OFFICIAL DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS

RELATING TO THE OUTBREAK OF

THE EUROPEAN WAR

■Th^^^

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

NBW YORK • BOSTON • CHICAGO • DALLAS
ATLANTA • SAN FRANCISCO

MACMILLAN & CO., Limited

LONDON • BOMBAY • CALCUTTA
MELBOURNE

THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltd.

TORONTO

OFFICIAL DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS

RELATING TO THE OUTBREAK OF

THE EUROPEAN WAR-

WITH PHOTOGRAPHIC REPRODUCTIONS OF OFFICIAL
EDITIONS OF THE DOCUMENTS (BLUE, WHITE,
YELLOW, ETC., BOOKS) PUBLISHED BY
THE GOVERNMENTS OF AUSTRIA-
HUNGARY, BELGIUM, FRANCE,
GERMANY, GREAT BRITAIN,
RUSSIA AND SERBIA

INTRODUCTION, DAILY SUMMARIES, CROSS-REFERENCES,
AND FOOTNOTES

EDMUND VON MACH, A.B., A.M., Ph.D. (harvard)

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
1916

>^-

Set up and electro typed. Published September, 1916.

J. S. Gushing Co. — Berwick «fe Smith Ca
Norwood, Mass., U.S.A.

INTRODUCTION

In constitutionally governed countries it is customary for the
Executive at important times to lay before the Representatives of
the people "collected documents" containing the information on
which the Government has shaped its foreign policy.

In Great Britain these documents are often printed on large sheets
of white paper, loosely bound, called "White Papers/' If the docu-
ments are very important, they are later reprinted in pamphlet form,
and are then called by the color of their cover, " Blue Books."

At the outbreak of the World War in 1914 several Governments
besides that of Great Britain issued pamphlets of collected -docu-
ments, and these have become known, by the color of their respective
bindings, as the German "White Book," the French "Yellow Book,"
the Russian "Orange Book," and so on.

Following the previous customs of their respective countries the
several Governments issued more or less exhaustive collections, and
in each case were primarily guided by the desire to justify themselves
before their own people.

In America the British Blue Book won the greatest favor, not
only because it became known first but also because of its inherent
worth. Its despatches are well written, and sufficiently numerous
to tell a consecutive story. The book is well printed, provided with
indexes and cross references, and represents the most scholarly work
done by any of the European Governments.

The German White Book, on the other hand, contains few de-
spatches, and these only as illustrations of points made in an exhaust-
ive argument. Such a presentation can be convincing only if one has
confidence in the honesty of the author. There can be no doubt that
as a source book for study the British Parliamentary Papers are
superior to the German Papers, but even the British Papers are not,
as many people have wished to believe, complete and do not, there-
fore, offer the final authority on which scholars can rely. This has
been conceded and actually emphasized by so staunch a friend of
the Allies as the late Charles Francis Adams. Writing in the Pro-
ceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, January, 1915,
Mr. Adams said : —

"We hear a great deal from those interested in original research of public
archives and access thereto, and of dates arbitrarily fixed by the various Foreign
Offices at which those archives have been, or are to be, laid open to the investi-
gator. It is, however, a bit confounding in this connection to learn, as we now

343133

Introduction

are learning, that, so far at least as the Foreign Office of Great Britain is concerned,
the papers there to be found are at times of somewhat secondary importance.
A knowledge of the true inwardness of any given situation of a certain sort must
be looked for elsew^here. More even than that, the papers on file in the Foreign
Office are not unseldom even illusory. The statement is unquestionably star-
tling ; and how, it will be asked, did such a condition of affairs come about ? The
explanation is curious — English I For at least two centuries now — indeed
ever since the British Foreign Office took its present form — a usage as to cor-
respondence has prevailed in connection with it which has now to be reckoned
with, a usage in no wise generally understood. As Parliament, far back in the
eighteenth century — during in fact the Walpole epoch — gradually assumed
the large state functions it has since developed, it became more and more a prac-
tice to call on those constituting the Ministry for papers relating to events
connected with foreign affairs, especially correspondence. The modern Blue
Book was thus gradually evolved. As the practice grew, its. inconveniences
made themselves felt. Both the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and those with
whom he was in correspondence wrote under an ever increasing sense of restraint.
As the British diplomatic service was constituted this, not unnaturally, resulted
in two forms of correspondence and sets of records — first the usual official
exchanges, including instructions and despatches subject to parliamentary call
through the Blue Book. Meanwhile, on the other hand, a private interchange
of letters, frequently familiar in tone as between old friends, or perhaps relatives,
would be going on between the representatives at certain of the foreign courts
and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. ... It was, moreover, in times of exigency
that recourse was naturally had to this form of communication. . . . The formal
despatches, constituting the great mass of the Foreign Office correspondence —
95 per cent of it, perhaps — were regularly filed in the official archives ; and there
they now are. The private communications, however, coming from the important
embassies and relating generally to more or less critical situations, were consid-
ered as belonging to the First Secretary for the time being. . . . Such were the
British usage and understanding. Such are they now."

This quotation establishes the presumption that also in the present
British Blue Book only a part of the Correspondence that was ex-
changed between the British Foreign Office and the British Ambas-
sadors and Ministers abroad has been published. For none of the
other books has completeness been claimed.

The question, therefore, arises whether the study of any one of
these books or of all of them together can enable the student to arrive
at the truth. The editor believes that this question should be
answered in the affirmative.

If six or more interested spectators describe one event, no two
descriptions may agree. By a judicious comparison of all, however,
an impartial observer may come very near to understanding the
truth. By noting, moreover, not only what each man says but
also what he refrains from saying, it is easy to understand the atti-
tude of each toward the event described, and thus to check his
credibility.

A successful study from this point of view necessitates an intimate
familiarity with the documents published by all the European Gov-
ernments, and to attain it the documents must be studied in their
relation to one another. This is, however, very difficult unless the
system of cross references contained in the British Blue Book is
extended to cover all the books. The Macmillan edition is the

Introduction vii

first to do this, and to enable the student to turn at once from one
book to another and to cheek the probable accuracy of a Russian
presentation, for instance, by comparing it with the British or Ger-
man version of the same incident.

The several versions are often so different that it becomes neces-
sary to adduce proof for the statement that they have reference to
the same event. Such proofs are given in the footnotes.

A great amount of additional information which the editor had
gathered in the course of his studies and which he thought might be
helpful to other students is also given in the footnotes. It is, of
course, not intended to be exhaustive.

There is one other point in which the Macmillan edition differs
from the official British publication of The Collected Diplomatic
Documents. The latter prints one book after another, complete,
beginning with the British Blue Book. This edition, on the other
hand, prints the despatches according to dates, and within the dates
according to the alphabetical order of the countries which sent or
received them. This enables the student to see at a glance the state
of the diplomatic activities in the various European capitals on any
one day. There are several reasons why this is desirable, but the
bare mention of one suffices.

The Serbian reply to Austria-Hungary was given on the evening
of July 25th. It did not become known in the European Chancel-
leries until the afternoon of July 26th, as is stated both in the French
Yellow Book and in the Russian Orange Book. Whether the delay
was due to Serbian negligence or to Austro-Hungarian interference
is not known. As a matter of fact, however, practically all the
messages of July 26th, in which the reply is discussed, were based
on hearsay and not on a knowledge of the wording of the reply. In
the British arrangement of the despatches this and similar facts
disappear. In the present arrangement they become immediately
apparent.

The English translations of the foreign books in the official British
version are excellent, and have been followed in this edition through-
out. Good translations cannot always be literal translations, and
while the editor believes that occasional errors have crept into the
Official English version there is no need of a general revision.
Serious students, moreover, will prefer to check the accuracy of
any given passage of importance themselves by consulting the
original. Nor will they be satisfied with reprints in which the
possibility of errors cannot be avoided. For this reason photo-
graphic reproductions of official copies of the books have been added
as an appendix to this edition.^

This appendix has relieved the editor of a double responsibility,
first of vouching for the accuracy of the translation, and secondly of
discussing every inaccuracy he discovered however slight it might
have been. He has, therefore, drawn attention to mistranslations

1 The Editor was unable to obtain an ojBficial Serbian Blue Book, and has substituted
an excellent French edition.

viii Introdiiction

only when they appeared to him to have a possible bearing on dis-
puted points. One instance will illustrate his meaning. In No. 39
of the Austro-Hungarian Red Book Count Berchtold instructs the
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London to explain to Sir Edward
Grey in detail the dossier "which has been sent to you by mail''
{^' das Ihnen auf dem Postwege vhermittelte Dossier ''). This is ren-
dered in the official English version "which is being sent to you by
mail." Since the question has arisen whether Sir Edward Grey
received the dossier before Great Britain declared war on Germany,
the change of the past tense in this despatch to the present tense may
be important.

There are many more points in which this edition differs from
others. To students they will be self-explanatory, because they are
the result, in every case, of the editor's wish to prepare a serviceable
source book, not for partisans but for scholars and intelligent readers.
The editor has been content with doing the hard and slow work of
collating the despatches and bringing order out of chaos. He has
tried to dispel the confusion due to redundance and at times perhaps
to wilful misrepresentation. He has cracked the nut, as it were,
that the kernel of truth might lie revealed.

What this truth is, or what it seems to him to be, he may discuss
at some future time. All he wished to do in this book was to make
the initial studies for others less arduous and thus to stimulate them
to search for the truth themselves. His greatest reward, therefore,
will be, if scholars agree that he has succeeded in keeping prejudice
out of the book, being fair to all, and preparing that most necessary
of all helps to a scholar, a reliable source book.

In many doubtful cases the Editor has fortunately had the in-
valuable advice of Professor C. A. Beard of Columbia University,
whose impartial fairness and keen scent for the truth are well
known among scholars and to whom he wishes to express his sincere
thanks.

EDMUND VON MACH.

Cambridge, Mass.
June, 1916.

LIST OF PRINCIPAL PERSONS MENTIONED IN THE
CORRESPONDENCE, SHOWING THEIR OFFICIAL
POSITIONS

1. GREAT BRITAIN.

Lord High Chancellor .
Secretary of State for

Affairs

Permanent Under-Secretary

State for Foreign Affairs
French Ambassador . .

Russian Ambassador . . . ,

German Ambassador . . .
Austro- Hungarian Ambassador
Belgian Minister ....
Serbian Minister . . . . ,

Viscount Haldane.

Sir Edward Grey.

Sir A. Nicolson.

M. Paul Cambon.

M. de Fleuriau (Charge d'Aff aires).

Count Benckendorff.

M. de Etter (Counsellor of Embassy).

Prince Lichnowsky.

Count Mensdorff.

Count de Lalaing.

M. Boschkovitch.

2. FRANCE.

President of the Republic . .
President of the Council . .
Ministers for Foreign Affairs

Political Director
British Ambassador .
Russian Ambassador

German Ambassador . . .
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador
Belgian Minister ....
Serbian Minister ....

M. Poincare.
M. Rene Viviani.

1. M. Jonnart.

2. M. Stephen Pichon.

3. M. Rene Viviani.

4. M. Bienvenu-Martin (Acting).

5. M. Doumergue.

6. M. Delcasse.
M. Berthelot.

Sir Francis Bertie.

M. Isvolsky.

M. Sevastopoulo (Charge d'Aff aires).

Baron von Schoen.

Count Szecsen.

Baron Guillaume.

M. Vesnitch.

3. RUSSIA.

Minister for Foreign Affairs
Minister for War . . .
British Ambassador . .
French Ambassador . .
German Ambassador . .
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador

Serbian Minister ....

M. Sazonof.

M. Suchomlinof.

Sir George Buchanan.

M. Paleologue.

Count Pourtales.

Count Szapary.

Count Czernin (Charge d'Aff aires).

Dr. M. Spalaikovitch.

List of Principal Persons

4. GERMANY.

Imperial Chancellor . .

Secretary of State . . .

Under-Secretary of State .

British Ambassador . .

French Ambassador ....

Russian Ambassador ....

American Ambassador . . .
Austro - Hungarian Ambassador

Belgian Minister

Serbian Charge d' Affaires . .
French Minister at Munich . .
French Consul-General at Frank-
fort

Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg.

Hen* von Jagow.

Herr von Zimmermann.

Sir Edward Goschen.

Sir Horace Rumbold (Counsellor of

Embassy).
M. Jules Cambon.

M. de Manneville (Charge d' Affaires).
M. Swerbeiev.

M. Broniewsky (Charge d' Affaires).
Mr. Gerard.
Count Szogyeny.
Baron Beyens.
Dr. M. Yovanovitch.
M. AUize.

M. Ronssin.

5. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs

Under-Secretaries of State for
Foreign Affairs ....

President of the Ministry of

Hungary . . .
British Ambassador
French Ambassador
Russian Ambassador .

American Ambassador
German Ambassador
Italian Ambassador
Belgian Minister . .
Serbian Minister . .
French Consul-General at Buda-
pest

Russian Consul-General at Fiume
Acting Russian Consul at Prague

Count Berchtold.

Baron Macchio.
Count Forgach.

Count Tisza.

Sir Maurice de Bunsen.

M. Dumaine.

M. Schebeko.

Prince Koudacheff (Charge d' Affaires).

Mr. Penfield.

Herr von Tschirscky.

Duke d'Avarna.

Count Errembault de Dudzeele.

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch.

M. d'Apchier-le-Maugin.
M. Salviati.
M. Kazansky.

6. TURKEY.

British Charge d' Affaires .
French Ambassador . .
Serbian Charge d' Affaires
Austrian Consul-General .

Mr. Beaumont.
M. Bompard.
M. M. Georgevitch.
Herr Jehlitschka.

7. BELGIUM.

Minister for Foreign Affairs . . M. Davignon.

Baron van der Elst (Secretary-General).

Colonial Minister H. Renkin.

British Minister Sir Francis Villiers.

French Minister M. Klobukowski.

American Minister Mr. Brand Whitlock.

German Minister Herr von Below Saleske.

Austro - Hungarian Minister . . Count Clary.

Dutch Minister M. de Weede.

List of Principal Persons . xi

8. SERBIA.

Prime Minister M. Pashitch.

Acting Prime Minister and Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs . Dr. Laza Patchou.

British Minister Mr. des Graz.

Mr. Crackanthorpe (First Secretary).

French Minister M. Boppe.

Russian Charge d' Affaires . . M. Strandtman.

German Secretary of Legation . Herr von Storck.

Austro -Hungarian Minister . . Baron Giesl von Gieslingen.

Belgian Minister M. de -Welle.

Austro - Hungarian Consular

Agent at Nish Herr Hoflehner.

9. ITALY.

Minister for Foreign Affairs
British Ambassador . .
French Ambassador . .
German Ambassador . .
Serbian Minister . . .

Marquis di San Giuliano.

Sir Rennell Rodd.

M. Barrere.

Herr von Flotow.

M. Ljub Michailovitch.

10. SPAIN.

Belgian Minister Baron Grenier.

11. DENMARK.

French Minister M. Bapst.

12. HOLLAND.

Minister for Foreign Affairs . . M. Loudon.

French Minister M. Pellet.

Belgian Minister Baron Fallon.

13. LUXEMBURG.

Minister of State and President

of the Government .... Dr. Eyschen.

French Minister ...... M. Mollard.

German Minister Herr von Buch.

14. NORWAY.

French Minister M. Chevalley.

15. SWEDEN.

French Minister M. Thiebaut.

16. SWITZERLAND.

French Consul-General at Basle M. Farges.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction v

List of principal persons mentioned in the correspondence,

SHOWING their OFFICIAL POSITIONS ix

Calendar of despatches sent and received xv

Part One. Despatches sent and received at the various
Foreign Offices ; arranged by names and places ; with
diaries, summaries of despatches, and footnotes ... 1

Part Two. The parts of the several official publications of

diplomatic documents not printed under Part One . . 525
I. The Austro-Hungarian Red Book : Introduction . 525
11. The French Yellow Book : Chapter I, Warnings

(1913) 531

III. The German White Book 551

IV. The British Blue Book : Introductory Narrative

OF Events . . . 561

Part Three. Documents frequently quoted but not contained
in the official publications of collected diplomatic docu-
MENTS 571

I. The Chancellor's speech, August 4:Th, 1914 . . 573
II. The "Brussels" documents ...... 577

III. The Allied Answer to the " Brussels " Documents 581
TV. Negotiations of Prince Lichnowsky with Sir

Edward Grey 586

V. Documents found in the possession of Mr. Grant-
Watson, Secretary of the British Legation . 588
VI. The telegrams and letters exchanged between the
Royal and Imperial courts of London, Berlin,

AND PeTROGRAD, AND BETWEEN KiNG GeORGE AND

President Poincare 590

Index 599

Appendix. The several official publications of collected

diplomatic documents in photographic reproduction . . 609

xiii

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CALENDAR

Despatches dated later than August 6, 1914

Foreign
Office of

Vienna

Paris 62 ,
Paris 61
Paris 63
London 64
London 65

August 9
August 8
August 10
August 11
August 12

Brussels 67
To Jap. Amb. 66
Tokio 69
Berlin 68

August 22
August 20
August 23
August 23

Brussels

The Hague 56
Paris and London
57,58
Paris 59
The Hague 60
Paris 61

The Hague 63, 64
To Entente 65, 66
The Hague 62
Whitlock 67
Brit. Min. 68

August 7
August 7

August 8
August 9
August 9
August 10
August 10
August 10
August 11*
August 11

French Min. 69
The Hague 71
The Hague 70
From Sazonof 72
The Hague 73
Paris 74
London 75
From colonies 76
From A.-H. Min. 77
The Hague 78
To all 79

August 11
August 12
August 12
August 12
August 13
August 16
August 17
August 26
August 28
August 29
August 29

Paris

Declaration 160

Sept. 4

Berlin

London

Sir E. Goschen 160

August 8

Sir M. de Bunsen
161

Sept. 1

Petrograd

Belgrade

Report from Serbian
Min. to Austria 52

August 16

PART ONE

DESPATCHES SENT AND RECEIVED AT THE VARIOUS
FOREIGN OFFICES; ARRANGED BY NAMES AND
PLACES; WITH DIARIES, SUMMARIES OF DE-
SPATCHES, AND FOOTNOTES

DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS CONCERNING

THE WAR

Sunday, June 28, 1914

On this day Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife, the Duchess of Hohen-
berg, were murdered in Serajevo.

SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

Foreign Office op

Austria-Hungary

Belgium

France

Sent Despatches to

Received
Despatches from

Vienna

Germany
Great Britain

Russia

Serbia

France :

From Vienna

French Yellow Book No. 7^

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, June 28, 1914.

News has just arrived at Vienna that the Hereditary Archduke
of Austria and his wife have been to-day assasinated at Serajevo
by a student belonging to Grahovo. Some moments before the
attack to which they fell a victim, they had escaped the explosion
of a bomb which wounded several officers of their suite.

The Emperor, who is now at Ischl, was immediately informed
by telegraph. . Dumaine.

Monday, June 29, 1914
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

Foreign Office of

Sent Despatches to

Received
Despatches from

Austria-Hungary

Belgium

France

Belgrade

Germany
Great Britain

Russia

Serbia

Vienna

1 For earlier numbers of French Yellow Book, see p. 531.
B 1

2 O^xial Diplomatic Documents

Austria-Himgary :

From Belgrade

Austro-Htjngarian Red Book No. 1
Ritter von Storck, Secretary of Legation, to Count Berchtold.

Belgrade, June 29, 1914-

Under the terrible shock of yesterday^s catastrophe it is diflB-
cult for me to give any satisfactory judgment on the bloody drama
of Serajevo with the necessary composure and judicial calm. I
must ask you, therefore, to allow me for the moment to limit myself
to putting on record certain facts.

Yesterday, the 15/28, the anniversary of the battle of the Amsel-
feld, was celebrated with greater ceremony than usual, and there were
celebrations in honour of the Servian patriot, Milos Obilic, who,
in 1389 with two companions treacherously stabbed the victorious
Murad.

Among all Servians, Obilic is regarded as the national hero. In
place of the Turks, however, we are now looked on as the hereditary
enemy, thanks to the propaganda which has been nourished under
the aegis of the Royal Government and the agitation which has for
many years been carried on in the press.

A repetition of the drama on the field of Kossovo seems, therefore,
to have hovered before the minds of the three young criminals of
Serajevo, Princip, Cabrinovic and the third person still unknown, who
also threw a bomb. They also shot down an innocent woman, and
may therefore think that they have surpassed their model.

For many years hatred against the Monarchy has been sown in
Servia. The crop has sprung up and the harvest is murder.

The news arrived at about 5 o'clock; the Servian Government
at about 10 o'clock caused the Obilic festivities to be officially stopped.
They continued, however, unofficially for a considerable time after it
was dark. The accounts of eye-witnesses say that people fell into
one another's arms in delight, and remarks were heard, such as:
" It serves them right, we have been expecting this for a long time,"
or "This is revenge for the annexation."

Serbia :

From Vienna

Serbian Blue Book No. 1

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime
Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, June 16/29, 1914.

The Vienna Press asserts that the magisterial enquiry has already
shown that the Serajevo outrage was prepared at Belgrade ; further^
that the whole conspiracy in its wider issues was organised at Bel-

Sent Despatches to

Received
Despatches from

^ Belgrade

Vienna, Berlin,
Constantinople

June 30 y Serbian Blue Book No. 2 3

grade among youths inspired with the Great Serbian idea, and that
the Belgrade Press is exciting pubHc opinion by pubHshing articles
about the intolerable conditions prevaiKng in Bosnia. Press articles
of this kind, according to the Vienna Press, are exercising a strong
influence, as Serbian newspapers are being smuggled in large quan-
tities into Bosnia.

Tuesday, June 30, 1814
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

Foreign Office of

Austria-Hungary

Belgium

France

Germany

Great Britain

Russia

Serbia

Austria-Hungary enquires what measures the Serbian Government had taken
"to follow up the clues to the crime which notoriously are partly to be found in
Serbia."

Serbia remarks on the attempt of Austria-Hungary to ''represent in the eyes
of Europe" the Serajevo murder as "the act of a conspiracy engineered in Serbia."
The murder " has not yet engaged the attention of the Serbian poHee."

Austria- Hungary :

From Belgrade

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 2

Ritter Von Storck, Secretary of Legation, to Count Berchtold.
(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, June 30, 1914.

To-day I sent an enquiry to Herre Gruic, General Secretary of
the Foreign Office, to ask the obvious question what measures the
Royal police had taken, or proposed to take, in order to follow up
the clues to the crime which notoriously are partly to be found in
Servia.

The answer was that the matter has not yet engaged the attention
of the Servian police.

Serbia :

From Vienna

Serbian Blue Book No. 2

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime
Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, June 17/30, 1914.

The tendency at Vienna to represent, in the eyes of Europe, the
outrage committed upon the Austro-Hungarian Crown Prince as

4 Official Diplomatic Documents

the act of a conspiracy engineered in Serbia is becoming more and
more apparent. The idea is to use this as a poUtical weapon against
us. The greatest attention ought, therefore, to be paid to the tone
adopted by our press in its articles on the Serajevo outrage.

Serbian Blue Book No. 5

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime
Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Vienna, June 17/30, 1914.

As Count Berchtold was not able to receive me when I called,
I spoke to the Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs concerning the Serajevo outrage. In the course of our
conversation I adopted the following line of argument : —

"The Royal Serbian Government condemn most energetically
the Serajevo outrage and on their part will certainly most loyally
do everything to prove that they will not tolerate within their terri-
tory the fostering of any agitation or illegal proceedings calculated
to disturb our already delicate relations with Austria-Hungary.
I am of opinion that the Government are prepared also to submit
to trial any persons implicated in the plot, in the event of its being
proved that there are any in Serbia. The Royal Serbian Govern-
ment, notwithstanding all the obstacles hitherto placed in their
way by Austro-Hungarian diplomacy (creation of an independent
Albania, opposition to Serbian access to the Adriatic, demand for
revision of the Treaty of Bucharest, the September ultimatum,
etc.) remained loyal in their desire to establish a sound basis for
our good neighbourly relations. You know that in this direction
something has been done and achieved. Serbia intends to con-
tinue to work for this object, convinced that it is practicable and
ought to be continued. The Serajevo outrage ought not to and
cannot stultify this work."

Baron Macchio has taken note of the above and promised to com-
municate to Count Berchtold all that I said to him.

On the same day I communicated to the French and Russian Am-
bassadors the substance of this conversation.

I have, etc.

From Berlin

Serbian Blue Book No. 3

Dr, M. Yovanovitch, Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch,
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, June 17/30, 191 4.

The Berlin Press, in publishing articles based on information from
Vienna and Budapest, in which the Serajevo outrage is connected
with Serbia, is misleading German public opinion.

June 30, Serbian Blue Book No. 6 5

Serbian Blue Book No. 4

Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch,
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, June 17/30, 1914.

The hostility of public opinion in Germany towards us is growing,
and is being fostered by false reports coming from Vienna and Buda-
pest. Such reports are being diligently spread in spite of the contra-
dictions issued by some newspapers and news agencies.

From Constantinople

Serbian Blue Book No. 6

M. M. Georgevitch, Charge d' Affaires at Constantinople, to M. N.
Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Constantinople, June 17/30, 1914-

I HAD to-day a long conversation with the Austro-Hungarian
Ambassador here concerning the Serajevo outrage. I expressed the
hope that this regrettable event — whatever is said about it in certain
diplomatic circles — would not unfavourably influence the relations
between Serbia and Austria-Hungary which lately had shown con-
siderable improvement.

He replied that such an eventuality was impossible, and ought not
to be contemplated. He was also of opinion that Serbo-Austro-
Hungarian relations had much improved lately. He added that
the work in that direction ought to be persevered in. He informed
me that from his latest conversations with Count Berchtold he
understood that the latter was satisfied with the attitude adopted
by the Serbian Government, and that he, on his part, sincerely
desired friendly relations with Serbia.

I have, etc.

Wednesday, July i, 19 14
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received

Despatches from

Austria-Hungary Uskub, Serbia

Belgium

France

Germany

Great Britain

Russia

Serbia All Legations abroad London, Vienna

Austria-Hungary is informed by her consul in Uskub, Serbia, of "the inhuman
joy with which the murder of Serajevo was received in Serbia."

EngUsh newspapers discuss the crime as emanating from Serbian revolu-
tionists.

6 Official Diplomatic Documents

Austria-Hungary :

From TJskuhy Serbia

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN JIeD BoOK No. 3

M. Jehlitschka, Consul-General, to Count Berchtold.

Uskuh, July 1, 1914-

On the 15/28 June the Feast of St. Vitus (Corpus Christi'Day),
which on this occasion coincided with the 525th anniversary of the
battle of the Amselfeld (1389), was for the first time officially cele-
brated as the " Festival of the Liberation " of the Servian nation.

For four months a special committee had worked at making this
celebration an especially solemn and magnificent demonstration of
Servian nationality.

The propaganda connected with this at the same time extended
to Croatia, Dalmatia and Bosnia, but especially to Hungary ; those
who took part in it received free passes on the Servian State railways ;
food and lodging at low prices, maintenance by public bodies, etc.,
were promised.

The agitation was carried on with energy, and was with a definite
end in view.

The visitors to the celebration at Prestina were brought in special
trains.

The various speeches ran riot in historical reminiscences, which
were connected with the scene of the celebration, and dealt under
different aspects with the well-known theme of the union of all Servia
and the "liberation of our brethren in bondage" beyond the Danube
and the Save, even as far as Bosnia and Dalmatia.

When, during the course of the evening, the news of the horrible
crime of which Serajevo had been the scene was circulated, the feeling
which animated the fanatical crowd was, to judge by the numerous
expressions of applause reported to me by authorities in w^hom I have
absolute confidence, one that I can only characterise as inhuman.

In view of this attitude of the population, which was also displayed
at Uskub, all attempts of the Servian press to divest Servia of the
moral responsibility for a deed which was received by a representa-
tive gathering with such unvarnished satisfaction, collapse miserably.

Serbia :

To All Serbian Legations Abroad

Serbian Blue Book No. 8

M. N. Pashitch, Prim.e Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs
to all the Royal Serbian Legations abroad.

Belgrade, June 18/ July 1, 1914-

The Austrian and Hungarian press are blaming Serbia more and
more for the Serajevo outrage. Their aim is transparent, viz., to

July 1, Serbian Blue Book No. 7 7

destroy that high moral reputation ^ which Serbia now enjoys in
Europe, and to take the fullest advantage politically against Serbia
of the act of a young and ill-balanced fanatic. But, in Serbia itself,
the Serajevo outrage has been most severely condemned in all circles
of society, inasmuch as all, official as well as unofficial, immediately
recognised that this outrage would be most prejudicial not only to
our good neighbourly relations with Austria-Hungary but also to our
co-nationalists in that country, as recent occurrences have proved.
At a moment when Serbia is doing everything in her power to im-
prove her relations with the neighbouring Monarchy, it is absurd
to think that Serbia could have directly or indirectly inspired acts
of this kind. On the contrary, it was of the greatest interest to
Serbia to prevent the perpetration of this outrage. Unfortunately
this did not lie within Serbians power, as both assassins are Austrian
subjects. Hitherto Serbia has been careful to suppress anarchic
elements, and after recent events she will redouble her vigilance, and
in the event of such elements existing within her borders will take
the severest measures against them. Moreover, Serbia will do every-
thing in her power and use all the means at her disposal in order
to restrain the feelings of ill-balanced people within her frontiers.
But Serbia can on no account permit the Vienna and Hungarian
press to mislead European public opinion, and lay the heavy respon-
sibility for a crime committed by an Austrian subject at the door
of the whole Serbian nation and on Serbia, who can only suffer harm
from such acts and can derive no benefit whatever.

Please act in the sense of the above views, and use all available
channels in order to put an end as soon as possible to the anti-Serbian
campaign in the European press.

From London

Serbian Blue Book No. 7

M. M. S. Boschkovitch, Minister in London, to M, N, Pashitch, Prime
Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) London, June 18/ July 1, 1914.

Basing their information upon reports coming from Austrian
sources, nearly all the English newspapers attribute the Serajevo
outrage to the work of Serbian revolutionaries.

1 For the reputation of Serbia see the Report on the Balkan Wars by an Inter-
national Commission appointed by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
and published by the Endowment, Washington, D. C, in the spring of 1914. The
murderers of the late king and queen have not yet been brought to justice.

8 Official Diplomatic Documents

From Vienna

Serbian Blue Book No. 9

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M, N. Pashitch,
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, June 18/ July 1, 1914.

There were demonstrations last night in front of the Legation.
I may say that the police showed considerable energy. Order and
peace were maintained. As soon as I obtain positive information
that the Serbian flag has been burned/ I will lodge a complaint in the
proper quarters. I will report to you the result. Hatred against
Serbians and Serbia is being spread among the people, especially
by the lower Catholic circles, the Vienna press, and military circles.
Please do what is possible to prevent demonstrations taking place
in Serbia, and to induce the Belgrade press to be as moderate as
possible in tone. The tendency towards us here is still the same.
It is expected that the decision as to the attitude to be adopted
towards Serbia and the Serbians will be taken after the funeral.

Thursday, July 2, 19 14
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

FoBEiON Office of Sent Despatches to Received

Despatches from

Austria-Hungary

Belgium

France Vienna

Germany

Great Britain

Russia

Serbia Paris

France is informed of great excitement in Vienna, and is quoted as counselling
composure in Serbia.

France :

From Vienna

French Yellow Book No. 8

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 2, 1914-

The crime of Serajevo arouses the most acute resentment in
Austrian military circles, and among all those who are not content
to allow Servia to maintain in the Balkans the position which she
has acquired.

1 See July 3, Serbian Blue Book No. 11.

July 3, Serbian Blue Book No. 11 9

The investigation into the origin of the crime which it is desired
to exact from the Government at Belgrade under conditions intoler-
able to their dignity would, in case of a refusal, furnish grounds of
complaint which would admit of resort to military measures.

DUMAINE.

Serbia :

From Paris

Serbian Blue Book No. 10

Dr. M. R. Vesnitch, Minister at Paris, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime
Minister and Minister for Foreign A fairs.

(Telegraphic.) Paris, June 19/ July 2, 1914-

The French Government advise ^ us to maintain an attitude of
the greatest possible calm and composure in official circles as well as
in pubUc opinion.

Friday, July 3, 1914
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received

Despatches from

Austria-Hungary

Belgium

France

Germany

Great Britain

Russia — —

Serbia Vienna

Austria-Hungary complains officially of the tenor of the Serbian press, while
Serbia complains of the Austro-Hungarian press and of a/'flag" incident in
Vienna which is not clearly described in the despatch.

Serbia :

From Vienna

Serbian Blue Book No. U

M. Yov. M. Yovanomtch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch,
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Vienna, June 20/ July 3, 1914.

Yesterday being the day on which the remains of the Archduke
Francis Ferdinand and his wife were brought from Serajevoto
Vienna, I gave instructions that the national flag at my residence
should be hoisted at half-mast as a sign of mourning.

1 Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 13, July 24.

10 Official Diplomatic Documents

Yesterday evening, on this account, protests were made by the
concierge, the other tenants, the landlord's agent, and the landlord
himself, who demanded the removal of the flag. Explanations proved
of no avail, and the assistance of the police authorities was requested.
The latter privately asked that the flag should be removed in order
to avoid further disorders. The flag was not removed, and accord-
ingly noisy demonstrations took place last night in front of the
Legation. The conduct of the police was energetic, and nothing
happened to the flag or to the building which might constitute an
insult. At 2 A.M. the crowd dispersed. To-day's papers, more
particularly the popular clerical papers, publish articles under the
heading "Provocation by the Serbian Minister," in which the
whole incident is falsely described.

The flag on the Legation building remained flying the whole time
up to the conclusion of the service at the Court Chapel. As soon
as this ceremony was concluded, the flag was removed. People
from all over the quarter in which I live went to the Prefecture, the
Municipality, and the State Council to demand the removal of our
flag.

The crowd was harangued by Dr. Funder, director in chief of the
Catholic Reichspost, Hermengild Wagner, and Leopold Mandl, all
of whom are known as the chief instigators of the attacks in the
Austrian and German press against Serbia and the Serbians.

I have, etc.

Serbian Blue Book No. 12

M. Yov. M. Yovanomtch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N, Pashitch,
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Vienna, June 20/ July 3, 1914.

In the course of a conversation which I had with the Under-
Secretary at the Foreign Office on the subject of the Serajevo outrage.
Baron Macchio severely criticised the Belgrade press and the tone
of its articles.^ He argued that the Belgrade press was under no
control and created die Hetzereien gegen die Monarchic. I told him
that the press in Serbia was absolutely free, and that as a result
private people as well as the Government very often suffered ; there
were, however, no means of proceeding against the press except by
going to law. I told him that in the present instance the fault lay
with the Austrian and Hungarian press which was controlled by the
Austro-Hungarian Government. Was it not true that during the past
two years the Austrian and Hungarian press had been attacking
Serbia, in such a manner as to offend her most sensitive feelings ? The
anniversary of the unfortunate war with Bulgaria had taken place a
few days ago. I had myself witnessed the great lack of respect with

1 For quotations from the Serbian Press see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19,
under date of July 25, 1914. See also French Yellow Book No. 14, under date of
July 20, 1914.

July 3y Serbian Blue Book No, 12 11

which the Vienna press had written about Serbia and the Serbian
army during and after the war, as well as in many other matters. The
press in Belgrade was much more moderate. For instance, in the
present case, a terrible crime had been committed and telegrams
were being sent from Vienna to the whole world accusing the entire
Serbian nation and Serbia of being accomplices of the detestable
Serajevo outrage. All the Austrian newspapers were writing in that
strain. Was it possible to remain indifferent? Even if the crimi-
nal was a Serbian, the whole Serbian nation and the Kingdom of
Serbia could not be held guilty, nor could they be accused in such a
manner.

Baron Macchio replied, "Nobody accuses the Kingdom of Serbia
nor its Government, nor the whole Serbian nation. We accuse those
who encourage the Great Serbian scheme and work for the realisation
of its object.'*

I told him that it appeared to me that from the first the nationality
of the criminal had been deliberately put forward in order to involve
Belgrade and to create the impression that the outrage had been
organised by Serbia. This had struck me immediately, as I knew
that up till now the Serbians of Bosnia had been spoken of as die
Bosniaken, hosnische Sprache, die Orthodoxen au^ Bosnien, while now
it was being said that the assassin was ein Serbe, but not that he was
a Bosnian nor that he was an Austrian subject. . . .

"I repeat," said Baron Macchio, "that we do not accuse the
Serbian Government and the Serbian nation but the various agi-
tators. ..."

I begged him to use his influence in order to induce the Vienna
press not to make matters more difficult by its accusations in this
critical moment, when Serbo-Austrian relations were being put to
a severe test.

I have, etc.

Saturday, July 4» iQiS
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received

Despatches from

Austria-Hungary Paris

Belgium

France Berlin

Germany

Great Britain

Russia

Serbia Paris, Petrograd

M. Poincare," President of France, expresses his sympathy with Austria-Hungary
and his belief that Serbia would show great willingness in the "judicial investiga-
tion and the prosecution of the accomplices" of the Serajevo criminals. In this
view he is seconded by Germany, who for this reason is quoted as expecting no fur-
ther complications.

12 Official Diplomatic Documents

Austria-Hxingary :

From Paris

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 4

Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 4, 1914.

To-day I communicated to M. Poincare the thanks of the Imperial
and Royal Government for their sympathy.

In referring to the hostile demonstrations against Servia among
us, he mentioned that after the murder of President Carnot, all Ital-
ians throughout France were exposed to the worst persecutions on the
part of the people.

I drew his attention to the fact that that crime had no connection
with any anti-French agitation in Italy, while in the present case it
must be admitted that for years past there has been an agitation in
Servia against the Monarchy fomented by every means, legitimate
and illegitimate.

In conclusion, M. Poincare expressed his conviction that the Ser-
vian Government would meet us with the greatest willingness in the
judicial investigation and the prosecution of the accomplices. No
State could divest itself of this duty.

France :

From Berlin

French Yellow Book No. 9

M. de Mannemlle, French Charge d^ Affaires at Berlin, to M. Rene
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 4, 1914-

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs told me yes-
terday, and has to-day repeated to the Russian Ambassador, that
he hoped Servia would satisfy the demands which Austria might
have to make to her with regard to the investigation and the prose-
cution of the accomplices in the crime of Serajevo. He added that
he was confident that this would be the case because Servia, if she
acted in any other way, would have the opinion of the whole civilised
world against her.

The German Government do not then appear to share the anxiety
which is shown by a part of the German press as to possible tension
in the relations between the Governments of Vienna and Belgrade,
or at least they do not wish to seem to do so.

De Manneville.

Jvly 4y Serbian Blue Book No, I4 13

Serbia :

From Paris

Serbian Blue Book No. 13

Dr. M. R. Vesnitch, Minister at Paris, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime
Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Parisj June 21/ July 4, 1914-

I HAD a long conversation on Wednesday last on the subject of
the Serajevo outrage with M. Viviani, the new Minister for Foreign
Affairs, who was somewhat concerned ^ at what had occurred. I
made use of this opportunity to describe to him briefly the causes
which had led to the outrage, and which were to be found, in the
first place, in the irksome system of Government in force in the
annexed provinces, and especially in the attitude of the officials, as
well as in the whole policy of the Monarchy towards anything ortho-
dox. He understood the situation, but at the same time expressed the
hope that we should preserve an attitude of calm and dignity in order
to avoid giving cause for fresh accusations in Vienna.

After the first moment of excitement public opinion here has
quieted down to such an extent that the Minister-President himself
considered it advisable in the Palais de Bourbon to soften the ex-
pressions used in the statement which he had made earlier on the
subject in the Senate.

I have, etc.

From Petrograd

Serbian Blue Book No. 14

Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd, to M, Pashitch, Prime
Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) Petrograd, June 21 /July 4, 1914-

The Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that the outrages com-
mitted upon Serbs in Bosnia will increase the sympathy of Europe
for us. He is of opinion that the accusations made against us in
Vienna will not obtain credence. The chief thing is for pubHc opin-
ion in Serbia to remain calm.

Sunday, July 5, 1914

There are no published despatches. .

1 The British Premier, Mr. Asquith, in speaking of the murder of Serajevo in the
House of Commons, had said that it made him "shudder for the fate of humanity."
[London Times, July 1, 1914.]

14 Official Diplomatic Documents

Monday, July 6, 1914
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

Foreign Office of , Sent Despatches to Received

Despatches from

Austria-Hungary Nish

Belgium

France Petrograd

Germany -

Great Britain

Russia

Serbia Vienna

Austria-Hungary is once more informed of the "joy" which the news of the
Serajevo murder had created in Serbia.

Serbian officials acknowledge the unfortunate tone of the Serbian press, while
the Russian foreign minister, M. Sazonof, is troubled by the ** attacks of theAus-
trian press against Serbia."

Austria-Hungary :

From Nish, Serbia

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 5

Herr Hqflehner, Consular Agent, to Count Berchtold.

Nish, July 6, 1914.

The news of the terrible crime at Serajevo, which had been only
too successful, created here a sensation in the fullest sense of the word.
There was practically no sign of consternation or indignation; the
predominant mood was one of satisfaction and even joy, and this
was often quite open without any reserve, and even found expression
in a brutal way. This is especially the case with the so-called leading
circles — the intellectuals, such as professional politicians, those occu-
pied in education, officials, officers and the students. Commercial
circles adopted a rather more reserved attitude.

All explanations made by official Servian circles or individual higher
personalities purporting to give expression to indignation at the crime
and condemnation of it, must have the effect of the bitterest irony
on anyone who has had an opportunity, during the last few days,
of gaining an insight at first hand into the feelings of the educated
Servian people.

On the day of the crime the undersigned had gone to a coffee
garden at about 9 o'clock in the evening without any suspicion of
what had happened, and here received from an acquaintance his
first information as to the very definite rumour which was being
circulated. It was painful in the highest degree to see and hear
what a feeling of real delight seizeci the numerous visitors who were
present, with what obvious satisfaction the deed was discussed,
and what cries of joy, scorn and contempt burst out — even one wha

July 6, Serbian Blue Book No. 16 15

has long been accustomed to the expression of poHtical fanaticism
which obtains here, must feel the greatest depression at what he ob-
served.

France :

From Petrograd

French Yellow Book No. 10

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Rene
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburgh, July 6, 1914-

In the course of an interview which he had asked for with the
Austro-Hungarian Charge d'Affaires, M. Sazonof pointed out in
a friendly way the disquieting irritation which the attacks of the
Austrian press against Servia are in danger of producing in his
country.

Count Czernin having given him to understand that the Austro-
Hungarian Government would perhaps be compelled to search for
the instigators of the crime of Serajevo on Servian territory, M.
Sazonof interrupted him : "No country," he said, "has had to suffer
more than Russia from crimes prepared on foreign territory. Have
we ever claimed to employ in any country whatsoever the procedure
with which your papers threaten Servia? Do not embark on such
a course."

May this warning not be in vain.

Paleologue.

Serbia:

From Vienna

Serbian Blue Book No. 15

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch,
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, June 23/ July 6, 1914.

The excitement in military and Government circles against Serbia
is steadily growing owing to the tone of our press, which is diligently
exploited by the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Belgrade.

Serbian Blue Book No. 16

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch,
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Vienna, June 23 /July 6, 1914.

The principal lines and tendencies to be found in the articles of
the Vienna press on the subject of the Serajevo outrage are as fol-
lows : —

16 Official Diplomatic Documents

As long ago as Sunday afternoon, June 25/28 last, when the
Vienna newspapers issued extra editions regarding the outrage
upon the Crown Prince, the headlines announced that both the
perpetrators were Serbians; moreover, this was done in such a
manner as to leave the impression that they were Serbs from Serbia
proper. In the later reports, which described the outrage, there
was a marked tendency to connect it with Serbia. Two circumstances
were especially emphasised and were intended to indicate Belgrade
as the place of origin of the outrage, viz. : (1) the visit to Belgrade of
both of the perpetrators ; and (2) the origin of the bombs. As the
third and last link in this chain of evidence, the Vienna papers
began to publish the evidence given by the assassins at the trial.
It was characteristic to find that the Hungarian Korrespondenz-
bureau, and the Hungarian newspapers, especially the Az Eszt
were alone in a position to know all about this "evidence." This
evidence mainly tends to show : (1) that it has been estabUshed that
the perpetrators, while in Belgrade, associated with the comitadji
Mihaylo Ciganovitch; and (2) that the organiser and instigator of
the outrage was Major Pribitchevitch.

Another tendency became apparent at the same time, viz. : to
hold the "Narodna Odbrana"^ responsible for this outrage. Fur-
ther, on Friday last, the latest announcement which the Hungarian
Korrespondenzbureau made to the newspapers stated : —

"The enquiries made up to the present prove conclusively that
this outrage is the work of a conspiracy. Besides the two perpetra-
tors, a large number of persons have been arrested, mostly young
men, who are also, like the perpetrators, proved to have been em-
ployed by the Belgrade Narodna Odbrana in order to commit the
outrage, and who were supplied in Belgrade with bombs and re-
volvers."

On the same day, late at night, the Hungarian Korrespondenz-
bureau sent the following request to the newspapers : —

"We beg the Editor not to publish the report relating to the
Serajevo outrage, which appeared in our evening's bulletin."

At the same time the Vienna Korrespondenzbureau published the
following official statement : —

"We learn from authoritative quarters that the enquiries relating
to the outrage are being kept absolutely secret.^ All the details,
therefore, which have appeared in the public press should be accepted
with reserve."

Nevertheless, the Budapest newspapers continued to publish

1 The "Narodna Odbrana" is a political society of Serbia. For its aims and con-
stitution see below, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 under date of July 25, 1914.

* The Austro-Hungarian Government did not know where the threads uncovered
by the investigation would lead. Its wish to have them kept secret until it had de-
cided on its course corresponds to its action a few months earlier, which is thus de-
scribed in the American Review of Reviews, May, 1914, p. 545: "Then one day in
March a bomb was exploded in the office of the Greek Catholic Magyar bishop that
killed the vicar and two others. Evidence discovered later proved that the plot was
of Russian origin, the purpose being — as those implicated admitted — to create
trouble between Roumania and Austria-Hungary which in its turn would embarrass
the Triple Alliance. To prevent more serious complications, the Hungarian Govern-
ment decided not to probe too deeply in the affair."

July 7, Serbian Blue Book No, 17 17

alleged reports on the enquiry. In the last " report " of the Budapest
newspaper A Nap, which was reprinted in yesterday's Vienna papers,
the tendency to lay the responsibility for the outrage on the Narodna
Odbrana is still further emphasised. According to this report the
accused Gabrinovitch had stated that General Yankovitch is the
chief instigator of the outrage.

I have, etc.

Tuesday, July 7, 1914
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

Foreign Office of

Sent Despatches to

Received
Despatches from

Austria-Hungary

Belgium

France

Germany

Great Britain

Russia

Serbia

Vienna

Austria-Hungary is reported by the Serbian Minister in Vienna to be much
excited.

Serbia :

From Vienna

Serbian Blue Book No. 17

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch,
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Vienna, June 24/ July 7, W14-

In influential circles the excitement continues undiminished.
Though the Emperor has addressed a letter to the Prime Ministers
of Austria and Hungary respectively, and to the Minister of Finance,
Herr Bilinski, in which an appeal is made for calmness, it is impossible
to determine what attitude the Government will adopt towards us.
For them one thing is obvious ; whether it is proved or not that the
outrage has been inspired and prepared at Belgrade, they must sooner
or later solve the question of the so-called Great Serbian agitation
within the Habsburg Monarchy. In what manner they will do this
and what means they will employ to that end has not as yet been
decided ; this is being discussed especially in high Catholic and mili-
tary circles. The ultimate decision will be taken oiily after it has
been definitely ascertained what the enquiry at Serajevo has brought
to light. The decision will be in accordance with the findings of the
enquiry.

In this respect, Austria-Hungary has to choose one of the following
courses : either to regard the Serajevo outrage as a national mis-
fortune and a crime which ought to be dealt with in accordance with
the evidence obtained, in which case Serbia's cooperation in the work

18 , Official Diplomatic Documents

will be requested in order to prevent the perpetrators escaping
the extreme penalty; or, to treat the Serajevo outrage as a Pan-
Serbian, South-Slav and Pan-Slav conspiracy with every manifes-
tation of the hatred, hitherto repressed, against Slavdom. There
are many indications that influential circles are being urged to
adopt the latter course : it is therefore advisable to be ready for
defence. Should the former and wiser course be adopted, we should
do all we can to meet Austrian wishes in this respect.

I have, etc.

Wednesday, July 8, 1914
There are no published despatches.

Thursday, July 9, 19 14
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received

Despatches from

Austria-Hungary

Belgium

France

Germany

Great Britain

Russia

Serbia All Serbian Legations

Serbia :

To All Serbian Legations A broad

Serbian Blue Book No. 18

M, N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs ,
to all the Serbian Legations abroad.

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, June 26/ July 9, 1914.

The Crown Prince Alexander is receiving threatening letters from
Austria-Hungary nearly every day. Make use of this in course of
conversation with your colleagues and journalists.

Friday, July 10, 19 14
There are no published despatches.

July 11, French Yellow Book No, 11 19

Saturday, July ii, 1914
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received

Despatches fbom

Austria-Hungary

Belgium

France Budapest

Germany

Great Britain

Russia

Serbia

France is informed that the Austro-Hungarian Government and the press are
for peace, but that "the general public here (Budapest) believes in war and fears
it."

France :

From Budapest

French Yellow Book No. 11

M. d^Apchier le Maugin, French Consul-General at Budapest, to
M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

Budapest, July 11, 1914.

Questioned in the Chamber on the state of the Austro-Serbian
question M. Tisza explained that before everything else it was
necessary to wait for the result of the judicial inquiry, as to w^hich
he refused at the moment to make any disclosure whatsoever. And
the Chamber has given its full approval to this. He also showed
himself equally discreet as to the decisions taken at the meeting of
Ministers at Vienna, and did not give any indication whether the
project of a demarche at Belgrade, with which all the papers of both
hemispheres are full, would be followed up. The Chamber assented
without hesitation.

With regard to this demarche it seems that the word has been
given to minimise its significance ; the anger of the Hungarians has,
as it were, evaporated through the virulent articles of the press,
which is now unanimous in advising against this step, which might
be dangerous. The semi-official press especially would desire that
for the word "demarche,'' with its appearance of a threat, there should
be substituted the expression "pourparlers,'' which appears to them
more friendly and more courteous. Thus, officially, for the moment
all is for peace.

All is for peace, in the press. But the general public here believes
in war and fears it. Moreover, persons in whom I have every rea-
son to have confidence have assured me that they knew that every
day cannon and ammunition were being sent in large quantities

2Q- Official Diplomatic Documents

towards the frontier. Whether true or not this rumour has been
brought to me from various quarters with details which agree with
one another ; at least it indicates what are the thoughts with which
people are generally occupied. The Government, whether it is
sincerely desirous of peace, or whether it is preparing a coup, is now
doing all that it can to allay these anxieties. This is why the tone
of the Government newspapers has been lowered, first by one note,
then by two, so that it is at the present moment almost optimistic.
But they had themselves spread the alarm as it suited them (a plaisir).
Their optimism to order is in fact without an echo ; the nervousness
of the Bourse, a barometer which cannot be neglected, is a sure proof
of this; without exception stocks have fallen to an unaccountably
low level ; the Hungarian 4 per cents were quoted yesterday at
79.95, a rate which has never been quoted since they were first issued.

D'Apchier Le Maugin.

Sunday, July 12, 1914

There are no published despatches.

Monday, July 13, 1914
There are no published despatches.

Tuesday, July 14, 1914
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

FoBEiGN Office of

Sent Despatches to

•Received
Despatches from

Austria-Hungary

Belgium

France

Germany
Great Britain

Russia

Serbia

All Serbian Legations

Berlin, Vienna

The tone of the Serbian press and in turn that of the Aiistro-Hungarian press
continue threatening.

Serbia :

From Berlin

Serbian Blue Book No. 19

Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch,
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July I/I4, 1914.

The Secretary of State has told me that he could not understand
the provocative attitude of the Serbian press and the attacks made

July 14, Serbian Blue Book No, 20 21

by it against Austria-Hungary, who, as a Great Power, could not
tolerate such proceedings.

From Vienna

Serbian Blue Book No. 22

M. Yov. M. Yovanomtch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch,
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Vienna, July I/I4, 1914.

Once more public opinion has been excited against us by the
Literary Bureau of the Austro-Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
With the exception of the Zeit and the Arheiter Zeitung, all the
Austro-Hungarian newspapers have obtained from that Bureau the
material and tone of their articles on the subject of the Serajevo
outrage. You have yourself seen what kind of material and tone
this is.

I am reliably informed that official German circles here are espe-
cially ill-disposed towards us. These circles have had some influence
upon the writings of the Vienna press, especially upon those of the
Neue Freie Presse.

This latter paper is still anti-Serbian a Voutrance. The Neue
Freie Presse, which is widely read and has many friends in high
financial circles, and which — if so desired — writes in accordance
with instructions from the Vienna Press Bureau, briefly summarises
the matter as follows : " We have to settle matters with Serbia by
war ; it is evident that peaceable means are of no avail. And if it
must come to war sooner or later, then it is better to see the matter
through now."

The Bourse is very depressed. There has not been such a fall in
prices in Vi*enna for a long time. Some securities have fallen 45
kronen.

To All Serbian Legations

Serbian Blue Book No. 20

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to all the Serbian Legations abroad.

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July I/I4, 1914.

(1) The Austrian Korrespondenzbureau is showing a marked
tendency to excite public opinion in Europe. This Bureau interprets
neither correctly nor sincerely the tone adopted by the Belgrade press.
It selects the strongest expressions from such articles as contain replies
to insults, threats and false news designed to mislead public opinion,
and submits them to the Austro-Hungarian public.

(2) The Korrespondenzbureau quotes especially extracts from
articles from those Serbian newspapers which are not the organs of
any party or corporation.

22 Official Diplomatic Documents

(3) As far back as the annexation crisis, Austria-Hungary pro-
hibited the entry into the country of all Serbian political and other
newspapers, and thus our Press would not be in a position to excite
public opinion in Austria-Hungary and Europe if the Korrespondenz-
bureau did not lay stress on and spread broadcast the items of news
w^hich it gathers from various Serbian papers, in every instance
-exaggerating them. Six days ago the entry into Austria-Hungary
of the Odyek, the organ of the Independent Radical Party, w^as pro-
hibited ; thus all our papers are now prevented from entering Austria-
Hungary.

(4) With us the press is absolutely free. Newspapers can be
confiscated only for lese-majeste or for revolutionary propaganda;
in all other cases confiscation is illegal. There is no censorship of
newspapers.

In these circumstances, you should point out for their informa-
tion, where necessary, that we have no other constitutional or legal
means at our disposal for the control of our press. Nevertheless,
w^hen the articles in our papers are compared with those of Austria-
Hungary, it is evident that the Austro-Hungarian papers originate
the controversy, while ours merely reply.

Please also emphasize the fact that public opinion in Serbia is
relatively calm, and that there is no desire on our part to provoke
and insult Austria-Hungary. No one in Europe would know what
our newspapers were writing if the Korrespondenzbureau did not
publish these items of news with the intention of doing as much harm
as possible to Serbia.

Serbian Blue Book No. 21

M. N. Pashitchy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to all the Serbian Legations abroad.

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade , July 1/H, 1914-

During the past few days the Austro-Hungarian newspapers have
been spreading reports to the effect that there have been demon-
strations at Belgrade against the Austro-Hungarian Legation, that
some Hungarian journalists were killed ; that Austro-Hungarian
subjects in Belgrade were maltreated and are now panic-stricken;
that at the funeral of the late M. Hartwig Serbian students made
a demonstration against the Austro-Hungarian Minister, etc. All
these reports are absolutely untrue and imaginary. Complete calm
prevails in Belgrade and there were no demonstrations of any kind
this year, nor has there been any question of disorder. Not only
do the Austro-Hungarian Minister and his staff w^alk about the
town without being molested in any way, but no Austro-Hungarian
subject has been in any way insulted, either by word or deed, as
is reported by the Viennese papers ; still less was any attack made
upon the house of any Austro-Hungarian subject or were any of their
windows broken. Not a single Austro-Hungarian subject has had

July 15, French Yellow Book No. 12 23

the slightest cause for any complaint. All these false reports are
being purposely spread in order to arouse and excite Austro-Hungarian
public opinion against Serbia.

The whole of Belgrade and the entire diplomatic body were pres-
ent to-day at the funeral of the late M. Hartwig ; there was not the
slightest sign of resentment shown by anybody. During the whole
ceremony exemplary order was maintained; so much so that for-
eigners were impressed with the good behaviour of the crowd, which
was such as does not always prevail on similar occasions even in their
own countries.

Be good enough to communicate the above to the Government
to which you are accredited and to the press.

Wednesday, July 15, 1914
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received

Despatches from

Austria-Hungary

Belgium

France Vienna

Germany

Great Britain

Russia

Serbia Vienna

France is informed of some bellicose articles in German and Austro-Hungarian
papers.

The Austro-Hungarian intentions toward Serbia are quoted by the Serbian
Minister as shrouded in mystery.

France :

From Vienna

French Yellow Book No. 12

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 15, 1914-

Certain organs of the Vienna Press, discussing the military organi-
sation of France and of Russia, represent these two countries as
incapable of holding their own in European affairs ; this would ensure
to the Dual monarchy, supported by Germany, appreciable facilities
for subjecting Servia to any treatment which it might be pleased
to impose. The Militdrische Rundschau frankly admits it. "The
moment is still favourable to us. If we do not decide for war, that
war in which we shall have to engage at the latest in two or three
years will be begun in far less propitious circumstances. At this
moment the initiative rests with us : Russia is not ready, moral fac-

24 Official Diplomatic Documents

tors and right are on our side, as well as might. Since we shall have
to accept the contest some day/ let us provoke it at once. Our
prestige, our position as a Great Power, our honour, are in question ;
and yet more, for it would seem that our very existence is concerned
— to be or not to be — which is in truth the great matter to-day."

Surpassing itself, the Neue Freie Presse of to-day reproaches Count
Tisza for the moderation of his second speech, in which he said,
"Our relations with Servia require, however, to be made clear."
These words rouse its indignation. For it, tranquillity and security
can result only from a war to the knife against Pan-Servism, and it is
in the name of humanity that it demands the extermination of the
cursed Servian race. Dumaine.

Serbia :

From Vienna

Serbian Blue Book No. 23

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch,
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, . Vienna, July 2/15, 1914.

The most important question for us is, what, if any, are the inten-
tions of the Austro-Hungarian Government as regards the Serajevo
outrage. Until now I have been unable to find this out, and my
other colleagues are in a similar position. The word has now been
passed round here not to tell anybody anything.

The evening before last the Ministers of the Dual Monarchy held
a meeting. It has not been possible to learn anything about the
object and the result of this meeting. The communique issued on
the subject was brief and obscure. It appears that the consequences
of the Serajevo outrage were discussed at length, but that nothing
was decided. It is not clear whether the Chief of Staff and the Naval
Commander-in-Chief were present, as was rumoured. After this
meeting Count Berchtold travelled to Ischl to report to the Em-
peror, who, after the funeral of Franz Ferdinand, had returned there
to recover his health. In the Hungarian Parliament Count Tisza
has replied to the interpellations of the opposition concerning the
Serajevo incident; you are acquainted with his statements. His
speech was not clear, and I believe it was intentionally obscure.
Some people saw in it signs of an intention quietly to await the de-
velopment of events and of calmness in the attitude of the Austro-
Hungarian Government, while others saw in it hidden intentions for

^ The reasons underlying this statement are thus set forth in the American Review
of Reviews, July, 1914, p. 30: "It is believed that Russia is intending to provoke a
Near Eastern Crisis. Reports are also rife that a secret Naval Convention has been
concluded between England and Russia with the object of enforcing the demands of
the Triple Entente against Germany." And these demands of the Triple Entente, so
far as Russia is concerned, are set forth in the same copy of American Review of
Reviews in an interview with the Russian statesman, Professor Mitronov, as follows :
"As far as Russia is concerned extension into the Balkans is a political necessity and
nothing short of the possession of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles will end the in-
tolerable faituation."

July 15, Serbian Blue Book No. 25 25

(I should say) an action as yet undecided. It was noted that there
was no occasion for haste until the results of the magisterial enquiry
were announced. Some time has now elapsed ; the matter has been
spoken of, discussed, written about and distorted ; then came the
death of Hartwig and the alarm of Baron Giesl. In connection with
this again came the interpellations addressed to Count Tisza in the
Hungarian Parliament; you have read his reply. Many hold the
opinion here that this second speech is much more restrained than
the first, and that this is to be attributed to an order from the Em-
peror. (The Bourse has now recovered ; both the War Minister and
the Chief of Staff have gone on leave.) I am loath to express an
opinion. In the above-mentioned speech it is to be noted that the
possibility of war is not excluded, in the event of the demands of
Austria-Hungary in regard to the Serajevo outrage not being com-
plied with.

One thing is certain : Austria-Hungary will take diplomatic steps
at Belgrade as soon as the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo is com-
pleted and the matter submitted to the Court.

I have, etc.

Serbian Blue Book No. 24

M. Ym. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch,
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Sir, Vienna, July 2/15, 1914-

It is thought here that the magisterial enquiries and investigations
have not produced sufficient evidence to justify bringing an official
accusation against Serbia, but it is believed that the latter will be
accused of tolerating within her borders certain revolutionary ele-
ments. Diplomatic circles here criticise and condemn the mode of
procedure of the Austro-Hungarian Government, especially the atti-
tude throughout of the Korrespondenzbureau and the Vienna press.
There are many who consider our attitude to be correct and in
accordance with the dignity of a nation. They find fault only with
the views expressed in some of our newspapers, though they all
admit that it is provoked by the Vienna press.

In spite of the fact that it appears that the German Foreign Office
does not approve of the anti-Serbian policy of Vienna, the German
Embassy here is at this very moment encouraging such a policy.

I have, etc.

Serbian Blue Book No. 25

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch,
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, . Vienna, July 2/15, 1914.

What steps will be taken ? In what form ? What demands will
Austria-Hungary make of Serbia ? I do not believe that to-day even

26 Official Diplomatic Documents

the Ballplatz ^ itself could answer these questions clearly and pre-
cisely. I am of opinion that its plans are now being laid, and that
again Count Forgach is the moving spirit.

In an earlier report I mentioned that Austria-Hungary has to
choose between two courses : either to make the Serajevo outrage
a domestic question, inviting us to assist her to discover and punish
the culprits ; or to make it a case against the Serbians and Serbia,
and even against the Jugo-Slavs. After taking into consideration
all that is being prepared and done, it appears to me that Austria-
Hungary will choose the latter course. Austria-Hungary will do this
in the belief that she will have the approval of Europe. Why should
she not profit by humiliating us, and, to a certain extent, justify the
Friedjung and Agram trials? Besides, Austria-Hungary desires in
this manner to justify in the eyes of her own people and of Europe
the sharp and reactionary measures which she contemplates under-
taking internally in order to suppress the Great Serbian propaganda
and the Jugo-Slav idea. Finally, for the sake of her prestige,^ Austria-
Hungary must take some action in the belief that she will thus raise
her prestige internally as well as externally. . . .^

Austria-Hungary will, I think, draw up in the form of a memoran-
dum an accusation against Serbia. In that accusation will be set
forth all the evidence that has been collected against us since April,
1909, until to-day ; and I believe that this accusation will be fairly
lengthy. Austria-Hungary will communicate this accusation to the
Cabinets of the European Powers with the remark that the facts con-
tained therein give her the right to take diplomatic steps at Belgrade,
and to demand that Serbia should in the future fulfill all the obliga-
tions of a loyal neighbour. At the same time Austria-Hungary will
also hand us a note containing her demands, which we shall be re-
quested to accept unconditionally.'^

I have, etc.

Thursday, July i6, 1914
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

Foreign Office of Sknt Despatches to Received

Despatches from

Austria-Hungary

Belgium

France

Germany

Great Britain

Russia

Serbia Berlin

1 The Austrian Foreign OflBce is situated on the Ballplatz.

' Cf. British Blue Book No. 38, despatch from Rome, under date of July 23,
1914.

' The omissions indicated by the dots are those of the official British translation.
* This was the exact course taken by Austria a few days later.

July 17, Serbian Blue Book No. 27 27

Serbia :

From Berlin

Serbian Blue Book No. 26

Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch,
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 3/16, 1914.

The Secretary of State has informed me that the reports of the
German Minister at Belgrade point to the existence of a Great Ser-
bian propaganda, which should be energetically suppressed by the
Government in the interest of good relations with Austria-Hungary.

Friday, July 17, 1914
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received

Despatches from

Austria-Hungary

Belgium • •

France

Germany

Great Britain

Russia ■ •

Serbia London, Rome

Italy is said to have warned Austria-Hungary, and the EngHsh Press is reported
in Serbia as being unfavorably influenced by cuttings from the Serbian Press sup-
plied to it by Austria-Hungary.

Serbia :

From London

Serbian Blue Book No. 27

M. M. S. Boschkovitch, Minister at London, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime
Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) London, July 4/17, 1914.

The Austrian Embassy is making very great efforts to win over
the English press against us, and to induce it to favour the idea that
Austria must give a good lesson to Serbia. The Embassy is sub-
mitting to the news editors cuttings from our newspapers as a proof
of the views expressed in our press. The situation may become
more acute during the next few weeks. No reliance should be placed
in the ostensibly peaceable statements of Austro-Hungarian official
circles, as the way is being prepared for diplomatic pressure upon
Serbia, which may develop into an armed attack. It is probable that
as soon as Austria-Hungary has taken action at Belgrade she will
change her attitude and will seek to humiliate Serbia.

28 Official Diplomatic Documents

From Rome
Serbian Blue Book No. 28

M, Ljub Michailovitchy Minister at Rome, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime
Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Telegraphic.) Rome, July 4/17, 191 4.

I ILWE obtained reliable information to the effect that the Marquis
di San Giuliano has stated to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador that
any step undertaken by Austria against Serbia which failed to take
into account international considerations would meet with the dis-
approval of public opinion in Italy, and that the Italian Government
desire to see the complete independence of Serbia maintained.

Saturday, July 18, 1914
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

Foreign Office of

Sent Despatches to

Received
Despatches from

Austria-Hungary

Belgium

France

Germany
Great Britain

Russia

Serbia

Petrograd

Serbia :

From Petrograd
Serbian Blue Book No. 29

Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd, to M. Pashitch, Prime
Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs

(Telegraphic.) Petrograd, July 5/18, 1914.

I HAVE spoken to the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs on the
subject of the provocative attitude of the Korrespondenzbureau and
the Vienna press.

M. Sazonof told me a few days ago that he wondered why the
Austrian Government were doing nothing to put a stop to the futile
agitation on the part of the press in Vienna which, after all, frightened
nobody, and was only doing harm to Austria herself.

July 19, French Yellow Book No. I4 29

Sunday, July 19, 1914
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received

Despatches fbom

Austria-Hungary

Belgium

France Vienna

Germany

Great Britain

Russia

Serbia All representatives

France is placed in possession, through secret sources, of the terms of the forth-
coming Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia, and learns the reason why it will con-
tain a time limit.

Serbia endeavors to justify herself at the various foreign offices of Europe.

France :

From Vienna

French Yeulow Book No. 13

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs

Vienna, July 19, 191 4.

The Chancellor of the Consulate, who has sent me his half-yearly
report, in which he sums up the various economic facts which have
been the subject of his study since the beginning of the year, has
added a section containing political information emanating from a
trustworthy source.

I asked him briefly to sima up the information which he has ob-
tained regarding the impending presentation of the Austrian note
to Servia, which the papers have for some days been persistently
announcing.

You will find the text of this memorandum interesting on account
of the accurate information which it contains.

Dumaine.

French Yellow Book No. 14

Memorandum

{Extract from a Consular Report on the Economic and Political Situa-
tion in Austria)

Vienna, July 20, 1914}

From information furnished by a person specially well informed
as to official news, it appears that the French Government would be

1 This memorandum is dated July 20, 1^14. Since it is enclosed in a letter of
July 19, 1914, it cannot possibly be later than the letter. From the letter itself it would

30 Official Diplomatic Documents

wrong to have confidence in disseminators of optimism; much will
be demanded of Servia ; she will be required to dissolve several
propagandist societies, she will be summoned to repress nationalism,
to guard the frontier in cooperation with Austrian officials, to keep
strict control over anti- Austrian tendencies in the schools ; and it is
a very difficult matter for a Government to consent to become in
this way a policeman for a foreign Government. They foresee the
subterfuges by which Servia will doubtless wish to avoid giving a
clear and direct reply ; that is why a short interval will perhaps ^ be
fixed for her to declare whether she accepts or not. The tenor of
the note and its imperious tone almost certainly ensure that Bel-
grade will refuse. Then military operations will begin.

There is here, and equally at Berlin, a party which accepts the
idea of a conflict of widespread dimensions, in other words, a con-
flagration. The leading idea is probably that it would be necessary
to start before Russia has completed the great improvements of her
army and railways, and before France has brought her military
organisation to perfection. But on this point there is no unanimity
in high circles ; Count Berchtold and the diplomatists desire at the
most localised operations against Servia. But everything must be
regarded as possible. A singular fact is pointed out : generally the
official telegraph agency, in its summaries and reviews of the foreign
press, pays attention only to semi-official newspapers and to the
most important organs ; it omits all quotation from and all mention
of the others. This is a rule and a tradition. Now, for the last ten
days, the official agency has furnished daily to the Austro-Hungarian
press a complete review of the whole Servian press, giving a promi-
nent place to the least known, the smallest, and most insignificant
papers, which, just on account of their obscurity, employ language
freer, bolder, more aggressive, and often insulting. This work of
the official agency has obviously for its aim the excitement of public
feeling and the creation of opinion favourable to war. The fact is
significant.

seem that the report would have to be dated not later than on the date previous to its
submission to the ambassador, and that is July 18, 1914,

Whether the student accepts this date, or July 19, 1914, the noteworthy fact is
established that France had accurate information — and the ambassador knew it
to be so (cf . last line of his letter) — of the intended action of Austria-Hungary, and
knew that there would be a time limit attached to Austria's demands.

1 The word "perhaps" does not occur in the Times edition of the French Yellow
Book, but has been added to the text in the Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating
to the Outbreak of the European War printed under the authority of His Majesty's
Stationery Office. There is no explanation in the Official British Version why the
word "perhaps" has been added. The text of the French Yellow Book supplied
to the editor by the French Embassy in Washington in October, 1915, contains the
word "peut-^tre."

July 19, Serbian Blue Book No. 30 31

Serbia :

To All Serbian Missions Abroad

Serbian Blue Book No. 30

M. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all
Serbian Missions abroad

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 6/19, 1914.

Immediately after the Serajevo outrage the Austro-Hungarian
press began to accuse Serbia of that detestable crime, which, in the
opinion of that press, was the direct result of the Great Serbian idea.
The Austrian press further contended that that idea was spread and
propagated by various associations, such as the "Narodna Odbrana,"
''Kolo Srpskich Sestara," etc., which were tolerated by the Serbian
Government.

On learning of the murder, the Serbian Royal Family, as well as
the Serbian Government, sent messages of condolence,^ and at the
same time expressed severe condemnation of and horror at the crime
that had been committed. All festivities which had been fixed to
take place on that day in Belgrade were immediately cancelled.

Nevertheless, the press of the neighbouring Monarchy continued
to hold Serbia responsible for the Serajevo outrage. Moreover, the
Austro-Hungarian press began to spread in connection with it various
false reports, designed to mislead public opinion, which provoked the
Belgrade press to reply in self-defence, and sometimes to active hos-
tility in a spirit of embitterment aroused by the misrepresentation
of what had occurred. Seeing that the Austro-Hungarian press was
intentionally luring the Belgrade press into an awkward and delicate
controversy, the Serbian Government hastened to warn the press in
Belgrade, and to recommend it to remain calm and to confine itself
to simple denials and to the suppression of false and misleading re-
ports. The action of the Serbian Government was ineffectual in the
case of some of the less important papers, more especially in view
of the fact that newly invented stories were daily spread abroad
with the object of serving political ends not only against Serbia but
also against the Serbs in Austria-Hungary. The Serbian Govern-
ment were unable to avert these polemics between the Serbian and
the Austrian press, seeing that Serbian law, and the provisions of the
constitution itself, guarantee the complete independence of the press
and prohibit all measures of control and the seizure of newspapers.
These polemics were further aggravated by the fact that the Vienna
and Budapesth journals selected passages from such of the Serbian
newspapers as have practically no influence upon public opinion,
strengthened still further their tone, and, having thus manipulated
them, passed them on to the foreign press with the obvious intention
of exciting public opinion in other European countries and of repre-
senting Serbia as being guilty.

Those who have followed the course of these polemics will know

^ These messages are not given in the published documents. Cf . also British Blue
Book No. 121, July 24 and note 1.

32 Official Diplomatic Documents

that the Belgrade newspapers merely acted in self-defence, confining
their activities to denials and to the refutation of falsehoods designed
to mislead public opinion, at the same time attempting to convince
foreign Governments (which, being occupied with other and more
serious affairs, had no time to go into the matter themselves) of the
intention of the Austro-Hungarian press to excite public opinion in
its own country and abroad.

The Serbian Government at once expressed their readiness to hand
over to justice any of their subjects who might be proved to have
played a part in the Serajevo outrage. The Serbian Government
further stated that they had prepared a more drastic law against the
misuse of explosives. The draft of a new law in that sense had already
been laid before the State Council, but could not be submitted to the
Skupshtina, as the latter was not sitting at the time. Finally, the
Serbian Government stated that they were ready, as heretofore, to
observe all those good neighbourly obligations to which Serbia was
bound by her position as a European State.

During the whole of this period, from the date of the perpetration
of the outrage until to-day, not once did the Austro-Hungarian Gov-
ernment apply to the Serbian Government for their assistance in the
matter.^ They did not demand that any of the accomplices should
be subjected to an enquiry, or that they should be handed over to
trial. In one instance only did the Austrian Government ask for
information as to the whereabouts of certain students who had been
expelled from the Pakratz Teachers' Seminary, and had crossed over
to Serbia to continue their studies. All available information on this
point was supplied.

The campaign against Serbia, however, was unremittingly pursued
in the Austrian press, and public opinion was excited against her in
Austria as well as in the rest of Europe. Matters went so far that
the more prominent leaders of political parties in Austria-Hungary
began to ask questions in Parliament on the subject of the outrage,
to which the Hungarian Prime Minister replied. It is evident from
the discussions in this connection that Austria is contemplating some
action, but it is not clear in what sense. It is not stated whether the
measures which are to be taken — more especially military measures
— will depend upon the reply and the conciliatory attitude of the
Serbian Government. But an armed conflict is being hinted at in
the event of the Serbian Government being unable to give a cate-
gorically satisfactory reply.

On the sudden death of the Russian Minister, M. de Hartwig, at
the residence of the Austrian Minister, the polemics in the news-
papers became still more acute ; nevertheless this sad event did not
lead to any disorders even during the funeral of M. Hartwig. On
the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian Legation was so perturbed by
certain false reports that Austrian subjects began to conceal them-
selves, some of them taking refuge in the Semlin and Belgrade hotels,

1 This statement seems to be at variance with Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 2,
under date of June 30, 1914.

July 19, Serbian Blue Book No, 30 33

and others in the Legation itself. At 5 p.m. on the day of the King's
birthday, which passed in the most orderly manner, I was informed
by the Austrian Minister, through the Viee-Consul, M. Pomgraz,
that preparations were being made for an attack that night on the
Austrian Legation and on Austro-Hungarian* subjects in Belgrade.
He begged me to take the necessary steps for the protection of Austro-
Hungarian subjects and of the Legation, stating at the same time
that he held Serbia responsible for all that might occur. I replied
that the responsible Serbian Government were not aware of any
preparations of this kind being made, but that I would in any case
at once inform the Minister of the Interior, and beg him at the same
time to take such measures as might be necessary. The next day
showed that the Austrian Legation had been misled by false rumours,
for neither any attack nor any preparations for attack were made.
Notwithstanding this, the Austro-Hungarian press took advantage
of this incident to prove how excited public opinion was in Serbia
and to what lengths she was ready to go. It went even further and
tried to allege that something really had been intended to happen,
since M. Pashitch himself had stated that he had heard of such
rumours. All this indicates clearly the intention to excite public
opinion against Serbia w^henever occasion arises.

When all that has been said in the Hungarian Parliament is taken
into consideration, there is reason for apprehension that some step
is being prepared against us which may produce a disagreeable effect
upon the relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary. There is
still further ground for such apprehension, as it is abundantly evi-
dent that the enquiry which is being made is not to be limited to the
perpetrators and their possible accomplices in the crime, but is most
probably to be extended to Serbia and the Great Serbian idea.

By their attitude and the measures they have taken, the Serbian
Government have irrefutably proved that they are working to restrain
excitable elements, and in the interests of peace and the maintenance
of good relations with all their neighbours. The Government have
given their particular attention to the improvement and strengthen-
ing of their relations with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which
had lately become strained as a result of the Balkan wars and of the
questions which arose therefrom. With that object in view, the Ser-
bian Government proceeded to settle the question of the Oriental
Railway, the new railway connections, and the transit through Serbia
of Austro-Hungarian goods for Constantinople, Sofia, Salonica, and
Athens.

The Serbian Government consider that their vital interests require
that peace and tranquillity in the Balkans should be firmly and last-
ingly established. And for this very reason they fear lest the excited
state of public opinion in Austria-Hungary may induce the Austro-
Hungarian Government to make a demarche which may humiliate
the dignity of Serbia as a State, and to put forward demands which
€ould not be accepted.

I have the honour therefore to request you to impress upon the

34 Official Diplomatic Documents

Government to which you are accredited our desire to maintain
friendly relations with Austria-Hungary, and to suppress every at-
tempt directed against the peace and public safety of the neighbour-
ing Monarchy. We will likewise meet the wishes of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire in the event of our being requested to subject to
trial in our independent Courts any accomplices in the outrage who
are in Serbia — should such, of course, exist.

But we can never comply with demands which may be directed
against the dignity of Serbia, and which would be inacceptable to any
country which respects and maintains its independence.

Actuated by the desire that good neighbourly relations may be
firmly established and maintained, we beg the friendly Governments
to take note of these declarations and to act in a conciliatory sense
should occasion or necessity arise.

Monday, July 20, 1 914
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS

FoBEiQN Office op Sent Despatches to Received

Despatches from

Austria-Hungary

Belgium

France

Germany

Great Britain Berlin

Russia

Serbia Vienna

Great Britain enters the diplomatic exchange of views on this day, according to
the British Blue Book. From the Introductory Narrative to the British Blue
Book, Edition of September 28, it appears that Sir Edward Grey had kept in
touch from the first with the events arising out of the Serajevo murder. (For
the Introductory Narrative see pp. 561 to 570.)

Great Britain :

Sent to Berlin

British Blue Book No. 1

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, British Charge d' Affaires at
Berlin

Sir, Foreign Office, July 20, 1914.

I ASKED the German Ambassador to-day if he had any news of
what was going on in Vienna with regard to Servia.

He said that he had not, but Austria was certainly going to take
some step, and he regarded the situation as very uncomfortable.

I said that I had not heard anything recently,^ except that Count

1 This seems to be at variance with Chapter Two of Sir Edward Grey's Introductory
Narrative to the British Blue Book Edition, of Sept. 28, 1914. See p. 562. Consider-
ing, moreover, the close relations existing between the French and the British Foreign
Offices it seems likely that Sir Edward Grey may have had cognisance of the information
contained in the Yellow Book, Nos. 13 and 14, under date of July 19, and of the infor-
mation contained in the despatches published by other Foreign Offices under dates of

July 20y Serbian Blue Book No. 31 35

Berchtold/ in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had
deprecated the suggestion that the situation was grave, but had said
that it should be cleared up.

The German Ambassador said that it would be a very desirable
thing if Russia could act as a mediator with regard to Servia.

I said that I assumed that the Austrian Government would not
do anything until they had first disclosed to the public their case
against Servia, founded presumably upon what they had discovered
at the trial.

The Ambassador said that he certainly assumed that they would
act upon some case that would be known.

I said that this would make it easier for others, such as Russia,
to counsel moderation in Belgrade. In fact, the more Austria could
keep her demand within reasonable limits, and the stronger the justi-
fication she could produce for making any demand, the more chance
there would be of smoothing things over. I hated the idea of a war
between any of the Great Powers, and that any of them should be
dragged into a war by Servia would be detestable.

The Ambassador agreed wholeheartedly in this sentiment.

I am, etc.

E. Grey.

Serbia :

From Vienna

Serbian Blue Book No. 31

M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitchy
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs

Sir, Vienna, July 7/20, 1914.

It is very difficult, indeed almost impossible, to ascertain here any-
thing positive as to the real intentions of Austria-Hungary. The
word has been passed round to maintain absolute secrecy about
everything that is being done. Judging by the articles in our news-
papers, Belgrade is taking an optimistic view of the questions pend-
ing with Austria-Hungary. There is, however, no room for optimism.
There is no doubt that Austria-Hungary is making preparations of a
serious character. What is chiefly to be feared, and is highly prob-
able, is, that Austria is preparing for war against Serbia. The general
conviction that prevails here is that it would be nothing short of
suicide for Austria-Hungary once more to fail to take advantage of
the opportunity to act against Serbia. It is believed that the two
opportunities previously missed — the annexation of Bosnia ^ and
the Balkan war ^ — have been extremely injurious to Austria-Hun-
gary. In addition, the conviction is steadily growing that Serbia,
after her two wars, is completely exhausted, and that a war against

June 28, to July 19, 1914. Whether Serbian Blue Book No. 30, July 19, had been deliv-
ered to Sir E. Grey when he wrote the above despatch is not sure.

1 Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

2 1908. 3 1913.

36 Official Diplomatic Documents

Serbia would in fact merely mean a military expedition to be con-
cluded by a speedy occupation. It is also believed that such a war
could be brought to an end before Europe could intervene.

The seriousness of Austrian intentions is further emphasised by
the military preparations which are being made, especially in the
vicinity of the Serbian frontier.

I have, etc.

Tuesday, July 21, 1814
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received

Despatches from

Austria-Hungary Belgrade

Belgium

France London, etc : Berlin

Germany

Great Britain

Russia ,

Serbia

Serbia declares her readiness in Berlin to accept the forthcoming Austro-
Hungarian demands, provided that Austria-Hungary asks ''only for judicial
cooperation."

G'erman?/ declares that she is in complete ignorance of the ** contents'* of the
forthcoming note.

Austria-Hungary receives another report of the hostile attitude of the Serbian
people, who are represented as rejoicing over the Serajevo murder.

Austria :

From Belgrade

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 6

Freiherr von Giesl to Count Berchtold

Belgrade, July 21, 1914.

After the lamentable crime of June 28th, I have now been back
at my post for some time, and I am able to give some judgment as
to the tone which prevails here.

After the annexation crisis ^ the relations between the Monarchy
and Servia were poisoned on the Servian side by national chauvinism,
animosity and an effective propaganda of Great-Servian aspirations
carried on in that part of our territory where there is a Servian popu-
lation; since the last two Balkan Wars, the success of Servia has
increased this chauvinism to a paroxysm, the expression of which in
some cases bears the mark of insanity.

I may be excused from bringing proof and evidence of this ; they
can be had easily everywhere among all parties, in political circles
as well as among the lower classes. I put it forward as a well-known
axiom that the policy of Servia is built up on the separation of the
territories inhabited by Southern Slavs, and as a corollary to this on

1 The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in 1908.

July 21 y Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 6 37

the abolition of the Monarchy as a Great Power; this is its only'
object.

No one who has taken the trouble to move and take part in political
circles here for a week can be blind to this truth.

The hatred against the Monarchy has been further intensified as
a result of the latest events which influence political opinion here;
among them I count the crime of Serajevo, the death of Hartwig
and the electoral campaign.

The crime at Serajevo has aroused among the Servians an expec-
tation that in the immediate future the'Hapsburg States will fall to
pieces ; it was this on which they had set their hopes even before ;
there has been dangled before their eyes the cession of those terri-
tories in the Monarchy which are inhabited by the Southern Slavs, a
revolution in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the unreliability of the
Slav regiments — this is regarded as ascertained fact and had brought
system and apparent justification into their nationalist madness.

Austria-Hungary, hated as she is, now appears to the Servians as
powerless, and as scarcely worthy of waging war with; contempt
is mingled with hatred ; she is ripe for destruction, and she is to fall
without trouble into the lap of the Great-Servian Empire, which is
to be realized in the immediate future.

Newspapers, not among the most extreme, discuss the powerless-
ness and decrepitude of the neighbouring Monarchy in daily articles,
and insult its officials without reserve and without fear of reprimand.
They do not even stop short of the exalted person of our ruler. Even
the official organ refers to the internal condition of Austria-Hungary
as the true cause of this wicked crime. There is no longer any fear
of being called to account. For decades the people of Servia has been
educated by the press, and the policy at any given time is dependent
on the party press ; the Great-Servian propaganda and its monstrous
offspring, the crime of June 28th, are a fruit of this education.

1 pass over the suspicions and accusations with regard to the death
of Hartwig, which are on the verge of insanity, and were characterised
by "The Times" as "ravings"; ^ I do not mention the lying cam-
paign in the press which, however, might strengthen Servians in the
conviction that the Government and the representatives of Austria-
Hungary are outlaws, and that appellations such as murderer, rogue,
cursed Austrian, etc., are suitable stock epithets for us.

The death of Hartwig and the recognition of the gravity of this
loss ^ to the Servian political world, have let loose a fanatical cult of
the deceased ; in this people were influenced not only by gratitude for
the past, but also by anxiety for the future, and outbid one another
in servile submissiveness to Russia in order to secure her goodwill
in time to come.

^ "The latest suggestion made in one of them (the Servian newspapers) is that M.
de Hartwig's sudden death in the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Belgrade the other
day was due to poison. Ravings of that kind move the contempt as well as the dis-
gust of cultivated people, whatever their political sympathies may be." — The Times,
July 16, 1913.

2 Hartwig was the Russian Minister in Belgrade, and was known as an ardent
Pan-Slavist, and reckless hater of Austria-Hungary.

38 Official Diplomatic Documents

As a third factor the electoral campaign has united all parties on a
platform of hostility against Austria-Hungary. None of the parties
which aspire to office will incur the suspicion of being held capable of
weak compliance towards the Monarchy. The campaign, therefore, is
conducted under the catchword of hostility towards Austria-Hungary.

For both internal and external reasons the Monarchy is held to be
powerless and incapable of any energetic action, and it is believed
that the serious words which were spoken by leading men among
us are only "bluff."

The leave of absence of the Imperial and Royal Minister of War
and Chief of the Staff have strengthened the conviction that the
weakness of Austria-Hungary is now obvious.

I have allowed myself to trespass too long on the patience of Your
Excellency, not because I thought that in what I have said I could
tell you anything new, but because I considered this picture led up
to the conclusion which forces itself upon me that a reckoning with
Servia, a war for the position of the Monarchy as a Great Power, even
for its existence as such, cannot be permanently avoided.

If we delay in clearing up our relations with Servia, we shall share
the responsibility for the difficulties and the unfavourable situation
in any future war which must, however, sooner or later be carried
through.

For any observer on the spot, and for the representative of Austro-
Hungarian interests in Servia, the question takes the form that we
cannot any longer put up with any further injury to our prestige.

Should we therefore be determined to put forward far-reaching
requirements joined to effective control — for this alone could clear
the Augean stable of Great-Servian intrigues — then all possible con-
sequences must be considered, and from the beginning there must be a
strong and firm determination to carry through the matter to the end.

Half measures, the presentation of demands, followed by long dis-
cussions and ending only in an unsound compromise, would be the
hardest blow which could be directed against Austria-Hungary's
reputation in Servia and her position in Europe.

France :

From Berlin

French Yellow Book No. 15

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 21, 1914.

It has come to my knowledge that the Servian representative at
Berlin declared, at the Wilhelmstrasse, yesterday, that his Govern-
ment was ready to entertain Austria's requirements arising out of
the outrage at Serajevo, provided that she asked only ^ for judicial
cooperation in the punishment and prevention of political crimes,

^ N. Y, Times translation reads "did not demand."

July 2U French Yellow Book No. 16 39

but that he was charged to warn the German Government that it
would be dangerous to attempt, through that investigation, to lower
the prestige of Servia.

In confidence I may also inform your Excellency that the Russian
Charge d'Affaires at the diplomatic audience to-day mentioned this
subject to Herr von Jagow. He said that he supposed the German
Government now had full knowledge of the note prepared by Austria,
and were therefore willing to give the assurance that the Austro-
Servian difficulties would be localised. The Secretary of State pro-
tested that he was in complete ignorance of the contents of that note,
and expressed himself in the same way to me.^ I could not help
showing my astonishment at a statement which agreed so little with
what circumstances lead one to expect.

I have also been assured that, from now on, the preliminary
notices for mobilisation,^ the object of which is to place Germany in
a kind of "attention" attitude in times of tension, have been sent
out here to those classes which would receive them in similar circum-
stances. That is a measure to which the Germans, constituted as
they are, can have recourse without indiscretion and without exciting
the people. It is not a sensational measure, and is not necessarily
followed by full mobilisation, as we have already seen, but it is none

the less significant. t ^

Jules Cambon.

To London, Petrograd, Vienna, Rome

French Yellow Book No. 16

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London,
St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Rome.

Paris, July 21, 1914.

I SPECIALLY draw your attention to information of which I am in
receipt from Berlin ^ ; the French Ambassador notifies the extreme
weakness of the Berlin Bourse yesterday, and attributes it to the
anxiety which has begun to be aroused by the Servian question.

M. Jules Cambon has very grave reason for believing that when
Austria makes the demarche at Belgrade which she judges necessary
in consequence of the crime of Serajevo, Germany will support her
with her authority, without seeking to play the part of mediator.

Bienvenu-Martin.

1 The reader must decide for himself whether or not to give credence to this state-
ment by Mr. von Jagow, the German Secretary of State. If true, it proves that
Austria-Hungary was preparing her case against Servia without consultation with
Germany. In that case it is natural that the Entente Powers should have had more
accurate preliminary information of the Austrian note, through their Secret Service,
which, for instance, must have supplied the information, French Yellow Book Nos.
13 and 14, July 19, 1914. A friendly power is less apt to maintain a spy service at
the capital of an allied Government. See however, also French Yellow Book No. 19,
July 22 and footnote.

2 This information is proved to be wholly false by French Yellow Book No. 101,
July 30, 1914, where Viviani implies that Germany had not even then proceeded to
partial mobilization.

3 The only two despatches published as previously received from Berlin are Nos. 9,
July 4, and 15, July 15, 1914. Neither of them contains the information here given.

Official Diplomatic Documents

Wednesday, July 22, 1915
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

Foreign Office of

Sent Despatches to

Received
Despatches from

Austria-Hungary

Belgrade, London, etc.

Belgium

France

London, etc.

Vienna, London

Germany

Great Britain

Berlin

Russia

Serbia

Austria-Hungary sends the text of her Serbian note to her minister in Belgrade
for presentation on the next day, and instructs her Representatives at the other
capitals in Europe to inform the several foreign offices of her step.

France counsels moderation in Vienna.

Germany and Great Britain are quoted as having done the same.

Austria-Hungary :

To Belgrade.

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 7

Count Berchtold to Freiherr von Giesl in Belgrade.

Vienna, July 22, 1914.

Your Honor will please transmit the following note on Thursday,
July 23, in the afternoon, to the Royal Government.

Le Gouvernement Imperial
et Royal s'est vu oblige d'a-
dresser jeudi le 23 de ce mois,
par Tentremise du Ministre
Imperial et Royal a Belgrade,
la note suivante au Gouverne-
ment Royal de Serbie :

"Le 31 mars, 1909, le
Ministre de Serbie a Vienne
a fait, d'ordre de son Gouverne-
ment, au Gouvernement Imperial
et Royal la declaration sui-
vante : —

" * La Serbie reconnait
qu'elle n*a pas ete atteinte dans
ses droits par le fait accompli
cree en Bosnie-Herzegovine et
qu'elle se conformera par conse-
quent a telle decision que les

(Translation)

The Austro-Hungarian Gov-
ernment felt compelled to ad-
dress the following note to the
Servian Government on the 23rd
July, through the medium of the
Austro-Hungarian Minister at
Belgrade : —

"On the 31st March, 1909,
the Servian Minister in Vienna,
on the instructions of the Ser-
vian Government, made the
following declaration to the
Imperial and Royal Govern-
ment : —

"^Servia recognises that the
fait accompli regarding Bosnia
has not affected her rights, and
consequently she will conform
to the decisions that the Powers
may take in conformity with

July 22y Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 7

Puissances prendront par rap-
port a I'article 25 du Traite de
Berlin. Se rendant aux conseils
des Grandes Puissances, la Ser-
bie s'engage des a present a
abandonner I'attitude de protes-
tation et d'opposition qu'elle a
observee a I'egard de I'annexion
depuis I'automne dernier, et elle
s'engage, en outre, a changer le
cours de sa politique actuelle
envers I'Autriche-Hongrie pour
vivre desormais avec cette der-
niere sur le pied d'un bon voi-
sinage.'

"Or, rhistoire des dernieres
annees, et notamment les evene-
ments douloureux du 28 juin, ont
demontre I'existence en Serbie
d'un mouvement subversif dont
le but est de detacher de la
Monarchic austro-hongroise cer-
taines parties de ses territoires.
Ce mouvement, qui a pris jour
sous les yeux du Gouvernement
serbe, est arrive a se manifester
au dela du territoire du royaume
par des actes de terrorisme, par
une serie d'attentats et par des
meurtres. '

"Le Gouvernement Royal
serbe, loin de satisfaire aux en-
gagements formels contenus dans
la declaration du 31 mars, 1909,
n'a rien fait pour supprimer ce
mouvement : il a tolere I'acti-
vite criminelle des differentes
societes et affiliations dirigees
contre la Monarchic, le langage
effrene de la presse, la glorifica-
tion des auteurs d'attentats, la
participation d'officiers et de fonc-
tionnaires dans les agissements
subversifs, une propagande mal-
saine dans I'instruction publique,
tolere enfin toutes les manifes-
tations qui pouvaient induire la
population serbe a la haine de la

article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin.
In deference to the advice of the
Great Powers, Servia undertakes
to renounce from now onwards
the attitude of protest and oppo-
sition which she has adopted with
regard to the annexation since
last autumn. She undertakes,
moreover, to modify the direc-
tion of her policy with regard to
Austria-Hungary and to live in
future on good neighbourly terms
with the latter.'

"The history of recent years,
and in particular the painful
events of the 28th June last,
have shown the existence of a
subversive movement with the
object of detaching a part of the
territories of Austria-Hungary
from the Monarchy. The move-
ment, which had its birth under
the eye of the Servian Gov-
ernment, has gone so far as to
make itself manifest on both
sides of the Servian frontier in
the shape of acts of terrorism
and a series of outrages and
murders.

"Far from carrying out the
formal undertakings contained
in the declaration of the 31st
March, 1909, the Royal Servian
Government has done nothing to
repress these movements. It has
permitted the criminal mach-
inations of various societies and
associations directed against
the Monarchy, and has tolerated
unrestrained language on the
part of the press, the glorifica-
tion of the perpetrators of out-
rages, and the participation of
officers and functionaries in sub-
versive agitation. It has per-
mitted an unwholesome propa-
ganda in public instruction; in

Official Diplomatic Documents

Monarchic ct au mepris dc ses
institutions.

"Cctte tolerance coupable du
Gouvernement Royal de Serbie
n'avait pas cesse au moment oil
les evenements du 28 juin der-
nier en ont demontre au monde
entier les consequences funestes.

"II resulte des depositions et
aveux des auteurs criminels de
I'attentat du 28 juin que le
meurtre de Sarajevo a ete trame
a Belgrade, que les armes et ex-
plosifs dont les meurtriers se
trouvaient etre munis leur ont
ete donnes par des officiers et
fonctionnaires serbes faisant par-
tie de la 'Narodna Odbrana/ et
enfin que le passage en Bosnie
des criminels et de leurs armes a
ete organise et effectue par des
chefs du service-frontiere serbe.

"Les resultats mentionnes de
I'instruction ne permettent pas
au Gouvernement Imperial et
Royal de poursuivre plus long-
temps Tattitude de longanimite
expectative qu'il avait observee
pendant des annees vis-a-vis des
agissements concentres a Bel-
grade et propages de la sur les
territoires de la Monarchic; ces
resultats lui imposent au con-
traire le devoir de mettre fin a
des menees qui forment une
menace perpetuelle pour la tran-
quillite de la Monarchic.

"C'est pour atteindre ce but
que le Gbuvernement Imperial
et Royal se voit oblige de de-
mander au Gouvernement serbe
I'enonciation officielle qu'il con-
damne la propagande dirigee

short, it has permitted all mani-
festations of a nature to incite the
Servian population to hatred of
the Monarchy and contempt of
its institutions.

" This culpable tolerance of the
Royal Servian Government had
not ceased at the moment when
the events of the 28th June last
proved its fatal consequences to
the whole world.

" It results from the depositions
and confessions of the criminal
perpetrators of the outrage of the
28th June that the Serajevo as-
sassinations were planned in Bel-
grade ; that the arms and explo-
sives with which the murderers
were provided had been given
to them by Servian officers and
functionaries belonging to the
' Narodna Odbrana ' ; and finally,
that the passage into Bosnia of
the criminals and their arms was
organised and effected by the
chiefs of the Servian frontier
service.

"The above-mentioned results
of the magisterial investigation
do not permit the Austro-Hun-
garian Government to pursue
any longer the attitude of ex-
pectant forbearance which they
have maintained for years in face
of the machinations hatched in
Belgrade, and thence propagated
in the territories of the Mon-
archy. The results, on the con-
trary, impose on them the duty
of putting an end to the intrigues
which form a perpetual menace
to the tranquillity of the Mon-
archy.

"To achieve this end the Im-
perial and Royal Government see
themselves compelled to demand
from the Royal Servian Govern-
ment a formal assurance that they
condemn this dangerous propa-

July 22y Amtro-Hungarian Red Book No, 7

centre la Monarchie austro-hon-
groise, c 'est-a-dire rensemble des
tendances qui aspirent en dernier
lieu a detacher de la Monarchie
des territoires qui en font partie,
et qu'il s'engage a supprimer, par
tous les moyens, cette propa-
gande criminelle et terroriste.

"Afin de donner un caractere
solennel a cet engagement, le
Gouvernement Royal de Serbie
fera publier a la premiere page
du ^Journal officiel' en date du
13/26 juillet I'enonciation sui-
vante : —

"'Le Gouvernement Royal de
Serbie condamne la propagande
dirigee contre I'Autriche-Hon-
grie, c'est-a-dire I'ensemble des
tendances qui aspirent en dernier
lieu a detacher de la Monarchie
austro-hongroise des territoires
qui en font partie, et il deplore
sincerement les consequences fu-
nestes de ces agissements cri-
minels.

" ' Le Gouvernement Royal re-
grette que des officiers et fonc-
tionnaires serbes aient participe
a la propagande susmentionnee
et compromis par la les relations
de bon voisinage auquel le Gou-
vernement Royal s'etait solen-
nellement engage par sa declara-
tion du 31 mars, 1909.

" ' Le Gouvernement Royal,
qui desapprouve et repudie toute
idee ou tentative d'immixtion
dans les destinees des habitants
de quelque partie de I'Autriche-
Hongrie que ce soit, considere de
son devoir d'avertir formellement
les officiers, les fonctionnaires et
toute la population du royaume
que dorenavant il procedera avec
la derniere rigueur contre les per-
sonnes qui se rendraient cou-
pables de pareils agissements qu'il

ganda against the Monarchy ; in
other words, the whole series of
tendencies, the ultimate aim of
which is to detach from the
Monarchy territories belonging
to it, and that they undertake to
suppress by every means this
criminal and terrorist propa-
ganda.

"In order to give a formal
character to this undertaking the
Royal Servian Government shall
publish on the front page of their
'Official Journal' of the 13/26
July the following declaration : —

"'The Royal Government of
Servia condemn the propaganda
directed against Austria-Hun-
gary — i.e., the general tendency
of which the final aim is to
detach from the Austro-Hun-
garian Monarchy territories be-
longing to it, and they sincerely
deplore the fatal consequences
of these criminal proceedings.

"'The Royal Government re-
gret that Servian officers and
functionaries participated in the
above-mentioned propaganda
and thus compromised the good
neighbourly relations to which
the Royal Government were
solemnly pledged by their decla-
ration of the 31st March, 1909.

" ' The Royal Government,
who disapprove and repudiate all
idea of interfering or attempting
to interfere with the destinies
of the inhabitants of any part
whatsoever of Austria-Hungary,
consider it their duty formally to
warn officers and functionaries,
and the whole population of the
kingdom, that henceforward they
will proceed with the utmost
rigour against persons who may
be guilty of such machinations,

Official Diplomatic Documents

mettra tous ses efforts a prevenir
et a reprimer/

" Cette enonciation sera portee
simultanement a la connaissance
de rArmee Royale par un ordre
du jour de Sa Majeste le Roi et
sera publiee dans le 'Bulletin
officiel ' de I'armee.

" Le Gouvernement Royal
serbe s'engage en outre :

" 1° a supprimer toute publica-
tion qui excite a la haine et au
mepris de la Monarchic et dont
la tendance generale est dirigee
contre son integrite territoriale ;

"2° a dissoudre immediate-
ment la societe dite 'Narodna
Odbrana/ a confisquer tous ses
moyens de propagande, et a pro-
ceder de la meme maniere contre
les autres societes et affiliations
en Serbie qui s'adonnent a la
propagande contre la Monarchic
austro-hongroise ; le Gouverne-
ment Royal prendra les mesures
necessaires pour que les societes
dissoutes ne puissent pas con-
tinuer leur activite sous un autre
nom et sous une autre forme ;

"3° a eliminer sans delai de
rinstruction publique en Serbie,
tant en ce qui concerne le corps
enseignant que les moyens d 'in-
struction, tout ce qui sert ou
pourrait servir a fomenter la
propagande contre I'Autriche-
Hongrie ;

"4° a eloigner du service mili-
taire et de I'administration en
general tous les officiers et fonc-
tionnaires coupables de la pro-
pagande contre la Monarchic
austro-hongroise et dont le Gou-
vernement Imperial et Royal se
reserve de communiquer les noms
et les faits au Gouvernement
Royal ;

which they will use all their
efforts to anticipate and sup-
press.'

"This declaration shall simul-
taneously be communicated to
the Royal army as an order of the
day by His Majesty the King and
shall be published in the ' Official
Bulletin ' of the Army.

"The Royal Servian Govern-
ment further undertake :

"1. To suppress any publica-
tion which incites to hatred and
contempt of the Austro-Hun-
garian Monarchy and the general
tendency of which is directed
against its territorial integrity ;

"2. To dissolve immediately
the society styled 'Narodna Od-
brana,' to confiscate all its means
of propaganda, and to proceed
in the same manner against other .
societies and their branches in
Servia which engage in propa-
ganda against the Austro-Hun-
garian Monarchy. The Royal
Government shall take the neces-
sary measures to prevent the
societies dissolved from continu-
ing their activity under another
name and form ;

"3. To eliminate without delay
from public instruction in Servia,
both as regards the teaching body
and also as regards the methods
of instruction, everything that
serves, or might serve, to foment
the propaganda against Austria-
Hungary ;

"4. To remove from the mili-
tary service, and from the ad-
ministration in general, all officers
and functionaries guilty of propa-
ganda against the Austro-Hun-
garian Monarchy whose names
and deeds the Austro-Hungarian
Government reserve to them-
selves the right of communicat-
ing to the Royal Government ;

July 22, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 7

" 5° a accepter la collaboration
en Serbie des organes du Gou-
vernement Imperial et Royal
dans la suppression du mouve-
ment subversif dirige contre I'in-
tegrite territorial de la Mo-
narchic ;

" 6° a ouvrir une enquete judi-
ciaire contre les partisans du
complot du 28 juin se trouvant
sur territoire serbe ;

"des organes, delegues par le
Gouvernement Imperial et Royal,
prendront part aux recherches y
relatives ;

"7° a proceder d'urgence a
Tarrestation du Commandant
Voija Tankosic et du nomme
Milan Ciganovic, employe de
I'Etat serbe, compromis par les
resultats de I'instruction de
Sarajevo ;

"8° a empecher, par des me-
sures efficaces, le concours des
autorites serbes dans le trafic illi-
cite d'armes et d'explosifs a tra-
.vers la f rontiere ;

"a licencier et punir severe-
ment les fonctionnaires du ser-
vice-frontiere de Schabatz et de
Loznica coupables d'avoir aide
les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo
en leur facilitant le passage de la
frontiere ;

"9° a donner au Gouverne-
ment Imperial et Royal des expli-
cations sur les propos injusti-
fiables de hauts fonctionnaires
serbes tant en Serbie qu'a Te-
tranger, qui, malgre leur position

"5. To accept the collabora-
tion ^ in Servia of representatives
of the Austro-Hungarian Govern-
ment for the suppression of the
subversive movement directed
against the territorial integrity
of the Monarchy ;

"6. To take judicial proceed-
ings against accessories to the
plot of the 8th June who are on
Servian territory; delegates of
the Austro-Hungarian Govern-
ment will take part in the inves-
tigation ^ relating thereto ;

"7. To proceed without delay
to the arrest of Major Voija Tan-
kositch and of the individual
named Milan Ciganovitch, a Ser-
vian State employe, who have
been compromised by the results
of the magisterial enquiry at
Serajevo ;

"8. To prevent by effective
measures the cooperation of the
Servian authorities in the illicit
traffic in arms and explosives
across the frontier, to dismiss and
punish severely the officials of
the frontier service at Schabatz
and Loznica guilty of having
assisted the perpetrators of the
Serajevo crime by facilitating
their passage across the frontier ;

"9. To furnish the Imperial
and Royal Government with ex-
planations regarding the unjus-
tifiable utterances of high Ser-
vian officials, both in Servia and
abroad, who, notwithstanding

1 The meaning of Clauses 5 and 6 was, according to Austria-Hungary, "wilfully
misinterpreted" by Serbia and her champions. See British Blue Book No. 64, July 28,
1914, where Austria-Hungary is quoted as stating "that cooperation of Austrian
agents in Servia was to be only in investigation, not in judicial or administrative
measures." Similar cooperation in investigation had, upon request, been granted
to Serbia twice at least in the past (see Austro-Hungary and the War by Ernest Ludwig),
and had also been asked by, and granted to, the United States of America in the in-
vestigation of the sinking of the Maine. See also the Austrian Explanation, Austro-
Hungarian Red Book No. 27, July 25, where Austria-Hungary explains that what she
has in mind is an arrangement in Serbia similar to the "Bureau de Siirete" maintained
in Paris by Russia. See also Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914.

Official Diplomatic Documents

officielle, n'ont pas hesite apres
Tattentat du 28 juin de s'expri-
mer dans des interviews d'une
maniere hostile envers la Mo-
narchie austro-hongroise ; enfin

"10° d'avertir, sans retard, le
Gouvernement Imperial et Royal
de I'execution des mesures com-
prises dans les points precedents.

" Le Gouvernement Imperial
et Royal attend la reponse du
Gouvernement Royal au plus
tard jusqu'au samedi, 25 de ce
mois, a 6 heures du soir.

"Un memoire concernant les
resultats de I'instruction de Sara-
jevo a regard des fonctionnaires
mentionnes aux points 7 et 8. est
annexe a cette note."

J'ai I'honneur d'inviter votre
Excellence de vouloir porter le
contenu de cette note a la con-
naissance du Gouvernement au-
pres duquel vous etes accredite,
en accompagnant cette communi-
cation du commentaire que voici :

Le 31 mars, 1909, le Gouverne-
ment Royal serbe a adresse a
I'Autriche-Hongrie la declaration
dont le texte est reproduit ci-
dessus.

Le lendemain meme de cette
declaration la Serbie s'est engagee
dans une politique tendant a
inspirer des idees subversives
aux ressortissants serbes de la
Monarchic austro-hongroise et a
preparer ainsi la separation des
territoires austro-hongrois, limi-
trophes a la Serbie.

La^Serbie devint le foyer d'une
agitation criminelle.

Des societes et affiliations ne
tarderent pax a se former qui,
soit ouvertement, soit clandes-
tinement, etaient destinees a

their official position, have not
hesitated since the crime of the
28th June to express themselves
in interviews in terms of hostility
to the Austro-Hungarian Gov-
ernment ; and, finally,

"10. To notify the Imperial
and Royal Government without
delay of the execution of the
measures comprised under the
preceding heads.

"The Austro-Hungarian Gov-
ernment expect the reply of the
Royal Government at the latest
by 6 o'clock on Saturday even-
ing, the 25th July.

" A memorandum dealing with
the results of the magisterial
enquiry at Serajevo with regard
to the officials mentioned under
heads (7) and (8) is attached to
this note."

I have the honour to request
your Excellency to bring the con-
tents of this note to the knowl-
edge of the Government to which
you are accredited, accompany-
ing your communication with
the following observations : —

On the 31st March, 1909, the
Royal Servian Government ad-
dressed to Austria-Hungary the
declaration of which the text is
reproduced above.

On the very day after this
declaration Servia embarked on a
policy of instilling revolutionary
ideas into the Serb subjects of
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
and so preparing for the sep-
aration of the Austro-Hungarian
territory on the Servian frontier.

Servia became the centre of a
criminal agitation.

No tirne was lost in the forma-
tion of societies and groups,
whose object, either avowed or
secret, was the creation of dis-

July 22, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 7

creer des desordres sur le terri-
toire austro-hongrois.- Ces socie-
tes et affiliations comptent parmi
leurs membres des generaux et
des diplomates, des fonction-
naires d'Etat et des juges, bref
les sommites du monde officiel et
inofficiel du royaume.

Le journalisme serbe est pres-
que entierement au service de
cette propagande, dirigee centre
I'Autriche-Hongrie, et pas un jour
ne passe sans que les organes de
la presse serbe n'excitent leurs
lecteurs a la haine et au mepris
de la Monarchic voisine ou a des
attentats diriges plus ou moins
ouvertement contre sa surete et
son integrite.

Un grand nombre d 'agents est
appele a soutenir par tons les
moyens I'agitation contre I'Au-
triche-Hongrie et a corrompre
dans les provinces limitrophes la
jeunesse de ces pays.

L'esprit conspirateur des poli-
ticiens serbes, esprit dont les
annales du royaume portent les
sanglantes empreintes, a subi une
recrudescence depuis la derniere
crise balkanique; des individus
ayant fait partie des bandes jus-
que-la occupees en Macedoine
sont venus se mettre a la disposi-
tion de la propagande terroriste
contre I'Autriche-Hongrie.

En presence de ces agissements,
auxquels I'Autriche-Hongrie est
exposee depuis des annees, le
Gouvernement de la Serbie n'a
pas cru devoir prendre la moindre
mesure. C'est ainsi que le Gou-
vernement serbe a manque au
devoir que lui imposait la decla-
ration solennelle du 31 mars,
1909, et c'est ainsi qu'il s'est mis
en contradiction avec la volonte
de I'Europe et avec I'engagement

orders on Austro-Hungarian ter-
ritory. These societies and
groups count among their mem-
bers generals and diplomatists,
Government officials and judges
— in short, men at the top of
official and unofficial society in
the kingdom.

Servian journalism is almost
entirely at the service of this
propaganda, which is directed
against Austria-Hungary, and
not a day passes without the
organs of the Servian press stir-
ring up their readers to hatred or
contempt for the neighbouring
Monarchy, or .to outrages
directed more or less openly
against its security and integrity.

A large number of agents are
employed in carrying on by every
means the agitation against Aus-
tria-Hungary and corrupting the
youth in the frontier provinces.

Since the recent Balkan crisis
there has been a recrudescence
of the spirit of conspiracy in-
herent in Servian politicia^ns,
which has left such sanguinary
imprints on the history of the
kingdom; individuals belonging
formerly to bands employed in
Macedonia have come to place
themselves at the disposal of the
terrorist propaganda against
Austria-Hungary.

In the presence of these doings,
to which Austria-Hungary has
been exposed for years, the Ser-
vian Government have not
thought it incumbent on them
to take the slightest step. The
Servian Government have thus
failed in the duty imposed on
them by the solemn declara-
tion of the 31st March, 1909,
and acted in opposition to the
will of Europe and the under-

Official Diplomatic Documents

qu'il avait pris vis-a-vis de TAu-
triche-Hongrie.

La longanimite du Gouverne-
ment Imperial et Royal a I'egard
de Tattitude proyocatrice de la
Serbie etait inspiree du desin-
teressement territorial de la
Monarchic austro-hongroise et de
Tespoir que le Gouvernement
serbe finirait tout de meme par
apprecier a sa juste valeur Taiiii-
tie de I'Autriche-Hongrie. En
observant une attitude bien-
veillante pour les interets poli-
tiques de la Serbie, le Gouverne-
ment Imperial et Royal esperait
que le royaume se deciderait
finalement a suivre de son cote
une ligne de conduite analogue.
L'Autriche-Hongrie s'attendait
surtout a une pareille evolution
dans les idees politiques en Ser-
bie, lorsque, apres les evenements
de Tannee 1912, le Gouverne-
ment Imperial et Royal rendit
possible, par une attitude desin-
teressee et sans rancune, Tagran-
dissement si considerable de la
Serbie.

Cette bienveillance manifestee
par I'Autriche-Hongrie a I'egard
de I'Etat voisin n'a cependant
aucunement modifie les procedes
du royaume, qui a continue a
tolerer sur son territoire une
propagande, dont les funestes
consequences se sont manifestees
au monde entier le 28 juin der-
nier, jour oil I'heritier presomptif
de la Monarchic et son illustre
epouse devinrent les victimes
d'un complot trame a Belgrade.

En presence de cet etat de
choses le Gouvernement Imperial
et Royal a du se decider a entre-
prendre de nouvelles et pressantes
demarches a Belgrade afin
d'amener le Gouvernement serbe
a arreter le mouvement incen-

taking given to Austria-Hun-
gary.

The patience of the Imperial
and Royal Government in the
face of the provocative attitude
of Servia was inspired by the
territorial disinterestedness of
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
and the hope that the Servian
Government would end in spite
of everything by appreciating
Austria-Hungary's friendship at
its true value. By observing a
benevolent attitude towards the
political interests of Servia, the
Imperial and Royal Government
hoped that the kingdom would
finally decide to follow an analo-
gous line of conduct on its own
side. In particular, Austria-
Hungary expected a development
of this kind in the political ideas
of Servia, when, after the events
of 1912, the Imperial and Royal
Government, by its disinterested
and ungrudging attitude, made
such a considerable aggrandise-
ment of Servia possible.

The benevolence which Aus-
tria-Hungary showed towards the
neighbouring State had no re-
straining effect on the proceed-
ings of the kingdom, which con-
tinued to tolerate on its territory
a propaganda of which the fatal
consequences were demonstrated
to the whole world on the 28th
June last, when the Heir Pre-
sumptive to the Monarchy and
his illustrious consort fell victims
to a plot hatched at Belgrade.

In the presence of this state of
things the Imperial and Royal
Government have felt compelled
to take new and urgent steps at
Belgrade with a view to inducing
the Servian Government to stop
the incendiary movement that is

July 22, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 7

diaire mena^ant la surete et Tin-
tegrite de la Monarchic austro-
hongroise.

Le Gouvernement Imperial et
Royal est persuade qu'en entre-
prenant cette demarche il se
trouve en plein accord avec les
sentiments de toutes les nations
civilisees, qui ne sauraient ad-
mettre que le regicide devint une
arme dont on puisse se servir
impunement dans la lutte poli-
tique, et que la paix europeenne
fut continuellement troublee par
les agissements partant de Bel-
grade.

C'est a I'appui de ce qui pre-
cede que le Gouvernement Im-
perial et Royal tient a la dis-
position du Gouvernement Royal
de Grande-Bretagne un dossier
elucidant les menees serbes et les
rapports existant entre ces menees
et le meurtre du 28 juin.

Une communication identique
est adressee aux representants
Imperiaux et Royaux aupres des
autres Puissances signatiares.

Vous etes autorise de laisser
une copie de cette depeche entre
les mains de M. le Ministre des
Affaires Etrangeres.

Vienne, le 24juillet, 1914.

threatening the security and
integrity of the Austro-Hun-
garian Monarchy.

The Imperial and Royal Gov-
ernment are convinced that in
taking this step they will find
themselves in full agreement with
the sentiments of all civilised
nations, who cannot permit regi-
cide to become a weapon' that
can be employed with impunity
in political strife, and the peace
of Europe to be continually dis-
turbed by movements emanating
from Belgrade.

In support of the above the
Imperial and Royal Government
hold at the disposal of the
British Government a dossier
elucidating the Servian intrigues
and the connection between these
intrigues and the murder of the
28th June.

An identical communication
has been addressed to the Im-
perial and Royal representatives
accredited to the other signatory
Powers.

You are authorised to leave a
copy of this despatch in the hands
of the Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

Vienna, July 24, 1914'

Annexe

L'instruction criminelle ou-
verte par le Tribunal de Sarajevo
contre Gavrilo Princip et con-
sorts du chef d^assassinat et de
complicite y relative — crime
commis par eux le 28 juin der-
nier — a jusqu'ici abouti aux
constations suivantes :

1°. Le complot ayant pour but
d'assassiner, lors de sor\ sejour a

Annex

The criniinal enquiry opened
by the Court of Serajevo against
Gavrilo Princip and his acces-
sories in and before the act of
assassination committed by them
on the 28th June last has up to
the present led to the following
conclusions : —

1. The plot, having as its ob-
ject the assassination of the Arch-

Official Diplomatic Documents

Sarajevo, de TArchiduc Fran-
cois-Ferdinand fut forme a Bel-
grade par Gavrilo Princip,
Nedelkjo ^Cabrinovic, le nomme
Milan Ciganovic et Trifko
Grabez, avec le concours du
commandant Voija Tankosic.

2°. Les six bombes et les qua-
tre pistolets Browning avec muni-
tion, moyennant lesquels les mal-
faiteurs ont commis Fattentat,
furent livres a Belgrade a Prin-
cip, Cabrinovic et Grabez par le
nomme Milan Ciganovic et le
commandant Voija Tankosic.

3°. Les bombes sont des gre-
nades a la main provenant du
depot d'armes de I'armee serbe a
Kragujevac.

4°. Pour assurer la reussite
de I'attentat, Ciganovic enseigna
a Princip, Cabrinovic et Grabez la
maniere de se servir des grenades
et donna, dans un foret pres du
champ de tir a Topschider, des
le9ons de tir avec pistolets Brown-
ing a Princip et Grabez.

5°. Pour rendre possible a
Princip, Cabrinovic et Grabez de
passer la frontiere de Bosnie-
Herzegovine et d'y introduire
clandestinement leur contrebande
d'armes, un systeme deJ:ransport
secret fut organise par Ciganovic.

D'apres cette organisation I'in-
troduction en Bosnie-Herzego-
vine des malfaiteurs et de leurs
armes fut op6ree par les capi-
taines-frontieres de Chabac
(Rade Popovic) et de Loznica
ainsi que par le douanier Rudivoj
Grbic de Loznica avec le con-
cours de divers particuliers.

duke Francis Ferdinand at the
time of his visit to Serajevo, was
formed at Belgrade by Gavrilo
Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, one
Milan Ciganovic, and Trifko
Grabez, with the assistance of
Commander Voija Tankosic.

2. The six bombs and the four
Browning pistols and ammuni-
tion with which the guilty par-
ties committed the ^ act were
delivered to Princip, Cabrinovic,
and Grabez by the man Milan
Ciganovic and Commander Voija
Tankosic at Belgrade.

3. The bombs are hand-gre-
nades coming from the arms
depot of the Servian army at Kra-
gujevac.

4. In order to^ ensure the suc-
cess of the act, Ciganovic taught
Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez
how to use the bombs, and gave
lessons in firing Browning pistols
to Princip and Grabez in a forest
near the shooting ground at Top-
schider.

■v

5. To enable Princip, Cabrino-
vic, and Grabez to cross the fron-
tier of Bosnia-Herzegovina and
smuggle in their contraband of
arms secretly, a secret system j3f
transport was organised by Ci-
ganovic.

By this arrangement the intro-
duction into Bosnia-Herzegovina
of criminals and their arms was
effected by the officials controlling
the frontiers at Chabec (Rade
Popovic) and Loznica, as well as
by the customs officer Rudivoj
Grbic, of Loznica, with the as-
sistance of various individuals.

On the occasion of transmitting the above note, your Honor will
verbally add that you are instructed — in case an unconditional
affirmative answer of the Royal Government shall not in the meantime
have been delivered to you — to leave Belgrade together with the
personnel of the Imperial and Royal Embassy at the expiration of the

July 22, Amtro-Hunganan Red Book No. 8 51

period of grace of forty-eight hours after your communication con-
templated in the note has been made.

To Berlin, Rome, Paris, London, Petrograd, and Constantinople

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 8

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in Berlin,
Rome, Paris, London, St. Petershurgh and Constantinople

Vienna, July 22} 1914.
(Translated from the French.)

The Imperial and Royal Government felt compelled to address
the following note to the Royal Servian Government on Thursday,
the 23rd instant, through the medium of the Imperial and Royal
Minister at Belgrade (see instructions to the Imperial and Royal
Envoy in Belgrade of July 22nd, 1914).

On the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government addressed
to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced
above.

On the very day after this declaration Servia embarked on a policy
of instilling revolutionary ideas into the Serb subjects of the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy, and so preparing for the separation of the
Austro-Hungarian territory on the Servian frontier.

Servia became the centre of a criminal agitation.

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups, whose
object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on
Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and groups count among
their members generals and diplomatists, Government officials and
judges — in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society in
the kingdom.

Servian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this prop-
aganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day
passes without the organs 'of the Servian press stirring up their
readers to hatred or contempt for the neighbouring Monarchy, or to
outrages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity.

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every
means the agitation against Austria-Hungary and corrupting the
youth in the frontier provinces.

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence of
the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which has
left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom ; indi-
viduals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have
come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda
against Austria-Hungary.

In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary has
been exposed for years, the Servian Government have not thought

1 This note was to be presented on July 24. See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 9,
July 23, 1914.

52 Official Diplomatic Documents

it incumbent on them to take the shghtest step. The Servian Gov-
ernment have thus failed in the duty imposed on them by the solemn
declaration of the 31st March, 1909, and acted in opposition to the
will of Europe and the undertaking given to Austria-Hungary.

The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in the face
of the provocative attitude of Servia was inspired by the territorial
disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope
that the Servian Government would end in spite of everything by
appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By
observing a benevolent attitude towards the political interests of
Servia, the Imperial and Royal Government hoped that the kingdom
would finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its
own side. In particular, Austria-Hungary expected a development
of this kind in the political ideas of Servia, when, after the events
of 1912, the Imperial and Royal Government, by its disinterested
and ungrudging attitude, made such a considerable aggrandisement
of Servia possible.

The benevolence which Austria-Hungary showed towards the
neighbouring State had no restraining effect on the proceedings of
the kingdom, which continued to tolerate on its territory a propaganda
of which the fatal consequences were demonstrated to the whole
world on the 28th June last, when the Heir Presumptive to the Mon-
archy and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched at
Belgrade.

In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal
Government have felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at
Belgrade with a view to inducing the Servian Government to stop
the incendiary movement that is threatening the security and in-
tegrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The Imperial and Royal Government are convinced that in tak-
ing this step they will find themselves in full agreement with the
sentiments of all civilised nations, who cannot permit regicide to
become a weapon that can be employed with impunity in political
strife, and the peace of Europe to be continually disturbed by move-
ments emanating from Belgrade.

In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government
hold at the disposal of the British Government a dossier elucidating
the Servian intrigues and the connection between these intrigues and
the murder of the 28th June.

An identical communication has been addressed to the Imperial
and Royal representatives accredited to the other signatory Powers.

You are authorised to leave a copy of this despatch in the hands
of the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

July 22; French Yellow Book No. 18 53

France :

To London, Petrograd, Vienna, Rome

French Yellow Book No. 17

M, Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the
French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Rome.

Paris, July 22, 1914.

M. Jules Cambon having questioned Herr von Jagow on the
tenor of the Austrian note at Belgrade, the latter replied that he
knew nothing of the text; our Ambassador expressed his great as-
tonishment at this.^ He emphasizes that the weakness of the Berlin
Bourse continues, and that pessimistic rumours are current.

M. Barrere also discussed the same question with the Marquis di
San Giuliano, who appears disturbed by it, and gives the assurance
that he is working ^ at Vienna in order that Servia may not be asked
for anything beyond what is practicable, for instance, the dissolution
of the Bosnian Club, and not a judicial inquiry into the causes of the
crime of Serajevo.

In present circumstances, the most favourable presumption one
can make is that the Cabinet at Vienna, finding itself carried away
by the press and the military party, is trying to obtain the maxi-
mum from Servia by starting to intimidate her, directly and in-
directly, and looks to Germany for support in this.

I have asked the French Ambassador at Vienna to use all his in-
fluence with Count Berchtold and to represent to him, in a friendly
conversation, how much Europe would appreciate moderation on
the part of the Austrian Government, and what consequences would
be likely to be entailed by violent pressure on Servia.

Bienvenu-Martin.

From Vienna

French Yellow Book No. 18

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 22? 19U.

Nothing is known as to the decision which Count Berchtold,
who is prolonging his stay at Ischl, is trying to obtain from the Em-
peror. The intention of proceeding against Servia with the greatest
severity, of having done with her, of "treating her like another Po-
land," is attributed to the Government. Eight army corps are said
to be ready to start on the campaign, but M. Tisza, who is very dis-

1 French Yellow Book No. 15, July 21, 1914. ,,.,,.

2 The despatch from Rome containing this information has not been pubhshed m
the French Yellow Book or elsewhere. -r> i ,, t. j

3 The date of this despatch seems strange, since Count Berchtold had returned to
Vienna and despatched the "Serbian Note " to the Austro-Hungarian Minister in Bel-
grade on that date.

54 Official Diplomatic Documents

turbed about the excitement in Croatia, is said to have intervened
actively in order to exercise a moderating influence.

In any case it is believed that the demarche will be made at Bel-
grade this week. The requirements of the Austro-Hungarian Gov-
ernment with regard to the punishment of the outrage, and to guaran-
tees of control and police supervision, seem to be acceptable to the
dignity of the Servians; M. Yovanovich believes they will be ac-
cepted. M. Pashitch wishes for a peaceful solution, but says that
he is ready for a full resistance. He has confidence in the strength
of the Servian army ; besides, he counts on the union of all the Slavs
in the Monarchy to paralyse the effort directed against his country.

Unless people are absolutely blinded, it must be recognised here
that a violent blow has every chance of being fatal both to the Austro-
Hungarian army and to the cohesion of the nationalities governed
by the Emperor, which has already been so much compromised.

Herr von Tschirscky, the German Ambassador, is showing him-
self a supporter of violent measures, while at the same time he is
willing to let it be understood that the Imperial Chancery would
not be in entire agreement with him on this point. The Russian
Ambassador, who left yesterday for the country in consequence of
reassuring explanations made to him at the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs, has confided to me that his Government will not raise any
objection to steps directed towards the punishment of the guilty and
the dissolution of the societies which are notoriously revolutionary,
but could not accept requirements which would humiliate Servian
national feeling. Dumaine.

From London

French Yellow Book No. 19

M. Paul Cambonj French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 22, 1914.

Your Excellency has been good enough to communicate to me the
impressions which have been collected by our Ambassador at Berlin
with regard to the demarche which the Austro-Hungarian Minister
is proposing to make at Belgrade.

These impressions have been confirmed by a conversation which
I had yesterday with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
Sir Edward Grey told me that he had seen the German Ambassador,
who stated to him ^ that at Berlin a demarche of the Austro-Hungarian

1 Cf. British Blue Book No. 2, July 22, 1914. The interview here spoken of is not
given in this British Blue Book unless it is the interview of July 20, British Blue Book
No. 1, July 20. Sir E. Grey's remarks quoted here are so much like those made by him
on July 20 that it seems unlikely that the interviews given in French Yellow Book No.
19 and British Blue Book No. 1 are not the same. In that case, however, the remarks
of the German Ambassador are wrongly given either here or in the Blue Book. In
British Blue Book No. 2, July 22, the German Secretary of Foreign Affairs is quoted as
considering it "inadvisable that the Austro-Hungarian Government should be ap-
proached by the German Government." It seems incredible that the accuracy of this
statement should not have been challenged in the British Blue Book if the German

July 22, French Yellow Booh No. 19 55

Government to the Servian Government was expected. Prince
Lichnowsky assured him that the German Government were en-
deavouring to hold back and moderate the Cabinet of Vienna/ but
that up to the present time they had not been successful in this, and
that he w^as not without anxiety as to the results of a demarche of this
kind. Sir Edward Grey answered Prince Lichnowsky that he would
like to believe that, before intervening at Belgrade, the Austro-
Hungarian Government had fully informed themselves as to the cir-
cumstances of the conspiracy to which the Hereditary Archduke and
the Duchess of Hohenburg had fallen victims, and had assured
themselves that the Servian Government had been cognisant of it
and had not done all that lay in their power to prevent the conse-
quences. For if it could not be proved that the Servian Government
were responsible and implicated to a certain degree, the intervention
of Austria-Hungary would not be justified and would arouse against
them the opinion of Europe.

The communication of Prince Lichnowsky had left Sir Edward
Grey with an impression of anxiety which he did not conceal from me.
The same impression was given me by the Italian Ambassador, who
also fears the possibility of fresh tension in Austro-Servian relations.

This morning the Servian Minister came to see me, and he shares
the apprehensions of Sir Edward Grey. He fears that Austria may
make of the Servian Government demands which their dignity, and
above all the susceptibility of public opinion, will not allow them to
accept without a protest. When I pointed out to him the quiet
which appears to reign at Vienna, and to which all the Ambassadors
accredited to that Court bear testimony, he answered that this
official quiet was only apparent and concealed feelings which were
most fundamentally hostile to Servia. But, he added, if these feel-
ings take a public form {demarche) which lacks the moderation that
is desirable, it will be necessary to take account of Servian public
opinion, which has been inflamed by the harsh treatment to which
the Austrian Government have constantly subjected that country,
and which has been made less patient by the memory of two vic-
torious wars which is still quite fresh. Notwithstanding the sacrifices
w^hich Servia has made for her recent victories she can still put
400,000 men in the field, and public opinion, which knows this, is
not inclined to put up with any humiliation.

Sir Edward Grey, in an interview with the Austro-Hungarian
Ambassador,^ asked him to recommend his Government not to de-
part from the prudence and moderation necessary for avoiding new
complications, not to demand from Servia any measures to which
she could not reasonably submit, and not to allow themselves to be
carried away too far.

Paul Cambon.

Ambassador had told Sir E. Grey on July 20 (or 21) that the " German Government
were endeavouring to hold back and moderate the Cabinet of Vienna etc."

1 This important statement is not given in the British Blue Book. See previous note.

2 Such an interview is pubHshed in the British Blue Book No. 3, July 23, while this
despatch is dated July 22, 1914.

56 Official Diplomatic Documents

Great Britain :

From Berlin

British Blue Book No. 2

Sir H. Rumbold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward
Grey. — {Received July 22)

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 22, 1914.

Last night I met Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the
forthcoming Austrian demarche at Belgrade was alluded to by his
Excellency in the conversation that ensued. His Excellency was
evidently of opinion that this step on Austria's part would have been
made ere this. He insisted that question at issue was one for settle-
ment between Servia and Austria alone, and that there should be no
interference from outside in the discussions between those two coun-
tries. He had therefore considered it inadvisable that the Austro-
Hungarian Government should be approached by the German Gov-
ernment on the matter. He had, however, on several occasions, in
conversation with the Servian Minister, emphasised the extreme
importance that Austro-Servian relations should be put on a proper
footing.

Finally, his Excellency observed to me that for a long time past
the attitude adopted towards Servia by Austria had, in his opinion,
been one of great forbearance.^

1 Cf. the previous despatch, French Yellow Book No. 19.

July 23, AustrO'Hungarian Red Book No. 9 57

Thursday, July 23, 1914

The Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum is Presented to Serbia

SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from

Austria-Hungary London '

Belgium

France London, etc. Munich

Germany ^ London, etc.

Great Britain Vienna Rome, Austr.-Hung.
. Ambassador

Russia Belgrade

Servia London, etc. Aust.-Hung. Minister

Austria-Hungary presents her note to Serbia at 6 p.m. ; and believing that
''Great Britain might be most easily led to form an impartial judgment," sends
special instructions to her Ambassador in London.

Germany sends instructions to her Ambassadors in London, Paris, and Petro-
grad, dating these instructions July 23 for presentation on July 24. In the in-
structions she defines her position.

Great Britain is informally informed of the Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia,
and discusses the possibility of a European war.

Austria-Hungary :

To London

Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 9
Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 23, 1914.

As among the Entente Powers, Great Britain might be most easily
led to form an impartial judgment on the step which we are to-day
taking at Belgrade, I request Your Excellency in the conversation which
you will have on the 24th instant on the occasion when you hand in
our circular note^ at the Foreign Office, to point out among other
matters that it would have been within the power of Servia to render
less acute the serious steps which she must expect from us, by spon-
taneously doing what is necessary in order to start an inquiry on
Servian soil against the Servian accomplices in the crime of 28th
June, and by bringing to light the threads, which, as has been proved,
lead from Belgrade to Servia.

Up to the present time, although a number of notorious indications
point to Belgrade, the Servian Government have not taken any
steps in this direction; on the contrary, they have attempted to
wipe out the existing traces.

Thus, from a telegraphic despatch from our Legation at Belgrade,^
it is to be gathered that the Servian civil servant Ciganovic, who is
compromised by the independent testimony of the affidavits of both

1 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 8, July 22.

2 This Despatch has not been published in the Austro-Hungarian Red Book.

58 Official Diplomatic Documents

criminals, on the day of the outrage was still in Belgrade, and three
days afterwards, when his name was mentioned in the papers, had
already left the town. As is^well known also, the director of the
Servian press declared that Ciganovic is completely unknown in
Belgrade.

With regard to the short time-limit attached to our demand,
this must be attributed to our long experience of the dilatory arts of
Servia.^

The requirements which we demand that Servia should fulfil, and
which indeed contains nothing which is not a matter of course in the
intercourse between States which are to live in peace and friendship,
cannot be made the subject of negotiations and compromise; and,
having regard to our economic interests, we cannot take the risk of a
method of political action by which it would be open to Servia at
pleasure to prolong the crisis which has arisen.

France :

To London, Berlin, Petrograd and Rome

French Yellow Book No. 20

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London,
Berlin, St. Petersburgh, and Rome.

Paris, July 23, 1914.

According to information collected by the French Ambassador
at Vienna,^ the first intention of the Austro-Hungarian Government
had been to proceed with the greatest severity against Servia, while
keeping eight army corps ready to start operations.

The disposition at this moment was more conciliatory ; in answer
to a question put to him by M. Dumaine, whom I instructed to call
the attention of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the anxiety
aroused in Europe, Baron Macchio stated^ to our Ambassador that the
tone of the Austrian note, and the demands which would be formu-
lated in it, allow us to count on a peaceful result. In view of the
customary procedure of the Imperial Chancery I do not know what
confidence ought to be placed in these assurances.

In any case the Austrian note will be presented in a very short
space of time. The Servian Minister holds that as M. Pashitch wishes
to come to an understanding, he will accept those demands which
relate to the punishment of the outrage and to the guarantees for
control and police supervision, but that he will resist everything
which might affect the sovereignty and dignity of his country.

In diplomatic circles at Vienna the German Ambassador is in
favour of violent measures, while at the same time he confesses that

1 Exactly the same explanation for the forthcoming time limit was advanced in
French Yellow Book, Nos. 13 and 14, as early as July 19, 1914. Austria could, of
course, not know that the substance of her note and her reasons for it had been familiar
to the Entente Powers since the previous Sunday.

2 French Yellow Book No. 18, July 22, 1915.

3 The interview here referred to is not mentioned in the only published Despatch,
French Yellow Book No. 18, July 22, 1915, on which the present message can be based.

July 23, German White Book Exhibit 1 59

the Imperial Chancery is perhaps not entirely in agreement with
him on this point ; the Russian Ambassador, trusting to assurances
which have been given him, has left Vienna, and before his departure
confided to M. Dumaine that his Government will not raise any ob-
jection to the punishment of the guilty and the dissolution of the rev-
olutionary associations, but that they could not accept requirements
which were humiliating to the national sentiment of Servia.

Bienvenu-Martin.

From Munich

French Yellow Book No. 21

M. Allize, French Minister at Munich, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Paris.

Munich, July 23, 1914.

The Bavarian press seems to believe that a peaceful solution of
the Austro-Servian incident is not only possible but even probable ;
on the other hand official circles have for some time been assuming
with more or less sincerity an air of real pessimism.

In particular the President of the Council said to me to-day that
the Austrian note the contents of which were known to him {dont il
avait cqnnaissance ^) was in his opinion drawn up in terms which could
be accepted by Servia, but that none the less the existing situation
appeared to him to be very serious.

Germany :

To Paris, London, and Petrograd

German WmTE Book ExmsiT 1^

The Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassadors at Paris, London, and
St. Petersburg, on July 23rd, 1914-

The publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government con-
cerning the circumstances under which the assassination of the
Austrian successor to the throne and his consort took place, disclose
clearly the aims which the pan-Serb propaganda has set itself and the

1 The French phrase does not imply accurate knowledge. It may mean that he
had a general idea of the contents, possibly similar to that shared by the Entente
Powers since July 19', 1914 ; cf. French Yellow Book, Nos. 13 and 14.

Bavaria is one of the federated States comprising the German Empire. Owing to
its size and importance it enjoys special prerogatives, one of which is its independent
representation in some foreign capitals and at the Vatican. Diplomatic negotiations
of importance and those concerning the Empire are conducted by the German Foreign
Office and the German Ambassadors and Ministers. If the President of the Bavarian
Council had more accurate information of the Austrian note than the phrase definitely
says he had, he may have received it through the Bavarian Minister who being a
CathoUc may be assumed to have been in intimate personal relations with the leading
Catholics of Austria-Hungary.

2 The German Foreign Office is not in the habit of issuing collected diplomatic
papers on given subjects as the British Foreign Office is. As regards the outbreak of
the European War the German Foreign Office contented itself with issuing a narra-
tive to which a number of despatches were added as exhibits. There are therefore
comparatively few German despatches published. For the narrative see pp. 551 to.
560.

60 Official Diplomatic Documents

means which it utiHses for their realization. Through the pub-
lished facts the last doubt must disappear that the centre of action
of the efforts for the separation of the South Slavic provinces from
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their union with the Servian
Kingdom must be sought in Belgrade where it displays its activity
with the connivance of members of the Government and of the
Army.

The Serb intrigues may be traced back through a series of years.
In a specially marked manner the pan-Serb chauvinism showed
itself during the Bosnian crisis.^ Only to the far-reaching self-re-
straint and moderation of the iVustro-Hungarian Government and the
energetic intercession of the Powers is it to be ascribed that the provo-
cations to which at that time Austria-Hungary was exposed on the
part of Servia, did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of future
well-behaviour which the Servian Government gave at that time, it
has not kept. Under the very eyes, at least with the tacit sufferance
of official Servia, the pan-Serb propaganda has meanwhile increased
in scope and intensity ; at its door is to be laid the latest crime the
threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become evident that it is
compatible neither with the dignity nor with the self-preservation
of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to view any longer idly the doings
across the border through which the safety and the integrity of the
Monarchy are permanently threatened. With this state of affairs,
the action as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Govern-
ment can be viewed only as justifiable. Nevertheless, the attitude
assumed by public opinion as well as by the Government in Servia
does not preclude the fear that the Servian Government will decline
to meet these demands and that it w^ill allow itself to be carried away
into a provocative attitude toward Austria-Hungary. Nothing would
remain for the Austro-Hungarian Government, unless it renounced
definitely its position as a great Power, but to press its demands with
the Servian Government, and, if need be, enforce the same by appeal
to military measures, in regard to which the choice of means must be
left with it.

I have the honour to request you to express yourself ^ in the sense
indicated above to (the present representative of M. Viviani) (Sir
Edward Grey) (M. Sasonof) and therewith give special emphasis
to the view that in this question there is concerned an affair which
should be settled solely between Austria-Hungary and Servia, the
limitation to which it must be the earnest endeavour of the powers
to insure. We anxiously desire the localisation of the conflict because

1 Of 1908-1909.

2 Austria had sent her note to her representative in Belgrade on July 22, and notified
her other representatives on the same day, Austro-Hungarian Red Book Nos. 7 and 8.
The formal presentation of the note in Serbia was to take place in the afternoon of
July 23, while the Powers were to be informed of it officially, receiving a copy of the
note on July 24, 1914 ; cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 9. Informally the Powers
were informed on July 23 ; cf. British Blue Book No. 3, July 23, 1914.

On July 21, French Yellow Book No. 15, the German Secretary of Foreign Affairs had
said he did not know the contents of the forthcoming note. Between then and July 23,
Germany had been informed of the note, and as the above despatch proves, given her
approval.

July 23, British Blue Book No. 3 61

every intercession of another power on account of the various treaty-
aUiances would precipitate inconceivable consequences.

I shall look forward with interest to a telegraphic report about
the course of your interview.

Great Britain :

From Rome

British Blue Book No. 38

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Re-
ceived July 27.)^

Sir, Rome, July 23, 1914.

I GATHER that the Italian Government have been made cognisant
of the terms of the communication which will be addressed to Servia.
Secretary-General, whom I saw this morning at the Italian Foreign
Office, took the view that the gravity of the situation lay in the con-
viction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that it was absolutely
necessary for their prestige, after the many disillusions which the turn
of events in the Balkans has occasioned, to score a definite success.

I have, etc.

Rennell Rodd.

To Vienna
British Blue Book No. 3
Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.
Sir, Foreign Office, July 23, 1914.

Count Mensdorff ^ told me to-day that he would be able to-
morrow morning to let me have officially the communication that he
understood was being made to Servia to-day by Austria. He then
explained privately what the nature of the demand would be. As he
told me that the facts would all be set out in the paper that he would
give me to-morrow, it is unnecessary to record them now. I gathered
that they would include proof of the complicity of some Servian
officials in the plot to murder the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and a
long list of demands consequently made by Austria on Servia.

As regards all this, I said that it was not a matter on which I would
make any comment until I received an official communication, and
it seemed to me probably a matter on which I should not be able to
make any comment at first sight.

But, when Count Mensdorff told me that he supposed there would

1 This is a letter, delayed in transmission to July 27, and therefore printed by Sir
E. Grey among the July 27 despatches. Important diplomatic messages are sent in
duplicate by telegram and by letter. This is one of the few instances where Sir E.
Grey did not print the telegram, which undoubtedly was properly received. The
British Blue Book contains no explanation.

2 Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

62 Official Diplomatic Documents

be something in the nature of a time-Hmit, which was in effect akin
to an ultimatum, I said that I regretted ^ this very much. To begin
with a time-Hmit might inflame opinion in Russia, and it would make
it difficult, if not impossible, to give more time, even if after a few
days it appeared that by giving more time there would be a prospect
of securing a peaceful settlement and getting a satisfactory reply from
Servia. I admitted that, if there was no time-limit, the proceedings
might be unduly protracted, but I urged that a time-limit could al-
ways be introduced afterwards ; that, if the demands were made with-
out a time-limit in the first instance, Russian public opinion might
be less excited, after a week it might have cooled down, and if the
Austrian case was very strong it might be apparent that the Russian
Government would be in a position to use their influence in favour
of a satisfactory reply from Servia. A time-limit was generally a
thing to be used only in the last resort, after other means had been
tried and failed.

Count Mensdorff said that if Servia, in the interval that had elapsed
since the murder of the Archduke, had voluntarily instituted an en-
quiry on her own territory, all this might have been avoided. In
1909, Servia had said in a note that she intended to live on terms
of good neighbourhood with Austria; but she had never kept her
promise, she had stirred up agitation the object of which was to dis-
integrate Austria, and it was absolutely necessary for Austria to pro-
tect herself.

I said that I would not comment upon or criticise what Count
Mensdorff had told me this afternoon, but I could not help dwelling
upon the awful consequences involved in the situation. Great
apprehension had been expressed to me, not specially by M. Cambon
and Count Benckendorff,^ but also by others, as to what might
happen, and it had been represented to me that it would be very de-
sirable that those who had influence in St. Petersburgh should use it
on behalf of patience and moderation. I had replied that the amount
of influence that could be used in this sense would depend upon how
reasonable were the Austrian demands and how strong the justifica-
tion that Austria might have discovered for making her demands.
The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible. If as
many as four Great Powers of Europe — let us say, Austria, France,
Russia, and Germany — were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it
must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money, and such an
interference with trade, that a war would be accompanied or followed
by a complete collapse of European^ credit and industry. In these
days, in great industrial States, this would mean a state of things
worse than that of 1848, and, irrespective of who were victors in the
war, many things might be completely swept away.

1 France, and therefore probably the Entente Powers had known of the time limit
since July 19, 1914 ; cf. French Yellow Book, Nos. 13 and 14.

2 Accounts of previous interviews to this effect with the Russian and French Am-
bassadors are not printed in the British Blue Book.

' This suggests what Sir E. Grey said in his speech of August 3, that England
would suffer almost as much if she stayed out as if she entered the war. Such a view
contemplates only England's trade, and disregards the loss of lives.

July 23, Russian Orange Booh No. 2 63

Count Mensdorff did not demur to this statement of the possible
consequences of the present situation, but he said that all would de-
pend upon Russia.

I made the remark that, in a time of difficulties such as this, it was
just as true to say that it required two to keep the peace as it was to
say, ordinarily, that it took two to make a quarrel. I hoped very
much that, if there were difficulties, Austria and Russia would
be able in the first instance to discuss them directly with each
other.

Count Mensdorff said that he hoped this would be possible, but
he was under the impression that the attitude in St. Petersburgh
had not been very favourable recently.

I am, etc.

E. Grey.

Russia :

From Belgrade.

Russian Okange Book No. 1

Russian Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade to Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

(Telegram.) Belgrade, July 10 {23), 1914.

The Austrian Minister, at 6 o'clock this evening, presented an
ultimatum from his Government to the Minister of Finance, Patcho/U,
in the absence of Pashitch, requiring the acceptance of the demands
contained therein within forty-eight hours. Giesl added verbally
that, in the event of failure to accept the note integrally within forty-
eight hours, he was under instructions to leave Belgrade with the
staff at the legation. Pashitch and the other Ministers, who are
away electioneering, have been recalled and are expected at Bel-
grade to-morrow, Friday, at 10 a.m. Patchou, who communicated
to me the contents of the note, solicits the help of Russia and de-
clares that no Servian Government could accept the demands of
Austria.

Russian Orange Book No. 2

Russian Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade to Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

(Telegram.) Belgrade, July 10 (23), 1914.

Text of the note presented to the Servian Government by the
Austro-Hungarian Minister to-day.

[Here follows the text of the note, for which see Austro-Hungarian Red Book
No. 7, July 22, 1914.]

64 Official Diplomatic Documents

Serbia :

From Austro-Hungarian Minister

Serbian Blue Book No. 32

Baron Giesl mn Gieslingen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade,
to Dr. Laza Patchou, Acting Prime Minister and Minister for
Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Belgrade, July 10/£3, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to Your Excellency herewith the
enclosed Note which I have received from my Government, addressed
to the Royal Serbian Government.

I have, etc.

Handed personally at 6 p.m.

[For the text of the note see Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. 7, July 22, 1914.]

To All the Serbian Legations Abroad

Serbian Blue Book No. 33

Dr. Laza Patchou, Acting Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad.

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 10/23, 1914.

The Austro-Hungarian Minister handed me this afternoon at
6 P.M. a note in regard to the Serajevo outrage embodying the demands
of the Austro-Hungarian Government, and insisting on a reply from
the Serbian Government within two days, i.e., by Saturday, at 6 p.m.
He informed me orally that he and his staff would leave Belgrade
unless a favourable answer were forthcoming within the stipulated
time.

Some of the Ministers being absent from Belgrade the Serbian
Government have not as yet come to any decision, but I am in a
position to state now that the demands are such that no Serbian
Government could accept them in their entirety.

July 24, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 17

Friday, July 24, 1914
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

Foreign Office of

Austria-Hungary

Belgium

France

Germany
Great Britain

Russia

Serbia

Sent Despatches to

Received Despatches from

London, Petrograd
London, etc.
Viviani, London, etc.

Vienna, Paris,

Belgrade
Vienna, London etc.

Petrograd, London
Crown Prince to Czar

London, Paris, Petrograd

Vienna

Viviani, Berlin, London, Petrograd,
Aust.-Hung. Ambassador
Vienna, Petrograd
Berlin, Petrograd, Vienna, Belgrade, Ger-
man Ambassador

Berlin, Paris, Belgrade Aust.-Hung.
Ambassador, Crown Prince of
Servia

Petrograd

The Governments of the several European Powers are officially notified of the
Austro-Hungarian note to Servia.

Austria-Hungary and Germany insist that the dispute remain localized between
Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

Great Britain proposes a Conference of four Powers, Great Britain, France,
Germany and Italy to mediate between Austria and Russia. At the request of
the French Ambassador she apparently alters her plan to mean mediation between
Austria and Serbia. From the published despatches of this day, which are con-
tradictory, it does not appear which plan Great Britain is urging. She refuses
however, to exert pressure on Russia while asking Germany to exert pressure in
Vienna.

Great Britain refuses Russia's request to promise her unconditional support of
Russia and France, but instructs her representative in Belgrade to express no
views except in agreement with the representatives of the other two Entente
Powers, whose alliance with each other she recognizes to be as binding as that of
Austria-Hungary and Germany.

Serbia is sure that war on her means a European War.

Russia is hostile in her dealings with Austria-Hungary and Germany, and
discusses her determination to support Serbia even to the extent of going to war,
but does so only with the Entente Powers.

France promises to support Russia in war, if need be, but gives active diplo-
matic support to Great Britain's proposal of a Conference of Four Powers. Italy
does the same.

Great Britain mobilizes her fleet, according to French Yellow Book No. 66,
July 27, 1914, but does not mention this fact in any of her published despatches.

Belgium foresees a European war.

Austria-Hungary :

To London

AUSTRO-HUNGAKIAN ReD BoOK No. 17

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London,

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 24, 1914,

In answer to Your Excellency's telegram of yesterday :
I beg you to explain at once to Sir Edward Grey that our demarche
of yesterday at Belgrade is not to be considered as a formal ultimatum,

66 Official Diplomatic Documents

but that it is merely a demarche with a time-Hmit, which, as Your
Excellency will be good enough to explain to Sir Edward Grey in
strict confidence will — if the time-limit expires without result — for
the time be followed only by the breaking off of diplomatic relations,
and by the beginning of the necessary military preparations, as we
are absolutely resolved to carry through our just demands.

Your Excellency is empowered to add that if Servia, after the ex-
piration of the time-limit, were only to give way under the pressure of
our military preparations, we should indeed have to demand that she
should make good the expenses which we had incurred ; as is well
known, we have already had twice (1908 and 1912) to mobilise because
of Servia.

Austria-Hungary:

From London

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 10

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.) London, July 24, 1914-

Have just handed the circular note to Sir Edward Grey, who
read it carefully. At the fifth heading, he asked what it meant;
to introduce officials of our Government in Servia would be equivalent
to the end of Servian political independence. I answered that co-
operation of, e.g., police officials, in no way affected the sovereignty
of the State.

He regretted the time-limit, as in this way we should be deprived
of the possibility of quieting the first outbreak of excitement and bring-
ing pressure to bear upon Belgrade to give us a satisfactory answer.
It was always possible to send an ultimatum if answer not satis-
factory.

I developed our point of view at length. (Necessity of defence
against continued revolutionary undertakings which threaten the
territory of the Monarchy, protection of our most vital interests,
complete failure of the conciliatory attitude which we had hitherto
often shown to Servia, who had had more than three weeks to set
on foot of her own accord investigations as to accomplices in outrage,
etc.)

The Secretary of State repeated his objections to the short time-
limit, but recognized that what was said as to complicity in the crime
of Serajevo, as well as many of our other requirements, was justified.

He would be quite ready to look on the affair as one which only
concerned Austria-Hungary and Servia. He is, however, very
"apprehensive" that several Great Powers might be involved in a
war. Speaking of Russia, Germany and France, he observed that
the terms of the Franco-Russian Alliance might be more or less to the
same effect as those of the Triple Alliance.

I fully explained to him our point of view, and repeated with
emphasis that in this case we must stand firm so as to gain for our-

July 24, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 11 67

selves some sort of guarantees, as hitherto Servian promises have never
been kept. I understand that in the first place he considered the
question only as it influences the position of Europe. He must, how-
ever, in order to be fair to our point of view, put himself in our situa-
tion.

He would not go into any more detailed discussion on this subject,
said he must have time to study the note more carefully. He was
to see the German and the French Ambassadors, as he must first of all
exchange ideas with the Powers who are allies of Austria-Hungary
and Russia respectively, but have themselves no direct interest in
Servia.

From Paris
Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 11
Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold,
(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 2^, 1914.

I HAVE just read instructions of the 22nd instant to the Minister
of Justice,^ who is entrusted with the representation of the Minister
for Foreign Affairs in his absence, and left copy.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, who had received information as to the con-
tents of our demarche at Belgrade through this morning's papers,
seemed to be considerably impressed by my communication. With-
out entering on any more detailed discussion of the text, he readily
agreed that recent events and the attitude of the Servian Government
made energetic action on our side quite comprehensible.

Point 5 in the note handed in at Belgrade seemed to make a special
impression on the Minister as he asked me to read it to him twice.

The Minister thanked me for my communication which, he said,
would be carefully examined. I took the opportunity to impress on
him that the question was one which must be brought to an issue
directly between Servia and us, but that it was in the general interests
of Europe that the trouble which for years past had been kept up by
Servian intrigues against us should at last make way for a clear situa-
tion.

All friends of peace and order, and I placed France in the first
rank of these, should therefore give serious advice to Servia com-
pletely to change her attitude, and to satisfy our just demands.

The Minister said that it was the duty of Servia to proceed ener-
getically against any accomplices of the murderers of Serajevo, a
duty which she could not escape. While laying special stress on the
sympathy of France for Austria-Hungary, and on the good relations
which existed between our two countries, he expressed the hope that
the controversy would be brought to an end peacefully in a manner
corresponding to our wishes.

The Minister avoided every attempt to palliate or to defend in
any way the attitude of Servia.

1 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 25, July 24, 1914.

68 Official Diplomatic Documents

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 12

Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 2Jj., 19H.

Baron Schoen will, in accordance with instructions/ make a com-
munication here to-day that according to the view of the Berlin
Cabinet, our controversy with Servia is a matter which concerns only
Austria-Hungary and Servia.

In this connection, he would give them to understand that in case
third States should wish to intervene, Germany, true to the obligations
of her alliance, would-be on our side.

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 13

Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 24, 1914-

Baron Schoen has just made the demarche as he was instructed.

M. Bienvenu-Martin said to him he could not yet express himself
definitely. He could, however, already say this, that the French
Government are also of opinion that our controversy with Servia
concerns Belgrade and Vienna alone, and that it was hoped here that
the question would find a direct and peaceful solution.

The Servian Minister here had already been advised ^ that his
Government should give way in every point so far as it was possible,
with the limitation, however, " so far as their sovereign rights were not
affected."

Baron Schoen laid stress on the European necessity that the focus
of constant disturbance at Belgrade must at last be done away with.

To Petrograd

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 18

Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petershurgh.

Vienna, July 24, 1914-

I RECEIVED the Russian Charge d'Affaires on the morning of the
24th, and assured him that I attached special importance to bringing
to his knowedge as soon as possible the steps we were taking in Bel-
grade, and explaining to him our point of view as regards them.

Prince Koudacheff, while thanking me for this courtesy, did not
hide his anxiety as to our categorical procedure against Servia, and
he observed that there had always been apprehension at St. Peters-
burgh that our demarche might take the form of a humiliation of
Servia, which must have an echo in Russia.

1 took the opportunity of reassuring the Russian Charge d'Affaires

» German White Book, Exhibit 1, July 23, 1914.

2 Cf. Serbian Blue Book No. 10, July 2. For different advice given Serbia by
France, see French Yellow Book No. 26, July 24, 1914.

July 24, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. I4. 69

as to this. Our aim was to clear up the untenable position of Servia
as regards the Monarchy, and with this object to cause the Govern-
nient of that State on the one hand publicly to disavow the tendencies
directed against the present position of the Monarchy, and to suppress
them by administrative measures, and on the other hand to make it
possible for us to satisfy ourselves that these measures were honestly
carried out. I explained at greater length the danger, not only to
the integrity of the Monarchy, but also to the balance of power and
the peace of Europe, which would be involved in giving further scope
to the Great-Servian propaganda, and how all the dynasties, and, not
least, the Russian, would apparently be threatened, if the idea took
root that a movement which made use of murder as a national weapon
could be continued with impunity.

In conclusion, I pointed out that we did not aim at any increase
of territory, but only at the maintenance of what we possess, a point
of view which could not fail to be understood by the Russian Govern-
ment.

Prince Koudacheff remarked on this that he did not know the view
of his own Government, and also did not know what position Servia
would take towards individual demands.

At the conclusion of our interview the Charge d 'Affaires expressly
said that he would not fail to bring to the notice of his Government
the explanation which I had given him of the step we had taken,
especially to the effect that no humiliation of Servia was intended
by us.

From Petrograd
Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 14
Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold.
(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 24, 1914.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs on receiving me, said that he knew
what brought me to him, and he would at once explain to me that he
could not take up any definite attitude towards my demarche. , I be-
gan by reading out my instructions.^ The Minister interrupted me
for the first time on the mention of the series of outrages, and, on my
explanation, asked if then it had been proved that they all had orig-
inated at Belgrade. I laid stress on the fact that they all sprang
from Servian instigation. In the further course of the reading he said
that he knew what it was all about : we wanted to make war on Servia,
and this was to serve as a pretext. I replied that our attitude during
recent years was a sufficient proof that we neither sought nor required
pretexts against Servia. The formal declaration which is required
did not elicit any objection from the Minister ; he only continued to
maintain that Pasic had already expressed himself to this effect. This
I corrected. "II dira cela 25 fois si vous midez,'' said he. I said to
him that no one among us was attacking the integrity of Servia or the

1 Austro-Hungarian Red Book Nos. 7 and 8, July 22, 1914.

70 Official Diplomatic Documents

dynasty. M. Sazonof expressed himself most vigorously against the
dissolution of the Narodna Odbrana, which Servia would never under-
take. The participation of Imperial and Royal officials in the sup-
pression of the revolutionary movements elicited further protest on
the part of the Minister. Servia then will no longer be master in
her own house. " You will always be wanting to intervene again, and
what a life you will lead Europe." I answered that if Servia shows
goodwill it will be a quieter life than hitherto.

The commentary added to the communication of the note was
listened to by the Minister with fair composure ; at the passage that
our feelings were shared by those of all civilised nations, he observed
that this was a mistake. With all the emphasis I could command, I
pointed out how regrettable it would be if we could not come to an
understanding with Russia on this question, in which everything
which is most sacred to us was at stake and, whatever the Minister
might say, everything which is sacred in Russia. The Minister
attempted to minimise the Monarchial side of the question.

With regard to the dossier which was put at the disposal of the
Governments, M. Sazonof wanted to know why we had given our-
selves this trouble, as we had already delivered the ultimatum. This
was the best proof that we did not really desire an impartial examina-
tion of the matter. I said to him that the results which had been
attained by our own investigations were quite sufficient for our pro-
cedure in this matter, which had to do with Austria-Hungary and
Servia, and that we were only ready to give the Powers further infor-
mation if it interested them, as we had nothing to keep secret.

M. Sazonof said that now that the ultimatum had been issued he
was not in the least curious. He represented the matter as if we only
wanted to make war with Servia whatever happened. I answered
that we were the most peace-loving Power in the world, but what
we wanted was security for our territory from foreign revolutionary
intrigues, and the protection of our dynasty from bombs.

In the course of the further discussion, M. Sazonof again made the
observation that we certainly had created a serious situation.

In spite of his relative calm, the attitude of the Minister was through-
out unaccommodating and hostile.

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 15

Communique of the Russian official Gazette,

St. Petershurgh, July 24, 1914.,

The St. Petersburgh telegraphic agency announces : —

The official journal publishes the following communique —
Recent events and the despatch of an ultimatum to Servia
by Austria-Hungary are causing the Russian Government
the greatest anxiety. The Government are closely following
the course of the dispute between the two countries, to which
Russia cannot remain indifferent.

July 24, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 16 71

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 16

Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 24, 1914.

After a Council of Ministers^ which lasted for five hours, M.
Sazonof this evening received the German Ambassador, and had a
long conversation with him.

The Minister took the point of view, which is probably to be con-
sidered as the outcome of the Council of Ministers, that the Austro-
Hungarian-Servian conflict was not a matter confined to these States,
but a European affair, as the settlement arrived at in the year 1909
by the Servian declaration had been made under the auspices of the
whole of Europe.

The Minister pointed out particularly that he had been disagree-
ably affected by the circumstance that Austria-Hungary had offered
a dossier for investigation when an ultimatum had already been
presented. Russia would require an international investigation of
the dossier, which had been put at her disposal. My German col-
league at once brought to M. Sazonof 's notice that Austria-Hungary
would not accept interference in her difference with Servia, and that
Germany also on her side could not accept a suggestion which would
be contrary to the dignity of her ally as a Great Power.

In the further course of the conversation, the Minister explained
that that which Russia could not accept with indifference was the
eventual intention of Austria-Hungary '' de devorer la Serbie." Count
Pourtales answered that he did not accept any such intention on
the part of Austria-Hungary, as this would be contrary to the most
special interest of the Monarchy. The only object of Austria-
Hungary was " d'infliger a la Serbie le chdtiment justement merite. ' ' M.
Sazonof on this expressed his doubts whether Austria-Hungary would
allow, herself to be contented with this, even if explanations on this
point had been made.

The interview concluded with an appeal by M. Sazonof that Ger-
many should work with Russia at the maintenance of peace.^ The
German Ambassador assured the Russian Minister that Germany
certainly had no wish to bring about a war, but that she naturally
fully represented the interests of her ally.

1 This is undoubtedly the Council of Ministers at which Mr. Sazonof said, British
Blue Book No. 6, July 24, 1914, he would have to consult his colleagues concerning the
reply which Serbia would make to Austria.

2 The condition on which Russia would insist is stated in British Blue Book No. 17,
July 25, 1914, where Sazonof, as a result of the Council of Ministers held in the after-
noon of July 24, states : "Russia could not allow Austria to crush Serbia and become
the predominant Power in the Balkans, and if she feels secure of the support of France,
she will face all the risks of war."

Students will note that while the determination of the Entente Powers to go to
war unless Austria-Hungary recedes from her position is occasionally expressed even in
the published despatches (e.g. British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, French Yellow Book
No. 38, July 25, and No. 37, which should be compared with British Blue Book No. 25,
same day. See also the Editor's " Germany's Point of View," page 230), this is nev^r
mentioned to any of the Triple Alliance Powers.

72 Official Diplomatic Documents

Belgium :

From Vienna

Belgian Gray Book No. 1

Count Erremhault de Dudzeele, Belgian Minister at Vienna, to M.
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Vienna, July 24, 1914-

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith the text of the Austro-
Hungarian ultimatum to Servia.

[Here follows the text of the Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia, Red Book No. 7,
July 22, 1914.]

To Paris, London, Berlin, Vienna and Petrograd

Belgian Gray Book No. 2

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian
Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg.

Sir, Brussels, July 24, 1914-

The Belgian Government have had under their consideration
whether, in present circumstances, it would not be advisable to
address to the Powers who guarantee Belgian independence and neu-
trality a communication assuring them of Belgium's determination to
fulfil the international obligations imposed upon her by treaty in
the event of a war breaking out on her frontiers.

The Government have come to the conclusion that such a communi-
tion would be premature at present, but that events might move
rapidly and not leave sufficient time to forward suitable instructions
at the desired moment to the Belgian representatives abroad.

In these circumstances I have proposed to the King and to my col-
leagues in the Cabinet, who have concurred, to give you now exact
instructions as to the steps to be taken by you if the prospect of a
Franco-German war became more threatening.

I enclose herewith a note, signed, but not dated, which you should
read to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and of which you should give
him a copy, if circumstances render such a communication necessary.

I will inform you by telegram when you are to act on these instruc-
tions.

This telegram will be despatched when the order is given for the
mobilisation of the Belgian army if, contrary to our earnest hope and
to the apparent prospect of a peaceful settlement, our information
leads us to take this extreme measure of precaution.

Enclosure in No. 2.
Sir,

The international situation is serious, and the possibility of a war
between several Powers naturally preoccupies the Belgian Government.

July 24i Belgian Gray Book No, 2 73

Belgium has most scrupulously observed ^ the duties of a neutral
State imposed upon her by the treaties of April 19, 1839 ; and those
duties she will strive unflinchingly to fulfil, whatever the circum-
stances may be.

The friendly feelings of the Powers towards her have been so often
reaffirmed that Belgium confidently expects that her territory will
remain free from any attack, should hostilities break out upon her
frontiers.

All necessary steps to ensure respect of Belgian neutrality have
nevertheless been taken by the Government. The Belgian army
has been mobilised and is taking up such strategic positions as have
been chosen to secure the defence of the country and the respect of
its neutrality. The forts of Antwerp and on the Meuse have been put
in a state of defence.

It is scarcely necessary to dwell upon the nature of these measures.
They are intended solely to enable Belgium to fulfil her international
obligations ; and it is obvious that they neither have been nor can
have been undertaken with any intention of taking part in an armed
struggle between the Powers or from any feeling of distrust of any
of those Powers.

In accordance with my instructions, I have the honour to communi-
cate to your Excellency a copy of the declaration by the Belgian
Government, and to request that you will be good enough to take
note of it.

A similar communication has been made to the other Powers
guaranteeing Belgian neutrality.^

1 The truth of this statement has been challenged by Germany. For the Official
Publications on this subject see European Politics During the Decade before the War
as Described by Belgian Diplomatists, German Foreign Office, 1915. See also Fuehr,
Alexander, The Neutrality of Belgium, Funk & Wagnalls Co., 1915.

2 These notes were presented to the several Powers on August 1, 1914, in accordance
with a telegram (see Belgian Gray Book No. 16) of that day ; i.e. a week and a day
after the note had been drawn.

One of the reasons why Belgium drew this note thus early, on July 24, may be
found in the events touched upon in an account of the experiences of a member of the
British Military Intelligence Department, given by himself before the Boston Press
Club on Sunday, January 14, 1915. This British officer is Mr. Forbes Sutherland,
who said according to an affidavit by two witnesses in the editor's possession :

That for several years he had been a member of the British Military -Intelligence
Department.

That he landed in New York toward the end of June, 1914, and he there found a
cablegram from the home office in London, already three days old, telling him to re-
port immediately.

That he telephoned to his local chief in Montreal, Canada, to mquire what it was
all about, and that he was told that it was for the European service.

That he had returned to London and that about one week before the first declara-
tion of war he had gone to Antwerp with one of the heads of the intelligence depart-
ment to concert measures with the head of the Belgian secret service.

74 Official Diplomatic Documents

From M. Viviani, the French Premier, who had been absent together
with the President on a msit to Russia.

French Yellow Book No. 22

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, to M. Rienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I SHOULD be obliged if you would urgently send on to M. Dumaine
the following information and instructions.

Reml, July 24, 1914, 1 A-M.

In the course of my conversation with the Russian Minister for
Foreign Affairs we had to take into consideration the dangers which
might result from any step taken by Austria-Hungary in relation to
Servia in connection with the crime of which the Hereditary Archduke
has been a victim. We found ourselves in agreement in thinking that
we should not leave anything undone to prevent a request for an ex-
planation or some mise en demeure which would be equivalent to in-
tervention in the internal affairs of Servia, of such a kind that Servia
might consider it as an attack on her sovereignty and independence.

We have in consequence come to the opinion that we might by
means of a friendly conversation with Count Berchtold, give him
counsels of moderation, of such a kind as to make him understand
how undesirable would be any intervention at Belgrade which would
appear to be a threat on the part of the Cabinet at Vienna.

The British Ambassador, who was kept informed by M. Sazonof,
expressed the idea that his Government would doubtless associate
itself with a demarche for removing any danger which might threaten
general peace, and he has telegraphed to his Government to this effect.

M. Sazonof has addressed instructions to this effect to M. Schebeko.
While there is no question in this of collective or concerted action at
Vienna on the part of the representatives of the Triple Entente, I ask
you to discuss the matter with the Russian and British Ambassadors,
and to come to an agreement with them as to the best means by which
each of you can make Count Berchtold understand without delay
the moderation that the present situation appears to us to require.

Further, it would be desirable to ask M. Paul Cambon to bring the
advantages of this procedure to the notice of Sir Edward Grey, and
to support the suggestion that the British Ambassador in Russia
will have made to this effect to the Foreign Office. Count Bencken-
dorff is instructed to make a similar recommendation.

Rene Viviani.

July 24, Frerwh Yellow Book No. 25 75

French Yellow Book No. 23

M. Biemenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Rene
Viviani, President of the Vouncil, on hoard the "France.''

Paris, July 2J,., 1914.

I HAVE sent on your instructions to Vienna as urgent, but ^ from in-
formation contained in this morning's papers it appears that the
Austrian note was presented at Belgrade at 6 o'clock yesterday
evening.

This note, the official text of which has not yet been handed to
us by the Austro-Hungarian x\mbassador, appears to be very sharp ;
it appears to aim not only at obtaining the prosecution of the Serbs
who were directly implicated in the outrage of Serajevo but to require
the immediate suppression of the whole of the anti-Austrian propa-
ganda in the Servian press and army. It is said to give Servia till
6 o'clock on Saturday evening to make her submission.

In sending your instructions to M. Dumaine I requested him to
come to an agreement with his British and Russian colleagues^ as to
his action.

Bienvenu-Martin. -

France

From the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador
French Yellow Book No. 24

[Here follows the text of the Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia, Austrian Red
Book No. 7, July 22, 1914.1

To Viviani, and London, Berlin, Vienna, Petrograd, Rome and Belgrade.

French Yellow Book No. 25

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Rene
Viviani, President of the Council, on board the "France,'' and to
London, Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburgh, Rome, Belgrade.

Paris, July 24, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Austro-Hungarian
Ambassador this morning left me a copy of the Austrian note which
was handed in at Belgrade on Thursday evening. Count Szecsen in-

1 M. Martin's reply, No. 23, indicates that he understood M. Viviani's message,
No. 22, to suggest means by which Austria-Hungary might be prevented from pre-
senting her note to Servia. If this was the meaning of the message, it can only have
been written with a view to future publication and not in the hope of accomplishing
anything. The note is dated July 24, 1 a.m. By that time both Russia and Great
Britain had been informed of the contents of the note (British Blue Book No. 3) and the
fact that the note had been presented (Russian Orange Book No, 2). In view of the
decision of the Entente Powers to have their representatives act in unison — cf. last
sentence of Yellow Book No. 23 with British Blue Book No. 12, July 24, 1914 — it is
certain that neither Great Britain nor Russia would have kept so important an event
as the presentation of the Austro-Hungarian note from the French Premier.

2 The Entente Powers acted in the Serbian difficulty as a unit from the first. Cf.
British Blue Book No. 12, same day, and French Yellow Book No. 23, same day, also
Serbian Blue Book No. 5, June 30, 1914.

76 Official Diplomatic Documents

forms me that the Austro-Hungarian Government gives the Servian
Government up to 5 o'clock on the evening of Saturday the 25th
for their answer.^

The note is based on the undertaking made by Servia on the
31st March 1909, to recognise the annexation of Bosnia and Herze-
govina, and reproaches the Servian Government with having tolerated
an anti-Austrian propaganda in which officials, the army, and the
press have taken part, a propaganda which threatens the security
and integrity of Austria, and the danger of which has been shown
by the crime of the 28th June which, according to the facts established
during the investigation, was planned at Belgrade.
. The Austrian Government explain that they are compelled to put
an end to a propaganda which forms a permanent danger to their
tranquillity, and to require from the Servian Government an official
pronouncement of their determination to condemn and suppress it,
by publishing in the Official Gazette of the 26th a declaration, the
terms of which are given, condemning it, stating their regret, and
threatening to crush it. A general order of the King to the Servian
army is at the same time to make these declarations known to the
army. In addition to this, the Servian Government are to undertake
to suppress publications, to dissolve the societies, to dismiss those
officers and civil servants whose names would be communicated to
them by the Austrian Government, to accept the cooperation of
Austrian officials in suppressing the subversive acts to which their
attention has been directed, as well as for the investigation into the
crime of Serajevo, and finally to proceed to the immediate arrest of a
Servian officer and an official who were concerned in it.

Annexed to the Austrian memorandum is a note which sums up
the facts established by the investigation into the crime of Serajevo,
and declares that it was planned at Belgrade ; that the bombs were
provided for the murderers, and came from a depot of the Servian
army ; finally that the murderers were drilled and helped by Servian
officers and officials.

On visiting the Acting Political Director immediately after making
this communication, Count Szecsen without any observations in-
formed him that the note had been presented. M. Berthelot, on
my instructions, confined himself to pointing out to the Austro-
Hungarian Ambassador the feeling of anxiety which had been aroused
by the information available this morning as to the contents of the
Austrian note, and the painful feeling which could not fail to be
aroused in French public opinion by the time chosen for so categorical

1 The French Yellow Book prints here the following note : " The Austro-Hungarian
Ambassador in a private letter on the 24th July sent to the Minister for Foreign Afifairs
the following correction :

" 'In the copy of the dispatch which I had the honour to send to your Excellency
this morning, it was said that my Government expected an answer from the Cabinet
at Belgrade at latest by 5 o'clock on the evening of Saturday the 25th of this month.
As our Minister at Belgrade did not deliver his note yesterday until 6 o'clock in the
evening, the time allowed for the answer has in consequence been prolonged to 6
o'clock to-morrow, Saturday evening.

"'I consider it my duty to inform your Excellency of this slight alteration in the
termination of the period fixed for the answer to the Servian Government.' "

July 24, French Yellow Book No. 26 11

a demarche with so short a time Hmit ; that is to say, a time when the
President of the Republic and the President of the Council and
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic had left St. Petersburgh
and were at sea/ and consequently were not able to exert, in agree-
ment with those Powers which were not directly interested, that
soothing influence on Servia and Austria which was so desirable in
the interest of general peace. ^

The Servian Minister has not yet received any information as to
the intentions of his Government.

The German Ambassador has asked me to receive him at 5 o'clock

this afternoon. ^

Bienvenu-Martin.

To Stockholm — for M. Vimani — Belgrade, Vienna, London, Berlin,

Rome, Petrograd

French Yellow Book No. 26

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M.
Thiehaut, French Minister at Stockholm (for the President of the
Council), and to Belgrade, Vienna, London, Berlin, Rome, St.
Petersburgh.

Paris, July 24, 1914-

M. Vesnitch was this morning still without any telegram from
his Government informing him as to their intentions, and did not
know the contents of the Austrian note.^

To a request for advice which he made to the Political Director,
M. Berthelot said to him, speaking personally and for himself alone,
that Servia must try to gain time,^ as the limit of forty-eight hours
perhaps formed rather a "mise en demeure^' than an ultimatum in
the proper sense of the term ; that there might, for instance, be an
opportunity of offering satisfaction on all those points which were
not inconsistent with the dignity and sovereignty of Servia ; he was
advised to draw attention to the fact that statements based on the
Austrian investigations at Serajevo were one sided, and that Servia,
while she was quite ready to take measures against all the accomplices
of a crime which she most strongly condemned, required full in-
formation as to the evidence in order to be able to verify it with all
speed ; above all to attempt to escape from the direct grip of Austria
by declaring herself ready to submit to the arbitration of Europe.

I have asked at London and St. Petersburgh for the views and in-
tentions of the British and Russian Governments. It appears on

1 This thought is stated as coining from the Russian Charg6 d 'Affaires in Berlin,
in Yellow Book No. 29, July 24, 1914. Cf. also British Blue Book No. 6.

2 The Austrian Ambassador reporting to his home office (Austro-Hungarian Red
Book No. 11, July 24), does not mention this interview with the Acting Political Director.

On the other hand M. Bienvenu-Martin does not state here what the Ambassador
quotes him there as having said.

3 The contents of the Austrian note had been published in the French morning
papers of July 24, 1914, see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 11, July 24; and had
been disclosed to Sir Edward Grey, British Blue Book No. 3, July 23, 1914.

* The advice given Serbia by France is differently stated in Austro-Hungarian Red
Book No. 13, July 24, 1914.

78y Official Diplomatic Documents

the other hand from our information that the Austrian note was not
communicated to Italy until to-day, and that Italy had neither been
consulted nor even informed ^ of it.

Bienvenu-Martin.

French Yellow Book No. 27

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stock-
holm {for the President of the Council), and to Belgrade, London,
St. Petershurgh, Berlin, Rome.

Paris, July 2Ii., 1914-

The French Ambassador at Vienna informs me ^ that opinion has
been startled by the sudden and exaggerated nature of the Austrian
demands, but that the chief fear of the military party appears to be
that Servia may give way.

The Servian Minister in Austria thinks that his. Government will
show themselves very conciliatory in all that concerns the punish-
ment of the accomplices of the crime, and the guarantees to be given
as to the suppression of the anti-Austrian propaganda, but that they
could not accept a general order to the army dictated to the King,
nor the dismissal of officers who were suspected by Austria, nor the
interference of foreign officials in Servia. M. Yovanovitch considers
that, if it were possible to start a discussion, a settlement of the dis-
pute might still be arranged, with the assistance of the Powers.

Our Ambassador at Berlin ^ gives an account of the excitement
aroused by the Austrian note, and of the state of feeling of the Russian
Charge d'Affaires, who thinks that a large part of opinion in Ger-
many would desire war. The tone of the press is threatening and
appears to have as its object the intimidation of Russia. Our
Ambassador is to see Herr von Jagow this evening.

M. Barrere informs us that Italy "^ is exercising moderating influence
at Vienna and is trying to avoid complications.

Bienvenu-Martin.

French Yellow Book No. 28

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stock-
holm {for the President of the Council), and to Belgrade, London,
St. Petershurgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.

Paris, July 24, 1914.

Herr von Schoen came to inform me of a note from his Govern-
ment, of which he would not leave me a copy,^ but at my request he
read it twice over to me.

1 This seems to be at variance with British Blue Book No. 38, July 23, 1914.

2 The despatch from the French Ambassador in Vienna here referred to has not
been published.

» Cf. below French Yellow Book No. 29. July 24, 1914.

* The despatch from the French Ambassador in Rome here referred to has not been
published.

' There is no reason why he should not leave a copy with M. Martin. The Ger-
man Ambassador in London apparently left a copy with Sir E. Grey ; British Blue Book

July 2Jf, French Yellow Book No. 28 79

The Note was almost word for word as follows : —

"The statements of the Austro-Hungarian newspapers concerning
the circumstances under which the assassination of the Austrian heir
presumptive and his consort has taken place disclose unmistakably
the aims which the Pan-Servian propaganda has set itself, and the
means it employs to realise them. The facts made known must also
do away with all doubt that the centre of activity of all those tend-
encies which are directed towards the detachment of the Southern
Slav provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their in-
corporation into the Servian Kingdom is to be found in Belgrade, and
is, at any rate, at work there, with the connivance of members of the
Government and the army.

"The Servian intrigues have been going on for many years. In
an especially marked form the Pan-Servian chauvinism manifested
itself during the Bosnian crisis. It was only owing to the moderation
and far-reaching self-restraint of the Austro-Hungarian Government
and to the energetic intervention of the Great Powers that the Servian
provocations to which Austria-Hungary was then exposed did not
lead to a conflict. The assurance of good conduct in future which
was given by the Servian Government at that time has not been kept.
Under the eyes, at least with the tacit permission, of official Servia,
the Pan-Servian propaganda has, since that time, continuously in-
creased in extension and intensity. To its account must be set the
recent crime, the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become
clearly evident that it would not be consistent either with the dignity
or with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to
remain longer inactive in face of this movement on the other side of the
frontier, by which the security and the integrity of her territories are
constantly menaced. Under these circumstances, the course of pro-
cedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only
be regarded as justified. In spite of that, the attitude which public
opinion as well as the Government in Servia have recently adopted
does not exclude the apprehension that the Servian Government
might refuse to comply with those demands, and might even allow
themselves to be carried away into a provocative attitude towards
Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Government, if they do
not wish definitely to abandon Austria's position as a Great Power,
would then have no choice but to obtain the fulfilment of their de-
mands from the Servian Government by strong pressure and, if
necessary, by using military measures, the choice of the means having
to be left to them."

The German Ambassador particularly called my attention to the
last two paragraphs of his note before reading it, pressing the point
that this was the important matter. I noted down the text literally ;
it is as follows : — " The German Government consider that in the
present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively

No. 9, July 24, 1914. M. Martin must have had a copy of it when he wrote this mes-
sage. However excellent his memory is, he could not have quoted a lengthy note as
accurately as he did, from memory.

80 Official Diplomatic Docummts

betweei? Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that the Great Powers
ought seriously to endeavour to restrict it to those two immediately
concerned.

"The German Government desire urgently the localisation of the
dispute, because every interference of another Power would, owing
to the natural play of alliances, be followed by incalculable conse-
quences."

I called the German Ambassador's attention to the fact that while
it might appear legitimate to demand the punishment of all those
who were implicated in the crime of Serajevo, on the other hand
it seemed difficult to require measures which could not be accepted,
having regard to the dignity and sovereignty of Servia ; the Servian
Government, even if it was willing to submit to them, would risk being
carried away by a revolution.

I also pointed out to Herr von Schoen that his note only took into
account two hypotheses : that of a pure and simple refusal or that of
a provocative attitude on the part of Servia. The third hypothesis
(which would leave the door open for an arrangement) should also
be taken into consideration ; that of Servia's acceptance and of her
agreeing at once to give full satisfaction for the punishment of the ac-
complices and full guarantees for the suppression of the anti-Austrian
propaganda so far as they were compatible with her sovereignty and
dignity.

I added that if within these limits the satisfaction desired by
Austria could be admitted, the means of obtaining it could be
examined ; if Servia gave obvious proof of goodwill it could not be
thought that Austria would refuse to take part in the conversation.

Perhaps they should not make it too difficult for third Powers, who
could not either morally or sentimentally cease to take interest in
Servia, to take an attitude which was in accord with the wishes of
Germany to localise the dispute.

Herr von Schoen recognised the justice of these considerations and
vaguely stated that hope was always possible. When I asked him if
we should give to the x\ustrian note the character of a simple mise en
demeure, which permitted a discussion, or an ultimatum, he answ^ered
that personally he had no views. Bienvenu-Martin.

From Berlin

French Yellow Book No. 29

M, Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 24, 1914.

The delivery of the Austrian note to Servia has made a deep im-
pression.

The Austrian Ambassador declares that his Government could
not abate any of their demands. At the Wilhelmstrasse, as well as
in the press, the same view is expressed.

July 24, French Yellow Book No. 30 81

Most of the Charges d'Affaires present in Berlin came to see me
this morning. They show Httle hope of a peaceful issue. The
Russian Charge d'Affaires bitterly remarked that Austria has pre-
sented her note at the very moment that the President of the Republic
and the President of the Council had left St. Petersburgh.^ He is in-
clined to think that a considerable section of opinion in Germany
desires war and would like to seize this opportunity, in which Austria
will not doubt be found more united than in the past, and in which
the German Emperor, influenced by a desire to give support to the
monarchic principle (par un sentiment de solidarite monarchique) and
by horror at the crime, is less inclined to show a conciliatory attitude.

Herr von Jagow is going to receive me late in the afternoon.

Jules Cambon.

French Yellow Book No. 30

M. Jules Camhon, French Ambassador at Berlin^ to M. Bienvenu-.
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 24, 1914.

I ASKED the Secretary of State to-day, in the interview which I
had w^ith him, if it was correct, as announced in the newspapers,
that Austria had presented a note to the Powers on her dispute
with Servia ; if he had received it ; and what view he took of it.

Herr von Jagow^ answered me in the affirmative, adding that the
note was forcible, and that he approved it, the Servian Government
having for a long time past wearied the patience of Austria. More-
over, he considers this question to be a domestic one for Austria, and
he hopes that it will be localised.

I then said to him that not having as yet received any instructions,
the views which I wished to exchange with him were strictly personal.
Thereupon I asked him if the Berlin Cabinet had really been entirely
ignorant of Austria's requirements before they were communicated to
Belgrade, and as he told me that that was so, I showed him my sur-
prise at seeing him thus undertake to support claims, of whose limit
and scope he w^as ignorant.

Herr von Jagow interrupted me, and said, " It is only because we
are having a personal conversation that I allow you to say that to me."

"Certainly," I replied, "but if Peter I. humiliates himself , domestic
trouble will probably break out in Servia ; that will open the door to
fresh possibilities, and do you know where you will be led by Vienna ? "
I added that the language of the German newspapers was not the
language of persons who were indifferent to, and unacquainted with,
the question, but betoken an active support. Finally, I remarked
that the shortness of the time limit given to Servia for submission
w^ould make an unpleasant impression in Europe.

Here von Jagow answered that he quite expected a little excitement

1 The identical thought was expressed on the same day in Paris by the Acting
Political Director, French Yellow Book No. 25. See also same day, British Blue Book
No. 6.

82 Official Diplomatic Documents

(un peu d' emotion) on the part of Servia's friends, but that he was
counting on their giving her wise advice.

"I have no doubt," I then said to him, "that Russia would en-
deavour to persuade the Cabinet of Belgrade to make acceptable
concessions ; but why not ask from one what is being asked from the
other, and if reliance is being placed on advice being given at Bel-
grade, is it not also legitimate to rely on advice being given at Vienna
from another quarter?"

The Secretary of State went so far as to say that that depended on
circumstances ; but immediately checked himself ; he repeated that
the difficulty must be localised. He asked me if I really thought the
situation serious. "Certainly," I answered, "because if what is
happening is the result of due reflection, I do not understand why all
means of retreat have been cut off."

k\\ the evidence shows that Germany is ready to support Austria's
attitude with unusual energy. The weakness which her Austro-
Hungarian ally has shown for some years past, has w^eakened the con-
fidence that was placed in her here. She was found heavy to drag
along. Mischievous legal proceedings, such as the Agram and the
Friedjung affairs, brought odium on her police and covered them with
ridicule. All that was asked of the police was that they should be
strong ; the conviction is that they were violent.

An article which appeared in the Lokal Anzeiger this evening shows
also that at the German Chancery there exists a state of mind to which
we in Paris are naturally not inclined to pay sufficient attention, I
mean the feeling that the monarchies must stand together {sentiment
de la solidarite monarchique) . I am convinced that great weight must
be attached to this point of view in order to appreciate the attitude
of the Emperor William, whose impressionable nature must have
been affected by the assassination of a prince whose guest he had been
a few days previously.

It is not less striking to notice the pains with which Herr von
Jagow, and all the officials placed under his orders, pretend to every
one that they were ^ ignorant of the scope of the note sent by Austria
to Servia. Jules Cambon.

From Petrograd
French Yellow Book No. 31

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at S. Peter shurgh, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin^ Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petershurgh, July 24, 1914.

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has communicated to M.
Sazonof a threatening note to Servia.

1 This sentence reads "know nothing of the note" in The New York Times Trans-
lation. It contradicts, therefore, the first part of the despatch where the contents of
the note are discussed. The official English version gives no explanation of the altered
wording. The edition of the French Yellow Book supplied to the editor by the French
Ambassador in Washington, October, 1915, contains the past tense.

July 24, French Yellow Book No. 32 83

The intentions of the Emperor of Russia and his Ministers could
not be more pacific/ a fact of which the President of the RepubHc
and the President of the Council have been able to satisfy them-
selves directly; but the ultimatum which the Austro-Hungarian
Government has just delivered to the Cabinet at Belgrade introduces
a new and disquieting element into the situation.

Public opinion in Russia would not allow Austria to offer violence
to Servia. The shortness of the time limit fixed by the ultimatum
renders still more difficult the moderating influence that the Powers
of the Triple Entente, might exercise at Vienna.

On the other hand, M. Sazonof assumes that Germany will desire

to support her ally and I am afraid that this impression is correct.

Nothing but the assurance of the solidarity of the Triple Entente

can prevent the German Powers from emphasising their provocative

attitude. ^

Paleologue.

From London

French Yellow Book No. 32

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 24, 1914-
Sir Edward Grey having discussed with me his desire to leave no
stone unturned to avert the crisis, we agreed in thinking that the
British Cabinet might ask the German Government to take the ini-
tiative in approaching Vienna with the object of offering the media-
tion, between Austria and Servia,^ of the four Powers which are not
directly interested. If Germany agrees, time will be gained, and this
is the essential point.

Sir Edward Grey told me that he would discuss with Prince Lich-
nowsky the proposal I have just explained. I mentioned the matter
to my Russian colleague, who is afraid of a surprise from Germany,
and who imagines that Austria w^ould not have despatched her ulti-
matum without previous agreement with Berlin.

Count Benckendorff told me that Prince Lichnowsky, when he
returned from leave about a month ago, had intimated that he held
pessimistic views regarding the relations between St. Petersburgh
and Berlin. He had observed the uneasiness caused in this latter
capital by the rumours of a naval entente between Russia and Great
Britain, by the Tsar's visit to Bucharest, and by the strengthening
of the Russian army. Count Benckendorff had concluded from this

1 This differs from British Blue Book No. 6, July 24 ; and No. 17, July 25, 1914.
There was a conference between Sazonof and the French and British Ambassadors in
Petrograd on July 24, in the morning, as described in British Blue Book No. 6. So far
as the French published despatches go, the above is the only report. Cf. also below,
German White Book, Exhibit 4, July 24, 1914.

2 M. Bienvenu-Martin in quoting this suggestion in Yellow Book No. 34, same day,
alters it to include mediation at Vienna and St. Petersburgh. That this was not the
Cambon-Grey intention appears from British Blue Book No. 10, July 24, where Sir
E. Grey begins with his idea of action " simultaneously in Vienna and St. Petersburgh,"
while M. Paul Cambon prefers "mediation between Austria and Servia."

84 Official Diplomatic Documents

that a war with Russia would be looked upon without disfavour in
Germany.

The Under-Secretary of State has been struck, as all of us have been,
by the anxious looks of Prince Lichnowsky since his return from
Berlin, and he considers that if Germany had wished to do so she
could have stopped the despatch of the ultimatum.

The situation, therefore, is as grave as it can be, and we see no way
of arresting the course of events.

However, Count Benckendorff thinks it right to attempt the
demarche upon which I have agreed with Sir Edward Grey.

Paul Cambon.

French Yellow Book No. 33 ^

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M, Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 2Jj., 19H.

The Servian Minister received to-night from M. Pashitch a tele-
gram saying that the Austro-Hungarian Government had sent him
their ultimatum, the time limit of which expires at 6 o'clock to-
morrow, Saturday evening. j\I. Pashitch does not give the terms of
the Austrian communication, but if it is of the nature reported in
to-day's " Times," it seems impossible for the Servian Government to
accept it.

In consultation with my Russian colleague, who thinks it extremely
difficult for his Government not to support Servia, we have been ask-
ing ourselves what intervention could avert the conflict.

Sir Edward Grey having summoned me for this afternoon, I pro-
pose to suggest that he should ask for the semi-official intervention
of the German Government at Vienna to prevent a sudden attack.

Paul Cambon.

To Stockholm for M. Viviani, Belgrade, Petrograd, Berlin, Vienna,

Rome

French Yellow Sook No. 34

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stock-
holm (for the President of the Council), Belgrade, St. Petersburg h,
Berlin, Vienna, Rome.

Paris, July 24, 1914.

The Austrian Ambassador having communicated his Govern-
ment's note to Sir Edward Grey, the latter observed that no such

1 This despatch has been doctored for insertion here. It is an impossible message
in its present form. It is dated July 24, and states that the " Servian Minister received
to-night," etc., notification of the Austro-Hungarian note. This notification, however,
was sent to the Servian Minister on the previous day, July 23. Cf . Serbian Blue Book
No. 33. The casual reader would receive the impression from this despatch that the
time limit granted to Serbia was 24 hours, from "to-night," July 24, to "to-morrow,
Saturday evening."

The last paragraph of this despatch. No. 33, refers to a summons to a conference,
which has been described in No. 32.

July 24, German White Book Exhibit 3 85

formidable declaration had ever been addressed by one Government
to another ; he drew Count Mensdorff's attention to the responsibility
assumed by Austria.

With the possibility of a conflict between Austria and Russia before
him, Sir Edward Grey proposes to ask for the cooperation of the
German Government with a view to the mediation of the four powers
who are not directly interested in the Servian question, namely,
England, France, Italy and Germany ; this mediation to be exercised
simultaneously at Vienna and at St. Petersburgh.^

1 advised the Servian Minister to act cautiously, and I am willing
to cooperate in any conciliatory action at Vienna, in the hope that
Austria will not insist on the acceptance of all her demands as against
a small State, if the latter shows herself ready to give every satis-
faction which is considered compatible with her independence and

^ ^ ^' Bienvenu-Martin.

Germany :

From Vienna

German WmTE Book ExmsiT 3^

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the Chancellor on
July 24th, 1914.

Count Berchtold has asked to-day for the Russian Charge
d'affaires^ in order to explain to him thoroughly and cordially Austria-
Hungary's point of view toward Servia. After recapitulation of the
historical development of the past few years, he emphasised that
the Monarchy entertained no thought of conquest toward Servia.
Austria-Hungary would not claim Servian territory. It insisted
merely that this step was meant as a definite means of checking the
Serb intrigues. Impelled by force of circumstances, Austria-Hungary
must have a guaranty for continued amicable relations with Servia.
It was far from him to intend to bring about a change in the balance
of powers in the Balkan. The Charge d'affaires, who had received no
instructions from St. Petersburg, took the discussion of the Secretary
"ad referendum" with the promise to submit it immediately to
Sasonof.

1 Mediation both in Vienna and Petrograd was Sir E. Grey's first idea, see British
Blue Book No. 10, July 24, but he was dissuaded from it by the French Ambassador
in London, M. Paul Cambon. Cf. British Blue Book No. 10, July 24, 1914. This
statement here is, moreover, at variance with M. Cambon's report. Yellow Book No.
32, same day. M. Cambon's desire not to bring any pressure to bear on Russia was
eventually shared by Sir E. Grey. Cf. French Yellow Book No. 62, July 27, and No.
80, July 28, and British Blue Book Nos. 11 and 16.

2 For Exhibit No. 2 see July 28, 1914. The Exhibits of the German White Book are
not numbered chronologically.

3 See above, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 18, July 24, 1914.

86 Official Diplomatic Documents

German White Book Exhibit 4

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chan-
cellor on July 2Jfth, 1914--

I HAVE just utilized the contents of Order 592 in a prolonged inter-
view with Sasonof . The Secretary (Sasonof) indulged in unmeasured
accusations^ toward Austria-Hungary and he was very much agitated.
He declared most positively that Russia could not permit ^ under any
circumstances that the Servo-Austrian difficulty be settled alone
between the parties concerned.

Great Britain :

From the Austrian Ambassador.

British Blue Book No. 4

Count Berchtold, Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count
Mensdorff, Austrian Ambassador in London. — {Communicated
by Count Mensdorff, July 24, 1914.)

[Here follows the Austro-Hungarian Note to Serbia; cf. Austro-Hungarian
Red Book No. 7, July 22, 1914.]

British Blue Book No. 5
Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.

Note addressed to Servia, together with an explanation of the
reasons leading up to it, has been communicated to me by Count
Mensdorff.3

In the ensuing conversation with his Excellency, I remarked that
it seemed to me a matter for great regret that a time limit,^ and such
a short one at that, had been insisted upon at this stage of the pro-
ceedings. The murder of the Archduke and some of the circum-
stances respecting Servia quoted in the note aroused sympathy with
Austria, as was but natural, but at the same time I had never before
seen one State address to another independent State a document of so
formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be hardly consistent
with the maintenance of Servia 's independent sovereignty if it were
to mean,^ as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be
invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority
within the frontiers of Servia.

1 Cf. above French Yellow Book No. 31, same day, "The intentions of the Emperor
and his ministers could not be more pacific."

2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, 1915.

3 Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

* That there would be a time limit had been known to France and, therefore,
probably to the Entente Powers, since July 19, 1914 ; cf. French Yellow Book Nos. 13
and 14.

6 The meaning of this clause is best explained in British Blue Book No. 64, July 28,
1914, where it is said that the Austro-Hungarian Government had stated "that co-
operation of Austrian agents in Servia was to be only in investigation, not in judicial
or administrative measures. Servia was said to have wilfully misinterpreted this."
Cf. also French Yellow Book No. 15, July 21, 1914.

July 23, British Blue Book No, 6 87

I added that I felt great apprehension, and that I should concern
myself with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of
the peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between Austria and
Servia were not the concern of His Majesty's Government, and such
comments as I had made above were not made in order to discuss
those merits.

I ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an exchange
of views with other Powers, and that I must await their views as to
what could be done to mitigate the diflSculties of the situation.

Count Mensdorff ^ replied that the present situation might never
have arisen if Servia had held out a hand after the murder of the
Archduke ; Servia had, however, shown no sign of sympathy or help,
though some weeks had already elapsed since the murder; a time
limit, said his Excellency, was essential, owing to the procrastination
on Servia's part.

I said that if Servia had procrastinated in replying, a time limit
could have been introduced later ; but, as things now stood, the terms
of the Servian reply had been dictated by Austria, who had not been
content to limit herself to a demand for a reply within a limit of
forty-eight hours from its presentation.

From Petrograd

British Blue Book No. 6

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward
Grey. — (Received July 24.)

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 24, 1914.

I HAD a telephone message this morning from M. Sazonof ^ to the
effect that the text of the Austrian ultimatum had just reached him.

His Excellency added that a reply within forty-eight hours was
demanded, and he begged me to meet him at the French ^ Embassy to
discuss matters, as Austrian step clearly meant that war was imminent.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's conduct was both
provocative and immoral ; she would never have taken such action
unless Germany had first been consulted ; some of her demands were
quite impossible of acceptance. He hoped that His Majesty's
Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia
and France.

The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would
fulfil all the obligations ^ entailed by her alliance with Russia, if
necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in any diplomatic
negotiations.

1 Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

2 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

3 The Entente Powers acted in the Serbian difficulty together from the first. Cf .
British Blue Book No. 12, same day, and French Yellow Book No. 23, same day. See
also British Blue Book No. 10, note 2.

4 This must mean "going to war," diplomatic support being spoken of in the next
line.

88 Official Diplomatic Documents •

I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their
Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of course, speak in the
name of His Majesty's Government, but personally I saw no reason
to expect any declaration of solidarity from His Majesty's Govern-
ment that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to
support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British interests
in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never
be sanctioned by British public opinion.^ To this M. Sazonof replied
that we must not forget that the general European question ^ was
involved, the Servian question being but a part of the former, and
that Great Britain could not afford to efface herself from the problems
now at issue.

In reply to these remarks, I observed that I gathered from what
he said that his Excellency was suggesting that Great Britain should
join in making a communication to Austria to the effect that active
intervention by her in the internal affairs of Servia could not .be
tolerated. But supposing Austria nevertheless proceeded to embark
on military measures against Servia in spite of our representations,
was it the intention of the Russian Government forthwith to declare
war on Austria ?

M. Sazonof ^ said that he himself thought that Russian mobilisa-
tion would at any rate have to be carried out ; ^ but a council of Min-
isters was being held this afternoon to consider the whole question.
A further council would be held, probably to-morrow, at which the
Emperor would preside, when a decision^ would be come to.

I said that it seemed to me that the important point was to induce
Austria to extend the time limit, and that the first thing to do was to
bring an influence to bear on Austria with that end in view ; French
Ambassador, however, thought that either Austria had made up her
mind to act at once or that she was bluffing. Whichever it might be,
our only chance of averting war was for us to adopt a firm and united
attitude. He did not think there was time to carry out my sugges-
tion. Thereupon I said that it seemed to me desirable that we should
know just how far Servia was prepared to go to meet the demands
formulated by Austria in her note. M. Sazonof replied that he must
first consult his colleagues ^ on this point, but that doubtless some of
the Austrian demands could be accepted by Servia.

French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continued to press me

1 This sentence is contrary to the claim that Great Britain is fighting for the rights
of the little nations, including Serbia. Cf. British Blue Book Nos. 10 and 11, same day.

' This refers to the fetich of all the Powers for the past century, often called "the
balance of power." See Russian Orange Book No. 17, July 25: "We count upon it
that England will at once side definitely with France and Russia in order to maintain
the European balance of power for which she has constantly intervened in the past."
Cf. also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 26, July 24, 1914.

' Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

* This raises the question, when it was begun.

' For a French account of the decision arrived at in this meeting, see French Yellow
Book No. 50, July 26, 1914.

* This almost makes it appear as if Russia wrote Serbia's reply for her. Cf. Re-
port of the Balkan Commission, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1914,
p. 41 : "The Balkan alliance in its later phase was but a tool employed by local policy
encouraged by Russia, and directed, under the inspiration of Russian diplomacy,
against Germanic pretensions."

July 24, British Blue Book No. 7 89

for a declaration of complete solidarity of His Majesty's Government
with French and Russian Governments, and I therefore said that it
seemed to me possible that you might perhaps be willing to make
strong representations to both German and Austrian Governments,
urging upon them that an attack by Austria upon Servia would
endanger the whole peace of Europe. Perhaps you might see your
way to saying to them that such action on the part of Austria would
probably mean Russian intervention, which would involve France and
Germany, and that it would be difficult for Great Britain to keep out
if the war were to become general. M. Sazonof answered that we
would sooner or later be dragged into war if it did break out; we
should have rendered war more likely if we did not from the outset
make common cause with his country and with France ; at any rate,
he hoped His Majesty's Government would express strong reprobation
of action taken by Austria.

President of French Republic and President of the Council cannot
reach France, on their return from Russia, for four or five days, and
it looks as though Austria purposely chose this moment to present
their ultimatum.^

It seems to me, from the language held by French Ambassador,
that, even if we decline to join them, France and Russia are deter-
mined to make a strong stand. ^

From Vienna
British Blue Book No. 7

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward
Grey. — {Received July 24-)

(Telegraphic.) ' Vienna, July 24, 1914.

Before departing on leave of absence, I was assured by Russian
Ambassador that any action taken by Austria to humiliate Servia
could not leave Russia indifferent.^

Russian Charge d'Affaires was received this morning by Minister
for Foreign Affairs, and said ^ to him, as his own personal view, that
Austrian note was drawn up in a form rendering it impossible of
acceptance as it stood, and that it was both unusual and peremptory
in its terms. J Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that Austrian
Minister was under instructions to leave Belgrade unless Austrian
demands were accepted integrally by 4 p.m. ^ to-morrow. His
Excellency added. that Dual Monarchy feh that its very existence

1 This same idea is expressed by the other two Entente Powers. Cf. French Yellow
Book Nos. 25 and 29, same day.

2 Cf. next day, British Blue Book No. 17, "If she [Russia] feels secure of the support
of France, she will face all the risks of war."

3 For a stronger phrasing see July 25, British Blue Book No. 17.

* This interview is spoken of in Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 18, July 24, and
German White Book, Exhibit 3, same day. According to both despatches the Russian
Charge d 'Affaires was without instructions, and consequently refrained from expressing
an opinion.

6 The hour was at first placed at 5 p.m., later at 6 p.m. See French Yellow Book
No. 25, July 24.

90 Official Diplomatic Documents

was at stake ; and that the step taken had caused great satisfaction
throughout the country. He did not think that objections to what
had been done could be raised by any Power.

From Belgrade

British Blue Book No. 8

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir
Edward Grey. — (Received July 24.)

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 24, 1914-

AusTRL\N demands are considered absolutely unacceptable by
Servian Government, who earnestly trust that His Majesty's Govern-
ment may see their way to induce Austrian Government to moderate
them.

This request was conveyed to me by Servian Prime Minister, who
returned early this morning to Belgrade. His Excellency is dejected,
and is clearly very anxious as to developments that may arise.

From the German Ambassador
British Blue Book No. 9

Note ^ communicated by German Ambassador, July 24, 1914-

The publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government con-
cerning the circumstances under which the assassination of the
Austrian heir presumptive and his consort has taken place disclose
unmistakably the aims which the Great Servian propaganda has set
itself, and the means it employs to realise them. The facts now
made known must also do away with the last doubts that the centre
of activity of all those tendencies which are directed towards the
detachment of the Southern Slav provinces from the Austro-Hun-
garian Monarchy and their incorporation into the Servian Kingdom
is to be found in Belgrade, and is at work there with at least the
connivance of members of Government and army.

1 German White Book Exhibit No. 1, July 23, 1914, cf. French Yellow Book No. 28,
same day.

July 24, British Blue Book No. 10 91

clearly evident that it would not be consistent either with the dignity
or with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy still
longer to remain inactive in face of this movement on the other side
of the frontier, by which the security and the integrity of her terri-
tories are constantly menaced. Under these circumstances, the
course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Govern-
ment can only be regarded as equitable and moderate. In spite of
that, the attitude which public opinion as well as the Government in
Seryia have recently adopted does not exclude the apprehension
that the Servian Government might refuse to comply with those
demands, and might allow themselves to be carried away into a
provocative attitude against Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hun-
garian Government, if it does not wish definitely to abandon Austria's
position as a Great Powder, would then have no choice but to obtain
the fulfilment of their demands from the Servian Government by
strong pressure and, if necessary, by using military measures, the
choice of the means having to be left to them.

The Imperial Government want to emphasise their opinion that
in the present case there is only question of a matter, to be settled
exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that the Great
Powers ought seriously to endeavour to reserve it to those two
immediately concerned. The Imperial Government desire urgently
the localisation of the conflict, because every interference of another
Power would, owing to the different treaty obligations, be followed
by incalculable consequences.

To Paris
British Blue Book No. 10
Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.
Sir, Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.

After telling M. Cambon ^ to-day of the Austrian communication
to Servia, which I had received this morning, and of the comment I
had made to Count Mensdorff ^ upon it yesterday, I told M. Cambon
that this afternoon I was to see the German Ambassador, who some
days ago ^ had asked me privately to exercise moderating influence in
St. Petersburgh. I would say ^ to the Ambassador that, of course, if
the presentation of this ultimatum to Servia did not lead to trouble
between Austria and Russia, we need not concern ourselves about it,^
but, if Russia took the view of the Austrian ultimatum, which it
seemed to me that any Power interested in Servia would take, I
should be quite powerless, in face of the terms of the ultimatum, to

1 French Ambassador in London.

2 Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

3 Cf. British Blue Book No. 1, July 20, 1914.

* Sir Edward's remarks to the German Ambassador are the result of his mterview
with the French Ambassador. For the determination of the Entente Powers to act
together in this matter see British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, and note 1.

6 Cf. Nos. 6 and 11, same day.

92 Official Diplomatic Documents

exercise any moderating influence. I would say that I thought the
only chance of any mediating or moderating influence being exercised
was that Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves, who had not direct
interests in Servia, should act together for the sake of peace, simul-
taneously in Vienna and St. Petersburgh.^

M. Cambon said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the
four Powers, he had no doubt that his Government would be glad to
join in it ; but he pointed out that we could not say anything in
St. Petersburgh till Russia had expressed some opinion or taken some
action. But, when two days were over, Austria would march into
Servia, for the Servians could not possibly accept the Austrian
demand. Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take
action as soon as Austria attacked Servia, and therefore, once the
Austrians had attacked Servia, it would be too late for any mediation.

I said that I had not contemplated anything being said in St.
Petersburgh ^ until after it was clear that there must be trouble
between Austria and Russia. I had thought that if Austria did move
into Servia, and Russia then mobilised, it would be possible for the
four Powers to urge Austria to stop her advance, and Russia also
to stop hers, pending mediation. But it would be essential for any
chance of success for such a step that Germany should participate
in it.

M. Cambon said that it would be too late after Austria had once
moved against Servia. The important thing was to gain time by
mediation in Vienna. The best chance of this being accepted would
be that Germany should propose it to the other Powers.

I said that by this he meant a mediation between Austria and
Servia.

He replied that it was so.

I said that I would talk to the German Ambassador this afternoon
on the subject.

I am, etc.
E. Grey.

To Berlin
British Blue Book No. U
Sir Edward Grey to Sir H, Rumbold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin.
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 24, 1914-

German Ambassador has communicated to me the view of the
German Government about the Austrian demand in Servia. I under-
stand the German Government is making the same communication
to the Powers.

I said that if the Austrian ultimatum to Servia did not lead to
trouble between Austria and Russia I had no concern with it ; ^ I had
heard nothing yet from St. Petersburgh, but I was very apprehensive

1 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 34, July 24, and note 1.
» Cf. British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, and note 3.

July 24, British Blue Book No. 12 93

of the view Russia would take of the situation. I reminded the
German Ambassador that some days ago he had expressed a personal
hope that if need arose I would endeavour to exercise moderating
influence at St. Petersburgh, but now I said that, in view of the
extraordinarily stiff character of the Austrian note, the shortness of
the time allowed, and the wide scope of the demands upon Servia,
I felt quite helpless as far as Russia was concerned, and I did not
believe any Power could exercise influence alone.

The only chance I could see of mediating or moderating influence
being effective, was that the four Powers, Germany, Italy, France,
and ourselves, should work together simultaneously at Vienna and
St. Petersburgh ^ in favour of moderation in the event of the relations
between Austria and Russia becoming threatening.

The immediate danger was that in a few hours Austria might
march into Servia and Russian Slav opinion demand that Russia
should march to help Servia ; it would be very desirable to get
Austria not to precipitate military action and so to gain more time.
But none of us could influence Austria in this direction unless Ger-'
many would propose and participate in such action at Vienna. You
should inform Secretary of State.

Prince Lichnowsky ^ said that Austria might be expected to move
when the time limit expired unless Servia could give unconditional
acceptance of Austrian demands in toto. Speaking privately, his
Excellency suggested that a negative reply must in no case be re-
turned by Servia ; a reply favourable on some points must be sent
at once, so that an excuse against immediate action might be afforded
to Austria.

To Belgrade

British Blue Book No. 12

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at
Belgrade.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.

Servia ought to promise that, if it is proved that Servian officials,
however subordinate they may be, were accomplices in the murder of
the Archduke at Serajevo, she will give Austria the fullest satisfaction.
She certainly ought to express concern and regret.^ For the rest,
Servian Government must reply to Austrian demands as they consider
best in Servian interests.

It is impossible to say whether military action by Austria when
time limit expires can be averted by anything but unconditional
acceptance of her demands, but only chance appears to lie in avoiding

1 Cf. previous note, where Sir E. Grey apparently dropped his idea of bringing
simultaneous pressure to bear on Vienna and Petrograd in favor of Paul Cambon's
idea of mediation between Vienna and Belgrade.

2 German Ambassador in London. c, ,.

3 This would imply that Austria-Hungary's claim was correct that Serbia had
neglected to do this, although four weeks had elapsed since the murder. Cf. also note
1 to Serbian Blue Book No. 30, July 19.

94 Official Diplomatic Documents

an absolute refusal and replying favourably to as many points as the
time limit allows.

Servian Minister here has begged that His Majesty's Government
will express their views, but I cannot undertake responsibility of
saying more than I have said above, and I do not like to say even
that without knowing what is being said at Belgrade by French and
Russian Governments.^ You should therefore consult your French
and Russian colleagues as to repeating what my views are, as ex-
pressed above, to Servian Government.^

1 have urged upon German Ambassador that Austria should not
precipitate military action.

Russia :

From Austro-Hungarian Ambassador

Russian Orange Book No. 3

Note verbale personally presented by the Austro-Hungarian Ambas-
sador at St. Petersburg to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
at 10 A.M. on July 11 {2^), 1914.

The Austro-Hungarian Government felt compelled to address
the following note to the Servian Government on Thursday, the
10th (23rd) instant, through the medium of the Austro-Hungarian
Minister at Belgrade.

[Here follows the text of the note ; see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 7, July
22, 1914.]

Russian Orange Book No. 4

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Charge d' Affaires
at Vienna. Communicated also to London, Rome, Paris, and
Belgrade.^

(Telegram.) St. Petersburgh, July 11 {24), 1914.^

Please convey the following message to the Austro-Hungarian Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs : —

" La communication du Gou- " The communication made by

vernement austro-hongrois aux Austria-Hungary to the Powers

Puissances le lendemain de la the day after the presentation of

presentation de I'ultimatum a the ultimatum at Belgrade leaves

Belgrade ne laisse aux Puissances a period to the Powers which is

qu'un delai tout a fait insuffisant quite insufficient to enable them

pour entreprendre quoi qu'il soit to take any steps which might

» Cf . French Yellow Book No. 23, July 24, and British Blue Book No. 6, same day,
and note 1.

2 This advice was never given to Servia ; cf. British Blue Book no. 22, July 25, 1914.
' According to French Yellow Book No. 39 this note was communicated to Bucharest

instead of to Belgrade and also to Berlin.

* This note, although dated July 24, was presented in London (British Blue Book
No. 13) and Paris (Yellow Book No. 39) on July 25, the very day on which the time
limit was to expire. Russia was informed of the presentation of the note on July 23.
(Russian Orange Book No. 2.)

July 24, Russian Orange Booh No. 4.

d'utile pour raplanissement des
complications siirgies.

"Pour prevenir les conse-
quences incalculables et egale-
ment nefastes pour toutes les
Puissances qui peuvent suivre le
mode d'action du Gouvernement
austro-hongrois, il nous parait in-
dispensable qu'avant tout le delai
donne a la Serbie pour repondre
soit prolonge. L'Autriche-Hon-
grie, se declarant disposee a in-
former les Puissances des donnees
de Fenquete sur lesquelles le
Gouvernement Imperial et Royal
base ses accusations, devrait leur
donner 6galement le temps de s'en
rendre compte.

" En ce cas, si les Puissances se
convainquaient du bien-fonde de
certaines des exigences autri-
chiennes, elles se trouveraient en
mesure de faire parvenir au
Gouvernement serbe des conseils
en consequence.

"Un refus de prolottger le
terme de I'ultimatum priverait
de toute ported la demarche du
Gouvernement austro-hongrois
aupres des Puissances et se trou-
verait en contradiction avec les
bases meme des relations inter-
nationales.

"Le Prince Koudachef est
charge de communiquer ce qui
precede au Cabinet de Vienne.'*

M. Sazonof espere que le
Gouvernement de Sa Majeste

1 See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 8, July 22, paragraph before last, where Aus-
tria-Hungary offers to the Powers a 'dossier elucidating the Servian intrigues and the
connection between these intrigues and the murder of the 28th June." So far as
Austria was concerned, this was an act of courtesy. The Powers had been unwilling
or unable to protect her from these intrigues culminating in the murder of the Arch-
duke. It was, therefore, she claimed, her right and her duty to punish them in her
own way.

Sazonof interprets the offer of Austria-Hungary not as an act of courtesy but as
an accusation lodged before the tribunal of the Powers, who, therefore, should be the
judges of how far Austria-Hungary might be permitted to go. According to European
traditions, followed for over a century by all the nations, such a course would have
affected the dignity of Austria-Hungary as one of the Great Powers. Cf. Austro-
Hungarian Red Book No. 21, July 25, 1914.

2 This line varied, of course, according to the Government to which the note was pre-
sented.

help to smooth away the diffi-
culties that have arisen.

"In order to prevent the con-
sequences, equally incalculable
and fatal to all the Powers, which
may result from the course of
action followed by the Austro-
Hungarian Government, it seems
to us to be above all essential
that the period allowed for the
Servian reply should be extended.
Austria-Hungary, having de-
clared her readiness ^ to inform
the Powers of the results of the
enquiry upon which the Imperial
and Royal Government base their
accusations, should equally allow
them sufficient time to study
them.

"In this case, if the Powers
were convinced that certain of
the Austrian demands were well
founded, they would be in a
position to offer advice to the
Servian Government.

" A refusal to prolong the term
of the ultimatum would render
nugatory the proposals made by
the Austro-Hungarian Govern-
ment to the Powers, and would
be in contradiction to the very
bases of international relations.

" Prince Kudachef is instructed
to communicate the above to the
Cabinet at Vienna.*'

M. Sazonof hopes that His Bri-
tannic Majesty's Government ^

96 Official Diplomatic Documents

britannique adherera au point de will adhere to the point of view

vue expose, et il exprime Tespoir set forth above, and he trusts

que Sir Edward Grey voudra bien that Sir E. Gray will see his way

munir I'Ambassadeur d'Angle- to furnish similar instructions to

terre a Vienne d 'instructions con- the British Ambassador at

formes. Vienna.

To London, Berlin, Rome and Paris

Russian Orange Book No. 5

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Representatives at
London, Berlin, Rome, and Paris.

(Telegram.) St. Petersburg, July 11 {2^), 1914.

With reference to my telegram of to-day to Kudachef ^ we trust
that the Government to which you are accredited will share the
Russian point of view and will at once instruct their Representative
at Vienna to hold similar language.

Communicated to Belgrade.

From the Serbian Crown Prince and Prince Regent of Serbia

Russian Orange Book No. 6

Telegram from His Royal Highness the Croivn Prince and Prince Regent
of Serbia to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia.

Belgrade, July 11 (24), 1914.

The Austro-Hungarian Government yesterday evening presented
to the Servian Government a note respecting the outrage at Sera-
jevo. Servia, aware of her international obligations, has declared,
ever since the horrible crime was committed, that she condemned it,
and that she was ready to open an enquiry in Servia if the complicity
of certain of her subjects were proved at the trial instituted by
the Austro-Hungarian authorities. The demands contained in the
Austro-Hungarian note are, however, unnecessarily humiliating
for Servia, and incompatible with her dignity as an independent
State. For instance, we are peremptorily called upon to insert a
declaration by the Government in the "Official Journal," and for
an order from the Sovereign to the army, in which we are to check
the spirit of hostility towards Austria and to blame ourselves for
criminal weakness as regards our treacherous intrigues. We are
further required to admit Austro-Hungarian officials into Servia to
take part with our officials at the trial and to superintend the carry-
ing out of the other conditions laid down in the note. We are re-
quired to accept these demands in their entirety within forty-eight
hours, failing which the Austro-Hungarian Legation will leave
Belgrade. We are prepared to accept those of the Austro-Hun-

^ Russian Charg^ d' Affaires in Vienna.

July 24, Russian Orange Book No. 8 97

garian conditions which are compatible with the position of an
independent State, as well as those to which your Majesty may
advise us to agree, and all those persons whose complicity in the
crime may be proved will be severely punished by us. Certain of
the demands could not be carried out without changes in our legis-
lation, which would need time. We have been allowed too short a
time limit. We may be attacked at the expiration of the time limit
by the Austro-Hungarian army which is concentrating upon our
frontier. We are unable to defend ourselves and we beg your Majesty
to come to our aid as soon as possible. The much appreciated good-
will which your Majesty has so often shown towards us inspires us
with the firm belief that once again our appeal to your noble Slav
heart will not pass unheeded.

At this critical moment I echo the feelings of the Servian people
in praying your Majesty to be pleased to interest yourself in the fate
of the Kingdom of Servia.

From Berlin

Russian Orange Book No. 7

Russian Charge d' Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

(Telegram.) Berlin, July 11 {24), 1914.

All the morning papers, even those few which recognise the
impossibility of Servians accepting the prescribed conditions, warmly
welcome the strong line adopted by Austria. The semi-ofiicial
"Lokal-Anzeiger'' is particularly violent; it describes as fruitless
any possible appeals that Servia may make to St. Petersburgh, Paris,
Athens, or Bucharest, and concludes by saying that the German
people will breathe freely when they learn that the situation in the
Balkan ^ peninsula is to be cleared up at last.

From Paris

Russian Orange Book No. 8

Russian Charge d' Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

(Telegram.) Paris, July 11 {24), 1914^

A COPY of the note officially presented at Belgrade has been com-
municated to the French Government by the Austrian Ambassador .^
The German Ambassador later visited ^ the Minister and read to

1 The Balkans had been spoken of for years as the Powder Magazine of Europe,
where at any moment a spark might start a European conflagration. Nobody in
Berlin or Vienna believed any nation would came to the support of Serbia in view of
the intrigues which had led to the murder of Serajevo, and which Berlin and Vienna be-
lieved were rightly charged against Serbia.

2 French Yellow Book No. 25, July 24, 1914.

3 French Yellow Book No. 28, July 24, 1914.

98 Official Diplomatic Documents

him a communication containing the Austrian arguments, and
indicating that in the event of a refusal on the part of Servia, Austria
would be obliged to resort to pressure, and, in case of need, to mili-
tary measures. The communication ended with the observation
that, in the opinion of Germany, this question ought to be settled
between Austria and Servia direct, and that it was to the interest of
the Powers to localise the affair by leaving it to the interested parties.
The Acting Head of the Political Department, who was present at
the interview, asked ^ the Ambassador whether the Austrian action
should be considered as an ultimatum — in other words, whether,
in the event of Servia not submitting entirely to the Austrian de-
mands, hostilities were inevitable. The Ambassador avoided a
direct reply, alleging that he had no instructions.

From Belgrade
Russian Orange Book No. 9

Russian Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade to Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

(Telegram.) Belgrade, July 11 (2J(), 1914.

Pashitch has returned to Belgrade. He intends' to give an answer
to Austria within the prescribed time limit — that is to say, to-
morrow, Saturday, at 6 p.m. — showing the points which are accept-
able or unacceptable. To-day an appeal will be addressed to the
Powers 2 to defend the independence of Servia. Then, added Pashitch,
if war is inevitable, we will make war.

Serbia :

To Petrograd

Serbian Blue Book No. 34

M, N, Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
Dr, M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd.

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 11/24, 1914.

I INFORMED the Russian Charge d'Affaires that I would hand in
the reply to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum on Saturday at 6 p.m.
I told him that the Serbian Government would appeal ^ to the Govern-
ments of the friendly Powers to protect the independence of Serbia.
If war was inevitable, I added, Serbia would carry it on.

1 In the French account of this interview, Yellow Book No. 28, July 24, M. Martin
and not the Acting Head of the Political Department is said to have asked this ques-
tion.

2 The only published appeal is that of the Serbian Crown Prince to the Czar, Russian
Orange Book No. 6, July 24, 1914.

' No such appeal had been published, except one from the Serbian Crown Prince
to the Czar, July 24, Russian Orange Book No. 6.

July 24, Serbian Blue Book No. 37 99

To London
Serbian Blue Book No. 35

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
M. M. Boschkovitch, Minister in London.

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 11/24, 1914.

I INFORMED the British Charge d'Affaires to-day that the Austro-
Hungarian demands were such that no Government of an independent
country could accept them in their entirety. I expressed the hope
that the British Government might possibly see their way to induce
the Austro-Hungarian Government to moderate them. I did not
conceal my anxiety as to future developments.

From Petrograd

Serbian Blue Book No. 36

Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime
Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

{Telegraphic.) Petrograd, July 11/24, 1914-

As I was leaving M. Sazonof, to whom I communicated the con-
tents of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, I met the German Am-
bassador. He seemed to be in very good spirits.^ During the con-
versation which followed in regard to the Austro-Hungarian demarche
I asked Count Pourtales to indicate to me some way out of the
situation created by the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum. The Am-
bassador replied that this depended on Serbia alone, since the matter
in question must be settled between Austria and Serbia only, and
did not concern anyone else. In reply I told Count Pourtales that
he was under a misapprehension, and that he would see before long
that this was not a question merely between Serbia and Austria,
but a European question.

To the Czar from the Serbian Crown Prince

Serbian Blue Book No. 37

His Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander to His Imperial
Majesty the Emperor of Russia.

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 11/24, 1914.

[See No. 6 of Russian Orange Book, July 24, 1914.]

1 This sentence may have been retained to give the reader an insight into the
character of Count Pourtales. It should, therefore, be compared with similar pic-
tures, e.g. British Blue Book No. 78, July 29, and contrasted with British Blue Book
No. 72, July 29, and No. 97, July 30.

100

Offijcial Diplomatic Documents

Saturday, July 25, 1914
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

Foreign Office of

Austria-Hungary

Sent Despatches to

Received
Despatches from

London, Petrograd
Under Secretary of State,

Rome etc.
London etc., Vienna

Belgrade

Germany
Great Britain

Russia

London

Paris, Petrograd, Berlin,
Vienna, Rome, Bel-
grade

London

All Representatives

Belgium ^ Rome etc. Belgrade

France London etc., Vienna Berlin, London, Petro-

grad, Rome, Vienna,
Belgrade
Petrograd

Paris, Petrograd, Ber-
lin, Rome, Vienna,
Belgrade, Russian
Ambassador
Vienna, Belgrade, Ber-
lin, Paris, London,
German Ambassa-
dor
Russia and Great Britain endeavor to secure from Austria-Hungary an exten-
sion of the time limit set in the Serbian note to expire on this day at 6 p.m. The
French support of this request, while promised, does not materialize. Germany
gives her support, but doubts Austria's willingness to grant the request.

Austria-Hungary denies the request, but announces that she will not immedi-
ately proceed to war, and that a period of military preparation will intervene.
This appears to satisfy Great Britain as a concession of practical value.

Serbia delivers her reply which does not satisfy Austria-Hungary, whose lega-
tion leaves Belgrade at 6.30 p.m.

Great Britain continues her efforts to bring about a Conference of four powers,
but apparently has yielded to the view of the French Ambassador that no pres-
sure should be exerted on Russia, for in one note Sir E. Grey even substitutes
Russia for Italy in the proposed group of the mediating powers.

Germany repeats that she had not been consulted by Austria-Hungary in the
preparation of her note to Servia, but finding her demands just would support her.
She declines to mediate between Austria and Serbia, but announces her willingness
to take part in mediation between Austria and Russia.

Russia and France are endeavoring to secure the unconditional support of Great
Britain, not in the interest of Serbia, but to maintain the European balance of
power.

Austria-Hungary disclaims any intention of disturbing this balance of power,
and explains anew her reasons for proceeding against Serbia. She also explains
the meaning of those clauses of her note which she says had been misunderstood ;
and states that Russia was acting under a misapprehension. She also issues a
dossier containing the proofs of her indictment of Serbia.

France refuses to issue an official correction of erroneous accounts in the French
press concerning the attitude of Germany.

Belgium continues to contemplate the probability of a European War.

Juhj 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Boole Nn. 19 IGl

Austria-Hungary :

AUSTROHUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 19

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at Berlin, Rome,
Paris, London, St. Petershurgh and Constantinople.

Vienna, July 25, lOlJf..

Your Excellency will find herewith the dossier mentioned in
the circular note ^ to the Powers with reference to the Great-Servian
propaganda, and its connection with the Serajevo murder.

Your Excellency is instructed to bring this dossier to the notice
of the Government to which you are accredited.

(See Note 2 to British Blue Book No. 48, July 27.)

Enclosure
"The Dossier" 2

The Servian agitation, which has as its object the separation from
the Austrian Monarchy of the Southern Slav districts in order to unite
them with the Servian States, dates from far back.

This propaganda on Servian soil, always the same in its ultimate
object, although varying in its means and intensity, reached one of its
culminating points at the time of the annexation crisis. Throwing
off the protecting cloak of secrecy, it then revealed its purpose openly
and undisguisedly, and attempted, under the patronage of the Servian
Government, to attain its ends by every means in its power.

While the whole of the Servian press was calling for war against
the Monarchy by malicious invectives in which facts were perverted,
apart from other means of propaganda, associations were being formed
to prepare for this war.

The Narodna Odbrana stood out as the most important of these
associations. Having its origin in an already existing revolutionary
committee, it was constituted as a private society, although in fact
it took the form of an organisation of Servian military and civil officials
wholly dependent on the Foreign Office at Belgrade. Amongst its
founders one may mention : General Bozo Jankovic, ex-ministers
Ljuba Jovanovic, Ljuba Davidovic, and Velislav Vulovic, Zivojin

. 1 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 8, July 22, 1914.
2 This "dossier, " being too long to be telegraphed, was sent by mail (see Austro-
Hungarian Red Book No. 39, July 28). It was presented (the Powers were advised of
it on July 25, see French Yellow Book No. 38 and note 1) in Paris on July 27, and was
published, in part, under No. 75 of the French Yellow Book of that date. It was prob-
ably presented in London to Sir Edward Grey on the same day. Sir E. Grey, however,
published only a scant summary of it in British Blue Book No. 48, omitting the rest
and not stating that he had received it. In the introductory narrative to the edition
of the Blue Book of Sept. 28, 1914, Sir E. Grey says : "That his Majesty's Government
did not receive any statement of the evidence on which Austria had founded her ulti-
matum till the 7th August." Neither the British Blue Book nor the Austro-Hungarian
Red Book contains a despatch of this day, which renders it impossible to ascertain
to which "evidence" Sir E. Grey referred in this sentence. It may have been a
complete transcript of the evidence presented at the trial of the Serajevo murderers.
The "dossier," however, contained the "evidence on which Austria had founded
her ultimatum," and this Sir E. Grey kept from Parliament, from the country and
possibly from his colleagues. The first partial knowledge of the "dossier" that the
world had came from the French Yellow Book which was published several months
after the outbreak of the war.

10^ Official Diplomatic Documents

Dacic (Director of the Government printing establishment), and
Majors (then Captains) Voja Tankosic^ and Milan Pribicevic. This
association aimed at the creation and equipment of free companies
for use in the impending war against the Austro-Hungarian Mon-
archy. (See Appendix 2.)

A convinction description of the activity at that time of the
Narodna Odbrana will be found amongst others in the deposition of
Trifko Krstanovic, a Bosnia-Herzegovinian subject, in the course of
his evidence before the district court at Serajevo ; he was then at
Belgrade, and had been accepted by the Narodna Odbrana, with
other subjects of the Monarchy as a komitadji. At the beginning of
1909, Krstanovic had arrived with about 140 fellow-^nembers at a
school established for the formation of new bands at Cuprija (in the
district of Jagodina), managed by Captains Voja Tankosic and Dusan
Putnik. The only instructors at this school were Servian officers.
General Bozo Jankovic and Captain Milan Pribicevic inspected the
three-monthly courses of these bands at regular intervals.

The new komitadjis received their training in musketry, bomb
throwing, mine laying, blowing up of railways, tunnels and bridges,
and the destruction of telegraph wires. According to the instructions
of their leaders, it was their duty to put into practice in Bosnia and
Herzegovina the knowledge they had recently acquired.^

By this action, carried on in the most open manner and encouraged
by the Servian Government, the Narodna Odbrana was thus prepared
for guerilla warfare against Austria-Hungary. In this way sub-
jects of the ]\Ionarchy were led into treason against their country,
and induced, as Servian emissaries, systematically to practice under-
hand attacks against the means of defence of their country.

This period of aggressive aspirations ended with the declaration
made by the Servian Government on the 31st March, 1909, in which
the Government of Belgrade announced that they were prepared to
accept the new situation created in municipal and international law
by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and solemnly promised
to maintain in future friendly relations with the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy.

With this declaration, the agitation, which constituted a source
of constant trouble to Austria-Hungary, seemed to have come to an
end, and the road to an amicable rapprochement between Servia and the
Monarchy to have been entered on. Deprived of the encouragement
of the Servian Government, and combated by that Government in
accordance with their engagements, the propaganda hostile to the
Monarchy could only have continued a shadowy existence and would
have been condemned to early destruction. On the other hand, the
ties of language, race and culture existing between the Southern Slav
districts of the Monarchy and Servia ought to have resulted in the
realisation of a task of common development inspired by mutual
friendship and parallel interests.

These hopes, however, have not been realised.

Aspirations hostile to the Monarchy have continued, and under

July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 103

the eyes of the Servian Government, who have done nothing to sup-
press this movement, the anti-Austro-Hungarian propaganda has
only increased in extent and volume. Hatred against the Monarchy
has been fanned and kindled into an irreconcilable feeling. The
Servian people alike by adapting their former course of action to the
new situation and by supplementing it by fresh methods were sum-
moned to the "inevitable death struggle" against Austria-Hungary.
Secret ramifications have been systematically spread towards the
Slav districts in the south of the Monarchy whose subjects have
been incited to treason against their country.

Above all, the Servian press has since then worked incessantly
in this spirit.

Up to the present time no fewer than eighty-one newspapers
appearing in Servia have had to forfeit their right to delivery through
the post on account of their contents falling within the scope of the
penal law.

There is hardly a clause in the penal code protecting the sacred
person of the Monarch and the members of the Imperial Family,
or the integrity of the State, that has not been violated by Servian
papers.

A few examples of these press views, selected from the great mass
of material published by the press at various dates, are contained in
Appendix I.

Without entering into a detailed account of these expressions of
Servian public opinion, it is necessary to note that in spite of the
formal recognition accorded by Servia, it has never ceased to consider
the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, both before and after
the event; as a robbery committed against Servia for which repara-
tion is due. This idea not only constantly recurs with every modu-
lation of its coarse language in the papers professing most advanced
views, but also finds expression in hardly veiled terms in the Samou-
prava, which is in such close touch with the Foreign OflSce of
Belgrade. (See Appendix I (6).)

Nor can one omit to draw attention to the manner in which the
attempt made on the 15th June, 1910, at Serajevo, by Bogdan Zerajic
against the Feldzeugmeister von Varesanin, Governor of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, was turned to account by the press.

As is known, Zerajic had killed himself immediately after his deed,
and before committing it had burnt all his papers. Under these
circumstances, it was impossible to throw full light upon the motives
of his crime. It could, however, be inferred from a document found
on his person that he was a follower of the views of Krapotkin.
Evidence collected leads likewise to the conclusion that the crime
was of an anarchist type.

This, however, did not prevent the Servian press from celebrating
the criminal as a national Servian hero and from glorifying his deed.
Indeed, the "Politika" protested strongly against the idea that
Zerajic was an anarchist, and declared him to be "a Servian hero
whose name all Servians will repeat with respect and grief."

104 Official Diplomatic Documents

The Politika considers the 18th August ^ of the same year as a
suitable opportunity on which to return to the crime of Zerajic,
"whose name will be sacred to the people," and to celebrate the
outrage in verse. (See Appendix I (a).)

In this way this crime, which had nothing to do with the territorial
aspirations against the Monarchy, was exploited for the furtherance
of these ideas and by the glorifying of Zerajic, murder was hailed
in the most explicit way as a glorious means towards the realisation
of this aim and one worthy to be imitated in the struggle. This
approbation of murder as a weapon fully admissible in the struggle
against the Monarchy re-appears later in the press in discussing the
attempt made by Jukic against the Royal Commissioner von Cuvaj.
(See Appendix I (c).)

These newspapers, which were circulated not only in Servia but
also, as we shall show later, illicitly smuggled into the Monarchy by
well-organised secret methods, have awakened and kept alive this
mood in the masses, a mood which has provided a fruitful field for
the activities of the associations hostile to the Monarchy.

The Narodna Odbrana became the centre of the agitation car-
ried on by the associations. The same persons who were at its head
at the time of the annexation still control it. Now as then, they
still control it in the capacity of the most active and energetic organ-
isers, the most violent opponents of the jMonarchy; General Bozo
Jankovic, Zivojin Dacic (Director of the Government printing estab-
lishment), and Majors Milan Pribicevic and Voja Tankosic. Organ-
ised on a broad and far-reaching scale and constituted on a strict
hierarchical basis (see Appendix 2, "Organisation"), the Narodna
Odbrana counted soon some 400 committees which developed a very
active agitation.

Moreover, the Narodna Odbrana became closely allied with
the "shooting federation" (Schutzenbimd) , (762 societies), the
great SokoP Association "Dusan" (2,500 members), the Olympian
Club, the association of horsemen (Reiterverein) , "Prince Michael,"
the society of sportsmen (Jdgerbund), and the league of development
(Kulturliga), as well as numerous other associations all of which,
subordinate to it, were under the guidance and protection of the
Narodna Odbrana, and worked on the same lines. Becoming more
and more closely intermingled, these associations arrived at a com-
plete amalgamation in such a way that to-day they are nothing but
members of the single body of the Narodna Odbrana.

Thus the Narodna Odbrana has set up all over Servia a close
network of agitation, and has attracted to its principles all those
who were receptive of its ideas.

The official publications of the Narodna Odbrana demonstrate
sufficiently clearly the spirit which animates it.

While in its statutes, it represents itself as an "educational society"

1 Birthday of His Imperial and Apostolic Majesty.

2 [Sokol = falcon. The name given to gymnastic associations throughout Slav
countries which have adopted the falcon as their emblem.]

July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 105

(Kulturverein) concerning itself only with the spiritual and physical
improvement of the Servian population and its material progress, the
Narodna Odbrana discloses in its official publication (see Appendix 2)
the true and single motive of its existence in that which it calls its
"re-organised programme": to preach to the Servian people the
sacred truth by "fanatical and indefatigable work" under the pre-
tence that the Monarchy wishes to "take away Servian liberty and
language and even to destroy her" ; that it is an essential necessity
to wage against Austria-Hungary, her "first and greatest enemy,"
"a war of extermination with rifle and cannon," and "by every
means" to prepare the people for this war, which is ''to liberate
the conquered territories," in which "seven million brothers are
suffering in bondage."

All the efforts " at an educational programme" {Kulturhestrehungen)
of the Narodna Odbrana are exclusively concerned with this idea
simply as a means for the organisation and education of the people
for the longed-for death struggle against the Monarchy.

All the associations affiliated to the Narodna Odbrana work
in the same spirit ; the Sokol Association at Kragujevac w^ill serve as
an example (see Appendix 3).

As in the case of the Narodna Odbrana, officers, professors and
civil servants are at its head.

The speech in which its President, Major Kovacevic, opened the
annual meeting of 1914, made absolutely no mention of physical
training, which is supposed to be the real object of a Sokol association,
and confined itself solely to "the preparations for war" against the
"dangerous, heartless, grasping, odious and greedy enemy in the
north" who "robs millions of Servian brothers of their liberty and
rights, and holds them in bondage and chains."

In the administrative reports of this association the technical
work is placed entirely in the background, and only serves as headlines
for the avowal of the real "objects of the activities of the adminis-.
tration,!' namely, the preparation of national development and the
strengthening of the "oppressed nation" with the object of enabling
it to carry out its "incomplete programme and its unfinished task,"
and to accomplish that "great action" "which is to be carried out
in the near future," "the liberation of those brothers who live across
the Drina, who are suffering the martyrdom of the crucified."

Even the treasurer makes use of his financial reports to send
forth the appeal that "falcons must be reared" capable "of bringing
freedom to the brothers still iri bondage."

As in the case of the "educational programme" of the Narodna
Odbrana, the gymnastic activity of the Sokols is not the real object
but merely a means at the service of the same propaganda carried
on in the same spirit, and even with the very same words.

When the Narodna Odbrana appeals to the "people" for a death
struggle against the Monarchy, it does not address itself only to
the Servian people, but to all Southern Slav nationalities. In the
eyes of the Narodna Odbrana, the Slav regions in the south of the

106 Official Diplomatic Documents

Monarchy are regarded as "our subjected Servian territories/' (See
Appendix 4.) The Southern Slav subjects of the Monarchy are
further also expected to take part in this ''national work." This
"healthy and necessary work" is, therefore, to be carried on beyond
the Servian frontier. The Narodna Odbrana recruits its "heroes for
this holy war" even on the soil of the Monarchy, and among them
Obilic, the murderer of Murad, is to light them on their way as an
example of sacrifice for one's country worthy of imitation.

But in order to incite "brothers outside Servia" to share in "the
work of private effort," the Narodna Odbrana keeps in close touch
with the "brothers beyond the frontier." It is not said in the publi-
cations of the society, how this intimate association is carried out,
no doubt because it appertains to that part of the "common work"
which "for many reasons cannot, or ought not to be divulged."

How comprehensive this branch of its activity is, can be seen by
the fact that not only the central committee of the Narodna Od-
brana, but also certain of its local committees contain special sections
for "foreign affairs."

This "foreign" activity of the Narodna Odbrana and its affiliated
branches is extremely varied.

What is relatively less dangerous inasmuch as it can be officially
controlled, consists of lecture tours undertaken by distinguished
members of the Narodna Odbrana in the southeastern parts of
the Monarchy where they speak before various societies on national
or educational subjects. These tours give the speakers the desired
opportunity, which is indeed the chief object of these journeys, of
explaining the true aims of the associations in language more or less
veiled, which is intelligible to those who are already initiated.

Amongst these, emissaries, one of the best known is Zivojin Dacic
(Director of the Government printing establishment), already several
times alluded to ; it was he who, on the 8th August, 1909, issued an
"appeal" to the Servian people in which he called Austria-Hungary
the enemy of Servia, and exhorted them to prepare for the war
against the Monarchy. On numerous occasions, Dacic under-
took tours of this nature in the southeastern districts of the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy. During one of these lectures at Karlovci in
1912, he flung his accustomed prudence to the winds and spoke openly
of the "union of all Serbs against the common foe," by which he
designated Austria-Hungary in unmistakable language.

More dangerous are the relations with associations in the Monarchy
formed by Servian associations imbued with the spirit of the Narodna
Odbrana under the cloak of community of interests and of culture ;
for the mutual visits of these associations, whether by delegates or
in bodies, which escape all official control, are utilised by the Ser-
vians for all sorts of plots against the Monarchy.

Thus, for instance, at the well-known feast of the Prosvjeta Asso-
ciation at Serajevo, in September, 1912, an envoy of the Narodna
Odbrana had the effrontery secretly to recruit Bosnian adherents to
his society. (See Appendix 6.) The message which the representa-

July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 107

tive of the Sokol Association at Kragujevac brought to the " brothers
in Bosnia " at this feast was : " We have not forgotten you ; the wings
of the falcon of Sumadija are still powerful" — a thought which in
confidential intercourse would no doubt have found quite a different
expression and one better corresponding to the tendencies of this
society which we have already explained. (See Appendix 3.) As to
the events that take place at meetings of the same kind in Servia,
the Imperial and Royal authorities cannot have any information
founded on unimpeachable authority, as they only possess on this
matter confidential information which it is difficult to check. In this
connection, one may mention the visit of Agram students to Servia
in April, 1912, who received from the Servians an official military
reception accompanied even by a review of troops in their honour,
and that in a manner so suggestive that the administrative report of
the Sokol Association at Kragujevac could say : "This event marks
the beginning and germ of a great deed which will be accomplished
in the near future, it is a germ which will ripen when the soul of the
people bursts its bonds and until there is no barrier that has not
been destroyed.''

It is only recently that it has come to the knowledge of the Austro-
Hungarian authorities that the Servian Sokol associations have
succeeded in inducing similar societies into the Monarchy to estab-
lish a connection with them which is up to the present secret, and the
character of which is not yet quite clear, for the inquiries on this
point are still in progress. Up to the present, however, the informa-
tion obtained permits the conclusion that traces have been dis-
covered of one of the ways by which the subversive aims of the Servian
Sdkols and their friends have poisoned the minds of certain groups
of mistaken and misled persons in the Monarchy.

This propaganda which is aimed at wider circles, and is rather of
a preparatory nature, assumes minor importance compared with that
of the "foreign work" which is conducted by the Narodna Odbrana
and its friends in the form of personal agitation among individuals.
It is in this field that the most melancholy results are shown.

By means of confidential and secret emissaries, it carries the
poison of rebellion to the circles of men of mature age as well as those
of irresponsible youth.

It is thus, for example, that the late officers of the Honved B.B.,
D.K., V.M., and the lieutenant of Croatian-Slavonian Gendarmerie
V.K., led astray by Milan Pribicevic, left the service of the army of
the Monarchy under most suspicious circumstances and turned to
Servia ; they have seen in the meanwhile most of their dreams
unrealised and some of them, at any rate, are thinking of returning
to the Fatherland they have betrayed.

The agitation introduced from Servia into the middle schools of
Croatia and Bosnia is unhappily too well known to need illustration ;
what is less known is that people who have been expelled from
Croatian and Bosnian schools owing to grave breaches of discipline,
are received in Servia with open arms, and often even protected by the

108 Official Diplomatic Documents

State and educated as enemies of the Monarchy. The Servian schools
with their anti-Austrian staffs, and their large number of professors
and teachers who are members of the Narodna Odbrana, are clearly
establishments thoroughly adapted for training experts of this kind.
A very notable case of this sort may be quoted here. In March, 1914,
several pupils of the Training College of Pakrac (Croatia) were dis-
missed on account of a strike. They went to Servia, where some of
them immediately obtained situations as schoolmasters, while others
were admitted to a college for teachers. One of those who had been
thus dismissed, and who was connected with ant i- Austrian circles,
declared publicly that he and his people would give a proof, during
the sojourn of the hereditary Archduke in Bosnia, that this province
was Servian territory. It is, as we may add, highly significant that
during the stay of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Bosnia, the Royal
Servian Prefect of the district of Krajna gave to the three training
college students, who were thus gravely implicated, Servian passports
in which he falsely described them as Servian subjects, although he
must have known that they were Croatians. With these passports,
the three agitators were able to enter the Monarchy without being
noticed, where, however, they were eventually recognised and
arrested.

All this is not, by a long way, enough to give a complete repre-
sentation of the "foreign" activity of the Narodna Odbrana.

The Imperial and Royal Government had been informed for a
long time past by confidential reports that the Narodna Odbrana
had made military preparations for the war which it desired to make
against the Monarchy, inasmuch as it kept emissaries in Austria-
Hungary, who, as soon as hostilities broke out, would attempt in the
usual guerilla manner to destroy means of transport and equip-
ment and stir up revolt or panic. (See Appendix 7.)

The criminal proceedings taken in 1913 by the District Court at
Serajevo against Jovo Jaglicic and his associates for espionage
(Appendix 6), confirm this confidential information. As at the time
of its foundation, the preparation for guerilla warfare still figures in
the programme of the Narodna Odbrana, to which must now be
further added a complete system of espionage.

It is for this reason that the programme of the Narodna Odbrana,
described as "re-organised," is in reality an extended programme
which includes the preparation for a "war of extermination" against
the Monarchy, and even its realisation, and finally the unfurling of
the "ancient red flag of the Narodna Odbrana."

Acts of terrorism must finally result from this atmosphere of hatred
against the Monarchy, which is publicly and secretly provoked, and
from an agitation which considers itself free from all responsibility ;
in order to bring them about, all means are regarded as permissible
in the struggle against Austria-Hungary, including even without any
sense of shame common acts of murder.

On the 8th June, 1912, a man named Lukas Jukic shot von Cuvaj,
the Royal Commissioner at Agram, with the result that the Councillor

July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 109

(Banalrat) von Hervoic, who was seated in the same carriage, was
mortally wounded. Jukic, in his flight, shot a policeman who was
pursuing him, and wounded two others.

From the subsequent public investigation it appeared that Jukic
was saturated with the ideas and plans propagated by the Narodna
Odbrana, and that although Jukic had for some time past been
devoting himself to criminal schemes, these schemes were only
matured after he had made an excursion to Belgrade together with
the Agram students on the 18th of April, 1912. At the noisy cele-
brations in honour of the visitors, Jukic had entered into relations
with several people belonging to the circle of the Narodna Odbrana,
with whom he had had political discussions. A few days after-
wards he returned to Belgrade, and there received from a Servian
major a bomb, and from a comrade the Browning pistol with which
he carried out his crime.

In the opinion of experts, the bomb found at Agram was made
in an arsenal for military purposes.

Jukic's attempt had not been forgotten, when on the 18th of
August, 1913, Stephen Dojcic, who had returned from America,
made an attempt on the life of the Royal Commissioner, Baron
Skerlecz, at Agram — an attempt which was the outcome of action
organised by the Servians among the Southern Slavs living in America,
and which was also the work of the "foreign" propaganda of the
Narodna Odbrana and its confederates.

A pamphlet by the Servian, T. Dimitrijevic, printed in Chicago,
and entitled "Natrag u staro ognjiste vase," with its unbridled
attacks against His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, and its
appeal to the Servians of the Monarchy with reference to their im-
pending "deliverance," and urging them to migrate home to Servia,
demonstrates the fact that the propaganda carried out unchecked
in America from Servia, and that carried on from Servia in the terri-
tory of the Monarchy, worked on parallel lines.

And again, scarcely a year later, Agram was the scene of a new
outrage, this time unsuccessful.

On the 20th of May, 1914, Jakob Schafer made an attempt at the
Agram Theatre on the life of the Ban, Freiherr von Skerlecz, an
attempt which was frustrated at the last moment by a police official.
The subsequent investigation revealed the existence of a plot inspired
by Rudolf Hercigonja. From the depositions of Hercigonja and his
five accomplices, it is manifest that this crime also originated in Servia.

Having taken part in an unsuccessful attempt to liberate Jukic,
Hercigonja fled to Servia (October, 1912), where, together with his
accomplice Marojan Jaksic, he consorted with the komitadjis and
.members of the Narodna Odbrana. As frequently happens when
immature minds are excited by occupying themselves too early with
political questions, the result of this corrupting company was here
also disastrous. Hercigonja returned home impressed by the dogma
learnt in Belgrade that the Southern Slav territories of Austria-Hun-
gary must be separated from it and re-united to the Servian kingdom.

110 Official Diplomatic Documents

He had further been persuaded by the teachings of the friends with
whom he associated there, that this object should be pursued by
means of attempts on the Hves of persons holding high office and
leading politicians of the Monarchy as the only means of obtaining
this end.

This is the spirit in which Hercigonja influenced his friends at
Agram and converted some of them to his ideas. Foremost among his
plans was the carrying out of an attempt on the life of the heir to the
throne, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

A few months before proceedings had been taken against Luka
Aljinovic for treasonable agitation. In the course of these proceed-
ings three witnesses declared that Aljinovic had told them that in
the year 1913 he had received at Belgrade 100 dinar from the Narodna
Odbrana, and a similar sum from a secret association of students,
for purposes of agitation, but especially to carry out an attempt on
the life of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

It is clear how far the criminal agitation of the Narodna Odbrana
and those who shared in its views, has of late been primarily directed
against the person of the hereditary Archduke. From these facts
the conclusion may be drawn that the Narodna Odbrana, as well
as the associations hostile to the Monarchy in Servia, which were
grouped round it, recently decided that the hour had struck to trans-
late theory into practice.

It is noteworthy, however, that the Narodna limits itself in this
way to inciting, and where the incitement has fallen on fertile soil
to providing means of material assistance for the realisation of its
plans, but that it has confided the only dangerous part of this prop-
aganda of action to the youth of the Monarchy, which it has ex-
cited and corrupted, and which alone has to bear the burden of this
miserable "heroism."

All the characteristics of this procedure are found in the history
and origin of the profoundly regrettable outrage of the 28th of June
(see Appendix 8) .

Princip and Grabez are characteristic examples of young men
who have been poisoned from their school days by the doctrines of
the Narodna Odbrana.

At Belgrade, where he frequented the society of students imbued
with these ideas, Princip busied himself with criminal plans against
the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, against whom the hatred of the
Servian element hostile to the Monarchy was particularly acute on
the occasion of his tour in the annexed territories.

He was joined by Cabrinovic, who moved in the same circles, and
whose shifting and radically revolutionary views, as he himself admits,
as well as the influence of his surroundings in Belgrade and the reading
of the Servian papers, inspired him with the same sense of hostility
to the Monarchy, and brought him into the propaganda of action.

Thanks to the state of mind in which he already was, Grabez
succumbed very quickly to this milieu, which he now entered.

But however far this plot may have prospered, and however

July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 111

determined the conspirators may have been to carry out the attempt,
it would never have been effected, if people had not been found, as
in the case of Jukic, to provide the accomplices with means of com-
mitting their crime. For, as Princip and Cabrinovic have expressly
admitted, they lacked the necessary arms, as well as the money to
purchase them.

It is interesting to see where the accomplices tried to procure
their arms. Milan Pribicevic and Zivojin Dacic, the two principal
men in the Narodna Odbrana, were the first accomplices thought of
as a sure source of help in their need, doubtless because it had already
become a tradition amongst those ready to commit crimes, that they
could obtain instruments for murder from these representatives of
the Narodna Odbrana. The accidental circumstance that these
two men were not at Belgrade at the crkical moment doubtless
balked this plan. However, Princip and Cabrinovic were not at a
loss in finding other help, that of Milan Ciganovic, an ex-komitadji,
and now a railway official at Belgrade, and at the same time an active
member of the Narodna Odbrana, who, in 1909, first appeared as
a pupil at the school {Bandenschule) at Cuprija (see Appendix 5).
Princip and Cabrinovic were not deceived in their expectations, as
they at once received the necessary help from Ciganovic.

The latter, and at his instigation, his friend Major Voja Tankosic,
of the Royal Servian Army, also one of the leaders of the Narodna
Odbrana, who has already been mentioned several times, and who,
in 1908, was at the head of the school of armed bands at Cuprija
(see Appendix 5), now appear as moving spirits and active furtherers
in the plot ; the repulsive manner in which they approved as a matter
of course, is significant of the moral qualities of the whole anti-
Austrian movement. They had at first only one doubt, and that but
a fleeting one, as to whether the three conspirators were really resolved
to commit this act. This doubt, however, soon disappeared, thanks
to their insidious counsels. Thenceforth they were prepared to give
every assistance. Tankosic produced four Browning pistols, ammuni-
tion and money for the journey ; six hand-grenades from the Servian
army supplies completed the equipment, of which the composition
and origin recalls the case of Jukic. Anxious about the success of
the attempt, Tankosic had the conspirators instructed in shooting,
a task which Ciganovic carried out with a success which has since
been fully proved. Tankosic and Ciganovic were further anxious to
ensure secrecy for the plot by special means which had not been bar-
gained for by the assassins. They therefore supplied cyanide of
potassium, telling the two culprits to commit suicide after the crime,
a precaution which was to be specially advantageous to themselves,
as secrecy would thus relieve them of the slight danger which they
were incurring in the enterprise. Sure death for the victims of their
corruption, perfect security for themselves, this is the motto of the
Narodna Odbrana, as was already known.

In order to render the execution of the crime possible, it was
necessary that the bombs and arms should be secretly smuggled into

112 Official Diplomatic Documents

Bosnia. There again Ciganovic gave all the assistance in his power ;
he wrote out for the conspirators the exact route to be followed, and
assured them of the collusion of the Servian Customs officials for
getting them into Bosnia. The way in which this journey, described
by Princip as "mysterious," was organised and carried out can leave
no doubt but that this route was a secret one, prepared in advance,
and already often used for the mysterious designs of the Narodna
Odbrana. With an assurance and a certainty which could only
result from long habit, the frontier guards at Sabac and Loznica lent
their administrative organisation for the purpose. The secret trans-
port with its complicated system of ever-changing guides, who were
summoned as if by magic, and who were always on the spot w^hen
wanted, was effected without a hitch. Without inquiring into the
object of this strange journey of some immature students, the Ser-
vian authorities set this smooth machinery into motion at a word
from the ex-komitadji and minor railway official, Ciganovic. How-
ever, they had no need to ask any questions, as from the instructions
they had received, it was perfectly clear that a new "mission'*' of the
Narodna Odbrana was being carried out. The sight of the arsenal
of bombs and revolvers caused the exciseman Grbic merely to smile
good-naturedly and approvingly — sufficient proof of how accus-
tomed they were on this "route" to find contraband of this nature.

The Royal Servian Government have taken a grave responsibility
on their shoulders, in allowing all this to take place.

Though bound to cultivate neighbourly relations with Austria-
Hungary, they have allowed their press to disseminate hatred against
the Monarchy; they have allowed associations established on their
own territory under the leadership of high officers, of public officials,
of professors and of judges, to carry on openly a campaign against
the Monarchy, with the ultimate object of inciting its citizens to revo-
lution; they have not prevented men devoid of all moral scruples,
who share in the direction of its military and civil administration,
from poisoning the public conscience, so that in this struggle low
murder appears as the best weapon.

APPENDIX 1

Opinions of the Servian Press

(a) The PolitikUy on the 18th August, 1910, on the occasion of
the eightieth birthday of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty,
published a large portrait of Bogdan Zerajic, who, two months
earlier, had made a murderous attack on the Governor of Bosnia,
Freiherr von Varesanin. In the article dealing with this, the fol-
lowing observations were made : — " Two months ago, on the 2nd
of June (old style), on the opening day of the Diet of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, a young Servian, the student Bogdan Zerajic, made
an attempt in Serajevo to kill the Governor of Bosnia and Herze-
govina, General Marian Varesanin. Zerajic fired five shots at

July 25 y Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 113

this renegade, who had assured his career by pouring out the blood
of his brothers in the famous insurrection in Rakovica, but, owing
to a remarkable accident, did not succeed in killing him. Whereon
the brave and composed Zerajic fired the sixth and last bullet through
his own head, and immediately fell dead. In Vienna, they knew very
well that it was not the reading of Russian and revolutionary writings
which had induced Zerajic to make his attempt, but that he acted
thus as the noble scion of a race which wished to protest against
foreign rule in this bloody way. Therefore, they sought to hush up
the whole matter as quickly as possible, and — contrary to their cus-
tom — to avoid an affair which would have still more compromised
the Austrian Government in Bosnia g^nd Herzegovina. In Vienna,
it was desired that every memory of Zerajic should be extinguished,
that no importance should be attached to his attempt ; but just this
fear of the dead Zerajic, and the prohibition against mentioning his
name throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, brought it about that his
name is spoken among the people as something sacred to-day, on
the 18th of August, perhaps more than ever.

" To-day, we too light a candle at his grave and cry * Honour to
Zerajic.'"

To this is added a poem, the translation of which is as follows : —

"Bosnia lives and is not dead yet,
In vain have you buried her corpse ;
Still the chained victim spits fire,

Nor is it yet time to sing the dirge. ^

With devil's hand you have scratched a grave for her
But the living dead will not descend into the vault ;
Emperor, dost thou hear ?

In the flash of the revolver the leaden bullets hiss about thy throne.
These are not slaves ; this is glorious freedom
Which flashes from the bold hand of the oppressed.
Why does this horrible Golgotha shudder ?
Peter drew the sword in Christ's defence,
His hand fell, but out of the blood
A thousand brave hands will rise ;
That shot was only the first herald
Of the glorious Easter after Golgotha's torments."

(6) On the 8th October, 1910, on the occasion of the anniversary
of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Politika and
the Mali Journal, the last of which appeared with a black border,
published articles in which they indulged in violent attacks
against Austria-Hungary. Europe must convince herself that the
Servian people still think always of the "remrwhe."^ The day of the
"remnche'' must come; for this the feverish exertions of Servia to
organise her military power as well as the feeling of the Servian people
and their hatred of the neighbouring kingdom were a guarantee.

On the same occasion the Samouprava wrote on the 9th October,
1910, " Abuse and excesses are no fit means to express true patriotism ;
quiet, steady and honest work alone leads to the goal."

(c) On the 18th April, 1911, the Politika said: "Except for a
few cynics, no one in Servia would be glad to see King Peter pro-

114 Official Diplomatic Documents

ceeding to Vienna or Budapest. By the annexation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the possibiUty of friendship between Servia and Austria-
Hungary was once for all destroyed. Every Servian feels that.''

(d) The Beogradske N ovine wrote on the 18th April, 1911: — ■
" Even in Government circles the projected journey of King Peter
to the Emperor Francis Joseph is disapproved. The storm of indig-
nation which has seized the whole of the Servian race on account of
the King's proposed journey is entirely comprehensible."

{e) The Mali Journal of the 19th April, 1911, says: "A visit
of King Peter to the ruler of Austria-Hungary would be an insult
to all Serbs. By this visit, Servia would forfeit the right to play the
part of Piedmont. The interests of Servia can never coincide with
the interests of Austria."

(/) On the 23rd April, 1911, the Politika, the Mali Journal, the
Tribuna, the Beogradske Novine, and the Vezernje Novosti, com-
mented on the projected visit of King Peter to the Court of Vienna :
"Between Servia and Austria, friendship can never exist. The
projected visit of King Peter would, therefore, be for Servia a ' shame-
ful capitulation,' 'a humiliation of Servia,' 'a solemn sanctioning
of all the crimes and misdeeds that Austria-Hungary has committed
against Servia and the Servian people.' "

(g) On the 18th April, 1912, the Trgovinski Glasnik wrote in an
article headed, "The decay of Austria": —

"In Austria-Hungary decay prevails on all sides. What is now
happening beyond the Danube and the Save is no longer a German,
Magyar, Bohemian or Croatian crisis, it is a universal Austrian crisis,
a crisis of the dynasty itself. We Servians can observe such a devel-
opment of affairs in Austria with satisfaction."

(h) The Balkan, in an article entitled "The Borders of Albania,"
in attacking Austria-Hungary, expressed itself to this effect : " If
Europe is too weak to call a halt to Austria-Hungary, Montenegro
and Servia will do it, saying to Austria, ' Halt ! no further ! ' A war
between Austria-Hungary and Servia is inevitable. We have dis-
membered the Turkish Empire, we will dismember Austria too. We
have finished one war, we are now facing a second."

(i) The Vecernje Novosti, of the 22nd April, 1913, appeals to the
Servian travelling public and to Servian traders to boycott the
Donau Dampfschifffahrts-Gesellschaft (The Danube Steam Navigation
Company). "No one should travel or consign goods by ships of
this Austrian Company. All who do this should be punished with
fines by a committee. The moneys would flow to the funds of the
Komitadjis which are to be applied for the purpose of the coming
war with Austria."

(k) The Tribuna of the 26th May, 1913, on the occasion of the
seizure of Ada Kaleh by Austria, writes : " The criminal black and
yellow Austria has again carried out a piratical trick. It is a thief
who, when he cannot steal a whole sack of gold, contents himself with
one dinar."

(I) On the 10th June, 1913, on the occasion of the recurrence of

July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 115

the anniversary of the murderous attack on the Royal Commissary
in Agram by the student Luka Jukic, the Servian newspapers pub-
lished memorial articles. An article in the Pragda stated that : " It
must grieve us to the bottom of our hearts that everyone has not
acted like our Jukic. We have no longer a Jukic, but we have the
hatred, we have the anger, we have to-day ten million Jukics. We
are convinced that soon Jukic, through his prison window, will hear
the last cannon shot of freedom."

(m) The Mali Journal of the 7th October, 1913, gives a leading
place to an article in which Austria-Hungary is denied the right of
existence, and the Slavonic peoples are invited to support the offensive
campaign contemplated by Servia.

(n) The Piemont writes on the commemoration day of the annex-
ation : " Five years ago to-day an imperial decree extended the sov-
ereignty of the Hapsburg sceptre over Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Servian people will feel for decades yet the grief which was that
day inflicted on them. Shamed and shattered, the Servian people
groaned in despair. The people vow to take vengeance in attaining
freedom by an heroic step. This day has aroused the energy which
had already sunk to sleep, and soon the refreshed hero will strive for
freedom. To-day when Servian graves adorn the ancient Servian
territories, when the Servian cavalry has trod the battlefields of
Macedonia and old Servia, the Servian people having ended their
task in the South turn to the other side, whence the groans and tears
of the Servian brother are heard, and where the gallows has its home.
The Servian soldiers who to-day in Dusan's kingdom fight those
Albanians who were provoked against us by the state which took
Bosnia and Herzegovina from us, vowed to march against the 'sec-
ond Turkey' even as with God's help they had marched against the
Balkan Turkey. They make this vow and hope that the day of
revenge is drawing near. One Turkey vanished. The good Servian
God will grant that the 'second Turkey' will vanish too."

(o) The Mali Jmtrnal of the 4th November, 1913, writes : "Every
effort tow^ards a rapprochement with Austria-Hungary is equivalent
to a betrayal of the Servian people. Servia must understand the
facts and always hold before her eyes that she has in Austria-Hungary
her most dangerous enemy, and that it must be the sacred obliga-
tion of every Servian Government to fight this enemy."

(p) On the 14th January, 1914, the Pragda said: "Our new
year's wishes are first of all for our still unfreed brothers sighing under
a foreign yoke. Let the Servians endure; after Kossovo came
Kumanovo, and our victorious career is not yet ended."

(q) The Novosti of the 18th January, 1914, published a picture
of "The Blessing of the Water in Bosnia" with the following text:
" Even in places which lie under the foreign yoke, the Servians pre-
serve their customs against the day when in glorious joy the day of
freedom dawns."

(r) The Zastava confesses in January, 1914: "Servia incites the
Austro-Hungarian Servians to revolution."

116 Official Diplomatic Documents

(s) The Mali Journal of the 9th March, 1914, writes : "Servia can
never forget Franz Ferdinand's sabre-rattHng in the Skutari affair."

(t) On the 4th April, 1914, the Zastava writes: "The Austrian
statesmen who only conduct a policy of hatred, a bureaucratic policy,
not a policy inspired by broad vision, are themselves preparing the
ruin of their State."

(u) The Pragda of the 8th April, 1914, says: "Austria has now
lost her right to exist."

{v) In their Easter numbers (April, 1914) all the Servian newspapers
expressed the hope that soon their unfreed, oppressed brothers under
the yoke would celebrate a joyous resurrection.

{w) In the Tribuna of the 23rd April, 1914, it is stated that :
"The pacifists have invented a new catchword, that of the 'patriotism
of Europe.' This programme can only be realised, however, when
Austria is partitioned."

(.t) The Mali Journal of the 12th May, 1914, writes: "What
are called crimes in private life are called, in Austria, politics. History
knows a monster, and that monster is called Austria."

APPENDIX 2

Extract from the "Narodna Odbrana," an organ published by
THE Central Committee of the Narodna Odbrana Society.
(Narodna odbrana izdanje stredisnog odbora narodne-

ODBRANE. BeOGRAD, 1911. "NoVA STAMPARIJA" DaVIDOVIC,

Decanska ulica BR. 14, Ljub. Davidovica.)

In a short introduction it is first of all remarked that this pamphlet
"does not completely or exhaustively reproduce the whole work of
the Narodna Odbrana because, for many reasons, it is neither per-
missible nor possible to do this."

The document is divided into three parts of which the first consists
of fourteen chapters and is in the nature of a programme, while the
second contains a report of the activities of the Society, and in the
third examples are given for the organisation of similar societies
abroad.

In the first chapter, "Origin and activity of the first Narodna
Odbrana," it is remarked that the Society was founded as a conse-
quence of the popular movement arising in Servia on the annexation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that it had the following objects : —

(1) Raising, inspiring and strengthening the sentiment of nation-
ality.

(2) Registration and enlistment of volunteers.

(3) Formation of volunteer units and their preparation for armed
action.

(4) Collection of voluntary contributions, including money and
other things necessary for the realisation of its task.

(5) Organisation, equipment and training of a special revolutionary
band (Komitee), destined for special and independent military action.

July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 117

(6) Development of activity for the defence of the Servian people
in all other directions. In this connection, it is remarked that owing
to the recognition of the annexation by the Great Powers an end had
been made to all this work of the Society on which, while retaining
its existing constitution, the Society had taken measures to reorganise
its programme and to undertake new work, so that, on the recurrence
of a similar occasion, " the old red War Flag of the Narodna Odbrana
would again be unfurled."

At the beginning of the second chapter, "The new Narodna
Odbrana of to-day," it is stated that "at the time of the annexation,
experience had shown that Servia was not ready for the struggle
which circumstances imposed upon her, and that this struggle, which
Servia must take up, is much more serious and more difficult than it
was thought to be ; the annexation was only one of the blows which
the enemies of Servia have aimed at this land, many blows have
preceded it, and many will follow it. Work and preparation are
necessary so that a new attack may not find Servia equally unpre-
pared." The object assigned to the work to be done by people of
every class is stated to be "the preparation of the people for war in
all forms of national work, corresponding to the requirements of the
present day," and the means suggested to effect this object are
" strengthening of the national consciousness, bodily exercises, increase
of material and bodily well-being, cultural improvement, etc. ... so
far as individuals and societies can and should assist the State in
these spheres."

The third chapter, "The three principal tasks," begins with a
hint that the annexation has taught that national consciousness in
Servia is not so strong as it should be in a country which, as a small
fraction of three millions, forms a hope of support for seven millions of
the oppressed Servian people. The first task of the Society, therefore,
consists in strengthening the national consciousness. The second
task is the cultivation of bodily exercises, the third the proper util-
isation of these activities learned in the field of sport.

In the fourth chapter (Musketry) prominence is given to the value
of good training in musketry, especially having regard to the circum-
stances of Servia, w^here the military training only lasts six months.
These observations conclude with the sentence :

"A new blow, like that of the annexation, must be met by a new
Servia, in which every Servian, from child to greybeard, is a rifle-
man."

The fifth chapter, which treats of "The relations of the Narodna
Odbrana to the Sokol societies," begins with a social and political
excursus as to the conditions on which the powers of States de-
pend. In this connection the fall of Turkey is referred to, and it is
said :

"The old Turks of the South gradually disappear and only a part
of our people suffer under their rule. But new Turks come from the
North, more fearful and dangerous than the old ; stronger in civilisa-
tion and more advanced economically, our northern enemies come

118 Official Diplomatic Documents

against us.' They want to take our freedom and our language from
us and to crush us. We can already feel the presages of the struggle
which approaches in that quarter. The Servian people are faced by
the question ' to be or not to be ? ' "

"What is the object of the Lectures?" is the title of the seventh
chapter, the principal contents of which are covered by the following
sentences :

"The Narodna Odbrana instituted lectures which were largely
propaganda lectures. The programme of our new work was devel-
oped. Every lecture referred to the annexation, the work of the
old Narodna Odbrana and the task of the new. The lectures will
never cease to be propaganda lectures, but they wdll develop special
branches more and more and concern themselves with all questions
of our social and national life."

In the eighth chapter, "Women's Activities in the Narodna
Odbrana," the ninth "Detail and Lesser Work," and the tenth,
"Renaissance of the Society," the preparation and deepening of the
Society's work and the necessity of a regeneration of the individual,
the nation and the State are treated in reference to the tasks of the
Narodna Odbrana.

The Introduction to the eleventh chapter (" New Obilice and
Singjelice" ^) runs as follows : —

" It is an error to assert that Kossovo is past and gone. We find
ourselves in the midst of Kossovo. Our Kossovo of to-day is the
gloom and ignorance in which our people live. The other causes of
the new Kossovo live on the frontiers to the North and West : the
Germans, Austrians and ^Schwabas,' with their onward pressure
against our Servian and Slavonic South." In conjunction with the
reference to the heroic deeds of Obilice and Singjelice, the necessity of
sacrifice in the service of the nation is alluded to, and it is declared
that "national work is interwoven with sacrifice, particularly in
Turkey and in Austria, where such workers are persecuted by the
authorities and dragged to prison and the gallows. For this struggle,
also, against gloom and ignorance there is no need of such heroes.
The Narodna Odbrana does not doubt that in the fight with gun and
cannon against the ' Schwabas ' and the other enemies with whom we
stand face to face, our people will provide a succession of heroes.
However, the Narodna Odbrana is not content with this, for it
regards the so-called peaceful present day conditions as war, and
demands heroes too for this struggle of to-day which we are carrying
on in Servia and beyond the frontier."

The twelfth chapter treats of "Union with our brothers and
friends," and its principal contents are concentrated in the following
sentences : —

^ Milos Obilice (or Kobili6) crept — according to Serbian tradition — into the
Turkish Camp, after the battle on the Amselveld, and there murdered the Sultan
Murad (von Kdllay, Geschichte der Serben, Vol. I). Stephan Singjelic, Prince of
Resara, played a part during the Serbian Revolution, 1807-1810. In 1809, Sing-
jeUc defended the redoubt of Tschagar against the Turks, and is said to have blown
himself into the air, with some of his followers and many Turks, when outnumbered.
(Von Kdllay, Die Geschichte des serbischen Aufstandes.)

July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 119

"The maintenance of union with our brothers near and far across
the frontier, and our other friends in the world, is one of the chief
tasks of the Narodna Odbrana. In using the word 'people' the
Narodna Odbrana means our whole people, not only those in Servia.
It hopes that the work done by it in Servia will spur the brothers out-
side Servia to take a more energetic share in the work of private
initiative, so that the new present day movement for the creation of a
powerful Servian Narodna Odbrana will go forward in unison in all
Servian territories."

The thirteenth chapter, which is headed "Two Important Tasks,"
proceeds as follows : —

"As we take up the standpoint that the annexation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina has completely brought into the light of day the
pressure against our countries from the North, the Narodna Odbrana
proclaims to the people that Austria is our first and greatest enemy."
This work (that is to say, to depict Austria to the Servian people as
their greatest enemy) is regarded by the Society, according to the fol-
lowing expressions of opinion, as a healthy and necessary task, in fact,
as its principal obligation. For the pamphlet goes on as follows : —

"Just as once the Turks attacked us from the south, so Austria
attacks us to-day from the north. If the Narodna Odbrana preaches
the necessity of fighting Austria, she preaches a sacred truth of our
national position."

The hatred against Austria brought about by this propaganda
is, of course, not the aim but the natural consequence of this work,
the object of which is independence and freedom. If on this account
hatred of Austria germinates, it is Austria who sows it by her advance,
w^hich conduct "makes obligatory a war of extermination against
Austria."

After some praise of the modern conception of nationalism the
remark is made that in speaking of "freedom and unity," too much is
mere talk. The people must be told that : —

" For the sake of bread and room, for the sake of the fundamental
essentials of culture and trade, the freeing of the conquered Servian
territories and their union with Servia is necessary to gentlemen,
tradesmen, and peasants alike." Perceiving this the people will
tackle the national work with greater self-sacrifice. Our people must
be told that the freedom of Bosnia is necessary for her, not only out
of pity for the brothers suffering there, but also for the sake of trade
and the connection with the sea.

The "two tasks" of the Narodna Odbrana are then again brought
together in the following concluding sentence : —

" In addition to the task of explaining to the people the danger
threatening it from Austria, the Narodna Odbrana has the important
duty, while preserving intact the sacred national memories, of giving
to the people this new, wholesome and, in its consequences, mighty
conception of nationalism and of work in the cause of freedom and
union."

The fourteenth and final chapter begins with an appeal to the

120 Official Diplomatic Documents

Government and people of Servia to prepare themselves in all ways
for the struggle "which the annexation has foreshadowed."

Hereon the activities of the Narodna Odbrana are again recapitu-
lated in the following sentences : —

" While the Narodna Odbrana works in conformity with the times
according to the altered conditions, it also maintains all the connec-
tions made at the time of the annexation ; to-day therefore it is the
same as it was at the time of the annexation. To-day, too, it is
Odbrana (defence) ; to-day, too, Narodna (of the people) ; to-day,
too, it gathers under its standard the citizens of Servia as it gathered
them at the time of the annexation. Then the crs^ was for war,
now the cr>^ is for work. Then meetings, demonstrations, voluntary
clubs, {Komitees), weapons and bombs were asked for ; to-day steady,
fanatical, tireless work and again work is required to fulfil the tasks
and duties to which we have drawn attention by way of present
preparation for the fight with gun and cannon which will come.''

The pamphlet and the atinual report contain the following infor-
mation as to the organisation of the Narodna Odbrana : —

A Central Committee at Belgrade directs all proceedings of the
Narodna Odbrana. All other committees of the Narodna Odbrana
are subject to this. The Central Committee is divided into four
sections : — for cultural work, for bodily training, for financial policy,
and for foreign affairs.

District Committees, with their centre at the seat of the offices
of the District Government, conduct the affairs of the Society in the
corresponding districts. Every District Committee divides itself
into sections for culture (the President being the Chairman of the local
branch of the "Culture League"), for bodily training (the President
being a local member of the Riflemen's, Sokol, Sportsmen's and
Horsemen's clubs) and for financial affairs; some District Com-
mittees have also a section for Foreign Affairs.

Divisional Committees located at the seat of the local authorities
conduct the affairs of the Society in the various divisions.

Local Committees conduct the Society's affairs in the various towns
and villages.

Confidential men are located in those places in the interior of the
country where the constitution of a Committee is not necessary.

Societies "which work in close connection with the organisation
of the Narodna Odbrana" and are supported by the latter in every
respect are the following : —

The Riflemen's Association with 762 societies, the Sokol Association
"Dusan the Strong" with 2500 members, the Olympic Club, the
Horsemen's Society, " Prince Michael," the Sportsmen's Association
and the Culture League.

All these societies are organised on similar lines to those of the
Narodna Odbrana and use their premises, including club houses,
libraries, etc. Distinguished members of these societies are chairmen
of sections in the Committees of the Narodna Odbrana.

July 25, AmtrO'Hungarian Red Book No. 19 121

APPENDIX 3

Extract from the "Report on the Activities of the Sokol
Society Dusan the Strong in Kragujevac in the years
1912-13." (Kragujevac Printing Office " Buducnost " Tm.
Lekic 1914.)

At the head of this report is printed the speech with which the
President, Major Kovacevic of the Servian Army, greeted the annual
meeting in January, 1914.

"It is known to you," the President began, "that SokoUsm, which
arose in the struggle against Germanism, is a purely Slavonic insti-
tution, which has for its aim to unite and to inspire all the Slavonic
brothers, and to give physical and intellectual training for the struggle
against the enemy of Slavism.

"We Servians, as a part of the great Slavonic community, have
taken up the Sokol idea and have agreed to the common work for our
own and our brothers' welfare and happiness.

"We Serbians, too, will live and work in the spirit of the Sokols,
for we wish to revive the weary and the feeble, to strengthen the
weak and the troubled, to free the imprisoned and the enchained.
We have done this now and in earlier wars. We have rescued part
of our brothers from the insolence of the enemy in the South. We
have struck off their fetters, we have rid them of their sufferings and
given them freedom, so that they enjoy happiness, equality and
brotherhood."

After giving a few words of praise to this "noble work" which
" realised a part of the great Sokol idea," Major Kovacevic proceeded :

"Oh, my brothers and sisters, our enemy in the North is more
dangerous and pitiless, because he is stronger in respect of his civilisa-
tion and his economic position.

" This enemy is insatiable in his lusts ; he holds millions of our
brothers in slavery and chains. He took law and freedom from them
and subjected them all to his service. The brothers murmur, call
and beg for still quicker help.

" We must not leave them to the mercy of this fearful and greedy
enemy. We must hurry to their help the sooner because it is our
duty to do so. Could we in any event be happy when so many
brothers live in slavery, suffer and murmur?

" Brothers and sisters !

"The enemy is dangerous, greedy and troublesome. Let us ever
be on our guard.

" Let us go to work with still greater willingness and self-sacrifice.
Let us be scrupulous according to the sacred Sokol obligation, true
and enduring.

"Let us prepare ourselves for the struggle and for the just Sokol
idea.

"Let us unite and ally ourselves with innumerable Sokol hosts,
and let us always remember that truth which the Servian Sokols

122 Official Diplomatic Documents

wrote upon their flag : That only a healthy, powerful, well-organised
people, conscious of its nationality, is fit to defend itself, to struggle,
and to conquer."

The report of the Committee of Management follows the speech
of the President. After a description of the successes in the last
wars, which interfered with the activities of the Society for two years,
it is stated that "the day arrived when we returned to our work,
because our programme w^as not yet fulfilled, because our task was
not yet ended. A great part of our people still endure the pains of
the crucified Christ ; we have still to visit our brothers beyond the
Drina ; we have still to seek out the town of Serajevo and the inherit-
ance of St. Sava ; ^ we must behold the home of Marina Novak, of
Deli Radivoj and of the old Vujadin ; we must cross the mountains
of Romanaija and see why Travnik is veiled in mist. That song must
end at last : ^ Ah ! Bosnia, thou orphan child before God, hast thou
nowhere people of thy race. . . .'"

After a discussion of various undertakings of the Society, emphasis
is laid on the fact that the Society maintains relations with the brother
societies beyond the Save and the Drina, and special emphasis is laid
on the dispatch of delegates to the Jubilee of the Prosvjeta held in
Serajevo. On this the report remarks : " By sending representatives
to the brothers in Bosnia the Committee intended to say to them —
we have not forgotten you, the wings of the falcon of Sumadija are
still mighty." After a detailed description of a visit of the Agram
students to Servia ^ and of the dedication of the flag of " the Young
People's Temperance Association," the report of the executive con-
cludes with the following sentences : —

" These manifestations — the coming of the brother Croats to
Sumadija and the meeting of the ' temperate youth ' from all Servian
regions are correctly appreciated by our leaders, and one would not
exaggerate if one said that these events indicate the beginning and
the germ of a great deed to be done in the near future.

"They are the expression of a great and, till now, silent awakening
of the national consciousness and of the strength of an oppressed
nation which is not allowed to arise and unite. In a little time this
germ will ripen, and when the soul of the people arises still more,
there will be no barrier which it cannot break, and no obstacle which
it cannot tear down upon its way. The work of strengthening this
power, the assistance and acceleration of the progress of this national
development, the preparation and the support of this idea, was
always the aim of the actions of our leaders."

The treasurer's report enumerates first of all those who. have
supported the society. In addition to a number of members of the

1 St. Sava (ob. 1236) is the patron saint of the Serbians. Herzegovina is the name
of Ducatus Santi Save. The "inheritance of St. Sava" is, therefore, equivalent in
meaning to "Herzegovina."

2 This visit of the Agram students (April, 1912) to Belgrade, Nish, Semendria, etc.,
was used in Serbia as the pretext for a great demonstration of hostility to the Mon-
archy. The excursionists were accorded military honours, and lunches and balls
took place in the Military Academy and the Ofl&cers' Club. In Nish, indeed, a military
parade was held in honour of the visitors.

July 25, Aitstro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 123

ivragujevac District Committee, the following are mentioned and
thanked : —

The District Committee of the " Narodna Odbrana " at Kragujevac,
particularly its "Ritter'* section, which often assisted the Sokol
Society with substantial support ; the Headmaster of the Gymnasium
at Kragujevac, who "always showed his fatherly care" to the Sokols ;
the Divisional Commandant of Sumadija, who had substantially
supported the society ; the President of the District Court at Kragu-
jevac; the District Chairman and the Parish Chairman at Kragu-
jevac.

After referring to the members of the society who have fallen
in war, the treasurer closes his report with the following words : —

"After so brilliant a victory over a portion of our enemies, those
who control our society hope that you all, from now onwards, > will
devote yourselves still more, more unitedly and more entirely, to
the activities of Sokolism so that you may rear falcons in our falcon's
eyrie, who at the given moment, will one day be ready to fly aloft,
and in their mighty flight bring freedom, love and brotherhood to all
our brothers who are not yet free."

The annual report is signed by Major M. J. Kovacevic, President,
by the secretary of the Law Courts, D. V. Brzakovic, as secretary, and
by ten members of the executive, among whom are included two
professors (Emil Lukic and Milan Jankovic), as well as a further
officer (Major of Infantry, Michael Vasic).

It is clear from this annual report, and from a schedule also signed
by Major M. J. Kovacevic and Brzakovic, Secretary of the Law
Courts, and sent to the Kragujevac Sokol Society by the "Srpski
Soko" in Tuzla for completion, that the Sokol Societies in Servia
stand in close relation with various similar societies in the Monarchy
to an extent not hitherto known.

APPENDIX 4

The Servian Official Gazette in the service of the Narodna

Odbrana

An appeal by the Narodna Odbrana appears as a supplement
to the Servian Official Gazette, Srpski Novine, of 28th June, 1914
(new style), and w^as supplied to all subscribers to the paper.

The following passages occur in this appeal : —

"Brothers and sisters ! Kossovo was only partly avenged, the day
of St. Vitus (Vidovdan) was only partly expiated. Just as far as the
territories reach where our people's speech is heard — the Servian,
Croatian, and Slovenian — from Kikinda to Monastir, from Trieste to
Carevo-Solo, just as far and wide does the meaning of St. Vitus' Day
and of Kossovo extend. So many souls of our race weep on this terri-
tory ; so many fetters of our brothers clank ; so much work is yet
to be done ; so much have we still to sacrifice. St. Vitus' Day could

124 Official Diplomatic Documents

formerly mean a day of mourning for us, but to-day, when we have
already gone so far in the new history of the people ; when behind
us stand great and glorious national events, and before us still greater
and more glorious events await us; to-day when we stand in the
midst of the creation of a great national State; to-day St. Vitus'
Day must be for us a day of great joy and pride, because of that
which has happened, and sprung from it, and still more because of
that which will come. Men and women of Servia ! Millions of our
brothers, Slovenes, Croats, and Servians beyond our frontiers, look
to-day to us, the Children of the Kingdom, and joy and hope fill their
breast as they now behold to-day's majestic manifestations for the
national cause. God helps the brave ! Forward all ! That part of
our sacred task which is as yet unrealised calls us. Belgrade, St.
Vitus' Day, 1914."

APPENDIX 5

Deposition of Trifko Krstanovic, concerning the Narodna

Odbrana

The baker's assistant, Trifko Krstanovic, of Zavadonici, was
arrested by a gendarmerie patrol on the night of the 6th-7th July,
1914, because he had been heard to remark shortly after the mur-
derous attack on the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, that this attack
was to be expected and because this remark brought him under sus-
picion of having had knowledge of the plot.

He was, on this account, brought up before the District Court at
Serajevo. The examination of the prisoner revealed that his remark
did not justify the suspicion which had arisen against him, since it,
founded entirely on his earlier knowledge of the activities of the
Narodna, was merely the expression of his conviction that, on
account of the agitation developing in Servia against the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy, and especially against the Archduke Franz
Ferdinand, a deed of that kind was to be expected. In the absence
of any material facts in support of the charge, the proceedings against
Krstanovic were accordingly withdrawn, and, having regard to his
knowledge of the activities of the Narodna Odbrana, which had an
important bearing on the inquiry, he was subpoenaed as a witness.

An extract from his depositions taken on the 19th July, 1914,
which is relevant to the matters here in question, is as follows : —

" In the autumn of the year 1 908, I crossed the frontier to Servia
on the Mokra Gora, near Visegrad, to seek work. I first came to
Bagina Basta in the district of Uzice, and as I found no work there,
I went to Belgrade, where I arrived just at the time when the annexa-
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina was announced. As I saw that the
annexation had caused great popular commotion and excitement,
and that I should not be able to find any work, I went to the Imperial
and Royal Consulate and tried to get myself sent home. There I was

July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 125

told to come back in the afternoon, and that I should then be sent
home. However, as I came out of the Consulate, a gendarme
seized me on the street, and asked me where I came from ; under the
impression that I was a spy, he conducted me to a tower (Karaula).
Here I was questioned, and when I said to them that I wanted to go
home, a non-commissioned officer began to abuse me : Why should
I now want to go out of Servia which now needed more people because
a war with Austria would come ? When I said to him that I had
nothing to live on, he answered me that I would find full maintenance
if I would register myself in the Komitee. In my need I agreed, and
a gendarme took me to the inn 'Zelenom Vijencu' ('The Green
Wreath'), and introduced me there to Voja Tankosic, the leader
of the Komitee and a captain in the regular army. Here, at the
'Green W>eath' I was provided with food and lodging, and, as I saw,
other members of the Komitee lived here. Voja Tankosic told me
that the business of the Komitee was to learn bomb-throwing,
the destruction of bridges, tunnels, telegraphs and railways, because a
war between Servia and iVustria could easily arise. On this a man
took me to a small building belonging to the Royal Demesne next to
the Treasury, where the offices of the Komitee were situated, and in
the office I met Milan Pribicevic, who enrolled me in the Komitee.
At this enrolment, Milan Pribicevic asked me whether Voja Tankosic
had told me the obligations which I had as a member of the Komitee.
To this I answered 'Yes.' He said that those enrolled must be
efficient, strong, and self-sacrificing. " There were then about 70 of
us enrolled. In Belgrade we did nothing. After about six weeks
our leader Tankosic informed us that the Great Powers had pro-
hibited our Komitee, and that we must leave Belgrade and hide
ourselves somewhere in an out-of-the-way place not visited by for-
eigners. In this way they sent us to the town of Cuprija. Here
we were drilled by the officers, Voja Tankosic, Dusan Putnik, Zivko
Gvosdic and Mitar Djinovic, who was involved in the Montenegrin
bomb outrage, and was shot in Montenegro. In order that no
one should become aware of our objects, or know anything of our
numbers, we were forbidden to have intercourse with outsiders.
We practised the throwing of bombs, the construction of mines, and
the destruction of telegraphs, railways, tunnels and bridges. Every
fortnight we were visited by Milan Pribicevic, General Bozo Jankovic,
the pharmacist Skaric, the deputy Zivko Rafajlovic, and a certain
Glisic Milutin, a Treasury official, who watched our drill and paid
for our board on each occasion. Our instructors told us that, when
war was declared, we Komitees would go in advance, then the volun-
teers, and then the regular army. There were about 140 men at
Cuprija. Besides board, we had lodging and clothes and 25 para a
day for tobacco. The school lasted about three months, that is until
March, 1909. Then the members of the committee told us that
we were dismissed, that we could all go wherever we wished, for
the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had been recognised by the
Great Powers, and that our Komitee had become useless. On the

126 Official Diplomatic Documents

dissolution of the Komitee General Bozo Jankovic told me to enter
the service of Bozo Milanovic at Sabac, where I should receive wages
of 50 dinar a month. He did not tell me what the nature of the service
would be. I accepted because, as a member of the Komitee, I re-
garded myself as bound to obey General Jankovic, and also because
I had nothing to live on, and had to earn my livelihood. In this
way I came to Sabac in March, 1909, and reported myself to Bozo
Milanovic, a tradesman of Sabac. General Jankovic had told me that
Bozo jNIilanovic was chairman of the Narodna Odbrana in Sabac, and
that I should assist him in connection with this Narodna Odbrana.
When I had given Bozo Milanovic the General's letter and he had read
it, he told me> that I must serve him faithfully and carry out his
orders. My chief duty would be to carry his letters wheresoever
they were addressed. It would cost me my life if I failed to carry a
letter to its destination, and if any one else got hold of it. On the next
day. Bozo Milanovic gave me a closed letter which I was to take to
Cedo Lukic, Superintendent of Excise at Serbisch-Rac^a. On the road
to RaCa, at the village of Bogatic, the District Captain stopped me,
took the letter from me opened it and read it. In the letter it said
that Lukic should immediately buy three boats so that they should
be ready if they were required. 100 dinar were enclosed in the letter.
On this occasion the Captain told me that the Ministry had given
strict orders that the Komitadji were to do nothing without orders,
so that international diplomatic intervention should not be provoked.
I returned to Sabac and told Bozo INIilanovic what had happened to
me. Bozo Milanovic applied to the District Prefect, who gave
orders that the revolver, which the Captain at Bogatic had taken
from me, should be returned. He also gave orders that the Captain
should send the letter to Cedo Lukic to whom it was addressed. I
carried letters of this sort from March, 1909, until October, 1910,
and in that time I took 43 letters to Serbisch-RaCa, 55 to Loznica,
5 to Zvornik, 2 to Ljubivija, and I don't know how many to Kovil-
jaca. I noticed how often I was in each place because these places
are a very long way from Sabac. I took the letters to the chiefs of
the Customs houses in the various places, and from them I received
letters in reply and took them to Bozo Milanovic. I recollect that
on a few occasions I took letters to Sepacka Ada. My assistant in
letter carrying was one Vaso Eric, a native of Srebrenica. Every
week I took letters from Bozo Milanovic to Belgrade, and delivered
them to Milan Pribicevic and Bozo Jankovic. I knew nothing of
the contents of these letters, and no one told me anything about them.
So far as I could see, the letters despatched by Bozo Milanovic were
not in cipher, but the letters sent by the chiefs of the Customs houses
were written in special characters, a fact which I observed when
Bozo Milanovic opened them. Once I brought one of these cipher
letters to Bozo Milanovic, I think it was from Zvornik, and he sent
me with the letter to Mika Atanasijevic, Professor at Sabac, to de-
cipher. He did this, as he usually did ; but perhaps he forgot to
close the letter, so that I could read it. The letter stated, that it

July 25 y Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 127

was reported from a reliable source, that money was to be stamped
with the likeness of the heir to the throne, and this was an indication
that the Emperor Francis Joseph was about to abdicate. After about
eight months of my service with Bozo Milanovic, Bozo gave me his
visiting card with a death's head drawn upon it ; on it was written
that I was designated an initiate (povjerenik) of the Narodna Odbrana.
On this occasion he told me, that the business was spying. . . .

"On one occasion, I learnt from the officer Dusan Opterkic,
member of the Narodna Odbrana, that the Narodna Odbrana had
23 branches in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Beyond this, I do not know
what organisation, if any, the Narodna Odbrana has in Bosnia.
From time to time, Milan Pribicevic gave me a revolver, or money
for the purchase of a revolver, for me to give to the Customs officers
on the frontier who served as Komitadjis who had no revolver nor
any money to buy a revolver themselves. It appeared to me that
Milan Pribicevic gave them these things as an honour, just because
they were Komitadjis. I had nothing else to do with arms.

"On one occasion, during my service with Bozo Milanovic, I was
ordered to accompany a man to a peasant in Lijasnica on the Drina,
who would give us all necessary information and show us everything,
so that we two could kill Ljubo Stanaricic, a Servian officer of Reserve,
who had fled to Bijeljina. For the Committee of the Narodna
Odbrana had learnt that Ljubo Stanaricic was dangerous to the
Servian State, and had resolved that he should be put to death.

"That man and I received instructions from Bozo Milanovic to
go to a certain place across the Drina, and to kill Ljubo Stanaricic,
who lives just on the bank of the Drina on the Bosnian side in the
district of Bijeljin. I and that man had descended into the Drina,
but because the water was deep, and we saw that Ljubo was walking
round his house with a gun on his shoulder, we returned to that
peasant's house. As I saw that Ave could not kill him with the knife,
I sent that man to Sabac to tell Bozo Milanovic that it was not pos-
sible to kill Stanaricic in the manner he desired, namely, with the
knife. On this, I received orders from Bozo Milanovic that we should
kill him in any case. We then determined to shoot him with a gun.
According to Bozo's instructions, the man who was with me was
to shoot and kill him, and I was to confirm whether these instructions
were carried out. In the meantime, however, a mounted gendarme
brought us instructions from the District Prefect of Sabac that we
were to return, and to abandon the original project. And so we
returned to Sabac.

"In October, 1910, I demanded an increase of pay from Bozo
Milanovic, and, on his refusal, I left his service. From Sabac I went
to Belgrade, where I met General Jankovic, and he had me arrested
for refusing obedience. They took me through various prisons for
about two months, and all because I had refused to obey them, and
they feared I would betray their secrets. Finally, the authorities
decided to send me to Bosnia. In Sabac a prisoner told me that my
life was at stake. The gendarmes accompanied me to Zvornik, where

128 Official Diplomatic Documents

they handed me over to the Bosnian gendarmes. In this way I came
to Bosnia in December^ 1910.

"I know nothing of any 'Black Hand/ with the exception of
w^hat I have read of it in Servian newspapers. I can't remember now
w^hat was written in the newspapers about the 'Black Hand.' Nor
do I know anything of the 'Black List.' After the annexation there
prevailed in Servia universal anger and hatred against the person
of the Heir to the Austrian Throne, who was regarded as the sworn
enemy of the Servians."

Beyond this, Krstanovic referred to his earlier statements, of which
only the following are of interest as supplementing the foregoing
testimony.

The Komitee into which Milan Pribicevic introduced Krstanovic
was set up by the Narodna Odbrana. In the school at Cuprija there
were 20 to 22 Austrian subjects. Milan Ciganovic was also one of
the pupils.

In the school at Cuprija it was inculcated that the Komitee must
be ready to proceed to Bosnia, on the command of the Narodna
Odbrana, and there act according to the orders of their commanders.

APPENDIX 6

Extract from the Proceedings of the District Court of
Serajevo in the Prosecution of Jovo Jaglicic and others
FOR Espionage.

In the year 1913, it was discovered that Jovo Jaglicic and several
accomplices were carrying on espionage in Bosnia in the interests of
Servia. The criminal proceedings instituted in the matter afforded
inter alia opportunities for obtaining an insight into the methods of
the Great-Servian propaganda, and more especially of the Narodna
Odbrana.

Jovo Jaglicic made a statement that in the month of August or
September, 1912, he for the first time met Petar Klaric, known as
Pesut, formerly a cattle inspector in Foca, who had fled to Monte-
negro in 1912 and then became a Komitadji.

At their first meeting Klaric asked Jaglicic whether he knew Rade
Milosevic of Kalinovik, and, on his answering, said that Milosevic was
lying very ill in hospital : " It would be a pity if he were to die ; we
have spoken of great matters ; has he never said anything to you about
them?" On receiving a negative answer Klaric went on: "I had
something important to tell you ; we are Servians, and must do some-
thing important for Servia. Come to my office." There the follow-
ing conversation ensued between them : —

"Jovan, I will tell you something; I don't know you yet and
whether you will betray me. I tell you, nevertheless, and if you have
the heart, betray me I"

July 25, AustrO'Hungarian Red Book No. 19 129

On Jaglicic asking him what it was all about, Klaric answered,
"Brother, in Servia there is a society called the 'Narodna Odbrana/
Many people must join this society ; many have been enrolled already
in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in the whole Monarchy ; among
them are people of intelligence and means, long-headed people, and if
they can do it why should we not do it too, so that we too may help
a bit."

To the question, what was the object of this society, Klaric an-
swered : —

"The Society has this object : for instance, you are in Kalinovik;
you let me know what the news is there, how many soldiers, how many
guns, how much ammunition, different arms, who comes, who leaves,
and so on. We have a secret writing, 'cipher,' and use it for corre-
spondence. If you are loyal, you will get it too."

Jaglicic was frightened that Klaric was merely sounding him for
the purpose of denouncing him, and therefore asked him to tell him
the names of some of the members, on which Klaric reflected for some
time and then told him a name, which gave him confidence.

Hereon Klaric said to him: "Shall I give you the 'cipher'?"
Jaglicic agreed. Klaric, who knew the cipher by heart, wrote it out
on a slip and gave it to Jaglicic.

On another occasion Klaric gave an account of his stay at Banja-
Koviljaca (near Loznica) where he was instructed by the Servian
captain Todorovic ^ in bomb-throwing, and when asked by the accused
why he learnt this he answered : " If anything such as I have spoken of
to you comes to pass, it is necessary that I should know how to handle
bombs, and that I should teach you and you should teach others, so
that powder magazines and other important objects should be blown
up, for in that case we should receive bombs from Servia."

Klaric then described the appearance of the bombs, and said that
he had already enrolled people w^ho, in case of war, would cut telegraph
and telephone wires.

At these meetings Jaglicic learnt from Klaric that it also apper-
tained to the duties of members of the Narodna Odbrana to induce
Austro-Hungarian soldiers to desert, to enlist volunteers (Komitadjis),
to organise bands, to blow up objects and depots, and so on. Klaric
also informed him that even cipher correspondence between Bos-
nian and Servian members would not be entrusted to the post, but
despatched across the frontier by reliable messengers.

Klaric further told Jaglicic that on the occasion of the Prosvjeta
celebration (in September, 1912) a Servian major had stayed in the
Hotel "Europe" with the Servian deputation which was sent to it,^
that Klaric had taken members of the Narodna Odbrana to him, and
that he had sworn them in.

From a spy Jadlicic learnt that bombs would arrive in Serajevo,
or had already arrived, that these had the appearance of pieces of

1 Captain Kosta Todorovic was then in fact Boundary Commissioner and Director
of the Serbian Intelligence Service for the frontier line from Raca to Ljuboija.

2 The Serbian major, Mika Jankovic, appeared as a delegate at the Prosvjeta cele-
bration.

130 Official Diplomatic Documents

soap/ and that two or three would either be sent to this spy or that
he would fetch them.

APPENDIX 7
From Confidential Reports on the Narodna Orbrana

The control of the Narodna Odbrana is in the hands of representa-
tives of all parties so as to win over both the progressives and those
who are hostile to the conspirators. Its actual guiding spirit is
Pribicevic, now Major. The position of secretary is always filled by
an officer on leave.

The object of the Narodna Odbrana is to develop effective prop-
aganda in military and civilian circles in the Southern-Slav portions
of Austria-Hungary, with the object of preparing for a revolution,
interference with any mobilisation that may take place, and the initia-
tion of panics, revolts, etc.

The organisation has many trusted representatives and emissaries
in the Monarchy, who carry on an unostentatious personal propa-
ganda. Some are sent specially — to enlist a few men — preferably
railway officials — in the neighbourhood of important bridges, junc-
tions, etc., whose duty it is at the appropriate moment to carry out
the directions they have received, or to get them carried out.

Intercourse between the members of the Narodna Odbrana is,
So far as possible, effected by keeping in personal touch with each
other.

Young people, workmen and railwaymen chiefly are enrolled as
members.

APPENDIX 8

Extract from the Records of the District Court of Bosnia
and Herzegovina at Serajevo, touching the proceedings

THERE instituted AGAINST GaVRILO PrINCIP AND CONFEDERATES
ON ACCOUNT OF THE CRIME OF ASSASSINATION PERPETRATED ON

THE 28th June, 1914, on His Imperial and Royal Highness
THE Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Este ^ and
Her Highness the Duchess Sophie of Hohenberg.

I. The deed and the perpetrators

Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, Trifko Grabez, Vaso Cubri-
lovic and Cetres Popovic confess that in common with the fugitive
Mehemed Mehmedbasic they contrived a plot for the murder of the

1 The bombs used in the Serajevo attack on the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, as
well as those found in the Save, near Brcko, in the year 1913, which came from the
Royal Serbian Arsenal at Kragujevac, can in fact be compared with pieces of soap.

July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 131

Archduke Franz Ferdinand and, armed with bombs and in the ease
of some of them with Browning pistols, laid wait for him on the
28th June, 1914, on his progress through Serajevo for the purpose of
carrying out the planned attack.

Nedeljko Cabrinovic confesses that he was the first of the con-
spirators to hurl a bomb against the Archduke's carriage, which
missed its mark and which on exploding injured only the occupants
of the carriage following the Archducal motor car.

Gavrilo Princip confesses that he fired two shots from a Browning
pistol against the Archducal motor car, by which the Archduke
Franz Ferdinand and the Duchess Sophie of Hohenberg received
fatal wounds.

Both perpetrators confess that the act was done with intent to
murder.

These confessions have been fully verified by means of the inves-
tigations which have taken place, and it is established that the
deceased Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the deceased Duchess
Sophie of Hohenberg died as a result of the revolver shots fired at
them by Gavrilo Princip.

II. Origin of the plot

The accused have made the following declarations, which are
essentially consistent, before the examining magistrate : —

In April, 1914, Princip, during his stay at Belgrade, where he
associated with a number of Servian students in the cafes of the town,
conceived the plan for the execution of an attempt on the life of
the late Archduke Franz Ferdinand. He communicated this in-
tention to his acquaintance Cabrinovic, who also was in Belgrade
at the time. The latter had already conceived a similar idea and was
ready at once to participate in the attempt. The execution of an
attempt on the Archduke's life was a^ frequent topic of conversation
in the circle in which Princip and Cabrinovic moved, because the
Archduke was considered to be a dangerous enemy of the Servian
people.

Princip and Cabrinovic desired at first to procure the bombs and
weapons necessary for the execution of the deed from the Servian
Major Milan Pribicevic or from the Narodna Odbrana, as they them-
selves did not possess the means for their purchase. As, however.
Major Pribicevic and the authoritative member of the said association,
Zivojin Dacic, were absent from Belgrade at that time, they decided
to try to obtain the weapons from their acquaintance Milan Ciganovic,
who had formerly been a Komitadji and was at that time in the
employment of the State railways.

^ Princip, through the instrumentality of an intimate friend of
Ciganovic, now got into communication with the latter. Thereupon
Ciganovic called on Princip and discussed the planned attempt with
him. He entirely approved it, and thereupon declared that he would
like to consider further whether he should provide the weapons for

132 Official Diplomatic Documents

the attempt. Cabrinovic also talked with Ciganovic on the subject
of the weapons.

At Easter Princip took Trifko Grabez, who also was in Belgrade,
into his confidence. The latter is also shown by his own confession
to have declared himself ready to take part in the attempt.
^ In the following weeks Princip had repeated conversations with
Ciganovic about the execution of the attempt.

Meanwhile Ciganovic had reached an understanding on the subject
of the planned attack with the Servian Major Voja Tankosic, who was
a close friend of his and who then placed at his disposal for this object
the Browning pistols.

Grabez confesses in conformity with the depositions of Princip
and Cabrinovic that on the 24th May he, accompanied by Ciganovic,
visited Major Tankosic at the latter's request at his rooms. He says
that after he had been introduced Tankosic said to him : " Are you
the man? Are you determined?" Whereupon Grabez answered:
" I am." Tankosic next asked : " Do you know how to shoot with a
revolver J" and when Grabez answered in the negative Tankosic
said to Ciganovic : " I will give you a revolver ; go and teach them
how to shoot .J'

Hereupon Ciganovic conducted Princip and Grabez to the military
rifle range at Toprider and instructed them in a wood adjoining the
range in shooting with a Browning pistol at a target. Princip proved
himself the better shot of the two. Ciganovic also familiarized
Princip, Grabez and Cabrinovic with the use of the bombs which
were later given to them.

On the 27th May, 1914, Ciganovic handed over to Princip, Cabri-
novic and Grabez, as their confessions agree in stating, six bombs,
four Browning revolvers and a sufficient quantity of ammunition, as
well as a glass tube of cyanide of potassium with which to poison
themselves after the accomplishment of the deed in order that the
secret might be kept. Moreover Ciganovic gave them some money.

Princip had previously informed Danilo Ilic, at Easter, of his plan
of assassination. He now begged the latter on his return to Serajevo
to enlist certain additional persons, in order to ensure the success of
the attempt. Hereupon Ilic according to his confession enlisted Jaso
Cubrilovic, Cetro Popovic and Mehemed Mehmedbasic in the plot.

III. Origin of the bombs

Only one of the bombs was made use of in the execution of the
attempt. The remaining five bombs came later into the possession
of the police at Serajevo.

In the opinion of the judicial experts these bombs are Servian
hand-grenades which were factory-made and intended for military
purposes. They are identical with the 21 bombs which were found in
the Save at Brcko in the year 1913 and which were partly in their
original packing, which proved without a doubt that they came from
the Servian arsenal of Kragujevac.

July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 133

It is thus proved that the grenades which were used in the attempt
against the Archduke Franz Ferdinand also came from the stores
of the Army Depot at Kragujevac.

Grabez quite spontaneously calls the grenades which were handed
over to him and his accomplices " Kragujevac bombs."

IV. Transport of the three assailants, and of the weapons from Serbia

to Bosnia

With regard to this Princip makes the following statement : —

Ciganovic told Cabrinovic, Grabez and Princip that they were to
make their way via Sabac and Loznica to Tuzla and there to betake
themselves to Misko Jovanovic who would take over the weapons.
Next they were to go to Sabac and report themselves to the frontier
captain Major Rade Popovic, to whom he gave them a note, of which
Princip took charge. On the 28th May the three accomplices left
Belgrade with the weapons. ^At Sabac Princip handed over the note
which he had received from Ciganovic to Major Popovic, who there-
upon conducted all three to the orderly room and drew them up a pass
in which it was stated that one of them was an exciseman and the
other two his colleagues. The pass contained also the name of this
alleged exciseman, but he had forgotten the name. At the same time
Major Popovic handed over a closed letter for the frontier captain at
Loznica, whose name was Pravanovic, Prdanovic or Predojevic,

Princip, Cabrinovic and Grabez passed the night at Sabac and went
by train the next morning to Loznica, with a half-price ticket, it may
be remarked, on the strength of the pass which Major Popovic had
drawn up for them. They reached Loznica at noon and delivered to
the frontier captain at that place Major Popovic's letter, in which were
the words : " See that you receive these people and bring them on
their way, you know where." The frontier captain said he would
summon his excisemen from the frontier and give the three into the
charge of the most reliable man. Thereupon he telephoned, and made
an appointment with the three accomplices for 7 o'clock the next
morning in his office.

Next morning the three conspirators agreed that Cabrinovic should
take Grabez's pass and make his way openly to Zvornik, but that
Princip and Grabez should cross the frontier secretly. This plan was
discussed with the frontier captain and it was decided that arp excise
man from Ljesnica called Grbic was to take Princip and Grabez with
him to his tower (karaula) and bring them over the frontier. Cabri-
novic accordingly walked to Banja Koviljaca in the direction of
Zvornik. Princip and Grabez drove with the exciseman Grbic to
Ljesnica, where they deposited the bombs and the revolver in a room
in a hotel. While they were doing so the exciseman Grbic caught sight
of these objects. Princip himself described this journey as mysterious.

Grabez's statement conformed in essentials with Princip's and was
supplemented by an addition to the effect that Grbic laughed when he
saw the bombs and the revolver and merely asked to what part of

134 Official Diplomatic Documents

Bosnia they were going with those bombs. The excisemen certainly
thought that Grabez and Princip were travelHng on a mission.

Grbic and a second exciseman brought Princip and Grabez in a boat
to an island in the Drina. There Grbic instructed them to wait for a
peasant who would come to fetch them. They passed the night on
the island in a peasant's hut to which Grbic had directed them ; next
day came a peasant who conducted them during the night first through
a bog and then over the mountains to the neighbourhood of Priboj,
where he handed them over to the local teacher Cubrilovic, who
seemed to have been already waiting for them, to see them further
on their way.

He took them on to Misko Jovanovic at Tuzla.

Cabrinovic's statement about the events of the journey up to the
point at which he parted with Princip and Grabez conformed in
essentials w^ith those of the latter, and only added by way of supple-
ment that Major Popovic told them that he did not reach Sabac from
Belgrade till the day before their arrival.

In Loznica, Cabrinovic, Princip and Grabez decided to separate,
as it was too dangerous to go about all three together. The frontier
captain at Loznica, whom they informed of this, applauded their
plan and gave Cabrinovic a letter for M. Jaklojevic, the teacher at
Mali-Zvornik. Hereupon Cabrinovic handed over the bombs, Brown-
ing pistol and ammunition which he had been carrying, to Princip
and Grabez, and went to Mali-Zvornik with an exciseman who had
been told off to accompany him.

There he found the teacher Jaklojevic, to whom he handed the
letter from the frontier captain of Loznica. Hereupon the former
notified the Servian frontier guard. When Cabrinovic, with the
teacher, reached this frontier post, a man was already waiting there
for them, who brought them in a boat over the Drina to Gross-Zvornik
in Bosnia.

Cabrinovic then proceeded to Misko Jovanovic at Tuzla.

Supplement

Just before this memoir was closed, minutes of evidence were
published by the District Court at Serajevo from which it appears
that a subject of the Monarchy some days before the 28th June last
desired to make a report to the Imperial and Royal Consulate at
Belgrade to the effect that he suspected that a plan existed for the
execution of an attempt on the life of Archduke Franz Ferdinand
during his presence in Bosnia. It seems that the man was prevented
from making this report by members of the Belgrade police force,
who arrested him on trivial grounds just as he was about to enter
the Imperial and Royal Consulate. The conclusion to be drawn from
the statements contained in the evidence in question would seem
to be that the police officials concerned had knowledge of the planned
attempt, and only arrested this man in order to prevent him from
laying the information.

July 25 y Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 135

As these statements have not yet been verified, no opinion can
be expressed at the present stage on their rehabiUty. In view of the
investigations into the matter now pending, the more minute details
of the evidence cannot be pubHshed more exactly at present.

APPENDIX 9
The Serbian Press on the Assassination

(a) The Belgrade newspaper Balkan writes on the 29th June,
with regard to the two perpetrators : —

"Nedeljko Cabrinovic, a compositor by profession, was full of
anarchical ideas, and well known as a restless spirit. Until twenty
days ago, he lived in Belgrade, whither he came after the war and
was employed in the State printing works. Before his departure he
announced that he was going to Trieste, where he would get work
in a new printing works. Gavrilo Princip also was living at Belgrade
until a short time ago. During the war he offered his services as a
volunteer, but was not accepted, and therefore he left Belgrade.
He returned, however, at Christmas last year to Belgrade, attended
the^gymnasium for a time, and left Belgrade almost at the same time
as Cabrinovic, though in a different direction. Princip was a silent,
nervous, hard-working student, and associated with some fellow
students who caine, like himself, from Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well
as latterly with Cabrinovic. He inclined towards socialistic ideas,
although he had originally belonged to the Young Men Progressive
Party. Princip, like Cabrinovic, was brought up at Serajevo; the
two have been bound by ties of the closest friendship since their
childhood."

(6) The Piemont of the 1st July, points out that Princip's pro-
test was a sequel to the public protest of the assassin Zerajic. The
explanation of the former's, as of the latter's activities, is to be found
in the system of government in Bosnia. The circumstance that
Princip executed the deed of vengeance on the national festival of
St. Vitus, the day which had been chosen for the manoeuvres, made
the desperate act of the young martyr more intelligible and more
natural. (The newspaper was confiscated by the police on account
of this article ; the confiscation was, however, annulled the day after
by the Court of First Instance at Belgrade.)

(c) The Young Radical Odjek, of the 3rd July, says: — "The
Archduke Franz Ferdinand was sent to Serajevo on the day of
enthusiasm in order to celebrate a brutal manifestation of vio-
lence and domination. This brutal act was bound to evoke brutal
feelings of resistance, hatred and revenge."

{d) The organ of the Nationalist Party, Srpska Zastam, of the
3rd July, says in an article entitled "Suspicions and Threats": —
''The assassination comes to be regarded more and more as the out-

136 Official Diplomatic Documents

come of the unsound state of affairs in the Monarchy. On the other
hand, the savage persecution of the Servian people in Bosnia and
Herzegovina evokes the horror of the whole civilised world."

{e) The Progressive newspaper, Pravda, of the 3rd July, writes : —
"The policy of Vienna is a cynical one. It exploits the death of
the unfortunate couple for its abominable aims against the Servian
people."

(/) The Agence des Balkans, of the 3rd July, says : — "The crimes
which have been perpetrated in Bosnia and Herzegovina against the
Servians have been carried out under the auspices and at the direct
instigation of the Austro-Hungarian civil and military authorities."

ig) The Pragda, of the 4th July, says: — "All the murders and
assassinations which have been carried out up to the present time
in Austria have arisen from one and the same source. The oppressed
peoples of the JMonarchy were obliged to have recourse to this method
of protest, because no other way was open to them. In the chaos of
a reign of terror, it is natural and quite intelligible that the era of
assassinations should have firmly established itself."

(h) The Balkan, of the 5th July, remarks that Austria-Hungary
"must be placed under international control, because of its persecu-
tion of the innocent"; for Austria-Hungary has less cohesion than
Turkey.

(i) The Mali Journal, of the 7th July, wTites : — "A sprig of the
Middle Ages has been murdered at Serajevo within the last few
days. He has been murdered by a lad whose grief for the enslave-
ment of his immediate Fatherland (engeres Vaterland) amounted to a
paroxysm, that grief w^hich the robbers of the land of his fathers had
brought upon him. What has been the contribution of official
Austria-Hungary to this? It has answered with general massacres,
plunderings and destruction of Servian life and property. Only the
worthless distinguish themselves by such heroism. Cowards are
always mighty heroes when they are sure that nothing will happen
to them. Only compare Princip and Cabrinovic with these heroes,
and you will at once see the great difference between them. Civil-
isation and justice are a huge lie in Austria-Hungary."

(j) The Tribuna, of the 7th July, says : — " We are of the opinion
that the Serajevo murder was arranged to facilitate the extermination
of the Servians at one blow."

(k) The Piemont, of the 8th July, reports from Bajina Baschka
that the Austrian officials in Bosnia are preparing a massacre of the
Christians.

(/) The Balkan, of the 8th, publishes a report from Bosnia, under
the title "St. Bartholomew's Day at Serajevo," and pleads for a
general boycott against all the Austrians living in Servia.

(m) The Mali Journal, of the 8th, appeals to its readers to boycott
the Danube Steamship Company.

(n) Under the title "Nothing from Austria-Hungary!" the
Tribuna, of the 8th, writes that it would be best to order nothing
from Austria-Hungary, to abstain from visiting the Austrian and

July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 137

Hungarian Spas, and from calling in doctors from Austria-Hungary.
It says that private initiative can accomplish a great deal in the
direction suggested. The State and the Government offices must not
mix themselves up in this movement. It is enough to appeal to the
citizens.

(o) The Stampa, of the 8th, asserts that the Serajevo police are
exposing the arrested assassins to the most inhuman and brutal torture
in order to extort from them untrue confessions on which it is intended
to base complaints against the Servian people.

(p) The Agence des Balkans, of the 9th, reports from Belgrade:
— "Absolutely trustworthy private reports announce that a general
massacre of Servians is on the point of breaking out in Bosnia and
Herzegovina."

(q) The Balkan, of the 9th July, taking as its text Mr. Asquith's
statement on the announcement of the news of the death of Arch-
duke Franz Ferdinand, that he was full of anxiety for the fate of
humanity,^ publishes a historical survey of the events of the last 40
years, from which it deduces that the Servian people during this
period have been exposed to the cruel persecutions of Austria-Hun-
gary's Jesuitical policy. Archduke Franz Ferdinand, like all the sons
of Loyola, who only work in human blood, and who do homage to the
principle, "The end justifies the means," was bound to be overtaken
by fate and to fall a victim to Jesuitism, as the whole of Austria-
Hungary will also fall. But by the downfall of Austria-Hungary,
peace and tranquillity would ensue to mankind. The sum of all these
truths emerges in the conclusion that Asquith might with a calm mind
have accompanied the news of the murder with the word, "I am
no longer anxious for the fate of humanity."

(r) The Politika, of the 9th July, expresses itself in a leading
article under the heading, "Shameless Lies," as follows: — "The
manner in which the inquiries into the Serajevo murder are being
carried on shows quite clearly what objects Austria is aiming at in
those inquiries. When the assassins, regardless of all the tortures to
which they were exposed, refused to say what was demanded of them,
other individuals were unearthed who expressed themselves ready on
certain conditions to confess a certain degree of complicity in the
murder, but at the same time to implicate all those persons who were
objectionable to Austria. This method has succeeded for the moment
because the hired individuals state whatever they are asked to state,
and the Austrian police take care that these lies are at once spread
to all the points of the compass. Austria has no sense of shame, and
thinks that somebody will be found to believe lies of this sort."

(s) The Stampa, of the 9th, says that not everything which has
happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina has yet been revealed and
attained publicity. Strict secrecy is being maintained. But the
truth will sooner or later come to the surface ; blood-thirsty Austria

^ ["We are once more confronted with one of those incredible crimes which almost
make us despair of the progress of mankind."

Mr. Asquith's Speech, Times, July 1, 1914.]

138 Official Diplomatic Documents

will drink, nay, is drinking, Servian blood, till she can drink no more.
It is reported that there are to-day about ten thousand wounded and
dead in Bosnia.

(t) The Politika, of the 10th July, hurls extravagant abuse against
the members of the Imperial House.

(u) The Commercial Journal, Trgovinski Glasnik, of the 10th
July, talks about the corruption and unscrupulousness of the Austro-
Hungarian policy, which it calls Jesuitical, reckless and dishonour-
able. It is a warning to the Servian people in Austria-Hungary that
they are not living in a civilised State which guarantees life and
property, but that they must hold themselves armed and ever ready
to defend themselves against the robbery of the officials and the
Government. After the latest occurrences, the Servian people ought
no longer to wait like a lamb, which any day might be led to the
slaughter, but like a lion ready for a bloody resistance.

{v) In the Stampa, of the 10th July, we find: — "Nothing lasts
for ever, nor will Austria-Hungary remain for ever in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The time is not far off when the Servians who broke
the power of the Turks and punished the Bulgarians, will circle
round the Ivan Planina on the Trebevic."

(w) The Pravda, of the 10th July, under the title "Boycott against
Good-for-nothings," appeals for a boycott of Austrian firms in
Belgrade, as well as of Austrian wares, and says that it is the duty
of the Narodna Odbrana to see that the boycott is strictly carried out.

{x) The Zvono, of the 16th July, declares Princip to be the son
of Countess Lonyay, to whom the charge was given that he should
avenge the death of Crown Prince Rudolf on his murderer. Arch-
duke Franz Ferdinand.

(y) The Mali Journal^ of the 19th July, publishes a report which
says : — " Princip was instigated to make the attempt by an Austro-
Hungarian agent. It is said in Vienna that it is only in the Austro-
Hungarian Legation at Belgrade that the real culprit is to be found."

(z) The leading Young Radical organ, Odjek, of the 20th July,
writes : — " Austria-Hungary offers a hundred proofs that it will
inherit the title of the 'sick man' of Europe. While in Servia not
a single Austrian citizen has been molested, villages and towns have
been plundered in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This fact is one more
proof on how much higher a cultural and moral level Servia stands
than Austria-Hungary."

APPENDIX 10
The Local Committee of the Narodna Odbrana at Nish, on

THE subject of THE CRIME AGAINST THE ArCHDUKE FrANZ

Ferdinand.

A confidential communication has come to the ears of the Imperial
and Royal Foreign OflBce from a reliable correspondent, whose name

July 25, AustrO'Hungarian Red Book No. 19 139

will be published at the proper time, according to which the Local
Committee of the Narodna Odbrana at Nish, recently held a meeting
at which the president of this Committee, Jasa Nenadovic, director
of the Nish prison, touched on the subject of the assassination of
the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, using the following words : "Servia
was absolutely bound this time to have recourse to a measure like the
assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, because the Arch-
duke, on account of his aggressive and eccentric character, was a
prominent and deadly danger for Servia, and possibly for wider
Slavonic circles also. Had he remained alive, he would have soon
challenged Servia to war or attacked it, in which case Servia, which
was now so much weakened materially, and had not yet completed
her army re-organisation, would certainly have been lost. But now
Servia had been rescued by the Serajevo murder, and one of the dan-
gers which threatened Servia in the person of the victim had been
swept out of the way. Servia would now have rest for several years,
as the new heir to the throne would consider well before walking
in the steps of his predecessor."

" Though he was aware, continued the speaker, that the murder of
the Archduke Franz Ferdinand would be a heavy blow and a great
grief to Austria-Hungary, and that it would be followed by the torture
of those of our nation who were living in that country, yet he would
not have thought that his suppositions would have been so completely
fulfilled, and that the Croatians would have behaved as they had.
Yet his friends in Bosnia and Herzegovina had assured him that
the Austro-Hungarian officials were cowards and would not dare to
overstep the mark in the measures they took ; unfortunately, how-
ever, these friends, and through them we too, had been disappointed.
If things went on much longer as they were going at present, revolvers
and bombs would at last have to play their real role. Whatever the
God of Servia has in store, things cannot go on as at present."

The remarks of the speaker were received with complete approval
by his hearers.

APPENDIX 11

Supplements after going to Press

1. — To Appendix 8

The teacher, Cubrilovic, who undertook the guidance of Princip
and Grabez at Priboj, has made a complete confession, from which
the following important facts emerge : —

In the year 1911, Cubrilovic, on the occasion of a Sokol expedition
to §abac, was initiated by Bozo Foviz, a member of the managing
committee of the Narodna Odbrana, into the objects of that asso-
ciation, and was then appointed representative of^the Narodna
Odbrana in Zvornik (Bosnia). At his invitation, Misko Jovanovic

140 Official Diplomatic Documents

was later nominated representative of the Narodna Odbrana for
Tuzla.

A peasant acted as go-between in the communications with the
Narodna Odbrana, in fact, the same peasant who brought Princip
and Grabez to Cubrilovic, with the information that he was bringing
two Servian students with weapons to him. When he learned this,
he knew that it was a " mission " from the Narodna Odbrana. Princip
and Grabez told him that they had bombs and revolvers with them,
with a view to making an attempt on the life of the Archduke Franz
Ferdinand.

2. — Pictures in the Belgrade War Office of a nature hostile to the

Monarchy

There are four allegorical pictures on the wall outside the reception
hall of the Royal Servian War Office, of which three are representa-
tions of Servian victories, while the fourth symbolises the realisation
of the anti-Monarchical tendencies of Servia.

Over a landscape, partly mountains (Bosnia), partly plains (South
Hungary), rises the "Zora," the rosy dawn of Servian hopes. In the
foreground stands a woman in armour, whose shield bears the names
of all the "provinces still awaiting Uberation" : Bosnia, Herzegovina,
Vojvodina, Syrmia, Dalmatia, etc.

To the UndSr Secretary of Foreign Affairs

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 20

Count Berchtold to the Under Secretary , Freiherr von Macchio at Vienna,
(Telegraphic.) Lamhach, July 25 y 1914.

Russian Charge d' Affaires telegraphs to me that he has received
urgent instructions from his Government to press for a prolongation
of time-limit fixed for the ultimatum to Servia. I request Your Excel-
lency to reply to him in my name that we cannot consent to a pro-
longation of time-limit. Your Excellency will add, that Servia, even
after breaking off of diplomatic relations, can bring about friendly
solution by unconditional acceptance of our demands, although we
should be obliged in such an event to demand reimbursement by
Servia of all costs and damage incurred by us through our military
measures.

July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 22 141

To Petrograd
Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 21
Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburgh.
(Telegraphic.) Bad Ischl, July 25, 191^.

For Your Excellency's information and guidance : —

The Russian Charge d'Affaires called this morning ^ on the Under
Secretary, in order to express in the name of his Government the
wish that the time-limit fixed in our note to Servia might be pro-
longed.

This request was based on the grounds that the Powers had been
taken by surprise by our move, and that the Russian Government
would regard it merely as natural consideration for the other Cabi-
nets, on the part of the Vienna Cabinet, if an opportunity were
given to the former to examine the data on which our communica-
tion to the Powers was based and to study our prospective dossier.

The Under Secretary replied to the Charge d'Affaires that he
would immediately bring his explanation to my knowledge; but
that he could tell him at once that there was no prospect of a pro-
longation of the time-limit fixed being granted by us. As to the
grounds which the Russian Government had advanced in sup-
port of the wish they had expressed, they appeared to rest upon a
mistaken hypothesis.^ Our note to the Powers was in no way in-
tended to invite them to make known their own views on the subject,
but merely bore the character of a statement for information, the
communication of which we regarded as a duty laid on us by inter-
national courtesy. For the rest, we regarded our action as a matter
concerning us and Servia alone, which action, notwithstanding the
patience and longsuffering we had exhibited for years past, we had
been forced by the development of circumstances to take, much
against our own wish, for the defence of our most vital interests.

From Belgrade

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 22

Freiherr von Giesl to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

Cabinet Council met yesterday evening and early this morning ;
form of answer to our note was settled after several drafts, and is
to be delivered to me before the time-limit expires. I^ hear that
Royal train is being made up ; gold belonging to the National Bank

1 This time of day is important, because the French Ambassador says, French
Yellow Book No. 48, that it "seems useless to support" the Russian request, when
there is no longer any time for it," since his instructions reached him exactly at the
moment when the time limit given to Servia expires." The time limit expired at 6
P.M. No reason is advanced in the French Yellow Book why the instructions should
have reached the French Ambassador so late. There is telegraphic and telephonic
communication between Paris and Vienna. See French Yellow Book No. 39, No. 41
<" this morning "), No. 44, No. 45, No. 47 and No. 48; British Blue Book No. 26, and
Russian Orange Book No. 15, all of the same day.

2 Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 4, July 24, 1914, and note 3.

142 Official Diplomatic Documents

and to the railway, as well as the Foreign Office records, are being
taken into the interior of the country. Some of my colleagues are
of the opinion that they must follow the Government; packing-up
is proceeding at the Russian Legation in particular.

Garrison has left town in field order. Ammunition depots in the
fortress were evacuated. RaiWay station thronged with soldiers.
The ambulance trains have left Belgrade, proceeding towards the
south. In pursuance of the instructions which have reached me while
I write, we intend, in the event of a rupture, to leave Belgrade by
the 6.30 train.

From Semlin, Serbia

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 23

Freiherr von Giesl to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraph c.) Semlin, July 25, 1914,

Orders for general mobilisation were issued in Servia at 3 p.m.

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 24

Freiherr Von Giesl to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.) Semlin, July 25, 1914-

As a result of the Royal Servian Government's unsatisfactory
answer to our demands of the 23rd inst., I have announced that
diplomatic relations are broken off with Servia, and have left Belgrade
with the staff of the Legation. The reply was delivered to me at
two minutes to six p.m.

From Serbia

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 25

Note ^ of the Royal Serbian Government of 12/25 July, 1914-

(Translation).

The Royal Servian Government have received the communication
of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant,^ and are
convinced that their reply will remove any misunderstanding which
may threaten to impair the good neighbourly relations between the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia.

Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both from
the tribune of the national Skuptchina and in the declarations and
actions of the responsible representatives of the State — protests

^ See Austrian Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914 where the Serbian Note is printed in
full together with the reasons why Austria-Hungary deemed it unsatisfactory.
« Old style.

July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 25 143

which were cut short by the declarations made by the Servian Govern-
ment on the 18th ^ March, 1909 — have not been renewed on any
occasion as regards the great neighbouring Monarchy, and that no
attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal
Governments or by their agents, to change the poUtical and legal
state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Govern-
ment draw attention to the fact that in this connection the Imperial
and Royal Government have made no representation except one con-
cerning a school book, and that on that occasion the Imperial and
Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation.
Servia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate
policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Servia and to the
sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace
that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Government cannot
be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such
as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies — manifes-
tations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course
of events, and which, as a general rule, escape official control. The
Royal Government are all the less responsible, in view of the fact that
at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between
Servia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness to
oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions
to the advantage of the two neighbouring countries.

For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and
surprised at the statements, according to which members of the
Kingdom of Servia are supposed to have participated in the prepara-
tions for the crime committed at Serajevo ; the Royal Government
expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that
concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire
correctness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons
concerning whom representations were made to them. Falling in,
therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government,
they are prepared to hand over for trial any Servian subject, without
regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of
Serajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake
to cause to be published on the first page of the Journal officiel,
on the date of the 13th (26th) July, the following declaration : —

"The Royal Government of Servia condemn all propaganda which
may be directed against Austria-Hungary — i.e., the general tend-
ency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the
fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings. The Royal Govern-
ment regret that, according to the communication from the Imperial
and Royal Government, certain Servian officers and functionaries
participated in the above-mentioned propaganda, and thus compro-
mised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Servian
Government was solemnly pledged by the declaration of the 31st
March, 1909.^

1 New style.

144 Official Diplomatic Documents

"The Government, etc. . . /' (identical with the text as de-
manded).

The Royal Government further undertake : —

1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skuptchina
a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punish-
ment of incitement to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general
tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of
Austria-Hungary. The Government engage at the approaching re-
vision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced
into article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such publi-
cation may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under
the categorical terms of article 22 of the Constitution.

2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the Im-
perial and Royal Government furnish them w^ith any, that the Na-
rodna Obdrana and other similar societies have committed up to the
present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of
any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will
accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government, and will
dissolve the Narodna Odbrana Society and every other society which
may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

3. The Royal Servian Government undertake to eliminate without
delay from public instruction in Servia everything that serves or might
serve to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever
the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and
proofs of this propaganda.

4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from the military
service all such persons as the judicial enquiry may have proved to
be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and
Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names
and the acts of these officers and functionaries for the purposes of the
proceedings which are to be taken against them.

5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly
grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial
and Royal Government that Servia shall undertake to accept the col-
laboration of the representatives of the Imperial and Royal Govern-
ment upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such
collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with
criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations.

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider
it their duty to open an enquiry against all such persons as are, or
eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15th ^ June, and who
happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the
participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authori-
ties appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Govern-
ment, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as
it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal

1 Old Style.

July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 26 145

procedure ; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the
results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-
Hungarian agents.

7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the
delivery of the^ note, to arrest Commandant Voja Tankosic. As
regards Milan Ciganovic, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy and who up to the 15th ^ June was employed (on probation)
by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest
him.

The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good
as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presump-
tive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which
have been collected up to the present, at the enquiry at Serajevo for
the purposes of the later enquiry.

8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the measures
which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic in arms and
explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will
immediately order an enquiry and will severely punish the frontier
officials on the Schabatz-Locnitza line who have failed in their duty
and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass.

9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the re-
marks made by their officials whether in Servia or abroad, in inter-
views after the crime which, according to the statement of the Imperial
and Royal Government, were hostile towards the Monarchy, as soon
as the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated to them
the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have
shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, al-
though the Royal Government will themselves take steps to collect
evidence and proofs.

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal
Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the
above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present
note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and^ carried out.

If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this
reply, the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the com-
mon interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready,
as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this
question to the decision of the International Tribunal of the Hague,
or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the decla-
ration made by the Servian Government on the 18th (31st) March,
1909.

To Petrograd

Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 26

Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburgh.

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

We were, of course, aware, when we decided to take serious
measures against Servia, of the possibility that the Servian dispute

146 Official Diplomatic Documents

might develop into a collision with Russia. We could not, however,
allow ourselves to be diverted by this eventuality from the position
we took up towards Servia, because fundamental considerations of
national policy brought us face to face with the necessity of putting
an end to the state of affairs in which a Russian charter made it
possible for Servia to threaten the Monarchy continuously without
punishment and without the possibility of punishment.

Should events prove that Russia considered the moment for the
great settlement with the central European Powers to have already
arrived/ and was therefore determined on war from the beginning,
the following instructions to your Excellency appear indeed super-
fluous.

It might, however, be conceivable that Russia, in the event of the
refusal of our demands by Servia, and in face of the resulting necessity
for us of military measures, might think better of it, and might even
be willing not to allow herself to be swept away by the bellicose
elements. It is to meet this situation that the following explanations
have been drawn up, which your Excellency will use with M. Sazonof
and the President of the Council, at the right moment, in the manner
which you think best, and when the opportunity, in your opinion,
presents itself.

I assume, generally, that your Excellency in the existing circum-
stances, has established a close understanding with your German
colleague,^ who will certainly have been enjoined by his Government
to leave the Russian Government no room for doubt that Austria-
Hungary, in the event of a conflict with Russia, would not stand
alone.

I am under no illusion that it will be easy to make M. Sazonof
understand the step taken by us at Belgrade, which had become
inevitable.

There is, however, one factor which cannot fail to impress the
Russian Foreign Minister, and that is the emphasising of the circum-
stance that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, in conformity with the
principle to which it has adhered for decades past, is actuated in
the present crisis by no selfish motives in appealing to arms in order
to reach a settlement of her differences with Servia.

The Monarchy possesses territory to repletion and has no desire
for Servian possessions. If a conflict with Servia is forced upon us,
it will be for us not a conflict for territorial gain, but merely a means
of self-defence and self-preservation.

The contents of the circular note, which in itself is sufficiently
eloquent, are placed in their proper light by the dossier relating to
the Servian propaganda against the Monarchy, and the various points
of connection between this propaganda and the crime of June 28th.

1 Cf. British Blue Book N9. 17, July 25, 1914.

2 Germany and Austria, it seems, were determined to stand together diplomati-
cally as closely as France, England and Russia ; cf. British Blue Book No. 6, July 24,
note 1. Italy appears to have been as close to the Entente Powers as to her own
allies if one may judge by the despatches from Rome contained in the British Blue
Book and the French Yellow Book. See also French Yellow Book No. 35, July 25, and
No. 51, July 26.

July 25, AustrO'Hungarian Red Book No, 26 147

Your Excellency will draw the Russian Minister's very particular
attention to this dossier ^ and impress upon him that it is an unique
event in history that a Great Power should have borne with the
seditious intrigues of an adjoining small State for so long a time and
with such unparalleled patience as Austria-Hungary has borne with
those of Servia.

We had no wish to pursue a policy adverse to the ambitions of
the Christian Balkan States, and we have therefore — notwithstand-
ing that we well knew how little value was to be attached to Servian
promises — suffered Servia to increase her territory after the annexa-
tion crisis of 1908 to nearly double its former extent.

Since that time the subversive movement which has been fostered
in Servia against the Monarchy has assumed such excessive propor-
tions that the vital interests of Austria-Hungary, and even of our
Dynasty itself, appear to be threatened by the revolutionary activities
of Servia.

We must assume that to conservative loyal Russia energetic
measures on our part against this menace to all public order will
appear intelligible and indeed necessary.

When Your Excellency reaches this point in your conversation
with M. Sazonof, the moment will have arrived to add to your expla-
nation of our motives and intentions the hint that we — as your
Excellency will have already been in a position to explain — aim at
no territorial gains, and also did not wish to infringe the sovereignty
of the Kingdom, but that, on the other hand, we will proceed to ex-
treme measures for the enforcement of our demands.

That we had striven up till now, so far as in us lay, to preserve the
peace which we considered to be the most precious possession of
nations, was shown by the course of events during the last 40 years,
and by the historical fact that our gracious Emperor has won for him-
self the glorious title of "Protector of the Peace."

We should, therefore, most sincerely deplore the disturbance of
the European peace, because we also were of the opinion that the
strengthening of the Balkan States in a position of political and
national independence would prove to the advantage of our relations
with Russia, and would also remove all possibility of antagonism
between us and Russia; also because we have always been ready,
in the shaping of our own policy, to take into consideration the
dominant political interests of Russia.

Any further toleration of Servian intrigues would undermine our
existence as a State and our position as a Great Power, thus also
threatening the balance of power in Europe. We are, however, con-
vinced that it is to Russia's own interests, as her peaceful leaders will
clearly see, that the existing European balance of power which is of
such importance for the peace of the world, should be maintained.
Our action against Servia, whatever form it takes, is conservative

1 See note 1 to Enclosure of Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25, 1914,
where it is stated that Sir E. Grey did not publish this "dossier." Russia also omitted
it in her published documents in the Russian Orange Book.

148 Official Diplomatic Documents

from first to last, and its object is the necessary preservation of our
position in Europe.

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 27

Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburgh.
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 25, 1914,

As point 5 of our demands, namely, the participation of representa-
tives of the Imperial and Royal Government in the suppression of the
subversive movement in Servia has given rise to special objection on
the part of M. Sazonof, your Excellency will explain in strict confi-
dence with regard to this point that this clause was interpolated
merely out of practical considerations, and was in no way intended
to infringe on the sovereignty of Servia.

By "collaboration" in point 5, we are thinking of the establish-
ment of a private "Bureau de Surete" at Belgrade, which would
operate in the same way as the analogous Russian establishments in
Paris and in co-operation with the Servian police and administration.

Belgium :

To Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg.

Belgian Gray Book No. 3

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian
Ministers at Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg.

Sir, Brussels, July 25, 1914.

I HAVE addressed an undated circular note, a copy of which is
enclosed, to the Belgian representatives accredited to the Powers
guaranteeing the independence and neutrality of Belgium.

Should the danger of a war between France and Germany be-
come imminent, this circular note will be communicated to the
Governments of the guaranteeing Powers, in order to inform them
of our fixed determination to fulfil those international obligations
that are imposed upon us by the treaties of 1839.

The communications in question would only be made upon tele-
graphic instructions from me.

If circumstances lead me to issue such instructions, I shall re-
quest you also, by telegram, to notify the Government to which you
are accredited of the step we have taken, and to communicate to
them a copy of the enclosed circular note for their information, and
without any request that they should take note thereof.

My telegram will ^ inform you of the date to be given to the cir-
cular note, which you should be careful to fill in on the copy which
you hand to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

It is unnecessary to point out that this despatch and its enclo-
sure should be treated as strictly confidential until the receipt of
fresh instructions from me.

1 Notice the absence of any uncertainty whether or not such a telegram will be sent.

July 25, French Yellow Book No. 35 149

Enclosure in No. 3
(See Enclosure in No. 2.)

From Belgrade

Belgian Gray Book No. 4

M. Michotte de Welle, Belgian Minister at Belgrade, to M. Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Sir, . Belgrade, July 25, 1914}

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the reply
returned by the Servian Government to the Austro-Hungarian
note of the 10 (23) July.

Enclosure in No. 4

[Text of the Serbian reply, for which see Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. 25,
July 25 and No. 34, July 27, 1914.]

France :

From Berlin

French Yellow Book No. 35

M, Jules Camhon, French Minister at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu- Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 25, 1914.

The Belgian Minister appears very anxious about the course of
events.

He is of opinion that Austria and Germany have desired to take
advantage of the fact that, owing to a combination of circumstances
at the present moment, Russia and England appear to them to be
threatened by domestic troubles, while in France the state of the
army is under discussion. Moreover, he does not believe in the
pretended ignorance of the Government of Berlin on the subject of
Austria's demarche.

He thinks that if the form of it has not been submitted to the
Cabinet at Berlin, the moment of its despatch has been cleverly
chosen in consultation with that Cabinet, in order to surprise the
Triple Entente at a moment of disorganisation.

He has seen the Italian Ambassador, who has just interrupted
his holiday in order to return. It looks as if Italy would be surprised,
to put it no higher, at having been kept out of the whole affair by
her two allies.^ j^^^^ ^ambon.

1 This despatch could not have reached Brussels on July 25. It was probably sent
by mail. In Belgian Gray Book No. 6, July 27, the actual Serbian reply does not seem
to be known. Cf . also French Yellow Book No. 56, July 26, where it is stated that the
reply became known after a delay of 20 hours. Cf. also Russian Orange Book No. 36,
July 27.

2 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 36, same day, where according to the German Am-
bassador Austria-Hungary had acted without consulting either Germany or Italy.

150 Official Diplomatic Documents

To Viviani and London, Berlin, Petrograd, and Vienna

French Yellow Book No. 36

M, Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stock-
holm {for the President of the Council), and to London, Berlin,
St. Petershurgh, Vienna.

Paris, July 25, 191 J^.

The German Ambassador came at 12 o'clock to protest against
an article ^ in the Ech) de Paris which applied the term " German
threat" (menace allemande) to his demarche of yesterday. Herr
von Schoen told a certain number of journalists, and came to state
at the Direction Politique, that there has been no "concert" between
Austria and Germany in connection with the Austrian note, and that
the German Government had no knowledge of this note when it was
communicated to them at the same time as to the other Powers,
though they had approved it subsequently.

Baron von Schoen added, moreover, that there was no "threat";
the German Government had merely indicated that they thought
it desirable to localise the dispute, and that the intervention of other
Powers ran the risk of aggravating it.

The Acting Political Director took note of Baron von Schoen's
demarche. Having asked ^ him to repeat the actual terms of the
last two paragraphs of his note, he remarked to him that the terms
showed the willingness of Germany to act as intermediary between
the Powers and Austria. M. Berthelot added that, as no private
information had been given to any journalist, the information in the
Echo de Paris involved this newspaper alone, and merely showed that
the German demarche appeared to have been known elsewhere than
at the Quai d'Orsay, and apart from any action on his part. The
German Ambassador did not take up the allusion.

On the other hand, the Austrian Ambassador at London also
came to reassure Sir Edward Grey, telling him that the Austrian
note did not constitute an "ultimatum" but "a demand for a reply
with a time limit"; which meant that if the Austrian demands are
not accepted by 6 o'clock this evening, the Austrian minister will
leave Belgrade and the Austro-Hungarian Government will begin
military "preparations" but not military "operations."

The Cabinet of London, like those of Paris and St. Petersburgh,
has advised Belgrade to express regret ^ for any complicity which
might be established in the crime of Serajevo, and to promise the
most complete satisfaction in this respect. The Cabinet added that
in any case it was Servia's business to reply in terms which the inter-
ests of the country appeared to call for. The British Minister at

1 Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 19, of same day commenting on the inaccuracies
and additions of this article.

2 This refers to the interview of the previous day, July 24, French Yellow Book No.
28. There, however, Mr, Martin himself does the asking.

3 Belgrade had obviously not done so before, for if it had this advice would have
been superfluous. One of the chief grounds of complaint that Austria-Hungary had
against Serbia was that the latter had neither officially expressed her regret, nor con-
trolled the exultation permeating the Serbian press.

July 25, French Yellow Book No, 37 151

Belgrade is to consult his French and Russian colleagues, and, if
these have had corresponding instructions in the matter, advise ^ the
Servian Government to give satisfaction on all the points on which
they shall decide that they are able to do so.

Sir Edward Grey told Prince Lichnowsky (who, up to the present,^
has made no communication to him similar to that of Herr von Schoen
at Paris) that if the Austrian note caused no difficulty between
Austria and Russia, the British Government would not have to
concern themselves with it, but that it was to be feared that the
stiffness of the note and the shortness of the time limit would bring
about a state of tension. Under these conditions the only chance
that could be seen of avoiding a conflict would consist in the mediation
of France, Germany, Italy ^ and England, Germany alone being able
to influence the Government at Vienna in this direction.

The German Ambassador replied that he would transmit this
suggestion to Berlin, but he gave the Russian Ambassador, who is
a relative of his, to understand that Germany would not lend
herself to any demarche at Vienna.

Bienvenu-Martin.

From London

French Yellow Book No. 37

M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu^
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 25, 1914.

The German Ambassador came to the Foreign Office to state that
his Government would refuse^ to interfere in the dispute between
Austria and Servia.

Sir Edward Grey replied that without the co-operation of Germany
at Vienna, England would not be able to take action at St. Peters-
burgh. If, however, both Austria and Russia mobilised, that would
certainly be the occasion for the four other Powers to intervene.
Would the German Government then maintain its passive attitude,
and would it refuse to join with England, France and Italy ?

Prince Lichnowsky does not think so, since the question would

1 As a matter of fact, while such instructions were sent by Sir E. Grey the British
representative failed to offer this advice to Serbia. See British Blue Book No. 22, July
25, 1914. He gave as his reason that his French and Russian colleagues "have not
yet received instructions from their Governments." So far as the French Minister is
concerned, this explanation is at variance with the above despatch.

2 This is wrong ; see British Blue Book No. 9, July 24, 1914.

3 This was the British formula of July 24, 1915. On the day of this despatch,
however, July 25, Sir E. Grey had changed this formula to read Germany, France,
Russia and Great Britain ; see British Blue Book No. 25.

^ This is not so stated in any despatch of this date in the British Blue Book. Cf.
British Blue Book No. 25, where the German Ambassador is quoted by Sir E. Grey :
"if what I contemplated was mediation between Austria and Russia, Austria might
be able with dignity to accept it." This means that Sir E. Grey's original idea of
mediation between Austria and Russia might be acceptable, while its modification,
under the pressure of the French Ambassador, of mediation between Austria and
Serbia was not acceptable.

152 Official Diplomatic Documents

no longer be one of difficulties between Vienna and Belgrade, but of
a conflict between Vienna and St. Petersburgh.

Sir Edward Grey added this observation, that if war eventually
broke out, no Power in Europe would be able to take up a detached
attitude^ (pourrait s'en desinteresser) .

De Fleuriau.

From Petrograd

French Yellow Book No. 38

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburgh, July 25, 1914.

The Russian Government is about to endeavour to obtain from
the Austro-Hungarian Government an extension of the time limit
fixed by the ultimatum, in order that the Powers may be able to
form an opinion on the judicial dossier, the communication of which
is offered to them.^

M. Sazonof has asked the German Ambassador to point out to his
Government the danger of the situation, but he refrained from mak-
ing any allusion to the measures ^ which Russia would no doubt be led
to take, if either the national independence or the territorial integrity
of Servia were threatened. The evasive replies and the recrimina-
tions of Count de Pourtales left an unfavourable impression on M.
Sazonof.

The Ministers will hold a Council to-morrow with the Emperor
presiding. M. Sazonof preserves complete moderation.^ " We must
avoid," he said to me, "everything which might precipitate the crisis.
I am of opinion that, even if the Austro-Hungarian Government
come to blows with Servia, we ought not to break off negotiations."

Paleologue.

To Vienna
French Yellow Book No. 39

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M,
Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna.

Paris, July 25, 1914.

The Russian Government has instructed its representative at
Vienna to ask the Austrian Government for an extension of the time

1 The New York Times translation reads "would be able to remain aloof from it."
A comparison of Fleuriau's report of Sir E. Grey's words with the latter's own report
of what he told the German Ambassador, British Blue Book No. 25, reveals that
Fleuriau gave his Government the impression that Sir E. Grey had far more definitely
hinted to the German Ambassador that England would fight by the side of France
and Russia than Sir E. Grey himself stated he had done.

2 This suggests that Sir E. Grey knew of the preparation of the dossier. Of. notes to
British Blue Book No. 48, July 27, and Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25
(enclosure).

' This means Russia's intention to go to war ; of. British Blue Book No. 17, July 25,
1914.

< For his determination, however, see British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, 1914.

July 25, French Yellow Book No. 4I 153

limit fixed for Servia, so as to enable the Powers to form an opinion
on the dossier which Austria has offered to communicate to them, and
with a view to avoiding regrettable consequences for everyone.

A refusal of this demand by Austria-Hungary would deprive of all
meaning the demarche which she made to the Powers by communi-
cating her note to them, and would place her in a position of con-
flict with international ethics.

The Russian Government has asked that you should make a corre-
sponding and urgent demarche to Count Berchtold. I beg you to
support the request of your colleague.^ The Russian Government
have sent the same request to London, Rome, Berlin and Bucharest.

Bienvenu-Maktin.

From London

French Yellow Book No. 40

M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, Jidy 25, 1914.

Sir Edward Grey has had communicated to him this morning the
instructions which require the Russian Ambassador at Vienna to ask
for an extension of the time limit given to Servia by Austria's note
of the day before yesterday. M. Sazonof asked that the Russian
demarche should be supported by the British Embassy.

Sir Edw^ard Grey telegraphed to Sir M. de Bunsen to take the same
action ^ as his Russian colleague, and to refer to Austria's communi-
cation which was made to him late last night by Count Mensdorff,
according to the terms of which the failure of Servia to comply with
the conditions of the ultimatum would only result, as from to-day,
in a diplomatic rupture and not in immediate military operations.

Sir Edward Grey inferred from this action that time would be left
for the Powers to intervene and find means for averting the crisis.

De Fleuriau.

From Berlin

French Yellow Book No. 41

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 25, 1914.

This morning the British Charge d'Affaires, acting under instruc-
tions from his Government, asked Herr von Jagow if Germany were
willing to join with Great Britain, France and Italy with the object of

1 The French Minister did not do so ; cf . French Yellow Book No. 48, same day.
For a discussion of his reasons see above, Austro-Hunganan Red Book No. 21, July 25,
1914

2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 26, July 25, 1914 where Sir E. Grey writes : "You may
support in general terms, etc."

154 Official Diplomatic Documents

intervening between Austria and Russia, to prevent a conflict and,
in the first instance, to ask Vienna to grant an extension of the time
Hmit imposed on Servia by the ultimatum.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that directly
after the receipt of Prince Lichnowsky's despatch informing him of
the intentions of Sir Edward Grey, he had already telegraphed this
very morning to the German ^ Ambassador at Vienna to the effect
that he should ask Count Berchtold for this extension. Unfor-
tunately Count Berchtold is at Ischl.^ In any case Herr von Jagow
does not think that this request would be granted.

The British Charge d'Affaires also enquired of Herr von Jagow, as
I had done yesterday, if Germany had had no knowledge of the
Austrian note before it was despatched, and he received so clear a
reply in the negative that he was not able to carry the matter further ;
but he could not refrain from expressing his surprise at the blank
cheque given by Germany to Austria.

Herr von Jagow having replied to him that the matter was a
domestic one for Austria, he remarked that it had become essentially
an international one.

Jules Cambon.

French Yellow Book No. 42

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 25, 1914.

The Russian Charge d'Affaires has been instructed to ask the
German Government to make strong representations to the Cabinet
at Vienna, with a view to obtaining an extension of the time limit
of the ultimatum.

Herr von Jagow not having made an appointment with him until
late in the afternoon,^ that is to say, till the very moment when the
ultimatum will expire, M. Broniewski sent an urgent note addressed to
the Secretary of State in which he points out that the lateness of
Austria's communication to the Powers makes the effect of this com-
munication illusory, inasmuch as it does not give the Powers time to
consider the facts brought to their notice before the expiration of
the time limit. He insists very strongly on the necessity for extending
the time limit, unless the intention be to create a serious crisis.

Jules Cambon.

1 In French text by an obvious error "de la Grande-Bretagne " is printed.

2 Count Berchtold left for Ischl on the 25th in the morning ; cf . Austro-Hungarian
Red Book No. 21, same day. The Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia had been made
known to Russia in the evening of July 23 ; and had been known to France and, there-
fore, probably to the Entente Powers, in general terms, inclusive of the fact that
there would be a time limit, on July 19, 1914 ; cf. French Yellow Book Nos. 13 and 14.

' Cf. the previous despatch No. 41, where Mr. von Jagow is spoken of as having
received the British Charg6 d'Affaires in the same matter, and having already re-
quested an extension of the time limit.

July 25, French Yellow Book No. 44 155

French Yellow Book No. 43

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-
martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Berlin, July 25, 1914.

The Russian Charge d'Affaires has, in accordance with his in-
structions, approached the Secretary of State with a view to securing
an extension of the time Hmit of the ultimatum. Herr von Jagow
repHed that he had already transmitted to Vienna a suggestion
of this nature, but that in his opinion all these demarches were too
late.

M. Broniewski insisted that if the time limit could not be extended,
action ^ at least might be delayed so as to allow the Powers to exert
themselves to avoid a conflict. He added that the Austrian note
was couched in terms calculated to wound Servia and to force her into
war.

Herr von Jagow replied that there was no question of a war, but
of an "execution'' ^ in a local matter.

The Charge d'Affaires in reply expressed regret that the German
Government did not weigh their responsibilities in the event of hos-
tilities breaking out, which might extend to the rest of Europe ; to
this Herr von Jagow replied that he refused to believe in such con-
sequences.

The Russian Charge d'Affaires, like myself, has heard the rumour
that Austria, while declaring that she did not desire an annexation
of territory, would occupy parts of Servia until she had received
complete satisfaction. "One knows," he said to me, "what this
word 'satisfaction' means." M. Broniewski's impressions of Ger-
many's ultimate intentions are very pessimistic.

Jules Cambon.

From Rome

French Yellow Book No. 44

M. Barrere, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, July 25, 1914.

The Russian Ambassador has carried out at the Consulta the
demarche which M. Sazonof requested the representatives of Russia
at Paris, Berlin, Rome and Bucharest ^ to undertake, the object of
which was to induce these various Cabinets to take action similar
to that of Russia at Vienna, with a view of obtaining an extension of
the time limit imposed on Servia.

1 Austria-Hungary had already promised that actual military operations would be
delayed ; cf. British Blue Book No. 26, July 25, 1914.

2 There is no reason why the official English translation should have retained this
French word, instead of translating the whole phrase which means "no question of
war, but of action in a local matter."

3 The occasional appearance of Bucharest in these despatches is noteworthy.

156 Official Diplomatic Documents

In the absence of the Marquis di San GiuUano, M. Salandra and
M. di Martino repKed that they would put themselves into communi-
cation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but that his reply could
not reach them until towards 6 o'clock, that is to say, too late to take
any step at Vienna.

Barrere.

From Vienna

French Yellow Book No. 45

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

The Russian Charge d'Affaires received instructions from his
Government to ask for an extended time limit for the ultimatum to
Servia at the very moment ^ that Count Berchtold was leaving for
Ischl, with the intention, according to the newspapers, of remaining
there near the Emperor until the end of the crisis.

Prince Koudacheff informed him nevertheless of the demarche which
he had to carry out, by means of two telegrams en clair, one addressed
to him on his journey and the other at his destination. He does not
expect any result.

Baron Macchio, General Secretary of the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs to whom the Prince communicated the tenour of his instruc-
tions and of his telegrams, behaved with icy coldness when it was
represented to him that to submit for consideration grievances with
documentary proofs without leaving time for the dossier to be studied,
was not consonant with international courtesy.^ Baron Macchio
replied that one's interests sometimes exempted one from being
courteous.

The Austrian Government is determined to inflict humiliation on
Servia : it will accept no intervention from any Power until the blow
had been delivered and received full in the face by Servia.

DUMAINE.

From Belgrade

French Yellow Book No. 46

M. Boppe, French Minister at Belgrade, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Belgrade, July 25, 1914-

M. Pashitch has just acquainted me with the reply which will be
sent this evening to the Austrian Minister.

The Servian Government agrees to publish to-morrow inihe Journal
Officiel the declaration which has been required of them ; they will

1 This was in the morning ; cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 21, same day.

2 Austria-Hungary was of a different opinion; cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book
No. 21, July 25, and note 2.

July 25, French Yellow Booh No. 4.7 157

communicate it also to the army by means of an Order of the Day ;
they will dissolve the societies of national defence and all other asso-
ciations which might agitate against Austria-Hungary ; they under-
take to modify the press law, to dismiss from service in the army,
in the ministry of public instruction and in the other Government
offices, all officials who shall be proved to have taken part in the
propaganda ; they only request that the names of these officials may
be communicated to them.

As to the participation of Austrian officials in the enquiry, the
Government ask that an explanation ^ of the manner in which this
will be exercised may be given to them. They could accept no parti-
cipation which conflicted with international law or with good and
neighbourly relations.

They accept all the other demands of the ultimatum and declare
that if the Austro-Hungarian Government is not content with this,
they are ready to refer the matter to the Hague Tribunal, or to the
decision of the Great Powers who took part in the preparation of the
declaration of March 31, 1909.

BOPPE.

From Berlin

French Yellow Book No. 47

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 25, 1914.

Throughout the afternoon there has been a persistent rumour
that Servia had submitted to the Austrian demands. This even-
ing the newspapers published extra editions which announce a
rupture at Belgrade and the departure of the Austro-Hungarian
Minister.

The correspondent of the Agence Havas at the Wilhelmstrasse has
just received confirmation of this rumour. Large crowds consisting
of several hundred persons are collecting here before the newspaper
offices and a demonstration of numbers of young people has just passed
through the Pariser-platz shouting cries of "Hurrah" for Germany,
and singing patriotic songs. The demonstrators are visiting the
Siegessdule, the Austrian and then the Italian ^ Embassy. It is a
significant outburst of chauvinism.

A German ^ whom I saw this evening confessed to me that it had
been feared here that Servia would accept the whole Austrian note,

1 For an explanation of the Austro-Hungarian meaning see the Austro-Hungarian
Red Book No. 27, of the same day.

2 As early as in 1912 Paul Rohrbach had pointed out in Der deutsche Gedanke in
der Welt (translated, German World Policies, The Macmillan Co.) that in a European
conflagration Germany could not count on the support of Italy.

3 For a clear understanding of the ante-war days it is unfortunate that the French
Ambassador in Berlin not infrequently quotes anonymous Germans whose standing
and importance remain obscure.

158 Official Diplomatic Documents

reserving to herself the right to discuss the manner in which effect
should be given to it, in order to gain time and to allow the efforts
of the Powers to develop effectively before the rupture.

In financial circles measures are already being taken to meet every
eventuality, for no means of averting the crisis is seen, in view of
the determined support which Germany is giving to Austria.

I, for my part, see in Great Britain the only Power which might
be listened to at Berlin.

Whatever happens, Paris, St. Petersburgh and London will not suc-
ceed in maintaining peace with dignity unless they show a firm and
absolutely united front. ^

Jules Cambon.

From Vienna

French Yellow Book No. 48

M. DumainCy French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign A fairs.

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

Your telegram^ reaches me exactly at the moment when the time
limit given to Servia expires. On the other hand I have just informed
you under what conditions the Russian Charge d 'Affaires has had
to carry out his demarche. It seems useless to support him when
there is no longer any time for it.^

During the afternoon a rumour spread that Servia had yielded
to the ultimatum, while adding that she was appealing to the Powers
against it. But the latest news is that at the last moment we are
assured that the Austrian Minister has just left Belgrade hurriedly;
he must have thought the Servian Government's acceptance of the
conditions imposed by his Government inadequate.

DUMAINE.

French Yellow Book No. 49
Reply of Serbian Government to AuMro-Hungarian Note.

(Communicated by M. Vesnitch, Serbian Minister, July 27.) ^
[For the text see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914,
or lb. No. 25, July 25, 1914.]

1 This was Russia's great aim, to secure England's unconditional support ; cf.
British Blue Book No. 6, June 24, 1914, and no. 17, June 25.

2 French Yellow Book No. 39, same day.

' Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 21, same day: "This morning." The time
limit was to expire at 6 p.m. See also Russian Orange Book No. 15, same day. There
would not seem to be any reason why the French Ambassador should have received
his instructions too late to act. See also British Blue Book No. 13, July 25, 1914.

* Notice the day, July 27, when the Serbian reply was officially presented. A sum-
mary reached France on July 26, but with a delay of .20 hours. See French Yellow
Book No. 56, July 26.

July 25, German White Book Exhibit 6 159

Germany:

To London

German White Book Exhibit 13

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London on
July 25th, 1914.

The distinction^ made by Sir Edward Grey between an Austro-
Servian and an Austro-Russian conflict is perfectly correct. We do
not wish to interpose in the former any more than England, and as
heretofore we take the position that this question must be localised
by virtue of all powers refraining from intervention. It is therefore
our hope that Russia will refrain from any action in view of her re-
sponsibility and the seriousness of the situation. We are prepared,
in the event of an Austro-Russian controversy, quite apart from our
known duties as allies, to intercede between Russia and Austria
jointly with the other powers.

From Petrograd

German White Book Exhibit 6

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to the
Chancellor on July 25th, 1914-

Message to H.M. from General von Chelius (German honorary
aide de camp to the Czar).

The manoeuvres of the troops in the Krasnoe camp were suddenly
interrupted and the regiments returned to their garrisons at once.
The manoeuvres have been cancelled. The military pupils were
raised to-day to the rank of officers instead of next fall. At head-
quarters there obtains great excitement over the procedure of Austria.
I have the impression ^ that complete preparations for mobilisation
against Austria are being made.

1 Sir Edward Grey knew from British Blue Book Nos. 6 and 17 of Russia's determina-
tion to intervene in favor of Serbia. Germany believed that Russia would not inter-
vene because, without England, she might be forced by France to r^rain from aggressive
action, and in view of Asquith's invectives against Serbia in Parliament after the Serajevo
murder [The Times, July 1, 1914 quotes him as saying, "We are once more confronted
with one of those incredible crimes which almost make us despair of the progress of
mankind"] did not believe that England would go to war for Serbia.

Sir Edward Grey's first proposal was that four powers should intervene simul-
taneously in Petrograd and in Vienna. This plan was modified under French pressure
(see despatches of July 24 and 25, 1914) to amount to a request that Germany induce
Austria-Hungary to submit her case against Serbia to a conference of four powers,
one of whom should be Russia herself (British Blue Book No. 25, July 25, 1914).

The German position is made perfectly clear in the above despatch.

2 The correctness of this impression is proved by the telegram from the Czar to
the German Emperor of July 30 (German White Book, Exhibit 23a), in which the Czar
says: "The military measures now taking form were decided upon five days ago."
Cf. also British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, and note 5. And for the general subject o^
Russian mobilization see the American Review of Reviews, May, 1914, p. 544: "The
French papers are now admitting that Russia's recent mobilization of a million men
on her German and Austrian frontiers was chiefly intended as a demonstration to
France that her ally could help her in time of need." See also Musical Courier, Sept.
30, 1915, p. 8, where an American traveller relates his experiences with mobilized Rus-
sian troops in Batum and in Sebastopol on May 24, 1914.

160 Official Diplomatic Documents

Great Britain:

From the Riossian Ambassador

British Blue BtooK No. 13 ^

Note communicated by Russian Ambassador, July 25.

(Translation.)
M. Sazonof telegraphic au M. Sazonof telegraphs to the
Charge d'iVff aires de Russie a Russian Charge d' Affaires at
Vienne en date du 11 (24) juillet, Vienna on the 11th (24th) July,
1914: 1914:

[For the text see Russian Orange Book No. 4, July 24, 1914.]

To Paris and Petrograd
British Blue Book No. 14

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, and to
Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

Austrian Ambassador has been authorised to explain to me that
the step taken at Belgrade was not an ultimatum, but a demarche
with a time limit, and that if the Austrian demands were not com-
plied with within the time limit the Austro-Hungarian Government
would break off diplomatic relations and begin military preparations,
not operations.^

In case Austro-Hungarian Government have not given the same
information at Paris (St. Petersburgh), you should inform Minister
for Foreign Affairs as soon as possible ; it makes the immediate situa-
tion rather less acute.

From Paris

British Blue Book No. 15

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. —
{Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 25, 1914.

I LEARN from the Acting Political Director that the French Govern-
ment have not yet received the explanation from the Austrian Gov-

1 This is the first despatch listed in the British Blue Book under date of July 25.
It was sent on the 24th from Petrograd and delivered in London early the next day.
It was undoubtedly received at the same time in Paris, if not late on July 24. Since
it is not listed in the French Yellow Book the exact time when it was received cannot
be given. It may, however, be surmised that in the absence of published information to
the contrary, it reached Paris in ample time to instruct the French Ambassador to sup-
port his Russian colleague in Vienna. The French Ambassador, however, claimed that
his instructions reached him too late ; cf . French Yellow Book No. 48, same day.

2 This concession of Austria-Hungary was a half-way acceptance of Russia's
request (British Blue Book No. 13, Russian Orange Book No. 4) for an extension of
the time limit.

July 25, British Blue Booh No. 17 161

eminent contained in your telegram of to-day .^ They have, how-
ever, through the Servian Minister here, given similar advice to
Servia as was contained in your telegram to Belgrade of yesterday .^

British Blue Book No. 16

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. —
(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 25, 1914.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has no suggestions to make
except that moderating advice might be given at Vienna as well as
Belgrade.^ He hopes that the Servian Government's answer to the
Austrian ultimatum will be sufficiently favourable to obviate extreme
measures being taken by the Austrian Government. He says, how-
ever, that there would be a revolution in Servia if she were to accept
the Austrian demands in their entirety.

From Petrograd

British Blue Book No. 17

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petershurgh, to Sir Edward
Grey. — (Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 25, 191^.

I SAW the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, and communi-
cated to his Excellency the substance of your telegram of to-day to
Paris,^ and this afternoon I discussed with him the communication
which the French Ambassador suggested should be made to the
Servian Government, as recorded in your telegram of yesterday to
Belgrade.^

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said, as regards the former, that the
explanations of the Austrian Ambassador did not quite correspond
with the information which had reached him from German quarters.*
As regards the latter, both his Excellency and the French Ambassador
agreed that it is too late to make such a communication, as the time
limit expires this evening.

1 See No. 14.

2 The advice spoken of is contained in British Blue Book No. 12, July 24, 1914, a
despatch to the British Minister in Belgrade, who in No. 22, July 25, informs Sir E.
Grey that he had not offered the advice because his French and Russian colleagues
had received no instructions. Cf. British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, 1914.

3 Cf. German White Book, Exhibit 13, July 25th, and note ; also British Blue Book
No. 10, July 24, and note, and French Yellow Book No. 34, July 24. France wishes
mediation between Vienna and Belgrade.

4 See No. 14.

6 See No. 12. There is no hint in Sir E. Grey's despatch to Belgrade that it was
suggested by the French Ambassador. Cf. British Blue Book No. 15, and note.

« The published despatches contain no hint as to this information, and as a matter
of fact Austria did as she had told England she would do. Sazonof, moreover, had
received the correct Austro-Hungarian offer through the Russian Ambassador in
London, Russian Orange Book No. 16, same day.

162 Official Diplomatic Documents

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Servia was quite ready
to do as you had suggested and to punish those proved to be guilty,
but that no independent State could be expected to accept the political
demands which had been put forward. The Minister for Foreign
Affairs thought, from a conversation which he had with the Servian
Minister yesterday, that, in the event of the Austrians attacking
Servia, the Servian Government would abandon Belgrade, and with-
draw their forces into the interior, while they would at .the same
time appeal to the Powers to help them. His Excellency was in
favour of their making this appeal. He would like to see the question
placed on an international footing, as the obligations taken by Servia
in 1908, to which reference is made in the Austrian ultimatum, were
given not to Austria, but to the Powers.

If Servia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready
to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France,
Germany, and Italy. It was possible, in his opinion, that Servia
might propose to submit the question to arbitration.

On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipi-
tate war by mobilising until you had had time to use your influence
in favour of peace, his Excellency assured me that Russia had no ag-
gressive intentions,^ and she would take no action until it was forced
upon her. Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia.
She aimed at overthrowing the present status quo in the Balkans, and
establishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Ger-
many really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If
we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no
war. If we failed them now, rivers of blood would flow, and we would
in the end be dragged into war.

I said that England could play the role of mediator at Berlin and
Vienna to better purpose as friend who, if her counsels of moderation
were disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if
she were to declare herself Russia's ally at once. His Excellency said
that unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count
upon our neutrality.

I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilised, Germany would
not be content with mere mobilisation, or give Russia time to carry
out hers, but would probably declare war at once. His Excellency
replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush Servia and be-
come the predominant Power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure
of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war. He as-
sured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict,
but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I could regard the
situation as desperate.

1 Cf. British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, 1914, and last paragraph of this note.

July 25y British Blue Book No. 18 163

From Berlin
British Blue Book No. 18

Sir H. Rumhold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward
Grey. — (Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 25, 1914.

Your telegram of the 24th July ^ acted on.

Secretary of State says that on receipt of a telegram at 10 this
morning from German Ambassador at London, he immediately in-
structed German Ambassador at Vienna to pass on to Austrian
Minister for Foreign Affairs your suggestion for an extension of time
limit, and to speak to his Excellency about it. Unfortunately it
appeared from press that Count Berchtold ^ is at Ischl, and Secretary
of State thought that in these , circumstances there would be delay
and difficulty in getting time limit extended. Secretary of State
said that he did not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the
spot, but he admitted quite freely that Austro-Hungarian Govern-
ment wished to give the Servians a lesson, and that they meant to
take military action. He also admitted that Servian Government
could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands.

Secretary of State said that a reassuring feature of situation was that
Count Berchtold had sent for Russian representative at Vienna and
had told him that Austria-Hungary had no intention of seizing Servian
territory. This step should, in his opinion, exercise a calming in-
fluence at St. Petersburgh. I asked whether it was not to be feared
that, in taking military action against Servia, Austria would dan-
gerously excite public opinion in Russia. He said he thought not.
He remained of opinion that crisis could be localised. I said that
telegrams from Russia in this morning's papers did not look very
reassuring, but he maintained his optimistic view with regard to
Russia. He said that he had given the Russian Government to under-
stand that last thing Germany wanted was a general war, and he
would do all in his power to prevent such a calamity. If the relations
between Austria and Russia became threatening, he was quite ready
to fall in with your suggestion as to the four Powers working in favour
of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburgh.

Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the note
left much to be desired as a diplomatic document. He repeated very
earnestly that, though he had been accused of knowing all about the
contents of that note, he had in fact had no such knowledge.

1 See No. 11, July 24, 1914.

2 Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

164 Official Diplomatic Documents

From Rome

British Blue Book No. 19

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. —
(Received July 25,)

(Telegraphic.) Rome, July 25, 1914.

I SAW the Secretary-General this morning and found that he
knew of the suggestion that France, Italy, Germany and ourselves
should work at Vienna and St. Petersburgh in favour of moderation,
if the relations between Austria and Servia become menacing.

In his opinion Austria will only be restrained by the unconditional
acceptance by the Servian Government of her note. There is reliable
information that Austria intends to seize the Salonica Railway.

From Vienna

British Blue Book No. 20

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.
— {Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 25, 1914.

Language of press this morning leaves the impression that the
surrender of Servia is neither expected nor really desired. It is
officially announced that the Austrian Minister is instructed to leave
Belgrade with staff of legation failing unconditional acceptance of
note at 6 p.m. to-day.

Minister for Foreign Affairs goes to Ischl to-day ^ to communicate
personally to the Emperor Servian reply when it comes.

From Belgrade

British Blue Book No. 21

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward
Grey. — {Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

The Council of Ministers is now drawing up their reply to the
Austrian note. I am informed by the Under-Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs that it will be most conciliatory and will meet the
Austrian demands in as large a measure as is possible.

The following is a brief summary of the projected reply : —
The Servian Government consent to the publication of a declara-
tion in the Official Gazette. The ten points are accepted with reserva-
tions. Servian Government declare themselves ready to agree to
a mixed commission of enquiry so long as the appointment of the

^ Cf . Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 21, and French Yellow Book No. 45 and note,
July 26, 1915.

July 25, British Blue Book No. 24 165

commission can be shown to be in accordance with international
usage. They consent to dismiss and prosecute those officers who can
be clearly proved to be guilty, and they have already arrested the
officer referred to in the Austrian note. They are prepared to sup-
press the Narodna Odbrana.

The Servian Government consider that, unless the Austrian Govern-
ment want war at any cost, they cannot but be content^ with the full
satisfaction offered in the Servian reply.

British Blue Book No. 22

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires, at Belgrade, to Sir
Edward Grey. — (Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914-

I HAVE seen the new French Minister, who has just arrived from
Constantinople, and my Russian colleague, and informed them of
your views.

They have not yet received instructions from their Governments,
and in view of this and of the proposed conciliatory terms of the
Servian reply, I have up to now abstained^ from offering advice to
the Servian Government.

I think it is highly probable that the Russian Government have
already urged the utmost moderation on the Servian Government.

British Blue Book No. 23

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward
Grey. — {Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

The Austrian Minister left at 6.30.

The Government have left for Nish, where the Skuptchina ^ will
meet on Monday. I am leaving with my other colleagues, but the
vice-consul is remaining in charge of the archives.

To Petrograd

British Blue Book No. 24

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Peters-
burgh.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

You spoke quite rightly in very difficult circumstances as to the
attitude of His Majesty's Government. I entirely approve what you

1 For reasons why Austria-Hungary was not content, see Austro-Hungarian Red
Book No. 34, July 27, 1914.

2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 12. July 24.

3 The Serbian Parliament.

166 Official Diplomatic Documents

said as reported in your telegram of yesterday/ and I cannot promise
more on behalf of the Government.

I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to sanc-
tion our going to war over a Servian quarrel.^ If, however, war does
take place, the development of other issues may draw us into it, and
I am therefore anxious to prevent it.

The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian
demarche makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time both
Russia and Austria will have mobilised against each other. In this
event, the only chance of peace, in my opinion, is for the other four
Powers to join in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not
to cross the frontier, and to give time for the four Powers acting at
Vienna and St. Peter sburgh to try and arrange matters. If Germany
will adopt this view, I feel strongly that France and ourselves should
act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly co-operate.

No diplomatic intervention or mediation would be tolerated by
either Russia or Austria unless it was clearly impartial and included
the allies or friends of both. The co-operation of Germany would
therefore, be essential.'

To Berlin
British Blue Book No. 25
Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, British Charge d^ Affaires at Berlin.
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

The Austrian Ambassador has been authorised to inform me that
the Austrian method of procedure on expiry of the time limit would
be to break off diplomatic relations and commence military prepara-
tions, but not military operations. In informing the German Am-
bassador of this, I said that it interposed a stage of mobilisation
before the frontier was actually crossed, which I had urged yesterday
should be delayed.

Apparently we should now soon be face to face with the mobilisa-
tion of Austria and Russia. The only chance of peace, if this did
happen, would be for Germany, France, Russia,^ and ourselves to keep

1 See No. 6, July 24. 1916.

* This disposes of the claim popularly made that one of the reasons why Great
Britain went to war was in part to protect the independence of a little state — Serbia.

3 Germany accepted Sir Edward Grey's view and promised her cooperation in media-
tion between Russia and Austria on this same day, July 25, cf. German White Book,
Exhibit 13. Cf., however, French Yellow Book No, 37, same day, where Germany
is quoted as refusing to interfere between Austria and Serbia.

The Petrograd-Vienna mediation may be called the Sir E. Grey plan, and this
Germany accepted on July 25. The Vienna-Belgrade mediation may be called the
Paul Cambon modification, and this Germany rejected.

* All the editions of the British Blue Book including the important one of Sept. 28,
1914, print here " Russia." In the Collected Diplomatic Documents Sir Edward Grey
inserts a footnote to Russia "Should be Italy." A similar footnote had appeared
in the New York Times edition of August, 1914. The fact that "Russia" continued
to be printed without a footnote, even in the official edition of Sept. 28, which con-
tained a number of corrections, raises the presumption that "Russia" had not only
been written, but also meant. It is true that in British Blue Book No. 17 of the same
date, Russia said that she "would be quite ready to stand aside," but this may also
imply that mention had been made of her as a naember of the "Conference." Cer-
tainty on this point is, however, impossible.

July 25 y British Blue Booh No-. 26 167

together, and to join in asking Austria and Russia not to cross the
frontier till we had had time to try and arrange matters between them.

The German Ambassador read me a telegram from the German
Foreign OflSce saying that his Government had not known before-
hand, and had had no more than other Powers to do with the stiff
terms of the Austrian note to Servia, but once she had launched that
note, Austria could not draw back. Prince Lichnowsky ^ said, how-
ever, that if what I contemplated was mediation between Austria
and Russia, Austria might be able with dignity to accept it.^ He ex-
pressed himself as personally favourable to this suggestion.

I concurred in his observation, and said that I felt I had no title
to intervene between Austria and Servia, but as soon as the question
became one as between Austria and Russia, the peace of Europe was
affected, in which we must all take a hand.^

. I impressed upon the Ambassador that, in the event of Russian and
Austrian mobilisation, the participation of Germany would be essen-
tial to any diplomatic action for peace. Alone we could do nothing.
The French Government were travelling at the moment, and I had
had no time to consult them,^ and could not therefore be sure of their
views, but I was prepared, if the German Government agreed with my
suggestion, to tell the French Government that I thought it the right
thing to act upon it.

To Vienna
British Blue Book No. 26
Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna,
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office^ July 25, 191Jf.

The Russian Ambassador has communicated to me the following
telegram which his Government have sent to the Russian Ambassador
at Vienna, with instructions to communicate it to the Austrian
Minister for Foreign Affairs : —

" The delay given to Servia for a reply is so limited that the Powers
are prevented from taking any steps to avert the complications which
are threatening. The Russian Government trust that the Austrian
Government will prolong the time limit, and as the latter have de-
clared their willingness to inform the Powers of the data on which they
have based their demands on Servia, the Russian Government hope
that these particulars will be furnished in order that the Powers may
examine the matter. If they found that some of the Austrian re-
quests were well founded, they would be in a position to advise the
Servian Government accordingly. If the Austrian Government
were indisposed to prolong the time limit, not only would they be

^ German Ambassador in London.

2 German White Book, Exhibit 13, same day.

3 This phrase is very much stronger in French Yellow Book No. 37, same day,
where Paul Cambon reports what he claims Sir E. Grey told him he had said to the
German Ambassador.

* See, however, the British-French and French-British despatches of July 24, and
July 25, 1914.

168 Official Diplomatic Documents

acting against international ethics, but they would deprive their
communication to the Powers of any practical meaning."

You may support in general terms ^ the step taken by your Russian
colleague.

Since the telegram to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna was sent,
it has been a relief to hear that the steps which the Austrian Govern-
ment were taking were to be limited for the moment to the rupture of
relations and to military preparations, and not operations. I trust,
therefore, that if the Austro-Hungarian Government consider it too
late to prolong the time limit, they will at any rate give time in
the sense and for the reasons desired by Russia before taking any
irretrievable steps.

To PariSy Berlin, and Petrograd

British Blue Book No. 27

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, Sir
H. Rumhold, British Charge d^ Affaires at Berlin, and Sir G.
Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914-

I HAVE communicated to German Ambassador the forecast of the
Servian reply contained in Mr. Crackanthorpe's telegram of to-day.^
I have said that, if Servian reply, when received at Vienna, corre-
sponds to this forecast, I hope the German Government will feel able
to influence the Austrian Government to take a favourable view of it.

To? or Fromf

No. 28

[Nil.]

Sir Edward Grey has never explained this deleted No. 28. The British Blue
Book was not prepared and distributed, as was the German White Book, in a
hurry to supply the necessary background to the speeches delivered in Parliament
on the strength of which the nation went to war. The British Blue Book was dis-
tributed in Parliament several days after England had declared war on Germany.
A careless numbering of the despatches seems out of the question. No. 28 very
likely was a despatch which Sir E. Grey at the last moment decided not to
publish.

To Rome

British Blue Book No. 29

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome.

Sir, Foreign Office, July 25, 19H.

The Italian Ambassador came to see me to-day. I told him in gen-
eral terms what I had said to the German Ambassador this morning.^

1 On this day Sir E. Grey was not yet willing to be known either in Vienna or in
Berlin as making common cause with the other Entente Powers.

2 See No. 21, same day.

» Cf . British Blue Book No. 27, same day.

July 25, Bxitish Blue Book No. 30 169

The Italian Ambassador cordially approved of this. He made
no secret of the fact that Italy was most desirous to see war avoided.

I am, etc.

E. Grey.

To Belgrade
British Blue Book No. 30

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charg^ d' Affaires at
Belgrade.

Sir, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914-

The Servian Minister called on the 23rd ^ instant and spoke to Sir
A. Nicolson ^ on the present strained relations between Servia and
Austria-Hungary.

He said that his Government were most anxious and disquieted.
They were perfectly ready to meet any reasonable demands of Austria-
Hungary so long as such demands were kept on the "terrain
juridique." If the results of the enquiry at Serajevo — an enquiry
conducted with so much mystery and secrecy — disclosed the fact that
there were any individuals conspiring or organising plots on Servian
territory, the Servian Government w ould be quite ready to take the
necessary steps to give satisfaction; but if Austria transported the
question on to the political ground, and said that Servian policy,
being inconvenient to her, must undergo a radical change, and that
Servia must abandon certain political ideals,^ no independent State
would, or could, submit to such dictation.

He mentioned that both the assassins of the Archduke were
Austrian subjects — Bosniaks ; ^ that one of them had been in Servia,
and that the Servian authorities, considering him suspect and dan-
gerous, had desired to expel him, but on applying to the Austrian
authorities found that the latter protected him, and said that he
was an innocent and harmless individual.

Sir A. Nicolson, on being asked by M. Boschkovitch ^ his opinion
on the whole question, observed that there were no data on which to
base one, though it was to be hoped that the Servian Government
would endeavour to meet the Austrian demands in a conciliatory and
moderate spirit. I am, etc.

E. Grey.

1 It seems strange that this interview of the 23d should not have been mentioned
to the British representative in Belgrade until two days later, the twenty-fifth, es-
pecially since the instructions given to the representative in Belgrade in No. 12, July 24,
seem to be based on the information given in the interview of the 23d. The inter-
view, moreover, appears to have taken place before the presentation of the Austro-
Hungarian note. While in a continuous story of events this note does not belong
here, the reader will have no difficulty in seeing why it has nevertheless been introduced
in this place.

2 British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

3 These certain political ideals were those of a Greater Serbia which could not be
realized except at the cost of a dismembered Austria-Hungary.

* Bosniaks is the term by which Austria-Hungary called the Serbians in Bosnia
before the murder of Serajevo, while Serbia called them Serbians. After the murder,
the Serbians used the term Bosniaks to indicate that Serbia was innocent, and Austria-
Hungary used the term Serbians to show that Serbia was guilty.

^ Serbian Minister in London.

170 Official Diplomatic Documents

Russia :

Announcement by the Russian Government

Russian Orange Book No. 10

St. Petersburg, July 12 {25), 1914.
Recent events and the despatch of an ultimatum to Servia by
Austria-Hungary are causing the Russian Government the greatest
anxiety. The Government are closely following the course of the
dispute between the two countries, to which Russia cannot remain
indifferent.

From Vienna

Russian Orange Book No. 11

Russian Charge d' Affaires at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 12 {25) 1914.

Count Berchtold is at Ischl.^ In view of the impossibility of
arriving there in time, I have telegraphed to him our proposal to ex-
tend the time limit of the ultimatum, and I have repeated this
proposal verbally to Baron Macchio. The latter promised to com-
municate it in time to the Minister for Foreign Affairs but added
that he had no hesitation in predicting a categorical refusal.

Russian Orange Book No. 12

Russian Charge d' Affaires at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 12 {25), 1914.

In continuation of my telegram of to-day I have just heard ^ from
Macchio that the Austro-Hungarian Government refuse our proposal
to extend the time limit of the note.

From Belgrade

Russian Orange Book No. 13

Russian Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade to Russia Minister for Foreign

^ff^^^^' Belgrade, July 12 {25), 1914.

(Delayed in transmission, received July 14 (27), 1914).
(Telegram.)

Following is the reply which the President of the Servian Cabinet
to-day handed to the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade before
the expiration of the time limit of the ultimatum.

[Here follows the text of the Serbian reply, for which see Austro-Hungarian
Red Book No. 25, July 25, and No. 34, July 27, 1914.]

1 He went there during the forenoon of July 25. Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book
No. 21, and British Blue Book No. 20, July 25, 1914, and French Yellow Book No. 45,
same day.

' Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 20, and for reasons for the refusal No. 21,
July 25, 1914.

July 25, Russian Orange Book No. 16 171

From Berlin

Russian Orange Book No. 14

Russian Charge d' Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

(Telegram.) Berlin, July 12 {25), 1914.

I HAVE received your telegrams of .the llth (24th) ^ July and have
communicated its contents to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He
tells me that the British Government have likewise urged him to
advise ^ Vienna to extend the time limit of the ultimatum. He has
informed Vienna telegraphically of this step, and he will do the same
as regards Russia's action, but he fears that in the absence of Berch-
told, who has left for Ischl, and in view of the lack of time, his tele-
grams may have no result. Moreover, he has doubts as to the wis-
dom of Austria yielding at the last moment, and he is inclined to
think that such a step on her part might increase the assurance of
Servia. I replied that a great Power such as Austria could give way
without impairing her prestige, and I adduced every other similar
argument, but failed, nevertheless, to obtain any more definite
promise. Even when I gave him to understand that action must be
taken at Vienna if the possibility of terrible consequences was to be
avoided, the Minister for Foreign Affairs answered each time in the
negative.

From Paris

Russian Orange Book No. 15

Russian Charge d' Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

(Telegram.) Paris, July 12 {25), 1914.

I HAVE received your telegram of the llth (24th) ^ July respecting
the extension of the time limit of the Austrian ultimatum, and I have
made the communication in accordance with your instructions. The
French Representative ^ at Vienna has been furnished with similar
instructions.

From London
Russian Orange Book No. 16
Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
(Telegram.) London, July 12 {25), 1914.

