OFFICIAL DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE EUROPEAN WAR ■Th^^^ THE MACMILLAN COMPANY NBW YORK • BOSTON • CHICAGO • DALLAS ATLANTA • SAN FRANCISCO MACMILLAN & CO., Limited LONDON • BOMBAY • CALCUTTA MELBOURNE THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltd. TORONTO OFFICIAL DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE EUROPEAN WAR- WITH PHOTOGRAPHIC REPRODUCTIONS OF OFFICIAL EDITIONS OF THE DOCUMENTS (BLUE, WHITE, YELLOW, ETC., BOOKS) PUBLISHED BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF AUSTRIA- HUNGARY, BELGIUM, FRANCE, GERMANY, GREAT BRITAIN, RUSSIA AND SERBIA INTRODUCTION, DAILY SUMMARIES, CROSS-REFERENCES, AND FOOTNOTES EDMUND VON MACH, A.B., A.M., Ph.D. (harvard) THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 1916 All rights reserved >^- Copyright, 1916, By the MACMILLAN COMPANY. Set up and electro typed. Published September, 1916. J. S. Gushing Co. — Berwick «fe Smith Ca Norwood, Mass., U.S.A. INTRODUCTION In constitutionally governed countries it is customary for the Executive at important times to lay before the Representatives of the people "collected documents" containing the information on which the Government has shaped its foreign policy. In Great Britain these documents are often printed on large sheets of white paper, loosely bound, called "White Papers/' If the docu- ments are very important, they are later reprinted in pamphlet form, and are then called by the color of their cover, " Blue Books." At the outbreak of the World War in 1914 several Governments besides that of Great Britain issued pamphlets of collected -docu- ments, and these have become known, by the color of their respective bindings, as the German "White Book," the French "Yellow Book," the Russian "Orange Book," and so on. Following the previous customs of their respective countries the several Governments issued more or less exhaustive collections, and in each case were primarily guided by the desire to justify themselves before their own people. In America the British Blue Book won the greatest favor, not only because it became known first but also because of its inherent worth. Its despatches are well written, and sufficiently numerous to tell a consecutive story. The book is well printed, provided with indexes and cross references, and represents the most scholarly work done by any of the European Governments. The German White Book, on the other hand, contains few de- spatches, and these only as illustrations of points made in an exhaust- ive argument. Such a presentation can be convincing only if one has confidence in the honesty of the author. There can be no doubt that as a source book for study the British Parliamentary Papers are superior to the German Papers, but even the British Papers are not, as many people have wished to believe, complete and do not, there- fore, offer the final authority on which scholars can rely. This has been conceded and actually emphasized by so staunch a friend of the Allies as the late Charles Francis Adams. Writing in the Pro- ceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, January, 1915, Mr. Adams said : — "We hear a great deal from those interested in original research of public archives and access thereto, and of dates arbitrarily fixed by the various Foreign Offices at which those archives have been, or are to be, laid open to the investi- gator. It is, however, a bit confounding in this connection to learn, as we now 343133 VI Introduction are learning, that, so far at least as the Foreign Office of Great Britain is concerned, the papers there to be found are at times of somewhat secondary importance. A knowledge of the true inwardness of any given situation of a certain sort must be looked for elsew^here. More even than that, the papers on file in the Foreign Office are not unseldom even illusory. The statement is unquestionably star- tling ; and how, it will be asked, did such a condition of affairs come about ? The explanation is curious — English I For at least two centuries now — indeed ever since the British Foreign Office took its present form — a usage as to cor- respondence has prevailed in connection with it which has now to be reckoned with, a usage in no wise generally understood. As Parliament, far back in the eighteenth century — during in fact the Walpole epoch — gradually assumed the large state functions it has since developed, it became more and more a prac- tice to call on those constituting the Ministry for papers relating to events connected with foreign affairs, especially correspondence. The modern Blue Book was thus gradually evolved. As the practice grew, its. inconveniences made themselves felt. Both the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and those with whom he was in correspondence wrote under an ever increasing sense of restraint. As the British diplomatic service was constituted this, not unnaturally, resulted in two forms of correspondence and sets of records — first the usual official exchanges, including instructions and despatches subject to parliamentary call through the Blue Book. Meanwhile, on the other hand, a private interchange of letters, frequently familiar in tone as between old friends, or perhaps relatives, would be going on between the representatives at certain of the foreign courts and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. ... It was, moreover, in times of exigency that recourse was naturally had to this form of communication. . . . The formal despatches, constituting the great mass of the Foreign Office correspondence — 95 per cent of it, perhaps — were regularly filed in the official archives ; and there they now are. The private communications, however, coming from the important embassies and relating generally to more or less critical situations, were consid- ered as belonging to the First Secretary for the time being. . . . Such were the British usage and understanding. Such are they now." This quotation establishes the presumption that also in the present British Blue Book only a part of the Correspondence that was ex- changed between the British Foreign Office and the British Ambas- sadors and Ministers abroad has been published. For none of the other books has completeness been claimed. The question, therefore, arises whether the study of any one of these books or of all of them together can enable the student to arrive at the truth. The editor believes that this question should be answered in the affirmative. If six or more interested spectators describe one event, no two descriptions may agree. By a judicious comparison of all, however, an impartial observer may come very near to understanding the truth. By noting, moreover, not only what each man says but also what he refrains from saying, it is easy to understand the atti- tude of each toward the event described, and thus to check his credibility. A successful study from this point of view necessitates an intimate familiarity with the documents published by all the European Gov- ernments, and to attain it the documents must be studied in their relation to one another. This is, however, very difficult unless the system of cross references contained in the British Blue Book is extended to cover all the books. The Macmillan edition is the Introduction vii first to do this, and to enable the student to turn at once from one book to another and to cheek the probable accuracy of a Russian presentation, for instance, by comparing it with the British or Ger- man version of the same incident. The several versions are often so different that it becomes neces- sary to adduce proof for the statement that they have reference to the same event. Such proofs are given in the footnotes. A great amount of additional information which the editor had gathered in the course of his studies and which he thought might be helpful to other students is also given in the footnotes. It is, of course, not intended to be exhaustive. There is one other point in which the Macmillan edition differs from the official British publication of The Collected Diplomatic Documents. The latter prints one book after another, complete, beginning with the British Blue Book. This edition, on the other hand, prints the despatches according to dates, and within the dates according to the alphabetical order of the countries which sent or received them. This enables the student to see at a glance the state of the diplomatic activities in the various European capitals on any one day. There are several reasons why this is desirable, but the bare mention of one suffices. The Serbian reply to Austria-Hungary was given on the evening of July 25th. It did not become known in the European Chancel- leries until the afternoon of July 26th, as is stated both in the French Yellow Book and in the Russian Orange Book. Whether the delay was due to Serbian negligence or to Austro-Hungarian interference is not known. As a matter of fact, however, practically all the messages of July 26th, in which the reply is discussed, were based on hearsay and not on a knowledge of the wording of the reply. In the British arrangement of the despatches this and similar facts disappear. In the present arrangement they become immediately apparent. The English translations of the foreign books in the official British version are excellent, and have been followed in this edition through- out. Good translations cannot always be literal translations, and while the editor believes that occasional errors have crept into the Official English version there is no need of a general revision. Serious students, moreover, will prefer to check the accuracy of any given passage of importance themselves by consulting the original. Nor will they be satisfied with reprints in which the possibility of errors cannot be avoided. For this reason photo- graphic reproductions of official copies of the books have been added as an appendix to this edition.^ This appendix has relieved the editor of a double responsibility, first of vouching for the accuracy of the translation, and secondly of discussing every inaccuracy he discovered however slight it might have been. He has, therefore, drawn attention to mistranslations 1 The Editor was unable to obtain an ojBficial Serbian Blue Book, and has substituted an excellent French edition. viii Introdiiction only when they appeared to him to have a possible bearing on dis- puted points. One instance will illustrate his meaning. In No. 39 of the Austro-Hungarian Red Book Count Berchtold instructs the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London to explain to Sir Edward Grey in detail the dossier "which has been sent to you by mail'' {^' das Ihnen auf dem Postwege vhermittelte Dossier ''). This is ren- dered in the official English version "which is being sent to you by mail." Since the question has arisen whether Sir Edward Grey received the dossier before Great Britain declared war on Germany, the change of the past tense in this despatch to the present tense may be important. There are many more points in which this edition differs from others. To students they will be self-explanatory, because they are the result, in every case, of the editor's wish to prepare a serviceable source book, not for partisans but for scholars and intelligent readers. The editor has been content with doing the hard and slow work of collating the despatches and bringing order out of chaos. He has tried to dispel the confusion due to redundance and at times perhaps to wilful misrepresentation. He has cracked the nut, as it were, that the kernel of truth might lie revealed. What this truth is, or what it seems to him to be, he may discuss at some future time. All he wished to do in this book was to make the initial studies for others less arduous and thus to stimulate them to search for the truth themselves. His greatest reward, therefore, will be, if scholars agree that he has succeeded in keeping prejudice out of the book, being fair to all, and preparing that most necessary of all helps to a scholar, a reliable source book. In many doubtful cases the Editor has fortunately had the in- valuable advice of Professor C. A. Beard of Columbia University, whose impartial fairness and keen scent for the truth are well known among scholars and to whom he wishes to express his sincere thanks. EDMUND VON MACH. Cambridge, Mass. June, 1916. LIST OF PRINCIPAL PERSONS MENTIONED IN THE CORRESPONDENCE, SHOWING THEIR OFFICIAL POSITIONS 1. GREAT BRITAIN. Lord High Chancellor . Secretary of State for Affairs Permanent Under-Secretary State for Foreign Affairs French Ambassador . . of Russian Ambassador . . . , German Ambassador . . . Austro- Hungarian Ambassador Belgian Minister .... Serbian Minister . . . . , Viscount Haldane. Sir Edward Grey. Sir A. Nicolson. M. Paul Cambon. M. de Fleuriau (Charge d'Aff aires). Count Benckendorff. M. de Etter (Counsellor of Embassy). Prince Lichnowsky. Count Mensdorff. Count de Lalaing. M. Boschkovitch. 2. FRANCE. President of the Republic . . President of the Council . . Ministers for Foreign Affairs Political Director British Ambassador . Russian Ambassador German Ambassador . . . Austro-Hungarian Ambassador Belgian Minister .... Serbian Minister .... M. Poincare. M. Rene Viviani. 1. M. Jonnart. 2. M. Stephen Pichon. 3. M. Rene Viviani. 4. M. Bienvenu-Martin (Acting). 5. M. Doumergue. 6. M. Delcasse. M. Berthelot. Sir Francis Bertie. M. Isvolsky. M. Sevastopoulo (Charge d'Aff aires). Baron von Schoen. Count Szecsen. Baron Guillaume. M. Vesnitch. 3. RUSSIA. Minister for Foreign Affairs Minister for War . . . British Ambassador . . French Ambassador . . German Ambassador . . Austro-Hungarian Ambassador Serbian Minister .... M. Sazonof. M. Suchomlinof. Sir George Buchanan. M. Paleologue. Count Pourtales. Count Szapary. Count Czernin (Charge d'Aff aires). Dr. M. Spalaikovitch. List of Principal Persons 4. GERMANY. Imperial Chancellor . . Secretary of State . . . Under-Secretary of State . British Ambassador . . French Ambassador .... Russian Ambassador .... American Ambassador . . . Austro - Hungarian Ambassador Belgian Minister Serbian Charge d' Affaires . . French Minister at Munich . . French Consul-General at Frank- fort Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg. Hen* von Jagow. Herr von Zimmermann. Sir Edward Goschen. Sir Horace Rumbold (Counsellor of Embassy). M. Jules Cambon. M. de Manneville (Charge d' Affaires). M. Swerbeiev. M. Broniewsky (Charge d' Affaires). Mr. Gerard. Count Szogyeny. Baron Beyens. Dr. M. Yovanovitch. M. AUize. M. Ronssin. 5. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs .... President of the Ministry of Hungary . . . British Ambassador French Ambassador Russian Ambassador . American Ambassador German Ambassador Italian Ambassador Belgian Minister . . Serbian Minister . . French Consul-General at Buda- pest Russian Consul-General at Fiume Acting Russian Consul at Prague Count Berchtold. Baron Macchio. Count Forgach. Count Tisza. Sir Maurice de Bunsen. M. Dumaine. M. Schebeko. Prince Koudacheff (Charge d' Affaires). Mr. Penfield. Herr von Tschirscky. Duke d'Avarna. Count Errembault de Dudzeele. M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch. M. d'Apchier-le-Maugin. M. Salviati. M. Kazansky. 6. TURKEY. British Charge d' Affaires . French Ambassador . . Serbian Charge d' Affaires Austrian Consul-General . Mr. Beaumont. M. Bompard. M. M. Georgevitch. Herr Jehlitschka. 7. BELGIUM. Minister for Foreign Affairs . . M. Davignon. Baron van der Elst (Secretary-General). Colonial Minister H. Renkin. British Minister Sir Francis Villiers. French Minister M. Klobukowski. American Minister Mr. Brand Whitlock. German Minister Herr von Below Saleske. Austro - Hungarian Minister . . Count Clary. Dutch Minister M. de Weede. List of Principal Persons . xi 8. SERBIA. Prime Minister M. Pashitch. Acting Prime Minister and Min- ister for Foreign Affairs . Dr. Laza Patchou. British Minister Mr. des Graz. Mr. Crackanthorpe (First Secretary). French Minister M. Boppe. Russian Charge d' Affaires . . M. Strandtman. German Secretary of Legation . Herr von Storck. Austro -Hungarian Minister . . Baron Giesl von Gieslingen. Belgian Minister M. de -Welle. Austro - Hungarian Consular Agent at Nish Herr Hoflehner. 9. ITALY. Minister for Foreign Affairs British Ambassador . . French Ambassador . . German Ambassador . . Serbian Minister . . . Marquis di San Giuliano. Sir Rennell Rodd. M. Barrere. Herr von Flotow. M. Ljub Michailovitch. 10. SPAIN. Belgian Minister Baron Grenier. 11. DENMARK. French Minister M. Bapst. 12. HOLLAND. Minister for Foreign Affairs . . M. Loudon. French Minister M. Pellet. Belgian Minister Baron Fallon. 13. LUXEMBURG. Minister of State and President of the Government .... Dr. Eyschen. French Minister ...... M. Mollard. German Minister Herr von Buch. 14. NORWAY. French Minister M. Chevalley. 15. SWEDEN. French Minister M. Thiebaut. 16. SWITZERLAND. French Consul-General at Basle M. Farges. TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction v List of principal persons mentioned in the correspondence, SHOWING their OFFICIAL POSITIONS ix Calendar of despatches sent and received xv Part One. Despatches sent and received at the various Foreign Offices ; arranged by names and places ; with diaries, summaries of despatches, and footnotes ... 1 Part Two. The parts of the several official publications of diplomatic documents not printed under Part One . . 525 I. The Austro-Hungarian Red Book : Introduction . 525 11. The French Yellow Book : Chapter I, Warnings (1913) 531 III. The German White Book 551 IV. The British Blue Book : Introductory Narrative OF Events . . . 561 Part Three. Documents frequently quoted but not contained in the official publications of collected diplomatic docu- MENTS 571 I. The Chancellor's speech, August 4:Th, 1914 . . 573 II. The "Brussels" documents ...... 577 III. The Allied Answer to the " Brussels " Documents 581 TV. Negotiations of Prince Lichnowsky with Sir Edward Grey 586 V. Documents found in the possession of Mr. Grant- Watson, Secretary of the British Legation . 588 VI. The telegrams and letters exchanged between the Royal and Imperial courts of London, Berlin, AND PeTROGRAD, AND BETWEEN KiNG GeORGE AND President Poincare 590 Index 599 Appendix. The several official publications of collected diplomatic documents in photographic reproduction . . 609 xiii Calendar XV < >* s 1 A 1 'a < 00 a > o 1 2 I o a 1 1 1 4 11 oWoo a> B 2 1 < 1 "E i s i - 1-9 B 2 1 "a < 1 .1 > ! 1 i "^ 1 ^ 1 1 O 03 a c3 CI a • o ^ C c .2 ffl 1 PQ 1 1 1 XVI Calendar OS o» 2 2 a eg 1 i a T32 d| Jh2 S8qO;BdS9Q o^ •-9 i 1 i a ir-l 1 2 1 i 1 .2 |s as a . t-s saqo^Bdsaa o^ s •-9 e 2 i .2 a o »1 is 11- CO a OJ £ o 1 §3 d . > .2 1 d 1 d o T3 J 1 1 Calendar xvii OS i a 43 S3 i 2 1 ^ •-5 2 <5 .a 1 i •-9 33 "b 1 < .2 Is i -d i G eg c3 b i 1 ■ July 12, 1914 July 13, 1914 saqoijBdsaa 0^ a 2 i a i 1 1 1= . eaqocjBdBaa ©N 1^ .2 .2 1 1 1 "3 XVlll Calendar •-9 > s c Si oo2 II O T3 fl © J- P 13 a 03 ! 73 a OS OJ 42 > 1 0) Xi 1 > • If t3 0) 05 00 i s ! a < OS (N T3 a E 1 II OS J 1 1 1 2 1 Calendar XIX 1 S3 1 T-4 II .S Basle 60 London 63, 68, 69,71 Petrograd 64 Constantinople 65 London 66 Berlin 67, 73, 74 Rome 72 Serbian Reply 49 A.-H. Memo- randum 73 lis O o 03 ?5 1 1^ illli "S Si (Nco O cocoio-* 0^ a fl t^ « fe o '^ Si> III c^ 'rt t^ fO 1-5 oS 1 o »o o a s a 1 llli " OJCO .2s a.2 £ fl S ^11 1 i 03 U 1 3 tS S a 3 Sbt-.'^' ^ffl M(NT3 »2§'.H«.-2a.g II » fl ^;^-'0C« f§ ^jJ J fS^;2^c«^;2^(§fS 3^3 ^-^ 05 1 (N 1 a JUifllil CO 03 C3 o s «l i- ^ fl^a a a a 5§ 1 ^" tf fH > $i >H m 00 (N >o -2 < ^i u 2 a §1 1 ¥ |§fl?i ^1 J Jss •IJ ^§2o a >■ 1 (N 1 .2 p 3 fl S* c3 .rl CO <»^ •* >■ .; O 0, >-3 o8 ^„ 1 i° J J" 1^ 1 ^ ii e3 •f ^g o 1 O 6k > « 1 J 1 PQ XX Calendar "^ S3 1 O § 00 S"o^§| Petrograd 120 Berlin 121, 122 Paris 124-126, 134, 136 Vienna 127 Brussels 128 Luxemburg 129 S J ^-^^l OS o < eg 1 1 = (2 13 2 a CD* rt -CO 1 CO CO ills ©§§ ©.i s s a Oj o-^ i-ic6 oo" 11 Ism H^H^cu >mpq •* o i i 0) J O TO 1^1 00 >^l CO (NO . r>. p O 05 2 1=1 "^ ^■«^'^«o |g 1 <5 §^2 §.S^ 2 g^ M -^ls ■i32^'S © 3'C gg g « CS w OJ c3 d -§^■1 a 2-2 ^^3 ^«^o a^^ S^^ ^-fScS«;S^ 33 2 1 2.1 li © nS eS M -05 erf . (N «o -« 1 00 1 © 3 ■♦3 a 5" 1 1 sis" s 1 If 1 PQHJCQ Coos' c 2-S .a ©^ ©20.25^ § §s".2 o^ C'O"' o £3 N i.3 00 c3 « c o c CO 1 ! o §28 ill! IJ^I •-9 c ej i S3 1 ^5§ .2.2 a a CO o a> «•- to 1 a 4 S Sco-SSJSf S C C3 h O >■ CO 2iO ^a^s c o 00 1 CO a.2 © CO 4> <»£2 Q O (SfS ^ B3 Is \ © 1 1 d 1 *© n Calendar XXI a lO 2 -*3 ^'os tJ< > OS M a OS tC ■;5 CO (N CO .c<, bcio^ ««> Coo !s| !s OS c3 i C3CO fl 0<^W<^ ■^ ol Is! Is iS r-t .a § 52. § P o p , 1 03 a o 2-C c « CI ill OS OQ 1 a d O OS 2 i 1 i -a is " gt- M ^ lO P o p < s 4 :- "1 1 d •* OS tS -«j t>. 3 « S". CO - ::^Hco 2(N^'H gcO i-2|a-i flV^'flSa ;5^2.2§§«^^J. OS T-l 1 03 w o 2 .s 1 i si tn 03 O P 5 1 a -2 °S 00^ ^ 11 ■ a §§"5 ^§ ig iS a 1 -s ^1 i « 1 i 1 xxu Calendar CALENDAR Despatches dated later than August 6, 1914 Foreign Office of Vienna Paris 62 , Paris 61 Paris 63 London 64 London 65 August 9 August 8 August 10 August 11 August 12 Brussels 67 To Jap. Amb. 66 Tokio 69 Berlin 68 August 22 August 20 August 23 August 23 Brussels The Hague 56 Paris and London 57,58 Paris 59 The Hague 60 Paris 61 The Hague 63, 64 To Entente 65, 66 The Hague 62 Whitlock 67 Brit. Min. 68 August 7 August 7 August 8 August 9 August 9 August 10 August 10 August 10 August 11* August 11 French Min. 69 The Hague 71 The Hague 70 From Sazonof 72 The Hague 73 Paris 74 London 75 From colonies 76 From A.-H. Min. 77 The Hague 78 To all 79 August 11 August 12 August 12 August 12 August 13 August 16 August 17 August 26 August 28 August 29 August 29 Paris Declaration 160 Sept. 4 Berlin London Sir E. Goschen 160 August 8 Sir M. de Bunsen 161 Sept. 1 Petrograd Belgrade Report from Serbian Min. to Austria 52 August 16 PART ONE DESPATCHES SENT AND RECEIVED AT THE VARIOUS FOREIGN OFFICES; ARRANGED BY NAMES AND PLACES; WITH DIARIES, SUMMARIES OF DE- SPATCHES, AND FOOTNOTES DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE WAR Sunday, June 28, 1914 On this day Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife, the Duchess of Hohen- berg, were murdered in Serajevo. SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office op Austria-Hungary Belgium France Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Vienna Germany Great Britain Russia Serbia France : From Vienna French Yellow Book No. 7^ M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, June 28, 1914. News has just arrived at Vienna that the Hereditary Archduke of Austria and his wife have been to-day assasinated at Serajevo by a student belonging to Grahovo. Some moments before the attack to which they fell a victim, they had escaped the explosion of a bomb which wounded several officers of their suite. The Emperor, who is now at Ischl, was immediately informed by telegraph. . Dumaine. Monday, June 29, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary Belgium France Belgrade Germany Great Britain Russia Serbia Vienna 1 For earlier numbers of French Yellow Book, see p. 531. B 1 2 O^xial Diplomatic Documents Austria-Himgary : From Belgrade Austro-Htjngarian Red Book No. 1 Ritter von Storck, Secretary of Legation, to Count Berchtold. Belgrade, June 29, 1914- Under the terrible shock of yesterday^s catastrophe it is diflB- cult for me to give any satisfactory judgment on the bloody drama of Serajevo with the necessary composure and judicial calm. I must ask you, therefore, to allow me for the moment to limit myself to putting on record certain facts. Yesterday, the 15/28, the anniversary of the battle of the Amsel- feld, was celebrated with greater ceremony than usual, and there were celebrations in honour of the Servian patriot, Milos Obilic, who, in 1389 with two companions treacherously stabbed the victorious Murad. Among all Servians, Obilic is regarded as the national hero. In place of the Turks, however, we are now looked on as the hereditary enemy, thanks to the propaganda which has been nourished under the aegis of the Royal Government and the agitation which has for many years been carried on in the press. A repetition of the drama on the field of Kossovo seems, therefore, to have hovered before the minds of the three young criminals of Serajevo, Princip, Cabrinovic and the third person still unknown, who also threw a bomb. They also shot down an innocent woman, and may therefore think that they have surpassed their model. For many years hatred against the Monarchy has been sown in Servia. The crop has sprung up and the harvest is murder. The news arrived at about 5 o'clock; the Servian Government at about 10 o'clock caused the Obilic festivities to be officially stopped. They continued, however, unofficially for a considerable time after it was dark. The accounts of eye-witnesses say that people fell into one another's arms in delight, and remarks were heard, such as: " It serves them right, we have been expecting this for a long time," or "This is revenge for the annexation." Serbia : From Vienna Serbian Blue Book No. 1 M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, June 16/29, 1914. The Vienna Press asserts that the magisterial enquiry has already shown that the Serajevo outrage was prepared at Belgrade ; further^ that the whole conspiracy in its wider issues was organised at Bel- Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from ^ Belgrade \ - Vienna, Berlin, Constantinople June 30 y Serbian Blue Book No. 2 3 grade among youths inspired with the Great Serbian idea, and that the Belgrade Press is exciting pubHc opinion by pubHshing articles about the intolerable conditions prevaiKng in Bosnia. Press articles of this kind, according to the Vienna Press, are exercising a strong influence, as Serbian newspapers are being smuggled in large quan- tities into Bosnia. Tuesday, June 30, 1814 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Austria-Hungary Belgium France Germany Great Britain Russia Serbia Austria-Hungary enquires what measures the Serbian Government had taken "to follow up the clues to the crime which notoriously are partly to be found in Serbia." Serbia remarks on the attempt of Austria-Hungary to ''represent in the eyes of Europe" the Serajevo murder as "the act of a conspiracy engineered in Serbia." The murder " has not yet engaged the attention of the Serbian poHee." Austria- Hungary : From Belgrade AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 2 Ritter Von Storck, Secretary of Legation, to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) Belgrade, June 30, 1914. To-day I sent an enquiry to Herre Gruic, General Secretary of the Foreign Office, to ask the obvious question what measures the Royal police had taken, or proposed to take, in order to follow up the clues to the crime which notoriously are partly to be found in Servia. The answer was that the matter has not yet engaged the attention of the Servian police. Serbia : From Vienna Serbian Blue Book No. 2 M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, June 17/30, 1914. The tendency at Vienna to represent, in the eyes of Europe, the outrage committed upon the Austro-Hungarian Crown Prince as 4 Official Diplomatic Documents the act of a conspiracy engineered in Serbia is becoming more and more apparent. The idea is to use this as a poUtical weapon against us. The greatest attention ought, therefore, to be paid to the tone adopted by our press in its articles on the Serajevo outrage. Serbian Blue Book No. 5 M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Vienna, June 17/30, 1914. As Count Berchtold was not able to receive me when I called, I spoke to the Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs concerning the Serajevo outrage. In the course of our conversation I adopted the following line of argument : — "The Royal Serbian Government condemn most energetically the Serajevo outrage and on their part will certainly most loyally do everything to prove that they will not tolerate within their terri- tory the fostering of any agitation or illegal proceedings calculated to disturb our already delicate relations with Austria-Hungary. I am of opinion that the Government are prepared also to submit to trial any persons implicated in the plot, in the event of its being proved that there are any in Serbia. The Royal Serbian Govern- ment, notwithstanding all the obstacles hitherto placed in their way by Austro-Hungarian diplomacy (creation of an independent Albania, opposition to Serbian access to the Adriatic, demand for revision of the Treaty of Bucharest, the September ultimatum, etc.) remained loyal in their desire to establish a sound basis for our good neighbourly relations. You know that in this direction something has been done and achieved. Serbia intends to con- tinue to work for this object, convinced that it is practicable and ought to be continued. The Serajevo outrage ought not to and cannot stultify this work." Baron Macchio has taken note of the above and promised to com- municate to Count Berchtold all that I said to him. On the same day I communicated to the French and Russian Am- bassadors the substance of this conversation. I have, etc. From Berlin Serbian Blue Book No. 3 Dr, M. Yovanovitch, Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegraphic.) Berlin, June 17/30, 191 4. The Berlin Press, in publishing articles based on information from Vienna and Budapest, in which the Serajevo outrage is connected with Serbia, is misleading German public opinion. June 30, Serbian Blue Book No. 6 5 Serbian Blue Book No. 4 Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegraphic.) Berlin, June 17/30, 1914. The hostility of public opinion in Germany towards us is growing, and is being fostered by false reports coming from Vienna and Buda- pest. Such reports are being diligently spread in spite of the contra- dictions issued by some newspapers and news agencies. From Constantinople Serbian Blue Book No. 6 M. M. Georgevitch, Charge d' Affaires at Constantinople, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Constantinople, June 17/30, 1914- I HAD to-day a long conversation with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador here concerning the Serajevo outrage. I expressed the hope that this regrettable event — whatever is said about it in certain diplomatic circles — would not unfavourably influence the relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary which lately had shown con- siderable improvement. He replied that such an eventuality was impossible, and ought not to be contemplated. He was also of opinion that Serbo-Austro- Hungarian relations had much improved lately. He added that the work in that direction ought to be persevered in. He informed me that from his latest conversations with Count Berchtold he understood that the latter was satisfied with the attitude adopted by the Serbian Government, and that he, on his part, sincerely desired friendly relations with Serbia. I have, etc. Wednesday, July i, 19 14 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary Uskub, Serbia Belgium France Germany Great Britain Russia Serbia All Legations abroad London, Vienna Austria-Hungary is informed by her consul in Uskub, Serbia, of "the inhuman joy with which the murder of Serajevo was received in Serbia." EngUsh newspapers discuss the crime as emanating from Serbian revolu- tionists. 6 Official Diplomatic Documents Austria-Hungary : From TJskuhy Serbia AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN JIeD BoOK No. 3 M. Jehlitschka, Consul-General, to Count Berchtold. Uskuh, July 1, 1914- On the 15/28 June the Feast of St. Vitus (Corpus Christi'Day), which on this occasion coincided with the 525th anniversary of the battle of the Amselfeld (1389), was for the first time officially cele- brated as the " Festival of the Liberation " of the Servian nation. For four months a special committee had worked at making this celebration an especially solemn and magnificent demonstration of Servian nationality. The propaganda connected with this at the same time extended to Croatia, Dalmatia and Bosnia, but especially to Hungary ; those who took part in it received free passes on the Servian State railways ; food and lodging at low prices, maintenance by public bodies, etc., were promised. The agitation was carried on with energy, and was with a definite end in view. The visitors to the celebration at Prestina were brought in special trains. The various speeches ran riot in historical reminiscences, which were connected with the scene of the celebration, and dealt under different aspects with the well-known theme of the union of all Servia and the "liberation of our brethren in bondage" beyond the Danube and the Save, even as far as Bosnia and Dalmatia. When, during the course of the evening, the news of the horrible crime of which Serajevo had been the scene was circulated, the feeling which animated the fanatical crowd was, to judge by the numerous expressions of applause reported to me by authorities in w^hom I have absolute confidence, one that I can only characterise as inhuman. In view of this attitude of the population, which was also displayed at Uskub, all attempts of the Servian press to divest Servia of the moral responsibility for a deed which was received by a representa- tive gathering with such unvarnished satisfaction, collapse miserably. Serbia : To All Serbian Legations Abroad Serbian Blue Book No. 8 M. N. Pashitch, Prim.e Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs to all the Royal Serbian Legations abroad. Belgrade, June 18/ July 1, 1914- The Austrian and Hungarian press are blaming Serbia more and more for the Serajevo outrage. Their aim is transparent, viz., to July 1, Serbian Blue Book No. 7 7 destroy that high moral reputation ^ which Serbia now enjoys in Europe, and to take the fullest advantage politically against Serbia of the act of a young and ill-balanced fanatic. But, in Serbia itself, the Serajevo outrage has been most severely condemned in all circles of society, inasmuch as all, official as well as unofficial, immediately recognised that this outrage would be most prejudicial not only to our good neighbourly relations with Austria-Hungary but also to our co-nationalists in that country, as recent occurrences have proved. At a moment when Serbia is doing everything in her power to im- prove her relations with the neighbouring Monarchy, it is absurd to think that Serbia could have directly or indirectly inspired acts of this kind. On the contrary, it was of the greatest interest to Serbia to prevent the perpetration of this outrage. Unfortunately this did not lie within Serbians power, as both assassins are Austrian subjects. Hitherto Serbia has been careful to suppress anarchic elements, and after recent events she will redouble her vigilance, and in the event of such elements existing within her borders will take the severest measures against them. Moreover, Serbia will do every- thing in her power and use all the means at her disposal in order to restrain the feelings of ill-balanced people within her frontiers. But Serbia can on no account permit the Vienna and Hungarian press to mislead European public opinion, and lay the heavy respon- sibility for a crime committed by an Austrian subject at the door of the whole Serbian nation and on Serbia, who can only suffer harm from such acts and can derive no benefit whatever. Please act in the sense of the above views, and use all available channels in order to put an end as soon as possible to the anti-Serbian campaign in the European press. From London Serbian Blue Book No. 7 M. M. S. Boschkovitch, Minister in London, to M, N, Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegraphic.) London, June 18/ July 1, 1914. Basing their information upon reports coming from Austrian sources, nearly all the English newspapers attribute the Serajevo outrage to the work of Serbian revolutionaries. 1 For the reputation of Serbia see the Report on the Balkan Wars by an Inter- national Commission appointed by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and published by the Endowment, Washington, D. C, in the spring of 1914. The murderers of the late king and queen have not yet been brought to justice. 8 Official Diplomatic Documents From Vienna Serbian Blue Book No. 9 M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M, N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, June 18/ July 1, 1914. There were demonstrations last night in front of the Legation. I may say that the police showed considerable energy. Order and peace were maintained. As soon as I obtain positive information that the Serbian flag has been burned/ I will lodge a complaint in the proper quarters. I will report to you the result. Hatred against Serbians and Serbia is being spread among the people, especially by the lower Catholic circles, the Vienna press, and military circles. Please do what is possible to prevent demonstrations taking place in Serbia, and to induce the Belgrade press to be as moderate as possible in tone. The tendency towards us here is still the same. It is expected that the decision as to the attitude to be adopted towards Serbia and the Serbians will be taken after the funeral. Thursday, July 2, 19 14 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES FoBEiON Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary Belgium France Vienna Germany Great Britain Russia Serbia Paris France is informed of great excitement in Vienna, and is quoted as counselling composure in Serbia. France : From Vienna French Yellow Book No. 8 M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, July 2, 1914- The crime of Serajevo arouses the most acute resentment in Austrian military circles, and among all those who are not content to allow Servia to maintain in the Balkans the position which she has acquired. 1 See July 3, Serbian Blue Book No. 11. July 3, Serbian Blue Book No. 11 9 The investigation into the origin of the crime which it is desired to exact from the Government at Belgrade under conditions intoler- able to their dignity would, in case of a refusal, furnish grounds of complaint which would admit of resort to military measures. DUMAINE. Serbia : From Paris Serbian Blue Book No. 10 Dr. M. R. Vesnitch, Minister at Paris, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign A fairs. (Telegraphic.) Paris, June 19/ July 2, 1914- The French Government advise ^ us to maintain an attitude of the greatest possible calm and composure in official circles as well as in pubUc opinion. Friday, July 3, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary Belgium France Germany Great Britain Russia — — Serbia Vienna Austria-Hungary complains officially of the tenor of the Serbian press, while Serbia complains of the Austro-Hungarian press and of a/'flag" incident in Vienna which is not clearly described in the despatch. Serbia : From Vienna Serbian Blue Book No. U M. Yov. M. Yovanomtch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Vienna, June 20/ July 3, 1914. Yesterday being the day on which the remains of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife were brought from Serajevoto Vienna, I gave instructions that the national flag at my residence should be hoisted at half-mast as a sign of mourning. 1 Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 13, July 24. 10 Official Diplomatic Documents Yesterday evening, on this account, protests were made by the concierge, the other tenants, the landlord's agent, and the landlord himself, who demanded the removal of the flag. Explanations proved of no avail, and the assistance of the police authorities was requested. The latter privately asked that the flag should be removed in order to avoid further disorders. The flag was not removed, and accord- ingly noisy demonstrations took place last night in front of the Legation. The conduct of the police was energetic, and nothing happened to the flag or to the building which might constitute an insult. At 2 A.M. the crowd dispersed. To-day's papers, more particularly the popular clerical papers, publish articles under the heading "Provocation by the Serbian Minister," in which the whole incident is falsely described. The flag on the Legation building remained flying the whole time up to the conclusion of the service at the Court Chapel. As soon as this ceremony was concluded, the flag was removed. People from all over the quarter in which I live went to the Prefecture, the Municipality, and the State Council to demand the removal of our flag. The crowd was harangued by Dr. Funder, director in chief of the Catholic Reichspost, Hermengild Wagner, and Leopold Mandl, all of whom are known as the chief instigators of the attacks in the Austrian and German press against Serbia and the Serbians. I have, etc. Serbian Blue Book No. 12 M. Yov. M. Yovanomtch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N, Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Vienna, June 20/ July 3, 1914. In the course of a conversation which I had with the Under- Secretary at the Foreign Office on the subject of the Serajevo outrage. Baron Macchio severely criticised the Belgrade press and the tone of its articles.^ He argued that the Belgrade press was under no control and created die Hetzereien gegen die Monarchic. I told him that the press in Serbia was absolutely free, and that as a result private people as well as the Government very often suffered ; there were, however, no means of proceeding against the press except by going to law. I told him that in the present instance the fault lay with the Austrian and Hungarian press which was controlled by the Austro-Hungarian Government. Was it not true that during the past two years the Austrian and Hungarian press had been attacking Serbia, in such a manner as to offend her most sensitive feelings ? The anniversary of the unfortunate war with Bulgaria had taken place a few days ago. I had myself witnessed the great lack of respect with 1 For quotations from the Serbian Press see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, under date of July 25, 1914. See also French Yellow Book No. 14, under date of July 20, 1914. July 3y Serbian Blue Book No, 12 11 which the Vienna press had written about Serbia and the Serbian army during and after the war, as well as in many other matters. The press in Belgrade was much more moderate. For instance, in the present case, a terrible crime had been committed and telegrams were being sent from Vienna to the whole world accusing the entire Serbian nation and Serbia of being accomplices of the detestable Serajevo outrage. All the Austrian newspapers were writing in that strain. Was it possible to remain indifferent? Even if the crimi- nal was a Serbian, the whole Serbian nation and the Kingdom of Serbia could not be held guilty, nor could they be accused in such a manner. Baron Macchio replied, "Nobody accuses the Kingdom of Serbia nor its Government, nor the whole Serbian nation. We accuse those who encourage the Great Serbian scheme and work for the realisation of its object.'* I told him that it appeared to me that from the first the nationality of the criminal had been deliberately put forward in order to involve Belgrade and to create the impression that the outrage had been organised by Serbia. This had struck me immediately, as I knew that up till now the Serbians of Bosnia had been spoken of as die Bosniaken, hosnische Sprache, die Orthodoxen au^ Bosnien, while now it was being said that the assassin was ein Serbe, but not that he was a Bosnian nor that he was an Austrian subject. . . . "I repeat," said Baron Macchio, "that we do not accuse the Serbian Government and the Serbian nation but the various agi- tators. ..." I begged him to use his influence in order to induce the Vienna press not to make matters more difficult by its accusations in this critical moment, when Serbo-Austrian relations were being put to a severe test. I have, etc. Saturday, July 4» iQiS SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary Paris Belgium France Berlin Germany Great Britain Russia Serbia Paris, Petrograd M. Poincare," President of France, expresses his sympathy with Austria-Hungary and his belief that Serbia would show great willingness in the "judicial investiga- tion and the prosecution of the accomplices" of the Serajevo criminals. In this view he is seconded by Germany, who for this reason is quoted as expecting no fur- ther complications. 12 Official Diplomatic Documents Austria-Hxingary : From Paris AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 4 Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 4, 1914. To-day I communicated to M. Poincare the thanks of the Imperial and Royal Government for their sympathy. In referring to the hostile demonstrations against Servia among us, he mentioned that after the murder of President Carnot, all Ital- ians throughout France were exposed to the worst persecutions on the part of the people. I drew his attention to the fact that that crime had no connection with any anti-French agitation in Italy, while in the present case it must be admitted that for years past there has been an agitation in Servia against the Monarchy fomented by every means, legitimate and illegitimate. In conclusion, M. Poincare expressed his conviction that the Ser- vian Government would meet us with the greatest willingness in the judicial investigation and the prosecution of the accomplices. No State could divest itself of this duty. France : From Berlin French Yellow Book No. 9 M. de Mannemlle, French Charge d^ Affaires at Berlin, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 4, 1914- The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs told me yes- terday, and has to-day repeated to the Russian Ambassador, that he hoped Servia would satisfy the demands which Austria might have to make to her with regard to the investigation and the prose- cution of the accomplices in the crime of Serajevo. He added that he was confident that this would be the case because Servia, if she acted in any other way, would have the opinion of the whole civilised world against her. The German Government do not then appear to share the anxiety which is shown by a part of the German press as to possible tension in the relations between the Governments of Vienna and Belgrade, or at least they do not wish to seem to do so. De Manneville. Jvly 4y Serbian Blue Book No, I4 13 Serbia : From Paris Serbian Blue Book No. 13 Dr. M. R. Vesnitch, Minister at Paris, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Parisj June 21/ July 4, 1914- I HAD a long conversation on Wednesday last on the subject of the Serajevo outrage with M. Viviani, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was somewhat concerned ^ at what had occurred. I made use of this opportunity to describe to him briefly the causes which had led to the outrage, and which were to be found, in the first place, in the irksome system of Government in force in the annexed provinces, and especially in the attitude of the officials, as well as in the whole policy of the Monarchy towards anything ortho- dox. He understood the situation, but at the same time expressed the hope that we should preserve an attitude of calm and dignity in order to avoid giving cause for fresh accusations in Vienna. After the first moment of excitement public opinion here has quieted down to such an extent that the Minister-President himself considered it advisable in the Palais de Bourbon to soften the ex- pressions used in the statement which he had made earlier on the subject in the Senate. I have, etc. From Petrograd Serbian Blue Book No. 14 Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd, to M, Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegraphic.) Petrograd, June 21 /July 4, 1914- The Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that the outrages com- mitted upon Serbs in Bosnia will increase the sympathy of Europe for us. He is of opinion that the accusations made against us in Vienna will not obtain credence. The chief thing is for pubHc opin- ion in Serbia to remain calm. Sunday, July 5, 1914 There are no published despatches. . 1 The British Premier, Mr. Asquith, in speaking of the murder of Serajevo in the House of Commons, had said that it made him "shudder for the fate of humanity." [London Times, July 1, 1914.] 14 Official Diplomatic Documents Monday, July 6, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of , Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary Nish Belgium France Petrograd Germany - Great Britain Russia Serbia Vienna Austria-Hungary is once more informed of the "joy" which the news of the Serajevo murder had created in Serbia. Serbian officials acknowledge the unfortunate tone of the Serbian press, while the Russian foreign minister, M. Sazonof, is troubled by the ** attacks of theAus- trian press against Serbia." Austria-Hungary : From Nish, Serbia AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 5 Herr Hqflehner, Consular Agent, to Count Berchtold. Nish, July 6, 1914. The news of the terrible crime at Serajevo, which had been only too successful, created here a sensation in the fullest sense of the word. There was practically no sign of consternation or indignation; the predominant mood was one of satisfaction and even joy, and this was often quite open without any reserve, and even found expression in a brutal way. This is especially the case with the so-called leading circles — the intellectuals, such as professional politicians, those occu- pied in education, officials, officers and the students. Commercial circles adopted a rather more reserved attitude. All explanations made by official Servian circles or individual higher personalities purporting to give expression to indignation at the crime and condemnation of it, must have the effect of the bitterest irony on anyone who has had an opportunity, during the last few days, of gaining an insight at first hand into the feelings of the educated Servian people. On the day of the crime the undersigned had gone to a coffee garden at about 9 o'clock in the evening without any suspicion of what had happened, and here received from an acquaintance his first information as to the very definite rumour which was being circulated. It was painful in the highest degree to see and hear what a feeling of real delight seizeci the numerous visitors who were present, with what obvious satisfaction the deed was discussed, and what cries of joy, scorn and contempt burst out — even one wha July 6, Serbian Blue Book No. 16 15 has long been accustomed to the expression of poHtical fanaticism which obtains here, must feel the greatest depression at what he ob- served. France : From Petrograd French Yellow Book No. 10 M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. St. Petersburgh, July 6, 1914- In the course of an interview which he had asked for with the Austro-Hungarian Charge d'Affaires, M. Sazonof pointed out in a friendly way the disquieting irritation which the attacks of the Austrian press against Servia are in danger of producing in his country. Count Czernin having given him to understand that the Austro- Hungarian Government would perhaps be compelled to search for the instigators of the crime of Serajevo on Servian territory, M. Sazonof interrupted him : "No country," he said, "has had to suffer more than Russia from crimes prepared on foreign territory. Have we ever claimed to employ in any country whatsoever the procedure with which your papers threaten Servia? Do not embark on such a course." May this warning not be in vain. Paleologue. Serbia: From Vienna Serbian Blue Book No. 15 M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, June 23/ July 6, 1914. The excitement in military and Government circles against Serbia is steadily growing owing to the tone of our press, which is diligently exploited by the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Belgrade. Serbian Blue Book No. 16 M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Vienna, June 23 /July 6, 1914. The principal lines and tendencies to be found in the articles of the Vienna press on the subject of the Serajevo outrage are as fol- lows : — 16 Official Diplomatic Documents As long ago as Sunday afternoon, June 25/28 last, when the Vienna newspapers issued extra editions regarding the outrage upon the Crown Prince, the headlines announced that both the perpetrators were Serbians; moreover, this was done in such a manner as to leave the impression that they were Serbs from Serbia proper. In the later reports, which described the outrage, there was a marked tendency to connect it with Serbia. Two circumstances were especially emphasised and were intended to indicate Belgrade as the place of origin of the outrage, viz. : (1) the visit to Belgrade of both of the perpetrators ; and (2) the origin of the bombs. As the third and last link in this chain of evidence, the Vienna papers began to publish the evidence given by the assassins at the trial. It was characteristic to find that the Hungarian Korrespondenz- bureau, and the Hungarian newspapers, especially the Az Eszt were alone in a position to know all about this "evidence." This evidence mainly tends to show : (1) that it has been estabUshed that the perpetrators, while in Belgrade, associated with the comitadji Mihaylo Ciganovitch; and (2) that the organiser and instigator of the outrage was Major Pribitchevitch. Another tendency became apparent at the same time, viz. : to hold the "Narodna Odbrana"^ responsible for this outrage. Fur- ther, on Friday last, the latest announcement which the Hungarian Korrespondenzbureau made to the newspapers stated : — "The enquiries made up to the present prove conclusively that this outrage is the work of a conspiracy. Besides the two perpetra- tors, a large number of persons have been arrested, mostly young men, who are also, like the perpetrators, proved to have been em- ployed by the Belgrade Narodna Odbrana in order to commit the outrage, and who were supplied in Belgrade with bombs and re- volvers." On the same day, late at night, the Hungarian Korrespondenz- bureau sent the following request to the newspapers : — "We beg the Editor not to publish the report relating to the Serajevo outrage, which appeared in our evening's bulletin." At the same time the Vienna Korrespondenzbureau published the following official statement : — "We learn from authoritative quarters that the enquiries relating to the outrage are being kept absolutely secret.^ All the details, therefore, which have appeared in the public press should be accepted with reserve." Nevertheless, the Budapest newspapers continued to publish 1 The "Narodna Odbrana" is a political society of Serbia. For its aims and con- stitution see below, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 under date of July 25, 1914. * The Austro-Hungarian Government did not know where the threads uncovered by the investigation would lead. Its wish to have them kept secret until it had de- cided on its course corresponds to its action a few months earlier, which is thus de- scribed in the American Review of Reviews, May, 1914, p. 545: "Then one day in March a bomb was exploded in the office of the Greek Catholic Magyar bishop that killed the vicar and two others. Evidence discovered later proved that the plot was of Russian origin, the purpose being — as those implicated admitted — to create trouble between Roumania and Austria-Hungary which in its turn would embarrass the Triple Alliance. To prevent more serious complications, the Hungarian Govern- ment decided not to probe too deeply in the affair." July 7, Serbian Blue Book No, 17 17 alleged reports on the enquiry. In the last " report " of the Budapest newspaper A Nap, which was reprinted in yesterday's Vienna papers, the tendency to lay the responsibility for the outrage on the Narodna Odbrana is still further emphasised. According to this report the accused Gabrinovitch had stated that General Yankovitch is the chief instigator of the outrage. I have, etc. Tuesday, July 7, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary Belgium France Germany Great Britain Russia Serbia Vienna Austria-Hungary is reported by the Serbian Minister in Vienna to be much excited. Serbia : From Vienna Serbian Blue Book No. 17 M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Vienna, June 24/ July 7, W14- In influential circles the excitement continues undiminished. Though the Emperor has addressed a letter to the Prime Ministers of Austria and Hungary respectively, and to the Minister of Finance, Herr Bilinski, in which an appeal is made for calmness, it is impossible to determine what attitude the Government will adopt towards us. For them one thing is obvious ; whether it is proved or not that the outrage has been inspired and prepared at Belgrade, they must sooner or later solve the question of the so-called Great Serbian agitation within the Habsburg Monarchy. In what manner they will do this and what means they will employ to that end has not as yet been decided ; this is being discussed especially in high Catholic and mili- tary circles. The ultimate decision will be taken oiily after it has been definitely ascertained what the enquiry at Serajevo has brought to light. The decision will be in accordance with the findings of the enquiry. In this respect, Austria-Hungary has to choose one of the following courses : either to regard the Serajevo outrage as a national mis- fortune and a crime which ought to be dealt with in accordance with the evidence obtained, in which case Serbia's cooperation in the work 18 , Official Diplomatic Documents will be requested in order to prevent the perpetrators escaping the extreme penalty; or, to treat the Serajevo outrage as a Pan- Serbian, South-Slav and Pan-Slav conspiracy with every manifes- tation of the hatred, hitherto repressed, against Slavdom. There are many indications that influential circles are being urged to adopt the latter course : it is therefore advisable to be ready for defence. Should the former and wiser course be adopted, we should do all we can to meet Austrian wishes in this respect. I have, etc. Wednesday, July 8, 1914 There are no published despatches. Thursday, July 9, 19 14 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary Belgium France Germany Great Britain Russia Serbia All Serbian Legations Serbia : To All Serbian Legations A broad Serbian Blue Book No. 18 M, N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs , to all the Serbian Legations abroad. (Telegraphic.) Belgrade, June 26/ July 9, 1914. The Crown Prince Alexander is receiving threatening letters from Austria-Hungary nearly every day. Make use of this in course of conversation with your colleagues and journalists. Friday, July 10, 19 14 There are no published despatches. July 11, French Yellow Book No, 11 19 Saturday, July ii, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches fbom Austria-Hungary Belgium France Budapest Germany Great Britain Russia Serbia France is informed that the Austro-Hungarian Government and the press are for peace, but that "the general public here (Budapest) believes in war and fears it." France : From Budapest French Yellow Book No. 11 M. d^Apchier le Maugin, French Consul-General at Budapest, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Budapest, July 11, 1914. Questioned in the Chamber on the state of the Austro-Serbian question M. Tisza explained that before everything else it was necessary to wait for the result of the judicial inquiry, as to w^hich he refused at the moment to make any disclosure whatsoever. And the Chamber has given its full approval to this. He also showed himself equally discreet as to the decisions taken at the meeting of Ministers at Vienna, and did not give any indication whether the project of a demarche at Belgrade, with which all the papers of both hemispheres are full, would be followed up. The Chamber assented without hesitation. With regard to this demarche it seems that the word has been given to minimise its significance ; the anger of the Hungarians has, as it were, evaporated through the virulent articles of the press, which is now unanimous in advising against this step, which might be dangerous. The semi-official press especially would desire that for the word "demarche,'' with its appearance of a threat, there should be substituted the expression "pourparlers,'' which appears to them more friendly and more courteous. Thus, officially, for the moment all is for peace. All is for peace, in the press. But the general public here believes in war and fears it. Moreover, persons in whom I have every rea- son to have confidence have assured me that they knew that every day cannon and ammunition were being sent in large quantities 2Q- Official Diplomatic Documents towards the frontier. Whether true or not this rumour has been brought to me from various quarters with details which agree with one another ; at least it indicates what are the thoughts with which people are generally occupied. The Government, whether it is sincerely desirous of peace, or whether it is preparing a coup, is now doing all that it can to allay these anxieties. This is why the tone of the Government newspapers has been lowered, first by one note, then by two, so that it is at the present moment almost optimistic. But they had themselves spread the alarm as it suited them (a plaisir). Their optimism to order is in fact without an echo ; the nervousness of the Bourse, a barometer which cannot be neglected, is a sure proof of this; without exception stocks have fallen to an unaccountably low level ; the Hungarian 4 per cents were quoted yesterday at 79.95, a rate which has never been quoted since they were first issued. D'Apchier Le Maugin. Sunday, July 12, 1914 There are no published despatches. Monday, July 13, 1914 There are no published despatches. Tuesday, July 14, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES FoBEiGN Office of Sent Despatches to •Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary Belgium France Germany Great Britain Russia Serbia All Serbian Legations Berlin, Vienna The tone of the Serbian press and in turn that of the Aiistro-Hungarian press continue threatening. Serbia : From Berlin Serbian Blue Book No. 19 Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July I/I4, 1914. The Secretary of State has told me that he could not understand the provocative attitude of the Serbian press and the attacks made July 14, Serbian Blue Book No, 20 21 by it against Austria-Hungary, who, as a Great Power, could not tolerate such proceedings. From Vienna Serbian Blue Book No. 22 M. Yov. M. Yovanomtch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Vienna, July I/I4, 1914. Once more public opinion has been excited against us by the Literary Bureau of the Austro-Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. With the exception of the Zeit and the Arheiter Zeitung, all the Austro-Hungarian newspapers have obtained from that Bureau the material and tone of their articles on the subject of the Serajevo outrage. You have yourself seen what kind of material and tone this is. I am reliably informed that official German circles here are espe- cially ill-disposed towards us. These circles have had some influence upon the writings of the Vienna press, especially upon those of the Neue Freie Presse. This latter paper is still anti-Serbian a Voutrance. The Neue Freie Presse, which is widely read and has many friends in high financial circles, and which — if so desired — writes in accordance with instructions from the Vienna Press Bureau, briefly summarises the matter as follows : " We have to settle matters with Serbia by war ; it is evident that peaceable means are of no avail. And if it must come to war sooner or later, then it is better to see the matter through now." The Bourse is very depressed. There has not been such a fall in prices in Vi*enna for a long time. Some securities have fallen 45 kronen. To All Serbian Legations Serbian Blue Book No. 20 M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad. (Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July I/I4, 1914. (1) The Austrian Korrespondenzbureau is showing a marked tendency to excite public opinion in Europe. This Bureau interprets neither correctly nor sincerely the tone adopted by the Belgrade press. It selects the strongest expressions from such articles as contain replies to insults, threats and false news designed to mislead public opinion, and submits them to the Austro-Hungarian public. (2) The Korrespondenzbureau quotes especially extracts from articles from those Serbian newspapers which are not the organs of any party or corporation. 22 Official Diplomatic Documents (3) As far back as the annexation crisis, Austria-Hungary pro- hibited the entry into the country of all Serbian political and other newspapers, and thus our Press would not be in a position to excite public opinion in Austria-Hungary and Europe if the Korrespondenz- bureau did not lay stress on and spread broadcast the items of news w^hich it gathers from various Serbian papers, in every instance -exaggerating them. Six days ago the entry into Austria-Hungary of the Odyek, the organ of the Independent Radical Party, w^as pro- hibited ; thus all our papers are now prevented from entering Austria- Hungary. (4) With us the press is absolutely free. Newspapers can be confiscated only for lese-majeste or for revolutionary propaganda; in all other cases confiscation is illegal. There is no censorship of newspapers. In these circumstances, you should point out for their informa- tion, where necessary, that we have no other constitutional or legal means at our disposal for the control of our press. Nevertheless, w^hen the articles in our papers are compared with those of Austria- Hungary, it is evident that the Austro-Hungarian papers originate the controversy, while ours merely reply. Please also emphasize the fact that public opinion in Serbia is relatively calm, and that there is no desire on our part to provoke and insult Austria-Hungary. No one in Europe would know what our newspapers were writing if the Korrespondenzbureau did not publish these items of news with the intention of doing as much harm as possible to Serbia. Serbian Blue Book No. 21 M. N. Pashitchy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad. (Telegraphic.) Belgrade , July 1/H, 1914- During the past few days the Austro-Hungarian newspapers have been spreading reports to the effect that there have been demon- strations at Belgrade against the Austro-Hungarian Legation, that some Hungarian journalists were killed ; that Austro-Hungarian subjects in Belgrade were maltreated and are now panic-stricken; that at the funeral of the late M. Hartwig Serbian students made a demonstration against the Austro-Hungarian Minister, etc. All these reports are absolutely untrue and imaginary. Complete calm prevails in Belgrade and there were no demonstrations of any kind this year, nor has there been any question of disorder. Not only do the Austro-Hungarian Minister and his staff w^alk about the town without being molested in any way, but no Austro-Hungarian subject has been in any way insulted, either by word or deed, as is reported by the Viennese papers ; still less was any attack made upon the house of any Austro-Hungarian subject or were any of their windows broken. Not a single Austro-Hungarian subject has had July 15, French Yellow Book No. 12 23 the slightest cause for any complaint. All these false reports are being purposely spread in order to arouse and excite Austro-Hungarian public opinion against Serbia. The whole of Belgrade and the entire diplomatic body were pres- ent to-day at the funeral of the late M. Hartwig ; there was not the slightest sign of resentment shown by anybody. During the whole ceremony exemplary order was maintained; so much so that for- eigners were impressed with the good behaviour of the crowd, which was such as does not always prevail on similar occasions even in their own countries. Be good enough to communicate the above to the Government to which you are accredited and to the press. Wednesday, July 15, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary Belgium France Vienna Germany Great Britain Russia Serbia Vienna France is informed of some bellicose articles in German and Austro-Hungarian papers. The Austro-Hungarian intentions toward Serbia are quoted by the Serbian Minister as shrouded in mystery. France : From Vienna French Yellow Book No. 12 M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, July 15, 1914- Certain organs of the Vienna Press, discussing the military organi- sation of France and of Russia, represent these two countries as incapable of holding their own in European affairs ; this would ensure to the Dual monarchy, supported by Germany, appreciable facilities for subjecting Servia to any treatment which it might be pleased to impose. The Militdrische Rundschau frankly admits it. "The moment is still favourable to us. If we do not decide for war, that war in which we shall have to engage at the latest in two or three years will be begun in far less propitious circumstances. At this moment the initiative rests with us : Russia is not ready, moral fac- 24 Official Diplomatic Documents tors and right are on our side, as well as might. Since we shall have to accept the contest some day/ let us provoke it at once. Our prestige, our position as a Great Power, our honour, are in question ; and yet more, for it would seem that our very existence is concerned — to be or not to be — which is in truth the great matter to-day." Surpassing itself, the Neue Freie Presse of to-day reproaches Count Tisza for the moderation of his second speech, in which he said, "Our relations with Servia require, however, to be made clear." These words rouse its indignation. For it, tranquillity and security can result only from a war to the knife against Pan-Servism, and it is in the name of humanity that it demands the extermination of the cursed Servian race. Dumaine. Serbia : From Vienna Serbian Blue Book No. 23 M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, . Vienna, July 2/15, 1914. The most important question for us is, what, if any, are the inten- tions of the Austro-Hungarian Government as regards the Serajevo outrage. Until now I have been unable to find this out, and my other colleagues are in a similar position. The word has now been passed round here not to tell anybody anything. The evening before last the Ministers of the Dual Monarchy held a meeting. It has not been possible to learn anything about the object and the result of this meeting. The communique issued on the subject was brief and obscure. It appears that the consequences of the Serajevo outrage were discussed at length, but that nothing was decided. It is not clear whether the Chief of Staff and the Naval Commander-in-Chief were present, as was rumoured. After this meeting Count Berchtold travelled to Ischl to report to the Em- peror, who, after the funeral of Franz Ferdinand, had returned there to recover his health. In the Hungarian Parliament Count Tisza has replied to the interpellations of the opposition concerning the Serajevo incident; you are acquainted with his statements. His speech was not clear, and I believe it was intentionally obscure. Some people saw in it signs of an intention quietly to await the de- velopment of events and of calmness in the attitude of the Austro- Hungarian Government, while others saw in it hidden intentions for ^ The reasons underlying this statement are thus set forth in the American Review of Reviews, July, 1914, p. 30: "It is believed that Russia is intending to provoke a Near Eastern Crisis. Reports are also rife that a secret Naval Convention has been concluded between England and Russia with the object of enforcing the demands of the Triple Entente against Germany." And these demands of the Triple Entente, so far as Russia is concerned, are set forth in the same copy of American Review of Reviews in an interview with the Russian statesman, Professor Mitronov, as follows : "As far as Russia is concerned extension into the Balkans is a political necessity and nothing short of the possession of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles will end the in- tolerable faituation." July 15, Serbian Blue Book No. 25 25 (I should say) an action as yet undecided. It was noted that there was no occasion for haste until the results of the magisterial enquiry were announced. Some time has now elapsed ; the matter has been spoken of, discussed, written about and distorted ; then came the death of Hartwig and the alarm of Baron Giesl. In connection with this again came the interpellations addressed to Count Tisza in the Hungarian Parliament; you have read his reply. Many hold the opinion here that this second speech is much more restrained than the first, and that this is to be attributed to an order from the Em- peror. (The Bourse has now recovered ; both the War Minister and the Chief of Staff have gone on leave.) I am loath to express an opinion. In the above-mentioned speech it is to be noted that the possibility of war is not excluded, in the event of the demands of Austria-Hungary in regard to the Serajevo outrage not being com- plied with. One thing is certain : Austria-Hungary will take diplomatic steps at Belgrade as soon as the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo is com- pleted and the matter submitted to the Court. I have, etc. Serbian Blue Book No. 24 M. Ym. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sir, Vienna, July 2/15, 1914- It is thought here that the magisterial enquiries and investigations have not produced sufficient evidence to justify bringing an official accusation against Serbia, but it is believed that the latter will be accused of tolerating within her borders certain revolutionary ele- ments. Diplomatic circles here criticise and condemn the mode of procedure of the Austro-Hungarian Government, especially the atti- tude throughout of the Korrespondenzbureau and the Vienna press. There are many who consider our attitude to be correct and in accordance with the dignity of a nation. They find fault only with the views expressed in some of our newspapers, though they all admit that it is provoked by the Vienna press. In spite of the fact that it appears that the German Foreign Office does not approve of the anti-Serbian policy of Vienna, the German Embassy here is at this very moment encouraging such a policy. I have, etc. Serbian Blue Book No. 25 M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, . Vienna, July 2/15, 1914. What steps will be taken ? In what form ? What demands will Austria-Hungary make of Serbia ? I do not believe that to-day even 26 Official Diplomatic Documents the Ballplatz ^ itself could answer these questions clearly and pre- cisely. I am of opinion that its plans are now being laid, and that again Count Forgach is the moving spirit. In an earlier report I mentioned that Austria-Hungary has to choose between two courses : either to make the Serajevo outrage a domestic question, inviting us to assist her to discover and punish the culprits ; or to make it a case against the Serbians and Serbia, and even against the Jugo-Slavs. After taking into consideration all that is being prepared and done, it appears to me that Austria- Hungary will choose the latter course. Austria-Hungary will do this in the belief that she will have the approval of Europe. Why should she not profit by humiliating us, and, to a certain extent, justify the Friedjung and Agram trials? Besides, Austria-Hungary desires in this manner to justify in the eyes of her own people and of Europe the sharp and reactionary measures which she contemplates under- taking internally in order to suppress the Great Serbian propaganda and the Jugo-Slav idea. Finally, for the sake of her prestige,^ Austria- Hungary must take some action in the belief that she will thus raise her prestige internally as well as externally. . . .^ Austria-Hungary will, I think, draw up in the form of a memoran- dum an accusation against Serbia. In that accusation will be set forth all the evidence that has been collected against us since April, 1909, until to-day ; and I believe that this accusation will be fairly lengthy. Austria-Hungary will communicate this accusation to the Cabinets of the European Powers with the remark that the facts con- tained therein give her the right to take diplomatic steps at Belgrade, and to demand that Serbia should in the future fulfill all the obliga- tions of a loyal neighbour. At the same time Austria-Hungary will also hand us a note containing her demands, which we shall be re- quested to accept unconditionally.'^ I have, etc. Thursday, July i6, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sknt Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary Belgium France Germany Great Britain Russia Serbia Berlin 1 The Austrian Foreign OflBce is situated on the Ballplatz. ' Cf. British Blue Book No. 38, despatch from Rome, under date of July 23, 1914. ' The omissions indicated by the dots are those of the official British translation. * This was the exact course taken by Austria a few days later. July 17, Serbian Blue Book No. 27 27 Serbia : From Berlin Serbian Blue Book No. 26 Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 3/16, 1914. The Secretary of State has informed me that the reports of the German Minister at Belgrade point to the existence of a Great Ser- bian propaganda, which should be energetically suppressed by the Government in the interest of good relations with Austria-Hungary. Friday, July 17, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary Belgium • • France Germany Great Britain Russia ■ • Serbia London, Rome Italy is said to have warned Austria-Hungary, and the EngHsh Press is reported in Serbia as being unfavorably influenced by cuttings from the Serbian Press sup- plied to it by Austria-Hungary. Serbia : From London Serbian Blue Book No. 27 M. M. S. Boschkovitch, Minister at London, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegraphic.) London, July 4/17, 1914. The Austrian Embassy is making very great efforts to win over the English press against us, and to induce it to favour the idea that Austria must give a good lesson to Serbia. The Embassy is sub- mitting to the news editors cuttings from our newspapers as a proof of the views expressed in our press. The situation may become more acute during the next few weeks. No reliance should be placed in the ostensibly peaceable statements of Austro-Hungarian official circles, as the way is being prepared for diplomatic pressure upon Serbia, which may develop into an armed attack. It is probable that as soon as Austria-Hungary has taken action at Belgrade she will change her attitude and will seek to humiliate Serbia. 28 Official Diplomatic Documents From Rome Serbian Blue Book No. 28 M, Ljub Michailovitchy Minister at Rome, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs (Telegraphic.) Rome, July 4/17, 191 4. I ILWE obtained reliable information to the effect that the Marquis di San Giuliano has stated to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador that any step undertaken by Austria against Serbia which failed to take into account international considerations would meet with the dis- approval of public opinion in Italy, and that the Italian Government desire to see the complete independence of Serbia maintained. Saturday, July 18, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary Belgium France Germany Great Britain Russia Serbia Petrograd Serbia : From Petrograd Serbian Blue Book No. 29 Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd, to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs (Telegraphic.) Petrograd, July 5/18, 1914. I HAVE spoken to the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the provocative attitude of the Korrespondenzbureau and the Vienna press. M. Sazonof told me a few days ago that he wondered why the Austrian Government were doing nothing to put a stop to the futile agitation on the part of the press in Vienna which, after all, frightened nobody, and was only doing harm to Austria herself. July 19, French Yellow Book No. I4 29 Sunday, July 19, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches fbom Austria-Hungary Belgium France Vienna Germany Great Britain Russia Serbia All representatives France is placed in possession, through secret sources, of the terms of the forth- coming Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia, and learns the reason why it will con- tain a time limit. Serbia endeavors to justify herself at the various foreign offices of Europe. France : From Vienna French Yeulow Book No. 13 M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs Vienna, July 19, 191 4. The Chancellor of the Consulate, who has sent me his half-yearly report, in which he sums up the various economic facts which have been the subject of his study since the beginning of the year, has added a section containing political information emanating from a trustworthy source. I asked him briefly to sima up the information which he has ob- tained regarding the impending presentation of the Austrian note to Servia, which the papers have for some days been persistently announcing. You will find the text of this memorandum interesting on account of the accurate information which it contains. Dumaine. French Yellow Book No. 14 Memorandum {Extract from a Consular Report on the Economic and Political Situa- tion in Austria) Vienna, July 20, 1914} From information furnished by a person specially well informed as to official news, it appears that the French Government would be 1 This memorandum is dated July 20, 1^14. Since it is enclosed in a letter of July 19, 1914, it cannot possibly be later than the letter. From the letter itself it would 30 Official Diplomatic Documents wrong to have confidence in disseminators of optimism; much will be demanded of Servia ; she will be required to dissolve several propagandist societies, she will be summoned to repress nationalism, to guard the frontier in cooperation with Austrian officials, to keep strict control over anti- Austrian tendencies in the schools ; and it is a very difficult matter for a Government to consent to become in this way a policeman for a foreign Government. They foresee the subterfuges by which Servia will doubtless wish to avoid giving a clear and direct reply ; that is why a short interval will perhaps ^ be fixed for her to declare whether she accepts or not. The tenor of the note and its imperious tone almost certainly ensure that Bel- grade will refuse. Then military operations will begin. There is here, and equally at Berlin, a party which accepts the idea of a conflict of widespread dimensions, in other words, a con- flagration. The leading idea is probably that it would be necessary to start before Russia has completed the great improvements of her army and railways, and before France has brought her military organisation to perfection. But on this point there is no unanimity in high circles ; Count Berchtold and the diplomatists desire at the most localised operations against Servia. But everything must be regarded as possible. A singular fact is pointed out : generally the official telegraph agency, in its summaries and reviews of the foreign press, pays attention only to semi-official newspapers and to the most important organs ; it omits all quotation from and all mention of the others. This is a rule and a tradition. Now, for the last ten days, the official agency has furnished daily to the Austro-Hungarian press a complete review of the whole Servian press, giving a promi- nent place to the least known, the smallest, and most insignificant papers, which, just on account of their obscurity, employ language freer, bolder, more aggressive, and often insulting. This work of the official agency has obviously for its aim the excitement of public feeling and the creation of opinion favourable to war. The fact is significant. seem that the report would have to be dated not later than on the date previous to its submission to the ambassador, and that is July 18, 1914, Whether the student accepts this date, or July 19, 1914, the noteworthy fact is established that France had accurate information — and the ambassador knew it to be so (cf . last line of his letter) — of the intended action of Austria-Hungary, and knew that there would be a time limit attached to Austria's demands. 1 The word "perhaps" does not occur in the Times edition of the French Yellow Book, but has been added to the text in the Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War printed under the authority of His Majesty's Stationery Office. There is no explanation in the Official British Version why the word "perhaps" has been added. The text of the French Yellow Book supplied to the editor by the French Embassy in Washington in October, 1915, contains the word "peut-^tre." July 19, Serbian Blue Book No. 30 31 Serbia : To All Serbian Missions Abroad Serbian Blue Book No. 30 M. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all Serbian Missions abroad (Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 6/19, 1914. Immediately after the Serajevo outrage the Austro-Hungarian press began to accuse Serbia of that detestable crime, which, in the opinion of that press, was the direct result of the Great Serbian idea. The Austrian press further contended that that idea was spread and propagated by various associations, such as the "Narodna Odbrana," ''Kolo Srpskich Sestara," etc., which were tolerated by the Serbian Government. On learning of the murder, the Serbian Royal Family, as well as the Serbian Government, sent messages of condolence,^ and at the same time expressed severe condemnation of and horror at the crime that had been committed. All festivities which had been fixed to take place on that day in Belgrade were immediately cancelled. Nevertheless, the press of the neighbouring Monarchy continued to hold Serbia responsible for the Serajevo outrage. Moreover, the Austro-Hungarian press began to spread in connection with it various false reports, designed to mislead public opinion, which provoked the Belgrade press to reply in self-defence, and sometimes to active hos- tility in a spirit of embitterment aroused by the misrepresentation of what had occurred. Seeing that the Austro-Hungarian press was intentionally luring the Belgrade press into an awkward and delicate controversy, the Serbian Government hastened to warn the press in Belgrade, and to recommend it to remain calm and to confine itself to simple denials and to the suppression of false and misleading re- ports. The action of the Serbian Government was ineffectual in the case of some of the less important papers, more especially in view of the fact that newly invented stories were daily spread abroad with the object of serving political ends not only against Serbia but also against the Serbs in Austria-Hungary. The Serbian Govern- ment were unable to avert these polemics between the Serbian and the Austrian press, seeing that Serbian law, and the provisions of the constitution itself, guarantee the complete independence of the press and prohibit all measures of control and the seizure of newspapers. These polemics were further aggravated by the fact that the Vienna and Budapesth journals selected passages from such of the Serbian newspapers as have practically no influence upon public opinion, strengthened still further their tone, and, having thus manipulated them, passed them on to the foreign press with the obvious intention of exciting public opinion in other European countries and of repre- senting Serbia as being guilty. Those who have followed the course of these polemics will know ^ These messages are not given in the published documents. Cf . also British Blue Book No. 121, July 24 and note 1. 32 Official Diplomatic Documents that the Belgrade newspapers merely acted in self-defence, confining their activities to denials and to the refutation of falsehoods designed to mislead public opinion, at the same time attempting to convince foreign Governments (which, being occupied with other and more serious affairs, had no time to go into the matter themselves) of the intention of the Austro-Hungarian press to excite public opinion in its own country and abroad. The Serbian Government at once expressed their readiness to hand over to justice any of their subjects who might be proved to have played a part in the Serajevo outrage. The Serbian Government further stated that they had prepared a more drastic law against the misuse of explosives. The draft of a new law in that sense had already been laid before the State Council, but could not be submitted to the Skupshtina, as the latter was not sitting at the time. Finally, the Serbian Government stated that they were ready, as heretofore, to observe all those good neighbourly obligations to which Serbia was bound by her position as a European State. During the whole of this period, from the date of the perpetration of the outrage until to-day, not once did the Austro-Hungarian Gov- ernment apply to the Serbian Government for their assistance in the matter.^ They did not demand that any of the accomplices should be subjected to an enquiry, or that they should be handed over to trial. In one instance only did the Austrian Government ask for information as to the whereabouts of certain students who had been expelled from the Pakratz Teachers' Seminary, and had crossed over to Serbia to continue their studies. All available information on this point was supplied. The campaign against Serbia, however, was unremittingly pursued in the Austrian press, and public opinion was excited against her in Austria as well as in the rest of Europe. Matters went so far that the more prominent leaders of political parties in Austria-Hungary began to ask questions in Parliament on the subject of the outrage, to which the Hungarian Prime Minister replied. It is evident from the discussions in this connection that Austria is contemplating some action, but it is not clear in what sense. It is not stated whether the measures which are to be taken — more especially military measures — will depend upon the reply and the conciliatory attitude of the Serbian Government. But an armed conflict is being hinted at in the event of the Serbian Government being unable to give a cate- gorically satisfactory reply. On the sudden death of the Russian Minister, M. de Hartwig, at the residence of the Austrian Minister, the polemics in the news- papers became still more acute ; nevertheless this sad event did not lead to any disorders even during the funeral of M. Hartwig. On the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian Legation was so perturbed by certain false reports that Austrian subjects began to conceal them- selves, some of them taking refuge in the Semlin and Belgrade hotels, 1 This statement seems to be at variance with Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 2, under date of June 30, 1914. July 19, Serbian Blue Book No, 30 33 and others in the Legation itself. At 5 p.m. on the day of the King's birthday, which passed in the most orderly manner, I was informed by the Austrian Minister, through the Viee-Consul, M. Pomgraz, that preparations were being made for an attack that night on the Austrian Legation and on Austro-Hungarian* subjects in Belgrade. He begged me to take the necessary steps for the protection of Austro- Hungarian subjects and of the Legation, stating at the same time that he held Serbia responsible for all that might occur. I replied that the responsible Serbian Government were not aware of any preparations of this kind being made, but that I would in any case at once inform the Minister of the Interior, and beg him at the same time to take such measures as might be necessary. The next day showed that the Austrian Legation had been misled by false rumours, for neither any attack nor any preparations for attack were made. Notwithstanding this, the Austro-Hungarian press took advantage of this incident to prove how excited public opinion was in Serbia and to what lengths she was ready to go. It went even further and tried to allege that something really had been intended to happen, since M. Pashitch himself had stated that he had heard of such rumours. All this indicates clearly the intention to excite public opinion against Serbia w^henever occasion arises. When all that has been said in the Hungarian Parliament is taken into consideration, there is reason for apprehension that some step is being prepared against us which may produce a disagreeable effect upon the relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary. There is still further ground for such apprehension, as it is abundantly evi- dent that the enquiry which is being made is not to be limited to the perpetrators and their possible accomplices in the crime, but is most probably to be extended to Serbia and the Great Serbian idea. By their attitude and the measures they have taken, the Serbian Government have irrefutably proved that they are working to restrain excitable elements, and in the interests of peace and the maintenance of good relations with all their neighbours. The Government have given their particular attention to the improvement and strengthen- ing of their relations with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which had lately become strained as a result of the Balkan wars and of the questions which arose therefrom. With that object in view, the Ser- bian Government proceeded to settle the question of the Oriental Railway, the new railway connections, and the transit through Serbia of Austro-Hungarian goods for Constantinople, Sofia, Salonica, and Athens. The Serbian Government consider that their vital interests require that peace and tranquillity in the Balkans should be firmly and last- ingly established. And for this very reason they fear lest the excited state of public opinion in Austria-Hungary may induce the Austro- Hungarian Government to make a demarche which may humiliate the dignity of Serbia as a State, and to put forward demands which €ould not be accepted. I have the honour therefore to request you to impress upon the 34 Official Diplomatic Documents Government to which you are accredited our desire to maintain friendly relations with Austria-Hungary, and to suppress every at- tempt directed against the peace and public safety of the neighbour- ing Monarchy. We will likewise meet the wishes of the Austro- Hungarian Empire in the event of our being requested to subject to trial in our independent Courts any accomplices in the outrage who are in Serbia — should such, of course, exist. But we can never comply with demands which may be directed against the dignity of Serbia, and which would be inacceptable to any country which respects and maintains its independence. Actuated by the desire that good neighbourly relations may be firmly established and maintained, we beg the friendly Governments to take note of these declarations and to act in a conciliatory sense should occasion or necessity arise. Monday, July 20, 1 914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS FoBEiQN Office op Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary Belgium France Germany Great Britain Berlin Russia Serbia Vienna Great Britain enters the diplomatic exchange of views on this day, according to the British Blue Book. From the Introductory Narrative to the British Blue Book, Edition of September 28, it appears that Sir Edward Grey had kept in touch from the first with the events arising out of the Serajevo murder. (For the Introductory Narrative see pp. 561 to 570.) Great Britain : Sent to Berlin British Blue Book No. 1 Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin Sir, Foreign Office, July 20, 1914. I ASKED the German Ambassador to-day if he had any news of what was going on in Vienna with regard to Servia. He said that he had not, but Austria was certainly going to take some step, and he regarded the situation as very uncomfortable. I said that I had not heard anything recently,^ except that Count 1 This seems to be at variance with Chapter Two of Sir Edward Grey's Introductory Narrative to the British Blue Book Edition, of Sept. 28, 1914. See p. 562. Consider- ing, moreover, the close relations existing between the French and the British Foreign Offices it seems likely that Sir Edward Grey may have had cognisance of the information contained in the Yellow Book, Nos. 13 and 14, under date of July 19, and of the infor- mation contained in the despatches published by other Foreign Offices under dates of July 20y Serbian Blue Book No. 31 35 Berchtold/ in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had deprecated the suggestion that the situation was grave, but had said that it should be cleared up. The German Ambassador said that it would be a very desirable thing if Russia could act as a mediator with regard to Servia. I said that I assumed that the Austrian Government would not do anything until they had first disclosed to the public their case against Servia, founded presumably upon what they had discovered at the trial. The Ambassador said that he certainly assumed that they would act upon some case that would be known. I said that this would make it easier for others, such as Russia, to counsel moderation in Belgrade. In fact, the more Austria could keep her demand within reasonable limits, and the stronger the justi- fication she could produce for making any demand, the more chance there would be of smoothing things over. I hated the idea of a war between any of the Great Powers, and that any of them should be dragged into a war by Servia would be detestable. The Ambassador agreed wholeheartedly in this sentiment. I am, etc. E. Grey. Serbia : From Vienna Serbian Blue Book No. 31 M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitchy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs Sir, Vienna, July 7/20, 1914. It is very difficult, indeed almost impossible, to ascertain here any- thing positive as to the real intentions of Austria-Hungary. The word has been passed round to maintain absolute secrecy about everything that is being done. Judging by the articles in our news- papers, Belgrade is taking an optimistic view of the questions pend- ing with Austria-Hungary. There is, however, no room for optimism. There is no doubt that Austria-Hungary is making preparations of a serious character. What is chiefly to be feared, and is highly prob- able, is, that Austria is preparing for war against Serbia. The general conviction that prevails here is that it would be nothing short of suicide for Austria-Hungary once more to fail to take advantage of the opportunity to act against Serbia. It is believed that the two opportunities previously missed — the annexation of Bosnia ^ and the Balkan war ^ — have been extremely injurious to Austria-Hun- gary. In addition, the conviction is steadily growing that Serbia, after her two wars, is completely exhausted, and that a war against June 28, to July 19, 1914. Whether Serbian Blue Book No. 30, July 19, had been deliv- ered to Sir E. Grey when he wrote the above despatch is not sure. 1 Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 2 1908. 3 1913. 36 Official Diplomatic Documents Serbia would in fact merely mean a military expedition to be con- cluded by a speedy occupation. It is also believed that such a war could be brought to an end before Europe could intervene. The seriousness of Austrian intentions is further emphasised by the military preparations which are being made, especially in the vicinity of the Serbian frontier. I have, etc. Tuesday, July 21, 1814 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary Belgrade Belgium France London, etc : Berlin Germany Great Britain Russia , Serbia Serbia declares her readiness in Berlin to accept the forthcoming Austro- Hungarian demands, provided that Austria-Hungary asks ''only for judicial cooperation." G'erman?/ declares that she is in complete ignorance of the ** contents'* of the forthcoming note. Austria-Hungary receives another report of the hostile attitude of the Serbian people, who are represented as rejoicing over the Serajevo murder. Austria : From Belgrade AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 6 Freiherr von Giesl to Count Berchtold Belgrade, July 21, 1914. After the lamentable crime of June 28th, I have now been back at my post for some time, and I am able to give some judgment as to the tone which prevails here. After the annexation crisis ^ the relations between the Monarchy and Servia were poisoned on the Servian side by national chauvinism, animosity and an effective propaganda of Great-Servian aspirations carried on in that part of our territory where there is a Servian popu- lation; since the last two Balkan Wars, the success of Servia has increased this chauvinism to a paroxysm, the expression of which in some cases bears the mark of insanity. I may be excused from bringing proof and evidence of this ; they can be had easily everywhere among all parties, in political circles as well as among the lower classes. I put it forward as a well-known axiom that the policy of Servia is built up on the separation of the territories inhabited by Southern Slavs, and as a corollary to this on 1 The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in 1908. July 21 y Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 6 37 the abolition of the Monarchy as a Great Power; this is its only' object. No one who has taken the trouble to move and take part in political circles here for a week can be blind to this truth. The hatred against the Monarchy has been further intensified as a result of the latest events which influence political opinion here; among them I count the crime of Serajevo, the death of Hartwig and the electoral campaign. The crime at Serajevo has aroused among the Servians an expec- tation that in the immediate future the'Hapsburg States will fall to pieces ; it was this on which they had set their hopes even before ; there has been dangled before their eyes the cession of those terri- tories in the Monarchy which are inhabited by the Southern Slavs, a revolution in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the unreliability of the Slav regiments — this is regarded as ascertained fact and had brought system and apparent justification into their nationalist madness. Austria-Hungary, hated as she is, now appears to the Servians as powerless, and as scarcely worthy of waging war with; contempt is mingled with hatred ; she is ripe for destruction, and she is to fall without trouble into the lap of the Great-Servian Empire, which is to be realized in the immediate future. Newspapers, not among the most extreme, discuss the powerless- ness and decrepitude of the neighbouring Monarchy in daily articles, and insult its officials without reserve and without fear of reprimand. They do not even stop short of the exalted person of our ruler. Even the official organ refers to the internal condition of Austria-Hungary as the true cause of this wicked crime. There is no longer any fear of being called to account. For decades the people of Servia has been educated by the press, and the policy at any given time is dependent on the party press ; the Great-Servian propaganda and its monstrous offspring, the crime of June 28th, are a fruit of this education. 1 pass over the suspicions and accusations with regard to the death of Hartwig, which are on the verge of insanity, and were characterised by "The Times" as "ravings"; ^ I do not mention the lying cam- paign in the press which, however, might strengthen Servians in the conviction that the Government and the representatives of Austria- Hungary are outlaws, and that appellations such as murderer, rogue, cursed Austrian, etc., are suitable stock epithets for us. The death of Hartwig and the recognition of the gravity of this loss ^ to the Servian political world, have let loose a fanatical cult of the deceased ; in this people were influenced not only by gratitude for the past, but also by anxiety for the future, and outbid one another in servile submissiveness to Russia in order to secure her goodwill in time to come. ^ "The latest suggestion made in one of them (the Servian newspapers) is that M. de Hartwig's sudden death in the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Belgrade the other day was due to poison. Ravings of that kind move the contempt as well as the dis- gust of cultivated people, whatever their political sympathies may be." — The Times, July 16, 1913. 2 Hartwig was the Russian Minister in Belgrade, and was known as an ardent Pan-Slavist, and reckless hater of Austria-Hungary. 38 Official Diplomatic Documents As a third factor the electoral campaign has united all parties on a platform of hostility against Austria-Hungary. None of the parties which aspire to office will incur the suspicion of being held capable of weak compliance towards the Monarchy. The campaign, therefore, is conducted under the catchword of hostility towards Austria-Hungary. For both internal and external reasons the Monarchy is held to be powerless and incapable of any energetic action, and it is believed that the serious words which were spoken by leading men among us are only "bluff." The leave of absence of the Imperial and Royal Minister of War and Chief of the Staff have strengthened the conviction that the weakness of Austria-Hungary is now obvious. I have allowed myself to trespass too long on the patience of Your Excellency, not because I thought that in what I have said I could tell you anything new, but because I considered this picture led up to the conclusion which forces itself upon me that a reckoning with Servia, a war for the position of the Monarchy as a Great Power, even for its existence as such, cannot be permanently avoided. If we delay in clearing up our relations with Servia, we shall share the responsibility for the difficulties and the unfavourable situation in any future war which must, however, sooner or later be carried through. For any observer on the spot, and for the representative of Austro- Hungarian interests in Servia, the question takes the form that we cannot any longer put up with any further injury to our prestige. Should we therefore be determined to put forward far-reaching requirements joined to effective control — for this alone could clear the Augean stable of Great-Servian intrigues — then all possible con- sequences must be considered, and from the beginning there must be a strong and firm determination to carry through the matter to the end. Half measures, the presentation of demands, followed by long dis- cussions and ending only in an unsound compromise, would be the hardest blow which could be directed against Austria-Hungary's reputation in Servia and her position in Europe. France : From Berlin French Yellow Book No. 15 M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 21, 1914. It has come to my knowledge that the Servian representative at Berlin declared, at the Wilhelmstrasse, yesterday, that his Govern- ment was ready to entertain Austria's requirements arising out of the outrage at Serajevo, provided that she asked only ^ for judicial cooperation in the punishment and prevention of political crimes, ^ N. Y, Times translation reads "did not demand." July 2U French Yellow Book No. 16 39 but that he was charged to warn the German Government that it would be dangerous to attempt, through that investigation, to lower the prestige of Servia. In confidence I may also inform your Excellency that the Russian Charge d'Affaires at the diplomatic audience to-day mentioned this subject to Herr von Jagow. He said that he supposed the German Government now had full knowledge of the note prepared by Austria, and were therefore willing to give the assurance that the Austro- Servian difficulties would be localised. The Secretary of State pro- tested that he was in complete ignorance of the contents of that note, and expressed himself in the same way to me.^ I could not help showing my astonishment at a statement which agreed so little with what circumstances lead one to expect. I have also been assured that, from now on, the preliminary notices for mobilisation,^ the object of which is to place Germany in a kind of "attention" attitude in times of tension, have been sent out here to those classes which would receive them in similar circum- stances. That is a measure to which the Germans, constituted as they are, can have recourse without indiscretion and without exciting the people. It is not a sensational measure, and is not necessarily followed by full mobilisation, as we have already seen, but it is none the less significant. t ^ Jules Cambon. To London, Petrograd, Vienna, Rome French Yellow Book No. 16 M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Rome. Paris, July 21, 1914. I SPECIALLY draw your attention to information of which I am in receipt from Berlin ^ ; the French Ambassador notifies the extreme weakness of the Berlin Bourse yesterday, and attributes it to the anxiety which has begun to be aroused by the Servian question. M. Jules Cambon has very grave reason for believing that when Austria makes the demarche at Belgrade which she judges necessary in consequence of the crime of Serajevo, Germany will support her with her authority, without seeking to play the part of mediator. Bienvenu-Martin. 1 The reader must decide for himself whether or not to give credence to this state- ment by Mr. von Jagow, the German Secretary of State. If true, it proves that Austria-Hungary was preparing her case against Servia without consultation with Germany. In that case it is natural that the Entente Powers should have had more accurate preliminary information of the Austrian note, through their Secret Service, which, for instance, must have supplied the information, French Yellow Book Nos. 13 and 14, July 19, 1914. A friendly power is less apt to maintain a spy service at the capital of an allied Government. See however, also French Yellow Book No. 19, July 22 and footnote. 2 This information is proved to be wholly false by French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30, 1914, where Viviani implies that Germany had not even then proceeded to partial mobilization. 3 The only two despatches published as previously received from Berlin are Nos. 9, July 4, and 15, July 15, 1914. Neither of them contains the information here given. 40 Official Diplomatic Documents Wednesday, July 22, 1915 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary Belgrade, London, etc. Belgium France London, etc. Vienna, London Germany Great Britain Berlin Russia Serbia Austria-Hungary sends the text of her Serbian note to her minister in Belgrade for presentation on the next day, and instructs her Representatives at the other capitals in Europe to inform the several foreign offices of her step. France counsels moderation in Vienna. Germany and Great Britain are quoted as having done the same. Austria-Hungary : To Belgrade. AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 7 Count Berchtold to Freiherr von Giesl in Belgrade. Vienna, July 22, 1914. Your Honor will please transmit the following note on Thursday, July 23, in the afternoon, to the Royal Government. Le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal s'est vu oblige d'a- dresser jeudi le 23 de ce mois, par Tentremise du Ministre Imperial et Royal a Belgrade, la note suivante au Gouverne- ment Royal de Serbie : "Le 31 mars, 1909, le Ministre de Serbie a Vienne a fait, d'ordre de son Gouverne- ment, au Gouvernement Imperial et Royal la declaration sui- vante : — " * La Serbie reconnait qu'elle n*a pas ete atteinte dans ses droits par le fait accompli cree en Bosnie-Herzegovine et qu'elle se conformera par conse- quent a telle decision que les (Translation) The Austro-Hungarian Gov- ernment felt compelled to ad- dress the following note to the Servian Government on the 23rd July, through the medium of the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade : — "On the 31st March, 1909, the Servian Minister in Vienna, on the instructions of the Ser- vian Government, made the following declaration to the Imperial and Royal Govern- ment : — "^Servia recognises that the fait accompli regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to the decisions that the Powers may take in conformity with July 22y Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 7 41 Puissances prendront par rap- port a I'article 25 du Traite de Berlin. Se rendant aux conseils des Grandes Puissances, la Ser- bie s'engage des a present a abandonner I'attitude de protes- tation et d'opposition qu'elle a observee a I'egard de I'annexion depuis I'automne dernier, et elle s'engage, en outre, a changer le cours de sa politique actuelle envers I'Autriche-Hongrie pour vivre desormais avec cette der- niere sur le pied d'un bon voi- sinage.' "Or, rhistoire des dernieres annees, et notamment les evene- ments douloureux du 28 juin, ont demontre I'existence en Serbie d'un mouvement subversif dont le but est de detacher de la Monarchic austro-hongroise cer- taines parties de ses territoires. Ce mouvement, qui a pris jour sous les yeux du Gouvernement serbe, est arrive a se manifester au dela du territoire du royaume par des actes de terrorisme, par une serie d'attentats et par des meurtres. ' "Le Gouvernement Royal serbe, loin de satisfaire aux en- gagements formels contenus dans la declaration du 31 mars, 1909, n'a rien fait pour supprimer ce mouvement : il a tolere I'acti- vite criminelle des differentes societes et affiliations dirigees contre la Monarchic, le langage effrene de la presse, la glorifica- tion des auteurs d'attentats, la participation d'officiers et de fonc- tionnaires dans les agissements subversifs, une propagande mal- saine dans I'instruction publique, tolere enfin toutes les manifes- tations qui pouvaient induire la population serbe a la haine de la article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great Powers, Servia undertakes to renounce from now onwards the attitude of protest and oppo- sition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direc- tion of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary and to live in future on good neighbourly terms with the latter.' "The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events of the 28th June last, have shown the existence of a subversive movement with the object of detaching a part of the territories of Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy. The move- ment, which had its birth under the eye of the Servian Gov- ernment, has gone so far as to make itself manifest on both sides of the Servian frontier in the shape of acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and murders. "Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done nothing to repress these movements. It has permitted the criminal mach- inations of various societies and associations directed against the Monarchy, and has tolerated unrestrained language on the part of the press, the glorifica- tion of the perpetrators of out- rages, and the participation of officers and functionaries in sub- versive agitation. It has per- mitted an unwholesome propa- ganda in public instruction; in 42 Official Diplomatic Documents Monarchic ct au mepris dc ses institutions. "Cctte tolerance coupable du Gouvernement Royal de Serbie n'avait pas cesse au moment oil les evenements du 28 juin der- nier en ont demontre au monde entier les consequences funestes. "II resulte des depositions et aveux des auteurs criminels de I'attentat du 28 juin que le meurtre de Sarajevo a ete trame a Belgrade, que les armes et ex- plosifs dont les meurtriers se trouvaient etre munis leur ont ete donnes par des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes faisant par- tie de la 'Narodna Odbrana/ et enfin que le passage en Bosnie des criminels et de leurs armes a ete organise et effectue par des chefs du service-frontiere serbe. "Les resultats mentionnes de I'instruction ne permettent pas au Gouvernement Imperial et Royal de poursuivre plus long- temps Tattitude de longanimite expectative qu'il avait observee pendant des annees vis-a-vis des agissements concentres a Bel- grade et propages de la sur les territoires de la Monarchic; ces resultats lui imposent au con- traire le devoir de mettre fin a des menees qui forment une menace perpetuelle pour la tran- quillite de la Monarchic. "C'est pour atteindre ce but que le Gbuvernement Imperial et Royal se voit oblige de de- mander au Gouvernement serbe I'enonciation officielle qu'il con- damne la propagande dirigee short, it has permitted all mani- festations of a nature to incite the Servian population to hatred of the Monarchy and contempt of its institutions. " This culpable tolerance of the Royal Servian Government had not ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th June last proved its fatal consequences to the whole world. " It results from the depositions and confessions of the criminal perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th June that the Serajevo as- sassinations were planned in Bel- grade ; that the arms and explo- sives with which the murderers were provided had been given to them by Servian officers and functionaries belonging to the ' Narodna Odbrana ' ; and finally, that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organised and effected by the chiefs of the Servian frontier service. "The above-mentioned results of the magisterial investigation do not permit the Austro-Hun- garian Government to pursue any longer the attitude of ex- pectant forbearance which they have maintained for years in face of the machinations hatched in Belgrade, and thence propagated in the territories of the Mon- archy. The results, on the con- trary, impose on them the duty of putting an end to the intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the Mon- archy. "To achieve this end the Im- perial and Royal Government see themselves compelled to demand from the Royal Servian Govern- ment a formal assurance that they condemn this dangerous propa- July 22y Amtro-Hungarian Red Book No, 7 43 centre la Monarchie austro-hon- groise, c 'est-a-dire rensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu a detacher de la Monarchie des territoires qui en font partie, et qu'il s'engage a supprimer, par tous les moyens, cette propa- gande criminelle et terroriste. "Afin de donner un caractere solennel a cet engagement, le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie fera publier a la premiere page du ^Journal officiel' en date du 13/26 juillet I'enonciation sui- vante : — "'Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie condamne la propagande dirigee contre I'Autriche-Hon- grie, c'est-a-dire I'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu a detacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il deplore sincerement les consequences fu- nestes de ces agissements cri- minels. " ' Le Gouvernement Royal re- grette que des officiers et fonc- tionnaires serbes aient participe a la propagande susmentionnee et compromis par la les relations de bon voisinage auquel le Gou- vernement Royal s'etait solen- nellement engage par sa declara- tion du 31 mars, 1909. " ' Le Gouvernement Royal, qui desapprouve et repudie toute idee ou tentative d'immixtion dans les destinees des habitants de quelque partie de I'Autriche- Hongrie que ce soit, considere de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers, les fonctionnaires et toute la population du royaume que dorenavant il procedera avec la derniere rigueur contre les per- sonnes qui se rendraient cou- pables de pareils agissements qu'il ganda against the Monarchy ; in other words, the whole series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of which is to detach from the Monarchy territories belonging to it, and that they undertake to suppress by every means this criminal and terrorist propa- ganda. "In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the Royal Servian Government shall publish on the front page of their 'Official Journal' of the 13/26 July the following declaration : — "'The Royal Government of Servia condemn the propaganda directed against Austria-Hun- gary — i.e., the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hun- garian Monarchy territories be- longing to it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings. "'The Royal Government re- gret that Servian officers and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Government were solemnly pledged by their decla- ration of the 31st March, 1909. " ' The Royal Government, who disapprove and repudiate all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, consider it their duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the kingdom, that henceforward they will proceed with the utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, 44 Official Diplomatic Documents mettra tous ses efforts a prevenir et a reprimer/ " Cette enonciation sera portee simultanement a la connaissance de rArmee Royale par un ordre du jour de Sa Majeste le Roi et sera publiee dans le 'Bulletin officiel ' de I'armee. " Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'engage en outre : " 1° a supprimer toute publica- tion qui excite a la haine et au mepris de la Monarchic et dont la tendance generale est dirigee contre son integrite territoriale ; "2° a dissoudre immediate- ment la societe dite 'Narodna Odbrana/ a confisquer tous ses moyens de propagande, et a pro- ceder de la meme maniere contre les autres societes et affiliations en Serbie qui s'adonnent a la propagande contre la Monarchic austro-hongroise ; le Gouverne- ment Royal prendra les mesures necessaires pour que les societes dissoutes ne puissent pas con- tinuer leur activite sous un autre nom et sous une autre forme ; "3° a eliminer sans delai de rinstruction publique en Serbie, tant en ce qui concerne le corps enseignant que les moyens d 'in- struction, tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir a fomenter la propagande contre I'Autriche- Hongrie ; "4° a eloigner du service mili- taire et de I'administration en general tous les officiers et fonc- tionnaires coupables de la pro- pagande contre la Monarchic austro-hongroise et dont le Gou- vernement Imperial et Royal se reserve de communiquer les noms et les faits au Gouvernement Royal ; which they will use all their efforts to anticipate and sup- press.' "This declaration shall simul- taneously be communicated to the Royal army as an order of the day by His Majesty the King and shall be published in the ' Official Bulletin ' of the Army. "The Royal Servian Govern- ment further undertake : "1. To suppress any publica- tion which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hun- garian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity ; "2. To dissolve immediately the society styled 'Narodna Od- brana,' to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other . societies and their branches in Servia which engage in propa- ganda against the Austro-Hun- garian Monarchy. The Royal Government shall take the neces- sary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continu- ing their activity under another name and form ; "3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria- Hungary ; "4. To remove from the mili- tary service, and from the ad- ministration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propa- ganda against the Austro-Hun- garian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserve to them- selves the right of communicat- ing to the Royal Government ; July 22, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 7 45 " 5° a accepter la collaboration en Serbie des organes du Gou- vernement Imperial et Royal dans la suppression du mouve- ment subversif dirige contre I'in- tegrite territorial de la Mo- narchic ; " 6° a ouvrir une enquete judi- ciaire contre les partisans du complot du 28 juin se trouvant sur territoire serbe ; "des organes, delegues par le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal, prendront part aux recherches y relatives ; "7° a proceder d'urgence a Tarrestation du Commandant Voija Tankosic et du nomme Milan Ciganovic, employe de I'Etat serbe, compromis par les resultats de I'instruction de Sarajevo ; "8° a empecher, par des me- sures efficaces, le concours des autorites serbes dans le trafic illi- cite d'armes et d'explosifs a tra- .vers la f rontiere ; "a licencier et punir severe- ment les fonctionnaires du ser- vice-frontiere de Schabatz et de Loznica coupables d'avoir aide les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo en leur facilitant le passage de la frontiere ; "9° a donner au Gouverne- ment Imperial et Royal des expli- cations sur les propos injusti- fiables de hauts fonctionnaires serbes tant en Serbie qu'a Te- tranger, qui, malgre leur position "5. To accept the collabora- tion ^ in Servia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment for the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy ; "6. To take judicial proceed- ings against accessories to the plot of the 8th June who are on Servian territory; delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment will take part in the inves- tigation ^ relating thereto ; "7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voija Tan- kositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Ser- vian State employe, who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo ; "8. To prevent by effective measures the cooperation of the Servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz and Loznica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier ; "9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with ex- planations regarding the unjus- tifiable utterances of high Ser- vian officials, both in Servia and abroad, who, notwithstanding 1 The meaning of Clauses 5 and 6 was, according to Austria-Hungary, "wilfully misinterpreted" by Serbia and her champions. See British Blue Book No. 64, July 28, 1914, where Austria-Hungary is quoted as stating "that cooperation of Austrian agents in Servia was to be only in investigation, not in judicial or administrative measures." Similar cooperation in investigation had, upon request, been granted to Serbia twice at least in the past (see Austro-Hungary and the War by Ernest Ludwig), and had also been asked by, and granted to, the United States of America in the in- vestigation of the sinking of the Maine. See also the Austrian Explanation, Austro- Hungarian Red Book No. 27, July 25, where Austria-Hungary explains that what she has in mind is an arrangement in Serbia similar to the "Bureau de Siirete" maintained in Paris by Russia. See also Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914. 46 Official Diplomatic Documents officielle, n'ont pas hesite apres Tattentat du 28 juin de s'expri- mer dans des interviews d'une maniere hostile envers la Mo- narchie austro-hongroise ; enfin "10° d'avertir, sans retard, le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal de I'execution des mesures com- prises dans les points precedents. " Le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal attend la reponse du Gouvernement Royal au plus tard jusqu'au samedi, 25 de ce mois, a 6 heures du soir. "Un memoire concernant les resultats de I'instruction de Sara- jevo a regard des fonctionnaires mentionnes aux points 7 et 8. est annexe a cette note." J'ai I'honneur d'inviter votre Excellence de vouloir porter le contenu de cette note a la con- naissance du Gouvernement au- pres duquel vous etes accredite, en accompagnant cette communi- cation du commentaire que voici : Le 31 mars, 1909, le Gouverne- ment Royal serbe a adresse a I'Autriche-Hongrie la declaration dont le texte est reproduit ci- dessus. Le lendemain meme de cette declaration la Serbie s'est engagee dans une politique tendant a inspirer des idees subversives aux ressortissants serbes de la Monarchic austro-hongroise et a preparer ainsi la separation des territoires austro-hongrois, limi- trophes a la Serbie. La^Serbie devint le foyer d'une agitation criminelle. Des societes et affiliations ne tarderent pax a se former qui, soit ouvertement, soit clandes- tinement, etaient destinees a their official position, have not hesitated since the crime of the 28th June to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Gov- ernment ; and, finally, "10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads. "The Austro-Hungarian Gov- ernment expect the reply of the Royal Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday even- ing, the 25th July. " A memorandum dealing with the results of the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo with regard to the officials mentioned under heads (7) and (8) is attached to this note." I have the honour to request your Excellency to bring the con- tents of this note to the knowl- edge of the Government to which you are accredited, accompany- ing your communication with the following observations : — On the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government ad- dressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced above. On the very day after this declaration Servia embarked on a policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into the Serb subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and so preparing for the sep- aration of the Austro-Hungarian territory on the Servian frontier. Servia became the centre of a criminal agitation. No tirne was lost in the forma- tion of societies and groups, whose object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of dis- July 22, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 7 47 creer des desordres sur le terri- toire austro-hongrois.- Ces socie- tes et affiliations comptent parmi leurs membres des generaux et des diplomates, des fonction- naires d'Etat et des juges, bref les sommites du monde officiel et inofficiel du royaume. Le journalisme serbe est pres- que entierement au service de cette propagande, dirigee centre I'Autriche-Hongrie, et pas un jour ne passe sans que les organes de la presse serbe n'excitent leurs lecteurs a la haine et au mepris de la Monarchic voisine ou a des attentats diriges plus ou moins ouvertement contre sa surete et son integrite. Un grand nombre d 'agents est appele a soutenir par tons les moyens I'agitation contre I'Au- triche-Hongrie et a corrompre dans les provinces limitrophes la jeunesse de ces pays. L'esprit conspirateur des poli- ticiens serbes, esprit dont les annales du royaume portent les sanglantes empreintes, a subi une recrudescence depuis la derniere crise balkanique; des individus ayant fait partie des bandes jus- que-la occupees en Macedoine sont venus se mettre a la disposi- tion de la propagande terroriste contre I'Autriche-Hongrie. En presence de ces agissements, auxquels I'Autriche-Hongrie est exposee depuis des annees, le Gouvernement de la Serbie n'a pas cru devoir prendre la moindre mesure. C'est ainsi que le Gou- vernement serbe a manque au devoir que lui imposait la decla- ration solennelle du 31 mars, 1909, et c'est ainsi qu'il s'est mis en contradiction avec la volonte de I'Europe et avec I'engagement orders on Austro-Hungarian ter- ritory. These societies and groups count among their mem- bers generals and diplomatists, Government officials and judges — in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society in the kingdom. Servian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propaganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day passes without the organs of the Servian press stir- ring up their readers to hatred or contempt for the neighbouring Monarchy, or .to outrages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity. A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every means the agitation against Aus- tria-Hungary and corrupting the youth in the frontier provinces. Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence of the spirit of conspiracy in- herent in Servian politicia^ns, which has left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom; individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against Austria-Hungary. In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary has been exposed for years, the Ser- vian Government have not thought it incumbent on them to take the slightest step. The Servian Government have thus failed in the duty imposed on them by the solemn declara- tion of the 31st March, 1909, and acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the under- 48 Official Diplomatic Documents qu'il avait pris vis-a-vis de TAu- triche-Hongrie. La longanimite du Gouverne- ment Imperial et Royal a I'egard de Tattitude proyocatrice de la Serbie etait inspiree du desin- teressement territorial de la Monarchic austro-hongroise et de Tespoir que le Gouvernement serbe finirait tout de meme par apprecier a sa juste valeur Taiiii- tie de I'Autriche-Hongrie. En observant une attitude bien- veillante pour les interets poli- tiques de la Serbie, le Gouverne- ment Imperial et Royal esperait que le royaume se deciderait finalement a suivre de son cote une ligne de conduite analogue. L'Autriche-Hongrie s'attendait surtout a une pareille evolution dans les idees politiques en Ser- bie, lorsque, apres les evenements de Tannee 1912, le Gouverne- ment Imperial et Royal rendit possible, par une attitude desin- teressee et sans rancune, Tagran- dissement si considerable de la Serbie. Cette bienveillance manifestee par I'Autriche-Hongrie a I'egard de I'Etat voisin n'a cependant aucunement modifie les procedes du royaume, qui a continue a tolerer sur son territoire une propagande, dont les funestes consequences se sont manifestees au monde entier le 28 juin der- nier, jour oil I'heritier presomptif de la Monarchic et son illustre epouse devinrent les victimes d'un complot trame a Belgrade. En presence de cet etat de choses le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal a du se decider a entre- prendre de nouvelles et pressantes demarches a Belgrade afin d'amener le Gouvernement serbe a arreter le mouvement incen- taking given to Austria-Hun- gary. The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in the face of the provocative attitude of Servia was inspired by the territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope that the Servian Government would end in spite of everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By observing a benevolent attitude towards the political interests of Servia, the Imperial and Royal Government hoped that the kingdom would finally decide to follow an analo- gous line of conduct on its own side. In particular, Austria- Hungary expected a development of this kind in the political ideas of Servia, when, after the events of 1912, the Imperial and Royal Government, by its disinterested and ungrudging attitude, made such a considerable aggrandise- ment of Servia possible. The benevolence which Aus- tria-Hungary showed towards the neighbouring State had no re- straining effect on the proceed- ings of the kingdom, which con- tinued to tolerate on its territory a propaganda of which the fatal consequences were demonstrated to the whole world on the 28th June last, when the Heir Pre- sumptive to the Monarchy and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched at Belgrade. In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Government have felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to inducing the Servian Government to stop the incendiary movement that is July 22, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 7 49 diaire mena^ant la surete et Tin- tegrite de la Monarchic austro- hongroise. Le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal est persuade qu'en entre- prenant cette demarche il se trouve en plein accord avec les sentiments de toutes les nations civilisees, qui ne sauraient ad- mettre que le regicide devint une arme dont on puisse se servir impunement dans la lutte poli- tique, et que la paix europeenne fut continuellement troublee par les agissements partant de Bel- grade. C'est a I'appui de ce qui pre- cede que le Gouvernement Im- perial et Royal tient a la dis- position du Gouvernement Royal de Grande-Bretagne un dossier elucidant les menees serbes et les rapports existant entre ces menees et le meurtre du 28 juin. Une communication identique est adressee aux representants Imperiaux et Royaux aupres des autres Puissances signatiares. Vous etes autorise de laisser une copie de cette depeche entre les mains de M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Vienne, le 24juillet, 1914. threatening the security and integrity of the Austro-Hun- garian Monarchy. The Imperial and Royal Gov- ernment are convinced that in taking this step they will find themselves in full agreement with the sentiments of all civilised nations, who cannot permit regi- cide to become a weapon' that can be employed with impunity in political strife, and the peace of Europe to be continually dis- turbed by movements emanating from Belgrade. In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government hold at the disposal of the British Government a dossier elucidating the Servian intrigues and the connection between these intrigues and the murder of the 28th June. An identical communication has been addressed to the Im- perial and Royal representatives accredited to the other signatory Powers. You are authorised to leave a copy of this despatch in the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, July 24, 1914' Annexe L'instruction criminelle ou- verte par le Tribunal de Sarajevo contre Gavrilo Princip et con- sorts du chef d^assassinat et de complicite y relative — crime commis par eux le 28 juin der- nier — a jusqu'ici abouti aux constations suivantes : 1°. Le complot ayant pour but d'assassiner, lors de sor\ sejour a E Annex The criniinal enquiry opened by the Court of Serajevo against Gavrilo Princip and his acces- sories in and before the act of assassination committed by them on the 28th June last has up to the present led to the following conclusions : — 1. The plot, having as its ob- ject the assassination of the Arch- 50 Official Diplomatic Documents Sarajevo, de TArchiduc Fran- cois-Ferdinand fut forme a Bel- grade par Gavrilo Princip, Nedelkjo ^Cabrinovic, le nomme Milan Ciganovic et Trifko Grabez, avec le concours du commandant Voija Tankosic. 2°. Les six bombes et les qua- tre pistolets Browning avec muni- tion, moyennant lesquels les mal- faiteurs ont commis Fattentat, furent livres a Belgrade a Prin- cip, Cabrinovic et Grabez par le nomme Milan Ciganovic et le commandant Voija Tankosic. 3°. Les bombes sont des gre- nades a la main provenant du depot d'armes de I'armee serbe a Kragujevac. 4°. Pour assurer la reussite de I'attentat, Ciganovic enseigna a Princip, Cabrinovic et Grabez la maniere de se servir des grenades et donna, dans un foret pres du champ de tir a Topschider, des le9ons de tir avec pistolets Brown- ing a Princip et Grabez. 5°. Pour rendre possible a Princip, Cabrinovic et Grabez de passer la frontiere de Bosnie- Herzegovine et d'y introduire clandestinement leur contrebande d'armes, un systeme deJ:ransport secret fut organise par Ciganovic. D'apres cette organisation I'in- troduction en Bosnie-Herzego- vine des malfaiteurs et de leurs armes fut op6ree par les capi- taines-frontieres de Chabac (Rade Popovic) et de Loznica ainsi que par le douanier Rudivoj Grbic de Loznica avec le con- cours de divers particuliers. duke Francis Ferdinand at the time of his visit to Serajevo, was formed at Belgrade by Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, one Milan Ciganovic, and Trifko Grabez, with the assistance of Commander Voija Tankosic. 2. The six bombs and the four Browning pistols and ammuni- tion with which the guilty par- ties committed the ^ act were delivered to Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez by the man Milan Ciganovic and Commander Voija Tankosic at Belgrade. 3. The bombs are hand-gre- nades coming from the arms depot of the Servian army at Kra- gujevac. 4. In order to^ ensure the suc- cess of the act, Ciganovic taught Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez how to use the bombs, and gave lessons in firing Browning pistols to Princip and Grabez in a forest near the shooting ground at Top- schider. ■v 5. To enable Princip, Cabrino- vic, and Grabez to cross the fron- tier of Bosnia-Herzegovina and smuggle in their contraband of arms secretly, a secret system j3f transport was organised by Ci- ganovic. By this arrangement the intro- duction into Bosnia-Herzegovina of criminals and their arms was effected by the officials controlling the frontiers at Chabec (Rade Popovic) and Loznica, as well as by the customs officer Rudivoj Grbic, of Loznica, with the as- sistance of various individuals. On the occasion of transmitting the above note, your Honor will verbally add that you are instructed — in case an unconditional affirmative answer of the Royal Government shall not in the meantime have been delivered to you — to leave Belgrade together with the personnel of the Imperial and Royal Embassy at the expiration of the July 22, Amtro-Hunganan Red Book No. 8 51 period of grace of forty-eight hours after your communication con- templated in the note has been made. To Berlin, Rome, Paris, London, Petrograd, and Constantinople AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 8 Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in Berlin, Rome, Paris, London, St. Petershurgh and Constantinople Vienna, July 22} 1914. (Translated from the French.) The Imperial and Royal Government felt compelled to address the following note to the Royal Servian Government on Thursday, the 23rd instant, through the medium of the Imperial and Royal Minister at Belgrade (see instructions to the Imperial and Royal Envoy in Belgrade of July 22nd, 1914). On the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government addressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced above. On the very day after this declaration Servia embarked on a policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into the Serb subjects of the Austro- Hungarian Monarchy, and so preparing for the separation of the Austro-Hungarian territory on the Servian frontier. Servia became the centre of a criminal agitation. No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups, whose object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and groups count among their members generals and diplomatists, Government officials and judges — in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society in the kingdom. Servian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this prop- aganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day passes without the organs 'of the Servian press stirring up their readers to hatred or contempt for the neighbouring Monarchy, or to outrages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity. A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every means the agitation against Austria-Hungary and corrupting the youth in the frontier provinces. Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence of the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which has left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom ; indi- viduals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against Austria-Hungary. In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary has been exposed for years, the Servian Government have not thought 1 This note was to be presented on July 24. See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 9, July 23, 1914. 52 Official Diplomatic Documents it incumbent on them to take the shghtest step. The Servian Gov- ernment have thus failed in the duty imposed on them by the solemn declaration of the 31st March, 1909, and acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the undertaking given to Austria-Hungary. The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in the face of the provocative attitude of Servia was inspired by the territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope that the Servian Government would end in spite of everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By observing a benevolent attitude towards the political interests of Servia, the Imperial and Royal Government hoped that the kingdom would finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its own side. In particular, Austria-Hungary expected a development of this kind in the political ideas of Servia, when, after the events of 1912, the Imperial and Royal Government, by its disinterested and ungrudging attitude, made such a considerable aggrandisement of Servia possible. The benevolence which Austria-Hungary showed towards the neighbouring State had no restraining effect on the proceedings of the kingdom, which continued to tolerate on its territory a propaganda of which the fatal consequences were demonstrated to the whole world on the 28th June last, when the Heir Presumptive to the Mon- archy and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched at Belgrade. In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Government have felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to inducing the Servian Government to stop the incendiary movement that is threatening the security and in- tegrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Imperial and Royal Government are convinced that in tak- ing this step they will find themselves in full agreement with the sentiments of all civilised nations, who cannot permit regicide to become a weapon that can be employed with impunity in political strife, and the peace of Europe to be continually disturbed by move- ments emanating from Belgrade. In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government hold at the disposal of the British Government a dossier elucidating the Servian intrigues and the connection between these intrigues and the murder of the 28th June. An identical communication has been addressed to the Imperial and Royal representatives accredited to the other signatory Powers. You are authorised to leave a copy of this despatch in the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. July 22; French Yellow Book No. 18 53 France : To London, Petrograd, Vienna, Rome French Yellow Book No. 17 M, Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Rome. Paris, July 22, 1914. M. Jules Cambon having questioned Herr von Jagow on the tenor of the Austrian note at Belgrade, the latter replied that he knew nothing of the text; our Ambassador expressed his great as- tonishment at this.^ He emphasizes that the weakness of the Berlin Bourse continues, and that pessimistic rumours are current. M. Barrere also discussed the same question with the Marquis di San Giuliano, who appears disturbed by it, and gives the assurance that he is working ^ at Vienna in order that Servia may not be asked for anything beyond what is practicable, for instance, the dissolution of the Bosnian Club, and not a judicial inquiry into the causes of the crime of Serajevo. In present circumstances, the most favourable presumption one can make is that the Cabinet at Vienna, finding itself carried away by the press and the military party, is trying to obtain the maxi- mum from Servia by starting to intimidate her, directly and in- directly, and looks to Germany for support in this. I have asked the French Ambassador at Vienna to use all his in- fluence with Count Berchtold and to represent to him, in a friendly conversation, how much Europe would appreciate moderation on the part of the Austrian Government, and what consequences would be likely to be entailed by violent pressure on Servia. Bienvenu-Martin. From Vienna French Yellow Book No. 18 M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, July 22? 19U. Nothing is known as to the decision which Count Berchtold, who is prolonging his stay at Ischl, is trying to obtain from the Em- peror. The intention of proceeding against Servia with the greatest severity, of having done with her, of "treating her like another Po- land," is attributed to the Government. Eight army corps are said to be ready to start on the campaign, but M. Tisza, who is very dis- 1 French Yellow Book No. 15, July 21, 1914. ,,.,,. 2 The despatch from Rome containing this information has not been pubhshed m the French Yellow Book or elsewhere. -r> i ,, t. j 3 The date of this despatch seems strange, since Count Berchtold had returned to Vienna and despatched the "Serbian Note " to the Austro-Hungarian Minister in Bel- grade on that date. 54 Official Diplomatic Documents turbed about the excitement in Croatia, is said to have intervened actively in order to exercise a moderating influence. In any case it is believed that the demarche will be made at Bel- grade this week. The requirements of the Austro-Hungarian Gov- ernment with regard to the punishment of the outrage, and to guaran- tees of control and police supervision, seem to be acceptable to the dignity of the Servians; M. Yovanovich believes they will be ac- cepted. M. Pashitch wishes for a peaceful solution, but says that he is ready for a full resistance. He has confidence in the strength of the Servian army ; besides, he counts on the union of all the Slavs in the Monarchy to paralyse the effort directed against his country. Unless people are absolutely blinded, it must be recognised here that a violent blow has every chance of being fatal both to the Austro- Hungarian army and to the cohesion of the nationalities governed by the Emperor, which has already been so much compromised. Herr von Tschirscky, the German Ambassador, is showing him- self a supporter of violent measures, while at the same time he is willing to let it be understood that the Imperial Chancery would not be in entire agreement with him on this point. The Russian Ambassador, who left yesterday for the country in consequence of reassuring explanations made to him at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, has confided to me that his Government will not raise any objection to steps directed towards the punishment of the guilty and the dissolution of the societies which are notoriously revolutionary, but could not accept requirements which would humiliate Servian national feeling. Dumaine. From London French Yellow Book No. 19 M. Paul Cambonj French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, July 22, 1914. Your Excellency has been good enough to communicate to me the impressions which have been collected by our Ambassador at Berlin with regard to the demarche which the Austro-Hungarian Minister is proposing to make at Belgrade. These impressions have been confirmed by a conversation which I had yesterday with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Sir Edward Grey told me that he had seen the German Ambassador, who stated to him ^ that at Berlin a demarche of the Austro-Hungarian 1 Cf. British Blue Book No. 2, July 22, 1914. The interview here spoken of is not given in this British Blue Book unless it is the interview of July 20, British Blue Book No. 1, July 20. Sir E. Grey's remarks quoted here are so much like those made by him on July 20 that it seems unlikely that the interviews given in French Yellow Book No. 19 and British Blue Book No. 1 are not the same. In that case, however, the remarks of the German Ambassador are wrongly given either here or in the Blue Book. In British Blue Book No. 2, July 22, the German Secretary of Foreign Affairs is quoted as considering it "inadvisable that the Austro-Hungarian Government should be ap- proached by the German Government." It seems incredible that the accuracy of this statement should not have been challenged in the British Blue Book if the German July 22, French Yellow Booh No. 19 55 Government to the Servian Government was expected. Prince Lichnowsky assured him that the German Government were en- deavouring to hold back and moderate the Cabinet of Vienna/ but that up to the present time they had not been successful in this, and that he w^as not without anxiety as to the results of a demarche of this kind. Sir Edward Grey answered Prince Lichnowsky that he would like to believe that, before intervening at Belgrade, the Austro- Hungarian Government had fully informed themselves as to the cir- cumstances of the conspiracy to which the Hereditary Archduke and the Duchess of Hohenburg had fallen victims, and had assured themselves that the Servian Government had been cognisant of it and had not done all that lay in their power to prevent the conse- quences. For if it could not be proved that the Servian Government were responsible and implicated to a certain degree, the intervention of Austria-Hungary would not be justified and would arouse against them the opinion of Europe. The communication of Prince Lichnowsky had left Sir Edward Grey with an impression of anxiety which he did not conceal from me. The same impression was given me by the Italian Ambassador, who also fears the possibility of fresh tension in Austro-Servian relations. This morning the Servian Minister came to see me, and he shares the apprehensions of Sir Edward Grey. He fears that Austria may make of the Servian Government demands which their dignity, and above all the susceptibility of public opinion, will not allow them to accept without a protest. When I pointed out to him the quiet which appears to reign at Vienna, and to which all the Ambassadors accredited to that Court bear testimony, he answered that this official quiet was only apparent and concealed feelings which were most fundamentally hostile to Servia. But, he added, if these feel- ings take a public form {demarche) which lacks the moderation that is desirable, it will be necessary to take account of Servian public opinion, which has been inflamed by the harsh treatment to which the Austrian Government have constantly subjected that country, and which has been made less patient by the memory of two vic- torious wars which is still quite fresh. Notwithstanding the sacrifices w^hich Servia has made for her recent victories she can still put 400,000 men in the field, and public opinion, which knows this, is not inclined to put up with any humiliation. Sir Edward Grey, in an interview with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador,^ asked him to recommend his Government not to de- part from the prudence and moderation necessary for avoiding new complications, not to demand from Servia any measures to which she could not reasonably submit, and not to allow themselves to be carried away too far. Paul Cambon. Ambassador had told Sir E. Grey on July 20 (or 21) that the " German Government were endeavouring to hold back and moderate the Cabinet of Vienna etc." 1 This important statement is not given in the British Blue Book. See previous note. 2 Such an interview is pubHshed in the British Blue Book No. 3, July 23, while this despatch is dated July 22, 1914. 56 Official Diplomatic Documents Great Britain : From Berlin British Blue Book No. 2 Sir H. Rumbold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 22) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 22, 1914. Last night I met Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the forthcoming Austrian demarche at Belgrade was alluded to by his Excellency in the conversation that ensued. His Excellency was evidently of opinion that this step on Austria's part would have been made ere this. He insisted that question at issue was one for settle- ment between Servia and Austria alone, and that there should be no interference from outside in the discussions between those two coun- tries. He had therefore considered it inadvisable that the Austro- Hungarian Government should be approached by the German Gov- ernment on the matter. He had, however, on several occasions, in conversation with the Servian Minister, emphasised the extreme importance that Austro-Servian relations should be put on a proper footing. Finally, his Excellency observed to me that for a long time past the attitude adopted towards Servia by Austria had, in his opinion, been one of great forbearance.^ 1 Cf. the previous despatch, French Yellow Book No. 19. July 23, AustrO'Hungarian Red Book No. 9 57 Thursday, July 23, 1914 The Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum is Presented to Serbia SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary London ' Belgium France London, etc. Munich Germany ^ London, etc. Great Britain Vienna Rome, Austr.-Hung. . Ambassador Russia Belgrade Servia London, etc. Aust.-Hung. Minister Austria-Hungary presents her note to Serbia at 6 p.m. ; and believing that ''Great Britain might be most easily led to form an impartial judgment," sends special instructions to her Ambassador in London. Germany sends instructions to her Ambassadors in London, Paris, and Petro- grad, dating these instructions July 23 for presentation on July 24. In the in- structions she defines her position. Great Britain is informally informed of the Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia, and discusses the possibility of a European war. Austria-Hungary : To London Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 9 Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 23, 1914. As among the Entente Powers, Great Britain might be most easily led to form an impartial judgment on the step which we are to-day taking at Belgrade, I request Your Excellency in the conversation which you will have on the 24th instant on the occasion when you hand in our circular note^ at the Foreign Office, to point out among other matters that it would have been within the power of Servia to render less acute the serious steps which she must expect from us, by spon- taneously doing what is necessary in order to start an inquiry on Servian soil against the Servian accomplices in the crime of 28th June, and by bringing to light the threads, which, as has been proved, lead from Belgrade to Servia. Up to the present time, although a number of notorious indications point to Belgrade, the Servian Government have not taken any steps in this direction; on the contrary, they have attempted to wipe out the existing traces. Thus, from a telegraphic despatch from our Legation at Belgrade,^ it is to be gathered that the Servian civil servant Ciganovic, who is compromised by the independent testimony of the affidavits of both 1 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 8, July 22. 2 This Despatch has not been published in the Austro-Hungarian Red Book. 58 Official Diplomatic Documents criminals, on the day of the outrage was still in Belgrade, and three days afterwards, when his name was mentioned in the papers, had already left the town. As is^well known also, the director of the Servian press declared that Ciganovic is completely unknown in Belgrade. With regard to the short time-limit attached to our demand, this must be attributed to our long experience of the dilatory arts of Servia.^ The requirements which we demand that Servia should fulfil, and which indeed contains nothing which is not a matter of course in the intercourse between States which are to live in peace and friendship, cannot be made the subject of negotiations and compromise; and, having regard to our economic interests, we cannot take the risk of a method of political action by which it would be open to Servia at pleasure to prolong the crisis which has arisen. France : To London, Berlin, Petrograd and Rome French Yellow Book No. 20 M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, Berlin, St. Petersburgh, and Rome. Paris, July 23, 1914. According to information collected by the French Ambassador at Vienna,^ the first intention of the Austro-Hungarian Government had been to proceed with the greatest severity against Servia, while keeping eight army corps ready to start operations. The disposition at this moment was more conciliatory ; in answer to a question put to him by M. Dumaine, whom I instructed to call the attention of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the anxiety aroused in Europe, Baron Macchio stated^ to our Ambassador that the tone of the Austrian note, and the demands which would be formu- lated in it, allow us to count on a peaceful result. In view of the customary procedure of the Imperial Chancery I do not know what confidence ought to be placed in these assurances. In any case the Austrian note will be presented in a very short space of time. The Servian Minister holds that as M. Pashitch wishes to come to an understanding, he will accept those demands which relate to the punishment of the outrage and to the guarantees for control and police supervision, but that he will resist everything which might affect the sovereignty and dignity of his country. In diplomatic circles at Vienna the German Ambassador is in favour of violent measures, while at the same time he confesses that 1 Exactly the same explanation for the forthcoming time limit was advanced in French Yellow Book, Nos. 13 and 14, as early as July 19, 1914. Austria could, of course, not know that the substance of her note and her reasons for it had been familiar to the Entente Powers since the previous Sunday. 2 French Yellow Book No. 18, July 22, 1915. 3 The interview here referred to is not mentioned in the only published Despatch, French Yellow Book No. 18, July 22, 1915, on which the present message can be based. July 23, German White Book Exhibit 1 59 the Imperial Chancery is perhaps not entirely in agreement with him on this point ; the Russian Ambassador, trusting to assurances which have been given him, has left Vienna, and before his departure confided to M. Dumaine that his Government will not raise any ob- jection to the punishment of the guilty and the dissolution of the rev- olutionary associations, but that they could not accept requirements which were humiliating to the national sentiment of Servia. Bienvenu-Martin. From Munich French Yellow Book No. 21 M. Allize, French Minister at Munich, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Paris. Munich, July 23, 1914. The Bavarian press seems to believe that a peaceful solution of the Austro-Servian incident is not only possible but even probable ; on the other hand official circles have for some time been assuming with more or less sincerity an air of real pessimism. In particular the President of the Council said to me to-day that the Austrian note the contents of which were known to him {dont il avait cqnnaissance ^) was in his opinion drawn up in terms which could be accepted by Servia, but that none the less the existing situation appeared to him to be very serious. Germany : To Paris, London, and Petrograd German WmTE Book ExmsiT 1^ The Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassadors at Paris, London, and St. Petersburg, on July 23rd, 1914- The publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government con- cerning the circumstances under which the assassination of the Austrian successor to the throne and his consort took place, disclose clearly the aims which the pan-Serb propaganda has set itself and the 1 The French phrase does not imply accurate knowledge. It may mean that he had a general idea of the contents, possibly similar to that shared by the Entente Powers since July 19', 1914 ; cf. French Yellow Book, Nos. 13 and 14. Bavaria is one of the federated States comprising the German Empire. Owing to its size and importance it enjoys special prerogatives, one of which is its independent representation in some foreign capitals and at the Vatican. Diplomatic negotiations of importance and those concerning the Empire are conducted by the German Foreign Office and the German Ambassadors and Ministers. If the President of the Bavarian Council had more accurate information of the Austrian note than the phrase definitely says he had, he may have received it through the Bavarian Minister who being a CathoUc may be assumed to have been in intimate personal relations with the leading Catholics of Austria-Hungary. 2 The German Foreign Office is not in the habit of issuing collected diplomatic papers on given subjects as the British Foreign Office is. As regards the outbreak of the European War the German Foreign Office contented itself with issuing a narra- tive to which a number of despatches were added as exhibits. There are therefore comparatively few German despatches published. For the narrative see pp. 551 to. 560. 60 Official Diplomatic Documents means which it utiHses for their realization. Through the pub- lished facts the last doubt must disappear that the centre of action of the efforts for the separation of the South Slavic provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their union with the Servian Kingdom must be sought in Belgrade where it displays its activity with the connivance of members of the Government and of the Army. The Serb intrigues may be traced back through a series of years. In a specially marked manner the pan-Serb chauvinism showed itself during the Bosnian crisis.^ Only to the far-reaching self-re- straint and moderation of the iVustro-Hungarian Government and the energetic intercession of the Powers is it to be ascribed that the provo- cations to which at that time Austria-Hungary was exposed on the part of Servia, did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of future well-behaviour which the Servian Government gave at that time, it has not kept. Under the very eyes, at least with the tacit sufferance of official Servia, the pan-Serb propaganda has meanwhile increased in scope and intensity ; at its door is to be laid the latest crime the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become evident that it is compatible neither with the dignity nor with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to view any longer idly the doings across the border through which the safety and the integrity of the Monarchy are permanently threatened. With this state of affairs, the action as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment can be viewed only as justifiable. Nevertheless, the attitude assumed by public opinion as well as by the Government in Servia does not preclude the fear that the Servian Government will decline to meet these demands and that it w^ill allow itself to be carried away into a provocative attitude toward Austria-Hungary. Nothing would remain for the Austro-Hungarian Government, unless it renounced definitely its position as a great Power, but to press its demands with the Servian Government, and, if need be, enforce the same by appeal to military measures, in regard to which the choice of means must be left with it. I have the honour to request you to express yourself ^ in the sense indicated above to (the present representative of M. Viviani) (Sir Edward Grey) (M. Sasonof) and therewith give special emphasis to the view that in this question there is concerned an affair which should be settled solely between Austria-Hungary and Servia, the limitation to which it must be the earnest endeavour of the powers to insure. We anxiously desire the localisation of the conflict because 1 Of 1908-1909. 2 Austria had sent her note to her representative in Belgrade on July 22, and notified her other representatives on the same day, Austro-Hungarian Red Book Nos. 7 and 8. The formal presentation of the note in Serbia was to take place in the afternoon of July 23, while the Powers were to be informed of it officially, receiving a copy of the note on July 24, 1914 ; cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 9. Informally the Powers were informed on July 23 ; cf. British Blue Book No. 3, July 23, 1914. On July 21, French Yellow Book No. 15, the German Secretary of Foreign Affairs had said he did not know the contents of the forthcoming note. Between then and July 23, Germany had been informed of the note, and as the above despatch proves, given her approval. July 23, British Blue Book No. 3 61 every intercession of another power on account of the various treaty- aUiances would precipitate inconceivable consequences. I shall look forward with interest to a telegraphic report about the course of your interview. Great Britain : From Rome British Blue Book No. 38 Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Re- ceived July 27.)^ Sir, Rome, July 23, 1914. I GATHER that the Italian Government have been made cognisant of the terms of the communication which will be addressed to Servia. Secretary-General, whom I saw this morning at the Italian Foreign Office, took the view that the gravity of the situation lay in the con- viction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that it was absolutely necessary for their prestige, after the many disillusions which the turn of events in the Balkans has occasioned, to score a definite success. I have, etc. Rennell Rodd. To Vienna British Blue Book No. 3 Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna. Sir, Foreign Office, July 23, 1914. Count Mensdorff ^ told me to-day that he would be able to- morrow morning to let me have officially the communication that he understood was being made to Servia to-day by Austria. He then explained privately what the nature of the demand would be. As he told me that the facts would all be set out in the paper that he would give me to-morrow, it is unnecessary to record them now. I gathered that they would include proof of the complicity of some Servian officials in the plot to murder the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and a long list of demands consequently made by Austria on Servia. As regards all this, I said that it was not a matter on which I would make any comment until I received an official communication, and it seemed to me probably a matter on which I should not be able to make any comment at first sight. But, when Count Mensdorff told me that he supposed there would 1 This is a letter, delayed in transmission to July 27, and therefore printed by Sir E. Grey among the July 27 despatches. Important diplomatic messages are sent in duplicate by telegram and by letter. This is one of the few instances where Sir E. Grey did not print the telegram, which undoubtedly was properly received. The British Blue Book contains no explanation. 2 Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. 62 Official Diplomatic Documents be something in the nature of a time-Hmit, which was in effect akin to an ultimatum, I said that I regretted ^ this very much. To begin with a time-Hmit might inflame opinion in Russia, and it would make it difficult, if not impossible, to give more time, even if after a few days it appeared that by giving more time there would be a prospect of securing a peaceful settlement and getting a satisfactory reply from Servia. I admitted that, if there was no time-limit, the proceedings might be unduly protracted, but I urged that a time-limit could al- ways be introduced afterwards ; that, if the demands were made with- out a time-limit in the first instance, Russian public opinion might be less excited, after a week it might have cooled down, and if the Austrian case was very strong it might be apparent that the Russian Government would be in a position to use their influence in favour of a satisfactory reply from Servia. A time-limit was generally a thing to be used only in the last resort, after other means had been tried and failed. Count Mensdorff said that if Servia, in the interval that had elapsed since the murder of the Archduke, had voluntarily instituted an en- quiry on her own territory, all this might have been avoided. In 1909, Servia had said in a note that she intended to live on terms of good neighbourhood with Austria; but she had never kept her promise, she had stirred up agitation the object of which was to dis- integrate Austria, and it was absolutely necessary for Austria to pro- tect herself. I said that I would not comment upon or criticise what Count Mensdorff had told me this afternoon, but I could not help dwelling upon the awful consequences involved in the situation. Great apprehension had been expressed to me, not specially by M. Cambon and Count Benckendorff,^ but also by others, as to what might happen, and it had been represented to me that it would be very de- sirable that those who had influence in St. Petersburgh should use it on behalf of patience and moderation. I had replied that the amount of influence that could be used in this sense would depend upon how reasonable were the Austrian demands and how strong the justifica- tion that Austria might have discovered for making her demands. The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible. If as many as four Great Powers of Europe — let us say, Austria, France, Russia, and Germany — were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money, and such an interference with trade, that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European^ credit and industry. In these days, in great industrial States, this would mean a state of things worse than that of 1848, and, irrespective of who were victors in the war, many things might be completely swept away. 1 France, and therefore probably the Entente Powers had known of the time limit since July 19, 1914 ; cf. French Yellow Book, Nos. 13 and 14. 2 Accounts of previous interviews to this effect with the Russian and French Am- bassadors are not printed in the British Blue Book. ' This suggests what Sir E. Grey said in his speech of August 3, that England would suffer almost as much if she stayed out as if she entered the war. Such a view contemplates only England's trade, and disregards the loss of lives. July 23, Russian Orange Booh No. 2 63 Count Mensdorff did not demur to this statement of the possible consequences of the present situation, but he said that all would de- pend upon Russia. I made the remark that, in a time of difficulties such as this, it was just as true to say that it required two to keep the peace as it was to say, ordinarily, that it took two to make a quarrel. I hoped very much that, if there were difficulties, Austria and Russia would be able in the first instance to discuss them directly with each other. Count Mensdorff said that he hoped this would be possible, but he was under the impression that the attitude in St. Petersburgh had not been very favourable recently. I am, etc. E. Grey. Russia : From Belgrade. Russian Okange Book No. 1 Russian Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Belgrade, July 10 {23), 1914. The Austrian Minister, at 6 o'clock this evening, presented an ultimatum from his Government to the Minister of Finance, Patcho/U, in the absence of Pashitch, requiring the acceptance of the demands contained therein within forty-eight hours. Giesl added verbally that, in the event of failure to accept the note integrally within forty- eight hours, he was under instructions to leave Belgrade with the staff at the legation. Pashitch and the other Ministers, who are away electioneering, have been recalled and are expected at Bel- grade to-morrow, Friday, at 10 a.m. Patchou, who communicated to me the contents of the note, solicits the help of Russia and de- clares that no Servian Government could accept the demands of Austria. Russian Orange Book No. 2 Russian Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Belgrade, July 10 (23), 1914. Text of the note presented to the Servian Government by the Austro-Hungarian Minister to-day. [Here follows the text of the note, for which see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 7, July 22, 1914.] 64 Official Diplomatic Documents Serbia : From Austro-Hungarian Minister Serbian Blue Book No. 32 Baron Giesl mn Gieslingen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, to Dr. Laza Patchou, Acting Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Belgrade, July 10/£3, 1914. I HAVE the honour to transmit to Your Excellency herewith the enclosed Note which I have received from my Government, addressed to the Royal Serbian Government. I have, etc. Handed personally at 6 p.m. [For the text of the note see Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. 7, July 22, 1914.] To All the Serbian Legations Abroad Serbian Blue Book No. 33 Dr. Laza Patchou, Acting Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad. (Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 10/23, 1914. The Austro-Hungarian Minister handed me this afternoon at 6 P.M. a note in regard to the Serajevo outrage embodying the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government, and insisting on a reply from the Serbian Government within two days, i.e., by Saturday, at 6 p.m. He informed me orally that he and his staff would leave Belgrade unless a favourable answer were forthcoming within the stipulated time. Some of the Ministers being absent from Belgrade the Serbian Government have not as yet come to any decision, but I am in a position to state now that the demands are such that no Serbian Government could accept them in their entirety. July 24, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 17 65 Friday, July 24, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Austria-Hungary Belgium France Germany Great Britain Russia Serbia Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from London, Petrograd London, etc. Viviani, London, etc. Vienna, Paris, Belgrade Vienna, London etc. Petrograd, London Crown Prince to Czar London, Paris, Petrograd Vienna Viviani, Berlin, London, Petrograd, Aust.-Hung. Ambassador Vienna, Petrograd Berlin, Petrograd, Vienna, Belgrade, Ger- man Ambassador Berlin, Paris, Belgrade Aust.-Hung. Ambassador, Crown Prince of Servia Petrograd The Governments of the several European Powers are officially notified of the Austro-Hungarian note to Servia. Austria-Hungary and Germany insist that the dispute remain localized between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Great Britain proposes a Conference of four Powers, Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy to mediate between Austria and Russia. At the request of the French Ambassador she apparently alters her plan to mean mediation between Austria and Serbia. From the published despatches of this day, which are con- tradictory, it does not appear which plan Great Britain is urging. She refuses however, to exert pressure on Russia while asking Germany to exert pressure in Vienna. Great Britain refuses Russia's request to promise her unconditional support of Russia and France, but instructs her representative in Belgrade to express no views except in agreement with the representatives of the other two Entente Powers, whose alliance with each other she recognizes to be as binding as that of Austria-Hungary and Germany. Serbia is sure that war on her means a European War. Russia is hostile in her dealings with Austria-Hungary and Germany, and discusses her determination to support Serbia even to the extent of going to war, but does so only with the Entente Powers. France promises to support Russia in war, if need be, but gives active diplo- matic support to Great Britain's proposal of a Conference of Four Powers. Italy does the same. Great Britain mobilizes her fleet, according to French Yellow Book No. 66, July 27, 1914, but does not mention this fact in any of her published despatches. Belgium foresees a European war. Austria-Hungary : To London AUSTRO-HUNGAKIAN ReD BoOK No. 17 Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London, (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 24, 1914, In answer to Your Excellency's telegram of yesterday : I beg you to explain at once to Sir Edward Grey that our demarche of yesterday at Belgrade is not to be considered as a formal ultimatum, 66 Official Diplomatic Documents but that it is merely a demarche with a time-Hmit, which, as Your Excellency will be good enough to explain to Sir Edward Grey in strict confidence will — if the time-limit expires without result — for the time be followed only by the breaking off of diplomatic relations, and by the beginning of the necessary military preparations, as we are absolutely resolved to carry through our just demands. Your Excellency is empowered to add that if Servia, after the ex- piration of the time-limit, were only to give way under the pressure of our military preparations, we should indeed have to demand that she should make good the expenses which we had incurred ; as is well known, we have already had twice (1908 and 1912) to mobilise because of Servia. Austria-Hungary: From London AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 10 Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) London, July 24, 1914- Have just handed the circular note to Sir Edward Grey, who read it carefully. At the fifth heading, he asked what it meant; to introduce officials of our Government in Servia would be equivalent to the end of Servian political independence. I answered that co- operation of, e.g., police officials, in no way affected the sovereignty of the State. He regretted the time-limit, as in this way we should be deprived of the possibility of quieting the first outbreak of excitement and bring- ing pressure to bear upon Belgrade to give us a satisfactory answer. It was always possible to send an ultimatum if answer not satis- factory. I developed our point of view at length. (Necessity of defence against continued revolutionary undertakings which threaten the territory of the Monarchy, protection of our most vital interests, complete failure of the conciliatory attitude which we had hitherto often shown to Servia, who had had more than three weeks to set on foot of her own accord investigations as to accomplices in outrage, etc.) The Secretary of State repeated his objections to the short time- limit, but recognized that what was said as to complicity in the crime of Serajevo, as well as many of our other requirements, was justified. He would be quite ready to look on the affair as one which only concerned Austria-Hungary and Servia. He is, however, very "apprehensive" that several Great Powers might be involved in a war. Speaking of Russia, Germany and France, he observed that the terms of the Franco-Russian Alliance might be more or less to the same effect as those of the Triple Alliance. I fully explained to him our point of view, and repeated with emphasis that in this case we must stand firm so as to gain for our- July 24, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 11 67 selves some sort of guarantees, as hitherto Servian promises have never been kept. I understand that in the first place he considered the question only as it influences the position of Europe. He must, how- ever, in order to be fair to our point of view, put himself in our situa- tion. He would not go into any more detailed discussion on this subject, said he must have time to study the note more carefully. He was to see the German and the French Ambassadors, as he must first of all exchange ideas with the Powers who are allies of Austria-Hungary and Russia respectively, but have themselves no direct interest in Servia. From Paris Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 11 Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold, (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 2^, 1914. I HAVE just read instructions of the 22nd instant to the Minister of Justice,^ who is entrusted with the representation of the Minister for Foreign Affairs in his absence, and left copy. M. Bienvenu-Martin, who had received information as to the con- tents of our demarche at Belgrade through this morning's papers, seemed to be considerably impressed by my communication. With- out entering on any more detailed discussion of the text, he readily agreed that recent events and the attitude of the Servian Government made energetic action on our side quite comprehensible. Point 5 in the note handed in at Belgrade seemed to make a special impression on the Minister as he asked me to read it to him twice. The Minister thanked me for my communication which, he said, would be carefully examined. I took the opportunity to impress on him that the question was one which must be brought to an issue directly between Servia and us, but that it was in the general interests of Europe that the trouble which for years past had been kept up by Servian intrigues against us should at last make way for a clear situa- tion. All friends of peace and order, and I placed France in the first rank of these, should therefore give serious advice to Servia com- pletely to change her attitude, and to satisfy our just demands. The Minister said that it was the duty of Servia to proceed ener- getically against any accomplices of the murderers of Serajevo, a duty which she could not escape. While laying special stress on the sympathy of France for Austria-Hungary, and on the good relations which existed between our two countries, he expressed the hope that the controversy would be brought to an end peacefully in a manner corresponding to our wishes. The Minister avoided every attempt to palliate or to defend in any way the attitude of Servia. 1 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 25, July 24, 1914. 68 Official Diplomatic Documents AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 12 Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 2Jj., 19H. Baron Schoen will, in accordance with instructions/ make a com- munication here to-day that according to the view of the Berlin Cabinet, our controversy with Servia is a matter which concerns only Austria-Hungary and Servia. In this connection, he would give them to understand that in case third States should wish to intervene, Germany, true to the obligations of her alliance, would-be on our side. AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 13 Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 24, 1914- Baron Schoen has just made the demarche as he was instructed. M. Bienvenu-Martin said to him he could not yet express himself definitely. He could, however, already say this, that the French Government are also of opinion that our controversy with Servia concerns Belgrade and Vienna alone, and that it was hoped here that the question would find a direct and peaceful solution. The Servian Minister here had already been advised ^ that his Government should give way in every point so far as it was possible, with the limitation, however, " so far as their sovereign rights were not affected." Baron Schoen laid stress on the European necessity that the focus of constant disturbance at Belgrade must at last be done away with. To Petrograd AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 18 Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petershurgh. Vienna, July 24, 1914- I RECEIVED the Russian Charge d'Affaires on the morning of the 24th, and assured him that I attached special importance to bringing to his knowedge as soon as possible the steps we were taking in Bel- grade, and explaining to him our point of view as regards them. Prince Koudacheff, while thanking me for this courtesy, did not hide his anxiety as to our categorical procedure against Servia, and he observed that there had always been apprehension at St. Peters- burgh that our demarche might take the form of a humiliation of Servia, which must have an echo in Russia. 1 took the opportunity of reassuring the Russian Charge d'Affaires » German White Book, Exhibit 1, July 23, 1914. 2 Cf. Serbian Blue Book No. 10, July 2. For different advice given Serbia by France, see French Yellow Book No. 26, July 24, 1914. July 24, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. I4. 69 as to this. Our aim was to clear up the untenable position of Servia as regards the Monarchy, and with this object to cause the Govern- nient of that State on the one hand publicly to disavow the tendencies directed against the present position of the Monarchy, and to suppress them by administrative measures, and on the other hand to make it possible for us to satisfy ourselves that these measures were honestly carried out. I explained at greater length the danger, not only to the integrity of the Monarchy, but also to the balance of power and the peace of Europe, which would be involved in giving further scope to the Great-Servian propaganda, and how all the dynasties, and, not least, the Russian, would apparently be threatened, if the idea took root that a movement which made use of murder as a national weapon could be continued with impunity. In conclusion, I pointed out that we did not aim at any increase of territory, but only at the maintenance of what we possess, a point of view which could not fail to be understood by the Russian Govern- ment. Prince Koudacheff remarked on this that he did not know the view of his own Government, and also did not know what position Servia would take towards individual demands. At the conclusion of our interview the Charge d 'Affaires expressly said that he would not fail to bring to the notice of his Government the explanation which I had given him of the step we had taken, especially to the effect that no humiliation of Servia was intended by us. From Petrograd Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 14 Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 24, 1914. The Minister for Foreign Affairs on receiving me, said that he knew what brought me to him, and he would at once explain to me that he could not take up any definite attitude towards my demarche. , I be- gan by reading out my instructions.^ The Minister interrupted me for the first time on the mention of the series of outrages, and, on my explanation, asked if then it had been proved that they all had orig- inated at Belgrade. I laid stress on the fact that they all sprang from Servian instigation. In the further course of the reading he said that he knew what it was all about : we wanted to make war on Servia, and this was to serve as a pretext. I replied that our attitude during recent years was a sufficient proof that we neither sought nor required pretexts against Servia. The formal declaration which is required did not elicit any objection from the Minister ; he only continued to maintain that Pasic had already expressed himself to this effect. This I corrected. "II dira cela 25 fois si vous midez,'' said he. I said to him that no one among us was attacking the integrity of Servia or the 1 Austro-Hungarian Red Book Nos. 7 and 8, July 22, 1914. 70 Official Diplomatic Documents dynasty. M. Sazonof expressed himself most vigorously against the dissolution of the Narodna Odbrana, which Servia would never under- take. The participation of Imperial and Royal officials in the sup- pression of the revolutionary movements elicited further protest on the part of the Minister. Servia then will no longer be master in her own house. " You will always be wanting to intervene again, and what a life you will lead Europe." I answered that if Servia shows goodwill it will be a quieter life than hitherto. The commentary added to the communication of the note was listened to by the Minister with fair composure ; at the passage that our feelings were shared by those of all civilised nations, he observed that this was a mistake. With all the emphasis I could command, I pointed out how regrettable it would be if we could not come to an understanding with Russia on this question, in which everything which is most sacred to us was at stake and, whatever the Minister might say, everything which is sacred in Russia. The Minister attempted to minimise the Monarchial side of the question. With regard to the dossier which was put at the disposal of the Governments, M. Sazonof wanted to know why we had given our- selves this trouble, as we had already delivered the ultimatum. This was the best proof that we did not really desire an impartial examina- tion of the matter. I said to him that the results which had been attained by our own investigations were quite sufficient for our pro- cedure in this matter, which had to do with Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that we were only ready to give the Powers further infor- mation if it interested them, as we had nothing to keep secret. M. Sazonof said that now that the ultimatum had been issued he was not in the least curious. He represented the matter as if we only wanted to make war with Servia whatever happened. I answered that we were the most peace-loving Power in the world, but what we wanted was security for our territory from foreign revolutionary intrigues, and the protection of our dynasty from bombs. In the course of the further discussion, M. Sazonof again made the observation that we certainly had created a serious situation. In spite of his relative calm, the attitude of the Minister was through- out unaccommodating and hostile. AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 15 Communique of the Russian official Gazette, St. Petershurgh, July 24, 1914., The St. Petersburgh telegraphic agency announces : — The official journal publishes the following communique — Recent events and the despatch of an ultimatum to Servia by Austria-Hungary are causing the Russian Government the greatest anxiety. The Government are closely following the course of the dispute between the two countries, to which Russia cannot remain indifferent. July 24, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 16 71 AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 16 Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 24, 1914. After a Council of Ministers^ which lasted for five hours, M. Sazonof this evening received the German Ambassador, and had a long conversation with him. The Minister took the point of view, which is probably to be con- sidered as the outcome of the Council of Ministers, that the Austro- Hungarian-Servian conflict was not a matter confined to these States, but a European affair, as the settlement arrived at in the year 1909 by the Servian declaration had been made under the auspices of the whole of Europe. The Minister pointed out particularly that he had been disagree- ably affected by the circumstance that Austria-Hungary had offered a dossier for investigation when an ultimatum had already been presented. Russia would require an international investigation of the dossier, which had been put at her disposal. My German col- league at once brought to M. Sazonof 's notice that Austria-Hungary would not accept interference in her difference with Servia, and that Germany also on her side could not accept a suggestion which would be contrary to the dignity of her ally as a Great Power. In the further course of the conversation, the Minister explained that that which Russia could not accept with indifference was the eventual intention of Austria-Hungary '' de devorer la Serbie." Count Pourtales answered that he did not accept any such intention on the part of Austria-Hungary, as this would be contrary to the most special interest of the Monarchy. The only object of Austria- Hungary was " d'infliger a la Serbie le chdtiment justement merite. ' ' M. Sazonof on this expressed his doubts whether Austria-Hungary would allow, herself to be contented with this, even if explanations on this point had been made. The interview concluded with an appeal by M. Sazonof that Ger- many should work with Russia at the maintenance of peace.^ The German Ambassador assured the Russian Minister that Germany certainly had no wish to bring about a war, but that she naturally fully represented the interests of her ally. 1 This is undoubtedly the Council of Ministers at which Mr. Sazonof said, British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, 1914, he would have to consult his colleagues concerning the reply which Serbia would make to Austria. 2 The condition on which Russia would insist is stated in British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, 1914, where Sazonof, as a result of the Council of Ministers held in the after- noon of July 24, states : "Russia could not allow Austria to crush Serbia and become the predominant Power in the Balkans, and if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war." Students will note that while the determination of the Entente Powers to go to war unless Austria-Hungary recedes from her position is occasionally expressed even in the published despatches (e.g. British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, French Yellow Book No. 38, July 25, and No. 37, which should be compared with British Blue Book No. 25, same day. See also the Editor's " Germany's Point of View," page 230), this is nev^r mentioned to any of the Triple Alliance Powers. 72 Official Diplomatic Documents Belgium : From Vienna Belgian Gray Book No. 1 Count Erremhault de Dudzeele, Belgian Minister at Vienna, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Vienna, July 24, 1914- I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith the text of the Austro- Hungarian ultimatum to Servia. [Here follows the text of the Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia, Red Book No. 7, July 22, 1914.] To Paris, London, Berlin, Vienna and Petrograd Belgian Gray Book No. 2 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg. Sir, Brussels, July 24, 1914- The Belgian Government have had under their consideration whether, in present circumstances, it would not be advisable to address to the Powers who guarantee Belgian independence and neu- trality a communication assuring them of Belgium's determination to fulfil the international obligations imposed upon her by treaty in the event of a war breaking out on her frontiers. The Government have come to the conclusion that such a communi- tion would be premature at present, but that events might move rapidly and not leave sufficient time to forward suitable instructions at the desired moment to the Belgian representatives abroad. In these circumstances I have proposed to the King and to my col- leagues in the Cabinet, who have concurred, to give you now exact instructions as to the steps to be taken by you if the prospect of a Franco-German war became more threatening. I enclose herewith a note, signed, but not dated, which you should read to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and of which you should give him a copy, if circumstances render such a communication necessary. I will inform you by telegram when you are to act on these instruc- tions. This telegram will be despatched when the order is given for the mobilisation of the Belgian army if, contrary to our earnest hope and to the apparent prospect of a peaceful settlement, our information leads us to take this extreme measure of precaution. Enclosure in No. 2. Sir, The international situation is serious, and the possibility of a war between several Powers naturally preoccupies the Belgian Government. July 24i Belgian Gray Book No, 2 73 Belgium has most scrupulously observed ^ the duties of a neutral State imposed upon her by the treaties of April 19, 1839 ; and those duties she will strive unflinchingly to fulfil, whatever the circum- stances may be. The friendly feelings of the Powers towards her have been so often reaffirmed that Belgium confidently expects that her territory will remain free from any attack, should hostilities break out upon her frontiers. All necessary steps to ensure respect of Belgian neutrality have nevertheless been taken by the Government. The Belgian army has been mobilised and is taking up such strategic positions as have been chosen to secure the defence of the country and the respect of its neutrality. The forts of Antwerp and on the Meuse have been put in a state of defence. It is scarcely necessary to dwell upon the nature of these measures. They are intended solely to enable Belgium to fulfil her international obligations ; and it is obvious that they neither have been nor can have been undertaken with any intention of taking part in an armed struggle between the Powers or from any feeling of distrust of any of those Powers. In accordance with my instructions, I have the honour to communi- cate to your Excellency a copy of the declaration by the Belgian Government, and to request that you will be good enough to take note of it. A similar communication has been made to the other Powers guaranteeing Belgian neutrality.^ 1 The truth of this statement has been challenged by Germany. For the Official Publications on this subject see European Politics During the Decade before the War as Described by Belgian Diplomatists, German Foreign Office, 1915. See also Fuehr, Alexander, The Neutrality of Belgium, Funk & Wagnalls Co., 1915. 2 These notes were presented to the several Powers on August 1, 1914, in accordance with a telegram (see Belgian Gray Book No. 16) of that day ; i.e. a week and a day after the note had been drawn. One of the reasons why Belgium drew this note thus early, on July 24, may be found in the events touched upon in an account of the experiences of a member of the British Military Intelligence Department, given by himself before the Boston Press Club on Sunday, January 14, 1915. This British officer is Mr. Forbes Sutherland, who said according to an affidavit by two witnesses in the editor's possession : That for several years he had been a member of the British Military -Intelligence Department. That he landed in New York toward the end of June, 1914, and he there found a cablegram from the home office in London, already three days old, telling him to re- port immediately. That he telephoned to his local chief in Montreal, Canada, to mquire what it was all about, and that he was told that it was for the European service. That he had returned to London and that about one week before the first declara- tion of war he had gone to Antwerp with one of the heads of the intelligence depart- ment to concert measures with the head of the Belgian secret service. 74 Official Diplomatic Documents From M. Viviani, the French Premier, who had been absent together with the President on a msit to Russia. French Yellow Book No. 22 M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, to M. Rienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. I SHOULD be obliged if you would urgently send on to M. Dumaine the following information and instructions. Reml, July 24, 1914, 1 A-M. In the course of my conversation with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs we had to take into consideration the dangers which might result from any step taken by Austria-Hungary in relation to Servia in connection with the crime of which the Hereditary Archduke has been a victim. We found ourselves in agreement in thinking that we should not leave anything undone to prevent a request for an ex- planation or some mise en demeure which would be equivalent to in- tervention in the internal affairs of Servia, of such a kind that Servia might consider it as an attack on her sovereignty and independence. We have in consequence come to the opinion that we might by means of a friendly conversation with Count Berchtold, give him counsels of moderation, of such a kind as to make him understand how undesirable would be any intervention at Belgrade which would appear to be a threat on the part of the Cabinet at Vienna. The British Ambassador, who was kept informed by M. Sazonof, expressed the idea that his Government would doubtless associate itself with a demarche for removing any danger which might threaten general peace, and he has telegraphed to his Government to this effect. M. Sazonof has addressed instructions to this effect to M. Schebeko. While there is no question in this of collective or concerted action at Vienna on the part of the representatives of the Triple Entente, I ask you to discuss the matter with the Russian and British Ambassadors, and to come to an agreement with them as to the best means by which each of you can make Count Berchtold understand without delay the moderation that the present situation appears to us to require. Further, it would be desirable to ask M. Paul Cambon to bring the advantages of this procedure to the notice of Sir Edward Grey, and to support the suggestion that the British Ambassador in Russia will have made to this effect to the Foreign Office. Count Bencken- dorff is instructed to make a similar recommendation. Rene Viviani. July 24, Frerwh Yellow Book No. 25 75 French Yellow Book No. 23 M. Biemenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Vouncil, on hoard the "France.'' Paris, July 2J,., 1914. I HAVE sent on your instructions to Vienna as urgent, but ^ from in- formation contained in this morning's papers it appears that the Austrian note was presented at Belgrade at 6 o'clock yesterday evening. This note, the official text of which has not yet been handed to us by the Austro-Hungarian x\mbassador, appears to be very sharp ; it appears to aim not only at obtaining the prosecution of the Serbs who were directly implicated in the outrage of Serajevo but to require the immediate suppression of the whole of the anti-Austrian propa- ganda in the Servian press and army. It is said to give Servia till 6 o'clock on Saturday evening to make her submission. In sending your instructions to M. Dumaine I requested him to come to an agreement with his British and Russian colleagues^ as to his action. Bienvenu-Martin. - France From the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador French Yellow Book No. 24 [Here follows the text of the Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia, Austrian Red Book No. 7, July 22, 1914.1 To Viviani, and London, Berlin, Vienna, Petrograd, Rome and Belgrade. French Yellow Book No. 25 M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, on board the "France,'' and to London, Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburgh, Rome, Belgrade. Paris, July 24, 1914. I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador this morning left me a copy of the Austrian note which was handed in at Belgrade on Thursday evening. Count Szecsen in- 1 M. Martin's reply, No. 23, indicates that he understood M. Viviani's message, No. 22, to suggest means by which Austria-Hungary might be prevented from pre- senting her note to Servia. If this was the meaning of the message, it can only have been written with a view to future publication and not in the hope of accomplishing anything. The note is dated July 24, 1 a.m. By that time both Russia and Great Britain had been informed of the contents of the note (British Blue Book No. 3) and the fact that the note had been presented (Russian Orange Book No, 2). In view of the decision of the Entente Powers to have their representatives act in unison — cf. last sentence of Yellow Book No. 23 with British Blue Book No. 12, July 24, 1914 — it is certain that neither Great Britain nor Russia would have kept so important an event as the presentation of the Austro-Hungarian note from the French Premier. 2 The Entente Powers acted in the Serbian difficulty as a unit from the first. Cf. British Blue Book No. 12, same day, and French Yellow Book No. 23, same day, also Serbian Blue Book No. 5, June 30, 1914. 76 Official Diplomatic Documents forms me that the Austro-Hungarian Government gives the Servian Government up to 5 o'clock on the evening of Saturday the 25th for their answer.^ The note is based on the undertaking made by Servia on the 31st March 1909, to recognise the annexation of Bosnia and Herze- govina, and reproaches the Servian Government with having tolerated an anti-Austrian propaganda in which officials, the army, and the press have taken part, a propaganda which threatens the security and integrity of Austria, and the danger of which has been shown by the crime of the 28th June which, according to the facts established during the investigation, was planned at Belgrade. . The Austrian Government explain that they are compelled to put an end to a propaganda which forms a permanent danger to their tranquillity, and to require from the Servian Government an official pronouncement of their determination to condemn and suppress it, by publishing in the Official Gazette of the 26th a declaration, the terms of which are given, condemning it, stating their regret, and threatening to crush it. A general order of the King to the Servian army is at the same time to make these declarations known to the army. In addition to this, the Servian Government are to undertake to suppress publications, to dissolve the societies, to dismiss those officers and civil servants whose names would be communicated to them by the Austrian Government, to accept the cooperation of Austrian officials in suppressing the subversive acts to which their attention has been directed, as well as for the investigation into the crime of Serajevo, and finally to proceed to the immediate arrest of a Servian officer and an official who were concerned in it. Annexed to the Austrian memorandum is a note which sums up the facts established by the investigation into the crime of Serajevo, and declares that it was planned at Belgrade ; that the bombs were provided for the murderers, and came from a depot of the Servian army ; finally that the murderers were drilled and helped by Servian officers and officials. On visiting the Acting Political Director immediately after making this communication, Count Szecsen without any observations in- formed him that the note had been presented. M. Berthelot, on my instructions, confined himself to pointing out to the Austro- Hungarian Ambassador the feeling of anxiety which had been aroused by the information available this morning as to the contents of the Austrian note, and the painful feeling which could not fail to be aroused in French public opinion by the time chosen for so categorical 1 The French Yellow Book prints here the following note : " The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in a private letter on the 24th July sent to the Minister for Foreign Afifairs the following correction : " 'In the copy of the dispatch which I had the honour to send to your Excellency this morning, it was said that my Government expected an answer from the Cabinet at Belgrade at latest by 5 o'clock on the evening of Saturday the 25th of this month. As our Minister at Belgrade did not deliver his note yesterday until 6 o'clock in the evening, the time allowed for the answer has in consequence been prolonged to 6 o'clock to-morrow, Saturday evening. "'I consider it my duty to inform your Excellency of this slight alteration in the termination of the period fixed for the answer to the Servian Government.' " July 24, French Yellow Book No. 26 11 a demarche with so short a time Hmit ; that is to say, a time when the President of the Republic and the President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic had left St. Petersburgh and were at sea/ and consequently were not able to exert, in agree- ment with those Powers which were not directly interested, that soothing influence on Servia and Austria which was so desirable in the interest of general peace. ^ The Servian Minister has not yet received any information as to the intentions of his Government. The German Ambassador has asked me to receive him at 5 o'clock this afternoon. ^ Bienvenu-Martin. To Stockholm — for M. Vimani — Belgrade, Vienna, London, Berlin, Rome, Petrograd French Yellow Book No. 26 M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Thiehaut, French Minister at Stockholm (for the President of the Council), and to Belgrade, Vienna, London, Berlin, Rome, St. Petersburgh. Paris, July 24, 1914- M. Vesnitch was this morning still without any telegram from his Government informing him as to their intentions, and did not know the contents of the Austrian note.^ To a request for advice which he made to the Political Director, M. Berthelot said to him, speaking personally and for himself alone, that Servia must try to gain time,^ as the limit of forty-eight hours perhaps formed rather a "mise en demeure^' than an ultimatum in the proper sense of the term ; that there might, for instance, be an opportunity of offering satisfaction on all those points which were not inconsistent with the dignity and sovereignty of Servia ; he was advised to draw attention to the fact that statements based on the Austrian investigations at Serajevo were one sided, and that Servia, while she was quite ready to take measures against all the accomplices of a crime which she most strongly condemned, required full in- formation as to the evidence in order to be able to verify it with all speed ; above all to attempt to escape from the direct grip of Austria by declaring herself ready to submit to the arbitration of Europe. I have asked at London and St. Petersburgh for the views and in- tentions of the British and Russian Governments. It appears on 1 This thought is stated as coining from the Russian Charg6 d 'Affaires in Berlin, in Yellow Book No. 29, July 24, 1914. Cf. also British Blue Book No. 6. 2 The Austrian Ambassador reporting to his home office (Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 11, July 24), does not mention this interview with the Acting Political Director. On the other hand M. Bienvenu-Martin does not state here what the Ambassador quotes him there as having said. 3 The contents of the Austrian note had been published in the French morning papers of July 24, 1914, see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 11, July 24; and had been disclosed to Sir Edward Grey, British Blue Book No. 3, July 23, 1914. * The advice given Serbia by France is differently stated in Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 13, July 24, 1914. 78y Official Diplomatic Documents the other hand from our information that the Austrian note was not communicated to Italy until to-day, and that Italy had neither been consulted nor even informed ^ of it. Bienvenu-Martin. French Yellow Book No. 27 M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stock- holm {for the President of the Council), and to Belgrade, London, St. Petershurgh, Berlin, Rome. Paris, July 2Ii., 1914- The French Ambassador at Vienna informs me ^ that opinion has been startled by the sudden and exaggerated nature of the Austrian demands, but that the chief fear of the military party appears to be that Servia may give way. The Servian Minister in Austria thinks that his. Government will show themselves very conciliatory in all that concerns the punish- ment of the accomplices of the crime, and the guarantees to be given as to the suppression of the anti-Austrian propaganda, but that they could not accept a general order to the army dictated to the King, nor the dismissal of officers who were suspected by Austria, nor the interference of foreign officials in Servia. M. Yovanovitch considers that, if it were possible to start a discussion, a settlement of the dis- pute might still be arranged, with the assistance of the Powers. Our Ambassador at Berlin ^ gives an account of the excitement aroused by the Austrian note, and of the state of feeling of the Russian Charge d'Affaires, who thinks that a large part of opinion in Ger- many would desire war. The tone of the press is threatening and appears to have as its object the intimidation of Russia. Our Ambassador is to see Herr von Jagow this evening. M. Barrere informs us that Italy "^ is exercising moderating influence at Vienna and is trying to avoid complications. Bienvenu-Martin. French Yellow Book No. 28 M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stock- holm {for the President of the Council), and to Belgrade, London, St. Petershurgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome. Paris, July 24, 1914. Herr von Schoen came to inform me of a note from his Govern- ment, of which he would not leave me a copy,^ but at my request he read it twice over to me. 1 This seems to be at variance with British Blue Book No. 38, July 23, 1914. 2 The despatch from the French Ambassador in Vienna here referred to has not been published. » Cf. below French Yellow Book No. 29. July 24, 1914. * The despatch from the French Ambassador in Rome here referred to has not been published. ' There is no reason why he should not leave a copy with M. Martin. The Ger- man Ambassador in London apparently left a copy with Sir E. Grey ; British Blue Book July 2Jf, French Yellow Book No. 28 79 The Note was almost word for word as follows : — "The statements of the Austro-Hungarian newspapers concerning the circumstances under which the assassination of the Austrian heir presumptive and his consort has taken place disclose unmistakably the aims which the Pan-Servian propaganda has set itself, and the means it employs to realise them. The facts made known must also do away with all doubt that the centre of activity of all those tend- encies which are directed towards the detachment of the Southern Slav provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their in- corporation into the Servian Kingdom is to be found in Belgrade, and is, at any rate, at work there, with the connivance of members of the Government and the army. "The Servian intrigues have been going on for many years. In an especially marked form the Pan-Servian chauvinism manifested itself during the Bosnian crisis. It was only owing to the moderation and far-reaching self-restraint of the Austro-Hungarian Government and to the energetic intervention of the Great Powers that the Servian provocations to which Austria-Hungary was then exposed did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of good conduct in future which was given by the Servian Government at that time has not been kept. Under the eyes, at least with the tacit permission, of official Servia, the Pan-Servian propaganda has, since that time, continuously in- creased in extension and intensity. To its account must be set the recent crime, the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become clearly evident that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to remain longer inactive in face of this movement on the other side of the frontier, by which the security and the integrity of her territories are constantly menaced. Under these circumstances, the course of pro- cedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as justified. In spite of that, the attitude which public opinion as well as the Government in Servia have recently adopted does not exclude the apprehension that the Servian Government might refuse to comply with those demands, and might even allow themselves to be carried away into a provocative attitude towards Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Government, if they do not wish definitely to abandon Austria's position as a Great Power, would then have no choice but to obtain the fulfilment of their de- mands from the Servian Government by strong pressure and, if necessary, by using military measures, the choice of the means having to be left to them." The German Ambassador particularly called my attention to the last two paragraphs of his note before reading it, pressing the point that this was the important matter. I noted down the text literally ; it is as follows : — " The German Government consider that in the present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively No. 9, July 24, 1914. M. Martin must have had a copy of it when he wrote this mes- sage. However excellent his memory is, he could not have quoted a lengthy note as accurately as he did, from memory. 80 Official Diplomatic Docummts betweei? Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that the Great Powers ought seriously to endeavour to restrict it to those two immediately concerned. "The German Government desire urgently the localisation of the dispute, because every interference of another Power would, owing to the natural play of alliances, be followed by incalculable conse- quences." I called the German Ambassador's attention to the fact that while it might appear legitimate to demand the punishment of all those who were implicated in the crime of Serajevo, on the other hand it seemed difficult to require measures which could not be accepted, having regard to the dignity and sovereignty of Servia ; the Servian Government, even if it was willing to submit to them, would risk being carried away by a revolution. I also pointed out to Herr von Schoen that his note only took into account two hypotheses : that of a pure and simple refusal or that of a provocative attitude on the part of Servia. The third hypothesis (which would leave the door open for an arrangement) should also be taken into consideration ; that of Servia's acceptance and of her agreeing at once to give full satisfaction for the punishment of the ac- complices and full guarantees for the suppression of the anti-Austrian propaganda so far as they were compatible with her sovereignty and dignity. I added that if within these limits the satisfaction desired by Austria could be admitted, the means of obtaining it could be examined ; if Servia gave obvious proof of goodwill it could not be thought that Austria would refuse to take part in the conversation. Perhaps they should not make it too difficult for third Powers, who could not either morally or sentimentally cease to take interest in Servia, to take an attitude which was in accord with the wishes of Germany to localise the dispute. Herr von Schoen recognised the justice of these considerations and vaguely stated that hope was always possible. When I asked him if we should give to the x\ustrian note the character of a simple mise en demeure, which permitted a discussion, or an ultimatum, he answ^ered that personally he had no views. Bienvenu-Martin. From Berlin French Yellow Book No. 29 M, Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 24, 1914. The delivery of the Austrian note to Servia has made a deep im- pression. The Austrian Ambassador declares that his Government could not abate any of their demands. At the Wilhelmstrasse, as well as in the press, the same view is expressed. July 24, French Yellow Book No. 30 81 Most of the Charges d'Affaires present in Berlin came to see me this morning. They show Httle hope of a peaceful issue. The Russian Charge d'Affaires bitterly remarked that Austria has pre- sented her note at the very moment that the President of the Republic and the President of the Council had left St. Petersburgh.^ He is in- clined to think that a considerable section of opinion in Germany desires war and would like to seize this opportunity, in which Austria will not doubt be found more united than in the past, and in which the German Emperor, influenced by a desire to give support to the monarchic principle (par un sentiment de solidarite monarchique) and by horror at the crime, is less inclined to show a conciliatory attitude. Herr von Jagow is going to receive me late in the afternoon. Jules Cambon. French Yellow Book No. 30 M. Jules Camhon, French Ambassador at Berlin^ to M. Bienvenu-. Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 24, 1914. I ASKED the Secretary of State to-day, in the interview which I had w^ith him, if it was correct, as announced in the newspapers, that Austria had presented a note to the Powers on her dispute with Servia ; if he had received it ; and what view he took of it. Herr von Jagow^ answered me in the affirmative, adding that the note was forcible, and that he approved it, the Servian Government having for a long time past wearied the patience of Austria. More- over, he considers this question to be a domestic one for Austria, and he hopes that it will be localised. I then said to him that not having as yet received any instructions, the views which I wished to exchange with him were strictly personal. Thereupon I asked him if the Berlin Cabinet had really been entirely ignorant of Austria's requirements before they were communicated to Belgrade, and as he told me that that was so, I showed him my sur- prise at seeing him thus undertake to support claims, of whose limit and scope he w^as ignorant. Herr von Jagow interrupted me, and said, " It is only because we are having a personal conversation that I allow you to say that to me." "Certainly," I replied, "but if Peter I. humiliates himself , domestic trouble will probably break out in Servia ; that will open the door to fresh possibilities, and do you know where you will be led by Vienna ? " I added that the language of the German newspapers was not the language of persons who were indifferent to, and unacquainted with, the question, but betoken an active support. Finally, I remarked that the shortness of the time limit given to Servia for submission w^ould make an unpleasant impression in Europe. Here von Jagow answered that he quite expected a little excitement 1 The identical thought was expressed on the same day in Paris by the Acting Political Director, French Yellow Book No. 25. See also same day, British Blue Book No. 6. 82 Official Diplomatic Documents (un peu d' emotion) on the part of Servia's friends, but that he was counting on their giving her wise advice. "I have no doubt," I then said to him, "that Russia would en- deavour to persuade the Cabinet of Belgrade to make acceptable concessions ; but why not ask from one what is being asked from the other, and if reliance is being placed on advice being given at Bel- grade, is it not also legitimate to rely on advice being given at Vienna from another quarter?" The Secretary of State went so far as to say that that depended on circumstances ; but immediately checked himself ; he repeated that the difficulty must be localised. He asked me if I really thought the situation serious. "Certainly," I answered, "because if what is happening is the result of due reflection, I do not understand why all means of retreat have been cut off." k\\ the evidence shows that Germany is ready to support Austria's attitude with unusual energy. The weakness which her Austro- Hungarian ally has shown for some years past, has w^eakened the con- fidence that was placed in her here. She was found heavy to drag along. Mischievous legal proceedings, such as the Agram and the Friedjung affairs, brought odium on her police and covered them with ridicule. All that was asked of the police was that they should be strong ; the conviction is that they were violent. An article which appeared in the Lokal Anzeiger this evening shows also that at the German Chancery there exists a state of mind to which we in Paris are naturally not inclined to pay sufficient attention, I mean the feeling that the monarchies must stand together {sentiment de la solidarite monarchique) . I am convinced that great weight must be attached to this point of view in order to appreciate the attitude of the Emperor William, whose impressionable nature must have been affected by the assassination of a prince whose guest he had been a few days previously. It is not less striking to notice the pains with which Herr von Jagow, and all the officials placed under his orders, pretend to every one that they were ^ ignorant of the scope of the note sent by Austria to Servia. Jules Cambon. From Petrograd French Yellow Book No. 31 M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at S. Peter shurgh, to M. Bienvenu- Martin^ Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. St. Petershurgh, July 24, 1914. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has communicated to M. Sazonof a threatening note to Servia. 1 This sentence reads "know nothing of the note" in The New York Times Trans- lation. It contradicts, therefore, the first part of the despatch where the contents of the note are discussed. The official English version gives no explanation of the altered wording. The edition of the French Yellow Book supplied to the editor by the French Ambassador in Washington, October, 1915, contains the past tense. July 24, French Yellow Book No. 32 83 The intentions of the Emperor of Russia and his Ministers could not be more pacific/ a fact of which the President of the RepubHc and the President of the Council have been able to satisfy them- selves directly; but the ultimatum which the Austro-Hungarian Government has just delivered to the Cabinet at Belgrade introduces a new and disquieting element into the situation. Public opinion in Russia would not allow Austria to offer violence to Servia. The shortness of the time limit fixed by the ultimatum renders still more difficult the moderating influence that the Powers of the Triple Entente, might exercise at Vienna. On the other hand, M. Sazonof assumes that Germany will desire to support her ally and I am afraid that this impression is correct. Nothing but the assurance of the solidarity of the Triple Entente can prevent the German Powers from emphasising their provocative attitude. ^ Paleologue. From London French Yellow Book No. 32 M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, July 24, 1914- Sir Edward Grey having discussed with me his desire to leave no stone unturned to avert the crisis, we agreed in thinking that the British Cabinet might ask the German Government to take the ini- tiative in approaching Vienna with the object of offering the media- tion, between Austria and Servia,^ of the four Powers which are not directly interested. If Germany agrees, time will be gained, and this is the essential point. Sir Edward Grey told me that he would discuss with Prince Lich- nowsky the proposal I have just explained. I mentioned the matter to my Russian colleague, who is afraid of a surprise from Germany, and who imagines that Austria w^ould not have despatched her ulti- matum without previous agreement with Berlin. Count Benckendorff told me that Prince Lichnowsky, when he returned from leave about a month ago, had intimated that he held pessimistic views regarding the relations between St. Petersburgh and Berlin. He had observed the uneasiness caused in this latter capital by the rumours of a naval entente between Russia and Great Britain, by the Tsar's visit to Bucharest, and by the strengthening of the Russian army. Count Benckendorff had concluded from this 1 This differs from British Blue Book No. 6, July 24 ; and No. 17, July 25, 1914. There was a conference between Sazonof and the French and British Ambassadors in Petrograd on July 24, in the morning, as described in British Blue Book No. 6. So far as the French published despatches go, the above is the only report. Cf. also below, German White Book, Exhibit 4, July 24, 1914. 2 M. Bienvenu-Martin in quoting this suggestion in Yellow Book No. 34, same day, alters it to include mediation at Vienna and St. Petersburgh. That this was not the Cambon-Grey intention appears from British Blue Book No. 10, July 24, where Sir E. Grey begins with his idea of action " simultaneously in Vienna and St. Petersburgh," while M. Paul Cambon prefers "mediation between Austria and Servia." 84 Official Diplomatic Documents that a war with Russia would be looked upon without disfavour in Germany. The Under-Secretary of State has been struck, as all of us have been, by the anxious looks of Prince Lichnowsky since his return from Berlin, and he considers that if Germany had wished to do so she could have stopped the despatch of the ultimatum. The situation, therefore, is as grave as it can be, and we see no way of arresting the course of events. However, Count Benckendorff thinks it right to attempt the demarche upon which I have agreed with Sir Edward Grey. Paul Cambon. French Yellow Book No. 33 ^ M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M, Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, July 2Jj., 19H. The Servian Minister received to-night from M. Pashitch a tele- gram saying that the Austro-Hungarian Government had sent him their ultimatum, the time limit of which expires at 6 o'clock to- morrow, Saturday evening. j\I. Pashitch does not give the terms of the Austrian communication, but if it is of the nature reported in to-day's " Times," it seems impossible for the Servian Government to accept it. In consultation with my Russian colleague, who thinks it extremely difficult for his Government not to support Servia, we have been ask- ing ourselves what intervention could avert the conflict. Sir Edward Grey having summoned me for this afternoon, I pro- pose to suggest that he should ask for the semi-official intervention of the German Government at Vienna to prevent a sudden attack. Paul Cambon. To Stockholm for M. Viviani, Belgrade, Petrograd, Berlin, Vienna, Rome French Yellow Sook No. 34 M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stock- holm (for the President of the Council), Belgrade, St. Petersburg h, Berlin, Vienna, Rome. Paris, July 24, 1914. The Austrian Ambassador having communicated his Govern- ment's note to Sir Edward Grey, the latter observed that no such 1 This despatch has been doctored for insertion here. It is an impossible message in its present form. It is dated July 24, and states that the " Servian Minister received to-night," etc., notification of the Austro-Hungarian note. This notification, however, was sent to the Servian Minister on the previous day, July 23. Cf . Serbian Blue Book No. 33. The casual reader would receive the impression from this despatch that the time limit granted to Serbia was 24 hours, from "to-night," July 24, to "to-morrow, Saturday evening." The last paragraph of this despatch. No. 33, refers to a summons to a conference, which has been described in No. 32. July 24, German White Book Exhibit 3 85 formidable declaration had ever been addressed by one Government to another ; he drew Count Mensdorff's attention to the responsibility assumed by Austria. With the possibility of a conflict between Austria and Russia before him, Sir Edward Grey proposes to ask for the cooperation of the German Government with a view to the mediation of the four powers who are not directly interested in the Servian question, namely, England, France, Italy and Germany ; this mediation to be exercised simultaneously at Vienna and at St. Petersburgh.^ 1 advised the Servian Minister to act cautiously, and I am willing to cooperate in any conciliatory action at Vienna, in the hope that Austria will not insist on the acceptance of all her demands as against a small State, if the latter shows herself ready to give every satis- faction which is considered compatible with her independence and ^ ^ ^' Bienvenu-Martin. Germany : From Vienna German WmTE Book ExmsiT 3^ Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the Chancellor on July 24th, 1914. Count Berchtold has asked to-day for the Russian Charge d'affaires^ in order to explain to him thoroughly and cordially Austria- Hungary's point of view toward Servia. After recapitulation of the historical development of the past few years, he emphasised that the Monarchy entertained no thought of conquest toward Servia. Austria-Hungary would not claim Servian territory. It insisted merely that this step was meant as a definite means of checking the Serb intrigues. Impelled by force of circumstances, Austria-Hungary must have a guaranty for continued amicable relations with Servia. It was far from him to intend to bring about a change in the balance of powers in the Balkan. The Charge d'affaires, who had received no instructions from St. Petersburg, took the discussion of the Secretary "ad referendum" with the promise to submit it immediately to Sasonof. 1 Mediation both in Vienna and Petrograd was Sir E. Grey's first idea, see British Blue Book No. 10, July 24, but he was dissuaded from it by the French Ambassador in London, M. Paul Cambon. Cf. British Blue Book No. 10, July 24, 1914. This statement here is, moreover, at variance with M. Cambon's report. Yellow Book No. 32, same day. M. Cambon's desire not to bring any pressure to bear on Russia was eventually shared by Sir E. Grey. Cf. French Yellow Book No. 62, July 27, and No. 80, July 28, and British Blue Book Nos. 11 and 16. 2 For Exhibit No. 2 see July 28, 1914. The Exhibits of the German White Book are not numbered chronologically. 3 See above, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 18, July 24, 1914. 86 Official Diplomatic Documents German White Book Exhibit 4 Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chan- cellor on July 2Jfth, 1914-- I HAVE just utilized the contents of Order 592 in a prolonged inter- view with Sasonof . The Secretary (Sasonof) indulged in unmeasured accusations^ toward Austria-Hungary and he was very much agitated. He declared most positively that Russia could not permit ^ under any circumstances that the Servo-Austrian difficulty be settled alone between the parties concerned. Great Britain : From the Austrian Ambassador. British Blue Book No. 4 Count Berchtold, Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Mensdorff, Austrian Ambassador in London. — {Communicated by Count Mensdorff, July 24, 1914.) [Here follows the Austro-Hungarian Note to Serbia; cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 7, July 22, 1914.] British Blue Book No. 5 Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 24, 1914. Note addressed to Servia, together with an explanation of the reasons leading up to it, has been communicated to me by Count Mensdorff.3 In the ensuing conversation with his Excellency, I remarked that it seemed to me a matter for great regret that a time limit,^ and such a short one at that, had been insisted upon at this stage of the pro- ceedings. The murder of the Archduke and some of the circum- stances respecting Servia quoted in the note aroused sympathy with Austria, as was but natural, but at the same time I had never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Servia 's independent sovereignty if it were to mean,^ as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of Servia. 1 Cf. above French Yellow Book No. 31, same day, "The intentions of the Emperor and his ministers could not be more pacific." 2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, 1915. 3 Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. * That there would be a time limit had been known to France and, therefore, probably to the Entente Powers, since July 19, 1914 ; cf. French Yellow Book Nos. 13 and 14. 6 The meaning of this clause is best explained in British Blue Book No. 64, July 28, 1914, where it is said that the Austro-Hungarian Government had stated "that co- operation of Austrian agents in Servia was to be only in investigation, not in judicial or administrative measures. Servia was said to have wilfully misinterpreted this." Cf. also French Yellow Book No. 15, July 21, 1914. July 23, British Blue Book No, 6 87 I added that I felt great apprehension, and that I should concern myself with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of the peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between Austria and Servia were not the concern of His Majesty's Government, and such comments as I had made above were not made in order to discuss those merits. I ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an exchange of views with other Powers, and that I must await their views as to what could be done to mitigate the diflSculties of the situation. Count Mensdorff ^ replied that the present situation might never have arisen if Servia had held out a hand after the murder of the Archduke ; Servia had, however, shown no sign of sympathy or help, though some weeks had already elapsed since the murder; a time limit, said his Excellency, was essential, owing to the procrastination on Servia's part. I said that if Servia had procrastinated in replying, a time limit could have been introduced later ; but, as things now stood, the terms of the Servian reply had been dictated by Austria, who had not been content to limit herself to a demand for a reply within a limit of forty-eight hours from its presentation. From Petrograd British Blue Book No. 6 Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 24.) (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 24, 1914. I HAD a telephone message this morning from M. Sazonof ^ to the effect that the text of the Austrian ultimatum had just reached him. His Excellency added that a reply within forty-eight hours was demanded, and he begged me to meet him at the French ^ Embassy to discuss matters, as Austrian step clearly meant that war was imminent. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's conduct was both provocative and immoral ; she would never have taken such action unless Germany had first been consulted ; some of her demands were quite impossible of acceptance. He hoped that His Majesty's Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France. The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfil all the obligations ^ entailed by her alliance with Russia, if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in any diplomatic negotiations. 1 Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. 2 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 3 The Entente Powers acted in the Serbian difficulty together from the first. Cf . British Blue Book No. 12, same day, and French Yellow Book No. 23, same day. See also British Blue Book No. 10, note 2. 4 This must mean "going to war," diplomatic support being spoken of in the next line. 88 Official Diplomatic Documents • I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of course, speak in the name of His Majesty's Government, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from His Majesty's Govern- ment that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion.^ To this M. Sazonof replied that we must not forget that the general European question ^ was involved, the Servian question being but a part of the former, and that Great Britain could not afford to efface herself from the problems now at issue. In reply to these remarks, I observed that I gathered from what he said that his Excellency was suggesting that Great Britain should join in making a communication to Austria to the effect that active intervention by her in the internal affairs of Servia could not .be tolerated. But supposing Austria nevertheless proceeded to embark on military measures against Servia in spite of our representations, was it the intention of the Russian Government forthwith to declare war on Austria ? M. Sazonof ^ said that he himself thought that Russian mobilisa- tion would at any rate have to be carried out ; ^ but a council of Min- isters was being held this afternoon to consider the whole question. A further council would be held, probably to-morrow, at which the Emperor would preside, when a decision^ would be come to. I said that it seemed to me that the important point was to induce Austria to extend the time limit, and that the first thing to do was to bring an influence to bear on Austria with that end in view ; French Ambassador, however, thought that either Austria had made up her mind to act at once or that she was bluffing. Whichever it might be, our only chance of averting war was for us to adopt a firm and united attitude. He did not think there was time to carry out my sugges- tion. Thereupon I said that it seemed to me desirable that we should know just how far Servia was prepared to go to meet the demands formulated by Austria in her note. M. Sazonof replied that he must first consult his colleagues ^ on this point, but that doubtless some of the Austrian demands could be accepted by Servia. French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continued to press me 1 This sentence is contrary to the claim that Great Britain is fighting for the rights of the little nations, including Serbia. Cf. British Blue Book Nos. 10 and 11, same day. ' This refers to the fetich of all the Powers for the past century, often called "the balance of power." See Russian Orange Book No. 17, July 25: "We count upon it that England will at once side definitely with France and Russia in order to maintain the European balance of power for which she has constantly intervened in the past." Cf. also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 26, July 24, 1914. ' Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. * This raises the question, when it was begun. ' For a French account of the decision arrived at in this meeting, see French Yellow Book No. 50, July 26, 1914. * This almost makes it appear as if Russia wrote Serbia's reply for her. Cf. Re- port of the Balkan Commission, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1914, p. 41 : "The Balkan alliance in its later phase was but a tool employed by local policy encouraged by Russia, and directed, under the inspiration of Russian diplomacy, against Germanic pretensions." July 24, British Blue Book No. 7 89 for a declaration of complete solidarity of His Majesty's Government with French and Russian Governments, and I therefore said that it seemed to me possible that you might perhaps be willing to make strong representations to both German and Austrian Governments, urging upon them that an attack by Austria upon Servia would endanger the whole peace of Europe. Perhaps you might see your way to saying to them that such action on the part of Austria would probably mean Russian intervention, which would involve France and Germany, and that it would be difficult for Great Britain to keep out if the war were to become general. M. Sazonof answered that we would sooner or later be dragged into war if it did break out; we should have rendered war more likely if we did not from the outset make common cause with his country and with France ; at any rate, he hoped His Majesty's Government would express strong reprobation of action taken by Austria. President of French Republic and President of the Council cannot reach France, on their return from Russia, for four or five days, and it looks as though Austria purposely chose this moment to present their ultimatum.^ It seems to me, from the language held by French Ambassador, that, even if we decline to join them, France and Russia are deter- mined to make a strong stand. ^ From Vienna British Blue Book No. 7 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 24-) (Telegraphic.) ' Vienna, July 24, 1914. Before departing on leave of absence, I was assured by Russian Ambassador that any action taken by Austria to humiliate Servia could not leave Russia indifferent.^ Russian Charge d'Affaires was received this morning by Minister for Foreign Affairs, and said ^ to him, as his own personal view, that Austrian note was drawn up in a form rendering it impossible of acceptance as it stood, and that it was both unusual and peremptory in its terms. J Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that Austrian Minister was under instructions to leave Belgrade unless Austrian demands were accepted integrally by 4 p.m. ^ to-morrow. His Excellency added. that Dual Monarchy feh that its very existence 1 This same idea is expressed by the other two Entente Powers. Cf. French Yellow Book Nos. 25 and 29, same day. 2 Cf. next day, British Blue Book No. 17, "If she [Russia] feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war." 3 For a stronger phrasing see July 25, British Blue Book No. 17. * This interview is spoken of in Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 18, July 24, and German White Book, Exhibit 3, same day. According to both despatches the Russian Charge d 'Affaires was without instructions, and consequently refrained from expressing an opinion. 6 The hour was at first placed at 5 p.m., later at 6 p.m. See French Yellow Book No. 25, July 24. 90 Official Diplomatic Documents was at stake ; and that the step taken had caused great satisfaction throughout the country. He did not think that objections to what had been done could be raised by any Power. From Belgrade British Blue Book No. 8 Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 24.) (Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 24, 1914- AusTRL\N demands are considered absolutely unacceptable by Servian Government, who earnestly trust that His Majesty's Govern- ment may see their way to induce Austrian Government to moderate them. This request was conveyed to me by Servian Prime Minister, who returned early this morning to Belgrade. His Excellency is dejected, and is clearly very anxious as to developments that may arise. From the German Ambassador British Blue Book No. 9 Note ^ communicated by German Ambassador, July 24, 1914- The publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government con- cerning the circumstances under which the assassination of the Austrian heir presumptive and his consort has taken place disclose unmistakably the aims which the Great Servian propaganda has set itself, and the means it employs to realise them. The facts now made known must also do away with the last doubts that the centre of activity of all those tendencies which are directed towards the detachment of the Southern Slav provinces from the Austro-Hun- garian Monarchy and their incorporation into the Servian Kingdom is to be found in Belgrade, and is at work there with at least the connivance of members of Government and army. The Servian intrigues have been going on for many years. In an especially marked form the Great Servian chauvinism manifested itself during the Bosnian crisis. It was only owing to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and to the energetic interference of the Great Powers that the Servian provocations to which Austria-Hungary was then exposed did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of good conduct in future which was given by the Servian Government at that time has not been kept. Under the eyes, at least with the tacit permission of official Servia, the Great Servian propaganda has continuously increased in extension and intensity: to its account must be set the recent crime, the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become 1 German White Book Exhibit No. 1, July 23, 1914, cf. French Yellow Book No. 28, same day. July 24, British Blue Book No. 10 91 clearly evident that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy still longer to remain inactive in face of this movement on the other side of the frontier, by which the security and the integrity of her terri- tories are constantly menaced. Under these circumstances, the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment can only be regarded as equitable and moderate. In spite of that, the attitude which public opinion as well as the Government in Seryia have recently adopted does not exclude the apprehension that the Servian Government might refuse to comply with those demands, and might allow themselves to be carried away into a provocative attitude against Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hun- garian Government, if it does not wish definitely to abandon Austria's position as a Great Powder, would then have no choice but to obtain the fulfilment of their demands from the Servian Government by strong pressure and, if necessary, by using military measures, the choice of the means having to be left to them. The Imperial Government want to emphasise their opinion that in the present case there is only question of a matter, to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that the Great Powers ought seriously to endeavour to reserve it to those two immediately concerned. The Imperial Government desire urgently the localisation of the conflict, because every interference of another Power would, owing to the different treaty obligations, be followed by incalculable consequences. To Paris British Blue Book No. 10 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. Sir, Foreign Office, July 24, 1914. After telling M. Cambon ^ to-day of the Austrian communication to Servia, which I had received this morning, and of the comment I had made to Count Mensdorff ^ upon it yesterday, I told M. Cambon that this afternoon I was to see the German Ambassador, who some days ago ^ had asked me privately to exercise moderating influence in St. Petersburgh. I would say ^ to the Ambassador that, of course, if the presentation of this ultimatum to Servia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, we need not concern ourselves about it,^ but, if Russia took the view of the Austrian ultimatum, which it seemed to me that any Power interested in Servia would take, I should be quite powerless, in face of the terms of the ultimatum, to 1 French Ambassador in London. 2 Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. 3 Cf. British Blue Book No. 1, July 20, 1914. * Sir Edward's remarks to the German Ambassador are the result of his mterview with the French Ambassador. For the determination of the Entente Powers to act together in this matter see British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, and note 1. 6 Cf. Nos. 6 and 11, same day. 92 Official Diplomatic Documents exercise any moderating influence. I would say that I thought the only chance of any mediating or moderating influence being exercised was that Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves, who had not direct interests in Servia, should act together for the sake of peace, simul- taneously in Vienna and St. Petersburgh.^ M. Cambon said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the four Powers, he had no doubt that his Government would be glad to join in it ; but he pointed out that we could not say anything in St. Petersburgh till Russia had expressed some opinion or taken some action. But, when two days were over, Austria would march into Servia, for the Servians could not possibly accept the Austrian demand. Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Servia, and therefore, once the Austrians had attacked Servia, it would be too late for any mediation. I said that I had not contemplated anything being said in St. Petersburgh ^ until after it was clear that there must be trouble between Austria and Russia. I had thought that if Austria did move into Servia, and Russia then mobilised, it would be possible for the four Powers to urge Austria to stop her advance, and Russia also to stop hers, pending mediation. But it would be essential for any chance of success for such a step that Germany should participate in it. M. Cambon said that it would be too late after Austria had once moved against Servia. The important thing was to gain time by mediation in Vienna. The best chance of this being accepted would be that Germany should propose it to the other Powers. I said that by this he meant a mediation between Austria and Servia. He replied that it was so. I said that I would talk to the German Ambassador this afternoon on the subject. I am, etc. E. Grey. To Berlin British Blue Book No. U Sir Edward Grey to Sir H, Rumbold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 24, 1914- German Ambassador has communicated to me the view of the German Government about the Austrian demand in Servia. I under- stand the German Government is making the same communication to the Powers. I said that if the Austrian ultimatum to Servia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia I had no concern with it ; ^ I had heard nothing yet from St. Petersburgh, but I was very apprehensive 1 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 34, July 24, and note 1. » Cf. British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, and note 3. July 24, British Blue Book No. 12 93 of the view Russia would take of the situation. I reminded the German Ambassador that some days ago he had expressed a personal hope that if need arose I would endeavour to exercise moderating influence at St. Petersburgh, but now I said that, in view of the extraordinarily stiff character of the Austrian note, the shortness of the time allowed, and the wide scope of the demands upon Servia, I felt quite helpless as far as Russia was concerned, and I did not believe any Power could exercise influence alone. The only chance I could see of mediating or moderating influence being effective, was that the four Powers, Germany, Italy, France, and ourselves, should work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburgh ^ in favour of moderation in the event of the relations between Austria and Russia becoming threatening. The immediate danger was that in a few hours Austria might march into Servia and Russian Slav opinion demand that Russia should march to help Servia ; it would be very desirable to get Austria not to precipitate military action and so to gain more time. But none of us could influence Austria in this direction unless Ger-' many would propose and participate in such action at Vienna. You should inform Secretary of State. Prince Lichnowsky ^ said that Austria might be expected to move when the time limit expired unless Servia could give unconditional acceptance of Austrian demands in toto. Speaking privately, his Excellency suggested that a negative reply must in no case be re- turned by Servia ; a reply favourable on some points must be sent at once, so that an excuse against immediate action might be afforded to Austria. To Belgrade British Blue Book No. 12 Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 24, 1914. Servia ought to promise that, if it is proved that Servian officials, however subordinate they may be, were accomplices in the murder of the Archduke at Serajevo, she will give Austria the fullest satisfaction. She certainly ought to express concern and regret.^ For the rest, Servian Government must reply to Austrian demands as they consider best in Servian interests. It is impossible to say whether military action by Austria when time limit expires can be averted by anything but unconditional acceptance of her demands, but only chance appears to lie in avoiding 1 Cf. previous note, where Sir E. Grey apparently dropped his idea of bringing simultaneous pressure to bear on Vienna and Petrograd in favor of Paul Cambon's idea of mediation between Vienna and Belgrade. 2 German Ambassador in London. c, ,. 3 This would imply that Austria-Hungary's claim was correct that Serbia had neglected to do this, although four weeks had elapsed since the murder. Cf. also note 1 to Serbian Blue Book No. 30, July 19. 94 Official Diplomatic Documents an absolute refusal and replying favourably to as many points as the time limit allows. Servian Minister here has begged that His Majesty's Government will express their views, but I cannot undertake responsibility of saying more than I have said above, and I do not like to say even that without knowing what is being said at Belgrade by French and Russian Governments.^ You should therefore consult your French and Russian colleagues as to repeating what my views are, as ex- pressed above, to Servian Government.^ 1 have urged upon German Ambassador that Austria should not precipitate military action. Russia : From Austro-Hungarian Ambassador Russian Orange Book No. 3 Note verbale personally presented by the Austro-Hungarian Ambas- sador at St. Petersburg to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, at 10 A.M. on July 11 {2^), 1914. The Austro-Hungarian Government felt compelled to address the following note to the Servian Government on Thursday, the 10th (23rd) instant, through the medium of the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade. [Here follows the text of the note ; see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 7, July 22, 1914.] Russian Orange Book No. 4 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Charge d' Affaires at Vienna. Communicated also to London, Rome, Paris, and Belgrade.^ (Telegram.) St. Petersburgh, July 11 {24), 1914.^ Please convey the following message to the Austro-Hungarian Min- ister for Foreign Affairs : — " La communication du Gou- " The communication made by vernement austro-hongrois aux Austria-Hungary to the Powers Puissances le lendemain de la the day after the presentation of presentation de I'ultimatum a the ultimatum at Belgrade leaves Belgrade ne laisse aux Puissances a period to the Powers which is qu'un delai tout a fait insuffisant quite insufficient to enable them pour entreprendre quoi qu'il soit to take any steps which might » Cf . French Yellow Book No. 23, July 24, and British Blue Book No. 6, same day, and note 1. 2 This advice was never given to Servia ; cf. British Blue Book no. 22, July 25, 1914. ' According to French Yellow Book No. 39 this note was communicated to Bucharest instead of to Belgrade and also to Berlin. * This note, although dated July 24, was presented in London (British Blue Book No. 13) and Paris (Yellow Book No. 39) on July 25, the very day on which the time limit was to expire. Russia was informed of the presentation of the note on July 23. (Russian Orange Book No. 2.) July 24, Russian Orange Booh No. 4. 95 d'utile pour raplanissement des complications siirgies. "Pour prevenir les conse- quences incalculables et egale- ment nefastes pour toutes les Puissances qui peuvent suivre le mode d'action du Gouvernement austro-hongrois, il nous parait in- dispensable qu'avant tout le delai donne a la Serbie pour repondre soit prolonge. L'Autriche-Hon- grie, se declarant disposee a in- former les Puissances des donnees de Fenquete sur lesquelles le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal base ses accusations, devrait leur donner 6galement le temps de s'en rendre compte. " En ce cas, si les Puissances se convainquaient du bien-fonde de certaines des exigences autri- chiennes, elles se trouveraient en mesure de faire parvenir au Gouvernement serbe des conseils en consequence. "Un refus de prolottger le terme de I'ultimatum priverait de toute ported la demarche du Gouvernement austro-hongrois aupres des Puissances et se trou- verait en contradiction avec les bases meme des relations inter- nationales. "Le Prince Koudachef est charge de communiquer ce qui precede au Cabinet de Vienne.'* M. Sazonof espere que le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste 1 See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 8, July 22, paragraph before last, where Aus- tria-Hungary offers to the Powers a 'dossier elucidating the Servian intrigues and the connection between these intrigues and the murder of the 28th June." So far as Austria was concerned, this was an act of courtesy. The Powers had been unwilling or unable to protect her from these intrigues culminating in the murder of the Arch- duke. It was, therefore, she claimed, her right and her duty to punish them in her own way. Sazonof interprets the offer of Austria-Hungary not as an act of courtesy but as an accusation lodged before the tribunal of the Powers, who, therefore, should be the judges of how far Austria-Hungary might be permitted to go. According to European traditions, followed for over a century by all the nations, such a course would have affected the dignity of Austria-Hungary as one of the Great Powers. Cf. Austro- Hungarian Red Book No. 21, July 25, 1914. 2 This line varied, of course, according to the Government to which the note was pre- sented. help to smooth away the diffi- culties that have arisen. "In order to prevent the con- sequences, equally incalculable and fatal to all the Powers, which may result from the course of action followed by the Austro- Hungarian Government, it seems to us to be above all essential that the period allowed for the Servian reply should be extended. Austria-Hungary, having de- clared her readiness ^ to inform the Powers of the results of the enquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal Government base their accusations, should equally allow them sufficient time to study them. "In this case, if the Powers were convinced that certain of the Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in a position to offer advice to the Servian Government. " A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment to the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of international relations. " Prince Kudachef is instructed to communicate the above to the Cabinet at Vienna.*' M. Sazonof hopes that His Bri- tannic Majesty's Government ^ 96 Official Diplomatic Documents britannique adherera au point de will adhere to the point of view vue expose, et il exprime Tespoir set forth above, and he trusts que Sir Edward Grey voudra bien that Sir E. Gray will see his way munir I'Ambassadeur d'Angle- to furnish similar instructions to terre a Vienne d 'instructions con- the British Ambassador at formes. Vienna. To London, Berlin, Rome and Paris Russian Orange Book No. 5 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Representatives at London, Berlin, Rome, and Paris. (Telegram.) St. Petersburg, July 11 {2^), 1914. With reference to my telegram of to-day to Kudachef ^ we trust that the Government to which you are accredited will share the Russian point of view and will at once instruct their Representative at Vienna to hold similar language. Communicated to Belgrade. From the Serbian Crown Prince and Prince Regent of Serbia Russian Orange Book No. 6 Telegram from His Royal Highness the Croivn Prince and Prince Regent of Serbia to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia. Belgrade, July 11 (24), 1914. The Austro-Hungarian Government yesterday evening presented to the Servian Government a note respecting the outrage at Sera- jevo. Servia, aware of her international obligations, has declared, ever since the horrible crime was committed, that she condemned it, and that she was ready to open an enquiry in Servia if the complicity of certain of her subjects were proved at the trial instituted by the Austro-Hungarian authorities. The demands contained in the Austro-Hungarian note are, however, unnecessarily humiliating for Servia, and incompatible with her dignity as an independent State. For instance, we are peremptorily called upon to insert a declaration by the Government in the "Official Journal," and for an order from the Sovereign to the army, in which we are to check the spirit of hostility towards Austria and to blame ourselves for criminal weakness as regards our treacherous intrigues. We are further required to admit Austro-Hungarian officials into Servia to take part with our officials at the trial and to superintend the carry- ing out of the other conditions laid down in the note. We are re- quired to accept these demands in their entirety within forty-eight hours, failing which the Austro-Hungarian Legation will leave Belgrade. We are prepared to accept those of the Austro-Hun- ^ Russian Charg^ d' Affaires in Vienna. July 24, Russian Orange Book No. 8 97 garian conditions which are compatible with the position of an independent State, as well as those to which your Majesty may advise us to agree, and all those persons whose complicity in the crime may be proved will be severely punished by us. Certain of the demands could not be carried out without changes in our legis- lation, which would need time. We have been allowed too short a time limit. We may be attacked at the expiration of the time limit by the Austro-Hungarian army which is concentrating upon our frontier. We are unable to defend ourselves and we beg your Majesty to come to our aid as soon as possible. The much appreciated good- will which your Majesty has so often shown towards us inspires us with the firm belief that once again our appeal to your noble Slav heart will not pass unheeded. At this critical moment I echo the feelings of the Servian people in praying your Majesty to be pleased to interest yourself in the fate of the Kingdom of Servia. From Berlin Russian Orange Book No. 7 Russian Charge d' Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Berlin, July 11 {24), 1914. All the morning papers, even those few which recognise the impossibility of Servians accepting the prescribed conditions, warmly welcome the strong line adopted by Austria. The semi-ofiicial "Lokal-Anzeiger'' is particularly violent; it describes as fruitless any possible appeals that Servia may make to St. Petersburgh, Paris, Athens, or Bucharest, and concludes by saying that the German people will breathe freely when they learn that the situation in the Balkan ^ peninsula is to be cleared up at last. From Paris Russian Orange Book No. 8 Russian Charge d' Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Paris, July 11 {24), 1914^ A COPY of the note officially presented at Belgrade has been com- municated to the French Government by the Austrian Ambassador .^ The German Ambassador later visited ^ the Minister and read to 1 The Balkans had been spoken of for years as the Powder Magazine of Europe, where at any moment a spark might start a European conflagration. Nobody in Berlin or Vienna believed any nation would came to the support of Serbia in view of the intrigues which had led to the murder of Serajevo, and which Berlin and Vienna be- lieved were rightly charged against Serbia. 2 French Yellow Book No. 25, July 24, 1914. 3 French Yellow Book No. 28, July 24, 1914. 