I HAVE received your telegram of the llth July.^ Grey has in-
structed ^ the British Ambassador at Vienna to support our action

1 Russian Orange Book Nos. 4 and 5, July 24, 1914.

2 British Blue Book No. 26, July 25, 1914 ; cf. also French Yellow Book Nos. 41,
42, 43, July 25, 1914.

3 Russian Orange Book Nos. 4 and 5, July 24, 1914.

* Cf. French Yellow Book Nos. 39 and 48, July 25, 1914.

6 Russian Calendar, which is July 24 of our calendar ; Russian Orange Book Nos,

6 British Blue Book No. 26, July 25, 1914.

172 Official Diplomatic Documents

for the extension of the time limit of the ultimatum. At the same
time he explained to me that the Austrian Ambassador had come
to see him/ and had explained that the Austrian note should not be
regarded as an ultimatum. It should be regarded as a step, which,
in the event of no reply, or in the event of an unsatisfactory reply
within the time fixed, would be followed by a rupture of diplomatic
relations and the immediate departure of the Austro-Hungarian
Mmister from Belgrade ; without, however, entailing the immediate
opening of hostilities. Grey added that as a result of this explana-
tion he had told the British Ambassador at Vienna that, should it be
too late to raise the question of extending the time limit of the ulti-
matum, the question of preventing hostilities might perhaps serve
as a basis for discussion.^

To London
Russian Orange Book No. 17

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at
London.

(Telegram.) St. Petersburg, July 12 {25), 1914.

In the event of any change for the worse in the situation which
might lead to joint action by the Great Powers, we count upon it that
England will at once side definitely with Russia and France, in order
to maintain the European balance of power ,^ for which she has con-
stantly intervened in the past, and which would certainly be com-
promised in the event of the triumph of Austria.

From the German Ambassador
Russian Orange Book No. 18'*

Note verbale handed to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs by the
German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, July 12 {25), 1914-

(Translation.)

Il nous revient de source We learn from an authorita-

autoritative que la nouvelle tive source that the news spread

repandue par quelques journaux by certain newspapers, to the

d'apres laquelle la demarche du effect that the action of the

Gouvernement d'Autriche-Hon- Austro-Hungarian Government

grie a Belgrade aurait ete faite a at Belgrade was instigated by

rinstigation de TAllemagne est Germany, is absolutely false.

1 British Blue Book No. 14, July 25, 1914.

' Contrast the information here directly transmitted to the Russian Minister for
Foreign Affairs with the latter's reply to the British Ambassador in Petrograd, British
Blue Book No. 17, July 25, 1914.

» Cf. British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, 1914, and note 4.

* This is only a supplementary declaration to German White Book, Exhibit No. 1,
which is the important German declaration, presented in Paris, London and Petrograd.
It is printed in British Blue Book No. 9, French Yellow Book No. 28, July 24, but is
omitted in the Russian Orange Book.

July 25, Russian Orange Book No. 19 173

absolumentfausse. LeGouverne- The German Government had

ment allemand n'a pas eu con- no knowledge of the text of the

naissance du texte de la note Austrian note before it was pre-

autrichienne avant qu'elle ait sented, and exercised no influence

ete remise, et n'a exerce aucune upon its contents. A threaten-

influence sur son contenu. C'est ing attitude is wrongly attributed

a tort qu'on attribue a I'Alle- to Germany,
magne une attitude commina-
toire.

L'Allemagne appuie naturelle- Germany, as the ally of

ment comme allie de I'Autriche Austria, naturally supports the

les revendications a son avis claims made by the Vienna

legitimes du Cabinet de Vienne Cabinet against Servia, which

contre la Serbie. she considers justified.

Avant tout elle desire, comme Above all Germany wishes, as

elle I'a deja declare des le com- she has already declared from

mencement du differend austro- the very beginning of the Austro-

serbe, que ce conflit reste loca- Servian dispute, that this conflict

lise. should be localised.

From Paris

Russian Orange Book No. 19

Russian Charge d' A f aires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign
A fairs.

(Telegram.) Paris, July 12 {25), 1914.

Please refer to my telegram ^ of the Uth (24th) July.

A morning paper has to-day published, in a not altogether correct
form,^ the declarations made yesterday by the German Ambassador,
and has added comments in which it characterises these utterances
as being in the nature of threats. The German Ambassador, who is
much upset by these disclosures, to-day visited the Acting Head of
the Political Department, and explained to him that his words in
no wise bore the threatening character attributed to them. He
stated that Austria had presented her note to Servia without any
deflnite understanding with Berlin, but that Germany nevertheless
approved of the Austrian point of view, and that undoubtedly " the
bolt once flred" (these were his own words), Germany could only
be guided by her duties as an ally.

1 Russian Orange Book No. 8, July 24, 1914.
* Cf. French Yellow Book No. 36, July 25, 1914.

174 Official Diplomatic Documents

From London

Russian Orange Book No. 20

Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs,

(Telegram.) London, July 12 {25), 1914.

Grey has told me that the German Ambassador has declared to him
that the German Government were not informed of the text of the
Austrian note, but that they entirely supported Austria's action.^
The Ambassador at the same time asked if Great Britain could see
her way to bring conciliatory pressure to bear at St. Petersburg.
Grey replied that this was quite impossible. He added that, as long
as complications existed between Austria and Servia alone, British
interests were only indirectly affected ; but he had to look ahead to
the fact that Austrian mobilisation would lead to Russian mobilisa-
tion, and that from that moment a situation would exist in which the
interests of all the Powers would be involved. In that event Great
Britain reserved to herself full liberty of action.^

From Belgrade

Russian Orange Book No. 21

Russian Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade to Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

(Telegram.) Belgrade, Jidy 12 (25), 1914.

In spite of the extremely conciliatory nature of the Servian reply
to the ultimatum, the Austrian Minister has just informed the
Servian Government, in a note handed in at 6.30 p.m. this evening,
that, not having received a satisfactory^ answer within the time
limit fixed, he was leaving Belgrade with the entire staff of the lega-
tion. The Skupshtina is convoked for the 14th (27th) July at Nish.
The Servian Government and the Diplomatic Body are leaving this
evening for that town.

From London

Russian Orange Book No. 22

Russian Ambassador at London to the Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

(Telegram.) London, July 12 {25), 1914.

Grey has told the German Ambassador that in his opinion Austrian
mobilisation must lead to Russian mobilisation, that grave danger of a

1 See German White Book, Exhibit No. 1, July 23, British Blue Book No. 9,
July 24, omitted in the Orange Book. See note to Russian Orange Book No. 18,
July 25, 1914.

2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 25, French Yellow Book No. 37, July 25, 1914. •
' For the reasons of Austria-Hungary why the Serbian note did not satisfy her, see

Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914.

July 25, Serbian Blue Book No. 39 175

general war will thereupon arise, and that he sees only one means of
reaching a peaceful settlement, namely, that, in view of the Austrian
and Russian mobilisations, Germany, France, Italy, and Great
Britain should abstain from immediate mobilisation, and should at
once offer their good offices. Grey told me that the first essential
of this plan was the consent of Germany and her promise not to
mobihse. 'He has therefore, as a first step, made an enquiry on this
point at Berlin.^

Serbia :

To All Serbian Legations Abroad

Serbian Blue Book No. 38

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
all the Serbian Legations abroad.

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 12/25, 1914.

A BRIEF summary of the reply of the Royal Government was com-
municated to the representatives of the allied Governments ^ at the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs to-day.^ They were informed that the
reply would be quite conciliatory on all points, and that the Serbian
Government would accept the Austro-Hungarian demands as far
as possible. The Serbian Government trust that the Austro-Hun-
garian Government, unless they are determined to make war at all
costs, will see their way to accept the full satisfaction offered in
the Serbian reply.

The Serbian Reply to Austria-Hungary

Serbian Blue Book No. 39

Reply of Serbian Government to the Austro-Hungarian Note. — Belgrade,
Jidy 12/25, 1914.

[For the text see Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. 25, July 25, and No. 34,
July 27, 1914.]

. 1 No detailed references to the mobilization of Germany, France, Italy and Great
Britain are contained in any despatches published in the British Blue Book.

2 This expression is noteworthy, referring no doubt to France, Russia and Eng-
land, who are here spoken of either as allied to each other or even allied to Serbia.
See also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 58, August 4. where Count Mensdorf quotes
Sir E. Grey as referring to Great Britain as the ally of France. Cf . also French Yellow
Book No. 158, August 4. Since no mention is made of a summary being given to the
representatives of the other Powers, "the representatives of the allied Governments"
were possibly invited as representing a unit to the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs".
This is, however, not mentioned in French Yellow Book No. 46, July 25, 1914, where the
French Minister simply reports "M. Pashitch has just acquainted me, etc."

3 For the delay with which even this summary reached the Powers see French Yellow
Book No. 56, July 26, and Russian Orange Book No. 36, July 27.

176 Official Diplomatic Documents

From the Austro-Hungarian Minister
Serbian Blue Book No. 40 ^

Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade,
to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

Sir, Belgrade, July 12/25, 1914.

As the time limit stipulated in the note, which, by order of my
Government, I handed to His Excellency M. Patchou, on Thursday,
the day before yesterday, at 6 p.m., has now expired, and as I have
received no satisfactory reply, I have the honour to inform Your
Excellency that I am leaving Belgrade to-night together with the staff
of the Imperial and Royal Legation.

The protection of the Imperial and Royal Legation, together with
all its appurtenances, annexes, and archives, as well as the care of
the subjects and interests of Austria-Hungary in Serbia, is entrusted
to the Imperial German Legation.

Finally, I desire to state formally that from the moment this
letter reaches Your Excellency the rupture in the diplomatic relations
between Serbia and Austria-Hungary will have the character of a
fait accompli.

I have, etc.

To All Serbian Legations Abroad
Serbian Blue Book No. 41 ^

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
all the Serbian Legations abroad.

Belgrade, July 12/25, 1914.

I COMMUNICATED the reply to the Austro-Hungarian note to-day
at 5.45 P.M. You will receive the full text of the reply to-night.
From it you will see that we have gone as far as was possible. When
I handed the note to the Austro-Hungarian Minister he stated that he
would have to compare it with his instructions, and that he would then
give an immediate answer. As soon as I returned to the Ministry, I
was informed in a note from the Austro-Hungarian Minister that he
was not satisfied with our reply, and that he was leaving Belgrade the
same evening, with the entire staff of the Legation. The protection of
the Legation and its archives, and the care of Austrian and Hungarian
interests had been entrusted by him to the German Legation. He
stated finally that on receipt of the note diplomatic relations between
Serbia and Austria-Hungary must be considered as definitely broken
off.

^ This note should more properly follow No. 41.

' Parts of this note, from a chronological point of view, should have been printed
before No. 40.

July 25, Serbian Blue Book No. 42 111

The Royal Serbian Government have summoned the Skupshtina
to meet on July 14/27 at Nish, whither all the Ministries with their
staffs are proceeding this evening. The Crown Prince has issued, in
the name of the King, an order for the mobilisation of the army,
while to-morrow or the day after a proclamation will be made in which
it will be announced that civilians who are not' liable to military service
should remain peaceably at home, while soldiers should proceed to
their appointed posts and defend the country to the best of their
ability, in the event of Serbia being attacked.

From the Au^tro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs
Serbian Blue Book No. 42

Count Leopold Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna.

Sir, Vienna, July 12/2S, 1914.

As no satisfactory reply^ has been given to the note which the Im-
perial and Royal Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary handed
to the Royal Government on the 10/23 instant, I have been compelled
to instruct Baron Giesl to leave the Serbian capital and to entrust
the protection of the subjects of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic
Majesty to the German Legation.

I regret that the relations which I have had the honour to maintain
with you, M. le Ministre, are thus terminated, and I avail myself of
this opportunity to place at your disposal the enclosed passports for
your return to Serbia, as well as for the return of the staff of the Royal
Legation.

I have, etc.

1 For Austria-Hungary's reasons why the reply was not satisfactory see Austro-
Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914.

178

Official Diplomatic Documents

Sunday, July 26, 1914
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

Foreign Office of

Sent Despatches to

Received
Despatches from

Austria-Hungary

London, Berlin, Rome,
London, Paris, Petrograd

Petrograd

Belgium

Austro-Hungarian
Minister

France

London, London, etc.

Rome, Petrograd, Vienna,

Note for Minister

Christiania, Luxemburg

Germany

London, Paris, Petrograd

Petrograd

Great Britain

Paris, Berlin, Rome,
Paris

Vienna, Berlin, Rome

Russia
Serbia

Rome, Vienna, Berlin

Prague, Paris, Berlin

The full Serbian reply and the reasons why it had not satisfied Austria-Hungary
remained unknown to the Powers throughout the whole of Sunday, July 26. A
summary of the Serbian reply reached Paris and also Petrograd with a delay of
twenty hours, and there is no indication in the published despatches that it reached
the other Foreign Offices sooner.

In the absence of accurate information two versions gained currency. First
that Serbia's seeming concessions were a sham, and that she knew them to be so
or she would not have ordered the mobilization of her troops three hours before
she sent her reply to Austria-Hungary. Secondly, that she had yielded in every-
thing except a few minor points.

Austria-Hungary continues her endeavors to prove to the Powers that she had
been forced to act harshly with Serbia, but that she did not contemplate any
territorial aggrandisement at the expense of Serbia. She orders the mobilization
of some of her troops.

Germany is greatly concerned about the military preparations going on espe-
cially in Russia and warns the Powers of the danger that lies in mobilisation. She
endeavors to gain the confidence of France, and France's willingness to intercede
in Russia.

Great Britain continues her efforts to bring about a Conference of four Powers ;
at first, as on the previous days, with a view to mediation between Petrograd and
Vienna ; afterwards — and probably owing to French opposition to her original
plan — with the view of discovering **an issue which would prevent complica-
tions."

Russia holds a "long and friendly conversation," as Sazonof describes it, with
Austria-Hungary, and suggests the settlement of the Serbian difficulty by means
of direct conversations between Petrograd and Vienna. Another suggestion that
Serbia should appeal for British intervention is not pressed.

Russian mobilization continues.

France reverts to her plan that Germany should exert pressure on Austria-
Hungary amounting to mediation between her and Serbia. She claims to be
convinced of Russia's moderation and pacific intentions, but does not publish the
accounts of Russian mobilisation which must have reached her as well as Ger-
many. Germany's request that she let it be known that France and Germany are
jointly working for peace, she rejects as emphatically as Germany's other request
that she should urge moderation in Petrograd.

Italy is urged by the Entente Powers to dissociate her interests from those of
Germany and Austria-Hungary, and is informed by Russia of the latter's definite
determination to come to the assistance of Serbia.

Serbia is silent on this day, and Belgium practically so.

July 26, AustrO'Hungarian Red Book No. 28 179

Austria-Hungary :

From Petrograd

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 28

Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 26, 1914,

As the result of reports about measures taken for mobilisation of
Russian troops, Count Pourtales has called the Russian Minister's
attention in the most serious manner to the fact that nowadays
measures of mobilisation ^ would be a highly dangerous form of diplo-
matic pressure. For, in that event, the purely military consideration
of the question by the general staffs would find expression, and if that
button were once touched in Germany, the situation would get out
of control.

M. Sazonof assured the German Ambassador on his word of honour
that the reports on the subject were incorrect ; that up to that time
not a single horse and not a single reservist had been called up, and
that all the measures that were being taken were merely measures
of preparation in the military districts of Kieff, Odessa, and perhaps
Kasan and Moscow.

Immediately afterwards the Imperial German Military Attache
received by courier late in the evening an invitation from Suchomlinof ,
the Minister for War, who explained that Count Pourtales had spoken
with the Foreign Minister about the Russian military preparations,
and as the Ambassador might have misunderstood certain military
details, he was taking the opportunity of giving him more detailed
information. In the following telegram ^ from Count Pourtales to
Berlin which has been placed at my disposal, the pertinent communi-
cations from Major von Eggeling are collected :

" The Military Attache reports with regard to a conversation with
the Russian Minister of War : M. Sazonof had asked him to make
the military position clear to me. The Minister for War gave me his
word of honour that as yet no orders for mobilisation of any kind had
been issued. For the present merely preparatory measures would be
taken, not a horse would be taken, not a reservist called up. If
Austria crossed the Servian frontier, the military districts of Kieff,
Odessa, Moscow and Kasan, which face Austria, would be mobilised.
In no circumstances will mobilisation take place on the German
front, Warsaw, Vilna and St. Petersburgh. Peace with Germany is
earnestly desired. My question what was the object of the mobilisa-
tion against Austria, was met with a shrug of the shoulders and a

^ For the aggressive meaning of mobilisation according to International Law see
Elihu Root, President of the American Society of International Law, in the American
Journal of International Law, July, 1914 : "It is well understood that the exercise of
the right of self-protection may and frequently does extend in its effect beyond the
limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the state exercising it. The strongest example
probably would be the mobilisation of an army by another Power immediately across
the frontier. Every act done by the other Power may be within its own territory, yet
the country threatened by the state of facts is justified in protecting itself by immediate war."

2 Not published in German White Book.

180 Official Diplomatic Documents

reference to the diplomatists. I gave the Minister for War to under-
stand that his friendly intentions would be appreciated by us, but
that we should also consider mobilisation against Austria to be in
itself extremely threatening. The Minister emphasised repeatedly
and with great stress Russia's urgent need of and earnest wish for
peace."

To London

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 29

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 26, 1914.

Herr von Tschirschky informed me to-day in pursuance of his
instructions that, according to a telegram ^ from Prince Lichnowsky
which had been despatched in London on the 25th of July at 3 p.m.,
Sir E. Grey had transmitted to the latter the sketch of an answer from
Servia, and had remarked in the private letter accompanying it, that
he hoped that the Berlin Cabinet in view of the conciliatory tenor
of this answer would support its acceptance in Vienna.

I consider it desirable that your Excellency should again approach
the matter with the Secretary of State, and call his attention to the
fact that almost simultaneously with the transmission by him of this
letter to Prince Lichnowsky, namely at 3 p.m. yesterday, Servia had
already ordered the general mobilisation ^ of her army, which proves
that no inclination for a peaceful solution existed in Belgrade. It
was not till six o'clock, after mobilisation had been proclaimed, that
the answer, which had apparently been previously telegraphed to
London and the contents of which were not reconcilable with our
demands, was delivered to the Imperial and Royal Minister at Bel-
grade.

To Berlin, Rome, London, Paris, and Petrograd

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 30

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at Berlin,
Rome, London, Paris, and St. Petershurgh.

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 26, 1914.

We have broken off diplomatic relations with Servia after she had
refused ^ the demands we had addressed to her. I beg your Excel-
lency now to proceed at once to the Foreign Minister or his deputy,
and to express yourself to him approximately to the following effect : —

The Royal Servian Government have refused to accept the de-
mands which we were forced to address to them in order to secure

1 Not published in German White Book.

* See Belgian Gray Book No. 5, July 26, 1914, and British Blue Book No. 32, same
day.

' For the reasons why Austria-Hungary deemed the Serbian note unsatisfactory
886 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914.

July 26, French Yellow Book No. 50 181

permanently our most vital interests which were menaced by them,
and have thereby made it clear that they do not intend to abandon
their subversive aims, tending towards continuous disorder in some of
our frontier provinces and their final disruption from the Monarchy.
Reluctantly, therefore, and very much against our wish, we find
ourselves obliged to compel Servia by the sharpest measures to make
a fundamental change in the attitude of enmity she has up to now
pursued.

See also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 31, July 27, 1914, which describes an
interview between Sazonof and the Austrian Ambassador on July 26, 1914.

Belgium :

From Austro-Hungarian Legation

Belgian Gray Book No. 5

Communications made on July 26, 1914, by the Austro-Hungarian
Legation at Brussels to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

M. Pashitch gave the reply of the Servian Government to the
Austro-Hungarian note before 6 o'clock yesterday. This reply not
having been considered satisfactory, diplomatic relations have been
broken off and the Minister and staff of the Austrian Legation have
left Belgrade. Servian mobilisation had already been ordered before
3 o'clock.^

France :

To Viviani, London, etc.

French Yellow Book No. 50

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Presi-
dent of the Council (on board the ''La France,'') and to the French
Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.

Paris, July 26, 1914.

The events of Saturday can be summed up as follows : — refusal
of Austria to grant the extension of the time limit asked for by
Russia, — departure of the Austrian Minister from Belgrade after
receiving a reply from Servia which was considered insufficient
although it reached the limit of any possible concession ^ — order for
mobilisation given in Servia whose Government retired to Kragou-
jewatz,^ where it was followed by the French and Russian Ministers.

The Italian Government, to whom the Austrian note had been
communicated on Friday, without any request for support or even

^ Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 29, also British Blue Book No. 32, same
day.

2 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 49, printed under July 25, 1914, stating that Serbia
did not present her reply to France till the next day, July 27. Cf. also French Yellow
Book No. 56, July 26, which states that even the summary was 20 hours late in
reaching the Foreign Office. Cf. also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 29, July 26,
1914, and Russian Orange Book No. 36, July 27. See also, Serbian Blue Book No. 38,
July 25, Note 2.

3 Nish, according to Russian Orange Book No. 21, July 25, 1914.

182 Official Diplomatic Documents

advice, could not, in the absence of the Marquis di San Giuliano,
who does not return till Tuesday, make any reply to the suggestion
of the Russian Government proposing to press at Vienna for an ex-
tension of time. It appears from a confidential communication by
the Italian Ambassador to M. Paleologue that at Vienna people still
soothe themselves with the illusion that Russia "will not hold firm."
It must not be forgotten that Italy is only bound by the engage-
ments of the Triple Alliance if she has been consulted beforehand.

From St. Petersburgh we learn that M. Sazonof has advised Servia
to ask for British mediation.^ At the Council of Ministers ^ on the
25th, which was held in presence of the Emperor, the mobilisation
of thirteen army corps intended eventually to operate against Austria
was considered ; this mobilisation, however, would only be made
effective if Austria were to bring armed pressure to bear upon Servia,
and not till after notice had been given by the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, upon whom falls the duty of fixing the day, liberty being
left to him to go on with negotiations even if Belgrade should be
occupied. Russian opinion makes clear that it is both politically
and morally impossible for Russia to allow Servia to be crushed.

In London the German demarche^ was made on the 25th in the
same terms as those used by Baron von Schoen at Paris. Sir Edward
Grey has replied to Prince Lichnowsky that if the war were to break
out no Power in Europe could take up a detached attitude. He did
not express himself more definitely and used very reserved language
to the Servian Minister. The communication made on the evening ^
of the 25th by the Austrian Ambassador makes Sir Edward Grey
more optimistic; since the diplomatic rupture does not necessarily
involve immediate military operations, the Secretary of State is still
willing to hope that the Powers will have time to intervene.

At Berlin ^ the language used by the Secretary of State to the
Russian Charge d'Affaires is unsatisfactory and dilatory ; when the
latter asked him to associate himself with a demarche at Vienna for
an extension of the time limit, he replied that he had already taken
action in this sense but that it was too late; to the request for an
extension of the time limit before active measures were taken, he
replied that this had to do with a domestic matter, and not with a
war but with local operations. • Herr von Jagow pretends not to
believe that the Austrian action could lead to general consequences.

A real explosion of chauvinism ^ has taken place at Berlin. The

1 This is a new suggestion. Cf. French Yellow Book No. 46, July 25, where an
appeal to the European Powers is contemplated. It reached Paris, moreover, not on
the 25th, as this despatch implies, but on the 26th ; see below No. 53, French Yellow
Book.

2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, 1914.

3 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 36, July 25, 1914, and note.

* Cf. British Blue Book No. 14, July 25, and its place among the despatches of
that date, which makes it more likely that the communication was made eariy in the
morning. It was, moreover, the subject of much diplomatic correspondence throughout
the day.

' For the events described in this paragraph see British Blue Book No. 18, and
French Yellow Book No. 37, of July 25, 1914. '

« Cf. French Yellow Book No. 47, July 25, 1914. The rest of the information con-
tained in this paragraph is not written in M. Jules Cambon's published despatch.

July 26, French Yellow Book No. 51 183

German Emperor returns direct to Kiel. M. Jules Cambon thinks
that, at the first military steps taken by Russia, Germany would
immediately reply, and probably would not wait for a pretext before
attacking us.

At Vienna, the French Ambassador has not had time ^ to join in
the demarche of his Russian colleague for obtaining an extension of
the time limit fixed for Servia ; he does not regret it, this demarche
having been categorically rejected, and England not having had
time to give instructions to her representative about it.

A note from the British Embassy ^ has been delivered to me : it
gives an account of the conversation between the British Ambassa-
dor at St. Petersburgh and M. Sazonof and M. Paleologue. Sir
Edward Grey thinks that the four Powers who are not directly in-
terested ought to press both on Russia and Austria that their armies
should not cross the frontier, and that they should give time to Eng-
land, France, Germany and Italy to bring their mediation into play.
If Germany accepts, the British Government has reason to think
that Italy also would be glad to be associated in the joint action of
England and France; the adherence of Germany is essential, for
neither Austria nor Russia would tolerate any intervention except
that of impartial friends or allies.

Bienyenu-Martin.

From Rome

French Yellow Book No. 51

M. Barrere, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, July 26,. 1914.

A TELEGRAM from Vienna which has just been received at the Con-
sulta informs them that the diplomatic rupture between Austria and
Servia has taken place, and that Austria is proceeding to military
measures.

The Marquis di San Giuliano, who is at Fiuggi, will not return to
Rome till the day after to-morrow.

To-day I had an interesting conversation with the President of
the Council on the situation, the full gravity of which he recognises.
From the general drift of his remarks, I have carried away the im-
pression that the Italian Government would be willing, in case of
war, to keep out of it and to maintain an attitude of observation.^

M. Salandra said to me on this subject: "We shall make the
greatest efforts to prevent peace being broken ; our situation is some-
what analogous to that of England. Perhaps we could do some-
thing in a pacific sense together with the English.'' M. Salandra

1 For the error of this statement see the despatches dealing with this subject on
July 25, 1914, and the notes.

2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 24, July 25, 1914. .

3 It was obviously in the interest of the Entente Powers, m case of a European
war, to secure the separation of Italy from Austria-Hungary and Germany.

184 Official Diplomatic Documents

stated definitely to me that the Austrian note had been communi-
cated to Rome at the last moment. t^

Barrere.

French Yellow Book No. 52 ^

M. Barrere y French Ambassador at Rome, to M, Bienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Rome, July 26, 1914.

M. Sazonof yesterday told the Italian Ambassador at St. Peters-
burgh that Russia would employ all diplomatic means to avoid a
conflict, and that she did not give up hope that mediation might lead
Austria to a less uncompromising attitude; but that Russia could
not be asked to allow Servia to be crushed.

I observe that the greater part of Italian public opinion is hostile

to Austria in this serious business. r,

Barrere.

To London

French Yellow Book No. 53

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. de
Fleuriau, Charge d' Affaires at London.

Paris, July 26, 1914.

M. Paleologue sends me the following telegram : —

" M. Sazonof advises the Servian Government to ask for the media-
tion of the British Government." ^

In concurrence with M. Paul Cambon,^ I think that the French
Government can only say that they hope to see the British Govern-
ment accept, if an offer of this kind is made to them.

Be good enough to express yourself in this sense at the Foreign

Bienvenu-Martin.

From Petrograd

French Yellow Book No. 54

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburgh, July 26, 1914.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs continues with praiseworthy per-
severance to seek means to bring about a peaceful solution. "Up

1 This despatch refers to the interview, described in British Blue Book No, 17, July 25,
1914, between the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the British and French
Ambassadors. The direct report of this interview by the French Ambassador has
not been printed in the French Yellow Book. No valid reason appears why such a
roundabout mention of this interview in Petrograd should receive preference in the
official publication of the despatches.

* See French Yellow Book No. 50, July 26, and note 3 ; contrast British Blue Book
No. 44, July 27.

» No despatch from Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador in London, to this
effect has been published in the French Yellow Book.

July 26y French Yellow Book No, 55 185

to the last moment," he declared to me, "I shall show myself ready
to negotiate." ^

It is in this spirit that he has just sent for Count Szapary to come
to a "frank and loyal explanation." M. Sazonof commented in his
presence on the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, article by article,
making clear the insulting character ^ of the principal clauses. "The
intention which inspired this document," he said, "is legitimate if
you pursued no aim other than the protection of your territory
against the intrigues of Servian anarchists; but the procedure to
which you have had recourse is not defensible." He concluded:
"Take back your ultimatum, modify its form, and I will guarantee
you the result."

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador showed himself moved by this
language; however, while awaiting instructions, he reserves the
opinion of his Government. Without being discouraged M. Sazonof
has decided to propose ^ this evening to Count Berchtold the opening
of direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburgh on the
changes to be introduced into the ultimatum.

This friendly and semi-official interposition of Russia between
Austria and Servia has the advantage of being expeditious. I there-
fore believe it to be preferable to any other procedure and likely to

succeed. ^ .

Paleologue.

From Vienna

French Yellow Book No. 55

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 26, 1914.

M. ScHEBEKO has returned hastily from a journey to Russia ; he
had only undertaken it after he had received an assurance from
Count Berchtold that the demands on Servia would be thoroughly
acceptable.^

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh spoke in
the same sense to M. Sazonof the evening before the delivery of the
note. This procedure, which is quite usual ^ in the diplomacy of the

1 Cf . French Yellow Book No. 38, July 25, and contrast with British Blue Book No.
17, same day.

2 In the Russian Orange Book No. 25, same day this interview is called "long and
friendly." Cf. German White Book, Exhibit 5, same day, and note; also British
Blue Book No. 44, July 27.

3 There is no published despatch showing that he did this. On the contrary in
French Yellow Book No. 53, July 26, Sazonof makes an entirely different suggestion.
He did, however, revert to the plan proposed here later (see British Blue Book No. 78,
July 29) and thereby blocked the plan of a Conference of Ministers in Belgrade.

* The reader must decide for himself whether Count Berchtold was honest in his
belief or^not. From French Yellow Book No. 15, July 21, New York Times translation,
it seems that Serbia was willing to accept the demands of Austria-Hungary, if they
did not include judicial participation. This demand was dropped in favor of participa-
tion in the investigation. See also British Blue Book No. 57, July 27, printed under
date of July 28.

^ A subjective judgment of this kind while indicative of the existing suspicion on
the part of the French Government cannot, of course, claim to be in the nature of
proving the case.

186 Offijcial Diplomatic Documents

Monarchy, and which Baron Macchio has also employed towards
me, seems to have greatly added to the irritation of the Russian
Government.

M. Schebeko will make an effort, however, to profit by the delay
which is indispensable for mobilisation, in order to make a proposal
for an arrangement, which will at least have the advantage of allow-
ing us to measure the value of the pacific declarations of Germany.

While we were talking over the situation this evening, in company
w^ith Sir M. de Bunsen,^ the latter received instructions ^ from the
Foreign Office with reference to the demarche to be attempted by the
representatives of the four Powers less directly interested. I am
expecting, therefore, that we may have to consult to-morrow with
the Duke d'Avarna and with M. Tschirscky, who, in order to refuse
his concurrence, will almost certainly entrench himself behind the
principle of localising the conflict.^

My impression is that the Austro-Hungarian Government, although
surprised and perhaps regretting the vigour with which they have
been inspired, will believe themselves obliged to commence military
action. t-v

DUMAINE.

To Vimaniy London, Petrograd, Berlin, Vienna, Rome

French Yellow Book No. 56

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting MiniMer for Foreign Affairs, to the Presi-
dent of the Council {on board the "La France,'') and to the French
Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome.

Paris, July 26, 1914.

The summary of the Servian reply to the Austrian note only
reached us after twenty hours delay ."^ Although the Servian Gov-
ernment had given way on all points, with the exception of two small
reservations,^ the Austro-Hungarian Minister has broken off rela-
tions, thus proving the determined wish of his Government to pro-
ceed to execution on Servia.

According to a telegram from M. Jules Cambon, the British Am-
bassador thinks that there is a slight yielding ; when he observed to
Herr von Jagow that Sir Edward Grey did not ask him to intervene
between Austria and Servia, but, as this question ceased to be local-
ised, to intervene with England, France and Italy at Vienna and St.
Petersburgh, the Secretary of State declared that he would do his
best to maintain peace.®

1 The close union of the three Entente Powers is apparent throughout. Cf . British
Blue Book No. 40, July 26, 1914, and British Blue Book No. 6, note 1, July 24.

2 See British Blue Book Nos. 55 and 36, July 26, 1914.

' Contrast this paragraph with British Blue Book No. 40, same day, where the same
interview is described.

* I.e. on Sunday, July 26, at 2 p.m.

* For the entirely different view of the Austro-Hungarian Government see their
Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914.

« Germany did more and accepted Sir E. Grey's plan ; German White Book,
Exhibit 13, July 25, 1914.

July 26, French Yellow Booh No. 57 187

In the course of an interview between M. Barrere and the General
Secretary of the Itahan Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the latter indi-
cated that probably the Italian Government would not have ap-
proved the Austrian note ; but as it was not communicated to them
beforehand, the Government consider themselves by this fact re-
lieved of all responsibility in the grave step taken by Austria.^

The German Ambassador came this afternoon to make a com-
munication to me relating to an intervention by France with Russia
in a pacific sense. "Austria," he said to me, "has declared to Russia
that she was not pursuing any territorial aggrandisement nor any
attack on the integrity of the Kingdom of Servia ; her only intention
is to ensure her own tranquillity and to take police measures. The
prexention of war depends on the decision of Russia ; Germany feels
herself identified with France in the ardent desire that peace may be
maintained, and has the firm hope that France will use her influence
in this sense at St. Petersburgh."

I replied to this suggestion that Russia was moderate, that she
had not committed any act which allowed any doubt as to her modera-
tion, and that we were in agreement with her in seeking a peaceful
solution of the dispute. It therefore appeared to us that Germany
on her side ought to act at Vienna, where her action would certainly
be effective, with a view to avoiding military operations leading to
the occupation of Servia.^

The Ambassador having observed to me that this could not be
reconciled with the position taken up by Germany "that the ques-
tion concerned only Austria and Servia," I told him that the media-
tion at Vienna and St. Petersburgh could be the act of the four other
Powers less interested in the question.

Herr von Schoen then entrenched himself behind his lack of instruc-
tions in this respect, and I told him that in these conditions I did not
feel myself in a position to take any action at St. Petersburgh alone.

The conversation ended by the renewed assurances of the Am-,
bassador of the peaceful intention of Germany, whom he declared
to be on this point identified with France.^ Bienvenu-Martin.

French Yellow Book No. 57

Note for the Minister

Paris, Sunday evening, July 26, 1914.

After the visit which he paid to the Minister at 5 o'clock in the
afternoon. Baron von Schoen went this evening at 7 o'clock to the

1 Cf. French Yellow Book Nos. 51 and 52, same day.

2 The attitude of France, consistently carried out through the next days, is here
foreshadowed. Her view is that Austria-Hungary's position was unreasonable, while
Russia's was reasonable and moderate. Germany, therefore-, should exert pressure on
Austria, while she herself refused to exert like pressure on Russia.

3 Germany was trying to work together with France for the maintenance of peace.
France refused to appear to act in accord with Germany for fear of offending Russia,
see French Yellow Book No. 62, July 27.

188 Official Diplomatic Documents

Direction Politique, to ask that in order to avoid the appearance in
the newspapers of comments intended to influence public opinion,
such as that in the Echo de Paris of the evening before/ and in order
to define exactly the sense of the demarches of the German Govern-
ment, a brief statement should be communicated to the press on the
interview between the German Ambassador and the Minister for
Foreign Affairs.

Herr von Schoen, in order to define what he had in his mind, sug-
gested the following terms, which the Acting Political Director took
down at his dictation : " During the afternoon the German Ambas-
sador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs had a fresh interview, in
the course of which, in the most amicable spirit, and acting in an
identical spirit of peaceful co-operation (sentiment de solidarite paci-
fique), they examined the means which might be employed to main-
tain general peace." ^

The Acting Political Director replied at once, "Then, in your
opinion, every thing is settled, and you bring us the assurance that
Austria accepts the Servian note or will enter into conversations with
the Powers on this matter?" The Ambassador having appeared
surprised, and having vigorously denied the suggestion, it was ex-
plained to him that if there was no modification in Germany's nega-
tive attitude, the terms of the suggested "note to the press" were
exaggerated, and of a nature to give a false security to French opinion
by creating illusion on the real situation, the dangers of which were
only too evident.

To the assurances lavished by the German Ambassador as to the
optimistic impressions which he had formed, the Acting Political
Director replied by asking if he might speak to him in a manner
quite personal and private, as man to man, quite freely and without
regard to their respective functions. Baron von Schoen asked him
to do so.

M. Berthelot then said that to any simple mind Germany's atti-
tude was inexplicable if it did not aim at war ; a purely objective
analysis of the facts and the psychology of the Austro-German rela-
tions led logically to this conclusion. In the face of the repeated
statement that Germany was ignorant of the contents of the Aus-
trian note, it was no longer permissible to raise any doubt on that
point ; but was it probable that Germany would have arrayed her-
self on the side of Austria in such an adventure with her eyes closed ?
Did the psychology of all the past relations of Vienna and Berlin
allow one to admit that Austria could have taken up a position with-
out any possible retreat, before having weighed with her ally all the
consequences of her uncompromising attitude? How surprising
appeared the refusal by Germany to exercise mediating^ influence
at Vienna now that she knew the extraordinary text of the Austrian
note ! What responsibility was the German Government assuming

1 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 36, and Russian Orange Book No. 19, July 25, 1914.

' Cf. preceding despatch and note 6.

' France was still clinging to the Paul Cambon modification — mediation between
Austria-Hungary and Serbia — of the Sir E. Grey plan — mediation between Russia
and Austria-Hungary.

July 26, French Yellow Book No, 57 189

and what suspicions would rest upon them if they persisted in inter-
posing between Austria and the Powers, after what might be called
the absolute submission of Servia, and when the slightest advice
given by them to Vienna would put an end to the nightmare which
weighed on Europe !

The breaking off of diplomatic relations by Austria, her threats
of war, and the mobilisation which she was undertaking^ make
peculiarly urgent pacific action on the part of Germany, for from the
day when Austrian troops crossed the Servian frontier, one would
be faced by an act which without doubt would oblige ^ the St. Peters-
burgh Cabinet to intervene, and would risk the unloosing of a war
which Germany declares that she wishes to avoid.

Herr von Schoen, who listened smiling, once more affirmed that
Germany had been ignorant of the text of the Austrian note,^ and
had only approved it after its delivery ; she thought, however, that
Servia had need of a lesson severe enough for her not to be able to
forget it, and that Austria owed it to herself to put an end to a situa-
tion which was dangerous and intolerable for a great Power. He
declared besides that he did not know the text of the Servian reply,
and showed his personal surprise that it had not satisfied Austria,
if indeed it was such as the papers, which are often ill informed,
represented it to be.

He insisted again on Germany's peaceful intentions and gave his
impressions as to the effect that might arise from good advice given,
for instance, at Vienna, by England in a friendly tone. According
to him Austria was not uncompromising; what she rejects is the
idea of a formal mediation, the " spectre *' of a conference : a peaceful
word coming from St. Petersburgh, good words said in a conciliatory
tone by the Powers of the Triple Entente, would have a chance of
being well received. He added, finally, that he did not say that
Germany on her side would not give some advice at Vienna.

In these conditions the Political Director announced that he
would ask the Minister if it appeared to him opportune to communi-
cate to the press a short note in a moderate tone.

1 There is here no reference to Serbia's mobilisation ordered three hours before she
sent her reply to Austria-Hungary ; cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 5, July 26, 1914.

2 France throughout deemed Russia's interest in protecting Serbia more vital
than Austria-Hungary's interests in protecting herself from Serbian intrigues.

'Here the official British publication "Collected Diplomatic Documents" prints
the following note, not contained in the French Yellow Book, and does so without any
explanation :

" Cf. No. 21. Letter from the French Minister in Munich stating that the Bavarian
President of the Council said, on July 23, that he had read the Austrian note to Servia.

"C/. also the British Diplomatic Correspondence, No. 95, page 74, in which Sir
M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, states : —

"Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that the German
Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was despatched
and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador
himself that he endorses every line of it."

The first paragraph in its English translation, is a perversion of the truth. The French
text merely says that he " had cognisance," and for this see note to French Yellow Book
No . 2 1 , July 23 . As to the rest the reader must decide for himself whether the anonymous
informant of the British Ambassador deserves more credence than the German Chan-
cellor and Secretary of Foreign Affairs who repeatedly said that they had not known
the contents of the Austro-Hungarian note until it was oflficially presented to the
Powers. Cf. especially French Yellow Book No. 15, July 21, No. 17, July 22, and
No. 30, July 24.

190 Official Diplomatic Documents

From Christiania
French Yellow Book No. 58

M. Chevalley, French Minister at Christiania, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Christiania, July 26, 1914.

The whole German fleet ^ in Norway has received orders to put
to sea. The German authorities at Bergen declare that it is to make
straight for Germany.

German ships scattered in the Fjords to the north of Bergen were
to join those which are in the neighbourhood of Stavanger.

Chevalley.

From Luxemburg

French Yellow Book No. 59

M. d'Annoville, French Charge d' Affaires at Luxemburg, to M. Bien-
venu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Luxemburg, July 26, 1914.

According to information which I have just received from Thion-
ville, the four last classes set at liberty have been ordered to hold
themselves at the disposition of the Commandatur at any moment.

Without being completely mobilised the reservists are forbidden
to go away from their place of residence.

Germany :

From Petrograd
German White Book Exhibit 5

The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor.
Telegram of July 26th, 1914.

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador had an extended interview ^
with Sazonof this afternoon. Both parties had a satisfactory im-
pression as they told me afterwards. The assurance of the Ambassa-
dor that Austria-Hungary had no idea of conquest but wished to
obtain peace at last at her frontiers, greatly pacified the Secretary.

1 Orders to stop the demobilization of the British fleet had been issued, two days
earlier, on July 24, 1914, according to French Yellow Book No. 66, July 27, 1914. See
also note 2, British Blue Book No. 47, July 27.

2 Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 25, same day, "long and friendly" interview; but
contrast impression of this interview on French Ambassador. French Yellow Book
No. 54, same day, where Sazonof is reported as having "made clear the insulting char-
acter of the principal clauses." No mention of this interview is made in the Austro-
Hungarian Red Book. The Russian despatch, No. 25, is sent to Vienna. There can
be no doubt that Sazonof gave the impression to both Austria-Hungary and Germany
that a rapprochement between Russia and Austria-Hungary was possible.

July 26, German White ^Book Exhibit 10a 191

German White Book Exhibit 7

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to the
Chancellor on July 26th, 1914.

The military attache requests the following message to be sent to
the general staff :

I deem it certain that mobilisation has been ordered for Kiev and
Odessa. It is doubtful at Warsaw and Moscow and improbable
elsewhere.

To London
German White Book Exhibit 10

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London.
Urgent. July 26th, 1914.

Austria-Hungary has declared in St. Petersburg officially and
solemnly that it has no desire for territorial gain in Servia ; that it
will not touch the existence of the Kingdom, but that it desires to
establish peaceful conditions. According to news received here,
Russia is about to summon several bodies of reservists also against us.^
If this news proves correct, we shall be forced to countermeasures
very much against our own wishes. Our desire to localise the con-
flict and to preserve the peace of Europe remains unchanged. We
ask to act in this sense at St. Petersburg with all possible emphasis.^

To Paris

German White Book Exhibit 10a'

Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at
Paris. July 26th, 1914.

After officially declaring to Russia that Austria-Hungary has no
intention to acquire territorial gain and to touch the existence of the
Kingdom, the decision whether there is to be a European war rests
solely with Russia which has to bear the entire responsibility. We
depend upon France with which we are at one in the desire for the
preservation of the peace of Europe that it will exercise its influence
at St. Petersburg in favour of peace.

1 The words in italics are substituted here from the New York Times translation for
those of the Collected Diplomatic Documents, which is the official British version
and follows the official German translation, and reads "the call for several classes of
the reserves is expected immediately which is equivalent to mobilisation." It will be
noticed that two thoughts are inadvertently omitted here : first that it is Russia who
is mobilizing; secondly that she is mobilising "also against us." The editor of the
Collected Diplomatic Documents who states, on p. 403, that "a few footnotes have
been inserted to point out certain discrepancies between the translation and the Ger-
man original," disregards the omission of Russia in his footnote to these words, stating
merely "The German text adds here auch gegen uns (also against us)."

2 This entire message delivered to Sir E, Grey by the German Ambassador has been
omitted in the British Blue Book.

3 From Russian Orange Book No. 28, July 26, 1914, it appears that this message
was delivered in Paris. It'is, however, not printed in the French Yellow Book.

In the English Translations published by The Imperial German Foreign Office these
"Exhibits" are renumbered and printed as numbers: 10a becomes 11 ; 106 12, etc.

192 Official Diplomatic Documents

To Petrograd
German White Book Exhibit 106 ^

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St,
Petersburg on July 26th, 1914.

After Austria's solemn declaration of its territorial disinterested-
ness, the responsibility for a possible disturbance of the peace of
Europe through a Russian intervention rests solely upon Russia. We
trust still that Russia will undertake no steps which will threaten
seriously the peace of Europe.

For an additional message to Russia see oelow after No. 29 of the Russian
Orange Book, July 26, 1914.

Great Britain:

From Vienna

British Blue Book No. 31 *

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward
Grey, — (Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 25, 1914.

Servian reply to the Austro-Hungarian demands is not considered
satisfactory, and the Austro-Hungarian Minister has left Belgrade.
War is thought to be imminent.

British Blue Book No. 32

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward
Grey. — (Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 26, 1914.

According to confident belief of German Ambassador, Russia will
keep quiet during chastisement of Servia, which Austria-Hungary is
resolved to inflict, having received assurances that no Servian terri-
tory will be annexed by Austria-Hungary. In reply to my question
whether Russian Government might not be compelled by public
opinion to intervene on behalf of kindred nationality, he said that
everything depended on the personality of the Russian Minister for
Foreign Affairs, who could resist easily, if he chose, the pressure of a
few newspapers. He pointed out that the days of Pan-Slav agita-
tion in Russia were over and that Moscow was perfectly quiet. The
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs would not, his Excellency
thought, be so imprudent as to take a step which would probably
result in many frontier questions in which Russia is interested, such

^ Like the preceding two messages which have been omitted from the British Blue
Book and the French Yellow Book respectively, this message has been omitted from
the Russian Orange Book.

2 The information contained in this despatch had reached England from Belgrade
on the previous day ; British Blue Book No. 23.

July 26, British Blue Book No. 33 193

as Swedish, Polish, Ruthene, Roumanian, and Persian questions being
brought into the melting-pot. France, too, was not at all in a con-
dition for facing a war.

I replied that matters had, I thought, been made a little difficult
for other Powers by the tone of Austro-Hungarian Government's
ultimatum to Servia. One naturally sympathised with many of the
requirements of the ultimatum, if only the manner of expressing
them had been more temperate. It was, however, impossible; ac-
cording to the German Ambassador, to speak effectively in any other
way to Servia. Servia was about to receive a lesson which she re-
quired ; the quarrel, however, ought not to be extended in any way
to foreign countries. He doubted Russia, who had no right to assume
a protectorate over Servia, acting as if she made any such claim.
As for Germany she knew very well what she was about in backing
up Austria-Hungary in this matter.

The German Ambassador had heard of a letter ^ addressed by you
yesterday to the German Ambassador in London in which you ex-
pressed the hope that the Servian concessions would be regarded as
satisfactory. He asked whether I had been informed that a pretence
of giving way at the last moment had been made by the Servian
Government. I had, I said, heard that on practically every point
Servia had been willing to give in. His Excellency replied that Ser-
vian concessions were all a sham.^ Servia proved that she well knew
that they were insufficient to satisfy the legitimate demands of
Austria-Hungary by the fact that before making her offer she had
ordered mobilisation ^ and retirement of Government from Belgrade.

Frmn Berlin

British Blue Book No. 33

Sir H. Rumhold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward
Grey. — (Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 26, 1911

. Emperor returns suddenly to-night, and Under-Secretary of State
says that Foreign Office regret this step, which was taken on His
Majesty's own initiative. They fear that His Majesty's sudden
return may cause speculation and excitement. Under-Secretary of
State likewise told me that German Ambassador at St. Petersburgh
had reported that, in conversation with Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs, latter had said that if Austria annexed bits of Servian ter-
ritory Russia would not remain indifferent. Under-Secretary of
State drew conclusion that Russia would not act if Austria did not
annex territory.

1 Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 29, same day.

2 For the reasons see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914.

8 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 29, Belgian Gray Book No. 5, same day.

194 Official Diplomatic Documents

British Blue Book No. 34

Sir H. Rumbold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward
Grey. — (Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 26, 1914.

Under-Secretary of State has just telephoned to me to say that
German Ambassador at Vienna has been instructed to pass on to
Austro-Hungarian Government your hopes that they may take a
favourable view of Servian reply if it corresponds to the forecast con-
tained in Belgrade telegram of 25th July.^

Under-Secretary of State considers very fact of their making this
communication to Austro-Hungarian Government implies that they
associate themselves to a certain extent with your hope. German
Government do not see their way to going beyond this.

From Rome

British Blue Book No. 35 ^

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. —
(Received July 26.)

(Telegraphic.) Rome, July 26, 1914.

Minister for Foreign Affairs welcomes your proposal for a con-
ference, and will instruct Italian Ambassador to-night accordingly.

Austrian Ambassador has informed Italian Government this even-
ing that Minister in Belgrade had been recalled, but that this did
not imply declaration of war.

. To Paris, Berlin, Rome

British Blue Book No. 36

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, Sir
H. Rumbold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, and Sir R. Rodd,
British Ambassador at Rome.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 26, 1914-

Would Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct Am-
bassador here to join with representatives of France, Italy, and Ger-
many, and myself to meet here in conference immediately for the
purpose bf discovering an issue which would prevent complications ? ^
You should ask Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he would do
this. If so, when bringing the above suggestion to the notice of the
Governments to which they are accredited, representatives at Bel-
grade, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh should be authorised to request

1 See No. 21, July 25, 1914.

2 This seems to be a reply to No. 36.

3 This is no longer the Conference of Sir E. Grey's original plan — mediation be-
tween Russia and Austria-Hungary — nor of the Paul Cambon modification of this
plan — mediation between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. See note to No. 37.

July 26, British Blue Book No. 39 195

that all active military operations should be suspended pending
results of conference.

To Paris
British Blue Book No. 37
Sir Edioard Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 26, 1911

Berlin telegram of 25th July.^

It is important to know if France will agree to suggested action
by the four Powers if necessary.

From Rome

British Blue Book No. 38

[Here Sir E. Grey prints a despatch from Rome dated July 23, but delayed in
transmission. For the text see above under date of July 23, and explanatory note.]

British Blue Book No. 39

Reply of Serbian Government to Austro-Hungarian Note. — {Commu-
nicated by the Serbian Minister, July 27.)

[For the text see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 25, July 25, and No. 34,
July 27, 1914. The British Blue Book fails to print the Austro-Hungarian
comment.]

According to the published despatches none of the Entente Powers had received
copies of the Serbian reply on July 26, and even a summary of the reply had
reached Paris with a delay of twenty hours, i.e. at 2 p.m. Sunday, July 26, 1914
(French Yellow Book No. 56, same day also Russian Orange Book No. 36, July 27).
As to the reply, however, two versions were current on July 26 : first, that dis-
seminated by Russia, Serbia and France, to the effect that Serbia had yielded
completely except on one or two minor points ; secondly, that given out by Austria-
Hungary and Germany, to the effect that Serbia's concessions were a sham and
that the entire reply was unsatisfactory.

The only foreign offices cognisant of the reply were, of course, those of Serbia
and Austria-Hungary, unless one wishes to understand a passage of British Blue
Book No. 6, July 24, (see note 7) to mean that the Russian Cabinet wrote the note
for Serbia.

Eventually Austria-Hungary sent her commentary on this note to the Powers
by mail July 27 (see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 39, July 28). These com-
ments, however, were not printed either in the British Blue Book or the French
Yellow Book in any of the editions receiving currency in America or in tlie
Collected Diplomatic Documents officially issued by England. Neither does it
appear in any of the other books except the Austro-Hungarian Red Book.

1 The officialBritish version contains here a footnote "See No. 18." The Conference
there spoken of has in view "working in favour of mediation in Vienna and at St.
Petersburgh." It is in short Sir E. Grey's original plan. Despatches Nos. 36 and 37,
therefore, contain different proposals. France's objections to working in favour of
moderation in Petrograd were discussed above in note 5 to French Yellow Book No.
56, July 26. Very probably, therefore, British Blue Book No. 37 should precede No. 36.
When Sir E. Grey met determined opposition in Paris to his plan (No. 37) he may
have modified it, as expressed in No. 36. No. 36 reached the British Ambassador while
he was at a conference with the Russian and French Ambassadors in Vienna in the
evening (French Yellow Book No. 55) and his reply, British Blue Book No. 40, while
dated July 26, was received in London the next day. All this makes it unlikely that
after sending No. 36, Sir E. Grey should have reverted to his original plan in No. 37.
From No. 35 it does not appear which plan of a conference was accepted by Italy.

196 Official Diplomatic Documents

From Vienna

British Blue Book No. 40^

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey,
— {Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 26, 191^.

Russian Ambassador just returned from leave thinks that Austro-
Hungarian Government are determined on war, and that it is im-
possible for Russia to remain indifferent. He does not propose to
press for more time in the sense of your telegram of the 25th instant ^
(last paragraph).

When the repetition of your telegram of the 26th instant to Paris ^
arrived, I had the French and Russian Ambassadors both with me.^
They expressed great satisfaction with its contents, which I commu-
nicated to them. They doubted, however, whether the principle of
Russia being an interested party entitled to have a say in the settle-
ment of a purely Austro-Servian dispute would be accepted by either
the Austro-Hungarian or the German Government.

Instructions were also given to the Italian Ambassador to support
the request of the Russian Government that the time limit should be
postponed. They arrived, however, too late for any useful action to
be taken.

Russia :

To Rome

Russian Orange Book No. 23

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Rome.
(Telegram.) St. Petersburgh, July 13 {26), 1914.

Italy might play a part of the first importance in favour of pre-
serving peace, by bringing the necessary influence to bear upon
Austria, and by adopting a definitely unfavourable attitude towards
the dispute on the ground that it could not be localised. You should
express your conviction that Russia cannot possibly avoid coming
to the help of Servia.^

1 No. 40 should precede No. 39, for while both despatches are said to have been
received on July 27, No. 40 was sent on July 26.

2 See No. 26, July 25.

» See No. 36, July 26, 1914.

* Cf. the French account of this interview, French Yellow Book No. 55, same day.

6 Cf. French Yellow Book Nos. 51 and 52, July 26, and for Russia's determination
to force a war unless Austria-Hungary yielded. British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, 1914,
" if she (i.e. Russia) feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks
of war."

July 26, Russian Orange Book No. 25 197

From Prague

Russian Orange Book No. 24

Acting Russian Consul at Prague to Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

(Telegram.) Prague, July 13 (26), 19H.

Mobilisation ^ has been ordered.

To Vienna; also Berlin, Paris, London, and Rome
Russian Orange Book No. 25
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Vienna.
(Telegram.) St. Petersburgh, July 13 {26), 1914.

I HAD a long and friendly ^ conversation to-day with the Austro-
Hungarian Ambassador. After discussing the ten demands addressed
to Servia, I drew his attention to the fact that, quite apart from the
clumsy form in which they were presented, some of them were quite
impracticable, even if the Servian Government agreed to accept
them. Thus, for example, points 1 and 2 could not be carried out
without recasting the Servian press law and associations law, and
to that it might be difficult to obtain the consent of the Skupshtina.
As for enforcing paints 4 and 5, this might lead to most dangerous
consequences, and even to the risk of acts of terrorism directed
against the Royal Family and against Pashitch, which clearly could
not be the intention of Austria. With regard to the other points it
seemed to me that, with certain changes of detail, it would not be
difficult to find a basis of mutual agreement, if the accusations con-
tained in them were confirmed by. sufficient proof.

In the interest of the maintenance of peace, which, according to
the statements of Szapary, is as much desired by Austria as by all
the Powers, it was necessary to end the tension of the present moment
as soon as possible. With this object in view it seemed to me most
desirable that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador should be authorised
to enter into a private exchange of views ^ in order to redraft certain
articles of the Austrian note of the 10th (23rd) July in consultation
with me. This method of procedure would perhaps enable us to
find a formula which would prove acceptable to Servia, while giving
satisfaction to Austria in respect of the chief of her demands. Please
convey the substance of this telegram to the Minister for Foreign
Affairs in a judicious and friendly manner.

Communicated to Russian Ambassadors in Germany, France,
Great Britain, and Italy.

1 The despatches probably received in Petrograd announcing the Serbian mobi-
lisation on July 25, three hours before Serbia sent her reply to Austria-Hungary,
are not published in the Russian Orange Book. See Belgian Gray Book No. 5, July 26,
1914.

2 Cf. German White Book, Exhibit 5, and contrast French Yellow Book No. 54,
both of July 26, 1914. For the Austrian Version see Red Book No. 31, July 27, 1914.

3 This is Sazonof 's counter proposition to Sir E. Grey's plan of a conference of four
Powers.

198 Official Diplomatic Documents

To Berlin
Russian Orange Book No. 26
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Berlin,
(Telegram.) St, Petersburg, July 13 {26), 1914.

Please communicate the contents of my telegram^ to Vienna of
to-day to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, and express to
him the hope that he, on his part, will be able to advise Vienna to
meet Russia's proposal in a friendly spirit.

From Paris

Russian Orange Book No. 27

Russian Charge d^ Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

(Telegram.) Paris, July 13 {26), 191J,..

The Director of the Political Department informs me that, upon
his informing the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador ^ of the contents of
the Servian reply to the ultimatum, the Ambassador did not conceal
his surprise that it had failed to satisfy Giesl. In the opinion of the
Director of the Political Department, Servia's conciliatory ^ attitude
should produce the best impression in Europe.

Russian Orange Book No. 28

Russian Charge d^ Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs,

(Telegram.) Paris, July 13 {26), 1914.

The German Ambassador again visited the Acting Minister for
Foreign Affairs to-day, and made to him the following declarations :^ —

(Translation.)

"L'Autriche a declare a la "Austria has declared to

Russie qu'elle ne recherche pas Russia that she does not desire

des acquisitions territoriales et territorial acquisitions, and that

qu'elle ne menace pas I'integrite she harbours no designs against

de la Serbie. Son but unique the integrity of Servia. Her sole

est d'assurer sa propre tranquil- object is to secure her own peace

1 Russian Orange Book No. 25, and see note 3 to that despatch.

» The summary of the Serbian reply reached Paris in the afternoon of July 26, 1914 ;
see French Yellow Book No. 56, July 26, where an interview with the German
Ambassador is described. The interview here referred to with the Austro-Hungarian
Ambassador is not mentioned in the French Yellow Book.

3 For a contrary interpretation of the Serbian attitude see British Blue Book
No. 32, same day, and note 2.

* This is the official message, German White Book, Exhibit 10a, sent by the Chan-
cellor to the German Ambassador in Paris. It is not printed in the French Yellow
Book and is here printed as if it were a personal opinion of the German Ambassador.

July 26 y Russian Orange Book No. 30 199

lite. Par consequent il depend and quiet, and consequently it

de la Russie d'eviter la guerre, rests with Russia to prevent war.

L'Allemagne se sent solidaire Germany is at one with France

avec la France dans le desir in her ardent desire to preserve

ardent de conserver la paix et peace, and she sincerely hopes

espere fermement que la France that France will exercise a

usera de son influence a Peters- moderating influence at St.

bourg dans un sens moderateur." Petersburg."

The Minister pointed out that Germany on her part might well
act on similar lines at Vienna, especially in view of the conciliatory
spirit displayed by Servia. The Ambassador replied that such a
course was not possible, owing to the decision not to intervene in
the Austro-Servian dispute. The Minister then asked whether the
four Powers — Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and France — could
not make representations at St. Petersburgh and Vienna, for that the
matter amounted, in effect, to a dispute between Austria and Russia.
The Ambassador alleged that he had no instructions. Finally, the
Minister refused to agree to the German proposal.

Russian Orange Book No. 29

Russian Charge d' Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

(Telegram.) Paris, July 13 {26), 1914.

The Director of the Political Department has expressed the per-
sonal opinion that the series of representations made by Germany at
Paris aim at intimidating ^ France and at securing her intervention at
St. Petersburgh.

From Berlin

Russian Orange Book No. 30

Russian Charge d' Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign

Affairs.
(Telegram.) Berlin, July 13 {26), 1911

On the news reaching Berlin that the Austrian army had
mobilised against Servia, a large crowd, in which the papers

1 Russia also received, on this day, July 26, 1914, the following message from
Berlin, which is not printed in the Russian Orange Book. It is here quoted from
the German White Book (authorized translation), p. 7 :

" Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to counter-measures which
must consist in mobilising the army.

" But mobilisation means war. .

" As we know the obligations of France towards Russia, this mobilisation would be
directed against both Russia and France. We cannot assume that Russia desires
to unchain such a European war. Since Austria-Hungary will not touch the exist-
ence of the Servian kingdom, we are of the opinion that Russia can afford to assume
an attitude of waiting. We can all the more support the desire of Russia to protect
the integrity of Servia, as Austria-Hungary does not intend to question the latter.
It will be easy in the further development of the affair to find a basis for an under-
standing."

200 Official Diplomatic Documents

report the presence of an Austrian element, gave vent to a series
of noisy demonstrations in favour of Austria. Late in the even-
ing the crowd several times collected before the Imperial Russian
Embassy and some anti-Russian shouting occurred. Hardly any
police were present and no precautions were taken.

Serbia :

Serbia has not published any despatches of July 26, 1914.

July ^7, 19U

201

Monday, July 27, 1914
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

Foreign Office of

Sent Despatches to

Received
Despatches from

Austria-Hungary

Petrograd, Berlin, Rome
London, Paris, Petrograd

Petrograd, Berlin

Belgium

Berlin

France

London, London etc.

Basle, London, Petro-
grad, Constantino-
ple, Berlin, Rome

Serbian reply and
Austro-Hungarian
Memorandum.

Germany

London

Kovno, Berne, Petro-
grad
Vienna, Paris, Berlin,

Great Britain

Berlin, Petrograd, Vienna,

Rome

Petrograd, Rome
Serbian reply and
Austro-H ungarian
Memorandum

Russia

Paris and London,

London, Paris, Berlin,

Berlin, London etc.

Vienna

Czar to Serbian Crown

Prince

Serbia

Czar to Serbian Crown
Prince.

Austria-Hungary sends out for presentation to the Powers the dossier with her
proofs of Serbian guilt and issues her comments to the Serbian reply, explaining in
detail why she could not accept it as satisfactory, and repeats her declaration
that she **does not aim in any way at territorial acquisitions of any sort."

France continues to hold Germany responsible for Austria-Hungary's firmness
in dealing with Serbia, and refuses Germany's request to intercede in Petrograd.
She is troubled by the confidence expressed by the German and Austro-Hungarian
Ambassadors in London that ^'England would preserve neutrality" and, like
Russia, is endeavoring to secure the promise of English support in case of war.
Sazonof is represented by the French officials as very moderate and desirous of
peace. Sir E. Grey's proposal of a conference to "examine means of finding a
solution" is supported but altered to include Belgrade instead of only Vienna
and Petrograd, while Jules Cambon in Berlin renews his request that Berlin alone
intervene in Vienna.

Germany accepts in principle Sir E. Grey's proposal of a conference and "at
once starts the mediation proposal in Vienna in the sense desired by Sir Edward
Grey." She expects, however, most good from direct conversations between
Vienna and Petrograd as suggested by Sazonof. She continues to point out the
danger of Russian mobilisation.

Great Britain announces the action of keeping her fleet mobilised as of this day
while it actually occurred on July 24. It was meant to dissipate the impression
that in any event England "would stand aside," which impression Sazonof
"deplored." Serbia's reply continues to be represented as satisfactory by Sir E.
Grey, who omits from the Blue Book both the dossier and the Austro-Hungarian
comments on the Serbian reply. Great Britain repeats her conference proposals
to mediate between Petrograd and Vienna or, according to the French Yellow
Book, also Belgrade. Sir E. Grey is, however, not unfavourable to Sazonof 's plan
of direct conversations.

Russia, while not refusing categorically Sir E. Grey's plan, urges her own of
direct conversations. She continues her mobilisation, although some of her hi^
officials deny this.

202 Official Diplomatic Documents

Serbia officially appeals to Russia for help.

Belgium discusses the Serbian reply on information supplied by the British
Charge d'Affaires at Belgrade.

Austria-Hungary :

From Petrograd

AUSTROHUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 31

Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 27, 1914.

Just had a long conversation with M. Sazonof.^ Told the Minis-
ter I was under the impression that mistaken ideas were prevalent in
Russia with regard to the character of our action. We were credited
with wishing to push forward into Balkan territory, and to begin a
march to Salonica or even to Constantinople. Others, again, went
so far as to describe our action merely as the starting point of a pre-
ventive war against Russia. I said that all this was erroneous, and
that parts of it were absolutely unreasonable. The goal of our action
was self-preservation and self-defence against hostile propaganda by
word, in writing, and in action, which threatened our integrity. It
would occur to no one in Austria-Hungary to threaten Russian in-
terests, or indeed to pick a quarrel with Russia. And yet we were
absolutely determined to reach the goal which we had set before us,
and the path which we had chosen seemed to us the most suitable.
As, however, the action under discussion was action in self-defence,
I could not conceal from him that we could not allow ourselves to
be diverted from it by any consequences, of whatever kind they
might be.

M. Sazonof agreed with me. Our goal, as I had described it to
him, was an entirely legitimate one, but he considered that the path
which we were pursuing with a view to attaining it was not the surest.
He said that the note which we had delivered was not happy ^ in its
form. He had since been studying it, and if I had time, he would
like to look it through once more with me. I remarked that I was
at his service, but was not authorised either to discuss the text of the
note with him or to interpret it. Of course, however, his remarks
were of interest. The Minister then took all the points of the note
in order, and on this occasion found seven of the ten points admissible
without very great difficulty ; only the two points ^ dealing with the
collaboration of the Imperial and Royal officials in Servia and the
point dealing with the removal of officers and civil servants to be
designated by us,'* seemed to him to be unacceptable in their present

1 While dated July 27, this interview took place on July 26 ; cf . Russian Orange
Book No. 25, July 26, and note 1. The last paragraph of this note, moreover, refers
to the Serbian mobilisation, which took place on the 25th, as of "the previous day."

2 French Yellow Book No. 54, July 26, quotes Sazonof as having said "insulting."
' They are points 5 and 6^ see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 7, July 22, 1914,

and the explanation. Red Book No. 27, July 25, 1914.

' ♦ This is point 4 of the note to Serbia, see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 7,
July 22, 1914.

July 27, Austro-Hunganan Red Book No. 34 203

form. With regard to the two first points, I was in a position to give
an authentic interpretation in the sense of your Excellency's telegram
of the 25th instant ; ^ with regard to the third, I expressed the opinion
that it was a necessary demand. Moreover, matters had already been
set in motion. The Servians had mobilised on the previous day ^ and
I did not know what had happened since then.

To Petrograd

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 32

Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburgh.
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 27, 1914.

I EMPOWER your Excellency to declare to M. Sazonof that, so
long as the war between Austria-Hungary and Servia remains local-
ised, the Monarchy does not aim in any way at territorial acquisitions
of any sort.

From Berlin

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 33

Count Szogyeny to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, June 27, 1914.

M. Sazonof explained to the German Ambassador that he could
"guarantee" to him "that on the Russian side no mobilisation had
been begun ; though it was true that certain necessary military pre-
cautions were being taken."

The German military attache at St. Petersburgh reports ^ that
" the Russian Minister of War has given him his word of honour that
not a man or a horse has been mobiHsed ; however, naturally, certain
military precautions have been taken"; precautions which, as the
German military attache adds, apparently spontaneously, to his
report, "are to be sure pretty far-reaching."

To Berlin, Rome, London, Paris, and Petrograd

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 34

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in Berlin,
Rome, London, Paris, and St. Petersburgh.

Vienna, July 27, 1914.

Annexed you will find the text, annotated with our remarks, of
the note which the Royal Servian Government on the 25th of June
transmitted to the Imperial and Royal Minister at Belgrade.

1 Austro-Hungarian Red Book Nos. 21, 26, and 27, July 25, 1914.

2 Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 5, July 25, 1914.

3 Cf. German White Book, Exhibit 11, also 8 and 9, July 27, 1914.

204

Official Diplomatic Documents

Enclosure ^

Reply of the Royal Servian Government to the Imperial and Royal
Government of the 12/25 July, 1914,

(Translation.)

The Royal Servian Govern-
ment have received the commu-
nication of the Imperial and
Royal Government of the 10th
instant,^ and are convinced that
their reply will remove any mis-
understanding which may
threaten to impair the good
neighbourly relations between
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
and the Kingdom of Servia.

Conscious of the fact that the
protests which were made both
from the tribune of the national
Skupschtina ^ and in the declara-
tions and actions of the respon-
sible representatives of the State
— protests which were cut short
by the declarations made by the
Servian Government on the 18th^
March, 1909 — have not been
renewed on any occasion as re-
gards the great neighbouring
Monarchy, and that no attempt
has been made since that time,
either by the successive Royal
Governments or by their agents,
to change the political and legal
state of affairs created in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, the Royal Gov-
ernment draw attention to the
fact that in this connection the
Imperial and Royal Government
have made no representation
except one concerning a school
book, and that on that occasion
the Imperial and Royal Govern-
ment received an entirely satis-
factory explanation. Servia has
several times given proofs of her
pacific and moderate policy dur-

1 For a brief summary see French Yellow Book No. 75 (2), July 28, and footnote.

2 Old style.

» The Serbian Parliament.

(Remarks.)

The Royal Servian Govern-
ment confine themselves to as-
serting that, since the declara-
tions on the 18th March, 1909,
no attempt has been made by the
Servian Government and their
agents to change the position of
Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Thereby they deliberately and
arbitrarily shift the ground on
which our demarche was based,
as we did not maintain that they
and their agents have taken any
official action in this direction.

Our charge, on the contrary,
is to the effect that the Servian
Government, notwithstanding the
obligations undertaken in the
above-quoted note, have neg-
lected to suppress the move-
ment directed against the terri-
torial integrity of the Monarchy.

Their obligation, that is to say,
was that they should change the
whole direction of their policy
and adopt a friendly and neigh-
bourly attitude towards the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy,
and not merely that they should
refrain from officially attacking
the incorporation of Bosnia in
the Monarchy.

July 27, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34

205

ing the Balkan crisis, and it is
thanks to Servia and to the sacri-
fice that she has made in the
exclusive interest of European
peace that that peace has been
preserved. The Royal Govern-
ment cannot be held responsible
for manifestations of a private
character, such as articles in the
press and the peaceable work of
societies — manifestations which
take place in nearly all countries
in the ordinary course of events,
and which, as a general rule,
escape official control. The
Royal Government are all the
less responsible, in view of the
fact that at the time of the solu-
tion of a series of questions which
arose between Servia and Aus-
tria-Hungary they gave proof of
a great readiness to oblige, and
thus succeeded in settling the
majority of these questions to the
advantage of the two neighbour-
ing countries.

For these reasons the Royal
Government have been pained
and surprised at the statements,
according to which members of
the Kingdom of Servia are sup-
posed to have participated in the
preparations for the crime com-
mitted at Serajevo; the Royal
Government expected to be in-
vited to collaborate in an investi-
gation of all that concerns this
crime, and they were ready, in
order to prove the entire correct-
ness of their attitude, to take
measures against any persons
concerning whom representations
were made to them. Falling in,
therefore, with the desire of the
Imperial and Royal Government,
they are prepared to hand over
for trial any Servian subject,

The proposition of the Royal
Servian Government that utter-
ances in the press and the activi-
ties of societies are of a private
character and are not subject to
official control is absolutely an-
tagonistic to the institutions of
modern States, even those which
have the most liberal law with
regard to press and associations ;
this law has a public character
and subjects the press, as well
as associations, to State control.
Moreover, Servian institutions
themselves contemplate some
such control. The complaint
against the Servian Government
is in fact that they have entirely
omitted to control their press
and their associations, of whose
activities in a sense hostile to
the Monarchy they were well
aware.

This proposition is incorrect;
the Servian Government were
accurately informed of the suspi-
cions which were entertained
against quite definite persons and
were not only in a position but
also bound by their internal laws
to initiate spontaneous enquiries.
They have done nothing in this
direction.

206

Ojfflcial Diplomatic Documents

without regard to his situation or
rank, of whose complicity in the
crime of Sera jevo proofs are forth-
coming, and more especially they
undertake to cause to be pub-
lished on the first page of the
Journal officiel, on the date of
the 13th (26th) July, the follow-
ing declaration : —

"The Royal Government of
Servia condemn all propaganda
which may be directed against
Austria-Hungary — i.e.y the

general tendency of which the
final aim is to detach from the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy ter-
ritories belonging to it, and they
sincerely deplore the fatal con-
sequences of these criminal
proceedings.

The Royal Government regret
that, according to the communi-
cation from the Imperial and
Royal Government, certain Ser-
vian officers and functionaries
participated in the above-men-
tioned propaganda, and thus
compromised the good neigh-
bourly relations to which the
Royal Servian Government was
solemnly pledged by the declara-
tion of the 31st March, 1909.^

"The Government, etc. . . ."
(identical with the text as de-
manded).

The Royal Government further
undertake : —

Our demand ran : —

"The Royal Government of
Servia condemn the propaganda
directed against Austria-Hun-
gary ''

The alteration made by the
Royal Servian Government in
the declaration demanded by us
implies that no such propaganda
directed against Austria-Hun-
gary exists, or that they are cog-
nisant of no such propaganda.
This formula is insincere and dis-
ingenuous, as by it the Servian
Government reserve for them-
selves for later use the evasion
that they had not by this decla-
ration disavowed the then exist-
ing propaganda, and had not
admitted that it was hostile to
the Monarchy, from which they
could further deduce that they
had not bound themselves to
suppress propaganda similar to
that now being carried on.

The wording demanded by us
ran : —

"The Royal Government re-
gret that Servian officers and
functionaries . . . partici-
pated. . . ."

By the adoption of this word-
ing with the addition "according
to the communication from the
Imperial and Royal Govern-
ment" the Servian Government
are pursuing the object that has
already been referred to above,
namely, that of preserving a free
hand for the future.

We had demanded of them : —

1. "To suppress any publica-
tion which incites to hatred and
contempt of the Austro-Hun-

New style.

July 27, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34

207

1. To introduce at the first
regular convocation of the Skup-
schtina ^ a provision into the press
law providing for the most severe
punishment of incitement to
hatred and contempt of the Aus-
tro-Hungarian Monarchy, and
for taking action against any
publication the general tendency
of which is directed against the
territorial integrity of Austria-
Hungary. The Government
engage at the approaching re-
vision of the Constitution to
cause an amendment to be intro-
duced into article 22 of the Con-
stitution of such a nature that
such publication may be confis-
cated, a proceeding at present
impossible under the categorical
terms of article 22 of the Con-
stitution.

garian Monarchy and the general
tendency of which is directed
against the territorial integrity
of the Monarchy."

We wished therefore to ensure
that Servia should be obliged
to see to it that press attacks of
that nature should be discon-
tinued in future; we wished
therefore to know that a definite
result in this connection was
assured.

Instead of this Servia offers us
the enactment of certain laws
which would be calculated to
serve as means towards this
result, viz. : —

(a) A law under which the
press publications in question
which are hostile to the Mon-
archy are to be punished on their
merits (suhjectiv) a matter which
is of complete indifference to us,
all the more as it is well known
that the prosecution of press
offences on their merits (suhjec-
tiv) is only very rarely possible,
and, if any law of the sort is laxly
administered, even in the few
cases of this nature a conviction
would not be obtained ; this,
therefore, is a proposal which in
no way meets our demand as it
does not offer us the slightest
guarantee for the result which
we wish to obtain.

(6) A law supplementary to
Article 22 of the constitution
which would permit confiscation
— a proposal which is equally
unsatisfactory to us, as the exist-
ence of such a law in Servia is of
no Use to us, but only the obliga-
tion of the Government to apply
it ; this, however, is not promised
us.

These proposals are therefore
entirely unsatisfactory — all the

» The Serbian Parliament.

208

Official Diplomatic Documents

more so as they are evasive in
that we are not told within what
period of time these laws would
be enacted, and that in the event
of the rejection of the Bills by the
Skupschtina — apart from the
possible resignation of the Gov-
ernment — everything would be
as it was before.

2. The Government possess no
proof, nor does the note of the
Imperial and Royal Government
furnish them with any, that the
Narodna Odbrana and other
similar societies have committed
up to the present any criminal
act of this nature through the
proceedings of any of their mem-
bers. Nevertheless, the Royal
Government will accept the de-
mand of the Imperial and Royal
Government, and will dissolve
the Narodna Odbrana Society
and every other society which
may be directing its efforts
against Austria-Hungary.

3. The Royal Servian Govern-
ment undertake to eliminate with-
out delay from public instruction
in Servia everything that serves
or might serve to foment the
propaganda against Austria-

The whole of the public life of
Servia teems with the propa-
ganda against the Monarchy, of
the Narodna Odbrana and of so-
cieties affiliated to it ; it is there-
fore quite impossible to admit
the reservation made by the
Servian Government when they
say that they know nothing
about them.

Quite apart from this the de-
mand we have made is not en-
tirely complied with, as we
further required : —

That the means of propaganda
possessed by these associations
should be confiscated.

That the re-establishment of
the dissolved associations under
another name and in another
form should be prevented.

The Belgrade Cabinet main-
tains complete silence in both
these directions, so that the half
consent which has been given us
offers no guarantee that it is
contemplated to put a definite
end to the activities of the asso-
ciations hostile to the Monarchy,
especially of the Narodna Od-
brana, by their dissolution.

In this case also the Servian
Government first ask for proofs
that propaganda against the
Monarchy is fomented in public
educational establishments in
Servia, when they must know

July 27, Austro -Hungarian Red Book No. 34

209

Hungary, whenever the Imperial
^nd Royal Government furnish
them with facts and proofs of
this propaganda.

4. The Royal Government also
agree to remove from the mili-
tary service all such persons as
the judicial enquiry may have
proved to be guilty of acts
directed against the integrity of
the territory of the Austro-Hun-
garian Monarchy, and they ex-
pect the Imperial and Royal
Government to communicate to
them at a later date the names
and the acts of these officers and
functionaries for the purposes of
the proceedings which are to be
taken against them.

5. The Royal Government
must confess that they do not
clearly grasp the meaning or the
scope of the demand made by the
Imperial and Royal Government
that Servia shall undertake to
xiccept the collaboration of the

that the school books which have
been introduced into the Servian
schools contain matter of an
objectionable nature in this re-
spect, and that a large propor-
tion of the Servian teachers are
enrolled in the ranks of the
Narodna Odbrana and the socie-
ties affiliated with it.

Moreover, here too the Ser-
vian Government have not
complied with a portion of our de-
mand as fully as we required, in-
asmuch as in their text they have
omitted the addition which we
desired "both as regards the
teaching body and also as re-
gards the methods of instruc-
tion" — an addition which quite
clearly shows in what directions
the propaganda against the Mon-
archy in the Servian schools is
to be looked for.

Inasmuch as the Royal Servian
Government attach to their con-
sent to the removal of the officers
and functionaries in question
from military and civil service
the condition that these persons
should have been convicted by
judicial enquiry, their consent is
confined to those cases in which
these persons are charged with a
crime punishable by law. As we,
however, demand the removal of
those officers and functionaries
who foment propaganda against
the Monarchy, a proceeding
which is not generally punish-
able by law in Servia, it appears
that our demand under this
head also is not complied with.

International Law has just as
little to do with this question as
has criminal procedure. This is
purely a matter of State police,
which must be settled by way of
a separate agreement. Servians
reservation is therefore unintel-

210

Official Diplomatic Documents

representatives of the Imperial
and Royal Government upon
their territory, but they declare
that they will admit such collab-
oration as agrees with the prin-
ciple of international law, with
criminal procedure, and with
good neighbourly relations.

6. It goes without saying that
the Royal Government consider
it their duty to open an enquiry
against all such persons as are,
or eventually may be, implicated
in the plot of the 15th ^ June,
and who happen to be within
the territory of the kingdom.
As regards the participation in
this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian
agents or authorities appointed
for this purpose by the Imperial
and Royal Government, the
Royal Government cannot ac-
cept such an arrangement, as
it would be a violation of the
Constitution and of the law of
criminal procedure ; neverthe-
less, in concrete cases communi-
cations as to the results of the
investigation in question might
be given to the Austro-Hun-
garian agents.

ligible, and would be calculated,
owing to the vague general form
in which it is couched, to lead to
unsurmountable difficulties when
the time comes for concluding
the prospective agreement.

Our demand was quite clear
and did not admit of misinter-
pretation. We desired : —

(1) The opening of a judicial
enquiry (enquete judiciaire)
against accessories to the. plot.

(2) The collaboration of repre-
sentatives of the Imperial and
Royal Government in the inves-
tigations relating thereto (" re-
cherches^' as opposed to "enquete
judiciaire").

It hever occurred to us that
representatives of the Imperial
and Royal Government should
take part in the Servian judicial
proceedings ; it was intended
that they should collaborate only
in the preliminary police inves-
tigations, directed to the collec-
tion and verification of the
material for the enquiry.

If the Servian Government
misunderstand us on this point
they must do so deliberately, for
the distinction between "enquete
judiciaire" and simple "recher-
ches" must be familiar to them.

In desiring to be exempted
from all control in the proceed-
ings which are to be initiated,
which if properly carried through
would have results of a very un-
desirable kind for themselves,
and in view of the fact that they
have no handle for a plausible
refusal of the collaboration of
our representatives in the pre-
liminary police investigations
(numberless precedents exist for

» Old style.

July 27 y AustrO'Hungarian Red Book No. 34

211

7. The Royal Government pro-
ceeded, on the very evening of
the deHvery of the note, to arrest
Commandant Voja Tankosic.
As regards Milan Ziganovic,
who is a subject of the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy and who
up to the 15th ^ June was em-
ployed (on probation) by the
directorate of railways, it has not
yet been possible to arrest him.

The Austro-Hungarian Gov-
ernment are requested to be so
good as to supply as soon as pos-
sible, in the customary form, the
presumptive evidence of guilt,
is well as the eventual proofs of
guilt which have been collected
up to the present, at the enquiry
at Serajevo for the purposes of
the later enquiry.

8. The Servian Government
will reinforce and extend the
measures which have been taken
for preventing the illicit traffic
in arms and explosives across the
frontier. It goes without saying
that they will immediately order
an enquiry and will severely
punish the frontier officials on
the Schabatz-Loznitza line who
have failed in their duty and
allowed the authors of the crime
of Serajevo to pass.

9. The Royal Government will
gladly give explanations of the
remarks made by their officials
whether in Servia or abroad, in
interviews after the crime which,
according to the statement of
the Imperial and Royal Govern-

lOld

such police intervention) they
have adopted a standpoint which
is intended to invest their refusal
with an appearance of justifica-
tion and to impress on our de-
mand the stamp of impractica-
bility.

This answer is disingenuous.

The enquiries set on foot by us
show that three days after the
crime, when it became known
that Ciganovic was implicated
in the plot, he went on leave and
travelled to Ribari on a commis-
sion from the Prefecture of
Police at Belgrade. It is, there-
fdre, in the first place incorrect
to say that Ciganovic had left
the Servian State Service on the
25th/28th June. To this must
be added the fact that the Pre-
fect of Police at Belgrade, who
had himself contrived the depar-
ture of Ciganovic and who knew
where he was stopping, declared
in an interview that no man of
the name of Milan Ciganovic
existed in Belgrade.

The interviews in question
must be quite well known to the
Royal Servian Government. By
requesting the Imperial and
Royal Government to communi-
cate tp them all kinds of details
about these interviews, and keep-
style.

212

Official Diplomatic Documents

ment, were hostile towards the
Monarchy, as soon as the Im-
perial and Royal Government
have communicated to them the
passages in question in these re-
marks, and as soon as they have
shown that the remarks were
actually made by the said offi-
cials, although the Royal Govern-
ment will themselves take steps
to collect eridence and proofs.

10. The Royal Government
will inform the Imperial and
Royal Government of the execu-
tion of the measures comprised
under the above heads, in so far
as this has not already been done
by the present note, as soon as
each measure has been ordered
and carried out.

If the Imperial and Royal
Government are not satisfied
with this reply, the Servian
Government, considering that it
is not to the common interest to
precipitate the solution of this
question, are ready, as always,
to accept a pacific understand-
ing, either by referring this ques-
tion to the decision of the Inter-
national Tribunal of The Hague,
or to the Great Powers which took
part in the drawing up of the
declaration made by the Servian
Government on the 18th (31st)
March, 1909.

ing in reserve the holding of a
formal enquiry into them, they
show that they are not willing
to comply seriously with this
demand either.

Belgium :

From Berlin

Belgian Gray Book No. 6

Baron BeyenSy Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M, Davignon, Belgian
Minister for Foreign Affairs,

(Telegram.) Berlin, July 21, 191 J^.

According to a telegram from the British Charge d' Affaires at
Belgrade,^ the Servian Government have given way on all the points

' Belgium had her own representative in Belgrade. No valid reason appears why
the information here published should have come in the roundabout way through the:

July 27, French Yellow Book No. 61 213

of the Austrian note. They even allow the intervention of Austrian
officials if such a proceeding is in conformity with the usages of inter-
national law. The British Charge d'Affaires considers that this reply
should satisfy Austria if she is not desirous of war. Nevertheless, a
more hopeful atmosphere prevails here to-day, more particularly
because hostilities against Servia have not begun. The British
Government suggest mediation by Great Britain, Germany, France,
and Italy at St. Petersburg and Vienna in order to find some basis
for compromise. Germany alone has not yet replied. The decision
rests with the Emperor.

France :

From Basle

French Yellow Book No. 60

M. Farges, French Consul-General at Basle, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Basle, July 21, 1914.

Four days ago the German officers on leave in this district re-
ceived orders to break off their leave and return to Germany.

Moreover, I learn from two reliable sources that warning has been
given to persons owning motor cars in the Grand Duchy of Baden to
prepare to place them at the disposal of the military authorities, two
days after a fresh order. Secrecy on the subject of this warning has
been directed under penalty of a fine.^

The population of Basle is very uneasy, and banking facilities are
restricted.

Faroes.

To Lcmdon, St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Rome

French Yellow Book No. 61

M. BienvenU'Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Jules
Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, on board the "La France'*
(for the President of the Council) and to the French Ambassadors
at London, St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Rome.

Paris, July 27, 1914.

The three steps taken by the German Ambassador at Paris seem
characteristic : — On Friday he reads a note ^ in which the German

British official in Belgrade and the Belgian Minister in Beriin. Since the exhaustive
Austro-Hungarian comment on the Serbian reply, Red Book No. 34, same day, was
presented to all the great Powers it is significant- that no reference to it is here made,"
and that the British official presents exclusively the Serbian, and one may say, Russian
view of the Serbian reply.

1 The accuracy of this statement can neither be proved nor disproved at this writ-
ing. German writers have denied it. If the information was true, one should expect
to have it reported directly by the French consuls in the Grand Duchy of Baden. On
the other hand, precautionary measures would, of course, have been taken near the
French frontier earlier than elsewhere.

2 French YeUow Book No. 28, July 24.

214 Official Diplomatic Documents

Government categorically place themselves between Austria and the
Powers, approving the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and adding
that "Germany warmly desires that the dispute should remain
localised, since any intervention of another party must through the
play of its alliances provoke incalculable consequences ; " — the second
day, Saturday, the effect having been produced, and the Powers hav-
ing, on account of the surprise, the shortness of the time-limit, and
the risks of general war, advised Servia to yield,^ Herr von Schoen
returns to minimise this step,^ pretending to be astonished at the
impression produced, and protests that intentions are attributed to
Germany which she does not harbour, "since," he says, "there was
neither concert before nor threat afterwards;" — the third day,
Sunday, the result having been obtained, since Servia has yielded,
as one might almost say, to all the Austrian demands, the German
Ambassador appears on two occasions ^ to insist on Germany's peace-
ful intentions, and on her warm desire to co-operate in the mainte-
nance of peace, after having registered the Austrian success which
closes the first phase of the crisis.

The situation at the moment of writing remains disturbing, on
account of the incomprehensible ^ refusal of Austria to accept Ser-
via's submission, of her operations of mobilisation, and of her threats
to invade Servia. The attitude taken up from the beginning by
the Austrian Government, with German support, her refusal to
accept any conversation with the Powers, practically do not allow
the latter to intervene effectively with Austria without the media-
tion of Germany. However, time presses, for if the Austrian army
crosses the frontier it will be very difficult to circumscribe the crisis,
Russia not appearing to be able to tolerate ^ the occupation of Servia
after the latter has in reality submitted to the Austrian note, giving
every satisfaction and guarantee. Germany, from the very fact of
the position taken up by her, is qualified to intervene effectively
and be listened to at Vienna ; if she does not do this she justifies all
suspicions and assumes the responsibility for the war.

The Powers, particularly Russia, France, and England, have by
their urgent advice induced Belgrade to yield, ^ they have thus ful-
filled their part ; now it is for Germany, who is alone able to gain a
rapid hearing at Vienna, to give advice to Austria, who has obtained
satisfaction and cannot, for a detail easy to adjust, bring about a
general war.

It is in these circumstances that the proposal made by the Cabinet
of London is put forward; M. Sazonof having said to the British
Ambassador that as a consequence of the appeal of Servia to the
Powers,® Russia would agree to stand aside. Sir Edward Grey has
formulated the following suggestion to the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin

1 See.note to British Blue Book No. 39, July 26, and British Blue Book No. 22,
where it appears that the advice was never given.
« French Yellow Book No. 36, July 25.
» French Yellow Book Nos. 56 and 57, July 26.

* For Austria's reasons see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27.

* Cf. Note 2, French Yellow Book No. 57, July 26.

* This appeal was never made ; cf. also French Yellow Book No. 68, July 27, 1914.

July 27, French Yellow Book No. 62 215

and Rome : the French, German and Itahan Ambassadors at Lon-
don would be instructed to seek with Sir Edward Grey a means of
resolving the present difficulties, it being understood that during
this conversation Russia, Austria and Servia would abstain from all
active military operations.^ Sir A. Nicolson has spoken of this sug-
gestion to the German Ambassador, who showed himself favourable
to it ; it will be equally well received in Paris, and also at Rome,
according to all probability. Here again it is Germany's turn to
speak, and she has an opportunity to show her goodwill by other
means than words.

I w^ould ask you to come to an understanding with your British
colleague, and to support his proposal with the German Govern-
ment in whatever form appears to you opportune. ^

Bienvenu-Martin.

To London, St. Petershurgh, Berlin, Vienna

French Yellow Book No. 62

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Presi-
deiit of the Council {on board the "La France'^) and to the French
Ambassadors at London, St. Peter sburgh, Berlin, Vienna.

Paris, July 27, 1914.

After his demarche of yesterday ^ tending to an intervention by
France at St. Petersburgh in favour of peace, the German Ambas-
sador returned, as I have informed you, to the Direction Politique
on the pretext that it might be desirable to communicate to the press
a short note indicating the peaceful and friendly sense of the con-
versation ; he even suggested the following terms : — " During the
afternoon the German Ambassador and the Minister for Foreign
Affairs had a fresh interview, in the course of which, in the most
amicable spirit and acting in an identical spirit of peaceful co-opera-
tion, they examined the means which might be employed to main-
tain general peace.'' He was told in answer, that the terms ap-
peared exaggerated and of a nature to create in public opinion illusions
on the real situation ; that, however, a brief note in the sense indi-
cated, that is to say, giving an account of a conversation at which
the means employed to safeguard peace had been examined, might
be issued if I approved it.

The note communicated was as follows: — "The German Am-
bassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs have had a fresh inter-
view, in the course of which they sought means of action by the Powers
for the maintenance of peace." This phrasing, deliberately colour-
less, avoided an appearance of solidarity with Germany which might
have been misinterpreted.

1 Note that no engagement is taken to refrain from mobilisation.

2 This last paragraph can refer only to the French Ambassador in Berlin, although
the despatch is not*listed as having been sent also to Berlin.

3 French Yellow* Book No. 56 and 57, July 26.

216 Official Diplomatic Documents

This morning ^ Herr von Schoen addressed a private letter to the
PoHtical Director under pretext of resuming his interview with the
^Minister, and has added : " Note w^ell the phrase in an identical
spirit of peaceful co-operation. This is not an idle phrase, but the
sincere expression of the truth." The summary annexed to the
letter was drawn up as follows : — " The Cabinet of Vienna has,
formally and officially, caused it to be declared to that of St. Peters-
burgh, that it does not seek any territorial acquisition in Servia, and
that it has no intention of making any attempt against the integrity
of the kingdom ; its sole intention is that of assuring its own tran-
quillity. At this moment the decision whether a European war
must break out depends solely on Russia. The German Govern-
ment have firm confidence that the French Government, with which
they know that they are at one in the warm desire that European
peace should be able to be maintained, will use their whole influence
with the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh in a pacific spirit."

I have let you know the reply ^ which has been given (a French
demarche at St. Petersburgh would be misunderstood,^ and must
have as corollary a German demarche at Vienna, or, failing that,
mediation by the four less interested Powers in both capitals).

Herr von Schoen's letter is capable of different interpretations;
the most probable is that it has for its object, like his demarche itself,
an attempt to compromise France with Russia and, in case of failure,
to throw the responsibility for an eventual war on Russia and on
France ^ ; finally, by pacific assurances which have not been listened
to, to mask military action by Austria in Servia intended to com-
plete the success of Austria.

I communicate this news to you by way of information and for
any useful purpose you can put it to.

Bienvenu-Martin.

From London

French Yellow Book No. 63

M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenii-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 21, 1914.

The German Ambassador and the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador
allow it to be understood that they are sure that England would
preserve neutrality if a conflict were to break out. Sir Arthur Nicol-

^ From Russian Orange Book No. 28, July 26, it appears that this declaration was
made on July 26. See German White Book 10a, July 26, giving an official German
message to France, which is not printed in its entirety in the Yellow Book.

* For a similar refusal of Great Britain to exert her conciliatory influence in Petro-
grad. see French Yellow Book No. 80, July 28.

' The Times translation says "would have been difficult to explain." This is the
more accurate translation.

< Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 29, July 26. It seems that the entire French de-
spatch refers to events that took place on the previous day. This then is a "rewritten "
despatch for the purpose of making the Yellow Book appear to be more complete
than it is.

July 27, French Yellow Book No. 65 217

son has told me/ however, that Prince Lichnowsky cannot, after the
conversation which he has had with him to-day, entertain any doubt
as to the freedom which the British Government intended to pre-
serve of intervening in case they should judge it expedient.

The German Ambassador will not have failed to be struck with
this declaration, but to make its weight felt in Germany and to avoid
a conflict, it seems indispensable that the latter should be brought
to know for certain that they will find England and Russia by the

side of France.^ _^ ^

De Fleuriau.

From St Petershurgh

French Yellow Book No. 64

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petershurgh, to M. Bien-
venu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petershurgh, July 27, 1914.

M. Sazonof has used conciliatory language to all my colleagues.

In spite of the public excitement, the Russian Government is
applying itself successfully to restraining the press; in particular
great moderation towards Germany has been recommended.^

M. Sazonof has not received any information from Vienna or from

Berlin since yesterday. t^ ^

'^ Paleologue.

From Constantinople

French Yellow Book No. 65

M. Bompard, French Ambassador at Constantinople, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Therapia, July 27, 1914.

The Austro-Servian conflict holds the attention of the Ottoman
Government, and the Turks are delighted at the misfortunes of
Servia, but people here generally are led to believe that the conflict
will remain localised. It is generally thought that once again Russia
will not intervene in favour of Servia in circumstances which would
extend the armed conflict.

The unanimous feeling in Ottoman political circles is that Austria,
with the support of Germany, will attain her objects and that she
will make Servia follow Bulgaria and enter into the orbit of the
Triple Alliance.^ Bompard.

1 This is not given in the British Blue Book.

2 For the culmination of this wish, see French Yellow Book No. 138, August 2, 1914.

3 But even M. Paleologue does not claim that it was observed. See the Russian
press of these days.

* This is a very important statement ; especially since no one had ever claimed
that Bulgaria had been forced into "the orbit of the Triple Alliance" by unfair or
militaristic means.

218 Official Diplomatic Documents

From London

French Yellow Book No. 66

M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 27, 191 If..

Sir Edward Grey ^ told the German Ambassador this morning
that if Austria were to invade Servia after the Servian reply, she
would make it clear that she was not merely aiming at the settlement
of the questions mentioned in her note of July 23, but that she wished
to crush a small state. "Then," he added, "a European question
would arise, and war would follow in which other Powers would be
led to take a part."

The attitude of Great Britain is confirmed by the postponement
of the demobilisation of the fleet. The First Lord of the Admiralty
took this measure quietly on Friday ^ on his own initiative ; to-night.
Sir Edward Grey and his colleagues decided to make it public.
This result is due to the conciliatory attitude of Servia and Russia.

De Fleuriau.

From Berlin

French Yellow Book No. 67

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 27, 19U.

To-DAY I have had a conversation with the Secretary of State on
the proposal by England that Germany should join the Cabinets of
London, Paris and Rome to prevent hostilities between St. Peters-
burgh and Vienna.

I remarked to him that Sir Edward Grey's proposal opened the
way to a peaceful issue. Herr von Jagow replied that he was dis-
posed to join in, but he remarked to me that, if Russia mobilised,
Germany would be obliged to mobilise at once, that we should be
forced to the same course also, and that then a conflict would be
almost inevitable. I asked him if Germany would regard herself as
bound to mobilise in the event of Russia mobilising only on the Aus-
trian frontier; he told me "No," and authorised me formally to
communicate this limitation to you. He also attached the greatest
importance to an intervention with Russia by the Powers which
were friendly with and allied to her.

Finally, he remarked that if Russia attacked Austria, Germany
would be obliged to attack at once on her side. The intervention

1 Cf. British Blue Book No. 46, July 27, 1914.

* Friday was July 24 ; cf. Sir E. Grey'^ " to-day," British Blue Book No. 48, July 27,
1914 ; see also Blue Book No. 47, July 27, 1914.

For the effect of this admiralty order on Russia and on bringing on the war, see
Editorial, Daily News (London), August 1, 1914.

July 27, French Yellow Book No, 69 219

proposed by England at St. Petersburgh and Vienna ^ could, in his
opinion, only come into operation if events were not precipitated.
In that case, he does not despair that it might succeed. I expressed
my regret that Austria, by her uncompromising attitude had led
Europe to the difficult pass through which we were going, but I
expressed the hope that intervention would have its effect.

Jules Cambon.

From London

French Yellow Book No. 68

M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d^ Affaires at London^ to M. Bienwnu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 27, 1914.

Yesterday in the course of a conversation between M. Sazonof,
M. Paleologue and Sir G. Buchanan, the Russian Minister said that
Servia was disposed to appeal ^ to the Powers, and that in that case
his Government would be prepared to stand aside.

Sir E. Grey has taken these words as a text on which to formulate
to the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin, and Rome a proposal with which
Sir Francis Bertie will acquaint your Excellency. The four Powers
would intervene in the dispute, and the French, German, and Italian
Ambassadors at London would be instructed to seek, with Sir E.
Grey, a means of solving the present difficulties.

It would be understood that, during the sittings of this little con-
ference, Russia, Austria and Servia would abstain from all active
military operations. Sir A. Nicolson has spoken of this suggestion
to the German Ambassador, who has shown himself favourable to it.

De Fleuriau.

From London

French Yellow Book No. 69

M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 27, 191^.

The Servian Minister has not received instructions from his Gov-
ernment to ask for the mediation ^ of England ; it is, however, pos-
sible that the telegrams from his Government have been stopped on
the way.

iThis is Sir E. Grey's first plan. The French wish was to have mediation between
Vienna and Belgrade.

2 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 61, July 27, and British Blue Book No. 22, July 25,
1914.

3 The proposal of English mediation was one of the many made but never pressed,
probably for the reason suggested in French Yellow Book No. 70, same day. The
nearest account of something in the nature of such a demand is given in Serbian Blue
Book No. 35, July 24 [note the date].

220 Official Diplomatic Documents

However, the British proposal for intervention by the four Powers
intimated in my preceding telegram has been put forward, and ought
I think to be supported in the first place. j^ ^

To London

French Yellow Book No. 70

M. Bienvenu-Martiny Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M, de
Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London.

Paris, July 27, 1914.

The British Ambassador has communicated to me Sir E. Grey's
proposal ^ for common action by England, Germany, France and
Italy at Vienna, Belgrade ^ and St. Petersburgh, to stop active mili-
tary operations while the German, Italian and French Ambassadors
at London examine, with Sir Edward Grey, the means of finding a
solution for the present complications.

I have this morning directed M. Jules Cambon to talk this over
with the British Ambassador at Berlin, and to support his demarche
in whatever form he should judge suitable.

I authorise you to take part in the meeting proposed by Sir E.
Grey. I am also ready to give to our representatives at Vienna, St.
Petersburgh and Belgrade, instructions in the sense asked for by the
British Government.

At the same time I think that the chances of success of Sir E.
Grey's proposal depend essentially on the action that Berlin would
be disposed to take at Vienna ; a demarche from this side, promoted
with a view to obtain a suspension of military operations, would
appear to me doomed to failure if Germany's influence were not first
exercised.

I have also noted, during Baron Von Schoen's observations, that

the Austro-Hungarian Government was particularly susceptible

when the words "mediation," "intervention," "conference" were

used, and was more willing to admit "friendly advice" and "con-
jt

Bienvenu-Martin .

versations.

From London

French Yellow Book No. 71

M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 27, 1914-

I HAVE communicated to Sir Edward Grey your adherence to his
proposal for mediation by the four Powers and for a conference at

1 British Blue Book No. 11, July 24 and No. 24, July 25.

"Belgrade is not contained in the British proposal, British Blue Book No. 11,
July 24. It was, however, France's persistent wish to have mediation between Vienna
and Belgrade.

July 27, French Yellow Book No. 72 221

London. The British Ambassador at Vienna has received the neces-
sary instructions to inform the Austro-Hungarian Government as
soon as his French, German, and Italian colleagues are authorised
to make the same demarche.

The Italian Government have accepted intervention by the four
Powers with a view to prevent military operations ; they are con-
sulting the German Government on the proposal for a conference
and the procedure to be followed with regard to the Austro-Hungarian
Government. The German Government have not yet replied.

De Fleuriau.

From Rome

French Yellow Book No. 72

M. BarrerCy French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, July 27, 19U.

The Marquis di San Giuliano has returned to Rome this evening,
and I saw him immediately after his arrival. He spoke to me of the
contents of the Austrian note, and formally assured me that he had
not had any previous knowledge of it.^

He knew, indeed, that this note was to have a rigorous and for-
cible character ; but he had not suspected that it could take such a
form. I asked him if it was true that he had given at Vienna, as
certain papers allege, an approval of the Austrian action and an
assurance that Italy would fulfil her duties as an ally towards Aus-
tria. "In no way :" the Minister replied : "we were not consulted ;
we were told nothing ; it was not for us then to make any such com-
munication to Vienna."

The Marquis di San Giuliano thinks that Servia would have acted
more wisely if she had accepted the note in its entirety ; to-day he
still thinks that this would be the only thing to do, being convinced
that Austria will not withdraw any of her claims, and will maintain
them, even at the risk of bringing about a general conflagration ; he
doubts whether Germany is disposed to lend herself to any pressure
on her ally. He asserts, however, that Germany at this moment
attaches great importance to her relations with London,^ and he
believes that if any Power can determine Berlin in favour of peaceful
action, it is England.

As for Italy, she will continue to make every effort in favour of
peace. It is with this end in view, that he has adhered without
hesitation to Sir Edward Grey's proposal for a meeting in London of
the Ambassadors of those Powers which are not directly interested
in the Austro-Servian dispute. Barrere

1 It is noteworthy that the Entente diplomats in none of the published despatches
doubted the honesty of Italy's denial of having had previous accurate knowledge of
the Austrian note. Cf. also French Yellow Book No. 51, July 26.

2 The opponents of Germany have desired to minimize Germany's wish to be on
good terms with England.

222 Official Diplomatic Documents

From Berlin

French Yellow Book No. 73

M. Jules Camhon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 21, 1911^.

The British Ambassador, who returned to-day, saw the Secre-
tary of State and discussed with him Sir Edward Grey's proposal.
In his reply Herr von Jagow continued to manifest his desire for peace,
but added that he could not consent to anything which would re-
semble a conference of the Powers ; that would be to set up a kind
of court of arbitration, the idea of which would only be acceptable if
it were asked for by Vienna and St. Petersburgh.^ Herr von Jagow's
language confirms that used by Baron von Schoen to your Excellency.

In fact, a demarche by the four Powers at Vienna and St. Peters-
burgh could be brought about by diplomatic means without assum-
ing the form of a conference and it is susceptible of many modifica-
tions; the important thing is to make clear at Vienna and at St.
Petersburgh the common desire of the four Powers that a conflict
should be avoided. A peaceful issue from the present difficulties
can only be found by gaining time. j^^^^^ Cambon.

From Berlin

French Yellow Book No. 74

if. Jules Camhon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 27, 1914.

I HAD a conversation to-day with the Secretary of State and gave
support to the demarche which Sir E. Goschen had just made.

Herr von Jagow replied to me, as he had to the British Ambassa-
dor, that he could not accept ^ the proposal that the Italian, French
and German Ambassadors should be instructed to endeavour to find
with Sir Edward Grey a method of resolving the present difficulties,
because that would be to set up a real conference to deal with the
affairs of Austria and Russia.^

I replied to Herr von Jagow that I regretted his answer, but that
the great object which Sir Edward Grey had in view went beyond any
question of form ; that what was important was the co-operation
of Great Britain and France with Germany and Italy in a work of
peace; that this co-operation could take effect through common
demarches at St. Petersburgh and at Vienna,^ that he had often ex-

1 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 70, same day.
« Cf. French Yellow Book Nos. 70 and 73, same day.

' See, however, British Blue Book No. 46, same day, where Germany accepts "in
principle."

* Cf. French Yellow Book No. 73, same day.

July 27, French Yellow Book No. 74 223

pressed to me his regret at seeing the two aUied groups always op-
posed to one another in Europe ; that there was here an opportunity
of proving that there was a European spirit, by shewing four Powers
belonging to the two groups acting in common agreement to prevent
a conflict.

Herr von Jagow evaded the point by saying that Germany had
engagements with Austria. I observed to him that the relations of
Germany with Vienna were no closer than those of France with
Russia/ and that it was he himself who actually was putting the two
groups of allies in opposition.

The Secretary of State then said to me that he was not refusing
to act so as to keep off an Austro-Russian dispute, but that he could
not intervene in the Austro-Servian dispute. "The one is the con-
sequence of the other," I said, "and it is a question of preventing
the appearance of a new factor of such a nature as to lead to inter-
vention by Russia."

As the Secretary of State persisted in saying that he was obliged
to keep his engagements towards Austria, I asked him if he was
bound to follow her everywhere with his eyes blindfolded, and if he
had taken note of the reply of Servia to Austria which the Servian
Charge d'Affaires had delivered to him this morning. "I have not
yet had time," he said. "I regret it. You would see that except
on some points of detail Servia has yielded entirely. It appears then
that, since Austria has obtained the satisfaction which your support
has procured for her, you might to-day advise her to be content or
to examine with Servia the terms of her reply."

As Herr von Jagow gave me no clear reply, I asked him whether
Germany wished for war. He protested energetically, saying that
he knew what was in my mind, but that it was wholly incorrect.
"You must then," I replied, "act consistently. When you read the
Servian reply, I entreat you in the name of humanity to weigh the
terms in your conscience, and do not personally assume a part of the
responsibility for the catastrophe which you are allowing to be pre-
pared." Herr von Jagow protested anew, adding that he was ready
to join England and France in a common effort, but that it was neces-
sary to find a form for this intervention which he could accept, and
that the Cabinets must come to an understanding on this point.

"For the rest," he added, "direct conversations between Vienna
and St. Petersburgh have been entered upon and are in progress.^
I expect very good results from them and I am hopeful."

As I was leaving I told him that this morning I had had the im-
pression that the hour of detente had struck, but I now saw clearly
that there was nothing in it. He replied that I was mistaken ; that

1 This has been denied by those who have claimed that the Teutonic alliance was
practically for aggressive purposes, while the French-Russian alliance was entirely
defensive.

2 Sazonof had proposed this conversation ; cf. Russian Orange Book No. 25, July 26,
and No. 38, July 27, alsQ French Yellow Book No. 54, July 26 ; also British Blue Book
Nos. 55 and 69, July 28. From French Yellow Book No. 54, it appears that Russia had
for the time being abandoned the Grey Conference idea, and that the French Ambas-
sador to Russia believed Russia's new plan " to be preferable to any other procedure."

224 Official Diplomatic Documents

he hoped that matters were on the right road and would perhaps
rapidly reach a favourable conclusion. I asked him to take such
action in Vienna as would hasten the progress of events, because it
was a matter of importance not to allow time for the development in
Russia of one of those currents of opinion which carry all before
them.

In my opinion it would be well to ask Sir Edward Grey, who must
have been warned by Sir Edward Goschen of the refusal to his pro-
posal in the form in which it was made, to renew it under another
form, so that Germany would have no pretext for refusing to asso-
ciate herself with it, and would have to assume the responsibilities
that belong to her in the eyes of England.

Jules Cambon.

To Lcmdorif St, Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome

French Yellow Book No. 75

M, BienvenvrMartin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the
French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna,
Rome.

Paris, July 27, 1914.

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador came to see me to hand me a
memorandum ^ which amounted to an indictment of Servia ; he was
instructed by his Government to state that since Servia had not
given a satisfactory reply to the requirements of the Imperial Gov-
ernment, the latter found themselves obliged to take strong measures
to induce Servia to give the satisfaction and guarantees that are re-
quired of her. To-morrow the Austrian Government will take steps
to that effect.

I asked the Ambassador to acquaint me with the measures con-
templated by Austria, and Count Scezsen replied that they might
be either an ultimatum, or a declaration of war, or the crossing of
the frontier, but he had no precise information on this point.

I then called the Ambassador's attention to the fact that Servia
had accepted Austria's requirements on practically every point, and
that the differences that remained on certain points might vanish
with a little mutual goodwill, and with the help of the Powers who
wished for peace; by fixing to-morrow as the date for putting her
resolution into effect, Austria for the second time was making their
co-operation practically impossible, and was assuming a grave respon-
sibility in running the risk of precipitating a war the limits of which
it was impossible to foresee.

I enclose for your information the memorandum that Count
Scezsen handed to me.

Bienvenu-Martin.

1 The so-called dossier, see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25. It was
published only in part in the New York Times translation of the French Yellow Book.
Sir E. Grey apparently received the dossier on the same day but gave only a very brief
nummary of it in British Blue Book No. 48, July 27. The dossier itself is not printed
in the British Blue Book.

July 27, German White Book Exhibit 11 225

Enclosure

Memorandum of the Austro-Hungarian G(yvernment, handed by Count
Scezsen to M. Bienvenur- Martin on July 21, 1914.

(See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25.)

From Serbia

The reply of the Serbian Government to the Austro-Hungarian note was
communicated to France on this day, July 27, 1914. See French Yellow Book
No. 49, July 25, and for text Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914,
except that France did not publish the Austro-Hungarian comment.

Germany :

From KoTmo

German White Book Exhibit 8

Telegram of the Imperial Consulate at Komw to the Chancellor on
July 27th, 1914.

Kovno has been declared to be in a state of war.

From Berne

German White Book Exhibit 9

Telegram of the Imperial Minister at Berne to the Chancellor on
July 27th, 1914.

Have learned reliably that French XlVth corps has discontinued
manoeuvres.

From St. Petersburgh

German White Book Exhibit 11

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chan-
cellor on July 27th, 1914-

Military Attache reports a conversation with the Secretary of War.

Sasonof has requested the latter to enlighten me on the situation.
The Secretary of War has given me his word of honour that no order
to mobilise has as yet been issued.^ Though general preparations
are being made, no reserves were called and no horses mustered. If
Austria crossed the Servian frontier, such military districts as. are
directed toward Austria, viz., Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, are to
be mobilised. Under no circumstances those on the German frontier,
Warsaw, Vilni, St. Petersburg. Peace with Germany was desired very
much. Upon my inquiry into the object of mobilisation against

1 The Czar telegraphed to the Emperor on July 30 that mobilisation had been
decided upon five days ago, i.e. July 25. Cf. German White Book, Exhibit 23a, July 30.
Cf . also British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, note 5.

226 Official Diplomatic Documents

Austria he shrugged his shoulders and referred to the diplomats. I
told the Secretary that we appreciated the friendly intentions, but
considered mobilisation even against Austria as very menacing.

To London
German White Book Exhibit 12

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London
on July 27th, 19U.

We know as yet nothing of a suggestion of Sir Edward Grey's to
hold a quadruple conference in London.-^ It is impossible for us to
place our ally in his dispute with Servia before a European tribunal.
Our mediation must be limited to the danger of an Austro-Russian
conflict.

To London

German White Book Exhibit 15

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in London
on July 27th, 1914.

We have at once started the mediation proposal in Vienna in the
sense as desired by Sir Edward Grey. We have communicated be-
sides to Count Berchtold the desire of M. Sasonof for a direct parley
with Vienna.^

Great Britain :

From Vienna

British Blue Book No. 41

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.
— {Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 27, 1914.

I HAVE had conversations with all my colleagues representing the
Great Powers. The impression left on my mind is that the Austro-
Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable ; that the
Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved to have war with
Servia ; that they consider their position as a Great Power to be at
stake; and that until punishment has been administered to Servia
it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation. This
country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Servia,
and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a great
disappointment.

^ Apparently antedates British Blue Book No. 43, and French Yellow Book No. 67,
July 27.

2 Apparently sent in reply to conversation between Mr. von Jagow and the British
Ambassador. British Blue Book No. 43, same day. Cf. also British Blue Book
No. 46, same day.

July 27, British Blue Booh No, 43 227

I propose, subject to any special directions you desire to send me,
to express to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs the hope of His
Majesty's Government that it may yet be possible to avoid war, and
to ask his Excellency whether he can not suggest a way out even now.

From Paris
British Blue Book No. 42

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. —
(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 27, 1914.

Your proposal,^ as stated in your two telegrams of yesterday,
is accepted by the French Government. French Ambassador in
London, who returns there this evening, has been instructed ac-
cordingly. Instructions have been sent to the French Ambassador
at Berlin to concert with his British colleague as to the advisability
of their speaking jointly to the German Government. Necessary
instructions have also been sent to the French representatives at
Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh, but until it is known that the
Germans have spoken at Vienna with some success, it would, in the
opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, be dangerous for the French,
Russian, and British Ambassadors to do so.

From Berlin
British Blue Book No. 43

Sir B. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. —

{Received July 27.)
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 27, 1914.

Your telegram of 26th July.^

Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practi-
cally amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion,
be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He
could not therefore fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he
was to co-operate for the maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that
your idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that repre-
sentatives of the foui* nations not directly interested should discuss
and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He main-
tained, however, that such a conference as you proposed was not
practicable. He added that news he had just received from St.
Petersburgh showed that there was an intention on the part of M. de
Sazoribf^ to exchange views with Count Berchtold.^ He thought

1 The official version prints here as a footnote "Nos. 36 and 37." These two
despatches contained different proposals as explained above in note 1 to British Blue
Book No. 37, July 26. . ^^ . , ^, ^ ,

2 British Blue Book No. 36, July 26 according to footnote m Official Blue Book.
Cf., however, British Blue Book No. 46, where Germany accepts the offer of No. 37.
See notes on Nos. 36 and 37, July 26, 1914.

' Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. . ^ -r^ , ^.r

< Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Cf. Russian Orange Book No.
25, July 26, 1914.

228 Official Diplomatic Documents

that this method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result^
and that it would be best, before doing anything else, to await out-
come of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian
Governments.

In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said that
as yet Austria was only partially mobilising, but that if Russia mo-
bilised against Germany latter would have to follow suit. I asked
him what he meant by "mobilising against Germany." He said that
if Russia only mobilised in south, Germany would not mobilise, but
if she mobilised in north, Germany would have to do so too, and
Russian system of mobilisation was so complicated that it might be
difficult exactly to locate her mobilisation. Germany would therefore
have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise.

Finally, Secretary of State said that news from St. Petersburgh
had caused him to take more hopeful view of the general situation.^

From St. Petersburgh
British Blue Book No. 44

Sir G. Bux^hanariy British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward
Grey. — {Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 27, 1914.

Austrian Ambassador tried, in a long conversation which he had
yesterday^ with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to explain away
objectionable features of the recent action taken by the Austro-
Hungarian Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out
that, although he perfectly understood Austria's motives, the ultima-
tum had been so drafted that it could not possibly be accepted as a
whole by the Servian Government. Although the demands were
reasonable enough in some cases, others not only could not possibly
be put into immediate execution seeing that they entailed revision
of existing Servian laws, but were, moreover, incompatible with
Servia's dignity as an independent State. It would be useless for
Russia to offer her good offices at Belgrade, in view of the fact that she
was the object of such suspicion in Austria. In order, however, to
put an end to the present tension, he thought that England and
Italy might be willing to collaborate with Austria.^ The Austrian

1 Cf. German White Book, Exhibit No. 5, July 26.

2 July 26, Russian Orange Book No. 25, July 26. French Yellow Book No. 54,
July 26.

' This is a new proposal added to the others that had been offered : (o) Sir Edward
Grey's various conference plans, (6) Sazonof's plan to substitute for the Conference
direct conversation with Vienna. This last proposal, according to Sir G. Buchanan,
was made by Sazonof to the Austrian Ambassador, This was, however, not the case.
See Sazonof's report of the interview, Russian Orange Book No. 25, July 26, and the
French Ambassador's report, French Yellow Book No. 54, same day, and the Austrian
Ambassador's report, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 31, July 27. From French
Yellow Book No. 52, July 26, it appears that this proposal may have been made to
the Italian Ambassador. It was directly made to Rome by Sazonof in Russian Orange
Book No. 23, July 26. From this despatch, where Italy is urged to adopt a definitely
unfavourable attitude, it is clear that the proposal was not bona fide, which may be
the reason why Sir E. Grey did not accept it. The prominent fact of the entire in-
vestigation is that Sir G. Buchanan's despatch is inaccurate.

July 27, British Blue Book No. 46 229

Ambassador undertook to communicate his Excellency's remarks to
his Government.

On the Minister for Foreign Affairs questioning me, I told him that
I had correctly defined the attitude of His Majesty's Government in
my conversation with him, which I reported in my telegram of the
24th instant.^ I added that you could not promise to do anything
more, and that his Excellency was mistaken if he believed that the
cause of peace could be promoted by our telling the German Govern-
ment that they would have to deal with us as well as with Russia
and France if they supported Austria by force of arms.^ Their atti-
tude would merely be stiffened by such a menace, and we could only
induce her to use her influence at Vienna to avert war by approaching
her in the capacity of a friend who was anxious to preserve peace. His
Excellency must not, if our efforts^ were to be successful, do anything
to precipitate a conflict. In these circumstances I trusted that
the Russian Government would defer mobilisation ukase for as long
as possible, and that troops would not be allowed to cross the frontier
even when it was issued.

In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that until the issue
of the Imperial ukase no effective steps towards mobilisation could
be taken, and the Austro-Hungarian Government would profit by
delay in order to complete her military preparations if it was deferred
too long.

From St. Petersburgh

British Blue Book No. 45

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward
Grey. — {Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 27, 1914.

Since my conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as
reported in my telegram of to-day,^ I understand that his Excellency
has proposed that the modifications to be introduced into Austrian
demands should be the subject of direct conversation between Vienna
and St. Petersburgh.

To Berlin

British Blue Book No. 46

Sir Edward Grey to Sir B. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Ofwe, July 27, 1914^

German Ambassador has informed me that German Government
accept in principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the

1 See No. 6, July 24, 1914.

2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, 1914.

3 What these efforts were, to preserve peace with dignity for all, or to force Austria-
Hungary to submit, is not stated.

* See No. 44.

230 Official Diplomatic Documents

four Powers/ reserving, of course, their right as an ally to help Austria
if attacked. He has also been instructed ^ to request me to use
influence in St. Petersburgh to localise the war and to keep up the
peace of Europe.

I have replied that the Servian reply went farther than could have
been expected to meet the Austrian demands. German Secretary of
State has himself said that there were some things in the Austrian
note that Servia could hardly be expected to accept.^ I assumed
that Servian reply could not have gone as far as it did unless Russia
had exercised conciliatory influence at Belgrade, and it was really at
Vienna that moderating influence was now required. If Austria
put the Servian reply aside as being worth nothing and marched into
Servia, it meant that she was determined to crush Servia at all costs,
being reckless of the consequences that might be involved. Servian
reply should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause.
I said German Government should urge this at Vienna."^

I recalled what German Government had said as to the gravity
of the situation if the w^ar could not be localised, and observed that if
Germany assisted Austria against Russia it would be because, with-
out any reference to the merits of the dispute, Germany could not
afford to see Austria crushed.^ Just so other issues might be raised
that would supersede the dispute between Austria and Servia, and
would bring other Powers in, and the war would be the biggest ever
known; but as long as Germany would work to keep the peace I
would keep closely in touch. I repeated that after the Servian reply
it was at Vienna that some moderation must be urged.

To St. Petersburgh

British Blue Book No. 47

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Bv^hanariy British Ambassador at St. Peters-
burgh.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.

See my telegram of to-day to Sir E. Goschen.®

I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and
Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand
aside. His Excellency deplored the effect that such an impression
must produce.^

1 Cf . German White Book Exhibit 15, July 27, in reply to British Blue Book No. 43,
July 27, 1914.

» This further instruction is not printed in the German White Book.

• Confirmation of such a remark by Mr. von Jagow would be valuable.

* Germany complied with this request ; cf . British Blue Book No. 67, July 28.

' This is a clear reference to one danger threatening Austria-Hungary. The otner
danger of losing her prestige as a big Power if she failed to punish Serbian intrigues is
often mentioned in the despatches.

« The ofl&cial British version prints this footnote: "See No. 46." In first edition
the reference was given as No. 37.

' Cf . British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, where Sazonof hopes that England "would not
fail to proclaim her solidarity with Russia and France." Germany and Austria con-
tinued to believe until July 29 that England would not do so ; cf . British Blue Book No.
106, July 30, where the British Ambassador in Rome states that "Germany was now

July 27, British Blue Book No. 48 231

This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the
orders we have given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it
happens, at Portland, not to disperse for manoeuvre leave. But
I explained to the Russian Ambassador that my reference to it must
not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was
promised.^

We hear from German and Austrian sources that they believe
Russia will take no action so long as Austria agrees not to take
Servian territory.^ I pointed this out, and added that it would be
absurd if we were to appear more Servian than the Russians ^ in our
dealings with the German and Austrian Governments.

To Vienna
British Blue Book No. 48
Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.
Sir, Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.

Count Mensdorff ^ told me by instruction ^ to-day that the
Servian Government had not accepted the demands which the
Austrian Government were obliged to address to them in order to
secure permanently the most vital Austrian interests. Servia showed
that she did not intend to abandon her subversive aims, tending to-
wards continuous disorder in the Austrian frontier territories and their
final disruption from the Austrian Monarchy. Very reluctantly, and
against their wish, the Austrian Government were compelled to take
more severe measures to enforce a fundamental change of the attitude
of enmity pursued up to now by Servia. As the British Government
knew, the Austrian Government had for many years endeavoured to
find a way to get on with their turbulent neighbour, though this had
been made very difficult for them by the continuous provocations of
Servia. The Serajevo murder had made clear to everyone what

disposed to give more conciliatory advice to Austria as she seemed convinced that we
should act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid issue with us."
Cf. also British Blue Book No. 80, July 29, and French Yellow Book No. 96, July 29.

1 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 66, July 27, where it is stated that the fleet was kept
mobilised on July 24. See also letter by Admiral Lord Fisher, New York Evening Sun
and Milwaukee Free Press, April 19, 1915, "Mobilisation of the fleet before the war
on the innocent pretext of an expected visit from the king."

2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 33, July 26.

3 Cf. British Blue Book No. 78, July 29, where Sazonof says he could not be "more
Servian than Ser\'ia."

* Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

^ What follows is a very brief summary in general terms of the dossier, Austro-
Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25. This was received in Paris on July 27 ; see
French Yellow Book No. 75, of that date.

In Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 39, July 28, it is stated that the dossier had
been sent by post, "das Ihnen auf dem Postwege iibermittelte Dossier." And from
French Yellow Book No. 75, July 27, it appears that it had been sent early enough to
be presented in Paris on July 27. Such documents are generally sent to be presented
simultaneously at the various Foreign ofl&ces. It is, therefore, practically certain that
the dossier was presented also in London on July 27. The official Enghsh translation
"which is being sent to you by post" conveys the wrong impression that the document
could not have been in London on July 27. It is noteworthy that Sir E. Grey did not
print the whole dossier anywhere in the British Blue Book, while he even stated in the
Preface to the Blue Book edition of Sept. 28, 1914, that he "did not receive any state-
ment of the evidence on which Austria had founded her ultimatum till the 7th August."
See also note 1 to the dossier, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25, and the
Instructions to the several Ambassadors.

232 Official Diplomatic Documents

appalling consequences the Servian propaganda had already produced
and what a permanent threat to Austria it involved. We would
understand that the Austrian Government must consider that the
moment had arrived to obtain, by means of the strongest pressure,
guarantees for the definite suppression of the Servian aspirations and
for the security of peace and order on the southeastern frontier of
Austria. As the peaceable means to this effect were exhausted, the
iVustrian Government must at last appeal to force. They had not
taken this decision without reluctance. Their action, which had no
sort of aggressive tendency, could not be represented otherwise than
as an act of self-defence. Also they thought that they would serve
a European interest if they prevented Servia from being henceforth an
element of general unrest such as she had been for the last ten years.
The high sense of justice of the British nation and of British states-
men could not blame the Austrian Government if the latter defended
by the sword what was theirs, and cleared up their position with a
country whose hostile policy had forced upon them for years measures
so costly as to have gravely injured Austrian national prosperity.
Finally, the Austrian Government, confiding in their amicable re-
lations with us, felt that they could count on our sympathy in a
fight that was forced on them, and on our assistance in localising the
fight, if necessary.

Count Mensdorff added on his own account that, as long as Servia
was confronted with Turkey, Austria never took very severe measures
because of her adherence to the policy of the free development of the
Balkan States. Now that Servia had doubled her territory and popu-
lation without any Austrian interference, the repression of Servian
subversive aims was a matter of self-defence and self-preservation on
Austria's part. He reiterated that Austria had no intention of taking
Servian territory or aggressive designs against Servian territory.^

I said that I could not understand the construction ^ put by the
Austrian Government upon the Servian reply, and I told Count Mens-
dorff the substance of the conversation that I had had with the Ger-
man Ambassador this morning about that reply.

Count Mensdorff admitted that, on paper, the Servian reply might
seem to be satisfactory ; but the Servians had refused the one thing
— the co-operation of Austrian officials and police — which would be
real guarantee that in practice the Servians would not carry on their
subversive campaign against Austria.

I said that it seemed to me as if the Austrian Government believed
that, even after the Servian reply, they could make war upon Servia
anyhow, without risk of bringing Russia into the dispute. If they
could make war on Servia and at the same time satisfy Russia, well
and good ^ ; but, if not, the consequences would be incalculable. I
pointed out to him that I quoted this phrase from an expression of
the views of the German Government. I feared that it would be

* Cf. note No. 3 to the previous despatch.

* Cf. note to British Blue Book No. 39 under date of July 26.

' Sir E. Grey here expresses an idea contrary to that often mentioned, viz. that
England was the protector of the little nations.

July 27, Russian Orange Book No. 31 233

expected in St. Petersburgh that the Servian reply would diminish
the tension, and now, when Russia found that there was increased
tension, the situation would become increasingly serious. Already
the effect on Europe was one of anxiety. I pointed out that our
fleet was to have dispersed to-day,^ but we had felt unable to let it dis-
perse. We should not think of calling up reserves at this moment,
and there was no menace in what we had done about our fleet ; but,
owing to the possibility of a European conflagration, it was im-
possible for us to disperse our forces at this moment. I gave this as
an illustration of the anxiety that was felt. It seemed to me that the
Servian reply already involved the greatest humiliation to Servia
that I had ever seen a country undergo,^ and it was very disappointing
to me that the reply was treated by the Austrian Government as if
it were as unsatisfactory as a blank negative.

I am, etc.

E. Grey.
To Rome

British Blue Book No. 49
Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome.
Sir, Foreign Office, July 21, 1914..

The Italian Ambassador informed Sir A. Nicolson ^ to-day that the
Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed entirely with my proposal
for a conference of four to be held in London.

As regards the question of asking Russia, Austria-Hungary, and
Servia to suspend military operations pending the result of the con-
ference, the Marquis di San Giuliano ^ would recommend the sugges-
tion warmly to the German Government, and would enquire what
procedure they would propose should be followed at Vienna.

I am, etc.

E. Grey.
British Blue Book No. 39

Reply of Serbian Government to Austro-Hungarian note (communicated by
the Serbian Minister, July 27) . See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27.

Russia :

From London

Russian Orange Book No. 31

Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign

Affairs.
(Telegram.) London, July 14 (27), 1914.

I HAVE received your telegram of the 13th (26th) July.^ Please
inform me by telegraph whether you consider that your direct dis-

1 Cf. note 2 to British Blue Book No. 47, July 27.

2 With this "humiliation" of Serbia compare the fate in recent years of Persia,
Morocco, Corea, and other small nations.

3 British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
* Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

^ Not printed in Russian Orange Book.

234

Official Diplomatic Documents

cussions ^ with the Vienna Cabinet harmonise with Grey's scheme
for mediation by the four Governments. Having heard from the
British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that you would be prepared
to accept such a combination, Grey decided to turn it into an official
proposal, which he communicated yesterday to Berlin, Paris, and
Rome.^

To Paris and London

Russian Orange Book No. 32

Ruissian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at Paris
and London.

^Saint-Petershourg,
(Telegraphique.)

le H {27) juillet, 1914.
L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre
est venu s'informer si nous
jugeons utile que TA^igleterre
prenne I'initiative de convoquer
a Londres une conference des
representants de I'Angleterre, la
France, I'Allemagne et I'ltalie,
pour etudier une issue a la
situation actuelle.

J'ai repondu a TAmbassadeur
que j'ai entame des pourparlers
avec I'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-
Hongrie, en conditions que j'es-
pere favorables. Pourtant je
n'ai pas encore re^u de reponse a
la proposition que j'ai faite d'une
revision de la note entre les deux
Cabinets.

Si des explications directs avec
le Cabinet de Vienne se trou-
vaient irrealisables, je suis pret a
accepter la proposition anglaise,
ou toute autre de nature a
resoudre favorablement le conflit.

Je voudrais pourtant ecarter
des aujourd'hui un malentendu
qui pourrait surgir de la reponse

(Translation.)

St. Petershurgh,
(Telegraphic.)

July 27, 1914.
The British Ambassador came
to ascertain whether we think it
desirable that Great Britain
should take the initiative in con-
voking a conference in London
of the representatives of Great
Britain, France, Germany, and
Italy to examine the possibility
of a way out of the present situa-
tion.

I replied to the Ambassador
that I have begun conversations
with the Austro-Hungarian Am-
bassador under conditions which,
I hope, may be favourable. I
have not, however, received as
yet any reply to the proposal
made by me for revising the note
between the two Cabinets.

If direct explanations with the
Vienna Cabinet were to prove
impossible, I am ready to accept
the British proposal, or any other
proposal of a kind that would
bring about a favourable solu-
tion of the conflict.

I wish, however, to put an end
from this day forth to a mis-
understanding which might arise

1 See Orange Book No. 25, July 26 ; No, 38, July 27, and French Yellow Book No.
64, July 27. Sazonof had made the proposals of direct discussions of the Austrian
note to Serbia on July 27, and on July 28 had not yet heard from Vienna. For a re-
view of this whole subject see the note to British Blue Book No. 67, July 28.

* British Blue Book Nos. 36, 37, July 26, also Nos. 43 and 57, July 27.

July 27, Russian Orange Book No. 35 235

donnee par le Ministre de la from the answer given by the

Justice fran9ais a I'Ambassadeur French Minister of Justice to the

d'Allemagne, concernant des con- German Ambassador, regarding

seils de moderation a donner au counsels of moderation to be

Cabinet Imperial. given to the Imperial Cabinet.

(To Paris, London, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome

Russian Orange Book No. 33

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at Paris,
London, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome.

(Telegram.) St. Petersburg, July U (27), 1914.

I HAVE taken note of the reply ^ returned by the Servian Govern-
ment to Baron Giesl. It exceeds all our expectations in its modera-
tion, and in its desire to afford the fullest satisfaction to Austria.
We do not see what further demands could be made by Austria, unless
the Vienna Cabinet is seeking for a pretext for war with Serviac

From Paris

Russian Orange Book No. 34

Russian Charge d' Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

(Telegram.) Paris, July U (27), 19U.

The German Ambassador discussed the situation again to-day
at great length with the Director of the Political Department. The
Ambassador laid great stress on the utter impossibility of any media-
tion or conference.^

From Paris
Russian Orange Book No. 35
Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
(Telegram.) Paris, July U (27), 1914.

I DISCUSSED the situation with the Acting Minister for Foreign
Affairs, in the presence of Berthelot, directly after my return to Paris.
They both confirmed the information respecting the action taken
by the German Ambassador,^ which Sevastopoulo has already tele-
graphed to you. This morning Baron von Schoen confirmed his
declaration of yesterday in writing, i.e. :

1. That Austria has declared to Russia that she seeks no territorial
acquisitions and that she harbours no designs against the integrity
of Servia. Her sole object is to secure her own peace and quiet.

1 See note to British Blue Book No. 39, under date of July 26.

2 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 61, July 27.

3 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 61, July 27.

236 Official Diplomatic Documents

2. That consequently it rests with Russia to avoid war.

3. That Germany and France, entirely at one in their ardent desire
to preserve peace, should exercise their moderating influence upon
Russia.

Baron von Schoen laid special emphasis on the expression of soli-
darity of Germany and France. The Minister of Justice is convinced
that these steps on the part of Germany are taken with the evident
object of alienating Russia and France, t)f inducing the French
Government to make representations at St. Petersburg, and of thus
compromising our ally in our eyes ; and finally, in the event of war, of
throwing the responsibility not on Germany, who is ostensibly mak-
ing every effort to maintain peace, but on Russia and France.

From Paris
Russian Orange Book No. 36
Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
(Telegram.) Paris, July 14 {27), 1914.

It is clear from your telegrams ^ of the 13th (26) July that you were
not then aware of the reply of the Servian Government. The tele-
gram from Belgrade informing me of it also took twenty hours ^
to reach us. The telegram from the French Minister for Foreign
Affairs, sent the day before yesterday at 11 o'clock in the morning, at
the special urgent rate, which contained instructions to support our
representations, only reached its destination at 6 o'clock. There
is no doubt that this telegram was intentionally delayed by the
Austrian telegraph office.

From Paris
Russian Orange Book No. 37
Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
(Telegram.) Paris, July 14 {27), 1914.

On the instructions of his Government, the Austrian Ambassador has
informed the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that Servians answer
has not been considered satisfactory in Vienna, and that to-morrow,
Tuesday, Austria will proceed to take "energetic action" with the
object of forcing Servia to give the necessary guarantees. The
Minister having asked what form such action would take, the Ambas-
sador replied that he had no exact information on the subject, but it
might mean either the crossing of the Servian frontier, or an ultima-
tum, or even a declaration of war.

* Not printed in either the French Yellow Book or the Russian Orange Book.
' It also reached the French Government with a delay of twenty hours. Cf . French
YeUow Book No. 56, July 26.

July 27 y Russian Orange Book No. Jfi 237

From Berlin

Russian Orange Book No. 38

Russian Charge d' Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

(Telegram.) Berlin, July U (27), 1914.

I BEGGED the Minister for Foreign Affairs to support your proposal
in Vienna that Szapary should be authorised to draw up, by means of
a private exchange of views with you, a wording of the Austro-Hun-
garian demands which would be acceptable to both parties. Jagow
answered that he was aware of this proposal and that he agreed with
Pourtales that, as Szapary had begun this conversation, he might
as well go on with it. He will telegraph in this sense to the German
Ambassador at Vienna. I begged him to press Vienna with greater
insistence to adopt this conciliatory line; Jagow answered that he
could not advise Austria to give way.

From Berlin

Russian Orange Book No. 39

Russian Charge d^ Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

(Telegram.) Berlin, July 14 {27), 1914.

Before my visit to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day his
Excellency had received the French Ambassador, who endeavoured
to induce him to accept the British proposal for action in favour of
peace, such action to be taken simultaneously at St. Petersburgh and
at Vienna by Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and France. Cambon
suggested that these Powers should give their advice to Vienna in the
following terms : " To abstain from all action which might aggravate
the existing situation." {S'abstenir de tout acte qui pourrait aggraver
la situation de Vheure actuelle.) By adopting this vague formula, all
mention of the necessity of refraining from invading Servia might
be avoided. Jagow refused point-blank to accept this suggestion ^ in
spite of the entreaties of the Ambassador, who emphasised, as a good
feature of the suggestion, the mixed grouping of the Powers, thanks
to which the opposition between the Alliance and the Entente — a
matter of which Jagow himself had often complained — was avoided.

To Serbia

Russian Orange Book No. 40

Telegram from His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia to His
Royal Highness Prince Alexander of Serbia, July 14 (27), 1914-

When your Royal Highness applied to me at a time of especial
stress, you were not mistaken in the sentiments which I entertain for
you, or in my cordial sympathy with the Servian people.

1 For von Jagow's reasons see French Yellow Book No. 74, July 27, also Austro-
Hungarian Red Book No. 35, July 28.

238 Official Diplomatic Documents

The existing situation is engaging my most serious attention, and
my Government are using their utmost, endeavour to smooth away
the present difficulties. I have no doubt that your Highness and the
Royal Servian Government wish to render that task easy by neglecting
no step which might lead to a settlement, and thus both prevent the
horrors of a new war and safeguard the dignity of Servia.

From Vienna

Russian Orange Book No. 41

Russian Ambassador at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

(Telegram.) Vienna, July I4 (^7), 1914.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs is away. During a long conver-
sation which I had with Macchio to-day I drew his attention, in a
perfectly friendly way, to the unfavourable impression produced in
Russia by the presentation of demands by Austria to Servia, which it
was quite impossible for any independent State, however small, to
accept. I added that this method of procedure might lead to the
most undesirable complications, and that it had aroused profound
surprise and general condemnation in Russia. We can only suppose
that Austria, influenced by the assurances given by the German
Representative at Vienna, who has egged her on throughout this crisis,
has counted on the probable localisation of the dispute with Servia,
and on the possibility of inflicting with impunity a serious blow upon
that country. The declaration by the Russian Government that
Russia could not possibly remain indifferent in the face of such con-
duct has caused a great sensation here.

From London
Russian Orange Book No. 42

Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign
A fairs.

(Telegram.) London, July I4 {27), 1914.

Grey has just informed the German Ambassador, who came
to question him as to the possibility of taking action at St. Peters-
burg, that such action ought rather to be taken at Vienna, and that
the Berlin Cabinet were the best qualified to do so. Grey also
pointed out that the Servian reply to the Austrian note had exceeded
anything that could have been expected in moderation and in its
spirit of conciliation. Grey added that he had therefore come to
the conclusion that Russia must have advised Belgrade to return a
moderate reply, and that he thought the Servian reply could form
the basis of a peaceful and acceptable solution of the question.

July 27, Serbian Blue Book No. 43 239

In these circumstances, continued Grey, if Austria were to begin
hostilities in spite of that reply, she would prove her intention of
crushing Servia. Looked at in this light, the question might give
rise to a situation which might lead to a war in which all the Powers
would be involved

Grey finally declared that the British Government were sincerely
anxious to act with the German Government as long as the preser-
vation of peace was in question ; but, in the contrary event. Great
Britain reserved to herself full liberty of action.

Serbia:

From St. Petersburg

Serbian Blue Book No. 43

His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia to His Royal Highness the
Crotvn Prince of Serbia.

(Telegraphic.) Petrograd, July 14/27, 1914.

[See Russian Orange Book No. 40, July 27.]

240

Official Diplomatic Documents

Tuesday, July 28, 1914
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

Foreign Office of

Sent Despatches to

Received
Despatches from

Austria-Hungary

Belgrade, Beriin, London,
St. Petersburg!!

Beriin, Tokio

Belgium

Vienna

France

London, Berlin, St. Peters-

Vienna, London, Ber-

burgh, Vienna, Rome,

lin, St. Petersburgh,

Viviani

Germany

German Governments, St.

Peter sburgh
Emperor to Czar

Vienna

Great Britain

BerUn, St. Petersburgh

Paris, St. Petersburgh,
Vienna, Rome, Ber-
lin, Nish, French and
Russian Embassies

Russia

London

Fiume, Vienna, Berlin

Serbia

All Serbian legations
St. Petersburgh

Vienna

Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia and endeavours to explain her point of
view to England most especially, but also to Russia. Russia's extensive mobilisa-
tion results in Austria-Hungary calling on Germany for assistance and urging her
to use toward Russia "unambiguous language." Sir E. Grey's proposal trans-
mitted by Germany is declared to have come too late.

France is resolved to support English and -Russian proposals but persists in
claiming that mediation should not be between Vienna and Petrograd alone,
but include Belgrade. She views with suspicion every act and statement of
Germany, and refuses to announce that she and Germany had agreed to work for
peace. She also refuses to use a moderating influence on Russia.

Germany : The Chancellor informs the Federal Governments of the serious state
of affairs, expressing the hope to be able to maintain peace but announcing it as the
duty of Germany to support Austria-Hungary, if ** through the interference of
Russia the fire " should be spread. At the same time she urges Austria-Hungary
to come to an uniderstanding with Russia.

The Emperor' personally appeals to the Czar in the interest of peace.

Great Britain declares that she would find it embarrassing to give Russia
"pacific advice." She also does not follow up the advice sent by the British
Ambassador in Rome to the effect that "Serbia may be induced to accept note in
its entirety on the advice of the four Powers." Her own conference proposal
she "w^ould suspend" in favor of Russia's proposal of direct conversations with
Vienna. Sir E. Grey even made an alternate proposal, which Germany trans-
mitted to Vienna, but which is not mentioned either in the British Blue Book
or the French Yellow Book. (See German White Book, Exhibit 16.)

Russia announces the failure of direct conversations with Vienna at the very
moment when Sir E. Grey suspends his proposal, and disregarding Sir E. Grey's
conference plan calls for English mediation, apparently between Vienna and
Belgrade, which was France's suggestion.

Serbia, according to the uncontradicted statement of Vienna (British Blue
Book No. 56, under date of July 28) opens hostihties, and asks Russia for help,
assuring the latter of her loyalty.

July 28, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 38 241

Austria-Hungary :

From Berlin

Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 35
Count Szdgyeny to Count Berchtold,
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 28, 1914.

The proposal for mediation made by Great Britain, that Germany,
Italy, Great Britain and France should meet at a conference at
London, is declined ^ so far as Germany is concerned on the ground
that it is impossible for Germany to bring her Ally before a European
Court in her settlement with Servia.

From Tokio
Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 36
Freiherr Von Milller to Count Berchtold.
(Telegraphic.) Tokio, July 28, 1914.

To-day's semi-officialJapan Times contains a leading article which
concludes by saying that Japan is on the best possible terms with
the three Great Powers concerned — Austria-Hungary, Germany
and Russia — while it is in no way interested in Servia. In the case
of war, the Imperial Government would, as a matter of course, main-
tain the strictest neutrality.

To Belgrade

Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 37

Count Berchtold to the Royal Servian Foreign Office at Belgrade. ( Trans-
lated from the French.)

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914-

The Royal Servian Government not having answered in a satis-
factory manner the note of 23rd July presented by the Austro-Hun-
garian Minister at Belgrade, the Imperial and Royal Government
are themselves compelled to see to the safeguarding of their rights
and interests, and, with this object, to have recourse to force of arms.
Austria-Hungary consequently considers herself henceforward in a
state of war ^ with Servia.

To Berlin
Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 38
Count Berchtold to Count Szdgyeny in Berlin.
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914^

For Your Excellency's information and for communication to the
Secretary of State : —

1 Cf. British Blue Book No. 43, July 27. For a later agreement see British Blue
Book No. 46, July 27, and German White Book, Exhibits 12 and 15, July 27.

2 For the Austro-Hungarian note announcing to the Powers that war had been,
declared, see British Blue Book No. 50, July 28.

242 Official Diplomatic Documents

I have received the following telegram from Count Mensdorff^
dated the 27th inst. : —

" I have to-day had the opportunity of explaining at length to Sir
Edward Grey, that our action is not one of aggression but of self-
defence and of self-preservation, and that we have no intention of
making any territorial acquisition, or of destroying Servian independ-
ence.^ What we desire is to obtain a certain measure of satisfaction
for what has passed, and guarantees for the future.

For this purpose I availed myself of some of the points out of Your
Excellency's communications to Count Szapary.

Sir E. Grey said to me that he was very much disappointed that we
were treating the Servian answer as if it were a complete refusal.

He had believed that this answer would furnish a basis on which
the four other Governments could arrive at a peaceful solution.

This was his idea when he proposed a conference.

The conference would meet on the assumption that Austria-Hun-
gary as well as Russia would refrain from every military operation
during the attempt of the other Powers to find a peaceful issue.

(The declaration of Sir E. Grey in the House of Commons to-day
amplifies the project of a conference.) When he spoke of our refrain-
ing from military operations against Servia, I observed that I feared
that it was perhaps already too late. The Secretary of State ex-
pressed the view that if we were resolved under any circumstances to
go to war with Servia, and if we assumed that Russia would remain
quiet, we were taking a great risk. If we could induce Russia to
remain quiet, he had nothing more to say on the question. ^ If we
could not, the possibilities and the dangers were incalculable.

As a symptom of the feeling of unrest he told me that the British
Grand Fleet, which was concentrated in Portsmouth after the
manoeuvres, and which should have dispersed to-day,^ would for the
present remain there. ''We had not called up any Reserves, but as
they are assembled, we cannot at this moment send them home
again."

His idea of a conference had the aim of preventing, if possible, a
collision between the Great Powers, and he also aimed at the isolation
of the conflict. If, therefore, Russia mobilises and Germany takes
action, the conference necessarily breaks down.

I believe that I need not specially point out to Your Excellency
that Grey's proposal for a conference, in so far as it relates to our
conflict with Servia, appears, in view of the state of war which has
arisen, to have been outstripped by events.

1 British Blue Book No. 48, July 27.

2 This is a refutation of the popular claim that Great Britain went to war in part oq
Serbia's account, to vindicate the rights of the little nations.

» This refers to the interview of July 27. See British Blue Book No. 48.

July 28, AustrO'Hungarian Red Book No. Jfi 243

To London

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 39

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914.

We attach the greatest importance to the point that Sir E. Grey
should appreciate in an impartial manner our action against Servia
in general, and in particular our refusal to accept the Servian answer,
and I therefore ask Your Excellency to take the opportunity of ex-
plaining to the Secretary of State in detail the dossier which is being ^
sent to you by post, and that you will emphasise the specially salient
passages ; in the same sense Your Excellency should discuss with Sir
E. Grey the critical observations on the Servian note (the text of
the note without observations has been sent to Your Excellency by
post yesterday), ^ and you should make clear to him that the offer of
Servia to meet points in our note was only an apparent one, intended
to deceive Europe without giving any guarantee for the future.

As the Servian Government knew that only an unconditional ac-
ceptance of our demands could satisfy us, the Servian tactics can
easily be seen through : Servia accepted a number of our demands,
with all sorts of reservations, in order to impress public opinion
in Europe, trusting that she would not be required to fulfil her
promises. In conversing with Sir E. Grey your Excellency should lay
special emphasis on the circumstance that the general mobilisa-
tion of the Servian army was ordered for the afternoon of the 25th
July at 3 o'clock, while the answer to our note was delivered just
before the expiration of the time fixed, that is to say, a few minutes
before 6 o'clock. Up to then we had no military preparations, but
by the Servian mobilisation w^e were compelled to do so.

To St. Petersburgh

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 40

Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburgh.
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914.

For your Excellency's information and guidance :
The Imperial Russian Ambassador spoke to me to-day in order to
inform me of his return from short leave in Russia, and at the same
time to execute a telegraphic instruction of M. Sazonof . The latter
had informed him that he had had a lengthy and friendly discussion
with your Excellency (your Excellency's telegram of the 27th in-
stant),^ in the course of which he had discussed with great readiness

1 This is a wrong translation ; it should read, "which has been despatched to you,"
and is so translated in the English translation issued by the Austro-Hungarian Gov-
ernment.

2 Neither the dossier nor the Austro-Hungarian comments on the Serbian note were
printed in the British Blue Book, although the Serbian reply was printed in No. 39
before No. 40 which is a telegram of July 26. For the reason why this Serbian reply
is printed in this edition among the July 27 despatches, see note to British Blue Book
No. 39, under date of July 26.

3 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 31, July 27.

244 Official Diplomatic Documents

the various points of the Servian answer. M. Sazonof was of the
opinion that Servia had gone far in meeting our wishes, but that some
of the demands appeared to him entirely unacceptable, a fact which
he had not concealed from your Excellency. It appeared to him
under these circumstances that the Servian reply might properly be
regarded as furnishing a starting point for an understanding to attain
which the Russian Government would gladly lend a hand. M.
Sazonof therefore desired to propose to me that the exchange of ideas
with your Excellency should be continued, and that your Excellency
should receive instructions with this end in view.

In reply, I emphasised my inability to concur in such a proposal.
No one in our country could understand, nor could anyone approve
negotiations with reference to the wording used in the answer which
we had designated as unsatisfactory. This was all the more im-
possible because, as the Ambassador knew, there was a deep feeling
of general excitement which had already mastered public opinion.
Moreover, on our side war had to-day been declared against Servia.

In reply to the explanations of the Ambassador, which culminated
in asserting that we should not in any way suppress the admitted
hostile opinion in Servia by a warlike action, but that, on the contrary
we should only increase it, I gave him some insight into our present
relations towards Servia which made it necessary, quite against our
will, and without any selfish secondary object, for us to show our rest-
less neighbour, with the necessary emphasis, our firm intention not
to permit any longer a movement which was allowed to exist by
the Government, and which was directed against the existence of the
Monarchy. The attitude of Servia after the receipt of our note had
further not been calculated to make a peaceful solution possible,
because Servia, even before she transmitted to us her unsatisfactory
reply, had ordered a general mobilisation, and in so doing had already
committed a hostile act against us. In spite of this, however, we had
waited for three days. Yesterday hostilities were opened against us
on the Hungarian frontier on the part of Servia. By this act we
were deprived of the possibility of maintaining any longer the patience
which we had shown towards Servia. The establishment of a funda-
mental but peaceful amelioration of our relations towards Servia had
now been made impossible, and we were compelled to meet the Servian
provocation in the only form which in the given circumstances was
consistent with the dignity of the Monarchy.

To London

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 41

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914,

The British Ambassador, who discussed matters with me to-day
has, in accordance with his instructions, explained the attitude of
Sir E. Grey with regard to our conflict with Servia as follows : —

July 28, Amtro-Hungarian Red Book No. 4I 245

The British Government have followed the previous course of
events during the crisis with lively interest, and they attach im-
portance to giving us an assurance that they entertain sympathy for
us in the point of view we have adopted, and that they completely
understand the grievances which we have against Servia.

If England has no ground for making our dispute with Servia in
itself an object of special consideration, nevertheless this question can-
not escape the attention of the Cabinet at London, because this con-
flict may affect wider circles and thereby imperil the peace of Europe.

To this extent England is affected by the question, and it is only
on this ground that Sir E. Grey has been led to send an invitation to
the Governments of those countries which are not directly interested
in this conflict (Germany, Italy and France), in order to test in com-
mon with them by means of a continuous exchange of ideas the
possibilities of the situation, and to discuss how the differences may be
most quickly settled. Following the precedent of the London con-
ference during the last Balkan crisis, the Ambassadors of the various
States mentioned resident at London should, according to the view
of the British Secretary of State, keep themselves in continual con-
tact with him for the purpose indicated. Sir E. Grey had already
received answers expressed in very friendly terms from the Govern-
ments concerned, in which they concurred in the suggestion put
forward. At present it was also the wish of the Secretary of State,
if possible, to prevent even at the eleventh hour the outbreak of
hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and if this were not
possible at least to prevent the conflict from causing a collision in-
volving bloodshed ; if necessary, by the Servians withdrawing with-
out accepting battle. The reply which had reached us from Servia
appeared to offer the possibility that it might provide the basis of an
understanding. England would willingly be prepared in this matter
to make her influence felt according to our ideas and wishes.

I thanked the Ambassador for the communication of Sir E. Grey,
and I answered him that I fully appreciated the view of the Secretary
of State. His point of view was, however, naturally different from
mine, as England was not directly interested in the dispute between
us and Servia, and the Secretary of State could not be fully informed
concerning the serious significance which the questions at issue had
for the Monarchy. If Sir E. Grey spoke of the possibility of prevent- ,
ing the outbreak of hostilities, this suggestion came too late, since
our soldiers were yesterday fired at by soldiers from over the Servian
frontier, and to-day war has been declared by us against Servia. I
had to decline to entertain the idea of a discussion based on the Servian
answer. What we asked was the integral acceptance of the ulti-
matum. Servia had endeavoured to get out of her difficulty by sub-
terfuges. We knew these Servian methods only too well.

Through the local knowledge which he has gained here. Sir Maurice
de Bunsen was in a position to appreciate fully our point of view,
and he would be in a position to give Sir E. Grey an accurate repre-
sentation of the facts.

246 Official Diplomatic Documents

In so far as Sir E. Grey desired to be of service to the cause of
European peace, he would certainly not find any opposition from
us. He must, however, reflect that the peace of Europe would not
be saved by Great Powers placing themselves behind Servia, and
directing their efforts to securing that she should escape punishment.

For, even if we consented to entertain such an attempt at an agree-
ment, Servia would be all the more encouraged to continue on the
path she has formerly followed, and this would, in a very short time,
again imperil the cause of peace.

The British Ambassador assured me in conclusion that he fully
understood our point of view, but, on the other hand, he regretted
that, under these circumstances, the desire of the British Government
to arrive at an agreement had, for the time being, no prospect of being
realised. He hoped to remain in constant communication with me
as that appeared to him, on account of the great danger of a European
conflagration, to be of special value.

I assured the Ambassador that I was at all times at his disposal,
and thereupon our conversation came to an end.

To Berlin

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 42

Count Berchtold to Count Szogyeny at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) July 28, 1914.

I REQUEST your Excellency to go at once to the Chancellor or the
Secretary of State and communicate to him the following in my
name : —

"According to mutually consistent reports, received from St.
Petersburgh, Kieff, Warsaw, Moscow and Odessa, Russia is making
extensive military preparations. M. Sazonof has indeed given an
assurance on his word of honour, as has also the Russian Minister
of War, that mobilisation has not up to now been ordered; the
latter has, however, told the German Military Attache that the mili-
tary districts which border on Austria-Hungary — Kieff, Odessa,
Moscow and Kasan — will be mobilised, should our troops cross the
Servian frontier.^

" Under these circumstances, I would urgently ask the Cabinet at
Berlin to take into immediate consideration the question whether the
attention of Russia should not be drawn, in a friendly manner, to
the fact that the mobilisation of the above districts amounts to a
threat against Austria-Hungary, and that, therefore, should these
measures be carried out, they would be answered by the most exten-
sive military counter measures, not only by the Monarchy but by
our Allyj the German Empire."

In order to make it more easy for Russia to withdraw, it appears
to us appropriate that such a step should, in the first place, be taken

1 German White Book, Exhibit 11, July 27.

July 28, French Yellow Book No. 75 {2) 247

by Germany alone ; nevertheless we are ready to take this step in
conjunction with Germany.

Unambiguous language appears to me at the present moment to
be the most effective method of making Russia fully conscious of all
that is involved in a threatening attitude.^

To Berlin

AUSTR0-HUNGARIA.N ReD BoOK No. 43

Count Berchtold to Count Szogyeny at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) July 28, 1914.

Information has been received from the Imperial German Ambas-
sador that Sir E. Grey has appealed to the German Government to use
their influence with the Imperial and Royal Government, in order
to induce them either to regard the reply received from Belgrade as
satisfactory, or to accept it as a basis for discussion between the
Cabinets.^

Herr von Tschirschky was commissioned to bring the British pro-
posal before the Vienna Cabinet for their consideration.

Belgium :

From Vienna

Belgian Gray Book No. 7

Count Erremhault de Dudzeele, Belgian Minister at Vienna, to M.
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs,

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 28, 1914.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has notified me of the declaration ^
of war by Austria-Hungary against Servia.

France :

From Vienna

French Yellow Book No. 75 (2)

Official Communique of the Press Bureau."^

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

The Austrian Minister at Belgrade has returned to Vienna and
presented the text of the Servian reply. ^

1 This despatch would seem to dispose of the claim sometimes made that Germany's
demand on Russia to demobilise brought on the war much against the wishes of Austria-
Hungary, who had been dragged in,

2 British Blue Book No. 46, July 27, and No. 67, July 28.

3 See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 37, July 28, and British Blue Book No. 50,
same day.

* This is a brief summary of the Austro-Hungarian comments on the Serbian reply,
see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27.

^ The Austrian Minister left Belgrade on the evening of July 25 (see Serbian Blue
Book No. 41, July 25), after receiving the Serbian reply. This despatch is dated July

248 Official Diplomatic Documents

A spirit of insincerity pervades the whole of this reply ; it makes
it clear that the Servian Government have no serious intention of
putting an end to the culpable toleration which has given rise to the
anti-Austrian intrigues. The Servian reply contains such restric-
tions and limitations, not only with regard to the principle of the
Austro-Hungarian demarche, but also with regard to the claims ad-
vanced by Austria, that the concessions which are made are without
importance.

In particular, under an empty pretext, there is a refusal to accept
the participation of the Austro-Hungarian officials in the prosecution
of the authors of the crimes who are resident in Servian territory.

In the same way, the Servian reply to the Austrian demand that
the hostile intrigues of the press should be suppressed, amounts to a
refusal.

The demand with regard to the measures to be taken to prevent
associations hostile to Austria-Hungary from continuing their activity
under another name and form after their dissolution, has not even
-been considered.

Inasmuch as these claims constitute the minimum regarded as
necessary for the re-establishment of a permanent peace in the south-
east of the Monarchy, the Servian reply is considered to be insufficient.

That the Servian Government is aware of this, appears from the
fact that they contemplate the settlement of the dispute by arbitra-
tion, and also from the fact that on the day on which their reply was
due and before it was in fact submitted, they gave orders for mobili-
sation.

From on board "La France*'

French Yellow Book No. 76

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, to M. Bienvenu-Martin^
A cting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

On hoard the "La France,'' July 28, 1914.

I HAVE received from Copenhagen your telegram summarising
the events of Saturday ; ^ the telegram describing the last visit of the
German Ambassador,^ that ^ relating to the mediation which Russia

28. Its number is 75 (2), which is unusual. Beginning with the second paragraph this
communique is a summary of the Austro-Hungarian comments on the Serbian reply.
In short it is the reply to the Serbian reply. See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34,
July 27, which was presented also in Paris. It is not printed in its entirety in the
French Yellow Book. The editor of the French Yellow Book, however, M. Jules
Cambon, former French Ambassador in Berlin, doubtless felt the unfairness of making
no reference to it at all. He, therefore, added this communique as an afterthought,
which accounts for the strange number 75 (2).

1 Saturday was July 25, the telegram referred to was sent on July 26. Cf. French
Yellow Book No. 50, also No. 56.

2 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 62, July 27.

3 This is a mistranslation substituted in the official British Blue Book of Sept. 28
and in the "Collected Diplomatic Documents" for the correct translation in the A^. Y.
Times version which reads, "also the telegram with regard to," etc. This third tele-
gram, however, has been omitted in the French Yellow Book. It would be interesting
to know what it contained and what the "British demarches at Berlin" refer to.
Cf . end of French Yellow Book No. 80, same day ; but see also French Yellow Book
No. 74, July 27, which may describe the demarche mentioned here.

July 28, French Yellow Book No. 77 249

advises Servia ^ to ask for and to the British demarches at Berlin, as
well 2 as your telegram received this morning directly through the
Eiffel Tower.

I fully approve the reply which you made to Baron von Schoen;
the proposition which you maintained is self-evident ; in the search
for a peaceful solution of the dispute, we are fully in agreement with
Russia, who is not responsible for the present situation, and has not
taken any measure whatever which could arouse the least suspicion ;
but it is plain that Germany on her side would find it difficult to refuse
to give advice to the Austro-Hungarian Government, whose action
has provoked the crisis.

We must now continue to use the same language to the German
Ambassador. Besides, this advice is in harmony with the two
British proposals mentioned in your telegram.^ I entirely approve
the combination suggested by Sir E. Grey, and I am myself requesting
M. Paul Cambon to inform him of this. It is essential that it should
be known at Berlin and at Vienna that our full concurrence is given
to the efforts which the British Government is making with a view
to seeking a solution of the Austro-Servian dispute. The action of
the four less interested Powers cannot, for the reasons given above,
be exerted only at Vienna and St. Peter sburgh. In proposing ^ to
exert it also at Belgrade, which means in fact between Vienna and
Belgrade, Sir E. Grey grasps the logic of the situation; and, in not
excluding St. Petersburgh, he offers on the other hand to Germany,
a method of withdrawing with perfect dignity from the demarche by
which the German Government have caused it to be known at Paris
and at London that the affair was looked upon by them as purely
Austro-Servian and without any general character.

Please communicate the present telegram to our representatives
with the great Powers and to our Minister at Belgrade.

Rene Viviani.

To Viviani

French Yellow Book No. 77

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Rene
Viviani, President of the Council on board the "La France.^'

Paris, July 28, 1914.

In spite of the assurances given, both in Berlin and Paris, by the
German representatives, of the desire of their Government to assist in

1 For another proposal by Russia see British Blue Book No. 44, July 27.

2 The New York Times translation reads : "I have also received this morning your
despatch direct from the Eiffel Tower." The only despatch printed under July 28 as
sent to Viviani is French Yellow Book No. 77. This latter despatch, therefore, should
have been printed before No. 76. It is, of course, possible that the fourth telegram
mentioned in No. 76 has not been pubUshed as was the case with the third telegram.

3 There were two proposals mentioned in the telegrams to which Viviani seems to
reply here ; cf. French Yellow Book No. 50, July 26, and No. 77, July 28. The first one
contemplates pressure in Petrograd and Vienna. The second includes Belgrade, un-
doubtedly as the result of the urging of France, who had always contended that it
was a case of mediation between Vienna and Belgrade rather than Vienna and Petro-
grad.

250 Official Diplomatic Documents

efforts for the maintenance of peace, no sincere action has been taken
by them to hold back Austria ; the British proposal, which consists
in action by the four less-interested Powers to obtain a cessation of
military operations at Vienna, Belgrade, and St. Petersburgh, and in a
meeting at London of the German, French, and Italian Ambassadors
under the chairmanship of Sir E. Grey, with a view of seeking a solu-
tion of the Austro-Servian difficulty, meets with objections at Berlin
of such a nature as must lead to failure.

The Austrian Ambassador has proceeded to announce that his
Government will to-morrow take energetic measures to compel
Servia to give to them the satisfaction and guarantees which they
demand from that Power ; Count Szecsen has given no explanation
as to those measures ; according to our Military Attache at Vienna,
mobilisation, dating from July 28, appears to be certain.

Bienvenu-Martin.

To London, Berlin, St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Rome
French Yellow Book No. 78

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London,
Berlin, St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Ernne.

Paris, July 28, 1914.

I HAVE had another visit from the German Ambassador this morn-
ing ; he told me that he had no communication or official proposal to
make to me, but that he came, as on the evening before, to talk
over the situation and the methods to be employed to avoid action
which would be irreparable. When I asked him about Austria's in-
tentions, he declared that he did not know them, and was ignorant of
the nature of the means of coercion which she was preparing.

Germany, according to Baron von Schoen, only asks that she may
act with France for the maintenance of peace. Upon my observing
to him that a proposal for mediation by the four Powers to which we
had adhered, and which had obtained assent in principle from Italy
and Germany, had been put forward by Great Britain, the Ambassador
said that the German Government really only asked to associate
themselves with the action of the Powers, provided that that action
did not* take the form of arbitration or a conference, which had been
rejected by Austria.

I replied that, if it was the expression only which was an obstacle
to the Austrian Government, the object might be attained by other
means ; the German Government are in a good position to ask Austria
to allow the Powers time to intervene and find a means of conciliation.

Baron von Schoen then observed to me that he had no instructions,
and only knew that Germany refused to exercise any pressure on
Austria, who does not wish for a conference. He accuses the French
papers of attributing to Germany an attitude which she has not taken
up, alleging that she is urging Austria on ; doubtless she approves
Austria's attitude, but she had no knowledge of the Austrian note ;

July 28, French Yellow Book No, 80 251

she did not see her way to check her too abruptly, for Austria must
have guarantees against the proceedings of the Serbs.

B ienvenu-Martin.

From Vienna

French Yellow Book No. 79

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M.
Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna.

Paris, July 28, 1914.

Through the telegrams from our Embassies which I have for-
warded to you, you are aware of the British proposal for mediation by
the four Powers and for a conference in London, as well as of our ad-
herence to that suggestion, and of the conditional acceptance by Italy
and of the reservations of Berlin.

Please keep yourself in touch on this subject with your British
colleague, who had received the necessary instructions to acquaint
the Austro-Hungarian Government with the British suggestion, as
soon as his three colleagues have been authorised to make the same
demarche; you will adapt your attitude to his.

From London
French Yellow Book No. 80

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 28, 191Jf.

Sir Edward Grey yesterday received my Austro-Hungarian and
German colleagues. The first continued to maintain that the Servian
reply was unacceptable. The second used language similar to that of
Baron von Schoen at Paris. He emphasised the value of moderating
action by Great Britain at St. Petersburgh. Sir Edward Grey re-
plied that Russia had shown herself very moderate from the beginning
of the crisis, especially in her advice ^ to the Servian Government, and
that he would find it very embarrassing to give her pacific ^ advice.
He added that it was at Vienna that it was necessary to act and that
Germany's help was indispensable.

On the other hand the British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh has
telegraphed that M. Sazonof had made a proposal to the Austrian
Ambassador for a conversation on the Servian business. This in-
formation has been confirmed by the British Ambassador at Vienna,

^ The published despatches nowhere give clear evidence that Russia gave Serbia
any advice that had a moderating influence, although the British Ambassador said
that Sazonof would do so, British Blue Book No. 55, under date of July 28.

2 Germany has always claimed that Russia could have been restrained by pacific
advice from England. The same view was expressed in the London Daily News of
August 1, 1914. France had also refused to exert her conciliatory influence on Russia.
Cf . French Yellow Book No. 62, July 27.

252 Official Diplomatic Documents

who has sent the information that the first interview between the
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Count Szapary had produced
a good effect at the Ballplatz.

Sir Edward Grey and Sir Arthur Nicolson told me that, if an agree-
ment could be brought about by direct discussion between St. Peters-
burgh and Vienna, it would be a matter for congratulation, but they
raised some doubts as to the success of M. Sazonof 's attempt.

When Sir George Buchanan asked M. Sazonof about the eventual
meeting at London of a conference of representatives of Great Britain,
France, Germany and Italy, to seek a solution for the present situa-
tion, the latter replied " that he had begun pourparlers with the Austrian
Ambassador under conditions which he hoped were favourable ; that,
however, he had not yet received any reply to his proposal for the
revision of the Servian note by the two Cabinets." If direct explana-
tions with the Cabinet of Vienna are impracticable,^ M. Sazonof de-
clares himself ready to accept the British proposals or any other of
such a nature as to bring about a favourable issue of the dispute.

In any case, at a moment when the least delay might have serious
consequences, it would be very desirable that these direct negotiations
should be carried on in such a way as not to hamper Sir E. Grey's
action, and not to furnish Austria with a pretext for slipping out of
the friendly intervention of the four Powers.

The British Ambassador at Berlin having made a determined
effort to obtain Herr von Jagow's adherence to Sir E. Grey's sugges-
tion, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that it was best
to await the result of the conversation which had been begun between
St. Petersburgh and Vienna. ^ Sir E. Grey has, in consequence,
directed Sir E. Goschen to suspend his demarche for the moment.^
In addition, the news that Austria has just officially declared war
against Servia, opens a new phase of the question.

Paul Cambon.

From Berlin

French Yellow Book No. 81

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 28, 1914.

M. Sazonof's conversation with Count Szapary ^ was brought to
the knowledge of Herr von Jagow by the Russian Charge d'Affaires.

1 This implies that Sazonof had not accepted the British proposals whole-heartedly
on the previous day, but had rather pushed his own proposal of direct conversations

2 Cf. British Blue Book Nos. 43 and 46, July 27, andNos. 67, 68 and 69, July 28, and
Austro-Hungarian Red Book, July 27. In British Blue Book Nos. 68, 69, Sir E. Grey
seems to prefer Sazonof's proposal of direct conversations to his own of a conference.

» It is nowhere stated what this demarche was, the despatch explaining it havmg
been omitted from the Yellow Book; see note 3 to No. 76, same day. A possible
explanation is found in the text of the German White Book, which is illustrated by
Exhibit 16, July 28. See the note there. r t i oc

* The only published conversation to which this can refer is the one of July 2b,
two days previous to this despatch. See Russian Orange Book No. 25, July 26.

July 28, French Yellow Booh No. 81 253

The Secretary of State told him that in agreement with the remarks
of the German Ambassador in Russia, since the Austrian Govern-
ment did not refuse to continue their conversations with the Russian
Government after the expiry of the ultimatum, there was ground for
hope that Count Berchtold on his side might be able to converse with
M. Schebeko, and that it might be possible to find an issue from the
present difficulties. The Russian Charge d 'Affaires takes a favour-
able view of this state of mind, which corresponds to Herr von Jagow's
desire to see Vienna and St. Petersburgh enter into direct relations
and to release Germany. There is ground, however, for asking
whether Austria is not seeking to gain time to make her preparations.

To-day I gave my support to the demarche made by my British
colleague with the Secretary of State. The latter replied to me, as he
did to Sir Edward Goschen, that it was impossible for him to accept
the idea of a kind of conference at London between the Ambassadors
of the four Powers, and that it would be necessary to give another
form to the British suggestion to procure its realisation. I laid stress
upon the danger of delay, which might bring on war, and asked him
if he wished for war. He protested, and added that direct conversa-
tions between Vienna and St. Petersburgh were in progress, and that
from now on he expected a favourable result.

The British and Italian Ambassadors came to see me this morning
together, to talk over with me the conversation which they had had
with Herr von Jagow yesterday on the subject of Sir Edward Grey's
proposal. To sum up, the Secretary of State used the same language
to them as to me; accepting in principle the idea of joining in a
demarche with England, Italy, and ourselves, but rejecting any idea
of a conference.

My colleagues and I thought that this was only a question of form,
and the British Ambassador is going to suggest to his Government
that they should change the wording of their proposal, which might
take the character of a diplomatic demarche at Vienna and St. Peters-
burgh.

In consequence of the repugnance shown by Herr von Jagow to any
demarche at Vienna, Sir Edward Grey could put him in a dilemma by
asking him to state himself precisely how diplomatic action by the
Powers to avoid war could be brought about.

We ought to associate ourselves with every effort in favour of peace
compatible with our engagements towards our ally ; but to place the
reponsibility in the proper quarter, we must take care to ask Germany
to state precisely what she wishes.

Jules Cambon.

254 Official Diplomatic Documents

From St. Petersburgh

French Yellow Book No. 82

M. Paleologiie, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburgh, July 28, 1914.

The Austro-Hungarian Government has not yet replied to the pro-
posal of the Russian Government suggesting the opening of direct
conversations between St. Petersburgh and Vienna.

M. Sazonof received the German and Austro-Hungarian Am-
bassadors this afternoon. The impression which he got from this
double interview is a bad one; "Certainly," he said to me, "Austria
is unwilling to converse."

As the result of a conversation which I have just had with my two
colleagues I have the same impression of pessimism.

Paleologue.

From Vienna

French Yellow Book No. 83

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

Count Berchtold has just declared to Sir M. de Bunsen that any
intervention, aiming at the resumption of the discussion between
Austria and Servia on the basis of the Servian reply, would be useless,
and besides that it would be too late, as war had been oflScially de-
clared at mid-day.

The attitude of my Russian colleague has never varied up to the
present ; in his opinion it is not a question of localising the conflict,
but rather of preventing it. The declaration of war will make very
difficult the initiation of pourparlers by the four Powers, as well as
the continuation of the direct discussions between M. Sazonof and
Count Szapary.

It is held here that the formula which seemed as if it might obtain
the adherence of Germany — " Mediation between Austria and
Russia " — is unsuitable, inasmuch as it alleges a dispute between
those two Empires which does not exist up to the present.

Among the suspicions aroused by the sudden and violent resolution
of Austria, the most disquieting is that Germany should have pushed
her on to aggressive action against Servia in order to be able herself
to enter into war with Russia and France,^ in circumstances which
she supposes ought to be most favourable to herself and under
conditions which have been thoroughly considered.

Dumaine.

1 If this is written with sincerity it reveals the serious suspicion of Germany enter-
tained by France. Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 42, same day, where it ap-
pears that it was not Germany who pushed on Austria-Hungary.

July 28, German White Book Exhibit 2 255

Germany :

To the Gowrnments of Germany

German White Book Exhibit 2

The Chancellor to the Federal Governments of Germany. Confidential.
Berlin, July 28, 1914.

You will make the following report to the Government to which
you are accredited :

In view of the facts which the Austrian Government has published
in its note ^ to the Servian Government, the last doubt must disappear
that the outrage to which the Austro-Hungarian successor to the
throne has fallen a victim, was prepared in Servia, to say the least
with the connivance of members of the Servian Government and
army. It is a product of the pan-Serb intrigues which for a series of
years have become a source of permanent disturbance for the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy and for the whole of Europe.

The pan-Serb chauvinism appeared especially marked during the
Bosnian crisis. Only to the far-reaching self-restraint and modera-
tion of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the energetic inter-
cession of the Powers is it to be ascribed that the provocations to
which Austro-Hungary was exposed at that time, did not lead to a
conflict. The assurance of future well-behaviour, which the Servian
Government gave at that time, it has not kept. Under the very eyes,
at least with the tacit sufferance of official Servia, the pan-Serb prop-
aganda has meanwhile continued to increase in scope and intensity.
It would be compatible neither with its dignity nor with its right
to self-preservation if the Austro-Hungarian Government persisted
to view idly any longer the intrigues beyond the frontier, through
which the safety and the integrity of the Monarchy are permanently
threatened. With this state of affairs, the action as well as the de-
mands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can be viewed only as
justifiable.

The reply of the Servian Government to the demands which the
Austro-Hungarian Government put on the 23rd inst., through its
representative in Belgrade, shows that the dominating factors in
Servia are not inclined to cease their former policies and agitation.
There will remain nothing else for the Austro-Hungarian Government
than to press its demands, if need be, through military action, unless
it renounces for good its position as a great Power.

Some Russian personalities deem it their right as a matter of course
and a task of Russia's, to actively become a party to Servia in the
conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia. For the European
conflagration which would result from a similar step by Russia, the
"Nowoje Wremja" believes itself justified in making Germany re-
sponsible in so far as it does not induce Austria-Hungary to yield.

1 This is probably an inaccurate reference, for the Chancellor undoubtedly had in
mind the dossier (Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25) which was to be
presented, and, judging by this despatch, was presented to the foreign offices in Berlin,
Rome, Paris, London, Petrograd, and Constantinople. For the Austro-Hungarian note
to Serbia see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 7, July 22.

256 Official Diplomatic Documents

The Russian press thus turns conditions upside down. It is not
Austria-Hungary which has called forth the conflict with Servia,
but it is Servia which, through unscrupulous favour toward pan-Serb
aspirations, even in parts of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy,
threatens the same in her existence and creates conditions, which
eventually found expression in the wanton outrage at Serajewo. If
Russia believes that it must champion the cause of Servia in this
matter, it certainly has the right to do so. However, it must realise
that it makes the Serb activities its own, to undermine the conditions
of existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and that thus it bears
the sole responsibility if out of the Austro-Servian affair, which all
other Great Powers desire to localise, there arises a European war.
This reponsibility of Russia's is evident and it weighs the more
heavily as Count Berchtold has officially declared to Russia that
Austria-Hungary has no intention to acquire Servian territory or to
touch the existence of the Servian Kingdom, but only desires peace
against the Servian intrigues threatening its existence.

The attitude of the Imperial Government in this question is clearly
indicated. The agitation conducted by the pan-Slavs in Austria-
Hungary has for its goal, with the destruction of the Austro-Hun-
garian Monarchy, the scattering or weakening of the Triple Alliance
with a complete isolation of the German Empire in consequence.
Our own interest therefore calls us to the side of Austria-Hungary.
The duty, if at all possible, to guard Europe against a universal war,
points to the support by ourselves of those endeavours which aim at
the localisation of the conflict, faithful to the course of those policies
which we have carried out successfully for forty-four years in the in-
terest of the preservation of the peace of Europe.

Should, however, against our hope, through the interference of
Russia the fire be spread, we should have to support, faithful to our
(Juty as allies, the neighbour-monarchy with all the power at our com-
mand. We shall take the sword only if forced to it, but then in the
clear consciousness that we are not guilty of the calamity which war
will bring upon the peoples of Europe.

Germany :

To St. Petersburg

German WmTE Book Exhibit 14

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial A mbassador at St. Petersburg
on July 28th, 1914.

We continue ^ in our endeavour to induce#Vienna to elucidate in
St. Petersburg the object and scope of the Austrian action in Servia in
a manner both convincing and satisfactory to Russia. The declara-
tion of war which has meanwhile ensued alters nothing in this matter.

1 See note to British Blue Book No. 67, July 28. See also German White Book,
Exhibit 15, July 27.

July 28, German White Book Exhibit 20 ' 257

From Vienna

German White Book Exhibit 16 ^

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the Chancellor on
July 28th, 1914.

Count Berchtold requests me to express to Your Excellency his
thanks for the communication of the English mediation proposal. He
states, however, that after the opening of hostilities by Servia and the
subsequent declaration of war, the step appears belated.

To St. Petersburg

German White Book Exhibit 20

I. His Majesty to the Czar.

July 28th, 10.4s P.M.

I HAVE heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression which is
caused by the action of Austria-Hungary against Servia. The unscru-
pulous agitation which has been going on for years in Servia, has led
to the revolting crime of which Archduke Franz Ferdinand has become
a victim. The spirit which made the Servians murder their own
King and his consort still dominates that country. Doubtless You
will agree with me that both of us. You as well as I, and all other
sovereigns, have a common interest to insist that all those who are
responsible for this horrible murder shall suffer their deserved
punishment.

On the other hand I by no means overlook the difficulty encoun-
tered by You and Your Government to stem the tide of public opinion.
In view of the cordial friendship which has joined us both for a long
time with firm ties, I shall use my entire influence to induce Austria-
Hungary to obtain a frank and satisfactory understanding with
Russia. I hope confidently that You will support me in my efforts
to overcome all difficulties which may yet arise. •

Your most sincere and devoted friend and cousin,

(Signed) Wilhelm. .

Great Britain:

For British Blue Book No. 50 see below under date of July 31, 1914.

1 The paragraph in the Narrative of the German White Book which these Exhibits
are to illustrate reads: "We further declared ourselves ready, after failure of the
Conference idea, to transmit a second proposal of Sir Edward Grey's to Vienna in
which he suggested Austria-Hungary should decide that either the Servian reply was
sufficient, or that it be used as a basis for further negotiations. The Austro-Hungarian
Government remarked with full appreciation of our action it had come too late, the
hostiUties having already been opened." This second proposal of Sir E. Grey is not
mentioned in the British Blue Book. It was probably discussed in the third tele-
gram referred to but not printed in the French Yellow Book No. 76, July 28, see also
French Yellow Book No. 80, same day.

258

Official Diplomatic Documents

From Paris

British Blue Book No. 51

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. —
(Received July 28, 1914.)

Sir, Paris, July 27, 191^.

I ELWE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a memo-
randum from the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the steps
to be taken to prevent an outbreak of hostiHties between Austria-
Hungary and Servia. I have, etc.

Francis Bertie.

Enclosure in No. 51
Note communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. Bienvenu-Martin.

Par une note en date du 25
de ce mois, son Excellence TAm-
bassadeur d'Angleterre a fait
connaitre au Gouvernement de
la Republique que, d'apres Sir
Edward Grey, la seule maniere
d'assurer, si c'etait possible, le
maintien de la paix dans le cas
ou les rapports entre la Russie et
TAutriche deviendraient plus
tendus serait une demarche com-
mune a Vienne et a Saint-
Petersbourg des representants de
TAngleterre, de la France, de
I'Allemagne et de Tltalie en
Autriche et en Russie; et il a
exprime le desir de savoir si le
Gouvernement de la Republique
etait dispose a accueillir favo-
rablement cette suggestion^

Le Ministre des Affaires Etran-
geres par interim a Thonneur de
faire connaitre a son Excellence
Sir Francis Bertie qu'il a invite
M. Jules Cambon ^ a se concerter
avec I'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre
en Allemagne et a appuyer la

(Translation.)
In a note of the 25th of this
month, his Excellency the British
Ambassador ^ informed the Gov-
ernment of the Republic that, in
Sir E. Grey's opinion, the only
possible way of assuring the
maintenance of peace in case of
the relations between Russia and
Austria becoming more strained
would be if the representatives
of Great Britain, France, Ger-
many, and Italy in Austria and
Russia were to take joint action
at Vienna and at St. Petersburg ;
and he expressed the wish to
know if the Government of the
Republic were disposed to wel-
come such a suggestion.

The Minister for Foreign
Affairs ad interim has the honour
to inform his Excellency Sir F.
Bertie that he has requested
M. Jules Cambon ^ to concert
with the British Ambassador in
Germany and to support any rep-

1 French Ambassador in Berlin.

» Acting on instructions contained in British Blue Book No. 10, July 24. For the
entire subject see the summary of events of July 24 based on the despatches of that
day, where it appears that Sir E. Grey altered his original proposal at the suggestion
of France.

July 28, British Blue Book No. 51

259

demarche qu'ils jugeront oppor-
tune de faire aupres du Cabinet
de Berlin.

Le Gouvernement de la Re-
publique a, d 'autre part, con-
formement au desir exprime par
le Gouvernement britannique et
que son Excellence Sir Francis
Bertie lui a transmis par une note
en date du 26 de ce mois, autorise
M. Paul Cambon ^ a prendre part
a la reunion proposee par Sir
Edward Grey pour rechercher
avec lui et les Ambassadeurs
d'Allemagne et d' Italic a Lon-
dres, les moyens de resoudre les
difficultes actuelles.

Le Gouvernement de la Re-
publique est pret egalement a
donner aux agents fran^ais a
Petersbourg, a Vienne et a Bel-
grade des instructions pour qu'ils
obtiennent des Gouvernements
russe, autrichien et serbe de
s'abstenir de toute operation
militaire active en attendant les
resultats de cette conference. II
estime toutefois que les chances
de succes de la proposition de Sir
Edward Grey reposent essen-
tiellement sur Taction que Ber-
lin serait disposee a Vienna [sic\.
Une demarche aupres du Gou-
vernement austro-hongrois pour
amener la suspension des opera-
tions militaires parait vouee a
I'echec si I'influence de I'Alle-
magne ne s'est pas exercee au
prealable sur le Cabinet de
Vienne.

Le Garde des Seaux, Presi-
dent du Conseil et Ministre des
Affaires Etrangeres par interim,
saisit cette occasion de renou-
veler, etc.

Paris, le 27 juillet, 1914.

resentation which they may con-
sider it advisable to make to the
BerHn Cabinet.

In accordance with the desire
expressed by the British Govern-
ment and conveyed to them by
Sir F. Bertie in his note of the
26th of this month, the Govern-
ment of the Republic have also
authorised M. Paul Cambon ^ to
take part in the conference which
Sir E. Grey has proposed with a
view to discovering in consulta-
tion with himself and the German
and Italian Ambassadors in Lon-
don a means of settling the pres-
ent difficulties.

The Government of the Re-
public is likewise ready to in-
struct the French representa-
tives at St. Petersburgh, Vienna,
and Belgrade ^ to induce the
Russian, Austrian, and Servian
Governments to abstain from all
active military operations pend-
ing the results of this conference.
He considers, however, that the
chance of Sir E. Grey's proposal
being successful depends essen-
tially on the action which the
Berlin Government would be will-
ing to take at Vienna. Repre-
sentations made to the Austro-
Hungarian Government for the
purpose of bringing about a sus-
pension of military operations
would seem bound to fail unless
the German Government do not
beforehand exercise their in-
fluence on the Vienna Cabinet.

The President of the Council
ad interim takes the opportunity,
etc.

Paris, July 27, 1914.

^ French Ambassador in London.

2 The frequency with which France introduces Belgrade, when Sir E. Grey s pro-
posal contemplates only Vienna and Petrograd, is noteworthy.

260 Official Diplomatic Documents

From Paris
British Blue Book No. 52
Note communicated by French Embassy, July 28, 1914..

Le Gouvernement de la Re-
publique accepte la proposition
de Sir Edward Grey relative a
une intervention de la Grande-
Bretagne, de la France, de I'Alle-
magne et de I'ltalie en vue
d'eviter les operations militaires
actives sur les frontieres autri-
chiennes, russes et serbes; il a
autorise M. P. Cambon ^ a pren-
dre part aux deliberations de la
reunion a quatre, qui doit se
tenir a Londres.

L'Ambassadeur de France a
Berlin a re^u pour instructions,
apres s'etre concerte avec I'Am-
bassadeur d'Angleterre a Ber-
lin, d'appuyer la demarche de ce
dernier dans la forme et la me-
sure qui seraient jugees oppor-
tunes.

M. Viviani ^ est pret a envoyer
aux representants fran9ais a
Vienne, Saint-Petersbourg et Bel-
grade des instructions dans le
sens suggere par le Gouverne-
ment britannique.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 27 juillet, 1914,

(Translation.)

The Government of the Re-
public accept Sir Edward Grey's
proposal in regard to interven-
tion by Great Britain, France,
Germany, and Italy with a view
to avoiding active military opera-
tions on the frontiers of Austria,
Russia, and Servia ; and they
have authorised M. P. Cambon ^
to take part in the deliberations
of the four representatives at the
meeting which is to be held in
London.

The French Ambassador in
Berlin has received instructions
to consult first the British Am-
bassador in Berlin, and then to
support the action taken by the
latter in such manner and degree
as may be considered appropriate.

M. Viviani ^ is ready to send
to the representatives of France
in Vienna, St. Petersburgh, and
Belgrade instructions in the sense
suggested by the Biritsh Gov-
ernment.

French Embassy, July 27, 1914-

From St. Petersburg

British Blue Book No. 53

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Bencken-
dorff, Russian Ambassador in London. — (Communicated by
Count Benckendorff, July 28.)

(See Russian Orange Book No. 32, July 27.)

' French Ambassador in London.
2 French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

July 28 y British Blue Book No. 55

261

From St. Petersburg
British Blue Book No. 54

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for
dorff, Russian A mbassador
Count Benckendorff, July 28,

Saint-Petersbourg,
le 15 (28) juillet, 1914.
(Telegraphique.)

Mes entretiens avec TAmbas-
sadeur d^Allemagne confirment
mon impression que rAllemagne
est plutot favorable a Tintransi-
geance de I'Autriche.

Le Cabinet de Berlin, qui
aurait pu arreter tout le develop-
pement de la crise, parait n'exer-
cer aucune action sur son alliee.

L'Ambassadeur trouve insuffi-
sante la reponse de la Serbie.

Cette attitude allemande est
tout partieulierement alarmante.

II me semble que mieux que
toute autre Puissance I'Angle-
terre serait en mesure de tenter
encore d'agir a Berlin pour en-
gager le Gouvernement alle-
mand a Taction necessaire.
C'est a Berlin qu'indubitable-
ment se trouve la clef de la
situation.

Foreign Affairs, to Count Bencken-
in London. — (Communicated by
1914.)

(Translation.)

St. Petersburgh,
July 15 {28), 1914.
(Telegraphic.)

My interviews ^ with the Ger-
man Ambassador confirm my
impression that Germany is, if
anything, in favour of the un-
compromising attitude adopted
by Austria.

The Berlin Cabinet, who could
have prevented ^ the whole of this
crisis developing, appear to be ex-
erting no^ influence on their ally.

The Ambassador considers that
the Servian reply is insufficient.

This attitude of the German
Government is most alarming.^

It seems to me that Great
Britain is in a better position
than any other Power to make
another attempt at Berlin to
induce the German Government
to take the necessary action.^
There is no doubt that the key
of the situation is to be found at
Berlin.

From St. Petersburgh

British Blue Book No. 55

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward

Grey. — {Received July 28.)
(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 27, 1914.

With reference to my telegram of yesterday,^ I saw the Minister
for Foreign Affairs this afternoon and found him very conciliatory
and more optimistic.

^ No accounts of interviews between Sazonof and the German Ambassador are men-
tioned in the Russian Orange Book in telegrams of July 26, 27, or 28. For Germany's
attitude, see note to British Blue Book No. 67, July 28, and German White Book, p. 554.

2 This is an assertion for which no proof has been advanced in the published despatches.

3 See, however, German White Book, Exhibit 15, July 27, and Exhibit 14, July 28. •

* Contrast with this footnote to British Blue Book No. 67, July 28.

* That this action was taken appears from notes to British Blue Book No. 67, July
28, and German White Book, Exhibit 16, same date.

6 British Blue Book No. 44, July 27.

262 Official Diplomatic Documents

He would, he said, use all his influence ^ at Belgrade to induce the
Servian Government to go as far as possible in giving satisfaction to
Austria, but her territorial integrity must be guaranteed and her
rights as a sovereign State respected, so that she should not become
Austria's vassal. He did not know whether Austria would accept
friendly exchange of views which he had proposed, but, if she did,
he wished to keep in close contact with the other Powers through-
out the conversations that would ensue.

He again referred to the fact that the obligations undertaken by
Servia in 1908, alluded to in the Austrian ultimatum, were given to
the Powers.

I asked if he had heard of your proposal with regard to conference
of the four Powers, and on his replying in the affirmative, I told him
confidentially of your instructions to me, and enquired whether
instead of such a conference he would prefer a direct exchange of
views, which he had proposed.^ The German Ambassador, to whom
I had just spoken, had expressed his personal opinion that a direct
exchange of views would be more agreeable to Austria-Hungary.

His Excellency said he was perfectly ready to stand aside if the
Powers accepted the proposal for a conference, but he trusted that
you would keep in touch with the Russian Ambassador in the event
of its taking place.

From Vienna

British Blue Book No. 56

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna^ to Sir Edward Grey.
— {Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 27, 1914.

The Russian Ambassador had to-day a long and earnest conversa-
tion with Baron Macchio, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs. He told him that, having just come back from St. Peters-
burgh, he was well acquainted with the views of the Russian Govern-
ment and the state of Russian public opinion. He could assure
him that if actual war broke out with Servia it would be impossible
to localise it, for Russia was not prepared to give way again, as she
had done on previous occasions, and especially during the annexation
crisis of 1909. He earnestly hoped that something would be done
before Servia was actually invaded. Baron Macchio replied that this
would now be difficult, as a skirmish had already taken place on the
Danube, in which the Servians had been the aggressors.^ The Rus-
sian Ambassador said that he would do all he could to keep the
Servians quiet pending any discussions that might yet take place,
and he told me that he would advise his Government to induce the

1 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 40, July 27.

2 Cf, British Blue Book No. 53, same date.

3 If this should prove to have been the case, it would be very important, because
a less yielding attitude could be expected of Austria-Hungary if hostilities had actually
been begun, not by Austria-Hungary, but by Serbia. The diplomatic. documents con-
tain no denial of this assertion.

July 28, British Blue Book No. 57 263

Servian Government to avoid any conflict as long as possible, and to
fall back before an Austrian advance. Time so gained should suffice
to enable a settlement to be reached. He had just heard of a satis-
factory conversation which the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs
had yesterday ^ with the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh.
The former had agreed that much of the Austro-Hungarian note to
Servia had been perfectly reasonable, and in fact they had practically
reached an understanding as to the guarantees which Servia might
reasonably be asked to give to Austria-Hungary for her future good
behaviour. The Russian Ambassador urged that the Austrian Am-
bassador at St. Petersburgh should be furnished with full powers
to continue discussion with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
who was very willing to advise Servia to yield all that could be fairly
asked of her as an independent Power. Baron Macchio promised
to submit this suggestion to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

From Rome

British Blue Book No. 57

Sir R. Roddy British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. — ■
{Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) Rome, July 27, 1914.

Minister for Foreign Affairs greatly doubts whether Germany
will be willing to invite Austria to suspend military action pending
the conference, but he had hopes that military action may be practi-
cally deferred by the fact of the conference meeting at once. As at
present informed, he sees no possibility of Austria receding from any
point laid down in her note to Servia, but he believes that if Servia
will even now accept it ^ Austria will be satisfied, and if she had rea-
son to think that such will be the advice of the Powers, Austria may
defer action. Servia may be induced to accept note in its entirety
on the advice of the four Powers invited to the conference, and this
would enable her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not to
Austria-Hungary alone.^

Telegrams from Vienna to the press here stating that Austria is
favourably impressed with the declarations of the Italian Government
have, the Minister for Foreign Affairs assures me, no foundation.
He said he has expressed no opinion to Austria with regard to the
note. He assured me both before and after communication of the

1 Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 25, July 26 ; and Austro-Hungarian Red Book
No. 31, July 27.

2 This passage taken together with the previous telegram would seem to imply
that on this date the Powers had not yet decided to condemn the Austrian demands
as altogether unacceptable. Serbia took the same view, cf. British Blue Book No. 64,
same day.

3 If this suggestion had been pressed events might have been different. When
Sir R. Rodd sent this telegram on July 27, he may not yet have known of Sir E. Grey's
announcement on that date that the British fleet had been kept mobilised. It was
this announcement which according to the London Daily News of August 1, 1914,
stiffened the backbone of the Russian war party and made war inevitable.

264 Official Diplomatic Documents

note, and again to-day, that Austrian Government have given him
assm'ances that they demand no' territorial sacrifices from Servia.^

From Paris

British Blue Book No. 58

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. —
{Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 28, 1914.

I COMMUNICATED to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs this
afternoon the substance of your conversation with the German Ambas-
sador, recorded in your telegram ^ to Berlin of the 27th July.

His Excellency is grateful for the communication. He said that
it confirms what he had heard of your attitude, and he feels confident
that your observations to the German Ambassador will have a good
effect in the interest of peace.

From Paris

British Blue Book No. 59

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. —
{Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 28, 1914.

I INFORMED the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day of
your conversation with the Russian Ambassador, as recorded in your
telegram of yesterday ^ to St. Petersburgh.

He is grateful for the communication, and quite appreciates the
impossibility for His Majesty's Government to declare themselves
"solidaires" with Russia on a question between Austria and Servia,
which in its present condition is not one affecting England. He
also sees that you cannot take up an attitude at Berlin and Vienna
more Servian than that attributed in German and Austrian sources
to the Russian Government.

German Ambassador has stated that Austria would respect the
integrity of Servia, but when asked whether her independence also
would be respected, he gave no assurance.^

" 1 By this assurance it was hoped to satisfy all legitimate demands of Russia, as
Austria-Hungary saw them. From British Blue Book No. 78, July 29, it appears
that even Sazonof did not categorically reject the proposals made in this telegram.

2 See No. 46, July 27.

» British Blue Book No. 47, July 27.
• ^ It is difficult to see how the German Ambassador in Paris could have given assur-
ances for Austria-Hungary.

July 28, British Blue Booh No. 62 265

From Berlin

British Blue Book No. 60

8ir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. —
{Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 28, 1914.

Secretary of State spoke yesterday in the same sense as that
reported in my telegram of yesterday ^ to my French and Italian
colleagues respecting your proposal. I discussed with my two^ col-
leagues this morning his reply, and we found that, while refusing the
proposed conference, he had said to all of us that nevertheless he
desired to work with us for the maintenance of general peace. We
therefore deduced that if he is sincere in this wish he can only be
objecting to the form ^ of your proposal. Perhaps he himself could
be induced to suggest lines on which he would find it possible to work
with us.

From Vienna
British Blue Book No. 61

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.

— (Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I SAW Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning.

His Excellency declared that Austria-Hungary cannot delay war-
like proceedings against Servia, and would have to decline any sugges-
tion of negotiations on basis of Servian reply.^

Prestige ^ of Dual Monarchy was engaged, and nothing could now
prevent conflict.

From Vienna
British Blue Book No. 62

Sir M. de Sunken, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.

— (Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914-

I SPOKE to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day in the sense of
your telegram of 27th July ^ to Berlin. I avoided the word " media-

1 British Blue Book No. 43, July 27.

2 The text would appear to mean the French and Italian Ambassadors, but when
only two are mentioned by one of the Entente Ambassadors the reference is generally
to the ambassadors of the other two Entente Powers.

3 That this was the case appears from British Blue Book No. 46, July 27.
* See note to German White Book, Exhibit 16, July 28.

5 Austria-Hungary believed that her prestige, i.e. her existence as a great power,
was at stake, and that her action against Serbia, therefore, was in self-defence.

6 British Blue Book No. 46, July 27.

266 Official Diplomatic Documents

tion," but said that, as mentioned in your speech/ which he had just
read to me, you had hopes that conversations in London between the
four Powers less interested might yet lead to an arrangement which
Austro-Hungarian Government would accept as satisfactory and as
rendering actual hostilities unnecessary. I added that you had re-
garded Servian reply as having gone far to meet just demands of
Austria-Hungary; that you thought it constituted a fair basis of
discussion during which warlike operations might remain in abey-
ance, and that Austrian Ambassador in Berlin was speaking in this
sense. Minister for Foreign Aifairs said quietly, but firmly, that no
discussion could be accepted on basis of Servian note; that war
would be declared to-day and that well-known pacific character of
Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might be accepted as a
guarantee that war was both just and inevitable. This was a matter
that must be settled directly between the two parties immediately
concerned. I said that you would hear with regret that hostilities
could not now be arrested, as you feared that they might lead to com-
plications threatening the peace of Europe.

In taking leave of his Excellency, I begged him to believe that,
if in the course of present grave crisis our point of view should some-
times differ from his, this would arise, not from want of sympathy
with the many just complaints ^ which Austria-Hungary had against
Servia, but from the fact that, whereas Austria-Hungary put first
her quarrel with Servia, you were anxious in the first instance for
peace of Europe. I trusted this larger aspect of the question would
appeal with equal force to his Excellency. He said he had it also in
mind, but thought that Russia ought not to oppose operations like
those impending, which did not aim at territorial aggrandisement
and which could no longer be postponed.^

From Rome

British Blue Book No. 63

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. —
{Received July 28,)

(Telegraphic.) Rome, July 28, 1914.

Your telegram of 25th July to Paris. ^

I have communicated substance to Minister for Foreign Affairs,
who immediately telegraphed in precisely similar terms to Berlin and
Vienna.

1 "Hansard," Vol. 65, No. 107, Columns 931, 932, 933.

2 These just complaints which are here acknowledged to have existed, were a few
days later entirely lost sight of.

3 Cf. British Blue Book No. 61, July 28.

* A footnote in the British Blue Book gives as reference No. 27. This can hardly
be the despatch referred to here. The proper despatch is either not printed, or con-
tained in No. 36 or 37. Their dates, however, are July 26.

July 28, British Blue Book No. 65 267

From Rome

British Blue Book No. 64

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. —
(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) Rome, July 28, 1914.

At the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs I submit the
following to you : —

In a long conversation this morning Servian Charge d'Affaires
had said he thought that if some explanations were given regarding
mode in which Austrian agents would require to intervene under
article 5 and article 6, Servia might still accept the whole Austrian
note.^

As it w^as not to be anticipated that Austria would give such
explanations to Servia, they might be given ^ to Powers engaged in
discussions, who might then advise Seryia to accept without con-
ditions.

The Austro-Hungarian Government had in the meantime published
a long official explanation of grounds on which Servian reply was
considered inadequate. Minister for Foreign Affairs considered many
points besides explanation — such as slight verbal difference in sen-
tence regarding renunciation of propaganda — quite childish, but
there was a passage which might prove useful in facilitating such a
course as was considered practicable by the Servian Charge d'Affaires.
It was stated that co-operation of Austrian agents in Servia was to
be only in investigation, not in judicial or administrative measures.
Servia was said to have wilfully ^ misinterpreted this. He thought,
therefore, that ground might be cleared here.

I only reproduce from memory, as I had not yet received text of
Austrian declaration.

Minister impressed upon me, above all, his anxiety for the imme-
diate beginning of discussion. A wide general latitude to accept at
once every point or suggestion on which he could be in agreement
with ourselves and Germany had been given to Italian Ambassador.

From Nish

British Blue Book No. 65

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British ChargS d'Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Ed-
ward Grey. — {Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) Nish, July 28, 1914.

I HAVE urged on the Servian Government the greatest moderation *
pending efforts being made towards a peaceful solution.

1 As late as July 28, therefore, Serbia was almost ready to accept the Austro-Hun-
garian note. For a discussion of articles 5 and 6, see Austro-Hungarian Red Book
Nos. 31 and 34, July 27, and Nos. 21, 26 and 27, July 25.

2 They were so given to Russia, see references given in preceding note.

3 See Austro-Hungarian comment to Serbian reply, Red Book No. 34, July 27.

* Cf . British Blue Book No. 12, July 24, note 3 and No. 22, July 25. The advice
for moderation was not given until after the reply had been sent.

268 Official Diplomatic Documents

Two Servian steamers fired on and damaged, and two Servian
merchant-vessels have been captured by a Hungarian monitor at
Orsova.

From Nish

British Blue Book No. 66

Mr. CracJcanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Ed-
ward Grey, — {Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) Nish, July 28, 1914.

Telegram received here that war declared by Austria.

To Berlin
British Blue Book No. 67
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 28, 1914-

Explanation given in your telegram of the 27th July ^ of what
was my idea in proposing a conference is quite right. It would not
be an arbitration, but a private and informal discussion to ascertain
what suggestion could be made for a settlement. No suggestion
would be put forward that had not previously been ascertained to
be acceptable to Austria and Russia, with whom the mediating
Powers could easily keep in touch through their respective allies.

But as long as there is a prospect of a direct exchange of views
between Austria and Russia, I would suspend ^ every other sugges-

1 British Blue Book No. 43, July 27.

2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 77, July 29. (See also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No.
47, July 29.) In view of the claim that Sir E. Grey consistently pressed his "con-
ference" idea, this passage is of importance. The entire subject has been discussed
from the German point of view by Chancellor von Bethmann-HoUweg in his speech
before the Reichstag, Aug. 19, 1915, as follows:

The statement that the whole war might have been avoided if I had agreed to accept
the suggestion of Sir Edward Grey and take part in a conference for the regulation
of the Russian-Austrian question at issue has again of late been repeatedly made in
England. Here are the real facts. The English proposals for a conference were de-
livered here by the English Ambassador on the 27th of July. The English Blue Book
also shows that the Secretary of State at the Foreign Office in the conversation in
question with Sir Edward Goschen — a conversation in which the Secretary designated
the means proposed as unsuitable — had communicated to the English Ambassador
that, according to his information from Russia, M. Sazonof was inclined to consider
a direct exchange of opinion with Count Berchtold. He was of the opinion that a
direct conversation between Petrograd and Vienna might lead to a satisfactory result.
For that reason it was best to await the results of this conversation. Sir Edward
Goschen communicated this to London and received a telegraphic answer in which Sir
Edward Grey used these words :

" As long as there is a prospect of a direct exchange of views between Austria and
Russia, I would suspend every other suggestion, as I entirely agree that it is the most
preferable method of all."

Thus Sir Edward Grey accepted the German point of view at that time, and ex-
pressly withdrew his proposal of a conference for the time being.

However, unlike Sir Edward Grey, I did not permit matters to rest with the platonic
wish that a direct conversation might ensue between Vienna and Petrogi*ad, but did
everything within my power to persuade the Russian and the Austro-Hungarian
governments to discuss their difTerences by an exchange of opinions between their
respective cabinets. I have once before declared in this very place that our endeavors

July 28, British Blue Book No. 67 269

tion, as I entirely agree that it is the most preferable method of
all.

I understand that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has
proposed a friendly exchange of views to the Austrian Government,
and, if the latter accepts, it will no doubt relieve the tension and
make the situation less critical.

It is very satisfactory to hear from the German Ambassador
here that the German Government have taken action at Vienna in
the sense of the conversation recorded in my telegram of yesterday
to you.^

at medialion, especially in Vienna, had been carried on in a manner, which, as I stated
at the time, " went to the extreme limits of all that was compatible with our relations
as an ally." Since this activity of mine as a mediator in the interests of preserving
the peace has been repeatedly called in question in England, I shall prove by the
evidence of facts that all these accusations are without foundation.

On the evening of July 29 the following communication of the Imperial Ambassador
at Petrograd reached Berlin :

" M. Sazonof, who has just requested me to see him, communicates to me that
the Vienna Cabinet had replied with a categorical refusal to consider the desire he had
expressed to enter into direct conversations. There was therefore nothing left to do
save to return to the proposal of a conversation of four, as made by Sir Edward Grey."

Since the Vienna government had in the meantime declared itself prepared for a
direct exchange of views with Petrograd, it was clear that there must be some mis-
understanding. 1 telegraphed to Vienna and made use of the opportunity once more
to make a clear announcement of my own conception of the situation as a whole. My
instructions to Herr von Tschirschky were as follows :

" The communication of Count Pourtales is not in accordance with the represen-
tations which Your Excellency has made of the attitude of the Austrian-Hungarian
government. Apparently there is some misunderstanding which I beg you to explain.
We cannot expect of Austria-Hungary a willingness to negotiate with Serbia, with
whom she is already in a state of war.i But the refusal of all interchange of opinion
with Petrograd would be a grave mistake. We are indeed prepared to fulfil our duty
as an ally, but should Austria-Hungary ignore our advice, we must nevertheless decline
to be drawn into a world conflagration, through Austria-Hungary ignoring our advice.
Your Excellency will therefore at once and with all emphasis and earnestness express
yourself in this sense to Count Berchtold."

Herr von Tschirschky in answer to this communicated on July 30 :

" Count von Berchtold states that, as Your Excellency assumes, there has indeed
been some misunderstanding in question, and that on the part of Russia. Having
already received word of this misunderstanding also through Count Szapary, the
Austrian-Hungarian Ambassador in Petrograd, and having at the same time followed
our urgent suggestion that he enter into communication with Russia, he had at once
given the necessary instructions to Count Szapary."

Gentlemen, I made all this known to the British press, when excitement in England
increased shortly before the outbreak of the war, and serious doubts as to our en-
deavors to preserve peace became audible. And now after the event, that press
makes the insinuation that this occurrence had never taken place at all and that the
instructions to Herr von Tschirschky had been invented in order to mislead public
opinion in England. You will agree with me that this accusation is unworthy of an
answer. I would also allude at the same time to the Austrian Red Book which merely
confirms my presentation of the case and shows how after the aforesaid misunder-
standing had been cleared up, the conversations between Petrograd and Vienna had
begun to take their course, until the general mobilization of the Russian army brought
them to an untimely end. I repeat, gentlemen, that we have supported the direct
discussion between Vienna and Petrograd with the utmost emphasis and success.

The assertion that we, by refusing to accept the English suggestion of a conference,
must accept the blame for this war, belongs to the category of those calumnies under
cover of which our enemies endeavor to hide their own guilt. The war became un-
avoidable only through the Russian mobilisation.

1 Cf . British Blue Book No. 46, July 27, and German White Book, Exhibit 15, same
date. The effect of Germany's continued pressure on Austria-Hungary appears from
French Yellow Book No. 104, July 30. See also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 44,
July 29.

270 Official Diplomatic Documents

To Berlin

British Blue Book No. 68

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.

German Government, having accepted principle of mediation
between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, if necessary, I am
ready to propose that the German Secretary of State should suggest
the lines on which this principle should be applied. I will, however,
keep the idea in reserve ^ until we see how the conversations between
Austria and Russia progress.

To St. Petersburgh

British Blue Book No. 69

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Bux^hanan, British Ambassador at St. Peters-
burgh.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.

It is most satisfactory that there is a prospect of direct exchange
of views between the Russian and Austrian Governments, as reported
in your telegram of the 27th July.^

I am ready to put forward any practical proposal that would
facilitate this, but I am not quite clear as to what the Russian Minister
for Foreign Affairs proposes ^ the Ministers at Belgrade should do.
Could he not first mention in an exchange of views with Austria his
willingness to co-operate in some such scheme ? It might then take
more concrete shape.

Russia :

To London

Russian Orange Book No. 43

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at
London.
[See No. 54 of British Correspondence, July 28, 1914.]

From Fiume

RussLAJj Orange Book No. 44

Russian Consul General at Fiume to Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

(Telegram.) Fiume, July 15 (28), 1914.

State of siege has been proclaimed in Slavonia, in Croatia, and
at Fiume, and the reservists of all classes have also been called up.

^ Again Sir E. Grey defers to Sazonof's direct conversation idea.
« British Blue Book No. 55, July 27.

» The proposal referring to the Ministers at Belgrade has been omitted from the
despatch No. 55, to which the Official Blue Book refers here.

July 28, Russian Orange Book No. 4^

271

From Vienna
Russian Orange Book No. 45

Russian Ambassador at Vienna
Affairs.

Vienne,
le 15 {28) juillet, 1914.

(Telegraphique.)

J'ai entretenu aujourd'hui le
Comte Berchtold ^ dans le sens
des instructions de votre Ex-
cellence. Je lui fis observer, en
termes les plus amicaux, combien
il etait desirable de trouver une
solution qui, en consolidant les
bons rapports entre TAutriche-
Hongrie et la Russie, donnerait
a la Monarchic austro-hongroise
des garanties serieuses pour ses
rapports futurs avec la Serbie.

J'attirais I'attention du Comte
Berchtold ^ sur tons les dangers
pour la paix de I'Europe, qu'en-
trainerait un conflit arme entre
I'Autriche-Hongrie et la Serbie.

Le Comte Berchtold ^ me re-
pondit qu'il se rendait parfaite-
ment compte du serieux de la
situation et des avantages d'une
franche explication avec le Cabi-
net de Saint-Petersbourg. II me
dit que d'un autre cote le Gou-
vernement austro-hongrois, qui
ne s'etait decide que tres mal
volontiers aux mesures ener-
giques qu'il avait prises contre la
Serbie, ne pouvait plus ni reculer,
ni entrer en discussion aucune
des termes de la note austro-
hongroise.

Le Comte Berchtold ^ ajouta
que la crise etait devenue si aigue,
et que I'excitation de Topinion
publique avait atteint tel degre.

to Russian Minister for Foreign
(Translation.)

Vienna, July 15 {28), 1914.
(Telegraphic.)

I SPOKE to Count Berchtold^
to-day in the sense of 'your
Excellency's instructions.^ I
brought to his notice, in the
most friendly manner, how desir-
able it was to find a solution
which, while consolidating good
relations between Austria-Hun-
gary and Russia, would give to
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
genuine guarantees for its future
relations with Servia.

I drew Count Berchtold's ^
attention to all the dangers to
the peace of Europe which would
be involved by an armed conflict
between Austria-Hungary and
Servia.

Count Berchtold ^ replied that
he was well aware of the gravity
of the situation and of the ad-
vantages of a frank explanation
with the St. Petersburgh Cabi-
net. He told me that, on the
other hand, the Austro-Hun-
garian Government, who had
only decided much against their
will on the energetic measures
which they had taken against
Servia, could no longer recede,
nor enter into any discussion
about the terms of the Austro-
Hungarian note.

Count Berchtold ^ added that
the crisis had become so acute,
and that public opinion had risen
to such a pitch of excitement,

1 Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

2 No despatch containing these instructions is printed in the Russian Orange Book.

272 Official Diplomatic Documents

que le Gouvernement, le voulait- that the Government, even if

il, ne pouvait plus y consentir, they wished it, could no longer

d'autant moins, me dit-il, que consent to such a course. This

la reponse meme de la Serbie was all the more impossible, he

donne la preuve du manque de said, inasmuch as the Servian

sincerite de ses promesses pour reply itself furnished proof of

Tavenir. the insincerity of Servia's

promises for the future.

From Berlin

Russian Orange Book No. 46

Russian Charge d' Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

(Telegram.) Berlin, July 15 {28), 1914.

The Wolff Bureau has not published the text of the Servian
reply, although it was communicated to them. Up to the present
this note has not appeared in extenso in any of the local papers, which,
to all appearances, do not wish to publish it in their columns, being
well aware of the calming ^ effect which it would have on German
readers.

From Vienna

Russian Orange ^ook No. 47

Russian Ambassador at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

(Telegram.) Vienna, July 15 {28), 1914.

The order for general mobilisation has been signed.^

To London

Russian Orange Book No. 48

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at
London.

(Telegram.) St. Petersburg, July 15 {28), 1914.

In face of the hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Servia,
it is necessary that Great Britain should take instant mediatory
action,^ and that the military measures undertaken by Austria against

1 Germany undoubtedly waited until she received the Austro-Hungarian com-
ments, which were sent by mail from Vienna on July 27 (see Austro-Hungarian Red
Book No. 39, July 28). German newspapers are always antedated, the paper dated
July 28 being issued on the evening of July 27.

2 If "signed" means issued, this information is probably inaccurate. For a com-
plete discussion of this subject see M. P. Price, The Diplomatic History of the War,
Chas. Scribner's Sons, p. 69, who says "This confirms the supposition that Austria
had not mobilised more than eight army corps before August 1st."

2 Sazonof apparently had now given up his plan of direct conversation with Austria,
which he had sought since July 26, and also Sir E. Grey's plan of a conference, and

July 28, Serbian Blue Book No. Jfi 273

Servia should be immediately suspended. Otherwise mediation
will only serve as an excuse to make the question drag on, and will
meanwhile make it possible for Austria to crush Servia completely
and to acquire a dominant position in the Balkans.
Sent to Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome.

Serbia :

From Vienna

Serbian Blue Book No. 45 ^

Count Leopold Berchtold, Au^tro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to M. N. Pashitch, Serbian Prime Minister and Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 15/28, 1914.

The Royal Serbian Government not having answered in a satis-
factory manner the note of July 10/23, 1914, presented by the
Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, the Imperial and Royal
Government are themselves compelled to see to the safeguarding
of their rights and interests, and, with this object, to have recourse
to force of arms. Austria-Hungary consequently considers herself
henceforward in state of war with Serbia. ^

To All Serbian Legations

Serbian Blue Book No. 46

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to all the Serbian Legations abroad,

(Telegraphic.) Nish, July 15/28, 1914.

The Austro-Hungarian Government declared war on Serbia at
noon to-day by an open telegram to the Serbian Government.

To Petrograd

Serbian Blue Book No. 47

Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd, to M. Sazonof, Russian
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Your Excellency, Petrograd, July 15/28, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to inform Your Excellency that I have received
from M. Pashitch the following urgent telegram despatched from
Nish at 2.10 p.m.

urged the other plan of British direct mediation which probably had been outlined in
the third despatch referred to in French Yellow Book No. 76, July 28, but not printed
in full in the Yellow Book or in the Blue Book. Cf. also British Blue Book No. 44,
July 27.

1 For Serbian Blue Book No. 44 see July 30, 1914. „ , x

2 This was notified to the Powers in a despatch printed British Blue Book No. 50,
July 28.

274 Official Diplomatic Documents

"The Austro-Hungarian Government declared war on Serbia
to-day at noon by an open telegram to the Serbian Government."

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency of this regrettable
act, which a Great Power had the courage to commit against a small
Slav country which only recently emerged from a long series of heroic
but exhausting battles, and I beg leave on this occasion of deep gravity
for my country, to express the hope that this act, which disturbs the
peace of Europe and revolts her conscience, will be condemned by the
whole civilised world and severely punished by Russia, the protector
of Serbia.^

I beg Your Excellency to be so kind as to lay this petition from
the whole Serbian nation before the throne of His Majesty.

I take this opportunity to assure Your Excellency of my loyalty ^
and respect.

I have, etc.

1 Cf. also the appeal of the Serbian Crown Prince, Russian Orange Book No. 6,
July 24, and the Czar's reply, Russian Orange Book No. 40, July 27.

2 According to one's interpretation of the Serbian relations to Russia, the word
"loyalty" is either significant or merely a polite phrase.

July 29 y 1914

275

Wednesday, July 29, 1914
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

Foreign Office of

Sent Despatches to

Received
Despatches from

Austria-Hungary

London, Petrograd,

Paris, Berlin, Petro-

Paris, and Rome

grad

Berlin

Belgium

London etc.

France

London etc., London

Rome, Petrograd, Brus-
sels, Frankfort, Mu-
nich, Vienna, Berlin,
London, Belgrade

Germany

Paris

Emperor to Czar

Czar to Emperor

Great Britain

Rome, Berlin, Paris,

Berlin, Petrograd, Vi-

Vienna

enna, Rome, Con-

stantinople, Nish,
from Russian Am-
bassador

Russia

Berlin, London and

Berlin, Nish, ^aris,

Paris,

London

Serbia

Paris

Serbian Crownprince
to Czar.

Austria-Hungary makes renewed efforts to convince the Powers of the justice
of her case, and unequivocally accepts Sir E. Grey's first proposal of mediation
between Petrograd and Vienna. At the same time, while refusing to discuss the
"wording of the note," she is ready to have direct conversations with Petrograd
on "a much broader basis of discussion in declaring that she had no desire to injure
any Russian interests" nor to annex territory or to touch the "sovereignty of
Serbia." She is much disturbed by French and especially Russian mobilisation
and announces that the latter may force her to proceed to general mobilisation
on her part.

Belgium announces that she has " decided to place her army upon a strengthened
peace footing."

France continues to be suspicious of Germany, whom she holds responsible for
Austria-Hungary's determination to put a stop to Serbian intrigues. While
publishing many notices to the effect that Germany and Austria-Hungary were
mobilising, she makes no mention of the Russian mobilisation except as measures
of defence forced upon Russia. Several of the French despatches published on this
day are by their contents proved to have been written earlier.

Germany is greatly troubled by the mobilisation going on in France and Russia
and declares that if it continues she will have, to declare Kriegsgefahr. The
Emperor exchanges telegrams with the Czar begging him to intercede for peace.
Germany continues her pressure on Austria to come to an understanding with
Russia, and wishes to work together with Great Britain, whose neutrality she
wishes to secure in case of war.

Great Britain believes direct conversations between Vienna and Petrograd "the
best possible solution." Sir E. Grey is erroneously informed that Austria-
Hungary has refused them, and reverting to his conierence or mediation plan
declares his willingness to accept "any method that Germany thought possible in
the interests of peace." In case of war, Sir E. Grey declares, England would "have
to decide what British interests required." The suggestion of a possible invasion
of Belgium first broached on this day is not denounced as wrong. Sir E. Grey also

276 Official Diplomatic Documents

suggests that Austria should halt after taking Belgrade to give the Powers the
chance of adjusting the difficulties.

Russia claims that Russian interests were in this case Serbian interests. She
also claims that Austria-Hungary had ** categorically refused to continue an
exchange of ideas," and mobilises the districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, and
Kasan. Receiving France's promise of unconditional support she "hastens" her
"military preparations."

Serbia does not publish any documents of this day.

Italy suggests that Austria-Hungary "convert into a binding engagement to
Europe" her declaration that she wished neither "to destroy the independence of
Serbia nor to acquire Serbian territory." Unfortunately this suggestion was not
pressed, for Italy believed that thus "Russia might be induced to remain quiet."

Austria-Hungary :

To St. Petersburgh, London^ Paris, and Rome

AUSTROHUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 44

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at St. Peters-
burgh, London, Paris, and Rome.

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 29, 1914.

For your Excellency's information.

I have to-day handed to the Imperial German Ambassador the
following memorandum in answer to a demarche made here by him : ^

Memorandum

The Imperial and Royal Government have received with deep
gratitude information of the communication which the Imperial Ger-
man Ambassador made to them on the 28th inst.^ with regard to the
request of the British Cabinet that the Imperial German Govern-
ment should use their influence with the Vienna Cabinet that they
might regard the answer from Belgrade either as satisfactory, or as a
basis for discussion. So far as concerns what was said by the British
Secretary of State to Prince Lichnowsky, the Imperial and Royal
Government desire in the first place to draw attention to the fact
that the Servian answer in no way contains an acceptance of all our
demands with one single exception, as Sir E. Grey appears to assume,^
but rather that on most points reservations are formulated, which
materially detract from the value of the concessions which are made.
The points which are not accepted are, however, precisely those which
contain some guarantee for the real attainment of the end in view.

The Imperial and Royal Government cannot conceal their aston-
ishment at the assumption that their action against Servia was
directed against Russia and Russian influence in the Balkans, for
this implies the supposition that the propaganda directed against the
Monarchy has not merely a Servian but a Russian origin.^ The basis

1 This seems to refer to German White Book, Exhibit 15, July 27, and Exhibit 14,
July 28. See also British Blue Book No. 84, July 29.

2 British Blue Book Nos. 46 and 48, July 27.

' The logic of this inference is from the Austro-Hungarian point of view irrefutable.

July 29, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 45 277

of our consideration has hitherto been rather that official Russia has
no connection with these tendencies, which are hostile to the Mon-
archy, and that our present action is directed exclusively against
Servia, while our feelings for Russia, as we can assure Sir E. Grey,
are entirely friendly.

Further, the Imperial and Royal Government must point out that
to their great regret they are no longer in a position to adopt an
attitude towards the Servian reply in the sense of the British sug-
gestion, since at the time of the demarche made by Germany a state of
war between the Monarchy and Servia had already arisen, and the
Servian reply has accordingly already been outstripped by events.

The Imperial and Royal Government take this opportunity of
observing that the Royal Servian Government, even before they
communicated their reply, had taken steps towards the mobilisation
of the Servian forces, and thereafter they allowed three days to elapse
without showing any inclination to abandon the point of view con-
tained in their reply, whereupon the declaration of war followed on
our side.

If the British Cabinet is prepared to use its influence on the Rus-
sian Government with a view to the maintenance of peace between
the Great Powers, and with a view to the localisation of the war which
has been forced upon us by many years of Servian intrigues, the
Imperial and Royal Government could only welcome this.^

From Paris
Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 45
Count Szecsen to Count BercUold.
(Telegraphic.) > Paris, July 29, 1914.

France is unmistakably making certain military preparations
as is announced by the newspapers, perhaps with a certain exag-
geration.

As I learn in strictest confidence. Baron Schoen is commissioned
to discuss these preparations ^ with M. Viviani to-day, and to point
out that in these circumstances Germany may be compelled to take
similar measures which necessarily could not be kept secret, and
which could not fail to cause great public excitement when they be-
came known. In this way the two countries, although they are only
striving for peace, will be compelled to at least a partial mobilisation,
which would be dangerous.

Further, in accordance with these instructions. Baron Schoen will
declare that Germany has a lively desire that the conflict' between us
and Servia should remain localised, and that in this Germany relies
on the support of France.

1 This is an unequivocal acceptance of Sir E. Grey's original proposal of mediation
between Petrograd and Vienna.

2 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30, referring to "yesterday afternoon," i.e.
July 29.

278 Official Diplomatic Docuvients

From Berlin

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 46

Count Szogyeny to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 29, 1914.

As early as Sunday the German Government declared at St. Peters-
burgh that Russian mobilisation would have as a consequence German
mobilisation.^

Thereupon there followed on the part of Russia the reply announced
in my telegram of the 27th inst.^ Following this a telegram has
to-day been sent to St. Petersburgh, stating that owing to the fur-
ther progress of the Russian measures of mobilisation Germany
might be brought to mobilise.^

From St. Petersburgh

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 47

Ccmnt Szdpdry to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July.29, 1914.

As I have learned from the German Ambassador that M. Sazonof
is showing himself greatly excited over your Excellency's alleged
disinclination to continue the exchange of ideas with Russia, and over
the mobilisation of Austria-Hungary, which is supposed to be much
more extensive than is necessary, and, therefore, directed against
Russia, I visited the Minister in order to remove certain misunder-
standings which seemed to me to exist.

The Minister began by making the point that Austria-Hungary
categorically refused to continue an exchange of ideas. I agreed
in view of your Excellency's telegram of the 28th July that your
Excellency had indeed declined, after all that had occurred, to dis-
cuss the wording of the note, and in general the Austro-Hungarian-
Servian conflict, but said that I must make it clear that I was in a
position to suggest a much broader basis of discussion ^ in declaring
that we had no desire to injure any Russian interests, that we had no
intention, naturally on the assumption that 'the conflict between
Austria-Hungary and Servia remained localised, of annexing Servian
territory, and that we also had no idea of touching the sovereignty of
Servia. I was convinced that your Excellency would always be ready
to keep in touch with St. Petersburgh with regard to Austro-Hun-
garian and Russian interests.

M. Sazonof gave me to understand that he had been convinced of
this so far as territory was concerned, but so far as the sovereignty of

1 Cf. German White Book Exhibits 10 and 10&, July 26.

2 See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 33, July 27.

'Not given in the German White Book or the Russian Orange Book. Cf. Austro-
Hungarian Red Book No. 42, July 28.

* Cf. Chancellor's Speech, note to British Blue Book No. 67, July 28. See also
Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 50, July 30.

July 29, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 4? 279

the country was in question he must continue to hold the opinion that
to force on Servia our conditions would result in Servia becoming a
vassal State. This, however, would upset the equilibrium in the
Balkans, and this was how Russian interests became involved. He
returned to the question of a discussion of the note, the action of
Sir E. Grey, etc., and he desired again to point out to me that Russia
recognised our legitimate interest, and desired to give it full satis-
faction, but that this should be clothed in a form which would be
acceptable to Servia. I expressed the view that this was not a Rus-
sian but a Servian interest, whereupon M. Sazonof claimed that
Russian interests ^ were in this case Servian interests, so that I was
obliged to make an end of the vicious circle by going on to a new
topic.

I mentioned that I had heard that there was a feeling of anxiety
in Russia, because we had mobilised eight corps for action against
Servia. M. Sazonof assured me that it was not he (who knew nothing
about this) but the Chief of the General Staff who had expressed this
anxiety. I endeavoured to convince the Minister that any unpreju-
diced person could easily be persuaded that our southern corps could
not constitute a menace for Russia.

I indicated to the Minister that it would be well if his Imperial
Master were informed of the true situation, more especially as it was
urgently necessary, if it was desired to maintain peace, that a speedy
end should be put to the military competition (lizitieren) which now
threatened to ensue on account of false news. M. Sazonof very
characteristically expressed the view that he could communicate this
io the Chief of the General Staff, for he saw His Majesty every day.

The Minister further informed me that a Ukase would be signed
to-day, which would give orders for a mobilisation in a somewhat
extended form. He was able, however, to assure me in the most
official way that these troops were not intended to attack us. They
would only stand to arms in case Russian interests in the Balkans
should he in danger. An explanatory note would make this clear, for
the question here was one of a measure of precaution which the
Emperor Nicholas had found to be justified, since we, who in any
case have the advantage of quicker mobilisation, have now also al-
ready so great a start. In earnest words I drew M. Sazonof's atten-
tion to the impression which such a measure would make in our
country. I went on to express doubt whether the explanatory note
would be calculated to soften the impression, whereupon the Minister
again gave expression to assurances regarding the harmlessness( ! ) of
this measure.

1 A possible explanation of the remark that "Russian interests were in this case
Serbian interests "may be found in British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, where Sazonof
cannot allow "Austria to become the predominant Power in the Balkans."

280 Official Diplomatic Documents

To Berlin

AUSTROHUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 48

Count Berchtold to Count Szogyeny at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 29, 1914.

I HAVE just heard from Herr von Tschirschky, that the Russian
Ambassador has told him that he has been notified by his Government
that the military districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow and Kasan are
being mobilised. He said that Russia was outraged in her honour as
a Great Power/ and was obliged to take corresponding measures.
The Russian mobilisation is confirmed by the commanders of our-
Galician forces, and, according to a communication from the Imperial
and Royal Military Attache, in a conversation which M. Sazonof had
to-day with the German Ambassador it was no longer denied.^

I request your Excellency to bring the above without delay to the
knowledge of the German Government, and at the same time to
emphasise that if the Russian measures of mobilisation are not
stopped without delay, our general mobilisation would have, on
military grounds, to follow at once.

As a last effort to maintain the peace of Europe, I considered it
desirable that our representative and the representative of Germany
at St. Petersburgh, and, if necessary, at Paris, should at once be
instructed to declare to the Governments to whom they are ac-
credited in a friendly manner, that the continuance of the Russian
mobilisation would have as a result counter-measures in Germany
and Austria-Hungary, which must lead to serious consequences.^

Your Excellency will add that, as can be understood, in our military
operations against Servia we will not allow ourselves to be diverted
from our path.

The Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at St. Petersburgh and
Paris are receiving identical instructions to make the above declara-
tion as soon as their German colleague receives similar instructions.

To St. Petersburgh

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 49

Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburgh.
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 30, 1914.

In answer to your Excellency's telegram of the 29th July.
I am of course still ready to explain to M. Sazonof, through your
Excellency, the various points contained in our note addressed to

1 The reason why "Russia was outraged in her honour as a Great Power" is not
given. The interesting part of this passage is that Austria-Hungary was not the
only country which beUeved that her honor as a Great Power demanded a certain
course of action of her.

2 See German White Book, Narrative, pp. 351 to 360.

' This was evidently an attempt on Austria's part to keep the peace among the
nations.

July 29, French Yelloiv Book No. 84 281

Servia which however has already been outstripped by recent events.
I should also attach special importance, in accordance with the sug-
gestion made to me through M. Schebeko, also to discussing on this
occasion in a confidential and friendly manner the questions which
affect directly our relations towards Russia. From this it might be
hoped that it would be possible to remove the ambiguities which have
arisen and to secure the development in a friendly manner of our
relations towards our neighbours, which is so desirable an object.^

Belgium :

To Berlin, Paris, London, Vienna, St Petersburgh, Rome, The Hague,

and Luxemburg

Belgian Gray Book No. 8

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian
Ministers at Berlin, Paris, London, Vienna, St. Petersburg,
Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg.

Sir, • ' Brussels, July 29, 1914.

The Belgian Government have decided to place the army upon a
strengthened peace footing.

This step should in no way be confused with mobilisation.

Owing to the small extent of her territory, all Belgium consists, in
some degree, of a frontier zone. Her army on the ordinary peace
footing consists of only one class of armed militia ; on the strengthened
peace footing, owing to the recall of three classes, her army divisions
and her cavalry division comprise effective units of the same strength
as those of the corps permanently maintained in the frontier zones
of the neighbouring Powers.

This information will enable you to reply to any questions which
may be addressed to you.

France :

From Rome

French Yellow Book No. 84

M. Barrere, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, July 29, 1914.

The Consulta considers that, in spite of the declaration of war
by Austria on Servia, there is no reason why the diplomatic efforts
for calling together a conference at London with a view to mediation
should be interrupted. Barkere.

1 This is another evidence that Germany's influence upon Vienna was having
effect or that Austria-Hungary of her own accord was willing to try and avert a general
war by making explanations to Russia.

282 Official Diplomatic Documents

To St. Petersburgh, London, Berlin, Rome, Vienna, Constantinople.
French Yellow Book No. 85

M. Bienxenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to St.

Petersburgh, London, Berlin, Rome, Vienna, Constantinople,

Belgrade.

Paris, July 29, 1914.
The Austro-German attitude is becoming clearer. Austria, un-
easy concerning the Slav propaganda, has seized the opportunity ^
of the crime of Serajevo in order to punish the Servian intrigues,
and to obtain in this quarter guarantees which, according as events
are allowed to develop or not, will either affect only the Servian
Government and army, or become territorial questions. Germany
intervenes ^ between her ally and the other Powers and declares that
the question is a local one, namely, the punishment of a political
crime committed in the past, and for the future sure guarantees that
the anti- Austrian intrigues will be put an end to. The German
Government thinks that Russia should be content with the official
and formal assurances given by Austria, to the effect that she does
not seek territorial aggrandisement and that she will respect the in-
tegrity of Servia ; in these circumstances the danger of war can only
come from Russia, if she seeks to intervene in a question which is
well defined. In these circumstances any action for the mainten-
ance of peace must therefore take place at St. Petersburgh alone.

This sophism,^ which would relieve Germany from intervening at
Vienna, has been maintained unsuccessfully at Paris by Herr von
Schoen, who has vainly endeavoured to draw us into identical Franco-
German action at St. Petersburgh ; it has been also expounded in
London to Sir E. Grey. In France, as in England, a reply was given
that the St. Petersburgh Cabinet have, from the beginning, given
the greatest proofs of their moderation, especially by associating
themselves with the Powers in advising Servia to yield to the re-
quirements of the Austrian note. Russia does not therefore in any
way threaten peace ; it is at Vienna that action must be taken ; it
is from there that the danger will come, from the moment that they
refuse to be content with the almost complete submission of Servia
to exorbitant demands ; that they refuse to accept the co-operation
of the Powers in the discussion of the points which remain to be
arranged between Austria and Servia ; and, finally, that they do not
hesitate to make a declaration of war as precipitate as the original
Austro-Hungarian note.

The attitude at Berlin, as at Vienna, is still dilatory. In the
former capital, while protesting that the Germans desire to safe-

1 The U. S. diplomatic agent, Mr. F. H. Mallett, reported to the Department of
State in Washington at the time that the Serajevo murder was undoubtedly instigated
by Serbia, and that a world war might ensue. See New York Herald, July 30, 1914.

' For Germany's explanation of her action, see German White Book, Exhibit 1,
and British Blue Book No. 67, July 28, with note.

' Granting that this term is used in all sincerity, it shows how widely apart France
and Germany were in viewing the events leading up to the war, since the expression
of Germany's honest belief appeared as a " sophism " to France.

July 29, French Yellow Booh No. 87 283

guard general peace by common action between the four Powers, the
idea of a conference is rejected without any other expedient being
suggested/ and while they refuse to take any positive action at
Vienna. In the Austrian capital they would like to keep St. Peters-
burgh in play with the illusion of an entente which might result
from direct conversations, while they are taking action against
Servia.

In these circumstances it seems essential that the St. Petersburgh
Cabinet, whose desire to unravel this crisis peacefully is manifest,
should immediately give their adherence to the British proposal.^
This proposal must be strongly supported at Berlin in order to decide
Herr von Jagow to take real action at Vienna capable of stopping
Austria and preventing her from supplementing her diplomatic ad-
vantage by military successes. The Austro-Hungarian Government
would, indeed, not be slow to take advantage of it in order to im-
pose on Servia, under the elastic expression of "guarantees," condi-
tions which, in spite of all assurances that no territorial aggrandise-
ment was being sought, would in effect modify the status of Eastern
Europe, and would run the risk of gravely compromising the general
peace either at once or in the near future.

Bienvenu-Martin.

From St Petersburgh

French Yellow Book No. 86

M. Paleologuey French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburgh, July 29, 1914.
I AM now in a position to assure Your Excellency that the Russian
Government will acquiesce in any measures which France and Great
Britain may propose in order to maintain peace. My British col-
league is telegraphing to London to the same effect.^

Paleologue.

From Brussels

French Yellow Book No. 87

M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, July 29, 1914.
I REPORT the following impressions of my interview with M.
Davignon and with several persons in a position to have exact in-

1 This is an error, see Chancellor's Speech in note to British Blue Book No. 67, July
28.

2 This shows that Russia had not accepted the conference idea on July 29. France
and Russia, therefore, seem to be working somewhat at variance with each other —
see, however, next number. , c^ e, .,i-

3 British Blue Book No. 78, July 29, which gives as the reason for Sazonof s willmg-
ness to have a conference that the "Austrian Government had now definitely declined
direct conversation." See, however, Chancellor's Speech in note to British Blue Book
No. 67, July 28.

284 Official Diplomatic Documents

formation. The attitude of Germany is enigmatical and justifies
every apprehension ; it seems improbable that the Austro-Hungarian
Government would have taken an initiative which would lead, ac-
cording to a pre-conceived plan, to a declaration of war, without
previous arrangement with the Emperor William.^

The German Government stand ''with grounded arms'' ready to
take peaceful or warlike action as circumstances may require, but
there is so much anxiety everywhere that a sudden intervention
against us would not surprise anybody here. My Russian and
British colleagues share this feeling.

The Belgian Government are taking steps which harmonise with
the statement made to me yesterday by M. Davignon that every-
thing will be put in readiness for the defence of the neutrality of the
country.

Klobukowski.

From Frankfort

French Yellow Book No. 88

M. Ronssin, French Consul-General at Frankfort^ to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Frankfort, July 29, 1914.

I NOTIFY you of important movements of troops yesterday and
to-night. This morning several regiments in service dress arrived
here, especially by the roads from Darmstadt, Cassel, and Mayence,
which are full of soldiers. The bridges and railways are guarded
under the pretext ^ of preparations for the autumn manoeuvres.

Ronssin.

From Munich

French Yellow Book No. 89'

M. Allize, French Minister at Munich, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Act-
ing Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Munich, July 29, 1914.

I AM informed that the mills at Illkirch (Alsace-Lorraine) have
been asked to stop delivery to their ordinary clients and to keep all
their output for the army.

From Strassburg information has been received of the transport
of motor guns used for firing on aeroplanes and dirigibles.

Under the pretext of a change in the autumn manoeuvres the non-
commissioned officers and men of the Bavarian infantry regiments at

^ This seems to have been France's firm conviction. For a discussion of Germany's
influence or lack of influence on Austria-Hungary see John W. Burgess, The European
War, A. C. McClurg & Co., Chicago.

2 The annual manoeuvres in Germany begin in July. For the subject of German
mobilisation see M. G. Price, The Diplomatic History of the War, Chas. Scribner's
Sons, and E. von Mach, Germany's Point of View.

» See note to No. 88.

July 29, French Yellow Book No. 91 285

Metz, who were on leave in Bavaria for the harvest, received orders
yesterday to return immediately.

Allize.

From Vienna

French Yellow Book No. 90*

M, Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

The French Consul at Prague confirms the mobilisation of the
8th army corps which had already been announced, and that of the
Landwehr division of this army corps. The cavalry divisions in
Galicia are also mobilising; regiments and cavalry divisions from
Vienna and Budapest have already been transported to the Russian
frontier. Reservists are now being called together in this district.

There is a rumour that the Austro-Hungarian Government, in
order to be in a position to meet any danger, and perhaps in order
to impress St. Petersburgh, intend to decide on a general mobilisa-
tion of their forces on the 30th July, or the 1st August. To conclude,
it is certain the Emperor will return from Ischl to Vienna to-morrow.

Dumaine.

From St. Petersburgh

French Yellow Book No. 91

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburgh, July 29, 1914.

The direct conversation, to which the Russian Government had
invited the Austro-Hungarian Government in a friendly spirit, has
been refused by the latter.^

On the other hand, the Russian General Staff have satisfied them-
selves that Austria is hurrying on her military preparations against
Russia, and is pressing forward the mobilisation which has begun on
the Galician frontier. As a result the order to mobilise will be de-
spatched to-night to thirteen army corps, which are destined to
operate eventually against Austria.

In spite of the failure of his proposal, M. Sazonof accepts ^ the
idea of a conference of the four Powers in London ; further, he does
not attach any importance to the title officially given to the discus-
sions, and will support all British efforts in favour of peace.

Paleologue.

1 See note to No. 88.

2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 78, July 29, and for the error in this statement
Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29.

3 This contains the information given above as a separate telegram, No. 86.

286 Official Diplomatic Documents

From Berlin

French Yellow Book No. 92

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenun
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

I ASKED the Secretary of State to-day ^ how the question of direct
conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburgh, which seemed
to him yesterday the best means of arriving at a detente, stood. He
answered that at St. Petersburgh they seemed well disposed towards
them and that he had asked Vienna to take this course. He was
awaiting the reply. The British Government, after seeing the sug-
gestion of a conference rejected, had let it be known that they would
view with favour the inception of such conversations between Austria
and Russia, and had asked Germany to urge Austria, which the Im-
perial Government are not failing to do.

I asked Herr von Jagow if he had at last received the Servian
reply to Austria and what he thought of it. He replied that he saw
in it a basis for possible negotiation.^ I added that it was just on
that account that I considered the rupture by Austria, after she had
received such a document, inexplicable.

The Secretary of State then remarked that with Eastern nations
one could never obtain sufficient guarantees, and that Austria wished
to be able to supervise the carrying out of promises made to her, a
supervision which Servia refused. This, in the eyes of the Secretary
of State, is the cardinal point. I answered Herr von Jagow that
Servia, as she wished to remain independent, was bound to reject
the control of a single Power, but that an International Commission
would not have the same character. The Balkan States have more
than one, for instance the Financial Commission at Athens. One
could imagine, I said, for instance, among other combinations, a Pro-
visional International Commission, charged with the duty of control-
ling the police inquiry demanded by Austria ; it was clear, by this
instance, that the reply of Servia opened the door to conversations
and did not justify a rupture.

1 then asked the Secretary of State if, leaving aside direct conver-
sations between Vienna and St. Petersburgh to which Sir E. Grey
had given his adherence, he did not think that common action could
be exercised by the four Powers by means of their Ambassadors.
He answered in the affirmative, adding that at this moment the
London Cabinet were confining themselves to exercising their in-
fluence in support of direct conversations.

At the end of the afternoon the Imperial Chancellor asked the

* The contents of this telegram seem to refer to events of the previous day.

2 This cannot possibly have been said on July 29, since Austria-Hungary had de-
clared war on Serbia, and the latter had begun the hostilities on July 27, cf. British
Blue Book No. 56 under date of July 28.

July 29, French Yellow Booh No. 93 287

British Ambassador to come and see him.^ He spoke to him of the
proposal of Sir E. Grey for the meeting of a conference ; he told him
that he had not been able to accept a proposal which seemed to im-
pose the authority of the Powers on Austria; he assured my col-
league of his sincere desire for peace and of the efforts he was mak-
ing to that effect at Vienna, but he added that Russia was alone able
to maintain peace or let loose war.

Sir E. Goschen answered that he did not agree, and that if war
broke out Austria would be chiefly responsible, for it was inadmis-
sible for her to have broken with Servia after the reply of the latter.

Without discussing this point, the Chancellor said that he was
trying his utmost to obtain direct conversations between Austria
and Russia; he knew that England looked on such conversations
with a favourable eye. He added that his own action would be
rendered very difficult at Vienna, if it were true that Russia had
mobilised fourteen army corps on the Austrian frontier. He asked
my colleague to call Sir E. Grey's attention to what he had said.

Sir E. Goschen has telegraphed to London to this effect.^

The attitude of the Chancellor is very probably the result of the
last interview of Sir E. Grey with Prince Lichnowsky. Up to quite
the last days they flattered themselves here that England would
remain out of the question, and the impression produced on the Ger-
man Government and on the financiers and business men by her
attitude is profound.

Jules Cambon.

From Vienna

French Yellow Book No. 93'

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

The opinion of my British, Russian and Italian colleagues agrees
with mine concerning the impossibility of preventing the outbreak
of hostilities between Austria and Servia, since all attempts to avoid
the collision have failed.

M. Schebeko had asked that the negotiations begun at St. Peters-
• burgh by MM. Sazonof and Szapary should be continued and made
more effective by special powers being conferred on the latter, but
Count Berchtold has flatly refused. He showed in this way that
Austria-Hungary does not tolerate any intervention which would
prevent her from inflicting punishment and humiliation on Servia.

The Duke of Avarna admits that it is very probable that the im-
minence of a general insurrection among the Southern Slav inhab-

1 Cf. British Blue Book No. 71, July 28, received and listed under July 29. This
interview took place on July 28, and proves that this French despatch is wrongly
dated.

2 British Blue Book No. 71, July 28, but received and therefore hsted under July 29.

3 This despatch, like the previous one, while dated July 29, must have been written
before Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, which was on July 28.

288 Official Diplomatic Documents

itants precipitated the resolutions of the Monarchy. He still clings
to the hope that, after a first success of the Austro-Hungarian arms,
.but not before this, mediation might be able to limit the conflict.

DUMAINE.

To London, Berlin, St. Petershurgh, Rome, Vienna, Constantinople,

Belgrade

French Yellow Book No. 94

M. Bienmnu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London,
Berlin, St. Petersburgh, Rome, Vienna, Constantinople, Belgrade.

Paris, July 29, 1914.

The following communication was semi-officially made to me this
morning by the German Ambassador : —

"The German Government are still continuing their efforts to
obtain the consent of the Austrian Government to a friendly con-
versation which would give the latter an opportunity of stating
exactly the object and extent of the operations in Servia. The
Berlin Cabinet hope to receive declarations which will be of a kind
to satisfy Russia. The German efforts are in no way impeded by the
declaration of war which has occurred." A similar communication
will be made at St. Petersburgh.

During the course of a conversation which I had this morning
with Baron von Schoen, the latter stated to me that the German
Government did not know what the intentions of Vienna were.
When Berlin knows how far Austria wishes to go, there will be a
basis of discussion which will make conversations with a view to
intervention easier.

When I observed that the military operations which had been
begun would not perhaps allow any time for conversation, and that
the German Government ought to use their influence at Vienna to
delay them, the Ambassador answered that Berlin could not exer-
cise any pressure, but that he hoped that the operations would not
be pushed forward very actively.

Bienvenu-Martin.

To London, Berlin, St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Constantinople, Rome,

Belgrade

French Yellow Book No. 95

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London,
Berlin, St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Constantinople, Rome, Belgrade.

Paris, July 29, 1914.

M. IsvoLSKY came to me by order of his Government to commu-
nicate a telegram addressed by M. Sazonof to Berlin.^ It appears

* This telegram is not published either in the Russian Orange Book or the German
White Book. It may be the telegram British Blue Book No. 70 published under
date of July 29.

July 29, ^French Yellow Book No. 96 289

from this information that, in consequence of the declaration of war
by Austria-Hungary on Servia, the measures of mobiHsation already
taken with regard to the largest part of the Austro-Hungarian army,
and finally the refusal ^ of Count Berchtold to continue negotiations
between Vienna and St. Petersburgh, Russia had decided to mobilise
in the provinces of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow and Kazan. While in-
forming the German Government to this effect, the Russian Ambas-
sador at Berlin was instructed to add that these military precautions
were not in any way directed against Germany, and also did not
imply aggressive measures against Austria-Hungary; furthermore
the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had not been recalled.

The Russian Ambassador also gave me the substance of two tele-
grams ^ addressed to London by M. Sazonof : the first, after point-
ing out that the declaration of war on Servia put an end to the con-
versations of the Russian Minister with the Austrian Ambassador,
asked England to exercise her influence, as quickly as possible, with
a view to mediation and to the immediate cessation of Austrian
military operations (the continuation of which gave Austria time to
crush Servia while mediation was dragging on) ; the second com-
municated the impression received by M. Sazonof from his conver-
sations with the German Ambassador that Germany favours Austria's
uncompromising attitude and is not exercising any influence on her.
The Russian Minister thinks that the attitude of Germany is very
disquieting,^ and considers that England is in a better position than
the other Powers to take steps at Berlin with a view to exercising
pressure on Vienna.

Bienvenu-Martin.

From Rome

French Yellow Book No. 96

M. Barrere, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, July 29, 1914.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has been officially informed by
the Russian Ambassador that his Government, in consequence of
the declaration of war by Austria on Servia and of the measures of
mobilisation which were from this moment being taken by Austria,
had given the order to mobilise in the districts of Kieff, Odessa,
Moscow and Kazan.^ He added that this step had no aggressive
character against Germany, and that the Russian Ambassador at
Vienna had not been recalled.

In speaking of this communication the Marquis di San Giuliano
told me that unfortunately throughout this affair Austria and Ger-
many had been, and were still, convinced that Russia would not

1 For the error of this statement see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29.

2 British Blue Book Nos. 93, 2 and 3, July 30. ■, . .

3 This statement is not contained in the despatch presented in London.
* Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 48, July 29.

290 Official Diplomatic Documents

move. In this connection he read to me a despatch from M. Bollati
reporting an interview which he had had yesterday with Herr von
Jagow, in which the latter had again repeated to him that he did
not think that Russia would move. He based this belief on the fact
that the Russian Government had just sent an agent to Berlin to
treat about some financial questions. The Austrian Ambassador at
Berlin also told his British colleague that he did not believe in a general
war, since Russia was not in the mood or in the condition to make
war.^

The Marquis di San Giuliano does not share this opinion. He
thinks that if Austria contents herself with humiliating Servia and
with exacting, besides the acceptance of the note, some material
advantages which do not involve her territory, Russia can still find
some means of coming to an agreement with her. But if Austria
wishes either to dismember Servia or to destroy her as an independent
State, he thinks that it would be impossible for Russia not to inter-
vene by military measures.

In spite of the extreme gravity of the situation, the Minister for
Foreign Affairs does not seem to me to despair of the possibility of
an agreement. He thinks that England can still exercise a great
deal of influence at Berlin in the direction of peace. He had yester-
day, he told me, a long conversation with the British Ambassador,
Sir R. Rodd,^ in order to show him to what extent British interven-
tion might be effective. He said to me in conclusion, "If your
Government are of the same opinion, they could on their side make
representations to this effect in London."^ Rat^rfrf

To London

French Yellow Book No. 97

M. RenS Vivianiy President of the Council, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.

Paris, July 29, 1914.

I SHOULD be obliged if you would ask Sir E. Grey to be good
enough to renew as soon as possible at Berlin, in the form which he
may consider most opportune and effective, his proposal of media-
tion by the four Powers, which had in principle ^ obtained the ad-
herence of the German Government.

The Russian Government on their side will have expressed the
same desire directly to the British Government ; the declaration of
war by Austria on Servia, her sending of troops to the Austro-Rus-
sian frontier,^ the consequent Russian mobilisation on the Galician

1 This statement, if true, seems to disprove the assertion popularly made that
Germany and Austria-Hungary wished to bring about a general war.

2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 57, written July 27, but received and published under
date of July 28. Barr^re says "yesterday," which shows that also this telegram was
written, at least in part, on July 28.

» For this interview see British Blue Book No. 80, July 29.

* British Blue Book No. 46, July 27.

' There is no proof given for this assertion.

July 29, French Yellow Book No. 98 291

frontier have in fact put an end to the direct Austro-Russian con-
versations.

The explanations which the German Government are going to
ask for at Vienna, in accordance with the statement of Baron von
Schoen which I have reported to you, in order to learn the intention
of the Austrian Government, will allow the four Powers to exercise
effective action between Vienna and St. Peter sburgh for the main-
tenance of peace.

I would ask you also to point out to the British Secretary of State
how important it would be for him to obtain from the Italian Gov-
ernment the most whole-hearted continuance of their support in
co-operating in the action of the four Powers in favour of peace.

Rene Viviani.

From London

French Yellow Book No. 98

M, Paul Camhon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 29, 191Jf..

In his interview to-day with my German colleague. Sir E. Grey
observed that, the overtures of M. Sazonof for direct conversations
between Russia and Austria not having been accepted ^ at Vienna,
it would be well to return to his proposal of friendly intervention
by the four Powers which are not directly interested. This sugges-
tion has been accepted in principle ^ by the German Government,
but they have objected to the idea of a conference or of mediation.
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has invited Prince Lich-
nowsky to ask his Government that they should themselves propose
a new formula. Whatever it may be, if it admits of the maintenance
of peace, it will be accepted by Great Britain, France and Italy.

The German Ambassador was to have forwarded Sir E. Grey's
request to Berlin immediately. In giving me an account of this
conversation, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs added that
Germany's reply to this communication and to that of Russia con-
cerning the mobilisation of four army corps on the Austrian frontier
would allow us to realise the intentions of the German Government.
My German colleague having asked Sir E. Grey what the intentions
of the British Government were, the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs replied that he had nothing to state for the present.

Sir E. Grey did not disguise the fact that he found the situation
very grave and that he had little hope of a peaceful solution.

Paul Cambon.

1 This error makes the round in the Entente despatches. Cf . Austro-Hungarian
Ked Book No. 47, July 29, where Austria-Hungary, while unwilling to discuss "the
wording of the note," makes it "clear that I [Austro-Hungarian Ambassador] was in a
position to suggest a much broader basis of discussion."

2 British Blue Book No. 46, July 27.

292 Official Diplomatic Documents

From Belgrade

French Yellow Book No. 99

M. Boppe, French Minister at Belgrade, to M. Bienvenu-AIartin,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Belgrade, July 29, 1914.

The Crown Prince, as soon as the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum
was received, telegraphed ^ to the Tsar to ask his help. My Russian
colleague tells me that he has just communicated to M. Pashitch
His Majesty's reply.

The Tsar thanks ^ the Prince for having turned to him at so critical
a juncture ; he declares that everything has been done to arrive at a
peaceful solution of the dispute, and formally assures the Prince
that, if this object cannot be attained, Russia will never cease to
interest herself in the fate of Servia.

BOPPE.

From St. Petershurgh

French Yellow Book No. 100

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petershurgh, to M. Bien-
venu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petershurgh, July 29, 1914.

The German Ambassador came to tell M. Sazonof that if Russia
does not stop her military preparations the German army will re-
ceive the order to mobilise.

M. Sazonof replied that the Russian preparations have been
caused,^ on the one hand, by the obstinate and uncompromising atti-
tude of Austria, and on the other hand by the fact that eight Austro-
Hungarian army corps are already mobilised.

The tong in which Count Pourtales delivered this communication
has decided the Russian Government this very night to order the
mobilisation of the thirteen army corps which are to operate against
Austria.

Paleologue.

Germany :

To Paris

German White Book Exhibit 17

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Paris on
July 29th, 1914.

News received here regarding French preparations of war multi-
plies from hour to hour. I request that you call the attention of the

1 Russian Orange Book No. 6, July 24. 2 Russian Orange Book No. 40, July 27.

' According to this despatch part of the Russian mobilization had taken place pre-
viously, while part was to be ordered on the evening of July 29. As regards the earlier
mobilization orders cf. the word of honor given by the Russian Chief of Staff, German
White Book, p. 556, that up to 3 p.m., July 29, "nowhere there had been a mobilisa-
tion, viz. calling in of a single man or horse."

July 29, German White Book Exhibit 22 293

French Government to this and accentuate that such measures would
call forth counter-measures on our part. We should have to pro-
claim threatening state of war {drohende Kriegsgefahr), and while
this would not mean a call for the reserves or mobilisation, yet the
tension would be aggravated. We continue to hope for the preser-
vation of peace.

From the Czar

German White Book Exhibit 21

II. The Czar to His Majesty.

Peterhof Palace, July 29th, 1 P.M.

I AM glad that You are back in Germany. In this serious moment
I ask You earnestly to help me. An ignominious war has been
declared against a weak country and in Russia the indignation
which I fully share is tremendous. I fear that very soon I shall be
unable to resist the pressure exercised upon me and' that I shall
be forced to take measures which will lead to war. To prevent such a
calamity as a European war would be, I urge You in the name of
our old friendship to do all in Your power to restrain Your ally
from going too far.

(Signed) ^ Nicolas.

To St. Petersburgh
German White Book Exhibit 22

III. His Majesty to the Czar.

July 29th, 6.30 P.M.

I HAVE received Your telegram and I share Your desire for the
conservation of peace. However : I cannot — as I told You in my
first telegram — consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an " igno-
minious war." Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the
promises of Servia as long as they are merely on paper are entirely
unreliable.

According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary is to be
considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty that the promises
of Servia are effectively translated into deeds. In this opinion I am
strengthened by the explanation of the Austrian Cabinet that Aus-
tria-Hungary intended no territorial gain at the expense of Servia.
I am therefore of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia to
remain a spectator in the Austro-Servian war without drawing
Europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen. I believe that a
direct understanding is possible and desirable between Your Govern-
ment and Vienna, an understanding which — as I have already
telegraphed You — my Government endeavours to aid with all pos-
sible effort. Naturally military measures by Russia, which might
be construed as a menace by Austria-Hungary, would accelerate a
calamity which both of us desire to avoid and would undermine

294 Official Diplomatic Documents

my position as mediator which — upon Your appeal to my friend-
ship and aid — I wiUingly accepted.

(Signed) Wilhelm.

Great Britain:

From St. Petersburgh

British Blue Book No. 70

Telegrams communicated by Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador
in London, July 29, 1914.

(1.) Telegram from M. Sazonof to Russian Ambassador at Berlin,
dated Jidy 28, 1914.

In consequence of the declaration of war by Austria against Ser-
via, the Imperial Government will announce to-morrow (29th) the
mobilisation in the military circumscriptions of Odessa, Kieff, Mos-
cow, and Kazan. Please inform German Government, confirming
the absence in Russia of any aggressive intention against Germany.

The Russian Ambassador at Vienna has not been recalled from
his post.

(2.) Telegram to Courd Benckendorff.^

The Austrian declaration of war clearly puts an end ^ to the idea
of direct communications between Austria and Russia. Action by
London Cabinet in order to set on foot mediation with a view to
suspension of military operations of Austria against Servia is now
most urgent.

Unless military operations are stopped, mediation would only
allow matters to drag on and give Austria time to crush Servia.^

From Berlin

British Blue Book No. 71

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edivard Grey. —
{Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) Berlin,- July 28, 1914.

At invitation of Imperial Chancellor, I called upon his Excellency
this evening."^ He said that he wished me to tell you that he was
most anxious that Germany should work together with England for
maintenance of general peace, as they had done successfully in the

^ Russian Ambassador in London.

2 This seems to indicate that Sazonof considered the direct conversations closed.
Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29, and footnote 1 to French Yellow
Book No. 98, July 29.

' Cf. French Yellow Book No. 95, July 29, where two telegrams from Sazonof to
Count BenckendorfT are mentioned. The second one is not given here. It was of a
kind to arouse suspicion of Germany. There is, however, nothing either in the British
Blue Book or the Russian Orange Book that would have borne it out.

* Cf. French Yellow Book No. 92, July 29.

July 29, British Blue Book No. 72 295

last European crisis. He had not been able to accept your proposal
for a conference ^ of representatives of the Great Powers, because he
did not think that it would be effective, and because such a con-
ference would in his opinion have had appearance of an "Areopagus"
consisting of two Powers of each group sitting in judgment upon
the two remaining Powers; but his inability to accept proposed
conference must not be regarded as militating against his strong
desire for effective co-operation. You could be assured that he was
doing his very best both at Vienna and St. Petersburgh to get the
two Governments to discuss the situation directly with each other
and in a friendly way. He had great hopes that such discussions
would take place and lead to a satisfactory result, but if the news
were true which he had just read in the papers, that Russia had
mobilised fourteen army corps in the south, he thought situation
was very serious, and he himself would be in a very difficult position,
as in these circumstances it Avould be out of his power to continue
to preach moderation at Vienna. He added that Austria, who as
yet was only partially mobilising, would have to take similar meas-
ures, and if war were to result, Russia would be entirely responsible.^
I ventured to say that if Austria refused to take any notice of Servian
note, which, to my mind, gave way in nearly every point demanded
by Austria, and which in any case offered a basis for discussion,
surely a certain portion of responsibility would rest with her. His
Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss Servian note, but
that Austria's standpoint, and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel
with Servia was a purely Austrian concern with which Russia had
nothing to do. He reiterated his desire to co-operate with England
and his intention to do his utmost to maintain general peace. "A
war between the Great Powers must be avoided" were his last
words.

Austrian colleague said to me to-day that a general war was most
unlikely, as Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make war.
I think that that opinion is shared by many people here.^

From St. Petersburgh

British Blue Book No. 72

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Ed-
ward Grey. — {Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 28, 1914.

Minister for Foreign Affairs begged me to thank you for the
language you had held to the German Ambassador, as reported in

1 From British Blue Book No. 46, July 27, it appears that Germany had accepted
"in principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers."

2 This claim made on July 29 is important because later France wished to make it
appear that Germany was not sincere and advanced this argument too late to deserve
any credence. Cf. French Yellow Book No. 127, August I-

3 If true this would seem to disprove the charge that either Germany or Austria-
Hungary was plotting to bring about a world war.

296 Official Diplomatic Documents

your telegram ^ to Berlin, substance of which I communicated to his
Excellency. He took a pessimistic view of the situation, having
received the same disquieting ^ news from Vienna as had reached His
Majesty's Government. I said it was important that we should
know the real intentions of the Imperial Government, and asked him
whether he would be satisfied with the assurances which the Austrian
Ambassador had, I understood, been instructed to give in respect of
Servians integrity and independence. I added that I was sure any
arrangement for averting a European war would be welcomed by
His Majesty's Government. In reply his Excellency stated that if
Servia were attacked Russia would not be satisfied with any engage-
ment which Austria might take on these two points, and that order
for mobilisation against Austria would be issued on the day that
Austria crossed Servian frontier.

I told the German Ambassador, who appealed to me to give
moderating counsels to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that from
the beginning I had not ceased to do so, and that the German Am-
bassador at Vienna should now in his turn use his restraining in-
fluence. I made it clear to his Excellency that, Russia being
thoroughly in earnest, a general war could not be averted if Servia
were attacked by Austria.

As regards the suggestion of conference, the Ambassador had
received no instructions, and before acting with me the French and
Italian Ambassadors are still waiting for their final instructions.

From Vienna

British Blue Book No. 73

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.
— (Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I HAVE received note verbale from Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
stating that, the Servian Government not having replied to note of
23rd July ^ in a satisfactory manner, Imperial and Royal Government
is compelled itself to provide for protection of its rights, and to have
recourse for that object to force of arms. Austria-Hungary has ad-
dressed to Servia formal declaration according to article 1 of con-
vention of 18th October, 1907, relative to opening of hostilities, and
considers herself from to-day in state of war with Servia. Austria-
Hungary will conform, provided Servia does so, to stipulations of
Hague conventions of 18th October, 1907, and to Declaration of
London of 26th February, 1909.^

1 See No. 46, July 27.

« Cf. however, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29.

» See No. 4, July 24.

* In view of later events this declaration of Austria-Hungary is very important.

July 29, British Blue Book No. 75 297

From Vienna
British Blue Book No. 74

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.
— (Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I AM informed by the Russian Ambassador that the Russian
Government's suggestion^ has been decHned by the Austro-Hun-
garian Government. The suggestion was to the effect that the means
of settling the Austro-Servian conflict should be discussed directly
between Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Am-
bassador at St. Petersburgh, who should be authorised accordingly.

The Russian Ambassador thinks that a conference in London
of the less interested Powers, such as you have proposed, offers now
the only prospect of preserving peace of Europe, and he is sure that
the Russian Government will acquiesce willingly in your proposal.
So long as opposing armies have not actually come in contact, all
hope need not be abandoned.

From Berlin

British Blue Book No. 75

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. —
(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 29, 1914.

I WAS sent for again to-day by the Imperial Chancellor, who told
me that he regretted to state that the Austro-Hungarian Govern-
ment, to whom he had at once communicated your opinion, had
answered that events had marched too rapidly and that it was there-
fore too late ^ to act upon your suggestion that the Servian reply
might form the basis of discussion. His Excellency had, on receiv-
ing their reply, despatched a message to Vienna, in which he ex-
plained that, although a certain desire had, in his opinion, been
shown in the Servian reply to meet the demands of Austria, he under-
stood entirely that, without some sure guarantees that Servia would
carry out in their entirety the demands made upon her, the Austro-
Hungarian Government could not rest satisfied in view of their past
experience. He had then gone on to say that the hostilities which
were about to be undertaken against Servia had presumably the
exclusive object of securing such guarantees, seeing that the Aus-
trian Government had already assured the Russian Government that
they had no territorial designs.

He advised the Austro-Hungarian Government, should this view
be correct, to speak openly in this sense.^ The holding of such

1 I.e. direct conversations. That this was an error appears from Austro-Hungarian
Red Book No. 47, July 29.

2 Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 44, July 29.

» Austria-Hungary did so, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29.

298 Official Diplomatic Documents

language would, he hoped, eliminate all possible misunderstand-
ings.

As yet, he told me, he had not received a reply from Vienna.

From the fact that he had gone so far in the matter of giving
advice at .Vienna, his Excellency hoped that you would realise that
he was sincerely doing all in his power to prevent danger of Euro-
pean complications.

The fact of his communicating this information to you was a
proof of the confidence which he felt in you and evidence of his
anxiety that you should know he was doing his best to support
your efforts in the cause of general peace, efforts which he sincerely
appreciated.

British Blue Book No. 76

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edivard Grey. —
(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 29, 1914.

I FOUND Secretary of State very depressed to-day. He reminded
me that he had told me the other day that he had to be very careful
in giving advice to Austria, as any idea that they were being pressed
would be likely to cause them to precipitate matters and present a
fait accompli. This had, in fact, now happened,^ and he was not
sure that his communication of your suggestion that Servia's reply
offered a basis for discussion had not hastened declaration of war.
He was much troubled by reports of mobilisation in Russia, and of
certain military measures, which he did not specify, being taken in
France. He subsequently spoke of these measures to my French
colleague, who informed him that French Government had done
nothing more than the German Government had done, namely, re-
called officers on leave. His Excellency denied German Government
had done this, but as a matter of fact it is true.^ iVIy French col-
league said to Under-Secretary of State, in course of conversation,
that it seemed to him that when Austria had entered Servia, and so
satisfied her military prestige, the moment might then be favourable
for four disinterested Powers to , discuss situation and come for-
ward with suggestions for preventing graver complications.^ Under-
Secretary of State seemed to think idea worthy of consideration, as
he replied that would be a different matter from conference proposed
by you.

Russian Ambassador returned to-day, and has informed Imperial
Government that Russia is mobilising in four southern governments.

1 Germany forwarded Sir E. Grey's proposal to Vienna on July 28, and on the same
day Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. From this despatch it would seem that
the German Secretary of State feared lest it was his urging mediation too strongly
that had induced Vienna to declare war.

' Whether Sir E. Goschen was mistaken in this statement or not, it is impossible to
state at this writing. From M. P. Price, The Diplomatic History of the War, Chas.
Scribner's Sons, chapters on Mobilisation, it would appear that the above statement
was erroneous. See also E. von Mach, Germany^ s Point of View, pp. 224 ff.

' This seems to imply France's acquiescence in Austria-Hungary's war on Serbia
provided she did not press it too far.

July 29, British Blue Book No. 78 299

To Berlin
British Blue Book No. 77
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

I MUCH appreciate the language of Chancellor, as reported in
your telegram of to-day.^ His Excellency may rely upon it that
this country will continue, as heretofore, to strain every effort to
secure peace and to avert the calamity we all fear. If he can induce
Austria to satisfy Russia and to abstain from going so far as to come
into collision with her, we shall all join in deep gratitude to his
Excellency for having saved the peace of Europe.^

From St. Petersburgh
British Blue Book No. 78

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Ed-
ward Grey. — (Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 29,1914.

Partial mobilisation was ordered to-day.

I communicated the substance of your telegram of the 28th in-
stant ^ to Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in accordance
with your instructions, and informed him confidentially of remarks
as to mobilisation which the German Secretary of State had made
to the British Ambassador at Berlin. This had already reached his
Excellency from another source. The mobilisation, he explained,
would only be directed against Austria.

Austrian Government had now definitely declined ^ direct conver-
sation betw^een Vienna and St. Petersburgh. The Minister for For-
eign Affairs said he had proposed such an exchange of views on
advice of German Ambassador. He proposed, when informing
German Ambassador of this refusal of Austria's, to urge that a return
should be made to your proposal for a conference of four Ambassa-
dors, or, at all events, for an exchange of views between the three
Ambassadors less directly interested, yourself, and also the Austrian
Ambassador if you thought it advisable. Any arrangement approved
by France and England would be acceptable to him, and he did not
care what form such conversations took. No time was to be lost,
and the only way to avert war was for you to succeed in arriving,
by mean of conversations with Ambassadors either collectively or
individually, at some formula which Austria could be induced to

1 See No. 75.

2 This was written after Germany had found herself unable to accept Sir E.
Grey's first plan of a conference, accepting it, however, in principle. Since the out-
break of the war Germany has been held responsible for the war because she rejected
the conference plan. On July 29 Sir E. Grey apparently did not hold the view that
Germainy's refusal of accepting his conference plan either indicated Germany's deter-
mination to have war, or shut the door to all pacific efifoi:ts. See also note 2 to British
Blue Book No. 67, July 28.

3 See No. 67, July 28.

^ This is the same error previously made in the Entente telegrams. See Austro-
Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29.

300 Official Diplomatic Documents

accept. Throughout Russian Government had been perfectly frank
and conciHatory, and had done all in their power to maintain peace.
If their efforts to maintain peace failed, he trusted that it would be
realised by the British pubhc that it was not the fault of the Russian
Government.

I asked him whether he would raise objections if the suggestion
made in Rome telegram of the 27th July/ which I mentioned to him,
were carried out. In reply his Excellency said that he would agree
to anything arranged by the four Powers provided it was acceptable
to Servia; he could not, he said, be more Servian than Servia.^
Some supplementary statement or explanations would, however, have
to be made in order to tone down the sharpness of the ultimatum.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that proposal referred to in your
telegram of the 28th instant ^ was one of secondary importance.
Under altered circumstances of situation he did not attach weight
to it. Further, the German Ambassador had informed his Excel-
lency, so the latter told me, that his Government were continuing at
Vienna to exert friendly influence. I fear that the German Ambas-
sador will not help to smooth matters over, if he uses to his own
Government the same language as he did to me to-day. He accused
the Russian Government of endangering the peace of Europe by
their mobilisation, and said, when I referred to all that had been
recently done by Austria, that he could not discuss such matters.
I called his attention to the fact that Austrian consuls had warned
all Austrian subjects liable to military service to join the colours,
that Austria had already partially mobilised, and had now declared
war on Servia. From what had passed during the Balkan crisis she
knew that this act was one which it was impossible without humilia-
tion for Russia to submit to. Had not Russia by mobilising shown
that she was in earnest, Austria would have traded on Russia's
desire for peace, and would have believed that she could go to any
lengths. Minister for Foreign Affairs had given me to understand
that Russia would not precipitate war by crossing frontier imme-
diately, and a week or more would, in any case, elapse before mobili-
sation was completed. In order to find an issue out of a dangerous
situation it was necessary that we should in the meanwhile all work
together.

From Vienna

British Blue Book No. 79

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna^ to Sir Edward

Grey. — {Received July 29.)
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 29, 1914.

There is at present no step which we could usefully take to stop
war with Servia, to which Austro-Hungarian Government are now
fully committed by the Emperor's appeal to his people which has

1 See No. 57, received July 28.

* For a similar phrase see British Blue Book No. 47, July 27.

« See No. 69, July 28.

July 29, British Blue Book No. 80 301

been published this morning, and by the declaration of war. French
and Italian Ambassadors agree with me in this view. If the Austro-
Hungarian Government would convert into a binding engagement
to Europe the declaration which has been made at St. Petersburgh
to the effect that she desires neither to destroy the independence of
Servia nor to acquire Servian territory, the Italian Ambassador
thinks that Russia might be induced to remain quiet. ^ This, how-
ever, the Italian Ambassador is convinced the Austrian Government
would refuse to do.

From Rome

British Blue Book No. 80

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. —
{Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) Rome, July 29, 1914.

In your telegram of the 27th instant ^ to Berlin, German Am-
bassador was reported to have accepted in principle the idea of a
conference. This is in contradiction with the telegram of the 27th
instant^ from Berlin.^

Information received by the Italian Government from Berlin
shows that German view is correctly represented in Sir E. Goschen's
telegram of the 27th July,^ but what creates difficulty is rather the
"conference," so the Minister for Foreign Affairs understands, than
the principle. He is going to urge, in a telegram which he is sending
to Berlin to-night, adherence to the idea of an exchange of views in
London. He suggests that the German Secretary of State might
propose a formula acceptable to his Government. Minister for For-
eign Affairs is of opinion that this exchange of views would keep the
door open if direct communication between Vienna and St. Peters-
burgh fails to have any result. He thinks that this exchange of
views might be concomitant with such direct communication.

The German Government are also being informed that the Italian
Government would not be pardoned by public opinion here unless
they had taken every possible step so as to avoid war. He is urging
that the German Government must lend their co-operation in this.

He added that there seemed to be a difficulty in making Germany
believe that Russia was in earnest. As Germany, however, was
really anxious for good relations with ourselves, if she believed that
Great Britain would act with Russia and France he thought it would
have a great effect.^

1 If the Italian Ambassador was right, it is unfortunate that no attempt was
made, — at least none appear in the despatches, — to invite Austria-Hungary^ to take
this "binding engagement."

2 See No. 46, July 27.

3 See No. 43, July 27.

^ Cf. German White Book, Exhibit 15, July 27, where Germany has taken action
"in the sense as desired by Sir Edward Grey."

5 See No. 43, July 27.

^ It is interesting to have Italy use the same argument that Russia had advanced
as early as July 24, British Blue Book No. 6.

302 Official Diplomatic Documents

Even should it prove impossible to induce Germany to take part,
he would still advocate that England and Italy, each as representing
one group, should continue to exchange views.^

To Rome
British Blue Book No. 81
Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome.
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Offix^e, July 29, 1914.

With reference to your telegram of yesterday.^

It is impossible for me to initiate discussions with Ambassadors
here, as I understand from Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs that
Austria will not accept any discussion on basis of Servian note, and
the inference of all I have heard from Vienna and Berlin is that Aus-
tria will not accept any form of mediation by the Powers as between
Austria and Servia.^ Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs must
therefore speak at Berlin and Vienna. I shall be glad if a favourable
reception is given to any suggestions he can make there.

From Constantinople

British Blue Book No. 82

Mr. Beaumont, British Charge d^ Affaires at Constantinople, to Sir
Edward Grey. — {Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) Constantinople, July 29, 1914-

I UNDERSTAND that the designs of Austria may extend consider-
ably beyond the sanjak and a punitive occupation of Servian terri-
tory. I gathered this from a remark let fall by the Austrian Am-
bassador here, who spoke of the deplorable economic situation of
Salonica under Greek administration and of the assistance on which
the Austrian army could count from Mussulman population dis-
contented with Servian rule.^

From Nish

British Blue Book No. 83

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Ed-
ward Grey. — {Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) Nish, July 29, 1914.

1 HAVE been requested by Prime Minister to convey to you expres-
sion of his deep gratitude for the statement which you made on the
27th instant in the House of Commons.

^ For this entire interview cf. French Yellow Book No. 96, July 29.
« See No. 64, July 28.

2 Mediation between Austria and Serbia was the French wish rejected by Germany
and Austria-Hungary. Germany was in favor of mediation between Vienna and
Petrograd. See German White Book, Exhibit 13, July 25.

* This despatch stands alone and unsupported by any other.

July 29, British Blue Book No. 85 303

To Berlin
British Blue Book No. 84
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 29, 1914-

The German Ambassador has been instructed by the German
Chancellor ^ to inform me that he is endeavouring to mediate between
Vienna and St. Petersburg!!, and he hopes with good success. Aus-
tria and Russia seem to be in constant touch, and he is endeavouring
to make Vienna explain in a satisfactory form at St. Petersburgh
the scope and extension of Austrian proceedings in Servia. I told
the German Ambassador that an agreement arrived at direct between
Austria and Russia would be the best possible solution.^ I would
press no proposal as long as there was a prospect of that, but my in-
formation this morning ^ was that the Austrian Government have
declined the suggestion of the Russian Government that the Aus-
trian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh should be authorised to discuss
directly with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs the means of
settling the Austro-Servian conflict. The press correspondents at
St. Petersburgh had been told that Russian Government would
mobilise. The German Government had said that they were favour-
able in principle to mediation between Russia and Austria if necessary.
They seemed to think the particular method of conference, consul-
tation or discussion, or even conversations a quatre in London too
formal a method. I urged that the German Government should
suggest any method by which the influence of the four Powers could
be used together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. France
agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating
influence was ready to be put into operation by any method that
Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable. In fact media-
tion was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany
thought possible if only Germany would "press the button" in the
interests of peace. ^

From Berlin
British Blue Book No. 85 ^

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey,

— {Received July 29.)
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 29, 1914-

I WAS asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency
had just returned from Potsdam.

1 German White Book, Exhibit 15, July 27. , . t, i t^ i.-u-x ^^

2 So long, therefore, as Germany was trying (see German White Book, Exhibit 14,
July 28) to bring it about, she cannot be blamed for not havmg accepted the farst con-
ference plan. ^ . T^ , T, , T.T ^T

3 British Blue Book No. 78, July 29, but see Austro-Hunganan Red Book No. 47,
July 29.

* Cf. British Blue Book No. 76, July 29, and note 1. , ..

5 In his Introductory Narrative, p. ix. Sir E. Grey calls this despatch a strange
response" to his appeal of mediation, No. 84. The juxtaposition of these despatches

304 Official Diplomatic Documents

He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European
conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's
obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to main-
tain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid
for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was
able to judge the main principle which governed British policy,
that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be
crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the
object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great
Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British
Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial
acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious
in any war that might ensue.

1 questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he
said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect.
As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that, so long as
Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the*
Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government
an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the
action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter
upon in Belgium,^ but when the war was over, Belgian integrity
would be respected if she had not sided against Germany.

His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chan-
cellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring
about an understanding with England ; he trusted that these as-
surances might form the basis of that understanding which he so
much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement
between England and Germany, though it was of course at the
present moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of
British neutrality in the conflict which present crisis might possibly
produce, would enable him to look forward to realisation of his desire.

In reply to his Excellency's enquiry how I thought his request
would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at
this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course
of action and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain
full liberty.

Our conversation upon this subject having come to an end, I
communicated the contents of your telegram of to-day ^ to his Ex-
cellency, who expressed his best thanks to you.

helps to carry out this suggestion. Nor would it have been possible to prove the error
of this presentation if it had not been for the last paragraph, which refers to No. 77
instead of No. 84.

The German enquiry about English neutrality was doubtless the result of disquiet-
ing information not only from Russia but also from Italy about the attempt made to
have Great Britain declare her solidarity with France and Russia (cf . British Blue Book
No. 80, note 5, July 29). Sir E. Grey, moreover, had two serious interviews and a
private talk with the German Ambassador in the morning and on the afternoon of
July 29, see British Blue Book Nos. 88 and 89. This despatch, No. 85, arrived "about
midnight," British Blue Book, p. ix. In fairness, therefore, it should have been printed
after No. 89 rather than after No. 84. See also note 3 to No. 90, July 29.

^ This is the first mention of Belgium. It is noteworthy that a possible invasion
of Belgium does not call forth the statement from Sir E. Goschen, or within the next
days, from Sir E. Grey, that it would be contrary to existing treaties.

2 See No. 77, same day.

July 29, British Blue Book No. 87 305

From Rome

British Blue Book No. 86

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. —
(Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) Rome, July 29, 1914.

Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that moment is past for any
further discussions on basis of Servian note, in view of communica-
tion made to-day by Russia at BerHn regarding partial mobilisation.
The utmost he now hopes for is that Germany may use her influence
at Vienna to prevent or moderate any further demands on Servia.

To Paris

British Blue Book No. 87

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.

Sir, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

After telling M. Cambon ^ to-day how grave the situation seemed
to be, I told him that I meant to tell the German Ambassador to-day
that he must not be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations
into any sense of false security that we should stand aside if all the
efforts to preserve the peace, which we were now making in common
with Germany, failed. But I went on to say to M. Cambon ^ that I
thought it necessary to tell him also that public opinion here ap-
proached the present difficulty from a quite different point of view
from that taken during the difficulty as to Morocco a few years ago.
In the case of Morocco the dispute was one in which France was
primarily interested, and in which it appeared that Germany, in an
attempt to crush France,^ was fastening a quarrel on France on a
question that was the subject of a special agreement between France
and us. In the present case the dispute between Austria and Servia
was not one in which we felt called to take a hand.^ Even if the
question became one between Austria and Russia we should not feel
called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a question of the
supremacy of Teuton or Slav — a struggle for supremacy in the Bal-
kans ; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a
war over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and
France became involved, we had not made up our minds what we
should do ; it was a case that we should have to consider. France
would then have been drawn into a quarrel which was not hers, but
in which, owing to her alliance, her honour and interest obliged her
to engage. We were free from engagements, and we should have
to decide what British interests required us to do.^ I thought it

^ French Ambassador in London.

2 For France's own point of view of the Morocco crisis see French Yellow Book
No. 1, Annex 1. "All Germans resent our having taken their share in Morocco."

3 This is contrary to the popluar claim that Great Britain went into the war for the
little nations.

* A very important statement.

306 Official Diplomatic Documents

necessary to say that, because, as he knew, we were taking all pre-
cautions with regard to our fleet, and I was about to warn Prince
Lichnowsky not to count on our standing aside, but it would not
be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled into supposing that
this meant that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I
still hoped might not arise.

M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly.
He understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, and in a struggle for
supremacy between Teuton and Slav we should not feel called to
intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany and France
become involved, so that the question became one of the hegemony
of Europe, we should then decide what it was necessary for us to do.
He seemed quite prepared for this announcement, and made no
criticism upon it.

He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a
demand from Germany that France would be neutral while Germany
attacked Russia. This assurance France, of course, could not give ;
she was bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked.^

I am, etc., •

E. Grey.

To Berlin
British Blue Book No. 88
Sir Edward Grey to Sir B. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.
Sir, Foreign Office, July 29, 191 If.

1 If this despatch printed after No. 85 and referring to the neutrality of England
was written after the receipt of No. 85, it is noteworthy that it contains no mention of
Belgium. For the probably proper order of the despatches, however, see note 1,
British Blue Book No. 85.

2 British Blue Book No. 70, July 29.

3 Russian Ambassador in London.

< Probably British Blue Book No. 84, July 29, although the telegram was sent to
Berlin not in the morning but "about 4 o'clock on the evening of the 29th," according
to the Introductory Narrative of the British Blue Book. To call 4 o'clock the
"evening" is strange, but is explained by the endeavor to make No. 85 appear to be
an answer to No. 84. See note 1 to British Blue Book No. 85, same day.

July 29, British Blue Book No. 89 307

be suspended, as otherwise a mediation would only drag on matters,
and give Austria time to crush Servia. It was, of course, too late
for all military operations against Servia to be suspended. In a short
time, I supposed, the Austrian forces would be in Belgrade, and in
occupation of some Servian territory. But even then it might be
possible to bring some mediation into existence, if Austria, while
saying that she must hold the occupied territory until she had com-
plete satisfaction from Servia, stated that she would not advance
further, pending an effort of the Powers to mediate between her and
Russia.^

The German Ambassador said that he had already telegraphed to
Berlin what I had said to him this morning.

I am, etc.,

E. Grey.
To Berlin

British Blue Book No. 89

Sir Edward Grey to Sir B. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

Sir, . Foreign Office, July 29, 191^.

After speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about
the European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite
private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The
situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at
present actually involved we had no thought of interfering in it.
But if Germany became involved in it, and then France, the issue
might be so great that it would involve all European interests ; and
I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversa-
tion — which I hoped would continue — into thinking that we should
stand aside.

He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I
meant that we should, under certain circumstances, intervene?

I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything that
was like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that, if
things became worse, we should intervene. There would be no ques-
tion of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France
was not involved. But we knew very well, that if the issue did be-
come such that we thought British interests ^ required us to inter-
vene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would have to be
very rapid, just as the decisions of other Powers had to be. I hoped
that the friendly tone of our conversations would continue as^ at
present, and that I should be able to keep as closely in touch with
the German Government in working for peace. But if we failed in
our efforts to keep the peace, and if the issue spread so that it in-

1 This is again Sir E. Grey's original proposal, which was agreeable to Germany in
principle. It was accepted by Austria-Hungary even to include negotiations between
Austria-Hungary and Serbia. See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 51, July 31, and
for the fact that the Austro-Hungarian acceptance, which was subject to the continu-
ation of the war, but with a " promise not to advance further, "was acceptable to Sir E.
Grey, see British Blue Book No. 103, July 30.

2 This idea occurs several times in the despatches of July 29.

308 Official Diplomatic Documents

volved practically every European interest, I did not wish to be
open to any reproach for him that the friendly tone of all our con-
versations had misled him or his Government into supposing that
we should not t-ake action, and to the reproach that, if they had not
been so misled, the course of things might have been different.

The German Ambassador took no exception to what I had said;
indeed, he told me that it accorded with what he had already given
in Berlin as his view of the situation.

I am, etc.

E. Grey.
To Berlin

British Blue Book No. 90

Sir Edward Grey to Sir B, Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

Sir, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

In addition to what passed with the German Ambassador this
morning,^ as recorded in my telegram of the 29th July ^ to your Excel-
lency, I gave the Ambassador a copy of Sir Rennell Rodd's ^ telegram
of the 28th July ^ and of my reply to it.^ I said I had begun to doubt
whether even a complete acceptance of the Austrian demands by
Servia would now satisfy Austria.^ But there appeared, from what
the Marquis di San Giuliano ^ had said, to be a method by which, if
the Powers were allowed to have any say in the matter, they might
bring about complete satisfaction for Austria, if only the latter would
give them an opportunity. I could, however, make no proposal, for
the reasons I have given in my telegram to you, and could only give
what the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had said to the German
Ambassador for information, as long as it was understood that Austria
would accept no discussion with the Powers over her dispute with
Servia. As to mediation between Austria and Russia, I said it could
not take the form simply of urging Russia to stand on one side while
Austria had a free hand to go to any length she pleased. That
would not be mediation, it would simply be putting pressure upon
Russia in the interests of Austria. The German Ambassador said
the view of the German Government was that Austria could not by
force be humiliated, and could not abdicate her position as a Great
Power. I said I entirely agreed, but it was not a question of humiliat-
ing Austria, it was a question of how far Austria meant to push the
humiliation of others. There must, of course, be some humiliation
of Servia, but Austria might press things so far as to involve the
humiliation of Russia.^

1 The official reference to this interview is No. 84, but see also No. 88.

2 See No. 84.

* British Ambassador in Rome.

* See No. 64.
5 See No. 81.

* The question whether it would satisfy Austria-Hungary does not seem to have
been asked.

7 Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

8 The tenor of this summary of the interview with the German Ambassador is
different from that given in Nos. 84 and 88. See also No. 89.

July 29, British Blue Book No. 91 309

The German Ambassador said that Austria would not take Ser-
vian territory, as to which I observed that, by taking territory
while leaving nominal Servian independence, Austria might turn
Servia practically into a vassal State, and this would affect the whole
position of Russia in the Balkans.

I observed that when there was danger of Etiropean conflict it
was impossible to say who would not be drawn into it. Even the
Netherlands ^ apparently were taking precautions.

The German Ambassador said emphatically that some means must
be found of preserving the peace of Europe.

I am, etc.
To Vienna ^- ^^^y.

British Blue Book No. 91
Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.
Sir, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

The Austrian Ambassador told me to-day he had ready a long
memorandum,^ which he proposed to leave, and which he said gave an
account of the conduct of Servia towards Austria, and an explanation
of how necessary the Austrian action was.

I said that I did not wish to discuss the merits of the question
between Austria and Servia. The news to-day seemed to me very bad
for the peace of Europe. The Powers were not allowed to help in
getting satisfaction for Austria, which they might get if they were
given an opportunity, and European peace was at stake.

Count Mensdorff ^ said that the war with Servia must proceed.
Austria could not continue to be exposed to the necessity of mobilising
again and again, as she had been obliged to do in recent years. She
had no idea of territorial aggrandisement, and all she wished was to
make sure that her interests were safeguarded.

I said that it would be quite possible, without nominally interfering
with the independence of Servia or taking away any of her territory,
to turn her into a sort of vassal State.

Count Mensdorff ^ deprecated this.

In reply to some further remarks of mine, as to the effect that the
Austrian action might have upon the Russian position in the Balkans,
he said that, before the Balkan war, Servia had always been regarded
as being in the Austrian sphere of influence.^ j ,

E. Grey.

1 The reference to the Netherlands is omitted in the accounts of the interviews,
Nos. 84, 88, 89. Since the Netherlands, however, were mentioned, other things may-
have been mentioned, and it. is not unlikely that No. 85, containing Germany's first
bid for English neutrality, was the result of the despatches received in Berlin from the
German Ambassador in London. Unfortunately these are not printed in the German
White Book. See also note 1 to No. 85.

2 This may refer to the famous dossier, presented in Paris on July 27, and printed
in the Yellow Book on that date. Parts, if not the whole, were surely presented also
in London on that day, as appears from British Blue Book No. 48, July 27. See notes
to British Blue Book No. 48 and Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25.

^ Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

^ The proper appraisal of this remark is only possible on the background of an ex-
tensive knowledge of the history of the Balkans since 1878.

310

Official Diplomatic Documents

To Rome
British Blue Book No. 92
Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome.
Sir, • Foreign Office, July 29, 1914,

The Italian Ambassador made to me to-day a communication
from the Marquis di San Giuliano ^ suggesting that the German
objections to the mediation of the four Powers, a mediation that was
strongly favoured by Italy, might be removed by some change in the
form of procedure.

I said that I had already anticipated this by asking the German
Government to suggest any form of procedure under which the idea
of mediation between Austria and Russia, already accepted by the
German Government in principle, could be applied.

I am, etc.

E. Grey.

Russia :

To Berlin
Russian Orange Book No. 49

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Charge d' Affaires

at Berlin}

(Translation.)

Saint-Petershourg,
le 16 {29) juillet, 19U.
(Telegraphique.)

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne
m'informe, au nom du Chance-
lier, que TAllemagne n'a pas
cesse d'exercer a Vienne une
influence moderatrice et qu'elle
continuera cette action meme
apres la declaration de guerre.
Jusqu'a ce matin il n'y avait
aucune nouvelle que les armees
autrichiennes aient franchi la
frontiere serbe. J'ai prie I'Am-
bassadeur de transmettre au
Chancelier mes remerciements
pour la teneur amicale de cette
communication. Je I'ai informe
des mesures militaires prises par
la Russie, dont aucune, lui dis-je,
n'etait dirigee contre I'Alle-
magne; j'ajoutais qu'elles ne

St. Petersburgh,
July 16 {29), 1914.
(Telegraphic.)

The German Ambassador in-
forms me, in the name of the
Chancellor, that Germany has
not ceased to exercise a moder-
ating influence at Vienna, and
that she will continue to do so
even after the declaration of war.
Up to this morning there had
been no news that the Austrian
army has crossed the Servian
frontier. I have begged the
Ambassador to express my thanks
to the Chancellor for the friendly
tenour of this communication.
I have informed him of the mili-
tary measures taken by Russia,
none of which, I told him, were
directed against Germany; I
added that neither should they

1 Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

* In the British Blue Book this despatch is listed as having been sent to London.

July 29, Russian Orange Booh No. 4^

311

prejugeaient pas non plus des
mesures agressives centre I'Au-
triche-Hongrie, ces mesures s'ex-
pliquant par la mobilisation de
la plus grande partie de I'armee
aust ro-hongroi se .

L'Ambassadeur se pronon^ant
en faveur d 'explications directes
avec le Cabinet de Vienne et nous
je repondis que j'y etais tout
dispose, pour peu que les con-
seils du Cabinet de Berlin dont
11 parlait trouvent echo a Vienne.

En meme temps je signalais
que nous etions tout disposes a
accepter le projet d'une con-
ference des quatre Puissances,
un projet auquel, paraissait-il,
I'Allemagne ne sympathisait pas
entierement.

Je dis que, dans mon opinion,
le meilleur moyen pour mettre a
profit tons les moyens propres a
produire une solution pacifique,
consisterait en une action paral-
lele des pourparlers d'une con-
ference a quatre de I'Allemagne,
de la France, de I'Angleterre et de
ritalie et d'un contact direct
entre I'Autriche-Hongrie et la
Russie, a I'instar a peu pres de ce
qui a vait eu lieu aux moments les
plus critiques de la crise de I'an
dernier.

Je dis a I'Ambassadeur qu'-
apres les concessions faites par la
Serbie, un terrain de compromis
pour les questions restees ou-
vertes ne serait pas tres difficile a
trouver, a condition toutefois de
quelque bonne volonte de la part
de I'Autriche et a condition que
toutes les Puissances usent de
toute leur influence dans un sens
de conciliation.

be taken as aggressive measures
against Austria-Hungary, their
explanation being the mobilisa-
tion of the greater part of the
Austro-Hungarian army.^

The Ambassador said that he
was in favour of direct explana-
tions between the Austrian Gov-
ernment and ourselves, and I
replied that I, too, was quite
willing, provided that the advice
of the German Government, to
which he had referred, found an
echo at Vienna.

I said at the same time that
we were quite ready to accept
the proposal for a conference of
the four Powers, a proposal with
which, apparently, Germany was
not in entire sympathy.

I told him that, in my opinion,
the best manner of turning to
account the most suitable
methods of finding a peaceful
solution would be by arranging
for parallel discussions to be
carried on by a conference of the
four Powers — Germany, France,
Great Britain, and Italy — and
by a direct exchange of views
between Austria-Hungary and
Russia on much the same lines
as occurred during the most criti-
cal moments of last year's crisis.

I told the Ambassador that,
after the concessions which had
been made by Servia, it should
not be very difficult to find a
compromise to" settle the other
questions which remained out-
standing, provided that Austria
showed some good-will and that
all the Powers used their entire
influence in the direction of con-
ciliation.

^ Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 78, August 2, where it is stated by Sazonof that
Russia mobilised while Austria-Hungary was "proceeding to a general mobilisation."

312 Official Diplomatic Documents

To London and Paris

Russian Orange Book No. 50

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at
London and Paris.

St. Petershurgh, July 16 {29), 1914.

At the time of my interview with the German Ambassador, dealt
with in my preceding telegram, I had not yet received M. Schebeko's
telegram ^\f the 15th (28th) July.

The contents of this telegram constitute a refusal of the Vienna
Cabinet to agree to a direct exchange of views with the Imperial
Government.

From now on, nothing remains for us to do but to rely entirely
on the British Government to take the initiative in any steps which
they may consider advisable.

From Berlin

Russian Orange Book No. 51

Russian Charge d^ Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

(Telegram.) . Berlin, July 16 {29), 1914.

On my enquiry whether he had received from Vienna a reply
respecting your proposal for private discussions at St. Petersburg,
the Secretary of State answered in the negative.^

He declares that it is very difficult for him to produce any effect
at Vienna, especially openly. He even added, in speaking to Cam-
bon, that were pressure brought to bear too obviously, Austria would
hasten to face Germany with a fait accompli.

The Secretary of State tells me that he received a telegram to-day
from Pourtales, stating that you seemed more inclined than you
previously were to find a compromise acceptable to all parties. I
replied that presumably you had been in favour of a compromise
from the outset, provided always that it were acceptable, not only
to Austria, but equally to Russia. He then said that it appeared that
Russia had begun to mobilise on the Austrian frontier, and that he
feared that this would make it more difficult for Austria to come to
an understanding with us, all the more so as Austria was mobilising
against Servia alone, and was making no preparations upon our fron-
tier. I replied that, according to the information in my possession,
Austria was mobilising upon the Russian frontier also, and that con-

1 If this refers to Orange Book No. 45, July 28, compare it with Austro-Hungarian
Red Book No. 47, July 29 : "it does not constitute a refusal." If it refers to another
despatch, such a despatch has not been printed. Cf. also Austro-Hungarian Red
Book No. 51, where Sazonof is the one to break off the negotiations.

2 For the reply from Vienna in reference to the conference plan see Austro-Hun-
garian Red Book No. 44, and for the Russian direct conversation plan see Austro-
Hungarian Red Book No. 47, both of July 29.

July 29, Russian Orange Book No. 53 313

sequently we had to take similar steps.^ I added that whatever
measures we might, perhaps, have taken on our side were in no
wise directed against Germany.

From Nish

Russian Orange Book No. 52

Russian Charge d' Affaires in Serbia to Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

(Telegram.) Nish, July 16 (29), 1914.

The Bulgarian Minister to-day declared to Pashitch, in the
name of his Government, that Bulgaria would remain neutral.

From Paris
Russian Orange Book No. 53
Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
(Telegram.) Paris, July 16 {29), 1914.

For the information of the President of the French Republic
on his return, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs had pre-
pared a short summary ^ of the present political situation, approxi-
mately in the following terms : Austria, fearing internal disintegra-
tion, seized upon the assassination of the Archduke as an excuse for
an attempt to obtain guarantees, which may assume the form of an
occupation of Servian military lines or even Servian territory. Ger-
many is supporting Austria. The preservation of peace depends
upon Russia alone, for the question at issue must be "localised"
between Austria and Servia; that question is the punishment of
Servia for her previous policy and the obtaining of guarantees for
the future. Germany concludes from this that a moderating influ-
ence should be exerted at St. Petersburg. This sophism has been
refuted both in Paris and in London. In Paris, Baron von Schoen
vainly endeavoured to induce France to adopt joint action with Ger-
many towards Russia for the preservation of peace. The same
attempts were made in London. In both capitals the answer was
given that any action taken should be at Vienna, as it was Austria's
inordinate demands, her refusal to discuss Servians few reservations,
and her declaration of war, that threatened to provoke a general
war. France and England are unable to bring any moderating
pressure to bear upon Russia, as, so far, that Power has shown the
greatest moderation, more particularly in her advice to Servia to
accept as much as was possible of the Austrian note. Apparently
Germany has now given up the idea of pressure upon Russia only

1 The important question is, "Who mobilised first?" In the Documents very
contrary statements occur.

2 French Yellow Book No. 85, July 29.

314 Official Diplomatic Documents

and inclines towards mediatory action both at St. Petersburg and at
Vienna, but at the same time both Germany and Austria are endeav-
ouring to cause the question to drag on. Germany is opposing the
conference without suggesting any other practical course of action.^
Austria is continuing discussions at St. Petersburg, which are mani-
festly of a procrastinating nature. At the same time she is taking
active steps, and if these steps are tolerated, her claims will increase
proportionately. It is highly desirable that Russia should lend all
her support to the proposal for mediation which will be made by Sir
E. Grey. In the contrary event, Austria, on the plea of "guaran-
tees," will be able, in effect, to alter the territorial status of eastern
Europe.

From London

Russian Orange Book No. 54

Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

(Telegram.) • London, July 16 {29), 1914.

I HAVE communicated the contents of your telegrams ^ of the
15th (28th) July to Grey. He informed the German Ambassador
to-day ^ that the direct discussions between Russia and Austria had
been fruitless, and that press correspondents were reporting from
St. Petersburgh that Russia was mobilising against Austria in conse-
quence of the latter's mobilisation. Grey said that, in principle, the
German Government had declared themselves in favour of mediation,
but that he was experiencing difficulties with regard to the form it
should take. Grey has urged that the German Government should
indicate the form which, in their opinion, would enable the four
Powers to have recourse to mediation to prevent war ; France, Italy,
and Great Britain having consented, mediation could only come into
play if Germany consented to range herself on the side of peace.

From Paris
Russian Orange Book No. 55
Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
(Telegram.) Paris, July 16 {29), 1914.

ViviANi has just confirmed to me the French Government's firm
determination to act in concert with Russia. This determination

1 This is an error, for Germany not only urged the British "mediation" plan (see
German White Book, Exhibits 15 and 16, July 28) but also the Russian direct con-
versations plan (see British Blue Book No. 67, note 2, July 28).

2 This is a confirmation of French Yellow Book No. 95, July 29, which states that
two telegrams were sent. In the Russian Orange and British Blue Books only one is
given. Cf. British Blue Book No. 70, 2, July 29.

3 Compare this summary with Sir E. Grey's own summary. British Blue Book
Nos. 84, 88, 89, July 29.

July 29 J RuLSsian Orange 'Book No. 56 315

is upheld by all classes of society and by the political parties, includ-
ing the Radical Socialists who have just addressed a resolution to the
Government expressing the absolute conjfidence and the patriotic
sentiments of their party. Since his return to Paris, Viviani has
telegraphed an urgent message ^ to London that, direct discussions
between St. Petersburgh and Vienna having ended, the London Cabi-
net should again put forward their proposal for mediation by the
Powers as soon as possible under one form or another. Before see-
ing me to-day Viviani saw the German Ambassador, and the latter
again assured him of the peaceful intentions of Germany. Viviani
having pointed out that if Germany wished for peace she should
hasten to give her support to the British proposal for mediation,
Baron von Schoen replied that the words "conference" or "arbitra-
tion" alarmed Austria. Viviani retorted that it was not a question
of words, and that it would be easy to find some other form for
mediation. In the opinion of Baron von Schoen, it was necessary
for the success of the negotiations between the Powers to know what
Austria intended to demand from Servia. Viviani answered that
the Berlin Cabinet could quite easily make this enquiry of Austria,
but that, meanwhile, the Servian reply might well form the basis
of discussion; he added that France sincerely desired peace, but
that she was determined at the same time to act in complete har-
mony with her allies and friends, and that he. Baron von Schoen,
might have convinced himself that this determination met with the
warmest approval of the country.

From Nish

Russian Orange Book No. 56 ^

Telegram from His Royal Highness Prince Alexander of Serbia to
His Majesty the Emperor of Russia,

Deeply touched by the telegram which your Majesty was pleased
to address to me yesterday, I hasten to thank you with all my heart.
Your Majesty may rest assured that the cordial sympathy which
your Majesty feels towards my country is especially valued by us,
and fills our hearts with the belief that the future of Servia is secure
now that it is the object of your Majesty's gracious solicitude. These
painful moments cannot but strengthen the bonds of deep attachment
which bind Servia to Holy Slav Russia, and the sentiments of ever-
lasting gratitude which we feel for the help and protection afforded
to us by your Majesty will ever be cherished in the hearts of all
the Serbs. ,

1 French Yellow Book No. 97, July 29.

2 Without a date but published in the Russian Orange Book among the telegrams
of July 29. In the Serbian Red Book it was published as No. 44 of July 30. This
may be a mistake, or it may contain a hint in the direction of the charge sometimes
made that Russia wrote the Serbian State Papers.

316 Official Diplomatic Documents

From Nish

Russian Orange Book No. 57

Russian Charge d' Affaires in Serbia to Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs,

(Telegram.) Nish, July 16 {29), 191A.

I HAVE communicated to Pashitch the text of the telegraphic
reply returned by His Majesty the Emperor to Prince Alexander.
On reading it, Pashitch crossed himself and exclaimed : "The Czar
is great and merciful !" He then embraced me and was overcome
with emotion. The heir-apparent is expected at Nish late to-night.

To Paris
Russian Orange Book No. 58
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Paris.
(Telegram.) 8t. Petersburgh, July 16 {29), 1914.

The German Ambassador to-day informed me of the decision
of his Government to mobilise, if Russia did not stop her military
preparations. Now, in point of fact, we only began these prep-
arations in consequence of the mobilisation already undertaken
by Austria, and owing to her evident unwillingness to accept any
means of arriving at a peaceful settlement of her dispute with Servia.

As we cannot comply with the wishes of Germany, we have no
alternative but to hasten^ on our own military preparations and
to assume that war is probably inevitable. Please inform the
French Government of this, and add that we are sincerely grateful
to them for the declaration ^ which the French Ambassador made
to me on their behalf, to the effect that we could count fully upon
the assistance of our ally, France. In the existing circumstances,
that declaration is especially valuable to us.

Communicated to the Russian Ambassadors in Great Britain,
Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Germany.

1 This elicited Viviani's request, French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30, not to "take
any step which may offer Germany a pretext for a total or partial mobilisation of her
forces," proving that on July 30, Viviani believed that Germany had not even partially
mobilised. ♦

2 Of. Russian Orange Book No. 55, same day.

Thursday, July 30, 1914

317

Thursday, July 30, 1914
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

Sent Despatches to

Received

Despatches fbom

Petrograd

Petrograd [Letter from

Belgian Minister]

London and Petrograd

Petrograd, Vienna

London

Berlin, London

Czar

Petrograd, Czar

Berlin, Paris, Petrograd

Vienna, Petrograd,

Berlin

Paris, Rome, Russian

Ambassador

London, etc.

Nish, Berlin, London

Czar

Petrograd

Foreign Office op

Austria-Hungary
Belgium

France

Germany
Great Britain

Russia
Serbia

Austria-Hungary, while unable to have her ambassador in Petrograd discuss her
Serbian note with Sazonof, was willing to discuss her relations with Russia on a
much broader basis, and had already done so with the Russian Ambassador in
Vienna. She regrets Russia's mobilisation against her, which is forcing her to
counter measures.

Belgium is silent on this day, and does not publish the despatch from her
Minister in Petrograd, dated July 30.

France renews her promise of support to Russia, but warns her in her mobilisa-
tion against "any step which may offer to Germany any pretext for a total or
partial mobilisation of her forces." She therefore believes that Germany has not
even partically mobilised, but nevertheless sends an alarming message concerning
German military measures to Sir E. Grey, who agrees that the moment has "come
to consider and discuss together every hypothesis."

Germany continues her pressure on Vienna, and by exchanges of royal tele-
grams between Berlin and London and Berlin and Petrograd endeavours to avoid
war. The General Staff urges immediate mobilisation but is unsuccessful.

Great Britain refuses to bind herself to remain neutral in case of war, on the
conditions proposed by Germany on the previous day. Sir E. Grey is even seri-
ously considering the necessity of joining France, and tightens the bond between
the two countries by making known to the British Ambassador in Paris the letters
exchanged in 1912 between himself and the French Ambassador. Great Britain
continues to mobilise, but does not publish the conversation with the German
Ambassador in which this subject was discussed. One of the most important
papers of this day (No. 105) suffers from notable inaccuracies.

Russia continues her mobilisation, but offers to "stop all military preparations"
if Austria will declare herself "ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which
violate principle of sovereignty of Serbia." Although Sazonof feels very hopeful
of the success of his new offer, he alters it on the next day "as requested by the
British Ambassador." Several Russian despatches printed under this date are
misleading.

Serbia does not announce anything of importance.

318 Official Diplomatic Documents

Austria-Hungary :

To St. Petershurgh

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 50

Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petershurgh.
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 30, 1914.

For Your Excellency's information and guidance : —

I have to-day explained to M. Schebeko that I have been informed
that M. Sazonof has been hurt by my flat refusal of his proposal as
to a discussion ^ with your Excellency, and that he is not less hurt
that no exchange of ideas has taken place between myself and M.
Schebeko.

With reference to the first point, I had already permitted your
Excellency by telegram to give M. Sazonof any explanations he desired
with regard to the note — which in any case appears to be outstripped
by the outbreak of war. In any case this could only take the form of
subsequent explanations, as it was never our intention to depart in
any way from the points contained in the note. I had also authorised
your Excellency to discuss in a friendly manner with M. Sazonof our
special relations towards Russia.

That M. Sazonof should complain that no exchange of ideas had
taken place between M. Schebeko and myself must rest on a mis-
understanding, as M. Schebeko and myself had discussed the practical
questions two days before, a fact which the Ambassador confirmed
with the observation that he had fully informed M. Sazonof of this
conversation.

M. Schebeko then explained why our action against Servia was
regarded with such anxiety at St. Petershurgh. He said that we
were a Great Power which was proceeding against the small Servian
State, and it was not known at St. Petershurgh what our intentions
in the matter were ; whether we desired to encroach on its sovereignty,
whether we desired completely to overthrow it, or even to crush
it to the ground. Russia could not be indifferent towards the future
fate of Servia, which was linked to Russia by historical and other
bonds. At St. Petershurgh they had taken the trouble to use all
their influence at Belgrade to induce them to accept all our condi-
tions, though this was indeed at a time when the conditions after-
wards imposed by us could not yet be known. But even with refer-
ence to these demands they would do everything they could in order
to accomplish at any rate all that was possible.

I reminded the Ambassador that we had repeatedly emphasised
the fact that we did not desire to follow any policy of conquest in
Servia, also that we would not infringe her sovereignty, but we only
desired to establish a condition of affairs which would offer us a
guarantee against being disturbed by Servia. To this I added a some-
what lengthy discussion of our intolerable relations with Servia. I also

1 I.e. of the wording of the Serbian note and Austro-Hungarian Serbian conflict in
general. See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29.

July 30, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 50 319

gave M. Schebeko clearly to understand to how large an extent Rus-
sian diplomacy was responsible for these circumstances, even though
this result might be contrary to the wishes of the responsible author-
ities.

In the further course of our discussion I referred to the Russian
mobilisation which had then come to my knowledge. Since this was
limited to the military districts of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow and Kasan
it had an appearance of hostility against the Monarchy. I did not
know what the grounds for this might be, as there was no dispute
between us and Russia. Austria-Hungary had mobilised exclusively
against Servia ; against Russia not a single man ; and this would be
observed from the single fact that the first, tenth and eleventh corps
had not been mobilised. In view, however, of the fact that Russia
was openly mobilising against us, we should have to extend our
mobilisation too, and in this case I desired to mention expressly that
this measure did not, of course, imply any attitude of hostility towards
Russia, and that it was exclusively a necessary counter-measure
against the Russian mobilisation.

I asked M. Schebeko to announce this to his Government, and this
he promised to do.

Belgium :

From Petrograd

(This letter was sent via Germany, where it was captured after war had been
declared, and pubhshed in the North German (official) Gazette. As appears from
the letter itself a telegraphic copy of it was sent by the Nordisk cable. The
authenticity of this letter has never been officially denied by the Belgian Govern-
ment.)

The Belgian Legation, St. Petersburgh, 795-Jfi2. The Political Con-
dition. July 30, 191Jf.

Yesterday and the day before passed in anticipation of the events
which must follow the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war on
Servia. The most contradictory news is being spread and it has
been impossible to separate truth from fiction concerning the inten-
tions of the Imperial (Russian) Government. Only one fact is in-
contestable ; namely, that Germany has endeavoured here, as well as
in Vienna, to find a means l3y which to avoid a general conflict, but
that she has met on the one hand the determination of the Vienna
cabinet not to yield one iota and on the other the suspicion of the
Petersburgh cabinet as regards the assurances of Vienna that it is
contemplating only the punishment, and not the acquisition of Servia.

Mr. Sazonof has declared that it was impossible for Russia not to
keep herself in readiness nor to mobilise, but that these measures
were not taken against Germany. This morning an official com-
munique to the papers announced that the "reservists in a certain
number of governments had been called to the colors." He who
knows the reticence of the official Russian communiques may well
assert that the mobilisation is general.

320 Official Diplomatic Documents

The German Ambassador declared this morning that he had
reached the ends of his endeavours as mediator, pursued incessantly
since Saturday, and that he had practically no hope left. I have
just been told that the British Ambassador had expressed himself
to the same effect. Latterly England proposed arbitration, but Mr.
Sazonof replied, "We ourselves proposed this to Austria, who de-
clined." The suggestion of a conference was met by Germany with
the suggestion of an agreement between the cabinets. One is
tempted to ask if the whole w^orld is not wanting war, trying only
to postpone the declarations of war in order to gain time.

At first England let it be known that she did not wish to be drawn
into the conflict. Sir George Buchanan openly said this. To-day,
however, St. Petersburg is convinced — nay, more, they have the
assurance that England will support France. (Aujourd'hui on est
fermement convaincu a St. Petersburgh, on en a meme I'assurance que
I'Angleterre soutiendra la France.) This assurance carries great
weight, and has done not a little to give the upper hand to the war
party.

The Russian Government has given free rein to all pro-Servian
and anti-Austrian manifestations these past days. In the cabinet
meeting early yesterday morning differences of opinion still existed,
and the announcement of the mobilisation was postponed. Since
then a change has taken place ; the war party has gained the upper
hand, and to-day at four o'clock in the morning the mobilisation was
publicly announced.

The army believes itself strong and is full of enthusiasm. It
bases its hopes on the remarkable progress it has made since the
Japanese war. The navy is still so far from the realisation of its
programme of reconstruction and reorganisation that it really cannot
be said to count. This was the reason which gave England's assur-
ances of support so much weight.

As I had the honour of telegraphing (T. 10) you to-day, every hope
of a peaceful solution seems to have vanished. This is the view of
the diplomatic corps. For my telegram I chose the way via Stock-
holm by the Nordisk cable as safer than the other. This despatch
I am entrusting to a private courier, who will mail it in Germany.

With the assurance of deepest respect, Mr. Secretary, I am,

(Signed) B. de L'Escaille.

Francie :

To St. Petersburgh and London

French Yellow Book No, 101

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Af-
fairs, to the French Ambassadors at St. Petersburgh and London.

Paris, July 30, 1914.

M. IsvoLSKY came to-night to tell me that the German Am-
bassador has notified M. Sazonof of the decision of his Govern-

July 30, French Yellow Book No. 102 321

ment to mobilise the army if Russia does not cease her mihtary
preparations.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Tsar points out that
these preparations were only commenced after Austria had mobi-
lised eight army corps ^ and had refused to arrange peacefully her
differences with Servia. M. Sazonof declares that in these circum-
stances Russia can only expedite her arming and consider war as
imminent, that she counts on the help of France as an ally, and that
she considers it desirable that England should join Russia and
France without loss of time.

France is resolved to fulfil all the obligations of her alliance. ^

She will not neglect, however, any effort towards a solution of
the conflict in the interests of universal peace. The conversa-
tion entered into between the Powers which are less directly in-
terested still allows of the hope that peace may be preserved ; I
therefore think it would be well that, in taking any precautionary'
measures of defence, which Russia thinks must go on, she should
not immediately take any step which may offer to Germany a pre-
text for a total or partial mobilisation of her forces.^

Yesterday in the late afternoon ^ the German Ambassador came
and spoke to me of the military measures which the Government of
the Republic were taking, adding that France was able to act in this
way, but that in Germany preparations could not be secret, and that
French opinion should not be alarmed if Germany decided on them.

I answered that the French Government had not taken any step

which could give their neighbours any cause for disquietude, and

that their wish to lend themselves to any negotiations for the purpose

of maintaining peace could not be doubted. ^ , ^^

Rene Viviani.

From St. Petersburgh

French Yellow Book No. 102

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Rene
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburgh, July 30, 1914.

M. Sazonof, to whom I communicated your desire that every
military measure that could offer Germany the pretext for general
mobilisation ^ should be avoided, answered that in the course of last
night the General Staff has suspended all measures of military pre-

1 See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 50, July 30, and that these eight army corps
had been mobilised against Serbia. See also Russian Orange Book No. 78, August 2.

2 France had given this declaration as early as July 24, British Blue BQok No. 6,
July 24.

3 This is an important statement because it shows that Viviani believed on July 30
that Germany had not even partially mobilised, all earlier despatches notwithstanding.
It also shows that Viviani knew the danger as soon as Germany should feel obliged to
mobilise. This warning was doubtless given in reply to Russian Orange Book No. 58,
July 29, Sir E. Grey knew of this message, as appears from British Blue Book No. 104,
July 30.

* That is on July 29, and France did not then deny having taken military measures.
6 The wording was "total or partial mobilisation," see previous despatch.

322 Official Diplomatic Documents

caution so that there should be no misunderstanding. Yesterday
the Chief of the Russian General Staff sent for the Military Attache
of the German Embassy and gave him his word of honour that the
mobilisation ordered this morning was exclusively directed against
Austria.^

Nevertheless, in an interview which he had this afternoon with
Count Pourtales, M. Sazonof was forced to the conclusion that
Germany does not wish to pronounce at Vienna the decisive word
which would safeguard peace. The Emperor Nicholas has received
the same impression from an exchange of telegrams which he has just
had personally with the Emperor William.

Moreover, the Russian General Staff and Admiralty have received
disquieting information concerning the preparations of the German
army and navy.^

In giving me this information M. Sazonof added that the Rus-
sian Government are continuing none the less their efforts towards
conciliation.^ He repeated to me : "I shall continue to negotiate

until the last moment." ^ t^

Paleologue.

Fro7n St. Petersburgh

French Yellow Book No. 103^

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Rene
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburgh, July 30, 1914.

The German Ambassador came to-night and again urged on
M. Sazonof, but in less categorical terms, that Russia should cease
her military preparations, and affirmed that Austria would not
infringe the territorial integrity of Servia : —

''It is not only the territorial integrity of Servia which we must
safeguard," answered M. Sazonof, "but also her independence and
her sovereignty. We cannot allow Servia to become a vassal of
Austria."

M. Sazonof added: "The situation is too serious for me not to
tell you all that is in my mind. By intervening at St. Petersburgh
while she refuses to intervene at Vienna, Germany is only seeking
to gain time so as to allow Austria to crush the little Servian king-
dom before Russia can come to its aid. But the Emperor Nicholas

1 For a different version of the interview see German White Book, Exhibit 18,
July 30.

2 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30, note 3.

3 It is not clear from the Entente telegrams what would have "conciliated" Russia
short of stopping the punishment of Serbia. Since Austria-Hungary was determined
to mete out this punishment, a deadlock ensued. Austria-Hungary's concessions
were her promise not to annex any Serbian territory and not to touch the sovereignty
of Serbia, see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29. It nowhere appears
that Russia offered any concessions. The different courses pursued by the respective
countries were due to the different attitudes assumed by their allies. Germany exerted
a constant pressure in Vienna, while England and France refused to take any steps in
Petrograd. Soe French Yellow Bf)ok No. 62, July 27, and No. 81, July 28. Contrast
with British Blue Book No. 104, Julv 30.

* Cf. note to British' Blue Book No. 97, July 30.
^Ibid.

July 30, French Yellow Book No. 105 323

is so anxious to prevent war that I am going to make a new proposal ^
to you in his name :

" If Austria, recognising that her dispute with Servia has assumed
the character of a question of European interest, declares herself
ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the clauses which are damaging
to the sovereignty of Servia, Russia undertakes to stop all military
preparations."

Count Pourtales promised to support this proposal with his Gov-
ernment.

In the mind of M. Sazonof, the acceptance of this proposal by
Austria would have, as a logical corollary, the opening of a discus-
sion by the Powers in London.

The Russian Government again show by their attitude that they
are neglecting nothing in order to stop the conflict.

Paleologue.

From Vienna

French Yellow Book No. 104

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Rene Viviani,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 30, 1914-
In spite of the communication made yesterday by the Russian
Ambassador to several of his colleagues, among them the German
Ambassador, with reference to the partial mobilisation in his coun-
try, the Vienna press refrained from publishing the news. This
enforced silence has just been explained at an interview of great
importance between M. Schebeko and Count Berchtold, who exam-
ined at length the present formidable difficulties with equal readiness
to apply to them mutually acceptable solutions.^

From Berlin

French Yellow Book No. 105

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 30, 1914.
Herr von Jagow telephoned to me at 2 o'clock that the news
of the German mobilisation which had spread an hour before was
false, and asked me to inform you of this urgently; the Imperial
Government is confiscating the extra editions of the papers which
announced it. But neither this communication nor these steps
diminish my apprehension with regard to the plans of Germany.^

^ This proposal was altered later at the request of the British Ambassador to one
much less acceptable to Austria-Hungary. Cf. French Yellow Book No. 113, and see
for the discussion of these changes E. von Mach, Germany's Point of View, pp. 142 ff.

2 This was probably due to German pressure. See Chancellor's Speech in note 2 to
British Blue Book No. 67, July 28.

3 Germany was apparently ready to mobilise at any moment. It has been popu-
larly stated in Germany that the General Staff urged this step ever since the first news
of Russian mobilisation had become known, but that the Emperor refused his consent.

324 Official Diplomatic Documents

It seems certain that the Extraordinary Council held yesterday
evening at Potsdam with the military authorities under the presi-
dency of the Emperor decided on mobilisation, and this explains the
preparation of the special edition of the Lokal Anzeiger, but that from
various causes (the declaration of Great Britain that she reserved
her entire liberty of action, the exchange of telegrams ^ between the
Tsar and William 11.) the serious measures which had been decided
upon were suspended.

One of the Ambassadors with whom I have very close relations saw
Herr von Zimmermann at 2 o'clock. According to the Under-
Secretary of State the military authorities are very anxious that
mobilisation should be ordered, because every delay makes Germany
lose some of her advantages. Nevertheless up to the present the
haste of the General Staff, which sees war in mobilisation, had been
successfully prevented. In any case mobilisation may be decided
upon at any moment. I do not know who has issued in the Lokal
Anzeiger, a paper which is usually semi-official, premature news cal-
culated to cause excitement in France.

Further, I have the strongest reasons to believe that all the meas-
ures for mobilisation which can be taken before the publication of
the general order of mobilisation have already been taken here, and
that they are anxious here to make us publish our mobilisation ^
first in order to attribute the responsibility to us.

Jules Cambon.

To London

French Yellow Book No. 106

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Af-
fairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.

Paris, July 30, 1914.

Please inform ^ Sir E. Gray of the following facts concerning
French and German military preparations.^ England will see from
this that if France is resolved, it is not she who is taking aggressive
steps.

You will direct the attention of Sir E. Grey to the decision taken
by the Council of Ministers this morning; although Germany has
made her covering dispositions a few hundred metres from the fron-
tier along the whole front from Luxemburg to the Vosges, and has
transported her covering troops to their war positions, we have kept

^ These telegrams are referred to in the French Yellow Book, but not in the British
Blue Book, nor were they laid before Parliament together with the Blue Book. Many-
people see in them a serious endeavor on the part of the Emperor to preserve the peace.

2 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30, note 4.

' This information is printed in British Blue Book No. 105, Enclosure 3, July 30. If
the French Yellow Book prints the original despatch accurately, either Sir E. Grey
or the French Ambassador in London must be held responsible for the alterations.
For a discussion of these despatches see E. von Mach, Germany's Point of View, pp.
421 ff.

* This despatch to London should be compared with French Yellow Book No. 101,
same day, to Petrograd, which shows that Viviani believed that Germany had not even
partially mobilised on July 30.

July 30, French Yellow Book No. 107 325

our troops ten kilometres from the frontier and forbidden them to
approach nearer.

Our plan, conceived in the spirit of the offensive, provided, how-
ever, that the fighting positions of our covering troops should be
as near to the frontier as possible. By leaving a strip of territory
undefended against sudden aggression of the enemy, the Government
of the Republic hopes to prove that France does not bear, any more
than Russia, the responsibility for the attack.

In order to be convinced of this it is sufficient to compare the
steps taken on the two sides of our frontier ; in France, soldiers who
were on leave were not recalled until we were certain that Germany
had done so five days before.

In Germany, not only have the garrison troops of Metz been
pushed up to the frontier, but they have been reinforced by units
transported by train from garrisons of the interior such as Treves
or Cologne ; nothing like this has been done in France.

The arming of the frontier defences (clearing of trees, placing
of armament, construction of batteries and strengthening of wire
entanglements) was begun in Germany on Saturday, the 25th ; with
us it is going to be begun, for France can no longer refrain from
taking similar measures.

The railway stations were occupied by the military in Germany
on Saturday, the 25th ; in France on Tuesday, the 28th.

Finally, in Germany the reservists by tens of thousands have been
recalled by individual summons, those living abroad (the classes of
1903 to 1911) have been recalled, the officers of reserve have been
summoned; in the interior the roads are closed, motor-cars only
circulate with permits. It is the last stage before mobilisation.
None of these measures has been taken in France.

The German army has its outposts on our frontier ; on two occa-
sions yesterday German patrols penetrated our territory. The whole
16th army corps from Metz, reinforced by part of the 8th from
Treves and Cologne, occupies the frontier from Metz to Luxemburg ;
the 15th army corps from Strassburg is massed on the frontier.

Under penalty of being shot, the inhabitants of the annexed
parts of Alsace-Lorraine are forbidden to cross the frontier.

Rene Viviani.

From Berlin

French Yellow Book No. 107

M, Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 30, 1914.
The British Ambassador has not been informed of Germany's
reply to Sir E. Grey's request. He told me that Berlin had consulted
Vienna and was still waiting to hear from her ally.^

1 This reply, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 44, July 29, was sent by telegram
on that day to Petrograd, Paris, London, and Rome. See also French Yellow Book
No. 104, July 30, and note.

326 Official Diplomatic Documents

My Russian colleague has just told me that Herr von Jagow (to
whom Count Pourtales had communicated the conciliatory formula
suggested by M. Sazonof for an Austro-Russian understanding) had
just told him that he found this proposal unacceptable to Austria,
thus showing the negative ^ action of German diplomacy at Vienna.

Jules Cambon.

From London
French Yellow Book No. 108

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 30, 1914-

Prince Lichnowsky has not brought any reply to the request
addressed to him by Sir E. Grey yesterday to obtain from the Ger-
man Government a formula for the intervention of the four Powers
in the interest of peace. But my German colleague questioned the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs about the military preparations
of England.2

Sir E. Grey replied that they were not of an offensive character,
but that in the present state of affairs on the continent it was natural
to take some precautions ; that in England, as in France, there was a
desire to maintain peace, and that if in England, as in France, defen-
sive measures were under consideration, it was not with the object
of making any aggression.^

The information ^ which your Excellency has addressed to me on
the subject of the military measures taken by Germany on the French
frontier gave me the opportunity of remarking to Sir E. Grey that
it is no longer a question of a conflict of influence between Russia
and Austria-Hungary, but that there is a risk of an act of aggression
which might provoke general war.

Sir E. Grey understood ^ my feelings perfectly, and he thinks,
as I do, that the moment has come to consider and discuss together
every hypothesis. Paul Cambon.

From Berlin

French Yellow Book No. 109

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 30, 1914.
In the interview which I had to-day with the Secretary of State,
I asked Herr von Jagow what reply he had made to Sir E. Grey,

1 Cf. Chancellor's Speech, note 2, British Blue Book No. 67, July 28, and British
Blue Book No. 95, July 30.

* No such questions are mentioned in the British Blue Book.

3 This is the natural excuse for any modern state to make, since self-defence is the
only excuse for military preparations anywhere.

* French Yellow Book No. 106, same day.

" From French Yellow Book No. 101, same day, it appeared that Viviani believed that
Germany had not yet even partially mobilised on July 30. Contrary despatches must
have been sent for effect. Did Sir E. Grey understand this, or was he imposed upon?

July 30, German White Book Exhibit 18 327

who had asked him to draw up himself the formula for the interven-
tion of the disinterested Powers.

He answered that "to gain time," he had decided to act directly,
and that he had asked Austria to tell him the ground on which
conversations might be opened with her. This answer has the effect,
under a pretext of proceeding more quickly, of eliminating Great
Britain, France and Italy, and of entrusting to Herr von Tschirscky,
whose Pan-German and Russophobe sentiments are well known, the
duty of persuading Austria to adopt a conciliatory attitude.

Herr von Jagow then spoke to me of the Russian mobilisation
on the Austrian frontier; he told me that this mobilisation com-
promised the success of all intervention with Austria, and that
everything depended on it. He added that he feared that Austria
would mobilise completely as a result of a partial Russian mobilisa-
tion, and this might cause as a counter-measure complete Russian
mobilisation and consequently that of Germany.

I pointed out to the Secretary of State that he had himself told
me that Germany would only consider herself obliged to mobilise
if Russia mobilised on her German frontiers,^ and that this was
not being done. He replied that this was true, but that the heads
of the army were insisting on it, for every delay is a loss of strength
for the German army, and "that the words of which I reminded
him did not constitute a firm engagement on his part." ^

The impression which I received from this conversation is that
the chances of peace have again decreased.

Jules Cambon.

Germany :

From St. Petersburgh

German White Book ExmBiT 18

Telegram of the Military Attache at St. Petersburgh to H. M. the Kaiser
on July 30, 1914.

Prince Troubetzki said to me yesterday,^ after causing Your
Majesty's telegram to be delivered at once to Czar Nicolas : Thank
God that a telegram of Your Emperor has come. He has just told
me the telegram has made a deep impression upon the Czar, but as
the mobilisation against Austria had already been ordered and Sazonof
had convinced His Majesty that it was no longer possible to retreat
His Majesty was sorry he could not change it any more. I then told
him that the guilt for the measureless consequences lay at the door
of premature mobilisation against Austria-Hungary, which after all
was involved merely in a local war with Servia, for Germany's answer
was clear and the responsibility rested upon Russia which ignored

1 French Yellow Book No. 67, July 27.

2 Immediately followingthe words referred to above Von Jagow had said (French
Yellow Book No. 67, July 27), "If Russia attacked Austria, Germany would be obliged
to attack at once on her side." An attack must be preceded by mobilisation. Jagow,
therefore, cannot have meant to give a promise in the sense in which it was understood
by Jules Cambon.

3 For the French version of this interview see French Yellow Book No. 102, July 30.

328 Official Diplomatic Documents

Austria-Hungary's assurance that it had no intentions of territorial
gain in Servia. Austria-Hungary mobilised against Servia and not
against Russia, and there was no ground for an immediate action on
the part of Russia. I further added that in Germany one could not
understand any more Russia's phrase that " she could not desert her
brethren in Servia," after the horrible crime of Serajevo. I told him
finally he need not wonder if Germany's army were to be mobilised.

To St. Petersbiirgh
German WmTE Book Exhibit 23

IV. Hi. Majesty to the Czar. j^^^ ^^^^ ^^^

My Ambassador has instructions to direct the attention of Your
Government to the dangers and serious consequences of a mobilisa-
tion. I have told You the same in my last telegram. Austria-Hun-
gary has mobilised only against Servia, and only a part of her army.
If Russia, as seems to be the case, according to Your advice and that
of Your Government, mobilises against Austria-Hungary, the part
of the mediator with which You have entrusted me in such friendly
manner and w^hich I have accepted upon Your express desire, is
threatened if not made impossible. The entire weight of decision
now rests upon Your shoulders, You have to bear the responsibility
for war or peace. (Signed) Wilhelm.

From St, Petersburgh
German White Book Exhibit 23a

V. The Czar to His Majesty.

Peterhof, July 30th, 1914, 1-20 P.M.
I THANK You from my heart for Your quick reply. I am sending
to-night Tatisheif (Russian honorary aide to the Kaiser) with instruc-
tions. The military measures now taking form were decided upon
five days ago, and for the reason of defence against the preparations
of Austria. I hope with all my heart that these measures will not
influence in any manner Your position as mediator which I appraise
very highly. We need Your strong pressure upon Austria so that
an understanding can be arrived at with us. Nicolas.

Great Britain:

From St. Petersburgh

British Blue Book No. 93

Telegrams communicated by Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador
in London, July 30, 1914-

(1)
Russian Ambassador at Vienna to M. Sazonof

[For text see Russian Orange Book No. 45, July 28. For 93, (2) and (3), see
under date of July 29, Russian Orange Book Nos. 49 and 50.]

July 30, British Blue Book No. 95 329

From Vienna
British Blue Book No. 94

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.

— {Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 29, 1914.

I LEARN that mobiHsation of Russian corps destined to carry
out operations^ on Austrian frontier has been ordered. My inform-
ant is Russian Ambassador. Ministry for Foreign Affairs here has
reahsed, though somewhat late in the day, that Russia will not re-
main indifferent in present crisis. I believe that the news of Russian
mobilisation will not be a surprise to the Ministry, but so far it is
not generally known in Vienna this evening.^ Unless mediation,
which German Government declared themselves ready to offer in
concert with three other Great Powers not immediately interested in
the Austro-Servian dispute, be brought to bear forthwith, irrevocable
steps may be taken in present temper of this country. German
Ambassador feigns ^ surprise that Servian affairs should be of such
interest to Russia. Both my Russian and French colleagues have
spoken to him to-day. Russian Ambassador expressed the hope
that it might still be possible to arrange matters, and explained that
it was impossible for Russia to do otherwise than take an interest
in the present dispute. Russia, he said, had done what she could
already at Belgrade to induce Servian Government to meet principal
Austrian demand in a favourable spirit ; ^ if approached in a proper
manner, he thought she would probably go still further in this direc-
tion. But she was justly offended at having been completely ig-
nored, and she could not consent to be excluded from the settlement.
German Ambassador said that if proposals were put forward which
opened any propect of possible acceptance by both sides, he per-
sonally thought that Germany might consent to act as mediator in
concert with the three other Powers.

I gather from what Russian Ambassador said to me that he is
much afraid of the effect that any serious engagement may have
upon Russian public opinion. I gathered, however, that Russia
would go a long way to meet Austrian demands on Servia.

From Vienna
British Blue Book No. 95

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.

— {Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 30, 1914.

Russian Ambassador hopes that Russian mobilisation will be
regarded by Austria as what it is, viz., a clear intimation that Russia

1 The meaning of this phrase is not perfectly clear, although it seems to contemplate
war.

2 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 107, same day.

3 Expressions of this kind, implying motives and not confining themselves to facts^
are regrettable in official documents.

" This was denied by Austria-Hungary ; see Red Book No. 34, July 27.

330 Official Diplomatic Documents

must be consulted regarding the fate of Servia, but he does not know
how the Austrian Government are taking it. He says that Russia
must have an assurance that Servia will not be crushed, but she would
understand that Austria-Hungary is compelled to exact from Servia
measures which will secure her Slav provinces from the continuance
of hostile propaganda from Servian territory.^

The French Ambassador hears from Berlin that the German
Ambassador at Vienna is instructed^ to speak seriously to the Austro-
Hungarian Government against acting in a manner calculated to
provoke a European war.

Unfortunately the German Ambassador is himself so identified
with extreme anti-Russian and anti-Servian feeling prevalent in
Vienna that he is unlikely to plead the cause of peace with entire
sincerity.

Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information
that the German Ambassador knew ^ the text of the Austrian ulti-
matum to Servia before it was despatched and telegraphed it to the
German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself
that he endorses every line of it.

From Vienna

British Blue Book No. 96

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey,
— (Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 30, 1914.

The Russian Ambassador gave the French Ambassador and
myself this afternoon at the French Embassy, where I happened to
be, an account of his interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
which he said was quite friendly. The Minister for Foreign Affairs
had told him that as Russia had mobilised, Austria must, of course,
do the same. This, however, should not be regarded as a threat,
but merely as the adoption of military precautions similar to those
which had been taken across the frontier. He said he had no objec-
tion to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian
Ambassador at St. Petersburgh continuing their conversations,^ al-
though he did not say that they could be resumed on the basis of
the Servian reply.

On the whole, the Russian Ambassador is not dissatisfied. He had
begun to make his preparations for his departure on the strength of

1 This is an eminently fair statement, nor did Austria-Hungary desire more. Cf.
Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29.

2 For the instruction see Chancellor's Speech, note 2, British Blue Book No. 67, July
28. Contrast with this, British despatch based on French information, French Yellow-
Book No. 107, July 30, where Jules Cambon complains of "the negative action of
German diplomacy at Vienna."

' There is no proof for this assertion.

* This is what Germany had demanded ; see Chancellor's Speech, note 2, British
Blue Book No. 67, July 28.

July 30, British Blue Book No. 97 331

a rumour that Austria would declare war in reply to mobilisation.
He now hopes that something may yet be done to prevent war with
Austria.

From St. Petersburgh

British Blue Book No. 97 ^

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward
Grey. — {Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.) St'. Petersburgh, July 30, 1914.

French Ambassador and I visited Minister for Foreign Affairs
this morning. His Excellency said that German Ambassador had
told him yesterday afternoon that German Government were willing
to guarantee that Servian integrity would be respected by Austria.
To this he had replied that this might be so, but nevertheless Servia
would become an Austrian vassal, just as, in similar circumstances,
Bokhara had become a Russian vassal. There would be a revolution
in Russia, if she were to tolerate such a state of affairs.

M. Sazonof ^ told us that absolute proof was in possession of Rus-
sian Government that Germany was making military and naval prep-
arations against Russia — more particularly in the direction of the
Gulf of Finland.

German Ambassador had a second interview with Minister for
Foreign Affairs at 2 a.m., when former completely broke down on
seeing that war was inevitable. He appealed to M. Sazonof ^ to make
some suggestion which he could telegraph to German Government as
a last hope. M. Sazonof ^ accordingly drew up and handed to Ger-
man Ambassador a formula ^ in .French, of which following is trans-
lation : —

" If Austria, recognising that her conflict with Servia has assumed
character of question of European interest, declares herself ready
to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate principle of
sovereignty of Servia, Russia engages to stop all military prepara-
tions." 4 .

Preparations for general mobilisation will be proceeded with if
this proposal is rejected by Austria, and inevitable result will be a
European war. Excitement here has reached such a pitch that,
if Austria refuses to make a concession, Russia cannot hold back,
and now that she knows that Germany is arming, she can hardly
postpone, for strategical reasons, converting partial into general
mobilisation.

1 This despatch refers to the interview described in French Yellow Book Nos. 102
and 103, July 30. For a full discussion of the British and French presentations, see
E. von Mach, Germany's Point of View, pp. 428 ff.

2 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

3 This proposal was altered at the request of the British Ambassador (French Yellow
Book No. 113, July 31) acting according to the wishes of Sir E. Grey, British Blue Book
No. 110, July 31. Cf. also British Blue Book 103, July 30, and No. 120, July 31, received
and listed under date of August 1. For a fuller discussion of these despatches see
E. von Mach, Germany's Point of View, pp. 432 ff.

* The meaning of this phrase is "demobilisation," as appears from British Blue Book
No. 99, same day.

332 Official Diplomatic Documents

From Berlin

British Blue Book No. 98

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. —
(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 30, 1914.

Secretary of State informs me that immediately on receipt of
Prince Lichnowsky's ^ telegram recording his last conversation ^ with
you he asked Austro-Hungarian Government whether they would be
willing to accept mediation on basis of occupation by Austrian troops
of Belgrade or some other point and issue their conditions from here.
He has up till now received no reply, but he fears Russian mobili-
sation against Austria will have increased difficulties, as Austria-
Hungary, who has as yet only mobilised against Servia, will probably
find it necessary also against Russia. Secretary of State says if you
can succeed in getting Russia to agree to above basis for an arrange-
ment and in persuading her in the meantime to take no steps which
might be regarded as an act of aggression against Austria he still sees
some chance that European peace may be preserved.

He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's position
in view of Russian mobilisation and military measures which he hears
are being taken in France. Beyond recall of officers on leave — a
measure which had been officially taken after, and not before, visit of
French ambassador yesterday — Imperial Government had done
nothing special in way of military preparations. Something, how-
ever, would have soon to be done, for it might be too late, and when
they mobilised they would have to mobilise on three sides. He
regretted this, as he knew France did not desire war, but it would be
a military necessity.

His Excellency added that telegram ' received from Prince Lich-
nowsky ^ last night contains matter which he had heard with regret,
but not exactly with surprise, and at all events he thoroughly appre-
ciated frankness and loyalty with which you had spoken.

He also told me that this telegram had only reached Berlin very
late last night; had it been received earlier Chancellor would, of
course, not have spoken to me in the way he had done.

1 German Ambassador in London.

' This conversation is not mentioned in the British Blue Book, although Sir E. Grey-
related it to the French Ambassador. The report of the latter is printed in the French
Yellow Book No. 108, July 30. It had reference to the "military preparations," i.e.
the mobilisation of England. Probably during the same conversation the subject of
the neutrality of England was discussed along the lines mentioned in British Blue Book
No. 102, July 30. The British Blue Book contains no footnote to "telegram" in the
second line of this despatch, but gives a footnote to "telegram" in the first line of the
second before last paragraph, namely "See No. 102." For the importance of the
despatch No. 102, see note to that despatch.

' See No. 102.

July 30, British Blue Book No. 99 . 333

From Paris

British Blue Book No. 99

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. —
(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 30, 1914.

President of the Republic tells me that the Russian Govern-
ment have been informed ^ by the German Government that unless
Russia stops her mobilisation Germany would mobilise. But a
further report, since received from St. Petersburgh, states that the
German communication had been modified, ^ and was now a request
to be informed on what conditions Russia would consent to demobili-
sation.^ The answer given is that she agrees to do so on condition
that Austria-Hungary gives an assurance that she will respect the
sovereignty of Servia and submit certain of the demands of the
Austrian note, which Servia has not accepted, to an international
discussion.

President thinks that these conditions will not be accepted by
Austria. He is convinced that peace between the Powers is in the
hands of Great Britain. If His Majesty's Government announced
that England would come to the aid of France ^ in the event of a
conflict between France and Germany as a result of the present
differences between Austria and Servia, there would be no war, for
Germany would at once modify her attitude.

I explained to him how difficult it would be for His Majesty's
Government to make such an announcement, but he said that he
must maintain that it would be in the interests of peace. France,
he said, is pacific. She does not desire war, and all that she has
done at present is to make preparations for mobilisation so as not
to be taken unawares. The French Government will keep His
Majesty's Government informed of everything that may be done
in that way. They have reliable information that the German troops
are concentrated round Thionville and Metz ready for war. If
there were a general war on the Continent it would inevitably draw
England into it for the protection of her vital interests. A declara-
tion now of her intention to support France, whose desire it is that
peace should be maintained, would almost certainly prevent Germany
from going to war.

1 Not in Russian Orange Book or German White Book, but given in French Yellow
Book No. 100, July 29.

2 French Yellow Book No. 103, July 30, British Blue Book No. 97, and Russian Orange
Book No. 60, same day.

3 Demobihsation, it appears from this, was the meaning of the phrase "stop all
military preparations" given in British Blue Book No. 97, same day.

* A declaration on the part of England of her "solidarity with Russia and France"
had been desired by Sazonof as early as July 24 (British Blue Book No. 6) and again on
July 27 (British Blue Book No. 44). Evidently France was now trying to persuade
England to take this stand at least so far as France was concerned.

334 Official Diplomatic Documents

From Rome
British Blue Book No. 100

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. —
(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.) Rome, July SO, 1914.

German Ambassador told me last night that he thought Germany
would be able to prevent Austria from making any exorbitant demands
if Servia could be induced to submit, and to ask for peace early, say,
as soon as the occupation of Belgrade had been accomplished.

I made to his Excellency the personal suggestion that some formula
might be devised by Germany which might be acceptable for an ex-
change of views.

I see, however, that you have already made this suggestion.^

To Berlin

British Blue Book No. 101 ^

Sir Edward Grey to Sir B. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin,
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

. Your telegram of 29th July.^

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the
Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality ^
on such terms.

WTiat he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French
colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not
take French territory as distinct from the colonies.

From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable,
for France, without further territory being taken from her, could be
so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become
subordinate to German policy.

Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make
this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from
which the good name of this country would never recover.

The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever
obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium.
We could not entertain that bargain either.

Having said so much it is unnecessary to examine whether the
prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between England
and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate
us for tying our hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to
act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavour-
able and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chan-
cellor contemplates.

1 A probable reference to suggestion contained in British Blue Book No. 68, July 28.

2 For the substance of this despatch see No. 102 and note.
» British Blue Book No. 85, July 29.

* From subsequent publications by the British and German Governments it ap-
pears that the subject of English neutrality had been frequently discussed in the
years immediately preceding the outbreak of the war.

July 30, British Blue Book No. 103 335

You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add
most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations
between England and Germany is that they should continue to work
together to preserve the peace of Europe ; if we succeed in this object,
the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be ipso
facto improved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty's
Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good-will.

And I will say this : If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and
the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote
some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she
could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued ^
against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or
separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could,
through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding
object, our relations sensibly improved. ^ The idea has hitherto
been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this
present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone
through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief
and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite
rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto.

To Berlin

British Blue Book No. 102 ^

Sir Edivard Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

I HAVE warned Prince Lichnowsky ^ that Germany must not count
upon our standing aside in all circumstances. This is doubtless
the substance of the telegram from Prince Lichnowsky to German
Chancellor, to which reference is made in the last two paragraphs of
your telegram of 30th July.^

To St. Petersburgh
British Blue Book No. 103

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Peters-
burgh.
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

German Ambassador informs me that German Government would
endeavour to influence Austria, after taking Belgrade and Servian

1 Such a promise at this time would seem to be unthinkable unless Germany here-
tofore could not have been assured that "no aggressive or hostile policy would be
pursued against her."

2 Sir E. Grey here recognises that through the last Balkan crisis Germany had
worked for peace as well as he himself. , ^

3 No reason appears why this despatch should not have been printed immediately
after No. 98 to which it refers. The conversation there discussed followed upon the
telegram, British Blue Book No. 85, July 29, and may be expected to have contained
Sir E. Grey's oral answer to the Chancellor's proposal. Unfortunately the whole
conversation is not given in the British Blue Book (see note to No. 98). Numbers 101
and 102, therefore, seem to contain two answers to the Chancellor's enquiry.

* German Ambassador in London.
6 See No. 98.

336 Official Diplomatic Documents

territory in region of frontier, to promise not to advance further,
while Powers endeavoured to arrange that Servia should give satis-
faction sufficient to pacify Austria.^ Territory occupied would of
course be evacuated when Austria was satisfied. I suggested this
yesterday as a possible relief to the situation, and, if it can be obtained,
I would earnestly hope that it might be agreed to suspend further
military preparations on all sides.

Russian Ambassador has told me of condition laid do^n by M.
Sazonof,^ as quoted in your telegram of the 30th July,^ and fears
it cannot be modified ; ^ but if Austrian advance were stopped after
occupation of Belgrade, I think Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs'
formula might be changed to read that the Powers would examine
how Servia could fully satisfy Austria without impairing Servian
sovereign rights or independence.

If Austria, having occupied Belgrade and neighbouring Servian
territory, declares herself ready, in the interest of European peace,
to cease her advance and to discuss how a complete settlement can
be arrived at, I hope that Russia would also consent to discussion
and suspension of further military preparations, provided that other
Powers did the same.

It is a slender chance of preserving peace, but the only one I can
suggest if Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs can come to no agree-
ment at Berlin. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

To Paris

British Blue Book No. 104

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F, Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris,
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

You should inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my telegram
to Sir G. Buchanan ^ of to-day,^ and say that I know that he has been
urging Russia not to precipitate a crisis.^ I hope he may be able to
support this last suggestion at St. Petersburgh.

1 This had been suggested by Sir E. Grey on the previous day, British Blue Book
No. 88. July 29.

* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
3 See No. 97.

* It does not appear why the Russian formula needed any modification, agreeing
substantially with Germany's suggestions to Austria-Hungary. See also Russian
Orange Book No. 60. The altered formula (British Blue Book No. 120 under date of
August 1) was certainly much less acceptable to the Teutonic Powers.

' British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

« See No. 103.

' This must refer to French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30, where Viviani begs
Sazonof not to take "any step which may offer to Germany a pretext for a total or
partial mobilisation of her forces." It cannot refer to general pacific pressure brought
to bear on Russia ; for Russian Orange Book No. 36, July 27, and No. 53, July 29, assert
that Germany had vainly tried to get France to do so. See also French Yellow Book
No. 62, July 27, and French Yellow Book No. 80, July 28.

July 30, British Blue Book No. 105 337

To Paris
British Blue Book No. 105

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.

Sir, Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

M. Cambon reminded me to-day of the letter I had written to him
two years ago, in which we agreed that, if the peace of Europe was
seriously threatened, we would discuss what we were prepared to do.
I enclose for convenience of reference copies of the letter in question
and of M. Cambon's reply. He said that the peace of Europe was
never more seriously threatened than it was now. He did not wish
to ask me to say directly that we would intervene, but he would like
me to say what we should do if certain circumstances arose. The
particular hypothesis he had in mind was an aggression by Germany
on France. He gave me a paper, of which a copy is also enclosed,
showing that the German military preparations were more advanced
and more on the offensive upon the frontier than anything France
had yet done.^ He anticipated that the aggression would take the
form of either a demand that France should cease her preparations,
or a demand that she should engage to remain neutral if there was
war between Germany and Russia. Neither of these things could
France admit.

I said that the Cabinet ^ was to meet to-morrow morning, and I
would see him again to-morrow afternoon.

I am, etc.

E. Grey.
Enclosure 1 in No. 105

Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London.
My dear Ambassador, Foreign Office, November 22, 1912.

From time to time in recent years the French and British naval
and military experts have consulted together. It has always been
understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of
either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to
assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation
between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engage-
ment that commits either Government to action in a contingency
that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for in-
stance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present
moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had
grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it
might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend
upon the armed assistance of the other.

1 From British Blue Book No. 104 it appeared that Sir E. Grey was familiar with
Viviani's despatch, French Yellow Book No. 101, which shows that Viviani knew that
Germany had not yet proceeded even to partial mobilisation.

2 For a fuller discussion of this and subsequent Cabinet meetings, see E. von Mach,
Germany's Point of View, McClurg & Co., pp. 263 ff.

338

Official Diplomatic Documents

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an
unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened
the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other
whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression
and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be pre-
pared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the
plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration,
and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given
to them.

Yours, etc.

Enclosure 2 in No. 105

M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London, to Sir Edward Grey,

L'Ambassade de France, Londres,
ce 23 novembre, 1912.
Cher Sir Edward.

Par votre lettre en date d'hier,
22 novembre, vous m'avez rap-
pele que, dans ces dernieres
annees, les autorites militaires
et navales de la France et de la
Grande-Bretagne s'etaient con-
sultees de temps en temps;
qu'il avait toujours ete entendu
que ces consultations ne restrei-
gnaientpasla liberte, pour chaque
Gouvernement, de decider dans
I'avenir s'ils se preteraient Tun
Tautre le concours de leurs forces
armees ; que, de part et d'autre,
ces consultations entre specia-
listes n'etaient et ne devaient
pas etre considerees comme des
engagements obligeant nos Gou-
vernements a agir dans certains
cas ; que cependant je vous avais
fait observer que, si Tun ou
Tautre des deux Gouvernements
avait de graves raisons d'appre-
hender une attaque non provo-
quee de la part d'une tierce
Puissance, il deviendrait essentiel
de savoir s'il pourrait compter
sur Tassistance armee de Tautre.

Votre lettre repond a cette ob-
servation, et je suis autorise a

(Translation.)
French Embassy, London,
November 23, 1912.
Dear Sir Edward.

You reminded me in your
letter of yesterday, 22nd Novem-
ber, that during the last few years
the military and naval authorities
of France and Great Britain had
consulted with each other from
time to time ; that it had always
been understood that these con-
sultations should not restrict
the liberty of either Government
to decide in the future whether
they should lend each other the
support of their armed forces ;
that, on either side, these consul-
tations between experts were not
and should not be considered
as engagements binding our
Governments to take action in
certain eventualities ; that, how-
ever, I had remarked to you that,
if one or other of the two Govern-
ments had grave reasons to fear
an unprovoked attack on the part
of a third Power, it would become
essential to know whether it
could count on the armed support
of the other.

Your letter answers that point,
and I am authorised to state that.

July 30, British Blue Book No. 105

339

vous declarer que, dans le cas ou
Tun de nos deux Gouvernements
aurait un motif grave d'appre-
hender soit Taggression d'une
tierce Puissance, soit quelque
evenement mena^ant pour la
paix generale, ce Gouvernement
examinerait immediatement avec
I'autre si les deux Gouvernements
doivent agir de concert en vue de
prevenir I'aggression ou de sauve-
garder la paix. Dans ce cas,
les deux Gouvernements deli-
bereraient sur les mesures qu'ils
seraient disposes a prendre en
commun; si ces mesures com-
portaient une action, les deux
Gouvernements prendraient aus-
sitot en consideration les plans
de leurs etats majors et decide-
raient alors de la suite qui devrait
etre donnee a ces plans.

Votre sincerement devoue,
Paul Cambon.

in the event of one of our two
Governments having grave
reasons to fear either an act of
aggression from a third Power,
or some event threatening the
general peace, that Government
would immediately examine with
the other the question whether
both Governments should act
together in order to prevent the
act of aggression or preserve
peace. If so, the two Govern-
ments would deliberate as to the
measures which they would be
prepared to take in common; if
those measures involved action,
the two Governments would take
into immediate consideration the
plans of their general staffs and
would then decide as to the effect
to be given to those plans.
Yours, etc.

Paul Cambon.

Enclosure 3 in No. 105 ^

French Minister for Foreign Affairs to M. Cambon, Frerwh Ambassador
in London.

(Translation.)

The German Army had its
advance-posts on our frontiers
yesterday ; German patrols twice
penetrated on to our territory.
Our advance-posts are withdrawn
to a distance of 10 kilom. from
the frontier. The local popula-
tion is protesting against being
thus abandoned to the attack
of the enemy's army, but the
Government wishes to make it
clear to public opinion and to
the British Government that in
no case will France be the aggres-

L'Armee allemande a ses
avant-postes sur nos bornes-fron-
tieres, hier; par deux fois des
patrouilles allemandes ont pene-
tre sur notre territoire. Nos
avant-postes sont en retraite a 10
kilom. en arriere de la frontiere.
Les populations ainsi abandon-
nees a I'attaque de Tarmee ad-
verse protestent ; mais le Gou-
vernement tient a montrer a
I'opinion publique et au Gou-
vernement britannique que
I'agresseur ne sera en aucun cas

1 Enclosure 3 in No. 105 was dated in the first editions of the British Blue Book,
namely July 31, while No. 105 itself is dated July 30. The text of the Enclosure
should be compared with French Yellow Book No. 106, on which it is based. Whether
the French Ambassador or Sir E. Grey is responsible for the errors and transpositions,
it is impossible to state. For a full discussion see E. von Mach, Germany s Fomt of
View, pp. 421 £f., and the same author's Why Europe is at War, G. P. I'utnam s
Sons.

340

Official Diplomatic Documents

la France. Tout le 16® Corps de
Metz renforce par une partie du
8® venu de Treves et de Cologne
oceupe la frontiere de Metz au
Luxembourg. Le 15® Corps
d'Armee de Strasbourg a serre
sur la frontiere. Sous menace
d'etre fusilles les Alsaciens-Lor-
rains des pays annexes ne peuvent
pas passer la frontiere; des
reservistes par dizaines de milliers
sont rappeles en Allemagne ; c'est
le dernier stade avant la mobilisa-
tion: or, nous n'avons rappele
aucun reserviste.

Comme vous le voyez, I'Alle-
magne I'a fait. J'ajoute que
toutes nos informations concor-
dent pour montrer que les pre-
paratifs allemands ont commence
samedi/ le jour meme de la
remise de la note autrichienne.

Ces elements, ajoutes a ceux
contenus dans mon telegramme
d'hier, vous permettent de faire
la preuve au Gouvernement bri-
tannique de la volonte pacifique
de Tun et des intentions agres-
sives de Tautre.

sor. The whole 16th corps from
Metz, reinforced by a part of
the 8th from Treves and Cologne,
is occupying the frontier at Metz
on the Luxemburg side. The
15th army corps from Strassburg
has closed up on the frontier.
The inhabitants of Alsace-Lor-
raine are prevented by the threat
of being shot from crossing the
frontier. Reservists have been
called back to Germany by tens
of thousands. This is the last
stage before mobilisation,
whereas w^e have not called back
a single reservist.

As you see, Germany has done
so. I would add that all my in-
formation goes to show that the
German preparations began on
Saturday,^ the very day on which
the Austrian note was handed
in.

These facts, added to those
contained in my telegram of
yesterday, will enable you to
prove to the British Government
the pacific intentions of the one
party and the aggressive inten-
tions of the other.

Russia :

From Nish
Russian Orange Book No. 59

Russian Charge d^ Affaires in Servia to Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

Nish, July 17 (30), 19U.
(Telegram.)

The Prince Regent yesterday published a manifesto, signed by all
the Servian Ministers, on the declaration of war by Austria against
Servia. The manifesto ends with the following words: "Defend
your homes and Servia with all your might.'' At the solemn opening
of the Skupschtina the Regent read the speech from the Throne, in
his own name. At the beginning of his speech he pointed out that

^ The earlier editions of the British Blue Book contained no footnote to this errone-
ous date. The later ones print this note : " Sic: in original. The actual date of the
presentation of the Austrian ultimatum was, in fact, Thursday, July 23. The Servian
reply was dated Saturday, July 25, and it is clearly to the latter document that
reference is intended."

July 30, Russian Orange Book No. 60 341

the place of their convocation showed the importance of present
events. He followed this with a summary of recent events — the
Austrian ultimatum, the Servian reply, the efforts of the Servian
Government to do their utmost to avoid war that was compatible
with the dignity of the State, and, finally, the armed aggression of
their most powerful neighbour against Servia, at whose side stood
Montenegro. Passing in review the attitude of the Powers towards
the dispute, the Prince emphasised in the first place the sentiments
which animated Russia, and the gracious communication from His
Majesty the Emperor that Russia would in no case abandon Servia.^
At each mention of His Majesty the Czar and of Russia the hall re-
sounded with loud bursts of wild cheering. The sympathy shown
by France and England ^ was also touched upon in turn, and called
forth approving plaudits from the members. The speech from the
throne ended by declaring the Skupschtina open, and by expressing
the hope that everything possible would be done to lighten the task
before the Government.

To Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, and Rome

Russian Orange Book No. 60

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at
Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, and Rome.

St. Petersburgh, July 17 (30), 1914.
(Telegram.)

The German Ambassador, who has just left me, has asked ^
whether Russia would not be satisfied with the promise which Austria
might give — that she would not violate the integrity of the Kingdom
of Servia — and whether we could not indicate upon what conditions
we would agree to suspend our military preparations. I dictated to
him the following declaration to be forwarded to Berlin for immediate
action :

"Si TAutriche, reconnaissant "If Austria, recognising that
que la question austro-serbe a the Austro-Servian question has
assume le caractere d'une ques- assumed the character of a ques-
tion europeenne, se declare prete tion of European interest, de-
a eliminer de son ultimatum les clares herself ready to eliminate
points qui portent atteinte aux from her ultimatum points which
droits souverains de la Serbie, violate the sovereign rights of
la Russie s'engage a cesser ses Servia, Russia engages to stop
preparatifs militaires." her military preparations."

Please inform me at once by telegraph what attitude the German
Government will adopt in face of this fresh proof of our desire to do

1 See Russian Orange Book No. 40, July 27.

2 For England's attitude a few weeks earlier, see Mr. Asquith's speech, London
Times,'^ July 1, 1914, referring to the Serajevo murder. "We are once more confronted
with one of those incredible crimes which almost make us despair of the progress of
mankind."

3 Cf. note 2 to British Blue Book No. 99, July 30.

342 Official Diplomatic Documents

the utmost possible for a peaceful settlement of the question, for we
cannot allow such discussions to continue solely in order that Germany
and Austria may gain time for their military preparations.

From Berlin
I Russian Orange Book No. 61 ^

Russian Ambassador at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
(Telegram.) Berlin, July 17 (30), 1914.

I LEARN that the order for the mobilisation of the German army
and navy has just been issued.

From Berlin
Russian Orange Book No. 62
Russian Ambassador at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
(Telegram.) Berlin, July 17 {30), 1914.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has just telephoned that the
news of the mobilisation of the German army and fleet, which has
just been announced, is false ; that the news sheets had been printed
in advance so as to be ready for all eventualities, and that they were
put on sale in the afternoon, but that they have now been confiscated.

From Berlin

Russian Orange Book No. 63

Russian Ambassador at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Berlin, July 17 (30), 1914.
(Telegram.)

I HAVE received your telegram of 16th (29th) July,^ and have com-
municated the text of your proposal ^ to the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, whom I have just seen. He told me that he had received an
identic telegram from the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, and
he then declared that he considered it impossible for Austria to accept
our proposal.

1 The juxtaposition of Nos. 61 and 60 makes it appear as if No. 61 contained the
reply to No. 60. This cannot be the case. From French Yellow Book No. 1 13, July 31,
and British Blue Book No. 120, July 31, printed under date of August 1, it appears
that the formula was changed by Sazonof probably on July 31. This would have
been impossible if Germany had issued her order for the mobilisation of her army and
navy on July 30. Cf. also French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30. As a matter of fact
Germany mobilised on August 1 as of August 2. See British Blue Book No. 142,
August 1, and the chapter on MobiUsation in M. P.- Price, The Diplomatic History
of the War.

2 British Blue Book No. 93, July 30, Enclosure No. 2, dated July 29.

' This proposal was superseded by the proposal of July 30, printed above. Orange
Book No. 60. To print this despatch (No. 63) after No. 60 is misleading, because the
casual reader may see in it Austria's refusal to accept the formula of No. 60, which is
not the case.

July 30, Russian Orange Book No. 65 343

From London
Russian Orange Book No. 64
Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
(Telegram.) London, July 17 {30), 1914.

I HAVE communicated the substance of your telegrams of the
16th (29th) 1 and 17th (30th) July ^ to Grey, who looks upon the situa-
tion as most serious, but wishes to continue the discussions. I
pointed out to Grey that — since you agreed with him to accept what-
ever proposal he might make in order to preserve peace, provided
that Austria did not profit by any ensuing delays to crush Servia —
the situation in which you were placed had apparently been modified.
At that time our relations with Germany had not been compromised.
After the declaration made by the German Ambassador at St. Peters-
burg regarding German mobilisation, those relations had changed, and
you had returned the only reply to his request that was possible
from a Great Power. When the German Ambassador again visited
you, and enquired what your conditions were, you had formulated
them in altogether special circumstances. I also again emphasised
to Grey the necessity of taking into consideration the new situation
brought about by the fault of Germany in consequence of the German
Ambassador's action.^ Grey replied that he fully understood this,
and that he would remember these arguments.

From London
Russian Orange Book No. 65
Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
(Telegram.) London, July 17 (30), 1914.

The German Ambassador has asked Grey^ why Great Britain
was taking military measures both on land and sea. Grey replied
that these measures had no aggressive character, but that the situa-
tion was such that each Power must be -ready.

1 British Blue Book No. 93, Enclosure 2, July 30. Since the Ambassador had com-
municated the entire telegram to Sir E. Grey, it does not appear why he should here
speak of communicating the substance. Equally confusing is the mixture of two
separate proposals. See second note to previous despatch.

2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 97, July 30, and Russian Orange Book No. 60, same day.
5 This action is described in very different terms in British Blue Book No. 97,

* Omitted in British Blue Book, see above, note 1 to British Blue Book No. 98,
July 30, and French Yellow Book No. 108, same day.

344 Offijcial Diplomatic Documents

Serbia :

To St. Petersburgh

^ Serbian Blue Bqok No. 44

His Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, to His Imperial
Majesty the Emperor of Russia.

(Telegraphic.) Nish, July 17/30, 1914.

[For the text see Russian Orange Book No. 56, undated in the Collected Dip-
lomatic Documents, but printed among the despatches of July 29. No reason is
given why a despatch from the Serbian Crown Prince was known in Russia a day
before it was published in the Serbian Blue Book as having been sent from Serbia.
For Serbian Blue Book Nos. 45 to 47 see under July 28.]

From St. Petersburgh

Serbian Blue Book No. 48

M. Sazonofy Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Dr. M. Spalaiko-
vitch, Serbian Minister at Petrograd.

Sir, Petrograd, July 17/30, 19U.

I HAD the honour to receive your note of July 15/28/ No. 527,
in which you communicated to me the contents of the telegram re-
ceived by you from His Excellency, M. Pashitch, in regard to the
declaration of war on Serbia by Austria-Hungary. I sincerely
regret this sad event, and will not fail to lay before His Majesty the
petition by the Serbian nation, whose interpreter you are.

I have, etc.

1 Not published in Russian Orange Book or Serbian Blue Book. If the date of the
telegram from Sazonof, July 30, is correct it would seem that Sazonof had waited at
least two days before laying Serbia's petition before the Czar. This seems incredible.

July 31, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 51

345

Friday, July 31, 1914
SUMMARY OF DESPATCHES

Foreign Office of

Sent Despatches to

Received
Despatches from

Austria-Hungary

London and Petrograd,
All representatives abroad

Petrograd, Paris

Belgium

London, Berlin and Paris,
All representatives abroad

France

London, etc., Petrograd

London, Luxemburg,

Petrograd
Vienna, Berlin, Brussels

Germany

Rome, Petrograd, Paris

Great Britain

Petrograd, Berlin, Paris

London, Luxemburg,

and Berlin, Brussels,

Petrograd, Vienna,

Paris

Berlin, Brussels

Russia

London, etc. ; London

Vienna, Berlin

Serbia

Austria-Hungary is prepared to entertain Sir E. Grey's proposal to negotiate
between her and Serbia. Russia's mobilisation order, however, posted in the
early hours throughout the Russian Empire, induces her to mobilise her own
forces in Galicia. She nevertheless continues her direct conversations with
Russia.

Belgium mobilises her forces but promises to observe strict neutrality. She
receives assurances of the French minister de suo, and publishes German assur-
ances made in the Reichstag several years ago.

France, having promised her unconditional support of Russia on the previous
day, is trying to obtain an unconditional promise of support from Great Britain.

Germany is deeply stirred by the Russian order of general mobilisation, which
came while Emperor and Czar were still exchanging telegrams. She says that this
order is making her pacific efforts in Vienna impossible and endangering her safety.
She consequently declares **Kriegsgefahrzustand" and asks Russia, in an ultima-
tum, to demobilise within 12 hours. At the same time she asks France to reply
within 18 hours, whether she will remain neutral in a Russo-German War.

Great Britain : The Cabinet refuses the request of France to make her a definite
promise of support. Sir E. Grey, however, or his assistant. Sir A. Nicolson,
promises to bring the matter up again in the Cabinet on the next day, while Sir E.
Grey himself gives Germany to understand that Great Britain would join France
in case of war, making thus a declaration contrary to the decision of the Cabinet.
Notes are addressed to France and Germany regarding their respective attitudes
toward the neutrality of Belgium, which Sir E. Grey declares to be not **a decisive
but an important factor, in determining our attitude." Sir E. Grey requests a
modification of Sazonof's formula of the previous day.

Russia alters her formula of the previous day in which she had promised to
stop her military measures, and orders the general mobilisation of her forces.

Serbia is silent on this day.

Austria-Hungary :

To London and St. Petersburgh

Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 51

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at London and

St. Petersburgh.
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 31, 1914,

I AM telegraphing as follows to Berlin : —

Herr von Tschirschky has in accordance with his instructions
yesterday communicated a discussion between Sir E. Grey and Prince

346 Official Diplomatic Documents

Lichnowsky in which the British Secretary of State made the following
announcement to the German Ambassador : —

Sazonof has informed the British Government that after the dec-
laration of war by Austria-Hungary against Servia, he is no longer
in a position to deal directly with Austria-Hungary/ and he there-
fore requests that Great Britain will again take up her work of media-
tion. The Russian Government regarded the preliminary stoppage
of hostilities as a condition precedent to this.

To this Russian declaration, Sir E. Grey remarked to Prince
Lichnowsky that Great Britain thought of a mediation a quatre, and
that she regarded this as urgently necessary if a general war was to
be prevented.

I ask your Excellency to convey our warm thanks to the Secretary
of State for the communications made to us through Herr von
Tschirschky, and to declare to him that in spite of the change in the
situation which has since arisen through the mobilisation of Russia,
we are quite prepared to entertain the proposal of Sir E. Grey to nego-
tiate between us and Servia.^

The conditions of our acceptance are, nevertheless, that our military
action against Servia should continue to take its course, and that the
British Cabinet should move the Russian Government to bring to a
standstill the Russian mobilisation which is directed against us, in
which case, of course, we will also at once cancel the defensive military
counter-measures in Galicia, which are occasioned by the Russian
attitude.

From St. Petersburgh

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 52'

Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.) *S^. Petersburgh, July 31, 1914.

The order for the general mobilisation of the entire Army and
Fleet was issued early to-day.

To the Imperial and Royal Diplomatic Representatives

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 53

Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Diplomatic Representatives.
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 31, 1914-

For your information and for use in your dealings with the Govern-
ment to which you are accredited.

1 The only published despatch in the British Blue Book and Russian Orange Book
to which this can refer is Russian Orange Book No. 50, July 29. Here, however, it is
Sazonof, while there it is Austria-Hungary who is said to have broken off the conversa-
tions. This despatch is not printed in the German White Book.

2 This is an enormous concession both to Great Britain and France. Heretofore
Germany and Austria-Hungary had always refused arbitration between Austria and
Serbia while ready to accept arbitration between Austria and Russia.

' The juxtaposition of these despatches, Nos. 51 and 52, is as unfortunate as that
noted above, Russian Orange Book Nos. 60 and 61, July 30. The mobilisation was
in neither case the result of the previous despatch. The Russian mobilisation was
the result of a decision reached "five days ago," according to the Czar's telegram of
July 30 ; see German White Book, Exhibit 23a.

July 31 f Austro-Hungarian Red Book No, 55 347

As mobilisation has been ordered by the Russian Government on our
frontier, we find ourselves obliged to take military measures in Galicia.

These measures are purely of a defensive character and arise ex-
clusively under the pressure of the Russian measures, which we regret
exceedingly, as we ourselves have no aggressive intentions of any
kind against Russia, and desire the continuation of the former neigh-
bourly relations.

Pourparlers between the Cabinets at Vienna and St. Petersburgh
appropriate to the situation are meanwhile being continued,^ and from
these we hope that things will quiet down all round.

From Paris

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 54

Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 31, 1914.

German Ambassador in pursuance of the instructions of his
Government has declared here that if the general mobilisation ordered
by the Russian Government is not stopped within 12 hours, Germany
also will mobilise. At the same time Baron Schoen has asked whether
France will remain neutral in the event of a war between Germany
and Russia. An answer to this is requested within eighteen hours.
The time limit expires to-morrow (Saturday) at 1 o'clock in the after-
noon.

From St. Petersburgh

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 55

Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 31, 1914.

Your Excellency's telegram ^ of the 30th July has been received.

You will have gathered from my telegram ^ of the 29th July, that
without waiting for instructions I again resumed conversations with
M. Sazonof more or less on the basis which has now been indicated
to me, but that the points of view on the two sides had not materially
approximated to each other.

Meanwhile, however, it has appeared from the conversations
between the German Ambassador and the Russian Minister for
Foreign Affairs that Russia will not ^ accept as satisfactory the
formal declaration that Austria-Hungary will neither diminish the ter-
ritory of the Servian Kingdom nor infringe on Servian sovereignty nor
injure Russian interests in the Balkans or elsewhere ; since then more-
over a general mobilisation ^ has been ordered on the part of Russia.

1 A despatch explaining the resumption of the pourparlers seems to be lacking,
unless No. 55, same day, explains it.

2 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 50, July 30.

3 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29.

* In reports of these conversations this is only stated by inference. Cf . British Blue
Book No. 97, July 30.

6 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 52, same day.

348 Official Diplomatic Documents

Belgium:

To Berlin, Paris, London

Belgian Gray Book No. 9

M. Damgnon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian
Ministers at Berlin, Paris, and London.

Sir, Brussels, July 31, 1914.

The French Minister came to show me a telegram from the Agence
Havas reporting a state of war ^ in Germany, and said ^ : —

"I seize this opportunity to declare that no incursion of French
troops into Belgium will take place, even if considerable forces are
massed upon the frontiers of your country. France does not wish to
incur the responsibility, so far as Belgium is concerned, of taking the
first hostile act. Instructions in this sense will be given to the French
authorities."

I thanked M. Klobukowski for his communication, and I felt bound
to observe that we had always had the greatest confidence in the loyal
observance by both our neighbouring States of their engagements
towards us. We have also every reason to believe that the attitude
of the German Government will be the same as that of the Govern-
ment of the French Republic.

To All Belgian Missions Abroad

Belgian Gray Book No. 10

M. Damgnon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all Heads of
Belgian Missions abroad.

(Telegram.) Brussels, July 31, 1914-

The Minister of War informs me that mobilisation has been ordered^
and that Saturday, the 1st August, will be the first day.

To Berlin, London, Paris

Belgian Gray Book No. U

M. Damgnon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian
Ministers at Berlin, London, and Paris.

Sir, Brussels, July 31, 191^.

The British Minister asked to see me on urgent business, and made
the following communication, which he had hoped for some days ^

1 "State of danger of war" (Kriegsgefahrzustand) , see French Yellow Book No.
119, July 31, and British Blue Book No. 112, same day.

2 It is an unusual step in diplomacy for the Minister to make such a declaration
without authority to that effect having been sent. The formal declaration of the
French Government was made later. Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 15, August 1, 1914.

' It will be noted that Belgium ordered the mobilisation of her troops one day
earlier than Germany. See German White Book, p. 559, August 1 at 5 p.m., and Brit-
ish Blue Book No. 127, August 1.

* No explanation is given why the British Minister could not have done so before.

July 31, Belgian Gray Book No. 12 349

to be able to present to me : Owing to the possibility of a Euro-
pean war, Sir Edward Grey has asked the French and German
Governments separately if they were each of them ready to respect
Belgian neutrality provided that no other Power violated it : —

" In view of existing treaties, I am instructed ^ to inform the Belgian
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the above, and to say that Sir Edward
Grey presumes that Belgium will do her utmost to maintain her
neutrality, and that she desires and expects that the other Powers
will respect and maintain it."

I hastened to thank Sir Francis Villiers for this communication,
which the Belgian Government particularly appreciate, and I added
that Great Britain and the other nations guaranteeing our independ-
ence could rest assured that we would neglect no effort to maintain
our neutrality, and that we were convinced that the other Powers,
in view of the excellent relations of friendship and confidence which
had always existed between us, would respect and maintain that
neutrality.

I did not fail to state that our military forces, which had been con-
siderably developed in consequence of our recent reorganisation, were
sufficient to enable us to defend ourselves ^ energetically in the event
of the violation of our territory.

In the course of the ensuing conversation. Sir Francis seemed
to me somewhat surprised at the speed with which we had decided
to mobilise our army. I pointed out to him that the Netherlands
had come to a similar decision before we had done so, and that, more-
over, the recent date of our new military system, and the tem-
porary nature of the measures upon which we then had to decide,
made it necessary for us to take immediate and thorough precautions.
Our neighbours and guarantors should see in this decision our strong
desire to uphold our neutrality ourselves.

Sir Francis seemed to be satisfied with my reply, and stated that his
Government were awaiting this reply before continuing negotiations
with France and Germany, the result of which would be communi-
cated to me.

To Berlin, London, and Paris

Belgian Gray Book No. 12

il. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian
Ministers at Berlin, London, and Paris.

Sir, Brussels, July 31, 1914.

In the course of the conversation which the Secretary-General
of my Department had with Herr von Below this morning, he ex-

1 British Blue Book No. 115, July 31.

2 This should be read in the light of the Brussels Documents, published by the
German Government, which reveal the close military understanding with Great Britain.
The reader should decide for himself whether Belgium was in a position to defend
herself also against the Allies. Germany says that this would have been impossible
because Belgium had given all her military secrets to Great Britain and, therefore,
also to France.

350 Official Diplomatic Documents

plained to the German Minister the scope of the military measures
which we had taken, and said to him that they were a consequence of
our desire to fulfil our international obligations, and that they in no
wise implied an attitude of distrust towards our neighbours.

The Secretary-General then asked the German Minister if he
knew of the conversation which he had had with his predecessor,
Herr von Flotow, and of the reply which the Imperial Chancellor
had instructed the latter to give.

In the course of the controversy which arose in 1911 as a conse-
quence of the Dutch scheme for the fortification of Flushing, certain
newspapers had maintained that in the case of a Franco-German war
Belgian neutrality ^ would be violated by Germany.

The Department of Foreign Affairs had suggested that a declara-
tion in the German Parliament during a debate on foreign affairs
would serve to calm public opinion, and to dispel the mistrust which
was so regrettable from the point of view of the relations between the
two countries.

Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg replied that he had fully appreciated
the feelings which had inspired our representations. He declared
that Germany had no intention of violating Belgian neutrality, but
he considered that in making a public declaration Germany would
weaken her military position in regard to France, who, secured on
the northern side, would concentrate all her energies on the east.

Baron van der Elst, continuing, said that he perfectly understood
the objections raised by Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg to the proposed
public declaration, and he recalled the fact that since then, in 1913,
Herr von Jagow had made reassuring declarations to the Budget
Commission of the Reichstag respecting the maintenance of Belgian
neutrality.

Herr von Below replied that he knew of the conversation with Herr
von Flotow, and that he was certain that the sentiments expressed
at that time had not changed.

Enclosure in No. 12

Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Berlin, May 2, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to bring to your notice the declarations re-
specting Belgian neutrality, as published in the semi-official Nord-
deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, made by the Secretary of State and the
Minister of War, at the meeting of the Budget Committee of the
Reichstag on April 29th : —

" A member of the Social Democrat Party said : * The approach
of a war between Germany and France is viewed with apprehension

* For a full discussion of the neutrality of Belgium see A. K. Fuehr, The Neutrality
of Belgium, Funk & Wagnalls Co.

July Sly French Yellow Book No, 110 351

in Belgium, for it is feared that Germany will not respect the neu-
trality of Belgium.'

" Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State, replied : ' Belgian neutrality
is provided for by International Conventions and Germany is de-
termined to respect those Conventions.'

"This declaration did not satisfy another member of the Social
Democrat Party. Herr von Jagow said that he had nothing to add
to the clear statement he had made respecting the relations between
Germany and Belgium.

"In answer to fresh enquiries by a member of the Social Demo-
crat Party, Herr von Heeringen, the Minister of War, replied:
* Belgium plays no part in the causes which justify the proposed re-
organisation of the German military system. That proposal is
based on the situation* in the East. Germany will not lose sight of
the fact that the neutrality of Belgium is guaranteed by international
treaty.'

" A member of the Progressive Party having once again spoken of
Belgium, Herr von Jagow repeated that this declaration in regard
to Belgium was sufficiently clear."

France :

From London

French Yellow Book No. 110

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene Vimani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, July 31, 1914-

At the beginning of our conversation ^ to-day Sir E. Grey told me
that Prince Lichnowsky had asked him this morning if Great Britain
would observe neutrality in the conflict which is at hand. The
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that, if the conflict
became general. Great Britain would not be able to remain neutral,
and especially that if France were involved Great Britain would be
drawn in.

I then asked Sir E. Grey concerning the Cabinet Council which
took place this morning. He replied that after having examined the
situation, the Cabinet had thought ^ that for the moment the
British Government were unable to guarantee to us their inter-
vention, that they intended to take steps to obtain from Germany
and France an understanding to respect Belgian neutrality, but that
before considering intervention it was necessary to wait for the situ-
ation to develop.

I asked Sir E. Grey if, before intervening, the British Government
would await the invasion of French territory. I insisted on the fact

1 This conversation is only very briefly touched upon in British Blue Book No. 116,
same day.

2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 119, July 31. This was the first vote of the Cabinet
to "intervene" or " pledge support" to France. For the second vote, likewise refusing,
see French Yellow Book No. 126, August 1.

352 Official Diplomatic Documents

that the measures already taken on our frontier by Germany showed
an intention to attack in the near future, and that, if a renewal of
the mistake of Europe in 1870 was to be avoided. Great Britain should
consider at once the circumstances in which she would give France
the help on which she relied.^

Sir E. Grey replied that the opinion of the Cabinet had only been
formed on the situation at the moment, that the situation might be
modified, and that in that case a meeting of the Cabinet would be
called ^ together at once in order to consider it.

Sir A. Nicolson, whom I saw on leaving the room of the Secretary of
State, told me that the Cabinet would meet again to-morrow, and
confidentially gave me to understand that the Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs would be certain to renew the discussion.

According to your instructions, I have taken the necessary steps
to secure that the autograph letter ^ which the President of the Re-
public has addressed to His Majesty the King of England should be
given to the King this evening. This step, which will certainly be
communicated to the Prime Minister to-morrow morning, will, I
am sure, be taken into serious consideration by the British Cabinet.

Paul Cambon.

From Luxemburg

French Yellow Book No. Ill

M. Mollardf French Minister at Luxemburg, to Rene Vimani, President
of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Luxemburg, July 31,1914.

The Minister of State has just left the Legation ; he has just told
me that the Germans have closed the bridges over the Moselle at
Schengen and at Remich with vehicles and the bridge at Wormel-
dange with ropes. The bridges at Wasserbillig and at D'Echternach
over the SHre have not been closed, but the Germans no longer allow
the export from Prussia of corn, cattle or motor cars.

M. Eyschen requested me — and this was the real object of his
visit — to ask you for an official declaration to the effect that France
will, in case of war, respect the neutrality of Luxemburg. When I
asked him if he had received a similar declaration from the German
Government, he told me that he was going to the German Minister to
get the same declaration.

Postscript. — Up to the present no special measure has been taken
by the Cabinet of Luxemburg. M. Eyschen has returned from
the German Legation. He complained of the measures showing sus-
picion which were taken against a neutral neighbour. The Minister
of State has asked the German Minister for an official declaration

1 If France had not relied on the help of Great Britain she might not have supported
Russia.

2 Contrast this with the assurance given in the next paragraph.

3 This letter was published by Sir E. Grey, after repeated requests had been made,
on Feb. 20, 1915.

July 31, French Yellow Book No. 112 353

from his Government undertaking to respect the neutrality. Herr
Von Buch is stated to have repUed, " That is a matter of course, but it
would be necessary for the French Government to give the same
undertaking."

MOLLARD.

To London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna and Rome

French Yellow Book No. 112

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh,
Berlin, Vienna, and Rome.

Paris, July 31, 1914.

The British Ambassador has handed me a note ^ from his Govern-
ment asking the French Government to support a proposal at St.
Petersburgh for the peaceful solution of the Austro-Servian conflict.

This note shows that the German Ambassador has informed Sir
E. Grey of the intention of his Government to try to exercise influence
on the Austro-Hungarian Government after the capture of Belgrade
and the occupation of the districts bordering on the frontier, in order
to obtain a promise not to advance further, while the Powers en-
deavoured to secure that Servia should give sufficient satisfaction to
Austria ; the occupied territory would be evacuated as soon as she
had received satisfaction.

Sir E. Grey made this suggestion on the 29th July,^ and expressed
the hope that military preparations would be suspended on all sides.
Although the Russian Ambassador at London has informed the
Secretary of State that he fears that the Russian condition ^ (if
Austria, recognising that her conflict tvith Servia has assumed the
character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready
to eliminate from her tdtimatum the points ivhich endanger the principle
of Servian sovereignty, Russia undertakes to stop all military prepara-
tions) cannot be modified. Sir E. Grey thinks that, if Austria stops
her advance after the occupation of Belgrade, the Russian Govern-
ment could agree to change their formula in the following way : —

That the Powers would examine how Servia should give complete
satisfaction to Austria without endangering the sovereignty or in-
dependence of the Kingdom. In case Austria after occupying
Belgrade and the neighbouring Servian territory should declare her-
self ready, in the interests of Europe, to stop her advance and to dis-
cuss how an arrangement might be arrived at, Russia could also
consent to the discussion and suspend her military preparations, pro-
vided that the other Powers acted in the same way.

In accordance with the request of Sir E. Grey, the French Govern-
ment joined in the British suggestion, and in the following terms

1 See British Blue Book No. 104, July 30, also British Blue Book No. 103, same day.

2 British Blue Book No. 88, July 29.

3 French Yellow Book No. 103, British Blue Book No. 97, July 30.

354 Official Diplomatic Documents

asked their Ambassador at St. Petersburgh to try to obtain, without
delay, the assent ^ of the Russian Government : —

" Please inform M. Sazonof urgently that the suggestion of Sir E.
Grey appears to me to furnish a useful basis for conversation between
the Powers, who are equally desirous of working for an honourable
arrangement of the Austro-Servian conflict, and of averting in this
manner the dangers which threaten general peace.

"The plan proposed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
by stopping the advance of the Austrian army and by entrusting to
the Powers the duty of examining how Servia could give full satis-
faction to Austria without endangering the sovereign rights and the
independence of the Kingdom, by thus affording Russia a means of
suspending all military preparations, while the other Powers are to
act in the same way, is calculated equally to give satisfaction to Russia
and to Austria and to provide for Servia an acceptable means of
issue from the present difficulty.

" I would ask you carefully to be guided by the foregoing considera-
tions in earnestly pressing M. Sazonof to give his adherence ^ without
delay to the proposal of Sir E. Grey, of which he will have been himself
informed."

Rene Viviani.

From St. Petersburgh

French Yellow Book No. 113

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Rene
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburgh, July 31, 1914.

The news of the bombardment of Belgrade ^ during the night
and morning of yesterday has provoked very deep feeling in Russia.
One cannot understand the attitude of Austria, whose provocations
since the beginning of the crisis have regularly followed Russia's
attempts at conciliation and the satisfactory conversations exchanged
between St. Petersburgh and Vienna.

Nevertheless, desirous of leaving nothing undone in order to prove
his sincere desire to safeguard peace, M. Sazonof informs me that he
has modified ^ his formula, as requested by the British Ambassador,
in the following way : —

"If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Servian
territory, and if, recognising that the Austro-Servian conflict has as-
sumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits

1 Austria-Hungary waa " quite prepared to entertain the proposal of Sir E, Grey to
negotiate between us and Serbia" ; see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 51, July 31.

2 Russia ordered complete mobilisation instead.

' Cf. last despatch, offer of Sir E. Grey for an agreement "after the occupation of
Belgrade."

* The modified formula must have been less satisfactory than the original one,
French Yellow Book No. 103, July 30, because here Austria has to agree to "stay the
march of her troops" while Russia merely agrees to a "waiting attitude," instead of
stopping her military preparations as she had first offered to do.

July 31, French Yellow Book No, 11 4 355

that the great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Servia
can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government, without injury
to her sovereign rights as a State and to her independence, Russia
undertakes to preserve her waiting attitude."

Paleologue.

To London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, and Constantinople
French Yellow Book No. 114

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin,
Vienna, Rome, and Constantinople.

Paris, July 31, 1914.
The efforts made up till now concurrently by Great Britain and
Russia with the earnest support of France (obtained in advance for
every peaceful effort) with the object of a direct understanding be-
tween Vienna and St. Petersburgh, or of the mediation of the four
Powers in the most appropriate form, are being united to-day;
Russia, giving a fresh proof of her desire for an understanding, has
hastened to reply to the first appearance of an overture ^ made by
Germany since the beginning of the crisis (as to the conditions on
which Russia would stop her military preparations) by indicating a
formula, and then modifying ^ it in accordance with the request of
Great Britain ; there ought to be hope, therefore, negotiations having
also been begun again between the Russian and Austrian Ambassadors
that British mediation will complete at London that which is being
attempted by direct negotiations at Vienna and St. Petersburgh.

Nevertheless, the constant attitude of Germany who, since the
beginning of the conflict, while ceaselessly protesting to each Power
her peaceful intentions, has actually, by her dilatory or negative^
attitude, caused the failure of all attempts at agreement, and has
not ceased to encourage through her Ambassador the uncompromising
attitude of Vienna ; the German military preparations begun since
the 25th July ^ and subsequently continued without cessation ;
the immediate opposition ^ of Germany to the Russian formula, de-
clared at Berlin inacceptable for Austria before that Power had even
been consulted; in conclusion, all the impressions derived from
Berlin bring conviction that Germany has sought to humiliate
Russia, to disintegrate the Triple Entente, and if these results could
not be obtained, to make war.

Rene Viviani.

1 French Yellow Book No. 103, July 30.

2 See note 2 to previous despatch.

3 Cf. Chancellor's Speech, note 2, British Blue Book No. 67, July 28.

^ That this was an error appears from French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30. See
also the chapters on Mobilization in M. P. Price, The Diplomatic History of the War,
Scribner's Sons.

6 There is no proof for this assertion. On the contrary Austro-Hungarian Red Book
No. 51, July 31, seems to prove that Germany had agreed, for Austria-Hungary's state-
ment that she was "prepared to entertain the proposal of Sir E. Grey to negotiate be-
tween us and Serbia " came as the result of a communication transmitted to her by
Germany. Russian Orange Book No. 67, July 31, while stating that the formula was
altered at the request of Great Britain, does not say that Germany had opposed the
original formula.

356 Official Diplomatic Documents

From Vienna

French Yellow Book No. 115

M, DumainCj French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council , Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 31, 1914.

General mobilisation for all men from 19 to 42 years of age was
declared by the Austro-Hungarian Government this morning at 1
o'clock.

My Russian calleague still thinks that this step is not entirely in
contradiction to the declaration made yesterday by Count Berchtold.

DUMAINE.

From Berlin

French Yellow Book No. 116

M, Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 31, 1914.

Herr von Jagow sent for me and has just told me that he was very
sorry to inform me that in face of the total mobilisation of the Russian
army, Germany, in the interest of the security of the Empire, found
herself obliged to take serious precautionary measures. What is
called " Kriegsgef ahrzustand " (the state of danger of war) has been
declared,^ and this allows the authorities to proclaim, if they deem it
expedient, a state of siege, to suspend some of the public services, and
to close the frontier.

At the same time a demand ^ is being made at St. Petersburgh that
they should demobilise, as well on the Austrian as on the German
side, otherwise Germany would be obliged to mobilise on her side.
Herr von Jagow told me that Herr von Schoen had been instructed to
inform the French Government of the resolution of the Berlin Cabinet
and to ask them what attitude they intended to adopt.

Jules Cambon.

To St. Petersburgh

French Yellow Book No. 117

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to M. Paleologu£, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh.

Paris, July 31, 1914.

The German Government decided at mid-day to take all military
measures implied by the state called "state of danger of war."

1 This proves that the previous references to " Kriegsgef ahr " were erroneous.
See French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30, and Russian Orange Book No. 61, same day.

2 Russian Orange Book No. 70, August 1 (midnight).

July 31, French Yellow Book No. 118 357

In communicating this decision to me at 7 o'clock this evening,
Baron von Schoen added that the Government required at the same
time that Russia should demobilise. If the Russian Government
has not given a satisfactory reply within twelve hours Germany
will mobilise in her turn.

I replied to the German Ambassador that I had no information
at all ^ about an alleged total mobilisation of the Russian army and
navy which the German Government invoked as the reason for the
new military measures which they are taking to-day.

Baron von Schoen finally asked me, in the name of his Government,
what the attitude of France would be in case of war between Germany
and Russia. He told me that he would come for my reply to-morrow
(Saturday) at 1 o'clock.

I have no intention of making any statement to him on this subject,
and I shall confine myself to telling him that France will have regard
to her interests. The Government of the Republic need not indeed
give any account of her intentions except to her ally.

I ask you to inform M. Sazonof of this immediately. As I have
already told you, I have no doubt that the Imperial Government, in
the highest interests of peace, will do everything on their part to
avoid anything that might render inevitable or precipitate the crisis.

Rene Viviani.

From St. Petersburgh

French Yellow Book No. 118

M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Rene
Viviani, President of Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburgh, July 31, 191 4.

As a result of the general mobilisation of Austria and of the measures
for mobilisation taken secretly, but continuously, by Germany for
the last six days,^ the order for the general mobilisation of the Russian
army has been given, Russia not being able, without most serious
danger, to allow herself to be further out-distanced ; really she is
only taking military measures corresponding to those taken by Ger-
many.

For imperative reasons of strategy the Russian Government, know-
ing that Germany was arming, could no longer delay the conversion
of her partial mobilisation into a general mobilisation.

Paleologue.

1 This is very strange, since the Russian mobilisation was "ordered during the
afternoon of July 31" (German White Book, p. 558), according to M. P. Price, The
Diplomatic History of the War, Scribner's Sons, p. 103, and London Times, Sept. 11,
letter by Mr. Stephen Graham, who states on the Mongolian frontier in Siberia the
first telegram to mobilise came through at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 31st July.

2 For the error of this and similar statements see M. P. Price's book referred to in
note to previous despatch.

358 Official Diplomatic Documents y

From Brussels

French Yellow Book No. 119

M. Klobukowskiy French Minister at Brussels, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, July 31, 1914-

L'Agence Havas having announced that the state "of danger of
war" had been declared in Germany, I told M. Davignon that I could
assure him that the Government of the Republic would respect the
neutrality of Belgium.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that the Government of
the King had always thought that this would be so, and thanked me.
The Russian INIinister and the British Minister, whom I saw subse-
quently, appeared much pleased that in the circumstances I gave this
assurance, which further, as the British INIinister told me, was in
accordance with the declaration of Sir E. Grey.

Klobukowski.
Germany :

To Rome

German WmxE Book Exhibit 19

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Rome on
July 31st, 1914.

We have continued to negotiate between Russia and Austria-
Hungary through a direct exchange of telegrams between His Majesty
the Kaiser and His Majesty the Czar, as well as in conjunction with
Sir Edward Grey. Through the mobilisation of Russia all our efforts
have been greatly handicapped if they have not become impossible.
In spite of pacifying assurances Russia is ^ taking such far-reaching
measures against us that the situation is becoming continually more
menacing.

To St. Petersburgh

German White Book Exhibit 24

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. Peters-
burgh on July 31st, 1914- Urgent.

In spite of negotiations still pending and although we have up to
this hour made no preparations for mobilisation, Russia has mobilised
her entire army and navy, hence also against us. On account of these
Russian measures, we have been forced, for the safety of the country,
to proclaim the threatening state of war, which does not yet imply
mobilisation. Mobilisation, however, is bound to follow if Russia
does not stop every measure of war against us and against Austria-

^ The British edition has this footnote: "The German text adds here 'alien uns
zugegangenen Nachrichten zufolge' (according to all the information that has reached
ua").

July SI, British Blue Book No. 50 359

Hungary within 12 hours, and notifies us definitely to this effect.
Please to communicte this at once to M. Sazonof and wire hour of
communication.^

To Paris

German White Book Exhibit 25

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in Paris on
July 31st, 1914' Urgent.

Russia has ordered mobilisation of her entire army and fleet, there-
fore also against us in spite of our still pending mediation. ^ We have
therefore declared the threatening state of war which is bound to
be followed by mobilisation unless Russia stops within 12 hours all
measures of war against us and Austria. Mobilisation inevitably
implies war. Please ask French Government whether it intends to
remain neutral in a Russo-German war. Reply must be made in 18
hours. Wire at once hour of inquiry. Utmost speed necessary.

Great Britain:

From Vienna

British Blue Book No. 50

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.

— {Received July 31.)
Sir, Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the
Austro-Hungarian note announcing the declaration of war against
Servia. I have, etc.

Maurice de Bunsen.

Enclosure in No. 50
Copy of note verbale, dated Vienna, July 28, 1914

(Translation.)

Pour mettre fin aux menees In order to bring to an end

subversives partant de Belgrade the subversive intrigues originat-

et dirigees centre Tintegrite terri- ing from Belgrade and aimed at

toriale de la Monarchic austro- the territorial integrity of the

hongroise, le Gouvernement Im- Austro-Hungarian Monarchy,

perial et Royal a fait parvenir the Imperial and Royal Govern-

a la date du 23 juillet, 1914, au ment has delivered to the Royal

Serbie une note dans laquelle se Servian Government a note,

trouvait formulee une serie de dated July 23, 1914, in which a

demandes pour T acceptation des- series of demands were formu-

quelles un delai de quarante-huit lated, for the acceptance of which

1 Presented at midnight. See Russian Orange Book No*. 70, August 1.

»The British edition adds here a footnote: "The German text adds here ' und
obwohl wir selbst keinerlei Mobilmachungsmassnahmen getroffen^ haben' (and al-
though we ourselves have taken no measures towards mobilisation").

360

Official Diplomatic Documents

henres a ete accorde a Gouverne-
ment Royal. Le Gouvernement
Royal de Serbie n'ayant pas
repondu a cette note d'une
maniere satisfaisante, le Gou-
vernement Imperial et Royal se
trouve dans la necessite de pour-
voir lui-meme a la sauvegarde
de ses droits et interets et de
reeourir a cet effet a la force des
armes.

L'Autriche-Hongrie, qui vient
d'adresser a la Serbie une de-
claration formelle conformement
a I'article l"de la convention du
18 octobre, 1907, relative a
Touverture des hostilites, se con-
sidere des lors en etat de guerre
avec la Serbie.

En portant ce qui precede a
la connaissance de TAmbassade
Royale de Grande-Bretagne le
Ministere des Affaires Etran-
geres a I'honneur de declarer que
I'Autriche-Hongrie se confor-
mera au cours des hostilites,
sous la reserve d'un procede
analogue de la part de la Serbie,
aux stipulations des conventions
de La Haye du 18 octobre, 1907,
ainsi qu'a celles de la Declaration
de Londres du 26 fevrier, 1909.

L'Ambassade est priee de
vouloir bien communiquer, d'ur-
gence, la presente notification a
son Gouvernement.

a delay of forty-eight hours has
been granted to the Royal
Government. The Royal Servian
Government not having answered
this note in a satisfactory manner,
the Imperial and Royal Govern-
ment are themselves compelled
to see to the safeguarding of
their rights and interests, and,
with this object, to have recourse
to force of arms.

Austria-Hungary, who has just
addressed to Servia a formal dec-
laration, in conformity with
article 1 of the convention of the
18th October, 1907, relative to
the opening of hostilities, con-
siders herself henceforward in a
state of war with Servia.

In bringing the above to notice
of His Britannic Majesty's Em-
bassy, the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs has the honour to declare
that Austria-Hungary will act
during the hostilities in con-
formity with the terms of the
Conventions of The Hague of
the 18th October, 1907, as also
with those of the Declaration of
London of the 28th February,
1909, provided an analogous pro-
cedure is adopted by Servia.

The embassy is requested to be
so good as to communicate the
present notification as soon as pos-
sible to the British Government.

From Rome
British Blue Book No. 106^

Sir R. Roddy British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. —
{Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.) Rorrw, July 30, 1914.

I LEARNT from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who sent for me
this evening, that the Austrian Government had declined ^ to continue

1 While printed here as received on July 31, the discussion is, especially in the
second paragraph, of events and proposals of July 29 and 30.

2 See, however, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29. Cf. also Austro-
Hungari'an Red Book No. 51, July 31.

July 31, British Blue Book No, 107 361

the direct exchange of views with the Russian Government. But he
had reason t6 beheve that Germany was now ^ disposed to give more
concihatory advice to Austria, as she seemed convinced that we should
act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid issue with
us.

He said he was telegraphing to the Italian Ambassador at Berlin to
ask the German Government to suggest that the idea of an exchange
of views between the four Powers should be resumed in any form which
Austria would consider acceptable. It seemed to him that Germany
might invite Austria to state exactly the terms which she would
demand from Servia, and give a guarantee that she would neither
deprive her of independence nor annex territory. It would be useless
to ask for anything less than was contained in the Austrian ultimatum,
and Germany would support no proposal that might imply non-
success for Austria. We might, on the other hand, ascertain from
Russia what she would accept, and, once we knew the standpoints
of these two countries, discussions could be commenced at once.
There was still time so long as Austria had received no check. He in
any case was in favour of continuing an exchange of views with His
Majesty's Government if the idea of discussions between the four
Powers was impossible.

From Berlin

British Blue Book No. 107 ^

Sir. E. GoscJien, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. —
{Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 30, 1914.

I DO not know whether you have received a reply from the German
Government to the communication^ which you made to them through
the German Ambassador in London asking whether they could suggest
any method by which the four Powers could use their mediating
influence between Russia and Austria. I was informed last night ^
that they had not had time to send an answer yet. To-day, in reply
to an enquiry from the French Ambassador ^ as to whether the Im-
perial Government had proposed any course of action, the Secretary
of State said that he had felt that time would be saved by com-
municating with Vienna direct, and that he had asked the Austro-
Hungarian Government what would satisfy them. No answer had,
however, yet been returned.^

The Chancellor told me last night that he was "pressing the
button" as hard as he could, and that he was not sure whether he

J This "now" is significant. Cf. British Blue Book No. 80, July 29.

2 See note 1 to previous despatch.

3 See British Blue Book No. 84, July 29.
* I.e. July 29.

6 French Yellow Book Na. 109, July 30.

^ For the answer that was returned, see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 51, July 31.

362 Official Diplomatic Documents

has not gone so far in urging moderation at Vienna that matters had
been precipitated rather than otherwise.

From Berlin

British Blue Book No. 108

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. —
{Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 31, 1914.

Chancellor informs me that his efforts to preach peace and
moderation at Vienna have been seriously handicapped by the Russian
mobilisation against Austria. He has done everything possible to
attain his object at Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was alto-
gether palatable at the Ballplatz. He could not, however, leave his
country defenceless while time was being utilised by other Powders;
and if, as he learns is the case, military measures are now being taken
by Russia against Germany also, it w^ould be impossible to him to
remain quiet. He wished to tell me that it was quite possible that
in a very short time, to-day perhaps, the German Government would
take some very serious step; he was, in fact, just on the point of
going to have an audience with the Emperor.

His Excellency added that the news of the active preparations on
the Russo-German frontier had reached him just when the Czar
had appealed to the Emperor, in the name of their old friendship, to
mediate at Vienna, and when the Emperor was actually conforming
to that request.

From Berlin

British Blue Book No. 109

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. —
{Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 31, 1914.

I READ to the Chancellor this morning your answer to his appeal
for British neutrality in the event of war, as contained in your tele-
gram of yesterday.^ His Excellency was so taken up with the news
of the Russian measures along the frontier, referred to in my im-
mediately preceding telegram, that he received your communication
without comment. He asked me to let him have the message that
I had just read to him as a memorandum, as he would like to reflect
upon it before giving an answer, and his mind w^as so full of grave
matters that he could not be certain of remembering all its points.
I therefore handed to him the text of your message on the under-
standing that it should be regarded merely as a record of conversa-
tion, and not as an official document.^

His Excellency agreed.

1 British Blue Book No. 101, July 30.

' From this it would appear that Great Britain at this time did not wish to bind
herself by "an oflSicial document."

July 31, British Blue Book No. Ill 363

To St. Petersburgh

British Blue Book No. 110

Sir Edtvard Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Peters-
burgh.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914-

I LEARN from the German Ambassador that, as a result of sug-
gestions by the German Government, a conversation has taken
place at Vienna between the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs
and the Russian Ambassador. The Austrian Ambassador at St.
Petersburgh has also been instructed that he may converse with the
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that he should give explana-
tions about the Austrian ultimatum to Servia,^ and discuss suggestions
and any questions directly affecting Austro-Russian relations. If the
Russian Government object to the Austrians mobilising eight army
corps, it might be pointed out that this is not too great a number
against 400,000 Servians.

The German Ambassador asked me to urge the Russian Govern-
ment to show goodwill' in the discussions and to suspend their military
preparations.

It is with great satisfaction that I have learnt that discussions are
being resumed between Austria and Russia, and you should express
this to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and tell him that I earnestly
hope he will encourage them.

I informed the German Ambassador that, as regards military prep-
arations, I did not see how Russia Could be urged to suspend ^ them
unless some limit were put by Austria to the advance of her troops
into Servia.

To Berlin
British Blue Book No. Ill
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 191 4.

I HOPE that the conversations which are now proceeding between
Austria and Russia may lead to a satisfactory result. The stumbling-
block hitherto has been Austrian mistrust of Servian assurances,
and Russian mistrust of Austrian intentions with regard to the in-
dependence and integrity of Servia. It has occurred to me that, in
the event of this mistrust preventing a solution being found by Vienna
and St. Petersburgh, Germany might sound Vienna, and I would
undertake to sound St. Petersburgh, whether it would be possible
for the four disinterested Powers to offer to Austria that they would
undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands

1 Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 51, July 31. . ,, -r. • • i. -o,

2 But Russia had herself offered to "stop all military operations. Bntish Blue
Book No. 97, July 30. Cf. also note 2, French Yellow Book No. 113, July 31.

364 Official Diplomatic Documents

on Servia, provided that they did not impair Servian sovereignty
and the integrity of Servian territory. As your Excellency is aware,
Austria has already declared her willingness to respect them. Russia
might be informed by the four Powers that they would undertake
to prevent Austrian demands going the length of impairing Servian
sovereignty and integrity. All Powers would of course suspend
further military operations or preparations.

You may sound the Secretary of State about this proposal.

I said to German Ambassador this morning that if Germany could
get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that
Germany and Austria' were striving to preserve European peace,
and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected
it, I would support it at St. Petersburgh and Paris, and go the length
of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it His Majesty's
Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences,^
but, otherwise, I told German Ambassador that if France became
involved we should be drawn in.^

You can add this when sounding Chancellor or Secretary of State
as to proposal above.

From Berlin

British Blue Book No. 112

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. —
{Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.) • Berlin, July 31, 1914.

According to information ^ just received by German Govern-
ment from their Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, whole Russian
army and fleet are being mobilised. Chancellor tells me that
" Kriegsgef ahr " * will be proclaimed at once by German Government,
as it can only be against Germany that Russian general mobilisation
is directed. Mobilisation would follow almost immediately. His
Excellency added in explanation that "Kriegsgefahr'' ^ signified the
taking of certain precautionary measures consequent upon strained
relations with a foreign country.

This news from St. Petersburgh, added his Excellency, seemed to
him to put an end to all hope of a peaceful solution of the crisis.
Germany must certainly prepare for all emergencies.

1 This is an eminently fair statement. Unfortunately it did not take into account
Russia's mobilisation. From the discussion of Sazonof's formula, moreover (cf.
British Blue Book No. 97, July 30, and No. 120, July 31 printed under date of August 1),
it appears that Sir E. Grey himself induced Sazonof to withdraw his offer to "stop all
military operations." The reason for this action is not explained in any of the pub-
lished despatches.

2 This declaration of Sir E. Grey was made before the Belgian question was seriously
raised. The defenders of Germany have always claimed that the invasion of Belgium
became necessary, because Great Britain had decided to join France at all hazards-
and that the risks of a French-English attack through Belgium were too great for
Germany to run.

2 See note to French Yellow Book No. 117, July 31.
* "Imminence of War."

July 31, British Blue Book No. II4 365

I asked him whether he could not still put pressure on the
authorities at Vienna to do something in general interests to reassure
Russia and to show themselves disposed to continue discussions on a
friendly basis. He replied that last night he had begged Austria
to reply to your last proposal/ and that he had received a reply to
the effect that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs would take wishes
of the Emperor this morning in the matter.

From St. Petershurgh

British Blue Book No. 113

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petershurgh, to Sir Edivard
Grey. — (Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.) St. Petershurgh, July 31, 1914.

It has been decided to issue orders for general mobilisation.^
This decision was taken in consequence of report received from
E-Ussian Ambassador in Vienna to the effect that Austria is deter-
mined not to yield to intervention of Powers, and that she is moving
troops against Russia as well as against Servia.

Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active
military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start.^

To Paris

British Blue Book No. 114

Sir Edivard Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, and
Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador 'at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

I STILL trust that situation is not irretrievable, but in view^ of pros-
pect of mobilisation in Germany it becomes essential to His Majesty's
Government, in view of existing treaties, to ask whether French (Ger-
man) Government are prepared to engage to respect neutrality of
Belgium so long as no other Power violates it.^

A similar request is being addressed to German (French) Govern-
ment. It is important to have an early answer.

1 This proposal was accepted by Austria-Hungary ; see Austro-Hungarian Red
Book No. 51, July 31.

2 If this despatch is correctly dated from St. Petershurgh, July 31, the British Am-
bassador sent this information rather late. See note to French Yellow Book No. 117,
July 31.

3 Considering that the Czar telegraphed on July 30 (German White Book, Exhibit
23a) that " military measures now taking form were decided upon five days ago," this
is a strange remark.

* If the quintuple treaty of 1839 was in force (see Sir E. Grey's phrase "existing
treaties"), the qualification "so long as no other Power violates it" was contrary to
the treaty, for in that case the remaining Powers were bound to make joint cause
against the invader. Germany has claimed that she could riot rely on Great Britain's
defence of Belgium if France should have invaded it. See A. K. Fuehr, The Neu-
trality of Belgium, Funk & Wagnalls Co.

366 Official Diplomatic Documents

To Brussels
British Blue Book No. 115
Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels.
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914,

In view of existing treaties, you should inform Minister for Foreign
Affairs that, in consideration of the possibility of a European war, I
have asked French and German Governments whether each is pre-
pared to respect the neutrality of Belgium provided it is violated by
no other Power.

You should say that I assume that the Belgian Government will
maintain to the utmost of their power their neutrality, which I desire
and expect other Powers to uphold and observe.

You should inform the Belgian Government that an early reply is
desired.

To Paris

British Blue Book No. 116

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

I HAVE received your telegram of yesterday's date.^

Nobody here feels that in this dispute, so far as it has yet gone,
British treaties or obligations are involved. Feeling is quite different
from what it was during the INIorocco question. That crisis involved
a dispute directly involving France, whereas in this case France is
being drawn into a dispute which is not hers.

I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a decisive
factor in situation . German Government do not expect our neutrality.^

We cannot undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a war.
I have so told the French Ambassador, who has urged His Majesty's
Government to reconsider this decision.^

I have told him that we should not be justified in giving any pledge
at the present moment, but that we will certainly consider the situ-
ation again directly there is a new development.

From Paris

British Blue Book No. 117

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. —
{Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 31, 1914.

At 7 o'clock this evening I was sent for by Minister for Foreign
Affairs. When I arrived the German Ambassador was leaving his
Excellency.

1 British Blue Book No. 99, July 30.

2 This was probably quite true on July 31, but it had not been so up to July 29,
see British Blue Book No. 80, July 29, and ih. No. 106, July 30, listed under date of
July 31. See also French Yellow Book No. 92, July 29, last paragraph.

» French Yellow Book No. 110, July 31.

July 31, British Blue Book No. 118 367

German Ambassador had informed his Excellency that, in view of
the fact that orders had been given for the total mobilisation of
Russian army and fleet, German Government have in an ultimatum
which they have addressed to the Russian Government required that
Russian forces should be demobilised.

The German Government will consider it necessary to order the
total mobilisation of the German army on the Russian and French
frontiers if within twelve hours the Russian Government do not give
an undertaking to comply with German demand.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs asks me to communicate this to
you, and enquires what, in these circumstances, will be the attitude of
England.

German Ambassador could not say when the twelve hours termi-
nate. He is going to call at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to-
morrow (Saturday) at 1 p.m. in order to receive the French Govern-
ment's answer as to the attitude they will adopt in the circumstances.

He intimated the possibility of his requiring his passports.

I am informed by the Russian Ambassador ^ that he is not aware of
any general mobilisation of the Russian forces having taken place.

From Vienna •

British Blue Book No. 118

8ir M. de Sunken, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward
Grey. — (Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 31, 1914.

I AM informed by Count Forgach, Under-Secretary of State, that
although Austria was compelled to respond to Russian mobilisation,
which he deplored, the Austrian Ambassador in London has received
instructions to inform you that mobilisation was not to be regarded
as a necessarily hostile act on either side. Telegrams were being
exchanged between the Emperor of Russia and the German Emperor,
and conversations were proceeding between Austrian Ambassador at
St. Petersburgh and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. A general
war might, he seriously hoped, be staved off by these efforts. On my
expressing my fear that Germany would mobilise, he said that Ger-
many must do something, in his opinion, to secure her position. ^ As
regards Russian intervention on behalf of Servia, Austria-Hungary
found it difficult to recognise such a claim. I called his attention to
the fact that during the discussion of the Albanian frontier at the
London Conference of Ambassadors the Russian Government had
stood behind Servia, and that a compromise between the views of
Russia and Austria-Hungary resulted with accepted frontier line.

1 This is very strange ; cf. the Czar's telegram of July 30, German White Book,
Exhibit 23a, and note to French Yellow Book No. 117, July 31.

2 The statement is important in view of the charge that has been made that Ger-
many forced the war by duping Austria-Hungary when the latter was on the point
of settling her differences with Russia.

368 Official Diplomatic Documents

Although he spoke in a conciHatory tone, and did not regard the situ-
ation as desperate, I could not get from him any suggestion for a
similar compromise in the present case. Count Forgach is going this
afternoon to see the Russian Ambassador, whom I have informed of
the above conversation.

The Russian Ambassador has explained that Russia has no desire
to interfere unduly with Servia; that, as compared with the late
Russian Minister,^ the present Minister at Belgrade is a man of
very moderate views ; and that, as regards Austrian demands, Russia
had counselled Servia to yield to them as far as she possibly could
without sacrificing her independence. His Excellency is exerting
himself strongly in the interests of peace.

From Paris
British Blue Book No. 119
Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.
Sir, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914-

M. Cambon ^ referred to-day to a telegram ^ that had been shown
to Sir Arthur Nicolson ^ this morning from the French Ambassador in
Berlin, saying that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether
we would intervene which was the encouraging element in Berlin,
and that, if we would only declare definitely on the side of Rus-
sia and France, it would decide the German attitude in favour of
peace.

I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany
under the impression that we would not intervene. I had refused
overtures ^ to promise that we should remain neutral. I had not
only definitely declined to say that w^e would remain neutral, I had
even gone so far this morning as to say to the German Ambassador
that, if France and Germany became involved in war, we should be
drawn into it.^ That, of course, was not the same thing as taking an
engagement to France, and I told M. Cambon of it only to show that
we had not left Germany under the impression that we would stand
aside.

M. Cambon then asked me for my reply to what he had said yester-
dsLyJ

1 said that we had come to the conclusion, in the Cabinet ^ to-day,
that we could not give any pledge at the present time. Though we

^ Mr. von Hartwig, whose very sudden death after the Serajevo murder has not
yet been explained.

2 French Ambassador in London.

3 Cf. the last paragraph, French Yellow Book No. 92, July 29.
* British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

6 See British Blue Book No. 85, July 29.
« British Blue Book No. Ill, July 31.

7 Cf. British Blue Book No. 105, July 30.

8 This was the first time the British Cabinet voted against joining France ; see also
French Yellow Book No. 110, July 31. On the next day, August 1, the Cabinet re-
fused for the second time to declare British solidarity with France. See French Yellow
Book No. 126, August 1.

July Sly Russian Orange Book No. 66 369

should have to put our policy before Parliament, we could not pledge
Parliament in advance. Up to the present moment, we did not feel,
and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or obligations
of this country were involved. Further developments might alter
this situation and cause the Government and Parliament to take the
view that intervention was justified. The preservation of the
neutrality of Belgium ^ might be, I would not say a decisive,^ but
an important factor, in determining our attitude. Whether we
proposed to Parliament to intervene or not to intervene in a war.
Parliament would wish to know how we stood with regard to the
neutrality of Belgium, and it might be that I should ask both
France and Germany whether each was prepared to undertake an
engagement that she would not be the first to violate the neutrality
of Belgium.

M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France
if Germany made an attack on her.

I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things
had gone at present, we could not take any engagement.

M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning rejected
proposals that might have made for peace.^ It could not be to Eng-
land's interest that France should be crushed by Germany. We
should then be in a very diminished position with regard to Germany.
In 1870 we had made a great mistake in allowing an enormous in-
crease of German strength, and we should now be repeating the mis-
take. He asked me whether I could not submit his question to the
Cabinet again.

Russia :

From Vienna

^ Russian Orange Book No. 66

Russian Ambassador at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
(Telegram.) Vienna, July 18 {SI), 191^.

In spite of the general mobilisation,^ my exchange of views with
Count Berchtold and his colleagues continues. They all dwell
upon the absence on Austria's part of any hostile intentions whatso-
ever against Russia, and of any designs of conquest at the expense of
Servia, but they are all equally insistent that Austria is bound to
carry through the action which she has begun and to give Servia a
serious lesson, which would constitute a sure guarantee for the
future.

1 This is not mentioned in Cambon's report of Sir E. Grey's remarks in French
YeUow Book No. 110, July 31.

2 This statement is important.

3 There is no statement here that Sir E. Grey corrected this misconception on the
part of the French Ambassador.

4 This may refer to the Russian mobilisation or to the counter measure of the
Austro-Hungarian mobilisation.

370 Official Diplomatic Documents

From St. Petersburgh

Russian Orange Book No. 67

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at
Rerlin, Vienna, Paris, London, and Rome.

(Telegram.) St. Petersburgh, July 18 {31), 1914.

Please refer to my telegram of 17 (30) July.^ The British Am-
bassador, on the instructions of his Government, has informed me
of the wish of the London Cabinet to make certain modifications ^
in the formula which I suggested yesterday to the German Am-
bassador. I replied that I accepted the British suggestion. I
accordingly send you the text of the modified formula which is as
follows : —

(Translation.)

"Si I'Autriche consent a ar- "If Austria consents to stay
reter la marche de ses armees the march of her troops on
sur le territoire serbe et si, Servian territory ; and if, recog-
reconnaissant que le conflit nising that the Austro-Servian
austro-serbe a assume le carac- conflict has assumed the character
tere d'une question d'interet of a question of European inter-
europeen, elle admet que les est, she admits that the Great
Grandes Puissances examinent Powers may examine the satisfac-
la satisfaction que la Serbie tion which Servia can accord to
pourrait accorder au Gouverne- the Austro-Hungarian Govern-
ment d'Autriche-Hongrie sans ment without injury to her rights
laisser porter atteinte a ses droits as a sovereign State or her inde-
d'Etat souverain et a son inde- pendence, Russia undertakes to
pendance, — la Russie s'engage a maintain her w^aiting attitude."
conserver son attitude expec-
tante."

From Berlin

Russian Orange Book No. 68

Russian Ambassador at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) Berlin, July 18 {31), 1914.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has just told me that our discus-
sions, which were already difficult enough on account of the mobilisa-
tion against Austria, were becoming even more so in view of the serious
military measures that we were taking against Germany. He said
that information on this subject was reaching Berlin from all sides,
and this must inevitably provoke similar measures on the part of
Germany. To this I replied that, according to sure information in my
possession, which was confirmed by all our compatriots arriving from

1 Russian Orange Book No. 60, July 30.

2 The reasons for the British wish to have the original formula modified are no-
where given. Cf. note to French Yellow Book No. 113, July 31, also British Blue
Book No. 110, July 31.

July 31, Russian Orange Book No. 69 371

Berlin, Germany also was very actively engaged in taking military
measures against Russia. In spite of this, the Minister for Foreign
Affairs asserts ^ that the only step taken in Germany has been the
recall of oflBcers from leave and of the troops from manoeuvres.

To London

Russian Orange Book No. 69

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at London,

(Telegram.) St. Petershurgh, July 18 {31), 1914.

I HAVE requested the British Ambassador to express to Grey my
deep gratitude for the firm and friendly tone which he has adopted
in the discussions with Germany and Austria, thanks to which the
hope of finding a peaceful issue ^ to the present situation need not yet
be abandoned.

1 For the truth of this assertion see chapters on mobilisation in M. P. Price, The
Diplomatic History of the War, Charles Scribner's Sons.

2 Cf . note 1 British Blue Book No. 119, July 31. Sir E. Grey had at last practically
done what Sazonof had wished him to do as early as July 24 ; see British Blue Book
No. 6, July 24.

372

Official Diplomatic Documents

Saturday, August 1, 1914
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

Foreign Office of

Sent Despatches to

Received
Despatches from

Austria-Hungary

Petrograd

Belgium

Berlin, Paris and London
London etc.

London, Berlin

France

London etc.

Berlin, Rome

London, Berlin, Brussels etc.

London, Luxemburg

Germany

Petrograd |

Paris

Great Britain

Berlin, Petrograd, Vienna

Petrograd, Berlin, Paris,
Vienna, Brussels, Lux-
emburg

Russia

All representatives

London, Paris

Serbia

Austria-Hungary explains her willingness to continue direct conversations with
Russia, at the same time expressing her deep concern at the Russian general
mobilisation which forces her to decree her own general mobilisation.

Belgium receives the official assurance that France will respect the neutrality of
Belgium, but "in the event of this neutrality not being respected by another Power,
the French Government, to secure their own defence, might find it necessary to
modify their attitude." The German "reply is awaited." Belgium instructs her
representatives abroad to notify the Powers of her mobilisation in notes prepared
and sent out, undated, on July 24. She commits hostile acts against Germany
according to the latter's declaration, a ^act which Belgium later categorically
denies.

France orders general mobiHsation, and in despatches to London endeavors to
blame Germany for the coming war. She again solicits the armed intervention
of Great Britain, and promises to respect Belgian and Luxemburg neutrality, with
a proviso. Her assurances to Belgium contain no reference to an existing
treaty, and are in wording contrary to the assumption of the existence of a treaty.
Her reply to Germany is "that France would do that which her interests
dictated."

Germany continues the exchange of royal and imperial telegrams. Russia not
having replied to the German ultimatum requesting her to demobilise, Germany
declares war on Russia. To the British enquiry whether she would respect
Belgian neutrality her Secretary of Foreign Affairs replies that probably no answer
would be returned, because by answering they "could not but disclose a certain
amount of their plan of campaign"; moreover, Belgium had already committed
"certain hostile acts." She orders general mobilisation, to take effect the next
day, August 2.

Great Britain ; the Cabinet for the second time refuses to commit itself in favor of
France. Sir E. Grey, however, repeats his personal promises to France, at the
same time refusing the German request that he formulate conditions under which
Great Britain would remain neutral. No despatches concerning the mobilisation
of the British army are published on this or any other day.

Russia refuses to reply to the German ultimatum and does not demobilise.

Serbia is silent on this day.

Augmt 1, Belgian Gray Book No. 13 373

Austria-Hungary :

From St. Petersburgh

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 56^

Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, August 1, 1914*

I VISITED ]\I. Sazonof to-day, and told him that I had received
instructions/ but that I must premise that I was entirely ignorant of
the present condition of affairs created in Vienna, by the general
Russian mobilisation, and that in interpreting the instructions which
I had received previously, I must leave this condition out of account.
I said that the two instructions of Your Excellency dealt with the
misunderstanding that we had declined further negotiations with
Russia. This was a mistake, as I had already, without instructions,
assured him.^ Your Excellency was not only quite prepared to deal
with Russia on the broadest basis possible, but was also especially
inclined to subject the text of our note to a discussion so far as its
interpretation was concerned.

I emphasised how much the instructions of Your Excellency af-
forded me a further proof of goodwill, although I had to remind him
that the situation created since then by the general mobilisation was
unknown to me ; but I could only hope that the course of events had
not already taken us too far ; in any case, I regarded it as my duty
in the present moment of extreme anxiety to prove once again the
goodwill of the Imperial and Royal Goverr^ment. M. Sazonof replied
that he took note with satisfaction of this proof of goodwill, but he
desired to draw my attention to the fact that negotiations at St. Peters-
burgh for obvious reasons appeared to promise less prospect of success
than negotiations on the neutral terrain of London.^ I replied that
Your Excellency, as I had already observed, started from the point
of view that direct contact should be maintained at St. Petersburgh,
so that I was not in a position to commit myself with regard to his
suggestion as to London, but I would communicate on the subject
with your Excellency.

Belgium:

From London

Belgian Gray Book No. 13

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, toM. Davignon, Belgian

Minister for Foreign Affairs.
(Telegram.) London, August 1, 1914.

Great Britain has asked France and Germany separately^ if
they intend to respect Belgian territory in the event of its not being

* Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 51, July 31.

2 Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 55, July 31. /tax

3 If Sazonof is correctly quoted, and this would seem to be the case (cf . Austro-
Hungarian Red Book No. 51, July 31, third paragraph), it appears that Russia had
changed her attitude, and was not now desirous of direct conversations. See Russian
Orange Book No. 69, July 31. * British Blue Book No. 114, July 31.

374 Official Diplomatic Documents

violated by their adversary. Germany's reply is awaited. France
has replied in the affirmative.^

From Berlin

Belgian Gray Book No. 14

Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Damgnon, Minister
for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) Berlin, August 1, 1914.

The British Ambassador has been instructed to inquire of the
Minister for Foreign Affairs whether, in the event of war, Germany
would respect Belgian neutrality, and I understand that the Minister
replied that he was unable to answer the question.^

To Berlin, Paris, and London

Belgian Gray Book No. 15 '

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian
Ministers at Berlin, Paris, and London,

Sir, Brussels, August 1, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the French Minister has
made the following verbal communication to me : —

(Translation.)

"Je suis autorise a declarer "I am authorised to declare
qu'en cas de conflit international, that, in the event of an inter-
le Gouvernement de la Repu- national war, the French Govern-
blique, ainsi qu'il I'a toujours ment, in accordance with the
declare, respectera la neutralite declarations they have always
de la Belgique. Dans Thypo- made, will respect the neutrality
these oil cette neutralite ne serait of Belgium. In the event of
pas respectee par une autre this neutrality not being re-
Puissance, le Gouvernement spected by another Power, the
fran^ais, pour assurer sa propre French Government, to secure
defense, pourrait etre amene a their own defence, might find
modifier son attitude." it necessary to modify their

attitude.

" 4

^ See below, No. 15, same day.

2 Cf . British Blue Book No. 122, July 31, printed under date of August 1, and
French Yellow Book No. 123, August 1, giving Germany's reason for not answering.

' This despatch should precede No. 13, same day, where it is referred to.

< See British Blue Book No. 114, July 31, note 1, and mark the wording of the French
announcement, which proceeds from the principle that France is released from any
obligation to respect the neutrality of Belgium "in the event of this neutrality not
being respected by another Power." Belgium was a buffer state between the bel-
ligerents. Small infractions of her neutrality could not have been avoided by either
side. The principle, therefore, that any infraction by one side would release the other
side from all obligations, and that the other side was, of course, the sole judge of what
constituted an infraction, is the chief reason why Belgium was invaded, for if it had
not been for this principle no " military necessity " would have existed for either side to
contemplate even the invasion of Belgium. It was the principle accepted by Great
Britain (see British Blue Book No. 114, July 31) and by France, and as events proved
also by Germany. Contrast this declaration with French Yellow Book No. 122,
same day.

August 1, French Yellow Book No, 120 375

I thanked his Excellency and added that we on our side had taken
without delay all the measures necessary to ensure that our inde-
pendence and our frontiers should be respected.

To Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh
Belgian Gray Book No. 16

M.Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Ministers
at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 1, 1914.

Carry out instructions ^ contained in my despatch of the 25th July.

To Rome, The Hague, Luxemburg

Belgian Gray Book No. 17

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Ministers
at Rome, The Hague, Luxemburg.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 1, 1914.

Carry out instructions ^ contained in my despatch of the 25th July.

France :

To London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome

French Yellow Book No. 120

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin,
Vienna, Rome.

Paris, August 1, 1914-

Two demarches were made yesterday evening by the Austrian
Ambassadors — the one at Paris,^ which was rather vague, the other
at St. Petersburgh/ precise and conciliatory.

Count Szecsen came to explain to me that the Austro-Hungarian
Government had officially informed Russia that it had no territorial
ambition, and would not touch the sovereignty of Servia ; that it also
repudiates any intention of occupying the Sandjak; but that these
explanations of disinterestedness only retain their force if the war
remains localised to Austria and Servia, as a European war would
open out eventualities which it was impossible to foresee. The
Austrian Ambassador, in commenting on these explanations, gave me
to understand that if his Government could not answer the questions

1 Belgian Gray Book No. 2, July 24, and note.

2 See note to previous despatch and Belgian Gray Book No. 3, July 24.

3 Not mentioned in Austro-Hungarian Red Book. See British Blue Book No. 137,
same day.

* See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 55, July 31, and Austro-Hungarian Red
Book No. 56, August 1.

376 Official Diplomatic Documents

of the Powers speaking in their own name, they would certainly
answer Servia, or any single Power asking for these conditions in the
name of Servia. He added that a step in this direction was perhaps
still possible.

At St. Petersburgh the Austrian Ambassador called on M. Sazonof
and explained to him that his Government was willing to begin a
discussion as to the basis of the ultimatum addressed to Servia.^
The Russian Minister declared himself satisfied with this declaration,
and proposed that the pourparlers should take place in London with
the participation of the Powers. M. Sazonof will have requested the
British Government to take the lead in the discussion; he pointed
out that it would be very important that Austria should stop her
operations in Servia.

The deduction from these facts is that Austria would at last show
herself ready to come to an agreement, just as the Russian Govern-
ment is ready ^ to enter into negotiations on the basis of the British
proposal.

Unfortunately these arrangements which allowed one to hope for
a peaceful solution appear, in fact, to have been rendered useless by
the attitude of Germany.^ This Power has in fact presented an ul-
timatum giving the Russian Government twelve hours in which to
agree to the demobilisation of their forces not only as against Germany,
but also as against Austria ; this time-limit expires at noon. The
ultimatum is not justified, for Russia has accepted the British pro-
posal which implies a cessation of military preparation by all the
Powers,

The attitude of Germany proves that she wishes for war. And she
wishes for it against France.^ Yesterday ^ when Herr von Schoen
came to the Quai d'Orsay to ask what attitude France proposed to
take in case of a Russo-German conflict, the German Ambassador,
although there has been no direct dispute ^ between France and
Germany, and although from the beginning of the crisis we have used
all our efforts for a peaceful solution ^ and are still continuing to do so,
added that he asked me to present his respects and thanks to the Presi-
dent of the Republic, and asked that we would be good enough to
make arrangements as to him personally (des dispositions pour sa

1 Viviani calls this an interview "yesterday evening," i.e. July 31. In the Austro-
Hungarian Red Book No. 56, it appears as an interview of "to-day," August 1.

2 This is a vague description of the Russian attitude. Cf. note 3 to Austro-Hun-
garian Red Book No. 56, August 1.

' Viviani blames Germany for her ultimatum. Germany claimed her ultimatum
had been forced by Russia's mobilisation (British Blue Book No. 121, August 1) which
Viviani does not deny as having taken place. If the student, therefore, agrees with
Viviani that Germany's ultimatum spoiled the prospects of a peaceful solution, the
further question arises "Was Germany's ultimatum forced by Russia's mobilisation?"
In the next sentence Viviani states that the ultimatum was not justified. This is the
crux of the whole matter. For Germany's attitude see German White Book, pp. 555 fF.

* Another evidence of the unfortunate suspicion of the French Government.

57 P.M., July 31, see German White Book, p. 560. ^

6 Viviani overlooks that France had promised her support to Russia, cf . French
Yellow Book No. 101, July 30 : British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, French Yellow Book
No. 74, paragraph 4, where Cambon says that the "relations of Germany with Vienna
were no closer than those of France with Russia." , r, ■.

7 For a fuller discussion of the French attitude, see E. von Mach, Germany s Point
of View, pp. 216 ff.

. August 1, French Yellow Book No. 121 377

'propre personne) ; we know also that he has already put the archives
of the Embassy in safety. This attitude of breaking off diplomatic
relations without any direct dispute, and although he has not received
any definitely negative answer, is characteristic of the determination
of Germany to make war against France. The want of sincerity in her
peaceful protestations is shown by the rupture which she is forcing
upon Europe at a time when Austria had at last agreed ^ with Russia
to begin negotiations.

Rene Viviani.

From Berlin

French Yellow Book No. 121

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

My Russian colleague received yesterday evening two telegrams ^
from M. Sazonof advising him that the Austrian Ambassador at
St. Petersburgh had explained ^ that his Government was ready to
discuss the note to Servia with the Russian Government even as
to its basis; M. Sazonof answered that in his opinion these con-
versations should take place in London.

The ultimatum to Russia ^ can only do away with the last chances
of peace which these conversations still seemed to leave. The ques-
tion may be asked whether in such circumstances the acceptance by
Austria was serious, and had not the object of throwing the responsi-
bility of the conflict on to Russia.

My British colleague during the night made a pressing appeal ^ to
Herr von Jagow's feelings of humanity. The latter answered that
the matter had gone too far and that they must wait for the Russian
answer to the German ultimatum. But he told Sir Edward Goschen
that the ultimatum required that the Russians should countermand
their mobilisation, not only as against Germany but also as against
Austria; my British colleague was much astonished at this, and
said that it did not seem possible for Russia to accept this last point.^
. Germany's ultimatum coming at the very moment when an agree-
ment seemed about to be established between Vienna and St. Peters-
burgh, is characteristic of her warlike policy.

In truth the conflict was between Russia and Austria only, and
Germany could only intervene as an ally of Austria; in these cir-
cumstances, as the two Powers which were interested as principals

1 This agreement had been due to Germany's pressure ; see despatches of previous
days. See especially German White Book, Exhibit 14, July 28.

2 Not given in Russian Orange Book.

3 Austro- Hungarian Red Book No. 56, August 1.

* Sent by Germany and presented at midnight, July 31-Aug. 1 ; see German "White
Book, p. 559. See note 5 to previous despatch.

5 British Blue Book No. 121 under date of August 1.

6 This is different from Sir E. Goschen's own report, see British Blue Book No. 121,

378 Official Diplomatic Documents

were prepared for conversations, it is impossible to understand ^ why
Germany should send an ultimatum to Russia instead of continuing
like all the other Powers to work for a peaceful solution, unless she
desired war on her own account.

J. Cambon.

To London, Berlin, and Brussels

French Yellow Book No. 122

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to the French Ambassadors at London, Berlin, and to the French
Minister at Brussels.

Paris, August 1, 1914-

The British Ambassador, under the instructions of his Govern-
ment, came to ask me what would be the attitude of the French
Government as regards Belgium in case of conflict with Germany.

I stated that, in accordance with the assurance which we had re-
peatedly given the Belgian Government, we intended to respect
their neutrality.

It would only be in the event of some other Power violating that
neutrality that France might find herself brought to enter Belgian
territory, with the object of fulfilling her obligations as a guaranteeing
Power.^

Rene Viviani.

From Berlin

French Yellow Book No. 123

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, August 1, 1914-

The British Ambassador has been instructed ^ by his Government
to make to the German Government a communication identical with
that which he made to you on the subject of the neutrality of
Belgium.

Herr von Jagow answered that he would take the instructions of
the Emperor and the Chancellor, but that he did not think an answer
could be given, for Germany could not disclose her military plans
in this way. The British Ambassador will see Herr von Jagow to-
morrow afternoon.^

J. Cambon.

1 A comparison of this view with that presented in the German White Book, pp. 557 ff.
shows how very far apart the governments of France and Germany found themselves.

2 Contrast the official French declaration which contains nothing about obliga-
tions. Belgian Gray Book No. 15, August 1.

' Cf. British Blue Book No. 122, French Yellow Book No. 123, both of August 1.

* The part of the interview with Sir E. Goschen printed British Blue Book No. 123,
in which Germany claims that Belgium has already committed "certain hostile
acts" against Germany, has been omitted here.

August 1, French Yellow Book No. 125 379

From Rome

French Yellow Book No. 124

M. Barrere, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Rene Viviani, President
of the Council y Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, August 1, 1914.

I WENT to see the Marquis di San Giuliano this morning at half-
past eight, in order to get precise information from him as to the
attitude of Italy in view of the provocative acts of Germany and the
results which they may have.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs answered that he had seen the
German Ambassador yesterday evening. Herr von Flotow had
said to him that Germany had requested the Russian. Government
to suspend mobilisation, and the French Government to inform
them as to their intentions; Germany had given France a time
limit of eighteen hours and Russia a time limit of twelve hours.

Herr von Flotow as a result of this communication asked what
were the intentions of the Italian Government.

The Marquis di San Giuliano answered that as the war under-
taken by Austria was aggressive and did not fall within the purely
defensive character of the Triple Alliance, particularly in view of the
consequences which might result from it according to the declaration
of the German Ambassador, Italy could not take part in the war.

Barrere.

To London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Con-
stantinople

French Yellow Book No. 125

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Af-
fairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh,
Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Constantinople.

Paris, August 1, 1914-

The German Ambassador came to see me again at 11 o'clock
this morning. After having recalled to his memory all the efforts
made by France towards an honourable settlement of the Austro-
Servian conflict and the difficulty between Austria and Russia which
has resulted from it, I put him in possession of the facts as to the
pourparlers which have been carried on since yesterday : —

(1) A British compromise,^ proposing, besides other suggestions,
suspension of military preparations ^ on the part of Russia,
on condition that the other Powers should act in the same
way ; adherence of Russia to this proposal.

1 This seems to refer to Sazonof s altered formula. Cf . Russian Orange Book No.
67, July 31.

2 This is an error, cf . note to Russian Orange Book no. 67.

380 Official Diplomatic Documents

(2) Communications from the Austrian Government ^ declaring that
they did not desire any aggrandisement in Servia, nor even
to advance into the Sandjak, and stating that they were
ready to discuss even the basis of the iVustro-Servian question
at London with the other Powers.

I drew attention to the attitude of Germany who, abandoning
all pourparlers, presented an ultimatum to Russia at the very moment
when this Power had just accepted the British formula ^ (which im-
plies the cessation of military preparations ^ by all ^ the countries
which have been mobilised) and regarded as imminent a diplomatic
rupture with France.

Baron von Schoen answered that he did not know the develop-
ments which had taken place in this matter for the last twenty-four
hours, that there was perhaps in them a "glimmer of hope" for some
arrangement, that he had not received any fresh communication ^
from his Government, and that he was going to get information. He
gave renewed protestations of his sincere desire to unite his efforts
to those of France for arriving at a solution of the conflict. I laid
stress on the serious responsibility which the Imperial Government
would assume if, in circumstances such as these, they took an initia-
tive which was not justified and of a kind which would irremediably
compromise peace.

Baron von Schoen did not allude to his immediate departure and did
not make any fresh request for an answer to his question concerning
the attitude of France in case of an Austro-Russian conflict. He
confined himself to saying of his own accord that the attitude of
France was not doubtful.

It would not do to exaggerate the possibilities which may result
from my conversation with the German Ambassador for, on their
side, the Imperial Government continue the most dangerous prepara-
tions on our frontier. However, we must not neglect the possibilities,
and we should not cease to work towards an agreement. On her
side France is taking all military measures required for protection
against too great an advance in German military preparations.
She considers that her attempts at solution will only have a chance
of success so far as it is felt that she will be ready and resolute if the
conflict is forced on her.

Rene Viviani.

1 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 120, August 1.

2 Viviani fails to mention that Russia had declared full mobilisation.

^ But not demobilisation. The status quo cannot be long maintained when one
country is mobilised and the other is not.

* The British fleet was mobilised. (See French Yellow Book No. 55, July 27.) Sir
E. Grey nowhere offered to demobilise it. Cf. next number.

' Cf . Russian Orange Book No. 74, same day.

August 1, French Yellow Book No. 127 381

From London

French Yellow Book No. 126

M. Paul Cavibon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Paris, ^ August 1, 1914.

Sir Edward Grey said to me that, at a meeting this morning,
the Cabinet had again considered the situation. As Germany had
asked Great Britain to give a declaration of neutrahty and had not
obtained it, the British Government remained masters of their
action ; this could shape itself in accordance with different hypotheses.

In the first place, Belgian neutrality is of great importance to
Great Britain. France has immediately renewed her engagement
to respect it. Germany has explained "that she was not in a posi-
tion to reply.'' Sir Edward Grey will put the Cabinet in possession
of this answer ^ and will ask to be authorised to state on Monday in
the House of Commons, that the British Government will not permit
a violation of Belgian neutrality.

In the second place the British fleet is mobilised,^ and Sir Edward
Grey will propose ^ to his colleagues that he should state that it will
oppose the passage of the Straits of Dover by the German fleet, or,
if the German fleet should pass through (venaient a le passer), will
oppose any demonstration on the French coasts. These two ques-
tions will be dealt with at the meeting on Monday. I drew the
attention of the Secretary of State to the point that, if during this
intervening period any incident took place, it was necessary not to
allow a surprise, and that it would be desirable to think of inter-
vening in time. Paul Cambon.

To London

French Yellow Book No. 127

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.

Paris, August 1, 1914-
We are warned through several channels that the German and the
Austrian Governments are trying at this moment to influence Eng-
land by making her believe that the responsibility for war, if it

1 Probably a mistake for London.

2 This appears as if the German "Belgian" reply had not been discussed at the
Cabinet meeting here described. Contrast Sir E. Grey's account of the Cabinet
meeting of August 1 to the German Ambassador, British Blue Book No. 123, August 1.

3 Since July 24, see French Yellow Book No. 66, July 27.

4 This phrase and the whole tenor of the despatch imply that the Cabinet had for
the second time voted against promising to France British support. For the first
refusal to vote so see French Yellow Book No. 110, July 31, where the Cabinet has
declared itself unable to promise to France "their intervention," and British Blue Book
No. 119, July 31.

Sir E. Grey's promise to "propose" to the Cabinet to be "authorised" to promise
help to France would seem to imply that he had assured the French Ambassador of
his personal wishes in this matter. He gave this assurance, or from the despatches just
cited from the previous date, renewed it on the very day on which he refused Germany's
request to formulate conditions under which Great Britain would remain neutral. In
refusing this request of Germany, he gave as his reason that "we must keep our hands
free." See British Blue Book No. 123, August 1, 1914.

382 Official Diplomatic Documents

breaks out, will fall on Russia.^ Efforts are being made to obtain
the neutrality of England by disguising the truth.^

France has not ceased in co-operation with England to advise mod-
eration at St. Petersburgh ;^ this advice has been listened to.

From the beginning M. Sazonof has exercised pressure on Servia
to make her accept all those clauses of the ultimatum which were
not incompatible with her sovereignty.

He then engaged in a direct conversation with Austria ; this was
fresh evidence of his conciliatory spirit. Finally he has agreed to
allow those Powers which are less interested to seek for means of
composing the dispute.

In accordance with the wish expressed to him by Sir George
Buchanan, M. Sazonof consented to modify ^ the first formula
which he had put forward, and he has drawn up a second which is
shown not to differ materially from the declaration which Count
Szecsen made yesterday to M. de Margerie. Count Szecsen affirms
that Austria has no intention of seeking territorial aggrandisement
and does not wish to touch the sovereignty of Servia. He expressly
adds that Austria has no designs on the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar.

It would then seem that an agreement between Sir Edward Grey's
suggestion, M. Sazonof 's formula and the Austrian declarations could
easily be reconciled.

France is determined, in co-operation with England, to work to the
very end for the realisation of this.

But while these negotiations were going on, and while Russia in
the negotiations showed a goodwill which cannot be disputed, Austria
was the first ^ to proceed to a general mobilisation.

Russia has found herself obliged to imitate Austria, so as not to
be left in an unfavourable position, but all the time she has con-
tinued ready to negotiate.

It is not necessary for me to repeat that, so far as we are concerned,
we will, in co-operation with England, continue to work for the success
of these pourparlers.

But the attitude of Germany has made it absolutely compulsory
for us to make out the order for mobilisation to-day.

Last Wednesday, well in advance of Russian mobilisation, as I

1 Cf. British Blue Book No. 134, same day.

2 Or "elucidating the truth," according to one's reading of all the despatches.

3 Contrast with French Yellow Book No. 80, July 28, where Paul Cambon reports
that Sir E. Grey "would be much embarrassed in making pacific recommendations to the
Russian Government." Also French Yellow Book No. 62, July 27. "The French step "
(Germany had asked France to declare that a solidarity of pacific intentions existed
between her and Germany) "in St. Petersburgh would have been difficult to explain."

* Russian Orange Book No. 67, July 31. Viviani overlooks, first, that the modified
formula was less acceptable, because instead of promising to "stop her military prep-
prations " Russia merely undertook " to maintain her waiting attitude," while Austria-
Hungary in the modified formula had " to stay the march of her troops," which was not
demand d in the first formula, and secondly that the change was not at Austria's biit at
Great Britain's request; that Russia, moreover, followed it up with full mobilisation.

6 This is an error. Russia's general mobilisation took place on the night of July
30, while Austria-Hungary ordered general mobilisation on August 1. For an ex-
haustive discussion of this point and the contradictory evidence see M. P. Price,
The Diplomatic History of the War, Scribner's, the chapters on "Preparations and
Mobilisations." See also British Blue Book No. 113, July 31 for Russian mobilisation,
and British Blue Book, Nos. 127 and 135, August 1, for Austro-Hungarian mobilisation.

August 1, French Yellow Book No. 128 383

have already telegraphed to you, Herr von Sehoen announced to me
the impending publication of Kriegsgefahrzustand. This measure has
been taken ^ by Germany, and under the protection of this screen,
she immediately began a mobilisation in the proper sense of the word.

To-day M. Paleologue telegraphed that Count Pourtales had noti-
fied the Russian Government of German mobilisation. ^

Information which has been received by the Ministry of War
confirms the fact that this mobilisation is really in full execution.^

Our decree of mobilisation is then an essential measure of protec-
tion. The Government have accompanied it by a proclamation
signed by the President of the Republic and by all the Ministers,
in which they explain that mobilisation is not war, and that in the
present state of affairs it is the best means for France of safeguarding
peace, and that the Government of the Republic will redouble their
efforts to bring the negotiations to a conclusion.

Will you be good enough to bring all these points urgently to the
notice of Sir Edward Grey, and to point out to him that we have
throughout been governed by the determination not to commit any
act of provocation.

I am persuaded that in case war were to break out, British opinion
would see clearly from which side aggression comes, and that it
would realise the strong reasons which we have given to Sir Edward
Grey for asking for armed intervention on the part of England in the
interest of the future of the European balance of power.^

Rene Viviani.

From Luxemburg

French Yellow Book No. 128

M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Luxemburg, August 1, 1914-
The Minister of State instructs me to ask from the French Gov-
ernment an assurance of neutrality similar to that which has been
given to Belgium. M. Eyschen has stated that at present, as the
declaration in question was made to the President of the Council of
the Belgian Government by the French Minister at Brussels, he
thought that the same procedure would be most suitable with regard
to the Grand Duchy. ^

1 But not as here implied "last Wednesday," i.e. July 29, but on Friday, i.e. July
31 ; see British Blue Book No. 112, July 31.

2 To begin on August 2, German White Book, p. 559, and British Blue Book No. 142,
August 1, listed under August 2.

3 Seemingly contradicted by British Blue Book No. 142, same day.

* France asks for armed British intervention in the interest of the European balance
of power. Sir E. Grey had personally committed himself to induce the British Cabinet
so to intervene; see notes to previous despatch. This was before German troops
entered Belgium. It was, however, subsequent to Germany's refusal to commit
herself on' the Belgian question ; and no mention of Belgium is made here.

s Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 15, August 1, and note. The assurance contained
no reference to a treaty or an obligation under it. The French Yellow Book despatch,
however. No. 122, Aug. 1, contained such a reference. The wording of the assurance
given to Luxemburg has not been published. The French despatch (see next number)
describing it, however, refers to a treaty.

384 Official Diplomatic Documents

This is the reason why he has abstained from making a request
direct to the Government of the Repubhc. As the Chamber of
Deputies meets on Monday, M. Eyschen wishes to have the answer
by that date; a similar demarche is being made at the same time
with the German Minister at Luxemburg. Mollard.

To Luxemburg

French Yellow Book No. 129

M. Rene Vimani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg.

Paris, August 1, 1914-

Be good enough to state to the President of the Council that in
conformity with the Treaty of London, 1867,^ the Government of
the Republic intends to respect the neutrality of the Grand Duchy
of Luxemburg, as they have shown by their attitude.

The violation of this neutrality by Germany would, however, be
an act of a kind which would compel France from that time to be
guided in this matter by care for her defence and her interests.

Rene Viviani.

From Berlin

French Yellow Book No. 130^

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, August 1, 1914-

Special editions of newspapers are being distributed in the streets
of Berlin announcing that the general mobilisation of the army and
the navy has been decreed and that the first day of the mobilisation
is Sunday, 2nd August. j^^^^^ ^^^^^^

Germany :

To St. Petersburgh

German White Book Exhibit 26

Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in St. Peters-
burgh on August 1st, 12.52 P.M. Urgent.

If the Russian Government gives no satisfactory reply to our
demand. Your Excellency will please transmit this afternoon 5
o'clock (mid-European time) the following statement :

"Le Gouvernement Imperial s'est efforce des les debuts de la
crise de la mener a une solution pacifique. Se rendant a un desir que

^ See note to previous despatch.

2 This despatch should precede No. 127, in which the information it contains is
discussed. In that case, however. No. 127 would hardly have been able to contain
the "information" that the German mobilisation was "really in full execution" on
August 1. Either Viviani had been erroneously informed, or he misinformed the
French Ambassador in London.

August U British Blue Booh No. 120 . 385

lui en avait ete exprime par Sa Majeste TEmpereur de Russie, Sa
Majeste I'Empereur d'Allemagne d'accord avec TAngleterre etait
applique a aecomplir un role mediateur aupres des Cabinets de Vienne
et de St. Petersbourg, lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le resultat,
proceda a la mobilisation de la totalite de ses forces de terre et de mer.

"A la suite de cette mesure mena(?ante motivee par aucun pre-
paratif militaire de la part de TAllemagne, I'Empire Allemand se
trouva vis-a-vis d'un danger grave et imminent. Si le Gouvernement
Imperial eut manque de parer a ce peril il aurait compromis la securite
et Pexistence meme de I'Allemagne. Par consequent le Gouverne-
ment Allemand se vit force de s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa
Majeste I'Empereur de toutes les Russies ensistant sur la cessation
des dits actes militaires. La Russie ayant refuse de faire droit a
cette demande et ayant manifeste par ce refus, que son action etait
dirigee contre I'Allemagne, j'ai I'honneur d'ordre de mon Gouverne-
ment de faire savoir a Votre Excellence ce qui suit :

'' Sa Majeste I'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain au nom de I'Em-
pire releve le defi et Se considere en etat de guerre avec la Russie."

Please wire urgent receipt and time of carrying out this instruction
by Russian time.

Please ask for your passports and turn over protection and affairs
to the American Embassy.

From Paris

German WmxE Book ExmsiT 27

Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador in Paris to the Chancellor on
August 1st, 1.05 P.M.

Upon my repeated definite inquiry whether France would remain
neutral in the event of a Russo-German war, the Prime Minister de-
clared that France would do that which her interests dictated.

Great Britain:

From St. Petersburgh

British Blue Book No. 120

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir
Edicard Grey. — {Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July SI, 1914.

Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me and French Ambassador
and asked us to telegraph to our respective Governments subjoined
formula ^ as best calculated to amalgamate proposal made by you in
your telegram of 30th July ^ with formula recorded in my telegram of
30th July.^ He trusted it would meet with your approval : ^ —

1 Russian Orange Book No. 67, July 31.

2 British Blue Book No. 103, July 30.

3 British Blue Book No. 97, July 30. , , . ,

4 There is no desire expressed that it would meet with Austria s approval, which
was the all-important thing, if peace was to be preserved. Nor doea it appear what

386 , Offixiial Diplomatic Documents

"Si TAutriche consentira a arreter marche des ses troupes sur
le territoire serbe, si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a assume
le caractere d'une question d'interet europeen, elle admet que les
Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait
accorder au Gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie sans laisser porter
atteinte a ses droits d'Etat souverain et a son independance, la Russia
s'engage a conserver son attitude expectante/^ ^

His Excellency then alluded to the telegram sent to German
Emperor by Emperor of Russia in reply to the former's telegram.^
He said that Emperor Nicholas had begun by thanking Emperor
William for his telegram and for the hopes of peaceful solution which
it held out. His Majesty had then proceeded to assure Emperor
William that no intention whatever of an aggressive character was
concealed behind Russian military preparations. So long as conver-
sation with Austria continued, His Imperial Majesty undertook that
not a single man should be moved across the frontier ; it was, however
of course impossible, for reasons explained, to stop a mobilisation which
was already in progress.

M. Sazonof ^ said that undoubtedly there would be better pros-
pect of a peaceful solution if the suggested conversation were to take
place in London, where the atmosphere w^as far more favourable, and
he therefore hoped that you would see your way to agreeing to this.

His Excellency ended by expressing his deep gratitude to His
Majesty's Government, who had done so much to save the situation.
It would be largely due to them if war were prevented. The Emperor,
the Russian Government, and the Russian people would never forget
the firm attitude adopted by Great Britain.

From Berlin

British Blue Book No. 121

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. —
{Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 31, 1914.

Your telegram of 31st July.^

I spent an hour with Secretary of State urging him most earnestly
to accept your proposal and make another effort to prevent terrible
catastrophe of a European war.

a new formula could do, after Russia had ordered her general mobilisation in the
mght of July 30-31. See note 5 to French Yellow Book No. 127, same day.

^Translation. — "If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on
Servian territory ; if, recognising that the dispute between Austria and Servia has
assumed a character of European interest, she will allow the Great Powers to look
into the matter and determine whether Servia could satisfy the Austro-Hungarian
Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign State or her independence,
Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude."

. J* None of these telegrams were published in the British Blue Book or mentioned
in the speeches of Sir E. Grey or Mr. Asquith which induced Parliament to vote for
war.

' Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
* See British Blue Book No. Ill, July 31.

August ly British Blue Booh No. 122 387

He expressed himself very sympathetically towards your proposal,
and appreciated your continued efforts to maintain peace, but said it
was impossible for the Imperial Government to consider any proposal
until they had received an answer from Russia to their communica-
tion of to-day ; ^ this communication, which he admitted had the form
of an ultimatum, being that, unless Russia could inform the Imperial
Government within twelve hours that she would immediately counter-
mand her mobilisation against Germany and Austria, Germany would
be obliged on her side to mobilise at once.

I asked his Excellency why they had made their demand even more
difficult for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilise in south as
well. He replied that it was in order to prevent Russia from saying
all her mobilisation was only directed against Austria.^

His Excellency said that if the answer from Russia was satisfactory
he thought personally that your proposal merited favourable con-
sideration, and in any case he would lay it before the Emperor and
Chancellor, but he repeated that it was no use discussing it until the
Russian Government had sent in their answer to the German
demand.^

He again assured me that both the Emperor William, at the request
of the Emperor of Russia, and the German Foreign Office had even
up till last night been urging Austria to show willingness to continue
discussions — and telegraphic and telephonic communications from
Vienna had been of a promising nature — but Russia's mobilisation
had spoilt everything.^

From Berlin

British Blue Book No. 122

Sir E, Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. —
{Received A ugust 1.)

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 31, 1914.

Neutrality of Belgium, referred to in your telegram of 31st July
to Sir F. Bertie.^

I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must con-
sult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer.
I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might
give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign
in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether
they would return any answer at all. His Excellency, nevertheless,
took note of your request.

It appears from what he said that German Government consider

1 German White Book, Exhibit 24, July 31 ; the German ultimatum.

2 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 121, August 1, note 5. , ,

3 The obvious reason for this was that Germany felt herself threatened by the
Russian general mobilisation. , xr n t. i xt

4 Contrast this view with the one expressed by France, French Yellow Book No.
120, August 1, and note 5.

6 British Blue Book No. 114, July 31.

388 Official Diplomatic Documents

that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium.^
As an instance of this,^ he alleged that a consignment of corn for
Germany had been placed under an embargo already.

I hope to see his Excellency to-morrow again to discuss the matter
further, but the prospect of obtaining a definite answer seems to me
remote.

In speaking to me to-day the Chancellor made it clear that Germany
would in any case desire to know the reply ^ returned to you by the
French Government.

To Berlin
British Blue Book No. 123
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.
Sir, Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.

I TOLD the German Ambassador to-day that the reply ^ of the
German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was
a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium
affected feeling in this country.^ If Germany could see her way to
give the same assurance ^ as that which had been given by France it
would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On
the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium
by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely
difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. I said that we had
been discussing this question at a Cabinet meeting,^ and as I was
authorised to tell him this I gave him a memorandum of it.

He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate
Belgium neutrality we would engage to remain neutral.^

I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free,^
and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could
say w^as that our attitude would be determined largely by public
opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very

1 Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 79 and enclosures where under date of August 29 Bel-
gium explains the embargo as not an hostile act. It is, however, very remarkable
that this charge against Belgium could be made by Germany, without Great Britain
to whom it was made at once challenging its accuracy. Nor does it appear from the
published documents that Sir E. Grey was at all troubled by it or enquired about it,
or felt called upon to deny it.

2 No other hostile acts are mentioned in the diplomatic documents published at
the outbreak of the war. Subsequently Germany published the "Brussels docu-
ments" which she had discovered in the Belgian archives after taking Brussels. In
these documents "military conversations" between Great Britain and Belgium were
discussed. For these documents see pp. 577 ff.

•'' For this reply see Belgian Gray Book No. 15, August 1, 1914.

* British Blue Book No. 122, July 31, printed under date of August 1.

* No mention is made of existing treaties, a violation of which on the part of Ger-
many has often been given as the reason for Great Britain to join the war.

6 Belgian Gray Book No. 15, August 1. It must be remembered that as European
friendships had shaped themselves, France and Germany were not in the same posi-
tion, although Great Britain had addressed to them identical questions. For France
the question was : "Will Great Britain remain neutral or be my ally ? " For Germany
it was: "Will Great Britain remain neutral or be my enemy?"

^ Contrast this with French Yellow Book No. 126, August 1, and note 2.

8 This is what Great Britain had done in 1870.

^ Compare this with Sir E. Grey's personal engagements toward France ; French
Yellow Book No. 126, August 1, and note 3.

August 1, British Blue Book No. 125 389

strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give
a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.

The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate
conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested
that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.^

I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain

neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our

hands free.^ ,

i am, etc.

E. Grey.

From Paris

British Blue Book No. 124

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. —
(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 31, 1914.

On the receipt at 8.30 to-night of your telegram of this afternoon,^
I sent a message to Minister for Foreign Affairs requesting to see him.
He received me at 10.30 to-night at the Elysee, where a Cabinet
Council was being held. He took a note of the enquiry as to the
respecting by France of the neutrality of Belgium which you in-
structed me to make.

He told me that a communication had been made to you by the
German Ambassador in London of the intention of Germany to order
a general mobilisation of her army if Russia do not demobilise at
once. He is urgently anxious as to what the attitude of England will
be in the circumstances, and begs an answer may be made by His
Majesty's Government at the earliest moment possible.

Minister for Foreign Affairs also told me that the German Embassy
is packing up.^

From Paris

British, Blue Book No.. 125

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. —
(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 31, 1914.

My immediately preceding telegram.^

Political Director h^s brought me the reply of the Minister for

1 No valid reason is given in the British Blue Book why Sir E. Grey did not formulate
such conditions. From the reference given in the previous despatches, however, it
appears that Sir E. Grey was personally too deeply committed to France. (See es-
pecially French Yellow Book No. 126, August 1.) Nor did Sir E. Grey mention this
German request either in the subsequent cabinet meetings or in Parliament. His
excuse offered weeks later that the German Ambassador had niade this request un-
officially seems to be contradicted by the despatch itself. It is not customary to
repeat unoflEicial offers in instructions to Ambassadors, at least without saying so.
Of. for instance British Blue Book No. 125, August 1, and Belgian Gray Book No.
24, August 3. ••

2 Cf . note 9, page 388. * Cf . French Yellow Book No. 120, August 1.

3 British Blue Book No. 114, July 31. ^ British Blue Book No. 124.

390 Official Diplomatic Documents

Foreign Affairs to your enquiry respecting the neutrality of Belgium.
It is as follows : ^ —

French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of
Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power violat-
ing that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity
in order to assure defence of her own security, to act otherwise. This
assurance has been given several times. President of the Republic
spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at
Brussels has spontaneously^ renewed the assurance to the Belgian
Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day .^

From Paris

British Blue Book No. 126

Sir F. Bertie J British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Re-
ceived Augiist 1 .)

(Telegraphic.) Paris , August 1, 1914-

1 HAVE had conversation with the Political Director, w^ho states
that the German Ambassador was informed, on calling at the Ministry
for Foreign Affairs this morning,^ that the French Government failed
to comprehend the reason which prompted his communication of
yesterday evening. It was pointed out to his Excellency that general
mobilisation in Russia had not been ordered until after Austria had
decreed a general mobilisation,^ and that the Russian Government
were ready to demobilise ^ if all Powers did likewise. It seemed
strange to the French Government that in view of this and of the fact
that Russia and Austria were ready to converse, the German Govern-
ment should have at that moment presented an ultimatum at St.
Petersburgh requiring immediate demobilisation by Russia. There
were no differences at issue between France and Germany, but the
German Ambassador had made a menacing communication to
the French Government . and had requested an answer the next
day, intimating that he would have to break off relations and leave
Paris if the reply were not satisfactory. The Ambassador was in-
formed that the French Government considered that this was an
extraordinary proceeding.

The German Ambassador, who is to see the Minister for Foreign
Affairs again this evening, said nothing about demanding his pass-
ports, but he stated that he had packed up.^

^ Cf. Belgian Gray Book no. 15, August 1.

2 Cf. end of note 7, British Blue Book No. 123, August 1.

3 Belgian Gray Book No. 9, July 31.

* See French Yellow Book No. 125, same day.

^ This is an error, see French Yellow Book No. 127, same day, and note 5 ; also
British Blue Book No. 127, same date.

* Contrast French Yellow Book No. 125, same day, "suspension of military prepara-
tions," which is not the same as "demobilisation." See also note 5 to this despatch in
French Yellow Book.

^ This is not given in the exhaustive French despatch describing this interview,
French Yellow Book No. 125, same day.

August 1, British Blue Book No. 130 391

From Vienna
British Blue Book No. 127

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey,
— {Received August 1.) ,

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 1, 1914.

General mobilisation of army and fleet.

From Brussels
British Blue Book No. 128

Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey. —
{Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 1, 1914.

Belgian neutrality.

The instructions conveyed in your telegram of yesterday ^ have
been acted upon.

Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will observe and
uphold 2 her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of
her power. In so informing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs said
that, in the event of the violation of the neutrality of their territory,
they believed that they were in a position to defend themselves against
intrusion. The relations between Belgium and her neighbours were
excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions ; but he
thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against emergencies.

[For British Blue Book No. 129 see under August 2.]

To Berlin
British Blue Book No. 130
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.

We are informed that authorities at Hamburg have forcibly de-
tained steamers belonging to the Great Central Company and other
British merchant-ships.

I cannot ascertain on what grounds the detention of British ships
has been ordered.

1 British Blue Book No. 115, July 31, expecting Belgium to observe neutrality.

2 This seems to contradict Belgian Gray Book No. 38, August 4, where the Belgian
Foreign Minister relates that Belgium had refrained from appealing to the guaranteeing
Powers as late as 6 a.m. on August 4, and probably later. On Aug. 3, at 10 a.m., the
Belgian Cabinet definitely voted not to appeal to the Powers.

392 Official Diplomatic Documents

incident of an aggressive nature, and the German Government will, I
hope, be equally careful not to take any step which would make the
situation between us impossible.

To Berlin
British Blue Book No. 131
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E, Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.

I STILL believe that it might be possible to secure peace if only a
little respite in time can be gained before any Great Power begins war.^

The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness of
Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness of Austria to accept
a basis of mediation which is not open to the objections raised in re-
gard to the formula which Russia originally suggested.

Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are
ready to converse, and I hope that German Government may be able
to make use of the Russian communications referred to above, in
order to avoid tension. His Majesty's Government are carefully
abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters.

From Berlin
British Blue Book No. 132
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin,
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.

Following telegram from M. Sazonof ^ to Count Benckendorff ^
of the 31st July communicated to me to-day : ^
" (Urgent.)
" Formule amend ee conf ormement a la proposition anglaise :

* Si Autriche consent a arreter la marche de ses troupes sur le territoire
serbe et si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a assume le carac-
tere d'un question d'interet europeen, elle admet que les Grandes
Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait accorder
au Gouvernement austro-hongrois sans laisser porter atteinte a ses
droits d'Etat souverain et a son independance, la Russie s'engage a
conserver son attitude expectante.' " ^

(Above communicated to all the Powers.)

1 Sir E. Grey here overlooks the fact that general mobilisation by one nation on
the frontier of another has always been sufficient cause for the latter to "defend itself
by instant war." See Elihu Root quoted above, note 4 Austro-Hungarian Red Book
No. 28, July 26.

Sir E. Grey nowhere asked Russia to demobilise.

2 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

3 Russian Ambassador in London,

4 See British Blue Book No. 120, July 31, printed under date of August 1, and
Russian Orange Book No. 67, July 31.

^Translation. — "Formula amended in accordance with the English proposal;

* If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Servian territory, and if, recog-

August 1, British Blue Book No. 134 393

From Berlin
British Blue Book No. 133
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.

M. De EtterI came to-day to communicate the contents of a
telegram from M. Sazonof/ dated the 31st July, which are as
follows : —

"The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declare^ ^ the readiness of
his Government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum
to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction, and
said it was desirable that the discussions should take place in London
with the participation of the Great Powers.

"M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume
the direction of these discussions. The whole of Europe would be
thankful to them. It would be very important that Austria should
meanwhile put a stop provisionally to her military action on Servian
territory."

(The above has been communicated to the six Powers.)

From Paris

British Blue Book No. 134

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Re-
ceived August 1.)

(Telegraphic.) Paris, August 1, 1914.

President of the Republic has informed me that German Govern-
ment ^ were trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility, that it was
only after a decree of general mobilisation had been issued in Austria
that the Emperor of Russia ordered a general mobilisation; that,
although the measures which the German Government have already
taken are in effect a general mobilisation, they are not so designated ;
that a French general mobilisation will become necessary in self-
defence, and that France is already forty-eight hours ^ behind Ger-
many as regards German military preparations; that the French
troops have ordered not to go nearer to the German frontier than a
distance of 10 kilom. so as to avoid any grounds for accusations of
provocation to Germany, whereas the German troops, on the other

nising that the Austro-Servian conflict has assumed the character of a question of
European interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction
which Servia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her
sovereign rights as a State and to her independence, Russia undertakes to preserve her
waiting attitude."

1 Counsellor of Russian Embassy in London.

2 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

3 Of. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 56, August 1.

* Cf. French Yellow Book No. 127, August 1, where it reads: "The German and
the Austrian Governments." For the several points see the notes to the French
Yellow Book despatch.

6 No such claim is made either in French Yellow Book Nos. 125 or 127, same date.

394 Official Diplomatic Documents

hand, are actually on the French frontier and have made incursions
on it ; ^ that, notwithstanding mobilisations, the Emperor of Russia
has expressed himself ready to continue his conversations with the
German Ambassador with a view to preserving the peace; that
French Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific, sincerely
desire the preservation of peace and do not quite despair, even now,
of its being possible to avoid war.

From St. Petersburgh

British Blue Book No. 135

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Peters-
burgh.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1914-

Information reaches me from a most reliable source that Austrian
Government have informed German Government that though the
situation has been changed by the mobilisation of Russia they would
in full appreciation of the efforts of. England for the preservation
of peace be ready to consider favourably my proposal for mediation
between Austria and Servia. The effect of this acceptance would
naturally be that the Austrian military action against Servia would
continue for the present, and that the British Government would urge
upon Russian Government to stop the mobilisation of troops directed
against Austria, in which case Austria would naturally cancel those
defensive military counter-measures in Galicia, which have been
forced upon Austria by Russian mobilisation.^

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and say that if,
in the consideration of the acceptance of mediation by Austria,
Russia can agree to stop mobilisation, it appears still to be possible
to preserve peace. Presumably the matter should be discussed
with German Government also by Russian Government.

From Paris

British Blue Book No. 136

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. —
{Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.) Paris, August 1, 1914.

Minister of War informed military attache this afternoon that
orders had been given at 3.40 ^ for a general mobilisation of the French
Army. This became necessary because the Minister of War knows
that, under the system of "Kriegszustand," ^ the Germans have

1 The German claim was to the very opposite effect ; see Speech of the Chancellor,
August 4, 1914.

2 Contrast this with the French claims in despatches of this day that Russia had
been forced to general mobilisation by a previous Austrian general mobilisation.

' Cf. German White Book, p. 560, 5 p.m., the latter being Berlin instead of Paris
time. * "State of war."

August 1, British Blue Book No. 137 395

called up six classes. Three classes are sufficient to being their cover-
ing troops up to war strength, the remaining three being the reserve.
This, he says, being tantamount to mobilisation, is mobilisation
under another name.^

The French forces on the frontier have opposed to them eight
army corps on a war footing, and an attack is expected at any moment.
It is therefore of the utmost importance to guard against this. A
zone of 10 kilom. has been left between the French troops and German
frontier. The French troops will not attack, and the Minister of War
is anxious that it should be explained that this act of mobilisation is
one for purely defensive purposes.

From Vienna
British Blue Book No. 137
Sir Edivard Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 191J,..

I SAW the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador this morning. He
supplied me with the substance of a telegram which the Austro-
Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs had sent to the Austrian
Ambassador in Paris.^ In this telegram his Excellency was given
instructions to assure the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that
there was no intention in the minds of the Austro-Hungarian Govern-
ment to impair the sovereign rights of Servia or to obtain territorial
aggrandisement. The Ambassador added that he was further in-
structed to inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there
was no truth in the report which had been published in Paris to the
effect that x\ustria-Hungary intended to occupy the sanjak.

Count Mensdorff ^ called again later at the Foreign Office. He in-
formed me of a telegram ^ sent yesterday to the Austro-Hungarian
Ambassador at St. Petersburgh by Count Berchtold,^ and gave me
the substance.

It states that Count Berchtold begged the Russian Ambassador,
whom he sent for yesterday, to do his best to remove the wholly
erroneous impression in St. Petersburgh that the '^door had been
banged" by Austria-Hungary on all further conversations. The
Russian Ambassador promised to do this. Count Berchtold repeated
on this occasion to the Russian Ambassador the assurance which had
already been given at St. Petersburgh, to the effect that neither an
infraction of Servian sovereign rights nor the acquisition of Servian
territory was being contempated by Austria-Hungary.

Special attention was called by Count Mensdorff ^ to the fact that

1 None of this seems to be based on facts. See M. P. Price, The Diplomatic
History of the War, Scribner's, the chapters on "Preparations and Mobilisations."

2 Not printed in French Yellow Book, but mentioned ih. No. 120, same day.

3 Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

< Probably Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 50, although this is dated July 30.
and Sir E. Grey says "sent yesterday," i.e. July 31.
^ Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

396 Official Diplomatic Documents

this telegram contains a statement to the effect that conversations at
St. Petersburgh had not been broken off by Austria-Hungary.

[For British Blue Book Nos. 138 and 139 see under August 2.]

From Paris

British Blue Book No, 140

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey, —
(Received AugiLst 1.)

(Telegraphic.) Paris, August 1, 1914.

The Minister of War again sent for the military attache this even-
ing, as he said he wished to keep him informed of the situation. He
laid great stress on the fact that the zone of 10 kilom., which he had
arranged between the French troops and the German frontier, and
which was still occupied by peasants, was a proof of the French
endeavours to commit no provocative act.^

Russia :

To Russian Representatives Abroad

Russian Orange Book No. 70
Secret Telegram to Russian Representatives abroad.
(Telegram.) July 19 (August 1), 1914.

At midnight the German Ambassador announced ^ to me, on the
instruction of his Government, that if within 12 hours, that is by mid-
night on Saturday, we had not begin to demobilise, not only against
Germany, but also against Austria, the German Government would be
compelled to give the order for mobilisation. To my enquiry whether
this meant war, the Ambassador replied in the negative, but added
that we were very near it.

From london
Russian Orange Book No. 71
Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
(Telegram.) London, July 19 (August 1), 1914-

Grey tells me that he has telegraphed ^ to Berlin that in his opinion
the last formula accepted by the Russian Government offers the best
prospect as a basis of negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the
dispute. At the same time he expressed the hope that no Great
Power would open hostilities before this formula had been considered.

1 Cf. note 3 to British Blue Book No. 134, August 1.

2 German White Book, Exhibit 24, July 31.

' Probably British Blue Book No. 131, same day.

August 1, Russian Orange Book No. 74 397

From London

Russian Orange Book No, 72

Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs,

(Telegram.) London, July 19 {August 1), 1914.

The British Government have enquired ^ of the French and German
Governments whether they will respect the neutrality of Belgium.

France answered in the affirmative,^ but the German Government
stated ^ that they could not give any definite answer to the question.

From Paris
Russian Orange Book No. 73
Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
(Telegram.) Paris, July 19 (August 1), 1914-

' The Austrian Ambassador yesterday ^ saw Viviani and declared
to him that Austria, far from harbouring any designs against the
integrity of Servia, was in fact ready to discuss the grounds of her
grievances against Servia with the other Powers. The French
Government are much exercised at Germany's extraordinary military
activity on the French frontier, for they are convinced that, under
the guise of Kriegszu^tand,^ mobilisation is in reality being carried
out.

From Paris

Russian Orange Book No. 74

Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs,

(Telegram.) Paris, July 19 {August 1), 1914-

On the receipt in Paris of the telegram ^ from the French Am-
bassador at St. Petersburg, reporting the communication made to
you by the German Ambassador respecting Germany's decision to
order general mobilisation to-day, the President of the French Repub-
lic signed the order for mobilisation. Lists of the reservists recalled
to the colours are being posted up in the streets. The German Am-
bassador has just visited Viviani,^ but told him nothing fresh, alleging
the impossibility of deciphering the telegrams he has received.^

1 British Blue Book No. 115, July 31.

2 Belgian Gray Book No. 15, August 1.

3 British Blue Book No. 122, August 1.

4 French Yellow Book No. 120, August 1. British Blue Book No. 137, same day.
6 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 127, August 1, and notes 5 and 6.

6 No such telegram is printed in the French Yellow Book. On the eventful August
1 not a single, despatch exchanged between Paris and Petrograd has been printed in
the French Yellow Book.

7 See French Yellow Book No. 125, August 1.

8 Cf. ih., where Viviani quotes the German Ambassador as saying that "he had
received no fresh communication from his government."

398 Official Diplomatic Documents

Viviani informed him of the signature of the order for mobiKsation
issued in reply to that of Germany, and expressed to him his amaze-
ment that Germany should have taken such a step at a moment when
a friendly exchange of views w^as still in progress between Russia,
Austria, and the Powers. He added that mobilisation did not neces-
sarily entail war, and that the German Ambassador might stay in
Paris as the Russian Ambassador had remained in Vienna and the
Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg.

From Paris
Russian Orange Book No. 75
Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
(Telegram.) Paris, July 19 {August i), 1914-

I HEAR from the President that during the last few days the Austrian
Ambassador emphatically assured both the President of the Council
of Ministers and him that Austria had declared to Russia that she was
ready to respect both the territorial integrity of Servia and also her'
sovereign rights, but that Russia had intentionally received this dec-
laration in silence. I contradicted this flatly.^

From Berlin

Russian Orange Book No. 76

Note presented by the German Ambassador at St. Petersburgh on July 19
(August 1), at 7.10 P.M.

(Translation.)

Le Gouvernement Imperial The Imperial German Gov-

s'est efforce des les debuts de ernment have used every effort

la crise de la mener a une solu- since the beginning of the crisis

tion pacifique. Se rendant a to bring about a peaceful settle-

un desir qui lui en avait ete ment. In compliance with a

exprime par Sa Majeste I'Em- wish expressed to him by His

pereur de Russie, Sa Majeste IVIajesty the Emperor of Russia,

I'Empereur • d'Allemagne d'ac- the German Emperor had under-

cord avec I'Angleterre s'etait taken, in concert with Great

applique a accomplir un role Britain, the part of mediator

mediateur aupres des Cabinets between the Cabinets of Vienna

de Vienne et de Saint-Peters- and St. Petersburg ; but Russia,

bourg, lorsque, la Russie, sans without waiting for any result,

en attendre le resultat, proceda proceeded to a general mobilisa-

a la mobilisation de la totalite de tion of her forces both on land

ses forces de terre et de mer. A and sea. In consequence of this

la suite de cette mesure mena- threatening step, which was not

^ It is not clear whether the Russian Ambassador contradicted the assertion, that
Austria-Hungary had made this declaration or that Russia had received it in silence.
For Austria-Hungary's declaration see Austro-Hungarian Red Book Nos. 47, July 29,
66, July 31, and 56, August 1.

August 1, Rmsian Orange Book No. 76

399

9ante ne motivee par aucun
presage militaire de la part de
rAllemagne, TEmpire allemand
s'est trouve vis-a-vis d'un dan-
ger grave et imminent. Si le
Gouvernement Imperial eut man-
que de parer a ce peril, il
aurait compromis la securite et
I'existence meme de I'Allemagne.
Par consequent le Gouvernement
allemand se vit force de s'adresser
au Gouvernement de SaMajeste
FEmpereur de Toutes les Russies
en insistant sur la cessation des
dits actes militaires. La Russie
ayant refuse de faire droit a
(n'ayant pas cru devoir repondre
a ^) cette demande et ayant mani-
festo par ce refus (cette atti-
tude ^) que son action etait
dirigee contre I'Allemagne, j'ai
I'honneur, d'ordre de mon Gou-
vernement, de faire savoir a
votre Excellence ce qui suit : —

Sa Majeste I'Empereur, mon
auguste Souverain, au nom de
TEmpire, relevant le defi, se
considere en etat de guerre avec
la Russie.

justified by any military proceed-
ings on the part of Germany,^
the German Empire was faced
by a grave and imminent danger.
If the German Government had
failed to guard against this peril,
they would have compromised
the safety and the very existence
of Germany. The German
Government were, therefore, ob-
liged to make representations to
the Government of His Maj-
esty the Emperor of All the
Russias and to insist upon a ces-
sation of the aforesaid military
acts. Russia having refused to
comply with (not having con-
sidered it necessary to answer ^)
this demand, and having shown
by this refusal (this attitude^)
that her action was directed
against Germany, I have the
honour, on the instructions of my
Government, to inform your
Excellency as follows ; —

His Majesty the Emperor, my
august Sovereign, in the name
of the German Empire, accepts
the challenge, and considers him-
self at war with Russia.

^ Les mots places entre parentheses se trouvent dans Toriginal. II faut supposer
que deux variantes avaient ete preparees d'avance et que par erreur elles ont 6t6
inserees toutes les deux dans la note.

2 The words in parentheses occur in the original. It rnust be supposed that two
variations had been prepared in advance, and that, by mistake, they were both in-
serted in the note.

3 This sentence contains the crux of the question. Students should ask themselves
(a) Did Russian mobilisation contain an element of danger for Germany? (b) If it
did, was Germany justified in replying to it with an ultimatum? (c) Was the Russian
general mobilisation justified by any military action previously taken by Germany?

400

Official Diplomatic Documents

Sunday, August 2, 1914
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

FoKEiGN Office of

Austria-H ungary
Belgium

France

Germany
Great Britain

Sent Despatches to

London etc.

All representatives
London etc.
London

Received
Despatches fbom

Berlin
Luxemburg
German Minister
Luxemburg, Petrograd,

London, German

Ambassador

Russia
Serbia

Paris, Berlin

Announcement by Sazonof
to all representatives

Berlin, Petrograd, Paris,
Vienna, Brussels, Lux-
emburg

Austria-Hungary is notified of Germany's declaration of war on Russia.

Belgium is notified of Germany's entry on Luxemburg territory, and receives
herself an ultimatum from Germany at 7 o'clock in the evening ; i.e. many hours
after the British Government had promised their support to France.

France announces to her representatives instances of Germany's troops crossing
her frontier and committing hostile acts, and receives the promise of support from
the British Government for which she had been working since July 27.

Germany sends troops into Luxemburg, thus violating the neutrality of the
duchy, but assuring her that the military measures taken are not a hostile act
but are "solely measures intended to assure the use of the railways which have
been leased to the Empire " against any attack of the French army. She promises
Luxemburg a complete indemnity for any damage.

Germany notifies Belgium that she has received "reliable information" of
French intentions to march through Belgium, and feels herself therefore forced
in self-defence to contemplate entering Belgian territory. If Belgium "should
oppose the German troops," Germany would "to her regret be compelled to con-
sider Belgium as an enemy." If the troops are not opposed, guarantees are
offered for the future integrity and independence of Belgium, and the payment
for any damage done.

Great Britain promises her support to France during the forenoon, independ-
ently of whether or no German troops should invade Belgium. She is silent on
the movement of her own troops.

Russia defends herself against Germany's attempt "to foist" on Russia the
"responsibility" for the war, claiming that Germany "neither could, nor had
the right to, doubt" the many proofs of Russia's "desire for peace." The fact
of Russia's general mobilisation is minimised.

Serbia is silent.

Austria-Hungary :

From Berlin

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 57

Count Szogyeny to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 2, 1914-

The Secretary of State has just informed me that no answer
has been received from Russia to the German demand.

August 2, Belgian Gray Book No. 19 401

The Russian troops have crossed the German frontier at Schwidden
(southeast of Bialla).

Russia has thus attacked Germany.

Germany, therefore/ regards herself as at war with Russia.

The Russian Ambassador has this morning received his passports ;
he intends to leave to-day.

Belgium :

From Luxemburg

Belgian Gray Book No. 18

M. Eyschen, President of the Luxemburg Government, to M. Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) Luxemburg, August 2, 1914-

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency with the following
facts : On Sunday, the 2nd August, very early, the German troops,
according to the information which has up to now reached the Grand
Ducal Government, penetrated into Luxemburg territory by the
bridges of Wasserbillig and Remich, and proceeded particularly
towards the south and in the direction of Luxemburg, the capital of
the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armoured trains with troops
and ammunition have been sent along the railway line from Wasser-
billig to Luxemburg, where their arrival is expected. These occur-
rences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the neu-
trality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London
of 1867. The Luxemburg Government have not failed to address
an energetic protest against this aggression to the representatives of
His Majesty the German Emperor at Luxemburg. An identical pro-
test will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs at Berlin.

To Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh

Belgian Gray Book No. 19

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Ministers
at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh

Sir, Brussels, August 2, 1914.

I WAS careful to warn the German Minister through M. de Bassom-
pierre that an announcement in the Brussels press by M. Klobukowski,
French Minister, would make public the formal declaration which the
latter had made to me on the 1st August. When I next met Herr
von Below he thanked me for this attention, and added that up to
the present he had not been instructed to make us an official commu-
nication, but that we knew his personal opinion as to the feelings
of security, which we had the right to entertain towards our eastern

^ This is not the reason given in the declaration of war, Russian Orange Book No.
76, August 1.

402

Official Diplomatic Documents

neighbours. I at once replied that all that we knew of their inten-
tions, as indicated in numerous previous conversations, did not allow
us to doubt their perfect correctness towards Belgium. I added,
however, that we should attach the greatest importance to the posses-
sion of a formal declaration, which the Belgian nation would hear of
with joy and gratitude.

From Berlin

Belgian Gray Book No. 20

Note presented by Herr von Below Salekse, German Minister at Brussels,
to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Kaiserlich Deutsche Gesandtschaft in Belgien. Brilssel, den 2.

August, 1914-
Imperial German Legation in Belgium. — Brussels, August 2, 1914-

(Translation.)
(Very Confidential.) ^

Reliable information has
been received by the German
Government to the effect that
French forces intend to march on
the line of the IMeuse by Givet
and Namur. This information
leaves no doubt as to the inten-
tion of France to march through
Belgian territory against Ger-
many.

The German Government can-
not but fear that Belgium, in
spite of the utmost goodwill, will
be unable, without assistance, to
repel ^ so considerable a French
invasion with sufficient prospect
of success to afford an adequate
guarantee against danger to Ger-
many. It is essential for the self-
defence of Germany that she
should anticipate any such hostile
attack. The German Govern-
ment would, however, feel the
deepest regret if Belgium re-
garded as an act of hostility

^ This ultimatum was presented at 7 p.m. (see Belgian Gray Book No. 38, August 4),
i.e. many hours after the British Government had promised their support to France ;
cf. British Blue Book No. 148, August 2, where Sir E. Grey says : "After the Cabinet
this morning J gave M. Cambon the following memorandum."

2 This is the same argument Great Britain advanced in her second military con-
versation with Belgium. See p. 580 and also note to Belgian Gray Book No. 22,
August 3.

(Tres Confidentiel.)

Der Kaiserlichen Regierung
liegen zuverlassige Nachrichten
vor iiber den beabsichtigten Auf-
marsch franzosischer Streitkrafte
an der Maas-Strecke Givet-
Namur. Sie lassen keinen
Zweifel iiber die Absicht Frank-
reichs, durch belgisches Gebiet
gegen Deutschland vorzugehen.

Die Kaiserliche Regierung
kann sich der Besorgniss nicht
erwehren, dass Belgien, trotz
besten Willens, nicht im vStande
sein wird, ohne Hiilfe einen fran-
zosischen Vormarsch mit so
grosser Aussicht auf Erfolg abzu-
wehren, dass darin eine ausrei-
chende Sicherheit gegen die
Bedrohung Deutschlands gefun-
den werden kann. Es ist ein
Gebot der Selbsterhaltung fiir
Deutschland, dem feindlichen An-
griff zu vorzukommen. Mit dem
grossten Bedauern wiirde es daher

August 2, Belgian Gray Book No. 20

403

die deutsche Regierung erfiillen,
wenn Belgien einen Akt der
Feindseligkeit gegen sich darin
erblicken wiirde, dass die Mass-
nahmen seiner Gegner Deutseh-
land zwingen, zur Gegenwehr
auch seinerseits belgisches Gebiet
zu betreten.

Um jede Missdeutung aus-
zuschliessen, erklart die Kaiser-
liche Regierung das Folgende :

1. Deutschland beabsichtigt
keinerlei Feindseligkeiten gegen
Belgien. 1st Belgien gewillt, in
dem bevorstehenden Kriege,
Deutschland gegeniiber eine
wohlwollende Neutralitat einzu-
nehmen, so verpflichtet sich die
deutsche Regierung, beim Frie-
densschluss Besitzstand und
Unabhangigkeit des Konigreichs
in vollem Umfang zu garantieren.

2. Deutschland verpflichtet
sich unter obiger Voraussetzung,
das Gebiet des Konigreichs wieder
zu raumen, sobald der Friede
geschlossen ist.

3. Bei einer freundschaftlicher
Haltung Belgiens ist Deutschland
bereit, im Einvernehmen mit den
Koniglich Belgischen Behorden
alle Bedurfnisse seiner Truppen
gegen Barzahlung anzukaufen
und jeden Schaden zu ersetzen, der
etwa durch deutsche Truppen
verursacht werden konnte.

4. Sollte Belgien den deutschen
Truppen feindlich entgegen tre-
ten, insbesondere ihrem Vorgehen
durch Widerstand der Maas-
Befestigungen oder durch Zer-
storungen von Eisenbahnen,
Strassen, Tunneln oder sonstigen
Kunstbauten Schwierigkeiten be-
reiten, so wird Deutschland zu
seinem Bedauern gezwungen sein,
das Konigreich als Feind zu be-
trachten. In diesem Falle wiirde

against herself the fact that the
measures of Germany's op-
ponents force Germany, for her
own protection, to enter Belgian
territory.

In order to exclude any possi-
bility of misunderstanding, the
German Government make the
following declaration : —

1. Germany has in view no
act of hostility against Belgium.
In the event of Belgium being
prepared in the coming war to
maintain an attitude of friendly
neutrality towards Germany, the
German Government bind them-
selves, at the conclusion of peace,
to guarantee the possessions and
independence of the Belgian
Kingdom in full.

2. Germany undertakes, under
the above-mentioned condition,
to evacuate Belgian territory on
the conclusion of peace.

3. If Belgium adopts a friendly
attitude, Germany is prepared,
in co-operation with the Belgian
authorities, to purchase all neces-
saries for her troops against a
cash payment, and to pay an
indemnity for any damage that
may have been caused by
German troops.

4. Should Belgium oppose the
German troops, and in particular
should she throw difficulties in
the way of their march by a re-
sistance of the fortresses on the
Meuse, or by destroying railways,
roads, tunnels, or other similar
works, Germany will, to her re-
gret, be compelled to consider
Belgium as an enemy.

In this event, Germany can
undertake no obligations towards

404 Official Diplomatic Documents

Deutschland dem Konigreich Belgium, but the eventual adjust-

gegeniiber keine Verpflichtungen ment of the relations between the

iibernehmen konnen, sondern two States must be left to the

miisste die spatere Regelung des decision of arms.
Verhaltnisses beider Staaten zu
einander der Entscheidung der
Waffen iiberlassen.

Die Kaiserliehe Regierung The German Government,

giebt sich der bestimmten however, entertain the distinct

Hoffnung hin, dass diese Even- hope that this eventuality will

tualitat nicht eintreten, und dass not occur, and that the Belgian

die Konigliche Belgische Regie- Government will know how to

rung die geeigneten Massnahmen take the necessary measures to

zu treffen wissen wird, um zu prevent the occurrence of inci-

verhinderen, dass Vorkommnisse, dents such as those mentioned,

wie die vorstehend erwahnten. In this case the friendly ties

sich ereignen. In diesem Falle which bind the two neighbouring

wiirden die freundschaftlichen States will grow stronger and

Bande, die beide Nachbarstaaten more enduring,
verbinden, eine weitere und
dauernde Festigung erfahren.

France :

From Luxemburg

French Yellow Book No. 131

M. Eyschen, Minister of State for Luxemburg, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Luxemburg, August 2, 1914-

I HAVE the honour to bring to your Excellence's notice the follow-
ing facts : —

On Sunday, the 2nd August, very early, German troops, according
to the information which has up to now reached the Grand Ducal
Government, penetrated into Luxemburg territory by the bridges of
Wasserbillig and Remich, and proceeded particularly towards the
south and in the direction of Luxemburg, the capital of the Grand
Duchy. A certain number of armoured trains with troops and am-
munition have been sent along the railway line from Wasserbillig to
Luxemburg, where their arrival is expected. These occurrences
constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the
Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The
Luxemburg Government have not failed to address an energetic pro-
test against this aggression to the representatives of His Majesty
the German Emperor at Luxemburg. An identical protest will be
sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at
Berlin. The Minister of State,

President of the Government.
Eyschen.

August 2, French Yellow Book No. 134 405

From Luxemburg

French Yellow Book No. 132 ^

M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to M. Rene Viviani, Presi-
dent of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Luxemburg, August 2, 191 4.
The Minister of State for Luxemburg, M. Eyschen, has just re-
ceived, through Herr von Buch, German Minister at Luxemburg, a
telegram from Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor of the German Empire,
saying that the military measures taken by Germany in Luxemburg
do not constitute a hostile act against this country, but are solely
measures tended to assure the use of the railways which have been
leased to the Empire against the eventual attack of a French army.
Luxemburg will receive a complete indemnity for any damage.

Mollard.

From Berlin

French Yellow Book No. 133

Note handed in by the German Ambassador.

Paris, August 2, 1914.

The German Ambassador has just been instructed, and hastens
to inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the military measures
taken by Germany in the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg do not con-
stitute an act of hostility. They must be considered as purely pre-
ventive measures taken for the protection of the railways, which,
under the treaties between Germany and the Grand Duchy of Luxem-
burg, are under German administration.

Von Schoen.

From St. Petersburgh

French Yellow Book No. 134

W. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Rene:
Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

St. Petersburgh, August 2, 1914-

Yesterday at ten minutes past seven in the evening the German
Ambassador handed to M. Sazonof a declaration of war by his Govern-
ment ; he will leave St. Petersburgh to-day.

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has not received any instruc-
tions from his Government as to the declaration of war.

Paleologue.

1 Cf. British Blue Book No. 129, same day.

4:06 Official Diplomatic Documents

To the Representatives of France Abroad

French Yellow Book No. 135

M.Rene Viviani, President of the Coum^il, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
to the Representatives of France abroad.

Paris, August 2, 1914.
The Russian Ambassador informs me that Germany has just de-
clared war on Russia, notwithstanding the negotiations which are
proceeding, and at a moment when Austria-Hungary w^as agreeing to
discuss with the Powers even the basis of her conflict with Servia.

Rene Viviani.

To London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Con-
stantinople

French Yellow Book No. 136

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh,
Berlin, Vienna^ RomCy Madrid, Constantinople.

Paris, August 2, 1914-
This morning, French territory was violated by German troops at
Ciry and near Longwy. They are marching on the fort which bears
the latter name. Elsewhere the Custom House at Delle ^ has twice
been fired upon. Finally, German troops have also violated this
morning the neutral territory of Luxemburg.

You will at once use this information to lay stress on the fact that
the German Government is committing itself to acts of war against
France without provocation ^ on our part, or any previous declaration
of war, whilst we have scrupulously respected the zone of ten kilo-
metres which we have maintained, even since the mobilisation,
between our troops and the frontier.

Rene Viviani.

From London

French Yellow Book No. 137

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, August 2, 1914.

After the meeting of the Cabinet held this morning, Sir Edward
Grey made the following declaration ^ to me : —

"I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German fleet
comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile

1 See below, French Yellow Book No. 139, same day.

2 The German Chancellor in his speech in the Reichstag on August 4 laid the blame
for the first border hostilities on the French. For translation of this speech see pp. 573-
676. See also for the German charges, Belgian Gray Book No. 21, August 3.

3 For different wording see French Yellow Book No. 143, August 3, and notes to
British Blue Book No. 148, August 2.

August 2, French Yellow Book No. 138 407

operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give
all the protection in its power.

"This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty's
Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be
taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until
the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place."

Afterwards in speaking to me of the neutrality of Belgium and that
of Luxemburg, the Secretary of State reminded me that the Conven-
tion of 1867, referring to the Grand Duchy, differed from the Treaty
referring to Belgium, in that Great Britain was bound to require the
observance of this latter convention without the assistance of the other
guaranteeing Powers, while with regard to Luxemburg all the guaran-
teeing Powers were to act in concert.

The protection of Belgian neutrality is here considered so important
that Great Britain will regard its violation by Germany as a casu^
belli. It is a specially British interest ^ and there is no doubt that the
British Government, faithful to the traditions of their policy, will
insist upon it, even if the business world, in which German influence
is making tenacious efforts, exercises pressure to prevent the Govern-
ment committing itself against Germany.

Paul Cambon.

To London

French Yellow Book No. 138

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.

Paris, August 2, 1914.

I NOTE the points contained in your telegrams of the 27th,2 30th,^
31st ^ July and the 1st August,^ and in that which you have sent to
me to-day.^

In communicating to the Chambers the declaration which Sir
Edward Grey has made to you, the text of which is contained in
your last telegram, I will add that in it we have obtained from Great
Britain a first assistance which is most valuable to us.

In addition, I propose to indicate that the help which Great
Britain intends to give to France for the protection of the French
coasts or the French merchant marine, will be used in such a way
that our navy will also, in case of a Franco-German conflict, be sup-
ported by the British fleet in the Atlantic as well as in the North

1 This is a very important statement, for if it is true, Great Britain, even if entering
the war because Belgian neutrality was infringed, did so for reasons of national self-
interest, and not merely to defend the rights of a smaller nation.

2 French Yellow Book No. 63. Other despatches of the same day but without
bearing on the question at hand here, are Nos. 68, 69, and 71.

3 Ih. No. 108.
4/6. No. 110.
5/6. No. 126.

6/6. No. 137. . . J . .T .o^

The coupling of these despatches shows that the final promise contained in No. 137

is the result of diplomatic efforts begun by France, certainly not later than on July 27.

Cf. French Yellow Book No. 63, July 27.

408 Official Diplomatic Documents

Sea and Channel. In addition I would note that British ports could
not serve as places for revictualling for the German fleet.

Rene Viviani.
To Berlin

French Yellow Book No. 139

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin.

Paris, August 2, 1914.

German troops having to-day violated the eastern frontier at
several points I request you immediately to protest in writing to
the German Government. You will be good enough to take as your
text the following note which, in the uncertainty of communications
between Paris and Berlin, I have addressed directly to the German
Ambassador : —

" The French administrative and military authorities in the eastern
district have just reported several acts which I have instructed the
Ambassador of the Republic at Berlin to bring to the knowledge of the
Imperial Government.

" The first has taken place at Delle in the district of Belfort ; on
two occasions the French Customs station in this locality has been
fired upon by a detachment of German soldiers. North of Delle ^
two German patrols of the 5th mounted Jaegers crossed the frontier
this morning and advanced to the villages of Joncherey and Baron,
more than ten kilometres from the frontier. The officer who com-
manded the first has blown out the brains of a French soldier. The
German cavalry carried off some horses which the French mayor of
Suarce was collecting and forced the inhabitants of the commune to
lead the said horses.

"The Ambassador of the Republic at Berlin has been instructed
to make a formal protest to the Imperial Government against acts
which form a flagrant violation of the frontier by German troops in
arms, and which are not justified by anything in the present situation.
The Government of the Republic can only leave to the Imperial
Government the entire responsibility for these acts."

Rene Viviani.
Great Britain:

From Luxemburg

British Blue Book No. 129 ^ .

Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received
August 2.)

(Translation.)

Luxembourg, 2 aout, 1914- Luxemburg, August 2, 1914.

(Telegraphique.)^ (Telegraphic.)

MiNiSTRE d'Etat du Luxem- The Luxemburg Minister of

bourg Eyschen vient de recevoir State, Eyschen, has just received

1 Cf. above, No. 136, same day.

2 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 132, same day.

August 2, British Blue Book No. 138 409

par rintermediaire du Ministre through the German Minister in

d'Allemagne a Luxembourg, M. Luxemburg, M. de Buch, a tele-

deBuch,untelegrammeduChan- gram from the Chancellor of the

eelier de TEmpire allemand Beth- German Empire, Bethmann-

mann-Hollweg disant que les Hollweg, to the effect that the

mesures militaires a Luxembourg military measures taken in

ne constituent pas un acte hostile Luxemburg do not constitute a

contre le Luxembourg, mais sont hostile act against Luxemburg,

uniquement des mesures destinees but are only intended to insure

a assurer contre attaque even- against a possible attack of a

tuelle d'une armee fran9aise. French army. Full compensa-

L'exploitation des voies ferrees tion will be paid to Luxemburg

affermees a I'Empire Luxembourg for any damage caused by using

recevra complete indemnite pour the railways which are leased to

dommages eventuels. the Empire.

[For British Blue Book Nos. 130 to 137 see under August 1.]

From Berlin

British Blue Book No. 138

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. —
{Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 1, 1914.

Your telegram of to-day.^

I have communicated the substance of the above telegram to the
Secretary of State, and spent a long time arguing with him that the
chief dispute was between Austria and Russia, and that Germany
was only drawn in as Austria's ally. If therefore Austria and Russia
were, as was evident, ready to discuss matters and Germany did not
desire war on her own account, it seemed to me only logical that
Germany should hold her hand and continue to work for a peaceful
settlement. Secretary of State said that Austria's readiness to dis-
cuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, and, had not
Russia mobilised against Germany, all would have been well. But
Russia by abstaining from answering Germany's demand that she
should demobilise, had caused Germany to mobilise also. Russia
had said that her mobilisation did not necessarily imply war, and
that she could perfectly well remain mobilised for months without
making war. This was not the case with Germany. She had the
speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the German
Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time to bring
up masses of troops from all parts of her wide dominions. The situa-
tion now was that, though the Imperial Government had allowed her
several hours beyond the specified time, Russia had sent no answer.
Germany had therefore ordered mobilisation, and the German repre-
sentative at St. Petersburgh had been instructed within a certain

1 British Blue Book No. 131, August 1.

410 Official Diplomatic Documents

time to inform the Russian Government that the Imperial Govern-
ment must regard their refusal to an answer as creating a state of
war.^

From St. Peter sburgh

British Blue Book No. 139

Sir G. Bicchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward
^ Grey. — {Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, August 1, 191^.

My telegram of 31st July.^

The Emperor of Russia read his telegram to the German Emperor
to the German Ambassador at the audience given to his Excellency
yesterday.^ No progress whatever was made.

In the evening ^ M. Sazonof ^ had an interview with the Austrian
Ambassador who, not being definitely instructed by his Government,
did his best to deflect the conversation towards a general discussion
of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia instead of
keeping to the question of Servia. In reply the Minister for Foreign
Affairs expressed his desire that these relations should remain friendly,
and said that, taken in general, they were perfectly satisfactory ; but
the real question which they had to solve at this moment was whether
Austria was to crush Servia and to reduce her to the status of a vassal,^
or whether she was to leave Servia a free and independent State. In
these circumstances, while the Servian question was unsolved, the
abstract discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and
Russia was a waste of time. The only place where a successful dis-
cussion of this question could be expected was London, and any
such discussion was being made impossible by the action of Austria-
Hungary in subjecting Belgrade, a virtually unfortified town, to
bombardment.

M. Sazonof ^ informed the French Ambassador and myself this
morning of his conversation ^ with the Austrian Ambassador. He
went on to say that during the Balkan crisis he had made it clear to
the Austrian Government that war w^ith Russia must inevitably
follow an Austrian attack on Servia. It was clear that Austrian
domination of Servia was as intolerable for Russia as the dependence

1 Russian Orange Book No. 76, August 1.

2 British Blue Book No. 120, under date of August 1.

3 i.e. yesterday of July 31 or July 30. See French Yellow Book 102, July 30.
There is no apparent reason why an event reported in Paris of July 30 and so printed
in the French Yellow Book should appear in the British Blue Book under date of August 2.

* The date of this interview is doubtful. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador re-
ceived his instructions by telegram sent from Vienna July 30, Austro-Hungarian Red
Book No. 50, and acknowledged by him,i6. No. 55, July 31. In this latter despatch
he refers to an " uninstructed " interview on July 29. "In the evening" cannot refer
to July 31. It may refer to July 30, but since no such interview is mentioned by the
Ambassador in Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 55, it possibly refers to July 29.

^ Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

* This occurred in interview between Sazonof and th& German Ambassador on
July 29. See British Blue Book No. 97, July 30.

^ Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

* From the preceding notes it is clear that the date of this conversation cannot be
fixed.

August 2, British Blue Book No. HI 411

of the Netherlands on Germany would be to Great Britain. It was,
in fact, for Russia a question of life and death. The policy of Austria
had throughout been both tortuous and immoral, and she thought
that she could treat Russia with defiance, secure in the support of
her German ally. Similarly the policy of Germany had been an
equivocal and double-faced policy, and it mattered little whether the
German Government knew or did not know the terms of the Austrian
ultimatum ; what mattered was that her intervention with the Aus-
trian Government had been postponed until the moment had passed
when its influence would have been felt. Germany was unfortunate
in her representatives in Vienna and St. Petersburgh: the former
was a violent Russophobe who had urged Austria on, the latter had
reported to his Government that Russia would never go to war.^
M. Sazonof was completely weary of the ceaseless endeavours he had
made to avoid a war. No suggestion held out to him had been re-
fused. He had accepted the proposal for a conference of four, for
mediation by Great Britain and Italy, for direct conversation between
Austria and Russia ; but Germany and Austria-Hungary had either
rendered these attempts for peace ineffective by evasive replies or
had refused them altogether. The action of the Austro-Hungarian
Government and the German preparations had forced the Russian
Government to order mobilisation, and the mobilisation of Germany
had created a desperate situation.^

M. Sazonof added that the formula, of which the text is contained
in my telegram of 31st July,^ had been forwarded by the Russian
Government to Vienna, and he would adhere to it if you could obtain
its acceptance before the frontier was crossed by German troops.
In no case would Russia begin hostilities first.

I now see no possibility of a general war being avoided unless the
agreement of France and Germany can be obtained to keep their
armies mobilised on their own sides of the frontier, as Russia has
expressed her readiness to do,^ pending a last attempt to reach a
settlement of the present crisis.

[For British Blue Book No. 140 see under August 1.]

From Vienna

British Blue Book No. 141

Sir M, de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward

Grey. — {Received August 2.)
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 1, 1914.

I AM to be received to-morrow by Minister for Foreign Affairs.
This afternoon he is to see the French and Russian Ambassadors.
I have just be^n informed by the Russian Ambassador of German

1 For a similar statement see British Blue Book No. 71, July 29. ^ .,. ^

2 This almost sounds as if Russia claimed that she had a right to mobilise, but that
her neighbor had not.

3 British Blue Book No. 120, under date of August 1. , , ., ,

* For Germany's reason for her belief that Russia could wait, while she could not,
see previous despatch.

412 Official Diplomatic Documents

ultimatum ^ requiring that Russia should demobilise within twelve
hours. On being asked by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs
whether the inevitable refusal of Russia to yield to this curt sum-
mons meant war, the German Ambassador replied that Germany
would be forced to mobilise if Russia refused. Russian Ambassador
at Vienna thinks that war is almost inevitable, and that as mobilisa-
tion is too expensive to be kept for long, Germany will attack Russia
at once. He says that the so-called mobilisation of Russia amounted
to nothing more than that Russia had taken military measures cor-
responding to those taken by Germany.^ There seems to be even
greater tension between Germany and Russia than there is between
Austria and Russia. Russia would, according to the Russian Am-
bassador, be satisfied even now w^ith assurance respecting Servian
integrity and independence.^ He says that Russia had no intention
to attack Austria. He is going again to-day to point out to the
Minister for Foreign Affairs that most terrific consequences must
ensue from refusal to make this slight concession. This time Russia
would fight to the last extremity. I agree with his Excellency that
the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from the first, and
that his strong personal bias probably coloured his action here.^
The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German Government
also desired war from the first. ^

It is the intention of the French Ambassador to speak earnestly
to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day on the extreme danger of
the situation, and to ask whether proposals to serve as a basis of
mediation from any quarter are being considered.^ There is great
anxiety to know what England will do. I fear that nothing can alter
the determination of Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed on
their present course, if they have made up their mind with the
approval of Germany.

From Berlin

British Blue Book No. 142

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. —
(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 1, 1914-

Orders have just "^ been issued for the general mobilisation of the
navy and army, the first day of mobilisation to be 2nd August.

1 This ultimatum was presented on July 31. German White Book, Exhibit 25.
It seems incredible that the Russian Ambassador refrained from telling this to Sir
M. de Bunsen until the next day.

2 The despatches of the previous days disprove this. Germany sent her ultimatum
after Russia had mobilised, and did not herself order general mobilisation until August
1 to take effect on August 2. See British Blue Book No. 138 under date of August 2,
and next number.

3 They were guaranteed by Germany on July 29. See British Blue Book No. 97,
July 30.

* Cf . previous despatch where he is called a Russophobe.

^ This is contradicted by the statement discussed in note 1 (page 411) to the previous
despatch. No. 140.

« This statement is unsupported by any evidence contained in the French Yellow
Book.

' This despatch disposes of the statements found in previous despatches to the
effect that Germany had mobilised earlier.

Augmt 2, British Blue Book No. IJfi 413

From Berlin

British Blue Book No. 143

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. —
(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 1, 191Jf.

Detention of British merchant ships at Hamburg.

Your telegram of 1st August ^ acted on.

Secretary of State, who expressed the greatest surprise and annoy-
ance, has promised to send orders at once to allow steamers to pro-
ceed without delay.

From Berlin

British Blue Book No. 144

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. —
{Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 2, IVI4.

Secretary of State has just informed me that, owing ^ to certain
Russian troops having crossed frontier, Germany and Russia are
now in a state of war.

From Berlin

British Blue Book No. 145

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. —
(Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 2, 191 4.

My telegram of 1st August.^

Secretary of State informs me that orders were sent last night to
allow British ships in Hamburg to proceed on their way. He says
that this must be regarded as a special favour to His Majesty's
Government, as no other foreign ships have been allowed to leave.
Reason of detention was that mines were being laid and other pre-
cautions being taken.

From Brussels

British Blue Book No. 146

Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey. —

(Received August 2).
(Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 2, 1914.

The news that a German force has entered Grand Duchy of
Luxemburg has been officially confirmed to the Belgian Government.^

1 British Blue Book No. 130, August 1. ^, t^ . ^ -,, ,

2 The declaration of war does not contain this reason. Cf . Russian Orange Book
No. 76, August 1.

3 c^ee No. 143.

* Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 18, August 2, and British Blue Book next despatch.

414 Official Diplomatic Documents

From Luxemburg

British Blue Book No. 147

Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received
August 2.)

(Translation.)

(Telegraphique.)

Luxembourg, le 2 aout, 19H.

J'ai rhonneur de porter a la
connaissance de votre Excellence
les faits suivants :

Dimanche, 2 aout, de grand
matin, les troupes allemandes,
d'apres les informations qui sont
parvenues au Gouvernement
Grand ducal a Theure actuelle,
ont penetre sur le territoire
luxembourgeois par les ponts de
Wasserbillig et de Remich, se
dirigeant specialement vers le
sud du pays et vers la ville de
Luxembourg, capitale du Grand
Duche. Un certain nombre de
trains blindes avec des troupes
et des munitions ont ete ache-
mines par la voie de chemin de
f er de Wasserbillig a Luxembourg,
ou Ton s'attend de les voir arriver.
D'un instant a Tautre, ces faits
impliquent des actes manifeste-
ment contraire a la neutralite du
Grand Duche garantie par le
Traite de Londres de 1867. Le
Gouvernement luxembourgeois
n*a pas manque de protester
energiquement contre cette agres-
sion aupres des representants de
Sa Majeste I'Empereur d'Alle-
magne a Luxembourg. Une
protestation identique va etre
transmise telegraphiquement au
Secretaire d'Etat pour les Affaires
Etrangeres a Berlin.

(Telegraphic.)

Luxemburg, August 2, 1914-
I HAVE the honour to bring
to your Excellency's notice the
following facts : —

On Sunday, the 2nd August,
very early, the German troops,
according to the information
which has up to now reached
the Grand Ducal Government,
penetrated into Luxemburg terri-
tory by the bridges of Wasser-
billig and Remich, and proceeded
particularly towards the south
and in the direction of Luxem-
burg, the capital of the Grand
Duchy. A certain number of
armoured trains with troops and
ammunition have been sent along
the railway line from Wasserbillig
to Luxemburg, where their arrival
is expected. These occurrences
constitute acts which are mani-
festly contrary to the neutrality
of the Grand Duchy as guaran-
teed by the Treaty of London of
1867. The Luxemburg Govern-
ment have not failed to address
an energetic protest against this
aggression to the representatives
of His Majesty the German Em-
peror at Luxemburg. An iden-
tical protest will be sent by tele-
graph to the Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs at Berlin.

August 2, British Blue Book No. I48 415

To Paris

Bkitish Blue Book No. 148

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 2, 1914.

After the Cabinet this morning ^ I gave M. Cambon the follow-
ing memorandum : —

"I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German fleet
comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile
operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will
give all the protection in its power.

"This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty's
Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be
taken as binding^ His Majesty's Government to take any action
until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes
place." ^

I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difiicult
issues to consider, and that Government felt that they could not bind
themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke
out between France and Germany to-morrow, but it was essential
to the French Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated
in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with
their north coast entirely undefended. We therefore thought it
necessary to give them this assurance^ It did not bind us to go to
war with Germany unless the German fleet took the action indicated,
but it did give a security to France that would enable her to settle
the disposition of her own Mediterranean fleet.

M. Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told
him the doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord
Clarendon in 1867. He asked me what we should say about the
violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much more
important matter; we were considering what statement we should
make in Parliament to-morrow — in effect, whether we should declare
violation of Belgian neutrality to be a casv^ belli. I told him what
had been said to the German Ambassador on this point .^

1 At two previous meetings the Cabinet had refused to make any promises to
France; see French Yellow Book Nos. 110, July 31, and 126, August 1, and note 4.

This promise was given before Germany's ultimatum to Belgium, see Belgian Gray
Book No. 201, August 2.

2 This is the very opposite of French Yellow Book No. 143, August 3 : "is to be
regarded as binding the British Government. Sir E. Grey assured me of this."

3 This iformula is different from the one given in French Yellow Book No. 143,
August 3, and quoted by Viviani in the Chamber of Deputies, French Yellow Book
No. 159, August 4. In both the last sentence reads "from that moment on England
and Germany would be in a state of war." There are then two distinct formulas.
The one appears in British Blue Book No. 148, French Yellow Book No. 137, Aug. 2,
and in the Speech in Parliament by Sir E. Grey printed as an appendix to the British
Blue Book. The other occurs in French Yellow Book No. 143, August 3, and No. 159,
August 4.

* British Blue Book No. 123, August 1.

416 Official Diplomatic Documents

To Berlin
British Blue Book No. 149
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Gosclien, British Ambassador at Berlin.
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 2, 1914.

Your telegram of 1st August.^

I regret to learn that 100 tons of sugar was compulsorily unloaded
from the British steamship Sappho at Hamburg and detained.
Similar action appears to have been taken with regard to other
British vessels loaded with sugar.

You should inform Secretary of State that, for reasons stated in
my telegram of 1st August,^ I most earnestly trust that the orders
already sent to Hamburg to allow the clearance of British ships
covers also the release of their cargoes, the detention of which can-
not be justified.

Russia :

Russian Orange Book No. 77

Announcement by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting
Recent Events.

July 20 {August 2), 1914.

A GARBLED version of the events of the last few days having ap-
peared in the foreign press, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs
considers it his duty to publish the following brief account of the
diplomatic discussions during the period under review : —

On the 10th (23rd) July, 1914, the Austro-Hungarian Minister at
Belgrade presented a note to the Prime Minister of Servia, in which
the Servian Government were accused of having fostered the pan-
Serb movement, which had led to the assassination of the heir to the
Austro-Hungarian throne. Austria-Hungary, therefore, demanded
of the Servian Government, not only the condemnation in the most
formal manner of the above-mentioned propaganda, but also the
adoption, under Austrian supervision, of a series of measures for the
discovery of the plot, for the punishment of any Servian subjects
who had taken part in it, and for the prevention of any future
attempts at assassination upon Austrian soil. A time limit of forty-
eight hours was given to the Servian Government within which to
reply to this note.

The Russian Government, to whom the Austro-Hungarian Am-
bassador at St. Petersburgh had communicated the text of the note
seventeen hours after its presentation at Belgrade, having taken
note of the demands contained therein, could not but perceive that
some of these demands were impossible of execution as regards their
substance, whilst others were presented in a form which was incom-
patible with the dignity of an independent State. Russia considered
that the humiliation of Servia, involved in these demands, and

1 British Blue Book No. 143, under date of August 2.

2 British Blue Book No. 130, August 1.

August 2, Russian Orange Book No. 77 417

equally the evident intention of Austria-Hungary to secure her own
hegemony in the Balkans, which underlay her conditions/ were in-
admissible. The Russian Government, therefore, pointed out to
Austria-Hungary in the most friendly manner that it would be
desirable to re-examine the points contained in the Austro-Hun-
garian note. The Austro-Hungarian Government did not see their
way to agree to a discussion of the note. The moderating influence
of the four Powers at Vienna was equally unsuccessful.

Despite the fact that Servia had reprobated the crime,^ and had
shown herself ready to give Austria satisfaction to an extent beyond
the expectations,^ not only of Russia, but also of the other Powers —
despite these facts, the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade con-
sidered the Servian reply insufficient and left the town.

Recognising the exaggerated nature of the demands made by
Austria, Russia had previously ^ declared that she could not remain
indifferent, while not desisting from doing her utmost to find a peace-
ful issue which might prove acceptable ^ to Austria, and spare the
latter's self-respect as a Great Power. At the same time Russia let
it be clearly understood that she could accept a peaceful settlement
of the question only so far as it involved no humiliation of Servia as
an independent State. Unhappily all the efforts of the Russian
Government to this end were fruitless. The Austro-Hungarian Gov-
ernment, which had shunned any attempt at conciliatory interven-
tion by the Powers in the Austrian dispute with Servia, proceeded
to mobilise and declared war officially against Servia, and the follow-
ing day Belgrade was bombarded. The manifesto which accom-
panied the declaration of war openly accuses Servia of having pre-
pared and carried out the crime of Serajevo. Such an accusation of
a crime at common law, launched against a whole people and a whole
State, aroused, by its evident inanity,^ widespread sympathy for
Servia throughout all classes of European society.

In consequence of this behaviour of the Austro-Hungarian Gov-
ernment in spite of Russia's declaration that she could not remain
indifferent to the fate of Servia, the Russian Government considered
it necessary to order mobilisation in the military districts of Kieff,
Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan. This decision was rendered necessary
by the fact that since the date when the Austro-Hungarian note was
communicated to the Servian Government, and since the first steps
taken by Russia, five days had elapsed, and yet the Vienna Cabinet
had not taken one step to meet Russia halfway in her efforts towards
peace. Indeed, quite the contrary; for the mobilisation of half of
the Austro-Hungarian army had been ordered.

The German Government were kept informed of the steps taken

1 This implies to Austria-Hungary a motive which may or may not have been hers.

2 No evidence for. this has been given.

3 This is denied by Austria-Hungary. See the despatches of July 26, especially
Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27.

s Cf. British Blue Book No. 120, under date of August 1, note 4.
6 The "dossier," Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25, takes a different
view.

418 Official Diplomatic Documents

by Russia. At the same time it was explained to them that these
steps were only the result of the Austrian preparations, and that
they were not in any way aimed at Germany. Simultaneously, the
Russian Government declared that Russia was ready to continue
discussions with a view to a peaceful settlement of the dispute, either
in the form of direct negotiations with Vienna or, as suggested by
Great Britain, in the form of a conference of the four Great Powers
not directly interested, that is to say. Great Britain, France, Ger-
many, and Italy.

This attempt on the part of Russia was, however, equally unsuc-
cessful. Austria-Hungary declined ^ a further exchange of views
with Russia, and the Vienna Cabinet was unwilling to join the pro-
posed conference of the Powers.

Nevertheless Russia did not abandon her efforts for peace. When
questioned by the German Ambassador as to the conditions on which
we would still agree to suspend our preparations, the Minister for
Foreign Affairs declared ^ that these conditions were Austria^s recog-
nition that the Austro-Serbian question had assumed a European
character, and a declaration by her that she agreed not to insist
upon such of her demands as were incompatible with the sovereign
rights of Servia.

Germany considered ^ this Russian proposal unacceptable to
Austria-Hungary. At that very moment news of the proclamation
of general mobilisation ^ by Austria-Hungary reached St. Petersburg.

All this time hostilities were continuing on Servian territory, and
Belgrade was bombarded afresh.

The failure of our proposals for peace compelled us to extend the
scope of our precautionary military measures.^

The Berlin Cabinet questioned us on this, and we replied that
Russia was compelled to begin preparations ^ so as to be ready for
every emergency.

But while taking this precautionary step, Russia did not on that
account abandon her strenuous efforts to find some solution of the
situation, and she announced that she was ready to accept any pro-
posed settlement of the problem that might be put forward, provided
it complied with the conditions laid down by her.

In spite of this conciliatory communication, the German Govern-
ment on the 18th (31st) July demanded of the Russian Government
that they should suspend their military measures by midday on the
19th July (1st August), and threatened, should they fail to comply,
to proceed to general mobilisation.^

1 This is denied by Austria-Hungary. See Red Book No. 50, July 30.

2 British Blue Book No. 97, July 30.

' There is no evidence of this anywhere. The formula was changed at England's
request, British Blue Book No. 132, August 1.

* Russia's general mobilisation took place on July 31. That of Austria-Hungary
on August 1. See British Blue Book No. 127, August 1.

^ This is contradicted by the previous note.

* "Begin preparations" is hardly the word for general mobilisation.

' In this sentence the Russian general mobilisation of July 31 is called "military
measures" while the German order of August 1 as of August 2, is properly called
what it is, general mobilisation.

August 2, Russian Orange Book No. 78 419

On the following day, the 19th July (1st August), the German
Ambassador, on behalf of his Government, forwarded a declaration
of war ^ to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

To Russian Representatives Abroad

Russian Orange Book No. 78

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Representatives
abroad.

(Telegram.) St. Petersburg, July 20 {August 2), 1914.

It is quite evident that Germany is now doing her utmost to foist
upon us the responsibility for the rupture. We were forced to
mobilise by the immense responsibility which would have fallen
upon our shoulders if we had not taken all possible precautionary
measures at a time when Austria, while confining herself to discus-
sions of a dilatory nature, was bombarding Belgrade and was under-
taking ^ general mobilisation.

The Emperor of Russia had promised the German Emperor that
he would take no aggressive action ^ as long as the discussions with
Austria continued. With such a guarantee, and after so many
proofs of Russia's desire for peace,^ Germany neither could, nor had
the right to, doubt our declaration that we would joyfully accept
any peaceful settlement compatible with the dignity and independ-
ence of Servia. Any other solution, besides being entirely incompat-
ible with our own dignity, would assuredly have upset the European
balance of power by securing the hegemony of Germany. The
European — nay, the world-wide — character of this dispute ^ is
infinitely more important than the pretext from which it springs.
By her decision to declare ivar upon us, at a moment when negotia-
tions were in progress between the Powers, Germany has assumed a
heavy responsibility.

1 Russian Orange Book No. 76, August 1.

2 This statement is more accurate than that contained in previous despatch. See
Russian Orange Book No. 77 note 10.

3 General mobiHsation is universally looked upon as an aggressive act in itself.

* Nobody before had called a general mobilisation a "proof of a desire for peace."
^ The previous sentence shows that so far as Russia is concerned she did not believe
that Prussianism or frightfulness or the invasion of Belgium, but the European balance
of power, would supply the motive for England to enter the war.

420

Official Diplomatic Documents

Monday, August 3, 1914
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

Foreign Office of

Sent Despatches to

Received
Despatches from

Austria-Hungary
Belgium

London, etc.
King George
German Minister

London

France

London, London, etc.

The Hague, Brussels,

All representatives
Berlin, Munich

London
German Ambassador

Germany
Great Britain

Paris

Berlin, Brussels

Russia

Serbia

Austria-Hungary is silent on this day.

Belgium refuses to accede to the German ultimatum and appeals to Great
Britain for ''diplomatic intervention." To the informal offer of military assist-
ance she replies, to the French Minister, that she is "making no appeal at present
to the guarantee of the Powers."

France offers her military assistance to Belgium, who declines it with thanks.
She denies the German accusations of having violated Belgian neutrality, and
having committed hostile acts against Germany. When the latter declares war
on her, she recalls her diplomatic agents from Germany, and lodges with the latter
formal protest against her violations of Luxemburg and Belgian neutrality.

Germany declares war on France at 6.45 p.m. citing as reasons several unlawful
and hostile acts on the part of France, whom she also charges with having violated
Belgian neutrality.

Great Britain issues only one important despatch. It contains the Italian
intention not to enter the war on the side of her allies of the Triple Alliance.
This Italian declaration is sent by Sir E. Grey to the British Ambassador in Paris
on the authority of the French Ambassador in London.

Russia is silent on this day.

Serbia is silent.

Belgium :

From Berlin
Belgian Gray Book No. 21

Meinorandum of an Interview asked for at 1.30 A.M., on August 3, by
Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister, with Baron van der
Elst, Secretary-General to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

At 1.30 A.M. the German Minister asked to see Baron van der
Elst. Pie told him that he had been instructed by his Government
to inform the Belgian Government that French dirigibles had thrown
bombs, and that a French cavalry patrol had crossed the frontier in
violation of international law, seeing that war had not been declared.^

The Secretary-General asked Herr von Below where these incidents
had happened, and was told that it was in Germany. Baron van der

1 Similar charges against Germany were made by France ; see French Yellow Book
No. 136, August 2.

August 3, Belgian Gray Book No. 22 421

Elst then observed that in that case he could not understand the
object of this communication. Herr von Below stated that these
acts, which were contrary to international law, were calculated to
lead to the supposition that other acts, contrary to international law,
would be committed by France.

To Berlin

Belgian Gray Book No. 22

Note communicated by M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister.

Brussels, August 3, 1914 (^ A.M.).

The German Government stated in their note of the 2nd August,^
1914, that according to reliable information French forces intended
to march on the Meuse via Givet and Namur, and that Belgium, in
spite of the best intentions, would not be in a position to repulse,
without assistance, an advance of French troops.^

The German Government, therefore, considered themselves com-
pelled to anticipate this attack and to violate Belgian territory. In
these circumstances, Germany proposed to the Belgian Government
to adopt a friendly attitude towards her, and undertook, on the con-
clusion of peace, to guarantee the integrity of the Kingdom and its
possessions to their full extent. The note added that if Belgium
put difficulties in the way of the advance of German troops, Germany
would be compelled to consider her as an enemy, and to leave the
ultimate adjustment of the relations between the two States to the
decision of arms.

This note had made a deep and painful impression^ upon the Bel-
gian Government.

The intentions attributed to France by Germany are in contra-*
diction to the formal declarations made to us on August 1, in the
name of the French Government.

Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, Belgian neutrality
should be violated by France, Belgium intends to fulfil her inter-
national obligations and the Belgian army would offer the most
vigorous resistance to the invader.*

The treaties of 1839, confirmed ^ by the treaties of 1870, vouch for
the independence and neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of
the Powers, and notably of the Government of His Majesty the King
of Prussia.

1 Belgian Gray Book No. 20, August 2.

2 This is exactly the same argument advanced by Great Britain in the second of the
Brussels documents (see p. 580) when the British officer claimed that the British
troops would enter Belgium even unasked.

3 The ring of sincerity in this sentence is lessened after having studied the document
mentioned in the previous note.

* It would, however, have been almost hopeless, for since Great Britain had the mil-
itary secrets of Belgium, France had them also, undoubtedly. See documents men-
tioned in preceding notes.

6 It had been claimed in Parliament in 1870 that the treaties of 1870 invalidated
those of 1839. See the editor's Germany's Point of View, the chapters on Belgium.

422 Official Diplomatic Documents

Belgium has always been faithful to her international obligations/
she has carried out her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality, and
she has left nothing undone to maintain and enforce respect for her
neutrality.

The attack upon her independence ^ with which the German
Government threaten her constitutes a flagrant violation of inter-
national law. No strategic interest justifies such a violation of law.

The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the proposals sub-
mitted to them, would sacrifice the honour of the nation and betray
their duty towards Europe.

Conscious of the part which Belgium has played for more than
eighty years in the civilisation ^ of the world, they refuse to believe
that the independence of Belgium can only be preserved at the price
of the violation of her neutrality.

If this hope is disappointed the Belgian Government are firmly
resolved to repel, by all the means in their power, every attack upon
their rights.

To St. Petersburgh, Berlin^ London, Paris, Vienna, and The Hague
Belgian Gray Book No. 23

M. Damgnon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian
Ministers at St. Petersbiirgh, Berlin, London, Paris, Vienna, The
Haggle.
(Telegram.) Brussels, August 3, 1914.

At 7 P.M. last night Germany presented a note proposing friendly
neutrality. This entailed free passage through Belgian territory,
while guaranteeing the maintenance of the independence of Belgium
and of her possessions on the conclusion of peace, and threatened, in
the event of refusal, to treat Belgium as an enemy. A time limit of
twelve hours was allowed within which to reply.

Our answer ^ has been that this infringement of our neutrality
would be a flagrant violation of international law. To accept the
German proposal would be to sacrifice the honour of the nation.
Conscious of her duty, Belgium is firmly resolved to repel any attack
by all the means in her power.

To Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petershurgh
Belgian Gray Book No. 24

M. Damgnon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian
Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petershurgh.
Sir, Brussels, August 3, 1914 U^ noon).

As you are aware, Germany has delivered to Belgium an ultima-
tum which expires this morning, 3rd August, at 7 a.m. As no act of

^ Germany claims that this is not true in view of the Brussels documents.
2 Germany had explicitly disclaimed making any attack on the "independence" of
Belgium.

2 The writer here forgot the chapter of Belgian atrocities in the Congo.
* See preceding despatch.

August 3, Belgian Gray Book No, 25 423

war has occurred up to the present, the Cabinet has decided that
there is, for the moment, no need to appeal to the guaranteeing
Powers.

The French Minister has made the following statement to me
upon the subject : —

(Translation.)

"Sans etre charge d'une decla- "Although I have received no

ration de mon Gouvernement, je instructions ^ to make a declara-

crois cependant, m'inspirant de tion from my Government, I feel

ses intentions connues, pouvoir justified, in view of their wtII-

dire que si le Gouvernement known intentions, in saying that

Royal faisait appel au Gouverne- if the Belgian Government were

ment fran^ais, comme Puissance to appeal to the French Govern-

garante de sa neutralite, nous ment as one of the Powers

repondrions immediatement a guaranteeing their neutrality, the

son appel; si cet appel n'etait French Government would at.

pas formule, il est probable, a once respond to Belgium's ap-

moins bien entendu que le souci peal ; ^ if such an appeal were

de sa propre defense ne determine not made, it is probable that

des mesures exceptionnelles, qu'il — unless of course exceptional

attendra pour intervenir que la measures were rendered necessary

Belgique ait fait un acte de in self-defence — the French

resistance effective." Government would not intervene

until Belgium had taken some
effective measure of resistance."

I thanked M. Klobukowski for the support which the French
Government had been good enough to offer us in case of need, and
I informed him that the Belgian Government were making no appeal
at present to the guarantee of the Powers, and that they would
decide later what ought to be done.^

To King George
Belgian Gray Book No. 25
His Majesty the King of the Belgians to His Majesty King George.
(Telegram.) Brussels, August 3, 1914.

Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship
and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England

1 It is unusual for diplomatic agents to speak without instructions or, as it is called,
de suo, and even more unusual to include such informal remarks in the official books
of despatches. The French Minister to Belgium had once before spoken de suo.
See Belgian Gray Book No. 9, July 31.

When M. Davignon gave a running review of the events leading up to August 4,
and quoted this despatch (No. 24) in No. 38, he felt constrained to explain the unusual
procedure of the French Minister by interpolating the words "in view of the rapid
march of events."

2 This appeal it was decided not to make as late as 10 o'clock, August 4. See
Belgian Gray Book No. 38.

3 For this reply see also French Yellow Book No. 142, and British Blue Book No. 151,
both August 3. In the British Blue Book the French offer consists of "five French
army corps." Since that can hardly be interpolated, the above declaration cannot
be accurate, although it has been printed in quotation marks.

424 Official Diplomatic Documents

in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I
make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention^ of your
Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium.

From London

Belgian Gray Book No. 26

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Bel-
gian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) . London, August 3, 1914-

1 SHOWED your telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who
has laid it before the Cabinet. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has
informed me that if our neutrality is violated it means war with
Germany. 2

France :

From The Hague

French Yellow Book No. 140

M. Marcelin Pellet, French Minister at The Hague, to M. Rene Vi-
mani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Hague, August 3, 1914-

The German Minister called yesterday on the Minister for For-
eign Affairs to explain the necessity under which, as he said, Ger-
many was placed of violating the neutral territory of Luxemburg,
adding that he would have a fresh communication to make to him
to-day. He has now this morning announced the entry of German
troops into Belgium in order, as he has explained, to prevent an
occupation of that country by France. p

From Brussels

French Yellow Book No. 141

M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, August 3, 1914-

Yesterday evening the German Minister handed to the Belgian
Government an ultimatum ^ stating that his Government, having
learnt that the French were preparing for operations in the districts

^ Cf. No. 24, same day, and No. 38, August 4. The appeal here made is only for
"diplomatic intervention." Such diplomatic intervention was of course out of the
question, since the British Cabinet, on August 2, had authorised Sir Edward Grey to
promise to France British assistance in the war against Germany. Cf . British Blue
Book No. 148, August 2.

2 See note to preceding despatch, and to French Yellow Book No. 143 and British
Blue Book No. 148, both of August 2, and Belgian Gray Book No. 23, August 3.

« Belgian Gray Book No. 20, August 2.

August 3, French Yellow Book No. I4S 425

of Givet and of Namur, were compelled to take steps, the first of
which was to invite the Belgian Government to inform them, within
seven ^ hours, if they were disposed to facilitate military operations in
Belgium against France. In case of refusal the fortune of war would
decide.

The Government of the King answered ^ that the information as
to the French movements appeared to them to be inaccurate in view
of the formal assurances which had been given by France, and were
still quite recent ; that Belgium, which since the establishment of
her Kingdom, has taken every care to assure the protection of her
dignity and of her interests, and has devoted all her efforts to peaceful
development of progress, strongly protests against any violation of
her territory from whatever quarter it may come : and that, sup-
posing the violation takes place, she will know how to defend with
energy her neutrality, which has been guaranteed by the Powers,

and notably by the King of Prussia. t^

*^ "^ ^ Klobukowski.

From Brussels

French Yellow Book No. 142

M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, August 3, 1914.

To the assurance which I gave him that if Belgium appealed to the
guarantee of the Powers against the violation of her neutrality by
Germany, France would at once respond to her appeal, the Minister
for Foreign Affairs answered :

" It is with great sincerity that we thank the Government of the
Republic for the support which it would eventually be able to offer
us, but under present conditions we do not appeal to the guarantee
of the Powers. At a later date the Government of the King will
weigh the measures which it may be necessary to take." ^

From London

French Yellow Book No. 143

M. Paul Camhon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, August 3, 1914-
Sir Edward Grey has authorised me to inform you that you
could state to Parliament that he was making explanations to the

1 This is an error. It was 12 hours, see also Belgian Gray Book No. 38, August 4.
The ultimatum was presented at 7 p.m. on August 2, and expired at 7 a.m. on August 3.
It was presented several hours after Great Britain had promised her support on the
sea to France, which made her an ally of France without any reference to Belgium. See
British Blue Book No. 148, August 2.

2 Belgian Gray Book No. 22, August 3.

' Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 24, August 3, and note 3. Also British Blue Book.
No. 151, August 3.

426 Official Diplomatic Documents

Commons as to the present attitude of the British Government, and
that the chief of these declarations would be as follows : —

"In case the German fleet came into the Channel or entered the
North Sea in order to go round the British Isles with the object of
attacking the French coasts or the French navy and of harassing
French merchant shipping, the British fleet would intervene in order
to give to French shipping its complete protection, in such a way
that from that moment Great Britain and Germany would be in a
state of war." ^

Sir Edward Grey explained to me that the mention of an opera-
tion by way of the North Sea implied protection against a demon-
stration in the Atlantic Ocean.

The declaration concerning the intervention of the British fleet
must be considered as binding ^ the British Government. Sir
Edward Grey has assured me of this and has added that the French
Government were thereby authorised to inform the Chambers of
this.

On my return to the Embassy I received your telephonic ^ com-
munication relating to the German ultimatum addressed to Belgium.
I immediately communicated it to Sir Edward Grey.

Paul Cambon.

From London

French Yellow Book No. 144

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, August 3, 1914.

Just as Sir Edward Grey was starting this morning for the meet-
ing of the Cabinet, my German colleague, who had already seen him
yesterday, came to press him to say that the neutrality of Great
Britain did not depend upon respecting Belgian neutrality. Sir
Edward Grey refused all conversation on this matter.^

The German: Ambassador has sent to the press a communique
saying that if Great Britain remained neutral Germany would give
up all naval operations and would not make use of the Belgian
coast as a point d'appui.^ My answer is that respecting the coast is
not respecting the neutrality of the territory, and that the German
ultimatum is already a violation of this neutrality.

Paul Cambon.

1 For the different wording of this formula see notes to British Blue Book No. 148,
August 2, and French Yellow Book No. 137, August 2.

2 See despatches mentioned in preceding note.

' This is very important, because it suggests that besides the loritten communications
which are printed in the official Books of documents, other communications were ex-
changed between London and Paris, and undoubtedly other places too.

* This may account for the fact that this matter is not mentioned in the British Blue
Book.

* Obviously done to allay any fear of Germany in Great Britain.

August 3, French Yellow Book No. 14? 427

From London

French Yellow Book No. 145

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene Vivianiy
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, August 3, 1914.

Sir Edward Grey has made the statement regarding the inter-
vention of the British fleet. ^ He has explained, in considering the
situation, what he proposed to do with regard to Belgian neutrality ;
and the reading of a letter from King Albert asking for the support
of Great Britain has deeply stirred the House.

The House will this evening vote the credit which is asked for;
from this moment its support is secured to the policy of the Govern-
ment, and it follows public opinion which is declaring itself more
and more in our favour. Paul Cambon.

To London

French Yellow Book No. 146

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London.

Paris, August 3, 1914.

I AM told that the German Ambassador is said to ha\ : stated to
the Foreign Office that yesterday morning eighty French officers in
Prussian uniform had attempted to cross the German frontier in
twelve motor cars at Walbeck, to the west of Geldern, and that this
formed a very serious violation of neutrality on the part of France.

Be good enough urgently to contradict this news, which is pure
invention, and to draw the attention of the Foreign Office to the
German campaign of false news which is beginning.

Rene Viviani.

From Berlin

French Yellow Book No. 147

Letter handed by the German Ambassador to M. Rene Viviani, Presi-
dent of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, during his fare-
tvell audience, August 3, 1914, at 6.45 P.M.

M. le President,

The German administrative and military authorities have estab-
lished a certain number of flagrantly hostile acts committed on Ger-
man territory by French military aviators. Several of these have
openly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the terri-

1 Which statement did he make, the one of French Yellow Book No. 137, August
2, or of ih. No. 143, August 3? In Sir E. Grey's speech given in British Blue Book of
Sept. 28, the former is given. In Viviani's speech of August 4, French Yellow Book
No. 159, the latter is quoted as having been given by Sir E. Grey.

428 Official Diplomatic Documents

tory of that country ; one has attempted to destroy buildings near
Wesel ; others have been seen in the district of the Eifel, one has
thrown bombs on the railway near Carlsruhe and Nuremberg.^

I am instructed, and I have the honour to inform your Excellency,
that in the presence of these acts of aggression the German Empire
considers itself in a state of war with France in consequence of the
acts of this latter Power.

At the same time I have the honour to bring to the knowledge
of your Excellency that the German authorities will detain French
mercantile vessels in German ports, but they will release them if,
within forty-eight hours, they are assured of complete reciprocity.

My diplomatic mission having thus come to an end, it only
remains for me to request your Excellency to be good enough to
furnish me with my passports, and to take the steps you consider
suitable to assure my return to Germany, with the staff of the Em-
bassy, as well as with the staff of the Bavarian Legation and of the
German Consulate General in Paris.

Be good enough, M. le President, to receive the assurances of my
deepest respect. (Signed) Schoen.

To the French Representatives Abroad

French Yellow Book No. 148

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to the French Representatives abroad.

Paris, August 3, 1914-

The German Ambassador has asked for his passports and is leav-
ing this evening with the staffs of the Embassy, the German Consu-
late General and the Bavarian Legation. Baron von Schoen has
given as his reason the establishment by the German administrative
and military authorities of acts of hostility which are said to have
been committed by French military aviators accused of having flown
over territory of the Empire and thrown bombs. The Ambassador
adds that the aviators are said to have also violated the neutrality
of Belgium by flying over Belgian territory. "In the presence of
these acts of aggression," says the letter of Baron von Schoen, "the
German Empire considers itself in a state of war with France in con-
sequence of the acts of this latter Power."

I formally challenged the inaccurate allegations of the Ambassa-
dor, and for my part I reminded him that I had yesterday addressed
to him a note ^ protesting against the flagrant violations of the French
frontier committed two days ago by detachments of German troops.

Rene Viviani.

1 Cf . New York Evening Post, July 22, 1916, referring to "Facts about the War"
published by the Paris Chamber of Commerce, in which Dr. Schwalbe is cited as
writing in the Deutsche Medizinische Wochenschrift, on May 18, to the effect that
his investigations cleared the French of the charge of having dropped bombs on
Nuremberg.

2 French Yellow Book Nos. 136 and 139, August 2, and note to No. 136.

August 3, French Yellow Book No. 150 429

To Berlin

French Yellow Book No. 149 •

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegram communicated to French Representatives abroad.)

Paris, August 3, 1914.

I REQUEST you to ask for your passports and to leave Berlin at
once with the staff of the Embassy, leaving the charge of French
interests and the care of the archives to the Spanish Ambassador.
I request you at the same time to protest in writing against the viola-
tion of the neutrality of Luxemburg by German troops, of which
notice has been given by the Prime Minister of Luxemburg ; against
the ultimatum addressed to the Belgian Government by the German
Minister at Brussels to force upon them the violation of Belgian
neutrality and to require of that country that she should facilitate
military operations against France on Belgian territory; finally
against the false allegation of an alleged projected invasion of these
two countries by French armies, by which he ^ has attempted to
justify the state of war which he declares henceforth exists between
Germany and France.

Rene Viviani.

To Munich

French Yellow Book No. 150

M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to M. Allize, French Minister at Munich.

Paris, August 3, 191^.

Be good enough to inform the Royal Bavarian Government that
you have received instructions to adapt your attitude to that of our
Ambassador at Berlin and to leave Munich.

Rene Viviani.

1 " He " does not refer to the last person mentioned, which was the "German Minister
at Brussels" (for whose remarks see Belgian Gray Book No. 20, August 2, 1914), but
to the German Ambassador in Paris, not mentioned in this despatch, for it was he who
"attempted to justify, etc." (see French Yellow Book No. 147, August 3). This
proves parts of the original despatch have been excised.

430 Official Diplomatic Documents

To London, St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Berne, Constan-
tinople, The Hague, Copenhagen, Christiania, Stockholm, Bucha-
rest, Athens, Belgrade.

French Yellow Book No. 151

M. Rene Vimani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to the French Representatives at London, St. Petersburgh,
Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Berne, Constantinople, The Hague, Co-
penhagen, Christiania, Stockholm, Bucharest, Athens, Belgrade.

Paris, August 3, 1914-

I LEARN from an official Belgian source ^ that German troops have
violated Belgian territory at Gemmerich in the district of Verviers.

Rene Viviani.

Great Britain:

From Berlin

British Blue Book No. 150

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. —
(Received August 3.)

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 3, 1914-

Your telegram of 2nd August : Detention of British ships at
Hamburg.

No information available.

From Brussels

British Blue Book No. 151

Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey. —
(Received August 3.)

(Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 3, 1914-

French Government have offered through their military attache
the support of five French army corps to the Belgian Government.^
Following reply has been sent to-day : —

" We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering
eventual support. In the actual circumstances, however, we do not
propose to appeal to the guarantee of the Powers. Belgian Govern-
ment will decide later on the action which they may think it neces-
sary to take."

^ No such account is contained in the Belgian Gray Book, according to which,
(No. 40, August 4,) the "armed forces of Germany" entered Belgium "this morning."
Cf. also Belgian Gray Book No. 30, August 4, which announces the violation of Belgian
territory at Gemmerich. This French despatch is, therefore, probably erroneously
dated August 3, because no "ofl&cial Belgian source " could have made the above state-
ment truthfully on August 3.

2 Cf . Belgian Gray Book No. 24 and French Yellow Book No. 142, both of August 3,
and note 3 to Belgian despatch.

August 3, British Blue Book No, 152 431

To Paris
British Blue Book No. 152
Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris,
Sir, Foreign Office, August 3, 1914,

On the 1st instant the French Ambassador made the following
communication : ^ —

"In reply to the German Government's intimation of the fact
that ultimatums had been presented to France and Russia, and to
the question as to what were the intentions of Italy, the Marquis di
San Giuliano ^ replied : —

"'The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which
might result, had, in the words of the German Ambassador himself,
an aggressive object. Both were therefore in conflict with the purely
defensive character of the Triple Alliance, and in such circumstances
Italy would remain neutral.'"

In making this cominunication, M. Cambon ^ was instructed to lay
stress upon the Italian declaration that the present war was not a
defensive but an aggressive war, and that, for this reason, the casus
fcederis under the terms of the Triple Alliance did not arise.

I am, etc.

E. Grey.

1 No reason is apparent why this Italian declaration should be sent by Sir E. Grey
to the British Ambassador in Paris on the authority of the French Ambassador in
London. There should have been an official Italian declaration available.

2 Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

3 French Ambassador in London.

432 Official Diplomatic Documents

Tuesday, August 4, 1914.
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

Foreign Office of

Sent Despatches to

Received
Despatches from

Austria-Hungary

London

Belgium

London, Paris

The Hague, Berlin,

Madrid, Berlin

London

German Minister

Belgian Ministers at

German Minister

Entente capitals

Entente Ministers in

British Minister

Brussels

France

Representatives of the

Brussels

Powers in Paris

London
Copenhagen

Germany

Great Britain

Berlin, Brussels

Brussels, Berlin

Russia

Serbia

Berlin

Austria-Hungary is discussing the possibility of maintaining friendly relations
with Great Britain.

Belgium dismisses the German Minister, and issues to the Entente Ministers
her version of the events leading up to the break with Germany. She decides, at
first, not to call on the armed intervention or assistance of the guaranteeing Powers
under the Treaty of 1839, but late in the day decides to do so.

France issues a protest on what she calls Germany's violation of the Hague
Conventions and the Treaty of 1839, addressing her protest to **the Representa-
tives of the Powers at Paris."

Germany notifies Belgium that to her ''deep regret" she finds herself "compelled
to take those measures of defence already foreshadowed as indispensable in view
of the menace of France;" and orders her troops to enter Belgian territory.

Great Britain sends an ultimatum to Germany concerning the neutrality of
Belgium. Since she, however, announces herself to be the ally of France, who is at
war with Germany, even the acceptance by Germany of the terms of the ultima-
tum could not have kept Great Britain neutral. At the same time she urges
Belgium to resist the expected invasion with force of arms, this being her reply
to Belgium's appeal for diplomatic intervention, which as the ally of France she
could, of course, not render.

Russia does not enter into the discussion on this day.

Serbia recalls her minister and consuls from Germany.

Austria-Hungary :

From London

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 58

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.) London, August 4) 1914-

I HAVE just seen Sir E. Grey. The British Government have sent
to Germany an ultimatum ^ on account of Belgium. They expect a
reply at 12 o'clock to-night.

Sir E. Grey said to me that at present there was no reason why he

1 British Blue Book No. 159, same day.

August 4, Belgian Gray Book No, 27 433

should make any communication to the Imperial and Royal Govern-
ment, and there was no cause why a conflict should arise between us,
so long as we were not in a condition of war with France. In any
case, he hoped that we would not begin hostilities without the for-
mality ^ of a previous declaration of war. He does not intend to
recall Sir M. de Bunsen.

Should we be at war with France, it would indeed be difficult for
Great Britain, as the ally ^ of France, to co-operate with her in the
Atlantic, and not in the Mediterranean.

Belgium :

From Berlin

Belgian Gray Book No. 27

Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(The original is in French.)

Brussels, August 4, 1914 {6 A.M.).

(Translation.)

Monsieur le Ministre, Sir,

J'ai ete charge et j'ai I'honneur In accordance with my instruc-

d' informer votre Excellence que tions, I have the honour to inform

par suite du refus oppose par le your Excellency that in con-

Gouvernement de Sa Majeste le sequence of the refusal of the

Roi aux propositions bien inten- Belgian Government to entertain

tionnees que lui avait soumises the well-intentioned proposals

le Gouvernement Imperial, celui- made to them by the German

ci se verra, a son plus vif regret, Government, the latter, to their

force d'executer — au besoin par deep regret, find themselves

la force des armes — les mesures compelled to take — if necessary

de securite exposees comme indis- by force of arms — those meas-

pensables vis-a-vis des menaces ures of defence already fore-

fran9aises. shadowed ^ as indispensable, in

Veuillez agreer, etc. view of the menace of France.
(Signe) VON Below.

1 The use of this word is strange here in view of III Convention 2d Hague Con-
ference, Article 1 :

. "The contracting powers recognize that hostilities between themselves must not
commence without previous and explicit warning." This Convention had been
ratified by Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Russia.

In this connection it may be asked how Belgium could ratify a Convention con-
cerning the opening of hostilities, if she was regarded, in 1907, as possessing a neutrality
guaranteed by treaty.

2 If Sir E. Grey is correctly quoted, the use of this word is significant ; and the ques-
tion naturally arises "Since when was Great Britain the ally of France? " Sir E. Grey
had been authorised by the British Cabinet in the morning of August 2 (British Blue
Book No. 148) to promise France their support. If Great Britain was the ally of France
when she sent her ultimatum about Belgium to Germany, the ethics of such a course
are doubtful, in view of the fact that France and Germany were at war. Cf. also
French Yellow Book No. 158, August 4, where President Poincar6 refers to Great
Britain as an ally of France. Cf. also Serbian Blue Book No. 38, July 25. The whole
sentence is, of course, a future condition, refering to the possibility of a war between
Austria-Hungary and France. No futurity idea, however, attaches to the term " as
the ally of France."

3 Belgian Gray Book No. 20, August 2.

434 Official Diplomatic Documents

From London

Belgian Gray Book No. 28

Note communicated by Sir Francis Villiers, British Minister at
Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, August 4-, 1914.

I AM instructed to inform the Belgian Government that if Germany
brings pressure to bear upon Belgium with the object of forcing her to
abandon her attitude of neutrality, His Britannic Majesty's Gov-
ernment expect Belgium to resist with all the means at her disposal.^

In that event, His Britannic Majesty's Government are pre-
pared to join Russia and France, should Belgium so desire, in ten-
dering at once joint assistance to the Belgian Government with a
view to resisting any forcible measures adopted by Germany against
Belgium, and also offering a guarantee ^ for the maintenance of the
future independence and integrity of Belgium.

From the Hague

Belgian Gray Book No. 29

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, Bel-
gian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, The Hague, August 4, 1914-

The Minister for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday evening
that the Netherlands Government would perhaps be obliged, owing
to the gravity of the present situation, to institute war buoying
on the Scheldt.

M. Loudon read me the draft of the note which would announce
this decision to me.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the note
in question which was communicated to me yesterday evening.

As you will observe, the Scheldt will only be closed at night.
By day navigation will be possible, but only with Dutch pilots who
have been furnished with the necessary nautical instructions. In
this way both Dutch interests in the defence of their territory, and
Belgian interests in the navigation of Antwerp will be safeguarded.

You will note that the Netherlands Government further ask that
in the event of the war buoying being carried out, we should cause
the lightships Wielingen and Wandelaar to be withdrawn in order to
facilitate the maintenance of the neutrality of Dutch territory.

I would point out that the phrase used in this note, "sailing up
the Scheldt," is not sufficiently explicit; sailing down would be

1 Belgium had asked for British "diplomatic intervention," Belgian Gray Book
No. 25, August 3.

2 This is the same guarantee as was offered by Germany, who guaranteed "the
possessions and the independence of the Belgian Kingdom in full" (Belgian Gray
Book No. 20, August 2). "Neutrality" is omitted both in the British and German
guarantees. Of. British Blue Book No. 155, August 4.

August 4, Belgian Gray Book No. 31 435

permitted under the same conditions. The Minister has, how-
ever, given me this assurance.

As soon as the Netherlands Government have decided upon this
exceptional measure I shall be informed of it.

About six hours are necessary to carry out war buoying.

I will at once telegraph to you.

Note enclosed in No. 29

The Netherlands Government may be compelled, in order to
maintain the neutrality of Dutch territory, to institute war buoying
upon the Scheldt, that is to say, to move or modify a portion of
the actual arrangement of buoys and lights.

At the same time this special arrangement of buoys has been so
drawn up that when it is brought into force it will still be possible
to sail up the Scheldt as far as Antwerp by day, but only with Dutch
pilots who have been furnished with the necessary nautical instruc-
tions. In thus acting the Netherlands Government are convinced
that they will be able to serve equally both the Dutch interests in
the defence of Netherlands territory and Belgian interests in the
navigation of Antwerp.

After the establishment of war buoying on the Scheldt, there
would be no further reason to enter the tidal water of Flushing at
night, and as the presence of the lightships Wielingen and Wandelaar
is not indispensable to navigation by day, the Netherlands Govern-
ment* would be much obliged if the Belgian Government would be good
enough, in the event of the establishment of war buoying, to with-
draw these boats in order to facilitate the maintenance of the neu-
trality of Dutch territory.

To London and Paris

Belgian Gray Book No. 30

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Min-
isters at London and Paris.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August ^, 1914'

The General Staff announces that Belgian territory has been
violated at Gemmenich.^

To Berlin

Belgian Gray Book No. 31

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below
Saleske, German Minister at Brussels.

Sir, Brussels, August 4, 1914-

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that from to-day
the Belgian Government are unable to recognise your diplomatic

1 See French Yellow Book No. 151, August 3, and note.

436 Official Diplomatic Documents

status and cease to have official relations with you. Your Excel-
lency will find enclosed the passports necessary for your departure
with the staff of the legation.

From Berlin

Belgian Gray Book No. 32

Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Britssels, to M. Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Brussels, August 4, 1914-

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excel-
lency's note of the 4th August, and to inform you that I have en-
trusted the custody of the German Legation of Brussels to the care
of my United States colleague.

To Madrid

Belgian Gray Book No. 33

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Grenier,
Belgian Minister at Madrid.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 4, 1914-

Please ask the Spanish Government if they will be good enough
to take charge of Belgian interests in Germany, and whether in that
event they will issue the necessary instructions to their Ambassador
at Berlin.

To Berlin
Belgian Gray Book No. 34

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Barcm Beyens,
Belgian Minister at Berlin.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 4, 1914-

The German Minister is leaving to-night ; ^ you should ask for
your passports. We are requesting the Spanish Government to
authorise the Spanish Ambassador to be good enough to take charge
of Belgian interests in Germany.

From Berlin

Belgian Gray Book No. 35

Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Berlin, August 4, 1914-

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of
part of the speech made to-day in the Reichstag by the Imperial

1 At the request of Belgium ; see Belgian Gray Book No. 31, same date.

August 4f Belgian Gray Book No. 36 437

Chancellor on the subject of the infamous violation of Belgian
neutrality : —

"We are in a state of legitimate defence, and necessity knows no law.

" Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and have perhaps already
entered Belgium. This is contrary to the dictates of international
law. France has, it is true, declared at Brussels that she was pre-
pared to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as it was respected
by her adversary. But we knew that France was ready to invade
Belgium. France could wait; we could not. A French attack
upon our flank in the region of the Lower Rhine might have been
fatal. We were, therefore, compelled to ride roughshod over the
legitimate protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium.
For the wrong which we are thus doing, we will make reparation as
soon as our military object is attained.

" Anyone in such grave danger as ourselves, and who is struggling
for his supreme welfare, can only be concerned with the means of
extricating himself; we stand side by side with Austria."

It is noteworthy that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg recognises,
without the slightest disguise, that Germany is violating international
law by her invasion of Belgian territory and that she is committing
a wrong against us.

From London

Belgian Gray Book No. 36

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Bel-
gian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, London, August 4, 1914-

I HAVE the honour to inform you that in the House of Commons
this afternoon the Prime Minister made a fresh statement with
regard to the European crisis.

After recalling the principal points set forth yesterday by Sir E.
Grey, the Prime Minister read : —

1. A telegram received from Sir F. Villiers this morning which
gave the substance of the second ultimatum ^ presented to the Bel-
gian Government by the German Government, which had been sent
to you this morning (see No. 27).

2. Your telegram informing me of the violation of the frontier at
Gemmenich,2 a copy of which I have given to Sir A. Nicolson.

3. A telegram which the German Government addressed to its
Ambassador in London this morning with the evident intention of
misleading popular opinion as to its attitude. Here is the translation
as published in one of this evening's newspapers : —

"Please^ dispel any mistrust which may subsist on the part of

1 Belgian Gray Book No. 27, same day. This is in no sense a second ultimatum,
but rather a declaration of the entrance of armed German forces.

2 Ih. No. 30, same day.

3 See British Blue Book No. 157, August 4.

438 Official Diplomatic Documents

the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeat-
ing most positively the formal assurance that, even in the case of
armed conjQiict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence
whatever, annex Belgian territory.

"Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly
pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality.

"It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian terri-
tory without making at the time territorial acquisitions at the
expense of Holland.

"Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not
be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned
according to absolutely unimpeachable information.^

"Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it
being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance."

Mr. Asquith then informed the House that in answer to this note
of the German Government the British Government had repeated
their proposal ^ of last week, namely, that the German Government
should give the same assurances as to Belgian neutrality as France
had given last week both to England and to Belgium. The British
Cabinet allowed the Berlin Cabinet till midnight to reply .^

From London

Belgian Gray Book No. 37 *

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M, Davignon, Bel-
gian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) London, August 4, 1914.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed the British Min-
ters in Norway, Holland, and Belgium, that Great Britain expects
that these three kingdoms will resist German pressure and observe
neutrality.^ Should they resist they will have the support of Great
Britain, who is ready in that event, should the three above-mentioned
Governments desire it, to join France and Russia, in offering an alli-
ance to the said Governments, for the purpose of resisting the use
of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain the

1 Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 20, August 2. Germany has not published this in-
formation.

2 Germany could have, and according to British Blue Book No. 123, August 1, last
two paragraphs, probably would have accepted this proposal if Great Britain would
have coupled with it the promise that she would do what she had done in 1870, i.e.
agree to make common cause in the interest of Belgium with either France or Germany
against the one who would violate Belgian neutrality. This Great Britain, however,
could not do, because she had promised her support to France on August 2. British
Blue Book No. 148.

' Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 58, same day. Mr. Asquith neglected to
tell Parliament that when Great Britain sent her request to Germany concerning
Belgium, she was no longer neutral, but bound by a vote of the Cabinet (cf . British Blue
Book No. 148, August 2) to support France who since 6.45 p.m. the previous day had
been at war with Germany.

* This despatch was later cancelled, Belgian Gray Book No. 39, same day. It has
been omitted from the British Blue Book.

5 This despatch is important, because Sir E. Grey is here quoted as placing the
neutrahty of Norway, Holland, and Belgium on a par. It has often been claimed
since that Belgian neutrality was of a different order, not voluntary, but imposed by
the treaty of 1839.

August 4y Belgian Gray Book No. 38 439

future independence and integrity of the three kingdoms.^ I ob-
served to him that Belgium was neutral in perpetuity. The Minister
for Foreign Affairs answered: This is in case her neutrality is
violated.^

To Paris, London, and St. Petersburgh

Belgian Gray Book No. 38

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Min-
isters at Paris, London, and St. Petersburgh.

Sir, Brussels, August 4, 191 4.

I HAVE the honour to inform you of the course of recent events
as regards the relations of Belgium with certain of the Powers which
guarantee her neutrality and independence.

On the 31st July the British Minister made me a verbal com-
munication^ according to which Sir E. Grey, in anticipation of a
European war, had asked the German and French Governments
separately if each of them were resolved to respect the neutrality
of Belgium should that neutrality not be violated by any other
Power. *

In view of existing treaties. Sir F. Villiers was instructed to bring
this step to the knowledge of the Belgian Government, adding that
Sir E. Grey presumed that Belgium was resolved to maintain her
neutrality, and that she expected other Powers to respect it.

I told the British Minister that we highly appreciated this com-
munication, which was in accordance with our expectation, and
I added that Great Britain, as well as the other Powers who had
guaranteed our independence, might rest fully assured of our firm
determination to maintain our neutrality; nor did it seem pos-
sible that our neutrality could be threatened by any of those States,
with whom we enjoyed the most cordial and frank relations. The
Belgian Government, I added, had given proof of this resolution
by taking from now on all such military measures as seemed to them
to be necessitated by the situation.

In his turn the French Minister made a verbal communication ^
on August 1st to the effect that he was authorised to inform the
Belgian Government that in case of an international war the French
Government, in conformity with their repeated declarations, would
respect Belgian territory, and that they would not be induced to
modify their attitude except in the event of the violation of Belgian
neutrality by another Power^

1 There is no promise here of maintaining the "treaty-imposed neutrality" of
Belgium,

2Cf. the "Brussels documents," pp. 577 ff. The Belgian Minister wished to dis-
tinguish between the neutrality of his country, and the neutrality of the other two
kingdoms.

The omission of Sweden and Denmark in this despatch is noteworthy.

3 Belgian Gray Book No. 11, July 31.

< Belgian Gray Book No. 15, August 1, but see also ih. No. 9, July 31.

440 Official Diplomatic Documents

I thanked his Excellency, and added that we had already taken
all the necessary precautions to ensure respect of our independ-
ence and our frontiers.

On the morning of the 2nd August I had a fresh conversation ^
with Sir F. Villiers, in the course of which he told me that he had
lost no time in telegraphing our conversation of July 31st to his
Government, and that he had been careful to quote accurately the
solemn declaration which he had received of Belgium's intention to
defend her frontiers from whichever side they might be invaded. He
added : "We know that France has given you formal assurances, but
Great Britain has received no reply from Berlin on this subject."

The latter fact did not particularly affect me, since a declaration
from the German Government might appear superfluous in view of
existing treaties. ^ Moreover, the Secretary of State had reaffirmed,
at the meeting of the committee of the Reichstag of April 29th, 1913,
"that the neutrality of Belgium is established by treaty which Ger-
many intends to respect."

The same day Herr von Below Saleske, the German Minister,
called at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at 7 o'clock, and handed
to me the enclosed note (see No. 20). The German Government
gave the Belgian Government a time limit of twelve hours within
which to communicate their decision.

No hesitation was possible as to the reply called for by the amaz-
ing proposal of the German Government. You will find a copy
enclosed. (See No. 22.)

The ultimatum expired at 7 a.m. on August 3rd. As at 10 o'clock no
act of war had been committed, the Belgian Cabinet decided that there
was no reason for the moment to appeal to the guaranteeing powers.

Towards mid-day the French Minister questioned me upon this
point, and said : —

" Although in view of the rapid march of events ^ I have as yet
received no instructions to make a declaration from my Govern-
ment, I feel justified, in view of their well-known intentions, in
saying that if the Belgian Government were to appeal to the French
Government as one of the Powers guaranteeing their neutrality, the
French Government would at once respond to Belgium's appeal;
if such an appeal were not made it is probable that — unless, of
course, exceptional measures were rendered necessary in self-defence
— the French Government would not intervene until Belgium, had
taken some effective measure of resistance."

I thanked M. Klobukowski for the support which the French
Government had been good enough to offer us in case of need, and
I informed him that the Belgian Goveri^ent were making no appeal
at present to the guarantee of the Powers, and that they would decide
later what ought to be done.

1 Not previously mentioned in the Belgian Gray Book.

2 "Treaties" do not seem to have been mentioned in the conversation with the
German Minister. See Belgian Gray Book No. 19, August 2.

* These words are added here to the despatch as published Belgian Gray Book No.
24, August 3.

August 4, Belgian Gray Book No. Jfi 441

Finally, at 6 a.m. on August 4th, the German Minister made the
following communication to me. (See No. 27.)

The Cabinet is at the present moment deliberating on the ques-
tion of an appeal to the Powers guaranteeing our neutrality.

From London

Belgian Gray Book No. 39

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Bel-
gian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) , London, August 4, 1914.

Great Britain this morning called^ upon Germany to respect
Belgian neutrality. The ultimatum says that whereas the note
addressed by Germany to Belgium threatens the latter with an
appeal to the force of arms if she opposes the passage of German
troops; and whereas Belgian territory has been violated at Gem-
menich; and whereas Germany has refused to give Great Britain
a similar assurance to that given last week by France; therefore
Great Britain must once again demand a satisfactory reply on the
subject of the respect of Belgian neutrality and of the treaty to which
Germany, no less than Great Britain, is a signatory. The ultimatum
expires at midnight.

In consequence of the British ultimatum to Germany, the British
proposal which I telegraphed to you is cancelled for the time being.
(See No. 37.)

To London, Paris, and St. Petersburgh

Belgian Gray Book No. 40

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to British, French,
and Russian Ministers at Brussels.

Sir, Brussels, August 4, 1914-

The Belgian Government regret to have to announce to your
Excellency that this morning the armed forces of Germany entered
Belgian territory in violation of treaty engagements.

. The Belgian Government are firmly determined to resist by all
the means in their power.^

Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France, and Russia to co-
operate as guaranteeing Powers in the defence of her territory.^

There should be concerted and joint action, to oppose the forcible
measures taken by Germany against Belgium, and, at the same
time, to guarantee the future maintenance of the independence
and integrity ^ of Belgium.

1 British Blue Book No. 159, August 4.

2 This is in reply to Great Britain's request, Belgian Gray Book No. 28, August 4.

3 This decision was apparently reached at the Cabinet meeting mentioned in the
last paragralph of No. 38, same day. See also Belgian Gray Book No. 42, August 5.

* Of. note 2 to Belgian Gray Book No. 28, same day.

442 Official Diplomatic Documents

Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will undertake the
defence of her fortified places,

France :

From Brussels

French Yellow Book No. 152

M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, August ^, 1914.

The Chief of the Cabinet of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sends
me a letter by which "the Government of the King declare that
they are firmly decided to resist ^ the aggression of Germany by all
means in their power. Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France
and Russia to co-operate as guarantors in the defence of her territory.

"There would be a concerted and common action having as its
object the resistance of forcible measures employed by Germany
against Belgium, and at the same time to guarantee the maintenance
of the independence and integrity of Belgium in the future.

"Belgium is glad to be able to declare that she will ensure the
defence of her fortified places."

Klobukowski.

From London

French Yellow Book No. 153

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

London, August 4, 1914-

Sir Edward Grey has asked me to come and see him immediately
in order to tell me that the Prime Minister would to-day make a
statement ^ in the House of Commons that Germany had been
invited to withdraw her ultimatum to Belgium and to give her
answer to Great Britain before 12 o'clock to-night.

Paul Cambon.

From Brussels

French Yellow Book No. 154

M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Rene Viviani,
President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Brussels, August 4t 1914'

This morning the German Minister informs ^ the Belgian Ministry
for Foreign Affairs, that in consequence of the refusal of the Belgian

1 Belgian Gray Book No. 40, same day.

2 Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 36, same day.
« Belgian Gray Book No. 27, same day.

August 4, French Yellow Book No. 157 443

Government the Imperial Government jBnd themselves compelled
to carry out by force of arms those measures of protection which
are rendered indispensable by the French threats.

Klobukowski.

[For French Yellow Book No. 155 see under August 6, and for No. 156 see under
August 5.]

To the Representatives of all the Powers at Paris
French Yellow Book No. 157

Notification hy the French Government to the Representatives of the
Powers at Paris.

The German Imperial Government, after having allowed its
armed forces to cross the frontier, and to permit various acts of
murder and pillage on French territory; after having violated the
neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg in defiance of the
stipulations of the Convention of London, 11th May, 1867, and
of Convention V. of the Hague, 18th October, 1907, on the rights
and duties of Powers and persons in case of war on land (Articles 1
and 2), Conventions which have been signed by the German Govern-
ment; after having addressed an ultimatum to the Royal Govern-
ment of Belgium with the object of requiring passage for German
troops through Belgian territory in violation of the Treaties of the
19th April, 1839, which had been signed by them,^ and in violation
of the above Convention of the Hague

Have declared war on France at 6.45 p.m. on the 3rd August, 1914.

In these circumstances the Government of the Republic find
themselves obliged on their side to have recourse to arms.

They have in consequence the honour of informing by these
presents the Government of . . . that a state of war exists between
France and Germany dating from 6.45 p.m. on 3rd August, 1914.

The Government of the Republic protest before all civilised
nations, and especially those Governments ^ which have signed the
Conventions and Treaties referred to above, against the violation
by the German Empire of their international engagements, and they
reserve full right for reprisals which they might find themselves
brought to exercise against an enemy so little regardful of its plighted
word.

The Government of the Republic, who propose to observe the
principles of the law of nations, will, during the hostilities, and
assuming that reciprocity will be observed, act in accordance with
the International Conventions signed by France concerning the law
of war on land and sea.

1 Only in so far as one assumes that signatures of the kingdom of Prussia are bind-
ing on the German Empire. In 1871 the kingdom of Prussia ceased to exist as a
Power in relation to foreign Powers, voluntarily sinking herself in the Federation of
German States, called the German Empire. See chapter on German Constitution
in the editor's Germany's Point of View.

2 This includes the Government of the United States. The American Government
has not published its reply.

444 Official Diplomatic Documents

The present notification, made in accordance with Article 2 of
the Third Convention of the Hague of the 18th October, 1907, relat-
ing to the opening of hostilities and handed to . . .

Paris, August 4, 1914, ^ P-M.

French Yellow Book No. 158

Message from M. Poincare, President of the Republic, read at the
Extraordinary Session of Parliament, August 4, 1914-

{Journal Officiel of the 5th August, 1914-)

{The Chamber rises and remains standing during the reading of the
message.)

" Gentlemen,

"France has just been the object of a violent and premeditated
attack, which is an insolent defiance of the law of nations. Before
any declaration of war had been sent to us, even before the German
Ambassador had asked for his passports, our territory has been
violated.^ The German Empire has waited till yesterday evening to
give at this late stage the true name to a state of things which it had
already created.

"For more than forty years the French, in sincere love of peace,
have buried at the bottom of their heart the desire for legitimate
reparation.

"They have given to the world the example of a great nation
which, definitely raised from defeat by the exercise of will, patience
and labour, has only used its renewed and rejuvenated strength in
the interest of progress and for the good of humanity.

" Since the ultimatum ^ of Austria opened a crisis which threat-
ened the whole of Europe, France has persisted in following and in
recommending on all sides a policy of prudence, wisdom and modera-
tion.

"To her there can be imputed no act, no movement, no word,
which has not been peaceful and conciliatory.

"At the hour when the struggle is beginning, she has the right,
in justice to herself, of solemnly declaring that she has made, up to
the last moment, supreme efforts ^ to avert the war now about to
break out, the crushing responsibility for which the German Empire
will have to bear before history. ( Unanimous and repeated applause.)

" On the very morrow of the day when we and our allies ^ were

1 Cf . note to French Yellow Books No. 136, also ih. No. 139, both of August 2 ; also
Belgian Gray Book No. 21, August 3.

2 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 8 under date of July 22.

2 See the discussion of these efforts in the editor's Germany's Point of View, chapters
on the French Yellow Book.

* Since Russia was the only other ally of France at tliis time, this includes Great
Britain, although the time limit of her ultimatum had not expired when this speech
was delivered. See also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 58, same day. Even more
important is the time reference here, August 1, implying that France considered Great
Britain an ally even then in spite of the fact that the British Government had repeatedly
denied that an alliance existed between them and France. Cf. below, note 7.

August 4, French Yellow Book No. 158 445

•
publicly expressing our hope of seeing negotiations which had been
begun under the auspices of the London Cabinet carried to a peace-
ful conclusion, Germany suddenly declared war upon Russia, she
has invaded the territory of Luxemburg, she has outrageously in-
sulted the noble Belgian nation {loud and unanimous applause), our
neighbour and our friend, and attempted treacherously to fall upon
us while we were in the midst of diplomatic conversation. (Fresh
and repeated unanimous applause.)

"But France was watching. As alert as she was peaceful, she
was prepared ; ^ and our enemies will meet on their path our valiant
covering troops, who are at their post and will provide the screen
behind which the mobilisation of our national forces will be methodi-
cally completed.

" Our fine and courageous army, which France to-day accompanies
with her maternal thought (loud applause) has risen eager to defend
the honour of the flag and the soil of the country. (Unanimous and
repeated applause.)

" The President of the Republic, interpreting the unanimous feeling
of the country, expresses to our troops by land and sea the admira-
tion and confidence of every Frenchman (loud and prolonged applause).

"Closely united in a common feeling, the nation will persevere
with the cool self-restraint of which, since the beginning of the
crisis, she has given daily proof. Now, as always, she will know
how to harmonise the most noble daring and most ardent enthu-
siasm with that self-control which is the sign of enduring energy and
is the best guarantee of victory (applause).

"In the war which is beginning France will have Right on her
side, the eternal power of which cannot with impunity be disregarded
by nations any more than by individuals (loud and unanimous
applause) .

"She will be heroically defended by all her sons; nothing will
break their sacred union before the enemy; to-day they are joined
together as brothers in a common indignation against the aggressor,
and in a common patriotic faith (loud and prolonged applause and
cries of ' Vive la France').

" She is faithfully helped by Russia, her ally (loud and unanimous
applause) ; she is supported by the loyal friendship ^ of Great Britain
(loud and unanimous applause).

"And already from every part of the civilised world sympathy
and good wishes are coming to her. For to-day once again she stands
before the universe for Liberty, Justice and Reason (loud and re-
peated applause) . ' Haut les coeurs et vive la France ! ' (unanimous
and prolonged applause) .

"Raymond Poincare."

1 Much injustice has been done to France by her pro-allies friends who have claimed
that France was unprepared.

2 Cf. above, note 6. Here, but not there, a distinction is made between the re-
lations of France with Russia and those with Great Britain.

446 Official Diplomatic Documents

French Yellow Book No. 159

Speech delivered by M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council in the
Chamber of Deputies, August 4, 1914.

{Journal Offix;iel, August 5, 1914-)
M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council,

Gentlemen,

The German Ambassador yesterday left Paris after notifying us
of the existence of a state of war.

The Government owe to Parliament a true account of the events
which in less than ten days have unloosed a European war and
compelled France, peaceful and valiant, to defend her frontier against
an attack, the hateful injustice of which is emphasised by its calcu-
lated unexpectedness.

This attack, which has no excuse, and which began before we were
notified of any declaration of war, is the last act of a plan, whose
origin and object I propose to declare before our own democracy and
before the opinion of the civilised world.

As a consequence of the abominable crime which cost the Austro-
Hungarian Heir-Apparent and the Duchess of Hohenburg their
lives, difficulties arose between the Cabinets of Vienna and Belgrade.

The majority of the Powers were only semi-officially informed
of these difficulties up till Friday, July 24th, the date on which the
Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors communicated to them a circular
which the press has published.

The object of this circular was to explain and justify an ultimatum
delivered the evening before to Servia by the Austro-Hungarian
Minister at Belgrade.

This ultimatum in alleging the complicity of numerous Servian
subjects and associations in the Serajevo crime, hinted that the
official Servian authorities themselves were no strangers to it. It
demanded a reply from Servia by 6 o'clock on the evening of Satur-
day, July 25th.

The Austrian demands, or at any rate many of them,^ without
doubt struck a blow at the rights of a sovereign State. Notwith-
standing their excessive character, Servia, on July 25th, declared
that she submitted to them almost without reserve.^

This submission, which constituted a success for Austria-Hungary
a guarantee for the peace of Europe, ^as not unconnected with the
advice tendered to Belgrade from the first moment by France, Rus-
sia and Great Britain.^

The value of this advice was all the greater since the Austro-

* Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 31, July 27, where Sazonof "found seven of
the ten points admissible without very great difficulty ; only the two points . . .
seemed to him to be unacceptable in their present form," etc.

2 Cf, Introductory remarks to the despatches of July 26.

' Cf . the despatches of July 24, 25, 26 where it is pointed out that no such advice
was actually given.

August 4) French Yellow Booh No. 159 447

Hungarian demands had been concealed ^ from the Chanceries of
the Triple Entente, to whom in the three preceding weeks the Austro-
Hungarian Government had on several occasions given an; assurance
that their claims would be extremely moderate.

It was, therefore, with natural astonishment that the Cabinets
of Paris, St. Petersburgh and London learned on 26th July that the
Austrian Minister at Belgrade, after a few minutes' examination,
declared that the Servian reply was inacceptable, and broke off
diplomatic relations.

This astonishment was increased by the fact that on Friday, the
24th, the German Ambassador came and read to the French Minister
for Foreign Affairs a note verbale ^ asserting that the Austro-Servian
dispute must remain localised, without intervention by the great
Powers, or otherwise " incalculable consequences " were to be feared.
A similar demarche was made on Saturday, the 25th,^ at London and
at St. Petersburgh.^

Need I, Gentlemen, point out to you the contrast between the
threatening expressions used by the German Ambassador at Paris
and the conciliatory sentiments which the Powers of the Triple
Entente had just manifested by the advice which they gave to Servia
to submit ? ^

Nevertheless, in spite of the extraordinary character of the Ger-
man demarche, we immediately, in agreement with our Allies ^ and
our friends, took a conciliatory course and invited Germany to
join in it.

We have had from the first moment regretfully to recognise that
our intentions and our efforts met with no response at Berlin.

Not only did Germany appear wholly unwilling to give to Austria-
Hungary the friendly advice which her position gave her the right
to offer, but from this moment and still more in the following days,
she seemed to intervene between the Cabinet at Vienna and the com-
promises suggested by the other Powers.^

On Tuesday, 28th July, Austria-Hungary declared war on Servia.
This declaration of war, with its aggravation of the state of affairs
brought about by the rupture of diplomatic relations three days
before, gave ground for believing that there was a deliberate desire
for war, and a systematic programme for the enslavement ^ of Servia.

Thus there was now involved in the dispute not only the inde-
pendence of a brave people, but the balance of power ^ in the Bal-

1 France knew of them before Austria-Hungary published them, French Yellow
Book Nos. 13 and 14, July 19.

2 French Yellow Book No. 28, July 24.

3 This is a mistake. See British Blue Book No. 9, July 24.
^ Russian Orange BooJk: No. 8, also July 24.

B See note 3, p. 446.

^ Note the plural which seems to include Great Britain.

^ For the error of this view see the French despatches of those days, and the dis-
cussion of them in the editor's Germany's Point of View, chapters on the French
Yellow Book.

8 Cf . Austria-Hungary's promise not to annex Serbian territory nor to touch the
sovereignty of Serbia. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29.

« This was the question which interested Russia most ; cf . British Blue Book
No. 17, July 25, last paragraph.

448 Official Diplomatic Documents

kans, embodied in the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913, and consecrated
by the moral support of all the great Powers.

However, at the suggestion of the British Government with its
constant and firm attachment to the maintenance of the peace of
Europe, the negotiations were continued, or, to speak more accurately,
the Powers of the Triple Entente tried to continue them.

From this common desire sprang the proposal for action ^ ])y the
Four Powers, England, France, Germany and Italy, which was
intended, by assuring to Austria all legitimate satisfaction, to bring
about an equitable adjustment of the dispute.

On Wednesday, the 29th,2 the Russian Government, noting the
persistent failure of these efforts, and faced by the Austrian mobi-
lisation and declaration of war, fearing the military destruction of
Servia, decided as a precautionary measure to mobilise the troops of
four military districts, that is to say, the formations echeloned along
the Austro-Hungarian frontier exclusively.

In taking this step, the Russian Government were careful to in-
form the German Government that their measures, restricted as
they were and without any offensive character towards Austria,
were not in any degree directed against Germany.

In a conversation with the Russian Ambassador at Berlin, the
German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs acknowledged this
without demur.

On the other hand, all the efforts made by Great Britain, with
the adherence of Russia and the support of France, to bring Austria
and Servia into touch under the moral patronage of Europe were
encountered at Berlin with a predetermined negative of which the
diplomatic despatches afford the clearest proof.

This was a disquieting situation which made it probable that
there existed at Berlin intentions which had not been disclosed.
Some hours afterwards this alarming suspicion was destined to become
a certainty.

In fact Germany's negative attitude gave place thirty-six hours
later to positive steps which were truly alarming. On the 31st July
Germany, by proclaiming "a state of danger of war," ^ cut the com-
munications between herself and the rest of Europe, and obtained
for herself complete freedom to pursue against France in absolute
secrecy military preparations which, as you have seen, nothing could
justify.

Already for some days, and in circumstances difficult to explain,
Germany had prepared for the transition of her army from a peace
footing to a war footing.^

From the morning of the 25th July, that is to say even before the
expiration of the time limit given to Servia by Austria, she had

1 Cf. the Introductory Remarks to the despatches of these days, and the letter
from the Belgian Minister in Petrograd printed under date of July 30.

2 According to the Czar's telegram to the German Emperor of July 30, the Russian
mobilisation was decided upon five days before, i.e. July 25.

3 Viviani entirely omits to mention that this was the result of Russia's order of
general mobilisation.

* There is no evidence for this statement.

August 4, French Yellow Book No. 159 449

confined to barracks the garrisons of Alsace-Lorraine. The same
day she had placed the frontier-works in a complete state of defence.
On the 26th, she had indicated to the railways the measures prepara-
tory for concentration. On the 27th, she had completed* requisi-
tions and placed her covering troops in position. On the 28th, the
summons of individual reservists had begun and units which were
distant from the frontier had been brought up to it.^

Could all these measures, pursued with implacable method, leave
us in doubt of German's intentions?

Such was the situation when, on the evening of the 31st July, the Ger-
man Government, which, since the 24th, had not participated by any
active step in the conciliatory efforts of the Triple Entente,^ addressed
an ultimatum to the Russian Government under the pretext that
Russia had ordered a general mobilisation ^ of her armies, and de-
manded that this mobilisation should be stopped within twelve hours.

This demand, which was all the more insulting in form because
a few hours earlier the Emperor Nicholas II., with a movement
at once confiding and spontaneous, had asked the German Emperor
for his mediation, was put forward at a moment when, on the request
of England ^ and with the knowledge of Germany,^ the Russian Gov-
ernment was accepting a formula of such a nature as to lay the
foundation for a friendly settlement of the Austro-Servian dispute
and of the Austro-Russian difficulties by the simultaneous arrest of
military operations and of military preparations.

The same day this unfriendly demarche towards Russia was sup-
plemented by acts which were frankly hostile towards France;
the rupture of communications by road, railway, telegraph and tele-
phone, the seizure of French locomotives on their arrival at the
frontier, the placing of machine guns in the middle of the permanent
way which had been cut, and the concentration of troops on this
frontier.

From this moment we were no longer justified in believing in the
sincerity of the pacific declarations which the German representative
continued to shower upon us {hear, hear).'

We knew that Germany was mobilising under the shelter of the
"state of danger of war."

We learnt that six classes of reservists had been called up, and
that transport was being collected even for those army corps which
were stationed a considerable distance from the frontier.

As these events unfolded themselves, the Government, watchful
and vigilant, took from day to day, and even from hour to hour, the
measures of precaution which the situation required; the general
mobilisation of our forces on land and sea was ordered.

1 There is no evidence for these statements, all of which seem to be disproved
by French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30, where Viviani acknowledges that Germany
had taken, up to then, no steps for even partial mobilisation, for if she had, it would
have been impossible to urge Russia not to take any measures which "may offer to Ger-
many a pretext for a total or partial mobilisation of her forces."

2 This is disproved by the despatches of those days.

3 No excuse for the general Russian mobilisation is offered.
* British Blue Book No. 132, August 1, and note.

6 No evidence for this statement has been published.
2g

450 Official Diplomatic Documents

The same evening, at 7.30, Germany, without waiting^ for the
acceptance by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh of the Enghsh propo-
sal, which I have already mentioned, declared war on Russia.

The next day, Sunday, the 2nd August, without regard for the
extreme moderation of France, in contradiction to the peaceful
declarations of the German Ambassador at Paris, and in defiance
of the rules of international law, German troops crossed our frontier
at three different points.

At the same time, in violation of the Treaty of 1867, which guar-
anteed with the signature of Prussia the neutrality of Luxemburg,
they invaded the territory of the Grand Duchy and so gave cause
for a protest by the Luxemburg Government.

Finally, the neutrality of Belgium also was threatened. The
German Minister, on the evening of the 2nd August, presented
to the Belgian Government an ultimatum ^ requesting facilities in
Belgium for military operations against France, under the lying
pretext that Belgian neutrality was threatened by us; the Belgian
Government refused, and declared ^ that they were resolved to
defend with vigour their neutrality, which was respected by France
and guaranteed by treaties, and in particular by the King of Prussia.
{Unanimous and prolonged applause.)

Since then. Gentlemen, the German attacks have been renewed,
multiplied, and accentuated. At more than fifteen points our fron-
tier has been violated. Shots have been fired at our soldiers and
Customs officers. Men have been killed and wounded. Yesterday ^
a German military aviator dropped three bombs on Luneville.^

The German Ambassador, to whom as well as to all the great
Powers, we communicated these facts, did not deny them or express
his regrets for them. On the contrary, he came yesterday evening
to ask me for his passports, and to notify us of the existence of a
state of war, giving as his reason, in the teeth of all the facts, hostile
acts committed by French aviators in German territory in the Eifel
district, and even on the railway near Carlsruhe and near Nuremberg.
This is the letter ^ which he handed to me on the subject : —

"M. le President,

"The German administrative and military authorities have
established a certain number of flagrantly hostile acts committed on
German territory by French military aviators. Several of these
have openly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the
territory of that country; one has attempted to destroy buildings
near Wesel ; others have been seen in the district of the Eifel, one
has thrown bombs on the railway near Carlsruhe and Nuremburg.

1 Because the time limit had expired.

2 Belgian Gray Book No. 20, August 2.
' Belgian Gray Book No. 22, August 3.
* Belgian Gray Book, August 3.

5 For a similar charge made by Germany against France, see Belgian Gray Book,
No. 21, August 3. Since the interview there mentioned took place at 1.30 a.m. the
French attacks there mentioned must have taken place on August 2.

« French Yellow Book No. 147, August 3.

August 4, French Yellow Book No. 159 451

" I am instructed, and I have the honour to inform your Excellency
that in the presence of these acts of aggression the German Empire
considers itself in a state of war with France in consequence of the
acts of this latter Power.

"At the same time, I have the honour to bring to the knowl-
edge of your Excellency that the German authorities will retain
French mercantile vessels in German ports, but they will release them
if, within forty-eight hours, they are assured of complete reciprocity.

"My diplomatic mission having thus come to an end it only re-
mains for me to request your Excellency to be good enough to fur-
nish me with my passports, and to take the steps you consider suit-
able to assure my return to Germany, with the staff of the Embassy,
as well as with the staff of the Bavarian Legation and of the German
Consulate General in Paris.

"Be good enough, M. le President, to receive the assurances of
my deepest respect. (Signed) Schoen."

•Need I, Gentlemen, lay stress on the absurdities of these pre-
texts which they would put forward as grievances ? At no time has
any French aviator penetrated into Belgium, nor has any French
aviator committed either in Bavaria or any other part of Germany
any hostile act. The opinion of Europe has already done justice
to these wretched inventions. {Loud and unanimous applause.)

Against these attacks, which violate all the laws of justice and
all the principles of public law, we have now taken all the necessary
steps ; they are being carried out strictly, regularly, and with calmness.

The mobilisation of the Russian army also continues with remark-
able vigour and unrestrained enthusiasm {unanimous and pro-
longed applause, all the deputies rising from their seats.) The Belgian
army, mobilised with 250,000 men, prepares with a splendid passion
and magnificent ardour to defend the neutrality and independence
of their country. {Renewed loud and unanimous applause.)

The entire British fleet is mobilised ^ and orders have been given
to mobilise the land forces. ^ {Loud cheers, all the deputies rising to
their feet.)

Since 1912 ^ pourparlers had taken place between English and
French General Staffs and were concluded by an exchange of letters
between Sir Edward Grey and M. Paul Cambon. The Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs yesterday evening communicated these
letters to the House of Commons, and I have the honour, with the
consent of the British Government, to acquaint you with the con-
tents of these two documents.

My dear Ambassador, Foreign Office, November 22, 1912.

From time to time in recent years the French and British naval
and military experts have consulted together. It has always been

1 And had been mobilised since July 24. See French Yellow Book No. 66, July 27.

2 No date is given for this order, nor is it mentioned in the British Blue Book.

3 This is an error. The letters referred to were of 1912, but these pourparlers had
been taking place for years previous. See first line of first letter below.

452 Official Diplomatic Documents

understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of
either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to
assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation
between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engage-
ment that commits either Government to action in a contingency
that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for
instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present
moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had
grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power,
it might become essential to know whether it could in that event
depend upon the armed resistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect
an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threat-
ened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other
whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression
and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be pre-
pared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the
plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration,
and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given
to them.

Yours, etc.,

E. Grey.

To this letter our Ambassador, M. Paul Cambon, replied on the
23rd November, 1912 : —

Dear Sir Edward, London, November 23, 1912,

You reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22nd November,
that during the last few years the military and naval authorities of
France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time
to time; that it had always been understood that these consulta-
tions should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide
in the future whether they should lend each other the support of
their armed forces ; that, on either side, these consultations between
experts were not and should not be considered as engagements bind-
ing our Governments to take action in certain eventualities; that,
however, I had remarked to you that, if one or other of the two
Governments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on
the part of a third Power, it would become essential to know whether
it could count on the armed support of the other.

Your letter answers that point, and I am authorised to state that,
in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reasons to
fear either an act of aggression from a third Power, or some event
threatening the general peace, that Government would immediately
examine with the other the question whether both Governments
should act together in order to prevent the act of aggression or pre-
serve peace. If so, the two Governments would deliberate as to the
measures which they would be prepared to take in common ; if those

August 4) French Yellow Book No. 159 453

measures involved action, the two Governments would take into
immediate consideration the plans of their general staffs and would
then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans.

Yours, etc.,

Paul Cambon.

In the House of Commons the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs spoke ^ of France amidst the applause of the members in a
noble and warm-hearted manner and his language has already
found an echo deep in the hearts of all Frenchmen {loud and unani-
mous applause). I wish in the name of the Government of the
Republic to thank the British Government from this tribune for their
cordial words and the Parliament of France will associate itself in
this sentiment {renewed, prolonged and unanimous applause).

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made in particular the
following declaration : ^

"In case the German fleet came into the Channel or entered the
North Sea in order to go round the British Isles with the object of
attacking the French coasts or the French navy and of harassing
French merchant shipping, the British fleet would intervene in order
to give to French shipping its complete protection in such a way that
from that moment Great Britain and Germany would be in a state
of war."

From now onwards, the British fleet protects our northern and
western coasts against a German attack. Gentlemen, these are
the facts. I believe that the simple recital of them is sufficient to
justify the acts of the Government of the Republic. I wish, how-
ever, to make clear the conclusion to be drawn from my story and
to give its true meaning to the unheard-of attack of which France
is the victim.

The victors of 1870 have, at different times, as you know, desired ^
to repeat the blows which they dealt us then. In 1875, the war
which was intended to complete the destruction of conquered France
was only prevented by the intervention of the two Powers to whom
we were to become united at a later date by ties of alliance and of
friendship {unanimous applause), by the intervention of Russia and
of Great Britain {prolonged applause, all the deputies rising to their
feet].

Since then the French Republic, by the restoration of her national
forces and the conclusion of diplomatic agreements unswervingly
adhered to, has succeeded in liberating herself from the yoke which
even in a period of profound peace Bismarck was able to impose
upon Europe.

She has re-established the balance of power in Europe,^ a guarantee
of the liberty and dignity of all.

1 No date is here given. It was August 3. See Sir E. Grey's speech of that date.

2 For the wording of this declaration which is different from that published in the
British Blue Book see French Yellow Book Nos. 137, August 2 ; and 143, August 3 and
notes.

^ Germany has always denied this desire.

* A noteworthy reference to this bugbear of European politics.

454 Official Diplomatic Documents

Gentleman, I do not know if I am mistaken, but it seems to me
that this work of peaceful reparation, of liberation and honour finally
ratified in 1904 and 1907, with the genial co-operation of King Edward
VII of England and the Government of the Crown (applause), this
is what the German Empire wishes to destroy to-day by one daring
stroke.

Germany can reproach us with nothing.

Bearing in silence in our bosom for half a century the wound which
Germany dealt us we have offered to peace an unprecedented sacrifice
(loud and unanimous applause).

We have offered other sacrifices in all the discussions which since
1904 German diplomacy has systematically provoked, whether in
Morocco or elsewhere in 1905, in 1906, in 1908, in 1911.^

Russia also has given proof of great moderation at the time of the
events of 1908, as she has done in the present crisis.

She observed the same moderation, and the Triple Entente with
her, when in the Eastern crisis of 1912 Austria and Germany formu-
lated demands, whether against Servia or against Greece, which still
were, as the event proved, capable of settlement by discussion.

Useless sacrifices, barren negotiations, empty efforts, since to-day
in the very act of conciliation we, our allies and ourselves, are attacked
by surprise {prolonged applause).

No one can honestly believe that we are the aggressors. Vain
is the desire to overthrow the sacred principles of right and of liberty
to which nations, as well as individuals, are subject ; Italy with that
clarity of insight possessed by the Latin intellect, has notified us that
she proposes to preserve neutrality {prolonged applause, all the deputies
rising to their feet) .

This decision has found in all France an echo of sincerest joy. I
made myself the interpreter of this feeling to the Italian Charge
d'Affaires when I told him how much I congratulated myself that the
two Latin sisters, who have the same origin and the same ideal, a
common and glorious past, are not now opposed to one another
{renewed applause).

Gentlemen, we proclaim loudly the object of their attack — it
is the independence, the honour, the safety, which the Triple Entente
has regained in the balance of power ^ for the service of peace. The
object of attack is the liberties of Europe, which France, her allies
and her friends, are proud to defend {loud applause).

We are going to defend these liberties, for it is they that are in
dispute, and all the rest is but a pretext.

France, unjustly provoked, did not desire war, she has done
everything to avert it. Since it is forced upon her, she will defend
herself against Germany and against every Power which has not yet
declared its intentions, but joins with the latter in a conflict between
the two countries. {Applause, all the deputies rising to their feet.)

^ For France's attitude toward Germany as it appears from the despatches of the
French Yellow Book, see the editor's Germany's Point of View, chapters on the
French Yellow Book.

2 See above.

August 4, British Blue Book No. 153 455

A free and valiant people that sustains an eternal ideal, and is
wholly united to defend its existence; a democracy which knows
how to discipline its military strength, and was not afraid a year ago
to increase its burden as an answer to the armaments of its neighbour ;
a nation armed, struggling for its own life and for the independence
of Europe — here is a sight which we are proud to offer to the on-
lookers in this desperate struggle, that has for some days been pre-
paring with the greatest calmness and method. We are without
reproach. We shall be without fear. {Loud applause, all the depu-
ties rising to their feet.) France has often proved in less favourable
circumstances that she is a most formidable adversary when she
fights, as she does to-day, for liberty and for right (applause).

In submitting our actions to you. Gentlemen, who are our judges,
we have, to help us in bearing the burden of our heavy responsibility,
the comfort of a clear conscience and the conviction that we have
done our duty (prolonged applause, all the deputies rising to their feet),

Rene Viviani.

Great Britain:

To Berlin

British Blue Book No. 153

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.

The King of the Belgians has made an appeal ^ to His Majesty
the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the
following terms : —

"Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship
and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England
in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I
make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your
Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium."

His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German
Government have delivered to the Belgian Government a note ^
proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian
territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity
of . the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace,
threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An
answer was requested within twelve hours.

We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused^ this
as a flagrant violation of the law of nations.

His Majesty's Government are bound to protect against this vio-
lation of a treaty^ to which Germany is a party in common with
themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made

1 Belgian Gray Book No. 25, August 3.

2 Belgian Gray Book No. 20, August 2.

3 Belgian Gray Book No. 22, August 3.

* Of. Sir E. Grey's despatch, Belgian Gray Book No. 37, August 4.

456 Official Diplomatic Documents

upon Belgium will not be proceeded with and that her neutrality
will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate
reply.

From Brussels

British Blue Book No. 154

Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey. —
{Received August 4-)

(Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 4, 1914.

German Minister has this morning addressed note ^ to Minister
for Foreign Affairs stating that as Belgian Government have declined
the well-intentioned proposals submitted to them by the Imperial
Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to
carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered
indispensable in view of the French menaces.

To Brussels
British Blue Book No. 155
Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels.
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4, 1914-

You should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied
to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, His
Majesty's Government expect that they will resist by any means in
their power,^ and that His Majesty's Government will support them
in offering such resistance, and that His Majesty's Government in
this event are prepared to join Russia and France, if desired, in offer-
ing to the Belgian Government at once common action for the pur-
pose of resisting use of force by Germany against them, and a guaran-
tee to maintain their independence and integrity in future years.

To Berlin
British Blue Book No. 156
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4, 1914-

I CONTINUE to receive numerous complaints from British firms as
to the detention pf their ships at Hamburg, Cuxhaven, and other
German ports. This action on the part of the German authorities
is totally unjustifiable. It is in direct contravention of international

1 Belgian Gray Book No. 27, same day.

2 This is in reply to the appeal for "diplomatic intervention," see British Blue
Book No. 153, same day, and notes to Belgian Gray Book No. 24, August 3, and No. 38,
August 4.

August 4, British Blue Book No, 159 457

law and of the assurances given to your Excellency by the Imperial
Chancellor. You should demand the immediate release of all British
ships if such release has not yet been given.

From Berlin

British Blue Book No. 157 ^

German Foreign Secretary to Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador
in London. — {Communicated by German Embassy, August 4.)

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 4, 1914.

Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the
British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating
most positively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed
conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever,
annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out
by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to
respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably
annex Belgian territory without making at the same time territorial
acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey
that German army could not be exposed to French attack across
Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable
information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neu-
trality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French
advance.

From Brussels

British Blue Book No. 158

Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey. —
{Received August 4-)

(Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 4, 1914-

Military attache has been informed at War Office that German
troops have entered Belgian territory,^ and that Liege has been sum-
moned to surrender by small party of Germans who, however, were
repulsed.

To Berlin
British Blue Book No. 159
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4j 1914-

We hear that Germany has addressed note ^ to Belgian Minister
for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be com-

1 Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 36, same day.

2 Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 30, same day.
8 Belgian Gray Book No. 27, same day.

458 Official Diplomatic Documents

pelled to carry out, if necessary, by force of arms, the measures con-
sidered indispensable.

We are also informed ^ that Belgian territory has been violated at
Gemmenich.

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany
declined ^ to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France
gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin
and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory
reply to it and to my telegram of this morning ^ be received here by
12 o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your
passports, and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to
take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium
and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party
as ourselves.

Serbia :

From Nish

Sei^bian Blue Book No. 49

M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to
Dr. M. Yovanomtch, Charge d' Affaires at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) Nish, July 22/ August 4, 1914.

Please inform the Imperial Government that you have received
instructions to leave ^ Germany, together with the staffs of the Lega-
tion and Consulate. You should leave immediately.

1 Belgian Gray Book No. 30, same day.

2 British Blue Book No. 122, under date of August 1.

3 British Blue Book No. 153, same date.

* This was a natural order, because Austria-Hungary was at war with Serbia, and
Germany was the former's ally. The diplomatic documents do not contain the dec-
laration of war between Germany and Serbia.

August 5, Au^tro-Hungarian Red Book No. 59

459

Wednesday, August 5, 1914
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

Foreign Office of

Sent Despatches to

Received
Despatches from

Austria-Hungary

Petrograd

Belgium

Ministers at Entente

London, Berlin, Mad-

Capitals ^

rid

All Representatives

Paris, The Hague

abroad

British Minister

Madrid

France

President's message
Viviani's speech

Luxemburg

Germany

Great Britain

Russia

Serbia

Austria-Hungary sends note to her Ambassador in Russia declaring war on
Russia.

Belgium protests against the invasion of her territory to all ''Countries having
Diplomatic Relations" with her.

France joins Great Britain and Russia in declaring their willingness to co-
operate '*in the defence of Belgian territory."

Germany requests the departure from Luxemburg of the Entente Ministers.

Great Britain declares war on Germany as of 11 a.m., and informs Belgium that
she considers "joint action with a view to resisting Germany to be in force."

Russia declares her willingness to cooperate with France and Great Britain
"in the defence of Belgian territory."

Austria-Hungary :

To St. Petersburgh

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 59

Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburgh.

{Translated from the French.)
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 5, 1914.

I ASK Your Excellency to hand over the following note to the
Minister for Foreign Affairs : —

"On the instructions of his Government, the undersigned, the
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, has the honour to inform His Excel-
lency the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs as follows : —

"In view of the threatening attitude adopted by Russia in the
conflict between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Servia ; and
of the fact that, according to a communication from the Berlin Cabi-
net, Russia has seen fit, as a result of that conflict, to open hostilities
against Germany; and whereas Germany is consequently at war
with Russia; Austria-Hungary therefore considers herself also at
war with Russia from the present moment."

After handing over this note Your Excellency will ask that pass-
ports may be prepared, and you will leave withiout delay with the

460 Official Diplomatic Documents

entire staff of the Embassy with the exception of any members who
are to be left behind. At the same time M. Schebeko is being fur-
nished with his passport by us.

Belgium :

From London

Belgian Gray Book No. 41

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M, Damgnon, Bel-
gian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) London, August 5, 1914-

Germany, having rejected the British proposals, Great Britain
has informed her that a state of war existed between* the two coun-
tries as from 11 o'clock.

To Paris, London, and St. Petersburgh
Belgian Gray Book No. 42

M. Damgnon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian
Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburgh.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 5, 1914.

After the violation of Belgian territory at Gemmenich,^ Belgium
appealed ^ to Great Britain, France, and Russia through their repre-
sentatives at Brussels, to co-operate as guaranteeing Powers in the
defence of her territory.

Belgium undertakes the defence of her fortified places.

To Paris, London, and St. Petersburgh

Belgian Gray Book No. 43

M. Damgnon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian
Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburgh.

Sir, Brussels, August 5, 1914-

In my despatch of August 4 (see No. 38) I had the honour to in-
form you of the sequence of events which had attended the inter-
national relations of Belgium from July 31st to August 4th. I added
that the Cabinet was considering the question whether Belgium,
whose territory had been invaded since the morning, should appeal
to the guarantee of the Powers.

The Cabinet had decided in the affirmative when the British
Minister informed me that the proposal which he had communicated
to me, and according to which the British Government were disposed
to respond favourably to our appeal to her as a guaranteeing Power,
was cancelled for the time being.^ (See No. 37.)

1 Belgian Gray Book No. 30, August 4.

2 Belgian Gray Book No. 40, same day.

3 This paragraph is txot clear. What had Sir E. Grey's offer, Belgian Gray Book
No. 37, or Its cancellation, ib. No. 39, to do with the decision of the Cabinet ?

August 5, Belgian Gray Book No. 44 461

A telegram from London made it clear that this change of atti-
tude was caused by an ultimatum from Great Britain giving Ger-
many a time limit of ten hours within which to evacuate Belgian
territory and to respect Belgian neutrality. (See No. 39.) During
the evening, the Belgian Government addressed to France, Great
Britain, and Russia, through their respective representatives at Brus-
sels, a note, of which a copy is enclosed herewith. (See No. 40.)

As you will observe, Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France,
and Russia to co-operate as guaranteeing Powers in the defence of
her territory and in the maintenance for the future of the independ-
ence and integrity of her territory. She will herself undertake the
defence of her fortified places.

As yet we are not aware how our appeal has been received.

To the Belgian Heads of Missions in all Countries having Diplomatic
Relations with Belgium.

Belgian Gray Book No. 44

M. Damgnouy Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian
Heads of Missions in all Countries ^ having Diplomatic Relations
with Belgium.

Sir, Brussels, August 5, 1914-

By the treaty of April 18th, 1839, Prussia, France, Great Britain,
Austria, and Russia declared themselves guarantors of the treaty
concluded on the same day between His Majesty the King of the
Belgians and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands. The treaty
runs : " Belgium shall form a State independent and perpetually
neutral." Belgium has fulfilled all her international obligations, she
has accomplished her duty in a spirit of loyal impartiality,^ she has
neglected no effort to maintain her neutrality and to cause that neu-
trality to be respected.

In these circumstances the Belgian Government have learnt with
deep pain that the armed forces of Germany, a Power guaranteeing
Belgian neutrality, have entered Belgian territory in violation of the
obligations undertaken by treaty.

It is our duty to protest with indignation against an outrage
against international law provoked by no act of ours.

The Belgian Government are firmly determined to repel by all
the means in their power the attack thus made upon their neutrality,
and they recall the fact that, in virtue of article 10 of The Hague
Convention of 1907 respecting the rights and duties of neutral
Powers and persons in the case of war by land, if a neutral Power
repels, even by force, attacks on her neutrality such action cannot be
considered as a hostile act.

I have to request that you will ask at once for an audience with

1 This includes the United States.

2 This is denied by Germany in view of the Brussels documents which show that
Belgium had given her military secrets to Great Britain.

462 Official Diplomatic Documents

the Minister for Foreign Affairs and read this despatch to his Excel-
lency, handing him a copy. If the interview cannot be granted at
once you should make the communication in question in writing.

From Berlin

Belgian Gray Book No. 45

Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin^ to M. Damgnon, Belgian
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) Berlin, August 5, 19H,

I HAVE received my passports and shall leave Berlin to-morrow
morning for Holland with the staff of the legation.

From Madrid

Belgian Gray Book No. 46

Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid, to M. Davignon, Belgian
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) St. Sebastian, August 5, 1914-

The Spanish Government undertake the custody of Belgian in-
terests in Germany, and are to-day sending telegraphic instructions
to their Ambassador at Berlin.

(See No. 33.)

From Paris

Belgian Gray Book No. 47

Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Belgian

Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Sir, Paris, August 5, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith a copy of the notification
of a state of war between France and Germany, which has been
communicated to me to-day.

Enclosure in No. 47.
(See French Yellow Book No. 157, August 4.)

From London

Belgian Gray Book No. 48

Communication of August 5, from Sir Francis Villiers, British Minis-
ter at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

I AM instructed to inform the Belgian Government that His Bri-
tannic Majesty's Government consider joint action with a view to

August 5, Belgian Gray Book No. 52 463

resisting Germany to be in force and to be justified by the Treaty
of 1839.

From London

Belgian Gray Book No. 49

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Bel-
gian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) London, August 5, 1914.

Great Britain agrees to take joint action in her capacity of
guaranteeing Power for the defence of Belgian territory. The
British fleet will ensure the free passage of the Scheldt for the pro-
visioning of Antwerp.

From The Hague
Belgian Gray Book No. 50

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, Bel-
gian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) The Hague, August 5, 191^.

The war buoying is about to be established.

(See No. 29.)

To Madrid

Belgian Gray Book No. 51

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Grenier,
Belgian Minister at Madrid.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 5, 1914-

Please express to the Spanish Government the sincere thanks of
the Belgian Government.

(See No. 46.)

To Paris, London, and St. Petersburgh

Belgian Gray Book No. 52

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian
Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburgh.

Sir, ~ Brussels, August 5, 1914.

I have the honour to inform you that the French and Russian
Ministers made a communication to me this morning informing me
of the willingness of their Governments to respond to our appeal,
and to co-operate with Great Britain in the defence of Belgian terri-
tory.

464 Official Diplomatic Documents

France :

From Luxemburg

French Yellow Book No. 156

M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to M. Doumergue, Minis-
ter for Foreign Affairs.

Paris, August 5, 1914-

The Minister of State came to see me at the Legation this morn-
ing, Tuesday, 4th August, 1914, at about half-past eight o'clock, in
order to notify me that the German military authorities required my
departure. On my answering that I would only give way to force
M. Eyschen said that he understood my feelings in this matter, and
it was just for that reason that he had himself come to make this
communication which cost him so much, for it was just because force
was used that he asked me to leave. He added that he was going
to bring me written proof of this.

I did not conceal from M. Eyschen the grief and anxiety which I
had in leaving my fellow-countrymen without defence, and asked
him to be good enough to undertake their protection ; this he promised
to do.

Just as he was leaving he handed me the enclosed letter (En-
closure I.) which is the answer of the Luxemburg Government to the
declaration which I had made the evening before, according to tele-
graphic instructions of M. Viviani.

About 10 o'clock, the Minister of State came again to the Lega-
tion and left me with a short note from himself, a certified copy of
the letter which the German Minister had addressed to him on
the subject of my departure from Luxemburg. (Enclosures IL and

III.)

At the same time he told me that he had informed Herr von Buch
that the Luxemburg Government would be entrusted with the pro-
tection of the French and would have charge of the Legation and
the Chancery. This news did not seem to be agreeable to my Ger-
man colleague, w^ho advised M. Eyschen to move me to entrust this
responsibility to the Belgian IMinister. I explained to the Minister
of State that the situation was peculiar. As I was accredited to Her
Royal Highness the Grand Duchess and as my country was not
in a state of war with Luxemburg, it was in these circumstances
clearly indicated that it should be the Luxemburg Government which
should look after the safety of my fellow-countrymen. M. Eyschen
did not insist, and again accepted the service which I entrusted to
him.

The Minister of State then asked me to be good enough to leave
quietly in order to avoid any demonstration, which, as he said,
would not fail to bring about reprisals on the part of the German
military authorities against the French. I answered that I attached
too much value to the safety of my countrymen to compromise it
and that he had nothing to fear.

August 5, French Yellow Book No. 156 465

^ My departure, which was required to take place as soon as pos-
sible, was fixed for two o'clock ; it was at the same time understood
that I should leave in my motor car. As to a safe conduct, M.
Eyschen told me that the German Minister was at that very moment
at the German headquarters to ask for it, and that he would take
care that I received it in good time.

At a quarter-past two the Minister of State accompanied by M.
Henrion, Councillor of the Government, came to take leave of
me and to receive the keys of the Legation and those of the
Chancery.

He told me that orders had been given for my free passage, and
that I must make for Arlon by way of the Merle, Mamers and Arlon
roads. He added that a German officer would wait for me at the
Merle road in order to go in front of my motor car.

I then left the Legation and made my w^ay to Arlon by the road
which had been determined on, but I did not meet anyone.

Your Excellency will have the goodness to find the enclosed text
of the letter which I sent to the Minister of State before leaving my
post (Enclosure IV.). Mollard.

Enclosure I

M. Eyschen, Minister of State, President of the Government, to M,
Mollard, French Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipoten-
tiary at Luxemburg.

Sir, Luxemburg, August 4, 1914.

In an oral communication made yesterday evening, your Excel-
lency has had the goodness to bring to my knowledge that in accord-
ance with the Treaty of London of 1867, the Government of the Re-
public intended to respect the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of
Luxemburg as they had shown by their attitude, but that the viola-
tion of this neutrality by Germany was nevertheless of such a kind
as to compel France henceforth to be influenced in this matter by
the care for her defence and her interests.

You will allow me to point out clearly that the decision of the
Government of the Republic is based solely on the act of a third
Power for which in truth the Grand Duchy is not responsible.

The rights of Luxemburg must then remain intact.

The German Empire has formally declared that only a temporary
occupation of Luxemburg entered into their intentions.

I am glad to believe that the Government of the Republic will
have no difficulty in establishing with me the fact that at all times
and in all circumstances the Grand Duchy has fully and loyally ful-
filled all the obligations of every kind which rested on it in virtue of
the Treaty of 1867. I remain, etc.,

Eyschen.
Minister of State, President of the Government.
2h

466 Official Diplomatic Documents

Enclosure II

Private Letter from M. Eyschen, Minister of State, President of the
Government, to M. Mollard, French Minister, at Luxemburg.

Sir,

A SHORT time ago I had with very great regret to inform you of
the intentions of General von Fuchs with regard to your sojourn in
Luxemburg.

As I had the honour to tell you, I asked for confirmation in writ-
ing of the decision taken by the military authorities in this matter.

Enclosed is a copy of a letter which I have at this moment re-
ceived from the German Minister.

He has assured me that in carrying out this step there will be no
want of the respect due to your position and person.

Be good enough to receive the renewed expression of my regret
and my deep regard. Eyschen.

Enclosure III
To His Excellency the Minister of State, Dr. Eyschen,

Your Excellency,

In accordance with the instructions of his Excellency General
Fuchs, I have the honour to ask you to be good enough to request
the French Minister, M. Mollard, to leave Luxemburg as soon as
possible and to return to France; otherwise the German military
authorities would find themselves under the painful necessity of
placing M. Mollard under the charge of a military escort and in the
last extremity of proceeding to his arrest.

I beg your Excellency to have the goodness on this occasion to
receive the assurance of my deepest regard. Von Buch.

Enclosure IV

M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to His Excellency M.
Eyschen, Minister of State, President of the Government of Luxem-
burg.

Sir, Luxemburg, August 4) 1914-

I HAVE just received your communication and I submit to force.
Before leaving Luxemburg it is my duty to provide for the for-
tunes and safety of my fellow-countrymen. Knowing the spirit of
justice and equity of the Luxemburg Government, I have the honour
to ask your Excellency to take them under your protection, and to
watch over the safety of their lives and goods.

August 5, French Yellow Book No. 156 467

At the same time I will ask your Excellency to take charge of the
Legation and the offices of the Chancery.

I should be much obliged to your Excellency if you would be good
enough to lay before Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess the
expression of my deepest respect, and my excuses for not having been
able myself to express them to her.

In thankmg you for all the marks of sympathy which you have
given me I beg you to receive renewed assurances of my deep regard.

Armand Mollard.

Sent Despatches to

Received
Despatches fkom

London
The Hague

The Hague

German Legation

Austro-Hungarian

Ambassador
BerHn

468 Official Diplomatic Documents

Thiirsday, August 6, 1914
SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES

Foreign Office of

Austria-Hungary

Belgium

France

Germany

Great Britain

Russia

Serbia

Austria-Hungary presents her declaration of war to Russia.

Belgium is informed by Holland of war regulations established for the naviga-
tion of the Scheldt.

Germany and Serbia sever diplomatic relations, and the former in so doing lays
the entire blame for the war on Russia for having ordered general mobiUsation
just when Germany was hopeful of success in her attempt at mediation.

Austria-Hungary :

To London

Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 60
Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 6, 1914.

I HAVE received Your Excellency's telegram of the 4th August.^
I ask you to assure Sir E. Grey that we will in no case open hostili-
ties against Great Britain without a previous formal declaration of
war, but that we also expect that Great Britain will observe towards
us a similar attitude, and that she will not undertake any hostile act
against us before formally declaring war.

Belgium :

From The Hague

Belgian Gray Book No. 53

Jonkheer de Weede, Netherlands Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Brussels, August 6, 1914-

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Excellency herewith a copy
of the special edition of the Staatscourant, containing the declara-
tion of the neutrality of the Netherlands in the war between Bel-
gium and Germany, and between Great Britain and Germany.

1 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 58, August 4.

August 6, Belgian Gray Book No. 53

469

Enclosure to No. 53

Laws, Decrees, Nominations, etc.

Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Marine, War, and the Colonies,

(Translation.)
The Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, Justice, Marine, War,
and the Colonies, authorised to
that effect by her Majesty the
Queen, make known to all whom
it may concern that the Nether-
lands Government will observe
strict neutrality in the war
which has broken out between
Great Britain and Germany, and
Belgium and Germany, Powers
friendly to the Netherlands, and
that, with a view of the observ-
ance of this neutrality, the fol-
lowing dispositions have been
taken : —

^ Les Ministres des Affaires
Etrangeres, de la Justice, de la
Marine, de la Guerre et des
Colonies, autorises a cette fin par
Sa Majeste la Reine, portent a la
connaissance de tons ceux que la
chose concerne, que le Gouverne-
ment neerlandais observera dans
la guerre qui a eclate entre les
Puissances amies des Pays-Bas,
Grande-Bretagne et Allemagne,
et Belgique et Allemagne, une
stricte neutralite, et qu'en vue de
I'observation de cette neutralite
les dispositions suivantes ont ete
arretees :

Article 1

Dans les limites du territoire
de I'Etat, comprenant le territoire
du Royaume en Europe, outre
les colonies et possessions dans
d'autres parties du monde, aucun
genre d'hostilites n'est.permis et
ce territoire ne pent servir de base
pour des operations hostiles.

Article 2

Ni I'occupation d'une partie
quelconque du territoire de I'Etat
par un belligerant, ni le passage
a travers ce territoire par voie de
terre par des troupes ou des con-
vois de munitions appartenanta
un des belligerants ne sont permis
non plus que le passage a travers
le territoire situe a Finterieur des
eaux territoriales neerlandaises
par des navires de guerre ou des
batiments des belligerants as-
similes a ceux-ci.

Article 1

Within the limits of the terri-
tory of the State, including the
territory of the Kingdom in
Europe and the colonies and
possessions in other parts of the
world, no hostilities of any kind
are permitted, neither may this
territory serve as a base for
hostile operations.

Article 2

Neither the occupation of any
part of the territory of the State
by a belligerent nor the passage
across this territory by land is
permitted to the troops or con-
voys of munitions belonging to
the beUigerents, nor is the pas-
sage across the territory situated
within the territorial waters of
the Netherlands by the warships
or ships assimilated thereto of
the belligerents permitted.

470

Official Diplomatic Documents

Article 3

Les troupes ou les militaires,
appartenant aux belligerants ou
destines a ceux-ci et arrivant sur
le territoire de I'Etat par voie
de terre seront immediatement
desarmes et internes jusqu'a la
fin de la guerre.

Les navires de guerre ou bati-
ments assimiles a ces derniers,
appartenant a un belligerant, qui
contreviendront aux prescriptions
des articles 2, 4 ou 7, ne pourront
quitter ce territoire avant la fin
de la guerre.

Article 4

Les navires de guerre oubati-
ments assimiles a ces derniers,
qui appartiennent a un belli-
gerant, n'auro^nt pas acces au
territoire de TEtat.

Article 3

Troops or soldiers belonging to
the belligerents or destined for
them arriving in the territory of
the State by land will be imme-
diately disarmed and interned
until the termination of the war.

Warships or ships assimilated
thereto belonging to a belligerent,
who contravenes the provisions of
articles 2, 4, or 7 will not be per-
mitted to leave the said territory
until the end of the war.

Article 4

No warships or ships assimi-
lated thereto belonging to any of
the belligerents shall have access
to the said territory.

Article 5

La disposition de Tarticle 4
n'est pas applicable :

1° aux navires de guerre ou
batiments d'un belligerant assi-
miles a ces derniers, et qui par
suite d'avarie ou de I'etat de la
mer sont tenus d'entrer dans un
des ports ou rades de I'Etat. Les
navires pourront quitter les dits
ports ou rades des que les circon-
stances qui les ont contraints de
s'y refugier auront cesse d'exister ;

2° aux navires de guerre ou
batiments assimiles, appartenant
a un belligerant, et qui font escale
dans un port ou une rade situes
dans le territoire des colonies et
possessions d'cutre-mer, exclu-
sivement dans le but de completer
leur provision de denrees alimen-
taires ou de combustibles. Ces
navires devront repartir des que
les circonstances qui \es ont forces

Article 5

The provisions of article 4 do
not apply to : —

L Warships or ships assimi-
lated thereto which are forced to
enter the' ports or roadstead of
the State on account of damages
or the state of the sea. Such
ships may leave the said ports or
roadsteads as soon as the circum-
stances which have driven them
to take shelter there shall have
ceased to exist.

2. Warships or ships assimi-
lated thereto belonging to a bel-
ligerent which anchor in a port
or roadstead in the colonies or
oversea possessions exclusively
with the object of completing
their provision of foodstuffs or
fuel. These ships must leave as
soon as the circumstances which
have forced them to anchor shall
have ceased to exist, subject to

August 6, Belgian Gray Book No. S3

471

a faire escale ont cesse d'exister,
avec cette condition que le sejour
en rade ou dans le port ne pourra
durer plus de vingt-quatre heures ;
3° aux navires de guerre ou
batiments assimiles, appartenant
a un belligerant, et qui sont
utilises exclusivement pour une
mission religieuse, scientifique, ou
humanitaire.

the condition that their stay in
the roadstead or port shall not
exceed twenty-four hours.

3. Warships or ships assimi-
lated thereto belonging to a bel-
ligerent employed exclusively on
a religious, scientific, or human-
itarian mission.

Article 6

Les navires de guerre ou bati-
ments assimiles appartenant a
un belligerant, ne peuvent reparer
leurs avaries dans les ports ou
rades de I'Etat qu'en tant que
cette reparation est indispensable
a la securite de la navigation, et
ils ne pourront en aucune fa9on
accroitre leurs capacites de
combat.

Article 6

Warships or ships assimilated
thereto belonging to a belligerent
may only execute such repairs in
the ports and roadsteads of the
State as are indispensable to
their seaworthiness, and they
may in no way increase their
fighting capacities.

Article 7

Les navires de guerre ou bati-
ments assimiles, appartenant a
un belligerant, et qui, au com-
mencement de la guerre, se trou-
veraient sur le territoire de I'Etat,
sont tenus de le quitter dans les
vingt-quatre heures de la publi-
cation de la presente.

Article 7

Warships or ships assimilated
thereto belonging to a belligerent
who may at the commencement
of war be within the territory of
the State must leave within
twenty-four hours from the mo-
ment of the publication of this
declaration.

Article 8

Si des navires de guerre ou
batiments assimiles appartenant
a divers belligerants se trouvent
en meme temps, dans les con-
ditions visees a I'article 5, dans
une meme partie du monde, et
sur le territoire de TEtat, un delai
d'au moins vingt-quatre heures
doit s'ecouler entre le depart des
navires de chacun des belli-
gerants. A moins de circon-
stances speciales, I'ordre de de-
part est determine par Tordre

Article 8

If warships or ships assimilated
thereto belonging to different bel-
ligerents find themselves at the
same time, in the conditions set
forth in article 5, in the same part
of the world and within the terri-
tory of the State, a delay of at
least twenty-four hours must
elapse between the departure of
each respective belligerent ship.
Except in special circumstances,
the order of departure shall be
determined by the order of arrival.

472

Official Diplomatic Documents

d'arrivee. Un navire de guerre
ou un batiment assimile, appar-
tenant a un belligerant, ^ne pent
quitter le territoire de TEtat que
vingt-quatre heures apres le
depart d'un navire de commerce
portant le pavilion de Tautre
belligerant.

A warship or ship assimilated
thereto belonging to a belligerent
may only leave the territory of
the State twenty-four hours after
the departure of a merchant ship
which flies the flag of another
belligerent.

Article 9

Les navires de guerre ou bati-
ments assimiles, appartenant a
un belligerant, vises a I'article
5 et a I'article 7, ne peuvent etre
ravitailles en denrees alimentaires
dans les ports et les rades du pays
que dans la mesure necessaire
pour parfaire leurs provisions
jusqu'a la limite normale du
temps de paix.

De meme, ils ne peuvent
charger de combustible que dans
la mesure necessaire pour pouvoir
atteindre, avec la provision qu'ils
ont encore a bord, le port le plus
rapproche de leur propre pays.

Un meme batiment ne pent
etre ravitaille a nouveau en com-
bustible qu'a I'expiration d'une
periode de trois mois au moins
apres son precedent ravitaille-
ment dans le territoire de I'Etat.

Article 9

Warships or ships assimilated
thereto belonging to a belligerent
to which articles 5 and 7 are appli-
cable may only be provisioned
with foodstuffs in the ports and
roadsteads of the country to the
extent necessary to bring their
provisions up to the normal limit
in time of peace.

Similarly they can only be
supplied with fuel to the extent
necessary to enable them, with
the stock they already have on
board, to reach the nearest port
of their own country.

The same vessel cannot again
be provided with fuel until a
period of at least three months
shall have elapsed since it was
last provisioned in the territory
of the State.

Article 10

Une prise ne pent etre amenee
dans le territoire que lorsqu'elle
est incapable de naviguer, qu'elle
tient mal la mer, qu'elle manque
de combustible ou de denrees
alimentaires.

Elle doit s'eloigner des que la
cause de son entree dans le terri-
toire cesse d'exister.

Si elle ne le fait pas, Tordre
lui sera donne de partir imme-
diatement; en cas de refus, il

Article 10

A prize may only be brought
into Dutch territory if such prize
is unnavigable, or unseaworthy,
or short of fuel or foodstuffs.

Such prize must leave as soon
as the reasons which caused her
to enter Dutch territory cease to
exist.

Should such prize fail to do so,
immediate orders shall be given
her to leave. In the event of a

August 6, Belgian Gray Book No. 53

473

sera fait usage des moyens dis-
ponibles pour liberer la prise avec
ses officiers et son equipage et
pour interner I'equipage place a
bord par le belligerant qui a fait
la prise.

refusal, all possible means shall
be employed to liberate the prize,
with her officers and crew, and to
intern the crew placed on board
by the belligerent who has taken
it as prize.

Article 11

II e^st interdit, sur le territoire
de TEtat, de former des corps
combattants ou d'ouvrir des
bureaux de recrutement au profit
des belligerants.

Article U

It is forbidden in State terri-
tory, to form a corps of com-
batants or to open recruiting
offices on behalf of the bellig-
erents.

Article 12

II est interdit, sur le territoire
de I'Etat, de prendre du service
a bord de navires de guerre ou de
batiments assimiles.

Article 12

It is forbidden, in State terri-
tory, to take service on board
warships or ships assimilated
thereto.

Article 13

II est interdit, sur le territoire
de TEtat, d'amenager, d'armer ou
d'equiper des navires destines a
des fins militaires au profit d'un
belligerant, ou de fournir ou con-
duire a un belligerant de tels
navires.

Article 13

It is forbidden, in State terri-
tory, to equip, arm, or man vessels
intended for military purposes on
behalf of a belligerent, or to
furnish or deliver such vessels to
a belligerent.

Article 14

II est interdit, sur le territoire
de I'Etat, de fournir des armes ou
des munitions a des navires de
guerre jdu batiments assimiles
appartenant a un belligerant, ou
de leur venir en aide d'une
maniere quelconque en vue de
I'augmentation de leur equipage
ou de leur amenagement.

Article 14

It is forbidden in State terri-
tory to supply arms or ammu-
nition to warships or ships
assimilated thereto belonging to
a belligerent, or to come to their
assistance in any manner what-
soever with a view to augment
their crew or their equipment.

Article 15

II est interdit, sur le territoire
de I'Etat, sauf autorisation pre-
alable des autorites locales com-
petentes, de faire des reparations

Article 15

It is forbidden in State terri-
tory failing previous authorisa-
tion by the competent local au-
thorities, to repair warships or

474

Official Diplomatic Documents

aux navires de guerre ou bati-
.ments assimiles appartenant a
un belligerant, ou de leur fournir
des provisions de bouche ou de
combustible.

ships assimilated thereto belong-
ing to a belligerent, or to supply
them with victuals or fuel.

Article 16

II est interdit, sur le territoire
de I'Etat, de cooperer au degree-
ment ou a la reparation de prises,
sauf en ce qui est necessaire pour
les rendre propres a tenir la mer ;
ainsi que d'acheter des prises ou
des marchandises confisquees, et
de les recevoir en echange, en
don ou en depot.

Article 16

It is forbidden in State terri-
tory to take part in the dis-
mantling or repairing of prizes
except in so far as is necessary to
make them seaworthy; also to
purchase prizes or confiscated
goods, and to receive them in
exchange, in gift, or on deposit.

Article 17

Le territoire de FEtat comprend
la mer cotiere sur une largeur de
3 milles marins a raison de 60 par
degre de latitude, a partir de la
laisse de la basse mer.

En ce qui concerne les bales
cette distance de 3 milles marins
est mesuree a partir d'une ligne
droite tiree a travers la bale aussi
pres que possible de I'entree, au
point ou I'ouverture de la bale ne
depasse pas 10 milles marins, a
raison de 60 par degre de latitude.

Article 17

The State territory comprises
the coastal waters to a distance
of 3 nautical miles, reckoning
60 to the degree of latitude, from
low-water mark.

As regards inlets, this distance
of 3 nautical miles is measured
from a straight line drawn across
the inlet at the point nearest the
entrance where the mouth of the
inlet is not wider than 10 nautical
miles, reckoning 60 to the degree
of latitude.

Article 18

. En outre, Tintention est attiree
sur les articles 100, 1°, et 205 du
Code penal ; Indisch Staats-
blad, 1905, No. 62 ; Art. 7, 4°,
de la loi sur la qualite de Neer-
landais et sur le domicile
{Nederlandsch Staatsblad, 1892,
No. 268; 1910, No. 216);
art. 2, No. 3, de la loi sur la
qualite de sujet neerlandais
(Nederlandsch Staatsblad, 1910,
No. 55 ; Indisch Staatsblad,
1910, No. 296; art. 54 et 55

Article 18

Further, attention is called to
Articles 100, Section l,^and 205
of the Penal Code; Indisch
Staatsblad, 1905, No. 62; Ar-
ticle 7, Section 4, of the Law
respecting the status of Nether-
lands nationality, and respecting
domicile {Nederlandsch Staats-
blad, 1892, No. 268; 1910,
No. 216); Article 2, No. 3, of
the Law respecting the sta-
tus of Netherlands nationality
(Nederlandsch Staatsblad, 1910,

August 6, Belgian Gray Book No. 5^

475

du Code penal de Suriname;
art. 54 et 55 du Code penal de
Cura9ao).

De meme, Fattention des com-
mandants de navires, armateurs
et affreteurs, est attiree sur le
danger et les inconvenients, aux-
quels ils s'exposeraient en ne
respectant pas le blocus effectif
des belligerants, en transportant
de la contrebande de guerre ou
des depeches militaires pour les
belligerants (a moins qu'il ne
s'agisse du service postal regulier)
ou en executant pour eux d'autres
services de transport.

Quiconque se rendrait coupable
d'actes prevus ci-dessus, s'ex-
poserait a toutes les consequences
de ces actes, et ne pourrait
obtenir a cet egard aucune pro-
tection ni intervention du Gou-
vernement neerlandais.

No. 55; Indisch Staatsblad,
1910, No. 296 ; Articles 54 and
55 of the Penal Code of Suri-
nam; Articles 54 and 55 of the
Penal Code of Cura9oa).

Similarly, the attention of com-
manding officers, owners, and
charterers of ships is called to
the dangers and inconveniences
to which they would expose
themselves by disregarding the
effective blockade of belligerents,
by carrying contraband of war,
or military despatches for bel-
ligerents (except in the course
of the regular postal service), or
by rendering them other trans-
port services.

Any person guilty of the acts
aforesaid would expose himself to
all the consequences of those acts
and would not be able, as regards
them, to obtain any protection or
intervention on the part of the
Netherlands Government.

To the Hague
Belgian Gray Book No. 54

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon,
Belgian Minister at The Hague.

(Telegram.)

Brussels, August 6, 1914-

Please communicate the following note to the Netherlands
Government : —

The Belgian Government have taken note of the establishment
of war buoying on the Scheldt and of the fact that the Netherlands
Government will ensure the maintenance of navigation.

It would be convenient that navigation should be possible from
30 minutes before sunrise to 30 minutes after sunset, and that
the exchange of pilots should take place at Bath.

With every desire to fall in with the requests of the Netherlands
Government, the Belgian Government think that it is desirable in
the interests of the littoral ports to retain the lightships of Wielingen
and of Wandelaar, and also the buoys of the Wielingen Channel.

476 Official Diplomatic Documents

(See No. 50.)

From The Hague

Belgian Gray Book No. 55

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Damgnon, Bel-
gian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) The Hague, August 6, 1914.

Navigation on the Scheldt is allowed from daybreak and so long
as it is light. The Wielingen buoys will be replaced. The exchange
of pilots at Hansweert is easier and better organised. Are you par-
ticularly anxious to have Bath?

France :

From Copenhagen

French Yellow Book No. 155

M. Bapst, French Minister at Copenhagen, to M. Doumergue, Minis-
ter for Foreign Affairs.

Copenhagen, August 6, 1914-

The French Ambassador at Berlin asks me to communicate to
your Excellency the following telegram : —

I have been sent to Denmark by the German Government.
I have just arrived at Copenhagen. I am accompanied by all the
staff of the Embassy and the Russian Charge d' Affaires at Darm-
stadt with his family. The treatment which we have received is of
such a nature that I have thought it desirable to make a complete
report on it to your Excellency by telegram.

On the morning of Monday, the 3rd August, after I had, in ac-
cordance with your instructions, addressed to Herr von Jagow a
protest against the acts of aggression committed on French territory
by German troops, the Secretary of State came to see me. Herr
von Jagow came to complain of acts of aggression which he alleged
had been committed in Germany, especially at Nuremberg and Co-
blenz by French aviators, who according to his statement "had
come from Belgium." I answered that I had not the slightest in-
formation as to the facts to which he attached so much importance
and the improbability of which seemed to me obvious ; on my part
I asked him if he had read the note v/hich I had addressed to him
with regard to the invasion of our territory by detachments of the
German army. As the Secretary of State said that he had not yet
read this note I explained its contents to him. I called his attention
to the act committed by the officer commanding one of the detach-
ments who had advanced to the French village of Joncherey, ten
kilometres within our frontier, and had blown out the brains of a
French soldier whom he had met there. After having given my
opinion of this act I added : " You will admit that under no circum-

August 6, French Yelloiv Book No. 155 477

stances could there be any comparison between this and the flight
of an aeroplane over foreign territory carried out by private persons
animated by that spirit of individual courage by which aviators are
distinguished.

"An act of aggression committed on the territory of a neighbour
by detachments of regular troops commanded by officers assumes an
importance of quite a different nature."

Herr von Jagow explained to me that he had no knowledge of the
facts of which I was speaking to him, and he added that it was diffi-
cult for events of this kind not to take place when two armies filled
with the feelings • which animated our troops found themselves face
to face on either side of the frontier.

At this moment the crowds which thronged the Pariser Platz in
front of the Embassy and whom we could see through the window
of my study, which was half-open, uttered shouts against France.
I asked the Secretary of State when all this would come to an end.

"The Government has not yet come to a decision," Herr von
Jagow answered. "It is probable that Herr von Schoen will receive
orders to-day to ask for his passports and then you will receive
yours." The Secretary of State assured me that I need not have any
anxiety with regard to my departure, and that all the proprieties
would be observed with regard to me as well as my staff. We w^ere
not to see one another any more and we took leave of one another
after an interview which had been courteous and could not make me
anticipate what w^as in store for me.

Before leaving Herr von Jagow I expressed to him my wish to
make a personal call on the Chancellor, as that would be the last
opportunity that I should have of seeing him.

Herr von Jagow answered that he did not advise me to carry out
this intention as this interview would serve no purpose and could
not fail to be painful.

At 6 o'clock in the evening Herr von Langwerth brought me my
passports. In the name of his Government he refused to agree to
the wish which I expressed to him that I should be permitted to
travel by Holland or Belgium. He. suggested to me that I should
go either by way of Copenhagen, although he could not assure me
a free passage by sea, or through Switzerland via Constance.

I accepted this last route ; Herr von Langwerth having asked me
to leave as soon as I possibly could it was agreed, in consideration
of the necessity I was under of making arrangements with the Spanish
Ambassador, who was undertaking the charge of our interests, that
I should leave on the next day, the 4th August, at 10 o'clock at night.

At 7 o'clock, an hour after Herr von Langwerth had left, Herr
von Lancken, formerly Councillor of the Embassy at Paris, came
from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to tell me to request the staff
of my Embassy to cease taking meals in the restaurants. This order
was so strict that on the next day, Tuesday, I had to have recourse
to the authority of the Wilhelmstrasse to get the Hotel Bristol to
send our meals to the Embassy.

478 Official Diplomatic Documents

At 11 o'clock on the same evening, Monday, Herr von Langwerth
came back to tell me that his Government would not allow our return
by way of Switzerland under the pretext that it would take three
days and three nights to take me to Constance. He announced
that I should be sent by way of Vienna. I only agreed to this altera-
tion under reserve, and during the night I wrote the following letter
to Herr von Langwerth : —

"M. le Baron, Berlin, August 3, 1914-.

" I have been thinking over the route for my return to my coun-
try about which you came to speak to me this evening. You pro-
pose that I shall travel by Vienna. I run the risk of finding myself
detained in that town, if not by the action of the Austrian Govern-
ment, at least owing to the mobilisation which creates great difficul-
ties similar to those existing in Germany as to the movements of
trains.

" Under these circumstances I must ask the German Government
for a promise made on their honour that the Austrian Government
will send me to Switzerland, and that the Swiss Government will
not close its frontier either to me or to the persons by whom I am
accompanied, as I am told that that frontier has been firmly closed
to foreigners.

" I cannot then accept the proposal that you have made to me
unless I have the security which I ask for, and unless I am assured
that I shall not be detained for some months outside my country.

"Jules Cambon."

In answer to this letter on the next morning, Tuesday, the 4th
August, Herr von Langwerth gave me in writing an assurance that
the Austrian and Swiss authorities had received communications to
this effect.

At the same time M. Miladowski, attached to the Consulate at
Berlin, as well as other Frenchmen, was arrested in his own house
while in bed. M. Miladowski, for whom a diplomatic passport had
been requested, was released after four hours.

I was preparing to leave for Vienna when, at a quarter to five,
Herr von Langwerth came back to inform me that I would have to
leave with the persons accompanying me at 10 o'clock in the even-
ing, but that I should be taken to Denmark. On this new require-
ment I asked if I should be confined in a fortress supposing I did not
comply. Herr von Langwerth simply answered that he would re-
turn to receive my answer in half an hour. I did not wish to give
the German Government the pretext for saying that I had refused
to depart from Germany. I therefore told Herr von Langwerth
when he came back that I would submit to the order which had been
given to me but "that I protested."

I at once wrote to Herr von Jagow a letter of which the following
is a copy :

August 6, French Yellow Book No. 155 479

"Sir, Berlin, August 4, 1914-

''More than once your Excellency has said to me that the Imperial
Government, in accordance with the usages of international courtesy,
would facilitate my return to my own country and would give me
every means of getting back to it quickly.

"Yesterday, however, Baron von Langwerth, after refusing me
access to Belgium and Holland, informed me that I should travel to
Switzerland via Constance. During the night I was informed that
I should be sent to Austria, a country which is taking part in the
present war on the side of Germany. As I had no knowledge of the
intentions of Austria towards me, since on Austrian soil I am noth-
ing but an ordinary private individual, I wrote to Baron von Lang-
werth that I requested the Imperial Government to give me a promise
that the Imperial and Royal Austrian authorities would give me all
possible facilities for continuing my journey and that Switzerland
would not be closed to me. Herr von Langwerth has been good
enough to answer me in writing that I could be assured of an easy
journey and that the Austrian authorities would do all that was
necessary.

"It is nearly five o'clock, and Baron von Langwerth has just an-
nounced to me that I shall be sent to Denmark. In view of
the present situation, there is no security that I shall find a ship to
take me to England and it is this consideration which made me reject
this proposal, with the approval of Herr von Langwerth.

" In truth no liberty is left me and I am treated almost as a prisoner.
I am obliged to submit, having no means of obtaining that the rules
of international courtesy should be observed towards me, but I
hasten to protest to your Excellency against the manner in which I
am being treated. Jules Cambon."

Whilst my letter was being delivered I was told that the journey
would not be made direct but by way of Schleswig. At 10 o'clock
in the evening, I left the Embassy with my staff in the middle of a
great assembly of foot and mounted police.

At the station the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was only repre-
sented by an officer of inferior rank.

The journey took place with extreme slowness. We took more
than twenty-four hours to reach the frontier. It seemed that at
every station they had to wait for orders to proceed. I was accom-
panied by Major von Rheinbaben of the Alesandra Regiment of the
Guard and by a police officer. In the neighbourhood of the Kiel
Canal the soldiers entered our carriages. The windows were shut
and the curtains of the carriages drawn down; each of us had to
remain isolated in his compartment and was forbidden to get up or
to touch his luggage. A soldier stood in the corridor of the carriage
before the door of each of our compartments which were kept open,
revolver in hand and finger on the trigger. The Russian Charge
d 'Affaires, the women and children and everyone were subjected to
the same treatment.

480 Official Diplomatic Documents

At the last German station about 11 o'clock at night, Major von
Rheinbaben came to take leave of me. I handed to him the follow-
ing letter to Herr von Jagow.

"Sir, Wednesday Evening, August 5, 1914-

"Yesterday before leaving Berlin, I protested in writing to your
Excellency against the repeated change of route which was imposed
upon me by the Imperial Government on my journey from Germany.

"To-day, as the train in which I was passed over the Kiel Canal
an attempt was made to search all our luggage as if we might have
hidden some instrument of destruction. Thanks to the interference
of Major von Rheinbaben, we were spared this insult. But they
went further.

"They obliged us to remain each in his own compartment, the
windows and blinds having been closed. During this time, in the
corridors of the carriages at the dcor of each compartment and fac-
ing each one of us, stood a soldier, revolver in hand, finger on the
trigger, for nearly half an hour.

"I consider it my duty to protest against this threat of violence to
the Ambassador of the Republic and the staff of his Embassy, vio-
lence which nothing could even have made me anticipate. Yester-
day I had the honour of writing to your Excellency that I was being
treated almost as a prisoner. To-day I am being treated as a dan-
gerous prisoner. Also I must record that during our journey which
from Berlin to Denmark has taken twenty-four hours, no food has
been prepared nor provided for me nor for the persons who were
travelling with me to the frontier. Jules Cambon.''

I thought that our troubles had finished, when shortly afterwards
Major von Rheinbaben came, rather embarrassed, to inform me
that the train would not proceed to the Danish frontier if I did not
pay the cost of this train. I expressed my astonishment that I had
not been made to pay at Berlin and that at any rate I had not been
forewarned of this. I offered to pay by a cheque on one of the largest
Berlin banks. This facility was refused me. With the help of my
companions I was able to collect, in gold, the sum which was re-
quired from me at once, and which amounted to 3,611 marks 75
pfennig. This is about 5,000 francs in accordance with the present
rate of exchange.^

After this last incident, I thought it necessary to ask Major von
Rheinbaben for his word of honour as an officer and a gentleman that
we should be taken to the Danish frontier. He gave it to me, and I
required that the policeman who was with us should accompany us.

In this way we arrived at the first Danish station, where the Danish
Government had had a train made ready to take us to Copenhagen.

I am assured that my British colleague and the Belgian Minister,
although they left Berlin after I did, travelled by the direct route to

1 Subsequently the sum thus required from M. Jules Cambon was given to the
Spanish Ambassador to be repaid to the French Ambassador.

Aiigust 6, Serbian Blue Book No. 60 481

Holland. I am struck by this difference of treatment, and as Den-
mark and Norway are, at this moment, infested with spies, if I suc-
ceed in embarking in Norway, there is a danger that I may be arrested
at sea with the officials who accompany me.

I do not wish to conclude this despatch without notifying your
Excellency of the energy and devotion of which the whole staff of
the Embassy has given unceasing proof during the course of this
crisis. I shall be glad that account should be taken of the services
which on this occasion have been rendered to the Government of
the Republic, in particular by the Secretaries of the Embassy and
by the Military and Naval Attaches. Jules Cambon.

Russia :

From Vienna

Russian Orange Book No. 79

Note presented by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh
to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs on July 24 (August 6),
1914, at 6 P.M.

On the instructions of his Government, the undersigned, the
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, has the honour to inform his Excel-
lency the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs as follows : —

(Translation.)
"Vu I'attitude mena^ante "in view of the threatening

prise par la Russie dans le con- attitude adopted by Russia in

flit entre la Monarchic austro- the conflict between the Austro-

hongroise et la Serbie et en Hungarian Monarchy and

presence du fait qu'en suite de Servia; and of the fact that,

ce conflit la Russie d'apres une according to a communication

communication du Cabinet de from the Berlin Cabinet, Russia

Berlin a cru devoir ouvrir les has seen fit, as a result of that

hostilites contre TAllemagne et conflict, to open hostilities

que celle-ci se trouve par conse- against Germany; and whereas

quent en etat de guerre avec la- Germany is consequently at war

dite Puissance, I'Autriche-Hon- with Russia; Austria-Hungary

grie se considere egalement en therefore considers herself also

etat de guerre avec la Russie a at war with Russia from the

partir du present moment." present moment."

Serbia :

To Berlin

Serbian Blue Book No. 50

The Royal Serbian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the German Lega-
tion at Nish.

Nish, July 21 /August 6, 1914.

The Royal Serbian Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honour
to inform the Imperial Legation that, in view of the state of war
2i

482 Official Diplomatic Documents

which now exists between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, and of that
between Russia and Germany, the ally of Austria-Hungary, the
Royal Serbian Government, in view of the solidarity of her interests
with Russia and her allies, considers the mission of Baron Gieslingen,
the Imperial German Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraor-
dinary, to be at an end. The Royal Serbian Government requests
His Excellency to leave Serbian territory with the staff of the Lega-
tion. The necessary passports are enclosed herewith.

From Berlin

Serbian Blue Book No. 51

Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch,
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, July 24/ August 6, 1914.

On the occasion of my visit to the Under-Secretary of State, M.
Zimmermann, for the purpose of breaking off diplomatic relations,
he stated, in the course of conversation, that Germany had always
cherished friendly feelings towards Serbia, and that he regretted that
owing to the political groupement our relations had to be broken off.
He blames Russia only, as the instigator of Serbia, for the develop-
ments which have occurred, and which will have grave consequences
for all nations. If Russia, at the last moment — just when it ap-
peared possible that an armed conflict might be avoided — had not
ordered the mobilisation of her whole forces, there would have been
no war, for Germany had used her whole influence in Austria-Hungary
in order to bring about an understanding with Russia. Austria-
Hungary would have probably been satisfied with the occupation of
Belgrade, when negotiations would have begun with a view to regu-
larising the relations between Serbia and Austria.

Friday, August 7, 1914

Despatches published only by Belgium who suggests that the European
war between the white races be not carried into Africa.

To the Hague

Belgian Gray Book No. 56

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs^ to Baron Fallon,
Belgian Minister at the Hague.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 7, 191J,..

Please express to the Netherlands Government the sincere
thanks of the Belgian Government for the measures taken to secure
navigation on the Scheldt. The Belgian Government are in agree-

August 7, Belgian Gray Book No. 58 483

ment with the Netherlands Government on the subject of the ex-
tent of navigation. They had proposed Bath, but accept Hanswert,
since this port has better facilities for the exchange of pilots.

To Paris and London

Belgian Gray Book No. 57

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian
Ministers at Paris and London,

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 7, 1914.

Belgium trusts that the war will not be extended to Central
Africa. The Governor of the Belgian Congo has received instruc-
tions to maintain a strictly defensive attitude. Please ask the
French Government [British Government] whether they intend to
proclaim the neutrality of the French Congo [British colonies in the
conventional basin of the Congo], in accordance with article 11 of
the General Act of Berlin. A telegram from Boma reports that
hostilities are probable between the French and Germans in the
Ubangi.

To Paris and London

Belgian Gray Book No. 58

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian

Ministers at Paris and London.
Sir, Brussels, August 7, 191^.

With reference to my telegram of this morning, I have the honour
to request you to bring to the notice of the French [British] Govern-
ment the following information : —

While instructions have been sent to the Governor-General of
the Congo to take defensive measures on the common frontiers of the
Belgian colony and of the German colonies of East Africa and the
Cameroons, the Belgian Government have suggested to that officer
that he should abstain from all offensive action against those colonies.

In view of the civilising mission common to colonising nations,
the Belgian Government desire, in effect, for humanitarian reasons,
not to extend the field of hostilities to Central Africa. They will,
therefore, not take the initiative of putting such a strain on civilisa-
tion in that region, and the military forces which they possess there
will only go into action in the event of their having to repel a direct
attack on their African possessions.

I should be glad to learn whether the French [British] Govern-
ment share this view and in that case whether it is their intention,
during the present conflict, to avail themselves of article 11 of the
General Act of Berlin to neutralise such of their colonies as are con-
tained in the conventional basin of the Congo.

I am addressing an identic communication to your colleague at
London (Paris).

484 Official Diplomatic Documents

Saturday, August 8, 1914

France complains of Austro-Hungarian troops having been sent to Germany ;
and seems favorably inclined to accept the Belgian proposal that the war be not
carried into Africa.

Great Britain publishes as an addition to her White Papers (later called Blue
Book) Sir E. Goschen's final report including a description of the last interview
with the German Chancellor in which the now famous expression **a scrap of
paper" occurs.

Austria-Hungary :

From Paris

AusTRO-HuNG - JiiAN Red Book No. 61

Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold.

(Translated from the French,)

(Telegraphic.) Paris, August 8, 1914.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to go and see him in order
to communicate to me that, according to positive information which
has reached him, the Innsbruck Army Corps has been brought to the
French frontier. M. Doumergue wishes to know without delay if this
information is correct, and if it is so, what is the intention of the
Imperial and Royal Government. As France is at war with Germany
the despatch of our troops to the French frontier is, according to the
views held by the Minister, not consistent with the existing condition
of peace between Austria-Hungary and France. M. Dumaine is
commissioned to make a similar communication to Your Excellency.

Belgium :

From Paris

Belgian Gray Book No. 59

Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Belgian
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Paris, August 8, 1914-

I HAVE had the honour of speaking to the President of the Republic
with respect to your telegram of yesterday. I had received it
during the evening and had immediately communicated it to the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs. They asked for time to consider it
before answering.

M. Poincare has promised me to speak on this subject to-day
to the Minister of the Colonies. At first sight he could see little
difficulty in proclaiming the neutrality of the French Congo, but he
nevertheless reserves his reply. He believes that acts of war have
already taken place in the Ubangi. He has taken the opportunity
to remind me that the protection accorded us by France extends
also to our colonies and that we have nothing to fear.

August 8, British Blue Book No. 160 485

Great Britain:

From Berlin

British Blue Book No. 160 ^

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.

Sir, London, August 8, 1914,

In accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram
of the 4th instant ^ I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon
and enquired, in the name of His Majesty's Government, whether the
Imperial Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality.
Herr von Jagow ^ at once replied that he was sorry to say that his
answer must be "No," as, in consequence of the German troops
having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had
been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons
why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step,
namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and
easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations
and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It
was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the
more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity
of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through with-
out formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of
time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up
their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great
German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of
troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this fait accompli of
the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily
understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether
there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences,
which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons
he had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back.

During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the
same date,^ and, in compliance with the instructions therein con-
tained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed
the Secretary of State that unless the Imperial Government could
give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night that they would proceed
no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their
advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform
the Imperial Government that His Majesty's Government would have
to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium
and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a
party as themselves.

1 This despatch was not contained in the original edition of the Blue Book. It con-
tains Sir E. Goschen's recollections of his last day in Berlin.

2 See No. 153, August 4. ^ German Secretary of State. * See No. 159, August 4.

486 Official Diplomatic Documents

his Excellency a written summary of your telegram and, pointing
out that you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's
Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view
of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were
not possible even at the last moment that their answer should be
reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even twenty-
four hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said that in that
case I should have to demand my passports. This interview took
place at about 7 o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued Herr
von Jagow ^ expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his
entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make
friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain, to get
closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin
was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that
he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our
engagements, His Majesty's Government could not possibly have
acted otherwise than they had done. i

1 then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it
might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of see-
ing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agi-
tated.^ His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about
twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Gov-
ernment was terrible to a degree ; just for a word — " neutrality," a word
which in war time had so often been disregarded — just for a scrap of
paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who de-
sired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that
direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the
policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession
to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had
done was unthinkable ; it was like striking a man from behind while
he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great
Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I
protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same
way as he and Herr von Jagow ^ wished me to understand that for
strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to
advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I
would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of
"life and death" for the honour of Great Britain that she should
keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's
neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept,
or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great
Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will
that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought
of that?" I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that
fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for break-

^ German Secretary of State.

2 For the Chancellor's account of this interview see his speech in the Reichstag, June
5, 1916 : " Sir Edward Goschen was during this interview so shaken to his depths that
from a natural feeling of decency I have always refrained from speaking of it publicly,
since what happened was personal and human."

August 8, British Blue Book No. 160 487

ing solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evi-
dently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to
hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further
argument. As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain
joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the
last moment he and his Government had been working with us and
supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia.
I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations
fall apart just at the moment when the relations between them had
been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfor-
tunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between
Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face to
face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could
not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation
from our late fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no
one regretted this more than I.

After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy
and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram
was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 p.m.
It was accepted by that office, but apparently never despatched.^

At about 9.30 p.m. Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of
State, came to see me. After expressing his deep regret that the
very friendly official and personal relations between us were about
to cease, he asked me casually whether a demand for passports was
equivalent to a declaration of war. I said that such an authority
on international law as he was known to be must know as well or
better than I what was usual in such cases. I added that there were
many cases where diplomatic relations had been broken off, and,
nevertheless, war had not ensued ; but that in this case he would
have seen from my instructions, of which I had given Herr von Jagow ^
a written summary, that His Majesty's Government expected an
answer to a definite question by 12 o'clock that night and that in
default of a satisfactory answer they would be forced to take such steps
as their engagements required. Herr Zimmermann ^ said that that
was, in fact, a declaration of war, as the Imperial Government could
not possibly give the assurance required either that night or any
other night.

In the meantime, after Herr Zimmermann ^ left me, a flying sheet,
issued by the Berliner Tageblatt, was circulated stating that Great
Britain had declared war against Germany. The immediate result
of this news was the assemblage of an exceedingly excited and unruly
mob before His Majesty's Embassy. The small force of police which
had been sent to guard the embassy was soon overpowered, and the
attitude of the mob became more threatening. We took no notice
of this demonstration as long as it was confined to noise, but when
the crash of glass and the landing of cobble stones into the drawing-
room, where we were all sitting, warned us that the situation was

1 This telegram never reached the Foreign Office.

2 German Secretary of State. ^ German Under-Secretary of State.

488 Official Diplomatic Documents

getting unpleasant, I telephoned to the Foreign Office an account of
what was happening. Herr von Jagow ^ at once informed the Chief
of Police, and an adequate force of mounted police, sent with great
promptness, very soon cleared the street. From that moment on we
were well guarded, and no more direct unpleasantness occurred.

After order had been restored Herr von Jagow ^ came to see me
and expressed his most heartfelt regrets at what had occurred. He
said that the behaviour of his countrymen had made him feel more
ashamed than he had words to express. It was an indelible stain on
the reputation of Berlin. He said that the flying sheet circulated in
the streets had not been authorised by the Government ; in fact, the
Chancellor had asked him by telephone whether he thought that such
a statement should be issued, and he had replied, "Certainly not,
until the morning." It was in consequence of his decision to that
effect that only a small force of police had been sent to the neighbour-
hood of the embassy, as he had thought that the presence of a large
force would inevitably attract attention and perhaps lead to dis-
turbances. It was the "pestilential 'Tageblatt/ " which had some-
how got hold of the news, that had upset his calculations. He
had heard rumours that the mob had been excited to violence by
gestures made and missiles thrown from the embassy, but he felt
sure that that was not true (I was able soon to assure him that the
report had no foundation whatever), and even if it was, it was no
excuse for the disgraceful scenes which had taken place. He feared
that I would take home with me a sorry impression of Berlin manners
in moments of excitement. In fact, no apology could have been
more full and complete.

On the following morning, the 5th August, the Emperor sent
one of His Majesty's aides-de-camp to me with the following mes-
sage : —

"The Emperor has charged me to express to your Excellency his
regret for the occurrences of last night, but to tell you at the same
time that you will gather from those occurrences an idea of the feelings
of his people respecting the action of Great Britain in joining with
other nations against her old allies of Waterloo. His Majesty also
begs that you will tell the King that he has been proud of the titles
of British Field-Marshal and British Admiral, but that in consequence
of what has occurred he must now at once divest himself of those
titles."

I would add that the above message lost none of its acerbity by
the manner of its delivery.

On the other hand, I should like to state that I received all through
this trying time nothing but courtesy at the hands of Herr von Jagow ^
and the officials of the Imperial Foreign Office. At about 11 o'clock
on the same morning Count Wed el handed me my passports — which
I had earlier in the day demanded in writing — and told me that he
had been instructed to confer with me as to the route which I should
follow for my return to England. He said that he had understood

1 German Secretary of State.

August 8, British Blue Book No. 160 489

that I preferred the route via the Hook of Holland to that via Copen-
hagen ; they had therefore arranged that I should go by the former
route, only I should have to wait till the following morning. I
agreed to this, and he said that I might be quite assured that there
would be no repetition of the disgraceful scenes of the preceding
night as full precautions would be taken. He added that they were
doing all in their power to have a restaurant car attached to the train,
but it was rather a difficult matter. He also brought me a charming
letter from Herr von Jagow couched in the most friendly terms.
The day was passed in packing up such articles as time allowed.

The night passed quietly without any incident. In the morning a
strong force of police was posted along the usual route to the Lehrter
Station, while the embassy was smuggled away in taxi-cabs to the
station by side streets. We there suffered no molestation whatever,
and avoided the treatment meted out by the crowd to my Russian
and French colleagues. Count Wedel met us at the station to say
good-bye on behalf of Herr von Jagow and to see that all the arrange-
ments ordered for our comfort had been properly carried out. A
retired colonel of the Guards accompanied the train to the Dutch
frontier and was exceedingly kind in his efforts to prevent the great
crowds which thronged the platforms at every station where we
stopped from insulting us ; but beyond the yelling of patriotic songs
and a few jeers and insulting gestures we had really nothing to
complain of during our tedious journey to the Dutch frontier.

Before closing this long account of our last days in Berlin I should
like to place on record and bring to your notice the quite admirable
behaviour of my staff under the most trying circumstances possible.
One and all, they worked night and day with scarcely any rest, and
I cannot praise too highly the cheerful zeal with which counsellor,
naval and military attaches, secretaries, and the two young attaches
buckled to their work and kept their nerve with often a yelling mob
outside and inside hundreds of British subjects clamouring for advice
and assistance. I was proud to have such a staff to work with, and
feel most grateful to them all for the invaluable assistance and support,
often exposing them to considerable personal risk, which they so
readily and cheerfully gave to me.

I should also like to mention the great assistance rendered to us all
by my American colleague, INIr. Gerard,^ and his staff. Undeterred
by the hooting and hisses with which he was often greeted by the
mob on entering and leaving the embassy, his Excellency came
repeatedly to see me to ask how he could help us and to make arrange-
ments for the safety of stranded British subjects. He extricated
many of these from extremely difficult situations at some personal
risk to himself, and his calmness and savoir-faire and his firmness in
dealing with the Imperial authorities gave full assurance that the
protection of British subjects and interests could not have been left
in more efficient and able hands. j }^ave etc.

W. E. GOSCHEN.
1 American Ambassador in Berlin.

490 Official Diplomatic Documents

Sunday, August 9, 1914

Austria-Hungary denies the participation of her troops in the war against
France.

Belgium receives a courteous note from Germany offering peace, the fortress of
Liege having fallen into German hands.

France wishes to offer to Germany the neutrahty of the possessions in the
Congo basin in Africa.

Austria-Hungary :

To Paris

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 62

Count Berchtold to Count Szecsen at Paris.

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 9, 1914.

With reference to Your Excellency's telegram of the Sth instant.^
After conferring with the General Staff I authorise Your Excellency
to inform the French Government that the information regarding the
participation of our troops in the Franco-German war is a complete
invention. I have expressed myself in a similar manner to M.
Dumaine.

Belgium :

From The Hague

Belgian Gray Book No. 60

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Damgnon, BeU
gian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) The Hague, August 9, 1914-

The Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs has begged me to
convey to you the following information, the United States Minister
at Brussels having declined to do so : ^

The fortress of Liege has been taken by assault after a brave de-
fence. The German Government most deeply regret that bloody-
encounters should have resulted from the attitude of the Belgian
Government towards Germany. Germany is not coming as an enemy
into Belgium, it is only through the force of circumstances that she
has had, owing to the military measures of France, to take the grave
decision of entering Belgium and occupying Liege as a base for her
further military operations. Now that the Belgian army has upheld
the honour of its arms by its heroic resistance to a very superior force,
the German Government beg the King of the Belgians and the Bel-
gian Government to spare Belgium the further horrors of war. The
German Government are ready for any compact with Belgium which
can be reconciled with their arrangements with France. (See No.
70.) Germany once more gives her solemn assurance that it is not

1 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 61.

August 10, Au^tro-Hungarian Red Book No. 63 491

her intention to appropriate Belgian territory to herself and that such
an intention is far from her thoughts. Germany is still ready to
evacuate Belgium as soon as the state of war will allow her to do so.
The United States Ambassador had asked his colleague to under-
take this attempt at mediation. The Minister for Foreign Affairs
has accepted this mission without enthusiasm. I have undertaken
it to oblige him.

From Paris

Belgian Gray Book No. 61

Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Belgian
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) Paris, August 9, 1914.

The French Government are strongly inclined to proclaim the
neutrality of the possessions in the conventional basin of the Congo
and are begging Spain to make the suggestion at Berlin.

Monday, August 10, 1914

France breaks off diplomatic relations with Austria-Hungary.
Belgium refuses the German offer of peace.

Austria-Hungary :

From Paris

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 63

Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold.

(Translated from the French.)
(Telegraphic.) Paris, August 10, 1914.

I HAVE received your telegram of the 9th August ^ and communi-
cated at once the contents to M. Doumergue. The Minister, who had
received a similar telegraphic report from M. Dumaine concerning his
conversation with Your Excellency, admitted that our troops are not
on the French frontier, but he maintains that he has positive informa-
tion that an Austro-Hungarian army corps has been brought to Ger-
many, and that this makes it possible' for that Empire to withdraw her
troops from those districts which are occupied by our soldiers, and
that in the opinion of the Minister this amounts to a facilitation of
German military operations. I repeatedly drew the attention of the
Minister to the wording of the answer of Your Excellency, and he has
admitted that it is not possible to speak of an effective participation of
our troops in the Franco-German war, but he insisted that it is unde-
niable that our troops are present on German territory, and that this
is equivalent to the provision of military assistance to Germany. In

1 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 62.

492 Official Diplomatic Documents

these circumstances he has authorised the French Ambassador at
Vienna to ask for his passports without delay, and to leave Vienna
to-day with the entire staff of the Embassy. The Minister informed
me that in view of this position, my presence here can be of no use ;
indeed in view of the excitement of the populace it might give occa-
sion to regrettable occurrences which he desired to avoid. He
offered to place a train at my disposal from to-night onwards in order
that I might leave France. I answered that it was impossible for
me to receive instructions from Your Excellency before the evening,
but that in view of the recall of M. Dumaine, I asked him to have my
passport prepared.

Belgium :

From The Hague

Belgian Gray Book No. 62

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, Belgian
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, The Hague, August 10, 1914.

In response to a call on the telephone, yesterday evening at 9
o'clock, I went to the Department for Foreign Affairs.

Jonkheer Loudon told me that my German colleague had just left
his room, and had handed him a document which the United States
representative at Brussels had declined to forward to you.

The United States official in charge of the German Legation at
Brussels stated that he had received no special instructions from
Washington to intervene officially with the Belgian Government in
the interest of Germany.

The United States Minister consequently telegraphed to his col-
league at The Hague, who informed the German representative of
Mr. Whitlock's refusal.

The German Government, therefore, took the initial step by
approaching the United States Ambassador at Berlin.

In these circumstances, and in view of the urgency of these mat-
ters, Herr von Miiller begged Jonkheer Loudon to act as the inter-
mediary of the German Government in this negotiation with you.

His Excellency read me the German text of the document. I did
not hide my astonishment at this attempt at mediation, and its poor
chance of success in this form; but, solely in order to oblige the
Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, I promised to telegraph
to you immediately; and this I did yesterday.

You will find the German document enclosed in original and
translation.

Enclosure 1 in No. 62. Enclosure 2 in No. 62.

(Translation)
Die Festung Liittich ist nach The fortress of Liege has been
tapfrer Gegenwehr im Sturm ge- taken by assault after a brave

August 10, Belgian Gray Book No, 62

493

nommen worden. Die Deutsche
Regierimg bedauert es auf
das tiefste, dass es infolge der
Stellungnahme der Belgischen
Regierung gegen Deutschland
zu bliitigen Zusammenstossen
gekommen ist. Deutschland
kommt nicht als Feind nach
Belgien. Nur unter dem Zwang
der Verhaltnisse hat es angesichts
der militarischen Massnahmen
Frankreichs den schweren Ent-
schluss fassen miissen, in Belgien
einzuriicken und Liittich als
Stiitzpunkt f (ir seine weiteren mi-
litarischen Operationen besetzen
zu miissen. Nachdem die Belg-
ische Armee in heldenmutigem
Widerstand gegen die grosse
Uberlengenheit ihre Waffenehre
auf das glanzendste gewahrt hat,
bittet die Deutsche Regierung
seine Ma jest at den Konig und
die Belgische Regierung, Belgien
die weiteren Schrecken des
Krieges zu ersparen. Die
Deutsche Regierung ist zu je-
dem Abkommen mit Belgien
bereit das sich irgendwie mit
Riicksicht auf seine {voir piece
No. 70) Auseinandersetzung mit
Frankreich vereinigen lasst.
Deutschland versichert nochmals
feierlichst, dass es nicht von der
Absicht geleitet gewesen ist sich
Belgisches Gebiet anzueignen,
und dass ihm diese Absicht
durchaus fern liegt. Deutsch-
land is noch immer bereit das
Belgische Konigreich unverziig-
lich zu raumen, sobald die Kriegs-
lage es ihm gestattet. " Der hie-
sige Amerikanische Botschafter
ist mit diesem Vermittlungsver-
such seines Briisseler Kollegen
einverstanden."

defence. The German Govern-
ment most deeply regret that
bloody encounters should have
resulted from the Belgian Gov-
ernment's attitude towards Ger-
many. Germany is not coming
as an enemy into Belgium. It is
only through the force of cir-
cumstances that she has had,
owing to the military measures
of France, to take the grave de-
cision of entering Belgium and
occupying Liege as a base for
her further military operations.
Now that the Belgian army has
upheld the honour of its arms in
the most brilliant manner by its
heroic resistance to a very su-
perior force, the German Gov-
ernment beg the King of the
Belgians and the Belgian Gov-
ernment to spare Belgium the
horrors of war. The German
Government are ready for any
compact with Belgium which can
in any way be reconciled with
their arrangements with France.
(See No. 70.) Germany gives
once more her solemn assurance
that she has not been animated
by the intention of appropriating
Belgian territory for herself, and
that such an intention is far
from her thoughts. Germany is
still ready to evacuate Belgium
as soon as the state of war will
allow her to do so.

The United States Ambassa-
dor here concurs in this attempt
at mediation by his colleague in
Brussels.

494 Official Diplomatic Documents

To The Hague

Belgian Gray Book No. 63

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon,
Belgian Minister at The Hague.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 10, 1914.

The Belgian Government have received the proposals made to
them by the German Government through the intermediary of the
Netherlands Government. They will forward a reply shortly.

(See No. 62 Enclosures.)

To The Hague

Belgian Gray Book No. 64

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon,
Belgian Minister at The Hague.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 10, 1914-

Doubt exists as to the meaning of the word " Auseinander-
setzung,'' which you translate by "arrangement." Please ascertain
whether the German Government have in mind any arrangements
which we may have come to with France, or a settlement of the dis-
pute between France and Germany.

To London, St. Petersburgh, and Paris

Belgian Gray Book No. 65

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the British,
Russian, and French Ministers at Brussels.

Sir, Brussels, August 10, 1914-

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the Belgian
Minister at The Hague, at the request of the Netherlands Minister
for Foreign Affairs, has forwarded to us the following proposal from
the German Government. (See No. 62, Enclosure 2.)

The Belgian Government propose to return the following reply
to this communication : —

(Translation.)

"La proposition que nous fait "The proposal made to us by
le Gouvernement allemand re- the German Government repeats
produit la proposition qui avait the proposal formulated in their
ete formulee dans Tultimatum du ultimatum of August 2. Faith-
2 aoiit. Fidele a ses devoirs ful to her international obliga-
internationaux, la Belgique ne tions, Belgium can only reiterate
pent que reiterer sa reponse a cet her reply to that ultimatum, the
ultimatum, d'autant plus que more so as since August 3 her

August 10 y Belgian Gray Book No. 66 495

depuis le 3 aout sa neutralite a neutrality has been violated, a

ete violee, qu'une guerre dou- distressing war has been waged

loureuse a ete portee sur son ter- on her territory, and the guar-

ritoire, et que les garants de sa antors of her neutrality have

neutralite ont loyalement et im- responded loyally and without

mediatement repondu a son delay to her appeal/'
appel."

The Belgian Government consider that the Powers guaranteeing
the neutrality of Belgium should have cognisance of these documents.

To London, Paris, and St. Petersburgh

Belgian Gray Book No. 66

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian
Ministers at london, Paris, and St. Petersburgh.

Sir, Brussels, August 10, 1914-

I HAVE the honour to inform you of the circumstances which led
to the departure of the Belgian representative from Luxemburg.

The General Officer commanding the German troops in the Grand
Duchy of Luxemburg informed the German Minister in that town,
on August 8, of the desire of the military authorities for the de-
parture of the Belgian representative at the Grand Ducal Court.

Herr von Buch addressed to Monsieur Eyschen, President of the
Government, a note, of which the following is a translation : —

"Your Excellency, ''Luxemburg, August 8, 1914-

"In consequence of the completely hostile attitude adopted by
Belgium towards Germany, the military authorities find themselves
obliged to insist upon the departure of the Belgian Minister from
Luxemburg.

"His Excellency the General Officer commanding begs Count
van den Steen de Jehay to arrange his journey home in such a way
that he may be able, within twenty-four hours, to see General von
Ploetz at Coblentz, with a view to settling the details of the further
stages of his journey. It is impossible for him to travel except
via Treves-Coblentz.

(Signed) "von Buch.'^

Monsieur Eyschen forwarded this note the same day to Count
van den Steen de Jehay, accompanied by a letter in the following
terms : —

"Sir, ''Luxemburg, August 8, 1914-

"I greatly regret to have to communicate to you the enclosed
copy of a note from the German Minister, informing me that the
German military authorities demand your departure.

"You will find in it the conditions which they attach thereto.

"Herr von Buch told me that the military authorities advise you

496 Official Diplomatic Documents

to travel by railway, as an attempt to carry out your journey by
motor would expose you to being too frequently stopped for reasons
connected with the control of the roads. But the choice is left to you.

"The German Minister will come to me for your answer.

"I cannot tell you how painful it is to me to fulfil my present
task. I shall never forget the pleasant relations which have existed
between us, and I hope that your journey may be carried out under
the best possible conditions. ^Si^^^j^ "Eyschen."

The Belgian Government, considering that the Grand Ducal
Government had no choice in their attitude, and that the course
they had been obliged to adopt in no way implied any discourteous
intentions towards the King of the Belgians or towards Belgium,
decided that there was no reason, in these circumstances, for request-
ing- the Luxemburg Charge d'Affaires to leave Belgium.

Tuesday, August 11, 1914
Austria-Hungary endeavors to maintain friendly relations with Great Britain.

Austria-Hungary :

To London

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 64

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London.

Vienna, August 11, 1914-
The French Government have commissioned their Ambassador
here to ask for his passports on the ground that an Austro-Hungarian
army corps has been sent to Germany, whereby it has been possible
for the German army staff to withdraw their troops from those Ger-
man districts which are occupied by our contingents. This measure
of our general staff indicates in his view the grant of military assist-
ance to Germany.

Your Excellency should bring to the knowledge of the British
Government that according to information obtained from a reliable
source the assertion made by the French Government is unfounded.

Belgium :

From Washington

Belgian Gray Book No. 67

Mr. Wkitlock, United States Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Brussels, August 11, 1914..

The United States Legation received a telegram to-day from
Washington, conveying the information that the United States
Government had, at the request of the German Government, con-

August 11, Belgian Gray Book No. 69 497

sented, as a matter of international courtesy, to undertake the pro-
tection of German subjects in Belgium.

In accordance with the instructions contained in this telegram,
we will, therefore, if you see no objection, undertake to use our good
and friendly offices with the Belgian Government for the protection
of German subjects. The pleasant relations which we have had
with you in this matter up to the present convince me that we may
continue them with the same object on the same pleasant footing.

From London

Belgian Gray Book No. 68

Sir Francis Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Brussels, August 11, 1914-

I HAVE telegraphed to Sir E. Gray the German communication and
the proposed reply.

I have received instructions to express to your Excellency the
entire concurrence of His Britannic Majesty's Government. The
latter can only declare their approval of the terms of the reply which
the Belgian Government propose to give to this attempt to sow dis-
cord between the Powers at present united for the defence of the
treaties violated by Germany.

From Paris

Belgian Gray Book No. 69

M. Klohukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Bel-
gian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Brussels, August 11, 1914-

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the French
Government give their entire concurrence to the reply which the
Belgian Government propose to return to the new German ultimatum.

That reply is one which was to be expected from a Government
and a people who have so heroically resisted the hateful violation of
their territory.

France will continue to fulfil her duties as a guaranteeing Power of
Belgian neutrality and as a faithful friend of Belgium.

(See No. 65)

498 Official Diplomatic Documents

Wednesday, August 12, 1914

Great Britain declares war on Austria-Hungary.

Austria-Hungary :

From London

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 65

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.

{Translated from the French.)

(Telegraphic.) London, August 12, 1914.

I HAVE just received from Sir E. Grey the following communica-
tion : —

At the request of the French Government, who are not in a position
to communicate direct with your Government, I have to make to you
the following communication : —

The Austro-Hungarian Government, after declaring war on Servia,
and thus taking the first initiative to the hostilities in Europe, have,
without any provocation on the part of the Government of the French
Republic, extended the war to France : —

(1) After Germany had in succession declared war on Russia and
France, the Austro-Hungarian Government have joined in the con-
flict by declaring war against Russia, which was already fighting
on the side of France.

(2) According to information from numerous trustworthy sources
Austria has sent troops to the German frontier under circumstances
which amounted to a direct menace to France.

In view of these facts the French Government are obliged to inform
the Austro-Hungarian Government that they will take all measures
which make it possible for them to answer these actions and these
threats.

Sir E. Grey adds : —

As a breach with France has been brought about in this way the
British Government feel themselves obliged to announce that Great
Britain and Austria-Hungary will be in a state of war as from 12
o'clock to-night.

Belgium :

From The Hagy£

Belgian Gray Book No. 70

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hagu£, to M. Davignon, Bel-
gian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) The Hague, August 12, 1914.

The German text contained a mistake: instead of ^^ seine Aus-
einandersetzung,'^ it should read ''ihre,'' and thus be translated "their
conflict with France."

(See No. 64.)

August 13, Belgian Gray Book No. 73 499

To The Hague

Belgian Gray Book No. 71

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon,
Belgian Minister at The Hague.

(Telegram.) Brussels, August 12, 1914-.

Please communicate the following telegram to the Netherlands
Minister for Foreign Affairs : —

"The proposal made to us by the German Government repeats
the proposal which was formulated in the ultimatum of August 2nd.
Faithful to her international obligations, Belgium can only reiterate
her reply to that ultimatum, the more so as since August 3rd, her
neutrality has been violated, a distressing war has been waged on
her territority, and the guarantors of her neutrality have responded
loyally and without delay to her appeal.

Thursday, August 13, 1914

Belgium :

From St. Petershurgh

Belgian Gray Book No. 72

M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Davignon,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Telegram.) St. Petershurgh, August 13, 1914.

Please thank the Belgian Government for their communication,
and express to them the pleasure which the Russian Government
feel at their firm and dignified attitude, upon which they are heartily
to be congratulated.

(See No. 65.)

From The Hague

Belgian Gray Book No. 73

Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, Bel-
gian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, The Hague, August 13, 1914.

I HAD the honour to receive your telegram of yesterday, and I
at once communicated to the Netherlands Minister for Foreign
Aifairs, the Belgian reply to the second German proposal.

His Excellency undertook to forward the Belgian communication
to the German Minister forthwith.

(See No. 71.)

[Of Friday, August 14, and Saturday, August 15, no despatches are published.]

500 Official Diplomatic Documents

Sunday, August 16, 1914

France changes her attitude about not carrying the war into Africa.
Serbia pubHshes the recollections of her former Minister in Vienna of the events
leading up to the war.

Belgium :

From Paris

Belgian Gray Book No. 74

Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Belgian
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Paris, August 16, 1914.

In the course of a conversation which I had this morning with
M. de Margerie, I turned the conversation to colonial affairs and to
the action which you had instructed me to take in your telegram
and your despatch of the 7th instant.

M. de Margerie reminded me that the French Government had
approached Spain, but the latter had not answered before knowing
the views of Great Britain. It seems that the latter has still given
no answer.

M. de Margerie considered that in view of the present situation
Germany should be attacked wherever possible; he believes that
such is also the opinion of Great Britain, who certainly has claims
to satisfy ; France wishes to get back that part of the Congo which
she had been compelled to give up in consequence of the Agadir
incident.

M. de Margerie added that a success would not be difficult to
obtain.

(See Nos. 57 and 58.)

Serbia :

From Vienna

Serbian Blue Book No. 52

M. Yox. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch,
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Nish, August 3/16, 1914.

From June 17/30 the Serbian Legation at Vienna was practically
surrounded by police and gendarmes, while the staff were under
constant police supervision. Our movements and our communica-
tions with the outer world were, as you can imagine, rendered ex-
tremely difficult ; the attitude of the population towards the Legation
and its staff was inclined to be menacing.

After the beginning of July (o.s.) even telegraphic communication
with you became difficult, while matters developed with such rapidity

August 16, Serbian Blue Book No. 52 501

that I was unable to report to you some of the events which preceded
our armed conflict with Austria-Hungary. I accordingly do so now.

Up to the end of June (o.s.) the whole question of the Serajevo
outrage appeared to be developing normally. At the commencement
of July, however, a change took place as regards the question of the
consequences of the Serajevo affair. There were no tangible proofs
that a radical change had taken place, but it was to some extent
indicated by certain vague signs and symptoms which betrayed
the existence of some hidden intentions. First of all, the Vienna
and Budapest press, in conformity with instructions issued by the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, ceased to publish reports of the magis-
terial enquiry relating to the Serajevo outrage. The press began
also to represent the whole matter as a question which must be settled
between Serbia and Austria-Hungary alone — eventually by war.

Moreover, statements to this effect were communicated to the
leading Vienna newspapers by the German Embassy.- Exceptions
were : the semi-official Fremdenblatt, which was, in general, more
moderate in the tone of its articles; Die Zeit; and the Arbeiter
Zeitung.

Simultaneously with this new attitude on the part of the press,
a very unsettled condition of affairs developed on the Bourse, such as
it had not witnessed during the whole course of recent events in the
Balkans. In private conversations also and in high financial circles
the "settlement with Serbia" was declared to be the only way out
of the general financial and economic crisis prevailing in Austria-
Hungary ever since the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Under secret instructions it was ordered that gold should be gradually
withdrawn from circulation, and a corresponding rise in exchange
took place.

A further indication was the clumsy explanation given of the
reasons which had induced the Minister for War, Krobatin, and the
Chief of the General Staff, Hetzendorf, to interrupt their leave of
absence and return to Vienna. The Chief of Staff constantly trav-
elled to the south, east, and north of Austria, and at that time had
had an interview with the Chief of the German General Staff, Count
Moltke, in Bohemia, I believe, at Carlsbad.

All the reserves which had been called out for the June manoeuvres
in Bosnia and Herzegovina were kept with the colours beyond the
stipulated period.

The number of soldiers belonging to the permanent establishment
in Austria-Hungary allowed to go home on short leave of absence in
order to gather in the harvest, and to attend to other private affairs,
was much larger than is usually the case; at the same time those
whose duties were of a military-administrative nature were called
upon in ever increasing numbers.

Another indication was the non-committal nature of the answers
given to several interpellations in the Hungarian Diet by the Hun-
garian Prime Minister, Count Tisza, a statesman who is very clear
in his political statements.

502 Official Diplomatic Documents

The attitude of the Ballplatz was especially characteristic. None
of the usual weekly receptions by Count Berchtold was held. They
suddenly ceased at the Ballplatz to discuss the Serajevo outrage with
the representatives of foreign countries; or, if discussion did arise,
it seemed as if instructions had been issued on the subject ; that is to
say, it was mentioned to everyone in such a manner as to dispel all
apprehensions and suspicion that Austria-Hungary was preparing some
serious step against Serbia. They acknowledged that some step
would be undertaken at Belgrade as soon as the results of the magis-
terial enquiry should have sufficiently established the connection
between Belgrade and the Serajevo outrage. But at the same time
it was said that this step would not be such as to give rise to any
uneasiness. The Russian Ambassador, who spoke several times on
the subject with Count Forgach, in the absence of Count Berchtold,
was unable to discover the true nature of Austria's intentions. M.
Schebeko told me that Count Szapary, the Austro-Hungarian
Ambassador at Petrograd, who, for family reasons, was at that time
stopping in Vienna, had said to him that the step to be taken at
Belgrade would be of conciliatory character. According to M.
Schebeko, Count Szapary had also assured M. Sazonof that the
intended Austro-Hungarian Note to Serbia would not be such as to
cause Russia any dissatisfaction. The French Ambassador, M.
Dumaine, who, under instructions from his Government, had drawn
the attention of the Ballplatz to the complications which might arise
should the eventual demands which it was intended to make of Serbia
not be of a moderate nature, was told by the principal Under-Secretary
Baron Macchio, that the Austro-Hungarian Government, appreciating
the friendly and conciliatory action of the French Government, would
only put forward such demands, embodied in a note to the Serbian
Government, as Serbia would be able to accept without difficulty.
I drew the attention of the Ambassadors of the Triple Entente to the
fact that such an assurance might well conceal the true nature of the
intentions of the Austro-Hungarian Government, and that the Powers
of the Triple Entente might then be confronted by certain faits
accomplis which Europe would be compelled to accept in order to
avoid a general European war. '

The line followed by the Ballplatz was, moreover, comparatively
successful, as all those of my colleagues whom I saw during that
period were more or less dissuaded from believing that Austria-
Hungary contemplated any serious step which could provoke Euro-
pean complications. Many of the members of the diplomatic body
were so firmly convinced of this that they were preparing at that time
to quit Vienna on long leave of absence at various watering places.

Nevertheless, it was known that a note was being drawn up at
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs which would contain the accusations
against Serbia, and also the demands of Austria-Hungary. This task
was entrusted to Count Forgach, formerly Austro-Hungarian Min-
ister in Serbia. At the same time it was universally believed that of
the foreign representatives, the German Ambassador, Herr von

August 16, Serbian Blue Book No. 52 503

Tschirsky, was the only one who was kept informed of the note even
in its minutest details, while I had reason to believe that he was also
co-operating in drafting it. In view of the above, the representatives
of the friendly Powers agreed with me in thinking that the note
would impose very difficult terms on Serbia, but that there would be
no inacceptable demands. When the contents of the note were pub-
lished all of them were surprised, not to say dumfounded.

In the same way as the contents of the note were kept secret,
a similar amount of secrecy was observed in regard to the date of its
presentation. On the very day that the note was presented at Bel-
grade, the French Ambassador had a prolonged conversation with
the Principal Under-Secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs
— Count Berchtold was again absent at Ischl — on the subject of
the note. Yet Baron Macchio did not tell M. Dumaine that the
note would be presented at Belgrade that afternoon, and published in
the newspapers on the following day.

On the publication in the Vienna papers on the morning of July
11/24 of the contents of the note, which Baron Giesl had presented to
the Serbian Government, a feeling of dejection came over the friends
both of Serbia and of the peace of Europe. It was only then realised
that serious European complications might ensue, though it was not
believed that it was the intention of the Austro-Hungarian Govern-
ment to provoke them. This feeling of depression was increased by
the tone of the articles in the Viennese newspapers, with the exception
of Die Zeit and Arheiter Zeitung, and by demonstrations in the streets,
which clearly showed that war would be a most welcome solution —
a war with Serbia, of course.

On that day, after having two or three conversations, I realised
that an armed conflict between Serbia and the Dual Monarchy was
inevitable, even should Serbia accept all the demands contained in the
Austro-Hungarian Note, from the first to the last. The attitude of
the people in the streets towards our Legation was such that I expected
even personal attacks upon the members of the staff.

The French Ambassador, the British Ambassador, and the Russian
Charge d'Affaires held the view that the step taken by Austria-Hun-
gary should be considered not as a note but as an ultimatum. They
disapproved of the form, the contents, and the time limit of the note;
they also declared it to be inacceptable.

In the course of conversation with them on the subject of the
note I pointed out that those passages in it which dealt with the order
by the King to the Army, with the dismissal of officers and Govern-
ment officials, and especially that which referred to the co-operation
of Austro-Hungarian officials in the "Suppression of the subversive
movement in Serbia against the territorial integrity of the Mon-
archy," would be inacceptable as not being compatible with the
dignity and sovereignty of Serbia. Only a victorious war, I said,
could enforce the acceptance of conditions which were so humiliat-
ing to an independent State. In reply to their enquiry whether it
would not perhaps be better to accept the conditions and avoid war

504 Official Diplomatic Documents

for the present, I said that the Austro-Hungarian Note, which
amounted in fact to a declaration of war upon Serbia, was worded
in such a way that, even if Serbia should accept all the conditions
without reserve, Austria-Hungary would still find an excuse for her
army to march into Serbia at any time. It was in the belief that the
conflict would be limited to Serbia and Austria-Hungary that Austria-
Hungary had drafted such a note.

To M. Dumaine, Sir M. de Bunsen, and the Russian Charge
d'Affaires, the unexpected character of the note was the cause not only
of surprise but also of alarm, in view of the complications which they
feared might ensue. The Russian Ambassador, M. Schebeko,
previously to the presentation of the note, had stated on several
occasions to his colleagues that Russia could not remain indifferent
to any step taken by Austria-Hungary, w^hich might have as an object
the humiliation of Serbia. He also expressed the same view at the
Ballplatz. Hence the apprehension felt by the three Ambassa-
dors, who at once foresaw the possibility of war between Russia and
Austria-Hungary.

The day after the note was presented. Prince Koudacheff went to
see Count Berchtold to discuss the matter. In reply to his statement,
that the note as it stood was inacceptable, and that Russia could
not watch with indifference the humiliation of Serbia, Count Berchtold
said that Austria-Hungary had been obliged to take this step, as her
very existence was threatened; that she could not withdraw nor
alter the demands made in the note, and that he considered that the
matter in dispute concerned Serbia and Austria-Hungary alone and
that no other Power had any grounds for interference.

Count Berchtold's reply did not allow of any further doubts as to
the intention of Austria-Hungary to chastise Serbia by force of arms
without the consent of the European concert. From conversations
which I had at that time with the Ambassadors of the Triple Entente
— who during the whole of that difficult period showed every kind-
ness and attention to me and to the staff of the Legation — it seemed
quite clear that Austria-Hungary had been assured, and felt con-
vinced, that the Serbo-Austro-Hungarian conflict would be localised,
as she would otherwise not have decided upon a note which undoubt-
edly meant war. It was also clear that Austria-Hungary was con-
firmed in this impression especially — and perhaps solely — by Herr
von Tschirsky, the German Ambassador in Vienna. Herr von
Tschirsky was the only one who thought, and even stated publicly,
that Russia would remain quiet while Austria-Hungary carried out
her punitive expedition against Serbia. He declared that the Rus-
sian Minister for Foreign Affairs would easily control the Panslavists,
in the same way as he had done last year, and that Russia was not
disposed at the moment to begin a discussion of the many vexed
questions in Europe and Asia which were her main concern. It was
necessary, according to Herr von Tschirsky, to give Serbia a lesson.
Russia had no right to interfere. As far as Germany, he said, was
concerned, she was in the fullest sense of the word conscious of

Augmt 17, Belgian Gray Book No. 75 505

what she was doing in giving Austria-Hungary her support in the
matter.

These statements of Herr von Tsehirsky have induced many to
hold the opinion that Germany desired to provoke a European war,
on the ground that it was better to have war with Russia before the
latter had completed her military reorganisation, i.e., before the spring
of 1917. This point of view had formerly been freely discussed and
even written about in Vienna. "The longer the matter is postponed
the smaller will become the chances of success of the Triple Alliance."
On the other hand, rumours from the most authoritative diplomatic
sources in Berlin reached me in Vienna, to the effect that the Wilhelm-
strasse did not approve of Austria's policy on this question, and that
Herr von Tsehirsky has exceeded the instructions given to him.

The Russian Ambassador, M. Schebeko, on his return from
Petrograd, did his utmost at the Ballplatz to obtain an extension of
the brief time limit given the Serbian Government for a reply to the
Austro-Hungarian Note, and to discover some way which might lead
to an exchange of views between Vienna and Petrograd in regard to
the whole question, but until July 13/26, when we met, his efforts
had proved unavailing. From the conversations I then had with him,
I gathered that the Austro-Hungarian Note, in its contents and in its
form, was regarded as a challenge to Russia and not to Serbia, and
that Russia would not permit the humiliation of Serbia, even if war
were to be the price.

On the day of my departure from Vienna, M. Schebeko told
me that, in spite of the many great difficulties to be overcome,
there was a prospect of arriving at a solution by which an armed
conflict might be avoided by means of discussion between the Russian
Government and Count Szapary. A feeling of depression, however,
prevailed in Vienna as soon as reports began to be spread that the
Austro-Serbian conflict would bring about a war between Russia and
the Dual Monarchy.

Monday, August 17, 1914
Great Britain declines the Belgian proposal not to carry the war into Africa.

Belgium :

From London

Belgian Gray Book No. 75

Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Bel-
gian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Sir, London, August 17, 1914-

In reply to your despatch of August 7th, I have the honour to
inform you that the British Government cannot agree to the Bel-

506 Official Diplomatic Documents

gian proposal to respect the neutrality of the belligerent powers in
the conventional basin of the Congo.

German troops from German East Africa have already taken
the offensive against the British Central African Protectorate.
Furthermore, British troops have already attacked the German
port of Dar-es-Salaam, where they have dsetroyed the wireless
telegraphy station.

In these circumstances, the British Government, even if they
were convinced from the political and strategical point of view of
the utility of the Belgian proposal, would be unable to adopt it.

The British Government believe that the forces they are sending
to Africa will be sufficient to overcome all opposition. They will
take every step in their power to prevent any risings of the native
population.

France is of the same opinion as Great Britain on account of Ger-
man activity which has been noticed near Bonar and Ekododo.

(See Nos. 57 and 58.)

[Of Tuesday, and Wednesday, August 18, and 19, no despatches have been
published.]

Thursday, August 20, 1914

Austria-Hungary receives from Japan a copy of the latter's ultimatum to Ger-
many.

Austria-Hungary :

From Tokio

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 66

The Japanese Ambassador to Count Berchtold.

(Translated from the English.)

My Lord, Vienna, August 20, 1914-

Your Excellency will doubtless have already received information
from his Excellency Baron Miiller of the communication which was
addressed to the German Government by my Government on the
15th inst. Nevertheless I take the liberty, although I have not
received any instructions to do so, to enclose herewith for your Excel-
lency's personal information, a copy of a telegram bearing on the
matter which I have received from Tokio.

Enclosure

The Japanese Government, who have taken the present situation
into their earnest consideration, have, in accordance with a complete
understanding made with the British Government, for the purpose
of strengthening and maintaining general peace in the regions of
Eastern Asia, which is one of the aims of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance,
decided to take common action with Great Britain in giving effect to

August 22y Au^tro-Hungarian Red Book No. 67 507

the necessary measures for this purpose. Nevertheless, before pro-
ceeding with measures of this kind, the Japanese Government have
thought it proper to address a friendly request to the German Govern-
ment, which was communicated to them on the 15th August, 1914,
in the following words : —

"(1) All German warships must be withdrawn at once from the
waters in the neighbourhood of Japan and China. The ships that
cannot be withdrawn must be disarmed.

" (2) The German Government must unconditionally and without
compensation hand over to the Japanese authorities the whole of the
leased territory of Kiao-chau before the 16th September, 1914, for
the purpose of handing this territory back to China.

" The Japanese Government have informed the German Government
that, in case an answer intimating unconditional compliance with the
above-mentioned demands is not received before Sunday, the 23rd,
at mid-day, they will proceed as appears necessary to them.

" It is earnestly to be hoped that the above-mentioned demands, for
a reply to which so ample time is given, will be agreed to by the German
Government ; should they, however, not comply with this demand, a
course of action which would be deplored, the Japanese Government
will be obliged to take the necessary measures to attain their end."

The grounds on which the Imperial Government base their present
attitude is, as already mentioned, none other than to maintain the
common interests of Japan and Great Britain, which are set out in
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, by establishing a basis of a lasting
peace in the territory of Eastern Asia. The Japanese Government
have in no respect the intention of embarking upon a policy of terri-
torial expansion, nor do they entertain any other selfish designs.
For this reason the Imperial Japanese Government are resolved to
respect with the greatest care the interests of third Powers in Eastern
Asia and to refrain from injuring them in any degree.

[Of Friday, August 21, no despatches have been published.]

Saturday, August 22, 1914

Austria-Hungary declares war on Belgium.

Austria-Hungary :

To Brussels

AusTRO-HxmGARiAN Red Book No. 67^

Count Berchtold to Count Clary at Brussels.

(Translated from the French.)

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 22, 1914.

I ASK your Excellency to communicate the following to the Royal
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs at once : —

"I have the honour to bring the following to the knowledge of

1 See Belgian Gray Book No. 77, August 28.

508 Official Diplomatic Documents

your Excellency in accordance with the instructions of our Govern-
ment : —

Whereas Belgium, having refused to accept the proposals made
to her on several occasions by Germany, is affording her military
assistance to France and Great Britain, both of which Powers have
declared war upon Austria-Hungary, and whereas as has just been
proved, Austrian and Hungarian nationals in Belgium have had to
submit, under the very eyes of the Belgian authorities, to treatment
contrary to the most primitive demands of humanity, and inadmis-
sible even towards subjects of an enemy State, therefore Austria-
Hungary finds herself obliged to break off diplomatic relations, and
considers herself, from this moment, in a state of war with Belgium.

I am leaving the country with the staff of the Legation, and I am
entrusting the protection of my countrymen to the Minister of the
United States in Belgium.

Count Errembault de Dudzeele has received his passports from
the Imperial and Royal Government.

Sunday, August 23, 1914

Germany refuses to reply to the Japanese ultimatum and gives the Japanese
Ambassador his passports.

Austria-Hungary :

From Berlin

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 68

Prince Hohenlohe to Count Berchtold.

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 23, 1914.

The Foreign Office has informed the Japanese Charge d' Affaires that
the Imperial German Government do not intend to send an answer to
the Japanese ultimatum. The German Government have instructed
their Ambassador at Tokio, after the expiration of the time allowed by
Japan at 12 o'clock to-day, to leave Japan, and they will, at the same
time, furnish the Japanese Charge d'Affaires here with his passports.

At mid-day the Charge d'Affaires was furnished with his passports,
and he will leave Berlin early to-morrow morning with the staff of
the Embassy.

Monday, August 24, 1914

Austria-Hungary makes common cause with Germany against Japan.

Austria-Hungary :

To Tokio

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 69

Count Berchtold to Freiherr von Miiller at Tokio.

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 2 4, 1914-

The Commander of S.M.S. Elisabeth has been instructed to
take part in the fighting at Tsingtau. I ask your Excellency, in view

August 28, Belgian Gray Book No. 77 509

of the action taken by Japan against our Ally, the German Empire,
to ask for your passports. You should inform the Consulates, and
you should travel to America with the colony and the staff of the
Embassy and of the Consulates. Your Excellency should entrust
the protection of our countrymen and their interests to the American
Ambassador. The Japanese Ambassador here is being furnished
with his passports.

Wednesday, August 26, 1914

Belgium :

From Elizabethmlle

Belgian Gray Book No. 76

M. Tomheur, Belgian Vice-Gowrnor of the Katanga, to M. Renkin,
Belgian Minister for the Colonies.

(Telegram.) Elizahethville, August 26, 1914-

The Germans are continuing their skirmishes on Tanganyika and
attacked the port of Lukuga, on August 22nd. Two of their natives
were killed and two wounded. Fresh attacks are expected.

[Of Thursday, August 27, 1914, no despatches have been published.l

Friday, August 28, 1914

Belgium :

From The Hague

Belgian Gray Book No. 77 ^

Count Clary and Aldringen, Au^tro-Hungarian Minister at The
Hague, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Forwarded through the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs.)

(Telegram.) The Hague, August 28, 1914.

On the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to in-
form your Excellency as follows : —

(Translation.)

"Vu que la Belgique, apres "Whereas Belgium, having re-
avoir refuse d'accepter les pro- fused to accept the proposals
positions qui lui avaient ete made to her on several occasions
adressees a plusieurs reprises par by Germany, is affording her
TAllemagne, prete sa cooperation military assistance to France and
militaire a la France et a la Great Britain, both of which
Grande-Bretagne, qui, toutes Powers have declared war upon
deux ont declare la guerre a I'Au- Austria-Hungary, and whereas

1 See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 67, August 22. No reason appears why this
despatch is printed here with a delay of six days.

510

Official Diplomatic Documents

triche-Hongrie, et en presence
du fait que, comme il vient d'etre
constate, les ressortissants autri-
chiens et hongrois se trouvant en
Belgique ont, sous les yeux des
autorites Royales, du subir un
traitement contraire aux exi-
gences les plus primitives de
rhumanite et inadmissibles meme
vis-a-vis des sujets d'un Etat
ennemi, TAutriche-Hongrie se
voit dans la necessite de rompre
les relations diplomatiques et se
considere des ce moment en etat
de guerre avec la Belgique. Je
quitte le pays avec le personnel
de la legation et coniie la protec-
tion de mes administres au Mi-
nistre des Etats-Unis d'Amerique
en Belgique. De la part du
Gouvernement Imperial et Royal
les passeports sont remis au
Comte Errembault de Dudzeele.
(Signe) " Clary."

as has just been proved, Austrian
and Hungarian nationals in Bel-
gium have had to submit, under
the very eyes of the Belgian
authorities, to treatment con-
trary to the most primitive de-
mands of humanity and inadmis-
sible even towards subjects of an
enemy State, therefore Austria
finds herself obliged to break off
diplomatic relations and con-
siders herself from this moment
in a state of war with Belgium.
I am leaving the country with
the staff of the legation and I
am entrusting the protection of
Austrian interests to the United
States Minister in Belgium. The
Austro-Hungarian Government
are forwarding his passports to
Count Errembault de Dudzeele."

Saturday, August 29, 1914

Belgium defends herself against the charge of having committed, previous to
August 1, "certain hostile acts" against Germany.

Belgium :

To The Hague
Belgian Gray Book No. 78

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon,
Belgian Minister at The Hague.

(Telegram.) Antiverp, August 29, 1914-

Please inform the Austrian Legation through the Minister for
Foreign Affairs that I have received Austria-Hungary's declaration
of war against Belgium, and add the following : —

"La Belgique a toujours entre-
tenu des relations d'amitie avec
tous ses voisins sans distinction.
Elle a scrupuleusement rempLi
les devoirs que la neutralite lui
impose. Si elle n'a pas cru

"Belgium has always enter-
tained friendly relations with all
her neighbours without distinc-
tion. She had scrupulously ful-
filled the duties imposed upon
her by her neutrality. If she

August 29 J Belgian Gray Book No. 78

511

pouvoir accepter les propositions
de rAllemagne, c'est que celles-ci
avaient pour objet la violation
des engagements qu'elle a pris a
la face de I'Europe, engagements
qui ont ete les conditions de la
creation du Royaume de Bel-
gique. Elle n'a pas cru qu'un
peuple, quelque faible qu'il soit,
puisse meconnaitre ses devoirs et
sacrifier son honneur en s'incli-
nant devant la force. Le Gou-
vernement a attendu, non seule-
ment les delais de I'ultimatum,
mais la violation de son territoire
par les troupes allemandes avant
de faire appel a la France et a
I'Angleterre, garantes de sa neu-
tralite au meme titre que I'Alle-
magne et I'Autriche-Hongrie,
pour cooperer au nom et en vertu
des traites a la defense du terri-
toire beige.

" En repoussant par les armes
les envahisseurs, elle n'a meme
pas accompli un acte d'hostilite
aux termes de Tarticle 10 de la
Convention de La Haye sur les
droits et devoirs des Puissances
neutres.

" L'Allemagne a reconnu elle-
meme que son agression constitue
une violation du droit des gens,
et ne pouvant la justifier elle a
invoque son interet strategique.

" La Belgique oppose un de-
menti formel a I'affirmation que
les ressortissants autrichiens et
hongrois auraient subi en Bel-
gique un traitement contraire aux
exigences les plus primitives de
I'humanite.

" Le Gouvernement Royal a
donne, des le debut des hostilites,
les ordres les plus stricts quant a
la sauvegarde des personnes et
des proprietes austro-hongroises.
(Signe) "Davignon."

has not been able to accept Ger-
many's proposals, it is because
those proposals contemplated the
violation of her engagements
toward Europe, engagements
which form the conditions of the
creation of the Belgian Kingdom.
She has been unable to admit that
a people, however weak they may
be, can fail in their duty and
sacrifice their honour by yield-
ing to force. The Government
have waited, not only until the
ultimatum had expired, but also
until Belgian territory had been
violated by German troops, be-
fore appealing to France and
Great Britain, guarantors of her
neutrality, under the same terms
as are Germany and Austria-
Hungary, to co-operate in the
name and in virtue of the treaties
in defence of Belgian territory.
By repelling the invaders by
force of arms, she has not even
committed an hostile act as laid
down by the provisions of article
10 of The Hague Convention
respecting the rights and duties
of neutral Powers.

"Germany herself has recog-
nised that her attack constitutes
a violation of international law,
and, being unable to justify it,
she has pleaded her strategical
interests.

"Belgium formally denies the
allegation that Austrian and
Hungarian nationals have suf-
fered treatment in Belgium con-
trary to the most primitive de-
mands of humanity.

"The Belgian Government,
from the very commencement of
hostilities, have issued the
strictest orders for the protection
of Austro-Hungarian persons and
property."

512 Official Diplomatic Documents

To Belgian Ministers Abroad

Belgian Gray Book No. 79

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Minis-
ters abroad.
Sir, Antwerp J August 29, 191 4.

Under date of the 17th August, I addressed a despatch ^ to the
Belgian Minister at London, in which I felt bound to call attention
to certain allegations made by the German Government which are
mentioned in the Blue Book^ recently published by the British
Government.

I have the honour to enclose for your information a copy of the
despatch in question and of its enclosures.

I request that you will bring its contents to the notice of the
Government to which you are accredited.

Enclosure 1 in No. 79.

M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count de La-

laing, Belgian Minister at London.
Sir, Brussels, August 17, 1914-

The Blue Book recently published by the British Government
contains (see No. 122, p. 92) the text of a telegram despatched from
Berlin on the 3 1st July by Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, in w^hich
the following passage occurs : —

"It appears from what he [his Excellency the Secretary of State]
said, that the German Government consider that certain hostile
acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance of
this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been
placed under an embargo already."

The incident to which the German Secretary of State alluded in
his conversation with Sir E. Goschen, and which he considered as a
hostile act on the part of Belgium, doubtless refers to the application
of the Royal decree of the 30th July, which provisionally prohibited
the export from Belgium of certain products. As you will see from
the explanation in the following paragraph, the incident with which
we are reproached has in no wise the character which Germany has
wished to attribute to it.

The Royal decrees dated the 30th July and published in the
Moniteur beige the following day forbade, provisionally, the export,
both by land and by sea, of a series of products, more especially of
cereals. On the 31st July the German Minister at Brussels called
my attention to the fact that the Antwerp customs were detaining
cargoes of grain addressed to Germany, which, as they were merely
transshipped in our port, were in reality only in transit. Herr von

1 Not previously printed.

2 British Blue Book No. 122, July 31, printed under date of August 1.

August 29, Belgian Gray Book No. 79 ' 513

Below Saleske requested that the vessels carrying these cargoes
should be allowed to depart freely. The very day on which the
German Minister's request was received, the Foreign Office brought
the matter to the notice of the Mihistry of Finance, and the follow-
ing day, the 2nd August, that Department informed us that instruc-
tions had been forwarded to the Belgian Customs giving full and
entire satisfaction to Germany.

I cannot do better than enclose, for your information, copies of the
correspondence exchanged on this subject with Herr Below Saleske.
You will observe that nothing in our attitude can be taken as show-
ing any hostile dispositions towards Germany; the steps taken by
the Belgian Government at that time were nothing more than those
simple precautions which it is the right and duty of every State to
adopt in such exceptional circumstances.

It would be as well that you should address a communication to
the British Government in order to explain the real facts of the case.

Enclosure 2 in No. 79.

Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, to M. Bavignon,

Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Sir, Brussels, July 31, 1914-

I AM informed from Antwerp that the Customs have forbidden the
despatch of vessels containing cargoes of grain for Germany.

In view of the fact that it is not in this case a question of the export
of grain, but of grain in transit, the goods in question having been
merely transshipped at Antwerp, I have the honour to ask your good
offices in order that the vessels in question may be allowed to leave
for Germany.

At the same time I beg your Excellency to inform me if the port
of Antwerp is closed for the transit of those goods specified in the
Moniteur of to-day.

Awaiting your Excellency's reply at your earliest possible con-
venience, I have, etc.

Enclosure 3 in No. 79.

M. Bavignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below

Saleske, German Minister at Brussels.
Sir, Brussels, August 1, 1914-

In reply to your Excellency's note of the 31st July, I have the
honour to inform you that the Belgian decree of the 30th July con-
cerns only the export and not the transit of the products mentioned.

I at once communicated your note to the Minister of Finance and
begged him to issue precise instructions to the Customs officials in
order that any error in the application of the above-mentioned decree
might be avoided.
2l^

514 Official Diplomatic Documents

Enclosure 4 in No. 79.

M. Damgnon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Be-
low Saleske, German Minister at Brussels.

Sir, Brussels, August 3, 1914.

With reference to the note which your Excellency was good
enough to address to me on the 31st July, I have the honour to in-
form you that the Minister of Finance has instructed the Customs
that the prohibitions established by the Royal decrees of the 30th
July last, only apply to actual exports, and do not, therefore, extend
to goods regularly declared in transit at the time of import. More-
over, when duty-free goods are declared to be for actual consump-
tion, although they are really intended for export, they are commonly
the object of special declarations of free entry which are considered
as transit documents. In short, if it should happen that such goods
had been declared as for consumption without restriction, as though
they were to remain in the country, the Customs would still allow
them to leave the country as soon as it had been duly established by
despatch receipts, bills of lading, etc., that they were to be exported
forthwith in transit.

I would add that the export of grain with which your note deals
was authorised on the 1st August.

(See note, page 509.)

Tuesday, September 1, 1914

Great Britain publishes as an addition to her White Papers (later Blue Book) Sir
Maurice de Bunsen's, former British Ambassador in Vienna, recollections of the
events of the last days preceding the war.

From Vienna
British Blue Book No. 161
Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador in Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.
Sir, London, September 1, 1914-

The rapidity of the march of events during the days which led
up to the outbreak of the European war made it difficult, at the time,
to do more than record their progress by telegraph. I propose now
to add a few comments.

The delivery at Belgrade on the 23rd July of the Austrian note to
Servia was preceded by a period of absolute silence at the Ballplatz.
Except Herr von Tschirscky,^ who must have been aware of the tenour
if not of the actual words of the note, none of my colleagues were
allowed to see through the veil. On the 22nd and 23rd July, M.
Dumaine, French Ambassador, had long interviews with Baron
Macchio, one of the Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs,

1 German Ambassador at Vienna.

September 1, British Blue Book No. 161 515

by whom he was left under the impression that the words of warning
he had been instructed to speak to the Austro-Hungarian Government
had not been unavailing, and that the note which was being drawn
up would be found to contain nothing with which a self-respecting
State need hesitate to comply. At the second of these interviews
he was not even informed that the note was at that very moment
being presented at Belgrade, or that it would be published in Vienna
on the following morning. Count Forgach, the other Under-Secre-
tary of State, had indeed been good enough to confide to me on the
same day the true character of the note, and the fact of its presen-
tation about the time we were speaking.

So little had the Russian Ambassador been made aware of what
was preparing that he actually left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of
absence about the 20th July. He had only been absent a few days
when events compelled him to return. It might have been supposed
that Duke Avarna, Ambassador of the allied Italian Kingdom, which
was bound to be so closely affected by fresh complications in the
Balkans, would have been taken fully into the confidence of Count
Berchtold ^ during this critical time. In point of fact his Excellency
was left completely in the dark. As for myself, no indication was
given me by Count Berchtold of the impending storm, and it was
from a private source that I received on the 15th July the forecast
of what was about to happen which I telegraphed to you the follow-
ing day. It is true that during all this time the Neue Freie Presse
and other leading Viennese new^spapers were using language which
pointed unmistakably to war with Servia. The official Fremderb-
blatt, however, was more cautious, and till the note was published,
the prevailing opinion among my colleagues was that Austria would
shrink from courses calculated to involve her in grave European
complications.

On the 24th July the note was published in the newspapers. By
common consent it was at once styled an ultimatum. Its integral
acceptance by Servia was neither expected nor desired, and when,
on the following afternoon, it was at first rumoured in Vienna that
it had been unconditionally accepted, there was a moment of keen
disappointment. The mistake was quickly corrected, and as soon
as it was known later in the evening that the Servian reply had been
rejected and that Baron Giesl ^ had broken off relations at Belgrade,
Vienna burst into a frenzy of delight, vast crowds parading the streets
and singing patriotic songs till the small hours of the morning.

The demonstrations were perfectly orderly, consisting for the
most part of organised processions through the principal streets ending
up at the Ministry of War. One or two attempts to make hostile
manifestations against the Russian Embassy were frustrated by the
strong guard of police which held the approaches to the principal em-
bassies during those days. The demeanour of the people at Vienna
and, as I was informed, in many other principal cities of the Mon-

1 Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

2 Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade.

516 Official Diplomatic Documents

archy, showed plainly the popularity of the idea of war with Servia,
and there can be no doubt that the small body of Austrian and Hun-
garian statesmen by whom this momentous step was adopted gauged
rightly the sense, and it may even be said the determination, of the
people, except presumably in portions of the provinces inhabited by
the Slav races. There had been much disappointment in many
quarters at the avoidance of war with Servia during the annexation
crisis in 1908 and again in connection with the recent Balkan war.
Count Berchtold's ^ peace policy had met with little sympathy in the
Delegation. Now the flood-gates were opened, and the entire people
and press clamoured impatiently for immediate and condign punish-
ment of the hated Servian race. The country certainly believed
that it had before it only the alternative of subduing Servia or of
submitting sooner or later to mutilation at her hands. But a peaceful
solution should first have been attempted. Few seemed to reflect
that the forcible intervention of a Great Power in the Balkans must
inevitably call other Great Powers into the field. So just was the
cause of Austria held to be, that it seemed to her people inconceivable
that any country should place itself in her path, or that questions
of mere policy or prestige should be regarded anywhere as super-
seding the necessity which had arisen to exact summary vengeance
for the crime of Serajevo. The conviction had been expressed to
me by the German Ambassador on the 24th July that Russia would
stand aside. This feeling, which was also held at the Ballplatz, in-
fluenced no doubt the course of events, and it is deplorable that no
effort should have been made to secure by means of diplomatic nego-
tiations the acquiescence of Russia and Europe as a whole in some
peaceful compromise of the Servian question by which Austrian
fears of Servian aggression and intrigue might have been removed
for the future. Instead of adopting this course the Austro-Hungarian
Government resolved upon war. The inevitable consequence en-
sued. Russia replied to a partial Austrian mobilisation and decla-
ration of war against Servia by a partial Russian mobilisation against
Austria. Austria met this move by completing her own mobilisa-
tion, and Russia again responded with results which have passed
into history. The fate of the proposals put forward by His Majesty's
Government for the preservation of peace is recorded in the White
Paper on the European Crisis.^ On the 28th July I saw Count
Berchtold and urged as strongly as I could that the scheme of media-
tion mentioned in your speech in the House of Commons ^ on the
previous day should be accepted as offering an honourable and peace-
ful settlement of the question at issue. His Excellency himself read
to me a telegraphic report of the speech, but added that matters had
gone too far ; Austria was that day declaring war on Servia, and she
could never accept the conference which you had suggested should
take place between the less interested Powers on the basis of the

^ Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

2 "Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914)."

'See "Hansard," Vol. 65, No. 107, columns 931-933.

, September 1, British Blue Book No. 161 517

Servian reply. This was a matter which must be settled directly
between the two parties immediately concerned. I said His Majesty's
Government would hear with regret that hostilities could not be
arrested, as you feared they would lead to European complications.
I disclaimed any British lack of sympathy with Austria in the matter
of her legitimate grievances against Servia, and pointed out that
whereas Austria seemed to be making these the starting point of her
policy, His Majesty's Government were bound to look at the question
primarily from the point of view of the maintenance of the peace
of Europe. In this way the two countries might easily drift apart.

His Excellency said that he too was keeping the European aspect
of the question in sight. He thought, however, that Russia would
have no right to intervene after receiving his assurance that Austria
sought no territorial aggrandisement. His Excellency remarked to
me in the course of his conversation that, though he had been glad
to co-operate towards bringing about the settlement which had re-
sulted from the ambassadorial conferences in London during the
Balkan crisis, he had never had much belief in the permanency of that
settlement, which was necessarily of a highly artificial character, in-
asmuch as the interests which it sought to harmonise were in them-
selves profoundly divergent. His Excellency maintained a most
friendly demeanour throughout the interview, but left no doubt in
my mind as to the determination of the Austro-Hungarian Govern-
ment to proceed with the invasion of Servia.

The German Government claim to have persevered to the end in
the endeavour to support at Vienna your successive proposals in
the interest of peace. Herr von Tschirscky ^ abstained from inviting
my co-operation or that of the French and Russian Ambassadors in
carrying out his instructions to that effect, and I had no means of
knowing what response he was receiving from the Austro-Hungarian
Government. I was, however, kept fully informed by M. Schebeko,
the Russian Ambassador, of his own direct negotiations with Count
Berchtold. M. Schebeko endeavoured on the 28th July to persuade
the Austro-Hungarian Government to furnish Count Szapary ^ with
full powers to continue at St. Petersburgh the hopeful conversations
which had there been taking place between the latter and M. Sazonof .^
Count Berchtold ^ refused at the time, but two days later (30th July),
though in the meantime Russia had partially mobilised against Aus-
tria, he received M. Schebeko ^ again, in a perfectly friendly manner,
and gave his consent to the continuance of the conversations at St.
Petersburgh. From now onwards the tension between Russia and
Germany was much greater than between Russia and Austria. As
between the latter an arrangement seemed almost in sight, and on
the 1st August I was informed by M. Schebeko^ that Count Szapary ^
had at last conceded the main point at issue by announcing to M.

1 German Ambassador in Vienna.

2 Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh.

3 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

< Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
' Russian Ambassador in Vienna.

518 Official Diplomatic Documents

Sazonof ^ that Austria would consent to submit to mediation the
points in the note to Servia which seemed incompatible with the
maintenance of Servian independence. M. Sazonof/ M. Schebeko ^
added, had accepted this proposal on condition that Austria would
refrain from the actual invasion of Servia. Austria, in fact, had
finally yielded, and that she herself had at this point good hopes of a
peaceful issue is shown by the communication made to you on the
1st August by Count IMensdorff,^ to the effect that Austria had
neither "banged the door" on compromise nor cut off the conversa-
tions.^ M. Schebeko ^ to the end was working hard for peace. He
was holding the most conciliatory language to Count Berchtold,^ and
he informed me that the latter, as well as Count Forgach,^ had re-
sponded in the same spirit. Certainly it was too much for Russia to
expect that Austria w ould hold back her armies, but this matter could
probably have been settled by negotiation, and M. Schebeko ^ repeat-
edly told me he was prepared to accept any reasonable compromise.

Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburgh and Vienna
were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous
ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany
intervened on the 31st July by means of her double ultimatums to
St. Petersburgh and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which
only one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on Russia
on the 1st August, and on France on the 3rd August. A few days'
delay might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the
greatest calamities in history.

Russia still abstained from attacking Austria, and M. Schebeko ^
had been instructed to remain at his post till war should actually be
declared against her by the Austro-Hungarian Government. This
only happened on the 6th August, when Count Berchtold ^ informed
the foreign missions at Vienna that "the Austro-Hungarian Ambas-
sador at St. Petersburgh had been instructed to notify the Russian
Government that, in view of the menacing attitude of Russia in the
Austro-Servian conflict and the fact that Russia had commenced
hostilities against Germany, Austria-Hungary considered herself
also at war with Russia."

M. Schebeko ^ left quietly in a special train provided by the Austro-
Hungarian Government on the 7th August. He had urgently re-
quested to be conveyed to the Roumanian frontier, so that he might
be able to proceed to his own country, but was taken instead to the
Swiss frontier, and ten days later I found him at Berne.

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, stayed on till the 12th August.
On the previous day he had been instructed to demand his passport
on the ground that Austrian troops were being employed against
France. This point was not fully cleared up when I left Vienna.

^ Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

' Russian Ambassador in Vienna,

' Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

<See No. 137, August 1.

^ Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

« Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

September 1, British Blue Book No. 161 519

On the 9th August, M. Dumaine had received from Count Berchtold ^
the categorical declaration that no Austrian troops were being moved
to Alsace. The next day this statement was supplemented by a
further one, in writing, giving Count Berchtold's assurance that not
only had no Austrian troops been moved actually to the French fron-
tier, but that none were moving from Austria in a westerly direction
into Germany in such a way that they might replace German troops
employed at the front. These two statements were made by Count
Berchtold in reply to precise questions put to him by M. Dumaine,
under instructions from his Government. The French Ambassador's
departure was not attended by any hostile demonstration, but his
Excellency before leaving had been justly offended by a harangue
made by the Chief Burgomaster of Vienna to the crowd assembled
before the steps of the town hall, in which he assured the people that
Paris was in the throes of a revolution, and that the President of the
Republic had been assassinated.

, The British declaration of war on Germany was made known in
Vienna by special editions of the newspapers about midday on the
4th August. An abstract of your speeches in the House of Commons,
and also of the German Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag of the
4th August, appeared the same day, as well as the text of the German
ultimatum to Belgium. Otherwise few details of the great events of
these days transpired. The Neue Freie Presse was violently in-
sulting towards England. The Fremdenblatt was not offensive,
but little or nothing was said in the columns of any Vienna paper to
explain that the violation of Belgian neutrality had left His Majesty's
Government no alternative but to take part in the war.

The declaration of Italian neutrality was bitterly felt in Vienna,
but scarcely mentioned in the newspapers.

On the 5th August I had the honour to receive your instruction of
the previous day preparing me for the immediate outbreak of war
with Germany, but adding that, Austria being understood to be not
yet at that date at war with Russia and France, you did not desire me
to ask for my passport or to make any particular communication to
the Austro-Hungarian Government. You stated at the same time
that His Majesty's Government of course expected Austria not to
commit any act of war against us without the notice required by
diplomatic usage.

On Thursday morning, the 13th August, I had the honour to re-
ceive your telegram of the 12th, stating that you had been compelled
to inform Count Mensdorff,^ at the request of the French Government,
that a complete rupture had occurred between France and Austria, on
the ground that Austria had declared war on Russia who was already
fighting on the side of France, and that Austria had sent troops to the
German frontier under conditions that were a direct menace to France.
The rupture having been brought about with France in this way, I
was to ask for my passport, and your telegram stated, in conclusion,

1 Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

2 Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

520 Official Diplomatic Documents

that you had informed Count Mensdorff that a state of war would
exist between the two countries from midnight of the 12th August.

After seeing Mr. Penfield, the United States Ambassador, who
accepted immediately in the most friendly spirit my request that his
Excellency would take charge provisionally of British interests in
Austria-Hungary during the unfortunate interruption of relations,
I proceeded, with Mr. Theo Russell, Counsellor of His Majesty's
Embassy, to the Ballplatz. Count Berchtold ^ received me at mid-
day. I delivered my message, for which his Excellency did not seem
to be unprepared, although he told me that a long telegram from
Count Mensdorff ^ has just come in but had not yet been brought to
him. His Excellency received my qpmmunication with the courtesy
which never leaves him. He deplored the unhappy complications
which were drawing such good friends as Austria and England into
war. In point of fact, he added, Austria did not consider herself
then at war with France, though diplomatic relations with that coun-
try had been broken off. I explained in a few words how circum-
stances had forced this unwelcome conflict upon us. We both avoided
useless argument. Then I ventured to recommend to his Excellency's
consideration the case of the numerous stranded British subjects at
Carlsbad, Vienna, and other places throughout the country. I had
already had some correspondence with him on the subject, and his
Excellency took a note of what I said, and promised to see what could
be done to get them away when the stress of mobilisation should be
over. Count Berchtold agreed to Mr. Phillpotts, till then British
consul at Vienna under Consul-General Sir Frederick Duncan, being
left by me at the Embassy in the capacity of Charge des Archives.
He presumed a similar privilege would not be refused in England
if desired on behalf of the Austro-Hungarian Government. I took
leave of Count Berchtold with sincere regret, having received from the
day of my arrival in Vienna, not quite nine months before, many
marks of friendship and consideration from his Excellency. As I left
I begged his Excellency to present my profound respects to the Em-
peror Francis Joseph, together with an expression of my hope that
His Majesty would pass through these sad times with unimpaired
health and strength. Count Berchtold was pleased to say he would
deliver my message.

1 Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
* Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

September 4> French Yellow Book No. 160 521

early in the morning of the 17th August. At the first halting place
there had been some hooting and stone throwing on the part of the
entraining troops and station officials, but no inconvenience was
caused, and at the other large stations on our route we found that
ample measures had been taken to preserve us from molestation as
well as to provide us with food. I was left in no doubt that the
Austro-Hungarian Government had desired that the journey should
be performed under the most comfortable conditions possible, and
that I should receive on my departure all the marks of consideration
due to His Majesty's representative. I was accompanied by my own
family and the entire staff of the embassy, for whose untiring zeal
and efficient help in trying times I desire to express my sincere thanks.
The Swiss Government also showed courtesy in providing comfortable
accommodation during our journey from the frontier to Berne, and,
after three days' stay there, on to Geneva, at which place we found
that every provision had been made by the French Government, at
the request of Sir Francis Bertie, for our speedy conveyance to Paris.
We reached England on Saturday morning, the 22nd August.

I have, etc. Maurice de Bunsen.

(See note, p. 509.)

Friday, September 4, 1914
France :

To the French Ambassadors and Ministers Abroad

French Yellow Book No. 160

DECLARATION OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE

(September 4, 1914)

Declaration
M. Delcasse, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors
and Ministers abroad. p^^^^ September 4, 1914.

The following declaration has this morning been signed at the
Foreign Office at London : —

"The undersigned duly authorised thereto by their respective
Governments hereby declare as follows : —

"The British, French and Russian Governments mutually engage
not to conclude peace separately during the present war. The three
Governments agree that when terms of peace come to be discussed,
no one of the Allies w ill demand terms of peace without the previous
agreement of each of the other Allies.

(Signed) "Paul Cambon.

Count Benckendorff.
Edward Grey.''

This declaration will be published to-day. Delcasse

PART TWO

THE PARTS OF THE SEVERAL OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS
OF DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS NOT PRINTED UNDER
PART ONE

I. The Austro-Hungarian Red Book

Servian names are spelt as in the German original according to the Croatian
system. The following is the signification of the sounds : —

s = sh in the English " ship."

c = ch in the English " church."

c = (the same, softer).

c = ts in the English " mats."

j = y in the English " yell."

gj = dj in the EngUsh " adjourn."

z = j in the French "jour."

INTRODUCTION

Since the dynasty of the Karageorgevic ascended the blood-stained
throne of Servia, and surrounded itself with those who had conspired
against the life of King Alexander, the Kingdom has continually,
though by different paths and with varied intensity, pursued the aim
of undermining by hostile propaganda and revolutionary plots, those
territories of Austria-Hungary which are inhabited by the Southern
Slavs, in order to tear them away from the Monarchy, whenever the
general political condition might be favourable to the realisation of
the Great-Servian claims.

To what a pitch the hopes of the kingdom on the Save had been
raised, and how near she thought herself to the attainment of their
aspirations, appeared in the embittered animosity and the deep dis-
appointment which were created in this crazy and deluded country
by the anexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and which brought her
to the verge of war.

Left in the lurch by Russia, the protecting Power, who did not at
the moment consider herself sufficiently prepared, in the spring of
1909 the Servian Government found themselves compelled to give a
solemn declaration before Europe, that they recognised the new
political and international conditions which had been created by the
annexation, and to acknowledge that the interests of Servia had
not been affected thereby. They were also compelled to dissolve
the gangs of armed men which had been raised against the Monarchy,
and to undertake for the future to maintain friendly relations with
Austria-Hungary.

The expectations were not fulfilled that it would now be possible
for the Monarchy to live in peace and good neighbourly relations
with Servia, as she had lived during the rule of the Obrenovic, and,
as was then the case, to show good will to, and further the interests of
this State, which owes to Austria-Hungary the recognition of her
independence at the Berlin Congress. The Servian Government who,

525

526 Official Diplomatic Documents

by their promise, were under an obligation to maintain friendly and
neighbourly relations with Austria-Hungary, permitted their press to
foment hatred against the Monarchy in an unprecedented way ; they
permitted associations formed on Servian territory under the leader-
ship of high officers, civil servants, teachers and judges, publicly to
pursue their aims with the object of stirring up revolution in the
territories of Austria-Hungary; they did not prevent prominent
members of their military and civil administration from poisoning
the public conscience in such a way that common assassination was
regarded as the best weapon in the struggle against the Monarchy.
From the atmosphere created by this malicious agitation there sprang
up a whole series of murderous attacks on high functionaries of the
Monarchy, which ended in the execrable crime against the exalted
person of the heir to the throne, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, which
had been carefully prepared in Servia. However, the sacrifice of his
life for the Fatherland, by which our enemies in their mad folly
expected that the downfall of the Monarchy would be accelerated,
brought all the peoples of Austria-Hungary together in fiery unanim-
ity around the dynasty. The whole world learned how unshakable
were the foundations on which the Monarchy rests, and how firmly
and loyally her sons cling to one another. All felt it ; there was no
room for any doubt that our honour, our self-respect and our deepest
interest peremptorily demanded that we should deal with the criminal
conspiracies of Servia and obtain guarantees for the security of
Austria-Hungary.

The unhappy experience which the Imperial and Royal Govern-
ment had had with this dishonest neighbour showed us the only way
by which our interests could be secured.

It was necessary to present to Servia all such demands and to
require from her such guarantees as would ensure the punishment
of the accomplices in this shameful outrage and the suppression of the
Great-Servian projects. Since the unparalleled patience of Austria-
Hungary had been interpreted as weakness by Servia, the Belgrade
Government must be made to understand that the Monarchy was
determined if necessary to go to the utmost limit in order to maintain
her prestige and the integrity of her territories ; and that she could
not tolerate any longer the intrigues of the Save Kingdom, which were
meant to deceive the Powers, by an apparent agreement to the de-
mands of Austria-Hungary, while at the same time she kept open the
possibility of continuing her underhand attack against the Monarchy
as she had done after the solemn promise of 1909. Against the usual
Servian tactics of using the most reprehensible means to work for
the separation of the Southern-Slav territories of Austria-Hungary,
and then, when the Monarchy called her to account, of seeking
protection and impunity from the Powers, there was only one way
open to the Imperial and Royal Government of protecting their
territory, and making an end of the injury done to their commercial
life by the constant repetition of the intolerable attacks engendered
by Servian aspirations if they were to avoid endangering the peace

AiLstro-Hungarian Red Book 527

of Europe. From the beginning, the Imperial and Royal Government
met the apprehensions of the Powers with the assurance that the
Monarchy would not go beyond what was necessary for the protection
of her own interests, and did not propose any annexation of territory.
Within these limits, which she had imposed upon herself, she must,
however, insist that the controversy with Servia should be carried
through as a question directly concerning Austria-Hungary and this
State. The request made by Russia for an extension of the time
given to Servia for answering our demands would have given the
Belgrade Government an opportunity for new subterfuges and for
further procrastination, and would have opened the door to the inter-
ference of single Powers in the interests of Servia. It was therefore
necessary to refuse any prolongation of the time limit. Although
before sending her crafty and evasive answer, Servia had ordered
general mobilisation, and thereby publicly proclaimed her hostility,
the Monarchy waited two days before proceeding to a declaration
of war. The suggestion of the British Government that the settle-
ment of the Servian controversy should be entrusted to a conference
of the Powers did not reach Vienna until after the opening of hostili-
ties, and was therefore outstripped by events. This proposal was,
however, in itself, not well suited to securing the interests of the
Monarchy. Nothing but the integral acceptance of the Austro-
Hungarian demands on the part of the Belgrade Government would
have given a guarantee for a tolerable relationship with Servia. The
Entente Powers, however, were guided by the desire of substituting
for the effective demands of Austria-Hungary, which were painful to
Servia, a method of compromise, by which every security for a future
correct attitude on the part of the Save Kingdom would have been
lost, and Servia would have been encouraged to continue her en-
deavours to bring about a separation of the Southern territories of
Austria-Hungary.

When the Imperial and Royal Government demanded from Servia
that she should punish those accomplices in the crime of Serajevo who
were in Servian territory, and fulfil the duties which are a necessary
condition for friendly relationship between neighbouring States,
their only object was to protect our dynasty from outrage and the
territory of the Monarchy from criminal intrigues. They w^ere repre-
senting the common interest of the civilised world that murder and
outrage should not be used with impunity as a weapon in political
controversy, and that Servia should not continue incessantly to
menace the peace of Europe by her aspirations.

The Entente Powers were guilty of a serious wrong when, under the
spell of their own political interests, they closed their ears to these
postulates of public morality and humanity, and ranged themselves
beside the Kingdom with its load of guilt. Had they listened to the
assurances of the Monarchy which, by her conservative policy and her
love of peace during the violent changes which had taken place in the
Balkan Peninsula, had gained full right to their confidence, and had
they maintained a waiting attitude towards the Servian conflict, the

528 Official Diplomatic Documents

world-war would have been avoided. It is they who must be made
answerable before history for-^the immeasurable suffering which has
come upon the human race.

There can be no doubt that the small Servian State would never
have ventured, with an animosity which was scarcely concealed, to
work for the separation from the great neighbouring Monarchy of
the territories which were inhabited by Southern Slavs, if she had not
been sure of the secret approval and protection of Russia, and if she
had not been able to depend on the powerful pan-Slavist tendency in
the Empire of the Czar forcing the Russian Government, if necessary,
to come to the aid of the Kingdom in her struggle for the realisa-
tion of the Great-Servian projects.

In the course of the two last centuries the Russian Empire has
extended over gigantic areas with the elementary force of a glacier,
and has, again and again, subdued fresh races under the Musco-
vite rule, suppressing their culture, religion and language. As
the supreme and inflexible aim of this restless pressure towards
universal dominion there stands before her the possession of the
Dardanelles, which would secure to the Russian Empire predominance
in the near East and in Asia Minor, and gain for Russian exports an
opening independent of the will of other countries.

As the realisation of these plans would injure important interests
of Austria-Hungary and Germany, and as it was therefore bound to
encounter the inevitable opposition of these Powers, it was the en-
deavour of Russian policy to weaken their power of resistance. The
powerful central European union which barred the way to the uni-
versal dominion of Russia must be shattered, and Germany must be
isolated. The first step was to hem in the Hapsburg Monarchy by
the creation of the Balkan Union, and to undermine its authority
by the pan-Slavist and Servian intrigues in its frontier territories.
A necessary condition for carrying out this plan was the overthrow
and expulsion of the Turks in order that the increased power of the
Christian Balkan States should be available against the two central
Powers.

When the Balkan Union broke up owing to the quarrel over the
territory which had been torn from Turkey, and the Russian plans
were threatened with failure, "the Protector of the Slavs" allowed
Bulgaria to be overthrown, humiliated and deprived of the largest
share of the territory which she had won. The Balkan Union which,
after the overthrow of the Turks, could now be directed rather against
Austria-Hungary and Germany, and could be used by Russia and
France for changing the relations of the European Powers, was to
be set on foot again by the prospect of the acquisition of fresh terri-
tories, planned at the cost of the jNIonarchy, through a successive
pushing forward of frontier from east to west. In this criminal
game of Russian diplomacy, which threatened the existence of the
Monarchy and the peace of the world, Servia was a catspaw^ which
Russia would not give up even in order to avoid general war.

The Imperial and Royal Government — and the documents pro-

Austro-Hungarian Red Book 529

vided in this collection give ample evidence of this — again and again
almost up to the outbreak of war assured the Cabinet of St. Peters-
burgh that they would not violate any Russian interest, would not
annex any Servian territory, and would not touch the sovereignty
of Servia, and that they were ready to enter into negotiations with
the Russian Government on Austro-Hungarian and Russian interests.
' Russia, however, had not expressed herself as satisfied with the
solemn declarations of the Imperial and Royal Government; as
early as the 24th July, in the communique of that date, she assumed
a threatening tone, and on the 29th July, although Austria-Hungary
had not mobilised a single man against Russia, she ordered the
mobilisation of the military districts of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow and
Kasan ; this was a threat to the Monarchy ; on the 31st July she
ordered general mobilisation, disregarding the repeated warnings of
the Imperial and Royal Ambassador, and the declaration of the
German Goverment, which had been made on the 26th, that prepara-
tory military measures on the part of Russia would force Germany
to counter measures w^hich must consist in the mobilisation of the
army, and that mobilisation meant war.

On the 24th July the Imperial and Royal Ambassador in conversa-
tion with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, laid stress on the
peaceful disposition of the Monarchy. Her only object was to make
an end to the menace to our dynasty from Servian bombs, and to our
territory from the revolutionary machinations of Servia.

The attainment of this end was a vital question to the Monarchy.
She could not, therefore, allow herself to be terrorised by the possi-
bility of a conflict with Russia, in the event of that country taking
Servia under her protection ; she must make an end of the intolerable
situation, that a Russian charter should give the Servian Kingdom
continued impunity in her hostility to Austria-Hungary.

On the 30th July the British Secretary of State again suggested
that Austria-Hungary, in her conflict with Servia, should avail herself
of the mediation of the Powers. Guided by their desire to do the
utmost in their power to maintain general peace, the Imperial and
Royal Government declared themselves ready to accept this media-
tion. The honour and the interest of Austria-Hungary, however,
required that this should not take place under the pressure of the
threatening measures of Russia. It was, therefore, a paramount
necessity for her to require that the hostile measures of mobilisation
in the Empire of the Czar should, first of all, be revoked. This
demand the St. Petersburgh Cabinet answered by mobilising the
whole of the Russian forces.

In alliance with the self-seeking policy of Great Britain, and the
desire for revanche of the French Republic, the St. Petersburgh
Government disdained no means of securing predominance in Europe
to the Triple Entente and paving the way for their boldest schemes.

Russia's unscrupulous hands tried to weave the threads of her
policy into a snare to be cast over the head of the Monarchy. When
Austria-Hungary, following the dictates of self-preservation, deter-
2m

530 Official Diplomatic Documents

mined to tear the web to pieces, Russia attempted to stay the hand of
the Imperial and Royal Government and to humiliate the Monarchy.

Exposed to the greatest danger in their vital interests, Austria-
Hungary and Germany saw themselves confronted with the choice of
protecting their rights and their safety, or of giving way before the
threats of Russia.

They took the road pointed out by honour and duty.

French Yellow Book 531

n. The French YeUow Book

CHAPTER I
WARNINGS (1913)

No. 1

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Jonnart,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, March 17, 1913.

Our naval and military attaches are sending to their respective
Ministers reports on the new German military law. I take this
opportunity of drawing the attention of your Excellency to these
important documents.

The consideration of the financial expedients by which Germany
intends to provide for these military measures is the sole cause of the
delay in the publication of the definite proposals of the Government.
In spite of the patriotism with which the rich classes affect to accept
the sacrifices asked of them, they are none the less, particularly the
business circles, dissatisfied with the financial measures which have
been announced, and they feel that a compulsory levy imposed in
times of peace creates a formidable precedent for the future. On
the other hand, the Federal Governments have strongly opposed an
innovation which grants to the Empire resources derived from direct
taxation. Hitherto, taxation of this kind has been reserved to the
Federal States, and the latter see in the surrender of this principle a
new declaration of the corporate unity (personalite) of the Empire,
constituting a distinct diminution of their own sovereign power.

However this may be, in increasing the strength of the German
army the Empire desires to leave nothing to chance in the event of a
possible crisis.

The German changes have produced a result unexpected by that
country, viz., the proposal of the Government of the Republic to re-
establish the three years' service, and the manly determination with
which this proposal has been welcomed in France. The surprise
occasioned by these proposals has been utilised by the Imperial
Government for the purpose of insisting on the absolute necessity of
an increase of German military strength ; the German proposals are
represented as a reply to our own. The reverse is the case, since the
immense military effort which France is undertaking is but the conse-
quence of German initiative.

The Imperial Government is constantly rousing patriotic senti-
ment. Every day the Emperor delights to revive memories of 1813.
Yesterday evening a military tattoo went through the streets of Berlin,
and speeches were delivered in which the present situation was com-
pared to that of a hundred years ago. The trend of public opinion
will find an echo in the speeches which will be delivered next month

532 Official Diplomatic Documents

in the Reichstag, and I have reason to fear that the Chancellor himself
will be forced to allude in his statements to the relations of France
and Germany. It was of course to be expected that national patri-
otism would be worked up just when fresh sacrifices are being required,
but to compare the present time to 1813 is to misuse an historical
analogy. If, to-day, there is anything corresponding to the movement
which a hundred years ago roused Germans to fight the man of genius
who aspired to universal dominion, it is in France that such a counter-
part would have to be sought, since the French nation seeks but to
protect itself against the domination of force.

Nevertheless, it is true that the state of public opinion in both
countries makes the situation grave. Jules Cambon.

Enclosure I

Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Serret, Military Attache to the French
Embassy at Berlin, to M. Etienne, Minister of War.

Berlin, March 15, 1913.

The patriotic movement which has manifested itself in France has
caused real anger in certain circles.

I do not, indeed, mean to say that the virulent article in the
Kolnische Zeitung is the expression of prevalent opinion. It is rather
the angry outburst of an impulsive journalist, which has been im-
mediately disavowed by the Government.

However, in spite of its want of good manners the article in the
Kolnische Zeitung cannot be disregarded; several important news-
papers have approved of its substance, if not of its form, and it appears
to express a real feeling, a latent anger.

It is interesting to note this fact, because it throws very vivid light
on the meaning of the present armaments.

For some time now it has been quite a common thing to meet
people who declare that the military plans of France are extraordinary
and unjustified. In a drawing room a member of the Reichstag who
is not a fanatic, speaking of the three years' service in France, went
so far as to say, "It is a provocation; we will not allow it." More
moderate persons, military and civil, glibly voice the opinion that
France with her forty million inhabitants has no right to compete in
this way with Germany.

To sum up, people are angry, and this anger is not caused by the
shrieking of certain French papers, to which sober-minded people pay
little attention. It is a case of vexation. People are angry at realis-
ing that in spite of the enormous effort made last year, continued and
even increased this year, it will probably not be possible this time to
outrun France completely.

To outdistance us, since we neither will nor can be allied with her, is
Germany's real aim. I cannot insist too much on the fact that the
impending legislation, which French public opinion is too apt to con-

French Yellow Booh 533

sider as a spontaneous outburst, is but the inevitable and expected
consequence of the law of June, 1912.

This law, while creating two new army corps, had deliberately,
according to German fashion, left regiments and other large units
incomplete. It was evident that there would be no long delay in
filling in the gaps.^ The Balkan crisis, coming just at the right mo-
ment, furnished a wonderful opportunity for exploiting the centenary
of the War of Liberation, and obtaining with greater ease sacrifices
through the memory of those made in days gone by, and that too at a
time when Germany was opposed to France.

In order to show clearly the genesis of this military programme, I
beg to recall what was written by my predecessor Colonel Pelle a year
ago, when the law of 1912 was published :

" We are discovering every day how deep and lasting are the feelings
of injured pride and revenge provoked against us by the events of last
year.

"The Treaty of the 4th November 1911 has proved a complete
disillusion.

" The feeling is the same in all parties. All Germans, even the
Socialists, bear us a grudge for having taken away their share in
Morocco.

" It seemed a year or so ago, as if the Germans had set out to con-
quer the world. They considered themselves so strong that no one
would dare to oppose them. Limitless possibilities were opening out
for German manufactures, German trade, German expansion.

"Needless to say, these ideas and ambitions have not disappeared
to-day. Germany still requires outlets for commercial and colonial
expansion. They consider that they are entitled to them, because
their population is increasing every day, because the future belongs
to them. They consider us, with our forty million inhabitants, as a
second rate power.

"In the crisis of 1911, however, this second rate power successfully
withstood them, and the Emperor and the Government gave way.
Public opinion has forgiven neither them nor us. People are deter-
mined that such a thing shall never happen again.''

And at the moment when the second and formidable part of the
programme is about to be realised, when German military strength is
on the point of acquiring that final superiority which, should the occa-
sion arise, would force us to submit to humiliation or destruction,
France suddenly refuses to abdicate, and shows, as Renan said, " her
eternal power of renaissance and resurrection." The disgust of
Germany can well be understood.

Of course the Government points to the general situation in Europe
and speaks of the "Slav Peril.'' As far as I can see, however, public
opinion really seems indifferent to this "Peril," and yet it has ac-
cepted with a good grace, if not with welcome, the enormous burdens
of these two successive laws.

1 The problem which is set us to-day would, therefore, only be set again a few years
later, and in a much more acute fashion, since the decrease of our contingents is con-
tinually lowering the number of our effectives on a peace footing.

534 Official Diplomatic Documents

On the 10th March last, being the centenary of the levee en masse of
Germany against France, in spite of a downpour of rain, a huge crowd
surged to the miUtary parade in front of the Schloss, in the middle of
the Tiergarten, in front of the statues of Queen Louise and Frederick
William III., which were surrounded by heaps of flowers.

These anniversaries, recalling as they do the fight with France,
will be repeated the whole year through. In 1914 there will be a
centenary of the first campaign in France, the first entry of the
Prussians into Paris.

To sum up, if public opinion does not actually point at France, as
does the Kolnische Zeitung, we are in fact, and shall long remain, the
nation aimed at. Germany considers that for our forty millions of
inhabitants our place in the sun is really too large.

Germans wish for peace — so they keep on proclaiming, and the
Emperor more than anyone — but they do not understand peace as
involving either mutual concessions or a balance of armaments. They
want to be feared and they are at present engaged in making the neces-
sary sacrifices. If on some occasion their national vanity is wounded,
the confidence which the country will feel in the enormous superiority
of its army will be favourable to an explosion of national anger, in the
face of which the moderation of the Imperial Government will
perhaps be powerless.

It must be emphasised again that the Government is doing every-
thing to increase patriotic sentiment by celebrating with eclat all the
various anniversaries of 1813.

The trend of public opinion would result in giving a war a more
or less national character. By whatever pretext Germany should
justify the European. conflagration, nothing can prevent the first
decisive blows being struck at France.

Enclosure II

M. de Faramond, Naval Attache to the French Embassy at Berlin, to
M. Baudin, Minister of Marine.

Berlin, March 15, 1913,

In reporting on the examination of the Naval budget by the Finan-
cial Committee of the Reichstag, I said that no Naval law would be
introduced this year having as its object an increase of the fleet, and
that the whole of the military effort would be directed against us.

Although the new Bill, having for its object the increase of the
German effectives, has not yet been presented to the Reichstag, we
know that it deals with " an increase of military strength of immense
scope," to use the expression of the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung.

The official newspapers have also referred to the military proposal
in terms which enable us to consider the communique of the Lokal
Anzeiger as accurate.

The German effectives reach at the present moment 720,000 men.
We are, therefore, entitled to conclude that on the 1st October, 1914,

French Yellow Book 535

the Imperial army will be raised to a figure not far removed from
860,000.

The importance of this figure would not be so great if the provisions
of the proposed legislation (as far as one can gather from the official
newspapers) did not tend, as, in fact, those of the law of 1912 tend,
to place the army corps nearest to our frontier in a state which most
nearly approaches a war footing, in order to be able on the very day
of the outbreak of hostilities, to attack us suddenly with forces very
much stronger than our own. It is absolutely imperative for the
Imperial Government to obtain success at the very outset of the
operations.

The conditions under which the German Emperor would nowadays
commence a campaign against France are not those of forty years ago.
At the commencement of the war of 1870 the Prussian General Staff
had considered the possibility of a victorious French offensive, and
Moltke, seeing that we might conceivably get as far as Mayence,
remarked to his sovereign, " There they will come to a stop." William
II. cannot allow a retreat to enter into his calculations, although the
German soldier is no longer to-day what he was forty years ago, a
plain religious man, ready to die at the order of his king. When it is
remembered that at the last elections 4,000,000 votes were cast by
the Socialists and that the franchise is only obtained in Germany at
the age of 25, it may be presumed that the active army, composed of
young men from 20 to 25, must contain in its ranks a considerable
proportion of Socialists.

It would indeed be foolish to think that the German Socialists will
throw down their rifles on the day when France and Germany come to
blows ; but it will be very important that the Imperial Government
should persuade them that on the one hand we are the aggressors, and
on the other that they can have entire confidence in the direction of
the campaign and its final result.

On the last occasion when the recruits for the Guard took the oath
at Potsdam I was struck to hear the Emperor take as a theme for his
address to the young soldiers "the duty of being braver and more
disciplined in adversity than in success.''

And it is because a German defeat at the outset would have such an
incalculable effect on the Empire, that we find in all the plans worked
out by the General Staff proposals for a crushing offensive movement
against France.

In reality the Imperial Government wishes to be in a position to
meet all possible eventualities. It is from the direction of France
that the danger seems to them greatest. The Kdlnische Zeitiing has
said as much in an article both spiteful and violent, the form rather
than the substance of which has been disavowed by the Wilhelmstrasse.

But w^e must be willing to realise that the opinion expressed by the
Kdlnische Zeitung is at the present moment that of the immense
majority of the German people.

In this connection I think it is interesting to quote a conversation
which a member of our Embassy had the other evening with the old

536 Official Diplomatic Documents

Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck, as it may serve to reflect the
opinions which dominate Court circles.

Referring to the new German miHtary proposals Prince Donners-
marck spoke as follows : —

" French people are quite wrong in thinking that we harbour evil
designs and want war. But we cannot forget that in 1870 popular
opinion forced the French Government to make a foolish attack on us
before they were ready. Who can assure us that public opinion,
which in France is so easily inflamed, will not force the Government
to declare war? It is against this danger that we wish to protect
ourselves."

And the Prince added : " I have even been considered in France as
one of those responsible for the war of 1870. That is quite false.
Even if I took part in the war after it had begun, I did my utmost to
prevent its outbreak. A short time before the war, happening to be
at a dinner where there were some of the most important personages
of the Imperial Government, I expressed my regret at the hostile
sentiments which were already becoming manifest between France
and Prussia. The answer was that, if I spoke like that, it was because
I was afraid of a struggle in which the issue would certainly be un-
favourable to Prussia. I replied, * No, it is not because I am afraid
that I repudiate the idea of war between France and Prussia, but
rather because I think that it is in the interest of both countries to
avoid war. And since you have referred to the possible result of such
a struggle I will give you my opinion. I am convinced that you will
be beaten and for this reason. In spite of the brilliant qualities which
I recognise are possessed by the French and which I admire, you are not
sufficiently accurate ; by accuracy I do not mean arriving in time at
a meeting, but I mean punctuality in the whole sense of the word.
Frenchmen, who have a great facility for work, are not as punctual as
Germans in the fulfilment of their duty. In the coming war that na-
tion will be victorious whose servants from the top of the ladder to the
bottom will do their duty with absolute exactitude, however important
or small it may be.' " And Prince Donnersmarck added : " An exacti-
tude which played so great a role forty years ago in moving an army of
500,000 men will have a far greater importance in the next war, when
it will be a question of moving masses far more numerous."

In this way the old Prince gave expression to the confidence shared
by all Germans in the superiority of their military organisation.

When I spoke above of the new German proposal I only alluded to
increased effectives. But the proposal will include also an increase of
material and of defence works, the details of which are not known, but
some idea of which may be gained by the figure estimated to be neces-
sary to meet the expenses, viz., 1,250,000,000 francs.

The carrying into effect of the law of the quinquennium of 1911 did
not necessitate any special financial measures.

The military and naval law of 1912 has been provisionally covered
by the Budget surplus of the years 1910 and 1911, by the reform
of the law with regard to alcohol and by delaying the reduction

French Yellow Book 537

of the tax on sugar. (These last two resources only represent to-
gether the sum of 60,000,000 francs.)

It must also be remembered that large loans have recently been
raised by the Empire and Prussia : 500,000,000 marks on the 29th
January, 1912, and 350,000,000 marks on the 7th March, 1913. Quite
an important part of these loans must have been applied to military
expenses.

The military law of 1913 will require quite exceptional financial
measures.

According to the indications given by the semi-official press, the
"non-recurring" expenditure will amount to a milliard marks, while
the "permanent" annual expenditure resulting from the increase of
effectives will exceed 200,000,000 marks.

It seems certain that the "non-recurring" expenditure will be
covered by a war contribution levied on capital. Small fortunes
would be exempted and those above 20,000 marks would be subject
to a progressive tax. Presented in this guise the war tax would not
be objected to by the Socialists, who will be able, in accordance with
their usual tactics, to reject the principle of the military law and
at the same time to pass the votes which assure its being carried into
effect.

The Government are afraid that among the rich and bourgeois
classes this extraordinary tax of a milliard levied exclusively on
acquired capital will cause permanent discontent. Accordingly they
are doing everything in their power to persuade those on whom so
heavy an exaction is to be levied that the security of the Empire is
threatened, establishing for the purpose an analogy between the war-
like times of 1813 and the present day.

By noisy celebrations of the centenary of the War of Independence
it is desired to convince people of the necessity of sacrifice, and to
remind them that France is to-day, as 100 years ago, their hereditary
enemy.

If it is established that the German Government are doing their
utmost to secure that the payment of this enormous tax should be
made in full, and not by way of instalment, and if, as some of the
newspapers say, the whole payment is to be complete before 1st
July, 1914, these facts have a formidable significance for us, for nothing
can explain such haste on the part of the military authorities to ob-
tain war treasure in cash to the amount of a milliard.

With regard to the manner in which the permanent expenditure
resulting from the application of the laws of 1912 to 1913 is to be met,
nothing has yet been said. Further legislation will certainly be neces-
sary in order that the required annual amounts may be forthcoming.

To sum up : In Germany the execution of military reforms always
follows very closely the decision to carry them out. All the provi-
sions made by the law of the quinquennium of 1911 and by the law
of 1912 have already been put into operation. It is quite possible
that part of the material, the purchase of which will be authorised
by the new law, is already in course of manufacture. Military secrets

538 Official Diplomatic Documents

are so well kept here that it is extremely difficult to follow the changes
in personnel and materiel.

With 700,000 men under arms (without counting the very large
number of reservists who are at the present time in training), a perfect
military organisation and a public opinion which can be swayed by
the warlike appeals of the Military and Naval Leagues, the German
people is at the present moment a very dangerous neighbour.

If the three years' service is adopted and immediately applied in
France, the conditions will be less unequal next year. The German
effectives will still be considerably more numerous than ours, but the
call to the Colours of all available contingents will no longer allow
any selection, and will bring into the ranks of the German army
elements of inferior quality and even some undesirable individuals.
The morale of the active army will deteriorate.

Germany has wished to upset the equilibrium of the two camps
which divide Europe by a supreme effort beyond which they can
do little more.

They did not think that France wa3 capable of a great sacrifice.
Our adoption of the three years' service will upset their calculations.

Faramond.

No. 2

M. EtiennCf Minister of War, to M. Jonnart, Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

Paris, April 2, 1913.

I HAVE just received from a reliable source an official secret report
concerning the strengthening of the German army. The report is
divided into two parts; the first consisting of general statements,
the second dealing with technicalities and describing in the greatest
detail, for each branch of the service, the measures to be adopted.
Especially striking are the instructions with regard to the employ-
ment of motor-traction and the utilisation of aircraft.

I have the honour to enclose a copy of the first part of ^ this docu-
ment, which seems to merit your attention. Etienne.

Enclosure

Memorandum on the strengthening of the German Army.

Berlin, March 19, 1913.

I. — General Memorandum on the new Military Laws

The increase has taken place in three stages : —

(1) The Conference of Algeciras has removed the last doubt with
regard to the existence of an Entente between France, Great Britain,
and Russia. Moreover we have seen that Austria-Hungary was

French Yellow Book 539

obliged to keep some of her forces mobilised against Servia and
Italy; finally our fleet was not at that time sufficiently strong. At
the end of the dispute the first matter taken in hand was the strengthen-
ing of our coast defences and the increase of our naval forces. To
meet the British plan of sending an Expeditionary Force of 100,000
men to the Continent, it would be necessary to make a better forma-
tion of reserves to be used according to circumstances in the protec-
tion of the Coast, in fortresses and in siege operations. It was already
clear at that time that it would be absolutely necessary to make a
great effort.

(2) The French having violated the Morocco Conventions brought
on the incident of Agadir. At that time the progress made by the
French army, the moral recovery of the nation, the technical advance
in the realm of aviation and of machine guns rendered an attack on
France less easy than in the previous period. Further, an attack by
the British fleet had to be considered. This difficult situation opened
our eyes to the necessity for an increase in the army. This increase
was from this moment considered as a minimum.

(3) The war in the Balkans might have involved us in a war in
support of our ally. The new situation in the south of Austria-
Hungary lessened the value of the help which this ally could give us.
On the other hand, France was strengthened by a new hi des cadres;
it was accordingly necessary to anticipate the date of execution con-
templated by the new military law.

Public opinion is being prepared for a new increase in the active
army, which would ensure Germany an honourable peace and the
possibility of properly ensuring her influence in the affairs of the world.
The new army law and the supplementary law which should follow
will enable her almost completely to attain this end.

Neither ridiculous shriekings for revenge by French chauvinists,
nor the Englishmen's gnashing of teeth, nor the wild gestures of the
Slavs will turn us from our aim of protecting and extending Deutsch-
tum (German influence) all the world over.

The French may arm as much as they wish, they cannot in one
day increase their population. The employment of an army of black
men in the theatre of European operations will remain for a long time
a dream, and in any case be devoid of beauty.

II. — Aim and Obligations of our National Policy, of our Army,

AND OF THE SPECIAL ORGANISATIONS FOR ArMY PURPOSES

Our new army law is only an extension of the military education of
the German nation. Our ancestors of 1813 made greater sacrifices.
It is our sacred duty to sharpen the sword that has been pyt into our
hands and to hold it ready for, defence as well as for offence. We must
allow the idea to sink into the minds of our people that our armaments are
an answer to the armaments and policy of the French. We must accus-
tom them to think that an offensive war on our part is a necessity, in
order to combat the provocations of our adversaries. We must act

540 Official Diplomatic Documents

with prudence so as not to arouse suspicion, and to avoid the crises
which might injure our economic existence. We must so manage
matters that under the heavy weight of powerful armaments, con-
siderable sacrifices, and strained political relations, an outbreak
(Losschlagen) should be considered as a relief, because after it would
come decades of peace and prosperity, as after 1870. We must
prepare for war from the financial point of view ; there is much to be
done in this direction. We must not arouse the distrust of our
financiers, but there are many things which cannot be concealed.

We must not be anxious about the fate of our colonies. The final
i;esult in Europe will settle their position. On the other hand we must
stir up trouble in the north of Africa and in Russia. It is a means of
keeping the forces of the enemy engaged. It is, therefore, absolutely
necessary that we should open up relations, by means of well-chosen
agents, with influential people in Egypt, Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco,
in order to prepare the measures which would be necessary in the case
of a European war. Of course in case of war we should openly recog-
nise these secret allies; and on the conclusion of peace we should
secure to them the advantages which they had gained. These aims
are capable of realisation. The first attempt which was made some
years ago opened up for us the desired relations. Unfortunately
these relations were not sufficiently consolidated. Whether we like
it or not it will be necessary to resort to preparations of this kind, in
order to bring a campaign rapidly to a conclusion.

Risings provoked in time of war by political agents need to be
carefully prepared and by material means. They must break out
simultaneously with the destruction of the means of communication ;
they must have a controlling head to be found among the influential
leaders, religious or political. The Egyptian School is particularly
suited to this purpose ; more and more it serves as a bond between
the intellectuals of the Mohammedan World.

However this may be, we must be strong in order to annihilate
at one powerful swoop our enemies in the east and west. But in
the next European war it will also be necessary that the small states
should be forced to follow us or be subdued. In certain conditions
their armies and- their fortified places can be rapidly conquered or
neutralised ; this would probably be the case with Belgium and Hol-
land, so as to prevent our enemy in the west from gaining territory
which they could use as a base of operations against our flank. In the
north we have nothing to fear from Denmark or Scandinavia, espe-
cially as in any event we shall provide for the concentration of a strong
northern army, capable of replying to any menace from this direction.
In the most unfavourable case, Denmark might be forced by Great
Britain to. abandon her neutrality ; but by this time the decision
would already hav^ been reached both on land and on sea. Our
northern army, the strength of which could be largely increased by
Dutch formations, would oppose a very active defence to any offen-
sive measures from this quarter.

In the south, Switzerland forms an extremely solid bulwark, and

French Yellow Book 541

we can rely on her energetically defending her neutrality against
France, and thus protecting our flank.

As was stated above, the situation with regard to the small states
on our northwestern frontier cannot be viewed in quite the same
light. This will be a vital question for us, and our aim must be to
take the offensive with a large superiority from the first days. For this
purpose it will be necessary to concentrate a large army, followed up
by strong Landwehr formations, which will induce the small states
to follow us or at least to remain inactive in the theatre of operations,
and which would crush them in the event of armed resistance. If we
could induce these states to organise their system of fortification in
such a manner as to constitute an effective protection for our flank we
could abandon the proposed invasion. But for this, army reorganisa-
tion, particularly in Belgium, would be necessary in order that it
might really guarantee an effective resistance. If, on the contrary,
their defensive organisation was established against us, thus giving
definite advantages to our adversary in the west, we could in no
circumstances offer Belgium a guarantee for the security of her
neutrality. Accordingly, a vast field is open to our diplomacy to
work in this country on the lines of our interests.

The arrangements made with this end in view allow us to hope
that it will be possible to take the offensive immediately after the
complete concentration of the army of the Lower Rhine. An ultima-
tum with a short time-limit, to be followed immediately by invasion,
would allow a sufficient justification for our action in international
law.

Such are the duties which devolve on our army and which demand
a striking force of considerable numbers. If the enemy attacks us,
or if we wish to overcome him, we will act as our brothers did a hun-
dred years ago; the eagle thus. provoked will soar in his flight, will
seize the enemy in his steel claws and render him harmless. We will
then remember that the provinces of the ancient German Empire,
the County of Burgundy and a large part of Lorraine, are still in
the hands of the French; that thousands of brother Germans in thei
Baltic provinces are groaning under the Slav yoke. It is a national
question that Germany's former possessions should be restored to her.

No. 3

M. Jules Camhon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Stephen Pichon,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, May 6, 1913.

I WAS talking this evening to the Secretary of State about the
conference of Ambassadors and the results obtained at the meeting
in London yesterday. The crisis with which Europe was threatened
is in his opinion over, but only temporarily. "It seems to me," said
Herr von Jagow, "that we are travelling in a mountainous district.
We have just reached a difficult pass and we see other heights rising

542 Official Diplomatic Documents

in front of us/' "The height which we have just surmounted," I
repUed, "was, perhaps, the most difficult to cross."

The crisis which we have just gone through has been very serious.
Here the danger of war has been considered imminent. I have proof
of the anxiety of the German Government by a number of facts which
it is important that your Excellency should know.

I received yesterday a visit from one of my colleagues with whom I
maintain special and cordial relations. On the occasion of the visit
he paid to Herr von Jagow, the latter asked my colleague confiden-
tially what was exactly the situation of Russia in the Far East, and
whether this Power had at the present time any cause for fear which,
might necessitate the retention of its troops in that quarter. The
Ambassador answered him that he knew of nothing, absolutely noth-
ing, which could be a cause of preoccupation for the Russian Govern-
ment, and that the latter have their hands free in Europe.

I said above that the danger of war had been regarded here as
extremely near. The Government have not been satisfied with
investigating the position in the Far East ; preparations have even
been made here.

The mobilisation of the German army is not restricted to the recall
of reservists to their barracks. There is in Germany a preliminary
measure which we have not got, and which consists in warning officers
and men of the reserve to hold themselves ready for the call, in order
that they may make the necessary arrangements. It is a general call
to "attention," and it requires an incredible spirit of submission,
discipline, and secrecy such as exists in this country, to make a step of
this kind possible. If such a warning were given in France, a thrill
would run through the whole country, and it would be in the papers
the next day.

This warning was given in 1911 during the negotiations which I was
carrying on w^ith regard to Morocco.

Now it has been given again about ten days ago — that is to say,
at the moment of the Austro- Albanian tension. I know that this
is so, and I have it from several different sources, notably from officers
of the reserve who have told it to their friends in the strictest con-
fidence. These gentlemen have taken the necessary measures to put
aside in a safe the means of existence for their families for a year.
It has even been said that it was for this reason that the Crown Prince,
who was to make the trial trip on the Imperator, did not embark.

The decision which occasioned this preliminary mobilisation order
IS quite in keeping with the ideas of the General Staff. On this point
I have been informed of some remarks made in a German milieu by
General von Moltke, who is considered here as the most distinguished
officer of the German army.

The intention of the General Staff is to act by surprise. " We must
put on one side," said General von Moltke, "all commonplaces
as to the responsibility of the aggressor. When war has become
necessary it is essential to carry it on in such a way as to place all the
chances in one's own favour. Success alone justifies war. Germany

French Yellow Book 543

cannot and ought not to leave Russia time to mobilise, for she would
then be obliged to maintain on her Eastern frontier so large an army
that she would be placed in a position of equality, if not of inferiority,
to that of France. Acordingly," added the General, "we must
anticipate our principal adversary as soon as there are nine chances
to one of going to war, and begin it without delay in order ruthlessly
to crush all resistance."

This represents exactly the attitude of military circles and it cor-
responds to that of political circles ; the latter, however, do not con-
sider Russia, in contradistinction to us, as a necessary enemy.

This is what was being thought and said privately a fortnight ago.

From these events the following conclusions may be drawn which
comprise the facts stated above ; these people are not afraid of war,
they fully accept its possibility and they have consequently taken the
necessary steps. They wish to he always ready.

As I said, this demands qualities of secrecy, discipline and of per-
sistence ; enthusiasm alone is not sufficient. This lesson may form
a useful subject of meditation when the Government of the Republic
ask Parliament for the means of strengthening the defences of the
country. Jules Cambon.

No. 4

M. Allize, French Minister in Bavaria, to M. Stephen Pichon, Minister
for Foreign Affairs.

Munich, July 10, 1913.

From a political point of view people are asking what is the
object of the new armaments. Recognising that no one threatens
Germany, they consider that German diplomacy had already at its
disposal forces sufficiently large and alliances sufficiently powerful
to protect German interests with success. As I pointed out the day
after the Morocco agreement of 1911, it is thought that the Imperial
Chancery will be as incapable in the future as in the past, of adopting
an active foreign policy and of achieving, at least in this sphere,
successes which would justify the burdens which the nation has
assumed.

This frame of mind is all the more a cause of anxiety as the Imperial
Government would find themselves supported by public opinion in
any enterprise on which they might energetically embark, even at the
risk of a confiict. The state of war to which all the events in the
East have accustomed people's minds for the last two years appears
no longer like some distant catastrophe, but as a solution of the polit-
ical and economic difficulties which will continue to increase.

May the example of Bulgaria exercise a salutary influence on Ger-
many. As the Prince Regent recently said to me, " The fortune of
war is always uncertain ; every war is an adventure, and the man is a
fool who risks it believing himself sure of victory."

Allize.

544 Official Diplomatic Documents

No. 5

Report to M. Stephen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs (on Public
Opinion in Germany according to the Reports of the Diplomatic and
Consular Agents).

Paris, July 30, 1913.

From observations which our agents in Germany have been able
to collect from persons having access to the most diverse circles, it
is possible to draw the conclusion that two feelings sway and irritate
men's minds : —

(1) The Treaty of the 4th November, 1912, is considered a dis-
appointment for Germany ;

(2) France — a new France — undreamed of prior to the summer
of 1911 is considered to be a warlike country, and to want war.

Members of all the parties in the Reichstag, from the Conservatives
to the Socialists, representing the most different districts of Germany,
university people from Berlin, Halle, Jena, and Marburg, students,
elementary school teachers, commercial clerks, bank clerks, bankers,
artisans, merchants, manufacturers, doctors, law^^ers, editors of
Democratic and Socialistic newspapers, Jewish publicists, members of
trade unions, clergymen and shopkeepers from the Mark of Branden-
burg, country squires from Pomerania and shoemakers from Stettin
celebrating the 505th anniversary of their association, country gentle-
men, officials, priests, and large farmers from Westphalia, are unan-
imous on these two points, with very slight differences corresponding
to their position in society or their political party. Here is a syn-
thesis of all these opinions :

The Treaty of the 4thiNovember is a diplomatic defeat, a proof of
the incapacity of German diplomacy and the carelessness of the
Government (so often denounced), a proof that the future of the
Empire is not safe without a new Bismarck ; it is a national humilia-
tion, a lowering in the eyes of Europe, a blow to German prestige, all
the more serious because up to 1911 the military supremacy of Ger-
many was unchallenged, and French anarchy and the powerlessness of
the Republic were a sort of German dogma.

In July, 1911, the "Coup of Agadir'' made the Morocco question
for the first time a national question affecting the life and expansion
of the Empire. The revelations and the press campaign which
followed, have sufficiently proved how the campaign has been organ-
ised, what Pan-German greed it had awakened, and what hatred
it had left behind. If the Emperor was discussed, the Chancellor
unpopular, Herr von Kiderlen was the best-hated man in Germany
last winter. However, he begins to be merely thought little of, for
he allows it to be known that he will have his revenge.

Thus, during the summer of 1911, German public opinion became
restive when confronted with French opinion with regard to Morocco.
And the attitude of France, her calmness, her re-born spiritual unity,
her resolution to make good her rights right up to the end, the fact
that she has the audacity not to be afraid of war, these things are the

French Yellow Booh 545

most persistent and the gravest cause of anxiety and bad temper on
the part of German public opinion.

Why then did not Germany go to war during the summer of 1911,
since pubhc opinion although not so unanimous and determined as
French public opinion, was certainly favourable? Apart from the
pacific disposition of the Emperor and the Chancellor, military and
financial reasons made themselves felt.

But these events of 1911 have caused a profound disillusionment
in Germany. A new France united, determined, resolved not to be
intimidated any longer, has emerged from the shroud in which she
had been seen burying herself for the last ten years. Public opinion
in Germ-any, from December to May, from the columns of the press
of all parties, which reproached the Imperial Government for their
incapacity and cowardice has discovered with surprise mingled with
irritation that the country conquered in 1870 had never ceased since
then to carry on war, to float her flag and maintain the prestige of her
arms in Asia and Africa, and to conquer vast territories ; that Ger-
many on the other hand had lived on her reputation, that Turkey is
the only country in which during the reign of William II. she had made
moral conquests, and these were now compromised by the disgrace
of the Morocco solution. Each time that France made a colonial
conquest this consolation was offered: — "Yes, but that does not
prevent the decadence, anarchy, and dismemberment of France at
home."

The public were mistaken and public opinion was misled.

Given this German public opinion that considers France as longing
for war, what can be augured for the future as regards the possibility
and proximity of war ?

German public opinion is divided into two currents on the question
of the possibility and proximity of war.

There are in the country forces making for peace, but they are
unorganised and have no popular leaders. They consider that war
would be a social misfortune for Germany, and that caste pride,
Prussian domination, and the manufacturers of guns and armour
plate would get the greatest benefit, but above all that war would
profit Great Britain.

The forces consist of the following elements : —

The bulk of the workmen, artisans and peasants, who are peace-
loving by instinct.

Those members of the nobility detached from military interests and
engaged in business, such as the grands seigneurs of Silesia and a few
other personages very influential at Court, who are sufficiently en-
lightened to realise the disastrous political and social consequences
of war, even if successful.

Numerous manufacturers, merchants and financiers in a moderate
way of business, to whom war, even if successful, would mean bank-
ruptcy, because their enterprises depend on credit, and are chiefly
supported by foreign capital.

Poles, inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, and Schleswg-Holstein —
2>

546 Official Diplomatic Documents

conquered, but not assimilated and sullenly hostile to Prussian policy.
There are about 7,000,000 of these annexed Germans.

Finally, the Governments and the governing classes in the large
southern states — Saxony, Bavaria, Wurtemburg, and the Grand
Duchy of Baden — are divided by these two opinions : —'an unsuc-
cessful war would compromise the Federation from which they have
derived great economic advantages; a successful war would only
profit Prussia and Prussianisation, against which they have diffi-
culty in defending their political independence and administrative
autonomy.

These classes of people either consciously or instinctively prefer
peace to war ; but they are only a sort of makeweight in political
matters, with limited influence on public opinion, or they are silent
social forces, passive and defenceless against the infection of a wave
of warlike feeling.

An example will make this idea clear : — The 110 Socialist members
of the Reichstag are in favour of peace. They would be unable to
prevent war, for war does not depend upon a vote of the Reichstag,
and in the presence of such an eventuality the greater part of their
number would join the rest of the country in a chorus of angry excite-
ment and enthusiasm.

Finally it must be observed that these supporters of peace believe
in war in the mass because they do not see any other solution for the
present situation. In certain contracts, especially in publishers'
contracts, a clause has been introduced cancelling the contract in the
case of war. They hope, however, that the will of the Emperor on
the one side, France's difficulties in Morocco on the other, will be
for some time a guarantee of peace. Be that as it may, their pes-
simism gives free play to those who favour war.

People sometimes speak of a military party in Germany. The
expression is inaccurate, even if it is intended to convey the idea that
Germany is the country where military power is supreme, as it is said
of France that it is the country where the civil power is supreme.
There exists a state of mind which is more worthy of attention than
this historical fact, because it constitutes a danger more evident and
more recent. There is a war party, with leaders, and followers, a
press either convinced or subsidised for the purpose of creating public
opinion ; it has means both varied and formidable for the intimida-
tion of the Government. It goes to work in the country with clear
ideas, burning aspirations, and a determination that is at once thrilling
and fixed.

Those in favour of war are divided into several categories ; each of
these derives from its social caste, its class, its intellectual and moral
education, its interests, its hates, special arguments which create a
general attitude of mind and increase the strength and rapidity of the
stream of warlike desire.

Some want war because in the present circumstances they think it is
inevitable. And, as far as Germany is concerned, the sooner the better.

Others regar^ war as necessary for economic reasons based on over-

French Yellow Book 547

population, over-production, the need for markets and outlets; or
for social reasons, i.e., to provide the outside interests that alone can
prevent or retard the rise to power of the democratic and socialist
masses.

Others, uneasy for the safety of the Empire, and believing that time
is on the side of France, think that events should be brought to an
immediate head. It is not unusual to meet, in the course of conversa-
tion or in the pages of patriotic pamphlets, the vague but deeply
rooted conviction that a free Germany and a regenerated France are
two historical facts mutually incompatible.

Others are bellicose from " Bismarckism " as it may be termed.
They feel themselves humiliated at having to enter into discussions
with France, at being obliged to talk in terms of law and right in
negotiations and conferences where they have not always found it
easy to get right on their side, even when they have a preponderating
force. From their still recent past they derive a sense of pride ever
fed by personal memories of former exploits, by oral traditions, and
by books, and irritated by the events of recent years. Angry dis-
appointment is the unifying force of the Wehrvereine, and other asso-
ciations of Young Germany.

Others again want war from a mystic hatred of revolutionary
France ; others finally from a feeling of rancour. These last are the
people who heap up pretexts for war.

Coming to actual facts, these feelings take concrete form as follows :
— The country squires represented in the Reichstag by the Conserva-
tive party want at all costs to escape the death duties, which are
bound to come if peace continues. In the last sitting of the session
which has just closed, the Reichstag agreed to these duties in principle.
It is a serious attack on the interests and privileges of the landed
gentry. On the other hand this aristocracy is military in character,
and it is instructive to compare the Army List with the year book of
the nobility. War alone can prolong its prestige and support its
family interest. During the discussions on the Army Bill, a Conser-
vative speaker put forward the need for promotion among officers as
an argument in its favour. Finally, this social class which forms a
hierarchy with the King of Prussia as its supreme head, realises with
dread the democratisation of Germany and the increasiilg power of
the Socialist party, and considers its own days numbered. Not
only does a formidable movement hostile to agrarian protection
threaten its material interests, but in addition, the number of its
political representatives decreases with each legislative period. In
the Reichstag of 1878, out of 397 members, 162 belonged to the
aristocracy ; in 1898, 83 ; in 1912, 57. Out of this number 27 alone
belong to the Right, 14 to the Centre, 7 to the Left, and one sits
among the Socialists.

The higher bourgeoisie, represented by the National Liberal Party,
the party of the contented spirits, have not the same reasons as the
squires for wanting war. With a few exceptions, however, they are
bellicose. They have their reasons, social in character.

548 Official Diplomatic Documents

The higher bourgeoisie is no less troubled than the aristocracy at
the democratisation of Germany. In 1871 they had 125 members in
the Reichstag ; in 1874, 155 ; in 1887, 99 ; in 1912, 45. They do not
forget that in the years succeeding the war they played the leading
role in parliament, helping Bismarck in his schemes against the
country squires. Uneasily balanced to-day between Conservative
instincts and Liberal ideas, they look to war to settle problems which
their parliamentary representatives are painfully incapable of solving.
In addition, doctrinaire manufacturers declare that the difficulties
between themselves and their workmen originate in France, the home
of revolutionary ideas of freedom — without France industrial unrest
would be unknown.

Lastly, there are the manufacturers of guns and armour plate, big
merchants who demand bigger markets, bankers who are speculating
on the coming of the golden age and the next war indemnity — all
these regard war as good business.

Amongst the " Bismarckians " must be reckoned officials of all
kinds, represented fairly closely in the Reichstag by the Free Con-
servatives or Imperial Party. This is the party of the "pensioned,"
whose impetuous sentiments are poured out in the Post. They find
disciples and political sympathisers in the various groups of young
men whose minds have been trained and formed in the public schools
and universities.

The universities, if we except a few distinguished spirits, develop
a warlike philosophy. Economists demonstrate by statistics Ger-
many's need for a colonial and commercial empire commensurate
with the industrial output of the Empire. There are sociological
fanatics who go even further. The armed peace, so they say, is a
crushing burden on the nations, it checks improvement in the lot of
the masses, and assists the growth of socialism. France by clinging
obstinately to her desire for revenge opposes disarmament. Once for
all she must be reduced, for a century, to a state of impotence ; that
is the best and speediest way of solving the social problem.

Historians, philosophers, political pamphleteers and other apolo-
gists of German Kultur wish to impose upon the world a way of think-
ing and feeling specifically German. They wish to wrest from France
that intellectual supremacy which according to the clearest thinkers is
still her possession. From this source is derived the phraseology of
the Pan-Germans and the ideas and adherents of the Kriegsvereine,
Wehrvereine and other similar associations too well known to need
particular description. It is enough to note that the dissatisfaction
caused by the treaty of November 4th has considerably swelled the
membership of colonial societies.