98 Official Diplomatic Documents him a communication containing the Austrian arguments, and indicating that in the event of a refusal on the part of Servia, Austria would be obliged to resort to pressure, and, in case of need, to mili- tary measures. The communication ended with the observation that, in the opinion of Germany, this question ought to be settled between Austria and Servia direct, and that it was to the interest of the Powers to localise the affair by leaving it to the interested parties. The Acting Head of the Political Department, who was present at the interview, asked ^ the Ambassador whether the Austrian action should be considered as an ultimatum — in other words, whether, in the event of Servia not submitting entirely to the Austrian de- mands, hostilities were inevitable. The Ambassador avoided a direct reply, alleging that he had no instructions. From Belgrade Russian Orange Book No. 9 Russian Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Belgrade, July 11 (2J(), 1914. Pashitch has returned to Belgrade. He intends' to give an answer to Austria within the prescribed time limit — that is to say, to- morrow, Saturday, at 6 p.m. — showing the points which are accept- able or unacceptable. To-day an appeal will be addressed to the Powers 2 to defend the independence of Servia. Then, added Pashitch, if war is inevitable, we will make war. Serbia : To Petrograd Serbian Blue Book No. 34 M, N, Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Dr, M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd. (Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 11/24, 1914. I INFORMED the Russian Charge d'Affaires that I would hand in the reply to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum on Saturday at 6 p.m. I told him that the Serbian Government would appeal ^ to the Govern- ments of the friendly Powers to protect the independence of Serbia. If war was inevitable, I added, Serbia would carry it on. 1 In the French account of this interview, Yellow Book No. 28, July 24, M. Martin and not the Acting Head of the Political Department is said to have asked this ques- tion. 2 The only published appeal is that of the Serbian Crown Prince to the Czar, Russian Orange Book No. 6, July 24, 1914. ' No such appeal had been published, except one from the Serbian Crown Prince to the Czar, July 24, Russian Orange Book No. 6. July 24, Serbian Blue Book No. 37 99 To London Serbian Blue Book No. 35 M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. M. Boschkovitch, Minister in London. (Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 11/24, 1914. I INFORMED the British Charge d'Affaires to-day that the Austro- Hungarian demands were such that no Government of an independent country could accept them in their entirety. I expressed the hope that the British Government might possibly see their way to induce the Austro-Hungarian Government to moderate them. I did not conceal my anxiety as to future developments. From Petrograd Serbian Blue Book No. 36 Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. {Telegraphic.) Petrograd, July 11/24, 1914- As I was leaving M. Sazonof, to whom I communicated the con- tents of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, I met the German Am- bassador. He seemed to be in very good spirits.^ During the con- versation which followed in regard to the Austro-Hungarian demarche I asked Count Pourtales to indicate to me some way out of the situation created by the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum. The Am- bassador replied that this depended on Serbia alone, since the matter in question must be settled between Austria and Serbia only, and did not concern anyone else. In reply I told Count Pourtales that he was under a misapprehension, and that he would see before long that this was not a question merely between Serbia and Austria, but a European question. To the Czar from the Serbian Crown Prince Serbian Blue Book No. 37 His Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander to His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia. (Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 11/24, 1914. [See No. 6 of Russian Orange Book, July 24, 1914.] 1 This sentence may have been retained to give the reader an insight into the character of Count Pourtales. It should, therefore, be compared with similar pic- tures, e.g. British Blue Book No. 78, July 29, and contrasted with British Blue Book No. 72, July 29, and No. 97, July 30. 100 Offijcial Diplomatic Documents Saturday, July 25, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Austria-Hungary Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from London, Petrograd Under Secretary of State, Rome etc. London etc., Vienna Belgrade Germany Great Britain Russia London Paris, Petrograd, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Bel- grade London All Representatives Belgium ^ Rome etc. Belgrade France London etc., Vienna Berlin, London, Petro- grad, Rome, Vienna, Belgrade Petrograd Paris, Petrograd, Ber- lin, Rome, Vienna, Belgrade, Russian Ambassador Vienna, Belgrade, Ber- lin, Paris, London, German Ambassa- dor Russia and Great Britain endeavor to secure from Austria-Hungary an exten- sion of the time limit set in the Serbian note to expire on this day at 6 p.m. The French support of this request, while promised, does not materialize. Germany gives her support, but doubts Austria's willingness to grant the request. Austria-Hungary denies the request, but announces that she will not immedi- ately proceed to war, and that a period of military preparation will intervene. This appears to satisfy Great Britain as a concession of practical value. Serbia delivers her reply which does not satisfy Austria-Hungary, whose lega- tion leaves Belgrade at 6.30 p.m. Great Britain continues her efforts to bring about a Conference of four powers, but apparently has yielded to the view of the French Ambassador that no pres- sure should be exerted on Russia, for in one note Sir E. Grey even substitutes Russia for Italy in the proposed group of the mediating powers. Germany repeats that she had not been consulted by Austria-Hungary in the preparation of her note to Servia, but finding her demands just would support her. She declines to mediate between Austria and Serbia, but announces her willingness to take part in mediation between Austria and Russia. Russia and France are endeavoring to secure the unconditional support of Great Britain, not in the interest of Serbia, but to maintain the European balance of power. Austria-Hungary disclaims any intention of disturbing this balance of power, and explains anew her reasons for proceeding against Serbia. She also explains the meaning of those clauses of her note which she says had been misunderstood ; and states that Russia was acting under a misapprehension. She also issues a dossier containing the proofs of her indictment of Serbia. France refuses to issue an official correction of erroneous accounts in the French press concerning the attitude of Germany. Belgium continues to contemplate the probability of a European War. Juhj 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Boole Nn. 19 IGl Austria-Hungary : AUSTROHUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 19 Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at Berlin, Rome, Paris, London, St. Petershurgh and Constantinople. Vienna, July 25, lOlJf.. Your Excellency will find herewith the dossier mentioned in the circular note ^ to the Powers with reference to the Great-Servian propaganda, and its connection with the Serajevo murder. Your Excellency is instructed to bring this dossier to the notice of the Government to which you are accredited. (See Note 2 to British Blue Book No. 48, July 27.) Enclosure "The Dossier" 2 The Servian agitation, which has as its object the separation from the Austrian Monarchy of the Southern Slav districts in order to unite them with the Servian States, dates from far back. This propaganda on Servian soil, always the same in its ultimate object, although varying in its means and intensity, reached one of its culminating points at the time of the annexation crisis. Throwing off the protecting cloak of secrecy, it then revealed its purpose openly and undisguisedly, and attempted, under the patronage of the Servian Government, to attain its ends by every means in its power. While the whole of the Servian press was calling for war against the Monarchy by malicious invectives in which facts were perverted, apart from other means of propaganda, associations were being formed to prepare for this war. The Narodna Odbrana stood out as the most important of these associations. Having its origin in an already existing revolutionary committee, it was constituted as a private society, although in fact it took the form of an organisation of Servian military and civil officials wholly dependent on the Foreign Office at Belgrade. Amongst its founders one may mention : General Bozo Jankovic, ex-ministers Ljuba Jovanovic, Ljuba Davidovic, and Velislav Vulovic, Zivojin . 1 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 8, July 22, 1914. 2 This "dossier, " being too long to be telegraphed, was sent by mail (see Austro- Hungarian Red Book No. 39, July 28). It was presented (the Powers were advised of it on July 25, see French Yellow Book No. 38 and note 1) in Paris on July 27, and was published, in part, under No. 75 of the French Yellow Book of that date. It was prob- ably presented in London to Sir Edward Grey on the same day. Sir E. Grey, however, published only a scant summary of it in British Blue Book No. 48, omitting the rest and not stating that he had received it. In the introductory narrative to the edition of the Blue Book of Sept. 28, 1914, Sir E. Grey says : "That his Majesty's Government did not receive any statement of the evidence on which Austria had founded her ulti- matum till the 7th August." Neither the British Blue Book nor the Austro-Hungarian Red Book contains a despatch of this day, which renders it impossible to ascertain to which "evidence" Sir E. Grey referred in this sentence. It may have been a complete transcript of the evidence presented at the trial of the Serajevo murderers. The "dossier," however, contained the "evidence on which Austria had founded her ultimatum," and this Sir E. Grey kept from Parliament, from the country and possibly from his colleagues. The first partial knowledge of the "dossier" that the world had came from the French Yellow Book which was published several months after the outbreak of the war. 10^ Official Diplomatic Documents Dacic (Director of the Government printing establishment), and Majors (then Captains) Voja Tankosic^ and Milan Pribicevic. This association aimed at the creation and equipment of free companies for use in the impending war against the Austro-Hungarian Mon- archy. (See Appendix 2.) A convinction description of the activity at that time of the Narodna Odbrana will be found amongst others in the deposition of Trifko Krstanovic, a Bosnia-Herzegovinian subject, in the course of his evidence before the district court at Serajevo ; he was then at Belgrade, and had been accepted by the Narodna Odbrana, with other subjects of the Monarchy as a komitadji. At the beginning of 1909, Krstanovic had arrived with about 140 fellow-^nembers at a school established for the formation of new bands at Cuprija (in the district of Jagodina), managed by Captains Voja Tankosic and Dusan Putnik. The only instructors at this school were Servian officers. General Bozo Jankovic and Captain Milan Pribicevic inspected the three-monthly courses of these bands at regular intervals. The new komitadjis received their training in musketry, bomb throwing, mine laying, blowing up of railways, tunnels and bridges, and the destruction of telegraph wires. According to the instructions of their leaders, it was their duty to put into practice in Bosnia and Herzegovina the knowledge they had recently acquired.^ By this action, carried on in the most open manner and encouraged by the Servian Government, the Narodna Odbrana was thus prepared for guerilla warfare against Austria-Hungary. In this way sub- jects of the ]\Ionarchy were led into treason against their country, and induced, as Servian emissaries, systematically to practice under- hand attacks against the means of defence of their country. This period of aggressive aspirations ended with the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 31st March, 1909, in which the Government of Belgrade announced that they were prepared to accept the new situation created in municipal and international law by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and solemnly promised to maintain in future friendly relations with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. With this declaration, the agitation, which constituted a source of constant trouble to Austria-Hungary, seemed to have come to an end, and the road to an amicable rapprochement between Servia and the Monarchy to have been entered on. Deprived of the encouragement of the Servian Government, and combated by that Government in accordance with their engagements, the propaganda hostile to the Monarchy could only have continued a shadowy existence and would have been condemned to early destruction. On the other hand, the ties of language, race and culture existing between the Southern Slav districts of the Monarchy and Servia ought to have resulted in the realisation of a task of common development inspired by mutual friendship and parallel interests. These hopes, however, have not been realised. Aspirations hostile to the Monarchy have continued, and under July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 103 the eyes of the Servian Government, who have done nothing to sup- press this movement, the anti-Austro-Hungarian propaganda has only increased in extent and volume. Hatred against the Monarchy has been fanned and kindled into an irreconcilable feeling. The Servian people alike by adapting their former course of action to the new situation and by supplementing it by fresh methods were sum- moned to the "inevitable death struggle" against Austria-Hungary. Secret ramifications have been systematically spread towards the Slav districts in the south of the Monarchy whose subjects have been incited to treason against their country. Above all, the Servian press has since then worked incessantly in this spirit. Up to the present time no fewer than eighty-one newspapers appearing in Servia have had to forfeit their right to delivery through the post on account of their contents falling within the scope of the penal law. There is hardly a clause in the penal code protecting the sacred person of the Monarch and the members of the Imperial Family, or the integrity of the State, that has not been violated by Servian papers. A few examples of these press views, selected from the great mass of material published by the press at various dates, are contained in Appendix I. Without entering into a detailed account of these expressions of Servian public opinion, it is necessary to note that in spite of the formal recognition accorded by Servia, it has never ceased to consider the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, both before and after the event; as a robbery committed against Servia for which repara- tion is due. This idea not only constantly recurs with every modu- lation of its coarse language in the papers professing most advanced views, but also finds expression in hardly veiled terms in the Samou- prava, which is in such close touch with the Foreign OflSce of Belgrade. (See Appendix I (6).) Nor can one omit to draw attention to the manner in which the attempt made on the 15th June, 1910, at Serajevo, by Bogdan Zerajic against the Feldzeugmeister von Varesanin, Governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was turned to account by the press. As is known, Zerajic had killed himself immediately after his deed, and before committing it had burnt all his papers. Under these circumstances, it was impossible to throw full light upon the motives of his crime. It could, however, be inferred from a document found on his person that he was a follower of the views of Krapotkin. Evidence collected leads likewise to the conclusion that the crime was of an anarchist type. This, however, did not prevent the Servian press from celebrating the criminal as a national Servian hero and from glorifying his deed. Indeed, the "Politika" protested strongly against the idea that Zerajic was an anarchist, and declared him to be "a Servian hero whose name all Servians will repeat with respect and grief." 104 Official Diplomatic Documents The Politika considers the 18th August ^ of the same year as a suitable opportunity on which to return to the crime of Zerajic, "whose name will be sacred to the people," and to celebrate the outrage in verse. (See Appendix I (a).) In this way this crime, which had nothing to do with the territorial aspirations against the Monarchy, was exploited for the furtherance of these ideas and by the glorifying of Zerajic, murder was hailed in the most explicit way as a glorious means towards the realisation of this aim and one worthy to be imitated in the struggle. This approbation of murder as a weapon fully admissible in the struggle against the Monarchy re-appears later in the press in discussing the attempt made by Jukic against the Royal Commissioner von Cuvaj. (See Appendix I (c).) These newspapers, which were circulated not only in Servia but also, as we shall show later, illicitly smuggled into the Monarchy by well-organised secret methods, have awakened and kept alive this mood in the masses, a mood which has provided a fruitful field for the activities of the associations hostile to the Monarchy. The Narodna Odbrana became the centre of the agitation car- ried on by the associations. The same persons who were at its head at the time of the annexation still control it. Now as then, they still control it in the capacity of the most active and energetic organ- isers, the most violent opponents of the jMonarchy; General Bozo Jankovic, Zivojin Dacic (Director of the Government printing estab- lishment), and Majors Milan Pribicevic and Voja Tankosic. Organ- ised on a broad and far-reaching scale and constituted on a strict hierarchical basis (see Appendix 2, "Organisation"), the Narodna Odbrana counted soon some 400 committees which developed a very active agitation. Moreover, the Narodna Odbrana became closely allied with the "shooting federation" (Schutzenbimd) , (762 societies), the great SokoP Association "Dusan" (2,500 members), the Olympian Club, the association of horsemen (Reiterverein) , "Prince Michael," the society of sportsmen (Jdgerbund), and the league of development (Kulturliga), as well as numerous other associations all of which, subordinate to it, were under the guidance and protection of the Narodna Odbrana, and worked on the same lines. Becoming more and more closely intermingled, these associations arrived at a com- plete amalgamation in such a way that to-day they are nothing but members of the single body of the Narodna Odbrana. Thus the Narodna Odbrana has set up all over Servia a close network of agitation, and has attracted to its principles all those who were receptive of its ideas. The official publications of the Narodna Odbrana demonstrate sufficiently clearly the spirit which animates it. While in its statutes, it represents itself as an "educational society" 1 Birthday of His Imperial and Apostolic Majesty. 2 [Sokol = falcon. The name given to gymnastic associations throughout Slav countries which have adopted the falcon as their emblem.] July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 105 (Kulturverein) concerning itself only with the spiritual and physical improvement of the Servian population and its material progress, the Narodna Odbrana discloses in its official publication (see Appendix 2) the true and single motive of its existence in that which it calls its "re-organised programme": to preach to the Servian people the sacred truth by "fanatical and indefatigable work" under the pre- tence that the Monarchy wishes to "take away Servian liberty and language and even to destroy her" ; that it is an essential necessity to wage against Austria-Hungary, her "first and greatest enemy," "a war of extermination with rifle and cannon," and "by every means" to prepare the people for this war, which is ''to liberate the conquered territories," in which "seven million brothers are suffering in bondage." All the efforts " at an educational programme" {Kulturhestrehungen) of the Narodna Odbrana are exclusively concerned with this idea simply as a means for the organisation and education of the people for the longed-for death struggle against the Monarchy. All the associations affiliated to the Narodna Odbrana work in the same spirit ; the Sokol Association at Kragujevac w^ill serve as an example (see Appendix 3). As in the case of the Narodna Odbrana, officers, professors and civil servants are at its head. The speech in which its President, Major Kovacevic, opened the annual meeting of 1914, made absolutely no mention of physical training, which is supposed to be the real object of a Sokol association, and confined itself solely to "the preparations for war" against the "dangerous, heartless, grasping, odious and greedy enemy in the north" who "robs millions of Servian brothers of their liberty and rights, and holds them in bondage and chains." In the administrative reports of this association the technical work is placed entirely in the background, and only serves as headlines for the avowal of the real "objects of the activities of the adminis-. tration,!' namely, the preparation of national development and the strengthening of the "oppressed nation" with the object of enabling it to carry out its "incomplete programme and its unfinished task," and to accomplish that "great action" "which is to be carried out in the near future," "the liberation of those brothers who live across the Drina, who are suffering the martyrdom of the crucified." Even the treasurer makes use of his financial reports to send forth the appeal that "falcons must be reared" capable "of bringing freedom to the brothers still iri bondage." As in the case of the "educational programme" of the Narodna Odbrana, the gymnastic activity of the Sokols is not the real object but merely a means at the service of the same propaganda carried on in the same spirit, and even with the very same words. When the Narodna Odbrana appeals to the "people" for a death struggle against the Monarchy, it does not address itself only to the Servian people, but to all Southern Slav nationalities. In the eyes of the Narodna Odbrana, the Slav regions in the south of the 106 Official Diplomatic Documents Monarchy are regarded as "our subjected Servian territories/' (See Appendix 4.) The Southern Slav subjects of the Monarchy are further also expected to take part in this ''national work." This "healthy and necessary work" is, therefore, to be carried on beyond the Servian frontier. The Narodna Odbrana recruits its "heroes for this holy war" even on the soil of the Monarchy, and among them Obilic, the murderer of Murad, is to light them on their way as an example of sacrifice for one's country worthy of imitation. But in order to incite "brothers outside Servia" to share in "the work of private effort," the Narodna Odbrana keeps in close touch with the "brothers beyond the frontier." It is not said in the publi- cations of the society, how this intimate association is carried out, no doubt because it appertains to that part of the "common work" which "for many reasons cannot, or ought not to be divulged." How comprehensive this branch of its activity is, can be seen by the fact that not only the central committee of the Narodna Od- brana, but also certain of its local committees contain special sections for "foreign affairs." This "foreign" activity of the Narodna Odbrana and its affiliated branches is extremely varied. What is relatively less dangerous inasmuch as it can be officially controlled, consists of lecture tours undertaken by distinguished members of the Narodna Odbrana in the southeastern parts of the Monarchy where they speak before various societies on national or educational subjects. These tours give the speakers the desired opportunity, which is indeed the chief object of these journeys, of explaining the true aims of the associations in language more or less veiled, which is intelligible to those who are already initiated. Amongst these, emissaries, one of the best known is Zivojin Dacic (Director of the Government printing establishment), already several times alluded to ; it was he who, on the 8th August, 1909, issued an "appeal" to the Servian people in which he called Austria-Hungary the enemy of Servia, and exhorted them to prepare for the war against the Monarchy. On numerous occasions, Dacic under- took tours of this nature in the southeastern districts of the Austro- Hungarian Monarchy. During one of these lectures at Karlovci in 1912, he flung his accustomed prudence to the winds and spoke openly of the "union of all Serbs against the common foe," by which he designated Austria-Hungary in unmistakable language. More dangerous are the relations with associations in the Monarchy formed by Servian associations imbued with the spirit of the Narodna Odbrana under the cloak of community of interests and of culture ; for the mutual visits of these associations, whether by delegates or in bodies, which escape all official control, are utilised by the Ser- vians for all sorts of plots against the Monarchy. Thus, for instance, at the well-known feast of the Prosvjeta Asso- ciation at Serajevo, in September, 1912, an envoy of the Narodna Odbrana had the effrontery secretly to recruit Bosnian adherents to his society. (See Appendix 6.) The message which the representa- July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 107 tive of the Sokol Association at Kragujevac brought to the " brothers in Bosnia " at this feast was : " We have not forgotten you ; the wings of the falcon of Sumadija are still powerful" — a thought which in confidential intercourse would no doubt have found quite a different expression and one better corresponding to the tendencies of this society which we have already explained. (See Appendix 3.) As to the events that take place at meetings of the same kind in Servia, the Imperial and Royal authorities cannot have any information founded on unimpeachable authority, as they only possess on this matter confidential information which it is difficult to check. In this connection, one may mention the visit of Agram students to Servia in April, 1912, who received from the Servians an official military reception accompanied even by a review of troops in their honour, and that in a manner so suggestive that the administrative report of the Sokol Association at Kragujevac could say : "This event marks the beginning and germ of a great deed which will be accomplished in the near future, it is a germ which will ripen when the soul of the people bursts its bonds and until there is no barrier that has not been destroyed.'' It is only recently that it has come to the knowledge of the Austro- Hungarian authorities that the Servian Sokol associations have succeeded in inducing similar societies into the Monarchy to estab- lish a connection with them which is up to the present secret, and the character of which is not yet quite clear, for the inquiries on this point are still in progress. Up to the present, however, the informa- tion obtained permits the conclusion that traces have been dis- covered of one of the ways by which the subversive aims of the Servian Sdkols and their friends have poisoned the minds of certain groups of mistaken and misled persons in the Monarchy. This propaganda which is aimed at wider circles, and is rather of a preparatory nature, assumes minor importance compared with that of the "foreign work" which is conducted by the Narodna Odbrana and its friends in the form of personal agitation among individuals. It is in this field that the most melancholy results are shown. By means of confidential and secret emissaries, it carries the poison of rebellion to the circles of men of mature age as well as those of irresponsible youth. It is thus, for example, that the late officers of the Honved B.B., D.K., V.M., and the lieutenant of Croatian-Slavonian Gendarmerie V.K., led astray by Milan Pribicevic, left the service of the army of the Monarchy under most suspicious circumstances and turned to Servia ; they have seen in the meanwhile most of their dreams unrealised and some of them, at any rate, are thinking of returning to the Fatherland they have betrayed. The agitation introduced from Servia into the middle schools of Croatia and Bosnia is unhappily too well known to need illustration ; what is less known is that people who have been expelled from Croatian and Bosnian schools owing to grave breaches of discipline, are received in Servia with open arms, and often even protected by the 108 Official Diplomatic Documents State and educated as enemies of the Monarchy. The Servian schools with their anti-Austrian staffs, and their large number of professors and teachers who are members of the Narodna Odbrana, are clearly establishments thoroughly adapted for training experts of this kind. A very notable case of this sort may be quoted here. In March, 1914, several pupils of the Training College of Pakrac (Croatia) were dis- missed on account of a strike. They went to Servia, where some of them immediately obtained situations as schoolmasters, while others were admitted to a college for teachers. One of those who had been thus dismissed, and who was connected with ant i- Austrian circles, declared publicly that he and his people would give a proof, during the sojourn of the hereditary Archduke in Bosnia, that this province was Servian territory. It is, as we may add, highly significant that during the stay of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Bosnia, the Royal Servian Prefect of the district of Krajna gave to the three training college students, who were thus gravely implicated, Servian passports in which he falsely described them as Servian subjects, although he must have known that they were Croatians. With these passports, the three agitators were able to enter the Monarchy without being noticed, where, however, they were eventually recognised and arrested. All this is not, by a long way, enough to give a complete repre- sentation of the "foreign" activity of the Narodna Odbrana. The Imperial and Royal Government had been informed for a long time past by confidential reports that the Narodna Odbrana had made military preparations for the war which it desired to make against the Monarchy, inasmuch as it kept emissaries in Austria- Hungary, who, as soon as hostilities broke out, would attempt in the usual guerilla manner to destroy means of transport and equip- ment and stir up revolt or panic. (See Appendix 7.) The criminal proceedings taken in 1913 by the District Court at Serajevo against Jovo Jaglicic and his associates for espionage (Appendix 6), confirm this confidential information. As at the time of its foundation, the preparation for guerilla warfare still figures in the programme of the Narodna Odbrana, to which must now be further added a complete system of espionage. It is for this reason that the programme of the Narodna Odbrana, described as "re-organised," is in reality an extended programme which includes the preparation for a "war of extermination" against the Monarchy, and even its realisation, and finally the unfurling of the "ancient red flag of the Narodna Odbrana." Acts of terrorism must finally result from this atmosphere of hatred against the Monarchy, which is publicly and secretly provoked, and from an agitation which considers itself free from all responsibility ; in order to bring them about, all means are regarded as permissible in the struggle against Austria-Hungary, including even without any sense of shame common acts of murder. On the 8th June, 1912, a man named Lukas Jukic shot von Cuvaj, the Royal Commissioner at Agram, with the result that the Councillor July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 109 (Banalrat) von Hervoic, who was seated in the same carriage, was mortally wounded. Jukic, in his flight, shot a policeman who was pursuing him, and wounded two others. From the subsequent public investigation it appeared that Jukic was saturated with the ideas and plans propagated by the Narodna Odbrana, and that although Jukic had for some time past been devoting himself to criminal schemes, these schemes were only matured after he had made an excursion to Belgrade together with the Agram students on the 18th of April, 1912. At the noisy cele- brations in honour of the visitors, Jukic had entered into relations with several people belonging to the circle of the Narodna Odbrana, with whom he had had political discussions. A few days after- wards he returned to Belgrade, and there received from a Servian major a bomb, and from a comrade the Browning pistol with which he carried out his crime. In the opinion of experts, the bomb found at Agram was made in an arsenal for military purposes. Jukic's attempt had not been forgotten, when on the 18th of August, 1913, Stephen Dojcic, who had returned from America, made an attempt on the life of the Royal Commissioner, Baron Skerlecz, at Agram — an attempt which was the outcome of action organised by the Servians among the Southern Slavs living in America, and which was also the work of the "foreign" propaganda of the Narodna Odbrana and its confederates. A pamphlet by the Servian, T. Dimitrijevic, printed in Chicago, and entitled "Natrag u staro ognjiste vase," with its unbridled attacks against His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, and its appeal to the Servians of the Monarchy with reference to their im- pending "deliverance," and urging them to migrate home to Servia, demonstrates the fact that the propaganda carried out unchecked in America from Servia, and that carried on from Servia in the terri- tory of the Monarchy, worked on parallel lines. And again, scarcely a year later, Agram was the scene of a new outrage, this time unsuccessful. On the 20th of May, 1914, Jakob Schafer made an attempt at the Agram Theatre on the life of the Ban, Freiherr von Skerlecz, an attempt which was frustrated at the last moment by a police official. The subsequent investigation revealed the existence of a plot inspired by Rudolf Hercigonja. From the depositions of Hercigonja and his five accomplices, it is manifest that this crime also originated in Servia. Having taken part in an unsuccessful attempt to liberate Jukic, Hercigonja fled to Servia (October, 1912), where, together with his accomplice Marojan Jaksic, he consorted with the komitadjis and .members of the Narodna Odbrana. As frequently happens when immature minds are excited by occupying themselves too early with political questions, the result of this corrupting company was here also disastrous. Hercigonja returned home impressed by the dogma learnt in Belgrade that the Southern Slav territories of Austria-Hun- gary must be separated from it and re-united to the Servian kingdom. 110 Official Diplomatic Documents He had further been persuaded by the teachings of the friends with whom he associated there, that this object should be pursued by means of attempts on the Hves of persons holding high office and leading politicians of the Monarchy as the only means of obtaining this end. This is the spirit in which Hercigonja influenced his friends at Agram and converted some of them to his ideas. Foremost among his plans was the carrying out of an attempt on the life of the heir to the throne, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. A few months before proceedings had been taken against Luka Aljinovic for treasonable agitation. In the course of these proceed- ings three witnesses declared that Aljinovic had told them that in the year 1913 he had received at Belgrade 100 dinar from the Narodna Odbrana, and a similar sum from a secret association of students, for purposes of agitation, but especially to carry out an attempt on the life of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. It is clear how far the criminal agitation of the Narodna Odbrana and those who shared in its views, has of late been primarily directed against the person of the hereditary Archduke. From these facts the conclusion may be drawn that the Narodna Odbrana, as well as the associations hostile to the Monarchy in Servia, which were grouped round it, recently decided that the hour had struck to trans- late theory into practice. It is noteworthy, however, that the Narodna limits itself in this way to inciting, and where the incitement has fallen on fertile soil to providing means of material assistance for the realisation of its plans, but that it has confided the only dangerous part of this prop- aganda of action to the youth of the Monarchy, which it has ex- cited and corrupted, and which alone has to bear the burden of this miserable "heroism." All the characteristics of this procedure are found in the history and origin of the profoundly regrettable outrage of the 28th of June (see Appendix 8) . Princip and Grabez are characteristic examples of young men who have been poisoned from their school days by the doctrines of the Narodna Odbrana. At Belgrade, where he frequented the society of students imbued with these ideas, Princip busied himself with criminal plans against the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, against whom the hatred of the Servian element hostile to the Monarchy was particularly acute on the occasion of his tour in the annexed territories. He was joined by Cabrinovic, who moved in the same circles, and whose shifting and radically revolutionary views, as he himself admits, as well as the influence of his surroundings in Belgrade and the reading of the Servian papers, inspired him with the same sense of hostility to the Monarchy, and brought him into the propaganda of action. Thanks to the state of mind in which he already was, Grabez succumbed very quickly to this milieu, which he now entered. But however far this plot may have prospered, and however July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 111 determined the conspirators may have been to carry out the attempt, it would never have been effected, if people had not been found, as in the case of Jukic, to provide the accomplices with means of com- mitting their crime. For, as Princip and Cabrinovic have expressly admitted, they lacked the necessary arms, as well as the money to purchase them. It is interesting to see where the accomplices tried to procure their arms. Milan Pribicevic and Zivojin Dacic, the two principal men in the Narodna Odbrana, were the first accomplices thought of as a sure source of help in their need, doubtless because it had already become a tradition amongst those ready to commit crimes, that they could obtain instruments for murder from these representatives of the Narodna Odbrana. The accidental circumstance that these two men were not at Belgrade at the crkical moment doubtless balked this plan. However, Princip and Cabrinovic were not at a loss in finding other help, that of Milan Ciganovic, an ex-komitadji, and now a railway official at Belgrade, and at the same time an active member of the Narodna Odbrana, who, in 1909, first appeared as a pupil at the school {Bandenschule) at Cuprija (see Appendix 5). Princip and Cabrinovic were not deceived in their expectations, as they at once received the necessary help from Ciganovic. The latter, and at his instigation, his friend Major Voja Tankosic, of the Royal Servian Army, also one of the leaders of the Narodna Odbrana, who has already been mentioned several times, and who, in 1908, was at the head of the school of armed bands at Cuprija (see Appendix 5), now appear as moving spirits and active furtherers in the plot ; the repulsive manner in which they approved as a matter of course, is significant of the moral qualities of the whole anti- Austrian movement. They had at first only one doubt, and that but a fleeting one, as to whether the three conspirators were really resolved to commit this act. This doubt, however, soon disappeared, thanks to their insidious counsels. Thenceforth they were prepared to give every assistance. Tankosic produced four Browning pistols, ammuni- tion and money for the journey ; six hand-grenades from the Servian army supplies completed the equipment, of which the composition and origin recalls the case of Jukic. Anxious about the success of the attempt, Tankosic had the conspirators instructed in shooting, a task which Ciganovic carried out with a success which has since been fully proved. Tankosic and Ciganovic were further anxious to ensure secrecy for the plot by special means which had not been bar- gained for by the assassins. They therefore supplied cyanide of potassium, telling the two culprits to commit suicide after the crime, a precaution which was to be specially advantageous to themselves, as secrecy would thus relieve them of the slight danger which they were incurring in the enterprise. Sure death for the victims of their corruption, perfect security for themselves, this is the motto of the Narodna Odbrana, as was already known. In order to render the execution of the crime possible, it was necessary that the bombs and arms should be secretly smuggled into 112 Official Diplomatic Documents Bosnia. There again Ciganovic gave all the assistance in his power ; he wrote out for the conspirators the exact route to be followed, and assured them of the collusion of the Servian Customs officials for getting them into Bosnia. The way in which this journey, described by Princip as "mysterious," was organised and carried out can leave no doubt but that this route was a secret one, prepared in advance, and already often used for the mysterious designs of the Narodna Odbrana. With an assurance and a certainty which could only result from long habit, the frontier guards at Sabac and Loznica lent their administrative organisation for the purpose. The secret trans- port with its complicated system of ever-changing guides, who were summoned as if by magic, and who were always on the spot w^hen wanted, was effected without a hitch. Without inquiring into the object of this strange journey of some immature students, the Ser- vian authorities set this smooth machinery into motion at a word from the ex-komitadji and minor railway official, Ciganovic. How- ever, they had no need to ask any questions, as from the instructions they had received, it was perfectly clear that a new "mission'*' of the Narodna Odbrana was being carried out. The sight of the arsenal of bombs and revolvers caused the exciseman Grbic merely to smile good-naturedly and approvingly — sufficient proof of how accus- tomed they were on this "route" to find contraband of this nature. The Royal Servian Government have taken a grave responsibility on their shoulders, in allowing all this to take place. Though bound to cultivate neighbourly relations with Austria- Hungary, they have allowed their press to disseminate hatred against the Monarchy; they have allowed associations established on their own territory under the leadership of high officers, of public officials, of professors and of judges, to carry on openly a campaign against the Monarchy, with the ultimate object of inciting its citizens to revo- lution; they have not prevented men devoid of all moral scruples, who share in the direction of its military and civil administration, from poisoning the public conscience, so that in this struggle low murder appears as the best weapon. APPENDIX 1 Opinions of the Servian Press (a) The PolitikUy on the 18th August, 1910, on the occasion of the eightieth birthday of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, published a large portrait of Bogdan Zerajic, who, two months earlier, had made a murderous attack on the Governor of Bosnia, Freiherr von Varesanin. In the article dealing with this, the fol- lowing observations were made : — " Two months ago, on the 2nd of June (old style), on the opening day of the Diet of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a young Servian, the student Bogdan Zerajic, made an attempt in Serajevo to kill the Governor of Bosnia and Herze- govina, General Marian Varesanin. Zerajic fired five shots at July 25 y Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 113 this renegade, who had assured his career by pouring out the blood of his brothers in the famous insurrection in Rakovica, but, owing to a remarkable accident, did not succeed in killing him. Whereon the brave and composed Zerajic fired the sixth and last bullet through his own head, and immediately fell dead. In Vienna, they knew very well that it was not the reading of Russian and revolutionary writings which had induced Zerajic to make his attempt, but that he acted thus as the noble scion of a race which wished to protest against foreign rule in this bloody way. Therefore, they sought to hush up the whole matter as quickly as possible, and — contrary to their cus- tom — to avoid an affair which would have still more compromised the Austrian Government in Bosnia g^nd Herzegovina. In Vienna, it was desired that every memory of Zerajic should be extinguished, that no importance should be attached to his attempt ; but just this fear of the dead Zerajic, and the prohibition against mentioning his name throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, brought it about that his name is spoken among the people as something sacred to-day, on the 18th of August, perhaps more than ever. " To-day, we too light a candle at his grave and cry * Honour to Zerajic.'" To this is added a poem, the translation of which is as follows : — "Bosnia lives and is not dead yet, In vain have you buried her corpse ; Still the chained victim spits fire, Nor is it yet time to sing the dirge. ^ With devil's hand you have scratched a grave for her But the living dead will not descend into the vault ; Emperor, dost thou hear ? In the flash of the revolver the leaden bullets hiss about thy throne. These are not slaves ; this is glorious freedom Which flashes from the bold hand of the oppressed. Why does this horrible Golgotha shudder ? Peter drew the sword in Christ's defence, His hand fell, but out of the blood A thousand brave hands will rise ; That shot was only the first herald Of the glorious Easter after Golgotha's torments." (6) On the 8th October, 1910, on the occasion of the anniversary of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Politika and the Mali Journal, the last of which appeared with a black border, published articles in which they indulged in violent attacks against Austria-Hungary. Europe must convince herself that the Servian people still think always of the "remrwhe."^ The day of the "remnche'' must come; for this the feverish exertions of Servia to organise her military power as well as the feeling of the Servian people and their hatred of the neighbouring kingdom were a guarantee. On the same occasion the Samouprava wrote on the 9th October, 1910, " Abuse and excesses are no fit means to express true patriotism ; quiet, steady and honest work alone leads to the goal." (c) On the 18th April, 1911, the Politika said: "Except for a few cynics, no one in Servia would be glad to see King Peter pro- 114 Official Diplomatic Documents ceeding to Vienna or Budapest. By the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the possibiUty of friendship between Servia and Austria- Hungary was once for all destroyed. Every Servian feels that.'' (d) The Beogradske N ovine wrote on the 18th April, 1911: — ■ " Even in Government circles the projected journey of King Peter to the Emperor Francis Joseph is disapproved. The storm of indig- nation which has seized the whole of the Servian race on account of the King's proposed journey is entirely comprehensible." {e) The Mali Journal of the 19th April, 1911, says: "A visit of King Peter to the ruler of Austria-Hungary would be an insult to all Serbs. By this visit, Servia would forfeit the right to play the part of Piedmont. The interests of Servia can never coincide with the interests of Austria." (/) On the 23rd April, 1911, the Politika, the Mali Journal, the Tribuna, the Beogradske Novine, and the Vezernje Novosti, com- mented on the projected visit of King Peter to the Court of Vienna : "Between Servia and Austria, friendship can never exist. The projected visit of King Peter would, therefore, be for Servia a ' shame- ful capitulation,' 'a humiliation of Servia,' 'a solemn sanctioning of all the crimes and misdeeds that Austria-Hungary has committed against Servia and the Servian people.' " (g) On the 18th April, 1912, the Trgovinski Glasnik wrote in an article headed, "The decay of Austria": — "In Austria-Hungary decay prevails on all sides. What is now happening beyond the Danube and the Save is no longer a German, Magyar, Bohemian or Croatian crisis, it is a universal Austrian crisis, a crisis of the dynasty itself. We Servians can observe such a devel- opment of affairs in Austria with satisfaction." (h) The Balkan, in an article entitled "The Borders of Albania," in attacking Austria-Hungary, expressed itself to this effect : " If Europe is too weak to call a halt to Austria-Hungary, Montenegro and Servia will do it, saying to Austria, ' Halt ! no further ! ' A war between Austria-Hungary and Servia is inevitable. We have dis- membered the Turkish Empire, we will dismember Austria too. We have finished one war, we are now facing a second." (i) The Vecernje Novosti, of the 22nd April, 1913, appeals to the Servian travelling public and to Servian traders to boycott the Donau Dampfschifffahrts-Gesellschaft (The Danube Steam Navigation Company). "No one should travel or consign goods by ships of this Austrian Company. All who do this should be punished with fines by a committee. The moneys would flow to the funds of the Komitadjis which are to be applied for the purpose of the coming war with Austria." (k) The Tribuna of the 26th May, 1913, on the occasion of the seizure of Ada Kaleh by Austria, writes : " The criminal black and yellow Austria has again carried out a piratical trick. It is a thief who, when he cannot steal a whole sack of gold, contents himself with one dinar." (I) On the 10th June, 1913, on the occasion of the recurrence of July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 115 the anniversary of the murderous attack on the Royal Commissary in Agram by the student Luka Jukic, the Servian newspapers pub- lished memorial articles. An article in the Pragda stated that : " It must grieve us to the bottom of our hearts that everyone has not acted like our Jukic. We have no longer a Jukic, but we have the hatred, we have the anger, we have to-day ten million Jukics. We are convinced that soon Jukic, through his prison window, will hear the last cannon shot of freedom." (m) The Mali Journal of the 7th October, 1913, gives a leading place to an article in which Austria-Hungary is denied the right of existence, and the Slavonic peoples are invited to support the offensive campaign contemplated by Servia. (n) The Piemont writes on the commemoration day of the annex- ation : " Five years ago to-day an imperial decree extended the sov- ereignty of the Hapsburg sceptre over Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Servian people will feel for decades yet the grief which was that day inflicted on them. Shamed and shattered, the Servian people groaned in despair. The people vow to take vengeance in attaining freedom by an heroic step. This day has aroused the energy which had already sunk to sleep, and soon the refreshed hero will strive for freedom. To-day when Servian graves adorn the ancient Servian territories, when the Servian cavalry has trod the battlefields of Macedonia and old Servia, the Servian people having ended their task in the South turn to the other side, whence the groans and tears of the Servian brother are heard, and where the gallows has its home. The Servian soldiers who to-day in Dusan's kingdom fight those Albanians who were provoked against us by the state which took Bosnia and Herzegovina from us, vowed to march against the 'sec- ond Turkey' even as with God's help they had marched against the Balkan Turkey. They make this vow and hope that the day of revenge is drawing near. One Turkey vanished. The good Servian God will grant that the 'second Turkey' will vanish too." (o) The Mali Jmtrnal of the 4th November, 1913, writes : "Every effort tow^ards a rapprochement with Austria-Hungary is equivalent to a betrayal of the Servian people. Servia must understand the facts and always hold before her eyes that she has in Austria-Hungary her most dangerous enemy, and that it must be the sacred obliga- tion of every Servian Government to fight this enemy." (p) On the 14th January, 1914, the Pragda said: "Our new year's wishes are first of all for our still unfreed brothers sighing under a foreign yoke. Let the Servians endure; after Kossovo came Kumanovo, and our victorious career is not yet ended." (q) The Novosti of the 18th January, 1914, published a picture of "The Blessing of the Water in Bosnia" with the following text: " Even in places which lie under the foreign yoke, the Servians pre- serve their customs against the day when in glorious joy the day of freedom dawns." (r) The Zastava confesses in January, 1914: "Servia incites the Austro-Hungarian Servians to revolution." 116 Official Diplomatic Documents (s) The Mali Journal of the 9th March, 1914, writes : "Servia can never forget Franz Ferdinand's sabre-rattHng in the Skutari affair." (t) On the 4th April, 1914, the Zastava writes: "The Austrian statesmen who only conduct a policy of hatred, a bureaucratic policy, not a policy inspired by broad vision, are themselves preparing the ruin of their State." (u) The Pragda of the 8th April, 1914, says: "Austria has now lost her right to exist." {v) In their Easter numbers (April, 1914) all the Servian newspapers expressed the hope that soon their unfreed, oppressed brothers under the yoke would celebrate a joyous resurrection. {w) In the Tribuna of the 23rd April, 1914, it is stated that : "The pacifists have invented a new catchword, that of the 'patriotism of Europe.' This programme can only be realised, however, when Austria is partitioned." (.t) The Mali Journal of the 12th May, 1914, writes: "What are called crimes in private life are called, in Austria, politics. History knows a monster, and that monster is called Austria." APPENDIX 2 Extract from the "Narodna Odbrana," an organ published by THE Central Committee of the Narodna Odbrana Society. (Narodna odbrana izdanje stredisnog odbora narodne- ODBRANE. BeOGRAD, 1911. "NoVA STAMPARIJA" DaVIDOVIC, Decanska ulica BR. 14, Ljub. Davidovica.) In a short introduction it is first of all remarked that this pamphlet "does not completely or exhaustively reproduce the whole work of the Narodna Odbrana because, for many reasons, it is neither per- missible nor possible to do this." The document is divided into three parts of which the first consists of fourteen chapters and is in the nature of a programme, while the second contains a report of the activities of the Society, and in the third examples are given for the organisation of similar societies abroad. In the first chapter, "Origin and activity of the first Narodna Odbrana," it is remarked that the Society was founded as a conse- quence of the popular movement arising in Servia on the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that it had the following objects : — (1) Raising, inspiring and strengthening the sentiment of nation- ality. (2) Registration and enlistment of volunteers. (3) Formation of volunteer units and their preparation for armed action. (4) Collection of voluntary contributions, including money and other things necessary for the realisation of its task. (5) Organisation, equipment and training of a special revolutionary band (Komitee), destined for special and independent military action. July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 117 (6) Development of activity for the defence of the Servian people in all other directions. In this connection, it is remarked that owing to the recognition of the annexation by the Great Powers an end had been made to all this work of the Society on which, while retaining its existing constitution, the Society had taken measures to reorganise its programme and to undertake new work, so that, on the recurrence of a similar occasion, " the old red War Flag of the Narodna Odbrana would again be unfurled." At the beginning of the second chapter, "The new Narodna Odbrana of to-day," it is stated that "at the time of the annexation, experience had shown that Servia was not ready for the struggle which circumstances imposed upon her, and that this struggle, which Servia must take up, is much more serious and more difficult than it was thought to be ; the annexation was only one of the blows which the enemies of Servia have aimed at this land, many blows have preceded it, and many will follow it. Work and preparation are necessary so that a new attack may not find Servia equally unpre- pared." The object assigned to the work to be done by people of every class is stated to be "the preparation of the people for war in all forms of national work, corresponding to the requirements of the present day," and the means suggested to effect this object are " strengthening of the national consciousness, bodily exercises, increase of material and bodily well-being, cultural improvement, etc. ... so far as individuals and societies can and should assist the State in these spheres." The third chapter, "The three principal tasks," begins with a hint that the annexation has taught that national consciousness in Servia is not so strong as it should be in a country which, as a small fraction of three millions, forms a hope of support for seven millions of the oppressed Servian people. The first task of the Society, therefore, consists in strengthening the national consciousness. The second task is the cultivation of bodily exercises, the third the proper util- isation of these activities learned in the field of sport. In the fourth chapter (Musketry) prominence is given to the value of good training in musketry, especially having regard to the circum- stances of Servia, w^here the military training only lasts six months. These observations conclude with the sentence : "A new blow, like that of the annexation, must be met by a new Servia, in which every Servian, from child to greybeard, is a rifle- man." The fifth chapter, which treats of "The relations of the Narodna Odbrana to the Sokol societies," begins with a social and political excursus as to the conditions on which the powers of States de- pend. In this connection the fall of Turkey is referred to, and it is said : "The old Turks of the South gradually disappear and only a part of our people suffer under their rule. But new Turks come from the North, more fearful and dangerous than the old ; stronger in civilisa- tion and more advanced economically, our northern enemies come 118 Official Diplomatic Documents against us.' They want to take our freedom and our language from us and to crush us. We can already feel the presages of the struggle which approaches in that quarter. The Servian people are faced by the question ' to be or not to be ? ' " "What is the object of the Lectures?" is the title of the seventh chapter, the principal contents of which are covered by the following sentences : "The Narodna Odbrana instituted lectures which were largely propaganda lectures. The programme of our new work was devel- oped. Every lecture referred to the annexation, the work of the old Narodna Odbrana and the task of the new. The lectures will never cease to be propaganda lectures, but they wdll develop special branches more and more and concern themselves with all questions of our social and national life." In the eighth chapter, "Women's Activities in the Narodna Odbrana," the ninth "Detail and Lesser Work," and the tenth, "Renaissance of the Society," the preparation and deepening of the Society's work and the necessity of a regeneration of the individual, the nation and the State are treated in reference to the tasks of the Narodna Odbrana. The Introduction to the eleventh chapter (" New Obilice and Singjelice" ^) runs as follows : — " It is an error to assert that Kossovo is past and gone. We find ourselves in the midst of Kossovo. Our Kossovo of to-day is the gloom and ignorance in which our people live. The other causes of the new Kossovo live on the frontiers to the North and West : the Germans, Austrians and ^Schwabas,' with their onward pressure against our Servian and Slavonic South." In conjunction with the reference to the heroic deeds of Obilice and Singjelice, the necessity of sacrifice in the service of the nation is alluded to, and it is declared that "national work is interwoven with sacrifice, particularly in Turkey and in Austria, where such workers are persecuted by the authorities and dragged to prison and the gallows. For this struggle, also, against gloom and ignorance there is no need of such heroes. The Narodna Odbrana does not doubt that in the fight with gun and cannon against the ' Schwabas ' and the other enemies with whom we stand face to face, our people will provide a succession of heroes. However, the Narodna Odbrana is not content with this, for it regards the so-called peaceful present day conditions as war, and demands heroes too for this struggle of to-day which we are carrying on in Servia and beyond the frontier." The twelfth chapter treats of "Union with our brothers and friends," and its principal contents are concentrated in the following sentences : — ^ Milos Obilice (or Kobili6) crept — according to Serbian tradition — into the Turkish Camp, after the battle on the Amselveld, and there murdered the Sultan Murad (von Kdllay, Geschichte der Serben, Vol. I). Stephan Singjelic, Prince of Resara, played a part during the Serbian Revolution, 1807-1810. In 1809, Sing- jeUc defended the redoubt of Tschagar against the Turks, and is said to have blown himself into the air, with some of his followers and many Turks, when outnumbered. (Von Kdllay, Die Geschichte des serbischen Aufstandes.) July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 119 "The maintenance of union with our brothers near and far across the frontier, and our other friends in the world, is one of the chief tasks of the Narodna Odbrana. In using the word 'people' the Narodna Odbrana means our whole people, not only those in Servia. It hopes that the work done by it in Servia will spur the brothers out- side Servia to take a more energetic share in the work of private initiative, so that the new present day movement for the creation of a powerful Servian Narodna Odbrana will go forward in unison in all Servian territories." The thirteenth chapter, which is headed "Two Important Tasks," proceeds as follows : — "As we take up the standpoint that the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has completely brought into the light of day the pressure against our countries from the North, the Narodna Odbrana proclaims to the people that Austria is our first and greatest enemy." This work (that is to say, to depict Austria to the Servian people as their greatest enemy) is regarded by the Society, according to the fol- lowing expressions of opinion, as a healthy and necessary task, in fact, as its principal obligation. For the pamphlet goes on as follows : — "Just as once the Turks attacked us from the south, so Austria attacks us to-day from the north. If the Narodna Odbrana preaches the necessity of fighting Austria, she preaches a sacred truth of our national position." The hatred against Austria brought about by this propaganda is, of course, not the aim but the natural consequence of this work, the object of which is independence and freedom. If on this account hatred of Austria germinates, it is Austria who sows it by her advance, w^hich conduct "makes obligatory a war of extermination against Austria." After some praise of the modern conception of nationalism the remark is made that in speaking of "freedom and unity," too much is mere talk. The people must be told that : — " For the sake of bread and room, for the sake of the fundamental essentials of culture and trade, the freeing of the conquered Servian territories and their union with Servia is necessary to gentlemen, tradesmen, and peasants alike." Perceiving this the people will tackle the national work with greater self-sacrifice. Our people must be told that the freedom of Bosnia is necessary for her, not only out of pity for the brothers suffering there, but also for the sake of trade and the connection with the sea. The "two tasks" of the Narodna Odbrana are then again brought together in the following concluding sentence : — " In addition to the task of explaining to the people the danger threatening it from Austria, the Narodna Odbrana has the important duty, while preserving intact the sacred national memories, of giving to the people this new, wholesome and, in its consequences, mighty conception of nationalism and of work in the cause of freedom and union." The fourteenth and final chapter begins with an appeal to the 120 Official Diplomatic Documents Government and people of Servia to prepare themselves in all ways for the struggle "which the annexation has foreshadowed." Hereon the activities of the Narodna Odbrana are again recapitu- lated in the following sentences : — " While the Narodna Odbrana works in conformity with the times according to the altered conditions, it also maintains all the connec- tions made at the time of the annexation ; to-day therefore it is the same as it was at the time of the annexation. To-day, too, it is Odbrana (defence) ; to-day, too, Narodna (of the people) ; to-day, too, it gathers under its standard the citizens of Servia as it gathered them at the time of the annexation. Then the crs^ was for war, now the cr>^ is for work. Then meetings, demonstrations, voluntary clubs, {Komitees), weapons and bombs were asked for ; to-day steady, fanatical, tireless work and again work is required to fulfil the tasks and duties to which we have drawn attention by way of present preparation for the fight with gun and cannon which will come.'' The pamphlet and the atinual report contain the following infor- mation as to the organisation of the Narodna Odbrana : — A Central Committee at Belgrade directs all proceedings of the Narodna Odbrana. All other committees of the Narodna Odbrana are subject to this. The Central Committee is divided into four sections : — for cultural work, for bodily training, for financial policy, and for foreign affairs. District Committees, with their centre at the seat of the offices of the District Government, conduct the affairs of the Society in the corresponding districts. Every District Committee divides itself into sections for culture (the President being the Chairman of the local branch of the "Culture League"), for bodily training (the President being a local member of the Riflemen's, Sokol, Sportsmen's and Horsemen's clubs) and for financial affairs; some District Com- mittees have also a section for Foreign Affairs. Divisional Committees located at the seat of the local authorities conduct the affairs of the Society in the various divisions. Local Committees conduct the Society's affairs in the various towns and villages. Confidential men are located in those places in the interior of the country where the constitution of a Committee is not necessary. Societies "which work in close connection with the organisation of the Narodna Odbrana" and are supported by the latter in every respect are the following : — The Riflemen's Association with 762 societies, the Sokol Association "Dusan the Strong" with 2500 members, the Olympic Club, the Horsemen's Society, " Prince Michael," the Sportsmen's Association and the Culture League. All these societies are organised on similar lines to those of the Narodna Odbrana and use their premises, including club houses, libraries, etc. Distinguished members of these societies are chairmen of sections in the Committees of the Narodna Odbrana. July 25, AmtrO'Hungarian Red Book No. 19 121 APPENDIX 3 Extract from the "Report on the Activities of the Sokol Society Dusan the Strong in Kragujevac in the years 1912-13." (Kragujevac Printing Office " Buducnost " Tm. Lekic 1914.) At the head of this report is printed the speech with which the President, Major Kovacevic of the Servian Army, greeted the annual meeting in January, 1914. "It is known to you," the President began, "that SokoUsm, which arose in the struggle against Germanism, is a purely Slavonic insti- tution, which has for its aim to unite and to inspire all the Slavonic brothers, and to give physical and intellectual training for the struggle against the enemy of Slavism. "We Servians, as a part of the great Slavonic community, have taken up the Sokol idea and have agreed to the common work for our own and our brothers' welfare and happiness. "We Serbians, too, will live and work in the spirit of the Sokols, for we wish to revive the weary and the feeble, to strengthen the weak and the troubled, to free the imprisoned and the enchained. We have done this now and in earlier wars. We have rescued part of our brothers from the insolence of the enemy in the South. We have struck off their fetters, we have rid them of their sufferings and given them freedom, so that they enjoy happiness, equality and brotherhood." After giving a few words of praise to this "noble work" which " realised a part of the great Sokol idea," Major Kovacevic proceeded : "Oh, my brothers and sisters, our enemy in the North is more dangerous and pitiless, because he is stronger in respect of his civilisa- tion and his economic position. " This enemy is insatiable in his lusts ; he holds millions of our brothers in slavery and chains. He took law and freedom from them and subjected them all to his service. The brothers murmur, call and beg for still quicker help. " We must not leave them to the mercy of this fearful and greedy enemy. We must hurry to their help the sooner because it is our duty to do so. Could we in any event be happy when so many brothers live in slavery, suffer and murmur? " Brothers and sisters ! "The enemy is dangerous, greedy and troublesome. Let us ever be on our guard. " Let us go to work with still greater willingness and self-sacrifice. Let us be scrupulous according to the sacred Sokol obligation, true and enduring. "Let us prepare ourselves for the struggle and for the just Sokol idea. "Let us unite and ally ourselves with innumerable Sokol hosts, and let us always remember that truth which the Servian Sokols 122 Official Diplomatic Documents wrote upon their flag : That only a healthy, powerful, well-organised people, conscious of its nationality, is fit to defend itself, to struggle, and to conquer." The report of the Committee of Management follows the speech of the President. After a description of the successes in the last wars, which interfered with the activities of the Society for two years, it is stated that "the day arrived when we returned to our work, because our programme w^as not yet fulfilled, because our task was not yet ended. A great part of our people still endure the pains of the crucified Christ ; we have still to visit our brothers beyond the Drina ; we have still to seek out the town of Serajevo and the inherit- ance of St. Sava ; ^ we must behold the home of Marina Novak, of Deli Radivoj and of the old Vujadin ; we must cross the mountains of Romanaija and see why Travnik is veiled in mist. That song must end at last : ^ Ah ! Bosnia, thou orphan child before God, hast thou nowhere people of thy race. . . .'" After a discussion of various undertakings of the Society, emphasis is laid on the fact that the Society maintains relations with the brother societies beyond the Save and the Drina, and special emphasis is laid on the dispatch of delegates to the Jubilee of the Prosvjeta held in Serajevo. On this the report remarks : " By sending representatives to the brothers in Bosnia the Committee intended to say to them — we have not forgotten you, the wings of the falcon of Sumadija are still mighty." After a detailed description of a visit of the Agram students to Servia ^ and of the dedication of the flag of " the Young People's Temperance Association," the report of the executive con- cludes with the following sentences : — " These manifestations — the coming of the brother Croats to Sumadija and the meeting of the ' temperate youth ' from all Servian regions are correctly appreciated by our leaders, and one would not exaggerate if one said that these events indicate the beginning and the germ of a great deed to be done in the near future. "They are the expression of a great and, till now, silent awakening of the national consciousness and of the strength of an oppressed nation which is not allowed to arise and unite. In a little time this germ will ripen, and when the soul of the people arises still more, there will be no barrier which it cannot break, and no obstacle which it cannot tear down upon its way. The work of strengthening this power, the assistance and acceleration of the progress of this national development, the preparation and the support of this idea, was always the aim of the actions of our leaders." The treasurer's report enumerates first of all those who. have supported the society. In addition to a number of members of the 1 St. Sava (ob. 1236) is the patron saint of the Serbians. Herzegovina is the name of Ducatus Santi Save. The "inheritance of St. Sava" is, therefore, equivalent in meaning to "Herzegovina." 2 This visit of the Agram students (April, 1912) to Belgrade, Nish, Semendria, etc., was used in Serbia as the pretext for a great demonstration of hostility to the Mon- archy. The excursionists were accorded military honours, and lunches and balls took place in the Military Academy and the Ofl&cers' Club. In Nish, indeed, a military parade was held in honour of the visitors. July 25, Aitstro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 123 ivragujevac District Committee, the following are mentioned and thanked : — The District Committee of the " Narodna Odbrana " at Kragujevac, particularly its "Ritter'* section, which often assisted the Sokol Society with substantial support ; the Headmaster of the Gymnasium at Kragujevac, who "always showed his fatherly care" to the Sokols ; the Divisional Commandant of Sumadija, who had substantially supported the society ; the President of the District Court at Kragu- jevac; the District Chairman and the Parish Chairman at Kragu- jevac. After referring to the members of the society who have fallen in war, the treasurer closes his report with the following words : — "After so brilliant a victory over a portion of our enemies, those who control our society hope that you all, from now onwards, > will devote yourselves still more, more unitedly and more entirely, to the activities of Sokolism so that you may rear falcons in our falcon's eyrie, who at the given moment, will one day be ready to fly aloft, and in their mighty flight bring freedom, love and brotherhood to all our brothers who are not yet free." The annual report is signed by Major M. J. Kovacevic, President, by the secretary of the Law Courts, D. V. Brzakovic, as secretary, and by ten members of the executive, among whom are included two professors (Emil Lukic and Milan Jankovic), as well as a further officer (Major of Infantry, Michael Vasic). It is clear from this annual report, and from a schedule also signed by Major M. J. Kovacevic and Brzakovic, Secretary of the Law Courts, and sent to the Kragujevac Sokol Society by the "Srpski Soko" in Tuzla for completion, that the Sokol Societies in Servia stand in close relation with various similar societies in the Monarchy to an extent not hitherto known. APPENDIX 4 The Servian Official Gazette in the service of the Narodna Odbrana An appeal by the Narodna Odbrana appears as a supplement to the Servian Official Gazette, Srpski Novine, of 28th June, 1914 (new style), and w^as supplied to all subscribers to the paper. The following passages occur in this appeal : — "Brothers and sisters ! Kossovo was only partly avenged, the day of St. Vitus (Vidovdan) was only partly expiated. Just as far as the territories reach where our people's speech is heard — the Servian, Croatian, and Slovenian — from Kikinda to Monastir, from Trieste to Carevo-Solo, just as far and wide does the meaning of St. Vitus' Day and of Kossovo extend. So many souls of our race weep on this terri- tory ; so many fetters of our brothers clank ; so much work is yet to be done ; so much have we still to sacrifice. St. Vitus' Day could 124 Official Diplomatic Documents formerly mean a day of mourning for us, but to-day, when we have already gone so far in the new history of the people ; when behind us stand great and glorious national events, and before us still greater and more glorious events await us; to-day when we stand in the midst of the creation of a great national State; to-day St. Vitus' Day must be for us a day of great joy and pride, because of that which has happened, and sprung from it, and still more because of that which will come. Men and women of Servia ! Millions of our brothers, Slovenes, Croats, and Servians beyond our frontiers, look to-day to us, the Children of the Kingdom, and joy and hope fill their breast as they now behold to-day's majestic manifestations for the national cause. God helps the brave ! Forward all ! That part of our sacred task which is as yet unrealised calls us. Belgrade, St. Vitus' Day, 1914." APPENDIX 5 Deposition of Trifko Krstanovic, concerning the Narodna Odbrana The baker's assistant, Trifko Krstanovic, of Zavadonici, was arrested by a gendarmerie patrol on the night of the 6th-7th July, 1914, because he had been heard to remark shortly after the mur- derous attack on the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, that this attack was to be expected and because this remark brought him under sus- picion of having had knowledge of the plot. He was, on this account, brought up before the District Court at Serajevo. The examination of the prisoner revealed that his remark did not justify the suspicion which had arisen against him, since it, founded entirely on his earlier knowledge of the activities of the Narodna, was merely the expression of his conviction that, on account of the agitation developing in Servia against the Austro- Hungarian Monarchy, and especially against the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, a deed of that kind was to be expected. In the absence of any material facts in support of the charge, the proceedings against Krstanovic were accordingly withdrawn, and, having regard to his knowledge of the activities of the Narodna Odbrana, which had an important bearing on the inquiry, he was subpoenaed as a witness. An extract from his depositions taken on the 19th July, 1914, which is relevant to the matters here in question, is as follows : — " In the autumn of the year 1 908, I crossed the frontier to Servia on the Mokra Gora, near Visegrad, to seek work. I first came to Bagina Basta in the district of Uzice, and as I found no work there, I went to Belgrade, where I arrived just at the time when the annexa- tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina was announced. As I saw that the annexation had caused great popular commotion and excitement, and that I should not be able to find any work, I went to the Imperial and Royal Consulate and tried to get myself sent home. There I was July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 125 told to come back in the afternoon, and that I should then be sent home. However, as I came out of the Consulate, a gendarme seized me on the street, and asked me where I came from ; under the impression that I was a spy, he conducted me to a tower (Karaula). Here I was questioned, and when I said to them that I wanted to go home, a non-commissioned officer began to abuse me : Why should I now want to go out of Servia which now needed more people because a war with Austria would come ? When I said to him that I had nothing to live on, he answered me that I would find full maintenance if I would register myself in the Komitee. In my need I agreed, and a gendarme took me to the inn 'Zelenom Vijencu' ('The Green Wreath'), and introduced me there to Voja Tankosic, the leader of the Komitee and a captain in the regular army. Here, at the 'Green W>eath' I was provided with food and lodging, and, as I saw, other members of the Komitee lived here. Voja Tankosic told me that the business of the Komitee was to learn bomb-throwing, the destruction of bridges, tunnels, telegraphs and railways, because a war between Servia and iVustria could easily arise. On this a man took me to a small building belonging to the Royal Demesne next to the Treasury, where the offices of the Komitee were situated, and in the office I met Milan Pribicevic, who enrolled me in the Komitee. At this enrolment, Milan Pribicevic asked me whether Voja Tankosic had told me the obligations which I had as a member of the Komitee. To this I answered 'Yes.' He said that those enrolled must be efficient, strong, and self-sacrificing. " There were then about 70 of us enrolled. In Belgrade we did nothing. After about six weeks our leader Tankosic informed us that the Great Powers had pro- hibited our Komitee, and that we must leave Belgrade and hide ourselves somewhere in an out-of-the-way place not visited by for- eigners. In this way they sent us to the town of Cuprija. Here we were drilled by the officers, Voja Tankosic, Dusan Putnik, Zivko Gvosdic and Mitar Djinovic, who was involved in the Montenegrin bomb outrage, and was shot in Montenegro. In order that no one should become aware of our objects, or know anything of our numbers, we were forbidden to have intercourse with outsiders. We practised the throwing of bombs, the construction of mines, and the destruction of telegraphs, railways, tunnels and bridges. Every fortnight we were visited by Milan Pribicevic, General Bozo Jankovic, the pharmacist Skaric, the deputy Zivko Rafajlovic, and a certain Glisic Milutin, a Treasury official, who watched our drill and paid for our board on each occasion. Our instructors told us that, when war was declared, we Komitees would go in advance, then the volun- teers, and then the regular army. There were about 140 men at Cuprija. Besides board, we had lodging and clothes and 25 para a day for tobacco. The school lasted about three months, that is until March, 1909. Then the members of the committee told us that we were dismissed, that we could all go wherever we wished, for the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had been recognised by the Great Powers, and that our Komitee had become useless. On the 126 Official Diplomatic Documents dissolution of the Komitee General Bozo Jankovic told me to enter the service of Bozo Milanovic at Sabac, where I should receive wages of 50 dinar a month. He did not tell me what the nature of the service would be. I accepted because, as a member of the Komitee, I re- garded myself as bound to obey General Jankovic, and also because I had nothing to live on, and had to earn my livelihood. In this way I came to Sabac in March, 1909, and reported myself to Bozo Milanovic, a tradesman of Sabac. General Jankovic had told me that Bozo jNIilanovic was chairman of the Narodna Odbrana in Sabac, and that I should assist him in connection with this Narodna Odbrana. When I had given Bozo Milanovic the General's letter and he had read it, he told me> that I must serve him faithfully and carry out his orders. My chief duty would be to carry his letters wheresoever they were addressed. It would cost me my life if I failed to carry a letter to its destination, and if any one else got hold of it. On the next day. Bozo Milanovic gave me a closed letter which I was to take to Cedo Lukic, Superintendent of Excise at Serbisch-Rac^a. On the road to RaCa, at the village of Bogatic, the District Captain stopped me, took the letter from me opened it and read it. In the letter it said that Lukic should immediately buy three boats so that they should be ready if they were required. 100 dinar were enclosed in the letter. On this occasion the Captain told me that the Ministry had given strict orders that the Komitadji were to do nothing without orders, so that international diplomatic intervention should not be provoked. I returned to Sabac and told Bozo INIilanovic what had happened to me. Bozo Milanovic applied to the District Prefect, who gave orders that the revolver, which the Captain at Bogatic had taken from me, should be returned. He also gave orders that the Captain should send the letter to Cedo Lukic to whom it was addressed. I carried letters of this sort from March, 1909, until October, 1910, and in that time I took 43 letters to Serbisch-RaCa, 55 to Loznica, 5 to Zvornik, 2 to Ljubivija, and I don't know how many to Kovil- jaca. I noticed how often I was in each place because these places are a very long way from Sabac. I took the letters to the chiefs of the Customs houses in the various places, and from them I received letters in reply and took them to Bozo Milanovic. I recollect that on a few occasions I took letters to Sepacka Ada. My assistant in letter carrying was one Vaso Eric, a native of Srebrenica. Every week I took letters from Bozo Milanovic to Belgrade, and delivered them to Milan Pribicevic and Bozo Jankovic. I knew nothing of the contents of these letters, and no one told me anything about them. So far as I could see, the letters despatched by Bozo Milanovic were not in cipher, but the letters sent by the chiefs of the Customs houses were written in special characters, a fact which I observed when Bozo Milanovic opened them. Once I brought one of these cipher letters to Bozo Milanovic, I think it was from Zvornik, and he sent me with the letter to Mika Atanasijevic, Professor at Sabac, to de- cipher. He did this, as he usually did ; but perhaps he forgot to close the letter, so that I could read it. The letter stated, that it July 25 y Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 127 was reported from a reliable source, that money was to be stamped with the likeness of the heir to the throne, and this was an indication that the Emperor Francis Joseph was about to abdicate. After about eight months of my service with Bozo Milanovic, Bozo gave me his visiting card with a death's head drawn upon it ; on it was written that I was designated an initiate (povjerenik) of the Narodna Odbrana. On this occasion he told me, that the business was spying. . . . "On one occasion, I learnt from the officer Dusan Opterkic, member of the Narodna Odbrana, that the Narodna Odbrana had 23 branches in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Beyond this, I do not know what organisation, if any, the Narodna Odbrana has in Bosnia. From time to time, Milan Pribicevic gave me a revolver, or money for the purchase of a revolver, for me to give to the Customs officers on the frontier who served as Komitadjis who had no revolver nor any money to buy a revolver themselves. It appeared to me that Milan Pribicevic gave them these things as an honour, just because they were Komitadjis. I had nothing else to do with arms. "On one occasion, during my service with Bozo Milanovic, I was ordered to accompany a man to a peasant in Lijasnica on the Drina, who would give us all necessary information and show us everything, so that we two could kill Ljubo Stanaricic, a Servian officer of Reserve, who had fled to Bijeljina. For the Committee of the Narodna Odbrana had learnt that Ljubo Stanaricic was dangerous to the Servian State, and had resolved that he should be put to death. "That man and I received instructions from Bozo Milanovic to go to a certain place across the Drina, and to kill Ljubo Stanaricic, who lives just on the bank of the Drina on the Bosnian side in the district of Bijeljin. I and that man had descended into the Drina, but because the water was deep, and we saw that Ljubo was walking round his house with a gun on his shoulder, we returned to that peasant's house. As I saw that Ave could not kill him with the knife, I sent that man to Sabac to tell Bozo Milanovic that it was not pos- sible to kill Stanaricic in the manner he desired, namely, with the knife. On this, I received orders from Bozo Milanovic that we should kill him in any case. We then determined to shoot him with a gun. According to Bozo's instructions, the man who was with me was to shoot and kill him, and I was to confirm whether these instructions were carried out. In the meantime, however, a mounted gendarme brought us instructions from the District Prefect of Sabac that we were to return, and to abandon the original project. And so we returned to Sabac. "In October, 1910, I demanded an increase of pay from Bozo Milanovic, and, on his refusal, I left his service. From Sabac I went to Belgrade, where I met General Jankovic, and he had me arrested for refusing obedience. They took me through various prisons for about two months, and all because I had refused to obey them, and they feared I would betray their secrets. Finally, the authorities decided to send me to Bosnia. In Sabac a prisoner told me that my life was at stake. The gendarmes accompanied me to Zvornik, where 128 Official Diplomatic Documents they handed me over to the Bosnian gendarmes. In this way I came to Bosnia in December^ 1910. "I know nothing of any 'Black Hand/ with the exception of w^hat I have read of it in Servian newspapers. I can't remember now w^hat was written in the newspapers about the 'Black Hand.' Nor do I know anything of the 'Black List.' After the annexation there prevailed in Servia universal anger and hatred against the person of the Heir to the Austrian Throne, who was regarded as the sworn enemy of the Servians." Beyond this, Krstanovic referred to his earlier statements, of which only the following are of interest as supplementing the foregoing testimony. The Komitee into which Milan Pribicevic introduced Krstanovic was set up by the Narodna Odbrana. In the school at Cuprija there were 20 to 22 Austrian subjects. Milan Ciganovic was also one of the pupils. In the school at Cuprija it was inculcated that the Komitee must be ready to proceed to Bosnia, on the command of the Narodna Odbrana, and there act according to the orders of their commanders. APPENDIX 6 Extract from the Proceedings of the District Court of Serajevo in the Prosecution of Jovo Jaglicic and others FOR Espionage. In the year 1913, it was discovered that Jovo Jaglicic and several accomplices were carrying on espionage in Bosnia in the interests of Servia. The criminal proceedings instituted in the matter afforded inter alia opportunities for obtaining an insight into the methods of the Great-Servian propaganda, and more especially of the Narodna Odbrana. Jovo Jaglicic made a statement that in the month of August or September, 1912, he for the first time met Petar Klaric, known as Pesut, formerly a cattle inspector in Foca, who had fled to Monte- negro in 1912 and then became a Komitadji. At their first meeting Klaric asked Jaglicic whether he knew Rade Milosevic of Kalinovik, and, on his answering, said that Milosevic was lying very ill in hospital : " It would be a pity if he were to die ; we have spoken of great matters ; has he never said anything to you about them?" On receiving a negative answer Klaric went on: "I had something important to tell you ; we are Servians, and must do some- thing important for Servia. Come to my office." There the follow- ing conversation ensued between them : — "Jovan, I will tell you something; I don't know you yet and whether you will betray me. I tell you, nevertheless, and if you have the heart, betray me I" July 25, AustrO'Hungarian Red Book No. 19 129 On Jaglicic asking him what it was all about, Klaric answered, "Brother, in Servia there is a society called the 'Narodna Odbrana/ Many people must join this society ; many have been enrolled already in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in the whole Monarchy ; among them are people of intelligence and means, long-headed people, and if they can do it why should we not do it too, so that we too may help a bit." To the question, what was the object of this society, Klaric an- swered : — "The Society has this object : for instance, you are in Kalinovik; you let me know what the news is there, how many soldiers, how many guns, how much ammunition, different arms, who comes, who leaves, and so on. We have a secret writing, 'cipher,' and use it for corre- spondence. If you are loyal, you will get it too." Jaglicic was frightened that Klaric was merely sounding him for the purpose of denouncing him, and therefore asked him to tell him the names of some of the members, on which Klaric reflected for some time and then told him a name, which gave him confidence. Hereon Klaric said to him: "Shall I give you the 'cipher'?" Jaglicic agreed. Klaric, who knew the cipher by heart, wrote it out on a slip and gave it to Jaglicic. On another occasion Klaric gave an account of his stay at Banja- Koviljaca (near Loznica) where he was instructed by the Servian captain Todorovic ^ in bomb-throwing, and when asked by the accused why he learnt this he answered : " If anything such as I have spoken of to you comes to pass, it is necessary that I should know how to handle bombs, and that I should teach you and you should teach others, so that powder magazines and other important objects should be blown up, for in that case we should receive bombs from Servia." Klaric then described the appearance of the bombs, and said that he had already enrolled people w^ho, in case of war, would cut telegraph and telephone wires. At these meetings Jaglicic learnt from Klaric that it also apper- tained to the duties of members of the Narodna Odbrana to induce Austro-Hungarian soldiers to desert, to enlist volunteers (Komitadjis), to organise bands, to blow up objects and depots, and so on. Klaric also informed him that even cipher correspondence between Bos- nian and Servian members would not be entrusted to the post, but despatched across the frontier by reliable messengers. Klaric further told Jaglicic that on the occasion of the Prosvjeta celebration (in September, 1912) a Servian major had stayed in the Hotel "Europe" with the Servian deputation which was sent to it,^ that Klaric had taken members of the Narodna Odbrana to him, and that he had sworn them in. From a spy Jadlicic learnt that bombs would arrive in Serajevo, or had already arrived, that these had the appearance of pieces of 1 Captain Kosta Todorovic was then in fact Boundary Commissioner and Director of the Serbian Intelligence Service for the frontier line from Raca to Ljuboija. 2 The Serbian major, Mika Jankovic, appeared as a delegate at the Prosvjeta cele- bration. 130 Official Diplomatic Documents soap/ and that two or three would either be sent to this spy or that he would fetch them. APPENDIX 7 From Confidential Reports on the Narodna Orbrana The control of the Narodna Odbrana is in the hands of representa- tives of all parties so as to win over both the progressives and those who are hostile to the conspirators. Its actual guiding spirit is Pribicevic, now Major. The position of secretary is always filled by an officer on leave. The object of the Narodna Odbrana is to develop effective prop- aganda in military and civilian circles in the Southern-Slav portions of Austria-Hungary, with the object of preparing for a revolution, interference with any mobilisation that may take place, and the initia- tion of panics, revolts, etc. The organisation has many trusted representatives and emissaries in the Monarchy, who carry on an unostentatious personal propa- ganda. Some are sent specially — to enlist a few men — preferably railway officials — in the neighbourhood of important bridges, junc- tions, etc., whose duty it is at the appropriate moment to carry out the directions they have received, or to get them carried out. Intercourse between the members of the Narodna Odbrana is, So far as possible, effected by keeping in personal touch with each other. Young people, workmen and railwaymen chiefly are enrolled as members. APPENDIX 8 Extract from the Records of the District Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina at Serajevo, touching the proceedings THERE instituted AGAINST GaVRILO PrINCIP AND CONFEDERATES ON ACCOUNT OF THE CRIME OF ASSASSINATION PERPETRATED ON THE 28th June, 1914, on His Imperial and Royal Highness THE Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Este ^ and Her Highness the Duchess Sophie of Hohenberg. I. The deed and the perpetrators Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, Trifko Grabez, Vaso Cubri- lovic and Cetres Popovic confess that in common with the fugitive Mehemed Mehmedbasic they contrived a plot for the murder of the 1 The bombs used in the Serajevo attack on the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, as well as those found in the Save, near Brcko, in the year 1913, which came from the Royal Serbian Arsenal at Kragujevac, can in fact be compared with pieces of soap. July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 131 Archduke Franz Ferdinand and, armed with bombs and in the ease of some of them with Browning pistols, laid wait for him on the 28th June, 1914, on his progress through Serajevo for the purpose of carrying out the planned attack. Nedeljko Cabrinovic confesses that he was the first of the con- spirators to hurl a bomb against the Archduke's carriage, which missed its mark and which on exploding injured only the occupants of the carriage following the Archducal motor car. Gavrilo Princip confesses that he fired two shots from a Browning pistol against the Archducal motor car, by which the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the Duchess Sophie of Hohenberg received fatal wounds. Both perpetrators confess that the act was done with intent to murder. These confessions have been fully verified by means of the inves- tigations which have taken place, and it is established that the deceased Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the deceased Duchess Sophie of Hohenberg died as a result of the revolver shots fired at them by Gavrilo Princip. II. Origin of the plot The accused have made the following declarations, which are essentially consistent, before the examining magistrate : — In April, 1914, Princip, during his stay at Belgrade, where he associated with a number of Servian students in the cafes of the town, conceived the plan for the execution of an attempt on the life of the late Archduke Franz Ferdinand. He communicated this in- tention to his acquaintance Cabrinovic, who also was in Belgrade at the time. The latter had already conceived a similar idea and was ready at once to participate in the attempt. The execution of an attempt on the Archduke's life was a^ frequent topic of conversation in the circle in which Princip and Cabrinovic moved, because the Archduke was considered to be a dangerous enemy of the Servian people. Princip and Cabrinovic desired at first to procure the bombs and weapons necessary for the execution of the deed from the Servian Major Milan Pribicevic or from the Narodna Odbrana, as they them- selves did not possess the means for their purchase. As, however. Major Pribicevic and the authoritative member of the said association, Zivojin Dacic, were absent from Belgrade at that time, they decided to try to obtain the weapons from their acquaintance Milan Ciganovic, who had formerly been a Komitadji and was at that time in the employment of the State railways. ^ Princip, through the instrumentality of an intimate friend of Ciganovic, now got into communication with the latter. Thereupon Ciganovic called on Princip and discussed the planned attempt with him. He entirely approved it, and thereupon declared that he would like to consider further whether he should provide the weapons for 132 Official Diplomatic Documents the attempt. Cabrinovic also talked with Ciganovic on the subject of the weapons. At Easter Princip took Trifko Grabez, who also was in Belgrade, into his confidence. The latter is also shown by his own confession to have declared himself ready to take part in the attempt. ^ In the following weeks Princip had repeated conversations with Ciganovic about the execution of the attempt. Meanwhile Ciganovic had reached an understanding on the subject of the planned attack with the Servian Major Voja Tankosic, who was a close friend of his and who then placed at his disposal for this object the Browning pistols. Grabez confesses in conformity with the depositions of Princip and Cabrinovic that on the 24th May he, accompanied by Ciganovic, visited Major Tankosic at the latter's request at his rooms. He says that after he had been introduced Tankosic said to him : " Are you the man? Are you determined?" Whereupon Grabez answered: " I am." Tankosic next asked : " Do you know how to shoot with a revolver J" and when Grabez answered in the negative Tankosic said to Ciganovic : " I will give you a revolver ; go and teach them how to shoot .J' Hereupon Ciganovic conducted Princip and Grabez to the military rifle range at Toprider and instructed them in a wood adjoining the range in shooting with a Browning pistol at a target. Princip proved himself the better shot of the two. Ciganovic also familiarized Princip, Grabez and Cabrinovic with the use of the bombs which were later given to them. On the 27th May, 1914, Ciganovic handed over to Princip, Cabri- novic and Grabez, as their confessions agree in stating, six bombs, four Browning revolvers and a sufficient quantity of ammunition, as well as a glass tube of cyanide of potassium with which to poison themselves after the accomplishment of the deed in order that the secret might be kept. Moreover Ciganovic gave them some money. Princip had previously informed Danilo Ilic, at Easter, of his plan of assassination. He now begged the latter on his return to Serajevo to enlist certain additional persons, in order to ensure the success of the attempt. Hereupon Ilic according to his confession enlisted Jaso Cubrilovic, Cetro Popovic and Mehemed Mehmedbasic in the plot. III. Origin of the bombs Only one of the bombs was made use of in the execution of the attempt. The remaining five bombs came later into the possession of the police at Serajevo. In the opinion of the judicial experts these bombs are Servian hand-grenades which were factory-made and intended for military purposes. They are identical with the 21 bombs which were found in the Save at Brcko in the year 1913 and which were partly in their original packing, which proved without a doubt that they came from the Servian arsenal of Kragujevac. July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 133 It is thus proved that the grenades which were used in the attempt against the Archduke Franz Ferdinand also came from the stores of the Army Depot at Kragujevac. Grabez quite spontaneously calls the grenades which were handed over to him and his accomplices " Kragujevac bombs." IV. Transport of the three assailants, and of the weapons from Serbia to Bosnia With regard to this Princip makes the following statement : — Ciganovic told Cabrinovic, Grabez and Princip that they were to make their way via Sabac and Loznica to Tuzla and there to betake themselves to Misko Jovanovic who would take over the weapons. Next they were to go to Sabac and report themselves to the frontier captain Major Rade Popovic, to whom he gave them a note, of which Princip took charge. On the 28th May the three accomplices left Belgrade with the weapons. ^At Sabac Princip handed over the note which he had received from Ciganovic to Major Popovic, who there- upon conducted all three to the orderly room and drew them up a pass in which it was stated that one of them was an exciseman and the other two his colleagues. The pass contained also the name of this alleged exciseman, but he had forgotten the name. At the same time Major Popovic handed over a closed letter for the frontier captain at Loznica, whose name was Pravanovic, Prdanovic or Predojevic, Princip, Cabrinovic and Grabez passed the night at Sabac and went by train the next morning to Loznica, with a half-price ticket, it may be remarked, on the strength of the pass which Major Popovic had drawn up for them. They reached Loznica at noon and delivered to the frontier captain at that place Major Popovic's letter, in which were the words : " See that you receive these people and bring them on their way, you know where." The frontier captain said he would summon his excisemen from the frontier and give the three into the charge of the most reliable man. Thereupon he telephoned, and made an appointment with the three accomplices for 7 o'clock the next morning in his office. Next morning the three conspirators agreed that Cabrinovic should take Grabez's pass and make his way openly to Zvornik, but that Princip and Grabez should cross the frontier secretly. This plan was discussed with the frontier captain and it was decided that arp excise man from Ljesnica called Grbic was to take Princip and Grabez with him to his tower (karaula) and bring them over the frontier. Cabri- novic accordingly walked to Banja Koviljaca in the direction of Zvornik. Princip and Grabez drove with the exciseman Grbic to Ljesnica, where they deposited the bombs and the revolver in a room in a hotel. While they were doing so the exciseman Grbic caught sight of these objects. Princip himself described this journey as mysterious. Grabez's statement conformed in essentials with Princip's and was supplemented by an addition to the effect that Grbic laughed when he saw the bombs and the revolver and merely asked to what part of 134 Official Diplomatic Documents Bosnia they were going with those bombs. The excisemen certainly thought that Grabez and Princip were travelHng on a mission. Grbic and a second exciseman brought Princip and Grabez in a boat to an island in the Drina. There Grbic instructed them to wait for a peasant who would come to fetch them. They passed the night on the island in a peasant's hut to which Grbic had directed them ; next day came a peasant who conducted them during the night first through a bog and then over the mountains to the neighbourhood of Priboj, where he handed them over to the local teacher Cubrilovic, who seemed to have been already waiting for them, to see them further on their way. He took them on to Misko Jovanovic at Tuzla. Cabrinovic's statement about the events of the journey up to the point at which he parted with Princip and Grabez conformed in essentials w^ith those of the latter, and only added by way of supple- ment that Major Popovic told them that he did not reach Sabac from Belgrade till the day before their arrival. In Loznica, Cabrinovic, Princip and Grabez decided to separate, as it was too dangerous to go about all three together. The frontier captain at Loznica, whom they informed of this, applauded their plan and gave Cabrinovic a letter for M. Jaklojevic, the teacher at Mali-Zvornik. Hereupon Cabrinovic handed over the bombs, Brown- ing pistol and ammunition which he had been carrying, to Princip and Grabez, and went to Mali-Zvornik with an exciseman who had been told off to accompany him. There he found the teacher Jaklojevic, to whom he handed the letter from the frontier captain of Loznica. Hereupon the former notified the Servian frontier guard. When Cabrinovic, with the teacher, reached this frontier post, a man was already waiting there for them, who brought them in a boat over the Drina to Gross-Zvornik in Bosnia. Cabrinovic then proceeded to Misko Jovanovic at Tuzla. Supplement Just before this memoir was closed, minutes of evidence were published by the District Court at Serajevo from which it appears that a subject of the Monarchy some days before the 28th June last desired to make a report to the Imperial and Royal Consulate at Belgrade to the effect that he suspected that a plan existed for the execution of an attempt on the life of Archduke Franz Ferdinand during his presence in Bosnia. It seems that the man was prevented from making this report by members of the Belgrade police force, who arrested him on trivial grounds just as he was about to enter the Imperial and Royal Consulate. The conclusion to be drawn from the statements contained in the evidence in question would seem to be that the police officials concerned had knowledge of the planned attempt, and only arrested this man in order to prevent him from laying the information. July 25 y Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 135 As these statements have not yet been verified, no opinion can be expressed at the present stage on their rehabiUty. In view of the investigations into the matter now pending, the more minute details of the evidence cannot be pubHshed more exactly at present. APPENDIX 9 The Serbian Press on the Assassination (a) The Belgrade newspaper Balkan writes on the 29th June, with regard to the two perpetrators : — "Nedeljko Cabrinovic, a compositor by profession, was full of anarchical ideas, and well known as a restless spirit. Until twenty days ago, he lived in Belgrade, whither he came after the war and was employed in the State printing works. Before his departure he announced that he was going to Trieste, where he would get work in a new printing works. Gavrilo Princip also was living at Belgrade until a short time ago. During the war he offered his services as a volunteer, but was not accepted, and therefore he left Belgrade. He returned, however, at Christmas last year to Belgrade, attended the^gymnasium for a time, and left Belgrade almost at the same time as Cabrinovic, though in a different direction. Princip was a silent, nervous, hard-working student, and associated with some fellow students who caine, like himself, from Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as latterly with Cabrinovic. He inclined towards socialistic ideas, although he had originally belonged to the Young Men Progressive Party. Princip, like Cabrinovic, was brought up at Serajevo; the two have been bound by ties of the closest friendship since their childhood." (6) The Piemont of the 1st July, points out that Princip's pro- test was a sequel to the public protest of the assassin Zerajic. The explanation of the former's, as of the latter's activities, is to be found in the system of government in Bosnia. The circumstance that Princip executed the deed of vengeance on the national festival of St. Vitus, the day which had been chosen for the manoeuvres, made the desperate act of the young martyr more intelligible and more natural. (The newspaper was confiscated by the police on account of this article ; the confiscation was, however, annulled the day after by the Court of First Instance at Belgrade.) (c) The Young Radical Odjek, of the 3rd July, says: — "The Archduke Franz Ferdinand was sent to Serajevo on the day of enthusiasm in order to celebrate a brutal manifestation of vio- lence and domination. This brutal act was bound to evoke brutal feelings of resistance, hatred and revenge." {d) The organ of the Nationalist Party, Srpska Zastam, of the 3rd July, says in an article entitled "Suspicions and Threats": — ''The assassination comes to be regarded more and more as the out- 136 Official Diplomatic Documents come of the unsound state of affairs in the Monarchy. On the other hand, the savage persecution of the Servian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina evokes the horror of the whole civilised world." {e) The Progressive newspaper, Pravda, of the 3rd July, writes : — "The policy of Vienna is a cynical one. It exploits the death of the unfortunate couple for its abominable aims against the Servian people." (/) The Agence des Balkans, of the 3rd July, says : — "The crimes which have been perpetrated in Bosnia and Herzegovina against the Servians have been carried out under the auspices and at the direct instigation of the Austro-Hungarian civil and military authorities." ig) The Pragda, of the 4th July, says: — "All the murders and assassinations which have been carried out up to the present time in Austria have arisen from one and the same source. The oppressed peoples of the JMonarchy were obliged to have recourse to this method of protest, because no other way was open to them. In the chaos of a reign of terror, it is natural and quite intelligible that the era of assassinations should have firmly established itself." (h) The Balkan, of the 5th July, remarks that Austria-Hungary "must be placed under international control, because of its persecu- tion of the innocent"; for Austria-Hungary has less cohesion than Turkey. (i) The Mali Journal, of the 7th July, wTites : — "A sprig of the Middle Ages has been murdered at Serajevo within the last few days. He has been murdered by a lad whose grief for the enslave- ment of his immediate Fatherland (engeres Vaterland) amounted to a paroxysm, that grief w^hich the robbers of the land of his fathers had brought upon him. What has been the contribution of official Austria-Hungary to this? It has answered with general massacres, plunderings and destruction of Servian life and property. Only the worthless distinguish themselves by such heroism. Cowards are always mighty heroes when they are sure that nothing will happen to them. Only compare Princip and Cabrinovic with these heroes, and you will at once see the great difference between them. Civil- isation and justice are a huge lie in Austria-Hungary." (j) The Tribuna, of the 7th July, says : — " We are of the opinion that the Serajevo murder was arranged to facilitate the extermination of the Servians at one blow." (k) The Piemont, of the 8th July, reports from Bajina Baschka that the Austrian officials in Bosnia are preparing a massacre of the Christians. (/) The Balkan, of the 8th, publishes a report from Bosnia, under the title "St. Bartholomew's Day at Serajevo," and pleads for a general boycott against all the Austrians living in Servia. (m) The Mali Journal, of the 8th, appeals to its readers to boycott the Danube Steamship Company. (n) Under the title "Nothing from Austria-Hungary!" the Tribuna, of the 8th, writes that it would be best to order nothing from Austria-Hungary, to abstain from visiting the Austrian and July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 137 Hungarian Spas, and from calling in doctors from Austria-Hungary. It says that private initiative can accomplish a great deal in the direction suggested. The State and the Government offices must not mix themselves up in this movement. It is enough to appeal to the citizens. (o) The Stampa, of the 8th, asserts that the Serajevo police are exposing the arrested assassins to the most inhuman and brutal torture in order to extort from them untrue confessions on which it is intended to base complaints against the Servian people. (p) The Agence des Balkans, of the 9th, reports from Belgrade: — "Absolutely trustworthy private reports announce that a general massacre of Servians is on the point of breaking out in Bosnia and Herzegovina." (q) The Balkan, of the 9th July, taking as its text Mr. Asquith's statement on the announcement of the news of the death of Arch- duke Franz Ferdinand, that he was full of anxiety for the fate of humanity,^ publishes a historical survey of the events of the last 40 years, from which it deduces that the Servian people during this period have been exposed to the cruel persecutions of Austria-Hun- gary's Jesuitical policy. Archduke Franz Ferdinand, like all the sons of Loyola, who only work in human blood, and who do homage to the principle, "The end justifies the means," was bound to be overtaken by fate and to fall a victim to Jesuitism, as the whole of Austria- Hungary will also fall. But by the downfall of Austria-Hungary, peace and tranquillity would ensue to mankind. The sum of all these truths emerges in the conclusion that Asquith might with a calm mind have accompanied the news of the murder with the word, "I am no longer anxious for the fate of humanity." (r) The Politika, of the 9th July, expresses itself in a leading article under the heading, "Shameless Lies," as follows: — "The manner in which the inquiries into the Serajevo murder are being carried on shows quite clearly what objects Austria is aiming at in those inquiries. When the assassins, regardless of all the tortures to which they were exposed, refused to say what was demanded of them, other individuals were unearthed who expressed themselves ready on certain conditions to confess a certain degree of complicity in the murder, but at the same time to implicate all those persons who were objectionable to Austria. This method has succeeded for the moment because the hired individuals state whatever they are asked to state, and the Austrian police take care that these lies are at once spread to all the points of the compass. Austria has no sense of shame, and thinks that somebody will be found to believe lies of this sort." (s) The Stampa, of the 9th, says that not everything which has happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina has yet been revealed and attained publicity. Strict secrecy is being maintained. But the truth will sooner or later come to the surface ; blood-thirsty Austria ^ ["We are once more confronted with one of those incredible crimes which almost make us despair of the progress of mankind." Mr. Asquith's Speech, Times, July 1, 1914.] 138 Official Diplomatic Documents will drink, nay, is drinking, Servian blood, till she can drink no more. It is reported that there are to-day about ten thousand wounded and dead in Bosnia. (t) The Politika, of the 10th July, hurls extravagant abuse against the members of the Imperial House. (u) The Commercial Journal, Trgovinski Glasnik, of the 10th July, talks about the corruption and unscrupulousness of the Austro- Hungarian policy, which it calls Jesuitical, reckless and dishonour- able. It is a warning to the Servian people in Austria-Hungary that they are not living in a civilised State which guarantees life and property, but that they must hold themselves armed and ever ready to defend themselves against the robbery of the officials and the Government. After the latest occurrences, the Servian people ought no longer to wait like a lamb, which any day might be led to the slaughter, but like a lion ready for a bloody resistance. {v) In the Stampa, of the 10th July, we find: — "Nothing lasts for ever, nor will Austria-Hungary remain for ever in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The time is not far off when the Servians who broke the power of the Turks and punished the Bulgarians, will circle round the Ivan Planina on the Trebevic." (w) The Pravda, of the 10th July, under the title "Boycott against Good-for-nothings," appeals for a boycott of Austrian firms in Belgrade, as well as of Austrian wares, and says that it is the duty of the Narodna Odbrana to see that the boycott is strictly carried out. {x) The Zvono, of the 16th July, declares Princip to be the son of Countess Lonyay, to whom the charge was given that he should avenge the death of Crown Prince Rudolf on his murderer. Arch- duke Franz Ferdinand. (y) The Mali Journal^ of the 19th July, publishes a report which says : — " Princip was instigated to make the attempt by an Austro- Hungarian agent. It is said in Vienna that it is only in the Austro- Hungarian Legation at Belgrade that the real culprit is to be found." (z) The leading Young Radical organ, Odjek, of the 20th July, writes : — " Austria-Hungary offers a hundred proofs that it will inherit the title of the 'sick man' of Europe. While in Servia not a single Austrian citizen has been molested, villages and towns have been plundered in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This fact is one more proof on how much higher a cultural and moral level Servia stands than Austria-Hungary." APPENDIX 10 The Local Committee of the Narodna Odbrana at Nish, on THE subject of THE CRIME AGAINST THE ArCHDUKE FrANZ Ferdinand. A confidential communication has come to the ears of the Imperial and Royal Foreign OflBce from a reliable correspondent, whose name July 25, AustrO'Hungarian Red Book No. 19 139 will be published at the proper time, according to which the Local Committee of the Narodna Odbrana at Nish, recently held a meeting at which the president of this Committee, Jasa Nenadovic, director of the Nish prison, touched on the subject of the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, using the following words : "Servia was absolutely bound this time to have recourse to a measure like the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, because the Arch- duke, on account of his aggressive and eccentric character, was a prominent and deadly danger for Servia, and possibly for wider Slavonic circles also. Had he remained alive, he would have soon challenged Servia to war or attacked it, in which case Servia, which was now so much weakened materially, and had not yet completed her army re-organisation, would certainly have been lost. But now Servia had been rescued by the Serajevo murder, and one of the dan- gers which threatened Servia in the person of the victim had been swept out of the way. Servia would now have rest for several years, as the new heir to the throne would consider well before walking in the steps of his predecessor." " Though he was aware, continued the speaker, that the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand would be a heavy blow and a great grief to Austria-Hungary, and that it would be followed by the torture of those of our nation who were living in that country, yet he would not have thought that his suppositions would have been so completely fulfilled, and that the Croatians would have behaved as they had. Yet his friends in Bosnia and Herzegovina had assured him that the Austro-Hungarian officials were cowards and would not dare to overstep the mark in the measures they took ; unfortunately, how- ever, these friends, and through them we too, had been disappointed. If things went on much longer as they were going at present, revolvers and bombs would at last have to play their real role. Whatever the God of Servia has in store, things cannot go on as at present." The remarks of the speaker were received with complete approval by his hearers. APPENDIX 11 Supplements after going to Press 1. — To Appendix 8 The teacher, Cubrilovic, who undertook the guidance of Princip and Grabez at Priboj, has made a complete confession, from which the following important facts emerge : — In the year 1911, Cubrilovic, on the occasion of a Sokol expedition to §abac, was initiated by Bozo Foviz, a member of the managing committee of the Narodna Odbrana, into the objects of that asso- ciation, and was then appointed representative of^the Narodna Odbrana in Zvornik (Bosnia). At his invitation, Misko Jovanovic 140 Official Diplomatic Documents was later nominated representative of the Narodna Odbrana for Tuzla. A peasant acted as go-between in the communications with the Narodna Odbrana, in fact, the same peasant who brought Princip and Grabez to Cubrilovic, with the information that he was bringing two Servian students with weapons to him. When he learned this, he knew that it was a " mission " from the Narodna Odbrana. Princip and Grabez told him that they had bombs and revolvers with them, with a view to making an attempt on the life of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. 2. — Pictures in the Belgrade War Office of a nature hostile to the Monarchy There are four allegorical pictures on the wall outside the reception hall of the Royal Servian War Office, of which three are representa- tions of Servian victories, while the fourth symbolises the realisation of the anti-Monarchical tendencies of Servia. Over a landscape, partly mountains (Bosnia), partly plains (South Hungary), rises the "Zora," the rosy dawn of Servian hopes. In the foreground stands a woman in armour, whose shield bears the names of all the "provinces still awaiting Uberation" : Bosnia, Herzegovina, Vojvodina, Syrmia, Dalmatia, etc. To the UndSr Secretary of Foreign Affairs AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 20 Count Berchtold to the Under Secretary , Freiherr von Macchio at Vienna, (Telegraphic.) Lamhach, July 25 y 1914. Russian Charge d' Affaires telegraphs to me that he has received urgent instructions from his Government to press for a prolongation of time-limit fixed for the ultimatum to Servia. I request Your Excel- lency to reply to him in my name that we cannot consent to a pro- longation of time-limit. Your Excellency will add, that Servia, even after breaking off of diplomatic relations, can bring about friendly solution by unconditional acceptance of our demands, although we should be obliged in such an event to demand reimbursement by Servia of all costs and damage incurred by us through our military measures. July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 22 141 To Petrograd Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 21 Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburgh. (Telegraphic.) Bad Ischl, July 25, 191^. For Your Excellency's information and guidance : — The Russian Charge d'Affaires called this morning ^ on the Under Secretary, in order to express in the name of his Government the wish that the time-limit fixed in our note to Servia might be pro- longed. This request was based on the grounds that the Powers had been taken by surprise by our move, and that the Russian Government would regard it merely as natural consideration for the other Cabi- nets, on the part of the Vienna Cabinet, if an opportunity were given to the former to examine the data on which our communica- tion to the Powers was based and to study our prospective dossier. The Under Secretary replied to the Charge d'Affaires that he would immediately bring his explanation to my knowledge; but that he could tell him at once that there was no prospect of a pro- longation of the time-limit fixed being granted by us. As to the grounds which the Russian Government had advanced in sup- port of the wish they had expressed, they appeared to rest upon a mistaken hypothesis.^ Our note to the Powers was in no way in- tended to invite them to make known their own views on the subject, but merely bore the character of a statement for information, the communication of which we regarded as a duty laid on us by inter- national courtesy. For the rest, we regarded our action as a matter concerning us and Servia alone, which action, notwithstanding the patience and longsuffering we had exhibited for years past, we had been forced by the development of circumstances to take, much against our own wish, for the defence of our most vital interests. From Belgrade AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 22 Freiherr von Giesl to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914. Cabinet Council met yesterday evening and early this morning ; form of answer to our note was settled after several drafts, and is to be delivered to me before the time-limit expires. I^ hear that Royal train is being made up ; gold belonging to the National Bank 1 This time of day is important, because the French Ambassador says, French Yellow Book No. 48, that it "seems useless to support" the Russian request, when there is no longer any time for it," since his instructions reached him exactly at the moment when the time limit given to Servia expires." The time limit expired at 6 P.M. No reason is advanced in the French Yellow Book why the instructions should have reached the French Ambassador so late. There is telegraphic and telephonic communication between Paris and Vienna. See French Yellow Book No. 39, No. 41 <" this morning "), No. 44, No. 45, No. 47 and No. 48; British Blue Book No. 26, and Russian Orange Book No. 15, all of the same day. 2 Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 4, July 24, 1914, and note 3. 142 Official Diplomatic Documents and to the railway, as well as the Foreign Office records, are being taken into the interior of the country. Some of my colleagues are of the opinion that they must follow the Government; packing-up is proceeding at the Russian Legation in particular. Garrison has left town in field order. Ammunition depots in the fortress were evacuated. RaiWay station thronged with soldiers. The ambulance trains have left Belgrade, proceeding towards the south. In pursuance of the instructions which have reached me while I write, we intend, in the event of a rupture, to leave Belgrade by the 6.30 train. From Semlin, Serbia AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 23 Freiherr von Giesl to Count Berchtold. (Telegraph c.) Semlin, July 25, 1914, Orders for general mobilisation were issued in Servia at 3 p.m. AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 24 Freiherr Von Giesl to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) Semlin, July 25, 1914- As a result of the Royal Servian Government's unsatisfactory answer to our demands of the 23rd inst., I have announced that diplomatic relations are broken off with Servia, and have left Belgrade with the staff of the Legation. The reply was delivered to me at two minutes to six p.m. From Serbia AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 25 Note ^ of the Royal Serbian Government of 12/25 July, 1914- (Translation). The Royal Servian Government have received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant,^ and are convinced that their reply will remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair the good neighbourly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia. Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both from the tribune of the national Skuptchina and in the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives of the State — protests ^ See Austrian Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914 where the Serbian Note is printed in full together with the reasons why Austria-Hungary deemed it unsatisfactory. « Old style. July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 25 143 which were cut short by the declarations made by the Servian Govern- ment on the 18th ^ March, 1909 — have not been renewed on any occasion as regards the great neighbouring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their agents, to change the poUtical and legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Govern- ment draw attention to the fact that in this connection the Imperial and Royal Government have made no representation except one con- cerning a school book, and that on that occasion the Imperial and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Servia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Servia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies — manifes- tations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which, as a general rule, escape official control. The Royal Government are all the less responsible, in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Servia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two neighbouring countries. For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and surprised at the statements, according to which members of the Kingdom of Servia are supposed to have participated in the prepara- tions for the crime committed at Serajevo ; the Royal Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to them. Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, they are prepared to hand over for trial any Servian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the Journal officiel, on the date of the 13th (26th) July, the following declaration : — "The Royal Government of Servia condemn all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary — i.e., the general tend- ency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings. The Royal Govern- ment regret that, according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government, certain Servian officers and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda, and thus compro- mised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Servian Government was solemnly pledged by the declaration of the 31st March, 1909.^ 1 New style. 144 Official Diplomatic Documents "The Government, etc. . . /' (identical with the text as de- manded). The Royal Government further undertake : — 1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skuptchina a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punish- ment of incitement to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. The Government engage at the approaching re- vision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such publi- cation may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categorical terms of article 22 of the Constitution. 2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the Im- perial and Royal Government furnish them w^ith any, that the Na- rodna Obdrana and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government, and will dissolve the Narodna Odbrana Society and every other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary. 3. The Royal Servian Government undertake to eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia everything that serves or might serve to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda. 4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from the military service all such persons as the judicial enquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and functionaries for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them. 5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Servia shall undertake to accept the col- laboration of the representatives of the Imperial and Royal Govern- ment upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations. 6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it their duty to open an enquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15th ^ June, and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authori- ties appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Govern- ment, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal 1 Old Style. July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 26 145 procedure ; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro- Hungarian agents. 