We come finally to those whose support of the war policy is inspired
by rancour and resentment. These are the most dangerous. They
are recruited chiefly among diplomatists. German diplomatists are
now in very bad odour in public opinion. The most bitter are those
who since 1905 have been engaged in the negotiations between France
and Germany; they are heaping together and reckoning up their

French Yellow Book 549

grievances against us, and one day they will present their accounts
in the war press. It seems as if they were looking for grievances
chiefly in Morocco, though an incident is always possible in any part
of the globe where France and Germany are in contact.

They must have their revenge, for they complain that they have
been duped. During the discussion on the Army Bill one of these
warlike diplomatists exclaimed, "Germany will not be able to have
any serious conversation with France until she has every sound man
under arms."

In what terms will this conversation be couched ? The opinion
is fairly widely spread, even in Pan-German circles, that Germany
will not declare war in view of the system of defensive alliances and
the tendencies of the Emperor. But when the moment comes, she
will have to try in every possible way to force France to attack her.
Offence will be given if necessary. That is the Prussian tradition.

Must war then be considered as inevitable ?

It is hardly likely that Germany will take the risk, if France can
make it clear to the world that the Entente Cordiale and the Russian
alliance are not mere diplomatic fictions but realities which exist and
will make themselves felt. The British fleet inspires a wholesome
terror. It is well known, however, that victory on sea will leave
everything in suspense. On land alone can a decisive issue be ob-
tained.

As for Russia, even though she carries greater weight in political
and military circles than was the case three or four years ago, it is not
believed that her co-operation will be sufficiently rapid and energetic
to be effective.

People's minds are thus getting used to consider the next war as a
duel between France and Germany.

No. 6

M, Jules Camhon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Stephen Pichon,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, November 22, 1913.

I HAVE received from an absolutely reliable source an account of a
conversation which took place a fornight ago between the Emperor
and the King of the Belgians, in the presence of the Chief of the
General Staff — General von Moltke. This conversation, it appears,
has made a profound impression on King Albert. I am in no way
surprised at the impression he gathered, which corresponds with
what I have myself felt for some time. Enmity against us is increas-
ing, and the Emperor has ceased to be the friend of peace.

The person addressed by the Emperor had thought up till then, as
did all the world, that William II., whose personal influence had been
exerted on many critical occasions in support of peace, was still in
the same state of mind. He found him this time completely changed.
The German Emperor is no longer in his eyes the champion of peace
against the warlike tendencies of certain parties in Germany. William

550 Official Diplomatic Documents

II. has come to think that war with France is inevitable, and that it
must come sooner or later. Naturally he believes in the crushing
superiority of the German army and in its certain success.

General von Moltke spoke exactly in the same strain as his sovereign.
He, too, declared war to be necessary and inevitable, but he showed
himself still more assured of success, "for," he said to the King, "this
time the matter must be settled, and your Majesty can have no con-
ception of the irresistible enthusiasm with which the whole German
people will be carried away when that day comes."

The King of the Belgians protested that it was a travesty of the
intentions of the French Government to interpret them in that sense ;
and to let oneself be misled as to the sentiments of the French nation
by the ebullitions of a few irresponsible spirits or the intrigues of
unscrupulous agitators.

The Emperor and his Chief of the General Staff nevertheless per-
sisted in their point of view.

During the course of this conversation the Emperor moreover
seemed overstrained and irritable. As William II. advances in years,
family traditions, the reactionary tendencies of the court, and espe-
cially the impatience of the soldiers, obtain a greater empire over his
mind. Perhaps he feels some slight jealousy of the popularity ac-
quired by his son, who flatters the passions of the Pan-Germans, and
who does not regard the position occupied by the Empire in the world
as commensurate with its power. Perhaps the reply of France to
the last increase of the German army, the object of which was to
establish the incontestable supremacy of Germany, is, to a certain
extent, responsible for his bitterness, for, whatever may be said, it is
realised that Germany cannot go much further.

One may well ponder over the significance of this conversation.
The Emperor and his Chief of the General Staff may have wished to
impress the King of the Belgians and induce him not to make any
opposition in the event of a conflict between us. Perhaps Germany
would be glad to see Belgium less hostile to certain aspirations lately
manifested here with regard to the Belgian Congo, but this last
hypothesis does not seem to me to fit in with the interposition of Gen-
eral von Moltke.

For the rest, the Emperor William is less master of his impatience
than is usually supposed. I have known him more than once to
allow his real thoughts escape him. Whatever may have been the
object of the conversation related to me, the revelation is none the
less of extreme gravity. It tallies with the precariousness of the gen-
eral situation and with the state of a certain shade of public opinion
in France and Germany.

If I may be allowed to draw a conclusion, I would submit that it
would be well to take account of this new factor, namely, that the
Emperor is becoming used to an order of ideas which were formerly
repugnant to him, and that, to borrow from him a phrase which he
likes to use, "we must keep our powder dr}."

Jules Cambon.

German White Book 551

III. The German White Book

Foreign Office, Berlin, August, 1914.

On June 28th the Austro-Hungarian successor to the throne, Arch-
Duke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, were
assassinated by a member of a band of Servian conspirators. The
investigation of the crime through the Austro-Hungarian authorities
has yielded the fact that the conspiracy against the hfe of the Arch-
Duke and successor to the throne was prepared and abetted in Bel-
grade with the co-operation of Servian officials, and executed with
arms from the Servian State arsenal. This crime must have opened
the eyes of the entire civilised world, not only in regard to the aims of
the Servian policies directed against the conservation and integrity
of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but also concerning the criminal
means which the pan-Serb propaganda in Servia had no hesitation in
employing for the achievement of these aims.

The goal of these policies was the gradual revolutionising and final
separation of the southeasterly districts from the Austro-Hungarian
monarchy and their union with Servia. This direction of Servians
policy has not been altered in the least in spite of the repeated and
solemn declarations of Servia in which it vouchsafed a change in these
policies towards Austria-Hungary as well as the cultivation of good
and neighbourly relations.

In this manner for the third time in the course of the last 6 years
Servia has led Europe to the brink of a world-war.

It could only do this because it believed itself supported in its
intentions by Russia.

Russia, soon after the events brought about by the Turkish revolu-
tion in 1908, endeavoured to found a union of the Balkan states under
Russian patronage and directed against the existence of Turkey.
This union, which succeeded in 1911 in driving out Turkey from a
greater part of her European possessions, collapsed over the question
of the distribution of spoils. The Russian policies were not dis-
mayed over this failure. According to the idea of the Russian states-
men a new Balkan union under Russian patronage should be called
into existence, headed no longer against Turkey, now dislodged from
the Balkans, but against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian
monarchy. It was the idea that Servia should cede to Bulgaria those
parts of Macedonia which it had received during the last Balkan war,
in exchange for Bosnia and the Herzegovina which were to be taken
from Austria. To oblige Bulgaria to fall in with this plan it was to be
isolated, Roumania attached to Russia with the aid of French propa-
ganda, and Servia promised Bosnia and the Herzegovina.

Under these circumstances it was clear to Austria that it was not
compatible with the dignity and the spirit of self-preservation of the
monarchy to view idly any longer this agitation across the border.
The Imperial and Royal Government appraised Germany of this con-
ception and asked for our opinion. With all our heart we were able

552 Official Diplomatic Documents .

to agree with our ally's estimate of the situation, and assure him that
any action considered necessary to end the movement in Servia
directed against the conservation of the monarchy would meet with
our approval.

We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of Austria-
Hungary against Servia might bring Russia upon the field, and that
it might therefore involve us in a war, in accordance with our duty as
allies. We could not, however, in these vital interests of Austria-
Hungary, which were at stake, advise our ally to take a yielding
attitude not compatible with his dignity, nor deny him our assistance
in these trying days. We could do this all the less as our own interests
were menaced through the continued Serb agitation. If the Serbs
continued with the aid of Russia and France to menace the existence
of Austria-Hungary, the gradual collapse of Austria and the subjec-
tion of all the Slavs under one Russian sceptre would be the conse-
quence, thus making untenable the position of the Teutonic race in
Central Europe. A morally weakened Austria under the pressure of
Russian pan-Slavism would be no longer an ally on whom we could
count and in whom we could have confidence, as we must be able to
have, in view of the ever more menacing attitude of our easterly and
westerly neighbours. We, therefore, permitted Austria a completely
free hand in her action towards Servia, but have not participated in
her preparations.

Austria chose the method of presenting to the Servian Govern-
ment a note, in which the direct connection between the murder at
Serajievo and the pan-Serb movement, as not only countenanced but
actively supported by the Servian Government, was explained, and
in which a complete cessation of this agitation, as well as a punishment
of the guilty, was requested. At the same time Austria-Hungary
demanded as necessary guarantee for the accomplishment of her desire
the participation of some Austrian officials in the preliminary examina-
tion on Servian territory and the final dissolution of the pan-Serb
societies agitating against Austria-Hungary^ The Imperial and Royal
Government gave a period of 48 hours for the . unconditional ac-
ceptance of its demands.

The Servian Government started the mobilisation of its army one
day after the transmission of the Austro-Hungarian note.

As after the stipulated date the Servian Government rendered a
reply which, though complying in some points with the conditions of
Austria-Hungary, yet showed in all essentials the endeavour through
procrastination and new negotiations to escape from the just demands
of the monarchy, the latter discontinued her diplomatic relations
with Servia without indulging in further negotiations or accepting
, further Servian assurances, whose value, to its loss, she had sufficiently
experienced.

From this moment Austria was in fact in a state of war with Servia,
which it proclaimed officially on the 28th of July by declaring war.

From the beginning of the conflict we assumed the position that
there were here concerned the affairs of Austria aloney which it would

German White Book

553

See exhibits
1 and 2.

See exhibit
3.

See exhibit
4.

See exhibit
5.

have to settle with Servia. We therefore directed our
efforts toward the locaHsing of the war, and toward con-
vincing the other powers that Austria-Hungary had to
appeal to arms in justifiable self-defence, forced upon her
by the conditions. We emphatically took the position
that no civilised country possessed the right to stay the
arm of Austria in this struggle with barbarism and politi-
cal crime, and to shield the Servians against their just
punishment. In this sense we instructed our representa-
tives with the foreign powers.

Simultaneously the Austro-Hungarian Government com-
municated to the Russian Government that the step
undertaken against Servia implied merely a defensive
measure against the Serb agitation, but that Austria-
Hungary must of necessity demand guarantees for a
continued friendly behaviour of Servia towards the mon-
archy. Austria-Hungary had no intention whatsoever
to shift the balance of power in the Balkan.

In answer to our declaration that the German Govern-
ment desired, and aimed at, a localisation of the conflict,
both the French and the English Governments promised
an action in the same direction. But these endeavours
did not succeed in preventing the interposition of Russia
in the Austro-Servian disagreement.

The Russian Government submitted an official com-
munique on July 24th, according to which Russia could
not possibly remain indifferent in the Servo-Austrian
conflict. ^ The same was declared by the Russian Secre-
tary of Foreign Affairs, M. Sasonof, to the German
Ambassador, Count Pourtales, in the afternoon of July
26th. The German Government declared again, through
its Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, that Austria-Hungary
had no desire for conquest and only wished peace at
her frontiers. After the official explanation by Austria-
Hungary to Russia that it did not claim territorial gain
in Servia, the decision concerning the peace of the world
rested exclusively with St. Petersburgh.

1 Note, — This passage takes a somewhat different form in the German
text, a translation of which is as follows : —

"The same was declared by the Russian Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
M. Sasonof, to the Imperial Ambassador, Count Pourtales. (See exhibit
4.) On the afternoon of July 26th the Imperial and Royal {that is the
Austrian) Government declared again through its Ambassador at St.
Petersburgh that Austria-Hungary had no desire for conquest and only
wished peace on her frontiers. (See exhibit 5.) In the course of the
same day, however, the first news of Russian mobilisation reached Berlin.
(See exhibits 6, 7, 8, and 9.) On the evening of the 26th, the German
Ambassadors at London, Paris, and St. Petersburgh were instructed
energetically to point out the danger of this Russian mobilisation. (See
exhibits 10, 10a, and 106.) After the official explanation by Austria-
Hungary to Russia that she did not claim territorial gain in Servia, the
decision concerning the peace of the world rested exclusively with St.
Petersburgh. On the same day the Imperial Ambassador at St. Peters-
■ burgh was also directed to make the following declaration to the Russian
Government."

554

Official Diplomatic Documents

See exhibits
10. 10a, 10b.

The same day the first news of Russian mobiUsation g^^ exhibits
reached BerKn in the evening. 6, 7, 8, 9.

The German Ambassadors at London, Paris, and St.
Petersburgh were instructed to energetically point out the
danger of this Russian mobilisation. The Imperial Am-
bassador at St. Petersburgh was also directed to make the
following declaration to the Russian Government : ^

" Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us
to counter-measures which must consist in mobilising the
army.

" But mobilisation means war.

" As we know the obligations of France towards Russia,
this mobilisation would be directed against both Russia
and France. We cannot assume that Russia desires to
unchain such a European war. Since Austria-Hungary
will not touch the existence of the Servian kingdom, we
are of the opinion that Russia can afford to assume an
attitude of waiting. We can all the more support the
desire of Russia to protect the integrity of Servia as
Austria-Hungary does not intend to question the latter.
It will be easy in the further development of the affair
to find a basis for an understanding."

On July 27th the Russian Secretary of War, M. Suchom-
linof, gave the German military attache his word of
honour that no order to mobilise had been issued, merely
preparations were being made, but not a horse mustered,
nor reserves called in. If Austria-Hungary crossed the
Servian frontier, the militar^^ districts directed towards
Austria, i.e., Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, would be mobi-
lised, under no circumstances those situated on the German
frontier, i.e., St. Petersburg, Vilna, and Warsaw. Upon gge exhibit
inquiry into the object of the mobilisation against Austria- n.
Hungary, the Russian Minister of War replied by shrugging
his shoulders and referring to the diplomats. The military
attache then pointed to these mobilisation measures against
Austria-Hungary as extremely menacing also for Germany.
In the succeeding days news concerning Russian mobili-
sation came at a rapid rate. Among it was also news
about preparations on the German-Russian frontier, as
for instance the announcement of the state of war in
Kovno, the departure of the Warsaw garrison, and the
strengthening of the Alexandrovo garrison.

On July 27th, the first information was received con-
cerning preparatory measures taken by France : the 14th
Corps discontinued the manoeuvres and returned to its
garrison.

In the meantime we had endeavoured to localise the
conflict by most emphatic steps.

1 See note on preceding page.

German White Book

555

See exhibit
12.

See exhibits

13,

14.

See exhibit
15.

See exhibit
16.

See exhibit
17.

On July 26th, Sir Edward Grey had made the proposal
to submit the differences between Austria-Hungary and
Servia to a ^conference of the Ambassadors of Germany,
France, and Italy under his chairmanship. We declared
in regard to this proposal that we could not, however
much we approved the idea, participate in such a con-
ference, as we could not call Austria in her dispute with
Servia before a European tribunal.

France consented to the proposal of Sir Edward Grey,
but it foundered upon Austria's declining it, as was to be
expected.

Faithful to our principle that mediation should not extend
to the Austro-Servian conflict, which is to he considered as a
purely Austro-Hungarian affair, but merely to the relations
between Austria-Hungary and Russia, we continued our
endeavours to bring about an understanding between these
two powers.

We further declared ourselves ready, after failure of the
conference idea, to transmit a second proposal of Sir Edward
Grey's to Vienna in which he suggested Austria-Hungary
should decide that either the Servian reply was sufficient, or
that it be used as a basis for further negotiations. The
Austro-Hungarian Government remarked with full apprecia-
tion of our action that it had come too late, the hostilities
having already been opened.

In spite of this we continued our attempts to the utmost,
and we advised Vienna to show every possible advance com-
patible with the dignity of the monarchy.

Unfortunately, all these proposals were overtaken by
the military preparations of Russia and France.

On July 29th, the Russian Government made the official
notification in Berlin that four army districts had been
mobilised. At the same time further news was received
concerning rapidly progressing military preparations of
France, both on water and on land.

On the same day the Imperial Ambassador in St.
Petersburgh had an interview with the Russian Foreign
Secretary, in regard to which he reported by telegraph, as
follows :

" The Secretary tried to persuade me that I should urge
my Government to participate in a quadruple conference ^
to find means to induce Austria-Hungary to give up those
demands which touch upon the sovereignty of Servia. I
could merely promise to report the conversation and took
the position that, after Russia had decided upon the
baneful step of mobilisation, every exchange of ideas ap-

1 Note. — The German word translated " conference" is Konversation :
the German text also contains the words auf freundscha/tlichem Wege ("in
a friendly manner").

556 Official Diplomatic Documents

peared now extremely difficult, if not impossible. Besides,
Russia now was demanding from us in regard to Austria-
Hungary the same which Austria-Hungary was being
blamed for with regard to Servia, i.e., an infraction of
sovereignty. Austria-Hungary having promised to con-
sider the Russian interests by disclaiming any territorial
aspiration — a great concession on the part of a state
engaged in war — should therefore be permitted to attend
to its affairs with Servia alone. There would be time at
the peace conference to return to the matter of forbearance
towards the sovereignty of Servia.

" I added very solemnly that at this moment the entire
Austro-Servian affair was eclipsed by the danger of a
general European conflagration, and I endeavoured to
present to the Secretary the magnitude of this danger.

"It was impossible to dissuade Sasonof from the idea
that Servia could not now be deserted by Russia."

On July 29th, the German Military Attache at St.
Petersburgh wired the following report on a conversation
with the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian army :

"The Chief of the General Staff has asked me to call on
him, and he has told me that he has just come from His
Majesty. He has been requested by the Secretary of
War to reiterate once more that everything had remained
as the Secretary had informed me two days ago. He
offered confirmation in writing and gave me his word of
honour in the most solemn manner that nowhere there
had been a mobilisation, viz., calling in of a single man
or horse up to the present time, i.e., 3 o'clock in the
afternoon. He could not assume a guarantee for the
future, but he could emphasise that in the fronts directed
towards our frontiers His Majesty desired no mobilisation.

"As, however, I had received here many pieces of news
concerning the calling in of the reserves in different parts
of the country, also in Warsaw and in Vilna, I told the
general that his statements placed me before a riddle.
On his officer's word of honour he replied that such news
was wrong, but that possibly here and there a false alarm
might have been given.

"I must consider this conversation as an attempt to
mislead us as to the extent of the measures hitherto taken
in view of the abundant and positive information about
the calling in of reserves."

In reply to various inquiries concerning reasons for its
threatening attitude, the Russian Government repeatedly
pointed out that Austria-Hungary had commenced no
conversation in St. Petersburgh. The Austro-Hungarian
Ambassador in St. Petersburgh was therefore instructed on
July 29th, at our suggestion, to enter into such conversa-

German White Book

557

See exhibit
19.

See exhibits
18, 20, 21,
22, 23, 23a.

tion with Sasonof. Count Szapary was empowered to
explain to the Russian minister the note to Servia, though
it had been overtaken by the state of war, and to accept
any suggestion on the part of Russia as well as to discuss
with Sasonof all questions touching directly upon the
Austro-Russian relations.

Shoulder to shoulder with England we laboured inces-
santly and supported every proposal in Vienna from which
we hoped to gain the possibility of a peaceable solution
of the conflict. We even as late as the 30th of July
forwarded the English proposal to Vienna, as basis
for negotiations, that Austria-Hungary should dictate
her conditions in Servia, i.e., after her march into
Servia. We thought that Russia would accept^ this
basis.

During the interval from July 29th to July 31st ^ there
appeared renewed and cumulative news concerning Russian
measures of mobilisation. Accumulation of troops on the
East Prussian frontier and the declaration of the state of
war over all important parts of the Russian west frontier
allowed no further doubt that the Russian mobilisation
was in full swing against us, while simultaneously all such
measures were denied to our representative in St. Peters-
burgh on word of honour.

Nay, even before the reply from Vienna regarding the
Anglo-German mediation, whose tendencies and basis
must have been known in St. Petersburgh, could possibly
have been received in Berlin, Russia ordered a general
mobilisation.

During the same days, there took place between His
Majesty the Kaiser and Czar Nicolas an exchange of
telegrams in which His Majesty called the attention
of the Czar to the menacing character of the Russian
mobilisation during the continuance of his own mediating
activities.

On July 31st, the Czar directed the following telegram
to His Majesty the Kaiser :

" I thank You cordially for Your mediation which per-
mits the hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It
is technically impossible to discontinue our military prepa-
rations which have been made necessary by the Austrian
mobilisation. It is far from us to want war. As long as
the negotiations between Austria and Servia continue, my
troops will undertake no provocative action. I give You
my solemn word thereon. I confide with all my faith in

1 Note. — The following words appear here in the German text :

wahrend diese unsere Bemuhungen um Vermittelung, von der englischen
Diplomatie unterstiXtzt, mit steigender Dringlichkeit fortgefuhrt wurden
("whilst these endeavours of ours for mediation were being continued
with increasing energy, supported by English diplomacy ").

558 Official Diplomatic Documents

the grace of God, and I hope for the success of Your medi-
ation in Vienna for the welfare of our countries and the
peace of Europe.

" Your cordially devoted

"Nicolas."

This telegram of the Czar crossed with the following,
sent by H. M. the Kaiser, also on July 31st, at 2 p.m. :

" Upon Your appeal to my friendship and Your request
for my aid I have engaged in mediation between Your
Government and the Government of Austria-Hungary.
While this action was taking place. Your troops were be-
ing mobilised against my ally Austria-Hungary, whereby,
as I have already communicated to You, my mediation
has become almost illusory. In spite of this, I have con-
tinued it, and now I receive reliable news that serious
preparations for war are going on on my eastern frontier.
The responsibility for the security of my country forces
me to measures of defence. I have gone to the extreme
limit of the possible in my efforts for the preservation of
the peace of the world. It is not I who bear the responsi-
bility for the misfortune which now threatens the entire
civilised world. It rests in your hand to avert it. No
one threatens the honour and peace of Russia which might
well have awaited the success of my mediation. The
friendship for You and Your country, bequeathed to me
by my grandfather on his deathbed, has always been sacred
to me, and I have stood faithfully by Russia while it was
in serious affliction, especially during its last war. The
peace of Europe can still be preserved by You if Russia
decides to discontinue those military preparations which
menace Germany and Austria-Hungary."

Before this telegram reached its destination, the mobili-
sation of all the Russian forces, obviously directed against
us and already ordered during the afternoon ^ of the 31st
of July, was in full swing. Notwithstanding, the telegram
of the Czar was sent at 2 o'clock that same afternoon.

After the Russian general mobilisation became known
in Berlin, the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburgh was
instructed on the afternoon of July 31st to explain to
the Russian Government that Germany declared the state See exhibit
of war as counter-measure against the general mobilisa-
tion of the Russian army and navy which must be fol-
lowed by mobilisation if Russia did not cease its military
measures against Germany and Austria-Hungary within
12 hours, and notified Germany thereof.

At the same time the Imperial Ambassador in Paris
was instructed to demand from the French Government a

» Note. — The German text says here Vormittag (morning).

German White Book 559

declaration within 18 hours, whether it would remain neu-
See exhibit tral in a Russo-German war.

The Russian Government destroyed through its mobili-
sation, menacing the security of our country, the labori-
ous action at mediation of the European cabinets.^ The
Russian mobilisation, in regard to the seriousness of which
the Russian Government was never allowed by us to en-
tertain a doubt, in connection with its continued denial,
shows clearly that Russia wanted war.

The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburgh delivered
his note to M. Sasonof on July 31st at 12 o'clock midnight.

The reply of the Russian Government has never reached
us.

Two hours after the expiration of the time limit the Czar
telegraphed to H.M. the Kaiser, as follows :

"I have received Your telegram. I comprehend that
. You are forced to mobilise, but I should like to have from
You the same guarantee which I have given You, viz.,
that these measures do not mean war, and that we shall
continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries
and the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts.
With the aid of God it must be possible to our long tried
friendship to prevent the shedding of blood. I expect
with full confidence Your urgent reply."

To this H.M. the Kaiser replied :

" I thank You for Your telegram. I have shown yester-
day to Your Government the way through which alone
war may yet be averted. Although I asked for a reply
by to-day noon, no telegram from my Ambassador has
reached me with the reply of Your Government. I there-
fore have been forced to mobilise my army. An immedi-
ate, clear and unmistakable reply of Your Government is
the sole way to avoid endless misery. Until I receive this
reply I am unable, to my great grief, to enter upon the
subject of Your telegram. I must ask most earnestly
that You, without delay, order Your troops to commit,
under no circumstances, the slightest violation of our
frontiers."

As the time limit given to Russia had expired without
the receipt of a reply to our inquiry, H.M. the Kaiser
ordered the mobilisation of the entire German Army and
Navy on August 1st at 5 p.m.

The German Ambassador at St. Petersburgh was in-
structed that, in the event of the Russian Government not
giving a satisfactory reply within the stipulated time, he
should declare that we considered ourselves in a state of
war after the refusal of our demands. However, before a

1 Note. — The German text adds here kurz vor dem Erfolge ("just aa
it was on the point of succeeding").

560 Official Diplomatic Documents

confirmation of the execution of this order had been re-
ceived, that is to say, already in the afternoon of August See exhibit
1st, i.e., the same afternoon on which the telegram of the
Czar, cited above, was sent, Russian troops crossed our
frontier and marched into German territory.

Thus Russia began the war against us.

Meanwhile the Imperial Ambassador in Paris put our
question to the French Cabinet on July 31st at 7 p.m.

The French Prime Minister gave an equivocal and
unsatisfactory reply on August 1st at 1 p.m., which gave See exhibit
no clear idea of the position of France, as he limited him- ^^*
self to the explanation that France would do that which
her interests demanded. A few hours later, at 5 p.m., the
mobilisation of the entire French Army and Navy was
ordered.

On the morning of the next day France opened hostili-
ties.

British Blue Book 561

IV. The British Blue Book
INTRODUCTORY NARRATIVE OF EVENTS

(1)

On the 23rd June, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, nephew
of the Emperor of Austria, Heir to the Throne, and Commander-in-
Chief of the Army, left Vienna to attend army manoeuvres in the
Province of Bosnia. On Sunday, the 28th, he visited Serajevo, the
capital of the province, and made a progress through the town accom-
panied by his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg. While passing through
the streets their automobile was fired on by an assassin. Both the
Archduke and Duchess were killed.

No crime has ever aroused deeper or more general horror throughout
Europe; none has ever been less justified. Sympathy for Austria
was universal. Both the Governments and the public opinion of
Europe were ready to support her in any measures, however severe,
which she might think it necessary to take for the punishment of the
murderer and his accomplices.

It immediately appeared, from the reports of our representatives
abroad, that the press and public opinion of Austria-Hungary attrib-
uted much of the responsibility for the crime to the Servian Govern-
ment, which was said to have encouraged a revolutionary movement
amongst the Serb populations of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

That there had for many years been a strong Serb nationalist
movement in these two provinces there is no doubt. This movement
in an earlier form had swept the provinces, then part of the Turkish
Empire, into the insurrection against the Turkish Government in the
seventies of last century, culminating in the war of 1877-8 between
Russia and Turkey. It had continued when Austria took over the
administration of the provinces under the Treaty of Berlin in 1878.
Austria then pledged her word to Turkey that her occupation should
not " detract from the rights of sovereignty of His Majesty the Sultan
over these provinces.'' Thirty years later, however, in 1908, she
suddenly proclaimed their annexation to her Empire. On the 7th
October of that year, the annexation was celebrated in Serajevo by
the firing of salutes and ringing of cathedral bells, amid scenes of
official rejoicing and popular apathy. Servian nationalist feeling
immediately asserted itself, and the Servian Government protested to
the Powers against the annexation as a "deep injury done to the
feelings, interests, and rights of the Servian people." Servia's atti-
tude, coupled with the resentment felt by Russia and certain other
Great Powers, nearly brought about a European war ; but after six
months of extreme tension she was induced to make a declaration
abandoning her protest and promising to live on good terms with
Austria. Her nationalist aspirations still continued, however, and
were strengthened by her successes in the Balkan wars of 1912-13
2o

562 Official Diplomatic Documents

— successes which were compromised by Austria's opposition to her
territorial expansion. As Servia grew, Austrian suspicion of her
designs deepened.

(2)

In the light of this history the storm of anti-Servian feeling which
swept Austria-Hungary after the Serajevo murders is easily under-
stood. It was a feeling based on patriotism and loyalty. Europe
was disposed to excuse its exaggerations and to sympathise with its
motives.

But the dangers to European peace which it involved were imme-
diately evident from the reports which reached the Government in
London. Anti-Serb riots took place at Serajevo and Agram. The
members of the Serb party in the Provincial Council of Croatia were
assailed by their colleagues with cries of "Servian assassins." Mobs
in Vienna threatened the Servian Legation. The Austrian press,
almost without exception, used the most unbridled language, and
called for the condign punishment of Servia. There were signs
that the popular resentment was shared, and perhaps encouraged, by
the Austrian Government. Both the British and also the German
Government knew that the peace might be disturbed.

In view of these reports, it naturally became incumbent on dis-
interested Powers to exercise what influence they possessed in a direc-
tion which would reconcile justice with peace. Unfortunately,
though the attitude of public opinion in Austria, and, to a less degree,
also in Germany, was plain, the intentions of the Austrian Govern-
ment remained almost equally obscure. The Austrian Foreign Office
maintained an attitude of reticence towards the British and Russian
Ambassadors. On the 7th July the Government were careful to
make a public announcement that a joint meeting of the Cabinets of
Austria and Hungary, which had just taken place, was only concerned
with the question of domestic measures to repress the Pan-Serb
propaganda in Bosnia. On the 8th July the Minister-President of
Hungary made, on the whole, a pacific speech in the Hungarian Parlia-
ment, defending the loyalty of the majority of the Serb subjects of the
Empire. On the 11th July the Servian Minister at Vienna had no
reason to anticipate a threatening communication from the Austrian
Government, and as late as the 22nd July, the day before the Aus-
trian ultimatum was delivered at Belgrade, the Minister-President
of Hungary stated in Parliament that the situation did not war-
rant the opinion that a serious turn of events was necessary or even
probable.

His Majesty^s Government had therefore largely to fall back on
conjecture. It was known that the situation might become serious,
but it was also known that Servia had made professions of readiness
to accept any demands compatible with the sovereignty of an inde-
pendent State. It was known that the opinibn of the Russian and
French — and also of the German — Governments was that the

> British Blue Book 563

Servian Government was not itself to blame for the crime, but that
Servia must be ready to investigate and put an end to the propaganda
which had apparently led to it, and which was said to have originated
in part on Servian soil. Sir E. Grey advised Servia to show herself
moderate and conciliatory. He promised the German Ambassador
to use his influence with the Russian Governmeat in the same direc-
tion. More could not be done, for no actual evidence had yet been
furnished that Servian territory had in fact been made the base for
revolutionary operations. It was only known that a court-martial
had been set up at Serajevo, the proceedings before which were secret.
The Servian Government stated that they were only waiting for the
Austrian Government to communicate the evidence thus collected
before setting their own investigations on foot. The Servian Govern-
ment also stated that both the assassins implicated were Austrian
subjects, and that on a previous occasion the Austrian Government
had informed the Servian Government, in reply to enquiries, that one
of these men was harmless and was under their protection. It was
remembered that Austria had tried on previous occasions to fasten
guilt on the Servian Government by means of police evidence brought
forward in Austrian courts, and had failed. It was therefore assumed
on all sides that, before Austria took any action, she would disclose
to the public her case against Servia. When Sir E. Grey said this
to the German Ambassador on the 20th July, the latter replied that he
certainly assumed that Austria would act upon some case that would
be known; but, as a matter of fact, His Majesty's Government
did not receive any statement of the evidence on which Austria had
founded her ultimatum till the 7th August.

It was, therefore, necessary to wait. The situation was as clear as
it could be made till Austria would consent to throw off her reticence.
There was nothing doubtful in the general international situation, no
incalculable element which Austria could not take into full considera-
tion. Whatever she did, she would know accurately the consequences
of her action. The Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente remained
as they had always been. We had been quite recently assured that
no new secret element had been introduced into the former, and Sir E.
Grey had stated emphatically in Parliament on the 11th June that
the latter had remained unchanged so far as we were concerned.
Russia's interest in the Balkans was well known. As late as the 23rd
May the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had reaffirmed in the
Duma the policy of the "Balkans for the Balkans," and it was known
that any attack on a Balkan State by any great European Power
would be regarded as a menace to that policy. If Servia was, as the
Austrian Ambassador said to Sir E. Grey on the 29th July, " regarded
as being in the Austrian sphere of influence"; if Servia was to be
humiliated ; then assuredly Russia could not remain indifferent. It
was not a question of the policy of Russian statesmen at St. Peters-
burgh, but of the deep hereditary feeling for the Balkan populations
bred in the Russian people by more than two centuries of development.
These things had been, as Sir E. Grey said to Parliament in March,

564 Official Diplomatic Documents

1913, in discussing the Balkan war, "a commonplace in European
diplomacy in the past." They were the facts of the European situa-
tion, the products of years of development, tested and retested during
the last decade. Patient work might change them, but the product
of years could not be pushed aside in a day.

(3)

Yet two days were as much as Austria decided to allow for the task.
On the 23rd July she showed her hand. She delivered an ultimatum
at Belgrade and required an answer in forty-eight hours. She made
ten demands, directed towards the elimination from Servian national
life of everything which was hostile to Austria. These demands
involved the suppression of newspapers and literature, the suppression
of nationalist societies, a reorganisation of the Government schools,
the dismissal of officers from the army, the participation of Austrian
officials in judicial proceedings in Servia, the arrest of two specified
men, the prevention of all traffic in arms across the frontier, a full
explanation of anti-Austrian utterances, and immediate notification
of the enforcement of these measures. In addition, the Servian
Government was to publish on the front page of the Official Journal
a prescribed statement, which amounted to a full recantation of her
alleged errors, and a promise of amendment. A very brief summary
was annexed to the ultimatum, giving the bare findings of the secret
trial at Serajevo, with no corroborative evidence. No independent
nation had ever been called on to accept a greater humiliation.

Between the delivery of this ultimatum and the declaration of war
between Great Britain and Germany there was an interval of only
twelve days. In the whirl of negotiations which now followed, there
was no time to draw breath and ponder. At the outset, therefore, it
may be well to explain definitely the British attitude towards the
Austrian ultimatum.

Austria was under provocation. She had to complain of a danger-
ous popular movement against her government. What evidence she
might have against the Servian Government no one in Europe then
knew. Great Britain had no interest in the Balkans, except one.
She desired the consolidation and progressive government of the
Balkan States ; she desired, in the words recently used by the Russian
Minister for Foreign Affairs before the Duma, that "the Balkan
Governments should recognise that, in the matter of strengthening a
State, the acquisition of territory is insufficient; the devotion and
confidence of the new citizens must be enlisted." The dispute between
Austria and Servia did not necessarily affect that interest ; it was a
dispute between two Governments with which Great Britain had
nothing to do. Sir E. Grey, therefore, consistently stated that he had
no concern in that dispute ; that he had no title to intervene between
Austria and Servia ; that he would express no opinion on the merits of
the ultimatum. But there was the other side. If the dispute af-
fected the interests of Russia, then the peace of Europe was at stake ;

British Blue Book 565

and, from the first, Sir E. Grey told the Austrian Government that
he did not see how Russia, interested as she was in Servia, could take
any but a most serious view of such a formidable document as the
ultimatum. The peace of Europe must be maintained, and it could
only be maintained, as Mr. Asquith had said to Parliament in March,
1913, in discussing the Balkan crisis, by a "spirit of forbearance,
patience, and self-sacrifice" — by a "loyal spirit of give and take
on the part of the Great Powers directly concerned.'' It was as the
agent of this spirit of conciliation alone that Great Britain intervened
in the European crisis.

(4)

On the 23rd July the Austrian Ambassador told Sir E. Grey that an
ultimatum was being handed to Servia. For the first time Sir E.
Grey heard that "there would be something in the nature of a time
limit." He immediately expressed his grave alarm. Next morning
the text of the ultimatum was handed to him, and he learnt that the
time limit was forty-eight hours. He confessed to the German Am-
bassador that, as no time had been left for deliberation, he felt helpless.
There was no time to advise Russia or to influence Servia.

At this critical moment everything depended on Germany. As the
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs said a little later, " the key of the
situation was to be found in Berlin." What was Germany's attitude ?
Privately, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his
doubts as to the ultimatum ; officially, the German Government called
it " equitable and moderate," and said that they " desired urgently the
localisation of the conflict." Everyone desired that ; but it was no
time for phrases. The same morning the Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs had summoned the French and British Ambassadors in St.
Petersburgh, had said that Austria's step meant imminent war, and
had asked for the support of Great Britain and France. The French
Ambassador had pledged the support of France, as was well known
to be inevitable under the terms of her alliance. The next morning
the Russian Government stated publicly that Russia could not remain
indifferent to the Austro-Servian conflict. The next evening troops in
Vienna had to be called out to guard the Russian Embassy from hos-
tile crowds. "Localisation" was a good phrase, but we had to deal
with facts. Austria had surprised Europe, and with surprise had
come universal alarm.

During these forty-eight hours Great Britain made three attempts
at peace. Before all things, the time-limit of the ultimatum had to be
extended. Great Britain and Russia urged this at Vienna. Great
Britain urged Germany to join in pressing the Austrian Government.
All that Berlin consented to do was to "pass on" the message to
Vienna.

Secondly, Sir E. Grey urged that Great Britain, France, Germany,
and Italy should work together at Vienna and St. Petersburgh in
favour of conciliation. Italy assented; France assented; Russia

566 Official Diplomatic Documents

declared herself ready; Germany said she had no objection, "if
relations between Austria and Russia became threatening."

Thirdly, the Russian, French, and British representatives at Bel-
grade were instructed to advise Servia to go as far as possible to meet
Austria.

But it was too late. The time-limit, which Austria would not ex-
tend, had expired ; and after all Servia did not need advice. On the
afternoon of Saturday, the 25th, she returned to Austria a reply which
amounted to an acceptance of all Austria's demands, subject on
certain points to the delays necessary for passing new laws and
amending her Constitution, and subject to an explanation by Austria-
Hungary of her precise wishes with regard to the participation of
Austro-Hungarian officials in Servian judicial proceedings. The reply
went far beyond anything which any Power — Germany not excepted
— had ever thought probable. But the same day the British Am-
bassador at Vienna reported that the tone of the Austrian press left
the impression that a settlement was not desired, and he later reported
that the impression left on his mijid was that the Austrian note was so
drawn up as to make war inevitable. In spite of the conciliatory
nature of Servia's reply, the Austrian Minister left Belgrade the same
evening, and Servia ordered a general mobilisation.

But an outline of the Servian reply had been communicated to
Sir E. Grey an hour or two before it was delivered. He immediately
expressed to Germany the hope that she would urge Austria to accept
it. Berlin again contented itself with "passing on" the expression of
Sir E. Grey's hope to Vienna through the German Ambassador there.
The fate of the message so passed on may be guessed from the fact
that the German Ambassador told the British Ambassador directly
afterwards that Servia had only made a pretence of giving way, and
that her concessions were all a sham.

(5)

During the next four days, 26th to 29th July, there was only one
question before Europe — how could Russia and Austria be brought
to an agreement? It was evident that Russia did not believe that
Austria would, or could, stop short of the absolute ruin of the Servian
State, if she once actually attacked it. Here again, the question was
not merely one of Government policy ; the popular sentiment of two
nations was involved. Austria indeed professed, no doubt with per-
fect honesty, that she would take no territory from Servia. But the
Austrian Ministers were being borne along on a wave of violent popu-
lar enthusiasm. They said themselves that they would be swept
from power if they did not follow the popular desire for a conflict with
Servia. Would this popular enthusiasm be content with any mere
punitive expedition against the enemy? Surely not. Russia, there-
fore, openly said that she would have to intervene if Servia were
attacked ; but she promised Austria on the 27th that she would use
all her influence at Belgrade to induce the Servian Government to

British Blue Book 567

give satisfaction to Austria, and only asked Austria to delay hostili-
ties in order to give time for deliberation. Austria refused, saying it
was too late. She declared war on Servia on the 28th. Russia
ordered a partial mobilisation on the 29th.

But meanwhile Sir Edward Grey had proposed that the German,
Italian, and French Ambassadors should meet him in London, to dis-
cuss the best means towards a settlement. Italy and France at once
accepted ; Russia said she was ready to stand aside ; but Germany
refused. She did not like what she called "a court of arbitration,"
and proposed instead direct negotiations between Russia and Austria.
These negotiations actually began, as we have seen in the last para-
graph, but they were cut short by the Austrian declaration of war
against Servia. Austria then apparently considered that the moment
for such negotiations was passed. She had, moreover, refused to dis-
cuss the Servian reply in any way, and it was difficult to see, after that
refusal, what Russia could negotiate with her about. Russia, there-
fore, fell back on Sir E. Grey's proposal for a conference of Ambassa-
dors in London, which she had originally expressed her readiness to
accept. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs urged Sir E. Grey
to induce Germany to indicate in what way she w^ould consent to
work for a settlement.

This brings the narrative of events down to Wednesday, the 29th
July. Russia was mobilising partially in her southern provinces.
Austrian troops were bombarding Belgrade. But, on the other hand,
better news was coming from Berlin. Up to the 28th at least, both
Germany and Austria had seemed unwilling to admit that the situ-
ation was really serious ; Russia, it was said, was unprepared, and
France was in no condition to go to war. Germany had said, in reply
to Sir E. Grey's repeated advances, that she did not like to make
representations to Vienna for fear of stiffening Austria's attitude.
But on the evening of the 28th the German Chancellor assured the
British Ambassador that he was trying to mediate at Vienna and St.
Petersburgh. On the strength of this assurance and similar assur-
ances made by the German Ambassador in London on the 29th, Sir
E. Grey telegraphed to Berlin once more, in accordance with the
request of the Russian Government, urging the German Government,
if they did not like the idea of the Ambassadors' conference m the
form he had suggested it, to suggest any other form they pleased.
"Mediation," he said, "was ready to come into operation by any
method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would
press the button on the interests of peace." The telegram was
despatched at about 4 o'clock on the evening of the 29th.

(6)

This appeal was followed almost immediately by a strange re-
sponse. About midnight, a telegram arrived at the Foreign Office
from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin. The German Chancellor
had sent for him late at night. He had asked if Great Britain would

568 Official Diplomatic Documents

promise to remain neutral in a war, provided Germany did not touch
Holland and took nothing from France but her colonies. He refused
to give any undertaking that Germany would not invade Belgium,
but he promised that, if Belgium remained passive, no territory would
be taken from her.

Sir E. Grey's answer was a peremptory refusal, but he added an
exhortation and an offer. The business of Europe was to work for
peace. That was the only question with which Great Britain was
concerned. If Germany would prove by her actions now that she
desired peace. Great Britain would warmly welcome a future agree-
ment with her whereby the whole weight of the two nations would be
thrown permanently into the scale of peace in years to come.

For the next two days peace proposals and negotiations continued,
some initiated and all supported by Great Britain. There remained
a spark of hope. But from the British point of view the face of
Europe henceforward was changed. On the 29th July the only
conflict in progress had been on the frontiers of Servia and Austria ;
the only fear of further war had lain in the relations of Russia and
Austria. Germany's declarations were pacific ; Russia had said she
desired nothing but a period of peace to allow for her internal develop-
ment ; France would not fight except to help her ally. There had
seemed no insuperable difficulty in keeping the peace ; it was only a
question of allaying the mutual suspicion between Vienna and St.
Petersburgh. But now a new element of danger had been introduced.
Great Britain now knew that Germany was contemplating an attack
on France. She knew more. The independence of the Low Countries
had for centuries been considered as one of the strongest means of
securing the peace of Europe. Their position and the nature of the
country rendered them the natural battlefield of Northern Europe.
If it was made impossible for a Great Power to invade them, war
would become increasingly difficult and dangerous. With the growth
of the idea of a fixed system of international law founded on treaties,
the neutrality of Belgium had been devised as a permanent safeguard
to this end. As such, it had been consecrated by two international
treaties signed by all the Powers, and recognised by two generations
of statesmen. Now, when the peace of Europe was our one object,
it was found that Germany was preparing to tear out the main rivet
of that peace.

Germany's position must be understood. She had fulfilled her
treaty obligations in the past ; her action now was not wanton. Bel-
gium was of supreme military importance in a war with France; if
such a war occurred, it would be one of life and death; Germany
feared that, if she did not occupy Belgium, France might do so. In
face of this suspicion, there was only one thing to do. The neutrality
of Belgium had not been devised as a pretext for wars, but to prevent
the outbreak of wars. The Powers must reaffirm Belgian neutrality
in order to prevent the war now threatened. The British Govern-
ment, therefore, on Friday, the 31st July, asked the German and
French Governments for an engagement to respect Belgium's neutral-

British Blue Book 569

ity, and the Belgian Government for an engagement to uphold it.
France gave the necessary engagement the same day ; Belgium gave
it the day after ; Germany returned no reply. Henceforward there
could be no doubt of German designs.

Meanwhile, on the 30th and 31st negotiations continued between
Russia and Austria. On the 29th Germany had suggested to Austria
that she should stop as soon as her troops had occupied Belgrade.
Late on the same night Russia offered to stop all military preparations,
if Austria would recognise that the conflict with Servia had become a
question of general European interest, and would eliminate from her
ultimatum the points which involved a violation of the sovereignty of
Servia. As the result of this offer, Russia was able to inform His
Majesty's Government on the 31st that Austria had at last agreed to
do the very thing she had refused to do in the first days of the crisis
namely, to discuss the whole question of her ultimatum to Servia.
Russia asked the British Government to assume the direction of these
discussions. For a few hours there seemed t^ be a hope of peace.

(7)

At this moment, on Friday, the 31st, Germany suddenly despatched
an ultimatum to Russia, demanding that she should countermand her
mobilisation within twelve hours. Every allowance must be made
for the natural nervousness which, as history has repeatedly shown,
overtakes nations when mobilisation is under way. All that can be
said is that, according to the information in the possession of His
Majesty's Government, mobilisation had not at the time proceeded
as far in Russia as in Germany, although general mobilisation was not
publicly proclaimed in Germany till the next day, the 1st August.
France also began to mobilise on that day. The German Secretary of
State refused to discuss a last proposal from Sir E. Grey for joint
action with Germany, France, and Italy until Russia's reply should be
received, and in the afternoon the German Ambassador at St. Peters-
burgh presented a declaration of war. Yet on this same day, Satur-
day, the 1st, Russia assured Great Britain that she would on no
account commence hostilities if the Germans did not cross the frontier,
and France declared that her troops would be kept 6 miles from her
frontier so as to prevent a collision. This was the situation when very
early on Sunday morning,. the 2nd August, German troops invaded
Luxemburg, a small independent State whose neutrality had been
guaranteed by all the Powers with the same object as the similar
guarantee of Belgium. The die was cast. War between Germany,
Russia, and France had become inevitable.

Only one question now remained for this country. His Majesty's
Government failed in their attempts to secure a general peace. Should
they now remain neutral ? The grounds on which that question was
decided are clearly set forth in the statements of Sir E. Grey and Mr.
Asquith in Parliament, which are contained in this volume,^ and no

1 See Part II.

570 Official Diplomatic Documents

additional explanations are needed here. But one fact may be em-
phasised. From the 24th July, when Russia first asked for British
support, to the 2nd August, when a conditional promise of naval
assistance was given to France, Sir E. Grey had consistently declined
to give any promise of support to either of our present allies. He
maintained that the position of Great Britain was that of a disinter-
ested party whose influence for peace at Berlin and Vienna would be
enhanced by the knowledge that we were not committed absolutely
to either side in the existing dispute. He refused to believe that the
best road to European peace lay through a show of force. We took
no mobilisation measures except to keep our fleet assembled, and we
confined ourselves to indicating clearly^ to Austria on the 27th July,
and to Germany on the 29th July, that we could not engage to remain
neutral if a European conflagration took place. We gave no pledge
to our present allies, but to Germany we gave three times — on the
30th July, the 31st July, and the 1st August — a clear warning of the
effect which would be produced on our attitude and on the sentiment
of the British people by* a violation of the neutrality of Belgium.

After Germany's declaration of war on Russia on the afternoon
of the 1st, the Tsar telegraphed to His Majesty the King as follows :
" In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more that I have done
all in my power to avert war." It is right to say that His Majesty's
Government believe this to be a true statement of the attitude both of
Russia and France throughout this crisis. On the other hand, with
every wish to be fair and just, it will be admitted that the response of
Germany and Austria gave no evidence of a sincere desire to save the
peace of Europe.

Foreign Office, Sept 28, 1914.

PART THREE

DOCUMENTS FREQUENTLY QUOTED BUT NOT CON-
TAINED IN THE OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF COL-
LECTED DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS

I. THE CHANCELLOR'S SPEECH IN THE REICHSTAG

August 4, 1914

[Translated from the Berliner Tageblatt of August 5, 1914]

A TERRIBLE fate is breaking over Europe. For forty-four years
after winning in war the respect of the world for our German Em-
pire, we have lived in peace, and have guarded the peace of Europe.
In peaceful labour we have grown strong and mighty ; and people
have envied us. In nervy patience we have suffered hostilities to
be fanned in the east and the west, and fetters to be forged against
us. The wind was sown there and now we have the whirlwind.
We wanted to go on living and working in peace, and like a silent
vow, from the Emperor down to the youngest recruit, this was the
will: "Our sword shall not be drawn except in a just cause." Now
the day has come when we must draw it. Russia has put the torch
to our house. We have been forced into a war with Russia and
France.

Gentlemen, a number of papers penned in the stress of hurrying
events have been distributed to . you. Let me single out the facts
which characterise our action.

From the first moment of the Austrian conflict we strove and la-
boured that this conflict might be confined to Austria-Hungary and
Servia. All the cabinets, notably the English cabinet, took the
same ground, only Russia insisted that she should have to say a word.
This was the beginning of the danger threatening Europe. As soon
as the first definite news of military preparations in Russia reached
us we declared in St. Petersburgh, kindly but firmly, that military prep-
arations against us would force us to take similar steps, and that
mobilisation and war are not far apart. Russia assured us in the
most friendly way that she was taking no measures against us. Eng-
land in the meanwhile was trying to mediate between Austria and
Servia, and was receiving our hearty support. On July 28, the
Emperor telegraphed to the Czar asking him to consider that Austria
had the right and the duty to protect herself against the Greater-
Servian plots which threatened to undermine her existence. The
Emperor called the Czar's attention to their common monarchical
interest against the crime of Serajevo, and asked the Czar to help
him personally to smooth away the difficulties between Vienna and
St. Petersburg. At about the same time, and before he had received
this telegram, the Czar asked the Emperor to help him and to counsel
moderation in Vienna. The Emperor accepted the part of mediator,
but he had hardly begun to act, when Russia mobilised all her troops

573

574 Official Diplomatic Documents

against Austria-Hungary. Austria-Hungary on the other hand had
mobihsed only her army corps on the Servian frontier, and two other
corps in the north, but far removed from Russia. The Emperor
at once pointed out to the Czar that the Russian mobilisation made
his mediation, undertaken at the Czar's request, very difficult if
not impossible. We nevertheless continued our mediation, — even
to the extreme limit permitted by our alliance. During this time,
Russia of her own accord repeated her assurance that she was mak-
ing no military preparations against us.

Then came July 31. In Vienna a decision was due. We had
already succeeded so far that Vienna had renewed her personal
exchange of opinion with St. Petersburgh, which had stopped for
some time. But even before a decision was taken in Vienna, we
received the news that Russia was mobilising her entire army —
that is, she was mobilising also against us. The Russian Govern-
ment, which from our repeated representations knew what a mobili-
sation on our frontier meant, did not notify us, and gave us no ex-
planatory reply. Nor until the afternoon of July 31st a telegram
was received from the Czar in which he said that his army was tak-
ing no provocative attitude toward us. The Russian mobilisation,
however, on our frontier had been vigorously begun as early as dur-
ing the night of July 30th. Thus while we were still trying to medi-
ate in Vienna, at Russia's request, the whole Russian military force
rose on our long, almost open frontier. And France, while she was
not yet mobilising, confessed that she was making military prepara-
tions. And we? We had intentionally refrained, up to that mo-
ment, from calling a single reservist to the colors — for the sake of
the peace of Europe. Should we now be waiting longer, and until
the Powers between whom we are wedged in would choose their own
moment of attack ?

To expose Germany to this danger would have been a crime !
For this reason we demanded at once, on July 31st, that Russia
demobilise, which action alone could still have preserved the peace
of Europe. The Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburgh was simul-
taneously instructed to declare that we should have to consider
ourselves at war with Russia if she declined. The Imperial Ambas-
sador has followed his instructions.

Even to-day we do not yet know Russia's reply to our demand
that she demobilise. No telegraphic news has reached us, although
the telegraph went on for a while communicating many less impor-
tant matters. So it came that when the time limit was long past the
Emperor was obliged to mobilise our military forces, at five o'clock
in the afternoon of August 1st.

At the same time, we had to ask for assurances as to the attitude
of France. She replied to our definite enquiry whether she would
be neutral in a Russian-German war by saying that she would do
what her interests demanded. This was an evasion of our question,
if not a negative reply. The Emperor nevertheless ordered that
the French frontier be respected in its entirety. This order has been

The Chancellor's Speech in the Reichstag 575

rigorously obeyed with one single exception. France, who mobi-
lized at the same hour that we did declared that she would respect
a zone of ten kilometers on our frontier. And what did really happen ?
Bomb throwing, flyers, cavalry scouts, and companies invading
Alsace-Lorraine. Thus France attacked us before war had been
declared.

As regards the one exception mentioned, I have received this
report from the General Staff: "As regards France's complaints
concerning our transgressing her frontier, only one case is to be ac-
knowledged. Contrary to definite orders, a patrol of the 14th Army
Corp^, led it would seem by an officer, crossed the frontier on August
2d. It appears that all were shot except one man, ^ho returned.
But long before this one act of crossing the frontier took place,
French flyers dropped bombs as far from France as South Germany,
and near the Schlucht pass, French troops made an attack on our
frontier guards. Thus far our troops have confined themselves to the
protection of our frontier." This is the report of the General Staff.

We have' been forced into a state of self-defence, and the necessity
of self-defence knows no other law. Our troops have occupied
Luxemburg, and have perhaps already been obliged to enter Belgian
territory. That is against the rules of international law. It is
true that the French government announced in Brussels that it
would respect Belgian neutrality as long as its opponents would
do so. But we knew that France was ready for an invasion of
Belgium.

France could afford to wait. We could not wait. An attack
on our flank might have been fatal. We were therefore obliged to
disregard the protest of the Luxemburg and Belgian governments.
For the wrong we have done thereby we shall try to atone, as soon
as our military end is obtained. People, who like ourselves, are
fighting for their lives and homes must think of naught but how they
may survive.^

Gentlemen, we are standing shoulder to shoulder with Austria-
Hungary. As regards the attitude of England, Sir Edward Grey's
remarks in the lower house of Parliament yesterday have shown what
her stand will be. We have assured the English government that
we shall not attack the north coast of France as long as England
remains neutral, and that we shall not infringe the territorial integrity
and independence of Belgium. This assurance I here repeat before
the whole world ; and I may add, that as long as England remains
neutral, we shall not even take any hostile measures against the
French merchant marine, provided France will treat our merchant-
men in the same way.

Gentlemen, this was the course of events. Germany enters this
war with a clear conscience. We are fighting to protect the fruits

1 The German word durchhauen has been translated in the English press "hack
their way through." While the German word hauen and the English word "hack"
are akin, their meanings, and even more their connotated meanings are very different.
"Hack their way through" suggests brutal methods, which the word durchhauen
does not.

576 Offixiial Diplomatic Documents

of our peaceful labor and our heritage of the great past: We are
fighting for our future. The fifty years are not yet past during which
Moltke used to say we should have to remain armed if we were to
protect our heritage and our achievements of 1870.

Now the supreme hour has come which will test our people. But
it finds us ready and full of confidence. Our army is in the field,
our fleet is well prepared, and back of them stands the whole Ger-
man people. — The Whole German People !

[For Sir E. Grey's two speeches, August 3, 1914, and Mr. Asquith's three
speeches, August 4, 5, 6, 1914, see the facsimile reproduction of the British Blue
Book, pp. 89 to 98.

For President Poincare's message August 5, and M. Viviani's speech on the
same day, see French Yellow Book Nos. 158, 159, August 5, 1914.1

The ''Brussels''' Documents 577

II. THE "BRUSSELS" DOCUMENTS

Found by the German Government in Brussels and published in facsimile
in a special Supplement to the " Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung"
of November 25, 1914.

(1)
(Translation)

Letter [from the Chief of the Belgian General Staff] to the [Belgian]

Minister of War respecting the Confidential Interviews.
(Confidential.)

Sir, Brussels, April 10, 1906.

I HAVE the honour to furnish herewith a summary of the conversa-
tions which I have had with Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, which
I have already reported to you verbally.

His first visit was in the middle of January. Lieutenant-Colonel
Barnardiston told me of the pre-occupation of the British General
Staff concerning the general political situation and the existing possi-
bilities of war. Should Belgium be attacked, it was proposed to send
about 100,000 men.

The lieutenant-colonel having asked me how we should interpret
such a step, I answered that, from the military point of view, it could
only be advantageous; but that this question of intervention had
also a political side, and that I must accordingly consult the Minister
of War.

Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston replied that his Minister at
Brussels would speak about it to our Minister for Foreign Affairs.

He continued as follows : The disembarkation of the British troops
would take place on the French coast, in the neighbourhood of
Dunkirk and Calais, in such a manner that the operation might be
carried out in the quickest possible way.^ Landing at Antwerp would
take much longer, as larger transports would be required, and, more-
over, the risk would be greater.

This being so, several other points remained to be decided, viz.,
transport by rail, the question of requisitions to which the British
Army might have recourse, the question of the chief command of the
allied forces.

He enquired whether our arrangements were adequate to secure
the defence of the country during the crossing and transport of the
British troops — a period which he estimated at about ten days.^

I answered that the fortresses of Namur and Liege were safe against
a surprise attack, and that in four days our field army of 100,000 men

1 The following marginal note occurs in the facsimile : —

(Translation)
"The entry of the Enghsh into Belgium would only take place after the violation
of our neutrality by Germany."
2p

578 Official Diplomatic Documents

would be ready to take the field. After having expresssed his entire
satisfaction at what I had said, my visitor emphasised the following
points: (1) Our conversation was absolutely confidential ; (2) it was
in no way binding on his Government ; (3) his Minister, the British
General Staff, he, and myself were the only persons then aware of the
matter ; (4) he did not know whether his Sovereign had been consulted.

At a subsequent meeting Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston assured
me that he had never received any confidential information from other
military attaches about our army. He then gave me a detailed
statement of the strength of the British forces : we might rely on it
that, in twelve or thirteen days, two army corps, four cavalry brigades,
and two brigades of mounted infantry would be landed.

He asked me to study the question of the transport of these forces
to that part of the country where they would be most useful, and with
this object in view he promised me a detailed statement of the com-
position of the landing force.

He reverted to the question of the effective strength of our field
army, and considered it important that no detachments from that
army should be sent to Namur and Liege, as those fortresses were
provided with adequate garrisons.

He drew my attention to the necessity of letting the British Army
take full advantage of the facilities afforded under our regulations
respecting military requirements. Finally, he laid stress on the ques-
tion of the chief command.

I replied that I could say nothing on the latter point, and I promised
that I would study the other questions with care.

Later, the British military attache confirmed his previous estimate :
twelve days at least were indispensable to carry out the landing on the
coast of France. It would take much longer (from one to two and a
half months) to land 100,000 men at Antwerp.

On my objecting that it would be useless to wait till the disembarka-
tion was finished, before beginning the transport by rail, and that it
would be better to send on the troops by degrees as they arrived on
the coast, Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston promised me precise
details of the daily disembarkation table.

With regard to the question of military requirements, I informed
my visitor that that question would easily be arranged.

As the plans of the British General Staff advanced, the details of the
problem were worked out with greater precision. The colonel assured
me that half the British Army could be landed in eight days, and the
remainder at the end of the twelfth or thirteenth day, except the
mounted infantry, on which we could not count till later.

Nevertheless, I felt bound once more to urge the necessity of know-
ing the numbers to be landed daily, so as to work out the railway
arrangements for each day.

The British attache then spoke to me of various other questions,
viz. : (1) The necessity of maintaining secrecy about the operations,
and of ensuring that the Press should observe this carefully ; (2) the
advantages there would be in attaching a Belgian officer to each

The " Brussels " Documents 579

British staff, an interpreter to each commanding officer, and gen-
darmes to each unit to help the British miUtary poUce.

At another interview Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston and I
examined the question of combined operations in the event of a
German attack directed against Antwerp, and on the hypothesis
of our country being crossed in order to reach. the French Ardennes.

Later on, the colonel signified his concurrence in the scheme I had
laid before him, and assured me of the assent of General Grierson,
Chief of the British General Staff.

Other questions of secondary importance were likewise disposed
of, particularly those respecting intermediary officers, interpreters,
gendarmes, maps, illustrations of uniforms, English translations of
extracts from certain Belgian regulations, the regulation of customs
dues chargeable on the British supplies, hospital accommodation for
the wounded of the allied army, etc. Nothing was settled as to the
possible control of the Press by the Government or the military
authorities.

In the course of the last meetings which I had with the British
attache he communicated to me the daily disembarkation table of the
troops to be landed at Boulogne, Calais and Cherbourg. The distance
of the latter place, included owing to certain technical considerations,
would cause a certain delay. The first corps would be landed on the
tenth day, the second corps on the fifteenth day. Our railways would
carry out the transport operations in such a way that the arrival of
the first corps, either towards Brussels-Lou vain or towards Namur-
Dinant, would be completed on the eleventh day and that of the
second corps on the sixteenth day.

I finally urged once again, as forcibly as was within my power, the
necessity of accelerating the transport by sea in order that the British
troops might be with us between the eleventh and the twelfth day ;
the very best and most favourable results would accrue from the
concerted and simultaneous action by the allied forces. On the other
hand, a serious check would ensue if such co-operation could not be
achieved. Colonel Barnardiston assured me that everything would
be done with that end in view.

In the course of our conversations I took the opportunity of con-
vincing the military attache of our resolve to impede the enemies'
movements as far as lay within our power, and not to take refuge in
Antwerp from the outset. Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, on his
side, informed me that he had at present little confidence in the sup-
port or intervention of Holland. He likewise confided to me that his
Government intended to move the British base of supplies from the
French coast to Antwerp as soon as the North Sea had been cleared
of all German warships.

At all our interviews the colonel regularly communicated to me any
confidential information he possessed respecting the military condi-
tion and general situation of our eastern neighbour, etc. At the same
time he laid stress on the imperative need for Belgium to keep herself
well informed of what was going on in the neighbouring Rhine country.

580 Official Diplomatic Documents

I had to admit to him that in our country the intelligence service
beyond the frontier was not, in times of peace, directly under our
General Staff. We had no military attaches at our legations. I
took care, however, not to admit to him that I was unaware whether
the secret service, prescribed in our regulations, was organised or not.
But it is my duty here to call attention to this state of affairs, which
places us in a position of glaring inferiority to that of our neighbours,
our possible enemies.

Major-General,

Chief of General Staff.

(Initialled)

Note. — When I met General Grierson at Compiegne at the ma-
noeuvres of 1906 he assured me that the reorganisation of the British
army would result not only in ensuring the landing of 150,000 men,
but in enabling them to take the field in a shorter period than had been
previously estimated.

End of September 1906,

(Initialled)

(2)
(Translation)

(Confidential.)

The British military attache asked to see General Jungbluth.
These gentlemen met on the 23rd April.

Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges told the general that Great Britain had,
available for despatch to the Continent, an army composed of six
divisions of infantry and eight brigades of cavalry, in all 160,000
men. She had also all that she needed for home defence. Every-
thing was ready.

The British Government, at the time of the recent events, would
have immediately landed troops on our territory, even if we had not
asked for help.

The general protested that our consent would be necessary for this.

The military attache answered that he knew that, but that as we
were not in a position to prevent the Germans passing through our
territory. Great Britain would have landed her troops in any event.

As to the place of landing, the military attache was not explicit.
He said the coast was rather long ; but the general knows that Mr.
Bridges made daily visits to Zeebrugge from Ostend during the
Easter holidays.

The general added that, after all, we were, besides, perfectly able
to prevent the Germans from going through.

April 24, 1912,

The Allied Ansioer to the '' Brussels ^^ Documents 581

III. THE ALLIED ANSWER TO THE "BRUSSELS"

DOCUMENTS

No. 1

Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Sir F,
Villiers, British Minister at Brussels}

Sir, Foreign Office, April 7, 1913.

In speaking to the Belgian Minister to-day I said, speaking unoffi-
cially, that it had been brought to my knowledge that there was
apprehension in Belgium lest we should be the first to violate Belgian
neutrality. I did not think that this apprehension could have come
from a British source.

The Belgian Minister informed me that there had been talk, in a
British source which he could not name, of the landing of troops in
Belgium by Great Britain, in order to anticipate a possible despatch
of German troops through Belgium to France.

I said that I was sure that this Government would not be the first
to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and I did not believe that any
British Government would be the first to do so, nor would public
opinion here ever approve of it. What we had to consider, and it w^as
a somewhat embarrassing question, was what it would be desirable
and necessary for us, as one of the guarantors of Belgian neutrality,
to do if Belgian neutrality was violated by any Power. For us to be
the first to violate it and to send troops into Belgium would be to
give Germany, for instance, justification for sending troops into
Belgium also. What we desired in the case of Belgium, as in that of
other neutral countries, was that their neutrality should be respected,
and as long as it was not violated by any other Power we should
certainly not send troops ourselves into their territory.

I am, etc.,
E. Grey.

No. 2

Extract from a Despatch from Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin,
to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated December 23, 191 1 .
{From the " Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung,'' October 13, 1914.)

(Translation)

From the French side the danger threatens not only in the south
from Luxemburg ; it threatens us along our whole common frontier.
For this assertion we are not dependent only on surmises. We have
positive facts to go upon.

The combinations of the Entente cordiale include, without doubt,
the thought of an enveloping movement from the north. If that were

1 A record of this dispatch was communicated by Sir F. Villiers to the Belgian Minis-
ter for Foreign Affairs.

582 Official Diplomatic Documents

not the case, the plan of fortifying Flushing would not have evoked
such an outcry in Paris and London. No secret was made there
about the reasons why it was wished that the Scheldt should remain
unfortified. The object was to be able to ship a British garrison with-
out hindrance to Antwerp, and to obtain in our country a base of oper-
ations for an offensive in the direction of the Lower Rhine and West-
phaha, and then to carry us along with them, which would not have
been difficult. For after giving up our national place of refuge, we
should by our own fault have deprived ourselves of any possibility of
resisting the demands of our doubtful protectors after being so foolish
as to admit them to it. The equally perfidious and naif revelations
of Colonel Barnardiston at the time of the conclusion of the Entente
cordiale showed us clearly what was intended. When it became
evident that we were not to be intimidated by the alleged threaten-
ing danger of the closing of the Scheldt, the plan was not indeed
abandoned, but altered in so far as the British auxiliary force was not
to be landed on the Belgian coast, but in the nearest French harbours.
The revelations of Captain Faber, which have been no more denied
than the information of the newspapers by which they were confirmed
or elaborated in certain particulars, are evidence of this. This British
army, landed at Calais and Dunkirk, would not march along our
frontier to Longwy in order to reach Germany. It would immediately
invade us from the north-west. This would gain for it the advantage
of going into action at once, of meeting the Belgian army in a region
where we cannot obtain support from any fortress, in the event of our
wishing to risk a battle. It would make it possible for it to occupy
provinces rich in every kind of resource, but in any case to hinder
our mobilisation or to allow it only when we had formally pledged
ourselves to complete mobilisation solely for the benefit of Great
Britain and her allies.

I would strongly urge that a plan of action should be drawn up
for this eventuality also. This is demanded as much by the require-
ments of our military defence as by the conduct of our foreign policy
in the case of a war between Germany and France.

No. 3

Circular Telegram addressed to His Britannic Majesty^ s Representatives
abroad}

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, October H, 1914.

The story of an alleged Anglo-Belgian agreement of 1906 published
in the German press, and based on documents said to have been
found at Brussels, is only a story which has been reproduced in various
forms and denied on several occasions. No such agreement has ever
existed.

As the Germans well know, General Grierson is dead, and Colonel

1 This telegram was sent on receipt of a summary of the documents contained in
No. 4, issued by the German Government on the 13th October in advance of the publi-
cation of the documents themselves.

The Allied Answer to the " Brmsels " Documents 583

(now General) Barnardiston is commanding the British forces before
Tsing-tao. In 1906 General Grierson was on the General Staff at the
War Office and Colonel Barnardiston was military attache at Brussels.
In view of the solemn guarantee given by Great Britain to protect
the neutrality of Belgium against violation from any side, some
academic discussions may, through the instrumentality of Colonel
Barnardiston, have taken place between General Grierson and the
Belgian military authorities as to what assistance the British army
might be able to afford to Belgium should one of her neighbours
violate that neutrality. Some notes with reference to the subject may
exist in the archives at Brussels.

It should be noted that the date mentioned, namely, 1906, was the
year following that in which Germany had, as in 1911, adopted a
threatening attitude towards France with regard to Morocco, and,
in view of the apprehensions existing of an attack on France through
Belgium, it was natural that possible eventualities should be discussed.

The impossibility of Belgium having been a party to any agree-
ment of the nature indicated, or to any design for the violation of
Belgian neutrality, is clearly shown by the reiterated declarations
that she has made for many years past that she would resist to the
utmost any violation of her neutrality from whatever quarter and in
whatever form such violation might come.

It is worthy of attention that these charges of aggressive designs
on the part of other Powers are made by Germany, who, since 1906,
has established an elaborate network of strategical railways leading
from the Rhine to the Belgian frontier through a barren thinly-popu-
lated tract, deliberately constructed to permit of the sudden attack
upon Belgium which was carried out two months ago.

No. 4

Viscount Haldane, Lord High Chancellor, to Dr. A. E. Shipley, Master
of Christ's College, Cambridge.

Dear Master of Christ's, November 14, 1914-

The enclosed memoranda have been specially prepared for me by
the Foreign Office in answer to your question.

Yours truly,

(Signed) Haldane.

Enclosure 1
Memorandum

It is quite untrue that the British Government had ever arranged
with Belgium to trespass on her country in case of war, or that Belgium
had agreed to this. The strategic dispositions of Germany, especially
as regards railways, have for some years given rise to the apprehension
that Germany would attack France through Belgium. Whatever

584 Official Diplomatic Documents

military discussions have taken place before this war have been
limited entirely to the suggestion of what could be done to defend
France if Germany attacked her through Belgium. The Germans
have stated that we contemplated sending troops to Belgium. We
had never committed ourselves at all to the sending of troops to the
Continent, and we had never contemplated the possibility of sending
troops to Belgium to attack Germany. The Germans have stated
that British military stores had been placed at Maubeuge, a French
fortress near the Belgian frontier, before the outbreak of the war,
and that this is evidence of an intention to attack Germany through
Belgium. No British soldiers and no British stores were landed on
the Continent till after Germany had invaded Belgium, and Belgium
had appealed to France and England for assistance. It was only
after this appeal that British troops were sent to France; and, if
the Germans found British munitions of war in Maubeuge, these
munitions were sent with our expedition to France after the outbreak
of the war. The idea of violating the neutrality of Belgium was never
discussed or contemplated by the British Government.

The extract enclosed, which is taken from an official publication
of the Belgian Government, and the extract from an official statement
by the Belgian Minister of War, prove that the Belgian Government
had never connived, or been willing to connive, at a breach of the
Treaty that made the maintenance of Belgian neutrality an inter-
national obligation. The moment that there appeared to be danger
that this Treaty might be violated, the British Government made an
appeal for an assurance from both France and Germany, as had been
done in 1870 by Mr. Gladstone, that neither of those countries would
violate the neutrality of Belgium if the other country respected it.
The French agreed, the Germans declined to agree. The appeal made
by the British Government is to be found in the Parliamentary White
Paper published after the outbreak of the war (see No. 114 of British
Correspondence, page 87). The reason why Germany would not
agree was stated very frankly by Herr von Jagow, the German Minister
for Foreign Affairs, to Sir Edward Goschen, our Ambassador in Berlin ;
and it is recorded in the second White Paper (see No. 160 of British
Correspondence, page 110) that we published. The attitude of the
British Government throughout has been to endeavour to preserve
the neutrality of Belgium, and we never thought of sending troops to
Belgium until Germany had invaded it, and Belgium had appealed for
assistance to maintain the international Treaty.

We have known for some years past that, in Holland, in Denmark,
and in Norway, the Germans have inspired the apprehension that,
if England was at war with Germany, England would violate the
neutrality of those countries and seize some of their harbours. This
allegation is as baseless as the allegation about our intention to violate
the neutrality of Belgium, and events have shown it to be so. But
it seems to be a rule with Germany to attribute to others the designs
that she herself entertains; as it is clear now that, for some long
time past, it has been a settled part of her strategic plans to attack

The Allied Answer to the " Brussels " Documents 585

France through Belgium. A statement is enclosed which was issued
by us on October 14 last, dealing with this point.

This memorandum and its enclosures should provide ample material
for a reply to the German statements.

Foreign Office, 9th November, 1914-

Enclosure 2
Despatch No. 22 in the Belgian Gray Book.

Enclosure 3
Extract from " The Times'' of 30th September, 1914.

Neutrality of Belgium
Official Statement

The German press has been attempting to persuade the public that
if Germany herself had not violated Belgian neutrality France or
Great Britain would have done so. It has declared that French and
British troops had marched into Belgium before the outbreak of war.
We have received from the Belgian Minister of War an official state-
ment which denies absolutely these allegations. It declares, on the
one hand, that " before August 3 not a single French soldier had set
foot on Belgian territory," and again, "it is untrue that on August 4
there was a single English soldier in Belgium." It adds : —

For long past Great Britain knew that the Belgian army would
oppose by force a "preventive" disembarkation of British troops in
Belgium. The Belgian Government did not hesitate at the time of
theAgadir crises to warn foreign Ambassadors, in terms which could
not be misunderstood, of its formal intention to compel respect for
the neutrality of Belgium by every means at its disposal, and against
attempts upon it from any and every quarter.

Enclosure 4

Circular Telegram addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Representatives
abroad on the 14th October, 1914-

See above No. 3 of " The Allied Answer to the Brussels Documents."

586 Official Diplomatic Documents

IV. NEGOTIATIONS OF PRINCE LICHNOWSKY WITH
SIR EDWARD GREY

(Published in the North German Gazette, September 6, 1914)

According to reports to hand, Sir Edward Grey declared in the
House of Commons that the publication by the German Govern-
ment of the German-English exchange of telegrams before the war
was incomplete. Prince Lichnowsky, it is declared, cancelled by
telegram his report on the well-known telephone conversation imme-
diately he was informed that a misunderstanding existed. This
telegram, it is asserted, was not published. The Times, appar-
ently upon information from official sources, made the same asser-
tion, adding the comment that the telegram had been suppressed
by the German Government in order that it might accuse England
of perfidy and prove Germany's love of peace.

In answer to this we are able to state that such a telegram is non-
existent. Apart from the telegram already published, which was
dispatched from London at 11 a.m.. Prince Lichnowsky on August
1st sent the following telegram :

First, at 1.15 p.m.

"... Sir Edward Grey's private secretary has just been to see
me to say that the Minister desired to make proposals to me regard-
ing England's neutrality, even for the event that we should go to
war with Russia as well as with France. I shall see Sir Edward
Grey this afternoon, and shall report immediately."

Second, at 5.30 p.m.

" Sir Edward Grey has just read to me the following declaration,
which has been unanimously framed by the cabinet :

" ' The reply of the German Government with regard to the neu-
trality of Belgium is a matter of very great regret, because the neu-
trality of Belgium does affect feeling in this country. If Germany
could see her way clear to give the same positive reply as that which
has been given by France, it would materially contribute to relieve
anxiety and tension here, while on the other hand, if there were a
violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the
other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public
feeling in this country.'

" In answer to my question as to whether, on condition that we
respected the Belgian neutrality, he could give me a definite declara-
tion concerning the neutrality of Great Britain, the Minister replied
that that was impossible for him to do, but that this question would
nevertheless play an important part In public opinion here. If we
should violate the Belgian neutrality in a war with France, a reversal
of sentiment would certainly result and this would make it difficult
for the Government here to assume a friendly neutrality. For the

Negotiations of Prince Lichnowsky with Sir Edward Grey 587

present there was not the slightest intention of taking hostile action
against us. It would be the desire to avoid that if it should be in
any way possible. It would, however, be difficult to draw a line
marking how far we might go before there would be intervention
from here. He recurred again and again to Belgian neutrality and
expressed the opinion that this question would play an important
part in any event. He had wondered whether it were not possible
that we and France should remain armed against each other without
attacking each other in case of a Russian war. I asked him whether
he was in a position to declare to me that France would enter into a
compact to that effect. Since we neither desired to destroy France
nor to acquire parts of her territory, I was able to believe that we
could enter into an agreement of such a sort, which would insure us
the neutrality of Great Britain.

" The Minister said he would make inquiries ; he did not overlook
the difficulties of holding the armies of both sides inactive."

Third, at 8.30 p.m. :

"My report made early to-day is cancelled by my report of this
evening. Since absolutely no positive English proposal has been
submitted, further steps along the line of the instructions given me
are superfluous."

As will be observed, these telegrams contain no sort of indication
that there had been a misunderstanding, and nothing concerning
the assertion made from the English side of a clearing up of the
alleged misunderstanding.

588 Official Diplomatic Documents

V. DOCUMENTS FOUND IN THE POSSESSION OF MR.
GRANT-WATSON, SECRETARY OF THE BRITISH
LEGATION

, (Published in the North German Gazette, December 15th, 1914)

New and important proofs have been found of the Anglo-Belgian
complicity. Some time ago Mr. Grant- Watson, the Secretary of the
British Legation, was arrested in Brussels. He had remained at the
legation quarters, after the legation had been transferred to Ant-
werp and later to Havre. The said gentleman was recently caught
trying to do away with some documents, which he had carried away
unnoticed from the legation when arrested. An examination of the
papers revealed that they were official documents, with data of the
most intimate character concerning the Belgian mobilisation and
the defence of Antwerp, dating from the years 1913 and 1914. They
include circular orders to the higher Belgian officers in command,
bearing the signature in facsimile of the Belgian Minister of War
and of the Belgian General Staff, and also a note concerning a con-
ference of the " Commission de la base d'approvisionnements a Anvers/*
on May 27th, 1913. The fact that these papers were found in the
British Legation shows sufficiently that the Belgian Government
had no military secrets to hide from the British Government, and
that both governments, with regard to military matters, are in very
close touch with each other.

There is also a hand-written note of special interest which was
found among the papers that the British Secretary endeavoured to
destroy. It follows :

Renseignements ^

1. Les officiers fran^ais ont re9U ordre de rejoindre des le 27,
apres-midi.

2. Le meme jour le chef de Gare de Feignies a re^u ordre de con-
centrer vers Maubeuge tous les wagons fermes disponible, en vue
du transport de troupes.

Communique par la Brigade de gendarmerie de Frameries.

Feignies, it may be remarked, is a railway station in France on
the road from Maubeuge to Mons, about three kilometres from the
Belgian frontier ; Frameries is on the same line in Belgium, ten kilo-
metres from the frontier.

From this notice it must be gathered that France had already
made her first mobilisation plans on July 27, and that the British

1 Translation : 1. The French officers have received orders to join the colors by
the 27th in the afternoon.

2. For the same day the Superintendent of the railway station of Feignies has received
orders to collect in the direction of Maubeuge all available closed coaches, with a view
to the transport of troops.

Documents Found in the Possession of Mr. Grant-Watsmi 589

Legation immediately received information thereof from Belgian
sources.

The material thus discovered furnishes an additional and valu-
able proof — if indeed any may be needed — of the relations existing
between England and Belgimn. It shows anew that Belgium had
sacrificed her own neutrality in favor of the Entente, and that she
was an active member of the coalition which had been formed to
fight the German Empire. For England, on the other hand, Bel-
gian neutrality really was nothing but a "scrap of paper,'' to which
she appealed when it was in her interest, and which she disregarded
when she found it expedient to do so. It is obvious that the British
Government made use of the violation of Belgian neutrality by Ger-
many only as a pretext to justify the war against us before the world
and before the British people.

590 Official Diplomatic Documents

VI. TELEGRAMS AND LETTERS EXCHANGED BETWEEN
THE ROYAL AND IMPERIAL COURTS OF LONDON,
BERLIN, AND PETROGRAD, AND BETWEEN KING
GEORGE AND PRESIDENT POINCARE

Telegrams Exchanged between His Majesty King George and
His Majesty the Czar

(Published in the British Press on the 5th August, 1914)

No. 1

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan {St. Petersburgh) .

Foreign Office, 1st August, 191^.

You should at once apply for an audience with His Majesty the
Emperor, and convey to him the following personal message from the
King: —

"My Government has received the following statement from the
German Government : —

" ' On July 29 the Russian Emperor requested the German Emperor
by telegraph to mediate between Russia and Austria. The Emperor
immediately declared his readiness to do so. He informed the
Russian Emperor of this by telegraph, and took the required action
at Vienna. Without waiting for the result of this action Russia
mobilised against Austria. By telegraph the German Emperor
pointed out to the Russian Emperor that hereby his attempt at media-
tion would be rendered illusory. The Emperor further asked the
Russian Emperor to suspend the military operations against Austria.
This, however, did not happen. In spite of this the German Govern-
ment continued its mediation at Vienna. In this matter the German
Government have gone to the farthest limit of what can be suggested
to a Sovereign State which is the ally of Germany. The proposals
made by the German Government at Vienna were conceived entirely
on the lines suggested by Great Britain, and the German Government
recommended them at Vienna for their serious consideration. They
were taken into consideration at Vienna this morning. During the
deliberations of the ( ?Austrian) Cabinet, and before they were con-
cluded, the German Ambassador at St. Petersburgh reported the
mobilisation of the entire Russian army and fleet. Owing to this
action on the part of Russia the Austrian answer to the German
proposals for mediation, which were still under consideration, was
not given. This action on the part of Russia is also directed against
Germany — that is to say, the Power whose mediation had been in-
voked by the Russian Emperor. We were bound to reply with serious
counter measures to this action, which we were obUged to consider
as hostile, unless we were prepared to endanger the safety of our

Royal and Imperial Telegrams and Letters 591

country. We are unable to remain inactive in face of the Russian
mobilisation on our frontier. We have therefore informed Russia that
unless she were prepared to suspend within twelve hours the warlike
measure against Germany and Austria, we should be obliged to
mobilise, and this would mean war. We have asked France if she
would remain neutral during a German-Russian war.'

"I cannot help thinking that some misunderstanding has pro-
duced this deadlock. I am most anxious not to miss any possibility
of avoiding the terrible calamity which at present threatens the
whole world. I therefore make a personal appeal to you to remove
the misapprehension which I feel must have occurred, and to leave
still open grounds for negotiation* and possible peace. If you think
I can in any way contribute to that all-important purpose, I will do
everything in my power to assist in reopening the interrupted con-
versations between the Powers concerned. I feel confident that you
are as anxious as I am that all that is possible should be done to
secure the peace of the world."

No. 2
His Majesty the Czar to His Majesty King George,

1st August, 1914.'

I would gladly have accepted your proposals had not German
Ambassador this afternoon presented a note to my Government
declaring war. Ever since presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade,
Russia has devoted all her efforts to finding some pacific solution of
the question raised by Austria's action. Object of that action was
to crush Servia and make her a vassal of Austria. Effect of this
would have been to upset balance of power in Balkans, which is of
such vital interest to my Empire. Every proposal, including that of
your Government, was rejected by Germany and Austria, and it was
only when favourable moment for bringing pressure to bear on Austria
had passed that Germany showed any disposition to mediate. Even
then she did not put forward any precise proposal. Austria's declara-
tion of war on Servia forced me to order a partial mobilisation, though,
in view of threatening situation, my military advisers strongly advised
a general mobilisation owing to quickness with which Germany can
mobilise in comparison with Russia. I was eventually compelled to
take this course in consequence of complete Austrian mobilisation,
of the bombardment of Belgrade, of concentration of Austrian troops
in Galicia, and of secret military preparations being made in Ger-
many. That I was justified in doing so is proved by Germany's
sudden declaration of war, which was quite unexpected by me, as
I have given most categorical assurances to the Emperor William
that my troops would not move so long as mediation negotiations
continued.

In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more that I have

592 Official Diplomatic Documents

done all in my power to avert war. Now that it has been forced on
me, I trust your country will not fail to support France and Russia.
God bless and protect you.

Telegrams Exchanged between London and Berlin, 30th July-

2nd August, 1914

(Published in the Norddeutsche AUgemeine Zeitung of the 20th

August, 1914)

No. 1

His Royal Highness Prince Henry of Prussia to His Majesty King
George, dated 30th July, 191 Jj..

I ARRIVED here yesterday and have communicated what you were
so good as to say to me at Buckingham Palace last Sunday to William,
who was very thankful to receive your message.

William, who is very anxious, is doing his utmost to comply with
the request of Nicholas to work for the maintenance of peace. He is
in continual telegraphic communication with Nicholas, who has
to-day confirmed the news that he has ordered military measures
which amount to mobilisation, and that these measures were taken
five days ago.

We have also received information that France is making military
preparations while we have not taken measures of any kind, but
may be obliged to do so at any moment if our neighbours continue
their preparations. This would then mean a European war.

If you seriously and earnestly desire to prevent this terrible mis-
fortune, may I propose to you to use your influence on France and
also on Russia that they should remain neutral. In my view this
would be of the greatest use. I consider that this is a certain and,
perhaps, the only possible way of maintaining the peace of Europe.
I might add that Germany and England should now more than ever
give each other mutual support in order to prevent a terrible disaster,
which otherwise appears inevitable.

Believe me that William is inspired by the greatest sincerity in
his efforts for the maintenance of peace. But the military prepara-
tions of his two neighbours may end in compelling him to follow their
example for the safety of his own country, which otherwise would
remain defenceless. I have informed William of my telegram to
you, and I hope that you will receive my communication in the same
friendly spirit which has inspired it.

(Signed) Henry.

No. 2

His Majesty King George to His Royal Highness Prince Henry of
Prussia, dated 30th July, 1914.
Thanks for your telegram. I am very glad to hear of William's
efforts to act with Nicholas for the maintenance of peace. I earnestly

Royal and Imperial Telegrams and Letters 593

desire that such a misfortune as a European war — the evil of which
could not be remedied — may be prevented. My Government is
doing the utmost possible in order to induce Russia and France to
postpone further military preparations, provided that Austria declares
herself satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade and the neighbouring
Servian territory as a pledge for a satisfactory settlement of her
demands, while at the same time the other countries suspend their
preparations for war. I rely on William applying his great influence
in order to induce Austria to accept this proposal. In this way he
will prove that Germany and England are working together to
prevent what would be an international catastrophe. Please assure
William that I am doing all I can, and will continue to do all that
lies in my power, to maintain the peace of Europe.

(Signed) George.

No. 3

His Majesty the Emperor William to His Majesty King George, dated
31st July, 1914.
Many thanks for your friendly communication. Your proposals
coincide with my ideas and with the communication which I have this
evening received from Vienna, and which I have passed on to London.
I have just heard from the Chancellor that intelligence has just
reached him that Nicholas this evening has ordered the mobilisation
of his entire army and fleet. He has not even awaited the result of
the mediation in which I am engaged, and he has left me completely
without information. I am travelling to Berlin to assure the safety
of my eastern frontier, where strong Russian forces have already
taken up their position. (gigged) William.

No. 4

His Majesty King George to His Majesty the Emperor William, dated
1st August, 1914-'
Many thanks for your telegram of last night. I have sent an
urgent telegram ^ to Nicholas, in which I have assured him of my
readiness to do everything in my power to further the resumption of
the negotiations between the powers concerned.

(Signed) George.

No. 5

German Ambassador at London to the German Imperial Chancellor,

dated 1st August, 1914-
' Sir Edward Grey has just called me to the telephone and has
asked me whether I thought I could declare that in the event of

1 See page 590.
2q

594 Official Diplomatic Documents

France remaining neutral in a German-Russian war we would not
attack the French. I told him that I believed that I could assume
responsibility for this. (Signed) Lichnowsky.

No. 6

His Majesty the Emperor William to His Majesty King George, dated
1st August, 1914'

I HAVE just received the communication of your Government
offering French neutrality under the guarantee of Great Britain.
To this offer there was added the question whether, under these
conditions, Germany would refrain from attacking France. For
technical reasons the mobilisation which I have already ordered this
afternoon on two fronts — east and west — must proceed according to
the arrangements made. A counter order cannot now be given, as
your telegram unfortunately came too late, but if France offers me
her neutrality, which must be guaranteed by the English army and
navy, I will naturally give up the idea of an attack on France and
employ my troops elsewhere. I hope that France will not be nervous.
The troops on my frontier are at this moment being kept back by
telegraph and by telephone from crossing the French frontier.

(Signed) William.

No. 7

German Imperial Chancellor to the German Ambassador at London,
dated 1st August, 1914-

Germany is ready to agree to the English proposal in the event of
England guaranteeing with all her forces the unconditional neutrality
of France in the conflict between Germany and Russia. Owing to
the Russian challenge German mobilisation occurred to-day before
the English proposals were received. In consequence our advance
to the French frontier cannot now be altered. We guarantee, how-
ever, that the French frontier will not be crossed by our troops until
Monday, the 3rd of August, at seven p.m., in case England's assent is
received by that time. (gjg^^d) Bethmann-Hollweg.

No. 8

His Majesty King George to His Majesty the Emperor William, dated
1st AugvM, 1914-

In answer to your telegram, which has just been received, I be-
lieve that there must be a misunderstanding with regard to a sugges-
tion which was made in a friendly conversation between Prince
Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey when they were discussing how

Royal and Imperial Telegrams and Letters 595

an actual conflict between the German and the French army might
be avoided, so long as there is still a possibility of an agreement being
arrived at between Austria and Russia. Sir Edward Grey will see
Prince Lichnowsky early to-morrow morning in order to ascertain
whether there is any misunderstanding on his side.

(Signed) George.

No. 9

German Ambassador at London to the German Imperial Chancellor^
dated 2nd August j 1914-

The suggestions of Sir Edward Grey based on the desire of creat-
ing the possibility of lasting neutrality on the part of England, were
made without any previous inquiry of France and w^ithout knowledge
of the mobilisation, and have since been given up as quite imprac-
ticable.

(Signed) Lichnowsky.

Ill

Telegrams from the German Ambassador at London to the
German Imperial Chancellor, 1st August, 1914

(Published in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of the 6th

September, 1914)

No. 1

1st August, 1.15 p.m.
. . . Sir Edward Grey's Private Secretary has just been to see
me in order to say that the Minister wishes to make proposals to me
for the neutrality of England, even in the case that we had war with
Russia and France. I see Sir Edward Grey this afternoon and will
communicate at once.

No. 2

1st August, 5.30 p.m.

Sir Edward Grey has just read to me the following declaration
which has been unanimously adopted by the Cabinet : —

" The reply of the German Government with regard to the neutral-
ity of Belgium is a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality
of Belgium does affect feeling in this country. If Germany could see
her w^ay to give the same positive reply as that which has been given
by France, it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and
tension here, while, on the other hand, if there were a violation of the
neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it,

596 Official Diplomatic Documents

it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this coun-

On my question whether, on condition that we would maintain
the neutrality of Belgium, he could give me a definite declaration
with regard to the neutrality of Great Britain, the Minister answered
that that was impossible, but that this question would play a great
part in public opinion in this country. If we violated Belgian neutral-
ity in a war with France there would certainly be a change in public
opinion which would make it difficult for the Cabinet here to maintain
friendly neutrality. For the time there was not the slightest intention
to proceed in a hostile manner against us. It would be their desire
to avoid this if there was any possibility of doing so. It was,
however, difficult to draw a line up to which we could go without
intervention on this side. He turned again and again to Belgian
neutrality, and was of opinion that this question would also play a
great part.

He had also thought whether it was not possible that we and France
should, in case of a Russian war, stand armed opposite to one another
without attacking. I asked him if he would be in a position to arrange
that France would assent to an agreement of this kind. As we
wanted neither to destroy France nor to annex portions of French
territory, I could think that we w^ould give our assent to an arrange-
ment of this kind which would secure for us the neutrality of Great
Britain. The Minister said he would make inquiries ; he also recog-
nised the difficulties of holding back the military on both sides.

No. 3

1st August, 8.30 p.m.

My communication of this morning is cancelled by my communica-
tion of this evening. As there is no positive English proposal before
us, any further step in the sense of the message I sent is superfluous.

Telegram from His Majesty the Czar to His Majesty the

Emperor William

(Published in the Russian Press on the 31st January, 1915)

29th July, 1914.

Thanks for your telegram,^ which is conciliatory and friendly,
whereas the official message presented to-day by your Ambassador
to my Minister was conveyed in a very different tone. I beg you to
explain this divergency. It would be right to give over the Austro-
Serbian problem to The Hague Tribunal. I trust in your wisdom
and friendship.

1 German White Book, No. 20.

Royal and Imperial Telegrams and Letters 597

Letters exchanged between His Majesty King George and
THE President of the French Republic

(Published in the British Press on the 20th February, 1915)

No. 1
The President of the French Republic to His Majesty King George.
Dear and Great Friend, Paris, July 31, 1914.

In the grave events through which Europe is passing, I feel bound
to convey to your Majesty the information which the Government of
the Republic have received from Germany. The military prepara-
tions which are being undertaken by the Imperial Government,
especially in the immediate neighbourhood of the French frontier, are
being pushed forward every day with fresh vigour and speed. France,
resolved to continue to the very end to do all that lies within her
power to maintain peace, has, up to the present, confined herself solely
to the most indispensable precautionary measures. But it does not
appear that her prudence and moderation serve to check Germany's
action ; indeed, quite the reverse. We are, perhaps, then, in spite of
the moderation of the Government of the Republic and the calm of
public opinion, on the eve of the most terrible events.

From all the information which reaches us it would seem that war
would be inevitable if Germany were convinced that the British
Government would not intervene in a conflict in which France might
be engaged ; if, on the other hand, Germany were convinced that the
entente cordiale would be affirmed, in case of need, even to the extent
of taking the field side by side, there would be the greatest chance
that peace would remain unbroken.

It is true that our military and naval arrangements leave complete
liberty to your Majesty's Government, and that, in the letters ex-
changed in 1912 ^ between Sir Edward Grey and M. Paul Cambon,
Great Britain and France entered into nothing more than a mutual
agreement to consult one another in the event of European tension,
and to examine in concert whether common action were advisable.

But the character of close friendship which public feeling has given
in both countries to the entente between Great Britain and France,
the confidence with which our two Governments have never ceased to
work for the maintenance of peace, and the signs of sympathy which
your Majesty has ever shown to France, justify me in informing you
quite frankly of my impressions, which are those of the Government
of the Republic and of all France.

It is, I consider, on the language and the action of the British
Government that henceforward the last chances of a peaceful settle-
ment depend.

We, ourselves, from the initial stages of the crisis, have enjoined
upon our Ally an attitude of moderation from which they have not

1 See pp. 337 f ., and Facsimile of British Blue Book, pp. 90 f.

598 Official Diplomatic Documents

swerved. In concert with Your Majesty's Government, and in con-
formity with Sir E. Grey's latest suggestions, we will continue to act
on the same lines.

But if all efforts at conciliation emanate from one side, and if
Germany and Austria can speculate on the abstention of Great
Britain, Austria's demands will remain inflexible, and an agreement
between her and Russia will become impossible. I am profoundly
convinced that at the present moment, the more Great Britain, France,
and Russia can give a deep impression that they are united in their
diplomatic action, the more possible will it be to count upon the
preservation of peace.

I beg that your Majesty will excuse a step which is only inspired
by the hope of seeing the European balance of power definitely re-
affirmed.

Pray accept the expression of my most cordial sentiments.

R. PO INC ARE.

No. 2
His Majesty King George to the President of the French Republic.
Dear and Great Friend, Buckingham Palace, August 1, 1914-

I MOST highly appreciate the sentiments which moved you to write
to me in so cordial and friendly a spirit, and I am grateful to you for
having stated your views so fully and frankly.

You may be assured that the present situation in Europe has been
the cause of much anxiety and preoccupation to me, and I am glad
to think that our two Governments have worked so amicably together
in endeavouring to find a peaceful solution of the questions at issue.

It would a be a source of real satisfaction to me if our united efforts
were to meet with success, and I am still not without hope that the
terrible events which seem so near may be averted.

I admire the restraint which you and your Government are exercis-
ing in refraining from taking undue military measures on the frontier
and not adopting an attitude which could in any wise be interpreted
as a provocative one.

I am personally using my best endeavours with the Emperors of
Russia and of Germany towards finding some solution by which actual
military operations may at any rate be postponed, and time be thus
given for calm discussion between the Powers. I intend to prosecute
these efforts without intermission so long as any hope remains of an
amicable settlement.

As to the attitude of my country, events are changing so rapidly

that it is difficult to forecast future developments; but you may

be assured that my Government will continue to discuss freely and

frankly any point which might arise of interest to our two nations

with M. Cambon. t> t

Uelieve me,

M. le President,

(Signed) George R. I.

INDEX

Africa,

British Attacks on German Territory,

506.
C»ngo. See that Title.
German Offensive against British Cen-
tral African Protectorate, 506,
509.
Great Britain declines proposal not to
carry war into Africa, 506.
Alsace-Lorraine,

Inhabitants forbidden to cross frontier,
325.
Austria-Hungary,
Belgium —

War declared with, 507, 509.
Belgian Reply, 510.
British Ambassador —

Comments on events from 22 July,

514.
Final Interview with Count Berch-
told, 520.
British relations with, 432, 468.

War declared by Great Britain, 498.
Communications with Representatives
at —
Belgrade, 2, 3, 36, 40, 141, 241.
Berlin, 51, 101, 180, 203, 241, 246,

247, 278, 280, 400, 507, 508.
Constantinople, 51, 101.
London, 12, 51, 57, 65, 66, 101, 180,
203, 243, 244, 276, 345, 432, 468,
496, 498.
Nish, 14.
Paris, 12, 67, 68, 51, 180, 203, 276,

277, 347, 484, 490, 491.
Rome, 51, 101, 180, 203, 276.
St. Petersburgh, 51, 68, 69, 71, 101,
141, 145, 148, 179, 180, 202,
203, 243, 276, 278, 280, 318, 345,
346, 347, 373, 459.
Semlin, 142.
Tokio, 241, 508.
Uskub, 6.

Vienna, 140, 346, 506.
General Mobilization of Army and Fleet,

197, 272, 356, 391.
Japan — Relations broken off, 508.
Mediation proposals. Attitude towards,
68, 142, 484, 490,-252, 287,
329, 392, 393, 394,-302, 385,
386,-237, 270, 274, 310, 312.
Military Preparations, 285.
Notification to Powers of Great-Ser-
bian propaganda and its con-
nection with the Serajevo mur-
der, 101.
Notification of state of war with Servia,
276.

Austria-Hungary — CorU.
Russia, Relations with —

Direct Conversations, proposals for
mediation &c., 277, 301, 302,
310, 336, 347, 363.
Refusal by Austria of Russian sug-
gestions, 297, 309, 328.
German efforts to prevent danger, 297.
Mediation proposals. See that Sub-
head, above.
Russia will stop military preparations
only upon certain conditions,
331, 333.
Russia's threatening attitude leads to

war, 459.
War declared by Austria, 459.
Sandjak, no intentions to advance into

or occupy the, 385, 389.
Serbia, Relations with —

Austrian Attitude, 19, 85, 329, — 67,
68, 69, 140, 180, 277, 373, 484,
— 34, 56, 61, 86, 87, 89, 90, 92,
93, 160, 161, 163, 164, 165, 166,
168, 192, — 77, 82, 153.
See also Title: Mediation proposals.
Austrian Dossier sent to the Powers,

101.
Austrian Intentions, 85, 329, 385,

389, — 218, 302.
Austrian official reports as to Ser-
bian feelings towards Austria,
2, 3, 6, 14, 36.
British Attitude, 164, 165, 174, 192,
193, 194, 195, 196, 226, 265,
268, 332, 359.
See also Title: Mediation Proposals.
French Attitude and French Reports
of Events from Date of Serajevo
Murder to Austria's Declaration
of War, 1, 8, 12, 15, 19, 23, 29,
38, 39, 53, 54, 58, 59, 74, 77,
78, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 149,
150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156,
157, 158, 181, 183, 184, 185,
186, 187, 190, 213, 215, 216,
217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222,
224, (247), 286.
See also Title: Mediation Proposals.
German Attitude, 39, 53, 54, 59, 78,
80, 81, 90, 92, 97, 151, 153,
155, 157, 181, 186, 187, 213, 215,
226, 254, 255, 256, 257, 283,
293, 327, 328, 551.
See also Title: Mediation Proposals.
Localization of the Dispute, German
View and Efforts, 35, 56, 78,
91, 159, 194, 226, 256, 257, 552,
553, 554.

599

600

Index

Austria-Hungary — Cont.

Mediation Proposals, See separate Title.

Military action not intended by Austria,
153, 167.

Military Operations not to be under-
taken immediately, 166, 167.

Non-interference by other Powers —
German View and Efforts. See
Subheading : Localization of the
Dispute, above.

Narodna Odbrana, 101.

Narodna Odbrana, Extract from (1911),
116.

Narodna Odbrana Society —

Confidential Reports of the — , 130.
Nish Local Committee — , Attitude on

Serajevo Murders, 138.
Organization and Work of, 101.
Servian Official Gazette in the Service

of the — , 123.
Work of — , Deposition by Trifko
Krstanovio, 124.

Occupation of Belgrade or other Towns
as a Basis for Negotiations, 332,
335, 353.

Russian Attitude, 191, 225, 328, 358,
— 71, 179, 202, 243, 246, 278,
280, 347, 373,-87, 89, 161,
193, 228, 261, 193, 228, 261,
367, — 15, 54, 58, 74, 82, 83,
84, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156,
181, 184, 185, 217.

See also Title: Mediation Proposals.

Serbia's alleged willingness to enter-
tain Austrian requirements, pro-
vided that only judicial coopera-
tion is asked, 38.

Serbian Attitude, 14, 51, 53, 54, 58, 78,
180.

Serbia's General Mobilization before
delivery of answer to Austrian
Note, 180.

Serbian Note of 1908, 65, 262.

Serbian Press, opinions of, prior to the
Serajevo Murders, 112.

Serbian Press on the Assassination, 135.

Serbian sovereign rights, no infraction
of — , 395.

Serbian Territory not to be seized, 69,
190, 203, 308, 309, 385, 395.

Serbian War Office — Pictures of a nature
hostile to Dual Monarchy, 140.

Situation before Presentation of Ulti-
matum of 23 July, 2, 3, 6.

Sokol Society Dusan the Strong —
Report of the activities of, in Kragu-
jevac (1912-13), 121.

Special Points for Great Britain, 243.

Telegrams between French and Russian
Representatives delayed, 236.

Turkish Views, 217.

Ultimatum of 23 July, 63, 64, 75, 78,
84, 86, 97, 99, 158.
Austrian Commentary, 523.
Austrian Statement that Note is not
an Ultimatum, but a Demarche
with a time-limit, 65, 150, 160.

Austria- Hungary — Cont.
Ultimatum — Cont.

Austro-Hungarian Views, 86, 89.
British Attitude, 86, 91, 92, 93, 162,

165, — 66.
French Attitude and Views, 67, 87,

91, 160, 161.
Germany had no knowledge, 39, 53,
75, 82, 149, 154, 163, 165, 173,
174, 187, 189, 250.
Germany approves Austrian point of

view, 173, 174.
Italian Views, 267.

Point 5 — , Austrian Explanation, 146.
Redrafting of certain Articles proposed
by Russia, 197.
German Attitude, 237.
Russian Attitude and Views, 87, 89,

94, 161, 171, 228, 261, 367.
See also Title: Mediation Proposals.
Serbian Reply, 142, 156, 157, 158, 175,

180, 243.
Austrian Commentaries, 529.
Austrian Views, 221, 251.
British Views, 227, 229, 231.
German Views, 192, 193, 194.
Non-publication of, in German Press,

272.
Refusal of Austria-Hungary to accept,

174, 231, 241.
Russian Views, 235.
Special Points to be brought before

Great Britain, 57, 65.
Time Chosen for Presentation, signif-
icance of, 36, 149.
Time Limit —
Dangers of, 62.

Proposals for Extension, 152, 153,
154, 155, 156, 158, 170, 171, 172,
181.
Austrian Refusal, 140, 141.
British Attitude, 93.
German Views, 163,
Italian Views, 196.
Russian Views, 66, 145, 243.
Unconditional acceptance demanded,
164.
War declared by Austria-Hungary, 181,
231, 241, 247, 268, 273, 296.
Belgium,

Agreement for Joint Action to Resist

Germany, 462, 463.
Appeal to Great Britain, France and

Russia, 441, 442, 460.
Austria declares War, 507, 509.

Belgian Reply, 510.
Communications with Representatives
at —
Belgrade, 149.
Berlin, 72, 212, 281, 348, 349, 374,

375, 401, 422, 436, 462.
Hague, 148, 281, 375, 422, 434, 490,

492, 494, 498, 499, 509, 510.
London, 72, 281, 348, 349, 373, 374,
375, 401, 422, 424, 435, 437, 438,
439, 441, 460, 463, 483. 495,
505, 512.

Index

601

Belgium — Cont.

Communications with Representatives
at — Cont.
Luxemburg, 148, 281, 375.
Madrid, 436, 462, 463.
Paris, 72, 281, 348, 349, 374, 375,
401, 422, 435, 439, 460, 462,
463, 483, 484, 491, 495, 500.
Rome, 148, 281, 375.
St. Petersburgh, 72, 281, 375, 401, 422,

439, 460, 463, 495.
Vienna, 72, 247, 281, 375, 401, 422.
Congo. See that Title.
Despatch to Representatives Abroad
for Presentation to the respective
Governments, 461.
Documents of Secret Military Arrange-
ments between Great Britain
and Belgium, 577.
French Offer of Support and Belgian

Reply, 422, 425, 430.
German Assurance that Territory would

not be annexed, 457.
German Minister, Departure of, 435, 436.
German Minister's ♦'Notification to
Belgian Foreign Secretary of
Breaches of International Law
by France, 420.
German Proposal to, after Fall of Liege,
490, 492, 494, 498.
Belgian Reply, 494, 499.
British Approval of Reply, 497.
French Approval, 497.
Russian Approval, 499.
German Request of Free Passage of
Troops through, — Belgian Re-
fusal and British Protest, 455.
German Ultimatum and Reply, 402,

421, 424.

Germany declares War, 452.

Germany discovers Documents of Secret

Military Arrangements between

Great Britain and Belgium, 577.

Great Britain, Relations with, previous

to the Outbreak of War, 577.
Hostile Acts against Germany, 387.

Belgian Reply, 512.
Integrity of — , German Attitude, 303,

357. British Attitude, 456.
Interests in Germany entrusted to Span-
ish Ambassador, 436, 462, 463.
King Albert's Appeal to King George,

423, 455.
Military Arrangements between Great

Britain and Belgium, 677-680.
Military Preparations, 72, 283, 281, 442.
Minister at Luxemburg, 495.
Minister leaves Berlin, 462.
Mobilization ordered, 348.
Neutrality of —

Belgian Request for Assurance from

Germany, 401.
British Action in case of Violation,
406, 415, 424, 434, 438, 441, 456,
460, 595.
British Inquiry to Belgium, 351, 365,
366, 457.

Belgium — Cont.

Neutrality of — Cont.

French Reply, 221, 358, 373, 374,

378, 389.
German Reply (Refusal) 374, 378,
381, 387, 388, 397, 457.
French Assurances, 348.
German Assurance in 1911, 349.
German Assurance in 1913, 349.
Violation, alleged Violation of Belgian — ■
by Germany, 424, 430, 435, 441,
442, 457.
Violation through Secret Military Ar-
rangements between Great Brit-
ain and Belgium, 577-580.
German Chancellor's View, 436, 437.
German Justification, 457.
German Note to Belgian Govern-
ment, 433, 435, 441.
Note sent to Representatives abroad to be
delivered to the Various Powers
if occasion should arise, 72, 148.
Presentation of, 375.
Scheldt, Navigation of — , Correspond-
ence with Netherlands, 475,
476, 482.
Telegram to Representatives abroad
announcing German Ultimatum
and Reply, 422.
Belgrade,

Bombardment of, 354.
Berlin,

Alleged Attack on British Embassy, 485.
Demonstrations by Public, 156, 181, 199.
Bulgaria,

Declaration of Neutrality, 313.
Congo,

Belgian Attitude as to, 483.
British Attitude, 483, 505.
French Attitude, 483, 500.
France,

Ambassador to Germany — , Departure,

476.
Army Officers on Leave recalled, 298.
Attitude in case of Attack on Great

Britain, 337, 451.
Attitude in case of War between Ger-
many and Russia, German In-
quiry concerning, 347, 356.
Austro-Hungarian Troops believed on
French Frontier, 484, 490, 491,
496.
Austro-Serbian Relations —

See Title : Austria-Hungary, Serbia,
Relations with — , French Re-
ports of Events from Date of
Serajevo Murders to Austria's
Declaration of War.
Ultimatum of 23 July —

Advice to Servia regarding Reply,

160.
Attitude and Views, 87, 91, 161, 167.
Views on and Efforts, 53, 74, 77,
78, 81, 84, 187, 286.
See also Title : Mediation Proposals.
Belgian Reply to German Proposal after
Fall of Li6ge.

602

Index

France — Cont.

Belgian Reply — Cont.

Approval of, 497.
Belgium —

Appeal from — , 348, 442.
Assurance to, of Respect for Neu-
trality, 348.
Neutrality of —

Agreement for Joint Action in De-
fence, 463.
Reply to British Inquiry, 373, 374,

378, 389, 397.
Breach of International Law, 420.
Offer of Support to Belgium, 422,

425, 430.
Colonies — German refusal to give

undertakings as to, 303.
Communications with Representa-
tives at —
Athens, 430.
Basle, 213.
Bavaria, 543.
Belgrade, 75, 77, 78, 84, 156, 282,

288, 292, 430.
Beriin, 12, 38, 58, 75, 77, 78, 80,
81, 84, 149, 150, 153, 154, 155,
157, 181, 186, 213, 217, 218,
222, 224, 250, 252, 282, 286,
288, 323, 325, 326, 353, 355,
356, 375, 377, 378, 379, 384,
406, 408, 429.
Berne, 430.
. Brussels, 283, 358, 378, 424, 442.
Bucharest, 430.
Budapest, 19.
Christiania, 190, 430.
Constantinople, 217, 282, 288,

355, 379, 406, 430.
Copenhagen, 430, 476.
Frankfort, 283.
Hague, 424, 430.
London. 39, 53, 54, 58, 75, 77, 78,
83, 84. 150, 151, 153, 181,
184, 186, 213, 215, 216, 218,
219, 220, 224, 250, 251, 282,
288, 290, 291, 320, 324, 326,
351, 353, 355, 375, 378, 379,
381, 406, 407, 425, 426, 427,
430, 442.
Luxemburg, 190, 352, 383, 384,

404, 405, 464.
Madrid, 379, 406, 430.
Munich, 59, 284, 429.
Rome, 39, 53, 58, 75, 77, 78, 84,
155, 181, 183, 184, 186, 213,
221, 250, 281, 282, 288, 289,
353, 355, 375, 379, 406, 430.
St. Peterstfurgh, 15, 39, 53, 58, 75,

77, 78, 82, 84, 150, 152, 181,

184, 186, 213, 215, 217, 224,
250, 254, 282, 283, 285, 288,
292, 320, 321, 322, 353, 354,
355, 356, 357, 375, 379, 405,
406, 430.

Stockholm, 1, 8, 23, 29, 53, 75, 77,

78, 84, 150, 152, 156, 158, 181,

185, 186, 213, 215, 224, 250,

France — Cont.

Belgium, Neutrality of — Cont.

251, 282, 285, 287, 288, 323, 353,
355. 356, 375, 379, 406, 430.
Vienna, 1, 8, 23, 29, 53, 75, 77,
78, 84, 150, 152, 156, 158, 181,
185, 186, 213, 224, 250, 251,
254, 282, 285, 287, 288, 323,
353, 355, 356, 375, 379, 406,
430.
Congo. See that Title.
Declaration of Determination to sup-
port Russia, 314, 316.
Germany, Relations with —

German Ambassador leaves Paris,

389, 390.
German assurance not to attack
France if France remains neutral
in case of German-Russian War,
593.
German territory violated by French,
and French view, 427, 428, 429,
476.
War declared by Germany, 427, 429,
462.
Government Notification to Repre-
sentatives of the Powers at
Paris, 443.
London Embassy — Note regarding the
interview communicated by, 260.
Mediation Proposals, 91, 220, 227, 237,
248, 251, 252, 258, 260, 264,
286, 290, 313, 314.
Military Attach6 at Berlin — , Letter to

Minister of War, 532.
Military Preparations, 277, 320.
Mobilisation Ordered, 394, 397.
Naval Attache at Berlin — , Letter to

Minister of Marine, 534.
Peace, Declaration not to conclude

separate peace during war, 521.
President's Letter to King George,
351, 597.
The King's Reply, 598.
President's Message to French Parlia-
ment (4 August, 1914), 444.
President of the Council's Speech in
the Chamber of Deputies (4
August, 1914), 446.
Press, Note to — suggested by German

Ambassador, 187, 215.
Report to Minister of Foreign Affairs

(30 July, 1913), 541.
Summary of Events by Foreign Min-
ister, 313.
Telegram to French Representatives
Abroad on Declaration of War,
429.
Territory,

German Territory violated, 427,

428, 429, 476.
French Allegations of French — vio-
lated by Germany, 406, 408, 476.
Troops on the Border, 324, 393, 394,

396.
Warnings from Reports of Ambassadors
in 1913, 531.

Index

603

Germany,

Africa — Attacks, 505, 509.

Aims and Ambitions (French View in

1913), 531.
Ambassador preparing to leave Paris,

389, 390.
Army Officers on Leave Recalled, 213,

298.
Attitude if Russia mobilized on Aus-
trian Frontier only, 218, 326.
Attitude toward France if she remains
Neutral in case of German-
Russian War, 544.
Austro-Russian Relations, Advice to
Austria, 297.
See also Title: Mediation Proposals.
Austro-Serbian Relations,

Localisation of the Dispute desired,

56, 78, 90, 150, 172.
Mediation Proposals. See that Title.
Ultimatum of 23 July —

Denial of Prior Knowledge, 163,
166,-38, 53, 81, 149, 150,
153, 157, 250, — 172, 173, 174.
Prior Knowledge of — , "Private In-
formation unable to verify," 329.
Redrafting of certain articles pro-
posed by Russia, 197, 237.
Serbian Reply —

Non-publication of — (July 15),

272.
Views on, 192, 194.
Support of Austrian Action, Views
on, 90, 92, — 12, 39, 53, 54, 58,
59, 78, 80, 81, 151, 153, 155, 157,
181, 186, 187, 213, 215, 254, 282,
283, 286, 288, 379,-97, 172,
173, 174, 198,-21, 25, 27,—
500, 551.
See also Title: Mediation Proposals.
Belgian Minister leaves Berlin, 462.
Belgium,

Brussels Documents, 577.

Corn for Germany placed under

Embargo, 378.
Hostile Acts committed by Belgium

against Germany, 378.
Military Preparations — Secret Ar-
rangements with Germany, 577.
Belgian Defence against charges,
510.
Neutrality of —

Alleged Violation of, 424, 430,

435, 441, 442, 457.
Belgian Request for Formal Decla-
ration, 401.
French Attack upon Germany

through Belgium, 457.
Necessity to protect German Army
from French attack through
Belgium, 457.
Notification to Belgian Govern-
ment, 433, 435, 441.
Refusal to Reply to British Inquiry,
374, 387, 388, 397, 475.
Proposal after Fall of Li^ge, 490,
492, 494, 498.

Germany — Cont.

Belgium, Neutrality of — Cont,
Belgian Reply, 494, 499.
British Approval, 497.
French Approval, 497.
Russian Approval, 499.
Request for free Passage of Troops
— Belgian Refusal, British Pro-
test, 455.
Ultimatum to, and Reply, 402, 421,

442.
War declared by Germany, 442.
British Ambassador's final Interview
and Departure from Berlin, 485.
Communications with Representatives
at —
Berne, 225.
Kovno, 225.

London, 59, 159, 191, 226, 457.
Paris, 59, 191, 192, 292, 385, 395.
Rome, 358.
St. Petersburg, 59, 86, 159, 190, 191,

192, 225, 256, 327, 358, 384.
Vienna, 85, 257.
Congo. See that Title.
Emperor —

British Military and Naval Titles,

Renunciation of, 488.
Conversation with King of the
Belgians in the presence of
General von Moltke in 1913 —
Attitude, 549.
Czar's Telegrams from and to, 362,

367, 410, 557, 596.
King George, Telegrams to and

from, 592, 593, 594.
Returns to Berlin (26 July), 193.
France, relations with —

Allegations of Violations of Terri-
tory, 420, 427, 428, 429, 477, —
406, 408, 477.
Inquiry as to Attitude in event of
War between Germany and
Russia, 347.
French Reply: "France would
do that which her interests dic-
tated," 347, 385.
War declared by Germany, 427, 429.
French Ambassador's Departure (Re-
port) , 476.
French Colonies — Refusal to give

Undertaking as to, 303.
French Military and Naval Attache's
Letter to Ministers (1913), 532,
534.
Great Britain —

Military and Naval Preparations,
Assurance that Measures had
no aggressive character, 343.
Neutrality —

Efforts to obtain Assurance of,
303, 381, 426.
British Reply, 334, 362.
Views on, 286.
Ships, Detention of, 391, 413, 416, 430,

456.
Ultimatum from, 432, 437, 441, 442.

604

Index

Germany — Cont.

Great Britain — cont.

War declared by Great Britain, 460.
Imperial Chancellor's Speech before
Reichstag, on 4 August, 573.
Interests in Belgium entrusted to
United States Minister, 436, 496.
Japanese Ultimatum, 506.

German decision not to reply, 508.
* ' Kriegsgef ahrzustand ' ' declared, 356,

364, 394.
Luxemburg — Neutrality, 352, 401, 404,
405, 408, 413, 414, 415, 424, 430.
Chancellor's View, 436.
Mediation proposals. Attitude towards,
34, 163, 227, 229, 261, 265, 294,
301, 303, 310, 329, 360, 361,
362,-213, 218, 222, 249, 250,
252, 286, 325, 326, 355,-198,
235, 312, 313, 314, 341, 342,
— 212, — 159, 226, 241, 256,
257, 554, 555, 557, 594, 595.
Military and Naval Preparations, 331.
Commencement, 284, 340, 364, 365.
Minister leaves Serbia, 481.
Mobilization,

Action to be taken in event of Rus-
sian Mobilization, 227, 364.
Alleged Mobilization of Army and

Navy, 342, 384, 412.
Official Denial, 323.
Ordered, 409.
Preliminary Steps, 323, 324, 356, 364,

370, 394.
Secret — Alleged Secret Measures,
357, 381, 397.
Naval Preparations, 190, 321.
Notification to Belgium of Breaches of
International Law by France, 420.
Seeking to gain time — Russian
view, 322.
Prince Henry — Telegrams to and from

King George, 592.
Reservists ordered to hold themselves
in readiness, French Report, 190.
Responsibility for War on Russia, —

Russian Defence, 419.
Russia, relations with —

Ultimatum to Russia requiring De-
mobilization, 278, 292, 316, 320,
322, 347, 356, 366, 375, 377, 386,
389, 390, 395, 396, 401.
War declared by Germany, 398, 400,
405, 406.
Secret French Report concerning Arms,
Aims and Obligations of the
National Policy, 538.
Summary of Events, 551.
Support of Austria-Hungary, 172, 173,

174, 261.
War not desired, 161, 163.

Contrary British and French Reports,
375, 377, 411.
Great Britain,

Ambassador to Austria Hungary —
Summary of Events from 22
July, 514.

Great Britain — Cont.

Ambassador to Berlin, Final Interview

and Departure, 485.
Assurance to France that Fleet will
protect French Coasts and Ship-
ping against German Fleet, 415.
Attitude if France and Russia reject

Reasonable Proposal, 363.
Attitude in case of Violation of Bel-
gium, 595.
Attitude in case of War between Ger-
many, Russia and France, 595,
596.
Attitude in Event of an Attack on
France, or a General War, 174,
216, 238, 241, 305, 307, 326, 334,
335, 337, 351, 366, 368, 381, 388,
415.
Correspondence between Sir E. Grey
and M. Paul Cambon (Novem-
ber, 1912), 337.
Russia expects that England will
side definitely with her, 172.
Austria-Hungary —

Relations with, 432, 468.
War declared by Great Britain, 498,
520.
Austro-Russian Relations —

Attitude, 305.
Austro-Servian Relations —

Attitude, 54, 74, 83, 84, 150, 151,
153, 181, 213, 218, 219, 243,
244, 291, 305. See also Media-
tion Proposals.
Ultimatum of 23 July —

Attitude, 66, 86, 91, 92, 93, 161,
165.
Servian Reply, Views on, 93, 165,

229, 238, 281.
Time-limit, Extension, Proposals
for —
Attitude, 92.
Belgian King's Appeal to King George,
423, 455.
Belgian Reply to German Proposal
after Fall of Li6ge, Approval of,
497.
Belgium —

Appeal from, 442.
Neutrality of —

Actions to be taken, 406, 415,
424, 426, 434, 438, 441, 456,
460, 595, 596.
Agreement for Joint Action, 462,

463.
Inquiry to Belgium, 348, 366.

Belgian Reply, 391.
Inquiry to France and Germany,
351, 365, 366, 457.
French Reply, 358, 378.
German Refusal to Reply, 378,
381.
Protest against German Demand
to Belgium to allow Free Pas-
sage of Troops, 455.
Relations previous to the Outbreak
of the War, 577.

Index

605;

Great Britain — Cont.

Communications with Representatives
at —

Belgrade, 90, 93, 164, 165, 196,
267, 268, 302.

Berlin, 34, 56, 92, 163, 166, 168,
193, 194, 227, 229, 265, 268,
270, 294, 297, 298, 299, 303,
306, 307, 308, 332, 334, 335, 361,
362, 364, 365, 386, 387, 388, 391,

392, 393, 409, 412, 413, 416,
430, 455, 456, 457.

Brussels, 366, 391, 413, 430, 456,
457.

Constantinople, 302.

Luxemburg, 408, 414.

Paris, 91, 160, 161, 168, 194, 195,
227, 258, 264, 305, 333, 336,
337, 365, 366, 368, 389, 390,

393, 394, 396, 415, 431.
Rome, 61, 164, 168, 194, 233, 263,

266, 267, 301, 302, 305, 310,
334, 360.
St. Petersburgh, 87, 160, 161, 165,
168, 228, 229, 230, 261, 270, 295,
299, 300, 335, 363, 365, 385,

394, 410.

Vienna, 61, 86, 89, 164, 167, 192,

196, 226, 231, 259, 262, 265, 296,

297, 300, 309, 329, 330, 367,

391, 395, 411, 514.

Congo. See that Title.

Declaration of Intention to support

France, 333.
Fleet —

Mobilized, 381.

Non-dispersal of, after Review, 218,

230, 231.
Protection assured to French Coasts
and French Shipping, 381, 406,
407, 425, 453.
Germany —

Ultimatum to, 432, 437, 441, 442, 457.
War declared by Great Britain, 460,
488.
King George —

Letters from French President, 351,
392.
The King's Reply, 598.
Personal Message to the Czar, 590.

The Czar's Reply, 591.
Telegrams from and to German Em-
peror, 593, 594.
Telegrams to and from Prince Henry
of Prussia, 592.
Luxemburg — Neutrality, British Atti-
tude, 406.
Mediation Proposals, 241, 247, — 91,
92, 194, 195, 228, 265, 268, 270,
294, 305, 306, 308, 363, — - 213
219, 291, — 174, 233, 396, —
590, 592, 593, 594.
Military and Naval Preparations —
German Inquiry and British Reply,

343.
Secret — with Belgium, 577.
Navy — See Subheading: Fleet above.

Great Britain — '■ Cont.

Neutrality of, 87, 161, 165, 230.

German Efforts to obtain Assurance

of, 303, 381, 426.
British Reply, 334, 362.
German Views, 286.
Parliament — Support of Government

PoHcy, 427.
Peace — Agreement not to conclude
separate Peace during War,
621.
Serbian Appeal, 99, 219.
Serbian Prime Minister's Thanks for
Speech in House of Commons
on 27 July, 302.
Ships, Detention of, 391, 413, 416, 430,
456.
Holland. See Title: Netherlands.
Italy,

Austro-Serbian Relations —

Mediation Proposals, See Title: Me-
diation Proposals.
Ultimatum of 23 July, Time limit —
Extension, proposals for, and atti-
tude, 196.
Views on, and Efforts, 28, 53, 78,

168, 181, 183, 184, 267.
See also Title: Mediation Proposals.
Declaration of Neutrality, 379, 431.
Mediation Proposals, 194, 220, 221,

233, 263, 281, 360.
Position of, with regard to the Austrian
Note to Servia, 149, 181, 183,
184, 186, 221.
Japan,

Austria-Hungary — Relations broken

off, 508.
Declaration of Neutrality as regards
Austria-Hungary, Germany, and
Russia, while having no interest
in Servia, 241.
Ultimatum to Germany, 506.

German Decision not to Reply, 508.
Luxemburg,

Belgian Minister's Departure, 495.
French Minister's Departure, 464.
Minister of State — Telegrams to Sir

E. Grey (2 August), 408, 414.
Neutrality of —

British Attitude, 406.

Inquiry to France and Germany,

352, 383.
French Reply, 384.
German Reply, 405.
German Military Measures to insure
against attack by French Army,
352, 401, 404, 405, 408, 413,
414, 415, 424.
Chancellor's View, 436.
Mediation Proposals, 163, 165, 166.

Austria-Hungary, Attitude, 241, 276,
278, 280, 345, 373,-265, 302,
328, 329, 392, 393, 394, — 254,
375, 377, 397.
France, Attitude, 91, 227, 258, 260,
264,-220, 248, 251, 252, 286,
290, — 237, 313, 314.

606

Index

Mediation Proposals — Cont.

Germany, Attitude, 592, 593, 594,

— 34, 163, 227, 229, 261, 265,
294, 301, 303, 310, 329, 360, 361,
362,-213, 218, 222, 249, 250,
252, 286, 325, 326, 355, — 198,
235, 312, 314, 341, 342,-212,

— 554, — 159, 226, 241, 256, 257.
Great Britain, Attitude, 241, 247, —

590, 592, 593, 594,-91, 92,
194, 195, 228, 265, 268, 270,
299, 305, 306, 308, 363,-213,

219, 291, — 174, 233, 396.
Italian Views, 194, 233, 263, 360,—

220, 221, 281.

Occupation of Belgrade or other point
a condition of accepting Media-
tion, 332, 335, 353.
Russia, Attitude, — 243, 278, — 590,
596,-260, 261, 262, 294, 297,
299, 328, 385, 392, 393,-283,
321, 322, 323, 353, 354, 381,—
272, 341, 370.
Serbia, Attitude, 53, 54, 58, 78.
Urgency of Action, 272.
Netherlands,

British Information that Great Britain
expects — will resist German pres-
sure and Offer of Support, 195.
Declaration of Neutrality, 468.
Integrity of — German Assurance, 303.
War Buoying in the Scheldt, 434, 463,
475, 476, 482.
Norway,

British Information that Great Britain
expects — will resist German
pressure and Offer of Support,
195.
Peace,

Agreement of Allies not to conclude
separate Peace during War, 521.
Efforts. See Title: Mediation Proposals.
Russia,

Austro-Hungary, Relations with —
Direct Conversations, proposals for,
185, 229, 251, 252, 254, 286,
323, 363.
Refusal, 285, 287, 297.
Engagement to stop Military Prep-
arations if Austria takes cer-
tain course, 331, 333.
German Advice, 297.
Mediation Proposals. See that Title.
War declared by Austria, 459, 481.
Austro-Serbian Relations —

Austrian Statement that her Declara^
tion of Readiness to respect Ser-
bian Integrity and Sovereign
Rights had been received by
Russia in Silence — Contradic-
tion by Russian Ambassador in
Paris, 398.
Ultimatum of 23 July —

Redrafting of certain Articles pro-
posed by Russia, 197.
German Attitude, 237.
Serbian Reply, Views on, 235.

Russia — Cont.

Austro-Serbian Relations — Cont.
Ultimatum of 23 July — Cont.

Time limit, Extension, proposals
for, views on, 160, 167, 196.
Views on and Attitude, 71, 179, 202,
278, 280, 347, 373,-87, 89,
161, 168, 193, 228, 261, 367,—
15, 53, 58, 74, 82, 83, 84, 152,
153, 154, 155, 156, 181, 184, 185,
217, — 170, 196, 237, 238.
*See also Mediation Proposals.
Belgium —

Appeal from, 442.
Neutrality of —

Agreement for Joint Action, 463.
Reply to German Proposal after
Fall of Li6ge, 499.
Communications with Representa-
tives at —
Belgrade, 63, 94, 98, 170, 174.
Berlin, 96, 97, 171, 198, 199, 235,
237, 272, 294, 310, 312, 341, 342,
370.
Fiume, 270.

London, 260, 261, 294, 328,—
94, 96, 171, 172, 174, 233, 234,
235, 238, 270, 272, 312, 314, 341,
333, 370, 371, 396, 397.
Nish, 316, 340.

Paris, 94, 96, 97, 171, 173, 198,
199, 234, 235, 312, 314, 316,
341, 370, 397, 398.
Prague, 197.

Rome, 94, 96, 196, 235, 341, 370.
Vienna, 94, 170, 197, 235, 238,
271, 272, 328, 341, 369, 370.
Czar —

Personal Message from King
George, 590.
The Czar's Reply, 591.
Telegrams to and from German
Emperor, 362, 367, 410, 454,
596.
French Declaration of Determination

to Support, 314, 316.
Germany puts Responsibility for War

on Russia, 215, 282, 381, 482.
Germany, Relations with, 63.
German Ultimatum requiring De-
mobilization, 366, 386, 389, 390,
409, 411, 316, 396, 278, 347.
Germany declares War, 405, 406,

— 398, — 400.
Germany's Reasons for War with

Russia, 551.

Great Britain, Expectations that

England will side with Russia

and France, 172.

Mediation Proposals, Attitude and

Efforts, 260, 261, 262, 294, 297,

299, 328, 385, 392, 393,-283,

321, 322, 323, 353, 354, 381,—

237, 341, 370, — 243, 278, — 586.

Mobilisation, 294, 298, 299, 362,

364, 365, 391, 288, 289,

292, 320, 323, 357,-288, 289,

Index

607

Russia — Cont.

Mobilisation — Cont.

292, 320, 323, 357,-225,—
312, 370, — 246, 280, 346.
Denial, Russian — of Mobilisa-
tion, 179.
Offer to Stop Military Prepara-
tions if Austria takes certain
course, 322.
Suspension of, 321.
Vienna Press did not publish
Russian Communication, Ex-
planation, 323.
Mobilisation against Austria
immediately, if Austrian
Troops Cross Servian Frontier,
295.
Peace, Declaration not to con-
clude separate Peace during
War, 521.
Troops Cross German Frontier,

413.
Unreadiness for War, 294.
Salonica,

Austrian Designs as to, British View,
302.
Sandjak,

Austria has no intentions to advance
into or occupy, 385, 389.
British View, 302.
Scheldt,

War Buoying Measures, 434, 464, 475,
476, 482.
Serajevo Murders,

1, 2, 3, 4, 8.

Austrian Dossier sent to the Powers, 101.

Austrian a^d Serbian View, 2, 3, 4,
5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 15, 18, 20, 21,
22, 25, 27, 28, 31, 500, 527.

Austrian Official Reports of State of
Serbian Feeling, 2, 3, 6, 14, 36.

Criminal Inquiry, Conclusions of, 86.

Extracts from Records of the Court
at Serajevo touching the Pro-
ceedings against Gavrilo Princip
and Confederate, 130.

Nish Local Committee of Narodna
Odbrana, 138.

Origin of the Plot, 131.

Origin of the Bombs, 132.

Reports from Austria and Serbian Alle-
gations, 4, 5, 6, 7.

Serbian Press Comments, 135.

Transport of Assailants, and of the Wea-
pons from Servia to Bosnia, 133.
Serbia,

Amsfeld Anniversary, Celebration of,

2, 6.

Appeal to Great Britain, 99, 219.
Appeal to the Powers, 98.
Austro-Hungary, Relations with —
Austrian Intentions, 302, 369.
Austrian Minister leaves Belgrade,
174, — 158, 186, — 165, 192, 194.
Austrian Official Reports as to
Serbian Feelings towards Austria,
2, 3, 6, 14, 36.

Serbia — Cont.

Austro-Hungary, Relations with — Cont.
Austrian Statement that her Decla-
ration of Readiness to Respect
Serbian Integrity and Sovereign
Rights had been Received by
Russia in Silence — Contradic-
tion, 398.
See also Title; Mediation Proposals.

Berlin Press, Attitude, 97.

British Attitude, 305, — 54, 74, 83,
84, 150, 151, 153, 181, 213, 218,
219, 291, — 174, — 243, 244.
See also Title: Mediation Proposals.

Events from Date of Serajevo Mur-
ders to Presentation of Austrian
Note to Serbia of 23 July —
French Reports, and French
Attitude and Reports. See Title:
Austria-Hungary, French Atti-
tude and French Reports.

German Views and Attitude, 551, —
21, 25, 27, — 482, 500, — 12,
39, 53, 54, 58, 59, 78, 80, 81,
151, 153, 155, 157, 181, 186,
187, 213, 215, 254, 282, 283,
286, 288, 379,-97, 172, 173,
174, 198.
See also Title: Mediation Proposals.

Italian Views and Attitude, 53, 78,
181, 183, 184, — 28.

Localisation of the Dispute, — German
Statement, 56, 78, 90, 150, 172.

Mediation Proposals. See that Title.

Military Action, 163, 196, 226.

Military Operations not to be under-
taken immediately, 166, 167.

Narodna Odbrana Society —

Appeal of, in Servian Official Gazette,

123.
Nish Local Committee — Attitude

on Serajevo Murders, 138.
Organization and Work of — , 101,

116, 124.
Work of — , Deposition by Trifko
Krstanovic, 124.

Non-interference by the Powers. See
Subhead, Localisation of Dispute,
above.

Occupation of Belgrade or other Towns
as a Basis for Negotiations, 332,
335, 353.

Russian Views and Attitude, 71, 179,
202, 278, 280, 347, 373,-168,
193, — 15, 53, 58, 74. 82, 83,
84, 152, 153, 154, 155, 196,
237, 238.
See also Title: Mediation Proposals.

Serbia's willingness to entertain require-
ments, provided that only judi-
cial cooperation is asked by
Austria, 38.

Serbian Appeal to the Powers, Possi-
bility of, 161.

Serbian Attitude and Views, 53, 54,
78, — 4, 6, 31.

Serbian Note of 1908, 86, 161, 261.

608

Index

Serbia — Cont.

Serbian Preparations before Delivery

of Austrian Note, 141, 180.
Serbian Press, Hostile Attitude prior

to Serajevo Murders, 112.
Serbian Territory not to be seized,

14, 203, — 163, 308, 309, 395.
Serbian War Office — Pictures of a nature
hostile to Austria-Hungary, 140.
Situation before Presentation of Ulti-
matum of 23 July, 34, 56, 61, 86.
Sokol Society Dusan the Strong —
Report on the Activities of — , in
Kragujevac, 121.
Special Points for Great Britain, 243.
Turkish Views, 217.

Ultimatum of 23 July, 86, 90, — 63, —
64, 98, 99,-75, 78, 158.
Austrian Official Commentary, 51.
Austrian Statement that Note is not
an Ultimatum but a D-marche
with a time limit, 160, 161, 236.
Austro-Hungarian Views, 86, 89.
British Views regarding Reply, 93, 165.
British Attitude, 66,-86, 91, 92, 93,

161, 165.
French Advice to Serbia Regarding

Reply, 160.
French Attitude and Views, 87, 91,

160, 161, — 67.

German Attitude and Views, 90, 92.

German Denial of Prior Knowledge,

163, 166, — 38, 53, 81, 149, 150,

153, 187, 250, — 172, 173, 174.

German Prior Knowledge ("unable

to confirm"), 329.
German Support of Austrian Action,

172, 173, 174.
Italian Views, 267.

Point 5 — Austrian Explanation, 148.
Redrafting of certain articles proposed
by Russia, 197.
German Attitude, 237.
Russian Attitude and Views, 69, 70, —

87, 161, 228, 261, 367, 191.
Serbian Attitude, 90.
Serbian Reply, 164, 169, 175, 195, —
156, 157, 158.
Austrian Official Commentaries.
Austrian Views, 198, 221, 251.
British Views, 229, 231, 238.
German Views, 192, 194, 235.
Non-publication of in German
Press, 272.

Serbia — Cont.

Ultimatum, Serbian Reply to — Cont.
Refusal of Austria to accept, 174,

231, 236.
Russian Views, 235.
Special Points to be brought before

Great Britain, 57, 65.
Time Limit —
Dangers of, 61.

Proposal for Extension, 152-158,
170, 171, 181.
Austrian Refusal, 140, 141.
British Attitude, 290.
German Attitude, 163.
Italian Attitude, 196.
Russian Attitude, 160, 167,
396.
Unconditional Acceptance de-
manded, 164.
War Declared by Austria-Hungary,
241, 268, 296,-247, —273, 344,
359.
British Charg6 d'Affaires Leaves Bel-
grade with Serbian Government,
165.
Government Leaves Belgrade, 165,

174, 176.
Integrity to be respected, 264.
Kragujevac — Work of Sokol Society

Dusan the Strong, 121.
Mediation Proposals, Attitude

towards, 53, 54, 58, 78.
Minister Leaves Berlin, 458.
Minister Leaves Vienna, 177.
Mobilisation Ordered, 142, 176.
Prince Regent —

Appeal to the Czar, 292, — 96.

The Czar's Reply, 237, 315.
Speech from the Throne to the
Skupschtina after Declaration of
War, 340.
Summary of Events by Minister at
Vienna, 500.
Triple Entente. See also Names of the
Powers.
Declaration not to conclude separate
Peace during War, 531*.
Turkey,

Austro-Servian Relations, Views on,
217.
Vienna,

Demonstrations, 8, 9.
War between Great Powers,
German Attitude, 294.

Printed in the United States of America.

APPENDIX

THE SEVERAL OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF COLLECTED
DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS IN PHOTOGRAPHIC RE-
PRODUCTION

K. U. K. MINISTERIUM DES AUSSERN.

DIPLOMATISCHE ARTENSTUCKE

ZUR

YORGESCHICHTE des RRIEGES

1914.

WIEN 1915.

AUS DER K. K. HOF UND STAATSDRUCKEREI.

INHALTSVERZEICHNIS.

Seitc

1. Legationsrat Ritter von Storck, Belgrad, 29. Juni 1914. Freudenkund-
gebungen in Belgrad bei der Nackriclit von der Ermordong des *Herm
Erzherzogs Thronfolgers 1

2. Legationsrat Ritter von Storck, Belgrad, 30. Juni 1914. Die serbische
Polizei hat keine Mafinahmen getroffen, um die Faden des Attentates

in Serbien zu verfolgen 2

3. Generalkonsul Jeblitscbka, tlskiib, 1. Juli 1914. Freudenkundgebungen

in tiskiib und Pristina bei Bekanntwerden des Attentates in Sarajevo 2

4. Graf Sz^csen, Paris, 4. Juli 1914. Der Prasident der franzosischen
Republik spricbt die Uberzeugung aus, die serbische Regierung werde
Osterreich-Ungarn bei der gerichtlichen Untersuchung und der Verfol-
gung eventueller Mitschuldiger Entgegenkommen zeigen 3

5. Gerent Herr Hoflehner, Nisch, 6. Juli 1914. Freudige Genugtuung in
Nisch liber das Sarajevoer Attentat 4

6. Freiherr von Giesl, Belgrad, 21. Juli 1914. Die Politik Serbiens verfolgt
nur ein Ziel, die Abtrennung der von Siidslawen bewohnten Gebiete
Osterreich-Ungarns und dessen schlieMche Vemichtung als Groiimacht.
Serbische Prelikampagne voU Liige, Hali und Geringschatzung. Eine
weitere Schadigung der Stellung der Monarchie kann nicht mehr zu-
gelassen werden 4

7. An FreiheiTn von Giesl in Belgrad, Wien, 22. Juli 1914. Note der

k. u. k. Regierung an die serbische Regierung 7

8. An die k. u. k. Botschafter in Berlin, Rom, Paris, London, St. Petersburg
und Konstantinopel, Wien, 22. JuH 1914. Mitteilung der an die serbische
Regierung gerichteten Note. Kommentar zu dieser Note, in welchem
die serbischen Machenschaften und Umtriebe gegen die Monarchie,
sowie die Gninde dargelegt werden, aus denen die k. u. k. Regierung
der provokatorischen Haltung Serbiens gegeniiber so yiel Langmut
bewahrte 11

Seite

9. An Graf Mensdorff in London, Wien, 23. Juli 1914. Die serblsche
Regierung hat keinerlei Mafinahmen zur Aufdeckung der nach Belgrad
weisenden Spuren des Sarajevoer Attentates ergriifen, sondern vieliiiehr
getrachtet, diese Spuren zu verwischen. Die kurze Befristung der an
Serbien gerichteten Forderungen war unerlaOlich, uni den der k. u. k.
Regierung aus langjahrigen Erfahrungen woUbekannten serbischen Ver-
scbleppungskiinsten keine Handbabe zu bieten . 13

10. Graf Mensdorff, London, 24. Juli 1914. Mitteilung der an Serbien ge-
richteten Note an Sir E. Grey, der Bedenken gegen die kurze Be-
fristung und Besorgnis wegen der Riickwirkung auf den europaischen
Frieden aulierte. Darlegung des Standpunktes der k. u. k. Rjegierung;
Verteidigung unserer vitalsten Interessen; Volikommener Milierfolg der
Serbien gegeniiber bisher stets beobachteten konzilianten Haltung . . 14r

11. Graf Sz6csen, Paris, 24. Juli 1914. Mitteilung der an Serbien gerich-
teten Note und Darlegung des Standpunktes dejr k. u. k. Regierung:
Es handle sich um eine Frage, welche direkt zwischen Osterreich-
Ungarn und Serbien ausgetragen werden muli; das Aufhoren der
durch die serbische Wiihlarbeit seit Jahren verursaohten Unruhe liege
aber im allgemeinen europaischen Interesse. Der interimistische fran-
zosi.sche Minister des Auliern vermied, die Haltung Serbiens irgend-
•wie zu beschbnigen oder zu yerteidigen 15

12. Graf Sz6esen, Paris, 24. Juli 1914. Deutscher Botschafter ist beauf-
tragt, dem franzbsisohen Kabinett die Auffassung seiner Regierung
mitzuteilen, dafi serbischer Streitfall Angelegenheit sei, die nur Oster-
reich-Ungarn und Serbien angehe 1$'

13. Graf Sz6csen, Paris, 24. Juli 1914. Deutscher Botschafter hat Auftrag
ausgefuhrt. Franzosische Regierung teilt deutsche Auffassung und hofft,
dafi die Kontroverse eine direkte und friedliche Losung finden
werde < . . 1&

14. Graf Szdpary, St. Petersburg, 24. Juli .1914. Mitteilung der an
Serbien gerichteten Note und Erorterung des osterreichisch-ungari-^
schen Standpunktes. Einwendungen Herrn Sazonows. Auf seine Dar-
stellungsweise, als ob Osterreich-Ungarn den Krieg -wolle, wurde
erwidert, die Monarchie sei die friedliebendste Macht der Welt, dock
miisse der Bedrohung unserer Dynastie durch serbische Bomben und
unseres Territoriums durch die serbischen revolutionaren Umtriebe ein
Ende bereitet werden 1?

15. Russisches Communiqu6, 24. Juli 1914. Rutland konne einem oster-
reichisch-ungarisch-serbischen Konflikte gegeniiber nicht indifferent
bleiben , 1$

Seitd

16. Graf Szapary, St. Petersburg, 24. Juli 1914. Der Bemerkung des
russischen Ministers des AuBem gegeniiber, Streitfall zwiscben Cster-
reicb-Ungarn und Serbien sei keine auf diese Staaten bescbrankte
Angelegenbeit und Ruliland konne es nicbt gleicbgiltig binnebmen,
wenn Osterreicb-Ungarn die Absicbt hatte, Serbien „aufziifressen"^
antwortete deutscber Botscbafter, Osterreicb-Ungarn liege dies voUig
feme, eine Einmiscbung in seine Differenz riiit Serbien konne es.
jedocb nicbt zugeben . IS

17. An Gr^af MensdorfF in London, Wien, 24. Juli 1914. Schritt in Belgrad
bat nicbt Cbarakter eines formellen Ultimatums, sondern einer befristeten
Demarcbe • 19

18. An Graf Szapary in St. Petersburg, Wien, 24. Juli 1914. Es .wurde
dem russiscben Gescbaftstrager erklart, dali Osterreicb-Ungarn keiner
Demiitigung Serbiens und keine Gebietserwerbung bezwecke, sondern.
nur die Erbaltung des Bestebenden, sowie die Verurteilung und Unter-
driickung der gegen den Bestand der Monarcbie gericbteten grofi-
serbiscben Stromungen , ■ . . 20

19. An die k. u. k. Botscbafter in Berlin, Rom, Paris, London, St. Peters-
burg und Konstantinopel, Wien, 25. Juli 1914. Dossier, betrefiend
die groftserbis'cbe Propaganda und ibre Zusammenbange mit dem
Sarajevoer Attentate ..,..., 21

20. An Sektionscbef Freiberrn von Maccbio in Wien, Lambacb, 25. Juli
1914. Dem vom russiscben Gescbaftstrager in Wien gestellten Ver-
langen einer Fristerstreckun^ fiir die an Serbien gericbteten Forde-
rungen kann nicbt stattgegeben werden ............ 69

21. An. Graf Szdpary in St. Petersburg, Bad Iscbl, 2.5. Juli 1914. Mit-
teilung und Begriindung dieses ablebnenden Standpmiktes ..... 69

22. Freiberr von Giesl, Belgrad, 25. Juli 1914. Administrative und mili-
tariscbe Vorbereitungen in Serbien »..-.. 70

23. Freiberr von Giesl, Semlin, 25. Juli 1914. Allgemeine Mobilisierung

in Serbien angeordnet 70

24. Freiberr von Giesl, Semlin. 25. Juli 1914. Abbrucb der diploma-
tiscben Beziebungen zu Serbien infolge ungeniigender Antwort der
Beigrader Regierung auf die osterreicbiscb-ungariscbe Note . . . , 71 '

."25. Note der konigHcb serbiscben Regierung vom 12./25. Juli 1914 . . 71
26. An Graf Szapary in St. Petersburg, Wien, 25. Juli 1914. Die k. u. k.
Regierung konnte sicb durcb die Moglicbkeit eines. Zusammenstofies
mit Ruliland nicbt in ibrer Stellungnabme gegen Serbien beirren
lassen, weil grundlegende staatspolitiscbe Konsiderationen Osterreicb-
Ungarn vor die Notwendigkeit stellten, der Situation ein Ende zu
bereiten, dafi ein russiscber Freibrief Serbien die dauernde ungestrafte

"VI

• Seitd

und anstrafbare Bedrohnng der MonarcHe ermogliclie. Die k. n. k.
Regiercng hofft, dafi Euiiland im Hinblicke 'auf das den Balkanstaaten
bisher bewiesene WoblwoUen Osterreich-Ungarns und auf die Erkla-
rung der k. u. k. Regierung, dafi sie keinerlei territorialen Gewinn
anstrebe und die Souveranitat Serbiens nicht antasten wolle, niclit
in die Aktion Osterreicb-Ungams gegen Serbien eingreifen werde . . 74

27. An Graf Szdpdry in St. Petersburg, Wien, 25. Juli 1914. Die For-
derung der Beteiligung von k. u. k. Funktionaren bei der Unter-
driickung der subversiven Bewegung in Serbien entsprang lediglich
praktiscben Eiicksichten und niclit der Absicbt, die Souveranitat
Serbiens zu tangieren . . . . , » . . . 77

28. Graf Szdpdry, St. Petersburg, 26. Juli 1914. Deutscher Botschafter in
St. Petersburg warnt russischen Minister des Auliern, dali russiscbe
Mobilisierungsmafinahmen gegen Deutschland unaufhaltsam den Krieg
herbeifiiliren wiirden. Deutscber Militarattach6 erklart russischem
Kriegsminister, Mobilmachung gegen Osterreicb-Ungam wiirde eine sehr
bedrohlicbe Situation ber\^orrufen. Kriegsminister gibt sein Ehrenwort,
dafi keinerlei Mobilmachungsordre ergangen 77

29. An Graf Mensdorff in London, Wien, 26. Juli 1914. Auftrag, Sir E.
Grey aufmerksam zu machen, dafi die scbon drei Stunden vor Uber-
reichung der serbiscben Antwortnote angeordnete allgemeine Mobi-
Hsierung der serbiscben Armee beweise, wie wenig Neigung in Belgrad
zu einer friedlicben Austragung des Streifalles bestand und wie unauf-
ricbtig der angeblicb versobnlicbe Tenor der serbiscben Erklarung sei . 78

30. An die k. u. k. Botscbafter in Berlin, Rom, London, Paris und St. Peters-
burg, Wien, 26. Juli 1914. Angesicbts der Ablebnung der bsterreicbisch-
ungariscb.en Forderungen seitens der serbiscben Regierung sielit sicb
die ki u. k. Regierung in die Notwendigkeit versetzt, Serbien zu einer
grundsatzlicben Anderung seiner bisberigen feindseligen Haltung zu
zwingen 78

31. Graf Szdpdry, St. Petersburg, 27. Juli 1914. Der k. u. k. Botschafter
erklart dem russischen Minister des Aufiem, daft Osterreich-Ungarn
ein Vorstofi am Balkan oder gar ein Praventivkrieg gegen Ruftland
vollig feme liege. Das Ziel unserer Aktion sei Selbsterhaltung und
Notwehr. Osterreich-Ungarn babe keineswegs die Absicbt, russiscbe
Interressen zu bedrohen oder gar mit Ruftland Streit suchen zu
wollen. Erorterung der an Serbien gestellten Forderungen Osterreich-
Ungarns 79

32. An Graf Szdpiry in St. Petersburg, Wien, 27. Juli 1914. K. u. k.
Regierung erklart, daft die Monarchic, solange der Krieg zwischen

VII

Seite
Gsterreicli-Ungarn und Serbien lokalisiert bleibe, keinerlei territoriale ,
Eroberungen beabsicbtige 80

33. Graf Szogy^ny, Berlin, 27. Juli 1914. „Militarische Vorsorgen" in
Ruliland 80

34. An die k. u. k. Botscbafter in Berlin, Rom, London, Paris und
St. Petersburg, Wien, 27. Juli 1914. Mitteilung der Note der konig-
licb serbiscben Regierung vom 12./25. Juli 1914 und des Kom-
mentares der k. u. k. Regierung zu dieser Note . 1 80

35. Graf Szogy^ny, Berlin, 28. Juli 1914. Der engliscbe Vorscblag, den
osterreicbisch-ungariscb-serbiscben Streitfall einer in London abzu-
baltenden Konferenz zur Regelung zu iiberlassen, wurde ^ron Deutscb-
land abgelebnt, da es seinen . Bundesgenossen in der Auseinander-
setzung mit Serbien nicbt vor ein europaiscbes Gericbt zieben lassen
konne 90

36. Freiberr von Miiller, Tokio, 28. Juli, 1914. Erklarung der offiziosen
japaniscben „ Times", dali die japaniscbe Regierung im Kriegsfalle
strengste Neutralitat bewahren werde 90

37. Note an das koniglich serbiscbe Ministerium des Auliern, Wien,

28. Juli 1914. Kriegserklarung an Serbien 90

38. An Graf Szogy6ny in Berlin, Wien, 28. JuH 1914. Es ist Sir E. Grey
dargelegt worden, dali Osterreicb-Ungarn weder territoriale Erobe-
rungen nocb die Vernicbtung der serbiscben Unabbangigkeit beab-
sicbtige, sondern Genugtuung fiir die Vergangenbeit und Garantien

•fiir die Zukunft verlange. Der engliscbe Konferenzvorscblag erscbeint,
insoweit er sicb auf unseren Konflikt mit Serbien beziebt, angesicbts
des eingetretenen Kriegszustandes durcb die Ereignisse uberbolt.
Konzentrierung der engliscben Flotte 91

39. An Graf Mensdorff in London, Wien, 28. Juli 1914. Auftrag, Sir
E. Grey die groGserbische Propaganda und ibre Zusammenbange mit
dem Sarajevoer Morde auseinanderzusetzen und ibm darzulegen, dali
das Entgegenkommen der serbiscben Antwortnote nur ein scbein-
bares war, bestimmt, Europa zu tauscben, so dali keinerlei Garantien

fiir die Zukunft geboten waren 92

40. An Graf Szdpdry in St. Petersburg, Wien, 28. Juli 1914. Wunscb der
russiscben Regierung, mit dem Wiener Kabinette bebufs Abanderung
einzelner seitens Osterreicb-Ungarns an Serbien gerichteten Forde-
rungen zu verbandeln. Dieser Wunscb muiite abgelebnt werden, da
die gestellten Forderungen unerlalilicb sind, um die gegen den Be-
stand der Monarcbie gericbtete serbiscbe Bewegung zum Stillstand zu
bringen. Serbien babe bereits durcb Anordnung der allgemeinen

Seite
Mobilisierung einen feindseligen Akt begangen. Trotzdem habe die
k; u. k. Kegierung noch drei Tage gewartet. Nun babe Serbien die
' Feindseligkeiten an der ungarischen Grenze eroffnet. Eine friedlicbe
Sanierung des Yerhaltnisses zu Serbien sei, nunmebr unmoglicb . . 93

41. An Graf Mensdorfif in London, Wien, 28. Juli 1914. Der engliscbe
Botschafter bat den Konferenzvorscblag Sir E. Greys dem k. u. k.
Minister des AuBem auseinandergesetzt und Englands Vermittlung im
Konflikte zwiscben Osterreicb-Ungarn und Serbien angeboten. Es
wurde ibm erwidert, dali die Verbinderung der Feindseligkeiten infolge
Kriegsausbrucbes nicbt mebr moglicb sei. Ein Transigieren auf Grund
der serbiscben Antwortnote sei angesicbts der woblbekannten serbiscben
Winkelzuge nicbt moglicb. Der Friede wiirde nicbt dadurcb gerettet
werden, dali sicb Groiimacbte binter Serbien stellen und fiir dessen
Straffreibeit eintreten. Serbien wiirde crmutigt und der Friede bald
wieder in Frage gestellt werden 94^

42. An Graf Szogy^ny in Berlin, Wien, 28. Juli 1914, Ersucben an die
deutscbe Kegierung, das russiscbe Kabinett darauf aufmerksam zu
macbenj daC die Mobilisierung der Militarb^zirke Kiew, Odessa,
Moskau und Kasan Buier Bedrobung Osterreicb-Ungams gleicbkame
und von der Monarcbie und Deutscbland mit den weitestgebenden
militariscben Gegenmaliregeln beantwortet werden miiiite 96

43. An Graf Szogy^ny in Berlin, Wien, 28. Juli 1914. Deutscbe Regierung
bat Anregung Sir E. Greys, dali das Wiener Kabinett die Ant-
wortnote der serbiscben Regierung als gentigend betracbte oder als
Grundlage fur Besprecbungen unter den Kabinetteii annebme, der

k. u. k. Regierung zur Ervvagung iibermittelt 96

.44. An die k. u. k. Botschafter in St. Petersburg, London, Paris und Rom,
Wien, 29. Juli 1914. Im Hinblicke auf die oben erwabnte Anregung
Sir E. Greys werden die Griinde wiederbolt, wesbalb die ser-
biscbe Antwortnote ungeniigend und binterbaltig ist. Die Annabme,
als ob die Aktion Osterreicb-Ungams gegen Serbien Rutland und
dessen Einfluii am Balkan treffen wolle, batte zur Yoraussetzung, daG
die gegen die Monarcbie gericbtete Propaganda nicbt allein serbiscben,
sondern aucb russischen Ursprunges sei. Im Zeitpunkte des in Wien
gemacbten Scbrittes der deutscben Regierung war Angelegenbeit der
serbiscben Antwortnote durcb ELriegsausbrucb scbon iiberbolt. Einfluii- •
nabme der engliscben Regierung auf Ruliland im Sinne der Erbaltung
des Friedens zwiscben den Grolimacbten wiirde dankbar begriiiit
werden 97

45. Graf Sz^csen, Paris, 29. Juli 1914. Deutscber Botschafter in Paris
wurde beauftragt, dortige Regierung aufmerksam zu macben, dali

Seite
franzosische militarische "Vorbereitungen Deutschland zu gleiclien Mafi-
nalimen zwingen wiirden, wodurcli beide Staaten trotz ihrer Friedens-
liebe zu gefahrlicher Mobilisierung gedrangt we.rden kbnnten. Deutsch-
land zahle auf die Unterstiitzung Frankreicbs zur Lokalisierung des
Konfliktes zwiscben Osterreich-Ungarn und Serbien 98

46. Graf Szogy^ny, Berlin, 29. Juli 1914. Deutsche Regierung hat am
26. Juli in St Petersburg erklaren lassen, daii sich Deutschland bei
einer Fbrtsetzung der milifarischen Riistungen Ruftlands veranlalit
sehen konnte, zu mobilisieren 99

47. Graf Szdpdry, St. Petersburg, 29. Juli 1914. Der k. u. k. Botschafter
betonte Herm Sazonow gegeniiber, dafi daa Wiener Kabinett, welches
kein russisches Interesse zu vferletzen, kein serbisches Territorium zu
erwerben und die Souveranitat Serbiens nicht anzutasten wunsche,
immer bereit sei, mit St. Petersburg iiber osterreichisch-ungarische und
russische Interessen Fiihlung zu nehmen. Die Bedenken, dafi die
gegen Serbien mobilisierten siidlichen Korps RuMand bedrohen, konnten
nicht ernst genommen werden. Es sei dringend geboten, dem zu
befiirchtenden militarischen lizitieren ein rasches Ende zu bereiten.
Der k. u. k. Botschafter machte in ernsten Worten auf den Eindruck
aufmerksam, den die bevorstehende umfangreiche russische Mobili-
sierung in Osterreich-Ungarn hervorrufen wvirde 99

48. An Graf Szogy^ny in Berlin, Wien, 29. Juli 1914. Anregung bei
der deutschen Regierung, dali die k. u. k. und die deutschen Bot-
schafter in St. Petersburg und Paris angewiesen werden, zu erklaren, daO
die Fortsetzung der russischen Mobilisierung Gegenmaliregeln in
Deutschland und Osterreich-Ungarn zur Folge hatte, die zu ernsten
Konsequenzen fiihren miiliten. Osterreich-Ungarn werde sich naturlich

in seiner kriegerischen Aktion gegen Serbien nicht beirren lassen . * 101

49. An Graf Szdpdry in St. Petersburg, Wien, 30. Juli 1914. Die k. u.k.
Regierung ist zu einer freundschaftlichen Atissprache mit dem St. Peters-
burger Kabinette iiber die die Beziehungen Osterreich-Ungarns zu
Ruliland direkt betreffenden Fragen stets bereit 101

50. An Graf Szdpdry in St. Petersburg, Wien, 30. Juli 1914. Den Klagen
Herrn Sazonows gegeniiber, dali kein Gedankenaustausch zwischen
Graf Berchtold und dem russischen Botschafter stattgefunden habe,
wird auf die jungste Ausspracbe hingewiesen, in welcher weitgehendo
Zusicherungen beziiglich der Respektierung der territorialen und sou-
veranen Rechte Serbiens erteilt wurden. Es wird hervorgehoben, wie
sehr die russische Diplomatic an dem unleidlichen Yerhaltnisse Oster-
reich-Ungarns zu Serbien schuld sei. Die Mobilisierung Ruiilands

' Sfito

gegen OsteiTeict-Ungam zwingt die Monarcliiei itre Mobilisienmg zq
erweitem 102

51. An die k. u. k. Botschafter in London und St. Petersburg, Wien,
.31. Juli 1914. Russisches Kabinett hat 6nglisclie Regierung ersucht,
ihre Vermittlung zwiscben Osterreicb-Ungarn nnd Serbien wieder axif-
zunebmen unter der Bedingung der vorlaufigen Einstellung der Feind-
seligkeiten. Sir E. Grey bat die Vermittlung Frankreichs, Englands,
Italiens und Deutschlands angeregt. Die k. u. k. Regierung ist geme
bereit, dem Vorscblage Sir E. Greys naberzutreten unter der Voraus-
setzung, daii die militariscbe Aktion gegen Serbien vorlaufig
ihren Fortgang nebme und daO Ruliland die gegen Osterreicb-Ungam
gericbtete Mobilisierung zum StUlstande bringe 103

52. Graf Szdpdry, St. Petersburg, 31. Juli 1914. .AUgemeine Mobilisierung.
der russiscben Armee und Flotte . . . :• .. . . .104

53. An die k. u. k. Missionen, Wien, 31. Juli 1914. Notwendigkeit mili-
tariscber Malinebmen in Galizien angesicbts der russiscben Mobilisie-
rung. Diese sind rein defensiven Cbarakters . 104

64. Graf Sz^csen, Paris, 31. Juli 1914. Erklarung der deutscben Regie-
rung in Paris, dali Deutscbland gleicbfalls mobilisieren werde, wenn
die russiscbe Mobilisierung nicbt binnen zwolf Stunden eingestellt
wird. Anfrage, ob Frankreicb im Falle deutscb-russiscben Krieges
neutral bleiben werde 3l05

55. Graf Szdpdry, St. Petersburg, 31. Juli 1914. Ruliland gibt sich selbst
mit der formellen Erklarung nicbt zufrieden, dali Osterreicb-Unganx
weder das serbisebe Territorium schmalem nocb die serbiscbe Souve*
ranitat antasten, nocb aucb die russiscben Balkan- oder sonstigen
Interessen verletzen werde, und hat die allgemeine Mobilisierung
angeordnet .....'......... 10&

56. Graf Szdpdry, St. Petersburg, 1. August 1914. Der k. u. k. Botschafter
bringt nochmals den guten Willen des Wiener Kabinettes zum Aus-
druck, mit RuRland auf breitester Basis zu verhandeln. Herr Sazonow
spricht Ansicht aus, daO ihm Unterhandlungen in St. Petersburg
weniger erfolgversprecbend erscheinen als solche auf dem neutralen
Londoner Terrain 106

67. Graf Szogy6ny, Berlin, 2. August 1914. Ruliland bat Kriegsmalinahmen
gegen Osterreicb-Ungarn und Deutscbland nicbt eingestellt. Russiscbe,
Truppen haben die deutsche Grenze iiberschritten. Deutscbland, das
somit angegriflfen ist, betrachtet sich als im Kriegszustande mit Ruliland 107

68. Graf Mensdorff, London, 4. August 1914. Ultimatum Englands an
Deutscbland. Erklarung Sir E. Greys, solange Osterreicb-Ungari^

' Seife

nicht im Kriegszustande mit Frankreich, sei keine Veranlassung zu
einem Konflikte zwischen England und der Monarchle . . . . . . lOt

.59, An Graf Szdpdry in St.' Petersburg, Wien, 5. August 1914. Kriegs-
zustand zwischen Osterreich-Ungarn und RuBlatid infolge der drohen-
den Haltung Rufilands im osterreicliiscli-ungariscli-serbisclien Konflikte
und der Eroffnung der Feindseligkeiten gegen Deutschland , . . . 10&

6^0. An Graf Mensdorff -in London, Wien, 6. August 1914. Osterreich-
Ungam vsdrd keinesfalls ohne vorliergehende tormelle Kriegserklarung
die Feindseligkeiten gegen England eroflFnen. Erwartet analoges Ver-
lialten Englands 108

61. Graf Sz6csen, Paris, 8. August 1914. Anfrage der franzosischen
Regierung, ob die Nacbriclit ricbtig sei, dali das Innsbrucker Armee-
korps an die franzosische Grenze verscboben worden sei . . . . . 109

62. An Graf Sz6csen in Paris, Wien, 9. August 1914. l^acbricht von der
Teilnahme eines osterreicbiscb-ungariscben Armeekorpers am deutscb-
franzosiscben Kriege ist vollsfandig erfunden 109

63. Graf Sz6csen, Paris, 10. August 1914. Franzosiscbe Regierung, welcbe
Nacbricbt erbielt, daO ein osterreicbiscb-ungariscbes Armeekorps nacb
Deutscbland gebracbt worden sei, erblickt bierin eine militariscbe
"Hilfeleistung an Deutscbland und bat daber den franzbsiscben Bot-
scbafter in Wien beauftragt, seine Passe zu verlangen 109^

64. An Graf Mensdorff in London, Wien, 11. August 1914. Auftrag,
engliscber Regierung mitzuteilen, daft die Nacbricbt der Entsendung
eines osterreicbiscb-ungariscben Armeekorps nacb Deutscbland vollig
unbegriindet sei 110

65. Graf Mensdorff, London, 12.' August 1914. Kriegserklarung Frank-
reicbs und Englands an Osterreicb-Ungam Ill

66. Note des japaniscben Botscbaffcers in Wien an Graf Bercbtold, Wien,
20. August 1914. Mitteilung des am .15. August seitens Japans an
Deutscbland gericbteten Ultimatums 112

.67. An Graf Clary in Brussel, Wien, 22. August 1914. Auftrag, der
belgiscben Regierung mitzuteilen, daft Osterreicb-Ungam angesicbts
der militariscben Kooperation Belgiens mit Frankreicb und England
gegen Deutscbland und der inbumanen Bebandlung der oster-
reicbiscben und ungariscben Staatsangeborigen in Belgien gezwungen
ist, die diplomatiscben Beziehungen zu dem Konigreicbe abzubrecben
und daft nunmebr der Kriegs;z;ustand eingetreten ist 114

Seite
6S. Prinz Hohenlohe, Berlin, 23. August 1914. Deutsche Regierung Tafit
japanisches Ultimatum unbeantwortet mid stellt japardscliem Gesoliafts-
trager in Berlin seine Passe zu 114

69. An Freiherrn von Miiller in Tokio, Wien, 24. August 1914. Angesichts
des Vorgetens Japans gegen das Deutsche Reich erhielt der Kom-
mandant S. M. S. „ Elisabeth" den Auftrag, in Tsingtau mitzu-
kampfen, nnd wird der k. u. k. Botschafter von Tokio abberufen . .115

Legationsrat Ritter von Storck an Graf Berchtold.

Belgrad, 29. Juni 1914,

Wir alle stehen noch immer derart unter dem erschiitternden Eindruck der
gestrigen Katastrophe, daO es mir schwer fallt, mit der notigen Fassung, Sacli-
lictkeit und Ruhe das blutige Drama in Sarajevo von hier aus entsprechend zu
beurteilen. Ich bitte daher, mich vorlaufig auf die Registrierung einiger Tat-
sachen beschranken zu diirfen.

Gestem — den 15./28. — wurde der Jahrestag der Schlacht am Amsel-
felde festlicber als sonst begangen und der serbiscbe Patriot Milos Obilid ge-
feiert, der 1389 mit zwei Gefahrten den siegreicben Murad meuchlings er-
stocben bat.

Wo Serben leben, gilt. Obili<i als der Nationalberos. An die Stelle der
Tiirken sind aber — dank der unter der Agyde der koniglicben Regierung ge-
zucbteten Propaganda und der seit Jabren betriebenen Prefibetze — nunmebr
wir als die Erbfeinde getreten.

Den drei jugendlicben Sarajevoer Attentatem Princip, Cabrinovi<S und dem
dritten unbekannten Bombenwerfer scbeint daber eine Wiederbolung des Dramas
auf dem Kossovopolje vorgescbwebt zu baben. Sie haben nocb eineunscbuldige
Frau miterschossen und mogen glauben, damit ibr Vorbild nocb ubertroffen zu
baben.

Jabrelang ist in Serbien Hali gegen die Monarcbie gesat worden. Die
Saat ist aufgegangen und Mord ward geerntet.

Die serbiscbe Regierung bat auf die zirka 5 Uhr nacbmittags bekaniit-
gewordene Nacbricbt bin die Obiii<5-Feier um 10 Ubr abends offiziell abstoppen
lassen; inoffiziell und in der Dunkelbeit bat sie aber nocb geraume Zeit weiter
gedauert.

Die Leute soUen sicb vor Freude in die Arme gefaUen sein (Augenzeugen)
nnd man borte Bemerkungen wie: „recbt ist ibnen gescbeben, wir baben das
scbon lange erwartet," oder „das ist die Racbe fiir die Annexion."

Legationsrat Ritter von Storck an Graf Berchtold.

Telegramm. Belgrad, 30. Juni 1914.

Ich riclitete heute an den Generalsekretar des Auswartigen Ajntes, Herrn Gruid,
die naheliegende Frage, welche MaOregeln die konigliclie Polizei ergrifFen habe,
respektive za ergreifen gedenke, um die Faden des Attentats, welcbe notorisch
nach Serbien hinuberspielen, zu verfolgen.

Seine Erwiderung lautete, dali sich die serbische Polizei bisher mit dem
Gegenstand iiberhaupt nicht befalit hatte.

Generaikonsui Jehlitschka an Graf Berchtold.

UskUb 1. Juli 1914.

Am 15./28. Juni wurde in Pristina der Vidov-Dan (Frohnleicbnamstag),
an welchem sicb diesmal die Scblacbt auf dem Amselfelde (1389) zum
525. Male jahrte, zum ersten Male offiziell als nBefreiungsfest" der serbischen
Nation gefeiert.

Seit vier Monaten hatte ein eigenes Festkomitee daran gearbeitet, dieses
Fest zu einem moglichst feierlichen und zu einer groliartigen nationalserbischenj
Demonstration zu gestalten.

Die beziigliche Propaganda setzte gleicbzeitig in Kroatien, Dalmatien und|
Bosnien, hauptsachlich aber in Ungam ein, den Teilnebmern wurde freie Fabrt
auf den serbischen Staatsbahnen, billige Unterkunft und Verpflegung, Unter-
stiitzung seitens der Behorden etc. zugesagt.

Die Agitation war eine energische und zielbewuftte.

Zur Festfeier in Pristina wurden die Gaste mit Extraziigen gebracht.

Die verschiedenen Festreden schwelgten in den historischen Reminiszenzen,
welche sich an den Schauplatz des Festes Imiipften, um schlielilich mehr oder
minder das bekannte Thema von der Yereinigung aller Serben und der „Be-
freiung der unterjochten Briider" jenseits der Donau und der Save, ferner in
Bosnien und Dalmatien zu variieren.

Als sict in den Abendstunden die Nachriclit von der entsetzlichen Schand-
tat, deren Schauplatz Sarajevo gewesen war, verbreitete, bema,cbtigte sicb der
fanatisierten Menge eine Stimmimg, welcbe icb nacli den zahbreichen Beifalls-
aulieru'ngen, welcbe mir von meinen absolut verlafilicben Gewabrsmannem ge-
meldet werden, nicbt anders als unmenscblicb bezeicbnen kanp.

Angesicbts dieser Haltung der Bevblkerung, welcbe in gleicber Weise aucb
in tiskiib zu Tage trat, fallen alle Versucbe der serbiscben Presse, die moraliscbe
Verantwortung fiir die Tat, welcbe von einer reprasentativen Versammlung mit
solcb unverboblener Genugtuung aufgenommen wird, von Serbien abzuscbiitteln,
in ein erbarmlicbes Nicbts zusammen.

Graf Sz^csen an Graf Berchtold.

Telegramm. Puris, 4. Juli 1914.

Icb babe beute Herrn Poincar6 den Dank der k. u. k. Regierung fiir sein
Beileid ubermittelt.

Auf die serbenfeindlicben Demonstrationen bei uns anspielend, erwabnte
er, dafi nacb der Ermordung des Priisidenten Carnot in ganz Frankreicb alle
Italiener den argsten Verfolgungen seitens der Bevolkerung ausgesetzt waren.

Icb macbte ibn darauf aufmerksam, dali die daraalige Bluttat mit keinerlei
antifranzbsiscber Agitation in Italien im Zusammenbange stand, wabrend man
jetzt zugeben muli, dali in Serbien seit Jabren mit alien erlaubten und
unerlaubten Mitteln gegen die Monarcbie gebetzt wird.

Zum Scblusse spracb Herr Poincar6 die Uberzeugung aus, die serbiscbe
Eegierang werde uns bei der gericbtlicben Untersucbung und der Verfolgung
eventueller Mitscbuldiger das grolite Entgegenkommen zeigen. Eiiier solcben
Pflicbt konne sicb kein Staat entzieben.

5.
Gerent Herr Hoflehner an Graf Berchtofd.

J^isch, 6. Jult WM.

Die Nachricht vom entsetzliclien, nar zu wotlgelungenen Attentate in
Sarajevo rief tier Sensation im volisten Sinne des Wortes hervor. Von Bestiirzung
oder aber Entriistung war so gut wie nichts zu bemerken, in weitaus vor-
herrscbendem Malie kamen nur Empfindungen d^r Genugtuung, ja der Freude,
und dies vielfacb ganz unverbiillt, obne jede Zuriickbaltung, nicbt selten in ganz
rober Form zum Ausdrucke. Dies gilt hauptsacblicb fiir die sogenannten fubren-
den Kreise, die Intelligenz, wie Berufspolitiker, Lebrpersonen, Beamte, Offiziere
und die Studentenscbaft. Etwas zuriickbaltender zeigte sicb nocb die Kauf-
mannscbaft.

AUe Erklarungen, die seitens serbiscber amtlicber Stellen oder einzelner
boberer Personlicbkeiten abgegeben wurden und die Entriistung iiber das
Attentat und dessen \erurteilung zum Ausdruck bringen sollfen, miissen als
bitterste Ironie auf den wirken, der Gelegenbeit batte, in d^n jiingst ver-
flossenen Tagen in nacbster Nabe Einblicke in das Gefuhlsleben der serbiscben
intelligenten Bevolkerung zu gewinnen.

Der Gefertigte batte am Tage des Attentates gegen 9 Ubr abends obne:
Abnung nocb vom Gescbebenen ein biesiges Gartenkaffee besucbt und wurde
bier zuerst von einem Bekannten iiber das ganz bestimmt aufgetretene Geriicbt
in Kenntnis gesetzt. Es- war eine Pein sondergleicben zu beobacbten und zu
boren, wie eine formlicb froblicbe Stiramung die zablreicben Gaste des Lokales
erfaftt batte, mit welcbei^ ersicbtlicben Genugtuung man iiber die Tat debattierte
und wie Ausrufe der Freude, des Hobnes und Spottes aufflattenen — selbst den
an Ausbrucbe des bier berrscbenden politiscben Fanatismus seit lajigem
Gewobnten muiiten diese Wabrnebmungen aufs aulierste deprimiereni

Freiherr von GiesI an Graf Berchtold.

Belgrad, 21. Juli 1914,

Icb bin nunmebr — nacb dem ungliickseligen Verbrecben vom 28. Juni —
wieder seit einiger Zeit auf meinem Posten und kann mir erlauben^ tiber di»
bier berrscbende Stimmung ein Urteil abzugeben.

Seit der Annexionskrise, waren die Beziehungen zwischen der Monarchie
und Serbien auf Seite des letzteren durch nationalen Chauvinismus, Feindselig-
keit und eine wirksame Propaganda der groliserbisclien Aspirationen in unseren
von Serben bewohnten Landem vergiftet, seit den letzten beiden Balkankriegen
hat der Erfolg Serbiens diesen Chauvinismus zum Paroxismus gesteigert, dessen
Ausbriiche stellenweise den Stempel des Wahnsinns tragen.

Es sei mir erspart, hiefiir Beweise und Beispiele erbringen zu miissen,
sie sind uberall and immer in den Kreisen der politischen Gesellschaft wie
unter dem niederen Volke, in alien Parteien billig zu haben! Ich stelle es als.
bekanntes Axiom hin, daft die Politik Serbiens auf die Abtrennung der von.
Siidslawen bewohnten Gebiete und in weiterer Folge auf die Vernichtung der
Monarchie als Groiimacht aufgebaut ist und nur dieses eine Ziel kennt.

Niemand, der auch nur acht Tage in dem hiesigen politischen Milieu zu
ieben und zu wirken bemiiiiigt ist, wdrd sich dieser Wahi'heit verschlielien.

Infolge der jiingsten Ereignisse, welche die hiesigen politischen Stimmun^en
beeinflussen, und dazu rechne ich das Attentat in Sarajevo, den Tod Hartwigs
und die Wahlkampagne, - hat sich der Hali gegen die Monarchie noch vertieft.

Das Attentat in Sarajevo hat den Serben den bevorstehenden Zerfall der
habsburgischen Staaten — auf welchen man schon friiher seine Hoffnungen
setzte — als in kiirzester Zeit zu erwarten, den Abfall der von Siidslawen
bewohnten Gebiete der Monarchie, die Revolution in Bosnien-Herzegowina iind
die Unverlalilichkeit der slawischen Regimentcr — als feststehende Tatsachen
vorgegaukelt und bfachte System und scheinbare Berechtigung in ihren natioriali-
stischen Wahnsinn.

Das so verhalite Osterreich-Ungarn erscheint den Serben nunmehr ohn-
machtig und kaum mehr wurdig, einen Krieg mit ihm zu fiihren — zum
Hasse gesellt sich die Verachtung — es fallt ohne Miihe als zermiirbter Korper
in den SchoO des in naher Zukunft zu verwirklichenden groliserbischen Reiches.

Blatter, welche nicht zu den allerextremsten gehoren, besprechen in tag-
lichen Artikeln die Ohnmacht und den Zerfall der .Nachbarmonarchie und.
beschimpfen ohne Scheu und Furcht vor Ahndung ihre Organe. Sie machen
selbst vor der erhabenen Person unseres Herrschers nicht Halt. Sogar das
Regierungsorgan weist auf die Zustande in Osterreich-Ungarn als auf die
einzigen Ursachen des fluchwurdigen Verbrechens hin. Die Furcht vor Verant-
wortung besteht nicht mehr. Das serbische Volk wird seit Jahrzehnten durch
die Presse erzogen und die jeweilige Politik hangt von der Parteipresse ab;
eine Frucht dieser Erziehung ist die groBserbische Propaganda und ihre abscheu-
liche Ausgeburt, das Attentat vom 28. Juni.

Ich tibergehe die an "Wahnwitz streifenden, von der t„ Times" als „tob-
suchtig" bezeichneten Anklagen und Verdachtigungen anlalilich des: Todes

Hart wigs, iiberhaupt die lugenhafte Prefikampagne, welche aber die Serben in
der Uberzeugung bestarken diirfte, dali die Regierung und die Vertreter Oster-
reich-Ungarns vogelfrei sind, und Bezeichnungen wie Morder, Lump, infamer
Osteneicher etc. fiir uns als schmiickende Beiworter gelten miissen.

Der Tod Hartwigs hat in der Erkenntnis der Schwere dieses Yerlusftes in
der serbischen politischen Welt einen fanatischen Kultus des Verstorbenen aus-
gelost und man lieli sich dabei nicht allein von der Dankbarkeit fiir die Ver-
gangenhe'it, sondern auch von der Sorge um die Zukunft leiten und liberbot
sich in sklavischer Unterwurfigkeit vor Rufiland, um dessen Wohlwollen fiir
komraende Zeiten zu sichern.

Als dritter Faktor vereinigt die Wahlkampagne alle Parteien auf der Platt-
form der Feindseligkeiten gegen Osterreich-Ungarn. Keine der auf die Regie-
rungsgewalt aspirierenden Parteien will in den Verdacht kommen, eines
schwachlichen. Nachgebens gegeniiber der Monarchie fiir fahig gehalten zu
werden. So wird die Wahlkampagne unter dem Schlagworte der Bekampfung
Osteixeich-Ungarns gefiihrt.

Man halt die Monarchie aus inneren und Sufieren Griinden fiir ohnmachtig,
zu jeder energischen Aktion unfahig und glaubt, dali die ernsten Worte, die
schon an maiigebenden Stellen bei uns gesprochen worden sind, nur
Bluff seien.

Die Urlaube des k. u. k. Kxiegsministers und Chefs des Generalstabes haben
in der Uberzeugung bestarkt, daO die Schwache Osterreich-Ungams nunmehr
evident ist.

Ich habe die Geduld Euer Exzellenz etwas i'anger in Anspruch zu nehmen
.mir erlaubt, nicht weil ich mit Vorstehendem etwas Neues zu bringen glaubte,
sondern weil ich diese Schilderung als Ausgang zu der sich aufdrangenden
Konklusion betrachte, daO eine Abrechnung mit Serbien, ein Krieg um die
Grolimachtstellung der Monarchie, ja um ihre Existenz als solche, auf die Dauer
nicht zu umgehen ist.

Versaumen wir es, Klarheit in unser Verhaltnis zu Serbien zu bringen,
so werden wir mitschuldig an den Schwierigkeiten und der Ungunst der Ver-
haltnisse bei einem kiinftigen Kampfe, dejr doch, ob friiher oder spater, aus-
getragen werden muli.

Fiir den lokalen Beobachter und den Vertreter der osterreichisch-ungarischen
Interessen in Serbien stellt sich die Frage so, daii wir eine weitere Schddigung
unseres Prestiges nicht mehr ertragen konnen.

Sollten wir daher entschlossen sein, weitgehende Forderungen, verbunden
mit wirksamer Kontrolle — denn nur eine solche konnte den Augiasstall der
groliserbischen Wiihlarbeit reinigen — zu stellen, dann muliten alle moglichen

Konsequenzen iiberblickt werden und es muji von Anfang an der starke und
feste Wille bestehen, durchzubalten.

Halbe Mittel, ein Stellen von Forderungen, langes Parlamentieren und
scblieGlich ein faules Kompromili ware der harteste Schlag, der Osterreioh-
Ungarns Ansehen in Serbien und seine Machtstellung in Europa treffen konnte.

Graf Berchtold an Freiherrn von GiesI in Belgrad.

Wien, am 22. Juli 1914,

Euer Hocbwohlgeboren woUen die nachfolgende • Note am Donnerstag, den
23. Juli nachmittags, der koniglicben Regierung iiberreichen:

„Le 31 mars 1909 le Ministre de Serbie k Vienne a fait d'ordre de son
Gouvernement au Gouvernement I. et R. la declaration suivante:

„„La Serbie reconnait qu'elle n'a pas 6t6 atteinte dans ses droits par le
fait accompli cr66 en Bosnie-Herc6govine et qu'elle se conformera par conse-
quent k telle decision que les Puissances prendront par rapport k I'article XXV
du Traite» de Berlin. Se rendant aux conseils des Grandes Puissances, la Serbie
s'engage d6s k present h. abandonner I'attitude de protestation et d'opposition
qu'elle a observe e a regard de 1' annexion depuis I'automne dernier, et elle
s'engage, en outre, a changer le cours de sa politique actuelle envers I'Autriche-
Hongrie pour vivre desormais avec cette derni^re sur le pied d'un bon voisinage." "

Or, I'histoire des derni^res annees, 6t notamment les evenements douloureux
du 28 juin, ont demontre I'existence en Serbie d'un mouvement subversif
dont le but est de detacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise certaines parties
de ses territoiies. Ce mouvement qui a pris jour spus les yeux du Gouverne'-
ment Serbe est arrive h. se manifester au delk du territoire du Royaume par
des actes de terrorisme, par une serie d'attentats et par des meurtres.

Le Gouvernement Royal Serbe, loin de satisfaire aux engagements formels
contenus dans la declaration " du 31 mars 1909, n'a rien fait pouc supprimer
ce mouvement: il a toiere I'activite criminelle des. differentes societes et affilia-
tions dirigees contre la Monarchie, le langage effrene de la presse, la glorifica-
tion des auteurs d'attentats, la participation d'officiers et de fonctionnaires dans
les agissements subversifs, une propagande malsaine dans I'instruction publique,
toiere enfin toutes les manifestations qui pouvaient induire la population serbe
•k la haine de la Monarchie et au mepris de ses institutions.

Cette tol6rance coupable du Gouvernement Royal de Serbie n'avait pas
cess6 au moment ou les 6v6nements du 28 juin dernier en ont d6montr6 au
monde entier les consequences funestes:

II r^sulte des depositions et aveux d'es auteurs criminels de I'attentat du
28 juin que le meurtre de Sarajevo a 6t6 tram6 a Belgrade, que les armes
et explosifs dont les meurtriers se trouvaient etre munis, leur ont 6t6 donn6s
par des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes faisant partie de la „Narodna Odbrana"
et enfin qne le passage en Bosnie des criminels et de leurs armes a 6t6 orga-
nist et effectue par des chefs du service-frontifere serbe.

Les r^sultats mentionnes de I'instrQCtion ne permettent pas au Gouverne-
ment I. et R. de poursuivre plus longtemps Tattitude de longanimity expectative
qu'il avait observ6e pendant des annees vis-a-vis des agissements concentres
a Belgrade et propag^s de Ik sur les territoires de la Monarcbie; ces r^sultats
lui imposent au contraire le devoir de mettre fin h, des menses qui forment
une menace perp6tuelle pour la tranquillite de la Monarchic.

C'est pour atteindre ce but que le Gouvernement I. et R. se voit oblige
de demander au Gouvernement Serbe I'enonciation officieUe qu'il condamne
la propagande dirigee contre la Monarchic austro-hongroise, c'est-k-dire I'ensemble
des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu a detacher de la Monarchic des
territoires qui en font partie, et qu'il s'engage a supprimer, par tous les moyens,
cette propagande criminelle et terroriste.

Afin de donner un caract^re solennel a cet engagement, le Gouvernement
Royal de Serbie fera publier k la premiere page du Journal officiel en date
du 26/13 juillet I'enonciation suivante:

„„Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie condamne la propagande dirigee
contre I'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-k-dire I'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en
dernier lieu k detacher de la Monarchic austro-hongroise des territoires qui en
font partie, et il deplore sinc^rement les consequences funestes de ses agisse-
ments criminels.

Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes
aient participe k la propagande susmentionnee et compromis par la les relations
de bon voisinage auquel le Gouvernement Royal s'etait solennellement engage
par sa declaration du 31 mars 1909.

Le Gouvernement Royal qui desapprouve et repudie toute idee ou tenta-
tive d'immixtion dans les destinees des habitants de quelque partie de I'Autriche-
Hongrie que ce soit, consid^re de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers,
les fonctionnaires et toute la population du Royaume que dorenavant il pro-
cedera avec la demifere rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables
de pareils agissements, agissements qu'il mettra tous ses efforts h, prevenir et
k reprimer.""

Cette 6nonciation sera port6e simultan6ment k la connaissance de I'Arm^e
Koyale par un ordre du jour de Sa Majest6 le Roi et sera publico dans le bulletin
official de I'Arm^e.

Le Gouvernement Royal Serbe s'engage en outre*

1° a supprimer toute publication qui excite h ,la haine et au m6pris
de.la Monarchic et dont la tendance gen^rale est dirigee centre son int6grit6
territoriale,

2° k dissoudre imm^diatement la soci6t6 dite „Narodna Odbrana'', k con-
fisquer tons ses moyens de propagande, et h proc^der de la meme mani^re
centre les autres societes et affiliations en Serbie qui s'adonnent a la pro-
pagande centre la Monarchic austro-hengroise; le Gouvernement Royal prendra
les mesures n^cessaires pour que les soci^t^s dissoutes ne puissent pas continuer
leur actiYit6 sous un autre nom et sous une autre forme,

3° a ^Kminer sans d^lai de I'instraction publique en Serbie, tant en ce
qui concerne le corps enseignant que les moyens d'instruction, tout ce <jui sert
cu pourrait servir a fementer la propagande centre I'Autriche-Hengrie,

4° h eloigner du service militaire et de I'administratien. en g6n6ral tous

les officiers et fonctionnaires ceupables de la propagande centre la Menarchie

austro-hengroise et dont le Gouvernement I. et R. se reserve de communiquer
les nems et les faits au Gouvernement Royal,

5° a accepter la collaboration en Serbie des erganes du Gouvernement I.
et R. dans la suppression du mouvement subversif dirig6 centre I'int^grit^
territoriale de la Monarchic,

6° a ouvrir une enquete judiciaire centre les partisans du complot
du 28 juin se treuvant sur territoire serbe;

des erganes, d616gu6s par le Gouvernement I. et R., prendront part aux

recherches y relatives,

7° a proc6der d'urgence h I'arrestation du commandant Veja Tankosid et
du nomm6 Milan Ciganovid, employ6 de I'Etat Serbe, compromis par les
r^sultafes de ['instruction de Sarajevo,

8° k empecher, par des mesures efficaces, le concours des Autorit^s Serbes
dans le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explesifs k travers la fronti^re;

k licencier et punir sdv^rement les fonctionnaires du service-frontifere de
Sabac et de Loznica ceupables d'aveir aid6 les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo en
leur facilitant le passage de la fronti^re,

9^ ^ denner au Gouvernement I. et R., des explications sax les propos
injustifiables de hauts fonctionnaires serbes tant en Serbie qu'^ I'^tranger qui,
;malgr^ leur position officielle, n'ont pas h^sit^ apr^s I'attentat du 28 juin de

s'exprlmer dans des interviews d'une mani^re hostile envers la Monarchie
austro-hongroise enfin

10° d'avertir, sans retard, le Gouvememjent I. et R. de I'ex^cution des
mesures comprises dans les points pr^c^dents.

Le Gouvernement I. et R. attend la r6ponse du Gouyernement Royal au
plus tard jusqu'au samedi 25 de ce mois ^ 6 h du soir.

Un m^moire concernant les r^sultats de Imstruction de Sarajevo h. I'^gard
des fonctionnaires mentionn6s aux points 7 et 8 est annex6 k, cette Note."

L'instruction criminelle ouverto par le tribunal de Sarajevo coritre Gavrilo
Princip et consorts du chef d'assassinat et de complicity y relative, crime commis
par eux le 28 juin dr., a jusqu'ici. abouti aux constatations suivantes:

1° Le complot ayant pour but d'assassiner, lors de son s6jour k Sarajevo,
Tai-chiduc JFran9ois Ferdinand fut form6 k Belgrade par Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko
Cabrinovid, le nomm^ Milan Ciganovid et Trifko Grabez avec le concours du
commandant Voja Tankosid.

2° Les 6 bombes et les 4 pistolets Browning avec munitions, moyennant
lesquels les malfaiteurs ont commis I'attentat, furent livr^s ii Belgrade k Pnncip,
Cabrinovid et Grabez par le nomme Milan Ciganovid et le commandant Voja
Tankosid.

3° Les bombes sont des grenades k la main provenant du ddpot d'armes
de I'arm^e serbe a Kragujevac.

4° Pour assurer la r^ussite de I'attentat, Ciganovid enseigna a Princip,
Gabrinovic et Grabez la maniSre de se servir des grenades et donna, dans
tine foret pr^s du champ de tir k Topschider, des le9ons de tir avec pistolets
JBrowning a Princip et Grabez.

5° Pour rendre possible k Princip, Cabrinovid et Grabez de passer la
fronti^re de Bosnie-Hercdgovine et d'y introduire clandestinement leur contre-
bande d'armes, un syst^me de transport secret fut organisd par Ciganovid.

D'apr^s cette organisation lintroduction en Bosnie-Hercdgovine des rriai-
faiteurs et de leurs armcs fut opdrde par les Capitaines-fronti^re de Sabac
(Rade Popovid) et de Loznica ainsi que par le douanier Rudivoj Orbid de
Loznica avec le concours de divers particuliers*

Gelegentlich der Ubergabe der vorstehenden Note woUen Euer Hoch-
wohlgeboren miindlich hinzufiigen, daJi Sie beauftragt seien — falls Thnen nicht
inzwischen eine vorbebaltlose zustimmende Antwort der koniglichen Regierung
zugekommen sein sollte — nach Ablauf der in der Note vorgesebenen, vom,
Tage and von der Stunde Ihrer Mitteilung an zu recbnenden 48stundigeix
Frist, mit dem Personale der k. u. k. Gesandtschaft Belgrad zu verlassen.

CIraf Berchtold an die k. u. k. Botschafter in Berlin, Rom, Paris, London,
St Petersburg und Konstantinopef.

Wien, 22. Juli 1914.

Le Gouvernement I, et R. s'est va oblige d'adresser jeudi le 23 de ce mois, par
I'entremise du Ministre I. et R. a Belgrade, la Note suivante au Gouvernement Royal
de Serbie. (Siehe Weisung an den k. u. k. Gesandten in Belgrad' vom 22. Juli 1914.)

J'ai I'honneur d'inviter Votre Excellence de vouloir porter le contehu de cette
Note a la connaissance du Gouvernement aupr^s duquel Vous etes accr6dit6,, en
accompagnant cette communication du commentaire que voici:

Le 31 mars 1909 le Gouvernement Royal Serbe a adress6 k I'Autriche-
Hongrie la declaration dont le texte est reproduit ci-dessus.

Le lendemain meme de cette declaration la Serbie s'est engag6e dans une
politique tendant k inspirer des id^es subversives aux ressortissants serbes de
la Monarchie austro-hongroise et k preparer ainsi la separation des territoires
austro-hongrois, limitrophes h, la Serbie.

La Serbie devint le foyer dune agitation crimin'elle:

Des societes et affiliations ne tard^rent pas k se former qui, soit ouverte-
me.nt, soit clandestinement, etaient destinies a cr^er des d^sordres sur le terri-
toire austro-hongrois. Ces societds et affiliations comptent parmi leurs membres
des gen^raux et des diplomates, des fonctionnaires d'Etat et des juges, bref les
sommites du monde officiel et inofficiel du Royaume.

Le journalisme serbe est presque enti^rement au service de cette propa-
gande, dirig^e centre rAutriche-Hongrie, et pas un jour ne passe sans que les
organes de la presse serbe n'excitent leurs lecteurs k la haine et au m^pris de
la Monarchie voisine ou a des attentats dirig^s plus ou moins ouvertement
cohtre sa surety et son integrite.

Un grand nombre d'agents est appel6 a soutenir par tous Ics moyeiis I'agitation
centre rAutricUe-Hongiie et h corrompre dans les provinces limitrophes la
jeunesse de ces pays.

L'esprit conspirateur des politiciens serbes, e^sprit dont les annales.du Royaume
portent les sanglantes empreintes,.a subi une recrudescence depiiis la derniere crise
balcanique; des individus jiyant fait partie des bandes jusque la occupies en Mace-
doine, sont venus se mettre h, la disposition de la propagande terroriste contre
I'Autriche-Hongrie.

En presence de ces agissements auxquels I'Autriche-Hongrie est expos^e
depuis des ann^es, le Gouvernement de la Serbie n'a pas cru devoir prendre
la moindre mesure. C'est ainsi que le Gouvernement Serbe a manqu(5 au devoir
que lui imposait la declaration solennelle du 31 mars 1909, ct c'est ainsi qu'il
s'est mis en contradiction avec la volenti de I'Europe et avec Tengagement
qu'il avait pris vis-a-vis de rAutriche-Hongrie.

La longanimite du Gouvernement I. et R. a I'^gard de I'attitude provocatrice
de la Serbie ^tait inspir6e du d6sint6ressement territorial de la Monaichie austro-
hongroise et de I'espoir que le Gouvernement Serbfe finirait tout de meme par
appr^cier h sa juste valeur I'amiti^ de rAutriche-Hongrie. En observant une attitude
bienveillante pour les int^rets politiques de la Serbie, le Gouvernement 1. et R.
esperait que le Royaume se d^ciderait finalement a suivre de son c6t4 une
ligne de conduite analogue. L'Autriche-Hongrie s'attendait surtout h une pareille
6volution dans les id^es politiques en Serbie, lorsque, apr6s les ^v^nements de
I'ann^e 1912, le Gouvernement I. et R. rendit possible par une attitude d(Ssint6ress6e
et sans ranoune I'agrandissement si considerable de la Serbie.

Oette bienveillance manifest^e par I'Autriche-Hongrie h I'dgard de I'Etat voisin
n'a cependant aucunement modifie les pioc^dds du Royaume qui a continue a tol^rer
sur son tenitoire une propagande dont les funestes consequences se sont manifestecs
au monde entier le 28 juin dr., jour, ofi I'heritier presomptif de la Monarchic et son
illustre epouse devinrent les victimes d'un complot trame a Belgrade.

En presence de cet etat de choses le Gouvernement I. et R. a du se decider a
entreprendre de nouvelles et pressantes demarches a Belgrade afin d'amener le
Gouvernement Serbe a arreter le mouvement incendiaire mena9ant la surete et
I'integrlte de la Monarchic austro-hongroise.

Le Gouvernement L et R. est persuade qu'en entreprenant cette-tiemarche, il
se trouve on plein accord avec. les sentiments de toutes les nations civilisees qui ne
sauraieat admettre que le regicide devint une arme dont on puisse se servir impune-
ment dans la lutte politique, et que la paix europeenne fut continuellemcnt ti'oublee
par les agi.ssements partant de Belgrade.

C'est h I'appui de ce qui precede que le Gouvernement I. et R. tient b. la
disposition du Gouvernement . un dossier

^lucidant les menses serbes et les rapports existant entrc ses menses et le meurtre
du 28 juin.

Une communication identique est adress<$e aux Repr^sentants Imp6riaux ot
Royaux aupr^s des autres Puissances Signataires.

Vous etes autoris^ de laisser une copie de cette d^peche entre les mains de
Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Etrang^res.

9.
Graf Berchtold an Graf Mensdorff in London.

Telegramm. Wien, 23. JmU 1914.

Da unter den Ententemachten England am ehesten flir eine objektive Be-
urteilung unseres heutigen Sehrittes in Belgrad zu gewinnen sein diirfte, ersuche
ich Euer Exzellenz bei der Konversation. die Sie am 24. 1. M. gelegentlich der
Uberreichung der Zirkularnote im Foreign Office haben werden, unter anderem
auch darauf binzuweisen, dali es Serbien in der Hand gehabt hatte, den ernsten
Scbritten, die es unsererseits erwarten mufite, die Spitze abzubrechen, wenn es
seinerseits spontan das Notwendige vorgekebrt batte, um auf serbiscbem Boden
eine Untersucbung gegen die serbiscben Teilnebmer am Attentat vom 28. Juni 1. J.
einzuleiten und die Verbindungen aufzudecken, die binsicbtlicb des Attentates
erwiesenermaften von Belgrad nacb Sarajevo fiibren.

Die serbiscbe Regierung bat bis beute, obwobl eine Anzabl notorisch
bekannter Indizien nacb Belgrad weisen, in diesem Belange nicbt nur nichts
unternommen, sie bat vielmebr die vorbandenen Spuren zu verwiscben getracbtet.

So ist einem telegrapbiscben Bericbt unserer Gesandtscbaft in Belgrad zu
entnebmen, daft der durcb die iibereinstimmenden Aussagen der Attentater
kompromittierte serbiscbe Staatsbeamte Ciganovid am Tage des Attentates nocb
in Belgrad weilte, drei Tage darauf aber, als sein Name in den Zeitungen
genannt wurde, die Stadt bereits verlassen batte. Bekanntlich erklarte aucb scbon
der serbiscbe Preficbef, daO Ciganovid in Belgrad vollig unbekannt sei.

Was die kurze Befristung unserer Forderungen anbelangt, so ist dieselbe
auf unsere langjabrigen Erfabrungen serbiscber Verscbleppungskiinste zuriick-
zufiibren.

Wir konnen die Forderungen, deren Erfiillung wir von Serbien verlangen
und die eigentlicb im Yerkebr zwiscben Staaten, die in Friede und Freundscbaft
Jeben sollen, nur Selbstverstandlicbes entbalten, nicbt ziim Gegenstand von Ver-
handlungen und Kompromissen macben und konnen mit Riicksicht auf unsere volks-

wirtscliaftliclien Interessen nicht riskieren, eine politische Methode, wonacli
Serbien die entstandene Krise nach seinem Belieben zu verlangern in der Hand
hatte, zu akzeptderen.

10.
Graf Mensdorff an Graf Berchtold.

Telegramm. London , 24. Juli 1914.

Zirkulamote Sir E. Grey eben iibergeben, der sie anfmerksam durcli-
gelesen. Bei Punkt 5 fragte er, wie da« zu verstehen sei, Einsetzung Organe
unsei-er Regierung in Serbien ware gleichbedeutend mit Aufhoren staatlicber
Upabhangigkeit Serbiens. Icb «rwiderte, Kollaboration von z. B. Polizeiorganen
tangiere keineswegs Staatssouveranitat.

Er bedauerte Befnstung, weil dadurcb die Moglichkeit benommen wiirde,
die erste Erregung zu berubigen und auf Belgrad einzuwirken, uns eine befriedi-
gende Antwort zu geben. Ein Ultimatum konne man immer noch stellen, wenn
Antwort nicht annehmbar.

Icb fiihrte lange unseren Standpunkt aus (Notwendigkeit Abwebr von un-
ausgesetzten subversiven Untemebmungen, welche Gebiet der Monarchie bedroben,
Verteidigung unserer vitalsten Interessen, voUkommenster Mi^erfolg der vielfach
bewiesenen bisberigen konzilianten Haltung gegeniiber Serbien, das jetzt iiber
drei Wocben Zeit hatte, aus eigenem Antrieb Untersuchung gegen Teilnahme
Attentat einzuleiten etc.).

Der Herr Staatssekretar wiederholte seine Bedenken gegen kurze Befristung,
anei-kannte aber, daO das, was iiber Mitschuld an Verbrechen von Sarajevo
gesagt wird, sowie manche unserer Verlangen berechtigt seien.

Er wiirde ganz bereit sein, die Angelegenheit als cine solche zu betrachten,
die nur Osterreich-Ungam und Serbien beriihre. Er ist aber sehr ^apprehensiv",
daC mebrere Grofimachte in einen Krieg verwickelt werden konnten. Von Rut-
land, Deutschland, Frankreich sprechend bemerkte er, die Bestimmungen des
franzosisch-russischen Biindnisses diirften ungefahr so lauten, wie die des Drei-
bundes.

Ich legte ihm ausfiihrlich unseren Standpunkt dar und wiederholte ent-
scbieden, dali in diesem Falle wir fest bleiben miiOten, um uns doch einiger-
malien Garantien zu schaffen, nachdem bisherige serbiscbe ErkJarungen niemals

eingehalten wurden. Ich begreife, daO er zunachst nur die Frage der Ruck-
wirkung auf europaischen Frieden erwage, er miisse aber auch, um unseren
Standpunkt zu wiirdigen, sich in unsere Lage versetzen.

Er wollte nicbt in eine nahere Diskussion iiber dieses Thema eingeben,
miisse aucb nocb Note genauer studieren. Er zitiere zunachst den deutscben und
den franzosiscben Botscbafter, da er mit den Alliierten Osterreicb-Ungams und
Ru Glands, die aber selbst keine direkten Interessen in Serbien baben, vor allem
in Gedankenaustauscb treten miisse.

11.

Graf Sz^csen an Graf Berchtold.

Telegramm. Paris, 24. Juli 1914.

Soeben dem mit der Vertretung des abwesenden Ministers des Aussern
betrauten Herrn Justizminister Weisung vom 22. 1. M. vorgelesen und Kopio
binterlassen. Herr Bienvenu Martin, der durcb beutige Morgenblatter vom Inbalt
unserer Demarcbe in Belgrad beilaufig informiert ^ar^ scbien durcb meine
Mitteilung ziemlicb impressioniert. Obne sicbin eine nabere Erbrterung des
Textes einzulassen, gab er bcreitwillig zu, dali die Ereignisse der letzten Zeit
und die Haltung der serbiscben Regierung ein energiscbes Einschreiten unserer-
seits ganz begreifiicb erscbeinen lassen.

Punkt 5 der in Belgrad iiberreicbten Note scbien dem Herrn Minister
besonders aufzufallen, denn er lieft sicb denselben zweimal vorlesen.

Der Herr Minister dankte mir fiir meihe Mitteilung, die, wie er sagte, ein-
gebend gepiuft werden wiirde. Icb nabm die Gelegenbeit wabr, um zu betonen, dafi
es sicb um eine Frage handle, die direkt zwischen Serbien und uns ausgetragen
werden mufi, dali es aber im allgemelnen europaischen Interesse liege, wenn
die Unrube, die seit Jahren durcb die serbische Wiihlarbeit gegen uns auf-
rechterbalten werde, endlich einem klaren Zustand Platz mache.

Alle Freunde des Friedens und der Ordnung, und zu diesen zahle icb
Frankreich in erster Linie, sollten daher Serbien ernstlich raten, seine Haltung
griindlich zu andern und unseren berecbtigten Forderungen Rechnung zu
tragen.

Der Herr Minister gab zu, dali Serbien die Pflicht babe, gegen etwaige
Komplizen der Mbrder von Sarajevo energisch vorzugehen, welcher Pflicht es

sich wohl nicht entzieKen werde. Unter nachdrucklicher Betonung der Sympathie
Frankreichs fiir Osterreich-Ungarn und der zwischen unseren beiden Landern
bestehenden guten Beziehungen, sprach er Hoffnung aus, daO die Streitfrag-e
friedlich, in einer xmseren Wiinschen entsprechenden Weise ausgetragen
werden wird.

Der Herr Minister vermied jeden Versuch, die Haltung Serbiens irgendwie ,
zu beschonigcn oder zu verteidigen.

12.
Graf Sz^csen an Graf Berchtold.

Telegramm. Paris, .24, Juli 1914.

Baron Schoen wird auftraggemali heute hier mitteilen, daO unsere Kontro-
verse mit Serbien nach Ansicht Berliner Kabinettes eine Angelegenheit sei, die
nur Osterreich-Ungarn und Serbien angehe.

Ankniipfend hieran wird er zu verstehen geben, dali, falls dritte Staaten
sich einmischen wollten, Deutschland, getreu seinen Allianzverpflichtungen, auf
unserer Seite sein wird.

13.

Graf Sz^csen an Graf Berphtold,

Telegramm. Paris, 24. Juli 1914,

Baron Schoen. hat die ihm aufgetragene Demarche soeben ausgefuhrt.

Herr Bienvenu Martin hat ihm gesagt, er konne sich noch nicht definitiv
auGem, soviel konne er aber schon jetzt sagen, da(i die franzosische Regierung
auch der Ansicht sei, unsere Kontr.overse mit Serbien ginge nnr Belgrad und
Wien an und dali man hier hoffe, dafi die Frage eine direkte und friedliche
Lbsung finden werde.

Dem hiesigen serbischen Gesandten wurde bereits der Rat gegeben, seine
Regierung moge in alien Punkten soweit als nur moglich nachgeben, freilich
mit der Einschrankung; „insofeme ihre Souveranitatsrechte nicht tangiert
werden".

Baron Schoen betonte die europaische Notwendigkeit, dafi der Herd ewiger
Beunruhigung in Belgrad endjich aus der Welt geschaflft werden miisse.

14.

Graf Szdp^ry an Graf Berchtold.

Telegramm. Sl Petersburg, 24. Juli 1914:

Der Herr Minister des AuBern empfing mich, indem er mir sagte, er wisse, was
mich zu ihm fiihre und erklare mir gleich, dali er zu meiner Demarcke keino
Stellung nehmen \Nrurde. Ich begann mit der Verlesung meipes Auftrages. Der
Minister unterbracli mich das erste Mai bei der Erwahnung der Serie von
Attentaten und fragte auf mcine Auf kl'arungeri, • ob denn erwiesen sei, daO diese
alle in Belgrad ihren Ursprung h'atten? Icb betonte, daft sie Ausflufi der serbi-
scben Aufwiegelung seien. Im weiteren Yerlauf der Verlesung aufierte er, er
wisse, worum es.sich handle: Wir wollten Serbien den Krieg macben und dies
fioUe der Vorwand sein. Ich replizierte, daft unsere Haltung in den letzten
Jahren e.in hinreichender Beweis sei, daft wir Serbien gegeniiber Vorwande
weder suchen noch brauchen. Die geforderten solennen Enunziationen riefen
nicht den Widerspruch des- Herrn Ministers hervor; er versuchte nur immer wieder
zu behailpten, daft Pasid sich bereits in dem Sinne • ausgesprochen habe, was
ich richtig stellte. „!! dira cela 25 fois si vous voulez", sagte er. Ich sagte
ihm, niemand wende sich bei uns gegen Serbiens Integritat oder Dynastie. Am
lebhaftesten erklarte sich Herr Sazonow gegen die Auflosung der „Narodna
Odbrana", die Serbien niemals vornehmen werde. Weiteren Widerspruch von
Seite des Herrn Ministers loste die Befeiligung von k. u. k. Funktionaren an- der
Unterdriickung der subversiven Bewegung aus. Serbien werde also daheim nicht
mehr der Herr sein! „Sie werden dann immer wieder intervenieren wollen und
welches Leben werden Sie da Europa bereiten!" Ich erwiderte, es werde, wenn
Serbien guten ^Villen hat, ein ruhigeres sein, als bisher.

Den an die Mitteilung der Note angefiigten Kommentar horte der Herr Minister
ziemlich ruhig an; bej dem Passus, daft wir uns in unseren Gefiihlen mit jenen
aller zivilisierten Nationen eins wissen, meinte er, dies sei ein Irrtum. Mit allem
mir zu Gebote stehenden Nachdruck verwies ich -darauf, wie traurig es ware,
wenn wir in dieser Frage, bei der alles im Spiele sei, was wir Heiligstes batten
und, was immer der Herr Minister sagen wolle, auch in Ruftland heilig sei,
kein Verstandnis in Ruftland fanden. Der Herr Minister suchte die monarchische
Seite der Angelegenheit zu verkleinern.

Das zur Verfiigung der Regierungen gehaltene Dossier b'etreffend, meinte
Herr Sazonow, wozu wir uns diese Miihe gegeben hatten, wo wir doch bereits
ein Ultimatum erlassen hatten. Dies beweise am besten, daft wir eine unparteiische
Priifung des Falles gar nicht anstreben, Ich sagte ihm, daft fiir unser Vorgehen
in dieser zwischen Osterreich-Ungarn und Serbien spielenden Angelegenheit die
durch unsere eigene Untersuchung erzielten Resultate geniigen und wir nur-

bereit seien, den Machten weltere Aufschlusse, falls dieselben sie interessieren,
zu geben, well wir nichts zu verheimliclien batten.

HeiT Sazonow meinte, jetzt nacb dem Ultimatum sei er eigentlicb gar
nicbt neugierig. Er stellte die Sacbe so dar, als ob es uns darauf ankomme,
unbedingt mit Serbien Krieg zu fiibren. Ich erwiderte, wir seien die fried-
liebendste Maebt der Welt, was wir wollten, sei nup Sicberung unseres
Territoriums vor fremden revolutionaren Umtrieben und unserer Dynastie vor-
Bomben.

Im Verlaufe der weiteren Erorterungen lieli Herr Sazonow nocbmals
Bemerkung fallen, daii wir jedenfalls eine emste Situation gescbaffen batten.

Trotz der relativen Rube des Herm Ministers war seine Stellungnabme eine
durcbaus ablebnende und gegneriscbe.

15.
Communique des russischen Amtsblattes.

St. Petersburg, 24. Juli 1914.

Die St. Petersburger Telegrapbenagentur meldet:
Das amtlicbe Organ veroffentlicbt folgendes Communique :
Die kaiserlicbe Regierung, lebbaft besorgt durcb die liberrascbenden Ereigr
nisse und durcb das an Serbien durcb Osterreicb-Ungarn gericbtete Ultimatum,
verfolgt mit Aufmerksamkeit -die Entwicklung des osterreicbiscb-ungariscb-serbi-
scben Konfliktes, in welcbem Rufiland nicbt indifferent bleiben kann.

16.
Graf Sz^p^ry an Graf Berchtold.

Telegramm. St. Petersburg, 24. Juli 1914.

Nacb funfstiindigem Ministerrate bat Herr Sazonow abends den deutscben
Botscbafter empfangen und mit ibm eine lange Unterredung gebabt.

Der Herr Minister vertrat biebei die wabrscbeinHcb als Resultat des Ministerrates
zu betracbtende Ansicbt, der osterreicbiscb-ungariscb-serbiscbe Streit sei keine
auf diese Staaten bescbrankte Angelegenbeit, sondern eine europaiscbe, da der

im Jahre 1909 durcli eine serbische Deklaration erfolgte Ausgleicli unter den
Auspizien ganz Europas vollzogen worden sei.

Der Herr Minister hob hervor, dali ihn besonders der Umstand uiiangenehm
beriihrt babe, dali Osterreich-Ungarn die Priifung eines Dossiers angeboten babe,
wabrend bereits^ein Ultimatum ergangen sei. Ruiiland wurde eine internationale
Priifung des von uns zur Verfugung gestellten Dossiers verlangen. Mein deutscber
Kollege macbte Herrn Sazonow sofort darauf aufmerksam, dali Osterreicb-
Ungarn eine Einmiscbung in seine Differenz mit Serbien nicbt akzeptieren
werde und dali aucb Deutscbland seinerseits eine Zumutung nicbt annebmen
konne, welche der Wiirde des Bundesgenossen als Groliraacbt zuwiderlaufe.

Im weiteren Verlaufe des Gespracbes erklarte der Herr Minister, dafi dasjenige,
was Ruliland nicbt gleicbgiiltig binnebmen kbnne, die eventuelle Absicbt Osterreicb-
Ungarns ware „de d^vorer la Serbie". Graf Pourtales erwiderte, dali er eine solcbe
Intention bei Osterreicb-Ungarn nicbt annebme, da dies dem eigensten Interesse
der Monarch ie zuwiderlaufen wiirde. Osterreicb-Ungarn sei wobl nur daran
gelegen „d'infliger a la Serbie le cbatiment justement m6rit6". Herr Sazonow
babe seine Zweifel daran ausgedriickt, ob Osterreicb-Ungarn, selbst wenn bier-
iiber Erklarungen vorliegen wiirden, sicb bieran geniigen lassen wiirde.

Die Unterredung scbloli mit einem Appell Herrn Sazonows, Deutscbland
moge rait Ruliland an der Erbaltung des Friedens zusammenarbeiten. Der
deutsche Botschafter versicberte dem russiscben Minister, dali Deutscbland
gewifi nicbt den Wunscb babe, einen Krieg zu entfesseln, daft es aber selbsfc^
verstandlich die Interessen seines Bundesgenossen voll vertrete.

17.

Graf Berchtold an Graf Mensdorff in London.

Telegramm. Wien, 24. Juli 1914,

Zu Euer Exzellenz gestrigem Telegramm.

Ersucbe, Sir E. Grey sofort aufzuklaren, dali unsere gestrige Demarche in
Belgi'ad nicbt als formelles Ultimatum zu betracbten sei, sondern. dali es sicb
um eine befristete Demarche handle, die, wie Euer Exzellenz Sir E. Grey streng
vertraulich mitteilen woUen, — wenn die Frist frucbtlos ablauft — einstweilen
nur von dem Abbruche der diplomatiscben Beziebungen und von dem Beginne

notwendiger militarischer Vorbereitungen gefolgt sein wird, da wir unbedlngt
entschlossen sind, unsere berecbtigten Forderungen durcbzusetzen.

Euer Exzellenz sind ermacbtigt beizufugen, dali wir allerdings, wenn
Serbien nach. Ablauf des Terraines nur unter dem Drucke unserer militariscberi
Vorbereitungen nacbgeben wiirde, es zum Ersatze der uns erwacbsenen Kosten
verbdlten miiliten; bekanntlicb muiiten wir zweimal (1908 nn^ 1912) Serbiens
wegen mobilisieren.

18.

Graf Berchtold an Graf Szdpary in St. Petersburg.

Wten, 24. Juli 1914.

Ich babe den russiscben Gescbaftstrager am 24. Juli vormittags empfangen
und ibn versicbert, dafi ich spezielles Gewicbt darauf lege, ihn sobald als
moglicb von unserem Scbritte in Belgrad in Kenntnis zu setzen und ihm
diesbeziiglicb unseren Standpunkt darzulegen.

Indem Fiirst KudascbefF fiir diese Aufmerksamkeit dankte, verbeblte er
mir nicbt seine Beunrubigung iiber unser kategoriscbes Vorgehen gegen Serbien,
wobei er bemerkte, dafi man in St. Petersljurg immer praokkupiert gewesen sei,
ob nicbt unsere Demarche die Form einer Demiitigung fiir Serbien annehmen
werde, was nicbt obne Reperkussion in Rutland bleiben konnte.

Ich lieli es mir angelegen sein, den russiscben Gescbaftstrager in dieser
Ricbtung zu berubigen. Unser Ziel bestebe darin, die unbaltbare Situation
Serbiens zur Monarchic zu klaren und zu diesem Zwecke die dortige
Regierung zu veranlassen, einerseits die gegen den derzeitigen Bestand der
Monarchic gerichteten Stromungen offentlicb zu desavouieren und durcb admi-
nistrative MaOnabmen zu unterdriicken, andererseits uns die Moglichkeit zu
bieten, uns von der gewissenhaften Durchfiihrung dieser MaOnahmen Recben-
schaft zu geben. Ich fiibrte des langeren aus, welcbe Gefabr ein weiteres
Gewabrenlassen der groiiserbiscben Propaganda nicbt nur fiir die Integritat
der Monarchic, sondern auch fiir das Glcicbgewicht und den Frieden in Europa
nach sich zieben wiirde und wie sebr alle Dynastien, nicbt zuletzt die russische,
durcb die Einbiirgerung der Auffassung bedroht erscheinen, dafi cine Bewegung
ungestraft bleiben konne, die sich des Mordcs als eines uation^ilistiscben Kampf-
mittels bedient

ScWIelilicli verwies ich darauf, da(i wir keine Gebietserwerbung, sondem
bloft die Erhaltung des Bestehenden bezweckten, ein Standpunkt, der bei der
russiscben Regierung Verstandnis finden miisse.

Fiirst KudascbefF bemerkte darauf, dali er den Standpunkt seiner Regierung
nicbt kenne und aucb nicbt wisse, wie sicb Serbien zu den einzelnen Forde-
ningen stellen werde.

Zum ScbluSse unserer Unterredung betonte der Herr Gescbaftstrager, daD er
nicbt ermangeln werde, seiner Regierung die Auskiinfte zur Kenntnis zu
bringen, die ich ibm iiber unseren Scbritt gegeben, namentlicb aucb in der
Ricbtung, dafi unsererseits keine Demiitigung Serbiens beabsicbtigt sei.

19.

Graf Berchtold an die k. u. k. Botschafter in Berlin, Rom, Paris, London,
St. Petersburg und Konstantinopel.

Wien, 25. Juli 1914.

Im Anbuge erbalten Euer Exzellenz das in der Zirkularnote an die Macbte
angekiiiidigte Dossier, das die groliserbiscbe Propaganda und ihre Zusammen-
bange mit dem Sarajevoer Attentate zum Gegenstande hat.

Euer Exzellenz woUen dieses Dossier zur Kenntnis der dortigen Regierung
bringen.

Memolre.

Die von Serbien ausgegangene Bewegung, die sicb zum Ziele gesetzt bat,
die siidslawischen Telle Osterreich-Ungarns von der Monarchic loszureilien, um
sie mit Serbien zu einer staatlichen Einheit zu verbinden, reicht weit zuriick.

In ihren Endzielen stets gleich bleibend und nur in ihren Mitteln und an
Intensitat wecbselnd, hat diese Propaganda ^uf serbiscbem Boden zur Zeit der
Annexionskrise einen ihrer Hohepunkte erreicbt. Den schiitzenden. Mantel der
Heimlichkeiten abstreifend, war sie damals mit dem Einbekenntnisso ihrer
Tendenzen ofFen hervorgetreten und hatte versucht, unter der Patronanz der
serbischen Regierung mit alien ihr zur Verfiigung stehenden Mitteln zur Ver-
wirklichung ihrer Absichten zu gelangen.

Wahrend die gesamte serbische Presse in gebassigen, die Tatsachen ent-
stellenden Ausf alien zum Kampfe gegen die Monarchie aufrief, bildeten sicb —
von anderen Propagandamittein abgesehen — Assoziationen, die diesen Kampf
vorbereiteten.

An Bedeutimg ragte unter diesen die Narodna odbrana hervor. Aus einem
damals bestandenen revolutionaren Komitee hervorgegangen, war diese als
Privatverein konstituierte, jedoch vom Belgrader Auswartigen Amte voUig ab-
hangige Organisation von scrbischen Militar- und Zivilfunktionaren ins Leben
gerufen worden. Als ihre Griinder fungierten unter anderen: General Bozo
Jankovid, , die ehemaligen Minister Ljuba Jovanovid, Ljuba Davidovid und Velislav
Vulovid, der Direktor der Staatsdruckerei Zivojin DaCid und die damaligen
Hauptlcute, jetzt Majore Voja Tankosid und Milan PribiCevid. Dieser Verein
hatte sich die Bildung und Ausriistung von Freischaren fiir den bevorstehenden
Krieg gegen die osterreicbisch-ungarisclie Monarchie zum Ziele gesetzt. (Siehe
Beilage 2.)

Ein anschauliches Bild der damaligen Tatigkeit der Narodna odbrana liefert
unter anderem die Aussagc des vom Kreisgericbte in Sarajevo als Zeugen ver-
nommenen bosnisch-berzegowinischen Landesangeliorigen Trifko Krstanovi<5, der
sich zu jener Zeit in Belgrad befand und der, nebst anderen Angehorigen der
jMonarchie, von der Narodna odbrana als Komitatschi angeworben war. Mit etwa
1140 anderen Bandenmitgliedem war Krstanovid anfangs 1909 nach einer fiir
die AusbilduDg von Banden in Cuprija , (Bezirk Jagodina) eriichteten und von
den Hauptleuten Voja Tankosid und Dusan Putnik geleiteten Scbule gebracht
worden. Als Lehrer fungierten, dort ausschlieiilicli serbische Offiziere. . General
Bozo Jankovid und Hauptmann Milan Pribidevid inspizierten diesen dreimonat-
lichen Bandenkurs in regelmaiiigen Zeitabschnitten.

Dort erbielten die angebenden Komitatscbis Unterricbt im Schieften und
Werfen von Bomben, im ^Minenlegen, Sprengen von Eisenbahnen, Tunnels und
Briicken sowie im Zerstoren von Telegraphenleitungen. Ihre Aufgabe war es,
nach den Auftragen ihrer Befehlshaber die neuerworbenen Kenntnisse in
Bosnien und der Herzegowina in die Tat umzusetzen.

Durch diese ganz offentlich betriebene und von der serbischen Regierung
gefbrderte Aktion der Narodna odbrana wurde damals der Bandenlmeg gegen
Osterreich-Ungarn vorbereitet. Angehorige der Monarchie wurden hiebei zum
VeiTate an ihrem Vaterlande verleitet und systematisch dazu erzogen, als
serbische Emissare heimtiickische Angriffe gegen die Verteidigungsinittel ihrer
Heimat zu richten.

Diese Periode der aggressiven Aspirationen fand ihren Abschluli mit der
von der serbischen Eegienmg am 31. Marz 1909 abgegebenen Erklarung, in
welcher sich diese mit der durch die Annexion Bosniens una der Herzego-
wina geschaflfenen volker- und staatsrechtlichcn Neuordnung abfinden zu wollen
erklarte und feierlich versprach, mit der osterreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie
in Hinkunft in freundschaftlichen Beziehungen leben zu wollen.

Mit dieser Erklarung schien auch das Ende der eine stete Quelle der
Unruhc bildenden Bewegung gegen Osterreich-Ungani gekommen und der Weg

zu einer wirkllch freundschaftlichen Annaherung Serbiens an die Monarchie
betreten. Der Forderung durch die serbiscbe Eegierung beraubt und von ibr
pflichtgemali bekampft, batte die monarcbiefeindlicbe Propaganda nur mebr ein
scbattenbaftes, dem baldigen Untergange geweibtes Dasein fristen konnen. Da-
gegen batten die zwiscben den siidslawiscben Teilen der Monarcbie und Serbien
auf spracblicbem, etbniscbem und kulturellem Gebiete bestebenden Beriibrungs-
punkte zur Verricbtung gemeinsamer, vom Geiste gegenseitiger Freundscbaffc
und pai-alleler Interessen getragener Kulturarbeit fiibren miissen.

Piesc Envartungen baben sicb jedocb nicbt erfiillt.

Die monarcbiefeindlicben Aspii'ationen sind geblieben und unter den Augen
der serbiscben Regierung, die nicbts getan bat, um diese Bewegung zu unter-
driicken, bat die gegen Osterreicb-Ungarn gericbtete Propaganda nur nocb an
Breitc und Tiefe gewonnen. Der Hali gegen die Monarcbie wurde wacberbalteti
und durcb stets neue Anfacbung zu einem unversobnlicben gestaltet. Mit den
alten, der geanderten Situation angepaOten und durcb neue Metboden erganzten
.Mittcbi wuide das Yolk Serbiens „zum unvermeidlicben Vernicbtungskampfe"
gegen Osten-eicb-Ungarn aufgerufen. Systematiscb wurden gebeimnisvolle Faden
nacb den siidslawiscben G.ebieten der Monarcbie gesponnen und deren Burger
,zum Verrate am Vaterlande geworben.

Vor allem bat die serbiscbe Presse seitber nicbt aufgebiirt, in diesem Geiste zu
"wirken.

Nicbt weniger als 81 in Serbien erscbeinenden Zeitscbriften muftte bis beute
wegen ibres die inlandiscben Strafgesetze verletzenden Inbaltes das Postdebit
entzogen werden.

Kaum eine der Strafoormen, welcbe die erbabene Person des Monarcben, die
Mitglieder Allerbocbstseines Hauses und die Integritat des Staates scbutzen, ist
seitens der serbiscben Blatter unverletzt geblieben. Einige wenige aus der iibfer-
reicben Fiille dieses Materials entnommene, aus verscbiedenen' Zeitpunkten
stammende Proben dieser Prefistimmen sind in der Beilage 1 zusammengestellt.

Obne in eine detaillierte Besprecbung dieser x4.ufierungen der offentlicben
Meinung Serbiens einzugeben, muli immerbin bemerkt werden, daft sie die An-
nexion Bosniens und der Herzegowina trotz der serbiscberseits erfolgten An-
erkennung dieses Aktes nacb wie vor als einen an Serbien veriibten Raub, der
einer Remedur bedarf, binstellen, ein Gedanke, der nicbt bloii in den Blattern
scbarfster Ricbtung in alien Variationen ibrer unflatigen Spracbe immer wieder-
kcbrt, sondern der aucb in der dem Belgrader Auswartigen Amte so nabe-
stebenden „Samouprava" in kaum verbiillter Form ausgesprocben wird (lit. b
der Beilage 1).

Ebenso kann nicbt unterlassen werden, das Augenmerk darauf zu lenken,
wie das am 15. Juni 1910 in Sarajevo von Bogdan Zeraji<5 veriibte ' Attentat

gegeD den Landes-Chef von Bosnien und der Herzegowina, Feldzengmelster
von Varesanin, publizistiscli vervvertet wurde.

Wie bekannt, hatte sicli Zerajid unmittelbar nacli der Tat entleibt und vor
deren Veriibung seine gesamten Papiere verbrannt. Unter diesen Umstanden
vermochten die Motive seines Anschlages nicht voUkommen klargestellt zu
werden. Immerbin konnte man aber aus einem bei ihm gefundenen Abzeichen
scbliefien, dali er ICrapotkinschen Ideen huldigte. Aucb die gefiihrten Erhebun-
gen deuteten darauf hin, daft man es mit einem auf anarcbistischen Grund-
lagen beruhenden Verbrecben zu tun batte.

Dies binderte jedocb die Presse Serbiens nicbt, den Attentater als serbiscben
Nationalhelden zu feiem und seine Tat zu /verberrlicben. Ja, die j,Politika"
verwabrte sicb fdrmlicb dagegen, dafi Zerajid Anarchist gewesen sei und rekla-
mierte ihn als „beldenmutigen Serben, dessen Name jeder Serbe mit Acbtung
und Scbmerz nennen \\drd".

Pas Datum des 18. August*) desselben Jabres bielt die ^Politika" fur
eine passende Gelegenbeit, sicb mit dem Anscblage des Zerajid, „dessen Name
im Volke wie etwas „„Heiliges"" genannt werde", neuerlicb zu befassen und
das Attentat in einem Gedicbte zu feiem (lit. a der Beilage ]).

So wurde dieses Verbrecben, das mit den Aspirationen auf Territorien
der Monarcbie nicbts zu tun batte, fiir die Forderung dieser Ideen ausgebeutet
und durcb die Gloiifizierung des Zcrajid der Mord ganz ausdriicklicb als ein
riibmlicbes und nachabmenswertes Mittel im Kampfe fiir die Verwirklicbung
dieser Gedanken anerkannt. Diese Sanktionierung des Mordes als einer voU-
kommen zulassigen Methode im Kampfe gegen die Monarcbie kcbrt spater in
den Blattem bei Besprccbung des von Jukid veriibten Attentates gegen den
koniglicben Kommissar von Cuvaj wieder (lit. c der Beilage p.

Diese nicbt nur in Serbien verbreiteten, sondern — wje spater gezeigt
weMen wird — auf woblorganisierten Scbleicbwegen in die Monarcbie ein-
gescbmuggelten Zeitungcn waren es,. die bei den breiten Massen jene Stimmun-
gen erzeugten und wacberbielten, welcbe einen frucbtbaren Nabrboden fiir die
Macbenscbaften der monarcbiefeindlicben Assoziationen boten.

Zum Zentralpunkte dieser von Vereinen bctriebenen Agitation wurde die
Narodna odbrana. Dieselben Personen, die zur Zeit der Annexion an der Spitzc
des Vereines gestanden waren, bildeten aucb jetzt seine Leitung; wieder findet
man bier, wie seinerzeit, als die energiscbesten und tatigsten Organisatoren die
beftigsten Gegner der Monarcbie; den General Bozo Jankovid, den Direktor
der Staatsdruckerei Zivojin Dadid so wie die Majore Milan Pribidevid und Voja
Tankosid. Organisatoriscb auf eine in die Breite und Tiefe gebende Basis gestellt
iund bierarcbisch straff gegliedert (siebe Beilage 2 unter „ Organisation"), besali

*; GeburtstAg Seiner k. und k. Apostolischeii M^jestat.

clle Narodna odbraria bald zirka 400 Ausschiisse, die eine lebkafte Agitation
entfalteten.

Hiezu kam, dafi die Narodna odbrana zu dem Scbiitzenbunde (mit 762 Ver-
elnen), dem Sokolbunde „Dusan Silni" (mit 2500 Mitgliedem), dem olympisclien
Klubj dem Beitervereine „Knez Mihajlo", dem Jiigerbunde und der Kulturliga
in engste Verbindung trat und zablreiche andere Vereine in ibre Dienste stellte,
die alle, von der Narodna odbrana gefiibrt und unterstiitzt, in deren Sinn
wirken. In steter gegenseitiger Durcbdringung gelangten diese Vereine zu einer
fonnlicben Amalgamierung, so dali sic beute eigentlicb alle -nur Glieder des
einen Korpei's der Narodna odbrana sind.

So spannte die Narodna odbrana iiber ganz Serbien ein engmaschiges
Netz der Agitation, mit welcbem sie alle fur ibre Ideen Empfanglicbeji an sicb zog.

Welcbes aber der Geist ist, in dem die Narodna odbrana wirkt, das gebt mit
geniigender Klarbeit scbon aus ibren ofliziellen Vereinspublikationen bervor.

In ibren Statuten im Kleide eines Kulturvereines auftretend, dem nur die
geistige und korperlicbe Entwicklung der Bevolkerung Serbiens sowie deren
materielle Kraftigung am Herzen liegt, entbiillt die Narodna odbrana in ibrem
Vereinsorgane (siebe Beilage 2) den wahren und einzigen Grund ibres Daseins, ibr
sogenanntes „reorganisiertes Programm", namlich:

In „fanatiscber und unermiidlicber Arbeit" dem serbiscben Volke unter dem
Vorwande, dali ibm die Monarcbie „ seine Freiheit und Spraebe nebmen, ja
Serbien zerscbmettern" wolle, die „beilige Wabrbeit" zu predigen,. daO es eine
unerlalilicbe Notwendigkeit ist, gegen Osterreicb-Ungarn, diesen seinen „ersten
und groBten Feind", den „Ausrottungskampf mit Gewebr und Kanone" zu
fiibren und das Volk „mit alien Mitteln" auf diesen Kampf vorzubereiten, der zu
fiibren ist, „zur Befreiung der unterworfenen Gebiete", in denen „7 Millionen
unterjocbter Briider scbmacbten".

Ausscblielilicb im Dienste dieser Idee steben die „Kultiirbestrebungen" der
Narodna odbrana, als blolie Mittel zur Organisierung und Erziebung des Volkes
fiir den ersebnten. Vernicbtungskampf gegen die Monarcbie.

In eben diesem Geiste wirken aber alle der Narodna odbrana affilierten
Vereine, wofiir der Sokolverein in Elragujevac als Beispiel dienen moge (siebe
Beilage 3).

Wie bei der Narodna odbrana, so steben aucb bier Offiziere, Professoren
ujid Staatsbeamte an der Spitze.

Die Anspracbe, mit welcber der Vereinsprasident Major KovaCevid die-
Jabresversammlung im Jabre 1914 erofFhete, verzicbtet vollkommen darauf, das
Turnen, das docb der eigentlicbe Zweck eines Sokolv,ereines ist, zu erwabnen
und befaflt sicb ausscblielilicb mit der „Yorbereitung zum Kampfe" gegen den
,;5gefabrlichen, berzlosen, lustemen, lastigen und gefraliigen Feind im Norden*.

der „Millionen serbisclier Briidei* Freiheit lind Recllt nimmt und sie in Sklaverei
und Ketten halt".

In dem Verwaltungsbericlite dieses Vereines treten die sachliclien Aus-
fulirimgen ganz in den Hintergrand und gebep nur die Stichworte fiir das
Bekenntnis des wahren „Zieles der Handlungen der Verwaltung" ab, namlicli:
die Vorbereitung der nationalon Entwicklung und der StUrkung der „unter-
driickten Nation" zu dem Ende, damit sie ihr „nocb niclit erfiilltes Programm,
ihre noch nicht erfiillte Arbeit" zu Ende fiihren und jene r-o^'oGe Tat" voU-
bringen konne, „die sich in nachster Zeit abspielen wird": „die Befreiung der
jenseits der Drina wohnenden Briider, welche- die Leiden des Gekreuzigten
erdulden".

Ja sogar der Kassier beniitzt seinen Kassenbericbt zu dem Mabnrufe, man
miisso „Falken erzieben", die imstande sind, den „nocli niclit befreiten Briidern
die Freiheit zu bringen".

Ebenso wie bei der Narodna odbrana die Kulturbestrebungen, ist also bei
den Sokols die turnerische Betatigung nicht Selbstzweck, sondern ein bloftes
Mittel im Dienste ebenderselben Propaganda, die mit denselben Gedanken, ja
fast mit den gleichen Worten betrieben wird.

Wenn nun die Narodna odbrana das „Yolk" zum Vernichtungskampfe
gegen die Monarchie aufruft, wendct sie sich nicht nur an das Volk in Serblen,
sondern an alle siidslawischen Volkerschaften. Gelten doch der Narodna odbrana
die siidslawischen Gebiete der Monarchie als „unsere unterworfenen serbischen
Gebiete". (Siehe auch Beilage 4). So sollen also auch die siidslawischen Ange-
horigen der Monarchie an dieser „nationalen Arbeit" teilnehmen; so soil auch
jenseits der serbischen Grenze diese „gesunde, notwendige Arbeit" verrichtet
werden. Und auch auf dem Boden.der Monarchie sucht die Narodna odbrana
jene „nelden fiir diesen heiligen Kampf", denen Obilid, der Morder Murads,
als nachstrebenswertes Beispiel nationaler Opferwilligkeit voranleuchten soil.

Um aber die „Briider aulierhalb Serbiens" zur Teilnahme an der ^Arbeit
privater Initiative" anzuspornen, unterhalt die Naiodna odbrana eine lebhafte
Verbindung mit den „Briidern jenseits der Grenze". Wie diese Verbindung
geartet jst, wird In dem Vereinsorgane nicht gesagt, Avohl deshalb, weil dies zu
jenem' Teile der' „Gesamtarbeit" g^hort, der „aus mehrfachen Grunden weder
wiedergegeben werden darf noch kann".

Wie umfangreich dieser Zweig ihrer Tatigkeit ist, lafit sich aus dem
Umstande erkennen, dali sowohl der Zentralausschuii der Narodna odbrana als
auch einzelne ihrer KreisausschUsse eigene Sektionen fur ^auswartige Angelegen-
heiten" besitzen.

Diese „auswartige" Tatigkeit der Narodna odbrana und ihrer Affilierten
ist eine aulierst vielseitigc.

Das, well behordlich kontrollierbar, reladv ungefahrlichste Mittel dleser
Agitation sind die Vortragsreisen, welche hervorragende Vereinsmitglieder der
Narodna odbrana nach den siidostlichen Teilen der Monarchie unternelimen,
wo sie in verschiedenen Vcreinen iiber nationale und kulturelle Fragen sprecben.
Diese Anlasse bieten den Vortragenden die von ihnen gesuchte und wohl den
vornehmlicbsten Zweck dieser Reissn bildende Gelegenheit, in halben, dem
Kenner verstandlicben Worten und Wendungen im Sinne der wahren Tendenzen
dieser Verelne zu wirken.

Unter diesen Emissaren nimmt nebst anderen aucb der schon mebrmals
erwahnte Direktor der serbiscben Staatsdrackerei Zivojin Da6i6 eine bervorragende
Stellung ein, jener Zivojin Daci(^, der am 8. August 1909 einen „Aufruf" an
das serbiscbe Volk erliefi,, in welcbem er Osterreicb-Ungarn als den Feind
Serbiens bezeicbnete und ziir Vorbereitung auf den Kampf mit der Monarcbie
ermabnte. Wiederbolt unternahm Dac$i(5 Agitatlonsreisen nacb den siidostlicben
Teilen der osterreicbiscb-ungarischen Monarcbie. Bei einem solcben Vortrage in
Karlovci (1912) legte er seine sonst beobacbtete Vorsicbt ab und trat geradezu
fiir die „Vereiniguhg aller Serben gegen den gemeinsamen' Feind '^ ein, als den
er in nicbt milizuverstebenden Andeutungen Osterreicb-Ungarn binstellte.

Bedenklicber sind die Beziebungen, welcbe die im Geiste der Narodna
odbrana wirkenden serbiscben Korporationen unter dem Deckmantel der Tnter-
essen- und Kulturgemeinscbaft mit Verelnen in der Monarcbie angekniipft
baben, denn die gegenseitigen deputativen oder korporativen Besucbe dieser
Verelne, die sicb einer genaueren bebordlicben Kontrolle entzieben, werden
serbiscberseits zu allerlei monarcbiefeindlicben Macbenscbaften beniitzt.

So bat sicb beispielsweise ein zu der bekannten Feier des Sarajevoer
Prosvjetavereines im September 1912 entsendeter Delegierter der Narodna
odbrana nicbt gescbeut (siebe Beilage 6) bei diesem Anlasse im gebeimen
bosniscbe MItglieder fiir seinen Verein anzuwerben. Die Entsendung eines Ver-
treters des Kragujevacer Sokolvereines zu dieser Feier sollte den ^Briidern in
Bosnien" sagen: „Wir baben Euer nicbt vergessen; die Fliigel des Falken der
Sumadija sind nocb macbtig", ein Gedanke, der im intlmen Verkehre wobi
einen ganz anderen, den friiber dargelegten Tendenze,n dieses Vereines adaquateren
Ausdruck gefunden baben wird. (Siebe Beilage 3.) Was die Vorgange anbelangt,
die sicb bei den in Serbien abgebaltenen Zusammenkunften dieser Art abspielen,
so entzieben sicb diese allerdings einer auf vollkommen sicberer Basis stebend en
Kenntnis der k. und k. Beborden, denen ja fur diese Falle nur scbwer kontrollier-
bare konfidentielle Mitteilungen zur Verfugung steben. In diesem Zusammenbange
ware des Besucbes von Agramer Studenten in Serbien im April 1912 zii gedenken,
der auf serbiscber Seite durcb die Veranstaltung eines offiziellen. militarischen
Empfanges, ja sogar einer Truppenparade zu Ebren dieser Studenten zu einer derart
jsuggestiven Demonstration gestaltet wurde, dali der Verwaltungsberjcht des

Kragujevacer Sokolvereines sagen darf, dieses „Ereignis bedeutet den Anfang nnd
Keim einer groiien- Tat, die sich in der nacbsten Zukunft abspielen wird", „ein
Keim, der reifen wird, wenn die Volksseele nocb mebr aufwallt", „bis es keine
Schranken gibt, die sie nicbt niederreifien konnte".

Erst vor kurzem ist cs zur Kenntnis der Beborden der Monarcbie gelangt, dali
die Sokolvereine Serbiens einige analoge Korporationen in der Monarcbie dazu
bestimmt baben, sicb mit ibnen in einem bisber gebeim gebaltenen Verbande zu
vereinigen, dessen Cbarakter bisber nocb nicbt ganz klargestellt ist, da die
Erbebungen dariiber derzeit nocb fortdauern. Immerbin lassen die scbon jetzt
erzielten Ergebnisse der Nacbforscbungen vermuten, dali man bier einem der Wege
auf die Spur gekommen ist, auf dem die subversiven Tendenzen der serbiscben
Sokols und ibrer Freunde einzelnen verfiibrten und irregeleiteten Personengruppen
in der Monarcbie eingeimpft werden.

Diese auf breitere Scbicbten gemiinzte, mebr vorbereitende Propaganda tritt
aber an Bedeutung gegeniiber jener „auswartigen Arbeit" in den Hintergrund, die
von der Narodna odbrana und ibren Freunden in der Agitation von Mann zu Mann
geleistet wird. Hier ist jenes Gebiet, auf dem ibre traurigsten Erfolge liegen.

Durcb ibre gebeimen Vertrauensmanner und Emissare tragt sie das Gift der
Aufwieglung in die Kreise der Erwacbsenen ebenso wie der urteilslosen Jugend.

So baben beispielsweise, von Milan Pribii^evid verleitet, die ebemaligen
Honvedofiiziere V. B., D, K., V. N. imd der kroatiscb-slawoniscbe'Gendarmerie-
leutnant V. K. den Heeresdienst in der Monarcbie unter bedenklicben Umsfanden
vei;lassen und sicb nach Serbien gewendet, wo sie inzwiscben allerdings mancbe
ibrer Hoffnungen getauscbt seben und wenigstens zum Teile daran denken, in
die von ibnen veiratene Heimat zuriickzukebren.

Die von Serbien aus in die mittleren Scbulen Kroatiens und Bosniens
getragene Agitation ist leider so bekannt, daft sie einer Exemplifizierung nicbt
bedarf. Weniger bekannt aber ist es, daft die wegen scbwerer disziplinarer
Vergeben aus kroatiscben und bosniscben Scbulen Ausgeschlossenen in Serbien
mit offenen Armen aufgenommen, oft sogar von Staats wegen unterstiitzt und zu
Feinden der Monarcbie erzogen werden. Die serbiscben Scbulen mit ibren
monarcbiefeindlicben Lebrbehelfen und ibrer groften Zabl von Professoren und
Lebrera, die in den Reihen der Narodna odbrana steben, sind allerdings geeignete
Anstalten zur Erziebung derartiger Adepten. Ein besonders beacbtenswerter
Fall dieser Art mag bier als Beispiel Erwabnung finden. Im Marz 1914 waren
mebrere Scbiiler der Lebrerpraparandie in Pakrac (l^roatien) wegen eines Streikes
relegiert worden. Dieselben wandten sicb nacb Serbien, wo sie zum Teile sofort als
Lebrer Anstellungen erbielten, zum Teile in einer Lebrerbildungsanstalt unter-
gebracht wurden. Mit monarcbiefeindlicben Kreisen in Verbindung stebend, bat
einer dieser Relegierten offentlicb erklart, er und seine Leute wurden zur Zeit
der Anwesenbeit des Herm Erzberzog-Tbronfolgers in Bosnien den Beweis liefern,

dafl Bosnien serblsctes Land sei. Recht merkwiirdig mutet es an, daO der
koniglich serbische Kreisprafekt in Krajnsi,, wie hier erganzend bemerkt sei,
dreien aus dem Kreise dieser so arg kompromittierten Studenten gerade zur Zeit
der Anwesenbeit des Herrn Eizberzogs Franz Ferdinand in Bosnien serbiscbe
Passe ausstellte, in denen er sie falscblicb als serbiscbe Staatsangeborige
bezeicbnete, obwobl er deren kroatiscbe Heimatsberecbtigung kennen. mulite. Mit
diesen Passen ausgeriistet, vermocbten die drei Praparandisten unbemerkt naob
der Monarcbie zu gelangen, wobei sie jedocb erkannt und angebalt^n warden.

Mit all dem ware aber die „auswartige" Tatigkeit der Narodna odbrana
nocb lange nicbt erscbopfend cbarakterisiert.

Scbon seit langerer Zeit war die k. und k. Regierung durcb konfidentielle
Meldungen dariiber unterricbtet, daii die Narodna odbrana den von ibr
gewunscbten Krieg gegen die Monarcbie aucb militariscb insoferne vorbereite,
als sie in der Monarcbie Emissare balte, die nacb gewobnter Bandenart im
Falle des Ausbrucbes von Feindseligkeiten die Zerstorung von Transport-Mitteln
und -Einricbtungen bewirken und B-evolten sowie Paniken bervorrufen soUten.
(Siebe Beilage 7.)

Das im Jabre 1913 beim Kreisgericbte in Sarajevo gegen Jovo Jagli6i(5
und Genossen eingeleitete Strafverfabren wegen Verbrecbens der Ausspabung
(Beilage 6) bat die Besfatigung dieser vertraulicben Mitteilungen gebracbt. . So
wie zur Zeit ihrer Griindung stebt aucb beute nocb die Vorbereitung des
Bandenkrieges auf dem Programme der Narodna odbrana, wozu nocb erganzend
die Entwicklung einer Spionagetatigkeit trat.

So ist das beutige sogenannte „reorganisierte Programm" .der Narodna
odbrana in Wahrbeit ein erweitertes Programm: Den „Ausrottungskampf" gegen
die Monarcbie vorzubereiten; ja berbeizufiibren und dann wieder „die alte rote
Fabne der Narodna odbrana" zu entfalten.

Aus dieser Atmospbare des offen und ^ebeim gescbiirten Hasses gegen die
Monarcbie, verbunden mit einer sicb jenseits aller Verantwortlicbkeit diinkenden
Agitation, die im Kampfe gegen Osterreich-Ungam alle Mittel fiir zulassig eracbtet
und hiebei ganz ungescbeut den gemeinen Mord als deren wirksamstes empfjeblt,
muiiten scblielilicb, aucb ohne weiteres Zutun der monarcbiefeindlicben Kreise
Serbians, Akte des Terrorismus entsteben.

Am 8. Juni 1912 gab Lukas Jukid gegen den koniglicben Kommissar in
Agram, von Cuvaj, einen ScbuO ab, durcb den der im Wagen sitzejide Banalrat
von Hervoid totlicb verletzt wurde. Auf der Flucbt erscbofi Jukid einen ibn
verfolgenden Polizeimann und verletzte zwei weitere^

Wie aus der offentlicb durcbgefiibrten Hauptverbandlung bekannt ist^ finden
sicb in den Ideen des Jukid die grundlegenden Gedanken der von der Narodna
odbrana propagierten Plane wieder. Wenn sicb Jukid aucb scbon seit einiger
Zeit mit Attentatspl'anen trug, so kamen diese docb erst zur Reife, als er am

18. April 1912 den Ausflug der Agramer Studenten nach Belgrad mitgemacht
liatte. Bei den zu Ehren der Besucher veranstalteten rauschenden Festlichkeiten
war Jukid zu verschiedenen Personen in Beziehung getreten, die dem Kreise
der Narodna odbrana angehorten und mit dferien er politische Gesprache fiih^rte.
Wenige Tage spater war Jukic wieder in Belgrad und hier erhielt er von einem
serbisclien Major eine Bombe und von einem Genossen die Browningpistole,
mit der er das Attentat vollfiilirte.

Die in Agram aufgefundene Bombe war nacb dem Gutachten der Sacb-
verstandigen in einem Arsenale zu militariscben Zwecken erzeugt' worden.

Nocb war der Anscblag des Jukid nicbt vergessen, als am 18. August 1913
der aus Amerika zugereiste Stepban Dojdid in Agram ein Attentat gegen den
koniglichen Kommissar Baron Skerlecz veriibte — eine Tat, die der von Serbien
aus organisierten Verbetzung der in Amerika lebenden Siidslaven entsprang —
gleicbfalls ein Werk der „auswartigeii" Propaganda der Narodna odbrana und
ibrer Gesinnungsgenossen.

Die von dem Serben T. Dimitrijevid verfaOte, in Cbicago gedruckte
Broscbiire „Natrag u staro ognjiste vase" mit ibren maQlosen Ausfalleri gegen
Seine k. und k. Apostoliscbe Majestat und ibrer Aufforderung an die Serben
der Monarcbie, im Hinblicke auf ibre baldige „Befreiung" nacb Serbien beim-
zuwandern, zeigt den Parallelismus dieser in Amerika mit voller Freibeit der
Bewegung betriebenen, von Serbien aus geleiteten Propaganda und jener, die
von Serbien aus in die Gebiete der Monarcbie getragen wird.

Und wieder kaum nach Jabresfrist war Agram der Scbauplatz eines, diesmal
miiigluckten Attentates.

Am 20. Mai 1. J. versucbte Jakob Scbafer im Agramer Tbeater einen
Anscblag auf den Banus Freiberrn von Skerlecz, woran er im letzten Augen-
blicke durcb einen Polizeibeamten gebindert wurde. Die Untersucbung ergab
den Bestand eines Komplottes, dessen Seele Eudolf Hercigonja war. Aus den
Aussagen He'rcigonjas und seiner fiinf Mitangeklagten ergab sicb, daO aucb
dieses Attentat seinen Ausgang von Serbien nabm.

An einem gescbeiterten Versucbe zur Befreiung des Jukid beteiligt, war
Hercigonja nacb Serbien gefliicbtet (Oktober 1912), wo er gemeinsam mit
seinem Komplizen Marojan Jaksid mit Komitatscbis und Mitgliedern der Narodna
odbrana verkebrte. Wie scbon so oft bei den durcb viel zu friibe Bescbaftigung
mit Fragen der Politik iiberbitzten jugendlicben Gemiitern, war das Ergebnis
dieses korrumpierenden Verkebres aucb diesmal ein unbeilvclles. Hercigonja
kebrte mit dem in Belgrad verkiindeten Dogma zuriick, dali die siidslawiscben
Lander Osterreicb-Ungarns von der Monarcbie abgetrennt und mit dem Konig-
reicbe vereinigt warden miiliten. Dazu batte er in dem Kreise, in dem er dort
-verkebrte, die Lebre eingesogen, daO dieses Ziel durcb die Ausfubrung von

Attentaten auf hochstehende Personlichkeiten und fiibrende Politiker der Mon-
archie anzustreben sei, da es nur durch diese Mittel verwiiklicht werden konne.

In diesem Sinne wirkte dann Hercigonja in Agram auf seine Freunde ein,
deren einige er fiir seine Ideen gewann. Im Voidergrunde seiner Plane stand
die Veriibung eines Anschlages auf den Tkronfolger Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand.

Wenige Monate vorher waren gegen Luka Aljinovic Erhebungen wegen
hocbverraterischer Propaganda gefiihrt worden. Im Zuge dieses Veifabrens
hatten drei Zeugen ausgesagt, Aljinovid babe vor ibnen erklart, er hatte im
Jabre 1913 in Belgrad zu Prdpagandazwecken, speziell aber zur Ausfiibrung
eines Attentates auf den Herrn Erzberzog Franz Ferdinand von der Narodna
odbrana 100 Dinar und die gleicbe Summe von einer gebeimen Studenten-
vereinigung bekommen.

Man siebt, wie sicb die verbrecberiscbe Agitation der Narodna odbrana
und der ibr Gleicbgesinnten in letzter Zeit auf die Person des Herrn Erz-
berzog-Tbronfolgers konzentrierte.

Aus alien diesen Feststellungen gelangt man zu dem Scblusse, dafi die
Narodna odbrana mit den um sie gruppierten monarcbiefeindlicben KJreisen
Serbiens seit kurzem den Zeitpunkt fiir gekommen eracbtete, die von ihr ver-
bi:eiteten Lebren durcb Taten verwirklicben zu lassen.

Beacbtenswert ist aber, dali sie sicb biebei damit begniigte, fiir diese Taten
die Anreg-ungen zu geben und dort, wo diese Anregungen auf frucbtbaren
Boden gefallen waren, die materiellen Hilfsmittel zu deren Verwirklicbung bei-
zustellen, daii sie aber die einzige gefabrlicbe Rolle bei dieser Prdpaganda der
Tat ausschlielilicb der von ibr verbetzten und verfiibrten Jugend der Monarcbie
zuscbob, die ganz allein die Lasten dieses traurigen ^Heldentums" zu tragen bat.

AUe Ziige dieser Macbe finden sich in der Entstebungsgescbicbte des tief-
betriibenden Attentates vom 28. Juni wieder. (Beilage 8.)

Princip und Grabez tragen den Typus der scbon in der Scbule von den
Gedanken der Narodna odbrana vergifleten Jugend.

In Belgrad, im Kreise einer von diesen Idcen erfiillten Studentenscbar
verkebrend, trug sicb Princip mit Attentatsplanen gegen den Herrn Erzberzog-
Tbronfolger Franz Ferdinand, gegen den sicb damals aus Anlafi seiner Keise nacli
den annektierten Landem der Hali der rnonarcbiefeindlicben Elemente Serbiens
besonders akzentuiert batte.

Ibm gesellte sicb der im selben Kreise verkebrende Cabrinovid bei, dessen
wechselnde, radikal-revolutionaren Ansicbten nacb seinem eigenen Gestandnisse
unter dem Einflusse seiner Belgrader Umgebung und der Lektiire der serbiscben
Blatter in die gleicbe monarcbiefeindlicbe und zur Propaganda der Tat neigende
Eichtung gedrangt wurden.

Dank seiner bereits vorhandenen Dispositionen erlag Grabez diesem Milieu,
in das er erst spater tirat, sebr rasch.

Soweit aber dieses Kojuplott auch gediehen und so fest der Entschlufi der
Verschworer auch gewesen sein mag, zur Ausfiihrung des Attentates zu
schreiten, so ware es doch nie zu dessen Veriibung gekommen, wenn sicb nicht,
gleichwie im Falle Jukid, Leute gefunden batten, die den Komplizen die Mittel
zur Veriibung des Anscblages zur Verfiigung gestellt batten. Denn es feblte
ibnen, wie Princip und Cabrinovid ausdriicklicb bestatigen, an den notigen
Waffen, ebenso aber aucb an Geld zu deren Anscbaffung.

Interessant ist es nun zu seben, wo sicb die Komplizen ibre Werkzeuge
zu verscbaffen sucbten. Milan PribiCevid und Zivojin Dadid, diese beiden fiibren-
den Manner der Narodna- odbrana, waren die ersten, an die sie als sicbere
Heifer in ibrer Not dacbten, ofienbar desbalb, weil es im Kreise der Attentats -
lustigen bereits zur Tradition geworden ist, die Mordwerkzeuge von diesen
Reprasentanten der Narodna odbrana zu bezieben. Ber zufallige Umstand, dali
diese beiden Manner zur kritiscben Zeit nicbt in Belgrad weilten, vereitelte
allerdings dieseri Plan, docb waren Princip und Cabrinovid desbalb nicbt. ver-
legen, eine andere Unterstiitzungsstelle zu finden, jenen Milan Ciganovid, einen
■gewesenen Komitatscbi, jetzt Beamten der serbiscben Eisenbabndirektion in
Belgrad, gleicbfalls ein aktives Mitglied der Narodna odbrana, welcber in deren
Gescbichte zuerst im Jabre 1909 als Z ogling der Bandenscbule in Cuprija
(Beilage 6) auftaucbt. In ibrer Erwartung batten sicb denn aucb Princip und
Cabrinovid nicbt getauscbt, denn bei Ciganovid fanden sie sofort die erbetene
Unterstiitzung.

Dieser und durcb dessen Vermittlung sein Freund, der scbon mebrmals
genannte koniglicb serbische Major Voja Tankosid, ebenfalls einer der Fiibrer
der Narodna odbrana, der im Jabre 1908 Leiter der Bandenscbule in Cuprija
gewesen war (Beilage 5), traten nun als geistige Leiter und entscbeidende
Forderer an die Spitze des Komplotts, das sie mit einer abstoiienden, fiir die
moralischen Qualitaten der ganzen monarcbiefeindlicben Bewegung bezeicbnen-
den Selbstverstandlicbkeit billigten. Nur ein leises Bedenken katten sie zuerst
— ob die drei Verscbworer aucb fest entscblossen waren, die Tat zu wagen —
ein Bedenken, das unter ibrer suggestiven Mitbilfe allerdings bald scbwand.
Dann aber waren sie zu jeder Hilfe bereit. Tankosid stellte 4 Brownings mit
Munition und .Reisegeld zur Verfiigung; 6 Handgranaten aus serbiscben Armee-
bestanden bildeten. die VervoUsfandigung der Ausriistung, eine Bewaffnung, die
nach ibrer Zusammenstellung und Herkunft Keminiszenzen an den Fall Jukitf
wacbruft. tJm den Erfolg der Aktion besorgt, verfiigte Tankosid die Unter-
weisung der Verscbworer im Scbiefien, eine Aufgabe, der sicb Ciganovid mit
dcm bekannten Erfolge unterzog. Eine spezielle, nicbt erbetene Fiirsorgc ent-
wickelten aber Tankosid und Ciganovid zur Gebeimbaltung des Komplottes: sie
stellten Zyankali rhit der Weisung bei, dali sicb die Tater nacb voUbracbtem
Anscblage damit eiitleiben, ein Akt der Fiirsorge, der in erster Lini© ihnen

zagato kommea mti6te, da die Walu-ung des Geheimnlsses sie atich nocli den
geringen Gefaliren entriickte, die -sie bei dieser Unternehmung- auf sich nehmea
mufiten. Der sichere Tod fur die Opfer ihrer VerfiiKrung, die voile Sicherlieit
fur sieh) das ist die berdts bekannte Devise der Narodna odbrana.

Um die Ausfiihrung des Attentatsplanes zu ermogliclien, mufiten die
Bomben und Waffen xinbemerkt nach Bosnien eingeschmuggelt werden. Auch
bier tritt Ciganovid belfend auf, er schreibt de.n Verscbworern eine genaue
Reiseroute vor und sIcHert ibuen fiir ihr Einschleichen nach Bosnien die Unter-
stutzung der serbiscben Grenzbeborden. Die Art, vvie dieser selbst von Prinzip
als „mysterios" bezeicbnete Transport organisiert war und durcbgefiibrt . wurde,
lalit keinen Zweifel dariiber offen, dafi dies ein wobl vorbereiteter und fiir die
gebeimnisvollen Zwecke der Narodna odbrana scbon oft begangener Scbleicb-
weg war. Mit einer Selbstverstandlichkeit und Sicherheit, die nur der Gewobnr
beit entspringen konnen, stellten die Grenzbauptleute in Sabac und Loznica
ihren Verwaltungsapparat fiir diesen Zweck zur Verfugung. Ohne Storungen
vollzog sicb dieser gebeimnisvolle Transport mit seinem komplizieiten System
von stets wecbselnden Fiibrern, die wie durcb- Zauberkraft herbeigerufen, immer
zur Stelle waren, wenn man sie braucbte. Ohne nach dem Zwecke dieser"
merkwiirdigen Reise einiger unreifer Studenten zu fragen, liefien die serbiscben
Beborden, auf die Weisung des ebemaligen Komitatschis und untergeordneten
[Babnbeamten Ciganovid bin, diesen glatt funktionierenden Apparat spielen. Sie
Ibrauchten iibrigens nicbt zu fragen, denn nach den erhaltenen Weisungen war
lihnen wohl klar, dafi bier wieder eine „ Mission" der Narodna odbrana zu
terfiillen war. Der Anblick des Arsenals von Bomben und Revolvern entlockte
idenn auch dem Finanzwachmanne Grbid nur ein wohlwollend zustimmendes
iLacheln, wohl ein ausreichender Beweis dafiir, wie sebr man auf dieser „Strafie"
an den Anblick derartiger Konterbande gewohnt war.

Schwere Schuld hat die koniglicb serbische Regierung auf sich geladen,
5ils sie all dies geschehen liefJ.

Zur Pflege freundnachbarlicher Beziehungen zu Osterreich-TJngarn ver-^
■pflichtet, hat sie ihrer Presse gestattet, den Hafi. gegen die Monarchie zu ver-
breiten; hat sie es zugelassen, dafi auf ihrem Boden etablierte Vereinigungen
unter Fiihrung hober Offiziere, Staatsbeamter, Lebrer und Richter offentlich
«ine Kampagne gegen die Monarchie fiihren, die auf die Revolutionierung
ihrer Burger abzielt; hat sie es m'cht verhindert, dafi an der Leitung ihrer
Militar- und Zivilverwaltung beteiligte, aller moralischen Hemmungen bare
Manner das offen tliphe Gewissen derart vergiften, dafi ihm- in diesem Kampf*
der gemeine Meuchelmord als die beste Waffe scheint.

Beilag'e 1.

Serbische PreBstimmen.

a) Die „PolItika" brachte am 18. August 1910 anlafillch des 80. GeBurts-
tages Seiner k. und k. Apostolischen Majestat ein groGes Bild des Bogdaii
Zerajic^, der zwei Monate vorher gegen, den Landeschef von Bosnien,
Freiherrn von Varesanin, ein Attentat verubt hatte. Tn dem dazu gehorigen
Artikel hieli es: „Vor zwei Monaten, am 2. Juni (a. St.), gerade am Tage
der Eroffnung des bosniscH-herzegowiniselien Landtages, versuchte ein junger
Serbe, der Student Bogdan Zerajid, in Sarajevo den Landes-Chef von Bosnien
und del' Herzegowina, den General Marian Varesanin zu toten. Fiinf
Schiisse feuerte Zerajid auf diesen Renegaten, der sicb seine Karriere im
beriilimten Yolksaufstande in Rakovica durcb Vergieliung des Blutes -seiner
leiblicben Briider gesicbert hatte, durch einen merkwurdigen Zufall gelang
es nicbt, ibn zu toten. Dann jagte sicb der tapfere und selbstbewuiite-
Zerajid die seebste und letzte Kugel in den Kopf und stiirzte sofort tot
zusammen. In Wien verstanden sie sebr gut, daft Zerajid das Attentat nicbt
desbalb veriibte, weil er russisebe und revolutionare Scbriften gelesen, sondern
dali er dies als edler Spi'osse eines Volkes getan batte, das auf diese blutlge
Weise gegen die Freindberrscbaft protestieren wollte. Desbalb tracbteten
sie, diese ganze Sacbe moglicbst scbnell zu vertuscben und — was gegen
ibre Gewobnbeit ist — eine Affaire zu vermeiden, welcbe die osterreicbiscbe
Regierung in Bosnien und der Herzegowina nocb mebr kompromittiert
batte. In Wien wunscbte man, dafi jedes Andenken an Zerajid ausgeloscbt
und seinem Attentate jede Bedeutung abgesprocben werde. Aber gerade
, diese Furcbt vor dem toten Zerajid und das Verbot, dali sein Name in
ganz Bosnien und der Herzegowina erwabnt werde, bewirkten, daO sein
Name im Volke wie etwas Heiliges genannt wird, beute, am 18. August,
vielleicbt mebr als jemals.

Am beutigen Tage ziinden aucb wir eine Kerze auf seinem Grabe
an und rufen: „Ebre dem Zerajid!"

Hieran scbloli sicb ein Gedicht, dessen Inbalt in Ubersetzung lautet:

„ Bosnien lebt, nocb ist es nicbt tot,

Umsonst babt Ihr seinen Leib begraben;

Nocb spriibt es Feuer, das gefesselte Opfer,

Nocb ist's nicbt Zeit, das Grabbed zu singen.

Mit Satanshand scharrtet auf Hir die Grube,
Aber der lebende Tote will nicht in die Gruft;
Kaiser, hortest Du? im Blitzen des Revolvers
Sausen die bleiernen Kugeln gegen Deinen Thron!
Das sind nicht Sklaven, das ist berrlicbe Freiheit,
Die aus der kiilmen Hand des Unterjocbten leucbtetl
Was zittert so dieses schrecklicbe Golgatba?
Petrus zog das Scbwert, Cbrlstus zu scbirmen.
Seine Hand sank, aber aus dem Blute
Werden tausende tapfere Hande sicb erbeben;
Dieser Scbuli war nur der erste Bote
Der glorreicben Ostern nacb Golgatbas Peinen."

b) Am 8. Oktober 1910 bracbten anlafilicb des Jabrestages der Annexion
Bosniens und der Herzegowina „Politika" und „Mali Journal", von denen
letzteres mit scbwarzem Rande er.scbien, Artikel, in denen sie sicb in
beftigen Angriffen gegen Osterreicb-XJngarn ergingen. Europa iniisse sicb
iiberzeugen, dafi das serbiscbe Volk nocb immer an die Revancbe denke.
Der Tag der Revancbe miisse kommen, dafiir biirgten die fieberbaften
Anstrengungen Serbiens zwecks Organisierung seiner Webrmacbt, sowie
die Stimmung und der Hafi des serbiscben Volkes gegen die Nacbbar-
monarcbie.

Aus dem gleicben Anlafi scbrieb die „Samouprava" am 9. Oktober
1910: „ Scbimpfworte und Exzesse sind kein Mittel, um den wabren Patrio-
tismus zum Ausdruck zu bringen. Nur stille und wiirdige Arbeit fiibrt
zum Ziele!"

c) Am 18. April 1911 bieft es in der jjPolitika": „Auiier einigen Zynikern
wiirde es niemand in Serbien geme seben, wenn Konig Peter nacb
Wien oder Budapest reisen sollte. Durcb die Annexion Bosniens und der
Herzegowina ist ein fiir allemal die Moglicbkeit einer Freundscbaft zwiscben
Serbien .und Osterreicb-Ungarn zerstort worden. Das fublt jeder Serbe."

d) Die „Beogradske Novine" scbreiben am 18. April 1911: „Aucb die
meisten Regierungsmanner milibilligen die geplante Reise des Konigs Peter
zu Kaiser Franz Josepb. Der Sturm der Entriistung, der sicb wegen des
Planes dieser Reise des Konigs dcs ganzen Serbentums bemacbtigt bat, ist
vollkommen begreiflicb. "

e) Das „Mali Journal" vom 19. April 1911 sagt: „Ein Besucb des Konigs
Peter beim HerrscKer von. Osterreicb-Ungarn ware eine Beleidigung des
ganzen Serbentums. Durcb diesen Besucb wiirde Serbien das Recbt auf
die PiemontroUe verlieren. Die Interessen Serbiens konnen sicb niemals
mit den Interessen Osterreicbs decken."

/; Am 23. April 1911 fuhren „PoIitika«, „Mali Journal", „Tribuna«,

„BeogTa(iske Novine'' und „Vecernje Novosti" zu dem Plane eines Besuches
Konig Peters am Wiener Hofe aus: Zwischen Serbien und Osterreich-
Ungarn konne niemals Freundschaft existieren. Der ^eplante Besuch des
Konigs Peter sei daher fiir Serbien eine „scliandliclie Kapitulation", eine
„Demutigung Serbiens", eine „felerliche Sanktionierung aller Yerbrecben
und Missetaten, die Osterreicb-Ungarn an Serbien und dem serbischen
Volke begangen babe".

g) Am 18. April 1912 scbreibt „Trgovinski Glasnik'^ in einem mit „I)er

Zerfall in Osterreicb" iiberscbriebenen Aj-tikel: „In Osterreicb-Ungarn
herrscbt ein Zerfall nacb alien Seiten. Was jenseits der Donau und Save
gescbieht, das ist nicbt mebr eine deutsebe, magyariscbe, bobmiscbe oder
kroatiscbe Krise, das ist eine allgemeine osterreicbische Krise, eine Krise
der Dynastie selbst. Wir Serben konnen mit Zufriedenbeit einer solcben
Entwicklung der Dinge in Osterreicb zuseben."

li) In einem „Die Grenzen Albaniens" betitelten Artikel greift der

„ Balkan" Osterreicb-Ungarn mit folgenden Ausfiibrungen an: Wenn Europa
zu scbwach sei, um Osterreicb Halt zu gebieten, wiirden Montenegro und
Serbien dies tun, indem sie Osterreicb zurufen: „Halt, weiter gebt es nicbt!
Ein Krieg zwiscben Osterreicb-Ungarn und Serbien ist unausbleiblicb. Wir
baben das tiirkiscbe Reicb zerstiickelt, wir werden aucb Osterreicb zer-
stiickeln. Einen Krieg baben -wir beendet, jetzt steben wir vor einem
zweiten."

i) „Ve5emje Novosti" vom 22. April 1913 .ricbten einen Aufruf an das

serbiscbe reisende Publikum und an die serbiscben Kaufleute, sie mogen
die Donau-Dampfschiffabrts-Gesellscbaft boykottieren. Niemand solle mit
den ScbiflFen dieser osterreicbischen Gesellscbaft fabren oder Waren trans-
portieren lassen, Alle, die dies taten, wiirden von einem Ausscbusse mit
Geldbulien bestraft. Die Gelder wiirden der Komitatschikasse zuflieGen,
welcbe fiir die Verwendung im kommenden Kriege mit Osterreicb
bestimmt sei."

1c) Die „Tribuna" vom 26. Mai 1913 scbreibt aus Anlali der Besitz-

ergreifung Ada Kalebs durcb Osteireicb-Ungarn : „Das scbwarz-gelbe
verbrecberiscbe Osterreicb bat wieder einen rauberiscben Trick durcb-
gefiibrt. Es ist ein Dieb, der, wenn er nicbt einen ganzen Sack Geld
steblen kann, sicb aucb mit einem Dinar begniigt."

I) Am 10. Juni 1913, anlalilicb der Wiederkebr des Jabrestages des

Attentates auf den koniglicben Kommissar in Agram durcb den Stadenten
Luka Jukid bracbten die serbiscben Blatter Gedenkartikel. In einem Artikel
der ^Pravda" beifit es: »Es mufi aus tiefster Seele webe tun, daft niclit
jeder so gebandelt bat, wie unser Jukid. Wir baben keinen Jykid mebr,

aber wir h^iben den Hiafi, -wir habeii deu Zorn, wir Baben beute zebn
Millionen Jukid. Wir sind £est uberzeugt^ dafi Jukid bald durcb sein Arrest-
fenster den letzten Kanonenschuii der Freilieit vemebmen wird."

m) „Mali Journal" vom 7. Oktober 1913 bringt an leitender Stelle einen

Ar^ikel, in welcKem Osterreich-Ungarn die Existenzberecbtigung abgesprocben
wird und die slawiscben Nationalitaten aufgefordert werden, den Angriffs-
kampf, den Serbien zu unternehmen gedenke, zii unterstutzen.

n) Der „Piemont" vom 8. Oktober 1913 schreibt zu dem Gedacbtnistage

der Annexion: ^Heute sind es fiinf Jahre, dali mittels eines kaiserlichen
Dekretes die Souveranitat des Habsburger Szepters liber Bosnien und die
Herzegowina ausgebreitet wurde. Den Schmerz, der an diesem Tage dem
serbiscben Volke zugefiigt wurde, wird das serbiscbe Volk noch durch. Jabr-
zebnte fiiblen. Bescbamt und vernichtet stohnte das serbiscbe Volk ver-
zweifelt. Das Volk legt das Geliibde ab, Racbe zu uben, um dureb einen
keroiscben Scbritt zur Freibeit zu gelangen. Dieser Tag bat die bereits
eingescblafene Energie geweckt und der wiederbelebte. Held wird eines
Tages die Freibeit sucben. Heute, wo serbiscbe Graber die alten serbiscben
Lander zieren, wo die serbiscbe Kavallerie die Scblacbtfelder von Mazedonien
und Altserbien betreten bat, wendet sicb das serbiscbe Volk, nacbdem es
seine Aufgabe im Siiden beendet bat, der entgegengesetzten Seite zu, von
wo das Stobnen und Weinen des serbiscben Bruders gebort wird, wo der
Galgen baust. Serbiscbe Soldaten, die beute in Dusans Reicbe mit jenen
Albanesen kampfen, die gegen uns der Staat aufwiegelte, welcber uns
Bosnien und Herzegowina nabm, legten beute das Geliibde ab, dali sie
gegen die „zweite Tiirkei" ebenso vorgeben werden, wie sie mit Gottes
Hilfe gegen die Balkan-Tiirkei vorgegangen sind. Sie legen dieses Geliibde
ab und boffen, dali der Tag der Racbe nabt. Eine Tiirkei verscbwand. Der
gute serbiscbe Gott wird geben, daO aucb die „zweite Tiirkei" verscbwindet."

t c) Das „ Mali Journal" vom 4. November 1913 scbreibt: „Jedes Streben

nacb einer Annaberung an Osterreicb-Ungarn kommt einem Verrate an
dem serbiscben Volke gleicb. Serbien muli sicb mit den Tatsacben abfinden
und immer vor Augen balten, dali es in Osterreicb-Ungarn seinen gefabr-
lichsten Feind hat, den energisch zu bekampfen die heiligste Pflicbt jeder
serbiscben Regierung sein muli."

J)) Am 14. Janner 1914 beiiit es in der „Pravda": „Unsere Neujabrs-

wiinscbe gelten in erster Linie unseren nocb nicbt befreiten, unter fremder
Knecbtschaft seufzenden -Briidern. Die Serben mogen ausbalten; nacb
Kossovo kam Kumanovo und unser Siegeszug ist nocb nicbt beendet."

g) „Novosti" vom 18. Janner 1914 bracbten ein Bild der Wasserweibe

in Bosnien mit folgendem Text: „Auch in Orten, die unter fremdem Jocbe

seufzen, bewahren die Serben ihre Sitten, bis sie der Tag der Freiheit in

teller Begeisterung finden wird."
■t) Die „Zastava" gestebt im Janner 1914: „Serbien eifert. die qster^

reicbiscb-xmgariscben Serben zur Revolution an."
s) Das „Mali Journal" vom 9. Marz 1914 scbreibt: „Serbien kann das

Sabelrasseln Franz Ferdinands anlaiilicb der Skufariaffaire nie vergessen."
t} Am 4. April 1914 scbreibt die „Zastava": .„Die osterreicbiscben Staats-

manner, die nur eine Politik des Hasses, eine Biireaukratenpolitik fiibren,

nicbt aber eine weit ausblickende Politik, bereiten selbst den Untergang

ibres Staates vor."
\u) Die „Pravda" vom 8. April 1914 sagt: ^Osten-eieb bat bente sein^

Existenzberecbtigung verloren."
v) In den Osternummern (April 1914) geben alle serbiscben Blatter der

Hofifnung Ausdruck, dali aucb die nicbtbefreiten, unterjocbten, gedriickten

Briider bald eine frobe Auferstebung feiern werden.
^o) In der „Tribuna" yom 23. April 1914 beifit es: „Die Pazifisten baben

ein neues Scblagwort erfunden, das vom „Patriotismus Europas". Dieses

Programm kann aber nur dann verwirklicbt -v^erden, wenn Osterreicb auf-

geteilt vyird."
x) Das „Mali Journal" vom 12. Mai 1914 scbreibt: „Was im Privat-

leben Verbrecben beilit, nennt man in Osterreicb Politik. Die Gescbicbte

kennt ein Ungebeuer iind dieses Ungebeuer beilit Osterreicb."

39
Bellagro 2.

Auszug aus dem vom Zentralausschusse des Vereines „Narodna odbrana" heraus-

gegebenen Vereinsorgane gleichen Namens. (Narodna odbrana, izdanje stredi§nog

odbora narodne odbrane. Beograd, 1911. Nova stamparija ,,Davidovic'S Decanska

ulica br. 14, Ljub. Davidovica.)

In einer kurzen Einleitung wird zunachst bemerkt, daG diese Broschiire
^keine vollkommene, erschopfende Wiedergabe der Gesamtarbeit der Narodna
odbrana bilde, da sie dies aus mehrfachen Griinden weder sein darf noch" sein
kann".

Diese Scbrift ist in drei Abschnitte geteilt, deren erster aus XIV Kapiteln
besteb.t und programmatiscber Natur ist, wahrend der zweit'e Abschnitt einen
Bericht iiber die Vereinstatigkeit enthalt und im dritten Beispiele fur die
Organisation ahnlicber auslandischer Vereine angefiihrt werden.

Im I. Kapitel „Entstebung und Tatigkeit der ersten Narodna odbrana"
wird bemerkt, daO dieser Verein anlalilich der in Serbien durch die Annexion
Bosniens und der Herzegowina entstandenen Volksbewegung mit folgenden
Zielen gegriindet wurde:

1. Hebung, Ermutigung und Starkung des NationalgefUHs.

2. Einscbreibung und Sammlung von- Freiwilligen.

3. Formierung von Freiwilligeneinheiten und deren Vorbereitung zur
bewaffneten Aktion.

4. Sammlung von freiwilligen Beitragen, Geld und anderen Erfordefnissen
zur Verwirklicbung ihrer Aufgabe.

5. Organisierung, Ausrustung und Einexerzierung einer besonderen auf-
standlscben Truppe (Komitefe)^ bestimmt zu besonderer: und selbstandiger Krieg-
fiibrung.

6. Entwicklung einer Aktion in alien anderen Ricbtungen der Verteidigung
des serbischen Volkes.

Ankniipfend hieran wird bemerkt, dafi durch die Anerkennung der Annexion
seitens der GroGmacbte dieser ganzen Arbeit des Vereines ein Ende bereitet
worden ist, worauf unter Beibebaltung der bestebenden Vereinsverfassung
zu einer Reorganisation des Programmes und zu neuer Arbeit gescbritten
worden sei, damit bei Wiederholung eines abnlichen Anlasses „die alte tote
Kriegsfabne der Narodna odbrana wieder entfaltet werden konne".

Im II. Kapitel „Die neue heutige Narodna odbrana" vvird* zunachst aus-
gefiilirt: „Man liat zur Zeit der Annexion die Erfahrung gemachty dafi Serbien
fur den Kampf, den ihm die Verhaltnisse auferlegen, nicht vorbereitet ist und
dafi dieser Kampf, den Serbien aufzunebmen hat, viel ernster und schwieriger
ist, als man dacbte; die Annexion war nur einer der Scblage, den die Feinde
Serbiens gegen dieses Land gefiihrt batten, ein Schlag, dem bereits viele
andere Scblage vorangegangen sind, und dem noch andere folgen werden.
Damit ein neuer Uberfall Serbien nicbt ebenso unvorbereitet trifft, ist es not-
wendig, sicb vorzubereiten' zu arbeiten." AJs Ziel dieser in den breitesten
Scbicbten des Volkes zu leistenden „ Arbeit" wird die „Vorbereitung des
Yolkes zum Kampfe in alien Richtungen der nationalen Arbeit, entsprecbend
den heutigen Zeiterfordernissen " bezeichnet und werden als Mittel biezu
„Starkung des nationalen Bewufitseins, korperliche tjbungen, das wirtschaftlicbe
nnd gesundheitlicbe Wohlergehen, Hebung der Kultur etc." hervorgehoben,
„insoweit auf diesem Gebiete neben dem Staate der einzelne und die Gesellschaft
wirken kann und mufi".

Das Kapitel HI „Die drei Hauptaufgaben** begiont mit dem Hinweise
darauf, dafi die Annexion gelehrt habe, das Nationalbewufitsein iin Serbien sei
nicht so stark, als es in einem Lande sein sollte, welches als ein kleiner TeiL
von 3 Millionen die Hoffnung und Stiitze fiir 7 Millionen des unterjochten.
serbischen Volkes bilde. Die erste Aufgabe des Vereines bestehe daher in der
Starkung des nationalen Bewufitseins. Die zweite Aufgabe sei die Pflege korper-
licher tJbungen, die dritte die Erzielung einer richtigen Wertung dieser sport-
lichen Betatigung.

In dem IV. . „Vom Schiefiwesen" hand'elnden Kapitel wird der Wert einer
guten Ausbildung im Schiefien speziell fiir die serbischen Verhaltnisse hervor-
gehoben, da dort die militarische Ausbildung nur 6 Monate dauere. Diese Aus-
fiihrungen konkludieren in dem Satze:

„Einem neuen Schlage, wie die Annexion einer war, mufi ein neues
Serbien entgegentreten, worin jeder Serbe vom Kinde bis zum Greise ein
Schiitze ist."

Kapitel V, welches das „Verhaltnis der Narodna odbrana zur Sokolschaff"
behandelt, beginnt mit einem allgemeinen kulturpolitischen Exkurs iiber die
Bedingungen der Kxafte der Staaten. Hiebei wird _auf den Niedergang der
Tiirkei verwiesen und ankniipfend hieran gesagt:

„Die alten TUrken vom Stiden her verschwinden nach und nach und nur
noch ein Teil unseres Volkes leidet unter ihrer Herrschaft. Aber neue Tiirken
kommen vom Norden, furchtbarer und gefahrlicher als die alten. Kulturell und
wirtschaftlich starker, gehen die pbrdlichen Feinde auf uns los. Sie woUen uns
unsere Freiheit, unsere Sprache bebraeii, wis ^.erschmettera. Die Vgrzeichen

des Kampfes, der da kommt, siiid fiihlbar. Das serbische Volk steht vor dec
Frage, sein oder. nicht sein"

„Was woUen wir mit den Vortragen", lautet die tjberschrift des VIL Kapitels^
dessen wesentlichster Inlialt sich in dem Satgie erschopft:

„Die Narodna odbrana veranstaltete Vortrage, welcbe mebr oder wenigei*
Agitationsvortrage waren. Es wurde das Programm unserer neuen Arbeit enfr-
wickelt. Bei jedem Vortrage wurde von der Annexion gesprochen, von der
Arbeit der alten Narodna odbrana und den Aufgaben der neuen. Die Vortrage
werden nie aufhoren Agitationsvortrage zu sein, sie werden sicli jedoch immer
mebr nach den einzelnen Fachern entwickeln und sich mit alien Fragen unseres
gesellschaftlichen und natipnalen Lebens befassen."

In den Kapiteln VIII „Tatigkeit der Frau in der Narodna odbrana", DC
„Detail- und Kleinarbeit" und X ^Renaissance dex Gesellschaft" wird unter
Hinweis auf die Aufgaben der Narodna odbrana die Vorbereitung und Ver-
tiefung der Vereinsarbeit und die Notwendigkeit einer E-egenerierung der
Individuen, des Voltes und des Staates behandelt.

Das Kapitel XI „Neue Obilide und Singjelide" *) sagt einleitend:
„Es ist ein Irrtum zu behaupten, Kossovo sei gewesen und yoruber. Wir
befinden uns mitten im Kossovo. Unser beutiges Kossovo ist die Finstemis und
Unkenntnis, in welcher unser Volk lebt. Die anderen Griinde des neuen Kossovo
leben an den Grenzen im Norden und Westen: Die Deutschen, Osterreicher
imd Schwabas mit ihrem Vordringen gegen unseren serbiscben und slawischen.
Siiden." Ankniipfend bieran v^rird unter Hinweis auf die Heldentaten des Obilid
und Singjeli(5 auf die Notwendigkeit der Aufopferung im Dienste der Nation
bingewiesen und gesagt: „Die nationale Arbeit ist mit Opfern verbunden,
namentlich in der Tiirkei und in Osterreich, wo solcbe Arbeiter von den
fBeborden verfolgt, in den Kerker und an den Galgen gebracbt werden. Auch.
fiir diesen Kampf gegen die Finstemis und Unwissenheit sind solche Helden
notig. Die „ Narodna odbrana" zweifelt nicht, dali im Kampfe mit Gewehr und
Kanone gegen die Schwabas und unsere sonstigen Feinde, dem wir entgegen-
gehen, unser Volk eine Reihe von Helden steUen wird. Doch ist die Narodna
odbrana damit nicht zufrieden, denn sie betrachtet auch die heutigen sogenannj;
friedlichen Verhaltnisse als Krieg und fordert gieichfalls Helden fiir diesen
heutigen Kampf, den wir in Serbien und jenseits der Grenze fiihren.^

*) Milos Obilic (auch Kobilic) schHch sich — nach der serbischen Tradition — nach der Schlacht
aiif dem Amselfelde in das tiirkischo Lager und ermoidete dort Sultan Murad (voo KalJay, „Geschichte der
SerDen", I. Bd.). Stephan Singjelic, Knez von Kesara. spielte wiihrend des serbischen Aufstandes
(1807—1810) eine Rolle. 1809 verteidigte Singjelid die Redouts von Tschagar gegen die TQrken und soil
sich, da er der Ubermacht nicht gewachson war, mit einem Teile der Seinen und mit zahlreichen TUrken
in die Luft gesprengt haben. (von Kallay, „Die Geschichte des fierbiacben Aufstandes. "

tjber die „Verbmdung mit den Briidern und Freunden" handelt das
Xn. Kapitel, dessen wesentliclister Inhalt sich in folgenden Satzen zusammen-
drangt:

^Zu den Hauptaufgaben der Narodna odbraAa gebort die Aufrecbterhaltung
der Verbindung mit unseren nahen und ferneren Briidern jenseits der Grenze
und unseren ubrigen Freunden in der Welt. Mit dem Worte „Volk" meint die
Narodna odbrana unser ganzes Volk, nicbt nur jenes in Serbien. Sie bofft, daft
die von ihr in Serbien geleistete Arbeit den Briidern aufierhalb Serbiens ein
Anspom zu lebhafterer Teilnahme an der Arbeit privater Initiative werde,
damit der beutige neue Aufschwung fiir die Schaffung einer kraftigen serbiscben
Narodna odbrana in alien serbischen Gebieten unter eineln vor sich gebe."

„Zwei wichtige Aufgaben" benennt sich Kapitel XIII, welclies ausfiilirt:

„Indem v^ir auf dem Standpunkte stehen, dali durcb die Annexion Bosniens
und der Herzegovina das Vordringen gegen unsere Lander vom Norden her
vollkommen zutage getreten ist, erachtet die Narodna odbrana und nennt dem
Volke Osterreich als unseren ersten und grofiten Feind." Diese Arbeit (namlich
Osterreicb dem serbiscben Volke als dessen groBteri Feind zu bezeichnen)
betracbtet der Verein nach den folgenden Ausfiibrungen als eine gesunde,
notwendige Aufgabe, als seine Grundpflicbt Dann fahrt die Broscbiire fort:

„Wie einst die Turken vom Siiden auf uns losgegangen sind, so gebt
teute Osterreich vom Norden her auf uns los. Wenn die Narodna odbrana die
Notwendigkeit des Kampfes mit Osterreich predigt, so predigt sie eine heilige
Wahrheit unserer nationalen Lage."

Der durch diese Propaganda entstehende Hafi gegen Osterreich sei aller-
dings nicht das Ziel, sondem die natiirliche Konsequenz der Arbeit, deren
Zweck die Selbsterhaltung und Freiheit sei. Wenn hiebei der Hali gegen Oster-
reich aufkeime, so sei es Osterreich, welches ihn durch sein Vorgehen sae,
welches Vorgehen den „Kampf gegen Osterreich bis zu dessen Ausrottung
auferlegt".

Nach einem Lobe der modernen Auffassung der nationalen Idee wird
bemerkt, dafi bei Besprechung der „Befreiung und Vereinigung" zu viel mit
Phrasen gearbeitet werde. Dem Volke miisse gesagt werden:

„Die Befreiung unserer unterworfenen serbischen Gebiete und deren Ver-
einigung mit Serbien ist fiir unseren Herm, unseren Kaufraann, unseren Bauer
notwendig wegen der fundamentalsten Bediirfnisse der Kultur, des Handels,
wegen des Brotes und des Raumes. In dieser Erkenntnis wird das Volk mit
grolierer OpfervnUigkeit bei der nationalen Arbeit zugreifen. Unserem Volke
mufi gesagt werden, daii die Freiheit Bosniens fiir dasselbe notwendig ist, nicht
HUT aus Mitleid mit den dortselbst leidenden Briidern, sondem wegen des Handels
und der Verbindung mit dem Meere.

Die „beiden Aufgaben" der Narodna odbrana werden dann nochmals in
folgendem Schlulisatze zusammengefalit : „Neben der Aufgabe, dem Volke die
ihm seitens Osterreicbs drobende Gefahr zu erklaren, hat die Narodna odbrana
noch die wicbtige Aufgabe, unter vollstandiger Wabrnng der beiligen nationalen
Erinnenmgen dieses neue, gesunde und in seineii Folgen macbtige Erfassen
des Nationalismus mid der Arbeit zum Zwecke der Befreiung und Vereinigung
in das Yolk zu tragen."

Das XIV., Scblulikapitel, beginnt mit einem Appell an die Regierung und
das Volk Serbiens, sicb mit alien Mitteln fur den Kampf vorzubereiten, „den
die Annexion vorangezeigt bat".

In folgendem Satze wird hierauf die Tatigkeit der Narodna odbrana noch-
mals rekapituliert:

„Indem die Narodna odbrana zeitgemafi, den veranderten Verhaltnissen
entsprechend wirkt, dabei alle zur Zeit dei' Annexion gekniipften Verbindungen
aufrechterhalt, ist sie heute dieselbe, die sie zur Zeit der Annexion war. Sie
ist auch heute odbrana (Wehr), sie ist auch heute Narodna (des Volkes). Sie
versammelt auch heute um ihre Fahne die Staatsbiirger Serbiens, wie sie sie
zur Annexionszeit versammelt hat. Damals rief man nach dem Kriege, heute^
ruft man nach der Arbeit, damals wurden Meetings, "Demonstrationen, frei-
willige Komitees, Gewehre iind Bomben verlangt, heute wird die stille, fana-
tische, unermiidliche Arbeit und wieder Arbeit in der Richtung der Aufgaben
und Pflichten verlangt, welche wir vorgefiihrt haben, als vorlaufige Vorbereitung
fiir den Kampf mit Gewehr und Kanone, welcher kommen wird."

t5l)ei: die Organisation der Narodna odbrana enthalt diese Broschiire und
der Jahresbericht dieses "Vereines folgende Paten:

Ein Zentralausschuli mit dem Sitze in Belgrad, leitet alle Agenden der
Narodna odbrana, Diesem sind alle anderen Ausschusse der Narodna odbrana
untergeordnet. Der Zentralausschuli teilt sich in vier Sektionen: ftir kulturelle
Arbeit, fiir korperliche Fortbjldung, fiir die finanzielle Gebarung und fiir aus-
wartige Angelegenheiten.

Kreisausschiisse mit dem Sitze an den Orten der politischen Kreisbehorden
leiten die Vereinsangelegenheiten in den betreffenden Kreisen. Jeder Kreis-
ausschuii teilt sich in je eine Sektion fiir kulturelle Arbeit (Vorstand ist der
im Orte befindliche Obmann einer Filiale der „Kulturliga"), fiir korperliche
Fortbildung (Vorstand ist ein im Orte befindliches Mitglied des Schiitzen-,
Sokol-, Jager-, Reitervereines) und fiir finanzielle Gebarung; bei einzelnen
Kj-eisausschiissen besteht auch eine Sektion fiir auswartige Angelegenheiten.

Bezirksausschiisse mit dem Sitze an den Orten der politischen Bezirks-
behorden leiten die Vereinsangelegenheiten in den betreffenden Bezirken,

Ortsausscliusse sind die leitenden Organe in den einzelnen Orten.

Vertrauensmanner befinden sich in jenen Orten im Innern des Landes, wo
die Notwendigkeit, einen- Ausschufi zu bilden, niclit. bestebt.

Vereine, „welche mit der Arbeit der Organisation der Naro:dna odbrana in
engster Verbindung steben" und von dieser in jeder Hinsicht unterstUtzt werden,
sind: der Schiitzenbund mit 762 Vereinen, der Sokolbund „Dusan Silni" mit
2500 Mitgliedern, der olympische Klub, der Keiterverein „Knez. Mibajlo", der
Jagerbund und die Kulturliga.

AUe diese Vereine sind ahnlicli organisiert wie die Narodna odbrana, beniitzen
auch deren Lokalifaten, bezw. Yerelnshauser, deren Bibliotheken etc.; angesehene
Mitglieder dieser Vereine sind Sektionsvorstande in den Ausscbiissen der Narodna
odbrana.

45^

Beilag'c 8.

Auszug aus xlem „Bericht Uber die T^tigkeit des Sokolvereines Du§an Silni in
Kragujevac in den Jahren 1912 und 1913" (Kragujevac, Druckerei „Buducnost''

Tih. Lekic 1914).

An der Spitze dieses Berichtes ist die AnspracHe abgedruckt, mit welclier
der Prasident des Vereines, der koniglicli serbiscKe Major KovaCevid, die Jahres-
versammlung im Janner 1914 begriifite.

^Es ist Euch bekannt", begann der Prasident, „dali das Sokolwesen, im
Kampfe gegen den Germanismus entstanden, eine rein slawische Institution ist,
welcbe das Ziel verfolgt, alle slawischen Briider zu vereinigen, zu begeistem
und durcb Kultur und Gewalt fiir den Kampf gegen den Feind des Slawen-
tuins vorzubereiten.

Wir Serben als ein Teil der groiien Slawengemeinschaft haben die Sokol-
idee aufgenommen und der gemeinschaftlichen Arbeit fiir unser und unserer
Briider Woblergeben und Gliick zugestimmt.

Auch wir Serben wollen im Geiste des Sokols leben und arbeiten, denn
"wir wiinschen die Miiden und Matten zu beleben, die Scliwachen und Ver-
kiimmerten zu starken, die Gefangenen und Gefesselten zu befreien. Wir haben
dies auch jetzt und in den friiheren Kriegen getan. Wir haben einen Teil
unserer Briider von dem tJbermute des Feindes im Siiden befreit. Wir haben
ihnen die Fesseln aufgerissen, sie der Qualen entledigt und ihnen die Freiheit
gegeben, damit sie in ihr das Gliick, die Gleichheit und Briiderschaft fiihlen."

Nach einigen Worten der Lobpreisung dieser „edlen Arbeif*, welche
„ einen Teil der grofien Sokolidee verwirklichte", fuhr Major KovaCevid fort:

„Aber meine Briider und Schwestem, unser Feind im Norden ist gefahr-
licher und herzloser, weil er kulturell und okonomisch starker ist.

Dieser Feind ist in seinen Geliisten unersattlich ; er halt Millionen unserer
Briider in Sklaverei und Ketten. Er nahm ihnen die Freiheit und das Recht
und unterwarf sie alle seinen Diensten. Die Briider murren, rufen und bitten
urn je raschere Hilfe.

Wir diirfen sie nicht auf Gnade und Ungnade diesem fiirchterlichen und
gefrafiigen Feinde iiberlassen. Wir miissen ihnen je eher zu Hilfe eilen, weil
dies zu tun unsere, Pflicht ist. Kbnnten wir denn schliefilich glUcklich sein,
wenn so viele Briider in Sklaverei leben, leiden und murren?

Briider und Schwestern!

Der Feind ist gefahrlich, liistern und lastig. Seien wir immfer auf der Hut!

Arbeiten wir mit noch grbfierer Lust und Aufopferung. Seien -wir genan
in der heiligen Sokolpflicht, treu und ausharrend.

Bereiten wir uns zum Kampfe und fiir die gerechte Sokolidee vor.

Vereinigen und gesellen wir uns zu unzaUbaren Sokolschwarmen und
denken wir immer an jene Wabrlieit, welcbe die serbiscben Sokolasen auf
ibrer Fabne gescbrieben babdn: Dafi nur ein gesundes, kraftiges, national-
bewuiites und gut organisiertes Volk geeignet ist, sicb zu verteidigen, zu
kampfen und zu siegen".

An diese Anspracbe des Prasidenten scblieOt sicb der Bericbt des Ver-
waltungsausscbusses an. Nacb einer Scbilderung der Erfolge der letzten Kriege,
welcbe den Verein wabrend zweier Jabre an einer Betatigung binderten, beilit
es dort: „Es kam der Tag, an dem wir zu unserer Arbeit zuriickkebren, weil
unser Programm nocb nicbt erfullt, well unsere Aufgabe nocb nicbt beendet
ist. Nocb ein grolier Teil unseres Volkes erduldet die Leiden des gekreuzigten
Cbristus; wir baben nocb' unsere Briider jenseits der Drina zu besucben; wir
baben nocb die Stadt Sarajevo und das Vermacbtnis des beiligen Sava*) auf-
zusucben.; wir baben das Heimatland des Mairina Novak, des Deli Radivoj und
des alten Vujadin zu besicbtigen; wir baben das Gebirge Romanija zu iiber-
scbreiten und zu seben, warum sicb Travnik in Nebel gebiillt bat, es muli
einmal jenes Lied aufboren : Aoj, Bosnien, Du Waisenkind vor Gott, bast Du
nirgends Leute Deines Stammes ..."

Nacb einer Besprecbung diverser Untemebmungen des Vereines wird
betont, dali der Verein zu den „Brudervereinen jenseits der Save und Drina"
Beziebungen unterbielt und speziell die Entsendung von Delegierten zu der in
Sarajevo abgebaltenen Jubelfeier der Prosvjeta betont. Hiezu bemerkt der
Bericbt: „Durcb Absendung der Eeprasentanten zu den Briidem nacb Bosnien
beabsicbtigte der Ausscbuii, denselben biemit zu sagen: „Wir baben Euer nicbt
vergessen, die Fliigel des Falken der Sumadija sind nocb macbtig."

Nacb eingebender Scbilderung eines Besucbes der Agramer Studenten in
Serbien**) und der Fabnenweibe des „Verbandes der niicbtemen Jugend"
scblielit der Verwaltungsbericbt mit folgenden Satzen:

„ Diese Erscbeinungen — die Ankunft der Briider Kroaten in der Sumadija
und die Zusammenkunft der „ niicbtemen Jugend" aus alien Gegenden des
Serbentums weifi die Verwaltung ricbtig zu wiirdigen und man wird nicbt
iibertreiben, wenn man sagt, daG diese Ereignisse^ den Anfang-oind Keim einer
grolien Tat bedeuten, die sicb in der nacbsten Zukunft abspielen wird.

*) Der hlg. Sava ist Schutzpatron der Serben (gestorbeu 123&). Ducatus sancti Save heilit Herzego-
wina. Vermachtnis des hi. Sava ist also mit Herzegowina gleichbedeatend.

**) Dieser Besuch der Agramer Studenten (April 1912) in Belgrad, Nig, Semendria a. 8. w. wnrde in
Serbien zu einer grofien, monarchiefeindUchen Demonstration beniitzt. Den Ausfliiglem wurden militariscHe
Ehren erwiesen, es fanden in der Militarakademie und im Offizierskasino D^jeneors nnd Biille statt. In Nid
wurde zn Ehren der Besucher sogar einb mUitarische Parade abgehalten.

. . 47

Sle sind der Ausdruck eines grofien, bislier nocli stillen Erwacliens des
nationalen Bewufttseins und der Starke einer unterdriickten Nation, welclier
man nicht erlaiibt, dali sie sich emporhebt und einigt. Noch eine Zeitlang und
dieser Keim wird reifen und wenn die Volksseele noch mehr aufwallt^ wird es
keine Schranken geben, die sie nicht zerreiflen kann, keine Hindernisse, die sie
auf ihrem Wege nicht wird niedeiTeiiien konnen. Die Arbeit an der Kraftigung
dieser Macht, die Mithilfe und BeSchleunigung des Laufes dieser nationalen
Entwicklung, die Vorbereitung und die Unterstiitzung dieser Idee war der Ver-
waltung stets das Ziel ihrer Handlungen."

I>er Bericht des Kassiers fiihrt vorerst alle jene an, die dem Verein ihre
Unterstiitzung liehen. Nebst einer Reihe von Mitgliedern des Kragujevacer
Kreisausschusses werden hiebei dankend erwahnt:

Der Kreisausschuli der „Narodna odbrana" in Kragujevac, insbesonders
dessen Eittersektion,. die dem -Sokolvereine ofters mit reichlichen Uhterstutzungen
zu Hilfe kam; der Diiektor des Gymnasiums in Kragujevac, der den Sokolen
„ Stan dig seine vaterliche Ailfmerksamkeit zeigte" ; der Divisionskommandant
der Sumadija, der den Verein reichlich unterstiitzte ; der Prasident deS Kreis-
gerichtes in Kragujevac, der Kreisvorstand und der Gemeindevorstand in
Kragujevac.

Nachdem der Kassier der im Kriege gefallenen Vereinsmitglieder gedacht
hat, schliefit er seinen Bericht mit folgenden Worten:

„Nach dem so glanzenden Siege iiber einen Teil unseres Feindes hofft
die Vereinsleitung, daii Ihr alle von nun ab noch mehr, fester und lieber Euch
der Tatlgkeit des Sokoltums widmen werdet, damit Ihr in unserem Falkenhorst
Falken erzieht, die im gegebenen Zeitpunkte eines Tages in der Lage sein
werden, hoch aufzufliegen und auf ihren machtigen Schwingen auch alien
unseren noch nicht befreiten Briidern Briiderschaft, Liebe und Freiheit zu
biingen."

Der Jahresbericht ist unterfertigt von dem Majore M. J. KovaCevid als
Prases, dem Gerichtssekretar D. V. Brzakovid als Sekretar und von 10 Vor-
standsmitgliedern, unter denen sich zwei Professoren (Emil Lukid und Milan
Jankovid) sowie- ein weiterer Offizier (Infanterie major Michael Vasid) befinden.

Aus diesem Jahresberichte und aus einer von dem Kragujevacer Sokol-
vereine dem „Srpski Soko" in Tuzla zur Ausfiillung zugesendeten, gleichfalls
vom Major Kovadevid und Gerichtssekretar Brzakovid gezeichneten Tabelle geht
hervor, daO die Sokolvereine in Serbien mit einzelnen derartigen Vereinen in
der Monarchie in einem bisher nicht bekannt gewesenen engeren Verbande
stehen.

48
Beilago 4.

Das serbische Amtsblatt im Dieniste der Narodna odbrana.

Dem serbischen Amtsblatte' „Srpski no vine" vom 28. Jqni 1914 (n. St.)
lag als Beilage ein Aufruf der , Narodna Odbrana" bei, der alien Abonnenten
des Blattes zugestellt wurde.

In diesem Aufrufe finden sich die tblgenden Stellen:

„Bruder und Schwestern! Nur ein Teil des .Kossovo wurde geracht, nur
ein Teil des St. Veittages (Vidovdan) gesiihnt. Ebenso weit und breit, wie die
Gebiete sind. in denen unsere Volkssprache gehort wird — die serbiscbe,
kroatische und sloweniscbe — von Kikinda bis Monastir, von Triest bis Carevo-
Solo, ebenso weit und breit ist die Bedeutung des St. Veittages und des
Kossovo. So viel nationale Seelen auf diesem Territorium weinen, so viel Ketten
unserer Briider knirscben, so viel Arbeit ist noch zu leisten, so viel baben wir noch
zu opfern. Der St. Veittag konnte friiher fur uns einen Tag der Trauer be-
deuten, aber beute, wo wir schon tief in die neue .Geschiclite des Volkes
gescbritten sind, wo binter uns groGe und glorreiche nationale Geschehnisse
steben und uns nocb groliere und glorreicbere erwarten, heute, wo wir in der
Mitte des Scbaffens des groGen nationalen Staates steben, beute raufi fiir uns
der St. Veittag ein Tag grolier Freude und Stolzes wegen des Geschehenen sein,
da es aus ihm entsprossen ist und nocb mebr wegen dessen, was kommen
wird. Serben und Serbinnen! Millionen unserer Briider. Slowenen, Kroaten und
Serben auOerhalb unserer Grenzen schauen heute auf uns, die Kinder des
Konigreiches, und ihre Brust wolbt die Freude und die Hofinung, indem sie
unsere heutige majestatische Manifestation fiir die nationale Sacbe betrachten.
Dem Mutlgen hilft Gott! Vorwarts alle! Es ruft uns derjei\ige Teil unserer
geheiligten Aufgabe, der nocb unverwirklicht geblieben ist. Am St. Veittage 1914
in Belgrad.

Beilago 5*

Zeugenaussage des Trifko Krstanovic Uber die Narodna odbrana.

Der Backergehilfe Trifko ICrstanovid m Zavldovici wurde von einep
Gendarmeriepatroiiille in der Nacht vom 6. zum 7. Juli 1914 verhaftet, weil
durch eine, kurz nach Veriibung des Attentates gegen den Herrn Erzlierzog
Franz Ferdinand von ihm gemachte x\.uiierung, dieses Attentat sei zu erwarten
gewesen, der Verdaclit entstanden war, dali er von dem Komplotte Kenntnis
gehabt habe.

Er wurde deshalb dem Kreisgericlite in Sarajevo eingeliefert. Bei der
Abhorung des Verhafteten ergab sicb, daO seine Aufierung den gegen ihn reg&
gewordenen Verdaclit nicbt rechtfertigte, da sie, lediglich auf seinen friilieren
Kenntnissen von der Tatigkeit der Narodna odbrana berahend, blofi der Aus-
druck seiner Uberzeugung gewesen war, daft bei der in Serbien gegen die
osterr.-ungar, Monarchic und speziell gegen den Plerrn Erzherzog Franz F-erdinand
entfalteten Agitation eine derartige Tat erwartet werden mulite. Das gegen
Kjrstanovid eingeleitete Verfabren wurde" desbalb mangels jedes Tatbestandea
eingestellt und der Genannte mit Eiicksicbt auf seine fiir die Untersuchung
wichtigen Kenntnisse uber die Tatigkeit der Narodna odbrana als Zeuge ein-
vernommen.

Ein die hier interessierenden Umstande betrefifender Auszug aus diesem
am 19. Juli 1914 aufgenommenen ZeugenprotokoUe folgt hiemit:

„Im Herbste des Jahres 1908 iiberscbritt icb auf der Mokra Gora bei
ViSegrad die Grenze nach Serbien, um mir Besch'aftigung zu suchen. Zuerst
kam ich nacb Bajina Basta im Bezirke Uzice und da ich dort keinerlei Be-
sch'aftigung fand, ging ich nach Belgrad, wo ich gerade zu der Zeit der Ver-
kiindigung der Annexion Bosniens und der Herzegowina emlangte. Da ich sah,
daO wegen der Annexion in der iBevolkerung eine grolie Bewegung und
Erregung entstanden war und daft ich keinerlei Beschaftigung werde finden
konnen, ging ich in das k. n. k. K^nsulat und ersuchte, mich nach Hause
abzufertigen. Dort sagte man mir, daft ich nachmittags kommen moge und daft
man mich dann in die Heimat abfertigen werde. Als ich jedoch aus dem
Konsulate hinausging, erwischte mich auf der Strafte ein Gendarm und fragte
mich, woher ich sei; in der Meinung, ich sei ein Spion, fiihrte er mich in
eine Karaula. Hier verhorte man mich und als ich ihnen sagte, daft ich gerne
nach Hause mochte, begann mich ein Unteroffizier zu schmahen, wieso ich
jetzt aus Serbien wolle, da sie gera,de jetzt mehr Leute brauch'en, weil es zu

eincm Kriege mit Osterreich kommen konnte. Als ich ihm sagte, daft ich nichts
zum Leben babe, antwortete er mir, dafi icb voUe Versorgung finden werde,
vvenn icb micb in das Komitee einscbreibe. Icb war in jener Not damit ein-
verstanden und ein Gendarm fiibrte micb ^in das Gasthaus „Zelenom Vijencu"
(„zum gi-iinen Kranz") und stellte micb dort dcm Voja Tankosid, dem Fiihrer
des Komitees und Kapifan im regularen Heere vor. Hier beim ^griinen Kranze"
wurdc icb in Kost und Wobnung genommen und wie icb sab, waren bier aucb
andcre vom Komitee wobnbaft. Voja Tankosid sagtc mir, daft es der Zweck
des Komitees sei, sicb zu unterricbten im Bombenwerfen, in der Zerstorung
von Briicken, Tunnels, Telegij-apben und Eisenbabnen, und zwar desbalb, weil
es Iciclit zu einem Kriege zwiscben Serbien und Osterreicb kommen konnte.
Hierauf fiibrte micb ein Mann in ein aiariscbes kleineres Plans ncben dem
Fiiianzministcrium, wo die Kanzleien des Komitees sicb befanden und bier in
der Kanzlei traf icb Milan Pribii^evir, welcber micb in das Komitee einscbrieb.
Bei dieser Einscbreibung fragte micb Milan Pnbi(?evid, ob mir Voja Tankosid
gesagt babe, welcbe Pflicbten icb als Komita babo, worauf icb antwortete: „ja".
Er sagte mir, daft die Eingescbriebenen tiicbtig, stark und opferwillig sein
miifiten. Damals waren wir etwa 70 eingescbrieben. In Belgrad baben w'ir
nicbts gemacbt. Nacb etwa iVt Monaten teilte uns unser FUbrer Tankosid mit,
daft die Groftmacbte unser Komitee verboten baben und daft wir uns aus Belgrad
entfernen und irgendwo in einem verlorenen Orte vcrstecken miissen, wobin
Fremde nicbt konmien. Auf diese Weise sandten sie uns in die Stadt Cuprija.
Hier iibten uns ein die Oftiziere Voja Tankosic, Dusan Putnik, Zivko Gvozdid
und Mitar Djinovid, der in die montenegriniscbe Bombenaffaire verwickelt war
und in Montenegro erscbossen wurde. Es war uns verboten, mit den ubrigen
Leuten zu verkebren, damit man nicbts von unserem Zwecke erfabre und aucb
nichts davon, wie viele wir waren. Wir iibten uns in dem Werfen von Bomben,
in dem Enicbten von Minen und in der Zerstorung von Telegrapben, Eisen-
babnen, Tunnels und Briicken. AUe 14 Tage kamen zu uns Milan Pribicevid,
General Bozo Jankovi«;, der Apotbeker .Skaric, der Abgeordnete Zivko Rafajlo-
vid, ein gewisser Glisid Milutin, Beamtcr im Finanzministerium, und diese
sahen zu, wie wir iibten und beglicben jedesmal fiir uns die Kosten der Ver-
pflcgung. Unsere Lebrer sagten uns, daft wir Komitees, sobald der Krieg ver-
kiindigt sei, voraus gcben werden, binter uns die Freiwilligen und dann das
regulare Heer. In Cuprija waren wir etwa 140 Mann. Wir bekamen aufier der
Kost, Wobnung und Kleidung je 25 Para faglicb fiir Tabak. Die Scbule
dauerte beilaufig 3 Monate, d. h. bis Marz 1909. Dann sagten uns die Mit-
glieder des Ausscbusses, daft wir entlassen waren, daft jeder geben konne,
wobin er wolle, denn die Annexion Bosniens und der Herzegowina sei von
den Groftmacbten anerkannt und unser Komitee babe keinen Zweck mebr.
Bei der Auflosung des Komitees sagte mir General Bozo Jankovid, daft icb in

den Dienst des Bozo Milanovid in Sabac trete und 50 Dinar monatlich Lohn
erhalte. Er sagte mir nicht, welcher Dienst das sein werde. Icb nahm an, weil
ich mich als Komitee gegeniiber dem General Jankovid zu folgen verpflichtet
fiihlte und auch da ich nichts zum Leben hatte und mir ein Bret suchen
mulite. So kam^ ich im Marz 1909 nach Sabac und meldete mich bei Bozo
Milanovid, Kaufmaiin in Sabac. General Jankovid hatte mir gesagt, dafi Bozo
MiJanovid der Vorstand der Narodna odbrana in Sabac sei und daft ich bei
ihm in dicser Narodna odbrana dienen werde. Als ich dem Bozo Milanovid das
Schreiben des Generals gab und er es gelesen hatte, sagte er mir, daft ich
ihm treu dienen und seine Auftriige ausfuhren miisse. Der hauptsachlichste
Dienst uerde fiir mich sein Briefe auszutragen, wohin sie eben lauten. Falls
ich einen Brief nicht dorthin tragen werde, wohin er gerichtet sei und falls
irgend jemand anderer zu diesem Briefe kame, so sei das mit meinem Leben
verbunden. Gleich nachsten Tages gab mir Bozo Miranovid einen geschlossenen
Brief, den ich ^u Cedo Lukid, Finanzwachtmeister in Serbisch-Raca, tragen
soUte. Am Wege nach Raca', im Orte. Bogatid, stelite mich der Bezirkskapetan,
nahm mir den Brief ab, offnete und las ihn. In dem Brief stand, daft Lukid
sofort drei Boote kaufen solle, dam it sie fertig waren, falls sie gebraucht
wiirden. Dem Briefe waren 100 Dinar beigeschlo§sen. Bei dieser Gelegenheit
sagte mir der Kapetan, daft vom Ministerium der strenge Auftrag gekommen
sei, daft die Komitatschi auf eigene Faust nichts tun diirfen, damit nicht eine
internationale diplomatische Intervention provoziert werde. Ich kehrte nach
•Sabac zuriick und meldete dem Bozo Milanovid, was mir geschehen war. Bozo
Milanovid wendete sich an den Kreisprafekten und dieser ordnete an, daft mir
der Revolver, den mir der Kapetan in Bogatid abgenommen hatte, zuriick-
gestellt werde. Auch ordnete er an, daft der Kapetan den Brief an Cedo Lukid,
an welchen er lautcte, zu expedieren habe. Deraitige Briefe habe ich vom
Marz 1909 bis zum Oktober 1910 ausgetragen, und zwar habe ich wahrend
dieser Zeit nach Serbisch-Raca 43 Briefe, nach Loznica 55 Briefe, nach
Zvornik 5, nach Ljubivija 2 Briefe getragen und nach Koviljada wcift ich nicht
wie viele. Ich habe mir deswegen gemerkt, vvie oft ich in jedem Orte war,
weil diese Orte von Sabac sehr weit entfernt sind. Die Briefe habe ich an die
Leiter der Zollamter in den betreffendcn Oiten getragen und von diesen habe
ich wieder Briefe als Antwort erhalten und zu Bozo Milanovid getragen. Ich
erinnere mich, daft ich auch einigemale Briefe nach Sepadka Ada getragen
habe. Mein Gehilfe im Austragen von Briefen war ein gewisser Vaso Erid,
gebiirtig aus Srebrenica. Nach Belgrad habe ich Briefe von Bozo Milanovid
jede Woche getragen und an Milan Pribicevid und Bozo Jankovid zugestellt.
Von dem Inhalte dieser Briefe habe ich nichts gewuftt und hat mir auch
niemand hieriiber etwas gesagt. Soviel ich sehen konnte, waren die Briefe,
welche Bozo Milanovid absandte, nicht chiffriert, wahrend die Briefe, welche

die Zollamtsleiter sendeten, mit besondeien Zeichen geschrieben waren, was
ich beobachtet habe, als sie Bozo Milanovid offnete. Einmal brachte ich dem
Bozo Milanovid ein solches chiffriertcs Scbreiben, ich glaube aus Zvornik, und
dieser sendete mich mit dem Sclireil^en zu Mika Atanasijevid, Professor in
Sabac, darait er es dechiffriere. Dieser vollfiihrte das, wie cr das gewohnlicli
tat; aber vielleicht vergaO er den Brief zu schlielien, so daft ich ihn lesen
konnte. In dem- Briefe stand, dafi von sicherer Seite gemeldet werde, daft Geld
mit dem Bildnisse des Thronfolgers zu pragen sei und daft dies ein Zeichen sei,
dafi Kaiser Franz Joseph abdizieren werde. Etwa nach 8 Monaten meiner Dienst-
leistung bei Bozo Milanovid gab mir Bozo seine Visitkarte, auf welcher ein
Totenkopf aufgezeichnet war und auf der aufgeschrieben stand, daO ich zum
Vertrauten (povjerenik) der Narodna odbrana ernannt sei. Bei dieser Gelegen-
heit sagte er mir, dali es sich um Spionage handle

"Von dem Offizier Dusan Opterkid, dem, Mitgliede der Narodna odbrana,
erfuhr ich einmal, dali die Narodna odbrana in Bosnien und Herzegowina 23 Mit-
glieder habe. Sonst ist mir aber nicht bekannt, ob und welche Organisation die
Narodna odbrana in Bosnien hat. Hin und wieder gab mir Milan Pribi(!evid
einen Revolver oder aber Geld zum Ankauf eines Revolvers, damit ich ihn den
Finanzem an der Grenze gebe, welche als Komitatschis dienten, da sie keinen
Revolver batten und auch kein Geld, um sich einen solchen selbst zu kaufen.
Wie mir scheint, gab ihnen Milan Pribic'^evid diese zur Ehrung, weil sie cben
Komitatschis waren. Eine andere Beschaftigung mit Waffen hatte ich nicht.

Einmal bekam ich zur Zeit meiner Dienstleistung von Bozo Milanovic derr
Auftrag, mit einem Manne zu einem Bauern in Lijesnica an der Drina zu
gehen und dieser Bauer werde una informieren und alles, was notwendig wird,
zeigen, damit wir zwei den Ljubo StanariCi('*, serbischen Reserveoffizier, der
nach Bijeljina gefliichtet war, toten. Der AusschuO dor Narodna odbrana hatte
namlich erfahren, daft Ljubo Stanari^ii^ fiir • den serbischen Staat gefahrlich sei
und hatte beschlossen, daii er getotet werden solle.

Von Bozo Milanovid erhielten ich und jener Mann den Auftrag, an einem
bestimmten Orte iiber die Drina zu gehen und Ljubo Stanaricid, der gerade
am Ufer der Drina auf der bosnischen Seite im Bijeljiner Bezirke wohnhaft ist,
zu toten. Ich und jener Mann waren in die Drina gestiegen, aber weil das
Wasser tief war und wir auch sahen, daO Ljubo mit dem Gewehr auf der
Schulter um sein Haus herumgehe, kehrten wir ' zum Hause jenes Bauern
zuriick. Weil ich sah, dali wir ihn mit dem Messer nicht toten konnen, sendete
ich jenen Mann nach Sabac, damit er Bozo Milanovid melde, dafi es nicht
moglich sei, den Stanaridid auf diese Weise, wie er ^wolie, namlich mit dem
Messer, zu toten. Daraufhin erhielt ich vom Bozo Milanovid den Auftrag, dafi
wir ihn auf jeden Fall toten. Dann haben wir uns entschlossen, ihn mit dem
Gewehre zu erschielien. Dieser Mann, der mit mir war, hatte nach, dem Au/-

trage des Bozo auf Stanari^id zu schieften und ilin zu toten und ich hatte zu
kontrollieren, ob dieser Auftrag ausgefiihrt werde. Inzwischen jedoch kam ein
berittener Gendarm und brachte vom Kreispr'afekten in Sabac den Auftrag, daO
wir zuriickkehren und von der urspriinglichen Absicht abstehen sollen. Und so
kehiten wir nach Sabac zuriick.

Im Oktober 1910 verlangte icb vom Bozo Milanovid, daft er mir den
Lohn erhohe und als er mir das nicht tun woUte, bedankte ich raich fiir den
Dienst. Aus Sabac ging ich nach Belgrad, wo ich mit dem General Jankovid
zusammentraf, der mich verhaften lieft, deshalb, weil ich den Gehorsam auf-
gesagt habe. Sie zogen mich durch verschiedene Gefangnisse, etwa durch zwei
Monato und alles deswegen, weil ich ihnen den Gehorsam aufgesagt hatte und
sie sich fiirchteten, daft ich ihre Geheimnisse venate. Zum Schlusse entschieden
sich die Behorden, mich nach Bosnien zu expediereu. In Sabac sagte mir ein
Gefangener, daft es sich um mein Leben handelt. Die Gendarmen begleitetcn mich
bis Zvornik, wo sie mich den bosnischen Gendarmen ubergaben. So Icam ich
im Dezember 1910 nach Bosnien.

Von irgend einer Schwarzen Hand weiB ich nichts Bestimmtes mit Aus-
nahme dessen, was ich von dieser Hand in serbischen Zeitungen gelesen
habe. Heute erinncre ich mich nicht daran, was von dieser Schwarzen Hand
in Zeitungen geschrieben war. Ebenso weili ich nichts von der Schwarzen Liste.
In Serbien herrschte nach dei- Annexion ein allgemeiner Unwille und Hali
gegen die Person des osterreichischen Thronfolgers, denn er war allgemein als
ein Blutfeind der Serben angesehen.

Im iibrigen berief sicb Krstanovid auf seine friiheren Angaben, von denen
bloft die folgenden zur Erganzung der vorstehenden Aussage von Interesse sind.

Das Komitee, in das Krstanovid durch Milan Pribidevid aufgenommen
wurde, gelangte von der Norodna odbrana zur Aufstellung. In der Schule in
Cuprija befanden sich 20 — 22 Angehorige aus der Monarchie. Unter den
Schiilem war auch Milan Ciganovid.

In der Schule zu Cuprija wurde gelehrt, daft die Komitees bereit sein
miissen, auf Befehl der Norodna odbrana nach Bosnien zu gehen und dort
nach 'den von ihren Vorgesetzten erhaltenen Auftragen zu handeln.

BeHago. G.

Auszug aus den Akten des Kreisgerichtes in Sarajevo Uber das Strafverrahren
gegen Jovo Jagiicic und Genossen wegen Verbrechens der Ausspahung.

Im Jahre 1913 wurde eine von Jovo Jagli6id und mehreren Komplizen
in Bosnien zugunsten Serbiens betriebene Ausspahungsaktion aufgedeckt. Das
hierauf in Sarajevo eingeleltete Strafverfahren lieferte unter anderem auch
folgendes, einen Einblick in die Methoden der grofiserbischen Propaganda und
speziell der Narodna odbrana bietendes Materiale.

Jovo JagliCi(? gab an, dafi er im Monate August oder September 1912
zum ersten Male dem gewesenen Viehrevisor in Foua, Petar Klarid genannt
Pesut, begegnete, welcher im Herbst 1912 nach Montenegro gefluehtet und
dann Komitatschi geworden war.

Bei der ersten Zusammenkunft fragte Klarid den Jaglieid, ob er den Rade
Milosevid aus Kalinovik kenne und meinte auf die Antvvort des letzteren, dali
Milosevic im Spital scbwer krank liege: „Sehade, wenn er stirbt, wir haben
Merkwiirdiges gesprochen, hat er Dir nichts davon erwahnt?" Auf die ver-
neinende Antwort erwiderte Klarid: ,.Ich hatte Dir etwas Wichtiges mitzuteilen,
wir sind Serben und miissen etwas Wichtiges fiir Serbien tun, komme zu mir
in meine Kanzlei". Dort entspann sich nun zwischen ihnen folgendes Gesprach:

„Jovan, ich will Dir etwas erzahlen, ich kenne Dich noeh nicht, ob Du
mich verraten wirst? Ich sage es Dir trotzdem und wenn Du das Herz hast
verrate mich!"

Auf die Frage des Jaglidid, um was es sich denn handle, antwortete Klarid:
„Bruder, in Serbien existiert ein Verein „Narodna odbrana". In diesen Verein
sollen ^^ele Leute eintreten; es sind auch schon viele in Bosnien und der
Herzegowina sowie in der ganzen Monarchic angeworben; es gibt Leute dabei
von Intelligenz und Wohlhabende, das sind grofie Kopfe, und wenn es die
konnen, waipum sollen es nicht auch wir tun, damit wir auch etwas dazu bei-
tragen".

Auf die Frage, welche Ziele dieser Verein verfolgt, antwortete Klarid:

„Der Verein verfolgt den Zweck: z. B. Du bist in Kalinovik, Du meldest
mir, was es dort. Neues gibt, wie viel Militar, Kanonen, Munition, verschiedene
Gewehre, wer kommt, wer geht u. dgl. Wir haben eine geheime Schrift „Chiffre"
und korrespondieren mit derselben. Wenn Du treu bist, erhaltst Du sie auch."

Jaglicid hatte Furcbt, da(i Klarid ihri nur ausforsche, um ihn dann zu'
verraten und ersuchte ihn daher, er solle .ihm einige Namen von Mitgliedern
nennen, worauf Klarid eine Zeitlang nachdaclite und dem JagliCid dann einen
Namen nannte, der diesem Vertrauen einflolite.

Hierauf sagte ihm IClarid: ^SoU ich Dir den „^Chiffre''" geben?" Jaglicid
war damit einverstanden. Klarid, welcher den Chiffre auswendig kannte, schrieb
ihn auf einen Zettel auf und vibergab ihn dem Jaglicid.

Bei einer anderen Gelegenheit erzahlte Klarid von seinem Aufenthalt in
Banja-Koviljaca (bei Loznica), wo er durch den serbischen Hauptmann
Todorovid*) Unterricht im Bombenwerfen erhalten hat und sagte auf die Frage
des Beschuldigten, warum er dies gelernt habe: „Wenn eS zu etwas kommt,
wie ich Dir bereits gesagt habe, ist es notwendig, dali ich mit Bomben umzu-
gehen verstehe, daft ich Dich einiibe und Du dann die anderen, damit Pulver-
magazine und sonstige wichtige Objekte in die Luft gesprengt werden, weil
wir in diesem Falle Bomben aus Serbien erhalten werden"

Hierauf beschrieb Klarid das Aussehen der Bomben und sagte, dafi er
bereits Leute angeworben habe, welche im Falle eines Krieges die Telegraphen-
und Telephondiahte durchschnelden werden.

Bei diesen Zusammenkiinften erfuhr Jaglicid von Klarid auch, daB es zu
den Aufgaben der Mitglieder der Narodna odbrana gehort, osterreichisch-unga-
rische Soldaten zur Fahnenflucht zu verleiten, Freiwlllige (Komitatschis) anzu-
werben, Banden zu organisieren, Objekte und Depots zu sprengen u. s. w.
Auch teilte ihm Klarid mit, dali selbst die chififrierte Korrespondenz zwischen
den serbischen und bosnischen Mitgliedern nicht der Post anvertraut, sondern
durch sichere Boten iiber die Grenze befordert wird.

Klarid hat dem Jaglicid weiters erzahlt, daft gelegentlich der Prosvjetafeier
(im September 1912) mit der zu dieser enlsendeter) Deputation aus Serbien
auch ein serbischer Major in Sarajevo im Hotel „Europe" gewohnt hat**}
welchem Klarid Mitglieder der Narodna odbrana zufiihrte, die dieser beeidete.

Von einem Spione erfuhr Jaglidid, daft Bomben nach Sarajevo kommen
werden odei schon gekommen sind, daft diese das Aussehen von Seifenstiicken
haben***j und daft man auch diesem Spione 2 — 3 Stiicke senden oder daft
er sich solche abholen werde.

*) Hauptmann Kosta Todorovic war damals latsjiclilich Grcnzkommissiir und Leiter des serbischen
Kundscliaftsdienstcs fiir die Grcnzstrecke Raca— Ljuboija.

**) Zu der Prosvjetafeier war der scrbisclie Major Mika Jankovic als serbiselier Delegierier ersciiicnen.
***) Die bei dem Sarajevoer Attentate gegen Er/lierzog Franz Ferdinand verwendeten und die im
Jahre 1913 in der Save bei Brcko gefundenen, aus dem konigl. serbischen Arsenale in Kragujevac stammen-
tlen Bomben ktinnen tatsachlich mit Seifenstiicken verglichen werden.

56
Beilage 7.

Aus konfidentielien Meldungen iiber die „Narodna odbrana".

Die Leitung der Narodna odbrana besteht aus Vertretem aller Partei-
richtungen, um auch die Fortschrittler und die Gegner der Versehworer zu
gewinnen. Ihr eigentlicher Spiritus rector ist der jetzige Major Pribi6evi(5. Die
Sekretarstelle ist immer mit einem beurlaubten Offizier besetzt.

Aufgabe der Narodna odbrana ist es, in den siidslawischen Teilen Oster-
reich-Ungarns eine wirksame Propaganda in Miiitar- und Zivilkreisen zu ent-
wickeln, um so eine Revolution vorzubereiten, evenluelle Mobilisierungen zu
storen, Paniken und Revolten hervorzurufen u. s. w.

Die Organisation besitzt in der Monarchie mehrere Vertrauensmiinner und
Emissare, die eine stille Propaganda von Mann zu Mann betreiben. Einzelne
haben spezielle Missionen, am bei wichtigen Briicken, Knotenpunkten etc. einige
Leute — womoglich Eisenbahnbeamte — anzuwerben, welche die Aufgabe
haben, im geeigneten Momente etwa erhaltene Weisungen durchzufuhren oder
durchfiihren zu lassen.

Der Verkehr zwischen den Mitgliedern der Narodna odbrana wird moglichst
durch personliche Fuhlungnahme bewerkstelligt.

Als Mitglieder werden hauptsachlich junge Leute, Arbeiter, Eisenbahner
geworben.

Bcilairc 8.

Auszug aus den Akten des bosnisch-herzegowinischen Kreisgerichtes in Sarajevo
Uber die dort anhangige Untersuchung gegen Gavrilo Princip und Genossen wegen
des am 28. Juni 1914 an Seiner k. und k. Hoheit dem Herrn Erzherzoge Franz
Ferdinand von Osterreich-Este und Ihrer Hoheit der Frau Herzogin Sophie von
Hohenberg verUbten Yerbreohens des IMeucheimordes.

I. Die Tat and die T'aterscliaft.

Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovid, Trifko Grabez, Vaso Cubrilovid und
Cetres Popovid sind gestandig, in Gemeinscbaft mit dem fliichtigen Mebemed
Mehmedbasid ein Komplott zur Ermordung des Herrn Erzberzogs Franz. Ferdinand
gebildet und mit Bomben, teilweise aucb mit Browningpistolen ausgeriistet,
Hochstdemselben am 28. Juni 1914 auf Seiner Rundfabii; durcb Sarajevo zwecks
Veriibung des geplanten Attentates aufgelauert zu baben.

Nedeljko Cabrinovid ist gestandig, als erster unter den Verscbworern gegen
den Wagen des Herrn Erzberzogs eine Bombe gescbleudert zu haben, die ibr
Ziel verfeblte und die beim Explodieren lediglicb Insassen des dem erzberzog-
licben Automobile folgenden Wagons verletzte.

Gavrilo Princip ist gestandig, aus einer Browningpistole zwei Scbiisse gegen
das erzherzoglicbe Automobil abgegeben zu baben, durch welcbe der Herr Erz-
herzog Franz Ferdinand und die Frau Herzogin Sopbie von Hobenberg totlicb
Terletzt wurden.

Beide Tater geben die Mordabsicbt bei Veriibung der Tat zu.

Diese Gestandnisse haben durcb die gepflogenen Erbebungen ibre voile
Bestatigung gefunden und ist festgestellt, dali weiland Herr Erzberzog Franz
Ferdinand und weiland Frau Herzogin Sopbie von Hobenberg an den Folgen
der von Gavrilo Princip auf sie abgegebenen Eevolverscbiisse gestorben sind.

n. Entstebung des Komplotts.

Die Bescbuldigten baben, im wesentlicben tibereinstimmend, vor dem Unter-
sucbungsricbter nacbstpbende Angaben gemacbt:

Im April 1914 fafite Princip wabrend seines Aufentbaltes in Belgrad, wd
er in dortigen Kaffeebausern mit vielen serbiscben Studenten verkebrte, den Plan
zm- Ausfubrung eines Attentates auf weiland Herrn Erzberzog Franz Ferdiniand.

Diese Absicht hat er mit dem ihm bekannten, damals gleichfalls in Belgrad
anwesenden Cabrinovid besprocben, der sich damals schon mit dem gleichen
Gedanken trug und der zur Teilnahme an dem Attentate sofort bereit war. tJber
dieVeriibung eines Anschlages auf den Herm Erzberzog wurde in dem Kreise, in
dem Princip mid Cab^ino^d<5 verkebrten, oft gesprocben, da der Herr Erzberzog
als gefabrlicber Feind des serbischen Yolkes gait.

Die zur Ausfiibrang der Tat notigen Bomben und Waffen wollten sich
Princip und Cabrinovid, da sie selbst die Mittel zu deren Ankauf nicbt besalien,
zuerst von dem serbischen Major Milan Pribice\i(5 oder von der Narodua odbrana
beschaffen. Da aber Major Pribi(5evi(5 und das mafigebende Mitglied des genannten
Vereines, Zivojin Dadid, zu jener Zeit verreist waren, beschlossen sie zu trachten,
die Waffen von dem ihnen bekannten ehemaligen Komitatschi und derzeitigen
Staatsbahnbeamten Milan Ciganovid zu erhalten.

Nun trat Princip durch Vermittlung eines intimen Bekannten des Ciganovid
mit diesem in Verbindung. Ciganovid suchte hierauf den Princip auf, sprach mit
ihm iiber das geplante Attentat, das er vollkommen billigte und erklarte zunachst,
daii er es sich noch iiberlegen woUe, ob er die Waffen hiezu beistellen solle.
Auch Cabrinovid sprach mit Ciganovid wegen der Waffen.

Zu Ostern zog Princip den gleichfalls iil Belgrad anwesenden Trifko Grabez
ins Vertrauen, der sich nach seinem Gestandnisse gleichfalls zur Mitwirkung an
dem Attentate bereit erklarte.

In der folgenden Zeit hatte Princip wiederholt Gesprache mil Ciganovid
liber die Ausfiihrung des Attentates.

Inzwischen hatte sich Ciganovid wegen des geplanten Attentates auch mit
dem ihm eng befreundeten serbischen Major Voja Tankosid ins Einvernehmen
gesetzt, der dann fiir diese Zwecke die Browningpistolen zur Verfugung stellte.

Grabez gesteht in Cbereinstimmung mit den Angaben des Princip und
Cabrinovid zu, am 24. Mai in Begleitung des Ciganovid den Major Tankosid
fiber dessen Wunsch in seiner Wohnung besucht zu haben. Nach der Vorstellung
babe Tankosid dem Grabez gesagt: „Bist Du dieser, bist Du entschlossen?"
worauf Grabez erwiderte: „Ich bin es". Als Tankosid dann fragte: „Versteht
Ihr aus dem Revolver zu schiefien?" und Grabez hierauf verneinend antwortete,
sagte Tankosid zu Ciganovid: „Ich werde Dir einen Revolver geben^ gebe und
unterrichte sie im Schiefien".

Hierauf fuhrte Ciganovid den Princip und den Grabez zur Militarschieli-
statte in Topdider und erteilte ihnen in einem bei der Schielistatte liegendera
Walde Unterricht im Schieiien mit Browningpistolen auf Ziele. Hiebei erwies
sich Princip als der bessere Schiitze. Ciganovid hat den Princip, Grabez und
Cabrinovid auch mit dem Gebrauche der ihnen spater ubergebenen Bomben
vertraut gemacht.

Am 27. Mai 1914 iibergab Ciganovic?, dem Princip, Cabrinovid and GrabeX
nach deren iibereinstimmenden Gestandnissen 6 Bomben, 4 Browningrevolver
und geniigende Mengen Munition, sowie eine Glastubc mit Zyankali, damit sie
sich zwecks Wabrung des Geheimnisses nach veriibter Tat vergiften. Uberdies
gab ihnen Ciganovid Geld.

Scbon zu Ostern hatte Princip den Danilo T\i6 von seinem Attentatsplane
unterrichtet. Bei der Riickkehr nacb Sarajevo ersuclite er nun diesen, einige
weitere Personen zu werben, die sich an dem Attentate beteiligen, damit es
sicher gelinge. Hierauf hat Hid nach seinem Gestandnisse den Jaso Cubrilovid,
Cetro Popovid und Mehemed Mehmedbasid hiezu geworben.

ni. Herkunft der Bomben.

Bei Veriibung des Attentates war nur eine der Bomben zur Verwendung
gelangt. Die iibrigen fiinf Bomben wurden spater von der Polizei in Sarajevo
zustande gebracht.

Diese Bomben sind nach dem Gutachten der gerichthchen Sachverstandigen
serbische Handgranaten, die fabriksmafiig erzeugt wurden und fur militiirische
Zwecke bestimmt waren. Sie sind identisch mit den 21 Bomben, die im Jahre
1913 in der Save bei Brdko gefunden wurden und die sich zum Teile noch in
der Originaipackung befanden, aus.der sich mit Sicherheit ergab, dali sie aus
dem serbischen Waffenlager in Kragujevac stammten.

Damit ist festgestellt, daii auch die bei dem Attentate gegen den Herrn
Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand verwendeten Granaten aus den Vorraten des
Kragujevacer Armeedepots stammen.

Grabez nennt die ihm und seinen Komplizen libergebenen Granaten ganz
spontan „ Kragujevacer Bomben"

IV. Transport der drei Attentater und der Waffen von Serbien

nach Bosnien.

Prinzip gibt hieriiber folgendes an:

Ciganovid sagte dem Cabrinovid, Grabez und Princip, sie sollten ihren Weg
tiber Sabac und Loznica nach Tuzla nehmen und sich dort an Misko Jovanovid
wenden, der die Waifen iibernehmen werde. Zunachst sollten sie nach Sabac
gehen und sich dort beim Grenzhauptmanne Major Rade Popovid melden, fiir
den er ihnen einen Zettel mitgab, den Princip ubernahm. Am 28. Mai verlieCen
die drei Komplizen mit den Waffen Belgrad. In Sabac tibergab Prinzip den
Zettel, den er von Ciganovid erhalten hatte dem Major Popovid, der hierauf alle
drei auf das Kommando fiihrte und ihnen einen Passierschein ausstellte, in
welchem bestatigt wurde, dali einer von ihnen Finanzwachmann und die beiden

anderen dessen Kameraden seien. Der Passiersclieiii entliielt auch den Namen
dieses angebliclien Finanzwaclimannes, doch habe er den Namen vergessen.
Gleichzeitig iibergab ilmen Major Popovid ein geschlossenes Scbreiben fiir den
Grenzbauptmann in Loznica, der Pravanovid, Prdanovid oder Predojevid hieli.

» Pfincip, Cabrinovid und Grabez iibernacbteten in §abac und reisten am

nacbsten Morgen mit der Babn nacb Loznica, und zwar auf Grand des ibnen
vom Major Popovid ausgefertigten Passierscheines mit balber Fabrkarte. Mittags
kamen sie in Loznica an mid iibergaben dem dortigen Grenzhauptmanne den
Brief des Majors Popovid, in dem es bieli: ^Scbau, daft Du diese Leute empfangst
und sie durcbfiibrst, wo Du vv^ilit." Der Grenzbauptmann, sagte, er werde seine
Finanzwacbleute von der Grenze rufen und die drei dem sicbersten Manne an-
vertrauen. Darauf telepbonierte er und bestellte die drei Komplizen fur den
nacbsten Morgen, 7 Ubr, in seine Kanzlei.

Am anderen Morgen vereinbarten die drei Verscbworer, dafi Cabrinovid mit
<iem Passe des Grabez offen den Weg nacb Zvomik nebme, Princip und Grabez
aber die Grenze beimlicb iiberscbreiten. Dieser Plan wurde, mit dem Grenz-
bauptmanne besprocben und biebei beschlossen, daO ein Finanzwacbmann aus
LjeSnica, namens Grbid, den Princip und Grabez in seine Karaula mitnebmen
und liber die Grenze bringen solle. Cabrinovid ging dann zu Fuli nacb Banja
Koviljada in der Ricbtung gegen Zvomik. Princip und Grabez fubren mit dem
Finanzwacbmanne Grbid nacb Ljesnica, wo sie die Bomben imd den Revolver in
einem Hotelzimmer ablegten. Hiebei sab der Finanzwacbmann Grbid diese
Objekte. Princip selbst bezeicbnete diese Reise als mysti;^cb.

Grabez sagte im wesentlicben konform mit Princip aus und ftigte erganzend
bei, Grbid babe gelacbt, als er die Bombe und die Revolver sab und lediglicb
gefragt, wobin in Bosnien sie mit diesen Bomben gingen. Der Finanzwacbmann
babe sicb jedenfalls gedacbt, dali Grabez und Princip eine Mission batten.

Grbid und ein zweiter Finanzwacbmann baben den Princip und Grabez auf
einem ICabne zu einer Insel in der Drina gebracbt. Dort wies sie Grbid an, auf
einen Bauer zu warten, der sie abbolen werde. Sie iibernacbteten auf der Insel
in einem Bauernbauscben, wobin Grbid sie gewiesen batte. Am nacbsten Tage
kam ein Bauer, der sie wabrend der Nacbt zuerst durcb einen Sumpf und dann
iiber das Gebirge bis in die Nabe von Priboj bracbte, wo er sie wieder dem
dortigen Lebrer Cubrilovid, der bereits auf sie gewartet zn- baben- scbien, zur
Weiterbefbrderung iibergab.

Dieser bracbte sie dann weiter nacb Tuzla zu MiSkq Jovanovid.

Cabrinovid sagte iiber die Yorgange der Reise bis zu dem Momente, in
dem er sicb von Princip und GrabeX trennte, im wesentlicben iibereinstimmend
mit diesen aus und ftigte nur erganzend bei, daii Major Popovid ibnen erzablt
habe, er sei erst am Tage vor ibrer Ankunft in Sabac aus Belgiad gekommen.

In Loznica beschlossen Cabiinovic, Princip und GrabeX sich zu trennen,
da es zu gefahiilch ware, wenn sie zu dritt gingen. -Der Grenzhauptmann in
Loznica, dem sie hievon Mitteilung macbten, lobte ibren Plan und gab dena
6abrinovi(5 einen Brief fiir den Lebrer M. Jaklojevid in Mali-Zvornik mit.
Cabrinovid iibergab bierauf die von ihm getragenen Bomben, Browning und
Munition dem Princip und Grabez und ging in Begleitung eines ibm beigege-j
benen Finanzwacbmannes nacb Mali-Zvornik.

Dort fand er den Lehrer Jaklojevid, dem er den Brief des Grenzhaupt-i
mannes von Loznica iibergab. Dieser avisierte bierauf den serbiscben Grcnzposten.,
Als Cabrinovid spater mit dem Lebrer zu diesem Grenzposten kam, wartete
dort bereits ein Mann auf sie, der sie mit einem Kabne iiber die Diina nacb
Grofi-Zvornik in Bosnien bracbte.

Von dort begab sicb dann Cabrinovid nacb Tuzla zu Misko Jovanovid.

Nachtrag.

Knapp vor Abschluli dieses Memoires wird vom ICreisgerichte in Sarajevo'
ein ZeugenprotokoU vorgelegt, aus dem sicb ergibt, dall ein Angeboriger der
Monarcbie einige Tage vor dem 28. Juni d. J. dem k. Und k. [Consulate in
Belgrad die Meldung crstatten woUte, dali er vermute, es bestebe der Plan auf Erz-
berzog Franz Ferdinand wahrend seiner Anwesenheit in Bosnien ein Attentat zu
veriiben. Dieser Mann soil nun durcb Belgrader Polizeiorgane, die ibn unmittelbar.
vor dem Betreten des k. und k. Konsulates aus nicbtigen Griinden verbafteten,
an der Erstattimg' dieser Meldung verhindert worden sein. Aus den in dem frag-
lichen ZeugenprotokoUe entbaltenen Angaben wiirde folgen, daO die betreffenden
Polizeiorgane von dem geplanten Attentate Kenntnis gebabt und diesen Mann
nur verbaftet batten, um ibn an der Erstattung der Anzeige zu bindern.

Da diese Angaben nocb nicbt nacbgepriift sind, kann iiber deren Sticbbaltig-
keit im gegenwartigen Zeitpunkte nocb kein Urteil abgegeben werden. Mit Rtick-
sicbt auf die bieriiber scbwebenden Erbebungen entzieben sicb die naberen
Details der Zeugenaussage derzeit einer genaueren Wiedergabe.

62^

Beilage 9.

Die serbische Presse Qber das Attentat.

a) Das Belgrader Blatt „Balkan" schreibt am 29. Juni liber die beiden Atten-
tater:

Nedeljko Cabrinovid, von Benif Typograph, war von anarchistischen
Ideen erfiillt und als unrubiger Geist bekannt. Er weilte bis vor 20 Tagen
in Belgrad, wobin er nacb dem Kriege kam und in der Staatsdruckerei
bescbaftigt war. Vor seiner Abreise erklarte er, dali er sicb nach Triest
begebe, wo er in einer neuen Druckerei Arbeit bekommen werde. Gavrilo
Princip weilte gleichfalls bis vor kurzem in Belgrad. .Wahrend des Krieges
hat er sich als Freiwilliger gemeldet, wurde jedoch nicht angenommen, wes-
balb er Belgrad verlieli. Er kebrte aber zu Weihnacbten des vorlgen Jahres
wieder nach Belgrad zuriick, besuchte eine Zeitlang das Gymnasium und
verlieli Belgrad fast zu gleicher Zeit wie Cabrinovid, jedoch auf einem
anderen Wege als dieser. Princip war sehweigsam, nervos, lernte gut, ver-
kehrte mit einigen gleichfalls aus Bosnien und der Herzegowina stammen-
den Mittelschiilern und in der letzten Zeit auch mit Cabrinovid. Er neigte
sozialistischen Ideen zu, obwohl er urspriinglich der fortschrittlichen Jugend
angehort hat. Princip ist ebenso wie Cabrinovid in Sarajevo aufgewachsen;
beide verband seit ihrer Kindheit eine unzertrennliche Freundschaft.

b) Der „ Pigment" vom 1. Juli verweist darauf, dali nach dem lauten Proteste
des Attentaters Zerajid der Protest Princips gefolgt sei. Das Werk des letz-
teren finde gleichfalls seine Aufklarung im bosnischen Regierungssystem.
Der Umstand, daft Princip den Racheakt am heiligen Nationaltag Vidovdan
veriibte, welcher fur die Vomahme der Manover gewahlt worden war, lasse
die Verzweiflungstat des jungen Martyrers verstandlicher .und naturlichor
erscheinen.

(Das Blatt wurde wegen dieses Artikels von der Polizei konfisziert,
die Konfiskation jedoch tags darauf von der ersten Instanz des Belgrader
Gerichtes annuUiert.)
\c) Der jungradikale „Odjek" vom 3. Juli sagt: man babe den Herrn Erzherzog
Franz Ferdinand am Tage des nationalen Enthusiasmus nach Sarajevo gesendet,
um eine brutale Manifestation der Gewalt und Unterwerfung zu feiern.

Dieser brutale Akt mufite bratale Gefuhle des Widerstandes, des Hasse*
and der Rache herausfordern.
\d) Das nationalistlsche Partciorgan ^Srpska Zastava" vom 3. Juli sagt in einem
Artikel, betitelt „Verdachtigungen und Drohungen: „Das Attentat stellt sioh
immer rnehr als ein Erzeugnis der ungesunden Verhaltnisse in der Monarchie
dar. Andererseits ruft die wilde Verfolgung des serbischen Volkes in Bosnien
und der Herzegowina den Abscbeu der ganzen zivilisierten Welt hervor."

e) Das fortschrittliche Blatt ^Pravda" vom 3. Juli schreibt: ^Die "Wiener Politik
ist zynisch. Sie beutet den Tod des ungliicklichen Paares fiir ihre abscheu-
licben Ziele gegen das serbische • Volk aus."

f) Die „Agence des Balkans" vom 3, Juli meldet: „Die in Bosnien und der
Herzegowina gegen die Serben veriibten Verbrechen sind unter den Auspizien
und auf direkte Anstiftung der osterreichisch-ungarischen Zivil- und Militar-
behorden begangen worden."

ig) Die ^Pravda" vom 4. Juli sagt: „Alle bisher in Osterreich begangenen
Morde und Attentate haben stets eine und dieselbe Quelle gehabt. Die
unterdriickten Volker der Monarchie mufiten zu dieser Art des Protestes greifen,
weil ihnen kein anderer Weg moglicb war. In einem Chaos der Schreckens-
herrschaft ist es natiirlich und voUkommen begreiflich, dafi sich die Ara
der Attentate eingebiirgert hat.

k) Der „ Balkan" vom 5. Juli bemerkt, dali Osterreich-Ungarn „wegen Ver-
folgung Unschuldiger unter internationale KontroUe gestellt werden miifite";
denn Osterreich-Ungarn sei weniger konsolidiert als die Tiirkei.

i) Das „Mali Journal" vom 7. Juli schreibt: „Ein Sproiiling des Mittelalters
wurde dieser Tage in Sarajevo ermordet. Ermordet hat ihn ein Knabe, der
das Leid um sein geknechtetes engeres Vaterland bis zum Paroxismus
fiihlte, das Leid, das ihm die Rauber der Lander seiner Vater angetan

. haben. Was hat daraufhin das offizielle Osterreich-Ungarn getan? Es hat
mit allgemeinen Massakiierungen, Pliinderungen und Zerstorungen des ser-
bischen Lebens und Eigentums geantwortet. Durch solches Heldentum
zeichnen sich nur die Nichtsnutzigen aus. Die Feigen sind immer grolie
Helden, wenn sie sicher sind, dali ihnen nichts gescbehen wird. Man ver-
gleiche nur Princip und Cabrinovid mit diesen Helden und man wird
gleich den grofien Unterscbied merken. Zivilisation und Gerechtigkeit sind
in Osterreich-Ungarn eine grofie Liige."

j) Die „Tribuna" vom 7. Juli sagt: „Wir sind der Ansicht, daD die Mordtat
von Sarajevo bestellt wurde, um die Ausrottung der Serben mit einem
Schlag durcbzufiihren."

%) Der „ Pigment" vom 8. Juli meldet aus Bajina Baschka, dafi die osterrei-
chischen Behorden in Bosnien ein Christenmassaker vorbereitan.

I) Der „Balkan" vom 8. veroffentlicht einen Berlcht aus Bosnien unter dem
Titel „Bartholomausnacht in Sarajevo" und tritt fiir einen allgemeinen
Boykott gegen alle in Serbien lebenden Osterreicher ein.

m) Das „Mali Journal" vom 8. fordert zum Boykott gegen die Donau-Dampf-
schiffahrts-Gesellscliaft auf.

nj Unter dem I'itel „Niclits aus Osterreich-Ungam!" schreibt die „Tribuna"
vom 8., es sei am besten, aus Osterreich-Ungarn nichts zu beziehen, auck
die osterreicbischen und ungarischen Bader nicht zu besucben und kein«
Arzte aus Osterreicli-Ungarn zu berufen. Die Privatinitiative konne in der
angedeuteten Ricbtung viel ausricbten. Der Staat und die Beborden baben sicb
darein nicbt einzumiscben. Es sei geniigend, an die Burger zu appellieren.

o) Die „Stampa" vom 8. bebauptet, dafi die Sarajevoer Polizei die verbafteten
Attentater der unmenscblichsten und scbamlosesten Tortur aussetze, um von
ibnen unwabre Gestandnisse zu erpressen, auf Grund welcber dann Anklagen
gegen das serbiscbe Volk erboben werden sollen.

p) Die ^Agence des Balkans" vom 9. meldet aus Belgrad: „ Absolut sicbere
Privatmeldungen kiindigen an, daO in Bosnien und der Herzegowina ein
allgemeines Massaker der Serben unmittelbar bevorstebe."

iq) Ankniipfend an die Aufierung des Premierministers Asquitb bei der Mit-
teilung der Nacbriebt vom Tode des Herrn Erzberzogs Franz Ferdinand, daft
er fiir das Scbicksal der Menscbbeit besorgt sei, vcroffentlicbt der „Balkan"
am 9. Juli einen bistoriscben tJberblick iiber die Ereignisse der letzten
40 Jabre, aus dem er ableitet, daG das serbiscbe VoDc in diesem Zeitraume
den furcbtbarcn Qualen der jesuitiscben Politik Osterreicb-Ungarns ausgesetzt
war. Scbliolilicb mulite Herr Erzberzog Franz Ferdinand, wie alle Sobiie
Loyolas, welcbe nur im Blutc der Menscben arbeiten und " dem Prinzipe,
„der Zweck beiligt die Mittel", buldigen, vom Scbicksal ereilt und ein
Opfer des Jesuitismus werden, wie es aucb das ganze Osterreicb-Ungarn
werden wird. Durcb den Untergang Osterreicb-Ungarns aber soil der Menscb-
beit Rube und Frieden gegeben werden. Wenn man alle diese Wabrbeiten
resumiert, dann kommt man zum Scblusse, dali Asqiiitb ruhigen Gemiits
die Todesnacbricbt batte mit den Worten begleiten konnen: ,Icb bin fiir
das Scbicksal der Menscbbeit nicbt mebr besorgt".

r) Die „Politika" vom 9. Juli fiibrt im Leitartikel unter der Uberscbrift
^Unverschamte Liigen" aus: „Die Art und Weise, wie die Untersucbung
iiber das Sarajevoer Attentat gefubrt wird, lafit offen erkennen, welcbe
2iele Osterreicb dabei verfolgt. Da die Attentater ungeacbtet aller Torturen,
denen sie ausgesetzt sind, nicbt das sagen wollen, was man von ibnen
verlangt, wurden andere Individuen ausfindig gemacbt, die sicb bereit
erklarten, unter gewissen Bedingungen eine gewisse Mitscbuld an dem

Attentate einzugestehen, zugleich aber alle jene zu beschuldigen, die
Osterreich unangenehm sind. Diese Methode ist vorlaufig gelungen, denn
die gedungenen Individuen erzahlen alles, was man von ihnen will und
die osterreichische Polizei sorgt dafiir, dafi. diese Ltigen sofort nach alien
Windrichtungen verbreitet werden. Osterreich hat ja kein Schamgefiihl
und es glaubt, dali sich jemand finden werde, der solchen Liigen Glauben
schenkt."
$)^ Die „Stampa" vom 9. sagt, es sei noch nicht alles, was sich in Bosnien
und der Herzegowina ereignet hat, aufgedeckt und in die Offentlichkeit
gedrungen! Das werde strengstens verheimlicht. Die Wahrheit werde aber
dennoch friiher oder spater an die Oberflache kommen. Das blutdiirstige
Osterreich will sich eben an serbischem Blute satt trinken und tut es auch.
Es verlautet, dali es heute ungefahr 10.000 Verwundete und Tote in
Bosnien gebe.
t) Die „Politika" vom 10. Juli richtet malilose Beleidigungen gegen Mitglieder
des Allerhochsten Kaiserhauses.

u) Das Handelsblatt „Trgovinski Glasnik" vom 10. Juli spricht von der Ver-
derbtheit und Skrupellosigkeit der osterreichisch-ungarischen Politik, die
es jesuitisch, riicksichtslos und unehrenhaft nennt. Sie sei dem serbischen
Volke in Osterreich- Ungarn eine Mahnung, daG es nicht in einem Kultur-
staate lebe, welcher Leben und Eigentum garantiere, sondern daii es stets
bereit und bewaffnet sein miisse, sich vor der Rauberei der Behorden
und der Regierung zu verteidigen. Nach den letzten Ereignissen diirfe
das serbische Volk nicht mehr wie ein Lamm warten, welches jeden Tag
abgeschlachtet werden konnte, sondern wie ein Lowe, der bereit ist zur
blutigen Abwehr.

^v) In der ^Stampa" vom 10. Juli heilit es: Nichts sei ewig und auch
Osterreich-Ungarn werde nicht ewig in Bosnien und der HerzegDwina
bleiben. Die Zeit sei nicht fern, wo die Serben, welche die Macht der
Tiirken brachen und die Bulgaren straften, um die Ivan Planina am
Trebevic kreisen werden.

id) Die „Pravda" vom 10. Juli fordert unter dem Titel „Boykott gegen die
Nichtsnutzigen" zum Boykott der osterreichischen Firmen in Belgrad sowie
der osterreichischen Waren auf und sagt, es sei Pflicht der „Narodna
odbrana", die strengste Durchfuhrung des Boykotts zu iiberwachen.

xj Der nZvono" vom 16. Juli erklart Princip als Sohn der Grafin Lonyay,
dem die Aufgabe zuteil wurde, den Tod des Kronprinzen Rudolf an
dessen Morder, Herrn Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand, zu rachen.

y) Das „Mali Journal" vom 19. Juli veroffentlicht einen Bericht, worin es heiiit:
Princip sei von einem osterreichisch-ungarischen Agenten zum Attentat

angestiftet worden. In Wien sage man, der walire Schuldige sei nur ia
der osterreicHscli-ungafisclieii Gesandtschaft in Belgrad zu finden.

t) Das fiilirende jungradikale Blatt j,Odjek" vom 20. Juli schreibt: „Osterreicli~
Ungam gibt durcli hundert Beweise kund, dafi es den Titel des kranken
Mannes in Europa erwerben will. Wahrend in Serbien nicbt ein einziger
osterreicbisclier Burger belastigt worden ist, warden in Bosnien und der
Herzegowina Dorfer und Stadte gepliindert. Diese Tatsacbe ist ein neuer
Beweis dafur, um wie viel Serbien kultxireU und moraliscb holier stebt
als Osterreich-Ungam."

67_

Beilage 10.

Der Ortsausschufi der Narodna odbrana in Nisch Qber das Attentat gegen den Herrn
Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand.

Dera k. und k. Ministerium des Aufiem ist von eiiiem verlafiliclieii
Konfidenten, dessen Name gegebenenfalls bekanntgegeben wird, eine vertrauliche*
Mitteilung zugekommen, wonacb der Ortsausscliuli der Narodna odbrana in
Niscb kijrzlich eine Sitzung abbielt, in welcber der Vorsitzende dieses Aus-
schusses, der Direktor der Niscber Strafanstalt Jasa Nenadovid, auf das gegen
den Herrn Erzberzog Franz Ferdinand verubte Attentat za sprechen kam
nnd biebei folgendes ausfiihrte.

Serbien muiite sich diesraal unbedingt eines Mittels wie das Attentat gegen den
Erzberzog Franz Ferdinand bedienen, weil eben dieser wegen seines aggresiven
"und^ exzentriscben Cbarakters eine eminente und fatale Gefabr fiir Serbien und
moglicberweise aucb fiir weitere slawiscbe Kreise bedeutete. Er batte, ware ef
am Leben geblieben, in Kiirze Serbien zum Kriege berausgefordert oder es
angegriffen, in welchem^Falle Serbien, das ja jetzt materiell so gescbwacbt und
mit seiner Armeereorganisation nocb niebt fertig ist, unbedingt verloren gewesen
ware. Nun aber ist durcb den Sarajevoer Mord Serbien gerettet und damit
einer jener aus dem Wege geraumt, die Serbien gefabrlicb sind. Serbien wird
jetzt einige Jabre lang Euhe baben, da der neue Tbronfolger es sicb "wobl
iiberlegen wird, in den Spuren seines Vorgangers zu wandeln,

Wenn er aucb wulite, so fiibrte der Redner weiter aus, daO die Ermordung
des Erzberzogs Franz Ferdinand fiir Osterreicb-Ungarn ein scbwerer Scblag und
grolier Scbmerz sein wird und daO darauf Torturen fiir unser dort lebendes Volk
folgen werden, so batte er docb nicbt gedacbt, dali seine Voraussetzungen in
solcbem Malie eintreffen und dafi die Kroaten sicb derart benebmen werden.
Hatten ibm docb seine Freunde in Bosnien und der Herzegowina aucb ver-
sicbert, daB die osterreicbiscb-ungariscben Beborden feige sind und in ihrem
Auftreten nicbt iibertreiben diirfen; leider aber batten sicb diese Freunde und
durcb sie aucb wir getauscbt. Wenn es so weiter andauert, so miissen Revolver
und Bomben erst recbt ibre wabre RoUe spielen. Was immer aucb der
serbiscbe Gott gibt, auf diese Art darf man,es nicbt weiter geben lassen.

Die Ausfubrungen des Redners fanden bei seinen Zuborem vollste
Zustimmung.

68_

Beilage 11.

NachtrMge nach SchluB des Druckes.

1. Zn Beilage 8.

Der Lehrer Cubrilovid, welcher bei Priboj die Fiihrung des Princip und
Grabez iibemalim, hat ein voiles Gestandnis abgelegt, aus dem sicb folgende
wicbtige Daten ergeben.

Im Jabre 1911 wurde Cubrilovid aus Anlali eines Sokolausfluges nach
Sabac durch Bozo Fovid, einem Vorstandsmitgliede der Narodna odbrana, in
die Ziele dieses Vereines eingeweibt und dann zum Kommissar der Narodna
odbrana in Zvornik (Bosnien) bestellt. tjber seine Einladung wurde spater
Misko Jovanovid zum Kommissar der Narodna odbrana fiir Tuzla ernannt.

Als Mittelsmann beim Verkehre mit der Narodna odbrana fungierte ein
Bauer, eben derselbe Bauer, der den iPrincip imd Grabez. mit der Mitteilung
zu. Cubrilovid brachte, er fiihre zwei serbische Studenten mit WaiFen zu ihm.
Als er dies erfuhr, babe er gewulit, dali dies eine ^Botschaft" der Narodna
odbrana sei. Princip und Grabez haben ihm gesagt, daft sie Bomben und Revolver
bei sich haben, um ein Attentat gegen den Herrn Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand
auszufiihren.

2. Monarchiefeindliche Bilder im Belgrader Kriegsministerium.

Vor. dem Empfangssaale des koniglich serbischen Kriegsministeriums be-*
finden sich an der Wand vier allegonsche Bilder, von denen drei Darstellungen
von serbischen Kriegserfolgen sind, wahrend das vierte die Verwirklichung der
monarchiefeindlichen Tendenzen Serbiens versinnbildlicht.

tJber einer Landschaft, teils Gebirge (Bosnien), teils Ebene (Siidungarn)
geht die „zora", die Morgenrote der serbischen Hoffnungen auf. Im Vorder-
grunde steht eine bewaffnete Frauengestalt, auf deren Schild die Namen aller.
„noch zu befreienden Provmzen": Bosnien, Herzegowina, Vojvodina, Syrmien,.
Dalmatien etc. stehen.

20.
Graf fierchtold an Sektionsohef Freiherrn von Macchio in Wien.

Telegramm. Lamhachy 25. Juli 1914.

Eussischer Geschaftstrager telegraphiert mir, er sei von seiner Regierung
dringend beauftragt, eine Fristerstreckung fiir das Ultimatum an Serbien zu
verlangen. Ich ersucKe Euer Exzellenz, ihm in . meinem Namen zu antworten,
daB ^ir eine Verlangerung der Frist nicht zugeben konnen. Euer Exzellenz
wollen hinzufiigen, daii Serbien ancli nach dem Abbruche der diplomatiscben
Beziebungen durcb uneing;escLLrankte Annabme unserer Forderungen eine fried-
liche Losung herbeifuhren kann, docb wiirden wir in diesem Falle genptigt
■sein, den Biickersatz aller unserer durch militarische Maiinaiimeu verursacbten
[Kosten und Scbaden von Serbien zu verlangen.

21.
Graf Berchtold an Graf Sz^pdry in St. Petersburg.

Telegramm. Bad Ischl, 25. Juli 1914.

Zu Euer Exzellenz Information und Regelung Ibrer Spracbe:

Der russiscbe Gescbaftstrager bat beute vormittag beim Herrn Ersten
Sektionscbef vorgesprocben, um im Namen seiner Regierung den Wunscb aus-.
zudriicken, daii die in unserer Note an Serbien angegebene Frist verlangert
werden moge.

Dieses Ersucben wurde darait begriindet, daJi die 'Macbte von unserem
Scbritt iiberrascbt worden seien und daO die russiscbe Regierung es als eine
natiirlicbe Rucksicbt des Wiener Kabinettes gegen die anderen Kabinette
betracbten wiirde, wenn den letzteren GelegenKeit gegeben wiirde, die Grund-
lagen unserer Mitteilung an die Macbte zu prtifen und das von uns in Aussicbt*
gestellte Dossier zu studieren.

Der Herr Erste Sektionscbef antwortete dem Herrn Gescbaftstrager, dafi er seine
Ausfiihrungen sofort zu meiner Kenntnis bringen werde; er konne ibm aber
scbon jetzt sagen, daii keine Aussicbt bestebe, daii eine Verlangerung der
angegebenen Frist von unserer Seite gewabrt wiirde. Was die Griinde
anbelange, die die russiscbe Regierung zur Erbartung des von ibr vorgebracbten
Wunscbes angefiibrt babe, so scbienen dieselben auf einer irrtumlicben

Voraussetzung za berulien. Unsere l^ote an die Machte tatte keineswegs
den Zweck verfolgt, dieselben einzuladen, ihre gegensfandliche Auffassung
bekannt zu geben, sondern nur den Charakter einer Information gehabt, die
wir als eine Pfliclit internationaler Hofliclikeit angesehen batten. Im iibrigen
betrachteten wir unsere Aktion als eine nur uns und Serbien beriihrende Ange-
legenbeit, zu der wir trotz unserer seit Jabren bekundeten Geduld und Lang-
mut durch die Entwicklung der Verhaltnisse zur Verteidigung unserer vitalsten
ilpteressen sebr gegen unseren Wunsch gezwungen worden sind.

22.

Freiherr von GiesI an Graf Berchtoid.

iTelegramm. Belgrad, 25. Juli 1914.

Ministerrat gestem abends und beute frut zusammengetreten, nach mehr-
fachen Versionen soil mir Antwort auf unsere Note noct vor Ablauf der Frist
tibergeben werden. Wie ich bore, wird Hofzug zusammengestellt; Geld der
Nationalbank und der Eisenbabn sowie die Akten des Ministeriums des Auliern
werden in das Innere des Landes gebracht. Einige meiner Kollegen sind der
AnffaSsung, daii sie der Regierung folgen miissen, speziell auf der russiscben
Gesandtscbaft wird gepackt.

Gamison bat in Feldausriistung Stadt verlassen.^ Munitionsdepots der Festung
-wurden evakuiert. Am Babnbof starker militariscber Verkebr. Die Sanitats-
kolonnen baben Belgrad in der Ricbtung nacb Siiden verlassen. In Befolgung
der mir inzwiscben zugekommenen Weisungen werden wir im Falle Abbrucbes
mit dem Zuge 6 Ubr 30 von Belgrad abreisen.

23.
Freiherr von GiesI an Graf Berchtoid.

Telegramm. Semlin, 25. Juli 1914.

Um 3 Ubr nacbmittags wurde in Serbien die aUgemeine Mobilisierung
angeordnet.

24.

Freiherr von CilesI an Graf Berchtold.

Telegramm. Semlin, 25. Juli 1914^

Ich habe infolge raigeniigender Antwort der kbniglich serbischen Regierung|

auf unsere am 23. 1. M. gestellten Fordemngen die diplomatiscben Beziebimgeiii

mit Serbien fiir abgebrocben erklart und mil Personal der Gesandtscbaft Belgrad^

verlassen.

Die Antwortuote wnrde mir 2 Minuten vor 6 Uhr abends iibergeben.

25.
Note der kSniglich serbischen Regierung vom 12./25. Juli 1914,

Le Gouvemement Royal serbe a recu la communication du Gouvernement
Imperial et Royal du 10 de ce mois et i] est persuade que sa r^ponse 61oignera
tout malentendu qui menace de gater les bons rapports de voisinage entre la
Monarcbie austro-bongroise et le Royaume de Serbie.

Le Gouvernement Royal est conscient que les protestations qui ont apparu
tant k la tribune de la Skoupcbtina Nationale que dans les declarations et les'
actes des repr6sentants responsables de I'.Etat, protestations qui furent couples
court par la declaration du Gouvemement serbe faite le 18 mars 1909, ne se
sont plus renouvel^es vis-k-vis la grande Monarcbie voisine, en aucune occasion,
et que depuis ce temps, aufcant de la part des Gouvernements Royaux qui. se
sont succ6des, que de la part de leurs organes aucune tentative n'a 6t6 faite,
dans le but de cbanger I'^tat de cbose politique et juridique cr66 en Bosnie-
Herc6govine. Le Gouvernement Royal constate que sous ce rapport le Gou-
vernement Imperial et Royal n'a fait aucune representation sauf en ce qui
concerne un livre scolaire, et au sujet de laquelle le Gouvemement L et R. a
;Te9u une explication enti^rement satisfaisante. La Serbie a de nombreuses fois
donn6 des preuves de sa politique pacifiste et moder^e pendant la dur^e de la
crise balcanique et c'est gri,ce a la Serbie et au sacrifice qu'elle a fait dans
I'interet exclusif de la paix europeenne que cette paix a ete pr^serv^e.

Le Gouvernement Royal ne peut pas ^tre rendu responsable pour des
manifestations d'un caract^re priv^ telle que les articles des journaux et le
travail paisible des societ^s, manifestations qui se produisent dans presque tous
les pays comme une cbose ordinaire et qui ecbappent enr^gle gen6rale au
controle officiel. D'autant moins que le Gouvernement Royal, lors de la solution
de toute une s^rie de questions qui se sont presentees entre la Serbie et

rAutriche-Hongrie a montr6 une grande provenance et a r6nssi de cette faQon
k en rOgler le plus grand nombre au profit du progr^s des deux pays voisins.

C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement Royal a 6t6 pOniblement surpris par les
affirmations d'apr^s lesquelles des personnes du Royaume de Serbie auraient
particip6 a la preparation de I'attentat commis h Saraievo. U s'attendait a ce
qu'il soit invito k collaborer a la recberclie de tout ce qui se rapporte h. ce
crime et il etait pret, pour prouver par des actes son enti^re correction, a agir
centre toutes les personnes a I'Ogard desquelles des communications lui seraient faites.

Se rendant done au dOsir du Gouvernement I. et R., le Gouvernement
Royal est disposO a remettre au tribunal tout sujet serbe, sans 6gard h aa
situation et a son rang pour la complicity duqu^l dans le crime de Saraievo
des preuves lui seraient fournies et spOcialement il s'engage h faire publier a la
premiere page du Journal Officiel en date du 13/26 juillet I'Ononciation suivante;

„Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie condamne toute propagande qui serait
dirigOe contre I'Autriclie-Hongrie c'est k dire I'ensemble des tendances qui
aspirent en dernier lieu a dOtacber de la Monarcbie austro-bongroise des terri-
toires qui en font partie, et il deplore sinc^rement les consequences funestes
de ces agissement criminels."

„Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que certains officiers et fonctionnaires
serbes aient particip6, d'aprOs la communication du Gouvernement I. et R., h la
propagande susmentionnOe et compromis par \h les relations de bon voisinage
auxquelles le Gouvernement Royal s'Otait solennellement engagO par sa decla-
ration du 31 mars 1909."

„Le Gouvernement, qui dOsapprouve et rOpudie toute idOe ou tentative
d'une immixtion dans les destinies des habitants de quelque partie de I'Autricbe-,
Hongrie que ce soit, considfere de son devoir d'avertir formeUement les officiers,
les fonctionnaires et toute la population du Royaume que dorOnavant il procOdera
avec la derni^re rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables d&
pareils agissements, agissements qu'il mettra tons ses efforts k prOvenir et k
rOprimer."

Cette Ononciation sera port6e a la connaissance de I'Annee Royale par un
ordre dn jour au nom de Sa MajestO le Roi, par son Altesse Royale le Prince'
Heritier Alexandre et sera publiOe dans le procbain bulletin officiel de rArmOe.

Le Gouvernement Royal s'engage en outre:

1" d'introduire k sa premiere convocation rOguli^re de la' Skoupcbtina, une
disposition dans la loi de la Presse par laquelle sera punie de la maniere la
plus sOv^re la provocation k la haine et au mOpris de la Monarcbie austro-
bongroise ainsi que contre toute publication dont la tendance gOnOrale serait
dirigOe contre I'integrite territoriale de I'Autricbe-Hongrie. II se cbarge lors de
la revision de la Constitution qui est procbaine, k faire introduire dans
I'article XXII de la Constitution un amen dement de telle sorte que les public

cations ci-dessus puissent 6tre confisqu6es, ce qui actaellement aux termes
cat^goriques de Tarticle XE de la Constitution est impossible.

20 Le Gouvernement ne poss^de aucune preuve — et la note du Gouver-
nement I. et R ne lui en fournit non plus aucune — que la soci6t6 „Narddna-
Odbrana" et autres soci^t^s similaires aient commis jusqu'5, ce jour quelque'
acte criihinel de ce genre par le fait d'un de leurs membres. N^anmoins le
Gouvernement Royal acceptera la demande du Gouvernement I. et R. et dissoudra
la soci6t6 „Narodna Odbrana" et toute autre soci6t6 qui agirait contre I'Autriche-;
Hongrie.

3* Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'engage k 6liminer sans d^lai de
rinstruction publique en Serbie tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir h. fermenter
la propagande contre I'Autriclie-Hongrie, quand le Gouvernement I. et R. lui
fournira des faits.et des preuves, de cette propagande.

40 Le Gouvernement Royial accepte de meme h eloigner du service mili-
taire et de I'administration les officiers et fonctionnaires pour lesquels I'enquete
judiciaire aura prouv6 qu'ils sont coupables, d'actes dirig^s contre I'int^grit^ du
territoire de la Monarchic austro-hongroise et il attend que le Gouvernement
I. et R. lui communique ultdrieurement les noms et les faits de ces officiers et'
fonctionnaires aux fins de la procedure qui doit s'ensuivre.

5" Le Gouvernement Royal doit avouer qu'il ne se rend pas clairement
compte du sens et de la port6e de la demande du Gouvernement L et R. que
la Serbie s'engage h accepter sur son territoire la collaboration des organes du
Gouvernement I. et R., mais il declare qu'il admettra la collaboration qui
repondrait aux principes du droit international et a la procedure criminelle,'
ainsi qu'aux bons rapports de voisinage.

6" Le Gouvernement Royal — cela va de soi — consid^re de son devoir
d'ouvrir une enquete contre qui sont ou qui ^ventuellement auraient 6t6 mel6s
au complot du 15/28 juin et qui se trouveraient sur le territoire du Royaume.
<^uant a la participation de cette enquete des organes des autorit^s austro-
hongroises, qui seraient d^l6gu6s h cet effet par le Gouvernement L et R. lei
Gouvernement Royal ne pent pas I'accepter, car ce serait une violation de la
Gonstitution et de la loi sur la procedure criminelle. Cependant dans des cas
concrets des communications sur les r^sultats de I'instruction en question
pourraient etre donn^es aux organes austro-hongrois.

7 " Le Gouvernement Royal a fait proc6der dhs le soir meme de la remise
de la note k I'arrestation du Comandant Voislav Tankositch.

Quant a Milan Ziganovitcb qui est sujet de la Monarcbie austro-bongrpise
et qui jusqu'au 15 juin 6tait employ^ (comme aspirant) h. la direction des
cbemins de fer, il n'a pas pu encore etre d6couvert et un mandat d'amener a 6t6
lanc6 contre lui. Le Gouvernement L et R. est pri^ de vouloir bien dans la forme

accoutum6e faire connattre le plus tot possible les pr6somptions de culpability ainsi
que les preuves 6ventuelles de leur culpability qui ont 6t6 recueillies jusqu'5, ce jour
pai- rinstruction a SaraieVo aux fins d'enquete ult^rieure.

80 Le . Gouvemement serbe renforcera et 6tendra les mesures prises pour
empecher le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs k travers la fronti^re.

II va de soi qu'il ordonnera de suite une enquete et punira s^verement
les fonctionnaires des fronti^res sur la ligne Sabad — Loznica, qui ont manqu6
leurs devoirs et laiss6 passer les auteurs du crime de SaraYevo.

90 Le Gouvemement Royal donnera volontiers des explications sur les propos
que ses fonctionnaires tant en Serbie qu'a r6tranger ont tenus apres I'attentat dans
des interviews et qui, d'apres I'affirmation du Gouvemement L et E,., ont 6t6
hostiles envers la Monarcbie d^s que le Gouvemement l/et R. lui aura indiqu6
les passages en question de ces propos et des qu'il aura d^montr^ que les propos
employ6s ont en effet dte tenus par lesdits fonctionnaires, au sujet de quoi le
Gouvemement Royal lui-meme aura soin de recueillir des preuves et con-
■victions.

lOo Le Gouvemement Royal informera le Gouvemiement I. et R. de I'exdcu-
tion des mesures comprises dans les points pr6c6dents, en tant que oela n'a pas
6t6 d6ja fait par la presente note, aussitot que chaque mesure aura 6t6 ordonn6e
et ex6cut6e.

Bans le cas ou le Gouvemement L et R. ne serait pas satisfait de cette
r^ponse, le Gouvemement Royal serbe, consid6rant qu'il est de I'int^ret
commun de ne pas precipiter la solution de cette question, est pret comme
toujours d'accepter une entente pacifique, soit en remettant cette question k la
decision du Tribunal International de la Haye soit aux Grandes Puissances qui
ont pris part h I'^laboration de la declaration que le Gouvemement serbe a faite
le 18/31 mars 1909.

26.
Graf Berclitold an Graf Sz^p^ry in St. Petersburg.

Wien, 25. Juli 1914.

In dem Augenblicke, wo wir uns zu einem ernsten Vorgehen gegen
Serbien entschlossen haben, sind wir uns naturlich auch der Moglichkeit eines
sich aus der serbiscben Differenz entwickelnden Zusammenstolies mit RuOland
bewuGt gewesen. Wir konnten uns aber durch diese Eventualitat nicbt in unserer
SteUungnahme gegeniiber Serbien beirren lassen, weil grundlegende staats-
politische Konsiderationen uns vor die Notwendigkeit stellten, der Situation ein
Ende zu machen, daft ein russiscber Freibrief Serbien die dauernde, ungestrafte
uijid unstrafbare Bedrohung der Monarchie ermogliche.

Fiir den Fall, als Rufiland den Moment fiir die grolie Abrechnung mit den
europaischen Zentralmachten bereits fiir gekommen erachten sollte und daber
von vorneberein zum Krieg entscblossen ware, erscbeint allerdings nacbstebende
Instraierung Euer Exzellenz iiberfliissig.

Es ware aber immerbin denkbar, dafi Ruliland, nacb der eventuellen Ab-
lebnung unserer Fordeningen durcb Serbien und angesicbts der sicb fiir uns
ergebenden Notwendigkeit* eines bewaffneten Vorgebens, mit sicb selbst zu Rate
ginge und daft es sogar gewillt sein konnte, sicb von den kriegslustigen
Elementen nicbt mitreilien zu lassen.

Dieser Situation sind die nacbfolgenden Darlegungen angepafit, die Euer
Exzellenz im gegebenen Moment und in der Ibnen geeignet erscbeinendeu
Weise und nacb der von Ibnen zu ermessenden Opportunitat bei Herrn Sazonow-
und dem Herrn Ministerprasidenten verwerten woUen:

Icb setze im allgemeine'n voraus, daO Euer Exzellenz unter den gegen-
wartigen Verbaltnissen ein enges Einvernebmen mit Ibrem deutscben Kollegen
hergestellt baben, der seitens seiner Regierung gewiii beauftragt worden sein
diirfte, der russiscben Regierung keinen Zweifel dariiber zu lassen, daO Oster-
reicb-Ungarn im Falle eines Konfliktes mit Rufiland nicbt allein steben wiirde.

Dariiber gebe icb micb keiner EQusion bin, daJi es nicbt leicbt sein wird,
fiir unseren unvermeidlicb gewordenen Scbritt in Belgrad bei Herrn Sazonow
Versfandnis zu finden.

Es gibt aber ein Moment, das seiifen Eindruck auf den russiscben Minister
des Auliem nicbt verfeblen kann und das ist die Betonung des Umstandes, dafi
die osterreicRiscb-ungariscbe Monarcbie, dem von ibr seit Jabrzenten fest-
gebaltenen Grundsatze entsprecbend, aucb in der gegenwartigen Ej-ise und bei
der bewaffneten Austragung des Gegensatzes zu Serbien keinerlei eigenniitzige
Motive verfolgt.

Die Monarcbie ist territorial saturiert und tragt nacb serbiscbem Besitz
kein Verlangen. Wenn der Kampf mit Serbien uns aufgezwungen wird, so
wird dies fiir uns kein Kampf um territorialen Gewinn, sondern lediglicb ein.
Mittel der Selbstverteidung und Selbsterbaltung sein.

Der Inbalt des Zirkularerlasses, der an sicb scbon beredt genug ist, -mid
in das recbte Licbt geriickt durcb das Dossier iiber die serbiscbe Propaganda
gegen die Monarcbie und die Zusamraenbange, die zwiscben dieser Propaganda*
und dem Attentat vom 28. Juni besteben.

Auf dieses Dossier wollen Euer Exzellenz die Aufmerksamkeit des Herrn
russiscben Ministers ganz spcziell lenken und dartun, es sei eine in der Ge-
scbicbte singulare Erscbeinung, daii eine Grollmacbt die aufriibreriscben
Umtriebe eines angrpnzenden kleinen Staates durcb so lange Zeit mit so beispielr
loser Lan'gmut geduldet batte wie Osterreicb-Ungarn jene Serbiens. ,

Wir wollten keine Politik gegen das Aufstreben der christlichen Balkan-
staaten machen und haben daher — trotzdem uns der geringe Wert serbischer
Versprechungen bekannt war — nach der Annexionskrise vom Jabre 1908 zu-
gelassen, daft sich Serbien beinabe um das Doppelte vergrofiere.

Seitdem hat die subversive Bewegung, die in Serbien gegen die Monarchie
genahrt wird, so exzessive Formen angenommen, dali die Lebensinteressen
Osterreich-Ungarns und selbst unsere Dynastie durch die serbische Wiihlarbeit
bedroht erscheinen,

Wir miissen annehmen, dafi das konservative, kaisertreue Rutland ein
energisches Vorgehen unsererseits gegen diese Bedrohung aller staatlichen Ord-
nung begreiflicb nnd sogar notwendig finden wird.

Wenn Euer Exzellenz in Ihrem Gespracb mit Herrn Sazonow an diesem
Punkte angelangt sein werden", wird der Moment gekommen sein, an die Auf-
stellung unserer Beweggriinde und Absichten den Hinweis zu kniipfen, dafi wir
zwar - — ^vie Euer Exzellenz bereits in der Lage gewesen waren darzulegen —
keinen territorialen Gewinn anstreben und auch die Souveranitat des Konig-
reiches nicbt anzutasten gedachten, dafi wir aber andererseits zur Durchsetzung
unserer Forderungen bis zum AuCersten gehen wiirden.

Dafi wir bisher, soweit es an uns lag, bestrebt waren, den Frieden zu er-
halten, den auch wir als das kostbarstc Gut der Volker betrachten, zeige der
Verlauf der letzten 40 Jahre und die geschichtliche Tatsache, dafi unser Aller-
gnadigster Herr Sich den glorreichen Namen eines Hiiters des Friedens er-
worben hat.

Wir wiirden eine Storung des euiopaischen Friedens schon deshalb auf
das lebhafteste bedauern, weil wir stets der Ansicht waren, dafi das Erstaiken
der Balkanstaaten zur staatlichen und politischen Selbsfandigkeit unseren Bezie-
hungen zu Rufiland zum Vorteil gereichen wiirde, auch alle Moglichkeit eines
Gegensatzes zwischen uns und I^ufiland beseitigen wiirde und well wir'immer
bereit waren, die grofien politischen Interessen Rufilands bei unserer eigenen
politischen Orientierung zu beriicksichtigen.

Eine weitere Duldung der serbischen Umtriebe wiirde unsere staatliche Exi-
stenz untergraben und unseren Bestand als Grofimacht, daher auch das europaische
Gleichgewicht, in Frage stellen. Wir sind aber Uberzeugt, dafi es Rulilands
eigenstes, von seinen friedlichen Staatsleitern wohlverstandenes Interesse ist, dafi
das gegenwartige europaische, fiir den Weltfrieden so nutzliche Gleichgewicht
erhalten bleibe. Unsere Aktion gegen Serbien, in welcher .Form immer sie
erfolgt, ist eine durchaus konservative und ihr Zweck die notwendige Erhaltung
unserer europaischen Stellung.

27.
Graf Berchtold an Graf Szdp^ry in St. Petersburg.

Telegram m. Wien, 25. JuU 1914,

Da Punkt 5 iinserer Forderungen, namlich die Beteiligung von k. u. k.
Funktionaren bei der Unterdriickung der subversiven Bewegung in Serbien,
besonderen Widersprucb Herrn Sazonows hervorgerufen, wollen Euer Exzellenz
sich iiber diesen Punkt streng vertraulich dabin auliern, daft dessen Einscbaltung
lediglich praktischen Riicksicbten entsprang und keineswegs der Absicbt, die
Souveranitat Serbiens zu tangieren. Wir denken bei Punkt 5 „ collaboration"
an die Errichtung eines gebeimen „ bureau de surety" in Belgrad, welches nach
Art der analogen russiscben Einrichtungen in Paris funktionieren und mit der.
.serbischen Polizei und Verwaltungsbeborde kooperieren wiirde.

28.
Graf Sz^p^ry an Graf Berchtold.

Telegramm. St. Petersburg, 26. Jnli 1914.

Aus AnlaO von Geriichten iiber russische Mobilisierungsmafinahmen hat Graf
Pourtal^s den russiscben Minister in der ernstesten Weise darauf aufmerksam
gemacht, dali heutzutage Mobilisierungsmafinahmen als diplomatisches Druck-
mittel hochst gefahL-licb seien. Denn in diesem Falle gelange die rein militarische
Erwagung der Generalstabe zum Wort und wenn in Deutschland einmal auf
den Knopf gedriickt werde, sei die Sache unaufhaltsam. Herr Sazonow ver-
sicherte dem deutschen Botschafter unter Ehrenwort, dafi die beziiglichen
Geriichte unrichtig seien, dali bisber kein Pferd und kein Reservist eingezogen
sei und daft es sich lediglich um vorbereitende Maftnahmen in den Militar-
bezirken Kiew und Odessa, vielleicbt Kasan und Moskau handle.

Unmittelbar nachber erhielt der kaiserlich deutsche Militarattach6 per Kurier
spat abend eine Einladung zu Kriegsminister Suchomlinow, welcher sich darauf
berief, daft Graf Pourtales dem Minister dcs Auftern iiber die russiscben
Riistungen gesprochen babe und da der Botschafter einzelne militarische Details
miftverstanden haben konnte, nehme er Gelegenheit, ihn ausfiihrlicher zu
informieren. In folgendem mir zur Verfiigung gestellten Telegramm des Grafen
Pourtales nach Berlin sind die diesfalligen Mitteilungen des Majors von Eggeling
ztisammengefaftt :

Milifarattach^ meldet iiber Gespracb mit russischem Kriegsminister: Herr
Sazonow hat ihn gebeten, mich iiber militarische Lage aufzuklaren. Der Herr
Kriegsminister gab mir sein Ehrenwort, daft noch keinerlei Mobilmachungsordre
ergangen sei. Vorlaufig wurden lediglich vorbereitende Maftnahmen getroffen,
kein Pferd ausgehoben, kein Reservist eingezogen. Wenn Osterreich serbische

Grenze ubcrsclu'eitc, werden aaf Osterreich gerichtete Militarbe/irke Kiew,
Odessa, Moskau, Kasan mobilisiert. Unter keinen Umstanden an deutscher Front,
Warschau, Wilna, St. Petersburg. Man wiinscht dringend Frieden mit Deutschland.
Anf meine Frage, zu welchem Zweck die Mobilisierung gegen Osterreich, Acbsel-
zucken und Hinweis auf Diplomaten. Sprach dem Herrn Minister aus, daO man
bei uns Wiirdigung fur freundschaftliche Absicht zeigen, aber auch Mobil-
machung gegen Osten-eich allein als sehr bedrohlicb ansehen werde. Herr
Minister betonte nachdriicklichst und wiederholt dringendes Bediirfnis und
Wunscb auf Frieden.

29.
Graf Berchtold an Graf Mensdorff in London.

Telegramm. Wien, 26. Juli 1914.

Herr von Tschirschky teilte mir auftraggemaii heute mit, laut eines in
London am 25. d. M., 3 Uhr nachmittags, aufgegebenen Telegrammes des
Fiirsten Lichnowsky habe Sir E. Grey diesem die Skizze einer Antwortnote
Serbiens iibersendet und in dem begleitenden Privatschreiben bemerkt, daft er
hoffe, das Berliner Kabinett wiirde sich angesichts des versohnlichen Tenors
dieser Antwort in Wien fiir deren Annahme verwenden.

Ich halte es fiir angezeigt, daft Euer E.Kzellenz dem Herrn Staatssekretar gegen-
iiber auf die Sache zurlickkommen und ihn darauf aufmerksam machen, daii fast
zur selben Zeit, als er dieses Schreiben an Fiirst Lichnowsky richtete, namlich
gestern um 3 Uhr nachmittags, Serbien bereits die allgemeine Mobilisierung
seiner Arme angeordnet hat, was beweist, daft in Belgrad zu einer friedlichen
Austragxmg der Sache keine Neigung bestand. Die tjberreichung der, wie es
scheint, schon vorher nach London telegraphierten Antwort an den k. und k.
Gesandten in Belgrad fand mit einem unseren Forderungen nicht entsprechenden
Inhalte erst um 6 Uhr nach erfolgter Ausschreibung der Mobilisierung statt.

30.

Graf Berchtold an die k. u. k. Botschafter in Berlin^ Rom, London, Paris und

St. Petersburg.

Telegramm. Wien, 26. Juli 1914.

Wir haben, nachdem Serbien die von uns aufgesteUten Forderungen ab-
gelehnt hat, die diplomatischen Beziehungen zu diesem Lande abgebrochfsn.

Ich ersuche Euer Exzellenz nunmehr, sich sofort zum Herrn Minister des
Auftern oder dessen Stellvertreter zu begeben und sich ihm gegeniiber beilaufig
in folgender Weise auszusprechen :

Die koniglich serbische Regierung hat es abgelehnt, die Forderungen, welche
wir zur dauernden Sicherung unserer von ihr bedrohten vitalsten Interessen an
sie stellen muliten, zu erfiillen, womit sie bekundet hat, dali sie ihre sub-
versiyen, auf die stete Beanruhigung einiger unserer Grenzgebiete und ihre
schliefiliche Lostrennung aus dem Gefiige der Monarchie gerichteten Bestre-
bungen aufzugeben, nicht willens sei.

Zu unserem Bedauern und sehr gegen unseren Willen sind wir dadurch
in die Notwendigkeit versetzt worden, Serbien durch die scharfsten Mittel zu
einer grundsatzlichen Anderung seiner . bisherigen feindseligen Haltung zu
zwingen.

31.
Graf Sz^p^ry an Graf Berchtold.

Telegramm. St Petersburg, 27. Juli 1914.

Soeben lange Unterredung mit Herrn Sazonow gehabt, Sagte dem Herrn
Minister, ich hatte den Eindruck, daft man iiber den Charakter unserer Aktion
in Rufiland in Irrtiimern befangen sei. Man imputiere uns, hiemit einen Vorstoii
auf den Balkan unternehmen und den Marsch nach Salonich oder gar nach
Konstantinopel antreten zu wollen. Andere wieder gingen so weit, unsere Aktion
nur als den Auftakt eines Praventivkrieges gegen Ruliland zu bezeichnen. All
dies sei irrig, zum Telle geradezu unverniinftig. Das Ziel unserer Aktion sei
Selbsterhaltung und Notwehr gegeniiber einer feindseligen, unsere Integritat
bedrohenden Propaganda des Wortes, der Schrift und der Tat. Niemandem in
Osterreich-Ungarn falle es ein, russische Interessen bedrohen oder gar Handel
mit Ruliland suchen zu wollen. Das Ziel jedoch, das wir uns vorgesetzt, seien
wir unbedingt entschlossen zu erreichen und der Weg, den wir gewahlt hatten,
schien uns der zweckdienlichste. Da es sich aber um eine Aktion der Notwehr
handle, konne ich ihm nicht verhehlen, daO man sich bei einer solchen durch
gar keine wie immer gearteten Konsequenzen beirren lassen konne.

Herr Sazonow stimmte mir bei. Unser Ziel, wie ich es ihm geschildert
habe, sei ein voUkomraen legitimes, aber er meine, der Weg, den wir zu dessen
Erreichung verfolgen, sei nicht der sicherste. Die Note, die wir iiberreicht hatten,
sei in der Form nicht glucklich. Er habe sie seitdem studiert und wenn ich
Zeit hatte, mochte er sie nochmals mit mir durchschauen. Ich bemerkte, dali
ich zu • seiner Disposition sei, aber weder autorisiert sei, den Notentext mit ihm
zu diskutieren, noch denselben zu in'terpretieren. Seine Bemerkungen seien aber
natiirlich von Interesse. Der Herr Minister nahm sodann alle Punkte der Note
durch und fand heute von den zehn Punkten sieben ohne allzu grolie Schwierig-
keiten annehmbar, nur die zwei Punkte, betreffend die Mitwirkung von k. u. k.

80-

Funktionaren in Serbien und den Punkt, betreffend die Entlassiing von unsersoits
zu bezeicbnenden Offizieren und Bcamten, fand er in diesei- Form unannehmbar.
Beziiarlicb der beiden ersten Punkte war icb in der Lagre eine authentische
Interpretation im Sinne Euer Exzellenz Telegjammes vom 25. d. M. zu geben,
beziiglicb des dritten meintc ich, daft er eine notwendige Forderang sei.
Ubrigens seien die Dinge im Rollen. Die Serben hatten schon gestern mobili-
siert und was sicb seither noch ereignet babe, sei rair unbekannt.

32.
Graf Berchtold an Graf Szdpdry in St. Petersburg.

Telegramm. Wien, 27. Juli 1914.

Icb ermacbtige Euer Exzellenz, Herrn SazonoW gegeniiber sicb dabin aus-
zusprecben, daJi, solange der Krieg z^viscben Ostcrreicb-Ungarn und Serbien
lokalisiert bleibe, die Monarcbie irgendwelcbe tewitoriale Eroberungen keineswegs
beabsichtige.

33.
Graf Szogy^ny an Graf Berchtold.

Telegramm. Berlin, 27. Juli 1914.

Herr Sazonow erklarte dem deutscben Botscbaftor, er konne ibm „garan-
tieren, dafi russiscberseits keine Mobilisierung vorgenommen worden sei; aller-
dings waren gewisse notwendigste militariscbe Vorsorgen getroffen."

Deutscber Militarattacb6 in St. Petersburg meldet, dafi „russiscber Kriegs-
minister ibm sein Ebrenwort gegeben babe, dafi nicbt ein Mann, nocb ein Pferd
mobilisiert sei; docb seien natiirlicberweise gewisse militariscbe Vorsorgen
getroffen worden"; Vorsorgen, die, wie der deutscbe Militarattacb6 seiner Meldung
als von sicb aus binzufiigt, „allerdings ziembcb weitgehend seien."

34.

Graf Berchtold an die k. u. k. Botschafter in Berlin, Rom, London, Paris

und St. Petersburg.

Wien, 27. Jnli 1914.

In der Anlage erbalten Euer — den mit unseren Bemerkungen versebenen
Text der Note, welcbe die koniglicb serbiscbe Regierung unterm 25. 1. M. an
den k. u. k. Gesandten in Belgrad gericbtet bat.

Beilagc.

Note der kbnigl. serbischen Regierung an die k. und k. Regierung vom 12./25. Juli

1914.

Ubersetzung.

Die konigl. serbiscLe Regierung hat
die Mitteilung der k. und k. Regierung
vom 10. d. M. erhalten und ist iiber-
zeugt, daO ihre Antwort jedes Mifiver-
standnis zerstreuen wird, welches die
frcundnachbarJichen Beziehungen zwi-
schen der osterreichisch-ungarischen Mon-
archie und dcm Konigreiche Serbien
zu storen droht.

Die konigliche Regierung ist sich
bewuftt, daO der grofien Nachbarmon-
archie gegeniiber bei keinem Anlasse
jcne Proteste erneuert wurden, die.
seinerzeit sowohl in der Skupschtina,
als auch in Erklarungen und Hand-
lungen der verantwortlichen Vertreter
des Staates zum Ausdrucke gebracht
wurden und die dui'ch die Erklarung
der serbischen Regierung vom 18. Miirz
1909 ihren Abschluli gefunden haben,
sowie weiters, daft seit jener Zeit weder
von den verschiedenen einander folgen-
den Regierungen des Konigreiches, noch
von deren Organen der Versuch unter-
nommcn wurde, den in Bosnien und
der Herzegowina geschaffenen politischen
und rechtlichen Zustand zu andern. Die
konigliche , Regierung stellt fest, dali
die k. und k. Regierung in dieser Rich-
tung keinerlei Vorstellungen erhoben
hat, abgesehen von dem Falle eines
Lchrhuches, hinsichtlich dessen die

Annierkangen.

Die konigl. serbische Regierung
beschrankt sich darauf festzustellen, dali
seit Abgabe der Erklarung vom 18. Marz
1909 von Seite der serbischen Regie-
rung und ihrer Organe kein Versuch
zur Anderung der Stellung Bosniens
und der Herzegowina unternommen
wurde.

Damit verschiebt sie in bewulit will-
kurlicher Weise die Grundlagen unserer
Demarche, da wir nicht die Behauptung
aufgestellt haben, dali sie und ihre Or-
gane in dieser Richtung offiziell irgend
etwas untemomnjen hatten,

UnserGravamengehtvielmehrdahin,
dafi sie es trotz der in der zitierten Note
iibemommenen Verpflichtungen unter-
lassen hat, die gegen die territoriale
Integritat der Monarchic gerichtete Be-
wegung zu unterdriicken.

Ihre Verpflichtung bestand also
darin, die ganze Richtung ihrer Politik
zu andern und zur ostcrreichisch-unga-

k. and k. Regierung eine vollkommen be-
friedigende Aufklarung erKalten hat.
Serbien bat wabrend der Dauer der
Balkankrise in zablreicben Fallen Be-
■weise fiir seine pazifistiscbe und ge-
maliigte Politik geliefert und es ist nur
Serbien und den Opfem, die es aus-
scblielilicb im Interesse des europaiscben
Friedens gebracbt bat, zu danken, wenn
dieser Friede erbalten geblieben ist.

Die koniglicbe Regierung kann
nicbt fiir AuGerungen piivaten Cbarakters
verantwortlicb gemacbt werden, wie es
Zeitungsai-tikel und die friedlicbe Arbeit
von Gesellscbaften ist, Auiierungen, die
fast in alien Landern ganz gewobnlicbe
Erscbeinungen sind und die sicb im
allgemeinen der staatlicben KontroUe
entzieben. Dies umsoweniger, els die
koniglicbe Regierung bei der Losung
einer ganzen Reibe von Fragen, die
zwiscben Serbien und Osterreicb-Ungam
aufgetaucbt waren, grolies Entgegen-
kommen bewiesen bat, wodurcb es ibr
gelungen ist, deren grolieren Teil zu-
gunsten des Fortscbrittes der bei den
Nacbbarlander zu losen.

Die koniglicbe Regierung war des-
balb durcb die Bebauptungen, dali An-
geborige Serbiens an der Vorbereitung
des in Sarajevo veriibten Attentates teil-
genommen batten, scbmerzlicb iiber-
rascbt. Sie batte erwartet, zur Mit-
wirkung bei den Nacbforscbungen iiber
dieses Verbrecben eingeladen zu werden
und war bereit, um ibre voile Korrekt-
heit durcb Taten zu beweisen, gegen
alle Personen vorzugeben, binsicbtlicb

riscben Monarcbie in ein freundnacb-'
barlicbes Verbaltnis zu treten, nicbt
blofi die Zugeborigkeit Bosniens zur
Monarcbie offiziell nicbt anzutasten.

Die Bebauptung der konigl. serbi-
scben Regierung, dali die Aulierangen
der Presse und die Tatigkeit von Yer-
einen privaten Cbarakter baben und sicb
der staatlicben KontroUe entzieben, stebt
im vollen Widersprucbe zu den Einricb-
tungen modemer Staaten, selbst der
freibeitlicbsten Ricbtung auf dem Ge-
biete des Preli- und Vereinsrecbtes, das
einen ofifentlicb recbtlicben Cbarakter
bat und Presse sowie Vereine der ^taat^
licben Aufsicbt unterstellt. tJbrigens
seben aucb die serbiscben Einricbtungen
eine solcbe Aufsicbt vor. Der gegen die
serbiscbe Regierung erbobene Vorwurf
gebt eben dabin, daO sie es ganzlicb
unterlassen bat, ibre Presse und ibre
Vereine zu beaufsicbtigen, deren Wir-
ken im monarcbiefeindlicben Sinne sie
kannte.

Diese Bebauptung ist unricbtig; die
serbiscbe Regierung war iiber den gegen
ganz bestimmte Personen bestebenden
Verdacbt genau unterricbtet und nicbt
nur in der Lage, sondem aucb nacb
ibren internen Gesetzeo verpflicbtet,

welpher ihr Mittellungen ztigekommen
waren.

Den Wiinschen der k. and k. Re-

^ierung entsprechend, ist die konigliclie
iRegierung somit bereit, dem Gerichte
iohne Riicksicht auf Stellung und Rang
jeden serbischen Staatsangeborigen zu
iibergeben, ftir dessen Teilnabme an
dem Sarajevoer Verbrecben ibr Beweise
geliefert werden sollten; gie verpflicbtet
sicb insbesondere auf der ersten Seite
des Amtsblattes vom 13./26. Juli fol-
gende Enunziation zu veroffentlicben:
„Die konigl. serbiscbe Regierung
verurteilt jede Propaganda, die gegen
Osterreicb-Ungam gericbtet sein sollte,
d. b. die Gesamtbeit der Bestrebungen,
die in letzter Linie auf die Losreiliung
einzelner Gebiete von der osterreicbiscb-
ungariscben Monarcbie abzielen und
sie bedauert aufricbtig die traurigen
Folgen dieser verbrecberiscben Macben-
scbaften.

Die koniglicbe Regierung bedauert,
dali laut der Mitteilung der k. und k.
Regierung gewisse serbiscbe Offiziere
und Funktionare an der eben genannten
Propaganda mitgewirkt und dafi diese
damit die freundnacbbarlicben Bezie-
bungen gefabrdet batten, zu deren
Beobacbtung sicb die koniglicbe Re-
gierung durcb die Erklarung vom

ganz spontan Erbebungen einzuleiten.
Sie bat in dieser Ricbtung gar nicbts
untemommen. ,

Unsere Forderung lautete:

„Die konigb serbiscbe Regierung
verurteilt die gegen Osterreicb-Ungarn
gericbtete Propaganda ..."

Die von der konigl. serbiscben
Regierung vorgenommene Anderung der
von uns geforderten Erklarung will
sagen, dali eine solcbe gegen Osterreicb-
Ungarn gericbtete Propaganda nicbt be-
stebt oder dafi ibr eine solcbe nicbt
bekannt ist. Diese Formel ist unauf-
ricbtig und binterbaltig, da sicb die
serbiscbe Regierung damit fiir spater
die Ausflucbt reserviert, sie batte die
derzeit bestebende Propaganda durcb
diese Erklarung nicbt desavouiert und
nicbt als monarcbiefeindlicb anerkannt,
woraus sie weiter ableiten konnte, dafi
sie zur Unterdriickung einer der jetzigen
Propaganda gleicben nicbt verpflicbtet sei.

Die von uns geforderte Formulie-
rung lautete:

„Die koniglicbe Regierung bedauert,
dali serbiscbe Offiziere und Funktionare
mitgewirkt baben "

Aucb mit dieser Formulierung und
dem weiteren Beisatze „laut der Mit-
teilung der k. und k. Regierung" ver-
folgt die serbiscbe Regierung den bereits

31. Marz 1909 feierlich verpflichtet
hatte.

j,Die Eegierung * gleichlaatend

mit dem geforderten Texte.

Die konigliche Regierung ver-
pflichtet sich welters:

1. Anlaiilich des nachsten ord-
nungsmafiigen Zusammentrittes der
Skupschtina in das Preligesetz eine
Bestimmung einzuschalten, wonach die
Aufreizung zum Hasse und zur Ver-
achtung gegen die Monarcliie sowie
jede Publikation strengstens bestraft
wiirde, deren allgemeine Tendenz gegen
die territoriale Integritat Osterr.eich-
Ungams gerichtet ist.

Sie verpflichitet sicli anlafilich der
demnachst erfolgenden Revision der
Verfassung in den Artikel XXII des
Ve'rfassungsgesetzes einen Zusatz aufzu-
nehmeh, der die Konfiskation derartiger
PubUkationen gestattet,- was nacb den
klaren Bestimmungen des Artikels XXII
der Konstitution derzeit unmoglicb ist.

oben angedenteten Zweck, sich fiir die
Zukunft freie Hand zu waliren.

Wir batten gefordert:

„1. Jede Publikation zu unter-
driicken, die zum Hasse und zur Ver-
achtung gegen die Monarcliie aufreizt
und deren allgemeine Tendenz gegen
die territoriale Integritat der Monarchic
gerichtet ist."

Wir wollten also die Verpflichtung
Serbiens herbeifiihren, dafiir zu sorgen,
dali derartige Prefiangriflfe in Hinkunft
unterbleiben; wir wiinschten also einen
bestimmten Erfolg auf diesem Gebiete
sichergestellt zu wissen.

Statt dessen bietet uns Serbien die
Erlassung gewisser Gesetze an, welche
als Mittel zu diesem Erfolge dienen
sollen, u. zw.:

a) ein Gesetz, womit die fraglichen
monarchiefeindlichen Preliaulierungen
subjektiv bestraft werden sollen, was
uns ganz gleichgiiltig ist, umsomehr als
bekanntermalien die subjektive Ver-
folgung von PreCdelikten aufierst selten
moglich ist und bei einer entprechend
laxen Behandlung eines solchen Gesetzes
auch die wenigen Falle dieser Art nicht zur
Bestrafung kommen wUrden; also ein
Vorschlag, der unserer Forderung in
keiner Weise entgegenkommt, da er
uns nicht die- geringste Garantie fiir
den von uns gewunschten Erfolg bietet;

h) ein Nachtragsgesetz zu Art. XXII
der Konstitution, das die Konfiskation
gestatten wiirde — ein . Vorschlag, der
uns gleichfalls nicht befriedigen kann,
da der Bestand eines solchen Gesetzes

2. Die Ilegierung besltzt keinerlei
Beweise dafur und auch die Note der
k. und k. Regierung liefert ihr keine
solchen, daii der Verein „Narodna
odbrana" und andere ahnliche Gesell-
schaften bis zum heutigen Tage durch
eines ihrer Mitglieder irgendwelche ver-
brecherischen Handlungen dieser Art
begangen batten. Nicbtsdestoweniger
wird die koniglicbe Regierung die For-
derung der k. und k. Regierung an-
nebmen und die Gesellscbaft Narodna
odbrana sowie jede Gesellscbaft, die
gegen Osterreicb-Ungarn wirken sollte,
auflosen.

3. Die koniglich serbische Regie-
rung verpflicbtet sicb ohne Verzug aus

in Serbien uns nicbts niitzt, sondern nur
die Verpflicbtuug der Regierung, es
aucb anzuwenden, was uns aber nicbt
versprocben wird.

Diese Vorscblage sind also voll-
kommen unbefriedigend — dies umso-
mebr, als sie aucb in der Ricbtung
evasiv sind, dafi uns nicbt gesagt wird,
innerbalb \velcber Frist diese Gesetze
erlassen wurden und daft im Falle der
Ablebnung der Gesetzvorlage durcb die
Skupscbtina — von der eventuellen
Demission der Regierung abgeseben —
alles beim alten bliebe.

Die monarcbiefeindlicbe Propa-
ganda der Narodna odbrana und der
ihr affilierten Vereine erfullt in Serbien
das ganze ofFentlicbe Leben; es ist
daber eine ganz unzulassige Reserve,
wenn die serbische Regierung bebaupte't,
daii ihr dariiber nicbts bekannt ist.

Ganz abgesehen davon ist die von
uns aufgestellte Forderung nicbt zur
Ganze erfullt, da wir iiberdies verlangt
haben:

Die Propagandamittel dieser Gesell-
scbaften zu konfiszieren;

die Neubildung der aufgelosten
Gesellscbaften unter anderem Namen
und in anderer Gestalt zu verbindern.

In diesen beiden Ricbtungen
scbweigt das Belgrader Kabinett voU-
kommen, so dafi uns aucb durcb die
gegebene balbe Zusage keine Garantie
dafiir geboten ist, daii dem Treiben der
monarcbiefeindlicben Assoziationen, ins-
besondere der Narodna odbrana, durcb
deren Auflosung definitiv ein Ende be-
reitet ware.

Aucb in diesem Falle verlangt die
serbische Regierung erst. Nacbw^ise

dem offentlichen Unterrlchte in Serbien
alles auszuscheiden, was die gegen
Osterreicli-Ungam gerichtete Pro-
paganda ibrdem konnte, falls ihr die
k. und k. Eegierung tatsacUiche Nach-
weise fiir diese Propaganda liefert.

4. Die konigliche Keglerung ist
audi bereit, jene Offiziere und Beamten
aus dem Militar- und Zivildienste zu
entlassen, hinsichtlicli ^velcher durch
gericbtliche Untersuchung festgestellt
wird, daft sie sich Handlungen gegen
die territoriale Integritat der Monarcbie
liaben zuscbulden komraen lassen; sie
erwartet, da(i ihr die k. und k. Regie-
rung zwecks Einleitang des Verfabrens
die Namen dieser Offiziere und Beamten
und die Tutsacben mitteilt, welcbe den-
selben zur Last gelegt werden.

5. Die koniglicbc Regierung mufi
bekennen, dali sic sicb iiber den Sinn
und die Tragweito jenes Begebrens der
k. und k. Regierung nicbt voile Recbcn-

dafiir, dafi im offentlicben Unterricbte
Serbiens eine monarcbiefeindliche Pro-
paganda geti-ieben wird, wabrend sie
docb wissen mufi, daii die bei den
serbiscben Scbulen eingefubrten Lebr-
biicber in dieser Ricbtung zu bean-
standenden Stoff entbalten und dali ein
grolier Teil der serbiscben Lehrer im
Lager der Narodna odl^rana und der
ibx affilierten Vereine stebt.

tjbrigens bat die serbiscbe Regie-
rung auch bier einen Teil unserer
Forderung nicbt so erfiillt, wie wir es
verlangt baben, indem sie in ibrem Text
den von uns gewiinscbten Beisatz „so-
wobl was den Lebrkorper als aucb was
die Lebrmittel anbelangt", weglieli —
ein Beisatz, welcber ganz klar zeigt,
wo die monarcbiefeindlicbe Propaganda
in- der serbiscben Scbule zu sucben ist.

Indem die koniglicb serbiscbe Re-
gierung die Zusage der Entlassung der
fraglicben Offiziere und Beamten aus
dem Militar- und Zivildienst an den
Umstand kniipft, dali diese Personen
durcb ein Gericbtsverfabren scbuldig
befunden werden, scbrankt sie ibre
Zusage auf jene Fiille ein, in dencn
diesen Personen ein strafgesetzlicb zu
abndendes Delikt zur Last liegt. Da
wir aber die Entfernung jener Offiziere
und Beamten verlangen, die monarcbie-
feindlicbe Propaganda betreibon, was ja
Im allgemeinen in Serbien kein ge-
ricbtlicb strafbarer Tatbestand ist, er-
scbeint unsere Forderung aucb in diesem
Punkte nicht erfullt.

Mit dieser- Frage bat das ailge-
meine Volkerrecbt ebensowenig etwas
zu tun, wie das Strafprozefirecbt; es
bandelt sicb um eine Angelegenbeit

schaft geben kann, welches daliin geht,
daO die koniglich serbische Regierung
sich verpflichten soil, auf ihrem Gebiete
die iMitwirkung von, Organen der
k. und.k. Eegierung zuzulassen, doch
erklart sie, dafi sie jene Mitwirkung
anzunehmen bereit ware, welche den
Grundsatzen* des Volkerrecbtes und des
Strafprozesses sowie den freundnachbar-
lichen Beziehungen entsprecben wiirde.
6. Die koniglicbe Eegierung halt
es selbstverstandlich fiir ihre Pflicht
gegen alle jene Personen eine Unter-
suchung einzuleiten, die an dem Kom-
piotte vom 15./28. Juni beteiligt waren
oder beteiligt gewesen sein sollen und
die sich auf ihrem Gebiete befinden.
Was die Mifwirkung von hiezu speziell
delegierten Organen der k. und k. Ee-
gierung an dieser Untersuchung anbe-
langt, so kann sie eine solche nicht
annehmen, da dies eine Verletzung der
Verfassung und des Strafprozeligesetzes
ware. Doch konnten den osterreichisch-
ungarischen Organen in einzelnen Fallen
Mitteilung von dem Ergebnisse der
Untersuchung gemacht werden.

rein staatspolizeilicher Natur, die im
Wege einer besonderen Vereinbarung
zu losen ist. Die Eesei-ve Serbiens ist
daher unverstandlich und ware bei ihrer
vagen, allgemeinen Form geeignet, zu
unuberbriickbaren Schwierlgkeiten bei
Abschluli des zu treffenden Abkommens
zu fiihren.

Unser Verlangen wai' ganz klar
und nicht miiizuverstehen. Wir be-
gehrten:

1. Einleitung einer gerichtlichen
Untersuchung gegen die Theilnehmer
am Komplotte.

2. Die Mitwirkung von k. und k.
Organen an den hierauf beziiglichen
Erhebungen („recherches'' im Gegen-.
Satze zu „enquete judiciaire").

Es ist uns nicht beigefallen, k. und k.
Organe an dem serbisclfen Gerichts-
verfahren teilnehmen zu lassen; sie
sollten nur an den polizeilichen Vor-
erhebungen mitwirken, welche das
Materiale fiir die Untersuchung herbei-
zuschaffen und sicherzustellen batten.

Wenn die serbische Eegierung uns
hier mifiversteht, so tut sie dies be-
wufit, denn der Unterschied zwischen
„enquete judiciaire'^ und den einfachen
„recherches" muli ihr gelaufig sein.

Da sie sich jeder KontroUe des
einzuleitenden Verfahrens zu entziehen
wunschtj das bei korrekter Durch-
fuhrung hochst unerwunschte Ergebnisse
fiir sie liefern wiirde und da sie keine
Handhabe besitzt, in plausibler Weisc
die Mit^Ndrkung unserer Organe am
polizeilichen Verfahren abzulehnen
(Analogien fiir solche poUzeiliche Inter-

7. Die konigliclie Regierung Lat
noch am Abend des Tages, an dem ikr
die Note zukam, die Verhaftung des
Majors Voislav Tankosid verfiigt.

Was aber den Milan Ciganovid an-
belangt, der cin Angehoriger der oster-
reichisch-ungarisclien Monarcbie ist und
der bis zum 15. Juni (als Aspirant) bei
der Eisenbabndirektion bedienstet war,
so konnte dieser bisber nicht ausge-
forscbt werden, \veshalb ein Steckbrief
gegen ibn erlassen Avurde.

Die k. und k. Regierung -vvird ge-
beten, zwecks Durchfiihrung der Unter-
suchung so bald als moglich die be-
stehenden Verdacbtsgriinde und die bci
der Untersuchung in Sarajevo ge-
sammelten Scbuldbeweise in der iiblicben
Forai bekanntzuffeben

8. Die serbischo Regierung wird
die bestehenden Malinahmen wegen
Unterdriickung des Scbmuggelns. von
AVafFen und Explosivstoffen verscharfen
und' erweitem.

Es ist selbstversfandlich, dafi sic
sofort eine Untersuchung einleiten und
jene Beamten des Grenzdienstes in der
Linie Sabac — Loznica streng bestrafen
wird, die ihre Pflicht verletzt und die
Urheber des Verbrecbens die Grenze
haben iiberschrciten lassen.

9. Die konigliche Regierung ist
geme bereit, Aufklarung iiber die

ventionen besteben in grofier Menge), bat'
sie sicb auf einen Standpunkt begeben, der
ihrer Ablebnung den Scbein der Be-
recbtigung geben und unserem Ver-
langen den Stempel der UnerfuUbar-
keit aufdriicken soil.

Diese^ Antwort ist hinterbaltig.

Ciganovic ging laut der von uns
veranlaliten Nachforschungen drei Tage
nacb dem Attentate, als bekannt wurde,
dafi Ciganovic an dem Komplotte be-
teiligt sei, auf Urlaub und begab sicb
iiber Auftrag der Polizeiprafektur in
Belgrad nacb Ribari. Es ist also zu-
nacbst unrichtig, dafi Ciganovic scbon
am 15./28. Juni aus dem serbiscben
Staatsdienste scbied. Hiezu kommt, dafi
der Polizeiprafekt von Belgrad, der die
Abreise des Ciganovic selbst veranlafit
hat und der wufite, wo dieser sicb auf-
halte, in einem Interview erklarte, ein
Mann namens Milan Ciganovic existiere
in Belgrad nicht.

Der koniglich serbischen Regierung
miissen die bezuglichen Interviews ganz

Aufiefungen zu geben, welche ihre
Beamten in Serblen und im Auslande
nach dem Attentate in Intendews ge-
macht haben und die nach der Be-
hauptung der k. und k. Regierung der
Monarchie feindselig waren, sobald die
k. und k. Hegierung die Stellen dieser
Ausfiihrungen bezeicbnet und bewiesen
haben wird, daft diese Aufierungen von
den betreffenden Funktionaren tatsach-
lich gemacht worden sind. Die k(5nig-
liche Regierung'wird selbst Sorge tragen,
die notigen Beweise und Uberfiihrungs-
mittel hiefiir zu sammeln.

10. Die konigliche Regierung wird,
insofern dies nicht schon in dieser Note
geschehen ist, die k. und k. Regierung
von der Durchfiihning der in den vor-
stehenden Punkten enthaltenen MaO-
nahmen in Kenntnis setzen, sobald eine
dieser Maliregeln angeordnet und durch-
gefiihrt wird.

Die konigl. serbische Regierung
glaubt, dali es im gemeinsamen Interesse
liegt, die Losung dieser Angelegenheit
nicht zu ubersturzen und ist daher, falls
sich die k. und k. Regierung durch
diese Antwort nicht fur befriedigt er-
achten soUte, wie immer bereit, eine
friedliche Losung anzunehmen, sei es
durch Ubertragung der Entscheidung
dieser Frage an das internationale Ge-
richt im Haag, sei es durch Uberlassung
der Entscheidung an die Grofimachte,
welche an der Ausarbeitung der von
der serbischen Regierung am 18./31.
Marz 1909 abgegebenen Erklarung mit-
gewirkt haben.

genau bekannt sein, Wenn sie von der
k. und k. Regierung verlangt, dafi diese
ihr allerlei Details iiber diese Interviews
liefere und sich eine fdrmliche Unter-
suchung hieriiber vorbehalt, zeigt sie,
dali sie auch diese Forderung nicht
emstlich erfuUen will.

35.
Graf Sz5gy§ny an Graf Berchtold.

Telegramm. Berlin, 28. Juli 1914.

Der von England gemachte Vermittlungsvorschlag, es soUten DeutscUand,
Italien, England und Frankreich zu einer Konferenz in London zusammentreten,
ist deutscherseits mit der Begriindung abgelehnt worden, daO es fiir Deutschland
unmoglich sei, seinen Bundesgenossen in seiner Auseinandersetzung mit Serbien
vor ein europaisches Gericht zu ziehen.

36.
Freiherr von Nluller an Graf Berchtold.

Telegramm. Toldo, 28. Juli 1914.

Die hentige offiziose japanische Times enthalt einen Leitartikel, der am
Schlusse besagt, dafi Japan mit den drei in Betracht kommenden Grolimachten
Osterreicb-Ungara, Deutschland und Ruliland auf bestem Fufi stehe, wahrend es
an Serbien in keiner Weise interessiert sei. Im Kriegsfalle wiirde die kaiser-
liche Regierung selbstverstandlicb strengste Neutral itat bewahren.

37.
Graf Berchtold an das koniglich serbische Ministerium des AuQern in Belgrad.

Telegramm. Wien, 28. Juli 1914.

Le Gouvemcment Royal de Serbie n'ayant pas rdpondu d'une mani^rc
satisfaisante h. la Note qui lui avait €i€ remise par le Ministre d'Autricbe-
Hongrie h. Belgrade h. la date du 23 juillet 1914, le Gouvernement I. et R.
se trouve dans la n^cessit^ de pourvoir lui-meme k la sauvegarde de ses droits
et int^-rets et de recourir k cet cffet h. la force des armes.

L'Autriche-Hongne se consid^re done des ce moment en etat de guerre
avec la Serbie.

38.
Graf Berohtold an Graf Szdgy^ny in Berlin.

Telegramm. Wien, 28'. JuU 1914.

Zu Euer Exzellenz Information and zur Mitteilung an den Herrn Staats-
sekretar;

Ich habe nachstehendes Telegramm des Grafen Mensdorff uiiterm 27. 1. M.
erhalten:

„Icli hatte heute Gelegenteit, Sir E. Grey ausfiihrlicli darzulegen, dafi
unsere Aktion nicht Aggression sondern Selbstverteidigung und Selbsterhaltung
sei und wir keine territorial en Eroberungen nocb Vemiclitung serbischer
Unabbangigkeit beabsichtigen. Wir wollen gewisse Genugtuung fiir Vergangen-
heit und Garantien fiir die Zukunft.

Hiebei verwertete ich einige Anbaltsp^nkte aus dem Erlasse Euer Exzellenz
an Graf Szdpdry.

Sir E. Grey sagte mir, er sei sehr enttauscht dariiber, daO wir die serbische
Antwort so behandeln, als wenn sie ganz ablebnend ware.

Er hatte geglaubt, diese Antwort wiirde eine Basis liefem, auf welcher die
vier anderen Regierungen ein befriedigendes Arrangement ausarbeiten konnten.

Das war seine Idee beim Yorschlag einer Konferenz.

Die Konferenz wiirde sich versammein unter der Voraussetzung, dafi sowohl
Osterreich-Ungarn wie Ruliland wahrend des Versuches der anderen Machte,
einea befriedigenden Ausweg zu finden, sich jeder militarischen Operation
enthalten wiirden.

(Heutige Erklarung Sir E. Greys im Unterhaus fiihrte Konferenzprojekt
aus.) Als er vom Enthalt militarischer Operationen unsererseits gegen Serbien
sprach, machte ich die Bemerkung, ich fiirchte, es sei vielleicht schoTa zu spat.
Der Herr Staatssekretar meinte, wenn wir entschlossen sind, unter alien Urn-
standen mit Serbien Krieg zu fiihren und voraussetzen, dali Ruliland ruhig
bleiben wird, so nehmen wir ein grolies Risiko auf uns. Konnen wir Ruliland
dazu bewegen, ruhig zu bleiben, habe er nichts mehr zu sagen. Wenn nicht,
sind die Moglichkeiten und Gefahren unberechenbar.

Als Symptom der Beunruhigung sagte er mir, die grolie englische Flotte,
die nach den Manovern in Portsmouth konzentriert wurde und heute auseinander
gehen sollte, wiirde vorlaufig dort bleiben. „„Wir h'atten keine Reserven ein-
berufen, aber nachdem sie versammelt sind, konnen wir sie in diesem Augen-
blick nicht nach Hause schicken.""

Seine Idee von Konferenz hat den Zweck, wenn moglich KoUision zwischen
den Grolimachten hintanzuhalten und er diirfte also auf Isolierung des Konfliktes
hinzielen. Falls aber Ruliland mobilisiert und Deutschland in Aktion tritt, so
fallt die Konferenz von selbst in Brach."

Ich glaube Euer Exiellen?: gegeniiber nicht besonders hervorbeben zu
«ollen, dafi dev Greyscbe Konferenzvorscblag, insoweit er sicb auf unseren
Konflikt mit Serbien beziebt, angesicbts des eiiigetretenen Kriegszustandes durcb
die Ereignisse uberbolt erscbeint.

39. \
Graf Berchtold an Graf Mensdorff in London.

Telegramm. Wien, 28. /uli 1914,

Wir legen das grolite Gewicbt darauf, dali Sir E. Grey unser Vorgeben
gegen Serbien im allgemeinen und speziell unsere Ablebnung der serbischen
Antwort in unparteiiscber Weise wiirdige, und ersiicbe icb Euer Exzellenz daber,
Gelegenbeit zu nebmen,. dem Herm Staatssekretar das Ibnen auf dem Post-
wege ubermittelte Dossier im Detail und unter Hervorbebung der besonders
markanten Stellen auseinanderzusetzen; in demselben Sinne woUen Euer Exzellenz
die kritiscben Bemerkungen zu der serbiscben Note (Text der Note mit unseren
Bemerkungen verseben ist gestern an Euer Exzellenz per Post abgegangen) mit
Sir E. Grey durcbsprecben und ibm klarlegen, daD das serbiscbe Entgegen-
kommen nur ein scbeinbares war, bestimrat, Europa zu tauscben, obne fur die
Zukunft irgendeine Garantie zu bieten.

Da die serbiscbe Regierung wuOte, dafi uns nur eine vorbebaltlose An-
nabme unserer Forderungen befriedigen konne, ist die serbiscbe Taktik klar zu
durchscbauen: Serbien akzeptierte, um Eindruck auf die europaiscbe Offentlicb-
keit zu maeben, mit allerlei Vorbebalten eine Anzabl unserer Forderungen, darauf
bauend, daO es nicbt in die Lage kommen werde, seine Zusagen zu erfiillen.
Ein Hauptgewicbt bei der Konversation Euer Exzellenz mit Sir E. Grey ware
auf den Umstand zu legen, daft die allgemeine Mobilisierung der serbiscben
Armee fiir den 25. Juli nacbmittags 3 Ubr angeordnet wurde, wabrend die
Antwort auf unsere Note erst knapp vor Ablauf der Frist, das beifit wenige
Minuten vor 6 Ubr, iiberreicbt wurde. Wir batten vorber keine militariscben
Vorbereitungen getroffen, durcb die serbiscbe Mobilisierunff wurden wir aber zu
solcben gezwungen.

40.
Graf Berchtold an Graf Szipiry in St. Petersburg.

Telegramm. Wien, 28. Juli 1914.

Zu Euer Exzellenz Orlentlening und Regelung Hirer Sprache:

Der kaiserlich russische Botschafter sprach heute bei mir vor, um mir sein©
Riickkehr aus Rufiland von kurzem Urlaube mitzuteilen und gleichzeitig einenji
telegraphischen Auftrage Herrn Sazonows nachzukommen. Letzterer liatte ihm
mitgeteilt, dali er eine langere, freundschaftliche Aussprache mit Euer Exzellenz^
gehabt liatte (Euer Exzellenz Telegramm vom 27. d. M.), in deren Yerlaufe
Hochdieselben mit grolier Bereitwilligkeit die einzelnen Punkte der serbischen
Antwortnote durchgesprochen batten. Herr Sazonow sei der Ansicbt, dali Serbien
in weitgebendem Maiie unseren Wiinscben entgegengekommen sei, dali aber
einige Forderungen ibm ganz unannebmbar scbienen, was er aucb Euer Exzellenz
nicbt verbeblt babe. Es ^cbiene ibm unter diesen Umstanden, dali die serbiscbe
Antwortnote geeignet sei, den AusgangspUnkt zu einer Verstandigung abzugeben,
wozu die russiscbe Regierung gerne die Hand bieten 'mocbte. Herr Sazonow
wolle mir daber vorscblagen, dali der Gedankenaustauscb mit Euer Exzellenz
Fortsetzung finde und Euer Exzellenz diesbezuglicb mit Insttuktionen verseben
werden.

In meiner Entgegnung betonte icb, daO icb auf einen derartigen Vorscblag
nicbt eingeben konne. Eine Verbandlung iiber den Wortlaut der von uns als
unbefriedigend bezeicbneten Antwortnote kbnnte bei uns niemand versteben und
niemand billigen. Es ware dies umsoweniger moglicb, -als sicb, wie der Botscbafter
wisse, bereits eine tiefgebende allgemeine Erregung der offentlicben Meinung
bemacbtigt batte, iiberdies unsererseits beute der Krieg an Serbien erklart
worden sei.

Auf die Auselnandersetzungen des Botscbafters, welcbe bauptsacblicb darin
gipfelten, dali wir die durcbaus nicbt abgeleugnete feindselige Stimmung in
Serbien durcb eine kriegeriscbe Aktion nicbt niederringen, im Gegenteile nur
steigern wiirden, gab icb ibm einige Streiflicbter binsicbtlicb unseres derzeitigen
Verbaltnisses zu Serbien, welcbes es unvermeidlicb macbe, ganz gegen unseren
Willen und obne jede egoistiscbe Nebenabsicbt unserem unrubigen Nachbar
mit dem notigen Nacbdrucke unsere emste Absicbt zu zeigen, nicbt langer
eine von der Regierung geduldete, gegen den Bestand der Monarcbie gericbtete
Bewegung zuzulassen. Die Haltung Serbiens nacb Empfang unserer Note sei
ubrigens nicbt darnacb gewesen, eine friedlicbe Beilegung zu ermoglichen, in dem
Serbien, nocb bevor es uns seine ungeniigende Antwort ubergel)en lieli, die allgememe
Mobilisierung angeordnet und scbon dadurcb uns gegenu"ber einen feindseligen
Akt vorgenommen babe. Trotzdem batten wir noch drei Tag^e ziigewartet.

Gestem seien nun serbischerseits gegen uns die Feindseligkeiten an der tuigarisclien
Grenze eroffhet worden. Dadurch sei uns die Mogliclikeit benommen, bei unserer
Serbien gegeniiber bewiesenen Langmut weiter zu bebarren. Die Herbeifiibrung
einer griindlicben aber friedlichen Sanierung unseres Verbaltnisses zu Serbien
sei uns nunmehr unmoglicb gemacbt worden und wir seien gezwungen, den
serbiscben Provokationen in der Form entgegenzutreten, die unter den gegebenen
Umstanden der. Wiirde der Monarcbie allein entsprecbe.

41.
Graf Berchtold an Graf Mensdorff in London.

Telegramm. Wien, 28. Juli 1914.

Der engliscbe Botschafter, welcher beute bei mir vorspracb, bat mir auf-
traggemafi den Standpunkt Sir E. Greys zu unserem Konflikte mit Serbien in
folgender Weise auseinandergesetzt:

Die engliscbe Regierung babe mit lebbaftem Interesse den bisherigen Ver-
lauf der Krise verfolgt und lege Wert darauf, uns zu versicbern, dafi sie
Sympatbien fiir unseren Standpunkt hege und unsere Griefs gegen Serbien
vollkommen verstebe.

Wenn somit England keinen Grund babe, unseren Streitfall mit Serbien
an sicb zum Gegenstande besonderer Praokkupation zu macben, so konne der-
selbe docb nicbt der Aufmerksamkeit des Londoner Kabinetts entgehen, weil
dieser Konflikt weitere Kreise zieben und dadurcb den europaiscben Frieden
in Frage stellen konne.

Nur aus diesem fiir England in Betracbt kommenden Grunde babe sicb
Sir E. Grey veranlalit geseben, eine Einladung an die Regierungen jener
Staatcn zu ricbten, die an diesem Kondikte nicbt naber interessiert seien
(Dcutschland, Italien und Frankreicb), um gemeinschaftlicb mit ibnen im Wege
fortlaufenden Gedankenaustauscbes die Moglicbkeiten zu priifen und zu erortern,
wie die Differenz mbglicbst rascb ausgeglicben werden konnte. Nacb dem
Muster der Londoner Konferenz wabrend der letzten Balkankrise soUten, nacb
Anschauung des engliscben Staatssekretars, die Londoner Botscbafter der
genannten Staaten sicb zu dem angegebcnen Zwecke in fortlaufendem Kontakte
mit ibm balten. Sir E. Grey babe bereits von den betreflfenden Regierungen sebr
freundscbaftlicb gebaltene Antworten erbalten, worin dieselben dem angeregten
Gedanken zustimmen. Gegen wartig ware es der Wunscb des Heri'n Staatssekretars,
wenn moglich, den Ausbrucb der Feindseligkeiten zwiscben Osterreicb-Ungarn

nnd Serbien in elfter Stunde zu verhindern, wenn dies aber iiicht tunlicb ware,
doch vorzubeugen, dali es zu einem blutigen ZusammenstoBe komme, eventuell
dadurch, daii die Serben sich zuriickziehen konnten, ohne den Kampf aufzu-
nehmen. Die von Serbien an uns eingelangte Antwort scheine die Moglichkeit
zu bieten, eine Basis fiir eine Verstandigung abzugeben. England sei game
bereit, hiebei in unserem Sinne und nacb unseren Wiinschen seinen Einfluli
zur Geltung zu bringen.

Icb dankte dem Herm Botscbafter fiir die Mitteilung Sir E. Greys und
terwiderte ibm, dafi ich der Auffassung des Herrn Staatssekretars voile Wiirdi-
jgung zu zollen wisse. Sein Standpunkt sei aber von dem meinigen naturgemafi
Terscbieden, da England an dem Streitfalle zwischen uns und Serbien nicbt
direkt intc-ressiert sei und der Herr Staatssekretar wobl kaum grundlich orien-
tiert sein konne iiber die schwerwiegende Bedeutung der zu losenden Fragen
fiir die Monarcbie. Wenn Sir E. Grey von der Moglicbkeit rede, den
Ausbrucb der Feindseligkeiten zu verhindern, so komme dieser Gedanke zu
spat, da gestem bereits serbiscberseits auf unsere Grenzsoldaten gescbossen und
beute von uns der Kjrieg an Serbien erklart wurde. Was die Idee eines Tran-
sigierens auf Grund der serbiscben Antwortnote anbelangt, miisse icb eine solcbe
ablebnen. Wir batten die integrale Annabme gefordert, Serbien babe sicb durch
Winkelziige aus der Verlegenbeit zu zieben gesucht. Uns seien diese serbiscben
Metboden nur zu gut bekannt.

Sir Maurice Bunsen konne unseren Standpunkt durcb seine bier erworbenen
Lokalkenntnisse gewili ricbtig einscbatzen und werde in der Lage sein. Sir
E. Grey bieriiber ein genaues Bild zu geben.

Insofeme Sir E. Grey dem europaiscben Frieden dienen woUe, wiirde
er gewiil nicht auf Widerstand bei uns stoBen. Er miisse jedocb bedenken, dafi
der europaiscbe Friede nicbt dadurcb gerettet wiirde, daO sicb Grolimacbte binter
Serbien stellen und fiir dessen Straffreibeit eintreten. Denn selbst wenn wir auf
einen solcben Ausgleicbsversucb eingeben wollten, wiirde dadurcb Serbien nuf
umsomebr ermutigt, auf dem bisberigen Pfade weiterzugehen, was den Frieden
binnen der allerkiirzesten Zeit abermals in Frage stellen mocbte.

Der engliscbe Botscbafter versicberte micb zum Scblusse, daii er unseren
Standpunkt voUkommen verstebe, andererseits aber bedauere, dali unter diesen
Umstanden der Wunsch der engliscben Regierung, einen Ausgleicb zu erzielen,
derzeit keine Aussicbt auf Verwirklicbung babe. Er boffe, mit mir weiterbin in
Kontakt bleiben zu diirfen, was ibm wegen der grolien Gefabr einer
europaiscben Konflagration von besonderem Werte ware.-

Icb erwiderte, icb stunde dem Herrn Botscbafter jederzeit zur Verfiigung,
womit unsere Konversation scblofi.

42.
Graf Berchtold an Graf SzQgy^ny in Berlin.

Telegramm. Wten, am 28. Juli 1914.

Ich ersuche JEuer Exzellenz sich sofort zum Herm Reichskanzler oder
Staatssekretar zu begeben und ihm folgendes in meinem Namen mitzuteilen :

Nacb iibereinstimmenden Nachrichten aus St. Petersburg, Kiew, Warschau,
Moskau und Odessa trifft Rutland umfangreiche militarische Vorbereitungen.
Herr Sazonow hat zwar ebenso wie der russische Kriegsmimster unter Ehren-
"wort versichert, daO eine Mobilisierung bisher nicht angeordnet wurde, der
letztere hat jedoch dem deutschen Militar-Attach6 mitgeteilt, dali die gegen
Osterreich-Ungarn gelegenen JVIilitarbezirke Kiew, Odessa, Moskau und Kasan
mobilisiert werden wiirden, wenn unsere Truppen die serbische Grenze iiber-
scbritten.

Unter diesen TJmstanden mochte ich das. Berliner Kabinett dringend er-
suchen, der Erwagung nahcr zu treten, ob nicht Ruliland in freundschaftlicher
Weise darauf aufmerksam gemacht werden sollte, dafi die Mobilisierung obiger
Bezirke einer Bedrohung Osterreich-Ungarns gleichkame und daher, falls sie
tatsachlich erfolgt, sowohl von der Monarchie als vom verbiindeten Deutschen
Reiche mit den weitestgehenden militarischen Gegenmaiiregeln beantwortet
•werden miifite.

Um RuGland ein eventuelles Einlenken zu erleichtem, schiene es uns
angezeigt, dali ein solcher Schritt vorerst von Deutschland allein untemommen
werden soUte: doch waren wir naturlich bereit, den Schritt auch zu zweien zu
machen.

Eine deutliche Sprache schiene mir in diesem Augenblick das wirksamste
Mittel, um Rufiland die ganze Tragweite eines drohenden Verhaltens zum Be-
"wulitsein za bringen.

43.
Graf Berchtold an Graf SzOgy^ny in Berlin.

Telegramm. Wien^ 28. Juli 1914.

Der kaiserlich deutsche Botschafter hat hier mitgeteilt, daO Sir E. Grey
sich mit der Bitte an die deutsche Regierung gewendet habe, sie moge ihren
Einfluli bei der L u. k. Regierung geltend machen, daft diese die Antwort aus

Belgrad ebtweder als geniigend betrachte oder als Grundlage fur Besprechungen
unter den Kabinetten akzeptiere.

Herr von Tscliiirsclilcy war beauftragt, den englischen Vorsoblag dem Wiener
Kabinette zur Erwagung zu unterbreiten.

44.

Graf Berchtold an die k. u. k. Botschafter in St. Petersburg, London, Paris

und Rom.

Telegramm. Wien, 29. JuU 1914,

Zu Euer Exzellenz Information:

Ich babe heute dem kaiserlich deutschen Botschafter das nachfolgende
Memoire in Beantwortung eines von demselben bei mir unternommenen Schrittes
zukommen lassen:

Memoire.

Die k. u. k. Regienmg hat mit dem ergebensten Danke von der Mitteilung
Kenntnis genommen, welche ihr der Herr kaiserliche deutsche Botschafter am
28. 1. M.' iiber das Ersuchen des englischen Kabinettes gemacht hat, es moge
die kaiserlich deutsche Eegierung ihren Einfluli beim Wiener Kabinette geltend
machen, damit dieses die Antwort aus Belgrad entweder als geniigend betrachte
oder aber als Grundlage fiir Besprechungen annehme. Was die Aussprache
des Herrn englischen Staatssekretars zu Fiirst Lichnowsky betrifft, mochte die
k. u. k. Regierung zunachst darauf aufmerksam machen, dafi die serbische
Antwortnote keineswegs, wie dies Sir E. Grey arjzunehmen scheint, eine Zu-
stimmung zu alien unseren Forderungen mit einer einzigen Ausnahme enthalte,
dali vielmehr in den meisten Punkten Vorbehalte formuliert sind, welche den
Wert der gemachten Zugestandnisse wesentlich herabdriicken. Die Ablehnung
betreffe aber gerade jene Punkte, welche einige Garantie fiir die faktische
Erreichung des angestrebten Zweckes enthalten.

Die k. u. k. Regierung kann ihre Uberraschung uber die Annahme nicht
unterdriicken, als ob ihre Aktion gegen Serbien Rufiland und den russischen
Einfluli am Balkan trefifen woUe, denn dies hatte zur Voraussetzung, dafi die
gegen die Monarchie gerichtete Propaganda nicht allein serbisch, sondern
russischen Ursprungs sei. Wir sind bisher vielmehr von der Auffassung aus-

gegangen, daft das offlzielle Ruliland diesen der Monarchie feindllchen Tendenzen
fernstelie und richtet sich unsere gegenwartige Aktion ausschlielilicli gegen
Serbien,- wahrend unsere Gefiihle ftir Ruliland, wie wir Sir E. Grey versichern
konnen, durchaus ffeundschaftliche sind.

Im iibrigen muli die k. u. k. Regierung darauf hinweisen, daO sie zu
ibrem lebbaften Bedauern nicbt mebr in der Lage ist^ zu der serbiscben
Antwortnote im Sinne der engllscben Anregung Stellung zu nebmen, da im
Zeitpunkte des bier gemacbten deutscben Schrittes der Kriegszustand zwiscben
der Monarcbie und Serbien bereits eingetreten war und die serbiscbe Antwort-
note demnr»cb durcb di6 Ereignisse bereits iiberbolt ist.

Die k. u. k. Regierung erlaubt sicb bei diese^ Anlasse darauf aufmerksam
zu macben, dali die koniglicb serbiscbe Regierung nocb vor Erteilung ibrer
Antwort mit der Mobilisierung der serbiscben Streitkrafte vorgegangen ist und
dali sie aucb hacbber drei Tage verstreicben lieO, obne die Geneigtbeit kund-
zugeben, den Standpunkt ibrer Antwortnote zu verlassen, worauf unsererseits
■die Kriegserklarung erfolgte.

Wenn im iibrigen das engliscbe Kabinett sicb bereit findet, seinen Einfluli
auf die russiscbe Regierung im Sinne der Erbaltang des Friedens zwiscben
den Grofimacbten und der Lokalisierung des uns durcb die jabrelangen serbiscben
XJmtriebe aufgezwungenen Krieges geltend zu macben, so kann dies seitens der
k. u. k. Regierung nur begriilit werden.

45.
Graf Sz^csen an Graf Berchtold.

Telegramm. Paris, 29. Juli 1914.

Frankreicb trifft unzweifelbaft gewisse militarische Vorbereitungen, wie
dies von den Zeitungen vielleicbt mit gewisser tjbertreibung verkiindet wird.

Wie icb streng vertraulicb erfabre, ist Baron Scboen beauftragt, diese Vor-
bereitungen beute bei Herrn Viviani zur Spracbe zu bringen und darauf bin-
zuweisen, dati Deutscbland unter diesen Umstanden gezwungen werden . konnte,
abnlicbe Malinabmen zu treffen, die liatUrHcb nicbt gebeim bleiben konnten und
deren Bekanntwerden in der OfFentlicbkeit groGe Aufregung verursacben wiirde.
So konnten beide Lander, trotzdem sie nur den Frieden anstreben, zu einer
wenigstens teilweisen Mobilisierung gedrangt werden, was gefabrlicb ware.

Ferner wird Baron Scboen auftraggemafi erklaren, Deutscbland wunscbo
lebbaft, daD der Konflikt zwiscben uns und Serbien lokalisiert bleibe, wobei
Deutscbland auf die Unterstiitzung seitens Frankreicbs zable.

46.
Graf Sz6gy§ny an Graf Berchtold..

Telegramm. Berlin, 29. JuU 1914.

Bereits Sonntag hat die deutsche Regierung in St. Petersburg erklart, daO
!die russische Mobilisierung die deutsche Mobilisierung zur Folge hatte.

Darauf erfolgte russischerseits die mit meinem Telegramm© vom 27. d. Mts.
gemeldete Antwort. Hieranf wurde heute neuerdings nach St. Petersburg tele-
graphiert, dafi durch das weitere Fortschreiten der russischen Mobilisierungs-
malinahmen Deutschland veranlafit werden konnte, zu mobilisieren.

47.
Graf Szdpiry an Graf Berchtold.

Telegramm. St. Petershurg, 29. JuU 1914.

Da ich vom deutschen Botschafter erfabren babe, HeiT Sazonow zeige sich
liber Euer Exzellenz angeblicbe Abgeneigtbeit, Gedankenaustauscb mit Rutland
fortzusetzen und iiber vermeintlicb weit iiber das notwendige Mali ausge-
debnte und daber gegen Rufiland gericbtete Mobilisierung Osterreicb-Ungarns
sebr aufgeregt, suchte icb den Herrn Minister auf, um einige mir vorbanden
scbeinende Unklarbeiten zu bebeben.

Der Herr Minister begann damit zu konstatieren, dafi Osterreicb-Ungarn
kategoriscb weitereh Gedankenaustauscb ablebne. Icb stellte auf Grund Euer
Exzellenz Telegrammes vom 28. d. M. ricbtig, dali Euer Exzellenz es zwar
abgelehnt batten, nacb allem, was vorgefallen, iiber die Notentexte und den oster-
reicbiscb-ungariscb-serbischen Konflikt iiberbaupt zu diskutieren, dali icb aber fest-
stellen miisse, in der Lage gewesen zu sein, eine viel breitere Basis des Gedanken-
austauscbes dadurcb anzuregen, dali icb erklarte, wir wunscbten kein'e russischen
Interessen zu verletzen, batten nicht die Absieht, natiirlich unter der Voraus-
setzung, daft der Konflikt zwischen Osterreicb-Ungarn und Serbien lokalisiert
bleibe, serbiscbes Territorium an uns zu bringeh und gedachten auch die
Souveranitat Serbiens nicht anzutasten. Icb sei uberzeugt, daO Euer Exzellenz
iiber osterreichisch-ungariscbe und russische Interessen immer bereit sein wUrden,
mit St. Petersburg Fiiblung zu nehmen.

100

Herr Sazonow meinte, in temtorialer Hinsicht habe er sich uberzeugen
lassen, aber was die Souveranitat anbelang^, miisse er den Standpunkt festhalten,
die Aufzwingung tinserer Bedingungen sei ein Vasallentum. Dieses aber verstofie
gegen das Gleichgewicht ■ am Balkan uiid letzteres sei das in Frage kommende
russische Interesse. Nun kam er wieder auf die Diskussion iiber die Note, die
Aktion Sir E. Greys etc. zuriick und woUte mir neuerlich nabelegen, daii man
unser legitimes Interesse zwar anerkenne und voll befriedigen wolle, dafi dies
aber in eine fiir Serbien annehmbare Form gekleidet werden soUte. Ich meinte,
dies sei kein russiscbes, sondern ein serbiscbes Interesse, worauf Herr Sazonow
geltend macbte, russiscbe Interessen seien in diesem Falle eben serbiscbe, so
daO icb dem Circulus vitiosus durcb Ubergan^ auf ein anderes Thema ein
Ende machte.

Icb erwabnte, icb batte gebort, man sei in EuJOland beunrubigt, weil wir
fur die Aktion gegen Serbien acbt Korps mobilisiert baben. Herr Sazonow
bestatigte mir, daO nicbt er, der hievon gar nicbts gewufit, sondern der General-
stabscbef diese Bedenken geauliert babe. Icb suchte dem Herrn Minister darzu-
legen, dali jeder Unbefangene sicb leicbt uberzeugen konne, unsere siidlicben
Korps konnten keine Bedrobung fiir Ruftland bilden.

Icb bedeutete dem Herm Minister, dali es gut ware, wenn sein kaiserlicber
Herr iiber die wabre Situation informiert wiirde, umsomebr als es diingend
geboten sei, wenn man den Frieden wolle, dem militariscben Lizitieren, welcbes
sich jetzt auf Grund falscber Nachricbten einzustellen drohe, ein rascbes Ende
zu bereiten. Herr Sazonow meinte sebr cbarakteristiscberweise, er konne dies
dem Generalstabscbef mitteilen, denn dieser sebe Seine Majestat
alle Tage.

Der Herr Minister sagte mir weiter, es werde heute ein Ukas unterzeicbnet,
welcher eine Mobilisierung in ziemlicb weitem Umfang anordne. Er konne mir
aber auf das alleroffiziellste erklaren, daft diese Truppen nicbt dazu bestimmt
seien, iiber uns berzufallen ; sie wiirden nur Gewebr bei Fufi bereit steben fiir
den Fall, als Rufilands Balkaninteressen gefabrdet wUrden. Eine note explicative
werde dies feststellen, denn es handle sich nur um eine Vorsichtsmaliregel, die
Kaiser Nikolaus gerechtfertigt gefunden babe, da wir, die wir ohnedies den
Vorteil rascherer MobiHsierung batten, nunmebr auch den so grolien Vorsprung
batten. Icb macbte Herrn Sazonow in emsten Worten auf den Eindruck auf-
merksam, den eine solche Maftregel bei uns erwecken werde. Icb miisse be-
zweifebi, dali die note explicative diesen Eindruck zu mildern geeignet sein
werde, worauf der Herr Minister sicb nochmals in Versicberungen iiber die
Harmlosigkeit (!) dieser Verfiigung erging.

101

48.
Graf Berchtofd an Graf SzSgy^ny in Berlin.

Telegratnm. Wien, 29. JuU 1914.

Soebeti wurde mir von Herm von Tschirscliky mitgetellt, der russische
Botschafter babe ibm gesagt, daft er von seiner Regierung verstandigt worden
sei, dali die Militarbezirke von Kiew, Odessa, Moskau und Kasan mobilisiert
Avurden. Euliland sei in seiner Ebre als Grofimacht gekrankt und genotigt,
entsprecbende Malinabmen zu ergreifen. Die russiscbe Mobllisierung wird von
unseren galiziscben Korpskommanden bestatigt und wurde, einer Meldung des
k. u. k. Militarattaches zufolge, beute aucb von Herm Sazono\\'' dem deutscben
Botscbafter gegeniiber nicht raebr geleugnet.

Icb ersuebe Euer\ Exzellenz, vorstebendes unverziiglicb zur Kenntnis der
deutscben Regierung zu bringen und biebei zu betonen, daii, wenn die russi-
scben Mobilisierungsmalinabmen nicbt obne Saumen eingestellt werden, unsere
allgemeine MobilisierUng aus militariscben Griinden unverziiglicb veranlaCt
werden miilite.

Als letzter Versucb, den europaiscben Kj-ieg bintanzubalten, bielte icb es
fiir wiinscbenswert, dali unser und der deutscbe Vertreter in St. Petersburg
eventuell aucb in Paris sogleicb angewiesen werden, den dortigen Regierungen
in freundscbaftlicber Weise zu erklaren, dali die Fortsetzung der russiscben-
Mobilisierung Gegenmaiiregeln in Deutscbland und Osterreicb-Ungarn zur Folgfr
baben wurde, die zu ernsten Konsequenzen fubren miiliten.

Euer Exzellenz wollen binzufiigen, dali wir uns selbstverstandlicb in unserer
kriegeriscben Aktion in Serbien nicbt beirren lassen werden.

Die k. u. k. Botscbafter in St. Petersburg und Paris erbalten unter einem
die Weisung, die vorerwabnte Erklarung abzugeben, sobald ibr deutscher Kollege
anologe Instruktionen erbalt.

49.
Graf Berchtold an Graf Sz^piry in St. Petersburg.

Telegramm. Wien, 30. Juli 1914.

Antwort auf Euer Exzellenz Telegramm vom 29. Juli.
Tcb bin selbstverstandlicb nacb wie vor bereit, die einzelnen Punkte unserer
durcb die Ereignisse iibrigens bereits uberbolten an Serbien gericbteten Note

102

durcli Euer Exzellenz Herm Sazonow erlautern zu lassen. Auch wiirde ict besiDii-
deren Wert darauf legen, bei dieser Gelegenheit der mir durch Herm Schebeko
verdolmetschten Anregung entsprecbend auch die unsere Beziebungen zu RuO-
land direkt betreffenden Fragen einet vertrauensvollen und freundscbaftlicben
Ausspracbe zu unterzieben, wovon sich eine Bebebung der in diesem Belange
bedauerlicberweise bestebenden Unklarbei.ten und Sicberstellung der so wunscbens-
werten friedlicben Entwicklung unserer Nacbbarverbaltnisse erboffen lielie.

50.
Graf Berchtold an Graf Sz^p^ry in St. Petersburg.

Telegramm. Wien, SO.Juli 1914.

Zu Eurer Exzellenz Orientierung und Kegelung Ibrer Sprg,cbe:

Ich babe beute Herm Scbebeko auseinandergesetzt, es sei mir gemeldet
worden, daO Herr Sazonow iiber meine glatte Ablebnung seiner Proposition
beziiglicb Ausspracbe mit Euer Exzellenz peinlicb beriibrt sei, wie nicbt minder
dariiber, daO kein Gedankenaustauscb zwiscben • mir nnd Herm Scbebeko statt-
gefunden babe.

Beziiglicb des erster-en Punktes batte icb Euer Exzellenz bereits telegrapbiscb
freigestellt, aucb weiterbin seitens Herm Sazonows etwa gewunscbte Erlaute-
ruiigen beziiglicb der Note — welcbe iibrigens durcb den Kriegsausbracb
iiberbolt erscbeint — zu geben. Es konne sicb dies allerdings nur im Babmen
nacbtraglicber Aufklarungen bewegen, da es niemals in unserer Absicbt gelegen
war, von den Punkten der Note etwas abbandeln zu lassen. Aucb batte icb
Euer Exzellenz ermacbtigt, unsere speziellen Beziebungen zu Ruliland mit
Herm Sazonow freundscbaftlicb zu besprecben.

DaO Herr Sazonow sicb dariiber beklagen konnte, es batte kein Gedanken-
austauscb zwiscben Herm Scbebeko und mir stattgefunden, mull auf einen
Irrtum bemhen, da wir — Herr Scbebeko und icb — vor zwei Tagen die
aktuellen Fragen durcbgesprocben batten, was mir der Herr Botscbafter mit
dem Bemerken bestatigte, er babe Herrn Sazonow in ausfiibrlicber Weise iiber
diese Unterredung referiprt.

Herr Scbebeko fiibrte dann aus,, warum man in St. Petersburg unser Vor-
geben gegen Serbien mit solcber Besorgnis betracbte. Wir seien eine Groli-
macbt, die gegen den kl einen serbischen Staat vorgebe, obne daO man in
St. Petersburg etwas dariiber wisse, was wir mit demselben beabsicbtigten, ob wir
dessen Souyeranitat tangieren, ibn ganz niederwerfen oder gar zertreten woUten,

103

Durch historlsche nnd andere Bande mit RuGland verbunden, konne letzterem
das weitere Schicksal Serbiens nicbt gleicbgultig sein. Man habe sich in
St. Petersburg angelegen sein lassen, mit allem Nacbdruck auf Belgrad ein-
zuwirken, dafi es alle unsere Forderungen erfiille, allerdings zu einer Zeit, wo
man nocb nicbt wissen konnte, was fiir Forderungen wir nacbmals gestellt.
Aber selbst beziiglicb dieser Forderungen wurde man alles einsetzen, um
wenigstens das Moglicbe durcbzubringen.

Icb erinnerte den Herrn Botscbafter daran, dafi wir wiederholt betont batten,
wir wollten keine Eroberungspolitik in Serbien treiben, aucb dessen Souveranitat
nicbt antasten, bloO einen Zustand berstellen, der uns Sicberbeit biete gegen
Beunrubigung seitens Serbiens. Hieran kniipfte icb eine langere Erorterung
unseres unleidlicben Verbaltnisses zu Serbien. Aucb gab icb Herrn Schebeko
deutlicb zu versteben, in welcb bobem Malie die russiscbe Diplomatic, wenn aucb
gewili gegen den Willen der leitenden Faktoren, an diesen Zusfanden scbuld sei.

Im weiteren Verlaufe unserer Unterredung .erwahnte icb die nunmebr zu
meiner Kenntnis gelangte russiscbe Mobilisierung. Nacbdem sicb dieselbe auf
die Militarbezirke Odessa, Kiew, Moskau und Kasan bescbranke, trage dieselbe
einen hostileii Cbarakter . gegen die Monarcbie. Was der Grund bievon sei,
wisse icb nicbt, da ja gar kein Streitfall zwiscben uns und Rutland existiere.
Ost^rreicb-Ungarn babe ausscblielilicb gegen Serbien mobilisiei-t, gegen Ruliland
nicbt einen Mann, was allein aus dem Umstande zu erseben sei, dafi das I., X. und
XI. Korps nicbt mobilisiert worden seien. Bei dem Umstande jedocb, daii Ruft-
land offensicbtlicb gegen uns mobilisiere, miiliten aucb wir unsere Mobilisierung
erweitem, wobei icb jedocb ausdriicklicb erwabnen wolle, dafi diese Mafinabme
selbstverstandlicb keinen feindseligen Cbarakter gegen Ruliland trage und sicb
lediglicb als notwendige Gegenmalinabme gegen die russiscbe Mobilisierung
darstelle.

Icb bat Herrn Scbebeko, dies seiner Regierung zu melden, was er mir
zusagte.

51.

Graf Berchtold an die k. u. k. Botschafter in London und St. Petersburg.

Telegramm. Wien, SI. Juli 1914.

Icb telegrapbiere wie folgt nacb Berlin:

Herr von Tscbirscbky bat auftraggemaO gestern bier Mitteilung tiber eine
Unterredung zwiscben Sir E. Grey lind Furst Licbnowsky ge'macbt, in welcber der
engliscbe Staatssekretar dem deutscben Botscbafter das Nacbfolgende eroffnete:

104

,Sazonow habe die englische Kegierung wissen lassen, daO er nacb der
Kriegserklaning Osterreich-Ungams an Serbien nicbt mehr in der Lage sei,
mit Osterreicb-Ungarn direkt zn verbandeln und Jaher die Bitte aussprecbe,
England moge seine Vemiittlung wieder aufnebmen. Als Varaussetzung betracbte
die russische Regierung die vorlaufige Eiristellimg der FeindseKgkeiten.

Zu dieser russiscben Eroffnung bemerkte Sir E. Grey zu Fiirst Licbnowsky,
England denke an eine Vermittlxmg A quatre und balte dieselbe fiir dringend
geboten, wenn nicbt ein Weltkrieg entsteben soUe.

Icb ersucbe Euer Exzellenz, dem Herm Staatssekretar, fiir die uns dureb
Herm von Tscbirscbky gemacbten Mitteilungen verbindlicbst zu danken und
ibm zu erklaren, dafi wir trotz der Anderung^, die in der Situation seitber dureb
die Mobilisierung RuBlands eingetreten sei, geme bereit seien, dem Vorscblag
Sir E. Greys, zwiscben uns und Serbien zu vermitteln, naber zu treten.

Die Voraussetzungen unserer Annabme seien jedocb natiirlicb, dali unsere
militariscbe Aktion gegen Serbien einstweilen ibren Fortgang nebme und dafi
das engliscbe Kabinett die russiscbe Regierung bewege, die gegen uns gericb-
tete russiscbe Mobilisierung zum Stillstand zu bringen, in welcbem Falle selbst-
verstandlicb aucb wir die uns dureb dieselbe aafgezwungenen defensiven mili-
tariscben Gegenmaliregeln in Galizien sofort wieder riickgangig macben wiirden.

52.
Graf Szdpdry an Graf Berchtold.

Telegramm. St. Petersburg, 31. JuU 1914.

Heute friib Ordre zur allgemeinen Mobilisierung der gesamten Armee und
Flotte erfolgt

53.
Graf Berchtold an die k. und k. Missionen.

Telegramm. Wien, 31. JuU 1914.

Zu Euer etc. Information und Verwertung bei dortiger Regierung:

Da Yon der russiscben Regierung Mobilisierungen an unserer Grenze

angeordnet worden sind, seben wir uns zu milifariscben MaDnabmen in Galizien

^ezwungen.

105

Diese Mafinahmen sind rein defensiven Charakters und lediglich nuter dem
Brucke der russischen Vorkehrungen erfolgt, die wir selir bedauern, da wir
selbst keinerlei aggressive Absichten gegen Ruliland haben nnd die Fortdauer
der bisherigen guten nachbarlicben Beziebungen wunschen. '

Die der Situation ^ntsprecbenden Pourparlers zwiscben dem Wiener und
St. Petersburger Kabinett, von denen wir uns eine allseitige Berubigung erboifen,
nebmen inzwiscben ibren Fortgang.

54.
Graf Sz^csen an Graf Berchtold.

Telegramm. Paris, 31. JuU 1914,

Deutscber Botscbafter bat im Auftrage seiner Regierung bier erklart, daii,
wenn angeordnete russiscbe allgemeine Mobilisierung nicbt binnen 12 Stunden
eingestellt wird, Deutscbland gleicbfalls mobilisieren werde. Gleicbzeitig fragte
Baron Scboen, ob Frankreicb im Falle deutscb-russiscben Krieges neutral bliebe.
Diesbeziiglicbe Antwort binnen- 18 Stunden erbeten. Termin lauft morgen,
Samstag, 1 Ubr nacbmittags ab.

55.
Graf Szdpiry an Graf Berchtold.

Telegramm. St. Petershurgy 31. JuU 1914.

Euer Exzellenz Telegramm vom 30, d. M. erbalten.

Hocbdieselben werden meinem Telegramm vom 29. d. M. entnommen
baben, daii icb, obne einen Auftrag abzuwarten, Konversation mit Sazonow
nabezu auf der mir nunmebr aufgetragenen Grundlage wieder aufgenommen babe,
obne daO sicb die beiderseitigen Standpunkte wesentlicb genabert batten.

Inzwiscben bat sicb aUerdings aus den vom deutscben Botscbafter mit
russiscbem Minister des Auliem gefiibrten Konversationen ergeben, daO
Ruliland sicb selbst mit einer formellen Erklarung, Osterreicb-Ungarn werde

106

weder das serbisclie Territorium solimalern noch die serbische Souveranitat
antasten, noch russische Balkan- oder sonstige Interessen verletzen, nicht
zufriedengeben wurde, und ist auch seitber russiscberseits die allgemeine
Mobilisierung angeordnet worden.

56.
Graf Szdp^ry an Graf Berchtold.

Telegramm. St. Petersburg, 1. August 1914.

Bei einem heutigen Besucbe legte icb Herrn Sazonow dar, dafi ich Instruk-
tionen erbalten batte, icb miisse aber vorausschicken, die augenblicklicbe,
durcb die russiscbe allgemeine Mobilisierung in Wien gescbaffene Lage sei mir
ganzlicb unbekannt, so dafi icb von dieser bei Verdolmetscbung meiner nocb
vorber abgegangenen Weisungen vollkommen abseben miisse. Icb sagte, daO die
beiden Weisungen Euer E?:zellenz von dem Miliverstandnis bandeln, als ob wir
weitere Verbandlungen mit RuDland abgelehnt batten. Dies sei, wie icb ibm
scbon obne Auftrag versicbert batte, ein Irrtum. Euer Exzellenz seien nicbt nur
gerne bereit, mit RuOland auf breitester Basis zu verbandeln, sondern aucb
speziell geneigt, unsefen Notentext einer Besprecbung zu unterzieben, sofern es
sicb um dessen Interpretation bandle.

Icb betonte, wie sebr die Instruktionen Euer Exzellenz an micb einen
weiteren Beweis guten Willens boten, wenn icb ibm aucb nocb einmal in Er-
innerung rufen miisse, dali mir die durcb die seitberige allgemeine Mobilisierung
gescbaffene Situation unbekannt sei, icb konne nur boffen, daO uns der Gang der
Ereignisse nicbt scbon zu weit gefiibrt babe; jedenfalls batte icb es fiir meine
Pflicbt gebalten, im gegenwartigen bocbernsten Augenblicke den guten Willen
der k. u- k. Regierung nocbmals zu dokumentieren. Herr Sazonow erwiderte, er
nebme von diesem Beweise guten Willens mit Befriedigung Akt; docb mocbte
or micb aufmerksam macben, daii ibm Unterbandlungen in St. Petersburg aus
nabelicgenden Griinden weniger Erfolg versprecbend erscbienen als solcbe auf
dem neutralen Londoner Terrain. Icb erwiderte, Euer Exzellenz gingen, wie icb
scbon dargelegt batte, vom Gesicbtspunkte einer direkten FUblungnabme in
St. Petersburg aus, so daO icb nicbt in der Lage sei, zu seiner Anregung
beziiglicb Londons Stellung zu nebmen, docb wGrde icb Euer Exzellenz bievon
Meldung erstatten.

107

57.
Graf SzSgy^ny an Graf Berchtoid.

Telegramm. Berlin, 2. August 1914,

Der Herr Staatssekretar sagte mir soeben, dafi von Ruliland keine Antwort
anf deutsclie Anfrage eingelangt sei.

Russische Truppen haben die deutsche Grenze bei Schwidden (sudostlich
Bialla) iiberscbritten.

RuDland hat daber Deutscbland angegriffen.

Deutscbland betracbtet sicb daber im ICriegszustande mit Ruliland.

Russiscber Botscbafter bat beute vormittags Passo zugestellt erbalten; er
wird voraussicbtlicb nocb beute abreisen.

58.

Graf Mensdorff an Graf Berchtoid.

Telegramm. London, 4. August 1914.

Icb babe eben Sir E. Grey geseben. Engliscbe Regierung bat an Deutscb-
land Ultimatum wegen Belgiens gericbtet, erwartet Antwort beute um Mitternacbt.

Sir E. Grey, sagte mir, er sebe vorlaufig keine Veranlassung zu einer Mitteilung
an die k. u. k. Regierung und keine Ursacbe, mit uns in Konflikt zu geraten,
solange wir nicbt im Kriegszustande mit Frankreicb sind. Jedenfalls boffe er,
dali wir keine Feindseligkeiten eroffnen wiirden obne vorberige Formalitat der
Kriegserklarung. Er wird Sir M. de Bunsen nicbt abberufen.

Falls wir mit Frankreicb im Kriegszustande waren, wiirde es fiir England
als Bundesgenosse Frankreicbs wobl scbwer sein, mit demselben im Atlantiscben
Meere zu kooperieren und nicbt im Mittellandiscben Meer.

108

59.
Graf Berchtold an Graf Sz^p^ry in St. Petersburg.

Telegramm. Wim^ 5. August 1914,

Ich ersuche Euer Exzellenz, dem dortigen Minister des AuJQern folgeDde
Note zu ubergeben:

„D'ordre de son Gouvemement, le soussign6 Ambassadeur d'Autriche-
Hongrie a Itonnear de notifier a Son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre des
Affaires Etrang^res de Russie ce qui suit:

Vu I'attitude mena9ante prise par la Russie dans le conflit entre la
Monarcbie austro-hongroise et la Serbie, et' en presence du fait qu'en suite
de ce conflit la Russie, d'apr^s une communication du Cabinet de Berlin, a cru
devoir ouvrir les bostilit^s contre I'Allemagne et que celle-ci se trouve, par
consequent, en 6tat de guerre avec la dite Puissance, I'Autricbe-Hongrie se
consid^re ^galement en 6tat de guerre avec la Russie."

Nacb Uberreichung dieser Note wollen Euer Exzellenz sicb die Ausfertigung
der Passe erbitten und ungesaumt mit dem gesamten Botscbaftspersonal, aus-
genommen etwa zuriickzulassende Organe, abreisen. Herrn von Scbebeko
werden gleichzeitig unsererseits die Passe zugestellt.

60.
Graf Berchtold an Graf Mensdorff in London.

Telegramm. Wien, 6. August 1914.

Erhalten Euer Exzellenz Telegramm vom 4. 1. M.

Ich ersucbe Hocbdieselben Sir E. Grey zu versichem, dafi wir keinesfalls
ohne vorbergehende formelle Kriegserklarung Feindseligkeiten gegen England
eroffnen wiirden, aber aucb erwarteten, dali England uns gegeniiber ein analoges
Verhalten beobachten und vor Eintritt des formellen Kriegszustandes keine
hostilen Akt« gegen uns unternehmen werde.

109

61.
Graf Sz^csen an Graf Berchtold.

Telegramm. Paris, 8. August 1914,

Ministre des Affaires Etrang^res m'a fait, appellor pour me dire que, selon
des renseignements positifs qui lui seraient parvenus, le corps d'arm^e d'lnns-
bruck serait transport^ a la fronti^re fran9aise. Monsieur Doumergue desire
savoir d'urgence si cette nouvelle est exacte et -au cas afiirmatif quelles sent
les intentions du Gouvernement I. et R La France se trouvant en guerre avec
I'Allemagne envoi de nos troupes h. la fronti^re fran9aise n'est pas compatible
selon I'avis du Ministre avec ^tat de paix existant entre I'Autriclie-Hongrie et
France. Monsieur Dumaine est charge d'une d-marche semblable aupr^s do
Votre Excellence.

62.
Graf Berchtold an Graf Sz^csen in Paris.

Telegramm. Wien, 9. August 1914.

Mit Bezug auf Euer Exzellenz Telegramm vom 8. d. M.

Nach mit Generalstab genommener Riickspraclie ermacbtige icb Euer
Exzellenz, franzbsiscber Regierung zu erklaren, daO Nacbrichten iiber Teilnabme
unserer Truppen an deutscb-franzosiscbem KJrieg voUsfandig erfunden. Analog
babe icb micb Herrn Dumaine gegeniiber ausgesprocben.

. 63.
Graf Sz^csen an Graf Berchtold.

Telegramm. Paris, 10. August 1914.

Re9u t6l6gramme du 9 aout. Ai imm^diatement communiqu6 contenu 5.
Monsieur Doumergue. Ministre qui avait re9u rapport t^l6grapbique analogue
de Monsieur Dumaine sur sa conversation avec Votre Excellence a reconnu
que nos troupes ne se trouvaient pas k la fronti^re fran9aise, mais il dit avoir
renseignements positifs qu'un corps d'arm^e austro-bongrois a ii^ transports en

Allemagne, ce qui permet h celle-ci de retirer ses troupes des territoires
allemands occup6s par nos soldats et constitue, selon avis du Ministre, facili-
tation des operations de guerre allemandes. J'ai k diff^rentes reprises attir6
attention da Ministre sur le texte de la rd^onse de Votre Excellence, il a
reconnu qu'on nc pouvait pas parler de participation effective de nos troupes
h. la guerre franco-allemande, mais il insista sur ce que j)resence de nos troupes
sur territdire allemand 6tait incontestable et que ceci constituait aide militaire
pret6 h TAllemagne. Dans ces conditions ii a charg6 Ambassadeur de France
h Vienne de demander imm^diatement ses passeports et de quitter Vienne
aujourd'hui avec tout le personnel de I'Ambassade. Le Ministre m'a dit que
dans, ces circonstances ma presence ici ne saurait eire d'aucune utilit6, mais
que, vti excitation populau-e, elle pourrait donner lieu a des incidents regret-
tables qu'il d6sirerait 6viter. II m'a offerf de mettre d^.s ce soir on train h ma
disposition pour quitter la France. J'ai r^pondu qu'il me serait impossible
d'avoir instruction de Yotre Excellence jusqu'au soir mais que, vu le rappel de
Monsieur Dumaine, je le priai de me faire d6livrej" mes passeports.

64.
Graf Berchtold an Graf Mensdorff in London.

Wieti, 11. August 1914.

Franzosiscbe Regierung hat ibren biesigen Botscbafter beauftragt, seine
Passe mit der Motivierung zu verlangen, dali ein osterreicbiscb-ungariscbes
Armeekorps nacb Deutscbland entsendet worden sei, woduicb es der deutscben
Heeresleitung ermoglicbt wiirde, ibre Truppen aus den deutscben Gebieten
zuriickzuzieben, welcbe von unseren Abteilungen besetzt seien. Diese Mafinabme
unseres Generalstabes bedeute eine militariscbe Hilfeleistung an Deutscbland.

Euer Exzellenz wollen zur Kenntnis der engliscben Regierung bringen,
daO den an zustandiger Stelle eingebolten Informationen zufolge die
franzosiscberseits aufgestellte Bebauptung unbegriindet ist.

Ill

65.
Graf Mensdorff an Graf Berchtold.

Telegramm. London, l9.^ Angust 19l4,

Je viens de recevoir de la part de Sir E. Groy la communication
suivante:

„Sur la demande du Gouvernement fran9ais qui ri'est pas a m^me do
communiquer directem^nt avec Votre Gouvernement, j'ai k Vous faire la com-
munication suivante:

^Apres avoir d6clar6 la* guerre h la Serbie et pris ainsi la premiere initia-
tive des hostilites en Europe, le Gouvenicmont austro-hongrois s'est mis sans
aucune provocation du Gouvernement de la R6publique fran9aise en 6tat de
guerre avec la France:

1; Apres que I'AUemagne avait succesivement dcclar6 la guerre h la Russie
et h la France, il est intervenu dans ce conflit en declarant la guerre a la
Eussie qui combattait d^h. aux c6t6s de la France.

2. D'apr^s de nombreuses informations dignes de foi I'Autricbe a envoyo
des troupes sur la frontiere allemande dans des conditions qui constituent uno
menace directe h I'^gard de la France.

En presence de cet ensemble de faits le Gouvernement fran9ais se voit
oblig6 de declarer au Gouvernement austro-bongrois qu'il va prendre toutes les
mesures qui lui permettront de r6pondre h ces actes et k ces menaces."

Sir E. Grey ajoute: Rupture avec la France ayant i6t6 amende de
cette mani^re, le Gouvernement de Sa Majest6 britannique se voit oblige
d'annoncer que r6tat de gueiTe existe entre la Grandc-Bretagne et TAutriche-
Hongiie h partir de minuit.

112

66.
Der japanische Botschafter an Graf Berchtold.

Wien, 20. August J 914.
Monsieur le Comte,

No doubt Your Excellency liave already been informed by His
CEJxcellency Baron Muller of the nature of the communication made,
(to the German Government by my Government on the 15*** inst.;
but, for Your Excellency's personal information, I beg to enclose
therewith a copy of a telegram received from Tokio on the subject
although I have no instruction to do so.

113

Beilage.

The Japanese Government, taking into serious consideration tlie present
situation, and as the result of full commanication with the British Government
for the purpose of consolidating and maintaining the general peace in the
regions of Eastern Asia which forms one of the objects of the Anglo-Japanese
alliance, have come to the decision of taking the necessary measures therefore
in common with Great Britain; but before taking such measures, the Japanese
Government thought it proper to once approach the German Government with
a friendly advice which was communicated to them to the following effect on
the 15'h of August 1914.

1. All German vessels of war to be immediately withdrawn from the
waters in the neighbourhood of Japan and China. The vessels, which cannot
be so withdrawn, to be disarmed.

"2. The German Government to deliver, unconditionally and without com-
pensation, to the Japanese authoi'ities, the entire leased territory of Kiau-Chau
before the 16*'^ of September 1914, for the purpose of returning it to China.

The Japanese Government have declared to the German Government that
unless their reply of unconditional acceptance of the above advice should be
received before noon of Sunday the 23'"^ instant, the Japanese Government shall
take such action as they deem necessary.

It is sincerely hoped that the above advice, with such ample allowance of
time for reply, may be accepted by the German Government; but should,
unfortunately, the German Government not accept the advice of the Japanese
Government the latter will be obliged to take the necessary measures in order
to accomplish their object.

The reason that led the Imperial Government to assume the present attitude
is, as already mentioned, none other than to safeguard the Common interests
of Japan and Great Britain mentioned in the Anglo- Japanese alliance by con-
solidating the foundation of permanent peace in the regions of Eastern Asia,
and the Japanese Government have no intention whatever of embarking on k
policy of territorial expansion or any other design of self-interest. Consequently,
the Imperial Japanese Government are resolved to respect, with the utmost
care, the interests of third powers in Eastern Asia and not in the least to
injure them.

114

67.
Graf Berchtold an Graf Clary in Brlissel.

Telegramm. Wien, 22. August 1914.

Ich ersuclie Euer Exzellenz, dem koniglicli belgischen Minister des AuOern
sofort folgendes mitzuteilen:

^D'ordre de mon GouvernepQent j'ai I'honneur de notifier k Votre Excellence
ce qui suit:

Vu que la Belgique, apr^s avoir refuse d'accepter les propositions qui lui
avaient 6t6 adress6es % plusieurs reprises par I'Allemagne, prete sa cooperation
militaire h. la France et a la Grande-Bretagne qui, toutes deux, ont d6clar6
la guerre h. FAutriche-Hongrie, et en presence du fait que, comme il vient
d'etre constate, les ressortissants autrichiens et hongrdis se trouvant en Belgique
ont, sous les yeux des autoiit^s Roy ales, dd subir un traitement contraire aux
exigences les plus primitives de Thumanite et inadmissible m^me vis-k-vis
des sujets d'un Etat ennemi, I'Autriclie-Hongrie se voit dans la. n^cessit^ de rompre
les relations diplomatiques et se consid^re d^s ce moment en ^tat de guerre
avec la Belgique.

Je quitte le pays avec le personnel de la Legation et confie la protection
de mes administr^s au Ministre des Etats-Unis d'Am^rique en Belgique.

De la part du Gouvernement I. et E-. les passeports sont remis au Comte
Errembault de Dudzeele.

Prinz Hohenlohe an Graf Berchtold.

Telegramm. Berlin, 23. August 1914.

Dem hiesigen japanischen Geschaftstrager wurde heute durch das Ans-
wartige Amt mitgeteilt, dali die kaiserlicb deutsche Regierung nicht die Absicht
babe, eine Antwort auf das japanische Ultimatum zu erteilen. Die deutsche
Regierung babe ihrem Botscbafter in Tokio den Auftrag erteilt, nacb Ablauf
d.er von Japan fur beute 12 Ubr gestellten Frist Japan zu verlassen und sie
werde zu gleicber Zeit dem hiesigen japanischen Geschaftstrager seine Passe
zuatellen.

Zu Mittag warden dann dem Herrn Geschaftstrager die Passe zugestellt
and wird derselbe mit dem Botschaftspersonal Berlin morgen friih verlassen.

115

69.
Graf Berchtold an Freiherrn von MUller in Tokio.

Telegramm. Wien, 24. Augttst 1914.

Der Kommandant S. M. S. „ElisabetiL" erliielt den Auftrag, in Tsin^u
mitzukampfen. Ersuche Euer Exzellenz, mit Rucksicht auf das Vorgelien Japans
gegen das nns verbiindete Deutsclie Reich Ihre Passe zu verlangen. Konsulate
zu verstandigen und mit Kolonie und Botschafts- und Konsulatspersonal nach
Amerika abzureisen. Schutz unserer Staatsangehorigen und Interessen wollen
Euer Exzellenz amerikanischem Botscbafter anvertrauen. Hiesigem japanischen
Botschafter werden Fasse zugestellt.

ROYAUME DE BELGlQUE.

MINfSTfeRE DES AFFAIRES feTRANGfeRES.

Correspondance diplomatique

RELATIVE A LA

Guerre de 1914.

(24 JUlLLET-29 AOUT.)

ANVERS.
Imprimerie et Publicity Flor BURTON, Soatrt Anonyme.

COURTE RUE NEUVE. 28.

TABLE DES MATlfeRES.

Date

RESUME

2* juillet

24 juillet

25 juillet

26 juillet

27 juillet

28juiUet
2y juiUet

31 juillet

31 juillet
31 juillet

31 juillet .
i" aoat

l«»aoitt

I" aout

Le Comte Errembault de
Dudzeele h M. Davignon.

M. Davignon aux Legations
a Paris, Berlin, Londres,
Vlenne et S»-P6tersbourg.

M. Davignon aux Legations
h Rome, La Haye et Lu-
xembourg.

M. Michotte de Welle 4 M.
Davignon.

Le Comte Clary et Aldringen
k M. Davignon..

Le fearon Beyens h M. Davi-
gnon.

Le Comte Errembault de
Dudzeele a M. Davignon.

M. Davignon aux Legations
k Berlin, Paris, Londres,
Vienne, Saint-P6tersbourg,
Rome, „La Haye, Luxem-
bourg.

M. Davignon aux L6gations
A Berlin, Paris et Londres.

M. Davignon h tous les Chefs
de mission k I'^tranger.

M. Davignon aux Legations
k Berlin, Paris- et Londres.

M. Davignon aux L6gations
k Berlin. Paris et Londres..

Le Comte de Lalaing k M.
Davignon.

Le Baron Bey«as 4M. X>avi-
, gnon.

M. Davignon :aux Legations
k Berlin, Paris .^t Londres.

Communication du texte de I'ultiinatum aus-
tro-hongrois k la.'Serbie. , .

Envoi d'une note k remettre 6ventuellement
aux Ministres respectifs des Affaires Etran-
g6res pour leur faire connaltre la volont^
de la Belgique de rester neutre en cas de
conflit europ6en. . . . . , . , .... .

Les dites Legations remettront aux Ministres
des Affaires Etrangferes une note identique
k celle qui aura et6 communigu6e aux cinq
Puissances, garantes de la neutralit6 beige.

Communication de la r^ponse du Gouveme-
ment serbe a Tultimatum austro-hongrois.

Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois juge la
r6ponse de la Serbie insuffisante et rompt
les relations diplomatiques avec elle. . . .

Le Gouvernement britannique propose I'inter-
vention k Vienne et k Saint-P6tersbourg de
I'Angleterre, de la France, de I'AUemagne
et de ritalie pour trouver un terrain de con-
ciliation. L'Allemagne seule n'a pas encore
r6pondu ,

Nbtification de . la declaration de guerre de
I'Autriche-Hongrie k la Serbie. . . . , .

Le Gouvernement beige a mis I'armSe sur le
pied de paix renforc6. Cette mesure ne doif
pas 6tre confondue avec la mobilisation. .

La France donne^ I'assurance k la Belgique
qu'aucune incursion des troupes francaises
n'aura lieu en Belgiigue m6me si des forces
importantes 6taient mass6es sur les fron-
ti6res beiges.

La mobilisation de I'^armSe beige est d6cr6-
Ue et le samedi 1" aout en. est le- premier
jour. .

Le Gouvernement anglais a demand^ s6par6-
ment aux Gouvernements francais et alle-
mand si chacun d'eux etait pr6t a respecter
la neutrality de la Belgique pourvu que
I'autre Puissance ne la viole pas

Le Baron van der Elst rappelle au Ministre
d'AUemagne les assurances donn^es par
I'Empire k la Belgique au sujet -du respect
de sa neutrality

La France a accept6 la proposition de. I'An-
gleterre de ne pas violer la neutralit6 beige
dans le cas ou ce\le-ci serait respect6e par.
I'AUemagne. (Voir n° 11.) ........

L'Allemeigne refuse de r6pondre k la proposi-
tion anglaise de respecter la neutrality de
la Belgique. <Voir n° 11.) . , . . . .' . .

La France explique les conditions dans les-
quelles elle respectera la neutrality de la
Belgique

Date

RESUME

1" aoOt

1" aoat

2aout

5 aout

2 aoCit

2 aout

3 aout

3ao<lt

3 aout

4aot:it

4 aout

4 abut
4 aoCit
4 aoat

4ao0t

M. Davignon aux Legations
prfes des Puissances garan-
tes.

M. bavignon aux Legations
a Rome, La Haye, Luxem-
bourg.

M. Eyschen A M. Davignon.

M. Davignon aux Lfegations
pr6s des Puissances garan-
tes.

M. de Below Saleske a M.
Davignon.

Entrevue entre M. de Below
Saleske "et le Baron van
der Elst.

M. Davignon a, M. de Below
Saleske.

M. Davignon aux Legations
a Paris, Londres, Vienne,
Berlin, 6aint-P6tersbourg,
La Haye.

M. Davignon aux Legations
h Berlin, Paris, Londres,
, Vienne et S'-P6tersbourg.

S. M. le Roi 4 S. M. le Roi
d'Angleterre,

Le Comte de Lalaing a M.
Davignon.

M. de Below Saleske k M.
Davignon.

Sir F H. vmiers k M. Davi-
gnon.

Le Baron Fallon i M. Davi-
gnon.

M. Davignon aux Legations
, k Londres et k Paris.

M. Davignon i M. de Below
Saleske.

M. de Below Saleske k M.
■ Davignon.

M. Davignon au Baron Ore-
nier.

Ex6cutez les instructions donn6es par la let-
tre du 24 juillet (voir n" 2)

Ex6cutez les instructions donn6es par la let-
tre du 25 juiUet (voir n° 3)

Le President du Gouvernement luxembour-
geois proteste centre la violation de la neu-
trality du Grand-Duch6 garantie par le trait6
de Londres de 1867

Le Ministre de France a rendu publique sa
declaration du 1*'' aoilt. La Belgique atta-
cherait le plus grand prix k recevoir de
I'AUemagne une assurance analogue ^i celle
donn6e par la France

Remise de I'ultimatum de I'Allemagne. L'Em-
pire sommela Belgique de ne pas s'opposer
au passage des troupes allemandes. . . .

L'AUemagne se plaint k la Belgique de la
violation de ses fronti^res par des dirigea-
bles et une patrouille venant de France. .

R6ponse du Gouvernement beige k I'ultima-
tum allemand. La Belgique ne peut faillir
aux devoirs que lui imposent les trait^s
de 1839. . . :

Telegramme adress^ pour faire connaltre aux,
Ministres du Roi prfes des grandes Puissan-
ces le sens de I'ultimatum allemand et de
la r6ponse du Gouvernement beige. . . .

La Belgique a fait savoir k la France que
pour I'instant elle ne faisait pas appel k la
garantie des Puissances. Elle appr6ciera
ult6rieurement ce qu'il y aura lieu de faire.

La Belgique fait un suprfime appel au Gou-
vernement anglais pour la sauvegarde de
sa neutrality

L'Angleterre declare qu'elle fera la guerre k
I'Allemagne si la neutrality de la Belgique
est viol6e. (Voir n° 23.) . . .

L'Allemagne ex<^cutera, au besoln par la force
des armes, les mesures de s6curit6 qu'elle
juge indispensables vis k ' vis des menaces
frangaises

L'Angleterre s'attend k ce que la Belgique r6-
siste par tous les moyens possibles k la
prejssion de TAUemagne tendant k lui faire
abandonner son r61e de pays neutre et h ce
qu'elle fasse appel aux Puissances garantes.

La Hollande fait savoir au Gouvernement
beige qu'elle sera peut-fetre obligee d'insti-
tuer sur I'Escaut le balisage de guerre. . .

Violation du territoire national & Gemmenich.

Remise des passeports au Ministre d'Alle-
magne . .,' .,..;.

L'Allemagne Vemet aux Etats-Unis le soln de
la protection des inti^rets allemapds en
Belgiqye .,., ........... ,

Le Gouvernement beige demande au Gouver^
nement espagnol de se charger de la prot
tection des int^rfits beiges en Allemzigne. .

N»

Date

•RESUME

Page

34-

4aoat

M. Davignon au Baron
Beyens.

Ordi-e de demander ses passeports . . . . .

l:i

4aout

Le Baron Beyens. i M. Davi-
gnon.

Discours prononc6 par M. de Bethmann-Hol-
- weg au Reichstag et dans lecjael le Chance-
lier de I'Empire reconnalt que I'AIlemagne
commet une injustice en passant outre aux
protestations des Gouvernements luxem-
bourgeols et beige

4aoat

Le Comte de Lalaing h M.
Davignon.

Expos6 de I'attitude de I'Angleterre dans le
conflit europ6en

i^,:

4aout

Le Comte de Lalaing 4 M.
Davignon (t616gramme) .

L'Angleterre s'attend k ce que la Norvfege,
la Hollande et la Belgique r6sistent k la
pression de I'AIlemagne et gardent la neu-
trality. Elles seront soutenues dans ce cas
par I'Angleterre . .

4aoat

M. Davignon aux Ministres
du Roi h Paris, Londres et
Saint-P6tersbourg.

R6sum6 de la situation diplomatique. Comme
aucun fait de guerre ne s'est produit k Vex-
piration de I'ultimatum, le Consell des
Ministres a d6cid6, le 3 aont, k 10 heures,
de ne pas encore faire appel aux Puissan-
ces garantes

4 aovit

Le Comte de, Lalaing k M.

Davignon.

L'Angleterre a somm6 PAUemagne de respec-
ter la neutralit6 de la Belgique. L'ultimatum
expire k minuit.

4aoai

M. Davignon aux Ministres
; de Grande Bretagne, Fran-
ce et Russle k Bruxelles.

Les forces allemandes ayant p6n6tr6 en Bel-
gique, le Gouvemement du Roi fait appel
k I'Angleterre, k la France et k la Russie
pour coop6rer, comme garantes. k la defense
de son territoire

5aout

Le Comte de Lalaing h M.
Davignon.

L'Angleterre a d6clar6 la guerre k I'AIlema-
gne .

oaout

M. Davignon aux Legations
k Paris, Londres et Saint-
P6tersbourg.

La Belgique fait appel aux Puissances ga-
rantes de sa neutrality

5aoat

M. Davignon aux Legations
a Paris, Londres et Saint-
P^tersbourg.

Expose de la situation diplomatique. . . .

Saoilt

M. Davignon k tous les Chefs
de mission a r6tranger.

En ve-tu de I'article 10 de la V« Convention de
La Haye de 1907, la Belgique, en repoussant
par la force une atteinte k sa neutrality,
ne pose pas un acte hostile

5aoul

Le Baron Beyens a M. Davi-
gnon.

Le Baron Grenier a M. Davi-
gnon.

La Mission du Roi en AUemagne quittera

5aout

Le Gouvemement espagnol se charge de la
protection des int6r6ts beiges en Allemagne.

5aoat

Le Baron Guillaume k M.
Davignon.

L'Allemagne a d6clar6 la guerre k la, France
le 3 aotit k 18 heures

16-

5aout

Sir F. H. Villiers k M. Davi-.
gnon.

L'Angleterre accepte de coop6rer comme ga-
rante k la defense du territoire beige. . .

oaoat

Le Comte de Lalaing k M.
Davignon.

La flotte anglaise assurera le libre passage
de I'Escaut pour le ravitaillement d'Anvers.

SaoCit

Le Barpn FaUon i M. Davi-
gnon.

Le balisage de guerre va 6tre 6tal)ll. (Voir
no 29.)

5aoat

M. Davignon au Baron Gre-
nier.

Le Gouvemement du Roi remercle le Gouver-
nement espagnol de bien vouloir se charger
de la protection des int6r6ts beiges en Alle-

5aoat

M. Davignon aux Legations
k Paris, Londres et Saint-
P6tersbourg.

La France et la Russie acceptent de coop6rer
avec I'Angleterre k la d6fense du territoire
beige

Dale j

RESUME

Page

6aout

M. de Weede 4 M. Davignon.

Communication de la declaration de neutra-
lity des Pays-Bas dans la guerre entre la
Belgiaue et TAlleroagne

6 aoul

M. Davignon au Baron Fal-
lon.

R6glementation de la navigation commerciale
sur I'Escaut. (Voir n<> 50.)

6aout

Le Bafon Fallon & M. Davi-
gnon.

MSme sujet

7 aoul

M. Davignon au Baron Fal-
lon.

M6me sujet

7 aoul

M. Davignon aux L6gations
a Paris et 4 Londres (tel6-
gramme).

Le Gbuvernement beige souhaite que la guerre
ne s'etende pas en .Afrique centrale. Les Gou-
vernements frangais et anglais se rallient-
ils k .notre proposition de neutraliesr le
bassin conventionnel du Congo

7 aoul

M. Davignon aux L6gations
k Paris et ft Londres.

Lettre pour expliquer le t616gramme precedent.

8 aoul

Le Baron Guillaume h M.
Davignon.

La France reserve sa r6ponse k la proposition
beige de neutraliser le bassin du Congo. . .

9adai

Le Baron Fallon k M. Davi-
gnon (t616gramme) .

Communication d'une nouvelle proposition de
I'Allemagne reproduisant Tultimatum du
2 aoOt

9 aoul

Le Baron Guillaume h M.
Davignon.

Le Gouvemement francais est dispos6 k pro-
clamer la neutralit6 du bassin du Congo.
(Voir n" 59.)

10 aoul

Le Baron Fallon k M. Davi-
gnon.

Transmission du texte allemand (contenant
une faute) de la seconde proposition de
I'Empire et d'une traduction (contenant une
autre erreur) de cette pifece. ......

10 aoul

M. Davignon au Baron Fal-
lon.

Le Gouvemement a regu les nouvelles propo-
sitions du Gouvemement allemand et y
repondra prochainement

fOaoCil

M. Davignon au Baron Fal-
lon.

Demandez au Gouvemement allemand le sens
qu'il attache au mot t auseinandersetzung».

65 •

10 aoul

M. Davignoil aux Ministres
d'Angleterre. de Russia et
de France.

Le Gouvemement du Roi communique aux
Repr6s6ntants des Puissances garantes le
texte de la seconde note allemande ainsi que
celui de la r6ponse qu'il se propose de faire
k cette communication

10 aofll

M. Davignon aux Legations
k Londres. Paris et Saint-
P6tersbourg.

Les autorit^s luxembourgeoises ont pri6 le
Ministre du Roi pr6s la Cour Grand-Ducale
de quitter Luxembourg. Vu les circonstances
le. Gouvemement beige n'a pas pris une me-
sure analogue k I'dgard du Repr6sentant du
Luxembourg k Bruxelles

Haoat

M. Brand WhiUock k M. Da-
vignon.

Les Etats-Unis d'Am6rique acceptent de pro-
t6ger les int6r6ts allemands en Belgique. .

11 aoai

Sir F. H. Villiers k M. Davi-
.gnon.

La Grande Bretagne approuve la r6ponse que
le Gouvemement beige propose de faire au
second ultimatum de I'Allemagne. (Voir
no 65 ) •

11 aofli

M. Klobukowski k M. Davi-
gnon.

Le Gouvemement de la R6publlque donne
6galement son entifere adh6sion k ce projet

Ho r/Snr>r>c*» /Vnir n* G.5 1 ....

12 aoiil

Le Baron Fallon h. M- £>&vi-
trnon.

Le texte allemand contenait une faute. Le sens
est : « son conflit avec la France » . . . . .

lUotl

M. Davison eu 'pajroh Pftl-
ion.

La nouvelle proposition allemande reproduit.
la proposition formul6e dans I'ultlmatum du
2 aotit. La Belgique ne peut <jue r6it6rer sa
>inftr>QP A p.pt ultimatum

Date

RESUME

Le Gouvernement russe f61icite la Belgique
de son attitude ferme et digne. (Voir n° 65.) .

La r6ponse du Gouvernement beige k la se-
conde proposition allemande a 6te remise
le 13 aout

La France n'est plus d'avls de neutraliser le
bassin conventionnel du Congo. (Voir n°* 57
et 58.) . .

Le Gouvernement anglais refuse de se rallier
k la proposition beige de neutraliser le bas-
sin du Congo

Les Allemands ont atta<iu6 le 22 aoOt le
Congo beige

L'Autriche-Hongrie declare la guerre h la
Belgigue

R6ponse du Gouvernement beige h la d6clara-
tion de guerre de I'Autriche-Hongrie. . . .

Renseignement sur des all6gations alleman-
des contre la Belgique mentionn6es au Blue
Book anglais

13 aout
13 aovit

16 aoflt

17 aoat

S6 aoM

28 aoat

29 aout

29 aoM

M. Sazonow k M. Davignon.

Le Baron FaUon a M. Davi-
gnon.

Le Baron Guillaume & M.
Davignon.

Le Comte de Lalaing h M.
Davignon.

M. Tombeur & M. Renkin.

Le Comte Clary t M. Davi-
gnon.

M. Davignon au Baron Fal-
lon.

M. Davignon h tons les Chefs
de mission h r^tranger.

CORRESPONDANCE DIPLOMATIQUE

RELATIVE

A LA GUERRE DE 1914.

(24 juillet-29 aout.)

No 1.

Leltre adressie par le Ministre du Roi d
Vienne a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires
Etrang^res-

Vienne, le 24 juillet 1914.
Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai rhonneur de vous faire parvenir, sous
ce pli, le texte de rultimatum de I'Autriche-
Hongrie a la Serbie.

Veuillez agreer, etc.

(s) Comte Errembault de Dudzeele.
Annexe Au- No- 1.

Le Gouvemement Imperial et Royal s'est
vu oblige d'adresser jeudi le 23 de ce mois,
par I'entremise du Ministre Imperial et Royal
a Belgrade, la note suivante au Gouvemement
Royal de Serbie :

« Le 31 mars 1909 le Ministre de Serbie a
,Vienne a fait, d'ordre de son Gouvemement,
au Gouvemement Imperial et Royal la decla-
ration suivante :

« La Serbie reconnait qu'elle n'a pas et6
atteinte dans sss droits par le fait accompli
cree en Bosnie-Herzegovine et qu'elle se con-
formera par consequent a telle decision que
les Puissances prendront par rapport k I'arti-
cle 25 du Traite de Berlin. Se rendant aux
conseils des Grandes Puissances, la Serbie
s'engage des a present a abandonner I'attitude
de protestation et d'opposition qu'elle a obser-
vee a I'egard de I'annexion depuis I'automne
dernier, et elle s'engage, en outre, a changer
le cours de sa politique actuelle envers I'Au-
triche-Hongrie pour vivre desormais avec cette
derniere sur le pied d'un bon voisinage. »

Or, I'histoire des dernieres ann6es, et notam-
ment les ev6nements douloureux du 28-juin,
ont demontre I'existence en Serbie d'un mou-
vement subversif dont le but est de detacher
de la Monarchic austro-hongroise certaines
parties de ses territoires. Ce mouvement, qui
a pris jour sous les yeux du Gouvernement
serbe, est arrive a se manifester au dela du
territoire du royaume par des actes de terro-
risme, par une serie d'attentats et par des
meurtres.

Le Gouvernement Royal serbe, loin de satis-
faire aux engagements formels contenus dans
la declaration du 31 mars 1909, n'a rien fait
pour supprimer ce mouvement : il a tol6r6
I'activite criminelle des diff^rentes societes et
affiliations d.irig6es contre la Monarchie, le
langage effrene de la presse, la glorification
des auteurs d'attentats, la participation d'offi-

ciers et de fonctionnaires dans les agisse-
ments subversifs, une propagande malsaine
dans I'instruction publique, tol6re enfin toutes
les manifestations qui pouvaient induire la
population serbe a la haine de la Monarchie
et au m6pris de ses institutions.

Cette tolerance coupable du Gouvernement
Royal de Serbie n'avait pas cesse au moment
ou les evenements du 28 juin demier en ont
demontre ay monde entier les consequences
funestes.

II resulte des depositions et aveux des au-
teurs criminels de I'attentat du 28 juin que
le meurtre de Sarajevo a ete tram6 a Belgrade,
que les armes et explosifs dont les meurtrieris
se trouvaient etre munis leur ont ete donnes
par des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes fai-
sant partie de la «Narodna Odbrana», et enfin
que le passage en Bosnie des criminels et de
leurs armes a et6 organist et effectu6 par des
chefs du service-frontiere serbe.

Les resultats mentionn^s de I'instruction ne
permettent pas au Gouvernement Imperial et
Royal de poursuivre plus longtemps I'attitude
de longanimity expectative qu'il avait observee
pendant des ann6es vis-a-vis des agissements
concentres a Belgrade et propages de la sur
les territoires de la Monarchie; ces resultats
lui imposent au contraire le devoir de mettre
fin a des menees qui forment une menace
perpetuelle pour la tranquillite de la Monar-
chie.

C'est pour atteindre ce but que le Gouver-
nement Imp^cial et Royal se voit 'oblig6 de
demander au Gouvemement serbe I'enoncia-
tion offioielle qu'il condamne la propaganda-
dirigee contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise,'
c'est-a-d*ire I'ensemble des tendances qui aspi-
rent en dernier lieu a detacher de la Monar-
chie des territoires qui en font partie, et qu'il.
s'engage a supprimer, par tons les moyens,
cette propagande criminelle et terroriste.

Afin de donner un caractere solennel h. cet
engagement, le Gouvernement RoyaLde Serbie
fera publier a la prefniere page du "Journal
officiel" en date du 26 juin (13 juillet) I'enon-
ciation suivante :

« Le Gouvemement Royal de Serbie con-
damne la propagande dirig6e contre I'Autriche-
Hongrie, c'est-a-dire I'ensemble des tendances
.aui aspirent en dernier lieu k detacher de" la
Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires qui
en font partie, et il deplore sinc6rement les
consequences funestes de ces agissements cri-
minels.

» Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que des
officiers et ionctionnaires serbes aient parti-
cipe a la propagande susmentionnee et com-
promis par la les .relations de bon voisinage

auquel le Gouvernemenf Royal s*!§tait solen-
nellement engage par sa declaration du 31
mars 1909.

» Le Gouvernement Royal, qui desapprouve
et repudie toute idee ou tentative d'immixtion
dans les destinees des habitants de quelque
partie de I'Autriche-Hongrie que ce soit, con-
sidere de son devoir d'avertir formellement
les officiers, les fonctionnaires et toute la po-
pulation du royaume que dorenavant il pro-
cedera avec la derniere rigueur ; contre les'
personnes qui se rendraient coupables de
pareils agissements qu'il mettra tons ses ef-
forts a prevenir et a reprimer. »

Cette enonciation sera portee simultan^ment
^ la connaissance de I'Armee >Royale par un
ordre du jour de Sa Majeste le Roi et sera
publiee dans le "Bulletin officiel» de I'armee.

Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'engage en
outre:

r a supprimer toute publication qui excite
a la haine et au mepris de la Monarchic et
dont la tendance generale est dirigee contre
son integrite territoriale,

2° a dissoudre immediatement la societe dite
« Narodna Odbrana », a confisquer tous ses
moyens de propagande, et k proceder de la
m6me mani^re contre les autres societes et
affiliations en Serbie qui s'adonnent a' la pro-
pagande contre la Monarchic austro-hongroi-
se; le Gouvernement Royal prendra les mesu-
res necessaires pour que les societes dissoutes
ne puissent pas continuer leur activite sous un
autre nom et sous une autre forme,

3° a eliminer sans delai de I'instruction
publique en Serbie, tant en ce qui concerne
le corps enseignant que les moyens d'instruc-
tion, tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir a
fomenter la propagande contre I'Autriche-
Hongrie,

^ 4° h Eloigner du service militaire et de
I'administration en general tous les officiers
et fonctionnaires coupables de la propagande
contre la Monarchic austro-hongroise ef dont
le Gouvernement linp^rial et Royal, se reserve
de communiquer les noms et les fails au Gou-
vernement Royal,

5° k accepter la collaboration en Serbie des
organes du Gouvernement Imperial et Royal
dans la suppression du mouvement subversif
dirige contre I'int^grite territoriale de la Mo-
narchie,

6° k ouvrir une enquSte judiciaire contre les
partisans du complot du 28 juin se trouvant
sur territoire serbe;

des organes, del6gues par le Gouvernement
Imperial et Royal, prendront part aux recher-
ches y relatives,

T k proceder d'urgence k I'arrestation du
Commandant Voija Tankosic et du nomme
Milan Ciganovic, employ^ de I'Etat serbe, com-
promis par les r^sultats de instruction de
Sarajevo,

8° k empgcher, par des mesures efficaces,
le concours des autorit6s serbes dans le trafic
illicite 'd'armes et d'explosifs k travers la
frontiers;

k licencier et punir s^v^rement les fonction-
naires du service-fronti^re de Schabatz et de
Loznica coupables d'avoir aid6 les auteilrs du
crime de Sarajevo en leur facilitant le passage
de la fronti^re,

9° k donner au Gouvernement Imperial et
Royal des explications sur les propos injus-
lifiables de hauls fonctionnaires serbes tant
en Serbie qu'k I'^tranger, qui, malgr6 leur

position officielle, n'ont pas h6sit6 aprfes I'at-
tentat du 28 juin de s'exprimer dans des
interview's d'une maniere hostile envers la
Monarchic austro-hongroise, enfin

10° d'avertir, sans retard, le Gouvernement
Imperial et Royal de I'execution des mesures
comprises dans les points precedents.

Le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal attend
la reponse du Gouvernement Royal au plus
tard jusqu'au samedi, 25 de ce mois, a 6 heu-
res du soir-

Un memoire concernant les resultats de I'in-
struction de Sarajevo a I'egard des fonction-
naires mentionnes aux points 7 et 8 est annexe
a cette note.

J'ai I'honneur d'inviter votre Excellence de
vouloir porter le contenu de cette note a la
connaissance du Gouvernement aupres duquel
vous etes accredite, en accompagnant cette
communication- du commentaire que voici :

Le 31 mars 1909, le Gouvernement Royal
serbe a adresse a I'Autriche-Hongrie la decla-
ration dont le texte est reproduit ci-dessus.

Le lendemain mgme de cette declaration la
Serbie s'est engagee dans une politique ten-
dant k inspirer des id6es subversives aux res-
sortissants serbes de la Monarchic austro-hon-
groise et a preparer ainsi la separation des
territoires austro-hongrois, limitrophes k la
Serbie.

La Serbie devint le foyer d'une agitation
criminelle.

Des societes et affiliations ne tarderent pas
a se former qui, soit ouvertement, soit clan-
destinement, 6taient destinees k cr6er des des-
ordres sur le territoire austro-hongrois. Ces
societes et affiliations comptent parmi leurs
membres des generaux et des diplomates, des
fonctionnaires d'Etat et des juges, bref les
sommites du monde officiel et inofficiel du
royaume.

Le journalisme serbe est presque entifere-
ment au service de cette propagande, dirig6e
contre I'Autriche-Hongrie, et pas un jour ne
passe sans que les organes de la presse serbe-
n'excitent leurs lecteurs k la haine et au me-
pris de la Monarchic voisine ou a des attentats
dirig^s plus ou moins ouvertement contre sa
surete et son int6grit6.

Un grand nombre d'agents est appel6 k sou-
tenir par tous les moyens I'agitation contre
I'Autriche-Hongrie et k corrompre dans les
provinces limitrophes la jeunesse de ces pays.

L'esprit conspirateur des politiciens serbes,
esprit dont les annales du royaume portent
les sanglantes empreintes, a subi une recru-
descence depuis la derniere crise balkanique;
des individus ayant fait partie des bandes jus-
que-la occupees en Mac6doine sont venus se
mettre a la disposition de la propagande ter-
roriste contre I'Autriche-Hongrie.

En presence de ces agissements, auxquels
I'Autriche-Hongrie est expos6e depuis des an-
n^es, le Gouvernement de la Serbie n'a paf
cru devoir prendre la moindre mesure. C'est
ainsi que le Gouvernement serbe a manqu6 au
devoir que lui imposait la declaration solen-
nelle du 31 mars 1909, et c'est ainsi qu'il s'est
mis en contradiction avec la volont6 de I'Eu-
rope et avec I'engagement qu'il avait pris vis-
^-vis de I'Autriche-Hongrie.

La longanimity du Gouvernement Imperial
et Royal k I'egard de I'attitude provocatrice
d3 la Serbie 6tait inspir6e du d6sint6ressement
territorial de la Monarchic austro-hongrois9
et de I'espoir que le Gouvernement serbe fini-

- 3 -

fait tout de m6me par appr^cier a sa juste
valeur I'amitie de I'Autriche-HoTigrie. En ob-
servant une attitude bienveillante pour ies
intergts politiques de la Serbie, le Gouverne-
ment Imperial et Royal esperait que le royau-
me se deciderait finalement a suivre de son
cote une ligne de conduite analogue. L'Autri-
che-Hongrie s'attendait surtout a une pareille
evolution dans Ies idees politiques en Serbie,
lorsque, apres Ies evenements de I'annee 1912,
le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal rendit pos-
sible, par une attitude desinteressee et sans
rancune, Tagrandissement si considerable de
la Serbie.

Cette bienveillance manifestee par I'Autri-
che-Hongrie a I'egard de FEtat voisin n'a ce-
pendant aucunement modifie Ies procedes du
royaume, qui a continue a tolerer sur son
territoire une propagande, dont Ies funestes
consequences se sont manifestees au monde
entier le 28 juin dernier, jour ou I'heritier
presomptif de la Monarchie et son illustre
epouse devinrent Ies victimes d'un complot
trame a Belgrade.

En presence de cet 6tat de choses le. Gou-
vernement Imperial et Royal a du se decider
ci entreprendre de nouvelles et pressantes de-
marches a Belgrade afin d'amener le Gouver-
nement serbe a arreter le mouvement incen-
diaire menagant la surete et I'integrite de la
Monarchie austro-hongroise.

Le Gouvernement Impetial et Royal est per-
suade qu'en entreprenant cette demarche il
se trouve en plein accord avec Ies sentiments
de toutes Ies nations civilisees,qui ne sauraient
admettre que le regicide devint une arme dont
on puisse se servir impunement dans la lutte
politique, et que la paix europeenne fut con-
tinuellement troublee par Ies agissements par-
tant de Belgrade.

C'est a I'appui de ce qui- precede que le
Gouvernement Imperial et Royal tient a la
disposition du Gouvernement Royal de Gran-
de-Bretagne un dossier elucidant Ies menees
serbes et Ies rapports existanfentre ces menees
et le meurtre du 28 juin-

Une communication identique est adress6e
aux representants Imperiaux et Royaux au-
pres des autres Puissances signataires.

Vous etes autorise de laisser une copie de
cette depeche entre Ies mains de M. le Mi-
nistre des Affaires Etrangeres.

Vienne, le 24 juillet 1914.

Annexe.

L'instruction criminelle ouverte par le Tri-
bunal de Sarajevo contre Gavrila Princip et
consorts du chef d'assassinat et de complicite
y relative — crime commis par eux le 28 juin
dernier — a jusqu'ici abouti aux constatations
suivantes •

r Le complot ayant pour but d'assassiner,
lors de son sejour a Sarajevo, I'Archiduc
Frangois-Ferdinand fut forme a Belgrade par
Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, le nom-
ine Milan Ciganovic et Trifko Grabez avec
le concours du commandant Voija Tankosic.

2° Les 6 bombes et Ies 4 pistolets Browning
avec munition, moyennant lesquels les mal-
faiteurs ont commis I'attentat, furent livr6s
ci .Belgrade a Princip, Cabrinovic et Grabez
par le nomm6 Milan Ciganovic et le comman-
dant Voija Tankosic

3' Les bombes sont des grenades 2l la mam
provenant du depdt d'armes de I'arm^e- serbe
a Kragujevac.

4" Pour assurer la r6ussite de Fattentat,
Ciganovic enseigna a Princip, Cabrinovic et.
Grabez la mani^re de se servir des grenades et
donna, dans une foret pres du champ de tir
a Topschider, des legons de tir avec pistolets
Browning a Princip et Grabez.

5° Pour rendre possible a Princip, Cabri-
novic et Grabez de passer la frontiere de Bos-
nie-Herzegovine et d'y introduire clandestine-
ment leur contrebande d'armes, . un, systeme
de transport secret^ fut organise par Ciganovic.

D'apres cette organisation I'introduction en
Bosnie-Herzegovine des malfaiteurs et de leurs
armes fut operee par leS capitaines-frontieres
de Chabac (Rade Popovic) et de Loznica ainsi
que par le douanier Rudivoj Grbic de Loz-
nica avec le concours de divers particuliers.

N° 2.

Lettre adressSe par M. Davignon, Mmistre
des Affaires etrangeres, aux Ministres du Rot
a Paris, Berlin, Londres, Vienne et Saini-
Petersbourg.

Bruxelles, le 24 juillet 1914.
Monsieur le Ministre,

Le Gouvernement du Roi s'est demande si,
dans les circonstances actuelles^ il n'y aurait
pas lieu d'adresser aux Puissances qui ont
garanti son independance et sa neutralite, une
communication destinee a leur confirmer sa
resolution de remplir les devoirs internatio-
naux que lui imposent les traites au cas ou une
guerre viendrait a 6clater aux frontieres de la
Belgique-

II a ete amene ci la conclusion qu'une telle
communication serait prematuree. a I'heure
presente mais que les evenements pourraient
S3 precipiter et ne point lui laisser le temps
de faire parvenir, au moment voulu, les
instructions opportunes a ses repres6ntants
a I'etranger.

Dans cette situation, j'ai propose au Roi et
a mes collegues du Cabinet, qui se sont ral-
lies a ma maniere de voir, de vous donner,
des a present, des indications precises sur la
demarche que vous auriez a faire si I'eventua-
lite d'une guerre franco-allemande deven^it
plus menagante.

Vous trouverez, sous ce pli, une lettre
sign6e, mais non datee dont vous aurez k don-
ner lecture et a laisser copie au Ministre des
Affaires etrangeres si les circonstances exigent
cette communication.

Je vous indiquerai par t^legramme le mo-
ment d'agir.

Le telegramme vous sera adresse a I'heure
ou la mobilisation de I'armee beige sera de-
cretee, si, contrairement ci notre sincere espoir,
et aux apparences de solution paeifique, nos
renssignements nous amenaient k prendre
cette mesure extreme de precaution.

Veuillez agreer, etc.

(s) Davignon.

Annexe au N" 2.
Monsieur le Ministre,

La situation internationale est grave; I'^ven-
tualit6 d'un conflit entre plusieurs puissances

4 —

ne peut Sire 6cart6e des preoccupations du
gouvernement du Roi.

La Belgique a observ6 avec la plus scrupu-
leusG exactitude les devoirs d'Etat neutre que
lui imposent les traites du 19 avril 1839. Ges
devoirs, elle s'attachera inebranlablement. a
les remplir, quelles que soient les circonstan-
ces.

Les dispositions amicales des puissances k
son egard ont ete affirmees si souvent que la
Belgique a la confiance de voir son territoire
demeurer hors de toute atleinte si des hosti-
lites venaient a se produire a ses frontieres.

Toutes les mesuves necessaires pour assurer
I'observation de sa neutralite n'en ont pas
moins ete prises par le Gouvernement du Roi.
L'armee beige est mobilisee et se porte sur
les positions strategiques choisies pour assurer
la defense du pays et le respect de sa neutra-
lite. Les forts d'Anvers et de la Meuse sont
en etat de defense.

II est a peine necessaire, Monsieur le Mi-
nistre, d'insister sur le caractere de ces mesu-
res. Elles n'ont d'autre but que de mettre la
Belgique en situation de remplir ses obliga-
tions Internationales; elles ne sont et n'ont pu
6tre inspirees, cela va de soi, ni par le dessein
de prendre part a une lutte armee des puis-
sances, ni par un sentiment de defiance envers
aucune d'elles.

Me conformant aux ordres regus, j'ai I'hon-
neur de remettre a Votre Excellence une copie
de la declaration du gouvernement du Roi et
de La prier de bien vouloir en prendre acte.

Une communication identique a ete faite aux
autres Puissances garantes de la neutralite
beige.

Je saisis, etc.

Nf> 3.

Letlrc adressee par M. Davignon, Minislre
des Affaires E/rangeres, aux Ministres du Roi
a Rome, La Uaije et Luxembourg .

Bruxelles, le 25 juillet 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai adresse h. vos Collegues accredit^s au-
pres des Puissances garantes de I'indepen-
dance et de la neutralite de la Belgique une
circulaire, sans date, dent vous trouverez le
texte sous ce pli.

Si la menace d'une guerre franco-allemande
devenait imminente, cette circulaire serait
communiquee aux Gouvernements des Puis-
sances garantes, pour leur faire connaitre no-
tre resolution bien arret^e de remplir les de-
voirs internationaux que nous imposent les
traites de 1839.

La communication dont il s'agit ne serait
effectuee que sur un ordre tel6graphique de
ma part.

Si les circonstances m'amenent a donner cet
ordre, je vous prierai, egalement par la voie
lelegraphique, de donner connaissance de no-
ire demarche au gouvernement aupres duquel
vous etes accredite, en lui communiquant une
copie de la circulaire ci-jointe, a titre de ren-
seignement, et sans demander qu'il vous soit
donne acte de cette communication.

Mon t616gramme vous indiquerait, eventuel-
lement, la date qui devrait etre attribute a
la circulaire, date que vous auriez soin d'in-
scrire sur la copie que vous remettriez au
Ministre des Affaires Etrang^res.

!1 va de soi que la pr6sente d^peche et son
annexe doivent conserver un caractere stric-
tement confidentiel, jusqu'au recu de nouvel-
les instructions de ma part.

(s) Dg.vignon,

Annexe au N" 3.

(Voir Vannexe au N° 2.)

N" 4.

Lethe adressee par le Ministre du Roi d. Bel-
grade a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires
Elranghres.

Belgrade, le 25 juillet 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai I'honneur de vous faire parvenir, sous
ce pli, le texte de la reponse faite par le gou-
vernem.ent serbe k la communication austro-
hongroise du 10/23 juillet.

Veuillez agr^er, etc.

(s) Michotte de Welle.

Annexe au N° 4.

Le Gouvernement Royal serbe a rcQu la
communication du Gouvernement Imperial et
Royal du 10 de ce mois et il est persuade que
sa reponse eloignera tout malentendu qui me-
nace de gatcr les bons rapports de voisinage
entre la Monarchic auslro-hongroise et le
Royaume de Serbie.

Le Gouvernement Royal conscient que les
protestations qui ont apparu tant de la tribune
de la Skoupchtina nationale que dans les de-
clarations et les actes des representants res-
ponsables de I'Elat, protestations qui furent
coupees court par les declarations du Gouver-
nement serbe, faites le 18 mars 1909, ne se
sont plus renouvel6es vis-a-vis de la grande
Monarchic voisine en aucune occasion et que,
depuis ce temps, autanl de la part des Gouver-
nements Royaux qui se sont succede que de
la part de leurs organes, aucune tentative n'a
ete faite dans le but de changer I'etat de
choses politique et juridique cre6 en Bosnie
et Herz6govine, le Gouvernement Royal con-
state que sous ce rapport le Gouvernement
Imperial et Royal n'a fait aucune represen-
tation, sauf en ce qui concerne un livre sco-
laire, et au sujet de laquelle le Gouvernement
Imperial et Royal a regu une explication en-
tierement satisfaisante. La Serbie a de nom-
breuses fois donn6 des preuves de sa politique
pacifique et moderee pendant la duree de la
crise balkanique, et c'est grace a la Serbie
et au sacrifice qu'elle a fait dans I'interet
exclusif de la paix europeenne que cette paix
a ete pr6serv6e. Le Gouvernement Royal ne
peut pas etre rendu responsable pour les
manifestations d'un caractere priv6, telles que
les articles des journaux et le travail paisible
des societes, manifestations qui se produisent
dans prcsque tous les pays comme une chose
ordinaire et qui 6chappe, en regie generale,
au controle officiel,d'autant moins que le Gou-
vernement Royal, lors de la solution dc toute
une s6rie de questions qui se sont presentees
entre la Serbie et I'Autriche-Hongrie, a montr6
une grande provenance et a r6ussi, de cette
fagon, a en regler le plus grand nombre au
profit du progrOs des deux pays voisins.

5 -

C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement Royal, 4
dt6 peniblement surpris par les affirmations,
d'apres lesquelles des personnes du Royaume
de Serbie auraient participe a la preparation
de Tattentat commis a Sarajevo; il s'attendait
a ce qu'il soit invite a collaborer a la recherche
de tout ce qui se rapporte a ce crime, et \\
etait pret, pOur prouver son entiere correc-.
tion, a agir contre toules les personnes a re-
gard desquelles des communications lui se-
raient faites, se rendant done au desir du
Gouvernement Imperial et Royal, est dispos6
h, remettre au Tribunal tout sujet serbe, san^
6gard ci sa situation et a son rang, pour la
complicity duquel, dans le crime de Sarajevo,
des preuves lui seraient fournies, et speciale-
ment, il s'engage a faire publier h la premiere
page du "Journal of ficiel» en date du 13 .(26)
juillet, Fenonciation suivante :

«Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie condam-
ne toute propagande qui serait dirigee contre
I'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-a-dire I'ensemble des
tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu a deta-
cher de la Monarchic austro-hongroise des
territoires qui en font partie, et il deplore sin-
cerement les consequences funestes de ces
agissements criminels.Le Gouvernement Royal
regrette que certains officiers et fonctionnaires
serbes aient participe, d'apres la communica-
tion du Gouvernement Royal et Imperial, a
!Ia propagande susmentionnee, et compromis
par la les relations de bon voisinage auxquel-
les le Gouvernement Royal serbe etait solen-
nellement engage par sa declaration du 31
mars 1909, qui desapprouve et repudie toute
idee ou tentative d'une immixtion dans les
destinees des habitants de quelque partie de
I'Autriche-Hongrie que ce soit, consid^re de
son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers
et fonctionnaires et toute la population du
royaume que, dorenavant, il procedera avec
la derniere rigueur contre les personnes qui
se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements,
qu'il mettra tous ses efforts a prevenir et a
r6primer.»

Gette enonciation sera portee h la connais-
sance de I'arm^e Royale par un ordre du jour,
au nom de Sa Majeste le Roi, par Son Altesse
Royale le Prince heritier Alexandre, et sera
public dans le prochain bulletin officiel de
I'armee.

Le Gouvernement Royal s'engage en outre :

1. D'introduire dans la premiere convocation
reguliere de la Sk6upchtina uhe disposition
dans la loi de la presse,par laquelle sera punie
de la maniere la plus severe la provocation
a la haine et au mepris de la Monarchic
austro-hongroise, ainsi que contre toute publi-
cation dont la tendance generale serait dirigee
contre I'integrite territoriale de I'Autriche-
Hongrie. II se charge^ lors de la revision de
la Constitution, qui est prochaine, a faire
introduire dans I'article 22 de la Constitution
un amendement de telle sorte que les publi-
cations ci-dessus puissent etre confisquees, ce
qui actuellement aux termes categoriques de
Particle 22 de la Constitution est impossible.

2. Le Gouvernement ne possede aucune
preuve et la note du Gouvernement Imperial
et Royal ne lui en fournit non plus aucune
que la soci6te «Narodna Odbrana» et autres
societes similaires aient commis, jusqu'a ce
jour quelques actes criminels de ce genre, par
le fait d'un de leurs membres. Neanmoins, le
Gouvernement Royal acceptera la demande du
Gouvernement Imperial et Royal et dissoudra
la societe «Narodna Odbrana» et toute autre
society qui agirait contre I'Autriche-Hongrie.

3. Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'engage
a eliminer sans delais de I'rnslruction publi-

,que en Serbie dans ce qui sert ou pourrait
servir ^ fomenter la propagande contre I'Au-
triche-Hongrie, quand le Gouvernement Im-
perial et Royal lui fournira des fails et des
preuveS de cette propagande.

4. Le Gouvernement Royal accepte de meme
h, Eloigner du service militaire ceux pour qui
I'enquete judiciaire aura prouve qu'ils sont
coupables d'actes diriges contre I'integrite du
territoire de la. Monarchic austro-hongroise,
et il attend que le Gouvernement Imperial et
Royal lui communique ult6rieurement les
noms et les fails de ces officiers et fonction-
naires aux fins de la procedure qui doit s'en-
suivre. . ,

5. Le Gouvernement Royal doit avouer qu'il
ne se rend pas clairement compte du sens
et de la portee de la demande du Gouverne-
ment Imperial et Royal que la Serbie s'engage
ci accepter sur son territoire la collaboration
des organes du Gouvernement Imperial et
Royal, mais il declare qu'il admettra la colla-
boration qui repondrait aux principes du droit
international et h la procedure criminelle ainsi
qu'aux bons rapports de voisinage.

6. Le Gouvernement Royal, cela va de soi,
considere de son devoir d'ouvrir une enquete.
contre tous ceux qui sont ou qui, eventuelle-
ment, auraient ete meles au complot du 15
juin, et qui se trouveraient sur le territoire
du royaume. Quant ci la participation a cette
enquSte des agents ou autorites austro-hon-
grois qui seraient delegues a cet effet par le
Gouyernement Imperial et Royal, le Gouver-
nement Royal ne pent pas I'accepter, car ce
serait une violation de la Constitution et de-
la loi sur la procedure criminelle; cependant
dans des cas concrets des communications sur
les r6sultats de I'instruction en question pour-
raient etre donnees aux agents austro-hon-
grois.

7. Le Gouvernement Royal a fait proceder,
d^s le soir meme de la remise de la note, a
I'arrestation du Commandant Voislav Tankos-
sitch. Quant a Milan Ziganovitch, qui est su-
jet de la Monarchic austro-hojigroise et qui
jusqu'au 15 juin 6tait employe (comme aspi-
rant) a la direction des chemins de feri il h'a
pas pu encore Stre arrSte.

Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois est prie de
vouloir bien, dans la forme accoutumee, faire
connaitre le plus tot possible,, les pr^somptions
de culpabilite ainsi que les preuves 6ventuelles
de leur pulpabilite qui ont et6 recueillies jus-
qu'^ ce jour par I'enquSte h Sarajevo, aux
fins d'enquete ult6rieure.

8. Le Gouvernement serbe renforcera et
etendra les mesures prises pour emp§cher le
trafic illicite d'armes et d'explpsifs h travers
la frontiere. II va de soi qu'il ordonnera de
suite une enquete et punira s6verement les
fonctionnaires des frontiferes sur la ligne Scha-
batz-Loznitza qui ont manqu6 k leurs devoirs
et laisse passer les auteurs du crime de Sara-
jevo.

9. Le Gouvernement Royal donnera volon-
tiers des explications sur les propos que ses
fonctionnaires, tant en Serbie qu'a I'^tranger,
ont eu apres I'attentat dans des entrevues et
qui, d'apres I'affirmation du Gouvernement
Imperial et Royal, ont 6t6 hostiles envers la
Monarchic, d^s que le Gouvernement Impe-
rial et Royal lui aura communique les passa-
ges en question de ces propos, et des qu'il
aura demontre que les propos employes ont,
en effet, 616 tenus par lesdits fonctionnaires,

6 -

quoique le Gouvernement Royal Iu)-m6mt
aura soin de. recueillir des preuves et con
victions.

10. Le Gouvernement Royal informera le
Gouvernement Imperial et Royal de I'ex^cu
tion des mesures comprises dans les points
precedents en tant que cela n'a pas ete dejcJ
fait par la presente note, aussitot que chaque
mesure aura ete ordonnee et executee

Dans le cas ou le Gouvernement Imperial
et Royal ne serait pas satisfait de cette reponse,
le Gouvernement serbe, considerant qu'il est
de I'interet commun de ne pas precipiter la
solution de cette question, est pret comme
toujours d'accepter une entente pacifique, soit
en remettant cette question a la decision du
Tribunal international de La Haye, soit aux
Grandes Puissances qui ont pris part a I'ela-
boration de la declaration que le Gouverne-
ment serbe a faite le 18 (3l) mars 1909

Belgrade, le 12 (25) juUlet 1914.

N° 5,

Communication faite le 26 juillet 1914 par
la Legation d" Autriche-Hongrie a Bruxelles a
M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.

M. Pachitch a donne hier avant 6 heures
la reponse du' Gouvernement serbe a la note
austro-hongroise. Cette reponse n'ayant pas
ete jugee satisfaisante, les relations diploma-
tiques ont ete rompues et le Ministre et le
personnel de la Legation d'Autriche ont quitt6
Belgrade. La mobilisation serbe avail et6 de-
cretee deja avant 3 heures.

No 6.

T^legramme adresse par le Baron Beyens,
Ministre du Roi a Berlin, a M Davignon,
Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.

Berlin, 27 juillet 1914.

D'apr^B un t§legramme du Charge d'Affaires
Britannique a Belgrade, le Gouvernement ser-
be a cede sur tous les points de la note autri-
chienne. II admet meme I'immixtion de fonc-
tionnaires autrichiens si c^lle-ci pent s'accor-
der avec les usages du droit des gens. Le
Charge d'Affaires Britannique estime que cette
reponse devrait satisfaire I'Autriche dans le
cas ou celle-ci ne voudrait pas la guerre.
N^anmoins I'impression est plus favorable ici
aujourd'hui, surtout parce que les hostilites
centre la Serbie n'ont pas commence. Le Gou-
vernement Britannique propose I'intervention
de I'Angleterre, de I'Allemagne, de la France
et de ritalie a Sainl-Petersbourg et a Vienne
pour trouver un terrain de conciliation. L'Al-
lemagne seule n'a pas encore repondu. L'Em-
pereur d6cidera.

Lettre adressee par M Damgnon, Ministre
des Affaires Etrangeres, awr Minis/res du Roi
d Berlin, Pari!,, Londrrs, Vienne. Saint-Pe
lersbourg, Romi- La Hayr.- Luxembourg

Bruxelles, le 29 juillet 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

Le Gouvernement du Roi a decid6 de mettre
I'armee sur le pied de paix renforce

Cette mesure ne doit etre en aucune fa^on
confondue avec la mobilisation.

A cause du peu d'etendue de son territoire,
la Belgique toute entiere constitue en quelque
sorte une zone frontiere. Son armee, sur le
pied de paix ordinaire, ne comporte qu'une
classe de milice sous les armes. Sur le pied
de paix renforce ses divisions d'armee et sa
division de cavalerie, grace au rappel de' 3
classes ont des effectifs analogues a ceux des
corps entretenus en permanence dans les zones
frontieres des Puissances voisines.

Ces renseignements vous permettraient de
repondre aux questions qui pourrafent vous
etre posees.

Veuillez agr6er, etc.

(s) DavigTion.

NO 9.

Lettre adressie par M. Vavignon, Ministre
des Affaires Etrangeres, aux Ministres du Roi
a Berlin, Paris et Londres.

Bruxelles, le 31 juillet 1914.
Monsieur le Ministre,

M. le Ministre de France 6tant venu me
montrer un telegramme de I'Agence Havas,
decretant I'etat de guerre en Aliemagne, m'a
dit : Je profite de cette occasion pour vous
declarer qu'aucune incursion des troupes fran-
^aises n'aura lieu en Belgique, meme si des
forces importantes 6taient massees sur les
frontieres de votre pays. La France ne veut
pas avoir la responsabilit6 d'accomplir vis-^-
vis de la Belgique, le premier acte d'hostilit6.
Des instructions dans ce sens seront donn6es
aux autorites frangaises.

J'ai remerci6 M. Klobukowski de sa com-
munication et j'ai cru devoir lui faire remar-
quer que nous avions toujours eu la plus
grande con fiance dans la loyaute que nos
deux Etats voisins mettraient a tenir leurs
engagements a notre 6gard. Nous avons £Cussi
tout lieu de croire que I'attitude du Gouver-
nement allemand sera identique k celle du
Gouvernement de la Republique frangaise.

Veuillez agr6er, etc.

(s) Davignon.

NO ,7.

T^gramme adressi par le Comte Err em-
bault de Dudzeele, Ministre du Roi a Vienne,
t M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etran-
gkres.

Vienne, 28 juniet 1914.

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres me no-
Ufie la declaration de .guerre de I'Autriche-
Hongrie a la Serbie.

No 10.

TSlSgramme adres&S par M. Davignon, Mi-
nistre des Affaires "Etrang^Tes, h tous les
Chefs de mission d. VMranger

Bruxelles, 31 juillet 1914.

Le Ministre de la Guerre me fait savoir que
la mobilisation est d6cr6t6e et que le samedi
l" aoiit est le premier jour de la mobilisation,
Cs) Davignon.

- 7 —

NO 11.

Lettre adrcssee par M .Davignon,Ministre des
Affaires Eirangercs, aux Ministres du Roi «:
Berlin, Londrcs et Paris.

Bruxelles, le 31 juillet 1914.
Monsieur le Ministre,

Le Ministre. d'Angleterre a demande a me
voir d'urgence et m'a fait la communication
suivante. qu'il souhaitait etre a meme de m'ex-
poser depuis plusieurs jours. En raison de
la possibilite d'une guerre europeenne. Sir
Edward Grey a demande aux Gouvernemenls
frangais et allemand, separement, si chacun
d'eux etait pret a respecter la neutralite de
la Belgique pourvu qu'aucune puissance ne
la viole.

«Vu les traites qui existent, je suis charge
d'informer le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres
de Belgique de ce qui precede et de dire que
Sir Edward Grey presume que la Belgique
fera tout son possible pour maintenir sa neu-
tralite et qu'elle desire et s'attend'a ce que
les autres puissances I'observent et la main-
tiennent".

•Je me suis empresse de remercier Sir Fran-
cis Villiers de cette communication que le
Gouvernement beige apprecie particulierement
et j'ai ajoute que la Grande-Bretagne et les
autres nations garantes de notre independance
pouvaient etre assurees que nous ne neglige-
rions aucun effort pour maintenir notre neu-
tralite, et que nous etions convaincus que les
autres puissances, vu les excellents rapports
d'amitie et de confiance, que nous avions
toujours entretenus avec elles, observeraient
et maintiendraient cette neutralite.

.Je n'ai pas manque d'affirmer que nos forces
militaires, considerablement developpees a la
suite de notre reorganisation recente, etaient
a meme de nous permettre de nous defendre
energiquement en cas de violation de notre
territoire.

Au cours de la conversation qui a suivi,
Sir. Francis m'a paru un peu surpris de la
rapidite avec laquelle nous avions decide la
mobilisation de notre armee. J'ai fait remar-
quer que les Pays-Bas avaient pris une resolu-
tion identique avant nous et que d'autre part
Ici date recente de notre nouveau regime mili-
taire et les mesures transitoires que nous
avions dij decider a cette occasion, nous impo-
saient des mesures urgentes et completes. Nos
voisins et garants devaient voir dans cette
resolution le desir de manifester notre pro-
fonde volonte de maintenir nous-memes notre
neutralite.

Sir Francis m'a paru satisfait de ma reponse
et m'a annonce que son Gouvernement atten-
dait cette reponse pour continuer les n6gocia-
tions avec la France et rAllemagne, liegocia-
tions dont la conclusion me serait communi-
quee.

Veuillez agreer, etc.

(s) Davignon.

No 12.

Lettre adressec par M. Davignon, Ministre
des Affaires Etrangeres, aux Ministres'du Roi
a Berlin, Londres et Paris.

Bruxelles, le 31 juillet 1914.
Monsieur le Ministre,
Ce matin, au cours d'une conversation que
le Secretaire General de mon Departem^nt a

eue avec M. de Below, 11 a.expliqul^ au Mi.
nistre d'Allemagne la portee des mesures mili-
taires que nous avons prises et lui a dit qu'el-
les etaient une consequence de notre. volonte
d'accomplir nos obligations internationales,
qu'elles n'impliquaient en aucune facon une
attitude de defiance envers nos voisins.-

Le Secretaire General a demande ensuite au
Ministre d'Allemagne s'il avait connaissance
de la conversation qu'il avait eue avec son
predecesseur M. de Flotow, et de la reponse
que le Chancelier de I'Empire avait charge
celui-ci'de lui faire.

Au cours de la polemique so.ulev6e en 1911
par le depot du projet hollandais concernant
les fortifications de Flessingue, certains jour-
naux avaient affirme qu'en cas de guerre fran-
co-allemande. notre neutralite serait violea
par VAllemagne.

Le Departement des Affaires Etrangeres
avait suggere I'idee qu'une declaration faitc
au Parlement allemand a I'occasion d'un debat
sur la politique etrangere serait de nature a
apaiser I'opinion publique et a calmer ses
defiances, si regrettables au point de vue des
relations des deux pays.

M. de Bethman-Holweg fit repondre qu'il
avait ete tres sensible aux sentiments qui
avaient inspire notre demarche. II declarait
que I'Allemagne h'avait pas I'intention de vio-
ler notre neutralite, mais il estinrtait qu'en
faisanf publiquement une declaration, I'Alle-
magne affaiblirait sa situation militaire vis-a-
vis de la France qui, rassuree du cote du
Nord, porterait toutes ses forces du cote de
I'Est.

Le Baron van der Elst poursuivant, dit qu'il
comprenait parfaitem'ent les objections qu'a-
vaient faites M. de Bethman-Holweg a la
declaration publique suggeree et il rappela que
depuis lors en 1913, M. de Jagow avait fait
a la Commission du budget du Reichstag, de«
declarations rassurantes quant au respect de
la neutralite de la Belgique.

M. de Below repondit qu'il 6tait au courant
de la conversation avec M. de Flotow et qu'il
etait certain que les sentiments exprimes a
cette epoque n'avaient pas change.

Veuillez agreer, etc.

(s) Davignon.

Annexe aun° 12<

Lettre adressee par le Ministre du Roi a. Ber-
lin, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires
Etrangeres.

Berlin, le 2 mai 1913.
Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai I'honneur de vous faire connaitre,
d'apr^s I'officieuse «Norddeutsche Allgemeine
Zeitung", les declarations faites, au cours de-
la seance du 29 avril de la commission du
budget du Reichstag, par le secretaire d'Etat
aux Affaires Etrangeres et le Ministre de
la Guerre, relativement a la neutralite de la
Belgique. ,. . .

« Un membre du parti social-d6mocrate dit :
En Belgique on voit avec apprehension s'ap-
procher une guerre franco-allemande, car on
craint que I'AUfemagne ne respectera pas la
neutralite de la Belgique.

» M. de Jagow, Secretaire d'Etat aux Af-
faires Etrangeres repondit: la neutralite de la'
Belgique est determinee par des conventions
internationales et I'Allemagne est decid^e h.
respecter ces conventions.

- 8

» Cette declaration ne satisfit pas un autre
membre du parti social-d6mocrate. M. de
Jagow observa qu'il n'avait rien ^ aj outer
aux paroles claires qu'il avait pron'oncees rela-
tivement aux relations de i'AIlemagne avec la
Belgique.

» A de nouvelles interrogations d'un mem-
bre du parti social-democrate M.de Heeringen,
Ministre de la Guerre, repondit: la Belgique
.ne joue aucun role dans la justification du,
projet de reorganisation militaire allemand;
celui-ci se trouve justifie par la situation en
Orient. L'AIlemagne ne perdra pas de-vue que
la neutralite beige est garantie par les trait6s
internationaux.

» Un membre du parti progressiste ayant
encore parle de la Belgique, M. de Jagow fit
remarquer a nouveau que sa declaration con-
cernant la Belgique 6tait suffisamment cj|^ire.»

Veuillez agreer, etc.

(s) Baron Beyens.

No 13.

Tiligramme adress^ par le Comte de La-
laing, Ministre du Roi a Londres, a M. Davi-
gnon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.

Londres, i" aout 1914.

L'Angleterre a demande s^parement a la
France et a I'AIlemagne si elles respecteraient
le territoire de la Belgique dans le cas ou
leur adversalre ne la violerait pas. On attend
la r^ponse ailemande. La France a accepte.

N" 14.

Tilegramme adresse par le Baron Beyens,
Ministre du Roi a Berlin, a M. Davignon,
Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.

Berlin, i" aout 1914.
L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a 6te charge
de demander au Ministre des Affaires Etran-
geres si en cas de guerre, I'AIlemagne respec-
terait la neutrality de la Belgique et le Ministre
aurait dit qu'il ne peut pas repondre h cette
question.

No 15.

Lettre adressie par M. Davignon, Ministre
des Affaires Etrangeres, aux Ministres du Roi
d. Berlin, Paris et Londres.

Bruxelles, 1" aout 1914.
Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai I'honneur de vous faire savoir que le
Ministre de France m'a fait verbalement la
communication suivante :

«Je suis autorise a declarer qu'en cas de
conflit international, le Gouvernement de la,
Republique, ainsi qu'il I'a toujours declare,'
respectera la neutralite de la Belgique. Dans
rhypothese ou cette neutralite ne serait pas
respectee par une autre puissance, le Gouver-
nement fran^ais, pour assurer sa propre de-
fense, pourrait Stre amene a modifier son atti-
tude."

J'ai remerci6 Son Excellence .et ai ajout6
que de notre cote nous avions pris sans aucun
retard toutes les mesures voulues pour faire
respecter notre ind6pendance et nos f rontieres,

Veuillez agreer, etc.

(s) Davignon.

NO le.

Td^gramme adresse par le Ministre des
Affaires Etrangeres aux Ligations du Roi a-
Paris, Berlin, Londres, Vienne, Saint-Peters-
bourg.

Bruxelles. 1" aout 1914.

Executez instructions donnees par lettre du
24 juillet.

(s) Davignon.
(Voir pihce N" 2.)

No 17.

TiUgramme adressS . par le Ministre des
Affaires. Etrangeres aux Ligations a Rome, La.
Haye, Luxembourg.

Bruxelles, le 1"" aoiit 1914.

Executez instructions donnees par lettre du
25 juillet.

(s) Davignon.
(Voir piece n° 3.)

No 18.

Tiligramme adressi par M. Eyschen, Pri-
sident du Gouvernement Ivxemhourgcois, a
M, Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangires.

Luxembourg,. 2 aoflt 1914.
J'ai I'honneur de porter k la connaissance
de Votre Excellence les faits suivants: Diman-
che 2 aout, de grand matin, les troupes, alle-
mandes, d'apres les. informations qui sont
parvenues au Gouvernement Grand. Ducal ^
I'heure actuelle, ont p6n6tr6 sur le territoire
luxembourgeois par les ponts de Wasserbillig
et de Remich, se dirigeant specialement vers
le Sud du pays et vers la ville.de Luxembourg,
capitale du Grand Duch6. Un certain nombre
de trains blind^s avec des troupes et des muni-
tions ont 6t6 achemin6s par la voie de chemin
de fer de Wasserbillig k Luxembourg, ou Ton
s'attend a. les voir arriver d'un instant a I'au-
tre. Ces faits impliquent des actes manifeste-
ment contraires k la neutrality du Grand Du-
che, garantie par le traits de Londres de 1867.
Le Gouvernement Luxembourgeois n'a pas
manqu6 de protester 6nergiquement contre
cette agression aupr^s du Repr^sentant de
Sa Majeste I'Empereur d'Allemagne k Luxem-
bourg. Une protestation identique va 6tre
transmise t^legraphiquement au Secretaire
d'Etat pour les Affaires Etrangeres a Berlin.
Le Ministre d'Etat,
President du Gouvernement :
(s) Eyschen.

No 1^.

Lettre adressie par M. Davignon, Ministre
des Affaires Etrangeres, aux Ministres du Roi
a Paris, Berlin^ Londres^ Vienne et Saint-Pi-
tersbourg.

Bruxelles, le 2 aoiit 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'avais eu soin de faire avertir par M. de

Baesompierre ie Ministre d'Allemagne qu'un

communique de M. Klobukowski, Ministre de

France,, k la presse bruxelloise, annoncerait

^ 9 -

la declaration formelle que ce'dernier m'avait
faite le 1" aout. Rencontrant M. de Below,
ce dernier m'a remercie de cette attention et
a ajoute "que jusqu'a present il n'avaif pas 616
charg6 de nous faire une communication offi-
cielle, mais que nous connaissions son opinipTi
personnelle sur la securite avec laquelle npus
ayions le droit de considerer* nos voisins de
I'Est, J'ai immediatement r^pondu que tout
ce que nous connaissions des intentions de
ceux-ci, intentions indiquees dans les multi-
ples entretiens anterieurs, ne nous permet-
tait pas de douter de leur parfaite correction
vis-a-vis de la Belgique; je tenais cependant
t ajouter que nous attacherions le plus grand
prix a gtre en possession d'une declaration
formelle dont 1^ nation prendrait connaissanqe
avec joie et reconnaissance.
Veuillez agr^ei*, etc.

(s) Davignon.

No 20.

Note remise le 2 aoUt, d. 19 heures, par M.
Below Saleske, Ministre d'Allemagne, a M.
Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangbre^.

Briissel, den 2 August 1914.

Kaiserlich

Deutsche Gesandtschaft

In Belgien.

TRES CONFIDENTIEL.

Der Kaiserlichen Regierung liegen zuyeriaa-
sige Nachrichten vor ueber den beabsichitigten
Aufmarsch franzosischer Streitkraft.e an der
Maas-Strecke Givet-Namur. Sie lassen keinen
Zweifel ueber die Absicht Frankreichs, durch
belgisches Gebiet gegen Deutschland vorzu-
gehen.

Die Kaiserliche Regierung kann sich der
Begorgniss nicht erwehren, dass Belgien, trotz
besten Willens, nicht im Stande sein wird,
ohne Hiilfe einen franzosischen Vormarsch
mit so grosser Aussicht auf Erfolg abzuweh-
ren, dass darin eine ausreichende Sicherheit
gegen die Bedrohung Deutschlands gefunden
werden kann. Es ist ein Gebot der Selbster-
haltung fiir Deutschland, dem feindlichen An-
griff zuvorzukonjmen. Mit dem grossten Be-
dauern wiirde es daher die deutsche Regie-
rung erfiillen, wenn Belgien einen Akt der
Feindseligkeit gegen sich darin erblicken wiir-
de, dass die Massnahmen seiner Gegner
Deutschland zwingen, zur Gegenwehr auch
seinerseits belgisches Gebiet zu betreten.

Um jede Missdeutung auszuschliessen, er-
klart die Kaiserliche Regierung das Folgende:

1. Deutschland beabsichtigt keinerlei Feind-
seligkeiten gegen Belgien. Ist Belgien gewillt,
in dem bevorstehenden Kriege, Deutschland
gegeniiber eine wohlwollende Neutral itat ein-
zunehmen, so verpflichtet sich die deutsche
Regierung, beim Friedensschluss Bezitzstand
und Unabhangigkeit des Konigreichs in vol-
lem Umfang zu garantieren.

2. Deutschland verpflichtet sich unter obi-
.ger Voraussetzung, das Gebiet des Konigreichs
wieder zu raumen, sobald der Friede geschlos-
sen ist.

3. Bei einer freundschaflticher Haltung Bel-
giens ist Deutschland bereit,im Einvernehriien
mit den Koniglich Belgischen Behorden alle
Bediirfnisse seiner Truppen gegen Barzahlung
anzukaufen und, jeden Schaden zu ersetzen,

der etwa durch deutsche Truppen verursacht
werden konnte.

4. Sollte Belgien den deutschen Truppen
feindlich entgegen treten, insbesondere ihrem'
vorgehen durch Widerstand der Maas-Befes-
tigungen oder durch Zerstorungen von Eisen-
bahnen, Strassen, Tunneln oder sonstigen
Kunstbauten Schwierigkeilen bereiten, so
wird Deutschland zu seinem Bedauern ge-
zwungen sein, das Konigreich als Feind zu
betrachten. In diesem Falle wiirde Deutsch-
land dem Konigreich gegeniiber keine Ver-
pflichtungen iibernehmen konnen, sondern
miisste die spatere Regelung des Verhaltnisses
beider Staaten zu einander der Entscheidung-
der Waff en -iiberlassen.

Die Kaiserliche Regierung giebt sich der
bestimmten Hoffnung bin, dass diese Eventua-
litat nicht eintreteh, und dass die Konigliche
Belgische Regierung die geeigneten Massnah-
men zu treffen wissen wird, um zu verhinde-
ren, dass Vorkommnisse, wie die vorstehend
erwahnten, sich ereignen. In diesem Falle
wiirden die freundschaftlichen Bande, die bei-
de Nachbarstaaten verbinden, eine weitere
und dauernde Festigung erfahren.

Annexe au N° 20.

Traduction de Vultimatum de CAllemagne.

Le Gouvernement allemand a regu des noa-
velles sures d'apres lesquelles les forces fran-
caises auraient I'intention de marcher sur la
Meuse par Givet et Namur.' Ces nouvelles ne
laissent aucun doute sur I'intention de la
France de marcher sur I'Allemagne par le
territoire beige. Le Gouvernement Imperial al-
lemand ne pent s'empecher de craindre que
la Belgique, malgr6 sa meilleure volont6, ne
sera pas en mesure de repousser sans secours
une marche frangaise d'un si grand d6velop-
pement. Dans ce fait on trouve une certitude
suffisante d'une menace dirig6e centre I'Al-
lemagne.

C'est un devoir imp6rieux de conservation
pour I'Allemagne de prevenir cette attaque de
I'ennemi

Le Gouvernement allemand regretterait tr6s
vivement que la Belgique regardit comme un
acte d'hostilit6 contre elle le fait que les me-
sures des ennemis de I'Allemagne I'obligent
de violer de son c6t6 le territoire beige.

Afin de dissiper tout malentendu le Gou-
vernement allemand declare ce qui suit:

1. L'Allemagne n'a en vue aucun acte d'hos-
tilite contre la Belgique. Si la Belgique con-
sent dans la guerre qui va commencer a pren-
dre une attitude de neutralite amicale vis-a-vis
de I'Allemagne, le Gouvernement allemand de
son c6t6 s'engage; aii moment de la paix, h.
garantir le royaume et ses possessions dans
tcute leur etendue.

2. L'Allemagne s'engage sous la condition
6nonc6e k 6vacuer le territoire beige aussitdt
la paix conclue

3. Si la Belgique observe une attitude ami-
cale, I'Allemagne est prete, d'accord avec les
autorit6s du Gouvernement beige, k acheter
contre argent comptant tout ce qui est n6ces-
saire k ses troupes et a indemniser pour les
dommages causes en .Belgique.

4 Si la Belgique se comcorle d'une fagon
hostile contre les troupes allemandes et par-
ticuli^rement fait des difficult6s k leur marche
en avant par une opposition des fortifications
de la Meuse ou par des destructions de routes
cbemins de fer, tunnels ou autres ouvrages

10 —

d'art, I'Allemagne sera obligee de consid^rer
la Belgique en'ennemie.

Dans ce cas TAllemagne ne prendra aucun
engagement vis-a-vis du royaume, mais elle
laissera le .reglement ulterieur des rapports
des deux Etats I'un vis-a-vis de I'autre a la
decision des armes. Le Gouvernement allC:
mand a I'espoir justifie que cette eventualite
ne se produira pas et que le Gouvernement
beige saura prendre les mesures appropriees
pour I'empecher de se produire. Dans ce cas
les relations d'amitie qui unissent les deux
Etats voisins deviendront plus etroites et du-
rables.

No 21.

Note SUT Ventrevue dernandee le 3 aoUt d. une
heure et demie, par M. de Below Sales ke,
Ministre d" Allemagne , a M. le Baron van der
Elst, Secretaire General au Ministere des Af-
faires Etrangeres.

A une heure et demie de la nuit, le Ministre
d'AIlemagne a demand^ a voir le Baron van
der Elst. II lui a d.it qu'il etait charge par
son Gouvernement de nous informer que des
dirigeables frangais avaient jete des bombes et
qu'une patrouille de cavalerie francaise, vio-
lant le droit des gens, attendu que la guerre
h'etait pas declaree, avait traverse la fron-
ti^re.

Le Secretaire G^n^ral a demande a M. de
Belovi^ ou ces faits s'^taient passes; en Alle-
magne, lui fut-il r^pondu. Le Baron van der
Elst fit remarquer que dans ce cas 11 ne
pouvait s'expliquer le but de sa communica-
tion. M. de Belov^^ dit que ces actes, contraires
au droit des gens, 6taient de nature h faire
supposer d'autres actes contre le droit des
gens que poserait la France.

No 22.

l^ote remise par M. Davignon, Ministre des
Affaires Etrangeres, a M. de Below Saleske,
Ministre d'AIlemagne.

Bruxelles, le 3 aout 1914.
(7 heures du matin).

Par sa note du 2 aout 1914, le Gouvernement
allemand a fait connaitre que d'apr^s des nou-
velles silres les forces frangaises auraient I'in-
tention de marcher sur la Meuse par Givet et
Namur, et que la Belgique, malgre sa meil-
leure volenti ne serait pas en 6tat de repousser
sans secours une marche en avant des troupes
francaises.

Le Gouvernement allemand s'estimefait
dans I'obligation de pr6venir cette attaque et
de violer le territoire beige. Dans ces condi-
tions, I'Allemagne propose au- Gouvernement
du Roi de prendre vis-^-vis d'elle une attitude
amicale et s'engage au moment de la paix a
garantir I'int^grit^ du Royaume et de ses pos-
sessions dans toute leur 6tendue. La note ajou-
te que si la Belgique fait des difficult^s h la
marche en avant des troupes allemandes, I'Al-
lemagne sera obligee d© la consid^rer comme
ennemie et de laisser le rfeglement ulterieur
des deux Etats I'un vis-a-vis de I'autre k la
decision des armes.

Cette note a provoqu6 chez le Gouverne-
ment du Roi un profond et douloureux 6tonne-
ment.

Les intentions qu'elle attribue h la France
sonten contradiction avec les declarations for-
melles qui nous ont ete faites le ler aout,
au nom du Gouvernement de la Republique.

D'ailleurs si contrairement a notre attente
une. violation de la neutralite beige venait a
etre commise par la France, la Belgique rem-
plirait tous ses devoirs internationaux et son
armee opposerait a I'envahisseur la plus vi-
goureuse resistance.

Les traites de 1839 confirmes par les traites
de 1870 consacrent I'independance et la neu-
tralite de la Belgique sous la garantie des
Puissances et notamment du Gouvernement de
Sa Majeste le Roi de Prusse.

La Belgique a tou jours ete fidele k ses obli-
gations Internationales; elle a accompli ses
devoirs dans un esprit de loyale impartialite;
elle n'a neglige aucun effort pour maintenir
ou faire respecter sa neutrality.

L'atteinte a son independance dont la me-
nace le Gouvernement allemand cOnstituerait
une flagrante violation du droit des gens.
Aucun interet strategique ne justifie la viola-
tion du droit.

Le Gouvernement beige en acceptant les
propositions qui lui sont notifiees sacrifierait
I'honneur de la nation en meme temps qu'il
trahirait ses devoirs vis-a-vis de I'Europe.

Conscient du role que la Belgique joue
depuis plus de 80 ans dans la civilisation du
monde, il se refuse ci croire que I'independance
de la Belgique ne puisse etre conserv^e qu'au
prix de la violation de sa neutrality.

Si cet espoir etait d^gu le Gouvernement
beige est fermement decide k repousser par
tous les moyens en son pouvoir toute atteinte
k son droit.

No 23.

Telegramme adrress^ par M. Davignon, Mi-
nistre des Affaires Etrangeres, aux Minis tres
du Roi, d. Saint-Petersbourg, Berlin, Londres,
Paris, Vienne, La Haye.

Bruxelles, le 3 aout 1914.

L' Allemagne a remis hier soir 7 heures une
note proposant la neutrality .amicale compor-
tant le passage libre par notre territoire, pro-
mettant le maintien de I'jnd^pendance du
Royaume et de ses possessions a conclusion de
la paix, menacant en cas de refus de traiter
la Belgique comme ennemie, d61ai de la re-
ponse fixe a douze heures. Nous avons r^pondu
que l'atteinte k notre neutrality serait une vio-
lation flagrante du droit des gens. L'accepta-
tion de la proposition allemande sacrifierait
I'honneur de la nation. Consciente de son de-
voir, la Belgique est ferinement d^cid6e k re-
pousser une agression par tous moyens.

(s) Davignon.

No 24.

Lettre adressie par M. Davignon, Ministre
des Affaires Etrangeres, aux Ministres du Roi
a Paris, Berlin, Londres, Vienne et Saint-Pi-
tersbourg.

Bruxelles, le 3 ao<it,19i4.
{k midi).
Monsieur le Ministre,

Comme vous le savez, I'Allemagne a remis
k la Belgique un ultimatum expirant ce matin

- 11

3 aout, a 7 heures. Aucun fait de guerre ne
s'etant encore produit a I'heure actuelle, le
Conseil des Ministres a decide qu'il n'y avail
pas lieu, pour le moment, de faire appel aux
Puissances garantes.

Le Ministre de France m'a dit a ce sujet :
«Sans etre charge d'une declaration de mon
Gouvernement, je crois cependant, m'inspi-
rant de ses intentions connues, pouvoir dire
que si le Gouvernement royal faisait appel au
Gouvernement frangais, comme puissance ga-
rante de sa neutralite, nous repondrions im-
mediatement a son appel; si cet appel n'etait
pas formule, il est probable, a moins bien
entendu que le souci de sa propre defense ne
determine des mesures exceptionnelles, qu'il
attendra pour intervenir que la Belgique ait
fait un acte de resistance effective."

J'ai remercie M. Klobukowski de I'appui
que le Gouvernement frangais voulait bien
nous offrir eventuellement et lui ai dit que
le Gouvernement du Roi ne faisait pas appel,
pour I'instant, a la garantie des Puissances et
se reservait d'apprecier ulterieurement ce qu'il
y aura lieu de faire.

(s) Davignon.

W 25.

THegrarhme adressS par S. M. le Roi ^
S. M. le Roi (VAngleterre.

Bruxelles, le 3 aout 1914.

Me souvenant des nombreuses marques d'a-
mitie de Votre Majesty et de ses pr6d6cesseurs,
de I'attitude amicale de I'Angleterre en 1870,
et de la preuve de sympathie qu'elle vient
encore de nous donner, je fais un supreme
appel h. I'intervention diplomatique du Gou-
vernement de Sa Majeste pour la sauvegarde
de la neutrality de la Belgique.

(s) -Albert.

NO 26.

TiUgramme adress^ par le Ministre du Roi
a Londres a M. Davignon, Ministre des Af-
faires Etrangdres.

Londres, 3 aoilt 1914.

J'ai montre votre t616granime au Ministre
des Affaires Etrangeres qui I'a communique
au Conseil des Ministres. Le Ministre des Af-
faires Etrangeres m'a dit que si notre neu-
trality etait viol6e, c'6tait la -guerre avec I'Al-
lemagne.

(s) Comte de Lalaing.

(Voir pikce N" 23.)

.Xo 27.

Lettre adressie par M. de Below Saleske,
Ministre d'Allemagne, d. M. Davignon, MiniS'
tre des Affaires Etrangeres (L'original est en
f rangais) .

Bruxelles, le 4 aoilt 1914.
(6 heures du matin).

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai 6t6 charge et j'ai I'honneur d'informer
Votre Excellence que par suite du refus oppo-
se par le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste le Roi
aux propositions bien intentionnees que lui

avait soumises le Gouvernement Imperial, ce-"
lui-ci se verra, a son plus vif regret, forc6
d'executer — au besoin par la force des armes
— les mesures de securite exposees comme
indispensables vis-a-vis des menaces frangai-
ses.

Veuillez agreer. Monsieur le Ministre, les
assurances de ma haute consideration.

(s) von Below.

No 28.

Note remise par Sir Francis H. Villiers, Mi-
nistre d'Angleterre, a M. Davignon, Ministre
des Affaires Etrangeres.

Bruxelles, le 4 aout 1914.

Je suis charge d'informer le Gouvernement
beige que si I'AUemagne exerce une pression
dans le but d'obliger la Belgique a abandonner
son role de pays neutre, le Gouvernement de
•Sa Majeste britannique s!attend h. ce que la
Belgique resiste par tous les moyens possir
bles.

Le Gouvernement de S.. M, Britannique,
dans ce cas, est pret a se joindre ci la Russie
et a la France, si la Belgique le desire, pour
offrir au Gouvernement beige sans deiai une
action commune, qui aurait comme but de
resister aux mesures de force employees par
I'AUemagne contre la. Belgique et en meme
temps d'offrir une garantie pour - mairitenir
I'independance et I'integrite de la Belgique
dans I'avenir.

NO 29.

Lett/re adressie par le Ministre du Roi a La
Haye a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires
Et/rangbres.

La Haye, le 4 aout 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres m'a dit
hier soir que le Gouvernement de la Reine
serait peut-etre oblige, dans les circonstances
graves actuelles, d'instituer sur I'Escaut le
balisage de guerre.

Le Jhr. Loudon m'a lu un projet de note
qui allait rm'annoncer cette .decision.

J'ai I'honneur de vous transmettre, sous ce
pli, une copie de la note en question qui m'a
ete remise dans la soiree d'hier. .

Comme vous le verrez, I'Escaut ne sera fer-
me que pendant la nuit. Pendant le jour, la
navigation sera possible mais seulement avec
des pilotes neerlandais qui ont ete munis des
indications nautiques , necessaires k ce sujet.
De cette fagon les interets de la defense du
territoire neerlandais et ceux de la navigation
beige d' An vers sont sauvegardes.

Vous -emarquferez qu'ensuite le Gouverne-
.ment des Pays-Bas nous demande qu'en cas
oil le balisage de guerre serait institue, nous
fassions retirer les bateaux-phare «Wielingen)>
et "W^andelaarw en vue de faciliter le maintien
de la neutralite du territoire des Pays-Bas.

Je vous ferai remarquer que le terme eni-
ploy6 dans cette note «remonter I'Escaut" n'est
pas assez explicite; descendre le fleuve sera
permis dans les mSmes conditions. Le Minis-
tre vient de m'en donner Tassurance.

- 12 -

Aussit6t que le Gouvernement n^erlandais
aura decid6 cette mesure d'exception j'en serai
inform^.

11 faut environ six heures pour effectuer ce
balisage de guerre.

Je vous telegraphierai aussitdt.

Veuillez agreer, etc.

(s) Baron Fallon.

Note annexee au.N<» 29.

Le Gouvernement de la Reine pourrait se
voir oblige dans I'interel du maintien de la
neutralite du territoire des Pays-Bas d'insti-
tuer sur I'Escaut le balisage de guerre, c'est-
a-dire d'enlever ou de modifier une partie do
'balisage actuel et des phares.

Toutefois, ce balisage de guerre a ete congu
de maniere a ce qu'apres son institution il
sera encore possible de remonter I'Escaut pour
gagner Anvers pendant le jour, mais seule-
ment avec des pilotes neerlandais, qui ont et6
munis -des indications nautiques necessaires
a ce sujet. En agissant de la sorte, le Gouver-
nement de la Reine est convaincu de pouvoir
tenir compte egalement des int^rets de la de-
fense du territoire neerlandais et de ceux de
la navigation beige d' Anvers.

Apres I'institution du balisage de guerre sur
I'Escaut, il n'y aurait plus de raison d'entrer
dans la passe de mer de Flessingue pendant
Ja nuit et comme la presence des bateaux-
phare «Wielingen» et «Wandelaarj) n'est pas
indispensable pour la navigation pendant le
jour, le Gouvernement Neerlandais mettrait
un haut prix a ce que le Gouvernement Royal
Beige voulM bien, au cas ou le balisage de
guerre serait institu6 par lui, faire retirer
lesdits bateaux en vue de faciliter le maintien
de la neutrality du territoire des Pays-Bas.

N° 30.

Tiligramme adressS par M. Davignon, Mi-
nistre des Affaires Etrangkres, aux Ministres
du Roi d. Londres et a Paris.

Bruxelles, le 4 aout 1914.

L'Etat Major fait savoir que le territoire
national a 6t6 viql6 k Gemmenich.

(s) Davignon.

No 31.

Leltre adress^e par M. Davignon, Ministre
des Affaires Etrangeres, a M. de Below Sales-
ke, Ministre d'Allemagne.

Bruxelles, le 4 aout 1914.
Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai I'honneur de faire savoir a Votre Ex-
cellence que des aujourd'hui le Gouvernement
du Roi ne saurait plus Lui reconnaitre de
caractere diplomatique et cesse d'avoir des
relations officielles avec Elle. Votre Excellence
trouvera sous ce pli les passeporls qui sont
necessaires a son depart et a celui du per-
sonnel de la Legation.

Je saisis, etc.

(s) Davignon.

NO 32.

Lettre adressee par M. de Below SaUske,
Mi/nistre d'Allemagne, a M. Davignon, Mi-
nistre des Affaires Etrangbres.

Bruxelles, le 4 aout 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai I'honneur d'accuser reception k Votre
Excellence de sa lettre du 4 aout et de Lui
faire savoir que j'ai remis la garde de la
Legation Imperiale k Bruxelles aux soins de
n^on collegue des Etats-Unis.

Je saisis, etc.

(s) de Below.

No 33.

Telegramme adresse par M. Davignon, Mi-
nistre des Affaires Etrangeres, d. M. le Baron
Grenier, Ministre du Roi a Madrid.

Bruxelles, le 4 aout 1914.

Veuillez demander au Gouvernement espa-
gnol s'il veut bien se charger de la protection
des interets beiges en Allemagne et, dans ce
cas, donner les instructions necessaires a son
Ambassadeur a Berlin.

(s) Davignon.

N" 34.

Teligramme adresse par M. Davignon, Mi-
nistre des Affaires Etrangeres, a M. le Baron
Bey ens, Ministre du Roi a Berlin.

Bruxelles, le 4 aout 1914.

Le Ministre d'Allemagne quitte le pays ce
soir; demandez vos passeports. Nous prions
le gouvernement de Madrid d'autoriser I'Am-
bassadeur d'Espagne de vouloir bien se char-
ger de la protection des interets beiges en
Allemagne.

(s) Davignon.

No 35.

Lettre adrissie par le Ministre de Belgique
a Berlin a M. Davignon^ Ministre des Affaires
Etrangeres.

Berlin, 4 aoCit 1914.
Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai I'honneur de vous faire parvenir, ci-
apres en traduction, la partie du discours pro-
nonce aujourd'hui k la tribune du Reichstag
par le Ghancelier de I'Empire et relative a
I'odieuse violation de notre neutralite :

«< Nous nous trouvons en 6tat de legitime
defense et la necessite ne connait pas de lois.

» Nos troupes ont occupe Luxembourg et
ont, peut-etre, deja penetre en Belgique. Cela
est en contradiction avec les prescriptions du
droit des gens. La France a, il est vrai,
declare k Bruxelles qu'elle etait resolue a res-
pecter la neutrality de la Belgique, aussi
longtemps que I'adversaire la respecterait.
Mais nous savions que la France se tenait
prete pour envahir la Belgique. La France
pouvait attendre. Nous pas. Une attaque fran-
caise sur notre flanc dans la region du Rhin
inferieur aurait pu devenir fatale. C'est ainsi
que nous avons ete forces de passer outre aux
protestations justifi6es d«;s Gouvernements lu^

xembourgeois et beige. L'injustice que nous
commettons de cette faQon, nous la reparerons
des que notre but militaire sera atteint.

>« A celui qui est menace au point oii nous
le sommes et qui lutte pour son bien supreme,
il n'est permis que de songer au moyen de
se degager; nous nous trouvons cote a cote
avec I'Autriche.))

II est a remarquer que M. de Bethmann-
HoUweg reconnait, sans le moindre detour,
que I'Allemagne viole le droit international
en envahissant le territoire beige et qu'elle
commet une injustice a notre egard.

Veuillez agreer, etc.

(s) Baron Beyens.

N°-36.

Lettre adressee par le Ministre du Roi d.
Londres a M. Davignon, Mmistre des Affmres
Etrangbres.

Londres, le 4 aout 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai I'honneur de vous faire savoir que le
Premier Ministre a fait cet apres-midi ci la
Chambre des Communes une nouvelle de-
claration relativement a la crise europeenne.

Apres avoir rappele les principaux . points
exposes hier par Sir E. ' Grey, le Premier
Ministre a donne lecture :

r d'un telegramme de Sir F. Villiers, regu
ce matin, qui fait connaitre la teneur du se-
cond ultimatum adresse par le Gouvernement
allemand au Gouvernement beige et qui vous
a et6 remis ce matin; (voir N" 27).

2° du telegramme par lequel vous m'annon-
cez la violation de la frontiere a Gemmenich,
dont j'ai remis copie a Sir A. Nicolson;

3° d'un telegramme adresse ce matin par
le Gouvernement allemand a son Ambassa-
deur a Londres dans le but evident d'egarer
I'opinion publique sur son attitude. En voici
la traduction d'apres un journal de ce soir :
«Veuillez dissiper toute mefiance que. le Gou-
vernement Britannique pourrait avoir au su-
jet de nos intentions, en repetant, de la ma-
niere la plus positive, I'assurance formelle que'
meme en cas de conflit armeavecla Belgique,
I'Allemagne n'annexera sous aucun pretexte
le territoire beige.

» La sincerite de cette declaration est cor-
roboree par le fait que I'Allemagne a solen-
nellement donne sa parole a la Hollande de
son intention de respecter sa neutralite.-

>' II est evident que nous ne pourrions nous
annexer le territoire beige d'une mani^re
avantageuse sans faire, en meme temps, une
acquisition territoriale au detriment de la
Hollande.

» Priere de faire bien comprendre a Sir
E. Grey qu'il etait impossible d'exposer I'ar-
m6e allemande a une attaque frangaise portee
en traversant la Belgique, attaque qui, d'apres
des informations absolument incontestables,
etait projetee.

» En consequence I'Allemagne n'a pas tenu
compte de la neutralite beige afin d'eviter
ce qui est pour elle une question de vie ou
de mort, une attaque frangaise par la Bel-
gique."

M. Asquith a ensuite expose a la Chambre
qu'en reponse a cette note du Gouvernement
allemand le Gouvernement britannique lui
avait renouvel6 sa proposition de la semaine
derni^re, a, savoir de donner au sujet de la

neutralite beige les memes assurances que la
France en avait donnees la semaine derniere,
tant a I'Angleterre qu'a la Belgique. Le Cabi-
net anglais accordait k celui de Berlin jusqu'a
minuit pour lui faire connaitre sa reponse.
Veuillez agreer, etc.

(s) Comte de Lalaing.

No 37.

TeUgramme adresse par le Ministre du Roi
a. Londres a M. Davignon, Mindstre des Af-
faires Btra/ngeres.

Londres, 4 aoiit 1914.

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a fait
savoir aux Ministres anglais en Norvege, Hol-
lande, Belgique, que I'Angleterre s'attend k
ce que ces trois Royaumes resistent a la pres-
sion de I'Allemagne etr gardent la neutralite.
Dans leur resistance ils seront soutenus par
I'Angleterre qui, dans ce cas, est prete a
coop6rer avec la France et la Russie si tel
est le desir de ces trois Gouvernements en
off rant alliance aux dits Gouvernements, pour
repousser I'emploi'contre eux de la force par
rAllemagrie, et garantie, pour le maintien
futur de I'independance et de' I'integrit^ des
trois Royaumes. J'ai fait remarquer que la
Belgique est neutre a perpetuite. Le Ministre
des Affaires Etrangeres a repondu : c'est pour
le cas de neutralit6 violee.

(s) Comte de Lalaing.

No 38.

Lettre adressie par M. Davigyion, Ministre
des Affaires Etrangeres, aux Ministres du Roi
Ci Paris, Londres et Saint-Petersbourg.

Bruxelles, le 4 aoiit 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre.,

J'ai I'honneur de porter a votre connaissan-
ce I'ordre des fails successifs qui ont marqu6
pendant les derniers jours les relations de la
Belgique avec certaines des Puissances garan-
tes de sa neutralite et de son independance.

Le 31 juillet le Ministre d'Angleterre me
fit une communication verbale aux termes de
laquelle, en prevision d'une guerre europeen-
ne. Sir E. Grey avait demande aux Gouver-^
nements allemand et frangais, separement,
si chacun d'cux etait resolu a respecter la
neutralite de la Belgique dans I'^ventualit^
ou cette neutralite ne serait pas violee par
aucune autre puissance.

En' raison des traites existants. Sir Francis
Villiers etait charge de porter cette d-marche
a la connaissance du Gouvernement du Roi
en ajoutant que Sir E. Grey presumait que
la Belgique 6tait resolue a maintenir sa neu-
tralite et qu'elle s'attendait k ce que les autres
puissances la respectent.

J'ai dit k M. le Ministre d'Angleterre que
nous appr6ciions hautement cette communcia-
lion qui repondait a notre attente et j'ai ajoute
que la Grande-Bretagne ainsi que les autres
Puissances garantes de notre independance
pourraient etre pleinement assurees de notre
ferme volonte de maintenir notre neutralite;
celle-ci ne nous paraissant d'ailleurs pas pou-
voir etre menacee par aucun de ces Etats avec
lesquels nous entretenons les rapports les plus
cordiaux et les plus confiants. Le Gouverne-
ment, ai-je fait remarquer, avait donn6 une

14 -

preuve d^ celte resolution en prenant des a
present toutes les mesures militaires que la
situation lui paraissait coinporter.

A son tour, M. le Ministre.de France se
declara, le l" aoiit, dans une conversation
verbale, autorise ~a faire connaitre au Gou-
-vernement beige, qu'en cas de con flit inter-
^national, le Gouvernement de la Republique,
econformement a ses declarations constantes,
respecterait le territoire de la Belgique et qu'il
ne serait amene a modifier son attitude que
dans le cas de violation de la neutralite beige
par une autre Puissance.

Je remerciai Son Excellence et ajoutai que
nous- avipns deja pris toutes les dispositions
requises pour assurer le respect de notre
independance et de nos frontieres.

Le 2 aout, dans la matinee, j'eus avec Sir
Francis Villiers un nouvel entretien au cours
duquel il me fit part de ce qu'il avait transmis
telegraphiquement samedi, des la premiere
heure, a son Gouvernement notre conversation
du 31 juillet en ay ant soiri de reproduire fide-
lement la declaration solennelle qu'il avait.
irecueillie de la volonte de la Belgique de
defendre ses frontieres, de quelque cote qu'el-
jles soient envahies. II ajouta : «Nous savons
{que la France vous a donne des assurances
iformelles;mais I'Angleterre n'a regu a ce sujet
aucune reponse de Berlin.

Ce dernier fait ne provoqua en moi aucune
Amotion particuliere, parce que la declaration
^u Gouvernement allemand pouvait paraitre
surabondante en presence des trait6s exis-
tants. D'ailleurs le Secretaire d'Etat aux af-
faires Etrangeres avait affirme a la seance
de la commission du Reichstag du 29 avril
1913 «que la neutralite de la Belgique est
etablie -conventionnellement et que I'Allema-
,gne a I'intention de respecter ce traite.»

he meme jour, M. de Below Saleske, Minis-
tre d'Allemagne, se presenta au Ministere des
Affaires Etrangeres a 19 heures et me remit
la note ci-jointe (voir piece N" 20). Le Gou-.
vernement allemand accordait au Gouverne-
,ment beige un delai de douze heures p.our
'lui faire connaitre sa decision.

Aucune hesitation ne pouvait se manifes-
(er au sujet de la reponse qu'appelait la pro-
.position surprenante du Gouvernement alle-
mand. Vous en trouverez une copie sous ce
pli. (Voir piece N° 22.)

L'Ultimatum expirait le 3 aout, a 7 heures
du matin ; comme a 10 heures aucun fait de
guerre ne s'etait produit, le Conseil des Minis-
.tres decida qu'il n'y avait pas lieu, pour le
imoment, de faire appel aux Puissances ga-
Tantes.

Vers midi, le Ministre de France m'inter-
frogea sur ce point et me dit :

« Bien qu'en raison de la soudainet6 des
evenements je ne sois encore charg6 d'aucune
declaration, je crois cependant, m'inspirant
des intentions bien connues de mon Gouver-
nement, pouvoir dire que si le Gouvernement
Tloyal faisait appel au Gouvernement fran-
gais comme puissance garante de sa neutra-
lite, il repondrait immediatement a son appel.
Si cet appel n'etait pas formule il est proba-
ble, a moins bien entendu que le souci de sa
propre defense ne determine des mesures ex-
ceptionnelles, qu'il attendrait, pour interve-
nir, que la Belgique ait fait un acte de resis-
tance .effective. »

J'ai remercie M. Klobukowski de I'appui
flue le Gouvernement frangais voulait bien

nous offrir 6ventueTlemenl el lui ai dit que le
Gouvernement du Roi ne faisait pas appel,
pour I'inslant, a la garantie des Puissances
et se r6servait d'apprecier ulterieurement ce
qu il y aura lieu de laire.

Enfin, le 4 aoilt, a 6 heures du matin, le
Ministre d'Allemagne me fit la communica-
tion suivante : (voir piece N" 27).

Le Conseil des Ministres delibere en ce mo-
ment au sujet de I'appel aux Puissances ga-
rantes de notre neutralite.

Veuillez agreer, etc.

(s) Davignon.

NO 39.

TeUgramme adressS par le Ministre du Roi
a Londres a M. Davignon^ Ministre des Af-
faires Etrangeres.

Londres, 4 aout 1914.

L'Angleterre a somme ce matin I'Allemagne
de respecter la neutralite beige. L'ultimatum
dit que vu la note adressee par I'Allemagne k
la Belgique menagant cette derniere de la for-
ce des armes si elle s'oppose au passage de
ses troupes, vu la violation du territoire beige
a Gemmenich, vu le fait que I'Allemagne a
refuse de donner k I'Angleterre la meme as-
surance que celle donnee la semaine derniere
par la France, I'Angleterre doit demander a
nouveau une reponse satisfaisante au sujet du
respect de la neutralite beige et d'un traite
dont I'Allemagne est signataire aussi bien
qu'elle-meme. L'ultimatum expire a minuit.

En consequence de l'ultimatum de I'Angle-
terre k I'Allemagne, la proposition anglaise
que je vous ai transmise par tel^gramme est
annul6e 'pour le moment.

(s) Comte de Lalaing.
{Voir piice N" 37.)

No 40.

Lettre adressie par M. Davignon, Ministre
des Affaires Etrangeres, aux Ministres de
Orande-Bretagne, de France et de Russie.

Bruxelles, le 4 aoiit 1914.
Monsieur le Ministre,

Le Gouvernement beige a le regret de de-
voir annoncer a Votre Excellence que ce ma-
tin les forces armies de I'Allemagne ont p6-
netre sur le territoire beige en violation des
engagements qui ont 6te pris par traite.

Le Gouvernement du Roi est fermemenl
decide a resister par tous les moyens en son
pouvoir.

La Belgique fait appel a I'Angleterre, a la
France et a la Russie pour cooperer, comme
garantes, a la defense de son territoire.
• II y aurait une action concertee et commune
ayant pour but de resister aux mesures de
forces employees par I'Allemagne contre la
Belgique et en meme temps de garantir le
maintien de l'ind6pendance et de i'int6grite
de la Belgique dans I'avenir.

La. Belgique. est heureuse de pouvoir decla-
rer qu elle assumera la defense des places for-
tes.

Je saisis, etc.

^s^ Davignon.

— 15 —

N041

Teligramme adresse par le Ministre du Rot
sh Londres a M. Davignon, Ministre des Af-
faires Etrang^res

Londres, 5 aout 1914.

L'Allemagne ayant fejete les propositions
anglaises, TAngleterre lui a declare que I'etat
de guerre existait entre les deux pays, a partir
de onze heares

(s) Comte. de Lalaing

NO 42.

Telegramme adresse par M. Davignon, Mi-
nistre des Affaires Etrang^res, aux Ministres
du Roi a Paris, Londres et Saint-Petersbourg.

Bruxeiles, le 5 aout 1914.

Apr^s la violation du territoire a Gemme-
nich, la Belgique a fait appel, par I'interme-
diaire de leurs Representants accredites a
Bruxelles, a I'Angleterre, a la France et a la
Russie pour coop6rer, connme garantes, a la
defense de son territoire.

La Belgique assume la defense des places
fortes.

(s) Davignon.

No 43.

Lettre adressie par M. Davignon, Ministre
ides Affaires Etrangbres, aux Ministres du Roi
[d Paris. Londres et Saint-Petersbourg.

Bruxelles, le 5 aoiit 1914.
Monsieur le Ministre,

Par ma d6p§che du 4 aout (voir pikce N° 38),
j'ai eu rhonneur de vous exposer la suite des
evenements qui ont rriarqu6 les relations in-
■ternationales de la Belgique du 31 juillet au
4 aout. J'ajoutais que le Conseil des Ministres
€xaminait la question«de savoir si la Belgique,
dont le territoire avait 6te envahl depuis le
matin, ferait appel k la garantie.

Le Conseil venait de se decider en faveur
de I'affirmative, lorsque le Ministre d'Angle-
terre me fit savoir que la proposition dont il
m'avait saisi et d'apr^s laquelle le Goaverne-
ment britannique 6tait dispose a r^pondre a
notre appel en garantie, 6tait annul^e pour
le moment. (Voir pibce N° 37).

On telegramme de Londres m'apprit que ce
changement d'attitude etait motiv6 par un
ultimatum de I'Angleterre laissant h I'Alle-
m.agne un delai de dix heures pour 6vacuer le
sol beige et respecter la neutrality de la
Belgique. (Voir pihce N° 39). Dans la soir6e,
le Gouyernement du Roi a adress6, par Tin
tcrmediaire de leurs representants respectifs
a Bruxelles. a la France, h la Grande-Breta-
gne et a la Russie, la note dont vous trouverez
la copie ci-jointe. (Voir pibce N° 40)

Comme vous le remarquerez la Belgique
fait appel k I'Angleterre, k la "France et k
la Russie pour coop6rer comme garants a la
defense de son territoire et au maintien dans
I'avenir de ri-nd^pendance et de I'int6grit6
du territoire. Elle assurera -la defense des
places fortes.

Jusqu'ici nous ne connaissons pas raccueil
qui a 6te reserve a notre appel.
Veuillez agreer, etc.

(s) Davignon,

No 44.

Lettre adrcssee par M Davignon, Ministre
des Affaires Etrangeres, aux Chefs de mission
dans tous les pays entretenant avec la Belgi-
que des nupports dvplomatjiques

Bruxelles, le 5 aout 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

Par le traite du 18 avril 1839, la Prusse, la
France, I'Angleterre, I'Autriche et la Russie
se sont declarees garantes du traite conclu
le meme jour entre S. M. le Roi des Beiges et
S. M. le Roi des Pays-Bas.Ce traite porte .'« La
Belgique formera un Etat independant et per-
petuellement neutre.» La Belgique a rempli
toutes ses obligations Internationales, elle a
accompli ses devoirs dans un esprit de loyale
impartialite, elle n'a neglige aucun effort
pour maintenir et faire respecter sa neutra-
lite.

Aussi est-ce avec une penible emotion que
le Gouvernement du Roi a appris que les
forces armees de rAllcmagne, puissance ga-
rante de notre neutralite, ont penetre sur le
territoire de la Belgique en violation des en-
gagements qui ont ete pris par traite.

II est de notre devoir de protester avec in-
dignation cohtre un attentat au droit des gens
qu'aiicun acte de notre part n'a pu provoquer.

Le Gouvernement du Roi est fermement
decide a repousser par tous les moyens en
son pouvoir I'atteinte portee a sa neutralite
et il rappelle qu'en vertu de I'article 10 de la
convention de La Haye de 1907, concernant
les droits et les devoirs des Puissances et
.des personnes neutres en cas de guerre su-r
terre, ne peut etre considere comme un ^cte
hostile le fait, par une Puissance neutre, de
repousser. meme par la Torce, les atteintes a
sa neutralite.

Vous voudrez bien demander d'urgence une
audience au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres
et donner lecture a Son Excellence de la
presente lettre dont vous lui laisserez copie.
Si I'audience ne pouvait vous etre immediate-
men t accordee, vous ferez par ecrit la conv
munication dont il s'agit.

Veuillez agreer. etc.

(s) Davigno.n.

No 45.

Telearam/tne adressi par le Ministre du Roi
a Berlin, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affai-
res Etrangkres.

Berlin, le 5 aout 1914.

J'ai recu mes passeports. Je quitterai Berlin
demain matin avec personnel pour la Hollan-
de.

(s) Baron Beyens.

No 46.

T6leqramme adressi par le Ministre du Roi
a Madrid, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Af-
faires Etrangeres.

Saint-Sebastien, 5 aoAt 1914.

Le Gouvernement espagnol se charge des
mterets beiges en Allemagne. Il donne au-

- 16 —

jourd'hui telegraphiquenitnt des instructions
a son Ambassadt'ur a Berlin.

(s) Baron Grenier.
(Voir pihcc N" 35.)

N° 47.

Let Ire adressec par le M mist re du Roi d.
Paris a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires
Etrangeres.

Paris, le 5 aout 1914.
Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai I'honneur de vous faire parvenir, sous
ce pli, une copie de la notification de I'etat
de guerre existant entre la France et TAlle-.
magne, qui m'a et6 remise aujoufd'hui.

Veuillez ag'r^er, etc.

(s) Baron Guillaume.

Annexe au N^ 47.

Le Gouvernement Imperial AUemand, apres
avoir laisse ses forces armees franchir la fron-
tiere et se livrer sur le territoire frangais a
divers actes de meurtre et de violence; apres
avoir viole la neutrality du Grand Duche de
Luxembourg au mepris des stipulations de la
convention de Londres du 11 mai 1867 et
de la convention de La Haye du 18 octobre
1907, sur Ics droits el devoirs des Puissances
et des personnes neutres en cas de guerre sur
lerre (articles 1 a 11), conventions signees de
lui; apres avoir adresse un ultimatum au
Gouvernement royal de Belgique, tendant ^
exiger le passage des forces allemandes par
le territoire beige, en violation des Trailes
du 19 avril 1839 egalement signes par lui et
de la susdite convention de La Haye;

A declare la guerre a la France le 3 aoiit
1914, a 18 heures 45;

Le Gouvernement de la Republique se voit
dans ces conditions oblige de son cote de
recourir a la force des armes.

II a en consequence I'honneur de faire sa-
voir par la presente au Gouvernement Royal
que I'etat de guerre existe entre la France
et I'Allemagne a dater du 3 aoilt, 18 heu-
res 45.

Le Gouvernement de la Republique pro-
teste aupres de toutes les nations civilisees
et sp^cialement aupres des Gouvernements
signataires des conventions et trait^s sus-
rappeles, contre la violation par I'Empire al-
lemand de ses engagements internationaux;
il fait toutes reserves quant aux repr^sailles
qu'il pourrait se voir amene a exercer contre
un ennemi aussi peu soucieux de la parole
donn^e.

Le Gouvernement de la Republique, qui
entend observer les principes du droit des
gens, se conformera durant les hostilites et
sous reserve de r6ciprocite aux dispositions
des conventions inlemationales sign6es par
la France concernant le droit de la guerre
sur terre et sur mer.

La pr6sente notification faite en conformity
de I'article 2 de ladite IP Convention de La
Haye du 18 octobre 1907 relative a I'ouverture
des hostilites est remise ci M. le Ministre de
Belgique k Paris, le 5 aoiit 1914, a 14 heures.

N" 48.

Communication faite le 5 aout par Sir Fran-
cis Villiers, Ministre d'Angletcrre, a M. Da-
vignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.

Je suis charge d'informer le Gouvernement
beige que le Gouvernement de S. M. Bri-
tannique considere Taction commune dans le
but de resister k I'Allemagne comme etant
en vigueur et justifiee par le Iraite de 1839.

No 49.

Tiligramme adresse jmr le Ministre du Roi
a Londres a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affai-
res Etrangeres.

Londres, 5 aout 1914.
L'Angleterre accepte de cooperer comme
garante a la defense de notre territoire. La
flotte anglaise assurera le libre passage de
i'Escaut pour le ravitaillement d'Anvcrs.

(s) Comte de Lalaing.

NO 50.

TeUgramme adresse par le Ministre du Roi
d La Haye a. M. Davignon, Ministre des Af-
faires E tr ang.br es.

La Haye, 5 aoilt 1914.
Le balisage de guerre va etre etabli.

(s) Baron Fallon.
(Voir pihce N" 29).

NO 51.

Telegramtne adresse par M. Davignon, Mi-
ndsPre des Affaires Etrangeres, a M. le Baron
Grenier, Ministre du Roi a Madrid.

Bruxelles, 5 aout 1914.

Exprimez au Gouvernement espagnol les
remerciements tr^s sinceres du Gouverne-
ment du Roi.

(s) Davignon.

(Voir jnhce N^ 46.) .

No 52.

Lettre adresskc par M. Davignon, Ministre
des Affaires Etrangeres aux Ministres du Roi
h Paris, Londres et Saint-Pitersbourg.

Bru.xelles, le 5 aoiit 1914.
Monsieur le Ministre,

.rai I'honneur de vous faire savoir que les
Ministres de France et de Russie ont fait ce
matin une demarche aupres de moi, pour
me faire connaitre la volonte de leurs gou-
vernements de repondre k notre appel et de
cooperer avec I'AngleteYre k la defense de
notre territoire.

Veuillez agr6er, etc.

(s) Davignon;

No 53.

Lettre adressee par le Minislre des Pays-
Bas t M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires
Etrangeres.

Bruxelles, le 6 aoilt 1914.
Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai rhonneur de faire parvenir ci-joint k
Votre Excellence un exemplaire du numero
extraordinaire du «Staalscourant)>, contenant
la declaration de neutralite des Pays-Bas dans
la guerre entre la Belgique et I'Allemagne, et
I'Angleterre et TAUemagne.

Veuillez agreer, etc.

(s) Jonkheer de Weede./

Annexe au N° 53.

LOIS, ARR£t£S, nominations, etc.

Ministere des Affaires etrangeres, de la Justice,

de la tAarine, de la Guerre et des Colonies.

Les Ministres des Affaires Etrangeres, de
la Justice, de la Marine, de la Guerre et
des Colonies, autorises a cette fin par Sa
Majeste la Reine, portent a la connaissance
de tous ceux que la chose concerne, que le
Gouvernement neerlandais observera dans la
guerre qui a eclate entre les Puissances amies
des Pays-Bas, Grande-Bretagne et Allemagne,
et Belgique et Allemagne, une stride neu-
tralite et qu'en vue de Tobservation de cette
neutralite les dispositions suivantes ont ete
arretees :

.\RTICLE I.

Dans les limites du territoire de I'Etat, com-
prenant le territoire du Royaume en Europe,
outre les colonies et possessions dans d'autres
parties du monde, aucun genre d'hostilites
n'est permis et ce territoire ne pent servir
de base pour des operations hostiles.

ARTICLE 2.

Ni I'occ.upation d'une partie qu^lconque du
territoire de I'Etat par un belligerant, ni le
passage a travers ce territoire par voie de
terre par des troupes ou des convois de muni-
tions appartenant a un des belligerants ne
sont permis, non plus que le passage a travers
le territoire situ6 a I'interieur des eaux terri-
toriales neerlandaises par des navires de guer-
re oil des batiments. des belligerants assimiles
a ceux-ci.

ARTICLE 3.

Les troupes ou les niilitaires, appartenant
aux belligerants ou destines a ceux-ci et arri-
vant sur le territoire de I'Etat par voie de
terre seront immediatement desarmes et in-
ternes jusqu'a la fin de la guerre.

Les navires de guerre ou batiments assimi-
les a ces derniers, appartenant a un belli-
gerant, qui contreviendront aux prescriptions
des articles 2, 4 ou 7, ne pourront quitter
ce territoire avant la fin de la guerre.

Les navires de guerre ou batiments assimi-
les a. ces derniers, appartenant a un bellige-
rant, qui contreviendront aux prescriptions
des articles 2, 4 ou 7, ne pourront quitter ce
territoire avant la fin de la guerre.

ARTICLE 4.

Les navires de guerre ou batiments assi-
miles a ces derniers, qui appartiennent h un
belligerant, n'auront pas acces au territoire
de I'Etat.

ARTICLE 5.

La disposition de I'article 4 n'est pas appli-
cable :

r aux navires de guerre ou batiments d'un
belligerant assimiles a ces derniers, et qui
par suite d'avarie ou de I'etat de la mer sont
tenus d'entrer dans un des ports ou rades de
I'Etat. Les navires pourront quitter les dits
ports ou rades des que les circonstances qui
les ont contraints de s'y r6fugier auront cess6
d'exister;

2° aux navires de guerre ou batiments
assimiles, appartenant ci un belligerant, et
qui font escale dans un port ou une rade
situes dans le lerritoire des colonies. et pos-
sessions d'outre-mer, exclusivement dans le
but de completer leur provision de denrees
alimentaires ou de combustibles. Ces navires
devront repartir des que les circonstances qui
les ont forces k faire escale ont cess6 d'exister,
avec cette condition que le sejour en rade ou
dans le port ne pourra durer plus de 24 heu-
res.

3° aiix navires de guerre ou batiments as-
similes, appartenant a un belligerant, et qui
sont utilises exclusivement pour une mission
religieuse, scientifique, ou humanitaire.

ARTICLE 6.

Les navires de guerre ou batiments assi-
miles, appartenant a un belligerant, ne peu-
vent reparer leurs avaries dans les ports ou
rades de I'Etat qu'en tant que cette reparation
est indispensable a la securite de la naviga-
tion, et ils ne pourront en aucune fa^on ac-
croitre leurs capacites de combat.

ARTICLE. 7.

Les navires de guerre ou batiments assimi-
les, appartenant k un belligerant, et qui, au
commencement de la guerre, se trouveraient
sur le territoire de I'Etat, sont tenus de le
quitter dans les 24 heures de la publication
de la presente.

ARTICLE 8.

Si des navires de guerre ou batiments assi-
miles appartenant k divers belligerants se
trouvent, en meme temps, dans les condi-
tions visees ci I'article 5, dans une meme par-
tie du monde, et sur le territoire de I'Etat,
un deiai d'au moins 24 heures doit s'ecouler
entre le depart des navires de chacun des
belligerants. A moins de circonstances spe-
ciales, I'ordre de depart est determine par
I'ordre d'arrivee. Un navire de guerre ou un
bMiment assimiie, appartenant a un belli-
gerant, ne pent quitter le territoire de I'Etat
que 24 heures apres le depart d'un navire
de commerce portant le pavilion de I'autre
belligerant.

ARTICLE 9.

Les navires de guerre ou batiments assimi-
les, appartenant a un belligerant, vises k
I'art. 5 et i I'art. 7, ne peuvent etre ravitailles

en denrees alimentaires dans les ports et les
rades du pays que dans la mesure necessaire
pour parfaire leurs provisions jusqu'^ la li-
nnite normale du temps de paix.

De meme, ils ne peuvent charger de coni*
bustible que, dans la mesure n^cessaire pour
pouvqir atteindre, avec la provision qu'ils ont
encore h bord, le port le plus rapproche de
leur propre pays.

Un m6me batiment ne peut §tre ravitaille
h nouveau en combustible qu'a I'expiration
d'une periode de trois mois au moins apres
son precedent ravitaillement dans le terri-.
toire de I'Etat.

ARTICLE iO.

Une prise ne peut etre amende dans le
territoire que lorsqu'elle est incapable de na-
viguer, qu'elle tient mal la mer, qu'elle man^
que de. conibustible ou de derir^es alimen-
taires.

Elle doit s'^loigner d6s que la cause de
son entree dans le territoire cesse d'exister.

Si elle ne le fait pas, I'ordre lui sera donne
|de partir imm^diatement; en cas de refus, il
[sera fait usage des moyens disponibles pour
lib^rer la prise avec ses officiers et son equi-
page et pour interner Tequipage place k bord
par le bellig6rant qui a fait la prise.

ARTICLE il.

II est interdit, sur le territoire de I'Etat,
de former des' corps combattants ou d'ouvrir
des bureaux de recrutement au profit des
bellig^rants.

ARTICLE i2.

II est interdit, sur le territoire de I'Etat, de
prendre du service k bord de navires de guer-
re ou de batiments assimil6s,

ARTICLE 13.

II est interdit, . sur le territoire de I'Etat,
d'am^nager. d'armer ou d'^quiper des navires
destines k des fins militaires au profit d'un
belligerant, ou de fournir ou conduire k un
bellig6rant de tels navires.

ARTICLE 14.

n est interdit, sur le territoire de I'Etat, de
fournir des armes ou des munitions k des navi-
res de guerre ou batiments assimil6s apparte-
nant k un belligerant, ou de leur venir en aide
d'une mani^re quelconqije en vue de I'aug-
mentation de leur ecjuipage oil de leur ame-
nagement.

ARTICLE 15.

II est interdit. sur le territoire de I'Etat, sauf
autorisation pr^alable des autorit§s locales
comp6tentes, de faire des reparations aux na-
vires de guerre ou batiments assimil6s appar-
tenant k un bellig6rant, ou de leur fournir des
provisions de.bouche ou de combustible.

ARTICLE 16.

II est interdit, sur le territoire de I'Etat, de
cooperer au degr6ement ou a la reparation de
prises, sauf en ce qui est necessaire pour les
rendre propres a tenir la mer; ainsi que
d'acheter des prises ou des merchandises con-
fisqu^es, et de les recevoir en ^change, en don
ou en depdt.

ARTICLE 17.

Le territoire de I'Etat- comprend -la mer
cdtiere sur une largeur de 3 milles marins
a raison de 60 par degre de latitude, a partir
de la laisse de la basse mer.

En ce qui concerne les bales, cette distance
do 3 milles marins est mesuree a partir d'une
ligne droite tiree a travers la bale aussi pres
que possible de I'entree, au point ou I'ouver-
ture de la baie ne depasse pas dix milles ma-
rins, k raison de 60 par degre de latitude.

ARTICLE 18.

En outre, i'attention est attiree sur les arti-
cles 100, 1°, et 205 du Code penal ; Indisch
Staatsblad 1905, N" 62 ; Art. 7, 4°, de la loi sur
ja qualite de Neerlandais et sur le domicile
(Nederlandsch Staatsblad 1892, N° 268; 1910,
N° 216); art. 2, N° 3, de la loi sur la qualite
de sujet neerlandais (Nederlandsch Staatsblad
1910, N" 55; Indisch Staatsblad 1910, N" 296;
art. 54 et 55 du Code p^nal de Suriname;
art. 54 et 55 du Code penal de Curagao).

De meme, I'attention des commandants de
navirps, armateurs et affreteurs, est attiree sur
le danger et les inconvenients auxquels ils
s'exposeraient en ne respectant pas le blocus
effectif des belligerants, en transportant de la
contrebande de guerre ou des depeches mili-
taires pour les belligerants {k moins qu'il ne
s'agisse du service postal regulier) ou en exe-
cutant pour eux d'autres services.de transport.

Quiconque se rendrait coupable d'actes pr6-
vus ci-dessus, s'exposerait a toutes les conse-
quences de ces actes, et ne pourrait obtenir
k cet egard aucune protection ni intervention
du Gouvernement neerlandais.

N" 54.

TiUgramme adressi. -par M. Davignon, Mi-
nislre des Affaires Etrangkres, a M. le Barori
Fallon, Ministre du Roi d. La Haye.

Bruxelles. 6 aout 1914.

Veuillez communiquer au Gouvernement
neerlandais la note suivante :

Le Gouvernement beige a pris note de I'eta-
^blissement du balisage de guerre sur I'Escaut
et de ce que le Gouvernement hollandais a&-
surera le maintien de la navigation.

II conviendrait que la navigation put se
faire k partir de 30 minutes avant le lever
du soleil jusqu'k 30 minutes apres son coucher
et que I'echange des pilotes se fit k Bath. -

Si desireux qu'il soit de consentir aux de-
mandes du gouvernement hollandais, le Gou-
vernement beige estime qu'il y a lieu, ci raison
des ports du littoral, de maintenir les bateaux-
phares de Wielingen et de Wandelaar, ainsi
que les bouees du chenal de Wielingen.

(s) Davignon.
(Voir pihce N" 50.)

NO 55.

TUigramme adressi -po-'r le Ministre du Roi d.
La Hage, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires
Etrang^res.

La Haye, 6 aoflt 1914.

La navigation sur I'Escaut peut se faire d^s
I'aube et tant qu'il fait clair. Les bouees de

- 19

Wielingen seront r^tablies. L'echange des pi-
lotes a Hansweert est plus facile et mieux
organise. Insistez-vous pour Bath.

(s) Baron Fallon.

N" 56.

Telegramme adresse par M .Davignon,Minis-
tre des Affaires Etrangeres, a M. le Baron
Fallon, Ministre du Roi a La Haye.

Bruxelles, 7 aout 1914.

Veuillez exprimer au Gouvernement neer-
landais les remerciements sinceres du Gou-"
vernement beige pour les niesures prises pour
assurer la navigation sur I'Escaut. Le Gou-
vernement est d'accord avec le Gouvernement
hollandais au sujet de la duree de la naviga-
tion. II avait propose Bath, mais accepte Hans-
weert, puisque ce port est mieux outille pour
I'echange des pilotes.

(s) Davignon.

No 57.

Tdlegramme adresse par M . Davignon, Mi-
nistre des Affaires Etrangeres, aux Ministres
du Roi a Paris et a Londres.

Bruxelles, 7 aout 1914.

La Belgique souhaite que la guerre ne soit
pas etendue en Afrique centrale. Le Gouver-
neur du Congo beige a regu pour instructions
d'observer une attitude strictement defensive.
Priez le Gouvernement frangais (anglais) de
faire savoir si son intention est de proclamer
la neutralite au Congo frangais (colonies bri-
tanniques du bassin conventionnel du Congo),
conformement a I'article onze de TActe gene-
ral de Berlin. Un telegramme de Boma an-
nonce que les hostilites sont probables entre
Frangais et Allemands dans I'Ubangi,

(s) Davignon.

No 58.

Lettre ddressSe par M. Davignon, Ministre
des Affaires Etrangeres, aux Ministres du Roi
a Paris et a Londres.

Bruxelles, le 7 aout 1914.
Monsieur le Ministre,

Comme suite a mon telegramme de ce ma-
tin, j'ai I'honneur de yous prier de porter a
la connaissance du Gouvernement frangais
(anglais) I'information suivante:

Tout en prescrivant au Gouverneur General
du Congo de prendre des mesures de defense
sur ies frontieres communes de la colonie
beige et des colonies allemandes de I'Est afri-
cain et du Kameroun, le Gouvernement du
Roi a invite ce haut fonctionnaire a s'abstenir
dfe toute action offensive centre ces colonies.

Vu la mission civilisatrice commune aux na-
tions colonisatrices, le Gouvernement beige
d6sire, en effet, par un souci d'humanite, ne
pas ^tendre le champ des hostilites k I'Afrique
centrale. II ne prendra done point I'initiativc
d'infliger une pareille epreuve a la civilisation
dans cette region et les forces militaires qu'il
y poss6de n'entreront en action que dans le
cas ou elles devraient repousser une attaque
;directe contre ses possessions africaines.

J'attacherais du prix ^ savoir si le Gouver-
nement de la Republique (de S. M. britanni-
que) partage cette mahiere de voir et, le cas
echeant, s'il entre dans ses intentions, k Toc-
casion du conflit actuel, de se prevaloir de
la disposition de I'article II de I'Acte general
de Berlin pour placer sous le regime de la
neutrality celles de ses colonies qui sont com-
prises dans le Bassin conventionnel du Congo.

J'adresse une communication identique a
votre collegue a Londres (Paris).

Veuillez agreer, etc.

(s) Davignon.

NO 59.

Lettre adressee par le Ministre du Roi a
Paris a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires
Etrangeres.

Paris, le 8 aout 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai eu I'honneur de parler au President de la
Republique de votre telegramme d'hier. Je
I'avais regu dans la soiree et I'avais immedia-
tement communique au Ministere des Affaires
Etrangeres. On avait demande a reflechir^ avant
de me repondre.

M. Poincare m'a promis de parler de cette
question aujourd'hui au Ministre des Colo-
nies. A premiere vue, il ne verrait guere d'in-
convenient a proclamer la neutralite du Congo
frangais, mais il reserve cependant sa reponse.
II croit que des faits de guerre ont deja eclat6
dans I'Oubanghi. II a profile de la circonstance
pour me rappeler que la protection que nous
accorde la France s etend aussi a nos colonies
et que nous n'avons rien a craindre.

Veuillez agreer, etc.

(s) Baron Guillaume.

No 60.

Telegramme adresse par le Ministre du Roi
a La Haye d M. Davignon, Ministre des Af-
faires Etrangeres.

La Haye, 9 aout 1914,

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres m'a prie
de vous transmettre les informations suivan-
tes, parce que le Ministre d'Amerique a Bru-
xelles s'y refuse.

. La forteresse de Liege a ete prise d'assaut
apres une defense courageuse. Le Gouverne-
ment Allemand regrette tres profondement
que par suite de I'attitude du Gouvernement
beige contre I'Allemagne, on en est arrive a
des rencontres sanglantes. L'Allemagne ne
vient pas en ennemie en Belgique, c'est seule-
ment par la force des 6venements qu'elle a
dii, a cause des mesures militaires de la Fran-
ce, prendre la grave determination d'entrer en
Belgique et d'occuper Liege corhme point d'ap-
pui pour ses operations militaires ulterieures.
Apres que I'armee beige a par sa resistance
h6roique contre une grande superiority, main-
tenu I'honneur de ses armes, le Gouverne-
ment allemand prie le Roi des Beiges et le
Gouvernement beige d'eviter k la Belgique les
horreurs ult6rieures de la guerre. Le Gouver-
nement est pr§t a tous accords avec la Bel-
gique qui peuvent se concilier avec ses arran-
gements (voir piece N° 70) avec la France.
L'Allemagne assure encore solennellement
qu'elle n'a pas rintention de s'approprier le ter-

20 -

ritoire beige et que cette intentioh est loin
d'elie. L'Allemagne est toujours prete a eva-
cucr lu Belgique aussitot que I'etat de guerre
ie lui permetlra.

L'Ambassadeur des Etats-Unis avait prie
son collegue de se charger de cette tentative
de mediation. Lc Ministre des Affaires Etran-
geres a accepte sans enthousiasme cette mis-
sion. Je m'en suis charge pour lui faire plai^
sir.

(s) Baron Fallon.

N"61.

Telegramme adresse par le Ministre du Roi
a Paris a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires
Elrang&res.

Paris, 9 aout 1914.

Le Go'uvernement fran<jais est tres dispose
a proclamer la neutral ite des possessions du
Bassin conventionnel du Congo et prie I'Es-
pagne de le proposer a Berlin.

(s.) Baron Guillaume.

(Voir piece N°'59.)

No 62.

Letlre adrcssee par le Ministre du Roi a
La Haye, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affai-
res Elrangeres.

La Haye, le 10 aout 1914.
Monsieur le Ministre,

. Repondant a un appel tel^phonique, hier a.
9 heures du soir, je me suis rendu au Depar-
tement des Affaires Etrangeres.

Le Jhr. Loudon m'a dit que mon collegue
d'Allemagne sortait de son Cabinet et lui avait
remis un document que le Representant des
Etats-Unis a Bruxelles avait refuse de vous
transmettre.

Le diplomate americain, charge de la Lega-
tion d'Allemagne a Bruxelles a pretendu qu'il
n'a pas regu d'ordres speciaux de Washing-
ton pour intervenir officiellement aupres du
Gouvernement beige dans I'interet de I'Alle-
magne.

Le Ministre d'Amerique a, en consequence^
telegraphic a son collegue a La Haye, lequel
a inform^ le Representant allemand du refus
de Mr. Whitlock.

La premiere demarche a done 6te faite par
le Gouvernement allemand aupres de I'ambas-
sadeur des Etats-Unis ci Berlin.

Dans ces conditions et vu I'urgence <ju6
presentent ces affaires, M. von Miiller a pri^
le Jhr. Loudon de servir d'intermediaire du
Gouvernement allemand aupres de vous.

Son Excellence m'a lu le texte alle-
mand du document. Je n'ai pas cache mon
etonnement de cette tentative de mediation
et sa fajble chance de succes dans cette forme;
mais uniquement pour etre agreable au Mi-
nistre des Affaires Etrangeres des Pays-Bas
j'ai promis de vous telegraphier immediate-
ment; ce que j'ai fait hier.

Vous trouverez, sous ce pli, le document
allemand dans son texte original et en traduc-
tion.

(s) Baron Fallon.

1« Annexe au N^ 62.

Die Festijng Liittich ist nach tapfrer Gegen-
wehr im Stui-m genommen worden. Die Deut-
sche Regierung bedauert es auf das liefste,

dass es infolge der Stellv^ngnahme der Bel-
gisohen Regierung gegen Deutschland zu blu-
tigen Zusammenstossen gekommen ist.
Deutschland kommt nicht als Fcind nach Bel-
gien. Nur unter dem Zwang des Verhaltnisse
hat es angesichts der militarischen Massnah-
mep. Frankreichs den schweren Entschluss
fasscn mussen, in Belgien einzurucken und
Lutlich als Stiitzpunkt fur seine weiteren
militarischen Operatibnen beselzen zu mus-
sen, Nachdem die Belgische Arniee in helden-
mutigem Widersland gegen die grosse Ueber-
legenheit ihre Waffenehre auf das.glanzendste
gewahrt hat, bittet die Deutsche Regierung
seine Majestat den Kbnig und die Belgische
Regierung, Belgien die. weiteren Schrecken
des Krieges zu ersparen. Die Deutsche Jle-
gierung ist zu jedem Abkommen mit Belgien
bereit das sich irgendwie mit Riicksicht auf
seine (voir piece N° 70) Auseinandersetzung
mit Frankreich vernigen -lasst. Deutschland
versichert nochmals feierlichst, dass es nicht
von der Absicht geleitet gewesen ist sich Bel-
gisches Gebiet anzueighen, und dass ihm diese
Absicht durchaus fernliegt. Deutschland is
noch immer bereit das Belgische Konigreich
unverzijglich zu raumen, sobald die Kriegs-
lage es ihm.gestattet. «Der hiesige Amerika-
nische Botschafter ist mit diesem Vermitt-
lungsversuch seines Brusseler Kollegen ein-
verstanden."

2">e Annexe aO N^ 62.-
(Traduction-)

La forteresse de Liege a et6 prise d'assaut
apres une defense courageuse. Le Gouverne-
ment allemand regrette le plus profondement
que par suite de I'at.titude du. Gouvernement
beige contre I'AUemagne on en soit arrive a
des rencontres sanglantds. L'AUemagne ne
vient. pas en ennemie en Belgique. C'est seu«
lement par la force des evenements qu elle a
du, a cause des mcsurfis militaires de la Fran-
ce, prendre la grave, determination d'entrer
en Belgique et d'occuper Liege- comme point
d'appul pour ses operations militaires ulte-
rieures. Apres que rarfnee beige a, dans une
resistance heroique contre une grande supe-
riorite, maintenu I'honneur de ses armes de
de la fagon la plus brillante, le -Gouvernement
allemand prie Sa Majeste le Roi et le Gou-
vernement beige d'eviter a la Belgique
les horreurs ulterieures de la guerre. Le Gou-
vernement allemand est pret k tout accord
■avec la Belgique, qui peut se concilier de n'im-
porte quelle maniere avec ses arrangements
avec la France. L'AUemagne assure encore
une fois solennellement qu'elle n'a pas ete di-
rigee par I'intention de s'approprier le terri-
toire beige et que cette intention est loin d'elle. .
L'AUemagne est encore toujours prete a 6va-
cuer ia Belgique aussitdt que I'etat de la
guerre le lui permettra.

L'Ambassadeur des Etats-Unis ici est d'ac-
cord avec cette tentative de mediation de son
collegue de Bruxelles.

No 63.

TiUgramme adressS par -M. Davignon, Mi-
nistre des Affaires Etrangeres, a M. le Baron
Fallon, Ministre du Roi 4' la Haye.

Bruxelles, le 10 aotit 1914.
Le Gouvernement du Roi a regu les propo-
sitions que le Gouvernement allemand lui a

- 21 -

fait parvenir par rentremise du gouvernement
neerlandais. II vous transmeltra prochaine-
ment sa reponse.

(s) Davignon
(Voir piece N° 62 el annexes.)

N" 64.

Telegrarmne adresse par M Davignon, Mi-
nistfe des Affaires Elranghres^ nu Minislre du
Roi a La Haye.

Bruxelles, 10 aout 19i4.

Un doute subsiste. quant a la signification du
mot «auseinanderselzung» que vous traduis.ez
par "arrangement". Veuillez vous informer si
dans la pens6e du Gouvernement allemand il
s'agit des arrangements que nous aurions pris
avec la France ou du reglement du differend
entre la France et I'Allemagne.

(s) Davignon.

Leitre adressie par M. Davignon, Minis Ire des
Affaires Etrangeres, aUx Ministres de Grande
Bretagne^ Hussie et France, accredites en Bel-^
gique.

Bruxelles, le 10 .aout 1914.
Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai rhonneur de faire savoir a Voire Ex-
cellence que le Ministre du Roi a La Haye,
a la demande du Minislre des Affaires Etran-
geres des Pays-Bas, nous a Iransmis la pro-
position suivante du Gouvernement allemand
(voir piece N° 62, annexe 2).

Voici le texte de la reponse que le Gou-
vernement du Roi se propose de faire a cette
communication :

«La proposition que nous fait le Gouverne-
ment allem.and reproduit la proposition qui
avait ete formulee dans I'ultimatum du 2 aout.
Fidele a ses devoirs internationaux,la Belgique
ne peut que reiterer sa reponse a cet ultima-
tum, d'autant plus que depuis le 3 aoiit sa
neutralite a ete violee, qu'une guerre dou-
loureuse a ete portee sur son territoire et que
les garants de sa neutralite bnt loyalement et
immediatement repondu a son appel.)>

Le Gouvernement du Roi tient a ce que les
Puissances garantes de la neutralite de Bel-
gique aient connaissance de ces- documents.

Je saisis, etc.

(s) Davignon.

N0 66.

M. von Buch adressa a M. Eyschen. Presi-
dent du Gouvernement, une lettre dont la
traduction suit:

«Luxembourg, le 8 aout 1914.

Excellence,

En consequence de Vattrtude compretement
hostile que la Belgique a prise vis-a-vis dd
TAllemagne, les autorites militaires se voient
contraintes d'insister pour le depart d'ici du
Ministre de Belgique.

Son Excellence le general commandant fait
prier le Comte van, den Steen de Jehay, d'or-
ganiser son voyage de depart.de telle fagon
qu'il puisse, end6ans les 24 heures, enlrer en
relation personnellement a Coblence avec le
general, de Ploetz, au sujet de son voyage
ulterieur. Le depart n'est possible que par la
VQie Treves-Coblence.w

(s) de Buch.

M. Eyschen transmit cette lettre le ni&me
jour au Comte van den Steen de Jehay» dans
les termes suivants :

« Luxembourg, le 8 aoiit 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai le tres vif regret de vous communiquer
ci-joint copie dune lettre du Ministre d'AUe^
magne m'informar.t que I'autorite militaire
allemande demande vofre d6part.

Vous y trouverez les conditions y attach6es-.

M. von Buch me dit que les autorites mili
taires conseilleraient plutot le voyage par che-
min de fer, parce que le voyage par automo-
bile vous exposerait a etre arrete trop souvent
pour des motifs de controle. Mais le choix
vous est abandonn6.

Le Ministre d'Allemagne viendra chez moi
prendre votre reponse.

Je ne saurais vous dire combien la tache
que je remplis en ce moment m'est "p^nible.
Je n'oublierai jamais les relations si agreables
que nous avons eues et je fais des voeux pour
que votre voyage se fasse dans les meilleures
conditions.

(s) Eyschen.))

Le Gouvernement beige estimant que le Gou-j,
vernement Grand Ducal n'avait pas eu le
choix de son attitude et que celle qu'il avail
6t6 oblige d'adopter n'impliquait en aucune
maniere une intention discourtoise ci l'6gard
du Roi et de la Belgique, decida qu'il n'y
avait pas lieu, dans ces conditions, de prier
le Charge d'Af f aires du Grand Duch6 de quit-
ter la Belgique.

Veuillez agreer, etc.

(s) Davignon.

Lettre adressee par M. Davignon, Ministre
des Affaires Etranghres, dux Ministres du Roi
a LondreSy Paris et Saint-Petersbourg.

Bruxelles, le 10 aout 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai I'honneur de vous faire connaitre les
Circonstances qui ont amene le depart de' Lu-
xembourg du Representant du Roi.

Le general commandant des troupes alle-
mandes dans le Grand-Duche de. Luxembourg
lit part, le 8 aout, au Ministre d'Allemagne
en cette ville, de la volonte des autorites mili-
taires de provoquer le depart du Representant
du Roi pres la Cour, Grand Ducale..

N» 67.

Lettre adressee d M. Davignon, Ministre des
Affaires Etrangeres,. par le Ministre des Etats-
Unis, accrMdte a Bruxelles.

Bruxelles, le 11 aoat 1914.
Monsieur le Ministre,
La L(§gation a regu aujourd'hui de V^ashing-
ton une depeche I'informant que le Gouver-
nement des Etats-Unis avait, k la demande
du Gouvernenient allemand, consenti a litre
de courtoisie internationale,^ accepter la pro-
tection des int^rets des sujets allemands en
Bejgique.

22 -

En vertu des instructions qui accompa-
gnaienl cette depeciie, nous nous occuperons
done, si vous n'y voyez pas d'incorivenient^
d'exercer nos bons et amicaux offices aupres
du Gouvernement du Roi, pour la protection
de§ sujets allemands. Les agreables rapporls
■que nous avons eus a ce sujet jusqu'a present
me donnent la conviction que c'est avec le me-
me et mutuel sentiment que nous pourrorls les
poursuivre, dans le meme but.

Je saisis cette occasion, Monsieur le Mi-
.nistre, pour vous renouveler I'assurance de ma
haute consideration.

(s) Brand Whitlock.

N« 68.

Leltre adressee d. M. Davignon, Ministre des
Affaires Etrangeres, par sir Francis H. Vil-
liers, Ministre d'Angleterre.

(Traduction.)

Bruxellies, le ll.aout 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai telegraphic a Sir Edward Grey la com-
munication allernande et la reponse projetee.

J'ai reQu I'ordre d'exprimer a Voire Excel-
lence I'entiere approbation du Gouvernement
de Sa Majeste britannique. Ce dernier ne peut
que se declarer d'accord sur les termes de la
reponse que le Gouvernement beige se propose
de faire a une tentative de semer la desunion,
parmi les pays maintenant unis, pour la de-
fense des Traites violespar I'Mlemagne.

Je saisis, etc.

(s) F. H. Villiers.

(Voir piece N" 65.)

No 69

Lettre adressee d. M, Davignon^ Ministre des
Affaires Etrangeres, par le Ministre de France,
accredite a Bruxelles.

Bruxelles, le 11 aoiit 1914.
Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai I'honneur de faire savoir a Votre Ex-
cellence que le Gouvernement frangais donne
son entiere adhesion a la reponse que le gou-
vernement beige se propose de faire au nouvel
ultimatum de I'Allemagne.

Cette reponse est bien celle qu'on pouvait
attendre d'un Gouvernement et d'un peuple
qui ont resists aussi heroiquement a la viola-
tion odieuse de leur territoire.

La France cohtinuera a remplir ses devoirs
de garante de la neutralite beige et de fidele
amie de la Belgique.

Je saisis, etc.

(s) Klobukovvski.

(Voir pihce N° 65.)

No 70.

TiUgramme adresse a M. Davignon, Ministre
des Affaires Etrangeres, par le Ministre du
f{Qi a La Haye.

La Haye, 12 aout 1914.
Le texte allemand contenait une faute; au
.lieu de «seine auseinandersetzung» il faut lire

<(ihre» et done traduire "Son conflit avec la
France".

(s) Baron Fallon.
(Voir pikce N° 64.)

NO 71.

Telegramme adressd par M. Davignon, Mi-
nistre des Affaires Etrangeres, a M. le Baron
Fallon, Ministre du Roi a La Haye.

Bruxelles. 12 aout 1914.

Priere de remettre le telegramme suivant
au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres : La propo-
sition que nous fait le Gouvernement allemand
reproduit la proposition qui avail ete formulee
dans rultimatum du 2 aout. Fidele a ses
devoirs internationaux, la Belgique ne peut
que reiterer sa reponse a cet ultimatum, d'au-
tant plus que depuis le 3 aout sa neutralite
a ete violee, qu'une guerre douloureuse a ete
portee sur son territoire et que les garanls
de sa neutralite ont loyalement et immedia-
tement repondu a son appel.

(s) Davignon.

No 72.

Telegramme adressi a M. Davignon, Minis-
tre des Affaires Etrangeres, par S. E. M. Sazo-
noff. President du Conseil des Ministres de
Russie.

Saint-Petersbourg, 13 aotit 1914
Veuillez remereier le Gouvernement Royai
pour sa communication et lui exprimer le
plaisir que le Gouvernement Imperial eprouve
k voir son attitude ferme et digne dont il le
fClicite tr^s vivement.

(s) Sazonoff.
(Voir piece N" 65.)

No 73.

Lettre adressie a M. Davignon, Ministre des
Affaires Etrangeres, par le Ministre du Roi a
La Haye.

La Haye, le 13 aoiit 1914.
Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai eu I'honneur de recevoir votre tele-
gramme d'hier et j'ai remis aussitot h. M.
le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres la reponse
de la Belgique a la seconde proposition alle-
mande.

Son Excellence m'a promis de faire parvenir
•immediatement au Ministre d'Allemagne la
communication du Gouvernement du Roi.

Veuillez agreer, ete.

(s) Baron Fallon.

(Voir pibce N° VI.)

No 74.

Lettre adressie par le Ministre du Roi a
Paris a M. Davignon, Ministre des AJiaires
Etrangeres.

Paris, le 16 aoiit 1914.
Monsieur le Ministre,
Au cours de I'entretien que j'ai eu ce matin
avec M. de Margerie, j'ai amene la conversa-
tion sur les affaires coloniales et sur la de-

23 —

marche.que vous m'arez charg6 de faire par
votre telegramme et votre dep^che. du 7 de ce.
mois.

Mon interlocuteur m'a rappele que le Gou-
vernement de la Republique s'etait adresse a
I'Espagne qui n'avait pas donne reponse avant
d'avoir I'avis de I'Angleterre. II parait que
celle-ci continue h ne pas donner de reponse.

M. de Margerie estime qu'en presence de la
situation actuelle, il importe de frapper I'Al
lemagne partout ou on peut I'atteindre ; il
croit que telle est aussi I'opinion de I'Angle-
terre qui aura certes des pretentions a faire
valoir; la France desire reprendre la partie
du Congo, qu'elle a dti c6der k la suite des
incidents d'Agadir. Un succ^s, me dit mon
interlocuteur, ne serait pas difficile k obtenir.

Veuillez agreer, etc.

(s) Baron Guillaume.

(Voir pieces N"' 51 et 58.)

No 75.

Lettre adressee par le Ministre du Roi h
Londres, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires
Elranghes.

Londres, le 17 aoiit 19t4.

Monsieur le Ministre,

En reponse a votre dep§che du 7 aoilt, j'ai
I'honneur de vous faire savoir que le Gou-
vernement britannique ne peut se ralliet k la
proposition beige tendant a respecter la neu-
tralite des possessions des Puissances bellig^-
rantes dans le bassin xon ventionnel du Congo.

Les troupes allemandes de I'Est Africain al-
lemand ont dej^ pris Toffensive contre le
protectorat anglais de I'Afrique centrale. D'au-
tre part, des troupes britanniques ont dejci
attaqu6 le port allemand de Dar-Es-Salaam, oii.
elles ont d^truit la station de t^legraphie sans
fil.

Dans ces circonstances, mgme si le Gouver-
nement anglais 6tait persuade de I'utilit^ po-
litique et strat6gique de la proposition beige,
irne pourrait I'adopter.

Le Gouvernement de Londres croit que les
forces qu'il envoie en Afrique seront suffi-
santes pour vaincre toute opposition. II fera
tous ses efforts . pour emp§cher des souleve-
ments dans la population indigene.

La France est du meme avis que I'Angle-
terre, vu I'activite allemande que Ton remar-
que pr^s de Bonar et Ekododo.

Veuillez agr6er, etc.

(s) Comte de Lalaing.

(Voir pieces N"* 57 et 58.)

No 76.

TSligramrfie adress6 vat le Vice-Gouverneur
du Katanga it M . Renkin, Ministre des Colo-
nies.

Elisabethville, 26 aoilt 1914.

Allemands continuant leurs escarmouches

au Tanganika ont attaqu6 le 22 aoClt le port

de Lukuga. lis ont eu deux noirs tu6s et deux

blesses. De nouvelles attaques sont attendues.

(s) TombeuP.

No 77.

Telegramme adresse' par le Comte Clary H
Aldringcn, Ministre d' Aittriche-Hongrie, d. M .
Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Efrangeres, et
transmis par VintermSdiaire du Ministre des,
Affaires Etrangercs des Paijs-Bas.

La Haye, le 28 aout 1914.

D'ordre de mon Gouvernement j'ai I'hon-
neur de notifier a Votre Excellence ce qui
suit : «Vu que la Belgique, apres avoir refuse
d'accepter les propositions qui lui avaient ete
adressees a plusieurs reprises par rAllemagne,
prete sa cooperation militaire a la France et
a la Grande-Bretagne qui, toutes deux ont
declare la guerre a I'Autriche-Hongrie, et en
presence du fait que, comme il vient d'etre
constate, les ressortissants autrichiens et hon-
grois se trouvant en Belgique ont sous les
yeux des autorites Royales, du subir un traite-
ment contraire aux exigences les plus primi-
tives de I'humanite et inadmissable meme
vis-a-vis des sujets d'un Etat ennemi, I'Autri-
che-Hongrie se voit dans la n6cessite de rom-
pre les relations diplomatiques et se considere
des ce moment en etat de guerre avec la Bel-
gique. Je quitte le pays avec le personnel de
la Legation et confie la protection de mes
administres au Ministre des Etats-Unis d'Ame-
rique en Belgique. De la part du Gouverne-
ment Imperial et Royal les passeports sont
remis au Comte Errembault de Dudzeele."

(s) Clary.

No 78.

TkUgramme adressi par M. Davignon, Mi-
nistre des Affaires Etrangbres a M. le Baron
Fallon, Ministre du Roi a La Haye.

Anvers, le 29 aoilt 1914.

Pri^re accuser reception k Legation Au-
triche par interm§diaire Ministre Affaires
Etrangeres declaration de guerre Autriche-
Hongrie a Belgique et ajouter ce qui suit:

«La Belgique a toujours entretenu des re-
lations d'amitie avec tous ses voisins sans
distinction. Elle a scrupuleusement rempli les
devoirs que la neutrality lui impose. Si elle
n'a pas cru pouvoir accepter les propositions
de I'AUemgane, c'est que celles-ci avaient pour
objet la violation des engagements qu'elle a
pris k la face de I'Europe, engagements qui
ont ete les conditions de la creation du Royau-
me de Belgique. Elle n'a pas cru qu'un peuple,
quelque.faible qu'il soit, puisse meconnaitre
ses devoirs et sacrifier son honneur en s'incli-
jiant devant la force. Le Gouvernement a
attendu, non seulement les d61ais de I'ultima-
tum, mais la violation de son territoire par
les troupes allemandes avant de faire appel
k la France et k I'Angleterre, garantes de sa
neutrality au mSme titre que I'Allemagne et
I'Autriche-Hongrie, pour coop^rer au nom et
en vertu des trait^s a la defense du territoire
beige.

En repoussant par les armes les envahis-
seurs, elle n'a mSme pas accompli un acte
d'hostilite aux termes de I'article 10 de la
convention de La Haye, sur les droits et de-
voirs des Puissances neutres.

w. 24 ^

L'Ai'leina'gn^ g, rqconnu elle-'mlme qoe son
agression constitue Urte violation du droit des
gens et ne pouvant la justified ellea mvoquef
son inter^t slrat^gique.

La Belgique oppose urt dementi formel b,
Taffirniation q\ie les ressortissants aulrichicins
et hongi'ois auraient subi en Belgique uii ti-ai-
tement contraire aux exigen<;es leS plua primi-
tives de I'humanite. .

Le Gouvernement Royal a donne, des 16 d4-
but des hostilites, les' ordres les plus stricts
quant a la sauvegafde de's personnes et-des
proprietes austrO'Eptigroises.

(s) Davignou.

LettT6 adressed par M. Davignon, Minimi
de$ Affaires Htfangdres, aux Legations. ■ 4u
Hoi a Vetrang^f.

Anvjers, le 29 aout 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

Sous la date du 17 aout, j'ai adress6 au Mi-
nistre du Roi a Londres une lettre dans
laquelle j'ai cru devoir relever certaines alle-
gations produites par le Gouvernement alle-
mand, et dont faisait mention le Blue Book
public recemment par le Gouvernement an-
glais.

J'ai I'honneur de placer sous vos yeux une
copie de cette lettre et de ses annexes. Veuil-.
lez, je vous prie, en donner connaissance au
Gouvernement aupres duquel vous etes accr©*
dite.

Veuillez a^eer, etc. %

(s) Davignon.

1'^ Annexe au N" 79.

Lettre adressee par M. Davignon, Ministre
des Affaires Etrang^res, au, Comte de La»
laing, Ministre du Roi a Londres.

Bruxelles, le 17 aoiit 1914.

Monsieur le Comte,

Le Blue BooJc public recemment par le Gou-
vernement britannique reproduit, sous le
n° 122 (page 65), le. texte d'un telegramme
adress6 de Berlin, le 31 juillet, par Sir E. Gro-
schen k Sir E. Grey, telegramme dont i'ex-
trais le passage suivant :

« It appears from what he (His Excellency
>> The Secretary of State) said that German
» Government consider that certain hostile
» acts have been already committed by Bel-
» gium. . As an instance af this, he alleged
» that a consignement of corn of Germany
»> had been placed under an embargo al-
» ready. »

Le fait auquel le Secretaire d'Etat allemand
des Affaires Etrangeres a fait allusion dans
son entretien avec Sir E. Groschen, et qu'il
consid6rait comme un acte hostile de la part
de la Belgique, se rapporte sans doute a I'ap-
plication des arretes royaux du 30 juillet, qui
ont prohib6 provisoirement I'exportation de
Belgique de certains produits. Comme vous
le constaterez par I'expose que je tiens a vous
faire ci-apres, le fait qui nous est reproche n'a
nullement le caractere qu'on a voulu lui don-
ner en AUemagne.

pes arrgtfis' royaux- dat$s du 30 j'uiUet el
publics au Moniie'ur beige du lendemain ont
prohibe ci titre provisoire, par toutes les fron-
litres de terre et de mer, I'exportation d'une
s6rie de produits, des cereales notamment.
Sous la date du 31 juillet, M. le Ministre
d' AUemagne a Bruxelles m^ signala que la
douane d'Anvers retenait des chargements de
grains a destination de TAllemagne qui, sim-
plemen.t transbordes dans notre port, ne fai-^
saient 6n realite qu'y Iransiter. M. de Below
Saleske demandait la libre sortie des bateaux
portant ces chargements. Le jour meme oii il
recut la reclamation du Ministre d'Allema-
gne, mon Departement en saisit le Minister^
des Finances, .et des le surlendemain 2 aout»
Celui-ci nous annonga qu'il avait ete transmis
k la douane beige des instructions donnanl
pleine et eiitiere satisfaction h I'Allemagne,

Je crois ne pouvoir mieux faire, Monsieuf
le Comte, que de placer sous vos yeux uno
copie de la correspondance echangee ^ ce
sujet avec M. de Below Saleske. Vous y ver-
rez que rien dans notre, attitude ne pouvait
etre considere comme teihoignant de dispo-
sitions hostiles a I'egard de I'Allemagne ; les
mesuries prises par le Gouvernement beige a
ce moment ne constituaient que les simples
precautions que tout Etat a le droit et le de-
voir de prendre. dans des circonstances aussi
exceptionnelles.

II serait bon que vous adressiez au Gouver-
nement de S. M. Britannique une communi-
cation afin de I'eclairer sur la realite de»
faits.

Veuillez agreer, etc.

(s) Davignon.

2™« Annexe au N* 79.

Lettre ddress6e par M. Dstvignon, Ministry'
des Affaires Etrangeres, diM.de Below 5<z-»
leske, Ministre d' AUemagne.

Bruxelles, 3 aoiit 1914,

Monsieur le Ministre,

Comme suite a la lettre que Votre Excel-
lence a bien voulu m'adresser le 31 juillet
j'ai I'honneur de Lui faire savoir que mon col-
legue des Finances a porte a la connaissance'
du service des douanes que les prohibitions
etablies> par .les arretes royaux du 30 juillet
ecoule he visent que I'exportation proprement
dite et ne s'6tendent done pas aux marchan-
dises regulierement a6clarees en transit lors
de I'importatioh.Au surplus, lorsque des mar-
chandises libres de droits sont declarees en
consommation, bien qu'elles soient en reality
destinies a I'exportation, elles font commune-
ment I'objet de declarations de libre entree
specialeSi qui sont considerees comme des
documents de transit. Enfin, s'il arrivait que
de telles marchandises avaient ete declarees
en consommation sans restrictions, comme si
elles devaient rester effectivement dans le
pays, la douane en permettrait encore la sor-
tie du moment oii il serait dument etabli,
par les documents d'expedition-manifestes,
connaissements, etc., qu'elles devaient etre
export6es immediatement en transit.

Je puis ajouter que I'exportation des grains
auxquels se rapportait la lettre pr6citee de la
Legation Imperiale a 6te autorise le 1" aofit.

Je saisis, etc.

(s) Davignon.

*- 29 -

3""^ Annexe au N" 79.

tettte adressee par M. Davignon, MifiiStfe
des Affaires Elrangcres, d. M. de BelOw Sa-
teske, Ministre d'Allemagne.

Bruxelles, le T" aout 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,

En reponse a la lettre de Votre Excellence
<iu 31 juiJlet, j'ai I'honneur de Lui faire
savoir que I'arrete beige du 130 juillet ne
vise, que I'exportation "et non te transit des
produits cites.

J'ai eu soin de faire part (h votre commu-
nication a mon coliegue des Finances, en le
priant de vouloir bien donner aux bureaux
de la douane des instructions precises de na*
ture a prevenir toute erreur dans rappljcat.ion
de I'arrete precite.

Je sa^is, etc.

ifi) B4vignon>

4"» Annexe au N» 79.

'Lettra adressee par M. de Below Saleske^
ministre d'Allemayne, 'a M. Davignon, Mi-
nistre des Affaires Etrangeres.

Bruxelles, le 31 juillet 19U.

Monsieur le Ministre,

On m'a informe d'Anvers que la douane a
defendu le depart des bateaux charges de
grains pour rAllemagne.

Vu qu'il ne s'agit pas dans ces cas d'une
exportation de grains, mais d'un transit, parce
que la marchandise a et^ seulement transbor-
dee k Anvers,' j'ai I'honneur de recourir a
votre .bienveillante entremise afin qu'on
laisse partir pour VAllemagne les bateaux en
question.

En m§me temps, je prie Votre Excellence
de me faire savoir si le port d'Anvers est fer-
me pour le transit des marchandises 6nume-
rees au Moniteur daujourd'hui.

En attendant la reponse de Votre Excel! en*
ce dans le plus bref delai possible, je profile
do cette occasion, etc.

(s) de Below Saleske.

MINISTfeRE DES AFFAIRES filRANGfeRES

DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES

1914

LA GUERRE EUROPEENNE

PlfeCES

RELATIVES AUX NEGOCIATIONS

QUI ONT PR]^C6di5 LES DECLARATIONS DE GUERREi

DE L'ALLEMAGNE A LA RUSSIE (T" AOUT 19U)

ET A LA FRANCE (3 AOUT 191^)

Dl^CLARATION DU ft SEPTEMBRE 1914

PARIS
IMPRIMERIE NATIONALE

MDCCCCXIV

MINISTfeRE DES AFFAIRES filRANGfeRES

DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES

GUERRE EUROPfiENNE

TABLE DES JVfATlfeRES.

NUMB-
ROS.

NOMS

BO SIGilATAIRE.

LIEU
et

DATE D'ENVOI.

SOMMAIRE.

CHAPITRE premier;

AVERTISSEMENTS.

(1913.

M. Jules Camroh.

1913.

Berlin, 17 mars .

M. ElfENNE.

M. Jules Camhon.

M. ALLrzE.

Note au Ministrc. .

Jules Cambon; . ..,

Paris, 2 avril

Berlin, 6 mai.

Munich, lojuilici.

Paris, 3o juiilet

Berlin, 22 nov.

"ransmission de rapports de I'altache militaire et de I'atta
che naval a Berlin sur la nouvelle loi militaire. Efforts
du Gouvernement allemand pour representer cette loi
comme une reponse au.projet fran^ais de loi de Irois ans
et pour exalter dans les masses le sentiment guerrier. .

Annexe 1. — Rapport du lieutenant-colonel Serret. Les
armemehts allemands sont destines a mettre la France
dans un etat d'inferiorite deGnitif. Colere provoqu^e dans
les milieux olTiciels par les mesures de precaution
francaises.

ANME-tE II. — Rapport de M. de Faramond. Le projet
de loi militaire a pour objet de rendre facile une offen-
sive foudroyante contre la France. Coafiance des Alle-
mands dans la superiorite de leur armee. Mesures Cnan-
cieres projetees pour couvrir les depenses militaires.

Envoi d'un rapport officiel et secret allemand sur le renfor-
cement de I'armee

Annexe. — Texte de ce rapport. Aper?u rctrospectif
sur les armcments successifs provoques par la Conference
d'Algesiras, I'affaire d'Agadir ct la guerce balkanique.
Necessite d'accomplir un nouvel effort, d'habitucr I'opi-
nion publique a I'idee de guerre, de susciter des troubles
dans les colonies francaises ou anglaises et de prevoir I'in-
vasion de la Bela;ique et de la Hollande.

Fin de la crise balkanique. Elle a faiili amener fAllemagne
a une guerre d'agression contre la France et a provoque,
dps preparatifs de mobilisation ,

L'opinion bavaroise n'accepte les nouveaux armements qUe
comme destines a provoquerune guerre dans laquelle elle
s'habitue a voir la seule solution possible aux dinTiculles
interieures

Sentiments dominants dans l'opinion allemande : desir d'une
revanche d'Agadir, crainte de resurrection d'une FraMce
foFte. Impuissance du parti de la paix. Formation, com-
position et developpement croissant d'un parti de la
guerre, encouragd dans ses ambitions par la faiblesse pre-
sum^e de la Triple-Entente . . . >

Conversation du Roi des Beiges avec I'Empereur, qui a cesse
d'etre pacifique, cede au courant belliqueux dont son fils
est le centre, et se familiarise avec la perspective d'un
conflit prochain avec la France.

ROS.

NOMS

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et

DATE D'EirvOI.

SOMMAIRE.

PAGES.

CHAPITRE U.

PRELIMINAIRES.

DE LA MORT DE L'ARCHIDUC HERITIER (28 JUIN igiA)

X LA REMISE

DE LA NOTE AUTRICHIENNE X LA SERBIE (SO JUILLET igiAj.

1914.

Mr PTyM*!?"?- t • • • 1 1 > . . . .

Vienne, aS juin...

Nouvelle de I'assassinat de I'arcbiduc Franjois-Ferdinand k

M. DcMAIHE •••••

Vienne, ajuiUet..

Exploitation de cet evdnement par le parti militaire autri-
chien

M. DE Mabreviixb

Beriin. AjniUet..

Confiance afiectee du Gouvernement allemand da^ns un ar-
rangement a I'amiable du differend auslro-serbe

M. Paleolo&de. . .^ . . . . .

Petersbourg,6juill.

M. Sazonoffa averti I'Ambassadeur d'Aulriche que le Gou-
vernement russe ne saurait accepter que I'assassinat de
I'Arcbiduc servit de pretexle a une action sur terriloire
serbe

Budapest, 11 juill..

Optimisme officiel de commande, contrastanl avec de s^-
rieuz preparatifs uilitaires en Horcrie ..••••••..•...

Vienne, iSjuiUet.

Les journaux odlcieux autricbiensprechent une guerre a fond
au panserbisme, la Russie el la France leur paraissant
bors d'etat d'intervenir

M. DtHAnfB «...c..

Vienne, ig juillet.

Transmission d'un rapport consulaire

Rapport • consulaire de
Vienne..

Vienne, igjuiUel.

Les milieux polillques autricbiens semblent resolus a une
guerre d'agression contre la Serbic, et les milieux mili-
taires envisagent I'evenlualild d'un conflit europ^en

M. Jules Cambon

Berlin, ai juiHet..

Le Gouvernement allemand, qui a deja envoyd des tavis
prdliminaircs de mobilisation*, declare calegoriquement
qu'il ignore la teneur de la note que I'Autricbe doit en-
voyer a la Serbie

M. BtENTERC-MARTIIf

Paris, 31 juillet..

L'AHemagne appuiera fortement les demarches aulri-
cbiennes, sans cbercher a jouer un role de mddialion. . .

17
18

M. Bientbhd-Marti5

M, Dduaine. ►

Paris, a a juillet..
Vienne, a a juUlet.

Le Gouvernement fran^ais prescrit a I'Ambassadeur de
France de donner amicalement a Vienne des conseils de

3
3

Dispositions con cilianfes de la Russie et de la Serbie. Indi-
cations rassurantes fournies aux diplomales etrangers.
Propos violents de I'Ambassadeur d'AUemagne

M. Paul Cambok

Londres, a a juillet.

Graves inquietudes de sir Edward Grey h la suite d'une
conversation ayec I'Ambassadeur d AHemagne. Conseils de
prudence et de moderation donnes a I'Ambassadeur d'Au.
tricbe-Uongrie ,

M. Bientenc-Martw.'. . . .

Paris, aS juillet..

Remise procbaine de la Note autrichienne a la Serbie. Im-
pressions conlradicloires des diplomates sur son conlenu
et sa portee. Assurances apaisanles donndes a Vienne. . . .

M. ALLni

Munich, a 3 juillet.

Pessimisme des milieux ofliciels'bavarois, en particuller du
President du Conseil, qui a eu connaissance de la Note

1 ,

NUME-

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DO SIGNATAIBE.

DATE D'ENVOI.

CHAPITRE m.

NOTE AUTRICHIENNE ET LA REPONSE SERBE.]

(Du vendredi 24 juillet au samedi 25 juillet.)

M. Rene Viviani

Reval, 3 4 juillet..

D'accord avec M. Sazonoff, M. Viviani p'rie M. Bienvenu-
Martin, Ministre interimaire des Affaires elrangeres. de
donner des instructions pour que de Paris et de Londres
des conseils de moderation soient adresses au Comte
Berchtold , ia remise de la Note autrichienne la veilie au

M. Bienvend-Martin

Paris. 2 A juiUet..

soir ctant encore i^noree

Instructions transmises dans ce sens a Vienne, oil elles ne

parviennent qu apres la remise de la Note a Belgrade. . .

Note actrichienne

Vienne, 24 juillet.

Texte de la Note autrichienne a la Serbie, communiqu^e

M. Bienvenu-Martin

Paris, 2^ juillet..

dans ia matinee du 2 4 juillet par le Comte Szecsen a

Analyse de cette Note. Le Comte Szecsen a ete avise, lors-

qu'il I'a apportee, de la penible impression que ne pou-
vaient manquer de produire, specialement dans les
conditions actuelles, I'etendue des exigences autrichiennes.

•

comme la brievete du delai fixe a la Serbie pour la re-

ponse

M. Bienvenu-Martin

Paris, 2 4 juillet..

Conseil donne par le Gouvernement fran?ais au Gouverne-
ment serbe d'accepter les demandes de i'Autriche dans
tout ce qu'elles peuvent avoir d'admissible et de proposer
de soumettre la question a I'arbitrage de i'Europe

M. Biekvenu-Martin

Paris, 24 juillet..

Renseignements donnes a nos ambassadeurs sur ies ten-
dances belliqueuses du parti militaire autrichien, sur la
difficulte pour la Serbie d'accepter I'inlegralite des exi-

M. Bienvend-Martin

Paris, 2 4 juillet..

gences autrichiennes et sur ie ton mdnacant de ia presse

D-marche de M. de Schoen au Quai d'Orsay pour appuyer,
au nom de son Gouvernement, ia demarche de I'Autriche-

Hongrie, approuver sa Note, et faire ressortir les « conse-

quences incalculables » qu entratnerait , en raison du jeu
des alliances, toute .tentative d'immixtion d'une tierce

M. Jules Cambon

Berlin, a 4 juillet. .

puissance dans le conflit austro-serbe

Manifestations austrophiles et chauvines a Berlin; pessi-

misme des milieux diplomatiaues

Ml Jules Cambon

Berlin, 24 juillet..

M. de Jagow declare approuver la Note autrichienne, mais
se defend absolument d'en avoir connu prealabiement le
contenu. II espere que .la Serbie recevra de ses amis le
conseil de ceder. La presse officielle se solidarise egale-
ment avec i'Autriche

31
32

M. Paleologde

Petersbourg, 2 4j'.
Londres, 24 juillet.

Dispositions pacifiques du Gouvernement russe, malgre
i'emolion profonde produite dans le public par la remise

M. Paul Cambon

Sir E. Grey expose a M. Paul Cambon son projet de media-
lion a quatre. Pessimisme du Comte Benckeadorf au

sujet des dispositions de I'Ailemagne

D0£DMENTS 0IPL0MATIQUES» — > Guerre europdenne.

- vm

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PAGEi

33
34

35
36

39
40
41

42
43

44
45

M. Paul Cambon

M. Bienveno-Martin

M. Jules Cambon

M. BiervehuMartiw

M. DE Fleuriau

M. PALEOtOGCE. >.....».

Londres, a^juillet.
Paris, 24 juiilet.. .

Beriin, 2 5 juiilet..
Paris, 2 5 juiilet...

LoDch-es,25 juillef.

Petersboarg, 25j'.

Pam, 35jaillet...
Londres, aSjurllet.
Berlin, 25 juHiet. .

Berlin, 2 5 juiilet. .
Berlin, 25 juiUel. .

Rom^, 25 juiHfit. ,

Vienne, 25 juiilet.

Belgcadfr, 2SjuiUet.
Beriini, a5 juiilet. .

Une intervention officieuse de TAUemagne a Vienne scmLlc
a M. Paul Cambon le meilleur moyen d'arreter le conflit.

Sir E. Grey veut proposer a I'Allemagne d'agir en commun
a Vienne et a Petersbourg, en vue de sdumettre le conflit
austro-serbe a la mediation des quatre puissances non
inleressees dans la question. Conseils de prudence donnes
au Mfnistre de Serbie a Paris ',

53
54'

56
57

Le ]VIinistre de Belgique a Berlin voit.dans la' crise en cours
Texecution de projets de guerre premedites par I'AUe-
magne

Resume de la situation. A Paris, M. de Schoen vient de-
i mentir au Quai d'Orsay le caractere menacant de^a de-
marche de la veiHe. A Londres , I'Ambassadeur d'Autriche
declare que la Note autrichienne n'a pas le caractere
d 'iin ultimatum. Sir E. Grey fait donner des conseils de
prudence a Belgrade et expose a I'Ambassadeur d'Alie-

Le Gouvernement allemand se refusant a intervenir entre
Vienne et Belgrade, Sir E. Grey fait remarquer au prince
Licbnowsky que cette attitude contribuera a araener un
conflit general dans lequel I'Angleterre ne saurait rester

Efforts de conciliation de M. Sazonoff : il demande a Vienne
une prolongation du delai imparti a la Serbie pour sa

M. Bienvknu-Martin

M. DE Flecriaxi

M. Jules Ca5!B05

M, Jules Cambon

M. Jules Cambon »,.

M. Barrere w . .

Le Gouveriiement francais appuie cette demande ^e prolon^
gation

Le Gouvernement anglais s'associe egalement a cetle de-

M. de Jagow declare de nouveau categoriquement n'avoir
pas eu connaissance de la Note autrichienne avant sa re-
mise. 11 repond evasivement a une demande du Chargd
d' Affaires d'Angleterre pour intervenir a Vienne en vue
idle prevenir un conflit et de prolongcr le delai de
I'ultimatum

Le Charge d'Affaires de Russie presentc a son tour cette
dcraiere demande a Berlin. 11 insiste sur I'urgence d'unc
reponse que M. de Jagow cherche a ajourner

Sac une nouvelle demarche pressante du Charge d'Afi'aires
de Russie, M. dt Jagow declare qu'il consiclere le diffu-
pend austro-serbe comme une afffiire purcment locale,
qui doit rester limitee a I'Autriche et a la Serbie et qui
ne lui paraitpas susceptible d'amener des difficultes inter-
nationales

L'Ambassadeur de Russie a Rome demande au gouverne-
ment ilalien d'intervenir pour la prolongation du delai

Le Gouvernement autrichien elude la demande de prolon-
gation du delai, qu'a presentee a Vienne le Charge d'Af-
faires de Russie. ,^

Resume de la reponse serbe a la Note autrichienne

La nonvelle du depart de Belgrade du Minislrft d'Autriche
provoquc a Berlin des manifestations de chauvinisme. Les
iioanciers croient a la guerre

M Boppe

60
61

M. Jules Camdor

>UME-
ROS.

NOMS

DES SIG.NATAIRES.

UEU

ET DATE D'ENTOI.

SOMMAIRE.

■ H— ill III'

PAGES.

Vienne, 25 juillel.
Belgrade, sBjuillet.

L'Ambassadeur de France a Vienne, en raison du retard
impose au telegramme qui lui a ete envoye de Paris, ne
recoit pas asscz t6t ses instructions pour s'associer en temps

62
63

Texte de la reppnse serbQ a la Note auslro-hongroise

CHAPITRE IV,

De la rupture des relations diplomatiques (25 juiiiet 191 4) A. la declaration de gtjerre
(28 juillet 1914) DE l'Autriche a Ca Serbie,

50 M. Bienvenu-Mahtin .

M. Barrebe

M. Barrerb

M. Bienvenc-Martin . .

M. Paleologce. . . . . .

M. Ddmaine.. .......

M. Bienveno-Martin . .

Note pour le Ministre.

M. Chevalley.
M. d'Annoville
M. Faroes....

Paris, 26 juiiiet.

Rome, 26 juiiiet. ,

Rome, 26 juillet.

Paris, 26 juillet.

Petersbourg ,
juillet.

Vienne, 26 juillet.

Paris, 26 juillet ..

Paris, 26 juillet.

Christiania, 2 6 juil-
let.

Luxembourg ,26
juillet.

Bale. 27 juillet...

Resume de la situation le 2 5 au soir, telle qu'elle r6sulte
de I'attitude intransigeante de I'Autricbe-Hongrie. Im-
pressions ressenties dans les difFerentes capitales et ten-
tatives pour emp^cher I'aggravation du conflit qui resul-
terait de mesures militaires contre la Serbie prises par
le Gouvernement austro-hongrois. Sir E. Grey espere
encore pr6venir un conflit par i'intervention des quatre
Puissances non int^ressees ,

L'ltalie participera aux efforts pour le maintien de la paix,
mais veut se tenir en dehors du conflit s'il edate

La Russie conserve I'espoir d'une solution paciiique; I'opi-
nion italienne se montre hostile a l'Autriche.. . ... ......

Le Gouvernement fran^ais appuie la demande de "mediation
que la Serbie adresse au Gouvernement anglais, sur les
conseils de; la Russie

M. Sazonoff, toujours anime du mfime esprit de conciliation,
propose une conversation directe entre Vienne -et Peters-
bourg sur les modifications a introduire dans rultimatum
pour le rendre acceptable

L'Ambassadeur de Russie, de retour a Vienne, se propose
d'y presenter une nouvelle proposition d' arrangement . . .

Demarche de M. de Schoen au Quai d'Orsay pour que la
France intervienne avec I'Allemagne a Petersbourg seule-
ment, pour donner des conseils pacifiques. Son refus de
repondre, faute d'instructions , a la demande de mediation
a quatre a Petersbourg et a Vienne i .

Nouvelle visile de I'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne pour afllrmer et
accentuer le sens pacifique de sa pr6cedente demarche. 11
refuse de se prononcer sur I'opportunite de conseils de mo-
deration a donner par I'Allemagne h Vienne, et persiste a
tenter d'engager le Gouvernement francais dans la voie
d'une demarche commune de «solidarite pacifique* a Pe-
tersbourg uniquement, de qui, selon lui, depend la paix.

Ordre a la flotte allemande de Norvege de rentrer en Alle-
magne

Premiers preparatifs de mobilisation a Thionville

Premiers preparatifs de mobilisation dans ie Grand-Duche
de Bade

NUME-
ROS.

NOMS

DES SIGNATAIRES.

M. Bienvend-Mabtis.

M. BlENVESD-MABTJiX .

M. D£ pLEnllUO

M. Paleol06UE. . . . i^

M. BOMPARD

M. D-E. FtECRlAU

M. Jules Cambor. . . .

M. DE Fleuriau.

M. Bienvenu-Martin.

M. DE Fleuriau

M. Barrere

M« Joles Camdon.. . .

.M. Jules Camdon. . . .

M. Biwvesd-Martim.

LIEU

ET' DATE D'ENVOI.

Paris. 27 juillet.

Paris, 27 juiUet .

Londres, 27 juillet

Saint-PetcrsbQUfg,
27 juillet.

Constantinople, 37
juillet.

Londres, 27 juiJlet.
Berlin, 27 juillet..

Londres, 27 juillet.

Paris, 27 juillet . .

Londres, 27juiljet.
Rome, 27 juillet. .

Berlin, 27 juillet..

Bfiriin, a 7 juillet..

Piaus,»7. juillet..

SOMMAIRE.

Resume des trois demarches successives de M. -de Schoen. La
situation s'aggrave, I'Autriche refusanl a la fois de se
contenter des concessions de la Serbie et d'enlrer en con-
versation a ce sujet avec les Puissances. — Nouvelle
proposition anglaise de rechercher a Paris, Berlin, Rome
et Londres les moyens deviter une-crise , la Russie et I'Au-
triche, les Puissances directement inleressees, restanl a
I'ecart

Nouvelle demarche de M. de Schoen au Quai d'Orsay, tehdant
visiblement a comprometire la France a legard de la
Russie, tout en gagnant du temps pour faciliter une ac-
tion militaire de I'Autriche en Serbie, que I'Allemagne
ne fait rien pour retarder

Les ambassadeurs d'Allemagne et d'Autriche laissent en-
tendre quils sont surs de la neutrality anglaise, malgre
le langage qui a ele tenu par Sir A. Nicolson au prince
Lichnovrski

Dispositions concilianles de M. Sazonoff.

On estime a Constantinople que le conQit austro-serbe res-
tera localise et que la Russie n'interviendra pas en faveur
de la Serbie

La Grande-Bretagne arr^le la demobilisation de sa Oottc et
averlit i'Allemagne qu'une invasion de la Serbie par I'Au
triche risque d'amener une guerre europeenne

M. de Jagow donne de vagues assurances pacifiques et de
dare, en reponse a une question, que I'Allemagne n?
mobiiiserait pas. si ia Russie nc mobilisait que sur la fron
liere autrichienne. Le Secretaire d'Etat temoigne de vives
inquietudes

Sir E. Grey propose que les Ambassadeurs de France, d'Al-
lemagne et d'llalie a Londres examinent, de concert avec
lui , le moyen de resoudre les -difliculles actucUes

La Serbie n'a pas demande la mediation anglaise; il faut
done s'en tenir au projet de mediatioii a qua\re preconise
par I'Anglelerre

Le Gouvernement francais accepte la proposition anglaise,
qu'une action siacerement moderatrice de I'Allemagne a
Vienne pourrait toutefois seule faire aboutir

Le Gouvernement italien acicepte
quatre

la mediation a

Le Marquis de San Giuliano declare n'avoir pas eu connais-
sance prealable de la Note autrichienne et adhere, sans
hesiler, a la proposition de Sir E. Grey

M. de Jagow repousse I'idee d'une conference des Puis-
sances, lout en protestant de son desir d'une solution
paciGque »

II se derobe a de nouvelles instances de M. Jules Cambon a
cet egard. Opportunite de renouveler sous une forme dif-
ferente la proposition anglaise, pou^ jvellre i'Allemaghe
au pied du mur

Le Comte Szecsen vient remetlrf.au .Quai. d'Orsay un me-
morandum de son Gouvernement pour justifier les me-
sures de coercilion qu'il annonce comme imminentes
contre la Serbie. — Texte de ce memorandum

NOME-
ROS.

15. bis.

, 83

NOM

DU SIGNATAIRK.

Communique da Bureau
tie la Pressc.

M..Ilene Vitiani

M. Biervenu-Mabtir.

M. BlENVEira-MARTpf .

IVr. BlEPiVESU-MARTIPt ^-

M1 R&ul.GvMBOB ..^.

M. Jules Camoor.

M. Paleologce. ...

M. DOMAJNE

LIEU
et

DATE D'ENVOI.

Vienne, 28 juillet.

A Lord (le la Fr«rt-
ce. 28 juillet.

Paris, '28 juillet. .

Paris, 28 juillet. .

Londres, 28 juillet.

Berlin, 28 j.uillel.^

Saint- Petersbourg,
28 juillet.

Vienne, 28 juillet.

SOMMAIRE.

Communique oflicieux du Bureau de la Presse viennoise au
sujet de la reponse serl)e, representee comme insuffisante.

Accuse de reception des communications revues de M. Bien-
venu-Martin et approbation des reponses qu'il a faites,
soit a M. de Schoen , soit a la proposition de Sir E. Grey.

Resume de la situation : refus de I'Allemagne d'intervenir a
Vienne, objection qu'elle oppose a la proposition anglaise.
remise du memorandum autrichieo. Dangers de.la situa-
tion

Yisite de M. de Scboen au Quai d'Orsay. 11 proteste a nou-
•veau de ses sentiments pacifiques, maij se derobe tou jours
a I'examen des moyens pratiques de prevenir ie conDit. .

Recommandation a M. Dumaine de se tenir en contact avec
son collegue d'Angleterre, pour presenter a Vienne- la
demande de mediation anglaise.. »-...^. ...... .*.....

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a Londres insiste, comme
M. de Schoen a Paris, sur i'utilite d*une action modera-
trice de I'Angleterre a Petersbourg uniquement. D'autre
par J , M. Sa/.onofT a accepte la proposition anglaise de
mediation, mais il voudrait la faire preceder d'une
conversation directe avec Viennef, dont il attend de
Jjons resultals ._....* •..^.. . .. .^. . ..,

M. de Jagow se montre toujours hostile a la conference
proposec par Sir E. Grey, etappuie son attitude dilatoire
sur la nouveile des efforts russes pour une entente directe
entre Vienne et Petersbourg v.-- ....

M. Sazonoff c^t oblige de cohstater que I'Autriche se derobe
a ses propositions d'crttente directe . — . ...... . —

La declaration de guerre de I'Autriche a la Serbie rend
inutile toute tentative de conciliation, au dire du comle
Berchtold qui romptainsi tout pourparler avec Petersbourg.

ds-

100

102

i.02

CHAPITRE V.

De la declaration Dte guerre de l'Autriche X la Serbie {28 juillet igi^)' a L'ULTiMAxosr^
DE l'Allemagne a. la Russie (3 1 juillet 191/i}.

84 M, Barrere,

JVJ. BlENVEMUrMABTIN ... . . .

M. Paleoiocde. .
M. Kloqckoivski.
M.Rqrssqi ......

Rome. ;» 9 juillet..

Paris... 29 Juillet.,

Saint - Petersbourg ,
29 juillet.

Bruxelles, a^ juil-
let.

-Francforl, a^^juil
leh.

La Consulta estime que la declaration de guerre de I'Au-
triche ne doit pas empdcher la continuation des efforts
diplomatiques pour Ja reunion d'une conference .a
Londres... ..^ ... .v.. .,. . . .;-...-. .,. ,. — ^.\.«^

L'Allemagne semble renoncer a I'espoir d'une pression
franco-anglaise sur la Russie seule, mais continue de se
refuser a agir sur Vienne. Dans ces conditions il parait
indispensable que la Russie se raUie definitivement et de
suite a la proposition anglaise de mediation aquatrci, pour
-la faire accepter par ' Berlin avant que les mesurcs mili-
taires de I'Autriclie ne compromettent definitivement la
paix. .. _, . .-»- .-^ > >.. > ,^,>...^..;>. . .....,■.. .... .

Le Gouvernemenl russe adhere enticremenl a cetle pro-
position. ... ...... .^...... ......... ^^.^-..-.^.^ ........ . . ..

Inquietudes soulevees a Bruxelles par raltitude enigmatique
et mena^ante de l'Allemagne...,..-. .«.^. ..... ....... . . . . .

Importants motlveihcnts ^de .troupes 5tgaoles autour de

lOS

105
106
J 07

107

XII

NDME-
BOS.

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DD SIGNATAIRE.

LIEU
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DATE D- ENVOI.

SOMMAIRE.

PAGES.

89
90
91

93
94

96
97

99
100
101

102
103

M. AUittE

Munich, ag juHlet
Vienne, 29 juiUet.

Saint -Petersbourg,

29 juillet.

Berlin , sgjuiUet.

Vienne, sg juillet.
Parts, 29 juillet . .

P«ris, ag juiUet. .

Rome, 39 juiUet. .
Paris, *9 juillet.. .

Londrcs, 99 juillet

Bdgrade, agjuiU.

Saint -Petersbourg,
19 juillet.

Paris, So joillet . .

Saint- Paersbourg,

30 juillet

Saint -Petersbourg,
3o juillet.

108

108
109

109

111

112
113

114

ii4

115
115

116
117

117

KAutriche se derobe a la conversation directe a laquelle elie

M. Jui«8 Cambon

M. de Jagow sest maintenu dans son attitude dilatoire,
Taguement pacifique, rejetant la responsabilite evenluene
du conflit sur la Russie, tout en declarant placer son
espoir dans une entente directe de Vienne el Petersbourg ,
au succes de laquelle il pretend chercher a travailler. . . .

L'Autriche semble decidee a la guerre; elle y est poussee
energiquement par M. de Tcbirsky, ambassadeur d'AUe-

M. Bientend-Maktbi , , . . .

M. BreNVESXJ-MARXTO

M. de Scboen est vCYiu dire que rAUemagne allait consuller
Vienne sur ses intentions, que cda fournirait une base de
discussion , el que les operations militaires ne seraient

La Russie en- presence de Tattitude inquielanle de rAUe-
magne et du refus du comte Bercbtod de continuer les
pourparlers et des preparatifs militaires de TAutriche,
«st obligee de proceder a une mobUisation partielle

M. de San Giuliano explique Taltitude de I'AUemagne et de
TAutriche par leur conviction erronee que la Russie aban-

M.R^eVxmM

M.P«al.CAMBOH.

M. BOPPB

Les conversations directes austro-russes ayanl ete inter-
rompues par la declaration de guerre de I'Autriche a la
Serbie, les gouvemements franrais et russe prient Sir E.
€rey de reprendre a Berlin sa proposition d'inlervenlion
a qualre, et d'agir sur I'ltalie pour obtenir son plein

L'AUemagne n'ayant voulu accepter que le principe de la
mediation a qualre. Sir E. Grey, pour eviter toute nouvelle
reponse dilatoire, laissera au gouvernement allemand le
choix de la forme sous laquelle cette intervention lui
paraitra praticable. 11 considere la situation comme tres
grave ....'...•

Le Gouvernement serbe a obtenu de la Russie I'assurance
que cette puissance ne se desinteressera pas du sort de la

M. Palsologub.

L'ambassadeur d'AUemagne a Petersbourg est venu declarer
que son pays mobiliserait si la Russie n'arrfitait pas ses
prdparatifs militaires

M.ReniVrmia

M. Paleologoe

Informe de cette demarche mena^ante, le Gouvernement
francais se declare resolu a remplir toutes les obligations
de I'aUiance russe, tout en continuant de travaiUer a une
solution pacifique, et en demandant au Gouvernement
russe d'agir de son cote dans le meme sens

Le Gouvernement russe se declare pr6t a n^gocier jusqu'au
bout, tout en restant convaincu que TAUemagne ne veut
pas agir it Vienne en faveur de la paix ;....... . . .

M. PALioi,oa5s

Sur une nouveUe demarche moins comminatoire de l'am-
bassadeur d'AUemagne, M. Sazonoff s'esl empresse de
faire une nouvelle proposition, indiquant que la Russie
interrompra ses preparatifs militaires si I'Autriche se
-. -declare pr^e a eliminer de son ultimatum les clauses qui
^ portent atteinte a la souverainete de ia Serbie

111

112

114

115
116

117

NOMS

DU SIGNATAIRE.

M. Ddmaine

M. Jnles Caaibon.

M. Rene VnruNi

M. Jules Cambon.
M. Paul Cambon ,

M. Jules Cambon.

M. Paul Cambon ,

LIEU

DATE D'ENVOI.

Vienna, 3o juillel .

Berlin, 3o juillet. .
Paris , 3o juillet. . .

Berlin, 3o juillet. .
Londres, 3o juillet,

M. MOLLAKD ■

M. Rene Vivuni

M. PALEOLOCXiS .

M. Ren6 Viviani

M. Ddmaink ....
M. Jules Cambon

M. Ren6 VvfUKh

Berlin, 3o juillet.

Londres , 3 1 juillet

Luxembourg, 3i
juillet.

Paris, 3i juillet..

Saint -Petersbourg
3i juillet ■

Paris, 3i juillet...

SOMMAIRE.

Vienne, 3i juillet..
Berlin, 3^ juillet.,

Paris, 3 1 juillet.,.

A la suite d'un entretien tres cordial entre I'ambassadeur de
Russie et le comte Bercbtold, une nouvelle tentative de
conversation directe austro-russe sera faite a Petersbourg
pour le reglement a Tamiable de Taffaire serbe

Le Gouvernement allemand dement la nouvelle de la mobi-
lisation, mais prend toules les mesures necessaires pour
la hater. .

M. Paul Cambon est invite a porter a la connaissance du
Gouvernement anglais tous les renseignements concor-
dants qui prouvenl les mesures militaires actives et mena-
cantes prises par I'Allemagne depuis le 26 juillet, tandis
que la France maintient ses troupes de couverture a dix
kilometres environ de la frontiere.

M. de Jagow declare inacccptablc pour I'Autricbe la propo-
sition de M. Sazonoff

L'Ambassadeur d'AUema^ne n'a pas apporte de reponse a la
demande de sir Edward Grey que le Gouvernement
allemand propose lui-meme une formule de mediation a
quatre. Le prince Lichnowski a queslionne le Gouverne-
ment anglais sur ses preparatifs militaires. Les renseigne-
ments dbnnes a Sir E. Grey sur les preparatifs militaires
de I'AQemagne I'ont amene a estimer, comme M. Paul
Cambon , que le moment est venu d'envisager en commun
toutes les hypotheses

M. de Jagow declare que, pour gagner du temps, il va agir
directement a Vienne en demandant les conditions autri-
chiennes, eludant ainsi de nouveau la demande de sir
Edouard Grey. 11 recrimine contre la Russie

Sir E. Grey avertit I'Ambassadeur d'AlIemagne a Londres
que TAngieterre ne pourrait pas rester neutre dans un
conflit general ou ia France serait impliquee. 11 a dit
d'autre part a M. Paul Cambon que le Gouvernement
anglais ne pouvait nous garantir son intervention.

La lettre autographe que i\I. le President de la Republique
a adressee au Roi d'Angleterre a ete remise a celui-ci. ,

Le Ministre d'Etat luxembourgeois signale les preparatifs
militaires a la frontiere allemande et demande a la France
I'engagement de respecter la neutralite du Grand-
Duche, quelle ne pent obtenir de I'Allemagne

Le Gouvernement francais demande a Petersbourg, en vue
de repondre au desir de I'Angleterre, de modifier la
proposition de M. Sazonoff a I'Autricbe pour la rendre
acceptable par cette puissance et a permettre une solution
pacifique du conflit

Le Gouvernement russe a accepte de modifier sa formule ,
malgreTemotion provoqueepar le bombardement de Bel-
grade et Taction constamment provocatrice de TAulriche-
Hongrie

Les efforts paralleles poursuivis par I'Anglelerre et la Russie
en vue du maintien de la paix se sont rejoints et perraet
traient d'esperer une entente avec I'Autricbe-Hohgrie qui
s'y montre plus disposee. Mais I'attitude de I'Allemagne
donne I'impression que cette puissance n'a poursuivi de-
puis ie debut que rhumiliation de la Russie, la desagre-
gation de la Triple-Entente, et, si ce resultat ne pouvait
Itre bbtenu , la guerre

La mobilisation generale autrichienne est decretee. ......

A son tour, I'Allemagne decrete « Tetat de danger de guerre
et demande a la Russie de demobiliser

En annoncant a Paris I'ultimatum adresse a la Russie,
M. de Schoen demande au Gouvernement francais de lui
dire, avant le lendemain a une heure de I'aprfes-midi
^elle sera I'attitude de la France en cas de conflit russo
alLemand

— XIY

BOS.

NOM

DD SlGNiTAIBK.

LIEU

DATE DENVOI.

SOMMAIRE.

PAGES.

Saint -Petersbourg,
3i juiUet,

La mobilisation generale de I'armee ausJro-hongroise enlrainB
la mobilisation generale russe

129

119

M. KloBimowsKi

Bruxelles.Sijuillet.

Le Gouvernemenl beige recoit I'assurance ofTicielle que la
France respeclera la neutralite beige

129

CHAPITRE VI.

Declaration de guerr

e de l'Allemagne a la Russie (samedi i" aout, a 7 h. 10 du soir)
et X LA France (lundi 3 aout, a i8 h. d5).

120

M. Rene Viviaki

Paris. i"aout.. . .

Les Ambassadeurs d'Aulricbe a Paris et a Petersbourg font
deux demarcbes dans un sens conciliant. Malbeureusement
I'attitude de l'Allemagne nc permet plus guere d'esperer

133

12J

M. Jules Cambon

Berlin, i"aoul.. .

L'Autriche-Hongrie annonce a Petersbourg quelle accepte
de discuter le fond de sort differend avec la Serbie; mais
la sommation adressee^iar rAllemagne a la Russie d'avoir
a demobiliser dans les dou/.e heures parait emporter les
dernieres esperanccs de paix

134

122

M. Rene Viviani

Paris, i"aoul....

Le Gouvernement francais declare au Gouvernemenl anglais

135

123
124

M. Jules Cambon

M. Barbere

Berlin, i",aoiit...
Rome, 1" aout. . .

Le Gouvernement allemand se refuse a prendre un engage-

135
136

M. de San Giuliano declare a TAmbassadeur d'AUemagne
que rilalie gardcra la neutralite

125

126

M. Rene VmAtii

M.Paul Cambon

Paris, 1" aout.. . .
Londres, 1" aout^

Informe des dispositions concilianles de I'Autriche ct de
I'acceptation par la Russie de la formule anglaise, M. de
Schoen ne parle plus de son depart et protesle de.scs dis-
positions pacifiques, tout en declarant qu'il n'a pas rccu

136
137

Sir E. Grey declare que TAngleterre a refuse la promesse
de garder la neutralite que lAllemagne lui demandail.
Le respect de la neutralite beige imporle beaucoup a
I'Angleterre et TAHemagne n'a pas reponda a la question
posee .. . ......

127

M.Ren6 Viviani...,

Paris, I "aout

La mobilisation francaise a ete ordonnee dans la journee.

138

128

Luxembourg, 1"
aout.

Le Ministre d'Etat luxembourgeois demande au Gouverne-
ment francais une assurance de neutralite semblable a
celle qu'a recue la Belcique .•••••••...

139

129

M. Rene Viviani

Paris, 1" aout. . . .

Cette assurance est donnee par le Gouvernement francais . .

140

130
131

132

M. Jules Cambon

M. Eyscum

Berlin, 1" aout...
Luxembourg, 2 aout

Luxembourg, aao6t

La mobilisation generale est ordonnee a Beriin. •

140
140

Violation de la neutralite luxembourgeoise par les troupes
allemandes. Protestation du Ministre d'Etat • ..... •

M MOLLARD ...»

Explications fournies par le Gouvernement allemand qui
declare que les mesures prises en Luxembourg sont Uni-
quement preventives et n'on taucun caractere d'hoslilite
centre, le.Grand-Duche . .

141

133

Note de M. de Scuoen. . . .

Paris, 3 aout ....

Meme explication loucbant I'entree des troupes allemandes
dans le Grand-Duchi 'le Luxembourz. >,.«»•«»«.

1/42

xy —

NOME-
ROS.

134
135

136
137

138

139
140

141

142
143

144

145

NOMS

DO SIGNATAIRE.

147

148
149
150
151

isiz

M. PaLeologue. . , ^. . , . .

M. Rbne Vituni?/ : : , —

M. Rene VivrANi ,..

M. Paul Cambon ^. .

M. Rene Viviani*

M. Rene Vivuni.-. .1..^,.
l/i. Pkllet. . , . . ^.-. . , . . .

M. Klobokowski. ,,.,...

M. Klobukowski. ...,.».
M. Paof Cambon..*'. . . » . .
M. Paul Cambon. ...;,,.

M. Paul Cambon-. .........

M. Rene Viviani. ..*.....

M. DE SCHOEJI

M. Rene Viviani... . ,. . . .

M. Rene Viviani. ,. . . . . .

M. Rene Vivuni. .......

M. Rene Vivun... ......

M. Elobdkowski

LIEU
et

DATE D'BNVOr.

PetersboOrg,' a ao&t
Paris; 5 aoiktt .•>;.■.

Paris, a aoQt.

Londres. a ao&t.

Paris, a aoiit.

Paris, a aoftt.. . .
La Haye , 3 aout .

Bruxeiles, 3 aout.

Bruxelles , 3 aofit. ,
Londres , 3 aoilif .
Londres, 3 aout. ,

Londres, 3 aoilt. ,

Paris , 3 aout . . . .

Paris , 3 ao6t

P^ris, 3. aout

P4)ris:, 3 aoiit. . . . .

PAris, 3 aout

Paris, 3 aofit

Bruxelles, 4 aoM..

SOMMAIRE.

L'AUemagne vient de declarer la guerre a la Russie. . .-...,

Communication de cetle nouvelle aux agents diplomatiques
frangais a I'etranger t. ,

Les agents diplomatiques francais a i'etranger sont invites k
faire connaitre cette situation aux gouvernements aupres
desquels ils sont accredites

Sir E. Grey a donne I'assurance que la flotte britannique
defendrait les c6tes francaises contre toute attaque alle-
mande par mer. La violalion de la neutralite de la Bel-
gique serait consideree comme un casus belli

Le President du Conseil communique aux Cbambres fran-
caises les declarations de Sir E. Grey relatives au concours
de la flotte britannique ; , - .

Protestation adressee a Berlin contre les violations de la
frontiere francaise

Le Ministre d'AUemagne a La Haye annonce au Gouverne-
ment neerlandais I'entree des troupes imperiales en
Luxembourg et en Belgique, a litre de mesures preven-
tives

Le Gouvernement beige repousse la sommation qui lui est
adressee d'avoir a laisscr aux troupes allemandes le libre
passage a travers son terriloire

11 ne croit pas encore le moment venu de faire appel a la
garantie des puissances pour defendre son independance.

La declaration concernant l*intervention-de la flotte anglaise
lie le Gouvernement britannique

Dcmarcbe infructueuse de TAmljassadeur d'AUemagne a
Londres aupres de Sir E. Grey pour obtenir i'assurance
que la neutralite de I'Angleterre ne dependrait pas du res-
pect de la neutralite beige

Sir E. Grey fait aux Communes la declaration relative a
rinlerventiori de la flotte anglaise et lit une iettre du roi
Albert demandant I'appui de I'Angleterre

Le Gouvernement francais dement a Londres la nouvelle
d'apres iaquelle la frontiere allemande aurait ete violee
par des ofliciers francais

Declaration de guerre remise par i'Ambassadeur d'AUe-
magne a Paris au President du Conseil.

Communication de cette nouvelle aux agents diplomatiques
francais a I'etranger

Instructions envoyees a M. Jules Cambon, a Berlin, pour
demander ses passeports

Le Ministre de France a Municb recoit I'instruction de de-
mander ses passeports

Violation du territoire beige par les troupes allemandes. . , .

Appel adresse par la Belgique a I'Angleterre , a la France et
a la.Russie i

142

143

144
145

145

146
146
147

147

148

\ti8

149

150

150
151

151

VOCVMRHTS oiPLOHATiQUS$. — Guerre europeenne.

>CME-
ROS.

NOMS

DC SIGNATAIRE.

LIEU

DATE D'ENVOI.

SOMMAIRE.

PAGES.

153

M. Paul Cambon

Londres , 4 aoiil. . .

Le Gouvernement allemand sera invite par le Gouvernemenl
anglais a retireir avant minuil son ultimatum a la Bei-

152

154

155

M. Klobdkowsm

M. Bapst

Broxefles, 4 aout..
Copenhague, 6 aout

Le Gouvernement allemand declare a Bruxelles qu'il se voit

152

Transmission d'un rapport d'apres lequel M. Jules Cambon
rend compte au Gouvernement des circonstances de son
voyage de relour et des vexations dont il a ete I'objet. . . .

152

156

M. MOLLARD

Paris, h aout ....

Rapport adresse au Gouvernement par M. Mollard au sujel
de son depart de Luxembourg , impose par les auloriles
mililaires aliemandes

157

M. Rene ViviANi

(Circulaire aux puissances.)

Paris , 4 aout

Texte de la notiGcation aux Puissances de I'etat de guerre
existant entre la France et I'Allemagne

100

158

M. Raymond Poincare ,

President de la Republique.

(Message au Parlement.)

Paris, 4 aout

Message du President de la Republique lu a la seance du
Parlement du 4 aout ibt4<<-*>>>- • •

161

159

M. Rene Viviani, Presi-
dent du Conseil. (Dis-
cours aux Chambres. )

Paris , 4 aout

Texte du discours prononce par le President du Conseil a la
Chambre des Deputes , le 4 aofit i Q 1 4 •

163

CHAPITRE VII.

DECLARATION DE LA TRIPLE-ENTENTE.

160 M. Delcasse.

Paris , 4 septembre

Declaration de I'Angleterre, de la Russie et de la France ,
relativement a leur engagement reciproque de ne pas con-
dure de paix separee, et de ne pas poser de conditions de
paix sans accord prealable avec chacun des autres allies .

ANNEXES.

ANNEXE I.
EXTRAiTS DU Livre blea relatifs a la position prise par L'angleterre

PENDANT LES POURPARLERS QUI ONT PRECEDE LA GUERRE.

Sir J. Bdchanan.

Sir E. Grey.

Sir E. Gret.

Saint- Petersbourg ,
i4 juillet.

Londres, agjuillet.

Conversation entre M. SazonofT, M. Palcologue et Sir .1. Bu-
chaiian concernant une declaration eventuelle de solid a -
rile de I'Angleterre avec la Russie et la France dans 1 a

crise europeenne.

Renseignements donnes a M. Paul Cambon sur les vues du
Gouvernement anglais au sujet de son attitude : ne pas
donner a I'Allemagne de fausse impression sur I'abstention
possible de I'Angleterre, ne pas prendre d'engagement
precis des maintenant a I'egard de la France

Compte-rendu d'un entretien avec rAmbassadeuB d'Alle-
magne pour I'avertir que I'Angleterre ne s'engageait nul-
lement k ne pas intervenir si la crise se developpait el si
I'Allemagne et la France y etaient impliquees

XVII

NOME-
ROS.

119

148

NOM

DU SIGNATAIRE.

SirFr. Bertie.

Sir K GiiE¥.

Sir E. Gret.

LIEU
et

DATE D'EN vox.

Paris, 3o juiilet.

Londres, 3i juilleL

Londres , 2 aout. . .

SOMMAIRE.

Conversation avec le President de la Republique, qui estime
qu'une declaration de I'Angleterre aEDrmant son inten-
tion de soutenir la France, don't la volonte pacifique est
certaine, arreterait rAllemagne dans ses velleit^s de
guerre , »

Declaration faite a I'Ambassadeur de France que, au point
ou en est la crise , le Gouvernement anglais ' ne peut
prendre aucUn engagement deGnitif ,

Assurance donnee relativement a la protection des cdtes et
de la marine frafiqaises par la flotte anglaise contra toute
atlaque de la flotte allemande par le Pas-de-Calais oula
mer du Nord

ANNEXE n.

EXTRAITS DU LIVRE BLEU RELATIFS AUX PROPOSITIONS FAITES PAR LE GOUVERNEMENT ALLEMAND
AU GOUVEBNEMENT ANGLAIS EN VUE D'OBTENIR LA NEUTRALITE DE LUNfiLETERRE.

8> Sir E. GoscHEN .

101

123

Sir E. Gret

Sir E. Grey.

Berlin, 29 juiilet..

Londres , So juiilet,

Londres, i"aout.

Offres faites piar le Chancelier de I'Empire a I'Ambassadeur
d'Angleterre pour tenter d'obtenir la neutralite anglaise :
promesse de respecter I'integrite du territoire francais,
mais non de ses colonies; intentions a I'egard de la
HoUande et de la Belgique. Proposition d'une entente
g^nerale de neutralite enlre I'Allemagne et I'Angleterre . .

Refus des propositions allemandes, non seulement ina;ccep-
tables en fait, mais dont I'acceptation sei'ait une honte
pour la reputation de I'Angleterre. Inutilite d'examiner la
perspective d'une convention generale de neutralite entre
I'Angleterre et I'AHemagne pour I'avenir. L'Angleterre
veiit garder son entiere liberie d'action et continuer a
cooperer au maintien de la paix en Europe : c'est pour
I'Allemagne la seule facon de maintenir de bonnes rela-
tions avec rAngleterre

Compte rendu d'une conversation avec I'Ambassadeur d'Alle-
magne relativement a la neutralite beige. Le prince
Lichnowsky insiste pour que le Gouvernement anglais
formule les conditions anxquelles I'Angleterr^ garderait
la neutralite; il lui est repondu qile le Gouvernement
anglais refuse definitivement toute promesse de rester
neutre et veut garder les mains libres

ANNEXE 11 his.

TENTATIYES ALLEMANDES POUR OBTENIR, SOUS LE COUVERT D'UN « MALENTENDU » , LA GARANTIE,
PAR L'ANGLETERRE DE LA MEUTRALITE DE LA FRANCE

DANS UNE GUERRE GERMANO-RUSSE [Gazette de I'Allemagne duNord), 20 aout i9i4).

Prince Lichnowsky .

Sa Majeste I'Empereur Gdil-
laume U.

Londres, 3i juiilet.

Berlin, i"aoiit.

Compte rendu d'une soi-disant demande telephonique visant
nn engagemient eventuel de I'Allemagne de ne pas attaquer
la France si celle-ci reste neutre dans une guerre entre
I'Allemagne et la Russie

Telegramme de I'Empereur Guillaumeau Roi George V pour
declarer qu'il ne peut arr^ter sa mobilisation contre la
Russie et la France, mais n'attaquera pas la France.
dans rhypothcsft oii cette puissance ofFrirait sa neutrality
gftrantie par I'armee et la flotte anglaises

XVIII

>TME-
BOS.

NOM

DO SIGNATAIHE.

M. DE BeTHMAKN HOLLWEG.

S.M. IcRoi George V.

Prince L1CHSOWSK.Y .

LIEU
et

DATE D'E-NVOI.

Beriin, 1" aout.

Londres,.i"ao{it..

Lon3res, »aoiil..

SOMMAIRE.

Telegramme au prince Lichnowsky. reprodulsant I'engage-
ment de I'Allema'rne

Telegramme du Roi d'Angleterre a I'Empereur d'AUemagne
declarant que I'Ambassadeur d'AUemagne s'est mepris et
quie sir Edward Grey n'a parl6 avec le prince Lichnowsy,
que des moyens de retander un conflit arme entre la
France et I'Allemagne jusqu'i ce qu'un terrain d'enlente
definitif ait ete trouve entre I'Autriche-Hongrie et la
Russie

Avis donne a M. de Bethmann HoHweg que les conversatfons
dont il avaitfaitetat ontete abandonnees comme « futiles f.

ANNEXE m.

EXTBAITS DO LIVRE BLEU VISANT LE REFUS DE L'ANGLETERRE D'ADMETTRE LE POINT DE VUE ALLEMAND
DANS LA QUESTION DE LA VIOLATION DE LA NEUTRALITE BELGE.

153

155

157

159
160

Sir E. Ghet.
Sir £. Grex.

M. DE Jagow

Sir £. Grey . . .
Sir E. GoscHEN ,

Londres, 4 aout .

Londres, 4 aout.

Berlin, 4 aout.

Londres, 4 aoiit. .
Londres, 8 aotA..

Demande d'engagement immediat de I'Allemagne qu'elle
respectera la neutralite beige

Declaration a la Belgique que I'Angleterre est pr^te a s'unir
a la France et a la Russie pour resister a une attaque de
TAllemagne contre la Belgique ;et pour garantir i'inte-
grite et I'independance de ce pays ^. . .

Declaration communiquee par I'Ambassadeur d'AUemagne a
Londres que malgre la violation jugee necessaire de la
Belgique aucune annexion de territoire n'aura lieu. Preuve
donnee de la sincerite de celte declaration par laflirma-
tion que la neutralite de la Hollande sera respectee, une
annexion du territoire beige ne pouvant itre profitable sans
une annefcion simultanie du territoire hollandais

Ultimatum de I'Angieterre a TAlIemagne .

Rapport de I'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre k Berlia sur ses
dernieres conversations avec M. de Jagow, M. de Beth-
mann HoHweg et M. de Zimmermann. Le Cbancelier de
I'Empire ne pent s'expliquer que, «pour un mot, neutra-
lite », que, tpour un chiffon de papier > I'Angleterre aille
faire la guerre a une nation a laquelle elle est appa-
rentee et qui ne desirait rien tant que d'etre son amie.
L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre essaye de faire comprendre
a son interlocuteur que c'est une question de vie ou do
mort pour I'honneur de la Grande-Bretagne que de lenir
I'engagement solennel qu'elle a sign6 de d^fendre la neu-
tralite de la Belgique

ANNEXE IV.

BXTBAITS DU UVRE GRJS INDIQUANT LES CONDITIONS DANS LESQUELLES L*ALLEMAGNB
A VIOLE LA NEUTRALITE BELGE :

Dep6che$ n** 9, 8,9, 11, 13, i3, li, i5, 19, 9o, aa,
37. 38. 3o, 3i. 35. 39. 4o. 4i. 44. 48, 5s. 60. 71.. 195

XIX

NOM

DO DESTINATAIRE.

LIEU

DATE D'KNVOI.

SOMMAIRE.

ANNEXE V.

EXTRAITS DU LIVRB BLANC.

Telegrammes ^changes entre TEmpereur d'Allemagne Guil-
laume II et I'Empereur de Russie Nicolas II, du 28 juii-

let au i" aout

ipereu

'9»

209

ANNEXE VI.

EXTRAITS DU LIVRE ORANGE RELATIFS \ LA DECLARATION DE GUERRE DE L'ALLEMAGNE X LA RUSSIE.
Comte DE POURTALES.

M. Sazonoff.

M. Sazonofp.

Saint -Petersbourg ,
1" avril.

Saint-Petersbourg,
2 aout.

Saint - Petersbourg ,
2 aout.

Note remise par I'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne i Saint-
Petersbourg au Ministre des Affaires etrangeres de
Russie

Communique du Ministre des Aflalres etrangeres de Russie
resumant les evenements qui se sont succede du 33 juillet
au 1" aout 1 9 1 /j

Circulaire du Ministre des Affaires etrangeres de Russie
aux Representants de I'Empire a I'etranger

213

213
215

MINISTfeRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES

&<8»<i

bOGUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES

1914

LA GUERRE EUROPfiENNE

PifeCES

RELATIVES AUX N^GOCIATIONS

QUI ONT PR^CfiDfi LES DECLARATIONS DE GUERRE

DE L'ALLEMAGNE A LA RUSSIE (I™ AOOT 1914)

ET A LA FRANCE (3 AOCt 1914)

DECLARATION DU 4 SEPTEMBRE 1914

PARIS
IMPRIMERIE NATIONALS

MDCCCCXIV

MINISTfeRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGfeRES

■«<»<»-

DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES

\ .

LA GUERRE EUROPEENNE

19H

Note. — Les droits de traduction en anglais et de reproduc-
tion de la traduclioQ anglaise da. pr^nt Livre Jaune, pour tons
pays, appartiennent au journal anglais The Timet.

CHAPITRE PREMIER

AVERTISSEMENTS

(1913)

|)ocTJMENTS i)iPi,OM*tiQCES. — GueiTe europecDne,

— 3

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de la Republique k Berlin,
a M. JoNNART, Ministre des AiFaires Etrangeres.

Berlin, le 17 mars igiS.

Nos attaches militaire et naval adressent k leurs Ministres respectifs des rapports sur
ia nouvelle lol militaire allemande. J'appelle Tattention de Votre Excellence sur ces
importants documents.

L etude des moyens financiers destines a pourvoir aux mesures militaires que
f Aliemagne a en vue r^tarde seule la publication des propositions definitives du Gou-
vemement. Malgre le patriotisme affecte avec lequel les dasses riches accepteni le
sacrifice qui leur sera demande , elles n'en sont pas moins , particulierement dans le
monde des affaires, mecontentes des mesures financieres annoncees, et elles sentent
qu'une contribution forcee, imposee en pleine paix,-cree pour I'avenir un precedent
redoutable. D'autre part, les Gouvernements confederes ont oppose une vive
Resistance a I'innovation qui attribuera a I'Empire des ressources tirees de I'impot
direct. Jusqu'ici les impots de cette nature etaient reserves aux Etats confederes, et
ceux-ci voient dans I'abandon de cette regie une affirmation nouvelle de la person-
nalite de f Empire , qui constitue une certaine diminution de leur propre souverainet6.

Quoi qu'il en soit, en augmentant la force de I'armee allemande , I'Empire veut ne
tien laisser a fimprevu , au cas ou une crise eciaterait.

Les innovations de f Aliemagne ont fait surgir un fait inattendu pour elle : la pro-
position du Gouvernement de la Republique retablissant. le service de trois ans, et la
resolution virile avec laquelle cette proposition a ete accueillie en France. L'im-r
pression d'etonnement que ces projets ont produite a ete mise a profit par le Gou-
vernement Lnperialpour insister surlanecessite absolue de I'augmentation des forces
militaires de TAllemagne; ses projets ont ete presentes comme une reponse. C'est le
contraire de la verite , puisque I'immense effort militaire que la France accepte nest
que la consequence des initiatives de f Aliemagne.

Les Autorites Impe^iales ne cessent d'exalter le sentiment patriotique. L'Empereur
se complait k rappeler tous les jours les souvenirs de i8i3. Hier soir, une retraita
militaire a parcouru les ilies de Berlin et des discours ont ete prononc^ dans lesqueb

— 4 —
la situation presente etait assimilee k celle d'il y a un siecle. L'entrainement de Topi-
nion aura sa repercussion dans les discussions qui s'ouvriront le mois prochain aul
Reichstag, et j'ai lieu de craindre que le Chancelier lui-meme ne soit pousse a faire
dans ses declarations des allusions aux relations de la France et de I'Allemagne. U
fallait s'altendre a ce qu'on exallat le palriotisme de la nation au moment ou on iui
demande de nouveaux sacrifices , mais c'est abuser du rapprochement historique que
de comparer le temps present a 181 3. Si le mouvement qui, il y a un siecle,
emportait le peuple allemand contre I'homme de genie qui aspirait a la domination
universelle, pouvait trouver aujourd'hui quelque equivalent, c'est en France qu'il le
faudrait chercher, puisque le peuple fran^ais ne songe qu a se 'defendre contre la
domination de la force.

11 n'en est pas moins vrai que cet et?it de fopinion dans les deux pays rend la ;
situation grave.

Jules Cambopj.

Annexe I.

Rapport du Lieutenant-Colonel Serret, Attache militaire pres TAmbassade
de la Republique Fran9aise k Berlin,

a M. Etienne, Ministre de la Guerre.

Berlin, le i5 mars 191 3.

Le mouvement patriotique qui s'est manifeste en France a cau$6 dans certains milieux
une veritable colere.

Je ne pretends certes pas que farlicle virulent de la Gazette de Colocjne soit fexpression
dun sentiment general. C'est rexplosion de rage d'un journaliste impulsif , aussitot desavou6
par le Gouvernement.

Mais, malgre son inconvenance, la manifestation de la Gazette de Cologne n'est pas
negiigeabie; elle a ete approuvce dans son esprit, sinon dans sa forme, par plusieurs jour-
naux assez importants , et elie me parait correspondie a un sentiment reel, a une colere
latente.

II est intdressant de le constater, parce que le sens des armements actuels s'en trouve
eclaire d'une lumiere plus vive.

Depuis quelque temps deja , on rencontre des gens qui declarent les projets militaires de
ia France extraordinaires et injustifics. Dans un salon , un membre du Reichstag et non un
cnergumcne, pariant du service de trois ans en France, allait jusqua dire : « C'est une pro-
vocation, nous ne le permettrpns pas ». De plus moderes, militaires ou civils, soutiennent
couramment la these que la France, avec ses quarante millions d'ames , n'a pas le droit de
rivaliser ainsi avec rAllemagne.

En somme, on est furieuX, et cette colere ne resulte pas des criailleries de certaines
feuilles frnncaises auxquelles les gens serieux ne s'arretent guere. C'est du depit. On enrage
de voir que, malgre I'eflbrt enorme enlrepris I'annee derniere. continue et accru encore

— 5 —

<iette annee, on ne poun^a probablement pas encore cette fois mettre la France hers de
course.

Nous mettre definitivement hors de course , puisque nous ne voulons ni ne pouvons 6ti*e
avec elle, c'est cela en effet que poursuit I'Allemagne. On ne saurait trop le repeter et la
prochaine loi, que i'opinion francaise regarde un peu trop comrae une explosion spontance ,
nest que la suite fatale, attendue, de la loi de juin 1912.

Celie-ci, en eflet, en creant deux corps d'armee nouveaux, avait laisse a dessein, suivanl
la maniere allemande,de grandes unites et des regiments incomplets. II etait evident quon
n'attendrait pas longtemps pour combler les lacunes''). La crise balkanique a fourni une
merveiHeuse occasion, eclatant juste a point voulu, pour permettre d'exploiter le centenaire
des guerres de delivrance, d'obtenir plus facilement des sacrifices au souvenir de ceux
consentis naguere, deja contre nous.

Pour bien montrer la genese de ce programme militaire, je me permets de rappeler ce
qu'ecrivait , il y a un an , lors de I'apparition de la loi de 1 9 1 2 , mon predecesseur, le colonel
Pelle :

« Nous d^cbuvrons tous les jours combien sont profonds et durables les sentinjents d'or-
gueil froisse et de rancunes contre nous provoqu^s par les evenements de Tan dernier^

(' Le traite du k novembre 1 91 1 est une profonde disillusion.

«Le ressentiment eprouve dans loutes les parties du pays est le meine. Tous les Alle-
mands, jusqu'aux socialistes, nous en veulent de leiir avoir pris leur part au Maroc.

« II semblait, il y a un ou deux ans, que les Allemands fussent partis a la conqu^te du
monde. lis s'estimaient assez forts pour que personne n osat entamer la lulte contre eux. Des
possibilit^s indefmies s'ouvraient a Industrie allemande, au commerce allemand, k I'expan-
sion allemande. »

« Naturellement, ces idees et ces ambitions n'ont pas disparu aujourd'hiii. Les Allemands
ont'toujours besoin de d6bouclies, d expansion economique et coloniale. lis estiment qu'ils
y ont droit parce qu'ils grandissent tous les jours, parce que I'avenir leur appartient. Us
nous regardent, avec nos ko millions d'habitanls, comme une nation secondaire,

« Dans la crise de 1911, cette nation secondaire leur a tenu tete, et TEmpereur et leGou-
vernement ont ced^. L opinion publique ne I'a pardonn6 ni a eux, ni a nous. Elle ne veatpas
qn'an pareilfait paisse se reproduire. »

Et au moment ou la seconde et formidable parlie du programme va^tre r^alisee, ou la
force militaire allemande est sur ie point d'acquerir cette superiority definitive qui nous for-
cerait a subir, le cas echeant , I'humiliation ou I'^crasement , voici que soudain la France
refuse d'abdiquer, et quelle montre, comme disait Renan, « son pouvoir eternel de renais-
sance et de resurrection ». On comprend a merveille le depit allemand.

Sans doute le Gouvernement invoque la situation generale de I'Europe et parle du p6ril
slave. Pom- ma part, fopinion me semble en realite indifFerente au peril slave et cependant
elle a accepte avec une tres belle tenue, sinon plus, les charges ^normes de ces deux lois
consi^cutives.

Le 10 mars dernier, centenaire de I'organisation de la lev^e en masse de I'AUemagne
contre nous, une foule ^nornie s'est press^e, m.ilgrd une pluie battante, k la parade mili-
taire devant le chateau, au milieu du Tiergarten devant les statues de la reine Louise et de
Frederic-Guillaume III, entourees de monceaux de fleurs.

'•> Le probleme qui nous est pos^ aujourd'hui se serait done pose quelques ann^es plus lard et d'une
maniere plus angoissanle encore, puisque la diminution de nos contingents amoindrit sans cesse le chiffre
de noire effectif de paix.

— 6 —

Ces anniversaires , rappelant la lutte contre la France, vont se r^peter toute I'annee. En
I gill on cei^brera le centenaire de la premiere campagne de France , de la premiere entree
des Prussiens k Paris.

En resum6,si I'opinion publique allemande ne montre pas la France du doigt, comme
le fjdt la Gazette de Cologne , c est cependant contre nous qu'elle est et restera iongtemps
braquee. Elle trouve que pour nos ho millions d'babitants nous tenons au soleil une place
vraiment trop grande.

Les Allemands desirent la paix , ne cesse-t-on de proclamet, et I'Empereur plus que tout
autre, piais ils ne I'entendent pas dans le sens de concessions mutuelles ni dequilibre des
armements. lis veulent qu'on les craigne et ils sont en train de faii'e les sacrifices necessaires.
Si, a quelque occasion, leur orgueil national se trouve bless6, la confiance que pourra avoir
le pays dans I'^norme superiorite de son armee favorisera une explosion de colere nationale
devant laquelle la moderation du Gouvernement imperial sera peut-etre impuissante.

II faut constater d'ailleurs que le Gouvernement met tout en ceuvre pour chauffer le sen-
timent national, en felanl avec eclat tous les anniversaires de 1 8 1 3.

Au reste, la tournur& de Topinion n'aurait pour effet que de donner a une guerre un
caractere plus ou moins national. Par quelque pretexte que I'AIlemagne justifie une confla-
gration europeenne, nul ne.peut faire que les premiers coups d^cisifis ne soient pas portes
contre la France.

Annexe II.

M. DE Faramond, attache naval pres TAmbassade de France k Beiiin,
a M. Baudin, Ministre de la Marine.

Berlin, le i5 mars 19 13.

En vous rendant compte de I'examen du budget de la marine par la Commission du
Reichstag, j'ai dit qu'aucune loi navale ayant pour objet un accroissement de la flotte ne
serait pr^sent^e cette ann^e et que tout Teffort militaire serait dirig6 contre nous.

Bien que le nouveau projet de loi destin^ a augmenter les effectifs allemands ne soit pas
encore d^pos^ devant ie Reichstag, nous savons qu'il s'agit d'un « renf'orcement militaire de
grande envergure», suivant I'expression de la Gazette de I'AIlemagne du Aoz-rf.

Les joumaux officieux ont d'ailleurs commente le projet militaire dans des termes qui
permeltent de tenir pour exact le communique du Lokal Anzeiger.

Les ettectifs allemands s'elevent actuellement a 720,000 hommes; nous sommes autoris^s
k conclure que , le 1 " octobre 1916, I'armee imp^riale sera port^e k un chiflre voisin de
860,000 hommes,

L'importance du chiffre serait moindre si les provisions "de la nouvelle loi ( d'apres ce que
nous ont laiss6 entrevoir les feuilles officielles) n'avaient pas pour tendance, comme du reste.
les dispositions de la loi de 1912, de mettre les corps d'armee voisin^ de notre fronti^ro

— 7 — .
dans un etat aussi rapproch6 que possible du pied de guerre, afln de pouvoir, le jour m^me
de I'ouverture des. hostiiites, nous attaquer brusqiiement avec des forces tres sup^rieures
aux notres. C'est pour, ie Gouvernement imperial une n^cessite imperieuse d'obtenir un
succ^s des le debut des operations.

Les conditions dans lesquelle§ I'Empereur allemand engagerait aujourd'hui une I utte
contre la France ne sont plus les memes qu'il y a quarante ans. Au d6but de la guerre
de 1870, I'Etat-Major prussien avait envisage la possibilite d'une offensive victorieuse des
Fraiicais et Moltke, prevoyant que nous pourrions k la rigueur parvenir jusqu'a Mayence,
avait dit a son souverain : « La ils se heurteront ». Guillaume II ne peut pas admettre une
retraite clans ses calculs, quoique le soldat allemand ne soit plus aujourd'hui, cdmme il y a
quarante ans , un homme simple , religieux et pret a mourir sur un ordre de son roi. Tenant
compte des quatre millions de suffrages social istes exp rimes aux dernieres Elections et du
fait que le droit de vote n'est acquis en AUemagne qu'ci 2 5 ans , on peut penser que Tarmee
active, composee de jeunesgens de 20 i 26 ans, doit comporter dans ses rangs une propor-
tion sMeuse de socialistes.

Certes, ce serait folie de croire que les socialistes allemands leveront la crosse en I'air ie
jour ou la France et I'Allemagne en viendront aux mains; mais il sera extremement impor-
tant, pour le Gouvernement imperial de leur persuader, d'une part que nous sommes les
agresseurs, et d'autre part qu'ils peuvent avoir pleine confiance dans le commandement et
le resultat.

Lors du dernier serment des recrues de la garde ii Potsdam, j'ai ete frappe d'entendre
I'Empereur prendre pour theme de son di^cours aux jeunes soldats « le devoir d'etre plus-
courageux et plus discipline dans la mauvaise fortune que dans la bonne ».

Et c'est parce qu'une premiere d^faite allemande aurait pour I'Empire une port^e incal-
culable que Ton trouve dans tous les projets militaires ^labor^s par le grand Etat-Majof
I'objectif d'une offensive fovidroyante contre la France.

En r^alite, le Gouvernement imperial veut se mettre en etat de faire face a toules les
6ventualites possibles. C'est du cote de la Frartce que le danger lui parait le plus grand. La
Gazette de Cologne I'a dit dans un article haineux et violent dont la Wilhelmstrasse a desa-
vou^ la forme plut6t que le fond.

Mais nous devons nous persuader que I'opinion exprimee par la Gazette de Cologne est k
I'heure actuelle celle de I'immense majorite du peuple allemand.

A cet egard, je crois interessant de citer une conversation qu'un membre de notre
ambassade a eue I'autre soir avec le vieux prince Henckel de Donnersmark , parce qu'elle
pourrait bien refl^ter la pensee qui domine dans les milieux de la Cour.

Faisant allusion au nouveau projet militaire allemand, le prince de Donnersmark a dit :
« Les Francais ont tout a fait tort de croire que nous nourrissons de sombres desseins et que
nous d^sirons une guerre. Mais nous ne pouvons pas oublier qu'en 1870 i'opinion populaire
a force le Gouvernement Francais a nous attaquer foUement, sans etre pret. Qui peut nous
assurer c[ue I'opinion publique, si prompte a s'enflammer en France, ne mettra pas queique
Jour le Gouvernement.de la R6publique dans robligalion de nous faire la guerre.^ C'est
contre ce danger que nous voulons nous premiinir ».

Et le prince a ajoute : « On m'a souvcnt regards en France comme un des artisans de la
guerre de 1870. Cela est tout a fait faux. Si j'ai travaille aux consequences de la guerre,
j'avais au contraire fait mon possible pour en empecher I'explosion. Queique tenlps avant la
guerre, me trouvant a un diner ou etaient reunies les personnalites les plus considerables du
regime imperial, je pris la parole pour deplorer les sentiments d'inimitie qui se manifes-
taient deja entre la France et la Prusse. On me^r6pondit que si je parlais ainsi, c'est que

— 8 —
j'avais peur dune lutte dont Tissue serait certainement defavorable k la Prusse. Je repliquai :
«Non, ce n'est pas parce que j'ai peur que je repudie I'idee dune guerre entre la France et
la Prusse, mais bien parce que je crois qu'il est de I'interet des deux pays de I'eviter. Et
puisque vous avez fait allusion aux chances d'une telle iutte, je vais vous dire mon ppinion.
J'ai la conviction que vous serez battus pour la raison que voici : en depit des brillantes
qualites que je reconnais aux Frangais et que j admire, vous netes pas exacts. Par exacti-
tude, je n'entends pas le fait d'arriver a I'heure a un rendez-vous, mais j'entends la ponc-
tualite dans toute I'etendue du mot. Le Francais, qui a une grande facilite de travail, n'est
]pas aussi ponctuel que I'Allemand dans I'accomplissement de ses devoirs. Dans la prochaine
guerre, ia nation victorieuse sera celle dont tous les servjteurs du haut en bas de i'echelle
seront exacts a remplir leur devoir, si important ou si infime que soit ce devoir. » Et le
prince de Donnersmark a ajoute : « La ponctualite, qui a joue un si grand role lorsqu'il
s'est agi, il y a quarante ans, de mouvoir une armee de 5 00,000 homm^s, aura une impor-
tance encore bien plus grande au cours de la prochaine guerre ou Ton devra mettre en action
des masses autrement nombreuses ».

Sous cctte forme, le vieux prince a.exprime ia confiance qu'ont tous les Allemands dans
la superiorite de leur organisation militaire.

Lorsque j'ai parle plus haut du nouveau projet aliemand, je n'ai fait allusion qua un
accroissement des effectifs. Mais le projet comportera aussi une augmentation du materiel et
des ouvrages de defense dont le detail n'est pas connu , mais dont on peut se faire une idee
par le chiflre des depenses envisagees pour y faire face : 1 ,2 5o, 000, 000 de francs.

L'execution de la ioi du quinquennat de 1911 n'avait pas n^cessite de mesure financiere
sp^ciale.

La Ioi militaire et navale de 1912 avait 6te provisoirepient couverte par les excedents
budgetaires des annees 1 9 1 o et 1911, par une r^forme de la Ioi sur i'alcool et par I'ajourne-
ment de I'abaissement de I'impdt sur les sucres (ces deux dernieres ressources ne repr^sen-
tent d'ailleurs ensemble qu'une somme d'une soixantaine de millions de francs).

11 faut en outre rappeler que de gros emprunts ont el6 fait r^ceniment par i'Empire et la
Prusse : cinq cents millions de marks le 29 Janvier 1912 et trois cent cinquante millions de
marks le 7 mars 1913. Une part assez importante de ces emprunts a du etre afiect^e aux
depenses mililaires.

La Ioi militaire de 1913 exigera des mesiires fmancieres tout a fait exceptionnelles.

D'apres les indications donnees par la presse officieuse, les depenses dites « d'une fois »
s'eleveraicnt k un milliard de marks et les depenses « permanentes » annuelles resultant de
i'augmentation des eflectifs depasseraient deux cents millions de marks.

II parait a peu pres certain que les depenses non renouvelables seront couvertes par une
contribution de guerre pr6Iev6e sur le capital. On exempterail lespetites fortunes el I'on
frapperait d'une taxe progressive les fortunes superieures k 20,000 marks. Present^ sous
cotte forme I'impot de guerre ne saurait deplaire aux socialistes , qui pourront ainsi , sui-
vant leur tactique habituelle, repousser le prin6ipe de la Ioi militaire et voter les credits qui
en assurent Texecution.

Le Gouvernement craint que parmi les classes riches et bourgeoises » cette imposition
extraordinaire d'un milliard portant exclusivement sur la fortune acquise ne cr^e up durable
m^contentement; aussi fait-il tout ce qui est en son pouvoir pour persuader ceux qu'il va
ranconner si durement que la securite de I'Empire est menacee et pour etablir une analogic
entre les temps belliqueux de 1 8 1 3 et la periode actuelle.

En fStantbruyammenllecentenaire de la guerre de I'Jndependance^ on veut convaincre

— 9 —

\e peuple de la n^cessit^ du sacrifice et. lui rappeler que la Frande e$t , aujourd'hui. comme il
y a oenl ans, rennemi h^redilaire.

Si nous constatons que le Gouvernement ailemand s'efforce d'obtenir que. cette ^norme
taxe ne soit pas acquiltee en plusieurs ^ch^ances; et si comrne le disent certains journaux,
le payement integral devait etre realise avantle i" juillet 1914, il y auraitla pour nous une
indication redoutable, car rien ne saurait expliquer une telle hate des autorit^s militaires ^
posseder un tr^sor de guerre liquide dun milliard dans leur caisse.

En ce qui concerne la couverture des depenses permanentes qui r^sullerorit de I'applica-
tion des lois de 1912 et 1913, rien n'a encore 6t^ dit. Une houvelle legislation sera i^vi
denlment necessaire pour procurer les ressoUrces annuelles.

Je conclus : en Allemagne I'execution d'une reforme militaire suit toujours de tres pres
la decision prise de I'accomplir. Toutes les dispositions nouvelles pr^vues par la loi du.
quinquennat de 1 9 1 1 et par la loi de 19 1 2 sont deja mises en vigueur, II est fort possible?
qu'une partie du materiel dont la noiivelle loi va autoriser I'achat soit en cours de fabri-
cation. Les secrets militaires sont si bien gardes ici qii'il est extr^mement difficile de suivre
les mouvements du personnel et du materiel.

Avec 700,000 hommes sous les armes (sans compter les reservistes fort nombreux qui
sont actuellement en instruction) une organisation militaire parfaite et une opinion publiqpe
qui se laisse dominer par les appels belliqueux de la Ligue militaire et de la Ligue navale,
ie peuple ailemand est a cette heure xm voisin bien dangereux.

Si le service de trois ans est adopte et imm^diatement appliqu6 en France, les conditions
seroni moins inegales Tan prochain. Les effectifs allemands seront encore sensiblement plus
considerables que les notres , mais I'appel de tout le contingent disponible ne permettra plus
la selection et amenera dans les rangs de Tarm^e allemande des elements de second ordre et
meme des unites peu desirables. La valeur morale de I'armee active y perdra.

Les Allemands ont voulu rompre 1 equilibre des deux camps qui divisent I'Europe , par
un grand eCfort supreme, au deli duquel ils ne peuvent plus grand'chose.

lis n'avaient pas cru la France capable dun grand sacrifice. L'adoption du service de
trois ans chez nous dejouera ieurs calculs.

Farahond.

r 2.

M.Etienne, Ministre de la Guerre,
^ a M. JoNNART, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres.

W§ Je viens de recevoir d'une source sure communicalion d'un rapporl.officiel et secret
^ur le renforcement de I'armee allemande : il se divise en deux parties : une premiere
de generalites, et une secoude, d'ordre technique, precisant dans le plus grand

DocuME>'TS DiPLOMATXQUES. — Guerrc europeenne. 2

Paris, le 2 avril 191 3.

— 10 —

detail, arme par arme, les mesures a prendre ; ce qui concerne Temploi des aiKcKJ
mobiles et I'utilisation de Faeronautique est particulierement frappant.

TdLi rhonneur de vous adresser ci-joint une copie de la premiere partie de ce docu-
ment, qui me parait devoir retenirvotre attention.

Etienne.

Annexe.

Note snr le renforcement de Varmee allemande.

Berlin , ie 1 9 mars 1 9 1 3.

I. — ^ GeNERALITES SUfl LES NODVELLES LOIS MILITAIRES.

L'augmentation a eu lieu en trois eta pes :

1° La Conference d'Alg6siras a enleve les derniers doutes sur i'existence dune entente
entre la) France, I'Angleterre et la Russie. Nous avons vu, d autre part, que rAutriche-
Hongrie etait obligee d'immobiiiser des forces contre la Serbie et I'ltalie ; enfm, notre flotte
n etait pas , u ce moment-la , assez forte. A la fin du conflit , on s'occupa done en premiere
ligne de renforcer la defense de nos c6tes, d'augmenter notre force navale. Contre I'inten-s
tion anglaise d'envoyer un corps d'expedition de 100,000 hommes sur le continent, on
devait repondre par une meilleure formation des reserve^ qui devaient etre employees, d'aprea
les circonstances , au service sur les cotes, dans les lorleresses et dans les sieges. 11 etait clair
deji a cette 6poque qu il serait indispensable de faire un grand effort.

2° Les Fran9ais ayant viole les conventions marocaines, amenerent I'incident d'Agadir. A
cette 6poque, les progres de I'arm^e fran9aise, le relevement moral de la nation, I'avancej
technique prise dans le domaine de Tavialion et dans celui des mitrailleuses, rendait une
attaque contre les Francais moins facile que dans la periode precedente. De plus, il fallait
s'attendre a une attaque de la flotte anglaise, Cette situation difficile ouvrit les yeux sur la
Ii6cessit6 d'une augmentation de I'armee. Cette augmentation fut, d6s cette epoque , consi-
der^e comme un minimum.

3' La guerre des Balkans aurait pu nous entrainer a la guerre pour soutenir notre alli6
La nouvelle situation au sud de rAutriche-Hongrie diminuait la valeur de I'aide que cet allid
pouvait nous appprter. D'autre part, la France s etait renforc6e par une nouvelle loi dea
cadres; il fallait done avancer les dates d'execution prevues pour la nouvelle loi militaire.

On prepare I'opinion k un renforcement nouveau de Tarm^e active^ qui assurerait a I'Al
lemagne une paix honorable, et la possibilite de garantir comme il convient son influence
dans les affaires du monde. La nouvelle loi militaire et le complement qui doit la suivre
permettront presque completement de repondre a ce but.

Ni les ridicules criailleries de revanche des chauvinistes francais, ni les grincements de
dents des Anglais, ni les gestes desordonnes des Slaves ne nous d^tourneront de notre but
qui est de fortifier et d'^tendre le Deutschthum (puissance germanique) dans le monde entier

Les Fran9ais peuvent armer tant qu'ils voudront; ils ne peuvent, du jour au lendemain
augmentcr leur population. L'emploi d'une armee noire sur les theatres d'operations e
p^ens restera pour longtemps un reve, du reste d^pourvu de beauty.

11 —

II. — But et devoirs de notre politique HATIONALE, DE NOTRE ARMEE

ET DE NOS ORGANES SPECIAUX AU SERVICE DE L'ARMEE.

Notre nouvelle loi militaire n est qu'une extension de I'oeuvre d'education mililaire du
peuple allemand. Nos ancetres de 1 8 1 3 , ont fait de plus gros sacrifices. Cest notre devoir
sacre d'aiguiser I'epee que Ion nous a mise en main , et de ia tenir prete pour nous defendre
comme pour porter des coups a notre ennemi. 11 fautfaire pen^trer dans le peaple I'idie que
nos armcmenU sont une reponse aux armements et a la politique fran^aise. H faut I'habituer a
penser qu'une guerre offensive de notre part est unc necessite pour combattre les provoca-
tions de fadversaire. II faudra agir avec prudence pour n'eveiller aucun soup9on , et 6viter
les crises qui pourraient nuire a notre vie ecouomique. 11 faut mener les affaires de telle
facon que sous la pesante impression d'armements puissants, de sacrifices considerables, et
d'une situation politique tendu^, un dechainement (Lo^c/iZa^fen) soil considere comme une
deiivrance , parce qu'apres lui viendraierit des decades de paix et de prosp6rite comme -apr^s
1870. II faut preparer la guerre ati point de vue financier; il y a beaucoup a faii'e de ce
c6te-la. 11 ne faut pas eveiller la mefiance de nos financiers , mais bien des choses cependant
no pourront ctre cachees.

11 n'y aurait pas a s'inquieter du sort de nos colonies. Le r^sultat final en Europe le reglera
pour elles. Par contre , il faudra susciter des troubles dans le Nord de I'Afrique et en Russie.
Cest un moyen d absorber des forces de I'adversaire. II est done absolument necessaire que
nous nous meltions en relations, par des organes bien choisis^ avec des gens influents en
Egypte, a Tunis, a Alger et au Maroc, pour preparer lesmesures n^cessaires en cas de guerre
europeenne. Bien entendu, en cas de g:uerre, on reconnaitrait ouvertement ces allies secrets;
et on leur assurerait, a la conclusion de ia paix, la conservation des avantages conquis. On
peut realiser ces ddsiderata. Un premier essai, qui a ete fait il y a quelques annees, nous
avait procure le contact voulu. Malheureuscment , on n'a pas consolide suflisamment les re-
lations obtenucs. Bon gre mal gr^, il faudra en venir a des pr^paratifs de ce genre, pour
mener rapidement a sa fin une campagne.

Les soulevenients provoques en temps de guerre par des agents poliliques demandent a
elre soigneusemcnt prepares, et par des moyens materiels. lis doivent eclater simultanement
avec la destruction des moyens de communication; ils doivent avoir une tete dirigeante que
Ton peut trouver dans des chefs influents, religieux ou politiques. L'ecole 6gyptienne y est
pnrticulierement apte, elle relie de plus en plus entre eux les intellectuels du monde
musulman.

Quoi qu il en soit, noiv*; devons ctre forts pour pouvoir aueantir d'un puissant elan nos
enncmis de fEst et de I'Ouest. Mais dans la prochaine guerre europeenne, il faudra aussi
que les petils Etats soicnl contraints a nous suivre, ou soient domptes. Dans certaines con-
ditions, leurs annees et leurs places fortes pcuventetre rapidement vaincues ou neutralis6es ,
ce qui pourrail elre vraisemblablement l,e cas pour la Belgique et la Hollandc, afin d'inter-
dire a notre ennemi de I'Ouest un territoire qui pourrait lui servir de base d'operation dans
notre flanc. Au Nord, nous n'avons a craindre aucune menace du Danemark ou des Etats
scandinaves, d'autant plus que dans tous les cas, nous pourvoirons a la concentration d'une
forte arm^e du Nord , capable de repondre a toute mauvaise intention de ce cote. Au cas le
plus defavorable , le Danemark pouirait etre force par I'Angleterre a abandonner sa neu-
tralite; mais a ce moment, la decision serait deja intervenue sur terrc ct sur mer. Notre
arniee du Nord , dont les forces pourraient etre notablement augmentees par les formations

— 12 —
hollandaises , r^pondrait par une defensive extremement active k toute offensive de cft
cdl6.

Au Sud, la Suisse forme un boulevard extremement solide, et nous pouvons compter
quelle defendra energiquement sa neutralite contre la France, protegeant ainsi notre
flanc.

Comme on I'a dit plus haut, on ne peut considerer de meme la situation vis-^-vis des
petits Etats de notre frontiere Nord-Ouest. Lk , ce sera pour nous une question vitale , et le
but verslequel il faudra tendre, c'est de prendre I'offensive avec une grande superiorite des
les premiers jours. Pour cela, il faudra concentrer une grande arm6e, suivie de fortes for-
mations de landwehr, qui d6termineront les armees des petits Etats a nous suivre , ou tout
au moins a rester inactives sur le Itieatre de la guerre , et qui les ecraseraient en cas de
resistance armee. Si Ton pouvait decider ces Etats a organiser leur systeme fortifie de telle
facon qu'il constitue une protection elTicace dd notre flanc , on pourrait renoncer a I'invasion
projet^e. Mais, pour cela, il faudrait aussi, particulierement en Beigique, qu'on reformat
I'armee, pour quelle offrit des garanties serieuses de resistance elficace. Si, au contraire, son
organisation defensive etait 6tablie contre nous, ce qui donnerait des avantages evi dents k
notre adversaire de I'Ouest, nous ne pourrions, en aucune facon, offrir a la Beigique une
garantie de la s6curit6 de sa neutralite. Un vaste champ est done ouvert a notre diplomatic
pour travailler, dans ce pays, dans le sens de nos int^rlts.

Les dispositions arret6es dans ce sens permettent d'esp^rer que I'offensive peut 6tre prise
[aussitdt apr^s la concentration complete de I'arm^e du Bas-Rhin. Un ultimatum h br^ve
^ch^ance, que doit suivre imm^diatement I'invasion, permettra de justifier sulTisamment
[notre action au point de vue dif droit des gens.

. Tels sont les devoirs qui incombent k notre arm^e, et qui exigent un effectif 61ev6. Si
I'ennemi nous atlaque. ou si nous voulons le dompter, nous ferons comme nos freres d'il y
I a cent ans; I'aigle provoqu^ prendra son vol, saisira I'ennemi dans ses serres acerees, et le
• rendra inoffensif. Nous nous souviendrons alors que les provinces de I'ancien empire alle-
mand : Comt6 de Bourgogne et une belle part de la Lorraine, sont encore aux mains des
I Francs; que des milliers de freres allemands des provinces balliques g^missent sous le joiig
[^lave. C'est une question nationale de rendre a I'AUemagne ce qu'elle a autrefois poss6d6.

r 3.

M. Jules Cambon , Ambassadeur de France k Berlin ,

k M. Stephen Pichon , Ministre des Affaires ^trang^res.

Berlin, le 6 mai 19 13.

Je paiiais ce soir avec le Secretaire d'Etat de la Conference des Ambassadeurs et
des resullats obtenus k la seance d'hier k Londres. La crise dent TEurope etait me-
nacee est, k ses yeux, ecartee, mais seulement pour quelque temps: « II semble, me
disait M. de Jagow, que nous marchons dans un pays de montagnes* Nous venons de
passer un col difficile et nous voyons d'autres hauteurs se dresser devant nous. » —
« Celle que nous venons de surmonter, lui repondis-je, etait peut-dtre la plus dure k
Tasser. »

— 13 — ;

La crise que nous venons de traverser a ete tres serieuse. Ici, on a consider^ le
danger de guerre comme imminent. J ai eu la preuve des preoccupations de
I'Allemagne par un certain nombre de faits qu'il importe que Votre Excellence
connaisse.

J'ai re^u hier la visite d'un de mes coUegues avec qui j'entretiens des relations
particulieres et cordiales. Lors de ia visite qu'il a faite a M. de Jagow, celui-ci lui a de-
mande, a tilre confidentiel quelle etait exactement la situation de la Russie en
Extreme-Orient et si cette Puissance a, en ce moment, quelque chose a redouter de
ce cote qui y puisse retenir ses forces. L'Ambassadeur lui repondit qu d ne voyait
rien , absolument rien , qui put etre une cause de preoccupation pour le Gouverne-
ment russe et que celui-ci avait les mains libres en Europe.

Je disais plus haut que le danger d'une guerre avait ete envisage ici comme tres
proche. Aussi ne s'est-on pas contente de tater le terrain en Extreme-Orient, on s'est
prepare ici-meme.

La mobilisation de I'armee allemande ne se borne pas h Tappel des reservistes k la
caserne. H y a, en AUemagne, une mesure preparatoire qui n'existe pas chez nous et
qui consiste a prevenir les officiers et les hommes de la reserve de se tenir prets
pour Tappel , afm qu'ils puissent prendre les arrangements qui leur sont necessaires.
Cestun « garde k vous » general, etil faut I'incroyable esprit de soumission, de disci-
pline et de secret qui existe en ce pays, pour qu'une pareille disposition puisse
exister. Si un pareil avertissement etait donne en France, le pays fremirait tout en-
tier et la presse le dirait le lendemain.

Get avertissement a ete lance, en 1 9 1 1 , au cours des negociations que je poursui-
vais sur le Maroc.

Or, il a ete lance de nouveau, il y a une dizaine de jours, c'est-^-dire aii moment
de la tension austro-albanaise. Je le sais, et le tiens de plusieurs sources differentes,
nolamment d'officiers de reserve qui Tont dit a des amis dans la plus stricte intimite.
Ges messieurs ont pris les mesures necessaires pour assurer a leur famille , en coffre-
fort, les moyens de vivre pendant un an. On a meme dit que c'etait pour cette meme
raison que le Kronprinz , qui devait faire le voyage d'essai de VImperator, ne s'est pas
embarque.

La decision qui a fait prendre cette mesure preparatoire a la mobilisation repond
aux idees du Grand Etat-Major general. Sur ce point, j'ai ete mis au courant d'une
conversation tenue dans un milieu allemand par le general de Moltke , qui est consi-
dere ici comme I'officier le plus distingue de I'armee allemande.

La pensee de I'Etat-Major general est d'agir par surprise. « II faut laisser de cote, a
dit le general de Moltke, les lieux communs siu* la responsabilite de I'agresseur.
Lorsque la guerre est devenue necessaire , il faut la faire en mettant toutes les chances
de son cote. Le succes seul la justifie. L' AUemagne ne pent ni ne doit laisser a la
Russie le temps de mobiliser; car eile serait obligee de maintenir sur sa frontiere Est
une force telle qu'elle se trouverait en situation d'egalite, sinon d'inferiorlte, avec la
France. Done, a ajoute le general , il faut prevenir notre principal adversaire des qu'il
y aura neuf chances sur dix d'avoir la guerre, et la commencer sans altendre pour
ecraser brutalement toute resistance. »

— 14 —

Voil^ exactement r^tat d'ame des milieux militaires, qui repond ^ Vetat d'ame
des milieux poiitiques, ceux-ci ne considerant pas la Russie, au coairaire de nous»
comme un ennemi necessaire.

Voili ce qu'on pensait et disait entre soi il y a quinze jours.

II faut relenir de cetle aventure la legon que renferment les fails que j ai presentes
plus hant : ces gens-ci ne craignent pas la guerre , ils en acceptent pleinemeat la pos-
sibilite et ils ont pris leurs niesures en consequence. Ih veulent elre toujnurs prels.

Comme je le disais, cela exige des conditions de secret et de discipline et une
volonte perseverantc : lenthousiasme ne suffit pas a tout. Cette leqon peut etre utile
a mediter dans le moment ou le Gouvernement de la Uepublique demande au Par-
lement les moyens de fortifier le pays.

Jules Cambon.

N" 4.

M. Allize, Ministre de la Republique en Baviere,

a M. Stephen Pichon, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres.

Munich, le 10 juiliet 19 13.

Au point de vue politique , on se demande a quoi serviront les nouveaux arme-
ments. Reconnaissant que personne ne menace I'AUemagne, on considere que la
diplomatic allemande disposait deja de forces assez considerables et d'alliances assez
puissantes pour defendre avec succes les interets allemands. Comme je le relevais
d^ja au lendemain de faccord marocain de 1911, on estime que la Chancellerie
imperiale sera aussi incapable dans I'avenir que dans le passe d'adopter une politique
exterieure active et de remporter, tout au moins sur ce terrain, des succes qui justi-
fieraient les sacrifices que la nation s'impose.

Cet etat d esprit est d'autant plus inquietant que le Gouvernement imperial se
trouverait actuellement soutenu par fopinion publique dans toute entreprise ou il
s'engagerait vigoureusement , meme aux risques d'un conflil. L'etat de guerre, auquel
tous les evenements d'Orient habituent les esprits depuis deux ans, apparait, non
plus comme une catastrophe lointaine, mais comme une solution aux difficultes
poiitiques et economiques qui n'iront qu'en s aggravant.

Puisse I'exemple de la Bulgarie exercer en Allemagne une influence salutaire.
Comme me le disait naguere le Prince-Regent : << Le sort des armes est toujours
incertain; toute guerre est une aventure, et bien fou est celui qui la court se croyant
assure de la victoire. »

Allize.

— 15 -

r 5.

Note a M. Stephen Pichon , Ministre des Affaires etrangeres
^ i{surl'opinion publique en Allemagne, d'apres les rapports des agents diplomatiques et consulaii-es)»

Paris, le 3o juillet 19 13.

Des observations que nos agents en Allemagne ont pu recueilllr aupres de per-
sonnes en mesure de penetrer dans les milieux les plus divers. Ton peut tirer cettb
conclusion que deux sentiments dominent et irritent les esprits :

1° Le traite du 4 novembre 1911 serait, pour I'Allemagne, un deboire;

a'* La France — une France nouvelle — insoup^onnee jusqu'a I'ete de 1911 —
serait belliquease. Elle voudrait la guerre.

Deputes de tous les partis du Reichstag , depuis les. conservateurs jusqu'aux socia-
listes, et representant les contrees les plus differenles de I'Allemagne, universitaires
de Berlin, de Halle, d'lena et de Marbourg, etudiauts, instituteurs, employes de
commerce, commis de banque, banquiers, artisans, commer^ants, industriels, me-
decins, avocats, redactcurs de journaux democrates et de journaux socialistes,
publicistes juifs, membres des syndicats ouvriers, pasteurs et boutiquiers de la
Marche de Brandebourg, hobereaux de Pomeranie el cordonniers de Stettin fetant
le 5o5® anniversaire de leur association, chatelains, fonctionnaires, cures et gros
cultivateurs de Westphalie sont unanimes sur ces deux points, sans nuances notables,
selon les milieux et les partis. Voici la synthese de toutes ces opinions :

Le traite du l\. novembre est une defaite diplomatique, une preuve de 1 incapacity
de la diplomatic allemande et de Tincurie du Gouvernement, si souvent denonc^es,
la preuve que I'avenir de TEmpire n'est pas assure sans un nouveau Bismarck,
une humiliation nationale, une deconsideration europeenne, une atleinte au prestige
allemand, d'autant plus grave que, jusquen 1911, la suprematie mihlaire de TAlle-
magne etait incontestee et que I'anarchie frangaise, Timpuissance de la Bepublique
etaient une sorte de dogme allemand.

En juillet 1911, le « coup d'Agadir « posa vraiment, pour la premiere fois,.la
question marocaine comme une question nationale, important a la vie et a Texpan-
sion de TEmpire. Les revelations et proces de presse qui suivirent ont sulTisamment
demontre comment la campagne avait ete organisee, quelles convoitises panger-
maniques elle avait allumees et quelles rancunes elle a laissees. Si TEmpereur est
discute, le Chancelier impopulaire, M. de Kiderlen, fut I'homme le plus hai de
I'Allemagne, I'hiver dernier. Cependant il commence a n etre plus que deconsidere,
car il laisse entendre qu'il prendra sa revanche.

Done, pendant I'ete de 1911, I'opinion publique allemande se cabra en face de
I'opinion fran9aise pour le Maroc. Et I'attitude de la France, son calme tranquille,
son unite morale refaite, sa resolution de faire valoir son droit jusqu'au bout, Ic

— 16 —

fait qu'elle a Imsoleiice de n'avoirpas peur de la guerre, sont le plus constant, \^
plus grave sujet d'inquietude et de mauvaise humeur de I'opinion pubiique allemandei.

Pourquoi done rAllemagne n'a-t-elle pas fait la guerre pendant I'ete de 1 9 1 i »
puisque lopinion pubiique, encore que moins unanime et resolue que ropiniom
frangaise, y etait cependant favorable? Oulre la volonte pacifique de TEmpereur ef
du Ghancelier, on fait valoir dans les milieux competents des raisons militaires ei
financieres.

Mais ces evenements de 191 1 ont cause une profonde desillusion en Allemagne
Une France nouvelle, unie, resolue, decidee a ne plus se laisser intimider, est
sortie du suaire dans lequel on la contemplait s'ensevelissant depuis dix ans. Avec
une surprise melee d'irritation , Topinion pubiique allemande a decouvert, de de-
cembre a mai, a travers la presse de tous les partis qui reprochaient au Gouvernement
imperial sonr incap a cit6, sa lachete : que la vaincue de 1870 n'avait cesse depuis de
guerroyer, de promener en Asie et en Afrique son drapeau et le prestige de ses
armes, de conquerir de v^stes territdires; que I'AUemagne avait vecu d'heroisme
honoraire, que la Turquie est le seul pays ou elie ait fait, sous le regne de Guil-
laume n, des conquetes morales, bien compromises maintenant par la honte de la
solution marocaine. Chaque fois que la France faisait une conquete coloniale, on
consolait cette meme opinion en disant « Oui, mais cela n'empeche pas la decadence,
i'anarchie, la decomposition de la France a I'interieur. B

On se trompait, et on trompait Topinion. j

Etant donne ces sentiments de I'opinion pubiique allemande, qui tient la France
pour belliqueuse, que peut-on augurer de I'avenir au point de vue d'une guerre pos-
sible et prochaine ?

L'opinion pubiique allemande est divisee, sur la question de I'eventualite d'une
guerre possible et prochaine , en deux courants.

Jl y a dans le pays des forces de paix , mais inorganiques et sans chefs populaires.
•EUes considerent que la guerre serait un malheur social pour I'Allemagne , que I'or-
gueil de caste, la domination prussienne et les fabricants de canons et de plaques
<de cuirasses en tireraient le meilleur benefice, que la guerre profiterait surtout i
I'Angleterre.

EUes se decomposent ainsi qu'il suit :

La masse profonde des ouvriers, des artisans et des paysans qui sont pacifiques
■d'instinct.

La noblesse degagee des interets de carriere militaire et engagee dans les affaires
industrielles — tels les grands seigneurs de Silesie et quelques autres personnalites
tres influentes k la Cour — et assez eclairee pour se rendre compte des consequences
politiques et sociales desastreuses d'une guerre, meme victorieuse.

Un grand nombre d'industriels , de commer^ants et de financiers de moyenne
importance, dont la guerre, meme victorieuse, amenerait la banqueroute, parce que
leurs entreprises vivent de credit et sont surtout commanditees par des capitaux
etrangers.

Les Polonais, les Alsaciens-Lorrains, les habitants du Schleswig-Holstein conquis,

~ 17 —

mais non assimiles, et en hostilite sourde centre la politique prussiehne, soil environ*
7 millions d'Aliemands annexes.

Enfin, les Gouvernements et les classes dirigeantes des grands Etats du Slid, la
Saxe, la Baviere, le Wurtemberg et le Grand-Duche de Bade, sont partages entre
ce doable sentiment : une guerre malheureuse compromettrait la Confederation »
dont ils ont tire de grands avantages economiques;<une guerre victorieuse ne profi-
terait qua la Prusse et a la prussianisation, contre laquelle ils defendent avec
peine leur independance politique et leur autonomie administrative.

Ces elements preferent, par raison ou par instinct, la paix a la guerre; mais ce ne
sont que des forces politiques de contrepoids, dont le credit sur I'opinion est limite,
ou des forces sociales de silence, passives et sans defense contre la contagion dune
poussee belliqueuse.

Un exemple eclairera cette idee : les i lo deputes socialistes sont des partisans
de la paix. Usne sauraient empecher la guerre, car elle ne depend pas d'un vote du
Reichstag, et, en presence de cette eventualile, le gros de leurs troupes ferait chorus
dans la colere ou dans I'enlhousiasme avec le reste du pays.

II faut noter enfin que ces partisans de la paix dans la masse croient a la guerre,
parce qu'ils ne vpient pas de solution a la situation actuelle. Dans certains contrats*
nolamment dans les contrats d'editeurs, on a introduit la clause de resiliation en cas
de guerre. Ils esperent cependant que la volonte de I'Empereur, d'une part, et ies
difficultes de la France au Maroc, d'autre part, sont pour quelque temps des garan-
Ires de paix. Quoi qu'il en soit, leur pessimisme laisse libre jeu aux partisans de la
guerre.

On parle quelquefois de parti militaire allemand. L'expression est inexacte,
meme pour dire que TAUemagne est le pays de la suprematie du pouvoir militaire,
comme on dit que la France est le pays de la suprematie du pouvoir civil. II y a
un etat d'espritplus digne d'attention que ce fait historique, parce qu'il constitue un
danger plus evident et plus prochain. II y a un parti de la guerre, avec des chefs, des
troupes, une presse convaincue ou payee pour fabriquer I'opinion, des moyens
varies et redoutables pour intimider le Gouvernement. II agit sur le pays avec des
idees clalres, des sentiments ardents, une volonte fremissante et tendue.

Les partisans de la guerre se divisent en plusieurs categories, chacun tire de sa
caste, de sa classe, de sa formation intellectuelle et morale, de ses interets, de ses
rancunes, des raisons particulieres qui creent en un etat d'esprit general et
accroissent la force et la rapidite du courant belliqueux.

Les uns veulent la guerre parce qu elle est inevitable etant donnees les circon-
stances actuelles. Et pour I'Allemagne, il valut mieux plus tot que plus tard.

D'autres la considerent comme necessaire pour des raisons, economiques tirees
de la surpopulation , de la surproductlon, du besoin de marches et de debouches;
ou pour des raisons sociales : la diversion a I'exterieur pent seule empecher ou
re larder la montee vers le pouvoir des masses democratiques et socialistes.

D'autres, insuffisamment rassures sur I'avenir de I'Empire , et croyant que le temps
Iravaille pour la France, pensent qu'il faut precipiter I'evenement., II n est^as rare de
rencontrer, a la traverse des conversations ou des brochures patriotiques, le senti-

DocuMENTS DiPLOMATiQEES. — Guerrc cufopeenne. ^

— . 18 —
ment obscur, mals profond, qu'une Allemagne libre. et une France ressuscitee sont
deux fails historiques incompatibles.

D'autres sont belliqueux par « BIsmarckisme », si I'on peut ainsi dire. Hs se sentent
humilies d' avoir a discuter avec des Fran^ais, a parler droit, raison, dans des nego-
ciations ou des conferences ou ils n'ont pas facilement eu toujours raison, alors
qu'ils ont la force plus decisive. Ils tireat d'un passe recent un orgueil sans cesse
alimente par des souvenirs vecus, par la tradition orale et par leslivres, et blesse
par les evenenients de ces dernieres annees. Le depit irrite caracterise I'esprit d'asso-
ciation des « Wehrvereine » et autres groupements de la Jeune Allemagne.

D'autres veulent la guerre par haine mystique de la France revolutionnaire.
D'autres enfm, par rancune. Ce sont ces derniers qui amassent les pretexles.

Dans la realite, ces sentiments se concretisent ainsi : les hobereaux, representes
au Reichstag par le parti conservateur, veulent eluder k tout prix I'impot sur les
successions, inevitable si la paix se prolonge. Le Reichstag, dans la derniere seanoe
de la session qui vient de se clore, en a vote le principe. C'est une atteinte grave aux
inter^ls et aux privileges de la noblesse terrienne. D'autre part, cette, noblesse est
une aristocratic mililaire, et il est instructif de comparer I'annuaire de I'armee avec
I'annuaire de la noblesse. La guerre seule peut faire durer son prestige et servir ses
interets familiaux. Dans la discussion de la loi militaire, un orateur du parti a fait
valoir en faveur du vote la necessite de I'avancement des officiers. Enfm, cette classe
sociale, qui forme une hierarchic dont' le roi de Prusse est le couronnement
supreme , constate avec terreur la democratisation de I'AUemagne et ta force grandis-
sante du parti socialiste et considere que ses jours sont comptes. Non seulement ses
interets materiels sont menaces par un formidable mouvement hostile au protec-
tionhisme agraire, mais encore sa representation politique diminue a chaque legisla-
ture. Dans le Reichstag de 1878, il y avait 162 membres (sur 897) appartenant a
la noblesse; dans celui de 1898, 83; dans le Reichstag de 1912, 67. Sur ce der-
nier nombre, 27 seulement siegent a droite, i^ au centre, 7 a gauche, un sur les
bancs sociahstes.

La grande bourgeoisie, representee par le parti national liberal, parti des satis-
faits, n'a pas les memes raisons que les hobereaux de vouloir la guerre. Elle est belli-
queuse cfependanl, sauf exceptions. Hie a ses raisons d'ordre social.

La grande bourgeoisie n'est pas moins afiligee que la noblesse de la democratisation
de I'AUemagne. En 1871, elle avait 126 represenlants au Reichstag; i55 en 187/1;
99 en 1 887 ; en 1912, 45. Elle n'oublie pas qu'ils jouerent le grand role parlemen-
taire au lendemain de la guerre en servant les desseins de Bismarck contre les hobe-
reaux. Aujourd'hui, mal assise entre des instincts conservateurs et des idees libe-
rales, elle demande h la guerre des solutions que ne trouvent pas ses representants
incapables et pitoyables. En outre, les industriels doctrinaires professent que les
difficul les qu'ils ont avec leurs ouvriers ont leurs originies en France, foyer revolu-
tionnaire des idees d'emancipation — sans la France, I'industric serait tranquille.

Enfin, fabricants de canons et de plaques d'acier, grands marchands qui deman-
dent de plus grands marches, banquiers qui speculent sur I'age d'or et la prochaine
indemnile de guen'e, pensent que la guerre serait une bonne affaire.

— 19 —

Parmi les « Bismarckiens.)> il faut compter les fonctionnalres de toutes carrieres,
representes assez exactement au Reichstag par les conservateurs libres ou parti d'Em-
pire, parti des retraites dont les idees fougueuses se deversent dans la Post, lis
font ecole et souche dans les groupements de jeunes gens doiit Tesprit a ete prepare
et tendh par lecole ou Tuniversite.

L'uhiversite , exception faite pour quelques esprits distingues, developpe une
ideologie guerriere. Les ecOnomistes demontrent a coups de statistiques " la necessite
pour I'Allemagne d'avoir un empire colonial et commercial qui reponde au rende-
ment industriel de I'Empire. H y a des sociologues fanatiques qui vont plus loin. La
paix armee, disent-ils, est un ecrasant fardeau pour les nations, elle empeche Tame-
lioration du sort des masses et favorise la poussee socialiste. La France, en s'obsti-
nant a vouloir la revanche , s'oppose au desarmement. H faut une fois pour toutes
la reduire a I'impuissance pour un siecle, c'est la meilleure et la plus rapide fagon
de resoudre la question sociale.

Historiens, philosophes, publicistes politiques et autres apologistes de la » deutsche
Kultur » veulent imposer au monde une maniere de sentir et de penser qui soit spe-
cifiquement allemande. lis veulent conquerir la suprematie intellectuelle qui, de
I'avis des esprits lucides, reste a la France. C'est a cette source que s'alimente la
phraseologie des pangermanistes comme. aussi les sentiments et les contingents des
Kriegesvereine. des Wehrvereine et autres associations de ce genre, trop connues
pour qu'il soit necessaire d'insister sur ce point. II convient de noter seulement
que le mecontentement cause par le traite du 4 novembre a considerablemGnt accru
le nombre des menlbres des societes coloniales.

II y a enfm les partisans de la guerre par rancune, par • ressenliment. Ce sont les
plus dangereux. Us se recrutent surtout parmi les diplomates. Les diplomates alle-
mands ont tres mauvaise presse dans Topiniou pidalique. Les plus acharnes sont
ceux qui, depuis 1906, ont ete meles aux negociations entre ia France et I'Alle^
magne; ils accumulent et additionnent les griefs contre nous, et un jour, ils preseijb-
leront des comptes dans la presse belliqueuse. On a I'impression que c'est surtout au
Maroc qu'ils les chercheront, bien qu'un incident soit toujours possible sur tous les
points du globe ou la Frauce et I'Allemagne sont en contact.

II leiir faut une revanphe, car ils se plaignent d'avoir ete dupes. Pendant la discus-
sion de la loi niilitaire, un de ces diplomates belliqueux declarait : « L'Allemagne ne
pourra causer serieusement .avec la France que quand elle aura tous ses hommes
valides sous les armes ».

Comment s'engagera .cette conversation .►^ C'est une opinion assez repandue»
meme dans les milieux pangermanistes, que I'Allemagne ne declarerait pas la guerre»
etant donne le systeme d'alliances. defensives et les dispositions de I'Empereur. Mais
quand le jmoment sera venu, il devra, par tous les moyens, contraindre ta France a
I'attaquer. On I'offensera, s'il le faut. C'est la tradition prussienne.

Faut-il done tenir la guerre pour fatale.^

II est peu probable que I'Allemagne ose risquer I'aventure, si la France pent faire
aux yeux de I'opinion la preuve decisive que I'entente cordiale et Talliance russe ne
soiit pas seulement des fictions diplomatiques » mais des realites qui existent et qui

— 20 —
joueront. La flotle anglaise inspire une salulaire terreur. Mais on sail bienque la vic-
toire sur mer laissera tout en suspens, que c'est sur terre que se regleront les comples
decisifs.

Quant a la Russie, si elle a dans Toplnion un. poids plus considerable qu'il y a
trois ou quatre ans, dans les milieux poliliques et militaires, on ne croit pas que
son concours soit assez rapide et energique pour etre efficace.

Les esprits s'habiluent ainsi a considerer la prochaine guerre comme un duel enlre
la France et TAllemagne.

N° 6.

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de la Republique frangaise a Berlin,
a M. Stephen Pichon , Ministre des Affaires etrangeres.

Berlin V le 22 novembre 1913.

Je tiens dune source absolument sure la relation d'une conversation que FEmpe-
ifBur aurait eue avec le Roi des Beiges, en presence du Chef d'Elat-Major General
de Moltke, il y a une quinzaine de jours, conversation qui aurait, parait-il ,- vivement
frappe le Roi Albert; je ne suis nuUement surpris de son impression, qui repond a
celle que moi-meme je ressens depuis queique temps : I'hoslilite contre nous s'ac-
centue et TEmpereur a cesse d'etre partisan de la paix.

L'interlocuteur de i'Empereur d'Allemagne pensait jusqu'ici , comme tout le monde ,
que Guillaume II, dont Tinfluence personnelle s'etait exercee dans bien des circop-
stances critiques au profit du maintien de la paix, etait toujours dans les memes
dispositions d'esprit. Cette fois, il faurait trouve complelement change : TEmpereur
d'Allemagne n'est plus k ses yeux le champion de la paix contre les tendances belli-
queuses de certains partis allemands. Guillaume II en est venu a penser que la guerre
avec la France est inevitable et qu'il faudra en venir la un jour ou I'autre. II croit
naturellement a la superlorite ecrasante de I'armee allemande et a son succes certain.

Le General de Mollke parla exactemeni comme son souverain. Lui aussi, il declara
la guerre necessaire et inevitable, mais il se montra plus assure encore du succes,
« car, dit-ilau Roi, cetlefois, il faut en finir, et Votre Majeste ne peut se douter de
Tenthousiasme irresistible qui, ce jour-la, entrainerale peuple allemand tout entier ».

Le Roi des Beiges prolesta que c'elait travestir les mtentions du Gouvernement
fran^ais que les traduire de la sorie ei se laisser abuser sur les sentiments de la nation
fran^aise par les manifestations de quelques esprits exaltes ou d'intrigants. sans
conscience.

L'Empereur et son Chef d'Etat-Major n'en persisterent pas moins dansleurmaniere
de voir.

Au cours de cette conversation I'Empereur etait, du resle, apparu surmene et
irritable. A mesure que les annees s'appesanlissent sur Guillaume II, les traditions

-^ 21 —

famlliales,. les senlimenls retrogrades de la Cour» et surtout i'impalience des
militaires prennent plus d'empire sur son esprit. Peut-etre eprouve-t-il on ne
salt quelle jalousie de la popul^rite . acqulse. par son fils, qui llalte les passions
des pangermanlstes et lie trouve pas la situation de TEmpire dans le monde
legale a sa puissance. Peut-dlre aussl la replique de la France a la derniere
augmentation de Tarmee allemande, dont i'objet etait d'elabllr sans conleste la supe-
riorite germanlque, est-elle pour quelque chose dans ces amerlumes, car, quol qu'on
disfi, on sent qu'on ne pent guere aller plus loin.

On pent se demander ce qu'il y a au fond de celte conversation. L'Empereur et
son Chef d'Etat-Major General ont pu avoir pour objeclif d'impresslonner le Roi des
Beiges et de le disposer a ne point opposer de resistance au cas ou un conflit avec
nous se produirait. Peut-etre aussi voudralt-on la Belgique moins hostile k cerlalnes
ambitions qui se manlfestent Ici a propos du Congo beige, mais celte derniere hypp-
these ne me parait pas concorder avec Tlnterventlon du General de Mollke..

Au reste, I'Empereur Guillaume est moirts maitre de ces Impatiences qu'on he le
crolt communement. Je I'ai vu plus d une fols laisser echapper le fond de sa pensee.
Quel qu'alt ete son objeclif dans la conversation qui m'a ete rapportee, la confidence
n'en a pas moins le caraclere le plus grave. EUe correspond a la precarite de la situa-
tion generale et a fetal d'une certalne partie de f opinion en France et en AUemagne.

S'U m etait pe'rmis de conclure , je dirais qu'Il est bon de tenir compte de ce fait
nouveau que I'Empereur se familiarise avec un ordre d'Idees qui lul repugnalt autre-
fois, et que, pour lul emprunter une locution qu'il alme a, employer, nous devons
tenIr noire poudre seche.

Jules Cambon,

— 23 -

CHAPITRE II

PRELIMINAIRES

DE LA MORT DE L'ARCHIDUC HERITIER
(28 JUIN 1914)

A LA REMISE DE LA NOTE AUTRICHIENNE A LA SERBIE
(23 JUILLET 1914)

^ 25 —

N^7,

M. DuMAiNE, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne,

a M. Ren^ Viviani, President du Cons^il, Ministre des. Affaires etran-
geres.

Vienne, le 28 juin 1914.

La nouvelle vient de parvenir a Vienne que rArchiduc heritier d'Autriche et sa
femme ont ete assassines aujourd'hui a Serajevo par un etudiant origlnaire de
Grahovo. Quelques instants avant ['attentat auquel ils ont succombe, ils avaleut
echappe a I'explosion d'une bombe qui a blesse plusieurs officiers de leur suite.

L'Empereur, en ce moment a Ischl, en a ete aussitot avise telegraphiquement.

DUMAINE.

]N?8.

M. DuMAiNE, Amba'ssadeur de France a Vienne,

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran-»
geres.

Vienne, le 2 juillet igi/i-

Le crime de Serajevo suscite les plus vives rancunes dans les milieux miiilaires
autrichiens et chez tons ceux qui ne se resignent pas a iajsser la Serbie garder dans
ies Balkans le rang qu'elle a conquis.

L'enquete sur les origines de I'attentat qu'on voudrait exiger du Gouveinement
de Belgrade dans des conditions intolerables pour sa dignite, fournirait, k la suite
d'un refus, le grief permettant de proceder a une execution militaire.

Dumaine.

Docdmehts diplomatiQCEs — Guerre europeenne.

— 26

r 9.

M. DE Man NEVILLE, Charge d'affaires de France a Berlin,

a ^L Ren^ Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran-
geres.

Berlin, ie k juillet 1914.

Le Sous-Secretaire d*Etat des Affaires etrangeres ma dit hier, et a repete aujour-
d'hui a I'Ambassadeur de Russie, qu'ii esperait que la Serbie donnerait satisfaction
aux demandes que TAutriche pouvait avoir k lui adresser en viie de la recherche et de
la poursuite des complices du crime de Serajevo. D a ajoute qu il avait confiance qu'il
en serait ainsi parce que la Serbie , si elle agissait autrement, aurait centre elle Topinion
de tout le monde civilise.

Le Gouvernement allemand ne parait done pas partager" les inquietudes qui se
manifestent dans une partie de la presse allemande au sujet d'une tension possible
des rapports entre les Gouvernements de Vienne et de Relgrade, ou du moins il n«
veut pas en avoir I'apparence.

DE Manneville.

K 10.

M. P/LEOLOGDE, AmbassadeuF de France k Saint-P^tersbonrg,

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran-
geres.

Sainl-Petersbourg, 6 juillet igi^-

Au cours d*un entretien qu'il avait tenu a avoir avec le Charge d'affaires d'Autriche-
Hongrie, M. Sazonoff a signale amicalement a ce diplomate I'irritation inquietante
que les attaques de la presse aiitrichienne contre la Serbie risquent de produire dans
son pays.

Le Comte Czemin ayant laiss6 entendre que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois

— 27 —
serait peut-etre oblig^ de rechercher sur le tenitoire serbe les instlgateurs de Tattentat
de Serajevo, M. Sazonoff rinterrompit : « Aucun pays plus que ia Russie, a-t-il dit,
n'a eu a souffrir des attentats pr^par^s sur tenitoire Stranger. Avons-nous jamais
pretendu employer contre un pays quelconque les precedes dont vos journaux
menacent la Serbie ? Ne vous engagez pas dans cette voie ».
Puisse cet avertissement n etre pas perdu.

Pal^ologue.

r 11.

M. d'Apchier le Maugin, Consul general de France a Budapest,

a M. Ren6 Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran-

geres.

Budapest, le ii juillet 19 14.

Interpelle a la Chambre surl'etat de la question austro-serbe , M. Tisza a declare
qu'il fallait avant toute cbose attendre le resultat de I'enquete judiciaire, dont il s'est
refuse pour I'instant a reveler quoi que ce soit. Et la Chambre I'a approuve haute-
ment. II s'est montre tout aussi discret sur les decisions prises dans la reunion des
ministres h Vienne, et n'a pas laisse deviner si on donnerait suite au projet de
demarche a Belgrade dont les journaux des deux mondes out retenti. La Chambre
s'est inclinee derechef.

En ce qui concerne cette demarche, il semble qu'il y ait un mot d'ordre pour eu
attenuer la portee : la colere hongroise s'est comme evaporee a travers les articles
virulents de la presse , unanime maintenant a deconseiller ce pas qui pourrait etre
dangereux. Les journaux officieux notamment voudraient que Ton substituat k ce
mot de « demarches aux apparences comminatoires, le terme qui leur parait plus
arnical et plus poii de « pourparlers ». Ainsi, officiellement, pour le quart d'heure,
tout est k la paix.

Tout est a la paix, dans les journaux. Mais le gros pubHc ici croit a la guerre et la
craint. Et par ailleurs, des personnes en qui j'ai toute raison d'avoir confiance m'ont
afFirme savoir que chaque jour des canons et des munitions etaientdiriges en masse
vers la frontiere. Vrai ou non, ce bruit ma ete rapporte de divers cotes avec des
details concordants; il indique au moins quell es sont les preoccupations generales
Le Gouvernement, soit qu'il veuille sincerement la paix, soit qu'il prepare un coup,

— 28 —
fait mainteilant tout son possible pbur calmer ces inquietudes. Et c'est poufquol I^
ton des journaux gouvernementaux a baisse dune note, puis de deux, pour etre k]
rheure actuelle presque optimlste. Mais ils avaient eux-memes propage I'alarme
k plaisir. Leur optimisme de commande est acluellement sans echo , la nervosity de
la Bourse, barometre que Ton ne saurait negliger, en est une preuve certaine; les
valeurssans exception sont tombees a des cours invraisemblablement bas; la rente
hongroise 4 o/o etait cotee hier 79,96, cours qui n a jamais ete cote depuis la pre-
miere emission.

d'Apchier le Maugin.

r 12.

M. DuMAiNE, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne,

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires 6lran-
geres.

Vienne, ie i5juillet 191 4,

Certains organes de la presse viennoise, discutant I'organisation militaire de la
France et de la Russie, presentent ces deux pays comme hors d'etat de dire leur mot
dans les affaires europeennes, ce qui assurerait a la monarchie dualiste, soutenue
par I'AUemagne, d'appreciables facilites pour soumettre la Serbie au regime quil
plairait de lui imposer. La MUildrische Rundschau I'avoue sans ambage. « L'instant
nous est encore favorable. Si nous ne nous d^cidons pas a la guerre, celle que nous
devrons faire dans deux ou trois ans au plus tard s'engagera dans des circonstances
beaucoup moins propices. Actuellement, c'est k nous qu'appartient I'initialive : la
Russie n'est pas prete, les facteurs moraux et le bon droit sont pour nous, de meme
que la force. Puisqu'un jour nous devrons accepter la lulte, provoquons-la lout de
suite. Notre prestige , notre situation de grande Puissance , notre honnei^r sont en
question : plus encore, car vraisemblablement il s'agirait de notre existence, d'etre
ou ne pas etre, ce qui reellement est aujourd'hui la grande affaire. »

En rencherissant sur elle-nieme, la Neue Freie Presse de cejour s'en prend au
Comte Tisza de la moderation de son second discours, ou il a dit : « nos relations
avec la Serbie auraient toutefois besoin d'etre clarifiees ». Ces mots provoquent son
indignation. Pour elle, I'apaisement, la securite ne peuvent resulter que d'une guerre
au couleau contre le panserbisme, et c'est au nom de I'humanite qu'elle reclame I'ex-
termination de la maudite race serbe.

DUMAINE.

29 —

M. DuMAiNE, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne,

a M. Ren6 Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires 6tran-
geres.

Vienne, ig juillet igiii.

Le Chancelier du Consulat qui m'a remis son rapport semestriel resumant les fails
divers d'ordre economique qui 0nt fait I'objet de ses etudes depuis le debut de
I'annee, y a joint une partie d'information politique provenant dune source serieuse.

Je I'ai prie de rediger brievement les renseignements qu'il a recueilHs surla remise^
prochaine de la Note autrichienne a la Serbie, que les journaux anrioncent depuis
quelques jours avec insistance.

Vous trouverez ci-joint le texte de cette note d'information, interessante en
raison de sa precision.

DUMAINE.

r 14.

Note.
{Extrait d'un rapport consulaire sur la situation economique et politique en Autriche.)

Vienne, le 20 juillel 191 A.

Il.resulte de renseignements fournis par une personnalite particulierement au
courant des nouvelles oflGcielles que le Gouverneinent frangais aurait tort de s'en
rapporter aux semeurs d'optimisme : on exigera beaucoup de la Serbie, on lui
imposera la dissolution de plusieurs societes de propagande, on la sommera de
reprimer le nationalisme, de surveilier la frontiere eh collaboration avec des com-
missaires autrichiens, de faire la police des ecoles au point de vue de I'esprit ariti-
autrichien, et il est bien difficile qu'un Gouvernement accept^ de se faire ainsi le
sergent de ville d'un Gouvernement etranger. On comple avec les echappatoires par
lesquelles ia Serbie voudra sans doute esquiver une repoose claire et directe; c'est

— 30 —

pourquoi on lui fixera peul-etre un delai bref pour declarer si elle accepte oui ou
non. La teneur de la Note et son allure imperative garantissent presque sArement
que Belgrade refusera. Alors", on operera militairement,

H y a ici, et pareillenaent a Berlin, un clan qui accepte Tidee du conflita dimen-
sions generalisees, en d'autres termes, la conflagration. L'idee directrice est pro-
bablement qu'il faudrait marcher avant que la Russie ait termine ses grands perfec-
tionnements de I'armee et des voies ferrees, et avant que la France ait mis au point
son organisation mililaire. Mais ici, il n'y a pas accord dans les hautes spheres : du
cote du comte Berchtold et des diplomates, on voudrait tout au plus une operation
localisee contre la Serbie. Mais tout doit etre envisage comme possible. On signage
un fait singulier : generalement I'agence telegraphique officielle, dans ses resumes
et revues de presse etrangere, ne lient compte que des journaux oilicieux et des
organes les plus importants; elle omet toute citation, toute mention des autres.
Cest une regie et une tradition. Or, depuis une dizaine de jours, I'agence offi-
cielle fournit quotidiennement a la presse d'Autriche-Hongrie une revue complete
de toute la presse serbe, en donnant une large place aux journaux les plus ignores,
les plus petits et insignifiants, qui par cela meme ont un langage plus libre, plus
hardi, plus agressif et souvent injurieux. Ce travail de I'Agence officielle a visible-
ment pour but d'exciter le sentiment public et de creer une opinion favorable a la
guerre. Le fait est significatif.

W 15.

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin,

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i.

Berlin, le 21 juillet igiA-

n me revient que le representant de la Serbie a Berlin aurait fait hier une
demarche a la Wilhelmstrasse pour dire que son Gouvernement 6tait pret a accueillir
la requete de I'Autriche motivee par Tattentat de Serajevo, pourvu qu'elle ne
demandikt que des concoursjudiciaires en vue de la repression et de la prevention
des attentats politiques, mais il aurait ete charge de prevenir le Gouvernement
allemand qu'il serait.dangereux de chercher par cette enquete i porter atteinte au
prestige de la Serbie.

Confidentiellement, je puis dire egalement k Votre Excellence que le Charge
d'affaires de Russie, i Taudience diplomatique d'aujourd'hui , a parle de cette ques-

— 31 —
tion a M. de Jagow. II lui a dit qu'il supposait que le Gouvernement' allemand con-
naissait actuellemeht tres bien la Note preparee par I'Autriche et etait par suite k
meme de donner I'assurance que les difficultes austro-serbes seraient localisees. Le
Secretaire d'Etat a proteste qu'il ignorait absolument le contenu de cette Note et s'est
exprime de meme avec moi. Je n ai pu que m'etonner dune declaration aussi peu
conforme a ce que les circonstances conduisent a penser.

II m'a ete assure d'ailleurs que, des mainlenant, les avis preliminaires de mobili-
sation qui doivent meltre I'Allemagne dans une sorte de « garde h. vous » pendant les
epoques de tension, ont ete adresses ici aux classes qui doivent les recevoir en pareil
cas. C'est la une mesure a laquelle les AUemands, etant donne leurs habitudes »
peuvent recourir sans s exposer a des indiscretions et sans emouvoir la population.
Elle ne revet pas un caractere sensationnel , et n'est pas forcement suivie de mobili-
sation effective ainsi que nous Tavons deja vu, mais elle n'en est pas moins signifi-^
cative.

Jules Cambon.

r 16.

;M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i., .
a Londres, Saint-Petersbourg, Vienne, Rome.

Paris, le 21 juiliet 19 id.

J'attire specialement votre attention sur des informations que je re^ois de Berlin :
I'Ambassadeur de France signale Textreme faiblesse de la Bourse de Berlin d'hier, et
i'attribue aux inquietudes que la question serbe commence a provoquer.
I M. Jules Cambon a des raisons tres serieuses de croire que lorsque TAutriche fera
k Belgrade la demarche quelle juge necessaire a la suite de I'attentat de Serajevo»
TAllemagne I'appuiera de son autorite , sans chercher k jouer un role de mediation.

Bienvenu-Martin.

— 32 —

r 17,

M, Bienvenu-Martln, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i..»

a MM. les Ambassadeurs de France a Londres, Saint-Petersbourg,]
Vienne, Rome.

Paris, le 2 2 juillet 19 id. '

M. Jules Cambon ayant interroge M. de Jagow sur la leneur de la Note autri-:
chienne k Belgrade, ce dernier lui a repondu qu'il n'en connaissait nullement le.'
libelle ; notre Ambassadeur en a marque toute sa surprise. II constate que la baisse de|
la Bourse de Berlin continue et que des nouvelles pessimistes circulent.

M. Barrere a egalement entretenu de la meme question le Marquis de San Giu-
liano, qui sen montre inquiet et assure qu'il agit k Vienne pour qu'il ne soit demande
a la Serbie que des choses realisables , par exemple la dissolution du Club bosniaque
et non une enquete judiciaire sur les causes de I'attentat de Serajevo.

Dans les circonstances presentes,la supposition la plus favorable qu'on puisse faire
est que le Cabinet de Vienne , se sentant deborde par sa presse et par le parti mili-i
taire, clierche^ obtenir le maximum de la Serbie par une intimidation prealable,
directe et indirecte, et s'appuie sur I'AUemagne a cet elfet. •

J'ai prie I'Ambassadeur de France k Vienne d'user de toute son influence sur le
Comte Berchtold pour lui representor, dans une conversation amicale , combien la^
moderation du Gouvernement autrichien serait appr^ciee en Europe, et quelle
repercussion risquerait d'avoir une pression brutale sur la Serbie.

* Bienvenu-Martin.

r 18.

M. Du MAINE, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne,

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i.

Vienne, le 22 juillet 1914.

On ne sait rien encore des decisions que le Comte Berchtold, prolongeant son
sejour k Ischl, lenle d'oblenir de I'Empereur. On attribuait au Gouvernement Tinlen-

— 33 —
lion d'aglr avec la plus grande rigueur envers la Serble, d'en fmir avec elle, «de la
trailer comme une autre Pologne ». Huit corps d'armee seraient prets a entrer ea
campagne, mais M. Tisza, tres inquiet de Tagitation en Groatie, serait intervenu acti-
vement dans un sens moderateur.

En tous cas, on croit que la d-marche a Belgrade aura lieu cette semaine. Les de-
mandes du Gouvernement austro-hongrois relative ment a la repression de Tattentat
ct k certaines garanties de surveillance et de police paraissent acceptables pour la
di^^nile des Serbes; M. Jovanovich croit qu elles seront accueillies. M. Pacbitcb desire
un arrangement pacifique, mais se declare pret k toute resistance. 11 a confiance
dans la force de Tarmee serbe ; il comple, en outre, sur Tunion de tous les Slaves de
la Monarcbie pour paralyser Teffort dirige contre son pays.

A moins d'un aveuglement absolu , on devrait reconnaitre ici qu'un coup de force
a les plus grandes chances d'etre funeste, aussi bien aux troupes austro-bongroises
qua la cohesion dejk si compromise des national! les gouvernees par I'Empereur.

L'Ambassadeur d'AlIemagne , M. de Tcbirsky, se monlre partisan des resolutions
violentes, tout en laissant volontiers entendre que la Chancellerie imp^riale ne serait
pas entierement d'accord avec lui sur ce point. L'Ambassadeur de Russie, parti hier
pour la campagne, en raison des declarations rassurantes qui lui ont ete faites au
Minislere des Affaires etrangeres, m'a confie que son Gouvernement n aura pas d ob-
jection contre des demarches visant la punition des coupables et la dissolution des
associations notoirement r^volutionnaires, mais ne pouvait admettre des exigences
bumiliantes pour le sentiment national serbe.

DUIIAINE.

N**19.

M. Paul Cambon , Ambassadeur de France k Londres ,

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires i^trang^res p. i.

Londres , ie 2 2 j uillet 1914*

Voire Excellence a bien voulu me faire part des impressions recueillies jpar notre
Ambassadeur k Berlin, relativement aux consequences de la d-marche que le Gou-
vernement austro-hongrois se propose de faire k Belgrade.

Cos impressions lii'ont ^t^ confirmees par une conversation que j*ai eue hier avec
le Principal Secretaire d'Etat pour les Affaires etrangeres. Sir E. Grey ma dit avoir
re^ula visite de I'Ambassadeur d'AlIemagne, qui lui a d6clar6 qu'i Berlin on s'attendait
k une demarche du Gouvernement austro-hongrois aupres du Gouvernement serbe.
Le Prince Lichnowski a assure que le Gouvernenient allemand s'employait k retenir
ct k moderer le Cabinet de Vienne, mais que jusqu'i present il n'y r6ussissait pas et
qu'il n'etait pas sans inquietude sur les suites d'une telle demarche. Sir E. Grey a r6-

DoctiMBMS DiPLOMATiQUES. — Guerre europdcnne. 5

— 34 —

pondu au Prince Lichnowski qu*il voulait croire qu'avant d'intervenir k Belgrade » ie
Gouvernement austrohongrois se serait bien renseigne surles circonstances du corn-
plot dont I'archiduc heritier et la duchesse de Hohenberg ont 6te victimes, se serait
assure que le Gouvemement serbe en avail eu connaissance et n'avait pas fait tout ce
qui dependait de lui pour en prevenir les effets. Car s'il ne pouvait pas etre prouve
que la responsabilite du Gouvemement serbe fut impliquee dans une certaine mesure ,
Tintervention du Gouvemement austro-hongrois ne se justifierait pas et souleverait
centre lui I'opinion europeenne.

La communication du Prince Lichnowski avait laisse Sir E. Grey sous une impres-
sion d'inqui^tude qu'il ne m'a pas dissimulee. La meme impression m'a ete donnee
par I'Ambassadeur d'ltalie qui redoute, lui aussi, I'^ventualite dune nouvelle ten-
sion des rapports austro-serbes.

Ce matin , j'ai recu la visile du Ministre de Serbie , qui partage egalement les ap-
prehensions de Sir E. Grey. II craint que TAutriche ne mette le Gouvemement
serbe en presence d'une demande que la dignite de celui-ci et surtout la suscepti-
bihte de Topinion publique ne lui permettent pas d'accueillir sans protestation.
Comme je lui objectais le calme qui parait regner a Vienne et dont temoignent tous
les Ambassadeurs accredites dans cette capitale , il m'a repondu que ce calme officiel
n'etait qu apparent et recouvrait les dispositions les plus foncierement hostiles contre
la Serbie. Or, a-t-il ajoute, si ces dispositions viennent a se manifester par une de-
marche depourvue de la mesure desirable, il y aura lieu de tenir compte de I'opinion
publique serbe, surexcitee par les mauvais procedes dont TAutriche a abreuve ce
pays et r endue moins patiente par le souvenir encore tout frais de deux guerres vic-
torieuses. Malgre les sacrifices dont la Serbie a paye ses re'centes victoires, elle pent ;
mettre encore sur pied 4oo,ooo hommes et Topinion publique, qui le sait, nest pas
disposee k tolerer une humiliation.

Sir E. Grey dans un entretien avec I'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie I'a pri6
de recommander a son Gouvemement de ne pas s'ecarter de la prudence et de la
moderation necessaires pour eviter de nouvelles complications, de ne demander k
la Serbie que des mesures auxqueiles celie-ci puisse raisonnablement se preter et
de ne pas se laisser entrainer au del^»

Paul Cambon.

— 35 -

r 20.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des AiFaires etrangeres p. i.,
a Londres, Berlin, Saint-Petersbourg et Rome.

Paris, le 23 juillet 19 1 4.

Les premieres intentions du Gouvernement austro-hongrois avaient ete, selon les
informations recueillies par TAmbassadeur de France a Vienne , d'agir avec la plus
grande rigueur contre la Serbie, en tenant huit corps d'armee prets k entrer en
campagne.

Ses dispositions actuelles seraient plus conciliantes : en reponse a une question
que lui posait M. Dumaine, a qui j'avais prescrit d'appeler I'attention du Gouvernement
autrichien sur les inquietudes eveillees en Europe, le baron Macchio a affirme a
notre Ambassadeur que le ton et les demandes qui seront formulees dans la note
autrichenne permettent de compter sur un denouement pacifique. Je ne sais quelle
foi il faut accorder a ces assurances, en raison des habitudes de la chanceilerie im-
periale.

Dans tons les cas, la note autrichienne sera remise dans un tres bref delai. Le
Ministre de Serbie estime que M. Pacbitch acceptera, par desir dun arrangement,
les demandes relatives a la repression de I'attentat et a des garanties de surveillance
et de police, mais qu'il resistera a ce qui attenterait a la souverainete et k la dignite
de son pays.

Dans les cercles diplomatiques de Vienne, I'Ambassadeur d'AUemagne preconise
des resolutions violentes, tout en convenant que peiit-etre la Chanceilerie impe-
riale nest pas entierement d'accord avec lui sur ce point; I'Ambassadeur de Russie,
se fiant aux assurances qui lui ont ete donnees, s'est absente de Vienne et a confie,
avant son depart, a M. Dumaine, que son Gouvernement n'elevera pas d'objections
contre la punition des coupables et la dissolution des associations revolutionnaires,
mais qu'il ne pourrait tolerer des exigences humiliante§ pour le sentiment national de
la Serbie.

Bienvenu-Martin.

r 21.

M. Allize, Ministre de France a Munich,

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des AiFaires etrangeres p. i.

Munich, le i!3 juiilet 191 4»

La presse bavaroise parait croire qu une solution pacifique de i'incident au'stro-
serbe est non seulement possible, mais ncieme vraisemblable; dans les spheres pffi-

— 56 —

cielles, auconlraiVc, on alTecle, depuis quelque temps, avec plus ou moins de since-
rite, un reel pessimisme.

Le President da Conseil nolamment m'a dit aujourd'hui que la note aulrlchlenne,
donl il avait connaissance , etait, i son avis, redigoe dans des lermes acceplables pour
la Serbie, mais que la situation acluelle ne lui en paraissait pas moins tres serieuse.

Allize.

— 37 —

CHAPITRE III

LA NOTE AUTRICHIENNE ET LA R^PONSF SERBE

DU VENDRfDI 24 JUILLET AU SAMEDl 25 JUILI ET)

— 39 —

N** 22.

M. Ren6 Viviani, President du Conseil,

a M.JBienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i.

Je voiis serais oblige de transmettre d'urgence a M. Dumaine les informations et
instructions suivantes :

Reval, le 2 A juillet 1914, a i heure du matio.

Au cours de mes entretiens avec le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres russe , nous
avons ete amenes a envisager les dangers qui pourraient resulter d'une demarche
eveiituelle de I'Autriche-Hongrie a Tegard de la Serbia vrelativement a Tattentat dont
a ete victime Tarchiduc heritier. Nous sommes tombes d accord pour penser qu'il
convenait de ne rien negliger pour prevenir vme demande d'explications ou quelque
mise en demeure qui equivaudraient k une intervention dans les affaires interieures-
de la Serbie , et que celle-ci pourrait considerer conune tme atteinte k sa souverai-
nete et k son independance.

En consequence , nous avons estime qu'il y avait lieu , dans une conversation amicale
avecle ComteBerchtoId, delui donner des conseils de moderation, propres a lui faire
comprendre combien seralt mal inspiree une intervention aBelgrade,ou Ton pourrait
voir une menace de la part du Cabinet de Vienne.

L'Ambassadeur d' Angle terre, mis au courant par M. Sazonow, a exprime I'idee
que son Gouvemement se joindrait sans doute k une demarche tendant a ecarter un
danger qui pent menacer la paix genersde, et a telegraphic dans ce sens a son Gou-
vemement.

M. Sazonow a adress6 des instructions k cet effet k M. Schebeko. Sans qu'il s'agisse
ici d'une action collective ou concertee des representants de la Triple Entente k
Vienne, je vous prie de vous entret^nir de la question avec les Ambassadeurs de
Russie et d'Ang^eterre , et de vous entendre avec eux sur le meilleur moyen, pour
chacun de vous, de faire entendre sans retard au Comle Berchtold les conseils de
moderation que nous parait reclamer la situation pr^sente.