7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the delivery of the^ note, to arrest Commandant Voja Tankosic. As regards Milan Ciganovic, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15th ^ June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him. The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presump- tive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present, at the enquiry at Serajevo for the purposes of the later enquiry. 8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will immediately order an enquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Locnitza line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass. 9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the re- marks made by their officials whether in Servia or abroad, in inter- views after the crime which, according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government, were hostile towards the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, al- though the Royal Government will themselves take steps to collect evidence and proofs. 10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and^ carried out. If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply, the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the com- mon interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of the Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the decla- ration made by the Servian Government on the 18th (31st) March, 1909. To Petrograd Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 26 Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburgh. Vienna, July 25, 1914. We were, of course, aware, when we decided to take serious measures against Servia, of the possibility that the Servian dispute 146 Official Diplomatic Documents might develop into a collision with Russia. We could not, however, allow ourselves to be diverted by this eventuality from the position we took up towards Servia, because fundamental considerations of national policy brought us face to face with the necessity of putting an end to the state of affairs in which a Russian charter made it possible for Servia to threaten the Monarchy continuously without punishment and without the possibility of punishment. Should events prove that Russia considered the moment for the great settlement with the central European Powers to have already arrived/ and was therefore determined on war from the beginning, the following instructions to your Excellency appear indeed super- fluous. It might, however, be conceivable that Russia, in the event of the refusal of our demands by Servia, and in face of the resulting necessity for us of military measures, might think better of it, and might even be willing not to allow herself to be swept away by the bellicose elements. It is to meet this situation that the following explanations have been drawn up, which your Excellency will use with M. Sazonof and the President of the Council, at the right moment, in the manner which you think best, and when the opportunity, in your opinion, presents itself. I assume, generally, that your Excellency in the existing circum- stances, has established a close understanding with your German colleague,^ who will certainly have been enjoined by his Government to leave the Russian Government no room for doubt that Austria- Hungary, in the event of a conflict with Russia, would not stand alone. I am under no illusion that it will be easy to make M. Sazonof understand the step taken by us at Belgrade, which had become inevitable. There is, however, one factor which cannot fail to impress the Russian Foreign Minister, and that is the emphasising of the circum- stance that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, in conformity with the principle to which it has adhered for decades past, is actuated in the present crisis by no selfish motives in appealing to arms in order to reach a settlement of her differences with Servia. The Monarchy possesses territory to repletion and has no desire for Servian possessions. If a conflict with Servia is forced upon us, it will be for us not a conflict for territorial gain, but merely a means of self-defence and self-preservation. The contents of the circular note, which in itself is sufficiently eloquent, are placed in their proper light by the dossier relating to the Servian propaganda against the Monarchy, and the various points of connection between this propaganda and the crime of June 28th. 1 Cf. British Blue Book N9. 17, July 25, 1914. 2 Germany and Austria, it seems, were determined to stand together diplomati- cally as closely as France, England and Russia ; cf. British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, note 1. Italy appears to have been as close to the Entente Powers as to her own allies if one may judge by the despatches from Rome contained in the British Blue Book and the French Yellow Book. See also French Yellow Book No. 35, July 25, and No. 51, July 26. July 25, AustrO'Hungarian Red Book No, 26 147 Your Excellency will draw the Russian Minister's very particular attention to this dossier ^ and impress upon him that it is an unique event in history that a Great Power should have borne with the seditious intrigues of an adjoining small State for so long a time and with such unparalleled patience as Austria-Hungary has borne with those of Servia. We had no wish to pursue a policy adverse to the ambitions of the Christian Balkan States, and we have therefore — notwithstand- ing that we well knew how little value was to be attached to Servian promises — suffered Servia to increase her territory after the annexa- tion crisis of 1908 to nearly double its former extent. Since that time the subversive movement which has been fostered in Servia against the Monarchy has assumed such excessive propor- tions that the vital interests of Austria-Hungary, and even of our Dynasty itself, appear to be threatened by the revolutionary activities of Servia. We must assume that to conservative loyal Russia energetic measures on our part against this menace to all public order will appear intelligible and indeed necessary. When Your Excellency reaches this point in your conversation with M. Sazonof, the moment will have arrived to add to your expla- nation of our motives and intentions the hint that we — as your Excellency will have already been in a position to explain — aim at no territorial gains, and also did not wish to infringe the sovereignty of the Kingdom, but that, on the other hand, we will proceed to ex- treme measures for the enforcement of our demands. That we had striven up till now, so far as in us lay, to preserve the peace which we considered to be the most precious possession of nations, was shown by the course of events during the last 40 years, and by the historical fact that our gracious Emperor has won for him- self the glorious title of "Protector of the Peace." We should, therefore, most sincerely deplore the disturbance of the European peace, because we also were of the opinion that the strengthening of the Balkan States in a position of political and national independence would prove to the advantage of our relations with Russia, and would also remove all possibility of antagonism between us and Russia; also because we have always been ready, in the shaping of our own policy, to take into consideration the dominant political interests of Russia. Any further toleration of Servian intrigues would undermine our existence as a State and our position as a Great Power, thus also threatening the balance of power in Europe. We are, however, con- vinced that it is to Russia's own interests, as her peaceful leaders will clearly see, that the existing European balance of power which is of such importance for the peace of the world, should be maintained. Our action against Servia, whatever form it takes, is conservative 1 See note 1 to Enclosure of Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25, 1914, where it is stated that Sir E. Grey did not publish this "dossier." Russia also omitted it in her published documents in the Russian Orange Book. 148 Official Diplomatic Documents from first to last, and its object is the necessary preservation of our position in Europe. AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 27 Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburgh. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 25, 1914, As point 5 of our demands, namely, the participation of representa- tives of the Imperial and Royal Government in the suppression of the subversive movement in Servia has given rise to special objection on the part of M. Sazonof, your Excellency will explain in strict confi- dence with regard to this point that this clause was interpolated merely out of practical considerations, and was in no way intended to infringe on the sovereignty of Servia. By "collaboration" in point 5, we are thinking of the establish- ment of a private "Bureau de Surete" at Belgrade, which would operate in the same way as the analogous Russian establishments in Paris and in co-operation with the Servian police and administration. Belgium : To Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg. Belgian Gray Book No. 3 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg. Sir, Brussels, July 25, 1914. I HAVE addressed an undated circular note, a copy of which is enclosed, to the Belgian representatives accredited to the Powers guaranteeing the independence and neutrality of Belgium. Should the danger of a war between France and Germany be- come imminent, this circular note will be communicated to the Governments of the guaranteeing Powers, in order to inform them of our fixed determination to fulfil those international obligations that are imposed upon us by the treaties of 1839. The communications in question would only be made upon tele- graphic instructions from me. If circumstances lead me to issue such instructions, I shall re- quest you also, by telegram, to notify the Government to which you are accredited of the step we have taken, and to communicate to them a copy of the enclosed circular note for their information, and without any request that they should take note thereof. My telegram will ^ inform you of the date to be given to the cir- cular note, which you should be careful to fill in on the copy which you hand to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It is unnecessary to point out that this despatch and its enclo- sure should be treated as strictly confidential until the receipt of fresh instructions from me. 1 Notice the absence of any uncertainty whether or not such a telegram will be sent. July 25, French Yellow Book No. 35 149 Enclosure in No. 3 (See Enclosure in No. 2.) From Belgrade Belgian Gray Book No. 4 M. Michotte de Welle, Belgian Minister at Belgrade, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sir, . Belgrade, July 25, 1914} I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the reply returned by the Servian Government to the Austro-Hungarian note of the 10 (23) July. Enclosure in No. 4 [Text of the Serbian reply, for which see Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. 25, July 25 and No. 34, July 27, 1914.] France : From Berlin French Yellow Book No. 35 M, Jules Camhon, French Minister at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 25, 1914. The Belgian Minister appears very anxious about the course of events. He is of opinion that Austria and Germany have desired to take advantage of the fact that, owing to a combination of circumstances at the present moment, Russia and England appear to them to be threatened by domestic troubles, while in France the state of the army is under discussion. Moreover, he does not believe in the pretended ignorance of the Government of Berlin on the subject of Austria's demarche. He thinks that if the form of it has not been submitted to the Cabinet at Berlin, the moment of its despatch has been cleverly chosen in consultation with that Cabinet, in order to surprise the Triple Entente at a moment of disorganisation. He has seen the Italian Ambassador, who has just interrupted his holiday in order to return. It looks as if Italy would be surprised, to put it no higher, at having been kept out of the whole affair by her two allies.^ j^^^^ ^ambon. 1 This despatch could not have reached Brussels on July 25. It was probably sent by mail. In Belgian Gray Book No. 6, July 27, the actual Serbian reply does not seem to be known. Cf . also French Yellow Book No. 56, July 26, where it is stated that the reply became known after a delay of 20 hours. Cf. also Russian Orange Book No. 36, July 27. 2 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 36, same day, where according to the German Am- bassador Austria-Hungary had acted without consulting either Germany or Italy. 150 Official Diplomatic Documents To Viviani and London, Berlin, Petrograd, and Vienna French Yellow Book No. 36 M, Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stock- holm {for the President of the Council), and to London, Berlin, St. Petershurgh, Vienna. Paris, July 25, 191 J^. The German Ambassador came at 12 o'clock to protest against an article ^ in the Ech) de Paris which applied the term " German threat" (menace allemande) to his demarche of yesterday. Herr von Schoen told a certain number of journalists, and came to state at the Direction Politique, that there has been no "concert" between Austria and Germany in connection with the Austrian note, and that the German Government had no knowledge of this note when it was communicated to them at the same time as to the other Powers, though they had approved it subsequently. Baron von Schoen added, moreover, that there was no "threat"; the German Government had merely indicated that they thought it desirable to localise the dispute, and that the intervention of other Powers ran the risk of aggravating it. The Acting Political Director took note of Baron von Schoen's demarche. Having asked ^ him to repeat the actual terms of the last two paragraphs of his note, he remarked to him that the terms showed the willingness of Germany to act as intermediary between the Powers and Austria. M. Berthelot added that, as no private information had been given to any journalist, the information in the Echo de Paris involved this newspaper alone, and merely showed that the German demarche appeared to have been known elsewhere than at the Quai d'Orsay, and apart from any action on his part. The German Ambassador did not take up the allusion. On the other hand, the Austrian Ambassador at London also came to reassure Sir Edward Grey, telling him that the Austrian note did not constitute an "ultimatum" but "a demand for a reply with a time limit"; which meant that if the Austrian demands are not accepted by 6 o'clock this evening, the Austrian minister will leave Belgrade and the Austro-Hungarian Government will begin military "preparations" but not military "operations." The Cabinet of London, like those of Paris and St. Petersburgh, has advised Belgrade to express regret ^ for any complicity which might be established in the crime of Serajevo, and to promise the most complete satisfaction in this respect. The Cabinet added that in any case it was Servia's business to reply in terms which the inter- ests of the country appeared to call for. The British Minister at 1 Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 19, of same day commenting on the inaccuracies and additions of this article. 2 This refers to the interview of the previous day, July 24, French Yellow Book No. 28. There, however, Mr, Martin himself does the asking. 3 Belgrade had obviously not done so before, for if it had this advice would have been superfluous. One of the chief grounds of complaint that Austria-Hungary had against Serbia was that the latter had neither officially expressed her regret, nor con- trolled the exultation permeating the Serbian press. July 25, French Yellow Book No, 37 151 Belgrade is to consult his French and Russian colleagues, and, if these have had corresponding instructions in the matter, advise ^ the Servian Government to give satisfaction on all the points on which they shall decide that they are able to do so. Sir Edward Grey told Prince Lichnowsky (who, up to the present,^ has made no communication to him similar to that of Herr von Schoen at Paris) that if the Austrian note caused no difficulty between Austria and Russia, the British Government would not have to concern themselves with it, but that it was to be feared that the stiffness of the note and the shortness of the time limit would bring about a state of tension. Under these conditions the only chance that could be seen of avoiding a conflict would consist in the mediation of France, Germany, Italy ^ and England, Germany alone being able to influence the Government at Vienna in this direction. The German Ambassador replied that he would transmit this suggestion to Berlin, but he gave the Russian Ambassador, who is a relative of his, to understand that Germany would not lend herself to any demarche at Vienna. Bienvenu-Martin. From London French Yellow Book No. 37 M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu^ Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, July 25, 1914. The German Ambassador came to the Foreign Office to state that his Government would refuse^ to interfere in the dispute between Austria and Servia. Sir Edward Grey replied that without the co-operation of Germany at Vienna, England would not be able to take action at St. Peters- burgh. If, however, both Austria and Russia mobilised, that would certainly be the occasion for the four other Powers to intervene. Would the German Government then maintain its passive attitude, and would it refuse to join with England, France and Italy ? Prince Lichnowsky does not think so, since the question would 1 As a matter of fact, while such instructions were sent by Sir E. Grey the British representative failed to offer this advice to Serbia. See British Blue Book No. 22, July 25, 1914. He gave as his reason that his French and Russian colleagues "have not yet received instructions from their Governments." So far as the French Minister is concerned, this explanation is at variance with the above despatch. 2 This is wrong ; see British Blue Book No. 9, July 24, 1914. 3 This was the British formula of July 24, 1915. On the day of this despatch, however, July 25, Sir E. Grey had changed this formula to read Germany, France, Russia and Great Britain ; see British Blue Book No. 25. ^ This is not so stated in any despatch of this date in the British Blue Book. Cf. British Blue Book No. 25, where the German Ambassador is quoted by Sir E. Grey : "if what I contemplated was mediation between Austria and Russia, Austria might be able with dignity to accept it." This means that Sir E. Grey's original idea of mediation between Austria and Russia might be acceptable, while its modification, under the pressure of the French Ambassador, of mediation between Austria and Serbia was not acceptable. 152 Official Diplomatic Documents no longer be one of difficulties between Vienna and Belgrade, but of a conflict between Vienna and St. Petersburgh. Sir Edward Grey added this observation, that if war eventually broke out, no Power in Europe would be able to take up a detached attitude^ (pourrait s'en desinteresser) . De Fleuriau. From Petrograd French Yellow Book No. 38 M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. St. Petersburgh, July 25, 1914. The Russian Government is about to endeavour to obtain from the Austro-Hungarian Government an extension of the time limit fixed by the ultimatum, in order that the Powers may be able to form an opinion on the judicial dossier, the communication of which is offered to them.^ M. Sazonof has asked the German Ambassador to point out to his Government the danger of the situation, but he refrained from mak- ing any allusion to the measures ^ which Russia would no doubt be led to take, if either the national independence or the territorial integrity of Servia were threatened. The evasive replies and the recrimina- tions of Count de Pourtales left an unfavourable impression on M. Sazonof. The Ministers will hold a Council to-morrow with the Emperor presiding. M. Sazonof preserves complete moderation.^ " We must avoid," he said to me, "everything which might precipitate the crisis. I am of opinion that, even if the Austro-Hungarian Government come to blows with Servia, we ought not to break off negotiations." Paleologue. To Vienna French Yellow Book No. 39 M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M, Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna. Paris, July 25, 1914. The Russian Government has instructed its representative at Vienna to ask the Austrian Government for an extension of the time 1 The New York Times translation reads "would be able to remain aloof from it." A comparison of Fleuriau's report of Sir E. Grey's words with the latter's own report of what he told the German Ambassador, British Blue Book No. 25, reveals that Fleuriau gave his Government the impression that Sir E. Grey had far more definitely hinted to the German Ambassador that England would fight by the side of France and Russia than Sir E. Grey himself stated he had done. 2 This suggests that Sir E. Grey knew of the preparation of the dossier. Of. notes to British Blue Book No. 48, July 27, and Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25 (enclosure). ' This means Russia's intention to go to war ; of. British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, 1914. < For his determination, however, see British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, 1914. July 25, French Yellow Book No. 4I 153 limit fixed for Servia, so as to enable the Powers to form an opinion on the dossier which Austria has offered to communicate to them, and with a view to avoiding regrettable consequences for everyone. A refusal of this demand by Austria-Hungary would deprive of all meaning the demarche which she made to the Powers by communi- cating her note to them, and would place her in a position of con- flict with international ethics. The Russian Government has asked that you should make a corre- sponding and urgent demarche to Count Berchtold. I beg you to support the request of your colleague.^ The Russian Government have sent the same request to London, Rome, Berlin and Bucharest. Bienvenu-Maktin. From London French Yellow Book No. 40 M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, Jidy 25, 1914. Sir Edward Grey has had communicated to him this morning the instructions which require the Russian Ambassador at Vienna to ask for an extension of the time limit given to Servia by Austria's note of the day before yesterday. M. Sazonof asked that the Russian demarche should be supported by the British Embassy. Sir Edw^ard Grey telegraphed to Sir M. de Bunsen to take the same action ^ as his Russian colleague, and to refer to Austria's communi- cation which was made to him late last night by Count Mensdorff, according to the terms of which the failure of Servia to comply with the conditions of the ultimatum would only result, as from to-day, in a diplomatic rupture and not in immediate military operations. Sir Edward Grey inferred from this action that time would be left for the Powers to intervene and find means for averting the crisis. De Fleuriau. From Berlin French Yellow Book No. 41 M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 25, 1914. This morning the British Charge d'Affaires, acting under instruc- tions from his Government, asked Herr von Jagow if Germany were willing to join with Great Britain, France and Italy with the object of 1 The French Minister did not do so ; cf . French Yellow Book No. 48, same day. For a discussion of his reasons see above, Austro-Hunganan Red Book No. 21, July 25, 1914 2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 26, July 25, 1914 where Sir E. Grey writes : "You may support in general terms, etc." 154 Official Diplomatic Documents intervening between Austria and Russia, to prevent a conflict and, in the first instance, to ask Vienna to grant an extension of the time Hmit imposed on Servia by the ultimatum. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that directly after the receipt of Prince Lichnowsky's despatch informing him of the intentions of Sir Edward Grey, he had already telegraphed this very morning to the German ^ Ambassador at Vienna to the effect that he should ask Count Berchtold for this extension. Unfor- tunately Count Berchtold is at Ischl.^ In any case Herr von Jagow does not think that this request would be granted. The British Charge d'Affaires also enquired of Herr von Jagow, as I had done yesterday, if Germany had had no knowledge of the Austrian note before it was despatched, and he received so clear a reply in the negative that he was not able to carry the matter further ; but he could not refrain from expressing his surprise at the blank cheque given by Germany to Austria. Herr von Jagow having replied to him that the matter was a domestic one for Austria, he remarked that it had become essentially an international one. Jules Cambon. French Yellow Book No. 42 M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 25, 1914. The Russian Charge d'Affaires has been instructed to ask the German Government to make strong representations to the Cabinet at Vienna, with a view to obtaining an extension of the time limit of the ultimatum. Herr von Jagow not having made an appointment with him until late in the afternoon,^ that is to say, till the very moment when the ultimatum will expire, M. Broniewski sent an urgent note addressed to the Secretary of State in which he points out that the lateness of Austria's communication to the Powers makes the effect of this com- munication illusory, inasmuch as it does not give the Powers time to consider the facts brought to their notice before the expiration of the time limit. He insists very strongly on the necessity for extending the time limit, unless the intention be to create a serious crisis. Jules Cambon. 1 In French text by an obvious error "de la Grande-Bretagne " is printed. 2 Count Berchtold left for Ischl on the 25th in the morning ; cf . Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 21, same day. The Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia had been made known to Russia in the evening of July 23 ; and had been known to France and, there- fore, probably to the Entente Powers, in general terms, inclusive of the fact that there would be a time limit, on July 19, 1914 ; cf. French Yellow Book Nos. 13 and 14. ' Cf. the previous despatch No. 41, where Mr. von Jagow is spoken of as having received the British Charg6 d'Affaires in the same matter, and having already re- quested an extension of the time limit. July 25, French Yellow Book No. 44 155 French Yellow Book No. 43 M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu- martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Berlin, July 25, 1914. The Russian Charge d'Affaires has, in accordance with his in- structions, approached the Secretary of State with a view to securing an extension of the time Hmit of the ultimatum. Herr von Jagow repHed that he had already transmitted to Vienna a suggestion of this nature, but that in his opinion all these demarches were too late. M. Broniewski insisted that if the time limit could not be extended, action ^ at least might be delayed so as to allow the Powers to exert themselves to avoid a conflict. He added that the Austrian note was couched in terms calculated to wound Servia and to force her into war. Herr von Jagow replied that there was no question of a war, but of an "execution'' ^ in a local matter. The Charge d'Affaires in reply expressed regret that the German Government did not weigh their responsibilities in the event of hos- tilities breaking out, which might extend to the rest of Europe ; to this Herr von Jagow replied that he refused to believe in such con- sequences. The Russian Charge d'Affaires, like myself, has heard the rumour that Austria, while declaring that she did not desire an annexation of territory, would occupy parts of Servia until she had received complete satisfaction. "One knows," he said to me, "what this word 'satisfaction' means." M. Broniewski's impressions of Ger- many's ultimate intentions are very pessimistic. Jules Cambon. From Rome French Yellow Book No. 44 M. Barrere, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Rome, July 25, 1914. The Russian Ambassador has carried out at the Consulta the demarche which M. Sazonof requested the representatives of Russia at Paris, Berlin, Rome and Bucharest ^ to undertake, the object of which was to induce these various Cabinets to take action similar to that of Russia at Vienna, with a view of obtaining an extension of the time limit imposed on Servia. 1 Austria-Hungary had already promised that actual military operations would be delayed ; cf. British Blue Book No. 26, July 25, 1914. 2 There is no reason why the official English translation should have retained this French word, instead of translating the whole phrase which means "no question of war, but of action in a local matter." 3 The occasional appearance of Bucharest in these despatches is noteworthy. 156 Official Diplomatic Documents In the absence of the Marquis di San GiuUano, M. Salandra and M. di Martino repKed that they would put themselves into communi- cation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but that his reply could not reach them until towards 6 o'clock, that is to say, too late to take any step at Vienna. Barrere. From Vienna French Yellow Book No. 45 M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, July 25, 1914. The Russian Charge d'Affaires received instructions from his Government to ask for an extended time limit for the ultimatum to Servia at the very moment ^ that Count Berchtold was leaving for Ischl, with the intention, according to the newspapers, of remaining there near the Emperor until the end of the crisis. Prince Koudacheff informed him nevertheless of the demarche which he had to carry out, by means of two telegrams en clair, one addressed to him on his journey and the other at his destination. He does not expect any result. Baron Macchio, General Secretary of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to whom the Prince communicated the tenour of his instruc- tions and of his telegrams, behaved with icy coldness when it was represented to him that to submit for consideration grievances with documentary proofs without leaving time for the dossier to be studied, was not consonant with international courtesy.^ Baron Macchio replied that one's interests sometimes exempted one from being courteous. The Austrian Government is determined to inflict humiliation on Servia : it will accept no intervention from any Power until the blow had been delivered and received full in the face by Servia. DUMAINE. From Belgrade French Yellow Book No. 46 M. Boppe, French Minister at Belgrade, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Belgrade, July 25, 1914- M. Pashitch has just acquainted me with the reply which will be sent this evening to the Austrian Minister. The Servian Government agrees to publish to-morrow inihe Journal Officiel the declaration which has been required of them ; they will 1 This was in the morning ; cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 21, same day. 2 Austria-Hungary was of a different opinion; cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 21, July 25, and note 2. July 25, French Yellow Booh No. 4.7 157 communicate it also to the army by means of an Order of the Day ; they will dissolve the societies of national defence and all other asso- ciations which might agitate against Austria-Hungary ; they under- take to modify the press law, to dismiss from service in the army, in the ministry of public instruction and in the other Government offices, all officials who shall be proved to have taken part in the propaganda ; they only request that the names of these officials may be communicated to them. As to the participation of Austrian officials in the enquiry, the Government ask that an explanation ^ of the manner in which this will be exercised may be given to them. They could accept no parti- cipation which conflicted with international law or with good and neighbourly relations. They accept all the other demands of the ultimatum and declare that if the Austro-Hungarian Government is not content with this, they are ready to refer the matter to the Hague Tribunal, or to the decision of the Great Powers who took part in the preparation of the declaration of March 31, 1909. BOPPE. From Berlin French Yellow Book No. 47 M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 25, 1914. Throughout the afternoon there has been a persistent rumour that Servia had submitted to the Austrian demands. This even- ing the newspapers published extra editions which announce a rupture at Belgrade and the departure of the Austro-Hungarian Minister. The correspondent of the Agence Havas at the Wilhelmstrasse has just received confirmation of this rumour. Large crowds consisting of several hundred persons are collecting here before the newspaper offices and a demonstration of numbers of young people has just passed through the Pariser-platz shouting cries of "Hurrah" for Germany, and singing patriotic songs. The demonstrators are visiting the Siegessdule, the Austrian and then the Italian ^ Embassy. It is a significant outburst of chauvinism. A German ^ whom I saw this evening confessed to me that it had been feared here that Servia would accept the whole Austrian note, 1 For an explanation of the Austro-Hungarian meaning see the Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 27, of the same day. 2 As early as in 1912 Paul Rohrbach had pointed out in Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt (translated, German World Policies, The Macmillan Co.) that in a European conflagration Germany could not count on the support of Italy. 3 For a clear understanding of the ante-war days it is unfortunate that the French Ambassador in Berlin not infrequently quotes anonymous Germans whose standing and importance remain obscure. 158 Official Diplomatic Documents reserving to herself the right to discuss the manner in which effect should be given to it, in order to gain time and to allow the efforts of the Powers to develop effectively before the rupture. In financial circles measures are already being taken to meet every eventuality, for no means of averting the crisis is seen, in view of the determined support which Germany is giving to Austria. I, for my part, see in Great Britain the only Power which might be listened to at Berlin. Whatever happens, Paris, St. Petersburgh and London will not suc- ceed in maintaining peace with dignity unless they show a firm and absolutely united front. ^ Jules Cambon. From Vienna French Yellow Book No. 48 M. DumainCy French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign A fairs. Vienna, July 25, 1914. Your telegram^ reaches me exactly at the moment when the time limit given to Servia expires. On the other hand I have just informed you under what conditions the Russian Charge d 'Affaires has had to carry out his demarche. It seems useless to support him when there is no longer any time for it.^ During the afternoon a rumour spread that Servia had yielded to the ultimatum, while adding that she was appealing to the Powers against it. But the latest news is that at the last moment we are assured that the Austrian Minister has just left Belgrade hurriedly; he must have thought the Servian Government's acceptance of the conditions imposed by his Government inadequate. DUMAINE. French Yellow Book No. 49 Reply of Serbian Government to AuMro-Hungarian Note. (Communicated by M. Vesnitch, Serbian Minister, July 27.) ^ [For the text see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914, or lb. No. 25, July 25, 1914.] 1 This was Russia's great aim, to secure England's unconditional support ; cf. British Blue Book No. 6, June 24, 1914, and no. 17, June 25. 2 French Yellow Book No. 39, same day. ' Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 21, same day: "This morning." The time limit was to expire at 6 p.m. See also Russian Orange Book No. 15, same day. There would not seem to be any reason why the French Ambassador should have received his instructions too late to act. See also British Blue Book No. 13, July 25, 1914. * Notice the day, July 27, when the Serbian reply was officially presented. A sum- mary reached France on July 26, but with a delay of .20 hours. See French Yellow Book No. 56, July 26. July 25, German White Book Exhibit 6 159 Germany: To London German White Book Exhibit 13 Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London on July 25th, 1914. The distinction^ made by Sir Edward Grey between an Austro- Servian and an Austro-Russian conflict is perfectly correct. We do not wish to interpose in the former any more than England, and as heretofore we take the position that this question must be localised by virtue of all powers refraining from intervention. It is therefore our hope that Russia will refrain from any action in view of her re- sponsibility and the seriousness of the situation. We are prepared, in the event of an Austro-Russian controversy, quite apart from our known duties as allies, to intercede between Russia and Austria jointly with the other powers. From Petrograd German White Book Exhibit 6 Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to the Chancellor on July 25th, 1914- Message to H.M. from General von Chelius (German honorary aide de camp to the Czar). The manoeuvres of the troops in the Krasnoe camp were suddenly interrupted and the regiments returned to their garrisons at once. The manoeuvres have been cancelled. The military pupils were raised to-day to the rank of officers instead of next fall. At head- quarters there obtains great excitement over the procedure of Austria. I have the impression ^ that complete preparations for mobilisation against Austria are being made. 1 Sir Edward Grey knew from British Blue Book Nos. 6 and 17 of Russia's determina- tion to intervene in favor of Serbia. Germany believed that Russia would not inter- vene because, without England, she might be forced by France to r^rain from aggressive action, and in view of Asquith's invectives against Serbia in Parliament after the Serajevo murder [The Times, July 1, 1914 quotes him as saying, "We are once more confronted with one of those incredible crimes which almost make us despair of the progress of mankind"] did not believe that England would go to war for Serbia. Sir Edward Grey's first proposal was that four powers should intervene simul- taneously in Petrograd and in Vienna. This plan was modified under French pressure (see despatches of July 24 and 25, 1914) to amount to a request that Germany induce Austria-Hungary to submit her case against Serbia to a conference of four powers, one of whom should be Russia herself (British Blue Book No. 25, July 25, 1914). The German position is made perfectly clear in the above despatch. 2 The correctness of this impression is proved by the telegram from the Czar to the German Emperor of July 30 (German White Book, Exhibit 23a), in which the Czar says: "The military measures now taking form were decided upon five days ago." Cf. also British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, and note 5. And for the general subject o^ Russian mobilization see the American Review of Reviews, May, 1914, p. 544: "The French papers are now admitting that Russia's recent mobilization of a million men on her German and Austrian frontiers was chiefly intended as a demonstration to France that her ally could help her in time of need." See also Musical Courier, Sept. 30, 1915, p. 8, where an American traveller relates his experiences with mobilized Rus- sian troops in Batum and in Sebastopol on May 24, 1914. 160 Official Diplomatic Documents Great Britain: From the Riossian Ambassador British Blue BtooK No. 13 ^ Note communicated by Russian Ambassador, July 25. (Translation.) M. Sazonof telegraphic au M. Sazonof telegraphs to the Charge d'iVff aires de Russie a Russian Charge d' Affaires at Vienne en date du 11 (24) juillet, Vienna on the 11th (24th) July, 1914: 1914: [For the text see Russian Orange Book No. 4, July 24, 1914.] To Paris and Petrograd British Blue Book No. 14 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, and to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. Austrian Ambassador has been authorised to explain to me that the step taken at Belgrade was not an ultimatum, but a demarche with a time limit, and that if the Austrian demands were not com- plied with within the time limit the Austro-Hungarian Government would break off diplomatic relations and begin military preparations, not operations.^ In case Austro-Hungarian Government have not given the same information at Paris (St. Petersburgh), you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs as soon as possible ; it makes the immediate situa- tion rather less acute. From Paris British Blue Book No. 15 Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 25.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 25, 1914. I LEARN from the Acting Political Director that the French Govern- ment have not yet received the explanation from the Austrian Gov- 1 This is the first despatch listed in the British Blue Book under date of July 25. It was sent on the 24th from Petrograd and delivered in London early the next day. It was undoubtedly received at the same time in Paris, if not late on July 24. Since it is not listed in the French Yellow Book the exact time when it was received cannot be given. It may, however, be surmised that in the absence of published information to the contrary, it reached Paris in ample time to instruct the French Ambassador to sup- port his Russian colleague in Vienna. The French Ambassador, however, claimed that his instructions reached him too late ; cf . French Yellow Book No. 48, same day. 2 This concession of Austria-Hungary was a half-way acceptance of Russia's request (British Blue Book No. 13, Russian Orange Book No. 4) for an extension of the time limit. July 25, British Blue Booh No. 17 161 eminent contained in your telegram of to-day .^ They have, how- ever, through the Servian Minister here, given similar advice to Servia as was contained in your telegram to Belgrade of yesterday .^ British Blue Book No. 16 Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 25.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 25, 1914. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has no suggestions to make except that moderating advice might be given at Vienna as well as Belgrade.^ He hopes that the Servian Government's answer to the Austrian ultimatum will be sufficiently favourable to obviate extreme measures being taken by the Austrian Government. He says, how- ever, that there would be a revolution in Servia if she were to accept the Austrian demands in their entirety. From Petrograd British Blue Book No. 17 Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petershurgh, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 25.) (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 25, 191^. I SAW the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, and communi- cated to his Excellency the substance of your telegram of to-day to Paris,^ and this afternoon I discussed with him the communication which the French Ambassador suggested should be made to the Servian Government, as recorded in your telegram of yesterday to Belgrade.^ The Minister for Foreign Affairs said, as regards the former, that the explanations of the Austrian Ambassador did not quite correspond with the information which had reached him from German quarters.* As regards the latter, both his Excellency and the French Ambassador agreed that it is too late to make such a communication, as the time limit expires this evening. 1 See No. 14. 2 The advice spoken of is contained in British Blue Book No. 12, July 24, 1914, a despatch to the British Minister in Belgrade, who in No. 22, July 25, informs Sir E. Grey that he had not offered the advice because his French and Russian colleagues had received no instructions. Cf. British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, 1914. 3 Cf. German White Book, Exhibit 13, July 25th, and note ; also British Blue Book No. 10, July 24, and note, and French Yellow Book No. 34, July 24. France wishes mediation between Vienna and Belgrade. 4 See No. 14. 6 See No. 12. There is no hint in Sir E. Grey's despatch to Belgrade that it was suggested by the French Ambassador. Cf. British Blue Book No. 15, and note. « The published despatches contain no hint as to this information, and as a matter of fact Austria did as she had told England she would do. Sazonof, moreover, had received the correct Austro-Hungarian offer through the Russian Ambassador in London, Russian Orange Book No. 16, same day. 162 Official Diplomatic Documents The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Servia was quite ready to do as you had suggested and to punish those proved to be guilty, but that no independent State could be expected to accept the political demands which had been put forward. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thought, from a conversation which he had with the Servian Minister yesterday, that, in the event of the Austrians attacking Servia, the Servian Government would abandon Belgrade, and with- draw their forces into the interior, while they would at .the same time appeal to the Powers to help them. His Excellency was in favour of their making this appeal. He would like to see the question placed on an international footing, as the obligations taken by Servia in 1908, to which reference is made in the Austrian ultimatum, were given not to Austria, but to the Powers. If Servia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. It was possible, in his opinion, that Servia might propose to submit the question to arbitration. On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipi- tate war by mobilising until you had had time to use your influence in favour of peace, his Excellency assured me that Russia had no ag- gressive intentions,^ and she would take no action until it was forced upon her. Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present status quo in the Balkans, and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Ger- many really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now, rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war. I said that England could play the role of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to better purpose as friend who, if her counsels of moderation were disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if she were to declare herself Russia's ally at once. His Excellency said that unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count upon our neutrality. I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilised, Germany would not be content with mere mobilisation, or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once. His Excellency replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush Servia and be- come the predominant Power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war. He as- sured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I could regard the situation as desperate. 1 Cf. British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, 1914, and last paragraph of this note. July 25y British Blue Book No. 18 163 From Berlin British Blue Book No. 18 Sir H. Rumhold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 25.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 25, 1914. Your telegram of the 24th July ^ acted on. Secretary of State says that on receipt of a telegram at 10 this morning from German Ambassador at London, he immediately in- structed German Ambassador at Vienna to pass on to Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs your suggestion for an extension of time limit, and to speak to his Excellency about it. Unfortunately it appeared from press that Count Berchtold ^ is at Ischl, and Secretary of State thought that in these , circumstances there would be delay and difficulty in getting time limit extended. Secretary of State said that he did not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the spot, but he admitted quite freely that Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment wished to give the Servians a lesson, and that they meant to take military action. He also admitted that Servian Government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands. Secretary of State said that a reassuring feature of situation was that Count Berchtold had sent for Russian representative at Vienna and had told him that Austria-Hungary had no intention of seizing Servian territory. This step should, in his opinion, exercise a calming in- fluence at St. Petersburgh. I asked whether it was not to be feared that, in taking military action against Servia, Austria would dan- gerously excite public opinion in Russia. He said he thought not. He remained of opinion that crisis could be localised. I said that telegrams from Russia in this morning's papers did not look very reassuring, but he maintained his optimistic view with regard to Russia. He said that he had given the Russian Government to under- stand that last thing Germany wanted was a general war, and he would do all in his power to prevent such a calamity. If the relations between Austria and Russia became threatening, he was quite ready to fall in with your suggestion as to the four Powers working in favour of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburgh. Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the note left much to be desired as a diplomatic document. He repeated very earnestly that, though he had been accused of knowing all about the contents of that note, he had in fact had no such knowledge. 1 See No. 11, July 24, 1914. 2 Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 164 Official Diplomatic Documents From Rome British Blue Book No. 19 Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 25,) (Telegraphic.) Rome, July 25, 1914. I SAW the Secretary-General this morning and found that he knew of the suggestion that France, Italy, Germany and ourselves should work at Vienna and St. Petersburgh in favour of moderation, if the relations between Austria and Servia become menacing. In his opinion Austria will only be restrained by the unconditional acceptance by the Servian Government of her note. There is reliable information that Austria intends to seize the Salonica Railway. From Vienna British Blue Book No. 20 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 25.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 25, 1914. Language of press this morning leaves the impression that the surrender of Servia is neither expected nor really desired. It is officially announced that the Austrian Minister is instructed to leave Belgrade with staff of legation failing unconditional acceptance of note at 6 p.m. to-day. Minister for Foreign Affairs goes to Ischl to-day ^ to communicate personally to the Emperor Servian reply when it comes. From Belgrade British Blue Book No. 21 Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 25.) (Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914. The Council of Ministers is now drawing up their reply to the Austrian note. I am informed by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that it will be most conciliatory and will meet the Austrian demands in as large a measure as is possible. The following is a brief summary of the projected reply : — The Servian Government consent to the publication of a declara- tion in the Official Gazette. The ten points are accepted with reserva- tions. Servian Government declare themselves ready to agree to a mixed commission of enquiry so long as the appointment of the ^ Cf . Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 21, and French Yellow Book No. 45 and note, July 26, 1915. July 25, British Blue Book No. 24 165 commission can be shown to be in accordance with international usage. They consent to dismiss and prosecute those officers who can be clearly proved to be guilty, and they have already arrested the officer referred to in the Austrian note. They are prepared to sup- press the Narodna Odbrana. The Servian Government consider that, unless the Austrian Govern- ment want war at any cost, they cannot but be content^ with the full satisfaction offered in the Servian reply. British Blue Book No. 22 Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires, at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 25.) (Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914- I HAVE seen the new French Minister, who has just arrived from Constantinople, and my Russian colleague, and informed them of your views. They have not yet received instructions from their Governments, and in view of this and of the proposed conciliatory terms of the Servian reply, I have up to now abstained^ from offering advice to the Servian Government. I think it is highly probable that the Russian Government have already urged the utmost moderation on the Servian Government. British Blue Book No. 23 Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 25.) (Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914. The Austrian Minister left at 6.30. The Government have left for Nish, where the Skuptchina ^ will meet on Monday. I am leaving with my other colleagues, but the vice-consul is remaining in charge of the archives. To Petrograd British Blue Book No. 24 Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Peters- burgh. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. You spoke quite rightly in very difficult circumstances as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government. I entirely approve what you 1 For reasons why Austria-Hungary was not content, see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914. 2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 12. July 24. 3 The Serbian Parliament. 166 Official Diplomatic Documents said as reported in your telegram of yesterday/ and I cannot promise more on behalf of the Government. I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to sanc- tion our going to war over a Servian quarrel.^ If, however, war does take place, the development of other issues may draw us into it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent it. The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian demarche makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will have mobilised against each other. In this event, the only chance of peace, in my opinion, is for the other four Powers to join in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross the frontier, and to give time for the four Powers acting at Vienna and St. Peter sburgh to try and arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this view, I feel strongly that France and ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly co-operate. No diplomatic intervention or mediation would be tolerated by either Russia or Austria unless it was clearly impartial and included the allies or friends of both. The co-operation of Germany would therefore, be essential.' To Berlin British Blue Book No. 25 Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, British Charge d^ Affaires at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. The Austrian Ambassador has been authorised to inform me that the Austrian method of procedure on expiry of the time limit would be to break off diplomatic relations and commence military prepara- tions, but not military operations. In informing the German Am- bassador of this, I said that it interposed a stage of mobilisation before the frontier was actually crossed, which I had urged yesterday should be delayed. Apparently we should now soon be face to face with the mobilisa- tion of Austria and Russia. The only chance of peace, if this did happen, would be for Germany, France, Russia,^ and ourselves to keep 1 See No. 6, July 24. 1916. * This disposes of the claim popularly made that one of the reasons why Great Britain went to war was in part to protect the independence of a little state — Serbia. 3 Germany accepted Sir Edward Grey's view and promised her cooperation in media- tion between Russia and Austria on this same day, July 25, cf. German White Book, Exhibit 13. Cf., however, French Yellow Book No, 37, same day, where Germany is quoted as refusing to interfere between Austria and Serbia. The Petrograd-Vienna mediation may be called the Sir E. Grey plan, and this Germany accepted on July 25. The Vienna-Belgrade mediation may be called the Paul Cambon modification, and this Germany rejected. * All the editions of the British Blue Book including the important one of Sept. 28, 1914, print here " Russia." In the Collected Diplomatic Documents Sir Edward Grey inserts a footnote to Russia "Should be Italy." A similar footnote had appeared in the New York Times edition of August, 1914. The fact that "Russia" continued to be printed without a footnote, even in the official edition of Sept. 28, which con- tained a number of corrections, raises the presumption that "Russia" had not only been written, but also meant. It is true that in British Blue Book No. 17 of the same date, Russia said that she "would be quite ready to stand aside," but this may also imply that mention had been made of her as a naember of the "Conference." Cer- tainty on this point is, however, impossible. July 25 y British Blue Booh No-. 26 167 together, and to join in asking Austria and Russia not to cross the frontier till we had had time to try and arrange matters between them. The German Ambassador read me a telegram from the German Foreign OflSce saying that his Government had not known before- hand, and had had no more than other Powers to do with the stiff terms of the Austrian note to Servia, but once she had launched that note, Austria could not draw back. Prince Lichnowsky ^ said, how- ever, that if what I contemplated was mediation between Austria and Russia, Austria might be able with dignity to accept it.^ He ex- pressed himself as personally favourable to this suggestion. I concurred in his observation, and said that I felt I had no title to intervene between Austria and Servia, but as soon as the question became one as between Austria and Russia, the peace of Europe was affected, in which we must all take a hand.^ . I impressed upon the Ambassador that, in the event of Russian and Austrian mobilisation, the participation of Germany would be essen- tial to any diplomatic action for peace. Alone we could do nothing. The French Government were travelling at the moment, and I had had no time to consult them,^ and could not therefore be sure of their views, but I was prepared, if the German Government agreed with my suggestion, to tell the French Government that I thought it the right thing to act upon it. To Vienna British Blue Book No. 26 Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office^ July 25, 191Jf. The Russian Ambassador has communicated to me the following telegram which his Government have sent to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, with instructions to communicate it to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs : — " The delay given to Servia for a reply is so limited that the Powers are prevented from taking any steps to avert the complications which are threatening. The Russian Government trust that the Austrian Government will prolong the time limit, and as the latter have de- clared their willingness to inform the Powers of the data on which they have based their demands on Servia, the Russian Government hope that these particulars will be furnished in order that the Powers may examine the matter. If they found that some of the Austrian re- quests were well founded, they would be in a position to advise the Servian Government accordingly. If the Austrian Government were indisposed to prolong the time limit, not only would they be ^ German Ambassador in London. 2 German White Book, Exhibit 13, same day. 3 This phrase is very much stronger in French Yellow Book No. 37, same day, where Paul Cambon reports what he claims Sir E. Grey told him he had said to the German Ambassador. * See, however, the British-French and French-British despatches of July 24, and July 25, 1914. 168 Official Diplomatic Documents acting against international ethics, but they would deprive their communication to the Powers of any practical meaning." You may support in general terms ^ the step taken by your Russian colleague. Since the telegram to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna was sent, it has been a relief to hear that the steps which the Austrian Govern- ment were taking were to be limited for the moment to the rupture of relations and to military preparations, and not operations. I trust, therefore, that if the Austro-Hungarian Government consider it too late to prolong the time limit, they will at any rate give time in the sense and for the reasons desired by Russia before taking any irretrievable steps. To PariSy Berlin, and Petrograd British Blue Book No. 27 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, Sir H. Rumhold, British Charge d^ Affaires at Berlin, and Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914- I HAVE communicated to German Ambassador the forecast of the Servian reply contained in Mr. Crackanthorpe's telegram of to-day.^ I have said that, if Servian reply, when received at Vienna, corre- sponds to this forecast, I hope the German Government will feel able to influence the Austrian Government to take a favourable view of it. To? or Fromf No. 28 [Nil.] Sir Edward Grey has never explained this deleted No. 28. The British Blue Book was not prepared and distributed, as was the German White Book, in a hurry to supply the necessary background to the speeches delivered in Parliament on the strength of which the nation went to war. The British Blue Book was dis- tributed in Parliament several days after England had declared war on Germany. A careless numbering of the despatches seems out of the question. No. 28 very likely was a despatch which Sir E. Grey at the last moment decided not to publish. To Rome British Blue Book No. 29 Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome. Sir, Foreign Office, July 25, 19H. The Italian Ambassador came to see me to-day. I told him in gen- eral terms what I had said to the German Ambassador this morning.^ 1 On this day Sir E. Grey was not yet willing to be known either in Vienna or in Berlin as making common cause with the other Entente Powers. 2 See No. 21, same day. » Cf . British Blue Book No. 27, same day. July 25, Bxitish Blue Book No. 30 169 The Italian Ambassador cordially approved of this. He made no secret of the fact that Italy was most desirous to see war avoided. I am, etc. E. Grey. To Belgrade British Blue Book No. 30 Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charg^ d' Affaires at Belgrade. Sir, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914- The Servian Minister called on the 23rd ^ instant and spoke to Sir A. Nicolson ^ on the present strained relations between Servia and Austria-Hungary. He said that his Government were most anxious and disquieted. They were perfectly ready to meet any reasonable demands of Austria- Hungary so long as such demands were kept on the "terrain juridique." If the results of the enquiry at Serajevo — an enquiry conducted with so much mystery and secrecy — disclosed the fact that there were any individuals conspiring or organising plots on Servian territory, the Servian Government w ould be quite ready to take the necessary steps to give satisfaction; but if Austria transported the question on to the political ground, and said that Servian policy, being inconvenient to her, must undergo a radical change, and that Servia must abandon certain political ideals,^ no independent State would, or could, submit to such dictation. He mentioned that both the assassins of the Archduke were Austrian subjects — Bosniaks ; ^ that one of them had been in Servia, and that the Servian authorities, considering him suspect and dan- gerous, had desired to expel him, but on applying to the Austrian authorities found that the latter protected him, and said that he was an innocent and harmless individual. Sir A. Nicolson, on being asked by M. Boschkovitch ^ his opinion on the whole question, observed that there were no data on which to base one, though it was to be hoped that the Servian Government would endeavour to meet the Austrian demands in a conciliatory and moderate spirit. I am, etc. E. Grey. 1 It seems strange that this interview of the 23d should not have been mentioned to the British representative in Belgrade until two days later, the twenty-fifth, es- pecially since the instructions given to the representative in Belgrade in No. 12, July 24, seem to be based on the information given in the interview of the 23d. The inter- view, moreover, appears to have taken place before the presentation of the Austro- Hungarian note. While in a continuous story of events this note does not belong here, the reader will have no difficulty in seeing why it has nevertheless been introduced in this place. 2 British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 3 These certain political ideals were those of a Greater Serbia which could not be realized except at the cost of a dismembered Austria-Hungary. * Bosniaks is the term by which Austria-Hungary called the Serbians in Bosnia before the murder of Serajevo, while Serbia called them Serbians. After the murder, the Serbians used the term Bosniaks to indicate that Serbia was innocent, and Austria- Hungary used the term Serbians to show that Serbia was guilty. ^ Serbian Minister in London. 170 Official Diplomatic Documents Russia : Announcement by the Russian Government Russian Orange Book No. 10 St. Petersburg, July 12 {25), 1914. Recent events and the despatch of an ultimatum to Servia by Austria-Hungary are causing the Russian Government the greatest anxiety. The Government are closely following the course of the dispute between the two countries, to which Russia cannot remain indifferent. From Vienna Russian Orange Book No. 11 Russian Charge d' Affaires at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Vienna, July 12 {25) 1914. Count Berchtold is at Ischl.^ In view of the impossibility of arriving there in time, I have telegraphed to him our proposal to ex- tend the time limit of the ultimatum, and I have repeated this proposal verbally to Baron Macchio. The latter promised to com- municate it in time to the Minister for Foreign Affairs but added that he had no hesitation in predicting a categorical refusal. Russian Orange Book No. 12 Russian Charge d' Affaires at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Vienna, July 12 {25), 1914. In continuation of my telegram of to-day I have just heard ^ from Macchio that the Austro-Hungarian Government refuse our proposal to extend the time limit of the note. From Belgrade Russian Orange Book No. 13 Russian Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade to Russia Minister for Foreign ^ff^^^^' Belgrade, July 12 {25), 1914. (Delayed in transmission, received July 14 (27), 1914). (Telegram.) Following is the reply which the President of the Servian Cabinet to-day handed to the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade before the expiration of the time limit of the ultimatum. [Here follows the text of the Serbian reply, for which see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 25, July 25, and No. 34, July 27, 1914.] 1 He went there during the forenoon of July 25. Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 21, and British Blue Book No. 20, July 25, 1914, and French Yellow Book No. 45, same day. ' Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 20, and for reasons for the refusal No. 21, July 25, 1914. July 25, Russian Orange Book No. 16 171 From Berlin Russian Orange Book No. 14 Russian Charge d' Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Berlin, July 12 {25), 1914. I HAVE received your telegrams of .the llth (24th) ^ July and have communicated its contents to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He tells me that the British Government have likewise urged him to advise ^ Vienna to extend the time limit of the ultimatum. He has informed Vienna telegraphically of this step, and he will do the same as regards Russia's action, but he fears that in the absence of Berch- told, who has left for Ischl, and in view of the lack of time, his tele- grams may have no result. Moreover, he has doubts as to the wis- dom of Austria yielding at the last moment, and he is inclined to think that such a step on her part might increase the assurance of Servia. I replied that a great Power such as Austria could give way without impairing her prestige, and I adduced every other similar argument, but failed, nevertheless, to obtain any more definite promise. Even when I gave him to understand that action must be taken at Vienna if the possibility of terrible consequences was to be avoided, the Minister for Foreign Affairs answered each time in the negative. From Paris Russian Orange Book No. 15 Russian Charge d' Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Paris, July 12 {25), 1914. I HAVE received your telegram of the llth (24th) ^ July respecting the extension of the time limit of the Austrian ultimatum, and I have made the communication in accordance with your instructions. The French Representative ^ at Vienna has been furnished with similar instructions. From London Russian Orange Book No. 16 Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) London, July 12 {25), 1914. I HAVE received your telegram of the llth July.^ Grey has in- structed ^ the British Ambassador at Vienna to support our action 1 Russian Orange Book Nos. 4 and 5, July 24, 1914. 2 British Blue Book No. 26, July 25, 1914 ; cf. also French Yellow Book Nos. 41, 42, 43, July 25, 1914. 3 Russian Orange Book Nos. 4 and 5, July 24, 1914. * Cf. French Yellow Book Nos. 39 and 48, July 25, 1914. 6 Russian Calendar, which is July 24 of our calendar ; Russian Orange Book Nos, 6 British Blue Book No. 26, July 25, 1914. 172 Official Diplomatic Documents for the extension of the time limit of the ultimatum. At the same time he explained to me that the Austrian Ambassador had come to see him/ and had explained that the Austrian note should not be regarded as an ultimatum. It should be regarded as a step, which, in the event of no reply, or in the event of an unsatisfactory reply within the time fixed, would be followed by a rupture of diplomatic relations and the immediate departure of the Austro-Hungarian Mmister from Belgrade ; without, however, entailing the immediate opening of hostilities. Grey added that as a result of this explana- tion he had told the British Ambassador at Vienna that, should it be too late to raise the question of extending the time limit of the ulti- matum, the question of preventing hostilities might perhaps serve as a basis for discussion.^ To London Russian Orange Book No. 17 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at London. (Telegram.) St. Petersburg, July 12 {25), 1914. In the event of any change for the worse in the situation which might lead to joint action by the Great Powers, we count upon it that England will at once side definitely with Russia and France, in order to maintain the European balance of power ,^ for which she has con- stantly intervened in the past, and which would certainly be com- promised in the event of the triumph of Austria. From the German Ambassador Russian Orange Book No. 18'* Note verbale handed to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs by the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, July 12 {25), 1914- (Translation.) Il nous revient de source We learn from an authorita- autoritative que la nouvelle tive source that the news spread repandue par quelques journaux by certain newspapers, to the d'apres laquelle la demarche du effect that the action of the Gouvernement d'Autriche-Hon- Austro-Hungarian Government grie a Belgrade aurait ete faite a at Belgrade was instigated by rinstigation de TAllemagne est Germany, is absolutely false. 1 British Blue Book No. 14, July 25, 1914. ' Contrast the information here directly transmitted to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs with the latter's reply to the British Ambassador in Petrograd, British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, 1914. » Cf. British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, 1914, and note 4. * This is only a supplementary declaration to German White Book, Exhibit No. 1, which is the important German declaration, presented in Paris, London and Petrograd. It is printed in British Blue Book No. 9, French Yellow Book No. 28, July 24, but is omitted in the Russian Orange Book. July 25, Russian Orange Book No. 19 173 absolumentfausse. LeGouverne- The German Government had ment allemand n'a pas eu con- no knowledge of the text of the naissance du texte de la note Austrian note before it was pre- autrichienne avant qu'elle ait sented, and exercised no influence ete remise, et n'a exerce aucune upon its contents. A threaten- influence sur son contenu. C'est ing attitude is wrongly attributed a tort qu'on attribue a I'Alle- to Germany, magne une attitude commina- toire. L'Allemagne appuie naturelle- Germany, as the ally of ment comme allie de I'Autriche Austria, naturally supports the les revendications a son avis claims made by the Vienna legitimes du Cabinet de Vienne Cabinet against Servia, which contre la Serbie. she considers justified. Avant tout elle desire, comme Above all Germany wishes, as elle I'a deja declare des le com- she has already declared from mencement du differend austro- the very beginning of the Austro- serbe, que ce conflit reste loca- Servian dispute, that this conflict lise. should be localised. From Paris Russian Orange Book No. 19 Russian Charge d' A f aires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign A fairs. (Telegram.) Paris, July 12 {25), 1914. Please refer to my telegram ^ of the Uth (24th) July. A morning paper has to-day published, in a not altogether correct form,^ the declarations made yesterday by the German Ambassador, and has added comments in which it characterises these utterances as being in the nature of threats. The German Ambassador, who is much upset by these disclosures, to-day visited the Acting Head of the Political Department, and explained to him that his words in no wise bore the threatening character attributed to them. He stated that Austria had presented her note to Servia without any deflnite understanding with Berlin, but that Germany nevertheless approved of the Austrian point of view, and that undoubtedly " the bolt once flred" (these were his own words), Germany could only be guided by her duties as an ally. 1 Russian Orange Book No. 8, July 24, 1914. * Cf. French Yellow Book No. 36, July 25, 1914. 174 Official Diplomatic Documents From London Russian Orange Book No. 20 Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, (Telegram.) London, July 12 {25), 1914. Grey has told me that the German Ambassador has declared to him that the German Government were not informed of the text of the Austrian note, but that they entirely supported Austria's action.^ The Ambassador at the same time asked if Great Britain could see her way to bring conciliatory pressure to bear at St. Petersburg. Grey replied that this was quite impossible. He added that, as long as complications existed between Austria and Servia alone, British interests were only indirectly affected ; but he had to look ahead to the fact that Austrian mobilisation would lead to Russian mobilisa- tion, and that from that moment a situation would exist in which the interests of all the Powers would be involved. In that event Great Britain reserved to herself full liberty of action.^ From Belgrade Russian Orange Book No. 21 Russian Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Belgrade, Jidy 12 (25), 1914. In spite of the extremely conciliatory nature of the Servian reply to the ultimatum, the Austrian Minister has just informed the Servian Government, in a note handed in at 6.30 p.m. this evening, that, not having received a satisfactory^ answer within the time limit fixed, he was leaving Belgrade with the entire staff of the lega- tion. The Skupshtina is convoked for the 14th (27th) July at Nish. The Servian Government and the Diplomatic Body are leaving this evening for that town. From London Russian Orange Book No. 22 Russian Ambassador at London to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) London, July 12 {25), 1914. Grey has told the German Ambassador that in his opinion Austrian mobilisation must lead to Russian mobilisation, that grave danger of a 1 See German White Book, Exhibit No. 1, July 23, British Blue Book No. 9, July 24, omitted in the Orange Book. See note to Russian Orange Book No. 18, July 25, 1914. 2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 25, French Yellow Book No. 37, July 25, 1914. • ' For the reasons of Austria-Hungary why the Serbian note did not satisfy her, see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914. July 25, Serbian Blue Book No. 39 175 general war will thereupon arise, and that he sees only one means of reaching a peaceful settlement, namely, that, in view of the Austrian and Russian mobilisations, Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain should abstain from immediate mobilisation, and should at once offer their good offices. Grey told me that the first essential of this plan was the consent of Germany and her promise not to mobihse. 'He has therefore, as a first step, made an enquiry on this point at Berlin.^ Serbia : To All Serbian Legations Abroad Serbian Blue Book No. 38 M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad. (Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 12/25, 1914. A BRIEF summary of the reply of the Royal Government was com- municated to the representatives of the allied Governments ^ at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to-day.^ They were informed that the reply would be quite conciliatory on all points, and that the Serbian Government would accept the Austro-Hungarian demands as far as possible. The Serbian Government trust that the Austro-Hun- garian Government, unless they are determined to make war at all costs, will see their way to accept the full satisfaction offered in the Serbian reply. The Serbian Reply to Austria-Hungary Serbian Blue Book No. 39 Reply of Serbian Government to the Austro-Hungarian Note. — Belgrade, Jidy 12/25, 1914. [For the text see Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. 25, July 25, and No. 34, July 27, 1914.] . 1 No detailed references to the mobilization of Germany, France, Italy and Great Britain are contained in any despatches published in the British Blue Book. 2 This expression is noteworthy, referring no doubt to France, Russia and Eng- land, who are here spoken of either as allied to each other or even allied to Serbia. See also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 58, August 4. where Count Mensdorf quotes Sir E. Grey as referring to Great Britain as the ally of France. Cf . also French Yellow Book No. 158, August 4. Since no mention is made of a summary being given to the representatives of the other Powers, "the representatives of the allied Governments" were possibly invited as representing a unit to the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs". This is, however, not mentioned in French Yellow Book No. 46, July 25, 1914, where the French Minister simply reports "M. Pashitch has just acquainted me, etc." 3 For the delay with which even this summary reached the Powers see French Yellow Book No. 56, July 26, and Russian Orange Book No. 36, July 27. 176 Official Diplomatic Documents From the Austro-Hungarian Minister Serbian Blue Book No. 40 ^ Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Belgrade, July 12/25, 1914. As the time limit stipulated in the note, which, by order of my Government, I handed to His Excellency M. Patchou, on Thursday, the day before yesterday, at 6 p.m., has now expired, and as I have received no satisfactory reply, I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that I am leaving Belgrade to-night together with the staff of the Imperial and Royal Legation. The protection of the Imperial and Royal Legation, together with all its appurtenances, annexes, and archives, as well as the care of the subjects and interests of Austria-Hungary in Serbia, is entrusted to the Imperial German Legation. Finally, I desire to state formally that from the moment this letter reaches Your Excellency the rupture in the diplomatic relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary will have the character of a fait accompli. I have, etc. To All Serbian Legations Abroad Serbian Blue Book No. 41 ^ M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad. Belgrade, July 12/25, 1914. I COMMUNICATED the reply to the Austro-Hungarian note to-day at 5.45 P.M. You will receive the full text of the reply to-night. From it you will see that we have gone as far as was possible. When I handed the note to the Austro-Hungarian Minister he stated that he would have to compare it with his instructions, and that he would then give an immediate answer. As soon as I returned to the Ministry, I was informed in a note from the Austro-Hungarian Minister that he was not satisfied with our reply, and that he was leaving Belgrade the same evening, with the entire staff of the Legation. The protection of the Legation and its archives, and the care of Austrian and Hungarian interests had been entrusted by him to the German Legation. He stated finally that on receipt of the note diplomatic relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary must be considered as definitely broken off. ^ This note should more properly follow No. 41. ' Parts of this note, from a chronological point of view, should have been printed before No. 40. July 25, Serbian Blue Book No. 42 111 The Royal Serbian Government have summoned the Skupshtina to meet on July 14/27 at Nish, whither all the Ministries with their staffs are proceeding this evening. The Crown Prince has issued, in the name of the King, an order for the mobilisation of the army, while to-morrow or the day after a proclamation will be made in which it will be announced that civilians who are not' liable to military service should remain peaceably at home, while soldiers should proceed to their appointed posts and defend the country to the best of their ability, in the event of Serbia being attacked. From the Au^tro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Serbian Blue Book No. 42 Count Leopold Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna. Sir, Vienna, July 12/2S, 1914. As no satisfactory reply^ has been given to the note which the Im- perial and Royal Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary handed to the Royal Government on the 10/23 instant, I have been compelled to instruct Baron Giesl to leave the Serbian capital and to entrust the protection of the subjects of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty to the German Legation. I regret that the relations which I have had the honour to maintain with you, M. le Ministre, are thus terminated, and I avail myself of this opportunity to place at your disposal the enclosed passports for your return to Serbia, as well as for the return of the staff of the Royal Legation. I have, etc. 1 For Austria-Hungary's reasons why the reply was not satisfactory see Austro- Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914. 178 Official Diplomatic Documents Sunday, July 26, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary London, Berlin, Rome, London, Paris, Petrograd Petrograd Belgium Austro-Hungarian Minister France London, London, etc. Rome, Petrograd, Vienna, Note for Minister Christiania, Luxemburg Germany London, Paris, Petrograd Petrograd Great Britain Paris, Berlin, Rome, Paris Vienna, Berlin, Rome Russia Serbia Rome, Vienna, Berlin Prague, Paris, Berlin The full Serbian reply and the reasons why it had not satisfied Austria-Hungary remained unknown to the Powers throughout the whole of Sunday, July 26. A summary of the Serbian reply reached Paris and also Petrograd with a delay of twenty hours, and there is no indication in the published despatches that it reached the other Foreign Offices sooner. In the absence of accurate information two versions gained currency. First that Serbia's seeming concessions were a sham, and that she knew them to be so or she would not have ordered the mobilization of her troops three hours before she sent her reply to Austria-Hungary. Secondly, that she had yielded in every- thing except a few minor points. Austria-Hungary continues her endeavors to prove to the Powers that she had been forced to act harshly with Serbia, but that she did not contemplate any territorial aggrandisement at the expense of Serbia. She orders the mobilization of some of her troops. Germany is greatly concerned about the military preparations going on espe- cially in Russia and warns the Powers of the danger that lies in mobilisation. She endeavors to gain the confidence of France, and France's willingness to intercede in Russia. Great Britain continues her efforts to bring about a Conference of four Powers ; at first, as on the previous days, with a view to mediation between Petrograd and Vienna ; afterwards — and probably owing to French opposition to her original plan — with the view of discovering **an issue which would prevent complica- tions." Russia holds a "long and friendly conversation," as Sazonof describes it, with Austria-Hungary, and suggests the settlement of the Serbian difficulty by means of direct conversations between Petrograd and Vienna. Another suggestion that Serbia should appeal for British intervention is not pressed. Russian mobilization continues. France reverts to her plan that Germany should exert pressure on Austria- Hungary amounting to mediation between her and Serbia. She claims to be convinced of Russia's moderation and pacific intentions, but does not publish the accounts of Russian mobilisation which must have reached her as well as Ger- many. Germany's request that she let it be known that France and Germany are jointly working for peace, she rejects as emphatically as Germany's other request that she should urge moderation in Petrograd. Italy is urged by the Entente Powers to dissociate her interests from those of Germany and Austria-Hungary, and is informed by Russia of the latter's definite determination to come to the assistance of Serbia. Serbia is silent on this day, and Belgium practically so. July 26, AustrO'Hungarian Red Book No. 28 179 Austria-Hungary : From Petrograd AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 28 Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 26, 1914, As the result of reports about measures taken for mobilisation of Russian troops, Count Pourtales has called the Russian Minister's attention in the most serious manner to the fact that nowadays measures of mobilisation ^ would be a highly dangerous form of diplo- matic pressure. For, in that event, the purely military consideration of the question by the general staffs would find expression, and if that button were once touched in Germany, the situation would get out of control. M. Sazonof assured the German Ambassador on his word of honour that the reports on the subject were incorrect ; that up to that time not a single horse and not a single reservist had been called up, and that all the measures that were being taken were merely measures of preparation in the military districts of Kieff, Odessa, and perhaps Kasan and Moscow. Immediately afterwards the Imperial German Military Attache received by courier late in the evening an invitation from Suchomlinof , the Minister for War, who explained that Count Pourtales had spoken with the Foreign Minister about the Russian military preparations, and as the Ambassador might have misunderstood certain military details, he was taking the opportunity of giving him more detailed information. In the following telegram ^ from Count Pourtales to Berlin which has been placed at my disposal, the pertinent communi- cations from Major von Eggeling are collected : " The Military Attache reports with regard to a conversation with the Russian Minister of War : M. Sazonof had asked him to make the military position clear to me. The Minister for War gave me his word of honour that as yet no orders for mobilisation of any kind had been issued. For the present merely preparatory measures would be taken, not a horse would be taken, not a reservist called up. If Austria crossed the Servian frontier, the military districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow and Kasan, which face Austria, would be mobilised. In no circumstances will mobilisation take place on the German front, Warsaw, Vilna and St. Petersburgh. Peace with Germany is earnestly desired. My question what was the object of the mobilisa- tion against Austria, was met with a shrug of the shoulders and a ^ For the aggressive meaning of mobilisation according to International Law see Elihu Root, President of the American Society of International Law, in the American Journal of International Law, July, 1914 : "It is well understood that the exercise of the right of self-protection may and frequently does extend in its effect beyond the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the state exercising it. The strongest example probably would be the mobilisation of an army by another Power immediately across the frontier. Every act done by the other Power may be within its own territory, yet the country threatened by the state of facts is justified in protecting itself by immediate war." 2 Not published in German White Book. 180 Official Diplomatic Documents reference to the diplomatists. I gave the Minister for War to under- stand that his friendly intentions would be appreciated by us, but that we should also consider mobilisation against Austria to be in itself extremely threatening. The Minister emphasised repeatedly and with great stress Russia's urgent need of and earnest wish for peace." To London AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 29 Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 26, 1914. Herr von Tschirschky informed me to-day in pursuance of his instructions that, according to a telegram ^ from Prince Lichnowsky which had been despatched in London on the 25th of July at 3 p.m., Sir E. Grey had transmitted to the latter the sketch of an answer from Servia, and had remarked in the private letter accompanying it, that he hoped that the Berlin Cabinet in view of the conciliatory tenor of this answer would support its acceptance in Vienna. I consider it desirable that your Excellency should again approach the matter with the Secretary of State, and call his attention to the fact that almost simultaneously with the transmission by him of this letter to Prince Lichnowsky, namely at 3 p.m. yesterday, Servia had already ordered the general mobilisation ^ of her army, which proves that no inclination for a peaceful solution existed in Belgrade. It was not till six o'clock, after mobilisation had been proclaimed, that the answer, which had apparently been previously telegraphed to London and the contents of which were not reconcilable with our demands, was delivered to the Imperial and Royal Minister at Bel- grade. To Berlin, Rome, London, Paris, and Petrograd AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 30 Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at Berlin, Rome, London, Paris, and St. Petershurgh. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 26, 1914. We have broken off diplomatic relations with Servia after she had refused ^ the demands we had addressed to her. I beg your Excel- lency now to proceed at once to the Foreign Minister or his deputy, and to express yourself to him approximately to the following effect : — The Royal Servian Government have refused to accept the de- mands which we were forced to address to them in order to secure 1 Not published in German White Book. * See Belgian Gray Book No. 5, July 26, 1914, and British Blue Book No. 32, same day. ' For the reasons why Austria-Hungary deemed the Serbian note unsatisfactory 886 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914. July 26, French Yellow Book No. 50 181 permanently our most vital interests which were menaced by them, and have thereby made it clear that they do not intend to abandon their subversive aims, tending towards continuous disorder in some of our frontier provinces and their final disruption from the Monarchy. Reluctantly, therefore, and very much against our wish, we find ourselves obliged to compel Servia by the sharpest measures to make a fundamental change in the attitude of enmity she has up to now pursued. See also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 31, July 27, 1914, which describes an interview between Sazonof and the Austrian Ambassador on July 26, 1914. Belgium : From Austro-Hungarian Legation Belgian Gray Book No. 5 Communications made on July 26, 1914, by the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Brussels to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. M. Pashitch gave the reply of the Servian Government to the Austro-Hungarian note before 6 o'clock yesterday. This reply not having been considered satisfactory, diplomatic relations have been broken off and the Minister and staff of the Austrian Legation have left Belgrade. Servian mobilisation had already been ordered before 3 o'clock.^ France : To Viviani, London, etc. French Yellow Book No. 50 M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Presi- dent of the Council (on board the ''La France,'') and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome. Paris, July 26, 1914. The events of Saturday can be summed up as follows : — refusal of Austria to grant the extension of the time limit asked for by Russia, — departure of the Austrian Minister from Belgrade after receiving a reply from Servia which was considered insufficient although it reached the limit of any possible concession ^ — order for mobilisation given in Servia whose Government retired to Kragou- jewatz,^ where it was followed by the French and Russian Ministers. The Italian Government, to whom the Austrian note had been communicated on Friday, without any request for support or even ^ Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 29, also British Blue Book No. 32, same day. 2 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 49, printed under July 25, 1914, stating that Serbia did not present her reply to France till the next day, July 27. Cf. also French Yellow Book No. 56, July 26, which states that even the summary was 20 hours late in reaching the Foreign Office. Cf. also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 29, July 26, 1914, and Russian Orange Book No. 36, July 27. See also, Serbian Blue Book No. 38, July 25, Note 2. 3 Nish, according to Russian Orange Book No. 21, July 25, 1914. 182 Official Diplomatic Documents advice, could not, in the absence of the Marquis di San Giuliano, who does not return till Tuesday, make any reply to the suggestion of the Russian Government proposing to press at Vienna for an ex- tension of time. It appears from a confidential communication by the Italian Ambassador to M. Paleologue that at Vienna people still soothe themselves with the illusion that Russia "will not hold firm." It must not be forgotten that Italy is only bound by the engage- ments of the Triple Alliance if she has been consulted beforehand. From St. Petersburgh we learn that M. Sazonof has advised Servia to ask for British mediation.^ At the Council of Ministers ^ on the 25th, which was held in presence of the Emperor, the mobilisation of thirteen army corps intended eventually to operate against Austria was considered ; this mobilisation, however, would only be made effective if Austria were to bring armed pressure to bear upon Servia, and not till after notice had been given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, upon whom falls the duty of fixing the day, liberty being left to him to go on with negotiations even if Belgrade should be occupied. Russian opinion makes clear that it is both politically and morally impossible for Russia to allow Servia to be crushed. In London the German demarche^ was made on the 25th in the same terms as those used by Baron von Schoen at Paris. Sir Edward Grey has replied to Prince Lichnowsky that if the war were to break out no Power in Europe could take up a detached attitude. He did not express himself more definitely and used very reserved language to the Servian Minister. The communication made on the evening ^ of the 25th by the Austrian Ambassador makes Sir Edward Grey more optimistic; since the diplomatic rupture does not necessarily involve immediate military operations, the Secretary of State is still willing to hope that the Powers will have time to intervene. At Berlin ^ the language used by the Secretary of State to the Russian Charge d'Affaires is unsatisfactory and dilatory ; when the latter asked him to associate himself with a demarche at Vienna for an extension of the time limit, he replied that he had already taken action in this sense but that it was too late; to the request for an extension of the time limit before active measures were taken, he replied that this had to do with a domestic matter, and not with a war but with local operations. • Herr von Jagow pretends not to believe that the Austrian action could lead to general consequences. A real explosion of chauvinism ^ has taken place at Berlin. The 1 This is a new suggestion. Cf. French Yellow Book No. 46, July 25, where an appeal to the European Powers is contemplated. It reached Paris, moreover, not on the 25th, as this despatch implies, but on the 26th ; see below No. 53, French Yellow Book. 2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, 1914. 3 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 36, July 25, 1914, and note. * Cf. British Blue Book No. 14, July 25, and its place among the despatches of that date, which makes it more likely that the communication was made eariy in the morning. It was, moreover, the subject of much diplomatic correspondence throughout the day. ' For the events described in this paragraph see British Blue Book No. 18, and French Yellow Book No. 37, of July 25, 1914. ' « Cf. French Yellow Book No. 47, July 25, 1914. The rest of the information con- tained in this paragraph is not written in M. Jules Cambon's published despatch. July 26, French Yellow Book No. 51 183 German Emperor returns direct to Kiel. M. Jules Cambon thinks that, at the first military steps taken by Russia, Germany would immediately reply, and probably would not wait for a pretext before attacking us. At Vienna, the French Ambassador has not had time ^ to join in the demarche of his Russian colleague for obtaining an extension of the time limit fixed for Servia ; he does not regret it, this demarche having been categorically rejected, and England not having had time to give instructions to her representative about it. A note from the British Embassy ^ has been delivered to me : it gives an account of the conversation between the British Ambassa- dor at St. Petersburgh and M. Sazonof and M. Paleologue. Sir Edward Grey thinks that the four Powers who are not directly in- terested ought to press both on Russia and Austria that their armies should not cross the frontier, and that they should give time to Eng- land, France, Germany and Italy to bring their mediation into play. If Germany accepts, the British Government has reason to think that Italy also would be glad to be associated in the joint action of England and France; the adherence of Germany is essential, for neither Austria nor Russia would tolerate any intervention except that of impartial friends or allies. Bienyenu-Martin. From Rome French Yellow Book No. 51 M. Barrere, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Rome, July 26,. 1914. A TELEGRAM from Vienna which has just been received at the Con- sulta informs them that the diplomatic rupture between Austria and Servia has taken place, and that Austria is proceeding to military measures. The Marquis di San Giuliano, who is at Fiuggi, will not return to Rome till the day after to-morrow. To-day I had an interesting conversation with the President of the Council on the situation, the full gravity of which he recognises. From the general drift of his remarks, I have carried away the im- pression that the Italian Government would be willing, in case of war, to keep out of it and to maintain an attitude of observation.^ M. Salandra said to me on this subject: "We shall make the greatest efforts to prevent peace being broken ; our situation is some- what analogous to that of England. Perhaps we could do some- thing in a pacific sense together with the English.'' M. Salandra 1 For the error of this statement see the despatches dealing with this subject on July 25, 1914, and the notes. 2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 24, July 25, 1914. . 3 It was obviously in the interest of the Entente Powers, m case of a European war, to secure the separation of Italy from Austria-Hungary and Germany. 184 Official Diplomatic Documents stated definitely to me that the Austrian note had been communi- cated to Rome at the last moment. t^ Barrere. French Yellow Book No. 52 ^ M. Barrere y French Ambassador at Rome, to M, Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Rome, July 26, 1914. M. Sazonof yesterday told the Italian Ambassador at St. Peters- burgh that Russia would employ all diplomatic means to avoid a conflict, and that she did not give up hope that mediation might lead Austria to a less uncompromising attitude; but that Russia could not be asked to allow Servia to be crushed. I observe that the greater part of Italian public opinion is hostile to Austria in this serious business. r, Barrere. To London French Yellow Book No. 53 M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. de Fleuriau, Charge d' Affaires at London. Paris, July 26, 1914. M. Paleologue sends me the following telegram : — " M. Sazonof advises the Servian Government to ask for the media- tion of the British Government." ^ In concurrence with M. Paul Cambon,^ I think that the French Government can only say that they hope to see the British Govern- ment accept, if an offer of this kind is made to them. Be good enough to express yourself in this sense at the Foreign Bienvenu-Martin. From Petrograd French Yellow Book No. 54 M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. St. Petersburgh, July 26, 1914. The Minister for Foreign Affairs continues with praiseworthy per- severance to seek means to bring about a peaceful solution. "Up 1 This despatch refers to the interview, described in British Blue Book No, 17, July 25, 1914, between the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the British and French Ambassadors. The direct report of this interview by the French Ambassador has not been printed in the French Yellow Book. No valid reason appears why such a roundabout mention of this interview in Petrograd should receive preference in the official publication of the despatches. * See French Yellow Book No. 50, July 26, and note 3 ; contrast British Blue Book No. 44, July 27. » No despatch from Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador in London, to this effect has been published in the French Yellow Book. July 26y French Yellow Book No, 55 185 to the last moment," he declared to me, "I shall show myself ready to negotiate." ^ It is in this spirit that he has just sent for Count Szapary to come to a "frank and loyal explanation." M. Sazonof commented in his presence on the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, article by article, making clear the insulting character ^ of the principal clauses. "The intention which inspired this document," he said, "is legitimate if you pursued no aim other than the protection of your territory against the intrigues of Servian anarchists; but the procedure to which you have had recourse is not defensible." He concluded: "Take back your ultimatum, modify its form, and I will guarantee you the result." The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador showed himself moved by this language; however, while awaiting instructions, he reserves the opinion of his Government. Without being discouraged M. Sazonof has decided to propose ^ this evening to Count Berchtold the opening of direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburgh on the changes to be introduced into the ultimatum. This friendly and semi-official interposition of Russia between Austria and Servia has the advantage of being expeditious. I there- fore believe it to be preferable to any other procedure and likely to succeed. ^ . Paleologue. From Vienna French Yellow Book No. 55 M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, July 26, 1914. M. ScHEBEKO has returned hastily from a journey to Russia ; he had only undertaken it after he had received an assurance from Count Berchtold that the demands on Servia would be thoroughly acceptable.^ The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh spoke in the same sense to M. Sazonof the evening before the delivery of the note. This procedure, which is quite usual ^ in the diplomacy of the 1 Cf . French Yellow Book No. 38, July 25, and contrast with British Blue Book No. 17, same day. 2 In the Russian Orange Book No. 25, same day this interview is called "long and friendly." Cf. German White Book, Exhibit 5, same day, and note; also British Blue Book No. 44, July 27. 3 There is no published despatch showing that he did this. On the contrary in French Yellow Book No. 53, July 26, Sazonof makes an entirely different suggestion. He did, however, revert to the plan proposed here later (see British Blue Book No. 78, July 29) and thereby blocked the plan of a Conference of Ministers in Belgrade. * The reader must decide for himself whether Count Berchtold was honest in his belief or^not. From French Yellow Book No. 15, July 21, New York Times translation, it seems that Serbia was willing to accept the demands of Austria-Hungary, if they did not include judicial participation. This demand was dropped in favor of participa- tion in the investigation. See also British Blue Book No. 57, July 27, printed under date of July 28. ^ A subjective judgment of this kind while indicative of the existing suspicion on the part of the French Government cannot, of course, claim to be in the nature of proving the case. 186 Offijcial Diplomatic Documents Monarchy, and which Baron Macchio has also employed towards me, seems to have greatly added to the irritation of the Russian Government. M. Schebeko will make an effort, however, to profit by the delay which is indispensable for mobilisation, in order to make a proposal for an arrangement, which will at least have the advantage of allow- ing us to measure the value of the pacific declarations of Germany. While we were talking over the situation this evening, in company w^ith Sir M. de Bunsen,^ the latter received instructions ^ from the Foreign Office with reference to the demarche to be attempted by the representatives of the four Powers less directly interested. I am expecting, therefore, that we may have to consult to-morrow with the Duke d'Avarna and with M. Tschirscky, who, in order to refuse his concurrence, will almost certainly entrench himself behind the principle of localising the conflict.^ My impression is that the Austro-Hungarian Government, although surprised and perhaps regretting the vigour with which they have been inspired, will believe themselves obliged to commence military action. t-v DUMAINE. To Vimaniy London, Petrograd, Berlin, Vienna, Rome French Yellow Book No. 56 M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting MiniMer for Foreign Affairs, to the Presi- dent of the Council {on board the "La France,'') and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome. Paris, July 26, 1914. The summary of the Servian reply to the Austrian note only reached us after twenty hours delay ."^ Although the Servian Gov- ernment had given way on all points, with the exception of two small reservations,^ the Austro-Hungarian Minister has broken off rela- tions, thus proving the determined wish of his Government to pro- ceed to execution on Servia. According to a telegram from M. Jules Cambon, the British Am- bassador thinks that there is a slight yielding ; when he observed to Herr von Jagow that Sir Edward Grey did not ask him to intervene between Austria and Servia, but, as this question ceased to be local- ised, to intervene with England, France and Italy at Vienna and St. Petersburgh, the Secretary of State declared that he would do his best to maintain peace.® 1 The close union of the three Entente Powers is apparent throughout. Cf . British Blue Book No. 40, July 26, 1914, and British Blue Book No. 6, note 1, July 24. 2 See British Blue Book Nos. 55 and 36, July 26, 1914. ' Contrast this paragraph with British Blue Book No. 40, same day, where the same interview is described. * I.e. on Sunday, July 26, at 2 p.m. * For the entirely different view of the Austro-Hungarian Government see their Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914. « Germany did more and accepted Sir E. Grey's plan ; German White Book, Exhibit 13, July 25, 1914. July 26, French Yellow Booh No. 57 187 In the course of an interview between M. Barrere and the General Secretary of the Itahan Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the latter indi- cated that probably the Italian Government would not have ap- proved the Austrian note ; but as it was not communicated to them beforehand, the Government consider themselves by this fact re- lieved of all responsibility in the grave step taken by Austria.^ The German Ambassador came this afternoon to make a com- munication to me relating to an intervention by France with Russia in a pacific sense. "Austria," he said to me, "has declared to Russia that she was not pursuing any territorial aggrandisement nor any attack on the integrity of the Kingdom of Servia ; her only intention is to ensure her own tranquillity and to take police measures. The prexention of war depends on the decision of Russia ; Germany feels herself identified with France in the ardent desire that peace may be maintained, and has the firm hope that France will use her influence in this sense at St. Petersburgh." I replied to this suggestion that Russia was moderate, that she had not committed any act which allowed any doubt as to her modera- tion, and that we were in agreement with her in seeking a peaceful solution of the dispute. It therefore appeared to us that Germany on her side ought to act at Vienna, where her action would certainly be effective, with a view to avoiding military operations leading to the occupation of Servia.^ The Ambassador having observed to me that this could not be reconciled with the position taken up by Germany "that the ques- tion concerned only Austria and Servia," I told him that the media- tion at Vienna and St. Petersburgh could be the act of the four other Powers less interested in the question. Herr von Schoen then entrenched himself behind his lack of instruc- tions in this respect, and I told him that in these conditions I did not feel myself in a position to take any action at St. Petersburgh alone. The conversation ended by the renewed assurances of the Am-, bassador of the peaceful intention of Germany, whom he declared to be on this point identified with France.^ Bienvenu-Martin. French Yellow Book No. 57 Note for the Minister Paris, Sunday evening, July 26, 1914. After the visit which he paid to the Minister at 5 o'clock in the afternoon. Baron von Schoen went this evening at 7 o'clock to the 1 Cf. French Yellow Book Nos. 51 and 52, same day. 2 The attitude of France, consistently carried out through the next days, is here foreshadowed. Her view is that Austria-Hungary's position was unreasonable, while Russia's was reasonable and moderate. Germany, therefore-, should exert pressure on Austria, while she herself refused to exert like pressure on Russia. 3 Germany was trying to work together with France for the maintenance of peace. France refused to appear to act in accord with Germany for fear of offending Russia, see French Yellow Book No. 62, July 27. 188 Official Diplomatic Documents Direction Politique, to ask that in order to avoid the appearance in the newspapers of comments intended to influence public opinion, such as that in the Echo de Paris of the evening before/ and in order to define exactly the sense of the demarches of the German Govern- ment, a brief statement should be communicated to the press on the interview between the German Ambassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Herr von Schoen, in order to define what he had in his mind, sug- gested the following terms, which the Acting Political Director took down at his dictation : " During the afternoon the German Ambas- sador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs had a fresh interview, in the course of which, in the most amicable spirit, and acting in an identical spirit of peaceful co-operation (sentiment de solidarite paci- fique), they examined the means which might be employed to main- tain general peace." ^ The Acting Political Director replied at once, "Then, in your opinion, every thing is settled, and you bring us the assurance that Austria accepts the Servian note or will enter into conversations with the Powers on this matter?" The Ambassador having appeared surprised, and having vigorously denied the suggestion, it was ex- plained to him that if there was no modification in Germany's nega- tive attitude, the terms of the suggested "note to the press" were exaggerated, and of a nature to give a false security to French opinion by creating illusion on the real situation, the dangers of which were only too evident. To the assurances lavished by the German Ambassador as to the optimistic impressions which he had formed, the Acting Political Director replied by asking if he might speak to him in a manner quite personal and private, as man to man, quite freely and without regard to their respective functions. Baron von Schoen asked him to do so. M. Berthelot then said that to any simple mind Germany's atti- tude was inexplicable if it did not aim at war ; a purely objective analysis of the facts and the psychology of the Austro-German rela- tions led logically to this conclusion. In the face of the repeated statement that Germany was ignorant of the contents of the Aus- trian note, it was no longer permissible to raise any doubt on that point ; but was it probable that Germany would have arrayed her- self on the side of Austria in such an adventure with her eyes closed ? Did the psychology of all the past relations of Vienna and Berlin allow one to admit that Austria could have taken up a position with- out any possible retreat, before having weighed with her ally all the consequences of her uncompromising attitude? How surprising appeared the refusal by Germany to exercise mediating^ influence at Vienna now that she knew the extraordinary text of the Austrian note ! What responsibility was the German Government assuming 1 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 36, and Russian Orange Book No. 19, July 25, 1914. ' Cf. preceding despatch and note 6. ' France was still clinging to the Paul Cambon modification — mediation between Austria-Hungary and Serbia — of the Sir E. Grey plan — mediation between Russia and Austria-Hungary. July 26, French Yellow Book No, 57 189 and what suspicions would rest upon them if they persisted in inter- posing between Austria and the Powers, after what might be called the absolute submission of Servia, and when the slightest advice given by them to Vienna would put an end to the nightmare which weighed on Europe ! The breaking off of diplomatic relations by Austria, her threats of war, and the mobilisation which she was undertaking^ make peculiarly urgent pacific action on the part of Germany, for from the day when Austrian troops crossed the Servian frontier, one would be faced by an act which without doubt would oblige ^ the St. Peters- burgh Cabinet to intervene, and would risk the unloosing of a war which Germany declares that she wishes to avoid. Herr von Schoen, who listened smiling, once more affirmed that Germany had been ignorant of the text of the Austrian note,^ and had only approved it after its delivery ; she thought, however, that Servia had need of a lesson severe enough for her not to be able to forget it, and that Austria owed it to herself to put an end to a situa- tion which was dangerous and intolerable for a great Power. He declared besides that he did not know the text of the Servian reply, and showed his personal surprise that it had not satisfied Austria, if indeed it was such as the papers, which are often ill informed, represented it to be. He insisted again on Germany's peaceful intentions and gave his impressions as to the effect that might arise from good advice given, for instance, at Vienna, by England in a friendly tone. According to him Austria was not uncompromising; what she rejects is the idea of a formal mediation, the " spectre *' of a conference : a peaceful word coming from St. Petersburgh, good words said in a conciliatory tone by the Powers of the Triple Entente, would have a chance of being well received. He added, finally, that he did not say that Germany on her side would not give some advice at Vienna. In these conditions the Political Director announced that he would ask the Minister if it appeared to him opportune to communi- cate to the press a short note in a moderate tone. 1 There is here no reference to Serbia's mobilisation ordered three hours before she sent her reply to Austria-Hungary ; cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 5, July 26, 1914. 2 France throughout deemed Russia's interest in protecting Serbia more vital than Austria-Hungary's interests in protecting herself from Serbian intrigues. 'Here the official British publication "Collected Diplomatic Documents" prints the following note, not contained in the French Yellow Book, and does so without any explanation : " Cf. No. 21. Letter from the French Minister in Munich stating that the Bavarian President of the Council said, on July 23, that he had read the Austrian note to Servia. "C/. also the British Diplomatic Correspondence, No. 95, page 74, in which Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, states : — "Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that the German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was despatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it." The first paragraph in its English translation, is a perversion of the truth. The French text merely says that he " had cognisance," and for this see note to French Yellow Book No . 2 1 , July 23 . As to the rest the reader must decide for himself whether the anonymous informant of the British Ambassador deserves more credence than the German Chan- cellor and Secretary of Foreign Affairs who repeatedly said that they had not known the contents of the Austro-Hungarian note until it was oflficially presented to the Powers. Cf. especially French Yellow Book No. 15, July 21, No. 17, July 22, and No. 30, July 24. 190 Official Diplomatic Documents From Christiania French Yellow Book No. 58 M. Chevalley, French Minister at Christiania, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Christiania, July 26, 1914. The whole German fleet ^ in Norway has received orders to put to sea. The German authorities at Bergen declare that it is to make straight for Germany. German ships scattered in the Fjords to the north of Bergen were to join those which are in the neighbourhood of Stavanger. Chevalley. From Luxemburg French Yellow Book No. 59 M. d'Annoville, French Charge d' Affaires at Luxemburg, to M. Bien- venu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Luxemburg, July 26, 1914. According to information which I have just received from Thion- ville, the four last classes set at liberty have been ordered to hold themselves at the disposition of the Commandatur at any moment. Without being completely mobilised the reservists are forbidden to go away from their place of residence. Germany : From Petrograd German White Book Exhibit 5 The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor. Telegram of July 26th, 1914. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador had an extended interview ^ with Sazonof this afternoon. Both parties had a satisfactory im- pression as they told me afterwards. The assurance of the Ambassa- dor that Austria-Hungary had no idea of conquest but wished to obtain peace at last at her frontiers, greatly pacified the Secretary. 1 Orders to stop the demobilization of the British fleet had been issued, two days earlier, on July 24, 1914, according to French Yellow Book No. 66, July 27, 1914. See also note 2, British Blue Book No. 47, July 27. 2 Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 25, same day, "long and friendly" interview; but contrast impression of this interview on French Ambassador. French Yellow Book No. 54, same day, where Sazonof is reported as having "made clear the insulting char- acter of the principal clauses." No mention of this interview is made in the Austro- Hungarian Red Book. The Russian despatch, No. 25, is sent to Vienna. There can be no doubt that Sazonof gave the impression to both Austria-Hungary and Germany that a rapprochement between Russia and Austria-Hungary was possible. July 26, German White ^Book Exhibit 10a 191 German White Book Exhibit 7 Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to the Chancellor on July 26th, 1914. The military attache requests the following message to be sent to the general staff : I deem it certain that mobilisation has been ordered for Kiev and Odessa. It is doubtful at Warsaw and Moscow and improbable elsewhere. To London German White Book Exhibit 10 Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London. Urgent. July 26th, 1914. Austria-Hungary has declared in St. Petersburg officially and solemnly that it has no desire for territorial gain in Servia ; that it will not touch the existence of the Kingdom, but that it desires to establish peaceful conditions. According to news received here, Russia is about to summon several bodies of reservists also against us.^ If this news proves correct, we shall be forced to countermeasures very much against our own wishes. Our desire to localise the con- flict and to preserve the peace of Europe remains unchanged. We ask to act in this sense at St. Petersburg with all possible emphasis.^ To Paris German White Book Exhibit 10a' Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Paris. July 26th, 1914. After officially declaring to Russia that Austria-Hungary has no intention to acquire territorial gain and to touch the existence of the Kingdom, the decision whether there is to be a European war rests solely with Russia which has to bear the entire responsibility. We depend upon France with which we are at one in the desire for the preservation of the peace of Europe that it will exercise its influence at St. Petersburg in favour of peace. 1 The words in italics are substituted here from the New York Times translation for those of the Collected Diplomatic Documents, which is the official British version and follows the official German translation, and reads "the call for several classes of the reserves is expected immediately which is equivalent to mobilisation." It will be noticed that two thoughts are inadvertently omitted here : first that it is Russia who is mobilizing; secondly that she is mobilising "also against us." The editor of the Collected Diplomatic Documents who states, on p. 403, that "a few footnotes have been inserted to point out certain discrepancies between the translation and the Ger- man original," disregards the omission of Russia in his footnote to these words, stating merely "The German text adds here auch gegen uns (also against us)." 2 This entire message delivered to Sir E, Grey by the German Ambassador has been omitted in the British Blue Book. 3 From Russian Orange Book No. 28, July 26, 1914, it appears that this message was delivered in Paris. It'is, however, not printed in the French Yellow Book. In the English Translations published by The Imperial German Foreign Office these "Exhibits" are renumbered and printed as numbers: 10a becomes 11 ; 106 12, etc. 192 Official Diplomatic Documents To Petrograd German White Book Exhibit 106 ^ Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St, Petersburg on July 26th, 1914. After Austria's solemn declaration of its territorial disinterested- ness, the responsibility for a possible disturbance of the peace of Europe through a Russian intervention rests solely upon Russia. We trust still that Russia will undertake no steps which will threaten seriously the peace of Europe. For an additional message to Russia see oelow after No. 29 of the Russian Orange Book, July 26, 1914. Great Britain: From Vienna British Blue Book No. 31 * Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey, — (Received July 26.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 25, 1914. Servian reply to the Austro-Hungarian demands is not considered satisfactory, and the Austro-Hungarian Minister has left Belgrade. War is thought to be imminent. British Blue Book No. 32 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 26.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 26, 1914. According to confident belief of German Ambassador, Russia will keep quiet during chastisement of Servia, which Austria-Hungary is resolved to inflict, having received assurances that no Servian terri- tory will be annexed by Austria-Hungary. In reply to my question whether Russian Government might not be compelled by public opinion to intervene on behalf of kindred nationality, he said that everything depended on the personality of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who could resist easily, if he chose, the pressure of a few newspapers. He pointed out that the days of Pan-Slav agita- tion in Russia were over and that Moscow was perfectly quiet. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs would not, his Excellency thought, be so imprudent as to take a step which would probably result in many frontier questions in which Russia is interested, such ^ Like the preceding two messages which have been omitted from the British Blue Book and the French Yellow Book respectively, this message has been omitted from the Russian Orange Book. 2 The information contained in this despatch had reached England from Belgrade on the previous day ; British Blue Book No. 23. July 26, British Blue Book No. 33 193 as Swedish, Polish, Ruthene, Roumanian, and Persian questions being brought into the melting-pot. France, too, was not at all in a con- dition for facing a war. I replied that matters had, I thought, been made a little difficult for other Powers by the tone of Austro-Hungarian Government's ultimatum to Servia. One naturally sympathised with many of the requirements of the ultimatum, if only the manner of expressing them had been more temperate. It was, however, impossible; ac- cording to the German Ambassador, to speak effectively in any other way to Servia. Servia was about to receive a lesson which she re- quired ; the quarrel, however, ought not to be extended in any way to foreign countries. He doubted Russia, who had no right to assume a protectorate over Servia, acting as if she made any such claim. As for Germany she knew very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter. The German Ambassador had heard of a letter ^ addressed by you yesterday to the German Ambassador in London in which you ex- pressed the hope that the Servian concessions would be regarded as satisfactory. He asked whether I had been informed that a pretence of giving way at the last moment had been made by the Servian Government. I had, I said, heard that on practically every point Servia had been willing to give in. His Excellency replied that Ser- vian concessions were all a sham.^ Servia proved that she well knew that they were insufficient to satisfy the legitimate demands of Austria-Hungary by the fact that before making her offer she had ordered mobilisation ^ and retirement of Government from Belgrade. Frmn Berlin British Blue Book No. 33 Sir H. Rumhold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 26.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 26, 1911 . Emperor returns suddenly to-night, and Under-Secretary of State says that Foreign Office regret this step, which was taken on His Majesty's own initiative. They fear that His Majesty's sudden return may cause speculation and excitement. Under-Secretary of State likewise told me that German Ambassador at St. Petersburgh had reported that, in conversation with Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, latter had said that if Austria annexed bits of Servian ter- ritory Russia would not remain indifferent. Under-Secretary of State drew conclusion that Russia would not act if Austria did not annex territory. 1 Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 29, same day. 2 For the reasons see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914. 8 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 29, Belgian Gray Book No. 5, same day. 194 Official Diplomatic Documents British Blue Book No. 34 Sir H. Rumbold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 26.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 26, 1914. Under-Secretary of State has just telephoned to me to say that German Ambassador at Vienna has been instructed to pass on to Austro-Hungarian Government your hopes that they may take a favourable view of Servian reply if it corresponds to the forecast con- tained in Belgrade telegram of 25th July.^ Under-Secretary of State considers very fact of their making this communication to Austro-Hungarian Government implies that they associate themselves to a certain extent with your hope. German Government do not see their way to going beyond this. From Rome British Blue Book No. 35 ^ Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 26.) (Telegraphic.) Rome, July 26, 1914. Minister for Foreign Affairs welcomes your proposal for a con- ference, and will instruct Italian Ambassador to-night accordingly. Austrian Ambassador has informed Italian Government this even- ing that Minister in Belgrade had been recalled, but that this did not imply declaration of war. . To Paris, Berlin, Rome British Blue Book No. 36 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, Sir H. Rumbold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, and Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 26, 1914- Would Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct Am- bassador here to join with representatives of France, Italy, and Ger- many, and myself to meet here in conference immediately for the purpose bf discovering an issue which would prevent complications ? ^ You should ask Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he would do this. If so, when bringing the above suggestion to the notice of the Governments to which they are accredited, representatives at Bel- grade, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh should be authorised to request 1 See No. 21, July 25, 1914. 2 This seems to be a reply to No. 36. 3 This is no longer the Conference of Sir E. Grey's original plan — mediation be- tween Russia and Austria-Hungary — nor of the Paul Cambon modification of this plan — mediation between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. See note to No. 37. July 26, British Blue Book No. 39 195 that all active military operations should be suspended pending results of conference. To Paris British Blue Book No. 37 Sir Edioard Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 26, 1911 Berlin telegram of 25th July.^ It is important to know if France will agree to suggested action by the four Powers if necessary. From Rome British Blue Book No. 38 [Here Sir E. Grey prints a despatch from Rome dated July 23, but delayed in transmission. For the text see above under date of July 23, and explanatory note.] British Blue Book No. 39 Reply of Serbian Government to Austro-Hungarian Note. — {Commu- nicated by the Serbian Minister, July 27.) [For the text see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 25, July 25, and No. 34, July 27, 1914. The British Blue Book fails to print the Austro-Hungarian comment.] According to the published despatches none of the Entente Powers had received copies of the Serbian reply on July 26, and even a summary of the reply had reached Paris with a delay of twenty hours, i.e. at 2 p.m. Sunday, July 26, 1914 (French Yellow Book No. 56, same day also Russian Orange Book No. 36, July 27). As to the reply, however, two versions were current on July 26 : first, that dis- seminated by Russia, Serbia and France, to the effect that Serbia had yielded completely except on one or two minor points ; secondly, that given out by Austria- Hungary and Germany, to the effect that Serbia's concessions were a sham and that the entire reply was unsatisfactory. The only foreign offices cognisant of the reply were, of course, those of Serbia and Austria-Hungary, unless one wishes to understand a passage of British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, (see note 7) to mean that the Russian Cabinet wrote the note for Serbia. Eventually Austria-Hungary sent her commentary on this note to the Powers by mail July 27 (see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 39, July 28). These com- ments, however, were not printed either in the British Blue Book or the French Yellow Book in any of the editions receiving currency in America or in tlie Collected Diplomatic Documents officially issued by England. Neither does it appear in any of the other books except the Austro-Hungarian Red Book. 1 The officialBritish version contains here a footnote "See No. 18." The Conference there spoken of has in view "working in favour of mediation in Vienna and at St. Petersburgh." It is in short Sir E. Grey's original plan. Despatches Nos. 36 and 37, therefore, contain different proposals. France's objections to working in favour of moderation in Petrograd were discussed above in note 5 to French Yellow Book No. 56, July 26. Very probably, therefore, British Blue Book No. 37 should precede No. 36. When Sir E. Grey met determined opposition in Paris to his plan (No. 37) he may have modified it, as expressed in No. 36. No. 36 reached the British Ambassador while he was at a conference with the Russian and French Ambassadors in Vienna in the evening (French Yellow Book No. 55) and his reply, British Blue Book No. 40, while dated July 26, was received in London the next day. All this makes it unlikely that after sending No. 36, Sir E. Grey should have reverted to his original plan in No. 37. From No. 35 it does not appear which plan of a conference was accepted by Italy. 