J'ajoute qu'il y aurait lieu de prier M. Paul Cambon de faire valoir aupres de Sir
E. Grey Tutilit^ de cette demarche, et d'appuyer la suggestion que TAmbassadeur
d'Angleterre en Russie a du presenter k cet effet au Foreign Office. Le Comte Benc-
kendorff est charg6 de faire ime reconmiandation analogue.

Rend Viviani.

— . 40

r 23.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, MInistre des Affaires ^trang^res p. i.

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, a bord de la France.

Paris, le 24 juillet 191^.

J'ai transtnis d'urgence k'Vienne vos instructions, mals il resulte des informations
de presse de ce matin que la Note aulrichienne a 6le remise hier soir a six heures a
Belgrade.

Cette note, dont I'Ambassadeur d'Aulriche-Hongrie ne nous a pas encore remis
le texte officiel, parait tres accentuee ; elie tendrait non seulement a obtenir la pour-
suite des Serbes meles' directement k Tatlenlat de Serajevo, mais demanderait ia
repression immediate dans ia presse et dans i armee serbe de toute propagande anti-
autrichienne. Elie donnerait jusqu'a samedi soir, a six heures, k la Serbie pour
s'executer.

En transmettant vos instructions k M. Dumaine, je i'ai prie de se concerler avec
ses collegues anglais et russe.

Bienvenc-Martin.

W 24.
Texte de la Note autrichienne.

(Note communiquce par le Comte Szecsen, Ambassadeur d'Autriche Hongrie , a M. Bienvenu-Martin ,
Miaistre des Affaires etrangeres p. i., le veadredi 24 juillet 1914, a jo h. 1/2 du matin.)

Vienne, le 2 4 juillet 1914.

Le Gouvemement imperial et royal s'est vu oblig6 d'adresser jeudi 28 juillet cou-
rant, par Tentremise du Ministre imperial et royal a Belgrade, la note suivante au
Gouvemement royal de Serbie :

« Le 3 1 mars 1 909 le Ministre de Serbie k Vienne a fait, d'ordre de son Gouver^
nement au Gouvemement imperial et royal la declaration suivante :

« La Serbie reconnait qu'elle n'a pas et6 atleinte dans ses droits par le fait accompli
cr^e en Bosnie-Herzegovine et qu'elle se conformera par consequent a telle decision
que les Puissances prendront par rapport k I'arlicle XXV du Traite de Berlin. Se ren-
dant aux conseils des grandes puissances, la Serbie s'engage des a present a a])andonner
I'attilude de protestation et d'opposition qu'elle a observee k I'egard de I'annexion
depuis I'automne dernier et elie s'engage, en outre, k changer le cours de sa politique
actuelle envers TAutriche-Hongrie pour vivre desormais avec cette derniere sur le pied
d'un bon voisinage. »

— 41 —

Or, riiisloire des dernieres annees, et notamment les evenements douloureux du
28 juin ont demonlre Texistcnce en Serbia d un mouvemcnt subversif dont le but est
de detacher de la Monarchie auslro-hongroise certaines parties de ses territoires. Ce
mouvement, qui a pris jour sous les yeux du Gouvernement serbe est arrive k se
manifeslcr au delk du lerriloire du royaume par des actes de terrorisme , par une seriei
d'atlenlats et par des meurlres.

Le Gouvernement royal serbe , loin de satisfaire aux engagements formels contenus
dans la declaration du 3i mars 1909, n'a rien fait pour supprimer ce mouvement.
II a tolero I'activile criminelle des dififerentes socieles et affiliations dirigees contre la
Monarchie, le langage eOrene de la presse, la glorification des auteurs d'attentats, la
participation d'olficiers et de fonctionnaires dans des agissements subversifs, une
propaganda malsaine dans I'instruction publique, tolere enfm toutes les manifestations
qui pouvaient induire la population serbe a la haine dc la Monarchie et au mepris
de ses institutions.

Celtc tolerance coupable du Gouvernement royal de Serbie n'avait pas ccsse au
moment ou les evenements du 28 juin dernier en ont demontre au monde entier les
consequences funestcs.

II resulte des depositions et aveux des auteurs criminels de fattentat du 28 juin
que le meurtre de Serajevo a ete trame k Belgrade ,^ue les armes et explosifs dont
les meurtriers se trouvaient etre munis, leur ont ete donnes par des ofQciers et fonc-
tionnaires serbes faisant partie de la « Narodna Odbrana » et enfm que le passage en
Bosnie des criminels et de leurs armes a ete organisevct eflectue par des chefs du
service-frontiere serbe. $■-

Les resultats mentionnes de I'instruction ne permettent pas au Gouvernement im-
perial et royal de poursuivre plus longtemps I'attitude de longanimite expectative
qu'il avait observee pendant des annees vis-a-vis des agissements concentres k Belgrade
et propages dc la sur les territoires de la Monarchie : ces resultats lui imposent au
contraire le devoir de mettre fm a des menees qui forment une menace perpetuelle
pour la tranquillite de la Monarchie.

C'est pour atteindre ce but que le Gouvernement imperial et royal se voit oblige
de demander au Gouvernement serbe I'enonciation officielle qu'il condamne la pro-
pagande dirigee contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise , c'est-i-dire I'ensemble des
tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu a detacher de la Monarchie des territoires qui
en font partie, et qu'il s'engage a supprimer, par tous les moyens, cette propaganda
criminelle et tcrroriste.

Afin de donncr un caractere solennel a cet engagement le Gouvernement royal de
Serbie fera publier a la premiere page du Journal ojjicicl en date du 13/26 juillet
I'enonciation suivanle :

n Le Gouvernement royal de Serbie condamne la propagande dirigee contre
I'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-^-dire fensemble des tolerances qui aspirent en dernier lieu
a detacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il
deplore sincerement les consequences funestes de ces agissements criminels.

Le Gouvernement royal rcgrelte que des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient
jparticipe a la propagande sus mentionnee et compromis par la les relations dc bon

DocDMENTS DiPLOMATiQUES. — Guerre europecnne. 6

- 42 —
voisi&aige auquel ie Gouvernement royal s'etait solennellemeiit engage par ses decla-
rations du 3 1 mars 1909.

Le Gouvernement royal qui d^sapprouve et repudie toute idee ou tentative d'im-
mixtion dans les destinees des habitants de quelque partie de rAutriche-Hongrie que
ce soit, considere de son devoir d'avertir formellement les olliciers, les fonctionnaires
et toute la population du royaume que dorenavant il procedera avec la derniere-
rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissemenls,
agissements qu'il mettra tous ses efforts k prevenir et a reprimer. »

Cette enonciation sera portee simultanement a la connaissance de Tarmee royale
par un ordre du jour de Sa Majeste le Roi et sera publiee dans le Biillelin officiel de.
I'armee,

Le Gouvernement royal serbe s'engage en outre :

1" A supprimer toute publication qui excite k la haine et au mepris de la Mo-
narchie, et dont la, tendance generale est dirigee contre son integ'rite territoriale.

2° A dissoudre immediatement la societe dite <> Narodna Odbrana «» a confisquer,
tous ses moyens de propagande , et a proceder de la meme maniere contre les autres
societes et aflQliations en Serbie qui s'adonnent k la propagande contre la Monarchie
austro-hongroise , le Gouverneqpjent royal prendra les mesures necessaires pour que
les societes dissoutes ne puisseo^ pas continuer leur activite sous un autre nom et sous
ime autre forme.

3° A eliminer sans delai de rinstructiou publique en Serbie, tant en ce qui con-
cerne le corps enseignant que les moyens d'instruction , tout ce qui sert ou pourrait
servir k fomenter la propagande contre rAutriche-Hongrie.

A** A eloigner du service militaire et de I'administration en general tous les offi-
ciers et fonctionnaires coupables de la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hon-
groise et dont le Gouvernement imperial et royal se reserve de communiquer les
tooms et les fails au Gouverriement royal.

5** A accepter la collaboration en Serbie des organes du Gouvernement imperial
et royal dsuis la suppression du mouvement subversif dirige contre Tintegrite territo-
riale de la Monarchie.

6° A ouvrir une enquete judiciaire contre les partisans du complot du 28 juin se
trouvant sur territoire serbe; des organes delegues par le Gouvernement imperial et
royal prendront part aUx recherches y relatives.

7° A proceder d'urgence i I'arrestation du commandant Voij a Tankosic et du
nomme Milan Ciganovic, employe de I'Etat serbe, compromis par les resultats de
Tinstruction de Serajevo.

8** A emp6cher, par des mesures efiicaces, le concours des autorites serbes dans
Je irafic illicile d'armes et d'explosifs a travers la frontiere;

A licencier el punir severemcnt les fonctionnaires du service-frontiere de Schabatz
et de Loznica coupables d'avoir aide les auteurs du crime de Serajevo en leur facilir
ifiiA ie passage <ie la frontiere.

9* Acldtiner au. Gouvernement imperial et royal. des explications sur ies propos

^ 43 —
injustlfiables de hauts fonctionnaires serbes tant en Serbie qu'a retranger qui^ malgre
leur position ofBcielle, n'ont pas hesite apres Tattentat du 28 juin de s'exprimer dans
des interwiews d'une maniere hostile envers ia Monarchre austro-hongroise. Enfmi

to'' D'averlir, sans retard, le Gouvemement imperial el royal de I'exfecution des
mesures comprises dans les points precedents.

Le Gouvemement imperial et royal attend la reponse du Gouvemement royal au
plus tard jusqu'au sartiedi 26 de ce mois k cinq heures du sdir (i).

Un memoire concernant les resultats de I'instruction de Serajevo k Tegard des
fonctionnaires mentionnes aux points 7 et 8 est annex 6 k cette note.

Jai riionneur d'inviter votre Excellence de vouloirbien porter le contenu de cette
Note a la connaissance du Gouvemement aupres duquel vous etes accredite, en
accompagnant cette communication du commentaire que voici :

Le 3i mars 1909 le Gouvemement royal serbe a adresse k TAutriche-Hongrie la
declaration dont le texte est reproduit ci-dessus.

Le lendemain meme de cette declaration , la Serbie s'est engagee dans uhe politique
tendant a inspirer des idees subversives aux ressortissants serbes de la Monarchie
austro-hongroise et a preparer ainsi la separation des territoires austro-hongrois,
limitrophes a la Serbie.

La Serbie devint le foyer d'une agitation criminelle :

Des socictes et affiliations ne tarderent pas a se former qui, soit ouvertement, soil
clandestinement, etaient destinees a creer des desordres sur le territoife austro-hon-
grois. Ces societes et affiliations comptent parmi leurs membres des generaux et des
diplomates, des fonctionnaires d'Etat et des juges, href, les sommites du monde
officiel et inofficiel du royaume.

Le journalisme serbe est presque entierement au service de cette propagande,
dirigee contre rAutriche-Hongrie, et pas un jour ne passe sans que les organes de la
presse serbe n'excitent leurs lecteurs a la haine et au mepris de la Monarchie voisine
ou a des attentats diriges plus ou moins ouvertement cohlre sa surete et son integrite.

Un grand nombre d'agents est appele a soutenir par tpiis les moyens I'agitalion
contre TAutriche-Hongrie et a corrompre dans les provinces limitrophes la jeunesse
de ces pays.

L'esprit conspirateur des politiciens serbes, esprit dont les annales du royaume
portent les sanglantes cmpreintes, a subi une recrudescence depuis la derniere crise
balkanique; des individus, ayant fait parlie des bandes jusque-li occupees en Mace-
doine, sent venus se mettre a la disposition de la propagande terroriste contre I'Au-
triche-Hongrie.

(1) L'Am])assadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie 9 adresse au Ministrc des Affaires etrangeres, par lettre parti-
cuUere, la rectification suivante, dans la journ^c du 24 juillet : «Dans Ja copie de la depeclie que j'al eu
I'honneur de remettre ce matin a Votre Excellence, il etail dit que mon Gouvemement attendait la reponse
<]u Cabinet de Belgrade au plus tard jusqu'au samedi 2^ de ce mois a ci>j<7 heures du soir. Notre Ministre
a Belgrade n'ayant remis sa'note hier qu'a six heures du soir, le delai pour la reponse se Irouve proroge
de ce fait jusqu'a demain samedi six heures du soir.

' « J'ai cru de mon devoir d'informer Voire Excellence de cette legere- modification dans Vex^ii^ation da
delai fixe pour la reponse du Gouvemement serl)e. »

— /i4 —

En presence de ces agissements auxquels I'Autriche-Hongrie est exposee depuis
des annees, le Gouvernement de la Serbie n'a pas cru devoir prendre la moindre
mesure. C'est ainsi que le Gouvernement serbe a manque au devoir que lui imposait
la declaration solennelle du 3i mars 1909, et c'est ainsi qu'il sest mis en contra-
diction avec la volonte de TEurope et avec I'engagement qu'il avait pris vis-a-vis de
TAutriche-Hongrie.

La longanimite du Gouvernement imperial et royal k I'egard de I'atlitude provo-
catrice de la Serbie etait inspiree du desinteressement territorial de la Monarchie
austro-hongroise et de I'espoir que le Gouvernement serbe finirait tout de meme par
apprecier a sa juste valeur I'amitie de TAutriche-Hongrie. En observant unc altitude
bienveillante pour les interets politiques de la Serbie, le Gouvernement imperial et
royal espdrait que le royaume se deciderait finalement a suivre de son cole une ligne
de conduite analogue. L'Aulriche-Hongrie s attendait surloul a une pareille evolution
dans les idees politiques en Serbie, lorsque, apres les evenements de I'annee 1912,
le Gouvernement imperial et royal rendit possible, par une attitude desinteressee et
sans rancune, I'agrandissement si considerable de la Serbie.

Cetle bienveillance manlfestee par I'Autriche-Hongrie k I'egard de I'Etal voisin n'a
cependant aucunement modifie les procedes du royaume, qui a continue k lolerer
sur son territoire une propagande dont les funestes consequences se sont manifestees
au monde entier le 28 juin dernier, jour ou Theritier presomptif de la Monarchie et
son illustre epouse devinrent les victimes d'un complot trame a Belgrade.

En presence de cet elat de choses, le Gouvernement imperial et royal a du se
decider a entreprendre de nouvelles et pressantes demarches a Belgrade afm d'amener
le Gouvernement serbe k arreter le mouvement incendiaire mena^ant la surele et
4'integrite de la Monarchie austro-hongroise.

Le Gouvernement imperial et royal est persuade qu'en enlreprenant cette demarche,
il se trouve en plein accord avec les sentiments de toutes les nations civilisees qui ne
sauraient admettre que le regicide devint une arme dont on puisse se servir impune-
ment dans la lutte politique, et que la paix europeenne fut conlinuellement troublee
par les agissements parlant de Belgrade.

C'est a I'appui de ce qui precede que le Gouvernement imperial et royal tient a la
disposilion du Gouvernement de la Republique fran^aise un dossier elucldant les
menees serbes et les rapports existant entre ces menses et le meurtre du 28 juin.

Une communication identique est adressee aux represenlants imperiaux et royaux
aupres des autres Puissances signataires.

Vous etes autorise de laisser une copie de cettB depeche entre les mains de M. le
Ministre des Affaires etrangeres.

Annexe.

L'inslruction criminelle ouverte par le tribunal de Serajevo contre Gravillo Princip et
•consorts du chef d'assassinat et de complicite y relative, crime commis par eux le 28 juin
dernier, a jusqu'ici abouli aux conslatations suivanles :

— 45 —
i" Le complot ayant pour but d'assassiner, lors de soa sejour a Serajevo, I'archiduc
Francois-Ferdinand fut form6 a Belgrade par Gravillo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, le
nomme Milan Ciganovic et Trifko Grabez avec le concours du commandant Voija Tanlcosic.

2" Les six bombes et les quatre pistolets Browning avec munitions, moyennant lesquels
les malfaiteurs ont commis I'attentat, furent livres 6 Belgrade a Princip, Cabrinovic et
Grabez par le nomme Milan Ciganovic et le commandant Voija Tankosic.

3° Les bombes sont des grenades 4 main provenant du depot d'armes de I'armee serbe
a Kragnjevaks.

k" Pour assurer la rdussite de I'attental, Ciganovic enseigna a Princip, Cabrinovic et
Grabez la mani^re de se servir des grenades et donna, dans une foret pres du champ de tir
a Topschider, des lecons de tir avec pistolets Browning a Princip et a Grabez.

5° Pour rcndre possible i Princip, Cabrinovic et Grabez de passer la frontiere de Bosnie-
Herz^govine et d'y introdiiire clandestinement leur contrebande d'armes, im systeme de
transport secret fut organise par Ciganovic.

D'apres cette organisation , Tintroduction en Bosnie-Herzegovine des malfaiteurs et de
leurs armes fut operee par les capitaines-frontieres de Sabac (Popovic) et de Loznica,
ainsi que par le douanier Rudivoj Grbic de Loznica , avec le concours de divers particuliers.

r 25 •. •

M. Bienvenu-Martin , Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i.,

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, a bord de la France, et a
Londres, Berlin, Vienne, Saint-Petersbourg, Rome, Belgrade.

Paris, le 2/ijuillet 1914.

J'ai Thonneur de vous informer que la Note autrichienne , remise a Belgrade jeudi
solr, m'a ete laissee en copie, ce matin, par i'Ambassadeur d'Aulriche-Hongrie.
Le comte Szecsen m'a fait connaitre que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois attend
la reponse du Gouvernement serbe jusqu^ samedi 26, a cinq heures du soir (1).

La Note s'appuie sur Tengagement pris par la Serbie, le 3 1 mars 1 909, de recon-
nailre Tannexion de la Bosnie-Herzegovine el reproche au Gouvernement serbe
d'avoir tolere une propaganda anti-aulrichienne, k laqueile ont pris part les fonction-
naires, I'armee el la presse, propagande mena^ante pour la securite etTinlegrile de
I'Autriche, et donl le crime du 28 juin, Irame a Belgrade, selon les constatalions de
rinstruclion, a demonlre les dangers.

Le Gouvernement autrichien se declare oblige de metlre fin k une propagande
qui constitue un danger permanent pour sa Iranquilllte, el d'exiger du Gouvernement
serbe une enoncialion oflicielle de sa volonle de la condamner et reprimer, par ia
publication, au Journal ojjlcicl du 26, d une declaration donl les termes sont indiques,
reprouvant, regrettant el mena^anl de sevir. Un ordre du jour du Roi a I'armee

serbe porterait egalemenl cette declaration i sa connaissance. En outre, le Gouver-

■
(l) Voir note page /i 3.

— 46 —
nement serbe s'engagerait a supprimer les publications, k dissoudre les Soci^les , ^ revo-
quer les officiers et fonctionnaires dont les noms seraient communiqnes par ie Gou-
Teniement aulriclilen, a accepter la collaTjotation de fonctlomiaires autricliiens pour
la suppression de Taction subversive signalee, ainsi que pour Tenquete sur i'attentat
de Serajevo, enlin a proceder a Tarrestation immediate' d'un officier et dun employe
serbes qui y sont compromis.

Au memorandum autrichien est annexee une Note, resumant les constat ationsde
Tinstruction du crime de Serajevo et affirmant qu'il a ete trame a Belgrade, que les
bombes ont ete fournies aux assassins et emanent d'un depot de Tarmee serbe, enfm
qae les assassins <Mat ele -exerces et aides par des officiers et employes serbes.

En rendant visite , aussilot apres cette -commimication au Directeur politique p. i^
le Comte Szecsen I'a informe, sans aucun commentaire, de la remise de la
Note. M. Berlhelot n'a pu que signaler, sur mes indications, ii TAmbassadeur
d'Autriche-Hongrie, I'impression d'inquietude eveillee par les informations paru.^
dans la roatinee sur ie contenu de la JMole autricbienne, et le sentiment penible
qae ;ie manquerait pas dcTeiller, dans Topinion fran^aise, le moment choisi pour
une demarcbe si imperative et de si court delai; c'est-a-dire TheTire oii le Presi-
dent de la Republiqne et le President du Conseil, Ministrc des Affaires etrangeres
de la Republique avaient qnittc Petersbour^ et ^e trouvaierit, en mer, par consequent
hors d'elat d'exercer, d'accord avec les Puissances qui n'etaient pas directement inte-
ressees. Taction apaisante si desirable entreia Serbie et TAutriche, dans Tinteret de
la paix generale.

Le Ministre de Serbie n'a encore aucune donnee sur les intentions de son Grou-
Vernement.

UAmbassadeur d'Afleinagne a demande k elre regu par moi, cet apres-midi, k
cinq heures.

Bienvenu-Martin,

r 26

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Minastre des Affaires ^tran^^res p. i.

a M. Thiebaut, IVfinistre de France a 'Stockliolin (pour le President
du Conseil) et ^ Belgrade, Vienne, Londres, Berlin, Rome, Pe-

lersbourg.

Paris, le 2 4 juillet igiil.

M. Vesnitchn'avait, ce matin encore, xegud^ son Gouvemement arucun t«legramme^
de nature a le renseigner ^W ^s intentions et ne oonnaissait pas ie contenu d© la
Note autrichienne.

A la demande de conseil quil formulait k la Direction politique, M. Berlhelot
lui a- dit, k litre tout personnel, que la Serbie devait chercher a gagner du "temps, le

-^ 47 —
terme de /i8 heures constituant peut-etre plutot une « raise en demeure » qu'im
ultimatum proprement dil; qu'il pouvait y avoir lieu, par exemple, d offrir imme-
diatemcnt satisfaction sur tous les points qui n'etaient pas inconciliables avec la
dignite et la souverainete de la Serbie ; il lui a ete conseille de f aire remarquer qiics
les constat ationsde I'instruction autriehieune de Serajevo etaienl unilalerales, et que
la Serbia, tout en etant prete a sevir contre tous les complices dun crime qu'elle
reprouvait hautement, demandait k etre mise au couranl des preuves, pour pouvoir
les verifier rapidement; de chercher surtout d echapper a la prise direcle de
I'Autriche, en se declarant prete a §e soumettre a Tarbitrage de TEurope.

J'ai demande a Londres et a Petersbburg les vues et lea intentions des Gouverne-
ments anglais et russe. II resulte, d'autre part, de nos informations, que I'ltalie n^a
re^u qu'aujourd'hui communication de la Note autrichienne. au sujet de laquello
elle n'avait ete ni pressentie ni meme avertie.

BrENVENU-MARTIN.

r 27

M. Bienvenu-JVIartin , Ministre des Afl'aires etrangeres

a Stockholm (pour le President du Conseil], Belgrade, Londres,
Saint-Petersbourg, Berlin, Rome.

Paris, le 24 juiUet igrA-

L'Ambassadeur de France a Vienne me fait savoir que lopinion a etc surprise par
la soudainete et Texageration des demandes aiitrichiennes, mais que le parti milir
taire parait craindre surtout que la Serbie ne cede.

Le Ministre de Serbie en Autriche pense que son Gouvernement se montrera tres
conciliant en ce qui concerne la punilion des complices'de faltentat er les garanties
cL donner en vue de la suppression de la propagande anli-autrichienne, mais qu'il
ne saurait accepter un ordre du jour a Tarmee dicte au Roi, ni Ic licenciement
d'officiers suspects a TAutriche , ni I'intervention de fpnclionnaires etrangers en
Serbie. M. Jovanovilch estime que s'il etait possible d'engager une discussion » le
conflit pourrait encore s'^arranger, avec le concours des Puissances..

Notre Ambassadeur a Berlin rend compte de femotion provoquee par la Note
autrichienne et de I'etat d'esprit du Charge d'affaires de Russie, qui pense quune
grande partie de I'opinion en AUenaagne souhaiterait la guerre. Le, ton de la presse
est menaqanl et parait avoir pour but dmtimider la Russie. Notre Ambassadeur doit
voir ce soir M. de Jagovv.

M Barrere informe que I'ltalie agit a, Vienne dans un sens .moderatemvet cherche
a eviter des complications.

Bienvenu-Martin.

— 48

r 28

M, Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires ^trang^res p. i.

a Stockholm (pour le President du Conseil), et k Belgrade, Londres,
Saint-Petersbourg, Berlin, Vienne, Rome.

Paris, le 24 juiUet igid-

M. de Schoen est venu me communiquer, sans vouloir m'en laisser une copie,
mais en m'en donnant lecture a deux reprises, sur ma demande, une Note de son
Gouvernement.

Celte Note s'exprime presque texluellement de la maniere suivante :

« Les declarations des journaux austro-hongrois relatives aux circonstances dans
lesquelles I'attenlat sur la personne de rherilier du trone d'Autriche et de son epouse
a eu lieu, devoilent nettement le but que la propagande panserbe s'etait propose et
les moyens dont elle s'est servie pour Tatteindre. D'apres les faits connus, il ne peut
non plus y avoir aucun doute, que c'est a Belgrade qu'il faut chercher le centre
d'action des agitations qui tendaient a detacher de TAutriche-Hongrie les provinces
slaves du Sud pour les reunir au royaume de Serbie et que c'est 1^ tout au moins
que s'est developpee son activite, avec la connivence de membres du Gouvernement
el de Tarmee.

« Les menees serbes remonlent a un grand nombre d'ann^es. Le chauvinisme pan-
serbe s'est particulierement manifeste pendant la crise bosniaque. C'est k la modera-
tion du Gouvernement austro-hongrois, k son grand empire sur lui-meme, a I'inter-
vention energique des Puissances que i'on est redevable si les provocations aux-
quelles I'Autriche-Hongrie a ete, i cette epoque, en bultede la part de la Serbie,
n'ont pas suscite un conflit. La promesse faite alors par le Gouvernement serbe
d'adopter une attitude irreprochable n'a pas ete tenue. Sous les yeux, tout au moins
avec la tolerance tacite de la Serbie ofEcielle, la propagande panserbe a continue,
dans I'enlretemps, h croitre en etendue et intensite. C'est sur son comple qu'il faut
meltre ce dernier forfait, dont on doit rechercher la trame a Belgrade. II est indubi-
table qu'il ne serait conciliable ni avec la dignite ni avec I'esprit de conservation de la
Monarchic auslro-hongroise de rester plus longtemps inactive en presence de I'agita-
tion qui se poursuit de ce c6te-la de sa frontlere et qui conslitue une menace perpe-
tuelle pour la surety et I'integrite de ses territoires. En raison de cet etat de choses,
la conduile de meme que les revendications du Gouvernement austro-hongrois
dolvcnt elre considerees comme jusllfiees. Cependant I'atlitude que Topinion pu-
blique aussi bien que ie Gouvernement ont adoptee dans ces derniers temps en
Serbie, n'exclul pas la crainle que le Gouvernement serbe se refusera k acceder a ces
reclamations et meme qu'il se laissera cntrainer k une attitude provocatrlce k I'egard
de rAutriche-Hongrie. Si celle-cl ne veut pas renoncef definltivement k son rang de
Grande Puissance, 11 ne restera au Gouvernement austro-hongrois plus rlen d'autre
k falre qui poursulvre ses revendications aupres du Gouvernement serbd en exer^ant
une forte presslon et au besoin en prenant des mesures militaires dont le choix
des moyens doit lui elre laiss^. »

— 49 —

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a appele parliculierement mon attention sur les deux
dernlers paragraphes de sa Note, indiquant avec insistance, avant de les lire, que
c'etait la le point capital. J'en ai note litteralement le texte, que voici : « Le Gouver-
nement allemand estime que la question actuelle est une affaire k r^gler exclusi-
vement entre rAutriche-Hongrie et la Serbie et que les Puissances ont le plus
serieux inleret a la restreindre aux deux Parlies interessees.

«Le Gouvernement allemand desire ardemment que le conflit soit localise, toute
intervention dune autre Puissance devant, par le jeu naturel des alliances, pro-
voquer des consequences incalculables. »

J'ai fait remarquer a TAmbassadeur d'Allemagne qu autanl il paraitrait legitime
qu'on demandat la punition de tous les complices de I'attentat de Serajevo, autant,
au contraire, il semblait difficile d'exiger des mesures inacceptables pour la dignite
et la souverainete de la Serbie : le Gouvernement serbe, meme s'il voulait sy sou-
mettre, risquerait d'etre emporte par une revolution.

J'ai egalement fait observer k M. de Schoen que sa Note n'envisageait que deux
hypotheses : celle d'un refus pur et simple, ou celle dune attitude de provocation
de la Serbie. Une troisieme hypothese (qui laisserait la porte ouverte a un accom-
modement) devrait en tous cas etre envisagee : celle d'une acceptation de la Serbie,
qui consentirait a donner immediatement toutes les satisfactions pour la punition des
complices et toutes les garanties pour la repression de la propagande anti-autrichienne,
compatibles avec sa souverainete et sa dignite.

J'ai ajoute que si, dans cette limite, les satisfactions poursuivies par TAutriche
etaient admissibles, les modalites de leur application pourraient ^Ire examinees ; si la
Serbie donnait des preuves evidentes de bonne volonte, on ne pourrait comprendre
que I'Autriche refusat de se preter a la conversation.

Peut-etre ne fallait-il pas rendre trop difficile a de tierces Puissances, qui ne sau-
raient ni moralement ni sentimentalement se desinteresser'de la Serbie, une attitude
conforme au desir exprime par TAHemagne de localiser le conflit.

M. de Schoen a reconnu la valeur de ces considerations et a declare vaguement
que I'espoir reslait toujours possrble. Comme je lui demandais s'il fallait attribuer a
la Note autrichienne le caractere d'une simple mise en demeure, permettant une
discussion, ou d'un ultimatum, il a repondu qu'il n'avait pas de sentiment personnel.

Bienvenu-Mabtin,^

r 29.

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin,

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires ^trang^res p. i.

Berlin , le 2^ juillet 1 9 1 4.

La remise de la Note autrichienne a la Serbie a cause une profonde emotion.
L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche declare que son Gouvernement ne saurait rien relran-

DoccMENTS DiPLOMATiQCES. — Gucrre europeenne. 7

- 50 —
cher de ses exigences. A. la Wilhelmslrasse , ainsique dans lapresse, ontient le mcme
langage.

La pkipart des Charges, d afiKaires^ presents k Berlin sont venus me voir ce matin .
lis manifestent peu d'espoir dans une issne paeifique. Le Charge d'aflfeires de Russie a
remarque avec amertume^que I'Autriche avait remis sa Note au moment meme oii le
President de la Repuhlique- et le President du Conseil avaient quitte Petersbourg. II
incline a penser qu'une grande partie de I'opinion en Allemagne souhaite ia guerre et
voudrait saisir cette occasion dans la quelle TAutriche se montrera sansdoute plus unie
que par le passe et ou I'Empereur d' Allemagne, par uo sentiment de solidarite
monarchique et par horrem* de I'attentat , est moins porte k se montrer conciliant.

M. de Jagow doit me recevoir a la fin de rapresHOMdi.

Jules Cambon.

r 30.

|M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de la Republique fran^alse a Berlin,
a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i.

Berlin,, le 24 juillet 1914.

J'ai demandeau Secretaire d'Etal, dans rentrevue que j'ai eue avec lui, aujourd'hui,
sil etait exact, comme I'annon^aient les journaux, que TAutriche eut remis une Note
aux Puissances sur son differend avec la Serbie, s'il I'avait re9ue, et comment ii i'ap-
preciait.

M. de Jagow m'a repondu affirmativement, ajoutant que la note etait ^nergique , et
qu'il I'approuvait, le Gouvemement Serbe ayant depuis'longtemps lasse la patience
autrichienne. U considere d'ailleurs cette question comme d'ordre interieur pour
I'Autriche et il espere qji'elle sera locahsee.

J'ai continue ea lui disant que n'ayant regu encore aucune instruction, je ne vou-
lais echanger avec lui que des vues toutes personnelles. Je lui ai demande alors si
vraiment le Cabinet de Berlin avait totalement ignore les exigences aulrichiennes
avant qu elles fussent communiquees k Belgrade et, comme il me I'affirmait, je lui ai
manifesle ma surprise de le voir ainsi s'engager a soulenir des pretentions dont il
ignorait la limite et la portee.

• C'estbien, m'a dit M. de Jagow eh m'lnterrompant , parce que nous causons
entre nous personnellement que je vous laisse me dire cela. »

« Certainemeiit, ai-je dit; mai^ si Pierre P"" s'humilie, la Serbie sera probablement
livree k des troubles interieurs, cela ouvrira la porte k de nouvelles eventualites , el
savez-vous ou vous serez conduit par Vienne ? » J'ai ajoute que leiangage desjournaux
allemands n'etait pas le langage de gens indifferents et etrangers a I'affaire, mais
annon9ait un appui actif. Enfm, j'ai remarque que la brievete du delai imparti k
la Serbie pourse soumettre, impressionnerart facheusement I'Europe.

— 51 —

M. de Jagow me repondit qu'il s'attendait bien k « un peu d' emotion » de la part
des amis de la Serbie, mais qu'ii comptait qu'ils lui donneraient de bons conseils.

« Je ne doule pas, lui dis-je alors, que la Russie fasse effort aupres <iu Cabinet de
Belgrade pour I'amener aux concessions acceptables ; mais ce qu'on demande a Tun
pourquoi ne pas le demandera I'autre; et si Ton compte que des conseils seront donnes
k Belgrade, n'est-il pas legitime de compter que, d'un autre cote, des conseils seront
aussi donnes a Vienne? »

Le Secretaire d'Etat se laissa aller a dire que cela dependait des circonstances,inais
se reprenant aiassitot, il repeta que Taffaire devait etre localisee. lime demanda si
vraiment je trouvaisia situation grave. "Assurement, lui repondis-je, car,'si cequise
passe a ete reflechi, je ne comprendspas qu'on ait coupe ies ponts derriere soi. »

Tout indique que I'AUemagne se dispose a appuyer dune faQon singulierement
energique I'altitude de FAutriche. La faiblesse, manifestee depuis quelques annees
parl'alliee austro-hongroise , affaiblissait la confiance que Ton avait ici en elle. On la
trouvaitlourde k trainer. Les mauvais proces, comme Taffaire d'Agram et Taffaire
Friedjung, rendaient sa police odieuse en la couvrant de ridicule. On ne lui deman-
dait que d'etre forte, mais Ton est satisfait qu elle soit brutale.

Un article paru dans le Lokal Anzeiger de ce soir indique aussi dans la Chancel-
lerie allemande un etat d'esprit dont, a Paris, nous sommesnaturellementportesane
pas tenir assez de compte, je veux parler du sentiment de la solidarite monarchique.
Je suis convaincu que ce point de vue doit etre grandement considere pour apprecter
lattitude de I'Empereiir Guillaume, dont la nature impressionnable a du etre sensible
4 Tassassinat d'un Prince qui I'avait regu quelques jours auparavant.

H ji'en est pas moins frappant de voir le soin avec lequel M. de Jagow, et tous
les fonctionnaires places sous ses ordres , affectent de dire k tout le monde qu'ils igno*
niient la portee de la Note autrichienne remise k la Serbie.

Mes Camion,

N' 31.

I M. Paleologue, Amtassadeur de France aSaint-Pdtersbourg,

a M. Bienvenu-Martin-, Ministre des Affaires ^trangeres p. i.

Pitersbourg, le a4 juiii&t 1914.

L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrle a donu^ .communicatioa k M. Sazoftoff d'une
note comminaloire k la Serbie.

Les dispositions de I'Empereur de Russie et de ses Ministres son|; des jplus pacji-

— 52 --
fiques, ainsi que le President de lia Republique et fe President du Conseil ont pti
s'en assurer directement; mais 1 ultimatum que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois
vient de remettre au Cabinet de Belgrade apporte dans la situation un element nou-
veau et inquietant.

L'opinion publique russe ne tolererait pas que rAutriche fit violence k la Serbie.
La brievete du delai assigne pour rultimatum rend plus difficile encore Taction mo-
deratrice que ies Puissances de la Triple Entente pourraient exercer k Vienne.

D'autre part, M. Sazonoff presmme que i'AUemagne voudra soutenir son alliee, et
je crains que cette impression ne soil exacte. La solidarite de la Triple Entente, en
s'affirmant, peut seule empechei Ies Puissances germaniques d'accentuer leur atti-
tude provocante.

Paleologue.

r 32.

M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France aLondres,

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrang^res p. i.

liondi'es, le 2 4 juiHet 1914.

Sir Ed. Grey m'ayant entretenu de son ddsir de ne rien negliger pour conjurer la
crise , nous avons et6 d'accord pour penser que le Cabinet anglais pourrait demander
au Gouvernement allemand de prendre rinitiative d'une demarche k Vienne pour
offrir une m^didtlon^entre I'Autriche et la Serbie, des quatre Puissances non direc-
tement interess6es. Si I'AUemagne sy prete, on gagnera du temps et c'est Tessentiel.

Sir Ed. Grey m*a dil qu'ii entretiendrait le Prince Lichnowsky du projet que je
viens d'exposer. Jen jai fait part a mon Collegue de Russie, qui apprehende une
surprise de FAllemagne et suppose que TAutriche n'aurait pas envoye son ultimatum
sans accord ptealable avec Berlin.

Le Ctjmte Benckendorff m'a dit que le Prince Lichnowsky, k son retour de conge »
il y a un mois environ , lul ayait t^moigne des vues pessimistes au sujet des rapporls
entre Petersbourg et Berlin. II avait note I'inquietude causee dans ceile derniere
capitale par Ies bruits d'entente navale entre la Russie et TAngleterre. par la visitc
du Tzar k Bucarest et par le renforcement de I'armee russe. Le Comte Benckendorff
en avail conclu qu'on envisagerait volontiers en AUemagne une guerre avec U
Russia .

Le Sous-Secretaire d'Etat a ele frappe , comme nous tons de Vair soucleux du
Prince Lichnowsky depuis son retom* de Berlin et il pense que si TAllemagne I'avail
voulu, elle aurait pu empecher.la remise de lultimatum.

— 53 —

La situation est done des plus graves, et nous ne voyons aucun moyen d'enrayer
la marche des evenements.

Cependant }e Comte Benckendorff crolt bon de tenter la demarche sur laquelle
je me suis mis d'accord avec Sir Ed. Grey,

Paul Cambon.

r 33.

M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres,

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires 6trang^res p. i.

Londres, le 24 juillet 191 A.

Le Ministre serbe a re^u cette nuit de M. Pachitch un telegramme disant que le
Gouvernement austro-hongrois lui avait adresse son ultimatum dont le delai expire
demain, soit samedi a 6 heures. M. Pachitch ne donne pas les termes de la commu-
nication autrichienne , mais, si elle est telle que le Times de ce jour le rapporte, il
semble impossible que le Gouvernement serbe puisse I'accepter.

Nous nous sommes demande avec mon Collegue russe, qui considere comme
extremement difficile pour son Gouvernement de ne pas soutenir la Serbie, quelle
intervention pourrait arreter le conflit.

Sir Ed. Grey m*ayant convoque pour cet apres-midi , je me propose de lui suggerer
de reclamer I'intervention officieuse du Gouvernement allemand a Vienne pour
empecher une attaque subite.

Paul Cambon.

N° 34.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires ^trangeres p. i.>

a Stockholm (pour le President du Conseil), Belgrade, Saiht-Peters-
bourg, Berlin, Vienne, Home.

Paris, le 2d juillet 19 id-

L' Ambassadeur d'Autriche ayant commuqiqu^ la Note de son Gouvernement k
Sir Ed. Grey, celui-ci a fait observer que jamais declaration aussi formidable n'avait
ete adressee par un Gouvernement a un autre; il a attire I'attention du Comte
Mensdorff siff les responsabilit6s assumees par I'Autriche.

— 54 —

Envisageant une possibilite de coufllt entre I'Autriche et k Russie, Sir Ed. Grey
se propose de reclamer le concours du Gouvernement allemand en vue d'une
mediation des quatre Puissances non interessees directement dans rafiaire Serbe :
Angleterre, France, Italie et Aliemagne; cette mediation s'exercerait a la fois i
Vienne et a Petersbourg.

J'ai donne au Ministre de Serbie des conseils de prudence et suis dispose k
m'associer a toute action conciliante a Vienne, dans I'espoir que I'Autriche ne main-
tiendra pas I'integralite de ses exigences vis-^-vis d'un petit Etat, si celui-ci se montre
dispose k donner toutes les satisfactions jugees compatibles avec son independance
et sa souverainete.

Bienvenu-Martin.

N" 35.

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin,

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i,

Berlfnje 2 5 juiHet 1914.

Le Ministre de Belgique se montre tres preoccupe des evenements.

II considere que lAutriche et lAUemagne ont voulu profiter du concours de cir-
constances qui fait qu'en ce moment la Russie et TAngleterre leur paraissent mena-
cees de troubles interieurs, et qu'en France le regime militaire est discute; aussi ne
croit-il pas a i'ignorance que le "Gonvemement de Berlin affecte au sujet de la
demarche de I'Autriche.

D pense que si la forme n'en a pas ete soumise aii cabinet de Berlin, le moment
en a ete habilement choisi avec lui pour §urprendre la Triple Entente dans un
monfient de desorganisation.

n a vu lAmbassadeur d'ltalie qui vient d'interrompre son conge pour rentrer.
II paraitrait que fllalie ^erait surprise, pour ne pas dire plus, d'avoir ete tenue ^
I'ecart de toute I'aflaire par ses deux alliees.

Jules Cambon,

— 55 —

r 36.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i.,

a Stockholin (pour le President du Conseil), et a Londres, Berlin,
P^tersbourg, Vienne.

Paris, le 25 juiliet 1914.

L'Ambassadeur d'Ailemagne est venu protester k midi contre un article de
L'Echo de Paris, qui qualifiait de « menace allemande » sa demarche d'hier. M. de
Schoen a dit k un certain nombre de journalistes, et est venu affirmer k la Direction
politique , qu il n'y a pas eu « concert » entre TAutriche et TAilemagne pour la Note
autrichienne et que le Gouvernement allemand ignorait celle-ci, bien qu'ii i'eut
approuvee ulterieurement , quand elle lui a ele communiquee, en meme temps
qu'aux autres Puissances.

Le Baron de Schoen a ajoute qu,'iL n'y ^vait pas davantage « menace » : le Gouver-
nement allemand s'etait contente d'indiquer qu'il estimait desirable de localiser le
conflit et que I'intervention d'autres Puissances risquerait de I'aggraver.

Le Directeur politique p. L a pris acte de la demarche du Baron de Schaen.
L'ayant prie de repeter bs termes memes des deux, derniers paragraphes de sa Note ,
il lui a fait remarquer que les termes indiquaient la volonte de TAUemagne de s'in-
terposer entre les Puissances et I'Autriche. M. Berthelot a ajoute qu'aucune confi-
dence n'ayant d'aiileurs ete faile k aucun journaliste, I'information de L'Echo de Paris
n'engageait que ce journal , et marquait seulement que la demarche allemande parais-
sait avoir ete connue autre part qu au Ouai d'Orsay, et en dehors de lui. L'Ambas-
sadeur d'Ailemagne n'a pas releve I'allusion.

D'autre part, TAmbassadeur d'Autriche k Londres est venu egalement rassurer
Sir Edward Grey, en lui disant que la Note autrichienne ne constituait pas un « ulti-
matum » , mais une « demande de reponse avec limitation de temps » ; ce qui signifiait
que, si les demandes autrichiennes ne sont pas acceptees ce soir k six heures, le
Ministre d'Autriche quittera Belgrade, et le Gouvernement auslro-hongrois commen-
cera les actes de « preparation » mihtaire, mais non les « operations » militaires.

Le Cabinet de Londres, comme ceux de Paris et de Petersbourg, a fait donner k
Belgrade le conseil d'exprimer des regrets pour les complicites qui pourraient etre
prouvees dans I'attentat de Serajevo et de promettre a cet egard les plus larges
satisfactions. II a ajoute que, pour le reste, c'est k la Serbie qu'il appartient de
repondre, dans les termes que I'interet du pays lui paraitra conseiller. Le Ministre
d'Angleterre a Belgrade doit consulter ses CoUegues franQais et russe et conseiller
au Gouvernement serbe, si ceux-ci en ont egalement I'instruction, de donner satisfac-
tion sur tous les points ou il jugcra pouvoir le faire.

Sir E. Grey a dit au Prince Lichnovvsky (qui ne lui a fait jusqu'ici aucunc commu-
nication analogue a celle de M. de Schoen k Paris) que, si la Note autricliienne n'ame-
nait aucune difliculte entre I'Autriche et la Piussie, le Gouvernement anglais n'aurail,

— 56 —

pas k s'ea occuper, mais qu'il elait a craindre que h raldeur de la Note et la brievete
du delai indique n'amenassent une tension. Dans ces conditions, la seule chance
qu'on aper^oive d'eviter un conflit consisterait dans une mediation de la France, de
I'Alleniagne , de I'ltalie et de I'Angleterre , TAllemagne seule pouvant exercer dans ce
sens une action sur le Gouvernement de Vienne.

L'Anabassadeur d'AUemagne a repondu qu'il transmettrait cette suggestion k Berlin ,
mais a laisse entendre k I'Ambassadeur de Russie, qui est son parent, que TAllemagne
ne se preterait a aucune demarche a Vienne.

Bienvenu-Martin,

N° 37.

M. DE Fleuriau, Charge d'AfFaires de France a Londres,

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i.

Londres, le aS juillet 1914.

L'Ambassadeur d'AUemagne est venu au Foreign Office affirmer que son Gouver-
nement refuserait de s'immiscer dans le conflit qui divise I'Autriche et la Serbie.

Sir E. Grey a repondu que, sans le concours de I'AUemagne a Vienne, I'Angleterre
ne saurait agir a Petersbourg. Si cependant I'Autriche et la Russie mobilisaient toutes
deux, ce serait bien I'occasion d'une intervention des quatre autres Puissances. Le
Gouvernement allemand mainliendrait-il alors son attitude passive et refuserait-il de
se joindre a I'Angleterre , k la France et a I'ltalie ?

Le Prince Lichnowsky ne le pense pas, puisqu'il ne s'agirait plus de difficultes
€ntre Vienne et Belgrade, mais dun conflit entre Vienne et Petersbourg.

Sir E. Grey a ajoute cette observation que, si la guerre venait k eclater, aucune
Puissance en Europe ne pourrait s'en desinteresser.

DE Fleuriau.

N^ 38.

M. PAl]§OJ.OGtJE, Ambassadeur de France a Saint-P^tersbourg,
a WL Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i,

Petersbourg, le 25 juillet j^iii.

Le Gouvernement Russe va s^effbrcer d'obtenir du Gouvernement austro-hongrois
une prolongation du ddlai assigne par I'ultimatum, afm que les Puissances puissent

— 57 —
se former une opinion sur \e dossier judicialre dont ia communication leuf est
offerte.

M. Sazonoff a prie I'Ambassadeur d'AlIemagne de signaler k son Gouvcmement
le danger de la situation; il s'est abstenu toutefois de faire allusion aux mesures que
la Russie serait sans doute amenee a prendre, si la Serbie etait menacee dans* son
independance nationale ou dans I'integrite de son territoire; les reponses evasives
et les recriminations du Comte de Pourtales ont laisse a M. SazonofF une impression
defavorable.

Un Conseil des ministres sera tenu demaln sous la presidence de I'Empereur.
M. SazonofF garde toute sa moderation : « II faut eviter, m'a-t-il dit, tout ce qui pour-
rait precipiter la arise. J'eslime que, meme si le Gouvernement austro-hongrois passait
k Taction contre la Serbie, nous ne devrions pas rompreles negociations. »

Paleologue.

r 39.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des AfFaires ^trangeres p. i.* ,
a M. DuMAiNE, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne.

Paris, le 25 juiilet igi/i.

Le Gouvernement russe a donne comme instructions a son representant a Vienne
de demander au Gouvernement autrichien une prolongation du delai fixe k la Serbie,
pour permettre aux Puissances de se faire une opinion sur le dossier que I'Autriche
a offert de leur communiquer, et en vue d'eviter des consequences regrettables
pour tons.

Un refus oppos6 par rAutriche-Hongrie k cette demande oterait toute signification
a la demarche qu'elle a fait.e aupres des Puissances, en leur communiquant sa Note, et
la mettrait en contradiction avec la morale internationale.

Le Gouvernement russe a demande que vous fassiez d'urgence une d-marche
analogue aupres du Comte Berchtold; je vous prie d'appuyer la demande de votre
Coliegue. Le Gouvernement russe a adresse la meme demande k Londres, Rome,
Berlin et Bucarest.

Bienvenu-Martin.

DocoMENTS OIPLOMATIQOES. — Guerfc europeennc.

58 —

r 40.

M, DE Fleuriau, Charge d'affaires de France a Londres,

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeresp. i.

Londres, h 25 juilldt igid-

Sir Ed. Grey a re^u communication ce -matin des instructions quiprescrivenl a I'Am-
bassadeur de Russie a Vienne , de demander la prolongation du delai donne a la Serbie
par la Note autrichienne d'avant-hier. M. Sazonoff demandait que la demarche russe
fut appuyee par I'Ambassade d'Angleterre.

Sir Ed. Grey a telegraphic a Sir M. de Bunsen de s'exprimer dans le meme sens
que son collegue russ6 et de rappeler la communication autrichienne qui lui a ete faite
hier soir tard par le Comte Mensdorf,. communication aux termes de laquelle le
defaut d'adhesion de la Serbie aux conditions de Tultimatum n'entrainerait, des
aujourd'hui, quune rupture diplomatique et non des operations militaires imme-
diates.

Sir Ed. Grey en concluait que le temps serait laisse aux Puissances pour intervenir,
et chercher les moyens de denouer la crise.

DE Fleuriau.

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin,

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires ^trangeres p. i.

Berlin, le 2 5 juillet' 19 14.

Ce matin, *le Charge d'affaires d'Angleterre a demande a M. de Jagovv, d'apres leS
ordres de son Gouvernement, siTAllemagne voudrait se joindre a I'Angleterre, a la
France et a Titalie , pour intervenir aupres de "PAutriche et de la Russie afm d'empe-
cher un conflit et, en premier lieu, pour demander 'k Vienne une prolongation du
delai imparti a "la Serbie par Tultlmatum.

Le Secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires etrangeres a repondu qu il Tivait dejik, des la
reception de Ha depeche du Prince Lichnowsky lui faisant part des intentions de
Sir E. Grey, telegraphic ce matin meme a I'Ambassadeur de la Grande-Bretagne a
Vienne pour quil demandat cette prolongation au Comte Berchtold. Malheureusement
le Comte Berchtold est a Ischl. Au resle, M. de Jagow ne croit pas que cette demande
soit accueillie.

Le Charge d'affaires d'Angleterre s'est egalement.enquis aupres de M. de Jagow,

-^ 59 —

c amine je l^avais fait hier, si rAllemagne n'ayait eUi aucune cojanaissance de la Note-
auitrichienne .avant quelle fut lanceev et a re^u. une repouse- si; riettement negative'
qu'il ne pourrait insister; mais- il n*a pu s'empechei: de s'^tonnej: du blanc-seing,
doime par rAllemagne a rAutriche-.

M. de Jagow lui ayant repondu que la question etait pour rAutriche une qjijestioo
interieure, iia remarque qu'elle etait devenue au premier chef iotemationaie..

Jules Carbon.

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin,
a M. le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i.

Berlin, le 25 juillet 191A.

Le Charge d'affaires de Russie a reQu pour instruction de demander au Gouver-
nement allemand d'insister aupres du Cabinet de Vienne , en vue de faire prolonger
le delai de Tultimatum.

M. de Jagow ne lui ayant donne rendez-vous qu'a la fin de Fapres-midi, c'iest-k-
dire au moment oii ['ultimatum viendra a echeance, M. Broniewski a envoye d'urgence
une note ecrite au Secretaire d'Etat, dans laquelle il marque que le retai:d de la
communication faite par I'Autriche aux Puissances rend I'elfet de cette communi-
cation iUusoire, puisqu'elle ne leur laisse pas le temps de prendre, conn aissance des
faits allegues, avant Texpiration du delai fixe. II insiste tres vivement sur la necessity
de le prolonger, si Ton n'a pas en vue de creer une grande crise.

Jules CAMBort.

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin,

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des AifFaires etrangeres p. i.

Berlin, le 25 juillet 1914.

Le Charge d'affaires de Russie a fait aupres du Secretaire d'Etat la demarche qui
lui etait prescrite, en vue d'une prolongation du delai de I'ultimatum; M. de Jagow
lui a repondu qu'il avait deja transmis une indication de ce genre i Vienne, mais
qu'il eslimait que toutes ces d-marches etaienttrop tardives.

M. Broniewski a insiste, en disant que si le delai ne pouvait etre prolonge, les

— 60 —
mesures d'execution pouvaient au moins etre retardees, de maniere a permettre aux
Puissances de s'employer k eviter un conflit. H a ajoute que la Note autrichienne etait
con9ue dans des termes calcules pour blesser la Serbie et la forcer a la guerre.

M. de Jagow lui a repondu qu'il ne s'agissait pas d'une guerre, mais d'une
« execution » dans une affaire locale.

Le Charge d'affaires a repris, en exprimant le regret que le Gouvernement allemand
ne mesurat pas ses responsabilites dans le cas ou des hostilites se produiraient , qui
pourraient s etendre au reste de I'Europe : a quoi , M. de Jagow a repondu qu'il se
refusait k croire a de pareilles consequences.

Le Charge d'aff'aires de Russie a recueilli comme moi le bruit que TAutriche , tout
en declarant ne vouloir aucune annexion de territoire, occuperait des parlies de la
Serbie jusqu'a cequ'elle ait complete satisfaction. « On sait, m'a-t-il dit, ce quesignifie
ce mot satisfaction. » Les impressions de M. Broniewski sur les arrieres-pensees de
I'Allemagne sent tres pessimistes.

Jules Cambon.

M Barrere, Ambassadeur de France a Rome,

a M. BiENVENU-MARTiN,Ministre des Affaires etrang^res p. i.

Rome, le 25 juillet 1914.

L' Ambassadeur de Russie a fait k la Consulta la demarche prescrite par M. Sazonoff
aux representants de la Russie k Paris, Berlin, Rome, Bucarest, et qui tendait a
obtenir de ces differents Cabinets qu'ils associent leur action a celle de la Russie k
Vienne en vue d'obtenir une prolongation du d^lai imparti a la Serbie.

En I'absence du Marquis de San Giullano, M. Salandra et M. de Martino ont
repondu qu'ils semettraient en rapport avec le MInlstre des Affaires ^trangeres, mais
que sa reponse ne pourrait leur parvenir que vers six heures, c'est-a-dire trop tard
pour entreprendre une demarche a Vienne.

Barrere.

M. DuMAiNE, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne,

a M* Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires ^trangeres p. i.

Vienne, le 25 juiilet 1914.

Le Charge d'affaires de Russie a re^u de son Gouvernement I'ordre de demander
un delai pour rultimatum a la Serbie, au moment m^me ou le Comie Berchtold

— 61 —
partailpour Ischl avec I'intenlion, au dire des journaux, d'y rester pres de TEmpereur
jusqu'i la fin de la crise.

Le Prince Koudachefl I'a neanmoins informe de la, demarche qu'il avail a remplir
par deux' telegrammes en clair, Tun en cours de route, I'autre a destination. II nen
attend aucun effet.

Le Baron Macchio, Secretaire general du Ministere des Affaires etrangeres, a qui
le Prince a communique le sens de ses mslructions et de sa demarche telegraphique »
a temoigne une froideur glaciale quand son interlocuteur lui a represents que donner
a juger des griefs avec pieces justificatives, sans laisser le temps d'etudier le dossier,
est contraire a la courtoisie internationale ; le Baron Mftcchio a repHque que parfois
I'interet dispense d'etre courlois.

Le Gouvernement autrichien est resolu a infliger k la Serbie une humiliation : il
n'acceptera Tintervention d'aucune puissance , jusqu'a ce que le coup ait ete porte et
re9u en pleine face par la Serbie.

DUMAINE.

r 46.

M. BoppE, Ministre de France a Belgrade,

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i.

Belgrade, 25 juillet 1914.

M. Paohilch vient de me donner connaissance de la reponse qui sera remise ce
soir au Ministre d'Autriche.

Le Gouvernement serbe accepte de publier demain au Journal ojjiciel la declaration
qui lui est demandee; il la communiquera egalement a Tarmee, par un ordre du
jour ; il dissoudra les societes de defense nationale et toutes autres associations suscep-
tibles d'agir contre I'Autriche-Hongrie; il s'engage a modifier la loi sur la presse, a
renvoyer du service de Tarmee, de I'instruction publique et des autres administrations,
tons fonctionnaires dont la participation dans la propagande sera prouvee ; il demande
seulement que le nom de ces fonctionnaires lui soit communique.

Quant a la participation dans I'enquete de fonctionnaires autrichiens, il derhande
qu'on lui explique comment elle s'exercerait; il ne pourrait accepter que celle qui
correspondrait au droit international ou aux relations de bon voisinage.

II accepte toutes les autres exigences de Tultimatum et declare que si le Gouver-
nement austro-hongrois ne s'en contente pas, il est pret k s'enremettre k la decision
du tribunal de La Haye,.ou k celle des grandes Puissances qui ont pris part a lelabo-
ration de la declaration du 3 1 mars i 909.

BOPPE.

— 62 —

r 47.

M. Jules Cambon, AmBassadeur de Fpance k Berlin,

a M. BiENVENt^-MARTiN ^ Ministre des Affaires etrang^res p. i^

Pendant tout rapres-midi le bruit a couni avec persistance que la. Serbie se sou-
mettait aux exigences autrichiemies; ce soir les journaux publient des supplements
annon^ant la rupture a Belgrade et le depart du Ministre d'Autricbe-Hongrie.

Ce bruit vient d'etre confirme au correspondant de TAgence Hayas a la Wilhelm.^
stcasse, Des groupes considerables de plusieurs centaines de personnes stalionnent ict
devant les bureaux des journaux, et une nombreuse manifestation de jeunes gens
vient de passer sur Pariser-platz en poussant des cris de « hurrah ! » pour rAllemagne»
€t en chantant des chants palriotiques ; elle se rend a la Golonne de la Victoire, k
VAmbassade d'Autricbe» puis ^ celle ditalie. C'est une explosion significative de
chauvinisme.

Une personnalite allemande, que j'ai xne ce soir, m'a avoue qu'on avait craint ici
que la Serbie n'acceptat en bloc la note autrichienne , en se reservant d'en discuter
I'application , pour gagner du temps et permettre aux efforts des Puissances de se
produire utilement avant la rupture.

Dans les milieux, financiers » on prend deja des mesures pour parer a toute even-
tualite, car on n'y aper^oit pas le moyen d'enrayer la crise, en presence de I'appui
determine que donne TAUemagne a I'Autriche.

Je ne vois, pour moi, que I'Angleterre qui puisse, en Europe, etre ecoutee k
Berlin.

Quoi qu'il arrive, Paris, Petersbourg et Londres ne parviendront a mainlenir diguQ^'
menC la paix quea se montrant fermement et absolument unis.

Jules CamboS).

M. DuMAiNE, Ambassadeur de France a ViennCt

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrang^res p. i.

Vienne, le 25juillet 19 id-

On me remel votre t^legramme precisement a I'heure ou expire le delai imparli ^
la Serbie. D^autre part, je viens de vous fairesavoir dansquelles conditions le Charge
d'affaires de Russie a du executer sa demarche. II semble inutile de I'appuyer quand^
il n'en est plus temps.

Dans I'apres-midi, le bruit s'etait repandu que la Serbie avait cede k Tultimatum
tout en ajoutant qu'elle en appelait aux Puissances. Mais on assure, au dernier

^ 53 —
Jnoment, que le Ministre d'Autriche vient de quitter precipitamment Belgrade ; il
auraitjuge insuffisante fadhesion du Gouvernement serbe aux conditions posees par
son GouvernemenL

DUMAINE.

r 49.

Repovse da Goavernament serhe a la Note austrd^komjroise.
(Communique par M; Ydsnitch, Ministre de Serbie, le Z7 juillet.)

Belgrade, de 2 5 juillet 191 4.

Le Gouvernement royal serbe a re9u la communication du Gouvernement imperial
et royal du 10/23 de ce mois et il est persuade que sa reponse eloignera tout nialen-
iQudu qui menace de comprometlre les bons rapports de voisinage enlre la Monarchie
austro-hongroise et le Hoyaume de Serbie.

Le Gouvernement royal a conscience que les protestations qui ont apparu tant a
la tribune de la Skoupchtina nationale que dans les declarations et les actes des
representants responsables de I'Etat, protestations auxquelles coupa court la declaration
du Gouvernement serbe faite le i8/3i mars 1909, ne se sont plus renouvelees vis-
a-vis de la grande Monarcbie voisine en aiicune occasion, et que depuis ce temps,
'autant de la part des Gouvernements royaux qui se sont succede que de la part de
leurs organes, aucune tentative n'a ete faite dans le but de cbanger Tetat de choses
politique et juridique cree en Bosnie-Herzegovine.

Le Gouvernement royal constate que sous ce rapport le Gouvernement imperial
et royal n'a fait aucune representatio"n , sauf en ce qui concerne un livre scolaire,
representation au sujet de laquelle le Gouvernemeat imperial et Toyal a vequ une
explication entierement satisfaisante.

La Serbie a, a de nombreuses reprises, donne despreuves de sa politique pacifique
et moderee pendant la duree de la crise balkanique, et c'est grace a la Serbie et aux
sacrifices qu'elle a faits dans Tinteret exclusif de la paix europeenne» que cette paix
a ete preservee.

Le Gouvernement royal ne ,peut pas etre .rendu responsable des manifestations
d'un caractere priye telles que les articles des journaux et les agissemerits des socieles»
manifestations qui se produisent dans presquc tous les pays comme une chose ordi-
naire et qui echappent en regie generale au controle officiel, d'autant moins que le
Gouvernement royal, lors de la solution de toute une s^rie de questions qui se sont
preseritees entre la Serbie et TAutriche-Hongrie, a montre une grande prevenance et
a reussi, de cette fa^on, a en regler le plus grand nombre au profit du progi'es des
deux pays voisrns.

Cest pourquoi'le Gouvernement royal a ete penfblement surpris par les affirma-
tions d'apres lesquelles dcB personnes du royaume de Serbie aurarent pariicip6 h la
preparation de Tattentat commis it Sarajevo. II s'attendait i etre invito a collaborer a
la reoherche de tout ce qui.6e rapporte a ce crime etal etait pret, paur^rouver par

— Ci-
ties actes son enliere correction , a agir contre loules les personnes a I'egard desquelles
des communications lui seraient faites.

Se rendant done au desir du Gouvernement imperial et royal, le Gouvernemenl
royal est dispose k remettre aux Iribunaux tout sujet serbe, sans egard a sa situation
ei k son rang, pour la complicite duquel, dans le crime de Sarajevo, des preuves lui
seraient fournies.

II s'engage specialement a faire publier a la premiere page du Journal ojjiciel en
date du 13/26 juiilet Tenonciation suivante :

« Le Gouvernement royal de Serbie condamne toute propagande qui serait dirigee
contre TAutnche-Hongrie, c'est-a-dire I'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en der-
nier lieu a detacher de la Monarchic austro-hongroise des terriloires qui en font partie ,
et il deplore sincerement les consequemces funestes de ces agissements criminels.

« Le Gouvernement royal regrette que certains officiers et fonctionnaires serbes
aient partlcipe, d'apres la communication du Gouvernement imperial et royal, a la
propagande susmentionnee et (Tompromis par \k les relations de bon voisinage aux-
quelles le Gouvernement royal s'etait solennellement engage par la declaration du
18/3 1 mars 1 909.

Le Gouvernement, qui desapprouve et repudie toute idee ou tentative d'une
immixtion dans les destinees des habitants de quelque partie de I'Autriche-Hongrie
que cesoit, considere qu'il est de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers, les
fonctionnaires et toute la population du royaume que dorenavant il procedera avec
la derniere rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils*
agissements, qu'il mettra tons ses efforts a prevenir et k reprimer. »

Cette enonciation sqra porlee a la connaissance de I'armee royale par un ordre du
jour, au nom de Sa Majeste le roi par S. A. R. le prince heritier Alexandre, et serai
publiee dans le prochain Bulletin officiel de i'armeo

Le Gouvernement royal s'engage en outre :

.1* A introduire dans la premiere convocation reguliere de la Skoupchtina une
disposition dans la loi de la presse par laquelle sera punie de la maniere la plus
severe la provocation a la haine et au mepris de la Monarchie austro-hongroise,
ainsi que contre toute publication dont la tendance generale serait dirigee contre
I'integrite territoriale de rAutriche-Hongrie.

II se charge, lors de la revision de la Constitution, qui est prochaine, de faire
introduire dans Tarticle 22 de la Constitution un amendement de telle sorte que les
publications ci-dessus puissent etre confisquees, ce qui, actuellement, aux termes
categoriques de I'article 2 2 de la Constitution , est impossible.

2° Le gouvernement ne possede aucuhe preuve et la Note du gouvernement
imperial et royal ne lui en fournit non plus aucune que la ^ociete Norodna Obrana et
les autres societes similaires aient commis jusqu'a ce jour quelque acte criminel de
ce genre par le fait d'un de leurs membres. Neanmoins le gouvernement royal
acceptera la demande du gouvernement imperial et royal et dissoudra la Societ6
Norodna Obrana et toute autre societe qui agirait contre I'Autriche-Hongrie.

3<* Le gouvernement royal serbe s'engage a eliminer sans delai de Tinstruction

— 65 —
publique en Serbie tout ce qui sert ou pourralt servir a fomenter la propagande centre
I'Autriche-Hongrie , quand le gouvernement imperial et royal lui fournira des fails et
des preuves de cette propagande.

/i" Le gouvernement royal accepte du moins d'eloigner du service militaire ceux
dont Tenquete judiciaire aura prouve qu'ils sont coupables d'actes diriges contre
I'integrite du territoire de la monarchie austro-hongroise ; il attend que le gouverne-
ment imperial et royal lui communique ulterieurement les noras et les faits de ces
officiers et fonctionnaires aux fms de la procedure qui doit s'ensuivre.

5° Le gouvernement royal doit avouer qu'il ne se rend pas clairement compte du
sens et de la portee de la demande du gouvernement imperial et royal tendant k ce
que la Serbie s'engage a accepter sur;son territoire la collaboration des organes du
gouvernement imperial et royal.

Mais il declare qu'il admettra toute collaboration qui repondrait aux principes du
droit international et a la procedure criminelle, ainsi qu'aux bons rapports de voisi-
nage.

6** Le gouvernement royal, cela va de soi, considere de son devoir d'ouvrir une
enquete contre tous ceux qui sont ou qui, 6ventuellement , auraient ete meles au
complot du i5/2 8juinetquise trouveraient sur le territoire du royaume. Quant a la
participation a cette enquete des agents des autorites austro-bongroises qui seraient
delegues a cet effet par le gouvernement imperial et royal, le gouvernement royal
ne peut pas I'accepter, car jce serait une violation de la Constitution et de la loi sur la
procedure criminelie. Cependant, dans des cas concrets, des communications sur les
resultats de I'instruction en question pourraient etre donnees aux organes austro-
hongrois.

7° Le gouvernement royal a fai^ proceder des le soir meme de la remise de la
note a Tarrestation du commandant Voija^Tankositch. Quant a Milan Ciganovitch,
qui est sujet de la Monarcbie austro-hongroise et qui jusqu^au 1 6/28 juin etait employe
(comme aspirant) a la direction des chemins de fer, il n'a pas pu encore etre joint.
Le gouvernement imperial et royal est prie de vouloir bien, dans la forme accou-
tumee, faire connaitre le plus tot possible les presomptions de culpabilite, ainsi que
les preuves eventuelles.de culpabilite qui ont ete recueillies jusqu'^ ce jour par
I'enquete a Sarajevo, aux fins d'enquetes ulterieures.

8° Le gouvernement serbe renforcera et etendrales mesures prises pour empecher
le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs a travers la frontiere. II va de soi qu'il ordon-
nera tout de suite une enquete el punira severement les fonctionnaires des fron-
tieres sur la ligne Schabac-Loznica, qui ont manque k leur devoir et laisse passer les
auteurs du crime de Sarajevo.

9° Le gouvernement royal donnera volontiers des explications sur les propos que
ces fonctionnaires, tant en Serbie qua Tetranger, ont tenus apres I'attenlat dans des
interviews et qui, d'apres I'affirmation du gouvernement imperial et royal, ont ete
bostiles a la Monarchie, des que le gouvernement imperial et royal lui aura commu-
nique les passages en question de ces propos, et des qu'il aura demontre que les
propos employes ont en effet ete tenus par lesdits fonctionnaires, propos au sujet
Documents diplomatiques. — Guerre europeeane.

desquels le gouvemement royal lui-meme aura soin de recueiHir des preuves et con-
victions.

10° Le gouvemement royal informe le gouvemement imperial et royal de I'exe-
culion des inesures comprises dans les points precedents en tant que cela n'a pas ete
deja fait par la presente note. Aussitot que chaque mesure aura ete ordonnee et
executee, dans le cas ou le gouvemement imperial et royal ne serait pas satisfaitde
cettereponse, le gouvemement royal serbe, considerant qu'il est de I'interet com-
mun de ne pas precipiter la solution de cette question, est pret, comme toujours,
accepter une entente pacifique , en remettant cette question soit a la decision du
Tribunal international de La Haye, soit aux grandes Puissances qui orit pris part
a I'elaboration de la declaration que, le gouvemement serbe a faite le i8/3i mars
1909-

67 --

CHAPITRE IV
DE LA RUPTURE DES RELATIONS DIPLOMATIQUES

(25 JUILLET 19U),

A LA DECLARATION DE GUERRE DE L'AUTRICHE A LA SERRIE

(28 JUILLET 1914)

— 69 —

r 50.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires ^trangeres p. L^

a bord de la France (pour le President du Conseil), et a MM. les Am*
bassadeurs de France a Londres , Petersbourg , Berlin , Vienne , Rome.

Paris, le 26 juillet igi^-

On pent resumer ainsi les evenements de samedi : refus de rAutriche d acceder a
la prolongation de delai demandee par la Russie, — depart du Ministre d'Autrichede
Belgrade apres remise dune reponse a la Serbie, estimee insuffisante, bien quelle
eut atteint la limite des concessions jugees possibles, — ordre de mobilisation donne
en Serbie, dont le Gouvernement sest retire a Kragoujewatz, pu il est suivi par
les Ministres de France et de Russie.

Le Gouvernement italien, a qui la note autrlchienne a ete communiquee ven-.
dredi, sans demande d'appui ni meme d'avis, n'apas, en I'absence du Marquis de
San Giuliano qui ne rentre que mardi, pu repondre k la suggestion du Gouverne-
ment russe qui proposait d'insister a Vienne pour une prolongation de delai. II resulte
d'une confidence de i'Ambassadeur d'ltalie k M. Paleologue qu'a Vienne on continue
k se bercer de I'illusion que la Russie « ne tiendra pas le coup ». II ne faut pas oublier
que ritalie nest tenue par les engagements de la Triple Alliance que si elle a ete prea-
iablement consultee.

De Petersbourg, nous apprenons que M. Sazonoff a conseille k la Serbie de
demander la mediation anglaise. Dans le Conseil des Ministres du 26, tenu en pre-
sence de TEmpereur, la mobilisation des treize corps d'armee eventuellement destines
k operer centre I'Autriche a ete envisagee; cette mobilisation ne serait toutefois
rendue effective que si TAutriche contraignait la Serbie par la force des armes, et
seulement apres avis du Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, a qui le soin incombe de
fixer la date, liberie lui etant laissee de continuer les negociations meme dans le cas
ou Belgrade serait occupee. L'opinion russe manifeste I'impossibilite politique et
morale pour la Russie de laisser ecraser la Serbie.

A Londres, la demarche allemande a ete faite le aS, dans les memes lermes que
par le Baron de Schoen a Paris. Sir E. Grey a repondu au Prince Lichnowski que,
si la guerre venait a eclater, aucune puissance en Europe ne pourrait s'en desinte-
resser. II n'a pas precise. davantage et a tenu un langage tres reserve au Ministre
de Serbie. La communication faite le 2 5 au soir par I'Ambassadeur d'Autriche rend
Sir E. Grey plus optimiste; puisque la rupture diplomatique ne doit pas entrainer
des operations militaires immediates, le Secretaire d'Etat veut encore esperer que
les Puissances auront le temps d'intervenir.

A Berlin, le langage tenu par le Secretaire d'Elat au Charge d'Affaires de Russie
est pen satisfaisant el dilatoire ; comme celui-ci lui demandait de s'associer a une de-
marche a Vienne pour une prolongation de delai, il a repondu qu'il avail deja agi dans
ce sens, maisque c'elait trop lard; k la demande d'oblenir un delai pour prolonger

— 70 —
les mesures d*executIon , il a replique qu'il s*agissait dune question Interieure et
non pas dune guerre mais dune execution locale. M. de Jagow feint de ne pas
croire que Taction autrichienne puisse entrainer des consequences generales.

n se produit une veritable explosion de chauvinisme a Berlin. L'Empereur d*Alle-
magne revient directement k Kiel. M. Jules Canabon estime que, aux premieres
mesures militciires de la Russie , I'Allemagne repondrait immediate ment et n'attendrait
vraisembfablement pas un pretexte pour nous attaquer.

A Vienne, TAmbassadeur de France n'a pas eu le temps de se joindre a la de-
marche de son collegue russe pour obtenir une prolongation du delai fixe a la
Serbie; il ne le regrette pas, celte demarche ayant ete repoussee categoriquement, ..
et I'Angleterre n'ayant pas non plus eule temps de donner des instructions a cet egard I
a son agent.

Une note de TAmbassade d'Angleterre m'a ete remise: elle rend compte de la
conference de TAmbassadeur britannique a Petersbourg avec M. Sazonoff et
M. Paleologue. Sir Edward Grey estime que les quatre Puissances non interessees
devraient insister aupres de la Russie et de I'Autriche pour que leurs armees ne fran-
chissent pas la frontiere et donnent le temps H I'Angleterre, a la France , a I'Allemagne
et a ritalie d'exercer leur mediation. Si I'Allemagne accepte, le Gouvernement anglais
a des raisons de penser que I'ltalie serait heureuse de s*associer egalement a Taction
jointe de I'Angleterre et de la France: I'adhesion de I'Allemagne est essentielle, car
pas plus TAutriche que la Russie ne lolererait d'autre intervention que d*amis impar-
tiaux ou d'allies.

Bienvenu-Marthl

r 51.

M. Babrere, Ambassadeur de France a Rome,

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre de3 Affaires ^trang^res p. i.

Rome, le 26 juiilet 1914.

Uh telegramme de Vienne re^n k i'inslant k la Consulta lui fait connaitre que la
\ rupture diplomatique est effective entre TAutriche et la Serbie. et que I'Autriche
procede i des mesures militaires.

Le Marquis- di San Giuliano, qui est a Fiu^i, ne reviendra k Rome qo'apres-
demain.

J'ai eu aujourd'hui avec le President du Conseil un interessanl entretien sur la
situation, dont il reconnait toutela gravite. De I'ensemble de ses propos, j'ai emporte
le sentiment que le Gouvernement italien vdudrait, en cas de conflit, se tenir en
dehors et rester dans une attitude d'observation.

M. Salandra m'a dit, a ce propos : « Nous ferons les plus grands efforts pour em-

— 71 -*
pecher la paix d'etre rompue : notfe situation est un peu analogue h telle de TAngle*
terre. Peut-elre pourrions-nous Iair6 quelque chose dans un sens pacifique avec les
Anglais ». M. Salandratm'a confirme que la note autrichieUne avail ete c6mmumque6
a Rome a la derniere heure.

r 52.

M. Barrjere, Ajnbassadeur de France a Rome,

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires ^trang^res p. L

Rome, le 26 juillet 191 A*

M. Sa7onoff a dit hier & l*Ambassadeur dltalie a Petersbourg que la Russie se
servirait de tous les moyens diplomatiqaes pour eviter le conflit et qu elle ne renon-
^ait pas k I'espoir qu.une mediation pourrait amener I'Auiriche a une attitude moins
intransigeanle ; mais qu'on ne pouvait cependant lui demander de laisser ecraser la
Serbie.

Je remarque que ia majeure partie de ropinion publique italienu'e est liostile k
TAutriche daris cetie grave affaire.

Barrere.

r 53.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i.,
a M. DE Fleuriau, Charge d'affaires a Londres.

Paris, le 26 juillet iQizi.

M. Paleologue m'adresse ie telegramme survant : « M. Sazonofif oonseille au Gou*
vernement serbe de solliciter la mediation du Gouvernement brilannique. »

D'accord avec M. Paul Cambon, je pense que le Gouvernement franqais ne pent
qu exprimer I'espoir de voir le Gouvernement anglais accepter^ si une offre de oelle
nature lui etait faite.

Veuillez vous exprimer dans ce sens aupres du Foreign Office.

BlENYENU-M.UmX.

— 72 —

N'' 54,

M. Paleologue, Ambassadeur de France a Saint-Petersbourg»
a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i.

Saint-Petersbourg, le 26 juillet 1914.

Le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres continue avec une louable persevfe'ance k
rechercher les moyens de faire prevaloir une solution pacifique. « Jusqu au dernier
instant, m'a-t-il declare, je me montrerai pret k negocier. »

C'est dans cet esprit qu il vient de mander le Comte Szapary pour le convier k une
« franche et loyale explication*. Article par article, M. Sazonoff a commerite devant
lui rultimatum austro-hongrois, en faisant ressortir le caractere injurieux des princi-
pales clauses. « L'intention qui a inspire ce document, a-t-il dit, est legitime si vous
n'avez poursuivi d'autre but que de proteger votre territoire contre les menees des
anarchistes serbes; mais le procede auquel vous avez eu r^cours n'est pas defen-
dable. » II a conclu : « Reprenez votre ultimatum, modifiez-en la forme, et je vous
garantis le resuUat ».

L' Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie s'est montre touche de ce langage; toutefois,
en attendant des instructions, il reserve I'opinion de son Gouvernement. Sans se de-
courager, M. Sazonoff a decide de proposer, des ce soir, au Comte Berchtold Tou-
verture d'une conversation directe entre Vienne et Petersbourg sur les changements
k introduire dans Tullimatum.

Celte entremise amicale et olficieuse de la Russie entre 1 Autrlche et la Serbic a
I'avantage d'etre expeditive. Je la crois done preferable a loute autre procedure » et
de nature k aboutir.

Paleologue.

r 55.

M. DuMAiNE, Ambassadeur de France si Vienne,

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i.

Vienne, le 26 juillet igii^.

M. Scbebeko est revenu pr^cipitamment d'un voyage en Russie; il ne Tavait
entrepris qu'apres I'assurance donnee par le Comte Berchtold que les reclamations
contre la Serbie seraient des plus acceplables.

L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie a Petersbourg avait parle dans le meme sens a
M. Sazonoff la veille de la remise de la note. Ce procede, tres habitue! dans la diplo-
matic de la Monarchic, el qui a servi egalement au Baron Macchio envers moi, parail
avoir beaucoup ajoute k I'irritation du Gouvernement russe.

— 73 —

M. Schebeko va s'efforcer, cependant, de profiler du delai indispensable a la nio-
bilisation pour introduire.une proposition d'arrangement, qui aura au moins I'avan-
tage de permettre de mesurer ia valeur des declarations pacifiques de TAllemagne.

Pendant que nous en deliberions ce soir, en compagnie de Sir M. de Bunsen-,
celui-ci a regu des instructions du Foreign 0£Gce concernant la demarche a tenter
par les representants des quatre Puissances moins directement interessees. Je m at-
tends done a ce que nous ayons a nous concerter demain avec le due d'Avarna et
M. de Tschirsky, lequel se retranchera presque surement derriere le principe de la
localisation du conflit pour refuser son concours.

Mon impression est, d'ailleurs, que le Gouvernement auslro-hongrois , quoique
surpris et pent etre au regret de I'energie qu'on lui a inspiree, se croira oblige a un
commencement d action riiilitaire.

DuifAINE.

r 56.

,M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i.

a bord de la France (pour le President du Conseil) et a MM. les Ambas-
sadeurs de France a Londres, Saint-P^tersbourg, Berlin, Vienne,
Rome.

Paris, ie 26 juillet igid-

Le resume de la reponse serbe a la note autrichienne ne nous est parvenu qu'avec
vjngt heures de retard. Bien que le Gouvernement serbe eut cede sur tous les points,
saufdcuxpetites reserves, le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongne a rompules relations, prou-
vant ainsi la volonte arretee de son gouvernement de proceder a I'execution de la Serbie.

D'apres un telegramme de M. Jules Cambon, VAmbassadeur d'Anglet'erre ale sen-
timent dun peu de flechissement; comme il faisait observer k M. de Jagow que
Sir Ed. Grey ne lui demandait pas d'intervenir entre I'Autriche et la Serbie, mais,
cette question cessant d'etre localisee, d'intervenir avec TAngleterre, la France et
ritalie k Vienne elPelersbourg, le SecretJ\ire d'Etat a declare qii'il ferait son possible
pour maintenir la paix.

Au cours d'un entretien de M. Bairere avec le Secretaire general du Ministere des
.Affaires etrangeres italien, celui-ci a indique que le Gouvernement italien naurait
vi-aisemblablement pas approuve la note autricihienne ; mais comme elle ne lui a pas
ete prealablement communiqu^e. Use trouve, de cefait, liber^ de toute responsabi-
iite dans la grave initiative prise par TAutriche.

L'Ambassadeur d'AUemagne est venu cet apres-midi me faire uae communication,
tendant a line intervention de la France aupres de la Russie dans un sens pacifique.
L'Autriche, mVt-iJ dit, a fait declarer a la Russie qu'elle ne poursuivait ni agrandis-
sement territorial, ni atteinte a Vintegrite du Royaume de Serbie; sa seule intention
estd'assurer sa propre tranqiiillite et de fair6 la police. C'est des decisions de la Russie
qu'il depend quune guerre soit evitee; i'Allemagne se sent solidaire de la France dans
i'ardent desir que la paix puisse etre .maintenue, tji a le femoe espoir que la France
ttsera de son influence dans un sens apaisant k Petersbourg.

OoGritSinrs diplomatiqcbs. — Cuerre curopeenne. »o

— 74 ^

J'ai repondu k cette suggestion que la Russie ^tait mod^r^e*, (ju'elle n'avait accom"
jpli aucun acte qui put faire douter de sa moderation et que nous etions d'accord avec
elie pour rechercher la solution pacifique de ce conflit. II nous paraiss ait doncqu a tltre
de contre-partie, TAllemagne devait agir k Vienne, ou refficacite de son action ^tait
icertaine en vue d'eviter des operations. miiitaires tendant-a I'occupation de la ^erbie.

L'Ambassadeur m'ayant fait remarquer que cela etait iiiconciliable avec la position
prise par TAllemagne « que la question ne regardait que TAutriche et la Serbie » , je
iui ai dit que la mediation a Vienne et k Petersbourg pourrait etre le. fait des quatre
autres Puissances moins interessees dans la question.

M. de Schoen se retrancha alors derrlere le manque d'instructions a cet egard, et
je lui.dis que, dans ces conditions, je ne me sentais pas en mesure d'exercer une ac-
tion seulement a Petersbourg.

La conversation se termina sur I'assurance , renouvelee par I'Ambassadeur , des in-
tentions pacifiques de I'Allemagne, qu'il declarait solidaire, sur (ie* point, de la
France.

Btenvenu-Martin.

N° 57.
Note pour le Ministre.

Dimanche soir, 26 juillet 1916.

Apres la visite qu'il avait faite au Ministre a 5 heures de Tapres-midi, le Baron
de Schoen s'est rendu , ce soir a 7 Heures , k la Direction politique , pour demander
qu'en vue d'eviter des commentaires tendancieux des journaux, comme celui de
VEcho de Paris la veille , et afm de bien preciser le sens des demarches du Gouvernement
allemand, un bref communique ful donne k h presse sur I'entrevue de I'Ambas-
sadeur d'Alliemagne et du Ministre des Affaires etrangeres.

M. de Schoen suggera, pour preciser sa pensee , les termes suivants, dont le Direc-
teur politique p. i. prit note sous sa dictee : « L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne et le Ministre
des Affaires 6trangeres ont eu, pendant fapres-midi, un nouvel entretien, au cours
duquel ils ont examine, dans I'esprit le plus amical et dans un sentiment de solidarite
pacifique, les moyens qui pourraient etre employes pour maintenir la paix gene-
rale. »

Le Directeur politique p. i. repondit aussitot.: « Alors, tout est regie dans
votre esprit, et vous nous apportez I'assurance que I'Autriche accepte la note serbe,
ou se pretera aux conversations avec les Puissances ^cet egard? » L'Ambassadeur ayant
paru surpris et fait une vive denegation, il Iui fut expose que si rien n'etait modifie
dans I'attitude negative de fAllemagne , les termes de la « Note a la presse » suggeree
^taient excessifs et de nature a donner a I'opinion frauQaise une fausse securite, en
creant des illusions sur la situation reelle, dont les dangers n'etaient que trop
^vidents.

Aux assurances que prodiguait I'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne sur I'impression opti-

— 75 —
misle qu'il eprouvait, le Directeur politique p. i. repondit en lui demandant s'il lui pei-
mettait de lui parler a titre tout personnel et prive, d'homme a homme, en toute
iiberte, et sans tenir compte de ieurs fonctions respectives. Le B^on de Schoen le
pria de le faire.

M- Berthelot dit alors qae pour tout esprit simple, I'attitude de TAUemagne ne
pouvait s'expliquer, si elle ne tendait pas a la guerre : une analyse purement objective
des faits et la psychologie des rapports austro-allemands conduisaient logiquement a cette
conclusion. Devant Taffirmation repetee que TAUemagne ignorait le contenu de la note
autrichienne, il netait plus permis d'elever de doutes sur ce point; etait-il vraisem-
blable, cependant, que I'Allemagne se fut rangee, les yeux fermes, a cote de I'Au-
triche, dans une pareille aventure? La psychologie de toutes les relations passees de
Vienne etde Berlin permeltait-elle d'admettre querAutricheeutpris une position sans
recul possible, avant d'avoir pese, avec son alliee , t(^tes les consecpienccs de son
intransigeance? Combien le refus de TAUemagne de donner un conseil de mediation
a Vienne paraissait surprenant, maintenant qu'elle connaissait le texte extraordinaire
de k note autrichienne! Quelle responsabilite le Gouvernement allemand prendrait,
€t quelifes suspicions peseraient sur lui, s'il persistait a s'interposer entre I'Autriche et
les Puissances,- apres la soumission pour ainsi dire absolue de la Serbie, et quand le
moindre conseil donne par lui k Vienne mettrait fin au.cauchemar qui pesait sur
I'Europe !

La rupture des relauons diplomatiques par I'Autriche, ses menaces de guerre et la
mobihsation quelle powsuit, donnent One particuliere urgence'a Taction pacifica-
trice de I'Allemagne , car du jour ou les troupes autrichiennes auraient franchi la
frontiere serbe,, op se tronverait en presence dun fait qui obligerait sans doute le
Cabinet de Petersbourg a intervenir et risquerait de dechainer une guerre que I'Al-
lemagne declare vouloir eviter.

M. de Schoen, qui ecoutait en^ouriant, affirma de nouveau que I'Allemagne avait
ignore le texte de la note autrichienne ( i ) et ne I'avait appro uvee qu'apressa remise ; elle.
estimait toujours que la Serbie avail besoin d'une le^on assez severe pour qu'elle ne
put I'oublier, et que I'Autriche se devait k elle-meme de mettre fin a une situation
dangereuse et intolerable pom; une grande puissance. II declara, d'ailleurs, ne pas
connaitre le texte de la reponse serbe, et se montra personnellement surpris qu'elle
n'eut pas satisfait I'Autriche, si tpiitefois elle etait telle que les journaux, souvent mal
informes, la representaient.

II insista encore sur les intentions pacifiques de I'Allemagne et donna son impres-
sion sur TelTet que pourraient avoir de bons conseils adresses, par exemple a Vienne,
par r Angle terre, sur un ton amical. Selon lui, I'Autriche n'etait pas intransigeante;
ce qu'elle repousse, c'est I'idee d'une mediation formelle, le « spectre » d'une confe-
rence : un mot pacifique venu de Petersbourg , de bonnes paroles dites d'un ton con-

(i) Voir pifece n* 21. Lettre du Ministre de France a Munich relatant que le President du Conseil bavarois
a dil, le 23 juillet, avoir coni;iaissance du texte de la note autrichienne a la Serbie.

V. aussi Livre Bleu, la pi^ce n° g5 oil Sir M. de Bunsen, ambassadeur d'Angleterre k Vienne, declare :
« Quoique je ne puisse p£is le verifier, je tiens d'une source privee que TAmbassadeur allemand connaissait
le texte de I'uhimatum aulrichien a la Serbie avant qu'il ne fut expedie et qu'il I'a telegraphic a TEmpe-
reur d'Allemagne ; je sais par TAmbassadeur allemand lui-mSme qu'il en approuve chaque ligne. »

~ 76 -

ciliant par les Puissances de la Triple Entente, auraient chance d'etre bien accueillles.
H ajouta enfm quil ne disait pas que TAUeniagne, de son cote, ne donnerait pas
quelques conseils a Vienne.

Dans ces conditions, leDirecteur pplitique declara quil demanderait au Ministre
s'il lui paraissait opportua de conaoiuaiquer a la presse une courte note de ton
modere.

N^ 58.

M. Chevalley, Ministre de France a Christiania,

a M. Bien^venu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i.

Christiania , le 26 juillct 1914.

Toute la flotte allemandc en Norvege a re^u I'ordre de prendre la mer. Les auto-
rites allemandesa Bergen declarent que c'est pourrallier directement TAlleniagne.

Les navires allemands disperses dans les fiords au nord de Bergen rejoindraient
ceux qui sont aux Environs de Stavanger.

Chevalley.

N^ 59.

M. d'Annoville, Charge d'affaires de France a Luxembourg,

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i.

Luxembourg, \e 26 juillet 191/i.

D'apres des renseignements que je viens de recevoir de Thionville, les qualre der-
nieres classes liberees ont ordre de se tenir a la disposition de la Komniandatur a
toule heure.

Sans elre completement mobilises, les reservistes ont interdiction de s'absenter du
lieu de leur domicile.

d'Annoville.

— 77 -^

N° 60.

M. Faroes, Consul general de France a Bale»

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministredes Affaires etrangeres p^L

Bale, le 27 juillet igiil*

Les ofEciers allernands en vacances dans cette region ont recu, il y a quatre jours,
1 ordre de les inlerrompre pour regagner TAllemagne.

D'autre part, j'apprends de deux sources serieuses qu*avis a ete donne aux pro-
priclaires de yoitures automobiles du Grand-Duche de Bade dese preparer a les
mettre a la disposition des autorites railitaires, deux jours apres un nouvel ordre. Le
secret, sous peine d'amende, a ete recommande sur cet avi^.

La population baloise est tres inquiete et les facilites bancaires se resserxent.

Farges*

r 61.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i.*

a M. Jules Cambon, Arabassadeur de France a Berlin, communique
a bord de la France (pour le President du Conseil) et a MM. les
Ambassadeurs de France a Londres, Saint-Petersbourg, Vienne,
Rome.

Paris, ie 27 juiilet 1914.

Les trois demarches de I'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a Paris semblent caracteris-
liques : — le vendredi, il lit une note ou le Gouvernement allemand se pose categorique-
ment enlre TAulriche et les Puissances, approuvant I'ultimatum autrichien a la Serbie
et ajoutant que « I'Allemagne desire ardemment que le conflit r^ste localise, toute
isilervention d'une autre Puissance devant, par le jeu de ses alliances, provoquer
d'iricalculables consequences »; — le second jour, le samedi, Teffet ayant ete produitet
les Puissances ayant, en raison de la surprise, dela brievete du delai et des risques
de guerre generale, conseille kla. Serbie de ceder, M. de Schoen revient attenuer sa
demarche, feignant de s'etonner de I'impression produite et proteste quon prete h
I'Allemagne des intentions quelle n'apas, puisque, dit-il, il n'y a eu ni concert avaat,
ni menace apres ; — le troisieme jour, le dimanche, le resultat ayant ete obtenu, puisque
la Serbie a cede en fait pour ainsi dire a toutes les exigences de TAulriche, TAmbas-
sadeur d'Allemagne repai^ait k deux reprises, pour insisler sur les intentions pacifiques

— 78 —
de FAllemagne et sur son desir ardent de collaborer au mainllen de la paix, apres
avoir enregistre le succes autrichien, qui clot ja premiere phase de la crise.

La situation a i'heure actuelle reste inquietante, en raison du refus incomprehen-
sible de i'Autriche d accepter la soumission serbe, de ses operations de mobilisation
et de'ses menaces d'envahir la Serbie. L attitude prise depuis le debut, avec I'appui
allemand, par le Gouvemement autrichien, son refus d'accepteraucune conversation
des P uissances ne permettant pas, en pratique, a celles-ci d'intervenir utilement aupres
deluisans Tintermediait-e de I'Allemagne. Cependant le temps presse, car si I'armee
autrichienne franchit la frontiere, ilsera Ires difficile d'enrayer la crise, laRussie ne
paraissant p-as pouvoir tolerer I'occupalion de la Serbie, apre^ que celle-ci s'e'st en
realite soumise k la Note autrichienne en lui donnant toutes satisfactions et garanties.
L'Allemagne, du fait meme de la position prise par elle, est qualifiee pour intervenir
utilement et etre ecoutee a Vienne; si elle ne le fait pas, elle justifie tous les soupgons
et assume la responsabilite de la guerre.

Les Puissances, et en particulier la Russie, la France et I'Angleterre ont determine
par leurs pressants conseils Belgrade a ceder;-elles ont done rempli leur role; main-
tenant c'est a I'Allemagne, seule en situation d'etre entendue rapidement a Vienne,
k donner des conseils k I'Autriche qui a obtenu satisfaction et ne peut, pour un detail
facile. i regler, dechainer la guerre generale.

C'est dans ces CO nditions que se presente la proposition faite par le cabinet de Lon-
dres; M. Sazonoff ayant dit k I'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre qu'a la suite de I'appel dela
Serbie aux Puissances, la Russie accepteraitde se tenir ^I'ecart, SirE. Grey a formule
aupres des Cabinets de Paris, Berlin et Rome, la suggestion suiyante : les Ambassa-
deurs de France, d'Allemagne et d'ltalie a Londres seraient charges de chercher avec
Sir E. Grey un moyeti de resoudre les difEcultes actuelles , etant entendu que pendant
cette conversation, la Russie, TAutriche et la Serbie s'abstiendraient de toute opera-
tion militaire active. Sir A. Nicolson a parle de cette suggestion a TAmbassadeur d'Alle-
magne, qui s'y est monlre favorable; elle sera egalement bien accueillie a Paris et
aussi a Rome, selon toute vraisemblance. Ici encore, la parole est k I'Allemagne,
qui a I'occasion de temoigner autrement qu'en paroles sa bonne volonte.

Je vous prie de vous concerter avec votre coUegue anglais et d'appuyer aupres du
Gouvernemenl allemand sa demarche dans la forme qui vous paraitra opportune.

Bienvenu-Martin.

K 62;

M. Bienvewu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires ^trangeres p. i.,

a bord de la France (pour le President du Conseil) et a MM. les
x\mbassadeurs de France a Londres, Saint-Petersbourg, Berlin,
Vienne.

Paris, le 27 juiilet 1914.

Apres sa demarche d'hier tendant k une intervention apaisante de la France k
Petersbourg, I'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne etait revenu, ainsi que je vous en ai in-
forme , a la Direction politique , sous le pretexte qu'il pourrait y avoir interet a com-

— 79 —
muniquer k la presse une courte note indiquant le sens pacifiquc et arnica! de la
conversation; il avait meme suggere les termes suivants : « L'Ambassadeur et le Mi-
nistre des Affaires etrangeres ont eu, pendant I'apres-midi , un nouvel entretien au
cours duquel on a examine , dans I'esprit le plus amical et dans un sentiment de
solidarite pacifique , les moyens qui pourraient etre employes pour maintenir la paix
generale. » II fut repondu de suite que les termes paraissaient excessifs et de nature
k donner a I'opinion des illusions sur la situation reelle, que cependarit une breve
note dans le sens indiqu6, c'est-a-dire*.rendant compte dune conversation oii avaient
ete examines les moyens employes pour sauvegarder la paix, pourrait etre donnee
si je I'approuvais.

La note communiquee a ete la suivante : « L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne et le Mi-
nistre des Affaires etrangeres ont eu un nouvel entretien, au cours duquel ils ont
recherche les moyens d'action des Puissances pour le maintien de la paix. » Cette
redaction, volontairement terne, evitait une solidarite avec TAllemagne qui pourrait
etre mal interpretee.

Ce matin , M. de Schoen a adresse une lettre particuliere dn Directeur politique , sous
le pretexte de resurher son entretien avec le Ministre , et a ajoute : « Notez bien la
phrase sur la solidarite des sentiments pacifiques. Ce n'est pas une phrase banale ,
mais la sincere expression ^e la realite. >- Le resume jomt k la lettre etait ainsi con^u :
a Le Cabinet de Vienne a fait formellement et oJ0B.ciellement declarer a celui de
Petersbourg qu'il ne poursuit aucune acquisition territoriale en Serbie et qu'il ne veut
point porter atteinte k I'integrite du royaume ; sa seule intention est celle d'assurer sa
tranquillite. En ce moment, la decision, si une guerre europeenne doit eclater,
depend uniquement de la Russie. Le Gouvernement AUeo^and a la ferme confiance
que le Gouvernement Fran(5ais, avec lequel il se skit solidaire dans I'ardent desir que
la paix europeenne puisse etre maintenue,.usera de toute son influence dans un esprit
apaisant aupres du Cabinet de Petersbourg. »

Je vous ai fait connaitre ia reponse qui avait et^ faite (une demarche frangaise a
Petersbourg s'expliquait mal et devait avoir pour coroUaire une d-marche allemande
k Vienne, ou, a defaut, une mediation, dans les deux capitales, des quatre Puissances
moins interessees).

La lettre de M. de Schoen est susceptible de diverses interpretations : la plus vrai-
semblable est qu'elle t^nd, comme sa demarche meme» a chercher k compronaettre la
France au regard de la Russie, quitte, en cas d'echec, a rejeter sur la Russie et sur
la France la responsabilite dune guerre eventuelle , enfin a masquer, par des assu-
rances pacifiques non ecoutees, une action militaire de rAutriche'en Serbie, destinee
k completer le succes aulrichien.

Je vous^ communique ces renseignements k titre d'information el a toutes fins
utiles.

BlENVENU-MABTm.

80 —

r 63.

M. DE Fleuriau, Charge d'Affaires de France a Londres,

a M. Bienvenu-Martin. Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. L

Londres, ie 27 juillet 191/i.

L'Ambassadeur d'AUemagne ct I'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie laissent en-'
lendre qu'ils sont surs qne I'Angleterre garderait la neulralite si un confllt venait 6.
eclaler. Sir Arthur Nicolson m'a dit que, cependant, le Prince Lichnowski ne pou-
vait, apre ia conversation qu il a eue avec lui aujourd'hui, conserver aucun doute sur
la liberte qu'enlendait garder le Gouvernement britannique d'inlervenir, au cas ou il
le jugerait utile.

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne n'aura pas manque d'etre frappe de cette declaration ,
mais pour peser sur I'Allemagne et pour eviter un conflit, il semble'indlspensahlQ
que celle-ci soil amenee a tenir pour certain quelle Irouveralt I'Anglelerre et la
Russie aux cotes de la France.

DE Fleuriau.

N" 64.

M. Paleologue, Ambassadeur de France a Saint-P^tersbourg,

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i.

Saint-Pelersbourg, 2 7 j uillet 1 9 1 A-

M. Sazonoff a tenu a tous mes collegues un ^ang.^ge conciliant.
Malgre I'emotion publique , le Gouvernement Russe s applique et reussit k conlenir
ia presse; on a notamment recommande une grande moderation envers TAUemagne.
Depuis bier, M. Sazonoff n'a re9u de Vienne ni de Berlin aucune information.

Paleolggue.

N** 65.

M. BoMPARD, Ambassadeur de France a Constantinople, '

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres p. i.

Therapia, Ic 2 7 juillet 191 4.

Le conflit au^lro-serl)e retient I'altention du Gouvernement Olloman et les Turcs.
se rejouissent des epreuves de la Serbie, mais on est porte a croirc ici en general ((ue

— si-
ce conflit restera localise. L'on eslime generalement que, celle fois encore, la Riissie
n'interviendra pas en faveur de WSerbie dans des conditions qui 6tendraienl le conflil
arme.

Le sentiment unanime, dans les milieux politiques ottomans, est que TAutriche,
avec Tappui de I'AHemagne, arrivera k sesfms et quelle fera entrer la Serbie, apres
la Bulgarie, dans Torbile de la Triple Alliance.

BOMPARD.

r 66.

M. DE Fleuriau, Charge d'affaires a Londres,

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires ^Irangeres p. i.

Londres, le 27 juillet 191 4.

Sir Ed. Grey a dil ce matin k I'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que si TAutriche
envahissait la Serbie apres la reponse serbe, elle demontrerait qu'elle ne poursuivail
pas seulement le re^ement des questions mentionnees dans sa note du 2 3 juillet,
mais qu'elle voulait ecraser un petit Etal. «Alors, a-t-il ajoute, se poserait une
question europeenne, et il s'ensuivrait une guerre, a laquelle d'autres Puissances
seraient amen^es a prendre part ».

L'attitude de la Grande-Bretagne s'affirme par I'arret de la demobilisation de sa
flotte. Le Premier Lord de I'Amiraute avait pris discretement cette mesure des
vendredi, de sa propre initiative; cette nuit, sir Edward Grey et ses collegues ont
decide de la publier. Ce resultat est du a I'altitude concilfante de la Serbie et de la
Russie.

- DE Fleuruu.

r 67.

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin ,

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires ^trang^res p. i.

Berlin, ic 27 juillet 1914.

J'ai entretenu aujourd'hui le Secretaire d'Etat de la demarche de I'Angleterre ten-
dant k ce que I'Allemagne se joigne aux Cabinets de Londres, Paris et Rome pour
empecher les hostilites entre Petersbourg et Vienne.

Documents diplomatiques. — Guerre europeenne. n

— 82 —

Je lui ai fait remarquer que la proposition de sir Edward Grey ouvrait la voie a
une issue pacifique. M. de Jagow m'a repondu qu'il etait dispose k y entrer, mais
il m'a fait Temarquer que si la Russie mobilisait, rAUemagrte serait obligee de
mobiliser aussitot, que nous y serions forces egalement et qu'alors le con flit serait
presque inevitable. Je lui ai demande si i'Allemagne se croirait engagee a mobiliser
dans le cas oii la Russie ne mobiliserait que sur la frontiere autricliienne ; ii m'a dit
que non et m'a autorise formellement k vous faire connaitre Cette restriction. Aussi
attacherait-il la plus grande importance k ce que les puissances amies e& all lees de la
Russie intervinssent aupres d'elle.

Enfm il a remarque que si la Russie attaqualt rAutficlie, TAllemagne' devralt
attaquer aussitot de son cote. L'interventlon proposee par VAngleterre a Petersbo ucg
et a Vienne nepourrait done s'exercer a sesyeux que si les evenements' ne . se preci-
pitaient pas. II ne desespere pas dans ce cas qu elle puisse reussir. J'ai exprime le
regret que rAutriche, par son inlransigeance, eul conduit I'Europe au pas difficile
que nous traversons, mais j'ai temolgne I'espoir que 1 intervention aboutirait.

Jules Cambox.

N" 63.

M. DE Fleuriau, Charge d'affaires a Londres,

4 M. Bienvenu-Martin , Ministre des AiBaires ^trangeres p, i..

Londres, le 27 juillet 1914-

Hier, au conrs d'une conversation entre M. Sazonoff, M. Paleologue et Sir G. Bu-
chanan, le Ministre russe aurait dit que la Serbie etait dlsposee a en appeler aux
Puissances, et, qu*en ce cas, son Gouvernement accepteralt de se lenir k lecart.

Sir Ed. Grey a pris texte de ces paroles pour formuler aupres des Cabinets de
Paris, de Berlin et de Rome une proposition dont Sir Francis Bertie salslra Votrc
Excellence. Les quatre puissances interviendraient dans le conflit, et les Ambassadeurs
de France, d'Allemagne et d'ltalie k Londres seraient charges de chercher, avec
Sir Ed. Grey, un moyen de resoudre les diflicultes actuelles.

II serait entendu que, pendant les debats de cette petite conference, Ja Russie,
I'Autriche et la Serbie s'abstiendraient de to«te operation milltaire active. Sir A. Ni-
colson a parle de cette suggestion a TAmbassadeur d'Allemagne qui s'y est montre
favorable.

DE Fleuriau.

-. 83 -^

r 09.

M. DE Fleuriau, Charge d'affaires a Londres,

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires ^trang^res p. i.

Londres, le 27 juillet 1914.

Le Ministre de Serbie n'a pas re^u d'instructions de son Gouvernement en vue de
demander la mediation de I'Angieterre; il est d'ailleurs possible que les telegrammes
de son Gouvernement soient arretes en route.

La proposition anglaise d'intervenir a quatre, indiquee dans mon telegramme;
precedent, est d'ailleurs lancee, et me parait devoir etre soutenue en premier lieu.

DE Fleuma-U,

r 70.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i.

a M. DE Fleuriau, Charge d'affaires de France a Londres.

Paris, le 27 juillet 1914.

L'Ambassadeurd'Angleterre m'a communique la proposition de Sir Ed. Grey ten-
dant a une action commune de VAngleterre, de TAUemagne, de la France et de Tllalie
a Vienne, Belgrade et Petersbourg pour arreter les operations militaires actives, pea-
dant que les Ambassadeurs d'AUemagne, d'ltalie et de France a Londres examine-
raient, avec Sir E. Grey, les moyens de trouver une solution aux complications
presentes.

J'ai prescrit ce matin a M. Jules Cambon de se concerter avec I'Ambassadeur
d'Angleterre a Berlin, et d'appuyer sa demarche, dans la lorme ou il le jugerait
opportun.

Je vous autorise a prendre part a la reunion projetde par Sir E. Grey. Je suis pret
egalement a donner a nos agents a Vienne, Petersbourg et Belgrade des instructions
dans le sens demande par le Gouvernement anglais.

Toutefois, j'estime que les chanoes de succes de la proposition de Sir E. Grey
reposent essemiellement sur Taction qi>e Berlin serait dispose k exercer a Vienne;
une demarche de ce cote pour amener la suspension des operations militaires nae
paraitrait vouee a lechec, si Tinfluence de I'AUemagne ne setait pas exercee au
prealable.

J ai egalement note parmi les observations de M. de Scboen, que le Gouvernement

— u —

austro-liongrois etalt speclalement susceptible quand on prononQalt les termes de
« mediation » , « intervention » , « conference » , el plus capable d'admettre des « conseils
amicaux » et des t conversations ».

Bienvenu-Martin,

r 71.

M. DE Fleoriau, Charge d affaires de France, k Londres,

a M.Biewvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i.

Londres, ie 27 juillet 1914.

J'ai fait connailre k Sir E. Grey voire adhesion a sa proposition de mediation k
quatre et de confereribe a Londres. L*Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a Vienne a re9U les
instructions necessaires pour saisir le Gouvernement austro-hongrois des que ses
collegues fran9ais, allemand ou italien auront ete autorises a laire la meme de-
marche.

Le Gouvernement italien a accepte I'intervention k quatre en vue de prevenir les
operations militaires; il consulte le Gouvernement allemand sur la proposition de
conference et la procedure a suivre k legard du Gouvernement austro-hongrois. Le
Gouvernement allemand n a pas encore repondu.

DE Fleobiap.

N** 72.

M. BarkeRe, Ambassadeur de France a Rome.

a M. BienvEnd-Martin, Mmistre des Affaires ^trang^res p. i.

Rome, le 27 juillet 1914.

Le Marquis de San Giuliano, est rentre a Rome ce soir et je Tai vu aussitot apres
son arrivee. 11 m'a parle du contenu de la Note autrichienne et m'a assure formel-
lement qu'iln'en a eu aucune connaissance prealable.

II savait bien que celte Note devait avoir un caraclere rigoureux el energique ;
mais il ne s'etait pas doute qu*elle put prendre une telle forme. Je lui ai demande
s'il etait vrai qu'il eut fait exprimer k Vienne k ce propos , comme le pretendent
certains joumaux, une approbation de Taction autrichienne et Tasstirance que lltalie
re.mplirait a I'egard de rAulriche ses devoirs d'alliee. « En aucune fa9on, m'a
repondu ie Minislre c nous n avons pas ete consultes, on ne nous a rien dit; nous
n'avons done eu k faire aucune communication de cette nature k Vienne ».

— 85 -.

Le Marquis de San Giuliano eslime que la Serbie aurait agi plus sagement en
acceptanl la note dans son iniegralite; aujourd'hui encore il eslime que ce serait la
seule chose a faire, etant convaincu que I'Autriche ne retirera aucune de ses pre-
tentions, etlesmaintiendra, meme au risque d'amener une conflagration generale; il
doute que TAllemagne soil disposee a se preler a une action aupres de son alliee. II
constate toutefois que rAllemagne tient en ce moment un grand compte de ses
rapports avec Londres, et il croit que si une Puissance pent determiner Berlin a une
action pacifique, c'est TAngleterre.

Quant a ritalie, elle continuera h faire tous ses efforts en faveur de la paix. C'est
a cet effet qu il a adhere sans hesiter a la proposition de Sir Ed. Grey de r6unir a
Londres les Ambassadeurs des Puissances, qui ne sont pas directement interessees
dans le conflit auslro-serbe.

Barrebe.

r 73.

M. Jule. Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin,

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires ^trang^res p. i.

Berlin, le 27Juillet igid.

L' Ambassadeur d'Anglelerre , qui est renlr6 aujourd'hui, a vu le Secretaire d'Etat
et I'a entretenu de la suggestion de Sir Ed. Grey. M. de Jagow lui a repondu en
manifestant toujours son desir de la paix, mais en ajoulant qu'il ne pourrait consentir
a ce qui ressemblerait a une conference des Puissances; ce serait inslituer une espece
de cour d'arbilrage, dont I'idee ne serait acceptable que si elle etait demandee par
Vienna el Petersbourg. Le langage de M. de Jagow confirme celui de M. de Schoen
[a Voire Excellence.

A la verite une demarche des quatre Puissances a Vienne et Petersbourg pent se
produire par la voie diplomatique, sans prendre la forme d'une conference et est
susceptible de bien des modalites ; ce qui importerait c'est de manifester a Vienne et
a Petersbourg le desir commun des quatre Puissances qu'un conflit soil evite* La
lemporisation permettrait seule d'arriver k 'une issue pacifique des difficultes ,pre-
sentes.

Jules Cambon.

— 86 —

r iL

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a BerJin,

a M. Bienvend-Martiw, Ministre des Affaires ^trang^es p. i

Berlin, le 27 juillet igid*

Je me suis entretenu aujoiird'hui avec le Secretaire d'Elat et j'ai appuye aupres
de lui la demarche que venait de faire Sir E. Goschen.

M. de Jagow m'a repondu, comme il I'avait fait a TAmbassadem- d'Anglelerre ,
qu'il ne pouvait accepter la proposition de charger les Ambassadeurs d'ltalie, de
France et d'Ailemagne de chercher avec Sir Ed. Grey les moy^ns de resoudre les
difficultes actuelles, parce que ce serait instituer une veritable conference pour
traiter des affaires de I'Autriche et de la Russie.

J'ai r^plique k M. de Jagow que je regrettais sa reponse, mais que le grand objet
que Sir Edw. Grey avait en vue depassait une question de forme ; que ce qui impor-
tait c'eiait I'association de I'Angleterre et de la France avec I'AUemagne et I'ltalie
pour travailler a une oeuvre de paix; que cette association pouvait se manifester par
des demarches communes a Petersbourg et k Vienne ; qu'il m'avait souvent exprime
son regret de voir les de^ix groupes d'alHance opposes toujours inn a I'autre en
Europe; qu'il: avait \k I'occasion de prouver qu'il y avait un esprit europeen, en mon-
trant quatre Puissances appartenant aux deux groupes agissant d'un commun accord,
pour empecher un conflit.

M. de Jagow s'est derobe en disant que TAllemagne avait des engagements avec
I'Autriche. Je lui ai fait remarquer que les rapports de I'Allemagne avec Vienne
n'etaient pas plus etroits que ceux de la France avec la Russie et que c'etait lui-meme
qui mettait dans I'espece les deux groupes d'alliance en opposition.

Le Secretaire d'Etat m'a dit alors qu'il ne se refusait pas a agir pour ecarter le
conflit austro-russe , mais qu'il ne pouvait pas intervenir dans le conflit austro-serbe.
« L'un est la consequence de I'autre, ai-je dit^ et il importe d'empecher quii ne sur-
•« vienne un etat de fait nouveau, de nature a amener une intervention de la Kussie. »

Comme le Secretaire d'Etat persistait a dire qu'il etait oblige de tenir ses engage-
ments ad'egard de I'Autriche, je lui ai demandi§ s'il s'etait engage k la suivre partout,
lesyeux bandes, et s'il avait pris connaissance dela reponse dela Serbie a TAutriche,
que le Charge d'affaires de Serbie lui avait remise ce matin. « Je n'en ai pas encore
« eu le temps, » me dit-il. « Je le regrette. Yous verriez que, sauf sur des points de

* detail, Ta Serbie se soumet entierement. II semble dome que, puisque I'Autriche a

* oblenu les satisfactions que votre appui lui a procurees, vous pouvez aujourd'hui
ii lui conseiUer de s'en contenter ou d'examiner avec la Serbie les termes de la reponse
f de celle-ci* »

Comme M. Jagow ne me repondait pas clairement, je lui ai demande si I'Alle-
magne voulait la guerre. II a proteste vivement, disant qu'il savait que c'etait
ijpaa pens^e, mais que c'etait tout k fait inexact. « D faut done, ai-je repris, agir en

— 87 -
« consequence. Quand vous lirez la reponse serbe , pesez-en les terraes avec votre
• conscience, je Vous en prie, au nom de I'huinanite, et n'assumez pas persoonelle-
€ ment une part de respoosabilite dans les caitastrophes que vous laissez preparer. »
M. de Jagow a proleste de nonveau, ajoutant qu il etait prel a s'unir a I'Anorleterre
el k la France dans un effort commun, mais qu il fallait trouver a cette intervention
line forme qu'il put accepter et que les Cabinets devaieat s'entendre a ce sujet.

« Au reste, a-t-il ajoute, les conversations directes entre Vienne et Petersbourg
« sont entamees et se poursuivent : j'en augure beaucoup de bien et j'espere. »

Au moment de le quitter, je lui dis que j'avals eu ce matin Timpression que Theiire
de la detente avait sonne, mais que je voyais bien qu'il n'en etait rien.Il m'a repondu
que je me trompais; qu'il esperait que les choses etaient en bonne v6ie et abouti-
raient peut-etre rapidement. Je lui ai demande d'agir a Vienne pour qu'elles marchent
vite-, parce qu'il importait de ne pas.- laisser se creer en Russie un de ces courants
d'opinion qui emportent tout.

A mon sentiment., il y aurait lieu de demander k Sir E. Grey„ qui a dti etre avise
par Sir E. Goschen du refua oppose a sa proposition dans la forme qui lui ^tait
donnee, de la renoiiveler sous une autre forme, de telle fa^on que TAUemagne n'ait
pas de pretexte pour refuser de s'y associer et prenne jesresponsabilites aux yeux de
i'Angleterre.

Jules Cambon.

N* 75.

ML Biewvenu-Martiis, Minislre des Affaires 6trangeres p^. i.

a MM. les Ambassadeurs de France a Londres, Saint-Petersbcmrg,
Berlin, Vienne, Rome.

Paris, ie nj juillct i9i4«

L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongi^ie est venu me voir pour me remettre un me-
moire, veritable acte d'accusation contre k Serbie; il m'a declare, d'ordre de soq
Gouvememenl, que la Serbie n'ayant pa& repondu d'une maniere satisfaisanle aux
demandes du Gouvernement imperial, celui-ci 5e voit contraint d'employer des
moyens energiques pour amener la Serbie a domier les satisfactions et garanties qui
sont reciamees d'elle. Cest demain que le Gouvernement autrichien prendra ies
mesures k eel effet.

Tai prie FAmbassadeur de me faire connailre les mesures envisagees par I'Autriche,
et le Comte Szecsen m'a repondu que cela pourrail etre soil un ultimatum, soil une
declaration de guerre, soil le passage de la frontiere, mais qu'il n'avait aucuue indi-
cation precise sur ce point.

J'ai alors fait remarquer k TAmbassadeur que la Serbie avait accepte sur presque
tous ies points ies exigences de l'Aulricbe» que la divergence qui subsistail sur

— 88 —
quelques points pounail disparaiire avec un peu de bonne volonte reciproque, et par
i'aide des Puissances amies de la paix; en fixant a demain Texeculion de ses resolu-
tions, TAutriche rendait, pour la seconde fois, leur concours presque impossible et
assumait une lourde responsabilite en risquant de dechainer une guerre, dont oa
ne pourrait mesurer I'exlension.

Je vous communique, a litre d'information , le memoire que ma remis le
Comte Szecsen.

Bienvenu-Martin.

Annexe.

Memoirs da Gouvemement aaslro-hongrois , remis par le Comte Szecsen
A M. Bienvena-Martin le 27 jaillet 19 U.

L'agitation serbe, qui s'est dojxne pour but d'arriver a ia separation de la Monarchie aulri-
ehienne des jiartis slaves du Sud pour les rattacher a un grand Etat serbe, remonle tres
loin en arriere. Celte propaganda sur le sol serbe, toujours la meme quant a son but final,
quoique diverse dans ses moyens et intensit^s, avait atteint son plus haut point lors de la
crise de Tannexion. Rejetant le manteau protecteur du secret, elle s'^tait montr^e alors avec
toute la franchise de ses tendances et avait montre sous le patronage du Gouvernement
serbe son intention de realiser ses desseins avec tous les moyens disponibles.

Tandis que la Presse serbe tout entiere appelait au combat centre la Monarcbie par des
cris haineux ct en denaturant les faits, il se creait des associations pour encourager a celte
lutte — meme abstraction faite d'autres moyens de propagande.

L association qui est devenue la plus importante est la « Narodna Odbrana ». Issue d'un
comite r^volutionnaire qui existait alors, elle fut constituee en Society priv^e, cependant,
sous forme d'organisation dependant du Departement des AfTaires ^trangere? de Belgrade
par des fonctionnaires serbes militaires et civils. Parmi ces fondateurs, on doit citer notam-
ment : le general Buzo Jankovic, les anciens ministres Ljuba Jovanovic, Ljuba Davidovic
et Valislav Valovic, le directeur de I'lmprimerie nationale Zivojin Dacic, et les anciens capi-
taines, maintenant commandants, Voja Tankovic et Milan Pribicevic. Cette association
s'etait impose comme but la creation et i'organisation de bandes en vue de la guerre esperee
contre la Monarchie. On trouvera une description saisissante de I'activil^ d'alors de la
« Narodna Odbrana », notamment dans les declarations du sujet bosn^o-herz^govinien Trifko
Krstanovic, entendu comme temoin par le conseii de guerre de Sarajevo, qui se trouvait
alors a Belgrade et qui, avec d'autres sujets de la Monarchie, a ^te accept^ comme comi-
tadji par la « Narodna Odbrana ». Avec environ cent quarante autres, Krstanovic avait ^te
amen^ a une dcole Cr^ee pour la formation de nouveHes bandes k Cuprija, district de Jago-
dina, et dirigce par les, capitaines Voja Tankosic et Dusan Putnick. 11 n'y avait comme
maitresdans cette ecole que des officiers serbes; le general Bozo Jankovic et le capitaine
Milan Pribicevic donnerent une grande r^gularite a ces. cours d'organisation de bandes, qui
duraient trois mois.

Les comitadji y recevaient un enseignement complet du tir, du jet des bombes, des mines,
de la destruction des chemins de fer, timnels , ponls et tel6graphes. Leur devoir 6tait, d'apres

— 89 —
leurs chefs, de mettre en pratique les connaissances nouvcllement acquises en Bosnie-Her-
z^govine.

Par cette aclion de la « Narodna Odbrana » exerc^e de la maniere la plus publique et favo-
ris6e par le Gouvernement Serbe, a ^t6 r^pandue la guerilla des bandes centre la Monar-
chic. Par la, les sujets de la Monarchic 6taient conduits a la Irahison contre leur patrie, et
amenes syst6matiquement a pratiquer comme ^missaires serbes des attaques secretes contre
les moyens de defense de leur patrie.

Cette periode des aspirations agressives s'est termin^e avec la declaration faite par le Gou-
vernement serbe le 3i mars 1909, dans laquelle celui-ci se d^clarait pret k accepter le
nouvel ^tat de choses cr6e par I'annexion de la Bosnie-Herzegovine au point de vue du droit
public, et a promis solennellement vouloir vivre en relations amicales de bon voisinage,
dans I'avenir, avec la Monarchie.

Avec cette declaration , il semblait que dut prendre fm I'agitation con§tituant une source
permanente de troubles contre TAutriche-Hongrie et qu'on eut trouve un moyen de, rappro-
chement amical entre la Serbie et la Monarchie. Privee de Tappui du Gouvernement serbe,
et combattue par lui conformement a ces engagements, la propagande hostile n'aurait pii
durer que dune nianiere occulte, vou^e a une prompte destruction. Par contre, les points
de contact existant entre les partis slaves du Sud de la Monarchie et la Serbie dans le
domaine de la langue, des races et de la culture auraient du conduire h la realisation dun
travail de developpement commun inspire d'amities r^ciproques et d'interets paralleles.

Cependant ces espoirs ne se sont pas realises. Les aspirations hostiles a la Monarchie ont
subsist^, et, sous les yeux du Gouvernement serbe qui n'a rien fait pour etouffer cette agi-
tation, la propagande institute contre I'Autriche n'a fait que gagner en 6tendueet prolondeur.
La haine contre la Monarchie a et4 tenue en haleine et s'est transform^e en un sentiment
irreconciliable. Le peuple serbe, tant paries moyens anciens, mieux adaptes a la situation,
que par des methodes plus completes, a et^ appele « au combat d'aneantissement in^luc
table » contre I'Autriche. Systematiquement, des fils secrets ont ele. tiss^s vers les donaaines
slaves du sud de la Monarchie, dont les sujets ont et^ incites ^ la trahison.

Par-dessus tout, c'estla presse serbe qui n'a cesse d'agir dans cet esprit.

Pas moins de quatre-vingt un journaux paraissant en Serbie ont du ^tre retires de la circu-
lation postale jusqu'aujourd'hui, en raison de leur contenu qui tomba sous le coup de la loi
p^uale. II n'est guere une loi penale protegeant la personne sacr6e du Monarque et des
membres de la famille imp^riale ou fint^grite de I'Etat qui n'ait ete viol^e par les feuilles
serbes. On trouvera k I'annexe I quelques-unes des uonabreuses preuves donndes par la presse
dans I'ordre d'idees ci-dessus.

Sans entrer dans un examen d6taill6 des manieres de voir de Topuiion publique serbe, il
y a lieu d observer que la presse n'a cesse de considerer i'annexion .de la Bosnie-Herz6govine ,
malgre la reconnaissance formelle serbe, apres comme avant, comme un rapt exerc^ contre
la Serbie ayant besoin d'etre repare. Cette pens6e ne revient pas seulement dans les feuilles
d'opinion avancee, mais aussi dans la nSamupfavaw qui tient de si pres k I'OiEce des
Affaires etrangeres de Belgrade , ou elie est exprim^e sous une forme k peine envelopp^e
(voir annexe IP).

On ne peut pas non plus n^gliger de considerer comment I'attentat commis le 1 5 juin
1910 4 Sarajevo par Bogdan Zerajic contre le Gouverneur de Bosnie-Herzegovine, mailre
de camp von Varesanin , a ete loue par la presse.

On se souvient que Zerajic s'^tait tue immediatement apres son acte et avait brul6, avant
de le commettre, tous ses papiers. Pour ces raisons, il n'avait pas ^t^ possible de mettre en
lumiere pleinement les motifs de cet attentat , on a cependant pu coiiclure d'une piece trouvee

DocQMEKTS DIPL0MATIQCB8. — GuciTe europcennc. >.♦

— 90 —

pr^ de lui qu'il etait partisan des ide^ de Kropotkine. Les indicBs relev^s ont egalement
conduit a penser quil s'agissait d un attentat d un caractere anarchiste,

Ceci n'empecha pas cependant la presse serbe de celebrer le criminal comrae un heros
•national serbe et deiouer son acte. Meme, ie « Politika s'est eleve contre i'idee que Zerajic
fut un anarchiste et la reclame comme un « heros serbe dont le nom sera repete par (ous ies
Serbes avec respect et douleur «.

Le« Politika » considere la date du 18'aout de la meme annee a jour de naissance de
S. M. ImpSriale et Royale » comme une occasion favorable pour parler a nouveau de
Zerajic « dont le nom sera dans le peuple qaelque chose comme celui d'un saint « et pour
iouer solennellement Tattentat en une poesie (annexe if I).

Cest ainsi qua, etc exploit^ ce crime n ayant rien de commun avec les aspirations sur des
territoires de la Monarchie , pour le progres de cette idee et que le meurtre a ete reconnu
de la maniere la pins explicite comme un moyen glorieux et digne d'imitation dans ia lutte
pour la realisation de cette pensee. Cette sauclification du meurtre comme une methode
pleinement admissible dans la lutte contre la Monarchie revient plus tard dans les feuilles
parlant de I'attentat commis pal- Jukic contre le Commissaire royal de Cuvaj (annexe I^).

Ces journauxrepahdus, uon pas.seulement en Serbie, mais comme on I'a vu plus tard
par des voies secretes bien organisees et par fraudes dans la Monarchie qui ont arnen^ et
maintenu ^veillee dans les grandes masses cette disposition , laquelle a fourni un terrain
nourricier, favorable pour les m^faits des associations hostiles h la Monarchie.

Cest !a R Narodna Odbrana y> qui est devenue le centre de Tagitation menee par les asso-
'dations. Les mSmes personnes qui, au temps de I'annexion, etaient a sa tete, sont encore
celles qai la dirigent. On retrouve parmi elles comme organisateurs energiques et pleins
d'aclion les plus violents opposants de la Monarchie cites plus haut. Organis^e sur une base
large et profonde et possedant une hierarchie (voir annexe II « organisation »), la « Narodna
Odbrana D posseda bientot environ quatre cents adherents, qui repandirent une agitation
tres active.

En outre , la Narodna s'est mise en association etroite avec la « Federation des Tireurs »
(762 societes), Tassociation des Sokol « Dusan Silni (2,600 membres), le Club olympique,
f Association des cavaliere « Knez Mihajlo d, ia Societe des chasseurs et la Ligue de d^velop-
pement, ainsi que de uombreuses autres associations, qui toutes, conduites et protegees par
la Narodna , agissaient dans le m^me esprit. Se penetrant de plas en plus les unes les autres,
ces associations parvinrent a une fusion complete , de telle maniere qu^elles ne sont plus
aujourdTiui que des membres du Corps unique de la Narodna. Ainsi cette derniere a con-
stitue sur toute la Serbie un reseau tres serre d'agitation et a attire a toutes ses idees tous
ceux capables de les recevoir.

Quel est lespril de Taction de la Narodna, cest ce que demontre avec tme suffisaiite
dart^ les publications officielles de cette Spciete.

Dans ses statuts , revetus de Vapparence d une societe de developpement ne se pr^occu-
pant que du perfectionnement spirituel et cprporeldeia population serbe et de son renfor-
cement materiel, la Narodna devoile dans sou organe corporatif (voir annexe U) le vrai et
unique mobile de son existence, en ce quelle appelle son « programme reorganise ».

Precher au peuple serbe notammeut « la verite sainie par un travail fanatique et infati-
gable »sous I'allegation que la Monarchie Veut « lui.prendre sa liberte et sa langue et m^me
detruirela Serbie)); qu'il est une necessite ineluctable de conduire cOutre TAutriche-Hon-
grie, son premier et plus grand entwmi, ie « combat de destruction avec fusils et canons i» et
de preparer le peuple a ce combat « par tous ies moyens » , pour la liberation des territoires
soamis, dans lesquels sont sous I'opprobe el ie joug sept millions de freres. Tous les « efforts

- 91 -^

pour le dldveloppement » de la Narodlna sont au service exclusif do cetie idl^e cdmme simple
moyen poiir rorganisation et i'eduCation du peuple en vue dekiutte poiir l'an6anli$$emen*
prevu.

C'est dans le meme esprit que travaillcnt toytes les associations affiliees k la Narodna ^
regard desquelles rassociation des « Sokol » de Kragujevac peut seryir comme exemple
(voir annexe III).

Comme pour la Narodna, ce sont des officiers, professeurs et agents de i'Etat qui sont a
sa tete.

LediscotDEs par lequel son President, major Kovacevic, a ouvert Tassemblee annuelie de
igi4 renonb'e. total ement h mentionner la gymnastique, ce qui est cependant ie but veri-
table des « Sokol » et ne parle que de {a a preparation k la guerre » contre « I'Ennemi danger
reux, sans coeur, odieux et envahissant du Nord» qui enleve h des millions de freres
serbes leurs libertes et leurs droits et Ifes maintient dans I'esclavage et les fers.

Dans les rapports administratifs de cette association, les developpements techniques
passcnt totalement h I'arriere-plan et ne servent que de rubriques pour ia connaissance da
veritable « but de 1 activite de I'administration », notamment « la preparation da dSveloppemenf
nallonai et la necessity de fortifier la « nation Scrasee » dans VobjectiffjaeUe puisse ainsi mener &.
lien son >■<■ procjramme non encore rempli, sa idcke nan encore accompliej>, et accomplir cette
ngrande action qui doit s'accomplir dans I'avenir prochain : la liberation des freres vivant au dela
de la Drina qui endurent le martyre des crucifiSs ».

II n est pas jusqu'au tresorier qui ne fasse servir son rapport financier pour lancer cet
appel que Ton doit « elever des faucons » qui sont en mesure « d'apporter la iiberte aux freres
non encore liberes. »

De meme que les aspirations au developpement dans la Narodna, I'activite en gymnastique'
des « Sokol » n'est pas le but lui-meme, mais un simple moyen au service de la meme propa--
gande menee avec les memes intentions pour ne pas dire avec les metoes mots exactement.'

Lorsque la Narodna appelle au combat daneantissement contre la Monarcbie, elle ne)
s'adresse pas, seulement au peuple de la Monarchic, mais h tous les peuples slaves du sud.l
Pour la Narodna, les territoires slaves du sud de la Monarchic font partie de « nos terri-'
toires serbes soumis » (voir aussi annexe IV). De m^me les sujets slaves du sud de la mo-
narcbie doivent prendre part a cette « oeuvre natio.nale » ». de mSme cette activite a saine et
necessaire » doit s'exercer de I'autre cote de la frontiere serbe et meme sur le sol de la
monarcbie, la Narodna recherche ses « heros pour la guerre sainte », dont Obilic, lassassin
de Mourad , est cite comme exemple digne d'imitation du sacrifice a la patrie.

Mais , pour amener les freres <t hors de Serbie » a participer au « travail d'initiative privee »
la Narodna entretient une association intime avec les « Freres de ce c6te-ci de la frontiere ».
Comment cette intimite est exercee, c'est ce qui n'est pas dit, sans doute parce que cela
appartient a cette partie da « travail d' ensemble » qui « pour des raisons nombreuses ne peut ni
ne doit etre explique ».

Combien cette branche de son activity est etendue, c'est ce que montre le fait que non
seulement le Comite central de la Narodna, mais encore certains de ses comites regionaux,
possede des sections speciales pour « les affaires ext^rieiires ».

L activite exterieure de la Narodna et de ses affilies est particulierement variee.

Celle qui est relativement la moins dangereuse parce que controlable ofTiciellement , con-
siste en toumees de conferences qu'entreprennent les membres influents de la Narodna vers
les parties sud-ouest de la Monarchic ou iis parlent dans diverses societes sur des sujets natio-
naux ou de culture. Ces occasions permettent aux orateurs d'exposer aux cercles les plus

19.

— 92 —

releves de leiirs adherents, en paroles plus ou moins gazees, comprehensibles pour ceux qui
sonl dej^ au courant, les veritables tendances de I'association.

Parmi ces emissan^es, un desplus connus est le Directeur de I'Imprimerie d'Etat Zivojin
Daciodeja nomme; cest lui qui, le 8 aout 1909, a lance un appel au peuple serbe, dans
lequcl ii a designe I'Autriche comme « I'ennemi de la Serbie » et I'a invite a se preparer au
combat contre la Monarcbie. A plusieurs reprises, il a entrepris des voyages d'agitation de ce
genre. A Karlova (en 191 2) il a meme abandonne toute prudence et a parle dans le sens de
« I'union de tous les Serbes contre rennemi commun ».

Plus dangereuses sont' les relations entretenues par les associations imbues de I'esprit de
la Narodna, sous le manteau de la communautd des interets et de la culture, avec les asso-
ciations dans la Monarchic; car les envoy es respectifs et les visites corporatives de ces asso-
ciations, qui echappenf a tout controle, sont utilisees par les Serbes k toutes especes de
machinations contre la Monarchic.

Cest ainsi, par exemple, qu'un envoye de la Narodna h la fete de Sarajevo en sep-
tembre 1912 (annexe VI) ne s'est pas g^ne pour recruter en secret des adherents bosniaques
a sa societe. L'envoi dun representant de I'association des Sokol de Kragujevac a cette fete
devait signifier pour les freres de Bosnie : « Nous ne vous avons pas oublies, les ailes de
faucon desumadija sonl encore puissantes.»Unepensee cpii, dans la circulation intime, aura
trouve sans doute une toute autre expression conforme aux tendances ci-dessus exposees de la
Narodna (annexe III). Quant aux evenements qui sepassent lors des reunions du meme genre
en Serbie, il est Evident qu'ils echappent a un controle quelconque des autorit^s Imperiales
€t Royales qui ne possederit a cet egard que des informations confidentielles difficilement
controlables. En relaiion avec ces faits il y aurait lieu d'elever des doutes sur la visite des
etudiants d'Agram en Serbie (avril 1912) qui ont re^u du cote serbe un accueil olficiel
pres(pje militaire accompagne meme dune parade, dune revue de troupes en leur honneur
et cela dune maniere assez suggestive pour que I'association des Sokol de Kragujevac puisse
dire : « Get evenement signifie le. commencement et la clef d'un grand acte qui doit s'accom-
plir.dans un ^v^nement rapproche, cest un germe qui miirira lorsque lame du peuple
g'evanouira jusqu a ce qu'il n'y ait plus aucune barriere qui ne soit detruite. »

Ce n'est que recemment qu'il est parvenu h la connaissance des autorites austro-hongroises
que les associations de Sokol serbes ont reussi k determiner quelques corporations analogues
de la' Monarchic a se mettre avec elles dans un lieu jusqu'i present secret dont le caractere
nest pas encore completement eclairci ; car les constatations a cet egard continuent a etre
relevees. Jusqu'i present cependant les renseignements obtenus permettent d'estimer que
Ton a decouvert les traces d'un des moyens par lesquels les tendances subversives des Sokol
serbes ont detourne et conduit a I'erreur certains groupes de personnes dans la Monarcbie.

Cette prbpagande dans les cercles de plus en plus dilT^rents parait cependant relegu^e au
second plan si on lui compare celle du « travail ext^rieur » qui est conduite par la Narodna et
ses amis vers une agitation d'homme a homme. Cest dans ce domaine que se constatent les
resultats les plus tristes.

Par ses hommes de confiance et emissaires secrets, elle apporte le poison de la mutirierie
dans les cercles des gens d'age comme dans ceux de la jeunesse irresponsaWe.

Cest ainsi par exemple que, detournes par Milan Pribicevitch les anciens officiers de Honved
V.B..D. K.V.N, et le lieutenant de gendarmerie de Croatie Esclavone V. K. ont abandonn6
le service de i'arm^e de la Monarchic dans les conditions les plus suspectes et se sont toumes
vers la Serbie ; ils virent entre temps la plupart de leurs esp^rances decues ou du moins en
partie, et pensent a retoumer dans la patrie qu'ils ont trahie. L'agitation introduite de Serbie
dans les ecoles moyennes de Croatie et de Bosnie ^est malheureusement si connue qu'elle a k

-^ 93 —
' peine besoin d'exemples. Ce qui est moins connu, cest que ceux qui ont ete elimin^s pour
infraction disciplinaire grave des 6coles creates et bosniaques sont accueillis en Serbie les
bras ouverts et souvent mcme proteges par I'Etat et entretenus comme des adversaires de la
Monarcbie. Les ^coles serbes avec leurs maitres hostiles h rAutricbe, qui sont en grande
partie adherents de la Narodna, sont evidemment des etablissements tout k fait appropries
ppur Teducation d'adeptes de ce genre. Un cas parliculierement notable doit etre cite ici.
En mars dernier, plusieurs ecoliers des ecoles norinales de maitres de Pakrac (Croatie) ont
ete expuls^s pour raison de greve. lis se sont retournes vers la Serbie ou ils ont obtenu illico
des positions de maitres d'ecole ou ont ete admis dans des ecoles normales de maitres. Un
de ces rel^gues, en relations avec des cercles hostiles a la Monarchie a declare publiqhement
que lui et ses gens donneraient le conseil, emettraient I'opinion pendant la duree du sejour
de larchiduc h^ritier en Bosnie, que cette province est une terre serbe. II est particuliere-
ment k remarquer que le Prelet du cercle serbe de Krajna a accorde a trois de ces etudiants
si compromis, pendant la duree du sejour de I'Archiduc Francois-Ferdinand en Bosnie, des
passeports serbes dans lesquels il les designe faussement comme des sujets serbes, quoiqu'il
eut du connaitre leur qualite de Croates. Munis de ces passeports, les trois agitateurs ont
pu gagner la Monarchie sans etre remarques , oil cependant ils ont fmi par etre reconnus
et arretes.

Mais ce qui precede ne sufTit pas k caracteriser integralement I'activite « exlerieure » de la
Narodna.

Depuis longtemps deja le Gouvernement imperial et royal a ete informe par des infor-
mations confidentielles que la Narodna a prepare la guerre qu'elle a desir^ a I'encontre de l?i
Monarchie par des moyens militaires en ce sens qu'elle y envoie des emissaires charges a la
maniere des bandes de tenter, des louver ture des hoslililes, la destruction des moyens de
transport et d'amener des revokes ou des paniques (voir annexe VII).

La procedure criminelle intentee en iQiS par le Conseil de guerre de Sarajevo contre
Jovo Jajlicic et consorts pour crimes d'espionnage a amen^ la confirmation de ces informa-
tions confidentielles. Comme au temps de sa fondation, aujCurd'hui encore, la preparation
de la guerre par bandes armees, figure encore au programme de la Narodna, auquel est venu
se joindre en plus toute une activite dans I'ordre de I'espionnage. Cest pour cela que le pro-
gramme dit « reorganise » de la Narodna est en reality nn programme ^iendu. D'une atmo-
sphere de haine ainsi exasperee publiquement et secretement, d'une agitation echappant k
toute responsabilite pour lesquelles clans la lutte contre I'Autriche tous les moyens sont bons
jusques et y compris, sans en avoir honte, le meurtre vulgaire, devait fmalement. resuiter
des actes de terrorisine.

Le 8 juin 1912, le nomme Jukic a tire sur le Commissaire royal a Agram , von Cuvaj , ce
qui a amcne la blessure mortelle du conseiller von Hervvic assis dans la meme voiture; dans
9ft fuite, a tue un policier qui le poursuivait et en a blesse deux autres.

II est connu par les poursuites que Jukic etait imbu des idees et des plans dela Narodna,
meme si Jukic se livrait deja depuis quelque temps a des projets d'attentat. ceux-ci n'arri-
verent cependant a malurite qu'apres quil eut fait le 18 aVril 1912 avec les Etudiants
d' Agram I'excursion de Belgrade aux fetes prepar^es pour honorer ces visiteurs, ce Jukic
est entre en rapporls avec diverses personnes appartenant aux cercles de la Narodna et avec
lesquelles il a discut^ de politique. Peu de jours apres, il est revenu a Belgrade et la ii a
recu cl'un major serbe ane bombe et d'an camarade un broivning, avec lesquels il a execute I'at-
tentat. La bombe trouvee a Agram provenait, d'apreS les experts, d'un arsenal militaire.

Le coup de Jukic n^tait pas encore oublie lorsque, le 18 aout 191 3, Stephan Dojcic.
revenu d'Am^rique a Agram, a commis un attentat contre le Commissaire royal baron

t — 94 —

Skerlecz, attentat resultant des actions organis^es par ies Serbes parmi les cercles des Slaves
du Sud vivant en Am6rique, et qui itait I'oBUvre de la propagande exterieure de ia
Karodna.

line brochure du serbe T. Dimitrijevitch imprimee a Chicago, avec ses attaques sans
mesui es contre S. M. Imperiale et Royale et ses appels aux Serbes de la Monarchie touchant
leur prochaine « d^iivrance » Ies poussant k rentrer en Serbie montre le parallelisme de la
propagande menee par Ies Serbes en toute liberie en Am6rique, et de celle men^e de Serbie
^ans Ies domaines de la Monarchie.

Et de nouveau, k peine un an apres., Agram etait le theatre d'un nouvel attentat, manqu6
cette fois.

Le 2 mai 191 3, Jacob Schafer a tent^, au theatre d'Agram, sur le ban Freiherr von
Skerlecz , un attentat qui a ete arrete au dernier moment par un policier. L'enquete a mis
au jour Texistence d'un complot dont 1 ame etait Rudolf Hercigonja. Des d^arations de ce
dernier et de ses cinq co-inculpes, il resulte que cet attentat aussi avait son origine en
Serbie.

Ayant pris part'^ une tentative manquee pour mettre en liberie Jukic, Hercigonja s'etait
sauv6 en Serbie (octobre 1912) ou il frequentait avec son complice Marojan Jakcic, des
comitadji et des membres de la Narodna. Comme cela est arrive frequemmont avec des
esprits juveniles s occupant trop tot de questions politiques, ces frequentations ont amene
Ies plus mauvais resultats. Hercigonja rentra chez lui avec le dogme preche a Belgrade que
Ies pays slaves du sud de la Monarchie doivent en etre separes pour elre reunis au royaume
serbe. 11 avait en outre ^te persuade par Tenseignement recu de ses amis que ce but devait
^tre poursuivi par I'ex^cution d'attentat sur de hauts personnages ayant part k la politique
de la Monarchie.

G'est dans cet esprit qu'Hercigonja a Agram a exerce son action sur ses amis et Ies a
amenes k ses idees. Au premier plan de ses projets , etait I'ex^cution d'un attentat sur I'heri'
tier du trone.

Peu de mois auparavant, des poursultes en haute trahison avaient it6 intentees contre
Suka Alginovic. Au coUrs de ce proces, trois t^moins ont declare qu'Alginovic -avait dit
devant eux avoir re^u cent dina de la Narodna et autant d'une association secrete d'eludiants
pour debut de propagande, mais piincipalement pour I'execution d'un attentat sur I'archi-
duc Francois-Ferdinand.

On voit a quel point I' agitation criminelle de la Narodna et, de ceux qui partagent ses opinions ,
s'est concentric ces demiers temps sur la personne de I'archidac heritier.

De toutes ces constatations , on arrive a la conclusion que la Narodna ainsi que Ies cercles
hostiles k la Monarchie group^s autour d'elle consideraient depuis peu le moment venu de
faire realiser leur enseignement par des actes.

II est remarquable quelle se contente pour ces actes de donner Yincitqtion et la ou cette
incitation etait tomb^e sur un sol fertile de placer Ies moycns de secours mat^riels h leur dispo-
sition, mais qu'elle a fait reposer tout le role dangereux de cette propagande par le fait,
uniquement sur la jeunesse de la Monarchie excitee el detournee par elle qui doit supporter
seule le fardeau de ce triste « h^roisme ».

Tous Ies trails de celle facon de faire se retrouvent dans Thistoire et I'origine de I'attentat
profond^menl regrettable du 28 juin.

Princip el Grabez sont des exemples de cette jeunesse empoisonn^e des I'dcole par Ies
pensees de la Narodna. A Belgrade, frequentant Ies cercles d'etudiants imbus de ces idees,
Princip s'est occupe de plans d'attentat contre I'Archiduc heritier contre lequel s'exer9ait la

— 95 —

haine particulierement aigue des elements hostiles 41a xnonarchie, 4 foccasion deson voyage
dans les pays annexes.

II se lia d'amitie avec Kabrinovitch qui freqaentait les memes cercles et dont les opinions
radicalement r^volutionnaires, d'apres ses propres" aveux , i'amenaient au m^me sentiment
hostile a la Monarchic et a la propagande par le fait. Mais, si soigneusement qu'ait et^ pre-
pare cecomplot, et si decides qu'aient ete les conjures, cependant i'attentat n'aurait jamais
ete accompli s'il ne s'etait pas trouve, comme dans le cas Jukic, des ^ens pour donner aux
complices les moyens d'ex^cuter leur agression , car Princip et Kabrinovitch I'ont expresse-
ment reconnu, ils manquaient awtant des armes necessaires que d'argent pour les acheter.
11 est interessant de voir oia les cOmplices se sont procure leurs armes- Milan Pribicevic et
Zivojin Dacic, ces deux hommes principaux de la Narodna sont les premiers auxquels les
complices se sont adresses dans leur besoin comme a une aide sure sans doute parce qu'il
etait deja devenu une traduction dans le cercle de ceux qui sont prets a commettre des atten-
tats quil etait possible d'obtenir des representants de la Narodna des instruments demeurtre.
Le fait accidentel que ces deux hommes, au moment critique, ne se trouvaient pas a Bel-
grade, dejoua sans doute ce projet, cependant Princip et Kabrinovic ne furent pas embar-
rasses pour trouver une autre assistance, celle de Milan Ciganovic, un ancien comitadji,
maintenant fonctionnaire des cherains de fer a Belgrade et membre de la Narodna. Ce der-
nier et son ami, le major Voja Tankosic deja nomm6, egalement.un des chefs dela Narodna
qui a ete en 1 908 le chef de I'ecole des bandes armees de Kuprija (annexe V) apparaissent
maintenant comme les chefs spirituels du complot. lis n'^urent qu'une hesitation , legere au
debut, h savoir si les trois conjur6s 6taient reellement decides a commettre cet acte, hesita-
tion qui disparut bientot grace k leurs suggestions. Des lors , ils furent prets a fournir toute
assistance, Tankosic a procur6 quatre brownings et des munitions et de I'argent pour le
voyage. Six grenades a main provenant de 1 armee serbe oonstituaient le complement d'arme-
ment, ce qui nous rappelle le cas Jukic. Preoccupe du succes, Tankosic procura fenseigne-
ment du tir, mais Tankosic et Ciganovic se sont pr^occupes en outre d assurer un moyen
special non desir^ d'assurer le secret du complot. Ils aposterent Zian Kali avec Tindication
que les deux auteurs, apres I'attentat, devaient se tuer, acte'de precaution qui devait leur
profiter en premiere ligne , car le secret leur enlevait le faible danger qu'ils avaiehf assume
dans cette entreprise. La mort sure pour les victimes de leur d^toarnement , lapkine Si^carii^ pour
elle-meme, telle est la devise, connue maintenant, de la Narodna.

Pour rendre possible I'execution de latlentat, il fallait que les armes et bombes par-
vinssent en fraude et sans etre apercues ero Bosnie. La encore, Ciganovic a donne toute son
assistance , il prescrit aux conjures une route determinee el leur assure la protection des,
autorites fronti^res serbes. La maniere dans laquelle ce voyage decrit par Princip comme
K.mysterieux » a ete organise et execute ne laisse subsister aucun doute qu'il s'agit d'une voie
secrete bien prepar^e et deja parcourue souvent en vue de desseins secrets de la Narodna.
Avec une simplicite et tine surety resultant de la seule habitude, les capitaines de la fron-
tiere a Sabak et Losnika ont prete dans ce but leur oi'ganisatioii administrative ; sans difficulte
s'est effectue ce transport secret, avec son systeme complique de guides toujours changeants
qui, appeles comme par miracle, se trouvaient toujours sur place quand on avait besoin
d'eux. Sans s'enquerir du but de ce voyage curieux de quelques etudiants .trop jeunes, les
autorites serbes ont laiss^ sur I'indication de I'ancien comitadji et du fonctionnaire subal-
terne des chemins de fer Ciganovic, jouer cet appareil fonclionnant si facilemenl. Ils
n'avaient d'ailleurs pas besoin de demander, car d'apres les indications re9ues, il^ etait clair
pour eux qu'il s'agissait de remplir de nouveau une mission de la « Narodna ». La vue de
i'af senal de bombes et de revolvers arrachait seulement au surveillant Grbic un sourire bien-

— 96 —
veillant d approbation donnant la preuve complete combien Ton etait habitue sur cette route
4 rencontrer une contrebande de ce genre.

Le Gouvernement royal serbe s'est charg^ dune faute lourde en laissant s'accomplir tout
cela.

Tenu a cultiver des relations de bon voisinage.avec TAutriche-Hongrie , il a permis a la
presse de repandre la haine contre la Monarchic, tolere que des associations elablies sur son
sol sous la conduite d'officiers eleves, de foncUonnaires, de raaitres et de juges^se livrent
contre la Monarchic a une campagne publique menant ses citoyens aux idees revolution-
naires , il n'a pas empech^ que des hommes ayant une part a la direction de son administra-
tion militaire et civile empoisonnent la conscience publique contre tons les sentiments
moraux au point que, dans cette lutte, I'assassinat vuigaire par guet-apens apparaisse comma
I'arme la plus recommandable.

N° 75 BIS.
Communique ojficieiix da bureau de la Presse :

Vienne, 2 8juillet igiA-

Le Minislre autrichien k Belgrade a presente des son retour a Vienne le texte de
la reponse serbe.

Celte reponse est remplie d'un esprit de manque, de sincerite : elle laisse appa-
raitre que le Gouvernement serbe est sans intention serieuse de ndeltre fin k la tole-
rance coupable grace k laquelle ont ete permises les menees anti-autrichiennes. La
reponse serbe conlient de telles restrictions et limitations, non seulemenl sur le prin-
cipe meme de la demarche austro-hongroise, mais encore en ce qui concerne les
revendications exposees par i'Autriche, que les concessions faites sont sans impor-
tance.

En particulier, refus sous pretexte vain, d'accepter la participation des organes
autro-hongrois pour la poursuite des auteurs des attentats residant en territoire
serbe.

,De meme la reponse serbe a la demande autrichienne pour mettre fin aux menees
hostiles de la presse equivaut k un refus.

La demande relative aux mesures qui devraient etre prises pour, que les associa-
tions hostiles k rAutriche-Hongrie ne puissent, apres leur dissolution, continuer leur
action sous un autre nom et forme, n'a pas meme ete envisagee.

Ces revendications constituant le minimum necessaire au retablissement du calme
permanent dans le Sud-Est de la Monarchie, la repbnse serbe est consideree comme
insuffisante.

Le Gouvernement serbe en a conscience d'ailleurs, puisqu'il envisage le reglement
du conflit par voie d'arbitrage, et que le jour ou sa reponse devait etre remise et
avant cette remise, il avait ordonne la mobilisation.

— 97

r 76.

M. Ren^ ViYiANi, President du Conseil,

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires Etrang^res p. i.

A bord de la France, le 28 juiliet 1914.

J'ai re^u par Copenhague votre telegramme resumant les faits de samedi, le tele-
gramme relatant la derniere visite de I'ambassadeur d'Allemagne, celui relatif a la
mediation que la Russie conseille a la Serbie de demander et aux demarches anglaises
k Berlin , ainsi que votre telegramme venu ce matin directement par la tour Eiffel.
J'approuve pleinement la reponse que vous avez faite au baron de Schoen; la these
que vous avez soutenue est I'evidence meme : dans la recherche d'une solution
pacifique du conflit, nous sommes pleinement d'accord avec la Russie, qui n'est pas
responsable de la situation actuelle, et n'a encore precede h aucune mesure quel-
conque pouvant eveiller le moindre soup9on ; mais il est evident qu'k titre de contre-
partie I'Allemagne ne saurait se refuser a donner des conseils au Gouvernement
austro-hongrois , dont Taction a ouvert la crise.

. II y a done lieu de continuer a tenir a I'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne le meme langage.
Ce conseil est d'ailleurs en harmonie avec la double proposition anglaise mentionnee
dans votre telegramme. J'approuve entierement la combinaison suggeree par sir Edward
Grey et j*invite directement M. Paul Cambon k le lui fjiire savoir. II est essentiel que
Ton sache a Berlin et k Vienne que notre plein concours est acquis aux efforts que
poursuit le Gouvernement britannique en vue de chercher une solution au conflit
austro-serbe. L'action des quatre puissances moins interessees ne peut, pour les
raisons exposees ci-dessus, s'exercer uniquement k Vienne et a Petersbourg. En pro-
posant de I'exercer aussi k Belgrade, ce qui veut dire surtout, en fait, entre Vienne et
Belgrade, sir Edward Grey rentre dans la logique de la situation; et, en n'excluant pas
Petersbourg, il ofl^re, d'autre part, k I'Allemagne, un moyen de se deplfeurtir, en toute
dignite, de la demarche parlaquelle le Gouvernement allemand a fait savoir k Paris
et a Londres que I'affaire etait envisagee par lui conmae purement autro-serbe et de-
pourvue de caractere general.

Je vous prie de communiquer le present telegramme a nos representants aupres
des grandes puissances et a noire Ministre k Belgrade.

Rene Viviani.

Documents DiPtOMAnQUES. — Guerre europ^enne. 13

98--.

r 77.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires Etraiig^res p ■ i.

a M. Rene ViviAm , President du Conseil, a bord de la France.

Paris, 28 juillet 1914.

Malgreles assurances donnees,,tant a Berliaqaii Paris, par. les agents allemands, du
desir de leur gouverxiement de cotocourir. aux. efforts, pour la maintlen de la paix,
aucune. action, sincere nest exercee par eux pour retenir. I'Auttiche ; la proposition
anglaise, qui. consist e dans- une action des.quatre puissances mains, interessees pour
oblenir un arret des operations >militaires.^ Vienne, Belgrade etPetersbourg, et dans
une reunion. a. Londres des A[hbassadeurs.d'AUeinagne, de France et d'ltalte, sous la
presidence. de Sir E- Grey en vue de chercher une solution aux. difflcidtes. austro-
serJies, rencontre, a Berlin des objections de nature ala faire echouer.

L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche a fait une demarche pour annoncer que son gouverae-
ment pTjendrait demain des mesures energiques pour contraindre la Serbie a lui
donner les satisfactions et les garanties qu'il exige de cette puissance; 1© Comte
Szecsenme s'est pas explique surces mesures; la mobilisation, k partir du 28 juillet,
parait.certaine d'lgpres notre attache militaire k Vienne.

Bienvenu-Martin.

r 78.

M..BiENVB5}U-^ARTiN% Mini&tre dcs Affaires Elrangeres p. L.
a Londies, Berlin, P^tersbourg, Vienne, Rome.

Paris, le 28 juiHeti^jiii.

J'ai eu de nouveau la visite de I'Ambassad^ar d'AUemagne ce matin;. il. ma dit
qu'il n'avait pas de communication, pas de proposition officielle k me faire, mais
qu'il venait,,commelaveille, causer de la situation et des moyens k employer pour
eviter des actes irreparables. Interroge sur les intentions de I'Autriche, il a declare
ine pas les connaitre, et ignorer la nature des moyens de coercition qu'elle prepare.

L'AUemagne, selon le Baron de Schoen, ne den;iande qu k agir avec la France pour
le mainti^n de la paix. Sur I'observation qui lui etait faite qu'un projet de mediation
des quatre puissances , auquel nous avons adhere , et qui a obtenu I'assentiment dc prin-
cipe de Fltalie et de TAUemagne , a ete mis en avant par TAngleterre , Tambassadeur a
dit qi^e le Gouvemenient allemand ne demandait en effet qu'^ s'associer a Taction des

— 09 — .
puissances, pourvu que «ette action n'affecte pas la fomie d'un arbitrage ou d'une
Gonference , repousses' par TAutricfie.

J'ai repondu que $i le mot seul arrete le Gouvernement autrichien , le but p«ut
^tre atteint par d'autres moyens; le Gouvernement allemand est bien place pour
demandera TAutriche de laisser awx puissances le temps d'intervenir, de trouver une
conciliation.

M. de Schoen m'a fait alors observer quil n'a pas d'instructions et sail seulement
que I'Allemagne se refuse k exercer une pression sur TAutriche, qui ne veut pas de
conference. II reproche aux journaux frangais de preter a TAllemagne une attitude
quelle n'a pas, en pretendant qu'elle pousse TAutriche : sans doute elle approuve
son attitude, mais elle n'a pas connu sa note; elle ne saurait Tarreter trop brusque-
ment, car I'Autriche a besoin de garanties contre les'procedes serbes.

Bienvbnu-Martin.

W 79.

M. Bienvenu-Martun,, Ministre des Affaires etrsngeres p. i.
a M. DuMAiNE, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne,

Paris, le,2.8:jiuUet igiA-

Vous connaissez, par les telegrammes de nos Ambassades, que je vous ai transmis,
la proposition anglaise de mediation a quatre et de conference a Londres, ainsi que
notre adhesion a cette suggestion, Tacceptation conditionnelle de lltalie et'les reserves
de Berlin.

Je vous prie de vous tenir en contact a ce siijet avec votre CoUegue d' Angleterre ,
qui a regu les instructions necessaires pour saisir le Gouvernement austro-hongrois
de la suggestion anglaise, des que ses trois CoUegues auront ete autorises a faire la
meme demarche; vous vous conformerez a son attitude.

r 80.

M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres,

a M. Bienvej^u-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i.

Londres, le 28 juiliet 19 14..

Sir' Ed. Greya re9u hiermes'Collegues d'Autriche Hongrie^ et d'Ailemagne. Le pre-
Tnier a' coiltiniie asoutenir que la reponse sel'be ^tait inaceeptable. Le second attenu

. _ iOO —
un langage analogue k celui de M. de Schoen a Paris. II a insiste sur, I'utilite d'une
action moderatrice de TAngleterre a Petersbourg. Sir Ed. Grey lui a repondu que la
Russie s'etait montree tres moderee d*epuis I'ouverture de la crise , notamment dans ses
conseils au Gouvernement serbe, et qu'il serait tres embarrasse de lui faire des
recommandations pacifiques. II a ajoute que c'eta[it a Vienne qu'il convenait d'agir et
que le concours de I'Allemagne etait indispensable.

D'autre part I'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a Petersbourg a telegraphic que M. Sazo-
noCP avait propose a TAmbassadeur d'Autriche une conversation sur I'affaire serbe.
Cette infornaation a ete confirmee par TAmbassadeur d'Angleterre a Vienne qui a fait
savoir qu'un premier entretien entre le Ministre russe des Affaires etrangeres et le
Comte Szapary avait produit un bon effet au Ballplatz.

Sir Ed. Grey et Sir A. Nicolson m'ont dit que, si un accord pouvait s'etablir directe-'
ment entre Petersbourg et Vienne, il faudrait s'en feliciter, mais ils ont eleve quelques
doutes sur le succes de I'initiative de M. Sazonoff .

Interroge par Sir G. Buchanan sur la convocation eventuelle a Londres d'une
Conference des Representants de I'Angleterre, de la France, de I'Allemagne et de
I'ltalie pour chercherune issue k la situation actuelle, M. Sazonoff a repondu : « qu'il
avait entame des pourparlers avec I'Ambassadeur d'Autriche dans des conditions qu'il
esperait favorables; que cependant il n'avait pas encore re^u de reponse a sa proposi-
tion d'une revision de la Note serbe par les deux Cabinets. » Si des explications
directes avec le Cabinet de Vienne sont irrealisables , M. Sazonoff se declare pret a
accepter la proposition anglaise ou toute autre de nature a resoudre favorablement
le conflit.

II serait, en tous cas, tres desirable que cette negociation directe, a un moment
ou le moindre retard pent avoir de si serieuses consequences , fut menee de maniere
k ne pas entraver faction de Sir Ed. Grey et a ne pas fournir a I'Autriche un pretexte
pour se derober a f intervention amicale des quatre puissahces .

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a Berlin ayant insiste aupres de M. de Jagow pour
obtenir une adhesion a la suggestion de Sir Ed. Grey, le Ministre allemand des Affaires
etrangeres a repondu qu'il convenait d'attendre te resultat de la conversation
engagee entre Petersbourg et Vienne. Sir Ed. Grey a, en consequence, prescrit a
Sir Ed. Goschen de suspendre pour le moment ses demarches. Au surplus I'annonce
que fAutriche vient de notifier officiellement sa declaration de guerre k la Serbie
fait entrer la question dans une nouvelle phase.

Paul Cambon.

N** 81.

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin,

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i.

Berlin, le 28 juillet 191 A.
La conversation que M. Sazonoff a eue avec le Comte Szapary a ete portee k la
connaissance de M. de Jagow par le Charge d'Affaires de Russie. Le Secretaire d'Etat

— 101 —
lui a dit que, conformement aux remarques de I'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne en Russie,
pulsque apres rexpiralion de ruitimatum de I'Autriche le Gouvernement de Vienne
ne se refusait pas k causer avec le Gouvernement de Petersbourg, il y avait lieu
d'esperer que de son cote le Gomte Berchtold pourrait causer avec M. Schebeko et
qu'une issue pourrait etre trouvee aux difBcultes actuelles. Le Charge d affaires russe
Yoit avec faveur cette disposition des esprits, qui correspond aux desirs de M. de
Jagow de voir Vienne et Petersbourg s'entetidre directement et degager TAllemagne.
D y a lieu de se demander seulement si I'Autriche ne cherche pas a gagner du temps
pour se preparer.

J'ai aujourd'hui appuye la demarche de mon CoUegue d'Angleterre aupres du
Secretaire d'Etat. Gelui-ci m'a repondu comme a Sir Ed. Goschen, qu'il lui etait
impossible d'accepter I'idee d'une sorte de conference a Londres entre les Ambas-
sadeurs des quatre Puissances, et quil faudrait donner a la suggestion anglaise une
autre forme, pour quelle put etre realisee. Je lui ai fait valoir le danger d'un retard,
qui pouvait amener la guerre , et lui ai demande s'il la souhaitait. II a proteste et a
ajoute que les conversations directes entre Vienne et Petersbourg etaient entamees, et
que, des maintenant, il en attendait une suite favorable.

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre et I'Ambassadeur d'ltalie sont venus me voir ce
matin ensemble , pour m'entrelenir des conversations qu'ils avaient eues avec M. de
Jagow hier au sujet de la proposition de Sir Ed. Grey. Le Secretaire d'Etat leur a,
somme toute, tenu le mem6 langage qua moi : acceptant en principe de s'unir dans
une demarche commune a I'Angleterre , a I'ltalie et a nous-memes, mais repoussant
toute idee de conference.

Nous avons pense, mes collegues et moi, qu'il n'y avait la qu'une question de
forme et I'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre va suggerer a son Gouvernement de libeller
autrement sa proposition, qui pourrait prendre le caractere d'une demarche diplo-
matique a Vienne et a Petersbourg.

En raison de la repugnance manifestee par M. de Jagow contre toute demarche a
Vienne, Sir Ed. Grey pourrait le mettre au pied du mur, en lui demandant de for-
muler lui-meme comment pourrait se produire Taction diplomatique des puissances
pour eviter la guerre.

Nous devons nous associer a tons les efforts en faveur de la paix compatibles avec
nos engagements vis-a-vis de notre alliee; mais, pour laisser les responsabilit^s ou
elles sont, il importe d'avoir soin de demander i I'Allemagne de preciser ce qu'elle
veut.

Jules Cambon.

^ 102

N'* 82.

M. Paleologue, Amhassadeur de France a Petersbourg,

a M. BiEM£N.u-MARTmvMinistre des Affaires etrangeres ,p. i.

Petersbourg, le 28 juillet igi4-

Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois n'a pas encore repondu a la proposition du
Gouvemement rnsse, tendant.a I'ouverture d'unc conversation directe entrc Peters-
bourg et Vienne.

M. Sazonoir a re^u cet apres-midl les Ambassadeurs d'Allemagne et d'Autriche-
Hongrie;rimpressioi5 qu'il a.gardee de son double entretien est mauvaise.: «.Decid6-
ment, ma-t-il dit, TAutriche ne veut pas causer ».

A la suite dune conversation que je viens d'avoir avec.mes deux collegues, j'e-
prouvcla meme injpression de pessimisme.

Paleqlogue.

r 83.

M. DuMAiNE, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne,

a M. BiENVENU-MARTiNvMinistre des Affaires etrangeres p, i.

Vienne, le 28 juiliet 1914.

Le'Comte Berchtold vient de declarer a Sir M. deBuusen que to.ute intervention
tendant a la reprise de la discussion entre I'Autriche et la Serbie> sur la base de la
reponse serbe, serait inutile, et d'ailleurs trop tardive, la guerre ayant ete oiTicielle-
ment declaree a midi.

L'attitude de mon collegue russe n'a jusqu a present pas varie : il ne s agissait pas
a son avis de localiser le conflit, mais bien de Tempecher. La declaration de guerre
rendra bien difficile Tengagemeilt des pourparlers aquatre, ainsi que' la continuation
des etitretiens directs entre M. Sazonoff et le Comte Szapary.

On pretexte ici que laformiile qui paraissait pouvoir obtenir I'adhesion de TAlle-
magne, « me'diation entre I'Autriche et la Russie », a I'inconvenient d'accuser entre ces
deux empires un conflit qui n'existe pas,jusqu'a present.

Parmi les soup^ons qu'inspire la soudaine et violente resolution de I'Autriche, le
plus inquietant est que I'Allemagne Taurait poussee a I'agression contre la Serbie afin
de pouvoir elle-meme entrer en lutte avec la Russie et la France, dans les circon-
stances quelle suppose devoir lui etre le plus favorables, et dans des conditions
deliberees.

DOMAINE.

— 103 —

CHAPITRE V

DE U DfiCLARATION DE GUERRE DE L'AUTRICHE A LA SERRIE

(28 JWLLET 19U

A L'ULTIMATUM DE L'ALLEMAGNE A LA RUSSIE

(31 JUILLET 1914)

— 105 —

N" 84.

r ■

M. Barrere, Ambassadeur de France a Rome,
I a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires ^trangeres p. i.

Rome, le 29 juUlet 19 14.

La Consulta estlme que, malgre fa declaration de guerre de I'Autriche kh Serbie,
il n'y a pas lieu d'interrompre ies efforts diplomatiques tendant a la reunion dune
Conference ^ Londres en vue d une mediation.

Barrere.

N° 85.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires ^trangeres p. i.,

a Saint-Petersbourg, Londres, Berlin, Rome, Vienne, Constantinople,
Belgrade.

Paris, le 29 juillet 191 4.

L'attitude austro-allemande se precise. L'Autriche, inquiete de la propagande
slave, a saisi Toccasion do lattentat de Serajevo pour chatier Ies menees serbes, el
prendre de ce cote, des garanties qui peuvent, selon que Ton laissera ou non se
developper Ies evenements, ne porter que sur le Gouvernement et I'armee serbes,
ou devenir territoriales. L'AUernagnc s'interpose entre son alliee et Ies autres puis-
sances, en declarant qu'il s'agit d'une question locale, chatiment d'un crime politique
dans le passe, garanties "certaines pour favenir que Ies menees anti-autricbiennes
prendront fin. Le Gouvernement allemand estime que la Russie doit se contenter
des assurances officielles et formelles donnees par I'Autricbe qu elle ne poursuit
pas d'agrandissement territorial et respectera fintegrite de la Serbie; dans ces con-
ditions, c'est de la Russie seule, si elle voulait intervenir dans une question bien
delimitee, que pent venir un danger de guerre. Dans ces conditions c'est a Peters-
bourg seulement qu'il faut agir pour le maintien de la paix.

Ce sophisme, qui dispenserait TAUemagne d'inlervenir k Vienne, a ete soutenu
sans succes k Paris par M. de Sch'oen, qui a vainement tenle de nous entratner dans
une action solidaire franco-allemande a Petersbourg; il a 6te egalement developpe
a Londres aupres de Sir E. Grey : en France comme en Angleterre, on a repondu
que le cabinet de Petersbourg a donne, depuis le d^but, Ies plus grandes preuveiS
de sa moderation, en particulier en s'associant aux puissances pour donner k la

Documents DiPLOMATigt^ES. '— Gaerre europdenne. 1 4

~- 106 —
Serbie \e conseil de ceder aux exigences de la note autrichienne. La Russle ne menace
done nuUement la paix ; c'est a Vienna qu'il faut agir, c'esl de la que vient le danger,
du moment qu'on y refuse de se conlenter de la soumission presque totale de la
Serbie a des exigences exorbitantes et qu'on ne veut pas accepter la collaboration des
puissances pour la discussion des points restant a regler entre I'Autricbe et la Serbie,
et enfin qu'on n'hesile pas devant une declaration de guerre aussi precipitee que la
note primitive de I'Autriche-Hongrie.

L attitude a Berlin, comme a Vienne, reste dilatoire. Dans la premiere capitale,
tout en protestant du d^sir allemand de sauvegarder la paix generate par une action
conunune des quatre puissances, on repousse I'idee d'une Conference, sans suggerer
aucun autre moyen et en refusant d'agir positiyement a Vienne. Dans la capitale
autrichienne, on voudrait amuser Petersbourg par I'illusion d'une entente pouvant
resulter de conversations directes, et Ton agit contre la Serbie.

Dans ces conditions, il parait essentiel que le cabinet de Petersbourg, dont le
desir de denouer pacifiquement la crise est manifeste , adhere immediatement a la
proposition anglaise. Celle-ci a besoin d'etre tres appuyee k Berlin pour decider M. de
Jagow a une action reelle sur Vienne, susceptible d'arreter I'Autriche et d'empecher
que son avanlage diplomatique se double d'un succes mililaire. Le Gouvernement
austro-hongrois ne manquerait pas en effet d'en profiler pour imposer a la Serbie,
sous le nom elastique de garanties, des conditions qui modifieraient en fait, malgre
toutes les assurances de desinteressement territorial, le statut de TEurope orientale,
et risqueraient de compromettre gravement, soit des main tenant, soit dans un avenir
prochain, la paix g6n6rale.

Bienvenu-Martin.

N° 86.

M. Paleologue, Ambassadeur de France a Saint-Petersbourg ,
k M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des AfF&ires ^trangeres p. i.

Saint-Petersbourg, le 29 juillet 1914.

Des maintenant, je suis en mesure d'assurer a Votre Excellence que le Gouverne-
ment russe acquiesce a toutes les procedures que la France et I'Angleterre lui propo-
seront pour sauvegarder la paix. Mon coUegue d'Anglelerre telegraphic dans le m6me
sens k Londres.

Pal^ologue. '

107 —

N** 87,

M. Klobukowski, Ministre de France a Bruxelles,

a M. BiENVENU- Martin, Ministre des Affaires toang^resp. i.

Bruxeiles, le 29 juillet 191 4.

De mon entretien avec M. Davignon et diverses personnes en mesure d'etre exac-
tement informees, je rapporte rimpression suivante : Tattitude de rAilemagne est
enigmatique et autorise toutes les apprehensions. II parait invraisembiable que le
Gouvemement austro-hongrois ait pris une initiative le conduisant, suivant un plan
precongu, k une declaration de guerre sans accord prealable avec I'empereur Guil-
laume.

Le Gouvemement allemand reste I'arme au pied, reservant, selon les circon-
stances, son action pacifique ou guerriere, mais I'inquietude est telle dans tous les
milieux qu'une intervention brusque contre nous ne surprendrait ici personne. Mes
Collegues de Russie et d'Angleterre partagent ce sentiment.

Le Gouvemement beige prend des dispositions conforaaes ^la declaration que m*a
faite hier soir M. Davignon que tout sera mis en oeuvre pour la defense de la neu-
tralite du pays.

Klobukowski.

r 88.

M. RoNSSiN, Consul g^n^ral de France a Francfort,

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i.

Francfort, le 29 juillet 1914.

Je vous signals d'importants mouvemenls de troupes hier et cette nuit. Ce matin,
plusleurs regiments sont arrives en tenue de campagne, notamment par jes routes de
Darmstadt, CasseletMayence, qui sont remplies de militaires. Les ponts et chemins de
fer sont gardes sous pretexte de preparer les manoeuvres d'automne.

RONSSIN.

108 —

r 89.

M. Allize, Ministre de France a Munich,

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i.

Munich, le 29 juillet 1914.

On m'assure que les moulins d'lUkirch (Alsace-Lorraine) ont ele invites a cesser de
livrer a leur clientele ordinaire et a reserver toule leur production pour Tarmee.

De Strasbourg sont signales des transports de canons automobiles employes pour
le tir sur aeroplanes et dirigeables.

Sous pretexte de modification dans les exercices d'automne, les sous-officiers el
soldats des regiments d'infanterie bavaroise de Metz, qui etaient en permission en
Bavierc a Toccasion des recoltes, ont re^u Tordre hier de rentrer immedial^ment,

Allize.

r 90.

M. DuMALNE, ambassadeur de France a Vienne,

a M. Bienvenu-Martin,. Ministre des Affaires elrangeres p. i.

Vienne, le 29 juillet 191 A.

Le Consul de France a Prague me confirme la mobilisation du 8*= corps d'armee
dejii annoncee, et celle de la division de landwehr de ce corps d'armee. Les divisions
de cavalerie de Galicie mobilisent egalemenl; des regiments, des divisions de cava-
lerle de Vienne et de Buda-Pest ont deja ete transportes a la frontiere russe. Des
convocations de reservistes ont actuellement lieu dans cette region.

En vue de faire face h toute menace, el peut-elre pour en imposer a Petersbourg,
Ic bruit court que le Gouvernemcnl auslro-hongrois aurait Tinlenlion de decider le
'60 juillet on le i*"" aout, la mobilisation generale des armees. Enfin le retour de
TEmpereur d'Iscbl a Vienne est assure pour demain.

DUMAINE.

— 109 —

^ r 91.

M. Paleologue, Ambassadeur de France a Saint-Petershourg,
a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires ^Irangeres p. i.

Saint-Petersboarg, le agjuillet 1914.

La conversation directe k laquelle le Gouvernemenl russe avail amicalement convie
le Gouvernenient austro-hongrois est refusec par celul-ci.

D'autre part^TEtat-Major russe a constate que TAutiiche precipite ses preparalifs
militaires contre la Russie et active sa mobilisation, qui a commence sur ia frontiere
de Galicie". En consequence, Tordre de mobilisation sera expedie, cette nuit, aux treize
corps d'armee destines i operer eventuellement contre TAutriche.

Malgre I'echec de sa proposition, M. Sazonoff accepte I'idee d'une conference des
quatre Puissances a Londres; il n'attache d'ailleurs aucune importance autitre officiel
de cette deliberation et se pretera k toutes les tentatives anglaises en faveur de la
paix.

Paleologue.

1\° 92.

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France h. Berlin,

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i.

Bciiin, le 29 juillet 19l4>

J'ai demande aujourd'hui au Secretaire d'Etal ou en etait la question des conver-
sations directes entre Vienne et Petersbourg, qui lui semblait bier la meilleure pro-
cedure pour arriver k une detente. II m'a repondu qu i Petersbourg les dispositions
sur ce point etaient bonnes et qu'il avail demande k V,ienne d'entrer dans cette voie.
11 altendail la reponse. Le Gouvernemenl britannique, apres avoir vu rep6usser la
suggestion d'une conference, avail fait connaitre qu'il verrail avec faveur ces conver-
sations s'ouvrir entre TAutrichc el la Russie et avail demande que I'Allemagne y
poussat I'Autriche, ce que le Gouvernemenl imperial ne manque pas de faire.

J'ai demande a M. de Jagow sll avail enfih la reponse de la Serbie a I'Autriche, ot
ce qu'il en pensait. II m'a repondu qu'il y voyait une base de negocialion possible.
J'ai repris que c'esl juslemenl pour cela que je trouvais inexplicable la rupture de
I'Autriche apres la reception d'un document pareil.

Le Secretaire d'Elat a alors fail remarquer qu'avec les peuples d'Orienl on n'avait
jamais assez de suretes et que I'Autriche voulait conlroler rexecutioa des promesses

— 110 —

qui lui etaient faites, controle que ia Serbie refusait. C'est la aux yeux du Secretaire
d'Etat, le point capital. J'ai replique a M. de Jagow que, voulant rester indepen-
dante, la Serbie devait repousser le controle d'une seule Puissance, mais qu'une
Commission Internationale ne presenterait pas le meme caractere. Les Etats Balka-
niques en comptent pins d'kme, a commencer par la Commi^ion finartciere a Athenes.
On pourrait par exenjple,. ai-je dit,, imaginer, entre- autres combinaisor^s, une Com-
mission internalionale provisoire chargee de controler I'enquete de police demandee
par rAutciche;.ii etait clairpar cet exemple que la reponse de la Serbie ouvrait la
porte a des conversations et ne justifiait pas ime rupture.

Tai ensuite demarlde au Secretaire d'Etat si, en dehors des conversations direcles
entre Vienne et Petersbourg^, auxqiielles Sir Ed. Grey s'etait rallie, il ne peinsait pas
que Taction conimiine des quatre Puissances pourrait s'exercer par Tintermediaire de
leurs Ambassadeurs; 11 ma repondu affirmativemeijt ajoutant qu'acluellemeni lie
Cabinet de Londres se confentait dappuyer dans le sens des conversations directes.

A la fin de I'apres-midi, le Chancelier de I'Empire a prie 'VAmbassadeur d'Angle-
terre de venir le Voir. II lui a parle de la proposition de Sir E; Grey tendant a .la
reunion d'une Conference ; il lui adit qu'il n'avait pas pu accepter une proposition qui
semblait imposer" Tautortte des Puissances a TAiitnche; il a assure mon Collegue de
son sincere desir de la paix et des efforts qu'il faisait a Vienne, mais il a ajoute que;
la Russie etait seule la maitresse de maintenir la paix ou de dechainer la guerre.

Sir Ed. Goschen lui a repondu qu'il ne partageait pas son sentiment et que si la
guerre eclatait, I'Autriche aurait la plus grosse part de responsabilite , car il etait
inadmissible qu'elle eut rompu avec la Serbie apres la reponse de celle-ci.

Sans discuter sur ce point, le Chancelier a dit qu'il poussait autant qu'il le pouvait
aux conveY-sations directes entre I'Autriche et la Russie; il savait que I'Angleterre
voyait cette conversation d'un ceil favorable. H a ajoute que sa propre action serait
bien difficile k Vienne , s'il etait vrai que la Russie eut mobilise sur la Irontiere au-
trichienne quatorze corps d*armee. II a prie moa collegue d'appeler sur toules' ces
observations raitefitiOD de Sir Ed. Grey.

Sir E. Goschen a telegraphic dans ce sens 6 Londres*

Lattitude du Chancelier est tres probablement la consequence du dernier entre-
lien de Sir Ed. Grey avec le prin6e Lichnowslci. Jusqu'^ ces tout derniers joUrs, on
s*est flalte ici que TAngleterre reslerait hers du d^bat, et Timpression produite par
son altitude est profonde sur le Goiivemement allemand et sur les financiers et
hommes .d'affaires.

Jules Cambon.

~ 111 —

r 93.

M. DuMAiNE, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne,

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Allaires etrangeres p. i.

Vienne, le 29 juillet 1914.

L'opinion de mes coUegues anglais, russe et italien concorde avec la mienne con-
cernant Timpossibilite d'empecher une premiere lutte entre rAutriche et la Serbia,
toutes les tentatives pour retarder le choc ayanl echoue.

M. Schebeko avail demande que les pourparlers engages a Petersbourg entre
MM. Sazondff et Szapary fussent poursuivis et renduspliis efficaces par des pouvoirs
specialement conferes a celui-ci, le comle Berchtold s y est n'etlement oppose. II
marquait ainsi que TAutriche-Hongrie ne tolere aucune intervention qui rempeche-
rait d'infliger a la Serbie un chatiment et une humiliation.

Le due d'Avarna adinet comme Ires vraiseojblable que Timminence d'une insurrec-
tion generale de ses sujets Sud-Slaves ait precipite les resolutions de la Monarchie.
II s'attache encore a lespoir qu'apres un premier succes des armees auslro-hongroises,
mais pas plus tot, une mediation pourrait limiter le conffit.

Du MAINE.

W 94,

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Miflistre des Allaires Etrangeres, p. i. ^

a Londres, Berlin^ Saint-PEtersbourg, Rome, Vienne, Constantinople,

Belgrade.

Paris, le 29 juillet 1914.

Ce matin , la communication suivante m'a ete faite par TAmbassadeur d'Allemagne
a litre ofiicieux : le Gouvernement allemand poursuit ses efforts en tue d'amener le
Gouvemement autrichien a une conversation amicale qui permettra a ce dernier de
faire connaitre exactement le but et I'extension des operations en Serbie. Le Cabinet
de Berlin espere recevoir des precisions qui seraient de nature a donner satisfactioa
a la Russie. Les efforts allemands ne sont aucunement enlraves par la declaration de
guerre intervenue. Une communication semblable sera faite k Petersbourg.

Au cours d'une conversation que j'ai eue ce matin avec le baron de Schoen,
celui-ci m'a declare que le Gouvernement allemand ignorait les intentions de Vienne.
Quand Berlin saura jusqu'ou I'Autriche veut aller, on aura une base de discussion,
qui rendra plus faciles les conversations en vue d une intervention.

— 112 —

Sur mon observation que les operations militaires engagees ne laisseraient peut-
etre pas le temps de causer, el que le Gouvernement allemand devraiit user de son
influence a Vienne en vue de les retarder, Fambassadeur m'a repondu que Berlin ne
pouvait exercer de pression, mais qu'il esperait que les operations ne seraient pas
poussees tres activement.

Bienvenu-Martin.

N° 95.

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires ^trangeres p. i.,

a Londres, Berlin, Saint-Petersbourg, Vienne, Constantinople, Rome,^
Belgrade.

Paris, le 29Juillet 191 A.

D'ordre de son Gouvernement, M. Iswolsky est venu me communiquer un tele-
gramme adresse par M. Sazonoff ^ Berlin. 11 resulte de cette information que la Russie,
a la suite de la declaration de guerre de rAutriche-Hongrie k la Serbie , des mesures
de mobilisation deja appliquees a la plus grande parlie de I'armee austro-hongroise ,
enfm du refus du comte Berchtold de continuer les pourparlers entre Vienne et
Saint-Petersbourg, avail decide la mobilisation dans les arrondissements d'Odessa,
Kiew, Moscou et Kazan. En portant ce fait a la connaissance du Gouvernement alle-
mand, I'Ambassadeur de Russie a Berlin a ete charge d'ajouler que ces precautions
militaires n'etaient a aucun degre dirigees contre TAllemagne, et ne prejugeaient pas
non plus des mesures agressives contre rAutriche-Hongrie ; I'Ambassadeur de Russie
a Vienne n'etait, d'ailleurs, pas rappele de son poste.

L'Ambassadeur de Russie m'a donne egalement le sens de deux telegrammes adresses
& Londres par M. Sazonoff : le premier, indiquant que la' decoration de guerre a la
Serbie mettait fin aux conversations du Ministre russe avec I'Ambassadeur d'Autriche,
demandait k I'Angletcrre d'exercer aussi rapidement que possible^ son action dans le
sens> de la mediation et de I'arret immediat des operations de guerre de I'Autriche
(dont la continuation donnait le temps k I'Autriche d'ecraser la Serbie pendant que
ia mediation Irainerait); le second communiquait I'impression gardee par M. Sazonoff
de ses Conversations avec I'Ambassadeur allemand, que I'AlIemagne favorise I'intran-
si^eance de I'Autriche et n'exerce pas d'action sur elle. Le Ministre russe considere
I'attilude de I'AlIemagne comme Ires inquietante et croit que I'Angleterre est en meil-
leure posture que les aulres Puissances pour entreprendre des demarches k Berlin ,
en vue d'une action sur Vienne.

Bienvenu-Martin.

113 — .

r 96.

M. Barrere, Ambassadeur de France a Rome,

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeresjp. i.

Rome, ie 29 juillet 191 4.

Le Ministre des Aflaires etrangeres a ete informe officiellement par TAmbassadeur.
de Russie que son Gouvernement, a la suite de la declaration de guerre de TAutriche.
a laSerbie et des mesures de mobilisation prises d'ores et deja par rAutriche, avait
donne I'ordre de mobiliser dans les districts de Kiew, Odessa, Moscou et Kazan. II
a ajoute que celle mesure n'avait pas un caractere agressif contre TAUemagne et que
I'Ambassadeur de Russie a Vienne n'avait pas ete rappele.

En commentant cette conamunication , le Marquis de San Giuliano m'a dit que
malheureusement dans toute cette affaire la conviction de TAutriche et celle de TAl-
lemagne avaient ete et etaient encore que la Russie ne marcherait pas. II m'a lu k ce
propos une depeche de M. BoUati lui rendant compte d'un entretien qu'il avait eu
aujourd'hui avec M. de Jagow, et ou ce dernier lui avait encore repete qu'il ne croyait
pas que la Russie marcherait. II fondait cette croyance sur le fait que le Gouverne-
ment russe venait d'envoyer a Berlin un agent pour traiter de certaines questions
linancieres. L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche a Berlin a dit egalement a son Gollegue
anglais qu'il ne croyait pas k une guerre generale , la Russie n'etant ni en humeur ni
en etat de faire la guerre.

Le Marquis de San Giuliano ne partage pas du tout cette opinion. II estime
que si I'Autriche se contente d'humilier la Serbie, et d'exiger, en outre de 1' ac-
ceptation de la note, certains avantages materiels qui ne touchent pas k son terri-
toire, la Russie peut encore trouver matiere a composition avec elle. Mais si I'Au-
triche veut soit demembrer la Serbie, soit la detruire comme Etat independant,
il considere comme impossible k la Russie de ne pas intervenir militairement.

Malgre I'extreme gravite de la situation, le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres ne me
parait pas desesperer de la possibilite d'un arrangement. II croit que I'Angleterre peut
encore exercer beaucoup d'influence k Berlin dans un sens pacifique. II a eu hier
soir, m'a-t-il dit, une longue conversation avec I'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre,
Sir R. Rodd, pour lui demontrer combien I'inlervention anglaise pourrait etre effi-
cace. II m'a dit en terminant : « Si tel est aussi I'avis de votre Gouvernement, il pour-
rait, de son cote, insister dans ce sens a Londres. »

BARRlfcRE.

Documents diplomatiooes. — Guerre europecnne. l5

116

r 97.

M. Ren6 Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires ^trang^res,
a M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France, a Londres.

Paris, le 29 juillet 1914.

Je vous serais oblige de prier Sir Ed. Grey de bien vouloir reprendre le plus tot
possible k Berlin, sous la forme qu'il jugera la plus opportune et la plus efficace, sa
proposition de mediation des quatre Puissances, qui avait obtenu I'adhesion de
principe du Gouvemement allemand.

Le Gouvemement russe a du, de son cote, faire exprimer directement le meme
d6sir au Gouveraement anglais; la declaration de guerre de TAutriche a la Serbie, ses
envois de troupes sur la frontiere austro-russe , la mobilisation russe consecutive sur
la frontiere de Galicie, ont en effet mis fin aux conversations directes austro-russes.

Les precisions que le Gouvemement allemand va demander k Vienne, conforme-
ment k la declaration du baron de Schoen que je vous ai fait connaitre, pour s'infor-
mer des intentions du Gouvemement autrichien, permettront aux quatre Puissances
d'exercer une action utile entre Vienne et Petersbourg pour le maintien de la paix.

Je vous prie de signaler egalement au Secretaire d'Elat anglais combien il serait
important qu'il obtint du Gouvemement italien le maintien de son concours le plus
entier pour sa collaboration a faction des quatre Puissances en faveur de la paix.

Ren4 Viviani.

N- 98.

M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France, a Londres,

a M. Bienvenu-Martin , Ministre des Affaires Mrang^res p. i. /

Londres, le 29 juiHet 19 14-

Dans son entretien d'aujourd'hui avec mon collegue d'Allemagne, Sir Ed. Grey a
fait observer que I'ouverture de M. Sazonoff pour une conversation directe entre la
Russie et I'Autriche n'ayant pas ete accueillie k Vienne , il conviendrait d'en revenir a
sa proposition d 'intervention amicale des quatre Puissances non directement interessees.
Cette suggestion a ete acceptee en principe par le Gouvemement Allemand , mais il a
fait des objections k I'idee d'une conference ou d'une mediation. Le Secretaire d'Etat
des Affaires etrangeres a invite le Prince Lichnowski k prier son Gouvemement de

— 115 —
proposer lui-meme une formule. Quelle quelle soit, si elle permet de maintenir la
paix, elle sera agreee par I'Angleterre, la France et I'ltalie.

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a du transxnettre.immediatement k Berlin la demande
de Sir Ed. Grey. En me rendant compte de cette conversation, le Secretaire d'Etat
des Affaires etrangeres a ajoute que la reponse de TAllemagne a cette communication ,
ainsi qu a celle de la Russie relative* a la mobilisation de quatre corps d'armee sur la
frontiere autrichienne , nous permettra de nous rendre compte des intentions du
Gouvernement allemand. Mon collegue d'Allemagne ayant interroge Sir Ed. Grey
sur les intentions du Gouvernement britannique, le Secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires
etrangeres a repondu qu'il n'avait pas a se prononcer quant a present.

Sir Ed. Grey ne m'a pas cache qu'il trouvait la situation tres grave et qu'il gardait
peu d'espoir dans une solution pacifique.

Paul Cambon.

X 99.

M. BoppE, Ministre de France a Belgrade,

a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i.

Belgrade, le 29 juiliet 191 A.

Le Prince heritier avait, des la remise de Tultimatum austro-hongrois, telegraphic
au Tzar pour demander sa protection. Mon collegue de Russie me confie qil'il vienl
de communiquer a M. Pachitch la reponse de Sa Majeste.

Le Tzar remercie le Prince de s'elre adresse a lui dans une circonstance aussi cri-
tique ; il declare que toutes les dispositions sont prises pour arriver a une solution
pacifique du conflit , et donne au Prince I'assurance formelle que , si ce but ne peut
etre atteint, la Russie ne se desinteressera jamais du sort de la Serbie.

BOPPE.

r 100.

~~ »

M. Paleologue, Ambassadeur de France a Saint-Petersbourg,

a M. Bienvenu-Martijs, Ministre des Aff'aires etrangeres p. i.

Saint-Petcrsbourg, le 29 juiliet 1914.

L' Ambassadeur d'Allemagne est venu declarer a M. Sazonoff" que si la Russie n'ar-
rele pas ses preparatifs militaires, I'armee allemande recevra I'ordre de mobiliser.

— 116 —

M. Sazonoff a repondu que les preparalifs russes sont motives: dun cote, par
rintransigeance obstinee de I'Autriche; d'autre part, par le fait que huit corps
austro-hongrois sont dejk mobilises.

Le ton sur lequel le comte de Pourtales s'est acquitte de la notification a decid6
le Gouvernement russe, cette nuit meme, k ordonner la mobilisation des treize
corps destines a operer contre I'Autriche.

Paleologue.

IN*' 101.

M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres,
aux. Ambassadeurs de France a Saint-Pete rsbourg et Londres.

Paris, ie 3ojuillet 1914

. M. Iswolski est venu cette nuit me dire que I'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a nollfie k
M. Sazonoff la decision de son Gouvernement de mobiliser ses forces armees, si
la Russie ne cesse pas ses preparatifs militaires.

Le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres du Tsar fait remarquer que ces preparatifs
n'ont ete commences qu'^ la suite de la mobilisation par I'Autriche de huit corps
d'armee et du refus de celle puissance de r^gler pacifiquement son differend avec la
Serbie. M. Sazonoff declare que, dans ces conditions, la Russie ne peut que hdter
ses armements et envisager I'imminence de la guerre , qu elle compte sur le secours
d'alliee de la France et qu'elle considere comrae desirable que I'Angleterre se joigne
sans perdre de temps k la Russie et k la France.

La France est resolue a remplir toutes les obligations de ralllance.

Elle ne negligera, d'ailleurs, aucun effort en vue de la solution du conflit dans
il'interet de la paix generale. La conversation engagee enlre les Puissances moins direc-
tement interessees permet d'esperer encore que la paix puisse etre preservee; j'estime
done qu'il serait opportun que, dans les mesures de precaution et de defense aux-
quelles la Russie croit devoir proceder, elle ne prit immediatement aucune dispo-
sition qui offrit k I'Allemagne un pretexle pour une mobilisation totale ou parlielle
de ses forces.

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne est venu a la fin de I'apres-midl d'hier me parler des
mesures militaires que prenait le Gouvernement de la Republlque en ajoutant que
la France etait libre d'agir ainsi, mais qu'en Allemagne les preparatifs ne pouvaient
etre secrets et qu'il ne faudrait pas que I'opinion fran^aise s'alarmat si I'Allemagne s'y
decidait.

J'ai r6pondu que le Gouvernement fran^ais n'avait pris aucune mesure dont ses

— 117 —

voisins pussent etre inquiets et que sa volonte de se preter a toute negociation pour!
le maintien de la paix ne pouvait elre mise en doute.

Ren^ VivjANi.

r 102.

M. Paleologue, Ambassadeur de France a Saint-P^tersbourg,

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires ^tran-

geres.

Si^int-Petersbourg, le 3o juillet igi'd-

M. SazonofF, k qui j'ai fait connaitre votre desir de voir eviter toute mesure mili-
taire qui pourrait oQrir k TAllemagne un pretexte k la mobilisation generale, m'a repondu
que juslement, dans le cours de la nuit derniere, I'Etat-Major avait fait surseoir k des
mesures de precaution militaire pour eviter toute equivoque. Hier, le Chef d'Etat-
Major general russe a convoque I'Attache militaire del'Ambassade d'Allemagne, et lui
a donne sa parole d'honneur que la mobilisation ordonnee ce matin vise exclusiv«-
ment I'Autriche.

Toutefois, dans un entretien qu'il a eu cet apres-midi avec le comte de Pourtales,
M. SazonofI a du se convaincre que TAUemagne ne veut pas prononcer k Vienne la
parole decisive qui sauvegarderait la paix. L'empereur Nicolas garde la meme impres-
sion d un echange de telegrammes qu'il vient d'avoir personnellement avec fempereur
Guillaume.

D'autre part, I'Etat-Major et I'Amiraute russes ont requ. d'inquietants renseigne-
ments sur les preparatifs de farmee et de la marine allemandes.

En me donnant ces informations, M. Sazonolf a ajoute que le Gouvernement
russe ne continue pas moins ses elfoi-ls de conciliation. II m'a repete : « Jusqu'au der-
nier instant, je negocierai. »

Paleologue.

r 103.

M. Paleologue, Ambassadeur de France a Saint- Petersbourg,

a M. Ren^ Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires ^tran-

geres.

Saint-Petersbourg, le 3o juillet 19' 4.

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne est venu cette nuit insister de nouveau , mais dans
des termes moins categoriques, aupres de M. Sazonoff pour que la Russia cesse

— 118 —
ses preparatifs militaires, en affirmant que TAutriche ne porterait pas atteinte k
I'inlegrite territoriale de la Serbie :

« Ce n est pas seulement Tintegrite territoriale de la Serbie que nous devons sau-
« vegarder, a repondu M. SazonolT, c'est encore son independance et sa souverainete.
« Nous ne pouvons pas admettre que la Serbie devienne vassale de TAutriche, »

M. Sazonoff a ajoute : « L'heure est trop grave pour que je ne vous declare pas
toule ma pensee. En intervenant a Pelersbourg, tandis qu'elle refuse d'intervenir
a Vienne, I'Allemagne ne cherche qu'i gagner du temps, afm de permettre a I'Au-
triche d'ecraser le petit royaume serbe avant que la Russie n'ait pu le secourir. Mais
I'empereur Nicolas a un tel desir de conjurer la guerre que je vais vous faire en son
nom une nouvelle proposition :

« Si I'Autriche, reconnaissant que son conflit avec la Serbie a assume le caractere
d'une question d'interet europeen, se declare prete k eliminer de son ultimatum les
clauses qui portent atteinte a la souverainete de la Serbie , la Russie s'engage a cesser
loutes mesures militaires. »

Le comle de Pourtales a promis d'appuyer cette proposition aupres de son Gou^
vernement.

Dans la pensee de M. Sazonoff, Tacceptation de sa proposition par TAutriche aurait
pour corollaire logique Touverture d'une deliberation des Puissances a Londres.

Le Gouvernement russe montre, une fois encore, par son attitude, qu'il ne neglige
rien pour enrayer le conflit.

pALtOLOGUE.

no4.

M. DuMAiNE, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne,

a M. Rene Viviani, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres.

Vienne, ie 3o juillet 19 1 4-

Malgre la communication faite hier par I'Ambassadeur de Russie a plusieurs de ses
collegues, dont celui d'Allemagne, au sujet de la mobilisation partielle dans son
pays, la presse de Vienne s'etait abstenue den publier la nouvelle. Ce silence impose
vient de s'expliquer dans un entretien de haule importance entre M. Schebeko et le
comte Berchtold, qui ont longuement envisage les redoutables difficultes pre^entes,
avec une egale bonne volonte d'y adapter des solutions reciproquement acceptablcs.

Les preparatifs militaires du cote russe, a explique M. Schebeko, n'ont d'autre but
que de repondre k ceux de I'Autriche et d'indiquer I'intention et les droits du Tzar
d'emettre son avis dans le reglemenl de la question serbe. Les mesures de mobilisa-
tion prises en Galicie, a repondu le comte Berchtold, n'impliquent non plus aucune
intention agressive et visent seulement a maintenir la situation sur le meme pied. De

— 119 —
part' et d autre on s appliquera a ce que ces mesures ne soient pas interpr§tees comme
des marques d'hostilite.

Pour ie reglement du conflit austro-serbe , il a ete convenu que les pourparlers
seraient repris a Petersbourg entre M. Sazonoll" et Ie comte Szapary ; s'ils ont ete
interrompus c'est par suite d'un malentendu, Ie comte Berchtold croyant que Ie
Mlnistre des Affaires etrangeres de Russie reclamait pour son interlocuteur des pou-
voirs qui iui permettraient de modifier les termes de Tultimatum autrichien. Le
comte Szapary sera seulemenl autorise a discuter quel accommodement serait com-
patible avec la dignite et le prestige dont les deux Empires ont un souci egal.

Ce serait done, pour le moment, sous cette forme directe et reduite aux deux
plus interessees qu'aurait lieu fexamen que Sir Ed. Grey proposait de confier aux
quatre Puissances non directement interessees.

Sir M, de Bunsen, qui se trouvait chez moi, a aussitot declare a M. Schebeko que
le Foreign Office approuvera entierement cette nouvelle procedure. Repetant fexpose
fait par Iui au Ballplatz, I'Ambassadeur de Russie a affirme que son Gouvernement
tiendra un compte beaucoup plus large qu'on ne le suppose des exigences de la Mo-
narchic ; rien n'a ete neglige par M. Schebeko pour convaincre le comte Berchtold
de la sinc6rite du desir de la Russie d'arriver a une entente acceptable pour les
deux Empires.

L'entretien s'etait maintenu dans un ton amical et permettait de croire que toute
chance de localiser le conflit n'etait pas perdue, lorsque la nouvelle de la mobilisation
allemande est parvenue a Vienne.

Dlmaine.

r 105.

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin,

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Gonseil, Ministre des Affaires etran-
geres.

Berlin, le 3o juillet 191 4-

M. de Jagow m'a telephone a deux heures que la nouvelle de la mobilisation alle-
mande, repandue une heure auparavant, etait fausse, etm'a prie de vous en informer
d'urgence; le Gouvernement imperial faitsaisir les supplements de journaux qui fan-
nonqaient. Mais ni cette communication ni ces mesures ne diminuent mes apprehen-
sions au sujet des projets de rAllemagne.

H parait certain que le Gonseil extraordinaire tenu hier soir a Potsdam avec les
autorites militaires et sous la presidence de I'Empereur avait decide la mobilisation,
ce qui explique la preparation de fedition speciale du Lokal Anzeiger, mais que sous
des influences diverses (declaration de I'Angleterre quefle reserve son entiere liberte

— uo —

d action, echange de telegrammes entre le Tzar et Guillaume II) les graves mesures
arretees ont ete suspendues.

Un des Ambassadeurs avec lequel je suls le plus lie a vu, a deux heures, M. Zini-
mermann. D'apres le Sous-Secretaire d'Etat, les autorites militaires pressent beaucoup
pour que la mobilisation soit decretee, parce que tout retard fait perdre a TAllemagne
quelques-uns de ses avantages. Cependant, jusqu a present on aurait reussi a com-
battre la bate de TEtat-Major qui, dans la mobilisation, voit la guerre. Quoi qu'il en
soit, la mobilisation pent etre decidee dun moment a I'autre. Je ne sais qui a lance
dans le Lokal Anzeiger, journal generalement officieux, une nouvelle prematuree de
nature a soulever les esprits en France.

J'ai les plus fortes raisons de penser, d'ailleurs, que toutes les mesures de mobi-
lisation qui peuvent etre realisees avant la publication de I'ordre general de mobilisa-
tion sont prises ici, ou Ton voudrait nous faire publier notre mobilisation les pre-
miers pour nous en attribuer la responsabilite.

Jules Cambon.

r 106.

M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires ^trangeres,
a M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres.

Paris, le 3o juillel 1914.

Je vous prie de porter k la connaissance de Sir Edward Grey les renseignemenls
suivants touchr.nt les preparatifs militaires fran^ais et allemands. L'Angleterre y verra
que si la France est resolue, ce n'est pas elle qui prend des mesures d'agression.

Vous atlirerez Tattcntion de Sir Edward Grey sur la decision prise par le Conseil
des Ministres de ce matin : bien que I'Allemagne ait pris ses dispositifs de couverture
k quelques centaines de metres de la frontiere, sur tout le front du Luxembourg aux
Vosges, et porte ses troupes de couverture sur leurs positions de combat, nous avons
retenu nos troupes k 1 o kilometres de la frontiere , en leur interdisant de s'en rappro-
cher davantage.

Notre plan, con^u dans un esprit d'oflensive, prevoyait pourtant que les positions
de combat de nos troupes de couverture seraient aussi rapprochees que possible de
la frontiere. En livrant ainsi une bande du territoire sans defense k I'agression sou-
daine de I'ennemi, le Gouvernement de la Republique tient a montrer que la France,
pas plus que la Russie, n'a la responsabilite de Tattaque.

Pour s'en assurer, il suffit de comparer les mesures prises des deux cotes de noire
frontiere : en France, les permissionnaires n'ont ete rappeles qu'apres que nous avons
acquis la certitude que I'Allemagne I'avait fait depuis cinq jours. « I

— 121 —

En Allemagne, non seulemenl les troupes en garnison a Metz ont ete poussees
jusqua la frontiere , mais encore elles ont ete renforcees par des elements transportes
en cheniin de fer de garnisons de Tinteneur, telles que celles de Treves on de Cologne.
Rien d'analogue n a ete fait en France.

L'armement des places de la frontiere (deboisements, mise en place de Tarme-
nient, construction de batteries, renforcement des reseaux de fil de fer) a ete com-
mence en Allemagne des le samedi 25; chez nous, il va fetre, la France ne pouvanl
plus se dispenser de prendre les meines mesures.

Les gares ont ete occupees militairement en Allemagne le samedi 2 5 , en France
le mardi 28.

Enlln, en Allemagne, les reservistes, par di-zaine de milliers, ont dte rappeles par
convocations individuelles, ceux residant a I'etranger (classes de 1 goS a 1911) rappe-
les, les ofTiciers de reserve convoques; a I'interieur, les routes sent barrees, les auto-
mobiles ne circulent qu'avec un permis. G'est le dernier stade avant la mobilisation.
Aucune de ces mesures n'a ete prise en France*

L'armee allemande a ses avant-postes sur nos bornes frontieres; par deux fois»
hier, des patrouilles allemandes ont penetre sur notre territoire. Tout le XVP Corps
de Metz, renforce par une partie du VHP venu de Treves et de Cologne, occupe la
frontiere de Metz au Luxembourg; le XV*" Corps d'armee de Strasbourg a serre sur
la frontiere.

Sous menace d'etre fusilles, les Alsaciens-Lorrains des pays annexes ont defense de
passer la frontiere.

Rene Viviani.

r 107.

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin,

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires ^tran-

geres.

Berlin , le 3o juillet 1914.

L' Ambassadeur d'Angleterre n'a pas regu communication de la reponse de I'Alle-
magne a la demande de Sir E. Grey. II ma dit que Berlin avail consulte Vienne et
attendait encore favis de son allie.

Mon collcgue de Russie vient de me faire connaitre, de son cote, que M. de
Jagow (auquel le Comte de Pourtales avail communique la formule de conciliation
suggeree par M. Sazonoff pour une entente austro-russe) venait de lui declarer qu'il
Irouvait cette proposition inacceptable pour fAutriche, marquanl ainsi Taction nega-
tive de la diplomatic allemande a Vienne.

Jules Cambon.

Documents diplomatiques. — Guerre ciiropdenne. , 16

- 122 —

r 10^.

M. Paul Cambon , Ambassadeur de France a Londres ,

a M. Ren^ Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des AfFaires etran-
geres.

Londres, le 3o juiilet 1914.

Le Prince Lichnowski n'a pas apporte de reponse k la demande que lui avail
adressee hier Sir Ed. Grey pour obtenir du Gouvemement allemand une formula
d'intervention des quatre puissances dans Imteret de la paix, Mais mon collegue
d'AHemagne a questionne le Secretaire d'Etat des Aflaires etrangeres sur les prepa-
raiifs jnilitaires de I'Angleterre.

. Sir Ed. Grey lui a repondu qu'ils n avaient aucun caractere offensif , mais que ,
dans I'etat actuel des aflaires sur le continent, il etait naturel de prendre quelques
precautions; qu'en Anglelerre, comme en France, on desirait le maintien de la paix,
et que si, en Angleterre, comme en France, on envisageait des mesures defensives,
ce n'etait pas dans le but de preparer une agression.

' Les renseignements que Votre Excellence m'a adress6s au sujet des mesures mili-
taires prises par I'Allemagne sur la frontiere Iran^aise m'ont permis de marquer k Sir
Edward Grey qu'il ne s'agit plus seulement au jourd'hui d'un conflit d'influence entre
ia Russie et rAutricbe-Hongrie; une agression risque d'etre commise qui pourrait
provoquer une guerre generale.

Sir Edward Grey a parfaitement compris mon sentiment et, comme moi, il estime
que le moment serait venu d'envisager toutes les hypotheses et de les discuter en
commun.

Paul Cambon^

N^ 109.

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France h Berlin,

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran-
geres.

Berlin , le 3o j uillet 1 9 1 4-

Dans Tentreyue que jai eue aujourd'hui avec le Secretaire d'Etat, j'ai demande k
M. de Jagow quelle reponse il avait faite k Sir Ed. Grey, qui lui avait demande de
dpnner lui-meme la formule de I'intervention des puissances desinteressees.

— 123 —

II m'a repondu que, « pour gagner du temps », il avail decide d'agir directemenl
€t qu'il avail demaiide a rAutriche de dire sur quel lerrain on pourrait causer
avec elle. Celte reponse a pour effel» sous pretexle d'ailer plus vile, d'eliminer TAn-
gleterre , la France el I'llalie el de confier a M. de Tehirsky, donl les senlimenls
pangermanisles el russophobes sonl conuus, le soin d'amener I'Aulriche k une altilude
conciliante.

M. de Jagow m'a parle ensuile de la mobilisalion russe sur la froutiere autrichiennei
ii m'a dil que cette mobilisation compromeltait Ic succes de loute intervention aupres
<3e rAutriche , el que lout dependail de \k. II a ajoute qu il craignail que TAulricbe
ne mobilisat completement a la suite de la mobilisation parlielle russe, ce epii pou-
yait entrainer par contre-coup la mobilisation lolale russe, el par suite celle de FAl-
iemagne.

J'ai fait remarquer au Secretaire d'Elat qu'il m avail dit lui-meme que TAUemagne
ne se considererait comme obligee de mobiliser que si la Russie mobilisaiit sur les
frontieres aHemandes el que lei n'etait pas le cas, II m'a repondu que c'etait vrai,
mai^ que les chefs de I'Artoee insistaienl, car tout retard est une perle de force*
pour I'armee allemande, el « que les paroles que je rappelais ne constituaienl pas, de
sa part, un engagement ferme ».

L'impression 'que je rapporte de cet entretien est que les chances de paix ont
encore decru.

Jules Cambon.

r no.

M. Paul Cambon i AmLassadeur de France h Londres,

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires ^tran-
geres.

Londres, le3i juiflet 191 4.

Au debut de notre entretien d'aujourd'hui , Sir E. Grey nia dit que le Prince
Lichnowski lui avail demande ce matin si TAngleterre observerait la neulralite dans
le conflit qui se prepare. Le Secretaire d'Elat aux Affaires etrangeres lui a repondu
que, si le conflit devenail general, I'Angleterre ne pourrait pas rester neutre el,
nolamment, que si la France y elait impliquee, I'Anglelerre y serail enlrainee.

J'ai interroge alors Sir E. Grey sur la deliberation du Cabinet qui avail eu lieu
ce matin. II m'a repondu qu'apres avoir examine la situation, le Cabinet avail pense
que pour le moment le Gouvernemenl britannique ne pouvail nous garanlir son inter-
vention, qu'il avail I'intention de s*entremellre pour obtenir de I'Allemagne el de la
France Tengagement de respecter la neulralite beige, mais que pour envisager une
intervention il convenait d'atlendre que la situation se developpslt.

J'ai demande a Sir E. Grey si, pour intervenir, le Gouvernemenl britannique
altendrait Tenvahissement du territoire fran^ais. J'ai insiste sur le fail que les me-

— 124 —
sures deja adoptees sur notre frontiere par I'Allemagne revelaient des intentions
d'agression prochaine, et que si Ton voulait eviter devoir se renouveier I'erreur de
i'Europe en 1870, il convenait que TADgleterre erivisageat des maintenant les con-
ditions dans lesquefles elle nous donnerait le concours sur lequel la France comptait.

Sir E. Grey m'a repondu que I'opinion du Cabinet ne s'etait formee que sur la
situation actuelle, que cette situation pouvait se modifier et ^ue, dans ce cas, on
appellerait aussitot le Conseil des Ministres a en deliberer.

Sir A. Nicolson, que j'ai vu en sortant du Cabinet du Secretaire d'Etal, ma dit que
le Conseil se reunirait de nouveau demain, et, confidentiellement, m'a fait entendre
que le Secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires etrangeres nemanquerait pas de reprendre la
discussion.

Conformement a vos instructions, j'ai fait le necessaire pour que la lettre auto-
graphe que M. le President de la Republique adresse a Sa Majeste le Roi d'Angleterre
soit remise ce soir au Roi. Cette demarche, qui sera cerlainement communiquee au
Premier Ministre, des demain matin, sera, je n'en doute pas, prise en serieuse con-
sideration par le Cabinet britannique.

Paul C AMBON.

N° 111.
M. MoLLARD, Ministre de France a Luxembourg,

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Etran-
geres-

Luxembourg, ie3i juiilet 1914.

Le Ministre d'Etat sort de la Legation, il venait de me dire que les AUemands
avaient ferme les ponts sur la Moselle de Schengen el de Remich avec des voilures,
celui de Wormeldange avec des cordes. Sur la Sure, les ponts de Wasserbillig et
d'Echternach ne sont pas condamnes, mais les AUemands ne laissent plus sortir de
Prusse ni ble, ni betail, ni automobiles.

M. Eyschen m'a prie, el c'est le vrai but de sa visile, de vous demander une decla-
ration officielle assuranl que la France respeclera .en cas de conflit la neutrality du
Luxembourg. Comme je lui demandais s'il avail re^u une declaration analogue du
Gouvememenl allemand, il m'a dit qu'il allait se rendre chez le Ministre d'Allemagne
pour avoir la meme declaration.

Post-scn'pium. — Jusqu'i present, aucune mesure particuliere n'a ete prise par le
Gouvememenl luxembourgeois. M. Eyschen revient de la Legation d'Allemagne, il
s'esl plaint des mesures de suspicion prises contre un voisin neutre. Le Ministre d'Etat
a demande au Ministre d'Allemagne une declaration officielle de son Gouvememenl,
prenant fengagement de respecter la neutralite. M, de Buch lui aurait repondu :
« Cela va de soi mais il laudrait que le Gouvememenl fran^ais prit le meme enga-
gement »,

MOLLARD.

— 125 —

r 112.

M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Aflaires ^trangeies,
a MM. les Ambassadeurs de France a Londres, Saint-P^tersboiirg,
Berlin , Vienne et Rome. ^

Paris, le 3i juillet 1914.

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre m'a remis une note de son Gouvernement demandant
au Gouvernement frangais d'appuyer k Saint-Pel ersbourg une proposition tendant
k la solution pacifique du conflit austro-serbe.

Cette note expose que I'Ambassadeur d'Aliemagne a inform^ Sir Edw. Grey de
I'intention qu'a son Gouvernement de s'efforcer d'agir sur le Gouvernement austro-
hongrois, apres la prise de Belgrade et I'occupation des regions voisines.de la fron-
tiere, pour obtenir la promesse de ne pas avancer davantage, pendant que les Puis-
sances chercheraient a obtenir que la Serbie donnat des satisfactions suffisantes a
I'Aulriche; le territoire occupe serait evacu6 une fois quelle aurait regu satisfaction.

Sir Edw. Grey a fait cette suggestion le 2 9 juillet et exprime Tespoir que les
preparatifs militaires seront suspendus de tons cotes. Bien que I'Ambassadeur de
Russie a Londres ait informe le Secretaire d'Etat qu'il craint que la condition russe
[si rAairiche, reconnaissant que son conflit avec la Serbie a assume le caractere (Pane
question d'lnleret europeen, se declare prete a eliminer de son ultimatum les points
qui portent atteinte au principe de la souverainete serhe, la Russie s engage a arreter
ious prSparatifs militaires). ne puisse elre modifiee, Sir Edw. Grey pense que, si I'Au-
triche arrete son avance apres Toccupation de Belgrade, le Gouvernement russe
pourrait accepter de cbanger sa formule, dans ce sens que les Puissances examineraient
comment la Serbie donnerait des satisfactions completes a I'Autriche sans porter
atteinte a la souverainete ou a I'independance du Royaume. Dans le cas ou TAutriche,
ayant occupe Belgrade et le territoire serbe voisin , se declarerait prete , dans Tinterct:
de I'Europe, a cesser d'avancer et k discuter comment Ton pourrait arriver a un
arrangement, la Russie pourrait aussi consentir k la discussion et suspendre ses pre-
paratifs militaires, pourvu que les autres Puissances agissent de meme.

Gonformemeht a la demande de Sir Edw. Grey, le Gouvernement frangais s'esl
rallie a la suggestion anglaise et a prie dans les termes suivants son Ambassadeur k
Petersbourg de s'efforcer d'obtenir sans retard Tassentiment du Gouvernement russe :

« Je vous prie de faire connaitre d'urgence a M. Sazonoff que la suggestion de Sir
Ed. Grey ,me par ait foumir une base utile de conversation entre les Puissances ega-
lement desireuseis de travailler k un reglement honorable du conflit austro-serbe et
d'ecarter ainsi les dangers qui menacent la paix g^nerale.

«Le plan propose par le Principal Secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires ^trangeres, en
arretantla marcbe en avant de Farmee autrichienne, et en confiant aux Puissances le
soin d'examiner comment la Serbie pourrait donner pleine satisfaction a I'Autriche

"^mm

~ 126 —

sans porter alteinte aux droits souverains et k I'ind^pendaace du Royaume , en donnant
ainsi un moyen a la Russie de suspendre lous preparatifs militaires, les autres Puis-
sances devant agir de meme , est de nature a donner egalement satisfaction a la Russie
et a I'Autriche et a menager a la Serbie une sortie acceptable de la difficulte actuelle.
« Je vous prie de vous inspirer des considerations qui precedent pour engager tres
instamment M. Sazonoff k donner sans retard son adhesion k la proposition de
Sir Ed. Grey donl il a du etre saisi de son cole. » /

Rene Viviani.

W 113.

M. Paleologde, Ambassadeur de France a Saint-Petersbourg,

a M. Ren6 Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran-
geres.

Saint-Petersbourg, le 3i juillet 191^.

La nouvelie du bonobardement de Belgrade dans la nuit el la matinee d'hier a
provoque en Russie la plus vive emotion. On ne parvienl pas a s'expliquer Tattitude
de rAulriche, donl les provocations ont constaniment suivi, depuis le debut de la
crise, les tentatives de conciliation de la Russie el les conversations satisfaisantes
echangees entre Petersbourg et Vienne.

Quoi qu'il en soil, deslreux de ne rien n^gliger pour prouver la sincerlle de son
deslr de sauvegarder la paix, M. Sazonofl minforme qu'il a modifie sa formula, k la
demande de Tambassadeur d'Angleterre, de la maniere suivante :

« Si rAulriche consent k arreter la marche de ses troupes sur le lerritoire serbe el
si , reconnaissant que le conOit auslro-serbe a assume le caractere dune (jueslion d'in-
l^rel europeen, elle admet que les grandes Puissances examinent les satisfactions que
la Serbie pourrait accorder 'au Gouvernement austro-hongrois, sansi porter atteinte
a ses droits souverains et a son independance, la Russie s'engage a conserver son
attitude expectante. »

PALtOLOGUE.

— 127

r 114.

M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires ^trangeres,
a MM. les Ambassadeurs de France, a Londres, Saint-P^tersbourg',
Berlin, Vienne, Rome, Constantinople.

Paris, le 3i jaillet igiA.

Les efforts poursiiivis jusqu'ici parallelement par TAngleterre et la Russie, avec le
concours empresse de la France (acquis d'avance k toute tentative pacifique), en vue
d'une entente directe entre Vienne et Saint-Petersbourg ou d'une mediation des
quatre puissances sous la forme la plus appropriee, se rejoignent aujourd'hui : la
Russie ,donnant une nouvelle preuve de sondesir d'entente , s^est empressee de repondre
k la premiere apparence d'ouverture faite par I'Allemagne depuis le debut de la crise
(sur les conditions auxquelles la Russie arreterait ses preparatifs militaires), en indi-
quant une formule et la modifiant de suite confoimement k la demande de I'Angle-
terre; on devrait done esperer, les pourparlers ayant repris d'autre part entre les
ambass^deiirs russe et autrichien, que la mediation anglaise viendra achever k Londres
Teffort des negociations directes de Vienne et Saint-Petersbourg.

Toutefois I'attitude constante de I'Allemagne qui, depuis le commencement du
conflit, tout en protestant sans cesse aupres de chacuue des puissances de ses inten-
tions pacifiques, a iait echouer en fait, par son attitude ou dilatoire ou negative,
toutesles tentatives d'accord etna pas cesse d'encourager^par son ambassadeur I'in-
transigeance deVienne;lespreparatifsmilitairesallemands, commences desle 26 juillet
et poursuivis sans arret depuis; I'opposition immediate de I'Allemagne a la formule
russe, declaree a Berlin inacceptable pour I'Autriche avant meme d'avoir consulte
cette Puissance; enfin toutes les impressions venues de Berlin imposent la conviction
que I'Allemagne a poursuivi I'humiliation de la Russie, la desagregalion de la Triple-
Entente et, si ces resultats ne pouvaient elre obtenus, la guerre.

Rene Viviani.

r 115.

M. DuMAiNE, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne,

a M. Ren6 Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires 6tran-

geres.

Vienne, le 3i juillet 1914.

La mobilisation generale atteignant tous les homnies de 19 k 4 2 ans a ete decr^
tee par le Goiivemement austro-hongrois ce matin k !a premiere heure.

Mon collegue russe estime encore que cette mesure n'est pas nettement en contra-
idiction avec le:> declarations du Comte Berchtold d'hier.

DUMAINE.

128

r 116.

M. Jules Cambon, Anibassadeur de France a Berlin,

a M. Rene Viviam, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran-
gores.

Berlin, le 3i juillet 191/1.

M'ayanl fait demander, M. de Jagow vient de me dire qu'il avait le grand regret
de me faire connaitre quen presence de la mobilisation totale de I'armee russe, I'Al-
lemagne, dans Tinteret de la securite de I'Empire, se voyait obligee de prendre de
graves mesures de precaution. On a decrete ce qu'on appelle « Kriegsgefahrzustand »
(I'etat de danger de guerre), qui permet k Tautorite de proclamer, si elle le juge
utile, letat de siege, de suspendre certains services publics et de fermer la frontiere.

En njeme temps, on demande a Petersbourg de demobiliser, aussi bien du cote
aulrichien que du cote allemand, sans quoi I'Allemagne serait obligee de mobiliser
de son cote. M. de Jagow m'a fait connaitre que M. de Scboen etail charge d'informer
le GoCivernement fran^ais des resolutions du cabinet de Berlin, et de lui demander
quelle attitude il pensait adopter.

Jules Cambon..

r 117.

M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres,
a M. Paleologue, Ambassadeur de France a Petersbourg.

Paris, le 3i juillet 1914.

Le Gouvernement allemand a decide k midi de prendre toutes les dispositions
militaires .que comporte Tetat dit « etat de danger de guerre ».

En me communiquant cette decision, ce soir a 7 heures, le Baron de Schoen a
ajoute que le Gouvernement exigeait en meme temps que la Russie demobilise. Si'le
Gouvernement russe n'a pas donne une r6ponse satisfaisante dans un delai de douze
heures, I'Allemagne mobllisera a son tour.

J'ai repondu a I'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que je n etais nuUement renseigne sur
une pretendue mobilisation totale de Tarmee et de la flotte russes, que le Gouver-
nement allemand invoquait comme raison des nouvelles mesures militaires quil
prend des. aujourd'hul.

Le Baron de Schoen m'a demands en terminant, au nom de son Gouvernement,
quelle serait, en cas de condit entre TAllemagne et la Russie, Tattitude de la France,
11 m'a dit qu'il viendrait prendre ma reponse demain samedi k une heure.

~ 129 —

Je n*ai pas rintention de lui faire une declaration a ce sujet et je me bomerai k
lui dire que la France s'inspirera de ses interets. Le Gouvernement de Ja R^publicjue
ne doit, en effet, compte de ses intentions qu'i son alli6e.

Je vous prie de porter imm^diatement ce qui precede k la connaissance de
M. Sazonoff. Ainsi que je vous I'ai dej^ fait connaitre, je ne doute pas que le Gou-
vernement imperial, dans Tint^ret superieur de la paix, n'evite pour sapart tout ce
qui pourrait rendre inevitable ou precipiter la crise.

Rene Viviani.

r 118.

M. Paleologue, Ambassiadeur de France a Saint-P^tersbourg,

a M. Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Ajffaires ^trang^res.

Saint-P^tersbourg, le 3i juijlet 1914.

En raison de la mobilisation generate de TAutriche et des mesures de mobilisatioa
prises secretement, mais d'une maniere continue, par TAllemagne depuis six jours,
Tordre de mobilisation generale de I'armee russe a ete donne, la Russie ne pouvant,
sans le plus grave danger, se laisser davantage devancer; en rdalite, elle ne fait que
prendre des mesures militaires correspondant k celles prises par TAllemagne.

Pour des raisons strategiques imperieuses, le Gouvernement russe ne pouvait
plus, sachant que I'AUemagne s'armait, retarder la conversion de sa mobilisation par-
tielle eu mobilisation generale.

Paleologue.

r 119.

M. Klobukowski, Ministre de France a Bmxelles,

a M. Ren6 Viviani, PrfSsident du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires ^tran-
g^res.

Bruxelles, le 3i juiUet 1914.

L*Agence Havas ayant annonc6 que Tetat « de danger de guerre » etait d6cret6 en
Allemiagne, j*ai dit k M. Davignon que je pouvais lui donner I'assurance que le
Gouvernement de la RepubUque respettei-ait la oeutrdiit^ de la Belgique.

PocoiiBNTS fiipjipAUTiQUEs* — Guerre. euro^'eooe. 17

— 130 —
Le Minislre des Affaires etrangeres m'a repondu que le Gouvernemeht royal avaft
loujours pense qu'il en serait ajjnsi et m'a remercie. Le Ministre de Russie et le
Ministre d'Angielerre, que j'ai vns ensuite, se sont monlres tres satisfaits qu'en la
circonsUucc j'aie donne cette assurance, conforme d'ailleurs^ m'a ditle Ministre anglais,
k ia declaration de Sir Edw. Grey.

Klobukowskl

— 131 —

CHAPITRE VI

DECLARATION DE GUERRE

DE L'ALLEMAGNE A U RUSSIE (SAMEDI r AOUT, A 19' 10)

ET A LA FRANCE (LUNDI 3 AOUT, A 18" 45)

^ 133 ^,

N* 120.

M.Tlene Viviani, President dn Conseil, Ministre des Affaires ^trang^res*
k MM. Jes Ambassadeurs de France a Londres, Saint-P^tetsbourg-;
Berlin » Vienne, Rome.

t*aris, le i" aoAt 1914.

Deux demarches ont ete failes hier soir par les Ambassadeurs d'Autriche, Tune
assez vague a Paris, i'aulre precise a Pelersbourg dans un sens conciliant.

Le Comle Szecsen est venu me declarer que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois
avail avise officiellemenl la Russie qu'il n'avait aucune ambition territoriale et ne tou-
chera pas i la souverainete d'Etat de la Serbie; qu'il repudie ^galement toute
intention d'bccuper le sandjak; mais que ces declarations de desinteressement ne
conservent leur valeur que si la guerre reste iocalisee a I'Autriche et k la Serbie, une
guerre europeenne ouvrant des eventualites impossibles a prevoir. L'Ambassadeur
d'Autriche, en commentant ces declarations, a laisse entendre que, si son Gouverne-
ment ne pouvait repondre aux questions des Puissances parlant en leur propre nom,
ii pourrait sans doute repondre a la Serbie ou a une Puissance iui demandant ses
conditions au nom de la Serbie. 11 ajoutait qu'il y aurait Ik peut-etre encore une
possibilite.

APetersbourg, I'Ambassadeur d'Autriche est venu voir M. Sazonoff et luL a de-
clare que sou Gouvernement consentait k enlamer une discussion quant au fond
de I'ultimatum adresse k la Serbie.. Le Ministre russe s'est declare satisfait de cette
declaration et a propose que les pourparlers aient lieu k Londres avec la parti-
cipation des Puissances. M. Sazonoff a du demander au Gouvernement anglais de
se charger de la direction de la negociation ; il a indique qu'il serait tres important
que I'Autriche arretat ses operations en Serbie.

II resulte de ces faits que rAutricbe se montrerait enlin disposee a un arrangement,
de meme que le Gouvernement russe est pret k entrer en negociations sur la base
de la proposition anglaise.

Malheureusement ces dispositions, qui permettraient d'esperer une solution paci-
lique, paraissent en fait devoir etre annulees par I'attitude de I'Allemagne. Cette
Puissance a en effet pose un ultimatum donnant douze heures au Gouvernement
russe pour accepter de dembbiliser, non seulement du cote allemand, mais aussi da
cote autrichien; c'est a midi que le delai expire. L'ultimatum ne se justifie pas,
puisque la Russie a accepte la proposition anglaise qui imphque un arret des pr6-
paralifs militaires de toutes les Puissances.

L'altitude de I'Allemagne prouve qu'elie veut la guerre. Et elle la veut contre la
France. Hier, lorsque M. de Schoen est venu demander au quai d'Orsay quelle atti-
tude la France comptait prendre en cas de conflit russo-allemand, I'Ambassadeur
d'Allemagne, bien qu'il n'y ait directement entre la France et I'Allemagne aucun
conflit etque nous ayons employe depuis le debut de la crise et employions encore
jtous nos efforts en vue d'une solution pacifique, a ajoute qu'il me priait de presenter

— 134 —

au Presideni de la Republique ses hommages et remerciements, et demandait que
I'on voulut bien prendre « des dispositions pour sa propre personne » ; nous savons
egalement qu'il a deja mis en siirete les archives de TAmbassade. Celte attitude de
rupture des relations diplomatiques sans conflit direct , et bien qu'aucune reponse
negative precise ne lui ait ete faite , est caracteristique de la volonte arretee de TAlle-
magoe de faire ia guerre A la France. Le defaut de slncerite de ses protestations
pacifiques est demontre par la rupture quelle impose k TEurope, lorsque les nego-
ciations etaient enfin acceptees par TAutriche, d'accord avec la Russie.

Rene Viviani.

r 121.

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin,

.a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre -des Affaires etran-
geres..

Berlin, le i" aoilt 19 li,

Mon Collegue de Russie a regu bier soir deux lelegrammes de M. Sazonoff I'avi-
sant que I'Ambassadeur d'Aulrichc a Petersbourg avait declare que son Gouverne-
ment etait pret a discuter avec le Gouvernement russe la note a la Serbie, meme
quant au fond ; M. Sazonoff lui aurait repondu que ces conversations devraient, k]
ses yeux , avoir lieu a Londres.

L' ultimatum a la Russie ne pent qu'ecarter les dernieres chances de paix que ces
conversations semblaient laisser subsister. On peut se demander si, dans de pareilles
conditions, Tacceptation de rAutriche etait serieuse et n avait pas pour objet de
faire peser la responsabilite du conllit sur la Russie.

Mon Collegue d'Angleterre a fait dans la nuit un appel pressant aux sentiments
d'humanile de M. de Jagovv. Celui-ci lui a repondu (jue la question elait trop enga-
gee et qu'il fallait attendre la reponse russe a I'ultimatum allemand. Or il a dit a sir
E. Goschen que ruUimatum recdamait le retrait de la mobilisation russe non seule-
ment du cote de I'Allemagne, mais encore du cote de I'Autriche; mon Collegue
anglais s'en est vivement elonne et lui a declare que ce dernier point scmblait inac-
ceplable pour la Russie.

L'ultimatumde I'Allemagne, inlervenant a.l'heure precise ou I'accord semble pres
de s'elablir entre Vienne et Saint-Pctersbourg, est significatif de sa politique belli-
queuse.

Le conllit n'exislait en fait quenlre la Russie ct rAutriche , I'Allemagne n'ayant h
intervenir que comme alliee de TAutriche; dans ces conditions, les deux Puissances
principalement inleressees etant disposees a causer, si I'Allemagne ne desirait pas la

— 135 —

guerre pour son propre compte, il est inconaprehensible qu elle envoie un ultima-
tum a la Russle, au lieu de continuer a travaiiier, comme toutes ies autres Puis-
sances, k une solution pacifique..

J. Cambok.

r 122.

M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseit, Ministre des A.ffaires etrangeres,
k MM. Ies Ambassadeurs de France a Londres, Berlin, et au Ministre
de France a Bruxelles.

Paris, le i*' aoiit igti.

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre est venu, d'ordre de son GoavernemeQt»me deman-
der quelle serait„ en cas de conflit avec TAllemagne, rattitude du Gouvernement
Franqais vis-a-vis de la Belgique.

J'ai declare que^ comme nous I'avions repete k plusieurs repri^ses au Gouverne-
ment Beige , nous entendions respecter sa neutralite.

' Ce serait seulement dans le cas oii cette neutralite serait violee par une autre Puis-
sance que la France, pour remplir ses obligations de Puissance garante, pourrait
etre amenee a penetrer sur le territoire belse.

Rene Yiviani.

r 123.

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin,

a M. Rene Viyiani, President du Conseil^ Ministre des Affaires etran-

geres.

Berlin J le i"" aeiit 19 14.

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a ^te charge par son Gouvernement defaire aupres
du Gouvernement AUemand la meme demarche qui a ete faite aupres de vous au
sujet de la neutralite de la Belgique.

M. de Jagow a repondu qu'il prendrait Ies ordres de rEmpereuret du Cbancelier»
mais qu'il doutait qu^une reponse put etre donnee, car FAllemagne ne pouvait ainsi
decouvrir ses projets militaires. L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre reverra demain M. do
Jagow dans Tapres-midi.

J. GmBON.

— 136 —

N° 124.
M. Barrere^ Ambassadeur de France a Rome,

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran-
geres.

Rome, le i"" aout 1914.

J*ai ete ce matin a 8 heures 1/2 chez le Marquis de San Giuliano pour connaitre
de lui d'une fa^on precise quelle serait I'allitude de lltalie en presence des actes
provocateurs de I'Allemagne et des suites qu'ils peuvent avoir.

Le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres m'a repopdu qu il avait re^u hier soir la visite
de TAmbassadeur d'Allemagne. M. de Flotow liii aurait dit que TAllemagne avait
demande au Gouvernement Russe de suspendre sa mobilisation et au Gouvernement
Fran9ais d'indiquer ce qu'il avait I'intention de faire; TAllemagne avait donne a la
France un delai de dix-huit heures et a la Russie un delai de douze heures pour
repondre.

M. de Flotow a demande, k la suite de cette communication, quelles etaient les
intentions du Gouvernement Italien.

Le Marquis de San Giuliano a repondu que la guerre ehtreprise par TAutriche,
etant donne surtout les consequences qui pouvaient en sortir d'apres les paroles
de TAmbassadeur d'Allemagne, ayant un caractere agressif ne cadrant pas avec le
caractere purement defensif de la Triple-Alliance, I'ltahe ne pourrait participer k la
guerre.

BARRiRE.

r 125.
M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil , Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres,

a MM. les Ambassadeurs de France a Londres, Saint- Petersbourg,
Berlin, Vienne, Rome, Madrid, Constantinople.

Paris, le i"" aout 191 4-

L'AmbassadeuT d'Allemagne est revenu me voir ce matin k 1 1 heures. Apres lui
avoir rappele tous les efforts poursuivis par la France en vue d'un reglement hono-
rable du conflit austro-serbe et de la difficulte qui s'en est suivie entre TAiitriche et
la Russie, je Tai mis au courant des pourparlers continues depuishier :

1" Proposition transactionnelle anglaise pr^voyant, entre autres, de la part de la
Russie, la suspension des preparatifs militaires, k condition que les autres Puissances
en fassent autant; adhesion de la Russie k cette proposition;

2° Communications du Gouvernement Autrichien declarant ne vouloir ni s'agrandir
en Serbie, ni meme penetrer dans le sandjak et se disant pret k discuter k Londres
avec les autres Puissances lefond meme de la question austro-serbe.*

J'ai mis en regard I'attilude de I'Allemagne qui, abandonnant tout pourparler,,
posait a la Russie un ultimatum au moment meme ou cette Puissance vient d'accepter
la formule anglaise (qui implique I'arret des preparatifs militaires de tous les pays
ayant mobilise) et envisageail comme imminente une rupture diplomatique avec la
France.

~ 137 —

Le Baron de Schoen m'a repondu qu'il ignorait les developpemenls survenus dans
cette question depuis vingt-qiialre heures, qu'il y avail peul-etre la une «lueur
d'espoir » pour un accommodement, qu'il n'avait re^u aucune nouvelle communication
de son Gouvernement et qu'il allait s'iriformer. II a de nouveau proteste de son sin-
cere desir de joindre ses efforts a ceux de la France pour arriver a la solution du
conflit, J'ai insiste sur la grave responsabilite qu'a'ssumerait le Gouvernement Imperial
si, dans de pareilles circonstances, ilprenait des initiatives non justifiees et de nature
k compromettre irremediablement la paix.

Le Baron de Schoen n'a plus fait allusion k son depart immedial et ne m'a plu^
demande de repondre a sa question concernant I'attitude de la France en cas de
conflit auslro-russe. II s'est borne a dire de lui-meme qu'elle n'etait, pas douteuse.

II ne convient a aucun degre d'exagerer les possibilites qui peuvent resulter de ma
conversation avec I'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, car, de son cote, le Gouvernement
Imperial continue les plus dangereux preparatifs sur notre frontiere. II ne faut pas les
negliger cependant et nous ne devons pas cesser de travailler a un arrangement. La
France, de son cote, procede a toutes les mesures militaires propres a la garantir
contre une avance trop grande des preparatifs militaires allemands. EUe estime que
ses tentatives de conciliation n'auront de chances d'aboutir que dans la mesure ou
on lasentira prete et resolue, si la lutte lui est imposee.

Rene Viviani.

r 126.
M. Paul C AMBON, Ambassadeur de France a Londres,

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires
Etrangeres.

Paris, le i" aoiit 1914.

Sir Edward Grey m'a dit que , dans le Conseil de ce matin , le Cabinet avait de
nouveau envisage la situation. L'Allemagne ayant reclame de I'Angleterre une decla-
ration de neutralite et ne I'ayant pas obtenue , le Gouvernement britannique demeu-
rait maitre de son action et celle-ci pourrait se manifester dans differentes hypotheses.

En premier lieu, la neutralite beige importe beaucoup a I'Angleterre. La France a
renouvele immedialement I'engagement de la respecter. L'Allemagne a declare « n'etre
pas en etat de repondre ». Sir Edward Grey saisira le Cabinet de cette reponse et
demand era Tautorisation de dire lundi a la Chambre des Communes que le Gouver-
nement britannique ne permettra pas une violation de la neutralite beige.

En second lieu, les escadres anglaises sont mobilisees et Sir Edward Grey propo-
sera k ses collegues de declarer qu'elles s'opposeront au passage du Detroit par les
escadres allemandes ou , si elles venaient a le passer, k toute demonstration sur les
cotes fran9aises. Le Conseil de lundi traitera ces deux questions ; j'ai fait remarquer
au Principal Secretaire d'Etat que si, d'ici U, quelque incident venait a se produire,
il ne fallait pas se laisser surpren^re et qu'il conviendrait de songer a intervenir a
temps.

Paul Cambon.

X —————— MMIM^ _— —

Documents DtPtOMAxiQUES. — Guerre europeenae. 18

— 138 —

r 127.

M..Ren6 ViviANi, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Elrsing^res,.
a M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France, a Londres.

Paris, le i" aout 1914.

Nous sommes avises par plusieurs voies que le Gouvernement allemand et le
GouTemement autrichien essaient en ce moment d'impressionner I'Angleterre en lui
faisant croire que la responsabilite de la guerre, si elle eclate, incombera k la Russie.
On fait eftort pour- obtenir la neutralile de TAngleterre en denaturant la verite;

La France n'a cesse de donner, d'accord avec I'Angleterre, des conseiis de
moderation a Petersbourg ; ces conseiis ont ete ecoutes.

Des le debut, M. Sazonoff a fait pression sur la Serbie pour qu'elle acceptal
toutes celles des clauses de I'ultlmatum qui etaient compatibles avec sa souverainete.

II a ensuite engage avec I'Autriche une conversation directe qui etait un nouveau
temoignage de son esprit de conciliation. II a enfm accept^ de laisser les puissances,
les moins interessees rechercher les moyens d'apaiser le conflit.

Conformement au desir qui lui a ete exprime par Sir G. Buchanan, M. Sazo-
noff a consenti k modifier la premiere formule qu'il avait presentee et il en a redige
une seconde qui ne s'eloigne pas sensiblement des declarations qui ont ete faites hier
a M. de Margerie par le comte Szecsen. Ce dernier affirme que fAutriche n'a
aucune intention d'acquisition territoriale et qu'elle ne veut pas toucher a la souve-
rainete de la Serbie. II ajoute express^ment que I'Autriche n'a aucune vis^e sur ie
Sandjak de Novi-Bazar.

II semblerait done que faccord fut facile a ^tablir entre la suggestion de Sir
Edward Grey, la formule de M. Sazonoff et les declarations de rAutriche.

La France est r^solue k poursuivre jusqu'au bout, avec I'Angleterre, la realisation
de cet accord.

Mais pendant que Ton negociait et que la Russie montfait dans la negociation une
bonne volonte incontestable, TAutriche a , la premiere , procede a une mobilisation
generale.

La Russie s'est vue I'orcee de fimrter pour ne pas se trouver en etat d'inferiorite ,
mais elle eist toujours restee prete k negocier.

Je n'ai pas besoin de rep^ter^ue , quant k nous, nous continuerons k travail|er,
avec I'Angleterre, au succes de ces pourparlers!

Mais I'attilude de TAllemagne nous a mis dans I'obligation absolqe de prendre au-
jourd'hui le d^cret de mobilisation.

Bien avant la mobilisation russe, des mercredi dernier, ainsi que je vous I'ai deji
t^Ugraphie , M. de Schoen m'avait annonce la publication prochaine du « Kriegsgefahr-

— 139 — -
zustand ». Cette mesure a dte prise par rAUemagne et, k Tabri de ce paravent, elle a
immediatement commence sa mobilisation proprement dite.

Aujourd'hui M. Paleblogue a telegrapbie que le Gomte de Pourtales avait an-!
nonce au Gouvernement russe la mobilisation allemande.

Des renseignements parvenus au Ministere de la Guerre confirment que cette
mobilisation est elTectivement en pleine execution.

Notre decret de mobilisation est done une mesare ^ssentielle de presei'vation. Le
Gouvernement I'a accompagnee dune proclamation signee du President de la Re-
publique et de tous les Ministres, et dans laquelle il explique que la . mobilisation
n est pas la guerre, quen I'etat actuel c'est pour la France le meilleur moyen de
sauvegarder la paix, et que le Gouvernement de la Republique multipliera ses efforts
pour faire aboutir les negociations.

Veuillez transmeltre d'urgence toutes ces indications k Sir Edward Grey et lui
marquer que nous avons obei constamment k la preoccupation de ne commettre
aucun acte de provocation.

Je suis persuade que, au cas ou la guerre, eclaterait, Topinlon anglaise verrait
clairement de quel cote vient I'agression ^ et qu'elle saisirait les raisons si fortes que
nous avons donnees k Sir Edward Grey pour reclamer une intervention armee de
lAngleterre dans Tint^ret de I'avenir de Tequilibre europeen.

Rene Viviani.

N° 128;

M. MoLLARD, Ministre de France a Luxembourg,

a M, Rene YiYiAm, President du Conseii, Ministre des Afiisdres ^tran-
geres.

Luxembourg, le i" aout 1914.

Le Ministre d'Etat me charge de demander, au Gouvernement fran9ais une assu-
rance de neutralite semblable k celle qui a ete donnee k la Belgique. M, Eyschen m'a
declare qu a present, du fait que <;'est le Ministre de France k Bruxelles qui a fait la
declaration en question au PriRsid^nt du Conseil du Gouvernement beige, il a pense
que la meme procedure conviendrait le mieux vis-a-vis du Graud-Duche-

G'est pourquoi il s'est abstenu de faire la demande directement au Gouvernement
de la Republique. Comme la Chambre des deputes se reunit lundi, M. Eyschen
desire etre en possession de la reponse a cette date ; une demarche analogue est faite
en meme temps aupr^s du Ministre d'Allemagne k Luxembourg.

MOLLABJO.

— 140 —

r 129,

M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires ^trangeres,
a M. MoLLARD, Ministre de France a Luxembourg.

Paris, le i" aout igxh.

Veuiliez declarer au President du Conseil que , conformement au traite de Londres
de 1867, le Gouvernement de la Republicjue entend respecter la neutialite du
Grand-Duche du Luxembourg, comme il Ta demontre par son attitude.

La violation de cettc neutralite par I'Allemagne serai t toutefois de nature a oblige r
la France k s'inspirer desormais, a cet egard, du souci de sa defense et de ses
int^rets.

Rene Viviani.

r 130.

M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin.

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran-
geres.

Berlin, le i"aout 191^.

On distribue dans les rues de Berlin des editions specialesdesjournaux annon^ant
que la mobilisation generale de I'armee et de la flotte efet ordonnee etque le i^'^jour
de la mobilisation est le dimanche 2 aout.

Jules C AMBON.

r 131.

M. Eyschen, Ministre d'Etat du Luxembourg,

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires ^tran-
g^res.

Luxembourg, le 2 aout 1914.

J'ai Thonneur de porter a la connaissance de Vptre Excellence les fails suivants.
Dimanche 2 aout de grand matin les troupes allemandes, d'apres les informations
qui sont parvenues au Gouvernement Grand-DuCal k I'heure actuelle, ont penetre
sur ie territoire Luxen)bourg;e9is par les ponts de Wasserbiilig et de Remich, se

— 141 —
dirigeant specialement vers le Sud du pays et vers ia ville de Luxembourg, capitale
du Grand-Duche ; un certain nombre de trains blindes avec des troupes et des mu-
nitions ont ete achemines par la voie de cliemin de fer de Wasserbillig a Luxembourg
ou Ton s'atlend a les voir arriver d'un instant k I'autre.

Ces fails impliquent des acles manifestement contraires a la neutralite du Grand-
Duche, garantie par le traite de Londres de 1867. ^® Gouvernement Luxembour-
geois n'a pas manque de protester energiquement contre celte agression aupres des
representants de Sa Majeste I'Etnpereur d'AUemagne a Luxembourg ; une protesta-
tion identique va etre transmise telegraphiquement au Secretaire d'Etat pour les
Affaires etrangeres k Berlin.

Le Minisire d'Etat, President da Gouvernement ,
Eyschen,

K 132.

M. MoLLARD, Ministre de France a Luxembourg,

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran-
geres.

Luxembourg, le 2 aoAt 19 1^.

Le Ministre d'Etat du Luxembourg, M. Eyschen, vient de recevoir, par Tinterme-
diaire du Ministre d'AUemagne a Luxenabourg, M. de Buch, un telegramme du
Chancelier de I'Empire allemand Bethmann Hollweg, disant que les mesures militaires
prises par I'Allemagne en Luxembourg ne constituent pas un acte hostile contre ce
pays, "naais sont uniquement des mesures destinees a assurer contre I'attaque 6ven-
luelle d'une armee frangaise I'exploitation des voies ferrees affermees a I'Empire,
Le Luxembourg recevra une complete indemnite pour les dommages evenluels.

MOLLARO.

— 142 —

r 133.

JVoTE remise par V Amhassadenr ^Allemacjue,,

Paris, le 2 aoAt 1914.

UAmbassadeur d'Allemagne vient d'etre charge et s'empresse de faire savoir air
Ministere d«s Affaires etrangeres que les mesures mililaires prises par I'Allemagne
dans le Grand-Duche de Luxembourg ne constituent pas un acte d'hostilite. Elles
doivent etre considerees comme des mesures purement preventives prises pour la
protection des chemins de fer qui, par suite des traites existant entre I'Allemagne e*
le Grand-Duche de Luxembourg, se trouvent sous I'administration allemande.

DE SCHOEN,

M. Paleologue, Ambassadeur de France a Saint-P^tersbourg,

k M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires ^trati-
geres.

P^tersl)ourg, le a aoAt igiA*

L' Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a remis k M. Sazonoff, hier, 37 h. 10 du soir, la
declaration de guerre de son Gouvernement; il quittera Petersbourg aujourd'hui.

L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie n'a re^u aucune instruction de son gouverne-
ment pour la declaration de guerre.

Paleologue.

r 135.

M. Ren6 Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres ,
k MM. les Repr^sentants de la France h. I'Etranger.

Paris, le 2 aoiit igiil.

L* Ambassadeur de Russia me fait connaitre que FAllemagne vient de declarer la
gaerre i la Russie, malgr6 les negociations en cours, et au moment ou TAutriche-
Hongrie acceptait de discuter avec- les. puissances le fond m^me de son conflit avep
l^a Serbie.

Ren6 Viviani.

143 —

N* 136.

M. Ben6 ViviANi, President du Conseii, Ministre des Affaires ^trangeres,
a MM. les Ambassadeurs de France a Londres, Saint-P^tersbourg,
Berlin, Vienne, Rome, Madrid, Constantinople.

Paris, le 2 aoAt rgi^.

Le territoire fraiiQais a ete viole ce matin par les troupes allemandes k Cirey et
pres de Longwy. Elies marchent sur le fort qui porte ce dernier horn. D'autre part,
le poste douanier de Delle a et6 assailli par une double fusillade. Enfm, les troupes
allemandes oht viole ce matin aussi le territoire neutre du Luxembourg.

Vous utiliserez ces renseignements sans retard pour faire constater comment le
Gouvernement AUemand se iivre conlre la France k des actes de guerre sans provo-
cation de notre part, ni declaration de guerre prealable, alors que nous avons
scrupuleusement respecte la zone de dix kilometres que nous avons maintenue memo
depuisla mobilisation, entre nos troupes et la frontiere.

Ren6 ViviANi.

N° 137.

M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres,

a M. Ren6 Viviani, Px^sideot du Conseii, Ministre des Affaires §tran-
geres.

Londres, le 2 aout 1914.

A i'issue du Con^efl des IWSmstres tenu ce matin. Sir Edward Grey m'a fait la dd-
claration^uivante :

« Jci^^uis autoiise k donner rassxirance (jue si la flotte allemande p^netre dans la
^'lanche ou traverse la mer du Nord afin d'entreprendre des Operations de guerre
contre la cote fran^iseoula marine marchande frauQaise, la flotte britannique don-
nera touXe la protection en son pouvoir.

« C6tte assurance est naturellement donnee sous la reserve que la politique du
Gouvernement de Sa Majeste sera approuvee par le Parlement britannique et ne doit

— 144 —

pas etre consideree comme obligeant le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste k agir jusqu a
ce que leventualite ci-dessus mentionnee d'une action de la flotte allenxande se soil
produite ».

Me parlant ensuite de la neutralile de la Belglqiie et de celle du Luxembourg, le
Principal Secretaire d'Etat m'a rappele que la Convention de 1867 relative au Grand-
Duche differait du Traite relatif a la Belgique en ce sens que I'Angleterre etait tenue
de faire respecter cette derniere convention sans le concours des autres Puissances
garantes, tandisque, pour- le Luxembourg, toutes les Puissances garantes devaient
agir de concert.

La sauvegarde de la neutralite beige est consideree ici comme si importante que
I'Angleterre envisagerait sa violation par TAIlemagne comme un casus belli. Cast la
un interet proprement anglais , et on ne pent douter que le Gouvernement britan-
nique, fidele aux traditions de sa politique, ne le fasse prevaloir, meme si le monde
des affaires, ou I'influence allemande poursuit des efforts tenaces, pretendait exercer
une pression pour empecher le Gouvernement de s'engager contre I'AUemagne.

Paul Cambon.

r 138.

M. Rene ViviANi, President du Conseii, Ministre des Affaires ^trang^res,
a M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres.

Paris , le 2 aout 1 9 1 4.

Je prends note des indications contenues dans vos telegrammes des 27, 3o»
3i juillet.et 1*' aout et dans celui que vous m'avez adresse aujourd'hui.

En communiquaut aux Chambres la declaration meme que vous a faile Sir Edward
Grey el dont votre dernier telegramme me donne le texle , j'ajouterai que nous avons
oblenu la de la Grande-Bretagne un premier concours dont la valeur nous est pre-
cieuse.

Je me propose, en outre, d'indiquer que Fassistance de la Grande-Bretagne a Tin-
tention de donner a la France en vue de protdger les cotes de France ou la marine
marchande fran9aise s'appliquerait de telle fa^on que notre marine de guerre fut
egalement soutenue par la flotte anglaise, en cas de conflit franco-allemand , dans
I'Atlantique, comme dans la mer du Nord et dans la Manche. Je noterais, en outre,
que les ports anglais ne pourraient pas servir de points de ravitaillement k la flotte
allemande.

Rene Viviani.

145

r 139.

M. Ren6 Vivtatii, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires ^tranjg^res,
k M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin.

Paris, le 2 aoilt igiA.

Les troupes aliemandes ayani aujourd'hui yiole la frontiere de I'Est sur plusieurs
points, je vous prie de protester sans retard par 6crit aupres du Gouvernenaent alle-
mand. Vous youdrez bien vous inspirer de la note suivante que, dans I'incertitude
des communications entre Paris et Berlin, j'ai adresse directement k TAmbassadeur
d'Allemagne :

« Les autorit^s administratives et militaires fran^aises de la region d& I'Est viennent
de signaler plusieurs faits que j'ai charge TAmbassadeur de ia Republique k Berlin
de porter k la connaissance du Gouvernement Imperial.

« L'un s'est produit k Delle, dans la region de Belfort : k deux reprises, le poste de
douaniers fran^ais stationne. dans cette localite a ete Tobjet dune fusillade de la
part d'un detachement de soldats allemands. Au nord de Delle, deux patrouilles alie-
mandes du 5** chasseurs k cheval ont franchi la frontiere dans la matinee d'aujourd'hui
et pen6tre jusqu'aux villages de Joncherey et Baron a plus de i o kilometres de la
frontiere. L'officier qui commandait la premiere a brule la cervelle k un soldat
fran^ais. Les cavaliers allemands ont emmene des chevaux que le maire fran^ais de
Suarce etait en train de reunir et ont force les habitants de la commune k conduire
les dits chevaux.

« L'A.mbassadeur de la Republique k Berlin a ete charge de protester formellement
aupres du Gouvernement Imperial contre des faits qui constituent une violation
caracteri see de la frontiere par des troupes aliemandes en armeset que rien ne justifie
dans I'etat actuel. Le Gouvernement de la Republique ne peut que laisser au Gou-
vernement, Imperial I'entiere responsabilite de ces actes ».

Rene Viviani.

N'' 140.

M. Marcelin Pellet, Ministre de France a La Haye,

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires ^tran-
geres.

La Haye, le 3 aodt 1914.

Le Ministre d'Allemagne s'est rendu hier chez le Ministre des Affaires etrang^res
pour lui expliquer la necessite 011 s etait trouvee I'Allemagne, a-t-il dit, de violer la

DocDMENTS DiPLQMATiQUES. — Gucrrc curopeennc. , ig

— 146 —
neutralite du Luxembourg, ajoutant qu'il aurait aujourd'hui une nouvelle commu-
nication a lui faire. En efFet,ce matin, il a annonce I'entr^e des troupes allemandes en
Beigique pour eviter, a-t-il declare, une occupation de ce pays par la France.

Pellet.

N° Ul.

M. Klobdkowski, Ministre de France A Bruxeite^

a M. Ren6 Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires ^tran-
g^res.

Bruxelles, le 3 aoAt 191^.

Le Ministre d'Ailemagne a remis hier soir au Gouvemement beige un ultimatum
oti il est dit que son Gouvemement, ayant appris que les Fran^ais se preparaient k des
operations dans les regions de Givet et de Namur, se voyait dans Tobligation de prendre
desmesures dont la premiere etait d'inviter le Gouvemement beige k lui faire savoir,
dans les sept heures, s'il etait dispose k lui faciliter en Beigique les operations mili-
taires contre la France. En cas de refus, le sort des armes d^ciderait.

Le Gouvemement du Roi a repondu que les renseignements sur les mouvements
franijais lui paraissaient inexacts en raison des assurances formelles, toutes r^centes
encore, donnees par la France; que la Beigique qui, depuis sa constitution, s'est pr^-
occupee d'assurer la sauvegarde de sa dignite et de ses interets et a consacr6 tous ses
efiforts au developpement pacifique du progr^s, proteste hautement contre toute violation
de son territoire, d'ou quelle vienne, et que, dans cette eventualite, elle saura
defendre energiquement sa neutrality, garar.tie par les puissances et notammentpar le
Roi de Pmsse.

Klobukowski.

N" U2.

M. Klobukowski, Ministre de France a Bruxelles,

a M. Ren6 Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires
etrang^es.

Bruxelles, le 3 aoAt 1914.

A I'assurance que je lui donnais que , si la Beigique faisait appel k la garantie des
Puissances, contre la violation de sa neutralit6 par I'AUemagne , la France r^pondrait
imm6diatement^ son appel, le Ministre des Affaires 6trangeres m'a repondu :

— 147 —
« C'est bien sincerement" que nous remercions le Gouvememeut de la Repu-
blique de I'appui eventuel. qu'O pourrait nous oft'rir, mais dans la circonstance
actueiie, nous ne faisons pas appel k la garantie des Puissances. Ulterieuremeht le
Gouvernement du Roi appreciera ce qu il y a lieu de faire ».

r 143.

M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres,

a M. Ren6 Viviani^ President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires
etrangeres.

Londres, le 3 aoi!lt iQi^*

Sir Ed. Grey m'a autorise k vous faire savoir que vous pourriez declarer au Parle -
ment qu'il ferait aux Communes des declarations sur Tattilude actueiie du Gouver-
nement Britannique et que la principale de ces declarations serait la siiivante :

« Dans le cas oii I'escadre allemande franchirait le detroit ou remonterait la Mer
du Nord pour doubler les iles britanniques dans le but d'attaquer les cotes frangaises
ou la marine de guerre fran^aise et d'inquieter la marine marcbande frangaise,
I'escadre anglaise interviendrait pour preter k la marine frangaise son entiere protec-
tion, en sorte que des ce moment I'Angleterre et I'Allemagne seraient en etat de
guerre. »

Sir Ed. Grey m'a fait observer que la mention d'une operation par la Mer du Nord
impliquait la protection contre une demonstration dans I'Ocean Atlantique.

La declaration concemant I'intervention de la flotte anglaise doit etre consider^e
comme liant le Gouvernement britannique. Sir E. Grey m'en a donne I'assurance et
a ajoute que le Gouvernement fran^ais etait par Ik meme en mesure d'en donner con-
naissance aux Chambres.

A mon retour a I'Ambassade, j ai eu conniissance de votre communication t6le-
phonique relative k fultimatum allemand adresse k la Belgique. J^en ai fait part
immediatement k Sir Ed. Grey.

Paul Caiibon,.

N' 144.

M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres,

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires
^trang^res.,

Londres, le 3 aput 1914.

Au moment ou Sir Ed. Grey partait ce matin pour le Conseil, ^mon coUegue alle-
mand, qui favait deja vu bier, est venu le prier avec insist^iace de lui dire que la

>97

— 148 —
neutralite de I'AngleteiTe ne dependait pas du respect de la neulralite beige.
Sir Ed. Grey s*est refuse a toute conversation k ce sujet.

X'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a adresse k la presse un commtfniqu6 disant que si
TAnglelerre restait neutre, TAllemagne renoncerait a toute operation navale etne se
servirait pas des cotes beiges comme point d'appui. Je fais repondre que le respect
des coles n'est pas le respect de la neutralite du terriloire, et que rultimatum alle-
mand est deja une violation de cette neutralite.

Paul Cambon.

N" 145.

M. Paul Cambon* Ambassadeur de France a Londres,

a M. Ren6 Viyiani^ President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires
etrangeres.

Londres, le 3 aoAt igiA.

Sir E. Grey a fait la declaration relative a I'intervention de la flotte anglaise ; il a
precise, en raison des evenements, celle qu'il comptait faire au sujet de la neutralite
beige ; et la lecture d une lettre du Roi Albert demandant I'appui de I'Angleterre a
vivement emu I'Assembl^e.

La Cbambre votera ce soir les credits demandes; des k present son appui est
acquis k la politique du Gouvemement et elle suit Topinion publique, qui se pro-
nonce de plus en plus en notre faveur.

Paul Cambon.

r 146.

M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires ^trangeres,
k M, Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France k Londres.

Paris, le 3 aoiit 1914.

n me revient que I'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne aurait d6clar6 au Foreign Office que
bier matin quatre-vingts officiers fran9ais en uniforme prussien auraient essaye de
traverser la frontiere allemande dans douze automobiles i Walbeck a I'ouest de Gel-'
dern, et que ceci conslituait une tres serieuse violation de la neutralite de Ta part de la
France.

Veuillez d^mentir d'urgence cette nouvelle de pure invention et attii er I'attention
du Foreign Office sur ia campagne allemande de fausses nouvelles qui commence.

Rene VrviANi.

- 149 —

r U7.

Lettre remise par VAmhassadeur d'Allemagne a M. Rene Viviani^ President da
Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres^ au cours de son audience de depart,
le 3 aout 1914, a 18 h. 45.

Monsieur le President,

Les aulorltes administratives et militaires allemandes ont constate un certain
Tiombre d'actes d'hostiiite caracterisee commis sur le territoire allemand par des avia-
teurs militaires fran^ais. Plusieurs de ces derniers ont manifestement viole la neutra-
lity de la Belgique survolant le territoire de ce pays; I'un a essaye de detruire des
constructions pres de Wesel, d'autres ont ete apergus sur la region de TEiffel, un
autre a jete des bombes sur le chemin de fer pres de Karlsruhe et de Nuremberg.

Je suis charge, et j'ai I'honneur de faire connaitre k Votre Excellence qu'en pre-
sence de ces agressions, TEmpire allemand se considere en etat de guerre avec ia
France, du fait de cette derniere Puissance.

J'ai en meme temps I'honneur de porter a la connaissance de Votre Excellence que
les autorites allemandes retiendront les navires marchands fran^ais dans des ports
allemands, mais qu'elles les relacheront si, dans les quarante-huit heures, la reci-
procite complete est assuree.

Ma mission diplomatique ayant ainsi pris fm, il ne me reste plus qu'k prier Votre
Excellence de vouloir bien me munir de mes passeports et de prendre les mesures
quelle jugera utiles pour assurer mon retour en AUemagne avec le personnel de
I'Ambassade, ainsi quavec le personnel de la Legation de Baviere et du Gonsulat
general d' AUemagne a Paris.

Veuillez agreer, Monsieur le President, i'expression de ma tres haute conside-
ration,

Signe: SGHOEN;

r U8.

M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires 6trangeres,
a MM. les Representants de la France a Tetranger.

Paris le 3 aout 19 id'

L'ambassadeur d' AUemagne a demande ses passeports et part ce soir avec le per-
sonnel de I'Ambassade et du Gonsulat general d'AUemagne, et de la Legation de
Baviere. Le Baron de Schoen a donne pour pretexte la constatation par les autorites
administratives et militaires allemandes d'actes d'hostiiite qui auraient 6te commis

— 150 —

sur territoire alleman^ par des aviateurs militaires fran^ais accuses d'avoir survole le
tenitoire de I'empire et jete des bombes; I'ambassadeur ajoute que des aviateurs
auralent 6galement viole la neutralite de la Belgique en survolant son territoire. « En
presence de ces agressions, dit la lettre de M. de Schoen, I'Empire allemand se
considere en 6tat de guerre avec la France du fait de cette demiere puissance ».

J'ai formellement contest^ les allegations inexactes de rambassadeur et, de mon
cote, j'ai rappele que des hier, je lui avais adresse une note protestant contre les
violations caracterisees de la frontiere fran^aise commises depuis deux jours par des
detachements de troupes aliemandes.

Ren6 Viviani.

N° 149.

M. Ren6 ViviANi, President du Conseil, Ministre des AfiFaires ^tranglres,
k M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin^

( Telegramme commanique aux Repriseniants de la France a Vetranger.)

Paris, le 3 aout 1914.

Je vous invite a demander vos passeports et i. quitter immediatement Berlin avec
le personnel de I'ambassade en laissant la charge des interets fi'an9ais et la gai'de des

' archives k I'ambassadeur d'Espagne. Je vous prie de protester en meme temps par
icni contre la violation de la neutrality du Luxembourg par les troupes allemande^
signal^e par le premier ministre luxembourgeois , contre Tultimatum adresse au

, gouvemement beige par le Ministre d'Allemagne k Bruxelles pour lui imposer la
violation de la neutralite de la Belgique et exiger de celle-ci quelle lui facilite sur
territoire beige les operations militaires contre la France ; enlin contre la fausse alle-
gation d'un pretendu projel d'invasion de ces deux pays par les armees fran^aises,
par lequel il a cssaye de justifier I'etat de guerre qu'il declare exister desormais entre
PAUemagne et la France.

Ren6 VrvriANi.

N' 150,

M. Ren^ YiviANi, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires ^ti'ang^reSi

k M. Allize, Ministre de France a Munich.

Parisle Saoiit igid*

Veuillez faire connaitre au Gouvemement royal bavarois que vous ave^ re^u pour

'instruction de conformer votre attitude k celle de TAmbassadeur de la R^publique k

^Berlin et de ^tter Munich^

Ren6 Viviawi.

— 151

r 151.

M. Ren6 ViviANi, President du Gonseil, Ministre des Affaires ^trang^res,

a MM. les Repr^sentants de la France a Londres, Saint-P^tersbourg,
Vienne, Rome, Madrid, Berne, Constantinople, La Haye, Copen-
hague, Christiania, Stokholm, Bucarest, Athenes, Belgrade.

Palis, le 3 aoiit igi4.

J'apprends de source officielle beige que les troupes allemandes out vioU le terri'
toire beige k Genimerich dans la region de Verviers.

Rene Vivuni.

N'' 152.

M. Klobukowski, Ministre de France a Bruxelles,

k M. Ren6 Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires ^tran-
g^res.

Bruieltes, le d aoAt igi/i.

Le Chef de Cabinet du Ministere des Affaires etrangeres me remet une lettre par
laquelle le « Gouvemement du Roi declare etre lermemenl decide k resister par tons
les moyens en son pouvoir a ragression de I'Allemagne. La Belgique fait appel a
rAngleterre , ia France et la Russie pour cooperer comme garantes k la defense de
.son territoire.

< fl y aurait une action concertee et commune ayant pour but ae resister aux mesures
de .force, employees par TAiiemagne contre la Belgique, et en meme temps de
garantir le maintien de I'independance et de I'integrite de la Bejgique dans Tavenir.

i La Belgique est heureuse de pouvoir declarer qu'elle assurera la defense des
places fortes. »

Klobukgws&i.

-- 152 —

r 153.

M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres,

a M. Rene ViViani, President du Gonseil, Ministre des Affaires %an*
geres.

Londres, le 4 ao6t i9i.4«

Sir Edw. Grey m'a pri6 de venir ie voir a I'lnstant pour me dire que le premier
Ministre declarerait aujoiu-d'hui k la Chambre des Communes que I'Ailemagne avait
6le invitee a retirer son ultimatum k la Belgique et a donner sa reponse a I'Angleterre
ce soir avant minuit.

Paul Gambon.

r 154.

M. Klobukowski^ Ministre de France a BruxeHes,

a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseii, Ministre des Affaires ^tran-

geres.

Bruxelles, Ic 4 aout 1911.

Le Ministre d'Allemagne informe ce matin le Ministere des Affaires elrangeres
beige que, par suite du refus du Gouverment beige, le Gouvernement imperial se
voit force d'ex^cuter, par la force des armes, les mesures de securite indispensables
vis-a-vis des menaces fran9aises.

Klobukowskl

155.

M. Bapst, Ministre de France a Copenbague,

a M. DouMERGUE, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres.

Copenhague, 6 aout 1914-

L'Ambassadeur de France a Berlin me prie de communiquer k votre Excellence
le telegramme suivant :

J'ai ele dirige par le Gouvernement allemand sur le Danemark. Je viens d'arriver
a Copenhague. Tout le personnel de I'Aoibassade et le Charge d'affaires de Russie a
Darmstadt avec sa famille, m'accompagnaient. On a use de tels procedes k notre
egard que je crois. utile d'en faire le rapport complet a Votre Excellence par le
telegraphe.

Lundi matin, 3 aout, apres que j'avais, conformement k vos instructions, adress6
a M. de Jagow une protestation contre les actes d'agression commis sur le territoire

— 153 —

fran^ais par ies troupes allemandes>, le Secretaire d'Etatvint me voir. M. de Jagovv
venait se plaindre d'actes d'agression qu il pretendait avoir ete commis en Allemagne,
a Nuremberg et a Coblentz riotamment, par des aviateurs fran^ais qui, selon lui,
« seraient venus de Belgique ».— - Je repondis que je n'avais pas la moindre donnee
sur les faits dont il voulait faire etat et dont Tinvraisemblance me paraissait evidente;
je lui demandai a mon tour s'il avait^pris connaissance de la Note que je lui avais
adressee au sujet de Tenvahissement de notre territoire par des detachements de
I'armee allemande. — Comme le Secretaire d'Etat me disait n'avoir pas encore lu
cetteNote, je lui en donnai connaissance. J'appelai son attention sur Tacte commis
parl'officier commandant un de ces detachements, qui s'etaitavance jusqu'au village
francais de Joncherey, a lo kilometres a I'interieur de nos frontieres, et avail briile
la cervelle a un soldat frangais qu'il y avait. rencontre. Apres avoir qualifie cet acte,
j'ajoutai : — « Vous reconnaitrez qu'en aucune hypothese il ne saurait etre compare
a un vol d'aeroplane sur territoire etranger, accompli par des particuliers animes de
cet esprit daudace individuelle qui distingue les aviateurs.

Un act€ d'agression commis sur le territoire d'un voisin par des detachements de
troupes regulieres commandes par desofficiers presente unegravite toute autre. »

M. de Jagpw me declai-a qu'il ignorait les fails dont je lui parlais et ilconclut
qu'il etait difficile qu'il ne s'en produisit pas de cette nature lorsque deux armees,.
remplies des sentiments qui animaient nos troupes, se trouvaienl face k face de
chaque cote de la frontiere.

A ce moment, les attroupements qiii se trouvaient sur la Parezer Platz, devant
I'Ambassade et que nous apercevions ^travers la. fenetre entr'ouverle demon cabinet,
pousserent des cris contre la France. Je demandai au Secretaire d'Etat quand lout
cela fmirail.

« Le Gouvernement n'a pas encQre pris de decision , me repondit M. de Jagovv. II
est probable que M. de Schoen recevra aujourd'hi I'ordre de demander ses passe-
ports, et ensuite, vous recevrez les votres ». — Le Secretaire d'Etat m'assura que du
reste je n'avais aucune preoccupation k avoir au sujet de mon depart et que toutes
les convenances seraient pbservees a mon egard ainsi qu'^ I'egard de-mon personnel.
Nousne devious plus nous voir et nous primes conge I'un de I'auire ,. apres un entre-^
tien qui avait ete courtois et qui ne pouvait me faire prevoir ce que Ton me reser-
vail.

Avantde quitter M. de Jagow, je lui avais exprime le desir de faire une visile
personnelle au Chancelier, puisque ce serait la derniere fois q^ue j'aurais I'occasion
de le voir.

M. de Jagow me repondit qu il ne m'engageait pas k donner suite a cette intention,,
car cette entrevue ne servirait k rien et ne pourrait elre que penible.

A -6 heures du soir, M. de Langwerlh m'a apporte mes, passeports. II refusa au
nom de son Gouvernement d'acceder au desir qiie je lui exprimais de me laisser par-
tir par la Hollande ou la Belgique. II me proposa de parlir soil par Copenhague „ bien
qu'il ne put m'assurer le libre passage de la mer, soil par fa Suisse, via Constance.

J'^cceptai cette derniere voie; M. de Langwerlh m'ayant demande de parlir le plus
tot possible, il fut convenu, en raison de la necessite oii j'elais de m'entendre avec

DoccMENTS 0IPLOM4TIQCES. — Gucrre europeenne." ao

— 154 —

I'Ambassadeur d'Espagne, qui prend nos int6rets en main, que je quitterais I'Ambas-
sade le lendemain mardi 4 aout, k i o heures du soir.

Une Iieure apres le depart de M. de Langwerth, a 7 heures, M. de Lancken, ancien
Conseiller d'Ambassade k Paris, vint me dire de la part du Ministere des Affaires
etrangeres, d'inviter le personnel de mon Ambassade a ne plus prendre ses repas dans
les restaurants. Cette consigne etait si stricte que le lendemain mardi j'eus besoin de
recourir a I'autorite de la Wilhelmstrasse pour que I'hotel Bristol nous envoyat nos
repas a I'Ambassade.

Le meme soir, lundi a 1 1 heures, M. de Langwerth revint mapprendre que son
Gouvernement me refusait le retour par la Suisse sous le pretexte qu'il faudrait trois
jours et trois nuits pour me conduire a Constance. II m'annon^a que je serais dirige
sur Vienne. Je ne consentis k ce changement que sous reserve et dans la nuit j'ecrivis
k M. de Langwerth la lettre suivante : ,

« Berlin , 3 ao6t 191^.
M. LE Baron,

« Je reflechis a la route dont vous etes venu me parler ce soir pour me faire rentrer
dans mon pays. Vous me proposez de passer par Vienne. Je suis expose a me irouver
retenu dans cette ville , sinon du fait du Gouvernement autrichien , du moins du fait
des circonstances de sa mobilisation , qui lui cr^e des difficultes analogues a celles de
I'AUemagne pour la circulation des trains.

• Dans ces conditions, je crois devoir reclamer du Gouvernement allemand fengage-
raent d'honneur que le Gouvernement autrichien me dirigera sur la Suisse et que le
Gouvernement suisse ne fermera ni k moi, ni aux personnes qui m'accompagnent, sa
fronti^re qu'on me ditjustementfermee aux elrangers.

« Je ne puis done accepter la proposition que vousm'avez faite que si j'ai les suretes
que je reclame et si je suis assure de ne pas etre retenu quelques mois hors de mon
pays. .

Jules Cambon.

En reponse k cette lettre, le lendemain matin, mardi 4 aout, M. de Langwerth me
donna par ecrit Tassurance que les autorites autrichiennes et suisses avaient recu les
communications n6cessaires.

En meme temps, on arretait chez lui, dans son lit, M. Miladowski , attache au
Consulat de Berlin, ainsi que d'autres Fran^ais. M. Miladowski, pour qui un passe-
port diplomatique avait ete demands , put ^tre relftche au bout de 4 heures.

Je me preparais a partir pour Vienne, quand, a 4 heures 45, M. de Langwerth
revint m'annoncer que je devrais partir avec les personnes m'accompagnant k
1 o heures du soir, mais que je serais conduit en Danemark. Devant cette exigence
nouvelle, je demandai si Ton me mettrait dans une forteresse, au cas ou je ne I'accep-
terais pas. M, de Langwerth me repondit simplement qu'il reviendrait chercher la
reponse dans une demi-heure. Je ne voulais pas donner au Gouvernement allemand
le pretexte de dire que je m'etais refuse k sortir d'Allemagne. Je declarai done a M. de
Langwerth, lorsqu'il revint, que je me soumetlrais a I'ordre qui m'etait donne, mais
« que je protestais »»

— 155 —
J'ecrivis aussitot k M* de Jago^ la kltre* dont ia copiesuit-;

« Berlin, 4 aodt 1914*
« Monsieur le Secretaire d'Etat,

« Votre Excellence m'avait dit a plusleurs reprises que le Gouvernement imperial,
conformement aux usages de la courtoisie internationale , me faciliterait mon retoiu"
dans mon pays et me donnerait tous les moyens d'y rentrer rapidement.

« Cependant bier, apres m' avoir refuse I'acces de ia Belgique et de la Hollande,
M. le baron de Langwerth m'a informe que je passerais par la Suisse via Constance.
Danslanuit, j'al ete avis6 que je serais envoye en Autriche, pays qui preud part du
cote de TAllemagne k ia presente guerre. Comme j'ignorais les intentions de TAu-
tricbe a mon egard, puisque sur son sol je ne suis qu'un simple particulier, j*ai 6crit
au baron de Langwerth que je demandais au Gouvernement imperial Tengagement
que les autorites imperiales et royales autrichiennes me donneraient toutes les faci-
lites possibles pour continuer ma route, et que la Suisse ne se fermerait pas devant
moi. M. de Langwertb a bien voulu me r^pondre par ecrit que je pouvais etre assure
d'un voyage facile et que les autorites autrichiennes feraient tout le necessaire.

« II est pres de 5 heures et le baron de Langwerth vient de m'annoncer que je serai
dirige sur le Danemark. Etant donne les evenements, je ne. suis pas assure de trou-
ver un bailment pour me transporter en Angleterre, et c'est cette consideration qui
m'avait fait ecarter cette proposition, d^accord avec M. de Langwerth.

« En realite, on ne me laisse aucune liberte, et on me traite presque en prisonnier,
Je suis oblige de me soumettre, n'ayant aucun moyen d'obtenir qu'il soit tenu
compte des regies de la courtoisie internationale k mon egard, mais je tiens a protes-
ter entre les mains de Votre Excellence centre lafacon dont je suis traite.

Jules C AMBON.

Pendant qu'on portait ma leltre, j'6tais avis6 que le voyage ne s'efTectuerait pas
direclement, mais par la voie du Schleswig. A 10 heures du soir, je quittais I'Am-
bassade, avec mon personnel, au milieu d'un grand concours de police a pied et k
cheval.

A la gare , un employe inferieur du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres representait
seul cette administration.

Le voyage s'est efTectu6 avec une lenteur extreme. Nous avons mis plus de vingt-
quatre heures pour gagner la frontiere. II a sembl^ qu'a chaque station on attendait
des ordres pour repartir. Jetais accompagne du major von Rheinbaben, du regi-
ment Alexandre de la Garde, et d'un fonctionnaire de la police. Aux environs du
canal de Kiel, la troupe a envahi nos wagons. On a fait fermer les fenetres et les
rideaux des voitures; chacun de nous a dii se tenir isolement dans son compartiment
avec defense de se lever el de toucher k ses sacs de voyage. Dans le coidoir des
wagons, devant la porte de chacun de nos compartiments maintenue ouverte, se
tenait un soldat, le revolver an poing et le doigt sur la gachette. Le charge d'affaires
de Russie, les femmes, les enfants, tout le monde a ete soumis au meme traitement.

A la demiire station allemande, vers 1 i heures du soir, le major von Rheinbaben

— 156 —
est Tenu prendre conge de moi. Je lui ai remis, pour M. de Jagovv, ia lettre qui
suit :

• Mercredi soir, 5 aodt 191^1.
« Monsieur le Secretaire d'Et/^,

• Hier, avant de quitter Berlin, ^'ai proteste par ecrit aupres de Voire Excellence
contre les changements successifs de direction qui m'ont ete imposes par le Gouver-
nement imperial , pour sortir d'AUemagne.

« Aujourd'hui, lors du passage du train qui m'emportait au-dessus du canal de
Kiel, on a voulu visiter tons nos bagages, comme si nous pouvions cacher quelque
instrument de destruction. Grace a I'intervention du major von Rheinbaben, cet
affront nous a ete epargne.

« Mais on a fait plus.

« On nous a oblige de rester cbacun dans nos compartiments, dont les fenetres et
les rideaux etaient fermes. Pendant ce temps, dans le couloir des voilures, a laporte
de chaque compartiment et faisanl face k chacun de nous, se tenait un soldat, le
revolver a la main, le doigt sur la gachette, durant pres d une demi-heure.

« Je crois devoir protester contre cette menace de violences a Tegard de I'Ambassa-
deur de la Republique et du personnel de son Ambassade , violences que rien n'avait
pu seulement me faire pressentir. J'avais Thonneur d'ecrire hier a Votre Excellence
que j'etais traite presque en prisonnier. Aujourd'hui , c'est en prisonnier dangereux
que j'ai ete traite. Je dois noter que, dans le cours du voyage qui, depuis Berlin
jusqu'au Danemark, a pris vingt-quatre heures, aucun repas n'a ete prepare , ni fourni
a moi, non plus quaux personnes reconduites avec moi jusqu'k la frontiere.

Jules Cambon.

Je croyais tout termine, lorsque peu apres le major von Rheinbaben vint, un pen
confus, m'annoncer que le train ne poursuivrait pas jusqu'a la frontiere danoise si je
ne payais pas le prix de ce train. Je m'etonnai qu'on ne me Teut pas fait payer a
Berlin et, quen tout cas, on ne m'eut pas prevenu. Je proposai de payer parun
cheque sur une des plus grandes banques de Berlin ; cette facilite me fut refusee.
Avec le concours de mes compagnons , je pus reunir en or la somme qui m'elait
demandee immediatement et qui s'elevait a 3,Ci 1 marks 76, soit a environ
5,000 francs au taux actuel du change (1).

Apres ce dernier incident , je crus devoir demander k M. de Rheinbaben sa parole
d'officier et de gentilhomme qu on allait me conduire jusqu i la frontiere danoise. II
me la donna et j'exigeai que I'hommede police qui etait avec nous nous accompagnat.

Nous arrivames ainsi a la premiere station danoise oii le Gouvernement danois
avait fait preparer un train pour nous conduire a Copenhague.

On m'assurfe que mon coUegue d'Angleterre et le Ministre de Belgique, bien qu'ils
aient quitte Berlin apres moi, sont partis directement pour la Hollande. Je suis frapp6
de cette difference de Iraitement. Et coinme le Danemark et la Norvege sont remplis
en ce moment d'espions, si je reussis a m'embarquer en Norvege, on craint que je
ne sois arrete en mer, avec, les officiers qui m'accompagnent.

' ^1) UU^rieurement la somme ainsi demandee a M. Jules Cambon a ete reversee a I'Ambassadeur d'Es-
pagoe 4 JBeriin poor &lre remboursi^e at I'Ambassadeur de France,

— 157 —
Je ne veux pas terminer cette d^peche sans signaler a voire Excellence le devoue-
ment et T^nergie dont tout le personnel de I'Ambassade n a pas cesse de faire preuve
pendant la duree de cette crise; je serais heureux quil lui fiit tenucompte des ser-
vices rendus a cette occasion au Gouvernement de la Republique , en particulier par
les Secretaires de I'Ambassade ainsi que par I'Attach^ militaire et I'Attaqhe naval.

Jules Gambon.

r 156.

M. MoLLARD, Ministre de France a Luxembourg,

a M. DouMERGUE. Ministre des AfFaires etrangeres.

Paris, le 4 aout 191 4.

Le Ministre d'Etat est venu mardi matin 4 aout, vers huit heures et demie, a la
Legation pour me notifier que les autorites mililaires allemandes exigeaient mon
depart, Sur ma reponse que je ne cederais que devant la force, M. Eyschen me dit
qu'il connaissait mes sentiments a ce sujet et que c etait precisement pour cela qu'il
etait venu lui-meme me faire cette communication qui lui coiitait beaucoup , car
c' etait effeclivement devant la force qu'il me priait de partir. II ajouta qu'il allait
men apporter la preuve ecrite.

Je ne cachai pas a M. Eyschen la tristesse et I'inqui^tude que j'avais de laisser mes
compatriotes sans defense et lui demandai de vouloir bien se charger de leur pro-
tection, ce quil accepta.

Au moment de partir, il me remit la lettre ci-jointe (annexe I), qui est la reponse
du Gouvernement luxembourgcois a la declaration que j'avais faite la veille au soir,
selon les instructions telegraphiques de M. Viviani.

Vers dix heures, le Ministte d'Etat vint de nouveau a la Legation et me laissa,
avec un mot de lui, une copie certifiee de la lettre que lui avait adressee le Ministre
d'Allemagne au sujet de raon depart du Luxembourg (annexes 11 et III).

lime ditegalement qu'il avait fait connaitre a M. von Buch que le Gouvernement
luxembourgcois serait charge deJa protection des Fran^ais et aurait la garde de la
Legation et de la Chaucellerie. Cette nouvelle ne parut pas plaire a mon collegue
d'Allemagne, qui conseilla a M. Eyschen de m'inciter k confier ce soin au Ministre de
Belgique. J'expliquai au Ministre d'Etat que la situation etait particuliere. Etant
accredite aupres die S, A. R. la. Grande-Duchesse et mon pays n'etant pas en etat de
guerre avec le Luxembourg, il etait^ dans ces conditions, lout indique que ce fut le
Gouvernement luxembourgcois qui assurat la sauvegarde de mes , compatriotes.
M. Eyschen n'insista pas et accepta de nouveau la miission que je lui confiai.

Le Ministre d'Etat me demanda dors de vouloir bien partir sans bruit, afin d'eviler
des manifestations qui ne manqueraient pas, me dit-il, d'amener des represailles vis-
a-vis des Fran^ais de la part des autorites mililaires allemandes. Je lui repondis que
j'atlachais Irop de'prix a la s6curite de mes compatriotes pour la comprometlre et
qu'il n avail rien k craindre.

— 158 —

Mon depart, qu'on exigeait le plus tot possible, fut fixe a 2 heures, ii ful egale-
ment entendu que je partirais dans mon automobile. Pour le sauf-conduit, M. Eyschen
me dit que le Ministre d'Allemagne etait actuellement au quartier general allemand
pour le demander et qu'il aurait soin de me le faire lenir en temps utile.

A 2 heures un quart, M. le Ministre d'Etat , accompagne deM. Henrion, Conseiller
du Gouvernement , vint me faire ses adieux et recevoir les clefs de la Legation et
«celles de la Chancelierie.

II me fit connaitre que les ordres avaient ete donnes pour mon fibre passage el
que je devais gagner Arlon par la route de Merle, la route de Mamers et la route
d'Arlon. II ajouta qu'iin oflicier allemand m'attendrait route de Merle pour preceder
ma voiture.

Je quittai alors la Legation et me rendis a Arlon par I'itineraire fixe, mais je ne
rencontrai personne.

Votre Excellence voudra bien trduver ci-contre (annexe IV) le texte de la lettre que
j'ai remise a M. le Ministre d'Etat avant de quitter mon poste.

MOLLARD.

Annexe I.

M. Eyschen, Ministre d'Etat, President du Gouvernement,

a M. MoLLARD, Envoye extraordinaire et Ministre plenipotentiaire de France k
Luxembourg.

Luxembourg, le 4 aoi!^t 1914.
Monsieur. LE Ministre,
Par sa communication verbale dliier soir. Voire Excellence a eu la haute obfigeance de
porter a ma connaissance que, conform^ment au lrait6 de Londres de 1867, le Gouverne-
ment de la Republique entendait respecter la neutraUt6 du Grand-Duche de Luxembourg,
comme il Tavail montre par son altitude, mais que la violation de cette neutrality par TAlle-
magne etait toulefois de nature k obliger la France a s'inspirer d^sormais a cet egard du
souci de sa defense et de ses int^rets.

Vous me permettrez de constater, Monsieur le Ministre, que la decision du Gouverne-
ment de la Republique est uniquement bas^e sur le fait d'une tierce Puissance dont, certes,
le Grand-Duche nest pas responsable.

Les droits du Luxembourg doivent done rester inlacls.

L'Empire allemand a formellement declare que seule une occupation teraporaire du
Luxembourg enlrait dans ses intentions.

Jaime a croire, Monsieur le Ministre, que le Gouvernement de la Republique n'aura pas
de peine a constater avec moi que de tout temps et en toules circonstances , le Grand-Duch6
a pleinement et loyalement rempli toules les obligations generalement quelconques qui lui
incombaient en verlu du Iraite de 1867.
Veuiliez agreer, etc. ^

Le Ministre d'Etat,

President du Gouvernement,
Eyschen.

^ 159 —

Annexe II.

Lettre particuliere adressee par M. Eyschen, Ministre d'Etat, President du Gouverne-
ment,

a M. MoLLARD, Ministre de France k Luxembourg.

Monsieur le Ministre,

Tout a I'heure, j'ai eu le tres vif regret de vous faire connaitre les intentions du General
von Fuchs au sujet de votre sejour h Luxembourg.

Comme j'ai eu Thonneur de vous le dire, j'avais demande une constatation par ^crit de
la decision prise a ce sujet par Tautorite militaire.

Ci-joint copie dune lettre que je viens de recevoir a I'instant de la part du Ministre
d'Allemagne.

II m'a ete assure que, dans I'ex^cution de la mesure, on ne manquera d'avoir tons les
|(5gards dus a votre quality et k votre personne.

Veuiliez recevoir I'expression r^iteree de tous mes regrets et de mes sentiments les meii-.
leurs.

Eyschbn.

Annexe III.

A Son Excellence le Ministre d'Etat , M. le D' Evschen.

Excellence

J ai I'honneur, conformement aux instructions de Son Excellence M. le general Fuchs,
de vous prier de vouloir bien inviter le Ministre de France, M. Mollard, a quitter aussitot
que possible le Luxembourg et a se rendre en France; autrement les autorites militaires
allemandes se trouveraient dans la penible obligation de placer M. Mollard sous la surveillance
dune escorte militaire et en cas extreme de proceder a son arrestation.

Je prie Votre Excellence de vouloir bien agreer a cette occasion lassurance de ma consi-
deration la plus distinguee.

VON BucH.

160 --

IV.

M. MoLLARD, Ministre de France k Luxembourg,

a Son Excellence M. Eyschen, Ministre d'Etat, President du Gouveniement de

Luxembourg.

Monsieur le Ministre,

Luxemboui^, le 4 aoiit 191.4.

Je viens de recevoir votre comaiunicalion et m'incline devant la force.

Avant de quitter le Luxembourg, jai le devoir de me preoccuper du sort et de la securile
de mes compatriotcs. Connaissant I'csprit de justice et d'equite du Gouvernement luxem-
bourgeois, j'ai I'honneur de prier Votre Excellence de les prendre sous sa haute protection
et de veiiler a la sauvegarde de leur vie et de leurs biens.

Je demanderai egalement a Votre Excellence d'assurer la garde de i'hotel de la Legation
et des bureaux de la Chancellerie.

Je serais tres oblige a Votre Excellence de vouloir bien .fairc agreer a S. A. R. Madame la
Grande-Duchesse THommage de mon profond respect et toutes mes excuses de n'avoir pu
aller ie lui exprimer moi-meme.

En vous remerciant, Monsieur le Ministre, do toutes les marques de sympathic que vous
m'avez donnees, je vous prie d'agreer la nouvelle assurance de ma haute consideration.

Armand Mollard.

N" 157,

Notification du Gouvernement fran(^ais
Aux Representants des Puissances A Paris.,

Le Gouvernement imperial allemand, apres avoir laisse ses forces armees franchir
la frontiere et se livrer sur le territoire fran^ais k divers actes de meurtre et de
pillage; apres avoir viole la neutralite du Grand-Duch6 de Luxembourg, au mepris des
stipulations de la Convention de Londres du 1 i mai 1 867 et de la Convention V de
la Have du 1 8 octobre 1907, sur les droits et devoirs des puissances tt des personnes en
cos de guerre sur terre (articles I el U), conventions signees de lui; apres avoir adresse
un ultimatum au Gouvernement royal de Belgique tendant k exiger le passage des
forces allemandes par le territoire beige, en violation des Traites du 19 avril 1889,
Egalement slgneS de lui et de la susdite Convention de La Haye

A declar6 la guerre k la France le 3 aout 1916, k 18 heures 45.

Le Gouvernement de la Republique se voit, dans ces conditions, oblige, do son
A4« de.recounr k la force des armes.

— J61 —

II a,, en consequence, i'honneur de laire savoir, par la presente, au Gouvernement

de que I'etat de guerre exrste entre la France et TAUemagne a dater du 3 aout

1914, 18 h. ^5.

Le Gouvernement de la Republique proteste aupres de toutes les nations civilis^es
€t specialement aupres des Gouvernements signataires des Conventions et Traites sus
rappeles, contre la violation par TEmpire allemand de ses engagements interna-
tionaux; il fait toutes reserves quant aux represailles qu'il pourrait se voir amener k
exercer contre un ennemi aussi peu soucieux de la parole donnee.

Le Gouvernement de la Republique qui entend observer les principes du droit des
gens, se conformera, durant les hostilites et sous reserve de reciprocite, aux disposi-
tions des Conventions Internationales signees par la France , concernant le droit de la
guerre surierre et sur mer.

La presente notification, faite en conformite de I'article 2 de la IIP Convention de
LaHaye du 18 octobre 1907, relative k I'ouverture des hostilites, et renodse k. . , .\

A Paris, le ./i aout 1914,^ 1 4 heures.

r 158.

Message de M. Poincare, President de la Republique,
a la seance extraordinaire du Parlement, le ^ aout 19 iU,

[Journal officiel du 5 aout 19 1 4.)
(La Chamhre ecoute, debout, la lecture du message.)

"Messieurs LES Deputes,

«La France vient d'etre Tobjet dune agression brutale et premeditee, qui est un
insolent defi au droit des gens. Avant qu'une declaration de guerre nous eut encore
ete adressee , avant meme que I'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne eut demands ses passe-
ports, notre territoire a ete viole. L'Empire d'Allemagne n'a fait hier soir que donner
lardivement le nom veritable k un etat de fait qu'il avait deja cree.

« Depuis plus de quarante ans, les Fran^ais, dans un sincere amour deia paix, ont
refoule au fond de leur coeur le desir des reparations legitimes.

« lis ont donne au monde I'ex^emple d'une grande nation qui , definitlvement
relevee de la defaite par la volonte, la patience et le travail, n'a us6 de sa force re-
nouvelee et rajeunie que dans I'interet du progres et pour le bien de I'humanite.

« Depuis qlie I'ultimatum de I'Autriche a ouvert une crise menagante pour I'Europe
entiere , la France s'est attachee k suivre et a recommander partout une politique de
prudence, de sagesse et de moderation.

« On ne pent lui imputer aucun acte, aucun geste, aucun mot qui n'ait ete paci-
fiqute et conciliant.

« A I'heure des premiers combats, elle a le droit de se reridre solennellement cette

Documents diplomatiques. — Guerre europ^enne. 9 1

— 162 —
justice, (ju'elle a fait» jusqu'au demier moment, des efforts supreroes pour conjurer
la guerre qui vient d*eclater et dont I'Empire d'AUemagne supportera, devant i'his-
toire, Tecrasante responsabilite. [Applaudissements unanimes et repetes.)

« Au lendemain meme du jour ou nos allies et nous, nous exprimions publique-*
ment Tesperance de voir se poursuivre pacifiquement les negociations engagees sous
les auspices du Cabinet de Londres, I'Allemagne a declare subitement la guerre a la
Russie, elle a envahi le territoire du Luxembourg, elle a outrageusement insulte
la noble nation beige (Vifs applaudissements unanimes)^ notre voisine et notre amie,
et elle a essaye de nous surprendre traitreusement en pleine conversation diploma-
tique. [Noaveaax applaudissements unanimes ei repetes. )

« Mais la France veillait. Aussi attentive <jue pacifique, elle s'etait preparee; et nos
ennemis vont rencontrer sur leur chemin nos vaillantes troupes de couverture, qui
sont a leurs postes de bataille et a I'abri desquelles s'achevera methodiquement la
mobilisation de toutes nOs forces nationales.

• Notre belle et co^irageuse armee, que la France accompagne aujourd'hui de sa
pensee maternelle [Vifs applaudissements), s'est levee toute fremissante pour de-
fendre I'honneur du drapeau et le sol de la patrie. (Applaudissements unanimes et
repetes. )

« Le President de la Republique, interprete de I'unanimite du pays, exprime a nos
troupes de terre et de mer I'admiration et la confiance de tous les Frangais. [Vifs
applaudissements prolonges.)

• Etroitement unie en un meme sentiment, la Nation perseverera dans le sang-froid
dont elle a donne , depuis fouverture de la crise , la preuve quotidienne. Elle saura ,
comme toujours, concilier les plus genereux elans et les ardeurs les plus enthou-
siastes avec cette maitrise de soi qui est le signe des energies durables et la meilleure
garantie de la victoire. [Applaudissements.)

« Dans la guerre qui s*engage , la France aura pour elle le Droit , dont les peuples ,
non plus que les individus, ne sauraient impunement meconnaitre letemelle puis-
sance morale. ( Vifs applaudissements unanimes. )

■ Elle sera heroiquement defendue par tous ses fils, dont rien ne brisera devant
rennemi Tunion sacree et qui sont ajourd'hui fraternellement assembles dans une
meme indignation contre Tagresseur et dans une meme foi patriotique. ( Vifs applau-
dissements prolonges et cris de : vive la France.)

• Elle est iidelement secondee par la Russie, son alliee [Vifs applaudissements una-
nimes) ; elle est soutenue par la loyale amitie de TAngleterre. ( Vifs applaudissements
unanimes.)

a Et deja de tous les points du monde civilise viennent a elle les sympathies et les
voeux. Car elle represente aujourd'hui, une fois de plus, devant I'univers, la liberte,
la justice et la raison. (Vifs applaudissements repetes.)

« Haut les coeurs et vive la France! (Applaudissements unanimes et prolonges.) •

Raymond PoincaSe.

— 163

r 159.

DiscouBs prononce par M, Bene Viviani, President da ConseiU
a la Chambre des Deputes le k aout 19 iH.

[Journal officiel du 5 aout 19 1 4.)

M. Rene Viviani, President da Conseil. Messieurs » Tambassadeur d'AUemagne a
quitte hier Paris, apres nous avoir notifie Tetat de guerre.

Le Gouvernement doit au Parlcment le recit veridique des evenements qui, en
moins de dix jours, ont dechaine la guerre europeenne et oblige la France pacifique
et forte a defendre sa frontiere conlre une agression dont la soudainete calculee sou-
ligne I'odieuse injustice.

Gette agression, que rien n'excuse et qui a commence avant qu^aucune declaration
de. guerre nous Teut notifiee , est le dernier acte d'un plan dont j'entends affirmer^
devant notre democratie et devant I'opinion civilisee, Torigine et le but.

A la suite du crime abominable qui a coute la vie i I'archiduc herider d'Autriche-
Hongrie et a la duchesse de Hohenberg, des difficultes se sont elevees entre le cabi-
net de Vienne et le cabinet de Belgrade.

La plupart des puissances n'en ont ete qu'officieusement informees jusqu'au ven-
dredi 2 4 juillet, date a laquelle les ambassadeurs d'Autriche-Hongrie leur ont remis
une circulaire que la presse a publiee.

Cette circulaire avait pour objet d'expliquer et de justifier un ultimatum adresse
la veille au soir k la Serbie par le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie a Belgrade.

Get ultimatum, en affirmant la complicite de nombreux sujets et associations
serbes dans le crime de Serajevo, insinuait que les autorites officielles serbes elles-
memes n y elaient pas .etrangeres. II exigeait pour le samedi 2 5 juillet k six heures
du soir, une reponse de la Serbie.

Les satisfactions exigees, ou du moins plusieurs d'entre elles, portaient indiscuta-
blement atteinte aux droits d'un Etat souverain. Malgre leur caractere excessif, la
Serbie, le 2 5 juillet, declara sy soumettre, presque sans alicune reserve.

A cette soumission, qui constituait pour TAutriche-Hongrie unsucces, pour la paix
europeenne une garantie, les conseils de la France, de la Russie et de la Grande-Bre-
tagne, adresses a Belgrade, des la premiere heure, n etaient pas etrangers.

Ges conseils avaient d'autant plus de valeur que les exigences austro-hongroises
avaient ete dissimulees aux chancelleries de la Triple Entente k qui, dans les trois
semaines precedentes, le Gouvernement austro-hongrois avait donne a plusieurs re-
prises I'assurance que ses revendications seraient extremement moderees.

C'est done avec un juste etonnement que les cabinets de Paris, de Saint-Peters-
bourg et de Londres apprirent le 2 6 juillet que le ministre d'Autriche k Belgrade,
apres un examen de quelques minutes , avait declare inacceptable la reponse serbe et
rompu les relations diplomatiques.

Get etonnement s'aggravait de ce fait que, des le vendredi 24, Tambassadeur
d'AUemagne etait venu lire au ministre fran^ais des affaires etrangeres une note ver-

— 164 —

bale affirmant que le conflit auslro-serbe devait demeurer localise , sans intervention
des grandes puissances , faute de quoi on en pouvait redouter des « consequences
incalculables;). Une demarche analogue fut faite le samedi 25 a Londres et a Saint-
Petersbourg.

Est-il besoin , messieurs , de vous signaler xombien les termes mena^ants employes
par I'ambassadeur d'AUemagne a Paris contrastaient avec les sentiments concilianls
dont les puissances de la Triple Entente venaient de fournir la preuve par les conseils
de soumission qu'elles avaient donnes a la Serbie ?

Neanmoins, sans nous arreter au caractere anormal de la demarche allemande, '
nous ayons, d'accord avec nos allies et nos amis, immediatement engage une action
de conciliation en invitant TAllemagne a s'y associer. '

Nous avons eu^ des la premiere heure , le regret de constater que nos dispositions
et nos efforts ne rencontraient a Berlin ^ucun echo.

Non seulement I'Allemagne ne paraissait nullement disposee a donner k I'Aulriche-
Hongrie les conseils amicaux que sa situation I'autorisait a formuler, mais, des ce
moment, et pljus encore dans les jours suivanls, elle semblait s'interposer entre le
cabinet de Vienne et les propositions transactionnelles emanant des autres puissances.

Le mardi 28 juillet, I'Autriche-Hongrie declara la guerre a la Serbie. Cette decla-
ration de guerre aggravant, a trois jours de distance, I'etat de choses cree
par la rupture des relations diplomatiques, permetlait de croire a une volontc refle-
chie de guerre, k un programme systematique tendant a Tasservissement de la Serbie.

Ainsi se trouvait mis en cause, non seulement I'independance d'un peuple vail-
lant, mais Tequiiibre des Balkans, inscrit dans le Iraite de Bucarest de iqkS, et con-
sacre par I'adhesion morale de toutes les grandes puissances.

Cependant, k la suggestion du Gouvernemenl Britannique, toujours attache de la
fagon la plus ferme au maintien de la paix europeenne, les negociations se poursui-
vaient ou, plus exactement, les Puissances de la Triple Entente essayaient de les
poursuivre.

De ce desir commun est sortie la proposition d'une action a quatre. Angleterre,
France, AUemagne, Italie, destinee, en assurant a I'Autriche toutes les satisfactions
legitimes, k menager un reglement equitable du conflit.

Le raercredi 29, le Gouvernemenl Russe, constatant lechec persistant de ces ten-
ia tives, et en presence de la mobilisation el de la declaration dc guerre aulrichiennes,
redoutant pour la Serbie un ecrasement militaire, decida, k litre prevenlif, la mobi-
lisation des troupes de qualre arrondisssements mililaires, c'est-a-dire des formations
echelonn^es le long de la frontiere auslro-hongroise exclusivement.

Ce faisanl, il prenait soin d'aviser le Gouvernemenl aliemand que cette *mesure ,
limilee el sans caractere offensif a Tegard de rAuiriche, n'elait, k aucun deijrfc,

O Til O '

dirigee centre I'Allemagne .

Dans une conversation avec I'ambassadeui de Bussie, a Berlin, le Secretaire d'Elat
aliemand aux affaires etrangeres ne faisail point difficulte de le reconnailre.

Par contre, lout ce que lenlait la Grande-Brelagne, avec I'adhesion de la Kussie
el I'appui de la France, pour elabhr le contact enlre I'Autriche el la Serbie sous le

— 165 —

patronage moral de I'Europe, se heurtait, a Berlin, a un parti pris negatif dont les
depeches diplomatiques fournissent la preuve peremptoire.

C'etait la une situation troublante et qui rendait vraisemblable I'existence k Berlin
de cerlaincs arriere-pensees. Quelques heures apres, ces hypotheses et ces craintes-
devaient se transformer en certitudes.

En effet, I'attitude negative de I'Allemagne laisait place trente-six heures plus tard
a des initiatives justement alarmantes : le 3 i juillet, I'Allemagne, en proclamant I'etat
de « danger de guerre », coupait les communications entre elle et le reste del'Europe
et se donnait toute liberte de pour-suivre contre la France, dans un secret absolu,
des preparatifs militaires que rien, vous I'avez vu, ne pouvait justifier.

Depuis plusieurs jours deja, et dans des conditions difficiles a expliquer, TAIle-
magne avait prepare le passage de son armee du pied de paix au pied de guerre.

Des le 2 5 juillet au matin, c'est-a-dlre avartt meme Texpiration du delai assigne a
la Serbie par I'Autriche, elle avait consigne les garnisons d'Alsace-Lorraine. Le meme
jour, elle avait mis en etat d'armement les ouvrages proches de la frontiere. Le 26,
elle avait present aux chemins de fer les mesures preparatoires de la concentration.
Le 27, elle avait effectue les requisitions et mis en place ses troupes de couverlure.
Le 28 , les appels individuels de reservisles avaient commence et les elements eloignes
de la frontiere en avaient ete rapproches.

Toutes ces mesures, poursuivies avec une methode implaccable, pouvaient-elles
nous laisser des doutes sur les intentions de TAllemagne ?

Telle etait la situation, lorsque, le 3i juillet au soir, le Gouvernement allemand,
qui depuis le 2I1, n'avait parlicipe par aucun acte positif aux efforts conciliants de la
Triple Entente, adressa au Gouvernement russe un ultimatum, sous pretexte que la
Russie avait ordonne la mobilisation generale de ses armees, et il exigea dans un
delai de douze heures I'arret de cette mobilisation.

Celte exigence, d'autant plus blessante dans la forme que, quelques heures plus
tot, I'empereur Nicolas II, dans un geste de confiance spontanee, avait demande k
I'empereur d'Allemagne sa mediation, se produisait au moment ou, a la demande de
I'Angleterre et au su de I'Allemagne, le Gouvernement russe acceptait une formule
de nature a preparer un reglement amiable du conflil austro-serbe et des difficultes
austro-russes par I'arret simultane des operations et preparatifs militaires.

Le meme jour, cette demarche inamicale a I'egard de la Russie se doublait d'acles
neltement hostiles a I'egard de la France : rupture des communications par routes,
voies ferrees, telegraphes et telephones, saisie des locomotives fran^aisesa leur arri-
vee a la frontiere, placement de mitrailleuses au milieu de la voie ferree qui avait
ete coupee , concentration de troupes a cette frontiere.

Des ce moment, il ne nous etait plus permis de croire a la sincerite des declarations
pacifiques que le representant de I'Allemagne continuait k nous prodiguer. [Mou-
vement. )

Nous savions qu'^ I'abri de I'etat de « danger de guerre* proclame, I'Allemagne
mobilisait.

Nous apprenions que six classes de reservistes avaient ete appelees et que les trans-
ports de concentration se poursuivaient pour des corps d'armee meme stationnes a
une notable distance de la frontiere.

— 166 —

A mesure que ces evenements se deroulaieni, le Gouvemement, attentif et vigi-
lant, prenait de jour en jour, et meme d'heure en heure, les mesures de sauvegarde
qu'imposait la situation; la mobilisation generale de nos armees de terre et de mer
etait ordonnee.

Le meme soir, a sept heures trente, I'AUemagne, sans s*arreter k I'acceptation par ie
cabinet de Saint-Petersbourg de la proposition anglaise que j'ai rappelee plus baut,
declarait la guerre a la Russie.

Le lendemain, dimancbe 2 aout, sans egard a I'extreme moderation de la France,
en contradiction avec les declarations pacifiques de I'ambassadeur d'Allemagne a
Paris, au mepfis des regies du droit international, les troupes allemandes francliis-
saient en trois points difierents notre frontiere.

En meme temps, en violation du traite de 1867, ^ * garanti avec la signature de
la Prusse la neulralite du Luxembourg, elles envahissaient le territoire du Grand-
Ducbe, motivant ainsi la protestation du Gouvemement luxembourgeois.

Enfin la neutralite de la Belgique meme etait menacee : le ministre d'Allemagne
remettait le 2 aoiit au soir au Gouvemement beige un ultimatum I'invitant a faciliter
en Belgique les operations militaires contre la France, sous le pretexte mensonger
que la neutralite beige etait menacee par nous; le Gouvemement beige s'y refusa,
declarant qu'il etait resolu a defendre energiquement sa neutralite, respectee par la
France et garantie par les traites, en particulier par le roi de Prusse. [Applaudisscments
ananimes et prolonrjes.)

i, Depuis lors, messieurs, les agressions se sont renouvelees, multipliees et accen-
tuees. Sur plus de quinze points notre frontiere a ete violee. Des coups de fusil ont
ete tires contre nos soldats et nos douaniers. II y a eu des morts et des blesses. Hier, un
aviateur militaire allemand a lance trois bombes sur Lun^ville.

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, k qui nous avons communique ces faits, ainsi qua
toutes les grandes Puissances, ne les a pas dementis et n en a pas exprime de regrets.
Par contre , il est venu hier soir me demander ses passeports et nous notifier Tetat de
guerre, en arguant, contre toute verite, d'actes d'hostilite commis par des aviateurs
fran^ais en territoire allemand dans la region de TEiffel et meme sur le chemin de
fer pres de Carlsruhe et pres de Nuremberg. Voici la leltre qu'il m'a remise a ce sujet :

« Monsieur le PRESroENT,

■ Les autorites administralives et militaires allemandes ont constate un certain
nombre d'actes d'hostilite caracterisee commis sur territoire allemand par des avia-
teurs militaires fran^ais. Plusieurs de ces derniers ont manifcstement viole la neutra-
lite de la Belgique survolarit le territoire de ce pays. L'un a essay c de detruire des
constructions pres de Wesel, d'autres ont ete aper^us sur la region de rEiifel, un
autre a jete des bombes sur le chemin de fer pres de Karlsruhe et de Nuremberg.

a Je suis charge et j'ai I'honneur de faire connaitre k Votre Excellence qu'cn pre-
sence de ces agressions, I'Empire allemand se considere en etat de guerre avec la
France du fait dfe cette derniere Puissance.

• J'ai en meme temps Thonneur de porter a la connaissancc de Voire Excellence
que les autorites allemandes retiendront les navires marchands frangais dans despoil

■^S

— 167 —
alleraands, mais qii'elles les rel^cheront si, dans Jes quarante-huit heures, la recipro-
city complete est assuree.

« Ma mission diplomatique ayant ainsi pris fin, il ne me resle plus qu a prier Votre
Excellence de vouloir bien me raunir de mes passeports et de prendre les mesures
qu elle jugerait utiles pour assurer men retour en AUemagne *avec le personnel de
I'ambassade ainsi qu avec le personnel de l<i Legation de Baviere et du Consulat ge-
neral d'AUemagne k Paris.

« Veuillez agreer, monsieur le president, Texpression de ma tres haute considera-
tion.

« Signe : Schoen. »

Ai-je besoin, messieurs, d'insister sur I'absurdite de ces pretextes que Ton vou-
<irait presenter comme des griefs? A aucun moment, aucun aviateur fran^ais n'a
penetre en Belgique, aucun aviateur fran^ais n'a commis, ni en Baviere, ni dans
aucune autre partie de TAIlemagne, aucun acte d'hostilite. L'opinion europeenne a
deja fait justice de ces inventions miserables. ( Vifs applaudisscmenis nnanimes. )

Gontre ces attaques qui violent toules les lois de. I'equite €t toutes les regies du
droit public, nous avons, des maintenant, pris toutes les dispositions necessaires;
Texecution sen poursuit avec une rigoureuse melhode et un absolu sang-froid.

La mobilisation de I'armee russe se continue egalement .avec une energie remar-
quable et un enthousiasme sans restriction. [La Chambre entiire se live. — Applau-
dissemenls nnanimes et prolonges.)

L'armee beige, mobilisee a 25o,ooo hommes, se dispose k defendre avec une
magnifique ardeur la neutralite et findependance de son pays. [Nouveaax applaudis-
sements vifs et unanimcs. )

La flotte anglaise est mobilisee tout entiere et I'ordre a ete donne de mobiHser
I'armee de terre. [Toas les deputes se levent et applaadissent longuement.)

Des 1912, des pourparlers avaient eu lieu entre les Etats-Majors anglais et fran-
gais, termines par un echange de lettres entre Sir Edward Grey et M. Paul Cambon.
Le Secretaire d'Etat aux affaires etrangeres a donne, hier soir, k la Chambre des
communes, communication des lettres echangees,et je vais avoir rhonneur, d'accord
avec le Gouvernement britannique , de porter k votre connaissance le contenu de ces
deux documents :

FOKEIGN OFnCE,

' lAnidres, le 21 oovembre igif.

aMoN CHER AmBASSADEUR,

« A diiferentes reprises, aucoursdesdernieresannees, les Etats-Majors militaires et
navals de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne oht echange leur vues. II a toujours 4td
entendu que ces echanges de vues ne portent pas atteinte a la liberty de I'un et I'autre
Gouvernement de decider k n'importe quel moment dans I'avenir s'il doit ou non sou-
tenir I'autre avec ses forces armies. Nous avons admis que des echanges de vues entre

— 168 —
techniciens ne constituent pas et ne doivenl pas etre regard^s comme constituant
un engagement qui oblige Tun ou lautre Gouvernement A intervenir dans une
eventualite qui ne s'est pas encore presentee et qui pent ne jamais naitre. Par
exemple, la repartition actuelle des flottes fran9aises et anglaises ne repose pas sur
un engagement de collaborer en temps de guerre.

« Vous avez cependant fait remarquer que si Tun ou I'aulre Gouvernement avait
de graves raisons de redouter ime attaque de la part d'uue tierce puissance sans
aucune provocation, il pourrait etre essentiel de savoir si, dans cette circonstance , il
pourrait compter sur I'assistance militaire de I'autre puissance.

« J'accepte que si I'un ou Tautre gouvernement a de graves raisons de craindre
une attaque sans provocation de la part d'une tierce puissance, ou tout autre evene-
ment menaQant pour la paix generale , ce gouvernement deviait examiner immedia-
tement avec I'autre s'ils ne doivent pas agir tons deux ensemble pour empecber
Tagression et maintenir la paix et, dans ce cas, recbercber les mesures qu'ils seraient
disposes a prendre en commun. Si ces mesures comportaient une action militaire,
les plans des Etats-Majors generaux seraient aussitot pris en consideration et les deux
Gouvernements decideraient alors la suite qu il conviendrait de leur donner.

« Sincerement votre,

« Sign^ : E. Grey. »

A cette lettre, k la date du 2 3 novembre 1912, notre ambassadeur, M. Paul Gam-
bon, repondait :

• Londres, le 23 novembre 1912.
Cher Sir Edward.

« Par votre lettre en date d'bier, 2 2 novembre , vous m'avez rappele que , dans
ces dernieres annees, les autorites militaires et navales de la France et de la Grande-
Bretagne s'etaient consultees de temps en temps; qu il avait toujours ete entendu que
ces consultations ne restreignaient pas la liberie, pour cbaque Gouvernement, de
decider dans I'avenir s'ils se preteraient Tun I'autre le concours de leurs forces
armees; que, de part et d'autre, ces consultations cntre specialistes n'etaient et ne
devaienl pas etre considerees comme des engagements obligeant nos Gouvernements
a agir dans certains cas; que cependant je vous avais fait observer que, si I'un ou
I'autre des deux Gouvernements avait de graves, raisons d'apprehender une attaque
non provoquee de la part d'une tierce puissance, il deviendrait essentiel de savoir
s'il pourrait compter sur I'assistance aj-mee de I'autre.'

« Votre lettre repond k cette observation et je suis autorise i vous declarer que,
dans le cas ou I'un de nos deux Gouvernements aurait un niolif grave d'apprehender
soit I'agression d'une tierce puissance, soit quelque evenement mena^ant pour la paix
generale, ce Gouvernement examinerait immcdiatement avec I'autre si les deux Gou-
vernements doivenl agir de concert en vue de prevenir I'agression ou de sauvegarder
la paix. Dans ce cas, les deux Gouvernements delibercraient sur les mesures qu'ils
seraient disposes 6 prendre en commun; si ces mesures comportaient une action, les

— 169 —
deux Gouvernemenls prendraient aussitot en consideration les plans de leUrs etals-
majors et decideraient alors de la suite qui devrait etre don nee a ces plans.

« Sincerement a vous.

« Signe : P. Cambon. »

( A la Qiambre des Communes, le Secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires etrangeres a parle
de la France, aux applaudissements des deputes, dans des termes eleves et chaleu-
reux, et son langage a deja profondement retenti dans tous les coeurs frangais. [Vifs
applaudissements unanimes.) Je tiens, au nom du Gouvernement de la Republique, a
remercier, du haut de la tribune, le Gouvernement anglais de la cordialite de ses
paroles et le Parlement fran^ais s'associera a ce sentiment. ( Nouveaux applaadissemenls
prolonges ct unanimes.

Le Secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires etrangeres a fait, notamment, la declaration sui-
vante :

« Dans le cas ou I'escadre allemande franchirait le detroit ou remonterait la mer
du Nord pour doubler les lies-Britanniques dans le but d'attaquer les cotes fran^aises
ou la marine de guerre frangaise, et d'inquieter la marine marchande fran(,^aise, I'es-
cadre anglaise interviendrait pour preter k la marine fran^aise son entiere protec-
tion, de sorte que, des ce moment, I'Angleterre et I'AUemagne s^raient en etat de
guerre. » (Applaudissements repetes el prolonges.)

Des maintenant, la flotte anglaise couvre done nos cotes du Nord et de I'Ouest
contre une agression allemande.

Messieurs, voila les fails. Je crois que, dans leur rigoureux enchainement, ils suf-
fisent a justifier les actes du Gouvernement de la Republique. Je veux cependant de
ce recit degager la conclusion, donner son veritable sens k Tagression inouie dont la
France est victime.

Les vainqueurs de 1 870 ont eu, vous le savez, k diverses reprises, le desir de re-
doubler les coups qu'ils nous avaient portes. En 1875, la guerre destin^e k achever
la France vaincue n a ete empechee que par Tintervention des deux Puissances a qui
devaient nous unir plus tard les liens de I'alliance et de I'amitie [Applaudissements
unanimes), par I'inlervention de la Russie et par celle de la Grande-Bretagne. (Tous
les deputes se levent et applaudisseni longuement.)

Depuis lors, la Republique fran^aise, par la restauration des forces nationales et
la conclusion d'accords diplomatiques invariablement pratiques, a reussi ase liberer
du joug qu'au sein meme dela paix, Bismarck avait su faire peser sur I'Europe..

EUe a retabli I'equilibre europeen, garant de la liberie et de la dignite de chacun.

Messieurs, je ne sais si je ne m'abuse, mais ilm'apparait que cette oeuvre de repa-
ration pacifique, d'affranchissement et de dignite defmitivement scellee en 1904 et
1907 avec le concours genial du roi Edouard VII d'Angleterre et du gouvernement
de IsiCouronne i Vifs applaadissemcji Is), c est cela queTempire allemand veut detruire
aujourd'hui par un audacieux coup de force^,

L'AHemagne n'a rien k nous reprocher.

Nous avons consenti a la paix un sacrifice sans precedent en portant un delni-

DoCDMENTS DiPtOMATiQDES^ — Cucrrc curopecnne. a

v^?B

— 170 —
siecle silencieux a nos flancs ia hiessure ouverte par elle. ( Vifs applaadissements una"

mmes.

Nous en avons consent! d'autres dans lous les debats que, depuis 1904* la diplq-
malie imperiale a systematiquement provoques soit au Maroc, soil ailleurs, aussi
bien eri igoS qu'en 1906, en 1908 qu'en 1911.

La Russie, elle aussi, a fait preuve d'une grande moderation lors des evenements
de 1908, comme danslacrise actuelle.

Elle a observe la meme moderation, et la TripleJEntente avec elle quand, dans la
crise orienlale de 1912, 1'Autriche etl'Allemagne ont formule» soil contre laSerbie,
soit contre la Grece des exigences, discutables pourtant, Tevenement Ta prouve.

Inutiles sacrifices, steriles transactions, vains efforts, puisqu'aujourd'hui, en
pleine action de conciliation, nous sommes,nos allies et nous, altaques par surprise.
(Applaadissements prolonges.)

Nul ne pent croire de bonne foi que nous sommes les agresseurs. Vainement Ton
veut troubler les principes sacres de droit et de liberte qui regissent les nations
comme les individus : Tltalie, dans la claire conscience du genie latin, nous a notifie
quelle entendait garder la neutrality. ( Tons les deputes se levent et opplaudisseRi kn-
gucment.)

Cette decision a rencontre dans loutela France Teclio de la joie la plus sincere. Je
m'en suis fail I'interprele aupres du charge d'affaires d'ltalie en lui disanl combien je
me felicitais que les deux soeurs latines, qui ont meme origme etmeme ideal, un
passe de gloire commun, ne se trouvent pas opposees. [Nouveaux applandissements.)

Ce qu'on attaque, messieurs, nousle declarons tres haul, c'est cette independance ,
cette dignite, cette securite que la Triple Entente a reconquises dans Tequilibre au
service de la paix.

Ce qu'on attaque, ce sent les. liberies de TEurope, dont la France, ses alliees et
ses amis sont fiers d'etre les defenseurs. [Vifs applaadissements.)

Ces liberies, nous allons les defendre, car ce sont elles qui sont en cause el toutle
reste n'a ete que pretextes.

La France, injustement provoquee, na pas voulula guerre, elle a lout fait pour
la conjurer. Puisqu'on la lui impose, elle se defendra contre I'Allemagne et contre
toute puissance qui, n'ayant pas encore fait connaitre son sentiment, prendrait part
aux cotes de cette demiere au conflit entre les deux pays. (Tous les deputes se levent et
€,pp.laudissent. )

Un peuple libre et fori qui soutient un ideal seculaire el s'unil lout enlier pour la
sauvegarde de son existence; une democratie qui asu discipliner son effort militaire
etn'apas craint. Tan passe, d'en alourdir le poids pour repondre aujc armemenls
voisins; une nation armee iultanl pour sa vie propre et pour Tindependance de I'JEu-
rope, voila le spectacle que nous nous honorons d'offrir aux temoins de celte lutle
formidable qui, depuis quelques jours, se prepare dans le calme le plus methodique.
Nous sommes sans reproches. Nous serons sans peur. ( Tom les deputes se levent et ap-
plaudissent lomjuement.)

La France a prouve sonvent dans des conditions moins favorables, qu'elle est \e

— 171 —
plus redoutable adversaire quand eile se bat, comme c'est le cas aujourd'hui, pour la
liberie et pour le droit. (Applaadissemenls.)

En vous soumeltant nos actes, a vous. Messieurs, qui etes nos juges, nous avon&
pour porter le poids de notre lourde responsabilite, le reconfort d'une conscience
sans trouble et la certitude du devoir accompli. ( Toas Ics deputes sc tevent et ap-
plaadissent longaemenl. )

Rene Viviani. ,

— 173

CHAPITRE VII

DfiCLARATION DE LA TRIPLE ENTENTE

{& SEPTEMBRE 1914)

175 —

DECLARATION.

M. Delcasse, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres,

a MM. les Ambassadeurs et Ministres de France a I'etranger.

Paris, Ic 4 septembre igiii

La declaration suivante a ete signee ce matin au Foreign Office, k Londres.

« Les soussignes, diiment autorises par leurs gouvernements respectifs font la
declaration suivante :

« Les Gouvernements britannique, franqais et russe s'engagent mutuellement a ne
pas conclure de paix separee au cours de la presente guerre.

« Les trois gouvernements conviennent que, lorsqu'il y aura lieu de discuter les
termes de la paix, aucune des Puissances alliees ne pourra poser des conditions de
paix sans accord prealable avec chacun des autres allies. »

Signe : Paul Cambon.

Comte Benckendorff.
Edward Grey.

Celte declaration sera publiee aujourd'hui.

Delcasse

177

ANNEXES

EXTRAITS

DU "LrVRE BLEU** (ANGLAIS), DU **LIVRE ORIS" (BELGE),
DU **UVRE BLANC" (AJbLEMAND), DU "LIVRE ORANGE" (RUSSE)

DocTJMERTS oiPLOMATiQDES. — GueiTe europdeiine, a3

179

Annexe I,

Esctraits du « (uvre bleu a Y^lattfa k U ixisition prise p^ Id GouV«m$mettt dfiglais & I'^gard
de la Russiei de rAllemagne et de la France pendant lea pourparlers <iui ottt pr^c^d
la guerre*

r 6.

Sir G. Buchanan, Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne 4 Saiiit-P^tersbourg»
a Sir Edward Grey.

Saint-Petersbourg, 24 jpiUet i^iA.

J'ai recu ce matin un message telephonique de M. Sazonoff m'informant que le texle de
lultimatum autrichien venait de lui parvenir.

Son Excellence ajouta quune reponse etait exigde dans les quarante-huit heures et il-me-
pria de venir le trouver a I'Ambassade de France pour discuter raffaire. car la d-marche
autrichienne voulait dire clairement que la guerre ^tait imminente.

Le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres dit que la conduite de rAutriche ^tail tout a la fois
jproYOcante et immorale ; elle n'aurait jamais agi ainsi a moins que TAUemagne n'ait ete
iprealablement consultee; quelques-unes de ses demandes etaient tout a fait impossibles a
accepter. H esperait que le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste ne manquerait pas de proclamer
sa solidarite avec la Russie el la France.

L'Ambassadeur de France me donna a entendre que la France remplirait, si cela devenait
n^cessaire, toutes les obligations que lui imposait son alliance avec la Russie, outre qu'elle
seconderait fortement la Russie dans toutes les negociations diplomatiques.

J'ai dit que je vous telegraphierais un rapport complet de ce que leurs Excellences'
venaient de me dire. Je ne pouvais pas, naturellement, parler au nom da Gouvernement de
Sa Majesty ; mais, personnellement, je ne voyais aucune raison de s'atlendre a une declara->;
tion de solidarity de la part du Gouvernement de Sa Majeste qui enirainerait un engagement
absolu de sa part de soutenir la Russie et la France par la force des armes. ^Les interetS
directs de la Grande-Bretagne en Serbic etaient nuls , et une guerre en faveur de ce pays ne
serait jamais sanctionn^e par Topinion publique de la Grande-Bretagne. A ceci, M. SazonofF
r^pondit qu'il ne fallait pas que nous dubliiohs que la question gen^rale europ^enne etait
impliquee, la question de la Serbie n'en form ant qu'une partie et que la Grande-Bretagne
ne pourrait pas en fait se degager des problemes maintenant en jeu.

En reponse a ces remarques, j'ai fait observer que je comprenais, de ce qu'il disait, que
Son Excellence proposait que la Grande-Bretagne se joignit k une communication qui serait'
faite a I'Autriche a I'effet qu'une intervention active par elle dans les affaires interieures de la
iSerbie ne pourrait pas elre tolej?ee, Mais supposant que I'Autriche, neanmoins, allait, avoir
^ecours a des mesures militaires contre la Serbie malgre nos representations , 6tait-ce I'inten-
Won du Gouvernement russe de declarer de suite la guerre a I'Autriche ?

M. Sazonoff dit que lul-m6me pensait que tout au moins la mobilisation russe devait dtre
faite, mais qu'il y avait un Conseil des Ministres cet apres-midi pour examiner la question
dans toute son etendue. Un autre Conseil, preside par i'Empereur, serait tenu probablement
demain , quand une decision serait prise.

s3.

— 180 —

Jai dit qu il me paraissait que le point important 6tait de persuader i'Autriche d etendre
•la iimite de temps, et que la premiere qhose a faire ^tait de faire peser sur I'Autriche une
influence ayant ce but en vue. L'Ambassadeur de France, cependant, croyait que, ou
TAutriche avait decide d'agir de suite ou eile blufTail. Dans n'importe quel cas, notre seule
chance d'eviter la guerre etait d'adopter une attitude ferme et unie. 11 ne pensait pas qu'il y
avait le tomps de donner suite a ma proposition. La-dessus, j'ai dit qu'il me semblait desi-
rable pour nous de connaitre exactement jusqu'a quel point la Serbie serait disposee a aller
pour accepter les demandes formulees par I'Aulriche dans sa note. M. Sazonoffrepondit qu'il
faijait d'abord qu'il consultat ses collegues a ce sujet, mais que, sans cloute, quelques-unes
des demandes de I'Autriche pourraient etre acceptees par la Serbie.

L'Ambassadeur de France et M. Sazonoffconlinuerent tous deux a me pressor pour une
declaration de solidarite complete du Gouvernement de Sa Majeste avec les Gouvernements
francais et russe, et j'ai, en consequence, dit qu'il me semblait possible que vpus voudriez,
peut-etre, consentir a faire de fortes representations aux deux Gouvernements allemand et
autrichien , faisant valoir aupres d'eux qu'une attaque sur la Serbie par rAutriche mettrait en
danger la paix entiere de I'Europe. Peut-etre pourriez-vous trouver -moyen de leur dire qu'uhe
telle action de la part de I'Autriche amenerait probablement une intervention russe, qui
impliquerait la France et I'Aliemagne, et qu'il serait difficile k la Grande-Bretagne de rester
a I'ecart si la guerre devenait generale. M. Sazonoff repondit que tot ou tard nous serious
enlraines a la guerre si elle eclatait; nous aurions rendu la guerre plus probable si, des le
debut, nous nefaisions pas cause commune avec son pays et avec la France; en tout cas, il
esperait que le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste exprimerait une forte reprobation de la deci-
sion prise par rAutriche.

G. Buchanan.

r 87.

Sir Edward Grey,

k Sir F. Bertie, Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne k Paris.

Foreign Office, 29 juillet 1914.
Monsieur,

Apres avoir expose i M.Cambon aujourd'hui combien la situation me paraissait grave, je
lui ai declare que j'avais I'intenlion de dire a I'Ambassadeur allemand aujourd'hui qu'il ne fal-
lait pas qu'il se laissat aller, a raison du ton amical de nos conversatious , a un sentiment de
fausse certitude que nous resterions a I'ecart si tous les efforts pour conserver la paix, que nous
faisions actuellement en commun avec I'Aliemagne , ^chouaient.

Mais j'ai continue en disant a M. Cambon que je trouvais n^cessaire de liii dire aussi que
I'opinion publique ici envisageait la difficult^ acluelle d'un point de vue tout k fait different
de celui qu'on avait adopts pendant la difficulte au sujet du Maroc il y a quelques annees.
Dans le cas du Maroc, il s'agissait d'uaconflit dans lequel la France ^tait la principale int6-
ress^e etou il paraissait que I'Aliemagne, dans un effort pour ^eraser la France, lui cherchait
querelle a Toccasioh d'une question qui formait I'objet d'une convention sp^ciale entre la
France et nous-mfimes. Dans le cas.acl^ei, U differend «nlre TAutriohe et la Serbie n'etait pas

— 181 —

un cas oil nous nous sentions appeles h jouer un role actif. MSme si la question airivait k se
poser entre I'Autriche et la Russie , nous ne nous sentirions pas appeles a y jouer un r6le. Ce
serait alors une question de suprematie entre le Teuton et le Slave dans les Balkans et notre
idee .avail toujours et6 d'eviter d'etre entraines dans une guerre pour une question balka-
nique.

Si I'Allemagne se trouvait entrainee dans la lutte et si par suite la France y ^tait 5 son tour
impliquee, nous n'avions pas decide ce que nous ferions. Ce serait un cas que nous aurions
a examiner. La France aurait ^te alors enlrainee dans une querelle qui n'^tait pas la sienne,
mais dans laquelle , par suite de son alliance , son honneur et ses interets Tobligeaiient k s'en-*
gager. Nous etions libres d'engagements et nous aurions a decider ce que les interets britan-
niques exigeaient que nous fissions. J'estimais qu'il etait necessaire de dire cela, parce que,
conime il le savait, nous prenions tomes les precautions ausujel de notre Flotte, etquej'^tais
sur le point d'avertir le Prince Licbnowski de ne pas compter que nous restions a I'ecart; mais
il ne serait pas jusle que je laisse M. Cambon s'egarer jusqu a supposer que ceci voulait dire
que nous avions decide ce que nous ferions dans une evenlualite, qui comme je I'esp^rais
|Cncore, pouvait ne pas se presenter.

M. Cambon n)'a dit que j'avais expose la situation tres clairement. II comprenait que je
voulais dire que dans une querelle balkanique et dans une lutte pour la suprematie entre le
Teuton et le Slave, nous ne nous sentirions pas appeles a intervenir; mais que si d'aulres
questions surgissaient et si la France et I'Allemagne se trouvaient impliquees de telle sorteque
Ja question de fhcgemonie en Europe seposat, nous d^ciderions alors ce qu'il nous serait ne-
cessaire de faire. II a paru tout a fait prepare a cette declaration et n'y fit aiicune objec-
tion.

L'Ambassadeur de France ajouta que I'opinion fran9aise 6tait calme mais decidee. II s'at-
tendait a ce que I'Allemagne demandat que la France restat neutre pendant que I'Allemagne
attaquerait la Russie. Cette assurance naturellement la France ne pouvait pas la donner;elle
etait obligee a aider la Russie si la Russie 6tait attaquefe.

E. Gret.

N'' 88.
Sir Edward Gbey,

a Sir E. GoscHEN, Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne a Berlin.

Foreign Office , 2 9 j uillet 1914.
Monsieur,

Apres avoir cause cet apres-tnidi avec 1' Ambassadeur allemand au sujet de la, situation eu-
ropeenne , j'ai dit que'je desirais lui dire, dune fa90n tout a fait particuliere et amicale,
quelque chose que j'avais dans I'esprit. La situation ^tait tres grave. Tant qu'elle se limitait
aux questions actuellement posees , nous n avions aucune intention d'inlervenir. Mais si I'Al-
iemagne s y trouvait engagde et ensuite la France , la question pourrait ^tre si vaste qu'elle
impliquerait tous" les interets europ^ens; el je ne voulais pas qu'il fut trompe par le ton ami-
cal de notre conversation — le^oi per$ister^t.| comme je Tesp^rais —- jusqua croire que
nous resterfons k Vacant,

— 182 —

II a dit qu'il comprenait parfaitement , mais il a demande si je voulais dire que nous inter-
viendrions dans certaines circonstances.

Je r^pondis que je ne desirais pas dire cela, ni quoi que ce fut qui ressemblat a une me-
nace ou k un essai d'exercer une pression en declarant que , si ies choses allaient plus mal ,
nous interviendrions. II ne serait pas question de noire intervention si TAllemagne netaitpas
impliquee, ou m^me si la France netail pas impliquee; mais nous savions fort bien que si
la question devenait telle que nous croyions que Ies int^rets britanniques exigeaient notre in-
tervention , il faudrait que nous intfervenions imm^diatement, et que la decision fut tres ra-
pide, exactement comme Ies decisions des autres puissances auraient a letre. J'esperais que
le ton amical de nos conversations continuerait comme a present, et queje pourrais conser-
verdes rapports aussi etroits avec le Gouvernement allemand en travaiUant pour la pais. Mais
si nous 6cbouions dans nos efforts pour conserver la paix, et si la question s'elargissait de fa-
9on a. impliquer pour ainsi diretous Ies interets etirop6ens, je ne voulais pas etre expose a
aucun reproche de sa part, que le ton amical de toutes nos conversations I'avait egare, lui
ou son gouvernemenl, a supposer que nous n'agirions pas au reproche que s'il n'avait pas
6t6 ainsi ^gar6, le cours des 6venements aurait pu etre different.

L'Ambassadeur allemand n'a fait aucune objection a ce que j ai dit , au contraire , il m'a
dit que cela s*accordait avec ce qu il avait deja fait savoir k Berlin comme sa maniere per-
sonnelle d'enyisager la sitilation.

N'* 99.

Sir F. Bertee, Ambaasadeur de Grande-Bretagne, k Paris,
a Sir Edward Grey.

Paris, 3o juillet igiA.

Le President de la R6publique me fait savoir que le Gouvernement russe a et^ inform^
par le Gouvernement allemand que I'Allemagne mobiliserait a moins que la Russie n arr^tat
sa mobilisation. Mais un rapport suppl^mentaire recu depuis de Saint-P^tersbourg declare
que le communique allemand avail die modifie et prenait maintenant la forme d'une
demande d'information a quelles conditions la Russie consentirait a ddmobiliser. La r^ponse
donnde est quelle consent ile faire k la condition que I'Autriche-Hongrie donne I'assurance
quelle respectera la souverainetd de la Serbie et soumettra certaines demandes formulees
dans la noleautricbienne, et non acceptdes par la Serbie a une discussion internationale.

Le President est d'avis que ces conditions ne seront pas accept6es par rAutriche ; il est
convaincu que la paix entre Ies Puissances est enlre Ies mains de la Grande-Bretagne. Si le
Gouvernement de Sa Majeste annon9ait que I'Angleterre viendi*ait en aide k la France, dans
le cas dun conflit entre la France et TAllemagne, resultant des differences acluelles enlre
I'Autricbe etla Serbie, il ny aurait pas de guerr&, car I'Allemagne modifierail aussitot son
attitude.

Je luiai expliqudcombien il serait difficile au Gouvernement deSa Majesty de faire une telle
declaration , mais il m'a repondu qu'il maintenait que cela serait dans I'interet de la paix.
La France, disait-il, est pacifique. Elle ne desire pas la guerre et tout ce qu'elle a fait jusqu'^
present est de se prdprer pour une mobilisation afin de ne pas ^tre prise au depourvu. Le
Gouvernement fran9ais tieodra le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste au courant de tout ce qui s&

- 183 —
{era dans ce sens. On a des rensoignements s^rieux quia Us troupes allemahdes sont concen-
trees dans les environs, de THiooville et de Metz, prates h la giierre. S'ii y avail une guerre
gen^rale sur le continent, TAngleterre y serait entralnee pour la protection de ses int^rfits
vitaux. Une declaration d^s k present de son intention de soutenir la France, dont c'est le
desir que la paix soit maitttenue, emp^cherait presque cerlainement rAIlemaghe de partit
en guerre.

F« Beatis.

r 119.
Sir Ed. Grey,

k Sir Francis Bertie/ Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne, k Paris.

Foreign-Office, 3i juillet 1914.

MONSIEDR,

M. Cambon s'est refere aujourd'hui k un tel6gramme qui avait 6td montre ce matin a
Sir Ar^hu^ Nicolson qui provenait de TAmbassadeur de France a Berlin et qui disait que
Tincertitude concernant notre intervention etait I'^lemerit encourageant k Berlin et que,:si
nous voulions seulement nous declarer definitivement du 66te de la Russie et de la Franbe,
cela d^ciderait rattitude allemande eri faveur de la paix.

J'ai dit qu'il ^tait tout a fait injuste de supposer que nous avions laissd rAHemagne sous
I'impression que nous n'interviendrons pas. J'avais refuse des ouvertures pour promettre que
nous resterions neutres. Non seulement j'avais refuse de dire que nous resterions neutres,
mais j'avais ete ce matin jusqu'i dire k i' Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que, si la France et
I'Ailemagne se trouvaient engag^es dans une guerre, nous y serions entraines. Cela, bien
entendu, n'etait pas la m^me chose que de prendre un engagement avec la France, ^et j'ai
dit cela a M. Cambon, seulement pour montrer que nous n'avions pas laiss^ I'AHemagne'
sous I'impression que nous resterions a I'ecart.

M. Cambon m'a aiors demande ma reponse k ce qu'il avait dit hier.

J'ai dit que nous etions arrives a la conclusion, dans le Cabinet d'aujourd'hui, que nous
ne pouvions donner aucun gage en ce moment. Bien que nous ayons a exposer notre poli-
tique devant le Parlement, nous ne pouvions pas engager le Parlemenl d'avance, Jusqu'a
present, nous ne ressentions pas, et I'opinion publique ne ressentait pas, qu'aucun traite ni
obligation de ce pays fussent engages. Des developpements ulterieurs pourraient modifier
cette situation et obliger Je Gouvernement et le Parlement k consid^rer qu'une intervention
etait justifi^e. La protection de la neutralite de la Belgique pourrait etre, je ne dirai pas un
d^cisif , mais un important facteur, dans la determination de notre attitude. Que nous pro-
posions au Parlement d'intervenir ou de ne pas intervenir dans une guerre, le Parlement
d^sirerait savoir comment nous etions places a I'^gard de la neutralite de la Belgique, et il se
pourrait que je demande et a la France et k I'Ailemagne si chacune etait disposee a prendre
I'engagement qu'elle ne serait pas la premiere a violer la neutrality de la Belgique.

M. Cambon a renouveld la question pour savoir si nous seconderions la France au cas oili
I'Ailemagne I'attaquerait.

J'ai dit que je pouvais seulement m'en tenir k la reponse et que, au point oil les cboses en
sont en ce moment , nous ne pouvions prendre aucun engagement.

M. Cambon a fait valoir que TAUemagne avait, depuis le commencement, rejet6 les pro-

^ 184 —
positions qui auraient peut-^tre aimsn^ ia paix. li ne pouvait p$is 6lre dans I'inter^t de I'An-
gleterre que la France soit ecrasee par TAIIemagne, nous serions alors dans une position
trfes amoindrie vis-a-vis de i'AlIemagne. En 1870, nous avions commis une grande faute en
permettant un accroissement enorme de la force allemande , et nous r^peterions raaintenant
cette faute. II m*a demande si je ne pouvais pas soumettre a nouveau cette question au
Cabinet.

JTai dit que le Cabinet serait certainement convoque aussit6t qu'ii y aurait de nouveaux
developpements , mais quant a present, la seule r^ponse que je pouvais donner etait que
nous nepouvions prendre aucun engagement d^finitif.

E. Grey.

N" 148.
Sir Edward Grey

k Sir F. Bertie , Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne a Paris.

Foreign Office, 2 aout 1914.

Apres le Conseil de Cabinet de ce matin , j'ai remis a M. Carabon la note suivante :

« Je suis autoris^ a donner I'assurance que si ia flotte allemande p^netre dans le Pas-de-
Calais ou dans la mer da Nord pour entreprendre des lioslilites contre les cotes ou les
bateaux fran^ais, la flotte anglaise donnera toute la protection en son pouvoir.

« Cette assurance est nalurellement soumise a I'approbation du Parlement et ne doit pas
^tre consider^e comme engageant le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste jusqu'^ ce qu'une telle
action se produise de la part de la flotte allemande. »

J'ai fait remarquer que nous avions des questions extremement graves et delicates a consi-
d^rer et que le Gouvernement ne pouvait s'engager a declarer la guerre k I'AlIemagne si la
guerre eclatait demain enire la France et I'Allemagnd, mais qu'il etait essentiel que le Gou-
vernement francais, donl la flotte etait depuis longtemps concentric dans la Mediterranee ,
sut quelles dispositions prendre, ia cdte septentrionale etant enliereirient sans defense. II
nous a done paru n^cessaire de lui donner cettte assurance. Cela ne nous engage pas a
declarer la guerre a rAllemagne, a moins que la flotte allemande n'agisse comme il est
indiqu6 ci-dessus, mais cela donne a la France une s6curite qui lui permettra de regler la
disposition de sa flotte mediterraneenne.

M. Cambon m'a interrog^ au sujet de la violation du Luxembourg. Je lui ai fait part de
la doctrine etablie sur ce point en 1867 par lord Derby et lord Clarendon.

II m'a demands ce que nous dirions en cas de violation de la neutralite beige. J'ai repondu
que c'etait la une aflaire beaucoup plus importante et que nous examinions quelle declaration
nous ferions demain a ce sujet au Parlement, cest-a-dire si nous d^clarerions que la violation
de la neutralite beige est un 00505 belli. Je lui ai rapport^ ce qui avait ete dit sur ce point k
i' Ambassadeur aliemand.

E. Grey.

— 185 —

Annexe n** H.

Extraits du wLivre bleu» relatifs aux propositions faites par le Grouvernement allem and
au Gouvernement anglais pour obtenir la neutrality de I'Angleterre.

r 85.

Sir E. GoscHEN, Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne a Berlin,
k Sir Edward Grey.

Berlin , 2 9 j uillet 1 9 1 4-

On m'a prie d'aller voir le Ghancelier ce soir. Son Excellence venait de rentrer de
Potsdam.

II me dit que, si la Russie attaquait I'Autriche, il craignait^qu'une conflagration eurpp^enne
ne devint inevitable, etant donnees les obligations quimposaita I'Allemagne son alliance avec
I'Autriche, malgre les efforts quil ne cessait de faire pour le maintien de la paix.

Ceci dit, il continua la conversation en olFrant une forte enchere pour s'assurer la neutra-
lite britannique. II me dit que, selon sa conception du principe essentiel de la politique bri-
tannique, la Grande-Bretagne ne consentirait jamais a se tenir a 1 ecart de facon a laisser
^eraser la France dans un conflit qui pourrait avoir lieu. La , cependant , n'etait pas le but
de lAUemagne. Si la neutralite de la Grande-Bretagne etait assui'ee, son Gouvernement rece-
vrait toutes les assurances que le Gouvernerrient imperial n'avait pour but aucune acquisition
territoriale aux frais de la France, en supposant que la guerre s'ensuivit et quelle se terminal
a I'avantage de I'Allemagne.

J'ai pose k Son Excellence une question au sujet des colonies francaises. II me repondit
qu il ne pouvait s'engager d'une maniere semblable k cet egard,

Pour la Hollande, Son Excellence me dit que, tant que les adversaires de TAllemagne- res-
pecteraient I'integrit^ et la neutralite des Pays-Bas, I'Allemagne serait pr^te a assurer le
Gouvernement de Sa Majeste quelle en ferait autant.

Les operations que I'Allemagne pourrait se trouver dans la necessite d entreprendre en
Belgique dependraient de ce que ferait ia France ; apres la guerre , I'integrite de la Bel-
gique serait respectee, si ce pays ne se rangeait pas contre I'Allemagne.

En terminant, Son Excellence me d^clara que, depuis lejour ou ii devint Ghancelier, il
avait eu pour but, ainsi que vous le saviez, d'arriver a une entente avec I'Angleterre; il espe-
rait que qes assurances pourraient devenir la base de 1' entente qui lui tenait tant a coeur.
II pensait a une entente g^nerale de neutrality entre TAllemagne et I'Angleterre ; et , quoi-.
qu'il fut encore trop tot pour en discu'ter les details , I'assurance de la neutralite britannique
dans le conflit que pourrait peut-^tre provoquer ia crise actuelle lui permettrait d'entrevoir
la realisation de son d^sir.

Son Exceflepce m'ayant demand^ men opiriioh en ce qui Goncerne ia maniere dent vous
pocotiENTs DiPLOMATiQDEs. — Guerw «ttroj>4enne. a 4

— 186 —

envisageriez sa demande, je lui r^pondis qua mon avis 3 ^tait peu probable que, dans les
circonstances acluelles , vous fussiez dispose a vous engager dune facon quelconque el que
vous desireriez garder une entiere liberty d'action.

E. GOSCHEN.

r 101.

Sir Edward Grey,

h. Sir E. GoscHEN, Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne a Berlin.

Foreign Office, 3o juillet 1914.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste ne peut pas accueillir un seul instant la proposition du
Chancelier de s'engager a rester neutre dans de telles conditions. Ce qu'il nous demande, en
effet, c'est de nous engager a rester a I'^cart, en attendant qu'on saisit des colonies francaises
et que la France fut battue, pourvu que rAUemagne ne prenne pas de territoire francais,
exception faite des colonies.

Au point de vue materiel, une telle propoisition est inacceptable , car la France, sans
qu'on lui enlevat de territoire en Europe , pourrait ^tre 6crasee au point de perdre sa posi-
tion de grande puissance et de se trouver desormais subordonnee a la politique allemande.
En g6n6ral , tout ceci k part , ce serait une honte pour nous que de passer ce inarcb6 avec
TAUemagne aux depens dela France, une honte de laqueUe la bonne renommee de cepays
ne se remettrail jamais.

Le Chancelier nous demande en outre' de marchander tontes les obligations ou int^rlts
que nous pouvons avoir dans la neutrality de la Belgiqae. Nous ne saurions en aucune facon
accueilhr ce march6 non plus.

Ceci dit, il.n'est pas n^cessaire d'examiner si la perspective dune convention g^n^rde de
neutralite dans I'avenir entre VAngletenre et TAllemagne ofFrirait des avantages positifs suffi-
sants pour nous d^dommager de nous 6tre lie les mains aujourd'hui. Nous devons conserver
notre enti^ liberty d'agir comme les circonstances nous paraitront I'exiger en cas d'un d6ve-
loppement defavorable et regrettable de la crise actuelle, tel que le Chancelier lepr^voit.

Je vous prie de parler au Chancelier dans le sens susindiqu6 et d'ajouter tres serieusement
que la seuie facon de maintenir les bonnes relations entre I'Angleterre et TAliemagne est
qu'elles continuant a coop6rer au maintien de la paix de I'Europe. Si nous obtenons ce
r^sultat, les relations mutuelles de I'Allemagne et de I'Angleterre seront, j'en suis convaincu,
am^lior^es et renforcees ipso facto. A cet effet, le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste traivaillera
dans ce sens avec un bon voidoir et une sincerite entiers.

Et j'ajouterai ceci : Si Ton peut conserver la paix de f Europe et traverser sans accident la
crise actuelle, mon effort personnel sera de prendre linitiative d'un arrangement auquel
I'Allemagne puisse souscrlre et par lequel elle pourra 6tre assur^e qu aucune politique agres-
sive ou hostile ne sera poursuivle centre elle ou ses allies par la France , la Russie et nous-
mSmes, soit ensemble, soit s6par^ment. J'ai d^sir^ ceci et travailli dans ce sens autant que
je fai pu pendant la derni^re crise balkanique, et, comme TAilemagne avait un but sem-
blable, nos relations se sont sensiblement am^lior^es. Cette id^e a 6t6 jusqu^aujourd'hui
trop utopique pour faire I'objet de propositions d^finies, mais si la crise actuelle, beaucoup
plus aigue que toutes celles par lesquelles f Europe a pass6 depuis plusieurs generations , est

— 187 —

traversee sans accident, j'ai Tespoir que le soulagenient et la reaction qui suivront rendront
possible un rapprochement plus precis entre les Puissances qu'il n a iti possible jusqu'au-
jourd'hui.

E. Grey.

r 123.
Sir Edward Grey,

k Sir GoscHEN", Ambassadeur de Grande-Brelagne k Berlin.

Foreign Office, i"aout 1914.
Monsieur,

J'ai dil k I'Ambassadeur allemand aujourdliui que la r^ponse du Gonvefnenoent alle-
mand au sujet de la neutralite de la Belgique 6tait tres regrettable, car cette neutralite
affecte I'opinion publique en Angleterre. Si TAilemagne pouvait donner les memes assurances
que ia France, cela contribuerait dune manierc appreciable a diminuer ici I'inquietude et
la tension generales. D'autre part, si Tun des Belligerants violaitla neutredit^ de la Belgique
pendant que I'autre la respectait , il serait tres difficile de contenir le sentiment piiblic en
Angleterre. J'ai dit que nous avions disout^ cette question auConseil de Cabinet et que, etant
autoris6 a faire cette declaration, je lui remettais une note a cet efFet.

II ine demanda si, au cas oil I'Allemagne promettrait de ne pas violer la neutralite beige,
nous nous engagerions a rester neutres.

J'ai repondu queje ne pouvais pas faire de promesses, que nos mains ^taient encore
libres et que nous etions en voie de considerer quelle serait notre attitude. Tout ce que je
pouvais dire, cest que notre attitude serait en grande partie dict^e par I'opinion publique
en Angleterre, pour qui la neutrality beige ayait une grande importance. Je ne pensais pas
pouvoir donner une assurance de neutralite sous cette seule condition.

L'Ambassadeur me pressa de formukr les conditions moyemiant lesquelles nous garde-
rions la neutralite. II suggera meme que I'Allemagne pourrait garantir I'int^grit^ de la France
et de ses colonies.

J'ai repondu que j'etais oblige de refuser d6fmitivement toute promesse de rester neutre
dans de telles conditions et que je ne pouvais que repeter qu'il nous falfait garder les mainis
libres. ^

E. Grey.

— 188 —

Annexe n° II bis.

Tentatives allemandes pour obtenir, sous le couvert d'un «malentendu», la garantie par
TAngleterre de la neutrality de la France dans une guerre germano-russe.

(Publication officieuse de la Gazette de VAUemagne du Nord, 20 aoiat 1914.)

r 1.

Le Prince Lichnowsky, Ambassadeur d'AUemagne a Londres,

a M. de Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancelier de i'Empire d'Allemagne.

Londres, 3i juillet 191^.

Sir Edward Grey vient de m'appeler au telephone et m'a demands si je pensais pouvoir
declarer que nous n attaquerions pas la France si la France restait neutre dans une guerre
germano-russe. J'ai dit que je pensais pouvoir assumer la responsabilite de cette declaration.

Lichnowsky.

N° 2.

TiiiGRAMME de VEmpereur GuiUaume an Roi George V.

^ Berlin, i*'aodt 191 A.

Je viens de recevoir la communication de voire Gouvemement m'offrant la neutralite de
la France avec la garantie de la Grande-Bretagne. A cette offre elait li^e la question de
savoir si , k cette condition , I'Allemagne n'attaquerait pas la France. Pour des raisons
techniques, ma mobilisation, qui a i\i ordonn6e cet apres-midi sur les deux fronts, Est et
Quest, doit s'accomplir selon les pr6paratifs commences.

Des contre-ordres ne peuvent etre donnas et votre t^l^gramme est malheureusement venu
Irop tard. Mais si la France offre sa n6utralite, qui sera alors garantie par la flotte et I'arm^e
anglaises, je m'abstiendrai d'attaquer la France et j'emploierai mes troupes ailleurs. Je sou-
haite que la France ne monlre aucune nervosity. Les troupes, sur ma frontiere, sont en ce
moment arrdtees par ordres tel^graphiques et t^l^phoniques, dans leur marche en avant au
dela de la frontiere fran9aise.

GCILLADME.

— 189 —

N** 3.

M. de Bethmann-Hollweg, Chanceller de I'Empire,

a M. le Prihce Lichnowsky, Ambassadeur d'AUemagne h Ldndres.

Berlin, i" aoiit 191 4.

L'Allemagne est prete a acquiescer aux propositions anglaises si I'Angleterre garantit avec
ses forces militaires et navales la neutralite fran^aise dans le conflit russo-allemand. La
mobilisation allemande s'est effecluee aujourd'hui, en r^ponse aux provocations russes, et
avant Tarrivee des propositions anglaises. Par consequent , noire concentration a la frontiere
francaise ne pent etre modifi^e. Nous garantissons dailleurs que, d'iciaulundi 3 aovA, a
sept heures du soir, la frontiere francaise ne sera pas franchie si Tassentiment de I'Angleterro
nous est parvenu a ce moment.

Bethmann-Hollweg.

r 4.

TiiEGRAMME du Roi George V a rEmperear Gaillaume.

Londres, i** aout 191 A.

En reponse a votre telegramme qui vient de me parvenir, je pense qu'il s'est produit un
malentendu a propos de la suggestion qui aurait ete faite au cours dune conversation ami-
cale entre le prince Lichnowsky et Sir Edward Grey, ou ils discutaient comment un conflit
arme entre I'AHemagne et la France pourrait etre retarde jusqu a ce qu'on ait trouve un
moyen d'entente entre rAutriche-Hongrie et la Bussie. Sir Edward Grey verra le prince
Lichnowsky demain matin pour determiner qu'il y a bien eu malentendu de la part de ce
dernier.

George.

r 5.

Le Prince Lichnowsky, Ambassadeur d'AUemagne k Londres,

a M. de Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancelier de TEmpire d'AUemagne.

Londres, 2 aoM 191^.

Les suggestions de Sir Edward Grey, bashes sur le d^sir de garder la neutralite, de la part
de I'Angleterre, orit 6te faites Sans accord pr^aiable avec la France et ont ^t^, depuis, aban-
donnees comme filtiles.

LiGBNOWS&T.

— 190 —

Annexe III.

Extx^ts dn «Livre Bleu» relatifs an refits de I'Angleterre d'admettre le point de
allemand dans la question de la violation de la neutrality beige.

r 153.

Sir Edward Grey,

a Sir E. Goschen, Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagtie a Berlin.

Foreign Office, 4 aotlt 19 1 A.

Le Roi des Beiges a adresse un appel a S. M. le Roi en vue dune intervention diploma-
tique en faveur de la Belgique dans les termes suivants :

« Me rappelant les nombreuses preuves d'amitie de Votre Majest6 et de son pr^decesseur,
ainsi que llattitude amicale de I'Angleterre en 1870 et le temoignage d'amitie que vous venez
de nous donner encore, je fais un supreme appel a I'intervention diplomatique du Gouver-
nement de Votre Majeste pour la sauvegarde de I'integrite de la Belgique. »

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste est egalement informe que le Gouvernement allemand a
remis au Gouvernement beige une note proposant ime neutralite amicale permettant le libre
passage en territoire beige et s'engageant a maintenir Imdependance du royaume et de ses
possessions h la conclusion de la paix; au cas contraire, la Belgique serait trait6e en ennemie.
Une r^ponse est exigee dans un d^lai maximum de douzeheures.

Nous apprenons aussi que la Belgique a oppose un refus forme! k ce quelle considere
comme une violation flagrante de la loi des nations.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste est oblige de protester confre cette violation d'un traits
que r AUemagne a signe aussi bien que nous-m^mes ; il lui faut des assurances que la demande
faite a la Belgique ne sera pas suivie d'effet et que sa neutralite sera respectee par I'Alle-
magne. Vous demanderez une reponse immediate.

E. Grey.

N*' 155.
Sir Edward Grey,

k Sir F ViLLiERS, Ministre de Grande-Bretagne k Bruxelles.

Foreign Office, 4 aoAt l^iA.

Informez le Gouvernement beige que , si I'Allemagne exerce une pression sur lui pour le
faire se departir de la neutralite, le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste sattendra k ce que la Bel-
gique resiste par tous les moyens en son pouvoir; que le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste I'aldera
h resister; que, dans ce cas, le Gouvernement deSa Majeste est pr^t a s'unir a la Russie et k
la France, s'il y a lieu, pour offirir immediatement au Gouvernement beige une action
commune pour resister k i'emploi par I'Allemagne de la force centre la Belgique et une
garantie pour le maintien de son integrite et de son independance dans Vavenir.

£. Grey.

— 191 —

NM57*

Le Secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires gtrangeres d'Aflemagne,

au Prince Lichnowsky, Ambassadeur d'AUemagne k Londres (communique par
TArobassade allemande, 4 aout).

Berlin, i aoftt 1914.

Priere de dissiper tout soupcon qui pourrdt subsister dans I'esprit du Gouvemement bri-
tannique au sujet de nos intentions.

Repetez positivement Tassurance formelle que, meme en cas de conflit arme avec la Bel
gique, I'AHemagne ne s'annexera du territoire beige sous aucun pretexte.

La sincerite de cette declaration estprouvee parnotre engagement solennel a I'egard de la
Hollande de respecter strictement sa neutralite. II est evident qvie noas ne poarrions annexer
profitahlement du territoire beige sans nons agrandir en meme temps anx d^pens de la Hollande.

Faites bien comprendre a Sir Edward Grey que I'armee allemande ne saurait s'exposer a
une attaque francaise par la Belgique, attaque qui a ete envisagee selon des informations
absolument sures.

L'AUemagne est done obligee de ne pas tenir compte dela neutralite beige: c*est pour elie
une question de vie ou de mort de prevenir f avance d^ 1 armee frangaise.

Jagow.

Tf 159.
Sir Edward Grey,

a Sir E. Goschen, Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne a Berlin.

Foreign Oflfice, 4 aotit 1914.

Nous apprenons que I'AHemagne a adresse une note au Ministre des Affaires etrangeres
beige, declarant que le Gouvemement alleraand serait oblige de mettre a execution, au besoin
par la force des armes, des mesures considerees comme indispensables.

Nous sommes egaiement informes quele territoire beige a ete viole a Gemmerich.

Dans ces conditions et etant donne que i'AUemagne a refuse de nous donner au sujet de
la Belgique les m^mes assurances que celles que nous a donnees la France la semaine der-
niere en reponse a notre demande laite simultanement a Berlin et a Paris, il nous faut
reiterei' cette demande et exiger ime reponse satisfaisante, ainsiqua mon t61egramrae die ce
matin , qui devra etre recue avant minuil ce soir.

Sinon, vous demanderez vos passeports et vous d^clarerez que le Gouvernement de Sa
Majeste se voit oblig^ de prendre toutes les mesures en son pouvoir pour maintenir la neu-
trality de la Belgique et le respect d'un traits auquel I'AHemagne a souscrit autant que
nous nl^mes.

E, Gr£X.

^ 192 ~

N' 160.

Sir E. GoscHEN,

k Sir Edward Gret.

MONSIEUB.

Londres, 8 aout 1914.

Conform^inent aiu instructions contenues dans votre t616gramme du 4 courant, je suis
all6 voir cet apres-midi le Secretaire d'Etat et lui ai demands, au nom du ,Gouvernem,ent de
Sa Majesty britannique, si le Gouvernement imperial sabstiendrait de violer la neutrality
dc la Belgique.

M. de Jagow a r^pliqu^ tout de suite qu'il ^tait facb6 d'avpir a dire que sa r^ponse de-
vaitetre : «NQn », 6tant donn^ que, puisque les troupes aliemandes avaient franchi la fron-
tiere ce matin, la neutrality de la Belgique se trouvait d ores et deja viol^e.

M, de Jagow s'est ^tendu a nouveau sur les raisons qui avaient oblig^ le Gouvernement
imperial k prendre cette mesure : c'est a savoir qu'il leur fallait p6n6trer en France par la
vpie la plus rapide et la plus facile, de maniire k prendre une bonne avance dar>s leurs
operations et s'efForcer de frapper quelque coup decisif le plus tot possible. C'est pour nous,
a-t-il dit, une question de vie ou de mort, car, si nous avions pass6 par la route pl,us au
Sud, nous n'aurionspu, vu le petit nombre de chemins et la force des forteresses, esperer
passer ^ans rencontrer une opposition formidable, impliquant une grosse perte de temps.
Cetle perte de temps aurait ^t^ autant de temps gagnd par les Russes pour amener leurs
troupes sur la fronli^re allemande. Agir avec rapidit^, voila, a-t-il ajoute, le raiaitre-atout de
TAHemagne; celui de la Russle est d'avoir d'in^puisables ressources en soldats.

J'ai fait remarquer k M. de Jagow que ce fait accompli, la violation de la frontiere beige ,
rendait, comme il le comprenait facilement, la situation excessivement grave, etje lui ai
demands s'il n'6tait pas temps encore de faire un pas en arri^re et d'eviter la possibilite de
consequences que lui et moi d^plorerions. II a r^pondu que, pour les raisons qu'il m'avait
donn^es, il ^tait maintenant impossible au Gouvernement allemand de faire un pas en
arri^re.

Au cours de rapres-midi, j'ai re9U votre nouveau teidgramme dela mSme date, et, ob6is-
sant aux instructions y contenues, me suis rendu a nouveau au Ministere imperial des
AlFaires ^trangeres, 011 j'ai inform^ le Secretaire d'Etat. qu'k moins que le Gouvernement
imperial piit donner ce soir ayant minuitlassurance de ne pas pousser plus loin sa violation
de la frontiere beige et d'arr^ter sa marcbe, j'avais regu des iiistructions pour demander
mes p^^ssepo^ts et pour informer [1^ Gouvernement imperial que le Gouvernement de Sa
Majeste britannique prendrait toutes les mesures en son pouvoir pour maintenir la neulra-
lite de la Belgique et Tobservaljion d'un trait6 auquel TAtlemagne etait autant partie que
Iqi-mSme,

M. de Jagow a r^pondu qu'^ son grand regret il nepouvait donner aucune reponse autre
que celle qu'il m'avait donn^e plus t6t dans la journee, c'est k savoir que la s^curite do
I'Empire rendait absolument necessalre la marche des troupes imperiales ii travers la Bel-,
glque. J'ai remis a Son Excellence un resum6 ^crit de votre teiegramme et, en faisant
remarquer que vous indiquiez minuit comme I'heure k laquelle le Gouvernement de Sa
Majeste britannique s'attendrait k une reponse, lui ai demand^ si, vu les consequences
tcrriblesqui suivraient necessairement, il ne serail pas possible, m§me au dernier moment,.

— 193 —
au Gouvernement imperial de reviser sa reponse. H m'a repondu que quand bien mdme le
temps accords serait de vingt-quatre heures ou davantage, il faliait que sa reponse restat
la meme. J'ai dit que dans ce cas j'aurais a demander mes passeports.

L'entrevue dont il s'agit a eu lieu vers sept heures. Au cours d'un bref entretien qui la
suivit, M. de Jagow a exprime son poignant regret de voir s'6crouler toute sa politique et
celle du Chancelier, qui a ete de devenir amis avec la Grande-Bretagne et ensuite, par
elle, de se rapprocher de ia France. Je lui ai dit que cetle terminaison soudaine de mon
travail a Berlin etait pour moi aussi une cause de profond regret et de deconvenue; mais
qu'il lui failait bien comprendre que dans les circonstances et vu nos engagements, il eut
ete tout a fait impossible au Gouvernement de Sa Majesty britannique d'agii' autrement
qu'il n'avait fait.

J'ai dit ensuite que j'etais d^sireux d'aller faire visile au Chancelier, car ce serait peut-etre
la derniere fois que j'aurais I'occasion de le voir. II m'a pri6 de le faire. J'ai trouve le
Chancelier tres agit^. Son Excellence a commence tout de siiite une harangue qui a dure
environ vingt minutes. 11 a dit que la mesure prise par le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste
britannique ^tait terrible au dernier point; juste pour un mot — « neutralite », un mot dont
en temps de guerre on n'a si souvent tenu aucun compte, — juste pour un chiffon de
papier la Grande-Bretagne allait faire la guerre k une nation k elle apparent^e, qui ne
d^sirait rien tant que d'etre son amie. Tous ses efforts en ce Sens ont, a-t-il continue, et6
rendus inutiles par cette derniere et terrible mesure; la politique k laquelle, comme je le
savais, il s'etait voue depuis son arriv^e au pouvoir, etait tombee comme un chateau de
cartes. 11 s'est eerie que ce que nous avons fait est inconcevable; c'est comme frapper par
derriere un homme au moment oil il defend sa vie contre deux assaillants. II tient la
Grande-Bretagne pour responsable de tous les terribles ^venementsquipourrontse produire.
J'ai proteste avec force contre cette declaration et ai dit que, de meme que lui-meme et
M. de Jagow desiraient me faire comprendre que pour des raisons strategiques , c'^tait pour
I'AHemagne une affaire de vie ou de mort d'avancer a travers la Belgique et de violer la
neutralite de cette derniere, de meme je d^sirais qu'il comprit que c'etait pour ainsi dire
une affaire de « vie ou de mort » pour Thonneur de la Grande-Bretagne que de tenir I'en-
gagement solennel pris par elle de faire en cas d'attaque tout son possible pour defendre la
neutralite de la Belgique. II est, ai-je insisle, tout simplement necessaire de tenir ce pacte
solennel, sans quoi quelle confiance n'importe qui pourrait-il avoir a I'avenir dans les en-
gagements pris par la Grande-Bretagne?

Le Chancelier a repris : « Mais a quel prix ce pacte aura-t-il ^t^ tenu ? Le Gouvernement
britannique y a-t-il songe? » J'ai insinue h. Son Excellence, avec toute la clarte qui me fut
possible, que la crainte des consequences ne pouvait guere etre consideree comme une excuse
pour la rupture d'engagements solennels; mais Son Excellence etait dans un tel etat d' exci-
tation, il etait si evidemment d^monte parla nouvelle de notre action et si peu dispose a
entendre raison que je m'abstins de jeter de I'huile siir le feu en argumentant davantage.
Comme je prenais conge de lui, il a dit que le coup que la Grande-Bretagne portait a
I'AUemagne en s'unissant a ses ennemis etait d'aufant plus violent que presque jusqu'au
dernier moment lui £t son Gouvernement avaient travaille avec nous et appuye nos efforts
en vue du maintien de la paix entre I'Autriche et la Russie. Je repondis que c'etait bien ce
qu'il y avait de tragique que de voir deux nations tomber en garde precisemeht au moment
ou les rapports entre elles se trouvaient plus amicaux et plus cordiaux qu'ils ne I'avaient
ete depuis des annees. J'ai ajoute que, par malheur, nonobstant nos efforts pour sauvegarder
la paix entre la Russie et I'Autriche, la guerre s'etait propagee et nous avait mis face a face
avec une position qu'il nous etait impossible d'esquiver si nous tenions nos engagements »
Documents diplomatiques. — Guerre europecnne. ai

— 194 —
sitaatioQ qui malheureusemeni impUquait separation d aveo nos anciens coilaborateups. Xai
termini en, disant qu'il n aurait point de difficult^ a comprendfe que personne ne. le regretr
tait plus que moi-mSme.

Apres cette entrevue plutdt p6nible , je suis rentr^ k TAmbassade et ai r^dige un compte
rendu tel^graphique de ce qui s etait passe. Ce t^i^gramme a ete remis au bureau de t6U-
graphe central de Berlin, un peu avant 9 heures du spir. II a ete accepte par iedit bureau,
mais semble n'a voir jamais 6t6 transnais.

Vers 9 heures et demie du soir, ie Sous-Secretaire d'Etat, M, de Zinamermann, est venu
me voir. Apres avoir exprime son profond regret que ies rapports officiels et personnels, si
cordiaux entre nous , fussent sur le point de cesser, il me demanda incidemment si la
demande de mes passeports 6quivaudrait k une declaration de guerre, Je lui ai dit quune
personne faisant aussi notoirement que lui autorit^ en matiere de droit international devait
savoir aussi bien ou mieux que moi quelle 6tail la coutume en pareil cas. J'ai ajoute qu il y
avail des exemples nombreux oh. ia rupture des rapports diplomatiques n avait point 6t6
suiviede guerre; mais que dans le cas aclael il avait sans doute vu d'apres rues instructions ,
dont j'avais donnS un r6sume par ecrit kM- de Jagow, que le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste
britannique s'altendait k une r6ponse k une question d^finie ce soir avant minuit et qu*^
d6faut de r^ponse satisfaisante Iedit Gouvernement se verrait forc6 de prendre Ies mesui^es
necessities par ses engagements. M. de Zimmermann declara que cela etait, de fait, une
declaration de guerre, ^tant donn6 quil ^tait de toute impossibility pour le Gouvernement
Imperial de donner ies assurances requises ni ce soir, ni aucun autre soir.

£. GoscBEN.

— 195 —

Annexe IV.

Extraitfi du nlivre Gris» indiquant les conditions dans lesquelles I'AIlemagne
a viole la neutrality beige.

r 2.

Lettre adressee par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres,
aux Ministres du Roi a Paris, Berlin, Vienne, Londres et Saint-Petersbourg.

Bruxelles, le 24 juillet 1914.
Monsieur le Ministre ,

Le Gouvernement duRoi s'esl demands si, dans les circonstances actuelles, il n'y aurait
pas lieu dadresser aux Puissances, qui ont garanti son independance et sa neutrality, une
connmunicalion destin^e a leur confirmer sa resolution de remplir les devoirs intern ationaux
que lui imposent les trait^s au cas ou. une guerre viendrait h eclater aux fronti^res de la
Belgique.

H a et6 amene a la conclusion qu'une telle communication serait premaluree k I'heure
presente mais que les evenements poiirraient se precipiter et ne point lui laisser le temps
de faire parvenir, au moment voulu, les instructions opportunes a ses repr^senlants a
letranger.

Dans cette situation , j'ai propose au Roi et a mes collegues du Cabinet , qui se sont rallies
a ma maciere de voir, de vous donncr, des a present, des indications precises sur la
demarche que vous auriez. a faire si T^ventualite d'une guerre franco-allemande devenait
plus menaQante.

Vous trouverez, sous ce pli, une lettre signee, mais non datee, dont vous aurez a donner
lecture et a laisser copie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres si les circonstances exigent
cette communication.

Je vous indiquerai par telegramme le moment d'agir.

Le telegramme vous sera adresse a I'heure oii la mobilisation de Tarm^e beige sera
decretee, si, contrairement a notre sincere espoir, et aux apparences de solution pacifique,
nos renseignements nous amenaient a prendre cette mesure extreme de precaution.

Veuillez agreer, etc,

Davignon,

Annexe au n' 2.
Monsieur le Ministre,

La situation internationale est grave; I'eventualite d'un conflit entre plusieurs Puissances ne
peut ^tre ecartee des preoccupations du Gouvernement du Roi.

La Belgique a observe avec la plus scrupuleuse exactitude les devoirs d'Etat neutre que lui

aS.

-— 196 --

imposent les traites du 19 avril 1889. Ces devoirs, elle s'attachera inebranlablement A les remplir,
quelles que soient les circonstances.

Les dispositions amicales des Puissances k son egard ont ^te affirm^es si souvent que la Belgique
a la confiance de voir son territoire demeurer hora de toute atteinte si des hostilites venaient a se
produire a ses frontieres.

Toutes les mesures necessaires pour assurer Tobservation de sa neutrality n'en ont pas moins
6te prises par le Gouvernement du Roi. L'armee beige est mobilisee et se porte sur les positions
strategiques choisies pour assurer la defense du pays et le respect de sa neutrality. Les forts
d'Anvers et de la Meuse sont en etat de defense.

II est a peine necessaire , Monsieur le Ministre , d'insister sur le caractere de ces mesures. EUes
n'ont d'autre but que de mettre la Belgique en situation de remplir ses obligations internationales;
elles ne sont et n'ont pu etre inspir^es, cela va de soi, ni par ie dessein de prendre part a una
lutte armee des Puissances, ni par un sentiment de deGanorenvers aucune d'elles.

Me conformant aux ordres requs, j'ai I'honneur de remettre a Votre Excellence une copie de la
declaration du Gouvernement du Roi et de La prier de bien vouloir en prendre acta.

Une communication identique a et^ faite aux autres Puissances garantes de ia neutralite beige.

Je saisis, etc.

N'' 8.

Lettre adressee par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires etrangSres, aupc Ministres da
Roi a Berlin, Paris, Londres, Vienne, Saint -Petersbourg, Rome, La Haye,
Luxembourg.

Bruxelies, le 29 juiliet i9i4>

MONSIEDR LE MiNISTRE,

Le Gouvernement du Roi a d^cid^ de mettre l'armee sur ie pied de paix renforc^.

Cette mesure ne doit 6tre en aucune fa9on confondue avec la mobilisation.

A cause da peu d'etendue de son territoire , la Belgique tout entiere constitue en quelque
sorte une zone frontiere. Son arm^e, sur le pied de paix ordinaire, ne comporte qu'une
classe de milice sous les armes. Sur le pied de paix renforce, ses divisions d'arm6e et sa
division de cavalerie, grace au rappel de trois classes ont des effectifs analogues k ceux (des
corps entretenus en permanence dans les zones frontieres des Puissances voisines.

Ces renseignements vous permettraient de r^pondre aux questions qui pourrslient vous
«tre poshes.

Veuiliez agreer, etc

Davignon.

r 9.

Lettre adressee par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires eirangeres, aux Ministres da
Roi a Berlin , Paris et Londres.

Bruxelies, ie 3i juiliet 1914.
Monsieur LE Ministre,

M. le Ministre de France etant venu me montrer un t616gramme de I'Agence Havas,
d^cr^tant i'6tat de guerre en Ailemagne, m'a dit : « Je profile de cette occasion pour vous

— 197 —
declarer qu*aucune incursion des troupes frangaises n'aura lieu en Belgique, inSme si des
forces importantes 6taient mass^es sur ies fronti^res de votre pays. La France ne veut pas
avoir la responsabilit6 d'accomplir, vis-k-vis de la Belgique , le premier acle d*hostilite. Des
instructions dans ce sens seront donn^es aux autorit^s franQaises. »

J'ai remercie M. Klobukowski de sa communication et j ai cru devoir lui faire remarquer
que nous avions toujours eu la plus grande confiance dans la loyaute que nos deux Etats
voisins mettraient a tenir leurs engagements h notre 6gard. Nous avons aussi tout lieu de
croire que I'attitude du Gouvernement allemand sera idenlique k celle du Gouvernement
de la Republique fran9aise.

Veuiilez agreer, etc.

Dayignon.

r 11.

LettAe adressie par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires dtrangkres, aux Ministres du
Roi a Berlin, Londres et Paris*

Bruxelies , le 3 1 juiilet 1 9 1 4r
MoNsiBUR LE Ministre,

Le Ministre d'Angleterre a demands a me voir d'urgence et m'a fait la communication
suivante, qu'il souhaitait etre i mdme de m'exposer depuis plusieurs jours. En raison de la
possibility dune guerre europ6enne, sir Edward Grey a demands aux Gouvernements fran-
9ais et allemand, s6par6ment, si chacun deux 4tait pr^t k respecter la neutrality de la Bel-
gique pourvu qu'aucune Puissance ne la viole.

« Vu Ies trait^s qui existent, je suis cbarg6 d'informer le Ministre des Affaires 6trangeres
de Belgique de ce qui precede et de dire que Sir Edward Grey presume que la Belgique fera
tout son possible pour maintenir sa neutrality et quelle desire et s'attend k ce que Ies autres
Puissances I'observent et la maintiennenl. »

Je me suis empress^ de remercier Sir Francis Villiers de cette communication que le
Gouvernement beige appr^cie particuli^rement et j'ai ajout^ que la Grande-Bretagne et Ies
autres nations garantes de notre ind^pendance pouvaient 6tre assur^es que nous ne neglige-
rions aucun effort pour maintenir notre neutralite, et que nous ^tions convaincus que Ies
autres Puissances , vu Ies exoellents rapports d'amiti^ et de confiance, que nous avions tou-
joiirs entretenus avec elles^ observeraient et maintiendraient cette neutrality.

Je n'ai pas manqu6 d'affirmer que nos forces militaires , corisid^rablement developp^es k
la suite de notre reorganisation recente, ^taient a m^me de nous permettre denous d^fendre
^ergiquement en cas de violation de noire territoire*

Au cours de la conversation qui a suivi , 3ir Francis m'a paru un peu surpris de la rapidity
avec laquelie nous avions d6cid6 la mobilisation de notre arm^e. J'ai fait remarquer que Ies
Pays-Bas avaient pris une resolution identique avant nous et que d'autre, part la date recente
de notre nouveau regime militaire et Ies mesures transitoires que nous avions du decider k
cette occasion nous imposaient des mesures urgentes et completes. Nos voisins et garants
devaient voir dans cette resolution le d^sir de manifester notr^ profonde volonte de mainr
tenir nous-m^mes notre neutrality.

— 198 —
Sir Francis ma pani satisfait de ma r^ponse et m'a annonc^ que son Gouvernement
atlendait cette reponse pour continuerles n6gociations avec la France et TAllemagne, nego-
ciations dont la conclusion me serait commmiiqu^e.

Veuiilez agreer, etc. '

Davignon.

r 12.

Lettre adressee par M. Davignon, Minislre des Affaires etrangeres, aux Ministres da
Roi a Berlin, Londres et Paris.

Bmxeiles, le 3i juiUet 1914.
Monsieur ie Ministre,

Ce matin, au cours dune conversation que le Secretaire general de mon departementa
eue avec M. de Bulow, il a explique au Ministre d'Allemagne la portee des mesures miii-
taires que nous avons prises et lui a dit qu'elles 6taieht une consequence de notre volonte
d'accomplir nos obligations internationales, qu'elles n'impliquaient en aucune fa9on une atti-
tude de defiance envers nos voisins.

Le Secretaire general a demands ensuite au Ministre d'Allemagne s'il avait connaissance
de la conversation qu'il avait eue avec son predecesseur, M. de Flotow, et de la reponse que
le Chancelier de I'Empire avait charge ceiui-ci de lui faire.

Au cours de la polemique soulevee en 1911 par le depot du projet hoilandais concernant
les fortifications de Flessingue, certains journaux avaient affirme qu'en cas de guerre franco-
allemande, notre neutrality serait violee par i'Allemagne.

Le departement des Afifaires ^trangeres avait suggere i'idee qu'une declaration faite au
Parlement allemand a I'occasion d'un debat sur la politique etrangere serait de nature k
apaiser I'opinion publique et a calmer ses defiances, si regrettables au point de vue des rela-
tions des deux pays.

M. de Bethman-Holweg fit repondre qu'il avait ^t^ tres sensible aux sentiments qui avaient
inspire notre demarche. 11 declarait que I'Allemagne n'avait pas I'intention de violer notre
neutralite, mais il estimait qu'en faisant publiquement une declaration, TAllemagne affaibli-
rait sa situation militaire vis-i-vis de la France qui, rassuree du cot^ du Nord, porterait
toutes ses forces du cot^ de I'Est.

Le baron ven der Der Elst, poursuivant, dit qu'il comprenait parfaitement les objections
qu'av^dent faites M. de Bethman-Holweg a la declaration pubhque sugg^r^e et il rappela que
depuis lors en igiS, M. de Jagow avait fa\t, ki la Commission du budget du Reichstag, des
declarations rassurantes quant au respect de la neutralite de la Belgique.

M. de Bulow repondit qu'il etait au courant de la conversation avecM. de Flotow et qu'il
etait certain que les sentiments exprimes a cette ^poque n'avaient pas chang^.

Veuiilez agreer, etc*

Davignon.

-^ 199

Annbxb AUN* 12.

Lettbe adressie par le MinisUe du Ibi d. Berlin d Af. Davignm, Ministre des Ajfairei
etrangeres. •

Berlin lea mai 191$
Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai rhonneur de vou^ faire connaitre, d'apr^ Tofficieuse Norddeatsche Allgemeine Zeitang, les
<lecIarations faites au cours de la seance du 29 avril de la Commission du budget du Reichstag ,
par le Secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires Etrang^res et le Ministre de la Guerre, relativement a la neu-
traiite de la Belgique.

u Un membre du parti sociai-d6mocrate dit : « En Belgique on voit avec appreheasipn s'approcher
^lune guerre franco-allemande, car on craint que TAllemagne ne respectera pas ia neutralite de la
« Belgique ».

.M. de Jagow, Secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires etrangeres r^pondit : la neutralite de la Belgique
west determinee par des conventions internationales etTAllemagne est decidee a respecter ces con-
«ventions.

« Cette declaration ne satisfit pas un autre membre du parti social-democrate. M. de Jagow
rt observa qu'il n'avait rien a ajouter aux paroles claii es qu'il avait prononcees relativement aux rela-
u tions de TAllemagne avec la Belgique.

u A de nouvelles interrogations d'un membre du parti social-democrate, M. de Heeringen ,
« Ministre de la Guerre, repondit : la Belgique ne joue aucun rdle dans la justification du projet de
« reorganisation militaire allemand ; celui-ci se trouve justifie par la situation en Orient. L'Alle-
« magne ne perdra pas de vue que la neutralite beige est garantie par les traites internationaux ».

« Un membre du parti progressiste ayant encore parle de la Belgique, M. de Jagow fit remarquer
a nouveau que sa declaration concernant la Belgique etait suffisamraenf claire. »

Veuillez agreer, etc.

Baron Beybns.

r 13.

TiLEGRAMME odressc par le Comte de Lalaing, Ministre du Roi a Londres, a
M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires dtrangeres.

Londres, 1" aoiit 191/i.

L'Angleterre a demands separement k la France et k i'Allemagne si eUes respecteraient ie
territoire de la Belgique dans le cas oii leur adversaire ne la vioierait pas. On attend la
reponse dlemande. La France a accepte.

rf 14.

TiiEGRAMMB adrcssepor le Baron Beyens, Ministre du Roiy a Berlin, a Af. Davignon,
Ministre des Affaires etrangeres.

Berlin, i" aodt 1914.

J-i'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a et6 charge de demander au Ministre des Affaires etrangeres
si, en cas de guerre, I'Allemagne respecterait la neutralite de la Belgique et le Ministre aurait
dit qu'il ne pent pas repondre a cette question.

200 —

r 15.

Lettre adressee par M* Davignon, Ministre des Affaires dtranghes, auxMinistres da Roi

a Berlin, Paris et Londres.

Bruxelles, i" aout 1914.
Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai rhonneur de vous faire savoir que le Ministre de France m'a fait verbalement la com-
munication suivante :

R Je suis autorise a declarer qu'en cas de conflit international, le Gouvernement de la
B6publique, ainsi qu'il Ta toujours d6clar6, respectera la neutrality de la Belgique. Dans
I'hypothese oil cette neutrality ne serait pas respect^e par une autre puissance , le Gouver-
nement francais, pour assurer sa propre defense, pourrait etre amen6 a modifier son atti-
ti^de».

J'ai remerci^ son Excellence et ai ajout6 que, de notre cdt6, nous avions pris sans aucun
retard toutes les mesures voulues pour faire respecter notre independance et nos frontieres.

VeuiUez agr^er, etc, . .

Davignon.

K 19.

Lettre adressee par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires etrangires , auxMinistres da Roi
a Paris, Berlin, Londres, Vienne et Saint-Petersboarg.

Bruxelles, le 2 aoiit 1914.
Monsieur le Ministre,

J'avais eu soin de faire avertir par M. de Bassompierre le Ministre d'AlIemagne, qu'un
communique de M. Klobukowski , Ministre de France, a la presse bruxelloise, annoncerait
la declaration formelle que ce dernier m'avait laite le i* aout. Rencuntrant M. de Bulow,
ce dernier m'a remerci6 de cette attention et a ajout^ que, jusqu'k present, il n'avait pas et6
charg^ de nous faire une communication ofBcieile, mais que nous connaissions son opinion
personnelle sur la securite avec laquelie nous avions le droit de consid^rer nos voisins de
l^Est. J'ai imm^dialement r^pondu que tout ce que nous connaissions des intentions de
ceux-ci, intentions indiqu^es dans les multiples entretiens anterieurs, ne nous permettait pas
de douter de leur parfaite correction vis-a-vis de la Belgique ; je tenais cependant a ajouter
que nous.altacherions le plus grand prix a ^tre en possession d'une declaration formelle
dont la nation prendrait connaissance avec joie et reconnaissance.

VeuiUez agr6er, etc. . .

Davignon.

201

r 20.

Note remise le 2. aout, & 19 heures, par M. de Belom Saleske, Ministre HAUemagne,
a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires etrangires,

Bruxeiles,, 2 aoAt 1914.

Le Gouvernement aUemand a re9u des nouveUes sures d apres lesquelles les forces fran-
^aises auraient I'mtention de marcher sur la Mease par Givet et Namur. Ces nouvelles ne
laissent aucun doute sur i'intention de la France de marcher sur TAUemagne par le terri-
toire beige. Le Gouvernement imperial allemand ne peut s'empecher de craindre que la
Belgique, malgr6 sa meilleure volont^, ne sera pas en mesure de repousser sans secours
une marche frangaise dun si grand d^veloppement. Dans ce fait, on trouve|Une certitude
suffisante d'une menace dirigee contre I'AUemagne.

C'est un devoir imperieux de conservation pour i'AJlemagne de prSvenir cette attaque de
fennemi.

Le Gouvernement allemand regretterait tres vivement que la Belgique regardat comme
un acte d'hostilit6 contre elle le fait que les mesures des ennemis de TAllemagne I'obligent de
violer de son c6t6 1^ territoire beige.