196 Official Diplomatic Documents From Vienna British Blue Book No. 40^ Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey, — {Received July 27.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 26, 191^. Russian Ambassador just returned from leave thinks that Austro- Hungarian Government are determined on war, and that it is im- possible for Russia to remain indifferent. He does not propose to press for more time in the sense of your telegram of the 25th instant ^ (last paragraph). When the repetition of your telegram of the 26th instant to Paris ^ arrived, I had the French and Russian Ambassadors both with me.^ They expressed great satisfaction with its contents, which I commu- nicated to them. They doubted, however, whether the principle of Russia being an interested party entitled to have a say in the settle- ment of a purely Austro-Servian dispute would be accepted by either the Austro-Hungarian or the German Government. Instructions were also given to the Italian Ambassador to support the request of the Russian Government that the time limit should be postponed. They arrived, however, too late for any useful action to be taken. Russia : To Rome Russian Orange Book No. 23 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Rome. (Telegram.) St. Petersburgh, July 13 {26), 1914. Italy might play a part of the first importance in favour of pre- serving peace, by bringing the necessary influence to bear upon Austria, and by adopting a definitely unfavourable attitude towards the dispute on the ground that it could not be localised. You should express your conviction that Russia cannot possibly avoid coming to the help of Servia.^ 1 No. 40 should precede No. 39, for while both despatches are said to have been received on July 27, No. 40 was sent on July 26. 2 See No. 26, July 25. » See No. 36, July 26, 1914. * Cf. the French account of this interview, French Yellow Book No. 55, same day. 6 Cf. French Yellow Book Nos. 51 and 52, July 26, and for Russia's determination to force a war unless Austria-Hungary yielded. British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, 1914, " if she (i.e. Russia) feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war." July 26, Russian Orange Book No. 25 197 From Prague Russian Orange Book No. 24 Acting Russian Consul at Prague to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Prague, July 13 (26), 19H. Mobilisation ^ has been ordered. To Vienna; also Berlin, Paris, London, and Rome Russian Orange Book No. 25 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Vienna. (Telegram.) St. Petersburgh, July 13 {26), 1914. I HAD a long and friendly ^ conversation to-day with the Austro- Hungarian Ambassador. After discussing the ten demands addressed to Servia, I drew his attention to the fact that, quite apart from the clumsy form in which they were presented, some of them were quite impracticable, even if the Servian Government agreed to accept them. Thus, for example, points 1 and 2 could not be carried out without recasting the Servian press law and associations law, and to that it might be difficult to obtain the consent of the Skupshtina. As for enforcing paints 4 and 5, this might lead to most dangerous consequences, and even to the risk of acts of terrorism directed against the Royal Family and against Pashitch, which clearly could not be the intention of Austria. With regard to the other points it seemed to me that, with certain changes of detail, it would not be difficult to find a basis of mutual agreement, if the accusations con- tained in them were confirmed by. sufficient proof. In the interest of the maintenance of peace, which, according to the statements of Szapary, is as much desired by Austria as by all the Powers, it was necessary to end the tension of the present moment as soon as possible. With this object in view it seemed to me most desirable that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador should be authorised to enter into a private exchange of views ^ in order to redraft certain articles of the Austrian note of the 10th (23rd) July in consultation with me. This method of procedure would perhaps enable us to find a formula which would prove acceptable to Servia, while giving satisfaction to Austria in respect of the chief of her demands. Please convey the substance of this telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in a judicious and friendly manner. Communicated to Russian Ambassadors in Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy. 1 The despatches probably received in Petrograd announcing the Serbian mobi- lisation on July 25, three hours before Serbia sent her reply to Austria-Hungary, are not published in the Russian Orange Book. See Belgian Gray Book No. 5, July 26, 1914. 2 Cf. German White Book, Exhibit 5, and contrast French Yellow Book No. 54, both of July 26, 1914. For the Austrian Version see Red Book No. 31, July 27, 1914. 3 This is Sazonof 's counter proposition to Sir E. Grey's plan of a conference of four Powers. 198 Official Diplomatic Documents To Berlin Russian Orange Book No. 26 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Berlin, (Telegram.) St, Petersburg, July 13 {26), 1914. Please communicate the contents of my telegram^ to Vienna of to-day to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, and express to him the hope that he, on his part, will be able to advise Vienna to meet Russia's proposal in a friendly spirit. From Paris Russian Orange Book No. 27 Russian Charge d^ Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Paris, July 13 {26), 191J,.. The Director of the Political Department informs me that, upon his informing the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador ^ of the contents of the Servian reply to the ultimatum, the Ambassador did not conceal his surprise that it had failed to satisfy Giesl. In the opinion of the Director of the Political Department, Servia's conciliatory ^ attitude should produce the best impression in Europe. Russian Orange Book No. 28 Russian Charge d^ Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, (Telegram.) Paris, July 13 {26), 1914. The German Ambassador again visited the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day, and made to him the following declarations :^ — (Translation.) "L'Autriche a declare a la "Austria has declared to Russie qu'elle ne recherche pas Russia that she does not desire des acquisitions territoriales et territorial acquisitions, and that qu'elle ne menace pas I'integrite she harbours no designs against de la Serbie. Son but unique the integrity of Servia. Her sole est d'assurer sa propre tranquil- object is to secure her own peace 1 Russian Orange Book No. 25, and see note 3 to that despatch. » The summary of the Serbian reply reached Paris in the afternoon of July 26, 1914 ; see French Yellow Book No. 56, July 26, where an interview with the German Ambassador is described. The interview here referred to with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador is not mentioned in the French Yellow Book. 3 For a contrary interpretation of the Serbian attitude see British Blue Book No. 32, same day, and note 2. * This is the official message, German White Book, Exhibit 10a, sent by the Chan- cellor to the German Ambassador in Paris. It is not printed in the French Yellow Book and is here printed as if it were a personal opinion of the German Ambassador. July 26 y Russian Orange Book No. 30 199 lite. Par consequent il depend and quiet, and consequently it de la Russie d'eviter la guerre, rests with Russia to prevent war. L'Allemagne se sent solidaire Germany is at one with France avec la France dans le desir in her ardent desire to preserve ardent de conserver la paix et peace, and she sincerely hopes espere fermement que la France that France will exercise a usera de son influence a Peters- moderating influence at St. bourg dans un sens moderateur." Petersburg." The Minister pointed out that Germany on her part might well act on similar lines at Vienna, especially in view of the conciliatory spirit displayed by Servia. The Ambassador replied that such a course was not possible, owing to the decision not to intervene in the Austro-Servian dispute. The Minister then asked whether the four Powers — Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and France — could not make representations at St. Petersburgh and Vienna, for that the matter amounted, in effect, to a dispute between Austria and Russia. The Ambassador alleged that he had no instructions. Finally, the Minister refused to agree to the German proposal. Russian Orange Book No. 29 Russian Charge d' Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Paris, July 13 {26), 1914. The Director of the Political Department has expressed the per- sonal opinion that the series of representations made by Germany at Paris aim at intimidating ^ France and at securing her intervention at St. Petersburgh. From Berlin Russian Orange Book No. 30 Russian Charge d' Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Berlin, July 13 {26), 1911 On the news reaching Berlin that the Austrian army had mobilised against Servia, a large crowd, in which the papers 1 Russia also received, on this day, July 26, 1914, the following message from Berlin, which is not printed in the Russian Orange Book. It is here quoted from the German White Book (authorized translation), p. 7 : " Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to counter-measures which must consist in mobilising the army. " But mobilisation means war. . " As we know the obligations of France towards Russia, this mobilisation would be directed against both Russia and France. We cannot assume that Russia desires to unchain such a European war. Since Austria-Hungary will not touch the exist- ence of the Servian kingdom, we are of the opinion that Russia can afford to assume an attitude of waiting. We can all the more support the desire of Russia to protect the integrity of Servia, as Austria-Hungary does not intend to question the latter. It will be easy in the further development of the affair to find a basis for an under- standing." 200 Official Diplomatic Documents report the presence of an Austrian element, gave vent to a series of noisy demonstrations in favour of Austria. Late in the even- ing the crowd several times collected before the Imperial Russian Embassy and some anti-Russian shouting occurred. Hardly any police were present and no precautions were taken. Serbia : Serbia has not published any despatches of July 26, 1914. July ^7, 19U 201 Monday, July 27, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary Petrograd, Berlin, Rome London, Paris, Petrograd Petrograd, Berlin Belgium Berlin France London, London etc. Basle, London, Petro- grad, Constantino- ple, Berlin, Rome Serbian reply and Austro-Hungarian Memorandum. Germany London Kovno, Berne, Petro- grad Vienna, Paris, Berlin, Great Britain Berlin, Petrograd, Vienna, Rome Petrograd, Rome Serbian reply and Austro-H ungarian Memorandum Russia Paris and London, London, Paris, Berlin, Berlin, London etc. Vienna Czar to Serbian Crown Prince Serbia Czar to Serbian Crown Prince. Austria-Hungary sends out for presentation to the Powers the dossier with her proofs of Serbian guilt and issues her comments to the Serbian reply, explaining in detail why she could not accept it as satisfactory, and repeats her declaration that she **does not aim in any way at territorial acquisitions of any sort." France continues to hold Germany responsible for Austria-Hungary's firmness in dealing with Serbia, and refuses Germany's request to intercede in Petrograd. She is troubled by the confidence expressed by the German and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors in London that ^'England would preserve neutrality" and, like Russia, is endeavoring to secure the promise of English support in case of war. Sazonof is represented by the French officials as very moderate and desirous of peace. Sir E. Grey's proposal of a conference to "examine means of finding a solution" is supported but altered to include Belgrade instead of only Vienna and Petrograd, while Jules Cambon in Berlin renews his request that Berlin alone intervene in Vienna. Germany accepts in principle Sir E. Grey's proposal of a conference and "at once starts the mediation proposal in Vienna in the sense desired by Sir Edward Grey." She expects, however, most good from direct conversations between Vienna and Petrograd as suggested by Sazonof. She continues to point out the danger of Russian mobilisation. Great Britain announces the action of keeping her fleet mobilised as of this day while it actually occurred on July 24. It was meant to dissipate the impression that in any event England "would stand aside," which impression Sazonof "deplored." Serbia's reply continues to be represented as satisfactory by Sir E. Grey, who omits from the Blue Book both the dossier and the Austro-Hungarian comments on the Serbian reply. Great Britain repeats her conference proposals to mediate between Petrograd and Vienna or, according to the French Yellow Book, also Belgrade. Sir E. Grey is, however, not unfavourable to Sazonof 's plan of direct conversations. Russia, while not refusing categorically Sir E. Grey's plan, urges her own of direct conversations. She continues her mobilisation, although some of her hi^ officials deny this. 202 Official Diplomatic Documents Serbia officially appeals to Russia for help. Belgium discusses the Serbian reply on information supplied by the British Charge d'Affaires at Belgrade. Austria-Hungary : From Petrograd AUSTROHUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 31 Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 27, 1914. Just had a long conversation with M. Sazonof.^ Told the Minis- ter I was under the impression that mistaken ideas were prevalent in Russia with regard to the character of our action. We were credited with wishing to push forward into Balkan territory, and to begin a march to Salonica or even to Constantinople. Others, again, went so far as to describe our action merely as the starting point of a pre- ventive war against Russia. I said that all this was erroneous, and that parts of it were absolutely unreasonable. The goal of our action was self-preservation and self-defence against hostile propaganda by word, in writing, and in action, which threatened our integrity. It would occur to no one in Austria-Hungary to threaten Russian in- terests, or indeed to pick a quarrel with Russia. And yet we were absolutely determined to reach the goal which we had set before us, and the path which we had chosen seemed to us the most suitable. As, however, the action under discussion was action in self-defence, I could not conceal from him that we could not allow ourselves to be diverted from it by any consequences, of whatever kind they might be. M. Sazonof agreed with me. Our goal, as I had described it to him, was an entirely legitimate one, but he considered that the path which we were pursuing with a view to attaining it was not the surest. He said that the note which we had delivered was not happy ^ in its form. He had since been studying it, and if I had time, he would like to look it through once more with me. I remarked that I was at his service, but was not authorised either to discuss the text of the note with him or to interpret it. Of course, however, his remarks were of interest. The Minister then took all the points of the note in order, and on this occasion found seven of the ten points admissible without very great difficulty ; only the two points ^ dealing with the collaboration of the Imperial and Royal officials in Servia and the point dealing with the removal of officers and civil servants to be designated by us,'* seemed to him to be unacceptable in their present 1 While dated July 27, this interview took place on July 26 ; cf . Russian Orange Book No. 25, July 26, and note 1. The last paragraph of this note, moreover, refers to the Serbian mobilisation, which took place on the 25th, as of "the previous day." 2 French Yellow Book No. 54, July 26, quotes Sazonof as having said "insulting." ' They are points 5 and 6^ see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 7, July 22, 1914, and the explanation. Red Book No. 27, July 25, 1914. ' ♦ This is point 4 of the note to Serbia, see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 7, July 22, 1914. July 27, Austro-Hunganan Red Book No. 34 203 form. With regard to the two first points, I was in a position to give an authentic interpretation in the sense of your Excellency's telegram of the 25th instant ; ^ with regard to the third, I expressed the opinion that it was a necessary demand. Moreover, matters had already been set in motion. The Servians had mobilised on the previous day ^ and I did not know what had happened since then. To Petrograd AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 32 Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburgh. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 27, 1914. I EMPOWER your Excellency to declare to M. Sazonof that, so long as the war between Austria-Hungary and Servia remains local- ised, the Monarchy does not aim in any way at territorial acquisitions of any sort. From Berlin AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 33 Count Szogyeny to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) Berlin, June 27, 1914. M. Sazonof explained to the German Ambassador that he could "guarantee" to him "that on the Russian side no mobilisation had been begun ; though it was true that certain necessary military pre- cautions were being taken." The German military attache at St. Petersburgh reports ^ that " the Russian Minister of War has given him his word of honour that not a man or a horse has been mobiHsed ; however, naturally, certain military precautions have been taken"; precautions which, as the German military attache adds, apparently spontaneously, to his report, "are to be sure pretty far-reaching." To Berlin, Rome, London, Paris, and Petrograd AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 34 Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in Berlin, Rome, London, Paris, and St. Petersburgh. Vienna, July 27, 1914. Annexed you will find the text, annotated with our remarks, of the note which the Royal Servian Government on the 25th of June transmitted to the Imperial and Royal Minister at Belgrade. 1 Austro-Hungarian Red Book Nos. 21, 26, and 27, July 25, 1914. 2 Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 5, July 25, 1914. 3 Cf. German White Book, Exhibit 11, also 8 and 9, July 27, 1914. 204 Official Diplomatic Documents Enclosure ^ Reply of the Royal Servian Government to the Imperial and Royal Government of the 12/25 July, 1914, (Translation.) The Royal Servian Govern- ment have received the commu- nication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant,^ and are convinced that their reply will remove any mis- understanding which may threaten to impair the good neighbourly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia. Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both from the tribune of the national Skupschtina ^ and in the declara- tions and actions of the respon- sible representatives of the State — protests which were cut short by the declarations made by the Servian Government on the 18th^ March, 1909 — have not been renewed on any occasion as re- gards the great neighbouring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their agents, to change the political and legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Gov- ernment draw attention to the fact that in this connection the Imperial and Royal Government have made no representation except one concerning a school book, and that on that occasion the Imperial and Royal Govern- ment received an entirely satis- factory explanation. Servia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy dur- 1 For a brief summary see French Yellow Book No. 75 (2), July 28, and footnote. 2 Old style. » The Serbian Parliament. (Remarks.) The Royal Servian Govern- ment confine themselves to as- serting that, since the declara- tions on the 18th March, 1909, no attempt has been made by the Servian Government and their agents to change the position of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thereby they deliberately and arbitrarily shift the ground on which our demarche was based, as we did not maintain that they and their agents have taken any official action in this direction. Our charge, on the contrary, is to the effect that the Servian Government, notwithstanding the obligations undertaken in the above-quoted note, have neg- lected to suppress the move- ment directed against the terri- torial integrity of the Monarchy. Their obligation, that is to say, was that they should change the whole direction of their policy and adopt a friendly and neigh- bourly attitude towards the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and not merely that they should refrain from officially attacking the incorporation of Bosnia in the Monarchy. July 27, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34 205 ing the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Servia and to the sacri- fice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Govern- ment cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies — manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which, as a general rule, escape official control. The Royal Government are all the less responsible, in view of the fact that at the time of the solu- tion of a series of questions which arose between Servia and Aus- tria-Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two neighbour- ing countries. For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and surprised at the statements, according to which members of the Kingdom of Servia are sup- posed to have participated in the preparations for the crime com- mitted at Serajevo; the Royal Government expected to be in- vited to collaborate in an investi- gation of all that concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correct- ness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to them. Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, they are prepared to hand over for trial any Servian subject, The proposition of the Royal Servian Government that utter- ances in the press and the activi- ties of societies are of a private character and are not subject to official control is absolutely an- tagonistic to the institutions of modern States, even those which have the most liberal law with regard to press and associations ; this law has a public character and subjects the press, as well as associations, to State control. Moreover, Servian institutions themselves contemplate some such control. The complaint against the Servian Government is in fact that they have entirely omitted to control their press and their associations, of whose activities in a sense hostile to the Monarchy they were well aware. This proposition is incorrect; the Servian Government were accurately informed of the suspi- cions which were entertained against quite definite persons and were not only in a position but also bound by their internal laws to initiate spontaneous enquiries. They have done nothing in this direction. 206 Ojfflcial Diplomatic Documents without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Sera jevo proofs are forth- coming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be pub- lished on the first page of the Journal officiel, on the date of the 13th (26th) July, the follow- ing declaration : — "The Royal Government of Servia condemn all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary — i.e.y the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy ter- ritories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal con- sequences of these criminal proceedings. The Royal Government regret that, according to the communi- cation from the Imperial and Royal Government, certain Ser- vian officers and functionaries participated in the above-men- tioned propaganda, and thus compromised the good neigh- bourly relations to which the Royal Servian Government was solemnly pledged by the declara- tion of the 31st March, 1909.^ "The Government, etc. . . ." (identical with the text as de- manded). The Royal Government further undertake : — Our demand ran : — "The Royal Government of Servia condemn the propaganda directed against Austria-Hun- gary '' The alteration made by the Royal Servian Government in the declaration demanded by us implies that no such propaganda directed against Austria-Hun- gary exists, or that they are cog- nisant of no such propaganda. This formula is insincere and dis- ingenuous, as by it the Servian Government reserve for them- selves for later use the evasion that they had not by this decla- ration disavowed the then exist- ing propaganda, and had not admitted that it was hostile to the Monarchy, from which they could further deduce that they had not bound themselves to suppress propaganda similar to that now being carried on. The wording demanded by us ran : — "The Royal Government re- gret that Servian officers and functionaries . . . partici- pated. . . ." By the adoption of this word- ing with the addition "according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Govern- ment" the Servian Government are pursuing the object that has already been referred to above, namely, that of preserving a free hand for the future. We had demanded of them : — 1. "To suppress any publica- tion which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hun- New style. July 27, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34 207 1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skup- schtina ^ a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred and contempt of the Aus- tro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria- Hungary. The Government engage at the approaching re- vision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be intro- duced into article 22 of the Con- stitution of such a nature that such publication may be confis- cated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categorical terms of article 22 of the Con- stitution. garian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy." We wished therefore to ensure that Servia should be obliged to see to it that press attacks of that nature should be discon- tinued in future; we wished therefore to know that a definite result in this connection was assured. Instead of this Servia offers us the enactment of certain laws which would be calculated to serve as means towards this result, viz. : — (a) A law under which the press publications in question which are hostile to the Mon- archy are to be punished on their merits (suhjectiv) a matter which is of complete indifference to us, all the more as it is well known that the prosecution of press offences on their merits (suhjec- tiv) is only very rarely possible, and, if any law of the sort is laxly administered, even in the few cases of this nature a conviction would not be obtained ; this, therefore, is a proposal which in no way meets our demand as it does not offer us the slightest guarantee for the result which we wish to obtain. (6) A law supplementary to Article 22 of the constitution which would permit confiscation — a proposal which is equally unsatisfactory to us, as the exist- ence of such a law in Servia is of no Use to us, but only the obliga- tion of the Government to apply it ; this, however, is not promised us. These proposals are therefore entirely unsatisfactory — all the » The Serbian Parliament. 208 Official Diplomatic Documents more so as they are evasive in that we are not told within what period of time these laws would be enacted, and that in the event of the rejection of the Bills by the Skupschtina — apart from the possible resignation of the Gov- ernment — everything would be as it was before. 2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the Narodna Odbrana and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their mem- bers. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the de- mand of the Imperial and Royal Government, and will dissolve the Narodna Odbrana Society and every other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary. 3. The Royal Servian Govern- ment undertake to eliminate with- out delay from public instruction in Servia everything that serves or might serve to foment the propaganda against Austria- The whole of the public life of Servia teems with the propa- ganda against the Monarchy, of the Narodna Odbrana and of so- cieties affiliated to it ; it is there- fore quite impossible to admit the reservation made by the Servian Government when they say that they know nothing about them. Quite apart from this the de- mand we have made is not en- tirely complied with, as we further required : — That the means of propaganda possessed by these associations should be confiscated. That the re-establishment of the dissolved associations under another name and in another form should be prevented. The Belgrade Cabinet main- tains complete silence in both these directions, so that the half consent which has been given us offers no guarantee that it is contemplated to put a definite end to the activities of the asso- ciations hostile to the Monarchy, especially of the Narodna Od- brana, by their dissolution. In this case also the Servian Government first ask for proofs that propaganda against the Monarchy is fomented in public educational establishments in Servia, when they must know July 27, Austro -Hungarian Red Book No. 34 209 Hungary, whenever the Imperial ^nd Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda. 4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from the mili- tary service all such persons as the judicial enquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hun- garian Monarchy, and they ex- pect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and functionaries for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them. 5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Servia shall undertake to xiccept the collaboration of the that the school books which have been introduced into the Servian schools contain matter of an objectionable nature in this re- spect, and that a large propor- tion of the Servian teachers are enrolled in the ranks of the Narodna Odbrana and the socie- ties affiliated with it. Moreover, here too the Ser- vian Government have not complied with a portion of our de- mand as fully as we required, in- asmuch as in their text they have omitted the addition which we desired "both as regards the teaching body and also as re- gards the methods of instruc- tion" — an addition which quite clearly shows in what directions the propaganda against the Mon- archy in the Servian schools is to be looked for. Inasmuch as the Royal Servian Government attach to their con- sent to the removal of the officers and functionaries in question from military and civil service the condition that these persons should have been convicted by judicial enquiry, their consent is confined to those cases in which these persons are charged with a crime punishable by law. As we, however, demand the removal of those officers and functionaries who foment propaganda against the Monarchy, a proceeding which is not generally punish- able by law in Servia, it appears that our demand under this head also is not complied with. International Law has just as little to do with this question as has criminal procedure. This is purely a matter of State police, which must be settled by way of a separate agreement. Servians reservation is therefore unintel- 210 Official Diplomatic Documents representatives of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collab- oration as agrees with the prin- ciple of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations. 6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it their duty to open an enquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15th ^ June, and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot ac- cept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure ; neverthe- less, in concrete cases communi- cations as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hun- garian agents. ligible, and would be calculated, owing to the vague general form in which it is couched, to lead to unsurmountable difficulties when the time comes for concluding the prospective agreement. Our demand was quite clear and did not admit of misinter- pretation. We desired : — (1) The opening of a judicial enquiry (enquete judiciaire) against accessories to the. plot. (2) The collaboration of repre- sentatives of the Imperial and Royal Government in the inves- tigations relating thereto (" re- cherches^' as opposed to "enquete judiciaire"). It hever occurred to us that representatives of the Imperial and Royal Government should take part in the Servian judicial proceedings ; it was intended that they should collaborate only in the preliminary police inves- tigations, directed to the collec- tion and verification of the material for the enquiry. If the Servian Government misunderstand us on this point they must do so deliberately, for the distinction between "enquete judiciaire" and simple "recher- ches" must be familiar to them. In desiring to be exempted from all control in the proceed- ings which are to be initiated, which if properly carried through would have results of a very un- desirable kind for themselves, and in view of the fact that they have no handle for a plausible refusal of the collaboration of our representatives in the pre- liminary police investigations (numberless precedents exist for » Old style. July 27 y AustrO'Hungarian Red Book No. 34 211 7. The Royal Government pro- ceeded, on the very evening of the deHvery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voja Tankosic. As regards Milan Ziganovic, who is a subject of the Austro- Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15th ^ June was em- ployed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him. The Austro-Hungarian Gov- ernment are requested to be so good as to supply as soon as pos- sible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence of guilt, is well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present, at the enquiry at Serajevo for the purposes of the later enquiry. 8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will immediately order an enquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznitza line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass. 9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the remarks made by their officials whether in Servia or abroad, in interviews after the crime which, according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Govern- lOld such police intervention) they have adopted a standpoint which is intended to invest their refusal with an appearance of justifica- tion and to impress on our de- mand the stamp of impractica- bility. This answer is disingenuous. The enquiries set on foot by us show that three days after the crime, when it became known that Ciganovic was implicated in the plot, he went on leave and travelled to Ribari on a commis- sion from the Prefecture of Police at Belgrade. It is, there- fdre, in the first place incorrect to say that Ciganovic had left the Servian State Service on the 25th/28th June. To this must be added the fact that the Pre- fect of Police at Belgrade, who had himself contrived the depar- ture of Ciganovic and who knew where he was stopping, declared in an interview that no man of the name of Milan Ciganovic existed in Belgrade. The interviews in question must be quite well known to the Royal Servian Government. By requesting the Imperial and Royal Government to communi- cate tp them all kinds of details about these interviews, and keep- style. 212 Official Diplomatic Documents ment, were hostile towards the Monarchy, as soon as the Im- perial and Royal Government have communicated to them the passages in question in these re- marks, and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said offi- cials, although the Royal Govern- ment will themselves take steps to collect eridence and proofs. 10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execu- tion of the measures comprised under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out. If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply, the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understand- ing, either by referring this ques- tion to the decision of the Inter- national Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18th (31st) March, 1909. ing in reserve the holding of a formal enquiry into them, they show that they are not willing to comply seriously with this demand either. Belgium : From Berlin Belgian Gray Book No. 6 Baron BeyenSy Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M, Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, (Telegram.) Berlin, July 21, 191 J^. According to a telegram from the British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade,^ the Servian Government have given way on all the points ' Belgium had her own representative in Belgrade. No valid reason appears why the information here published should have come in the roundabout way through the: July 27, French Yellow Book No. 61 213 of the Austrian note. They even allow the intervention of Austrian officials if such a proceeding is in conformity with the usages of inter- national law. The British Charge d'Affaires considers that this reply should satisfy Austria if she is not desirous of war. Nevertheless, a more hopeful atmosphere prevails here to-day, more particularly because hostilities against Servia have not begun. The British Government suggest mediation by Great Britain, Germany, France, and Italy at St. Petersburg and Vienna in order to find some basis for compromise. Germany alone has not yet replied. The decision rests with the Emperor. France : From Basle French Yellow Book No. 60 M. Farges, French Consul-General at Basle, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Basle, July 21, 1914. Four days ago the German officers on leave in this district re- ceived orders to break off their leave and return to Germany. Moreover, I learn from two reliable sources that warning has been given to persons owning motor cars in the Grand Duchy of Baden to prepare to place them at the disposal of the military authorities, two days after a fresh order. Secrecy on the subject of this warning has been directed under penalty of a fine.^ The population of Basle is very uneasy, and banking facilities are restricted. Faroes. To Lcmdon, St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Rome French Yellow Book No. 61 M. BienvenU'Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, on board the "La France'* (for the President of the Council) and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Rome. Paris, July 27, 1914. The three steps taken by the German Ambassador at Paris seem characteristic : — On Friday he reads a note ^ in which the German British official in Belgrade and the Belgian Minister in Beriin. Since the exhaustive Austro-Hungarian comment on the Serbian reply, Red Book No. 34, same day, was presented to all the great Powers it is significant- that no reference to it is here made," and that the British official presents exclusively the Serbian, and one may say, Russian view of the Serbian reply. 1 The accuracy of this statement can neither be proved nor disproved at this writ- ing. German writers have denied it. If the information was true, one should expect to have it reported directly by the French consuls in the Grand Duchy of Baden. On the other hand, precautionary measures would, of course, have been taken near the French frontier earlier than elsewhere. 2 French YeUow Book No. 28, July 24. 214 Official Diplomatic Documents Government categorically place themselves between Austria and the Powers, approving the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and adding that "Germany warmly desires that the dispute should remain localised, since any intervention of another party must through the play of its alliances provoke incalculable consequences ; " — the second day, Saturday, the effect having been produced, and the Powers hav- ing, on account of the surprise, the shortness of the time-limit, and the risks of general war, advised Servia to yield,^ Herr von Schoen returns to minimise this step,^ pretending to be astonished at the impression produced, and protests that intentions are attributed to Germany which she does not harbour, "since," he says, "there was neither concert before nor threat afterwards;" — the third day, Sunday, the result having been obtained, since Servia has yielded, as one might almost say, to all the Austrian demands, the German Ambassador appears on two occasions ^ to insist on Germany's peace- ful intentions, and on her warm desire to co-operate in the mainte- nance of peace, after having registered the Austrian success which closes the first phase of the crisis. The situation at the moment of writing remains disturbing, on account of the incomprehensible ^ refusal of Austria to accept Ser- via's submission, of her operations of mobilisation, and of her threats to invade Servia. The attitude taken up from the beginning by the Austrian Government, with German support, her refusal to accept any conversation with the Powers, practically do not allow the latter to intervene effectively with Austria without the media- tion of Germany. However, time presses, for if the Austrian army crosses the frontier it will be very difficult to circumscribe the crisis, Russia not appearing to be able to tolerate ^ the occupation of Servia after the latter has in reality submitted to the Austrian note, giving every satisfaction and guarantee. Germany, from the very fact of the position taken up by her, is qualified to intervene effectively and be listened to at Vienna ; if she does not do this she justifies all suspicions and assumes the responsibility for the war. The Powers, particularly Russia, France, and England, have by their urgent advice induced Belgrade to yield, ^ they have thus ful- filled their part ; now it is for Germany, who is alone able to gain a rapid hearing at Vienna, to give advice to Austria, who has obtained satisfaction and cannot, for a detail easy to adjust, bring about a general war. It is in these circumstances that the proposal made by the Cabinet of London is put forward; M. Sazonof having said to the British Ambassador that as a consequence of the appeal of Servia to the Powers,® Russia would agree to stand aside. Sir Edward Grey has formulated the following suggestion to the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin 1 See.note to British Blue Book No. 39, July 26, and British Blue Book No. 22, where it appears that the advice was never given. « French Yellow Book No. 36, July 25. » French Yellow Book Nos. 56 and 57, July 26. * For Austria's reasons see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27. * Cf. Note 2, French Yellow Book No. 57, July 26. * This appeal was never made ; cf. also French Yellow Book No. 68, July 27, 1914. July 27, French Yellow Book No. 62 215 and Rome : the French, German and Itahan Ambassadors at Lon- don would be instructed to seek with Sir Edward Grey a means of resolving the present difficulties, it being understood that during this conversation Russia, Austria and Servia would abstain from all active military operations.^ Sir A. Nicolson has spoken of this sug- gestion to the German Ambassador, who showed himself favourable to it ; it will be equally well received in Paris, and also at Rome, according to all probability. Here again it is Germany's turn to speak, and she has an opportunity to show her goodwill by other means than words. I w^ould ask you to come to an understanding with your British colleague, and to support his proposal with the German Govern- ment in whatever form appears to you opportune. ^ Bienvenu-Martin. To London, St. Petershurgh, Berlin, Vienna French Yellow Book No. 62 M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Presi- deiit of the Council {on board the "La France'^) and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Peter sburgh, Berlin, Vienna. Paris, July 27, 1914. After his demarche of yesterday ^ tending to an intervention by France at St. Petersburgh in favour of peace, the German Ambas- sador returned, as I have informed you, to the Direction Politique on the pretext that it might be desirable to communicate to the press a short note indicating the peaceful and friendly sense of the con- versation ; he even suggested the following terms : — " During the afternoon the German Ambassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs had a fresh interview, in the course of which, in the most amicable spirit and acting in an identical spirit of peaceful co-opera- tion, they examined the means which might be employed to main- tain general peace.'' He was told in answer, that the terms ap- peared exaggerated and of a nature to create in public opinion illusions on the real situation ; that, however, a brief note in the sense indi- cated, that is to say, giving an account of a conversation at which the means employed to safeguard peace had been examined, might be issued if I approved it. The note communicated was as follows: — "The German Am- bassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs have had a fresh inter- view, in the course of which they sought means of action by the Powers for the maintenance of peace." This phrasing, deliberately colour- less, avoided an appearance of solidarity with Germany which might have been misinterpreted. 1 Note that no engagement is taken to refrain from mobilisation. 2 This last paragraph can refer only to the French Ambassador in Berlin, although the despatch is not*listed as having been sent also to Berlin. 3 French Yellow* Book No. 56 and 57, July 26. 216 Official Diplomatic Documents This morning ^ Herr von Schoen addressed a private letter to the PoHtical Director under pretext of resuming his interview with the ^Minister, and has added : " Note w^ell the phrase in an identical spirit of peaceful co-operation. This is not an idle phrase, but the sincere expression of the truth." The summary annexed to the letter was drawn up as follows : — " The Cabinet of Vienna has, formally and officially, caused it to be declared to that of St. Peters- burgh, that it does not seek any territorial acquisition in Servia, and that it has no intention of making any attempt against the integrity of the kingdom ; its sole intention is that of assuring its own tran- quillity. At this moment the decision whether a European war must break out depends solely on Russia. The German Govern- ment have firm confidence that the French Government, with which they know that they are at one in the warm desire that European peace should be able to be maintained, will use their whole influence with the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh in a pacific spirit." I have let you know the reply ^ which has been given (a French demarche at St. Petersburgh would be misunderstood,^ and must have as corollary a German demarche at Vienna, or, failing that, mediation by the four less interested Powers in both capitals). Herr von Schoen's letter is capable of different interpretations; the most probable is that it has for its object, like his demarche itself, an attempt to compromise France with Russia and, in case of failure, to throw the responsibility for an eventual war on Russia and on France ^ ; finally, by pacific assurances which have not been listened to, to mask military action by Austria in Servia intended to com- plete the success of Austria. I communicate this news to you by way of information and for any useful purpose you can put it to. Bienvenu-Martin. From London French Yellow Book No. 63 M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenii- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, July 21, 1914. The German Ambassador and the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador allow it to be understood that they are sure that England would preserve neutrality if a conflict were to break out. Sir Arthur Nicol- ^ From Russian Orange Book No. 28, July 26, it appears that this declaration was made on July 26. See German White Book 10a, July 26, giving an official German message to France, which is not printed in its entirety in the Yellow Book. * For a similar refusal of Great Britain to exert her conciliatory influence in Petro- grad. see French Yellow Book No. 80, July 28. ' The Times translation says "would have been difficult to explain." This is the more accurate translation. < Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 29, July 26. It seems that the entire French de- spatch refers to events that took place on the previous day. This then is a "rewritten " despatch for the purpose of making the Yellow Book appear to be more complete than it is. July 27, French Yellow Book No. 65 217 son has told me/ however, that Prince Lichnowsky cannot, after the conversation which he has had with him to-day, entertain any doubt as to the freedom which the British Government intended to pre- serve of intervening in case they should judge it expedient. The German Ambassador will not have failed to be struck with this declaration, but to make its weight felt in Germany and to avoid a conflict, it seems indispensable that the latter should be brought to know for certain that they will find England and Russia by the side of France.^ _^ ^ De Fleuriau. From St Petershurgh French Yellow Book No. 64 M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petershurgh, to M. Bien- venu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. St. Petershurgh, July 27, 1914. M. Sazonof has used conciliatory language to all my colleagues. In spite of the public excitement, the Russian Government is applying itself successfully to restraining the press; in particular great moderation towards Germany has been recommended.^ M. Sazonof has not received any information from Vienna or from Berlin since yesterday. t^ ^ '^ Paleologue. From Constantinople French Yellow Book No. 65 M. Bompard, French Ambassador at Constantinople, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Therapia, July 27, 1914. The Austro-Servian conflict holds the attention of the Ottoman Government, and the Turks are delighted at the misfortunes of Servia, but people here generally are led to believe that the conflict will remain localised. It is generally thought that once again Russia will not intervene in favour of Servia in circumstances which would extend the armed conflict. The unanimous feeling in Ottoman political circles is that Austria, with the support of Germany, will attain her objects and that she will make Servia follow Bulgaria and enter into the orbit of the Triple Alliance.^ Bompard. 1 This is not given in the British Blue Book. 2 For the culmination of this wish, see French Yellow Book No. 138, August 2, 1914. 3 But even M. Paleologue does not claim that it was observed. See the Russian press of these days. * This is a very important statement ; especially since no one had ever claimed that Bulgaria had been forced into "the orbit of the Triple Alliance" by unfair or militaristic means. 218 Official Diplomatic Documents From London French Yellow Book No. 66 M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, July 27, 191 If.. Sir Edward Grey ^ told the German Ambassador this morning that if Austria were to invade Servia after the Servian reply, she would make it clear that she was not merely aiming at the settlement of the questions mentioned in her note of July 23, but that she wished to crush a small state. "Then," he added, "a European question would arise, and war would follow in which other Powers would be led to take a part." The attitude of Great Britain is confirmed by the postponement of the demobilisation of the fleet. The First Lord of the Admiralty took this measure quietly on Friday ^ on his own initiative ; to-night. Sir Edward Grey and his colleagues decided to make it public. This result is due to the conciliatory attitude of Servia and Russia. De Fleuriau. From Berlin French Yellow Book No. 67 M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 27, 19U. To-DAY I have had a conversation with the Secretary of State on the proposal by England that Germany should join the Cabinets of London, Paris and Rome to prevent hostilities between St. Peters- burgh and Vienna. I remarked to him that Sir Edward Grey's proposal opened the way to a peaceful issue. Herr von Jagow replied that he was dis- posed to join in, but he remarked to me that, if Russia mobilised, Germany would be obliged to mobilise at once, that we should be forced to the same course also, and that then a conflict would be almost inevitable. I asked him if Germany would regard herself as bound to mobilise in the event of Russia mobilising only on the Aus- trian frontier; he told me "No," and authorised me formally to communicate this limitation to you. He also attached the greatest importance to an intervention with Russia by the Powers which were friendly with and allied to her. Finally, he remarked that if Russia attacked Austria, Germany would be obliged to attack at once on her side. The intervention 1 Cf. British Blue Book No. 46, July 27, 1914. * Friday was July 24 ; cf. Sir E. Grey'^ " to-day," British Blue Book No. 48, July 27, 1914 ; see also Blue Book No. 47, July 27, 1914. For the effect of this admiralty order on Russia and on bringing on the war, see Editorial, Daily News (London), August 1, 1914. July 27, French Yellow Book No, 69 219 proposed by England at St. Petersburgh and Vienna ^ could, in his opinion, only come into operation if events were not precipitated. In that case, he does not despair that it might succeed. I expressed my regret that Austria, by her uncompromising attitude had led Europe to the difficult pass through which we were going, but I expressed the hope that intervention would have its effect. Jules Cambon. From London French Yellow Book No. 68 M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d^ Affaires at London^ to M. Bienwnu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, July 27, 1914. Yesterday in the course of a conversation between M. Sazonof, M. Paleologue and Sir G. Buchanan, the Russian Minister said that Servia was disposed to appeal ^ to the Powers, and that in that case his Government would be prepared to stand aside. Sir E. Grey has taken these words as a text on which to formulate to the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin, and Rome a proposal with which Sir Francis Bertie will acquaint your Excellency. The four Powers would intervene in the dispute, and the French, German, and Italian Ambassadors at London would be instructed to seek, with Sir E. Grey, a means of solving the present difficulties. It would be understood that, during the sittings of this little con- ference, Russia, Austria and Servia would abstain from all active military operations. Sir A. Nicolson has spoken of this suggestion to the German Ambassador, who has shown himself favourable to it. De Fleuriau. From London French Yellow Book No. 69 M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, July 27, 191^. The Servian Minister has not received instructions from his Gov- ernment to ask for the mediation ^ of England ; it is, however, pos- sible that the telegrams from his Government have been stopped on the way. iThis is Sir E. Grey's first plan. The French wish was to have mediation between Vienna and Belgrade. 2 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 61, July 27, and British Blue Book No. 22, July 25, 1914. 3 The proposal of English mediation was one of the many made but never pressed, probably for the reason suggested in French Yellow Book No. 70, same day. The nearest account of something in the nature of such a demand is given in Serbian Blue Book No. 35, July 24 [note the date]. 220 Official Diplomatic Documents However, the British proposal for intervention by the four Powers intimated in my preceding telegram has been put forward, and ought I think to be supported in the first place. j^ ^ To London French Yellow Book No. 70 M. Bienvenu-Martiny Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M, de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London. Paris, July 27, 1914. The British Ambassador has communicated to me Sir E. Grey's proposal ^ for common action by England, Germany, France and Italy at Vienna, Belgrade ^ and St. Petersburgh, to stop active mili- tary operations while the German, Italian and French Ambassadors at London examine, with Sir Edward Grey, the means of finding a solution for the present complications. I have this morning directed M. Jules Cambon to talk this over with the British Ambassador at Berlin, and to support his demarche in whatever form he should judge suitable. I authorise you to take part in the meeting proposed by Sir E. Grey. I am also ready to give to our representatives at Vienna, St. Petersburgh and Belgrade, instructions in the sense asked for by the British Government. At the same time I think that the chances of success of Sir E. Grey's proposal depend essentially on the action that Berlin would be disposed to take at Vienna ; a demarche from this side, promoted with a view to obtain a suspension of military operations, would appear to me doomed to failure if Germany's influence were not first exercised. I have also noted, during Baron Von Schoen's observations, that the Austro-Hungarian Government was particularly susceptible when the words "mediation," "intervention," "conference" were used, and was more willing to admit "friendly advice" and "con- jt Bienvenu-Martin . versations. From London French Yellow Book No. 71 M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, July 27, 1914- I HAVE communicated to Sir Edward Grey your adherence to his proposal for mediation by the four Powers and for a conference at 1 British Blue Book No. 11, July 24 and No. 24, July 25. "Belgrade is not contained in the British proposal, British Blue Book No. 11, July 24. It was, however, France's persistent wish to have mediation between Vienna and Belgrade. July 27, French Yellow Book No. 72 221 London. The British Ambassador at Vienna has received the neces- sary instructions to inform the Austro-Hungarian Government as soon as his French, German, and Italian colleagues are authorised to make the same demarche. The Italian Government have accepted intervention by the four Powers with a view to prevent military operations ; they are con- sulting the German Government on the proposal for a conference and the procedure to be followed with regard to the Austro-Hungarian Government. The German Government have not yet replied. De Fleuriau. From Rome French Yellow Book No. 72 M. BarrerCy French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Rome, July 27, 19U. The Marquis di San Giuliano has returned to Rome this evening, and I saw him immediately after his arrival. He spoke to me of the contents of the Austrian note, and formally assured me that he had not had any previous knowledge of it.^ He knew, indeed, that this note was to have a rigorous and for- cible character ; but he had not suspected that it could take such a form. I asked him if it was true that he had given at Vienna, as certain papers allege, an approval of the Austrian action and an assurance that Italy would fulfil her duties as an ally towards Aus- tria. "In no way :" the Minister replied : "we were not consulted ; we were told nothing ; it was not for us then to make any such com- munication to Vienna." The Marquis di San Giuliano thinks that Servia would have acted more wisely if she had accepted the note in its entirety ; to-day he still thinks that this would be the only thing to do, being convinced that Austria will not withdraw any of her claims, and will maintain them, even at the risk of bringing about a general conflagration ; he doubts whether Germany is disposed to lend herself to any pressure on her ally. He asserts, however, that Germany at this moment attaches great importance to her relations with London,^ and he believes that if any Power can determine Berlin in favour of peaceful action, it is England. As for Italy, she will continue to make every effort in favour of peace. It is with this end in view, that he has adhered without hesitation to Sir Edward Grey's proposal for a meeting in London of the Ambassadors of those Powers which are not directly interested in the Austro-Servian dispute. Barrere 1 It is noteworthy that the Entente diplomats in none of the published despatches doubted the honesty of Italy's denial of having had previous accurate knowledge of the Austrian note. Cf. also French Yellow Book No. 51, July 26. 2 The opponents of Germany have desired to minimize Germany's wish to be on good terms with England. 222 Official Diplomatic Documents From Berlin French Yellow Book No. 73 M. Jules Camhon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 21, 1911^. The British Ambassador, who returned to-day, saw the Secre- tary of State and discussed with him Sir Edward Grey's proposal. In his reply Herr von Jagow continued to manifest his desire for peace, but added that he could not consent to anything which would re- semble a conference of the Powers ; that would be to set up a kind of court of arbitration, the idea of which would only be acceptable if it were asked for by Vienna and St. Petersburgh.^ Herr von Jagow's language confirms that used by Baron von Schoen to your Excellency. In fact, a demarche by the four Powers at Vienna and St. Peters- burgh could be brought about by diplomatic means without assum- ing the form of a conference and it is susceptible of many modifica- tions; the important thing is to make clear at Vienna and at St. Petersburgh the common desire of the four Powers that a conflict should be avoided. A peaceful issue from the present difficulties can only be found by gaining time. j^^^^^ Cambon. From Berlin French Yellow Book No. 74 if. Jules Camhon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 27, 1914. I HAD a conversation to-day with the Secretary of State and gave support to the demarche which Sir E. Goschen had just made. Herr von Jagow replied to me, as he had to the British Ambassa- dor, that he could not accept ^ the proposal that the Italian, French and German Ambassadors should be instructed to endeavour to find with Sir Edward Grey a method of resolving the present difficulties, because that would be to set up a real conference to deal with the affairs of Austria and Russia.^ I replied to Herr von Jagow that I regretted his answer, but that the great object which Sir Edward Grey had in view went beyond any question of form ; that what was important was the co-operation of Great Britain and France with Germany and Italy in a work of peace; that this co-operation could take effect through common demarches at St. Petersburgh and at Vienna,^ that he had often ex- 1 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 70, same day. « Cf. French Yellow Book Nos. 70 and 73, same day. ' See, however, British Blue Book No. 46, same day, where Germany accepts "in principle." * Cf. French Yellow Book No. 73, same day. July 27, French Yellow Book No. 74 223 pressed to me his regret at seeing the two aUied groups always op- posed to one another in Europe ; that there was here an opportunity of proving that there was a European spirit, by shewing four Powers belonging to the two groups acting in common agreement to prevent a conflict. Herr von Jagow evaded the point by saying that Germany had engagements with Austria. I observed to him that the relations of Germany with Vienna were no closer than those of France with Russia/ and that it was he himself who actually was putting the two groups of allies in opposition. The Secretary of State then said to me that he was not refusing to act so as to keep off an Austro-Russian dispute, but that he could not intervene in the Austro-Servian dispute. "The one is the con- sequence of the other," I said, "and it is a question of preventing the appearance of a new factor of such a nature as to lead to inter- vention by Russia." As the Secretary of State persisted in saying that he was obliged to keep his engagements towards Austria, I asked him if he was bound to follow her everywhere with his eyes blindfolded, and if he had taken note of the reply of Servia to Austria which the Servian Charge d'Affaires had delivered to him this morning. "I have not yet had time," he said. "I regret it. You would see that except on some points of detail Servia has yielded entirely. It appears then that, since Austria has obtained the satisfaction which your support has procured for her, you might to-day advise her to be content or to examine with Servia the terms of her reply." As Herr von Jagow gave me no clear reply, I asked him whether Germany wished for war. He protested energetically, saying that he knew what was in my mind, but that it was wholly incorrect. "You must then," I replied, "act consistently. When you read the Servian reply, I entreat you in the name of humanity to weigh the terms in your conscience, and do not personally assume a part of the responsibility for the catastrophe which you are allowing to be pre- pared." Herr von Jagow protested anew, adding that he was ready to join England and France in a common effort, but that it was neces- sary to find a form for this intervention which he could accept, and that the Cabinets must come to an understanding on this point. "For the rest," he added, "direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburgh have been entered upon and are in progress.^ I expect very good results from them and I am hopeful." As I was leaving I told him that this morning I had had the im- pression that the hour of detente had struck, but I now saw clearly that there was nothing in it. He replied that I was mistaken ; that 1 This has been denied by those who have claimed that the Teutonic alliance was practically for aggressive purposes, while the French-Russian alliance was entirely defensive. 2 Sazonof had proposed this conversation ; cf. Russian Orange Book No. 25, July 26, and No. 38, July 27, alsQ French Yellow Book No. 54, July 26 ; also British Blue Book Nos. 55 and 69, July 28. From French Yellow Book No. 54, it appears that Russia had for the time being abandoned the Grey Conference idea, and that the French Ambas- sador to Russia believed Russia's new plan " to be preferable to any other procedure." 224 Official Diplomatic Documents he hoped that matters were on the right road and would perhaps rapidly reach a favourable conclusion. I asked him to take such action in Vienna as would hasten the progress of events, because it was a matter of importance not to allow time for the development in Russia of one of those currents of opinion which carry all before them. In my opinion it would be well to ask Sir Edward Grey, who must have been warned by Sir Edward Goschen of the refusal to his pro- posal in the form in which it was made, to renew it under another form, so that Germany would have no pretext for refusing to asso- ciate herself with it, and would have to assume the responsibilities that belong to her in the eyes of England. Jules Cambon. To Lcmdorif St, Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome French Yellow Book No. 75 M, BienvenvrMartin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome. Paris, July 27, 1914. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador came to see me to hand me a memorandum ^ which amounted to an indictment of Servia ; he was instructed by his Government to state that since Servia had not given a satisfactory reply to the requirements of the Imperial Gov- ernment, the latter found themselves obliged to take strong measures to induce Servia to give the satisfaction and guarantees that are re- quired of her. To-morrow the Austrian Government will take steps to that effect. I asked the Ambassador to acquaint me with the measures con- templated by Austria, and Count Scezsen replied that they might be either an ultimatum, or a declaration of war, or the crossing of the frontier, but he had no precise information on this point. I then called the Ambassador's attention to the fact that Servia had accepted Austria's requirements on practically every point, and that the differences that remained on certain points might vanish with a little mutual goodwill, and with the help of the Powers who wished for peace; by fixing to-morrow as the date for putting her resolution into effect, Austria for the second time was making their co-operation practically impossible, and was assuming a grave respon- sibility in running the risk of precipitating a war the limits of which it was impossible to foresee. I enclose for your information the memorandum that Count Scezsen handed to me. Bienvenu-Martin. 1 The so-called dossier, see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25. It was published only in part in the New York Times translation of the French Yellow Book. Sir E. Grey apparently received the dossier on the same day but gave only a very brief nummary of it in British Blue Book No. 48, July 27. The dossier itself is not printed in the British Blue Book. July 27, German White Book Exhibit 11 225 Enclosure Memorandum of the Austro-Hungarian G(yvernment, handed by Count Scezsen to M. Bienvenur- Martin on July 21, 1914. (See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25.) From Serbia The reply of the Serbian Government to the Austro-Hungarian note was communicated to France on this day, July 27, 1914. See French Yellow Book No. 49, July 25, and for text Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914, except that France did not publish the Austro-Hungarian comment. Germany : From KoTmo German White Book Exhibit 8 Telegram of the Imperial Consulate at Komw to the Chancellor on July 27th, 1914. Kovno has been declared to be in a state of war. From Berne German White Book Exhibit 9 Telegram of the Imperial Minister at Berne to the Chancellor on July 27th, 1914. Have learned reliably that French XlVth corps has discontinued manoeuvres. From St. Petersburgh German White Book Exhibit 11 Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chan- cellor on July 27th, 1914- Military Attache reports a conversation with the Secretary of War. Sasonof has requested the latter to enlighten me on the situation. The Secretary of War has given me his word of honour that no order to mobilise has as yet been issued.^ Though general preparations are being made, no reserves were called and no horses mustered. If Austria crossed the Servian frontier, such military districts as. are directed toward Austria, viz., Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, are to be mobilised. Under no circumstances those on the German frontier, Warsaw, Vilni, St. Petersburg. Peace with Germany was desired very much. Upon my inquiry into the object of mobilisation against 1 The Czar telegraphed to the Emperor on July 30 that mobilisation had been decided upon five days ago, i.e. July 25. Cf. German White Book, Exhibit 23a, July 30. Cf . also British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, note 5. 226 Official Diplomatic Documents Austria he shrugged his shoulders and referred to the diplomats. I told the Secretary that we appreciated the friendly intentions, but considered mobilisation even against Austria as very menacing. To London German White Book Exhibit 12 Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London on July 27th, 19U. We know as yet nothing of a suggestion of Sir Edward Grey's to hold a quadruple conference in London.-^ It is impossible for us to place our ally in his dispute with Servia before a European tribunal. Our mediation must be limited to the danger of an Austro-Russian conflict. To London German White Book Exhibit 15 Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in London on July 27th, 1914. We have at once started the mediation proposal in Vienna in the sense as desired by Sir Edward Grey. We have communicated be- sides to Count Berchtold the desire of M. Sasonof for a direct parley with Vienna.^ Great Britain : From Vienna British Blue Book No. 41 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 27.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 27, 1914. I HAVE had conversations with all my colleagues representing the Great Powers. The impression left on my mind is that the Austro- Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable ; that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved to have war with Servia ; that they consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake; and that until punishment has been administered to Servia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation. This country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Servia, and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a great disappointment. ^ Apparently antedates British Blue Book No. 43, and French Yellow Book No. 67, July 27. 2 Apparently sent in reply to conversation between Mr. von Jagow and the British Ambassador. British Blue Book No. 43, same day. Cf. also British Blue Book No. 46, same day. July 27, British Blue Booh No, 43 227 I propose, subject to any special directions you desire to send me, to express to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs the hope of His Majesty's Government that it may yet be possible to avoid war, and to ask his Excellency whether he can not suggest a way out even now. From Paris British Blue Book No. 42 Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 27.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 27, 1914. Your proposal,^ as stated in your two telegrams of yesterday, is accepted by the French Government. French Ambassador in London, who returns there this evening, has been instructed ac- cordingly. Instructions have been sent to the French Ambassador at Berlin to concert with his British colleague as to the advisability of their speaking jointly to the German Government. Necessary instructions have also been sent to the French representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh, but until it is known that the Germans have spoken at Vienna with some success, it would, in the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, be dangerous for the French, Russian, and British Ambassadors to do so. From Berlin British Blue Book No. 43 Sir B. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 27.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 27, 1914. Your telegram of 26th July.^ Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practi- cally amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not therefore fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to co-operate for the maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that repre- sentatives of the foui* nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He main- tained, however, that such a conference as you proposed was not practicable. He added that news he had just received from St. Petersburgh showed that there was an intention on the part of M. de Sazoribf^ to exchange views with Count Berchtold.^ He thought 1 The official version prints here as a footnote "Nos. 36 and 37." These two despatches contained different proposals as explained above in note 1 to British Blue Book No. 37, July 26. . ^^ . , ^, ^ , 2 British Blue Book No. 36, July 26 according to footnote m Official Blue Book. Cf., however, British Blue Book No. 46, where Germany accepts the offer of No. 37. See notes on Nos. 36 and 37, July 26, 1914. ' Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. . ^ -r^ , ^.r < Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 25, July 26, 1914. 228 Official Diplomatic Documents that this method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result^ and that it would be best, before doing anything else, to await out- come of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian Governments. In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said that as yet Austria was only partially mobilising, but that if Russia mo- bilised against Germany latter would have to follow suit. I asked him what he meant by "mobilising against Germany." He said that if Russia only mobilised in south, Germany would not mobilise, but if she mobilised in north, Germany would have to do so too, and Russian system of mobilisation was so complicated that it might be difficult exactly to locate her mobilisation. Germany would therefore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise. Finally, Secretary of State said that news from St. Petersburgh had caused him to take more hopeful view of the general situation.^ From St. Petersburgh British Blue Book No. 44 Sir G. Bux^hanariy British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 27.) (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 27, 1914. Austrian Ambassador tried, in a long conversation which he had yesterday^ with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to explain away objectionable features of the recent action taken by the Austro- Hungarian Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that, although he perfectly understood Austria's motives, the ultima- tum had been so drafted that it could not possibly be accepted as a whole by the Servian Government. Although the demands were reasonable enough in some cases, others not only could not possibly be put into immediate execution seeing that they entailed revision of existing Servian laws, but were, moreover, incompatible with Servia's dignity as an independent State. It would be useless for Russia to offer her good offices at Belgrade, in view of the fact that she was the object of such suspicion in Austria. In order, however, to put an end to the present tension, he thought that England and Italy might be willing to collaborate with Austria.^ The Austrian 1 Cf. German White Book, Exhibit No. 5, July 26. 2 July 26, Russian Orange Book No. 25, July 26. French Yellow Book No. 54, July 26. ' This is a new proposal added to the others that had been offered : (o) Sir Edward Grey's various conference plans, (6) Sazonof's plan to substitute for the Conference direct conversation with Vienna. This last proposal, according to Sir G. Buchanan, was made by Sazonof to the Austrian Ambassador, This was, however, not the case. See Sazonof's report of the interview, Russian Orange Book No. 25, July 26, and the French Ambassador's report, French Yellow Book No. 54, same day, and the Austrian Ambassador's report, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 31, July 27. From French Yellow Book No. 52, July 26, it appears that this proposal may have been made to the Italian Ambassador. It was directly made to Rome by Sazonof in Russian Orange Book No. 23, July 26. From this despatch, where Italy is urged to adopt a definitely unfavourable attitude, it is clear that the proposal was not bona fide, which may be the reason why Sir E. Grey did not accept it. The prominent fact of the entire in- vestigation is that Sir G. Buchanan's despatch is inaccurate. July 27, British Blue Book No. 46 229 Ambassador undertook to communicate his Excellency's remarks to his Government. On the Minister for Foreign Affairs questioning me, I told him that I had correctly defined the attitude of His Majesty's Government in my conversation with him, which I reported in my telegram of the 24th instant.^ I added that you could not promise to do anything more, and that his Excellency was mistaken if he believed that the cause of peace could be promoted by our telling the German Govern- ment that they would have to deal with us as well as with Russia and France if they supported Austria by force of arms.^ Their atti- tude would merely be stiffened by such a menace, and we could only induce her to use her influence at Vienna to avert war by approaching her in the capacity of a friend who was anxious to preserve peace. His Excellency must not, if our efforts^ were to be successful, do anything to precipitate a conflict. In these circumstances I trusted that the Russian Government would defer mobilisation ukase for as long as possible, and that troops would not be allowed to cross the frontier even when it was issued. In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that until the issue of the Imperial ukase no effective steps towards mobilisation could be taken, and the Austro-Hungarian Government would profit by delay in order to complete her military preparations if it was deferred too long. From St. Petersburgh British Blue Book No. 45 Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 27.) (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 27, 1914. Since my conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as reported in my telegram of to-day,^ I understand that his Excellency has proposed that the modifications to be introduced into Austrian demands should be the subject of direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburgh. To Berlin British Blue Book No. 46 Sir Edward Grey to Sir B. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Ofwe, July 27, 1914^ German Ambassador has informed me that German Government accept in principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the 1 See No. 6, July 24, 1914. 2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, 1914. 3 What these efforts were, to preserve peace with dignity for all, or to force Austria- Hungary to submit, is not stated. * See No. 44. 230 Official Diplomatic Documents four Powers/ reserving, of course, their right as an ally to help Austria if attacked. He has also been instructed ^ to request me to use influence in St. Petersburgh to localise the war and to keep up the peace of Europe. I have replied that the Servian reply went farther than could have been expected to meet the Austrian demands. German Secretary of State has himself said that there were some things in the Austrian note that Servia could hardly be expected to accept.^ I assumed that Servian reply could not have gone as far as it did unless Russia had exercised conciliatory influence at Belgrade, and it was really at Vienna that moderating influence was now required. If Austria put the Servian reply aside as being worth nothing and marched into Servia, it meant that she was determined to crush Servia at all costs, being reckless of the consequences that might be involved. Servian reply should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause. I said German Government should urge this at Vienna."^ I recalled what German Government had said as to the gravity of the situation if the w^ar could not be localised, and observed that if Germany assisted Austria against Russia it would be because, with- out any reference to the merits of the dispute, Germany could not afford to see Austria crushed.^ Just so other issues might be raised that would supersede the dispute between Austria and Servia, and would bring other Powers in, and the war would be the biggest ever known; but as long as Germany would work to keep the peace I would keep closely in touch. I repeated that after the Servian reply it was at Vienna that some moderation must be urged. To St. Petersburgh British Blue Book No. 47 Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Bv^hanariy British Ambassador at St. Peters- burgh. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 27, 1914. See my telegram of to-day to Sir E. Goschen.® I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand aside. His Excellency deplored the effect that such an impression must produce.^ 1 Cf . German White Book Exhibit 15, July 27, in reply to British Blue Book No. 43, July 27, 1914. » This further instruction is not printed in the German White Book. • Confirmation of such a remark by Mr. von Jagow would be valuable. * Germany complied with this request ; cf . British Blue Book No. 67, July 28. ' This is a clear reference to one danger threatening Austria-Hungary. The otner danger of losing her prestige as a big Power if she failed to punish Serbian intrigues is often mentioned in the despatches. « The ofl&cial British version prints this footnote: "See No. 46." In first edition the reference was given as No. 37. ' Cf . British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, where Sazonof hopes that England "would not fail to proclaim her solidarity with Russia and France." Germany and Austria con- tinued to believe until July 29 that England would not do so ; cf . British Blue Book No. 106, July 30, where the British Ambassador in Rome states that "Germany was now July 27, British Blue Book No. 48 231 This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland, not to disperse for manoeuvre leave. But I explained to the Russian Ambassador that my reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was promised.^ We hear from German and Austrian sources that they believe Russia will take no action so long as Austria agrees not to take Servian territory.^ I pointed this out, and added that it would be absurd if we were to appear more Servian than the Russians ^ in our dealings with the German and Austrian Governments. To Vienna British Blue Book No. 48 Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna. Sir, Foreign Office, July 27, 1914. Count Mensdorff ^ told me by instruction ^ to-day that the Servian Government had not accepted the demands which the Austrian Government were obliged to address to them in order to secure permanently the most vital Austrian interests. Servia showed that she did not intend to abandon her subversive aims, tending to- wards continuous disorder in the Austrian frontier territories and their final disruption from the Austrian Monarchy. Very reluctantly, and against their wish, the Austrian Government were compelled to take more severe measures to enforce a fundamental change of the attitude of enmity pursued up to now by Servia. As the British Government knew, the Austrian Government had for many years endeavoured to find a way to get on with their turbulent neighbour, though this had been made very difficult for them by the continuous provocations of Servia. The Serajevo murder had made clear to everyone what disposed to give more conciliatory advice to Austria as she seemed convinced that we should act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid issue with us." Cf. also British Blue Book No. 80, July 29, and French Yellow Book No. 96, July 29. 1 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 66, July 27, where it is stated that the fleet was kept mobilised on July 24. See also letter by Admiral Lord Fisher, New York Evening Sun and Milwaukee Free Press, April 19, 1915, "Mobilisation of the fleet before the war on the innocent pretext of an expected visit from the king." 2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 33, July 26. 3 Cf. British Blue Book No. 78, July 29, where Sazonof says he could not be "more Servian than Ser\'ia." * Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. ^ What follows is a very brief summary in general terms of the dossier, Austro- Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25. This was received in Paris on July 27 ; see French Yellow Book No. 75, of that date. In Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 39, July 28, it is stated that the dossier had been sent by post, "das Ihnen auf dem Postwege iibermittelte Dossier." And from French Yellow Book No. 75, July 27, it appears that it had been sent early enough to be presented in Paris on July 27. Such documents are generally sent to be presented simultaneously at the various Foreign ofl&ces. It is, therefore, practically certain that the dossier was presented also in London on July 27. The official Enghsh translation "which is being sent to you by post" conveys the wrong impression that the document could not have been in London on July 27. It is noteworthy that Sir E. Grey did not print the whole dossier anywhere in the British Blue Book, while he even stated in the Preface to the Blue Book edition of Sept. 28, 1914, that he "did not receive any state- ment of the evidence on which Austria had founded her ultimatum till the 7th August." See also note 1 to the dossier, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25, and the Instructions to the several Ambassadors. 232 Official Diplomatic Documents appalling consequences the Servian propaganda had already produced and what a permanent threat to Austria it involved. We would understand that the Austrian Government must consider that the moment had arrived to obtain, by means of the strongest pressure, guarantees for the definite suppression of the Servian aspirations and for the security of peace and order on the southeastern frontier of Austria. As the peaceable means to this effect were exhausted, the iVustrian Government must at last appeal to force. They had not taken this decision without reluctance. Their action, which had no sort of aggressive tendency, could not be represented otherwise than as an act of self-defence. Also they thought that they would serve a European interest if they prevented Servia from being henceforth an element of general unrest such as she had been for the last ten years. The high sense of justice of the British nation and of British states- men could not blame the Austrian Government if the latter defended by the sword what was theirs, and cleared up their position with a country whose hostile policy had forced upon them for years measures so costly as to have gravely injured Austrian national prosperity. Finally, the Austrian Government, confiding in their amicable re- lations with us, felt that they could count on our sympathy in a fight that was forced on them, and on our assistance in localising the fight, if necessary. Count Mensdorff added on his own account that, as long as Servia was confronted with Turkey, Austria never took very severe measures because of her adherence to the policy of the free development of the Balkan States. Now that Servia had doubled her territory and popu- lation without any Austrian interference, the repression of Servian subversive aims was a matter of self-defence and self-preservation on Austria's part. He reiterated that Austria had no intention of taking Servian territory or aggressive designs against Servian territory.^ I said that I could not understand the construction ^ put by the Austrian Government upon the Servian reply, and I told Count Mens- dorff the substance of the conversation that I had had with the Ger- man Ambassador this morning about that reply. Count Mensdorff admitted that, on paper, the Servian reply might seem to be satisfactory ; but the Servians had refused the one thing — the co-operation of Austrian officials and police — which would be real guarantee that in practice the Servians would not carry on their subversive campaign against Austria. I said that it seemed to me as if the Austrian Government believed that, even after the Servian reply, they could make war upon Servia anyhow, without risk of bringing Russia into the dispute. If they could make war on Servia and at the same time satisfy Russia, well and good ^ ; but, if not, the consequences would be incalculable. I pointed out to him that I quoted this phrase from an expression of the views of the German Government. I feared that it would be * Cf. note No. 3 to the previous despatch. * Cf. note to British Blue Book No. 39 under date of July 26. ' Sir E. Grey here expresses an idea contrary to that often mentioned, viz. that England was the protector of the little nations. July 27, Russian Orange Book No. 31 233 expected in St. Petersburgh that the Servian reply would diminish the tension, and now, when Russia found that there was increased tension, the situation would become increasingly serious. Already the effect on Europe was one of anxiety. I pointed out that our fleet was to have dispersed to-day,^ but we had felt unable to let it dis- perse. We should not think of calling up reserves at this moment, and there was no menace in what we had done about our fleet ; but, owing to the possibility of a European conflagration, it was im- possible for us to disperse our forces at this moment. I gave this as an illustration of the anxiety that was felt. It seemed to me that the Servian reply already involved the greatest humiliation to Servia that I had ever seen a country undergo,^ and it was very disappointing to me that the reply was treated by the Austrian Government as if it were as unsatisfactory as a blank negative. I am, etc. E. Grey. To Rome British Blue Book No. 49 Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome. Sir, Foreign Office, July 21, 1914.. The Italian Ambassador informed Sir A. Nicolson ^ to-day that the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed entirely with my proposal for a conference of four to be held in London. As regards the question of asking Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Servia to suspend military operations pending the result of the con- ference, the Marquis di San Giuliano ^ would recommend the sugges- tion warmly to the German Government, and would enquire what procedure they would propose should be followed at Vienna. I am, etc. E. Grey. British Blue Book No. 39 Reply of Serbian Government to Austro-Hungarian note (communicated by the Serbian Minister, July 27) . See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27. Russia : From London Russian Orange Book No. 31 Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) London, July 14 (27), 1914. I HAVE received your telegram of the 13th (26th) July.^ Please inform me by telegraph whether you consider that your direct dis- 1 Cf. note 2 to British Blue Book No. 47, July 27. 2 With this "humiliation" of Serbia compare the fate in recent years of Persia, Morocco, Corea, and other small nations. 3 British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. * Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. ^ Not printed in Russian Orange Book. 234 Official Diplomatic Documents cussions ^ with the Vienna Cabinet harmonise with Grey's scheme for mediation by the four Governments. Having heard from the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that you would be prepared to accept such a combination, Grey decided to turn it into an official proposal, which he communicated yesterday to Berlin, Paris, and Rome.^ To Paris and London Russian Orange Book No. 32 Ruissian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at Paris and London. ^Saint-Petershourg, (Telegraphique.) le H {27) juillet, 1914. L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre est venu s'informer si nous jugeons utile que TA^igleterre prenne I'initiative de convoquer a Londres une conference des representants de I'Angleterre, la France, I'Allemagne et I'ltalie, pour etudier une issue a la situation actuelle. J'ai repondu a TAmbassadeur que j'ai entame des pourparlers avec I'Ambassadeur d'Autriche- Hongrie, en conditions que j'es- pere favorables. Pourtant je n'ai pas encore re^u de reponse a la proposition que j'ai faite d'une revision de la note entre les deux Cabinets. Si des explications directs avec le Cabinet de Vienne se trou- vaient irrealisables, je suis pret a accepter la proposition anglaise, ou toute autre de nature a resoudre favorablement le conflit. Je voudrais pourtant ecarter des aujourd'hui un malentendu qui pourrait surgir de la reponse (Translation.) St. Petershurgh, (Telegraphic.) July 27, 1914. The British Ambassador came to ascertain whether we think it desirable that Great Britain should take the initiative in con- voking a conference in London of the representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy to examine the possibility of a way out of the present situa- tion. I replied to the Ambassador that I have begun conversations with the Austro-Hungarian Am- bassador under conditions which, I hope, may be favourable. I have not, however, received as yet any reply to the proposal made by me for revising the note between the two Cabinets. If direct explanations with the Vienna Cabinet were to prove impossible, I am ready to accept the British proposal, or any other proposal of a kind that would bring about a favourable solu- tion of the conflict. I wish, however, to put an end from this day forth to a mis- understanding which might arise 1 See Orange Book No. 25, July 26 ; No, 38, July 27, and French Yellow Book No. 64, July 27. Sazonof had made the proposals of direct discussions of the Austrian note to Serbia on July 27, and on July 28 had not yet heard from Vienna. For a re- view of this whole subject see the note to British Blue Book No. 67, July 28. * British Blue Book Nos. 36, 37, July 26, also Nos. 43 and 57, July 27. July 27, Russian Orange Book No. 35 235 donnee par le Ministre de la from the answer given by the Justice fran9ais a I'Ambassadeur French Minister of Justice to the d'Allemagne, concernant des con- German Ambassador, regarding seils de moderation a donner au counsels of moderation to be Cabinet Imperial. given to the Imperial Cabinet. (To Paris, London, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome Russian Orange Book No. 33 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at Paris, London, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome. (Telegram.) St. Petersburg, July U (27), 1914. I HAVE taken note of the reply ^ returned by the Servian Govern- ment to Baron Giesl. It exceeds all our expectations in its modera- tion, and in its desire to afford the fullest satisfaction to Austria. We do not see what further demands could be made by Austria, unless the Vienna Cabinet is seeking for a pretext for war with Serviac From Paris Russian Orange Book No. 34 Russian Charge d' Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Paris, July U (27), 19U. The German Ambassador discussed the situation again to-day at great length with the Director of the Political Department. The Ambassador laid great stress on the utter impossibility of any media- tion or conference.^ From Paris Russian Orange Book No. 35 Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Paris, July U (27), 1914. I DISCUSSED the situation with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the presence of Berthelot, directly after my return to Paris. They both confirmed the information respecting the action taken by the German Ambassador,^ which Sevastopoulo has already tele- graphed to you. This morning Baron von Schoen confirmed his declaration of yesterday in writing, i.e. : 1. That Austria has declared to Russia that she seeks no territorial acquisitions and that she harbours no designs against the integrity of Servia. Her sole object is to secure her own peace and quiet. 1 See note to British Blue Book No. 39, under date of July 26. 2 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 61, July 27. 3 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 61, July 27. 236 Official Diplomatic Documents 2. That consequently it rests with Russia to avoid war. 3. That Germany and France, entirely at one in their ardent desire to preserve peace, should exercise their moderating influence upon Russia. Baron von Schoen laid special emphasis on the expression of soli- darity of Germany and France. The Minister of Justice is convinced that these steps on the part of Germany are taken with the evident object of alienating Russia and France, t)f inducing the French Government to make representations at St. Petersburg, and of thus compromising our ally in our eyes ; and finally, in the event of war, of throwing the responsibility not on Germany, who is ostensibly mak- ing every effort to maintain peace, but on Russia and France. From Paris Russian Orange Book No. 36 Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Paris, July 14 {27), 1914. It is clear from your telegrams ^ of the 13th (26) July that you were not then aware of the reply of the Servian Government. The tele- gram from Belgrade informing me of it also took twenty hours ^ to reach us. The telegram from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, sent the day before yesterday at 11 o'clock in the morning, at the special urgent rate, which contained instructions to support our representations, only reached its destination at 6 o'clock. There is no doubt that this telegram was intentionally delayed by the Austrian telegraph office. From Paris Russian Orange Book No. 37 Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Paris, July 14 {27), 1914. On the instructions of his Government, the Austrian Ambassador has informed the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that Servians answer has not been considered satisfactory in Vienna, and that to-morrow, Tuesday, Austria will proceed to take "energetic action" with the object of forcing Servia to give the necessary guarantees. The Minister having asked what form such action would take, the Ambas- sador replied that he had no exact information on the subject, but it might mean either the crossing of the Servian frontier, or an ultima- tum, or even a declaration of war. * Not printed in either the French Yellow Book or the Russian Orange Book. ' It also reached the French Government with a delay of twenty hours. Cf . French YeUow Book No. 56, July 26. July 27 y Russian Orange Book No. Jfi 237 From Berlin Russian Orange Book No. 38 Russian Charge d' Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Berlin, July U (27), 1914. I BEGGED the Minister for Foreign Affairs to support your proposal in Vienna that Szapary should be authorised to draw up, by means of a private exchange of views with you, a wording of the Austro-Hun- garian demands which would be acceptable to both parties. Jagow answered that he was aware of this proposal and that he agreed with Pourtales that, as Szapary had begun this conversation, he might as well go on with it. He will telegraph in this sense to the German Ambassador at Vienna. I begged him to press Vienna with greater insistence to adopt this conciliatory line; Jagow answered that he could not advise Austria to give way. From Berlin Russian Orange Book No. 39 Russian Charge d^ Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Berlin, July 14 {27), 1914. Before my visit to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day his Excellency had received the French Ambassador, who endeavoured to induce him to accept the British proposal for action in favour of peace, such action to be taken simultaneously at St. Petersburgh and at Vienna by Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and France. Cambon suggested that these Powers should give their advice to Vienna in the following terms : " To abstain from all action which might aggravate the existing situation." {S'abstenir de tout acte qui pourrait aggraver la situation de Vheure actuelle.) By adopting this vague formula, all mention of the necessity of refraining from invading Servia might be avoided. Jagow refused point-blank to accept this suggestion ^ in spite of the entreaties of the Ambassador, who emphasised, as a good feature of the suggestion, the mixed grouping of the Powers, thanks to which the opposition between the Alliance and the Entente — a matter of which Jagow himself had often complained — was avoided. To Serbia Russian Orange Book No. 40 Telegram from His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia to His Royal Highness Prince Alexander of Serbia, July 14 (27), 1914- When your Royal Highness applied to me at a time of especial stress, you were not mistaken in the sentiments which I entertain for you, or in my cordial sympathy with the Servian people. 1 For von Jagow's reasons see French Yellow Book No. 74, July 27, also Austro- Hungarian Red Book No. 35, July 28. 238 Official Diplomatic Documents The existing situation is engaging my most serious attention, and my Government are using their utmost, endeavour to smooth away the present difficulties. I have no doubt that your Highness and the Royal Servian Government wish to render that task easy by neglecting no step which might lead to a settlement, and thus both prevent the horrors of a new war and safeguard the dignity of Servia. From Vienna Russian Orange Book No. 41 Russian Ambassador at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Vienna, July I4 (^7), 1914. The Minister for Foreign Affairs is away. During a long conver- sation which I had with Macchio to-day I drew his attention, in a perfectly friendly way, to the unfavourable impression produced in Russia by the presentation of demands by Austria to Servia, which it was quite impossible for any independent State, however small, to accept. I added that this method of procedure might lead to the most undesirable complications, and that it had aroused profound surprise and general condemnation in Russia. We can only suppose that Austria, influenced by the assurances given by the German Representative at Vienna, who has egged her on throughout this crisis, has counted on the probable localisation of the dispute with Servia, and on the possibility of inflicting with impunity a serious blow upon that country. The declaration by the Russian Government that Russia could not possibly remain indifferent in the face of such con- duct has caused a great sensation here. From London Russian Orange Book No. 42 Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign A fairs. (Telegram.) London, July I4 {27), 1914. Grey has just informed the German Ambassador, who came to question him as to the possibility of taking action at St. Peters- burg, that such action ought rather to be taken at Vienna, and that the Berlin Cabinet were the best qualified to do so. Grey also pointed out that the Servian reply to the Austrian note had exceeded anything that could have been expected in moderation and in its spirit of conciliation. Grey added that he had therefore come to the conclusion that Russia must have advised Belgrade to return a moderate reply, and that he thought the Servian reply could form the basis of a peaceful and acceptable solution of the question. July 27, Serbian Blue Book No. 43 239 In these circumstances, continued Grey, if Austria were to begin hostilities in spite of that reply, she would prove her intention of crushing Servia. Looked at in this light, the question might give rise to a situation which might lead to a war in which all the Powers would be involved Grey finally declared that the British Government were sincerely anxious to act with the German Government as long as the preser- vation of peace was in question ; but, in the contrary event. Great Britain reserved to herself full liberty of action. Serbia: From St. Petersburg Serbian Blue Book No. 43 His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia to His Royal Highness the Crotvn Prince of Serbia. (Telegraphic.) Petrograd, July 14/27, 1914. [See Russian Orange Book No. 40, July 27.] 240 Official Diplomatic Documents Tuesday, July 28, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary Belgrade, Beriin, London, St. Petersburg!! Beriin, Tokio Belgium Vienna France London, Berlin, St. Peters- Vienna, London, Ber- burgh, Vienna, Rome, lin, St. Petersburgh, Viviani Viviani Germany German Governments, St. Peter sburgh Emperor to Czar Vienna Great Britain BerUn, St. Petersburgh Paris, St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Rome, Ber- lin, Nish, French and Russian Embassies Russia London Fiume, Vienna, Berlin Serbia All Serbian legations St. Petersburgh Vienna Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia and endeavours to explain her point of view to England most especially, but also to Russia. Russia's extensive mobilisa- tion results in Austria-Hungary calling on Germany for assistance and urging her to use toward Russia "unambiguous language." Sir E. Grey's proposal trans- mitted by Germany is declared to have come too late. France is resolved to support English and -Russian proposals but persists in claiming that mediation should not be between Vienna and Petrograd alone, but include Belgrade. She views with suspicion every act and statement of Germany, and refuses to announce that she and Germany had agreed to work for peace. She also refuses to use a moderating influence on Russia. Germany : The Chancellor informs the Federal Governments of the serious state of affairs, expressing the hope to be able to maintain peace but announcing it as the duty of Germany to support Austria-Hungary, if ** through the interference of Russia the fire " should be spread. At the same time she urges Austria-Hungary to come to an uniderstanding with Russia. The Emperor' personally appeals to the Czar in the interest of peace. Great Britain declares that she would find it embarrassing to give Russia "pacific advice." She also does not follow up the advice sent by the British Ambassador in Rome to the effect that "Serbia may be induced to accept note in its entirety on the advice of the four Powers." Her own conference proposal she "w^ould suspend" in favor of Russia's proposal of direct conversations with Vienna. Sir E. Grey even made an alternate proposal, which Germany trans- mitted to Vienna, but which is not mentioned either in the British Blue Book or the French Yellow Book. (See German White Book, Exhibit 16.) Russia announces the failure of direct conversations with Vienna at the very moment when Sir E. Grey suspends his proposal, and disregarding Sir E. Grey's conference plan calls for English mediation, apparently between Vienna and Belgrade, which was France's suggestion. Serbia, according to the uncontradicted statement of Vienna (British Blue Book No. 56, under date of July 28) opens hostihties, and asks Russia for help, assuring the latter of her loyalty. July 28, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 38 241 Austria-Hungary : From Berlin Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 35 Count Szdgyeny to Count Berchtold, (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 28, 1914. The proposal for mediation made by Great Britain, that Germany, Italy, Great Britain and France should meet at a conference at London, is declined ^ so far as Germany is concerned on the ground that it is impossible for Germany to bring her Ally before a European Court in her settlement with Servia. From Tokio Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 36 Freiherr Von Milller to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) Tokio, July 28, 1914. To-day's semi-officialJapan Times contains a leading article which concludes by saying that Japan is on the best possible terms with the three Great Powers concerned — Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia — while it is in no way interested in Servia. In the case of war, the Imperial Government would, as a matter of course, main- tain the strictest neutrality. To Belgrade Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 37 Count Berchtold to the Royal Servian Foreign Office at Belgrade. ( Trans- lated from the French.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914- The Royal Servian Government not having answered in a satis- factory manner the note of 23rd July presented by the Austro-Hun- garian Minister at Belgrade, the Imperial and Royal Government are themselves compelled to see to the safeguarding of their rights and interests, and, with this object, to have recourse to force of arms. Austria-Hungary consequently considers herself henceforward in a state of war ^ with Servia. To Berlin Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 38 Count Berchtold to Count Szdgyeny in Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914^ For Your Excellency's information and for communication to the Secretary of State : — 1 Cf. British Blue Book No. 43, July 27. For a later agreement see British Blue Book No. 46, July 27, and German White Book, Exhibits 12 and 15, July 27. 2 For the Austro-Hungarian note announcing to the Powers that war had been, declared, see British Blue Book No. 50, July 28. R 242 Official Diplomatic Documents I have received the following telegram from Count Mensdorff^ dated the 27th inst. : — " I have to-day had the opportunity of explaining at length to Sir Edward Grey, that our action is not one of aggression but of self- defence and of self-preservation, and that we have no intention of making any territorial acquisition, or of destroying Servian independ- ence.^ What we desire is to obtain a certain measure of satisfaction for what has passed, and guarantees for the future. For this purpose I availed myself of some of the points out of Your Excellency's communications to Count Szapary. Sir E. Grey said to me that he was very much disappointed that we were treating the Servian answer as if it were a complete refusal. He had believed that this answer would furnish a basis on which the four other Governments could arrive at a peaceful solution. This was his idea when he proposed a conference. The conference would meet on the assumption that Austria-Hun- gary as well as Russia would refrain from every military operation during the attempt of the other Powers to find a peaceful issue. (The declaration of Sir E. Grey in the House of Commons to-day amplifies the project of a conference.) When he spoke of our refrain- ing from military operations against Servia, I observed that I feared that it was perhaps already too late. The Secretary of State ex- pressed the view that if we were resolved under any circumstances to go to war with Servia, and if we assumed that Russia would remain quiet, we were taking a great risk. If we could induce Russia to remain quiet, he had nothing more to say on the question. ^ If we could not, the possibilities and the dangers were incalculable. As a symptom of the feeling of unrest he told me that the British Grand Fleet, which was concentrated in Portsmouth after the manoeuvres, and which should have dispersed to-day,^ would for the present remain there. ''We had not called up any Reserves, but as they are assembled, we cannot at this moment send them home again." His idea of a conference had the aim of preventing, if possible, a collision between the Great Powers, and he also aimed at the isolation of the conflict. If, therefore, Russia mobilises and Germany takes action, the conference necessarily breaks down. I believe that I need not specially point out to Your Excellency that Grey's proposal for a conference, in so far as it relates to our conflict with Servia, appears, in view of the state of war which has arisen, to have been outstripped by events. 1 British Blue Book No. 48, July 27. 2 This is a refutation of the popular claim that Great Britain went to war in part oq Serbia's account, to vindicate the rights of the little nations. » This refers to the interview of July 27. See British Blue Book No. 48. July 28, AustrO'Hungarian Red Book No. Jfi 243 To London AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 39 Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. We attach the greatest importance to the point that Sir E. Grey should appreciate in an impartial manner our action against Servia in general, and in particular our refusal to accept the Servian answer, and I therefore ask Your Excellency to take the opportunity of ex- plaining to the Secretary of State in detail the dossier which is being ^ sent to you by post, and that you will emphasise the specially salient passages ; in the same sense Your Excellency should discuss with Sir E. Grey the critical observations on the Servian note (the text of the note without observations has been sent to Your Excellency by post yesterday), ^ and you should make clear to him that the offer of Servia to meet points in our note was only an apparent one, intended to deceive Europe without giving any guarantee for the future. As the Servian Government knew that only an unconditional ac- ceptance of our demands could satisfy us, the Servian tactics can easily be seen through : Servia accepted a number of our demands, with all sorts of reservations, in order to impress public opinion in Europe, trusting that she would not be required to fulfil her promises. In conversing with Sir E. Grey your Excellency should lay special emphasis on the circumstance that the general mobilisa- tion of the Servian army was ordered for the afternoon of the 25th July at 3 o'clock, while the answer to our note was delivered just before the expiration of the time fixed, that is to say, a few minutes before 6 o'clock. Up to then we had no military preparations, but by the Servian mobilisation w^e were compelled to do so. To St. Petersburgh AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 40 Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburgh. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. For your Excellency's information and guidance : The Imperial Russian Ambassador spoke to me to-day in order to inform me of his return from short leave in Russia, and at the same time to execute a telegraphic instruction of M. Sazonof . The latter had informed him that he had had a lengthy and friendly discussion with your Excellency (your Excellency's telegram of the 27th in- stant),^ in the course of which he had discussed with great readiness 1 This is a wrong translation ; it should read, "which has been despatched to you," and is so translated in the English translation issued by the Austro-Hungarian Gov- ernment. 2 Neither the dossier nor the Austro-Hungarian comments on the Serbian note were printed in the British Blue Book, although the Serbian reply was printed in No. 39 before No. 40 which is a telegram of July 26. For the reason why this Serbian reply is printed in this edition among the July 27 despatches, see note to British Blue Book No. 39, under date of July 26. 3 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 31, July 27. 244 Official Diplomatic Documents the various points of the Servian answer. M. Sazonof was of the opinion that Servia had gone far in meeting our wishes, but that some of the demands appeared to him entirely unacceptable, a fact which he had not concealed from your Excellency. It appeared to him under these circumstances that the Servian reply might properly be regarded as furnishing a starting point for an understanding to attain which the Russian Government would gladly lend a hand. M. Sazonof therefore desired to propose to me that the exchange of ideas with your Excellency should be continued, and that your Excellency should receive instructions with this end in view. In reply, I emphasised my inability to concur in such a proposal. No one in our country could understand, nor could anyone approve negotiations with reference to the wording used in the answer which we had designated as unsatisfactory. This was all the more im- possible because, as the Ambassador knew, there was a deep feeling of general excitement which had already mastered public opinion. Moreover, on our side war had to-day been declared against Servia. In reply to the explanations of the Ambassador, which culminated in asserting that we should not in any way suppress the admitted hostile opinion in Servia by a warlike action, but that, on the contrary we should only increase it, I gave him some insight into our present relations towards Servia which made it necessary, quite against our will, and without any selfish secondary object, for us to show our rest- less neighbour, with the necessary emphasis, our firm intention not to permit any longer a movement which was allowed to exist by the Government, and which was directed against the existence of the Monarchy. The attitude of Servia after the receipt of our note had further not been calculated to make a peaceful solution possible, because Servia, even before she transmitted to us her unsatisfactory reply, had ordered a general mobilisation, and in so doing had already committed a hostile act against us. In spite of this, however, we had waited for three days. Yesterday hostilities were opened against us on the Hungarian frontier on the part of Servia. By this act we were deprived of the possibility of maintaining any longer the patience which we had shown towards Servia. The establishment of a funda- mental but peaceful amelioration of our relations towards Servia had now been made impossible, and we were compelled to meet the Servian provocation in the only form which in the given circumstances was consistent with the dignity of the Monarchy. To London AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 41 Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914, The British Ambassador, who discussed matters with me to-day has, in accordance with his instructions, explained the attitude of Sir E. Grey with regard to our conflict with Servia as follows : — July 28, Amtro-Hungarian Red Book No. 4I 245 The British Government have followed the previous course of events during the crisis with lively interest, and they attach im- portance to giving us an assurance that they entertain sympathy for us in the point of view we have adopted, and that they completely understand the grievances which we have against Servia. If England has no ground for making our dispute with Servia in itself an object of special consideration, nevertheless this question can- not escape the attention of the Cabinet at London, because this con- flict may affect wider circles and thereby imperil the peace of Europe. To this extent England is affected by the question, and it is only on this ground that Sir E. Grey has been led to send an invitation to the Governments of those countries which are not directly interested in this conflict (Germany, Italy and France), in order to test in com- mon with them by means of a continuous exchange of ideas the possibilities of the situation, and to discuss how the differences may be most quickly settled. Following the precedent of the London con- ference during the last Balkan crisis, the Ambassadors of the various States mentioned resident at London should, according to the view of the British Secretary of State, keep themselves in continual con- tact with him for the purpose indicated. Sir E. Grey had already received answers expressed in very friendly terms from the Govern- ments concerned, in which they concurred in the suggestion put forward. At present it was also the wish of the Secretary of State, if possible, to prevent even at the eleventh hour the outbreak of hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and if this were not possible at least to prevent the conflict from causing a collision in- volving bloodshed ; if necessary, by the Servians withdrawing with- out accepting battle. The reply which had reached us from Servia appeared to offer the possibility that it might provide the basis of an understanding. England would willingly be prepared in this matter to make her influence felt according to our ideas and wishes. I thanked the Ambassador for the communication of Sir E. Grey, and I answered him that I fully appreciated the view of the Secretary of State. His point of view was, however, naturally different from mine, as England was not directly interested in the dispute between us and Servia, and the Secretary of State could not be fully informed concerning the serious significance which the questions at issue had for the Monarchy. If Sir E. Grey spoke of the possibility of prevent- , ing the outbreak of hostilities, this suggestion came too late, since our soldiers were yesterday fired at by soldiers from over the Servian frontier, and to-day war has been declared by us against Servia. I had to decline to entertain the idea of a discussion based on the Servian answer. What we asked was the integral acceptance of the ulti- matum. Servia had endeavoured to get out of her difficulty by sub- terfuges. We knew these Servian methods only too well. Through the local knowledge which he has gained here. Sir Maurice de Bunsen was in a position to appreciate fully our point of view, and he would be in a position to give Sir E. Grey an accurate repre- sentation of the facts. 246 Official Diplomatic Documents In so far as Sir E. Grey desired to be of service to the cause of European peace, he would certainly not find any opposition from us. He must, however, reflect that the peace of Europe would not be saved by Great Powers placing themselves behind Servia, and directing their efforts to securing that she should escape punishment. For, even if we consented to entertain such an attempt at an agree- ment, Servia would be all the more encouraged to continue on the path she has formerly followed, and this would, in a very short time, again imperil the cause of peace. The British Ambassador assured me in conclusion that he fully understood our point of view, but, on the other hand, he regretted that, under these circumstances, the desire of the British Government to arrive at an agreement had, for the time being, no prospect of being realised. He hoped to remain in constant communication with me as that appeared to him, on account of the great danger of a European conflagration, to be of special value. I assured the Ambassador that I was at all times at his disposal, and thereupon our conversation came to an end. To Berlin AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 42 Count Berchtold to Count Szogyeny at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) July 28, 1914. I REQUEST your Excellency to go at once to the Chancellor or the Secretary of State and communicate to him the following in my name : — "According to mutually consistent reports, received from St. Petersburgh, Kieff, Warsaw, Moscow and Odessa, Russia is making extensive military preparations. M. Sazonof has indeed given an assurance on his word of honour, as has also the Russian Minister of War, that mobilisation has not up to now been ordered; the latter has, however, told the German Military Attache that the mili- tary districts which border on Austria-Hungary — Kieff, Odessa, Moscow and Kasan — will be mobilised, should our troops cross the Servian frontier.^ " Under these circumstances, I would urgently ask the Cabinet at Berlin to take into immediate consideration the question whether the attention of Russia should not be drawn, in a friendly manner, to the fact that the mobilisation of the above districts amounts to a threat against Austria-Hungary, and that, therefore, should these measures be carried out, they would be answered by the most exten- sive military counter measures, not only by the Monarchy but by our Allyj the German Empire." In order to make it more easy for Russia to withdraw, it appears to us appropriate that such a step should, in the first place, be taken 1 German White Book, Exhibit 11, July 27. July 28, French Yellow Book No. 75 {2) 247 by Germany alone ; nevertheless we are ready to take this step in conjunction with Germany. Unambiguous language appears to me at the present moment to be the most effective method of making Russia fully conscious of all that is involved in a threatening attitude.^ To Berlin AUSTR0-HUNGARIA.N ReD BoOK No. 43 Count Berchtold to Count Szogyeny at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) July 28, 1914. Information has been received from the Imperial German Ambas- sador that Sir E. Grey has appealed to the German Government to use their influence with the Imperial and Royal Government, in order to induce them either to regard the reply received from Belgrade as satisfactory, or to accept it as a basis for discussion between the Cabinets.^ Herr von Tschirschky was commissioned to bring the British pro- posal before the Vienna Cabinet for their consideration. Belgium : From Vienna Belgian Gray Book No. 7 Count Erremhault de Dudzeele, Belgian Minister at Vienna, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, (Telegram.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has notified me of the declaration ^ of war by Austria-Hungary against Servia. France : From Vienna French Yellow Book No. 75 (2) Official Communique of the Press Bureau."^ Vienna, July 28, 1914. The Austrian Minister at Belgrade has returned to Vienna and presented the text of the Servian reply. ^ 1 This despatch would seem to dispose of the claim sometimes made that Germany's demand on Russia to demobilise brought on the war much against the wishes of Austria- Hungary, who had been dragged in, 2 British Blue Book No. 46, July 27, and No. 67, July 28. 3 See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 37, July 28, and British Blue Book No. 50, same day. * This is a brief summary of the Austro-Hungarian comments on the Serbian reply, see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27. ^ The Austrian Minister left Belgrade on the evening of July 25 (see Serbian Blue Book No. 41, July 25), after receiving the Serbian reply. This despatch is dated July 248 Official Diplomatic Documents A spirit of insincerity pervades the whole of this reply ; it makes it clear that the Servian Government have no serious intention of putting an end to the culpable toleration which has given rise to the anti-Austrian intrigues. The Servian reply contains such restric- tions and limitations, not only with regard to the principle of the Austro-Hungarian demarche, but also with regard to the claims ad- vanced by Austria, that the concessions which are made are without importance. In particular, under an empty pretext, there is a refusal to accept the participation of the Austro-Hungarian officials in the prosecution of the authors of the crimes who are resident in Servian territory. In the same way, the Servian reply to the Austrian demand that the hostile intrigues of the press should be suppressed, amounts to a refusal. The demand with regard to the measures to be taken to prevent associations hostile to Austria-Hungary from continuing their activity under another name and form after their dissolution, has not even -been considered. Inasmuch as these claims constitute the minimum regarded as necessary for the re-establishment of a permanent peace in the south- east of the Monarchy, the Servian reply is considered to be insufficient. That the Servian Government is aware of this, appears from the fact that they contemplate the settlement of the dispute by arbitra- tion, and also from the fact that on the day on which their reply was due and before it was in fact submitted, they gave orders for mobili- sation. From on board "La France*' French Yellow Book No. 76 M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, to M. Bienvenu-Martin^ A cting Minister for Foreign Affairs. On hoard the "La France,'' July 28, 1914. I HAVE received from Copenhagen your telegram summarising the events of Saturday ; ^ the telegram describing the last visit of the German Ambassador,^ that ^ relating to the mediation which Russia 28. Its number is 75 (2), which is unusual. Beginning with the second paragraph this communique is a summary of the Austro-Hungarian comments on the Serbian reply. In short it is the reply to the Serbian reply. See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27, which was presented also in Paris. It is not printed in its entirety in the French Yellow Book. The editor of the French Yellow Book, however, M. Jules Cambon, former French Ambassador in Berlin, doubtless felt the unfairness of making no reference to it at all. He, therefore, added this communique as an afterthought, which accounts for the strange number 75 (2). 1 Saturday was July 25, the telegram referred to was sent on July 26. Cf. French Yellow Book No. 50, also No. 56. 2 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 62, July 27. 3 This is a mistranslation substituted in the official British Blue Book of Sept. 28 and in the "Collected Diplomatic Documents" for the correct translation in the A^. Y. Times version which reads, "also the telegram with regard to," etc. This third tele- gram, however, has been omitted in the French Yellow Book. It would be interesting to know what it contained and what the "British demarches at Berlin" refer to. Cf . end of French Yellow Book No. 80, same day ; but see also French Yellow Book No. 74, July 27, which may describe the demarche mentioned here. July 28, French Yellow Book No. 77 249 advises Servia ^ to ask for and to the British demarches at Berlin, as well 2 as your telegram received this morning directly through the Eiffel Tower. I fully approve the reply which you made to Baron von Schoen; the proposition which you maintained is self-evident ; in the search for a peaceful solution of the dispute, we are fully in agreement with Russia, who is not responsible for the present situation, and has not taken any measure whatever which could arouse the least suspicion ; but it is plain that Germany on her side would find it difficult to refuse to give advice to the Austro-Hungarian Government, whose action has provoked the crisis. We must now continue to use the same language to the German Ambassador. Besides, this advice is in harmony with the two British proposals mentioned in your telegram.