Afin de dissiper tout malentendu, le Gouvernement allemand declare ce qui suit :

L L'AUemagne n a en vue aucun acte d'hostilit6 contre la Belgique. Si la Belgique
consent, dans la guerre qui va commencer, k prendre une attitude de neutrality amicale vis-
a-vis de rAUeifaagne, le Gouvernement allemand de son cote s engage, au moment de la
paix, a garantir le royaume et ses possessions dans toute leur etendue.

IL L'AUemagne s engage, sous la condition ^noncle, k evacuerJe tercitDire beige aussitot
ia paix conclue.

III. Si la Belgique observe une attitude amicale, I'AUemagne est pr^te, d'accord avec les
autorit^s du Gouvernement beige a acheter contre argent comptant tout ce qui est n^cessaire
k ses troupes et a indemniser pour les dommages causes en Belgique.

IV. Si la Belgique se comporte d'une fa9on hostile contre les troupes allemandes et partir
culierement fait des difficult^s a leur marche en avant par une opposition de fortifications
de la Meuse ou par des destructions de routes , de chemins de fer, tunnels ou autres ouvrages
d'art, I'Allemagne sera obligee de consid^rer la Belgique en ennemie.

Dans ce cas, I'Allemagne ne prendra aucun engagement vis-a-vis du royaume, mais elle
laissera le reglement ult^rieur des rapports des deux jfitats Vun vis-a-vis de I'autre k la
decision des armes. Le Gouvernement allemand a fespoir justifi^ que cette eventuality ne
se produira pas et que le Gouvernement beige saura prendre les mesures appropri^es pour
I'emp^cher de se produire. Dans ce cas, les relations d'amitid qui unlssent ies deux Etats
voisins deviendront plus etroites et durables.

DoccMENTs MPLOMATiQBBs. — Guerre earopeenoe.

— 202 —

N" 22.

^OTE remise par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires itrangeres, iiM,de Below Saleske,

Ministre ctAllemagne.

Broxelles, le 3 aoM igiA (7 heures du matin).

Par sa note du a aout 19 1 4, le Gouvemement ailemand a fait connaitre que d apres des
nouvelles sures , les forces fran9aises auraient rintention de mardher sur la Meuse par Givet
et Namur, et que la Beigique , maJgr6 sa meiiieure volonte , ne serait pas en etat de repousser
sans secours une marche en avant des troupes francaises.

Le Gouvemement ailemand s'estimerait dans Tobligation de pr^venir cette attaqtie et de
violer le territoire beige. Dans ces conditions, I'Allemagne propose au Gouvemement du
Roi de prendre vis-^-vis d'elle une attitude amicale et s'engage au moment de la paix a
garantir I'int^grite du Royaume et de ses possessions dans toute leur etendue. La note ajoute
que si la Beigique fait des difficultes k la marche en avant des troupes allemandes, I'Alle-
magne sera obligee de la considerer comme ennemie et de laisser le reglement ulterieur des
deux Etats Tun vis-^-vis de I'autre a la decision des armes. "*

C^tte note a provoque chez le .Gouvemement du Roi un profond et douloureux etonne^-
jnent.

Les intentions qu'elle attribue a la France sont en contradiction avec les declarations for-
melles qui nous ont 6t6 faites le i* aout, au nom du Gouvemement de la R^publique.

D'ailleurs si contrairement a notre attente une violation de la neutrality beige venait h etre
commise par la France, la Beigique remplirait tous ses devoirs internationaux et son armee
opposerait a I'envabisseur la plus vigoureuse resistance.

Les traites de 1839 confirm^s par les traites de 1870 consacrent Imdependance et la
neutralite de la Beigique sous la garantie des Puissances et notamment du Gouvemement de
Sa Majeste le Roi de Prasse.

La Beigique a toujours ^te fidele 2i ses obligations intemationales; elles a accompli ses
devoirs dans un esprit de loyale impartiality ; elle n'a neglige aucuo effort pour mainteriir
ou faire respecter sa neutrality,

L'atteinte a son independance dont la menace du Gouvemement constituerait une fla-
grante violation du droit des gens. Aucah iriter^t strat^gique ne justifie la violatioli du
droit.

Le Gouvemement beige en acceptant les propositions qui lui iont notifi^es sacrifierait
ITionneur de la nation en meme temps qu'il trahirait ses devoirs vis-a-vis de I'Europe.

Conscient du role que la Beigique joue depuis plus de quatre-vingts ans dans la civi-
lisation du monde, il se refuse k croire' que I'independance de la Beigique ne puisse 6tre
conserv^e qu*au prix de la violation de sa neutralite.

Si cetespoir ^tait decu,le Gouvemement beige est fermement d^cidd a repousser par tons
les moyens en son pouvoir toute atteinle a son droit,

Davignon*

— 203 —

N** 27.

Lettre adressde par M, de- Below Saleske, Ministre ^Allemagn$, & M, Davignon^
Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, (L'originai est en firancals).

Bruxdles, le 4 aodt igiii (6 heures dumatin).
Monsieur le Ministre,

J*ai eti charg^ et j'ai ITionneur dmformer Votre Excdlencfe que par suite du refus oppose
par le Gouvernement de Sa Majest6 le Roi aux propositions bien intentionn^es que lui avait
soumises le Gouvernement imperial, celui-ci se verra, h. son plus vif regret, forc6 dex^cuter
—7- au besoin par la force des armes — les mesures de sdcurite expos^es comme indispea*;
sables vis-k-vis des menaces j&*an9aises.

Veuillez agr^er, Monsieur le Ministre, les assurances de ma haute consideration.

von Bfitow.

r 28.

Note remise par Sir Francis H. Villiers, Ministre d'Angleterre, a M. Davignon, Ministre
des Affaires etrangeres.

Bruxelles, le H aoClt igi^

Je suis charg^ d'informer le Gouvernement beige que si I'Allemagne exerce une pression.
dans le but d'obliger la Belgique a abandonner son r61e de pays neutre, le Gouvernement
de Sa Majeste britannique s'attend a ce que la Belgique r^siste par tous les moyens
possibles.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majest6 britannique, dans ce cas, est pr^t a se joindre a la Russie
et h la France, si la Belgique le desire, pour ofirir au Gouvernement beige, sans delai, une
action commune, qui aurait comme but de resister aux mesures de force employees par
I'Allemagne contre la Belgique et en meme temps d'offrir une garantie pour maintenir I'in-
d^pendance et I'integrite de la Belgique dans I'avenir.

Sir Francis H. Villiers.

N° 30,

TiiiGRAMM^ adresse par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires etrangdres, aux Ministres
dtt Roi a Londres et k Paris.

Brnxelles, le 4 aodt 1914.

L'Etat-Major fait savoir que le territoire national a iih viole a Gemmenich.

Davignon.

>6.

204 —

r 3i<

Lettre adressee par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, a M. de Below
Saleske, Ministre d'AUemagne.

Bruxelles, le 4 aout 1914.
Monsieur le Ministre ,

J'ai I'honneur de faire savoir k Votre Excellence que des aujburd'hui le Gouvernement du
Roi ne saurait plus Lui reconnaitre de caract^re diplomatique et cesse d'avoir des relations
oflicielies avec Elle. Votre Excellence trouvera sous ce pli ies passeports qui sont nedessaires
^ son depart et a celui du personnel de la Legation.

Je saisis, etc.

Davignon.

r 35.

Lettre adressee par le Ministre de Belgique a Berlin a M. I)avignon, Ministre des
Affaires etrangeres.

Berlin, 4 aout 1914.

MONSIEDR LE MiNISTRE,

J'ai I'honneur de vous faire parvenir, ci-apres en traduction , la partie du discours pro-
nonc6 aujourd'hui a la tribune du Reichstag par le Chancelier de I'Empire et relative k
I'odieuse violation de notre neutrality :

« Nous nous trouvons en etat de legitime defense et la necessity ne connait pas de lois.

«Nos troupes ont occup6 Luxembourg H ont, peut-etre, deja penetre en Belgique. Cela
est en contradiction avec Ies prescriptions du droit des gens. La France a, il est vrai, declard
4 Bruxelles qu'elle ^tait r^solue a respecter la neutrality de la Belgique aussi longtemps que
I'adversaire la respecterait. Mais nous savions que la France se tenait prete pour envahir la
Belgique. La France pouvait attendre. Nous, pas. Une attaque francaise sur notre flaiic
dans la region du Rhin inferieur aurait pu devenir fatale. C'est ainsi que nous avons ^le
forces de passer outre aux protestations justifiees des Gouvernements Luxembourgeois et
Beige. L'injustice que nous commettons de cette facon , nous la reparerons des que notre
but mililaire sera alteint.

« A celui qui est mehac^ au point oil nous le sommes et qui lutte pour son bien supreme,
il nest permis que de songer au moyen de se d^ager; nous nous trouvons cote k cote avec
VAutriche. »

II est i remarquer que M. de Bethmann-Hollvveg reconndit, sans le moindre detour, que
I'AUemagne viole le droit international en envahissant le territoire beige et qu'elle comraet
une injustice k tiotre 6gard..

Yeuillez agr^er, etc.

Baron Beyens.

205 —

r 39.

Telegramme adresse par le Ministre du Roi a Londres a M. Davignon, Ministre des
Affaires etrangires.

Londres, A aout 19 14.

L'Angleterre a somm6 ce malin rAIIemagne de respecter la neutrality beige. L'ultiinatum
dit que, vu la note adressee par TAllemagne a la Belgique, menacant cette derniere de la
force des armes si elle s'oppose au passage de ses troupes; vu la violation du territoire beige
a Gemmenich; vu le fait que TAllemagne a refuse de donner a I'Angleterre la meme-assu-
rance que celle donnee la semaine derniere par la France, TAngleterre doit demander k
nouveau una reponse satisfaisante au sujet du respect de la neutrality beige et d'un traite
,dont I'Allemagne est signataire aussi bien qu'elle-m^me. L'ultimatum expire k minuit.

En consequence de rultimatum de I'Angleterre a I'Allemagne, la proposition anglaise
que je vous ai transraise par telegramme est annul^e pour le moment.

Gomte m Lalajng.

r 40.

Lettre adressee par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, aux Minislres de
Grande-Brelagne , de France et de Russie.

Bruxelles, le 4 aoiit 191^.
Monsieur leJMinistre,

Le Gouvernement Beige a le regret de devoir annoncer a Votre Excellence que, ce
matin, les forces armies de I'Allemagne ont p^netr^ sur le territoire beige, en violation des
engagements qui ont 6t6 pris par traite.

Le Gouvernement du Roi est fermement decide a r^sister par tous les moyens en son
pouvbir.

La Belgique fait appel a I'Angleterre, a la France et k la Russie pour coop^rer, comme
garantes, k la defense de son territoire.

II y aurait une action concertee et commune ayant pour but de resister aux mesures de
force employees par I'Allemagne contre la Belgique et en meme temps de garantir le main-
tien de I'ind^pendance et de i'int^grite de la Belgique dans I'avenir.

La Belgique est heureuse de pouvoir declarer quelle assumera la defense des places
fortes.

Je saisis, etc»

Davignon.

— 206

N'* 41.

TiLicRAMME adressipar le Ministre da Roi a Londres, a M. Davignon, Ministre del

Affaires elrangires.

Londres, 5 aoAt 19 1^.

L'Allemagne ayant rejele les propositions anglaises, I'Ang^eterre lui a d^ciar^ que I'^tat de
guerre existait entre les deux pays, a partir de onze heures.

Gomte o£ Lalmng.

Lettre adressee par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires ^tranghes, aux Chefs de mis-
sion dans ious les pays entretenant avec la Belgique des rapports diplomatiques.

Bruxeiles, le 5 aout 19 id.
Monsieur le Ministre,

Par le traite du 18 avril 1 83 9, la Prusse, la France, rAngleterre, I'Autriche et la Russia
se sont declarecs garantes du traite conclu le m^me jour entre S. M. le roi des Beiges et
S. M. le roi des Pays-Bas. Ce traits porte : «La Belgique formera un Elat independant et
perp^tuellement neutre ». La Belgique a rempli toutes ses obligations internationales , elle a
accompli ses devoirs dans un esprit de loyale iinpartialil^, elle n*a n6glig6 aucun effort pour
maintenir et faire respecter sa neutralite.

Aussi est-ce avec une penible Amotion que le Gouvernement du Roi a appris que les
forces armies de I'AHemagne, puissance garante de notre neutrality ont p6n6tr6 sur ieterri-
toire de la Belgique en violation des engagements qui ont et6 pris par traits.

n est de notre devoir de protester avec indignation centre un attentat au droit des gens
qu aucun acte de notre part n'a pu provoquer.

Le Gouvernement du Roi est fermement ddcidd a repousser par tous les moyens en son
pouvoir I'atteinte port^e a sa neutrality et il rappelle qu'en vertu de I'article 10 de k Con-
vention de La Haye de 1 907 concernant les droits et les devoirs des Puissances et des per-
sonnes neutres en cas de guerre sur terre ne peut 6tre consid^re comme un acte hostile
le fait, par une puissance neutre, de repousser mSme par la force les atteintes a sa neu-
tralite.

Vous voudrez bien demander d'urgence audience au Ministre des Affaires ^trangeres et
donner lecture k Son Excellence de la presente lettre dont vous lui laisserez copie. Si f au-
dience ne pouvait vous ^tre imm^diatement accord^e, vous ferez par 6crit la communica-
tion dont il sagit. *

Veuiliez agreer, etc.

Davignon.

207

rr 48.

Communication faite le 5 ao6,f par Sir Francis Villiers, Ministre ctAngh^erre,
a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires elrangeres.

Je suis charge d'informer le Gouvemement Beige que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesty
britannique considere Taction commune dans le but de r^sister a TAUemagne comme 6tant
en vigueur et justifi^e par le traits de 1 889. .

r 52.

Lettre adressee par M. Davignon, Ministre dfis Affaires dirangires, aax Ministres da
Roi a Paris, Londres et Saint-Petersbourg.

Bruxelles, le 5 aodt I9i4>

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai I'honneuT de vous faire savoir que les Minislres de France et de Russie ont fait ce
matin une demarche aupr^s de moi pour me faire connaitre la volonte de leurs Gouverne-
ments de repondre k notre appel et de coop^rer avec TAngleterre a la defense de notre
territoire.

Veuillez agreer, etc.

Davignon.

N'' 60.

Telegramme adresse par le Ministre da Roi a La Haye a M. Davignon,, Ministre des
Affaires Strangeres.

La Haye, le 9 aout 1,9 14«

Le Ministre des Affaires 6trangeres m'a prie de vous transmettre les informations suivantes
parce que le Ministre d'Amerique k Bruxelles s y refuse.

La forteresse de Liege a ^t^ prise d'assaut apres une defense courageuse. Le Gouverne-
ment Allemand regrette tres profond^ment , que par suite de I'attitude du Gouvernement
Beige centre I'Allemagne, on en est arriv^ a des rencontres sanglantes. L'Allemagne ne vient
pas en ennemie en Belgique, c'est seulement par la force des evenements quelle a du, a
cause des mesures militaires de la France, prendre la grave determination d'entrer en
Belgique et d'occuper Li6ge comme point d'appui pour ses operations militaires uit^rieures.
Apres que I'arm^e beige a , par sa resistance heroique contre une grande superiorite , main-
teny I'honneur de ses armes, le Gouvernement Allemand prie le Roi des Beiges et le Gou-
vemement Beige deviter a la Belgique les horreurs vdterieures de'la guerre. Le Gouverne-
ment est prSt a tous accords avec la Belgique qui peuvent se concilier avec son conflit avec

^ 208 —
la France. L'Allemagne assure encore solennellement qti*eile n'a pas Hntention de s'appro-
prier le territoire beige et que cette intention est loin d elle. L'Allemagne est toujours prMe
a evacuer la Belglque aussitot que I'etat de guerre le lui permettra.

L'Ambassadeur des Etats-Unis avait prie son collegue de se charger de cette tentative de
mediation. Le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres a accepte sans enlhousiasme cette mission.
Je m'en suis charge pour lui faire plaisir.

Baron Fallon.

N° 71.

Telegram ME adresse par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres a M. le baron
Fallon, Ministre du Roi a La Eaye.

Bruxelles, le 12 aoiit 19 14.

Priere de remettre le t^legramme suivant au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres : « La propo-
sition que nous fait le Gouvernement Allemand reproduit la proposition qui avait etE for-
mulee dans rultimatum du 2 aout. Fidele k ses devoirs internationaux, la Beigique ne peut
que r^it^rer sa r^ponse a cet ultimatum, d'autant plus que depuis le 3 aout sa neutralite
a ete violee, qu'une guerre douloureuse a ete port^e sur son territoire et que les garants de
sa neutrality ont ioyalement et imm^diatement r^pondu k son appel. »

Davignon.

— 209 ~

Annexe V.

T^l^grammes ^changte entre rEmperenr GuUlatime n et rEmpereur lYicolas n.
(Extraits du Livre Blanc allemand)

L'Empereur Guillaume

k I'Empereur Nicolas.

28 juillet 1914 (10 h. ii5 du soir.)

C'est avec la plus vive inquietude que j'ai appris I'impression qua produite dans ton Em-
pire , ia marche en avant de rAutriche-Hongrie centre la Serbie. L'agitation sans scrupule
qui se poursuit depuis des ann^es en Serbie, a conduit au mcnstrueux attentat dont I'Ar-
chiduc Francois-Ferdinand a 6t6 la victime. L'6tat d'esprit qui a amen6 les Serbes a assassiner
leur propre roi et son dpouse regne encore dans ce pays. Sans dopte conviendras-tu avec
raoi que tous deux, toi aussi bien que moi, nous avons, comme tous les souverains, un
interet commun a insister pour que ceux qui sont moralement responsables de ce terrible
meuitre recoivent le chatiment qu'ils m^ritent.

D'autre part, je ne me dissimule aucunement combien il est difficile pour toi et ton Gou-
vernement de resister aux manifestations de i 'opinion publique. En souvenir de la cordiale
amitie qui nous lie tous deux ^troitement depuis longtemps, j'use de toute men influence
pour decider I'Autricbe-Hongrie a en venir k une entente loyale et satisfaisante avec la Russie.
Je compte bien que tu me secourras dans mes efibrt* tendant a ^carter toutes les difficult^s
qui pourraient encore s elever.

Ton ami et cousin tr^s sincere et d^vou^

Guillaume.

L'Empereur Nicolas

a TEmpereur Guillaume.

Palais de Peterhof, le 29 juillet 1914 (1 heure apr^s-midi.)

Je suis heureux que tu sois rentr6 en Allemagne. En ce moment si grave, je te prie
instamment de venir a mon aide. Une guerre honteuse a ^t^ declar^e a une laible nation ; je
partage enli^rement I'indignation , qui est immense en Russie.

Je pr^vois que tres prochainement je ne pourrai plus longtemps resister a ia pression qui
est exerc6e sur moi et que je serai force de prendre des mesures qui conduiront a la guerre.

Pour pr^venir le malheur que serait une guerre europ^enne, je te prie, au nom da
notre vieille amiti6 , de faire tout ce qui te sera possible pour empecher ton alli^e d aller
trop loin.

Nicolas

DocmoDiTS piPLOMAnQOBs. — Guerre europ^nne..

- 210 —

29 juillet 1914 (6 h. 3o du sofr.)
L'Empereur Guillaume

a I'Empereur Nicolas.

J'ai recu ton telegramme et partage ton desir de maintenir la paix.

Cependant, je ne puis, ainsi que je le disais dans mon premier telegramme, considerer la
marche en avant de rAutriche-Hongrie comme « une guerre honteuse ». L'Autriche-Hongrie
sail par experience qu'on ne peut absolument pas se fier aux promesses de la Serbie taut
qu'elles n'existent que sur le papier.

A mon aVis , la conduite de rAutriche-Hongrie doit 6tre consider^e comme une tentative
d'obtenir toule garantie que les promesses de la Serbie seront executees aussi en fait. La
declaration du cabinet autricbien me fortifie dans mon opinion que rAutriche-Hongrie ne
vise a aucune acquisition territoriale au detriment de la Serbie.

Je pense done qu il est tres possible h. la Russie de pers^verer, en presence de la guerre
austro-serbe , dans son role de spectatrice, sans entrainer I'Europe dans la guerre la plus
eflfroyabie qu elle ait jamais vue.

Je crois qu'une entente directe entre ton Gouvernement et Vienne est possible et desirable
attendu que, comme je te I'ai deji telegraphic, mon Gouvernement essaie de toutes ses forces
de la favoriser.

Naturellement des mesures militaires de la Russie, que fAutriche-Hongrie pourrait con-
siderer comme une menace, hateraient une calamite que tous deux nous cherchons a eviter,
et rendrait Cgalement impossible ma mission de m^diateur que j'ai acceptCe avec empres-
sement lorsque tu as fait appei k mon amitiC et a mon aide.

GuiLLAUME.

L'Empereur Guillatjme

k TEmpereur Nicolas.

3o juillet 1914(1 heure du matin.)

Mon Ambassadeur a dt6 chargC d'appeler Tattention de ton Gouvernement sur les dangers
et les graves consequences d une mobilisation ; c est ce que je t'avais dit dans mon dernier
telegramme.

L'Autriche-Hongrie n'a mobilise qne contre la Serbie et seulement une partie de son
arrnee. Si la Russie, comme cest le cas d'apres ton telegramme et la communication de ton
Gouvernement, mobilise centre i'Autriche-Hongrie, la mission de mCdiateur que tu mas
amicalement confiee et qaej'ai acceptee sur ton instante priere, sera compromise sinon
rendue impossible.

Tout le poids dc la decision k prendre p^se actuellement sur tes epaules , qui auront k
supporter la responsabilit6 de la guerre ou de la paix.

GOILLAUME.

— 211 -

L'Empereur Nicolas

k TEmpereur Guillaume.

PIterhof, Te 3o Jufllet 1914 ( i h- 20 apr^midi.)

Je te remeroie cordialement de ta prompte reponse, Jeavoie aujourdlrai soir Taticiheff
avec meg instructions. Les decisions militaires qui sOQt niises maintenant en vigneur, ont 6.i}h
^te prises ii y a cinq jours a litre de defense contre les preparatifs de i'Autriche.

J'espere de tout mon coeur que ces mesures n'influeront en rien sur ton role de m^diateur
que j apprecie grandement. Nous avons besoin de ton intervention ^nergique aupres de
I'Autriche , afin quelle arrive k une entente avec nous.

Nicolas. 1

L'Empereur Nicolas

a I'Eiupereur Guhxaume.

3i juillet 1914.

Je te remercie de tout coeur de ton intention, qui iaisse percer une lueur d'espoir que
tout se terminera encore a I'amiabie. Techniquement, il est impossible de suspendre nos
preparatifs militaires qui ont ete necessites par la mobilisation de i'Autriche.

Nous sommes loin de d^sirer la guerre; aussi longtemps que dureront les pourpariers
avec I'Autriche! au sujet de la Serbie, mes troupes ne se livreront a aucun acte de provoca-
tion. Je t'en donne ma parole d'honneur.

J'ai confiance absolue dans la grace divine et souhaite la r^ussite de ton intervention k^
Vienne pour le bien de nos pays et ia paix de TEurope.

Bien cordialement a toi.

Nicolas.

L'Empereur Guillaume

k I'Empereur Nicolas.

3i juillet 1914 {2 heures apr^s<nidi).

Sur ton appel a mon amiti6 et ta priere de te vetiir en aide , j'ai ehtrepris une action
mediatrice entre ton Gouvemement et ie Gouvernement austro hongrois.

Pendant que cette action 6tait encore en cours, tes troupes ont ^t^ mobilis^es contre mon
alii ee i'Autriche- Hongric', a la suite de quoi, ainsi que je te I'ai di]k fait savoir, mon inter-
vention est devenue presque illusoire. Malgre cela, jel'ai cohtlnu^e^

Je recois a I'instant des nouvelles dignes de foi touchant de s6rieux preparatifs de guerre
egalement sur ma fronti^re orientale. Ay ant a repondre de la s6curit6 de mon Empire, je
me vois force de prendre les memes mesures defensives.

«7.

— 212 —

Je suis al]^ josqu a I'extreme limite du possible dans mes efforts pour maintenir la paix.
Ce n'est pas moi qui supporterai la responsabilitd de Taffreux d^sastre qui menace mainte-
nant tout le monde civilise.

En ce moment encore il ne tient q\xk toi de Temp^cher. Personne ne menace I'honneur
et la puissance de la Russie, qui eut bien pu attendre le resullat de mon intervention.
L'amiti6 pour toi et ton. royaume, qui m'a ete transmise par mon Grand-Pere a son lit de
mort, est toujours sacr^e pour moi, et j'ai 6t^ fidele a la Russie lorsqu'elie s'est trouv6e
dans le malheur, notamment dans ta derniere guerre. Maintenant encore la paix de I'Europe
peut elre maintenue par toi, si la Russie se decide a suspendreses mesures militaires qui
menacent I'Allemagneet TAulriche.

GUILLADUE.

vni

L'Empereur Nicolas

k I'Empereur Guillaume.

i" aout 1914 (2 heures apr^s-midi).

J'ai recu ton tel^gramme, je comprends que tu sois oblige de mobiliser, maisje voudrais
avoir de toi la m^me garantie que je t'ai donnee, a savoir que ces mesures ne signifient pas
la guerre et que nous poursuivrons nos negociations pour le bien de nos deux pays et la
paix generale si ch^re k nos cceurs.

Notre longue arhilie ^prouvee doit, avec I'aide de Dieu, r^ussir a empScher ces effusions
de sang. J attends avec confiance une r^ponse de toi.

Nicolas.

L'Empereur Guillaubie
k TEmpereur Nicolas.

Berlin, i^aoAt 1914.

Je te remercie de ton t^l^gramme; j'ai indique hier k ton Gouvernement le seui moyen
par lequel la guerre pouvait encore 6tre 6vit6e.

Bien que jeusse demande une r^ponse pour midi, aucun tdl^gramme de mon Ambassa-
deur contenant une r^ponse de ton Gouvernement ne m est encore parvenu. J'ai done 6te
contraint de mobiliser mon arm6e.

Une reponse immediate, claire et non Equivoque, de ton Gouvernement est le seul
moyen de conjurer une calamity incommensurable. Jusqu'i ce que je re9oive cette reponse,
il m'est impossible, k mon vif regret, d'aborder le sujet de ton t616gramme. Je dois te de-
mander cat^goriquement de donner sans retard I'ordre k tes troupes de ne porter en aucun
cas ia moindre atteinte a nos froixtieres.

Gcillaume.

— 213 —

Annexe VL
Extraits du «Livre orange» relatifs 4 la d^laration de guerre de rAllemagne & la Russle.

r 76.

Note remise par I' Ambassadeur d'Allemagne d.Saint-Petersboarg, le 1"^ aout 191^,
d7 h, 10 du soir.

Le Gouvernement imperial s'est efForce des les debuts de la crise de la mener a une solu-
tion pacifique. Se rendant a un desir quilui en avait 6te exprime par Sa Majesle rEmpereur
de Russie, Sa Majesty I'Empereur d'Allemagne, d'accord avec I'Angleterre, s'^tait appliqu6 a
accomplir un r61e m^diateur aupr^s des Cabinets de Vienne et de Saint-P^tersbourg ,
lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le rdsultat, proc^da a la mobilisation de la totalite de ses
forces de terre et de mer. A la suite de cette mesure menaQante motiv^e par aucun presage
militaire de la part de TAllemagne, I'Empire allemand s'est trouve vis-a-vis d'un danger grave
et imminent. Si le Gouvernement imperial eut manqu6 de parer a ce peril, il aurait com-
promis' la s6curite et Texistence meme de I'Allemagne. Par consequent le Gouvernement
allemand se vit forc6 de s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majestc I'Empereur de Toutes
les Russies en insistant sur la cessation desdits actes militaires. La Russie ayant refus6 de
faire droit a (n'ayant pas cru devoir repondre j«)<'^ cette demande et ayanl manifest^ par ce
refus (cette attitude) que son action elait dirig^e contrc I'Allemagne, j'ai I'honneur, d'ordre
de mon Gouvernement, de faire savoir h Votre Excellence ce qui suit :

Sa Majesty I'Empereur Mon Auguste Souverain au nom de I'Empire, relevant le defi, se
considere en etat de guerre avec la Russie.

Saiut-Petersbourg, le 1 9 juillet/i " aout 1914.

F. POURTALES.

r 77.

Communique da Ministre des Affaires eirangires concernant les evenements des derniers
jours.

Le 2 aout 19 14-

Un expose defigurant les Evenements des derniers jours ayant paru dans la presse etran-
gere, le Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres croit de son devoir de publier I'aper^u suivant des
pourparlers diplomatiques pendant le temps susvise.

'*' hei mols places enlre parentheses se trouvent dans Toriginal. II faut supposer que deux varlante»
avaient ete pr^par^es d'avance et que par erreur elles ont ^t^ inser^es toules les deux dans la note.

^ 214 —

Le 10-2 3 juHlet a. c. le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie a Belgrade presenta au Mmistre
Presi(!ent serbe line note ou le Gouvernement serbe etait accuse d'avoir favoris^ le mouvG-
ment panseibe qui avail abouti a I'assassinat de Theritier du trone austro-hongrois. En conse-
quence rAutriche-Hongric demandait an Gouvernement serbe non seulement de condamner
sous une forme solennelie la susdite propagande, nnais aussi de prendre, sous le controle de
rAutriclie-Hongrie , une serie de mesures tendanta la decouverte du complot, a la punilion
des sujels serbes y ayant participe el a ia prevention dans I'avenir de lout attentat sur le sol
du Royaume. Un d61ni de quarante-huit heures fut fixe au Gouvernement serbe pour la
reponse a la susdite note.

Le Gouvernement imperial , auquel I'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie a Saint-Petersboui'g
avail communique le texte de la note dix-sept heures apres sa remise a Belgrade , ayant pris con-
naissance des demandes y contenues, dut s'apercevoir que quelques-unes parmi elles etaient
inexecutables quant au fond , tandis que d'autres etaient presentees sous une forme incompa-
tible avec la dignite d'un etat independant. Trouvant inadmissibles la diminution de la
dignite de la Serbie, conlenue dans ees demandes, ainsi que la tendance de TAutriche-
Hongrie d'assurer sa preponderance dans les Balkans demon tree par ces memes exigences,
le Gouvernement russe fit observer dans la forme la plus amicale i I'Autriche-Hongrie qu'il
serait desirable de soumettre a un nouvei examen les points contenus dans la note austro-
hongroise. Le Gouvernement auslro-hongrois ne cnitpas possible de consentir a une discussion
de la note. L'action moderatrice des autres Puissances k Vienne ne fut non plus couronneo
de succes.

Malgre que la Serbie eiit reprouve le crime el se fiit montree prete a donner satisfaction a
I'Autriche dans une mesure qui depassat les provisions non seulement de la Russie, mais aussi
des autros Puissances, le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie k Belgrade jugea la reponse serb*
insuffisanle el quitta cette ville.

Reconnaissant le caractere exagere des demandes presentees par TAutriche, la Russie
avail declare encore auparavant qu'il lui serait impossible de rester indilferente , sans se
refuser totitefois a employer tous ses efiorts pour trouver une issue pacifique qui fut accep-
table pour TAutriche el menageat son amour-propre de grande puissance. En meme temps
la Russie etablit fermement quelle admettait une solution pacifique de ia question seulement
dans une mesure qui n'impliquerait pas la diminution de la dignite de la Serbie comme Etat
independant. Malheureusement tous les efforts deployes par le Gouvernement imperial dans
cetle direction resterent sans effet. Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois, apres s'etre derobo
a toute intervention conciliatrice des Puissances dans son conflit avec la Serbie , proceda h
la mobilisation, declara ofTiciellement la guerre k la Serbie, el le jour suivant, Belgrade fut
bombardee. Le manifeste qui a accompagn6 la declaration de guerre accuse ouvertement la
Serbie d'avoir prepare et execute le crime de Sai'ajevo. Une pareille accusation d'un crime de
droit commun lancee contre tout un peuple et toutun Etat attira a la Serbie par son inanite
Ovidente les larges sympathies des cercles de la societe europeenne.

A la suite de cette maniere d'agir du Gouvernement austro-hongrois, malgrO la declara-
tion de la Russie quelle ne pourrait rester indifferente au sort de la Serbie, le Gouveine-
menl imperial jugea necessairc d'ordonner la mobilisation des circonscriptions mililaires de
Kiew, d'Odessa, de JMoscou et de Kazan. Une telle decision s'imposait parce que depuis la
date de la remise de la note austro-hongroise au Gouvernement serbe et les premieres
demarches, de la Riusie cinq joiii's s'Otaient ecoules, et cependant le Cabinet de Vienne
n'avait fait aucun pas pour aller au-devant de nos efforts pacifiques;. au contraire la mobili-
sation de la moiti6 de farmOe austro-hongroise avail ete decrOtOe.

Le GouvememieDX allemand fut mis au com-ant des mesures prises jiar la Russie; ii lui

— 215 —
flit en in^me temps expliqu^ queiles n'^taient que la consequence des arniemenls autri-
chiens et nullement dingoes centre I'AUemagne. En mime temps, ie Gouverncment imp^
rial declara que la Russie etait prdlc ;\ continucr hs pourparlers en vue d'une solution paci-
fique jdu conflit, soit par la voie de n^gociations direcles avec le Cabinet de Vienne, soit, en
auivant la proposition de la Grande-Bretagne, par la voie d'une Conference des quatre
grandes Puissances nan int^ressees directement,. voire TAngleterre, la France, I'AUemagne
et ritalie.

Cependant cette tentative de la Russie ^choua ^galement. L'Autriche-Hongrie declina un
echange de vues ult^rieur avec nous, et le Cabinet de Vienne se d^roba a la participation h
la Conference des Puissances projetee.

Neanmoins, la Russie ne discontinua pas ses efforts en faveiir de la paix. R^pondant k la
question de rAHemagne, a queiles conditions nous consentirions encore k suspendre nos
armements, le Ministre des Affaires ^trangeres d^clara que c6s conditions seraient la recon-
naissance par I'Autriche-Hongrie que la question austro-serbe avail revetu le caractere d'une
question europeenne, et la declaration de cette meme Puissance quelle consentait k ne pas
insister sur des demandes incompatibles avec les droits souverains de la Serbie.

La proposition de la Russie fut jug^e par I'Allemagne inacceptable pour TAutriche-Hon-
grie. Simultan^ment on re9ut a Saint -P^tersbourg la nouvelle de la proclamation de la
mobilisation gen^rale par I'Autriche-Hongrie.

En mime temps les hostilit^s continuaient sur le territoire serbe et Belgrade fut bom-
bardee derechef.

L'insucces de nos propositions nous obligea d'elargir les mesures de precautions mili^
taires.

Le Cabinet de Berlin nous ayant adress6 une question a ce sujet, il lui fut r^pondu que la
Russie etait forcee de commencer ses armements pour se pr^munir centre toutes eventua-
liies.

Tout en prenant cette niesure de precaution , la Russie n'en discontinuait pas moins de
recherchdr de toutes ses forces une issue de cette situation et declara ^tre prMe k accepter
tout moyen de solution du conflit qui comporterait I'observation des conditions posees par
nous.

Malgre cette communication conciliante , le Gouvernement allemand, le i8/3i juillet,
adressa au Gouvernement russe la demande d'avoir a suspendre ses mesures militaires a
midi du 19 juillet/i* aoAt, en menacant, dans le cas contraire, de proceder k une mobili-
sation gen^rale.

Le lendemain, 19 juiUet/i* aoiit, I'Ambassadeur d'AHemagne transmit au Ministre des
Affaires etrangeres, au nom de son Gouvernement, la declaration de guerre.

Sazonofp.

r 78.
Le MiNiSTRfi DES Affaires i^trang^ires

aux Representants de S. M. TEmpereur k i'etranger. ,

[telegram ME.)

SaintPetersbouTg, le 20 juille^2 aoiHt igid-

11 est abeolument clair que I'Memagne s'efforce des k present de rejeter sur nous la res-
ponsabilite de la rupture. Notre mobilisation a ^te provoqu^e par I'^norme responsabilit^

-- 216 —
que nous aurions assumee, si nous navions pas pris toutes les mesures de precaution A un
moment ou I'Aulriche , se bornant k des pourparlers d'un caractere dilatoire , bombardait
Belgrade et procedait k une mobilisation gen^rale.

Sa Majeste I'Empereur s etait engagee vis-a-vis de i'Empereur d'AUemagne par sa parole a
n'entreprendre aucun acta agressif tant que dureraient les pourparlers avec TAutriche. Apres
une telle garantie et apres toutes les preuves de I'amour de ia Russie pour la paix, I'Alle-
magne ne pouvait ni n'avait le droit de douter denotre declaration, que nous accepterions
avec joie toute issue pacifique compatible avec la dignite et I'independance de la Serbie. Une
autre issue, tout en ^tant completement incompatible avec notre propre dignite aurait cer-
tainement ^branle lequilibre europ^en , en assurant Th^g^monie de I'Allemagne. Ce carac-
tere europeen, voire mondial, du conflit est infiniment plus important que le pretexte qui
la cr6e. Par sa decision de nous declarer la guerre a un moment ou se poursuivaient les
n^gociations entre les Puissances, I'Allemagne a assum^ une lourde responsabiiite.

Sazonofp.

i)mf fc^riff mi> ZttmftMe

Sim 28. 3«ni b. % ijl bet oficrrcic^ifd^.unganfc^c .^^^ronfolgcr tr^i^crjog^
f^tatij f^erbinanb unb [eine ®ema[}lm, bic ^crjogiu bon ^ol)tnhtxQ burd^ SRcDolber*
fc^iip bc§ 9)iitglieb§ ciner ferbifc^eu Scrj'c^njoterbanbc nicbergcjltedft njorben. ^ic Hnter.-
fuelling beg 53ct6rec^en§ burcf) bic opcrrcic^ifc^-ungaiifcl^cn Sc^orben ^at crgc6en, ha^ ba3
^omptott gegeii ha^ Co6cn be3 Gq^erjog-^^ronfoJgerS in 23c(grab untet 9}lith)irfung
amtlic^er ferbifdbcr ^erfonen borbereitct unb gcf 5rbert, mit SBaffen ou§ ben jtaatlic^cn
ferbi[d}cn ©epotg auggcfuC)rt wurbe. ^ic§ 5}ecbrc£§en mufjic ber ganjen jiDilifiettcn
Sclt bic Slugctt offncn, nic^t nnr iiber bic gcgcn ben 53c[1:anb unb bic ^wt^QT^i^^
ber ojlcttcic^ifc^'ungarifc^en SDiouarc^ic gct;i(f)tctcn giclc ber fcrbi[c^en ^olitif, fonbern
mdi) iiber bic t)erbrcc^crifc^cn Wliiid, bic bic grofferbifc^c ^ropaganba in ©crbicn
jur ^rteid^ung biefcr giete an^uwenben jtc^ nic^t fd^cute. ^a§ Snbjicl bicfcr
^olitiE tear bic aO[ma[}(icL)e Dieootutionierung unb fd)(ie^li(^c SoStrcnnung
ber fiibofllic^en ®ebiet§tei(c ber ojierrcic^ifd^'Ungarifc^en 9}ionarc^ie unb i^rc
Sereinigung mit ©crbien. Sin bie[er SHic^tung ber ferbi[rf)en ^olitif. ^aben bie
n)ieber^o[ten unb. feicrlicfien Srflarungen, in bcnen ©erbicn Oj^erreid^'Ungam ^i^tn'
liber bie 5lbfe^r t)on biefer ^olitit uv.b bic ^{lege gutcr nac^barlid^er ^esie^imgcn
gelobt ^at, nic^t ha^ gcringjle geanbert. gum britten SRole im Caufe ber ie|ten
fec^g ^af)xt fu[)rt ©evbicn auf biefc ffieifc Guropa an ben SRonb cineS 5BcIitrieg8.
g§ fonnte bie8 nur tun, loeil eg fir^ bei feinen 53e|lrcbungen burc^ Sftu^lanb gep^t
•glaubtc. ^ie ruffifc^c $olitif Yoai balb md) ben burd^ bic tiirEifd)e SHetJolution
J^crbcigefii^rtcn (Sreigniffcn beS '^a^u^ 1908 baran gegangen, eincn gegen ben ^ejtanb
ber 2:iLirfei gerid)tcten Sunb ber SalEanjlaaten unter feinem ^atronat gu begriinben.
<Dicfer ^Salfanbunb, bem eB im ^a^xt 1911 gelang, bie ^urfei ficgreic^ qu8 bcm
gropen^cil i^rer europdifd^en S3eft|ungen ju Derbrangcn, brac^ uber ber gragc ber
53cutet)erteilung in ftc^ jufnmmcn. ^ic ru[fi[c^e ^olitif . lief fic^ burd^ biefcn 9)li^'
crfol^ nid^t obfc^reden. 3" ^^^ 3^^^ ^^^ ruffifc^en ©taotgrndnncr foUtc cin neuet
Satfanbunb unter ru[ft[c§cm ^atronat entj^ct^en, bejfen ®pi|c fic^ nid}t mc^r-
gegen bic au8 bem 53alfan »eri»rdngte ^iirfei, fonbern gegen ben Sejlanb ber
Djtcrreic^ifc^'ungarifc^en 9]Ronorc^ic rid^tete. ^Dic 3^^^ ^(^^i ^o§ <Scrbien gcgcn bic
auf Soften ber ^Donaumonarc^ic ge^cnbe ginoerleibung SSo§nicn§ unb ber ^crjcgo*
toina bic im Ic|tcn Salfanfrieg crnjorbenen Sleile 3)iajebonien8 an Sulgartcn ab»
treten folltc.. gu biefem S3ct)ufc foffte Bulgaricn burc§ 3foticrung murbc gemod^t,
SRumanien burd^ einc mit §ilfc granfrcic^g untcrnommene ^ropaganba an SRuplanb
ge!ettet; ©crbicn auf SSpgnicn unb bic Serjcgottiina gen^icfen n^crben.

Xlntcr biefcn Umflanbcn mu|te i&jlerrcic^ fic^ fagen, ha^ c8 »cbct mit bet
tffiurbc nod^ mit ber ©elbftcr^altung ber SDlonarc^ic oercinbar ware, bem Slreibeit
Jenfeitg ber ©rcnje nod^ (anger tatenloS jujufe^en. . ^ic f. unb f, SRcgierung 6c?'
tiac^ric^tigte .un8 t>on biefcr 5luffajfung unb erbat unfcrc Slnfic^t. Slug Doffcm ^crjen

— 4 — .

fonntcn trir unfctcm 55unbc8gcnoffcn unfct SinbcrftanbniS mit fcinct (Sinfc^a^ung
ber ©ac^Iagc gcbcii unb i^m Dcr[i(f)ern, ba^ einc %ition, bic cr fiir notmcnbig
l^icltc, um bet gcgcn ben 55cflanb ber TD^onard^ie gcric^teten 53en)cgung
in Scrbicn tin Gnbe 511 macficn, imfcrc 53ifligung finbcn ttjurbe. 5Bit luarcu
un§ §icr6ei h)ot)[ bctru^t, baj3 ein etmaigcg friegeri[(^c§ 33orge^en Cjlerreic^-UngarnS
gcgen 8evDicn SRii^laub auf ben ^lan bringcn unb un§ [}icrmit uiiferer 5^unbc8«
pflic^t cntfprerf)cr.b in eincn 5^rieg Demicfcfn fonntc. 50ir fonnten abec in ber Sr*
fcnntnig bet oitafen ^ntei^effen Ojlcrvcic^'Ungarng, bic auf bcm Spicfc flanben, unferem
Sunbeggcncjfen n?cbcr 5U cincr mit fcincr SGurbc nic^t ju cereinbarenbcn 9^acl^gie6igfeit
ratcn noc^ auc^ i^m unferen ^eij^anb in biefem [d^rocrcn 5)^oinent oerfagcn. 2Bir fonnten
bic§ um fo iccnigcr, a[8 and) unferc ^ntercffen burd^ bie anbauernbc fcrbifc^c Su^t*
atbcit auf ha^ enipfinblici^j^c bebrof}t tt)arcn. Senn e§ ben 8erbcn mit 5RuJ3tanb§
unb granfreic^g ioiffe noc^ tanger geftattct gcblieben Ujarc, ben SScftanb ber ^Rac^bor*
monarchic ju gefd^rbcn, fo miirbc bic§ ben offma^Uc^en Sufammcnbruc^ £)jlerrcid)§
unb eine Untcrnjerfung beS gefaui ten (S(an)entum§ unter ruffifd^em (33cptcr jur ^ofgc
^aben, moburc^ bie ©tcUung ber germanifc^en iRaffe in S^iitteleuropa un^attbor
h)urbc. Gin moraiifcf) ge|d)ti>ac^tc§, burc^ ba^ 5^orbringcn beg ruffifc^cn \panf(an)i8mu§ ju*
fammenbrcc^cnbeg Ofterrcic^ tcdre fiir un8 fcin ^^unbeggcnoffc mc^r, mit bcm tt)ir rec^ncn
fonnten, unb auf ben mir un§ Dcrlaffen fonnten, wie njir eg angcfic^tg ber immcr
brof}cnbcr wcvbenben .^altung unferer ofilic^en unb tt)eft(irf)en SRac^barn miiffcn.
<ffiir lichen ba^er Cftcrreic^ ooilig freic ^axib in fciuer 3lftion gegcn ©crbicn. Sir
l^abcn an ben Sorbereitungen ba^u nid^t teiigcnommcn.

Cftcrreic^ ipd^ite ben ®eg, in einer 9iotc ber ferbifd)cn JRegicrung augfiii}r(ic^
ben burc^ bic Untcrfud^ung beg 3)^orbcg Don (5araien)o fcjtgejteUten unmittcibaren
3ufammcnl^ang jraifc^en bem Wloxbt unb ber t)on ber fcrbifc^en SRegicrung nic^t nut
gebu[beten, fonbcvn untcr|tii|tcn gro^ferbifc^en 53en)cgung barjufegcn unb Don i§r einc
boUjldnbige SlbflcUung biefcg ^rcibcng fon)ic ^cftrafung ber ©d^ulbigen ju forbern.
©leic^jcitig t)er(aiigtc6[lerrei!i)'Ungarn o(g (Marantic fiir bic Duvd[)fii^ruug beg ^crfa^rcng
^^ ^cilna^mc fciner Organc an ber Kntctfuc^ung auf ferbifc^em ©cbict unb befinitiuc
^^^ Sluffofung ber gcgen Ojterveir^'Ungarn n)ii^lenbcn gro^fcrbifrf^en 'Ceveine. 'Die f. u. f.
JRegicrung flelltc eine ^-zx^ oon 48 ©tunben jur bebingungglofcn 5tnna^mc i^rcr
gorbcrungen. 2)ic fcrbifc^e 9icgicrung l^at cinen ^ag nad^ Uberrcid[)ung bet
0|lcrTeidji[d)'Ungarifc^cn 5^otc bic SObbitifation begonncn. SUg noc^ Slblauf ber
grift bic ferbifc^c SRcgierung eine $lntrcort ertciltc, bic jmor in cinigen ^unftcn
bic SDiinfc^c 6ftcrrcid)'Ungarng erfuttte, im njcfentlid^en aber bcutlid^ bag S3e|lrebcn
erfcnncn tiep, buret) Serfd^leppung unb ncuc Ser^anbiungcn fid} ben gercd)tcn
Jorberungcn ber IJJlonarc^ic ju cntjic^cn, brac^ bicfc bic biplomatifd)en Sejic^ungcn
ju (Scrbien oSi, otjnc fid) auf mcitcrc Scr^anbiungen cinjutaffcn obct fid^
\)on fcrbifc^cn S3erfic^erungen l;in[}alten ju taffcn, bercn SIBcrt eg genugfam -— ju
fcincm ©c^abcn — fcnnt.

55on biefem Slngenblic! an befanb ji(^ feftcrreic^ tatfdc^(ic^ im ^ricggjuftdnbe
mit ©erbicn, ben c8 bonn nod) burc^ bic offijicdc ^rieggerftdrung »om 28. b.3)lt8,
offentHr^ prottainiertc.

53om crflcn Slnfang beg ^onfliftg an ^aben n?ir auf bem-^tanbpunft gejlanbcn,
ba^ eg fic^ ^ierbci um cine '^Ingcfcgcni^cit Ojtcrreic^g ^nnbeltC; bic eg affein mU

— 5 —

©evbicn jum Slu8trag ju Bringcn §a6cn h)urbc. 5Bir l^abcn ba^cr uufet ganjcS
Scflrebcn bnrauf geric{)tet, ben 5lricg ju Tofatifieren UHb bie nnbercn 3Jtdc^te bauon
311 iibcvjcugen, ba^ Ofierreic^'Ungarn in berec^tigtct 5Rotn)cbr unb burcf) bie 23er[}drtniffe
gcjttjungen fic^ $um Sipped an bie SBaffen r}abc entfc{)[icf,cn mu|[en. 5Bit l^obeu nad)*
briirflid^ ben ©tanbpunft uertretcn, ba^ feiu .^u(turf!aat bn8 9vecf)t ^abe, in biefcm
^ampf gegen Unfultur nnb politifc^c 5>etbrec^ermoral Oftcrrcic^ in ben 5lrm ju
fallen unb bie 8er6en i^rcr gcvec^tcn 8trafc ju cnt3ic[}en. 3" ^ic[eni ©innc ^aben
n)it unferc S3crtrcter im 2lu§lanb inflruieit. ^

®(eid)5eitig tei(tc bie Ofterrcid}ifd)4lngarif(^c JKcgierung bcr 9\u[fif(^cn mit, ^^B^^^^^
ber Pon i^r 6ei (Ecr6ien unternommene S>rf)fitt (ebiglicf) eine bcfciifiDc SJ^a^regct gcgen« ^^^n^
ubet ben [erbifc^en 5Bii^(eveicn jum 3ie(c ^q6c, ba^ abcr Oflericic^ ♦ Ungarn notgc*
brungen ©nrantien fiir cin meitere^ freunbfc^aftUdieS SSer^alten ®erbicn3 Hx
SJionarc^ie gcgcnuber ocrlange. G§ liege ,£)j^etrei(^=Ungarn gdnjlic^ fern, ctoa einc
5?et|"(^ie6ung ber 3)iac^tDer^Q[tni[[e auf bem SSalfan (}er6cijufiiljrcn. 3lnf unfere Gr*
ffdrung, ba^ bie -Deutfc^e 9iegierung bie Cofalifierung beg ^onfliftS miinfc^c unb et-
jltebe, iDurbe fomo^t Don ber granjofifc^en qI§ ber (Englifc^en JRegicrung einc ffiir*
fung in bem glcic^en 6innc jugcfagt. ®ie[en SSeftrebungen gclang e§ inbeffcn
nic^t, cine ginmifc^ung JRu^lanb§ in bie 6fterveid}i[c^'fer6ifd}c 2lu§cinanber[e^ung ju
Pcr^inbern.

T)ic SRuffifc^c ^Rcgierung erlicfj am 24. ^uli ein. amt(id)e§ Communique, njo*
mdi) Diu^tanb unmoglirf) in bem [evbifd)'6fterrcid)ifd;cn 5lonflift inbifferent bleiben
fimnte. ©q§ glcic^e erflartc ber ru|"ft[c^e 9}^inijler be§ Slugmdrtigcn, ^err
©affonom, bem Caiferfic^en 58ot[c^Qfter ©rafen <Pourta(eg. Sim !Rac^mittag
be§ 26. 3uli lie^ bie t u. f. 3Regierung a6ermal§ burc^ i^rcu ^otfd^after in
(St. Petersburg crfldren, oa§ Ojlerreic^'Ungarn feinerlei gro6erung§pldne ^abt
unb nur enblic^ an feineu ©renjen 9lu^e §a6en tvoHc. 3'" ^^^if^ ^^^ glcic^en
^ageS gclongten inbc§ bcreit§ bie crj^en SJiclbungcn iiber ruffifc^e 3]Robi(mac^ungen s^^^
nod) Berlin. SRoc^ am 26. abenbg njurben bie Caiferlic^en SSotfc^after in Conbon,
^ariS unb Petersburg angemiefen, 6ei ben JRegierungen Gnglanbg, granfreic^§ unb
Slu^lanbS energi[c^ auf bie ©efa^r biefer ruffifc^cn ^ERobiltfierungen ^iujunjeifen.
5Rac^bem Ojlerreic^'Ungarn JRu^lanb offijietl erlldrt ^abc, ba^'cS feinen tcrritorialen
©erninn in (Serbien anflrcbe, liege bie (Entfc^eibung ubcr ben SBettfrieben au8'
fc^lie^lic^ in ^Petersburg. 9ioc^ am gleic^cn ^agc h3urbe ber Caiferlic^c ^otfc^aftcr*
in ©t. Petersburg angcmiefen, ber SRuffifc^cn 3Regierung ju erfldren:

53orbereitcnbe militdrifc^e SOk^nal^men 5Ru|lanbS merben unS ju
©egenma^regetn gtt)ingen, bie in ber S}^obilifierung ber Slrmee befte^en
miiffen. "Die ^^obilificrung aber bcbeutet ben Cricg. ^a unS granfreid^S
S3erpflid)tungen gegeniiber 5Ru^tanb befannt ftnb, njurbe biefe 9}^obili»
fierung gegen JRu^lanb unb ^ranfreic^ ^ugteic^ geric^tet fein. ffiir
fonnen nic^t onne^mcn, ba^ SRu^lanb eincn folc^en europdifc^cn Crieg
entfejfeln will. ^a Ojterrcic^ » Ungarn ben Sejtanb beS ferbifc^cn
C6nigrcic^§ nic^t antajlen toitl, fmb ttjir ber Slnfidit, ha^ SRu^lanb cine
abttjartenbe ©teHung einne^mcn fann. ®en 5Sun[c^ giiu^lanbS, ben
SSejlanb -btS ferbifc^en Conigreid^S nic^t in ^xa^i jtellen in laffen, iverben
to.it urn fo c^er unterjlu^cn fonncn; atS Ojlcrrcic^'Ungattt biefen 53e|tattb

— 6 —

gar nid^t in ^ragc jlefft. (S8 mirb leic^t fein, im »citercn Scrtauf bet
Slngctcgcn^cit tie Sofi§ cinet Serjtaubigang ju finbcn.

Sim 27. 3uli erf [arte bcr ruffifc^c ^rieg§minij^er ©fuc^omlinom bcm beutfd^cit
©iititarottac^e c^rcntoortUc^, ta^ noc^ feine S)^o6i(maci^ung8orbrc ergangen [ei. 6§
Itiirben kbiglic^ SSorbereitungSniafregeln gctrof[cn, fein ^fcrb au§ge^o6cn, fein SRe*
feroifl eingcjogcn. 2Benn Opcrreic^'Ungarn bic fcrbifc^c ©rcnje iiberfc^tcite, wiirben bic
auf Ojtcrreic^ geric^teten S}^i(itatbejirfc ^ien), Obeffa, tSRoSfau, ^afan mobilifiert. Unter
feinen Umjldnben bic an bet beutfc^en gront liegenben: Petersburg, 9Citna unb
SBarfd^QU. 5luf bie ^rage beS 9Jiilitarattac^e8, 5U n?elc^em gn^ccfe bie SDlobit-
mad^ung gegen Sbj^erreic^'Ungarn erf olge, autwortete ber ruffifd^e ^rieg§mini|ler mit Slc^fel'
jucfen unb bcm i3in^ci§ Q"? ^ie T^i|)tomQten T)er n}U(itdrQttac^e be^cic^nctc barauf
bie SJ^obifmac^unggma^ual^men gegen Ojlcrreic^-Ungarn a[§ and) fiir ^eutfc^[anb^6c^|l
bebro^Cic^. 3" ^^" barauf folgcnben 5:agen fotgten f\d) bic 9kd)ric^tcn iibcr ruffifc^c
S)iobilifierungen in fd^netTcm ^empo. Unter bie[en tt)aren auc^ 9tac^ric^ten'
fiber Sorbereitungen nn ber beutfc^en ©rcn^c, fo bie 23er§angung be§ ^rieg§»
jujtanbeS fiber ^on^no unb ber Slbmarfc^ bcr 2Bar[(^auer ©arnifon, Serftdrfung bet
©arnifon SltcjanbroiDO. 5lm 27. ^uti trofen bie erj^ert 5)lelbungcn fiber borbcrcitenbe
SJ^a^nal^men auc^ granfrcic§§ cin. ©a8 14. ^oxp^ bxad) bie 9}ian6t)er ah unb
fe^rtc in bic ©arnifon jurucf.

^njttjifc^cn jtnb h)ir bemfi^t gcblieben, burc^ nac^brucflid^jTe Sinwirfung nuf;
tie ^abinettc cine Sofolijierung bc8 ^onfliftS bur(^3u[e^en.

Sim 26, ^otte ©ir (Sbtuarb ®re^ ben ^orfc^lag gemac^t, bie ©ifferen^en
jtoifc^cn 6j^errei(^'Ungarn unb 6erbien ciner unter feinem S3orfi| tagcnben S^onfercnj
bet 53ot[c^after ©eutfd)[anb8, ^ranfreic^S unb 3^^^^^"^ 3" unterbreitcn. 3" ^i^f^ni
^Jorfc^fag ^aben mit erfldrt, h)ir fonnten un8, fo fe^r toil feine ^cnbenj bittigtcn^
an cinet betartigen ^onferen^ nic^t beteiligcn, ha mx Ojlerreic^ in fciner Slu8cinanbw*^
fe^ung mit 8erbien nic^t Dot ein europdifcfje^ (Serid^t jiticrcn fonnten.

f^ranftcic^ i^ai bcm SSorfd^lag 8ir (Ebnjarb ®rep jugeftimmt, et ift jeboc^
fc^lie|(ic^ baran gefc^eitett, ha^ Ojletteid^ fid^ i^m gegenubet, mt t)Drau§jufe^en, ab«|
(e^nenb oer^ielt.

©ctreu unferem ©runbfa^, ba^ cine S3ermittelung8oftion firf) nic^t auf ben febig*'
lic^ cine ojtcrrcic^ifc^-ungarifc^e Slnge(egenE)cit bnrflcKcnbcn oj^erreicbifc^'fcrbifc^cn ^on^
fiift, fonbern nur auf ha^ 53cr^d(tnig 3n)i)d)cn Oftcrreirb'Ungarn unb 9iu^lanb be3ie[)en
fonnte, [)aben n)ir unfere 5?emu()ungen f ortgcfe|t, cine 53er|tdnbigung ^mifc^en bicfen beiben
!!J?dd)ten ^erbeijuffi^ren. ffiir f)aben un8 abcr and) bereitgefunbcn, nac^ Slblc^nung
ber ^onferenjibec eincn iceitcren SSorfc^lag ©ir ©bmarb ©re^§ nad) 5Cicn ju fiber*
mitteln, inbcm er anrcgt, 6fterrcid)»Ungarn mod)tc fic^ ent[d)(icj3en, cntn}eber bie ferbifc^e
Slntttjort a[8 gcufigenb ju betrad)ten ober abcr al8 ®runb(age ffir njeiterc 5?cfpred)ungcn.
^ic Oftctrcic^ifcb'ungarifc^e !Kegicrimg bat unter ooUer ©firbigung unferer ocrmittelnben
^dtigfcit ju biefcm 55orfc^lag bemcrft, ba^ er nac^ Ciroffnung ber gcinbfcligfcitcn
ju fpdt fommc.

^ro|bcm ^aben xn'ix unfere 53crmitte(ung8oerfuc^e bi§ jum flu^erj^cn fovtgefc^t
Unb l^aben in 5Bien geraten, jebc§ mit ber ©urbe ber 9)ionarc^ie toercinbarc (Snt*
gcgenfommen ju jcigen. Ccibev fiub nttc biefe 53crmittclung8aftioncn oon ben mitt'

— 7 —

tarifd)cn ^orbeteitungcn 9f?u^ranb§ uub ^rauftci*^ u6frr)o{t TOoifbcn. 5lm 29.3"^
f)at bic 9iuffi[c6c DJcgtcrung in Berlin mntdc^ laitgetcilt, ha^ fic intx Sltmcebcsitfe
mobinficrt §abc. ©(cicbjeitig trafen wcitcrc "JD^elbungen u6er fdjnclt fortfc^rcitciibe
mifitdrifc^c 55or6ercitungen J^raufrcic^S ju ®affcr unb ju Canbc ein. $hi bcmfclbcn ^agc ^^^
^attc bcr Jiaiferlic^c <8ot[c^aftet in Petersburg ctue Unterrebung mit bcm ru[fi[d)eu ^^
3}^iniftcr bcS 2lu8n)artigcn, iibcr bic er tctcgrap^ifd^ ta^ golgcnbe beric^tcte:

»'t)cr 5Jiinif!cr uerfuc^te mic^ ju liberrcbcn, ba^ ic^ 6ci meiuer JRcgicrung bic
^cifna^mc an cincr S^onberfation ju oiercn befiirtuorten [otttc, urn Witttl au8'
finbig ju mac^en, auf freunb[c^aftnd)cm 5Bcge Oflerrcic^-Ungarn ^u 6crt)cgcn, bie*
jcnigen ^orbcrungcn aufjugebcn, bie bie ©ouocranitdt ©crbieng antaflcn, 5"^ ^^^^i
inbem ic6 (ebig[id^ bie SCiebcrgabe bet Unterrebung jufagtc, mid^ aiif ben ©tanb-
punft gcftedt, baj) mir, nar^bem 9vu^(onb fic^ ju bent Der^dngni§DolIen ©c^rittc bet
9)bbi[mac§ung ent[d}(o|fen ijabt, jebcr ®ebanfenau§tau[c^ ^ieriiber fcl^r [c^tt)icrig, tocnti
nic^t unmogtic^ erfc^eine. ®a8 !Ku^[Qnb jc^t Don un8 Sj^errcid^'Ungarn geg^enubct
oerfange, fei bagfelbc, ma§ Oj^erreic^'Ungarn ©erbien gegcniiber Dorgcnjorfcn wcrbe: eincn
Singritf in ®out)erdnitdt3rec^te, 6flerrcic^»Ungarn §abc t)cr[proc^en, burc^ (Srfldrung

,feittc8 territoriaten 'Dcgintercffeinentg $Rucffic§t auf rufjtfc^c 3ntcrcjfen in ne[}men, ein
grofcS 3"9'^f^^nb"'^ fciteng cineg fricgfu^rcnben ©laatcg.^ SJlan [otttc ht^aib hit
'Doppetmonarc^ie i§rc $lnge(egcn^eit mit ©erbien attcin regc(n Tajfen. 68 hjetbe
bcim gricbenSfc^lu^ immer noc^ 2^[t fein, auf ©c^onung ber fcrbifc^en ©ouberdnitdt
jumcEjufommcn.

■!l)or 5lugen ju fiil^ren.

6§ iDar nic^t moglic^, ©afonoto Don bem ©ebanfen abjuSringcn, ba^.^crbicii .
Don 9lu^(anb |e|t nic^t im ©tid^ gctoffcn. njcrbcn biirfc«.

Sbenfaffg am 29. beric^tetc ber 9)li(itdrattac^e in Petersburg tefegrap^ifd^.
uber cine Unterrebung mit bcm ©eneraljlabSc^ef ber ruffifc^en Slrmce:

»Der ®cnera[ftab8cE)ef ^at mid^ ju fic^ bitten Caffen unb mir eroffnet, ha^ iS:
'Don, ©einer SJlaiejtdt [oebcn fomme. (Sr fei Dom ^rieggminijtcr beauftragt tt)orben;i;
mir noc^ma[§ ju bejldtigen, e§ fei atteS fo gebtieben, roie e§ mir Dor jnjci . S^agctt
ber ?D?ini|!er mitgeteirt ^abc. 6r bot mir fc^riftlid}e 53ejtdtigung an unb: gab .mii;,.
fein Sl^renlwort in feierlld^fter ^orm, ha^ nirgenbS einc 9)^obi[mac^ung, h.f), €in-*
jie^uug eineS ein^igen 9Jiannc8 ober ^ferbeS big jUr ©tunbe, 3 U^r nac§« '
mittagg, erfofgt fei. (Sr fonne ftcb bafiir fur bic 3wfii"ft ^W Derbiirgcn, abcr
h?o^[ nac^brudtic^fl befldtigcn, ha^ in ben gronten, bic auf unferc ©renjen ge*
rid^tet feinen, Don ©einer 9)laiejtdt fcine ?D^obiIificrung gettjunfc^t murbe. €8
ftnb aber ^ier iibcr crfotgtc Sin^icl^ung Don SRefcrDiftcn in Dcrfc^icbencn 3:cileri
beg JRcic^g, auc^ in SBarfc^au unb in SBitna, Dielfad)c 9iac^ric^tcn cingegangen. 3^
;§a6c be8§a(b bcm ©cncral Dorgc^altcn, baf ic^ burc^ bie mir Don i^m. gcmac^tca
groffnungen Dor ein 5Rdtfc( gejtetlt fei. Sluf OffijicrSparotc crtoibcrtc cr mir jeboc^.
ba^ folc^c 9lac^ric^ten unric^tig fcicn, e8 mogc §ic unb ba aO[cnfatt8 ein fa(fc|ct
iSllarm Doxlicgen.

— g —

3ci^ ntup ha^ ©cfprac^ in 5ln6ctracl^t bcr ^ofitiDcn, jo^lrelc^cli, u6ct ctfofgtt
©injie^ungeti uorlicgcnbeu 9Jacl^ricl^tcn alg cinen 5>erfut^ Bctrac^tcn, un8 u6er ben
Umfan^ bet big^crigen SRapna^mcn ivTCjufu^ren «;

■Da bic 9Ru[ft[c^c 9tegierung auf bic berfc^iebenen Slnfragen ubct bie ©runbc
i§i*er brof)enben ^altung bc^ ofteren baraiif §intt)ic§, ha^ 6flerreic^>llngaru noc^ feinc
^on&erfatiou in Petersburg bcgonncn f)abt, cr^ielt ber 6[terveid)i[c^'Ungavi[c§c 53ot[c^aftcr
in Petersburg om 29. 3uli ^wf unferc 5lnregung bie ffieifung, mit §errn ©af)onoiD
bie ^ontjerfation ju beginnen. ®raf ©^aparp ij^ crmdc^tigt morbcu; bie burti^ ben
53eginn ,be§ ^riegS^uJtanbeg allcrbingg iiber^olte Dtote an ©erbicn bcm ruffifd^en-
9)iinifier gegenuber ju erlduteni unb jebc Slnregung entgegen3unc[)men, bie t)on
rufjifd^et ©eite auS noc^ meiter crfolgeu fottte, fonjie mit ©affonoto aHe birctt bie
■ 5jlcrreic^i(^'ruffi[c^cn Se^ief^ungen tongierenbcn <}ragen 311 6efpred)en.

©clutter an 8cE)u(ter mit Sugfanb ^aben n)it uuauggefc^t an bet ^etmitte*
fung§a!tion fortgearbeitet unb jeben S3ot[c^[ag in 3Cien unterj^ii|t, toon bem tt)it bic
9)J6glic^fcit einet ftieblid^eu Cofung be§ 5!on|lift§ er^otfcn ju fonncn gfaubtcn.
Sir l^oben noc^ am 30. cinen engdfi-fien 33orfc^(ag nad^ Sien njeitergegeben, bet
ol§ SajtS bet SBet^anblungen auffteUte, ^fterteic^'Ungarn [oHe nac^ erfotgtem din*
matfc^ in (Setbien bott feinc 53ebingungcn biftieten. 3Cit mu^tcn anne^men, ha^
SRu^Ianb biefe S3ofi§ afjeptiercn teurbc.

Sa()teub in bet ^^it ^om 29. biS Bl.^ufi bicfc unfete ^Scmii^ungen urn
Setmitteiung, toon bet englifc^en Diplomatic untctf^u^t, mit ftei^cnbet Dtinglid^feit
fottgefu^rt wurben, famen immet crneute unb fid) ^dufcnbc 5)^e(bungeu ubet tuj'fifc^e
!S^o6i(ifietung§mn§nal^men. ^ruppenanfammtungen an bet oftptcupfcfien ©rcnjc, bie
SSet^angung beg ^tiegg3uj!anbeg iibet famtlic^e n^ic^tigen ^[d^e bet tuffifc^cn ffiefl'
gtenje He^en fcinen 3^cifel nie^t batan, ba^ bie tuf|i[d)e 3J?o6i(ijietung and) gegen
un§ in toollem ©ange wat, n?d^renb gleic^^eitig unfctem 53ertrctet in ^ctetSburg
aHc bctattigen 9)k^tcgcln etncut c^rcnnjortQc^ abgeteugnet njutben. ^lod) c^e
bic 2C>ienct ^Intnjott auf ben te^ten englifc^.beutfi-^cn 33etmitte[ung8Dotfc|[ag, bcjfen
^enbcnj unb ©tunblagc in ^etetgbutg bcfannt genjefen fein mu^tCj. in Settin
einttcffen fonnte, otbnctc JKu^lanb bie affgemeinc 5)b6i[marf)ung an. 3" ^^^ gteid^en
^agen fanb jujifc^en 8einet 9J^ajejtdt bem i^aifet unb ^onig unb bem %aitn
9^ifo(aug ein ^ctegtammmec^fcr jlatt, in bem ©cine 2)^a)cj^dt ben 2^xm ouf htn
4ih^i^' bto^enbcn (E^ataftet bet tuffifd)cn 9J^obi(mac^ung unb bie gottbauct feinet eigencn
toetmittedibcn ^dtigfeit aufmetffam mac^tc.

»3c^ feanfe Dit toon ^ctjcn fiit Deinc 53etmitt(ung, bic cine ipoffnung aufleuc^ten
ia^i, ha^ boc^ noc^ atteS ftieblic^ enben fonnte. (£g ijt tcc^nifc^ unmoglid;, unfete
militdtifc^cn 53orbercitungen einjuftelten, bie burc^ 6petreid^§ SJlobilifietung notwenbig
getootben fmb. 2Cit fmb n?eit batoon entfetnt, cinen ^tieg ju tt)unfc§en. .©olangc
itoic bic 5Jet^anbrungen mit Oj^etteid^ iibet ©ctbien anbauetn, hjctben meine ^tuppen
feinc ^ctaugfotbetnbc Slftion untetne^mcn. 3^ 9^^^ ®i^ *"c^" feietUc^eg 2Cott batauf.
^d) Dctttauc mit allet ^raft auf ©otteg Qinabe unb i)offe auf ben (£tfoIg Deiner
93etmittlung in SBieu fiit bic ®o(}lfa^tt unferet Cdnbet unb ben ^^ticben SutopaS.

Dcin Dit ^ctjlic^ etgcbencr
9^ico(aug.<

— 9 —

5JJit bicfcm ^c(cgramm bc8 '^axm frcujtc [i(t [olgcubcg c6cn[all^ (jm 31. ^\i\\
urn 2- U^r p.m. abgefanbteg ^cfegramm (Seiner 'l^^ajejltat be8 i^nifevS:

»Sluf ^cincn 5lppe(l on 5}Jeinc ^reunbfc^nft uub T)eiuc 55itte urn 5}ieluc ."oilfc
§a6e icE) eine S3crmitte(ung8afHon 5ix)i[rf)cu ©cincr unb bcr 6fieiTcic^il'd)'llngnrifif>cii
$Regicrung aufgenommcn. 2Ba[)rcnb biefe ?lfticii im @angc tuar, fiiib T^einc ^vuppcu
gegen ba§ mir Dcrbunbete Oj^crreid)4lngavn mobilifiert morben, luobuvc^, trie 3^) *55i^
[d^on mitgeteid ^abe, 5]^cinc 53ermittc[ung bcina^c ittuforifc^ gcmad)t luovbeii i[l.
3:ro|5bem [)abe 5<f) fi^ fottgefe|t. 9hinme^v erl^artc ^"^ jtiUcrlnffigc 9kcbvic^ten liDcv
ernp:e ^triegSOorbereitungcn and) an Wlmm ojllic^en ©rcnje. ^ie 53erantwortiiug
fur bic (Siid)erf)eit 9}icineg 9fieid}eg jmingt !!)iid) ^u befenfiDcn ©cgenma^rcgeln. ^"^
bin mit tO^cinen ^emii^ungen urn bic (Sr[)aftung be§ 5Be(tfriebcn8 bi3 an bic aufjcrfle
©renjc bc§ moglid^en gegangcti. D^ic^t 3<i) ttagc bie ^^erantmortuug fiir ba§ Unt)ei(,
ha^ je|t ber ganjcn jiDilifierten 5Bc(t bro^t. 5Roc^ in bicfcm Jtugcnblictc liegt eg in
Dcincr 5>anb, eg ab^^umenben. 9^iemanb bcbro^t bic d^rc unb 3)^ad)t JRufjfanbg,
bag n.'io^l auf ben (Svfotg 5)^cincr S3eriuitte[ung ^citte n^artcn fonnen. T)ic "iD^it
t)on SD^einem ©vo^Datet auf bent ^otcnbettc uberfotninenc J^reunbfc^aft fiir T)ic^
unb ^cin 9fieic^ ijl Wiz intmcr ^eilig genjcfcn, unb ^d) i)abt treu ju $Ru§[anb
gef^anben, n)enn c§ in fc^merct S3ebrdngni§ n^ar, befonbetS in fcinem lc|ten
^riegc. ^er ^mht (Europag fann t)on ^ir nod) je^t erl)a(tcn roerbcn, menn SRu|»
(anb fid^ cntfd}(ie(3t, bic niititdrifd^cn 5Jia^na§men einjujUellcn, bic Deutfc^tanb unb
6fterrcid)'llngartt bebro^cn. «

'^od) c^c bieg ^ctegramnt feinc Scjlimntung crreicfitc, n^at bic bereitg am 53ot'
mittag bcgfclbcn ^ageg angcorbnete, offenfic^tlic^ gegcn ung gcric^tctc, 9Kobi(iftcvung
bcr gcfamtcn rufftfd^en Streitfrdftc in Dollem ®ange, ^a8 ^etegramm beg '^aitn
aber loar um 2 H§r nad^mittagg aufgegcbcn.

S^ac^ "iBcfanntttierben ber ruffifd)en ®cfamtntobi(ifation in 53er(in cr^ictt am
?Rad^mittag beg 31. 3"^^ ^^^ ^aifer(id)c 5?Dtfd)after in ^ctcrgburg ben S3efe[)(
SRuffifd^en 3Rcgierung gu eroffncn, ^eutfd^lanb l^abc a[g ®cgenma§regel gegcn bic aff*
gcincine ^JJiobilifierung ber ruffifcbcn Slrmec unb <}(ottc ben ^ricggjujlanb tjcrfiinbct,
bem bic ^Jlobitifation fo[gcn miiffe, njcnn JKu^fanb nic^t binncn 12 ©tunben feinc
mifitdrifc^en 9}^a§na^tnen gegen ^cutfc^lanb unb 6[lerreid)»Ungarn cinfteUe unb ^cutfc^*
(anb bat)on in ^enntnig fc^e.

©leic^jcitig n>urbc ber ^aifcrlir^c 5?otfc^after in ^arig angcwicfen, t)on bcr
gran36fifc^cn JHegierung binncn 18 8tunben cine (Srfldruiig ju t^crfangcn, ob fic in
eincm ruffifc^>beutfd)en ^riegc neutral blciben tt)offc.

©ic 9?ufftfc^c JRcgicrung f)at burc^ il^rc bic ©ic^er^cit beg 9lcic^g gcfd^rbcnbc
9J^obi(maci^ung bic mii^famc SScrmittetunggarbcit bcr europdifc^cn ®taatgfan3(cicn furj
t)or bem Srfotge jerfc^tagcn. ©ie SJiobilifierunggma^regcln, fiber bercn ^rnfl bcr
SRuffifc^cn SKegicrung oon Slnfang an feinc gtocifet gcfaffen tDurbcn, in SScrbinbuitg
ihit i^rer fortgefe|tcn Slblcugnung ^eigcn flar, ba^ $Ru0[onb ben ^ricg iDoCtc.

^Dcr ^aiferlic^c ^Sotfc^after in ^etergburg i)ai bic i^m aufgctragenc 5)^ittci(ung
an Qtxxn (Safonon) am 31. ^^ili utn 12 ll^r nad^tg gemad)t.

(£inc 5lntaiort ber 3Ruffifc^en JRcgicrung ^ierauf f)at ung nic crrcic^t.

2 8tunben nad) Slbtauf ber in biefer 3}Jittcilung gcjleUten (^jrijl l^at bcr '^aXu
an j8cinc tDlajcjldt ben ^aifcr telcgrap^icrt:

— 10

•^di) ^aht <Dciu 3:cfegramm cr^aftcn, tc6 ucrflc^c, ba^ <Du gcjtpuitgcn 6i|l,
ino6i( ju madden, abet ic^ moc^tc Don ^ir biefe(6c ©arantie f)abtn, bic ic^ ^it gc*
•geBcit ^abc, ndintic^, ha^ bicfc 9)k§na^incn nicf)t ^ricg 6cbcutcn unb ba^ mir fort*
fa^rcn njcrben, ju ucrf)nnbe[n, jum §cUc unfcrct bciben Cdnbcr unb be§ allgemcincn
griebcng, bcr unfcrcn ^crjcn fo tcuer ifl. Unferer tangbcn)a[)rten 3reunb[c[)aft mu^
c§ mit ®otte§ ipiffc flcfinQ^"; ^lutDcrgicpcn ju »er§inbcrn. Ciringcnb enoattc ic^
DoH SJertraucn ^cinc Slntn^ort*

^'^dcf hank ^ir fur ^cin ^cCcgtamm, ic^ f)abt "Deincr 3Rcgictung gcflctn
ben ®eg angegcben, burc^ ben attein noc^ bcr ^ricg Dcrmicben n?erben fann. 06'
tt)o^[ id) urn. einc Slntroott fiir Beute mittag erfud^t f)attt, f)at m'xd) 6i8 jc|t noc^ fein
3^c(egramm 3}ieine§ 53ot[d)after§ mit cincc 5lntroort Deinet 5Regierung crreid^t. 3"^
bin ba^ct gc^iuungen toorbcn, meinc 5lrmec ju mobilifiercn. Sine fofortigc ftatc unb
unmi^oerftdnblic^e Slntwort Reiner JRegictung ijl bet cinjigc SDeg, urn enb(o[c8 (g(enb
ju uetmeiben. 5^i§ ic^ bicfc 5lntn30tt er^altcn ^abe, bin ic^ ju meiner 23ettubnig hic^t
in bcr Cage, au^ ben ©cgcnflanb T'cincS ^cfegtammS ein3ugc^en. "^d) mu^ ouf ha^
etnjlcfie bon <Dit Dcrfangen, baf ^u unoetjug(irf) ^einen ^tuppen ben 53efe^[ gibjl,
untet feinen Umfldnbcn and) nut bic leifeflc 53ct(e^ung unfcici ©tenjen ju bege^en.«

©a bic SRu^tonb gcflcCtc O^ijl »ct|ltirf)cn tt)ar, o^nc ba| cine Slntmott
.Quf unfete 5lnftagc eingegangen tt)dtc, f)at (Seine S)kiej^dt bet ^aifet unb ^onig
am 1 . Slugujl urn 5 U^t p. m. bic 3)Jobitmac^ung bc§ gefamten bcutfd^en ^ttu^
unb bet ^aifctlic^en tJJiatine befo^Un. ^et ^oifcrlic^c SSotfd^after in ^Petersburg
\:)aik injnjifc^en ben 5lu[trag er§o[ten, faffs bie JRuffifc^c 3f?cgictung tnnet^atb feet
il^t ge|tcllten ^^rifl feine beftiebigenbc Slntttiott ettciten rcutbc, i^t ju etfldten, ha^
tok md) 9lbre^nung unfetet gotb^tung un8 a(8 im ^tieggjuflanb bcfinblid^ bettac^tcn.
(E§e jcboc^ cine 3)^elbung iibet bic 5lu8fu^tung bic[e8 51ufttage8 cinlief, ubetfd^tittcn
ruffifc^e 2;ruppcn, unb jwar [c^on am 9kc^mittag be§ l.SIugujl, a[fo bcgfclbcn ^ad)*
mittagS, an bcm bag eben ertt)d^ntc ^cfegramm bc8 '^axtn abgcfanbt tear, unfete
©renjc unb tucften auf beutfd^cm ©cbiet Dot.

ioiermit i}at SRu^tanb ben 5hieg gcgen un8 bcgonncn.

3njn)ifc^cn ^atte bcr iVaifcrlidjc Sotfc^aftet in ^ati§ bie il^m befo^lcnc Sin*
ftage an bag ftanjofifc^c ^abinett am 31. ^u^i «»« 7 U^t nac^mittagg gcj^eUti

^et ftanjojifc^e 5}iinijletptdfibcnt f^at batauf am 1. Slugufl urn 1 U^t nad^
mittagg cine jrocibeutige unb unbeftiebigenbe Slntmott cttci(t, bic ubet bie ©teCung'
na[)mc (^ranftcic^g fein f[ateg ^BiJb gibt, ba et jic^ batauf befc^rdnfte, jU ctftdtcn,
(}tanftcic^ routbc bag tun, mag feinc 3"^f^f|[f« i^ni- gebotcn. , ®cnige ©tunben
batauf, urn 5 U^t nac^mittagg, mutbe bie 3Jtobilifietung bet gefamten ftanjofifc^cn
?ltmee unb glotte angeotbnet.

Sim 3Kotgen beg ndc^jlen $ageg etoffncte gtanftcic^ bie Jcinbfcligfeitw,:^

Slbgefc^loffcn am 2. Slugujl mittog^.

11 —

Xloviibeutfd^c ^Ugemeine 3dfuncf.

25. Suit 1914»

t>ic note (Dtlerreict)'i(n^arn0 art Serbien.

S3ctan, ben 24. ^uti,

6 U^r bet ferbi[c^en SHcgictung einc 5Jer6a-htote mit bcu gotbcrungcn bet

oflcrreic^ifc^'UngaTifc^cn 5Regietung. • ^n bet 9iotc mrb bic Slnttuort 6i8

Sim 81. Wlati 1909 bat ber ^oniglic^ ©crbifcbe ©cfanbte am ©iener ^ofe
tm, Sluftrage [eincr JRegierung bet ^ai[ertic^eii unb ^oniglic^en JRegierung fofgenbc
(Srfldrung abgcgeben: »®cr6ien anctfcnnt, bQ§. e§ burc§ bic in 53o8nien gefc^affcnc
^atfac^c in [einen SRcc^ten nic^t beru^rt tourbc, unb bo^ e8 fic^ bemgcma^ ben (£nt«
fd^tic^ungcn onpaffen h)itb, mlcS^t bit 3Jlac^te in' bejug auf Slrtifcl 25 beg 23er(iner
S3ertrag§ treffen metben. ^nbm ©erbien ben SHatfc^ldgcn bet ©rofmac^te ^otge
leij^et, tjcrpflic^tet eg fic^, bie ioattuhg beg ^rotej^eg unb beg Siberjianbeg, bie eg
^infic^tlic^ ber Slnncjion feit tjergangencm Oftobet eingenommcn ^at, aufjugeben, unb
toerpflid^tet fic^ ferner, bic JRid^tung feinct gcgemDdrtigcn ^olitiE gcgenuber Oj^erreic^*
Ungarn ju dnbern unb fiinftig^in mit biefem le^teren auf bcm ^u^e freuubnad^baf
(ic^er 53e3ie§ungen ju Icben.

'Die ©cfc^ic^te ber te|ten '^af^xt nun, unb ingbcfonbcrc ber [cbmetjlic^en
©reigniffe be§ 28. ^^tti? ^aben bag 58or^anbcn[ein eincr [uboerfioen 53cmegung in
©crbien ermiefen, beren gi^l eg ijl, oon ber ojlcrreic^ifc^'Ungarifc^cn 5J?onarc§ic gc
U?ijfc ^ei{c i^rcg ©cbietg logjutrcnnen. Diefe 53cn)egung, bie unter ben Slugen bet
[crbifc^cn JRegierung entflanb, ^at in ber go(ge jenfeitg beg ©ebietg beg ^onigreic^g
burc^ Slftc beg 3:crrorigmug, burd^ cine SRci^c toon Slttcntatcn unb burd^ 9Jiorbe'
SlugbrucE gcfunben.

ffieit cntfernt, bie in ber erfldrung Dom 31. ^ax^ 1909 cnt[)a(tencn formctten
Serpflic^tungctt ju crfutten, ^at bic 5^6nig[i(^ ©erbifc^c JRegierung nic^tg getan, um
biefe SetDcgung gu unterbruden. ©ic bulbctc bag Dcrbrec^crifc^c 3;reiben ber Dcr*
fc^icbencn gegen bic ID^onarc^ic gerif^teten "iBercinc unb SSereinigungen, bic jugcllofc
Sprad^c ber ^rcjfc, bie 55erl^crrli(^ung ber Ur^eber Don Slttcntatcn, bic ^cilna^me
Don. Offijicren unb Seamten an fubocrjiDcn Uratricben, fic bulbctf cine ungefunbe
^ropaganba im offcntlic^ctt llnteni(^t unb bulbctc fc^lic^tic^ aHe 9Jlanifcj!ationenf
toclc^c bic fcrbifd^c 53eD6lferung jum ^af{t gcgcn bic 9)lonarc^ic unb jur SSerac^tung
i^rcr ©nrid^tungcn Dcrlciten fonnten.

©iefe ©ulbung, ber jid^ bic ^oniglid^ ©crbifc^e JRcgicrung ' fc^ulbig mac^tc,
f)at noc^ in jenem SJlomcnt angebauert, in bcm bie (Ereignijfe beg 28. 3"W ^^
gaujcn ®clt bie grauen^aften golgcn folc^ct C)ulbung jcigten.

— 12 —

6g cr^efft nu§ ben 5lu§[agcn unb ©cjldnbnijfcn bcr ocrbtcc^crifc^cn Ur^cbct
bc8 Slttentatg toom 28. 3^i"i/ ^^^ ^^^ '^^^^^ ^o" ©crajehjo in 53c(grab auggc^ccft
iDurbc, ba^ bic 5Jiorber bic SBaffen unb 53Dm6cn, init benen fie auggcj^attct toaxtUf
Don fcr6ifc^cn Offljiercn unb 53camtcn cr^ictten, bie bet 9iarcbna Obbrana nnge«
fiorten, unb ha^ fd)HeJ5lid) bie Seforbetung bcr 58cv6rcc^er unb beren Soften nad)
58ognicn Don (eitenben [erbifc^en ©renjorgancn oeranj^altet unb burc^gefii^rt rourbc.

^ic angcfu^rten Srgcbniffe bcr Unkrfuc^ung geftatten e.8 bcr t. unb t 9le«
gicrung nic^t, noc^ Idngcr bie §altung smvartcubcr Cangmut ju beobac^ten, bie fte
burcf) 3a[)re jencn ^rcibereicn gcgenubcr cingcnommcn ^aik, bie i[)rcn 5)^itte(punft
in 53c(grab ^nben unb oon ha auf bic ®c6ictc bcr !0^onarci^ie iibcrtragcn werben.
<Dicfe grgcbniffc (cgen ber f. unb f. 9iegierung oielmc^r bie ^fi'id^t ouf, Umtriebcn
ein Snbc ju bcrcitcu, bie cine bcj^dnbigc 53cbroi)ung fur bic JKu^e bcr 3)bnarc^ic bilbcn.

Urn bicfen ^n^cif ju crrcid}cn, fic^t f\d) bit t. unb t. Slegicrung gcjttjungcn,
con htt [erbifc^cn JRcgicrung cine offijictU 55erfic^ctung jii oerUngen, ba^
fie bie gegen 6|lerrci(^4ingarn gcric^tctc ^ropaganba Derurtcift, ha^
f)t\^t bic ©ciamt^cit bcr 53cj^rcbungen, beren (Snbjicl t§ \^, Don ber 5}ionQrd}ic
®cbiete logjurofcn, bic i[)r angcE)6ren, unb bQ§ fie fic^ Derpf(id)tet, bicje Dcr*
Bred^erifc^c unb terroriftifc^e ^^ropaganba mit alien 9!Ritteln 3U untcr*
brucEcn.

Urn bicfen S3erpfiid)tungcn cinen fcicrlid)en (E^araftcr ju geben, tt)irb bie
^oniglic^ ©crbifd^e SRcgicrung auf ber crj^en ©cite i[)rc§ offijicHeu Organ§ Dom
26./13. 3"^^ nad)fD[gcnbc 6rf(drung Dcroffentlid^en :

'T)ie ^oniglid^ ©crbifc^e SRcgicrung oerurtciit bic gcgcn Ofterrcid^'Ungarn
geric^tetc ^ropaganba, ha^ §ci^t bie @cfanit[)eit jener 53eftrcbungcn, beren '^id eS
ifl, Don bcr o|^crrcic^ifd)'ungari[c^en 5}ionardnc ©cbicte (ogjutrcnncn, bie it)r angc-
^orcn, unb fic bcbauert aufric^tig|^ bic grauen[)aftcn ^^olgcn biefer Dcrbrcd)crifc^en
^anblungen.

T)ie ^oniglid) 8erbifc^e JRegierung bcbauert, baJ3 fcrbifc^e Cffijicrc unb 53camte
an bcr Dorgenannten ^ropaganba tciigcnommcn unb bamit bic frcunbnad)barlici^cn
53e3ic^ungcn gcfd^rbct [jaben, bic ju Dfiegeu fic^ bie ^ionig[id}e SRcgicrung burc^ i^rc
erfiarung Dom 31. 3)?dr3 1909 fcicrac^jl Dcrpflic^tet f)atk.

^ic ^6niglid)e JRegicrung, bie jcben ©cbanfcn ober jcben '23erfuc^ einct 6in«
mifc^ung in bie ©cfc^irfc bcr 53ctt)0^ncr n)a§ immet eineS ^ei(c3 6flcrreic^'llngarn§
mi^biUigt unb juriicflDcift, crad^tet e8 fiir i^re ''Pflid)t, bic Offijicre unb Scamten.
unb bie gcfamtc S?eD6(fcrung beg ^onigrcic^g gan3 augbriidlid) aufmcrffani 3U
madden,, baf fie funftigl^in mit du|erflcr Strenge gcgcn jene '^Pcrfoncn Dorgcl^en
tt)itb; bie fic^ berartiger ioAnbtungen fd^uibig macbcn foCten, ^anbiungcn, benen,
Dorjubeugcn unb bic ju untcrbrurfcn fic aHe Stnflrengungen mac^en trirb.*

•Diefc (5rfldtung njirb g(cid)3eitig jur ^enntnig bcr 5lDnig(idE)en ?lrmcc burd^
eincn 3;agcgbefc^l 8cinct S)^aicfldt beg ^onigg gebrad^t unb in bem offijicttcn Organ
ber Sltmce Dcroffcntiid^t njcrben.

Die ^oniglic^ (Serbifd}c 5Rcgierung oerpflic^tct fid^ iibcrbieg,

1. jcbc ^ubiifation ju untcrbruden, bie jum ^a^ unb ^ur 5Jerad)tung ber
Slonarc^ie aufrcijt unb beren allgcmcinc ^cubcnj gegen bic territoriaie ^Ktcgritdt
bet (e^teren geric^tet ifl,

^ 13 —

2. [ofott mit bcr $lufI5fiing be5 T>cvcing'*9^arobnn Obtnaiin- uor5ucjc()cu, bcffcn
^efamtc ^propaganbainittct ju fonfi^^^iciv.i unb in bcr[c(6cu Scifc gcgcii Me anbcvcii
?Oercinc uiib S3crcinigungcn in ^erbien ciii^ufd^veitcu, bic [iif) mit bcv "IT^ropaj-^nnba.
gegen 6jierrcid)'Ungarn bcfc^af tigcn. ^ic .^onignd}c a^cgicrung iwirb bic iiotigcii
!Dkprcgchi treffen, bamlt bie aufgcloflcn Sercine nic[}t etira . iJ^re ^dtrgfeit unter
anbcrcm 9iamen ober in anberev ^orm f ortfc^en,

3. o^nc Serjug aii§ bem offcntlic^en llntevrid)t in ©evbien, [oiDof;! \m^ bcu
Cc^rforpet nl§ duc^ bie Ce^rmittct betrifft, alleS ju befeitigeii, tDa§ bo^u bicnt obcr
biencn fonnte, bie ^rppaganba gegen Oj^erreicb-llngarn ^u nd^ren,

4. au§ bem 5)?ilitdrbienft linb ber SSerlDattung im nflgemeinen aCc Offijierc
unb 53eamtc ju entferncn, bie ber ^ropaganba gegen Oflcrreid}'Ungarn fi-§nlbig finb,
unb beren SRamen nnter 9Jiittci(uug be§ gegen fie toortiegenben 9)^Qtcrin(§ ber ^5uig»
lichen 5Regierung befanntjugeben, ftd^ bie !. unb t Stegierung uorbct)d(t,

5. einjutDiHigen, ba^ in 8erbien Organe ber f. unb t, JKegicrung bci bet
Unterbrudung ber gegen bie territoriate .3ntegritdt ber S)ionavd)ic gcrid)teten ful>*
ocrfiDcn 33elocgung mitloirfcn,

6. eine gerid)tHd)e Unterfuc^ung gegen jene ^eifne[}mer be8 ^omplottS Dom.
28. 3uni einjuleiten, bic fid) auf ferbi[d)em 3:erritoiium befinben.

Son ber t u. f. 9{egicrung ^ierju belegiette Organe njerbcn on ben bcjiig*
lic^ctt (^r^ebungen tei(ne[}men,

7. mit aQer Se[cf)(eunigung bie 53erf)a[tung be§ 9)kior§ SSoja ^anffofic unb-
;einc8 genjiffen SJiitan GiganoDic, ferbifc^cn ©taat§beamtcn, oorjuneljnicn, luetc^e butd^
bic Srgcbnifjc ber Untcrfud^ung fompromittiert fmb,

8. buxd^ toirffamc 3}ta^nQ^men bie ^ei(na()me ber [erbifdien Sef)6rben an bem
6ittfd)muggeln Don Saffcn unb Gjplofujforpcrn iiber bie ©ren^e ju uer^inbcrn,

jenc Organe be§ ©ren^bienfte^ »on <Bd)abai} unb Cojnica, bic ben Ur^cbeni
bc& Serbred^en§ uon ©crajenjo bci bem Ubertritt iiber bic ©rcn^e bc()i(f(ici^ waxtrif
laui bem ^ienjte ^u cntlajfen unb jlrengc ju befttafen,

9. ber f. u. f. !Rcgierung Sluffldrungcn jn geben uber bic nid)t ju rer^t*
[fcrtigenben 5iu^erungen ()oj)er ferbifd^cr guttf^iondre in (Berbien- unb bem 2lu§tanbC|
Ibie i^rer offijieHen >3tc(Iung ungcac^tet nic^t ge36gert ^aben, fic^ nac^ bem Sltt«ntat
;»om^8. 3«ni in ^nteroiem^ in fcinbtic^er 2Bei[c gegen Oftcrreii^^Ungarn au^^ufprccben,

10. bie f. u. t $Regicrung o^uc ^Ser^ug Don ber ©urc^fu^rung ber in ben
toorigctt '•^unftcn ^ufammengefaften 9J^a{3na^men 5U Derjldnbigen.

<Dic f. u. f. !Rcgierung erttjartet bie Slntmort ber ^6nig[id)en 9^cgiernng
fpdtejkng bi§ @onnabcnb, ben 25. b. SDJtg., um 6 U§r noc^mittagS.

(Sine 3)^emoire iiber bie (Ergebniffe ber Unter[uct)ung Don ©erajenjo, fomeit fic
fid^ auf bic in ^unft 7 unb 8 genannten ^^unftiondrc be5ic[)en, ift biefcr 9^otc bci*
gefd)[DJfen.

Scilagc. ^k bci bem ©cric^t in ©croiemo gegen ben ©abrito ^rincip unb
©cnojfen mcgen be§ am 28. ^mi b. % begangenen Sieuc^elmorbeS bc3ie[}unggn)ei[c
wcgcn 9)ilitf(^ulb ^icran anpngigc ©trafuntcrfud^ung f)at big[)cr ju folgcuben ^cfl*
flellungen gcfii^rt:

1. ^er ^lan^. ben. (Sr^^erjog granj gerbirtanb tod^rcnb fcinc§ SlufentCjaltcg
in Serajewo ju crmorben, tDurbc in SBclgrab Don ©abrito ^rincip, ^Icbeljfo ©abrinoDic,

— 14 ^

2. ^ic fcd[)§ 53om6cn unb »icr 53roh)ningpijlo[cn, bcrcn fid^ bic 33eT?bre(^cr a(^
ffierfjcugc bcbicntcn, tourbcm bcm ^rincip, ©abrinooic unb ©rabcj in Sclgrab toon
eincm gcmiffcn TOiilan Siganobic unb bcm !D^a|or SSojo ^anffojic »crf(f>afft unb ubcrgcben.'

3. 1)16 53om6en fmb io^nbgranatcn, bic bcm 5Baffenbcpot bcr fcrbifd^en Slrmec
in ^agujcDac cntjtammcn.

4. Urn ha^ ©clingcn bc§ 5lttcntnt§ ju fic^crir, untcrnjieS !9h(an (EiganoDtc bcu'
^rittcip, bcu ©abrinouic unb ®xxibq in ber io«"b^a6ung bcr ©rnuatcn unb ga& in
cinem ^S^albc nebcn bcm ©c^icpfctbc »on 2;opf(^ibcr bcm ^rincip unb ©rabcj Untcr*
rid^t tm 8c^icpen mit Sron^ningpiftolcn,

5. Um bcm ^rincip, ©abrinooic unb ©rabc^ ben lUcrgang fiber bic 6o2ini[c^''
[jcrjcgolDinifcbc ©tenjc unb bic 6in[c6muggc(ung i[)rer SBaffcn ju crmoglicficn, tt)urbc
cin ganjcg ge§cimc§ ^rangportf^flcm burd) (SiganoDic organificrt. ^tx ^intritt bcr
53cr6rcc^cr [amt i^rcn ©off en nac^ So§nicn unb bcr i^cr^egoioiua ujurbc Don ben
©rcnji^auptrcutcn t)on ©cl^aba| (3?abc ^opouic) unb eD3nica fomic con ben gott*
organen 9iubiDoj ©rbic Don Cojnica mit Sci[)ilfe mcl^rcrcr onbercr ^erfoucn burd^*
gefu^rt.

Xlovifbmtfd?c 2lUc(emeine deitrxng.

29. Suit 1914»

(5tterreict)=^ngarn nnb bic ferbif4>e XTote.

SBicn, 27. 3uli. 1)ic 9lote bcr ^oniglic^ 6er6ifc^cn JRcgicrung Dom 12./25. Juli
!9l4 (autet in bcutfc^cr flbcrfc^ung wic folgt:

Die ^oniglic^c JKcgicrung ^at bic 9)iitteilung bcr f. unb f. JRegierung com
10. b. 5)i. er^attcn unb ijl ubcrjcugt, baji i[)rc ^IntlDort jebeS 5}ii^Dcrfianbni§ jcrftreucn
toirb, hai bie freunbnad^bnrUd^en S3c3ic[)ungcn jn)ifrf)en bcr ojlerrcic^ifdEicn 3)iouard^it
unb bem 5?6nigrcicfe ©erbicn ju ftoren bro^t

Die ^oniglid^c JRegierung ijl fic^ bemu^t, bo^ ber groJ3en 9^QC^6armonorc^ie
gcgeuuber 6ei tcincm SlnCa^ jcnc ^rotcflc cmeucrt tourben, bic [cincrjcit fomo^l in
bet @fup[ci^tina a(3 and) in grflaruitgen unb }OQ»l>fungen ber Dcrantmortlic^cn S^cr-
treter bc§ 8taatcg jum Slu8brucf gcbrac^t wurbch unb bic burrb bie Grfldrung ber
fctbifc^cn SRcgicrung Dom 18. tKarj 1909 i^ren Slbfc^fu^ gefunben tjaben, fon}ic
toeiter, ba^ [eit jener S^it mcber Don ben Dcrfc^icbcnen cinanbcr folgcnbcn Sicgierungcn
fcc8 ^6nigrcic^3 nod^ Don bcrcn Organen bcr 5Jcrfu(^ untcrnommen iDurbe, ben in
S3o8nien unb bcr ^cr3egotDinQ gefd)affcflen politifc^cn unb red}tlic^cn 9ufla»b ju anbcrn.
Die ^oniglic^c JKegierung jleCt fefl, ha^ bie f. unb f. 3iegicrung in biefer SRic^tung
fcincrlci 5?orflcffung cri^oben ^at, obgefe^cn Don bcm J^qUc cine§ Cc^rbud^cS, ^injic^t-
tic^ beffen bic f. unb f. SRcgicrung cine Dollfommcn befricbigenbe ?lufE(drung crl^altcn.
§at. ©erbien i)at n?d^renb ber Dauer ber 53Q[fQnfri[c in ^a^lreidicn gdaen SciDcifc
fur feinc pojififtifc^e unb gcmdgigtc ^oUtif gelicfcrt, unb c3 ijt nur (Berbien unb ben
Opfern, bie eg au§[c^(ic^[id) im ^ntcreffc beg europdifc^en griebeug gebrac^t ^ot, ju
banfcn; »enn bic(er gricbc er^altcn geblicben ijl.

— 15 —

^aju Bcmcrft bie Ojlcrrcic^ifc^.Ungarifc^e JRccjictun^:

^ie^oniglic^ ®erbifc^c 9^egicrung bcfc^tanft fic^ bavauf, fcjljiiflcHcn, ba& fcifi
tl6ga6c bex eillarung uom 18. Wlati 1909 Don [citcu bcr 6i:t&i0cu JKccvicruuflj
unb i[}vcr Organc fein 2)crfuc[) jur flnbcvung ber ©tertuug '^o§nicn§ uiib t>£C j^erjc"
QOiDina untcruommen luurbe.

^omit »ctf(^ic6t fic in 6cimi§t midfuvlic^cr Seifc bie ©vuubragcn unfcrct
<DcniQtc^c, ba toir md}t bie toauptuug aufgejlcUt ^abcn, bo^ jic unb i^rt Organc
in biefcr SRi(|tung offijiett irgcnb cttoag untcruommen fatten.

Unfer ©raDomen gel^t otelme^r bd^in, ba^ fie c§ trolj bcv in bcr jitierteiv
•fefe ubcrnwmmencn 35crp[lic^tungen unterlaffen ijai, bie gcgeu bie territorialc 3"^^*
gxitdt bw !ERonarci^ic gcrid^tete 53emcgung ju uutcrbriicfeu.

3^rc S3erp[Iic^tung 6e[tanb d([o barin, bie ganjc JRic^tung i^rcr ^olitif ju

dnbern unb 3ur oj^erreic^i[cb'ungari[c^en 9)?onarr^ie in tin frcunbnad)bar(i(^e§ ^ct'

Joltni§ ju tretcn, nic^t blo§ bie Suge^ortgfeit ^oSnieng jur 9)?onarf^ie offijiea uic^t

anjutajlem

<Dte 9lote 6erbien§ fd^rt bann fort:

^ie ^ouigQc^e SRegicrung fann nic^t fiir tuf erungen prioaten Si^araftcrS bct»'

auth?0Ti[ic^ gcmad^t . werben, toie eg ^^itungSortifel unb bie frieblid^c Slrbeit oon

fd^eftiungen ftnb, unb bie fic^ im aCgemeinen ber jlaatlic^en ^outrolle entjic^en^

Die§ urn fo toenigcr, al§ bie ^oniglic^e Dicgierung bei ber Cofung ciner ganjcn 5Rei§c

toon (^agen, bie 3n)ifcf)en 6erbien unb Ofierrcic^'Ungarn nufgctaud^t toarcn, gro§e8

(EntgegenEommcn bettjiefen [jat, rtjoburd^ e8 i^r geCungen ift, beren gtoferen ^ei^

jugunflcn be8 gortfc^ritt§ ber beiben SRad)barldnber ju lofcn.

Slnmerfung ber f. unb f. SRegierung:
$)ic Set)auptung bcr ^oniglic^ ©erbifc^cn JRegierung, ba^ bie tu^erungen bcri
^reffe unb bie ^dtigfeit oon 53ereinen prioatcn (S^arafter f)abtn unb fid^ ber \taair
lichen ^ontrolle ent^ie^en, ftcl^t in oottcm Siberfpruc^e ju ben (Sinric^tungen mobernet
©taaten, fe(bjl ber frei^citUrf)j^eu .JRic^tung auf bcm ©ebiete be§ ^rep- unb ^ercin8«
red[}t§, ba^ einen offcntlic^'rcd^tlic^en (E^arafter §at unb ^reffc fonjie Sereine ber
jtaatlic^cn Slufftd}t untcrfieat. UbrigenS fc^en ouc^ bie fcrbifc^en (Sinric^tungen eine
folc^e Slufjic^t t)or. 'Der gcgen bie ©erbifc^e $Kegierung er^obene 33orrourf ge§t eben
ba^in, baJ3 fie e§ gdn^lic^ untcrlaffen \)at, i^re ^reffe unb i^re 5Sereine ju beauf*
jic^tigen, beren Sivfung im monacc^iefeinblic^en <Sinne fie fannte.

T)ie 5RDte Serbien§ fd^rt fort:
<Die ^oniglic^e SRegierung mar bt^\)alb buxd} bie S3e^auptungcn, ba^ Slnge^orige'
'SerbienS an ber SSorbereitung beg in ©erajettjo oeriibtcn Slttentatg teilgenommen:
fatten, fc^mcr^lid^ uberrafcbt. ©ie ^atte ernjortet, ^ur 3)^itn)irfung bei ben ^lai^'
forfc^ungen uber biefeg SSerbrcd^en eingelaben ju loerben, unb tt?ar bereit, urn i^te
Dottfommenc ^orreft^eit burc^ 5:aten ju bcmeifen, gcgen atte ^erfonen Dorjugel^cn;;
^infic^tlic^ meld^er i§r 9)littei[ungen jugefommen wdren.

Slnmerfung ber f. unb f.- SHegicrung:
<Dicfc Sebauptung ijt unrid)tig. ©ie ©erbifc^e JRcgierung h?ar ubcr ben gcgen
gona bejlimmte ^erfoncn befte^enben «8erbac^t genau unterric^tet unb nic^t nur in

— 16 —

ber ?agc, fonbcra oud^ nad) i^rcn intctncn ®cfc|cn Dcr^flic^tet, ganj fpontan gt'
^cbungcn cinjulcitcn. <pic ^Qt in bicfct SRic^tung gar nic^tS untcrnommen.

g^otc ©ct6icn8:
T^cn ©unfc^cn bet !. unb f. JRcgierung entfptcd^cnb ifl bic ^oniglic^e
?Rcgictung fomit bcrcit, bcm ©cric^t o[)nc JKucffic^t auf 8tcUung unb JRang jcbcn
ferbifc^cn ®tant§ange[)Dtigcn pi ubcrgeben, fiir bcffcn ^eitna^me an bcm Serajcnjoer
ICcrbrcc^cn i^r Scipcife gclicfert mcrben fofltcn. ©ic Derpflicl^tct fic^ insbcfonberc
auf bcr erflen ©cite bc§ 2lmt§b(att§ Dom 13/26. 3uli folgcnbc Gnuntiation ju
tjcroffcntUcbcn : ^ic ^oniglic^ ©crbifc^c 9\cgierung Dcruttcilt jcbc ^ropaganbo, bie
gcgcn Opcrreic^'Ungarn geric^tct fcin fotttc, b. 6. bic ©efamt^eit bet 53ejlrebungen,
bie in (c^tct Cinie auf bic CoSrei^ung einjclner ©ebietc oon bcr ojlcrrcic^ifd^-
ungarlfd^cu 5Jtonarc^ic ob^iclen, unb fie bcbauert aufric^tig bie traurigen %6iQtn
biefcr Derbrcc^erifc^en SJtac^enfd)aften.

Slnmcrfung ber f. unb f. 9iegicrung:

Unfcte Ootbening lautetc: »<Die ^oniglic^ ©crbifc^e JKegierung Dcturtcilt bic
gcgcn ^jicttcic^'llngam gcrid^tetc ^ropaganba. . .«

<t)ic t»on bcr 5\onignd^ ©erbifc^cn SRcgicrung »orgenommenc Sinberung bcr
Don ung geforbcrtcn Grfldrung h)iD[ [agcn, ba^ cine fotd^c gcgcn Operrcic^ ' Ungarn
geric^tcte ^ropaganbd nic^t bcflc^t, ober ba^ i^r cine fold^c nic^t bcfannt ijt. ^icfc
gotmcf ifl unaufric^tig unb ^inter^dttig, ba fic^ bie ©crbifc^c JRcgieruiig bamit fiir
fpater bic Slugfluc^t rcfevDiert, fie ^dttc bic bcrjcit bcfie^cnbe ^ropaganba burc^ bicfe
©rfldrung nic^t begoDouicrt unb nic^t al§ monarc^icfcinblic^ ancrfannt, troraug jic
hjcitcr abieitcn fonntc, ba§ fic jur Uiitcrbriicfung ciner bcr jc^igcn ^ropaganba
g[cic^cn nic^t Dcrpflid^tct fci.

?Rotc SctbicnS:

1)ic ^onigiic^c 5Rcgicrung bcboucrt, ba§ laut bcr SJlittcilung bcr f. unb f.
9?cgicrung genjiffe fcrbifc^c Offijicrc unb (^unftiondrc an bcr cben genanntcu ^ro*
paganba mitgc»irft, unb bo^ bicfe bamit bic freunbnac^6ar[irf}en 5^e5ic[)ungen gc«
fd^rbct ^dttcn, ju bercn Scobac^tung fic^ bie ^onigiic^c JRcgierung burc^ bic
ertidrung tjom 31.3Jldrj 1909 feicrtic^ Dcrpflic^tct ^attc.

Die JRegicrung . . . .« glcic^fautcnb mit bcm geforbcrtcn ^ejtc.

Slnmcrfung ber f. unb f. JKcgicrung:

Die con un8 geforbcrte f^otmuUcrung (autcte: »X)ie ^onigHc^c JRcgicrung
bcboucrt, bo^ fcrbifc^e Offijiere unb gunftiondrc .... mitgemirft ^obcn . , . .«

^iud) mit bicfct gormulicrung unb bcm mcitcvcu Seifa^ »(aut bcr SJiit-
teilung bcr f. unb f. JKcgicrung* oerfoigt bie c®rbifd)c JRcgicrung ben bereitS obcn
angebeutcten 3*^^^/ f^^ fu^ bic 3"fw"ft frcic Qanh ju toa^rcn.

SRote OerbicnS:

^ic ^oniglic^c JRcgierung Dcrpflic^tct fic^ meitcr

1. Slnid^iic^ bc8 ndc^jlcn orbnungSmd^igcn 3"[<i"imcntritt§ bcr ©fupfcf)tina
in bag <Pre^gcfc| cine 53cftimmung cinjufc^aitcn, monac^ bic ?lufreijung jum .f^ajfc
unb jut SScrac^tung gcgcn bic 9)bnarc^ie foiuie jcbc ^ubtifation ftrcngflcnS 6cf!raft
miirbc, bercn aCgemcinc ^cubcnj gc^en bic territorialc ^ntegritdt Oflcrteic^'UngarnS
geric^tct ijl.

-- 17 —

^ic \jcvpflirf)tet f\d), an(d^(ic§ ber bemnarf)}!: crforgcubcn 3\coifiott bcr 23ct«
faffung in ben 5lrtifel XXII beg 53crfaf[ung89efc|e8 tincn 3nfa| aufjunc^men, htc
Ut ^onfi§fation bcrartiger ^ublifationcn gcjlattet, waS nad) ben fkrcn SScj^immungcn
bcS 2lrti£ct§ XXII bcr ^onjlitution bcr^eit unmogtic^ ijl.

Slnmetfung bcr f. unb t SRcgierung:

Sir fatten geforbcrt:

»1. 3ebe ^IDuBlifation 3u untcrbrucfcn, bie jum ipaffe unb ^ur Scrac^tung^
ber TD^onarc^ie aufvcist unb beren ^cnbenj gcgen bic territoriafc 3"tcgritdt bcr
SJionarc^ic gcrid^tct i|i.«

2Bir njotltcn alfo bic Scrpflic^tung ©crbicnS ^crbcifii^ren, bafiiv ju [orgcn,
ba^ bcrartigc ^rc^angriffc in ^infunft uhtcrblcibcuj n)ir ttjiinfc^tcu. a(fo eincn 6c*
jlimntten Grfolg auf bicfcm ®c6iete fic^crgcj^cllt ju ttjijfen.

©tatt bcffcn bictet ung ©crbicn bic erlajfung gcroijfcr ®cfc|c on, toclc^c aU
Wxitd ju bicfcm (Erfolgc bicnen foUcn, unb jmar:

a) (Sin ®cfc|, n?omit bie fraglic^cn monarc^icfeinblic^cn ^rcfdu§crungcn fu6'
jcftiD bcflraft n^erben follen, n^ag ung gang g[eic^gu[tig ijl, urn fo me^r, alg befanntcr*
ma§cn bic fu6jeftiDc SScrfolgung toon ^rc|be(iftcn Su^crjl feltcn moglic^ ift, unb bci
cincr cntfprcc^cnb (ojcn Sc^anbtung cincg f eleven ®efc|eg and) bic tt)cmgcn gaCc
bicfcr 5lrt nic^t jur Scflrafung fommcn tDiirbcn/ a[fo cin SSorfc^tag, bcr unfcrcr
gorbcvung in fcincr ffieifc cntgcgenfommt, ba^cr ung nid^t bic gcringjlc ©arantic fur
ben t)on ung gch?iinfct)tcn Srfolg bietctj

b) ein SRac^tragggefel ^u SlrtifcC XXII bcr ^onj^itution, ha^ bic ^onfigfation
gcjtattet njfirbc — cin 53orf(^lag, bcr ung glcid^faffg nic^t befricbigcn fann, ha bcr
53efianb cincg folc^en ®efc|cg in 6cr6icn ung nic^tg nu^t, fonbcm nur bic Scr*
pflic^tung ber 5Regicrung, eg aucf) an3utt5cnbcn, ttjag ung aber nic^t tocrfproc^cn mirb.

©iefe 53Drfc^ldgc fmb alfo Dottfommcn unbcfricbigenb — bicg urn fo me^r,
alg ftc avid) in bcr !!Ric^tung cbafto fmb, ba^ ung nic^t gcfagt mirb, inncr^alb rocfd^cr
^rift biefc ®cfc|c crloffcn ttjiirben, unb ba| im ^attc bcr Sl6le§nung bcr ®cfc^cg.
toorlagcn burc^ bie ©fupfc^tina — toon bcr cDcntucttcn €)cmiffion bcr SRcgicrung ab*
gefc^cn — alleg beim olten blicbc.

9latc ©crbicng:
2. <t)ic 5Rrgicrung bcft^t fcincrlci Setocifc bafiir unb ouc^ bic 9lotc bcr t
unb t. SRcgierung ticfert i^r fcinc fotc^cn, ba§ bcr SSercin »5Rarobna Obbrana* unb
anberc d^nlic^c ®cfcafc^aftcn big jum ^cutigcrt 2;agc burc^ cincg i^rct SJlitglicbct
irgcnbn)e[c^e oerbrec^cvifc^cn ^anbhingen bicfcr Slrt bcgangcn l^dttcn. ^Uc^tgbejlomcnigcr
juirb bic ^oniglic^c SRcgicrung bic gorbcrung bcr f. unb t 9f?cgicrung onnc^mcn
unb bic ©cfellfc^aft ^gkrobna Obbranai foioic jcbc ®cfcafc^aft, bic gcgen 6flcrrcic^»
Ungdm mxUn fotttc, auflofcn.

Slnmerfung bcr f. uttb t JRcgicrung:
^ie monarcbicfcinblic^c ^ropagonba bcr »9larobna Obbrana* unb bcr i^r
affiUcrtcn SScreinc crfuUt in ©crbien bag gaujc bffentlicbc Ccbcn, eg ijl ba^cr cine
ganj un^ulaffige SUcfcrtoc, wcnn bic fcrbifc^ Oicgierung bc^auptcty ha^ i^r bariibw
nic^tg bcfannt ijl.

— 18 —

bie ^ropaganbamittel bicfcr ©cfettfc^aftcn ju f onfigjiercn /
bie 9icu6ilbun0 bet aufgdojlen ®c[ettfc^aftcn untcr anbetcm 9kmen unb
in nnbeter ©cjlatt ju Dct^inbern.
3n bicfcn beibcn SRic^tungen fc^iccigt ba§ Scrgrabet ^abinctt ooUfommcn, fo
bof un8 awd) butd^ bic gegebcnc ^albc S^f^Q^ ^fi"^ ©arantic ba[ur gcbotcn i^, bo^
bcm 3:m6cn bet monatc^icfcinbUc^cn Slffojiationcn, inSbefonbcrc bet »5Rarobna
Db6rano«, burd^ bcren Sluflofung befinitiD ein 6nbc bercitct marc.

?Rotc @crbicn§:

3. Oic ^onigrid^ ®cr6ifcf)c JRcgicrung ocrpflic^tet fid) o^nc SSctjug ou8 bcm
fiffentlic^cn Untcrtid^t in ©crbien atteS au§5ufd^ciben, h)a8 bic gegcn Sjlcrrcid^'Ungatn
geric^tctc ^ropaganba fSrbcrn fonntc, fall8 i^r bic t unb t Slegicrung totfac^Uc^c
Scmcifc flit bicfc ^topaganbo licfcrt.

Slnmcrfung bcr t unb t SRcgictung:

Slud^ in bicfcm %a\lt ocrlangt bic fctbifc^c SRcgicrung ct|l S3cn)ci[c bafiir,
bo^ tm offcntlic^cn Untcrric^tc @crbicn§ cine monarc^iefcinblid^c ^ropaganba gctricbcn
njirb, tud^renb fic boc^ toijfcn mu^, ba^ bic bci ben ferbifc^cn ©c^ulen cingefii^xten
Ccl^rbuc^er in bicfcr SRic^tung ju beonpanbcnbcn ©toff cnt^altcn, unb ba^ cin grower
3;ci( bcr fcrbifc^cn Cc§rct im Cagcr bcr »9^Qrobno Obbrana* unb bcr i^r afplicrtcn
SScreinc ftc§t.

flbrigcnS f^at bic 6crbi[c^c SRegierung aud^ ^icr cincn ^cil unfcrcr ^urberungcn
nid^t fo crfuClt, n)ic njir c8 Dcrlangt ^abcn, inbcm fic in i^rcm 2;c5tc ben Don un8
getoiinfc^tcn 53cifa| »fott)0^l ma8 ben Ce^rforper, al§ auc^ n)a8 bic Cc^rmittct aW'
6e[angt«, toegliel, — cin 53cifa|, hjcic^cr ganj ffar jcigt, mo bic monarc^iefclnbHc^c
^ropaganba in bcr ferbifd^en ©d^ulc ju fuc^cn i|l.

4. 5!)ic ^oniglic^c SRcgicrung ijl and) bercit, |ene Offijicre unb Scamten au8
bcm 9?^iiitdr« unb giDilbienfl ju entiajfen, ^inpc^tlic^ meic^cr burc^ geric^tlic^e Untcr'
fuc^ung fcftgejlcllt mirb, ba^ fic fic^ ioonblungcn gegcn bic tcrritorialc ^"tegritdt
bcr !Konarc^ie ^aben jufcf)ulbcn tommen (ojfcn| fie crtoartet, ba^ i§r bic t unb t
Slcgierung jmedfg GinUitung be8 S3erfa^rcn8 bic Xiamen bicfcr Offl^icrc unb Seamten
unb bie ^^tfad^cn mittcilt, toclc^c bcnfclbcn jur Cap gclcgt tocrbcn.

Slnmcrfung bcr t unb t JRcgicrung:
3nbcm bie ^oniglic^ ©erbifc^c JRcgierung bic Suf^flc bcr (Sntiaffung bcr frog*
lichen Dffijicre unb ^camten au§ bcm SKilitdr* unb 3i^if^if"j^ Q" ^e« Umftanb
fnupft, ha^ biefc ^erfoncn burc^ cin ©cric^tsocrfa^ren fc^ulbig befunben merben, fc^rdnft
fic i^re gufage auf jene ^^aUt cin, in bencn bicfcn ^erfonen cin ftrafgcfc^lic^ ju
a^nbenbeg ^elift jur Cajt licgt. <Da mir aber bic entfernung jener Offijicrc unb
Scomten oertangcn, bic monard^icfcinblic^c ^ropaganba betrcibcn, ioaS \a im allgcmcincn
in 6erbicn fcin geric^tlic^ jlrafbarcr ^atbepanb i|t, erfc^cinen unferc gorbcrungen
and) in bicfcm ^unftc nic^t erfiiUt.

— 19 —

5. ^ic ^onigticfcc SRcgierung mu^ bcfcnnen, ha^ jic jic^ iiber ben (Sinn unb
bic ^ragn^eitc jeneg 23egcl^rcng bet t unb t SRegicrung nid^t DoHe* 9?ed)cnfd[)aft
gebcn fann, toefc^eg ba^in gc^t, ba§ bic ^oniglic^ ©er6ifd}c JRcgicrung fic^ berpflic^tcn
foff, auf i^rcn ©ebieten bic SDlitoirfung oon Organen bet f. f. JRegicrung 3U3U'
[ajfcn, boc^ erflart fic, ba^ fic jebc 3}tittt}irfung onjunefjmcn bereit njarc, n)clc^c htn
®runb[d|en be§ 23olferrcd[)tg unb be§ ©trafprojeffcg foroic ben freunbna(f)6Qr[id^en
55ejic^ungen cntfprcd^en njurbc.

Slnmerfung bet f. unb f. JRegtcrung:
^it biefcr grage f)at ba^ attgemeinc SSolferred^t cBcnfowenig drna^ ju tun
tt)ic bog 6trafpro3e|re(^t: gg ^anbelt fid^ urn einc Slngefcgen^eit rein jlaatSpolijci'
lid^er Dhtur, bic im 2Bege einet Befonbcren 53ercin6atung ju lofen ijt. ^ic Dtcfetuc
@cr5ien§ ijl bn^cr unoerftanblic^ unb rodre 6ei i^rcr bagen allgemcincn gorm gecignct,
ju unuberbriictbarcn ®c^tt)icrigfeiten 6ei 2l6[(f)lup be§ 3U tteffenben 5l6fommcnS
ju ful^ten.

?Rote bcr ^oniglic^ ®er6ifc^cn SRcgierung:

6. ^ic ^oniglic^c !Kegictung p(t eg fe[bftt)erjtdnb(ic^ fiir i^re ^jiic^t, gegen
affc jcnc ^erfoncn einc Untcrfuc^ung cinjufeitcn, bic an bem ^omplott »om
15./28. 3«nt beteifigt n^aren ober Beteiligt genjefcn fein foffen unb bic fid) Quf
i^rcm ©cbiete bcfinbcn. SfBa8 bic !5Jlitmirfung Don l^icrju fpe^ied belegicrten Organen
bcr f. unb f. JRegierung an biefcr Unterfud^ung anbcJangt, [0 fann fic einc [o(c^c
nid^t anne^men, ba bie§ einc S3er[e^ung bcr 33erfa[[ung unb bc§ ©trafprojc^gefelcS
n)are. ^Doc^ fonntc ben ojlerreit^ifc^'Ungarifd^cn Organen in cinjcfncn gotten 5)^ittei[ung
t)on ben Srge6nif[cn bcr Unterfud^ung gemad^t luerben.

Slnmcrfung bcr f. unb f. SfJcgicrung:
llnfcr 5^erfangcn n?ar ganj f(ar unb nic^t mi^jubeuten. ffiir 6ege[}rten

1. Sintcitung einer gerid^tlid^cn Untcrfuc^ung gegen bic ^cilne^mer be§ 5^omplott§,

2. ^ei(na[)me bon t unb f. Organen an ben ()ierauf Bcjiiglic^en (Srfjebungcn
(SRec^crc^c im ©cgenfa| 3U enquete judiciaire), 3. e8 ijl un8 nic^t bcigcfatten,
t unb f. Organc an bem ferbifc^en ®eric^t§oerfal)rcn tcirne^mcn ju la[|en: ©ic
fottten nur an ben poli^eilic^en <8orer[)cbungeu mitwirfen, mi<^t ha^ 33Ratcria[ fiir
bie Untcrfuc^ung l^crbcijufd^affen unb fid^cr^ujleden fatten.

Senn bic 8erbifc§e SRcgicrung ung ^icr mi^Dcrjlc^t, fo tut ftc bie§ bctou^^
benn bet Unterfd^icb jn^ifd^cn enquete judiciaire unb ben cinfad^en SRed^erd^en muf
i^t getdufig fein.

<Da fic fic^ jcbct ^ontrottc beg cinjufcitcnbcn 23erfa^rcng ju eiitjie^en njiinfc^te,
bag bei forreftcr ^urd^fu^rung ^od^jl unern)unfd)te Grgcbniffe fur fic (iefcrn n^urbc,
unb ha fie feine ioonbE>abc befi|t, in ptaufibfer SCeifc bie SBitroirfung unfcrcr
Orgone an bem polijcilic^cn Scrfa^ren abjule^nen (5lna(ogien fur folc^c polijcitic^cn
3ntcrt)cntioncn bcjlef)en in grower 3)^engc), i}at fie fic^ auf einen 8tanbpunft begeben,
ber i^ret Slbtc^ung ben ©c^ein bet 53ercd^tigung gcben unb unferem ^erlangcn ben
8tempel bcr Unerfuttbarfcit aufbriiden foU.

— 20 —

Vlott bet ®cr6if(^cn JRegicrung:

7. ^ie ^onigfid^c 9legierung f)at noc^ am Slbcnb bc8 ^ageS, nn bem i^t bie
!^ote 3ufam, bie 23et^aftung be8 SJiajorS 53oigIar ^anfofic Dcrfiigt. 5Ba8 abet ben
Wlilan Siganoctc anbefangt, bet eiit Slngc^ottgct bet ofletteid^ifc^-uugartfc^eu Wlori'
Qtc^ic ifl, unb bet big jum 15. 3uni (Q^^ Slfpitaut) bei bet 6i[en6a^nbiteftion bt'
bienjlct njat, fo fonnte biefet bi§^et nic^t auggefotfc^t tuetben, m^alb ein ©tecfbtief
gegen ii^n etfaffcn toutbe.

T)ie t unb f. 9f?egietung tt)itb gebeten, jnjccfg ^Durd^fiil^tung bet Untetfud^ung
fobolb a[§ mogHc^ bie bcfie^enben 53etbacl^t§gtuubc unb bie bei bet Untctfuc^ung in
©etajenjo gefammeften @ci^ulbben)ei[e in bet be^cic^neten ^^otm befannt^ugeben.

Slnntetfung bet !. unb f. JRegictung:
^iefc 5lntn)otl: ifl §intetf)a[tig. 6igano»ic ging (out bet toon un8 bctanra^ten
9lac^fotfc^ung btei 2:age nac^ bem 5lttentat, aU bcfannt xoniht, ha^ (Eiganobic an
bem ^omplotte beteiiigt toat, auf Utlaub unb begab jic^ im Slufttag bet ^*o[ijei»
ptdfeftut in S3efgtab noc^ SRibati. 68 ift a[\o junac^jl unti(f)tig, ba^ Siganooic fd^on
am 15./28. 3uni au3 bem fetbifc^en <5taat§bienjt fd^ieb. ioift:ju fommt, bo^ bcr
^oHjeiptafcft Don SSefgtob, bet bie 5lbtei[e be§ Siganobic felbjl oetanta^t f)at unb
bet tou^te, mo biefet fid^ auf^ielt, in einem 3"tci^^i*^ etfldtte, ein 23^ann namenS
Mian giganotoic csijlictc in ^elgtab nic^t.

g^ote bet 8etbifd)cn JRcgietung:

8. ©ie 6etbi[c^e 5Rcgictung mitb bie bejlei)cnben SJiapnatjmen gegen bie Untet'
btucfung bc§ 6cbmugge{n§ Don ffiaffen unb (Jjplofiojloffen octfc^dtfen unb ctmcitctn.

(Sg ijt fc(bftDftjlanblirf), baf fie fofott eine llntetfud()ung einieiten unb jene
SSeamtcn bc§ ®tenjbienfle§ in bet Cinie Sabnc-^ojuica jlvcng bejltrafen mitb, bie
i^te ^fli(f)t Detle^t unb bie llr[}ebet bes SSetbiec^cng bie ©ren^c [}a6en iibetfc^rciten (affen.

9i ^ie ^oniglic^c JRegictung ift getn bereit, (^ttldtungen libct bie 5iu§etungcn
ju gcben, meicbe i^te 5^eamten in ©etbien unb im Slu§fanb nac^ bem 3lttentat in
3nteroicmg gemac^t ^aBen unb bie nad^ hex 5Bc§auptung bet f. unb t 9f?egierung
bet SJionarc^ie feinbfelig morcn, fobalb bie f. unb f. JRcgierung bie ^UHm biefet
tlugfii^tungcn bejeic^nct unb bcmicfen §aben mitb, ba^ biefc flu^etungen Don bm
betteffenben ^unftiondven tatfdc^lirf) gemac^t morbcn fmb. Die 5!onig(i(^c JRegietung
mitb felbjl 6otge tragcn, bie notigeu Semcife unb lUetfii^tunggmittel ^ietfut ju
fammetn.

Slnmetfung bet f. unb f. JRegictung:

15et ^oniglic^ Sctbifc^cn JRegietung miiffcn bie bejiiglid^cn ^ntetoiemS ganj
genau bcfninit fein. Senn fie Don bn t. unb f. JRegierung Detlangt, ba^ biefe
i^t nCerfei <Cctai(g ubet bicfe 3ntetDien>§ (iefcte unb fi(^ eine formlic^c Untctfuc^ung
l^ietubet Dotbe^dU, ^cigt fie, ba^ fie auc^ bie ^^otbcning nic^t ctnjltic^ etfuflen mifl.

^Xoit bet <Setbifc^en SRegietung:
10. ©ic ^oniglidie JRegictung mirb, fofetn bie§ nic^t fc^on in biefet 9lotc
£efc^el)en ifl, bie f. unb f. 9Regietung Don bet ^utc^fii^tung bet in ben Dotflc^enben
^unften cnt^altcnen ^a^na^meu in 5^enntni§ fe^en, fobalb cine biefet SjRoftegeln
pngeotbnct unb butc^gcfu^tt mitb.

— lii —

<C)ie ^onigftc^ 6et6ifc^e SRegierung gfauBt,. ha^ c8 im gcmctnfamen 3"*^^^!!^
fiegt, bte Cofung bicfcr. $lnge(cgcn^ctt nic^t ju uBcrjlurjcu unb ift balder, falls fic^
bic f. unb t Diegicrung burc^ bicfc Slntroort nic^t fur bcfticbigt crac^ten fotttc,
ttjic immer bercit, cine fneb(id)c Cofung anjunc^mcn, fci c8 burc^ llBcrtragung bcr
entfc^cibung biefcr ^^ragc an ba8 3"t^^nationa(e ©crlc^t im ^aa^, fei c8 burc^
flbcrtajfung ber Sntfc^cibung an bic ©to^mac^tc, h)eld)c an ber SluSarbcitung bet
Don ber (gcrbifc^cn SRcgicrung am 18./31. SMrj 1909 abgcgcbcncn €rf(a.tung init»
geteitft ^aben. — ©c^lu^ bet 5Rotc.

Zn& dem d|!etrci4>ifct>*un0atif4>en Material

ffiien^ 27. 3"li- ^^^ in ber ojltetteid^ifc^'Ungatifc^cn gipfurornotc an bic
flugtoartigen Sotfc^aften in Slngctegen^cit b'eS fcrbifc^en ^onjiift§ crroa^nte <Doffier
toitb ^eutc betoffcnttid^t.

.Jn biefcm S}lcmoirc tt)irb barauf l^ingcttjicfcn, ha^ bit t)on 6etbicn au8»
fitgangene Semcgung, bic fic^ jum gielc gcfe^t l^at, bic fubHc^cn ^citc 6flctreid^'
UngornS t»on ber SJlonarc^ie iogjureipen, urn jie mit 6er6icn ju ciner jtaatiic^cn
Cin^eit 3U ocrbinbcn, hjcit jururfgreiff. ©icfe in i^rcn (Snbjiefcn jietS gfeid^bleibenbe
unb nur in i^ren S)iitte[n unb an ^ntcnptot toed^felnbe ^ropaganba erreic^te jur
3cit ber Slnnejiongfrifc i^ren ^o^epunft unb trat bamaf§ offen mit i^rcn ^cnbenjen
^er»or. SBa^renb cinerfeitS bie . gefamtc ferbifc^e ^reffc jum ^ampfc gcgen bie
tWonarc^ic aufricf, bifbcten fid) — Don anbcrcn^ropaganbamittcfn abgcfcl^en —
^Ijfojiationen, bic biefe ^dmpfc Dorberciteten, untcr bencn bic 9^arobna Obbrana
an Scbcutung ^croorrogtc. Slug cinem rcDolutionaren ^omitce ^erDorgcgangcn, fon«
jlituiertc fic§ biefe dom 53elgiabct Slugnjdrttgen §lmtc Dollig ab^dngige Organifation
untcr Ccitung Don ©taat§niduncrn unb Offi3icrcn, baruntec bem ©encral ^anfobic
unb bem c^emaligcn 9}?inificr 3^«noDic. Sluc§ S^ajor Oja ^anfoDic unb SJittan
^ribiceDic ge^oren ju bicfen ©runbern. bicfcr Serein f)aitt fid) bie 53ilbung unb
Slu§riijtung Don ^^reifc^aren fiir ben bcDor|!el^cnbcn ^xicg gegen bie ojl ertcid^ifd^-unga'
rifd}e 3)?onarc^ic jum '^itiz gefe^t. 3" ciner bem 3)lemoire angefugten 5lnlage »Dirb
ein Slugjug au8 bem Dom SentralauSfc^up bet 9larobna Obbrana §erau§gcgebcnen
53ercin8organc gleic^en 9^amen§ Deroffcntlicbt, njorin in me^rcren Slrtifcln bic ^attg*
feit unb Sielc bicfeS 53ercin8 au§fu^rlic^ bargelcgt merben. (£§ l)ei^t barin, bo^
ju ber Si^uptaufgabc ber 5Ravobnc Obbrana bic Serbinbung mit i^reii na^cn unb
fernercn Sriibern jenfeitS ber ©ren^e unb unferen iibrigcn gi^unben in ber 5Celt gc^oren.

fcflerrcic^ ijl a(8 trjlcr unb gro^ter ^cinb Bcaeid^nct. SBic bie
Slarobna Obbrana bie 5lotmcnbigfcit be8 ^ampfeS mit ^ftcrrcid^ prebigt, prcbigt fie
eine ^clligc ©a^r^eit unferer nationalcn Cage. "Dag 6c§lu§fapite[ cnt^dlt einen
apca an bie JRcgicrung unb ba8 Solf ecrbien8, . f^ mit alien SKittcln fur ben
5^ampf Dorjubcreiten, ben bic Slnnc^ion Dorangejeigt §ot.

^a8 SJicmoirc fc^ilbert nad) ciner 5lu8fagc einc8 Don ber 9^arobna Obbrona
angeiDorbencn ^omitatfc^i8 bie bamaligc ^dtigfeit ber 9iarobna Obbrana,
bie cine Don jmci ^Quptlcutcn, barunter Q:anfoDic, geleitctc ©c^ulc jur 2lu8»
l&ilbu'ng Don SBanben untcr^iclt^ ©c^ulcuy njclc^e Don ©cncral 3anfoDic unb Doa

— 5i2 —

ioou^tmann Wlitan ^riBicctotc rcgclma^ig infpijicrt tourbcn, Scitet tourbeh bie
^oinitatf(f)i§ im ©d^ie^cn unb SombentDcrfcn, im ?Dlincn[cgcn, ©prcngcn
t)on Gifcnbal^nbriicfcn ufm. untetric^tet. 9iac^ ber fcicrli(f)cn (Erflarung bcr ©ctbi'
fc^en SRegicrung torn '^a^u 1909 fc^ien auc^ ba^ 6nbe biefer Organifation gc'
fommen ju fcin. ©'ie[c Grnjartungcn f)ahtn f\d) abcr nid)t nur nid)t erfiiUt, fonbcrn
bic ^Propaganba tcmhe burc^ bic fcrbi[c^c ^rcjye fortgcfc^t. ^Da§ S)^emoire fii^rt
al8 Scifplel bic Slit unb SBeifc an, mie ba§ Slttentat gcgen ben bo§nifc^cn Canbe§'
d^cf 23aTc[anin publtjijlifc^ certocrtct tt»urbe, inbcm bet 5lttentdtcr al§ [erbi[cf)er
S^ational^clb gcfeiert unb fcinc %at Dcr^errdc^t wurbc. '^kit Slattcr n)urbcn md)t
nut in Serbien berbrcitct, fonbern au6) auf Wo^Iorganificrtcn Sc^leic^mcgcn in bie
Wlomxdi)k cingefcE)muggclt.

Untcr bcr gleic^en Ccitung tt)ic bci i^ter ©runbung wurbe bie 9iftrobna Dbbtano
ncuerlic^ bet 3^"^^<i^punft ^^^^^ Slgitation, teelc^er ber v3c^u|cnbunb mit
762 SScreinen, cin 8o!o(bunb mit 3 500 SJiitgliebctn unb oerfc^iebenc
dnberc SSereinc ongc^orten.

3m 5^[cibe cincS ^u[tutuerein8 ouftretcnb, bem nur bie geij^ige unb bic
forperlic^e Gntioicfetung bcr 53eD5lfcrung ©crblen§ fon^ic bcren matcrieCe ^roftigung
am ^erjen (iegt, ent^iiUt bic Dkrobna Obbrana i^r uja^reS reorganifiertcg ^ro«
gramm in botjiticrtcm SluSjug au8 i^rem SSereinSorgon, in ttietci^em »bic ^eiiige
2Ba^r^eit« geprcbigt wirb, ba^ c8 cine unerld^lic^c 5^otn3enbigfeit ifl, gcgcn
Sflcrrcid^, fcincn erjicn gr6§ten O^i^b, biefcn 2lusrottung§fampf mit
®ett}e^r unb ^anonc ju fii^ren, unb ha^ SSolf mit alien -D^itteln auf ben
^ampf ootjubereitcn, jur 53efreiung ber unterft>orfenen ©ebicte, in benen tjietc
!D?iUioncn untcrjoc^tcr Sriiber fc^mad)ten. 1)ic in bem 2)^cmolre jitierten 5lufrufc
unb JKcben d^nlic^en (i^araftcr§ beleuc^teu bie Dicifeitige auSivartige 5;dtigfeit bcr
9^arobna Obbrana unb i^rcr affiliertcn SScrcine, bie in Sortragsrcifen, in ber ^eil*
na^mc an T^cfien con bo8ni[c^en l^ereinen, bci bcnen offcn SJ^itglieber [iir bic
crrod^nte ferbifc^e 53ereinigung gcmorben njurben, bcftel^t. ©egcnn?drtig ift noc^ bie
Unterfuc^ung bariiber im 3uge, ba§ bie 8ofolDcrcinc (BerbicnS analoge SScrcinignngen
ber 3}^onar(^ic bejlimmten, jic^ mit i^nen in cinem bigger gc^eim gc^altenen 33cr«
6anbe 3U Dcreinigen. ^urd^ 53ertrauen8mdnner unb 3)^i[fiondrc iDutbc bie Sluf*
toicgelung in bie ^reife Grnjoc^fener unb ber urtcilgfofen 3"9^'^b gebracf)t. ©0
tt)urbcn Don Wlilan ^ribiceh)itfc^ e^cmalige ioonbeboffijicre unb ein ©enbarmcrie*
tcutnant jum SSertaffen bc8 ^eereSbienjleS in ber 9)ionarc^ie untcr bcbenflid^en Um*
jtdnbcn oerleitet. 3" ^^n ©cf)uren ber Ce^rerbi(bung§anjlaltcn njurbc cine meit*
ge^enbe 5lgitation entmicfett. ^er gemiinfc^te ^ricg gegen bie 9)^Dnord)ie murbe
militdtifc^ aucf) infoferu Dorbercitet, al^ ferbif(f)e Gmipre im gatte be§ Slu§bruc[)8
ber geinbfeligfeiten mit ber S^i^f^orung Don 2iran8portmitteln u[n)., ber 5lnfad}ung
toon SRctooltcn unb ^onifen betraut njurben. 5lIIe3 bie3 h?irb in eirter befonberen
Scilage betegt.

'Dag 9J?emoire [c^itbert ferncr ben 3"ffln^^^"^o"9 S^Jifcfien bie[er 3:dtigfeit
ber 9larobna Obbrana unb ben affitiierten Organifationen mit ben Stttentaten gcgcn
ben i^oniglic^cn ^ommiffdr in Slgram (Euoaj im 3"^^ 1912, bem Slttcntat Don
©ojcic in Slgram 1913 gcgen ©fcrlcq unb bem mi^gtiirften ^tUntat (£c^d[er8 am
20. ^a'x im Slgramcr 3:l^eater. Sg Derbrcitct fic^ ^ierauf iibcr ben gufammen^ang

— 23 —

l)c§ 5lttcntat8 ouf ben ^^ronfolgct unb bcffcn ©cma^Iin, uDct bic Slrt;
Xoit [xd) bic 3""9^" f^o" '" ^^'^ ©d[)ufc an bent ©ebonfcn bet 9^Qrobna Obbrana
Dcrgiftcten unb xo'it fic^ ble 5lttcntdtct mit 5i[fe Don ^tibiccmic unb ©acic bic
5Bcrf^cuge ju bcm Slttcntat Deifd^apcn, njobci ins6c[onbcrc bic SRoUc beg !S)laior8
Xanfofic bargelegt n)itb, bcr bie 9Jlorbn)affcn liefcrte, n.ne and) bic SRoHc cinc3
gcn)if[en (Eiganocic, eine§ geiuefcncn 5^omitat[c§i unb jc^igen Seamten bcr ferbifc^cu
(Eifenba^nbircftion 53elgrab, bet fc^on 1909 aU Sogling bet Sanbenfd^ulc bet
batnaligcn 5Ratobna Obbrana auftauc^te. gernct njitb bic Slrt bargelcgt, n^ic 53omben
unb SBaffcn un6cmev!t iiad) S3o§iiicn eingc[c^mugge(t ttjutben, bie feinen ^njcifcl
borubct Id^t, ha^ bie§ ein toot)! Dorbcreitetet unb fur bic ge^cimnigoollcn '^totdt
bet 9iarobna oft begangenet @c^(cic^n)eg n^at.

Sine Scitngc ent^att eincn SluS^ug au§ ben Slftcn bc§ ^rei8gcrid[)tg in ©ctajenjo
uber bie Untctfud)ung be§ 5lttentat8 gcgen ben ©r^f)erjog granj ^^erbinanb unb
beffen ©emal^lin. ©anad^ fmb ^rincip, SabrinoDic, ®ta6e3, (ErupiJoDic unb ^apooic
gejldnbig, in ©emcinfc^aft mit bcm fliic^tigcn SJic^mebbofic ein 5^ont|)[ott jut
Srmorbung beg Sr^^erjogg gcbiibct unb i^n 3U biefem 3tt>c(fe aufgclaucrt ju l^abcn.
(iabrinoDic ift geftdnbig, bic Sombc getoorfen unb ®abri(o ^rincip ha^ Slttentat mit bet
SBro^ningpiflole auSgefiifirt ju l^aben. Seibe 5;dter gaben 3U, bei ber SSetiibung bcr %at
bie 5l6fic^t beg 9)^orbe8 gc^abt ju ^abcn. ©ic meitereu ^cilc bcr Slniogc crl^aiten n)eitctc
Slngabcn bcr Sefc^ulbigten Dor bem Untcrfud^unggric^ter iiber Sntj^c^ung beg ^omplottg,
ioerfunft bcr 23omben; teeic^c fabrifmdjjig ^crgc|icO[t ftjurbcn, fiit militdrifc^c 3tt}ccEc
bcjlimmt tt)aren unb i^rcr Originalpadung md) aug bem ferbifc^en SCaffcntager aug
^ragujcDQC jtammtcn. Snblic^ gibt bie Scilage Slugfunft uber ben ^rangport bet brci
Slttentdter unb ber SBaffen Don ©erbien nad) ^ognien. Slug bcm toeiteren geugenprotofoK
crgibt fic^, ha^ ein Slngc^origcr ber 9}?onard^ie einigc ^agc Dor bcm Stttentat bem
oftcrrcid^ifc^'ungarifc^en ^onfufat in 53eigrab 9}ie(bung Don ber 33ermutung erftotten njoUte,
ha^ ein ^ian jur^Scrilbung beg Slttcntatg gcgcn ben grj^er^og h)d^renb beffen Slnttjcfcn^cit
in Sognien bej^el}e. 1)iefer Wlann fott nun burd) .53e(graber ^olijeiorgane, mcld^e
i^n immittcibar Dor Sctreten beg ^onfulatg aug nic^tigen ©riinbcn Dcr^aftctcn, an
ber ©rjlottung bcr 5)icibung Dcri^inbert njorben fein. fficiter ge^e aug bem 3f"9^"'
protofoil §erDor, ba^ bie bctveffcnben ^olijciorgane Don bcm gepianten ?lttcntat
^enntnig gel^abt ^dtten. ^a biefe Slngabcn nod^ nid^t nad^gepriift fmb, fann
iibet beren (Sti(i}^a[tigfcit Dorldufig nod) fein Urteif abgegcben njcrben. 3" ^^^
S3ei(agc jum tD^cmoire §ci^t eg: S3or bem (Smpfanggfaai beg ferbifcfien ^ri^gg*
minij^criumg befinben fic^ an bet 5Canb Diet aHcgorifc^e 53i(bcr, Don bcnen brci
T)ar|iteffuiigen ferbifc^er ^rieggcrfo(ge fmb, n^d^renb bag Dicrte bic 33ern)irf(ic^ung
bcr monard^iefcinb[icf)cn ^enbenjen ©erbicng Dcrfinnbitbtid^t. IJibcr ciner 5?anbfrf)aft,
bic teilg ©ebirgc (Sognien), tei(g ©bene (©ubungarn), barjlcttt, gc[)t bic "^oxa, bic
5Jiorgcnrote ber ferbifd^en ^offnungcn, auf. ^m SSorbcrgmnbc jtc^t cine bch)affnctc
^rauengejlalt, auf beren ©c^ilbc bic 9iamcn aller »nod^ ju befrcicnben ^roDin^cn*:
S3ognicn, ^txit^oto'inai 5Boin)obina, ©^rmien, <Daimatien ufm. jic^cn.

— 24 —

^cr DRcic^gfanjler oil bic ^dfcrttc^cn Sotfd^affcr in ^nrig, bonbon, 6t.^efcc8'
Burg tjom 23. 3uli 1914;

^ic 53er5ffcnt(icf)utigcn bcr Ofterrcid^ifi^'Ungarifci^cn JRegici'ung u6er bic Umftdnbc,
untcr benen haB 'Hitttntat aiif ben o|!crrcid^ifc^en X^roufoCger unb feinc @ema[)Hn
ftattgefunbcn l^at, ent^iillen offcn bic '^kUf bic firf) bic gro§[cibifc^c ^ropaganba
gcfep [)at, unb bic Witki, bercn fie fic^ jur ^Scrmirflic^ung bcr[e[6en bebicnt. Slud[>
ittuf[en butc^ bie bcfonnt gcgebcncn ^at[acf)cn bie [c|ten glucifel baru6er fdbiuinben,
ha^ ha^ 5lftion83entrum bet S3e{ltc6ungen, bic auf Coglofung bcr [ubf(atoi[dben ^ro*
D^injcn Don bcr oftcrreic^ifd^'Ungarifc^cn 5Jtonarrf)ic unb bercn ISercinigung mit bcm
tfcrbifc^cn 5?onigreic^ ^inau8laufcn, in Sefgrab ju fur^cn ifl, unb bort jum minbcjlcn
iinit bcr 5?onni»cnj Don 5lngc§origen ber JRcgierung unb Slrmec [cine 2;atigteit entfaltct

3)ic ferbifd)cn ^rcibercien ge^cn au[ cine (angc JRcil^c Don 3a^^cn juriicf. 3^
j^cfonbcrg ma'rfnnter ^orm hat ber gvo^ferbifc^c S^auDiniSmuS iDo^renb ber 6o8'
[nifc^cn ^ri[i§ in bic Srfd^einung. 9iur ber njcitgc^cnbcn ©cibjlBc^crrfc^ung unb
pia^igung ber 5perueic^i[rf)'Ungarifcl^en JKcgicrung unb bcm cnergifd}cn Sinfc^rciten
'5)er @ro|mdc^tc loar e3 jujufrfjreiben, n^enn bie "iproDofotioncn, njeld^en Ofterreid^*
f^ngarn in biefcr 3^^* Don fciten (Berbicng au8gc[e^t "max, nir^t jum ^onfliftc
^fii^rtcn. 1)it ^uf\d)txm^ funftigen 5Bo^rDerl^a(tcn§, bic bic ©evbi[d)c JRcgicrnng
il)amo(3 gegcben ^ot, ^at fie nic^t einge^alten. Untcr htn Slugcn^ juni minbejlen-
anter flidfc^melgenber <t)u(bung bc8 amtfic^en 8crbicn8, f)ot bie gro^[crbi[rf)c ^ro*
i:}3ngQnba injrt)i[(f)cn fortgc[c|t on 5lu£Sbe^nung unb 3"tcnfitat jugenommcn; ouf if)r
l^onto ifl bag jungjlc 33erbrcci^en ju fc^en, bcffen ^^dben nadb l^ctgrab fu[)ren. 6g
il^ot fxdf in unjnjcibcutigcr Seifc funbgctnn, ba^ eg tt)ebcr mit ber ffiurbc nod^ mit
htx <Selb|ler^a(tung ber ofterrelc^ifcfj'Ungarifc^en SJlonnrc^ic Dcreinbar fcin n)iirbe, bcm
5J;reibcn jcnfeitg bcr ®rcn^c norf; Idnger tatcnToS ju^ufel^cn, burc^ bag bic ©irf)erl^cit
unb bic 3»^f9^**^t i^i^f^ ©ebietc bauernb bebroI)t mirb 55ci biefcr @arf)[age fonnen
i)(ii S3orge^cn foiric bie l^orbcrnngcn bcr 6)lerrcirf)ifd^-ungorifd^en S^itegicrung nur ofg
gered^tfcrtigt angcfe^en njcrben. 5^ro^bem frf)(ie§t bic ipattung, bic bic offeiitlid^c
9)icinung foivo^t a(g aurf;> bic Sfiegicrung in ©erbien in tester '^t'lt eingenommcii [)at,
bic ^cfurd)tung nic^r aug/ ha^ bie <Serbifc^e Diegicrung eg ab(e[)nen iDirb, bicfen
i^orbcrungcn ju entfprcd)cn, unb ba^ jlc fid^ ju ciner proDofatorifc^en ^altung
•Ojterreid^ Ungarn gegeniiber- l^inrcipcn Td^t. (B iDurbc ber C)flerreic^vfd^'UngQrifd)en
'JKegicrung, loiK fic nid^t auf iC)rc 6tellung otg ©rofmar^t cnbgiUtig 5^erjid)t [etftcn,
iiid^tg anbereg iibrigbleibcn, a(g \i)xt ^orbcrungen bci bcr @crbifd)en 5Rcgierung burdE)
einen flarfcn Drucf unb notigcnfallg untcr bcr grgreifung mititdrifc^er 9]Ra^na[)mcn
burd^^ufc^en, iDobci i^r bie Sa^t ber Witkl iiberraffcn blciben mu^.

(£n). nfu) bccl^rc ic^ mid) ju erfuc^cn, f.c^ in Dovflet)enbem Sinne (bcm bcr*
^eitigen 53crtretcr beg .^crrn 53iDiani) (Sit (Sbmarb ®rcp) (Scrrn ©afanoiu) gegen<
iibcr augjufprcd^cn unb bubci.inSbcfonberc bcr ?lnfc^auuug nac^briuf(ic^ Slugbrud ^^u
Dcrlci^cU; t>a^ eg \\d) in ber Dorlic^cnbcn ^ragc urn einc (cbiglic^ ^mifc^eii Oj^erreicb'

-- 25 ~

Ungarn unb (SctSicn jum 2lu8trag ju bringcnbe. Slnger^gcn^cit ^anbefe, bic ouf Ut.
Beibcit biteft ^^cteitigtcn ju Bcfc^ranfcn ha^ ernjlc 23c|trcbcn bet 9}ta(^te fcin muffe.
5Bir h)un[i^en bringcnb bic l?ofa(ificrung bc8 ^onfliftg, iPciC jcbc§ ©ingtcifcn einet
anbereu 9)k(^t infofgc ber »er[c^icbenert 58unbnig»crpfiic^tungcn unabfe^bare^onfcqucnjcn
nad) fic^ ^ie^en tt?urbc.

eincm gefdlligcu tclegra^.'^^ifc^cn ^cric^t xibtx ben S3crtauf 3^}^^^ Untevvebung
werbe i($ mit 3"tfi^c[ic cntgcgcn[e§cn.

mutate Z.

t>cv Xeic|>0tan?ler an i)ie 23ttn&C0regieruttcten,

X>erfrauti<:^! Scrtin, ben 28. ^uU 1914.

(£uer pp. tDoCen ber 9^cgicruiig, bei bet (Bit bcgraubigt ftnb", fpfgenbe Wit*'
teitung madden:

?lngefid)tg ber ^atfarf)en, bic bie 6ficrrcirf)ifci^«llngarifci^c JRegierung in i^rec
9^Dte an bie 6erbifd[)c ^Regievung befauntgegeben i)ai, miiffen bie [e|ten 3^eif«t bariibct
[d^njlnben, ba^ ba§ 5lttentdt, bem ber ofterreid^ifc^'ungarifd^e ^^ronfotgcr unb feinc
@emaf)Itn gum Opfer gefaHcn jinb, in ©erbien jum minbej^en mit ber ^onniDcng.
Don 2tngcl)origen ber <Ser6i[c^en 5Rcgierung unb Slrinec tjorbcrcitet ivorben ift. 63 ijl
cin <Probuft ber gro^[erbifd^en Seprebungen, bie feit ciner 9Rei[)e Don 3a^ren cine
OueCe bauernber 53eunvu^igungen fiir bic Ojlcrreid^ifd^^^Ungarifc^e S)lonarrf)ie unb fiir
ganj- Suropa gen^orben jinb.

^n .befonberg marfanter gorm trat ber gro^fcrbifc^c SC^auoinigmuS n)dt)rcnb
ber bognifc^en 5^riftg in bic 6r[d)cinung. 9hir ber loeitgc^cnben 8c(bj^6e[}crr[d)ung
unb 3)^d^igung ber 6jlerreic^ifc^4lngari[d)cn SHcgicrung unb bem encrgi[d)en (Sin*
fc^rciten ber ®rDf3mdd}tc h)ar eg jujufd^reibcn, locnn bie ^roDofationcn, toelc^cn
Oftcrreic^'Ungarn in biefer geit oon feitcn ©crbicng auggcfc|t roar, nid)t jum .^on«
fliftc fii^rtcn. I^ic gufic^cTung fiinftigcn ffio^locr^altcng^ bic bie ©erbifc^c JHegicrung
bama(g gcgeben f^at, i^ai fie nic^t cingel^altcn. Unter bzii Slugen, jum minbcfien
unter |^i((fd)tt)cigenber ^ulbung' beg amttid^en (Serbieng, §at bic gro^fcrbifc^c ^ropa«
ganba injttiifc^cn fortgc[c|t an Slugbe§nung unb 3"tcn|itdt jugenommen. dg ttjiirbe
ttjcbcr mit ber ffiiirbc noc^ mit i^rem SKccbt ouf (Selbflcr^altung oereinbar fein,
iDotttc bic 6ftcrreid)ifc^>UngaiH[c^e SRcgicrung bem ^reiben jenfeitg ber ®rcn3C noc^-
(dngcr tatcnfog 3u[e[)en, burd) bag bic ©ic^cr^eit unb bic 3"^f9i^itdt i^rer ©cbictc
bauernb bcbro^t njirb. ^ci biefer <Sad^[agc miiffen bag Sorgefien fon?ic bic (jorbe*
tungcn ber Ofterreic^ifc^Ungarifc^cn !Rcgierung a(g gcrec^tfcrtigt angcfe^cn n)erben.

— 26 —

<Die §lntiDort bet ©crbifc^cn Siegierung auf bie ^orbcrungen, mld)t bic fejlcr*
rcic^ifc^'ungaiifc^c 3Regierung am 23. b. SDitS. burc^ il^rcn Scttrcter in Sefgrab .^at
peHen (affcn, lajjt inbeffcn crfcnncn, ba^ bic ma^gebcnben ^aftoren in 8er6icn nid^t
gcfonncn [inb, it)rc bigi^crigc ^oUtif unb ogitntorifc^e Xatigfeit aufjugcben. <Dcr
Opcrvcic^ifc^'Ungarifc^cn Stegiciung mirb bcninad^, mil fic nic^t auf i^rc ©tcllung
a[3 ©rofjmac^t enbgiiitig iBerjic^t (cijltcn, nic^tg anbcreS fibrig bicibcn, a(8 i^rc gorbc»
Tungcn burcf) eincn j^arfcn ©rucE unb notigenfaQg unter bet ©rgveifung mintati[(f)et
tD^a^na^mcn butd)ju[e^cn.

gin^clnc tuffifc^e Stimmcn bettoc^ten c8 alg fel6ftDerfldnb(ic^e§ JRcd^t unb alg
bic ?(ufgabc JHu^ianbg, in bcni ^onflittc 3mi[d)cn Ofterteic^'Ungatn unb ©ctbien aftiD
flit Scrbien ^attei ju ctgteifen. giit bic qu3 cincm foic^en ©cf)tittc 5Ku|[anbg
te[u(tietenbc cutopdifc^c .'Ronflagtation gfaubt bic !i!Ron}oie SBtemia fogat ^cutfc^lanb
»etantn)ort(i(^ inad)en ju butfcn, fofcrn c8 nic^t 6fletrcid)>Ungarn jum 9tad)gebcn
toctanla^t ^ie tuffifc^c ^rejfc ficttt §icrmit bie Set^dltniffc auf ben ^opf. DHd^t
Ofletteic^'llngatn \)at ben ^onflift mit (Sevbien ^crootgctufen, fonbetn (Serbicn ijl
c8 gcn^efcn, ba^ burc^ cine ffrupc((o[c Segunftigung gtoBferbifc^ct Slfpirationen auc^
in 3:ci(en bet 6jletreici^i[d)'ungati[c^en SDionaid^ic bicfc [clbjt in i[)tet Gjijlenj ge*
fd^tbet unb 3"l^fli^^c Qcfi^afffn ^^^i ^^^ fc^lie^lic^ in bet ftcDei^aften %at Don
©ctajeroo i^tcn $lu8btuct gcfunbcn §a6cn. ®enn 5Ku^(anb in biefem 5^onflifte fiit
©ctbicn cinttetcn ju miiffen glaubt, fo ijl bag an fic^ gcn3i^ cin giiteg JRcc^t. 68
mu| fic^ abet batiibet flat fcin, ba^ c§ bamit bic fetbifc^en 53cfltcbungen auf llntct«
l^o^iung bet Gjijlcn^bebingungen bet ofletteid^ifd^'Ungatifc^cn 'iT^onatdjie ju ben feinigen
madjt, unb ba^ c8 aCfein bie 33etantwortung bafiit ttdgt, toenn au8 bem oftetteid^ifci^'
fctbifc^cn Qanbti, ben aHe iibtigcn ©to^nidd)tc ju lofalifictcn n)unfd)en, ein eutopd-
ifd^ct ^tieg cntpe^t. ^iefe 53etanttt}ottung SRu|(anb8 licgt Hat jutagc unb h)iegt
urn fo fd)n}etCT, al8 ®taf 53etc^to(b JHu^lanb offi^icd erftdrt \)a\, e8 bcabjld^tigc
ivebet fcrbifc^c ®ebiet8tei(e ju etujctbcn nocb ben 5^ejlonb be8 fcrbifc^en ^6nigteic^8
anjutaflen, fonbetn tootte (cbiglic^ 9iu()e Dot ben feine G^ijlenj gefd^tbcnben fetbifc^en
Umttiebeu ^abcn.

^ic fioltung bet ^aifetiic^cn SRcgietung in biefet ^tage ifl bcutlic^ botgc-
3eid)net. ©ic uon ben ^anflaiDiflen gegen 6(lettcic^'Ungatn betttebene §igitation
ctfltebt in intern 6nbjie(, mittc(8 bet 3^'f^^"^*"f^""9 ^^^ T)onaumonatd)ie bie
©ptengung obet 8c^tt)d(f)ung be8 <Dteibunbe8 unb in i^tet ^oigcmitfnng cine oodige
3folictung bc8 ©eutfc^en 9icic^8. Unfet cigenfle8 ^^^^^i^fff^ ^^\^ ""^ bcmnac^ an
bie 8eitc 6fletteid)'Ungotn8. Die ^flid^t, 6utopa toenn itgcnb mogtid} Dot cinem'
allgcnicincn 5^iicge ju bemai)ten, weifl un8 g(eid)3eitig batauf^in, biejenigen Se-
jltebungcn ju unterflii^cn, bie auf bie Cofalifierung be8 5^onflift8 [^injielcn, getten
ben 9iid)t(inien betjenigen "ipolitit, bie toit fcit nunme(}t 44 ^o^ten im 3"tetef[e
bet $luftec^tct^a(tung be8 eutopdifc^en f}tieben8 mit (5tfo(g butc^gefii^tt §aben.
©ottte inbe8 ipiebet Gt^offen butc^ cin Gingteifen SRu^lanb8 bet Stanbtjevb eine
6tn?citetung etfa^ten, fo hJiitbcn n?it gctreu unfetet 53unbc8pflic^t mit bet ganjcn
Wlaifi be8 9Reid)8 bie 9kd)batmonatc^ie ju untcrj^ii^en ^abcn. 5Rut gc^mungen
njetben roit jum ©d^mette greifcn, bann abet in bem tu^igen S3ett)u^tfcin, ba^ mit
aw bem Unveil feine ©ctiulb ttagen, ba8 ein ^tieg iibct Gutopa8 536lfct btingen mii^tc.

— 27 —

Cetectramm be^ Kaifcrli4>en ^otf4>aftcr0 in 5Pien
an &en Xei4)0fan?ler t>om 24. 0uli 1914.

©raf 53erc^to(b l^dt l^cutc ben $Ru[fifc^cn ®efc§aft§tragct 511 fid^ gcbetcn, urn
i^m cingcf)eiib iinb freuubfc^aftlic^ ben ©tanbpuutt Ojlerrcic^'UngarnS Setbicn gcgcn^
iibct augeiudnbei-^ufelcn 9^ac5 5Rcfapituliening bcr ()i[li)tifc^cu 6iitluicfc[iing bcr
fcl^ten 3a^rc bctontc er, baf bic 9)^onarci^ic nic^t baraii bcnfc, ©crbieii gegeniibct
erobernb aufjutretcn. Oflcrrcid^-Hngarn ircrbc fcin fcrbifd)eg ^evvitortum beniifprurf}cn.
(!g f^aik ftricft baran fe|^, ba^ bcr ©cbritt nut cine bcfinitiDc S}?a^regcl gcgcniibcv
ben ferbifc^en 5Bu^[ereien jum ^\tk [)abc. 5Rotgebrungcn miiffc Ofterrcid^'Ungarn ©avantieu
fiir ein rocitereS frcunbfd^aftlid^eS 23er[)a[ten ©crblcnS bet 5)^onavcl^ic gcgeniibcr Dcr^
(angen. S§ liege iC}m fern, cine 53cr[c^iebung bcr 5J^acl^tDcr[)a[tni[fc im Saltan ^cv*
beifii^ren ju njoHen. <Der ©cfc^aftgtragcr, ber noc^ feinc 5Bcifungcn aug ^cterSbuvg
Ijattt, l^at bie 5lu8fu^rungen beS ?SJiinifter8 ad referendum gcnommen mit bet
3ufage, fic fofort ©afanolD ^u untcrbrciten.

TcUQvamm bc^ Haifevlid^en 15otfd;>aftev^ in Peterebutcf
an ben Kei4>etan?ler t>om 24. Juli 1914.

©en 3n^a(t t)c8 erlajfcS 592' l^abe ic^ foeben in ciner (angen Unterrcbung
mit ©afanoh) eingcr}enb Dcrmertet. 'Der 9}lini|lcr crging fic^ gegen Oj^crrcic^-Ungarn
in ma§(o[en ?lnflagen unb ttjar fe^r crrcgt. 2luf ba8 bcjlimmtcftc erf [arte er: ba^
bie fcrbi[d)'bj!crrcic^i[c^c Diffcrcnj jraifc^cn ben SSctciligtcn oUcin ouggctragcn njcrbc,
fonne Stu^lanb nnmoglic^ jutaffen.

3Mafle 5>

t)er 'Kaifexlid?c :»otf4>after in pctcv^bmg
an &m Xeic^0tan?ler.

Zcie^vamm uotn 26. 3uU 1914.

'£)ti Oj^crreic^ifc^'Ungorifc^e 55ot[c^after §attc [)eutc nad^mittag cine (angcre
Unterrcbung mit ©afanoh). Seibc SetciUgte fatten, trie fic mir nac^^cr fagten,
eincn bcfriebigcnben einbrucf. <Die 55crfic^erung be8 5Bot[c^after8, ha^ ^jlerrcic^'
Ungarn feinc grobcrunggplane l^aBc unb nur cnblic^ an fcinen ©rcnjen JRu^c ^aikn
Xoo\itj ^at ben 9)?inijtct fic^tlic^ bcru^igt.

^ 29 •-»

Cekgramm be& 2{aiferli4)m 15otfd;>aftct^ in Petersburg
an t>en Xei4>0fan?ler t>om 25. 0uli J9)4.

S)^clbun3 fiir 6. 9Jt. Don ©cncrat oon (E^cHuS. 3^ ^raSnoeragcr iDurbcn
f)cute bic 2:ru))pcnu6ungen ptollic^ a6ge6rocE)cn, unb bic jReglmcntcr fe^ren in i^rc
©arnifonen fofort juriicf. 'Die SJlanooer fmb aBgcfogt n)orbcn. ^Dic ^ricgSfc^uter
icutbcn [}eutc flatt im y^txb^ ju Offi.^icrcn beforbevt. JJbet haB 53orgel^en CJtcrrcic^S
^crtfc^t im ^anptquartict gro^c Slnfrcgung. 3^) '^^^^ ^f" (Sinbrucf, boj} attc SSot*
bctcitungcn fiir bic 9)b6i(mac^ung gcgcn Oj!erteic^ gctroffcn Jverben.

^elegrantm i>c^ Kaiferli4>en 15otfd?aftcve^ in Petersburg
an ben Xei4>0fan?ler t>om 26. Juli 1914.

3f^ §artc eg fur f4er, baB fiir ^\m unb Dbeffa bie SJlobiimoci^ung befofjCcn
ttjorben ift. ^ei 5Qar[c^au unb 3]Rogfau ijl bieS frogiic^ unb 6ci htw anbercu n?ol^t
norf) nic^t bcr (^att.

^Telegramm &e0 5Caiferlict>en 3{onfulaf6t>ertt>efer0 in
Hovono an ben Xei4>stan?ler t>om 27. Juli 1914.

3n S^oreno .^rieggjuflaiib evflort.

^elegramm J^ee 'Kaiferlict>en 6efan&ten in Hem
an ben Xeic^sfan^ler vom 27.0ulil914.

erfnf)rf juDcrtaffig, bojj fvanj6[i[c^e8 XIV. S^orpg SJianovcr abbrad^.

— 29 —

3Ittrage 10,

Teiegvamm bcB Xeic|)0fan?ler0 an J)en T^aifetiid^m
23otfc|)after in Conbon.

Dringenb. 26. JuU 19J4.

0|!en:cic6'Ungain §at in ^etcr86urg offijieH unb fcicrlic^ crflort, bo^ c8
fcinen tcrritoriarcn ©ctoinn in ©crbicn 6ea6fic^tigt, ben S3cf!anb .bc8 ^onigreic^S
nic^t antajlten, fonbern nur JRu^c [c^ajfen toottc. 9lac^ [)iet cingcgangcncn ^ady
rid^tcn fte§t in SRuptanb Sinbcxufung mc§rcrct SRcfcrDijUcn'^Q^tgonge unmittelbat
bcDor, tDa§ ciner 9)lD6i(ifterung quc^ gcgcn un8 glcic^fommcn. njutbc. fficnn fic^ bicfc
9iad)tic^ten bctoa^r^citen, fo toerbcn tt)it gcgcn unfcrn SBunfc^ ju ©cgcnma^rcgcln
gcjtDungcn. Sluc^ ^cutc noc^ gc^t unfcr ©ttcben ba^in, ben ^onflift ju (ofalificrcn
nnb ben curopdifc^cn gricben ju cr^alten. Sir bitten ba^ct in bicfcm ©innc in
Petersburg mit aUcm 9iac^brucf ju teirfen.

STelecframm be^ Kcid^&tan^tcvfd an ben Haiievlid^m
15otf(i?aftcv in Paria. X>om 26. Onli i9H.

9kc^bcm Ojtcrreic^'llngarn JRu^ronb offijieU crftart ^ot, ba^ e8 feinen tcrritorialcn
©ctuinn bcabfid^tigc, ben 53ejtonb beS ^onigreic^g nic^t Qntojten tooUt, iiegt bie
Sntfc^eibung, 06 ein europaifc^cr ^rieg entjle^en foil, nur 6cl 9lu^lanb, ba^ bie
gefamte 53cranttt>oitung ju tragcn l^at. Sir oertrauen auf ^^ranfreii^, mit bem roir
un8 in bem Sunfc^e um bie Sr^altung bc8 europdifc^en griebenS ein8 tt>iffen,
bo^ eg in Petersburg feinen (Sinflu^ in beru^igenbcm ^Sinne gettenb madden toirb.

glttlage 10 b.

^elegramm &C0 Xcic^efan^kr^ an ben Haifexlid^en
15otf<i^aftet in Petevidbms vom 26. Juli 1914-

?Roci^bem 6|terreic^ fein tcrritorialeg ^egintcreffement feierlid^ erfldrt f)at,
ru^t bie 33erantn)ortung fiir cine etjcntuclle ©torung bc8 europdifc^en ^icbeng
burd) cine ruffifc^e 3"ter»ention attein auf ?lufelflnb. Sir toertrauen immer noc^
barauf, ta^ 5Ru^lonb !eine ©c^ritte unterne^men toirb; bie ben europdifc^en grieben
ernftlicl) gefdl^rben wurben.

— 30 —

C^elegramm bad Kaiferlic^en 15otf(i?afteve in Petereburcf
an if en Xei4)ef angler vom 27. 3uli 1914.

SD^ilitdrattad^c mefbet uber -(Sefptad^ mit ^rieg§miniflet:

©afanon? ^a6e biefen Ie|tcrcn gebcten, mic^ iiber bic Cage aufjuflarcn. ^et
^ticggminiflcr ^at mit fein S^rentoort barauf gcgeben, ba^ nod) fcine 9Jiibilmac^ung§.
otbre crgangcn fci. G8 mutbcn Icbiglic^ oorlaufig 33or6crcitung8ma^nal^men gctroffcn,
abcr c§ fei fein SHefcroijt cingcjogen unb fein ^[crb augge^obcn. 5Cenn Ojlerrcic^
bic fcrbifc^c ©rcn^c uberfc^tcitcn njcrbe, fo toerbcn biejcnigcn 3)ii(itar6e3irEe, bic auf
Cjicrrcic^ gcric^tet jinb, ^ictt), Obef|a, 9]Ro§fau, ^afan, mobilifiert iDcrben. T)icicnigcn
an bet beutfc^en gront, SBatfc^au, 5Bi(na, ^ctcrgbutg untcr fcincn Umfldubcn. Wlan
tounfc^c ben grieben mit ^cutfd^lanb bringcnb. 2luf meinc gragc nac^ bcm Sttjccfe
bet 5Jio6itmac^ung gcgen Oflctteic^ etfolgtc 2lc^fe(jucfcn, unb eg njutbe auf bie ^i))Io'
matic ^ingcmicfen. ^d) fagtc bem 5Jiinij^et, baf man bic ftcunbfc^afttic^en $lbfic^ten
6ei ung n?utbige, obet auc^ bic attcin gcgen Oflcttcic^ gctic^tetc 2Jiobi(mac^ung al§
fc^t bcbto^lid^ anfe^cn ttjctbc.

gtittagc la.

^degramm ftee Xeic|>0tan?ler0 an ben Kaiferlict>en
25otfc^after in Conbon vom 27.0uli 1914.

Soil einem SSotfc^rag ©ir ©bmatb ©tcp'g, einc ^onfetcnj in Gonbon ju Dieten
abju^oUen, i|l ^icr bisect nic^tg befannt. 68 ijl fut ung unmoglicfe, unfeten Sunbeg^
genoffcn in fcinct 2lugeinanbcr[e|ung mit ©ctbien Dot cin eutopaift^eg ©ctic^t ju.
jic^cn, Unfetc 53ctmitte(unggtatigtcit mu^ fic^ auf bic ©cfa^t eincg oflcttcic^ifc^'
ruffifc^cn ^onjiifteg bcfc^tdnfcn.

glitrage 13.

Celegramm dee Xeic|)0fan?ler0 an i>en Haifevlid^en
15otfd?aftev in Condon vom 25. Onli 1914.

T)ie con ©it Gbmatb &xt\) jttjifc^cn 6ftcttcic^ifc^'[erbi[c^cm unb 6|letteic6ifcl^'
tu[fi[d)em ^onflitte gemac^te Untetfc^cibung ttifft ooUfommen ju. 2Bit njollcn cben*
fowcnig loie (Englanb ung in etj^eten cinmifc^cn, unb nac^ n)ie Dot octtteten mx ben

— 31 —

€tanbpunft, ha^ bicfc ^xa^t baburc^ fofalificrt Bteibcn imij}, ba^ otte !Diac^tc fid)
ber (Sinmifc^ung tntijaikn. (Eg ifl beS^nlb imfcrc briugenbc §ot[nung, bn{5 Shijjfnnb
fic^ eine§ jcben oftben 6ingrip cnlf)a[tcn tDivb, iin "BcttjuBtfciu [cincr 55evnntivorhing
unb be§ grn|!c§ bcr (Situation. SBir fiiib, falls ein 5[tcrrcirf)i[c^'Vu[fi[rf)cr Stvcit
entf^el^cn fofltc, bcreit, oor&e^attlic^ unfercr bcfannteu 53unbni§pflicE)teu, 5n)i[cl)en Shij}-
lanb unb Ojlerrcic^ mit ben nnberen ©ro^mdc^tcn jufamuien cine SSermittlung cin*
treten ju lajfen.

C^elegramm ftee Kcid^^tan^Uve an ben Haifevlid^cn
15otfd?aftcv in pctcv^bmg t)om 28. Juli 1914.

Sit bcmii^en unS unauggc[e|t, Sim ju oerantaffcn, in Petersburg 2^td unb
Hmfang be§ ofterreic^ifc^en 5?orge[)en8 in ©erbien in einer unan[ec^tborcn unb ^offent*
[id) Sflujjianb befriebigenbeu Sei[e flarjulegen. Micron anbert auc^ bie in3n)i[c^cn cr*
folgte ^riegSerfldrung nic^tS.

ZekQvamm bc^ Xeic|)0tan?ler0 an &en HaifetUd^en
23otf4)after in Conbon vom 27. 3nli 1914.

2Bir l^aben bic SetmittcrungSaftion in SBien in bcm »on ©ir (Sbnjatb ©ret)
gcnjiinfc^ten ©inne fofort cingeleitet. llberbieS ^abcn njir ®raf Serc^tolb auc^ ben
Sunfc^ beS 5cvrn ©afanon? Quf birefte SluSfprac^c mit Sien mitgeteitt.

TdcQvamm be& 2{aiferlicJ>en Sotfc|)after0 in 5Pien an
ben Xeic|>0tan?ler vom 28. Juli 1914.

®raf Serc^tolb bitkt mid), (guerer ©jjctleuj feinen i)er6inblid)en T)anf fur
S)^itteilung beS cnglifd)en SermittelungSDorfc^lagS ju fagen. Sr bemerft jeboc^ baju,
ta^ md) ©roffnung ber geinbfeligfeiten fcitenS ©erbienS unb nac^ ber in^roifd^wi
crfolgten ^ricgSerflarung er ben (Sdiritt ^ngfanbg alS berfpatet anfe^en muffe,

— 32 —

Zde^amm i)e0 Xeic|)0tan?ter£> an ben HaifctUd^m
Hotfd^aftct in Pavi^ vom 29. Oniu

©ic un8 u6ct franjojifc^e ^ricgSoorBcreitungcn jugc^cnben 5Rac^ric^tcn mc^rcn
fic^ oon ©tunbc 3U ©tunbe. 3<^ ^^^tc bieg 6ei bcr i5ran36fifc^en Sicgicrung jur
©prad^c ju bringen unb fic einbringlic^jl barauf ^itijutocifcn, bo^ un8 berartigc
SRafno^men ju ©d^u^ma^regetn jhjingen njurben. ©it ttJiirbcn ^rieg§gefa^r profta*
mieren mujfcn, unb tomn bic8 aud^ tioc^ fcinc (Sinbcriifungen unb noc^ nid^t
SJlobitiftcrung ^ebcute, fo njurbc babutc^ immcr^in hit 8pannung cr^o^t n^crben.
tffiir ^ojften fortgcfc^t noc| auf (Sr^altung bc8 gricbcnS.

^elegftamm &C0 5JtilMrbet)oUtnd4)ttc(ten in* St. peters*
burof an S. ill. ben Haifev vom 30. Juli.

®c|!etn fagtc mir (^iirji Stroube|fi, noc^bcm cr toeranlap §otte, bog (Suet
SB^ojel^Qt ^elegtamm on ^aifet ?RifolQu8 fofort ubermittclt hjiitbc: ®ott(ob, ba^ cin
^clcgtomm 3^«8 ^ai[ct& gefommcn ijt. (£t fagte mit nun foebcn, baS Stclcgtomm
l^dttc ouf ben ^Qifet tiefen Ginbtucf gemac^t, abet ha blc 5Jio6i(i|ietung gegcn
Ojlctteic^ beteitS befo^lcn genjcfcu unb ©afonoro ©cine 9)^ajeflat tuo^l baoon uber*
jeugt f)attt, ha^ c8 ni(^t me^t moglit^ fei, jutucfjunjeic^en, fo fonnc ©einc !!)^ojcj^dt
.teibet ntd^tS mcl^t anbctn. 3^*^ 1^9*^ ^W batauf, bic ©d^ulb an ben unabfe^botcn
^olgen ttagc bic ftii^jeitige 3Jiobi(ifietung gcgen ha^ boc^ nut in eincn tofalcn ^ticg
mit ©etbicri Dcrmicfclte ^jlettcic^-Ungarn, bcnn ^cutfc^lanbg 5(nttt)ott botauf [ci tt)o^C
flat unb bic 33ctanttt}ottung fielc auf 5Ru^[anb, n)clrf)C§ 6petrcic^'Ungatn§ 3uprf)erung,
ba§ e8 tcttitotiafc Gtn?ct6ungcn in ©crbicn in fcinet 5Bcife bcabfic^tige, ignoricrt
l^abc. 6ftettcic^'Ungatn §a6e gegcn ©ctbicn unb nirf)t gcgen JHu^lanb mobilifiett,
unb jum fofottigcn Singteifcn fei fcin ®tunb fut 9Ru|(anb. 3<^ f"9t^ ^^^ toeiteten
j^inju, ba^ man in <Dcut[c^(anb bic JRebcnSatt SRu^(onb8 >n)it fSnnen unfcrc Stiibct
in ©ctbicn nic^t im ©tic^ (affcn« nac^ bem futc^tbatcn 53ct6tc(^en »ou ©ctajcmo
nic^t mc§t octjlc^e. 3'^ W^ ^^^ fd}nc^lid^, et mogc, toenn ©cutfc^ianbg ©tteitmad^t
mobilijictt hjctbc, fic^ nit^t njunbetn.

— 33 —

gfttlage 19.

^clegramm ^ee Xei4)0fan?ler0 an bm %aifcvlid?cn
:&otfMftev in Xom vom dh Juli 1914.

^ortge[e|t ijt Don un8 3VuifcI)en JRuplanb unb 5flcri'cicl^'Utigarn fowo^r burc^
bireEten 1)epe[f^einvec§[e[ ©elncr 3)^Qiej^dt be8 ^aiferS mit ©eincr 9)taj[cjidt bcm ^Q^'C"
aU and) im 55enc[)mcn mit 6it Gbiuarb ®rc^ tjermitteft iDOvbcu. ^urc^ bic 3]RobUi«
fictung $Hu^(anb§ jinb jebod) alle unferc Semii^ungen fe^t crfc^mctt, toenn nic^t
unmogfid) gemac^t. ^tD| beru^igenber 53erfic^ctungen ttifft 5Kup[anb affen un8 ju*
gegangcnen 9kc^tid}ten §ufo(ge fo n)eitger)enbc 9)^apna^mcn aiic^ gcgcn un§, baf3 bie
Sage immer bebro^lic^cr mtb.

I. Seine iRajeftdt an ben 3aven.

28. 3ua 10-45 p.m.

S)lit bet gr5pten 53eunru[)igung ^otc ic^ oon bcm (Sinbrucf, ben Oflcrreic^'Ungarng
53orgel^en gcgen ©erbien in ^einem Sicic^c l^eri)orruft. ^ic ffrupeUofc §lgitation,
bie feit ^^^^en in ©erbien getrieBcn toorben ijt, §at ju bem emporcnben S3er6tec^ett
gcfii^rt, beffen Opfer (Etjl^erjog ^ranj ^erbinanb gettjorben ift. 3)et ®t\% bcr
bic ©ctbcn i^ren cigencn ^onig unb [cine ©ema^lin morben tiep, ^ctrfc^t §cutc
nod^ in jencm Canbc. gnjcifcUog n^irj^ ^u mit mit barin ubcrcinjlimmen, ha^ tt)ir
beibc, T!u unb ic^ fowo^f, al§ dk ©ouDevdnc ein gcmcinfame§ 3"*f^^P boTan
l^abcn, barauf ju bcfte^cn, ba^ offe bicienigen, bic fur ben fc^eu^lic^en 9}lorb mo»
Tatifrf) l?etantn)ort[ic^ fmb, i^re berbicntc ©ttafc erlcibcn.

2lnbcrcrfcit§ ubctfe^e ic^ feinc8n)eg§, n)ic fd)micrig c8 fiir €5ic^ unb ©cine
5Rcgierung ift, ben ©tromungcn bcr offenttic^cn SJ^cinung cntgcgcn^utrctcn. Singebenf
bcr rjcrjlic^cn grcunbfc^aft, bic unS beibc feit (anger geit mit feftcm Sanb t)cr«
binbet, fe|e ic^ ba^cr mcinen gan^en Sinfluf ein, um Oj^crrcid^'Ungarn ba^u ju beftimmcn,
einc offcne unb bcfriebigenbe SScrj^dnbi^ung mit SRuptanb anjuftreben. 3'^ §offe ju*
bcrfic^ttic^, ha^ ©u mid^ in meinen Scmii^ungen, atle ©d^njicrigfeiten, bic noc^ cnt*
fle^cnfonnen, ju befeitigcn, unter|tu|cn mirft.

gcj. SBil^etm.

— 34 —

II. Der 3ar an Seine ^aje^dt

^etcrS^off. ^ftlaig, 29. ^uJi 1 p. m.
3c^ Bin crfreut, ba^ 'Du jurucE in <Deutfcf)fanb b'\% 3" ^icfem [o ern|len
5lugen6(icE 6ittc id^ <£)ici^ inj^aubig mir ju l^elfcn. (Ein fc^mo^lid^er ^ricg ijl an
eiu fd}tt)ac^eg Canb titlaxt ^Dorbcn, bie (Sntriifiung l^icriiber, bie ic^ uonig tcile, ift
in SRulJfanb ungel^euct. 3*^ f^^^ t)orau§, ba^ id) fe§r bolb bem ^tucf, bcr ouf
mid) an§geu5t n^irb, nid^t me^r ttjerbe tt)ibcrfte^cn fbnncn unb gejiDungen fcin njerbc,
9?k^regc(n ^u crgrcifen, bie jum ^ricgc fii^ren njcrtcn. Urn einem Ungd'icf, toie eg
ciii eufopai[(f}ev ^rieg fcin njutbe, uor^ubcugen, fcitte ic^ ©ic^ im SRomen unferet
alten i5^cw"^[c^«ft/ attfS ©it moglic^e 3U tun, urn ©eincn Sunbc§genoffcn booon
juriicfju^altcn, ju tocit ju gc^cn.

gej. 9lifo{auS.

III. Seine XRajetldf an ben daven.

29. 3ult 6.30 r. m.

3cl^ ^o6c Dein ^elcgramm er^atten unb teifc 'Dcinen 5Bun[(^ nad) gr^oltung
be§ griebeng. 3^^''^ ^o"" i<^ — ^ic ic^ ^it in mcinem erficn ^clegramm fagtc
— Sflerrcic^'Ungamg Sorge^cn nid^t aU ^fc^mci^lic^en ^rieg* bctrac^ten. 6j^errcic§«
Ungarn tt)ci{3 aug (Erfa^rung, ba^ ©erbieng Cerfprcc^ungen, mcnn fie nur auf bem
"iPapier fte^en, gdn^lic^ unjUDcrlaffig fmb. !0^einer ?lnfic^t nad) ijt 6flctreicE)'Ungarng
Sorge^cn olg ein Serfuc^ ju betroc^ten, DoDle ©arontic bafur ju er^atten, ba^ ©erbieng
55erfprcd)ungcn auc^ h?itf(id^ in bie %at umge[e|t mibtn. ^n bie[er 2lnfid)t njerbe
ic^ beflaift burc^ bie Srfldrung beg ojlcrreic^ifc^en ^abinettg, ba^ fejtcrreic^'Ungarn
feine tertitorialcn Grobcrungen auf ^ojten ©erbieng bcabfic^tige. 3^^ "^^i"^ ba^cr,
ta^ eg fur JHufitanb burc^aug moglic^ ijt, bem oj^erreic^ifc^'fcrbifc^cn ^rieg gegenubct
in bet 3RoD[c beg ^wf^^^werg ju oer^orren, o^ne ©uropo in btn fc^redtic^flcn ^ricg
l^ineinju^ie^en, ben eg jemafg erlebt i)at 3^ glaube, ba^ eine birefte Serjidnbigung.
jmifd^en Reiner JRegicrung unb 2Qien moglic^ unb njiinfc^engnjert ij^, eine SSerj^dnbi*
gung, bie — luic ic^ ©ir fcf)on teUgrap^icrte — meine SRegicrung mit aHcn
Kraften ju forbcvn bcmii^t ift. SRatiirlic^ n)iivbcn militdrifc^e 5}Ja^nn^men JKup*
(anbg, njclc^c 6jlerreic^'Ungarn a(g ©ro^ung auffaffen tonnte, ein UngriicE 6efd)(eunigcn,
bag luir bcibe ju oermeibcn n^unfd^en, unb miirben anc^ meine ©tcCung a(g Ser*
mittler, bie ic^ — auf dcinen Sipped pn meine ^^reunbfc^aft unb §i(fe — bereit*
tt)iUig angcnommcn ^abC; untergrabcn.

gc3. Sil^elm.

— 35 —

IV. Seine XTTajeflat an ^en 3aren.

30. 3un 1 a. m.
SJIctn Sotfc^after ift angctDiefen, ^etnc SRegicrung ouf bic ©cfa^rcn itnb
[d^rDeten ^onfequenjcn eincr 3)^o6iUfotion j^in^utoeif en / hai gfeid^c §a6c ic^ *Dit in
rncinem le|ten ^elcgtamm ge[agt. fejlcvTeid^-Hngaru ^at nur gcgen ©crbien mo6i(i»
jiert, unb jttjar nur eincn ^eit fcinet §lrnice. fficnn 5Rup(anb, xok e8 ic|t noc^
Deiner unb Reiner SRcgierung 5]^ittci[ung ber ^^att ifl; gegcn 6|lcrreic^'Ungatn mo6i(
mac^t, fo mixb bic SctmitttcrtoQc, mit ber ^Du mif^ in freunbfc^aftlic^cr 5Deife
6ctrautcft unb bic id^ auf 5)cinc auSbtiicflic^e 53ittc angcnominen ^abc, gcfa^rbct,
roenn nid^t unmogfid^ gcmoc^t. 'Die ganjc <Bd)\r)txt ber Sntfd^eibung ru^t je^t ouf
Deinen ©c^ultern, fic I^a5en bie SSerantoortung fur !Rricg obcr griebcn ju tragcn.

gcj. Sit^cfm

V. Der 3ar an Seine TTtajeftdt.

^ctcrH ^cn 30. 3ua 1914, U 20 p.m.
3d^ bantc T)ir oon Serpen fur 1)cine rafc^c Slntrcort. 3^^ cntfenbc ^cutc
5t6enb ^ati[[)ejf mit 3n|^i^"^tion. ©ie je^t in ^raft tretenbcn mifitarifc^en Wla^*
na^mcn fmb fc^on toor 5 ^agcn befc^loffen toorbcn, unb 3rt)ar au^ ©runben ber Set*
teibigung gcgen bic Sorbercitungen ^j!erreid^3. 3<^ ^'^ff^ ^^^ %^W^ 6«3en, ba^
biefc 3)^a^nQ^men in feiner SBeifc ^cinc ©tcttnng aU 53ermitt(cr 6ceinflu|yen werbcn,
bic 3d^ fc^r f)odi) anfc^lagc. 5Bir braud^cn "Deincn jlarEcn <Drucf auf 6ftcrrcid^,
bamit eg ju cincr SScrjlanbigung mit un8 fommt.

5^ico(au8.

^elegramm J^ee Xeict)0tan?let0 an &en Kaiferlic^en
Sotf4)after in Petersburg vom 3J. Juli 1914. t)ringen&.

^ro^ noc^ fc^tt)c6enber S3ermittcrung§Der^anblungcn unb ohYoof)[ toix fclbjl
bis jur ©tunbc feincrlci 9)^obilmac§ung8maBna^meu getroffen ^abcn, ^at 5Ru^lan6
gan^e ?(rmec unb f^fottc, alfo and) gegcn un§, mobiliftert. <Durd^ btefe ruffifd^cn
SJiapna^men fmb n)ir gcjwungcn hjorbcn, 3ur ©ic^erung bc§ SReic^g bic bro^enbc
5^rieg§gcfQ^r auSjufprcc^en, bic noc^ nic^t 9)Jobilifierung bebcutct. ^ic SJlbbirificrung
mu(3 aber folgen, fa[l§ nic^t 5Ru^(anb binncn jnjolf ©tunben jebc ^ricgSmo^na^me
gcgen un8 unb Ofterrcic^^Ungom cinjteat unb ung ^icruber bcflimmte grflatung
abgibt. Sitte bic8 fofort 5>txm ©ojonoto mittcilen unb (Stunbc bet Slittcilung
bra^tcn.

— 36 —

'^ckQvamm ba^ Xei4)0fan?ler0 an J)en 1{aiferli4)m
23otf4>after in pavie vom 3K Onli 1914, J)rinc(en&-

JRu^fanb ^at tro| unfctcr nod^ fc^meBcnben Scrmittcrunggaftion unb obttjo^t
n)it felbj^ .fcinerici SJlobifmac^unggmapna^mcn gctroffcn ^abcn, 3)^o6Umac^ung fetncr
gcfamtcn 5Irmec unb ^^totte, alfo nuc^ gcgcu unS; tjcrfiigt. S!Bit ^aben batnuf
bro^cnbcn ^ricgg^ujlanb crfldrt, bcm !D^obi[mQc^ung folgen mufj, faUS nic^t 5Ruf (anb
binncn 12 ©timbcu atte ^ricg§maJ3iia§mcn gcgen uni unb 6|tcrrcic^ clnf!eD[c. ^ic
2)lo6i(mQcbung bcbeutct unDcrmeibfic^ ^rieg 53ittc franjoftfc^c 3Regicrung fragcn,
d6 jic in cittern ru[fifc^-bcut[c^ctt ^tiegc ticutral blciben ttjid. 2lntn)ort tnuf binncti
18 ©tutibcn crfotgen. ©ofort ©tunbc bet gcficttten Slnftagc bro^ten. ©ro^tc (Ei(e
gebotctt.

STelecframm t)ee Xeic|)6fart?ler0 an ben Tiaifetlid^cn
23offct>after in petereburcf t>om K Ttuguft 12^^ p. m.

T>vinsenb.

j^qDS bie JRuffifc^e JRegierung fcinc befriebigenbe Slntttjort auf unfere gorberung
trteilt, fo ivoHen (Sucre ©jcKcnj i^r ^eutc ttad)tnittag8 5 Ul^t (tttittcrcuropdifc^c '^tii)
forgcnbc Grffarung ubcrrcic^cn:

Le Gouvernement Imperial s'est efforce des les debuts de la crise de
la mener a une solution pacifique. Se rendant a un desir que lui en avait
ete exprime par Sa Majeste I'Empereur de Russie, Sa Majeste I'Empereur
d'Allemagne d'accord avec I'Angleterre etait applique a accomplir un r61e
mediateur aupres des Cabinets de Vienne et de St. Petersbourg, lorsque la
Russie, sans en attendre le resultat, proceda a la mobilisation de la totalite
de ses forces de terre et de mer-

A la suite de cette mesure menacante motivee par aucun preparatif
militaire de la part de I'AUemagne, I'Empire Allemand se trouva vis-a-vis
d'un danger grave et imminent. Si le Gouvernement Imperial eut manque
de parer k ce peril 11 aurait compromis la securite et I'existence m6me de
I'Allemagne. Par consequent le Gouvernement Allemand se vit force de
s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majeste I'Empereur de toutes les Russies
en sistant sur la cessation des dits actes militaires. La Russie ayant refuse
de faire droit a cette demande et ayant manifeste par ce refus, que son action

— 37 —

etait dirigee centre TAlleinagne, j'ai Thonneur d'ordre de mon Gouveme-
ment de faire savoir a Votre Excellence ce qui suit:

Sa Majeste I'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain, au nom de TEmpire
releve le defi et Se considere en etat de guerre avec la Russie.

Sittc eingang unb ^eitpunft bet Slu8fu§rung biefer 3nfttuftion nac^ ruf jtfd^er
5cit bringenb bra^tcn.

?^kcframm ^e0 Haifctlid^cn Hotfd^aftcv^ in parte an
i>en Xeict>0fan?kr t>om K 2tugutl 1 >t^r 5 ixiin, nm.

?luf mcinc njiebcr^ofte bcjlimmte ^ragc, 06 3^^"f^^i<^ ii" S^ttc cinc3 beutfd^'
rufflfc^cn ^riege§ neutral bfcibe, txtiattt bet 9)iinijler^)rafibent mix, ha^ granfteid^
ha^ tun njcrbe, nja? feine ^ntcreffcn ii^m ge^otcn.

[Crown Copyright jReserved*

GREAT BRITAIN

AND THE

EUROPEAN CRISIS.

CORRESPONDENCE, AND STATEMENTS
IN PARLIAMENT, TOGETHER WITH AN
INTRODUCTORY NARRATIVE OF EVENTS.

LONDON:

PRINTED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OP HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

By HAZELL. WATSON & VINEY, Ld., London and Aylesbury,

Printers by Appointment to His Majesty the King.

To be purchased, either directly or through any Bookseller, from

WYMAN & SONS, Ltd., 29, Breams Buildings, Feiter Lane, E.G., and

54, St. Mary Street Cardiff ; or

H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE (Scottish Branch), 23, F«rth Street, Edinburgh • oi-

B. PONSONBY, Ltd , IIG, Grafton Street, Dublin; '

or from the Agencies in the British Colonies and Dependencies,

the United States of America, the Continent of Europe and Abroad, of

T. FISHER UN WIN, London, W.C.

1914.

Price One Penny,

CONTENTS.

Introductory Narrative of Events

Table of Contents of Correspondence laid before
Parliament

List of Principal Persons mentioned in the Corre-
spondence, showing their official positions

Part I. — Correspondence laid before Parliament
Part II. — Speeches in the House of Commons: —

(1) Sir Edward Grey (August 3, 1914).

(2) Sir Edward Grey (August 3, 1914).

(3) Mr. Asquith (August 4, 1914)

(4) Mr. Asquith (August 5, 1914)

(5) Mr. Asquith (August 6, 1914)

Page

iii.

xi.

xxvi.
1

89
97

97
98
98

INTRODUCTORY NARRA.TIVE OF EVENTS.

(1.)

On the 23rd June, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, nephew of the
Emperor of Austria, Heir to the Throne, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army,
left Vienna to attend army manoeuvres in the Province of Bosnia. On Sunday,
the 28th, he visited Sarajevo, the capital of the province, and made a progress
through the town accompanied by his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg. While
passing through the streets their automobile was fired on by an assassin. Both
the Archduke and Duchess were killed.

No crime has ever aroused deeper or more general horror throughout
Europe ; none has ever been less justified. Sympathy for Austria was universal.
Both the Governments and the public opinion of Europe were ready to support
her in any measures, however severe, which she might think it necessary to
take for the punishment of the murderer and his accomplices.

It immediately appeared, from the reports of our representatives abroad,
that the press and public opinion of Austria-Hungary attributed much of the
responsibility for the crime to the Servian Government, which was said to have
encouraged a revolutionary movement amongst the Serb populations of Bosnia
and Herzegovina.

That there had for many years been a strong Serb nationalist movement in
these two provinces there is no doubt. This movement in an earlier form had
swept the provinces, then part of the Turkish Empire, into the insurrection
against the Turkish Government in the seventies of last century, culminating
in the war of 1877-8 between Russia and Turkey. It had continued when
Austria took over the administration of the provinces under the Treaty of
Berlin in 1878. Austria then pledged her word to Turkey that her occupation
should not '' detract from the rights of sovereignty of His Majesty the Sultan
over these provinces." Thirty years later, however, in 1908, she suddenly pro-
claimed their annexation to her Empire. On the 7th October of that year, the
annexation was celebrated in Sarajevo by the firing of salutes and ringing of
cathedral bells, amid scenes of official rejoicing and popular apathy. Servian
nationalist feeling immediately asserted itself, and the Servian Government
protested to the Powers against the annexation as a "deep injury done to the
feelings, interests, and rights of the Servian people." Servia's attitude,
coupled with the resentment felt by Russia and certain other Great Powers,
nearly brought about a European war ; but after six months of extreme tension
she was induced to make a declaration abandoning her protest and promising
to live on good terms with Austria. Her nationalist aspirations still continued,
however, and were strengthened by her successes in the Balkan wars of 1912-13
—successes which were compromised by Austria's opposition to her territorial
expansion. As Servia grew, Austrian suspicion of her designs deepened.

(2.)

In the light of this history the storm of anti-Servian feeling which swept
Austria-Hungary after the Sarajevo murders is easily understood. It was a
feeling based on patriotism and loyalty. Europe was disposed to excuse its
exaggerations and to sympathise with its motives.

But the dangers to European peace which it involved were inimcdiately
evident from the reports wliich reached the Government in London. Anti-Serb
riots took place at Sarajevo and Agram. The members of the Serb party in
the Provincial Council of Croatia were assailed by their colleagues with cries
of "Servian assassins." Mobs in Vienna threatened the Servian Legation.
The Austrian press, almost without exception, used the most unbridled lan-
guage, and called for the condign punishment of Servia. There were signs

that the popular resentment was shared, and perhaps encouraged, by the
Austrian Government. Both the British and also the German Government
knew that the peace might be disturbed.

In view of these reports, it naturally became incumbent on disinterested
Powers to exercise what influence they possessed in a direction which would
reconcile justice with peace. Unfortunately, though the attitude of public
opinion in Austria, and, to a less degree, also in Germany, was plain, the inten-
tions of the Austrian Government remained almost equally obscure. The
Austrian Foreign Ofl&ce maintained an attitude of reticence towards the British
and Russian Ambassadors. On the 7th July the Government were careful to
make a public announcement that a joint meeting of the Cabinets of Austria
and Hungary, which had just taken place, was only concerned with the question
of dom.estic measures to repress the Pan-Serb propaganda in Bosnia. On the
Sth July the Minister-President of Hungary made, on the whole, a pacific
speech in the Hungarian Parliament, defending the loyalty of the majority of
the Serb subjects of the Empire. On the 11th July the Servian Minister at
Vienna had no reason to anticipate a threatening communication from the
Austrian Government, and as late as the 22nd July, the day before the Austrian
ultimatum was delivered at Belgrade, the Minister-President of Hungary stated
in Parliament that the situation did not warrant the opinion that a serious
turn of events was necessary or even probable.

His Majesty's Government had therefore largely to fall back on conjecture.
It was known that the situation might become serious, but it was also known
that Servia had made professions of readiness to accept any demands com-
patible with the sovereignty of an independent State. It was known that the
opinion of the Russian and French — and also of the German — Governments was
that the Servian Government was not itself to blame for the crime, but that
Servia must be ready to investigate and put an end to the propaganda which
had apparently led to it, and which was -said to have originated in part on Ser-
vian soil. Sir E. Grey advised Servia to show herself moderate and conciliatory.
He promised the German Ambassador to use his influence with the Russian
Government in the same direction. More could not be done, for no actual
evidence had yet been furnished that Servian territory had in fact been made
the base' for revolutionary operations. It was only knoAvn that a court-martial
had been set up at Sarajevo, the proceedings before which were secret. The
Servian Government stated that they were only waiting for the Austrian Govern-
ment to communicate the evidence thus collected before setting their own investi-
gations on foot. The Servian Government also stated that both the assassins
implicated were Austrian subjects, and that on a previous occasion the Austrian
Government had informed the Servian Government, in reply to enquiries, that
one of these men was harmless and was under their protection. It was remem-
bered that Austria had tried on previous occasions to fasten guilt on the Ser-
vian Government by means of police evidence brought forward in Austrian
courts, and had failed. It was therefore assumed on all sides that, before
Austria took any action, she would disclose to the public her case against
Servia. When Sir E. Grey said this to the German Ambassador on the 20th
July, the latter replied that he certainly assumed that Austria would act upon
some case that would be known ; but, as a matter of fact, His Majesty's Govern-
ment did not receive any statement of the evidence on which Austria had
founded her ultimatum till the 7th August.

It was, therefore, necessary to wait. The situation was as clear as it could
be made till Austria would consent to throw off her reticence. There was
nothing doubtful in the general international situation, no incalculable element
which Austria could not take into full consideration. Whatever she did, she
would know accurately the consequences of her action. The Triple Alliance
and the Triple Entente remained as they had always been. We had been quite
recently assured tliat no new secret element had been introduced into the former,
and Sir E. Grey had stated emphatically in Parliament on the 11th June that
the latter had remained unchanged so far as we were concerned. Russia's
interest in the Balkans was well known. As late as the 23rd IMay the Russian
Minister for Foreign Affairs had reaffirmed in the Duma the policy of the
"Balkans for the Balkans," and it was known that any attack on a Balkan
State by any great European Power would be regarded as a menace to that
policy. If Servia was, as the Austrian Ambassador said to Sir E. Grey on the
29th July, " regarded as being in the Austrian sphere of influence " j if Servia

was to be humiliated; then assuredly Russia could not remain indifferent. It
was not a question of the policy of Russian statesmen at St. Petersburgh, but
of the deep hereditary feeling for the Balkan populations bred in the Russian
people by more than two centuries of development. These things had been, as
Sir E. Grey said to Parliament in March, 1913, in discussing the Balkan war,
"a commonplace in European diplomacy in the past." They were the facts of
the European situation, the products of years of development, tested and
retested during the last decade. Patient work might change them, but the
product of years could not be pushed aside in a day.

(3.)

Yet two days were as much as Austria decided to allow for the task. On
the 23rd July she showed her hand. She delivered an ultimatum at Belgrade
and required an answer in forty-eight hours. She made ten demands, directed
towards the elimination from Servian national life of everything which was
hostile to Austria. These demands involved the suppression of newspapers and
literature, the suppression of nationalist societies, a reorganisation of the
Government schools, the dismissal of officers from the army, the participation
of Austrian officials in judicial proceedings in Servia, the arrest of two specified
men, the prevention of all traffic in arms across the frontier, a full explanation
of unti- Austrian utterances, and immediate notification of the enforcement of
these measures. In addition, the Servian Government was to publish on the
front page of the " Official Journal " a prescribed statement, which amounted
to iv full recantation of her alleged errors, and a promise of amendment. A
very brief summary was annexed to the ultimatum, giving the bare findings of
the secret trial at Sarajevo, with no corroborative evidence. No independent
nation had ever been called on to accept a greater humiliation.

Between the delivery of this ultimatum and the declaration of war between
Great Britain and Germany there was an interval of only twelve days. In the
whirl of negotiations which now followed, there was no time to draw breath and
ponder. At the outset, therefore, it may be well to explain definitely the
British attitude towards the Austrian ultimatum.

Austria was under provocation. She had to complain of a dangerous popular
movement against her government. What evidence she might have against the
Servian Government no one in Europe then knew. Great Britain had no
interest in the Balkans, except one. She desired the consolidation and pro-
gressive government of the Balkan States; she desired, in the words recently
used by tTie Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs before the Duma, that "the
Balkan Governments should recognise that, in the matter of strengthening a
State, the acquisition of territory is insufficient; the devotion and confidence
of the new citizens must be enlisted." The dispute between Austria and Servia
did not necessarily affect that interest; it was a dispute between two Govern-
ments with which Great Britain had nothing to do. Sir E. Grey, therefore,
consistently stated that he had no concern in that dispute; that he had no title
to intervene between Austria and Servia; that he would express no opinion on
the merits of the ultimatum. But there was the other side. If the dispute
affected the interests of Russia, then the peace of Europe was at stake; and,
from the first. Sir E. Grey told the Austrian Government that ho did not see
how Russia, interested as she was in Servia, could take any but a most serious
view of such a formidable document ias the ultimatum. The peace of Europe
must be maintained, and it could only be maintained, as Mr. Asquith had said
to Parliament in March, 1913, in discussing the Balkan crisis, by a "spirit of
forbearance, patience, and self-sacrifice "—by a "loyal spirit of give and take
on the part of the Great Powers directly concerned."" It was as the agent of this
spirit of conciliation alone that Great Britain intervened in the European crisis.

(4.)

On the 23rd July the Austrian Ambassador told Sir E. Grey that an ulti-
matum was being handed to Servia. For the first time Sir E. Grey heard that
"there would be something in the nature of a time limit." He immediately
expressed his grave alarm. Next morning the text of the ultimatum was
handed to him, and he learnt that the time limit was forty-eight hours. He

confessed to the German Ambassador that, as no time had been left for delibera-
tion, he felt helpless. There was no time to advise Russia or to influence
Servia.

At this critical moment everything depended on Germany. As the Russian
Minister for Foreign Affairs said a little later, "the key of the situation was
to be found in Berlin." What was Germany's attitude? Privately, the
German Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his doubts as to the ultimatum ;
officially, the German Government called it *' equitable and moderate," and
said that they "desired urgently the localisation of the conflict." Everyone
desired that ;, but it was no time for phrases. The same morning the Russian
Minister for Foreign Affairs had summoned the French and British Ambassa-
dors in St. Petersburgh, had said that Austria's step meant imminent war,
and had asked for the support of Great Britain and France. The French
Ambassador had pledged the support of France, as was well known to be in-
evitable under the terms of her alliance. The next morning the Russian
Government stated publicly that Russia could not remain indifferent to the
Austro-Servian conflict. The next evening troops in Vienna had to be called
out to guard the Russian Embassy from hostile crowds. " Localisation " was
a good phrase, but we had to deal with facts. Austria had surprised Europe,
and with surprise had come universal alarm.

During these forty-eight hours Great Britain made three attempts at peace.
Before all things, the time-limit of the ultimatum had to be extended. Great
Britain and Russia urged this at Vienna. Great Britain urged Germany to
join in pt^ssing the Austrian Government. All that Berlin consented to do was
to " pass on " the message to Vienna.

Secondly, Sir E. Grey urged that Great Britain, France, Germany, and
Italy should work together at Vienna and St. Petersburgh in favour of con-
ciliation. Italy assented; France assented; Russia declared herself ready j
Germany said she had no objection, "if relations between Austria and Russia'
became threatening."

Thirdly, the Russian, French, and British representatives at Belgrade were
instructed to advise Servia to go as far as possible to meet Austria.

But it was too late. The time-limit, which Austria would not extend, had
expired ; and after all Servia did not need advice. On the afternoon of
Saturday, the 25th, she returned to Austria a reply which amounted to an
acceptance of all Austria's demands, subject on certain points to the delays
necessary for passing new laws and amending her Constitution, and subject
to an explanation by Austria-Hungary of her precise wishes with regard to
the participation of Austro-Hungarian officials in Servian judicial proceedings.
The reply went far beyond anything which any Power — Germany not excepted
— had ever thought probable. But the same day the British Ambassador at
Vienna reported that the tone of the Austrian press left the impression that
a settlement was not desired, and he later reported that the impression left on
his mind was that the Austrian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable.
In spite of the conciliatory nature of Servia's reply, the Austrian Minister left
Belgrade the same evening, and Servia ordered a general mobilisation.

But an outline of the Servian reply had been communicated to Sir E. Grey
an hour or two before it was delivered. He immediately expressed to Germany
the hope that she would urge Austria to accept it. Berlin again contented
itself with " passing on " the expression of Sir E. Grey's hope to Vienna through
the German Ambassador there. The fate of the message so passed on may bo
guessed from the fact that the German Ambassador told the British Ambassador
directly afterwards that Seryia had only made a pretence of giving way, and
that her concessions were all a shanL

(5.)

During the next four days, 26th to 29th July, there was only One question
"before Europe — how could Russia and Austria be brought to an /agreement?
It was evident that Russia did not believe that Austria would, or could, stop
short of the absolute ruin of the Servian State, if she once actually attacked
it. Here again, the question was not merely one of Government policy ; the
popular sentiment of two great nations was involved. Austria indeed pro-
fessed, no doubt with perfect honesty, that she would take no territory from
Servia. But the Austrian Ministers were being borne along on a wave of

vii;

violent popular enthusiasm, Tliey said themselves that they would bo swept
from power if they did not follow the popular desire for a conflict with Servia.
Would this popular enthusiasm be content with any mere punitive expedition
against the enemy? Surely not. Russia, therefore, openly said that sho
would have to intervene if Servia were attacked; but she promised Austria
on the 27th that sho would use all her influence at Belgrade to induce the
Servian Government to give satisfaction to Austria, and only asked Austria
to delay hostilities in order to give time for deliberation. Austria refused,
saying it was too late. Sho declared war on Servia on the 28tli. Russia
ordered a partial mobilisation on the 29th.

But meanwhile Sir Edward Grey had proposed that the German, Italian,
and French Ambassadors should meet him in London, to discuss the best means
towards a settlement. Italy and France at once accepted; Russia said sho
was ready to stand aside; but Germany' refused. She did not like what she
called "a court of arbitration," and proposed instead direct negotiations
between Russia and Austria. These negotiations actually began, as we have
seen in the last paragraph, but they were cut short by the Austrian declaration
of war against Servia. Austria then apparently considered that the moment
for such negotiations was passed. She had, moreover, refused to discuss the
Servian reply in any way, and it was difficult to see, after that refusal, what
Russia could negotiate with her about. Russia, therefore, fell back on Sir E.
Grey's proposal for a conference of Ambassadors in London, which she had
originally expressed her readiness to accept. The Russian Minister for Foreign
Aff'airs urged Sir E. Grey to induce Germany to indicate in what way she would
consent to work for a settlement.

This bring!5 the narrative of events down to Wednesday, the 29th July.
Russia was mobilising partially in her southern provinces. Austrian troops
wet"o bombarding Belgrade. But, on the other hand, better news was coming
from Berlin. Up to the 28th at least, both Germany and Austria had seemed
unwilling to admit that the situation was really serious; Russia, it was said,
was unprepared, and France was in no condition to go to war. Germany had
said, in reply to Sir E. Grey's repeated advances, that she did not like to make
representations to Vienna for fear of stiffening Austria's attitude. But on the
evening of the 28th the German Chancellor assured the British Ambassador
that he was trying to mediate at Vienna and St. Petersburg!!. On the strength
of this assurance and similar assurances made by the German Ambassador in
London on the 29t]i, Sir E. Grey telegraphed to Berlin once more, in accord-
ance with the request of the Russian Government, urging the German Govern-
ment, if they did not like the idea of the Ambassadors' conference in the form
he had suggested it, to suggest any other form they pleased. "Mediation," he
said, " was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought
possible if only Germany would press the button in the interests of peace."
The telegram was despatched at about 4 o'clock oYi the evening of the 29th.

(6.)

This appeal was followed almost immediately by a strange response. About
midnight, a telegram arrived at the Foreign Ofi&ce from His Majesty's. Ambassa-
dor at Berlin. The German Chancellor had sent for him late at night. He
had asked if Great Britain would promise to remain neutral in a war, provided
Germany did not touch Holland and took nothing from Franco but her colonies.
He refused to give any undertaking that Germany would not invade Belgium,
but he promised that, if Belgium remained passive, no territory would be taken
from her.

Sir E. Grey's answer was a peremptory refusal, but he added an exhortation
and an offer. The business of Europe was to work for peace. That was the
only question with which Great Britain was concerned. If Germany would
prove by her actions now that she desired peace, Gseat Britain would warmly
welcome a future agreement with hei- whereby the whole weight of the two
nations would be thrown permanently into the scale of peace in years to come.

For the next two days peace proposals and negotiations continued, s(fmo
initiated and all supported by Great Britain. There remained a spark of hope.
But from the British point of view the face of Europe henceforward was
changed. On the 29th July the only conflict in progress had been on tho
frontiers of Servia and Austria ; the only fear of further war had lain in the

Vlll

relations of Russia and Austria. Germany's declarations were pacific ; Russia
had said she desired nothing but a period of peace to allow for her internal
development ; France would not fight except to help her ally. There had
seemed no insuperable difliculty in keeping the peace ; it was only a question
of allaying the mutual suspicion between Vienna and St. Petersburgh. But
now a new element of danger had been introduced. Great Britain now knew
that Gei many was contemplating an attack on France. She knew more. The
independence of the Low Countries had for centuries been considered as one
of the strongest means of securing the peace of Europe. Their position and
the nature of the country rendered them" the natural battlefield of Northern
Europe. If it was made impossible for a Great Power to invade thein, war
would become increasingly diii;calt and dangerous. With the growth of the
idea of a fixed system of \nternational law foundt^d on treaties, the neutrality
of Belgium had been devised as a permanent safeguard to this end. As such,
it had been consecrated by two international treaties signed by all the Powers,
and recognised by two generations of statesmen. Now, when the peace of
Europe was our one object, it was found that Germany was preparing to tear
out the main rivet of that peace.

Germany's position must be understood. She had fulfilled her treaty obliga-
tions in the pnst ; her action now vwa« not wanton. Belgium was of supremo
military importance in a war with France ; if such a war occurred, it would be
one of life and death ;- Germany feared that, if she did not occupy Belgium,
France might do so. In face of this siLspioon, there was only one thing to do>
The nejitrality of Belgium had not been devised as n pretext for wars, but to
prevent the outbreak of wars. The Powers must reaffirm Belgian neutrality iu
order to prevent the war now threatened. Tbe Bntisb Government, therefore,
on Friday, the 31st July, ask^d the German and French Governments for an
fingag§nient to respect Belgium's neutrality, and the Belgian Got-ernment for
an engngement to uphold it. France gave the necessary engagement the same
day; Belgium gave it the day after; Germany returned no reply. Hence-
forward there could be no doubt of Gorman designs.

Meanwhile, on the 30th and 31st negotiations continned between Russia and
Austria. On the 29th Gerniany had suggested to Austria that she "should s;top
as soon ^ her troops had occupied Belgrade. Late on the same night Russia
ofi'ered to stop all military preparations, if Austria would recognise that the
conflict with Seryia had become a question of general European interest, and
would eliminate from her nitimotum the points which involved a violation of
the sovereignty of Servia- As the result of this offer, Russia wa« able t^ inform
His Majesty's Government on the 31st that Austria had at last agreed to do
the very thing she had refused to do in the first days of the crjsis, namely, to
discuss the whole question of her ultimatum to Servfa. Russia asked the British
Government to assume the <li ruction of these discussions. For a few hours
there seemed to be a hope of peace.

(7.)

At this moment, on Friday, the 31st, Germany suddenly despatched an
ultimatum to Russia, demanding that she should countermand her mobilisation
within twelve hours. Every allowance must be made for the natural nervous-
ness which, as history has repeatedly shown, overtakes nations when mobilisa-
tion is under way. All that can be said is that, according to the information
in the possession of His Majesty's Government, mobilisation had' not at the
time proceeded as far in Russia as in Germany, although general mobilisation
was not publicly proclaim.ed in Germany »till the next day, the 1st August.
France also began to mobilise on that day. The German Secretary of State
refused to discuss a last proposal from Sir E. Grey for joint action with Ger-
many, France, and Italy until Russia's reply sho"uld be received, and in the
afternoon the Gorman Ambassador at St. Petersburgh presented a declaration
of Av-ar.. Yet on this same day, Saturday, the 1st, Russia assured Great Britain
that she would on no account' commence hostilities if the Germans did not cross
the frontier, and France declared that her troops would be kept 6 miles from
her frontier so as to prevent a colhsion. This was the situation when very early
on Sunday morning, the 2nd August, German troops invaded Luxemburg, a
small independent State whose neutrality had heen guaranteed by all the Powers

with the same object as the similar guarantee of Belgium. The die was cast.
War between Germany, Russia, and France had become inevitable.

Only one question now remained for this country. His Majesty's Govern-
ment failed in their attempts to secure a general peace. Should they now
remain neutral? The grounds on which that question was decided are clearly
set forth in the statements of Sir E. Grey and Mr. Asquith in Parliament,
which are cpntained in this volume,* and no additional explanations are needed
here. But one fact may be emphasised. From the 24th July, when Russia
first asked for British support, to the 2nd August, when a conditional promise
of naval assistance was given to France, Sir E. Grey had consistently declined
to give any promise of support to either of our present allies. He maintained
that the position of Great Britain was that of a disinterested party whose
influence for peace at Berlin and Vienna would be enhanced by the . knowledge
that we were not committed absolutely to either side in the existing dispute. He
refused to believe that the best road to European peace lay through a show of
force. We took no mobilisation measures except to keep our fleet assembled,
and we confined ourselves to indicating clearly to Austria on. the 27th July, and
to Germany on the 29th July, that we could not engage to remain neutral if a
European conflagration took place. We gave no pledge to our present allies,
but to Germany we gave three times— on the 30th July, the 31st July, and the
1st August— a clear warning of the eflFect which would be produced on our atti-
tude and on the sentiment of the British people by a violation of the neutrality of
Belgium.

After Germany's declaration of war on Russia on the afternoon of the 1st,
the Tsar telegraphed to His Majesty the King as' follows: "In this solemn hour
I wish to assure you once more that I have done all in my power to avert war."
It is right to say that His Majesty's Government believe this' to be a true state-
ment of the attitude both of Russia and France throughout this crisis. On the
other hand, with every wish to be fair and just, it will be admitted that the
response of Germany and Austria gave no evidence of a sincere desire to save the
peace of Europe.

Foreign Office, Sept, 28, 1914.

* See Part II.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CORRESPONDENCE LAID BEFORE
PARLIAMENT,

NOTE.

(1) Documents Nos^ 1-159 have been published as a White Paper,
Miscellaneous No. 6 (1914) [Gd. 7467].

(2) Document No. 160 has been published ais a White Paper,
Miscellaneous No. 8 (1914) [Gd. 7445].

(3) Document No. 161 has been published as a White Paper,
Miscellaneous No. 10 (1914) £Gd. 7596],

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.

Name.

To Sir H. Rumbold

Sir H. Rumbold ...
(Telegraphic]

To Sir M. de Bunsen

Communicated by
Austro - Hungarian
Ambassador

To Sir M. de Bunsen
(Telegraphic)

Sir G. Buchanan ...
(Telegraphic)

Sir M. de Bunsen ...
(Telegraphic)

Mr, Crackanthorpe
(Telegraphic)

German Ambassador

To Sir H. Rumbold
(Telegraphic)

To Mr. Crackan-
thorpe

(Telegraphic)

Date.

Subject.

1914.
July 20

Conversation .with German Ambassador r6sp6cting
disquieting situation between Austria-Hungary and
Servia. Sir E. Grey assumes that Austria-Hungary
will publish her case against Servia before taking
any action, and thus facilitate Russia counselling
moderation at Belgrade

Attitude of German Government. Secrctary^of State
prefers not to interfere, and considers that Austria-
Hungary has shown great forbearance towards
Servia in the past

Conversation with Austro-Hungarian Ambassador' re-
specting note to be sent to Servian Government.
Objections urged to insertion of time-limit. Dangers
of European conflagration ,.

vText of Austro-Hungarian note to Servia

Austro-Hungarian note to S6rvia; Conversation with
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador. Sir E. Grey de-
precates Austrian demands as inconsistent with
maintenance of Servian independent sovereignty ...

Conversation with Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs respecting results of M. Poincare's visit to
St. Petersburgh. Minister for Foreign Affairs and
French Ambassador urged that His Majesty's
Government should proclaim solidarity with them.
Former hoped in any case His Majesty's Govern-
ment would express strong reprobation of Austro-
Hungarian action

Views of Russian Charge d'Affaircs on situation as
expressed to Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign
Affairs

Servian Prime Minister hopes that His Majesty's
Government will use influence in moderating Austro-
Hungarian demands

Views of German Government on situation. . German
Government defend attitude of Austria-Hungary
towards Servia, and consider matter concerns those
States alone

Conversation with French Ambassador respecting
Austro-Hungarian note and possibility of mediation
by the four Powers

Conversation with German Ambassador, who justified
Austro-Hungarian action and demands, and urged
localisation of conflict. Question of using influence
at St. Petersburgh and Vienna in favour of modera-
tion. Ambassador says Servian reply must not bo
a nroro negative

Suggests lines of Servian reply to Austria-Hungary.
To consult with Russian and French colleagues as
to giving advice to Servian Government. Favour-
able reply should be given on as many points as
possible

TABLB OP CONTENTS.

Xiii

■13 Commiuiicafced by
I BuBsian Ambafisa-
dor

To Sir ,F, Bertie .,.

Sir G. Buchanan

(Telegraphic)

Sir F. Bertie

(Telegraphic)

Sir G. Buchanan ...
(Telegraphic)

Sir H. Rumbald ...
(Telegraphic)

Sir R. Rodd

(Telegraphic)

Sir M. de Bunse-n ...
(Telegraphic)

Mr. Crackanthorpe
(Telegraphic)

(Telegraphic)

To Sir G. Buchanan
(Telegraphic)

To Sir H. Rumbold

(Telegraphic)

To Sir M. de Bunsen
(Telegraphic)

1914
July 25

Russian Ambassador at Viennar instructed to request
extension of time-limit allowed to Servia, and to
urge that Austria-Hungary should inform Powers
of basis of accusations against Servia. Recommends
similar instructions to His Majesty's Ambassador ...

Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has stated that step
taken at Belgrade was not an ultimatum. Austro-'
Hungarian Government did not threaten actual mili-
tary operations. To infojrm Minister for Foreign
Affairs •. .>i

French Government have given Servia advice similar
to that advocated by His Majesty's Government (see
No. 12) .,.. ... ... ...

Acting French Minister for Foreign Affairs suggests
that moderating advice be given at Vienna as well
as at Belgrade ;

Russian Government consider^ that, in view of early
expiry of time-limit, it is too late to counsel modera-
tion at Belgrade Russia prepared to stand aside if
mediation of four Powers is accepted. Minister for
Foreign Affairs urges that Great Britain should
act with FFance and Russia. Situation will be des-
perate unless Germany can restrain Austria-Hungary

German Secretary of State adrnits intention of Austria-
Hungary to take military action against Servia.
His Excellency considers crisis might be localised.
He disclaims all previous knowledge of terms of
Austro-Hungarian note

Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs says Austria-
Hungary will only be satisfied with unconditional
acceptance of her note

Austro-Hungarian press comments sliow that Servian
surrender is neither expected nor desired. Austro-
Hungarian Minister will leave Belgrade failing un-
conditional acceptance of note by 6 P.M. to-day ...

Brief summary of projected Servian 'reply

Russian and French representatives still without in-
structions. In view of this and of proposed con-
ciliatory Servian reply he has abstained from
advising Servian Government. Probable that Russia
has already urged utmost moderation on Servian
Government ;

Departure of Austro-Hungarian Minister. Govern-
ment has left for Nish with diplomatic representa-
tives

Refers to No. 6. Approves statement as to attitude
of His Majesty's (government. Latter cannot do
more, but are anxious to ^prevpnr war. Suggests
that four other Powers should mediate at Vienna
and St. Petersburgh if Austria-Hungary and Russia
mobilise. German co-operation essential

Conversation with German Ambassador respecting
questionfor mediation between Austria-Hungary and
Russia. Ambassador thinks Austria might accept it

Russian communication to Austria-Hungary, asking
for an extension^ of time limit of ultimatum to
Servia, and enquiring data on which Austria bases
her demands. He should support his Russian
colleague

XIV

I^ABLE OF CONTENTS.

Name.

Date,

Subject.

To Sir F. Bettie ...
„ Sir H. Rumboid
;, Sir -G. Buchanan

ToBivl^

Eoda

To Mr. Grackan-
tliorpe

Sir M. de Bunsen ...
(Telegraphic)

(Telegraphic)

Sir H, Rumboid ...
^Telegraphic)

(Telegraphic)

Sir R. Rodd

(Telegraphic]

To Sir F. Bertie ...

,) Sir H. Rumboid

„ Sir R. Rodd ...

(Telegraphic)

To Sir F. Bertie

Sir R. Rodd

Communicated by
Servian Minister

Sir M. de Bunsen ...
(Telegraphic)

(Telegraphic)

Sir F. Bertie

(Telegraphic)

Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic)

1914.
July 25

Has informed German Ambassador of projected Ser-
vian reply (see No. 21), and expressed hope that
Germany will influence Austria-Hungary to receive
it favourably ...

Has informed Italian Ambassador of statements madd
to German Ambassador (see No. 25). His Excel*
lency states that Italy is anxious to see. war avoided

Conversation with Servian Minister. Although ready
to meet any^ reasonable demands of Austria-
Hungary, Servian Government could not agree to
abandon certain political ideals ...

Servian reply considered unsatisf'actofy. War regarded
as imminent ... .« ...

Reports conversation with German Ambassador.
Latter considers that Russia will remain inactive ...

Reports sudden return of Emperor to Berlin. German
Under-Secretary of State of opinion that Russia
will not move unless Servian territory is annexed ...

German Ambassador at Vienna instructed to pass on
to AuStro-Hungarian Government hope of His
Majesty's Government that they will take favourable
view of Servian reply. German Government cannot
go beyond this

Minister for Foreign Affairs welcomes proposal for
conference, and Italian Ambassador at Vienna will
be instructed accordingly -

To ascertain whether Minister for Foreign Affairs will
agree to a conference in London, and to ask that
French, German, and Italian representatives at
Vienna, St. Petersburgh, and Belgrade should
urge on Tespective Governments that, pending deci-
sion, all active military operations should be sijs-
pended "

It is important to know if France will agree to sug-
gestion that the four Powers should urge moderation
at Vienna and St. Petersburgh

Conversation with Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
who considers gravity of situation lies in conviction
of the Austro-Hungarian Government that their
prestige is involved

Text of Servian reply to Austro-Hungarian note ...

Conversation with Russian Ambassador. Russian
Government will not press for more time. Russia
cannot possibly remain indifferent if Servia is
attacked

Considers that Austria-Hungary is fully determined
on war with Servia

Freiich Government accept proposals respecting con-
ference. Necessary instructions sent to French repre-
sentatives at Berlin, Belgrade, Vienna, and St.
Petersburgh

German Secretary of State is opposed to British pro-
posal for a conference. In favour of direct exchange
of views between Vienna and St. Petersburgh. Ger-
many's position in the event of Russian mobilisation.
Secretary of State more hopeful

TABLE OP CONTENTS.

Sir G. Buchanan ...
(Telegraphic)

(Telegraphic)

To Sir E. Goschen..,
(Telegraphic)

To Sir G. Buchanan
(Telegraphic)

To Sir M, de Buasen

To Sir R. Rodd ...

Sir M. de Bunsen ...
Sir F. Bertie

French Ambassador

Communicated by
Russian Ambassa-
dor

»» »t

Sir G. Buchanan ...
(Telegraphic)

1914.
July 27

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' conversation
with Austro-Hungarian Ambassador respecting note
to Servia. Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that
Entente Po^yers should present solid front to
Germany

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has decided to
propose direct conversation between Vienna and St.
Petersburgh

German Ambassador informed that Sir E. Grey desires
to keep in touch with Germany so long as the latter
works for peace. Germany should urge moderation
at Vienna. Servian reply might form basis for dis-
cussion

Russian^ Ambassador informed of British attitude.
Question whether Russia would . take action if
Austria-Hungary agreed not to annex Servian
territory

Conversation with Austro-Hungarian Ambassador,
who reviewed Servian question at length. Sir E.
Grey expressed surprise at Austrian attitude towards
Servian reply, which seems already to involve deep
humiliation of Servia. British fleet will be kept
assembled, but this is no more than proof of anxiety
felt in coimtry

Conversation with Italian Ambassador, who agrees in
proposal for conference. His Excellency will recom-
mend to (German Government that Austria-Hun-
gary, Russia, and Servia should suspend military
operations pending- conference ,

Text of declaration of war by Austria-Hungary against
Servia

French Government agree to proposals of His
Majesty's Government for conference between the
four Powers in London

French Government in favour of British proposal ifor
conference, and are ready to send instructions
accordingly

Communicates telegram from Russian Minister for
Foreign Affairs to the effect that Russian GJovern-
mcnt are in favour of British proposal for confer-
ence, failing commencement of direct Austro-Rus-
sian conversations

Communicates telegram received from Russian Minis-
tor for Foreign Affairs to effect that German Govern-
ment appear to have taken no measures to induce
Austria-Hungary to modify attitude towards Servia,
and suggesting His Majesty's Government approach-
ing the Gorman Government. Key of the situation
really at Berlin

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs will use all his
influence at Belgrade to induce Servia to give, satis-
faction to Austria, but Servian territorial integrity
must be guaranteed and sovereign rights be re-
spected. He has proposed direct conversations with
Austria, ^ but would be perfectly ready to stand
aside if idea of conference accepted

tvi

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.

Name.

Date.

Subject.

^♦i Sir M. de Bunsen

(Telegraphic)

B7
58
59

61
62

♦53
64

65
€6
67

Sir R. Rodd

, (Telegraphic)

Sir F. Bertie

(Telegraphic)

Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic)

Sir m. as Bunsen ...

(Telegraphic)

Sir R. Rodd

(Telegraphic)

Mr. Crackanthorpo...
(Telegraphic)

(Telegraphic)

To Sir E. Gcschen...
(Teiegraphic)

1914.

July 27

(Telegraphic)

Reports conversation between Russian Ambassador
and Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs. Russia will be unable to localise
war. Russia will restrain Servia as long as possible,
in oi'dor to give time for a settlement. Russian Am-
bassador urged that conversations should be con-
tinued at St. Petcrsburgh

Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs* views as to con-
ference and suspension of hostilities.^ Possibility of
Servia accepting Austrian note in its entirety on
recommendation of four Powers .,

Has communicated substance of No. 46 to Minister
for Foreign Affairs, who is confident that Sir E.
Grey's observations to German Ambassador will
tend towards peace ...

Has communicated No. 47 to Minister for Foreign
Affairs, who fully appreciates standpoint of His
Majesty's Government. 'German Ambassadov has
informed Minister for Foreign Affairs that Austria-
Hungary would respect integrity of Servia, but gave
no assurance respecting her independence ... " ...

Refer.g to No. 43. German Secretary of State has
used similar language to French and Italian Ambas-
sadors. Agrees with his two colleagues in thinking
that German Government object only to form of
proposal respecting conference. Suggests Hcrr von
Jagow might himself bo induced to suggest lines
of co-operation

28 Minister for Foreign Affairs states that Austria cannot
delay proceedings against Servia, and would decline
any negotiations on basis of Servian reply. Nothing
could now prevent conflict

Conversation with Austro-Hungarian Minister for
Foreign Affairs, who says that war will bo declared
to-day, and that no mediation could bo accepted.
Has appealed to him to place peace of Europe first
and quarrel with Servia second

Has informed Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs of
substance of No. 27. He is telegraphing similar
instructions to Berlin and Vienna

Informs _ of conversation between Servian Charge
d'Affaires and Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs^
Servia might still accept whole Austrian note if
certain explanations were given her. Such e.xplana-
tions should bo given to the Powers, who should
then advise Servia to accept without conditions ...

Has urged greatest moderation on Servian Govern-
ment pending result of efforts for peaceful solution

Declaration of war by Austria-Hungary against
Servia '.

Refers to No. 43. Proposed confcrcnco would not
be arbitration, but private and informal discirssion
to find a settlement. Agrees that direct con-
versations between St. Petcrsburgh and Vienna
would be preferable

Ready to propose that German Secretary of State
should suggest method of mediation by four Powers.
Will keep the idea in reserve till result of Austro-
Russian conversations is seen 39

TABLE OP CONTENTS.

To Sir G. Buchanan
(Tekgraphic)

70 Communicated by
Count Bencken-
dorff

Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic)

Sir G. Buchanan ...
(Telegraphic)

S'ir M. de Bunsen ...
(Telegraphic)

(Telegraphic)

Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic)

1914.
July 28

(Telegraphic)

Tq Sir E. Goschen...
(Telegraphic)

Sir G. Buchanan ...
(Telegraphic)

Sir M. de Bunsen ...
(Telegraphic)

Refers to No. 55. Expresses satisfaction at prospect of
direct Austro-Russian conversations. Enquires fur-
ther as to proposed action at Belgrade '

Communicates text of two telegrams from Russian
Minister for Foreign Affairs to the effect that Rus-
sian Government will announce partial mobilisation
on the 29th July; that. Russian Ambassador at
Vienna has not been recalled; and thaib mediation
by His Majesty's Government is most urgent

Conversation with Imperial Chancellor, who ex-
pressed anxiety to work in concert with England.
Reasons for German refusal to support proposed con-
ference. As Russia had mobilised, he could no
longer urge moderation at Vienna. General opinion
at Berlin that Russia is unprepared for war

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs grateful for Sir
E. Grey's language to Gei-man Ambassador (see
No. 46). If. Austria crossed Servian frontier Russia
would mobilise. Has informed German Ambassador
that Germany should use her inftuence at Vienna ...

Informs of Austrian declaration of war against Servia

Russian Ambassador states that Austro-Hungarian
Government have declined Russian Government's
suggestion of direct discussion between Russian
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Austrian Ambas-
sador at St. Petersburgh. Russian Ambassador con-
siders conference in London of less interested Powers
the only solution

Chancellor states it is too late to act on British sug-
gestion that Servian reply might form basis of dis-
cussion. German Government had informed Aus-
trian Government that they quite «nderstood that
latter could not rest satisfied unless guaranteed that
demands on Servia should be carried out in their
entirety. Austrian Government had been advised
to say openly that hostilities had that exclusive
object

German Secretary of State states that any appearance
of pressing moderation on Austria would probably
precipitate matters. His Excellency is troubled by
reports of military measures in Russia and Franco

Refers to No. 75. Much appreciates language of Chan-
cellor, and will be very grateful if he can save the
peace of Europe. This country will continue to make
every effort in that direction

Partial Russian mobilisation ordered. Has communi-
cated substance of No. 68 to Minister for Foreign
Affairs. Mobilisation only directed against Austria.
As Austria has definitely^ declined direct conversa-
tions, Minister for Foreign Affairs will suggest to
German Ambassador return to idea of conference.
Views of Minister for Foreign Affairs on Italian
proposals (see Nos. 57 and 69). German Ambassador
says his Government are continuing to exert friendly
influence at Vienna

French and Italian Ambassadors agree that no steps
can now be taken to stop war with Servia. ^ Italian
Ambassador thinks that Russia might remain quiet
if Austro-Hungarian Government gave binding
engagement to Europe not to acquire Servian terri-
tory or destroy independence of Servia

40.
41

SVUl

TABLE OP CONTENTS.

80 Sir R. Rodd

(Telegraphic)

To Sir R. Rodd ...
(Telegraphic)

Mr. Beaumont

(Telegraphic)

Mr. Crack enthorpe...
(Telegraphic)

To Sir E. Goschen...
(Telegraphic)

Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic)

Sir R.- Rodd

(Telegraphic)

To 3ir F. Bertie ..

1914.
July 29

To Sir E. Goschen.

■*• ••

Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs suggests that
German Secretary of State might propose formula,
and that this might be concomitant with direct
Austro-Russian conversations

Understands that Austria will not accept any form
of mediation bet\yeen Austria and Servia. Italian
Minister for Foreign Affairs should speak at Berlin
and Vienna

Designs of Austria likely to extend considerably
beyond the sanjak and the punitive occupation of
Servian territory. Expected assistance for Austrian
army from Mussulman population in Servia

Has been asked by Servian Prime Minister to convey
his thanks for statement in the House of Commons
on the 27th July

German Ambassador states that Chancellor is endea-
vouring to mediate between Austria and Russia. His
Majesty's Government urge that Germany should
suggest some method by which the four Powers
could preserve the peace between Austria and Russia

German Secretary of State offers that in return for
British neutrality German Government would give
every assurance that they would make no territorial
acquisitions at thq expense of France. He was
.unable to give similar assurance as regards French
colonies. If neutrality of Holland were respected by
Germany's adversaries, Germany would give^ assur-
ances to do likewise. Operations of Germany in Bel-
gium depend oh action of France, but at end of war
Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not
sided against Germany

In view of partial Russian mobilisation, Italian Minis-
ter for Foreign Affairs thinks moment is passed for
further discussions on basis of Servian note. His
utmost hope is that Germany will influence Vienna
to prevent or moderate any further Austrian
demands on Servia . ...

Conversation with French Ambassador respecting
policy of His Majesty's Government. Has told M.
Cambon of intention to warn German Ambassador
that His Majesty's Government will not necessarily
stand aside if efforts for peace fail. On the other
hand, the present case is different from that of
Morocco a few years back, and if France becomes
involved His Majesty's Government, who are free
from engagements, will have to decide on their
attitude in the light of British interests

Conversation with German Ambassador. Austro-
Hungarian declaration of war having rendered direct
conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburgh
impossible, it is most important, in the event of
German Chancellor failing in his efforts at media-
tion, that Germany should propose some method
of co-operation between the four Powers

Has warned German ^ Ambassador ojf iDossibility
British intervention in certain , eventualities ...

Has communicated to German Ambassador text of
Italian proposals and of reply returned thereto (see
Nob. 64 and &1). Discussion of question of mediation

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Name.

Date.

Subject.

To Sir M. de Bilnsen

To Sir R. Rodd

Communicated by
Count Bencken-
dorff

1914.
July 29

Sir M. de Bunsen ...
(Telegraphic)

(Telegraphic)

Sir G. Buchanan ...
(Telegraphic)

Sir E, Gosohen -...
(Telegraphic)

Sip F. Bertie

(Telegraphic)

Conversation with Austro-Hungarian ^ Ambassador,
who attempted to justify attitude of his Government
in spite of readiness of Powers to assist in obtaining
•satisfaction from Scrvia

Conversation with Italian Ambassador. Italian Govern-
ment suggest that German objections to mediation
might be met by some change in procedure

Communicates telegraphic correspondence between
himself, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
and Russian Ambassador* at Vienna. (1) Austro-
Hungarian Government have been urged by
Russian Ambassador at Vienna to bo moderate
towards Servia; (2) negotiations with German
Government through Russian Ambassa,dor at
Berlin; (3) Atistro-Hungarian Government decline
direct conversations with Russian Government

In present temper of Austria-Hungary, irrevocable
steps may be taken unless Germany with the other
three Powers can mediate at once. Russian Ambas-
sador fears effect on Russian opinion if serious
engagement takes place before agreement is reached.
Reports interviews between the Russian and French
Ambassadors and the German Ambassador ...

Conversation with Russian Ambassador. Russia could
not see Servia crushed, but would acquiesce in mea-
sures that would safeguard Austria-Hungary's Slav
provinces from further hostile propaganda. Extreme
anti-Servian and anti-Russian sentiments of German
Ambassador to whom text of Austro-Hungarian
note was probably known beforehand

Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs has
informed Russian Ambassador that, as Russia
had mobilised, Austria must do likewise. No threat
meant. No objection to direct Austro-Hungarian
conversations being continued at St. Petersburgh.
Russian Ambassador more hopeful

German Ambassador has informed Russian Minister
for Foreign Affairs that his Government would
guarantee that Austria should respect Servian in-
tegrity. Russia could not, however, agree to vas-
salage of Servia to Austria. Formula of conditions
subject to which Russia would stop military pre-
parations

German Government .have asked Austrian Govern-
ment whether they would accept mediation on basis
of occupation of Belgrade by Austrian troops and
issue of conditions from there. Gould His Majesty's
Government induce Russia to agree to above basis
for ^n arrangement? German Secretary of State
says that Russian mobilisation has increased diffi-
culties of situation. German Government have
made no special military preparations

Conversation with President of the "Republic regard-
ing German communication to St. Petersburgh as
to Russian mobilisation. Russia constants to demo-
bilise subject to assurance from Austria to respect
sovereignty of Servia and submit certain point, in
the Austrian note to international discussion. Peace
depended on attitude of His Majesty's Government.
Pacific attitude of France. A British declaration to
support France would prevent Germany going to
war. Explained difficulty of such a declaration

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

100

101

102

103

Sir R. Rodd

(Telegraphic)

To Sir E. Goschen
(Telegraphic)

10-1

105

106

107

IOh

109

110

(Telegraphic)

To Sir G. Buchanan
(Telegraphic)

To Sir F. B«rtie ...

(Telegraphic)

** »>

•Sir R. Rorld

(Telegraphic)

Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic)

>» . »»

(Telegraphic)

To Sir G. Buchanan
(Telegraphic)

1914
July 30

German Ambassador at Rome thinks Germany Could
prevent Austria from making exorbitant dohiands
if Servia would submit on occupation of Belgrade ...

Replies to No. 85. His Majesty's Government cannot
entertain German proposals to secure British neu-
trality. For many reasons sudi a bargain with Ger-
many at the expense of Franco would be a disgrace
to Great Britain. His Majesty's Government cannot
bargain away her obligations regarding Belgian
neutrality. His Majesty's Government must pre-
serve full freedom of action. Best way of main-
taining good relations with Great Britain is for
Germany to work with her for the preservation
of peace ;

Has warned German Ambassador that Germany must
not count on Great Britain standing aside in all
circumstances •..

German Ambassador states that German Government
would advise Austria not to advance beyond Bel-
grade and adjoining territories, whilst Powers urged
Servia to give satisfaction sufficient to placate
Austria. Earnest hope that this may bo agreed to.
Suggests change in the formula proposed by Russian
Minister for Foreign Affairs (see No. 97) in order,
to meet existing situation

To inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of telegram
to Sir G. Buchanan (see No 103). Trusts that
French Ambassador at St. Potersburgh will be able
to induce Russian Government not to precipi-
tate a crisis

Conversation with French Ambassador respecting atti-
tude of Great Britain in event of conflict between
France and Germany ; encloses copies of notes ex-
changed ^vith French Ambassador in 1912, and dis-
cusses their scope. Cabinet to meet to-morrow ...

Austria has declined to continue direct conversations
with Russia. Germany believed to be more dis-
posed to g_ivo conciliatory advice at Vienna owing
to likelihosd of British support for Russia and
France. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs is in
favour of working with His Majesty's Government
oven if idea of discussions betwceii four Powers
is impossible

Has asked German Secretary of State if he can sug-
gest any course of action. Latter replied that he'
was in communication with Vienna to save time.
ChancoUor was ''pressing the button" at Vienna
to utmost of his power, and feared ho had perhaps
gone too far

German Chancellor states that owing to Russian
mobilisation Germany cannot remain quiet. These
proceedings had come just when the Czar had ap-
pealed to the Empeix>r and when the hitter was
about to mediate at Vienna

Reports having read to Chancellor reply of His
Majesty's Government to his appeal for British
neutrality (seo No. 101). Chancellor desires time
to reflect on it

German Ambassador states that Austro-Russian con-
versations have been resumed at Vienna and St.
Petersburgh. German Ambassador has asked that
Russia should suspend military preparations in mean-
while. Has informed his Excellency that His

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

XXI

111

112

113

To Sir E. Goechen...
(Telegraphic)

Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic)

Sir G. Buchanan ...
(Telegraphic)

114 To Sir F. Bertie ...
Sir E. Goschen...
(Telegraphic)

115

116

117

118

119

120

121

1914

July 31

To Sir. F. Villiers ...
(Telegraphic)

To Sir E. Bertie ...
(Telegraphic)

Sir F. Bertie

(Telegraphic)

Sir M. de Bunsen ...
(Telegraphic)

To Sir F. Bertie

Sir: Gr. Buchanan ...
(Telegraphic)

Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic)

Majesty's Government cannot ask Russia to do this
unless Austria consents to limit advance of her troops
into Servieu Expresses satisfaction at i-esumption of
conversations

If settlement cannot be reached by direct Austro-
Russian conversations, suggests that four Powers
should undertake to obtain full satisfaction of Aus-
trian demands from Servia, provided latter's
sovereignty and integrity remain intact. Has in-
formed German Ambassador that if Austria and Ger-
many could bring forward any fair proposal, His
Majesty's Government would support it strongly
at Paris and St. Petersburgh

German Government are about to proclaim . " Kriegs-
gefahr," to be followed by immediate mobilisation.
Germany preparing for all emergencies

Russian general mobilisation ordered, ovying to
Austro-Hungarian movements of troops against her.
Germany also making military preparations. Russia
cannot allow 'Germany to get a start

Enquires whether France and Germany will engage
to respect neutrality of Belgium

To inform Belgium Government of No. 114. Sir E.
Grey assumes that Belgium will do her utmost to
maintain her neutrality

French Ambassador informed that His Majesty's
Government cannot undertake definite pledge to
intervene in war, but that situation will be recon-
sidered in presence of any new development

Informs of German ultimatum to Russia. German
Ambassador demands answer from French Govern-
ment by 1 P.M. to-morrow aS to French attitude ...

Under-Secretary of State says that mobilisation was
not necessarily a hostile act. Austria-Hungary re-
sents Russian intervention on behalf of Servia. Rus-
sian Ambassador states that his Government have
advised Servian compliance with Austrian demands
so far as compatible with independence

Has denied to French Ambassador that His Majesty's
Government had given German Government the
impression that they would remain neutral. . His
Majesty's Government could not, however, at the
present moment giye France any pledge, though fur-
ther developments might justify intervention

New formula proposed by Russian Government. Rus-
sian Government will maintain waiting attitude if
Austria agrees to stop advance of her troops and
to allow consideration by Great Powers of satisfac-
tion to be given by Servia to Austria-Hungary with-
out prejudice to her independence. ^ Czar has under-
taken that no Russian soldier will cross frontier
so long as conversation with Austria, continues

German Government appreciate Sir E. Grey's efforts
to, maintain peace, but cannot consider any pro-
posal pending Russian reply to ultimatum presented
by Germany relating to Russian, mobilisation ,

xxu

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.

Name.

Date.

Subject.

122

123

.124
125

126

127
128

129

130

131

Sir E. Gosohen

(Tekgraphio)

To Sir E. Gosohen...

Sir F. Bertie

(Telegraphic)

it >f •••

(Telegraphic)

Sir M. de Bunsen ...
(Telegraphic)

Sir F. Villiers

(Telegraphic)

Luxemburg Minister
of State

To Sir E. Goschen...
(Telegraphic)

(Telegraphic)

r> i»

1914
July 31

Aug. 1

July 31
31

Aug, 1

(Telegraphic)

Sir P. Bertie

(Telegraphic)

Belgian neutrality. Refers to No. 114. Secretary of
State cannot reply to British request until he has
consulted Emperor and Chancellor. ' He doubts,
however, whether Gei-man Government can "give
any ansver. German Government alleges commis-
sion of hostile acts by Belgium

Conversation with German Ambassador respecting the
possible effect on British public opinion of any
violation of the neutrality of Belgium. Any pro-
mise that His Majesty's Government should stand
aside definitely refused ... »

German ultimatum to Russia. French Government
anxious to know at once attitude of His Majesty's
Government

NeutrS-lity of Belgium (see No. 114). French Govern-
ment are resolved to respect neutrality of Belgium
unless compelled to act otherwise by reason of
violation at the hands of another Power

German AmbassaxJor has been informed that French
Government fail to understand reason for Gei-man
communication respecting attitude of France in the
event of a Russo-German war (see No. 117) Ger-
man Ambassador will see Mmister for Foreign
AGPairs in the evening

Mpbilisation of Austrian army and fleet

Belgian neutrality. Refers to No. 115. Belgium ex-
pects Powers to observe and uphold her neutrality,
which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her
power

German Government have informed Luxemburg that
the German military measures in that country
do not constitute a hostile act. but are only to insure
against attack from France

British merchant ships have been detained at Ham-
burg To request immediate release Points out
deplorable effefct on British public opinion if deten-
tion continued

Russian Government report readiness of Austria to
di.scuss with Russia and to accept basis of mediation
not open to obiections raised in regard to original
Russian formula (see No 97> Hopes that German
Government may be able to make use of Russian
communication m order to avoid tension

Russia consents to British formula for basis of media-
tion (see No. 103)

Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has informed Russian
Government that Austro-Hungarian Government
are ready to discuss substance of Austrian ultimatum
to Seryia. Russian Government hope that these
discussions will take place in London with partici-

Sation of Great Powers, and that His Majesty's
rovernment will assume direction of then\

Conversation with President of Republic. German
Government are trying to saddle Russia with the
responsibility for present situation. President jus-
tifies Russian action. Germany is practically mobi-
lising, so France must also. French troops are kept
10 kilom. from frontier, whereas Germans have made
incursions into French territory. French Govern-
ment do not yet despair of possibility of avoiding war

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

XXUl

No.

Name.

Date.

Subject.

135

13G

137

138

130

1-10

141

142
143

.144

To Sir G. Buchanan
iTele graphic)

Sir F. Bcirtie

(Telegrapliic)

To Sir M. de Bunseoi
(Telegraphic)

Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic)

Sir G. Buchanan ...
(Telegraphic)

Sir F. Bea-tie

(Tel^raphic)

Sir M. do Bun6e.n ...
(Telegraphic)

Sir E. Gosohe-n

(Telegraphic)

1914.
Aug. 1

Has received reliable information that Austria-Hun-
gary has informed German Government that she
would accept Sir E. Grey's proposal for mediation

bet\

Austria-Hungary and

;ervia.

Military

action would continue against Servia for present,
but Russian mobilisation and Austro-Hungarian
counter measures would cease. He chould inform
Minister for Foreign Affairs

General mobilisation in France ordered owing to Ger-
man military measures. French troops have left a
zone of 10 kilom. between them and the frontier ...

Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has given assurance
that Austrians will respect territorial integrity
of Servia, and will not occupy sanjak. Austria has
not "banged the door" on further conversations
with Russia

Conversation with German Secretary of State. Ger-
man Government have ordered mobilisation. Ab-
sence of reply to German ultimatum must be re-

garded as creating a state of war,
ment will be so inform.ed

Russian Govcrn-

Unsatisfactory result of discussions between German
and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors with the Czar
and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs respectively.
Russian Miiiister for Foreign Affairs says that •
Austrian domination of Servia would vitally affect
Russia, and that he is weary of his ceaseless efforts
to avoid war. Action of Austro-Hungarian Govern-
ment and German preparations have forced Rus-
sian Government to order mobilisation, and mobi-
lisation of Germany has created desperate situation.
M. Sazonof v.ould adhere to formula contained in
No. 120, if its acceptance could be secured before
the Germans cross frontier. In no case will Russia
commence hostilities. Fear of general conflagration
in the Balkans

French Minister for War has impressed on British
military attache that only way of securing peace
v/as for Great Britain to take military action. Minis-
ter cf War maintains that France has, by w'ith-
dra\>'ing from frontier, given proof of her desire to
abstain from any provocative act

Conversation with Russian Ambassador at Vienna
respecting German ultimatum to Russia. His Ex-
cellency thinks that German Government desired
war from the first. Explains nature of Russian
mobilisation, and says that Russia had no intention
of attacking Austria. French Ambassador to speak
earnestly to Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Anxiety us to attitude of Great Britain

General mobilisation of German army and navy

Detention of British steamers. German Secretary of
State has promised to send ordei-s to release steamers
without delay

German Secretary of State says that, owing to certain
Russian troops having crossed frontier, Germany
and Russia arc in a state of war

XXIV

TABLE OP CONTENTS.

No.

Name.

Date.

Subject.

145

.116
147

US
149

150
151

162
153

15t

155

15G
167

158

Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic)

Sir F. VilHers

(Telegraphic)

Luxemburg Minister
of State

(Telegraphic)

To Sir F. Bertie ...
(Telegraphic)

To Sir E. Goschen..
(Telegraphic)

Sir E. Goschen

(Telegraphic]

Sir F. Villiers

(Telegraphic)

To Sir F. Bertie ...

To Sir E. Goschen...
(Telegraphic)

1914.
Aug. 2

Sir F. Villiers

(Telegraphic)

To Sir F. Villiers ..

To Sir E. Goschen...
(Telegraphic)

Communicated by
German Ambassa-
dor

(Telegraphic)

Sir F. Villiers

(Telegraphic)

Orders sent last night to allow British ships detained
in Hamburg to proceed. This as a special favour
to His Majesty's Government. Reason of detention
was that mines were being laid and other pre-
cautions taken

Belgian Government confirms report that German
force has entered Grand Duchy of Luxemburg ...

Acts of German troops in Luxemburg territory are
manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand
Duchy guaranteed by Treaty of London of 1867.
Protest has been made to the German representa-
tives at Luxemburg and also to German Secretary
of State

Assurance given to French Ambassador respecting
protection by British fleet of P'rench coasts or ship-
ping subject to consent of Pai'liament. Question
of despatch of British force to assist France. Effect
of violation of Luxemburg and Belgian neutrality ...

Detention of British steamers. Sugar unloaded by
force from British vessels at Hamburg and detained.
Should inform Secretary of State that His Majesty's
Government trust that order already sent for release
of British vessels covers also release of cargoes (see
No. 143) ...

Detention of British steamers. Refers to No. 149. No
information available

French Government have offered five army corps to
Belgian Government. Belgian Government reply
that whilst sincerely grateful they do not- propose
to appeal to the guarantco of the Powers, and wiU
decide later on their action

Communication of French Ambassador to effect that
Italy does not consider casus fccderis has arisen ...

Belgian neutrality. His Majesty's Government have
been informed that German Government have pro-
posed to Belgium friendly neutrality entailing free
passage through Belgian territory, and of German
threat in case of refusal. Belgian .Government have
declined offer. Should ask for immediate assurance
from German Government that they will not pro-
ceed with threat or violate Belgian territory

Belgian neutrality (see No. 153). In view of Belgian
reply, German Government have threatened to carry
out their proposals by force

To inform Belgian Government that His Majesty's
Government expect that thoy will resist attempt to
infringe their neutrality. His Majesty's Govern-
ment prepared to join with Russia and France in
assisting Belgian Government to resist German
aggression and to guarantee independence and in-
tegrity in future years

To demand immediate release of British ships
detained in German ports

Assurance that Germany will in no case annex Belgian
territory. Germany forced to disregard Belgian
neutrality owing to knowledge of French plans ...

German troops have entered Belgian territory,
summoned to surrender ,

Liego

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

IXV

^o.

Name.

Date.

Subject.

159

160

161

To Six E. Goach^'in...
(Tolegrapbic)

Sir E. Goschea

Sir M. de Buufiran ...

1914.
Aug. 4

Sept. 1

Belgian neutrality threatened by Germany. Unless
Gorman Government prepared to give assurance by
12 midnight to respect neutrality of Belgium. His
Majesty's Ambassador is to ask for passports and
to' say that His Majesty's Government fee) bound
to take all steps in their power to uphold their
treaty obligations

Reports final negotiations at Berlin. Records depar-
ture from Berlin and journey to England

Reviews negotiations with Austro-Hungarian Govern-
ment at Vionna, and incidents upon rupture of
diplomatic negotiations. Reports departure from
Vienna upon declaration of war % ...

XXVI

LIST OF PRINCIPAL PERSONS MENTIONED IN THE COR.
RESPONDENCE, SHOWING THEIR OFFICIAL POSITIONS.

GREAT BRITAIN/

Secretanj of State for Foreign Affairs ... Sir Edward Grey.
Permanent Under Secretary of State for
Foreif/n Affairs ... .. . Sir A. Nicolson.

French Ambassador Monsieur Paul Catnbon.

liussian Ambassador Count Benckendorff.

Monsieur de Etter {Counsellor
Einhas^'j').

German Ambassador . Prince Lichnowsky.

Austro-HiingariaJi Ambasmdor ... ... Count Mcusdorff.

Belgian 3Iinister Count Lalaing,

Servian Minister Monsieur Boschkovitch.

FRANCE.

Prfsldentoftheltepuhlio

Prenident of the Council and Minister for

Foreign Affairs

Minister of Jiistice and Acting Minister for

Foreign Affairs

British Ambassador

Russian Ambassador ...
German Ambassador ...
A u&trian A m bassador

Monsieur Poincare.

Monsieur Viviani.

Monsieur Bienvenu-Martin.
Sir Francis Bertie.
Monsieur Isvolsky.
Baron von Sclioen.
Count Seczsen,

RUSSIA.

Minister for Foreign Affairs
British Ambassador ...

French A m bassador

German A m bassa dor ...
Austro-Hungdrian Ambassador

GERMANY.

Imperial Chancellor

Secret ary of State

Under Secretary rf State
British Ambassxdjr

Raissian Ambassador

French Ambassador ...
Austro- JIangarian A mbassadoT

.. Monsieur Sazonof.
,.. Sir George Buchanan.
,.. Monsieur Paloolofjue.
... Count Pourtales.
,.. Count Szup^ry.

,. Dr. von Betlimann-HoUweg,
.. Herr von Jagow.
.. Herr von Zimmermann.
,. Sir Edward Goschen.

Sir Horace Kumbold {CoitnseUci*
Embassy).
.. Monsieur Swerbeiev.
.. iVEonsienr Jules Cambon.
,. Count S^ogycny.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs ... Count Berchtold.
Under Secretaries of State for Foreign f Baron Macchio.

Affairs , { Count Forgach

British Ambassador Sir Maurice de Bunsen.

French Ambis-^adcr ... ... ... ... IMonsieur Dumaino.

Russian Ambas ador Monsieur Schebeko.

German Ambassador Herr von Tschirscky,

ITALY.

M-nisterfor Foreign Affairs.
British Ambassador ...

BELGIUM.

British Minister

.. Marquis di Pan Giuliano*
.. Sir Rennell Rodd.

... Sir Francis Villiers.

8ERYIA.

Prime Minister
British Minister

^intrO'Hungarian Minister

Monsieur Pashitch.

Mr. des Graz.

Mr. Crackanthorpe {First Secretary),

Baron Gieel.

PART I

COERESPONDENCE LAID BEFORE
PARLIAMENT.

No. 1.
Sir Edward Grey to Sir H, Rumhold^ British Charge d^A^aires at Berlin,

Sir, Foreign Office, July 20, 1914.

I ASKED the German Ambassador to-day if he had any news of what
was going on in Vienna with regard to Servia.

He said that he had not, but Austria was certainly going to. take some
step, and he regarded the situation as very uncomfortable.

I said that I had not heard anything recently, except that Count
Berchtold,* in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had
deprecated the suggestion that the situation was grave, but had said that
it should be cleared up.

The German Ambassador said that it would be a very desirable thing
if Russia could act as a mediator with regard to Servia.

I said that I assumed that the Austrian Government would not do
anything until they had first disclosed to the public their case against
Servia, founded presumably upon what they had discovered at the trial.

The Ambassador said that he certainly assumed tha't they would act
upon some case that would be known.

I said that this would make it easier for others, such as Russia, to counsel
moderation in Belgrade. In fact, the more Austria could keep her demand
within reasonable limits, and the stronger the jilstification she could produce
for making any demand, the more chance there would be of smoothing things
over. I hated the idea of a war between any of the Great Powers, and that
any of them should be dragged into a war by Servia would be detestable.

The Ambassador agreed wholeheartedly in this sentiment.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.
* Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 2.

Sir H. Rwmhold, BriUsh Charge d'AffoAjres at Be7'Un, to

Sir Bdward Grey. — (deceived July 22.)

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 22, 1914.

Last night I met Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the forthcoming
Austrian demarche at Belgrade was alluded to by his Excellency in the
conversation that ensued. His Excellency was evidently of opinion that tl^is
step on Austria's part would have been made ere this. He insisted that
question at issue was one for settlement between Servia and Austria alone, and
that there should be no interference from outside in the discussipns between
those two countries. He had therefore considered it inadvisable that the
Austro-Hungarian Government should be approached by the German Govern-
ment on the matter. He had, however, on several occasions, in conve'rsation
v.'ith the Servian Minister, emphasised the extreme importance that Austro-
Servian relations should be put on a proper footing.

Finally, his Excellency observed to me that for a long time past the attitude
adopted towards Servia by Austria bad, in his opinion, been one of great
forbearance.

No. 3.
Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen^ Britdsh Ambassador at Yierma.

Sir, Formgn Office, July 23, 1914.

CoTJNt * Mensdorff* told me to-day that he would be able to-morrow
morning to let me have officially the communication that he understood was
being made to Servia to-day by Austria. He then explained privately what
the nature of the demand would be. As he told me that the facts would all
be set out in the paper that he would give me to-morrow, it is unnecessary
to record them now. I gathered that they would include proof of the com-
plicity of some Servian officials in the plot to murder the Archduke Franz
Ferdinand, and a long list of demands consequently made by Austria on Servia.

As regards all this, I said that it was not a matter on which I would make
any comment until I received an official communication, and it seemed to me
probably a matter on which I should not be able to make any comment at
first sight.

But, when Count Mensdorff told me that he supposed there would be
something in the nature of a time-limit, which was in effect akin to an
ultimatum, I said that I regretted this very much. To begin with a time-
limit might inflame opinion in Russia, and it would make it difficult, if not
impossible, to give more time, even if after a few days it appeared that by
giving more time there would be a prospect of securing a peaceful settlement
and getting a satisfactory reply from Servia, I admitted that, if there was
no time-:limit, the proceedings might be unduly protracted, but I urged that
a time-limit could always be introduced afterwards ; that if the demands were
made without a time-limit in the first instance, Russian public opinion might
bo less excited, after a week it might have cooled down, and if the Austrian
case was very strong it might be apparent that the Russian Government
would be in a position to use their influence in favour of a satisfactory reply
from Servia. A time-limit was generally a thing to be used only in the last
resort, after other means had been tried and failed.

Count Mensdorff said that if Servia, in the interval that had elapsed since
the murder of the Archduke, had voluntarily instituted an enquiry on her
own territory, all this might have been avoided. In 1909, Servia had said
in a note that she intended to live on terms of good neighbourhood with
Austria; but she had never kept her promise, she had stirred up agitation
the object of which was to disintegrate Austria, and it was absolutely necessary
for Austria to protect herself.

I said that I would not comment upon or criticise what Count Mensdorff
had told me this afternoon, but I could not help dwelling upon the awful
consequences involved in the situation. Great apprehension had been
expressed to me, not specially by M. Cambon and Count Benckendorff, but
also by others, as to what might happen, and it had been represented to me
that it would be very desirable that those who had influence in St. Petersburgli
should use it on behalf of patience and moderation. I had replied that the
amount of influence that could be used in this sense would depend upon how
reasonable were the Austrian demands and how strong the justification that
Austria might have discovered for making her demands. The possible
consequences of the present situation were terrible. If as many as four Great
Powers of Europe — let us say, Austria, France, Russia, and Germany — were
engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expenditure of so
vast a sum of money, and such an interference with trade, that a war would
be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit and
industry. In these days, in great industrial States, this would mean a state
of things worse than that of 1848, and, irrespective of who were victors in
the war, many things might be completely swept away.

Count Mensdorff did not demur to this statement of the possible con-
sequences of the present situation, but he said that all would depend upon
Russia.

I made the remark that, in a time of difficulties such as this, it was just
as true to say that it required two to keep the peace as it was to say,
ordinarily, that it took two to make a quarrel. I hoped very much that, if
there were difficulties, Austria arid Russia would be able in the first instance
to discuss them directly with each other.

* Aiistro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

Count Mensdorff said tliat h(^ hoped this would be possible, but he was
under the impression that the attitude in St. Petersburgh had not been very
favourable recently. I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 4.

Cov/nt Berchtcldj AustHam Mimster for Foreign Affairs, to Count Mensdorff ^

Austrimi Ambassador in London. — {Qormriv/mcated hy Couni Mensdorff^
July 24, 19U.)

Le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal
s'est vu oblige d'adresser jeudi le 23 de
ce mois, par I'entremise du Ministre
Imperial et Royal a Belgrade, la not6
suivante au Gouvernement Royal de
Sorbie :

"Le 31 mars, 1909, le Ministre de
Serbie a Vienne a fait, d'ordre de son
Gouvernement, au Gouvernement Im-
perial et Royal la declaration sui-
vante :—

" * La Serbie reconnait qu^elle n'a
pas ete atteinto dans ses droits
par le fait accompli cree en Bosnie-
Herzegovine et qu'elle se confor-
mera par consequent a telle de-
cision que les Puissances prendront
par rapport a I'article 25 du Traite de
Berlin. Se rendant aux conseils des
Grandes Puissances, la Serbie s'engage
des a present a abandonner I'attitude
de protestation et d'opposition qu'elle
a observee a I'egard de 1' annexion de-
puis I'automne dernier, et elle s'en-
gage, en outre, a changer le cours de
sa politique actuelle envers I'Autriche-
Hongrie pour vivre desormais aveo
cette derniere sur le pied d'un bon
voisinage.'

" Or, I'histoire des d^rnieres annees,
;et notamment les evenements dour
jloureux du 28 juin, ont demontre
il'existence en Serbie d'un mouvement
jsubversif dont le but est de detacher
de la Monarchie austro-hongroise cer-
taines parties de ses territoires. Ce
mouvement, qui a pris jour sous les
yeux du Gouvernement serbe, est
arrive a se manifcster au dela du terri-
toire du royaume par des actes de ter-
roisme, par unc serie d' attentats et
par des meurtres.

"Lg Gouvernement Royal serbe, loin
de satisfaire aux engagements formels
contenus dans la declaration du 31
mars, 1909, n'a rien fait pour sup-
primer ce mouvement: il a tolere
I'activite criminelle des differentes
societes et affiliations dirigees centre
la Monarchie, le langage effrene de la
presse, la glorification des auteurs
d'attentats, la participation d'officiers
et de fonctionnaires dans les agisse-

(Translation.)

The Austro-Hungarian Government
felt compelled to address the following
note to the Servian Government on
the 23rd July, through the medium of
the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Bel-
grade : —

"On the 31st March, 1909, the
Servian Minister in Vienna, on the in-
structions of the Servian Government,
made the following declaration to tho
Imperial and Royal Government : —

" ' Servia recognises that the fait
accompli regarding Bosnia has not
aflected her rights, and consequently
she will conform to the decisions that
the Powers may take in conformity
with article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin.
In deference to the advice of the Great
Powers, Servia undertakes to re-
nounce from now onwards the attitude
of protest and opposition which she
has adopted with regard to the annexa-
tion since last autumn. She under-
takes, moreover, to modify the direc-
tion of her policy with regard to
Austria-Hungary and to live in future
on good neighbourly terms with the
latter.'

"The history of recent years, and in
particular the painful events of the
28th June last, have shown the exist-
ence of a subversive movement with
the object of detaching a part of the
territories of Austria-Hungary from
the Monarchy. The movement, which
had its birth under the eye of the
Servian Government, has gone so far
as to make itself manifest on both
sides of- the Servian frontier in the
shape of acts of terrorism and a series
of outrages and murders.

" Far from carrying out the formal
undertakings contained in the declara-
tion of the 31st March, 1909, the
Royal Servian Government has done
nothing to repress these movements.
It has permitted the criminal machina-
tions of various societies and associa-
tions directed against the Monarchj'^,
and has tolerated unrestrained lan-
guage on the part of the press, the
glorification of the perpetrators ot

ments subversifs, ime propaganda nlal-
saine dans Tinstruction publique, tolere
enfin toutes les manifestations qui
pouvaient induire la population serbe
a la haine de la Monarehie et au mepris
d6 ^es institutions.

"Cette tolerance coupable du 6ou-
vernement Royal de Serbie n'avait pas
cesse au moment ou les evenements du
28 juin dernier en ont demontre au
monde en tier les consequences funestes,

"II resulte des depositions et aveux
des auteurs criminels de I'attentat dn
28 juin que le meurtre de Sarajevo a
ete trame a Belgrade, que les armes et
explosifs dont les meurtriers se trou-
vaient etre munis leur ont ete donnes
par des officiers et fonctionnaires
serbes faisant partie de la * Narodna
Odbrana,' et enfin que le passage en
Bosnie des criminels et de leurs armes
a ete organise et eflfectues par des chefs
du service-frontiere serbe.

"Les resultats mentionnes de I'in-
struction ne permettent pas au Gou-
vernement Imperial et Royal de pour-
suivrc plus longtemps I'attitude de
longanimite expectative qu'il avait
observee pendant des annees vis-a-vis
des agissements concentres a Belgrade
et propages de la sur les territoires de
la Monarchic; ces resultats lui im-
posent au contraire le devoir de mettre
fin a des menees qui forment une
menace perpetuelle pour la tranquillite
de la Monarchic.

"C'est pour atteindre ce but que le
Gouvernement Imperial et Royal se
voit oblige de demander au Gouverne-
ment serbe I'enonciation officielle qu'il
condamne la propagande dirigee centre
la Monarchic austro-hongroise, c'est-
a-dire I'ensemble des tendances qui
aspirent en dernier lieu a detacher de
la Monarchic des territoires qui en
font partie, et qu'il s' engage a sup-
primer, par tous les moyens, cette pro-
pagande criminelle et terroriste.

"Afin de donner un caractere solen-
nel a cet engagement, le Gouverne-
ment Royal de Serbie fera publier a la
premiere page du ' Journal oflficiel ' en
date du 13/26 juillet renonciation sui-
vante :—

outrages, an^ the participation ol
officers and functionaries in subversive!
agitation. It has permitted an xini
wholesome propaganda in public in-*
struction, in short, it has permitted all
manifestations of a nature to incite
the Servian population to hatred of the
Monarchy and contempt of its institu^
tions.

"This culpable tolerance of the Royal
Servian Government had not ceased at
the moment when the events of the
28th June last proved its fatal conse*
quences to the whole world.

"It results from the depositions and
confessions of the criminal perpetra-
toi*s of the outrage of the 28th June
that the Serajevo assassinations were
planned in Belgrade ; that the arms
and explosives with which the mur-
derers were provided had ]jeen given
to them by Servian officers and func-
tionaries belonging to the Narodna
Odbrana; and finally, that the passage
into Bosnia of the criminals and their
arms was organised and effected by the
chiefs of the Servian frontier service.

" The above-mentioned results of the
magisterial investigation do not permit
the Austro-Hungarian Government to
pursue any longer the attitude of ex-
pectant forbearance which they have
maintained for years in face of the
machinations hatched in Belgrade, and
thence propagated in the territories of
the Monarchy. The results, on the
contrary, impose on them the duty of
putting an end to the intrigues which
form a perpetual menace to the tran-
quillity of the Monarchy^.

"To achieve this end the Imperial
and Royal Government see themselves
compelled to demand from the Royal
Servian Government a formal assurance
that they condemn this dangerous propa-
ganda against the Monarchy ; in other
words, the whole series of tendencies,
the ultimate aim of which is to detach
from the Monarchy territories belong-
ing to it, and that they undertake to
suppress by every means this criminal
and terrorist propaganda.

" In order to give a formal character
to this undertaking the Royal Servian
Government shall publish on the front
page of their ' Official Journal ' of the
13/26 July the following declaration :—

" * Le Gouvernement Royal de
Serbie condamne la propagande dirigee
centre I'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-a-dire
I'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent
en dernier lieu a detacher de la
Monarehie austro-hongroise des terri-
toires qui en font, partie, et il deplore

" * The Royal Government of Servia
condemn the propaganda directed
against Austria-Hungary — i.e., the
general tendency of which the final aim
is to detach from the Austro-Hun-
garian Monarchy territories belonging
to it, and they sincerely deplore the

sincerement les consequences funestca
de ces agissements criminels.

"*Le Gouvernement Royal regrette
quo des ofliciers et fonctionnaires
serbes aient participe k la propagande
susmentionnee et compromis par la les
relations de bon voisinage auquel le
Gouvernement Royal s'etait solennelle-
jnent engage par sa declaration du 31
mars, 1909.

" ' Le Gouvernement Royal, qui des-
approuve et repudie toute idee ou ten-
tative d'immixtion dans les destinees
des habitants de quelque partie de
I'Autriche-Hongrie que ce soit, con-
Bide re de son devoir d'avertir formelle-
ment les officiers, les fonctionnaires et
toute la population du royaume que
dorenavant il procedera avec la der-
niere rigueur centre les personnes qui
se rendraient coupables de pareils
agissements qu'il mettra tous ses efforts
a prevenir et a reprimer.'

" Cette enonciation sera portee simul-
tanement a la connaissance de I'Armee
Royale par un ordre du jour de Sa
Majeste le Roi et sera publiee dans le
* Bulletin officiel ' de I'armee.

"Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'en-
gage en outre :

"1° a supprimer toute publication
qui excite a la haine et au mepris de
la Monarchic et dont la tendance
generale est dirigee centre son inte-
grite territoriale ;

"2° a dissoudre iramediatement la
societe dite ' Narodna Odbrana,' a con-
fisquer tous ses moyens de propagande,
et a proceder de la meme maniere
centre les autres societes et aflSliations
en Serbie qui s'adonnent a la propa-
gande centre la Monarchic austro-hon-
groise; le Gouvernement Royal pren-
dra les mesures necessaires pour que les
societes dissoutes ne puissent pas con-
tinuer leur activite sous un autre nom
et sous une autre forme ;

"3° a eliminer sans delai de I'instruc-
tion publique en Serbie, tant en ce qui
concerne le corpa enseignant que les
moyens d'instruction, tout ce qui sert
ou pourrait servir a fomenter la propa-
gande centre I'Autriche-Hongrie ;

"4° a eloigner du service militaire
et de 1' administration en general tous
les officiers et fonctionnaires coupables
de la propagande centre la Monarchic
austro-hongroise et dont le Gouverne-
ment Imperial et Royal se reserve de
communiquer les noms et les faits au
Gouvernement Royal ;

fatal consequences of these criminal
proceedings.

" ' The Royal Government regret that
Servian ofl&cers and functionaries parti-
cipated in the above-mentioned propa-
ganda and thus compromised the good
neighbourly relations to which the
Royal Government were solemnly
pledged by their declaration of the 31st
March, 1909.

" ' The Royal Government, who dis-^
approve and repudiate all idea of inter-
fering or attempting to interfere with
the destinies of the inhabitants of any
part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary,
consider it their duty formally to warn
officers and functionaries, and the
whole population of the kingdom, that
henceforward they will proceed with
the utmost rigour against persons who
may be guilty of such machinations,
which they will use all their efforts to
anticipate and suppress.'

"This declaration shall simulta-
neously be communicated to the Royal
army as an order of the day by His
Majesty the King and shall be pub-
lished in the ' Official Bulletin ' of the
Army.

"The Royal Servian Government
further undertake :

"1. To suppress any _ publication
which incites to hatred and contempt
of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
and the general tendency of which is
directed against its territorial in-
tegrity ;

"2. To dissolve immediately the
society styled ' Narodna Odbrana,' to
confiscate all its means of propaganda,
and to proceed in the same manner
against other societies and their
branches in Servia which engage in
propaganda against the Austro-Hun-
garian Monarchy. The Royal Govern-
ment shall take the necessary measures
to prevent the societies dissolved from
continuing their activity under another
name and form ;

" 3. To eliminate without delay from
public instruction in Servia, both as
regards the teaching body and- also as
regards the methods of instruction,
everything that serves, or might serve,
to foment the propaganda against
Austria-Hungary j

"4. To remove from the military
service, and from the administration
in general, all officers and function-
aries guilty of propaganda against the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose
names and deeds the Austro-Hun-
garian Government reserve to them-
selves the right of communicating to
the Royal Government ;

"5" a accepter la collaboration en
Serbia des organes du Gouvernemcnt
Imperial et Koyal dans la suppression
du mouvement subversif dirige contra
rintegrite tcrritoriala da la Monarchie ;

"6° a ouvrir iinc enquote jiidiciaire
centre les partisans du complot du 28
juin se trouyant sur territoire serbe;

"des organes, delegues par le Gou-
vcrnoment Imperial et Royal, pren-
dront part aux recherches y relatives ;

"7° a proceder d'urgence a I'arresta-
tion du Commandant Voija Tankosic et
du nomme Milan Ciganovic, employe de
I'Etat serbe, compromia par les resuU
tats de I'instruction de Sarajevo ;

"8° a empechcr, par des mesures
eflBcaces, le concours des autorites
serbes dans le trafic illicitc d'armes et
d'explosifs a travers la frontiere ;

"a licencier et punir severement les
fonctionnaires du service-frontiere de
Schabatz et de Loznica coupables
d'avoir aide les auteurs du crime do
Sarajevo en leur facilitant le passage
de la frontiere ;

"9° a donner au Gouvernemcnt Im-
perial ct Royal des explications sur les
propos injustifiables de hauts fonctipn-
naires serbes tant en Serbie qu'a
I'etranger, qui, malgre leur position
officielle, n'ont pas hesite apres I'atten-
tat du 28 juin de s'exprimer dans des
interviews d'une. maniere hostile en-
vers la Monarchie austro-hongroise ;
enfin

"10° d'avertir, sans retard, le Gou-
vernemcnt Imperial et Royal de I'exe-
cution des mesures comprises dans les
points precedents.

" Le Gouvernemcnt Imperial et Royal
attend la reponsc du Gouvernement
Royal au plus tard jusqu'au samedi,
25 de ce mois, a G heures du soir.

"Un memoire concernant les resul-
tats do I'instruction de Sarajevo a
regard des ionctionnaires mentionnes
aux points 7 et B efet annexe a cette
note."

J'ai I'honneur d'invitcr votre Excel-
lence de vouloir porter le contenu de
■cette note a la connaissance du Gou-
vernemcnt • aupres duquel vous etes
.accredite, en accompagnant cette com-
munication du commentaire que voici :

Le 31 mars, 1909, le Gouvernement
Royal serbe a adrcsse a I'Autrichc-
Hongrie la declaration dont le texte est
reproduit ci-dessus.

Le lendemain meme de cette declara-
tion la Serbie s'est engagee dans une
politique tendant a inspirer des idees

"5. To accept the collaboration m
Scrvia of representatives of the Austro-
Hungarian Government for the sup-
pression of the subversive movement
directed against the territorial in-
tegrity of the Monarchy ;

"6. To take judicial proceedings
against accessories to the plot of tho
28th June who are on Servian terri-
tory ; delegates of the Austro-Hun-
garian .Govenunent will take part in
the investigation relating thereto ;

"7. To proceed without delay to
the arrest of. Major Voija Tankositch
and of the individual named Milan
Ciganovitch, a Servian State employe,
who have been compromised by the
results of the magisterial enquiry at
Sarajevo ;

"8. To prevent by effective measures
the co-operation of the Servian autho-
rities in the illicit traffic in arms and
explosives across the frontier, to dis-
miss and punish severely the officials
of the frontier service at Schabatz and
Loznica guilty of having assisted the
perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by
facilitating their passage across the
frontier ;

"9. To furnish the Imperial and
Royal Government with explanations
regarding the unjustifiable utterances
of high Servian officials, both in Scrvia
and abroad, who, notwithstanding
their official position, have not hesi-
tated since the crime of the 28th Juno
to express themselves in interviews in
terms of hostility to the Austro-Hun-
garian Government ; and, finally,

"10. To notify the Imperial and
Royal Government without delay of
the execution of tho measures com-
prised under the preceding heads.

"The Austro-Hungarian Govern-
ment expect the reply of the Royal
Government at the latest by G o'clock
on Saturday evening, the 25th July.

"A memorandum dealing with the
results of the magisterial enquiry at
Serajevo with regard to the officials
mentioned under heads (7) and (8) is
attached to this note."

I have the honour to request your
Excellency to bring the contents of
this note to the knowledge of tho
Government to which you are
accredited, accompanying your com-
munication with the following obser-
vations : —

On the 31st March, 1909, the Royal
Servian Government addressed to
Austria-Hungary the declaration of
which the text is reproduced above.

On the very day after this declara-
tion Scrvia embarked on a policy of
instilling revolutionary ideas into tho

subversives aux ressortissants serbes de
la MonarcKie aiistro-hongroise et a pre-
parer ainsi la separation des territoires
austfo - hongrois, limitrophes a la
Serbie.

La Serbie devint' le foyer d'lmo agi-
tation criminello.

Des societes et affiliations ne tar-
derent pas a se former qui, soit ouyer-
tement, soit clandestinement> etaient
destinees a creer des desordres sur le
territoire austro-hongrois. Ces societes
et affiliations comptent parmi leurs
membres des generaux et des diplo-
mates, des fonctionnairfes d'Etat et des
juges, bref les sommites du monde
officiel et inofficiel du royaume.

Lo journalisme serbe est presque en-
tierement au service de cetto propa-
gande, dirigee contro TAutriche-Hon-
grie, et pas un jour ne passe sans quo
les organes de la presse serbe n'excitent
leurs lecteurs a la haine et au niepris
de la Monarchie voisine ou a des atten-
tats diriges plus ou moins ouvertement
centre sa surete et son integrite.

Un grand nombre d'agents est appele
h soutenir par tous les moyens I'agita-
tion. centre rAutriche-Hongrie et a cor-
rompro dans les provinces limitrophes
la jeunesse de ces pays.

L'esprit conspirateur des politiciens
serbes, esprit dent les annales du
royaume portent les sanglantes em^
preintes, a subi une recrudescence de-
puis la derniere crise balkanique; des
individus ayant fait partie des bandes
jusque-la occupees en Macedoine sent
venus se mettre a la disposition de la
propagande terreriste contre 1' Autriche-
Hongrie.

En presence de ces agissements,
auxquels rAutriche-Hongrie est ex-
posee depuis de^ annees, le Geuverne-
ment de la Serbie n'a pas cru devoir
prendre la moindre mesure. C'est
ainsi quo le Gouvernement serbe a
manque au. devoir que lui imposait la
declaration solennelle du 31 mars,
1909, et c'est ainsi qu'il s'est mis en
contradiction avec la volonte de
I'Europe et avec I'engagement qu'il
avait pris vis-a-vis de I'Autriche-
Hongrie.

La longanimite du Gouvernement
Imperial et Royal a I'egard de I'atti-
tude provocjitrice de la Serbie etait
inspireo du desinteressement territorial
do la Monarchie austro-hongroise et de
I'espoir que le Gouvernement serbe
finirait tout de meme par apprecier a
sa juste valeur I'amitie de I'Autriche-
Hongrie. En observant une attitude
bienveillante pour les interets poli-
tiques de la Serbie, le Gouvernement
Imperial et Royal esperait que le

Serb subjects of the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy, and so preparing for the
separation of the Austro-Hungarian
territory on the Servian frontier.

Servia became the centre • of a
criminal agitation.

No time was lost lii the formation
of societies and groups, whose object
either avowed or secret, was the
creation of disorders on Austro-Hun-
garian territory. These societies and
groups count among their members
generals and diplomatists, Government
officials and judges— in short, men at
tho top of official and unofficial society
in the kingdom.

Servian journalism is almost entirely
at the service of this propaganda,
which is directed against Austria-Hun-
gary, and not a day passes without
tho organs of the Servian press stirring
up their readers to hatred or contempt
for tho neighbouring Monarchy, or to
outrages directed more or less openly
against its security and integrity.

A large number of agents are em-
ployed in carrying on. by every means
the agitation against Austria-Hungary
and corrupting the youth in the fron-
tier provinces.

Since the recent Balkan crisis there
has been a recrudescence of the spirit
of conspiracy inherent in Servian
politicians, which has left such san-
guinary imprints on the history of the
kingdom ; individuals belonging for-
merly to bands employed in Macedonia
have come to place themselves at the
disposal of the terrorist propaganda
against Austria-Hungary.

In the presence of these doings, to
which Austria-Hungary has been ex-
posed for years, the Servian Govern-
ment have not thought it incumbent
on them to take the slightest step.
The Servian Government have thus
failed in the duty imposed on them by
the solemn declaration of the 31st
March, 1909, and acted in opposition
to the will of Europe and the under-
taking given to Austria-Hungary.

The patience of the Imperial and
Royal Government in the face of the
provocative attitude of Servia was in-
spired by the territorial disinterested-
ness of the Austro-Hungarian Mon-
archy and the hope that the Servian
Government would end in spite of
everything by appreciating Austria-
Hungary's friendship at its true value.
By observing a benevolent attitude to-
wards the political interests of Servia,
the Imperial and Royal Government

royaume se deciderait fmalement h
suivre de son cote une ligne de con-
duite analogue. L'Autriche-Hongrie
s attendait surtout a une pareille evo-
lution dans les ideas politiques en
Serbie, lorsque, apres les evenements
de I'annee 1912, le Gouvernement Im-
perial et Royal rendit possible, par une
attitude desinteressee et sans rancune,
Tagrandissement si considerable de la
Serbie.

Cette bienveillance manifestee par
; I'Autriche-Hongrie a I'egard de I'Etat
JToisin n'a cependant aucunement mo-
' difie les precedes du royaume, qui a
continue a tolerer sur son territoire
une propagande, dont les funestes con-
sequences se sent manifestees au
monde entier le 28 juin dernier, jour
ou I'heritier presomptif de la Monarchic
et son illustre epouse devinrent les vic-
times d'un complot trame a Belgrade.

En presence de cet etat de choses le
Gouvernement Imperial et Royal a du
se decider a entreprendre de nou-
velles et pressantes demarches a Bel-
grade afin d'amener le Gouvernement
serbe a arreter le mouvement incen-
diaire mena9ant la surete et I'integrit^
de la Monarchie austro-hongroise.

Le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal
est persuade qu'en entreprenant cette
demarche il se trouve en plein accord
avec les sentiments de toutes les
nations civilisees, qui ne sauraient ad-
mettre que le regicide devint une arme
dont on puisse se servir impunement
dans la lutte politique, et que la
paix europeenne fut continuellement
troublee par les agissements partant
do Belgrade.

C'est a I'appui de ce qui precede que
le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal
tient a la disposition du Gouvernement
Royal de Grande-Bretagne un dossier
elucidant les menees serbes et les rap-
ports existant entre ces menees et le
meurtre du 28 juin.

Une communication identique est
adressee aux reprcsentants Imperiaux
et Royaux aupres des autres Puis-
sances signataires.

Vous etes autorise de laisser' une
copie de cette depeche entre les mains
de M. le Ministre des Affaires Etran-
geres.

Vienne, le 24 juillet, 1914.

hoped that the kingdom would finally
decide to follow an analogous line of
conduct on its own side. In particu-
lar, Austria-Hungary expected a de-
velopment of this kind in the political
ideas of Servia, when, after the events
of 1912, the Imperial and Royal
Government, by its disinterested and
ungrudging attitude, made such a con-
siderable aggrandisement of Servia
possible.

The benevolence which Austria-Hun-
gary showed towards the neighbouring
State had no restraining effect on tho
proceedings of the kingdom, which
continued to tolerate on its territory
a propaganda of which the fatal con-
sequences were demonstrated to the
whole world on the 28th June last,
when the Heir Presumptive to the
Monarchy and his illustrious consort
fell yictims to a plot hatched at Bel-
grade.

In the presence of this state of
things the Imperial and Royal
Government have felt compelled to
take new and urgent steps at Belgrade
with a view to inducing the Servian
Government to stop the incendiary
movement that is threatening tho
security and integrity of the Austro*
Hungarian Monarchy.

The Imperial and Royal Govern-
ment are convinced that in taking this
step they will find themselves in full
agreement with the sentiments of all
civilised nations, who cannot permit
regicide to become a weapon that can
be employed with impunity in political
strife, and the peace of Europe to bO
continually disturbed by movements
emanating from Belgrade.

In support of the above the Imperial
and Royal Government hold at the
disposal of the British Government a
dossier elucidating the Servian in-
trigues, and the connection between
these intrigues and the murder of the
28th June.

An identical communication has been
addressed to the Imperial and Royal
representatives accredited to the other
signatory Powers.

You are authorised to leave a copy
of this despatch in the hands of tho
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, Juhj 24, 1914.

Annexe.

L'instruction criminelle ouverte par

le Tribunal de Sarajevo centre Gavrilo

Princip et consorts du chef d'assassinat

et de complicite y relative— crime com-

Annex.

The criminal enquiry opened by the
Court of Serajevo against Gavrilo
Princip and his accessories in and
before the act of assassination com-

mis par eux le 28 juin dernier— a jus-
qu'ici abouti aiix constations sui-
vantes:

1°. Le complot ayant pour but
d'assassiner, lors de son sejour a Sara-
jevo, de I'Archiduc Fran9ois-Ferdi-
nand fut forme a Belgrade par Gavrilo
Princip, Nedeljko Oabrinovic le
nomme Milan Ciganovic et Trifko
Grabez, avec le concours du comman-
dant Voija Tankosi6.

2°. Les six bombes et les quatre pis-
tolets Browning avec munition, moyen-
nant lesquels les malfaiteurs ont com-
mis I'attentat, furent livres a Bel-
grade a Princip, Cabrinovic. et Grabez
par lo nomme Milan Ciganovic et le
commandant Voija Tankosic.

3^. Les bombes sont des grenades a
la main provenant du depot d'armes do
I'armee serbe a fCragujeva<5

4°. Pour assurer la reussite de I'at-
tentat, Ciganovic enseigna a Princip,
Cabrinovic et Grabez la mani^ro der se
servir des grenades et donna, dans un
foret pres du champ de tir a Topschider,
des le9oris de tir avec pistolets Brown-
ing a Princip et Grabez.

5*^. Pour re'ndre possible a Princip,
Cabrinovio et Grabez de passer la fron-
tiere de Bosnie-Herzegovine et d'y in-
troduire clandestinement leur contre-
bando d'armes, iin systems de trans-
port secret fut organise par Ciganovic.

D'apres cette organisation I'intro-
duction en Bosnie-Herzegovine des
malfaiteurs et de leurs armes fut
operee par les capitaines-frontieres de
Chabac (Rade Popovic) et de Loznica
ainsi que par le douanier Rudivoj
Grbic de Loznica avec le concours de
divers particuliers.

mitted by them on the 28th Juno last;
has up to the present led to the follow-
ing conclusions: —

1. The plot, having as its object the
assassination of the Archduke Francis
Ferdinand at the time of his visit to
Serajevo, was formed at Belgrade by
Gavrilo Princip* Nedeljko Cabrinovic,
one Milan Ciganovic, and Trifko
Grabez, with the assistance of Com-
mander Voija Tankosic.

2. The six bombs and the four
Browning pistols and ammunition
with which the guilty parties com-
mitted the act were delivered to
Princip, ('cabrinovic and Grabe'2. by
the man Milan 6iganovi6 and Com-
mander Voija Tankosi6 at Belgrade.

3. The bombs are hand-grenades
coming from the arms depot of tho
Servian Army at Kragujevac.

4. In order to ensure the succesis of
the act, Ciganovic taught Princip,
Cabrinovic, and Grabez how to use the
bombs, and gave lessons m firing
Browning pistols to Princip dnd
Grabez in a forest near the shooting
ground at Topschider.

5. To enable Princip, Cabrinovic,
and Grabe2 to cross the frontier of
Bosnia-Herzegovina and smuggle in
their contraband of arms secretly, a
secret system of transport was orga-
nised by Ciganovic.

By this arrangement the introduc-
tion into Bosnia-Herzegovina of crimi-
nals and their arms was effected by.
the officials controlling the frontiers at
Chabac (Eade Popovic) and Loznica,'
as well as by the customs officer
Eudivoj Grbic, of Loznica, with the
assistance of various individuals.

No. 5.
Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bv/nsen^ British Ambassador at Vienna.
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.

Note addressed to Servia, together with an explanation of the reasons
leading up to it, has been communicated to me by Count Mensdorff.*.

In the ensuing conversation with his Excellency, I remarked that it seemed
to me a matter for great regret that a time limit, and such a short one at
that, had been insisted upon at ^this stage of the proceedings. The murder
of the Archduke and some of the circumstances respecting Servia quoted in
the note aroused sympathy with Austria, as was but' natural, but at the same
time I had never before seen one State address to ahother independent State
a document of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be hardly
consistent with the maintenance of Servia's independent sovereignty if it
were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be
invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority within the
frontiers of Servia.

I added that I felt great apprehension, and that I should concern myself-
with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of the peace of
Europe. The merits of the dispute between Austria and Servia were not the
concern of His Majesty's Government, ahd such comments as I had made above
v/ere not made in order to discuss those merits,

* Austro-Hungarkn Ambassador ia London. 2 2

I ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an exchange of views
with other Powers, and that I must await their views as to what could
done to mitigate the difficulties of the situation.

Count Mensdorff* replied that the present situation might never have
arisen if Servia had held out a hand after the murder of the Archduke ;
Servia had, however, shown no sign of sympathy or help, though some weeks
had already elapsed since the murder ; a time limit, said his Excellency, Avas
essential, owing to the x^rocrastination on Servia's part.

I said that if Servia had procrastinated in replying, a time limit could
have been introduced later ; but, as things now stood, the terms of the Servian
reply had been dictated by Austria, who had -not been content to limit herself
to a demand for a reply within a limit of forty-eight hours from its
presentation./'

* Austro-Huagarian Ambassador in London.

No. 6.

Sir G, Buchanan, Bntish AmhassadoQ" at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edioard
Chrey^ — (Becdved Jtdy 24.)

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 24, 1914.

I HAD a telephone message this morning from M. Sazonof* to the effect that
/the text of the Austrian ultimatum had just -reached him

His Excellency added that a reply within forty-eight hours was demanded,
fRnd' he begged me 1o meet him at the French Embassy to discuss matters, as
Austrian step clearly meant that waf was imminent.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's conduct was both provoca-
tive and immoral ; she would never have taken such action unless Germany
had first been consulted ; some of her demands were quite impossible of
acceptance. He hoped that His Majesty's Government would not fail to
proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France.

The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfil all
the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia, if necessity arose, besides,
supporting Russia strongly in any diplomatic negotiations.

I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their Excellencies
}iad just said to .me. I could not, of course, speak in the name of His Majesty's
Government, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of
solidarity from His Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional
.engagement on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms.
Direct British interests in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country
would never be sanctioned by British public opinion. To this M. Sazonof
replied that we must not forget that the general European question was
involved, the Servian question being but a part of the former, and that Great
Britain could not afford to efface herself from the problems now at issue

In reply to these remarks, I observed that I gathered from Avhat he said
that his Excellency was suggesting that Great Britain should join in making
a communication tp Austria to the effect that active intervention by her in
the internal affairs of Servia could not be tolerated. But supposing Austria
nevertheless proceeded to embark on military measures against Servia in spite
of our representations, was it the intention of the Russian Government forth-
with to declare v.ar on Austria ?

M. Sazonof* said that he himself thought that Russian mobilisation would
at any rate have to be carried out ; but a council of Ministers was being held
this afternoon to consider the whole question. A further council would be
held, probably to-morrow, at which the Emperor would preside, when a decision
would be come to

I said that it seemed to me that the important point was to induce Austria
'to extend the time limit, and that the first thing to do was to bring an influence
to bear on Austria with that tsnd in view; Freiich Ambassador, however,
thought that either Austria had made up her mind to act at once or that she
was bluffing. Whichever it might be, our only chance of averting war was for
lis to adopt a firm and united attitude. He did not think there was time to
carry out my suggestion. Thereupon I said that it seemed to mo desirable
that we should know just how far Servia was prepared to go to meet the

* Russian Minister- for Foreign Affairs.

ws 1
bo 1

demands formulated by Austria in her note. M. Sazonof replied that he must
first consult his colleagues on this point, but that doubtless some of the
Austrian demands could be accepted by Servia.

French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continued to press me for a
declaration of complete solidarity of His Majesty's Government with French
and Eussian Governments, and I therefore said that it seemed to me possible
•that you might perhaps be willing fo make strong representations to both
German and Austrian Governments, urging upon them that an attack by
Austria upon Servia would endanger the whole peace of Europe. Perhaps you
might see your way to saying to them that such action on the part of Austria
would probably mean Russian intervention, which would involve France and
Germany, and that it would be difficult for Great Britain to keep out if the
war were to become general. M. Sazonof answered that we would sooner or
later be dragged into war if it did break out ; we should have rendered war
more likely if we did not from the outset make common cause with his country
and with France; at any rate, he hoped His Majesty's Government would'
express strong reprobation of action taken by Austria.

, President of French Republic and President of the Council cannot reach
France, on their return from Russia, for four or five days, and it looks as
though Austria purposely chose this moment to present their ultimatum.

It seems to me, from the language held by French Ambassador, that, even
if we decline to join them, France and Russia are determined to make a strong
stand.

No. 7.

Sir M. de JBwisen, British Ambassador at Vienna^ to Sir Edward

Grey. — {Received July 2i.)

(Telegraphic.) Vienna^ Jtihj 24, 1914.

Before departing on leave of absence, I was assured by Russian Ambassador
that any action taken by Austria to humiliate Servia could not leave Russia
indifferent. ^

Russian Cliarge d'Affaires was received this morning by Minister for
Foreign Affairs, and said to him, as his own personal view> that Austrian. not©
was drawn up in a form rendering it impossible of acceptance as it stood, and
. that it was both unusual and peremptory in its terms. Minister for Foreign
Affairs replied that Austrian Minister was under instructions to leave Bel-
grade unless Austrian demands were accepted integrally by 4 r.M., to-iiiorrow.
His Excellency added that Dual Monarchy felt that its very existence was at
stake ; and that the step taken had caused great satisfaction throughout the
country. He did not think that objections to what had been done could be
raised by any Power.

No. 8.

Mr. Cracka/nthorpej British Charge d^ Affaires at Belgrade^ to
Sir Edward Grey. — {^Received July 24.)

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 24, 1914.

Austrian demands are considered absolutely unacceptable by Servian
Government, who earnestly trust that His Majesty's Government may see their
way to induce Austrian Government to moderate them.

This request was conveyed to me by Servian Prime Minister, who returned
early this morning to Belgrade. His Excellency is dejected, and is clearly
very anxious as to developments that may arise.

No. 9.

JSfote communicated by German Ambassador*, July 24, '19 14.

The publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning the
bircumstances under which X\>:q assassination of the Austrian heir presumptive
and bfs consort has taken place disclose unmistakably the aims which the
Great Servian propaganda has set itself, and the means it employs to realise
ihem. " The facts now made known must also do away with the last dqubts

that the centre of activity of all those tendencies which are directed towards
the detachment of the Southern Slav provinces from the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy and their incorporation into the Servian Kingdom is to be found
in Belgrade, and is at work there with at least the connivance of members
of Government and army.

The Servian intrigues have been going on for many years. In an especially
marked form the Great Servian chauvinism manifested itself during the
Bosnian crisis. It was only owing to the far-reaching self-restraint and
moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and to the energetic inter-
ference of the Great Powers that the Servian provocations to which Austria-
Hungary was then exposed did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of good
conduct in future which was given by the Servian Government at that time
has not been kept. Under the eyes, at least with the tacit permission of
official Servia, the Great Servian propaganda has continuously increased in
extension and intensity ; to its account must be set the recent crime, the
threads of which lead to Belgrade. It' has become clearly evident that it
^'ould not be consistent either with the dignity or with the self-preservation
of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy still longer to remain inactive in face of
this movement on the other side of the trontler, by "which the security and the
integrity of her territories are constantly menaced. Under these circum-
stances, the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian
Government can only be regarded as equitable and moderate. In spite of that,
the attitude which public opinion as well as the Government in Servia have
recently adopted does not exclude the. apprehension that the Servian Govern-
ment might refuse to comply with those demands, and might allow themselves
to be carried away into a provocative attitude against Austria-Hungary. The
Austro-Hungarian Government, if it does not wish . definitely to abandon
Austria's position as a Great Power, would then have no choice but to obtain
the fulfilment of their demands from the Servian Government by strong
pressure and, if necessary, by using military measures, the choice of the means
having to be left to them.

The Imperial Government want to emphasise their opinion that in the
present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively between
Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that the Great Powers ought seriously to
endeavour to reserve it to those two immediately concerned. The Imperial
Government desire urgently the localisation of the conflict, because every
interference of another Power would, owing to the different treaty obligations,
be followed by incalculable consequences.

No. 10.
Sir Edijcard Grey to Sir F. Bertie^ British Ambassador at Paris.

Sir, Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.

After telling M. Cambon* to-day of the Austrian communication to Servia,
which I had received this morning, and of the comment 1 had made to Count
Mensdorflt upon it yesterday, I told M. Cambon that this afternoon I was to
see the German Ambassador, who some days ago had asked me privately to
exercise moderating influence in St. Petersburgh. I would say to the Ambas-
sador that, of course, if the presentation of this ultimatum to Servia did not'
lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, we need not concern ourselves about
it ; but, if Russia took the view of the Austrian ultimatum., which it seemed to
me that any Power interested m Servia would take, I should be quite powerless,
in face of the terms of the ultimatum, to exercise any moderating influence.
I would say that I thought the only* chance of any mediating or moderating
influence being exercised was that Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves,
who had not direct interests in Servia, should act together for* the sake of
peace, simultaneously in Vienna and St. Petersburgh..

M. CamboTi said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the four Powers,
he had no doubt that his Government T\'ould be glad to join in it; but he
pointed out that we could not say anything in St. Petersburgh till Russia had
expressed some opinion or taken some action. But, when two days were over,
Austria would march into Servia, for the Servians could not possibly accept,
* French Ambassador in London.
t Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

the Austrian demand. Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to
take action as soon as Austria attacked Servia, and therefore, once the
Aiistrians had attacked Servia, it would be too late for any mediation.

I said that I had not contemplated anything being said in St. Petersburgh
until after it was clear that there must be trouble between Austria and Russia.
I had thought that if Austria did move into Servia, and Russia then mobilised,
it would bo possible for the four Powers to urge Austria to stop her advance,
and Russia also to stop hersy pending mediation. But it would be essential
for any chance of success for such a step that Germ.any should partioipato
in it.

M. Cambon said that it would be too late after Austria had once moved
agains^t Servia. Tho important thing was to gain time by mediation in Vienna.
The best chance of this being accepted woukl be that Germany should propose
it to the other Powers.

I said that by this he meant a mediation between Austria and Servia.

He replied that it was so.

I said that I would talk to the German Ambassador this afternoon on tho
subject.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 11.
Sir Edward Grey to /Sir 11. Buinbold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.

German Ambassador ' has communicated to me the view of the German
Government about the Austrian demand in Servia. I understand the German
Government is making the same communication to tho Powers.

I said that if the Austrian ultimatum to Servia did not lead to trouble
between Austria and Russia I had no concern with it ; I had heard nothing yet
from St. Petersburgh, but I was very apprehensive of tho view Russia would
take of the situation. I reminded tho German Ambassador that some d^ys
ago he had expressed a personal hope that if need arose I would endeavolir
to exercise moderating influence at St. Petersburgh, but now I said that, in
view of the extraordinarily stifF character of the Austrian note, the shortness
of the time allowed, and the wide scope of the demands upon Servia, I felt
quite helpless as far as Russia was concerned, and I did not believe any Power
could exercii*^ influence alone.

The only chance I xjould see of mediating or moderating influence being,
effective, was that the four Powers, Germany, Italy, France, and ourselves,
should work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburgh in favour
of moderation in tho event of tlie relations between Austria and Russia becom-
ing threatening.

The immediate danger was that in a few hours Austria might march into
Servia and Russian Slav opinion demand that Russia should march to help'
Servia ; it would bo very desirable to get Austria not to precipitate military
action and so to gain more time. But none of us could influence Austria in this
direction unless Germany would propose and participate in such action at
Vienna. You should inform Secretary of State.

Prince Lichnowsky* said that Austria might be expected to move when the
time limit expired unless Servia could give unconditional acceptance of
Austrian demands in tofo. Speaking privately, his Excellency suggested that
a negative reply must in no case be returned by Servia ; a reply favourable
on some points must be sent at once, so that an excuse against immediate
action might be afforded to Austria.

■•• German Ambassador in London.

No. 12.
Sir Edicard Grey to Mr. Crackardhorpej British Cluv(jt d' Affaires at

Btlfjrade.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.

Servia ought to promise that, if it is proved that Servian officials, however
subordinate they may be, were accomplices in tho murder of. the Archduke at

Serajevo, she will give Austria the fullest satisfaction. She certainly ought
to express concern and regret. For the rest, Servian Government must reply
to Austrian demands a?? they consider best in Servian interests.

It is impossible to say whether military action by Austria when time limit
expires can be averted by anything but unconditional acceptance of her de-
mands, but only chance appears to lie in avoiding an absolute refusal and
replying favourably to as many points as the time limit allows.

Servian Minister here has begged that His Majesty's Government will-
express their views, but T cannot undertake responsibility of saying more than
I have said above, and I do not like to say even that without knowing what
is being said at Belgrade by French and Russian. Governments. You should
therefore consult your French and Russian colleagues as to repeating what my
views are, as .expressed above, to Servian Government.

I have urged upon German Ambassador that Austria should not precipitate
military action.

No. 13.
Note communicated by Russian Ambassador, .Tnbf 25.

(Translation.)

M;- Sazonof telegraphic au Charge
d' Affaires de Russie a Vionne en date
dull (24) juillet, 1914:

"La communication du "Gouverne-
ment austro-hongrois aux Puissances
le lendemain de la presentation de
r ultimatum a Belgrade ne laisse aux
Puissances qu'un dtlai tout a tait in-
^uffisant pour entreprendre quoi qu'il
Boit d'utile pour I'aplanissement des
complications surgies.

"Pour prevcnir les consequences in-
calculables et egalement nefast*^^ pour
toutes les Puissances qui peuvent
suivre le mode d'action du Gouverne-
ment austro-hongrois, il nous parait
indispensable qu'avant tout le delai
donne a la Serbie pour repondre soit
prolonge. L'Autriche-Hongn^. se de-
clarant disposee a informer le?^ Puis-
sances des donnees de I'enqnete sur
lesquelles le Gouvernement Imperial et
Royal base ses accusations, devrait
leur donner egalement le temps de s'en
rendre compte.

"En ce cas, si les Puissances; se con-
vainquaient du bien-fonde de oprtames
des exigences autrichiennes, elles se
trouveraient en mcsure de fairo par-
venir au Gouvernem.ent serbe des con-
seils en consequence.

" Un ref us de prolonger le terme de
i'ultimatum priverait de toute portee
la demarche du Gouvernement austro-
hongrois aupres des Puissances et se
trouvcrait en contradiction avec les
bases meme des relations interna-
tional es.

"Le Prince Koudachef est charge de
communiquer ce qui precede au Cabi-
net de Vienne."

M. Sazonof espere que le Gouverne-
ment de Sa Majeste britanniquc ad-

M. Sazonof telegraphs to the
Russian Charge d Affaires at Vienna
on the Uth (24th^ Ti.ly. 1914-

The communication made by
Austria- Hungary to the Powers the
day after the presentation of the
ultimatum at Belgrade I^.aves a period
to the Pnwors which is quite insuffi-
cient to enable them to take any «4teps
which might help to smooth away the
difficulties that have arisen.

"In order to pr^vpnt the conse-
quences, equally incalculable and fatal
to all the Power**, which may result
from the course of action followed by
the Austro-Hunganan Government, it
seems to us to be above all essential
that the period allowed for the
Servian reply should be extended.
Austria- Hungary, having declared
her readiness to inform the Powers of
the results of the enquiry upon
which the Imperial and Royal Govern-
ment bnse their accusations, should
eqna^ly si How them sufficient time to
studv them.

" In this CH.se. if the Powers were
convinced that certain of the Austrian
demands were well founded, they
would be in a position to offer advice
to the Servian Government.

"A refusal to prolong the term of
the ultimatum would render nugatory
the proposals made by the Austro-
Hungarian Government to the Powers,
and would be in contradiction to the
very bases of international I'elations.

"Prince Kudachef is instructed to
communicate the above to the Cabinet
at Vienna.''

M. Sazonof hopes that His Britannic
Majesty's Government will adhere to

herera au point de vue expose, et il the point of view set forth above, and

exprime I'espoir que Sir Edward Grey he trusts that Sir E. Grey will see his

voudra biei> munir TAmbassadeur way to furnish similar instructions to

d'Angleterre a Vienne d'instructions the British Ambassador at Vienna,
conformes.

No. 14.

/SVr Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie^ British Ambassador at Paris, and to

Sir G, Buchanan, British Ambassador at St, Peter sburgh.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

Austrian Ambassador has been "authorised to explain to me that the step
taken at Belgrade was not an ultimatum, but a demarche with a time limit,
and that if the Austrian demands were not complied with within the time limit
the Austro-Hungarian Government would break off diplomatic relations and
begin military preparations, not operations.

In case Austro-Hungarian Government have not given the same informa-
tion at Paris (St, Petersburgh), you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs
as soon as possible ; it makes the immediate situation rather less acute.

No. 15.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. —
{RfXiived'July 26.)
(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 25, 1914.

I LEARN from the Acting Political Director that the French Government
have not yet received the explanation from the Austrian Governmeijt con-
tained in your telegram of to-day.* They have, however, through the Sebvian
Minister here, given similar advice to Servia as was contained in your telegram
to Belgrade of yesterday.t

* See No. U. f See No. 12.

No. 16.
Sir F. Berlie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. —
{Received July 25.)
(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 25, 1914.

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has no suggestions to make except that
moderating advice might be given at Vienna as well as Belgrade. Ho hopes
that the Servian Government's answer to the Austrian ultimatum will be
sufficiently favourable to obviate extreme measures being taken by the Austrian
Government. He says, however, that there would be a revolution in Servia
if she were to accept the Austrian demands in their entirety.

No. 17.

Sir G. Buchanan^ British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward

^rey, — -{Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 25, 1914.

I SAW the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, and communicated
to his Excellency the substance of your telegram of to-day to Paris,* and this
afternoon I discussed witli him the communication which the French Ambassa-
dor suggested should be made to the Servian Government, as recorded in your
telegram of yesterday to Belgrade. t

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said, as regards the former, that tho
explanations of the Austrian Ambassador did not quite correspond with tho
information which had reached him from German quarters. As regards the
latter, both his Excellency and the French Ambassador agreed that it is too
late to make such a communication, as the time limit expires this evening.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Servia was quite ready to do as
you had suggested and to punish those proved to be guilty, but that no inde-
pendent State could be expected to accept the political demands which had
been put forward. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thought, .from a conversa-

* See No, 14. + See No. 12.

tion which he had with the Servian Minister yesterday, that, in the event^
of the Austrians attacking Servia,' the Servian Qovernment would abandon
Belgrade, and withdrauj: their forces into the interior, while they would at the
B&mo time appeal to the Powers to help them. His Excellendy was in favour
of their making this appeal. He would like to see the question placed on an
international footing, as the obligations taken by Servia in 1908, to which
reference is made in the Austrian ultimatum, were given not to Austria, but
to the Powers.

If Servia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready tq
stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany,
and Italy. It was possible, in his opinion, that Servia might propose to submit
the question to arbitration.

On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war
by mobilising until you had had time to use j^our influence in favour of peace,
his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions, and she
would take fio action until it was forced upon her. Austria's action was in
reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present statiLS
quo in the Balkans, and establishing her OAvn hegemony there. He did not
believe that Germany really, wanted war, but her attitude .was decided by
purs. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no,
war. If we failed them now, rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the
end be dragged into war.

I said that England could play the role of mediator at Berlin and Vienna
to better purpose as friend who, if her eounsels of moderation were disregarded,
might one day be converted into an ally, than if she were to declare herself
Russia's ally at once. His Excellency said that unfortunately Germany was
convinced that she could count upon our neutrality.

I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
and warned him that if Russia mobilised, Germany would not be content with
mere mobilisation, or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably
declare war at once. His Excellency replied that Russia could not allow
Austria to crush Servia and become the predominant Power in the Balkans,
End, if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of
war. He assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflipt,
but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I could regard the situation as
desperate.

No. 18.
Sii' H, Rumholdj British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin^ to Sir Edward
Grey. — {Received July 25.)
^Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 25, 1914.

Your telegram of the 24th July* acted on.

Secreti^ry of State says that on receipt of a telegram at 10 this morning
from German Ambassador at London, he immediately instructed German
Ambassador at Vienna to pass on to Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs
your suggestion for an extension of time limit, and to speak to his Excellency
about it. Unfortunately it appeared from press that Count Berchtoldt is at
Ischl, and Secretary of State thought that in these circumstances there would
be delay and difficulty in getting time limit extended. Secretary of State
said tliat lie did not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the spot, but
he admitted quite freely that Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give
the Servians a lesson, and that they meant to take military action. He also
.admitted that Servian Goternment could not swallow certain of the Austro-
Hungarian demands.

Secretary of State said that a reassuring feature of situation was that
Count Berciitold had sent for Russian representative at Vienna and had told
him that Austria-Hungary had no intention of seizing Servian territory. This
step should, in his opinion, exercise a calming influence at St. Petersburgh.
I asked whether it was not to be feared that, in taking military action against
Servia. Austria would dangerously excite public opinion in Russia. He said
he thought not. Ho remained of opinion that crisis could be localised. I
said that telegrams from Russia in this morning's papers did not look very
reassuring, but he maintained his optimistic view '^ith regard to Russia. He

* Sec No. 11. t Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

said that he had given the Russian Government to understand that last thing
Germany wanted was a general war, and he would do all in his power to
prevent such a calamity. If the relations between Austria and Russia beca«me
threatening, he was quite ready to fall in with your suggestion as to the^four
Powers working in favour of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburgh.

Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the note left much'
to be desired as a diplomatic document. He repeated very earnestly that,
though he had been accused of knowing all about the contents of that note,
he had in fact had no such knowledge.

No. 19.

/SVr A*, liodd, Briiish Ambassador at Rome, to Svr Edivard Gr&y. —

(heceived July 25.)

(Telegraphic.) 7?ome, JvXy 25, 1914.

I SAW the Secretary-General this m.orning and found that he knew of tho
suggestion that France, Italy, Germany, and ourselves should work at Vienna
and St. Petersburgh in favour of moderation, if the relations between Austria
and Servia become menacing.

In his opinion Austria will only be restrained by the unconditional accept-
ance by tho Servian Government of her note. There is reliable information
that Austria intends to seize the Salonica Railway. •

No. 20.
ISir M. de Bunsen, Bi'itish Amhass'idor at Vienna, to Sir Edward
Grey. — {Received July 25.)
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 25, 1914.

Language of press this morning leaves the impression that the surrender '
of Servia is neither expected nor really desired. It is officially announced
that the Austrian Minister is instructed to leave Belgrade with staff pf legation
failing unconditional acceptance of note at 6 p.m. to-day.

Minister for Foreign Affairs goes to Ischl to-day to communicate personally
to the Emperor Servian reply when it comes.

No. 21.

Mr, Crackanthoiye, British Charge d* Affaires at Belgrade^ to
Sir Edward Grey, — {Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.) ' Bplgrade, Jvly 25, 1914.

The Council of Ministers is now drawing up their reply to the Austrian
note. I am informed by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that
it will be most conciliatory and will meet the Austrian demands in as large a
measure as is possible.

The following is a brief summary of the projected reply: —

The Servian Government consent to tho publication oi,a declaration in the
'"Official Gazette." The ten points are accepted with reservations. Serviau
Government declare themselves ready to agree to a mixed commission of
enquiry so long as the appointment of the commission can be shown to be in
accordance with international usage. They consent to dismiss and prosecute
those officers who can be clearly proved to be guilty, and they have already
arrested tho officer referred to in the Austrian note. They are prepared to
suppress the Narodna Odbrana.

The Servian Government consider that, unless the Austrian Government
'want war at any cost, they cannot but be content with the full satisfaction
offered in the Servian reply.

No. 22.

Mr. CrachantJior'pe] British Chan^ge d' Affaires at Belgrade^ to
Sir Edivard Grey.— {Recemed July 25.)

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

I HAVE seen the new French Minister, who has just arrived from Con-
stantinople, and m^y Russian colleague, and informed them of your views. \

They have not yet received instruoiions from their Governments, and itx

fiew of this and of the proposed conciliatory terms of the Servian reply, 1
nave up tq now abstained from offering advice to the Servian Government.

I think it is highly probable that the Russian Government have already
urged the utmost moderation on the Servian Government.

i>Io. 23.

M?'. Crachanthorpey British Charge cC Affaires at Belgrade^ to
!bir Edivard Grey, — {Received Jxdy 25.)

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

The Austrian Minister left at 6.30.

The Government nave left for Nish, where the Skuptchina* will meet on
lilonday. I am leaving with my other colleagues, but the vice-consul is
remaining in charge of the archives.

* The Servian Parliament.

No. 24.

Sir Edicard Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at
St. Feiei'sburgh,
(Telegraphic.) - Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

You spoke quite rightly in very difficult circumstances as to the attitude
cf His Majesty's Government. I entirely approve what you said, as reported
in your telegram of yesterday,* and I cannot promise more on behalf of the
Government.

I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to sanction our
going to war over a Servian quarrel. If, however, war does take place, the
development of other issues may draw us into it, and I am therefore anxious
to prevent it.

The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian demarche
makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria
will have mobilised against each other. In this event, the only chance of
peace, in my opinion, is for the other four Powers to join in asking the Austrian
and -Russian Governments not to cross the frontier, and to give time for the
four Powers acting at Vienna and St. Petersburg!! to try and arrange matters.
If Germany will adopt this view, I feel strongly that. France and ourselves
should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly co-operate.

No diplomatic intervention or mediation would be tolerated by either Russia
or Austria unless it was clearly impartial and included the allies or friends
of both. The co-operation of Germany would, therefore, be essential.

* See No. 6.

No. 25.
Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rwnhold, British Charge dJ Affaires at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

The Austrian Ambassador has been authorised to inform me that the
Austrian method of procedure on expiry of the time, limit would be to break
off diplomatic relations and commence military preparations, but not military
operations. In informing the German Ambassador of this, I said that it inter-
posed a stage of mobilisation before the frontier was actually crossed, which
I had urged yesterday should be delayed. Apparently we should now soon
1)0 face to face with the mobilisation of Austria and Russia. The only chance
of peace, if this did happen, would be for Germany, France, Russia, and
ourselves to keep together, and to join in asking Austria and Russia not to
cross the frontier till we had liad time to try and arrange matters between
them.

The German Ambassador read me a telegram from the German Foreign
Office saying that his Gavernment had not known beforehand, and had had
no more than other Powers to do with the stiff terms of the Austrian note
to Servia, but once she* had launched that note, Austria could not draw back.
Prince Lio'inojvsky* said, however, that if what I contemplated was mediation

Ocrman Ambassador in London.

betwoen Austria and Russia, Austria might be able with dignity to accept it^
He expressed himself as personally favonrablo to this suggestion.

I concurred in his observation, and said that I felt I had no titld to inter-
vene between Austria and Servia, but as soon as the question became one as
between Austria and Russia, the peace of Europe was affected, in which we
must all take a hand

I impressed upon the Ambassador that, in the event of Russian and
Austrian mobilisation, the participation of Germany would be essential to any
diplomatic action for peace. Alone Ave could do nothing. The French Govern-
ment were travelling at the moment, and I had had no time to consult them,
and could not therefore be sure of their views, but I was prepared, if tho
German Government agreed with my suggestion, to tell the French Govern-
ment that I thought it the right thing to act upon it.

No. 2G.
Sw Eckum-d Grey to Sw M. de Bvmse/ii, British Ambassador at Vienna.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office July 25, 1914.

The Russian Ambassador has communicated to me the following telegram
which his Government have sent to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, with
instructions to communicate it to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs: —

''The delay given to Servia for a reply is so limited that the Powers are
prevented from taking any steps to avert the complications which are
threatening. The Russian Government trust that the Austrian Government
will prolong the time limit, and as the latter have declared their willingness
to inform the Powers of the data on which they have based their demands on
Servia, the Russian Government hope that these particulars will be furnished
in order that the Powers may examine the matter. If they k>und that some
of the Austrian requests were well founded, they would be in a position to
advise the Servian Government accordingly. If the Austrian Government were
indisposed to prolong the time limit, not only would they be acting against
international ethics, but they would deprive their communication to the
Powers of any i)ractical meaning."

You may support in general terms the step taken by your Russian
colleague.

Since the telegram to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna was sent, it has
been a relief to liear that the steps, which the Austrian Government were
taking were to be limited for the moment to the rupture of relations and to
military preparations, and not operations. I trust, therefore, that if tho
Austro-Hungarian Government consider it too late to prolong the time limit,
they will at any rate give time in the sense and for the reasons desired by
Russia before taking any irretrievable steps.

No. 27.

JSvr EdAoa/rd Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Biitish Ambassador at PariSy Sir II.
Rimibold, British Charge dAffaires at Berlin, and Sir G. Buchanan,
British jlmhassador at St. Fetershurgh.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office. July 25, 1914.

I HAVE communicated to German Ambassador the forecast of vthe Servian
reply contained in Mr. Crackanthorpe's telegra;m of to-day.* I have said that,
if Servian reply, when received at Vienna, corresponds to this forecast, I hope
tho German Government will feel able to influence the Austrian Government
to take a favourable view of it.

• See No. 21.

No. 28.
[Nil.]

No. 29.
Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, BHtish Ambassador at Rome. (
Sir, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

The Italian Ambassador came to see me to-day. I told him in general terms
what I had said to the German Ambassador this morning.

The Italian Ambassador cordially approved of this. He jnade no secret of-
the fact that Italy was most desirous to see war avoided.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 30.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at

Belgrade.
Sir, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

The Servian Minister called on the 23rd instant and spoke to Sir A. Nicolson^
on the present strained relations between Servia and Austria-Hungary.

He said that his Government were most anxious and disquieted. They
were perfectly ready to me^t any reasonable demands of Austria-Hungary so
long as such demands were kept on the "terrain juridique." If the results of
the enquiry at Sarajevo — an enquiry conducted with so much mystery and
secrecy — disclosed the fact that there were any individuals conspiring or
organising plots on Servian territory, the Servian Government would be quite
ready to take the necessary steps ^ give satisfaction; but if Austria trans-
ported the question on to the political ground, and said that Servian policy,
being inconvenient to her, must undergo a radical change, and that Servia must
abandon cci-tain political ideals, no independent State would, or could, submit
to such dictation.

He mentioned that both the assassins of the Archduke were Austrian
subjects — Bosniaks ; that one of them had been in Servia, and that the Servian
authorities, considering him suspect and dangerous, had desired to expel him>
but on applying to the Austrian autht)rities found that the latter protected
him, and said that he was an innocent and harmless individual.

Sir A. Nicolson,^on being asked by M. Boschkovitcht his opinion on the
whole question, observed that there were no data on which to base one, though
it was to be hoped that the Servian Government would endeavour to meet the^
Austrian demands in a conciliatory and moderate spirit.

I am, &c.
^ , E. GREY.

* British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
t Servian Minister in London.

No. 31.

Sir M. de Buns'-.n^ British Ambassador at Vienna^ to Sir Edward Grey.-^ ^

{Received July 26.)
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 25, 1914.

Servian reply to the Austro-Hungarian demands is not considered satis-
factory, and the Austro-Hungarian Minister has left Belgrade. War is thought
to be imminent.

No. 32.

Sir M. de Bunsen^ British Ambassador at Vienna ^ to Sir Edward Grey* — *

{Received July 26.)
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 26, 1914.

According to confident belief of German Ambassador, Russia will keep
quiet during chastisement of Servia, which Austria-Hungary is resolved to
inflict, having received assurances that no Servian territory will be annexed
by Austria-Hungary. In reply to my question whether Russian Government
might not be compelled by public opinion to intervene on behalf of kindred
nationality, ho said that everything depended on the personality of the Russian
Minister for Foreign Affairs, who could resist easily, if he chose, the pressure
of a few newspapers. He pointed out that the days of Pan-Slav agitation in
Russia were over and that Moscow was perfectly quiet. The Russian Minister

for Foreign Affairs would not, his Excellency thought, be so imprudent as to
take a step which wourd probably result in many frontier questions in which
Russia is interested, such as Swedish, Polish, Ruthene, Roumanigin, and Persian
questions being brought into tho melting-pot. France, too, was not at all in a
condition for facing a war.

I replied that matters had, I thought, been made a little difficult for other
Powers by the tone of Austro-Hungarian Government's ultimatum to Servia.
One naturally sympathised with many of the requirements of the ultimatum,
if only the manner of expressing them had been more temperate. It was,
however, impossible, according to the German Ambassador, to speak effectively
in any other way to Servia. Servia was about to receive a lesson which she
required ; the quarrel, however, ought not to be extended in any way to foreign
countries. He doubted Russia, who had no right to assume a protectorate over
Servia, acting as if she made any such claim. As for Germany she knew very
well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter.

The German Ambassador had heard of a letter addressed by you yesterday
to the German Ambassador in London in which you expressed the hope that the
Servian concessions would be regarded as satisfactory. Ho asked whether I
had been informed that a pretence of giving way at the last moment had been
made by the Servian Government. I had, I said, heard that on practically
every point Servia had been willing to give in. His Excellency replied that
Servian concessions were all a sham. Servia proved that she well knew that
they were insufficient to satisfy the legitimate demands of Austria-Hungary
by the fact that before making her offer she had ordered mobilisation and
retirement of Government from Belgrade.

No. 33.

Sir H. Bumhold, British Charge cV Affaires at Berlin^ to Sir Edivard
Grey. — [Received Jidij 2G.)
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 26, 1914.

Emperor returns suddenly to-night, and Under-Secretary of State says that
Foreign Office regret this step, which was taken on His Majesty's own initiative.
They fear that His Majesty's sudden return may cause speculation and excite-
ment. Under-Secretary of State likewise told me that German Ambassador at
St. Petersburgh had reported that, in conversation with Russian Minister for
Foreign Affairs, latter had said that if Austria annexed bits of Servian territory
Russia would not remain indifferent. Under-Secretary of State drew conclusion
that Russia would not act if Austria did not annex territory.

No. 34.

Sir H. Rumbold, British Charge d^ Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward
Grey. — {Received July 26.)
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 26, 1914.

Under-Secretary of State has just telephoned to me to say that German
Ambassador at Vienna has been instructed to pass on to Austro-Hunf^arian
Government your hopes that they may take a favourable view of Servian'^reply
if it corresponds to the forecast contained in Belgrade telegram of 25th JuW.*
Under-Secretary of State considers very fact of their making this communi-
cation to Austro-Hungarian Government implies that they associate themselvefi
to a certain extent with your hope. German Governm.ent do not see their way
to going beyond this.

* See No. 21.

No. 35.

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey.

{Received July 26.)
(Telegraphic.) Borne, July 26, 1914.

Minister for Foreign Affairs welcomes your proposal for a conference, and
will instruct Italian Ambassador to-night accordingly.'

xiustrian Ambassador has informed Italian Government this evening that
Minister in Belgrade had been recalled, but that this did not imply declaration
of war.

No. 36.
Sir Edward Grey to Sir F, Bertie, 'British Ambassador at Paris, Sir IT,
Rumbold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, and Sir R. Rodd, British
Ambassador at Rome.

(Telegraphic.) Forcig)i Office, Jidy 26, 1914.

Would Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct Ambassador here
to join with representatives of France, Italy, and Germany, and myself to meet
here in conference immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which
would prevent complications? You should ask -Minister for Foreign Affairs
whether he would do this. If so, when bringing the above suggestion to the
notice of tlio Governments to whicli they are accredited, representatives at
Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh should be authorised to request that all
active military operations should be suspended pending results of conference.

No. 37.
Sir EdiLKird Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 26, 1914.

Berlin telegram of 25tli July.*

It is important to know if France will agree to suggested action by the four
Powers if necessary.

* Sec No. 18.

No. 38.

Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edivard Grey. —
[Received Jidy 27.)

Sir, Rome, July 23, 1914.

I FATHER that the Italian Government have been made cognisant of the
terms of the communication which will be addressed to Servia. Secretary-
General, whom I saw this morning at tlie' Italian Foreign Office, took the
view that the gravity of the situation lay in the conviction of the Austro-
Hungarian Government that it was absolutely necessary for their prestige, after
the many disillusions which the turn of events in the Balkans has occasioned,
to score, a definite success.

I have, &c.

RENNELL RODD

No. 39.

Reply of Servian Government to Aitstro-Hungarian Xote. — {Communicated
by the Servian Minister, July 27.)

(Translation.)
Le Gouvernenicnt Royal serbe a The Royal Servian Government
rccu la communication du Gouvcrne- have received the communication of
ment Imperial et Royal du *10 de. co the Imperial and Royal Government
mois et il est persuade que sa reponse of the 10th instant,* and are con-
eloignera tout malcntendu qui menace vinced that their reply v\'ill remove
de gater les bons rapports de voisinage any misunderstanding which may
cntre la Monarchic austro-hongroise et threaten to impair the good ncigh-
lo Iloyaurac de Serbie. bonrly rclatiouij between the Austro-

Hungarian Monarchy and the King-
dom of Servia.
Le Gouvernement Royal conscient Conscious of the fact that the pro-

que les protestations qui ont apparu tests which were made botii from the
tant de la tribune de la Skoupchtina tribune of the national Skuptchinat
nationale que dans les declarations et and in the declarations and actions of
le.s actes des representants respon- the responsible representatives of the
sables de I'fitat, protestations qui State — protests which were cut short
furent coupees court par les declara- by the declarations made by the
tions du Gouvernement serbe, faites le Servian Government on the 18th*
*18 mars, 1909, ne se sent plus renou- March, 1909— have not been renewed
* Old style. f The Servian Parliament.

velees vis-a-vis de la grande Monarchic
voisine en aucune occasion et que, de-
piiis ce temps, aiitant de la part des
Couvernements Royaiix qui se sont
succede que de la part de leurs or-
gancs, aucune tentative n'a ete faite
dans Ic but de changer I'etat de choses
politique et juridique cree en Bosnie et
Hcrzegovine, le Gouvernement Royal
constate que sous cc rapport le Gou-
vernement Imperial et Royal n'a fait
aucune representation, sauf en ce qui
concerno un livre scolaire, et au sujet
de laquelle le Gouvernement Imperial
et Royal a rc^u une explication en-
tieroment satisfaisantc. La Serbic a
de nombreuses fois donne des preuves
de sa politique .pacifique et moderee
pendant la duree de la crise balkanique,
et c'cst grace a la Serbie et^au sacrifice
qu'ello a fait dans Finteret excliisif de
la paix europeenne que cette paix a
ete preservee. Le Gouvernement Royal
no pout pas etre rendu responsable
pour les manifestations d'un caractere
prive, telles que les articles des jour-
naux et le travail paisible des societes,
manifestations qui se produisent dans
prcsque tous les pays comme une chose
ordinaire et qui echappent, en regie
generale, au controle officiel, d'autant
moins que le Gouvernement Royal, lors
de la solution de toute une serie de
questions qui se sont presentees entre
la Serbie et I'Autriche-Hongrie, a
montre une grande prevenance et a re-
ussi, de cette fa9on, a en regler le plus
grand nombre au profit du progres des
deux pays voisins.

C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement
Royal a ete peniblement surpris par les
affirmations, d'apres lesquclles des per-
sonnes du Royaumc de Serbie auraient
participe a la preparation de I'attentat
commis a Sarajevo; il s'attendait a ce
qu'il soit invite a collaborer a la re-
cherche de tout ce qui se rapporte a ce
crime, et il etait pret, pour prouver
son cntiere correction, a agir contre
toutcs les personnes a I'egard des-
quelles des communications lui seraient
faiteS, se rendant- done au desir du
Gouvernement Imperial et Royal, est
dispose a remettre au Tribunal tout
sujct serbe, sans egard a sa situation
et a son rang, jjour la complicite du-
quel, dans le crime de Sarajevo, des
preuves lui seraient foutnies, et spe-
cialement, il s'engage a faire publier a
la premiere page du "Journal officiel "
en date du 13 (26) juillet, renonciation
suivante:

"Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie

on any occasion as regards the great
neighbouring Monarchy, and that no
attempt has been made since that
time, either by the successive Royal
Governments or by their organs, to
change the political and legal state of
affairs created in Bosnia and Herze-
govina, the Royal Government draw
attention to the fact that in this con-
nection the Imperial and Royal
Government have made no representa-
tion except one concerning a school
book, and that on that occasion the
Imperial and Roj'al Government re-
ceived an entirely satisfactory explana-
tion.. Servia has several times given
proofs of her pacific and moderate
policy during the Balkan crisis, and it
is thanks to Servia and to the sacrifice
that she has made in the exclusive
interest of European peace that that
peace has been preserved. The Royal
Government cannot be held responsible
for manifestations of a private charac-
ter, such as articles in the press and
the peaceable work of societies— mani-
■festations which take place in nearly
all countries in the ordinary course of
events, and which, as a general rule,
escape official control. The Royal
Government are all the less respon-
sible, in view of the fact that at the
time of the solution of a series of ques-
tions which arose between Servia and
Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a
great readiness to oblige, and thus
succeeded in settling the majority of
these questions to the advantage of
the two neighbouring countries.

For these reas6ns the Royal Govern-
ment have been pained and surprised
at the statements, according to which
members of the Kingdom of Servia are
supposed* to have participated in the
preparations for the crime committed
at Serajevo ; the Royal Government
expected to be invited to collaborate in
an investigation of all that concerns
this crime, and they were ready, in
order to prove the entire correctness
of their attitude, to take measures
against any persons concerning whom
representations were made to them.
Palling in, therefore, with the desire
of the Imperial and Royal Govern-
ment, they are prepared to hand over'-
for trial any Servian subject, without
regard to his situation or rank, of
whose complicity in the crime of Sera-
jevo proofs are forthcoming, and more
especially they undertake to cause to
be published on the first page of the
"Journal officiel," on the date of the
13th (26th) July, the following declara-
tion : —

"The Royal Government of Servia

condamne toute propagande qui serait
dirigee centre FAutriche-Hongrie, c'est-
a-dire Tensemble des tendances qui
aspirent en dernier lieu a detacher de la
Monarchic austro-hongroise des terri-
toires qui en font partie, et il deplore
sincerement les consequences funestes
de ces agissements criminels. Le Gou-
vernement Royal regrette que certains
officiers en fonctionnaires serbes aient
participe, d'apres la communication du
Gouvernement Royal et Imperial, a la
propagande susmcntionnee, et compro-
mis par la les relations de bon voisi-
nage aiixquelles le Gouvernement
Royal serbe etait solennellement en-
gage par sa declaration du 31 mars,
1909,* qui desapprouve et repiidie
toute idee ou tentative d'une immix-
tion dans les destinees des habitants de
quelque partie de I'Autriche-Hongrie
que se soit, considere de son devoir
d'avertir formellement les officiers et
fonctionnaires et toute la population
du royaume que, dor^enavant il proce-
dera avec la derniere rigueur centre les
personnes qui se rendraient coupables
de pareils agissements, qu'il mettra
tons ses efforts a prevenir et a re-
primer."

Cette enonciation sera portee a la
connaissance de I'armee Roy ale par un
ordre du jour, au nom de Sa Majeste
lo Roi, par Son Altesse Royale le
Prince heritier Alexandre, .et sera
publie dans le prochain bulletin officiel
de I'armee.

Le Gouvernement Royal s'engage en
outre :

1. D'introduire dans la premiere con-
vocation reguliere de la Skoupchtinat
une disijosition dans la loi de la presse,
par laquello sera punie de la maniere
la plus severe la provocation a la haine
et au mepris de la Monarchic austro-
hongroise, ainsi quo centre toute publi-
cation dent la tendance generale serait
dirigee centre I'integrite territoriale de
I'Autriche-Hongrie. II se charge, lors
de la revision de la Constitution, qui
.est prochaine, a faire introduire dans
I'article 22 de la Constitution un
ame.ndement de telle sorte que les
publications ci-dessus puissent etre
confisquees, cc qui actiiellement aux
termes categeriques de I'article 22 de
la Constitution est impossible.

2. Le Gouvernement ne possede au-
cjine preuve et la note du Gouverne-
ment Imperial et Royal ne lui en four-
nit non plus aucune que la societe

condemn all propaganda which may be
directed against Austria-Hungary,
that is to say, all such tendencies as
aim at ultimately detaching from the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy terri-
tories which form part thereof, and
they sincerely deplore the baneful
consequences of these criminal move-
ments. The Royal Government regret
that, according to the communication
from the Imperial and Royal Govern-
ment, certain Servian oflficers and
officials sliould have taken part in the
above-mentioned propaganda, and thus
compromised the good neighbourly re-
lations to which the Royal Servian
Government was solemnly engaged by
the declaration of the 31st March,
1909,* which declaration disapproves
and repudiates all idea or attempt at
interference with the destiny of the
inhabitants of any part whatsoever of
Austria-Hungary, and they consider it
their duty formally to warn the
officers, officials, and entire population
of the kingdom that henceforth they
will take the most rigorous steps
against all such persons as are guilty of
such acts, to prevent and to repress
which they will use their utmost
endeavour."

This declaration will bo brought to
the knowledge of the Royal Army in
an order of the day, in the name of
His IMa.jesty the King, by his Royal
Highness the Crown Prince Alex-
ander, and will be published in the
next official army bulletin.

The Reyal Government further
undertake : —

1. To introduce at the first regular
convocation of the Skuptchinat a
provision into the press law providing
for the most severe punishment of in-
citement to hatred or contempt of the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for
taking action against any publication
the general tendency of which is
directed against the territorial in-
tegrity of Austria-rfungary. The
Government engage at the approach-
ing revision of the Constitution to
cause an amendment to be introduced
into article 22 of the Constitution of
such a nature that such publication
may be confiscated, a proceeding at
present impossible under the categori-
cal terms of article 22 of the Constitu-
tion.

2. The Government possess no
proof, nor does the note of the Im-
perial and Royal Government furnish
them with any, that the " Narodna

* New style.

t The Scrvi;in Parliament.

"Narodna Oditrana " et aiitres soeietes
similaires aient commis, jiisqu'a ce jour
quelques actes criminols de ce genre,
par le fait d'un de leurs membres.
Neaiinioins, Je Gouvernoment Royal
acceptera la deiiiaiido dii Gouvernc-
ment Imperial et Royal et dissoiidra
la societe "Narodna Od))rana " et tonte
autre societe qui a;;irnit contre
rAiitriche-Hon;[;rie.

3. Le Gouvernement lloyal serbe
s'engngo a eliminer sans delais de I'in-
strnction publique en Serbie tout ce
qui sert ou pourrait servir a fomenter
la propagande contre I'Autiiche-Hon-
grie, quand le Gouvernement Imperial
et lloyal lui fournira des faits et des
preuves de cette propagande.

4. Le Gouvernement Royal accepte
de meme a eloigner du service mili-
tairo ceux pour qui I'enquete judi-
ciaire aura prouve qu'ils sent coupables
d'actes diriges contre I'integrite du
territoire de la Monarchie austro-hon-
groise, et il attend que le. Gouverne-
ment Imperial et Royal lui com-
munique ulterieurement les noms et les
faits de ces officiers et fonctionnaires
aux iins de la procedure qui. doit s'en-
suivre.

5. Le Gouvernement Royal doit
avouer qu'il ne se rend pas clairemcnt
compto du sens et de la -portee de la
demande du Gouvernement Imperial et
Royal que la Serbie s'engage a accepter
sur son territoire la collaboration des
organes du Gouvernement Imperial et
Royal, mais il declare qu'il admettra la
collaboration qui repondrait aux. prin-
cipes du droit international et a la
procedure criminelle ainsi qu'aux bons
I'apports do voisinage.

G. Le Gouvernement Royal, cela va
de soi, considere de son devoir d'ouvrir
une cnquetc contie tons ceux qui sont
ou^ qui, event uellement, auraient cte
meles au complot du 15* juin, et qui
se trouveraient sur le territoire du
royaume. Quant a la participation a
cette enquete des agents ou autoj-ites
austro-liongrois qui seraient delegues a
cet effet par Ic Gouvernement Imperial
ot Royal, le Gouvernement Royal ne
pent pas I'accepter, car ce serait une
violation do la Constitution et de la loi
sur la proce'dure criminelle; cependant
dans des cas concrets des communica-
tions sur les resultats do I'instruction

Odbrana " and other similar societies
have committed up to the present any
criminal act of this nature through the
proceedings of any of their members.
Nevertheless, the Royal Government
will accept the demand of the Imperial
and Royal Government, and will dis-
solve the "Narodna Odbrana" Society
and every other society which may be
directing its efforts against Austria-
Hungary.

3. The Royal Servian Government
undertake to remove without delay
from their public educational estab-
lishments in Servia all that serves or
could serve to foment jpropaganda
against Austria-Hungary," whenever
the Imperial and Royal Government
furnish them with facts and proofs of
this propaganda.

4. The Royal Government also
agree to remove from military service
all such persons as the judicial enquiry
may have proved to be guilty of acts
directed against the integrity of the
territory of the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy, and they expect the Im-
perial and Royal Government to com-
municate to them at a later date the
names and the acts of these officers
and officials for the purposes of the
proceedings which are to be -taken
against them.

5. The Royal Government must
confess that they do not clearly grasp
the meaning or the scope of the de-
mand made by the Imperial and Royal
Government that Servia shall under-
take to accept the collaboration of the
organs of the Imperial and Royal
Government upon their territory, but
they declare that they will admit such
collaboration as agrees with the prin-
ciple of international law, Avith crimi-
nal procedure, and with good neigh-
bourly relations.

6. It goes without saying that the
Royal Government consider it their
duty to open an enquiry against all
such persons as are, or eventually may
be, implicated in the plot of the 15th*
June, and who happen to be within the
t<3rritory of the kingdom. ' As regards
the participation in this enquiry of
Austro-JIungarian agents or authori-
ties appointed for this purpose by the
Imperial and Royal Government, the
Royal Government cannot accept such
an arrangement, as it would be a viola-
tion of the Constitution and of the
law. of criminal procedure; neverthe-
less, in concrete casses communications

* Old style.

en question pourraient etre dennees
aux agents austro-hongrois.

7. Le Gouvernement Royal a fait
proceder, des le soir meme de la remise
de la note, a I'arrestation du Com-
mandant Voislav Tankossitch. Quant
a Milan Ziganovitch, qui est sujet de
la Monarchie austro-hongroise et qui
jusqu'au 15* juin etait employe
(comme aspirant) a la direction des
chemins de fer, il n'a pas pu encore
etre arrete.

Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois est
prie de vouloir bien, dans la forme ac-
coutumee, faire connaitre le plus tot
possible, les presomptions de culpabilite
ainsi que les preuves eventuelles de
leur culpabilite qui ont ete recueillies
jusqu'a ce jour par I'enquete a Sara-
jevo, aux fins d'enquete ulterieure.

8. Le Gouvernement serbe^ renfor-
cera et etendra les mesurea prises pour
empecher le trafic illicite d'armes et
d'explosifs a travers la frontiere. II
va de soi qu'il ordonnera de suite une
enquete et punira severement les fonc-
tionnaire^ des frontiores sur la ligne
Schabatz-Loznitza qui ont manque a
lours devoirs et laisse passer les au-
teurs du crime de Sarajevo.

9. Le Gouvernement Royal donnera
vofontiers des explications sur • les
propos que ses fonctionnaires, tant en
Serbie qu'a I'etranger, ont eu apres
Tattentat dans des entrevues et qui,
d'apres I'aflSrmation du Gouvernement
Imperial et Royal, ont ete hostiles
envers la Monarchie, des que le Gou-
vernement Imperial et Royal lui aura
communique les passage^s en question de
ces propos, et des qu'il aura demontre
que Jes propos employes ont, en effet,
ete ten us par lesdits fonctionnaires,
quoique le Gouvernement Royal lui-
meme aura soin de recueillir des
preuves et convictions.

10. Le Qouverneraent Royal infor-
mora le Gouvernement Imperial et
Royal de I'execution des mesures com-
prises dans les points precedents en
tant que cela n'a pas ete deja fait par
la, pvesento note, aussitot que chaque
mcsuro aura ete ordonnce et ex^cutse.

Dans lo cas oii le Gouvernpment Im-
perial et Royal ne serait pas satisfait
de cctt© reponse, le Gouvernement
serbe, considerant qu'il est de Tin-
t^ret commun de ne pas precipiter la
solution de cette question, est pret
comme toujours d'accepter une en-

. as to the results of the investigation
in question might be given to the
Austro-Hungarian agents.

7. The Royal Government pro-
ceeded, on the very evening of the
delivery of the note, to -arrest -Com-
mandant Voislav Tankossitch. As re-
gards Milan Ziganovitch, who is a
subject of the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy and who up to the 15th*
June was employed (on probation) by
the directorate of railways, it has not
yet been possible to arrest him.

The Austro-Hungarian Government
are requested to be so good as to
supply as soon as possible, in the cus-
tomary form, the presumptive evi-
dence of guilt, as well as the eventual
proofs of guilt which have been col-
lected up to the present, at the enquiry
at Serajevo for the purposes of the
later enquiry..

8. The Servian Government will
reinforce and extend the measures
which have been taken for preventing
the illicit traflBc df arms and explosives
across the frontier. It goes without
sao^ing that they will immediately
order an enquiry and will severely
punish the frontier officials on the
Sohabatz-Loznitza line who have failed
in their duty and allowed the authors
of the crime of Serajevo to pass.

9. The Royal » Government will
gladly give explanations of the re-
marks made by thpir officials, whether
in Servia or abroad, in interviews
after the crime which according tp
the statement of the Imperial and
Roval Government were hostile to-
wards the Monarchy, as soon as the
Imperial and Royal Government have
communicated to them the passages in
question in these remarks, and as soon
as they have shown that the remarks
were actually made by the Said officials,
although the Royal Government will
it^ielf take steps to collect evidence
and proofs.

10. The Royal Government will in-
form the Imperial and Royal Govern-
ment of the execution of the measures
comprised under the above heads, in
so far as this has not already been
done by the. present note, as Soon as
each measure has been ordered and
carried out

If the Imperial and Royal Govern-
ment are not satisfied with this reply,
the Servian Government, considering
that it is not to the common interest to
precipitate the solution of this ques-
tion, are ready, as always, to accept a
pacific understanding, either by refer-

Old Stylo.

27 '

tente pacifique, soit en remeftarit cette ring this question to the decision of

question a la decision du Tribunal in-, the International Tribunal of The

ternational de La Haye, soit aux Hague; or to the Great Powers which

Grandes Puissances qui ont pris part a took part in the drawing up of tho

I'elaboration de la declaration que le declaration made by the Servian

Gouvernement serbe a faite le 18 (31) Government on the 18th (31st) March,

mars, 1909. 1909.

Belgrade, le 12 (25) juillet, 1914. Belgrade, July 12 (25), 1914.

No. 40.
Sir M. de JBunsen^ British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward G^^ey. —

\Receivei July 27.)
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 26, 1914.

RUSSIAN Ambassador just returned from leave thinks that Austro-Hun-
garian Government are determined on war, and that it is impossible for Russia
to remain indifferent. He does not propose to press for more time in the
sense of your telegram of tho 25th instant* (last paragraph).

When the repetition of your telegram of the 26th instant to Parist arrived,
I had the French and Russian Ambassadors both with me. They expressed
great satisfaction with its contents, which I communicated to them. They
doubted, however, whether the principle of Russia .being an interested party
entitled to have a say in the settlement of a purely Austro-Servian dispute
would be accepted by either the Austro-Hungarian or the German Government.
Instructions were also given to the Italian Ambassador to support tho
request of the Russian Government that the time limit should be postponed.
They arrived, however, too late for aAy useful action to be taken.
* See No. 26. t See No. 36.

No. 41.

Sir M, de Bunsen, British -Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. —

{Received July 27.)
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 27, 1914.

I HAVE had conversations with all my colleagues representing the Great
Powers. Tlie impression left on my mind is that the Austro-Hungarian note
was so drawn up as to make war inevitable ; that the Austro-Hungarian
Government are fully resolved to have war with Servia ; that they consider
their position as a Great Power to be at stake ; and that until punishment
has been administered to Servia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals
of mediation. This country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with
Servia, and its postponement or prevention "would undoubtedly be a great
disappointment.

I propose, subject to any special directions you desire to send me, to express
to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs the hope of His Majesty's
Government that it may yet be possible to avoid war, and to ask his Excellency
whether he cannot suggest a way out even now.

No. 42.

Sir F, Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. —
(Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 27, 1914.

YOUR proposal, as stated in your two telegrams of yesterday,* is accepted
by the French Government. French Ambassador in London, who returns there
this evening, has been instructed accordingly. Instructions have been sent
to the French Ambassador at Berlin to concert with his British colleague
as to the advisability of their speaking jointly to the German Government.
Necessary instructions have also been sent to the French representatives at
Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh, but until it is known that the Germans
have spoken at Vienna with some success, it would, in the opinion of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, be dangerous for the French, Russian, and British!
Ambassadors to do so.

• Nos. 36 and 37.

No. 43.

Sir E, Goschen^ Bntish Amhassadw at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. —
{Received JvXy 27.)

(Telegraphic.) BtTMn, July 27, 1914.

YOUR telegram of 26th July.*

Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practically
amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be called
together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not therefore
fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to co-operate for the
maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do
with arbitration, biit meant that representatives of the. four nations not
direetly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous
situation. He maintained, however, that such a conference as you proposed
was not practicable. He added that news he had just received from St.
Petersburgh showed that there was an intention on the part of M. de Sazonoft
to exchjinge views with Count Berchtold.if He thought that this method of
procedure might lead to a satisfactory result, and that it would be be^, before
doing anything else, to await outcome of the exchange of views between the
Austrian and Russian Governments.

In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said that as yet
Austria was only partially mobilising, but that if Russia mobilised against Ger-
many latter, would have to follow suit. I asked him what he meant by
"mobilising against Germany." He said that if Russia only mobilised in south '
Germany would not mobilise, but if she mobilised in north, Germany would
have to do so too, and Russian system of mobilisation was so complicated that
it misht be difficult exactly to locate hpf mobilisation. Germany would there-
fore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise.

Finally, Secretary of State said that news- from St. Petersburgh had caused
him to take more hopeful view of the general situation.

* See No. 36,

t Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

t Austro-Hungarian Minieter for Foreign Affairs.

No. 44.

Sir O, Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward

Grey. — {^Received Jvly 27.)

(Telegraphic) ^i. Petershvrgh\ July 27, 1914.

AUSTRIAN Ambassador tried, in a long conversation which he had yesterday
with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to explain away objectionable features
of the recent action takdn by .the Austro-Hungarian Government. Minister
for Foreign Affairs pointed out that, althongh he perfectly understood Austria's
motives, the ultimatum had been so drafted that it could not possibly be
accepted as a whole by the Servian Government. Although the demands were
reasonable enough in some cases, others not only could not possibly be put
into immediate. execution seeing that they entailed revision of existing Servian
laws, bub were, moreover, incompatible with Servia's dignity as an independent
State. It would be useless for Russia to offer her good offices at Belgrade,
in view of the fact that she was the object of such suspicion in Austria. In
order, however, to put an end to tne present tension, he thought that England
and Italy might be willing to coUaboratP vvith Austria. The Austrian Ambas-
sador undertook to communicate his Excellency's remarks- to his Government.
On thr; Minister for Foreign Affairs questioning me, 1 told him that I had
correctly defined the attitude of Hij Majesty's Gover-nment in my conversation
with him, which I reported in my telegram of the 24th instant.* I added that
you could not promise to do anything more, and that his Excellency was
mistaken if ho believed that the cause of peace could be promoted by our
telling the German Government that they would have to deal with us as well]
as with Russia and France if they supported Austria by force of arms. Their
attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace, and we could only induce
her to use her influence at Vienna to avert war by approaching her in the
capa'^ity of a friend who was anxious to preserve peace. His Excellency must
not, if our efforts were to be successful, do anything to precipitate a conflict.

^SoqNo.'6.

In these circumstances I trusted that the Russian Government would defer
mobilisation ukase for as long as possible, and that troops would not be allowed
to cross the frontier even when it was issued.

In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that until the issue of
the Imperial ukase no effective steps towards mobilisation could bo taken, and
the Austro-Hungarian Government would profit by delay in order to complete
her military preparations if it was deferred too long.

No. 45.

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petershurgh, to Sir Edward
Grey. — [Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.) St. VetcrsburgK July 27, 1914.

SINCE my conversation with the Minister for. Foreign Affairs, as reported
in my telegram of to-day,-^ I understand that his Excellency has proposed
that the modifications to be introduced into Austrian demands should be the
subject of direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburgh.

* Sco No. 4*.

No. 46.
Sir Edicard Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin:

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.

GERMAN Ambassador has informed me that German Government accept in
principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, reserving,
of -course, their right as an ally to help Austria if attacked. He has also
been instructed to request me to use influence in St. Petersburgh to localise
the war and to keep up the peace of Europe.

I have replied that the Servian reply went farther than could have been
expected to m.eet the Austrian demands. German Secretary of State has him-
self said that there were some things in the Austrian note that Servia could
hardly be expected to accept. I assumed that Servian reply could not have
gone as far as it did unless Russia had exercised conciliatory influence at
Belgrade, and it was really at Vienna that moderating influence was now
required. If Austria put the Servian reply aside as being worth nothing and
marched into Servia, it meant that she was determined to crush Servia at all
costs, being reckles§ of the consequences that might be involved. Servian reply
should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause. I said German
Government should urge this at Vienna.

I recalled what German Government had said as to the gravity of the
situation if the war could not be localised, and observed that if Germany
assisted Austria against Russia it would be because, without any reference to
the merits of the dispute, Germany could not afford to see Austria crushed.
Just so other issues might be raised that would supersede the dispute between
Austria and Servia, and would bring other Powers in, and the war would be
the biggest ever known ; but as long as Germany would work to keep the peace.
I would keep closely in touch. I repeated that after the Servian reply it was
at Vienna that some moderation must be urged.

No. 47.
Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanom, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh,

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.

SEE my telegram of to-day to Sir E. Goschen.*

I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian
circles impression, prevails that in any event we would stand aside. His
Excellency deplored the effect that such an impression must produce.

This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders
we have given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it happens, at
Portland, not to disperse for manoeuvre leave. But I explained to the Russian
Ambassador that my reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything^
more than diplomatic action was promised.

"We bear from German and Austrian sources that they believe Russia will

* Soo No. 46.

take no action so long as Austria agrees not to take Servian territory. I
pointed this out, and added that it would be absurd if we were to appear more
Servian than the Russians in our dealings with the German and Austrian
Governments.

No. 48.
jSir E. Grey to Sir M. de BimseUj BrUish Ainhassador at Vienna.

Sir, ForelgM Office, July 27, 1914.

COUNT MENSDORFF". told me by instruction to-day that the Scrviaa'
Government had not accepted the demands which the Austrian Government
were obliged to address to them in order to secure permanently the most vital
Austrian interests. Servia showed that she did not intend to abandon her
subversive aims, tending towards continuous disorder in the Austrian frontier
territories and their final disruption from the Austrian ^ilonarchy. Very
reluctantly, and against their wish, the Austrian Government were compelled to
take more severe measures to enforce a fundamental change in the attitude of
enmity pursued up to now by Servia. As the British Government knew, the
Austrian Government had for many years endeavoured to find a way to get on
with their turbulent neighbour, though tiiis had been made very difficult for
them by the continuous provocations of Servia. The Scrajevo murder had
made clear to everyone what appalli'ng consequences the Servian propaganda
had already produced and what a permanent threat to Austria it involved.
We would understand that the Austrian Government must consider that the
moment had arrived to obtain, by means of the strongest pressure, guarantees
for the definite suppression, of the Servian aspirations and for the security of
peace and order on the south-eastern frontier of Austria. As the peaceable
means to this effect were exhausted, the Austrian Government must at last
appeal to force. They had not taken this decision without reluctance. Their
action, which had no sort oi aggressive tendency, could not be represented
otherwise than as an act of self-defence. Also they thought that they would
serve a European interest if they prevented Servia from being henceforth an
element of general unrest such as she had been for the last ten years. The high
sense of justice of the British nation and of British statesmen could not blame
the Austrian Governm.ent if the latter defended by the sword what was theirs,
and cleared up their position with a country whose hostile policy had forced
upon them for years measures so costly as to have gravely injured Austrian
national prosperity. Finally, the Austrian Government,- confiding in their
amicable relations with us, felt that they could count on our sympathy in a
fight that was forced on them, and on our assistance in localising the fight, if
necessary.

Count Mcnsdorff added on his own account that, ' as long as Servia was
confronted with Turkey, Austria never took very severe measures because of
her adherence to the policy of the free development of the Balkan States. Now
that Servia had doubled her territory and population without any Austrian
interference, the repression of Servian subversive aims was a matter of self-
defence and self-preservation on Austria's part. He reiterated that Austria
had no intention of taking Servian territory or aggressive designs against
Servian territory.

I said that I could not understand the construction put by the Austrian
Government upon the Servian reply, and I told Count Mensdorff the substance
of the conversation that I had had with the German Ambassador this morning
about that reply.

Count Mensdorff admitted that, on paper, the Servian reply might seem to
be satisfactory ; but the Servians had refused the one tiling — the co-operation of
Austrian officials and police — which would be a real guarantee that in practice
the Servians would not carry on their subversive campaign against Austria.

I said that it seemed to me as if the Austrian Government believed that,
even after the Servian reply, they could make war upon Servia anyhow, without
risk of bringing Russia into the dispute. If they could make war on Servia an J
at the same time satisfy Russia, well and good; but, if not, the consequences
would be incalculable. I pointed out to him that I quoted this phrase from an
expression of the views of the German Government. I feared that it would be
expected in St. Petersburgh that the Servian reply would diminish the tension,

* Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

and now, when Russia found that there was increased tension, the situation
would become increasingly serious. Already the eftect on Europe was one of
anxiety. I pointed out that our fleet was to have dispersed to-day, but we had
felt unable to let it disperse. We should not think of calling up reserves at
this moment, and there was no menace in what we had done about our fleet;
but, owing to the possibility of a European conflagration, it was impossible
for us to disperse our forces at this moment. I gave this as ah illustration of
the anxiety that was felt. It seemed to mc that the Servian reply alreadj
involved the greatest humiliation to Servia that I had ever seen a country
undergo, and it was very disappointing to me that the. reply was treated by
the Austrian Government as if it v/cre as unsatisfactory as a blank negative.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 49.

Sir Edivard Grey to Sir R Rodd^ British Ambassador at Rome.

Sir,^ Foreign Office, July 27, 1914.

THE Italian Ambassador informed Sir A. Nicolson* to-day that the Italian
Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed entirely with my proposal for a conference
of four to be hold in London.

As regards the question of asking Russia, Anstria-Hungary, and Servia to
suspend military operations pending the result o? the oonfcronco, the Marquis
di San Giulianot would recommend the suggestion warmly to the German
Government, and would enquire what procedure they would propose should be
followed at Vienna.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.
* British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
t Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs

No. 50.

Sir M. de Bunsen^ British Atnhassador at Vienna^ to Sir Edward Grey, —
{Received July 31.)

Sir, Vifana, July 28, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the t«xt of the Austro
Hungarian note announcing the declaration of war against Servia.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Enclosure in No. 50,
Copy of Note verbale, dated Vienna^ July 28, 1914.

(Translation.)

POUR mctti'o fin aux menees sub- IN order to brmg to an end the

Tcrsives partant de Belgrade et diri- subversive intrigues originating from

gees rontre Tintegiite territoriale de 13iel2radG and aimed at the territorial

la iMonarrhie austro-hongroise, le Gou- intf'gnty of the Austro-Hnnganan

vprnement Imperial <^t Royal a fait par- Monarchy, the Inippnal and Royal

vohir a la date du 23 juillet, 1914, au Govpirwropnt has d»^hvpred to the

Gouvernement Royal de Seihie rine Royal Servism Government a note,

note dans laquelle se trou^ait fornndee dated luly 23, 1914, in which a series

une serio de demandes pour I'arcppta- of demands were formulated, for the

lion desqnelles im delai de quarante- acceptanr'e of which a dMny of forty-

buit heures a ete acoord^ au Gouverne- ci.^ht honrs has been granted to the

ment Royal. Le Gouvernement Royal Royal Government. The Royal Servian

d(,^ Scrbie n'ayant pas repondu a ce'tte Government not having answered this

note d'une maniere satisfaisante, le note in a satisfactory manner, the

Gouvernement Imperial et Royal se Imperial and Royal Government are

trouve dnns la necessite de pourvoir lui- themselves compelled to see to the

meme a la sauvegarde de ses droits et satee^uarding of their rights and in-

interets et do recourir a cet effet a la terests, and, with this object, to have

force des armes. recourse to force of arms.

L'Autriche - Hongrie, qui vient Austria-Hungary, who has just ad-

d'adresser a la Serbie une declara-
tion formelle conformement a Tarticle
1'''" de la convention du 18 octobre,
1907, relative a I'oiiverture des hos-
tilites, se considore des lors en etat de
guerre avec la Serbie.

En portant co qui precede a la con-
naissanco do I'Ambassade Royale de
Grande-Bretagne le Minister© des
Affaires Etrangeres a Thonneur de
declarer que I'Autriclie-Hongrie se
conformera au cours des liostiiites, sous
la reserve d'un precede analogue de la
part de la Serbie, aux stipulations des
conventions de La Hayo du 18 octobre,
1907, ainsi qu'a celles de la Declaration
de Londres du 26 fevrier, 1909.

L'Ambassado est price de vouloir bien
comranniquer, d'urgence, la presente
notification a son Gouvernement.

dressed to Servia a formal doclaraiiou^
in conformity with article 1 of the con-
yention of the 18th October, 1907, rela-
tive to the opening of hostilities, con-
siders herself henceforward in a state
of war with Servia.

In bringing the above to notice of
His Britannic Majesty's Embassy, the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs lias the
honour to declare that Austria-
Hungary will act during the hostilities
in conformity with the terms ot tlio
Conventions of The Hague of the 18tli
October, 1907, as also with those of
the Declaration of London of the 28th
February, 1909, provided an analogous
procedure is adopted by Servia.

The embassy is requested to be so
good as to communicate the present
notification as soon as po:?siblc to the'
British Government.

No. 51.

Sir F. BerVky BHt/ish Ambassador at PariSy to Sin" Echoanl Grey. —
[Received Juhj 28.)
Sir, Faris, JuJ/y 27, 1914..

I HAVE tho honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a memorandum from
the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the steps to bo takcii to prevent an
outbreak of hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Servia.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 51.
I^ote communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. Bienvenu-Martia,

(Translation.)

PAR uno note en date du 25 de ce
mois, son Excellence TAmbassadeur

d'Angleterrc a fait connaitre au Gou-
vernement de la Republique que,
d'apres Sir Edward Grey, la seule
manicre d'assurer, si c'etait possible,
1'3 maintien de la paix dans lo cas ou
les rapports cntro la Ru.ssie et I'Au-
triche deviendraient plus tendus serait
uno demarche commune a Vienne et a
Saint-Petersbourg des reprcsentants
de rAngleterrc, do la France, do
rAllemagne et de I'ltalio en Autriche
et en Russie; et il a cxprime le desir
de savoir si le Gouvernement do la Re-
publique etait dispose a accucillir
favorablement cette suggestion.

Le Ministre dos Affaires £lran.
gercs par interim a I'hcnneur de faire
connaitre a son Excellence Sir Francisj
Bertie qu'il a invite M. Jules Cambon*
a se concerter avfc I'Ambassadeur
d'Augleterro en Allemagne et a ap-
puyer la demarche qu'ils jugeront op-
portune de faire auprcs du Cabinet de
Berlin.

Le Gouvernement de la Repiiblique

* French Ambassador, in Berlin.

IN a note of the 2oth of this month,
his Excellency tho British Ambassador
informed the Government of tho
Republic that, in Sir E. Grey's
opinion, the only pos.siblo way of
assuring the maintenance of pcaco in
case of the relations between Russia j
and Austria becoming more strained'
would be if the representatives of
Great Britain, France, Germany, and
Italy in Austria and Russia were to
take joint action at Vienna and at]
St. Petersburg!! ; and he expressed the
wish to know if the Government of
the Republic were disi)oscd to welcome
such a suggestion.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs]
ad inierim has the honour to inform'
his Excellency Sir F. Bertie that ho
has requested M. Jules Cambon"" to
concert with the British Ambassador
in Germany and to support any repre-
sentation which they may consider it
advisable to make to tho Berlin
Cabinet.

In accordance with the desire ox-

a, d' autre part, confornaement au desir
exprime par le Gouvcrnemeiit britan-
nique et que son Excellence Sir Francis
Bertie lui a transmis par une note en
date du 26 de ce mois, autorise M.
Paul Cambon* a prendre part a la re-
union proposee par Sir Edward Grey
pour rechercher avec lui et les Ambas-
Badeurs d'Allemagne et d'ltalie a
Londres, les moyens de resoudre les
difficultes actuelles.

Lc Gouvernement de la Republique
est pret egalement a donncr aux
agents f ran9ais a Petersbourg, a Vienne
et a Belgrade des instructions pour
qu'ils obticnnent des Gouvernements
russe, autrichien et serbe do s'abstenir
de toute operation militaire active en
attendant les resultats de cette confer-
ence. II estime toutefois que les
chances de succes de la proposition de
Sir Edward Grey reposent essentielle-
mont sur Taction que Berlin serait dis-
posee a Vienne [sic]. Une demarche
alipres du Gouvernement austro-h6n-
grois pour amener la suspension des
operations militaires parait vouee a
I'echec si Tinflueuce de I'AUemagne lie
s'est pas exercee au prealable sur le
Cabinet de Vienne.

Le Garde des Sceaux, President du
Conseil et >Iinistre des Affaires £tran-
geres par interim, saisit cette occasion
de irenouveler, &c.

Paris, U 27 juilkt, 1914.

pressed by the British Government
and conveyed to them by Sir F. Bertie
in his note of the 26th ot this month,
the Government of-the Republic have
also authorised M. Taul Cambon* to
take part in the conference which Sir
E. Grey has proposed with a view to
discovering in consultation with him-
self and the German and Italian
Ambassadors in London a means of
settling the present difficulties.

The Government of the Republic
is likewise ready to instruct the French
representatives at St. Petersburgh,
Vienna, and Belgrade to induce the
Russian, Austrian, and Servian Gov-
ernments to abstain from all active
military opei^ations pending the results
of this conference. He considers, how-
ever, that the chance of Sir E. Grey's
proposal being successful depends
essentially on the action which the
Berlin Government would be willing
to take at Vienna. Representations
made to the Austrian-Hungarian
Government for the purpose of bring-
ing about a suspension of military-
operations would seem bound to fail
unless the German Government do not
beforehand exercise their inflaence on
the Vienna Cabinet.

The President of the Council ad,
interim takes the opportunity, «&c.

Paris, July 27, 1914.

French Ambassador in. London.

No. 52.
I^ote communicated by French Embassy, July 28, 1914.

(Translation.)

LE Gouvernement de la Republique
accepte la proposition de Sir Edward
Grey relative a une intervention do la
Grande-Bretagne, de la France, de
TAlleraagne et de I'ltalie en vue d'eyi-
ter les operations militaires actives sur
les frontieres autrichiennes, russes et
serbes; il a autorise M. P. Cambon* a
prendre part aux deliberations de la
reunion a quatre, qui doit se tenir a
Londres.

L'Ambassadeur de France a Berlin a
recu pour instructions, apres s'etre
conccrte avec I'Ambassadeur d'Angle-
tene a Berlin, d'appuyer la demarche
de ce dernier dans la forme et la
mesure qui seraient Jugees opportunes.

M. Vivianit est pret a envoyer aux
representants fran9ais a Vienne, Saint-

THE Government of the Republic
accept Sir Edward Grey's proposal in
regard to intervention by Great
Britain, France, Germany, and Ital^
with a view to avoiding active mili-
tary operations on the frontiers of
Austria, Russia, and Servia ; and they
have authorised M. P. Cainbon* to
take part in the deliberations of the
four representatives at the meeting
which is to be held in London.

The French Ambassador in Berlin
has received instructions to consult
first the' British Ambassador in Berlin,
and then to support the action taken
by the latter in such manner and
degree as may be considered appro-
priate.

M. Vivianit is ready to send to the
representatives of France in Vienna,

* French Ambassador in London.

t French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Petersbourg et Belgrade des instruc-
tions dans le sens suggere par le Gou-
vernoment britanniqiie.

Ambassade de France, LondreSy
le 27 niillct, 1914.

St. PetersUurgh, and Belgrade instruc-
tions in the sense suggested by the
British Government.

French Embassy , July 27, 1914.

No. 53.

M, Sazonoff RuLssian Mmister for Foi^eign Affairs, to Count Benckendmff,

Russian Ambassador in London.
July 28.)

Saint-Fetersbourgy
le 14 (27) juillet, 1914.
(Telegraphique.)

L'AMBASSADEUR d'Angleterre est
venu s'informer si nous jugeons utile
quo I'Angleterre prenne I'initiative de
convoquer a Londres une conference
des representants de TAngleterre, la
France, rAllemagne et I'ltalie, pour
etudier une issue a la situation
actuelle.

J'ai repondu a I'Ambassadeur que
j'ai entame des pourparlers avec TAm-
bassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie, en con-
ditions que i'espere favorables. Pour-
tant je n'ai pas encore re9u de reponse
h, la proposition que j'ai faite d'une re-
vision de la note entre les deux
Cabinets.

Si des explications directes avec le
Cabinet de Vienne se trouvaient ir-
realisables, je suis pret a accepter la
proposition anglaise, ou toute autre de
nature a resoudre favorablement le
conflit.

Je voudrais pourtant ecarter des
aujourd'hui un malentendu qui pour-
rait surgir de la reponse donnee par le
Ministre de la Justice fran9ais ^ I'Am-
bassadeur d'Allemagne, concernant des
conseils de moderation a donner au
Cabinet Imperial.

-( Communicated hy Count Benchend&tff^

(Translation.)

>Sf. Fetershurgh,
(Telegraphic.) July 27, 1914.

THE British Ambassador came to
ascertain whether we think it desirab'o
that Great Britain should take tlio
initiative in convoking a conference in
London of the representatives, of
JEngland, France, Germany, and- Italy
to examine the possibility of a way out
of the present situation.

I replied to the Ambassador that I
have begun conversations with the
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador under
conditions which, I hope, may be
favourable. I have not, however, re-
ceived as yet any reply to the proposal
made by me for revising the note be-
tween the two Cabinets.

If direct explanations with the
Vienna Cabinet were to prove impos-
sible, I am ready to accept the British
proposal, or any other proposal of a
kind that would bring about a
favourable solution of the conflict.

I wish, however, to put an end from
this day forth to a misunderstanding
which might arise from the answer'
given by the French Minister of
Justice to the German Ambassador,
regarding counsels of moderation to bo!
given to the Imperial Cabinet.

No. 54.

M, Sazonof Russicm Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Coimt Benckendorff,
Russian Ambassador in London.— {Communicated hy Coimt Benckendorff\ ,
July 28, 1914.)

Baini'Feiersbourg,
le 15 (28) Quillet, 1914.
(Telegraphique.)

MES entretiens avec I'Ambassadeur
d'Allemagne confirmeiit mon impres-
sion que I'Allemagne est plutot favor-
able a I'intransigeance de I'Autriche.

Le Cabinet de Berlin, qui aurait pu
arreter tout le developpement de la
crise, parait n'exercer aucune action
sur soil alliee.

L'Ambassadeur trouve insufiisante la
reponse de la Serl)ic.

(Translation.)

<S'L Fcfersburgli ,
(Telegraphic.) July 15 (28), 1914.

MY interviews with the German
Ambassador confirm my impression"
that Germany is, if anything; in'
favour of the unconjpromising attitude
adopted by Austria.

The Berlin Cabinet, who could have
prevented the whole of this crisis |
d.eveloplng, appear to bo exerting nok
influence on their ally. _.

Thg Ambassador considers that the
Servian reply is insufficient..

Cette attitude allemande est tout This attitude of the German Govern-

particulierement alarmante. ^ merit is most alarming.

II me semble que mieux que toute It seems to me that England is in

(autre Puissance I'Angleterre serait en a better position than any other Power

mesure de tenter encore d'agir a to make another attempt at Berlin to

Berlin pour engager le Gouvernement induce the German Government to

allemand a I'action necessaire. C'est take the necessary action. There is no

a Berlin qu'indubitablement se trouve doubt that the key of the situation is

la clef de la situation. to be found at Berlin.

No. 55.

tSir G. Bibchana7iy British Ambassador at St, Peter sburgh^ to Sir Edward

Grey. — {Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) St. Fetershurghy July 27, 1914.

WITH reference to my telegram of yesterday,* I saw the Minister for;
Foreign Affairs this afternoon and found him very conciliatory and morej
optimistic. ,

He would, he said, use all his influence at Belgrade to induce the Servian
Government to go as far as possible in giving satisfaction to Austria, but her
territorial integrity must be guaranteed and her rights as a sovereign State
respected, so that she should not become Austria's vassal. He did not know
whether Austria would accept friendly exchange of views which he had pro-
posed, but, if she did, he wished to keep in close contact with the other Powers
throughout the conversations that would ensue.

He again referred to the fact that the obligations undertaken by Servia
in 1908, alluded to in the Austrian ultimatum, were given to the Powers.

I asked. if he had heard of your proposal with regard to conference of the
four Powers, and on his replying in the affirmative, I told him confidentially
of your instructions to me, and enquired whether instead of such a conference
he would prefer a direct exchange of views, which he had proposed. The
German Ambassador, to whom I had Just spoken, had expressed his personal
opinion that a direct exchange of views would be more agreeable to Austria-
Hungary.

His Excellency said he was perfectly ready to stand aside if the Powers
accepted the proposal for a conference, but he trusted that you would keep
in touch with the Russian Ambassador in the event of its taking place.

* See No. 44.

No. 56.
Sir 31. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna^ to Sir Edward Grey. —

[Received July 28.)
(Telegraphic.) Vienna^ July 27, 1914.

THE Russian Ambassador had to-day a long and earnest conversation with
Baron Macchio, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He told
him that, having just come back from St. Petersburgh, he was well acquainted
with the views of the Russian Government and the state of Russian jjublic
opinion. He could assure him that if actual war broke out with Servia it
would be impossible to localise it, for Russia was not prepared to give way
again, as she had done on previous occasions, and especially during the
annexation crisis of 1909. He earnestly hoped that something would be done
before Servia was actually invaded. Baron Macchio replied that this would
now be difficult, as a skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, in
which the Servians had been the aggressors. The Russian Ambassador said
that he would do all he could to keep the Servians quiet pending any discus-
sions that might yet take place, and he told me that he would advise his
Government to induce the Servian Government to avoid any conflict as long
as possible, and to fall back before an Austrian advance. Time so gained
should suffice to enable a settlement to be reached. Ho had just heard of a
satisfactory conversation which the. Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had
yesterday with the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. The former had
agreed that much of the Austro-Hungarian note to Servia had been perfectly
reasonable, and in fact tlioy had practically reached an understanding as icy

the guarantees which Servia might reasonably be asked to give to Austria-
Hungary for her future good behaviour. The Kugsian Ambassador urged that
the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh should be furnished with full
powers to continue discussion with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
who was very willing to advise Servia to yield all that could be fairly
asked of her as an independent Power. Baron Macchio promised to submit
this suggestion to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 57.

Sir 7?. JRoddj British Ambassador at Home, to Sir Edioard Grey. —

{Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) Eomc, J-u^i/ 27, 1914.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs greatly doubts whether Germany will be
.willing to invite Austria to suspend military action pending the conference,
but he had hopes that military action may be practically deferred by the fact
of the conference meeting at once. As at present informed, he sees no possi-
bility of Austria receding from any point laid down in her note to Servia,
but, he believes that if Servia will even now accept it Austria will be satisfied,
and if she had reason to think that such will be the advice of the Powers,
Austria may defer action. Servia may be induced to accept note in its entirety
on the advice of the four Powers invited to the conference, and this would
enable her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not- to Austria-Hungary
alone.

Telegrams from Vienna to the press here stating that Austria is favourably
impressed with the declarations of the Italian Government have, the Minister
for Foreign Affairs assures me, no foundation. He said he has expressed no
opinion to Austria with regard to the note. He assured me both -before and
after communication of the note, and again to-day, that Austrian Government
have given him assurances that they demand no territorial sacrifices from
Servia.

No. 58.

Sir F'. Bertie f British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir E&ward Grey,—-
{Received July 28.)
(Tolegraphic.) Taris, July 28, 1914.

1 CX)MMUNIOATED to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs this after-
noon the substance of your conversation with the German Ambassador, recor^ied
in your telegram* to Berlin of the 27th July.

His Excellency is grateful for the communication. He said that it confirms
yhat he had heard of your attitude, and he feels confident that your observa-
tions to the German Ambassador aviII have a good effect in the interest of
peace.

* So.0 No. 46.

No. 59.

Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edicard Grey. —
{Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) -paris, July 28, 1914.

I INFORMED the Acting Mini.ster for Foreign Affairs to-day of your
conversation with the Russian Ambassador, as recorded in your telegram of
yesterday* to St. Petersburgh.

H6 is grateful for the communication, and quite appreciates the impossi-
bility for His Majesty's Government to declare themselves " solidaires " with
Russia on a question between Austria and Servia, which in its present condi-
tion is not one affecting England. He also sees that you cannot take up an
attitude at Berlin and Vienna more Servian than that attributed in German
and Austrian sources to the Russian Government.

German Ambassador has stated that Austria would respect the integrity
of Servia, but when asked wlicther her independence also would be respected,
he gave no assurance.

* Sec No. 47.

No, 60.

Sir E. Goschen^ JBritdsh Ambassador at JBerUn, to Sir Edioard Grey, —

{Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 28, 1914.

SECRETARY of State spoke yesterday in the same sense as that reported
in my telegram of yesterday^ to my French and Italian colleagues respecting
your proposal. I discussed with my two colleagues this morning his reply,
and we found that, while refusing the proposed conference, he had said to all
of us that nevertheless he desired to work with us for- the maintenance of
general peace. We therefore deduced that if he is sincere in this wish he
can only be objecting to the form of your proposal. Perhaps he himself could
be induced to suggest lines on which he would find it possible to work with us.

* See No. 43,

No. 61.

Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna^ to Sir Edward Grey, —

(Received July 28.)
(Telegraphic.) Viefina, July 28, 1914.

I SAW Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning.

His Excellency declared that Austria-Hungary cannot delay warlike pro-
ceedings against Servia, and would have to decline any suggestion of negotia-
tions on basis of Servian reply.

Prestige of Dual Monarchy was engaged, and nothing could now prevent
conflict.

No. 62.

Sir M. de Bunsen^ British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. —

(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic) Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I SPOKE to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day in the sense of your tele-
gram of 27th July* to Berlin. I avoided the word "mediation," but said
that, as mentioned in your Bpeech,t which he had just read to me, you had
hopes that conversations in London between the four Powers less interested
might yet lead to an arrangement which Austro-Hungarian Government would
accept as satisfactory and as rendering actual hostilities unnecessary. I added
that you had regarded Servian reply as having gone far to meet just demands
of Austria-Hungary ; that you thought it constituted a fair basis of discussion
during which warlike operations might remain in abeyance, and that Austrian
Ambassador in Berlin was speaking in this sense. Minister for Foreign Affairs
said quietly, but firmly, that no discussion could be accepted on basis of
Servian note ; that war would be declared to-day, and that well-known pacific
character of Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might be accepted
as a guarantee that war was both just and inevitable. This was a matter
that must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned.
I said that you would hear with regret that hostilities could not now be
arrested, as you feared that they might lead to complications threatening the
peace of Europe.

In taking leave of his Excellencyy I begged him to believe that, if in the
course of present grave crisis our point of view should sometimes differ from
his, this would arise, not from want of sympathy with the many just complaints
which .Austria-Hungary had against Servia, but ifrom the fact that, whereas
Austria-Hungary pu£ first her quarrel with Servia, you were anxious in the first
instance for peace of Europe. I trusted this larger aspect of the question
would appeal with equal force to his Excellency. He said he had it also in
mind, but thought that Russia ought not to oppose operations like those
impending, which did not aim at territorial aggrandisement and which could no
longer be postponed.

* See No. 46.

t "Hansard," Vol. 65, No. 107, Columns 931, 932, 933.

No. 63.
Sir i?. JRoddy British Ambassador at JRome, to Sw Edward Ch^ey,*^
{Eeceiv.d July 28.)
(Telegraphic.) Borne, Juhj 28, 1914.

YOUR telegram of 25th July to Paris.*

I have communicated substance to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who.
immediately telegraphed in precisely similar terms to Berlin and Vienna,

* See No. 27.

No. 64.

Svr R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sin' Ednjoa/rd Orey,^^
(Recei/ved July 28.)
(Telegraphic.) Borne, JuVj 28, 1914.

AT the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs I submit the following
to you : —

In a long conversation this morning Servian Charge d' Affaires had said he
thought that if some explanations were given regarding mode in which Austrian
agents would require to intervene under article 5 and article 6, Servia might
still accept the whole Austrian note.

As it was not to be anticipated that Austria would give such explanations to
Servia, they might be given to Powers engaged in discussions, who might then
advise Servia to accept without conditions.

The Austro-Hungarian Government had in the meantime published a long
official explanation of grounds on which Servian reply was considered inade-'
quate. Minister for Foreign Affairs considered many points besides explanation
— ^such as slight verbal difference in sentence regarding renunciation of propa-
ganda — quite childish, but there was a passage which might prove useful in
facilitating such a course as was considered practicable by the Servian Charge
d'Affaires. It was stated that co-operation of Austrian agents in Servia was
to be only in investigation, not in judicial or administrative measures. Servia
was said to have wilfully misinterpreted this. He thought, therefore, that
ground might be cleared here.

I only reproduce from memory, as I had not yet received text of Austrian
declaration.

Minister impressed upon me, above all, his anxiety for the immediate
beginning of discussion. A wide general latitude to accept at once every point
or suggestion on which he could be in agreement with ourselves and Germany
had been given to Italian Ambassador.

No. 65.
Mr, GrackantJhorpe, Bntish Cha/rge d'Affaires at Bdyrade, to
Si/r Edwa/rd Grey. — {Recei/ved Jid/y 28.)
(Telegraphic.) iV^js/i, Juhj 28, 1914.

I HAVE urged on the Servian Government the greatest moderation pending
efforts being made towards a peaceful solution.

Two Servian steamers fired on and damaged, and two Servian merchant-
vessels have been captured by a Hungarian monitor at Orsova.

No. 66.

Mr. CracTcanthorpe, British Cha/rge d^Affai/res at Belgrade, to
Si/r Edward Grey. — [Received July 28.)
(Telegraphic.) ' Nish, Juhj 28, 1914.

TELEGRAM received here that war declared by Austria.

No. 67.

Sir Ed/wa/rd Grey to Sir E. Goschen^ Brit/ish Ambassadoo' at BerUn.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.

EXPLANATION given in your telegram of the 27th July* of what was my
idea in proposing a conference is quite right. It would not be an arbitration,

* See- No. 43.

but a private and informal discussion to ascertain what suggestion could bo
made tor a settlement. No suggestion would be put forward that had not
previously been ascertained to be acceptable to Austria and Russia, with whom
the mediating Powers could easily * keep in touch through their respective
allies.

But as long as there is a prospect of a direct exchange of views between
Austria and itussia, I would suspend every other suggestion, as I entirely agree
that it is the most preferable method of all.,

I understand that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has proposed
a friendly exchange of views to 'the Austrian GoVernmeilt, and, if the latter
accepts, it will no doubt relieve the tension and make the situation less critical.

It is very satisfactory to hear from the German Ambassador here that the
German Government have taken action at Vienna in the sense of the conversa-
|tion recorded in my telegram of yesterday to you.*

* See No. 46.

No. 68.

Sij" Edward Grey t& Sir E. GoscheUy British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.

GERMAN Government, having accepted principle: of mediation between
Austria and Russia by the four Powers, if necessary, I am ready to propose
that the German Secretary of State should suggest the lines on which this
principle should be applied. I v/ill, however, keep the idea in reserve until we
see how the conversations between Austria and Russia progress.

No. 69.
Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh!
(Telegraphic.) . Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.

IT is most satisfactory that there is a prospect of direct exchange of views
between the Russian and Austrian Governments, as reported in your teleeram
of the 27th July.^ ^ ^

I am ready to put forward any practical proposal that would facilitate this,
but I. am not quite clear as to what the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs
proposes the Ministers at Belgrade should do.' Could he not first mention in
an exchange of views with Austria his willingness to co-operate in some such
scheme? It might then take more concrete sh^pe.