^ I entirely approve the combination suggested by Sir E. Grey, and I am myself requesting M. Paul Cambon to inform him of this. It is essential that it should be known at Berlin and at Vienna that our full concurrence is given to the efforts which the British Government is making with a view to seeking a solution of the Austro-Servian dispute. The action of the four less interested Powers cannot, for the reasons given above, be exerted only at Vienna and St. Peter sburgh. In proposing ^ to exert it also at Belgrade, which means in fact between Vienna and Belgrade, Sir E. Grey grasps the logic of the situation; and, in not excluding St. Petersburgh, he offers on the other hand to Germany, a method of withdrawing with perfect dignity from the demarche by which the German Government have caused it to be known at Paris and at London that the affair was looked upon by them as purely Austro-Servian and without any general character. Please communicate the present telegram to our representatives with the great Powers and to our Minister at Belgrade. Rene Viviani. To Viviani French Yellow Book No. 77 M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council on board the "La France.^' Paris, July 28, 1914. In spite of the assurances given, both in Berlin and Paris, by the German representatives, of the desire of their Government to assist in 1 For another proposal by Russia see British Blue Book No. 44, July 27. 2 The New York Times translation reads : "I have also received this morning your despatch direct from the Eiffel Tower." The only despatch printed under July 28 as sent to Viviani is French Yellow Book No. 77. This latter despatch, therefore, should have been printed before No. 76. It is, of course, possible that the fourth telegram mentioned in No. 76 has not been pubUshed as was the case with the third telegram. 3 There were two proposals mentioned in the telegrams to which Viviani seems to reply here ; cf. French Yellow Book No. 50, July 26, and No. 77, July 28. The first one contemplates pressure in Petrograd and Vienna. The second includes Belgrade, un- doubtedly as the result of the urging of France, who had always contended that it was a case of mediation between Vienna and Belgrade rather than Vienna and Petro- grad. 250 Official Diplomatic Documents efforts for the maintenance of peace, no sincere action has been taken by them to hold back Austria ; the British proposal, which consists in action by the four less-interested Powers to obtain a cessation of military operations at Vienna, Belgrade, and St. Petersburgh, and in a meeting at London of the German, French, and Italian Ambassadors under the chairmanship of Sir E. Grey, with a view of seeking a solu- tion of the Austro-Servian difficulty, meets with objections at Berlin of such a nature as must lead to failure. The Austrian Ambassador has proceeded to announce that his Government will to-morrow take energetic measures to compel Servia to give to them the satisfaction and guarantees which they demand from that Power ; Count Szecsen has given no explanation as to those measures ; according to our Military Attache at Vienna, mobilisation, dating from July 28, appears to be certain. Bienvenu-Martin. To London, Berlin, St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Rome French Yellow Book No. 78 M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, Berlin, St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Ernne. Paris, July 28, 1914. I HAVE had another visit from the German Ambassador this morn- ing ; he told me that he had no communication or official proposal to make to me, but that he came, as on the evening before, to talk over the situation and the methods to be employed to avoid action which would be irreparable. When I asked him about Austria's in- tentions, he declared that he did not know them, and was ignorant of the nature of the means of coercion which she was preparing. Germany, according to Baron von Schoen, only asks that she may act with France for the maintenance of peace. Upon my observing to him that a proposal for mediation by the four Powers to which we had adhered, and which had obtained assent in principle from Italy and Germany, had been put forward by Great Britain, the Ambassador said that the German Government really only asked to associate themselves with the action of the Powers, provided that that action did not* take the form of arbitration or a conference, which had been rejected by Austria. I replied that, if it was the expression only which was an obstacle to the Austrian Government, the object might be attained by other means ; the German Government are in a good position to ask Austria to allow the Powers time to intervene and find a means of conciliation. Baron von Schoen then observed to me that he had no instructions, and only knew that Germany refused to exercise any pressure on Austria, who does not wish for a conference. He accuses the French papers of attributing to Germany an attitude which she has not taken up, alleging that she is urging Austria on ; doubtless she approves Austria's attitude, but she had no knowledge of the Austrian note ; July 28, French Yellow Book No, 80 251 she did not see her way to check her too abruptly, for Austria must have guarantees against the proceedings of the Serbs. B ienvenu-Martin. From Vienna French Yellow Book No. 79 M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna. Paris, July 28, 1914. Through the telegrams from our Embassies which I have for- warded to you, you are aware of the British proposal for mediation by the four Powers and for a conference in London, as well as of our ad- herence to that suggestion, and of the conditional acceptance by Italy and of the reservations of Berlin. Please keep yourself in touch on this subject with your British colleague, who had received the necessary instructions to acquaint the Austro-Hungarian Government with the British suggestion, as soon as his three colleagues have been authorised to make the same demarche; you will adapt your attitude to his. From London French Yellow Book No. 80 M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, July 28, 191Jf. Sir Edward Grey yesterday received my Austro-Hungarian and German colleagues. The first continued to maintain that the Servian reply was unacceptable. The second used language similar to that of Baron von Schoen at Paris. He emphasised the value of moderating action by Great Britain at St. Petersburgh. Sir Edward Grey re- plied that Russia had shown herself very moderate from the beginning of the crisis, especially in her advice ^ to the Servian Government, and that he would find it very embarrassing to give her pacific ^ advice. He added that it was at Vienna that it was necessary to act and that Germany's help was indispensable. On the other hand the British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh has telegraphed that M. Sazonof had made a proposal to the Austrian Ambassador for a conversation on the Servian business. This in- formation has been confirmed by the British Ambassador at Vienna, ^ The published despatches nowhere give clear evidence that Russia gave Serbia any advice that had a moderating influence, although the British Ambassador said that Sazonof would do so, British Blue Book No. 55, under date of July 28. 2 Germany has always claimed that Russia could have been restrained by pacific advice from England. The same view was expressed in the London Daily News of August 1, 1914. France had also refused to exert her conciliatory influence on Russia. Cf . French Yellow Book No. 62, July 27. 252 Official Diplomatic Documents who has sent the information that the first interview between the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Count Szapary had produced a good effect at the Ballplatz. Sir Edward Grey and Sir Arthur Nicolson told me that, if an agree- ment could be brought about by direct discussion between St. Peters- burgh and Vienna, it would be a matter for congratulation, but they raised some doubts as to the success of M. Sazonof 's attempt. When Sir George Buchanan asked M. Sazonof about the eventual meeting at London of a conference of representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy, to seek a solution for the present situa- tion, the latter replied " that he had begun pourparlers with the Austrian Ambassador under conditions which he hoped were favourable ; that, however, he had not yet received any reply to his proposal for the revision of the Servian note by the two Cabinets." If direct explana- tions with the Cabinet of Vienna are impracticable,^ M. Sazonof de- clares himself ready to accept the British proposals or any other of such a nature as to bring about a favourable issue of the dispute. In any case, at a moment when the least delay might have serious consequences, it would be very desirable that these direct negotiations should be carried on in such a way as not to hamper Sir E. Grey's action, and not to furnish Austria with a pretext for slipping out of the friendly intervention of the four Powers. The British Ambassador at Berlin having made a determined effort to obtain Herr von Jagow's adherence to Sir E. Grey's sugges- tion, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that it was best to await the result of the conversation which had been begun between St. Petersburgh and Vienna. ^ Sir E. Grey has, in consequence, directed Sir E. Goschen to suspend his demarche for the moment.^ In addition, the news that Austria has just officially declared war against Servia, opens a new phase of the question. Paul Cambon. From Berlin French Yellow Book No. 81 M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 28, 1914. M. Sazonof's conversation with Count Szapary ^ was brought to the knowledge of Herr von Jagow by the Russian Charge d'Affaires. 1 This implies that Sazonof had not accepted the British proposals whole-heartedly on the previous day, but had rather pushed his own proposal of direct conversations 2 Cf. British Blue Book Nos. 43 and 46, July 27, andNos. 67, 68 and 69, July 28, and Austro-Hungarian Red Book, July 27. In British Blue Book Nos. 68, 69, Sir E. Grey seems to prefer Sazonof's proposal of direct conversations to his own of a conference. » It is nowhere stated what this demarche was, the despatch explaining it havmg been omitted from the Yellow Book; see note 3 to No. 76, same day. A possible explanation is found in the text of the German White Book, which is illustrated by Exhibit 16, July 28. See the note there. r t i oc * The only published conversation to which this can refer is the one of July 2b, two days previous to this despatch. See Russian Orange Book No. 25, July 26. July 28, French Yellow Booh No. 81 253 The Secretary of State told him that in agreement with the remarks of the German Ambassador in Russia, since the Austrian Govern- ment did not refuse to continue their conversations with the Russian Government after the expiry of the ultimatum, there was ground for hope that Count Berchtold on his side might be able to converse with M. Schebeko, and that it might be possible to find an issue from the present difficulties. The Russian Charge d 'Affaires takes a favour- able view of this state of mind, which corresponds to Herr von Jagow's desire to see Vienna and St. Petersburgh enter into direct relations and to release Germany. There is ground, however, for asking whether Austria is not seeking to gain time to make her preparations. To-day I gave my support to the demarche made by my British colleague with the Secretary of State. The latter replied to me, as he did to Sir Edward Goschen, that it was impossible for him to accept the idea of a kind of conference at London between the Ambassadors of the four Powers, and that it would be necessary to give another form to the British suggestion to procure its realisation. I laid stress upon the danger of delay, which might bring on war, and asked him if he wished for war. He protested, and added that direct conversa- tions between Vienna and St. Petersburgh were in progress, and that from now on he expected a favourable result. The British and Italian Ambassadors came to see me this morning together, to talk over with me the conversation which they had had with Herr von Jagow yesterday on the subject of Sir Edward Grey's proposal. To sum up, the Secretary of State used the same language to them as to me; accepting in principle the idea of joining in a demarche with England, Italy, and ourselves, but rejecting any idea of a conference. My colleagues and I thought that this was only a question of form, and the British Ambassador is going to suggest to his Government that they should change the wording of their proposal, which might take the character of a diplomatic demarche at Vienna and St. Peters- burgh. In consequence of the repugnance shown by Herr von Jagow to any demarche at Vienna, Sir Edward Grey could put him in a dilemma by asking him to state himself precisely how diplomatic action by the Powers to avoid war could be brought about. We ought to associate ourselves with every effort in favour of peace compatible with our engagements towards our ally ; but to place the reponsibility in the proper quarter, we must take care to ask Germany to state precisely what she wishes. Jules Cambon. 254 Official Diplomatic Documents From St. Petersburgh French Yellow Book No. 82 M. Paleologiie, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. St. Petersburgh, July 28, 1914. The Austro-Hungarian Government has not yet replied to the pro- posal of the Russian Government suggesting the opening of direct conversations between St. Petersburgh and Vienna. M. Sazonof received the German and Austro-Hungarian Am- bassadors this afternoon. The impression which he got from this double interview is a bad one; "Certainly," he said to me, "Austria is unwilling to converse." As the result of a conversation which I have just had with my two colleagues I have the same impression of pessimism. Paleologue. From Vienna French Yellow Book No. 83 M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, July 28, 1914. Count Berchtold has just declared to Sir M. de Bunsen that any intervention, aiming at the resumption of the discussion between Austria and Servia on the basis of the Servian reply, would be useless, and besides that it would be too late, as war had been oflScially de- clared at mid-day. The attitude of my Russian colleague has never varied up to the present ; in his opinion it is not a question of localising the conflict, but rather of preventing it. The declaration of war will make very difficult the initiation of pourparlers by the four Powers, as well as the continuation of the direct discussions between M. Sazonof and Count Szapary. It is held here that the formula which seemed as if it might obtain the adherence of Germany — " Mediation between Austria and Russia " — is unsuitable, inasmuch as it alleges a dispute between those two Empires which does not exist up to the present. Among the suspicions aroused by the sudden and violent resolution of Austria, the most disquieting is that Germany should have pushed her on to aggressive action against Servia in order to be able herself to enter into war with Russia and France,^ in circumstances which she supposes ought to be most favourable to herself and under conditions which have been thoroughly considered. Dumaine. 1 If this is written with sincerity it reveals the serious suspicion of Germany enter- tained by France. Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 42, same day, where it ap- pears that it was not Germany who pushed on Austria-Hungary. July 28, German White Book Exhibit 2 255 Germany : To the Gowrnments of Germany German White Book Exhibit 2 The Chancellor to the Federal Governments of Germany. Confidential. Berlin, July 28, 1914. You will make the following report to the Government to which you are accredited : In view of the facts which the Austrian Government has published in its note ^ to the Servian Government, the last doubt must disappear that the outrage to which the Austro-Hungarian successor to the throne has fallen a victim, was prepared in Servia, to say the least with the connivance of members of the Servian Government and army. It is a product of the pan-Serb intrigues which for a series of years have become a source of permanent disturbance for the Austro- Hungarian Monarchy and for the whole of Europe. The pan-Serb chauvinism appeared especially marked during the Bosnian crisis. Only to the far-reaching self-restraint and modera- tion of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the energetic inter- cession of the Powers is it to be ascribed that the provocations to which Austro-Hungary was exposed at that time, did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of future well-behaviour, which the Servian Government gave at that time, it has not kept. Under the very eyes, at least with the tacit sufferance of official Servia, the pan-Serb prop- aganda has meanwhile continued to increase in scope and intensity. It would be compatible neither with its dignity nor with its right to self-preservation if the Austro-Hungarian Government persisted to view idly any longer the intrigues beyond the frontier, through which the safety and the integrity of the Monarchy are permanently threatened. With this state of affairs, the action as well as the de- mands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can be viewed only as justifiable. The reply of the Servian Government to the demands which the Austro-Hungarian Government put on the 23rd inst., through its representative in Belgrade, shows that the dominating factors in Servia are not inclined to cease their former policies and agitation. There will remain nothing else for the Austro-Hungarian Government than to press its demands, if need be, through military action, unless it renounces for good its position as a great Power. Some Russian personalities deem it their right as a matter of course and a task of Russia's, to actively become a party to Servia in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia. For the European conflagration which would result from a similar step by Russia, the "Nowoje Wremja" believes itself justified in making Germany re- sponsible in so far as it does not induce Austria-Hungary to yield. 1 This is probably an inaccurate reference, for the Chancellor undoubtedly had in mind the dossier (Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25) which was to be presented, and, judging by this despatch, was presented to the foreign offices in Berlin, Rome, Paris, London, Petrograd, and Constantinople. For the Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 7, July 22. 256 Official Diplomatic Documents The Russian press thus turns conditions upside down. It is not Austria-Hungary which has called forth the conflict with Servia, but it is Servia which, through unscrupulous favour toward pan-Serb aspirations, even in parts of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, threatens the same in her existence and creates conditions, which eventually found expression in the wanton outrage at Serajewo. If Russia believes that it must champion the cause of Servia in this matter, it certainly has the right to do so. However, it must realise that it makes the Serb activities its own, to undermine the conditions of existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and that thus it bears the sole responsibility if out of the Austro-Servian affair, which all other Great Powers desire to localise, there arises a European war. This reponsibility of Russia's is evident and it weighs the more heavily as Count Berchtold has officially declared to Russia that Austria-Hungary has no intention to acquire Servian territory or to touch the existence of the Servian Kingdom, but only desires peace against the Servian intrigues threatening its existence. The attitude of the Imperial Government in this question is clearly indicated. The agitation conducted by the pan-Slavs in Austria- Hungary has for its goal, with the destruction of the Austro-Hun- garian Monarchy, the scattering or weakening of the Triple Alliance with a complete isolation of the German Empire in consequence. Our own interest therefore calls us to the side of Austria-Hungary. The duty, if at all possible, to guard Europe against a universal war, points to the support by ourselves of those endeavours which aim at the localisation of the conflict, faithful to the course of those policies which we have carried out successfully for forty-four years in the in- terest of the preservation of the peace of Europe. Should, however, against our hope, through the interference of Russia the fire be spread, we should have to support, faithful to our (Juty as allies, the neighbour-monarchy with all the power at our com- mand. We shall take the sword only if forced to it, but then in the clear consciousness that we are not guilty of the calamity which war will bring upon the peoples of Europe. Germany : To St. Petersburg German WmTE Book Exhibit 14 Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial A mbassador at St. Petersburg on July 28th, 1914. We continue ^ in our endeavour to induce#Vienna to elucidate in St. Petersburg the object and scope of the Austrian action in Servia in a manner both convincing and satisfactory to Russia. The declara- tion of war which has meanwhile ensued alters nothing in this matter. 1 See note to British Blue Book No. 67, July 28. See also German White Book, Exhibit 15, July 27. July 28, German White Book Exhibit 20 ' 257 From Vienna German White Book Exhibit 16 ^ Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the Chancellor on July 28th, 1914. Count Berchtold requests me to express to Your Excellency his thanks for the communication of the English mediation proposal. He states, however, that after the opening of hostilities by Servia and the subsequent declaration of war, the step appears belated. To St. Petersburg German White Book Exhibit 20 I. His Majesty to the Czar. July 28th, 10.4s P.M. I HAVE heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression which is caused by the action of Austria-Hungary against Servia. The unscru- pulous agitation which has been going on for years in Servia, has led to the revolting crime of which Archduke Franz Ferdinand has become a victim. The spirit which made the Servians murder their own King and his consort still dominates that country. Doubtless You will agree with me that both of us. You as well as I, and all other sovereigns, have a common interest to insist that all those who are responsible for this horrible murder shall suffer their deserved punishment. On the other hand I by no means overlook the difficulty encoun- tered by You and Your Government to stem the tide of public opinion. In view of the cordial friendship which has joined us both for a long time with firm ties, I shall use my entire influence to induce Austria- Hungary to obtain a frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia. I hope confidently that You will support me in my efforts to overcome all difficulties which may yet arise. • Your most sincere and devoted friend and cousin, (Signed) Wilhelm. . Great Britain: For British Blue Book No. 50 see below under date of July 31, 1914. 1 The paragraph in the Narrative of the German White Book which these Exhibits are to illustrate reads: "We further declared ourselves ready, after failure of the Conference idea, to transmit a second proposal of Sir Edward Grey's to Vienna in which he suggested Austria-Hungary should decide that either the Servian reply was sufficient, or that it be used as a basis for further negotiations. The Austro-Hungarian Government remarked with full appreciation of our action it had come too late, the hostiUties having already been opened." This second proposal of Sir E. Grey is not mentioned in the British Blue Book. It was probably discussed in the third tele- gram referred to but not printed in the French Yellow Book No. 76, July 28, see also French Yellow Book No. 80, same day. 258 Official Diplomatic Documents From Paris British Blue Book No. 51 Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 28, 1914.) Sir, Paris, July 27, 191^. I ELWE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a memo- randum from the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the steps to be taken to prevent an outbreak of hostiHties between Austria- Hungary and Servia. I have, etc. Francis Bertie. Enclosure in No. 51 Note communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. Bienvenu-Martin. Par une note en date du 25 de ce mois, son Excellence TAm- bassadeur d'Angleterre a fait connaitre au Gouvernement de la Republique que, d'apres Sir Edward Grey, la seule maniere d'assurer, si c'etait possible, le maintien de la paix dans le cas ou les rapports entre la Russie et TAutriche deviendraient plus tendus serait une demarche com- mune a Vienne et a Saint- Petersbourg des representants de TAngleterre, de la France, de I'Allemagne et de Tltalie en Autriche et en Russie; et il a exprime le desir de savoir si le Gouvernement de la Republique etait dispose a accueillir favo- rablement cette suggestion^ Le Ministre des Affaires Etran- geres par interim a Thonneur de faire connaitre a son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie qu'il a invite M. Jules Cambon ^ a se concerter avec I'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre en Allemagne et a appuyer la (Translation.) In a note of the 25th of this month, his Excellency the British Ambassador ^ informed the Gov- ernment of the Republic that, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, the only possible way of assuring the maintenance of peace in case of the relations between Russia and Austria becoming more strained would be if the representatives of Great Britain, France, Ger- many, and Italy in Austria and Russia were to take joint action at Vienna and at St. Petersburg ; and he expressed the wish to know if the Government of the Republic were disposed to wel- come such a suggestion. The Minister for Foreign Affairs ad interim has the honour to inform his Excellency Sir F. Bertie that he has requested M. Jules Cambon ^ to concert with the British Ambassador in Germany and to support any rep- 1 French Ambassador in Berlin. » Acting on instructions contained in British Blue Book No. 10, July 24. For the entire subject see the summary of events of July 24 based on the despatches of that day, where it appears that Sir E. Grey altered his original proposal at the suggestion of France. July 28, British Blue Book No. 51 259 demarche qu'ils jugeront oppor- tune de faire aupres du Cabinet de Berlin. Le Gouvernement de la Re- publique a, d 'autre part, con- formement au desir exprime par le Gouvernement britannique et que son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie lui a transmis par une note en date du 26 de ce mois, autorise M. Paul Cambon ^ a prendre part a la reunion proposee par Sir Edward Grey pour rechercher avec lui et les Ambassadeurs d'Allemagne et d' Italic a Lon- dres, les moyens de resoudre les difficultes actuelles. Le Gouvernement de la Re- publique est pret egalement a donner aux agents fran^ais a Petersbourg, a Vienne et a Bel- grade des instructions pour qu'ils obtiennent des Gouvernements russe, autrichien et serbe de s'abstenir de toute operation militaire active en attendant les resultats de cette conference. II estime toutefois que les chances de succes de la proposition de Sir Edward Grey reposent essen- tiellement sur Taction que Ber- lin serait disposee a Vienna [sic\. Une demarche aupres du Gou- vernement austro-hongrois pour amener la suspension des opera- tions militaires parait vouee a I'echec si I'influence de I'Alle- magne ne s'est pas exercee au prealable sur le Cabinet de Vienne. Le Garde des Seaux, Presi- dent du Conseil et Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres par interim, saisit cette occasion de renou- veler, etc. Paris, le 27 juillet, 1914. resentation which they may con- sider it advisable to make to the BerHn Cabinet. In accordance with the desire expressed by the British Govern- ment and conveyed to them by Sir F. Bertie in his note of the 26th of this month, the Govern- ment of the Republic have also authorised M. Paul Cambon ^ to take part in the conference which Sir E. Grey has proposed with a view to discovering in consulta- tion with himself and the German and Italian Ambassadors in Lon- don a means of settling the pres- ent difficulties. The Government of the Re- public is likewise ready to in- struct the French representa- tives at St. Petersburgh, Vienna, and Belgrade ^ to induce the Russian, Austrian, and Servian Governments to abstain from all active military operations pend- ing the results of this conference. He considers, however, that the chance of Sir E. Grey's proposal being successful depends essen- tially on the action which the Berlin Government would be will- ing to take at Vienna. Repre- sentations made to the Austro- Hungarian Government for the purpose of bringing about a sus- pension of military operations would seem bound to fail unless the German Government do not beforehand exercise their in- fluence on the Vienna Cabinet. The President of the Council ad interim takes the opportunity, etc. Paris, July 27, 1914. ^ French Ambassador in London. 2 The frequency with which France introduces Belgrade, when Sir E. Grey s pro- posal contemplates only Vienna and Petrograd, is noteworthy. 260 Official Diplomatic Documents From Paris British Blue Book No. 52 Note communicated by French Embassy, July 28, 1914.. Le Gouvernement de la Re- publique accepte la proposition de Sir Edward Grey relative a une intervention de la Grande- Bretagne, de la France, de I'Alle- magne et de I'ltalie en vue d'eviter les operations militaires actives sur les frontieres autri- chiennes, russes et serbes; il a autorise M. P. Cambon ^ a pren- dre part aux deliberations de la reunion a quatre, qui doit se tenir a Londres. L'Ambassadeur de France a Berlin a re^u pour instructions, apres s'etre concerte avec I'Am- bassadeur d'Angleterre a Ber- lin, d'appuyer la demarche de ce dernier dans la forme et la me- sure qui seraient jugees oppor- tunes. M. Viviani ^ est pret a envoyer aux representants fran9ais a Vienne, Saint-Petersbourg et Bel- grade des instructions dans le sens suggere par le Gouverne- ment britannique. Ambassade de France, Londres, le 27 juillet, 1914, (Translation.) The Government of the Re- public accept Sir Edward Grey's proposal in regard to interven- tion by Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy with a view to avoiding active military opera- tions on the frontiers of Austria, Russia, and Servia ; and they have authorised M. P. Cambon ^ to take part in the deliberations of the four representatives at the meeting which is to be held in London. The French Ambassador in Berlin has received instructions to consult first the British Am- bassador in Berlin, and then to support the action taken by the latter in such manner and degree as may be considered appropriate. M. Viviani ^ is ready to send to the representatives of France in Vienna, St. Petersburgh, and Belgrade instructions in the sense suggested by the Biritsh Gov- ernment. French Embassy, July 27, 1914- From St. Petersburg British Blue Book No. 53 M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Bencken- dorff, Russian Ambassador in London. — (Communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28.) (See Russian Orange Book No. 32, July 27.) ' French Ambassador in London. 2 French Minister for Foreign Affairs. July 28 y British Blue Book No. 55 261 From St. Petersburg British Blue Book No. 54 M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for dorff, Russian A mbassador Count Benckendorff, July 28, Saint-Petersbourg, le 15 (28) juillet, 1914. (Telegraphique.) Mes entretiens avec TAmbas- sadeur d^Allemagne confirment mon impression que rAllemagne est plutot favorable a Tintransi- geance de I'Autriche. Le Cabinet de Berlin, qui aurait pu arreter tout le develop- pement de la crise, parait n'exer- cer aucune action sur son alliee. L'Ambassadeur trouve insuffi- sante la reponse de la Serbie. Cette attitude allemande est tout partieulierement alarmante. II me semble que mieux que toute autre Puissance I'Angle- terre serait en mesure de tenter encore d'agir a Berlin pour en- gager le Gouvernement alle- mand a Taction necessaire. C'est a Berlin qu'indubitable- ment se trouve la clef de la situation. Foreign Affairs, to Count Bencken- in London. — (Communicated by 1914.) (Translation.) St. Petersburgh, July 15 {28), 1914. (Telegraphic.) My interviews ^ with the Ger- man Ambassador confirm my impression that Germany is, if anything, in favour of the un- compromising attitude adopted by Austria. The Berlin Cabinet, who could have prevented ^ the whole of this crisis developing, appear to be ex- erting no^ influence on their ally. The Ambassador considers that the Servian reply is insufficient. This attitude of the German Government is most alarming.^ It seems to me that Great Britain is in a better position than any other Power to make another attempt at Berlin to induce the German Government to take the necessary action.^ There is no doubt that the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin. From St. Petersburgh British Blue Book No. 55 Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 28.) (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 27, 1914. With reference to my telegram of yesterday,^ I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon and found him very conciliatory and more optimistic. ^ No accounts of interviews between Sazonof and the German Ambassador are men- tioned in the Russian Orange Book in telegrams of July 26, 27, or 28. For Germany's attitude, see note to British Blue Book No. 67, July 28, and German White Book, p. 554. 2 This is an assertion for which no proof has been advanced in the published despatches. 3 See, however, German White Book, Exhibit 15, July 27, and Exhibit 14, July 28. • * Contrast with this footnote to British Blue Book No. 67, July 28. * That this action was taken appears from notes to British Blue Book No. 67, July 28, and German White Book, Exhibit 16, same date. 6 British Blue Book No. 44, July 27. 262 Official Diplomatic Documents He would, he said, use all his influence ^ at Belgrade to induce the Servian Government to go as far as possible in giving satisfaction to Austria, but her territorial integrity must be guaranteed and her rights as a sovereign State respected, so that she should not become Austria's vassal. He did not know whether Austria would accept friendly exchange of views which he had proposed, but, if she did, he wished to keep in close contact with the other Powers through- out the conversations that would ensue. He again referred to the fact that the obligations undertaken by Servia in 1908, alluded to in the Austrian ultimatum, were given to the Powers. I asked if he had heard of your proposal with regard to conference of the four Powers, and on his replying in the affirmative, I told him confidentially of your instructions to me, and enquired whether instead of such a conference he would prefer a direct exchange of views, which he had proposed.^ The German Ambassador, to whom I had just spoken, had expressed his personal opinion that a direct exchange of views would be more agreeable to Austria-Hungary. His Excellency said he was perfectly ready to stand aside if the Powers accepted the proposal for a conference, but he trusted that you would keep in touch with the Russian Ambassador in the event of its taking place. From Vienna British Blue Book No. 56 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna^ to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 28.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 27, 1914. The Russian Ambassador had to-day a long and earnest conversa- tion with Baron Macchio, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He told him that, having just come back from St. Peters- burgh, he was well acquainted with the views of the Russian Govern- ment and the state of Russian public opinion. He could assure him that if actual war broke out with Servia it would be impossible to localise it, for Russia was not prepared to give way again, as she had done on previous occasions, and especially during the annexation crisis of 1909. He earnestly hoped that something would be done before Servia was actually invaded. Baron Macchio replied that this would now be difficult, as a skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, in which the Servians had been the aggressors.^ The Rus- sian Ambassador said that he would do all he could to keep the Servians quiet pending any discussions that might yet take place, and he told me that he would advise his Government to induce the 1 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 40, July 27. 2 Cf, British Blue Book No. 53, same date. 3 If this should prove to have been the case, it would be very important, because a less yielding attitude could be expected of Austria-Hungary if hostilities had actually been begun, not by Austria-Hungary, but by Serbia. The diplomatic. documents con- tain no denial of this assertion. July 28, British Blue Book No. 57 263 Servian Government to avoid any conflict as long as possible, and to fall back before an Austrian advance. Time so gained should suffice to enable a settlement to be reached. He had just heard of a satis- factory conversation which the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had yesterday ^ with the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. The former had agreed that much of the Austro-Hungarian note to Servia had been perfectly reasonable, and in fact they had practically reached an understanding as to the guarantees which Servia might reasonably be asked to give to Austria-Hungary for her future good behaviour. The Russian Ambassador urged that the Austrian Am- bassador at St. Petersburgh should be furnished with full powers to continue discussion with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was very willing to advise Servia to yield all that could be fairly asked of her as an independent Power. Baron Macchio promised to submit this suggestion to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. From Rome British Blue Book No. 57 Sir R. Roddy British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. — ■ {Received July 28.) (Telegraphic.) Rome, July 27, 1914. Minister for Foreign Affairs greatly doubts whether Germany will be willing to invite Austria to suspend military action pending the conference, but he had hopes that military action may be practi- cally deferred by the fact of the conference meeting at once. As at present informed, he sees no possibility of Austria receding from any point laid down in her note to Servia, but he believes that if Servia will even now accept it ^ Austria will be satisfied, and if she had rea- son to think that such will be the advice of the Powers, Austria may defer action. Servia may be induced to accept note in its entirety on the advice of the four Powers invited to the conference, and this would enable her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not to Austria-Hungary alone.^ Telegrams from Vienna to the press here stating that Austria is favourably impressed with the declarations of the Italian Government have, the Minister for Foreign Affairs assures me, no foundation. He said he has expressed no opinion to Austria with regard to the note. He assured me both before and after communication of the 1 Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 25, July 26 ; and Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 31, July 27. 2 This passage taken together with the previous telegram would seem to imply that on this date the Powers had not yet decided to condemn the Austrian demands as altogether unacceptable. Serbia took the same view, cf. British Blue Book No. 64, same day. 3 If this suggestion had been pressed events might have been different. When Sir R. Rodd sent this telegram on July 27, he may not yet have known of Sir E. Grey's announcement on that date that the British fleet had been kept mobilised. It was this announcement which according to the London Daily News of August 1, 1914, stiffened the backbone of the Russian war party and made war inevitable. 264 Official Diplomatic Documents note, and again to-day, that Austrian Government have given him assm'ances that they demand no' territorial sacrifices from Servia.^ From Paris British Blue Book No. 58 Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 28.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 28, 1914. I COMMUNICATED to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon the substance of your conversation with the German Ambas- sador, recorded in your telegram ^ to Berlin of the 27th July. His Excellency is grateful for the communication. He said that it confirms what he had heard of your attitude, and he feels confident that your observations to the German Ambassador will have a good effect in the interest of peace. From Paris British Blue Book No. 59 Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 28.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 28, 1914. I INFORMED the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day of your conversation with the Russian Ambassador, as recorded in your telegram of yesterday ^ to St. Petersburgh. He is grateful for the communication, and quite appreciates the impossibility for His Majesty's Government to declare themselves "solidaires" with Russia on a question between Austria and Servia, which in its present condition is not one affecting England. He also sees that you cannot take up an attitude at Berlin and Vienna more Servian than that attributed in German and Austrian sources to the Russian Government. German Ambassador has stated that Austria would respect the integrity of Servia, but when asked whether her independence also would be respected, he gave no assurance.^ " 1 By this assurance it was hoped to satisfy all legitimate demands of Russia, as Austria-Hungary saw them. From British Blue Book No. 78, July 29, it appears that even Sazonof did not categorically reject the proposals made in this telegram. 2 See No. 46, July 27. » British Blue Book No. 47, July 27. • ^ It is difficult to see how the German Ambassador in Paris could have given assur- ances for Austria-Hungary. July 28, British Blue Booh No. 62 265 From Berlin British Blue Book No. 60 8ir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 28.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 28, 1914. Secretary of State spoke yesterday in the same sense as that reported in my telegram of yesterday ^ to my French and Italian colleagues respecting your proposal. I discussed with my two^ col- leagues this morning his reply, and we found that, while refusing the proposed conference, he had said to all of us that nevertheless he desired to work with us for the maintenance of general peace. We therefore deduced that if he is sincere in this wish he can only be objecting to the form ^ of your proposal. Perhaps he himself could be induced to suggest lines on which he would find it possible to work with us. From Vienna British Blue Book No. 61 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 28.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. I SAW Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning. His Excellency declared that Austria-Hungary cannot delay war- like proceedings against Servia, and would have to decline any sugges- tion of negotiations on basis of Servian reply.^ Prestige ^ of Dual Monarchy was engaged, and nothing could now prevent conflict. From Vienna British Blue Book No. 62 Sir M. de Sunken, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 28.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914- I SPOKE to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day in the sense of your telegram of 27th July ^ to Berlin. I avoided the word " media- 1 British Blue Book No. 43, July 27. 2 The text would appear to mean the French and Italian Ambassadors, but when only two are mentioned by one of the Entente Ambassadors the reference is generally to the ambassadors of the other two Entente Powers. 3 That this was the case appears from British Blue Book No. 46, July 27. * See note to German White Book, Exhibit 16, July 28. 5 Austria-Hungary believed that her prestige, i.e. her existence as a great power, was at stake, and that her action against Serbia, therefore, was in self-defence. 6 British Blue Book No. 46, July 27. 266 Official Diplomatic Documents tion," but said that, as mentioned in your speech/ which he had just read to me, you had hopes that conversations in London between the four Powers less interested might yet lead to an arrangement which Austro-Hungarian Government would accept as satisfactory and as rendering actual hostilities unnecessary. I added that you had re- garded Servian reply as having gone far to meet just demands of Austria-Hungary; that you thought it constituted a fair basis of discussion during which warlike operations might remain in abey- ance, and that Austrian Ambassador in Berlin was speaking in this sense. Minister for Foreign Aifairs said quietly, but firmly, that no discussion could be accepted on basis of Servian note; that war would be declared to-day and that well-known pacific character of Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might be accepted as a guarantee that war was both just and inevitable. This was a matter that must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said that you would hear with regret that hostilities could not now be arrested, as you feared that they might lead to com- plications threatening the peace of Europe. In taking leave of his Excellency, I begged him to believe that, if in the course of present grave crisis our point of view should some- times differ from his, this would arise, not from want of sympathy with the many just complaints ^ which Austria-Hungary had against Servia, but from the fact that, whereas Austria-Hungary put first her quarrel with Servia, you were anxious in the first instance for peace of Europe. I trusted this larger aspect of the question would appeal with equal force to his Excellency. He said he had it also in mind, but thought that Russia ought not to oppose operations like those impending, which did not aim at territorial aggrandisement and which could no longer be postponed.^ From Rome British Blue Book No. 63 Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 28,) (Telegraphic.) Rome, July 28, 1914. Your telegram of 25th July to Paris. ^ I have communicated substance to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who immediately telegraphed in precisely similar terms to Berlin and Vienna. 1 "Hansard," Vol. 65, No. 107, Columns 931, 932, 933. 2 These just complaints which are here acknowledged to have existed, were a few days later entirely lost sight of. 3 Cf. British Blue Book No. 61, July 28. * A footnote in the British Blue Book gives as reference No. 27. This can hardly be the despatch referred to here. The proper despatch is either not printed, or con- tained in No. 36 or 37. Their dates, however, are July 26. July 28, British Blue Book No. 65 267 From Rome British Blue Book No. 64 Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 28.) (Telegraphic.) Rome, July 28, 1914. At the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs I submit the following to you : — In a long conversation this morning Servian Charge d'Affaires had said he thought that if some explanations were given regarding mode in which Austrian agents would require to intervene under article 5 and article 6, Servia might still accept the whole Austrian note.^ As it w^as not to be anticipated that Austria would give such explanations to Servia, they might be given ^ to Powers engaged in discussions, who might then advise Seryia to accept without con- ditions. The Austro-Hungarian Government had in the meantime published a long official explanation of grounds on which Servian reply was considered inadequate. Minister for Foreign Affairs considered many points besides explanation — such as slight verbal difference in sen- tence regarding renunciation of propaganda — quite childish, but there was a passage which might prove useful in facilitating such a course as was considered practicable by the Servian Charge d'Affaires. It was stated that co-operation of Austrian agents in Servia was to be only in investigation, not in judicial or administrative measures. Servia was said to have wilfully ^ misinterpreted this. He thought, therefore, that ground might be cleared here. I only reproduce from memory, as I had not yet received text of Austrian declaration. Minister impressed upon me, above all, his anxiety for the imme- diate beginning of discussion. A wide general latitude to accept at once every point or suggestion on which he could be in agreement with ourselves and Germany had been given to Italian Ambassador. From Nish British Blue Book No. 65 Mr. Crackanthorpe, British ChargS d'Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Ed- ward Grey. — {Received July 28.) (Telegraphic.) Nish, July 28, 1914. I HAVE urged on the Servian Government the greatest moderation * pending efforts being made towards a peaceful solution. 1 As late as July 28, therefore, Serbia was almost ready to accept the Austro-Hun- garian note. For a discussion of articles 5 and 6, see Austro-Hungarian Red Book Nos. 31 and 34, July 27, and Nos. 21, 26 and 27, July 25. 2 They were so given to Russia, see references given in preceding note. 3 See Austro-Hungarian comment to Serbian reply, Red Book No. 34, July 27. * Cf . British Blue Book No. 12, July 24, note 3 and No. 22, July 25. The advice for moderation was not given until after the reply had been sent. 268 Official Diplomatic Documents Two Servian steamers fired on and damaged, and two Servian merchant-vessels have been captured by a Hungarian monitor at Orsova. From Nish British Blue Book No. 66 Mr. CracJcanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Ed- ward Grey, — {Received July 28.) (Telegraphic.) Nish, July 28, 1914. Telegram received here that war declared by Austria. To Berlin British Blue Book No. 67 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 28, 1914- Explanation given in your telegram of the 27th July ^ of what was my idea in proposing a conference is quite right. It would not be an arbitration, but a private and informal discussion to ascertain what suggestion could be made for a settlement. No suggestion would be put forward that had not previously been ascertained to be acceptable to Austria and Russia, with whom the mediating Powers could easily keep in touch through their respective allies. But as long as there is a prospect of a direct exchange of views between Austria and Russia, I would suspend ^ every other sugges- 1 British Blue Book No. 43, July 27. 2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 77, July 29. (See also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29.) In view of the claim that Sir E. Grey consistently pressed his "con- ference" idea, this passage is of importance. The entire subject has been discussed from the German point of view by Chancellor von Bethmann-HoUweg in his speech before the Reichstag, Aug. 19, 1915, as follows: The statement that the whole war might have been avoided if I had agreed to accept the suggestion of Sir Edward Grey and take part in a conference for the regulation of the Russian-Austrian question at issue has again of late been repeatedly made in England. Here are the real facts. The English proposals for a conference were de- livered here by the English Ambassador on the 27th of July. The English Blue Book also shows that the Secretary of State at the Foreign Office in the conversation in question with Sir Edward Goschen — a conversation in which the Secretary designated the means proposed as unsuitable — had communicated to the English Ambassador that, according to his information from Russia, M. Sazonof was inclined to consider a direct exchange of opinion with Count Berchtold. He was of the opinion that a direct conversation between Petrograd and Vienna might lead to a satisfactory result. For that reason it was best to await the results of this conversation. Sir Edward Goschen communicated this to London and received a telegraphic answer in which Sir Edward Grey used these words : " As long as there is a prospect of a direct exchange of views between Austria and Russia, I would suspend every other suggestion, as I entirely agree that it is the most preferable method of all." Thus Sir Edward Grey accepted the German point of view at that time, and ex- pressly withdrew his proposal of a conference for the time being. However, unlike Sir Edward Grey, I did not permit matters to rest with the platonic wish that a direct conversation might ensue between Vienna and Petrogi*ad, but did everything within my power to persuade the Russian and the Austro-Hungarian governments to discuss their difTerences by an exchange of opinions between their respective cabinets. I have once before declared in this very place that our endeavors July 28, British Blue Book No. 67 269 tion, as I entirely agree that it is the most preferable method of all. I understand that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has proposed a friendly exchange of views to the Austrian Government, and, if the latter accepts, it will no doubt relieve the tension and make the situation less critical. It is very satisfactory to hear from the German Ambassador here that the German Government have taken action at Vienna in the sense of the conversation recorded in my telegram of yesterday to you.^ at medialion, especially in Vienna, had been carried on in a manner, which, as I stated at the time, " went to the extreme limits of all that was compatible with our relations as an ally." Since this activity of mine as a mediator in the interests of preserving the peace has been repeatedly called in question in England, I shall prove by the evidence of facts that all these accusations are without foundation. On the evening of July 29 the following communication of the Imperial Ambassador at Petrograd reached Berlin : " M. Sazonof, who has just requested me to see him, communicates to me that the Vienna Cabinet had replied with a categorical refusal to consider the desire he had expressed to enter into direct conversations. There was therefore nothing left to do save to return to the proposal of a conversation of four, as made by Sir Edward Grey." Since the Vienna government had in the meantime declared itself prepared for a direct exchange of views with Petrograd, it was clear that there must be some mis- understanding. 1 telegraphed to Vienna and made use of the opportunity once more to make a clear announcement of my own conception of the situation as a whole. My instructions to Herr von Tschirschky were as follows : " The communication of Count Pourtales is not in accordance with the represen- tations which Your Excellency has made of the attitude of the Austrian-Hungarian government. Apparently there is some misunderstanding which I beg you to explain. We cannot expect of Austria-Hungary a willingness to negotiate with Serbia, with whom she is already in a state of war.i But the refusal of all interchange of opinion with Petrograd would be a grave mistake. We are indeed prepared to fulfil our duty as an ally, but should Austria-Hungary ignore our advice, we must nevertheless decline to be drawn into a world conflagration, through Austria-Hungary ignoring our advice. Your Excellency will therefore at once and with all emphasis and earnestness express yourself in this sense to Count Berchtold." Herr von Tschirschky in answer to this communicated on July 30 : " Count von Berchtold states that, as Your Excellency assumes, there has indeed been some misunderstanding in question, and that on the part of Russia. Having already received word of this misunderstanding also through Count Szapary, the Austrian-Hungarian Ambassador in Petrograd, and having at the same time followed our urgent suggestion that he enter into communication with Russia, he had at once given the necessary instructions to Count Szapary." Gentlemen, I made all this known to the British press, when excitement in England increased shortly before the outbreak of the war, and serious doubts as to our en- deavors to preserve peace became audible. And now after the event, that press makes the insinuation that this occurrence had never taken place at all and that the instructions to Herr von Tschirschky had been invented in order to mislead public opinion in England. You will agree with me that this accusation is unworthy of an answer. I would also allude at the same time to the Austrian Red Book which merely confirms my presentation of the case and shows how after the aforesaid misunder- standing had been cleared up, the conversations between Petrograd and Vienna had begun to take their course, until the general mobilization of the Russian army brought them to an untimely end. I repeat, gentlemen, that we have supported the direct discussion between Vienna and Petrograd with the utmost emphasis and success. The assertion that we, by refusing to accept the English suggestion of a conference, must accept the blame for this war, belongs to the category of those calumnies under cover of which our enemies endeavor to hide their own guilt. The war became un- avoidable only through the Russian mobilisation. 1 Cf . British Blue Book No. 46, July 27, and German White Book, Exhibit 15, same date. The effect of Germany's continued pressure on Austria-Hungary appears from French Yellow Book No. 104, July 30. See also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 44, July 29. 270 Official Diplomatic Documents To Berlin British Blue Book No. 68 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 28, 1914. German Government, having accepted principle of mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, if necessary, I am ready to propose that the German Secretary of State should suggest the lines on which this principle should be applied. I will, however, keep the idea in reserve ^ until we see how the conversations between Austria and Russia progress. To St. Petersburgh British Blue Book No. 69 Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Bux^hanan, British Ambassador at St. Peters- burgh. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 28, 1914. It is most satisfactory that there is a prospect of direct exchange of views between the Russian and Austrian Governments, as reported in your telegram of the 27th July.^ I am ready to put forward any practical proposal that would facilitate this, but I am not quite clear as to what the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes ^ the Ministers at Belgrade should do. Could he not first mention in an exchange of views with Austria his willingness to co-operate in some such scheme ? It might then take more concrete shape. Russia : To London Russian Orange Book No. 43 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at London. [See No. 54 of British Correspondence, July 28, 1914.] From Fiume RussLAJj Orange Book No. 44 Russian Consul General at Fiume to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Fiume, July 15 (28), 1914. State of siege has been proclaimed in Slavonia, in Croatia, and at Fiume, and the reservists of all classes have also been called up. ^ Again Sir E. Grey defers to Sazonof's direct conversation idea. « British Blue Book No. 55, July 27. » The proposal referring to the Ministers at Belgrade has been omitted from the despatch No. 55, to which the Official Blue Book refers here. July 28, Russian Orange Book No. 4^ 271 From Vienna Russian Orange Book No. 45 Russian Ambassador at Vienna Affairs. Vienne, le 15 {28) juillet, 1914. (Telegraphique.) J'ai entretenu aujourd'hui le Comte Berchtold ^ dans le sens des instructions de votre Ex- cellence. Je lui fis observer, en termes les plus amicaux, combien il etait desirable de trouver une solution qui, en consolidant les bons rapports entre TAutriche- Hongrie et la Russie, donnerait a la Monarchic austro-hongroise des garanties serieuses pour ses rapports futurs avec la Serbie. J'attirais I'attention du Comte Berchtold ^ sur tons les dangers pour la paix de I'Europe, qu'en- trainerait un conflit arme entre I'Autriche-Hongrie et la Serbie. Le Comte Berchtold ^ me re- pondit qu'il se rendait parfaite- ment compte du serieux de la situation et des avantages d'une franche explication avec le Cabi- net de Saint-Petersbourg. II me dit que d'un autre cote le Gou- vernement austro-hongrois, qui ne s'etait decide que tres mal volontiers aux mesures ener- giques qu'il avait prises contre la Serbie, ne pouvait plus ni reculer, ni entrer en discussion aucune des termes de la note austro- hongroise. Le Comte Berchtold ^ ajouta que la crise etait devenue si aigue, et que I'excitation de Topinion publique avait atteint tel degre. to Russian Minister for Foreign (Translation.) Vienna, July 15 {28), 1914. (Telegraphic.) I SPOKE to Count Berchtold^ to-day in the sense of 'your Excellency's instructions.^ I brought to his notice, in the most friendly manner, how desir- able it was to find a solution which, while consolidating good relations between Austria-Hun- gary and Russia, would give to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy genuine guarantees for its future relations with Servia. I drew Count Berchtold's ^ attention to all the dangers to the peace of Europe which would be involved by an armed conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia. Count Berchtold ^ replied that he was well aware of the gravity of the situation and of the ad- vantages of a frank explanation with the St. Petersburgh Cabi- net. He told me that, on the other hand, the Austro-Hun- garian Government, who had only decided much against their will on the energetic measures which they had taken against Servia, could no longer recede, nor enter into any discussion about the terms of the Austro- Hungarian note. Count Berchtold ^ added that the crisis had become so acute, and that public opinion had risen to such a pitch of excitement, 1 Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 2 No despatch containing these instructions is printed in the Russian Orange Book. 272 Official Diplomatic Documents que le Gouvernement, le voulait- that the Government, even if il, ne pouvait plus y consentir, they wished it, could no longer d'autant moins, me dit-il, que consent to such a course. This la reponse meme de la Serbie was all the more impossible, he donne la preuve du manque de said, inasmuch as the Servian sincerite de ses promesses pour reply itself furnished proof of Tavenir. the insincerity of Servia's promises for the future. From Berlin Russian Orange Book No. 46 Russian Charge d' Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Berlin, July 15 {28), 1914. The Wolff Bureau has not published the text of the Servian reply, although it was communicated to them. Up to the present this note has not appeared in extenso in any of the local papers, which, to all appearances, do not wish to publish it in their columns, being well aware of the calming ^ effect which it would have on German readers. From Vienna Russian Orange ^ook No. 47 Russian Ambassador at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Vienna, July 15 {28), 1914. The order for general mobilisation has been signed.^ To London Russian Orange Book No. 48 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at London. (Telegram.) St. Petersburg, July 15 {28), 1914. In face of the hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Servia, it is necessary that Great Britain should take instant mediatory action,^ and that the military measures undertaken by Austria against 1 Germany undoubtedly waited until she received the Austro-Hungarian com- ments, which were sent by mail from Vienna on July 27 (see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 39, July 28). German newspapers are always antedated, the paper dated July 28 being issued on the evening of July 27. 2 If "signed" means issued, this information is probably inaccurate. For a com- plete discussion of this subject see M. P. Price, The Diplomatic History of the War, Chas. Scribner's Sons, p. 69, who says "This confirms the supposition that Austria had not mobilised more than eight army corps before August 1st." 2 Sazonof apparently had now given up his plan of direct conversation with Austria, which he had sought since July 26, and also Sir E. Grey's plan of a conference, and July 28, Serbian Blue Book No. Jfi 273 Servia should be immediately suspended. Otherwise mediation will only serve as an excuse to make the question drag on, and will meanwhile make it possible for Austria to crush Servia completely and to acquire a dominant position in the Balkans. Sent to Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome. Serbia : From Vienna Serbian Blue Book No. 45 ^ Count Leopold Berchtold, Au^tro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. N. Pashitch, Serbian Prime Minister and Min- ister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 15/28, 1914. The Royal Serbian Government not having answered in a satis- factory manner the note of July 10/23, 1914, presented by the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, the Imperial and Royal Government are themselves compelled to see to the safeguarding of their rights and interests, and, with this object, to have recourse to force of arms. Austria-Hungary consequently considers herself henceforward in state of war with Serbia. ^ To All Serbian Legations Serbian Blue Book No. 46 M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad, (Telegraphic.) Nish, July 15/28, 1914. The Austro-Hungarian Government declared war on Serbia at noon to-day by an open telegram to the Serbian Government. To Petrograd Serbian Blue Book No. 47 Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Your Excellency, Petrograd, July 15/28, 1914. I HAVE the honour to inform Your Excellency that I have received from M. Pashitch the following urgent telegram despatched from Nish at 2.10 p.m. urged the other plan of British direct mediation which probably had been outlined in the third despatch referred to in French Yellow Book No. 76, July 28, but not printed in full in the Yellow Book or in the Blue Book. Cf. also British Blue Book No. 44, July 27. 1 For Serbian Blue Book No. 44 see July 30, 1914. „ , x 2 This was notified to the Powers in a despatch printed British Blue Book No. 50, July 28. 274 Official Diplomatic Documents "The Austro-Hungarian Government declared war on Serbia to-day at noon by an open telegram to the Serbian Government." I have the honour to inform Your Excellency of this regrettable act, which a Great Power had the courage to commit against a small Slav country which only recently emerged from a long series of heroic but exhausting battles, and I beg leave on this occasion of deep gravity for my country, to express the hope that this act, which disturbs the peace of Europe and revolts her conscience, will be condemned by the whole civilised world and severely punished by Russia, the protector of Serbia.^ I beg Your Excellency to be so kind as to lay this petition from the whole Serbian nation before the throne of His Majesty. I take this opportunity to assure Your Excellency of my loyalty ^ and respect. I have, etc. 1 Cf. also the appeal of the Serbian Crown Prince, Russian Orange Book No. 6, July 24, and the Czar's reply, Russian Orange Book No. 40, July 27. 2 According to one's interpretation of the Serbian relations to Russia, the word "loyalty" is either significant or merely a polite phrase. July 29 y 1914 275 Wednesday, July 29, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary London, Petrograd, Paris, Berlin, Petro- Paris, and Rome grad Berlin Belgium London etc. France London etc., London Rome, Petrograd, Brus- sels, Frankfort, Mu- nich, Vienna, Berlin, London, Belgrade Germany Paris Emperor to Czar Czar to Emperor Great Britain Rome, Berlin, Paris, Berlin, Petrograd, Vi- Vienna enna, Rome, Con- stantinople, Nish, from Russian Am- bassador Russia Berlin, London and Berlin, Nish, ^aris, Paris, London Serbia Paris Serbian Crownprince to Czar. Austria-Hungary makes renewed efforts to convince the Powers of the justice of her case, and unequivocally accepts Sir E. Grey's first proposal of mediation between Petrograd and Vienna. At the same time, while refusing to discuss the "wording of the note," she is ready to have direct conversations with Petrograd on "a much broader basis of discussion in declaring that she had no desire to injure any Russian interests" nor to annex territory or to touch the "sovereignty of Serbia." She is much disturbed by French and especially Russian mobilisation and announces that the latter may force her to proceed to general mobilisation on her part. Belgium announces that she has " decided to place her army upon a strengthened peace footing." France continues to be suspicious of Germany, whom she holds responsible for Austria-Hungary's determination to put a stop to Serbian intrigues. While publishing many notices to the effect that Germany and Austria-Hungary were mobilising, she makes no mention of the Russian mobilisation except as measures of defence forced upon Russia. Several of the French despatches published on this day are by their contents proved to have been written earlier. Germany is greatly troubled by the mobilisation going on in France and Russia and declares that if it continues she will have, to declare Kriegsgefahr. The Emperor exchanges telegrams with the Czar begging him to intercede for peace. Germany continues her pressure on Austria to come to an understanding with Russia, and wishes to work together with Great Britain, whose neutrality she wishes to secure in case of war. Great Britain believes direct conversations between Vienna and Petrograd "the best possible solution." Sir E. Grey is erroneously informed that Austria- Hungary has refused them, and reverting to his conierence or mediation plan declares his willingness to accept "any method that Germany thought possible in the interests of peace." In case of war, Sir E. Grey declares, England would "have to decide what British interests required." The suggestion of a possible invasion of Belgium first broached on this day is not denounced as wrong. Sir E. Grey also 276 Official Diplomatic Documents suggests that Austria should halt after taking Belgrade to give the Powers the chance of adjusting the difficulties. Russia claims that Russian interests were in this case Serbian interests. She also claims that Austria-Hungary had ** categorically refused to continue an exchange of ideas," and mobilises the districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, and Kasan. Receiving France's promise of unconditional support she "hastens" her "military preparations." Serbia does not publish any documents of this day. Italy suggests that Austria-Hungary "convert into a binding engagement to Europe" her declaration that she wished neither "to destroy the independence of Serbia nor to acquire Serbian territory." Unfortunately this suggestion was not pressed, for Italy believed that thus "Russia might be induced to remain quiet." Austria-Hungary : To St. Petersburgh, London^ Paris, and Rome AUSTROHUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 44 Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at St. Peters- burgh, London, Paris, and Rome. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 29, 1914. For your Excellency's information. I have to-day handed to the Imperial German Ambassador the following memorandum in answer to a demarche made here by him : ^ Memorandum The Imperial and Royal Government have received with deep gratitude information of the communication which the Imperial Ger- man Ambassador made to them on the 28th inst.^ with regard to the request of the British Cabinet that the Imperial German Govern- ment should use their influence with the Vienna Cabinet that they might regard the answer from Belgrade either as satisfactory, or as a basis for discussion. So far as concerns what was said by the British Secretary of State to Prince Lichnowsky, the Imperial and Royal Government desire in the first place to draw attention to the fact that the Servian answer in no way contains an acceptance of all our demands with one single exception, as Sir E. Grey appears to assume,^ but rather that on most points reservations are formulated, which materially detract from the value of the concessions which are made. The points which are not accepted are, however, precisely those which contain some guarantee for the real attainment of the end in view. The Imperial and Royal Government cannot conceal their aston- ishment at the assumption that their action against Servia was directed against Russia and Russian influence in the Balkans, for this implies the supposition that the propaganda directed against the Monarchy has not merely a Servian but a Russian origin.^ The basis 1 This seems to refer to German White Book, Exhibit 15, July 27, and Exhibit 14, July 28. See also British Blue Book No. 84, July 29. 2 British Blue Book Nos. 46 and 48, July 27. ' The logic of this inference is from the Austro-Hungarian point of view irrefutable. July 29, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 45 277 of our consideration has hitherto been rather that official Russia has no connection with these tendencies, which are hostile to the Mon- archy, and that our present action is directed exclusively against Servia, while our feelings for Russia, as we can assure Sir E. Grey, are entirely friendly. Further, the Imperial and Royal Government must point out that to their great regret they are no longer in a position to adopt an attitude towards the Servian reply in the sense of the British sug- gestion, since at the time of the demarche made by Germany a state of war between the Monarchy and Servia had already arisen, and the Servian reply has accordingly already been outstripped by events. The Imperial and Royal Government take this opportunity of observing that the Royal Servian Government, even before they communicated their reply, had taken steps towards the mobilisation of the Servian forces, and thereafter they allowed three days to elapse without showing any inclination to abandon the point of view con- tained in their reply, whereupon the declaration of war followed on our side. If the British Cabinet is prepared to use its influence on the Rus- sian Government with a view to the maintenance of peace between the Great Powers, and with a view to the localisation of the war which has been forced upon us by many years of Servian intrigues, the Imperial and Royal Government could only welcome this.^ From Paris Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 45 Count Szecsen to Count BercUold. (Telegraphic.) > Paris, July 29, 1914. France is unmistakably making certain military preparations as is announced by the newspapers, perhaps with a certain exag- geration. As I learn in strictest confidence. Baron Schoen is commissioned to discuss these preparations ^ with M. Viviani to-day, and to point out that in these circumstances Germany may be compelled to take similar measures which necessarily could not be kept secret, and which could not fail to cause great public excitement when they be- came known. In this way the two countries, although they are only striving for peace, will be compelled to at least a partial mobilisation, which would be dangerous. Further, in accordance with these instructions. Baron Schoen will declare that Germany has a lively desire that the conflict' between us and Servia should remain localised, and that in this Germany relies on the support of France. 1 This is an unequivocal acceptance of Sir E. Grey's original proposal of mediation between Petrograd and Vienna. 2 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30, referring to "yesterday afternoon," i.e. July 29. 278 Official Diplomatic Docuvients From Berlin AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 46 Count Szogyeny to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 29, 1914. As early as Sunday the German Government declared at St. Peters- burgh that Russian mobilisation would have as a consequence German mobilisation.^ Thereupon there followed on the part of Russia the reply announced in my telegram of the 27th inst.^ Following this a telegram has to-day been sent to St. Petersburgh, stating that owing to the fur- ther progress of the Russian measures of mobilisation Germany might be brought to mobilise.^ From St. Petersburgh AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 47 Ccmnt Szdpdry to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July.29, 1914. As I have learned from the German Ambassador that M. Sazonof is showing himself greatly excited over your Excellency's alleged disinclination to continue the exchange of ideas with Russia, and over the mobilisation of Austria-Hungary, which is supposed to be much more extensive than is necessary, and, therefore, directed against Russia, I visited the Minister in order to remove certain misunder- standings which seemed to me to exist. The Minister began by making the point that Austria-Hungary categorically refused to continue an exchange of ideas. I agreed in view of your Excellency's telegram of the 28th July that your Excellency had indeed declined, after all that had occurred, to dis- cuss the wording of the note, and in general the Austro-Hungarian- Servian conflict, but said that I must make it clear that I was in a position to suggest a much broader basis of discussion ^ in declaring that we had no desire to injure any Russian interests, that we had no intention, naturally on the assumption that 'the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia remained localised, of annexing Servian territory, and that we also had no idea of touching the sovereignty of Servia. I was convinced that your Excellency would always be ready to keep in touch with St. Petersburgh with regard to Austro-Hun- garian and Russian interests. M. Sazonof gave me to understand that he had been convinced of this so far as territory was concerned, but so far as the sovereignty of 1 Cf. German White Book Exhibits 10 and 10&, July 26. 2 See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 33, July 27. 'Not given in the German White Book or the Russian Orange Book. Cf. Austro- Hungarian Red Book No. 42, July 28. * Cf. Chancellor's Speech, note to British Blue Book No. 67, July 28. See also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 50, July 30. July 29, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 4? 279 the country was in question he must continue to hold the opinion that to force on Servia our conditions would result in Servia becoming a vassal State. This, however, would upset the equilibrium in the Balkans, and this was how Russian interests became involved. He returned to the question of a discussion of the note, the action of Sir E. Grey, etc., and he desired again to point out to me that Russia recognised our legitimate interest, and desired to give it full satis- faction, but that this should be clothed in a form which would be acceptable to Servia. I expressed the view that this was not a Rus- sian but a Servian interest, whereupon M. Sazonof claimed that Russian interests ^ were in this case Servian interests, so that I was obliged to make an end of the vicious circle by going on to a new topic. I mentioned that I had heard that there was a feeling of anxiety in Russia, because we had mobilised eight corps for action against Servia. M. Sazonof assured me that it was not he (who knew nothing about this) but the Chief of the General Staff who had expressed this anxiety. I endeavoured to convince the Minister that any unpreju- diced person could easily be persuaded that our southern corps could not constitute a menace for Russia. I indicated to the Minister that it would be well if his Imperial Master were informed of the true situation, more especially as it was urgently necessary, if it was desired to maintain peace, that a speedy end should be put to the military competition (lizitieren) which now threatened to ensue on account of false news. M. Sazonof very characteristically expressed the view that he could communicate this io the Chief of the General Staff, for he saw His Majesty every day. The Minister further informed me that a Ukase would be signed to-day, which would give orders for a mobilisation in a somewhat extended form. He was able, however, to assure me in the most official way that these troops were not intended to attack us. They would only stand to arms in case Russian interests in the Balkans should he in danger. An explanatory note would make this clear, for the question here was one of a measure of precaution which the Emperor Nicholas had found to be justified, since we, who in any case have the advantage of quicker mobilisation, have now also al- ready so great a start. In earnest words I drew M. Sazonof's atten- tion to the impression which such a measure would make in our country. I went on to express doubt whether the explanatory note would be calculated to soften the impression, whereupon the Minister again gave expression to assurances regarding the harmlessness( ! ) of this measure. 1 A possible explanation of the remark that "Russian interests were in this case Serbian interests "may be found in British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, where Sazonof cannot allow "Austria to become the predominant Power in the Balkans." 280 Official Diplomatic Documents To Berlin AUSTROHUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 48 Count Berchtold to Count Szogyeny at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 29, 1914. I HAVE just heard from Herr von Tschirschky, that the Russian Ambassador has told him that he has been notified by his Government that the military districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow and Kasan are being mobilised. He said that Russia was outraged in her honour as a Great Power/ and was obliged to take corresponding measures. The Russian mobilisation is confirmed by the commanders of our- Galician forces, and, according to a communication from the Imperial and Royal Military Attache, in a conversation which M. Sazonof had to-day with the German Ambassador it was no longer denied.^ I request your Excellency to bring the above without delay to the knowledge of the German Government, and at the same time to emphasise that if the Russian measures of mobilisation are not stopped without delay, our general mobilisation would have, on military grounds, to follow at once. As a last effort to maintain the peace of Europe, I considered it desirable that our representative and the representative of Germany at St. Petersburgh, and, if necessary, at Paris, should at once be instructed to declare to the Governments to whom they are ac- credited in a friendly manner, that the continuance of the Russian mobilisation would have as a result counter-measures in Germany and Austria-Hungary, which must lead to serious consequences.^ Your Excellency will add that, as can be understood, in our military operations against Servia we will not allow ourselves to be diverted from our path. The Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at St. Petersburgh and Paris are receiving identical instructions to make the above declara- tion as soon as their German colleague receives similar instructions. To St. Petersburgh AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 49 Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburgh. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 30, 1914. In answer to your Excellency's telegram of the 29th July. I am of course still ready to explain to M. Sazonof, through your Excellency, the various points contained in our note addressed to 1 The reason why "Russia was outraged in her honour as a Great Power" is not given. The interesting part of this passage is that Austria-Hungary was not the only country which beUeved that her honor as a Great Power demanded a certain course of action of her. 2 See German White Book, Narrative, pp. 351 to 360. ' This was evidently an attempt on Austria's part to keep the peace among the nations. July 29, French Yelloiv Book No. 84 281 Servia which however has already been outstripped by recent events. I should also attach special importance, in accordance with the sug- gestion made to me through M. Schebeko, also to discussing on this occasion in a confidential and friendly manner the questions which affect directly our relations towards Russia. From this it might be hoped that it would be possible to remove the ambiguities which have arisen and to secure the development in a friendly manner of our relations towards our neighbours, which is so desirable an object.^ Belgium : To Berlin, Paris, London, Vienna, St Petersburgh, Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg Belgian Gray Book No. 8 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, Paris, London, Vienna, St. Petersburg, Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg. Sir, • ' Brussels, July 29, 1914. The Belgian Government have decided to place the army upon a strengthened peace footing. This step should in no way be confused with mobilisation. Owing to the small extent of her territory, all Belgium consists, in some degree, of a frontier zone. Her army on the ordinary peace footing consists of only one class of armed militia ; on the strengthened peace footing, owing to the recall of three classes, her army divisions and her cavalry division comprise effective units of the same strength as those of the corps permanently maintained in the frontier zones of the neighbouring Powers. This information will enable you to reply to any questions which may be addressed to you. France : From Rome French Yellow Book No. 84 M. Barrere, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Rome, July 29, 1914. The Consulta considers that, in spite of the declaration of war by Austria on Servia, there is no reason why the diplomatic efforts for calling together a conference at London with a view to mediation should be interrupted. Barkere. 1 This is another evidence that Germany's influence upon Vienna was having effect or that Austria-Hungary of her own accord was willing to try and avert a general war by making explanations to Russia. 282 Official Diplomatic Documents To St. Petersburgh, London, Berlin, Rome, Vienna, Constantinople. French Yellow Book No. 85 M. Bienxenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to St. Petersburgh, London, Berlin, Rome, Vienna, Constantinople, Belgrade. Paris, July 29, 1914. The Austro-German attitude is becoming clearer. Austria, un- easy concerning the Slav propaganda, has seized the opportunity ^ of the crime of Serajevo in order to punish the Servian intrigues, and to obtain in this quarter guarantees which, according as events are allowed to develop or not, will either affect only the Servian Government and army, or become territorial questions. Germany intervenes ^ between her ally and the other Powers and declares that the question is a local one, namely, the punishment of a political crime committed in the past, and for the future sure guarantees that the anti- Austrian intrigues will be put an end to. The German Government thinks that Russia should be content with the official and formal assurances given by Austria, to the effect that she does not seek territorial aggrandisement and that she will respect the in- tegrity of Servia ; in these circumstances the danger of war can only come from Russia, if she seeks to intervene in a question which is well defined. In these circumstances any action for the mainten- ance of peace must therefore take place at St. Petersburgh alone. This sophism,^ which would relieve Germany from intervening at Vienna, has been maintained unsuccessfully at Paris by Herr von Schoen, who has vainly endeavoured to draw us into identical Franco- German action at St. Petersburgh ; it has been also expounded in London to Sir E. Grey. In France, as in England, a reply was given that the St. Petersburgh Cabinet have, from the beginning, given the greatest proofs of their moderation, especially by associating themselves with the Powers in advising Servia to yield to the re- quirements of the Austrian note. Russia does not therefore in any way threaten peace ; it is at Vienna that action must be taken ; it is from there that the danger will come, from the moment that they refuse to be content with the almost complete submission of Servia to exorbitant demands ; that they refuse to accept the co-operation of the Powers in the discussion of the points which remain to be arranged between Austria and Servia ; and, finally, that they do not hesitate to make a declaration of war as precipitate as the original Austro-Hungarian note. The attitude at Berlin, as at Vienna, is still dilatory. In the former capital, while protesting that the Germans desire to safe- 1 The U. S. diplomatic agent, Mr. F. H. Mallett, reported to the Department of State in Washington at the time that the Serajevo murder was undoubtedly instigated by Serbia, and that a world war might ensue. See New York Herald, July 30, 1914. ' For Germany's explanation of her action, see German White Book, Exhibit 1, and British Blue Book No. 67, July 28, with note. ' Granting that this term is used in all sincerity, it shows how widely apart France and Germany were in viewing the events leading up to the war, since the expression of Germany's honest belief appeared as a " sophism " to France. July 29, French Yellow Booh No. 87 283 guard general peace by common action between the four Powers, the idea of a conference is rejected without any other expedient being suggested/ and while they refuse to take any positive action at Vienna. In the Austrian capital they would like to keep St. Peters- burgh in play with the illusion of an entente which might result from direct conversations, while they are taking action against Servia. In these circumstances it seems essential that the St. Petersburgh Cabinet, whose desire to unravel this crisis peacefully is manifest, should immediately give their adherence to the British proposal.^ This proposal must be strongly supported at Berlin in order to decide Herr von Jagow to take real action at Vienna capable of stopping Austria and preventing her from supplementing her diplomatic ad- vantage by military successes. The Austro-Hungarian Government would, indeed, not be slow to take advantage of it in order to im- pose on Servia, under the elastic expression of "guarantees," condi- tions which, in spite of all assurances that no territorial aggrandise- ment was being sought, would in effect modify the status of Eastern Europe, and would run the risk of gravely compromising the general peace either at once or in the near future. Bienvenu-Martin. From St Petersburgh French Yellow Book No. 86 M. Paleologuey French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. St. Petersburgh, July 29, 1914. I AM now in a position to assure Your Excellency that the Russian Government will acquiesce in any measures which France and Great Britain may propose in order to maintain peace. My British col- league is telegraphing to London to the same effect.^ Paleologue. From Brussels French Yellow Book No. 87 M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Brussels, July 29, 1914. I REPORT the following impressions of my interview with M. Davignon and with several persons in a position to have exact in- 1 This is an error, see Chancellor's Speech in note to British Blue Book No. 67, July 28. 2 This shows that Russia had not accepted the conference idea on July 29. France and Russia, therefore, seem to be working somewhat at variance with each other — see, however, next number. , c^ e, .,i- 3 British Blue Book No. 78, July 29, which gives as the reason for Sazonof s willmg- ness to have a conference that the "Austrian Government had now definitely declined direct conversation." See, however, Chancellor's Speech in note to British Blue Book No. 67, July 28. 284 Official Diplomatic Documents formation. The attitude of Germany is enigmatical and justifies every apprehension ; it seems improbable that the Austro-Hungarian Government would have taken an initiative which would lead, ac- cording to a pre-conceived plan, to a declaration of war, without previous arrangement with the Emperor William.^ The German Government stand ''with grounded arms'' ready to take peaceful or warlike action as circumstances may require, but there is so much anxiety everywhere that a sudden intervention against us would not surprise anybody here. My Russian and British colleagues share this feeling. The Belgian Government are taking steps which harmonise with the statement made to me yesterday by M. Davignon that every- thing will be put in readiness for the defence of the neutrality of the country. Klobukowski. From Frankfort French Yellow Book No. 88 M. Ronssin, French Consul-General at Frankfort^ to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Frankfort, July 29, 1914. I NOTIFY you of important movements of troops yesterday and to-night. This morning several regiments in service dress arrived here, especially by the roads from Darmstadt, Cassel, and Mayence, which are full of soldiers. The bridges and railways are guarded under the pretext ^ of preparations for the autumn manoeuvres. Ronssin. From Munich French Yellow Book No. 89' M. Allize, French Minister at Munich, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Act- ing Minister for Foreign Affairs. Munich, July 29, 1914. I AM informed that the mills at Illkirch (Alsace-Lorraine) have been asked to stop delivery to their ordinary clients and to keep all their output for the army. From Strassburg information has been received of the transport of motor guns used for firing on aeroplanes and dirigibles. Under the pretext of a change in the autumn manoeuvres the non- commissioned officers and men of the Bavarian infantry regiments at ^ This seems to have been France's firm conviction. For a discussion of Germany's influence or lack of influence on Austria-Hungary see John W. Burgess, The European War, A. C. McClurg & Co., Chicago. 2 The annual manoeuvres in Germany begin in July. For the subject of German mobilisation see M. G. Price, The Diplomatic History of the War, Chas. Scribner's Sons, and E. von Mach, Germany's Point of View. » See note to No. 88. July 29, French Yellow Book No. 91 285 Metz, who were on leave in Bavaria for the harvest, received orders yesterday to return immediately. Allize. From Vienna French Yellow Book No. 90* M, Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, July 29, 1914. The French Consul at Prague confirms the mobilisation of the 8th army corps which had already been announced, and that of the Landwehr division of this army corps. The cavalry divisions in Galicia are also mobilising; regiments and cavalry divisions from Vienna and Budapest have already been transported to the Russian frontier. Reservists are now being called together in this district. There is a rumour that the Austro-Hungarian Government, in order to be in a position to meet any danger, and perhaps in order to impress St. Petersburgh, intend to decide on a general mobilisa- tion of their forces on the 30th July, or the 1st August. To conclude, it is certain the Emperor will return from Ischl to Vienna to-morrow. Dumaine. From St. Petersburgh French Yellow Book No. 91 M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. St. Petersburgh, July 29, 1914. The direct conversation, to which the Russian Government had invited the Austro-Hungarian Government in a friendly spirit, has been refused by the latter.^ On the other hand, the Russian General Staff have satisfied them- selves that Austria is hurrying on her military preparations against Russia, and is pressing forward the mobilisation which has begun on the Galician frontier. As a result the order to mobilise will be de- spatched to-night to thirteen army corps, which are destined to operate eventually against Austria. In spite of the failure of his proposal, M. Sazonof accepts ^ the idea of a conference of the four Powers in London ; further, he does not attach any importance to the title officially given to the discus- sions, and will support all British efforts in favour of peace. Paleologue. 1 See note to No. 88. 2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 78, July 29, and for the error in this statement Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29. 3 This contains the information given above as a separate telegram, No. 86. 286 Official Diplomatic Documents From Berlin French Yellow Book No. 92 M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenun Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 29, 1914. I ASKED the Secretary of State to-day ^ how the question of direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburgh, which seemed to him yesterday the best means of arriving at a detente, stood. He answered that at St. Petersburgh they seemed well disposed towards them and that he had asked Vienna to take this course. He was awaiting the reply. The British Government, after seeing the sug- gestion of a conference rejected, had let it be known that they would view with favour the inception of such conversations between Austria and Russia, and had asked Germany to urge Austria, which the Im- perial Government are not failing to do. I asked Herr von Jagow if he had at last received the Servian reply to Austria and what he thought of it. He replied that he saw in it a basis for possible negotiation.^ I added that it was just on that account that I considered the rupture by Austria, after she had received such a document, inexplicable. The Secretary of State then remarked that with Eastern nations one could never obtain sufficient guarantees, and that Austria wished to be able to supervise the carrying out of promises made to her, a supervision which Servia refused. This, in the eyes of the Secretary of State, is the cardinal point. I answered Herr von Jagow that Servia, as she wished to remain independent, was bound to reject the control of a single Power, but that an International Commission would not have the same character. The Balkan States have more than one, for instance the Financial Commission at Athens. One could imagine, I said, for instance, among other combinations, a Pro- visional International Commission, charged with the duty of control- ling the police inquiry demanded by Austria ; it was clear, by this instance, that the reply of Servia opened the door to conversations and did not justify a rupture. 1 then asked the Secretary of State if, leaving aside direct conver- sations between Vienna and St. Petersburgh to which Sir E. Grey had given his adherence, he did not think that common action could be exercised by the four Powers by means of their Ambassadors. He answered in the affirmative, adding that at this moment the London Cabinet were confining themselves to exercising their in- fluence in support of direct conversations. At the end of the afternoon the Imperial Chancellor asked the * The contents of this telegram seem to refer to events of the previous day. 2 This cannot possibly have been said on July 29, since Austria-Hungary had de- clared war on Serbia, and the latter had begun the hostilities on July 27, cf. British Blue Book No. 56 under date of July 28. July 29, French Yellow Booh No. 93 287 British Ambassador to come and see him.^ He spoke to him of the proposal of Sir E. Grey for the meeting of a conference ; he told him that he had not been able to accept a proposal which seemed to im- pose the authority of the Powers on Austria; he assured my col- league of his sincere desire for peace and of the efforts he was mak- ing to that effect at Vienna, but he added that Russia was alone able to maintain peace or let loose war. Sir E. Goschen answered that he did not agree, and that if war broke out Austria would be chiefly responsible, for it was inadmis- sible for her to have broken with Servia after the reply of the latter. Without discussing this point, the Chancellor said that he was trying his utmost to obtain direct conversations between Austria and Russia; he knew that England looked on such conversations with a favourable eye. He added that his own action would be rendered very difficult at Vienna, if it were true that Russia had mobilised fourteen army corps on the Austrian frontier. He asked my colleague to call Sir E. Grey's attention to what he had said. Sir E. Goschen has telegraphed to London to this effect.^ The attitude of the Chancellor is very probably the result of the last interview of Sir E. Grey with Prince Lichnowsky. Up to quite the last days they flattered themselves here that England would remain out of the question, and the impression produced on the Ger- man Government and on the financiers and business men by her attitude is profound. Jules Cambon. From Vienna French Yellow Book No. 93' M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Vienna, July 29, 1914. The opinion of my British, Russian and Italian colleagues agrees with mine concerning the impossibility of preventing the outbreak of hostilities between Austria and Servia, since all attempts to avoid the collision have failed. M. Schebeko had asked that the negotiations begun at St. Peters- • burgh by MM. Sazonof and Szapary should be continued and made more effective by special powers being conferred on the latter, but Count Berchtold has flatly refused. He showed in this way that Austria-Hungary does not tolerate any intervention which would prevent her from inflicting punishment and humiliation on Servia. The Duke of Avarna admits that it is very probable that the im- minence of a general insurrection among the Southern Slav inhab- 1 Cf. British Blue Book No. 71, July 28, received and listed under July 29. This interview took place on July 28, and proves that this French despatch is wrongly dated. 2 British Blue Book No. 71, July 28, but received and therefore hsted under July 29. 3 This despatch, like the previous one, while dated July 29, must have been written before Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, which was on July 28. 288 Official Diplomatic Documents itants precipitated the resolutions of the Monarchy. He still clings to the hope that, after a first success of the Austro-Hungarian arms, .but not before this, mediation might be able to limit the conflict. DUMAINE. To London, Berlin, St. Petershurgh, Rome, Vienna, Constantinople, Belgrade French Yellow Book No. 94 M. Bienmnu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, Berlin, St. Petersburgh, Rome, Vienna, Constantinople, Belgrade. Paris, July 29, 1914. The following communication was semi-officially made to me this morning by the German Ambassador : — "The German Government are still continuing their efforts to obtain the consent of the Austrian Government to a friendly con- versation which would give the latter an opportunity of stating exactly the object and extent of the operations in Servia. The Berlin Cabinet hope to receive declarations which will be of a kind to satisfy Russia. The German efforts are in no way impeded by the declaration of war which has occurred." A similar communication will be made at St. Petersburgh. During the course of a conversation which I had this morning with Baron von Schoen, the latter stated to me that the German Government did not know what the intentions of Vienna were. When Berlin knows how far Austria wishes to go, there will be a basis of discussion which will make conversations with a view to intervention easier. When I observed that the military operations which had been begun would not perhaps allow any time for conversation, and that the German Government ought to use their influence at Vienna to delay them, the Ambassador answered that Berlin could not exer- cise any pressure, but that he hoped that the operations would not be pushed forward very actively. Bienvenu-Martin. To London, Berlin, St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Constantinople, Rome, Belgrade French Yellow Book No. 95 M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, Berlin, St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Constantinople, Rome, Belgrade. Paris, July 29, 1914. M. IsvoLSKY came to me by order of his Government to commu- nicate a telegram addressed by M. Sazonof to Berlin.^ It appears * This telegram is not published either in the Russian Orange Book or the German White Book. It may be the telegram British Blue Book No. 70 published under date of July 29. July 29, ^French Yellow Book No. 96 289 from this information that, in consequence of the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary on Servia, the measures of mobiHsation already taken with regard to the largest part of the Austro-Hungarian army, and finally the refusal ^ of Count Berchtold to continue negotiations between Vienna and St. Petersburgh, Russia had decided to mobilise in the provinces of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow and Kazan. While in- forming the German Government to this effect, the Russian Ambas- sador at Berlin was instructed to add that these military precautions were not in any way directed against Germany, and also did not imply aggressive measures against Austria-Hungary; furthermore the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had not been recalled. The Russian Ambassador also gave me the substance of two tele- grams ^ addressed to London by M. Sazonof : the first, after point- ing out that the declaration of war on Servia put an end to the con- versations of the Russian Minister with the Austrian Ambassador, asked England to exercise her influence, as quickly as possible, with a view to mediation and to the immediate cessation of Austrian military operations (the continuation of which gave Austria time to crush Servia while mediation was dragging on) ; the second com- municated the impression received by M. Sazonof from his conver- sations with the German Ambassador that Germany favours Austria's uncompromising attitude and is not exercising any influence on her. The Russian Minister thinks that the attitude of Germany is very disquieting,^ and considers that England is in a better position than the other Powers to take steps at Berlin with a view to exercising pressure on Vienna. Bienvenu-Martin. From Rome French Yellow Book No. 96 M. Barrere, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Rome, July 29, 1914. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has been officially informed by the Russian Ambassador that his Government, in consequence of the declaration of war by Austria on Servia and of the measures of mobilisation which were from this moment being taken by Austria, had given the order to mobilise in the districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow and Kazan.^ He added that this step had no aggressive character against Germany, and that the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had not been recalled. In speaking of this communication the Marquis di San Giuliano told me that unfortunately throughout this affair Austria and Ger- many had been, and were still, convinced that Russia would not 1 For the error of this statement see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29. 2 British Blue Book Nos. 93, 2 and 3, July 30. ■, . . 3 This statement is not contained in the despatch presented in London. * Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 48, July 29. TJ 290 Official Diplomatic Documents move. In this connection he read to me a despatch from M. Bollati reporting an interview which he had had yesterday with Herr von Jagow, in which the latter had again repeated to him that he did not think that Russia would move. He based this belief on the fact that the Russian Government had just sent an agent to Berlin to treat about some financial questions. The Austrian Ambassador at Berlin also told his British colleague that he did not believe in a general war, since Russia was not in the mood or in the condition to make war.^ The Marquis di San Giuliano does not share this opinion. He thinks that if Austria contents herself with humiliating Servia and with exacting, besides the acceptance of the note, some material advantages which do not involve her territory, Russia can still find some means of coming to an agreement with her. But if Austria wishes either to dismember Servia or to destroy her as an independent State, he thinks that it would be impossible for Russia not to inter- vene by military measures. In spite of the extreme gravity of the situation, the Minister for Foreign Affairs does not seem to me to despair of the possibility of an agreement. He thinks that England can still exercise a great deal of influence at Berlin in the direction of peace. He had yester- day, he told me, a long conversation with the British Ambassador, Sir R. Rodd,^ in order to show him to what extent British interven- tion might be effective. He said to me in conclusion, "If your Government are of the same opinion, they could on their side make representations to this effect in London."^ Rat^rfrf To London French Yellow Book No. 97 M. RenS Vivianiy President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London. Paris, July 29, 1914. I SHOULD be obliged if you would ask Sir E. Grey to be good enough to renew as soon as possible at Berlin, in the form which he may consider most opportune and effective, his proposal of media- tion by the four Powers, which had in principle ^ obtained the ad- herence of the German Government. The Russian Government on their side will have expressed the same desire directly to the British Government ; the declaration of war by Austria on Servia, her sending of troops to the Austro-Rus- sian frontier,^ the consequent Russian mobilisation on the Galician 1 This statement, if true, seems to disprove the assertion popularly made that Germany and Austria-Hungary wished to bring about a general war. 2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 57, written July 27, but received and published under date of July 28. Barr^re says "yesterday," which shows that also this telegram was written, at least in part, on July 28. » For this interview see British Blue Book No. 80, July 29. * British Blue Book No. 46, July 27. ' There is no proof given for this assertion. July 29, French Yellow Book No. 98 291 frontier have in fact put an end to the direct Austro-Russian con- versations. The explanations which the German Government are going to ask for at Vienna, in accordance with the statement of Baron von Schoen which I have reported to you, in order to learn the intention of the Austrian Government, will allow the four Powers to exercise effective action between Vienna and St. Peter sburgh for the main- tenance of peace. I would ask you also to point out to the British Secretary of State how important it would be for him to obtain from the Italian Gov- ernment the most whole-hearted continuance of their support in co-operating in the action of the four Powers in favour of peace. Rene Viviani. From London French Yellow Book No. 98 M, Paul Camhon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, July 29, 191Jf.. In his interview to-day with my German colleague. Sir E. Grey observed that, the overtures of M. Sazonof for direct conversations between Russia and Austria not having been accepted ^ at Vienna, it would be well to return to his proposal of friendly intervention by the four Powers which are not directly interested. This sugges- tion has been accepted in principle ^ by the German Government, but they have objected to the idea of a conference or of mediation. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has invited Prince Lich- nowsky to ask his Government that they should themselves propose a new formula. Whatever it may be, if it admits of the maintenance of peace, it will be accepted by Great Britain, France and Italy. The German Ambassador was to have forwarded Sir E. Grey's request to Berlin immediately. In giving me an account of this conversation, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs added that Germany's reply to this communication and to that of Russia con- cerning the mobilisation of four army corps on the Austrian frontier would allow us to realise the intentions of the German Government. My German colleague having asked Sir E. Grey what the intentions of the British Government were, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that he had nothing to state for the present. Sir E. Grey did not disguise the fact that he found the situation very grave and that he had little hope of a peaceful solution. Paul Cambon. 1 This error makes the round in the Entente despatches. Cf . Austro-Hungarian Ked Book No. 47, July 29, where Austria-Hungary, while unwilling to discuss "the wording of the note," makes it "clear that I [Austro-Hungarian Ambassador] was in a position to suggest a much broader basis of discussion." 2 British Blue Book No. 46, July 27. 292 Official Diplomatic Documents From Belgrade French Yellow Book No. 99 M. Boppe, French Minister at Belgrade, to M. Bienvenu-AIartin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Belgrade, July 29, 1914. The Crown Prince, as soon as the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was received, telegraphed ^ to the Tsar to ask his help. My Russian colleague tells me that he has just communicated to M. Pashitch His Majesty's reply. The Tsar thanks ^ the Prince for having turned to him at so critical a juncture ; he declares that everything has been done to arrive at a peaceful solution of the dispute, and formally assures the Prince that, if this object cannot be attained, Russia will never cease to interest herself in the fate of Servia. BOPPE. From St. Petershurgh French Yellow Book No. 100 M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petershurgh, to M. Bien- venu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. St. Petershurgh, July 29, 1914. The German Ambassador came to tell M. Sazonof that if Russia does not stop her military preparations the German army will re- ceive the order to mobilise. M. Sazonof replied that the Russian preparations have been caused,^ on the one hand, by the obstinate and uncompromising atti- tude of Austria, and on the other hand by the fact that eight Austro- Hungarian army corps are already mobilised. The tong in which Count Pourtales delivered this communication has decided the Russian Government this very night to order the mobilisation of the thirteen army corps which are to operate against Austria. Paleologue. Germany : To Paris German White Book Exhibit 17 Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Paris on July 29th, 1914. News received here regarding French preparations of war multi- plies from hour to hour. I request that you call the attention of the 1 Russian Orange Book No. 6, July 24. 2 Russian Orange Book No. 40, July 27. ' According to this despatch part of the Russian mobilization had taken place pre- viously, while part was to be ordered on the evening of July 29. As regards the earlier mobilization orders cf. the word of honor given by the Russian Chief of Staff, German White Book, p. 556, that up to 3 p.m., July 29, "nowhere there had been a mobilisa- tion, viz. calling in of a single man or horse." July 29, German White Book Exhibit 22 293 French Government to this and accentuate that such measures would call forth counter-measures on our part. We should have to pro- claim threatening state of war {drohende Kriegsgefahr), and while this would not mean a call for the reserves or mobilisation, yet the tension would be aggravated. We continue to hope for the preser- vation of peace. From the Czar German White Book Exhibit 21 II. The Czar to His Majesty. Peterhof Palace, July 29th, 1 P.M. I AM glad that You are back in Germany. In this serious moment I ask You earnestly to help me. An ignominious war has been declared against a weak country and in Russia the indignation which I fully share is tremendous. I fear that very soon I shall be unable to resist the pressure exercised upon me and' that I shall be forced to take measures which will lead to war. To prevent such a calamity as a European war would be, I urge You in the name of our old friendship to do all in Your power to restrain Your ally from going too far. (Signed) ^ Nicolas. To St. Petersburgh German White Book Exhibit 22 III. His Majesty to the Czar. July 29th, 6.30 P.M. I HAVE received Your telegram and I share Your desire for the conservation of peace. However : I cannot — as I told You in my first telegram — consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an " igno- minious war." Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the promises of Servia as long as they are merely on paper are entirely unreliable. According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary is to be considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty that the promises of Servia are effectively translated into deeds. In this opinion I am strengthened by the explanation of the Austrian Cabinet that Aus- tria-Hungary intended no territorial gain at the expense of Servia. I am therefore of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia to remain a spectator in the Austro-Servian war without drawing Europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen. I believe that a direct understanding is possible and desirable between Your Govern- ment and Vienna, an understanding which — as I have already telegraphed You — my Government endeavours to aid with all pos- sible effort. Naturally military measures by Russia, which might be construed as a menace by Austria-Hungary, would accelerate a calamity which both of us desire to avoid and would undermine 294 Official Diplomatic Documents my position as mediator which — upon Your appeal to my friend- ship and aid — I wiUingly accepted. (Signed) Wilhelm. Great Britain: From St. Petersburgh British Blue Book No. 70 Telegrams communicated by Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London, July 29, 1914. (1.) Telegram from M. Sazonof to Russian Ambassador at Berlin, dated Jidy 28, 1914. In consequence of the declaration of war by Austria against Ser- via, the Imperial Government will announce to-morrow (29th) the mobilisation in the military circumscriptions of Odessa, Kieff, Mos- cow, and Kazan. Please inform German Government, confirming the absence in Russia of any aggressive intention against Germany. The Russian Ambassador at Vienna has not been recalled from his post. (2.) Telegram to Courd Benckendorff.^ The Austrian declaration of war clearly puts an end ^ to the idea of direct communications between Austria and Russia. Action by London Cabinet in order to set on foot mediation with a view to suspension of military operations of Austria against Servia is now most urgent. Unless military operations are stopped, mediation would only allow matters to drag on and give Austria time to crush Servia.^ From Berlin British Blue Book No. 71 Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edivard Grey. — {Received July 29.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin,- July 28, 1914. At invitation of Imperial Chancellor, I called upon his Excellency this evening."^ He said that he wished me to tell you that he was most anxious that Germany should work together with England for maintenance of general peace, as they had done successfully in the ^ Russian Ambassador in London. 2 This seems to indicate that Sazonof considered the direct conversations closed. Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29, and footnote 1 to French Yellow Book No. 98, July 29. ' Cf. French Yellow Book No. 95, July 29, where two telegrams from Sazonof to Count BenckendorfT are mentioned. The second one is not given here. It was of a kind to arouse suspicion of Germany. There is, however, nothing either in the British Blue Book or the Russian Orange Book that would have borne it out. * Cf. French Yellow Book No. 92, July 29. July 29, British Blue Book No. 72 295 last European crisis. He had not been able to accept your proposal for a conference ^ of representatives of the Great Powers, because he did not think that it would be effective, and because such a con- ference would in his opinion have had appearance of an "Areopagus" consisting of two Powers of each group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining Powers; but his inability to accept proposed conference must not be regarded as militating against his strong desire for effective co-operation. You could be assured that he was doing his very best both at Vienna and St. Petersburgh to get the two Governments to discuss the situation directly with each other and in a friendly way. He had great hopes that such discussions would take place and lead to a satisfactory result, but if the news were true which he had just read in the papers, that Russia had mobilised fourteen army corps in the south, he thought situation was very serious, and he himself would be in a very difficult position, as in these circumstances it Avould be out of his power to continue to preach moderation at Vienna. He added that Austria, who as yet was only partially mobilising, would have to take similar meas- ures, and if war were to result, Russia would be entirely responsible.^ I ventured to say that if Austria refused to take any notice of Servian note, which, to my mind, gave way in nearly every point demanded by Austria, and which in any case offered a basis for discussion, surely a certain portion of responsibility would rest with her. His Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss Servian note, but that Austria's standpoint, and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel with Servia was a purely Austrian concern with which Russia had nothing to do. He reiterated his desire to co-operate with England and his intention to do his utmost to maintain general peace. "A war between the Great Powers must be avoided" were his last words. Austrian colleague said to me to-day that a general war was most unlikely, as Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make war. I think that that opinion is shared by many people here.^ From St. Petersburgh British Blue Book No. 72 Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Ed- ward Grey. — {Received July 29.) (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 28, 1914. Minister for Foreign Affairs begged me to thank you for the language you had held to the German Ambassador, as reported in 1 From British Blue Book No. 46, July 27, it appears that Germany had accepted "in principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers." 2 This claim made on July 29 is important because later France wished to make it appear that Germany was not sincere and advanced this argument too late to deserve any credence. Cf. French Yellow Book No. 127, August I- 3 If true this would seem to disprove the charge that either Germany or Austria- Hungary was plotting to bring about a world war. 296 Official Diplomatic Documents your telegram ^ to Berlin, substance of which I communicated to his Excellency. He took a pessimistic view of the situation, having received the same disquieting ^ news from Vienna as had reached His Majesty's Government. I said it was important that we should know the real intentions of the Imperial Government, and asked him whether he would be satisfied with the assurances which the Austrian Ambassador had, I understood, been instructed to give in respect of Servians integrity and independence. I added that I was sure any arrangement for averting a European war would be welcomed by His Majesty's Government. In reply his Excellency stated that if Servia were attacked Russia would not be satisfied with any engage- ment which Austria might take on these two points, and that order for mobilisation against Austria would be issued on the day that Austria crossed Servian frontier. I told the German Ambassador, who appealed to me to give moderating counsels to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that from the beginning I had not ceased to do so, and that the German Am- bassador at Vienna should now in his turn use his restraining in- fluence. I made it clear to his Excellency that, Russia being thoroughly in earnest, a general war could not be averted if Servia were attacked by Austria. As regards the suggestion of conference, the Ambassador had received no instructions, and before acting with me the French and Italian Ambassadors are still waiting for their final instructions. From Vienna British Blue Book No. 73 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 29.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. I HAVE received note verbale from Ministry for Foreign Affairs, stating that, the Servian Government not having replied to note of 23rd July ^ in a satisfactory manner, Imperial and Royal Government is compelled itself to provide for protection of its rights, and to have recourse for that object to force of arms. Austria-Hungary has ad- dressed to Servia formal declaration according to article 1 of con- vention of 18th October, 1907, relative to opening of hostilities, and considers herself from to-day in state of war with Servia. Austria- Hungary will conform, provided Servia does so, to stipulations of Hague conventions of 18th October, 1907, and to Declaration of London of 26th February, 1909.^ 1 See No. 46, July 27. « Cf. however, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29. » See No. 4, July 24. * In view of later events this declaration of Austria-Hungary is very important. July 29, British Blue Book No. 75 297 From Vienna British Blue Book No. 74 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 29.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. I AM informed by the Russian Ambassador that the Russian Government's suggestion^ has been decHned by the Austro-Hun- garian Government. The suggestion was to the effect that the means of settling the Austro-Servian conflict should be discussed directly between Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Am- bassador at St. Petersburgh, who should be authorised accordingly. The Russian Ambassador thinks that a conference in London of the less interested Powers, such as you have proposed, offers now the only prospect of preserving peace of Europe, and he is sure that the Russian Government will acquiesce willingly in your proposal. So long as opposing armies have not actually come in contact, all hope need not be abandoned. From Berlin British Blue Book No. 75 Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 29.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 29, 1914. I WAS sent for again to-day by the Imperial Chancellor, who told me that he regretted to state that the Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment, to whom he had at once communicated your opinion, had answered that events had marched too rapidly and that it was there- fore too late ^ to act upon your suggestion that the Servian reply might form the basis of discussion. His Excellency had, on receiv- ing their reply, despatched a message to Vienna, in which he ex- plained that, although a certain desire had, in his opinion, been shown in the Servian reply to meet the demands of Austria, he under- stood entirely that, without some sure guarantees that Servia would carry out in their entirety the demands made upon her, the Austro- Hungarian Government could not rest satisfied in view of their past experience. He had then gone on to say that the hostilities which were about to be undertaken against Servia had presumably the exclusive object of securing such guarantees, seeing that the Aus- trian Government had already assured the Russian Government that they had no territorial designs. He advised the Austro-Hungarian Government, should this view be correct, to speak openly in this sense.^ The holding of such 1 I.e. direct conversations. That this was an error appears from Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29. 2 Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 44, July 29. » Austria-Hungary did so, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29. 298 Official Diplomatic Documents language would, he hoped, eliminate all possible misunderstand- ings. As yet, he told me, he had not received a reply from Vienna. From the fact that he had gone so far in the matter of giving advice at .Vienna, his Excellency hoped that you would realise that he was sincerely doing all in his power to prevent danger of Euro- pean complications. The fact of his communicating this information to you was a proof of the confidence which he felt in you and evidence of his anxiety that you should know he was doing his best to support your efforts in the cause of general peace, efforts which he sincerely appreciated. British Blue Book No. 76 Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edivard Grey. — (Received July 29.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 29, 1914. I FOUND Secretary of State very depressed to-day. He reminded me that he had told me the other day that he had to be very careful in giving advice to Austria, as any idea that they were being pressed would be likely to cause them to precipitate matters and present a fait accompli. This had, in fact, now happened,^ and he was not sure that his communication of your suggestion that Servia's reply offered a basis for discussion had not hastened declaration of war. He was much troubled by reports of mobilisation in Russia, and of certain military measures, which he did not specify, being taken in France. He subsequently spoke of these measures to my French colleague, who informed him that French Government had done nothing more than the German Government had done, namely, re- called officers on leave. His Excellency denied German Government had done this, but as a matter of fact it is true.^ iVIy French col- league said to Under-Secretary of State, in course of conversation, that it seemed to him that when Austria had entered Servia, and so satisfied her military prestige, the moment might then be favourable for four disinterested Powers to , discuss situation and come for- ward with suggestions for preventing graver complications.^ Under- Secretary of State seemed to think idea worthy of consideration, as he replied that would be a different matter from conference proposed by you. Russian Ambassador returned to-day, and has informed Imperial Government that Russia is mobilising in four southern governments. 1 Germany forwarded Sir E. Grey's proposal to Vienna on July 28, and on the same day Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. From this despatch it would seem that the German Secretary of State feared lest it was his urging mediation too strongly that had induced Vienna to declare war. ' Whether Sir E. Goschen was mistaken in this statement or not, it is impossible to state at this writing. From M. P. Price, The Diplomatic History of the War, Chas. Scribner's Sons, chapters on Mobilisation, it would appear that the above statement was erroneous. See also E. von Mach, Germany^ s Point of View, pp. 224 ff. ' This seems to imply France's acquiescence in Austria-Hungary's war on Serbia provided she did not press it too far. July 29, British Blue Book No. 78 299 To Berlin British Blue Book No. 77 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. I MUCH appreciate the language of Chancellor, as reported in your telegram of to-day.^ His Excellency may rely upon it that this country will continue, as heretofore, to strain every effort to secure peace and to avert the calamity we all fear. If he can induce Austria to satisfy Russia and to abstain from going so far as to come into collision with her, we shall all join in deep gratitude to his Excellency for having saved the peace of Europe.^ From St. Petersburgh British Blue Book No. 78 Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Ed- ward Grey. — (Received July 29.) (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 29,1914. Partial mobilisation was ordered to-day. I communicated the substance of your telegram of the 28th in- stant ^ to Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in accordance with your instructions, and informed him confidentially of remarks as to mobilisation which the German Secretary of State had made to the British Ambassador at Berlin. This had already reached his Excellency from another source. The mobilisation, he explained, would only be directed against Austria. Austrian Government had now definitely declined ^ direct conver- sation betw^een Vienna and St. Petersburgh. The Minister for For- eign Affairs said he had proposed such an exchange of views on advice of German Ambassador. He proposed, when informing German Ambassador of this refusal of Austria's, to urge that a return should be made to your proposal for a conference of four Ambassa- dors, or, at all events, for an exchange of views between the three Ambassadors less directly interested, yourself, and also the Austrian Ambassador if you thought it advisable. Any arrangement approved by France and England would be acceptable to him, and he did not care what form such conversations took. No time was to be lost, and the only way to avert war was for you to succeed in arriving, by mean of conversations with Ambassadors either collectively or individually, at some formula which Austria could be induced to 1 See No. 75. 2 This was written after Germany had found herself unable to accept Sir E. Grey's first plan of a conference, accepting it, however, in principle. Since the out- break of the war Germany has been held responsible for the war because she rejected the conference plan. On July 29 Sir E. Grey apparently did not hold the view that Germainy's refusal of accepting his conference plan either indicated Germany's deter- mination to have war, or shut the door to all pacific efifoi:ts. See also note 2 to British Blue Book No. 67, July 28. 3 See No. 67, July 28. ^ This is the same error previously made in the Entente telegrams. See Austro- Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29. 