* See No. 55.

No. 70.

Telegrams communicated by Count Benc^cendorff, liussian Amhassaior in
Londoii, Jioly 29, 1914:.

(1.) Telegram from M. Sazonof to Russian Ambassador at Berlin, dated

July 28, 1914.

IN consequence of the declaration of war by Austria against Servia, the
Imperial Government will announce to-morrow (29th) the mobilisation- in- the
military circonscriptions of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow, and Kazan. Please inform
German Government, confirming the absence in Russia of any aggressive inten-
tion against Germany.

The Russian Ambassador at Vienna has not been recalled from his post.

(2) Telegram to Count BencTcendorff.'-'

The Austrian declaration of war clearly puts an end to the idea of direct
communications between Austria and Russia. Action by London Cabinet in
order to set on foot mediation with a view to suspension of military operations
of Austria against Servia is now most urgent.

Unless military operations are stopped, mediation would only allow matters
to drag on and give Austria time to crush Servia.

* Rcissian Ambassador in London.

No. 71.
Sir E, Goschenj BritisJi Ambassador at Berlin^ to Sir Edward Grey*-^

(Received July 29.) '
(Telegraphic.) Berhn, July 28, 1914.

AT invitation of Imperial Chancellor, I called upon his Excellency this
evening. He said that he wished me to tell you that he was most anxious that
Germany should work together with England for maintenance of general peace,
as they had done successfully in the last European crisis,.. He had not been
nble to accept your proposal for a conference of representatives of the Great
Powers, because he did not think that it would be effective, and because such
Si conference would in his opinion have had appearance of an " Areopagus "
consisting of two Powers of each group sitting in judgment upon the two
remaining Powers; but his inability to accept the proposed conference must not
be regarded as militating against his strong desire for effective co-operation.
You could be assured that he was doing his very best both at Vienna and
'St. Petersburgh to get the two Governments to discuss the situation diTectly
with each other and in a friendly way. He had great hopes that such discussions
would take place and lead to a satisfactory result, but if the news were true
which he had just read in the papers, that Russia had mobilised fourteen army
corps in the south, he thought situation was very serious, and he himself would
be in a very difficult pQsition, as in these circumstances it would be out of his
power to continue to preach moderation at Vienna. He added that Austria,
who as yet was only partially mobilising, would have to take similar measures,
and if war were to result, Russia would* be entirely responsible. I ventured
to say that if Austria refused to take any notice of Servian note, which, to my
mind, gave way in nearly every point demanded by Austria, and which in any
casc-bfrered a basis for discussion, surely a certain portion of responsibility
wouldtcst with her. His Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss Servian
note/iKut that Austria's standpoint, and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel
with Servia was a purely Austrian concern with which Russia had nothing to
do. He reiterated his desire to co-operate with England and his intention to
do his utmost to maintain general peace. "A war between the Great Powers
must be avoided " were his last words.

Austrian colleague said to me to-day that a general war was most unlikely,
as Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make war. I think that that
opinion is shared by/many people here.

No. 72.

Sir G» Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward
Grey. -^{Received July 2^.)

(Telegraphic.) St. rctersburgh, July 28, 1914.

MlNlSl'ER for Foreign Affairs begged me to thank y^n for the language
you had held to .the German Ambassador, as reported in your telegram* to
Berlin, substance of which I communicated to his Excellency, He took a
pessimistic view of the situation, having received the same disquieting news
from Vienna as had reached His Majesty's Government, I said it was important
that we should know the real intentions of the Imperial Government, and asked
him whether he would be satished with the assurances which the Austrian
Ambassador had, I understood, been instructed to give in respect of Servia'e
integrity and independence. I added that I was sure any arrangement for avert-
ing a European war would be welcomed "by His Majesty's Government, In reply
iiis Excellency stated that if Servia were attacked Russia would not be satisfied
with any engagement which Austria might take on these two points, and that
order for mobilisation against Austria would be issued on the day that Austria
crossed Servian frontier

I told the German Ambassador, who appealed to me to give moderating
.counsels to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that from the beginning I had
■not ceased to do so, and that the German Ambassador at Vienna should now
in his turn use his restraining influence. I made it clear to his Excellency
that, Russia being thoroughly in earnest, a general war could not be averted if
Servia were attacked by Austria.

* Se« No. 46.

As regards the suggestion of conference, the Ambassadoi- had received no
instructions, and before acting with me the French and Italian Aniba^^^adors
are still waiting for their final instructions.

No. 73.
Sir M. djC Bunsp.n^ British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. —

{Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I HAVE received note verbale from Ministry for Foreign Affairs, stating
that, the Servian Government not having replied to note of 23rd July* in a
satisfactory manner, Imperial and Royal Government is compelled itself to
provide for protection of its rights, and to have recourse for that object to
force of arms. Austria-Hungary has addressed to Servia formal declaration
according to article 1 of convention of 18th October, 1907, relative to opening
of hostilities, and considers herself from to-day in state of war with Servia.
Austria-Hungary will conform, provided Servia does so, to stipulations of
Hague conventions of 18th October, 1907, and to Declaration of London of 2Gth
February, 1909

* Sc€ No. 4.

No. 74.

Sr M. de Bimserit British Ambassador- at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. —

(R^c&tved July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, lyl4.

I AM informed by the Russian Ambassador that the Russian Government's
suggestion has been declined by the Austro-Hungarian Government. The
suggestion was to the effect that the means of settling the Austro-Servian
conflict should be discussed directly between Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, who should be
authorised accordingly.

The .Russiaii' Anioassador thinks that a conference in London of the less
interested Powers, such as you have proposed, offers now the only prospect of
preserving peace of Europe, and he is sure that the Russian Government will
acquiesce willingly in your proposal. So long as opposing armies have not
actually 'come in contact, all hope need not be abandoned.

No. 75.

^Sir E. Goschjen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. -^

{Iteceived July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 29, 1914.

I WAS sent for again to-day by the Imperial Chancellor, who told me that
he regretted to state that the Austro-Hungarian Government, to whom he had
at once communicated your opinion, had answered that events had marched too
rapidly and that it was therefore too late to act upon your suggestion that the
Servian reply miglit form the basis of discussion. His Excellency had, on
receiving their reply, despatched a message to Vienna, in whicli he explained
that, although a certain desire had, in his opinion, been shown in the Servian
reply to meet the demands of Austria, he understood entirely that, without
some sure guarantees that Servia would carry out in tlieir entirety the demands
made upon her, the Austro-Hungarian Government could not rest satisfied in
view of their past experience. He had then gone on to say that the hostilities
which were about to be undertaken against Servia had presumably the exclusive
object of securing such guarantees, seeing that the Austrian Government
already assured the Russian Government that they had no territorial designs.

He advised the Austro-Hungarian Government, should this view be correct,
to speak openly in this sense. The holding of such language would, he hoped,
eliminate all possible misunderstandings.

As yet, he told me, he had not received a reply from Vienna.

From the fact that he had gone so far in the matter of giving advice at

Vienna, his Excellency hoped that you would realise, that he -was sincerely
doing all in his power to prevent danger of. European complications.,

The fact of his communicating this information to you was a proof of the
confidence which he felt in you and evidence of his anxiety that you should
know he was doing his best to support your efforts in the cause of general
peace, efforts which he sincerely appreciated.

No. 76.

Sir E. GoscheTij British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey, —

(Received Julu 29.)

(Telegi^aphic.) JBcWm, Juhj 29, 1914.

I FOUND Secretary of State very depressed to-day. He reminded me that
he had told me the other day that he had to be very careful in giving advice to
Austria, as any idea that they were being pressed would be' likely to cause
them to precipitate matters and present a fait accompli. This had, in fact, now
happened, and he was not sure that his commufiication of your suggestion that
Servia's reply offered a basis for discussion had not hastened declaration of
war. Ho was much troubled by reports of mobilisation in Russia, and of certain
military measures, which he did not specify, being taken in France. He subse-
quently spoke of these measures to my French colleague, who informed him
that French Government had done nothing more than the German Government
had done, namely, recalled ofl&cers on leave. His Excellency denied German
Government had done this, but as a matter of fact it is true. My French
colleague said to Under-Secretary of State, in course of conversation^ that it
seemed to him that when Austria had entered Servia, and so satisfied her
military prestige, the moment might then be favourable for four disinterested
Powers to discuss situation and come forward with suggestions for preventing
graver complications. Under-Secretary of State seemed to think idea worthy
of consideration, as he rephed that would be a different matter from conference
proposed by you.

Russian Ambassador returned to-day, and has informed Imperial Govern-
ment that Russia is mobilising in four southern governments.

No. 77.
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

I MUCH appreciate the language of Chancellor, as reported in your telegram
of to-day.* His Excellency may rely upon it that this country will continue, as
heretofore, to strain every effort to secure peace and to avert the calamity we
all fear. If he can induce Austria to satisfy Russia and to abstain from going
so far as to come into collision with her, we shall all join in deep gratitude to
his Excellency for having saved the peace of Europe.

• Se« No. 75.

No. 78.

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersbunjh, to Sir Ed0ard
Grey. — (Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) St. Feterslurgh, July 29, 1914.

PARTIAL mobilisation was ordered to-day.

I communicated the substance of your telegram of the 28th instant* to
Bcrhn to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in accordance with your instructions,
and informed him confidentially of remarks as to mobilisation which the German
Secretary of State had made to the British Ambassador at Berlin. This had
already reached his Excellency from another source. The mobilisation, he
explained, would only be directed against Austria.

Austrian Government had now definitely declined direct conversation
between Vienna and St. Petersburgh. The ^Minister for Foreign Affairs said
he bad proposed such an exchange of views on advice of German Ambassador.
He proposed, when informing German Ambassador of this rofusal of Austria's,

* S€c No. 67.

to urge that a return should be made to your propofial for a confcrenco of
four Ambassadors, or, at all events, for an exchange of views between the
three Ambassadors less directly interested, yourself, and also the -Austrian
Ambassador if you thought it advisable. Any arrangement approved by France
and England would be acceptable to him, and he did not care what form such
conversations took. No time was to be lost, and the only way to avert war
was for you to succeed in arriving, by means of conversations with Ambassadors
either collectively or individually, at some formula v/hich Austria could be
induced to accept. Throughout Russian Government had been perfectly frank
and conciliatory, and had done all in their power to maintain peace. If their
efforts to maintain peace failed, he trusted that it would be realised by the
British public that it was not the fault of the Russian Government.

I asked him whether he would raise objections if the suggestion made in
Rome telegram of the 27th July,* which I mentioned to him, were carried out.
In^ reply his Excellency said that he would agree to anything arranged by the
four Powers provided it was acceptable to Servia ; he could not, he said, be
more Servian than Servia. Some supplementary statement or explanations
would, however, have to be made in order to tone down the sharpness of the
ultimatum.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that proposal referred to in your telegram
of the 28th instantt was one of secondary importance. Under altered cir-
cumstances of situation he did not attach weight to it. Further, the Gormaii
Ambassador had informed his Excellency, so the latter told me, that his
Government were continuing at Vienna to exert friendly influence. I fear
that the German Ambassador v.'ill not help to smooth matters over, if he uses
to his own Government the same language as he did to me to-day He accused
the Russian Government of endangering the peace of Europe by their mobilisa-
tion, and said, when I referred to all that had been recently done by Austria,
that ho could not discuss such matters. I called his attention to the fact that
Austrian consuls had warned all Austrian subjects liable to military service
to join the colours, that Austria had already partially mobilised, and had now
declared war on Servia. From what had passed during the Balkan crisis she
knew that this act was one which it was impossible without humiliation for
Russia to submit to. Had not Russia by mobilising shown that she was in
earnest, Austria w^ould have traded on Russia's desire for peace, and would
have believed that she could go to any lengths. Minister for Foreign Affairs
had given me to understand that Russia would not precipitate war by crossing-
frontier immediately, and a week or more would, in any case, elapse before
mobilisation was completed. In order to find an issue out of a dangerous
situation it was necessary that we should in the meanwhile all work together
* Sco No. 57. t Soe No. 69.

No. 79

♦Si?' M dc Jhinsen, BHtish Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edicard Grey.

{Ecceived July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) Vmnna, July 29, 1914.

THERE is at present no step which we could usefully take to stop war with
Servia, to which Austro-Hungarian Government are now fully committed by
the Emperor's appeal to his people which has been published this morning,
and by the declaration of war. French and Italian Ambassadors agree witli
me in this view. If the Austro-Hungarian Government would convert into
a binding engagement to Europe the declaration which has been made at St
Petcrsburgh to the effect that she desires neither to destroy the indopendenco
of Servia nor to acquire Servian territory, the Italian Ambassador thinks tliat
Russia might bo induced to remain quiet. This, however, the Italian Ambas-
«adov is convinced the Austrian Government would refuse to do.

No. 80.

Sir R, Hoddf British Ambassador at Bonier to Sir Edicard Grey. —
{Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) Borne, July 29, 1914.

IN your telegram of the 27th instant* to Berlin, German Ambassador was
reported €o have accepted in principle the idea of a conference. This is in
contradiction with the telegram of the 27th instantt from Berlin.

Information received by the Italian Government from Berlin shows that
German view is correctly represented in Sir E. Goschen's telegram of the
27th July,t but what creates difficulty is rather the^ "conference," so the
Minister for Foreign Affairs understands, than the principle. He is going to
urge, in a telegram which he is sending to Berlin to-night, adherence to the
idea of an exchange of views in London. He suggests that the German Secre-
tary of State might propose a formula acceptable to his Government. Minister
for Foreign Affairs is of opinion that this exchange of views would keep the
door open if direct communication between Vienna and St. Petersburgh fails
ta have any result. He thinks that this exchange of views might be con-
comitant with such direct communication.

The German Government are also being informed that the Italian Govern-
ment would not be pardoned by public opinion here unless they had taken
every possible step so as to avoid war. He is urging that the German Govern-
ment must lend their co-operation in this.

He added that there seemed to be a difficulty in making Germany helieve
that Russia was in earnest. As Germany, however, was really anxious for
good relations with ourselves, if she believed that Great Britain would act
with Russia and France he thought it would have a great effect.

Even should it prove impossible to induce Germany to take part, he would
till advocate that England and Italy, each as representing one group, should
continue to exchange views.

* See No. 46. t See No. 43.

No. 81.
Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome,

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

"WITH reference to "your telegram of yesterday.*

It is impossible for me to initiate discussions with Ambassadors here, as I
understand from Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs that Austria will not
accept any discussion on basis of Servian note, and the inference of all I have
heard from Vienna and Berlin is that Austria will not accept any form of
mediation by the Powers as between Austria and Servia. Italian Minister for
Foreign Affairs must therefore speak at Berlin and Vienna. I shall be glad
if a favourable reception is given to any suggestions he can make there.

* See No. 64.

No. 82.

Mr. Beauraonty British Charge d Affaires at Constantinople, to Sir Edward
Grey.— (Received July 29.)

(Telegraphic.) Constantinople, July 29, 1914.

I UNDERSTAND that the designs of Austria may extend considerably
beyond the sanjak and a punitive occupation of Servian territory. I gathered
this from a remark let fall by the Austrian Ambassador here, who spoke of
the deplorable economic situation of Salonica under Greek administration and
of the assistance on which the Austrian army could count from Mussulman
population discontented with Serbian rule.

No. 83.

Mr Crackanthorpe^ British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade^ to Sir Edward

Grey. — {Received Jidy 29.)

(Telo-raphic.) Nisli, July 29, 1914.

[ HAVE been requested by Prime Minister to convey to you expression
of his deep gratitude for the statement which you made on the 27th instant
in the House of Commons

No. 8-1.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E Gcschen, British Amhassadoo' at Berlin.

(Telegrapiiic.) Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

THE German Ambassador has been instructed by the German Chancellor
to inform me that he is endeavouring to mediate between Vienna and St.
Petersburgh, and ho hopes with good success. Austria and Russia seem to
be in constant touch, and he is endeavouring to make Vienna explain in a
satisfactory form at St. Petersburgh the scope and extension of Austrian pro-
ceedings in Servia. I told the German Ambassador that an agreement arrived
at direct between Austria and Russia would be the best possible solution. I
would press no proposal as long as there was a prospect of that, but my
information this morning was that the Austrian Government have declined
the suggestion of the Russian Government that. the Austrian Ambassador at
St. Petersburgh should be authorised to discuss directly with the Russian
Minister for Foreign Affairs the means of settling the Austro-Servian conflict.
The press correspondents at St, Petersburgh had been told that Russian
Government would mobilise. The German Government had said that they
were favourable in principle to mediation between Russia and Austria if
necessary. They seemed to think the particular method of conference, con-
sultation or discussion, or even conversations d quatre in London too formal
A method. I urged that the German Government should suggest any method
by which the influence of the four Powers could be used together to prevent
war between Austria and Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole
idea of mediation or mediating influence \yas ready to be put into operation
by any method that Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable. In
fact mediation was ready to come into operation, by any method that Germany
thought possible if only Germany would " press the button " in the interests of
peace.

No. 85.

Sir E, GoscheUf British Arahassador at Berlin^ to Sir Edward Grey. —
{Received July 29.)
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 29, 1914.

I WAS asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency had
just returned from Potsdam.

He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagra-
tion might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as
Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then
proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said
that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which
governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow
France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not
the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Gref.t
Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Govern-
ment that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at
the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might
ensue.

I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that
he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards
Holland, however, his Excellency said that so long ^s Germany's adversaries
respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready
to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that the would do likewise'.

It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be
forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity
would be respected if she had not sided against Germany^

His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellor
the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an
understanding with England; he trusted that these assurances might. form
the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind
a general neutrality agreement betAveen England and Germany, though it
was of course at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an
assurance of British neatrality in the conflict which present crisis might
possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realisation of his desire.

In reply to his Excellency's enquiry how' I thought his request would appeal
to you, I said that 1 did not think it probable that at this stage of events -you
would care to bind yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion
that you would desire to retain full liberty.

Our conversation upon this subject having come to an end, I communicated
the contents of your telegram of to-day^ to his Excellency, who expressed his
best thanks to you.

* Se€ No. 77.

No. 86.
Sir R, Roddy British Ambassador at Rome^ to Sir Edward Grey,—
.(Received J%dy 29.)
(Telegraphic.) Rome, July 29, 1914.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs thinks that moment is past for any further
discussions on basis of Servian note, in view of communication made to-day
by Russia at Berlin regarding partial mobilisation. The utmost he now hopes
for is that Germany may use her influence at Vienna to prevent or moderate
any further demands on Serviai.

No. 87.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie f Biitish Ambassador at Paris.

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.
Sir,

AFTER telling M. Cambon*- to-day how grave the situation seemed to be,
I told him tht\t 1 meant to tell the German Ambassador to-day that he must
not be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations into any sense of false
security that wo should stand aside if all the efforts to preserve the peace,
which we were now making in common with Germany, failed. But I went
on to say to M. Cambon^ that I thought it necessary to tell him also that
public opinion here approached the present difficulty from a quite different
point of view from that taken during the difficulty as to Morocco a few years
ago. In the case of Morocco the dispute was one in which France was
primarily interested, and in which it appeared that Germany, in an att*empt
to crush France, was fastening a quarrel on France on a question that was the
subject of a special agreement between Franco and us. In the present case
the dispute between Austria and Servia was not one in which we felt called
to take a hand. Even if the question became one between Austria and
Russia we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be
a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav — a struggle for supremacy in
the Balkans ; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war
over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and France became
involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do ; it was a case
that wo should have to consider. France would then have been drawn into
a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her honour
and interest obliged her to engage. We were free from engagements, and
we should have to decide what British interests required us to do. I thought
it necessary to say that, because, as he knew, wo were taking all precautions
with regard to our fleet, and I was about to warn Prince Idchnowskyt not

* French Ambassador in London,
t German Ambassador in London.

to count on our standing aside, but it would not be fair that I should let
M. Cambon be misled into supposing that this meant that we had decided what
to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise.

M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly. He
understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, and in a struggle for supremacy
between Teuton and Slav we should not feel called to intervene ; should other
issue? be raised, and Germany and France become involved, so that the
question became one of the hegemony of Europe, we should then decide what
it was necessary for us to do. He seemed quite prepared for this announce-
ment, and made no criticism upon it.

He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a demand
from Germany that France Avould be neutral Avhile Germany attacked Russia.
This assurance France, of course, could not give; she was bound to help
Russia if Russia was attacked.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 88.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen^ British Ambassador at Berlin.

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.
Sir,

I TOLD the German Ambassador this afternoon of the information that I
had received, that Russia had informed Germany respecting her mobilisation.
I also told him of the communication made by Count Benckendorff,* that
the Austrian. declaration of war manifestly rendered vain any direct conversa-
tions between Russia and Austria. I said that the hope built upon those
direct conversations by the German Government yesterday had disappeared
to-day. To-day the German Chancellor was working in the interest of media-
tion in Vienna and St. Petersburgh. If he succeeded, well and good. If not,
it was more important than ever that Germany should take up what I had
suggested to the German Ambassador this morning, and propose some method
by which the four Powers should be able to work together to keep the peace
of Europe. I pointed out, however, that the Russian Government, while
desirous of mediation, regarded it as a condition that the military operations
against Servia should be siispended, as otherwise a mediation would only
drag on matters, and give Austria time to crush Servia. It was, of course, too
late for all military operations against Servia to be suspended. In a short
time, I supposed, the Austrian forces would be in Belgrade, and in occupation
of some Servian territory. BuU even then it might be possible to bring some
mediation into existence, if Austria, while saying that she must hold the
occupied territory until she had complete satisfaction from Servia, stated
that she would not advance further, pending an effort of the Powers to
mediate between her and Russia.

The German Ambassador said that he had already telegraphed to Berlin
what I had said to him this morning.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.
* Russian Ambassador in London.

No. 89.

Sir Edward GreiJ to Sir E. GoscheUj British Ambassador at Berlin.

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.
Sir,

AFTER speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the
'European situation-, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite private and
friendly way, something that was on my mind. The situation was very grave.
While it was restricted to the issues at present actually involved we had no
thought of interfering in -it. But if Germany became involved in it, and
then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European
interests; and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our

lid I

conversation— which I hoped would continue— into thinking that we should
stand aside.

He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I meant that
we should, under 'certain circumstances, intervene?

I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything that was like
a- threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that, if things became
worse, we should intervene. There v.ould be no question of our intervening
if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved. But we
knew very well, that if the issue did become such that we thought British
interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision
would have to be very rapid, just as the decisions of other Powers had to be.
I hoped that the friendly tone of our conversations would continue as at
present, and that I should be abld to keep as closely in touch with the German
Government in working for peace. But if we failed in our efforts to keep
the peace, and if the issue spread so that it involved practically every European
interest, I did not wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly
tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing
that we should not take action, and to the reproach that, if they had not been
so misled, the course of things might have been different. ♦

The (German Ambassador took no exception to what I had said ; indeed,
he told me that it accorded with what he had already given in Berlin as his
view of the situation.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 90.
Sir Edvjard Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

Sir, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

IN addition to what passed with the German Ambassador this morning,
as recorded in my telegram of the 29th July* to your Excellency, I gave the
Ambassador a copy of Sir Rennell Rodd'st telegram of the 28th Julyt and of
my reply to it.§ I said I had begun to doubt whether even a complete
acceptance of the Austrian demands by Servia would now satisfy Austria. But
there appeared, from what the Marquis di San GiulianolF had said, to be a
method by which, if the Powers were allowed to have~any say in the matter,
they might bring about complete satisfaction for Austria, if only the latter
Vould give them an opportunity. I could, however, make no proposal, for the
leasons I have given in my telegram to you, and could only give what the
Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had said to the German Ambassador for
information, as long as it was understood that Austria would accept no discus-
sion with the Powers over her dispute with Servia. As to mediation between
Austria and Russia, I said it could not take the form simply of urging Russia
to stand on one side while Austria had a free hand to go to any length
she pleased. That would not bo mediation, it would simply be
putting pressure upon Russia in the interests of Austria. The German
Ambassador, said the view of the German Government was that Austria could
not by force be humiliated, and could not abdicate her position as a Great
Power. I said I entirely agreed, but it was not a question of humiliating
Austria, it was a question of how far Austria meant to push fhQ humiliation
of others. There must, of course, be some humiliation of Servia, but Austria
might press things so far as to involve the humiliation of Russia.

The German Ambassador said that Austria would not take Servian terri-
tory, as to which I observed that, by taking territory while leaving nominal
Servian independence, Austria might turn Servia practically into a vassal
State and this would affect the whole position of Russia in the Balkans.

I observed that when there was danger of European conflict it was impos-
sible to say who would not be drawn into it. Even the Netherlands apparently
were taking precautions.

The German Ambassador said emphatically that some means must be found
of preserving the peace of Europe.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

* Sco No. 84. t British Ambassador in Rome. ^ X Soe No. 64.

§ See No. 81. ^ Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 91.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir if. de Bunsen, Britisli Ambassador at Vienna,
Sir, Fore gn Office, July 29, 1914.

THE Austrian Ambassador tofd me to-day he had ready a long memo-
randum, which he proposed to leave, and wiiich he said gave an account of
the conduct of Servia towards Austria, and an explanation of how necessary
the Austrian action was.

I said that 1 did not wish to discuss the merits of the question between
Austria and Servia. The news to-day seemed to me very bad for the peace of
Europe The Powers were not allowed to help in getting satisfaction for
Austria, which they might get if they were given an opportunity, and European
peace was at stake.

Count Mensdorif* said that the war with Servia must proceed. Austria
couid not continue to be exposed to the necessity of mobilising again and
again, as she had been obliged to do in recent years. She had no idea of
territorial aggrandisement, and all she wished was to make sure that her
interests v/ere safeguarded.

I said that it would be quite possible, v/ithout nominally interfering with the
independence of Servia or taking away any of her territory, to turn her into a
sort of vassal State.

Count Mensdorff* deprecated this.

In reply to some further remarks of mine, as to the effect that the Austrian
action might haye upon the Russian position in the Balkans, he said that,
before the Balkan war, Servia had always been regarded as being in the
Austrian sphere of influence.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.
* Aiistro-H vulgarian Ambassador in London.

No. 92.

Sir^ Edward Grey to Sir R. Eodd^ British Ambassador at Roms,

Sir, Foreign Office,. July 29, 1914.

THE Italian Ambassador made to me to-day a communication from the
Marquis di San Giuliano* suggesting that the German objections to the media-
tion of the four Powers, a mediation that was strongly favoured by Italy,
might be removed by some change in the form of procedure.

1 said that I had already anticipated this by asking the German Govern-
ment, to suggest any form of procedure under which the idea of mediation
between Austria and Russia, already accepted by the German Government in
principle, could be 'applied.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.
* Italian Minlst-er for Foreign Affairs.

No. 93.

Telegrams communicated by Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador' in
London, July 30, 1914.

(1.)
Russian Ambassador at Vienna to M. Sazonofr'

ViennCi (Translation.)

le 15 (28) juillet, 1914. Vienna, July 15 (28), 1914.

(Telegraphique.) (Telegraphic.)

J'AI entretenu awjourd'hui le Comte I SPOKE to Count Berchtoldf

Berchtoldt dans le sens des instruc- to-day in the sense of your Excellency's

tions de votre Excellence. Je lui fis instructions. I brought to his notice,

* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

■f Aufitro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

observer, en termes les plus amicaux,
combien il etait desirable de trouver
line solution qui, en consolidant les
bons rapports entre I'Autriche-Hongrie
et la Russie, donnerait a la Monarchie
austro-hongroise des garanties serieuses
I)our ses rapports futurs avec la
Serbic.

J'attirais I'attention du Comto
Berchtold* sur tous les dangers pour la
paix de I'Europe, qu'entrainerait un
conflit arme entrc PAutriche-Hongrie
et la Serbie.

Le Comte Berchtold* me repondit
qu'il se rendait parfaitement compte
d^i serieux de la situation et des avan-
tages d'une franche explication avec
le Cabinet de Saint-Petersbourg. II
me dit que d*un autre cote le Gou-
vernement austro-hongrois, qui ne
s'etait decide que tres mal volontiers
aux mesures energiques qu'il avait
prises centre la Serbie, ne pouvait plus
ni reculer, ni entrer en discussion au-
cune des termes de la note austro-
hongroise.

Le Comte Berchtold* ajouta que la
crisc etait devenue si aigue, et que I'ex-
citation de Topinion publique avait at-
teint tel degre, que le Gouvernement,
le Toulait-il, ne pouvait plus y consen-
tir,- d'aiitant moins, me dit-il, quo la
reponse meme de la Serbie donne la
preuve du manque de sincerite de ses
promesses pour Tavenir.

in the most friendlj' manner, how de-
sirable it was to find a solution which,
while consolidating good relations be-
tween Austria-Hungary and Russia,
would give to the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy genuine guarantees for its
future relations with Servia.

I drew Count Berchtold's* atten-
tion to all the dangers to the peace of
Europe which would bo involved by an
armed conflict between Austria-Hun-
gary and Servia.

Count Berchtold" replied that he was
well aware of the gravity of the situa-
tion and of the advantages of a frank
explanation with the St. Petcrsburgh
Cabinet. He told me that, on tho
other hand, the Austro-Hungarian
Government, who had only decided
much against their will on the ener-
getic measures which they had taken
against Servia, could no longer recede,
nor enter into any discussion about the
terms of the Austro-Hungarian note.

Count Berclitold* added that the
crisis had become so acute, and that
public opinion had risen to such a pitch
of excitement, that the Government,
even if they wished it, could no longer
consent to such a course. This was
all the more impossible, he said, inas-
much as the Servian reply itself fur-
nished proof o^f the insincerity of
Servia's promises for the future.

^ Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(2.)

M. Sazono/j Hiissian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benchendorff^

Russian Ambassador in London.

Saint-Fetershourg,
U 16 (29) juiUet, 1914.
(Telegraphique.)

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagrte m'in-
forme, au nom du Chancelier, que
rAllemagnc n'a pas cesse d'exercer a
Viennc ime influence moderatrice et
qu'elle continuera cette action mem©
apres la declaration de guerre.
Jusqu'a ce matin il n'y avait aucunc
nouvclle que les armees autrichiennes
aiont franchi la frontiere serbe. J'ai
prie I'Ambassadeur de- transmettre au
Chancelier mes remcrciements pour la
teneur amicale de cette communica-
tion. Jo I'aiinforme des mesures mili-
taires prises par la Russie, dont au-
cune, lui dis-je, n'etait dirigee centre
rAllomagne; j'ajoutais qu'elles ne pre-
jugeaient pas non plus des mesures
agressivcs centre rAutriche-Hongrie,

tSt. Pctershurgh,
July 16 (29), 1914.
(Telegraphic.)

THE Gernian Ambassador informs
me, in the name of the Chancellor, that
Germany .has not ceased to exercise a
moderating influence at Vienna, and
that she Avill continue to do so even
after the declaration of war. Up to
this morning there had been no news
that the Austrian army has crossed
the Servian frontier. I have begged
the Ambassador to express my thanks
to the Chancellor for the friendly
tenour of this communication. I have
informed him of the military measures
taken by Russia, none of which, I told
him, were directed against Germany;
I added that neither should they be
taken as aggressive measures against
Austria-Hungary, their explanation

ces mesures s'expliqiiant par la mobili-
sation de la plus grande partie do
I'armee austro-hongroise.

L'Ambassadeur se pronon9ant en
fiVveiir d'explications directes avec le
Cabinet dc Vienne et nous, je repon-
dis que j*y etais tout dispose, pour pen
que les conseils du Cabinet de Berlin
dont il parlait trouvent echo a Vienne.

En menie temps je signalais que nous
etions tout disposes a accepter le projet
d'une conference des quatre Puis-
sances, un projet auquel, paraissait-il,
I'Allemagne ne sympathisait pas en-
tieremcnt.

Je dis qu€f, dans mon opinion, le
meilleur moyen pour mettre a profit
tous les moyens propres a produire une
solution pacifique, consisterait en unc
action parallele des pourparlers d'une
conference a quatre de I'Allemagne, de
la France, de rAngloterre et de
ritalic et d'un contact direct entre
I'Autricbe-Hongrie et la Russie, a
I'instar a peu pres de ce qui avait eu
lieu aux inoments les plus critiques de
la crise de Fan dernier.

Je dis a I'Ambassadeur qu'apres les
concessions faites par la Serbie, un ter-
rain de compromis pour les questions
restees puvertes ne serait pas tres diffi-
cile a trouver, a condition toutefois de
quelque bonne volonte de la part de
I'Autriche et a condition que toutes les
Puissances usent de toute leur in-
fluence dans un sens de conciliation.

being the mobilisation of the greatet
part of the Austro-Hungarian army.

The Ambassador said that he was in
favour of direct explanations between
the Austrian (Bovernment and our-
selves, and I replied that I, too, was
quite willing, provided that the advice
of the Gorman Government, to which
he had referred, found an echo xit
Vienna.

1 said at the same time that wo were
quite ready to accept the proposal for
a conference of the four Powers, a pro-
posal with which, apparently, Ger-
many was not in entire sympathy.

I told him that, in my opinion, the
best manner of turning to account the
most suitable methods of finding a
peacofur solution would be by arrang-
ing for parallel discussions to be car-
ried on by a coufercnce of the four
Powers— Germany, France, England,
and Italy— and by a direct exchange
of views between Austria-Hungary and
Russia on much tlio same lines as
occurred during the most critical
moments of last year's crisis.

T told the Ambassador that, after
the concessions which had been made
by Servia, it should not be very diffi-
cult to find a compromise to settle the
other questions which remained out-
standing, provided that Austria
showed some good- will and that all the
Powers used tlioir entire influence in
the direction of conciliation.

(3.)

M* Sazonofy Russian Mimster for Foreign Affairs, to Count Benckendorff^

Russian Ambassador in London.

Saint-Fetershourg,
le 16 (29) juiild, 1914.
(Telegraphique.)

Lors de mon entretien avec I'Ambas-
sadeur d'Allemagne, dont traite mon
telegramme precedent, je n'avais pas
encore re9u le telegramme du 15 (28)
juilletdeM. Schebeko.*

Le contenu do ce telegramme consti-
tue un refus du Cabinet de Vienne dc
proceder a un echange d'idees direct
avec le Gouvernement Imperial.

Des lors, il ne nous reste plus qu'a
nous en remettre entierement au, Gou-
vernement britannique pour I'initia-
tive des demarches qu^ljugora- utile
de provoquer.

St, Petershurghf
July 16 (29), 1914.
(Telegraphic.)

AT the time of my interview with
the German Ambassador, dealt with,
in my preceding telegram, I had not
yet received M. Srh^beko's* telegram
of the 15th (28th) July.

The contents of this telegram con-
stitute a refusal of the Vienna Cabinet
to agree to a direct exchange of views
with the Imperial Government.

From now on, nothing remains for
us to do but to rely entirely on the
British Government to take the initia-
tive in any steps which they may
consider advisable.

* Russian Ambassador at Vienna.

No. 94.
Sir M. de Bunsen^ British Ambassador at Vienna, fo Sir Edward Grey»-^

{Received Jidy 30.)

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 29, 1914.

I LEARN that mobilisation of Russian corps destined to carry out opera-
tions on Austrian frpntier has been ordered. My informant is Russian
Ambassador. Ministry for Foreign Affairs here has realised, though somewhat
Ic^te in the day, that Russia will not remain indifferent in present crisis. I
believe that the news of Russian mobilisation will not be a suj-prise to the
Ministry, but so far it is not generally known in Vienna this evening. Unless
mediation, which German Government declared themselves ready to offer in
concert with three other Great Powers not immediately interested in the Austro-
Servian dispute, be brought to bear forthwith, irrevocable steps may be taken
in present temper of this country. German Ambassador feigns surprise that
Servian affairs should be of such interest to Russia. Both my Russian and
Fi'Onch colleagues have spoken to him to-day. Russian Ambassador expressed
the hope that it might still be possible to arrange matters, and explained that
it was impossible for Russia to do otherwise than take an interest in the
present dispute. Russia, he said, had done what she could already at Belgrade
to induce Servian Government to meet principal Austrian demands in a favour-
able spirit; if approached in a proper .manner, he thought she would probably
go still further in this direction. But she was justly offended at having been
completely ignored, and she could not consent to be excluded from the settle-
ment. German Ambassador said that if proposals were put forward which
opened any prospect of possible acceptance by both sides, he personally thought
that Germany might consent to act as mediator in concert with the three
other Powers.

I gather from what. Russian Ambassador said to me that he is much afraid
of the effect that any serious engagement may have upon Russian public
opinion. I gathered, however, that Russia would go a long way to riieet
Austrian demands on Servia.

No. 95.
Sir M, de Binisen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey, —

(Received Jvly 30.)

(Telegraphic.) Vienna,, July 30, 1914.

RUSSIAN Ambassador hopes that Russian mobilisation will be regarded by
Austria as what it is, viz., a clear intimation that Russia must be consulted
regarding the fate of Servia, but he does not know how the Austrian Govern-
ment are taking it. He says that Russia must have an assurance that Servia
will not be crushed, but she would understand that Austria-Hungary is com-
pelled to exact from Servia measures which will secure her Slav provinces from
the continuance of Ipiostile propaganda from Servian territory.

The French Ambassador hears from Berlin that the German Ambassador at
Vienna is instructed to speak seriously to the Austro-Hungarian Government
against acting in a manner calculated to provoke a European war.

Unfortunately the German Ambassador is himself so identified with extreme
anti-Russian and aiiti-Scrvian feeling prevalent in Vienna that he is unlikely to
plead the caus5 of peace with entire sincerity.

Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that tho
German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatunuto Servia before
it was despatched and telegraphed it to the Gerjnan EmperoT. I know from
tho German Ambassador himself that he endbrses every line of it.

No. 96.

Sir M. de Bunaen^ Bntiah Ambassador at Vienna, io Sir Edward Grey,-^

(Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 30, 1914.

THE Russian Ambassador gave the French Ambassador and myself this
afternoon at the French Embassy, where I happened to be, an account of his

interview with the Minister for- Foreign Affairs, which he said was. quite
friendly. The Minister for Foreign Affairs had told him that as Russia had
mobilised, Austria must, of course, do the same. This, however, should not
be regarded as a threat, but merely as the adoption of military precautions
similar to those which had been taken across the frontier. He said he had
no objection to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian
Ambassador at St. Petersburgh continuing their conversations, although he
did not say that they could be resumed on the basis ot the Servian reply.

On the whole, the Russian Ambassador is not dissatisfied. He had begun to
make his preparations for his departure on the strength of a rumour that
Austria would declare war in reply to mobilisation. He now hopes that some-
thing may yet be done to prevent war with Austria.

No. 97.
JSir G. Buchanan^ British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward
Grey. — {Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 30, 1914.

FRENCH Ambassador and I visited Minister for Foreign Affairs this
morning. His ^Excellency said that German Ambassador had told him yesterday
afternoon that German Government were willing to guarantee that Servian
integrity would be respected by Austria. To this he had replied that this
might be so, but nevertheless Servia would become, an Austrian vassal, just as,
in similar circumstances, Bokhara had become a Russian vassal. There would
be a revolution in Russia if she were to tolerate such a state of affairs.

M. Sazonof* told us that absolute proof was in possession of Russian
Government that Germany was making military and naval preparations against
Russia — more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland.

German Ambassador had a second interview with Minister for Foreign
Affairs at 2 a.m., when former completely broke down on seeing that war was
inevitable. He appealed to M. Sazonof* to make some suggestion which he
could telegraph to German Government as a last hope. M. Sazonof* accord-
ingly drew up and handed to German Ambassador a formula in French, of
ivhich following is translation ; —

"If Austria, recognising that her conflict with Servia has assumed character
of question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her-
ultimatum points which violate principle of sovereignty of Servia, Russia
engages to stop all military preparations."

Preparations for general mobilisation will be proceeded with if this proposal
is rejected by Austria, and inevitable result will be a European war. Excite-
ment here has reached such a pitch that, if Austria refuses to make a concession,
Russia cannot hold back, and now that she knows that Germany is arming, she
can hardly postpone, for strategical reasoiis, converting partial into general
mobilisation.

• Russian Minister for For^eign Affairs.

No. 98.

Sir E. GoscheUf British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. —

[Received July 30.)

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 30, 'l914.

SECRETARY. of State informs me that immediately on receipt of Prince
Lichnowsky's* telegram recording his last conversation with you ho asked
Austro-Hungarian Government whether they would be willing to accept media-
tion on basis of occupation by Austiian troops of Belgrade or some other point
and issue their conditions from here. He has up till now received no reply, but
he fears Rlissian mobilisation against Austria will have increased difficulties, as
AustriarHungary, who has as yet only mobilised against Servia, will probably
find it necessary also against Russia. Secretary of State says if you can succeed
in getting Russia to agree to above basis for an arrangement and in persuading
her in the meantime to take no steps which might be regarded as an act of

* Gorman Ambassador in London.

aggression against Austria he still sees some chance that European peace may
be preserved.

He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's position in view
of Russian mobilisation and military measures which he hears are being taken
in France. Beyond recall of officers on leave — a measure which had been
officially taken after, and not before, visit of French ambassador yesterday-
Imperial Government had done nothing special in way of military preparations-
Something, however, would have soon to be done, for it might be too late, and
when they mobilised they would have to mobilise on three sides. He regretted
this, as he knew France did not desire war, but it would be a military necessity.

His Excellency added that telegram* received from Prince Lichnowskyt
last night contains matter which he had heard with regret, but not exactly
with surprise, and at all events he thoroughly appreciated frankness and loyalty
with which you had spoken.

He also told me that this telegram had only reached Berlin very late last
night; had it been received earher Chancellor would, of course, not have
spoken to me in the way he had done.

* See No. 102. t German Ambassador in London.

No. 99.

Sir F. Bertie y British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edioard Grey. —
{Rec'dved July 30.)
(Telegraphic.) Faris, July 30, 1914.

PRESIDENT of the Republic tells me that the Russian Government have
been informed by the German Government that unless Russia stops her
mobilisation Germany would mobilise. But a further report, since received
from St. Petersburgh, states that the German communication had been modi-
fied, and was now a request to be informed on what conditions Russia would
consent to demobilisation. The answer given is that she agrees to do so on
condition that Austria-Hungary gives an assurance that she will respect the
sovereignty of Servia and submit certain of the demands of the Austrian note,
which Servia has not accepted, to an international discussion.

President thinks that these conditions will not be accepted by Austria.
He is convinced that peace between the Powers is in the hands of Great
Britain. If His Majesty's Government announced that England would come to
the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany as a
result of the present differences between Austria and Servia, there would be
no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude.

I explained to him how difficult it would bo for His Majesty's Government
to make such an announcement, but he said that he must maintain that it would
be in the interests of peace. France, he said, is pacific. She does not desire
war, and all that she has done at present is to make preparations for mobHisa-
tion so as not to be taken unawares. The French Government will keep His
Majesty's Government informed of everything that may be done in that way.
They have reliable information that the German troops are concentrated round
Thionville and Metz ready for war. If there were a general war on the Con-
tinent it would inevitably draw England into it for the protection of her vital
interests. A declaration now of her intention to support France, whose desire
it is that peace should be maintained, would almost certainly prevent Germany
from going to war.

No. 100.

Sir R. lioddj British Ambassador at Roine^ to Sir Edward Grey. —
(Received Jidy 30.)
(Telegraphic.) Rome, July 30, 1914.

GERMAN Ambassador told me last night that he thought Germany would
be able to prevent Austria from making any exorbitant demands if Servia
could be induced to submit, and to ask for peace early, say, as soon as the
occupation of Belgrade had been accomplished.

I made to his Excellency the personal suggestion that some formula might
be devised by Germany which might be acceptable for an exchange of views.

I see, however, that you have already made this suggestion.

No. 101.
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen^ British Ambassador at Berlin.
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

YOUR telegram of 29th July.*

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's
proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.

What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies
are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French
territory as distinct from the colonies.

From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France,
without further' territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed
as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German
policy.

Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this
bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the
good name of this country would never recover.

The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation
or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not
entertain that bargain either.

Having said so much it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect of
a future general neutrality agreement between England and Germany offered
positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands now. We
must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require
in any such unfavourable and regrettable development of the present crisis as
the Chancellor contemplates.

You should speak to tlie Chancellor in the above sense, and add most
earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations between England
and Germany is tliat they should continue to work together to preserve the
peace of Europe ; if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of Germany
and England will, I believe, be ipso facto improved and strengthened. For that
object His Majesty's Government will work in that way with all sincerity and
good-will.

And I will say this : If the pence of Europe can be preserved, and the present
crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement
to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no
aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by
France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and
worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany
havihg a corresponding object, 6ur relations sensibly improved. The idea has
hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this
present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through
for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction
wiiich will follow may malvo possible some more definite rapprochement between
the Powers than has boon possible hitherto.

■' Soc No. 85.

No. 102.
Sir Echvard Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British A^nbassador at Berlin.

(Telcgiapliic.) Fo.eign Office, July 30, 1914.

I HAVE warned Piince Liclniowsky* that Germany must not count upon
our standing aside in all circumstances. This is doubtless the substance of the
telegram from Prince Liclmov.sky^ to German Chancellor, to which reference
is made in th.e last Uvo paragraphs of your telegram of 30th July.f
* German Ambiissador in London. f See No. 98.

x\o. 103.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G, Bach^nan-, British Ambassador at St. Petersburyh.

(Telegraphic.) ^ Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

GERMAN Ambassador informs me that German Government would
endeavour to influence Austria, after taking Belgrade and Servian territory in
region of frontier, to promise not to advance further, while Powers endeavoured

•I

to arrange that Servia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria.
Territory occupied would of course be evacuated when Austria was satisfied.
I suggested this yesterday as a possible relief to the situation, and, if it can
be obtained, I would earnestly hope that it might be agreed to suspend further :
military preparations on all sides.

Russian Ambassador has told me of condition laid down by M. Sazonof,*
as quoted in your telegram of the 30th Jul^,t and fears it cannot be modified ;
but if Austrian advance were stopped after occupation of Belgrade, I think
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' formula might be changed to read that
the Powers would examine how Servia could fully satisfy Austria without
impairing Servian soviereign rights or independence.

If Austria, having occupied Belgrade and neighbouring Servian territory,
declares herself ready, in the interest of European peace, to cease her advance
and to discuss how a complete settlement can be arrived at, I hope that Russia
would also consent to discussion and suspension of further military prepara
tions, provided that other Powers did the same.

It is a slender chance of preserving peace, but the only one I can suggest
if Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs can come to no agreement at Berlin.
You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

* Russian Minister for Foreigii Affairs. + See No. 97.

No. 104.
Sir Edward Grey to Sir F, Bertie j British Ambassador at Paris.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

YOU should inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my telegram to Sir
G. Buchanan* of to-day,t and say that I know that he has been urging Russia
not to precipitate a crisis. I hope he may be able to support this last sugges-
tion at St. Petersburgh.

* British Ambassador at St. Peteirsburgih. t See No. 103.

No. 105.
Sir Edvmrd Grey to Sir F, Bertie^ British Ambassador at Paris,

Sir, Foreign Office^ July 30, 1914.

M. CAMBON* reminded me to-day of the letter I had written to him
two years ago, in which we agreed that, if the peace of Europe was seriously
threatened, we would discuss what we were prepared to do. I enclose for
convenience of reference copies of the letter in question and of M. Cambon's
reply. He said that the peace of Europe was never more seriously threatened
than it was now. He did not wish to ask me to say directly that w'e would
intervene, but he would like me to say what we should do if certain circum-
stances arose. The particular hypothesis he had in mind was an aggression
by Germany on France. He gave me a paper, of which a copy is also enclosed,
showing that the German military preparations were more advanced and more
on the offensive upon the frontier than anything France had yet done. He
anticipated that the aggression would take the form of either a demand tha^
France should cease her preparations, or a demand that she should engage
to remain neutral if there was war between Germany and Russia. Neither
of these things could France admit,

I said that the Cabinet was to meet to-morrow morning, and I would seo
him again to-morrow afternoon.

I am, &c..

E. GREY.
• French Ambassador in London.

Enclosure 1 in No. 105.
Sir Edioard Grey to M. CamboUy French Ambassador in London*
My dear Ambassador, Foreign Office, November 22, 1912.

FROM time to time in recent years the French and British naval and
military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood

that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to
decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force.
We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to
be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in
a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for
instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment
is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave
reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become
essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed
assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an xinpro-
voked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general
peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Govern-
ments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and,
if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these
measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once bo
taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect
should be given to them.

Yours, &c.,

E. GREY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 105.

M, Camhon, French Ambassador

L* Ambassade dc France,
Londres,
ce 23 novcmbre, 1912.
Cher Sir Edward,

PAR votre lettre en date d'hier, 22
novembre, vous m'avez rappele que,
dans ces dernieres annees, les autorites
militaires et navales de la France et de
la Grande-Bretagne s'etaient consul-
tees de temps en temps ; qu'il avait tou-
jours ete entendu quo ces consulta-
tions ne restreignaient pas la liberte,
pour chaque Gouvernement, de decider
dans I'avenir s'ils se preteraient I'un
I'autre le concours de leurs forces
arrnees ; -.que, de part et d'autre,
ces consultations entre specialistes
n'etaient et ne devaient pas etre con-
sid^rees comme des engagements obli-
geant nos Gouvernements a agir dans
certains cas; que cependant je vous
avais fait observer que, si I'un ou
I'autre des deux Gouvernements avait
dc graves raisons d'apprehender une
attaque non provoquec de la part d'une
tierce Puissance, il deviendrait essen-
tiel de savoir s'il pourrait compter sur
I'assistance armee de I'autre.

Votre lettre repond a cette observa-
tion, et je suis autorise a vous declarer
que, dans le cas ou I'un de nos deux
Gouvernements aurait un motif grave
d'apprehender soit I'agression d'une
tierce puissance, soit quelque evene-
ment mena9ant pour la paix generale,
ce Gouvernement examinerait immedia-
temcnt avec I'autre si les deux Gou-
vernements doivent agir de concert en
vue de prevenir I'agression ou de
sauvegarder la paix. Dans ce cas, les

in London f to Sir Edioard Grey.
(Translation.)
French Fmbassy, London ^
November 23, 1912.
Dear Sir Edward,

YOU reminded me in your letter of
yesterday, 22nd November, that during
the last few years the military and
naval authorities of France and Great
Britain had consulted with each other
from time to time ; that it had always
been understood that these consulta-
tions should not restrict the liberty of
either Government to decide in the
future whether they should lend each
other the support of their armed
forces ; that, on either side, these con-
sultations between experts were not
and should not be considered as
engagements binding our Governments
to take action in certain eventuali-
ties ; that, however, I had remarked
to you that, if one or other of the two
Governments had grave reasons to fear
an unprovoked attack on the part of a
third Power, it would become essential
to know whether it could count on the
armed support of the other.

Your letter answers that point, and
I am authorised to state that, in the
event of one of our two Governments
having grave reasons to fear either an
act of aggression from a third Power,
or some event threatening the general
peace, that Government would imme-
diately examine with the other the
question whether both Governments
should act together in order to prevent
the act of aggression or preserve peace.
If so, the two Governments would de-

5'3

deux Goiivcrnements delibereraient siir
les mcsures^qirils seraient disposes a
prendre en commun; si ces mesures
comportaient ime action, les deux Gou-
vernements prendraient aussitot en
consideration les plans de leiirs etats
majors et decideraient alors de la suite
<iui devrait etre donnee a ces plans
Votre sincerement devone,

PAUL CAMBON.

liberate as to the measures -which they
would be prepared to take in common^
if those measures involved .action, the
two Governments woidd take into im-
mediate consideration the plans of
their general staffs and would then de-
cide as to the effect to be given to
those plans.

Yours, &c.,

PAUL CAMBON.

Enclosure 3 in No. 105.
French Minister for Foreign Affairs to M. CamVon, French Amhcissador

in London.

L'AEMliE allemande a Bes avant-
postes sur nos bornes-f rontieres, hier ;
par deux fois des patrouilles alle-
mandes ont penetre sur notro terri-
toire. Nos avant-postes sont en re-
traite a 10 kilom. en arriere de la fron-
tiere. Les populations ainsi abandon-
nees a I'attaque de I'armee adverse
protestent ; mais le Gouvernement tient
a montrer a 1' opinion publique et au
Gouvernement britannique que I'agres-
seur no sera en aucun cas la France.
Tout le 16® Corps de.Metz renforce par
une partie du 8« venu do Treves et de
Cologne occupe la f rontiere de Metz au
Luxembourg. Le 15® Corps d'Armee
de Strasbourg a serre sur la frontiere.
Sous menace d'etre fusilles les Al-
saciens-Lorrains des pays annexes- ne
peuvent pas passer la frontiere; des
reservistes par dizaines de milliers
sont rappeles en Allemagne; c'est le
dernier stade avant la mobilisation:
or, nous n'avons rappele aucun reser-
viste:

Comme vous le voyez, TAllemagne
I'a fait. J'ajoute que toutes nos in-
formations concordent pour montrer
que les preparatifs allemands ont coni-
mfence samedi,* le jour meme de la
remise de la note autrichienne.

Ces elements, ajoutes a ceux contenus
dans mon telegramme d'hier, vous per-
mettent de faire la preuve au Gou-
vernement britannique de la volonte
pacifique de I'un et des intentions
agressives de I'autre.

(Translation.)

THE German Army had its advance-
posts on our frontiers yesterday ;
German patrols twice penetrated on
to our territory. Our advance-posts
are withdrawn to a distance of 10
kilom. from the frontier. The local
population is protesting against being
thus abandoned to the attack of the
enemy's army, but the Government
wishes to make it clear to public
opinion and to the British Government
that in no case will France be the
aggressor. The whole 16th corps from
Metz, reinforced by a part of the 8th
from Treves apd Cologne, is occupying
the frontier at Metz on the Luxemburg
side. The 15th , army corps from
Strassburg has closed up on the frontier.
The inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine are
prevented by the threat of being shot
from crossing the frontier. Reservists
have been called back to Germany by
tens of thousands. This is the last stage
before mobilisation, whereas we have
not called back a single reservist.

As you see, Germany has done so.
I would add that all my information
goes to show that the German prepara-
tions began on Saturday,* the very
day on which the Austrian note was
handed in.

These facts, added to j>hose contained
in my telegram of yesterday, will
enable you to prove to the British
Government the pacific intentions of
the one party and the aggressive in-
tentions of the other.

* Sic: in original. The actual date of th^ preseoitafcibn of the Austrian ultimatum
wad, in fact, Thursday, July 23. The Servian reply was da^ed Saturday, July 25, and
^it is clearly to the latter dooumeoit that refereaioe is intended.

No. 106.
Sir E. Roddy British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey, —
{Received. July 31.)
(Telegraphic.) Borne, July 30, 1914.

I LEARNT from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who sent for me this
evening, that the Austrian Government had declined to continue the direct

exchange of views with the Kussian Government. But he had reason to be-
lieve that Germany was now disposed to, give more conciliatory advice to
Austria, as she seemed convinced that we should act with France and Russia,
and was most anxious to avoid issue with us.

He said he was telegraphing to the Italian Ambassador at Berlin to ask
the German Government to suggest that the idea of an exchange of views
between the four Powers should be resumed in any form which Austria would
consider acceptable. It seemed to him that Germany might invite Austria
to state exactly the terms which she would demiind from Servia, and give a
guarantee that she would neither deprive her of independence nor annex
territory. It would be useless to ask for anything less than was contained
in the Austrian ultimatum, and Germany would support no proposal that
might imply non-success for Austria. We might, on the other hand, ascertain
from Russia what she would accept, and, once we knew the standpoints of
these two countries, discussions could be commenced at once. There was still
time so long as Austria had received no check. He in any case was in favour
of continuing an exchange of views with His Majesty's Government if the idea
of discussions between the four Powers was impossible.

No. 107.

Sir E, Goschen^ British Ambassador at Berlin^ to Sir Edward Grey.
(Received Judy 31.)

(Telegraphic.) Berlin^ July 30, 1914.

I DO not know whether you have received a reply from the German Govern-
ment to the communication* which you made to them through the German
Ambassador in London asking whether they could suggest any method by which
the four Powers could use their mediating influence between Russia, and
Austria.' I was informed last night that they had not had time to send an answer
yet. To-day, in reply to an enquiry from the French Ambassador as tc
whether the Imperial Government had proposed any course of action, the
Secretary of State said that he had felt that time would be saved by com-
municating with Vienna direct, and that he had asked the Austro-Hungarian
Government what would satisfy them. No answer had, however, yet been
returned.

The Chancellor told me last night that he was "pressing the button "
as hard as he could, and that he was not sure whether he had not gone
so far in urging moderation at Vienna that matters had been precipitated
rather than otherwise.

* See No. 84.

No. 108.

Sir E, Goschen^ British Ambassador at Berlin^ to Sir Edtcard Grey. —
(Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 31, 1914.

CHANCELLOR informs me that his efforts to preach peace and modera-
tion at Vienna have been seriously handicapped by the Russian mobilisation
against Austria. He has done everything possible to attain his object at
Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was altogether palatable at the Ball-
platz. He could not, however, leave his country defenceless while time was
being utilised by other Powers ; and if, as he learns is- the case, military
measures are now being taken by Russia against Germany also, it would
be ipipossible for him to remain quiet. He wished to tell me that it was quite
possible that in a very short time, to-day perhaps, the German Government
would take some very serious step; he was, in fact, just on the point of going
to have an audience with the Emperor.

His Excejlency added that the news of the active preparations on the Russor
German frontier had reached him just when the Czar had appealed to the
lEmpefor, in the name of their old friendship, to mediate at Vienna, and when
the Emperor was actually conforming to £hat request.

No. 109.
Sir E. GoscJieriy British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. —
(^Received July 31.)

(Telegraphic.) BerlinyJuXy ^l, 191^.

I READ to the Chancellor this morning your answer to Iiis appeal .for
British neutrality in the event of war, as contained in your telegram of
yesterday ."* His Excellency was so taken up with the news of the Russian
measures along the frontier, referred to in my immediately preceding telegram,
that he received your communication without comment. He asked me to let,
him have the message that I had just read to him as a memorandum, as he
would like to reflect upon it before giving an a,nswer, and his mind; was so full
of grave matters that he could not be certain of remembering all its points. I
therefore handed to him the text of your message on the understanding that
it should be regarded merely as a record of conversation, and not as an official
document.

His Excellency agreed.

* See No. 101.

No. 110,
Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador' at St. Petersburgh,

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

I LEARN from the German Ambassador that, as a result of suggestions by
the German Government, a conversation has taken place at Vienna between
the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Russian Ambassador. The
Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh has also been instructed that he
may converse with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that he should
give explanations about the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and discuss sug-
gestions and any questions directly affecting A ustro- Russian relations. If the
Russian Government object to the Anstrians mobilising eight army corps,
it might be pointed out that this is not too great a number against 400,000
Servians.

The German Ambassador asked me to urge the Russian Government to
show goodwill in the discussions and to suspend their military preparations.

It is with great satisfaction that I have learnt that discussions are being
resumed between Austria and Russia, and you should express this to the
Minister for Foreign Affairs and tell him that I earnestly hope he will encourage
them.

I informed the German Ambassador that, as regards military preparations, I
did not see how Russia could be urged to suspend them unless some limit were
put by Austria to the advance of her troops into Servia.

No. 111.
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E, Goschen, British Arabassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

1 liOPE that the convei-sations which are now proceeding between Austria
and Russia may lead to a satisfactory result. The stumbling-block hitherto
has been Austrian mistrust of Servian assurances, and Russian mistrust of
Austrian intentions with regard to the independence and integrity of Servia.
It has occurred to me that, in the event of this mistrust preventing a solution
being found by Vieiana and St. Petersburgh, Germany might sound Vienna,
and I would undertake to sound St. Petersburgh, whether it i\'ould be poss'ble
for the four disinterested Powers to offer to Austria that they would under-
take to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Servia, provided
that they did not impair Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian
territory. As your Excellency is aware, Austria has already declared her
willingness to respect them. Russia might be informed by the four Powers
that they would undertake to prevent Austrian demands going the length of
impairing- Servian sovereignty and integrity. All Powers would of course
iuispond further military operations or preparations.

You may sound the Secretary of State about this proposal.

I said to German Ambassador this morning that if Germany could get any
'reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria
were striving to preserve European p^ace, and that Russia and France would
be unreasonable, if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburgh and-
Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept
it His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the conse-
quences ;• but, otherwise, I told German Ambassador that if Fra"fice became
involved we should be drawn in.

You can add this when sounding Chancellor or Secretary of State as to
proposal above.

No. 112.

Sii' E, GoscheUj British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Eduo'xrd Grey. —
[Received July 31.)
(Telegraphic.) Bciiih, July 31,-1914.

ACCORDING to information just received by German Government from
their Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, whole. Russian army and fleet are being
mobilised. Chancellor tells me that " Kriegsgefahr "* will bo proclaimed at once
by German Government, as it <;an only be against Germany that Russian
general mobilisation is directed. Mobilisation would follow almost immediately.
His Excellency'added in explanation, that " Kriegsgefahr "* signified the taking
of certain precautionary measures consequent upon strained relations Avith a
foreign country.

This news from St. Petersburgh, added his Excellency, seemed to him to
put an end to all hope of a peaceful solution of the crisis. Germany must
Certainly prepare for all emergencies

I asked him whether he could not still put pressure on the authorities at
Vienna to do something in general interests to reassure Russia and to show
themselves disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis. He replied
that last night he had begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, and that
he had received a reply to the effect that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs
would take wishes of the Emperor this morning in the matter.

* "Imminence of War."

No. 113.

ISir G. Buchanan^ British Ambassador at St. Petersburyhf to Sir Eduxird
Grey. — [Received July 31.)

<;Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July ai, 1914.

IT has been decided to issue orders for general mobilisation.

This decision was taken in consequence of report received from Russian
Ambassador in Vienna to the effect that Austria is determined not to yield to
intervention of Powers, and that she. is r.ioving troops against Russia as well
as n gainst Servia.

Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active military
preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start.

No. 114.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at PariSf anX
Sir E. Goschev^ British Ambassador at Berlin,

(Telegraphic.; Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

I STILL trust that situation is not irretrievable, but in view of prospect of
mobilisation in- Germany it becomes essential to His Majesty's Government,
in view of existing treaties, to ask whether French (German) Government aro
prepared to engage to respect neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power
violates it.

A similar request is being addressed to German (French) Government. It
is important to have an early answer.

No. 115.
Sir Edward Grei/ to Sir F, Villisrs, British Minister at Brussels.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914,

IN view of existing treaties, you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs

that, in consideration of the possibility of a European war, I have asked French

and German Governments whether each is prepared to respect the neutrality of

Belgium provided it is violated by no other Power.

You should say that I assume that the Belgian Government will maintain

to the utmost of their power their neutrality, which I desire and expect other

Powers to uphold and observe^

You should inform the Belgian Government that an early reply is desired.

No. 116.
Sir Edward Grfiy to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

I HAVE received your telegram of yesterday's date.*

Nobody here feels that in this dispute,' so far as it has yet gone, British
treaties or obligations are involved. Feeling is quite different from what it
was during the Morocco question. That crisis involved a dispute directjy
involving France, whereas in this case France is being drawn into a dispute
which is not hers.

I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a decisive factor
in situation. German Government do not expect our neutrality.

We cannot undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a war. I have so
told the French Ambassador, who has urged His Majesty's Government to
reconsider this decision.

I have told him that we should not be justified in giving any pledge at the
present moment, but that we will certainly consider the situation again directly
there is a new development.

* See No. 99.

No. 117.

Sir F!' Bertie, British Ambassador ut Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. —
(Peceived Jvly 31.)

(Telegraphic.) . Paris, July 31, 1914.

AT 7 o'clock this evening I wa£< sent for by Minister for Foreign Affairs.
When I arrived the German Ambaj-sador was leaving his Excellency.

German Ambassador had informed his Excellency that, in view of the fact
that orders had been given for the total mobilisation of Russian army and fleet,
German Government have in an ultimatum which they have addressed to the
Russian Government required that Russian forces should be demobilised.

The German Government will consider it necessary to order the total
mobilisation of the German army on the Russian and French frontiers if within
twelve hours the Russian Government do not give an undertaking to comply
with German demand.

Thb Minister for Foreign Affairs asks me to communicate this to you, and
enquires what, in these circumstances, will be the attitude of England.

German Ambassador could not say when the twelve hours terminates. He is
going to call at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to-morrow (Saturday) at 1 p.m.
in order to receive the French Government's answer as to the attitude they will
adopt in the cir cum. stances.

He intimated the possibility of his requiring his passports.

I am inforiiied by the Russian Ambassador that he is not aware of any
general mobilisation of the Russian forces having taken place.

,63

No. 118.

Sir M. de Buneen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. —

{Received July Z\.)

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 31, 19X4.

I AM informed by Count Forgach, Under-Secretary of State, that although
Austria was compelled to respond to Russian mobilisation, which he deplored,
the Austrian Ambassador in London has received instructions to inform you
that mobilisation was not to bo regarded as a necessarily hostile act on either
side. Telegrams were being exchanged between the Emperpr of Russia and
the German^ Emperor, and conversations were proceeding between Austrian
Ambassador a,t St. Petersburgh and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. A
general war might, he seriously hoped, be staved off by these efforts. On my
expressing my feaf that Germany would mobilise, he said that Germany must
do something, in his opinion, to secure her position. As regards Russian
intervention on behalf of Servia, Austria-Hungary found 't difficult to recognise
such a claim. I caviled his attention to the fact that during the discussion of
the Albanian frontier at the London Conference of Ambassadors the Russian
Government had stood behind Servia, and that a compromise between the viiews
of Russia and Austria- Hungary resulted with accepted frontier line. Although
iie spoke in a conciliatory tone, and did not regard the situation as de^sperate,.
I could not get from him any suggv-stion for a similar compromise in the
present casd. Count Forgach is going this afternoon to see the Russian
Ambassador, whom T have informed of the above conversation.

The Russian Ambassador has explained that Russia has no desire to interfere
unduly with Servia ; that, as compared with the late Russian Minister, the
present Minister at Belgrade is a man of very moderate^ views ; and that, as
regards Austrian demands, Russia had counselled Servia to yield to. them as
far as she possibly could without sacrificing her independence. His Excellency
is exerting himself strongly in the interests of peace.

No. 119.
Sir Edward Qrey to Sir F, Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris*

Sir, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914.

M. CAMBON* referred to-day to a telegram that had been shown to Su
Arthur Nicolsonf this morning from the French Ambassador in Berlin, saying
that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether we would intervene which
was the encouraging element in Berlin, and that, if we would only declare
definitely on the side of Russia and France, it would decide the German attitude
in favour of peace.

I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany under
the impression that we would not intervene. I had refused overtures to promisd
that we should remain neutral. I had not only definitely declined to say that
we would remain neutral, I had even gone so far this morning as to say bo the
German Ambassador that, if France and Germany beoarae involved in war. we
should be drawn into it. That, of course, wyis not th« same thing a« taking
an engagement to France, and I told M. Cambon of n only to show that we
had not left Germany under the impression that we would stand aside.

M. Camboil then asked me for my reply to what he had said ypsterday.

I said that we had come to the conclusion, in the Cabinet to-day, that we
could not give any pledge at the present time. Though wp should have to put
our policy before Parliament, we could not pledge Parliament in advance. Up
to the present moment, we did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that
any treati'es or obligations of this country were involved. Further develop-
ments might alter this situation and cause the Government and Parliament to
take, the view that mtervention was justified. The preservation of the neutrality
of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important factor, in
determining our attitude. Whether we proposed to Parliament to intervene
or not to intervene in a war, Parliament would wish to know how we stood
with regard to the neutrality of Belgium; and it might be that I should ask

* French Ambassador in London.

t British Under Secretary of State fox Foreign Affairs.

both France and Germany whether each was prepared to undertake an engage-
ment that she would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium.

M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help Trance if Germany
made an attack on her.

I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone
at present, we could not take any engagement.

M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning rejected proposals
that might have niiide for peace. It could not be to England's interest thiat
France should be crushed by Germany. We should then be in a very diminished
position with regard to Germany. In 1870 wc had made a great mistake in
allowing an enormous increase of German strength, and we should now be
repeating the mistake. He asked me whether I could not submit his question
to the Cabinet again.

I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as there was
some new development, but at the present moment the only -answer I could
give was that wo could not undertake any definite engagement.

I am, (Src,

E. GREY.

No. 120.

Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador' at St. Peter sburgh, to Sir Edivard
Grey. — {Rtctived A^cgnst 1.)

(Telegraphic.) 6'f. Petcrsburgh, July 31, 1Q14.

MINISTER for Foreign AiTairs sent for mo and French Ambassador and
asked us to telegraph to our respective Governments subjoined formula as best
calculated to amalgamate proposal made by you in your telegram of 30th July*
with formula recorded in my telegram of 30th July.t He trusted it would
meet with your approval : —

" Si TAutricho consentira a arreter marche des sea troupes sur le territoire
serbe, si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a assume le caractere d'une
question d'interet europeen, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent
la satisfaction que la Serbic pourrait accorder au Gouvernement d'Autriche-
Hongric sans laisser porter atteinte a ses droits d'£tat souverain et a son
indepoudance, la Russie s'engage a conserver son attitude expectante."t

His Excellency then alluded to the telegram sent to German Emperor
by Emperor of Russia in reply to the former's telegram. He said that Emperor
Nicholas had begun by thanking Emperor William for his telegram and for
the hopes of peaceful solution which it held out. His Majesty had then
proceeded to assure Emperor William that no intention whatever of an aggres-
sive character was concealed behind Russian military preparations. So long
as conversation with Austria continued, His Imperial Majesty undertook that
not a single man should be moved across the frontier ; ii was, however, of course
impossible, for reasons cxi>lained, to stop a mobilisation which was already
in progress.

M. Sazonof§ said that undoubtedly there would bo better prospect of a
peaceful solution if the suggested conversation were to take i>lace in London,
where the atmosphere was far more favourable, and he therefore hoped that
you Avould see your way to agreeing to this.

His Excellency ended by expressing his deep gratitude to His Majesty's
Government, who had done so much to save the situation. It would be largely
due to them if war were prevented. The Emperor, the Russian Government,
and the Russian people would never forget the firm attitude adopted by
Great Britain.

* Sec No. 103. ' f See No. 97

t Tkanslation.— "If Austria will agree to check the advance, of her troops on
Servian territory; if, recognising thafe the dispute between Austria and Servia has
assumed a character of European interest, she will allow the Great Powers to look
into the matter and determine whs-ther Servia could satisfy the Aastro-Hungariaa
Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign State or hor indepondenco,
Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude."

§ Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 121.
Sir E. Goscherif British Ambassador at .Berlin^ to Sir Edioard Grey, —
{Received, Avz/iosi 1.)
(TeJegraphic.) Berliriy July 31, 1914.

'YOUR telegram of 31st July.*

I spent an hour witn Secretary of State .urging liim most earnestly to
accept your proposal and make another effort to prevent terrible catastropho
of a European war.

Ho expressed himself very sympathetically towards your , proposal, and
appreciated your continued efforts to maintain peace, but said it was impos-
sible for the Imperial Government to consider any proposal until they had
received an answer from Russia to their communication of to-day; this com-
munication, which he admitted had the form of an ultimatum, being that,
unless Russia could inform the Imperial Government within twelve hours that
she would immediat^jly countermand her mobilisation against Germany and
Austria, Germany would be obliged on her side to mobilise at once.

I asked his Excellency why they had made their demand even more difficult
for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilise m south as well. , He
replied that it was in order to prevent Russia from saying all her mobilisation
was only directed against Austria. ^

His Excellency said that if the answer from Russia was satisfactory he
thought personally that your proposal merited favourable consideration', and
in any case he would lay it before the Emperor and Chancellor, but he
repeated that it was no use discussing it until the Russian Government had
sent in their answer to the German demand.

He again assured me that both the Emperor William, at the request of the
Emperor of Russia, ana the German Foreign Office had even up till last night
been urging Austria to show willingness to continue discussions — and tele-
graphic and telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a promising
nature — but Russia's niobilisation had spoilt everything.

♦ Sco No. 111.

No. 122.

Sir E. Gosckeriy British Aviihassador at Berlin^ to Sir Edward Grey, —
{Received August 1.)
<Telegraphic.) Bprliuy July 31, 1914.

-NEUTRALITY of Belgium, referred to in your telegram of 31st July to
Sir F. Bertie.*

I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that ho must consult the
Bmperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer, J gathered from,
what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose
a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event oi war ensuing,
and ho Was thereforo very doubtful whether they would return any answer
at all. His Excellency, nevertheless, took note of your request.

It appears from what he said that German Government consider that
certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance
of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed
under an embargo already.

I hope to see his Excellency to-morrow again to discuss the matter further,
but the prospect of obtaining a definite answer seems to me remote.

In speaking to. md to-day the Chancellor made it clear that Germany
would in any case desire to know the reply returned to you by tho Frjench
Government.

* See No. 114.

No. 123.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

Sir, Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.

I' TOLD the German Ambassador to-day that tho reply* of tho German
Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very

* See No. 122.

great regret, because the neutrality. of Belgium affected feeling in this country.
If Germany could ^oe her way to give the same assurance as that which had
been given by Franco it would matoi:ially contribute to relievo anxiety and
tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality
of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be ex-
tremely dijfficult to restrain public feeling in this country. I said that we had
been discussing this question ftt a Cabinet meeting, and as I- was-atithorised
to tell him this I gave him a memorandum of it.

lie asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgium
neutrality we would engage to remain neutral.

I replied that I could not say that ; our hands wore still free, and we were
considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude
would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality
of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think
that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alono.

The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions
on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of
France and her colonies might be guaranteed.

I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral
on similar terms, .and I could only say that we must keep our hands free.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

No. 124.

Sir F. Bertie f British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward (h'ey.. —
(Received August 1.)

^Telegraphic.) Taris, July 31, 1914.

ON the receipt at 8.30 to-night of your telegram of this afternoon,* I sent
a message to Minister for Foreign Affairs requesting to see him. Ho received
me at 10.30 to-night at the Elysee, where a Cabinet Council v.as being held.
He took a note of the enquiry as to the respecting by France of the neutrality
of Belgium which you instructed me to make.

He told me that a communication had been mad« to you by the German
Ambassador in London of the intention of .Germany to order a general mobili-
sation of her army if Russia do not demobilise at once. He is urgently anxious
as to what the attitude of England will bo in the circumstances, and begs
an ans)ver may be made by His Majesty's Government at the earliest moment
possible.

Minister for Foreign Affairs also told me that the German Embassy is
packing up.

* Se-e No. 114.

No. 125.

Sir F. BertiCf British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. —
{Received Aif-giist 1.)

(Telegraphic.) Paris, July 31, 1914.

MY immediately preceding telegram.*

Political Director has brought me the reply of the Minister for Foreign
Affairs to your enquiry respecting the neutrality of Belgium. It is as
follows : —

French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and
it would only bo in the event of some other Power violating- that neutrality
that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure defence
of her own .security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given severiil
times. President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgian.s,
and the French- Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance
to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day.

* Sco No. 124.

No. 126.

Sir F, Bertie, British Ambassador at PaHs, to Sir Edioard Greij.-^^

{Eeceivsd August 1 )

(Telegraphic.) Paris, August 1, 1914.

I HAVE had conversation with the Political Director, who states that the
German Ambassador was informed, on calling at the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs this morning, that the French Government failed to comprehend the
reason which prompted his communication of yesterday evening. It was
pointed out to his Excellency that general mobilisation in Russia had not
been ordered until after Austria had decreed a general mobilisation, and that
the Russian Government were ready to demobilise if all Powers did likewise.
It seemed strange to the French Government that in view of this and of the
fact that Russia and Austria were ready to converse, the German GoYernmeut
should have at that moment presented an ultimatum at St. Petersburgh
requiring immediate demobilisation by Russia. There were no diifererices at
issue between France and Germany, but the German Ambassador had made
a menacing communication to the French Government and had requested
an answer the next day, intimating that he would have to break off relations
and leave Paris if the reply were not satisfactory. The Ambassador was in-
formed that the French Government considered that this was an extraordinary
proceeding.

The German Ambassador, who is to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs
again this evening, said nothing about demanding his passports, but he stated
that he had packed up.

No. 127.

Sir M, de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. —
{Received Augtust 1.)

(Telegraphic.) ^ Vienna, August 1, 1914.

GENERAL mobilisation of army and fleet.

No. 128.

Sir F, Villiers, BHtish Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey, —
{Received Augicst 1 .)

(Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 1, 1914.

BELGIAN neutrality.

The instructions conveyed in your telegram of yesterday* have been acted
upon.

Belgium expects and desires that other l^ov/ers will observe and uphold
her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power.
In so informing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, in the event of
the violation of the neutrality of their territory, they believed that they were
in a position to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations between
Belgium and her neighbours were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect
their intentions; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against
emergencies.

* Seo No. 115.

No. 129.
Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received August 2.)

(Translation.)
Luxembourg, 2 aoUt, 1914, Luxemburg, Augu>8t 2, 1914,

(Telegraphique.) (Telegraphic.)

MINISTRE d'£tat du Luxembourg The Luxemburg Minister of State,

Eyschen vient de recevoir par Pinter- JEyshen, has just received through the
mediaire du Ministre d'Allemagne a German Minister in Luxemburg, M. de
Luxembourg, M. de Buch, un tele- Buch, a telegram from the Chancellor
gramme du Chancelier de I'Empire of the German Empire, Bethmann-

allemand Bethmann-Hollweg disant HoUweg, to the effect that the military

que les mesures militaires a Luxem- measures taken in Luxemburg do not

bourg ne constituent pas un acte hos- constitute a hostile act against Luxem-

tilc centre le Luxembourg, mais sont burg, but are only intended to insure

uniquement des mesures destinees a against a possible attack of a French

assurer centre attaque eventuelle d'une army* Full compensation will be paid

armee fran9aise. L' exploitation des to Luxemburg for any damage caused

voies ferrees affermees a TEmpire by using the railways which are leased

Luxembourg recevra complete indem- to the Empire,
nite pour dommages eventuels.

No. 130.
Sir Edward Gre^j to Sir E. Goschen^ British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) Foreian Office, August 1, 1914.

WE are informed that authorities at Hamburg have forcibly detained
steamers belonging to the Great Central Company and other British merchant-
ships.

I cannot ascertain on what grounds the detention of British ships has been
ordered.

You should request German Government to send immediate orders that
they should be allowed to proceed without delay. The effect on public opinion
here will be deplorable unless this is done. His Majesty's Government, on
their side, are most anxious to avoid any incident of an aggressive nature,
and the German Government will, I hope, be equally careful not to take any
step which would make the situation between us impossible.

No. 131.
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E, Goschcn, British Amh'iss:tdor at Berlin^

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1S14.

I STILL believe that it might be possible to secure peace if only a little
respite in time can be gained before anj' Great Power begins war.

The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness of Austria
to discuss with Russia and the readiness of Austria to accept a basis of media-
tion which is not open to the objections raised in regard to the formula which
Russia originally suggested.

Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready
to converse, and I hope that German Government may be able to make use
of the Russian communications referred to above, in order to avoid tension.
His Majesty's Government arc carefully abstaining from any act which may
precipitate matters.

No. 132.
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Gosc/ccUy British Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) Fore'gn Office, Auguat 1, 1014.

FOLLOWING telegram from M. Sazonof* to Count Benckendorfft of the
Slst July communicated to me to-day : — '
(Urgent.)

" Formule amendee conf ormemcnt a la proposition anglaise : "* Si Autriche
consent a arretcr la marclie de ses troupes sur le territoire serbc et si, recon-
naissant que le conflit austro serbe a assume le caractere d'une question d'interet
puropeen, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que
la Serbie pourrait accorder au Gouvernement austro-hongrois sans laisser ported

* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
+ Russian Ambassador in London.

atteinte a ses droits d'etat souverain et a son independance, la Russie s* engage
a conserve!' son attitude expectante.' "*
(Above communicated to all>the Powers.)

* Tkaxslation.— "Formula amended in accordance with the English proposal: * If
Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Servian territory, and if, recognising
that the Austro-Servian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European
interest, she admits that the Great Poanxvs may examine the satisfaction which Servia
can accord to the Austxo-Hungarian Government without injury to her sovereign rights
as a State and to her independence, Russia undertakes to preserve her waiting attitude.' "

No. 133.
fSh" Edward Grey to Sir E. Goscheriy BHtish Ambassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.

M. DE ETTER* came to-day to communicate the contents of a telegram
from M. Sazonof ,t dated the 31st July, which are as follows : —

"The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared the readiness of his Govern-
ment to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatiim to Servia. M. Sazonof
replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the dis-
cussions should take place in London with the participation of the Great
Powers.

"M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume the direction
of these discussions. The whole of Europe would be thankful to them. It
would be very important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop provisionally
to 'her military action on Servian. territory."

(The above has been communicated to the six Powers.)

* Counsellor of Russian Embassy in London,
t Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 134.

JSir F, Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey, —
[Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.) Paris, August 1, 1914.

PRESIDENT of the Republic has informed me that German Government
were trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility ; that it was only after a
decree of general mobilisation had been issued in Austria that the Emperor of
Russia ordered a general mobilisation; that, although the measures which
the German Government have already taken are m effect a general mobilisa-
tion, they are not so designated; that a French general mobilisation will
become necessary in self-defence, and that France is already forty-eight hours
behind Germany as regards German military preparations ; that the French
troops have orders not to go nearer to the German frontier than a distance of
10 kilom. so as to avoid any grounds for accusations of provocation to Germany,
whereas the German troops, on the other hand, are actually on the French
frontier and have made incursions on it ; that, notwithstanding mobilisations,
tljG Emperor of Russia has expressed himself ready to continue his conversa-
tions with the German Ambassador with a view to preserving the peace ; that
French Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific, sincerely desire the
preservation of peace and do not quite despair, even now, of its being possible
to avoid war.

No. 135.
Sir Edwa/rd Grey to Sir G, Buchanan^ British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh.

CTelegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.

INFORMATION reaches me from a most reliable source that Austrian
Government have informed German Government that though the situation has
been changed by the mobilisation of Russia they would in full appreciation of
the efforts of England for the preservation of peace be ready to consider favour-
ably my proposal for mediation between Austria and Servia. The effect of

this acceptance would naturally be that the Austrian military action against
Servia would continue for the present, and that the British Government would
urge upon Russian Government to stop the mobilisation of troops directed
against Austria, in which case Austria would naturally cancel those defensive
military counter-measures in Galicia, which have been forced upon Austria by
Russian mobilisation.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and say that if, in the con-
sideration of the acceptance of mediation by Austria, Russia can agree to stop
mobilisation, it appears still to be possible to preserve peace, Presumably
the matter should be discussed with German Government, also by Russian
Government.

No. 136.
Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edioard Grey.—
(Received August i.)
(Telegraphic.) Paris, August 1, 1914.

MINISTER of AVar informed military attache this afternoon that orders
had been given at 3.40 for a general mobilisation of the French Army. This
became necessary because the Minister of War knows that, under the system
of " Kriegszustand,"* the Germans have called up six classes! Three classes
are sufficient to bring .their covering troops up to war strength, the remaining
three being the reserve. This, he says, being tantamount to mobilisation, is
mobilisation under another name.

The French forces on the frontier have opposed to them eight army co;rps
on a war footing, and an attack is expected at any moment. It is therefore
of the utmost importance to guard against this. A zone of 10 kilom. has been
left between the French troops and German frontier. The French troops will
not attack, and the Minister of War is anxious that it should be explained
that this act of mobilisation is one for purely defensive purposes.-

* ''State of war."

No. 137.
Sir Edward Grey to Sir M, de Bunsen, British Ambassador" at Vienna.

(Telegraphic.) ^ Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.

I SAW the Austro-Hungaxiah Ambassador this morning. He supplied
me with the substance of a telegram which the Austro-Hungarian Minister for
Foreign Affairs had sent to the Austrian Ambassador in Paris. In this telegram
his Excellency was given instructions to assure the French Minister for Foreign
Affairs that there was no intention in the minds of the Austro-Hungarian
Government to impair the sovereign rights of Servia or to obtain territorial
aggrandisement. The Ambassador added that he was further instructed to
inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was no truth in the
report which had been published in Paris to the effect that Austria-Hungary
intended to occupy the sanjak.

Count Mensdorff* called again later at the Foreign Office. He informed
me of a telegram sent yesterday to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at
.St. Petersburgh by Count Berchtold,t and gave me the substance.

It states that Count Berchtold begged the Russian Ambassador, whom he
sent for yesterday, to do his best to remove the wholly erroneous impression in
St. Petersburgh that the " door had been banged " by Austria-Hungary on all
.further convei-sations. The Russian Ambassador promised to do this. Count
Berchtold repeated on this occasion to the Russian Ambassador the assurance
which had already been given at St. Petersburgh, to the effect that neither
an infraction of Servian sovereign rights nor the acquisition of Servian territory
was being contemplated by Austria-Hungary.

'Special attention was called by Count Mensdorff* to the fact that this tele-
gram contains a statement to the effect that conversations at St. Petersburgh
had not been broken off by Austria-Hungary.

* AustTo-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

f Ausbro-Hungarian Mirw'sber for Foreign Affairs.

No. 138.
Sir E, GoscJieriy British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Fdvjard Grey,-r
(Received August 2.)
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 1, 1914.

YOUR telegram of to-day.*

I have communicated the substance of the above telegram to the Secretary
of State^ and spent a long time arguing with him that the chief dispute was
between Austria and Russia, and that Germany was only drawn in as Austria's
ally. If therefore Austria and Russia were, as was evident, ready to discuss
matters and Germany did not desire wgr on her own account, it seemed to me
only logical that Germany should hold her hand and continue to work for a
peaceful settlement. Secretary of State said that Austria's readiness to discuss
was the result of German influence at Vienna, and, had not Russia mobilised
against Germany, all would have been well. But Russia by abstaining from
answering Germany's demand that she should demobilise, had caused Germany
to mobilise also. Russia had said tha,t her mobilisation did not necessarily
imply war, and that she could perfectly well remain mobilised for months
without making war. This was not the case with Germany. She had the speed
and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the German Empire forbade that
Germany should allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops from all parts
of her wide dominions. The situation now was that, though the Imperial
Government had allowed her several hours beyond the specified time, Russia
had sent no answer. Germany had therefore ordered mobilisation, and the
German representative at St. Petersburgh. had been instructed within a certain
time to inform the Russian Government that the Imperial Government must
regard their refusal to an answer as creating a state of war,.

* See No. 131.

No. 139.

Sir G. Buchanan^ British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edicard
Grey. — {Received August 2.)
(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburghy August 1, 1914.

■ MY telegram of 31st July.*

The Emperor or. Russia read his telegram to the German Emperor to the
German Ambassador at the audience given to his Excellency yesterday. No
progress whatever was made.

In the evening M. Sazonoft had an interview with the'Austrian Ambassa-
dor, who, not being definitely instructed by his Government, did his best to
deflect' the conversation towards a general discussion of the relations between
Austria-Hungary and Russia instead of keeping to the question .of Seryia.
In reply the Minister for Foreign Aifairs expressed his desire that these
relations should remain friendly, and said that, taken in general, they were
perfectly satisfactory ; but the real question which they liad to solve at this
moment was whether Austria was to crush Servia and to reduce her to the
status of a vassal, or whether she was to leave Servia a free and independent
State. In the.se circumstances, while the Servian question was unsolved, the
abstract discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary arid Russia was
a waste of time. The only place where a successful discussion of this question
could be expected was London, and any such discussion was being made impos-
sible 'by the action of Au§tria-Hungary in subjecting Belgrade, a virtually
unfortified town, to bombardment.

M. Sazonoft informed the French Ambassador and myself this morning
of his. conversation with the Austrian Ambassador. He went on to say that
"during the Balkan crisis he had made it clear to the Austrian Government,
ihat war with Russia must inevitably follow an Austrian attack on Servia.
It was clear that Austrian domination of Servia was as intolerable for Russia
as the dependence of the Netherlands on Germanv would be to Great Britain.
It was, in fact, for Russia a question of life and death. The policy of Austria
had throughout been both tortuous and immoral, and she thought that she
could treat Russia with defiance, secure in the support oi her German ally.

* See No. 120.

t Russian Minister for Foreign Aflfairs.

Similarly the policy of Germany had been a:a equivocal and double-faced policy,
,and it mattered little whether the German Gbvernmcnt linew or did not
know tlie t<}rms of the Austrian ultimatum; w^hat mattered was that her
intervention with the Austrian Government had been postponed until the
moment had passed when its. influence would have been felt. Germany was
unfortunate .in her representatives in Vienna and St. Petersburgh : tho
former was a violent Russophobe who had urged Austria on, the latter had
reported to his Government that Russia would never go to war. M. Sazonof*
was completely weary of the ceaseless endeavours he had made to avoid a war.
No suggestion held out to him had been refused. He had accepted the pro-
posal for a conference of four, for mediation by Great Britain and Italy, for
direct conversation between Austria and Russia; but Germany and Austria-
Hungary had either rendered these attempts for peace ineffective by evasive
replies or had refused them altogether. The action of the Austro-Hungarian
Government and the German preparations had forced the Russian Government
to order mobilisation, and the mobilisation of Germany had created a desperate
situation.

M. Sazonof* added that the formula, of which the text is contained in my
telegram of 31st July,+ had been forwarded by the Russian Government to
Vienna, and he would adhere to it if you could obtain its acceptance before the
frontier was crossed by German troops. . In no case would Russia begin hos-
tilities first.

I now see no possibility of a general war being avoided unless the agree-
ment of France and Germany can be obtained to keep their armies mobilised
on their ov/n sides of the frontier,* as Russia has expressed her readiness to
do, pending a last attempt to reach a settlement of the present crisis.

* Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
t See No. 120.

No. 140.

Sh' F. Bertie, British Amhassaclor at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. —
{Received Aio</ust 1.)
(Telegraphic.) Paris, August 1, 1914.

THE Minister of War again sent for the military attache this evening, as
he said he wished to keep hin\ informed of the .situation. He laid great stress
on the fact that the 'zone of 10 kilom., which he had arranged between the
French troops and the German frontier, and which was still occupied by
peasants, was a proof of the French endeavours to commit no provocative act.

No. 141.

Sir M, de Bwisoif British Ambassador at Viennay to Sir Edxoard Grey.-^

(Received Augiist 2.)
(Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 1, 1914.

I AM to be received to-morrow by Minister for Foreign Affairs. This after-
noon he is to see the French and Russian Ambassadors. I have just been
informed by the Russian Ambassador of Gferman ultimatum requiring that
Russia should demobilise within twelve hours. On being asked by the Russian
Minister for Foreign Affairs whether the inevitable refusal of Russia to yield
to this curt summons meant war, the German Ambassador replied that Ger-
many would be forced to mobilise if Russia refused. Russian Ambassador at
Vienna thinks that war is almost inevitable, and that as mobilisation is too
expensive to be kept for long, Germany will attack Russia at once. He says
that the so-called mobilisation of Russia amounted to nothing more than that
Russia had taken military measures corresponding to those taken by Germany,
There seems to be .even greater tension between Germany and Russia than
there is between Austria and Russia. Russia would, according to the Russian
Ambassador, be satisfied even now with assurance respecting Servian integrity
and independence. He says that Russia had no intention to attack Austria.
He is going again to-day to point out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs
that most terrific consequences must ensue from refusal to make this slight
concession. This time Russia v/ould fight to the last extremity. I agree with
his Excellency that the German Ambassador at^ Vienna desired war from the

first, and that his strong personal bias probably coloured his action here.
The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German Government also
desired war from the first.

It is the intention of the French Ambassador to speak earnestly to the
Minister for Foreign Aftairs to-day on the extreme danger of the situation,
and to ask whether proposals to serve as a basis- of mediation from any quarter
are being considered. There is great anxiety to know what England will do.
I fear that nothing can alter the determination of Austro-Hungarian Govern-
ment to proceed on their present course, if they have made up their mind with
the approval of Germany.

No. 142.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Gre^j. —
[Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 1, 1914.

ORDERS have just been issued for the general mobilisation of the navy
and army, the first day of mobilisation to be 2nd August."

No. 143.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. —
{Received August 2.)
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 1,' 1914.

DETENTION of British merchant ships at Hamburg.

Your telegram of 1st August* acted on.

Secretary of State, who expressed the greatest surprise and annoyance, has
promised to send orders at once to allow steamers, to proceed without delay.

•^ See No. 130.

No. 144.

Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. —
(Received August 2.)
(Telegraphic;) Berlin, August 2, 1914.

SECRETARY of State has just informed me that, owing to certain Russian
troops having crossed frontier, Germany and Russia are now in a state of war.

No. Ub.
Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edivard Grey.—r-
{Received August 2.)
(Telegraphic.) Berlin, AMgust 2, 1914,

MY telegram of 1st August.*

Secretary of State inf.orms me that orders were sent last night to allow
British ships in Hamburg to proceed on their way. He says that this must
be regarded as a special favour to His Majesty's Government, as no other
foreign ships hare been allowed to leave. Reason of detention was that mines
were being laid and other precautions being taken.

* Se© No. 143.

No. 146.
Sir F, yUliers, Bntish Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey, —
{Received August 2.)
(Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 2, 1914.

THE news that a German force has entered Grand Duchy of Luxemburg
has been officially confirmed to the Belgian Government.

No. 147.

Minister of State^ Luxemburg ^ to /Sir

Lux'cnihourg, Ic 2 aoiit, 1914.
(Telej;raphiqiic.)

J'AI riionncur do porter a la con-
iiaissance dc votrc Excellence Ics faits
siiivants

Dimancbe, 2 aout, dc f^rand matin,
les troupes allcmandeSj d'apres Ics in-
formations qui sont parvenues au Gou-
vernement Grand ducal a I'hcure ac-
tuelle, ont pcnctre sur le territoire
luxembourgeois par Ics ponts de Was-
scrbillig ct de Rcmicli, se dirigeant
spccialement vers le sud du pays et vers
la ville de Luxembourg, capitale du
Grand Duche. Un certain nombre de
trains blindes avec des troupes et des
munitions ont ete achemines par la
voic de cliemin de fer de Wasserbillig a
Luxembourg, ou Ton s'attend de les
voir arriver. D'un instant a I'autrc,
ccs faits impliqucnt des actes mani-
fostement contraire a la neutralite du
Giand Duclie garantie par le Traite de
Londrcs de 18G7 Le Gouvernement
luxembourgeois u'a pas manque de
protester energiquement contre cettc
agression aupres des representants de
Sa Majeste TEmpereur d'Allemagno a
Luxembourg. Une protestation iden-
tiquo va etre transmise telegraphique-
ment au Secretaire d'j^tat pour les
Affaires Etrangeres a Berlin.

Edicard Grey, — {Received August 2.)

(Translation.)
Luxemburg,
(Telegraphic.) August 2, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to bring to
your Excellency's notice the following
facts : —

On Sunday, the 2nd August, very
early, the German troops, according to
the information which has up to now
reached the Grand Ducal Government,
penetrated into Luxemburg territory
by the bridges of Wasserbillig and
llcmich, and proceeded particularly
towards the south and in the direction
of Luxemburg, the capital of the Grand
Duchy. A certain number of armoured
trains with troops and ammunition
have been sent along the railway line
from Wasserbillig to Luxemburg,
where their arrival is expected. These
occurrences constitute acts which are
manifestly contrary to the neutrality
of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by
the Treaty of London of 1867. The
Luxemburg Government have not
failed to address an energetic protest
against this aggression to the represen-
tatives of His Majesty the German
Emperor at Luxemburg. An identi-
cal protest will be sent by telegraph to
the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs at Berlin.

No. 148.

iSir Edicard Grey to Sir F, Bertie, British Ambassador at Farts.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 2, 1914.

AFTER the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon* the following memo-
randum :— r

''I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into
the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against
French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its
power.

"Tiiis assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty's Govern-
ment receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding
His -Alnjesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of
action by the German fleet takes place."

I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difficult issues to
consider, and that Government felt that they could not bind themselves to
declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out between France and
Germany to-morrow, but it was essential to the French (Government, whose
fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make
tlioir dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. We therefore
thought it necessary to give them this assurance. It did not bind us to go to
u'or with Germany unless the German fleet took the action indicated, but it
did give a ^xciirity to Frnnce that would enable her to settle the disposition of
her own Moditonnnean fleet.

M. Cambon* asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him the
* French Ambassador in London.

.75

doctrine on that point laid down' by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in 1867.
He asked me what we should say about the violation of the neutrality of
Belgium. I said that was a much more important matter ; we were considering
what statement we should make in Parliament to-morrow-^in effect, whether
we should declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a casus belli. I told him
what had. been said to the German Ambassador on this point.

No. 149.
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British AnrilHissador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) Forcigr, Office, August 2., 1914. '

YOUR telegram of 1st August.*

I regret to learn that 100 tons of sugar was compulsorily unloaded from the
British steamship " Sappho " at Hamburg and detained. Similar action appears
■ to have been taken with regard to other British vessels loaded with sugar.

You should inform Secretary ot State that, for reasons stated in my tele-
gram of 1st Augustjt I most earnestly trust that the orders already sent to
Hamburg to allow the clearance of British ships covers also the release of
their cargoes, the detention of which cannot be justified.

* See No. 143. t Sec No. 130.

No. 150.

Sir E. Goschen^ Brilisli Amhassadiyr at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. —
{Received Avgiist 3.)
(Telegraphic.) , Berlin, August 3, 1914.

YOUR telegram of 2nd August* : Detention of British ships at Hamburg.

No information available.

See No. 149.

No. 151.

. Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels y to Sir Edward Grey, —
{Received August 3.)
(Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 3, 1914.

FRENCH Government have offered through their military attache the
support of five French army corps to the Belgian Government. Following reply
has been sent to-day : —

"We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for oft'ering eventual
support. In the actual circumstances, however, we do not propose to appeal
to the guarantee of the Powers. 'Belgian Government will decide later on the
action which they may tliink it necessary to take."

No. 152.
Sir Edivard Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris.

Sir,' , Foreign Office, August 3, 1914.

ON the 1st instant the French Ambassador made the following communi-
cation : —

'In reply to the German Government's intimation of the fact that ulti-
matums had been presented to France and Russia, and to the question as to
what were the intentions of Italy, 'the Marquis di San Giuliano* replied :—

"'The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which might
result, had, in the words of the German Ambassador himself, an aggressive
object. Both were therefore in conflict with the purely defensive character of
the Triple Alliance, and in such circumstances Italy would remain neutral.' "

In making this communication, M. Cambont was instructed to lay stress

* Italian Minist^f for Foreign Affairs,
t French Ambassador in London.

upon the Italian declaration that the present war vv^as not a defensive but aii
aggressive war, and that, for this reason, the casus faderis under the terms of
the Triple Alliance did not arise.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 153.
Sir Edicard Grey to Sir E. GoscJwn, British Amlassador at Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.

TilE King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King
for dipiomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the following teiui.s : —

"Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that
of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof
of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the
diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the
integii^y of Belgium."

His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government
hiive delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly neutrality
entail-ng free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain
the independence and integrity of tlie kingdom and its possessions a^the con-
clusion ot peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy.
An answer was requested within twelve hours.

We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant
violation of the law of nations.

His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a
treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must
request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be pro-
ceeded with and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should
ask for an immediate reply.

No. 154.

Sir F. ViUierSy British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey. —
{Received August 4.)
(Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 4, 1914.

GERMAN Minister has this morning addressed note to Minister for Foreign
Affairs stating that as Belgian Government have declined the well-intentioned
proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply
to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the
measures considered indispensable in view of the French menaces.

No. 155.

Sir Edicard Grey to Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.

YUU should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them
by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality. His Majesty's Gov^ern-
ment expect that they will resist by any means in their power, and that His
Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that
His Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and France,
if desired, in offering to the Belgian Government at once common action for
the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee
to maintain their independence and integrity in future years.

No. 156.
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin,
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.

I CONTINUE to receive numerous complaints from British firms as to the
detention of their ships at Hamburg, Cuxhaven, and other German ports. This

action on the part of the German authorities is totally unjustifiable. It is in
direct contravention of international law and of the assurances given to your
Excellency by the Imperial Chancellor. You should demand the immediate
release of all British ships if such release has not yet been given.

No. 157.

German Foreign Secretary to Prince Lichnoiosh/, German Ambassndor in
London. — {Communicated hj Germayi Emhassy, Au^/Kst 4.)
(Telegraphic.) ^ Berlin, August 4, 1914.

PLEASE dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British
Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most positively formal
assurance that, even in tlie case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will,
under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this
declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland
strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably
annex Belgian territory without making at the same time territorial
acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that
German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which
was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany
had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of
life or death to prevent French advance.

No. 158.

Sir F. VillierSf British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edivard Grey. —
(Received August 4.)

(Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 4, 1914.

MILITARY attache has been informed at War Office that German troops
have entered Belgian territory, and that Liege has been summoned to
surrender by small party of Germans who, however, were repulsed.

No. 159.
Sir Ediodrd Grey to Sir E» Goscken, British Ambassador at.Berlin.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4, 1914,

WE hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian Minister for Foreign
Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to carry out, if
necessary, by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable.

We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at
Gemmenich.

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to
give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply
to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that
request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this
morning* be received here by 12 o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed
to ask for your passports, and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound
to take all ste^s in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the
observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves.

» See No. 153.

No. 160.

Sir E. Goschcn, British Ambassador" in Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.

Sir, London, Augusts, 1914.

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the
4th instant* I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and enquired,
m the. name of His Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government

* See No. 153.

would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow* at once'
replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be " No," as, in conse-
quence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian
neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow ^gain went into the
reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step,
namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest
way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavour
to strike some decisive, blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and
death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route th«y could
not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the
fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great
loss of time. This loss ot time would have meant time gained by the Russians
for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was
the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of
troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this fait accompli of the violation
of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation
exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was n<jrt still time to draw
back and avoid possible consequences, which both he and I would deplore.
He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for
them to draw back.

During the atternoon I received your further telegram of the same date,t
and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I again proceeded
to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary of State that unless
the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night
that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier
and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and
inform the Imperial Government that His Majesty's Government would have
to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the
observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves.

Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other
answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that the
safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops
should advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a written summary of
your telegram and, pointing out that you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time
when His Majesty's Government would expect an answer, asked him whether,
in view of the tferrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not
possible even at the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered.
He replied that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more," his
answer must be the- same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my
passports. This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short conversa-
tion which ensued Herr von Jagow* expressed his poignant regret at the
crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to
make friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain, to get closer
to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me also
a matter of deep regret and disappointment, T)ut that he must understand that
under the circumstances and in view of our engagements, His Majesty's Govern-
ment could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done.

I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it might be,
perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged
me to do so. I found the Chancellor *very agitated. His Excellency at once
began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the
step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree ; just for a
word — ** neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been disrcgarded-^-
just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make War on a k?ndrcd
nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts
in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible stop, and the
policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office
had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable ;
it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against
two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events
that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said
that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow* wished me to understand
that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to

* German Secretary of State,
t See No. 159.

advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish
him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of " life and death " for
the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do
her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact
simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements
given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, "But at what
price will that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought
of that? " I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of conse-
quences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engage-
ments, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news
of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding
fuel to the flame by further argument. As 1 was leaving he said that the blow
of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up
to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us and
supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said
that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just
at the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and
cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts
to maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had
brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements,
we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation
from our late fellow- workers. He would readily understand that no one
regretted this more than I.

After this somewhat painful intervie'v? I returned to the embassy and drew
up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed in at
the Central Telegraph Ofl&ce a little before 9 p.m. It was accepted by that
office, but apparently never despatched.*

At about 9.30 p.m. Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of State,
came to see me. After expressing his deep regret that the very friendly official
and personal relations between us were about to cease, he asked me casually
whether a demand for passports was equivalent to a declaration of war. I said
that such an authority on international law as he was known to be must know
as well or better than I what was usual in such cases. I added that there were
many cases where diplomatic relations had been broken off, and, nevertheless,
war had not ensued ; but that in this case he would have seen from my instruc-
tions, of which I had given Herr von Jagowt a written summary, that His
Majesty's Government expected an answer to a definite question by 1,2 o'clock
that night, and that in default of a satisfactory answer they would be forced
to take such steps as their engagements required. Herr Zimmermannt said
that that was, in fact, a declaration of war, as the Imperial Government could
not possibly give the assurance required either that night or any other night.

In the meantime, after Herr Zimmermannt left me, a flying sheet, issued
by the "Berliner Tageblatt," was circulated stating that Great Britain had
declared war against Germany. The immediate result of this news was the
assemblage of an exceedingly excited and unruly mob before His Majesty's
Embassy. The small force of police which had been sent to guard the embassy
was soon overpowered, and the attitude of the mob became more threatening.
We took no notice of this demonstration as long as it was confined to noise,
but when the crash of glass and the landing of cobble stones into the drawing-
room, where we were all sitting, warned us that the situation was getting
unpleasant, I telephoned to the Foreign Office an account of what was happen-
ing. Herr von Jagowt at once informed the Chief of Police, and an adequate
force of mounted police, sent with great promptness, very soon cleared the
street. From that moment on we were well guarded, and no more direct
unpleasantness occurred.

After order had been restored Herr von Jagowt came to see me and expressed
his most heartfelt regrets at what had occurred. He said that the behaviour
of his countrymen had made him feel more ashamed than he had words to
express. It was an indelible stain on the reputation of Berlin. He said that
the flying sheet circulated in the streets had not been authorised by the
Government ; in fact, the Chancellor had asked him by telephone whether ho
thought that such a statement should be issued, and he had replied, "Certainly

* This telegram never reached the Foreign Office.

+ German Secretary of State.

1 German Under-Secretary of State.

not, until the morning." It was in consequence of his decision to that effect that
only a small force of police had been sent to the neighbourhood of the embassy,
as ho had thought that the presence of a large force would inevitably attract
attention and perhaps lead to disturbances. It was the " pestilential ' Tage-
blatt,' " which had somehow got hold of the news, that had upset his calcula-
tions. He had heard rum.ours that the mob had been excited to violence by
gestures made and missiles thrown from the embassy, but he felt sure that
that was not true (I. was able soon to assure him that the report had no founda-
tion whatever), and even if it was, it was no excuse for the disgraceful scenes
which had taken place. He feared that I would take home with me a sorry
impression of Berlin manners in moments of excitement. In fact, no apology
could have been more full and complete.

On the following morning, the 5th August, the Emperor sent one of His
Majesty's aides-de-camp to me with the following message : —

"The Emperor has charged me to express to your Excellency his regret
for the occurrences of last night, but to tell you at the same time that you
will gather from those occurrences an idea of the feelings of his people respect-
ing the action of Great Britain in joining with other nations against her old
allies of Waterloo. His Majesty also begs that you will tell the King that he
has been proud of the titles of British Field-Marshal and British Admiral, but
that in cojisequence of what has occurred ho must now at once divest himself
of those titles."

I would add that the above message lost none of its acerbity by the manner
of its delivery.

On the other hand, I should like to state that I received all through this
trying time nothing but courtesy at the hands of Herr von Jagow* and the
officials of the Imperial Foreign Office. At about 11 o'clock on the same
morning Count Wede! handed me my passports — which I had earlier in the day
demanded in writing — and told me that he had been instructed to confer with
rne as to the route which I should folloAV for my return to England. He said
that he had understood that I preferred the route via the Hook of Holland to
that via Copenhagen ; they had therefore arranged that I should go by the
former route, only I should have to wait till the following morning. I agreed
lo this, and he said that I might be quite assured that there Ayould be no
repetition of the disgraceful scenes of the preceding night as full precautions
would be taken. He added that they were doing all in tlieir power to have
a restaurant car attached to the train, but it was rather a difficult matter.
He also brought me a charming letter from Herr von Jagow couched in the
most friendly terms. The day was passed in packing up such articles as time
allowed.

The night passed quietly without any incident. In the morning a strong
force of police was posted along the usual route to the Lchrter Station, while
the embassy was smuggled away in taxi-cabs to the station by side streets.
Wo there suffered no molestation whatever, and avoided the treatment meted
out by the crowd to my Russian and French colleagues. Count Wedel met us
at the station to say good-bye on behalf of Herr von Jagow and to see that
all the arrangements ordered for our comfort had been properly carried out.
A retired colonel of the Guards accompanied the train to the Dutch frontier
and was exceedingly kind in his efforts to prevent the great crowds which
thronged the platforms at every station where we stopped from insulting us;
but beyond the yelling of patriotic songs and a few jeers and insulting gestures
we had really nothing to complain of during our tedious journey to the Dutch
frontier.

Before closing this long account of our last days in Berlin I should like
to place on record and bring to your notice the quite admirable behaviour of
my staff under the most trying circumstances possible. One and all, they
worked night and day with scarcely any rest, and I cannot praise too highly the
cheerful zeal with which counsellor, naval and military attaches, secretaries,
and the two young xittaches buckled to their work and kept their nerve with
often a yelling mob outside and inside hundreds of British subjects clamouring
for advice and assistance. I was proud to have such a staff" to work with, and
feel most grateful to them all for the invaluable assistance and support, often
exposing them to considerable personal risk, which they so readily and cheer-
fullv gave to me.

I should also like to mention the great assistance rendered to us all hy

* German Secretary of State.

my American colleague, Mr. Gerard,* aiid his staff. Undeterred by the hooting
and hisses with which he was often greeted by the mob on entering and leaving
the embassy, his Exo'ellency came repeatedly to see me to ask how he could
holp us and to make arrangements for the safety of stranded British subjects.
He extricated many of thjese from extremely difficult situations at some per-
sonal risk to himself, and his calmness and savoir-faire and his firmness in
dealing with the Imperial authorities gave full assurance that the protection
of British subjects and interests could not have been left in more efficient and
able hands. I have, &c.

W. E. GOSCHEN.
* Am<>rican Ambassador in Berlin.

No. 161.
Sir 31. de Bimsen, British Amhas^ador in Vienna, to Sir Edioard Grey.
Sir, London. September I, 1914.

THE rapidity of the march of events during the days which led up to the
outbreak of the European war made it difiicult, at the time, to do more than
record their progress by telegrai>li. I propose now to add a few comments.

The delivery at Belgrade on the 2tird July of the Austrian note to Servia
was preceded by a period of absolute silence at the Ballplatz. Except Herr von
Tschirscky,* who must have been aware of the tenour, if not of the actual words
of the note, none of my colleagues were allowed to see through the veil On
the 22nd and 23rd July, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, had long interviews
with Baron Macchio, one of the Under-Secretaries of State- for Foreign Aflairs,
by whom he was left under the impression that the words of warning he had
been instructed to speak to the Austro-Hangarian Government had not been
unavailing, and that the note which was being drawn up would be found to
contain nothing with which a self-respecting State need hesitate to comply.
At the second of these interviews he was not even informed that the note was
at that very moment being presented at Belgrade, or that it would be pub-
lished in Vienna on- the following morning. Count Forgach, the other Under-
Secretary' of State, had indeed been good enoug-h to confide to me on the same
day the true character of the note, and the fact of its presentation about tho
time we were speaking.

So little had the Russian Ambassador been made aware of what was pre-
paring that he actually left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of absence about the
20th July. He had only been absent a few days when events compelled him
to return. It miQ;ht have been supposed that Duke Avarna, Ambassador of tho
allied Italian Kingdom, which was bound to be so closely affected by fresh
complications in the Balkans, would have been taken fully into the confidence
of Count BerchtoUlt during this critical time. In no"^t of fact his Excellency
was left completely in the dark. As for myself, no indication was given me by
Count Berchtold of the inr^ending storm, and it was from a private source
that i received on the 15th Julv the forecast of what was about to happen
which I telegraphed to you the following day. It is true that during all this
time the " Neue Freie Presse " and other leading Viennese newspapers were
using language which pointed unmistakably to war with Servia The official
'• Fremdenblatt," however, was more cautious, and till the note was published,
tho prevailing opinion amoiifi: my colleagues was that Austria would shrink
from courses calculated to involve her in grave European complications:

On the 24th July the note was published in the newspapers. By common
consent it was at once styled an ul'imatum. Its integral acceptance by Servia
was neither expeotod nor desired, and when, on the following: afternoon, it was
at first rumoured in Vienna that it had boon unconditionally accepted, th^^ro
was a mom-^nt of keen disappointment. The mistake was quickly corrocted.
and as soon as it was known la+er in the evening that the Servian roply had
])eon veipct'^d .ind thnt "Hnron G'<^s1t hnd brokon off rf^ntions at Bo^nrrndo
Vienna burst into a frenzv of delight, vast crowds parading the -streets and
singing patriotic songs till the smMl hours of the morriing.

The demonstrations were perfe-^tly ord^rlv. conri=ting for the most part of
organised processions through the prin'^ipa) streets cndino: \^v at the Ministry
of^'War. One or two attempts to make hostile manifostations against tho

* German Ambassador at Vienna.

t A LIS tro -Hungarian Minister for Foreign AfTaire.

:;: Aiistro-Hungiarian Minister at Belgrade.

Russian /Embassy were frustrated by the strong guard of police which held the
approaches to the principal embassies during those days. The demeanour of
the pcoplo at Vienna and^ as I was infornied, in many other principal cities
of ths Monarchy, showed plainly the popularity of the idea of war with Servia,
and there can be no doubt that the small body of Austrian and Hungarian
£:tatesnion by whom this momentous step was adopted gauged rightly the sense,
and it may even be said the determination, of the people, except presumably
in pcrlions cf the provinces inhabited by the Slav races. There had been much
di.sappointment in many quarters at the avoidance of war with Servia during
the annexation crisis in 1903 and again in connection with the recent Balkan
war. Count Bcrchtold's* peace policy had met with little sympathy in the
Delegation. Now the flood-gates were opened, and the entire people and press
clamoured impatiently for immediate and condign punishment of the hated
Servian race. The country certainly believed that it had before it only the
alternative of subduing Servia or of submitting sooner or later to mutilation
at her hands. But a peaceful solution should first have been attempted. Few
seemed to reflect that the forcible intervention of a Great Power in the Balkans
must inevitably call other Great Powers into the field. So just was the cause
of Austria held to be, that it seemed to her people inconceivable that any
country should place itself in her path, or that questions of mere policy or
prestige should be regarded anyAvhere as superseding the necessity which had
arisen to exact summary vengeance for the crime of Serajevo. The conviction
had been expressed to me by the German Ambassador on the 24th July that
Russia would stand aside. This feeling, which was also held at the Ballplatz,
influenced no doubt the course of events, and it is deplorable that no effort
should have been made to secure by means of diplomatic negotiations the
acquiescence of Russia and Europe as a whole in some peaceful compromise of
the Servian question by which Austrian fears of Servian aggression and
intrigue might have been removed for the future. Instead of adopting this
course the Austro-Hungarian Government resolved upon war. Tlie inevitable
consequence ensued. Russia replied to a partial Austrian mobilisation and
declaration of war against Servia by a partial Russian mobilisation against
Austria. Austria met this move by completing her own mobilisation, and
Russia again responded with results which have passed into history. The
fate of the proposals put forwarcl by His Majesty's Government for the pre-
servation of peace is recorded in the "White Paper on the European Crisis. t
On the 28th July I saw Count Berchtold and urged as stronglj" as I could that
the scheme of mediation mentioned in your speech in the House of Commonst
on the previous day should be accepted as offering an honourable and peaceful
settlement of the question at issue. His Excellency himself read to me a tele-;
graphic report of the speech, but added that matters hj^d gone too far ; Austria
was that day declaring war on Servia, and she could never accept the confer-
ence which you had suggested should take place between the less interested
Powers on the basis of the Servian reply. This was a matter wJiich
must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned.
I said His Majesty's Government would hear with regret that
hostilities could not be arrested, as you feared they would lead to
European complications. I disclaimed anj- British lack of sympathy with
Austria in the matter of her legitimate grievances against Servia, and pointed
out that whereas Austria seemed to be making these the starting point of her
policy. His Majesty's Government were bound to look at the question primarily
from the point of view of the maintenance of the peace of Europe. In this way
the two countries might easily drift apart.

His Excellency said that he too was keeping the European aspect of the
question in sight. He thought, however, that Russia would have no right to
intervene after receiving his assurance that Austria sought no territorial
aggrandisement. His Excellency remarked to me in the course of his conversa-
tion that, thouerh he had been glad to co-operate towards bringing about the
settlement which had resulted from the ambassadorial conferences in London
during the Balkan crisis, he had never had mucli belief in the nermanency
of that settlement, which was necessarily of a highly artificial character,
inasmuch a.s the interests, which it sought to liarmonise were in themselves pro-
foundly divergent. His Excellency maintained a most friendly demeanour

* Au :tro-Hungarian Minister for Fproign Affairs.

+ "'Miscolkjieous. No. 6 (1914)."

:;: Sec Han^Trd, Vol. -65, No. 107, columns 931-933.

throughout the interview, but left no doubt in my mind as to the determination
of the Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed with the invasion of Servia.

The German Government claim to have i^ersevered to the end in the endeavour
to support at Vienna your successive proposals in the interest of peace. Herr
von Tschirscky* abstained from inviting ray co-operation or that of the French
and Russian Ambassadors in carrying out his instructions to that effect, and
I had no means of knowing what response he was receiving from the Austro-
Hungarian Governm-ent. 1 was, however, kept fully informed by M. Schebeko,
the Russian Ambassador, of his own direct negotiations with Count Berchtold.
M. Schebeko endeavoured on the 28th July to persuade the Austro-Hungarian
Government to furnish Count Szaparyt with full powers to continue at St.
Petersburgh the hopeful conversations which had there been taking place
between the latter and M. Sazonof.it Count Berchtold§ refused at the time,
but two days later (30th July), though in the meantime Russia had partially
mobilised against Austria, he received M. Schebekojl again, in a perfectly
friendly manner, and gave his consent to the continuance of the conversations
at St. Petersburgh. 1^'rom now onwards the tension between Russia and Ger-
many was much greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the
latter an arrangement seemed almost in sight, and on the 1st August I was
informed by M. Schebekoll that Count Szapary+ had at last conceded the main
point at issue by announcing to M. Sazonoft that Austria would consent to
submit to mediation the points m the note to Servia which seemed incompatible
with the maintenance of Servian independence. M. Sazonof.I M. Schebekoll
added, had accepted this proposal on condition that Austria would refrain from
the actual invasion of Servia. Austria, in fact, had finally yielded, and that
she herself had at this point good hopes of a peaceful issue is shown by the
communication made to you on the 1st August by Count Mensdorff,1^ to the
effect that Austria had neither "banged the door" on ropi promise nor cut off
the conversations.*'* M. Schebekoll to the end was working hard for peace.
He was holding the most conciliatory language to Count Berchtold, § and he
informed me that the latter, as well as Count Forgach,t+ had responded in the
same spirit. Certainly it was too much for Russia to expect that Austria would
hold back her armies, but this matter could probably have been settled by
negotiation, and M Schebekoll repeatedly told me he was prepared to accept
any reasonable compromise.

Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburgh and A"^ienna were cut
short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a direct
conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on the 31st July
by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburgh and Paris. The ulti-
matums were of a kind to which only one answer is po.ssible, and Germany
declared war on Russia on the 1st August, and on France on the Srd August.
A few days' delay miglit in all probability have sjived Europe from one of the
greatest calamities in history.

Russia still abstained from attacking Austria, and IVl Schphekol! had been
instructed to remain at his post till war should actually hp declared against
her by the Austro-Hungarian Government. This only happened on the 6tfi
August when Count Berchtold§ informed the foreign ; -is-inns at Vienna that
'' the Austro-ITungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh had been instructed
to notify the Russian Government that, in view of the menacing attitude of
Russia in the Austro-Servian conflict and the fact that Russia had commenced
hostilities against Germany, Austro-Hungary considered herself also at war
with Russia."

M. Schebekoll left quietly in a sr)ocial train provided by th^ Austro-
Hungarian Government on the 7th August. He had urgently requested to be
conveyed to the Roumanian frontier, so that he might be ab'e to proceed to his
own country, bub was taken instead to the Swiss frontier, and ten days later
I found him at Borne.

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, stayed on till the 12th August. On the
previous day he had been instructed to demand his passport on the ground that

* German Ambassador in Vienna.

t Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh.

t Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

§ Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

II Russian Ambassador in Vienna.

IT Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

*" See No. 137

+t Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Austrian troops were being employed against France. This point was not fully
cleared up when I left Vienna. On the 9th August, M. Dumaine had received
from Count Berchtold* the categorical declaration that no Austrian troops were
being moved to Alsace. The next day this statement was supplemented by a
further one, in writing, giving Count Berchtold's assurance that not only had
no Austrian troops been moved actually to the French frontier, but that none
were moving from Austria in a westerly direction into Germany in such a
way that they might replace German troops employed at the front. These two
statements were made by Count Berchtold in reply to precise questions put to
him by M. Dumaine, under instructions from his Government. The French
Ambassador's departure was not attended by any hostile demonstration, but
liis Excellency 'before leaving had been justly offended by a harangue made by
the Chief Burgomaster of Vienna to the crowd assembled before the steps of
the town hall, in which he assured the people that Paris 'was in the throes of a
revolution, and that the President of the Republic had been assassinated.

The British declaration of war on Germany was made known in Vienna by
special editions of the newspapers about midday on the 4th August. An abstract
of your speeches in the. House of Commons, and also of the German Chancellor's
speech in the Reichstag of the 4th August, appeared the same day, as well as
the text of the German ultimatum to Belgium. Otherwise few details of the
great events of these days transpired. The "Neue Freie Presse " was violently
insulting towards England. The " Fremdenblatt " was not offensive, but little
or nothing was said in the columns of any Vienna paper to explain that "the
violation of Belgium neutrality had left His Majesty's Government no alterna-
tive but to take part in the war.

The declaration of Italian neutrality was bitterly felt in Vienna, but scarcely
mentioned in the newspapers.

On the 5th August I had the honour to receive your instruction of the
previous day preparing me for the immediate outbreak of war with Germany,
but adding that, Austria being understood to be not yet at that date at war
with Russia and France, you did not desire me to ask for my passport or to make
any particular communication to the Austro-Hungarian Government. You
stated at the same time that His Majesty's Government of course expected
Austria not to commit any act of war against us without the notice required by
diplomatic usage.

On Thursday morning, the 13th August, I had the honour to receive your*
telegram of the 12th, stating that you had been compelled to inform Count
Mensdorff ,t at the request of the French Government, that a complete rupture
had occurred -between France and Austria, on the ground that Austria had
declared war on Russia who was already fighting on the side of France, and th^t
Austria had sent troops to the German frontier under conditions that were a
direct menace to France. The rupture having been brought about with France
in -this way, I was to ask for my passport, and your telegram stated, in con-
clusion, that you had informed Count Mensdorff that a state of war would exist
between the two countries from midnight of the 12th August.

After seeing Mr. Penfleld, the United States Am\)assador, who accepted
immediately in the most friendly spirit my request that his Excellency would
take charge provisionally of British interests in Austria-Hungary during the
unfortunate interruption of relations, I proceeded, with Mv. Theo Russell,
Counsellor of His Majesty's Embassy, to the Ballplatz. Count Berchtold*
received me at midday. I delivered my message, for which his Excellency did
not seem to be unprepared, although he told me that a long telegram from Count
Mensdorfft had just come in but had not yet been brought to him. His
Excellency received my communication with the courtesy which never leaves
liim. He deplored the unhappy complications which were drawing such good
friends as Austria and England into war. In point of fact, he added, Austria
did not. consider herself then at war with France, though diplomatic relations
with that country had been broken off.- I explained in a few words how cir-
cumstances had forced this unwelcome conflict upon us. Wo both avoided use-
less argument. Then I ventured to recommend to his Excellency's consideration
the case of the numerous stranded British subjects at Carlsbad, Vienna, and

* Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
i Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London.

other pljtces throughout the country. I had -already had some correspondence
with him on the subject, and his Excellency took a no*e of what I said, and
promised to see what could be done to get them away when the stress of
mobilisation should be over. Count Berchtold agreed to Mr. Phillpotts, till
then British consul at Vienna under Consul-General Sir Frederick Duncan, being
left by me at the Embassy in the capacity of Charge des Archives. He pre-
sumed a similar privilege would not be refused in England if desired on behalf
of the Austro-Hungarian Government. I took leave of Count Berchtold with
sincere regret, having received from the day of my arrival in Vienna, not quite
nine months before, many marks of friendship and consideration from his
Excellency. As I left I begged his Excellency to present my profound respects
to the Emperor Francis Joseph, together with an expression of my hope that
His Majesty would pass through these sad times with unimpaired health and
strength. Count Berchtold was pleased to say he would deliver my message.

Count Walterskirchen, of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, was deputed
the following morning to bring me my passport and to acquaint me with the
arrangements made for my departure that evening (14th August). In the course
of the day Countess Berchtold and other ladies of Vienna society called to take
leave of Lady de Bunsen at the embassy. We left the railway station by special
train for the Swiss frontier at 7 p.m. No disagreeable incidents occurred. Count
Walterskirchen was present at the station on behalf of Count Berchtold. ^ The
journey was necessarily slow, owing to the encumbered state of the line. We
reached Buchs, on the Swiss frontier, early in the morning of the 17th August.
At the first halting place there had been some hooting and stone throwing on
the part of the entraining troops and station officials, but no inconvenience was
caused, and at the other large stations on our route we found that ample
measures had been taken to preserve us from molestation as well as to provide
us with food. I was left in no doubt that the Austro-Hungarian Government had
desired that the journey should be performed under the most comfortable con-
ditions possible, and that I should receive on my departure all the marks of
consideration due to His Majesty's representative. I was accompanied by my
own family and the entire staff of the embassy, for whose untiring zeal and
efficient help in trying times I desire to express my sincere thanks. The Swiss
Government also showed courtesy in providing comfortable accommodation
during our journey from the frontier to Berne, and, after three days' stay there,
on to Geneva, at which place we found that every provision had been made by
the French Government, at the request of Sir Francis Bertie, for our speedy
conveyance to Paris. We reached England on Saturday morning, the 22nd
August.

I have, &Q.;

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

PART II,

SPEECHES IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

(1) Sir Eciwaid Giey (August 3, 19U)

(2) Sir Edward Grey (August 3, 1914)

(3) Mr. Asquith (August 4, 1914) ...

(4) Mr. Asquith (August 5, 1914) ...

(5) Mr. Asquith (August 6, 1914) e-.-

Pago

89
97
97
98
98

PART II.

SPEECHES IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

(1) STATEMENT BY SIR EDWARD GREY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS,

AUGUST 3, 1914.

Last week I staied that we were working for peace not only for this
country, but to preserve the peace of Europe. To-day events move so rapidly
that it is exceedingly difficult to state with technical accuracy the actual state
of affairs, but it is clear that the peace of Europe cannot be preserved. Russia
and Germany, at any rate, have declared war upon each other.

Before I proceed to state the position of His Majesty's Government, I would
like to clear the ground so that, before I come to state to the House what our
attitude is with regard to the present crisis, the House may know exactly under
what obligations the Government is, or the House can be said to be, in coming
to a decision on the matter. First of all let me say, very shortly, that we have
consistently worked with a single mind, with all the earnestness in our power,
to preserve peace. The House may be satisfied on that point. We have always
done it. During these last years, as far a^ His Majesty's Government are con-
cerned, we would have no difficulty in proving that we have done so. Through-
out the Balkan crisis, by general admission, we worked for peace. The co-
operation of the Great Powers of Europe was successful in working for peace
in the Balkan crisis. It is true that some of the Powers had great difficulty in
adjusting their points of view. It took much time and labour and discussion
before they could settle their differences, but peace was secured, because peace
was their main object, and they were willing to give time and trouble rather
than accentuat^e differences rapidly.

In the present crisis, it has not been possible to secure the peace of Europe ;
because there has been little time, and there has been a disposition — at any
rate in some quarters on which I will not dwell — to force things rapidly to
an issue, at any rate to the great risk of peace, and, as we now know, the
result of that is that the policy of peace as far as the Great Powers generally
are concerned, is in danger. I do not want to dwell on that, and to comment
on it, and to say where the blame seems to us to lie, which Powers were.niost in
favour of peace, which were most disposed to risk or endanger peace, because
I would like the House to approach this crisis in which we are now from the
point of view of British interests, British honour, and British obligations, free
•from all passion as to why peace has not been preserved.

We shall iDublish papers as soon as we can regarding what took place last
week when we were working for peace; and when those papers are published
I have no doubt that to every human being they will make it clear how
strenuous and genuine and wHole-hearted our efforts for i)eace Were, and that
they will enable people to form their own judgment as to what forces were at
work which operated against peace.

I come first, now, to the question of British obligations. I have assured the
House — and the Prime Minister has assiired the House more than once — that
if any crisis such as this arose we should come before the House of Commons
and be able to say to the House that it was free to decide what the British
attitude should be, that we would have no secret engagement which we should
spring upon the House, and tell the House that because we had entered into
that engagement there was an obligation of honour upon the country. I will
deal with that point to clear the ground first.

There have been in Europe two diplomatic groups, the Triple Alliance and
what came to be called the Triple Entente, for some years past. The Triple
Enten'G was not an alliance— it was a diplomatic group. The House will
remember that in 1908 there was a crisis— also a Balkan crisis— originating in
the annexation -of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Russian Minister, M.
Isvolsky, came to London, or happened to come to London, because his visit
wa? planned before the crisis broke out. I told him definitely then, this being
a Balkan crisis, a Balkan affair, I did not consider that public opinion in this
country would justify us in promising to give anything more than diplomatic

Buppoi t. More was never asked from us, more was never given, and more was
never promised.

In this present crisis, up till yesterday, we have also given no promise of
anything more than diplomatic support — up till yesterday no promise of more
than diplomatic support. Now I must make this question of obligation clear
to the House. I must go back to the first Moroccan crisis of 1906. That was
the time of the Algeciras Conference, and it came at a time of very great
difiiculty to His Majesty's Government when a general election was in progress,
and Ministers were scattered over the country, and I — spending three days a
week in my constituency, and three days at the Foreign Office— was asked tho
question whether, if that crisis developed into war between France and
Oermany, we would give armed support. I said then that I could promise
nothing to any foreign Power unless it H'as subsequently to receive tho whole-
hearted support of public opinion here if the occasion arose. I said, in my
opinion, if war was forced upon France then on the question of Morocco— a
question which had just been the subject of agreement between this country
and France, an agreement exceedingly popular on both sides — that if out of
that agreement war was forced on France at that time, in my view public
opinion in this country would have rallied to the material support of France.

I gavh no promise, but I exp-essed that opinion during the crisis, as far as
I remember almost in the same words, to the French Ambassador and the
German Ambassador at the time. I made no promise, and I used no threats ;
but I expressed that opinion. That position was accepted by the French
Government, but they said to me at the time, and I think very reasonably,
*' If you think it possible that the public opinion of Great Britain might,
should a sudden crisis arise, justify you in giving to France the armed
support which you cannot promise in advance, you will not be able to give
that, support, even if you wish it, when the time comes, unless some
conversations have already taken place between naval and military experts."
There was force in that. I agreed to it, and authorised those conversations to
take place, but on the distinct understanding that nothing which passed
beween military or naval experts should bind either Government or restrict
in any way their freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they would
give that support when the time arose.

As I have told the House, upon that occasion a general election was in
prospect; I had to take the responsibility of doing that without the Cabinet.
It could not be summoned. An answer had to be given. I consulted Sir
Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Prime Minister ; I consulted, I remember,
Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of State for War; and the present
Prime Minister, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer. That was tho
most I could do, and they authorised that, on the distinct understanding that
it left the hands of the Government free whenever the crisis arose. The fact
that conversations between military and naval experts took place was later
on — I think much later on, because that crisis passed, and the thing ceased to
be of importance — but later on it was brought to the knowledfre of the Cabinet.

The Aga^Jir crisis came — another Morocco crisis — and throughout that I
took precisely the same line that had been taken in 1906. But subsequently,
in 1912, after discussion and consideration in the Cabinet, it was decided that
we ought to have a definite understanding in writing, which was to be only in
the form of an unofficial letter, that these conversations which took place were
not binding upon the freedom of either Government ; and on the 22nd of
November, 1912, I wrote to the French Ambassador the letter which I will
now read to the House, and I received from him a letter in similar terms
in reply. The letter which I have fo read to the House is this, and it will
be known to the piiblic now as the record that, .whatever took place between
military and naval experts, they were not binding engagements upon the
Governments : —

" My dear Ambassador,

"From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and
military experts have consulted togpther. It has always been
understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of
either- Government to decide at any future time whether or not to
assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation
between experts is not, and ought not, to be regarded as an engage-
ment that commits either Government to action in a contingency
that has not yet arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for

instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present
moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operato in war.
" You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave
reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might
become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon
the armed assistance of the other.
"I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an
unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened
the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other
whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggres-
sion and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would
bo prepared to take in common."
Lord Charles Beresford.—Wlvdt is the date of that? ,

Sir E. Gre)/.— The 22nd November, 1912. That is the starting point for
the Government with regard to the present crisis. I think it mak«s it clear
that what the Prime Minister and I said to the House of Commons was perfectly
justified, and that, as regards our freedom to decide in a crisis what our line
should be, whether we should intervene or whether we should abstain, the
Government remained perfectly free, and a fortiori^ the House of Commons
remains perfectly free. That I say to clear the ground from the point of view
of obligation. I think it was due to prove our good faith to the House of
Commons that I should give that full information to the House now,
and say what I think is obvious from the letter I have just read, that we do
not construe anything which has previously taken place in our diplomatic
relations with other Powers in thjs matter as restricting the freedom of the
Government to decide what attitude they should take now, or restrict the
freedom of the House of Commons to decide what their attitude should be.

Well, Sir, I will go further, and I will say this: The situation in the
present crisis is not precisely the same as it was in the Morocco question. In
the Morocco question it v/as primarily a dispute which concerned France^—
a dispute which concerned France and France primarily — a dispute, as it
seemed to us, affecting France out of an agreement subsisting between us and
France, and published to the whole world, in which we engaged to give France
dii^lomatic. support. No doubt we were pledged to give nothing but diplomatic
support; v.e were, at any rate, pledged by a definite public agreement, to
stand with France diplomatically in that question.

The present crisis has originated differently. It has not originated with
regard to Morocco. It has not originated as regards anything with which we
had a special agreement with France ; it has not originated with anything
which iDrimarily concerned France. It has originated in a dispute between
Austria and Servia. I can say this with the most absolute confidence — no
Government and no country has less desire to be involved in war over a dispute
with Austria and Servia than the Government and the country of France.
They are involved in it because of their obligation of honour under a definite
alliance with Russia. Well, it is only fair to say to the House that that
obligation of honour cannot apply in the same way to us. We are not parties
to the Franco-R-ussian Alliance, We do not even know the terms of that
alliance. vSo far I have, I think, faithfully and completely cleared the ground
V/ith regard to the question of obligation.

I now come to wliat we think the situation requires of us. For many years
we have had a long-standing friendship with France. I remember well the
feeling in the House — and my own feeling — for I spoke on the subject, I think,
when the late Government made their agreement with France— the warm and
cordial feeling resulting from the fact that those two nations, who had had per-
petual differences in the past, had cleared these differences away; I remember
saying, I think, that it. seemed to me that some benign influence had been at
work to produce the cordial atmosphere that had made that possible. But how
far that friendship entails obligation— it has been a friendship between the
nations and ratified by the nations— how far that entails an obligation, let every
man look into his own heart, and his own feelings, and construe the extent of
the obligation for himself. I construe it myself as I feel it, but I do not wish
to urge uDon anyone else more than their feelings dictate as to what they
should feel about the obligation. The House, individually and collectively, may
judge for itself. I speak my personal view, and I have given the House my
own feeling in the matter.

The French fleet is now in tho Mediterranean, and the northern and western

coasts of France are absolutely undefended. The French fleet being concen-
trated in the Mediterranean, the situation is very different from what it used
to be, because the friendship which has grown up between the two countries has
given them a sense of security that there was nothing to be feared frdm us.

The French coasts are absolutely undefended. The French fleet is in the
Mediterranean, and has for some years been concentrated there because of the
feeling of confidence and friendship which has existed between the two countries.
My own feeling is that if a foreign fleet, engaged in a war which France had not
sought, and in which she had not been the aggressor, came down the English
Channel and bombarded and battered the undefended coasts of France, we
could not stand aside, and see this going -on practically witliin sight of our eyes,
with our arms folded, looking on dispassionately, doing nothing. I believe, that
would be the feeling of this country. There are times when one feels that if
these circumstances actually did arise, it would be a feeling which would spread
with irresistible force throughout the land.

But I also want to look at the matter without sentiment, and from the point
of view of British interests, and it is on that that I am going to base and justify
what I ai. presently going to say to the House. -If we say nothing at this
moment, what is France to do with her fleet in the Mediterranean!'' If she
leaves it. there, with no statement from us as to what we v/ill do, she leaves her
northern and western coasts absolutely undefended, at the mercy of a German
fleet coming down the Channel to do as it pleases in a war which is a war of life
and death between them. If we say nothing, it may be that the French fleet
is withdrawn from the Mediterranean. We are in the presence of a European
conflagration ; can anj'body set limits to the consequences that may arise out of
it? Let us assume that to-day we stand g-side in an attitude of neutrality,
saying, "No, we cannot undertake and engage to help either party in this con-
flict." Let us suppose the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean;
and let us assume that the consequences— which are already tremendous in what
has happened in Europe even to countries which are at peace— in fact, equally
whether countries are at peace or at war — let us assume that out of that come
consequences unforeseen, which make it necessary at a sudden moment that, in
defence of vital British interests, we should go to war ; and let us assume — which
is quite possible— that Italy, who is now neutral — because^ as I understand, sho
considers that this war is an aggressive war, and the Triple Alliance being a
defensive alliance, her obligation did not arise — let us assume that consequences
which are not yet foreseen and which, perfectly legitimately consulting her own
interests, make Italy depart from her attitude of neutrality at a time when wo
are forced in defence of vital British interests ourselves to fight — what then will
be the position in the Mediterranean? It might be that at some critical
moment those consequences would be forced upon us because our trade routes
in the Meditemanean might be vital to this country.

. Nobody can say that in the course of the next few weeks there is any parti-
cular trade route, the keeping open of which may not be vital to this country.
What will be our position then? We have not kept a fleet in the Mediterranean
which is equal to dealing alone with a combination of other fleets in the Medi-
terranean. . It would be the very moment when we could not detach more ships
to the Mediterranean, and we might have exposed this country from our nega-
tive attitude at the present moment to the most appalling risk. " I say that from
the point of view of British interests, We feel strongly that France was entitled
to know— and to know at once — whether or not in the event of attack upon her
unprotected northern and western coasts she could depend upon British sup-
port. In that emergency, and in these compelling circumstances, yesterday
afternoon I gave to the French Ambassador the following statement :—

" I am authorised to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes into
the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile opera-
tions against the French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give
all the protection in its power. This assurance is, of course, subject
to the policy of His Majesty's Government recoiving the support of
Parhament, and must not be tnken as binding His Majesty's Govern-
ment to take any action until the above contingency of action by the
German fleet takes place."

I read that to the House, not as a declaration of war on our part, not as
entailing immediate aggressive action on our part, but as binding us to take
aggressive action should that contingency arise. Tilings move very hurriedly
from hour to hour. Fresh news comes in, and I cannot give this in any very formal

iray; but I understand that the German Government would be prepared, if we
would pledge ourselves to neutrality, to agree that its fleet would not attack
the noilbhern coast of France. I have only heard that shortly before I came
to tiie House, but it is far too narrow an engagement for us. And, Sir, there
IS the more serious consideration— becoming more serious every hour— there is
the question of the neutrality of Belgium.

I shall have to put before the House at some length what is our position in
regard to Belgium. The governing factor is the treaty of 1839, but this is a
treaty with a history— a history accumulated since. In 1870, when there was
war between France and Germany, the question of the neutrality of Belgium
arose, and various things were said. Amongst other things, Prince Bismarck
gave an assurance to Belgium that— confirming his verbal assurance, he gave in.
writing a declaration which he said was superfluous in reference to the treaty'
in existence— that the German Confederation and its allies would respect the
neutraUty of Belgium, it being always understood that that neutrality would
be respected by the other belligerent Powers. That i& valuable as a recognition
in 1870 on the part of Germany of the sacredness of these treaty rights.

What was our own attitude.^ The people who laid down the attitude of the
British Government were Lord Granville in the ^ouse of Lords and Mr.
Gladstone in the House of Commons. Lord Granville on the 8th August, 1870,
used these words. He said : —

'* We might have explained to the country and to foreign nations, that
we could not think this country v,'as bound either morally or inter-
nationally, or that its interests were concerned in the maintenance
of the neutrality of Belgium; though this course might have had
some conveniences, though it might have been easy to adhere to .it,
though it might have saved us from some immediate danger, it is a
course which Her Majesty's Government thought it impossible to
adopt in the name of the country with any due regard to the
country's honour or to the country's interests."
Mr. Gladstone spoke as follows two days later : —

" There is, I admit, the obligation of the treaty. It is not necessary, nor
would time permit me, to enter into the complicated question of the
nature of the obligations of that treaty ; but I am not able to sub-
scribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House what
plainly amounts to an assertion, that the simple fact of the existence
of a guarantee is binding on every party to it, irrespectively altogether
of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when
the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises. The great autliori-
ties upon foreign policy to whom I have been accustomed to listen,
such as Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston, never to my knowledge
took that rigid and, if I may venture to say so, that impracticable
view of the guarantee. The circumstance that there is already an
existing guarantee in force is, of -necessity, an important fact, and
a weighty clement in the. case, to which wo are bound to give full
and ample consideration. There is also this further consideration,
the force of which we must all feel most deeply, and that is, the
common interests against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any
Power whatever."
The treaty is an old treaty— 1839 — and that was the view taken of it in 1870.
It is one of those treaties which are founded, not only on consideration for
Belgium, Avhich benefits under the treaty, but in the interests of those who
guarantee the neutrality of Belgium. The honour and interests are, at least,
as strong to-day as in 1870, and we cannot take a more narrow view or a less
serious view of our obligations, and of the importance of those obligations, than
was taken by ]Mr. Gladstone's Government in 1870.

I will read to the House what took place last week on this subject. When
mobilisation was beginning, I knew that this question must be a most important
element in our policy — a most important subject for the House of Commons.
I telegraphed at the same time in similar terms to both Paris and Berlin to
say that it was essential for us to know whether the French and German
Governments respectively were prepared to undertake an engagement to respect
the neutrality of Belgium. These are the replies. I got from the French
Government this reply :—

"The French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of
Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power

violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the
necessity, in order to assure the defence of her security, to act other-
wise. This assurance has been given several times. The President
of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the
French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance
to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to-day."
From .the German Government the reply was : —

" The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs could not possibly give an
answer before consulting the Emperor and the Imperial Chancellor."
Sir Edward Goschen, to whom 1 had said it was important to have an answer
Joon,. said he hoped the answer would not be too long delayed. The German
Minister for Foreign Affairs then gave Sir Edward Goschen to understand that
lie rather doubted whether they could answer at all, as any reply they might
give could not fail, in the event of war, to have the undesirable effect of dis-
closing, to a certain extent, part of their plan of campaign. I telegraphed at
the same time to Brussels to the Belgian Government, and I got the following
reply from Sir Francis Villiers : —

"Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will observe and. uphold her
neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. In so-
informing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, in the event of the viola-
tion of the neutrality of their territory, they believed that they were in a posi-
tion to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations between Belgium
and her neighbours were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their
intentions; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to "be prepared against
emergencies."

It now appears from the news 1 have received to-day — which has come quite
recently, and I am not yet quite sure how far it has reached me in an accurate
form— that an ultimatum has been given to Belgium by Germany, the object
of which was to offer Belgium friendly relations with Germany on condition
that she would facilitate the passage of German troops through Belgium,
Well, Sir, until o;ie has these things absolutely definitely, up to the last moment,
I do not Avish to say all that one would say if one were in a position to give
the House full, complete, and absolute informatix)n upon the points We were
sounded in the course of last week as to whether, if a guarantee were given
that, after the war, Belgian integrity would be preserved, that would content
lis. We replied that we could not bargain away whatever interests or obliga-
tions we had in Belgian neutrality.

Shortly before I reached the House I was informed that the following
telegram had been received from the King of the Belgians by bur King — King
George : —

"Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and
that of your predecessors, and the friendly attitude of England in
1870, and the proof of friendship she has just given us again, I
make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your
Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium."
Diplomatic intervention took place last week on our part. What can
diplomatic intervention do now? We have groat and vital interests in the
independence— and integrity is the least part, — of Belgium. If Belgium is
compelled to submit to allov/ her neutrality to be violated, of course the
situation is clear. Even if by agreement she admitted the violation of her
neutrality, it is clear she could only do so under duress. The smaller States
in that region of Europe ask but one thing. Their one desire is that they
should be left alone and independent. The one thing they fear is, I think,
not so much that their integrity but that their independence should be inter-
fered with. If in this war which is before Europe the neutrality of one of
those countries is violated, if the troops of one of the combatants violate its
neutrality arid nonaction be taken to resent it,. at the end of the war, whatever
the integrity may be, the independence will be gone.

I have one further quotation from Mr. Gladstone as to Vvhathe thought
about the independence of Belgium. It will be found in "Hansard," vohuno
203, p. 1787. I have not had time to read the whole speech and verify the
context, but the thing seems to me so clear that no context could inake any
difference to the meaning of it. Mr. Gladstone said;-

"We have an interest in the independence of Belgium, which is wider
than that which we may have in the literal operation of the.
guarantee. It is found in the answer to the question whether, under-

the circumstances of tho, case, this country, endowed as ft is with
influence and power, would quietly stand by and witness the perpe-
tration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history,
and thus become participators in the sin."

No, Sir, if it be the case that there has been anything in the nature of in
ultimatum to Belgium, asking her to compromise or violate her neutrality,
whatever may have been ottered to her in return, her independence is gone
if that holds. If her independence goes, the independence of Holland v/ill
follow. I ask the House from the point of view of British interests to consider
what may "be at stake. If France is beaten in a struggle of life and death,
beaten to her knees, loses, her position as a great Power, becomes subordinate to
the will and power of one greater than herself — consequences which I do not
anticipate, because 1 am sure that France has the power to defend herself
with all the energy and ability and patriotism which she has shown so often —
still, if that weie to happen, and if Belgium fell under the same dominating
influence, and then Holland, and then Denmark, then would not Mr. Glad-
stone s words come true, that just opposite, to us there would be a common
interest against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any Power?

It may be said, I suppose, that we might stand aside, husband our strength,
and that, whatever happened in the course of this war, at the end of it
intervene with effect to put things right, and to adjust them to our own point
of view. If, in a crisis like this, we run away from those obligations of
honour and interest as regards the Belgian treaty, I doubt whether, whatever
material force we might have at the end, it would be of very much value in
face of the respect that we should have lost. .And do not believe, whether a
great Power stands outside this war or not, it is going to be. in a position at
the end of it to exert its superior strength. For us, with a. powerful fleet,
which we believe able to protect our commerce, to protect our shores, and to
protect our interests, if we are engaged in war, we shall suffer but little more
than we shall suffer even if we stand aside.

We are going to suffer, I am afraid, terribly in this war, whether we are
in it or whether we stand aside. Foreign trade is going -to stop, not because
the trade routes are closed, but because there is no trade at the other end.
Continental nations engaged in war — all their populations, all their energies,
all their wealth, engaged in a desperate struggle — they cannot carry on the
trade with us that they are carrying on in times of peace, whether we are
parties to the war or whether we are not. I do not believe for a moment that
at the end of this war, even if we stood aside and remained aside, we should be
in a position, a material position, to use our force decisively to undo what
had happened in the course of the war, to prevent the whole of the West of
Europe opposite to us — if that had been the result of the war — falling uiidor
the domination of a single Power, and I am quite sure that our moral position
^would be such as to have lost us all respect. I can only say that I have put
the question of Belgium somewhat hypothetically, because 1 am not yet sure
of all the facts, but, if the facts turn out to be as they have reached us at
present, it is quite clear that there is an obligation on this country to xlo its
utmost to prevent the consequences to which those facts will lead 4f they are
undisputed.

i have read to the House the only engagements that we have yet talvcn:
definitely with regard to the use of force. I think it is due to the House to
say that we have taken no engagement yet with regard to sending an expedi-
tionary armed force out of the country. Mobilisation of the fleet has taken
place ; mobilisation of the army is taking place ; but we have as yet taken no
engagement, because I feel that — in the case of a European conflagration such
as this, unprecedented, with our enormous responsibilities in India and other
parts of the Empire, or in countries in British occupation, with all the unknown
factors — we must take very carefully into consideration the use which we make
of sending an expeditionary force out of the country until wo know how we
stand. One thing I would say.

The one bright spot in the whole of this terrible situation is Ireland. Tlio
general feeling throughout Ireland — and I would like this to bo clearly under-
stood abroad — does not make the Irish question a consideration which wo feel
we have now to take into account. I have-told the House hov/ far wc-havc at
present gone in commitments and the conditions which influence our policy, .ind
I have put to the House and dwelt at length upon how vital is the condition
of the neutrality of Belgium.

What other poliov is there before the Hourp? There is but one way in which

the Government could make certain at the present moment of keeping outside
this war, and that would be that it should immediately issue a proclamation of
unconditional neutrality. We cannot do that. We have made the commitment'
to France that I have read to the House which prevents us doing that. We
have got the consideration of Belgium which prevents us also from any uncon-
ditional neutrality, and, without these conditions absolutely satisfied and satis-
factory, we are bound not to shrink from proceeding to the i^e of all the force's
in our power. If we did take that line by saying, " We will have nothing what-
ever to do with this matter " under no conditions— the Belgian treaty obliga-
tions, the possible position in the Mediterranean, with damage to British
interests, and what may happen to France from our failure to support France —
if we were to say that all those things mattered nothing, were as notliing, and
to say we would stand aside, we should, I believe, sacrifice our respect and good
name and reputation before the world, and should not escape the most serious
and grave economic consequences.

My object has been to explain the view of the Government, and to place
before the House the issue and the choice. I do not for a moment conceal, after
what I have said, and after the information, incomplete as it is, that I have
given to the House with regard to Belgium, that wo must be prepared, and we
are prepared, for the consequences of having to use all the strength we have
at any moment— we know not how soon— to defend ourselves and to take our
part. We know, if the facts all be as I have stated them, though I have
announced no intending aggressive action on our part, no final decision to resort
to force at a moment's notice, until we know the whole of the case, that the use
of it may be forced upon us. As far as the forces of the Crown are concerned,,
we are ready. I believe the Prime Minister and my right lion, friend the First
Lord of the Admiralty have no doubt whatever tliat the readiness and the
efficiency of those forces Avere never at a higher mark than they are to-day, and
never was there a time when confidence was more justified in the power of the
navy to protect our commerce and to protect our shores. The thought is with
us always of the suffering and misery entailed, from which no country in Europe
will escape by abstention, and from which no neutrality will save us. The
amount of harm that can be done by an enemy ship to our trade is infinitesimal,
compared with the amount of harm that must be done by the economic con-
dition that is caused on the Continent.

The most awful responsibility is resting upon the Government in deciding
what to advise the Holise of Commons to do. W^e have disclosed our mind to
the House of Commons. We have disclosed the issue, the information which
we have, and made clear to the House, I trust, that we are prepared to face
that situation, and that should it develop, as probably it may develop, we will
face it. We worked for peace up to the last moment, and beyond the last
moment. How hard, how persistently, and how earnestly we strove for peace
last week the House will see from the papers that will be before it.

But that is over, as far as the peace of Europe is concerned. Wo are now
face to face with a situation and all the consequences Avhich it may yet have to
unfold. We believe we shall have the support of the House at largo in pro-
ceeding to whatever the consequences maj' be and whatever measures may be
forced upon us by the development of facts or action takeii by others. I believe
the country, so quickly has the situation been forced upon it, has not had time
to realise the issue. It perhaps is still thinking of the quarrel between Austria
and Servia, and not the complications of this matter which have grown out of
the quarrel between Austria and Servia. Russia and Germany we know arc
at war. We do not yd know officially that Austria, the ally whom Germany,
is to support, is yet at war v.ith Russia. We know that a good deal has been
happening on the French frontier. We do not know that the German Ambas-
sador has left Paris.

The situation has developed so rapidly that technically, ias regards the con-
dition of the war, it is most difficult to describe what has actually happened. I
wanted to bring out the underlying issues which would affect our own conduct,
and our own policy, and to put them clearly. I have now put the vital facts before
the House, and if, as seems not improbable, we are forced, and rapidly forced,
to take our stand upon those issues, then I believe, when the country realises '
what is at stake, what the real issues are, the magnitude of the impending
dangers in the West of Europe, which I have endeavoured to describe to the
House, we shall be supported throughout, not only by the House of Commons,
but by the determination, the resolution, the courage, and the endurance of the
whole country.

(2) FURTHER STATEMENT MADE BY SIR EDWARD GREY IN THE
HOUSE OF COMMONS. AUGUST 3, 1914.

Germany and Belgium.
I want to give the House some information which I have received, and which
was not in my possession when I made my statement this afternoon. It is
information I have received from the Belgian Legation in London, and is to
the following effect —

" Germany sent yesterday evening at 7 o'clock a note proposing to
Belgium friendly neutrality, covering free passage on Belgian terri-
tory, and promising maintenance of independence of the kingdom
and possession at the conclusion of peace, and threatening, in case of
refusal, to treat Belgium as an enemy. A time limit of twelve hours
was fixed for the reply Tlie Belgians have answered that an attack
on their neutrality would be a flagrant violation of the rights of
nations, and that to accept the German proposal would be to sacri-
fice the honour of a nation. Conscious of its duty, Belgium is
firmly resolved to repel aggression by all possible means.'*
Of course, I can only say that the Government are prepared to take into
grave consideration the information which it has received I make no further
comment upon it

(3) STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE OP
COMMONS, AUGUST 4, 1914.

Mr Bonar Law — I wish to ask the Prime Minister whether he has any
statement that he can now make to the House?

The Prime Minister (Mr Asquith). — In conformity with the statement of
policy made here by my right hon friend the Foreign Secretary yesterday, a,
telegram was early this morning sent by him to our Ambassador in Berlin.
It was to this effect —

" The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King
for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium. His Majesty's
Government are also informed that the German Government has
delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly
neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and
promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the king-
dom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in
case of refusal to treat Belgium as an encmy> An answer was
requested witlim twelve hours. We also understand that Belgium
has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of
nations His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against
tjiis violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common
with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand
made upon Belgium may not be proceeded with, and that her
neutrality will be respected by Germany Yon should ask for an
immediate reply."
We received this morning from our Minister at Brussels the following
telegram —

"German Minister has this morning addressed note to the Belgian
Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that, as Belgian Government-
have declined the well-intended proposals submitted to them by the
Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be
compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures
considered rndispensable in view of the French menaces."
Simultaneously — almost immediately afterwards — we received from the
Belgian Legation here m London the following telegram —

'General staff announces that territory has been violated at Gemmenich
(near Aix-la-Chapelle).'*
Subsequent information tended to show that the German force has pene-
trate J still further into Belgian territory We also received this morning from
the Go'man Ambassador here the telegram sent to him by the German Foreign
Secretary, and communicated by the Ambassador to us. It is in these terms —
" Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British
Government with regard to our intentions by repeating most posi-

tively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with
Belgium, Germany will, under no i^retence whatever, annex Belgian
territory. Sincerity of this, declaration is borne out by fact that
we -solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her
neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgic
territory withou.t mak-ing at the same time territorial acquisitions
at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that
German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium,
which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable informa-
tion. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian" neutrality,
it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French
advance."
I have to add this on behalf of His Majesty's Government: "VVe cannot
regard this as in any sense a satisfactory communication. We have, in reply,
to it, repeated the request we made last week to the German Government, that
they should give us the same assurance in regard 'to Belgian neutrality as was
given to us and to Belgium by France last week. Wo have asked that a reply
to that request and a satisfactory answer to the telegram of this porning—
which I have read to the House— should be given before midnight.

(4) STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE OF
COMMONS, AUGUST 5, 1914.
Mr. Jionar Xau'.— May I ask the Prime IMinister if he has any information
he can give us to-day?

TJiC Frimc Minisfcr.— Our Ambassador at Berlin received his passports at
7 o'clock last evening, and shice 11 o'clock last night a state of war has existed
between Germany and ourselves.

We have received from our Minister at Brussels the following telegram : —
"I have just received from Minister for Foreign Affairs"
—that is the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs—

" a note of which the following is a literal translation : —
"'Belgian Government regret to have to inform His Majesty's Govern-
ment that this morning armed forces of Germany penetrated into
Belgian territory in violation of engagements assumed by treaty.
" * Bel<j;ian Government are further resolved to resist by all moans in their

l>ower.
"'Belgium appeals to Great Britain and Franco and Russia to co-
operate, as guarantors, in defence of her territory.
" ' There would be concerted and common action with the object of
resisting the forcible measures employed by Germany against Bel-
gium, and at the samo time of guarding the maintenance for future
of the independence and integrity of Belgium.
" ' Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will assume defence
of her fortified places.' "
We have also received to-day from the French Ambassador hero the follow-
ing telegram received by the French Government from the French Minister at
Brussels : —

"The Chef du Cabinet of the Belgian Ministry of War has asked the

French military attache to prepare at once for the co-operation and

contact of French troops with the Belgian army pending the results

of the appeal to the guaranteeing Powers nov/ being made. Order:S

have therefore been given to Belgian provincial Governors not to

regard movements of French troops as a violation of the frontier."

This is all the information I am at the moment able to give to the House,

but I take the opportunity of giving notice that to-morrow, in Committee of

Supply, I sliall move a vote of credit of 100,000,OOOZ.

(5) STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE OF
COMMONS, AUGUST 6, 1914.
Motion made, and Question proposed, "That a sum, not exceeding
£100,000.000, be granted to His Majesty, beyond the ordinary grants of Parlia-
ment, towards defraying expenses that may be incurred during the year ending
March 31st, 1915, for all measures which may be taken for the security of the

country, for the conduct of Naval and Military operations, for assisting the food
supply, for promoting the continuance of trade, industry, and business com-
munications, whether by means of insurance or indemnity against risk, or other-
wise for the relief of distress, and generally for all expenses arising out of the
existence of a state of war "

The Frime Minister {Mr Asquith) —In asking the House to agree to the
resolution which i^Ir Speaker has just read from the Chair, I do not propose,
because I do not think it is in any way necessary, to traverse the ground again
which was covered by my right hon friend the Foreign Secretary two or three
nights ago He stated— and I do not think any of the statements he made are
capable of answer and certainly have not yet been answered — the grounds upon
which, with the utmost reluctance and with infinite regret, His Majesty's
Government have bccii compelled to put this country in a state of war with
what, for many years and indeed generations past, has been a friendly Power,
But, Sir, the papers which have since been presented to Parliament, and which
are now in the hands ot hon Members, will, I think, show how strenuous, how
unremitting, how persistent, even when the last glimmer of hope seemed to
have faded away, were the efforts "of my right hon. friend to secure for Europe
an honourable and a lasting peace. Everyone knows, in the great crisis which
occurred last year m the East of Europe, it was largely, if not mainly, by the
acknowledgment of all Europe, due to the steps taken by my right hon. friend
that the area of the conflict was limited, and that, so far as the great Powers
are concerned, peace was maintained. If his efforts upon this occasion have,
unhappily, been less successful, I am certain that this House and the country,
and I will add posterity and history, will accord to 'him what is, after all, the
best tribute that can be paid to any statesman ; that, never derogating for
an instant or by an inch from tlie honour and interests of his own country, he
has striven, as few men have striven, to maintain and preserve the greatest
interest of all countries — universal peace. These papers which are now in the
hands of hon Members show something more than that. They show what were
the terms which were offered to us in exchange for our neutrality. I trust that
not only the Members of this House, but all our fellow-subjects everywhere, will
read the communications, will read, learn and mark the communications which
passed only a week ago to-day between Berlin and London in this matter. The
terms by which it was sought to buy our neutrality are contained in the com-
munication made by the German Chancellor to Sir Edward Goschen on the
29th July. No. 85 of the published Paper.* I think I must refer to them for
a moment. After referring to the state of things as between Austria and
Eussia. Sir Edward Gosclien goes on —

"He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neu-
trality He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the
main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain
would never stand by and allow France to be ct-ushed in any conflict
there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Ger-
many aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were cer-
tain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that
the Imperial Government "

Let the House observe these words —

"aimed at no territorial acquisition at the expense of France should
they prove victorious in any war that might ensue."

Sir Edv/ard Goschen proceeded to put a very pertinent question :—

"I questioned His Excellency about the French colonies"

AVhat are the French colonies? They mean every part of the dominions and
possessions of France outside the geographical area of Europe —

" and ho said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that
respect."
Jjct me come to what, in my mmd, personally, has always been tlie crucial, and
almost the governing consideration, namely, the position of the small States : —
"As regards Holland, however, His Excellency said that so long as Ger-
many's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the
Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government
an assurance that she would do likewise."
Then we come to Belgium; : —

"It dtsponded upon the action of France what operations Germany might
be forced to enter 'upon in Belgium, but, when the war was over^
Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against
Germany."

* See Part II, No. 85. page 64.

100

Lot the House observe the distinction between those two cases. In regard to
Holhmd it was not only independence and integrity but also neutrality ; but m
regard to Belgium, there was no mention of neutrality at all, nothing but an
assurance that after the war came to an end the integrity of Belgium would
be respected. Then His Excellency added :—

"Ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been to

bring about an understanding with England. He trusted that these

assurances "

the assurances I have read out to the House —

"might form the basis of that understanding which he so much

desired."

What docs that amount to? Let me just ask the House. • I do so, not with the
object of inflaming passion, certainly not with the object of exciting feeling
against Germany, but I do so to vindicate and make clear the position of the
British Government in this matter. What did that proposal amount to? In
the first place, it meant this: That behind the back of France— they were not
made a party to these communications— we should have given, if we had assented
to that, a free licence to Germany to annex, in the event of a successful war,
the whole of the extra-European dominions and possessions of France. What
did it mean as regards Belgium ? When she addressed, as she has addressed in
these last few days, her moving appeal to us to fulfil our solemn guarantee of
her neutrality, what reply should we have given ? What reply should we have
given to that Belgian appeal? We should have been obliged to say that, with-
out her knowledge, we had bartered away to the Power threatening her our
obligation to keep our plighted word. The House has read, and the country
has read, of course, in the last few hours, the most pathetic appeal addressed
by the King of Belgium, and I do not envy the man who can read that appeal
with an unmoved heart. . Belgians are fighting and losing their lives. What
would have been the position of Great Britain to-day in the face of that spec-
tacle, if we had assented to this infamous proposal? Yes, and what are we to
get in return for the betrayal of our friends and the dishonour of our obliga-
tions? What are we to get in return? A promise — nothing more; a promise
as to what Germany would do in certain eventualities ; a promise, be it observed
— I am sorry to have to say it, but it must be put upon record — given by a Power
which was at that very moment announcing its intention to violate its own treaty
and inviting us to do the same. I can only say, if we had dallied or temporised,
we, as a Government, should have covered ourselves with dishonour, and we
should have betrayed the interests of this country, of v/hich we are trustees. I
am glad, and I think the country will be glad, to turn to the reply which my
right hon. friend made, and of which I will read to the House two of the more
salient passages.. This document. No. 101 of my Paper,* puts on record a week
ago the attitude of the British Government, and, as I believe, of the British
people. My right hon. friend saj's:—

"His ^Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chan-
cellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on
such terms. What he asks us in eflect is to engage to stand by while
French Colonies are taken if France is beaten, so long as Germany
does not take French territory as distinct from the Colonies. From

the material point of view "

My right hon. friend, as he always does, used very temperate language: —

"such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further terri-
tory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose
her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German
policy."

That is the material aspect. But he proceeded : —

"Altogether, apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this
bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from
which the good name of this country would never recover. The
Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation
or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could
not entertain that bargain either."

He then says:—

"We must preserve our full freedom to act, as circumstances may seem
to us to require."

And he added, I think, in sentences which the House will appreciate : —

"You should . . J add most earnestly that the one way of main-
tnining the good relations between England and Germany is that

* Sec Part II, No. 101, page 77.

101 /

they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of
Europe. . . . For that object this Government will work in that
way With all sincerity and good will.
If the peace ci Europe can be preserved and the present crisis safely
passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to
which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that
no aggressive or hostile pr-licy would be, pursued against her or her
allies by France, Russia,* and ourselves, jointly or separately. I

have dosired this and worked for it"

"as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis and Germany

having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved.

The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of

definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute

than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely

passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow

may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the

Powers than has been possible hitherto."

That document, in my opinion, states clearly, in temperate and convincing

language the attitude of this Government. Can anyone who reads it fail to

appreciate the tone of obvious sincerity and earnestness which underlies it ; can

anyone honestly doubt that the Government of this country in spite of great

provocation — and I regard the proposals made to us as proj)osals which we

might have thrown aside without consideration and almost without answer-^

can anyone doubt that in spite of great provocation the right hon. Gentleman,

who had already earned the title — and no one ever more deserved it — of Peace

Maker of Europe, persisted to the very last moment of the last hour in that

beneficent but unhappily frustrated purpose ? I am entitled to say, and I do

so on behalf of this country — I speak not for a party, I speak for the country

as a whole— that we made every effort any Government could possibly make for

peace. But this war has been forced upon us. What is it we are fighting for?

Every one knows, and no one knows better than the Government, the terrible

incalculable suffering, economic, social, personal and political, which war, and

especially a war between the Great Powers of the world, must entail. There

is no man amongst us sitting upon this bench in these trying days — more trying

perhaps than any body of statesmen for a hundred years have had to pass

through, there is not a man amongst us who has not, during the whole of that

time, had clearly before his vision the almost unequalled suffering which war,

even in a just cause, must bring about, not only to the peoples who are for the

moment living in this country and in the other countries of the world, but to

posterity and to the whole prospects of European civilisation. Every step we

took we took with that vision before our eyes, and with a sense of responsibility

which it is impossible to describe. Unhappily, if — in spite of all our efforts to

keep the peace, and with that full and overpowering consciousness of the

result, if the issue be decided in favour of war — ^we have, nevertheless, thought

it to be the duty as well as the interest of this country to go to war, the House

may be well assured it was because we believe, and I am certain the country will

believe, we are unsheathing our sword in a just cause.

If I am asked what we are fighting for, I reply in two sentences. In the
first place to fulfil a solemn international obligation, an obligation which, if it
had been entered into between private persons in the ordinary concerns of life,
would have been regarded as an obligation not only of law but of honour, which
no self-respecting man could possibly have repudiated. I say, secondly, we are
fighting to vindicate the principle which, in these days when force, material
force, sometimes seems to be the dominant influence and factor in the develop-
ment of mankind, we are fighting to vindicate the principle thai; small nation-
alities are not to be crushed, in defiance of international good faith,, by the
arbitrary will of a' strong and over-mastering Power. I do not believe any
nation ever entered into a great controversy — and this is one of the greatest
history will ever know — with a clearer conscience and stronger conviction that
it is fighting not for aggression, not for the maintenance even of its own selfish
interest, but that it i« fighting in defence of principles, the maintenance of
which is vital to the civilisation of the world. With a full conviction, not only
of the wisdom and justice, but of the obligations which lay upon us to challenge
this great issue, we are entering into the struggle. Let us now make sure that
all the resources, not only of this United Kingdom, but of the vast Empire of •
Which it is the centre, shall be thrown into the scale, and it is that that object
may be adequately secured that I am now about to ask this Committee — to
make the very unusual demand upon it — to give the Government a Vote of
Credit of 100,000,OOOL I am not going, and I am sure the Committee do nob
wish it, into the technical distinctions between Votes of Credit and Supple-

102

mentary Estimates and all the rarities and refinements which arise in that
connection. There is a much higher point of view than that. If it were neccsr
sary, I could justify, upon purely technical grounds, the course we propose to
adopt, but I am not going to do so, because I think it would be foreign to the
temper and disposition of the Committee. There is one thing to which I do
call attention, that is, the Title and Heading of the Bill. As a rule, in the
past, Votes of this kind have been taken simply for naval and military opera-
tions, but we have thought it right to ask the Committee to give us its confi-
dence in the extension of the traditional area of Votes of Credit so that this
money, which we are asking them to allow us to expend, may be applied not
only for strictly naval and military operations, but tp assist the food supplies,
promote the continuance of trade^ industry, business, and communications —
whether by means of insurance or indemnity against risk or otherwise— for the
relief of distress, and generally for all expenses arising out of thcj existence of
a state of war. I believe the Committee will agree with us that it was wise to
extend the area of the Vote of Credit so as to include all these various matters.
It gives the Government a free hand. Of course, the Treasury will account for
it, and any expenditure that takes place will be subject to the approval of tho
House. I think it would be a great pity— in fact, a great disaster— if, in a
crisis of this magnitude, we were not enabled to make provision — provision far
more needed now than it was under the simpler conditions that prevailed in the
old days — for all the various ramifications and developments of expenditure
whicli the existence of a state of war between the great Powers of Europe must
entail on any one of them.

I am asking also in my character of Secretary of State for War— a position
which I held until this morning— for a Supplementary Estimate for men for
the Army. Perhaps the. Committee will allow me for a moment just to say on
that personal matter that I took upon myself the office of Secretary of State for
War under conditions, upon which I need not go back but which are fresh in
the'-minds of everyone, in the hope and with the object that the condition of
things in the Army, which all of u& deplored, might speedily be brought to an
end and complete confidence re-established. I believe that is the case ; in fact,
I know it to be. There is no more loyal and united body, no body in which the
spirit and habit of discipline are more deeply ingrained and cherished than in
the British Army. Glad as I should have been to continue the work of that"
office, and I would have done so under normal conditions, it would not be fair
to the Army, it would not be just to the country, that any Minister should
divide his attention between that Department and another," still less that tho
First Minister of the Crown, who has to look into the affairs of all departments
and who is ultimately responsible for the whole policy of the Cabinet, should
give, as he could only give, perfunctory attention to the affairs of our Army
in a great war. I am very glad to say that a very distinguished soldier ana
administrator, in the person of Lord Kitchener, with that great public spirit
and patriotism that everyone would expect from him, at my request stepped
into the breach. Lord Kitchener, as everyone knows, is not a politician. His
association with the Government as a Member of the Cabinet for this purpose
must not be taken as in any way identifying him with any set of political
opinions. He has, at. a great public emergency, responded to a great public
call, and I am certain he will have with him, in the discharge of one of the
most arduous tasks that has ever fallen upon a Minister, the complete confi-
dence of all parties and all opinions.

I am asking on his behalf for the Army, power to increase the number of
men of all ranks, in addition to the number already voted, by no' less than
500,000. I am certain the Committee will not refuse its sanction, for we are
encouraged to ask for it not only by our own sense of the gravity and the
necessities of the case, but by the knowledge that India is prepared to send
us certainly two Divisions, and that every one of our self-governing Dominions,"
spontaneously and imasked, has already tendered to the utmost limits of theii;

Sossibilities, both in men and in monev, every help they can afford to the
mpire in a moment of need. Sir, the Mother Country must set the example,
while she responds with gratitude and affection to those filial overtures from
the outlying members of her family.

^11^' J will say no more. This is not an occasion for controversial discussion.
In all that I have said, I believe I have not gone, either in the statement of our
case or in my general descriotion of the provision we think it necessary to make,
beyond the strict bounds of truth. It is not my purpose— it is not the purpose
of any patriotic man— to inflame feeling, to indulge in rhetoric, to excite inter-
rational animosities. The occasion is far too grave for that. We have a great
duty to perform, we have a great trust to fulfil, and confidently we believe that
Parliament and the country will enable us to do it.

BAZELL, WATSON AND VINEY, LD., LONDON AND AYLESBURY. PRINTERS BY APPOINTMENT TO
HIS MAJESTY THE KING.

wmtM m mum Mmim.

RECUEIL

DE DOCUMENTS DIPLONATIIlllES.

lV6^oeialions ayani preeede la guerre.

% Juillet - ", S" 1914.

Retrograde,

Imprimerie de V Etat.

1914.

he Charge d'aflTaire^ eii Serbia au AUnistre de» ItTaires

Etrang^res.

Belgrade, le >%s Juillet 1914.

(T^ldgramme).

Le Ministre d'Autriche vient de transmettre, k 6 heures du
soir, au Ministre dee Finances Patchou, qd remplace Pachitch, une
note ultimative de son Gouveraement f ixant un d61ai de 48 heures pour
Tacceptation des demandes y contenues. Giesl a ajoute verbalement
que pour le cas oii la note ne serait pas acceptee int^gralement dans
un d41ai de 48 heures, il avait Tordre de quitter Belgrade avec le
personnel de la Legation. Pachitch et les autres Ministres qui se
trouvent en toum^e 61ectoraIe ont 6t^ rappel^s et sont attendus k
Belgrade demain Vendredi k 10 heures du matin. Patchou qui m'a
communique le contenu de la note, sollicite Taide de la Russia
et d^lare qu'aucun Grouvemement Serbe tfe pourra accepter les
demandes de rAutriche

(Sign6) Strandtman.

^2.

Le Charge d'aflUres en Serble au Ministre des AflUres

Etrangdres*

Belgrade, le "/„ Juillet 1914.

(T^ldgramme).

Textedela note qui a 4t6 transmis** anjonrd'hui par le Ministre
d^Autriche-Hongrie au gouvemement Serbe:

Le 31 Mars 1909 le Ministre de Serbie 4 Vienne a fait, d'ordre

de son Gouvemement, au Gouvemement Let R.la declaration suivante:

La Serbie reconnait qu'elle n'a pas ete atteinte dans ses droits

par le fait accompli cr^e en Bosnie Herz^govine et qu'elle se conformera

par consequent a telle decision que les Puissances prendront par
rapi)ort k Tarticle 25 du Traite de Berlin. Se rendant aux Conseils
des Grandes Puissances, laSerbie s'engagodes a present k abandtmnei
Pattitude de protestation et opposition qu'elle a observee- k Pegard
de Pannexion depuis Pautoume dernier, et elle sVngage, en outre,
a changer le cours de sa politique actuelle envers PAutriche-Hongrie
pour vivTe desormais avec cette demiere sur le pied d'un bon voisinage*.

Or, Phistoire des demieres ann^es, et not^mment les 6venenients
douloureux du 28 Juin, ont d^montre Pexistence en Serbie d'un
mouvement subversif dont le but est de detacher de la Monarchie
Austro-Hongroise eertaines parties de ses territoires. Ce mouvement
qui a pris jour sous les yeux du Gouvemement Serbe est arrive a
se manifester au dela du territoire du Eoyaume par des actes de terro-
risrae, par une s4rie d'aftentats et par des meurtres.

Le Gouvemement Royal Serbe, loin de satisfaire aux engagements
formels contenus dans la declaration du 31 Mars 1909, n'h rien fait
pour supprimer ce mouvement: il a tol^re Pactivit6 criminelle des
diff^rentes soci^tfe et affiliations dirigees contre la Monarchic, le
langage effr^nede la presse, la glorification des auteursde Pattentat,
la participation d'officiers et de fonctionnaires dans les agissements
subversifs, une propagande malsaine dans Pinstruction publique,
tol^re enfin toutes les manifestations qui pouvaient induire la popula-
tion serbe k la haine de la Monarchie et au mepris de ses institutions.

Cette tolerance coupable du Gouvemement Eoyal de Serbie
n'avait pas cess6 au moment oik les 4venements du 28 Juin demier en
ont dtoontr^ au monde entier les consequences funestes:

II r^sulte des depositions et aveux des auteurs criminels de Patten-
tat du 28 Juin que le meurtre de Sarajevo a ^t^ tram6 k Belgrade,
que les armes et explosifs dont les meurtri^rs se trouvaient etre munis,
leur ont et6 donn6s par des officiers et fonctionnaires Serbes faisant
])artie de la oNarodna Odbrana* et enfin que le passage en Bosnic
des criminels et de leurs annes a 6t4 organist et effectu6 par des chefs
du ser\ice-frontiere serbe.

Les r^sultats mentionnes de Pinstmction ne pemiettent pas
au Gouvemement I. et R. de poursuivre plus longtemps Pattitude
de longanimity expectative qu'il avait observe pendant des amines
vis-^-vis des agissements concentres a Belgrade et propag^s de \k sur
les territoires de la Monarchie; ces resultats lui imposent au contraire

— 4 —

le devoir de inettre fin k des nieiiees qui foriiieiit une menace perpe-
tuelle pour la tranquillite de la Monarchic.

Cost pour atteindre ce but que le Gouvemement I. et R. se voit
oblige de demander au Gouvemement Serbe T^nonciation officiclle
qu'il condamne la propagande dirigee contra la Monarchic Austro-
Hongroise, c'est a dire, I'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en
dernier lieu a detacher de la Monarchic des territoires qui en font
partic, et qu'il s'engage a supprimer, par tous les moyens, cettc pro-
pagande criminelle et terroriste.

Afin de donner un caractdre solennel a cet engagement, le Gouver-
nement Royal de Serbie fera publier a la premiere page du journal
officiel en date du 26/13 Juillet T^nonciation suivaiite:

«Le Gouvemement Royal de Serbie condamne la propaganda
dirigee contre TAutriche-Hongrie, c'est a dire Tensemble des ten-
dances qui aspirent en demier lieu a detacher de la Monarchic Austro-
Hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il deplore sincerement
les consequences funestes de ces agissements criminels.

Le Gouvemement Royal regrette que des officiers et fonction-

naires serbes aient particip6 a la propagande susmentionn^e et com*

l)romis par la les relations de bon voisinage auquel le Gouvemement

! Royal s'6tait solennellement engage par sa declaration du 31 Mars 1909.

^ Le Gouvemement Royal, qui d^sapprouve et r^pudie toute id6e

ou tentative dMmmixtion dans les destinies des habitants de

quelque partie de TAutriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considere de son

devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers, les fonctionnaires et toute la

.population du Royaume que dor^navant il procedera avec la der-

niere rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils

agissements, agissements qu'il mettra tous ses efforts a prevenir et

a r^primer^.

Cette ^nonciation sera portee simultan^ment k la connaissance
de TArm^e Royale par im ordre du jour de Sa Majesty le Roi et sera
publiee dans le bulletin officiel de TArmee.

Le Gouvemement Royal Serbe s'engage en outre:

1) i supprimer toute publication qui excite k la haine et au mepris
de la Monarchic et dont la tendance g^n^rale est dirig^^ contre son
integrity territoriale,

2) a dissoudre imniediatement la soci§t4 ditc «Narodna Odbrana».
a confisquer tous ses moyens de propagande et k procedor de la meme

inauiere contre les autres societes et affiliations en Serbie qui
sadonnenta la propiigande contre la Monarchie Austro-Hongroise; le
Gouvemement Royal prendra les mesures n6cessaires pour que les
soci§t§s dissoutes ne puissent pas continuer leur activity sous un
autre nom et sous une autre forme,

3) a 6liininer sans d61ai de Tinstruction publique en Serbie,
tant en ce qui conceme le corps enseignant que les moyens d'instruc-
tion, tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir 4 fomenter la propagande
contre FAutriche-Hongrie,

4) a Eloigner du service militaire et de Tadministration en g6n6-
ral tous les officiors et fonctionnaires coupables de la propagande
contre la Monarchie Austro-Hongroise et dont le Gouvernement I. et
R. se reserve de comrauniquer les noms et les faits au Gouvemement
Royal,

5) h accepter la collaboration en Serbie des organes du Gou-
vemement I. et R. dans la suppression du mouvement subversif
dirig§ contre Tint^grit^ territoriale de la Monarchie,

6) k ouvrir line enquete judiciaire contre les partisans du com^
plot du 28 Juin se trouvant sur territoire serbe;

des organes del^^s par le Gouvemement I. et R. prendront
part aux recherches y relatives;

7) k proceder d'urgence k Tarrestation du commandant Voija
Tankosic et du nomm^ Milan Ciganovic, employ^ de T^tat Serbe ^
compromis par les r6sultats de Tinstmction de Sarajevo,

8) k empecher, par des mesures efficaces le concours des autorit^s
Serbes dans le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs k travers la fron-
tiere,

k licencier et punir s^verement les fonctionnaires du service
frontiere de Schabatz et de Loznica coupables d*avoir aid6 les auteurs
du crime de Sarajevo en leur facilitant le passage de la frontito,

9) a donner au Gouvemement I. et R. des explications sur les
prupos injustifiables de hauts fonctionnaires serbes tant en Serbie
qu'4 r^tranger qui, malgr6 leurs positions officielles, n'ont pas h^site
apres Tattentat du 28 Juin de s'exprimer dans des interviews d'une
mani^re hostile envers la Monarchie Austro-Hongroise, enfin,

10) d'avertir sans retard le Gouvemement I. et R. de Tex^cution
Jes mesures comprises dans les points pr6c6dent8.

Le Gouvemement I. ct R. attend la r^ponse du Gouverncmont
Royal au j)lu8 tard jusqu'au Samedi 25 do ce mois, h 6 heures du soir.

Un m^moire concemant les r6sultats de rinstniction de Sarajevo
k regard des f onctionnaires mentionn^s axix points 7 et 8 est ann6x§
k c^tte note»»

(Sign6) Strandtman.

Ko 3.

Note Verbale transiiiise persoimellenieut par rAmbas-
sadeur d'Autriche-Hoiigrie h St,-Petersboui-g au Ministre
des Affaires Etraugeres le "A* Juillet 1914 k 10 heures

du matin.

Le Gouvemement Imperial et Royal s'est trouve dans la neces-
sity de remettre le Jeudi *%3 du mois courant, par IVntremise du
Ministre Imperial et Royal k Belgrade, la note suivante au Gouver-
nement Royal de Serbie:

(Suit le texte de la note).

Voir document .\2 2.

J\o 4.
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres au (liarge cVaffairesen

Autriclie-Hongrie.

St.-P6tersbourg, le "A4 Juillet 1914-
(Tel^anime).

Veuillez transmettre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres d'Au-
triche-Hongrie ce qui suit.

La communication du Gouvemement anstro-hongrois aux Puis-
sances le lendemain de la presentation de Tultimatum a Belgrade
ne laisse aux Puissances qu'un d^lai tout-a-fait insuffisant
pour entreprendre quoi qu'il soit d'utile pour Taplanissoment
des complications surgies. Pour pr^venir les consequences incal-

- 7 -

ciilables et ^alemcut nefastes pour toutes les Puissances qui
|H»uvent sui\Te Ic mode d'action du Gouveraeraent austro-
aongrois, il nous parait indispensable qu'avant tout le delai
donne a la Serbie pour repondre soit prolonge. L'Autriche-
Hongrie se declarant disposee a informer les Puissances des
donnet^s de Tenquete sur lesquelles le Gouvernement Imperial
et Royal base ses accusations, devrait leur donner ^alement
le temps de sVn rendre compte. En ce cas, si les Puissances
se convainquaient du bienfond^ de certaines des exigences
autrichiennes, elles se trouveraient en mesure de faire parvenir
au Gouveraeinent Serbe des conseils en consequence. Un refus
de prulunger le terme de rnltimatum priverait de toute port^
la demarche du Gouveraemont austro-hongrois aupres des Puis-
sances et se trouverait en contradiction avec les bases memes
des relations Internationa los.

Conmumique a I>mdres, Rome, Paris, Belgrade.

(Signe) Sazonow.

JV? 5.

Le Miiiistre <les Afl'aires Etrangeres au\ Representants de

Sa M^este I'Eiiipereiir en Angleterre, en Allemagne, en

Italie et en France*

St.-Petersbourg, le '7,4 Juillet 1914.

(Telegramme).

Me refere a mon telegramme a Koudachew d'aujourd'hni; nous
esperons que le Gouvernement auprfe duquel Vous etes accr6dit6
partagera notre point de vue et prescrira d'urgence a son Repr6-
sentant a Vienne de se prononcer dans le meme sens.

Tomm unique a Belgrade.

(Signe) Sazonow,

^a-

Tel^^ramiiie de Son Altesse Koyale le Prince Regent de
Serbie a Sa Majeste rEmpereur

Belgrade, le "A^ JuiJlet 1914.

Le Gouvemement Austro-Hongrois a rt-mis bier soir au Gouver-
neraent serbe une note concemant I'attentat de Sarajevo. 0>nsciente
de ses devoirs intemationaux, la Serbie d6s les premiers jours de Tho-
rible crime a d6clar6qu'ellelecondamnaitetqu'elleetaitpreteaouvrir
uneenquetesursonterritoire si la complicity de certains de ses sujets
etait prouv^ au cours du proces instruit par les aiitoritfe Austrc-
boiigroises. Cependant les demandes contenues dans la note Austro-
bongroise sont inutilement bumiliantes pour la Serbie et incom-
patibles avec sa dignity comme Etat independant. Ainsi on nous de-
mandesurun ton peremptoire une declaration du gouvemement dans
Tofficiel et un ordre du souverain a Tarmee, ou nous reprimerions
Tesprit bostile contre TAutriche en nous faisant a nous memes des
reprocbes d'une faiblesse criminelle envers nos menees perfides.—
On nous impose ensuite Tadmission des fonctionnaires austro-bon-
grois en Serbie pour participer avec les notres a Tinstruction et pour
surveiller Texecution des autres conditions indique€*s dans la note.
Nous avons re^u un delai de 48 beures pour accepter le tout, faute de
quoi la Legation d'Autriche - Hougrie quittera Belgrade. Noo?
sorames prets a accepter les conditions austro-bongroises qui sont
compatibles avec la situation d'un Etat independant. ainsi que celles
dont I'acception nous sera conseillee par Votre Majeste; toutes^
les personnes dont la participition a I'attentat sera demontree seront
severement punis par nous. Certaiues parmi ces demandes ne pour-
raient etre executees sans des cbangements de notre legislation, ce qui
exige du temps. On nous a donne im delai trop court. Nous pouvons
etreattaques apres Texpiration du delai par Tannce austro-bongroise
qui se concentre sur notre frontiere. II noug est im|)osible de nous de-
fendre et nous supplions Votre Majeste de nous donner Son aide le
plus tot possible. La bienveillance precieuse de Votre Majeste qui
s'est manifestee tant de fois a notre egard nous fait esperer ferme-
nient que cette fois encore notre appel sera entendu par Son gen^reux
coeur slave.

-5- 2

En ces moments difficiles J'int^rprete les sentiments du peuple
serbc qui supplie Votre Majeste de vouloir bien s'int6resser au sort
du Boyaume de Serbie.

(Sign6) Alexandre.

JVo 7.
Le Charge d'Affalres eii Allemagne au Mlnistre des Affaires

Etraugeres*

Berlin, le "A* Juillet 1914.
(T^l^gramme).

Tons les joumaux du matin, meme ceux, rares, qui reconnaissent
i*impossibilit6 pour la Serbie d'accepter les conditions posies,
accueillent avec une grande sympathie le ton inergique adopts par
I'Autriche. L'officieux «Local-Anzeiger» est particulierement agressif;
il qualifie de superflus les recours iventuels de la Serbie h St. Piters-
bourg, h Paris, k Athenes et a Bucarest, et termine en disant que le
peuple allemand respirera librement quand il aura appris que la
situation dans la pininsule Balcanique va enfin s'iclaircir.

(Sign6) Bronewsky.

Le Cliarg^ (VAffalres en France* au Mlnistre des Affalred

Etrangires*

Paris, le "A* Juillet 1914.

(T^l^gramme).

La copiedela note officiellement renuse ^ Belgrade a 6ti commu-
niquie par i'Ambassadeur d'Autriche au Gouvemement Franoais.
Plus tard TAmbassadeur d'Allemagne a visiti le Mlnistre et
lui a lu une communication reproduisant les arguments autri-
chiens et indiquant qu'en cas de refus de la part de la Serbie,
rAutriche serait obligie de recourir k une pression et, en cos

- 10 -

de besoin, a des mesures militaires; la communication se termi-
nait par la remarque qu'^ Tavis de rAUemagne cette question
devrait etre r6soIue directement entre TAutriche et la Serbie
et qu'il §tait de Tint^ret des Puissances de circonscrire Taffaire
en I'abandonnant aux Parties int6ress^es. Le Gerant du Departed
mcnt Politique, qui assistait a Tentretien, demanda a PAmbassa*
deur s'il fallait consid^rer Paction autrichienne comme
un ultimatum— en d'autres termes, si, dans le cas oik la Serbie
ne se soumettrait pas entierement aux demandes autrichiennes,
les hostilit^s ^taient inevitables? L'ambassadeur 4vita une
r^ponse directe en alleguant Pabsence d'instructions.

(Signe) Sevastopoulo.

Le Charge d' Affaires eii Serbie au Ministre des Affaires

Etrang^res.

Belgrade, le "/« Juillet 1914.
(T41%raiiime).

Pachitch est rentr6 a Belgrade. II a Pintention de
donner dans le delai fix6, c'est k dire demain Samedi k 6 heures
du soir, une r^ponse k PAutriche indiquant les points accep-
tables et inacceptables. On adressera aojourd'hui meme aux
Puissances la pri^re de dSfendre Pind6pendance de la Serbie.
Ensuite, ajouta Pachitch, si la guerre est inevitable—nous

ferons la guerre.

(Sign^) Strandtman.

JVo 10.
Communique du Gonyernemeut Imp^rialc

St.-Petersbourg, le "/« Juillet 1914.

Les demiers 6venements et Penvoi par PAutriche- Hongrie
d'un ultimatum k la Serbie pr^occupent le Gouvemement Imp^-

-11 -

rial au plus haut degr^. Le Gouvenieinent suit attentivement
revolution du conflit serbo-autrichien qui nc peut pas lai^ser
la Russie indiffdrente.

JV. 11.

Le Charge d'Affaires eii Autriche-Moiigrie au Miiiistre des
Affaires Etraiigeres.

Vienne, le "/„ Juillet 1914.

(T^l^ramme).

Le comte Berchtold se trouve h, Ischl. Vu rimpossibilit^
d'y arriver a temps, je lui ai telegraphic notre proposition
de prolonger le d61ai de Tultimatum et Tai rep6t§e verbale-
inent au Baron Macchio. Ce dernier m'a promis de la coniniu-
niquer a temps au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, mais a ajout6
qu'il pouvait prMire avec assurance un refus catCgorique.

(Sign6) Koudachew.

JV? 12.

Lc Charge d'Affaires en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des
Affaires EtrangereSt

Vienne, le »%5 Juillet 1914.

(T616gramme).

Suite a nion telCgramme d'aujourd'hui. Viens de recevoir de
Macchio la rCponse negative du Gouvemement Austro-Hongrois
i notre proposition de prolonger le deiai de la note.

(SignC) Koudachew..

•^ 12 u.

m 13.

Le Charge d'Affaires en Serbie au Miiiistre lies Affaires

Etraiigeres,

Belgrade, le "/^g Juillet 1914.
(T^legramme).

Re^u avec retard le 14—27 Juillet 1914.

Je transmets la r^ponse que le President du Conseil des Mi-
nistres Serbe a remis au ministre Austro-Hongrois k Belgrade
aujourd'hui avant Texpiration du d^lai de rultimatum.

<Le Gouvemement Royal Serbe a re^u la communication du
Gouvernement Imperial et Royal du '•/« de ce mois et il est persuade
que sa r6ponse ^loignera tout malentendu qui menace de gater les bons
rapports de voisinage entre la Monarchie austro hongroise et le
Royaume de Serbie.

LeGouvemement Royal est conscient que les protestations qui ont
apparu tant de la tribune de la Skoupchtina nationale que dans les
declarations et les actes des repr^sentants responsables de TEtat, pro-
testations qui furent couples court par la declaration du Gouver-
nement Serbe en date du ^Vsi Mars 1909, ne se sont plusrenouvel^es
vis-^-vis de la grande Monarchie voisine en aucune occasion et que,
depuis ce temps, autant de la part des Gouvemements Royaux qui
se sont succede que de la part de leurs organes, aucune tentative n'a
et6 faite dans le but de changer I'^tat de choses politique et juri-
dique cr6e en Bosnie et Herzegovine. Le Gouvememeut Royal constate
que sous ce rapport le gouvemement J. et R. n'a fait aucune rep-
resentation, sauf en ce qui conceme un livre scolaire, et au sujet de
laquelle le gouvemement Imperial et Royal a re^u une explicatiou
entiJrement satisfaisante.

La Serbie a, de nombreuses fois, donne des preuves de sa
politique pacifique et moder^e pendant la dur^e de la crise balca-
nique, et c'est grace k la Serbie et au sacrifice qu'elle a fait dans
rinteret exclusif de la paix europeenne, que cette paix a M

Le Gouvemement Royal ne peut pas etre rendu responsable des
manifestations d'un caract^re prive telles que les articles des journaux

--18-^

et le travail paisible des societes, manifestations qui se prodiiisent
dans presqne tons los pays conune une chose ordinaire et qui echap-
pent, en regie generale, au controle officiel, d'autant moins que le
Gouvemement Royal, lors de la solution de toute une s6rie de
questions qui se sont presentees entre la Serbie et rAutriche-Hongrie,
a niontr§ une grande prevenance et a reussi, de cette fagon, h en r^ler
le plus grand nombre au profit du progres des deux pays voisins.

C'est pourquoi le Gouvemement Royal a 6t6 p6niblement surpris
par les affirmations, d'apres lesquelles des personnes du royaume
de Serbie auraient participe a la preparation de Tattentat commis
a Sarajevo. 11 s'attendait k etre invito h collaborer ^ la recherche
de tout ce qui se rapporte ^ ce crime et il §tait pret, pour prouver
par des aetes son cntiere correction, k agir contre toutes les personnes
a regard desquelles des communications lui seraient faites.

Se rendant done au d^sir du Gouvemement Imperial et Royal,
le Gouvemement Royal est dispose h remettre aux tribunaux tout
sujet serbe, sans egard h sa situation et h son rang, pour la complicity
duquel, dans le crime de Sarajevo, des preuves lui seraient
foumies.

UsVngage specialement a faire publier k la premiere page du
Journal officiel en date du 13—26 juillet, I'^onciation suivante:

«Le Gouvemement Royal de Serbie condamne toute propagande
qui serait dirigee contre TAutriche-Hongrie, c'est-^-dire Tensemble
des tendances qui aspirent en demier lieu k detacher de la Monarchic
Austro-Hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il deplore sin-
cerement les consequences funestes de ces agissements criminels*

♦Ix* Gouvemement Royal regrette que certains officiers et fon-
ctionnaires serbes aient particip6, d'apr^s la communication du
Gouvemement Imperial et Royal, k la propagande susmentionnfee
et compromis par 1^ les relations de bon voisinage auxquelles le
Gouvemement Royal s'6tait solennellement engage par sa declaration
du 18/31 mars 1909.

«Le Gouvemement Royal, qui desapprouve et r^pudie toute id§e ou
tentative d'une immixtion dans les destinies des habitants de quelque
partie de rAutriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considke qu'il est de son
devoir d'avertir forniellement les officiers, les fonctionnaires et toute
la population du royaume que dorenavant il procMera avec la der-

-14-

niere rigiicur contre Ics personnes qui se rendraient coupables de
paieils agisscmcnts, qu'il mettra tous ses efforts k privenir et k
r6primer».

Cette 6nonciation sera ported a la connaissance de rarmee Koyale
par un ordre du jour, au nom de Sa Majest6 le Roi par S. A., R. le
Prince h^ritier Alexandre, et sera public dans le prochain Bulletin
officiel de rarmee.

Le Gouvemement Royal s'engage ejj outre:

1) A introduire dans la premiere convocation reguliere de la
Skoupchtina une disposition dans la loi de la presse par laquelle
sera punie de la maniere la plus severe la provocation k la haine et
au m6pris de la Monarchie Austro-Hongroise, ainsi que contre toute
publication dont la tendance, g^n^rale serait dirig^e contre Tinte*
grit6 territoriale de rAutriche-Hongrie.

II se charge, lors de la revision de la Constitution, qui est pro-
chaine, de faire introduire dans Tarticle 22 de la Constitution ua
amendement de telle sorte que les publications ti-dessus puissent
etre coniisquees, ce qui, actuellement, aux termes cat^goriques de
I'article 22 de la Constitution, est impossible.

2) Le Gouvemement ne possede aucune preuv^, et la note du:
Gouvemement Lnp^rial et Royal ne lui en foumit non plus aueune^
que la Soci6t6 Narodna Obrana et les autres societes similaires aient
commis jusqu'a ce jour quelque acte criminel de ce genre par le fait
d'un de leurs membres. Neanmoins,le Gouvemement Royal acceptera
la demande du Gouvemement Imperial et Royal et dissdudra la So-
ci^te Narodna Obrana et toute autre society qui agirait contre
I'Autriche-Hongrie.

3) Le Gouvemement Royal Serbe s'engage a eliminer sans d^lai
de I'instmction publique en Serbie tout ce qui sert ou pourrait ser-
vir k fomenter la propagande contre rAutriche-Hongrie, quand le
Gouvemement Imperial et Royal lui foumira des faits et des preuves
de cette propagande.

4) Le Gouvemement Royal accepte de meme d'^loigner du service
militaire ceux pour qui Tenquete judiciaire aura prouv^ qu'ils sont
coupables d'actes diriges contre Tintegrit^ du territo^e de la Monarchie
Austro-Hongroise; il attend que le Gouvemement liiip^al et Royal
lui communique ulterieurement les noms et les faiUs de ces officiers
€t fonctionnaires aux fins de la procMiure qui doit s'ensuivre.

— 15 -

5) LeGouveraement Royal doit avouerqu'ilnese rend pas claire-
ment compte du sens et de la port^e de la demande du Gouyeraement
Imperial et Royal tendant k ce que la Serbie s'engage k accepter sur
son territoire la collaboration des organes du Gouvemement inpfirial
et Royal.

Mais il declare qu'il admettra toute collaboration qui r^pondrait
aux principes du droit international et h la procedure criminelle,
ainsi qu'aux bons rapports de voisinage.

6) Le Gouvemement Royal,, cela va de soi, considere de son devoir
d'ouvrir une enquete contre tons ceux qui sont ou qui, 6ventuellement,
auraient 6t6 mel^s au complot du 15 juin et qui se trouveraient sur
le territoire du royaunie. Quant h la participation k cette enquete
des agents des autorit^s austro-hongroises qui seraient d61^gu6s a
cet effet par le Gouvemement Imperial et Royal, le Gouvemement
Royal ne pent pas raecepter,carceseraitune violation de la Constitu-
tion et de la loi sur la procedure criminelle. Cependant, dans des
cas concrets, des communications sur les r^sultats de Tinstruction
en question pourraient etye donn^es aux organes austro-hongrois.

7) Le Gouvemement Royal a fait proceder des le soir meme de
la remise de la note a Tanestation du commandant Voija Tankositch.
Qu^ant a Milan Ciganovitch, qui est sujet de la Monarchic Austro-
Hongroiseet qui jusqu'au 15 juin ^tait employ^ (comme aspirant)
k la direction des chemins de fer, il n'a pas pu encore etre joint. Le,
Gouvemement Imperial et Royal est pri6 de vouloir bien, dans la;
fonne accoutumee, faire eonnaitre le plus tot possible les pr6somptionsi
de culpability, ainsi que les preuves 6ventuelles de culpability qui
ont et6 recueillies jusqu'a ce jour par Tenquete a Sarajevo, aux fins
d'enquetes ult^rieures.

8) Le Gouvemement Sorbe renforcera et 6tendra les mesures
prises pour empecher le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs k travers
la frontiere. II va de soi qu'il ordonnera tout de suite une enquete
et punira s^verement les fonctionnaires des frontieres sur la ligne
Schabatz-Loznica, qui ont manqu6 k leur devoir et laiss6 passer les
auteurs du crime de Sarajevo.

9) Le Gouvemement Royal donnera volontiers des explications sur
les propos que ses fonctionnaires, tant en Serbie qu'^ T^tranger, ont
tenus apr^s Fattentat dans des entrevues et qui, d'apres Taffirmation du
Gouvemement I. et R., ont ^tfihostilesenyersla Monarchic, d^s que le

- 16 -

Gouvemement I. et R. lui aura communique les passages en ques-
tion de ces propos, et des qu'il aura demontre que les propos
employes out en effet ete tenus par les dits fonctionnaires, quoi-
que le Gouvemement Royal lui meme aura soin de recueilltr des
preuves et convictions.

10) Le Gouvemement Royal informera le Gouvemement Imperial
et Royal de Tex^cution desmesures comprises dans les points prece-
dents, en tant que cela n'a pas et.e d^ja fait par la presente note, aussitot
que chaque mesure aura ete ordonnee et executee. Dans le cas ou le
Gouvemement Imperial et Royal ne serai t pas satisfait de cette reponse,
le Gouvemement Royal Serbe, considerant qu'il est de Tinteret com-
mun de ne paa precipiter la solution de cette question, est pret, comme
toujours, a accepter une entente pacifique, en remettant cette que-
stion, soit a la decision du tribunal intemational de la Haye, soit
aux Grandes Puissances qui out pris part a Telaboration de
la declaration que le Gouvemement serbe a faite le 18/31 Mars
1909».

(Signe) Strandtman.

J^o 14.

Le Charg:e d'affaires en Allema^iie au Ministre des affaires

Etrangeres.

Berlin, le ^-„ Juillet 1914.

(Telegranime).

Ai reiju Votre teiegramme du ^V^i Juillet. Ai communique
son contenu au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. II me dit que le
Gouvemement Anglais Ta egaleraent prie de conseiller h Vienne la
prolongation du deiai de Tultimatum; il a communique cette demarche
teiegraphiquement a Vienne^ il va en faire autant pour notre de-
marche, mais il craint qu'4 la suite de Tabsence de Berchtold parti=^
.pour Ischl, et vu le manque de temps, ses teiegrammes ne restent
sans resultats: il a, en outre, des doutes sur ropportimite pour
TAutriche de ceder au demier moment et il se demande si cela ne
pouvait pas augmenter Tassurance de la Serbie. J'ai repondu
qu'une grande Puissance cojnrae PAutriche pourrait ceder sans porter

- 17 - 8

atteinte a son prestige et ai fait yaloir tous Jes arguments conformes
cependant je n'ai pu obtenir des promesses plus precises. Mcme lors-
que je laissais entendre qu'il fallait agir & Vienne pour 4viter
la possibility de consequences redoutables, le Ministre des Affaires
Etrangeres r^pondait chaque fois n^ativement.

(Sign6) Bronewsky.

JV? 15.

Le Charge d'affaires en France an Ministre des Affaires

Etrangeres.

Paris, le "/as Juillet 1914.
(T^l^ramme).

Ai re^u le t^l^amme du "/«4 Juillet concemant la prolonga-
tion du d^lai de rultimatum autrichien et ai fait la communication
prescrite. Le Eepr^sentant de France k Vienne a 6t6 muni d'instruc^
tions conformes.

(Sign6) Seyastopoulo.

J^ 16.

L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Uinisire des Affaires

Etrangeres.

Londres, le "7,5 Juillet 1914.

(T^l^amme).

Recu t^I^amme du II Juillet. Grey a present h TArabas-
sadeur d 'Angleterre h Vienne d'appuyer notre d-marche concemant
la prolongation du d^lai de Tultimatum. II m'a dit en m§me temps
que TAmbassadeur d'Autriche 6tait venu le voir et avait expliqu6
qu'on ne devrait pas attribuer k la note autrichienne le caract^re
d'un ultimatum;il faudrait la consid^rer comme une dtoarche qui,enca«
d'absencede r6ponseou en cas de r^ponse insuffisante au terme f ix6,aurait
comme suite la rupture des relations diplomatiques et le depart immidiat

^ 16 -

de Belgrade du Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie, sans entraiaer cependant
Ic commencement immMiat des hostilites.— Grey a ajout^ qu' a
la suite de cette explication il a indiqu6 h rAmbassadeur d'Angle-
terre h Vienne que dans le cas ou il serait trop tard pour soulever la
question de la prolongation du d^lai de rultimatum, celle de I'arret
des hostilites pourrait peutretre servir de base a la discussion.

(Sign6) Benckendorff.

JS? 17.

Le^ JSIiiIstre des Affaires Etraiigeres a FAmbassadeur k

Londres.

St.-Petersbourg, le «/„ Juillet 1914.
(T^l^gramme).

Dans le cas d'une nouvelle aggravation de la situation,
pouvant provoquer de la part des Grandes Puissances des actions
conformes, nous comptons que I'Angleterre ne tardera pas de
se ranger nettement du c6t6 de la Russie et de la France,
en vue de maintenir T^quilibre europ6en, en favour duquel
elle est intervenue constamment dans le pass^ et qui serait
sans aucun doute compromis dans le cas du triomphe de rAutriche.

(Signe) Sazonow.

JVolS.

Kote verbale reinlse par FAmbassadeur d'Allemagne au
Ministre des Affaires Etrangferes le "As Juillet 1914.

II nous revient de source aUtoritative que la nouvelle
r^pandue par quelques joumaux d'apr^s laquelle la demarche
du Gouvemement d'Autriche-Hongrie k Belgrade aurait ^tk
laite h Tinstigation de TAllemagne est absolument fausse. Le
Gouvemement Allcmand n*a pas eu connais$ance du texte de
la note Autrictienne avant qu'elle ait ^t6 remise et n'a exfei^c^

- 10 .^ ♦

aucune influence sur son contenu. G'est a tort qu'on attribue
a rAUemagne line attitude comminatoire.

L'Allemagne appuie naturellement comme alli6 de TAutriche
les revendications i, son avis legitimes du Cabinet de Vienna
centre la Serbie.

Avant tout elle desire comme elle Ta d^]h d^clar^ des le
commenceinent du differend Austro-Serbe que ce conflit reste
localise.

JV? 19.

Le Charge d^aflaire en France au Ministre des aflaires

Etrangeres.

Paris, le "/„ Juillet 1914.
(Telegramme).

Me refere a mon telegramme du ^^^ Juillet.

Aujourd'hui un journal du matin a public, sous une forme
pas entierenient exacte, les declarations d'hier de TAmbassadeur
d'Allemagne, en les faisant suivre de commentaires qui attri-
buent k cette demarche le caractere d'une menace. L'Ambassa-
deur d'Allemagne, tres impressionne par ces divulgations, a visite
aujourd'hxii le G^rant du D^partement Politique pour lui
dire que ses paroles n'avaient nullement eu le caractere de
menace qu'on leur attribue. II a declare que TAutriche avait
presents sa note h la Serbie sans entente precise avec Berlin,
mais que cependant I'Allemagne approuvait le point de yue de
rAutriclie et que certainement ih fleche unefois parties (ce sont la
$es propres paroles), TAUemagne ne pouvait se laisser guider que
par ses devoirs .d'alliee.

(Sign6) Sevastopoulo.

-20-

JV? 20.

L'ainbassadeur en Angleterre au Hinistre des Affaires

Etrang^res.

Londres, le "/„ Juillet 1914.
(T^l^gramme).

Grey m'a dit que TAmbassadeur d'Allemague lui a dMard
que le Gouvernement Allemand n'avait pas 6t6 informe du
texte de la note autrichienne, mais qu'il soutenait entierement
la d-marche autrichienne. L'Ambassadeur a demand^ en meme
temps si TAngleterre pouvait consentir k agir k St.-P^tersbourg
dans un esprit de conciliation. Grey a r^pondu que cela 6tait
completement impossible. Le Ministre a ajoute que tant que
les complications n'existaient qu'entre TAutriche et la
Serbie, les int^rets Anglais n'etaient engages qu'indirecte-
ment, mais qu'il devait prevoir que la mobilisation autrichienne
aurait comme suite la mobilisation de la Russie et que des ce mo-
ment on se trouverait en presence d'une situation a laquelle seraient
interessees toutes les Puissances. L'Angleterre se reservait pour
ce cas une complete liberte d'action.

(Signe) Benckendorff.

JSf 21.

Le Charge d'affaires en Serbie au Hinistre des Affaires

Etrang^res.

Belgrade le "/„ JuiUet 1914.
(T^l^amme).
Malgre le caractere extremement conciliant de la reponse serbe
a Tultimatum, le Ministre d'Autriche vient d'infonner, a 6V2 du
soir, le Gouvernement Serbe par note, que n'ayant pas recu au delai
fix6 une reponse satisfaisante il quitte Belgrade avec tout le personnel
de la Legation. La Scoupchtina est convoqu^ k Nich pour le "/a? Juil-
let. Le Gouvernement Serbe et le Corps Diplomatique partent ce
soir pour la meme ville.

(Sign^) Strandman.

-21 —

JVo 22.

L'AmbassaAeur en Angleterre au Miuistre des ilfaires

Etrang^res,

Londres le ^-/as Juillet 1914.

(T^16gramme).

Grey a dit a TAinbassadeur d'Allemagne qu'4 son avis la
mobilisation autrichienne devait entrainer la mobilisation de la
Russie, qii'alors siu^irait le danger aigu d*une guerre g^nerale et
qu'il ne vovait qu'un seul nioyen pour ime solution pacifique: qu'en
presence des mobilisations autrichienne et russe, TAllemagne, la France,
ritalie et TAngleterre s'abstiennent d'une mobilisation immediate
et proposent tout d'abord leurs bons offices. Grey m'adit que ce
plan necessitait avant tout Tagrement de TAllemagne et Tengage-
ment de cette Puissance de ne pas mobiliser. En consequence il a
adresse tout d'abord a Berlin une question a ce sujet.

(Signe) Benckendorff .

No 23.
te Miiiistre des A.ffaires Etrangeres k TAmbassadeur en

Italie.

St. Petersbourg, le »V«c Juillet 1914.

(T^l^gramme).

L'ltalie pourraitjouer un role detout premier ordre en faveur du
maintien de la paix, en exercant T influence necessaire sur TAutriche
et en adoptant une attitude nettement defavorable au conflit, car
ce demict ne saurait etre localise. II est desirable que vous expri-
miez la conviction qu*il est impossible pour la Russie de ne pas
venir en aide a la Serbie,

{Sign6) Sazonow.

- 22 -

JV? 24.

Le^Gerant du Consulat a Prague au Ministre des Affaires

Etrangeres.

Prague, le »%e Juillet 1914.
(T^l^gramme).
La mobilisation a et6 decretee.

(Signe) Kazanskv..

JVo 25.

Xe Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres & I'Ambassadeur en

Autriche Hongrle.

St. P^tersbourg, le »Vjc Juillet 1914.
(Telegramme).

J-ai eu aujourd'hui un long entretien sur iin ton amical avec
TAmbassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie. Apres avoir examine avec lui les
lO.demandes adfess^esa la Serbie, j'ai fait observer qu'a part la forme
peu habile sous laquelle elles sont presentees, quelques uries panni elles
sont absolument inexecutables, meme dans le cas ou le gouvernement
Serbe d^clarerait les vouloir accepter. Ainsi, par exemple, les points 1
et 2 ne pourraient etre executes sans un remaniement des lois serbes
sur la presse et sur les associations, pour lequel le consentemeht de la
Scoupchtina pourrait etre difficilement obtenu; quant a Texecution des
points 4 et 5, elle pourrait produire des consequences fort dangereuses
et meme faire naitre le danger d'actes de terrorisme diriges centre
les membres de la Maison Royale et centre Pachitch, ce qui ne saurait
entrer dans les vues de TAntriclie. En ce qui regarde les autres points.
il me semble,qu'aveccertainschangements dans les details, il ne serait
pas difficile de trouver un terrain d'entente si ies accusations y
contenues 6taient confirmees par des preuves suffisantes.

Dans rinteret le la conservation de la paix qui. aux dires de
Szapary, est precieuse a TAutriche au meme degre qu'^ toutes les
Puissances, il serait necessaire de mettre au plus tot possible une

- 23 -

fin a la situation tenduo du moment Dans ce but il lae semblerait
tres desirable, que rAmbassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie fiit autorise
d'entrer avec moi dans un echangede vues prive aux fins d'un rema-
niement en comniun de quelques articles de la note autrichienne du
^VnJuillet. Ce procede permettrait peut etre de trouver une formule
qui lut acceptable pour la Serbie, tout en donnant satisfaction
a r Autriche quant au fond de ses demandes. Veuillez avoir une expli-
cation prudente et amicale dans le sens de ce t616grainme avec le
Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Communique aux Ambassadeurs
en Allemagne, en France, en Angleterre et en Italic.

(Signe) Sazonow.

X? 26.

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres h rAmbassadeui* en

Alleniague.

St. Petersbourg^ le "Aa Juillet.

(Telegranime).

Veuillez comrauniquer le contenu de mou telegraimne a Vienne
d'aujourd'hui au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres Allemand et lui
exprimer Tespoir, que de son cote il trouvera possible de conseiller
a Vienno d'aller au devant de notre proposition.

(Signe) Sazonow.

J^o 27.

Le Charge d'AtTaires en France au Ministre des Affaires

Etrangeres.

Paris, le ^V-c Juillet 1914.

(Telegramme).

L»? DIrecteur du Departement Politique m'informe, que lors de
la communication quMl a faite a FAmbassadeur d'Autriche du contenu
de la reponse serbe a rultimatum, TAmbassadeur n'a pas cache son

- 24 ~

etonnement de ce qu'elle n'ait pas donne satisfaction a Giesl. L'at-
titude conciliante de la Serbie doit, selon Tavis du Directeur du
Departement Politique, produire la meilleure impression en Europe.

(Signe) Sevastopoulo.

J^9 28.

Le Charge d'AlTaires en France au Ministre des AfTaires

Etraiig:eres.

Paris, le 'V,o Juillet 1914.

(Tel^grarame).

Aujourd'hui TAmbassadeur d'Allemagne a de nouveau rendu
visite au Gerant du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres et lui a fait les
declarations suivantes:

«L'Autriche a declare a la Russie qu'elle ne recherche pas des
acquisitions territoriales et qu'elle ne menace pas Tintegrite de la
Serbie. Sou but unique est d'assurer sa propre tranquillite. Par
consequent fl depend de la Russie d'eviter la guerre. L'Alle-
magne se sent solidaire avec la France dans Je d^sir ardent de
conserver la paix et espere ferniement que la France usera die son
influence a Petersbourg dans un sens niodtoteur». Le Ministte fit
observer que rAllemagne pdurrait de son cote entreprendre des
demarches analogues a Vienne, surtout en presence de Pesprit de
conciliation dont a fait preuve la Serbie. L'Ambassadeur repondit
que cela n'etait pas possible, vu la resolution prise de nepass'immiscer
dans le conflit austro-serbe. Alors le Ministre demanda, si les quatre
Puissances— PAngleterre, rAllemagne, Pltalie et la France— ne poi;i-
vaient pas entreprendre des demarches a St.-^P^tersbourg et a Vienne,
puisque I'affaiire se reduisait en somrae k un conflit entre la Russie
et PAutriche. yAi:nbassadeur allegua Pabsehce d'instnictions.
Finalement le Mmistre refusa d'adherer a la proposition allemande.

(Signe) Sevastopoulo.

-25-

J^s 29.

Le Charge d*Affaires en France au Ministre de8 AtTaires

Etrang^res.

Paris, le '%6 Juillet 1914.

(TeUgramrae).

Le Directeur du P^partement Politique a declare qu*^ sod avis
persormeU les demarches successives allemandes a Paris ont pour
but d'intimider la France et d'amener son intervention h St-P6ter8-
buurg.

(Sign6) Sevastopoulo.

JVo 30.

Le Charge d'AtTaires en Allemagne an Ministre des AlTai*

res Etrangferes.

. Berlin, le "Vze Juillet 1914.
(Tdfgramme).

Apres la reception a BerliD de la nouvelle de la mobilisation
de Parmee autrichienne contre la Serbie une grande foule, cdmpos^e,
auxdiresdes journaux,enpartie d elements autrichiens, se livra h une
serie de bruyantes manifestations en faveur de TAutriche. A une heure
avanc6e de la soiree les manifestants se masserent a plusieurs reprises
devant le palais de TAmbassade Imp^riale en poussant des cris hostiles
a la Russie; la police etait presque absente et ne prenait aucune mesure.

(Sign6) Bronewsky.

-26-

JV? 31.

L*Ambassadeur cii Aiigleterre au Miuistre des AITaires

£traiigeres.

Londres, le ^V^, Juillet 1914.

(T^legramme).

Ai reQuvotret^legramme du 13—26 Juillet. Prie me tMegraphief
«i, i Votre avis, Vos pourparlers directs avec le cabinet de Vienne s'accor^
dent avec le projet de Grey concemant la mediation des 4 (jouveme-
ments; Ayant appris del'Ambassadeurd'AngleterreiSt.-P^tersbourg
^jue Vous 6tiez dispose k accepter cette corabinaison, Grey a decide
de la transformer en une proposition officielle quMl a faite bier soir
at Berlin, h Paris et i Jlorae.

(Signe) Benckendorff.

j^ 32.

Le JUnistre des Affaires Etraiig^res aux Ambassadeiirs en
France et en Augleterre.

St.-P6tersbourg, le '% JuiUet 1914.

(T^ldgramme).

L'Ambassadeur d^Angleterre est venu s*infonner si nous
jugeons utile que rAngleterre prenne Pinitiative de convoquer k
Londres une conference des reprSsentants de PAngleterre, la France,
PAllemagne et ritaliCj pour 4tudier une issue k la situation actuelle-

J'ai r^pondu k PAmbassadeur que f ai entame des pourpar-
lers avec I'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie, en conditions que
j^esp§re favorables. Pourtant je n'ai pas encore re^u de reponse k
la proposition que j'al {aite d'une revision de la note entre les
deux Cabinets.

^ 2t -

Si des explications directos avec le Cabinet de Viwme se
frouvaient irr6alisables, je suis pret a accepter la proposition
auglaise ou toute autre de nature h resoudre favorablenient le
couflit.

(Signe) Sazonow.

J^? 33.

Lc Miiiii^tre des AtYaires Etraiii^eres aiix Aiiibassacleurs en
France, en Angleterre, en Alleiuagne, en Autriehe-llongrie

et en Italie.

St.-Petersbourg, le '% Juillet 1914.

(T^legramme).

Ai pris connaissance de la r^ponse transniise par lc Gouvcnicmcnt
Serbe au Baron Gicssl. Elle d^passe toutes nos previsions par sa mode-
ration et son desir de donner la plus complete satisfaction a rAutriche.
Nous ne voyons pas quelles pourraient etre encore les deraandes de
J'Autriche, amoins que le Cabinet de Vienne ne cherche un pretexte
pour une guerre avec la Seibie,

(Sign6) Sazonow.

JVo 34.

Le Charge d'AtTaires en France an Ministre dcs Affaires

Etrangeres.

Paris, le "/„ Juillet 1914.

(T^legramme).

J/Ambassadour d'AlIemagne a conf^re aujourd'hui de nouveau
longuement sur la situation avec le Directeur du D^partement Poli-
tique. L'Ambassadour a beaucoup insists sur rexclusion de toute
possibilite d'unc mediation ou d'une conference.

(Signe) Sevastppoulo.

— 28 —

JV? 35.

L'AiiibasHiMleiir en France au Jllinistre des AITairen

£traugeres.

Paris, le 'V*7 JuiHet 1914.
(T61egrammej.

Ai coni*6re avec le Gerant du Ministere des Affaires Etrang^res,
en presence de Berthelot, imm^diatement apres men retour k Paris.
Tons les deux m'ont confirme les details concemant les d-marches de
TAmbassadeur d'AUemagne que Sevastopoulo Vous a comiiiunrques
dans ses telegrammes. Ce matin le Baron de Schoen a confirme par
ecrit sa declaration d'hier, savoir: 1) T Autriche a declare h la Kussie
qu'elle ne recherche ])as d'acquisitions et n'attente pas a Tintegrit^
de la Serbie. Son unique but. est d'assurer sa j)ropre tranquil-^
lite. 2) Par consequent il d^jiend de la Russie d'^viter la guerre.
3) L'AIleniagne et la France, completement solidaires dans I'ardent
desir de ne pas rompre la paix, doivcnt agir sur la Russie dans un
sens modtoteur. Le Baron de Schoen a specialenient souligne Tex-
pression de la solidarity entr^ TAllemagne et la France. D'apres la
conviction du Ministre de la Justice, les d-marches susditesdeTAl-
lemagne ont i)our but evident de desunir la Russie et la France,
d'entraimrleGouvemementFranQaisdans la voie des representations
a St.-Petersbourg et de conipromettre ainsi notre alli§ k nos yeux;
enfin, en cas de guerre, d'en rejeter la responsabilite non surTAlle-
magne, qui employe soi disant tons ses efforts pour le maintien de
la paix, mais sur la Russie et la France.

(Sign6) Iswolsky.

JV? 36.

L'Ambassadeur en France au Ninistre des Attaires

Etrangei'es.

Paris, le •%, Juillet PJ14.
(T61pgramme).

II ressort de vos teiegrammes du ^Vifi Juillet que vous ne con-
naissiez pas encore la rej^onse du Gouvernement Serbe. Le t^legramme
par lequel cette nouvelle m'a ete coramuniquee de Belgrade a et^

— 29 —

egalement en route pendant 20 heures. Le t6l^rainme du Ministre
des Affaires Etrangeres Fran^ais expMi6 avant hier, au triple tarif,
a onze heures du matin, et contenant Tordre d'appuyer notre d6-
marche n'est parvenu k sa destination qu'4 6 heures. II n^y a aucun
doute que ce t^lSgramme n'ait 6t6 retenu intentionnelloment par
le t^l^aphe autrichien.

(Sign6) Iswolsky.

J^37.

L'Aiiibassadeur en France au Mini^re des Affaires

Etrangeres.

Paris, le "/.^ Juillet 1914.

(T^l^gramme).

D'ordre de son Gouvemeraent, V Ambassadeur d'Autriche a cora-
iuuniqu6 au G^rant du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres que la r6-
ponse de la Serbie a 6t4 jug6e insuffisante h Vienne et que demain,
tnardi , rAutriche proc^derait k des tactions 6nergiques» dont le but serait
de forcer la Serbie de lui donner les garanties n^cessaires. Le Ministre
ayant demand^ en quoi consisteraient ces actions, V Ambassadeur
r6pondit qu'il n'avait pas de renseignements exacts k ce sujet, mais
qu'il pouvait s'agir d'un passage da la fronti^re serbe, d'un ultima-
tum et meme d'une declaration de guerre.

(Sign6) Iswolsky.

JS^?38.

he Charge iFAffaTres en Alleniagne au Ministre des Affaires

Etrangeres*

Berlin, le "/„ Juillet 1914.

(T^l^gramme).!

J'ai prie le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres d'a[)puyer a Vienne
votrc proposition tendant k autoriser Szapary d*eiaborer, parlavoie
d'un ^change de vues priv6 avec Vous, une redaction des demandcs

— 30 —

austro-hongroises acceptable pour les deux parties. Jagow a r^pondu
qu'il 6tait au courant de cette proposition et qu'il partageait Tavis
de Pourtales que, puisque Szapary avait commence cette
conversation, il pourrait aussi bien la continuer. II t^l^aphiera
dans ce sens k I'Ambaisadeur d'Allemagne k Vicnne. Je Tai pri6
de cottseiller d'une fa^on plus pressante k Vienne de s'engager dans
cette voie de conciliation; Jagow a r^pondu qu'il ne pouvait pas
conseiller k TAutriche de c^der.

(Sign6) Bronewsky.

JV?39.
Le Charge d'AtTalres eu Alleuiagiie au Ministre des Affaires

£traiig^res.

Berlin, le "/„ Juillet 1914.»

(T^l^amme).

Aujourd'hui, avantma visite au Ministre des Affaires Etrang^res,
ce dernier avait re^u celle de TAmbassadeur de France qui avait tent6 de
lui faire accepter la proposition anglaise relative k une action en favour
de la paix, action qui serait exerc^e simultan^ment k St.-P6tersbourg
et AVienne par TAngleterre, TAllemagne, Tltalie et la France. Cambon
a propose que ces Puissances donnent k Vienne un conseil dans les
termes suivants: «S'abstenir de tout acte qui pourrait aggraver la
situation de Theure actuelle^. En adoptant cette formule voilde on
^viterait de mentionner la n6cessit6 de s'abstenir d'une invasion de
la Serbie. Jagow a oppos6 k cette proposition un refus cat^orique,
et oela malgr6 les instances de TAmbassadeitr qui a fait valoir, comme un
bon c6t6 de la proposition, le groupement mixte des Puissances
grace auquel on 6vitait I'opposition del' Alliance i TEntente, ce dont
s'6tait si souvent plaint Jagow lui meme.

(Sign§) Bronewsky.,

— 31 —

Ko 40.

Telegraiiiine rte Sa Majeste Impcriale FEmpereur h Son
Altesse Royale le Prince Alexandre de Serbie en date du

'% Juillet 1914.

Votre Altesse Royale en s'adressant k Moi dans un moment
particulierement difficile no s'est pas tromp^e sur les sentiments qui
M'animent a Sou 6gard et sur Ma sympathie cordiale pour le peuple
serbe.

Ma plus serieuse attention est attir^e par la situation actuelle
et Mon Gouvcrnements'applique de toutes ses forces k aplanir les pre-
sentes difficult^s. Je ne doute point que Votre Altesse et le Gouver-
nement Royal ne veuillent faciliter cette tache en ne negligeant rien
pour arriver a une solution qui permette de pr6venir les horreurs
d'lme nouvelle guerre tout en sauvegardant la dignite de la Serbie.

Tant qu'il y a le moindre espoir d'eviter une effusion de sang,
tons nos efforts doivent tendre vers ce but. Si, malgr6 Notre plus
sincere d^sir, Nous ne reussissons pas, Votre Altesse pent etre assur^e
qu'en aucim cas la Russie ne se d6sinteressera du sort de la Serbie.

(Signe) Nicolas.

Xo 41.

L'Ambassadeur en Aiitriclie-Hougrie an Ministre des
AtTaires Etrani^eres.

Vienne le ^% juillet 1914.

(Tel^gramme).

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres est absent. Pendant un entre-
tien prolong^, que j'ai eu aujourd'hui avec Macchio, j*ai, en
terraes tout a fait amicaux, attir^ son attention sur rimpression defa-
vorable qu'a produite en Russie la presentation par I'Autriche a la
Serbie de demandes absolument inacceptables pour chaque 6tat
ind^pondant, bien que petit. J'ai ajout6 que ce proc6d6, qui pour-
rait am^ner des complications les raoins desirables, a provoqu6 en Rus-
sie une profonde surprise et une reprobation g6n6rale, II faut sup-

poser que TAutriche, sous I'influence des assurances du Represen-
tant Allemand k Vienna, lequel pendant toute cette crise a jou§ un
role d'instigateur, a compt6 sur la probability do la localisation de
son conflit avee la Serbie et sur la possibility de porter a cette der-
ni^re impun^ment un coup grave. La declaration du Gouvemement
Imperial concemant Timpossibilit^ pour la Russie de rester indif-
f^rente en presence d'un tel proc6d4 a i)rovoque ici une grande impres-
sion.

(Sign6) Sch§b6ko.

Xo 42.

PAmMssadeur en AiigleteiTe au Ministre des Affaires

Etrangeres.

Londres, le "/n Juillet 1914.
(T^legramme).

Grey vient de r6pondre a TAmbassadeur d' Allemagne, qui efaft
venu le questionner sur la possibilite d'une action a St.-Petcrsbourg,
que cette action devrait se produire a Vienne et que le cabinet de Berlin
serait le mieux qualif i6 pour Texercer. Grey afait observer enmeme temps
que lar^ponse serbe h la note autrichienne d^passait par sa moderation
et son esprit de conciliation tout ce k quoi on pouvait s'attendre. Grey a
ajoute qu'il en concluait que la Russie avait conseille k Belgrade de
donner une r^ponse moder^e et qu'il pensait que la reponse serbe pouvait
servir de base a une solution pacifique et acceptable de la question.

Dans ces conditions, a continue Grey, si TAutriche malgre cette
reponse commen(?ait les hostilit^s, elle prouverait son intention
d'an^antir la Serbie. La question plac^e sur ce terrain produirait une
situation qui pourrait amener une guerre dans laquelle seraient im-
pliqu^es toutes les Puissances.

Grey a enfin d6clar6 que le Gouvemement Anglais etait bien
sincerement dispose k collaborer avee le gouvemement Allemand tant
qu'il s'agirait de la conservation de la, paix; mais que pour le cas
contraire I'Angleterre se r^servait une pleiue liberty d'action.

(Sign6) Benckendorff.
— 33 — 6

^ 43.

lie JUiiiistre de$ AtYaires Etraiii^eres h rAiiibassadeiir en

Aiigleteri*e.

St.-Pa<jrsbourg, le *V«8 Juillet 1914,

(T^l^gramme).

Mes entretiens avec I'Ainbassadeur d'Allemagne confirment mon
impression que rAllemague est plutot favorable h I'intransigeance
de rAutriche.

Le Cabinet de Berlin, qui aurait pu arreter tout le d^velop-
penient de la crise, parait n'exercer aucune action sur son alli^e.

L'ambassadeur trouve insuffisante la r^ponse de la Serbie.

Cette attitude allemande est tout particulierement alannante.

11 nie semble que mieux que toute autre Puissance I'Angleterre
serait en mesiure de tenter encore d'agir k Berlin pour engager le
Gouvemement Allemanda Taction neci^ssaire. C'est k Berlin qu'indu-:
bitablement se trouve la clef de la situation.

(Sign6) Sazonow.

JVo 44.

Le Consul genera) a Fiunie an Ministre des Attlnii*e$ Eti*an«

geres.

Fiume lo "Ag juillet 1914.

(T616gramme),

L'^tat dc si§ge a 6t6 proclani6 en Slavonie, en Croatia eth Fiume et
en meme temps les reservistt-s de toutes lescat^oriesont6t6mobilis6s.

(Signe) Salviati.

3r-

A? 45.

L'AmlKiBsad^iii* en 4iiinc1ie-l[oii^rie an Niiiistre de$ AtTat*

res Etrangeres.

Vieiinek'Vig JuilH1914.
(T616gramme).

J'tii entretenu aujourd'hui le Comte B^rchtold dans le sens
dos instructions de Votre Excellence. Jo lui fis observer, en termes
Ics plus amicaux, corabien il ^tait desirable de trouver une solu-
tion qui, en consolidant les bons rapports entre rAutriche-Hongrie
et la Russie, donnerait k la Monarchie Austro-Hongroise des garan-
ties s^ricuses pour ses rapports futurs avec la Serbie.

J'attirais Tattcntion du Comte Borchtold sur tous les dangers
pour la paix de TEurope qu'entrainerait un conflit arm6 entre
TAutriche-Hongrie et la Serbie.

Le Comte Berchtold me r^pondit qu*il se rendait parfaitement
compte du s^rieux de la situation et des avantages d'une
franche explication avec le Cabinet de Saint-Petersbourg. II me
dit que d*un autre c6t4 le Gouvemement Austro-Hungrois, qui
ne s'6tait d§cid6 que tr^s mal volontiers aux mesures ^ner-
giques qu'il avait prises contre la Serbie, ne pouvait plus ni reculer, ni
entrer en discussion aucune des termes de la note Austro-Hongroise.

Le Comte Berchtold ajouta que la crise 6tait de venue si aigue,
et que Texcitation de Topinion publique avait atteint tel degr^,
que le Gouvemement, le voulait il, ne pouvait plus y consentir,
d'autant moins, me dit-il, que la r6ponse meme de la Serbie donne
la preuve du manque de sinc6rit6 de ses promesses pour Tavenir.

(Sign6) Sch^b^ko.

A? 4G.

Le Charge d'affaires eii Alleiiia?iie an Miiiistre des Attiiires

Etraiig^res.

Berlin, le »/t8 Juillet 1914.
(T^Ugramme).

Le Buteau Wolff n'a pas public le texte de la note respon-
sive serbe qui lui avait 6t6 communique. Jusqu'a ce moment

-. 36 —

iBtte note n'a paru in extenso dans aucun des jonrnaux locaux;
qui selon toute Evidence ne veulent pas lui donner place dans
leurs colonnos, se rendant compte de I'effet calmant que cette
publication pruduirait sur les lecteurs Allemands.

(Signe) Bronewsky.

JV? 47.

L'Ambassadeur en Aiitriclie-Hongrie an Miiiislre des AtTai-

res Etrangeres.

Vienne, le 'Vt8 Juillet, 1914.

(T^legramme).

Le decret sur la mobilisation gencrale a ete signe.

(Signe) Schebeko.

Ko 48,

Le Minis! re des Ait'aires Etrangeres h TAnibassadeur k

Londres.

St.-Petersbourg, le »%8 Juillet, 1914.
(Tel^gramrae).

En presence des hostilites entre rAutriche-Hongrie et 'la
Serbie il est necessaire que TAngleterre entreprenne d'urgence
uue action mediatrice et que Taction militaire de rAutrichc
contre la Serbie soit imm^diatement suspendue. Autrement la
mediation ne servira que de pr^texte pour tirer en longueur
la solution de la question et donnera entre temps a TAutriche
la possibilite d'ecraser completement la Serbie et d'occuper
une situation dominante dans les Balcans.

Communique k Paris, Berlin, Vienne et Rome.

(Sign6) Sazonow,

— 36 —

JVo 49.

Le Miuistrc des Affaires Etraiigeres au Charge d'Affaircs

^n Allema^^iie.

St.-Petersbourg, le »V„ Juillet, 1914.

(T614graiiime).

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne m'informe, au nora du Chance-
lier, que rAllemagne n'a pas cess^ dVxercer a Vienne une influence
modfea trice et qu'elle contintiera cette action meme apres la
declaration de guerre. Jusqu'^ ce matin il n'y avait aucune nou-
velle que les armies autrichiennes aient franchi la frontiere
Serbe. J'ai pri6 TAmbassadeur de transmettre au Chancelier mes
remerciments pour la teneur amicale de cette communication. Je
Tai inform^ des mesures militaires prises par la Russie, dont au-
Cune, lui dis-je, n'etait dirigee contre TAllemagne; j'ajoutais
qu'elles ne pr^jugeaient pas no?i plus des mesures agressives contre
I'Autriche-Hongrie, ces mesures s'expliquant par la mobilisation
de* la plus grande partie de I'armee austro-hongroise.
L'ambassadeur se pronon(?ant en faveur d'explications directes entre
le Cabinet de Vienne et nous, je r^pondis que j'y 6tais tout
dispose, pour peu que les conseils du Cabinet de Berlin dont il
parlait trouvent echo h Vienne.

En meme temps je signalais que nous etions tout disposes a
accepter le projet d'une conference des qua tre Puissances, un projet
auquel, paraissait-il, I'Allemagne ne sympathisait pas entierement.

Je dis que, dans mon opinion, le meilleur moyen pour met tre
k profit tous" les moyens propres h produire une solution pacifique
consisterait en une action parallele des pourparlers d'une conference
h quatre de TAllcmagne, de la France, de TAngleterre et de Tlta-
lie et d'un contact direct entre rAutriche-Hongrie et la Russie, a
rinstar h peu pres de ce qui avait eu lieu aux moments les plus
critiques de la crise de Van dernier.

Je dis h TAmbassadeur qu'apres les concessions faites par la
Serbie, un terrain de compromis pour les questions restees ou-
vertes ne serait pas tres difficile k trouver, k condition toutefois de

- 37 —

qiielque boniie voloiite de la part do I'Autriche et a condition quel
toutes les Puissances usent de toute leur influence dans un sens d^
conciliation.

Communique aux Ambassadeurs en Angleterre, en France, enj
Autriche-Hongrie et en Italic.

(Sign6) Sazonow.

JV? 50.

Le Miiiistre des Affaires Etrangires aux Ambassadeurs eu!
Augleterre et eu France.

St.-P4tersboiirg, le '%^ JuUlet 1914.

(T^l^gramme).

Lors de mon entretien avec TAmbassadeur d'Allemagne, dont
traite mon telegramme pr6e6dent, je n'avais pas encore rcQU le
tel^granmie du *V« Juillet de M. Sch^b^ko.

Le contenu de ce t^l^anmie constitue un refus du Cabinet
de Vienne de proc^er h un ^change d'idees direct avec le Gouver-
nement Imperial.

D^ lors, il ne nous reste plus qu'^ nous en rcmettre entiSre-
ment au Gouvemement britannique pour Tinitiative des d-marches
qu'il jugera utile de provoquer.

Communique a Vienne, Rome et Berlin.

(Sign^) Sazonow.

J«51.

Le Charge d'AfTaires en Allemagne au Miuistre des AflUres

£trang^res.

Berlin, le»V„ Juillet 1914.
(T^l^gramme).

Sur ma question s'il avait une r^ponse de Vienne relativement
h Votre proposition de pourparlers privfe ^ St.-P6tersbourg, le Secre-
taire d'Etat a r^pondu ndgativement.

— 38 —

II declare qu'il lui est fort difficile d'agir sur Vienne, surtout
ouvertement. Parlant i Cambon, il a meme ajout^ qu'en cas d'une
pression trop 6vidente I'Autriche se haterait de mettre rAllemagne
en presence d'un fait accompli.

Le Secretaire d'Etat dit qu'il a fe^u aujourd'hui un t6l6grarame
de Pourtales d'oik il constate que plus que les premiers jours VousStes
dispose h trouver un compromis acceptable pour tous. J'ai repliqu^
que probablement Vous avez ete d^s le commencement en faveur d'un
compromis bien entendu a la condition qu'il soit acceptable non
seulement pour TAutriche, mais ^galement pour nous. II m'a dit
ensuite qu'il paraissait que nous avions conmienc^ k mobiliser sur la
fronti^re autrichienne et qu'il craignait que ceci rendrait plus
difficile pour TAutriche la possibilite de s'entendre avec nous,
d'autant plus que I'Autriche ne mobilisait que contre la Serbie et
ne faisait pas de pr^paratifs sur notre frontiere. J'ai repondu que, d'apres
les renseignements dont jedisposais, I'Autriche mobilisait egalement
sur notre frontiere et que par consequent nous devions prendre des
mesures analogues. J'ai ajoute que les mesures que nous avons peut-
etre prises de notre cote n'etaient nuUement dirigees contre
TAUemagne*

(Signe) Bronewsky.

JVo 52.

Le Charge d'afTalres en Serbie au Hinistre des Affaires

Etrangeres.

Nich, le >«A9 Juillet 1914.

(T^I^gramme). '-

Aujourd'hui, le Ministre de Bulgarie, au nom de son Gouvemo-
ment, a declare h Pachitch que la Bulgarie observerait la ufiutralite.

(Signe) Strandtman.

-39

JVo53.

L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires

Etranj^eres.

Paris, le »«Air Juillet 1914.

(T^l^gramme).

A Voccasion de Tarrivee du President de la Republique Francaise
le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres avait prepare un court expose
de la situation politique actuelle, k pen pres dans les termes suivants:
L'Autriche, craignant la decomposition interieiire, s'est empar6e du
pr6texte de Tassassinat de rArchiduc pour essayer d'obtenir des
garaiities qui pourront revetir la forme de Toccupation des communi-
cations militaires serbes ou meme du territoire serbe. L'Allemagne
^outient TAutriche. Le maintien de la paix depend de la seule Russie,
parce qu'il s'agit d'une affaire qui doit etre «localisee» entre FAutriche
et la Serbie, c'est a dire de la punition de la politique precedente de
la Serbie et des garanties pour Tavenir. De ceci TAUemagne conclue
qu'il faut exercer une action moderatrice a Petersbourg. Ce sophisme
a 6te rMute a Paris comme a Londres. A Paris, le Baron de Schoen
a envaintached'entrainer la France a une action soiidaire avec I'Alle-
magne sur la Russie en faveur du maintien de la paix. Les memes
tentatives ont et6 faites a Londres. Dans les deux capitales il a ete
r6pondu que Paction devrait etre exerc6e a Vienne, car les demandes
excessives de I'Autriche, son refus de discuter les rares reserves de
la Serbie, et la declaration de guerre menacent de provoquer la guerre
gendrale. La France et PAngleterre ne peuvent exercer une action
moderatrice sur la Russie laquelle jusqu'ici a fait preuve de la plus
grande moderation, surtout en conseillant a la Serbie d'accepter
ce qui etait possible de la note autrichienne. Aujourd'hui I'Allemagne
parait renoncer k I'idee d'une action sur la Russie seule et incline
vers une action mediatrice a Petersbourg et k Vienne, mais en meme
temps PAllemagne comme PAutriche tachent de faire trainer Paffaire.
L'AUemagne s'oppose a la Conference sans indiquer aucune autre
maniere d'agir pratique. L'Autriche mene des pourparlers manifeste-
ment dilatoires k Petersbourg. En meme temps elle prend des mesures
actives, et si ces mesures sont toierees, ses pretentions augmenteront
proportionellcment.. 11 est tr^s desirable que la Russie prete tout

— 40 —

son appui au projet de ra^diatioa que pr6sentera Sir E. Grey. Dans
le cas contraire TAutriche, sous pr^texte de «garantie», pourra, en
fait, changer le statut territorial de ['Europe orientale.

(Signe) Iswolsky.

^ 54.

L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires

Etraiigeres,

Londres, le ^V^, Juillet 1914.

(T^l^gramme).

Ai communique le contenu de Vos tel^grammes du *V«8 Juillet
h Grey. 11 a d6clar6 aujourd'hui k TArabassadeur d'AUemagne que
les pourparlers directs entre la Russie et rAutriche avaient 6chou6,
et que les correspondants des journaux mandaient de St.-Peters-
bourg que la Russie mobilisait contre TAutriche k la suite de la
mobilisation de cette derniere. Grey dit qu'en principe le Gouver-
nement AUemand s'est declare en faveur de la mediation, mais qu'il
rencontre des difficultes quant a la forme. Grey a insiste pour que
le Gouvernement AUemand indiquat la forme laquelle a I'avis de
TAllemagne pourrait permettre aux 4 Puissances d'exercer leur media-
tion pour 6viter la guerre; vu le consentement de la France, de Tltalie
et de TAngleterre la mMiation pourrait avoir lieu seulement dans le
cas ou TAllemagne cionsentirait k se ranger du c6t6 de la paix.

(Signe) Benckendorff.

JVo 55.

L'Ambassadeor en Prance au Ministre des Affaires Etra ng^res.

Paris, le 'V,, Juillet 1914.

(T^l^gramme).

Vivian! vient de me confirmer I'enti^re resolution du Gouveme*
ment Fran^ais d'agir d*accord avec nous. Cette resolutioTi est sou-

- 41 - 6

tentio par les cereles les plus 6tendus et par les partis y conipris les
radicaux-socialistes qui viennent de lui presenter luie declaration
exprimant la confiance absolue et les dispositions patriotiques dugroupe.
Des sou arrivee a Paris, Viviani a telegraphic d'urgence k Londres que
vu la cessation des pourparlers directs entre P6tersbourg et Vienne il
etait necessaire que le Cabinet de Londres renouvelat le plus tot
possible sous telle ou autre forme sa propesition concemant la me-
diation des Puissances. Avant moi Viviani a re(ju aujourd'hui TAmbas-
sadeur d'Allemagne qui lui a renouveie Tassurance des tendances
pacifiques de rAIlemagne. Viviani ayant fait observer que si TAlle-
niagne desirait la paix elle devrait se hater d'adherer a la proposition
de mediation anglaise, le Baron Schoen a rCpondu que les mots«confe-
r€nce» ou «arbitr.age» effrayaient TAutriche. Viviani a repliqu6 qu'il
ne s'agissait pas de mots et qu'il serait facile de trouver une autre
forme de mediation. D'apres Tavis du Baron de Schoen, pour le succ^s
des negociations entre les Puissances il serait necessaire de savoir
ce que TAutriche compterait demander a la Serbie, Viviani a repbndu
que le Cabinet de Berlin pourrait bien facilement s'en enqu^rir aupr^s
derAutriche, mais qu'en attendant la note responsive serbe pour-
rait servir de base a la discussion; il a ajoute que la France desirait
sincerement la paix, mais qu'elle etait en meme temps rCsolue d'agir en
pleine harmonic avec ses allies et amis,et que lui, le Baron de Schoen,
avait pu se convaincre que cette resolution rencontrait la plus vive
approbation du pays.

(Signer Iswolsky.

JV? 56.

Telegramme de son Altesse Royale le Prince Alexandre
de Serbie a sa Majeste I'tmpereur.

Profondement touche par le teiegramme que Votre Majeste a
bien voulu M'adresserhier, Je M'empresse de Laremercierde tout mon
coeur. Je prie Votre Majeste d'etre persuadeeque la cordialesyrapathie,
dont Votre Majeste estanimee en vers Mon pays, nous est particulie-
rement precieuse et remplit notre ame de Tespoir que Pavenir de la
Serbie est assure etant devenu Pobjet de la Haute sollicitude de

- 42 -

Votre Majest6.~Ces moments penibles ne peiivent queraffermir les
liens de Tattachement profond qui unissent la Serbie a la sainte Russia
slave, et les sentiments de reconnaissance etemelle pour Taide et
la protection de Votre Majesty seront conserves pieusement dans Tame
detous les serbes.

(Sign6) Alexandre.

Ko 67.

Le Charge d'Airaires en SerWe au Ministre des Affaires

Etrang^res.

Nich le »V„ Juillet 1914.

(T^l^gramme).

J'ai communique a Pachitch le texte du telegrarame responsif
de Sa Majest6 TEmpereur au Prince Alexandre. Pachitch apres
Tavoir lu,sesignaet dit: «Seigneurl Le Tzar est grand et clement*!
Ensuite il m'embrassa, ne pouvant contenir Temotion qui I'avait
gagn6. L'heritier est attendu a Nich dans la.nuit.

(Signe) Strandtman.

JV?58.

Le 3Iinistre des Affaires Btrang^res k TAmbassadeur en

France.

St. Pctersbourg le *%, Juillet 1914.
(T^l^gramme).

Aujourd'hui TAmbassadeur dAllemagne m'a communique la
resolution prise par son gouvemement de mobiliser, si la Russie ne
cessait pas ses preparatifs militaires. Or, nous n'avons commence
ces derniers qu'^ la suite de la mobilisation h laquelle avait dej^
procede TAutriche et vu Tabsence §vidente chez cette deniiere du
desir d'accepter un mode quelconque d'une solution pacifique de
son conflit avec la Serbie.

- 43 --

Puisque nous ne pouvons pas aec^der au desir de I'Alleniagne,
il ne nous reste que d'acc61erer nos propres armements etde compter
avec rinevitabilite probable de la guerre.— Veuillez en avertir le
Gouveniement Francais et lui exprimer en nieme temps notre sincere
reconnaissance pour la declaration que I'Ambassadeur de Prance m\i
faite en son nom en disant que nous pouvons compter enti^-
rement sur I'appui de notre alli^e la France. Dans les circonstances
actuelles cette declaration nous est particulierement pr§cieuse.
Communique aux Ambassadeurs en Angleterre, Autriche-Hongrie,
Italic. Allemagne.

(Signe) Sazonow.

X? 59.

Le Charge d'Aflaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires

Etraiigeres.

Nich, le "A, Juillet 1914.

(T^legramme).

Le Prince-R^gcnt a public hier un 'manifeste sign^ par tous les
Ministres a Toccasion de la declaration de la guerre par TAutriche
a la Serbie. Le manifeste se termine par les paroles suivantes: «De-
fendez de toutes vos forces vos foyers et la Serbie». Lors de I'ouver-
ture solennelle de la Scouptchina, le Regent lut en son non
le discours du trone, au d^but duquel il indiqua que le lieu de la con-
vocation demontrait I'importance des evcnements actuels. Suit
Texpose des faits des demiers jours— rultimatum autrichien, la
reponse serbe, les efforts du gouvemement Royal de faire tout ce qui
etait compatible avec la dignity le TEtat pour ^viter la guerre et
enfin I'agression armee du voisin plus puissant contre la Serbie, aux
cotes de laquelle se tient le Montenegro. En passant a Texaraen de
I'attitude des Puissances en presence du conflit, le Prince insista
tout d'abord sur les sentiments dont est anim6e la Russie et sur la
Toute Gracieuse Conmiunication de sa Majest6 TEmpereur
disant que la Russie en aucun cas n'abandonnera la Serbie. A chaque
mention du nom de Sa Majeste Imp6riale et de la Russie un «jivio>

- 44 -

foriniduble et febrile secouait la salle des stances. Les marques de
sympathie de la part de la France et de TAngletene furent aussi
relev^es s^parement et provoquerent des «jivio» d'approbation de
la part des d6put6s. Le discours du trone se tennine par la declaration
d*ouverture de la Scouptchina et par Texpression du voeu que toutes
les mesures soient prises pour faci liter la tache du Gouvemement.

(Signe) Strandtiuan.

Xo 60.

].e Miiiistre de5 Affaires Etrangeres aux Aiiibassadeiirs en
Allemagiie, «ii Autriche-Hongrie. en France, en Angleterre.

et en Italie.

St. Paersbourg, le 'V30 Juillet 1914.
(T61egramme).

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne qui vient de me quitter m'a de-
niande si nous ne pouvions pas nous contenter de la promesse que
rAutriche pourrait donner— de ne pas porter atteinte a Tintegrite
du Royaume de Serbie — et indiquer h quelles conditions nous
pourrions encore consentir a suspendre nos armements; je lui ai
dict6, pour etre transmise d'urgence a Berlin, la declaration suivante:
«Si rAutriche, reconnaissant que la question austro-serbe a assume
le oaractere d'une question europeenne, se declare prete a
eiiminer de son ultimatum les points qui portent atteinte aux droits
souverains de la Serbie, la Russie s'engage k cesser ses pr^paratifs
niilitaires».

Veuillez tei^graphier d'urgence quelle sera I'attitude du Gouver:
nement Allemand en presence de cette nouvelle preuve de notre
d^sir de faire le possible pour la solution pacitique de la question,
car nous no pouvons pas admettre que de seniblables pourparlers ne
servent qu a faire gagner du temps k rAllemagne et a TAutriciie
pour leurs pr^paratifs militaires.

(Signe) Sazonow.

- 46 -

L^Aiiibassadeur eii Alleiiiaj^iie au Miiiistre des Affaires

Etraiigdres.

Berlin, le 'Vao Juillet 1914.
(T^legramme).

J'apprends que le d^cret de mobilisation de Tarra^e et de la
flotte' allemandes vient d'etre promulgue.

(Sign6) Swerb^ew.

JVo 62.

L'Ambassadeur en AUema^ne au Miiiistre des Affaires

Etraug^res.

Berlin, le "Ao Juillet 1914.

fT^legramme).

Le Miuistre des Affaires Etrangeres vient de me telephoner pour
me communiquer que la nouvelle lancee tout a I'heure de la mobili-
sation de Tarm^e ct de la flotte allemandes est fausse; que les feuillets
des journaux etaient imprimes d'avance en prevision de toutes 6ven-
tualites, et mis en vente a Theure de Tapres raidi, mais que main-
tenant ils sont confisqu6s.

(Signe) Swerb6ew.

^0 63.

L'Aiabassadeur en Alleniagiie au Ministre des Affaires

Etrangeres.

Berlin, le "Ao Juillet 1914.

(T^l^gramme).

Ai re^u. Votre t^legramme du 1^—29 Juillet et ai transmis le
tfixU de Votre proposition au Ministre des Affaires Etrangtos que je

- 46 -

viens de voir; il m'a dit qu'il avait re^u un tdl^gramme identique
de rAmbassadttur d'Allemagne a St.-P6tosbourg et m*a d^clar^
ensuite qu'il trouvait notre proposition inacceptable pour I'Autriche.

(Sign6) Swerb^ew.

^ 64-.

L'Aiiibassadciir en Aii^leterrc au Sliuistre des Affaires

Etrangeres.

Londres, le 17/30 Jiiillet 1914.
(T^l^granune).

Ai communique le contenu de Vos t^legrammes du 16 el ITJuillet.
a Grey lequel considere la situation comme tres serieuse, mais desire
continuer les pourparlers. J'ai fait observer a Grey que depuis que
Vous lui aviez fait la proposition d'accepter tout ce qu'il propose-
rait en faveur du maintien de la paix, pourvu que TAutriche
ne {)ut prof iter de ces atermoiements pour ^eraser la Serbie, la
^tuation dans laquelle Vous vous trouviez s'etait apparenmient
modifiee. A cette epoque nos rapports avec rAllemagneu'etaient pas
comi)romis. Apres la declaration de TAmbassadeur d'Allemagne a
St.-P6tersbourg concemant la mobilisation allemande, ces rapports
avaient change et sa demande avait re^u de Votre part la seule reponse
que pouvait donner une grande Puissance. Lorsque TAmbassadeur
d'Allemagne ^tait revenu aupres de Vous et s'etait enquis de Vos
conditions, Vous les aviez formul6es dans de^ circonstances tout-a-
fait speciales. J'ai en meme temps de nouveau insists aupres de Grey
sur la necessite de prendre en consideration la situation uouvelle
cr66e par la f ante de rAllemagne a la suite de Taction dePAmbassadeur
d'AUemagne. Grey a repondu qu'il le comprenait et qu'il tiendrait
compte de ces arguments.

(Sign6) Benckendorff.

- 47 -

JVo G5.

L'Ambassadeur en Amt^leterre au Ministre des Affaires

£traug^re$.

Londres, le "Ao Juillet 1914.
'(T616gramme).

L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a demand^ k Grey pour quelle
raison I'Angleterre prenait des mesures militaires sur terre et sur
mer. Grey a r^pondu que ces mesures n'avaient pas un caract^re
agressif , mais que la situation 6tait telle que chaque Puissance devait
se preparer.

(Sign^) Benckendorff.

JV^ 66.

L'Ambassadeur en Autriclie-Hongrie au Ministre des AftUires

Etrangeres.

Vienue, le ^Vsi Juillet 1914.

(T416gramme).

Malgr6 la mobilisation gen^rale je continue k ^changer des vues
avec le Comte Berchtold et ses collaborateurs Tous insistent but
I'absence chez TAutriche d'intentions aggressives quelconques contre
laRussieetde vis6es de conqueteil'^gard delaSerbie, mais tous insistent
6galement sur la n6cessit6 pour TAutriche de poursuivre jusqu'au
bout Taction commenc^e et de donner a la Serbie une le(?on s6rleuse
qui pourrait constituer une certaine garantie pour Tavenir.

(Sign6) Sch6b6ko.

JVo 67.

Le Mlnistre des Affaires Etrangeres aux Ambassadeiirs en
Allemagiie, Autriclie-Hoiigrie, en France, en Angletcrre et

en Italie.

St. Petersbourg, le »%i Juillet 1914.
(T61egrarame).

Me r^f^re k mon tel^gramme du *Vjo* Juillet. D'ordre de son
gouvernement, rAmbassadeur d'Angleterre m'a transmis le desir du
Cabinet de Londres d'introduire quelques modifications dans la for-
raule que j'ai propos^e hier k TAmbassadeur d'Allemagne. J*ai r6-
pondu que j'acceptais la proposition anglaise. Ci dessous je vous
transmets la formule modifide en consequence.

«Si TAutriche consent a arreter la niarche de ses arraees sur le
territoire Serbe et si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a
assum6 le caractere d'une question d'interet europeen, elle adinet
que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie
pourrait accorder au gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie sans laisser
porter atteinte k ses droits d'Etat souverain et a son independance,—
la Russie s'engage a conserver son attitude expectante».

(Sign6) Sazonow.

J^ 68.

L'Ambassadeur en AUeniagne au Ministre des Affaires

Etrangeres.

Berlin, le %t Juliet 1914.

(T^l^gramme).

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres vient de me dire que nos
pourparlers, qui 6taient d6ja difficiles k la suite de la mobilisation
contre PAutriche, le deviennent encore davantage en presence des graves
mesuresmilitaires que nous prenonscontrePAllemagne; des nouvelles y
relatives sont, d'apres lui^reijues ici de tons les cotes et devront prOvo-
quer in^vitablement des mesures analogues de la part de PAllemague.

— 49 — 1

A cela j\ii r^pondu que, d'apres des renseigiiemcnts surs dont je
disposals ct qui ctaient confirmes par tous nos compatriptes iurivant
a Berlin, la prise coutre nous des mcsuros susditos se poursuivait 6gale-
nient en Allemagne avec graude activite. Malgr6 cela, le Ministre des
Affaires Etrangeres affirme qu'ici on n'a fait que rappeler les offi-
ciers de leurs conges et les troupes des champs de manoeuvres.

(Sign^) Swerb^w.

Xo 69.

Le 3Iiiii$tre des Affaires Etrangeres h rAinbassadeiir eii

Aiigleterre.

S.-Petersbourg, le ^V^i Juilletl914.
(T^l^gramme).

J'ai prie TAmbassadeur d'^Vngleterre de transmettre a Grey
Texpression de ma plus sincere reconnaissance pour le ton amical et
ferme dont il a use pendant les pourparlers avecrAllemagiieetrAutri-
che, grace a quoi Tespoir de trouver une issue pacifique de la situation
actuelle n'est pas encore perdu.

Je Tai aussi pri6 de dire au Ministre Anglais que je pensais que
ce n'etait qu'a Londres que les pourparlers auraient encore quelques
chances d'un succes quelconque, en facilitant ^TAutriche la necessite
d'un compromis.

Communique k TAmbassadeur en France.

(Signe) Sazonow.

X? 70.

Telegrainiiic secret aux Representaiits de Sa Majeste
TEmpereur k Tetraiiger.

Le 19 Juillet/1 Aout 1914.
(Telegramrae).
A minuit TAmbassadeur d'AUemagne m'a d6clar6, d'ordre de
son Gouvemcment, que si dans les 12 heures, c'est k dire k midi,
Samedi, nous ne commencions pas la demobilisation, non seulement

— 60 —

a I'^gard de I'Allcmagnc, mais aussi k regard de I'AutricIie, le Gauverac-
ment Allemand serait force de donner Tordre de mobilisation. A ma
question si c'6tait la 'guerre, i'Ainbassadeur a repondu par la
negative, mais en ajoutant que nous etions fort pres d'elle.

(Signe) Sazonow.

Xo 71.

L'Ainbassadeur en Angleterrc au Miuistre des AfTaires

Etran^eres.

Londres 19 Juillet/1 Aout 1914.

(T^legramme).

Grey m'a dit qu'il a tel^aphi6 a Berlin q\i*k son avis la der-
niere formule acceptee par le Gouvemcment Russe constitue la base
de n^ociations qui presente le plus de chimces pour une solution
pacifique du conflict. 11 a exprime en meme temps Tespoir qu'aucune
grande Puissance ne commencerait les hostilites avant Texamen de
cette formule.

(Signe) Benckendorff.

Xo 72.

L'Aiubassadcur cu Aiigletcrre an Ministrc des AfiFaires

Etrangeres.

Londres, le 19 Juillet/1 Aout 1914.

(T^l^gramme).

Le Gouvernement de la Grande Bretagne a pos6 aux Gouverneihents
Franeais et Allemand la question s'ils respecteraient la neutralite
de la Belgique.

La France a repondu dans Taffirmative, tandis que le Gouverne-
ment Allemand a declare ne pouvoir repbndre a cette question cat^gori-
quemcnt.

(Signe) Benckendorff.

51 ->

Ko 73.

L'Aiiibassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires
Etrang^res.

Paris, le 19 Juillet/1 Aout 1914.

(Teli^gramme).

L'Anibassadeur d'Autricho a visits hier Viviani et lui a d6clar§
quo TAutrichc non seulement n'avait pas le dessein de porter atteinte
a rint^grit^ territoriale de la Serbio, mais etait prete h discuter
avee les autres Puissances le fond de son eonflit avec la Serbie. Le
GouvemementFrangaisesttrespreoeuppe paries preparatifs militaires
extraordinaires de rAllemagne sur la frontiere fran^aise, car il est
convaineu que sous le voile du «Kriegszustand» se produit une veri-
table mobilisation.

(Sign6) Iswolsky.

Ko 74.

L'Anibassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires
Etrang:^res.

Paris, la 19 Juillet/1 Aout 1914.

(T616gramme).

A la reception ici du t^l^gramme de TAmbassadeur de France
a St.-P^tcrsbourg contonant la communication que Vous a faite
TAnibassadeur Allemand concemant la resolution de I'Allemagne
de d^creter aujourd'hui la mobilisation g^n^rale, le President do
la Republique a signe le d^cret de mobilisation. Dans les rues on
procede a Taffichage des listes d'appel des r^servistes. L'Ambassadeur
d'Allemagne vient de rendre visite a Viviani, mais ne lui a fait aucune
nouvclle communication, en all^guant Timpossibilite de d^chiffrer les
t^l^ammes qu'il a reQus. Viviani Pa informe de la signature du
decrct de mobilisation en r^ponse a la mobilisation allemande et
lui a fait part de son 6t(»nnement de ce que PAllemagne eiit pris une
telle raesure a un moment ou se poursuivait encore un ^change de
Tucs amical entre la Russie, rAutriche et les Puissances; il a ajoute

- 52 -

que la mobilisation ne pr^jugeait pas n^cessairement la guerre et
que TAmbassadeur d'AlIemagne pourrait rester k Paris coramc
TArnbassadeur de Russie est rest6 k Vicnne et cclul d'Autriche k
St.-P6tersbourg.

(Sign6) Iswolsky.

JVo 75.

L'Anibassadeur en France au Jlinistre des Affaires

Etran^eres.

Paris, le 19 Juillet/1 Aout 1914.

(T^ldgramme).

Jetionsdu President que pendant les demi^res joum^es TAmbaa-
sadeur d'Autriche a assure avec force le President du Conseil des
Ministres et Ini meme, que I'Autriche nous aurait d6clar6
etre prete a respecter non seulement Tint^grit^ territoriale de la
Serbie, mais aussi ses droits souverains, mais que nous aurions inten-
tionnellement fait le silence sur cette declaration.* J'ai oppose ua
dementi cat^orique k cela..

(Sign6) Iswolsky.

\Xo 70.

Jiote remise par TAmbassadeur d'Allemagne a S.-Peters-
bourg le 19 Juillet 19U a 7 h. 10 du soir.

Le Gouvemement Imj^^rial s'est efforc6 des les debuts dc
laitise de la mener a une solution pacifique. Se rendant a un
d^sir qui lui en avait M exprim^ par Sa Majesty TEmpereur
de Eussiti, Sa Majeste TEmpereur d'Allemagne d'accord avee
I'AngletHrre s'6tait appliqu6 a accomplir un role m6diateur
aupres des Cabinets de Vienne et de St.-Petersbourg, lorsque
la Kussie, sans en attendre le resultat, proc^da a la mobili-
sation de la totality de ses forces de terre et de mer. A la
suite 'de cette mesure mena(?ante motiv6e par aucun presage
militaire d^ la part de TAllemagne TEmpire Allemand c'est
trouv6 vis-^-vis d'un danger grave et imiiiinent. Si le Gouveme-

- 53 -

ment Imperial out lUiinque de parer k ce peril, il aurait oompro-
mis la security et Texistencc meme de rAllomtigue. Par conse-
quent le Gouvemeraent Allemand se vit force do s'adresser au
Gouvemement de Sa Majeste TEmpereur de Toutes les Russies
en insistant sur la cessation des dits actes miiitaires. La Russie
ayant refus6 de faire droit k (n'ayant pas cru devoir repondre
a*) cette demande et ayant manifesto par ce refus (cette atti-
tude*) que son action etait dirig§e centre TAUeinagne, j'ai
riionneur, d'ordre de inon Gouvemement, de faire savoir a
Votre Excellence ce qui suit:

Sa Majeste TEinpereur Mon Auguste Souvorain au nom de
TEiupire, relevant le defi se considere en etat de guerre avec la
Russie.

St.-Petersbourg, le 19 Juillet/1 Aout 1914.

(Signe) F. Pourtales.

jYo 77.

Communique du 3Iiulstre des AtTaircs Etraui^^^rcs coucer-
uaut les evenemeuts des deruiers jours.

Le 20 Juillet/2 Aout 1914.

Un expos6 dcfigurant les eveneraents des derniers jours
ayant paru dans la presse 6trangere, le Ministcre des Affaires
Etrangeres croit de son devoir de publier Taper^u suivant des
pouri)arlers di[)lomatiques pendant le temps susvise.

Le 10/23 Juillct a. c. le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie a
Belgrade presenta au Ministre President Serbe une note o^
le Gouvemement Serbe etait accuse d 'avoir favorise le mouve-
ment panserbe qui avait abouti h Tassassinat de rentier
du trone austro-hongrois. En consequence TAutriche-Hongrie

•) Les mots places cntre parentheses se trouvent dans Toriginal. II faut
suppuser que deux variantes avaient et6 preparSes d'avance et que par erreur
clles ont ete inser^es tiutes les deux dans la note.

— 64 —

demandait au Gouvemrment Serbc non seulement de condamner
sous une forme solennelle la susdite propagandc, mais aussi
de prendre, sous le controle de rAutriche-Hongrie, une serie
de mesures tendant a la decouvcrte du coniplot, a la punition
des sujets swbes y ayant particip^ et a la- prevention dans
Tavenir de tout attentat sur le sol du Roavume. Un delai de
48 heures fut fix6 au Gouvemement Serbe pour la reponse a
la susdite note.

Le Gouvemement Imperial, aiiquel I'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-
Hongrie h St.-Petersbourg avait communique le texte de la
note 17 heures apres sa remise a Belgrade, ayant pris eonnais-
sance des demandes y contenues, dut s'apercevoir que quelques
unes parmi elles etaient inexecutables quant au fond, tandisque
d'autres etaient presentees sous une forme incompatible avee
la dignite d'un Etat independant. Trouvant inadmissibles la
diminution de la dignite de la Serbie contenue dans ces deman-
des, ainsi que la tendance de rAutriche-Hongrie d'assurer sa
preponderance dans les Balcans demontree par ces memes exi-
gences, le Gouvemement Russe fit observer dans la forme la
plus amicale a I'Autriche-Hongrie qu'il serait desirable de
soumettre k un nouvel examen les points contenus dans la
note austro-hongroise. Le Gouvemement Austro-Hongrois ne
cmt possible de consentir h, une discussion de la note. L 'action
moderatrice des autres Puissances a Vienne ue fut non plus
couronnee de succes.

Malgr6 que la Serbie eut reprouve le crime et se fut mon-
tr^e prete a donner satisfaction a rx\utriche dans une mesure
qui depassa les provisions non seulement de In Russie, mais
aussi des autres Puissances, le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie a
Belgrade jugea la reponse serbe insuffisante et quitta cette
ville.

Reconnaissant le caractere exagOre des demandes presentees
par TAutriche, la Russie avait declare encore auparavant qu'il lui
serait impossible de rester indifferente, sans se refuser toutefois a
employer tons ses efforts pour trouver une issue pacifique qui fut
acceptable pour rAutriche et menageatson amour-propre de grande
puissance. En meme temps la Russie etablit fernieijient qu'elle
admettait une solution pacifique de la question seulement dans une

— r>5 —

raesure qui n'impliquerait ptos la diminution do la dignity dc la Serbie
conime Etat ind6])endant. Mallii^ureuseinent tons Ics efforts d^ploy^s
piir lo Gouvenioment Imperial dans cctto direction rrsterent sans
effet. LeGouvernemont Austro-Hongfois, apres s'etre derob6 ^touto
intervention eonciliatrice des Puissances dans sonconflitavocla Serbie,
prot-eda a la mobilisation, d6clara officiellemont la guerre c\ la Serbie,
et le jour suivant Belgrade fut bombard^e. Le manifesto qiii a accoin-
piigne la declaration de guerre accuse ouvertement la Serbie d'avoir
prepare et execute le crime de S^Taiewo. Une parnlle accusation d'un
crime de droit commun lancee contre tout un peuple et tout un 6tat
attira k la S.^rbie par son inanite cvidente les larges sympathies dos
cercles de la society europeemie.

A la suiti' de cette maniere d'agir du Gouvernement. Austro-
Hongrois, malgre la declaration de la Russic qu'elle ne pourrait rester
indifferente au sort de la Serbie, le Gouvernement Imp6rial jugea
necessaire d'ordonner la mobilisation des circonscriptions militnires
deKiew,d'Odessa,de Moscou etde Kazan. Une telle decision s'iinpo-
sait parceque depuis la date de la remiso de la note austro-lion-
groise au Gouvernement Serbe et les premieres demarches de la Russie
cinq juurs s'etaient ecoules, et cependant le Cabinet d'' Vienne n'avait
fait aucun pas pour aller au devant de nos efforts pacifiques; au
contraire, la mobilisation de la moiti6 dc Tarinee austro-hongroise
Avait ele decretee.

Le Gouvernement Allemand fut mis au courant des mesures
prises par la Russie; 11 lui fut en meme temps cxpliqu6 qu'elles
n'6taient que la consequence des armements autrichiens et nullement
dirigees contre rAlli'nuigno. En meme temps, le Gouvernement
Imperial dec lara que la Russie 6tait prete a continuer les pourparlers
en vue d'une solution pacifique du confiit, soit par la voie de nego-
ciations directes avec le Cabinet dc Vienne,soit, en suivant la pro-
position de ia Grande Bretagne, par la voie d'une Conference des
quatre Grandes Puissancs non interosseosdircctement, voire,, I'Angle-
terre, la France, TAllemagne et I'ltalie.

Cependant cette tentative de la Russie echoua egalement. L'Au-
triche-Hongric declina un echange de vucs ulterieur avec nous, et le
Cabinet de Vienne se deroba a la participation a la Conference des
Puissances projetee.

- 56 -

Neanmoins, la Eussie ne discontinua pas ses efforts en faveur de
la paix R^pondant h la question de TAmbassadeur d'Allemagne, a
quelles conditions nous consentirions encore k suspendre nos armements,
le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres declara que ces conditions
seraient la reconnaissance par TAutriche-Hongrie que la question
Austro-Serhe avaitrevetu le caractere d'une question europeenne, et la
declaration de cette meme Puissance qu'elle consentait a ne pas
insister sur des demandes incompatibles avec les droits souverains
de la Serbie.

La proposition de la Russie fut jugee par TAllemagne inaccep-
table pour I'Autriche-Hongrie. Simultanement onre^uta St.-Peters-
bourg la houvelle de la proclamation de la mobilisation generale
par TAutriche-Hongrie.

En meme temps les hostilites continuaient sur le territoirre Serbe
et Belgrade fut bombardee de rechef.

L'insucces de nos propositions pacifiques nous obligea d'elargir
les mesures de precaution militaires.

Le Cabinet de Berlin nous ayant adresse une question a cesujet,
il lui fut repondu que la Russie etait forcee de commencer ses arme-
nieuts pour se prenmnir contre toutes eventualites.

Tout en prenant cette mesure de precaution, la Russie n'en ^f^
continjait pas moins de rechercher de toutes ses forces une issue de
cette situation et declara etre prete a accepter tout moyen de solution
du conflit qui comport^ait Tobservation des conditions posees par
nous.

Malgre cette communication conciliante, le Gouvernement Alle-
mand, le ^ V31 Jwill^t,adressa au Gouvemement Russelademande d'avoir
a suspendre ses mesures militaires a midi du 19 Juil let/1 Aout,
en menaQant, dans le cas contraire, de proceder a une mobilisation
generale.

Le lendemain, 19 Juillet/1 Aout, TAmbassadeur d'Allemagne
transmit au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, au nom de son Gouver-
nement, la declaration de guerre.

- 57

j\o 78.

Le Hinistre des Affaires Etraiig^res aux Kepreseiitaiits de
8. M. FEiupereur a retrauji:er.

St.-Petersboui^, le 20 Juillet/2 Aout 1914.
(T^l^gramme).

II est absohiment clair que TAllemagne s'efforce des a present
de rejeter sur nous la responsabilit^ de la rupture. Notre mobilisation
a ete provoquee par Tenorme responsabilite que nous aurions assumee,
si nous n'avions pas pris toutes les mesures de precaution a un moment
ou TAutriche, se bomanta des pourparlers d'un caractere dilatoire,
bombardait Belgrade et procedait a une mobilisation generale.

Sa Majesty TErapereur s'etait engage vis-a-vis de TEmpereur
d'Allemagne par sa parole a n'entreprendreaucun acte agressif tant que
dureraient les pourparlers avec rAutriche, Apres une telle garantie et
apres toutes les preuves de Tamour de la Russie pour la paix, TAlle-
magne ne pouvait ni avait le droit de douter de notre declaration que
nous accepterions avec joie toute issue pacifique compatible avec
la dignite et Tindependance de la Serbie. Une. autre issue, tout en
etant completement incompatible avec notre propre dignite, aurait
certainement ebranle Tequilibre Europeen, enassurant Th^gemonie de
TAllemagne. Ce caractere Europeen, voire mondial, du conflit est infi-
niment plus important que le pretexte qui Ta cree. Par sa decision de
nous declarer la guerre a un moment oil se poursuivaient les n4go-
ciations entre les Puissances, TAllemagne a assume une lourde
responsabilite.

(Signe) Sazonow.

J^79.

Note remise par I'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie h

St.-Petersboui'g au Miiiistre des Aflfaires Etrangeres le

24 Jiiillet h 6 h. du soir.

D'ordre de son Gouvemement le soussigne Ambassadeur d'Au-
triche-Hongrie a Thonneur de notifier a Son Excellence Monsieur
le Ministre des Affaires Etrangercs de Russie ce qui suit:

■k — 58 — '

<Vu Tattitude mena^te prise par la Russie dans le conflict entrc
la Monarchic Austro-Hongroise et la Serbie et en presence du fait
qu'en suite de ce conflict la Russie d'aprds une communication du
Cabinet de Berlin a cru devoir ouvrir les hostilit^s centre TAUemagnc
et que celle-ci se trouve par consequent en 6tat de guerre avec la
dite Puissance, TAutriche-Hongrie se considere ^alement en ^tat
de guerre avec la Russie k partir du present moment.

(Sign6) Szapary.

St.-Petersbourg.
6 Aout/24 Juillet 1914.

59-

PAGES D'HISTOIRE - 1914

2* Serif

Les Pourparlers

Diplomatiques

16/29 JOIK — 3/16 ROUT

LE LIVRE BLEU SERBE

NEGOCIATIONS AYAHT PRECEDE LA GUERRE

LlBRAIRIE MILITAIRE BERGER-LEVRAULT

PARIS I NANCY

5-7, RUE DES 8EAUX ARTS j 18, ROE DBS CLACtS

;5?S? Prtjc : 60 centimes.

Les Pourparlers

Diplomatiques

Correspondance diplomatique du Gouvernement serbe

11 a eie tire de ce polume cinqnante-cinq exem-
plaires numerot^s a lapresse, dont:

5 sur papier du Japon (N""^ i a 5);
5o sur papier de Hollande (N""^ 6 a 55).

Les Pourparlers

Diplomatiques

Correspondance diplomatique du GouYernemeni serbe

M. Jov. M. Jopanoi>itch , ministre a Viennef
a M. N. Pachitch, pr^esident du Conseil et mU
nistre des Affaires etrangeres.

(Telegramme.) Vienne, le 16/29 juin 1914.

Les journaux de Vienne affirment que Tins-
truction judiciaire, ouverte contre les auteurs de
Fattentat, a e tabli que le crime avait ete prepare a
Belgrade, que tout un com plot sur une base plus
large avait ete organise a Belgrade parmi la jeu-
nesse ins]3iree par Tidee panserbe, et que les
journaux de Belgrade alarment le public par
ieurs peintures de la gravite de la situation en
Bosnie. Ceci, d'apr^s euX; exerce une influence

4 PAGES D'raSTOIRE

considerable, vu quecesjournaux sont introduits
en Bosnie, en cachette, en grand nombre.

N« 2

M. Jov. M. Joi>anoQitch, ministre a Viennej^
a M. N. Pachitchy president du Conseil et
ministre des Affaires 4trangeres.

(Telegramme.) Vienne, le 17/30 juin 1914.

La tendance est de plus en plus ^vidente a
Vienne de donner a TEurope I'impression que
Tattentat commis contre I'archiduc - heritier
d'Autriche-Hongrie est le resultat d*un complot
l)repare en Serbie. On a I'intention de s'en ser-
vir co.mme d'un moyen politique contre nous.
Aussi FsLitt-il surveiller avec la plus grande atten-
tion le langage de nos journaux sur I'^venement
de Serajevo.

N«3

M. le D' M. Jomnontch, charge d'affaires a Ber-
lin, a M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et
ministre des Affaires etrangeres.

(T616gramme.) Berlin, le 11/30 juin 1914.

Les journaux de Berlin publient, d'apres les
informations de Vienne et de Budapest, les ar-

LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUE S 5

tides on I'attentat de Serajevo est rattache a la
Serbia : on induit ainsi en erreur Fopinion pu-
blique allemande.

N°4

M. le D"" M. Jo{>ano{>itch^ charge d'affaires a
Berlin^ a M. N. Pachitch^ president du Conseil
et ministi^e des Affaires etr anger es»

(Telegramme.) Berlin, le 17/30 juin 1914.

L'hostilite de Fopinion publique en Allemagne
envers nous dure toujours, entretenue par des
nouvelles mensongeres, envoy ees de Vienne et de
Budapest, que j)resque tons les journaux alle-
mands, malgre nos dementis, repandent avec
zele par Fintermediaire de certains jOurnaux^et

N« 5

M. JoQ. M. JoQanovitchy ministre a Vienne^
a M. N. Pachitch, president da Conseil et
ministre des Affaires etrangeres.

Vienne, le 17/30 juin 1914.

Monsieur le President,
Gomme le comte Berchtold n'a i)u me rece-
voir, j'ai eu, sur Fattcntatdc Serajevo, un entre-

6 PAGES D^HISTOIRE

tien avec le premier chef de section du minis-
tere des Affaires etrangeres, Au cours de notre
conversation, je luiai diten resume ceci :

« Le Gouverncment Royal reprouve de. la
maniere la plus energique I'attentat de Serajevo
et de son cote fera, certainement et le x:>lus loya-
lement, tout pour prouver que sur son territoire
il ne souffrira aucune agitation ou entreprisc
passible d'une j)eine et pouvant nuire a nos
relations deja si delicates avec TAutriche-Hon-
grie. Jepense que le Gouverncment de Belgrade
esti^ret a mettre en jugement les complices, s'il
est prouve qu'il y en ait en Serbie, en depit de
tons les obstacles qu'y a aj^portes la diplomatic
austro-hongroise (creation d'une Albanie inde-
pendante, opposition a une sortie libre du
Royaume serbe sur I'Adriatique, demande de
revision du traite de Bucarest, ultimatum du
mois de septembre, etc.), le Gouvernement
serbe a persiste dans son desir de retablir
sur des bases solides nos relations de voisinage.
Vous savez que dans cette voie quelque chose a
ete fait et obtenu. La Serbie veut poursuivre cet
effort, convaincue qu'il peut et doit etre con-
tinue. L'attentat de Serajevo ne doit pas et ne
peut pas entraver cette tache. »

Le baron Macchio a pris note en se chargeant
de communiquer au comte Berchtold tout ce que
je lui ai dit. Le m^me jour, j'ai communique le
fond de mon entretien aux ambassadeurs de
France et de Russie.

Veuillez, etc.

LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 7

N" 6.

M. M. Georgevitch, charge d'affaires a Cons-
tantinoplBy a M. N. Pachitch, president du
Conseil et ministre des Affaires itrangeres.

Constantinople, le 17/30 juin 1914.

Monsieur le President,

J'ai eu aujourd'hui, a pivjpos de I'attentat de
Serajevo, une assez longue conversation avec
Tambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie. J'ai exprime
I'espoir que ce triste evenement, quoi qu'on en
dise dans certains cei^cles diplomatiques, ne nui-
rait pas aux relations entrc la Serbie et I'Au-
trich6-Hongrie, considerablement ameliorees dans
ces derniers temps.

II m'a repondu qu'il ne faut pas m€me avoir
de crainte a ce sujet. II tix)uve, lui aussi, que les
rapports entre la Serbie et I'Autriche-Hongrie
sont devenus bien meilleurs ces derniers temps.
II a ajoute qu'il faut continuer dans cette yoie. II
m'a dit que ses derniers entretiens avec le comte
Berchtold I'avaient convaincu que celui-ci etait
content de Tattitudc du Gouvernement serbe et
que, pour sa part, il desire sincerement les rela-
tions amicales avec la Serbie.

Veuillez, etc.

NO 7

M. M. S. Bochkovltch^ ministre h Londres, h
M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et mi-
nistre des Affaires stranger es.

(Teiegramme.) Londres, le 18 juin/l" juillet 1914.

Pi*esque tous les journaux anglais annoncent,

8 PAGES D'HISTOIRE

d'apres les sources autrichiennes, que Tattentat
de Serajevo est I'oeuvre des revolutionnaires
serbes.

N*^ 8

M. N. Pachitch^ president du Conseily ministre
des Affaires etrangereSy a touies les Legations
Roy ales.

Belgrade, le 18 juin/1" juillet 1914.

La presse austro-hongroise accuse de plus en
plus la Serbie de Tattentat de Serajevo. Le but
est evident : ruiner le grand credit moral dont la
Serbie jouit aujourd'hui en Europe et exploiter
politiquement contre la Serbie la folle entreprise
d'un jeune fan^^tique exalte. Gependant I'attentat
de Serajevo a rencontre en Serbie la reprobation
la plus severe dans toutes les classes sociales;
dans les cercles officiels et non officiels, tous ont
immediatement compris que cet evenement
aurait la repercussion la plus d^favorable sur
nos relations de bon voisinage et sur la vie des
Serbes d'Autriche-Hongrie, ce que les derniers
evenements ont confirme. Au moment ou la Ser-
bie fait tout pour que le» relations avec la Mo-
narchic voisine deviennent meilleures et de plus
en plus amicales, il serait absurde de penser
qu'elle aurait pu, soit directement soit indirecte-
ment, insj)irer depareils actes. Tout au contraire,
il etait dans I'interet vital de la Serbie elle-meme
que ce crime fut evite. Par malheur, cela n'etait

LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 9

pas en son pouvoir, les deux auteurs de Tattentat
etant sujets autrichiens. La Serbie a toujours
veille, et depuis les derniers evenements elle re-
doublera de vigilance, sur les elements anar-
chistes; si elle en decouvre en Serbie, elle pren-
dra contre eux, avec energie, les mesures les
plus severes. De-plus, elle fera tout son devoir,
et par tous les moyens en son pouvoir, pour cal-
mer, a I'interieur de ses fronti^res, les esprits
exaltes. Seulement, elle ne peut nullement per-
mettre que la presse austro-hongroise induise
en erreur I'opinion publique en Europe et que,
dans un but purement politique, elle fasse re-
tomber la lourde responsabilite du crime d'un
sujet autricbien sur la Serbie et tout le peuple
serbe, auxquels de pareils actes ne peuvent cau-
ser que des dommages sans leur apporter aucun
profit.

Je vous prie d'agir, en cet esprit, par tous les
moyens propices, pour mettre fin le plus tot pos-
sible a la campagne antiserbe de'vant Topinion
publique euroioeenne.

N°9

M. Joi>. M. JoQanovitch, ministre a Vienney a
M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et mi-
nistre des Affaires etrangeres.

(Telegramme.) Vienne, le 18 juin/1" juillet 1914.

Des demonstrations ont eu lieu bier soir devant
la Legation. Je peux dire que la police s'est mon-

10 PAGES D'HISTOIRE

tr^e energique. L*ordre et la tranquillity ont ^16
maintenus. Si j'apx^renais que le drapeau national
ait et6 brftle, je ferais une d-marche aupr^s de
qui de droit et vous informerais du resultat. Ge
sont surtout les cercles cathoKques inferieurs, la
presse et les cercles militaires qui pr6chent la
haine centre les Serbes etla Serbie. Je vous prie
de faire le necessaire pour que les demonstrations
soient evitees chcz nous et pour que le ton de la
presse de Belgrade soit mesurt^ autant que pos-
sible. Les dispositions centre nous reslent ici les
jnSmes. Oncroit que I'attitude k prendre, vis-a-vis
de la Serbie et des Serbes, sera decid^e apres les
funerailles de FArchiduc.

N° 10

M. le D^ M. R. Vesnitchy ministre d Paris, A
M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et mi'
nistre des Affaires e tr anger es.

(Telegramme.) Paris, le 19 juin/2 juillet 1914.

Le Gouvernement frangais nous conseille d'ob-
server le plus grand sang-froid et le recueiile-
ment aussi bien dans nos cercles officiels que
dansropinion publique.

LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 11

N« 11

M. JoQ. M. JoQanovitchy ministre a Vienne^ a
M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et mi-
nistre des Affaires etrangeres.

Viennc, le 20 juin/3 juillet 1014.

Monsieur le President,

Hier, jour du transfert des deponilles mor-
telles de rarchiduc Francois-Ferdinand et de sa
femme, de Serajevo, j'ai fait hisser et mettre 6n
heme, a mon domicile, le drapeau national.

Get evenement a donne lieu nier soir aux pro-
testations du concierge, des locataires, du gerant
et du proprietaire meme de Timmeuble, qui exi-
gerent qu'on enlevdt le drapeau. Les explications
n'ayant servi a rien, on a requis le concours de
la police qui a demande, non officiellement, I'en-
l^vement du drai)eau pour eviter les desordres.
Le drapeau a ete maintenu , et ce fait a provoque
hier soir des demonstrations vehementes devant
la Legation. La police fut energique et aucune
atteinte ne fut portee ni au bdtiment, ni au dra-
peau. Vers 2 heures du matin, les manifes-
tants furent re^Dousses de mon domicile. Les jour-
naux d'aujourd'hui, surtout ceux de la nuance
clerico-populaire, ont public des articles sous le
litre : « Los provocations du ministre de Ser-
bie » en representant d'une fagon infidele toute
cette affaire.

Le drapeau est reste hisse sur I'immeuble de
la Legation jusqu'a la fin de la messe funebre
celebree, dans I'eglise de la Cour, pour les de-
funts, puis il a ete retire.

IJ^ PAGES D'HISTOIRE

lous les habitants du quartier que j'habite
sont alles a la police, a THotel de Ville, a la pre-
sidence du Gonseil des ministres, pour reclaimer
renlevement de notre drapeau.

Les manifestants furent harangues ^par le doc-
teur Funder, le directcur principal du journal
catholique Reichspost, Hermengild Wagner et
Leopold Mandl, qui sont connus comme les prin-
cijDaux instigateurs de la campagne dirigee dans
la presse autrichienne et allemande contre la
Serbie et les Serbes.

Veuillez, etc.

N<» 12

M, Jov. M. Jopano(fitch, ministre a Vienne, a
. M. N. Pachitchy president du Conseil et mi-
nistre des Affaires etrangeres,

Vienne, le 20 juin/3 juillet 1914.
Monsieur le President,

Dans la conversation que j'ai eue a projDos de
I'attentat de Serajevo avec le premier chef de
section au ministere des Afiaires etrangeres, le
baron Macchio a attaque tres vivement la presse
de Belgrade. 11 a cite des exemples afm de prou-
ver qu'elle etait efTrene'e et qu'elle faisait die
Ileizercien gegen die Monarchie (des excitations
contre la Monarchie). Je lui ai dit que la presse
etait chez nous completement libre et que les
particuliers et le Gouvernement en sou (Trent sou-
vent, mais que nous n'avions d'autres moyens
contre elle que le recours aux tribunaux. J'ai
ajoute que, dans le cas present, la presse autri-

LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 13

cliienne et hongroise, que le Gouvernement com-
mun tenait entre ses mains, avait commence :
n'est-ce j)sis la presse autrichienne et hongroise
qui, depuis presque deux ans, administre des
coups aux Serbes et a la Serbie, en touchant les
points les plus sensibles? Ges jours-ci, il y avait
juste un an depuis la malheureuse guerre avec
les Bulgares. J'ai ete temoin du manque de res-
pect avec lequel la presse de Vienne avait traite
la Serbie et son armee pendant et apres la cam-
j)agne, i^uis dans beau coup d'autres questions.
La presse de Belgrade a ete beaucoup plus
moderee. Aujourd'hui aussi, apres cet horrible
crime, c'est d'ici qu'on envoie dans le monde des
telegrammes accusant tout le peuple serbe et la
Serbie comme s'ils avaient ete meles a I'odieux
attentat de Serajevo. Tons les journaux de la
Monarchie ^crivent en ce sens. Peut-on rester
indifferent devant tout cela ? Si I'auteur de I'at-
tentat est de race serbe, tout le peuple serbe et
le royaume de Serbie n'en sont pas coupables, et
on ne pent pas les en accuser comme on le fait a
present

Le baron Macchio m'a r^pondu :

— Personne n'accuse le Royaume, ni le Gou-
vernement serbe, ni tout le peuple serbe. Nous
accusons seulement . ceux qui entretiennent les
projets panserbes et qui travaillent a leur reali-
sation...

— II m'a paru des le premier moment, lui
r^pondis-je, qu'on insistait sur la rac^ de I'auteur
pour le rattacher a Belgrade et provoquer Tim-
pression que le crime avait ete prepare en Ser-
bie. Geci m'a frappe de suite, car je savais que
jusqu'a present on appelait les Serbes en Bosnie

14 PAGES D'HISTOIRE

die Bosniaken (les Bosniaques), et que Ton disait
bosnische Sprache (la laiigue bosniaque), die
Orthodoxen aiis Bosnien (les prthodoxes de Bos-
nie) ; maintcnant on dit que I'auteur de rattentat
est ein Serbe (un Serbe), mais sans ajouter qu'il
etait de Bosnia et sujet autrichien...

— Je vous repete, reprit le baron Macchio,
que nous n'accusons ni le Gcuvernement serbe,
ni le ]3euple serbe, mais certains agilateurs...

Je I'ai prie d'agir sur la presse de Yienne, afni
qu'en ces heures difficilcs oii Ton met a serieuse
epreuve les relations entre la Scrbie et I'Au-
triche-IIongrie, elle n'aggrave pas cette crise i)ar
de telles accusations.

Vcuillez, etc,

N*> 13

M. le D^ M. R. Vesnitchy ministre a Paris, a
M. N. Pachitchy president dii Conseil et mi-
nistre des Affaires etrangeres.

Paris, le 21 juin/4 juillet 1914.

Monsieur le President,

J'ai eu, mercredi, a pix)pos de I'attentat de Sera-
jevo, un assez long entretien avec le nouveau
ministre des Affaires etrangeres, M. Yiviani, que
cet evenement a rendu passablement inquiet.
J'ai profite de cette occasion pour lui exposer a
grands traits les causes qui ont provoque cet
attentat, a savoir, en premier lieu, I'intolerable
systeme de gouvernement dans les provinces
annexees, surtout I'attitude des organes officiels

LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 15

et toute la politique du Gouvernement bosniaque
vis-a-vis de tout ce qui touche a la religion ortho-
doxe. II a compris la situation; cependant il a
exprimc le desir et I'espoir que le sang-froid et
la dignity seront gardes chez nous, afin de ne
pas donner des motifs j)Our de nouvelles accusa-
tions de Vienne.

Apres la premiere emotion, Topinion publique
frangaise s'est ressaisie a tel point que le presi-
dent du Conseil lui-mdme a juge convenable
d'adoucir au Palais-Bourbon les termes de la
declaration qu'ii propos de cct evidnement, 11
avail faite anterieurement au Senat.

Veuillez, etc.

N* 14

M. leD" M. Spalaikovitch, ministre a Petrogrady
a M^ N, Pachitcky president da Conseil^ mi-
nistre des Affaires etrangeres.

(T616gramme.) Petrograd, le 21 juin/4 juiUet 1914.

Le ministre des Affaires etrangeres m'a dit que
les cruautes commises sur les Serbes en Bosnie
accroitront les sympathies de I'Europe pour nous.
II croit que le monde ne pretera pas foi aux accu-
sations lancdes de Vienne centre nous. II est
essentiel que Topinion publique en Serbie reste
calme.

16 PAGES D'HISTOIRE

NO 15

M. Jov. Jomnooitch, ministre a Vienne, a
M, N. Pachitch, president dii Conseil et mi-
nistre des Affaires etrangeres.

(T61egramme.) Vienne, le 23 juin/6 jiiillet lOli.

Kemotion dans les cercles militaires et gouvcr-
nementaux contre la Serbie augmente sans cesse,
par suite des articles de nos journaux que la Lega-
tion austro-hongroise a Belgrade exploite avee
zele.

N^ 16

M. JoQ. JovanoQitch, ministre a Vienne, a
M. N. Pachitchy president dii Conseil ^ mi-
nistre des Affaires etrangeres.

Vienne, le 23 juin/6 juillet 1914.

Monsieur le President,

La tendance generale des journaux de Vienne
au sujet de I'attentat est la suivante :

Des le diraanche i5 juin, dans Tapres-midi,
les editions speciales des journaux annon^aient
en gros caracteres que les deux auteurs de I'at-
tentat etaient des Serbes, de fagon a faire croire
qu'il s'agissait de Serbes de Serbie. Dans les
comptes rendus publics plus tard, on remarque
la tendance constante d'etablir un lien entre cet
evenement et la Serbie, en insistant particuliere-

LES POURPARLERS DIPLOIVIATIQUES 17

inent sur deux circonstances qui semblaient prou-
ver que les origines de Tattentat devraient etre
recherchecs a Belgrade : i^ le sejour de deux au-
teurs de rattentat a Belgrade et i" I'origine des
hombes. Goinme troisieme et derniere de leurs
preuves, les journaux d'ici out commence a pu-
blier les dires des auteurs de Tattentat a Tins-
truction. II est caracteristique que ces cc dires »
n'ont dte connus que par le Bureau hongrois de
correspondance et les journaux, magyars, surtout
le journal Az Est. Ces dires se resument a ceci :
V qu'il est prouve que les auteurs de I'attentat
avaient frequents a Belgrade le comitadji Michel
Giganovitcb et 2® que I'organisateur et I'instiga-
teur de I'attentat avait ete le commandant Pri-
bitchevitch.

En meme temps, une nouvelle tendance de faire
retomber la responsabilite sur I'association « Na-
rodna Odbrana » (la Defense nationale) com-
mencait a se faire jour, de sorte que le dernier
communique du Bureau hongrois de correspon-
dance aux journaux, vendredi dernier, a ete
eongu dans ces termes :

<k L'instruction poursuivie jusqu'ici a demon-
tre, d'une fagon qui exclut le moindre doute, que
€et attentat etait le r^sultat d'un complot. En
dehors de deux auteurs de I'attentat, on a arr^te
un certain nombre de personnes, pour la pluj)art
des jeunes gens; d'apr^s ce qui est demontre, ils
avaient ete, comme les auteurs de I'attentat, en-
gages par laK< Narodna Odbrana » de Belgrade
pour commettre le crime et c'etait a Belgrade
qu'on leur avait remis les bombes et les revol-
vers. »

Le nieme jour, tard dans la nuit, le meme Bu-

18 PAGES D'HISTOIRE

reau avait adresse aux journaux la demande sui-
vante : -« Nous prions I'lioiiorable redaction de
ne pas publier la nouvelle au sujet de Tattentat
de Serajevo, inseree dans notre edition de ce
soir. »

En meme temj)s, le Bureau de corr^spondance
de Vienne a public le communique suivant :

« On affirme en lieu competent que Tinstruc-
tion au sujet de I'attentat se poursuit dans le
plus grand secret. Tons les details publics la-
dessus doivent etre acceptes sous reserves. »

Neanmoins, on ne cessait pas de publier a
Budapest les pretendus comptes rendu? de Tins-
truction. Dans le dernier compte rendu publie
par le journal A Nap et rex>roduit par les jour-
naux viennois d'hier, la tendance a faire retom-
ber la responsabilite de I'attentat sur la (c Na-
rodna Odbrana » est encore plus accentu^e : on
pretend que I'accuse Cabrinovitch aurait designe
le general Jankovitch comme le principal insti-
gateur.

Veuillez, etc.

P^o ^7

31. Jov. M. JomnoQitchy ministre a Vienney a
M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et mi-
nistre des Affaires 4trangeres.

Vienne, le 24 juin/7 juillet 1914.

Monsieur le President,
Keraotion produite par I'attentat de Serajevo

LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 19

subsiste toujours dans les cerclcs comxoetenls.
Bien que TEmpereur ait adresse aux presidents
des Conseils autrichien et hongrois et au ministre
commun des Finances, M. Bilinski, une lettre
qui invite au calmc, on ne iieut tout de memc
pas preciser quelle attitude le Gouvernement
commun prendra a notre egard. Pour cux, une
chose est claire : avec ou sans preuve que I'at-
tentat ait ete inspire a Belgrade, ils doivent re-
gler une fois pour toutes la question des soi-
disant agitations panserbes dans les limites de la
Monarchie des Habsbourg. II n'est -psLS encore
decide de quelle fagon ils procederont et quels
moyens ils emploieront jjour atteindre leur but;
on en delibere, surtout dans les hautes spheres
catholiqucs et militaires. La decision ne sera
X)rise certainement qu'apres qu'on aura appris
cc que les juges d'instruction auront trouve a
Scrajevo. G'est d'apres ce qu'on aura trouve que
la decision sera prise.

A cet egard, TAutrichc-Hongrie aura a choisir
entre deux solutions : ou considerer le crime de
Serajevocomme un m.alhcur national, mais aussi
comme un acte criminel qui doit etre juge sui-
vant les preuves etablies, en demandant a la
Serbie de lui j)i'eter aide dans cette tacbe, afm
que les coupables ne puissent pas se soustraire a
la condamnation la plus severe; ou faire de I'at-
tentat de Serajevo un complot panserbe, jougo-
slave, panslavc, avec toutes Ires manifestations de
la haine envers le monde slave, haine jusqu'ici
dissimulee. II y a plusieurs signes qu'on pousse
les cercles competents vers cette seconde solution,
et c'est pour cela qu'il faut etre pret pour la de-
fense. Au cas oil la premiere solution serait

20 PAGES D'HISTOIRE

adoptee, ce qui serait un signe de grande sagesse^
il nous faudrait nous y raUier completement.
Veuillez, etc.

NO 18

M. "N. Pachitch, president dii Conseil et ministre
des Affaires etrangeres, a toiites les Legations
toy ales,

(Telegramme.) Belgrade, le 26 juin/9 juillet 1914.

Presque tous les jours, le Prince-heritier re^oit
d' Autriche - Hongrie des lettres de menace de
mort. Mettez au courant de ce fait dans vos con-
versations vos collogues et les journalistes.

N°^19

M. le D* M. Jovanovitchy charge d'affaires a
Berlin^ a M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil
et ministre , des Affaires etrang^res.

(Telegramme.) Berlin, le 1«V16 juillet 1914.

Le secretaire d'Etat a declare qu'il ne compre-
nait pas I'attitude provocante de la presse serbe
et ses attaques contre rAutriche-Hpngrie, que
celle-ci, comme grand© puissance, ne peut sup*
porter;

LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 21

M. N. Paehitch, president du Conseil et ministre
des Affaires etrangereSj a toutes les Legations
royales.

(Telegramme.) Belgrade, le 1""-/14 juillet 1914.

I* Le Gorrespondenz Bureau imperial et royal
alarme roj)iiiioii europeenne dans im but spe-
cial. II ne represente pas Fattitude de la press«
de Belgrade d'une fayon exacte et vraie. II clioi-
sit a dessein les expressions les j)lus fortes dans
les articles des journanx qui publient des re-
ponses aux injures, aux menaces et aux men-
songes tendancieux, et les sert au public en Au-
triche-Hongrie ;

a"" Le Gorrespondenz Bureau cite surtout les
extraits des journaux, qui ne sont les organes ni
des partis, ni des corporations;

3*^ L'Autricbe-Hongrie a interdit, depuis I'an-
nexion bosniaque, Timporlation sur son terri-
toirc des organes de nos partis ainsi que de tous
les autres journaux paraissant en Serbie, de
sorte que ceux-ci ne pourraient jDas exciter Topx-
nion publiqueen Autriche-Hongrieet en Europe,
si le Gorrespondenz Bureau ne faisait pas ressor-
tir et repandre les nouvelles dont il fait choix
dans les differents journaux en aggravant leur
contenu. II y a six jours, VOd/ek, organe du
parti radical independant, a et6 frappe d'inter-
diction; maintenant aucun journal serbe nepeut
passer en Autz-iclie-Hongrie ;

4^ La presse est completement libra chez nous;

22 PAGES d'histoire

les journaux ne peuvcnt ^tre confisques que pour
le crime de lese-majeste ou Lieu au cas d'une
excitation a la revolution. Iln'existe aucune cen-
sure preventive.

En cetetat de choses, expliquez a qui de droit,
rien qu'^a titre de renseignement, que nous ne
possedons aucun moyen constitutionnel ou legal
de changer la maniere d'ecrire de nos journaux,
Cependant si Ton compare la maniere d'ecrire des
journaux serbes avec celle des journaux d'Au-
tricbe-IIongrie, on voit clairement que ce sont
ces derniers qui commencent la polemique et que
nos journaux ne font que riposter. Insistez de
meme sur le fait que I'opinion publique chez
nous est relativement calme et que, de notre
cote, personne ne desire provoquer ou blesser
I'Autriche-Hongrie. De ce que nos journaux. pu-
blient, personne en Europe n'en saurait rien,
si le Correspondenz Bureau do Vienne ne le re-
pandaitdans le setil but de nuire a la Serbie.

N° 2X

M. N. Pachitchf president da Conseil et minis'
tre des Affaires etrangereSy a toutes les Lega-
tions royales.

(Telegramme.) Belgrade, le 1"/14 juillet 1914.

Les journaux austro-hongrois ont repanduces
derniers jours le bruit que des demonstrations
contra la legation d'Autriche-Hongrie auraient

LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 23

lieu a Belgrade, que certains correspondants des
journaux austro-hongrois auraientete assassines,
que les sujets austro-hongrois sent maltraites et
qu'ils soiit pris de panique, que les etudiants
serbes ont manifeste contre le ministre d'Autri-
che-Hongrie lors des funerailles de feu Hartwig,
ministre de Russie, etc... Toutes ces nouvelles
sont absolument fausses et inventees. La tran-
quillite absolue regne a Belgrade ; aucune de-
monstration n'a eu lieu cette annee; personne
n'a eu I'intention de provoquer des desordres.
Ce n'est pas seulement le ministre d'Autriche-
Hongrie et ses fonctionnaires qui se promenent
librement en ville ; mais encore aucune injure,
soit par des actes soit par des paroles, n'a ete
faite a aucun sujet austro-hongrois, comme
les journdux de Vienne le pretendent, de meme
qu'aucun n'a vu sa maison attaquee ni ses
fenetres brisees; aucun sujet austro hongrois
n'a eu des motifs pour exprimer la moindre
plainte. Toutes ces fausses nouvelles ne sont re-
pandues que dans le but d'emouvoir et d'aigrir
Topinion publique en Autriche-Hongrie contre
la Serbie.

Toute la population de Belgrade a pris part
aux obseques de M. Hartwig, tout le corps diplo-
matique y assistait, et aucune manifestation con-
tre qui que ce soit Ji'a ete signalee. Toute la cere-
monie s'est passee dans un ordre exemplaire, de
sorte que les etrangers en furent surpris. Je vous
prie de porter ces renseignements a la connais-
sance du Gouvernement et de la presse.

Si PAGES lyHISTOmE

M. Jo^. M. Jovanovitch, ministre a Vienney a
M. N. Pachitchy president du Gonseil et mi-
nistre des Affaires etrangeres.

yienne,le X-'/U juillQt 1914.

Monsieur le President,

C'est le Bureau de la presse du imuistere des
Affaires etrangeres qui, cette fois encore, a dirige
Fopinion publique contre nous. Sauf la Z^i7 et
VArbeiter Zeitung jtous les journauxauslro-bon-
grois ont etc renseignes et diriges par lui potir
leurs articles sur I'attentat de Serajevo. Vous
avez vu quels furent ces renseignements et le ton
de leurs articles.

Je tiens d'une source siire que les cercles offi^
ciels allemands d'ici sont les plus hostiles contre
nous. Ces cercles ont exerce une certaino in-
fluence sur la fagon d'ecrire des journaux de
Vienne, particulierement sur celle de la Nou-
pelle Presse Libre.

Ce journal esttoujours anim^ d'un esprit anti-
serbe a outrance. La NouQelle Presse Libre qui
a assez de lecteurs et d'amis dans les hauts cer-
cles financiers et qui, lorsqu'il le faut,. ecrit sui-
vant les instructions du Bureau de la presse
de Vienne, resume Taffaire en quelques mots ;
« Nous devons regler nos affaires avec la Serbie
par la force des armes ; il est Evident qu'il n'est
pas possible d'y arriver par des mojens pacifi-
ques. Et puisqu'on arrivera a la guerre plus tard,
il vaut mieux en finir tout de suite! »

LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES ^5

La Bourse est tres mauvaise. Une pareille
baisse n'a pas eu lieu depuislongtemps. Certains
papiers ont baisse de 4^ couronnes.

Veuillez, etc.

N** 23

M, Jov. M. JopanoQitch, ministre a Vienney
a M. iV. Pachitchy president du Conseil et
ministre des Affaires etrangeres.

Viennci le 2/15 juillet 1914.

Monsieur le President,

La chose qui doit le plus nous interesser, c'est
le geste que le Gouvemement austro-hongrois a
Tintention de faire a propos de I'attentat de Sera-
jevo. Jusqu'k present, je n'ai pas pu me rensei-
gner a ce sujet ; mes collegues non plus. La devise
est ici maintenant ; « Ne rien communiquer a
per Sonne. »

Gne reunion des minis tres communs a eu lieu
la semaine derniere a Vienne. On n'a pas appxns
beaucoup de choses sur les deliberations et les
resultats de ce con^eiL Le communique en fut
court et peu clair. 11 semble qu*on y a discute
longuement sur les consequences de I'attentat de
Serajevo, mais qu'aucune decision n'a ete prise.
On n'est pais sur que le chef d'^tat-major gene-
ral et le chef de la marine aient assiste k cetta
seance, comme on I'avait dit. Apres cette seance,
le comte Berchtold est alle a Ischl pour eji
rendre compte k I'Empereur qui y ^tait reparti

26 PAGES d'histoire

apres les funerailles de Francois-Ferdinand, dans
un etat de sante et d'esprit loarfait. An Parle-
ment de Hongrie, Tisza a repondu aux interpel-
lations de I'opposition sur I'evenement de Sera-
jevo; voiis savez ce qu'il a dit. Son discours
n'etait pas clair; je pense qu'il n'etait pas clair a
dessein. D'aucuns y ont vu un ton rassurant
pour le developpement des choses et pour I'atti-
tude du Gouvernement austro-hong-rois, et d'au-
cuns, les intentions dissimulees pour — dirai-je —
une action encore non decidee. On s'est aper^u
qu'il ne fall ait point s'a venturer avant de con-
naitre les resultats de I'instruction. Apres cela,
un certain temps se i)assa; on jDarla, on discuta,
on ecrivit, on inventa, puis survinrentla mort de
Hartwig et I'alarme du baron Giesl. A ce propos,
de nouvelles interpellations furent adressees au
comte Tisza au Parlement hongrois; vous avcz lu
sa seconde reponse egalement. Plusieurs per-
sonnes trouvent ici que ce discours est beaucoup
plus rassurant que le premier et qu'il est du a la
lettre de I'EmjDereur. La Bourse est meilleure
maintenant ; les deux ministres de la Guerre et
le chef d'etat - major general sont partis en
conge. Je m'abstiens de toutc appreciation. Ce
qui frappe dans ce dernier discours, c'est que
I'hypothese d'une guerre n'est pas cxclue, au cas
ou les reclamations austro-liongroises au sujet
des consequences de I'attentat de Serajevo n'ob-
tiendraient pas satisfaction.

Une chose est d'ores et deja siire : I'Autriche-
Hongrie fera des demarches diplomatiques a
Belgrade aussitot que Tinstruction aura ete close
^Serajevo, et I'affaire presentee au tribunal.

Veuillez, etc.

LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 27

N1 24

M. Jov. M. Jovanontch, ministre a Vlennef
a M. N. Pachilch, president du Conseil et
ministre des Affaires etrangeres.

Vienne, le 2/15 juillet 1914.

Monsieur le President,

On est d'avis ici que ni Tinstr action, ni Ten-
quete sur I'attentat com mis a Serajevo n'ont
fourni de preuve suffisante pour qu'on puisse
accuser la Serbie officielle ; mais on croit que la
Serbie sera accusee d'avoir tolere sur son terri-
toire certains elements re volutionnaires. On cri-
tique et on condamne dans les cercles diploma-
tiques d'ici les procedes du Gouvernement
austro-bongrois, surtout Tattitude du Correspon-
denz Bureau, du Ballplatz et de la presse vien-
noise depuis I'attentat jusqu'aujourd'bui. Un
tres grand nombre de j)ersonnes approuvent
notre attitude, la jugeant correcte et digne d'Un
pays serieux. Elles desapprouvent seulement les
articles de certains de nos journaux, quoiqu'elles
reconnaissent toutes que ces articles ont ^te pro-
voques par la presse viennoise.

Bien qu'il paraisse que le ministere des Affaires
etrangeres allemand n'approuve pas la politique
de Vienne contre la Serbie, I'ambassade d'Alle-
magne a Vienne encourage cette politique preci-
s^ment en ce moment-ci.-

VeuiUez, etc.

28 PAGES d'ihstoire

N° 25

M. Jov. M. Jo0ano9itchy ministre a Vienne, a
M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et mi-
nistre des Affaires etrangeres.

Vienne, le 2/15 juillet m4.

Monsieur le President,

Quelles demarches seront faites? Sous quelle
forme? Que va demander a la Serbie I'Autriche-
Hongrie? Je ne crois pas qu'au Ballplatz meme,
on puisse repondre aujourd'hui a ces questions
d'une maniere claire et precise., Je pense que
cela s'elabore maintenant et que le comte For-
gach y est redevenu le facteur principal.

Dans un de mes rapports precedents, j*ai men-
tionne que I'Autriche-Hongrie avait a choisir
entre deux voies : consid^rer Tattentat de Sera-
jevo comme une affaire interieure en nous invi-
tant a lui prSter aide pour decouvrir les cou-
pables et les punir ; ou bien faire de la tragedie
de Serajevoun proces contre les Serbes et la Ser-
bie et meme contre la Jougo-slavie. A en juger
par tout ce qui se prepare et ce qui se fait, il me
semble que I'Autriclie-Hongrie choisira cette
seconde voie. Elle fera cela, convaincue qu'elle
obtiendra Tapprobation de I'Europe; pourquoi
ne pas en profiter pour nous humilier et, jusqu'a
un certain point, justifier le proces Friedjung et
celui d'Agram? En outre, elle justifierait devant
ses peuples et devant I'Europe les mesures
s^v^res et reactionnaires qu'elle a I'intention de
prendre dans le pays, pour r^primer la propa-

LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUE S 29

gande panserbe et Tidee jougo-slave. Enfin, ce
Gouvernement croira faire quelque cHose aiissi
en faveur de son prestige, convaincu que cela
le relevera a l-exterieur ainsi qu'a Tinterieur de
la Monarchie.

Je pense que le Gouvernement austro-hon-
grois redigera un memoire» plutot une accusa-
tion contre la Serbie. Dans cet acte d'accusation,
on exposera tout ce qui a ete recueilli contre
nous depuis avril 1909 jusqu'aujourd'hui, et je
crois que cet acte sera assez long. Get acte d'acr
ciisation, il le transmettra aux cabinets des
Puissances eurojo^ennes, en ajoutant que les faits
exposes lui conferent le droit de faire a Bel-
grade des demarches diplomatiques et de deman^
der que la Serbie remplisse a. Tavenir toutes les
obligations d'un voisin loyal. En meme temps,
le Gouvernement de Vienne nous remettra, a
nous aussi, une note ou sera consigne tout ce que
la Monarcliie dualiste desire que nous execu-
tions saris discussion.

Veuillez, etc...

N« 36

M. le D^ M. JoQanoQilchf charge d'affaires h
Berlin', a M, N.Pachitch, president du Conseil
et ministre des Affaires etrangeres,

(T6l6gramme<) Berlin, le 3/16-3uiIlet 1914.

Le secretaire d'fitat m-a declare qu'il a acquis

30 PAGES D HISTOIRE

la conTiction, d'aj)res les rapports du ministre
d'AUemagne a Belgrade, de Texistencc d'lme
proiDagande j)anserbe, que le Gouvernement
devrait eiiergiquement reprimer, dans I'interet
de scs bonnes relations avec TAutriche-Hongrie.

N° 27

M. M. S. Bochkovltch, ministre a Londres, a
M. N. Pachilch, president da Conseil et mi-
nistre des Affaires etrangeres.

(Telegramme.) Londres, le 4/17juillet 1914.

L'ambassade d'Autriche fait Ics plus grands
ellbrts pour exciter la presse anglaise contre
nous et la gagn3r a I'idee que la Monarchic doit
donner une bonne le^on a la Serbia. L'ambas-
sade remet aux redactions les coupures de nos
journaux comme preuves de la fa^on dont notre
presse est redigee. La situation pcut s'aggraver
au cours des semaines a venir. 11 ne faut pas se
ficr aux declarations pacifiques, bien calculees,
des cercles austro-hongrois, car on prepare une
pression sur la Serbie, qui pent se transformer
en une attaque a main armee. II est a croire que
FAutriche-Hongrie changera d'attitude et cher-
chera a humilier la Serbie, des qu'elle aura fait
une demarche a Belgrade.

LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 3f

N« 28

M. Ljdub. MickailoQitch, ministre a RomCy a
M. N. Pachitch, president du Gonseil et mi-
nistre des Affaires etrangeres.

(T61egramme.) Rome, le 4/17 juillet 1914.

J'ai des informations sures que le marquis de
San Giuliano a declare a rambassadeur d*Au-
triche-Hongrie, qu'une demarche quelconque de
rAutriche-Hongrie, dirigee contre la Serbie et
ne lui temoignant pas les egards dus par'un^
nation a une nation, rencontrerait la reproba-
tion de ropinion pubiique en italiej et que le
Gouvernement italien tient a ce que Tentiere
independance de la Serbie soit maintenue.

N'' 29

j\L le D^ M. SpalaXkovitchf ministre a Petro-
grad, dM. N. Pachitchi president du Gonseil
et ministre des Affaires etrangeres.

(Telegramme.) Petrograd, le 5/18 juillet 1914.

J'ai eu iin entretien avec I'adjoint du ministre
des Affaires etrangeres au sujet de I'attitude
provocante du Correspondenz Bureau de Vienne
et de la presse austro-hongroise. M. Sazonoff
m'a dit, il y a quelques jours^ qu'il et.ait dtonne

32 PAGES d'HISTOIRE

que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois n'eiit pris
aucune mesure pour mettre fm a cette agitation
sterile de la x^i^esse de Vienne " qui aboutit a
n'emouvoir personne et qui ne nuit qu'a I'Au-
triclie-Hongrie.

N** 30

M. N. Pachitch, president dii Conseil et ministre
des Affaires etrangeres a toutes les Legations
royales.

(Telegramme.) Belgrade, le 6/19 juillet 1914.

Des I'attentat de Serajevo, la x)resse austro-
liongroise a commence a rejetei ?ur la Serbie la
responsabilitc de ce crime horrible qui, a son
avis, etait le resultat de I'idec panserbe. Elle a
ensuite affirme que cette idee avait ete soutcnue
et propagee par les differentcs associations comme
« Narodna Qdbrana », « Kolo Srpskih Sestara »
(cercle des Soeurs serbes), etc., que le Gouver-
nement serbe avait toler^es.

Gependant, des I'arrive'e de la nouvelle de I'at-
tentat, la Gour et le Gouvernement serbes ont
exprime non seulement leurs condoleances, mais
leur vive reprobation et leur borreur contre un
tel crime. Toutes les rejouissances qui devaient
avoir lieu ce jour-la a Belgrade furent sus-
pendues.

Neanmoins la presse de la Monarcbie voisine
n'a cess^ de rendre la Serbie resix)nsable de I'eve-
nement de Serajevo. De plus elle a commence a

LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUE S 33

ce.propos a lancer differentes nouvelles tendan-
cieuses et fausses qui ont provoque la presse de
Belgrade a y repondre, a se defendre et quelque-
fois a atlaquer aussi, indignee de la voir denatu-
rer ainsi les evenements. Voyant que c'est avec
intention que la presse austro-hongroise attirait
la presse de Belgrade dans cette discussion deli-
cate et desagreable, le Gouvernement serbe s'est
empresse de conseiller a la presse de Belgrade et
meme de lui recommander de garder le sang-
froid et de se borner a dementir et a refuter les
fausses et tendancieuses nouvelles. Cette de-
maixihe du Gouvernement serbe est restee sans
resultat aupres de certains journaux de moindre
importance, surtout parce qu'on ne cessait de
lancer de nouvelles inventions dont la tendance
etait d'exp loiter I'attentat au point de vue poli-
tique, non seulement contre la Serbie, mais aussi
contre les Serbes d'Autriche-Hongrie. Le Gou-
vernement serbe n'a pas ete a meme de mettre
fin a cette polemique entre les presses serbe et
austro-hongroise; la loi et meme les clauses de la
Constitution garantissent en Serbie I'entiere
liberie de la px'esse et interdisent tdute mesure
preventive et meme la confiscation des journaux.
Cette polemique a ete cependant aggravee par ce>
fait que les journaux de Vienne et de Budapest
avaient pris des extraits de certains de nos jour-
naux, qui n'exercent aucune^ influence sur ToxdI-
nion publique, aggrave encore leur ton et, de-
formes de cette fa^on, les avaient repandus dans
la presse etrangere dans le but Evident d'emou-
voir I'opinion publique dans les autres Etats euro-
peens et de representer la Serbie comme coupable.
Ceux qui ont suivi cette polemique savent que

34 PAGES D'HISTOIRE

les journaux de Belgrade n'ont fait que se dc-
fendre et se borner a repousser des attaqucs, a
refuter des mensongss tendancieux. Les Gouver-
nements etrangers, occupes j)ai' d'autres affaires,
n'ont pas eu le loisir de bien voir le but jioursuivi
par la presse austi^o-hongroise qui est d'emou-
voir Topinion publique dans la Monarcbie et a
I'etranger. Des le commencement, le Gouverne-
ment serbe s'est declare pret a traduire devant
les tribunaux tout sujet sei^be dont il aurait ete
prouv^ qu'il cut pris j)art a I'attcntat de Serajevo.
En outre, il a declare qu'il avait prepare un pro-
jet de loi pour rendre plus efficaces les mesures
deja prises contre tout abus d'explosifs. Ceprojet
de loi etait deja soumis au Gonseil d'Etat, mais
il n'a pas pu ^tre prdsente a la Skoux^chtina,
celle-ci ayant ^t^ dissoute. Enfin, le Gouverne-
ment serbe a declare qu'il etait pret k I'avenir
comme pai' le passe a remplir tous les devoirs de
voisinage, auxquels Toblige sa position d'Etat
europeen.

Depuis que Tattentat a ete commis, le Gouver-
nement austro-hongrois ne s'est jamais adresse
au Gouvernement serbe pour un concours quel-
conque au sujet de I'attcntat. II n'a "reclame pour
aucun des complices. ni Fouverture d'unc instruc-
tion ni la mise en jugement. Une seule fois, il a
demande des renseignements sur le domicile
actuel de quelques eleves expulses de I'P^cole
normale primaire de Pakrac, qui avaient ]Dasse
en Serble pour continuer leurs etudes. Tous les
renseignements qui ont pu 6tx^e recueillis a ce
sujet lui ont ete transmis.

Gependant la campagne contre la Serbie conti-
nuait dans la presse austro-hongroise, et on excl-

LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 35

tait contre la Serbie ropinion publique en Au-
triche-Hongrie et en Europe. On a pouss^ si loin
dans cette voie que des chefs eminents de partis
polidques en Autriche-Hongrie ont commence a
interpeller au Parlement au sujet de Tattentat, et
que le President du Conseil hongrois leur a re-
pondu. Des discussions engagees a ce sujet j il
apparalt que I'Autriche-Hongrie a I'intention de
faire certaines demarches, mais on ne voit pas
dans quel sens. On ne dit pas si les mesures
prises, surtout . les mesures militaires, depen-
dront de la reponse et de 1' esprit de conciliation
du Gouvernement serbe. De loin, on fait entre-
voir la possibilite d'un conflit, au cas ou le Gou-
Ternement serbe ne pourrait pas donner une
reponse categorique et satisfaisante,

Lors de la mort subite du minisire russe
Hartwig a Belgrade, au domicile du ministre
d'Autriche, la polemique de presse a ete encore
ranimee ; mais ce triste evenement n a provoque
aucun desordre, lors des funerailles. Cependant la
legation d'Aiitriche-Hongrie, par suite de fausses
nouvelles recues parelle, s'etait emue a tel point,
que les sujets austro-hongi*ois ayaient commence
a S8 cacher dans des hotels de Semlin et de Bel-
grade, ct certains a la Legation meme. Le jour
de I'anniversaire du Roi, qui s'est j)asse dans un
ordre parfait, le ministre d' Autriche-Hongrie,
par I'intcrmediaire du vice-consul Podgradski,
m'a informe, ver« 5 heures de Tapres-midi, que
des agressions contre la l%ation d'Autriche-
Hongrie et contre les sujets austro-hongrois a
Belgrade etaient projetees pour cette nuit m^nie.
II m'a prie de prendre les mesures n^cessaires
pour la protection des sujets austro-hongrois et

36 PAGES D'HISTOIRE

de la Legation, en ajoutant qu'il rendrait la
Serbie responsable de tout ce qui arriverait. Je
lui ai repondu que le Gouvernement responsable
du Royaume de Serbie n'avait aucun renseigne-
ment sur n'importe quels preparatifs de cette
nature, mais que j'en informerais tout de meme,
sans retard, le ministrc de I'lnterieur et lui de-
manderais en mfime temps de prendre toutes les
mesures necessaires. Le lendemain a demon tre
que la legation d'Autriche-Hongrie avait ete
trompee jDarde fauxrenseignements, etantdonne
qu*aucune agression n'a ete tentee, aucun prepa-
ratif d'attaque n'ayant ete fait. Neanmoins, la
i)resse austro-hongroise a exploite cette affaire
encore dans le but de prouver que I'opinion serbe
est excitee et prete a tout. Eile est allee meme
plus loin et a essaye d'affirmer « qu'en effet quel-
que chose devait se passer, car M. Pacbitch, lui-
meme, avait dit qu'il en avait entendu parler :».
Tout ccla demontre d'une fagon evidente Tinten-
tion d' exciter I'opinion publique contre la Serbie
dans cbaque occasion et a propos de tout evene-
ment.

Si Ton ]Drend en consideration tout ce qui a ete
dit au Parlement bongrois au sujet de la tragedie
de Sarajevo, on aura des raisons de s'inquieter
ct de croire qu'on prepare contre nous une de-
marche qui pourrait avoir des consequences de-
sagreables pour les relations entre la Serbie et
TAutriche-Hongrie. Cette inquietude est d'autant
plus justifiee qu'il semble, d'apres tout, quel'ins-
truction ouverte ne se bornerait pas aux seuls
coupables et aux complices eventuels de I'at-
tentat, mais qu'elle engloberait aussi la Serbie et
Tidee nanslave.

LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES Sf

Par son attitude et ses precedes, le Gouverne-
ment serbe a donne des preuves irrefutables
qu'il travaille a Fapaisement des esxDrits, dans
i'interet de lapaix et du maintien des bons rap-
ports avec tons ses voisins. II a donne surtout
des preuves de son desirderegler et d'ameliorer
ses relations avec la Monarchie austro-hongroise
qui, dans ces derniers temps, s'etaient refroidies ,
a cause de la guerre balkanique et des questions
qui en ont decoule. Dans ce but, le Gouverne-
ment serbe a x^rocede au reglement des chemins
de fer orientaux, de nouveaux cbemins de fer
et du transit des produits austro-hongrois pour
Constantinople, Sofia, Salonique et Athenes.

Le Gouverneraent serbe considere que ses in-
terets vitaux lui imposent que la paix et la tran-
quillite dans les Balkans soient consolidees au
mieux et pour la duree la plus. longue possible.
Et c'est parce qu'il desire cela qu'il craint main-
tenant que la surexcitation de Topinion publique
en Autriche-Hongrie ne fournisse au Gouverne-
ment austro hongrois des motifs pour faire une
demarclie qui tendrait a liumilier la dignite de
TEtat serbe et pour faire presenter des reclama-
tions qui ne pourraient pas etre acceptees.

C'est pour cela que j'ai I'honneur de vous
prier de faire, aupres du Gouvernement aupres
duquel vous etes accredite, tout ce qui est neces-
saire pour qu'il prenne note de notre desir sin-
cere de maintenir des relations amicales avec
I'Autriche-Hongrie, et de'reprimer sur notre ter-
ritoire toute tentative pouvant porter atteinte a
la tranquillite et a la securite de la Monarchie
voisine. De meme, nous accueillerons les recla-
mations de I'Autriche-Hongrie au cas oii elle

38 PAGES D'HISTOIRE

demanderait que certains complices se trouvant
en Scrbie — sil y en a, bicn entendu — soient
traduits dcrant nos tribunaux indeiDcndants,
j)our etre juges.

Mais nous ne pourrons jamais accepter des
reclamations qui iraient contre la dignite de la
Serbie et que ne saurait accepter aucun Etat
qui respcctc son independancc ct qui veut la
con server.

Dans le desir de voir les bons rapports de voi-
sinage avec la Monarcbie dualiste se consolider
et se maintenir, nous prions les Gouvernements
amis de prendre note de notre declaration et
d*agir dans un esprit pacinque lorsque Toccasion
se prcsentera ou lorsque le besoin I'exigera.

K« 31

M. Jov. M. Jovano^itch, ministre a Vienne^ a
M. N. Pachiich, president du Conseilj ministre
des Affaires etrangeres.

Vienne, le 7/20 juillet 1014.

Monsieur le President,
II est tres difficile, presque impossible d'ap-
prendre ici queique chose de jwsitif sur les veri-
tables inlenlions de rAutriche-Hongrie. Le mot
d'ordre pour tout ce qui se fait est d'en gardcr le
secret absolu. A en juger par ce que nos jour-
naux ecrivent, on est oi^timiste a Belgrade en ce
qui concerne nos rapports avec rAulriche-Hon-

LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUEo 39

grie. Cependant, on ne i)eut pas etre oi^timiste.
II n'est pas douteux que rAutriche-Hongrie pre-
pare quelque chose de serieux. Ge qu'on devrait
craindre le j)lus, et ce qui est tres a croire, c'est
qu'elle prepare une guerre contre la Serbie. La
conviction generale ici est que ne rien faire cette
fois-ci encore contre la Serbie equivaudrait pour
TAutriche-Hongrie a un vei^itable suicide. En
outre, Tidee que- la Serbie, apres deux guerres,
est completement epuisee et qu'une guerre en-
treiDrise contre elle serait en fait une simple
expedition terminee par une prompte occupation,
a pris des racines encore plus profondes. On
croit aussi qu'une telle guerre serait terminee
avant que I'Europe ait pu intervenir.

Les i^reparatifs militaircs qu'on est en train
dc faire, surlout sur la frontiere serbe, prouvent
que les intentions de rAutriche sont serieuses.

Veuillez, etc.

N" 32

M. le baron Giesl de Gieslingen, ministre d'Au-
iriche-Hongrie a Belgrade, a M. Laza PatchoUy
president dii Conseil et ministre des Affaires
etrangeres par interim.

Belgrade, le 10/23 juillet 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,
J'ai I'honneur de remettre a Votre Excellence
laJiote ci-jointe que j'ai re^ue de mon Gouverne-

40 PAGES D HISTOIRE

ment et qui est adressee au Gouvernement da
Royaume de Serbie.
Yeuillez, etc.

Remis p'ersonnellement a 6 heures de rapres-midi.

« Le 3 1 mars 1909, le ministre de Serbie a
Vienne a fait, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, au
Gouvernement imperial et royal, la declaration
suivante :

« La Serbie recoiinait qu'elle n'a pas ete atteinte
dans ses droits par le fait accompli cree en Bos-
nie-Herzegovine et qu'elle se conformera par
consequent a telle decision que les Puissances
prendront par rapport a rarlicle 25 du traite de
Berlin. Se rendant aux conseils des grandes
Puissances, la Serbie s'engage des a jDresent a
abandonner Tattitude de protestation et d oppo-
sition qu'elle a observee a I'egard de I'anncxion
depuis Tautomne dernier et elle s'engage, en
outre, a changer le cours de sa politique actuelle
envers I'Autriche-Hongrie pour vivre desormais
avec cette derniere sur le pied dun bon voisi-
nagc. »

Or, I'histoire des dernieres annees et notam- ,
ment les cvenemenls douloureux du 28 juin ont
demontre I'existence en Serbie d'un mouvement
subversif dont le but est de detacher de la Mo-
narchic austro-hongroise certaines parties de ses
territoires. Ce mouvement, qui a pris jour sous
les yeux du Gouvernement serbe, est arrive a se
mani fester au dela du territoire du royaume par
des actes de terrorisme, par une s^rie d'attentats
et par des meurtres.

Le Gouvernement royal serbe, loin de satis-

LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 41

faire aux engagements formels contenus dans la
declaration du 3i mars 1909, n'a rien fait pour
supprimcr ce mouvemcnt : il a tolere ractivite
criminelle des difFerentes societes et affiliations
dirigees contre la Monarchie, le langage elTrene
de la presse, la glorification des auteurs d'atten-
lats, la participation d'officiers et de fonction-
naires dans des agissements subversifs, une pro-
pagande malsaine dans Tenseignement, tolere
enfin toutes les manifestations qui pouvaient
induire la population serbe a la haine de la
Monarchie et au mepris de ses institutions.

Gette tolerance coupable du Gouvernement

royal de Serbie n'avait j)as cesse au moment ou

Jos evenements du 28 juin dernier en ont de-

iaontrc au monde cntier les consequences fu-

nestcs.

II resulte des depositions et aveux des auteurs
de Tattentat du 28 juin que le meurtre de Sera-
jevo a ete trame a Belgrade, que les armes et les
explosifs dont les meurtriers se trouvaient etre
munis leur ont ete donnes par des officiers et
fonctionnaires serbes faisant partie de la « Na-
rodna Odbrana » et enfin que le passage en Bos-
nie des criminels et de leurs armes a ete orga-
nise et effectuepar des chefs du service-frontiere
serbe.

Les resultats mentionnes de Tinstruction ne
permettent pas au Gouvernement imperial et
royal de poursuivre plus longtemps I'attitude
de ionganimite expectative qu'il avait obser-
vee pendant des annees vis-a-vis des agissements
de Belgrade propage's de la sur les territoires
de la Monarchie. Ces resultats lui imposent au
contraire le devoir de mettre fm a des menees qui

42 PAGES D^HISTOIKE

forment une menace perpetuelle pour la tran-
quillitc de la Monarchie.

G'est pour atteindre ce but que le Gouverne-
ment imperial et royal se voit oblige de deman-
der au. Gouvernement serbe d'enoncer officielle-
ment qu'il condamne la propagande dirigee
contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise, c'est-
a-dire Tensemble des tendances qui aspirent en
dernier lieu a detacher de la Monarchie des ter-
ritoires qui en font paitie, et qu'il s'engage a
supprimer, -par lous les moyens, cette propa-
gande criminelle et terrorisle.

A fin de donncr un caractere solenncl a cet
engagement, le Gouvernement royal de Serbie
fera publier a la ^^remiere page du Journal Ofji-
del en date du i3/26 juillet I'enonciation sui-
vante :

i( Le Gouvernement royal de Serbia condamne
la propagande dirigee contre rAutriche-Hongrie,
c'est-a-dire Fensemble des tendances qui asx:)irent
eu dernier lieu a detacher de la -Monarchie aus-
tro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partic,
et il deplore sincerement les cons(3quences fu-
ncstes de ces agissements criminels.

tt Le Gouvernement royal regrette que ses of-
ficiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient particip^ a
la propagande susmentionnee et comj)romis par
la les relations de bon voisinage auxquelles le
Gouvernement royal s'etait solenncl Icment en-
gage par ses declarations du 3i mars 1909.

(c Le Gouvernement royal, qui desapprouve et
r^pudie toute idee ou tentative d'immixtion dans
les deslinees des habitants de quelque ]3artie de
rAutriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considere de son
devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers, les

LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 43

fonctionnaires et toute la population duroyaume
que dorenavant il procedera avec la dernierc ri-
gueur contre les per^sonnes qui se rendraient
coupables de pareils agissements, qu'il mettra
tous ses efforts a iDrevenir et a reprimer. »

Cette enonciation sera porte'e en mSme temps
a la connaissance de Tarmee royale par un ordre
du jour de Sa Majeste le Roi et sera publi^e dans
le Bulletin Officiel de VArmee.

Le Gouvernement royal serbe s'engage, en
outre :

1° A interdirc toute publication qui excite a la
haine et au mepris de la Monarchie et dont la
tendance generate est dirigee contre son integrity
territoriale ;

2° A dissoudre immediatement la Societe dite
« Narodna Odbrana », a confisquer tous ses
raoyens de propagande et a proceder de la m^me
maniere contre les autres societes et affiliations
en Serbie qui s'adonnent a la propagande contre
la Monarchie austro-hongroise. Le Gouvernement
royal prendra les mesures necessaires pour qiie
les societes dissoutes ne puissent pas continuer
leur activite sous un autre nom et sous une
autre forme ;

3"" A eliminer sans delai de Tenseignement pu-
blic en Serbie, tant du corps enseignant que des
moyens d'instruction, tout ce qui sert pu pour-
rait servir a fomenter la propagande contre I'Au-
triche-Hongrie ;

4° A eloigner du service militaire et de Tadmi-
nistration en general tous les officiers et fonction-
naires coupables de propagande contre la Mo-
narchie austro-hongroise et dont le Gouverne-
ment imperial et royal se reserve decommuni-

44 PAGES d'histoire

quer les noms et les actes au Gouvernement
royal;

5** A acceijter la collaboration en Serbie des
organes du Gouvernement imperial et royal dans
la suppression du mouvement subversif dirige
contre Tintegrite territoriale de le Monarchie ;

6^ A ouvrir une enquSte judiciaire contre les
partisans du complot du 28 juin se trouvant sur
le territoire serbe ; des organes delegues par le
Gouvernement imperial et royal prendront j)art
aux recherche s;

'j° A proceder d'urgence a Tarrestation du com-
mandant Voia Tankositch et du nomme Milan
Ciganovitch, employe de TEtat serbe, compromis
par les resultats de I'instruction de Serajevo;

8^ A empecher par des mesures efficaces le
concours des autorites serbes dans le trafic illi-
cite d'armes et d'explosifs a travers la frontiere;
a licencier et punir s^verement les fonction-
naires du service frontiere de Ghabatz et de Loz-
nitza coupables d'avoir aide les auteurs du
crime de Serajevo en leur facilitant le passage
de la frontiere ;

9"* A donner au Gouvernement imperial et
royal des explications sur les propos injustifia-
bles de hauts fonctionnaires serbes tant en Ser-
bie qu'a I'etranger qui, malgre leur jDosition
officielle, n'ont pas hesite, apres I'attenlat du
28 juin, a s'exp rimer dans des interviews d'une
maniere hostile envers la Monarchie austro-
hongroise ;

10° Avertir, sans retard, le Gouvernement
imperial et royal de Fexecution des mesures pre-
c^dentes.

Le Gouvernement imperial et royal attend la

LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 45

reponse du Gouvernement royal au plus tard
jiisqu'au samedi 25 de ce mois a 5 heures du
soir.

Le memoire relatif aux resultats de I'instruc-
tion ouverte a Serajevo, en ce qui concerne les
fonctionnaires mentionnes sous les n**^ 7 et 8, est
joint a cette note.

L'instruction criminclle ouverte par le tribu-
nal de Serajevo contre Gavrilo Princip et
consorts du chef d'assassinat et de complicite
y relative, crime commis par eux le 28 juin der-
nier, a jusqu'ici abouti aux constatations sui-
vantes :

i<* Le complot, ayant pour but d'assassincr,
lors de son sejour a Serajevo, I'archiduc Fran-
Qois-Ferdinancl, fut forme a Belgrade par Gavrilo
Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovitch, le nomme Milan
Ciganovitch et Trifko Grabez, avec le concours
du commandant Voi'a Tankositch ;

2'' Les six bombes et les quatre pistolets brow-
nings, au moyen desquels les malfaiteurs ont com-
mis Tattentat, furent livres a Belgrade a Princip,
Cabrinovitch et Grabez par le nomme Milan Ci-
ganovitch et le commandant Voia Tankositch ;

3"" Les bombes sont des grenades a main prove-
nant du depot d'armes de I'armee serbe a Kragu-
jevats ;

4° Pour assurer la reussite de Fattentat, Ciga-
novitch enseigna a Princip, Cabrinovitch et
Grabez la maniere de se servir des grenades et
donna, dans une foret pres du champ de tir a
Topchidere, des lemons de tir avec pistolets brow-
nings a Princip et a Grabez ;

48 PAGES D'HISTOIRE

5** Pour rendre possible a Princip, Cabrinovitch
et Grabez de passer la frontiere de Bosnie-Herze-
govine et d'y introduire clandestinement leur
contrebande d'armes, un systeme de transport
secret fut organise par Ciganovitch.

D'apres cette organisation, I'introduction en
Bosnie-Herzegovine des malfaiteurs et de leurs
armes fut operee par les capitaines-frontieres de
Chabatz (Rado PoiDOvitch) et ceiui de Loznitza^
ainsi que par le douanier Radivoj Grbitch de
Loznitza avec le concoux's de divers particuliers.

N« 33

M. le ly L. PatchoUj president dii Conseil et mi-
nistre des Affaires etran^eres par interim^ a
toutes les Legations royales.

(Tel^gramme.) Belgrade, le 10/23 juillet 1914.

A propos de I'attentat de Serajevo, le ministre
d'Autriche-Hongrie m'a remis aujourd'ltui a six
heures de I'apres-midi une note contenant les
reclamations du Gouvernement austro-hongrois
et a demande une reponse du Gouvernement
serbe dans un delai de deux jours, c est-a-dire
avant samedi a 6 heures de I'apres-midi. II m'a
inform^ verbalement qu'il quitterait Belgrade
avec son iDersonnel au cas ou il n'aurait pas re^u
une rdponse satisiaisante dans le delai fixe.

Le Gouvernement serbe n'a encore pris aucune
decision, tous les ministres n'etant pas x^resents

LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 47

a Belgrade; mais, des mainteaant, je puis dire
que ces reclamations sont telles qu'aucun Gou-
vernement serbe ne pourrait les accepter eix
entier.

N'^S^

M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et ministre
des Affaires elrangeres, a M. N, Spalaikovitch,
ministre a Peirograd.

(Telegramme.) Belgrade, le 11/24 juillet 1914.

J'ai informe le charge d'affaires russe que je
remettrai, la rdponse a rultimatum austro-hon-
grois demain samedi avant 6 beures de Fapres-
midi. Je lui ai dit que le Gouvernement serbe
demandera aux Etats amis de proteger I'indepen-
dance de la Serbie. Au cas ou la guerre . serait
inevitable, ajoutai-je, la Serbie la fera.

N« 35

M, N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et ministre
des Affaires etrangeres, a M. M. Bochkovitchj
ministre a Londres.

(Telegramme.) Belgra(ie, le 11/24 juUIet A9U.

J'ai informe aujourd'hui le cbarge d'affaires
anglais que les reclamations de I'Autricbe-Hon-

48 PAGES D'HISTOIRE

grie etaient telles que le Gouverneinent d'aucun
pays independant ne pourrait les accepter en
entier. Je lui ai exprime I'espoir que le Gouver-
nement anglais pourrait agir aupres du Gouver-
nement austro-hongrois pour que ce dernier
attenue ses reclamations. Je ne lui ai pas cachd
que j'etais inquiet, a cause des evenements qui
j)ourraient survenir.

NO 36

M. leD"^ N, Spalaikovitchy ministre a Petrograd,
a M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et mi-
nistre des Affaires etrangeres.

(Tel^gramme.) Petrograd, le 11/24 Juillet 1914.

En sortant du cabinet de M. Sazonow, a qui j'ai
fait connaitrc le texte de rultimatum austro-hon-
grois, j'ai rencontre Tambassadcur d'Alleraagne.
II avait I'air d'etre de tres bonne humeur. Dans
la conversation que j'ai engagee avec le comte
de Pourtales au sujet de la demarche austro-hon-
groise, je Fai prie de m'indiquer la mauiere dont
on jDourrait sortir de la situation creee par Tulti-
matum austro-hongrois. L'ambassadeur m'a re-
pond u que cela ne dependrait que de la Serbie,
puisqu'il s agit d'une question qui doit etre reglee
entre rAutriche et la Serbie seules et dont per-
sonne autre ne pourrait semeler. J'ai r^pondu au
comte de Pourtales qu'il se trompait et qu'il se
convaincrait bientot qu'il s'agissait non pasd'une

LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 49

question entre la Serble et I'Autriche, mais d'une
question europeenne.

N^ST

S. A. It. le prince heritier Alexandre
a S, M. VEmpereur de Russie.

(Telcgrammc.) Belgrade, le 11/24 juillet 1911.

Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois a remis
hier soir au Gouvernement serbe une note eon-
cernant I'attentat de Serajevo. Consciente de ses
devoirs internationaux, la Serbie, d6s les pre-
miers jours qui suivirent I'horrible crime, a
declare qu'elle le condamnait et qu'elle etait j)rete
a ouvrir line enquete sur son territoire si la com-
plicity de certains de ses sujets etait j)rouvee au
cours du X3roces instruit par les autorites austro-
hongroises.

Cependant, les demandes contenues dans la
note austro-bongroise sont inutilement humi-
liantes pour la Serbie et incompatibles avec sa
dignite d'Etat independant. Ainsi on nous de-
mande sur un ton peremptoire une declaration
du Gouvernement dans VOfJiciel et un ordre du
Souverain k I'armee ou nous reprimerions I'esprit
hostile contre TAutriche, en nous faisant k nous-
m^mes des reproches d'une faiblesse criminelle
envers nos menees perfides. On nous impose en-
suite I'admission de fonctionnaires austro-hon-
grois en Serbie pour participer avec les n6tres a

50 PAGES D'HISTOIRE

I'instruction et pour surveiller rexecution des
autres conditions indiquees dana la note. Nous
avons regu un delai de quarante-huit heures
pour accepter le tout, faute de quoi la legation
d'Autriche-Hong-rie quittera Belgrade.

Nous sommes prdts a accepter les conditions
austro-hongroises qui sont compatibles avec la
situation d'un Etat independant, ainsi que celles
dont I'acceptation nous sera conseillee par Votre
Majeste ; toutes les personnes dont la participa-
tion a I'attentat sera demontree seront severe-
ment punies par nous. Certaines, parmi ces de-
mandes, ne pourraient etre executees sans des
changements de notre legislation, ce qui exige
du temj^s. On nous a donne un delai trop court.
Nous pouvons etre attaques apres I'expiration du
delai par I'armee austro-hongroise qui se con-
centre sur notre frontiere. II nous est impossible
de nous defendre et nous supplions Votre Ma-
jeste de nous donner son aide le plus tot pos-
sible. La bienveillance precieuse de Votre Ma-
jeste, qui s'est manifestee tant de fois a notre
egard, nous fait esperer f ermement que, cette fois
encore, notre appel sera entendu par son gene-
reux coeur slave.

Eu ces moments difficiles, j'interprete les sen-
timents du peuple serbe qui supplie Votre Ma-
jeste de vouloir bien s'interesser au sort du
Royaume de Serbie.

Alexandre.

LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 51

N° 38

M. N. Pachitch, president dii Conseil et ministre
des Affaires etrangeres, a toutes les Legations
royales.

(Telegramme.) Belgrade, le 12/25 juillet 1914.

J'ai communique aujourd'hui aux represen-
tants des iitats amis les grands traits do la re-
ponse du Gouvernement royal. Je leur ai dit que
la reponse sera tout a fait conciliante et que le
Gouvernement serbe acceptera toutes les recla-
ttiations austro hongroises dans la mesure ou 11
sera possible de le faire. Le Gouvernement serbe
espere que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois,
sauf dans le cas ou il desirerait a tout prix la
guerre, ne pourra qu'accepter la satisfaction com-
plete que lui donne la reponse serbe.

N« 39

Reponse du Gouvernement royal serbe a la
note de VAutriche-Hongrie,

Belgrade, le 12/25 juillet 1914.

Le Gouvernement royal serbe a requ la com-
munication du Gouvernement imperial et royal
du 10/23 de ce mois et il est persuade que sa re-
ponse eloignera tout malentendu qui menace de

52 PAGES D'HISTOIRE

comproinettre les bons rapports de voisinage
entre la Mcnarchie austro-hongroise et le
Royaume de Scrbie.

Le Gouvernemcnt royal a conscieuce que les
protestations qui out apparu tant a la tribune de
la Skoupcbtina nationale que dans les declara-
tions et les actes des representants responsables
de I'Etat, protestations auxquelles coupa court la
declaration du Gouvernement serbe faite le
i8/3i mars 1909, ne se sont plus renouvelees vis-
a-vis de la grande Monarcliie voisine en aucune
occasion et que, dej^uis ce temps, aulant de la
part des Gouvemements royaux qui se sont s.;c-
cede que de la part de leurs organcs, aucune ten-
tative n'a ete faite dans le but de changer I'etat
de choses politique et juridique cree en Bosnie-
Herzegovine.

Le Gouvernement royal constate que sous ce
rapport le Gouvernement imperial et royal n'a
fait aucune representation, sauf en ce qui con-
cerne un livre scolaire, au sujet de laquelie repre-
sentation le Gouvernement imperial et royal a
re^u une explication entierement satisfaisante.

La Serbie a, a de nombreuses reprises, donne
des preuves de sa politique pacifique et moderee
pendant la duree de la crise balkanique, et c'est
grace a la Serbie et aux sacrifices qu'elle a fails
dans I'inter^t exclusif de la'paix europeenne, que
cette iDaix a ete preservee.

Le Gouvernement royal ne pent pas etre rendu
responsable des manifestations d'un caractere
prive telles que les articles des journaux et les
agissements des societes, manifestations qui se
produisent dans presque tous les pays comme
une chose ordinaire et qui ^chappent en r^gle

LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 53

generale au controle officiel — d'autant moius
que le Gouvernement royal, lors dc la solution
do toutc une seric de questions qui so sont pre-
sentees entrc la Serbie el rAutriche-Hongrie, a
montre une grande prevenance et a reus si, de
cette fa^on, a en regler le plus grand nombre au
profit du progres des deux x^ays voisins.

G'est pourquoi le Gouvcrnement royal a ete
peniblement surpris par ies affirmations d'apres
lesquelles des sujets du Royaume de Serbie au-
raient partici]3e a la preparation dc I'attentat
commis a Serajevo. II s'atlendait a etre invile a
collaborer a la reclierclie de tout ce qui so rai)-
porte a ce crime et il etait j)ret, pour prouver
imr des actes son entiere correction, a agir contre
toutes Ies personnes a Tegard desquelles des
communications iui seraient faites.

Se rendant done au desir du Gouvernement
imperial et royal, le Gouvernement royal est dis-
pose a remettre aux tribunaux sans egard a sa
situation et a son rang, tout sujet serbe, pour la
complicite duquel, dan^^le crirae de Serajevo,
des preuves Iui seraient fournics.

II s'engage specialement a fairc publicr a la
premiere page du Journal Officiel en dale du
13/2G juillet I'enonciation suivante :

« Le Gouvernement royal de Serbie condamne
toute 2:)ropagandc qui scrait dirigee contre I'Au-
triche-Hongrie, c'est-a-dire rensemble des ten-
dances qui aspircnt en dernier lieu a detacher
de la'Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires
qui en font parlic et il deplore sinccrement Ies
consequences funestes dc ces agissements crimi-
nals.

« Le Gouvei'nement royal regrette que cer-

54 PAGES d'histoire

tains officiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient par-
ticipe, d'apres la communication du Gouverne^
ment imperial et royal, a la propagande sus-
mentionnee et compromis par la les relations de
bon voisinage auxquelles le Gouvernement royal
s*etait solennellement engage par la declaration
du 1 8/3 1 mars 1909.

« Le Gouvernement, qui desapprouve et repu-
die toute idee ou tentative d'une immixtion dans
les destinees des habitants de quelque partie de
I'Autriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considere qu^il
est de son devoir d'avertir formellement les offi-
ciers, les fonctionnaires et toute la population du
Royaume que dorenavant il procedera avec la
derniere rigueur contre les personnes qui se
rendraient coupables de pareils agissements,
qu'il mettra tous ses efforts a pr^venir et a re-
primer. »

Cette enonciation sera portee a la connaissance
de Tarmee royale par un ordre du jour, au nom
de Sa Majeste le Roi par S. A. R. le Prince
heritier Alexandre, et sera publiee dans le pro-
chain Bulletin officiel de VArm^e.

Le Gouvernement royal s'engage, en outre r
I** A introduire dans la premiere convocation
r^guliere de la Skoupchtina une disposition dans
la loi sur la presse par laquclle sera punie de la
maniere la plus severe la provocation a la haine
et au mepris de la Monarchic austro-hongroise,
ainsi que contre toute publication dont la ten-
dance generale sera dirigee contre I'integrite
territoriale de I'Autriche-Hongrie.

II se charge, lors de la revision de la Constitu-
tion, qui est prochaine, de faire introduire dans
Farticle 22 de la Constitution, un amendement

LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 55

de telle soHe que les publications ci-dessus
puissent etre confisquees, ce qui, aetuellement,
aux termes categoriques de I'article 22 de la
Constitution, est impossible ;

2*^ Le Gouvernement ne possede aucune
preuve et la note du Gouvernement imperial et
royal ne lui en fournit non i>lus aucune, que la
soci^te « Narodna Odbrana » et les autres societes
similaires aient commis jusqu'a ce jour quelque
acte criminel de ce genre jyixv le fait d'un de
leui*s membres. Neanmoins, le Gouvernement
royal accejDtera la demande du Gouvernement
imperial et royal et dissoudra la societe « Na-
rodna Odbrana » et toute autre societe qui agirait
contre TAutriche-Hongrie ;

3** Le Gouvernement royal scrbe s'engage a
elimirer sans delai de I'instruction publique en
Serbie tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir a fo-
mcnter la propagande contre FAutriche-Hon-
grie, quand le Gouvernement imperial et royal
lui fournira des faits et des preuve s de cette
propagande ;

4° Le Gouvernement royal accepte, du moins,
d'eloigner du service militaire ceux dont I'en-
quete judiciaire aura prouve qu'ils sont cou-
pables d'actes diriges contre I'integrite du terri-
toire de la Monarchic austro-hongroise ; il attend
que le Gouvernement imperial et royal lui com-
munique ulterieureraent les noms et les faits de
ces officiers et fonctionnaires aux fins de la pro-
cedure qui doit s'ensuivre ;

5° Le Gouvernement royal doit avouer qu'il
ne se rend pas clairement compte du sens et de la
portee de la demande du Gouvernement impe-
rial et royal tendant a ce que la Serbie s'engage

56 PAGES D'HISTOIRE

a accepter sur sou tem^itoire la collaboration des
organes du Gouvernement imperial et royal.

Mais 11 declare qu'il admettra toute collabora-
tion qui repondrait aux principes du droit inter-^
national et a la procedure criminelle, ainji
qu'aux bons raipports de voisinage ;

G*' Le Gouvernement royal, cela va de s^i,
considere de son devoir d'ouvrir une enquete
centre tous ceux qui sont ou qui, eventuellement,
auraient ete meles au complot du i5/28 jum et
qui se trouvefaient sur le territoire du Royaime.
Quant a la participation a cette enquete des
agents des autorites austro-bongroises qu se-
raient delegues a cet effet par le Gouvernepaent
imperial et royal, le Gouvernement royal ne
peut pas Taccepter, car ce serait une violation
de la Constitution et de la loi sur la procedure
criminelle. GejDendant, dans des cas cohere ts,
des communications sur les resultats de I'ins-
truction en question pourraient dtre donnees aux
organes austro-hongrois ;

7* Le Gouvernement royal a fait proceder des
le soir me me de la remise de la note a I'arresta-
tion du commandant Voia Tankositch. Quant a
Milan Ciganovitcb, qui est sujet de la Monarcbie
austro-bongroise et qui, jusqu'au 16/28 juin,
etait employe (comme aspirant) a la direction
des cbemins de fer, il n'a pas pu encore etre
joint. Le Gouvernement imperial et royal est
prie de vouloir bien, dans la forme accoutumee,
faire connaitre le plus t6t possible les presomp-
tions de culpabilite, ainsi que les preuves even-
tuelles de culpabilite qui ont 6i6 recueillies jus-
qu'a ce jour par I'enquete de Serajevo, aux fins
d'enquStes ulterieures;

LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 57

S*' Le Gouveruement serbe renforcera et eten-
dra les mesures j)rises pour empecher le tratic
illicite d'armes et d'explosifs a travers la fron-
tiere. II ya de soi qu'il ordonnera tout de suite
una enquete et punira severement les fonction-
naires des frontieres sur la ligne Chabatz-Loz-
nitza qui out manque a leur devoir et laisse
passer les auteurs du crime dc Serajevo ;

9° Le Gouvernement royal donnera volontiers
des explications sur les propos que ses fonction-
naires, tant en Serbic qu'a I'etranger, ont tenu
apres Tattentat dans des interviews et qui,
d'apres I'affirmation du Gouvernement imperial
et royal, ont ete hostiles a la Monarchic, des
que ]e Gouvernement imperial et, royal lui aura
communique les passages en question de ces
propos, et des qu'il aura demontre que les pro-
pos employes ont en elTet ete tenus par lesdits
fonctionnaires, propos au sujet desquels le Gou-
vernement royal lui-meme aura soin de re-
cueillir des prcuves et convictions ;

10" Le Gouvernement royal informera le Gou-
vernement imperial et royal de 1' execution des
mesures comprises dans les points pi'ecedents en
tant que cela n'a pas ete deja fait par la pre-
cedente note. A issitOt que cbaque mesure aura
ete ordonnee et executee, dans le cas ou le Gou-
vernement imperial et royal ne serait pas satis-
fait de cette reponse, le Gouvernement royal
serbe, considerant qu'il est de I'interet commun
de ne pas precipiter la solution de cette ques-
tion, est pret, comme toujours, a accepter une
entente pacifique, en remettant cette question
soit k la decision du tribunal international de La
Haye, soit aux grandes puissances qui ont pris

58 PAGES d'HISTOIRE

part a relaboration de la declaration que le
Gouvernement serbe a faite le i8/3i mars 1909.

N*> 40

M. le baron Giesl de Gieslingen, ministre cTAii-
triche-Hongrie a Belgrade^ a M. N. Pachitch,
president da Conseil et ministre des Affaires
etr anger es.

Belgrade, le 12/15 juillet 1914, 6 heures
de Tapres-midi.

Monsieur le President,

Etant donne que le delai fixe par la note que
j'ai remise sur I'ordre de mon Gouvernement a
Son Excellence M. Patchou avant-hier, jeudi, a
six heures de Tapres-midi, a expire, et que je n'ai
pas rcQU une reponric satisfaisante, j'ai I'honneur
d'informer Votre Excellence que je quitte Bel-
grade ce soir avec le personnel de la legation
imperiale et royalc.

La protection de la legation imperiale et
royale avec tout ce qui s'y rattache, avec ses
annexes et ses archives, ainsi que la protection
des sujets et interets autrichiens et hongrois en
Serbic sont confiees a la legation imperiale d'Al-
lemagne.

Les chanceliers Ferdinand Jovanovitch et Mi-
lan Mekovitch, qui resteront a Belgrade, sont
rattaches a la legation imperiale d'Allemagne.

Enfin, je constate que, des le moment ou
Votre Excellence aura re^u cette Icttre, la rup-

LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 59

ture des relations diplomatiques entre la Serbie
et I'Autriche-Hongrie revdtira le caractere d'un
fait accompli.
Veuillez, etc...

N°41

M. N. Pachitchj president du Conseil ef minis ire
des Affaires etrangereSy a toutes les Legations
royales,

Belgrade, le 12/25 juillet 1914.

C'est aujourd'hui a 5 h. et 3/4 de rapres-midi
que J'ai remis la reponse a la note austro-hon-
groise. V6us en recevrez ce soir le texte integral.
Vous y verrez que nous sommes alles jusqu'aux
limites extremes ou nous pouyions aller. Lors-
qu'il a re^u la note, le ministre d'Autriche-
Hongrie a declare qu'il devait la comparer avec
les instructions et qu'il donnerait immediate-
ment sa reponse. Des mon retour au ministere,
le ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie ma informe par
lettre qu'il n'etait pas satisfait de notre reponse
et qu'il quittera Belgrade ce soir m^me avec
tout le personnel de la legation. II remet au
ministre d'Allemagne la protection de la legation
avec tout le mobilier et les archives, ainsi que la
protection des sujets et des interets austro-hon-
grois en Serbie. Enfin, 11 declare que, par le fait
de la remise de sa lettre, les relations diploma-
tiques entre la Serbie et rAutriche-Hongrie sont
c6mpletement rompues.

Le Gouvernement royal a convoque la Skoup-
cbtina pour le 14/27 juillet a Nicb, ou partent

60 PAGES D'HISTOIRE

des ce soir tous les minist^res avec leur person
nel. Au nom du Roi, le Prince heritier a sign^
Tordre de mobilisation de I'armee; domain ou
apres-demain, paraitra una j)roclamation par la-
quelle les citoyens qui ne sont pas militaircs
seront invites a rester tranquillement cliez eux,
et les militaires a rejoindre ieiirs drapeaux et a
defendre la Serbie selon leurs forces, au cas oii
elle serait attaquee.

N° 42

M. le comte Leopold Berchiold, ministre des
Affaires etrangeres d* Aiitriche-Hongrie ^ a
M. JoQ. M. Jo^anovitch, ministre de Serbie a
Vienne,

Vienne, Ic 12/25 juillet 1914.

Etant donne que la note que I'envoye extraor-
dinaire ct ministre plenipotcntiaire imperial et
royal a remise au Gouvernement royal le io/i^3
de ce mois, est restee sans reponse favorable,
j'ai ete contraint d'envoyer Fordre au baron
Giesl de quitter la capitale serbe ct de remettre
la protection des sujcts dc Sa Majeste Imperiale
et Royale apostolique au ministre d'Allemagne.

Ayant le regret de voir par la se terminer les
rapports que j'ai eu I'honneur d'entretenir avec
vous, Monsieur le Ministre, je n'ai pu manquer
de mcttre a votre disposition les passeports
ci-joinls pour votre retour en Serbie et pour le
retour du personnel de la legation royale.

Veuillez, etc.

LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUE S 61

N^* 43

Sa Majeste Imperiale VEmpereiir de Riissie a
Son Aliesse Royals le Prince heritier de Ser-
bie, Alexandre.

(Telegi-amme.) Petrograd, le 14/37 juillet 1914.

Voire Altesse Royale, en s'adressant a Moi
dans un moment iDarticulierement difficile, ne
s'est pas trompee sur les sentiments qui
m'animent a Son egard et sur Ma symjjathie
cordiale pour le peuple serbe.

Ma plus serieuse attention est attiree sur la
situation actuelle et Mon Gouvernement s'ap-
plique de toutes ses forces a aplanir les presentes
difficultes. Je no doute point que Votre Altesse
et le Gouvernement royal ne yeuillent faciliter
cette taclie en ne negligeant rien pour arriver a
une solution qui permette de x^revenir les hor-
reurs d'une nouveile guerre, tout en sauvegar-
dant la dignite de la Serbie.

Taiit qu'il y a le moindre espoir d'eviter une
effusion de sang, tous mes efforts doivent tendrc
vers ce but. Si, malgre notre idIus sincere desir,
Nous ne reussissons pas, Votre Altesse pent etre
assuree qu'en aucun cas, la Russie ne se desint^-
ressera du sort de la Serbie.

Nicolas.

62 PAGES d'HISTOIRE

NO 44

Son Altesse Roy ale le Prince her i tier de Serbie
Alexandre a Sa Majeste Imperiale I'Empereur
de Riissie,

(T6l6gramme.) Nich, le 17/30 juillet 1914.

Profondement touche par le telegramme que
Votre Majeste a bien voulu M'adresser hier, je
m'empresse de La remercier de tout Mon coeur.
Je prie Votre Majeste d'etre j)ersuadee que la
cordiale sympathie dont Votre Majeste est ani-
mee envers Mon pays nous est particulierement
precieuse et remplit notre ame de Tespoir que
TavfeDir de la Serbie est assure^ etant devcnu
I'objet de la haute soUicitude de Votre Majeste.

Ces moments peniblcs ne peuvent que rafler-
mir les liens d'attachement profond qui unissent
la Serbie a la sainte Russie slave et les senti
ments de reconnaissance eternell^ pour I'aide et
la protection de Votre Majeste seront conserves
precieusement dans I'^me de tous les Serbes.

Alexandre.

N°45

M. le comte Leopold Berchtold, ministre des
Affaires etrangeres dAutriche-Hongriej a
M. N. Pachitchf president du Conseil et mi-
nistre des Affaires etrangeres de Serbie.

(T616gramme.) Vienne, le 15/28 juillet 1914.

Le Gouvernement royal serbe n'ayant pas
(donne une r^ponse favorable a la note que le

LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 63

ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie lui a remise le
23/10 juillet 1914, le Gouvernement imperial et
royal se voit oblige de pourvoir lui-merae a la
protection de ses droits et interets et de rficou-
rir, dans ce but, a la force des armes. L*Au-
triche-Hongrie se considere done, des ce mo-
ment, en etat de guerre avec la Serbie.

N« 46

M. TV". Pachitch, president du Conseil et minis tr^e
des Affaires elrangeres, a toutes les Legations
royales.

(Telegramme.) Nicli, le 15/28 juillet 1914.

Le Gouvernement de FAutriche - Hongrie a
declare la guerre aujourd'hui, a midi, par un
telegramme en clair adresse au Gouvernement
serbe.

N« 47

M. le D"" Spala'ikontch, ministre a Petrograd^
a M. S. D, SazonoWy ministre russe des Affaires
etr anger es.

Petrograd, le 15/28 juillet 1914.

Excellence,

J'ai I'honneur de porter a votre connaissance
que je viens de recevoir de M. N. Pachitch, pre-
sident du Conseil, ce telegramme urgent envoye

04 PAGES D HISTOIRE

de Nich aujourd'hui a a h. lo dans rapr^s-midi.
« Le Gouvcrnement de FAutriche-Hongric a
declare la guerre aujourd'hui, a midi, par un
telegramme en clair adress^ au Gouvernement
serbe. » « Pachitch. »

En portant a votre connaissance I'acte qu'une
grande Puissance a eu le triste courage de com-
mettre vis-a-vis d'un petit pays slave qui vient
a I)eine de sortir d'une longue serie de luttes
aussi heroiques qu'epuisantes, je prends la liberie,
en une circonstance si grave pour mon pays, d'ex-
primer I'espoir que cct acte, qui brise la paix de
TEurope et re volte sa conscience, sera r^jirouve
par tout le monde civilise et severement puni
par la Russie, protectrice de la Serbie.

Je j)rie Votre Excellence de vouloir bien porter
devant le tr6ne deSaMajeste cette priere de tout
le peuple serbe et de vouloir bien agreer I'assu-
rance de mon devouement et de mon respect*

Veuillez, etc.

N« 48

M. S. D. SazonoWt ministre des Affaires etran-
geres russe^ a M, le Jy Spalaikovitch, ministre
de Serbie a Petrograd,

Petrograd, le 17/30 juillet 1914.

Monsieur le Ministre,
J'ai eu Thonneur de recevoir votre lettre du
15/28 juillet, n^ 527, par laquelle vous avez bien
voulu me communiquer le telegramme de Son

LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 65

Excellence M. N. Pachitch au sujet de la cle'cla-
ration de guerre de I'Autriche - Honiifrie a la
Serbie. En regrettant sincerement ce triste ev^-
nement, je m empresse de vous informer, Mon-
sieur le Mini^rtt^, que je ne manquerai pas de
soumettre a Sa Majesie TErapereur la demand©
du peuple serbe, dont vous etes Tinterprele.
Veuillez, etc.

N» 49

M, N. Pachitchy president du Conseil et minisire
des Affaires elrangereSj a M. le D' Jovanovitch»
charge d'affaires a Berlin.

(T^legramme.) Nich, le 22 juilIet/4 aoul 1914.

Je vous prie d'informer le Gouvernement impe-
rial que vous avez regu Tordre de quitter TAlle-
magne avec le personnel de la legation et du
consulat. Je vous prie de partir saus retard.

N« 50

. Le Ministere des Affaires etrangeres serbe
a la Legation d'Allemagne a Nich,

Nich, le 24 juillet/6 aoui 1914.

Le Ministere royal des Affaires etrangeres a
Thonneur d'informer la Legation imperiale d'Al-

66 PAGES b*HISTOIRE

lemagne que, vu I'etat de guerre existant entre
la Serbie et rAutriche-Hongrie, alliee de I'AUe-
magne, ainsi que I'etat de guerre existant entre
la Russie et rAllemagne, alliee de rAutriche-
Hongrie, le Gouvernement royal serbe, se soli-
darisant avec la Russie et ses allies, consid^re
comme terminee la mission en Serbie de Son
Excellence le baron Griesinger, envoye extraor-
dinaire et ministre plenipotentiaire d'Allemagne.
II prie Son Excellence de quitter, avec le person-
nel de la legation, le territoire de la Serbie et
lui remet ci-joint les passeports necessaires.

N* 51

M. le ly JoQanoQitchf charge d'affaires a Berlin ,
d M, Pachltch, president du Conseil et ministre
des Affaires etrang-^res.

Berlin, le 24 juillet/6 aout 1914.

Lors de la visite que j'ai faite au sous-secre-
taire d Etat, M. Zimmermann, pour lui notifier la
rupture des rapports diplomatiques, il m*a, entre
autres choses, declare que rAllemagne avait tou-
jours ete animee de sentiments amicaux envers
la Serbie et qu'elle regrettait que les relations
entre la Serbie et I'AUemagne, a cause des com-
binaisons politiques, dussent etre rompues. II
tient la Russie, qui a sans cesse excite la Serbie,
pour seule responsable des evenements qui sont
survenus et qui auront de lourdes consequences

LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 67

pour tous les peuples. Si la Russie n'avait pas,
au dernier moment, alors qu'il paraissait deja
possible d eviter un conflit arme, mobilise toute
sa force militaire, on n'en serait pas arrive a la
guerre, car TAlIemagne. avait use de toute son
influence sur I'Autriche-Hongrie pour qu*elle
s'enlendit avee la Russie. Peut-etre I'Autriche-
Hongrie se serait-elle contentee d'occuper Bel-
grade, et alors des negociations se seraient enga-
gees dans le but de regler les rapports austro-
serbes.

N^- 52

M. JoQ. M: Jos^anovitch, ministre a Vienne^ a
AI. jV. Paclutch, president du Conseil et mi-
nistre des Affaires e tr anger es,

Nich, le 3/16 aout 1914.

Monsieur le President,

Depuis le i7/3o juin, la legation de Serbia a
Vienne a ete assiegee par la police et la gendar-
merie, et son personnel soumis sans cesse a la sur-
veillance des fonctionnaires de la Surete. Nos
mouvements et nos communications avee le
monde exterieur furent rendus, com me vous
pouvez le penser, considerablement plus diffi-
cilcs; Tattitude de la rue avait quelque chose de
mena^ant envei^s la legation et son personnel.

Des le commencement du mois de juillet, m^me
les communications telegraphiques avee vous de-
yinrent plus dil'ficiles et les evenements se sont

68 PAGES d'HISTOIRE

developpes si vite que je n'ai pas pu vous com-
muniquer certains details relatifs a ce qui a pre-
cede notre con flit arme avec rAutriche-Hongrie.
Cast pourquoi je le fais maintenant.

Jusqu'a la fin du mois de juin, il parut que
toute FalFaire de Serajevo se developpait normale-
ment. Mais au commencement du mois de juillet
un revirement s'opera. II n'y avait pas de signes
patents de ce revirement : c'etaient plutot des in-
dices et des symptomes imprecis qui trahissaient
certaines intentions dissimulees. Tout d'abord, les
journaux de Vienne et de Budapest, sur les ins-
tructions du Bureau de la presse du ministere
des Ailaires etrangeres, suspendirent la publica-
tion des informations sur le cours de Tinstruc-
tion au sujet de I'attentat de Serajevo. Cette
meme presse commen^a a representer toute Taf-
faire comme une question qui devait ^tre reglee
cntre la Serbie et TAutriche-Hongrie, eventuelle-
ment par la force des armes

D'ailleurs, les grands journaux de Vienne rece-
vaient des communications .pareilles provenant
de Tambassade d'Allemagne; exception doit etre
faite pour le aemi-ofriciei Fremdenblatt qui etait,
en general, plus modere, comme aussi pour la
Zeit et VArbeiier Zeitang.

A cette nouvelle attitude de la presse, vint
s'ajouter un etat d'insecurite de la Bourse tel
qu'on n'en avait pas connu de pareil durant tout le
cours des derniei^ evenements dans les Balkans.
Dans les conversations privees des hauts cercles
financiers, on denon^ait le « compte a regler avec
la Serbie », comme la seule issue de la crise gene-
rale, financiere et economique, ou TAutriche-
Hongrie etait entree depuis I'annexion de la Bos-

LES POURPARLERS DIPL0MATIQUE3 69

ni(3-HerzegoVine. Puis, par une circulaire secrete,
on ordonaa le retrait graduel de la monnaie d'or
et en meme temps la hausse graduelle de son
cours. On ne tarissait pas d' explications sur I'in-
terruption du conge du ministre de la Guerre
Krobatin rt du chef d'etat-major Hoetzendorf, sur
leur retour et leur sejour a Vienne. Le chef
d'etat-major general etait tantot dans le Slid,
tantot dans TEst, tantot dans le Nord de la Mo-
narchic, ou il se rencontrait avec le chef d'etat-
major allemand, comte de Moltke, en Boheme, a
Karlsl^ad, je crois.

Tous les reservistes, qui avaient ele convoques
pour les. manoeuvres de juin en Bosnie-Herzego-
vine, furent maintenus sous les drapeaux. Les
soldats des cadres en Autriche et en Hongrie
obtenaient ^n nombre beaucoup plus conside-
rable que d'ordinaire de courtes permissions
dans le but de terminer les travaux des champs
et autres, et les reservistes charges des services
administi'atifs dans I'armee elaient convoques de
plus en plus. Ajoutez les interpellations au Par-
lement hongrois et les reponses ambigues du
president du Conseil, le comte Tisza, un homme
d'Etat qui, j usque-la, avait ete tres clair dans ses
declarations politiques.

L' attitude du Ballplatz fut la plus caracteris-
tique. Les receptions hebdomadaires chez le
comte Berchtold furent suspendues. Tout d'un
coup, les conversations au sujet de I'evenement
de Serajevo avec les representants des Etats etran-
gers cesserent, ou, lorsqu'on en parlait, c'etait
toujours com me par ordre et pour dissiper la
crainte ou le doute que TAutriche-Hongrie pre-
parat une action serieuse contre la Serbie. On y

70 PAGES D*HISTOmE

avouait que certaines demarches seraient faites
a Belgrade des que les resultats de Tinstruction
ouverte au sujet de Tattentat de Serajevo en
auraient suffisamment prouve les attaches avec
Belgrade. Mais, en meme temps, on disait que
ces demarches ne seraient pas telles qu on diit
s'en inquieter beaucoup. L'ambassadeur de Rus-
sie qui, en Fabsence du comte Berchtold, avait
plusieurs Ibis cause a ce sujet avec le comte For-
gach, n'a jamais pu saisir les veritables inten-
tions de FAutriche-Hongrie. M. Schebeko m'a dit
que le comte Szapary, ambassadeur d'Autriche-
Hongrie a Petrogi^d, qui, pour des raisons de
famille, se trouvait en Autriche-Hongrie, lui
avait dit que les demarches qui seraient faites a
Belgrade auraient le caractere conciiiant. Le
"Comtej d'apres les dires de M. Schebeko a
M. Sazonow, a donne I'assurance que la note que
TAutriche-Hongrie avait Fintention d'adresser a
la Serbie serait telle que les Russes n'en seraient
pas mecontents. M. Dumaine, ambassadeur de
France, qui, sur Fordre de son Gouvernement,
avait attire Fattention du Gouvernement de
Vienne sur les complications qui pourraient sur-
gir au cas ou les reclamations eventuelles qu'on
avait Fintention d'adresser a la Serbie ne seraient
pas moderees, rcQut du baron Macchio, premier
chef de section au ministere des Allaires etran-
geres, la reponse que le Gt^^vernement austro-
hongrbis appreciait les demarches amicales et
conciliantes de la France et que les conditions de
la note a la Serbie seraient de nature a ^tr
acceptees par celle-ci sans grande hesitation. Je
fis remarquer aux ambassadeurs des puissances
de la Triple-Entente que de telles assurances pou-

LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 71

vaient cacher les vraies intentions du Gouveme-
ment austro-hongrois afin de mettre les puis-
sances devant certains iaits accomplis que I'Eu-
rope serait obligee d'accepter pour eviter une
guerre gene rale.

Cependant, les precedes du Ballplatz eurent
un certain succes, car tous mes collegues, que
j'eus I'occasion de voir ces jours-la, croyaient a
peine que T Autriche-Hongrie vouliit entreprendre
une action serieuse qui put provoquer des com-
plications europeennes. Plusieurs membres du
corps diplomatique etaient si confiants que, ces
jours-la, ils faisaient des preparatils pour leur
depart en long conge ou dans les villes d'eaux.

Malgre tout, on savait qu/on preparait au mi-
nistere une note qui contiendrait les griefs et les
reclamations de I'Autriche-Hongrie contre la
Serbie. Ce travail fut confie au comte Forgach,
ancien ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie en Serbie.
On croyait generalement que, parrai les repr^-
sentants etrangers, seul I'ambassadeur d'Alle-
magne, M. Tschirsky, avait ete tenu- au courant
de ce travail, et j'ai eu des raisons de croire qu'il
a meme collabore a la redaction de la note. Aussi
les representants des Etats qui nous etaient favo-
rables etaient-ils d'accord avec moi pour penser
que, redigee par ces deux auteurs, la note con-
tiendrait des conditions tres dures pour la Ser-
bie, mais non pas telles qu'elle ne put les accep-
ter. Lorsque le texte de la note fut public, ils en
furent tous surpris, j)our ne pas dire constern^s.

Autant on a fait mystere avec soin du contenu
de la note, autant on a cache la date ou elle serait
presentee. Le jour de la remise de I'ullimatum a
Belgrade, I'ambassadeur de France euti a ce

78 PAGES D*HISTOmE

^ujet» Tine longue conversation avec le premier-
chef de section au ministere des Affaires etran-
g^res, le comte Berchtold s*etant trouvedenou-
veau a Ischl. Or, le baron Macchio n'avait pas
dit k M. Dumaine que ce jour-la, dans I'apres-
midi, la note serait remise a Belgrade et que le
Lendemain elle serait publiee par les journaux,

Lorsque le 1 1/24 j uillet, au matin, les joumaux
viennois publierent le contenu de la note que le
baron Giesl avait remise au Gouvernement serbe,
une inquietude s'empara de nos amis et des amis
de la paix europeeiine. G'est alors seulement
qu'on coraprit que de grands evenements euro-
peens pourraient survenir, bien qu'on ne crut
pas que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois eut
Tintention de les i^rovoquer. Ce sentiment fut
fortifi« par les violents articles de tous les jour-
naux de Vienne, excepte le Zeit et VArbeiter
Zeitiing, ainsi que par les demonstrations de la
rue qui prouvaient d'une fa^on evidente que la
guerre bien entendu une guerre contre la Ser-
bie, — serait la solution la plus desirable.

Apres deux, trois conversations que j'ai cues
ce jour-la, je me suis rendu compte qu'un conllit
arme entre la Serbie et la Monaivhie etuit inevi-
table, m^me au cas ou la Serbie accepterait tou-
tes les conditions austro-hongroises, de la pre-
miere a la derniere. L'attitude de la rue erivers
notre legation etait deja telle que je m'attendais
m^me a des voies de fait contre le personnel de
la legation.

L'ambassadeur de France aussi bien que celui
d*Angloterre, et le charge d*all*aires de Russia
considererent que la demarche du Gouverne-
ffienl austro-hongrois etait, non x>as une simple

UES POUnPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 73

note, mais un ultimatum. lis furent indignes de
la forme aussi bien que du fond et du delai
fixe par la note, et ils la jugerent, eux aussi,
inacceptable. Dans les convei^sations que j*a:i
eues avec eux au sujet de cette note,^ je leur
exj)liquai qu'en particulier les passages relatifs
a I'ordre du jour du Roi a I'armee, a la destitu-
tion des fonctionnaires et officiers, et surtout k
la participation des fonctionnaires austro-hon-
grois a la « repression du mouvement existant
en Serbie contre Tintegrite de la Monarchic »,ne
pourraient absolument pas ^tre acceptes, etant
contraires a la dignite et a la souverainete natio-
nales. Ce n'est qu'une guerre victorieuse, dis-je,
qui x>ourrait amener Taeceptation de conditions
aussi humiliantes poiir un pays independant. A
leur question : s 'il ne valait pas mieux les accep-
ter pour le moment et eviter la guerre, j'ai
repondu que la note austro-hongroise, qui en fait
^tait une declaration de guerre a la Serbie, etait
redigee de fa^on que, m^me au cas ou la Serbie
I'aurait acceptee sans aucune reserve, I'Autricha-
Hongrie y aurait trouve a tout instant des motifs
pour faire entrer ses troupes en Serbie. G'est
dans la conviction que le conflit resterait iimite
a nous deux qu'elle . avait redige une telle
note.

M. Dumaine, Sir Maurice de Bunsen et le prince
KoudacheflV charge d'allaires russe, furent sur-
pris de cette note inattendue, autant qu inquiets
des complications qu'elle mena^ait d'amener.
Avant la remise de la note austro-hongroise,
M. Schebeko, ambassadeur de Russie, avait dit
a plusieurs reprises a ses collegues que la Russie
ne pourrait pas rester indiiferente a une demarche

74 PAGES D*HIST0IRE

de TAutriche-Hongrie qui tendrait k humilier la
Serbie. Cette opinion, ii Tjivait ouvertement ex-
primee au Ballplatz. D'ou, Finqui^tude chez les
ambassadeurs qui envisageaient la possibilite
d'une ftueri^ entre la Russie et TAutriche-Hon-
grie.

Le lendemain du jour ou la note fut remise a
Belgrade, le prince Koudacheff alia en parler au
comte Berchtold. A sa declaration que la note,
telle quelle, etait inaccep table et que la Russie ne
pouvait pas regarder avec indifference une humi-,
liation de la Serbie, le comte Berchtold repondit
que TAutriche-Hongrie s'etait trouvee forcee de
faire une telle d-marche en SerbiCj son existence
mdme etant mise en question, que rAutriclie-
Hongriene pourrait jms renoncer a ses demarches
ni changer les conditions de la note, et qu^elle esti-
mait que ce differend ne regardait que la Serbie
et r Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-a-dire qu'aucune autre
puissance n*avait de raisons de s'en meler.

Cette r^ponse du comte Bei^chtold ne laissait
pas de doutes sur I'intention de I'Autriche-Hon-
grie d'infliger une correction ^ niain armee k la
Serbie, sans jugement de FEurope Fy autorisant.
Des conversations que j'ai cues alors avec les
ambassadeurs des puissances de la Triple-En-
tente, — qui, durant ces jours penibles, furent k
tous egards accoeillants et bienveillants envers
moi et envers le personnel de la legation, — il
ressortait clairement que, du moment ou ell«
s'etait decidee k adresser cette note qui signifiait
sans aucun doute la guerre, FAutiiche-Hongrie
avait re^u des assurances et m^me acquis la con-
viction que le conflit serbo-austro-hongrois serait
localise. De m^me, 11 6tait clair que FAutriche-

LES POUiiPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 75

Hongrie avail ete confirmee dans cette convic-
tion particulierement et peut-etre uniquement
par M. Tscliirsky, ambassadeur d*Aliemagne a
Vienne. M. Tschirsky etait seul a penser eta dire
ouvertement que la Russie se tiendrait tranquille
pendant que rAutriche-Hongrie infligerait la pu-
nition {Straf expedition) a la Serbie. II assurait
que le ministre des Affaires etrangeres de Rus-
sie viendrait facilementa bout des panslavistes,
comme' I'annee prec^dente, et que la Russie
n'avait aujourd'hui aucun interet a soulever tant
de questions epineuses qui latouchent de plus
pres en Europe et en Asie. Selon lui, il etait
necessaire qu'une legon fut donnee a la Serbie.
La Russie n'avait aucun droit d'intervenir. Quant
a TAllemagne, il declarait qu'elle avait pleine
conscience de ce qu'elle faisait, enappuyantTAu-
triche-Hongrie dans sa demarche*

Ge langage de M. Tschirsky a fait penser a
beaucoup de personnes que c'est TAUemagne qui
a voulu provoquer la guerre europeenne, car,
bien auparavant, on a dit et mdme ecrit a Vienne
qu'il fallait faire la guerre a la Russie avant
qu'elle Cut prete au point de vue militaire,
c'est-a-dire avant le printemps de 191 7 ; « Plus
on remet TaHaire, moindres seront les chances
des puissances de la Triple- Alliance. » Cepen-
dant, de Berlin, de sources diplomatiques, les
plus authentiques nouvelles me parvenaient que
la Wilhelmstrasse n'approuvait pas Taction de
TAutriche-Hongrie dans cette question et que
M. Tschirsky avait outrepasse ses instructions.

A son re tour de Petrograd, M. Schebeko, am-
bassadeur de Russie, multiplia ses efforts aupres
du Ballpjatz, afin d'obtenir prolongation du ccurt

76 PAGES D*HISTOIRE

delai fix^ au Gouvernement serbe pour sa re-
ponse a-Ja note austro-hongroise, et de trouver le
moyen d'arriver a un echange d'idees sur Ten-
semble du diil'erend entre Vienne et Petro-
grad; mais ces eftbrts resterent sans s\icc6s jus-
qu'au 13/26 juillet, jour de notre entrevue. Par
la conversation que j'eus alors avec lui, je com-
pris qua Petrograd ia note austro-hongroise ^tait
consideree, dans le fond et dans la forme, comme
une provocation adressee k la Russie, non pas k
la Serbie, et que la Russie ne soull'rirait pas
rhumiliation de la Serbie, dilt-elle s'exposer a
une guerre.

Le jour de mon depart de Vienne, M. Sch^-
beko me dit que, en depit de toutes les grandes
difficultes, il y avait des chances pour qu'on
trouvat a Petrograd, entre le^ Gouvernement
russe et le comte Szapary, une solution quel-
sonque qui empdcherait I'ouverture du conflit.
D'autre part, des que Ton apprit a Vienne que
le conflit austro-serbe pouvait provoqUer une
guerre entre la Russie et rAutriche-Hongric, on
commenga a s'en inquieter.

ANNEXE

Declarations
de M. Giolitti a la Chambre italienne \i)

5 decern bre 1914-

« ... Comrae je tiens pour necessaire que la
loyaut^ de 1 Italie dans robservation des pactes
internationaux soit au-dessus de toute discus-
sion| je me sens oblige de rappeler un precedent
qui demontre que T interpretation donnee par
notre Gouverneraent a nos traites, au debut du
conflit, etait exacte et qu'elleaele admise comme
TPaie par les Puissances alliees elles-memes.

« Au cours dela guerre balkanique, precis^-
ment le 9 aout igiS, etant absent de Rome, j'ai
re?u de mon coUegue, I'bon. Di San Giuliano, le
telegramme suivant :

« L'Autricbe nous a communique, ainsi qu'a
« FAllemagne, son intention d'agir contre la

(1} II semble qu'il yait egalement eu une demarche syme-
trique de I'Autiiche aupres de la Roumanie f»n mai 1913.
M. Take lon^^s^.o a lormellement declare qu'il en avail trace
dans un ttlegramme adresse par le comte Beichtuld au
prince de Kiiifeienherg et communique par lui au chef da
Gouvernement roumaiu. Les dementis officieux anxquiels
cette r6vehit on a donne lieu de la pan de i'Autriche ne nous
permetteni pas de lui donner place dans ce recueil sour
fonne d'un lextc olficiel.

78 PAGES D'HISTOIRE

* SerLie et elle defmit cette action une action
« defensive, esperant appliquer a la Triple-Al-

* liance le casus foederis, que je crois inappli-
« cable. Je cherche a concerter avec TAUemagne
<f des ellbrts en vue d'empecher cette action
« autrichienne ; mais il pourrait etre necessaire
« de dire clairement que nous ne considerons
« pas cette action eventuelle' comme defensive et
« que, par consequent, nous ne croyons pas que
« le casus foederis existe. Je te prie de me tele-
« graph ier a Rome si tu approuves. »

« — J ai repondu ainsi :

« Si TAutriche agit contre la Serbie, il est
« evident que le casus Joederis n'existe pas.
« Cest une action qu'elle entreprend pour son
cc proi>re compte; car il n'est pas question de de-
« fense, puisque personne ne songe a Tattaquer.
« II est necessaire que cela soit declare a TAu-
« triche de la fa<;on la plus formelle et il est a
« souhaiter que Taction de TAllemagne dissuade
« I'Autriche de cette perilleuse aventure. »

t Cest ce qui fut fait; et I'interpretation don-
« n^e par nous eut le consentement de nos allies
« avec lesquels nos rapports d'amitie ne furent
« pas le moins du monde troubles. La declara-
« tion de neutralite faite au debut du present
« conflit est done conforme a I'esprit et a la
« lettre des traites. J'ai voulu rappeler ce fait
« parce que je juge utile qu'il apparaisse aux
« yeux de toute TEurope que lltalie a ete com-
« pletement loyale. »

NANCY-PARIS. — IMPRIMERIS BERCyER-LEVRAULT

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