300 Official Diplomatic Documents accept. Throughout Russian Government had been perfectly frank and conciHatory, and had done all in their power to maintain peace. If their efforts to maintain peace failed, he trusted that it would be realised by the British pubhc that it was not the fault of the Russian Government. I asked him whether he would raise objections if the suggestion made in Rome telegram of the 27th July/ which I mentioned to him, were carried out. In reply his Excellency said that he would agree to anything arranged by the four Powers provided it was acceptable to Servia; he could not, he said, be more Servian than Servia.^ Some supplementary statement or explanations would, however, have to be made in order to tone down the sharpness of the ultimatum. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that proposal referred to in your telegram of the 28th instant ^ was one of secondary importance. Under altered circumstances of situation he did not attach weight to it. Further, the German Ambassador had informed his Excel- lency, so the latter told me, that his Government were continuing at Vienna to exert friendly influence. I fear that the German Ambas- sador will not help to smooth matters over, if he uses to his own Government the same language as he did to me to-day. He accused the Russian Government of endangering the peace of Europe by their mobilisation, and said, when I referred to all that had been recently done by Austria, that he could not discuss such matters. I called his attention to the fact that Austrian consuls had warned all Austrian subjects liable to military service to join the colours, that Austria had already partially mobilised, and had now declared war on Servia. From what had passed during the Balkan crisis she knew that this act was one which it was impossible without humilia- tion for Russia to submit to. Had not Russia by mobilising shown that she was in earnest, Austria would have traded on Russia's desire for peace, and would have believed that she could go to any lengths. Minister for Foreign Affairs had given me to understand that Russia would not precipitate war by crossing frontier imme- diately, and a week or more would, in any case, elapse before mobili- sation was completed. In order to find an issue out of a dangerous situation it was necessary that we should in the meanwhile all work together. From Vienna British Blue Book No. 79 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna^ to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 29.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 29, 1914. There is at present no step which we could usefully take to stop war with Servia, to which Austro-Hungarian Government are now fully committed by the Emperor's appeal to his people which has 1 See No. 57, received July 28. * For a similar phrase see British Blue Book No. 47, July 27. « See No. 69, July 28. July 29, British Blue Book No. 80 301 been published this morning, and by the declaration of war. French and Italian Ambassadors agree with me in this view. If the Austro- Hungarian Government would convert into a binding engagement to Europe the declaration which has been made at St. Petersburgh to the effect that she desires neither to destroy the independence of Servia nor to acquire Servian territory, the Italian Ambassador thinks that Russia might be induced to remain quiet. ^ This, how- ever, the Italian Ambassador is convinced the Austrian Government would refuse to do. From Rome British Blue Book No. 80 Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 29.) (Telegraphic.) Rome, July 29, 1914. In your telegram of the 27th instant ^ to Berlin, German Am- bassador was reported to have accepted in principle the idea of a conference. This is in contradiction with the telegram of the 27th instant^ from Berlin.^ Information received by the Italian Government from Berlin shows that German view is correctly represented in Sir E. Goschen's telegram of the 27th July,^ but what creates difficulty is rather the "conference," so the Minister for Foreign Affairs understands, than the principle. He is going to urge, in a telegram which he is sending to Berlin to-night, adherence to the idea of an exchange of views in London. He suggests that the German Secretary of State might propose a formula acceptable to his Government. Minister for For- eign Affairs is of opinion that this exchange of views would keep the door open if direct communication between Vienna and St. Peters- burgh fails to have any result. He thinks that this exchange of views might be concomitant with such direct communication. The German Government are also being informed that the Italian Government would not be pardoned by public opinion here unless they had taken every possible step so as to avoid war. He is urging that the German Government must lend their co-operation in this. He added that there seemed to be a difficulty in making Germany believe that Russia was in earnest. As Germany, however, was really anxious for good relations with ourselves, if she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France he thought it would have a great effect.^ 1 If the Italian Ambassador was right, it is unfortunate that no attempt was made, — at least none appear in the despatches, — to invite Austria-Hungary^ to take this "binding engagement." 2 See No. 46, July 27. 3 See No. 43, July 27. ^ Cf. German White Book, Exhibit 15, July 27, where Germany has taken action "in the sense as desired by Sir Edward Grey." 5 See No. 43, July 27. ^ It is interesting to have Italy use the same argument that Russia had advanced as early as July 24, British Blue Book No. 6. 302 Official Diplomatic Documents Even should it prove impossible to induce Germany to take part, he would still advocate that England and Italy, each as representing one group, should continue to exchange views.^ To Rome British Blue Book No. 81 Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Offix^e, July 29, 1914. With reference to your telegram of yesterday.^ It is impossible for me to initiate discussions with Ambassadors here, as I understand from Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs that Austria will not accept any discussion on basis of Servian note, and the inference of all I have heard from Vienna and Berlin is that Aus- tria will not accept any form of mediation by the Powers as between Austria and Servia.^ Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs must therefore speak at Berlin and Vienna. I shall be glad if a favourable reception is given to any suggestions he can make there. From Constantinople British Blue Book No. 82 Mr. Beaumont, British Charge d^ Affaires at Constantinople, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 29.) (Telegraphic.) Constantinople, July 29, 1914- I UNDERSTAND that the designs of Austria may extend consider- ably beyond the sanjak and a punitive occupation of Servian terri- tory. I gathered this from a remark let fall by the Austrian Am- bassador here, who spoke of the deplorable economic situation of Salonica under Greek administration and of the assistance on which the Austrian army could count from Mussulman population dis- contented with Servian rule.^ From Nish British Blue Book No. 83 Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Ed- ward Grey. — {Received July 29.) (Telegraphic.) Nish, July 29, 1914. 1 HAVE been requested by Prime Minister to convey to you expres- sion of his deep gratitude for the statement which you made on the 27th instant in the House of Commons. ^ For this entire interview cf. French Yellow Book No. 96, July 29. « See No. 64, July 28. 2 Mediation between Austria and Serbia was the French wish rejected by Germany and Austria-Hungary. Germany was in favor of mediation between Vienna and Petrograd. See German White Book, Exhibit 13, July 25. * This despatch stands alone and unsupported by any other. July 29, British Blue Book No. 85 303 To Berlin British Blue Book No. 84 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 29, 1914- The German Ambassador has been instructed by the German Chancellor ^ to inform me that he is endeavouring to mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg!!, and he hopes with good success. Aus- tria and Russia seem to be in constant touch, and he is endeavouring to make Vienna explain in a satisfactory form at St. Petersburgh the scope and extension of Austrian proceedings in Servia. I told the German Ambassador that an agreement arrived at direct between Austria and Russia would be the best possible solution.^ I would press no proposal as long as there was a prospect of that, but my in- formation this morning ^ was that the Austrian Government have declined the suggestion of the Russian Government that the Aus- trian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh should be authorised to discuss directly with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs the means of settling the Austro-Servian conflict. The press correspondents at St. Petersburgh had been told that Russian Government would mobilise. The German Government had said that they were favour- able in principle to mediation between Russia and Austria if necessary. They seemed to think the particular method of conference, consul- tation or discussion, or even conversations a quatre in London too formal a method. I urged that the German Government should suggest any method by which the influence of the four Powers could be used together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation by any method that Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable. In fact media- tion was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would "press the button" in the interests of peace. ^ From Berlin British Blue Book No. 85 ^ Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey, — {Received July 29.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 29, 1914- I WAS asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency had just returned from Potsdam. 1 German White Book, Exhibit 15, July 27. , . t, i t^ i.-u-x ^^ 2 So long, therefore, as Germany was trying (see German White Book, Exhibit 14, July 28) to bring it about, she cannot be blamed for not havmg accepted the farst con- ference plan. ^ . T^ , T, , T.T ^T 3 British Blue Book No. 78, July 29, but see Austro-Hunganan Red Book No. 47, July 29. * Cf. British Blue Book No. 76, July 29, and note 1. , .. 5 In his Introductory Narrative, p. ix. Sir E. Grey calls this despatch a strange response" to his appeal of mediation, No. 84. The juxtaposition of these despatches 304 Official Diplomatic Documents He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to main- tain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue. 1 questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that, so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the* Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium,^ but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany. His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chan- cellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an understanding with England ; he trusted that these as- surances might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it was of course at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which present crisis might possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realisation of his desire. In reply to his Excellency's enquiry how I thought his request would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain full liberty. Our conversation upon this subject having come to an end, I communicated the contents of your telegram of to-day ^ to his Ex- cellency, who expressed his best thanks to you. helps to carry out this suggestion. Nor would it have been possible to prove the error of this presentation if it had not been for the last paragraph, which refers to No. 77 instead of No. 84. The German enquiry about English neutrality was doubtless the result of disquiet- ing information not only from Russia but also from Italy about the attempt made to have Great Britain declare her solidarity with France and Russia (cf . British Blue Book No. 80, note 5, July 29). Sir E. Grey, moreover, had two serious interviews and a private talk with the German Ambassador in the morning and on the afternoon of July 29, see British Blue Book Nos. 88 and 89. This despatch, No. 85, arrived "about midnight," British Blue Book, p. ix. In fairness, therefore, it should have been printed after No. 89 rather than after No. 84. See also note 3 to No. 90, July 29. ^ This is the first mention of Belgium. It is noteworthy that a possible invasion of Belgium does not call forth the statement from Sir E. Goschen, or within the next days, from Sir E. Grey, that it would be contrary to existing treaties. 2 See No. 77, same day. July 29, British Blue Book No. 87 305 From Rome British Blue Book No. 86 Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 29.) (Telegraphic.) Rome, July 29, 1914. Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that moment is past for any further discussions on basis of Servian note, in view of communica- tion made to-day by Russia at BerHn regarding partial mobilisation. The utmost he now hopes for is that Germany may use her influence at Vienna to prevent or moderate any further demands on Servia. To Paris British Blue Book No. 87 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. Sir, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. After telling M. Cambon ^ to-day how grave the situation seemed to be, I told him that I meant to tell the German Ambassador to-day that he must not be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations into any sense of false security that we should stand aside if all the efforts to preserve the peace, which we were now making in common with Germany, failed. But I went on to say to M. Cambon ^ that I thought it necessary to tell him also that public opinion here ap- proached the present difficulty from a quite different point of view from that taken during the difficulty as to Morocco a few years ago. In the case of Morocco the dispute was one in which France was primarily interested, and in which it appeared that Germany, in an attempt to crush France,^ was fastening a quarrel on France on a question that was the subject of a special agreement between France and us. In the present case the dispute between Austria and Servia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand.^ Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav — a struggle for supremacy in the Bal- kans ; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and France became involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do ; it was a case that we should have to consider. France would then have been drawn into a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her honour and interest obliged her to engage. We were free from engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do.^ I thought it ^ French Ambassador in London. 2 For France's own point of view of the Morocco crisis see French Yellow Book No. 1, Annex 1. "All Germans resent our having taken their share in Morocco." 3 This is contrary to the popluar claim that Great Britain went into the war for the little nations. * A very important statement. 306 Official Diplomatic Documents necessary to say that, because, as he knew, we were taking all pre- cautions with regard to our fleet, and I was about to warn Prince Lichnowsky not to count on our standing aside, but it would not be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled into supposing that this meant that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise. M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly. He understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, and in a struggle for supremacy between Teuton and Slav we should not feel called to intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany and France become involved, so that the question became one of the hegemony of Europe, we should then decide what it was necessary for us to do. He seemed quite prepared for this announcement, and made no criticism upon it. He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a demand from Germany that France would be neutral while Germany attacked Russia. This assurance France, of course, could not give ; she was bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked.^ I am, etc., • E. Grey. To Berlin British Blue Book No. 88 Sir Edward Grey to Sir B. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. Sir, Foreign Office, July 29, 191 If. I TOLD the German Ambassador this afternoon of the information that I had received, that Russia had informed Germany respecting her mobilisation. I also told him of the communication ^ made by Count Benckendorff ,^ that the Austrian declaration of war manifestly rendered vain any direct conversations between Russia and Austria. I said that the hope built upon those direct conversations by the German Government yesterday had disappeared to-day. To-day the German Chancellor was working in the interest of mediation in Vienna and St. Peter sburgh. If he succeeded, well and good. If not, it was more important than ever that Germany should take up what I had suggested to the German Ambassador this morning,^ and propose some method by which the four Powers should be able to work together to keep the peace of Europe. I pointed out, however, that the Russian Government, while desirous of mediation, regarded it as a condition that the military operations against Servia should 1 If this despatch printed after No. 85 and referring to the neutrality of England was written after the receipt of No. 85, it is noteworthy that it contains no mention of Belgium. For the probably proper order of the despatches, however, see note 1, British Blue Book No. 85. 2 British Blue Book No. 70, July 29. 3 Russian Ambassador in London. < Probably British Blue Book No. 84, July 29, although the telegram was sent to Berlin not in the morning but "about 4 o'clock on the evening of the 29th," according to the Introductory Narrative of the British Blue Book. To call 4 o'clock the "evening" is strange, but is explained by the endeavor to make No. 85 appear to be an answer to No. 84. See note 1 to British Blue Book No. 85, same day. July 29, British Blue Book No. 89 307 be suspended, as otherwise a mediation would only drag on matters, and give Austria time to crush Servia. It was, of course, too late for all military operations against Servia to be suspended. In a short time, I supposed, the Austrian forces would be in Belgrade, and in occupation of some Servian territory. But even then it might be possible to bring some mediation into existence, if Austria, while saying that she must hold the occupied territory until she had com- plete satisfaction from Servia, stated that she would not advance further, pending an effort of the Powers to mediate between her and Russia.^ The German Ambassador said that he had already telegraphed to Berlin what I had said to him this morning. I am, etc., E. Grey. To Berlin British Blue Book No. 89 Sir Edward Grey to Sir B. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. Sir, . Foreign Office, July 29, 191^. After speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present actually involved we had no thought of interfering in it. But if Germany became involved in it, and then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European interests ; and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversa- tion — which I hoped would continue — into thinking that we should stand aside. He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I meant that we should, under certain circumstances, intervene? I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything that was like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that, if things became worse, we should intervene. There would be no ques- tion of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved. But we knew very well, that if the issue did be- come such that we thought British interests ^ required us to inter- vene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would have to be very rapid, just as the decisions of other Powers had to be. I hoped that the friendly tone of our conversations would continue as^ at present, and that I should be able to keep as closely in touch with the German Government in working for peace. But if we failed in our efforts to keep the peace, and if the issue spread so that it in- 1 This is again Sir E. Grey's original proposal, which was agreeable to Germany in principle. It was accepted by Austria-Hungary even to include negotiations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 51, July 31, and for the fact that the Austro-Hungarian acceptance, which was subject to the continu- ation of the war, but with a " promise not to advance further, "was acceptable to Sir E. Grey, see British Blue Book No. 103, July 30. 2 This idea occurs several times in the despatches of July 29. 308 Official Diplomatic Documents volved practically every European interest, I did not wish to be open to any reproach for him that the friendly tone of all our con- versations had misled him or his Government into supposing that we should not t-ake action, and to the reproach that, if they had not been so misled, the course of things might have been different. The German Ambassador took no exception to what I had said; indeed, he told me that it accorded with what he had already given in Berlin as his view of the situation. I am, etc. E. Grey. To Berlin British Blue Book No. 90 Sir Edward Grey to Sir B, Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. Sir, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. In addition to what passed with the German Ambassador this morning,^ as recorded in my telegram of the 29th July ^ to your Excel- lency, I gave the Ambassador a copy of Sir Rennell Rodd's ^ telegram of the 28th July ^ and of my reply to it.^ I said I had begun to doubt whether even a complete acceptance of the Austrian demands by Servia would now satisfy Austria.^ But there appeared, from what the Marquis di San Giuliano ^ had said, to be a method by which, if the Powers were allowed to have any say in the matter, they might bring about complete satisfaction for Austria, if only the latter would give them an opportunity. I could, however, make no proposal, for the reasons I have given in my telegram to you, and could only give what the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had said to the German Ambassador for information, as long as it was understood that Austria would accept no discussion with the Powers over her dispute with Servia. As to mediation between Austria and Russia, I said it could not take the form simply of urging Russia to stand on one side while Austria had a free hand to go to any length she pleased. That would not be mediation, it would simply be putting pressure upon Russia in the interests of Austria. The German Ambassador said the view of the German Government was that Austria could not by force be humiliated, and could not abdicate her position as a Great Power. I said I entirely agreed, but it was not a question of humiliat- ing Austria, it was a question of how far Austria meant to push the humiliation of others. There must, of course, be some humiliation of Servia, but Austria might press things so far as to involve the humiliation of Russia.^ 1 The official reference to this interview is No. 84, but see also No. 88. 2 See No. 84. * British Ambassador in Rome. * See No. 64. 5 See No. 81. * The question whether it would satisfy Austria-Hungary does not seem to have been asked. 7 Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 8 The tenor of this summary of the interview with the German Ambassador is different from that given in Nos. 84 and 88. See also No. 89. July 29, British Blue Book No. 91 309 The German Ambassador said that Austria would not take Ser- vian territory, as to which I observed that, by taking territory while leaving nominal Servian independence, Austria might turn Servia practically into a vassal State, and this would affect the whole position of Russia in the Balkans. I observed that when there was danger of Etiropean conflict it was impossible to say who would not be drawn into it. Even the Netherlands ^ apparently were taking precautions. The German Ambassador said emphatically that some means must be found of preserving the peace of Europe. I am, etc. To Vienna ^- ^^^y. British Blue Book No. 91 Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna. Sir, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. The Austrian Ambassador told me to-day he had ready a long memorandum,^ which he proposed to leave, and which he said gave an account of the conduct of Servia towards Austria, and an explanation of how necessary the Austrian action was. I said that I did not wish to discuss the merits of the question between Austria and Servia. The news to-day seemed to me very bad for the peace of Europe. The Powers were not allowed to help in getting satisfaction for Austria, which they might get if they were given an opportunity, and European peace was at stake. Count Mensdorff ^ said that the war with Servia must proceed. Austria could not continue to be exposed to the necessity of mobilising again and again, as she had been obliged to do in recent years. She had no idea of territorial aggrandisement, and all she wished was to make sure that her interests were safeguarded. I said that it would be quite possible, without nominally interfering with the independence of Servia or taking away any of her territory, to turn her into a sort of vassal State. Count Mensdorff ^ deprecated this. In reply to some further remarks of mine, as to the effect that the Austrian action might have upon the Russian position in the Balkans, he said that, before the Balkan war, Servia had always been regarded as being in the Austrian sphere of influence.^ j , E. Grey. 1 The reference to the Netherlands is omitted in the accounts of the interviews, Nos. 84, 88, 89. Since the Netherlands, however, were mentioned, other things may- have been mentioned, and it. is not unlikely that No. 85, containing Germany's first bid for English neutrality, was the result of the despatches received in Berlin from the German Ambassador in London. Unfortunately these are not printed in the German White Book. See also note 1 to No. 85. 2 This may refer to the famous dossier, presented in Paris on July 27, and printed in the Yellow Book on that date. Parts, if not the whole, were surely presented also in London on that day, as appears from British Blue Book No. 48, July 27. See notes to British Blue Book No. 48 and Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25. ^ Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. ^ The proper appraisal of this remark is only possible on the background of an ex- tensive knowledge of the history of the Balkans since 1878. 310 Official Diplomatic Documents To Rome British Blue Book No. 92 Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome. Sir, • Foreign Office, July 29, 1914, The Italian Ambassador made to me to-day a communication from the Marquis di San Giuliano ^ suggesting that the German objections to the mediation of the four Powers, a mediation that was strongly favoured by Italy, might be removed by some change in the form of procedure. I said that I had already anticipated this by asking the German Government to suggest any form of procedure under which the idea of mediation between Austria and Russia, already accepted by the German Government in principle, could be applied. I am, etc. E. Grey. Russia : To Berlin Russian Orange Book No. 49 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Charge d' Affaires at Berlin} (Translation.) Saint-Petershourg, le 16 {29) juillet, 19U. (Telegraphique.) L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne m'informe, au nom du Chance- lier, que TAllemagne n'a pas cesse d'exercer a Vienne une influence moderatrice et qu'elle continuera cette action meme apres la declaration de guerre. Jusqu'a ce matin il n'y avait aucune nouvelle que les armees autrichiennes aient franchi la frontiere serbe. J'ai prie I'Am- bassadeur de transmettre au Chancelier mes remerciements pour la teneur amicale de cette communication. Je I'ai informe des mesures militaires prises par la Russie, dont aucune, lui dis-je, n'etait dirigee contre I'Alle- magne; j'ajoutais qu'elles ne St. Petersburgh, July 16 {29), 1914. (Telegraphic.) The German Ambassador in- forms me, in the name of the Chancellor, that Germany has not ceased to exercise a moder- ating influence at Vienna, and that she will continue to do so even after the declaration of war. Up to this morning there had been no news that the Austrian army has crossed the Servian frontier. I have begged the Ambassador to express my thanks to the Chancellor for the friendly tenour of this communication. I have informed him of the mili- tary measures taken by Russia, none of which, I told him, were directed against Germany; I added that neither should they 1 Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. * In the British Blue Book this despatch is listed as having been sent to London. July 29, Russian Orange Booh No. 4^ 311 prejugeaient pas non plus des mesures agressives centre I'Au- triche-Hongrie, ces mesures s'ex- pliquant par la mobilisation de la plus grande partie de I'armee aust ro-hongroi se . L'Ambassadeur se pronon^ant en faveur d 'explications directes avec le Cabinet de Vienne et nous je repondis que j'y etais tout dispose, pour peu que les con- seils du Cabinet de Berlin dont 11 parlait trouvent echo a Vienne. En meme temps je signalais que nous etions tout disposes a accepter le projet d'une con- ference des quatre Puissances, un projet auquel, paraissait-il, I'Allemagne ne sympathisait pas entierement. Je dis que, dans mon opinion, le meilleur moyen pour mettre a profit tons les moyens propres a produire une solution pacifique, consisterait en une action paral- lele des pourparlers d'une con- ference a quatre de I'Allemagne, de la France, de I'Angleterre et de ritalie et d'un contact direct entre I'Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie, a I'instar a peu pres de ce qui a vait eu lieu aux moments les plus critiques de la crise de I'an dernier. Je dis a I'Ambassadeur qu'- apres les concessions faites par la Serbie, un terrain de compromis pour les questions restees ou- vertes ne serait pas tres difficile a trouver, a condition toutefois de quelque bonne volonte de la part de I'Autriche et a condition que toutes les Puissances usent de toute leur influence dans un sens de conciliation. be taken as aggressive measures against Austria-Hungary, their explanation being the mobilisa- tion of the greater part of the Austro-Hungarian army.^ The Ambassador said that he was in favour of direct explana- tions between the Austrian Gov- ernment and ourselves, and I replied that I, too, was quite willing, provided that the advice of the German Government, to which he had referred, found an echo at Vienna. I said at the same time that we were quite ready to accept the proposal for a conference of the four Powers, a proposal with which, apparently, Germany was not in entire sympathy. I told him that, in my opinion, the best manner of turning to account the most suitable methods of finding a peaceful solution would be by arranging for parallel discussions to be carried on by a conference of the four Powers — Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy — and by a direct exchange of views between Austria-Hungary and Russia on much the same lines as occurred during the most criti- cal moments of last year's crisis. I told the Ambassador that, after the concessions which had been made by Servia, it should not be very difficult to find a compromise to" settle the other questions which remained out- standing, provided that Austria showed some good-will and that all the Powers used their entire influence in the direction of con- ciliation. ^ Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 78, August 2, where it is stated by Sazonof that Russia mobilised while Austria-Hungary was "proceeding to a general mobilisation." 312 Official Diplomatic Documents To London and Paris Russian Orange Book No. 50 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at London and Paris. St. Petershurgh, July 16 {29), 1914. At the time of my interview with the German Ambassador, dealt with in my preceding telegram, I had not yet received M. Schebeko's telegram ^\f the 15th (28th) July. The contents of this telegram constitute a refusal of the Vienna Cabinet to agree to a direct exchange of views with the Imperial Government. From now on, nothing remains for us to do but to rely entirely on the British Government to take the initiative in any steps which they may consider advisable. From Berlin Russian Orange Book No. 51 Russian Charge d^ Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) . Berlin, July 16 {29), 1914. On my enquiry whether he had received from Vienna a reply respecting your proposal for private discussions at St. Petersburg, the Secretary of State answered in the negative.^ He declares that it is very difficult for him to produce any effect at Vienna, especially openly. He even added, in speaking to Cam- bon, that were pressure brought to bear too obviously, Austria would hasten to face Germany with a fait accompli. The Secretary of State tells me that he received a telegram to-day from Pourtales, stating that you seemed more inclined than you previously were to find a compromise acceptable to all parties. I replied that presumably you had been in favour of a compromise from the outset, provided always that it were acceptable, not only to Austria, but equally to Russia. He then said that it appeared that Russia had begun to mobilise on the Austrian frontier, and that he feared that this would make it more difficult for Austria to come to an understanding with us, all the more so as Austria was mobilising against Servia alone, and was making no preparations upon our fron- tier. I replied that, according to the information in my possession, Austria was mobilising upon the Russian frontier also, and that con- 1 If this refers to Orange Book No. 45, July 28, compare it with Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29 : "it does not constitute a refusal." If it refers to another despatch, such a despatch has not been printed. Cf. also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 51, where Sazonof is the one to break off the negotiations. 2 For the reply from Vienna in reference to the conference plan see Austro-Hun- garian Red Book No. 44, and for the Russian direct conversation plan see Austro- Hungarian Red Book No. 47, both of July 29. July 29, Russian Orange Book No. 53 313 sequently we had to take similar steps.^ I added that whatever measures we might, perhaps, have taken on our side were in no wise directed against Germany. From Nish Russian Orange Book No. 52 Russian Charge d' Affaires in Serbia to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Nish, July 16 (29), 1914. The Bulgarian Minister to-day declared to Pashitch, in the name of his Government, that Bulgaria would remain neutral. From Paris Russian Orange Book No. 53 Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Paris, July 16 {29), 1914. For the information of the President of the French Republic on his return, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs had pre- pared a short summary ^ of the present political situation, approxi- mately in the following terms : Austria, fearing internal disintegra- tion, seized upon the assassination of the Archduke as an excuse for an attempt to obtain guarantees, which may assume the form of an occupation of Servian military lines or even Servian territory. Ger- many is supporting Austria. The preservation of peace depends upon Russia alone, for the question at issue must be "localised" between Austria and Servia; that question is the punishment of Servia for her previous policy and the obtaining of guarantees for the future. Germany concludes from this that a moderating influ- ence should be exerted at St. Petersburg. This sophism has been refuted both in Paris and in London. In Paris, Baron von Schoen vainly endeavoured to induce France to adopt joint action with Ger- many towards Russia for the preservation of peace. The same attempts were made in London. In both capitals the answer was given that any action taken should be at Vienna, as it was Austria's inordinate demands, her refusal to discuss Servians few reservations, and her declaration of war, that threatened to provoke a general war. France and England are unable to bring any moderating pressure to bear upon Russia, as, so far, that Power has shown the greatest moderation, more particularly in her advice to Servia to accept as much as was possible of the Austrian note. Apparently Germany has now given up the idea of pressure upon Russia only 1 The important question is, "Who mobilised first?" In the Documents very contrary statements occur. 2 French Yellow Book No. 85, July 29. 314 Official Diplomatic Documents and inclines towards mediatory action both at St. Petersburg and at Vienna, but at the same time both Germany and Austria are endeav- ouring to cause the question to drag on. Germany is opposing the conference without suggesting any other practical course of action.^ Austria is continuing discussions at St. Petersburg, which are mani- festly of a procrastinating nature. At the same time she is taking active steps, and if these steps are tolerated, her claims will increase proportionately. It is highly desirable that Russia should lend all her support to the proposal for mediation which will be made by Sir E. Grey. In the contrary event, Austria, on the plea of "guaran- tees," will be able, in effect, to alter the territorial status of eastern Europe. From London Russian Orange Book No. 54 Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) • London, July 16 {29), 1914. I HAVE communicated the contents of your telegrams ^ of the 15th (28th) July to Grey. He informed the German Ambassador to-day ^ that the direct discussions between Russia and Austria had been fruitless, and that press correspondents were reporting from St. Petersburgh that Russia was mobilising against Austria in conse- quence of the latter's mobilisation. Grey said that, in principle, the German Government had declared themselves in favour of mediation, but that he was experiencing difficulties with regard to the form it should take. Grey has urged that the German Government should indicate the form which, in their opinion, would enable the four Powers to have recourse to mediation to prevent war ; France, Italy, and Great Britain having consented, mediation could only come into play if Germany consented to range herself on the side of peace. From Paris Russian Orange Book No. 55 Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Paris, July 16 {29), 1914. ViviANi has just confirmed to me the French Government's firm determination to act in concert with Russia. This determination 1 This is an error, for Germany not only urged the British "mediation" plan (see German White Book, Exhibits 15 and 16, July 28) but also the Russian direct con- versations plan (see British Blue Book No. 67, note 2, July 28). 2 This is a confirmation of French Yellow Book No. 95, July 29, which states that two telegrams were sent. In the Russian Orange and British Blue Books only one is given. Cf. British Blue Book No. 70, 2, July 29. 3 Compare this summary with Sir E. Grey's own summary. British Blue Book Nos. 84, 88, 89, July 29. July 29 J RuLSsian Orange 'Book No. 56 315 is upheld by all classes of society and by the political parties, includ- ing the Radical Socialists who have just addressed a resolution to the Government expressing the absolute conjfidence and the patriotic sentiments of their party. Since his return to Paris, Viviani has telegraphed an urgent message ^ to London that, direct discussions between St. Petersburgh and Vienna having ended, the London Cabi- net should again put forward their proposal for mediation by the Powers as soon as possible under one form or another. Before see- ing me to-day Viviani saw the German Ambassador, and the latter again assured him of the peaceful intentions of Germany. Viviani having pointed out that if Germany wished for peace she should hasten to give her support to the British proposal for mediation, Baron von Schoen replied that the words "conference" or "arbitra- tion" alarmed Austria. Viviani retorted that it was not a question of words, and that it would be easy to find some other form for mediation. In the opinion of Baron von Schoen, it was necessary for the success of the negotiations between the Powers to know what Austria intended to demand from Servia. Viviani answered that the Berlin Cabinet could quite easily make this enquiry of Austria, but that, meanwhile, the Servian reply might well form the basis of discussion; he added that France sincerely desired peace, but that she was determined at the same time to act in complete har- mony with her allies and friends, and that he. Baron von Schoen, might have convinced himself that this determination met with the warmest approval of the country. From Nish Russian Orange Book No. 56 ^ Telegram from His Royal Highness Prince Alexander of Serbia to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, Deeply touched by the telegram which your Majesty was pleased to address to me yesterday, I hasten to thank you with all my heart. Your Majesty may rest assured that the cordial sympathy which your Majesty feels towards my country is especially valued by us, and fills our hearts with the belief that the future of Servia is secure now that it is the object of your Majesty's gracious solicitude. These painful moments cannot but strengthen the bonds of deep attachment which bind Servia to Holy Slav Russia, and the sentiments of ever- lasting gratitude which we feel for the help and protection afforded to us by your Majesty will ever be cherished in the hearts of all the Serbs. , 1 French Yellow Book No. 97, July 29. 2 Without a date but published in the Russian Orange Book among the telegrams of July 29. In the Serbian Red Book it was published as No. 44 of July 30. This may be a mistake, or it may contain a hint in the direction of the charge sometimes made that Russia wrote the Serbian State Papers. 316 Official Diplomatic Documents From Nish Russian Orange Book No. 57 Russian Charge d' Affaires in Serbia to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, (Telegram.) Nish, July 16 {29), 191A. I HAVE communicated to Pashitch the text of the telegraphic reply returned by His Majesty the Emperor to Prince Alexander. On reading it, Pashitch crossed himself and exclaimed : "The Czar is great and merciful !" He then embraced me and was overcome with emotion. The heir-apparent is expected at Nish late to-night. To Paris Russian Orange Book No. 58 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Paris. (Telegram.) 8t. Petersburgh, July 16 {29), 1914. The German Ambassador to-day informed me of the decision of his Government to mobilise, if Russia did not stop her military preparations. Now, in point of fact, we only began these prep- arations in consequence of the mobilisation already undertaken by Austria, and owing to her evident unwillingness to accept any means of arriving at a peaceful settlement of her dispute with Servia. As we cannot comply with the wishes of Germany, we have no alternative but to hasten^ on our own military preparations and to assume that war is probably inevitable. Please inform the French Government of this, and add that we are sincerely grateful to them for the declaration ^ which the French Ambassador made to me on their behalf, to the effect that we could count fully upon the assistance of our ally, France. In the existing circumstances, that declaration is especially valuable to us. Communicated to the Russian Ambassadors in Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Germany. 1 This elicited Viviani's request, French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30, not to "take any step which may offer Germany a pretext for a total or partial mobilisation of her forces," proving that on July 30, Viviani believed that Germany had not even partially mobilised. ♦ 2 Of. Russian Orange Book No. 55, same day. Thursday, July 30, 1914 317 Thursday, July 30, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Sent Despatches to Received Despatches fbom Petrograd Petrograd [Letter from Belgian Minister] London and Petrograd Petrograd, Vienna London Berlin, London Czar Petrograd, Czar Berlin, Paris, Petrograd Vienna, Petrograd, Berlin Paris, Rome, Russian Ambassador London, etc. Nish, Berlin, London Czar Petrograd Foreign Office op Austria-Hungary Belgium France Germany Great Britain Russia Serbia Austria-Hungary, while unable to have her ambassador in Petrograd discuss her Serbian note with Sazonof, was willing to discuss her relations with Russia on a much broader basis, and had already done so with the Russian Ambassador in Vienna. She regrets Russia's mobilisation against her, which is forcing her to counter measures. Belgium is silent on this day, and does not publish the despatch from her Minister in Petrograd, dated July 30. France renews her promise of support to Russia, but warns her in her mobilisa- tion against "any step which may offer to Germany any pretext for a total or partial mobilisation of her forces." She therefore believes that Germany has not even partically mobilised, but nevertheless sends an alarming message concerning German military measures to Sir E. Grey, who agrees that the moment has "come to consider and discuss together every hypothesis." Germany continues her pressure on Vienna, and by exchanges of royal tele- grams between Berlin and London and Berlin and Petrograd endeavours to avoid war. The General Staff urges immediate mobilisation but is unsuccessful. Great Britain refuses to bind herself to remain neutral in case of war, on the conditions proposed by Germany on the previous day. Sir E. Grey is even seri- ously considering the necessity of joining France, and tightens the bond between the two countries by making known to the British Ambassador in Paris the letters exchanged in 1912 between himself and the French Ambassador. Great Britain continues to mobilise, but does not publish the conversation with the German Ambassador in which this subject was discussed. One of the most important papers of this day (No. 105) suffers from notable inaccuracies. Russia continues her mobilisation, but offers to "stop all military preparations" if Austria will declare herself "ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate principle of sovereignty of Serbia." Although Sazonof feels very hopeful of the success of his new offer, he alters it on the next day "as requested by the British Ambassador." Several Russian despatches printed under this date are misleading. Serbia does not announce anything of importance. 318 Official Diplomatic Documents Austria-Hungary : To St. Petershurgh AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 50 Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petershurgh. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 30, 1914. For Your Excellency's information and guidance : — I have to-day explained to M. Schebeko that I have been informed that M. Sazonof has been hurt by my flat refusal of his proposal as to a discussion ^ with your Excellency, and that he is not less hurt that no exchange of ideas has taken place between myself and M. Schebeko. With reference to the first point, I had already permitted your Excellency by telegram to give M. Sazonof any explanations he desired with regard to the note — which in any case appears to be outstripped by the outbreak of war. In any case this could only take the form of subsequent explanations, as it was never our intention to depart in any way from the points contained in the note. I had also authorised your Excellency to discuss in a friendly manner with M. Sazonof our special relations towards Russia. That M. Sazonof should complain that no exchange of ideas had taken place between M. Schebeko and myself must rest on a mis- understanding, as M. Schebeko and myself had discussed the practical questions two days before, a fact which the Ambassador confirmed with the observation that he had fully informed M. Sazonof of this conversation. M. Schebeko then explained why our action against Servia was regarded with such anxiety at St. Petershurgh. He said that we were a Great Power which was proceeding against the small Servian State, and it was not known at St. Petershurgh what our intentions in the matter were ; whether we desired to encroach on its sovereignty, whether we desired completely to overthrow it, or even to crush it to the ground. Russia could not be indifferent towards the future fate of Servia, which was linked to Russia by historical and other bonds. At St. Petershurgh they had taken the trouble to use all their influence at Belgrade to induce them to accept all our condi- tions, though this was indeed at a time when the conditions after- wards imposed by us could not yet be known. But even with refer- ence to these demands they would do everything they could in order to accomplish at any rate all that was possible. I reminded the Ambassador that we had repeatedly emphasised the fact that we did not desire to follow any policy of conquest in Servia, also that we would not infringe her sovereignty, but we only desired to establish a condition of affairs which would offer us a guarantee against being disturbed by Servia. To this I added a some- what lengthy discussion of our intolerable relations with Servia. I also 1 I.e. of the wording of the Serbian note and Austro-Hungarian Serbian conflict in general. See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29. July 30, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 50 319 gave M. Schebeko clearly to understand to how large an extent Rus- sian diplomacy was responsible for these circumstances, even though this result might be contrary to the wishes of the responsible author- ities. In the further course of our discussion I referred to the Russian mobilisation which had then come to my knowledge. Since this was limited to the military districts of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow and Kasan it had an appearance of hostility against the Monarchy. I did not know what the grounds for this might be, as there was no dispute between us and Russia. Austria-Hungary had mobilised exclusively against Servia ; against Russia not a single man ; and this would be observed from the single fact that the first, tenth and eleventh corps had not been mobilised. In view, however, of the fact that Russia was openly mobilising against us, we should have to extend our mobilisation too, and in this case I desired to mention expressly that this measure did not, of course, imply any attitude of hostility towards Russia, and that it was exclusively a necessary counter-measure against the Russian mobilisation. I asked M. Schebeko to announce this to his Government, and this he promised to do. Belgium : From Petrograd (This letter was sent via Germany, where it was captured after war had been declared, and pubhshed in the North German (official) Gazette. As appears from the letter itself a telegraphic copy of it was sent by the Nordisk cable. The authenticity of this letter has never been officially denied by the Belgian Govern- ment.) The Belgian Legation, St. Petersburgh, 795-Jfi2. The Political Con- dition. July 30, 191Jf. Yesterday and the day before passed in anticipation of the events which must follow the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war on Servia. The most contradictory news is being spread and it has been impossible to separate truth from fiction concerning the inten- tions of the Imperial (Russian) Government. Only one fact is in- contestable ; namely, that Germany has endeavoured here, as well as in Vienna, to find a means l3y which to avoid a general conflict, but that she has met on the one hand the determination of the Vienna cabinet not to yield one iota and on the other the suspicion of the Petersburgh cabinet as regards the assurances of Vienna that it is contemplating only the punishment, and not the acquisition of Servia. Mr. Sazonof has declared that it was impossible for Russia not to keep herself in readiness nor to mobilise, but that these measures were not taken against Germany. This morning an official com- munique to the papers announced that the "reservists in a certain number of governments had been called to the colors." He who knows the reticence of the official Russian communiques may well assert that the mobilisation is general. 320 Official Diplomatic Documents The German Ambassador declared this morning that he had reached the ends of his endeavours as mediator, pursued incessantly since Saturday, and that he had practically no hope left. I have just been told that the British Ambassador had expressed himself to the same effect. Latterly England proposed arbitration, but Mr. Sazonof replied, "We ourselves proposed this to Austria, who de- clined." The suggestion of a conference was met by Germany with the suggestion of an agreement between the cabinets. One is tempted to ask if the whole w^orld is not wanting war, trying only to postpone the declarations of war in order to gain time. At first England let it be known that she did not wish to be drawn into the conflict. Sir George Buchanan openly said this. To-day, however, St. Petersburg is convinced — nay, more, they have the assurance that England will support France. (Aujourd'hui on est fermement convaincu a St. Petersburgh, on en a meme I'assurance que I'Angleterre soutiendra la France.) This assurance carries great weight, and has done not a little to give the upper hand to the war party. The Russian Government has given free rein to all pro-Servian and anti-Austrian manifestations these past days. In the cabinet meeting early yesterday morning differences of opinion still existed, and the announcement of the mobilisation was postponed. Since then a change has taken place ; the war party has gained the upper hand, and to-day at four o'clock in the morning the mobilisation was publicly announced. The army believes itself strong and is full of enthusiasm. It bases its hopes on the remarkable progress it has made since the Japanese war. The navy is still so far from the realisation of its programme of reconstruction and reorganisation that it really cannot be said to count. This was the reason which gave England's assur- ances of support so much weight. As I had the honour of telegraphing (T. 10) you to-day, every hope of a peaceful solution seems to have vanished. This is the view of the diplomatic corps. For my telegram I chose the way via Stock- holm by the Nordisk cable as safer than the other. This despatch I am entrusting to a private courier, who will mail it in Germany. With the assurance of deepest respect, Mr. Secretary, I am, (Signed) B. de L'Escaille. Francie : To St. Petersburgh and London French Yellow Book No, 101 M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Af- fairs, to the French Ambassadors at St. Petersburgh and London. Paris, July 30, 1914. M. IsvoLSKY came to-night to tell me that the German Am- bassador has notified M. Sazonof of the decision of his Govern- July 30, French Yellow Book No. 102 321 ment to mobilise the army if Russia does not cease her mihtary preparations. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Tsar points out that these preparations were only commenced after Austria had mobi- lised eight army corps ^ and had refused to arrange peacefully her differences with Servia. M. Sazonof declares that in these circum- stances Russia can only expedite her arming and consider war as imminent, that she counts on the help of France as an ally, and that she considers it desirable that England should join Russia and France without loss of time. France is resolved to fulfil all the obligations of her alliance. ^ She will not neglect, however, any effort towards a solution of the conflict in the interests of universal peace. The conversa- tion entered into between the Powers which are less directly in- terested still allows of the hope that peace may be preserved ; I therefore think it would be well that, in taking any precautionary' measures of defence, which Russia thinks must go on, she should not immediately take any step which may offer to Germany a pre- text for a total or partial mobilisation of her forces.^ Yesterday in the late afternoon ^ the German Ambassador came and spoke to me of the military measures which the Government of the Republic were taking, adding that France was able to act in this way, but that in Germany preparations could not be secret, and that French opinion should not be alarmed if Germany decided on them. I answered that the French Government had not taken any step which could give their neighbours any cause for disquietude, and that their wish to lend themselves to any negotiations for the purpose of maintaining peace could not be doubted. ^ , ^^ Rene Viviani. From St. Petersburgh French Yellow Book No. 102 M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. St. Petersburgh, July 30, 1914. M. Sazonof, to whom I communicated your desire that every military measure that could offer Germany the pretext for general mobilisation ^ should be avoided, answered that in the course of last night the General Staff has suspended all measures of military pre- 1 See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 50, July 30, and that these eight army corps had been mobilised against Serbia. See also Russian Orange Book No. 78, August 2. 2 France had given this declaration as early as July 24, British Blue BQok No. 6, July 24. 3 This is an important statement because it shows that Viviani believed on July 30 that Germany had not even partially mobilised, all earlier despatches notwithstanding. It also shows that Viviani knew the danger as soon as Germany should feel obliged to mobilise. This warning was doubtless given in reply to Russian Orange Book No. 58, July 29, Sir E. Grey knew of this message, as appears from British Blue Book No. 104, July 30. * That is on July 29, and France did not then deny having taken military measures. 6 The wording was "total or partial mobilisation," see previous despatch. 322 Official Diplomatic Documents i caution so that there should be no misunderstanding. Yesterday the Chief of the Russian General Staff sent for the Military Attache of the German Embassy and gave him his word of honour that the mobilisation ordered this morning was exclusively directed against Austria.^ Nevertheless, in an interview which he had this afternoon with Count Pourtales, M. Sazonof was forced to the conclusion that Germany does not wish to pronounce at Vienna the decisive word which would safeguard peace. The Emperor Nicholas has received the same impression from an exchange of telegrams which he has just had personally with the Emperor William. Moreover, the Russian General Staff and Admiralty have received disquieting information concerning the preparations of the German army and navy.^ In giving me this information M. Sazonof added that the Rus- sian Government are continuing none the less their efforts towards conciliation.^ He repeated to me : "I shall continue to negotiate until the last moment." ^ t^ Paleologue. Fro7n St. Petersburgh French Yellow Book No. 103^ M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. St. Petersburgh, July 30, 1914. The German Ambassador came to-night and again urged on M. Sazonof, but in less categorical terms, that Russia should cease her military preparations, and affirmed that Austria would not infringe the territorial integrity of Servia : — ''It is not only the territorial integrity of Servia which we must safeguard," answered M. Sazonof, "but also her independence and her sovereignty. We cannot allow Servia to become a vassal of Austria." M. Sazonof added: "The situation is too serious for me not to tell you all that is in my mind. By intervening at St. Petersburgh while she refuses to intervene at Vienna, Germany is only seeking to gain time so as to allow Austria to crush the little Servian king- dom before Russia can come to its aid. But the Emperor Nicholas 1 For a different version of the interview see German White Book, Exhibit 18, July 30. 2 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30, note 3. 3 It is not clear from the Entente telegrams what would have "conciliated" Russia short of stopping the punishment of Serbia. Since Austria-Hungary was determined to mete out this punishment, a deadlock ensued. Austria-Hungary's concessions were her promise not to annex any Serbian territory and not to touch the sovereignty of Serbia, see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29. It nowhere appears that Russia offered any concessions. The different courses pursued by the respective countries were due to the different attitudes assumed by their allies. Germany exerted a constant pressure in Vienna, while England and France refused to take any steps in Petrograd. Soe French Yellow Bf)ok No. 62, July 27, and No. 81, July 28. Contrast with British Blue Book No. 104, Julv 30. * Cf. note to British' Blue Book No. 97, July 30. ^Ibid. L July 30, French Yellow Book No. 105 323 is so anxious to prevent war that I am going to make a new proposal ^ to you in his name : " If Austria, recognising that her dispute with Servia has assumed the character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the clauses which are damaging to the sovereignty of Servia, Russia undertakes to stop all military preparations." Count Pourtales promised to support this proposal with his Gov- ernment. In the mind of M. Sazonof, the acceptance of this proposal by Austria would have, as a logical corollary, the opening of a discus- sion by the Powers in London. The Russian Government again show by their attitude that they are neglecting nothing in order to stop the conflict. Paleologue. From Vienna French Yellow Book No. 104 M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Rene Viviani, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, July 30, 1914- In spite of the communication made yesterday by the Russian Ambassador to several of his colleagues, among them the German Ambassador, with reference to the partial mobilisation in his coun- try, the Vienna press refrained from publishing the news. This enforced silence has just been explained at an interview of great importance between M. Schebeko and Count Berchtold, who exam- ined at length the present formidable difficulties with equal readiness to apply to them mutually acceptable solutions.^ From Berlin French Yellow Book No. 105 M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 30, 1914. Herr von Jagow telephoned to me at 2 o'clock that the news of the German mobilisation which had spread an hour before was false, and asked me to inform you of this urgently; the Imperial Government is confiscating the extra editions of the papers which announced it. But neither this communication nor these steps diminish my apprehension with regard to the plans of Germany.^ ^ This proposal was altered later at the request of the British Ambassador to one much less acceptable to Austria-Hungary. Cf. French Yellow Book No. 113, and see for the discussion of these changes E. von Mach, Germany's Point of View, pp. 142 ff. 2 This was probably due to German pressure. See Chancellor's Speech in note 2 to British Blue Book No. 67, July 28. 3 Germany was apparently ready to mobilise at any moment. It has been popu- larly stated in Germany that the General Staff urged this step ever since the first news of Russian mobilisation had become known, but that the Emperor refused his consent. 324 Official Diplomatic Documents It seems certain that the Extraordinary Council held yesterday evening at Potsdam with the military authorities under the presi- dency of the Emperor decided on mobilisation, and this explains the preparation of the special edition of the Lokal Anzeiger, but that from various causes (the declaration of Great Britain that she reserved her entire liberty of action, the exchange of telegrams ^ between the Tsar and William 11.) the serious measures which had been decided upon were suspended. One of the Ambassadors with whom I have very close relations saw Herr von Zimmermann at 2 o'clock. According to the Under- Secretary of State the military authorities are very anxious that mobilisation should be ordered, because every delay makes Germany lose some of her advantages. Nevertheless up to the present the haste of the General Staff, which sees war in mobilisation, had been successfully prevented. In any case mobilisation may be decided upon at any moment. I do not know who has issued in the Lokal Anzeiger, a paper which is usually semi-official, premature news cal- culated to cause excitement in France. Further, I have the strongest reasons to believe that all the meas- ures for mobilisation which can be taken before the publication of the general order of mobilisation have already been taken here, and that they are anxious here to make us publish our mobilisation ^ first in order to attribute the responsibility to us. Jules Cambon. To London French Yellow Book No. 106 M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Af- fairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London. Paris, July 30, 1914. Please inform ^ Sir E. Gray of the following facts concerning French and German military preparations.^ England will see from this that if France is resolved, it is not she who is taking aggressive steps. You will direct the attention of Sir E. Grey to the decision taken by the Council of Ministers this morning; although Germany has made her covering dispositions a few hundred metres from the fron- tier along the whole front from Luxemburg to the Vosges, and has transported her covering troops to their war positions, we have kept ^ These telegrams are referred to in the French Yellow Book, but not in the British Blue Book, nor were they laid before Parliament together with the Blue Book. Many- people see in them a serious endeavor on the part of the Emperor to preserve the peace. 2 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30, note 4. ' This information is printed in British Blue Book No. 105, Enclosure 3, July 30. If the French Yellow Book prints the original despatch accurately, either Sir E. Grey or the French Ambassador in London must be held responsible for the alterations. For a discussion of these despatches see E. von Mach, Germany's Point of View, pp. 421 ff. * This despatch to London should be compared with French Yellow Book No. 101, same day, to Petrograd, which shows that Viviani believed that Germany had not even partially mobilised on July 30. July 30, French Yellow Book No. 107 325 our troops ten kilometres from the frontier and forbidden them to approach nearer. Our plan, conceived in the spirit of the offensive, provided, how- ever, that the fighting positions of our covering troops should be as near to the frontier as possible. By leaving a strip of territory undefended against sudden aggression of the enemy, the Government of the Republic hopes to prove that France does not bear, any more than Russia, the responsibility for the attack. In order to be convinced of this it is sufficient to compare the steps taken on the two sides of our frontier ; in France, soldiers who were on leave were not recalled until we were certain that Germany had done so five days before. In Germany, not only have the garrison troops of Metz been pushed up to the frontier, but they have been reinforced by units transported by train from garrisons of the interior such as Treves or Cologne ; nothing like this has been done in France. The arming of the frontier defences (clearing of trees, placing of armament, construction of batteries and strengthening of wire entanglements) was begun in Germany on Saturday, the 25th ; with us it is going to be begun, for France can no longer refrain from taking similar measures. The railway stations were occupied by the military in Germany on Saturday, the 25th ; in France on Tuesday, the 28th. Finally, in Germany the reservists by tens of thousands have been recalled by individual summons, those living abroad (the classes of 1903 to 1911) have been recalled, the officers of reserve have been summoned; in the interior the roads are closed, motor-cars only circulate with permits. It is the last stage before mobilisation. None of these measures has been taken in France. The German army has its outposts on our frontier ; on two occa- sions yesterday German patrols penetrated our territory. The whole 16th army corps from Metz, reinforced by part of the 8th from Treves and Cologne, occupies the frontier from Metz to Luxemburg ; the 15th army corps from Strassburg is massed on the frontier. Under penalty of being shot, the inhabitants of the annexed parts of Alsace-Lorraine are forbidden to cross the frontier. Rene Viviani. From Berlin French Yellow Book No. 107 M, Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 30, 1914. The British Ambassador has not been informed of Germany's reply to Sir E. Grey's request. He told me that Berlin had consulted Vienna and was still waiting to hear from her ally.^ 1 This reply, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 44, July 29, was sent by telegram on that day to Petrograd, Paris, London, and Rome. See also French Yellow Book No. 104, July 30, and note. 326 Official Diplomatic Documents My Russian colleague has just told me that Herr von Jagow (to whom Count Pourtales had communicated the conciliatory formula suggested by M. Sazonof for an Austro-Russian understanding) had just told him that he found this proposal unacceptable to Austria, thus showing the negative ^ action of German diplomacy at Vienna. Jules Cambon. From London French Yellow Book No. 108 M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, July 30, 1914- Prince Lichnowsky has not brought any reply to the request addressed to him by Sir E. Grey yesterday to obtain from the Ger- man Government a formula for the intervention of the four Powers in the interest of peace. But my German colleague questioned the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs about the military preparations of England.2 Sir E. Grey replied that they were not of an offensive character, but that in the present state of affairs on the continent it was natural to take some precautions ; that in England, as in France, there was a desire to maintain peace, and that if in England, as in France, defen- sive measures were under consideration, it was not with the object of making any aggression.^ The information ^ which your Excellency has addressed to me on the subject of the military measures taken by Germany on the French frontier gave me the opportunity of remarking to Sir E. Grey that it is no longer a question of a conflict of influence between Russia and Austria-Hungary, but that there is a risk of an act of aggression which might provoke general war. Sir E. Grey understood ^ my feelings perfectly, and he thinks, as I do, that the moment has come to consider and discuss together every hypothesis. Paul Cambon. From Berlin French Yellow Book No. 109 M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 30, 1914. In the interview which I had to-day with the Secretary of State, I asked Herr von Jagow what reply he had made to Sir E. Grey, 1 Cf. Chancellor's Speech, note 2, British Blue Book No. 67, July 28, and British Blue Book No. 95, July 30. * No such questions are mentioned in the British Blue Book. 3 This is the natural excuse for any modern state to make, since self-defence is the only excuse for military preparations anywhere. * French Yellow Book No. 106, same day. " From French Yellow Book No. 101, same day, it appeared that Viviani believed that Germany had not yet even partially mobilised on July 30. Contrary despatches must have been sent for effect. Did Sir E. Grey understand this, or was he imposed upon? I July 30, German White Book Exhibit 18 327 who had asked him to draw up himself the formula for the interven- tion of the disinterested Powers. He answered that "to gain time," he had decided to act directly, and that he had asked Austria to tell him the ground on which conversations might be opened with her. This answer has the effect, under a pretext of proceeding more quickly, of eliminating Great Britain, France and Italy, and of entrusting to Herr von Tschirscky, whose Pan-German and Russophobe sentiments are well known, the duty of persuading Austria to adopt a conciliatory attitude. Herr von Jagow then spoke to me of the Russian mobilisation on the Austrian frontier; he told me that this mobilisation com- promised the success of all intervention with Austria, and that everything depended on it. He added that he feared that Austria would mobilise completely as a result of a partial Russian mobilisa- tion, and this might cause as a counter-measure complete Russian mobilisation and consequently that of Germany. I pointed out to the Secretary of State that he had himself told me that Germany would only consider herself obliged to mobilise if Russia mobilised on her German frontiers,^ and that this was not being done. He replied that this was true, but that the heads of the army were insisting on it, for every delay is a loss of strength for the German army, and "that the words of which I reminded him did not constitute a firm engagement on his part." ^ The impression which I received from this conversation is that the chances of peace have again decreased. Jules Cambon. Germany : From St. Petersburgh German White Book ExmBiT 18 Telegram of the Military Attache at St. Petersburgh to H. M. the Kaiser on July 30, 1914. Prince Troubetzki said to me yesterday,^ after causing Your Majesty's telegram to be delivered at once to Czar Nicolas : Thank God that a telegram of Your Emperor has come. He has just told me the telegram has made a deep impression upon the Czar, but as the mobilisation against Austria had already been ordered and Sazonof had convinced His Majesty that it was no longer possible to retreat His Majesty was sorry he could not change it any more. I then told him that the guilt for the measureless consequences lay at the door of premature mobilisation against Austria-Hungary, which after all was involved merely in a local war with Servia, for Germany's answer was clear and the responsibility rested upon Russia which ignored 1 French Yellow Book No. 67, July 27. 2 Immediately followingthe words referred to above Von Jagow had said (French Yellow Book No. 67, July 27), "If Russia attacked Austria, Germany would be obliged to attack at once on her side." An attack must be preceded by mobilisation. Jagow, therefore, cannot have meant to give a promise in the sense in which it was understood by Jules Cambon. 3 For the French version of this interview see French Yellow Book No. 102, July 30. 328 Official Diplomatic Documents Austria-Hungary's assurance that it had no intentions of territorial gain in Servia. Austria-Hungary mobilised against Servia and not against Russia, and there was no ground for an immediate action on the part of Russia. I further added that in Germany one could not understand any more Russia's phrase that " she could not desert her brethren in Servia," after the horrible crime of Serajevo. I told him finally he need not wonder if Germany's army were to be mobilised. To St. Petersbiirgh German WmTE Book Exhibit 23 IV. Hi. Majesty to the Czar. j^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ My Ambassador has instructions to direct the attention of Your Government to the dangers and serious consequences of a mobilisa- tion. I have told You the same in my last telegram. Austria-Hun- gary has mobilised only against Servia, and only a part of her army. If Russia, as seems to be the case, according to Your advice and that of Your Government, mobilises against Austria-Hungary, the part of the mediator with which You have entrusted me in such friendly manner and w^hich I have accepted upon Your express desire, is threatened if not made impossible. The entire weight of decision now rests upon Your shoulders, You have to bear the responsibility for war or peace. (Signed) Wilhelm. From St, Petersburgh German White Book Exhibit 23a V. The Czar to His Majesty. Peterhof, July 30th, 1914, 1-20 P.M. I THANK You from my heart for Your quick reply. I am sending to-night Tatisheif (Russian honorary aide to the Kaiser) with instruc- tions. The military measures now taking form were decided upon five days ago, and for the reason of defence against the preparations of Austria. I hope with all my heart that these measures will not influence in any manner Your position as mediator which I appraise very highly. We need Your strong pressure upon Austria so that an understanding can be arrived at with us. Nicolas. Great Britain: From St. Petersburgh British Blue Book No. 93 Telegrams communicated by Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London, July 30, 1914- (1) Russian Ambassador at Vienna to M. Sazonof [For text see Russian Orange Book No. 45, July 28. For 93, (2) and (3), see under date of July 29, Russian Orange Book Nos. 49 and 50.] July 30, British Blue Book No. 95 329 From Vienna British Blue Book No. 94 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 30.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 29, 1914. I LEARN that mobiHsation of Russian corps destined to carry out operations^ on Austrian frontier has been ordered. My inform- ant is Russian Ambassador. Ministry for Foreign Affairs here has reahsed, though somewhat late in the day, that Russia will not re- main indifferent in present crisis. I believe that the news of Russian mobilisation will not be a surprise to the Ministry, but so far it is not generally known in Vienna this evening.^ Unless mediation, which German Government declared themselves ready to offer in concert with three other Great Powers not immediately interested in the Austro-Servian dispute, be brought to bear forthwith, irrevocable steps may be taken in present temper of this country. German Ambassador feigns ^ surprise that Servian affairs should be of such interest to Russia. Both my Russian and French colleagues have spoken to him to-day. Russian Ambassador expressed the hope that it might still be possible to arrange matters, and explained that it was impossible for Russia to do otherwise than take an interest in the present dispute. Russia, he said, had done what she could already at Belgrade to induce Servian Government to meet principal Austrian demand in a favourable spirit ; ^ if approached in a proper manner, he thought she would probably go still further in this direc- tion. But she was justly offended at having been completely ig- nored, and she could not consent to be excluded from the settlement. German Ambassador said that if proposals were put forward which opened any propect of possible acceptance by both sides, he per- sonally thought that Germany might consent to act as mediator in concert with the three other Powers. I gather from what Russian Ambassador said to me that he is much afraid of the effect that any serious engagement may have upon Russian public opinion. I gathered, however, that Russia would go a long way to meet Austrian demands on Servia. From Vienna British Blue Book No. 95 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 30.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 30, 1914. Russian Ambassador hopes that Russian mobilisation will be regarded by Austria as what it is, viz., a clear intimation that Russia 1 The meaning of this phrase is not perfectly clear, although it seems to contemplate war. 2 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 107, same day. 3 Expressions of this kind, implying motives and not confining themselves to facts^ are regrettable in official documents. " This was denied by Austria-Hungary ; see Red Book No. 34, July 27. 330 Official Diplomatic Documents must be consulted regarding the fate of Servia, but he does not know how the Austrian Government are taking it. He says that Russia must have an assurance that Servia will not be crushed, but she would understand that Austria-Hungary is compelled to exact from Servia measures which will secure her Slav provinces from the continuance of hostile propaganda from Servian territory.^ The French Ambassador hears from Berlin that the German Ambassador at Vienna is instructed^ to speak seriously to the Austro- Hungarian Government against acting in a manner calculated to provoke a European war. Unfortunately the German Ambassador is himself so identified with extreme anti-Russian and anti-Servian feeling prevalent in Vienna that he is unlikely to plead the cause of peace with entire sincerity. Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that the German Ambassador knew ^ the text of the Austrian ulti- matum to Servia before it was despatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it. From Vienna British Blue Book No. 96 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey, — (Received July 30.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 30, 1914. The Russian Ambassador gave the French Ambassador and myself this afternoon at the French Embassy, where I happened to be, an account of his interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, which he said was quite friendly. The Minister for Foreign Affairs had told him that as Russia had mobilised, Austria must, of course, do the same. This, however, should not be regarded as a threat, but merely as the adoption of military precautions similar to those which had been taken across the frontier. He said he had no objec- tion to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh continuing their conversations,^ al- though he did not say that they could be resumed on the basis of the Servian reply. On the whole, the Russian Ambassador is not dissatisfied. He had begun to make his preparations for his departure on the strength of 1 This is an eminently fair statement, nor did Austria-Hungary desire more. Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29. 2 For the instruction see Chancellor's Speech, note 2, British Blue Book No. 67, July 28. Contrast with this, British despatch based on French information, French Yellow- Book No. 107, July 30, where Jules Cambon complains of "the negative action of German diplomacy at Vienna." ' There is no proof for this assertion. * This is what Germany had demanded ; see Chancellor's Speech, note 2, British Blue Book No. 67, July 28. July 30, British Blue Book No. 97 331 a rumour that Austria would declare war in reply to mobilisation. He now hopes that something may yet be done to prevent war with Austria. From St. Petersburgh British Blue Book No. 97 ^ Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 30.) (Telegraphic.) St'. Petersburgh, July 30, 1914. French Ambassador and I visited Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning. His Excellency said that German Ambassador had told him yesterday afternoon that German Government were willing to guarantee that Servian integrity would be respected by Austria. To this he had replied that this might be so, but nevertheless Servia would become an Austrian vassal, just as, in similar circumstances, Bokhara had become a Russian vassal. There would be a revolution in Russia, if she were to tolerate such a state of affairs. M. Sazonof ^ told us that absolute proof was in possession of Rus- sian Government that Germany was making military and naval prep- arations against Russia — more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland. German Ambassador had a second interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs at 2 a.m., when former completely broke down on seeing that war was inevitable. He appealed to M. Sazonof ^ to make some suggestion which he could telegraph to German Government as a last hope. M. Sazonof ^ accordingly drew up and handed to Ger- man Ambassador a formula ^ in .French, of which following is trans- lation : — " If Austria, recognising that her conflict with Servia has assumed character of question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate principle of sovereignty of Servia, Russia engages to stop all military prepara- tions." 4 . Preparations for general mobilisation will be proceeded with if this proposal is rejected by Austria, and inevitable result will be a European war. Excitement here has reached such a pitch that, if Austria refuses to make a concession, Russia cannot hold back, and now that she knows that Germany is arming, she can hardly postpone, for strategical reasons, converting partial into general mobilisation. 1 This despatch refers to the interview described in French Yellow Book Nos. 102 and 103, July 30. For a full discussion of the British and French presentations, see E. von Mach, Germany's Point of View, pp. 428 ff. 2 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 3 This proposal was altered at the request of the British Ambassador (French Yellow Book No. 113, July 31) acting according to the wishes of Sir E. Grey, British Blue Book No. 110, July 31. Cf. also British Blue Book 103, July 30, and No. 120, July 31, received and listed under date of August 1. For a fuller discussion of these despatches see E. von Mach, Germany's Point of View, pp. 432 ff. * The meaning of this phrase is "demobilisation," as appears from British Blue Book No. 99, same day. 332 Official Diplomatic Documents From Berlin British Blue Book No. 98 Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 30.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 30, 1914. Secretary of State informs me that immediately on receipt of Prince Lichnowsky's ^ telegram recording his last conversation ^ with you he asked Austro-Hungarian Government whether they would be willing to accept mediation on basis of occupation by Austrian troops of Belgrade or some other point and issue their conditions from here. He has up till now received no reply, but he fears Russian mobili- sation against Austria will have increased difficulties, as Austria- Hungary, who has as yet only mobilised against Servia, will probably find it necessary also against Russia. Secretary of State says if you can succeed in getting Russia to agree to above basis for an arrange- ment and in persuading her in the meantime to take no steps which might be regarded as an act of aggression against Austria he still sees some chance that European peace may be preserved. He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's position in view of Russian mobilisation and military measures which he hears are being taken in France. Beyond recall of officers on leave — a measure which had been officially taken after, and not before, visit of French ambassador yesterday — Imperial Government had done nothing special in way of military preparations. Something, how- ever, would have soon to be done, for it might be too late, and when they mobilised they would have to mobilise on three sides. He regretted this, as he knew France did not desire war, but it would be a military necessity. His Excellency added that telegram ' received from Prince Lich- nowsky ^ last night contains matter which he had heard with regret, but not exactly with surprise, and at all events he thoroughly appre- ciated frankness and loyalty with which you had spoken. He also told me that this telegram had only reached Berlin very late last night; had it been received earlier Chancellor would, of course, not have spoken to me in the way he had done. 1 German Ambassador in London. ' This conversation is not mentioned in the British Blue Book, although Sir E. Grey- related it to the French Ambassador. The report of the latter is printed in the French Yellow Book No. 108, July 30. It had reference to the "military preparations," i.e. the mobilisation of England. Probably during the same conversation the subject of the neutrality of England was discussed along the lines mentioned in British Blue Book No. 102, July 30. The British Blue Book contains no footnote to "telegram" in the second line of this despatch, but gives a footnote to "telegram" in the first line of the second before last paragraph, namely "See No. 102." For the importance of the despatch No. 102, see note to that despatch. ' See No. 102. July 30, British Blue Book No. 99 . 333 From Paris British Blue Book No. 99 Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 30.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 30, 1914. President of the Republic tells me that the Russian Govern- ment have been informed ^ by the German Government that unless Russia stops her mobilisation Germany would mobilise. But a further report, since received from St. Petersburgh, states that the German communication had been modified, ^ and was now a request to be informed on what conditions Russia would consent to demobili- sation.^ The answer given is that she agrees to do so on condition that Austria-Hungary gives an assurance that she will respect the sovereignty of Servia and submit certain of the demands of the Austrian note, which Servia has not accepted, to an international discussion. President thinks that these conditions will not be accepted by Austria. He is convinced that peace between the Powers is in the hands of Great Britain. If His Majesty's Government announced that England would come to the aid of France ^ in the event of a conflict between France and Germany as a result of the present differences between Austria and Servia, there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude. I explained to him how difficult it would be for His Majesty's Government to make such an announcement, but he said that he must maintain that it would be in the interests of peace. France, he said, is pacific. She does not desire war, and all that she has done at present is to make preparations for mobilisation so as not to be taken unawares. The French Government will keep His Majesty's Government informed of everything that may be done in that way. They have reliable information that the German troops are concentrated round Thionville and Metz ready for war. If there were a general war on the Continent it would inevitably draw England into it for the protection of her vital interests. A declara- tion now of her intention to support France, whose desire it is that peace should be maintained, would almost certainly prevent Germany from going to war. 1 Not in Russian Orange Book or German White Book, but given in French Yellow Book No. 100, July 29. 2 French Yellow Book No. 103, July 30, British Blue Book No. 97, and Russian Orange Book No. 60, same day. 3 Demobihsation, it appears from this, was the meaning of the phrase "stop all military preparations" given in British Blue Book No. 97, same day. * A declaration on the part of England of her "solidarity with Russia and France" had been desired by Sazonof as early as July 24 (British Blue Book No. 6) and again on July 27 (British Blue Book No. 44). Evidently France was now trying to persuade England to take this stand at least so far as France was concerned. 334 Official Diplomatic Documents From Rome British Blue Book No. 100 Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 30.) (Telegraphic.) Rome, July SO, 1914. German Ambassador told me last night that he thought Germany would be able to prevent Austria from making any exorbitant demands if Servia could be induced to submit, and to ask for peace early, say, as soon as the occupation of Belgrade had been accomplished. I made to his Excellency the personal suggestion that some formula might be devised by Germany which might be acceptable for an ex- change of views. I see, however, that you have already made this suggestion.^ To Berlin British Blue Book No. 101 ^ Sir Edward Grey to Sir B. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 30, 1914. . Your telegram of 29th July.^ His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality ^ on such terms. WTiat he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies. From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy. Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover. The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either. Having said so much it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between England and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavour- able and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chan- cellor contemplates. 1 A probable reference to suggestion contained in British Blue Book No. 68, July 28. 2 For the substance of this despatch see No. 102 and note. » British Blue Book No. 85, July 29. * From subsequent publications by the British and German Governments it ap- pears that the subject of English neutrality had been frequently discussed in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of the war. July 30, British Blue Book No. 103 335 You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe ; if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be ipso facto improved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty's Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good-will. And I will say this : If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued ^ against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. ^ The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto. To Berlin British Blue Book No. 102 ^ Sir Edivard Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 30, 1914. I HAVE warned Prince Lichnowsky ^ that Germany must not count upon our standing aside in all circumstances. This is doubtless the substance of the telegram from Prince Lichnowsky to German Chancellor, to which reference is made in the last two paragraphs of your telegram of 30th July.^ To St. Petersburgh British Blue Book No. 103 Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Peters- burgh. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 30, 1914. German Ambassador informs me that German Government would endeavour to influence Austria, after taking Belgrade and Servian 1 Such a promise at this time would seem to be unthinkable unless Germany here- tofore could not have been assured that "no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her." 2 Sir E. Grey here recognises that through the last Balkan crisis Germany had worked for peace as well as he himself. , ^ 3 No reason appears why this despatch should not have been printed immediately after No. 98 to which it refers. The conversation there discussed followed upon the telegram, British Blue Book No. 85, July 29, and may be expected to have contained Sir E. Grey's oral answer to the Chancellor's proposal. Unfortunately the whole conversation is not given in the British Blue Book (see note to No. 98). Numbers 101 and 102, therefore, seem to contain two answers to the Chancellor's enquiry. * German Ambassador in London. 6 See No. 98. 336 Official Diplomatic Documents territory in region of frontier, to promise not to advance further, while Powers endeavoured to arrange that Servia should give satis- faction sufficient to pacify Austria.^ Territory occupied would of course be evacuated when Austria was satisfied. I suggested this yesterday as a possible relief to the situation, and, if it can be obtained, I would earnestly hope that it might be agreed to suspend further military preparations on all sides. Russian Ambassador has told me of condition laid do^n by M. Sazonof,^ as quoted in your telegram of the 30th July,^ and fears it cannot be modified ; ^ but if Austrian advance were stopped after occupation of Belgrade, I think Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' formula might be changed to read that the Powers would examine how Servia could fully satisfy Austria without impairing Servian sovereign rights or independence. If Austria, having occupied Belgrade and neighbouring Servian territory, declares herself ready, in the interest of European peace, to cease her advance and to discuss how a complete settlement can be arrived at, I hope that Russia would also consent to discussion and suspension of further military preparations, provided that other Powers did the same. It is a slender chance of preserving peace, but the only one I can suggest if Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs can come to no agree- ment at Berlin. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs. To Paris British Blue Book No. 104 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F, Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 30, 1914. You should inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my telegram to Sir G. Buchanan ^ of to-day,^ and say that I know that he has been urging Russia not to precipitate a crisis.^ I hope he may be able to support this last suggestion at St. Petersburgh. 1 This had been suggested by Sir E. Grey on the previous day, British Blue Book No. 88. July 29. * Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 3 See No. 97. * It does not appear why the Russian formula needed any modification, agreeing substantially with Germany's suggestions to Austria-Hungary. See also Russian Orange Book No. 60. The altered formula (British Blue Book No. 120 under date of August 1) was certainly much less acceptable to the Teutonic Powers. ' British Ambassador at St. Petersburg. « See No. 103. ' This must refer to French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30, where Viviani begs Sazonof not to take "any step which may offer to Germany a pretext for a total or partial mobilisation of her forces." It cannot refer to general pacific pressure brought to bear on Russia ; for Russian Orange Book No. 36, July 27, and No. 53, July 29, assert that Germany had vainly tried to get France to do so. See also French Yellow Book No. 62, July 27, and French Yellow Book No. 80, July 28. July 30, British Blue Book No. 105 337 To Paris British Blue Book No. 105 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. Sir, Foreign Office, July 30, 1914. M. Cambon reminded me to-day of the letter I had written to him two years ago, in which we agreed that, if the peace of Europe was seriously threatened, we would discuss what we were prepared to do. I enclose for convenience of reference copies of the letter in question and of M. Cambon's reply. He said that the peace of Europe was never more seriously threatened than it was now. He did not wish to ask me to say directly that we would intervene, but he would like me to say what we should do if certain circumstances arose. The particular hypothesis he had in mind was an aggression by Germany on France. He gave me a paper, of which a copy is also enclosed, showing that the German military preparations were more advanced and more on the offensive upon the frontier than anything France had yet done.^ He anticipated that the aggression would take the form of either a demand that France should cease her preparations, or a demand that she should engage to remain neutral if there was war between Germany and Russia. Neither of these things could France admit. I said that the Cabinet ^ was to meet to-morrow morning, and I would see him again to-morrow afternoon. I am, etc. E. Grey. Enclosure 1 in No. 105 Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London. My dear Ambassador, Foreign Office, November 22, 1912. From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engage- ment that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for in- stance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war. You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other. 1 From British Blue Book No. 104 it appeared that Sir E. Grey was familiar with Viviani's despatch, French Yellow Book No. 101, which shows that Viviani knew that Germany had not yet proceeded even to partial mobilisation. 2 For a fuller discussion of this and subsequent Cabinet meetings, see E. von Mach, Germany's Point of View, McClurg & Co., pp. 263 ff. 338 Official Diplomatic Documents I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be pre- pared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them. Yours, etc. Enclosure 2 in No. 105 M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London, to Sir Edward Grey, L'Ambassade de France, Londres, ce 23 novembre, 1912. Cher Sir Edward. Par votre lettre en date d'hier, 22 novembre, vous m'avez rap- pele que, dans ces dernieres annees, les autorites militaires et navales de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne s'etaient con- sultees de temps en temps; qu'il avait toujours ete entendu que ces consultations ne restrei- gnaientpasla liberte, pour chaque Gouvernement, de decider dans I'avenir s'ils se preteraient Tun Tautre le concours de leurs forces armees ; que, de part et d'autre, ces consultations entre specia- listes n'etaient et ne devaient pas etre considerees comme des engagements obligeant nos Gou- vernements a agir dans certains cas ; que cependant je vous avais fait observer que, si Tun ou Tautre des deux Gouvernements avait de graves raisons d'appre- hender une attaque non provo- quee de la part d'une tierce Puissance, il deviendrait essentiel de savoir s'il pourrait compter sur Tassistance armee de Tautre. Votre lettre repond a cette ob- servation, et je suis autorise a (Translation.) French Embassy, London, November 23, 1912. Dear Sir Edward. You reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22nd Novem- ber, that during the last few years the military and naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time to time ; that it had always been understood that these con- sultations should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the support of their armed forces ; that, on either side, these consul- tations between experts were not and should not be considered as engagements binding our Governments to take action in certain eventualities ; that, how- ever, I had remarked to you that, if one or other of the two Govern- ments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third Power, it would become essential to know whether it could count on the armed support of the other. Your letter answers that point, and I am authorised to state that. July 30, British Blue Book No. 105 339 vous declarer que, dans le cas ou Tun de nos deux Gouvernements aurait un motif grave d'appre- hender soit Taggression d'une tierce Puissance, soit quelque evenement mena^ant pour la paix generale, ce Gouvernement examinerait immediatement avec I'autre si les deux Gouvernements doivent agir de concert en vue de prevenir I'aggression ou de sauve- garder la paix. Dans ce cas, les deux Gouvernements deli- bereraient sur les mesures qu'ils seraient disposes a prendre en commun; si ces mesures com- portaient une action, les deux Gouvernements prendraient aus- sitot en consideration les plans de leurs etats majors et decide- raient alors de la suite qui devrait etre donnee a ces plans. Votre sincerement devoue, Paul Cambon. in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reasons to fear either an act of aggression from a third Power, or some event threatening the general peace, that Government would immediately examine with the other the question whether both Governments should act together in order to prevent the act of aggression or preserve peace. If so, the two Govern- ments would deliberate as to the measures which they would be prepared to take in common; if those measures involved action, the two Governments would take into immediate consideration the plans of their general staffs and would then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans. Yours, etc. Paul Cambon. Enclosure 3 in No. 105 ^ French Minister for Foreign Affairs to M. Cambon, Frerwh Ambassador in London. (Translation.) The German Army had its advance-posts on our frontiers yesterday ; German patrols twice penetrated on to our territory. Our advance-posts are withdrawn to a distance of 10 kilom. from the frontier. The local popula- tion is protesting against being thus abandoned to the attack of the enemy's army, but the Government wishes to make it clear to public opinion and to the British Government that in no case will France be the aggres- L'Armee allemande a ses avant-postes sur nos bornes-fron- tieres, hier; par deux fois des patrouilles allemandes ont pene- tre sur notre territoire. Nos avant-postes sont en retraite a 10 kilom. en arriere de la frontiere. Les populations ainsi abandon- nees a I'attaque de Tarmee ad- verse protestent ; mais le Gou- vernement tient a montrer a I'opinion publique et au Gou- vernement britannique que I'agresseur ne sera en aucun cas 1 Enclosure 3 in No. 105 was dated in the first editions of the British Blue Book, namely July 31, while No. 105 itself is dated July 30. The text of the Enclosure should be compared with French Yellow Book No. 106, on which it is based. Whether the French Ambassador or Sir E. Grey is responsible for the errors and transpositions, it is impossible to state. For a full discussion see E. von Mach, Germany s Fomt of View, pp. 421 £f., and the same author's Why Europe is at War, G. P. I'utnam s Sons. 340 Official Diplomatic Documents la France. Tout le 16® Corps de Metz renforce par une partie du 8® venu de Treves et de Cologne oceupe la frontiere de Metz au Luxembourg. Le 15® Corps d'Armee de Strasbourg a serre sur la frontiere. Sous menace d'etre fusilles les Alsaciens-Lor- rains des pays annexes ne peuvent pas passer la frontiere; des reservistes par dizaines de milliers sont rappeles en Allemagne ; c'est le dernier stade avant la mobilisa- tion: or, nous n'avons rappele aucun reserviste. Comme vous le voyez, I'Alle- magne I'a fait. J'ajoute que toutes nos informations concor- dent pour montrer que les pre- paratifs allemands ont commence samedi/ le jour meme de la remise de la note autrichienne. Ces elements, ajoutes a ceux contenus dans mon telegramme d'hier, vous permettent de faire la preuve au Gouvernement bri- tannique de la volonte pacifique de Tun et des intentions agres- sives de Tautre. sor. The whole 16th corps from Metz, reinforced by a part of the 8th from Treves and Cologne, is occupying the frontier at Metz on the Luxemburg side. The 15th army corps from Strassburg has closed up on the frontier. The inhabitants of Alsace-Lor- raine are prevented by the threat of being shot from crossing the frontier. Reservists have been called back to Germany by tens of thousands. This is the last stage before mobilisation, whereas w^e have not called back a single reservist. As you see, Germany has done so. I would add that all my in- formation goes to show that the German preparations began on Saturday,^ the very day on which the Austrian note was handed in. These facts, added to those contained in my telegram of yesterday, will enable you to prove to the British Government the pacific intentions of the one party and the aggressive inten- tions of the other. Russia : From Nish Russian Orange Book No. 59 Russian Charge d^ Affaires in Servia to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Nish, July 17 (30), 19U. (Telegram.) The Prince Regent yesterday published a manifesto, signed by all the Servian Ministers, on the declaration of war by Austria against Servia. The manifesto ends with the following words: "Defend your homes and Servia with all your might.'' At the solemn opening of the Skupschtina the Regent read the speech from the Throne, in his own name. At the beginning of his speech he pointed out that ^ The earlier editions of the British Blue Book contained no footnote to this errone- ous date. The later ones print this note : " Sic: in original. The actual date of the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum was, in fact, Thursday, July 23. The Servian reply was dated Saturday, July 25, and it is clearly to the latter document that reference is intended." July 30, Russian Orange Book No. 60 341 the place of their convocation showed the importance of present events. He followed this with a summary of recent events — the Austrian ultimatum, the Servian reply, the efforts of the Servian Government to do their utmost to avoid war that was compatible with the dignity of the State, and, finally, the armed aggression of their most powerful neighbour against Servia, at whose side stood Montenegro. Passing in review the attitude of the Powers towards the dispute, the Prince emphasised in the first place the sentiments which animated Russia, and the gracious communication from His Majesty the Emperor that Russia would in no case abandon Servia.^ At each mention of His Majesty the Czar and of Russia the hall re- sounded with loud bursts of wild cheering. The sympathy shown by France and England ^ was also touched upon in turn, and called forth approving plaudits from the members. The speech from the throne ended by declaring the Skupschtina open, and by expressing the hope that everything possible would be done to lighten the task before the Government. To Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, and Rome Russian Orange Book No. 60 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, and Rome. St. Petersburgh, July 17 (30), 1914. (Telegram.) The German Ambassador, who has just left me, has asked ^ whether Russia would not be satisfied with the promise which Austria might give — that she would not violate the integrity of the Kingdom of Servia — and whether we could not indicate upon what conditions we would agree to suspend our military preparations. I dictated to him the following declaration to be forwarded to Berlin for immediate action : "Si TAutriche, reconnaissant "If Austria, recognising that que la question austro-serbe a the Austro-Servian question has assume le caractere d'une ques- assumed the character of a ques- tion europeenne, se declare prete tion of European interest, de- a eliminer de son ultimatum les clares herself ready to eliminate points qui portent atteinte aux from her ultimatum points which droits souverains de la Serbie, violate the sovereign rights of la Russie s'engage a cesser ses Servia, Russia engages to stop preparatifs militaires." her military preparations." Please inform me at once by telegraph what attitude the German Government will adopt in face of this fresh proof of our desire to do 1 See Russian Orange Book No. 40, July 27. 2 For England's attitude a few weeks earlier, see Mr. Asquith's speech, London Times,'^ July 1, 1914, referring to the Serajevo murder. "We are once more confronted with one of those incredible crimes which almost make us despair of the progress of mankind." 3 Cf. note 2 to British Blue Book No. 99, July 30. 342 Official Diplomatic Documents the utmost possible for a peaceful settlement of the question, for we cannot allow such discussions to continue solely in order that Germany and Austria may gain time for their military preparations. From Berlin I Russian Orange Book No. 61 ^ Russian Ambassador at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Berlin, July 17 (30), 1914. I LEARN that the order for the mobilisation of the German army and navy has just been issued. From Berlin Russian Orange Book No. 62 Russian Ambassador at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Berlin, July 17 {30), 1914. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has just telephoned that the news of the mobilisation of the German army and fleet, which has just been announced, is false ; that the news sheets had been printed in advance so as to be ready for all eventualities, and that they were put on sale in the afternoon, but that they have now been confiscated. From Berlin Russian Orange Book No. 63 Russian Ambassador at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Berlin, July 17 (30), 1914. (Telegram.) I HAVE received your telegram of 16th (29th) July,^ and have com- municated the text of your proposal ^ to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I have just seen. He told me that he had received an identic telegram from the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, and he then declared that he considered it impossible for Austria to accept our proposal. 1 The juxtaposition of Nos. 61 and 60 makes it appear as if No. 61 contained the reply to No. 60. This cannot be the case. From French Yellow Book No. 1 13, July 31, and British Blue Book No. 120, July 31, printed under date of August 1, it appears that the formula was changed by Sazonof probably on July 31. This would have been impossible if Germany had issued her order for the mobilisation of her army and navy on July 30. Cf. also French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30. As a matter of fact Germany mobilised on August 1 as of August 2. See British Blue Book No. 142, August 1, and the chapter on MobiUsation in M. P.- Price, The Diplomatic History of the War. 2 British Blue Book No. 93, July 30, Enclosure No. 2, dated July 29. ' This proposal was superseded by the proposal of July 30, printed above. Orange Book No. 60. To print this despatch (No. 63) after No. 60 is misleading, because the casual reader may see in it Austria's refusal to accept the formula of No. 60, which is not the case. July 30, Russian Orange Book No. 65 343 From London Russian Orange Book No. 64 Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) London, July 17 {30), 1914. I HAVE communicated the substance of your telegrams of the 16th (29th) 1 and 17th (30th) July ^ to Grey, who looks upon the situa- tion as most serious, but wishes to continue the discussions. I pointed out to Grey that — since you agreed with him to accept what- ever proposal he might make in order to preserve peace, provided that Austria did not profit by any ensuing delays to crush Servia — the situation in which you were placed had apparently been modified. At that time our relations with Germany had not been compromised. After the declaration made by the German Ambassador at St. Peters- burg regarding German mobilisation, those relations had changed, and you had returned the only reply to his request that was possible from a Great Power. When the German Ambassador again visited you, and enquired what your conditions were, you had formulated them in altogether special circumstances. I also again emphasised to Grey the necessity of taking into consideration the new situation brought about by the fault of Germany in consequence of the German Ambassador's action.^ Grey replied that he fully understood this, and that he would remember these arguments. From London Russian Orange Book No. 65 Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, (Telegram.) London, July 17 (30), 1914. The German Ambassador has asked Grey^ why Great Britain was taking military measures both on land and sea. Grey replied that these measures had no aggressive character, but that the situa- tion was such that each Power must be -ready. 1 British Blue Book No. 93, Enclosure 2, July 30. Since the Ambassador had com- municated the entire telegram to Sir E. Grey, it does not appear why he should here speak of communicating the substance. Equally confusing is the mixture of two separate proposals. See second note to previous despatch. 2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 97, July 30, and Russian Orange Book No. 60, same day. 5 This action is described in very different terms in British Blue Book No. 97, * Omitted in British Blue Book, see above, note 1 to British Blue Book No. 98, July 30, and French Yellow Book No. 108, same day. 344 Offijcial Diplomatic Documents Serbia : To St. Petersburgh ^ Serbian Blue Bqok No. 44 His Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, to His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia. (Telegraphic.) Nish, July 17/30, 1914. [For the text see Russian Orange Book No. 56, undated in the Collected Dip- lomatic Documents, but printed among the despatches of July 29. No reason is given why a despatch from the Serbian Crown Prince was known in Russia a day before it was published in the Serbian Blue Book as having been sent from Serbia. For Serbian Blue Book Nos. 45 to 47 see under July 28.] From St. Petersburgh Serbian Blue Book No. 48 M. Sazonofy Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Dr. M. Spalaiko- vitch, Serbian Minister at Petrograd. Sir, Petrograd, July 17/30, 19U. I HAD the honour to receive your note of July 15/28/ No. 527, in which you communicated to me the contents of the telegram re- ceived by you from His Excellency, M. Pashitch, in regard to the declaration of war on Serbia by Austria-Hungary. I sincerely regret this sad event, and will not fail to lay before His Majesty the petition by the Serbian nation, whose interpreter you are. I have, etc. 1 Not published in Russian Orange Book or Serbian Blue Book. If the date of the telegram from Sazonof, July 30, is correct it would seem that Sazonof had waited at least two days before laying Serbia's petition before the Czar. This seems incredible. July 31, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 51 345 Friday, July 31, 1914 SUMMARY OF DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary London and Petrograd, All representatives abroad Petrograd, Paris Belgium London, Berlin and Paris, All representatives abroad France London, etc., Petrograd London, Luxemburg, Petrograd Vienna, Berlin, Brussels Germany Rome, Petrograd, Paris Great Britain Petrograd, Berlin, Paris London, Luxemburg, and Berlin, Brussels, Petrograd, Vienna, Paris Berlin, Brussels Russia London, etc. ; London Vienna, Berlin Serbia Austria-Hungary is prepared to entertain Sir E. Grey's proposal to negotiate between her and Serbia. Russia's mobilisation order, however, posted in the early hours throughout the Russian Empire, induces her to mobilise her own forces in Galicia. She nevertheless continues her direct conversations with Russia. Belgium mobilises her forces but promises to observe strict neutrality. She receives assurances of the French minister de suo, and publishes German assur- ances made in the Reichstag several years ago. France, having promised her unconditional support of Russia on the previous day, is trying to obtain an unconditional promise of support from Great Britain. Germany is deeply stirred by the Russian order of general mobilisation, which came while Emperor and Czar were still exchanging telegrams. She says that this order is making her pacific efforts in Vienna impossible and endangering her safety. She consequently declares **Kriegsgefahrzustand" and asks Russia, in an ultima- tum, to demobilise within 12 hours. At the same time she asks France to reply within 18 hours, whether she will remain neutral in a Russo-German War. Great Britain : The Cabinet refuses the request of France to make her a definite promise of support. Sir E. Grey, however, or his assistant. Sir A. Nicolson, promises to bring the matter up again in the Cabinet on the next day, while Sir E. Grey himself gives Germany to understand that Great Britain would join France in case of war, making thus a declaration contrary to the decision of the Cabinet. Notes are addressed to France and Germany regarding their respective attitudes toward the neutrality of Belgium, which Sir E. Grey declares to be not **a decisive but an important factor, in determining our attitude." Sir E. Grey requests a modification of Sazonof's formula of the previous day. Russia alters her formula of the previous day in which she had promised to stop her military measures, and orders the general mobilisation of her forces. Serbia is silent on this day. Austria-Hungary : To London and St. Petersburgh Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 51 Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at London and St. Petersburgh. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 31, 1914, I AM telegraphing as follows to Berlin : — Herr von Tschirschky has in accordance with his instructions yesterday communicated a discussion between Sir E. Grey and Prince 346 Official Diplomatic Documents Lichnowsky in which the British Secretary of State made the following announcement to the German Ambassador : — Sazonof has informed the British Government that after the dec- laration of war by Austria-Hungary against Servia, he is no longer in a position to deal directly with Austria-Hungary/ and he there- fore requests that Great Britain will again take up her work of media- tion. The Russian Government regarded the preliminary stoppage of hostilities as a condition precedent to this. To this Russian declaration, Sir E. Grey remarked to Prince Lichnowsky that Great Britain thought of a mediation a quatre, and that she regarded this as urgently necessary if a general war was to be prevented. I ask your Excellency to convey our warm thanks to the Secretary of State for the communications made to us through Herr von Tschirschky, and to declare to him that in spite of the change in the situation which has since arisen through the mobilisation of Russia, we are quite prepared to entertain the proposal of Sir E. Grey to nego- tiate between us and Servia.^ The conditions of our acceptance are, nevertheless, that our military action against Servia should continue to take its course, and that the British Cabinet should move the Russian Government to bring to a standstill the Russian mobilisation which is directed against us, in which case, of course, we will also at once cancel the defensive military counter-measures in Galicia, which are occasioned by the Russian attitude. From St. Petersburgh AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 52' Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) *S^. Petersburgh, July 31, 1914. The order for the general mobilisation of the entire Army and Fleet was issued early to-day. To the Imperial and Royal Diplomatic Representatives AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 53 Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Diplomatic Representatives. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 31, 1914- For your information and for use in your dealings with the Govern- ment to which you are accredited. 1 The only published despatch in the British Blue Book and Russian Orange Book to which this can refer is Russian Orange Book No. 50, July 29. Here, however, it is Sazonof, while there it is Austria-Hungary who is said to have broken off the conversa- tions. This despatch is not printed in the German White Book. 2 This is an enormous concession both to Great Britain and France. Heretofore Germany and Austria-Hungary had always refused arbitration between Austria and Serbia while ready to accept arbitration between Austria and Russia. ' The juxtaposition of these despatches, Nos. 51 and 52, is as unfortunate as that noted above, Russian Orange Book Nos. 60 and 61, July 30. The mobilisation was in neither case the result of the previous despatch. The Russian mobilisation was the result of a decision reached "five days ago," according to the Czar's telegram of July 30 ; see German White Book, Exhibit 23a. July 31 f Austro-Hungarian Red Book No, 55 347 As mobilisation has been ordered by the Russian Government on our frontier, we find ourselves obliged to take military measures in Galicia. These measures are purely of a defensive character and arise ex- clusively under the pressure of the Russian measures, which we regret exceedingly, as we ourselves have no aggressive intentions of any kind against Russia, and desire the continuation of the former neigh- bourly relations. Pourparlers between the Cabinets at Vienna and St. Petersburgh appropriate to the situation are meanwhile being continued,^ and from these we hope that things will quiet down all round. From Paris AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 54 Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 31, 1914. German Ambassador in pursuance of the instructions of his Government has declared here that if the general mobilisation ordered by the Russian Government is not stopped within 12 hours, Germany also will mobilise. At the same time Baron Schoen has asked whether France will remain neutral in the event of a war between Germany and Russia. An answer to this is requested within eighteen hours. The time limit expires to-morrow (Saturday) at 1 o'clock in the after- noon. From St. Petersburgh AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 55 Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 31, 1914. Your Excellency's telegram ^ of the 30th July has been received. You will have gathered from my telegram ^ of the 29th July, that without waiting for instructions I again resumed conversations with M. Sazonof more or less on the basis which has now been indicated to me, but that the points of view on the two sides had not materially approximated to each other. Meanwhile, however, it has appeared from the conversations between the German Ambassador and the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that Russia will not ^ accept as satisfactory the formal declaration that Austria-Hungary will neither diminish the ter- ritory of the Servian Kingdom nor infringe on Servian sovereignty nor injure Russian interests in the Balkans or elsewhere ; since then more- over a general mobilisation ^ has been ordered on the part of Russia. 1 A despatch explaining the resumption of the pourparlers seems to be lacking, unless No. 55, same day, explains it. 2 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 50, July 30. 3 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29. * In reports of these conversations this is only stated by inference. Cf . British Blue Book No. 97, July 30. 6 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 52, same day. 348 Official Diplomatic Documents Belgium: To Berlin, Paris, London Belgian Gray Book No. 9 M. Damgnon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, Paris, and London. Sir, Brussels, July 31, 1914. The French Minister came to show me a telegram from the Agence Havas reporting a state of war ^ in Germany, and said ^ : — "I seize this opportunity to declare that no incursion of French troops into Belgium will take place, even if considerable forces are massed upon the frontiers of your country. France does not wish to incur the responsibility, so far as Belgium is concerned, of taking the first hostile act. Instructions in this sense will be given to the French authorities." I thanked M. Klobukowski for his communication, and I felt bound to observe that we had always had the greatest confidence in the loyal observance by both our neighbouring States of their engagements towards us. We have also every reason to believe that the attitude of the German Government will be the same as that of the Govern- ment of the French Republic. To All Belgian Missions Abroad Belgian Gray Book No. 10 M. Damgnon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all Heads of Belgian Missions abroad. (Telegram.) Brussels, July 31, 1914- The Minister of War informs me that mobilisation has been ordered^ and that Saturday, the 1st August, will be the first day. To Berlin, London, Paris Belgian Gray Book No. U M. Damgnon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, London, and Paris. Sir, Brussels, July 31, 191^. The British Minister asked to see me on urgent business, and made the following communication, which he had hoped for some days ^ 1 "State of danger of war" (Kriegsgefahrzustand) , see French Yellow Book No. 119, July 31, and British Blue Book No. 112, same day. 2 It is an unusual step in diplomacy for the Minister to make such a declaration without authority to that effect having been sent. The formal declaration of the French Government was made later. Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 15, August 1, 1914. ' It will be noted that Belgium ordered the mobilisation of her troops one day earlier than Germany. See German White Book, p. 559, August 1 at 5 p.m., and Brit- ish Blue Book No. 127, August 1. * No explanation is given why the British Minister could not have done so before. July 31, Belgian Gray Book No. 12 349 to be able to present to me : Owing to the possibility of a Euro- pean war, Sir Edward Grey has asked the French and German Governments separately if they were each of them ready to respect Belgian neutrality provided that no other Power violated it : — " In view of existing treaties, I am instructed ^ to inform the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs of the above, and to say that Sir Edward Grey presumes that Belgium will do her utmost to maintain her neutrality, and that she desires and expects that the other Powers will respect and maintain it." I hastened to thank Sir Francis Villiers for this communication, which the Belgian Government particularly appreciate, and I added that Great Britain and the other nations guaranteeing our independ- ence could rest assured that we would neglect no effort to maintain our neutrality, and that we were convinced that the other Powers, in view of the excellent relations of friendship and confidence which had always existed between us, would respect and maintain that neutrality. I did not fail to state that our military forces, which had been con- siderably developed in consequence of our recent reorganisation, were sufficient to enable us to defend ourselves ^ energetically in the event of the violation of our territory. In the course of the ensuing conversation. Sir Francis seemed to me somewhat surprised at the speed with which we had decided to mobilise our army. I pointed out to him that the Netherlands had come to a similar decision before we had done so, and that, more- over, the recent date of our new military system, and the tem- porary nature of the measures upon which we then had to decide, made it necessary for us to take immediate and thorough precautions. Our neighbours and guarantors should see in this decision our strong desire to uphold our neutrality ourselves. Sir Francis seemed to be satisfied with my reply, and stated that his Government were awaiting this reply before continuing negotiations with France and Germany, the result of which would be communi- cated to me. To Berlin, London, and Paris Belgian Gray Book No. 12 il. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, London, and Paris. Sir, Brussels, July 31, 1914. In the course of the conversation which the Secretary-General of my Department had with Herr von Below this morning, he ex- 1 British Blue Book No. 115, July 31. 2 This should be read in the light of the Brussels Documents, published by the German Government, which reveal the close military understanding with Great Britain. The reader should decide for himself whether Belgium was in a position to defend herself also against the Allies. Germany says that this would have been impossible because Belgium had given all her military secrets to Great Britain and, therefore, also to France. 350 Official Diplomatic Documents plained to the German Minister the scope of the military measures which we had taken, and said to him that they were a consequence of our desire to fulfil our international obligations, and that they in no wise implied an attitude of distrust towards our neighbours. The Secretary-General then asked the German Minister if he knew of the conversation which he had had with his predecessor, Herr von Flotow, and of the reply which the Imperial Chancellor had instructed the latter to give. In the course of the controversy which arose in 1911 as a conse- quence of the Dutch scheme for the fortification of Flushing, certain newspapers had maintained that in the case of a Franco-German war Belgian neutrality ^ would be violated by Germany. The Department of Foreign Affairs had suggested that a declara- tion in the German Parliament during a debate on foreign affairs would serve to calm public opinion, and to dispel the mistrust which was so regrettable from the point of view of the relations between the two countries. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg replied that he had fully appreciated the feelings which had inspired our representations. He declared that Germany had no intention of violating Belgian neutrality, but he considered that in making a public declaration Germany would weaken her military position in regard to France, who, secured on the northern side, would concentrate all her energies on the east. Baron van der Elst, continuing, said that he perfectly understood the objections raised by Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg to the proposed public declaration, and he recalled the fact that since then, in 1913, Herr von Jagow had made reassuring declarations to the Budget Commission of the Reichstag respecting the maintenance of Belgian neutrality. Herr von Below replied that he knew of the conversation with Herr von Flotow, and that he was certain that the sentiments expressed at that time had not changed. Enclosure in No. 12 Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Berlin, May 2, 1913. I HAVE the honour to bring to your notice the declarations re- specting Belgian neutrality, as published in the semi-official Nord- deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, made by the Secretary of State and the Minister of War, at the meeting of the Budget Committee of the Reichstag on April 29th : — " A member of the Social Democrat Party said : * The approach of a war between Germany and France is viewed with apprehension * For a full discussion of the neutrality of Belgium see A. K. Fuehr, The Neutrality of Belgium, Funk & Wagnalls Co. July Sly French Yellow Book No, 110 351 in Belgium, for it is feared that Germany will not respect the neu- trality of Belgium.' " Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State, replied : ' Belgian neutrality is provided for by International Conventions and Germany is de- termined to respect those Conventions.' "This declaration did not satisfy another member of the Social Democrat Party. Herr von Jagow said that he had nothing to add to the clear statement he had made respecting the relations between Germany and Belgium. "In answer to fresh enquiries by a member of the Social Demo- crat Party, Herr von Heeringen, the Minister of War, replied: * Belgium plays no part in the causes which justify the proposed re- organisation of the German military system. That proposal is based on the situation* in the East. Germany will not lose sight of the fact that the neutrality of Belgium is guaranteed by international treaty.' " A member of the Progressive Party having once again spoken of Belgium, Herr von Jagow repeated that this declaration in regard to Belgium was sufficiently clear." France : From London French Yellow Book No. 110 M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene Vimani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, July 31, 1914- At the beginning of our conversation ^ to-day Sir E. Grey told me that Prince Lichnowsky had asked him this morning if Great Britain would observe neutrality in the conflict which is at hand. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that, if the conflict became general. Great Britain would not be able to remain neutral, and especially that if France were involved Great Britain would be drawn in. I then asked Sir E. Grey concerning the Cabinet Council which took place this morning. He replied that after having examined the situation, the Cabinet had thought ^ that for the moment the British Government were unable to guarantee to us their inter- vention, that they intended to take steps to obtain from Germany and France an understanding to respect Belgian neutrality, but that before considering intervention it was necessary to wait for the situ- ation to develop. I asked Sir E. Grey if, before intervening, the British Government would await the invasion of French territory. I insisted on the fact 1 This conversation is only very briefly touched upon in British Blue Book No. 116, same day. 2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 119, July 31. This was the first vote of the Cabinet to "intervene" or " pledge support" to France. For the second vote, likewise refusing, see French Yellow Book No. 126, August 1. 352 Official Diplomatic Documents that the measures already taken on our frontier by Germany showed an intention to attack in the near future, and that, if a renewal of the mistake of Europe in 1870 was to be avoided. Great Britain should consider at once the circumstances in which she would give France the help on which she relied.^ Sir E. Grey replied that the opinion of the Cabinet had only been formed on the situation at the moment, that the situation might be modified, and that in that case a meeting of the Cabinet would be called ^ together at once in order to consider it. Sir A. Nicolson, whom I saw on leaving the room of the Secretary of State, told me that the Cabinet would meet again to-morrow, and confidentially gave me to understand that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would be certain to renew the discussion. According to your instructions, I have taken the necessary steps to secure that the autograph letter ^ which the President of the Re- public has addressed to His Majesty the King of England should be given to the King this evening. This step, which will certainly be communicated to the Prime Minister to-morrow morning, will, I am sure, be taken into serious consideration by the British Cabinet. Paul Cambon. From Luxemburg French Yellow Book No. Ill M. Mollardf French Minister at Luxemburg, to Rene Vimani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Luxemburg, July 31,1914. The Minister of State has just left the Legation ; he has just told me that the Germans have closed the bridges over the Moselle at Schengen and at Remich with vehicles and the bridge at Wormel- dange with ropes. The bridges at Wasserbillig and at D'Echternach over the SHre have not been closed, but the Germans no longer allow the export from Prussia of corn, cattle or motor cars. M. Eyschen requested me — and this was the real object of his visit — to ask you for an official declaration to the effect that France will, in case of war, respect the neutrality of Luxemburg. When I asked him if he had received a similar declaration from the German Government, he told me that he was going to the German Minister to get the same declaration. Postscript. — Up to the present no special measure has been taken by the Cabinet of Luxemburg. M. Eyschen has returned from the German Legation. He complained of the measures showing sus- picion which were taken against a neutral neighbour. The Minister of State has asked the German Minister for an official declaration 1 If France had not relied on the help of Great Britain she might not have supported Russia. 2 Contrast this with the assurance given in the next paragraph. 3 This letter was published by Sir E. Grey, after repeated requests had been made, on Feb. 20, 1915. July 31, French Yellow Book No. 112 353 from his Government undertaking to respect the neutrality. Herr Von Buch is stated to have repUed, " That is a matter of course, but it would be necessary for the French Government to give the same undertaking." MOLLARD. To London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna and Rome French Yellow Book No. 112 M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome. Paris, July 31, 1914. The British Ambassador has handed me a note ^ from his Govern- ment asking the French Government to support a proposal at St. Petersburgh for the peaceful solution of the Austro-Servian conflict. This note shows that the German Ambassador has informed Sir E. Grey of the intention of his Government to try to exercise influence on the Austro-Hungarian Government after the capture of Belgrade and the occupation of the districts bordering on the frontier, in order to obtain a promise not to advance further, while the Powers en- deavoured to secure that Servia should give sufficient satisfaction to Austria ; the occupied territory would be evacuated as soon as she had received satisfaction. Sir E. Grey made this suggestion on the 29th July,^ and expressed the hope that military preparations would be suspended on all sides. Although the Russian Ambassador at London has informed the Secretary of State that he fears that the Russian condition ^ (if Austria, recognising that her conflict tvith Servia has assumed the character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her tdtimatum the points ivhich endanger the principle of Servian sovereignty, Russia undertakes to stop all military prepara- tions) cannot be modified. Sir E. Grey thinks that, if Austria stops her advance after the occupation of Belgrade, the Russian Govern- ment could agree to change their formula in the following way : — That the Powers would examine how Servia should give complete satisfaction to Austria without endangering the sovereignty or in- dependence of the Kingdom. In case Austria after occupying Belgrade and the neighbouring Servian territory should declare her- self ready, in the interests of Europe, to stop her advance and to dis- cuss how an arrangement might be arrived at, Russia could also consent to the discussion and suspend her military preparations, pro- vided that the other Powers acted in the same way. In accordance with the request of Sir E. Grey, the French Govern- ment joined in the British suggestion, and in the following terms 1 See British Blue Book No. 104, July 30, also British Blue Book No. 103, same day. 2 British Blue Book No. 88, July 29. 3 French Yellow Book No. 103, British Blue Book No. 97, July 30. 2a 354 Official Diplomatic Documents asked their Ambassador at St. Petersburgh to try to obtain, without delay, the assent ^ of the Russian Government : — " Please inform M. Sazonof urgently that the suggestion of Sir E. Grey appears to me to furnish a useful basis for conversation between the Powers, who are equally desirous of working for an honourable arrangement of the Austro-Servian conflict, and of averting in this manner the dangers which threaten general peace. "The plan proposed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs by stopping the advance of the Austrian army and by entrusting to the Powers the duty of examining how Servia could give full satis- faction to Austria without endangering the sovereign rights and the independence of the Kingdom, by thus affording Russia a means of suspending all military preparations, while the other Powers are to act in the same way, is calculated equally to give satisfaction to Russia and to Austria and to provide for Servia an acceptable means of issue from the present difficulty. " I would ask you carefully to be guided by the foregoing considera- tions in earnestly pressing M. Sazonof to give his adherence ^ without delay to the proposal of Sir E. Grey, of which he will have been himself informed." Rene Viviani. From St. Petersburgh French Yellow Book No. 113 M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister of Foreign Affairs. St. Petersburgh, July 31, 1914. The news of the bombardment of Belgrade ^ during the night and morning of yesterday has provoked very deep feeling in Russia. One cannot understand the attitude of Austria, whose provocations since the beginning of the crisis have regularly followed Russia's attempts at conciliation and the satisfactory conversations exchanged between St. Petersburgh and Vienna. Nevertheless, desirous of leaving nothing undone in order to prove his sincere desire to safeguard peace, M. Sazonof informs me that he has modified ^ his formula, as requested by the British Ambassador, in the following way : — "If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Servian territory, and if, recognising that the Austro-Servian conflict has as- sumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits 1 Austria-Hungary waa " quite prepared to entertain the proposal of Sir E, Grey to negotiate between us and Serbia" ; see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 51, July 31. 2 Russia ordered complete mobilisation instead. ' Cf. last despatch, offer of Sir E. Grey for an agreement "after the occupation of Belgrade." * The modified formula must have been less satisfactory than the original one, French Yellow Book No. 103, July 30, because here Austria has to agree to "stay the march of her troops" while Russia merely agrees to a "waiting attitude," instead of stopping her military preparations as she had first offered to do. July 31, French Yellow Book No, 11 4 355 that the great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Servia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government, without injury to her sovereign rights as a State and to her independence, Russia undertakes to preserve her waiting attitude." Paleologue. To London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, and Constantinople French Yellow Book No. 114 M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, and Constantinople. Paris, July 31, 1914. The efforts made up till now concurrently by Great Britain and Russia with the earnest support of France (obtained in advance for every peaceful effort) with the object of a direct understanding be- tween Vienna and St. Petersburgh, or of the mediation of the four Powers in the most appropriate form, are being united to-day; Russia, giving a fresh proof of her desire for an understanding, has hastened to reply to the first appearance of an overture ^ made by Germany since the beginning of the crisis (as to the conditions on which Russia would stop her military preparations) by indicating a formula, and then modifying ^ it in accordance with the request of Great Britain ; there ought to be hope, therefore, negotiations having also been begun again between the Russian and Austrian Ambassadors that British mediation will complete at London that which is being attempted by direct negotiations at Vienna and St. Petersburgh. Nevertheless, the constant attitude of Germany who, since the beginning of the conflict, while ceaselessly protesting to each Power her peaceful intentions, has actually, by her dilatory or negative^ attitude, caused the failure of all attempts at agreement, and has not ceased to encourage through her Ambassador the uncompromising attitude of Vienna ; the German military preparations begun since the 25th July ^ and subsequently continued without cessation ; the immediate opposition ^ of Germany to the Russian formula, de- clared at Berlin inacceptable for Austria before that Power had even been consulted; in conclusion, all the impressions derived from Berlin bring conviction that Germany has sought to humiliate Russia, to disintegrate the Triple Entente, and if these results could not be obtained, to make war. Rene Viviani. 1 French Yellow Book No. 103, July 30. 2 See note 2 to previous despatch. 3 Cf. Chancellor's Speech, note 2, British Blue Book No. 67, July 28. ^ That this was an error appears from French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30. See also the chapters on Mobilization in M. P. Price, The Diplomatic History of the War, Scribner's Sons. 6 There is no proof for this assertion. On the contrary Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 51, July 31, seems to prove that Germany had agreed, for Austria-Hungary's state- ment that she was "prepared to entertain the proposal of Sir E. Grey to negotiate be- tween us and Serbia " came as the result of a communication transmitted to her by Germany. Russian Orange Book No. 67, July 31, while stating that the formula was altered at the request of Great Britain, does not say that Germany had opposed the original formula. 356 Official Diplomatic Documents From Vienna French Yellow Book No. 115 M, DumainCj French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council , Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, July 31, 1914. General mobilisation for all men from 19 to 42 years of age was declared by the Austro-Hungarian Government this morning at 1 o'clock. My Russian calleague still thinks that this step is not entirely in contradiction to the declaration made yesterday by Count Berchtold. DUMAINE. From Berlin French Yellow Book No. 116 M, Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 31, 1914. Herr von Jagow sent for me and has just told me that he was very sorry to inform me that in face of the total mobilisation of the Russian army, Germany, in the interest of the security of the Empire, found herself obliged to take serious precautionary measures. What is called " Kriegsgef ahrzustand " (the state of danger of war) has been declared,^ and this allows the authorities to proclaim, if they deem it expedient, a state of siege, to suspend some of the public services, and to close the frontier. At the same time a demand ^ is being made at St. Petersburgh that they should demobilise, as well on the Austrian as on the German side, otherwise Germany would be obliged to mobilise on her side. Herr von Jagow told me that Herr von Schoen had been instructed to inform the French Government of the resolution of the Berlin Cabinet and to ask them what attitude they intended to adopt. Jules Cambon. To St. Petersburgh French Yellow Book No. 117 M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paleologu£, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. Paris, July 31, 1914. The German Government decided at mid-day to take all military measures implied by the state called "state of danger of war." 1 This proves that the previous references to " Kriegsgef ahr " were erroneous. See French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30, and Russian Orange Book No. 61, same day. 2 Russian Orange Book No. 70, August 1 (midnight). July 31, French Yellow Book No. 118 357 In communicating this decision to me at 7 o'clock this evening, Baron von Schoen added that the Government required at the same time that Russia should demobilise. If the Russian Government has not given a satisfactory reply within twelve hours Germany will mobilise in her turn. I replied to the German Ambassador that I had no information at all ^ about an alleged total mobilisation of the Russian army and navy which the German Government invoked as the reason for the new military measures which they are taking to-day. Baron von Schoen finally asked me, in the name of his Government, what the attitude of France would be in case of war between Germany and Russia. He told me that he would come for my reply to-morrow (Saturday) at 1 o'clock. I have no intention of making any statement to him on this subject, and I shall confine myself to telling him that France will have regard to her interests. The Government of the Republic need not indeed give any account of her intentions except to her ally. I ask you to inform M. Sazonof of this immediately. As I have already told you, I have no doubt that the Imperial Government, in the highest interests of peace, will do everything on their part to avoid anything that might render inevitable or precipitate the crisis. Rene Viviani. From St. Petersburgh French Yellow Book No. 118 M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Rene Viviani, President of Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. St. Petersburgh, July 31, 191 4. As a result of the general mobilisation of Austria and of the measures for mobilisation taken secretly, but continuously, by Germany for the last six days,^ the order for the general mobilisation of the Russian army has been given, Russia not being able, without most serious danger, to allow herself to be further out-distanced ; really she is only taking military measures corresponding to those taken by Ger- many. For imperative reasons of strategy the Russian Government, know- ing that Germany was arming, could no longer delay the conversion of her partial mobilisation into a general mobilisation. Paleologue. 1 This is very strange, since the Russian mobilisation was "ordered during the afternoon of July 31" (German White Book, p. 558), according to M. P. Price, The Diplomatic History of the War, Scribner's Sons, p. 103, and London Times, Sept. 11, letter by Mr. Stephen Graham, who states on the Mongolian frontier in Siberia the first telegram to mobilise came through at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 31st July. 2 For the error of this and similar statements see M. P. Price's book referred to in note to previous despatch. 358 Official Diplomatic Documents y From Brussels French Yellow Book No. 119 M. Klobukowskiy French Minister at Brussels, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Brussels, July 31, 1914- L'Agence Havas having announced that the state "of danger of war" had been declared in Germany, I told M. Davignon that I could assure him that the Government of the Republic would respect the neutrality of Belgium. The Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that the Government of the King had always thought that this would be so, and thanked me. The Russian INIinister and the British Minister, whom I saw subse- quently, appeared much pleased that in the circumstances I gave this assurance, which further, as the British INIinister told me, was in accordance with the declaration of Sir E. Grey. Klobukowski. Germany : To Rome German WmxE Book Exhibit 19 Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Rome on July 31st, 1914. We have continued to negotiate between Russia and Austria- Hungary through a direct exchange of telegrams between His Majesty the Kaiser and His Majesty the Czar, as well as in conjunction with Sir Edward Grey. Through the mobilisation of Russia all our efforts have been greatly handicapped if they have not become impossible. In spite of pacifying assurances Russia is ^ taking such far-reaching measures against us that the situation is becoming continually more menacing. To St. Petersburgh German White Book Exhibit 24 Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. Peters- burgh on July 31st, 1914- Urgent. In spite of negotiations still pending and although we have up to this hour made no preparations for mobilisation, Russia has mobilised her entire army and navy, hence also against us. On account of these Russian measures, we have been forced, for the safety of the country, to proclaim the threatening state of war, which does not yet imply mobilisation. Mobilisation, however, is bound to follow if Russia does not stop every measure of war against us and against Austria- ^ The British edition has this footnote: "The German text adds here 'alien uns zugegangenen Nachrichten zufolge' (according to all the information that has reached ua"). July SI, British Blue Book No. 50 359 Hungary within 12 hours, and notifies us definitely to this effect. Please to communicte this at once to M. Sazonof and wire hour of communication.^ To Paris German White Book Exhibit 25 Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in Paris on July 31st, 1914' Urgent. Russia has ordered mobilisation of her entire army and fleet, there- fore also against us in spite of our still pending mediation. ^ We have therefore declared the threatening state of war which is bound to be followed by mobilisation unless Russia stops within 12 hours all measures of war against us and Austria. Mobilisation inevitably implies war. Please ask French Government whether it intends to remain neutral in a Russo-German war. Reply must be made in 18 hours. Wire at once hour of inquiry. Utmost speed necessary. Great Britain: From Vienna British Blue Book No. 50 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 31.) Sir, Vienna, July 28, 1914. I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the Austro-Hungarian note announcing the declaration of war against Servia. I have, etc. Maurice de Bunsen. Enclosure in No. 50 Copy of note verbale, dated Vienna, July 28, 1914 (Translation.) Pour mettre fin aux menees In order to bring to an end subversives partant de Belgrade the subversive intrigues originat- et dirigees centre Tintegrite terri- ing from Belgrade and aimed at toriale de la Monarchic austro- the territorial integrity of the hongroise, le Gouvernement Im- Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, perial et Royal a fait parvenir the Imperial and Royal Govern- a la date du 23 juillet, 1914, au ment has delivered to the Royal Serbie une note dans laquelle se Servian Government a note, trouvait formulee une serie de dated July 23, 1914, in which a demandes pour T acceptation des- series of demands were formu- quelles un delai de quarante-huit lated, for the acceptance of which 1 Presented at midnight. See Russian Orange Book No*. 70, August 1. »The British edition adds here a footnote: "The German text adds here ' und obwohl wir selbst keinerlei Mobilmachungsmassnahmen getroffen^ haben' (and al- though we ourselves have taken no measures towards mobilisation"). 360 Official Diplomatic Documents henres a ete accorde a Gouverne- ment Royal. Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie n'ayant pas repondu a cette note d'une maniere satisfaisante, le Gou- vernement Imperial et Royal se trouve dans la necessite de pour- voir lui-meme a la sauvegarde de ses droits et interets et de reeourir a cet effet a la force des armes. L'Autriche-Hongrie, qui vient d'adresser a la Serbie une de- claration formelle conformement a I'article l"de la convention du 18 octobre, 1907, relative a Touverture des hostilites, se con- sidere des lors en etat de guerre avec la Serbie. En portant ce qui precede a la connaissance de TAmbassade Royale de Grande-Bretagne le Ministere des Affaires Etran- geres a I'honneur de declarer que I'Autriche-Hongrie se confor- mera au cours des hostilites, sous la reserve d'un procede analogue de la part de la Serbie, aux stipulations des conventions de La Haye du 18 octobre, 1907, ainsi qu'a celles de la Declaration de Londres du 26 fevrier, 1909. L'Ambassade est priee de vouloir bien communiquer, d'ur- gence, la presente notification a son Gouvernement. a delay of forty-eight hours has been granted to the Royal Government. The Royal Servian Government not having answered this note in a satisfactory manner, the Imperial and Royal Govern- ment are themselves compelled to see to the safeguarding of their rights and interests, and, with this object, to have recourse to force of arms. Austria-Hungary, who has just addressed to Servia a formal dec- laration, in conformity with article 1 of the convention of the 18th October, 1907, relative to the opening of hostilities, con- siders herself henceforward in a state of war with Servia. In bringing the above to notice of His Britannic Majesty's Em- bassy, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honour to declare that Austria-Hungary will act during the hostilities in con- formity with the terms of the Conventions of The Hague of the 18th October, 1907, as also with those of the Declaration of London of the 28th February, 1909, provided an analogous pro- cedure is adopted by Servia. The embassy is requested to be so good as to communicate the present notification as soon as pos- sible to the British Government. From Rome British Blue Book No. 106^ Sir R. Roddy British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 31.) (Telegraphic.) Rorrw, July 30, 1914. I LEARNT from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who sent for me this evening, that the Austrian Government had declined ^ to continue 1 While printed here as received on July 31, the discussion is, especially in the second paragraph, of events and proposals of July 29 and 30. 2 See, however, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29. Cf. also Austro- Hungari'an Red Book No. 51, July 31. July 31, British Blue Book No, 107 361 the direct exchange of views with the Russian Government. But he had reason t6 beheve that Germany was now ^ disposed to give more concihatory advice to Austria, as she seemed convinced that we should act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid issue with us. He said he was telegraphing to the Italian Ambassador at Berlin to ask the German Government to suggest that the idea of an exchange of views between the four Powers should be resumed in any form which Austria would consider acceptable. It seemed to him that Germany might invite Austria to state exactly the terms which she would demand from Servia, and give a guarantee that she would neither deprive her of independence nor annex territory. It would be useless to ask for anything less than was contained in the Austrian ultimatum, and Germany would support no proposal that might imply non- success for Austria. We might, on the other hand, ascertain from Russia what she would accept, and, once we knew the standpoints of these two countries, discussions could be commenced at once. There was still time so long as Austria had received no check. He in any case was in favour of continuing an exchange of views with His Majesty's Government if the idea of discussions between the four Powers was impossible. From Berlin British Blue Book No. 107 ^ Sir. E. GoscJien, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 31.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 30, 1914. I DO not know whether you have received a reply from the German Government to the communication^ which you made to them through the German Ambassador in London asking whether they could suggest any method by which the four Powers could use their mediating influence between Russia and Austria. I was informed last night ^ that they had not had time to send an answer yet. To-day, in reply to an enquiry from the French Ambassador ^ as to whether the Im- perial Government had proposed any course of action, the Secretary of State said that he had felt that time would be saved by com- municating with Vienna direct, and that he had asked the Austro- Hungarian Government what would satisfy them. No answer had, however, yet been returned.^ The Chancellor told me last night that he was "pressing the button" as hard as he could, and that he was not sure whether he J This "now" is significant. Cf. British Blue Book No. 80, July 29. 2 See note 1 to previous despatch. 3 See British Blue Book No. 84, July 29. * I.e. July 29. 6 French Yellow Book Na. 109, July 30. ^ For the answer that was returned, see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 51, July 31. 362 Official Diplomatic Documents has not gone so far in urging moderation at Vienna that matters had been precipitated rather than otherwise. From Berlin British Blue Book No. 108 Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 31.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 31, 1914. Chancellor informs me that his efforts to preach peace and moderation at Vienna have been seriously handicapped by the Russian mobilisation against Austria. He has done everything possible to attain his object at Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was alto- gether palatable at the Ballplatz. He could not, however, leave his country defenceless while time was being utilised by other Powders; and if, as he learns is the case, military measures are now being taken by Russia against Germany also, it w^ould be impossible to him to remain quiet. He wished to tell me that it was quite possible that in a very short time, to-day perhaps, the German Government would take some very serious step; he was, in fact, just on the point of going to have an audience with the Emperor. His Excellency added that the news of the active preparations on the Russo-German frontier had reached him just when the Czar had appealed to the Emperor, in the name of their old friendship, to mediate at Vienna, and when the Emperor was actually conforming to that request. From Berlin British Blue Book No. 109 Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 31.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 31, 1914. I READ to the Chancellor this morning your answer to his appeal for British neutrality in the event of war, as contained in your tele- gram of yesterday.^ His Excellency was so taken up with the news of the Russian measures along the frontier, referred to in my im- mediately preceding telegram, that he received your communication without comment. He asked me to let him have the message that I had just read to him as a memorandum, as he would like to reflect upon it before giving an answer, and his mind w^as so full of grave matters that he could not be certain of remembering all its points. I therefore handed to him the text of your message on the under- standing that it should be regarded merely as a record of conversa- tion, and not as an official document.^ His Excellency agreed. 1 British Blue Book No. 101, July 30. ' From this it would appear that Great Britain at this time did not wish to bind herself by "an oflSicial document." July 31, British Blue Book No. Ill 363 To St. Petersburgh British Blue Book No. 110 Sir Edtvard Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Peters- burgh. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914- I LEARN from the German Ambassador that, as a result of sug- gestions by the German Government, a conversation has taken place at Vienna between the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Russian Ambassador. The Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh has also been instructed that he may converse with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that he should give explana- tions about the Austrian ultimatum to Servia,^ and discuss suggestions and any questions directly affecting Austro-Russian relations. If the Russian Government object to the Austrians mobilising eight army corps, it might be pointed out that this is not too great a number against 400,000 Servians. The German Ambassador asked me to urge the Russian Govern- ment to show goodwill' in the discussions and to suspend their military preparations. It is with great satisfaction that I have learnt that discussions are being resumed between Austria and Russia, and you should express this to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and tell him that I earnestly hope he will encourage them. I informed the German Ambassador that, as regards military prep- arations, I did not see how Russia Could be urged to suspend ^ them unless some limit were put by Austria to the advance of her troops into Servia. To Berlin British Blue Book No. Ill Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 191 4. I HOPE that the conversations which are now proceeding between Austria and Russia may lead to a satisfactory result. The stumbling- block hitherto has been Austrian mistrust of Servian assurances, and Russian mistrust of Austrian intentions with regard to the in- dependence and integrity of Servia. It has occurred to me that, in the event of this mistrust preventing a solution being found by Vienna and St. Petersburgh, Germany might sound Vienna, and I would undertake to sound St. Petersburgh, whether it would be possible for the four disinterested Powers to offer to Austria that they would undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands 1 Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 51, July 31. . ,, -r. • • i. -o, 2 But Russia had herself offered to "stop all military operations. Bntish Blue Book No. 97, July 30. Cf. also note 2, French Yellow Book No. 113, July 31. 364 Official Diplomatic Documents on Servia, provided that they did not impair Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory. As your Excellency is aware, Austria has already declared her willingness to respect them. Russia might be informed by the four Powers that they would undertake to prevent Austrian demands going the length of impairing Servian sovereignty and integrity. All Powers would of course suspend further military operations or preparations. You may sound the Secretary of State about this proposal. I said to German Ambassador this morning that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria' were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburgh and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences,^ but, otherwise, I told German Ambassador that if France became involved we should be drawn in.^ You can add this when sounding Chancellor or Secretary of State as to proposal above. From Berlin British Blue Book No. 112 Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 31.) (Telegraphic.) • Berlin, July 31, 1914. According to information ^ just received by German Govern- ment from their Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, whole Russian army and fleet are being mobilised. Chancellor tells me that " Kriegsgef ahr " * will be proclaimed at once by German Government, as it can only be against Germany that Russian general mobilisation is directed. Mobilisation would follow almost immediately. His Excellency added in explanation that "Kriegsgefahr'' ^ signified the taking of certain precautionary measures consequent upon strained relations with a foreign country. This news from St. Petersburgh, added his Excellency, seemed to him to put an end to all hope of a peaceful solution of the crisis. Germany must certainly prepare for all emergencies. 1 This is an eminently fair statement. Unfortunately it did not take into account Russia's mobilisation. From the discussion of Sazonof's formula, moreover (cf. British Blue Book No. 97, July 30, and No. 120, July 31 printed under date of August 1), it appears that Sir E. Grey himself induced Sazonof to withdraw his offer to "stop all military operations." The reason for this action is not explained in any of the pub- lished despatches. 2 This declaration of Sir E. Grey was made before the Belgian question was seriously raised. The defenders of Germany have always claimed that the invasion of Belgium became necessary, because Great Britain had decided to join France at all hazards- and that the risks of a French-English attack through Belgium were too great for Germany to run. 2 See note to French Yellow Book No. 117, July 31. * "Imminence of War." July 31, British Blue Book No. II4 365 I asked him whether he could not still put pressure on the authorities at Vienna to do something in general interests to reassure Russia and to show themselves disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis. He replied that last night he had begged Austria to reply to your last proposal/ and that he had received a reply to the effect that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs would take wishes of the Emperor this morning in the matter. From St. Petershurgh British Blue Book No. 113 Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petershurgh, to Sir Edivard Grey. — (Received July 31.) (Telegraphic.) St. Petershurgh, July 31, 1914. It has been decided to issue orders for general mobilisation.^ This decision was taken in consequence of report received from E-Ussian Ambassador in Vienna to the effect that Austria is deter- mined not to yield to intervention of Powers, and that she is moving troops against Russia as well as against Servia. Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start.^ To Paris British Blue Book No. 114 Sir Edivard Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, and Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador 'at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. I STILL trust that situation is not irretrievable, but in view^ of pros- pect of mobilisation in Germany it becomes essential to His Majesty's Government, in view of existing treaties, to ask whether French (Ger- man) Government are prepared to engage to respect neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power violates it.^ A similar request is being addressed to German (French) Govern- ment. It is important to have an early answer. 1 This proposal was accepted by Austria-Hungary ; see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 51, July 31. 2 If this despatch is correctly dated from St. Petershurgh, July 31, the British Am- bassador sent this information rather late. See note to French Yellow Book No. 117, July 31. 3 Considering that the Czar telegraphed on July 30 (German White Book, Exhibit 23a) that " military measures now taking form were decided upon five days ago," this is a strange remark. * If the quintuple treaty of 1839 was in force (see Sir E. Grey's phrase "existing treaties"), the qualification "so long as no other Power violates it" was contrary to the treaty, for in that case the remaining Powers were bound to make joint cause against the invader. Germany has claimed that she could riot rely on Great Britain's defence of Belgium if France should have invaded it. See A. K. Fuehr, The Neu- trality of Belgium, Funk & Wagnalls Co. 366 Official Diplomatic Documents To Brussels British Blue Book No. 115 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914, In view of existing treaties, you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that, in consideration of the possibility of a European war, I have asked French and German Governments whether each is pre- pared to respect the neutrality of Belgium provided it is violated by no other Power. You should say that I assume that the Belgian Government will maintain to the utmost of their power their neutrality, which I desire and expect other Powers to uphold and observe. You should inform the Belgian Government that an early reply is desired. To Paris British Blue Book No. 116 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. I HAVE received your telegram of yesterday's date.^ Nobody here feels that in this dispute, so far as it has yet gone, British treaties or obligations are involved. Feeling is quite different from what it was during the INIorocco question. That crisis involved a dispute directly involving France, whereas in this case France is being drawn into a dispute which is not hers. I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a decisive factor in situation . German Government do not expect our neutrality.^ We cannot undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a war. I have so told the French Ambassador, who has urged His Majesty's Government to reconsider this decision.^ I have told him that we should not be justified in giving any pledge at the present moment, but that we will certainly consider the situ- ation again directly there is a new development. From Paris British Blue Book No. 117 Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 31.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 31, 1914. At 7 o'clock this evening I was sent for by Minister for Foreign Affairs. When I arrived the German Ambassador was leaving his Excellency. 1 British Blue Book No. 99, July 30. 2 This was probably quite true on July 31, but it had not been so up to July 29, see British Blue Book No. 80, July 29, and ih. No. 106, July 30, listed under date of July 31. See also French Yellow Book No. 92, July 29, last paragraph. » French Yellow Book No. 110, July 31. July 31, British Blue Book No. 118 367 German Ambassador had informed his Excellency that, in view of the fact that orders had been given for the total mobilisation of Russian army and fleet, German Government have in an ultimatum which they have addressed to the Russian Government required that Russian forces should be demobilised. The German Government will consider it necessary to order the total mobilisation of the German army on the Russian and French frontiers if within twelve hours the Russian Government do not give an undertaking to comply with German demand. The Minister for Foreign Affairs asks me to communicate this to you, and enquires what, in these circumstances, will be the attitude of England. German Ambassador could not say when the twelve hours termi- nate. He is going to call at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to- morrow (Saturday) at 1 p.m. in order to receive the French Govern- ment's answer as to the attitude they will adopt in the circumstances. He intimated the possibility of his requiring his passports. I am informed by the Russian Ambassador ^ that he is not aware of any general mobilisation of the Russian forces having taken place. From Vienna • British Blue Book No. 118 8ir M. de Sunken, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 31.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 31, 1914. I AM informed by Count Forgach, Under-Secretary of State, that although Austria was compelled to respond to Russian mobilisation, which he deplored, the Austrian Ambassador in London has received instructions to inform you that mobilisation was not to be regarded as a necessarily hostile act on either side. Telegrams were being exchanged between the Emperor of Russia and the German Emperor, and conversations were proceeding between Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. A general war might, he seriously hoped, be staved off by these efforts. On my expressing my fear that Germany would mobilise, he said that Ger- many must do something, in his opinion, to secure her position. ^ As regards Russian intervention on behalf of Servia, Austria-Hungary found it difficult to recognise such a claim. I called his attention to the fact that during the discussion of the Albanian frontier at the London Conference of Ambassadors the Russian Government had stood behind Servia, and that a compromise between the views of Russia and Austria-Hungary resulted with accepted frontier line. 1 This is very strange ; cf. the Czar's telegram of July 30, German White Book, Exhibit 23a, and note to French Yellow Book No. 117, July 31. 2 The statement is important in view of the charge that has been made that Ger- many forced the war by duping Austria-Hungary when the latter was on the point of settling her differences with Russia. 368 Official Diplomatic Documents Although he spoke in a conciHatory tone, and did not regard the situ- ation as desperate, I could not get from him any suggestion for a similar compromise in the present case. Count Forgach is going this afternoon to see the Russian Ambassador, whom I have informed of the above conversation. The Russian Ambassador has explained that Russia has no desire to interfere unduly with Servia; that, as compared with the late Russian Minister,^ the present Minister at Belgrade is a man of very moderate views ; and that, as regards Austrian demands, Russia had counselled Servia to yield to them as far as she possibly could without sacrificing her independence. His Excellency is exerting himself strongly in the interests of peace. From Paris British Blue Book No. 119 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. Sir, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914- M. Cambon ^ referred to-day to a telegram ^ that had been shown to Sir Arthur Nicolson ^ this morning from the French Ambassador in Berlin, saying that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether we would intervene which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and that, if we would only declare definitely on the side of Rus- sia and France, it would decide the German attitude in favour of peace. I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany under the impression that we would not intervene. I had refused overtures ^ to promise that we should remain neutral. I had not only definitely declined to say that w^e would remain neutral, I had even gone so far this morning as to say to the German Ambassador that, if France and Germany became involved in war, we should be drawn into it.^ That, of course, was not the same thing as taking an engagement to France, and I told M. Cambon of it only to show that we had not left Germany under the impression that we would stand aside. M. Cambon then asked me for my reply to what he had said yester- dsLyJ 1 said that we had come to the conclusion, in the Cabinet ^ to-day, that we could not give any pledge at the present time. Though we ^ Mr. von Hartwig, whose very sudden death after the Serajevo murder has not yet been explained. 2 French Ambassador in London. 3 Cf. the last paragraph, French Yellow Book No. 92, July 29. * British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 6 See British Blue Book No. 85, July 29. « British Blue Book No. Ill, July 31. 7 Cf. British Blue Book No. 105, July 30. 8 This was the first time the British Cabinet voted against joining France ; see also French Yellow Book No. 110, July 31. On the next day, August 1, the Cabinet re- fused for the second time to declare British solidarity with France. See French Yellow Book No. 126, August 1. L July Sly Russian Orange Book No. 66 369 should have to put our policy before Parliament, we could not pledge Parliament in advance. Up to the present moment, we did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country were involved. Further developments might alter this situation and cause the Government and Parliament to take the view that intervention was justified. The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium ^ might be, I would not say a decisive,^ but an important factor, in determining our attitude. Whether we proposed to Parliament to intervene or not to intervene in a war. Parliament would wish to know how we stood with regard to the neutrality of Belgium, and it might be that I should ask both France and Germany whether each was prepared to undertake an engagement that she would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium. M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if Germany made an attack on her. I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement. M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning rejected proposals that might have made for peace.^ It could not be to Eng- land's interest that France should be crushed by Germany. We should then be in a very diminished position with regard to Germany. In 1870 we had made a great mistake in allowing an enormous in- crease of German strength, and we should now be repeating the mis- take. He asked me whether I could not submit his question to the Cabinet again. Russia : From Vienna ^ Russian Orange Book No. 66 Russian Ambassador at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Vienna, July 18 {SI), 191^. In spite of the general mobilisation,^ my exchange of views with Count Berchtold and his colleagues continues. They all dwell upon the absence on Austria's part of any hostile intentions whatso- ever against Russia, and of any designs of conquest at the expense of Servia, but they are all equally insistent that Austria is bound to carry through the action which she has begun and to give Servia a serious lesson, which would constitute a sure guarantee for the future. 1 This is not mentioned in Cambon's report of Sir E. Grey's remarks in French YeUow Book No. 110, July 31. 2 This statement is important. 3 There is no statement here that Sir E. Grey corrected this misconception on the part of the French Ambassador. 4 This may refer to the Russian mobilisation or to the counter measure of the Austro-Hungarian mobilisation. 2b 370 Official Diplomatic Documents From St. Petersburgh Russian Orange Book No. 67 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at Rerlin, Vienna, Paris, London, and Rome. (Telegram.) St. Petersburgh, July 18 {31), 1914. Please refer to my telegram of 17 (30) July.^ The British Am- bassador, on the instructions of his Government, has informed me of the wish of the London Cabinet to make certain modifications ^ in the formula which I suggested yesterday to the German Am- bassador. I replied that I accepted the British suggestion. I accordingly send you the text of the modified formula which is as follows : — (Translation.) "Si I'Autriche consent a ar- "If Austria consents to stay reter la marche de ses armees the march of her troops on sur le territoire serbe et si, Servian territory ; and if, recog- reconnaissant que le conflit nising that the Austro-Servian austro-serbe a assume le carac- conflict has assumed the character tere d'une question d'interet of a question of European inter- europeen, elle admet que les est, she admits that the Great Grandes Puissances examinent Powers may examine the satisfac- la satisfaction que la Serbie tion which Servia can accord to pourrait accorder au Gouverne- the Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment d'Autriche-Hongrie sans ment without injury to her rights laisser porter atteinte a ses droits as a sovereign State or her inde- d'Etat souverain et a son inde- pendence, Russia undertakes to pendance, — la Russie s'engage a maintain her w^aiting attitude." conserver son attitude expec- tante." From Berlin Russian Orange Book No. 68 Russian Ambassador at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Berlin, July 18 {31), 1914. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has just told me that our discus- sions, which were already difficult enough on account of the mobilisa- tion against Austria, were becoming even more so in view of the serious military measures that we were taking against Germany. He said that information on this subject was reaching Berlin from all sides, and this must inevitably provoke similar measures on the part of Germany. To this I replied that, according to sure information in my possession, which was confirmed by all our compatriots arriving from 1 Russian Orange Book No. 60, July 30. 2 The reasons for the British wish to have the original formula modified are no- where given. Cf. note to French Yellow Book No. 113, July 31, also British Blue Book No. 110, July 31. July 31, Russian Orange Book No. 69 371 Berlin, Germany also was very actively engaged in taking military measures against Russia. In spite of this, the Minister for Foreign Affairs asserts ^ that the only step taken in Germany has been the recall of oflBcers from leave and of the troops from manoeuvres. To London Russian Orange Book No. 69 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at London, (Telegram.) St. Petershurgh, July 18 {31), 1914. I HAVE requested the British Ambassador to express to Grey my deep gratitude for the firm and friendly tone which he has adopted in the discussions with Germany and Austria, thanks to which the hope of finding a peaceful issue ^ to the present situation need not yet be abandoned. 1 For the truth of this assertion see chapters on mobilisation in M. P. Price, The Diplomatic History of the War, Charles Scribner's Sons. 2 Cf . note 1 British Blue Book No. 119, July 31. Sir E. Grey had at last practically done what Sazonof had wished him to do as early as July 24 ; see British Blue Book No. 6, July 24. 372 Official Diplomatic Documents Saturday, August 1, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary Petrograd Belgium Berlin, Paris and London London etc. London, Berlin France London etc. Berlin, Rome London, Berlin, Brussels etc. London, Luxemburg London, Luxemburg Germany Petrograd | Paris Great Britain Berlin, Petrograd, Vienna Petrograd, Berlin, Paris, Vienna, Brussels, Lux- emburg Russia All representatives London, Paris Serbia Austria-Hungary explains her willingness to continue direct conversations with Russia, at the same time expressing her deep concern at the Russian general mobilisation which forces her to decree her own general mobilisation. Belgium receives the official assurance that France will respect the neutrality of Belgium, but "in the event of this neutrality not being respected by another Power, the French Government, to secure their own defence, might find it necessary to modify their attitude." The German "reply is awaited." Belgium instructs her representatives abroad to notify the Powers of her mobilisation in notes prepared and sent out, undated, on July 24. She commits hostile acts against Germany according to the latter's declaration, a ^act which Belgium later categorically denies. France orders general mobiHsation, and in despatches to London endeavors to blame Germany for the coming war. She again solicits the armed intervention of Great Britain, and promises to respect Belgian and Luxemburg neutrality, with a proviso. Her assurances to Belgium contain no reference to an existing treaty, and are in wording contrary to the assumption of the existence of a treaty. Her reply to Germany is "that France would do that which her interests dictated." Germany continues the exchange of royal and imperial telegrams. Russia not having replied to the German ultimatum requesting her to demobilise, Germany declares war on Russia. To the British enquiry whether she would respect Belgian neutrality her Secretary of Foreign Affairs replies that probably no answer would be returned, because by answering they "could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign"; moreover, Belgium had already committed "certain hostile acts." She orders general mobilisation, to take effect the next day, August 2. Great Britain ; the Cabinet for the second time refuses to commit itself in favor of France. Sir E. Grey, however, repeats his personal promises to France, at the same time refusing the German request that he formulate conditions under which Great Britain would remain neutral. No despatches concerning the mobilisation of the British army are published on this or any other day. Russia refuses to reply to the German ultimatum and does not demobilise. Serbia is silent on this day. Augmt 1, Belgian Gray Book No. 13 373 Austria-Hungary : From St. Petersburgh AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 56^ Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, August 1, 1914* I VISITED ]\I. Sazonof to-day, and told him that I had received instructions/ but that I must premise that I was entirely ignorant of the present condition of affairs created in Vienna, by the general Russian mobilisation, and that in interpreting the instructions which I had received previously, I must leave this condition out of account. I said that the two instructions of Your Excellency dealt with the misunderstanding that we had declined further negotiations with Russia. This was a mistake, as I had already, without instructions, assured him.^ Your Excellency was not only quite prepared to deal with Russia on the broadest basis possible, but was also especially inclined to subject the text of our note to a discussion so far as its interpretation was concerned. I emphasised how much the instructions of Your Excellency af- forded me a further proof of goodwill, although I had to remind him that the situation created since then by the general mobilisation was unknown to me ; but I could only hope that the course of events had not already taken us too far ; in any case, I regarded it as my duty in the present moment of extreme anxiety to prove once again the goodwill of the Imperial and Royal Goverr^ment. M. Sazonof replied that he took note with satisfaction of this proof of goodwill, but he desired to draw my attention to the fact that negotiations at St. Peters- burgh for obvious reasons appeared to promise less prospect of success than negotiations on the neutral terrain of London.^ I replied that Your Excellency, as I had already observed, started from the point of view that direct contact should be maintained at St. Petersburgh, so that I was not in a position to commit myself with regard to his suggestion as to London, but I would communicate on the subject with your Excellency. Belgium: From London Belgian Gray Book No. 13 Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, toM. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) London, August 1, 1914. Great Britain has asked France and Germany separately^ if they intend to respect Belgian territory in the event of its not being * Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 51, July 31. 2 Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 55, July 31. /tax 3 If Sazonof is correctly quoted, and this would seem to be the case (cf . Austro- Hungarian Red Book No. 51, July 31, third paragraph), it appears that Russia had changed her attitude, and was not now desirous of direct conversations. See Russian Orange Book No. 69, July 31. * British Blue Book No. 114, July 31. 374 Official Diplomatic Documents violated by their adversary. Germany's reply is awaited. France has replied in the affirmative.^ From Berlin Belgian Gray Book No. 14 Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Damgnon, Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Berlin, August 1, 1914. The British Ambassador has been instructed to inquire of the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether, in the event of war, Germany would respect Belgian neutrality, and I understand that the Minister replied that he was unable to answer the question.^ To Berlin, Paris, and London Belgian Gray Book No. 15 ' M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, Paris, and London, Sir, Brussels, August 1, 1914. I HAVE the honour to inform you that the French Minister has made the following verbal communication to me : — (Translation.) "Je suis autorise a declarer "I am authorised to declare qu'en cas de conflit international, that, in the event of an inter- le Gouvernement de la Repu- national war, the French Govern- blique, ainsi qu'il I'a toujours ment, in accordance with the declare, respectera la neutralite declarations they have always de la Belgique. Dans Thypo- made, will respect the neutrality these oil cette neutralite ne serait of Belgium. In the event of pas respectee par une autre this neutrality not being re- Puissance, le Gouvernement spected by another Power, the fran^ais, pour assurer sa propre French Government, to secure defense, pourrait etre amene a their own defence, might find modifier son attitude." it necessary to modify their attitude. " 4 ^ See below, No. 15, same day. 2 Cf . British Blue Book No. 122, July 31, printed under date of August 1, and French Yellow Book No. 123, August 1, giving Germany's reason for not answering. ' This despatch should precede No. 13, same day, where it is referred to. < See British Blue Book No. 114, July 31, note 1, and mark the wording of the French announcement, which proceeds from the principle that France is released from any obligation to respect the neutrality of Belgium "in the event of this neutrality not being respected by another Power." Belgium was a buffer state between the bel- ligerents. Small infractions of her neutrality could not have been avoided by either side. The principle, therefore, that any infraction by one side would release the other side from all obligations, and that the other side was, of course, the sole judge of what constituted an infraction, is the chief reason why Belgium was invaded, for if it had not been for this principle no " military necessity " would have existed for either side to contemplate even the invasion of Belgium. It was the principle accepted by Great Britain (see British Blue Book No. 114, July 31) and by France, and as events proved also by Germany. Contrast this declaration with French Yellow Book No. 122, same day. August 1, French Yellow Book No, 120 375 I thanked his Excellency and added that we on our side had taken without delay all the measures necessary to ensure that our inde- pendence and our frontiers should be respected. To Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh Belgian Gray Book No. 16 M.Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh. (Telegram.) Brussels, August 1, 1914. Carry out instructions ^ contained in my despatch of the 25th July. To Rome, The Hague, Luxemburg Belgian Gray Book No. 17 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Ministers at Rome, The Hague, Luxemburg. (Telegram.) Brussels, August 1, 1914. Carry out instructions ^ contained in my despatch of the 25th July. France : To London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome French Yellow Book No. 120 M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome. Paris, August 1, 1914- Two demarches were made yesterday evening by the Austrian Ambassadors — the one at Paris,^ which was rather vague, the other at St. Petersburgh/ precise and conciliatory. Count Szecsen came to explain to me that the Austro-Hungarian Government had officially informed Russia that it had no territorial ambition, and would not touch the sovereignty of Servia ; that it also repudiates any intention of occupying the Sandjak; but that these explanations of disinterestedness only retain their force if the war remains localised to Austria and Servia, as a European war would open out eventualities which it was impossible to foresee. The Austrian Ambassador, in commenting on these explanations, gave me to understand that if his Government could not answer the questions 1 Belgian Gray Book No. 2, July 24, and note. 2 See note to previous despatch and Belgian Gray Book No. 3, July 24. 3 Not mentioned in Austro-Hungarian Red Book. See British Blue Book No. 137, same day. * See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 55, July 31, and Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 56, August 1. 376 Official Diplomatic Documents of the Powers speaking in their own name, they would certainly answer Servia, or any single Power asking for these conditions in the name of Servia. He added that a step in this direction was perhaps still possible. At St. Petersburgh the Austrian Ambassador called on M. Sazonof and explained to him that his Government was willing to begin a discussion as to the basis of the ultimatum addressed to Servia.^ The Russian Minister declared himself satisfied with this declaration, and proposed that the pourparlers should take place in London with the participation of the Powers. M. Sazonof will have requested the British Government to take the lead in the discussion; he pointed out that it would be very important that Austria should stop her operations in Servia. The deduction from these facts is that Austria would at last show herself ready to come to an agreement, just as the Russian Govern- ment is ready ^ to enter into negotiations on the basis of the British proposal. Unfortunately these arrangements which allowed one to hope for a peaceful solution appear, in fact, to have been rendered useless by the attitude of Germany.^ This Power has in fact presented an ul- timatum giving the Russian Government twelve hours in which to agree to the demobilisation of their forces not only as against Germany, but also as against Austria ; this time-limit expires at noon. The ultimatum is not justified, for Russia has accepted the British pro- posal which implies a cessation of military preparation by all the Powers, The attitude of Germany proves that she wishes for war. And she wishes for it against France.^ Yesterday ^ when Herr von Schoen came to the Quai d'Orsay to ask what attitude France proposed to take in case of a Russo-German conflict, the German Ambassador, although there has been no direct dispute ^ between France and Germany, and although from the beginning of the crisis we have used all our efforts for a peaceful solution ^ and are still continuing to do so, added that he asked me to present his respects and thanks to the Presi- dent of the Republic, and asked that we would be good enough to make arrangements as to him personally (des dispositions pour sa 1 Viviani calls this an interview "yesterday evening," i.e. July 31. In the Austro- Hungarian Red Book No. 56, it appears as an interview of "to-day," August 1. 2 This is a vague description of the Russian attitude. Cf. note 3 to Austro-Hun- garian Red Book No. 56, August 1. ' Viviani blames Germany for her ultimatum. Germany claimed her ultimatum had been forced by Russia's mobilisation (British Blue Book No. 121, August 1) which Viviani does not deny as having taken place. If the student, therefore, agrees with Viviani that Germany's ultimatum spoiled the prospects of a peaceful solution, the further question arises "Was Germany's ultimatum forced by Russia's mobilisation?" In the next sentence Viviani states that the ultimatum was not justified. This is the crux of the whole matter. For Germany's attitude see German White Book, pp. 555 fF. * Another evidence of the unfortunate suspicion of the French Government. 57 P.M., July 31, see German White Book, p. 560. ^ 6 Viviani overlooks that France had promised her support to Russia, cf . French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30 : British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, French Yellow Book No. 74, paragraph 4, where Cambon says that the "relations of Germany with Vienna were no closer than those of France with Russia." , r, ■. 7 For a fuller discussion of the French attitude, see E. von Mach, Germany s Point of View, pp. 216 ff. . August 1, French Yellow Book No. 121 377 'propre personne) ; we know also that he has already put the archives of the Embassy in safety. This attitude of breaking off diplomatic relations without any direct dispute, and although he has not received any definitely negative answer, is characteristic of the determination of Germany to make war against France. The want of sincerity in her peaceful protestations is shown by the rupture which she is forcing upon Europe at a time when Austria had at last agreed ^ with Russia to begin negotiations. Rene Viviani. From Berlin French Yellow Book No. 121 M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 1, 1914. My Russian colleague received yesterday evening two telegrams ^ from M. Sazonof advising him that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh had explained ^ that his Government was ready to discuss the note to Servia with the Russian Government even as to its basis; M. Sazonof answered that in his opinion these con- versations should take place in London. The ultimatum to Russia ^ can only do away with the last chances of peace which these conversations still seemed to leave. The ques- tion may be asked whether in such circumstances the acceptance by Austria was serious, and had not the object of throwing the responsi- bility of the conflict on to Russia. My British colleague during the night made a pressing appeal ^ to Herr von Jagow's feelings of humanity. The latter answered that the matter had gone too far and that they must wait for the Russian answer to the German ultimatum. But he told Sir Edward Goschen that the ultimatum required that the Russians should countermand their mobilisation, not only as against Germany but also as against Austria; my British colleague was much astonished at this, and said that it did not seem possible for Russia to accept this last point.^ . Germany's ultimatum coming at the very moment when an agree- ment seemed about to be established between Vienna and St. Peters- burgh, is characteristic of her warlike policy. In truth the conflict was between Russia and Austria only, and Germany could only intervene as an ally of Austria; in these cir- cumstances, as the two Powers which were interested as principals 1 This agreement had been due to Germany's pressure ; see despatches of previous days. See especially German White Book, Exhibit 14, July 28. 2 Not given in Russian Orange Book. 3 Austro- Hungarian Red Book No. 56, August 1. * Sent by Germany and presented at midnight, July 31-Aug. 1 ; see German "White Book, p. 559. See note 5 to previous despatch. 5 British Blue Book No. 121 under date of August 1. 6 This is different from Sir E. Goschen's own report, see British Blue Book No. 121, 378 Official Diplomatic Documents were prepared for conversations, it is impossible to understand ^ why Germany should send an ultimatum to Russia instead of continuing like all the other Powers to work for a peaceful solution, unless she desired war on her own account. J. Cambon. To London, Berlin, and Brussels French Yellow Book No. 122 M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, Berlin, and to the French Minister at Brussels. Paris, August 1, 1914- The British Ambassador, under the instructions of his Govern- ment, came to ask me what would be the attitude of the French Government as regards Belgium in case of conflict with Germany. I stated that, in accordance with the assurance which we had re- peatedly given the Belgian Government, we intended to respect their neutrality. It would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself brought to enter Belgian territory, with the object of fulfilling her obligations as a guaranteeing Power.^ Rene Viviani. From Berlin French Yellow Book No. 123 M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 1, 1914- The British Ambassador has been instructed ^ by his Government to make to the German Government a communication identical with that which he made to you on the subject of the neutrality of Belgium. Herr von Jagow answered that he would take the instructions of the Emperor and the Chancellor, but that he did not think an answer could be given, for Germany could not disclose her military plans in this way. The British Ambassador will see Herr von Jagow to- morrow afternoon.^ J. Cambon. 1 A comparison of this view with that presented in the German White Book, pp. 557 ff. shows how very far apart the governments of France and Germany found themselves. 2 Contrast the official French declaration which contains nothing about obliga- tions. Belgian Gray Book No. 15, August 1. ' Cf. British Blue Book No. 122, French Yellow Book No. 123, both of August 1. * The part of the interview with Sir E. Goschen printed British Blue Book No. 123, in which Germany claims that Belgium has already committed "certain hostile acts" against Germany, has been omitted here. August 1, French Yellow Book No. 125 379 From Rome French Yellow Book No. 124 M. Barrere, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council y Minister for Foreign Affairs. Rome, August 1, 1914. I WENT to see the Marquis di San Giuliano this morning at half- past eight, in order to get precise information from him as to the attitude of Italy in view of the provocative acts of Germany and the results which they may have. The Minister for Foreign Affairs answered that he had seen the German Ambassador yesterday evening. Herr von Flotow had said to him that Germany had requested the Russian. Government to suspend mobilisation, and the French Government to inform them as to their intentions; Germany had given France a time limit of eighteen hours and Russia a time limit of twelve hours. Herr von Flotow as a result of this communication asked what were the intentions of the Italian Government. The Marquis di San Giuliano answered that as the war under- taken by Austria was aggressive and did not fall within the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, particularly in view of the consequences which might result from it according to the declaration of the German Ambassador, Italy could not take part in the war. Barrere. To London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Con- stantinople French Yellow Book No. 125 M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Af- fairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Constantinople. Paris, August 1, 1914- The German Ambassador came to see me again at 11 o'clock this morning. After having recalled to his memory all the efforts made by France towards an honourable settlement of the Austro- Servian conflict and the difficulty between Austria and Russia which has resulted from it, I put him in possession of the facts as to the pourparlers which have been carried on since yesterday : — (1) A British compromise,^ proposing, besides other suggestions, suspension of military preparations ^ on the part of Russia, on condition that the other Powers should act in the same way ; adherence of Russia to this proposal. 1 This seems to refer to Sazonof s altered formula. Cf . Russian Orange Book No. 67, July 31. 2 This is an error, cf . note to Russian Orange Book no. 67. 380 Official Diplomatic Documents (2) Communications from the Austrian Government ^ declaring that they did not desire any aggrandisement in Servia, nor even to advance into the Sandjak, and stating that they were ready to discuss even the basis of the iVustro-Servian question at London with the other Powers. I drew attention to the attitude of Germany who, abandoning all pourparlers, presented an ultimatum to Russia at the very moment when this Power had just accepted the British formula ^ (which im- plies the cessation of military preparations ^ by all ^ the countries which have been mobilised) and regarded as imminent a diplomatic rupture with France. Baron von Schoen answered that he did not know the develop- ments which had taken place in this matter for the last twenty-four hours, that there was perhaps in them a "glimmer of hope" for some arrangement, that he had not received any fresh communication ^ from his Government, and that he was going to get information. He gave renewed protestations of his sincere desire to unite his efforts to those of France for arriving at a solution of the conflict. I laid stress on the serious responsibility which the Imperial Government would assume if, in circumstances such as these, they took an initia- tive which was not justified and of a kind which would irremediably compromise peace. Baron von Schoen did not allude to his immediate departure and did not make any fresh request for an answer to his question concerning the attitude of France in case of an Austro-Russian conflict. He confined himself to saying of his own accord that the attitude of France was not doubtful. It would not do to exaggerate the possibilities which may result from my conversation with the German Ambassador for, on their side, the Imperial Government continue the most dangerous prepara- tions on our frontier. However, we must not neglect the possibilities, and we should not cease to work towards an agreement. On her side France is taking all military measures required for protection against too great an advance in German military preparations. She considers that her attempts at solution will only have a chance of success so far as it is felt that she will be ready and resolute if the conflict is forced on her. Rene Viviani. 1 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 120, August 1. 2 Viviani fails to mention that Russia had declared full mobilisation. ^ But not demobilisation. The status quo cannot be long maintained when one country is mobilised and the other is not. * The British fleet was mobilised. (See French Yellow Book No. 55, July 27.) Sir E. Grey nowhere offered to demobilise it. Cf. next number. ' Cf . Russian Orange Book No. 74, same day. August 1, French Yellow Book No. 127 381 From London French Yellow Book No. 126 M. Paul Cavibon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Paris, ^ August 1, 1914. Sir Edward Grey said to me that, at a meeting this morning, the Cabinet had again considered the situation. As Germany had asked Great Britain to give a declaration of neutrahty and had not obtained it, the British Government remained masters of their action ; this could shape itself in accordance with different hypotheses. In the first place, Belgian neutrality is of great importance to Great Britain. France has immediately renewed her engagement to respect it. Germany has explained "that she was not in a posi- tion to reply.'' Sir Edward Grey will put the Cabinet in possession of this answer ^ and will ask to be authorised to state on Monday in the House of Commons, that the British Government will not permit a violation of Belgian neutrality. In the second place the British fleet is mobilised,^ and Sir Edward Grey will propose ^ to his colleagues that he should state that it will oppose the passage of the Straits of Dover by the German fleet, or, if the German fleet should pass through (venaient a le passer), will oppose any demonstration on the French coasts. These two ques- tions will be dealt with at the meeting on Monday. I drew the attention of the Secretary of State to the point that, if during this intervening period any incident took place, it was necessary not to allow a surprise, and that it would be desirable to think of inter- vening in time. Paul Cambon. To London French Yellow Book No. 127 M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London. Paris, August 1, 1914- We are warned through several channels that the German and the Austrian Governments are trying at this moment to influence Eng- land by making her believe that the responsibility for war, if it 1 Probably a mistake for London. 2 This appears as if the German "Belgian" reply had not been discussed at the Cabinet meeting here described. Contrast Sir E. Grey's account of the Cabinet meeting of August 1 to the German Ambassador, British Blue Book No. 123, August 1. 3 Since July 24, see French Yellow Book No. 66, July 27. 4 This phrase and the whole tenor of the despatch imply that the Cabinet had for the second time voted against promising to France British support. For the first refusal to vote so see French Yellow Book No. 110, July 31, where the Cabinet has declared itself unable to promise to France "their intervention," and British Blue Book No. 119, July 31. Sir E. Grey's promise to "propose" to the Cabinet to be "authorised" to promise help to France would seem to imply that he had assured the French Ambassador of his personal wishes in this matter. He gave this assurance, or from the despatches just cited from the previous date, renewed it on the very day on which he refused Germany's request to formulate conditions under which Great Britain would remain neutral. In refusing this request of Germany, he gave as his reason that "we must keep our hands free." See British Blue Book No. 123, August 1, 1914. 382 Official Diplomatic Documents breaks out, will fall on Russia.^ Efforts are being made to obtain the neutrality of England by disguising the truth.^ France has not ceased in co-operation with England to advise mod- eration at St. Petersburgh ;^ this advice has been listened to. From the beginning M. Sazonof has exercised pressure on Servia to make her accept all those clauses of the ultimatum which were not incompatible with her sovereignty. He then engaged in a direct conversation with Austria ; this was fresh evidence of his conciliatory spirit. Finally he has agreed to allow those Powers which are less interested to seek for means of composing the dispute. In accordance with the wish expressed to him by Sir George Buchanan, M. Sazonof consented to modify ^ the first formula which he had put forward, and he has drawn up a second which is shown not to differ materially from the declaration which Count Szecsen made yesterday to M. de Margerie. Count Szecsen affirms that Austria has no intention of seeking territorial aggrandisement and does not wish to touch the sovereignty of Servia. He expressly adds that Austria has no designs on the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar. It would then seem that an agreement between Sir Edward Grey's suggestion, M. Sazonof 's formula and the Austrian declarations could easily be reconciled. France is determined, in co-operation with England, to work to the very end for the realisation of this. But while these negotiations were going on, and while Russia in the negotiations showed a goodwill which cannot be disputed, Austria was the first ^ to proceed to a general mobilisation. Russia has found herself obliged to imitate Austria, so as not to be left in an unfavourable position, but all the time she has con- tinued ready to negotiate. It is not necessary for me to repeat that, so far as we are concerned, we will, in co-operation with England, continue to work for the success of these pourparlers. But the attitude of Germany has made it absolutely compulsory for us to make out the order for mobilisation to-day. Last Wednesday, well in advance of Russian mobilisation, as I 1 Cf. British Blue Book No. 134, same day. 2 Or "elucidating the truth," according to one's reading of all the despatches. 3 Contrast with French Yellow Book No. 80, July 28, where Paul Cambon reports that Sir E. Grey "would be much embarrassed in making pacific recommendations to the Russian Government." Also French Yellow Book No. 62, July 27. "The French step " (Germany had asked France to declare that a solidarity of pacific intentions existed between her and Germany) "in St. Petersburgh would have been difficult to explain." * Russian Orange Book No. 67, July 31. Viviani overlooks, first, that the modified formula was less acceptable, because instead of promising to "stop her military prep- prations " Russia merely undertook " to maintain her waiting attitude," while Austria- Hungary in the modified formula had " to stay the march of her troops," which was not demand d in the first formula, and secondly that the change was not at Austria's biit at Great Britain's request; that Russia, moreover, followed it up with full mobilisation. 6 This is an error. Russia's general mobilisation took place on the night of July 30, while Austria-Hungary ordered general mobilisation on August 1. For an ex- haustive discussion of this point and the contradictory evidence see M. P. Price, The Diplomatic History of the War, Scribner's, the chapters on "Preparations and Mobilisations." See also British Blue Book No. 113, July 31 for Russian mobilisation, and British Blue Book, Nos. 127 and 135, August 1, for Austro-Hungarian mobilisation. August 1, French Yellow Book No. 128 383 have already telegraphed to you, Herr von Sehoen announced to me the impending publication of Kriegsgefahrzustand. This measure has been taken ^ by Germany, and under the protection of this screen, she immediately began a mobilisation in the proper sense of the word. To-day M. Paleologue telegraphed that Count Pourtales had noti- fied the Russian Government of German mobilisation. ^ Information which has been received by the Ministry of War confirms the fact that this mobilisation is really in full execution.^ Our decree of mobilisation is then an essential measure of protec- tion. The Government have accompanied it by a proclamation signed by the President of the Republic and by all the Ministers, in which they explain that mobilisation is not war, and that in the present state of affairs it is the best means for France of safeguarding peace, and that the Government of the Republic will redouble their efforts to bring the negotiations to a conclusion. Will you be good enough to bring all these points urgently to the notice of Sir Edward Grey, and to point out to him that we have throughout been governed by the determination not to commit any act of provocation. I am persuaded that in case war were to break out, British opinion would see clearly from which side aggression comes, and that it would realise the strong reasons which we have given to Sir Edward Grey for asking for armed intervention on the part of England in the interest of the future of the European balance of power.^ Rene Viviani. From Luxemburg French Yellow Book No. 128 M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Luxemburg, August 1, 1914- The Minister of State instructs me to ask from the French Gov- ernment an assurance of neutrality similar to that which has been given to Belgium. M. Eyschen has stated that at present, as the declaration in question was made to the President of the Council of the Belgian Government by the French Minister at Brussels, he thought that the same procedure would be most suitable with regard to the Grand Duchy. ^ 1 But not as here implied "last Wednesday," i.e. July 29, but on Friday, i.e. July 31 ; see British Blue Book No. 112, July 31. 2 To begin on August 2, German White Book, p. 559, and British Blue Book No. 142, August 1, listed under August 2. 3 Seemingly contradicted by British Blue Book No. 142, same day. * France asks for armed British intervention in the interest of the European balance of power. Sir E. Grey had personally committed himself to induce the British Cabinet so to intervene; see notes to previous despatch. This was before German troops entered Belgium. It was, however, subsequent to Germany's refusal to commit herself on' the Belgian question ; and no mention of Belgium is made here. s Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 15, August 1, and note. The assurance contained no reference to a treaty or an obligation under it. The French Yellow Book despatch, however. No. 122, Aug. 1, contained such a reference. The wording of the assurance given to Luxemburg has not been published. The French despatch (see next number) describing it, however, refers to a treaty. 384 Official Diplomatic Documents This is the reason why he has abstained from making a request direct to the Government of the Repubhc. As the Chamber of Deputies meets on Monday, M. Eyschen wishes to have the answer by that date; a similar demarche is being made at the same time with the German Minister at Luxemburg. Mollard. To Luxemburg French Yellow Book No. 129 M. Rene Vimani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg. Paris, August 1, 1914- Be good enough to state to the President of the Council that in conformity with the Treaty of London, 1867,^ the Government of the Republic intends to respect the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, as they have shown by their attitude. The violation of this neutrality by Germany would, however, be an act of a kind which would compel France from that time to be guided in this matter by care for her defence and her interests. Rene Viviani. From Berlin French Yellow Book No. 130^ M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 1, 1914- Special editions of newspapers are being distributed in the streets of Berlin announcing that the general mobilisation of the army and the navy has been decreed and that the first day of the mobilisation is Sunday, 2nd August. j^^^^^ ^^^^^^ Germany : To St. Petersburgh German White Book Exhibit 26 Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in St. Peters- burgh on August 1st, 12.52 P.M. Urgent. If the Russian Government gives no satisfactory reply to our demand. Your Excellency will please transmit this afternoon 5 o'clock (mid-European time) the following statement : "Le Gouvernement Imperial s'est efforce des les debuts de la crise de la mener a une solution pacifique. Se rendant a un desir que ^ See note to previous despatch. 2 This despatch should precede No. 127, in which the information it contains is discussed. In that case, however. No. 127 would hardly have been able to contain the "information" that the German mobilisation was "really in full execution" on August 1. Either Viviani had been erroneously informed, or he misinformed the French Ambassador in London. August U British Blue Booh No. 120 . 385 lui en avait ete exprime par Sa Majeste TEmpereur de Russie, Sa Majeste I'Empereur d'Allemagne d'accord avec TAngleterre etait applique a aecomplir un role mediateur aupres des Cabinets de Vienne et de St. Petersbourg, lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le resultat, proceda a la mobilisation de la totalite de ses forces de terre et de mer. "A la suite de cette mesure mena(?ante motivee par aucun pre- paratif militaire de la part de TAllemagne, I'Empire Allemand se trouva vis-a-vis d'un danger grave et imminent. Si le Gouvernement Imperial eut manque de parer a ce peril il aurait compromis la securite et Pexistence meme de I'Allemagne. Par consequent le Gouverne- ment Allemand se vit force de s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majeste I'Empereur de toutes les Russies ensistant sur la cessation des dits actes militaires. La Russie ayant refuse de faire droit a cette demande et ayant manifeste par ce refus, que son action etait dirigee contre I'Allemagne, j'ai I'honneur d'ordre de mon Gouverne- ment de faire savoir a Votre Excellence ce qui suit : '' Sa Majeste I'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain au nom de I'Em- pire releve le defi et Se considere en etat de guerre avec la Russie." Please wire urgent receipt and time of carrying out this instruction by Russian time. Please ask for your passports and turn over protection and affairs to the American Embassy. From Paris German WmxE Book ExmsiT 27 Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador in Paris to the Chancellor on August 1st, 1.05 P.M. Upon my repeated definite inquiry whether France would remain neutral in the event of a Russo-German war, the Prime Minister de- clared that France would do that which her interests dictated. Great Britain: From St. Petersburgh British Blue Book No. 120 Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edicard Grey. — {Received August 1.) (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July SI, 1914. Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me and French Ambassador and asked us to telegraph to our respective Governments subjoined formula ^ as best calculated to amalgamate proposal made by you in your telegram of 30th July ^ with formula recorded in my telegram of 30th July.^ He trusted it would meet with your approval : ^ — 1 Russian Orange Book No. 67, July 31. 2 British Blue Book No. 103, July 30. 3 British Blue Book No. 97, July 30. , , . , 4 There is no desire expressed that it would meet with Austria s approval, which was the all-important thing, if peace was to be preserved. Nor doea it appear what 2c 386 , Offixiial Diplomatic Documents "Si TAutriche consentira a arreter marche des ses troupes sur le territoire serbe, si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a assume le caractere d'une question d'interet europeen, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait accorder au Gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie sans laisser porter atteinte a ses droits d'Etat souverain et a son independance, la Russia s'engage a conserver son attitude expectante/^ ^ His Excellency then alluded to the telegram sent to German Emperor by Emperor of Russia in reply to the former's telegram.^ He said that Emperor Nicholas had begun by thanking Emperor William for his telegram and for the hopes of peaceful solution which it held out. His Majesty had then proceeded to assure Emperor William that no intention whatever of an aggressive character was concealed behind Russian military preparations. So long as conver- sation with Austria continued, His Imperial Majesty undertook that not a single man should be moved across the frontier ; it was, however of course impossible, for reasons explained, to stop a mobilisation which was already in progress. M. Sazonof ^ said that undoubtedly there would be better pros- pect of a peaceful solution if the suggested conversation were to take place in London, where the atmosphere w^as far more favourable, and he therefore hoped that you would see your way to agreeing to this. His Excellency ended by expressing his deep gratitude to His Majesty's Government, who had done so much to save the situation. It would be largely due to them if war were prevented. The Emperor, the Russian Government, and the Russian people would never forget the firm attitude adopted by Great Britain. From Berlin British Blue Book No. 121 Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received August 1.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 31, 1914. Your telegram of 31st July.^ I spent an hour with Secretary of State urging him most earnestly to accept your proposal and make another effort to prevent terrible catastrophe of a European war. a new formula could do, after Russia had ordered her general mobilisation in the mght of July 30-31. See note 5 to French Yellow Book No. 127, same day. ^Translation. — "If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on Servian territory ; if, recognising that the dispute between Austria and Servia has assumed a character of European interest, she will allow the Great Powers to look into the matter and determine whether Servia could satisfy the Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude." . J* None of these telegrams were published in the British Blue Book or mentioned in the speeches of Sir E. Grey or Mr. Asquith which induced Parliament to vote for war. ' Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. * See British Blue Book No. Ill, July 31. August ly British Blue Booh No. 122 387 He expressed himself very sympathetically towards your proposal, and appreciated your continued efforts to maintain peace, but said it was impossible for the Imperial Government to consider any proposal until they had received an answer from Russia to their communica- tion of to-day ; ^ this communication, which he admitted had the form of an ultimatum, being that, unless Russia could inform the Imperial Government within twelve hours that she would immediately counter- mand her mobilisation against Germany and Austria, Germany would be obliged on her side to mobilise at once. I asked his Excellency why they had made their demand even more difficult for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilise in south as well. He replied that it was in order to prevent Russia from saying all her mobilisation was only directed against Austria.^ His Excellency said that if the answer from Russia was satisfactory he thought personally that your proposal merited favourable con- sideration, and in any case he would lay it before the Emperor and Chancellor, but he repeated that it was no use discussing it until the Russian Government had sent in their answer to the German demand.^ He again assured me that both the Emperor William, at the request of the Emperor of Russia, and the German Foreign Office had even up till last night been urging Austria to show willingness to continue discussions — and telegraphic and telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a promising nature — but Russia's mobilisation had spoilt everything.^ From Berlin British Blue Book No. 122 Sir E, Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received A ugust 1.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 31, 1914. Neutrality of Belgium, referred to in your telegram of 31st July to Sir F. Bertie.^ I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must con- sult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer. I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether they would return any answer at all. His Excellency, nevertheless, took note of your request. It appears from what he said that German Government consider 1 German White Book, Exhibit 24, July 31 ; the German ultimatum. 2 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 121, August 1, note 5. , , 3 The obvious reason for this was that Germany felt herself threatened by the Russian general mobilisation. , xr n t. i xt 4 Contrast this view with the one expressed by France, French Yellow Book No. 120, August 1, and note 5. 6 British Blue Book No. 114, July 31. 388 Official Diplomatic Documents 1 that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium.^ As an instance of this,^ he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo already. I hope to see his Excellency to-morrow again to discuss the matter further, but the prospect of obtaining a definite answer seems to me remote. In speaking to me to-day the Chancellor made it clear that Germany would in any case desire to know the reply ^ returned to you by the French Government. To Berlin British Blue Book No. 123 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. Sir, Foreign Office, August 1, 1914. I TOLD the German Ambassador to-day that the reply ^ of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country.^ If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance ^ as that which had been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. I said that we had been discussing this question at a Cabinet meeting,^ and as I was authorised to tell him this I gave him a memorandum of it. He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgium neutrality we would engage to remain neutral.^ I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free,^ and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say w^as that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very 1 Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 79 and enclosures where under date of August 29 Bel- gium explains the embargo as not an hostile act. It is, however, very remarkable that this charge against Belgium could be made by Germany, without Great Britain to whom it was made at once challenging its accuracy. Nor does it appear from the published documents that Sir E. Grey was at all troubled by it or enquired about it, or felt called upon to deny it. 2 No other hostile acts are mentioned in the diplomatic documents published at the outbreak of the war. Subsequently Germany published the "Brussels docu- ments" which she had discovered in the Belgian archives after taking Brussels. In these documents "military conversations" between Great Britain and Belgium were discussed. For these documents see pp. 577 ff. •'' For this reply see Belgian Gray Book No. 15, August 1, 1914. * British Blue Book No. 122, July 31, printed under date of August 1. * No mention is made of existing treaties, a violation of which on the part of Ger- many has often been given as the reason for Great Britain to join the war. 6 Belgian Gray Book No. 15, August 1. It must be remembered that as European friendships had shaped themselves, France and Germany were not in the same posi- tion, although Great Britain had addressed to them identical questions. For France the question was : "Will Great Britain remain neutral or be my ally ? " For Germany it was: "Will Great Britain remain neutral or be my enemy?" ^ Contrast this with French Yellow Book No. 126, August 1, and note 2. 8 This is what Great Britain had done in 1870. ^ Compare this with Sir E. Grey's personal engagements toward France ; French Yellow Book No. 126, August 1, and note 3. August 1, British Blue Book No. 125 389 strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone. The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.^ I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free.^ , i am, etc. E. Grey. From Paris British Blue Book No. 124 Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 1.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 31, 1914. On the receipt at 8.30 to-night of your telegram of this afternoon,^ I sent a message to Minister for Foreign Affairs requesting to see him. He received me at 10.30 to-night at the Elysee, where a Cabinet Council was being held. He took a note of the enquiry as to the respecting by France of the neutrality of Belgium which you in- structed me to make. He told me that a communication had been made to you by the German Ambassador in London of the intention of Germany to order a general mobilisation of her army if Russia do not demobilise at once. He is urgently anxious as to what the attitude of England will be in the circumstances, and begs an answer may be made by His Majesty's Government at the earliest moment possible. Minister for Foreign Affairs also told me that the German Embassy is packing up.^ From Paris British, Blue Book No.. 125 Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 1.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 31, 1914. My immediately preceding telegram.^ Political Director h^s brought me the reply of the Minister for 1 No valid reason is given in the British Blue Book why Sir E. Grey did not formulate such conditions. From the reference given in the previous despatches, however, it appears that Sir E. Grey was personally too deeply committed to France. (See es- pecially French Yellow Book No. 126, August 1.) Nor did Sir E. Grey mention this German request either in the subsequent cabinet meetings or in Parliament. His excuse offered weeks later that the German Ambassador had niade this request un- officially seems to be contradicted by the despatch itself. It is not customary to repeat unoflEicial offers in instructions to Ambassadors, at least without saying so. Of. for instance British Blue Book No. 125, August 1, and Belgian Gray Book No. 24, August 3. •• 2 Cf . note 9, page 388. * Cf . French Yellow Book No. 120, August 1. 3 British Blue Book No. 114, July 31. ^ British Blue Book No. 124. 390 Official Diplomatic Documents Foreign Affairs to your enquiry respecting the neutrality of Belgium. It is as follows : ^ — French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power violat- ing that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity in order to assure defence of her own security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously^ renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day .^ From Paris British Blue Book No. 126 Sir F. Bertie J British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Re- ceived Augiist 1 .) (Telegraphic.) Paris , August 1, 1914- 1 HAVE had conversation with the Political Director, w^ho states that the German Ambassador was informed, on calling at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs this morning,^ that the French Government failed to comprehend the reason which prompted his communication of yesterday evening. It was pointed out to his Excellency that general mobilisation in Russia had not been ordered until after Austria had decreed a general mobilisation,^ and that the Russian Government were ready to demobilise ^ if all Powers did likewise. It seemed strange to the French Government that in view of this and of the fact that Russia and Austria were ready to converse, the German Govern- ment should have at that moment presented an ultimatum at St. Petersburgh requiring immediate demobilisation by Russia. There were no differences at issue between France and Germany, but the German Ambassador had made a menacing communication to the French Government . and had requested an answer the next day, intimating that he would have to break off relations and leave Paris if the reply were not satisfactory. The Ambassador was in- formed that the French Government considered that this was an extraordinary proceeding. The German Ambassador, who is to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs again this evening, said nothing about demanding his pass- ports, but he stated that he had packed up.^ ^ Cf. Belgian Gray Book no. 15, August 1. 2 Cf. end of note 7, British Blue Book No. 123, August 1. 3 Belgian Gray Book No. 9, July 31. * See French Yellow Book No. 125, same day. ^ This is an error, see French Yellow Book No. 127, same day, and note 5 ; also British Blue Book No. 127, same date. * Contrast French Yellow Book No. 125, same day, "suspension of military prepara- tions," which is not the same as "demobilisation." See also note 5 to this despatch in French Yellow Book. ^ This is not given in the exhaustive French despatch describing this interview, French Yellow Book No. 125, same day. August 1, British Blue Book No. 130 391 From Vienna British Blue Book No. 127 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey, — {Received August 1.) , (Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 1, 1914. General mobilisation of army and fleet. From Brussels British Blue Book No. 128 Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received August 1.) (Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 1, 1914. Belgian neutrality. The instructions conveyed in your telegram of yesterday ^ have been acted upon. Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will observe and uphold 2 her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. In so informing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, in the event of the violation of the neutrality of their territory, they believed that they were in a position to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations between Belgium and her neighbours were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions ; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against emergencies. [For British Blue Book No. 129 see under August 2.] To Berlin British Blue Book No. 130 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1914. We are informed that authorities at Hamburg have forcibly de- tained steamers belonging to the Great Central Company and other British merchant-ships. I cannot ascertain on what grounds the detention of British ships has been ordered. You should request German Government to send immediate orders that they should be allowed to proceed without delay. The effect on public opinion here will be deplorable unless this is done. His Majesty's Government, on their side, are most anxious to avoid any 1 British Blue Book No. 115, July 31, expecting Belgium to observe neutrality. 2 This seems to contradict Belgian Gray Book No. 38, August 4, where the Belgian Foreign Minister relates that Belgium had refrained from appealing to the guaranteeing Powers as late as 6 a.m. on August 4, and probably later. On Aug. 3, at 10 a.m., the Belgian Cabinet definitely voted not to appeal to the Powers. 392 Official Diplomatic Documents incident of an aggressive nature, and the German Government will, I hope, be equally careful not to take any step which would make the situation between us impossible. To Berlin British Blue Book No. 131 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E, Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1914. I STILL believe that it might be possible to secure peace if only a little respite in time can be gained before any Great Power begins war.^ The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness of Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness of Austria to accept a basis of mediation which is not open to the objections raised in re- gard to the formula which Russia originally suggested. Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready to converse, and I hope that German Government may be able to make use of the Russian communications referred to above, in order to avoid tension. His Majesty's Government are carefully abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters. From Berlin British Blue Book No. 132 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1914. Following telegram from M. Sazonof ^ to Count Benckendorff ^ of the 31st July communicated to me to-day : ^ " (Urgent.) " Formule amend ee conf ormement a la proposition anglaise : * Si Autriche consent a arreter la marche de ses troupes sur le territoire serbe et si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a assume le carac- tere d'un question d'interet europeen, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait accorder au Gouvernement austro-hongrois sans laisser porter atteinte a ses droits d'Etat souverain et a son independance, la Russie s'engage a conserver son attitude expectante.' " ^ (Above communicated to all the Powers.) 1 Sir E. Grey here overlooks the fact that general mobilisation by one nation on the frontier of another has always been sufficient cause for the latter to "defend itself by instant war." See Elihu Root quoted above, note 4 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 28, July 26. Sir E. Grey nowhere asked Russia to demobilise. 2 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 3 Russian Ambassador in London, 4 See British Blue Book No. 120, July 31, printed under date of August 1, and Russian Orange Book No. 67, July 31. ^Translation. — "Formula amended in accordance with the English proposal; * If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Servian territory, and if, recog- August 1, British Blue Book No. 134 393 From Berlin British Blue Book No. 133 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1914. M. De EtterI came to-day to communicate the contents of a telegram from M. Sazonof/ dated the 31st July, which are as follows : — "The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declare^ ^ the readiness of his Government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the discussions should take place in London with the participation of the Great Powers. "M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume the direction of these discussions. The whole of Europe would be thankful to them. It would be very important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop provisionally to her military action on Servian territory." (The above has been communicated to the six Powers.) From Paris British Blue Book No. 134 Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Re- ceived August 1.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, August 1, 1914. President of the Republic has informed me that German Govern- ment ^ were trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility, that it was only after a decree of general mobilisation had been issued in Austria that the Emperor of Russia ordered a general mobilisation; that, although the measures which the German Government have already taken are in effect a general mobilisation, they are not so designated ; that a French general mobilisation will become necessary in self- defence, and that France is already forty-eight hours ^ behind Ger- many as regards German military preparations; that the French troops have ordered not to go nearer to the German frontier than a distance of 10 kilom. so as to avoid any grounds for accusations of provocation to Germany, whereas the German troops, on the other nising that the Austro-Servian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Servia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her sovereign rights as a State and to her independence, Russia undertakes to preserve her waiting attitude." 1 Counsellor of Russian Embassy in London. 2 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 3 Of. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 56, August 1. * Cf. French Yellow Book No. 127, August 1, where it reads: "The German and the Austrian Governments." For the several points see the notes to the French Yellow Book despatch. 6 No such claim is made either in French Yellow Book Nos. 125 or 127, same date. 394 Official Diplomatic Documents hand, are actually on the French frontier and have made incursions on it ; ^ that, notwithstanding mobilisations, the Emperor of Russia has expressed himself ready to continue his conversations with the German Ambassador with a view to preserving the peace; that French Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific, sincerely desire the preservation of peace and do not quite despair, even now, of its being possible to avoid war. From St. Petersburgh British Blue Book No. 135 Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Peters- burgh. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1914- Information reaches me from a most reliable source that Austrian Government have informed German Government that though the situation has been changed by the mobilisation of Russia they would in full appreciation of the efforts of. England for the preservation of peace be ready to consider favourably my proposal for mediation between Austria and Servia. The effect of this acceptance would naturally be that the Austrian military action against Servia would continue for the present, and that the British Government would urge upon Russian Government to stop the mobilisation of troops directed against Austria, in which case Austria would naturally cancel those defensive military counter-measures in Galicia, which have been forced upon Austria by Russian mobilisation.^ You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and say that if, in the consideration of the acceptance of mediation by Austria, Russia can agree to stop mobilisation, it appears still to be possible to preserve peace. Presumably the matter should be discussed with German Government also by Russian Government. From Paris British Blue Book No. 136 Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received August 1.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, August 1, 1914. Minister of War informed military attache this afternoon that orders had been given at 3.40 ^ for a general mobilisation of the French Army. This became necessary because the Minister of War knows that, under the system of "Kriegszustand," ^ the Germans have 1 The German claim was to the very opposite effect ; see Speech of the Chancellor, August 4, 1914. 2 Contrast this with the French claims in despatches of this day that Russia had been forced to general mobilisation by a previous Austrian general mobilisation. ' Cf. German White Book, p. 560, 5 p.m., the latter being Berlin instead of Paris time. * "State of war." August 1, British Blue Book No. 137 395 called up six classes. Three classes are sufficient to being their cover- ing troops up to war strength, the remaining three being the reserve. This, he says, being tantamount to mobilisation, is mobilisation under another name.^ The French forces on the frontier have opposed to them eight army corps on a war footing, and an attack is expected at any moment. It is therefore of the utmost importance to guard against this. A zone of 10 kilom. has been left between the French troops and German frontier. The French troops will not attack, and the Minister of War is anxious that it should be explained that this act of mobilisation is one for purely defensive purposes. From Vienna British Blue Book No. 137 Sir Edivard Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 191J,.. I SAW the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador this morning. He supplied me with the substance of a telegram which the Austro- Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs had sent to the Austrian Ambassador in Paris.^ In this telegram his Excellency was given instructions to assure the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was no intention in the minds of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment to impair the sovereign rights of Servia or to obtain territorial aggrandisement. The Ambassador added that he was further in- structed to inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was no truth in the report which had been published in Paris to the effect that x\ustria-Hungary intended to occupy the sanjak. Count Mensdorff ^ called again later at the Foreign Office. He in- formed me of a telegram ^ sent yesterday to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh by Count Berchtold,^ and gave me the substance. It states that Count Berchtold begged the Russian Ambassador, whom he sent for yesterday, to do his best to remove the wholly erroneous impression in St. Petersburgh that the '^door had been banged" by Austria-Hungary on all further conversations. The Russian Ambassador promised to do this. Count Berchtold repeated on this occasion to the Russian Ambassador the assurance which had already been given at St. Petersburgh, to the effect that neither an infraction of Servian sovereign rights nor the acquisition of Servian territory was being contempated by Austria-Hungary. Special attention was called by Count Mensdorff ^ to the fact that 1 None of this seems to be based on facts. See M. P. Price, The Diplomatic History of the War, Scribner's, the chapters on "Preparations and Mobilisations." 2 Not printed in French Yellow Book, but mentioned ih. No. 120, same day. 3 Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. < Probably Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 50, although this is dated July 30. and Sir E. Grey says "sent yesterday," i.e. July 31. ^ Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 396 Official Diplomatic Documents this telegram contains a statement to the effect that conversations at St. Petersburgh had not been broken off by Austria-Hungary. [For British Blue Book Nos. 138 and 139 see under August 2.] From Paris British Blue Book No, 140 Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey, — (Received AugiLst 1.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, August 1, 1914. The Minister of War again sent for the military attache this even- ing, as he said he wished to keep him informed of the situation. He laid great stress on the fact that the zone of 10 kilom., which he had arranged between the French troops and the German frontier, and which was still occupied by peasants, was a proof of the French endeavours to commit no provocative act.^ Russia : To Russian Representatives Abroad Russian Orange Book No. 70 Secret Telegram to Russian Representatives abroad. (Telegram.) July 19 (August 1), 1914. At midnight the German Ambassador announced ^ to me, on the instruction of his Government, that if within 12 hours, that is by mid- night on Saturday, we had not begin to demobilise, not only against Germany, but also against Austria, the German Government would be compelled to give the order for mobilisation. To my enquiry whether this meant war, the Ambassador replied in the negative, but added that we were very near it. From london Russian Orange Book No. 71 Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) London, July 19 (August 1), 1914- Grey tells me that he has telegraphed ^ to Berlin that in his opinion the last formula accepted by the Russian Government offers the best prospect as a basis of negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the dispute. At the same time he expressed the hope that no Great Power would open hostilities before this formula had been considered. 1 Cf. note 3 to British Blue Book No. 134, August 1. 2 German White Book, Exhibit 24, July 31. ' Probably British Blue Book No. 131, same day. August 1, Russian Orange Book No. 74 397 From London Russian Orange Book No, 72 Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, (Telegram.) London, July 19 {August 1), 1914. The British Government have enquired ^ of the French and German Governments whether they will respect the neutrality of Belgium. France answered in the affirmative,^ but the German Government stated ^ that they could not give any definite answer to the question. From Paris Russian Orange Book No. 73 Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Paris, July 19 (August 1), 1914- ' The Austrian Ambassador yesterday ^ saw Viviani and declared to him that Austria, far from harbouring any designs against the integrity of Servia, was in fact ready to discuss the grounds of her grievances against Servia with the other Powers. The French Government are much exercised at Germany's extraordinary military activity on the French frontier, for they are convinced that, under the guise of Kriegszu^tand,^ mobilisation is in reality being carried out. From Paris Russian Orange Book No. 74 Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, (Telegram.) Paris, July 19 {August 1), 1914- On the receipt in Paris of the telegram ^ from the French Am- bassador at St. Petersburg, reporting the communication made to you by the German Ambassador respecting Germany's decision to order general mobilisation to-day, the President of the French Repub- lic signed the order for mobilisation. Lists of the reservists recalled to the colours are being posted up in the streets. The German Am- bassador has just visited Viviani,^ but told him nothing fresh, alleging the impossibility of deciphering the telegrams he has received.^ 1 British Blue Book No. 115, July 31. 2 Belgian Gray Book No. 15, August 1. 3 British Blue Book No. 122, August 1. 4 French Yellow Book No. 120, August 1. British Blue Book No. 137, same day. 6 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 127, August 1, and notes 5 and 6. 6 No such telegram is printed in the French Yellow Book. On the eventful August 1 not a single, despatch exchanged between Paris and Petrograd has been printed in the French Yellow Book. 7 See French Yellow Book No. 125, August 1. 8 Cf. ih., where Viviani quotes the German Ambassador as saying that "he had received no fresh communication from his government." 398 Official Diplomatic Documents Viviani informed him of the signature of the order for mobiKsation issued in reply to that of Germany, and expressed to him his amaze- ment that Germany should have taken such a step at a moment when a friendly exchange of views w^as still in progress between Russia, Austria, and the Powers. He added that mobilisation did not neces- sarily entail war, and that the German Ambassador might stay in Paris as the Russian Ambassador had remained in Vienna and the Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg. From Paris Russian Orange Book No. 75 Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, (Telegram.) Paris, July 19 {August i), 1914- I HEAR from the President that during the last few days the Austrian Ambassador emphatically assured both the President of the Council of Ministers and him that Austria had declared to Russia that she was ready to respect both the territorial integrity of Servia and also her' sovereign rights, but that Russia had intentionally received this dec- laration in silence. I contradicted this flatly.^ From Berlin Russian Orange Book No. 76 Note presented by the German Ambassador at St. Petersburgh on July 19 (August 1), at 7.10 P.M. (Translation.) Le Gouvernement Imperial The Imperial German Gov- s'est efforce des les debuts de ernment have used every effort la crise de la mener a une solu- since the beginning of the crisis tion pacifique. Se rendant a to bring about a peaceful settle- un desir qui lui en avait ete ment. In compliance with a exprime par Sa Majeste I'Em- wish expressed to him by His pereur de Russie, Sa Majeste IVIajesty the Emperor of Russia, I'Empereur • d'Allemagne d'ac- the German Emperor had under- cord avec I'Angleterre s'etait taken, in concert with Great applique a accomplir un role Britain, the part of mediator mediateur aupres des Cabinets between the Cabinets of Vienna de Vienne et de Saint-Peters- and St. Petersburg ; but Russia, bourg, lorsque, la Russie, sans without waiting for any result, en attendre le resultat, proceda proceeded to a general mobilisa- a la mobilisation de la totalite de tion of her forces both on land ses forces de terre et de mer. A and sea. In consequence of this la suite de cette mesure mena- threatening step, which was not ^ It is not clear whether the Russian Ambassador contradicted the assertion, that Austria-Hungary had made this declaration or that Russia had received it in silence. For Austria-Hungary's declaration see Austro-Hungarian Red Book Nos. 47, July 29, 66, July 31, and 56, August 1. August 1, Rmsian Orange Book No. 76 399 9ante ne motivee par aucun presage militaire de la part de rAllemagne, TEmpire allemand s'est trouve vis-a-vis d'un dan- ger grave et imminent. Si le Gouvernement Imperial eut man- que de parer a ce peril, il aurait compromis la securite et I'existence meme de I'Allemagne. Par consequent le Gouvernement allemand se vit force de s'adresser au Gouvernement de SaMajeste FEmpereur de Toutes les Russies en insistant sur la cessation des dits actes militaires. La Russie ayant refuse de faire droit a (n'ayant pas cru devoir repondre a ^) cette demande et ayant mani- festo par ce refus (cette atti- tude ^) que son action etait dirigee contre I'Allemagne, j'ai I'honneur, d'ordre de mon Gou- vernement, de faire savoir a votre Excellence ce qui suit : — Sa Majeste I'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain, au nom de TEmpire, relevant le defi, se considere en etat de guerre avec la Russie. justified by any military proceed- ings on the part of Germany,^ the German Empire was faced by a grave and imminent danger. If the German Government had failed to guard against this peril, they would have compromised the safety and the very existence of Germany. The German Government were, therefore, ob- liged to make representations to the Government of His Maj- esty the Emperor of All the Russias and to insist upon a ces- sation of the aforesaid military acts. Russia having refused to comply with (not having con- sidered it necessary to answer ^) this demand, and having shown by this refusal (this attitude^) that her action was directed against Germany, I have the honour, on the instructions of my Government, to inform your Excellency as follows ; — His Majesty the Emperor, my august Sovereign, in the name of the German Empire, accepts the challenge, and considers him- self at war with Russia. ^ Les mots places entre parentheses se trouvent dans Toriginal. II faut supposer que deux variantes avaient ete preparees d'avance et que par erreur elles ont 6t6 inserees toutes les deux dans la note. 2 The words in parentheses occur in the original. It rnust be supposed that two variations had been prepared in advance, and that, by mistake, they were both in- serted in the note. 3 This sentence contains the crux of the question. Students should ask themselves (a) Did Russian mobilisation contain an element of danger for Germany? (b) If it did, was Germany justified in replying to it with an ultimatum? (c) Was the Russian general mobilisation justified by any military action previously taken by Germany? 400 Official Diplomatic Documents Sunday, August 2, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES FoKEiGN Office of Austria-H ungary Belgium France Germany Great Britain Sent Despatches to London etc. All representatives London etc. London Received Despatches fbom Berlin Luxemburg German Minister Luxemburg, Petrograd, London, German Ambassador Russia Serbia Paris, Berlin Announcement by Sazonof to all representatives Berlin, Petrograd, Paris, Vienna, Brussels, Lux- emburg Austria-Hungary is notified of Germany's declaration of war on Russia. Belgium is notified of Germany's entry on Luxemburg territory, and receives herself an ultimatum from Germany at 7 o'clock in the evening ; i.e. many hours after the British Government had promised their support to France. France announces to her representatives instances of Germany's troops crossing her frontier and committing hostile acts, and receives the promise of support from the British Government for which she had been working since July 27. Germany sends troops into Luxemburg, thus violating the neutrality of the duchy, but assuring her that the military measures taken are not a hostile act but are "solely measures intended to assure the use of the railways which have been leased to the Empire " against any attack of the French army. She promises Luxemburg a complete indemnity for any damage. Germany notifies Belgium that she has received "reliable information" of French intentions to march through Belgium, and feels herself therefore forced in self-defence to contemplate entering Belgian territory. If Belgium "should oppose the German troops," Germany would "to her regret be compelled to con- sider Belgium as an enemy." If the troops are not opposed, guarantees are offered for the future integrity and independence of Belgium, and the payment for any damage done. Great Britain promises her support to France during the forenoon, independ- ently of whether or no German troops should invade Belgium. She is silent on the movement of her own troops. Russia defends herself against Germany's attempt "to foist" on Russia the "responsibility" for the war, claiming that Germany "neither could, nor had the right to, doubt" the many proofs of Russia's "desire for peace." The fact of Russia's general mobilisation is minimised. Serbia is silent. Austria-Hungary : From Berlin AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 57 Count Szogyeny to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 2, 1914- The Secretary of State has just informed me that no answer has been received from Russia to the German demand. August 2, Belgian Gray Book No. 19 401 The Russian troops have crossed the German frontier at Schwidden (southeast of Bialla). Russia has thus attacked Germany. Germany, therefore/ regards herself as at war with Russia. The Russian Ambassador has this morning received his passports ; he intends to leave to-day. Belgium : From Luxemburg Belgian Gray Book No. 18 M. Eyschen, President of the Luxemburg Government, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Luxemburg, August 2, 1914- I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency with the following facts : On Sunday, the 2nd August, very early, the German troops, according to the information which has up to now reached the Grand Ducal Government, penetrated into Luxemburg territory by the bridges of Wasserbillig and Remich, and proceeded particularly towards the south and in the direction of Luxemburg, the capital of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armoured trains with troops and ammunition have been sent along the railway line from Wasser- billig to Luxemburg, where their arrival is expected. These occur- rences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the neu- trality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The Luxemburg Government have not failed to address an energetic protest against this aggression to the representatives of His Majesty the German Emperor at Luxemburg. An identical pro- test will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin. To Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh Belgian Gray Book No. 19 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh Sir, Brussels, August 2, 1914. I WAS careful to warn the German Minister through M. de Bassom- pierre that an announcement in the Brussels press by M. Klobukowski, French Minister, would make public the formal declaration which the latter had made to me on the 1st August. When I next met Herr von Below he thanked me for this attention, and added that up to the present he had not been instructed to make us an official commu- nication, but that we knew his personal opinion as to the feelings of security, which we had the right to entertain towards our eastern ^ This is not the reason given in the declaration of war, Russian Orange Book No. 76, August 1. 2d 402 Official Diplomatic Documents neighbours. I at once replied that all that we knew of their inten- tions, as indicated in numerous previous conversations, did not allow us to doubt their perfect correctness towards Belgium. I added, however, that we should attach the greatest importance to the posses- sion of a formal declaration, which the Belgian nation would hear of with joy and gratitude. From Berlin Belgian Gray Book No. 20 Note presented by Herr von Below Salekse, German Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Kaiserlich Deutsche Gesandtschaft in Belgien. Brilssel, den 2. August, 1914- Imperial German Legation in Belgium. — Brussels, August 2, 1914- (Translation.) (Very Confidential.) ^ Reliable information has been received by the German Government to the effect that French forces intend to march on the line of the IMeuse by Givet and Namur. This information leaves no doubt as to the inten- tion of France to march through Belgian territory against Ger- many. The German Government can- not but fear that Belgium, in spite of the utmost goodwill, will be unable, without assistance, to repel ^ so considerable a French invasion with sufficient prospect of success to afford an adequate guarantee against danger to Ger- many. It is essential for the self- defence of Germany that she should anticipate any such hostile attack. The German Govern- ment would, however, feel the deepest regret if Belgium re- garded as an act of hostility ^ This ultimatum was presented at 7 p.m. (see Belgian Gray Book No. 38, August 4), i.e. many hours after the British Government had promised their support to France ; cf. British Blue Book No. 148, August 2, where Sir E. Grey says : "After the Cabinet this morning J gave M. Cambon the following memorandum." 2 This is the same argument Great Britain advanced in her second military con- versation with Belgium. See p. 580 and also note to Belgian Gray Book No. 22, August 3. (Tres Confidentiel.) Der Kaiserlichen Regierung liegen zuverlassige Nachrichten vor iiber den beabsichtigten Auf- marsch franzosischer Streitkrafte an der Maas-Strecke Givet- Namur. Sie lassen keinen Zweifel iiber die Absicht Frank- reichs, durch belgisches Gebiet gegen Deutschland vorzugehen. Die Kaiserliche Regierung kann sich der Besorgniss nicht erwehren, dass Belgien, trotz besten Willens, nicht im vStande sein wird, ohne Hiilfe einen fran- zosischen Vormarsch mit so grosser Aussicht auf Erfolg abzu- wehren, dass darin eine ausrei- chende Sicherheit gegen die Bedrohung Deutschlands gefun- den werden kann. Es ist ein Gebot der Selbsterhaltung fiir Deutschland, dem feindlichen An- griff zu vorzukommen. Mit dem grossten Bedauern wiirde es daher August 2, Belgian Gray Book No. 20 403 die deutsche Regierung erfiillen, wenn Belgien einen Akt der Feindseligkeit gegen sich darin erblicken wiirde, dass die Mass- nahmen seiner Gegner Deutseh- land zwingen, zur Gegenwehr auch seinerseits belgisches Gebiet zu betreten. Um jede Missdeutung aus- zuschliessen, erklart die Kaiser- liche Regierung das Folgende : 1. Deutschland beabsichtigt keinerlei Feindseligkeiten gegen Belgien. 1st Belgien gewillt, in dem bevorstehenden Kriege, Deutschland gegeniiber eine wohlwollende Neutralitat einzu- nehmen, so verpflichtet sich die deutsche Regierung, beim Frie- densschluss Besitzstand und Unabhangigkeit des Konigreichs in vollem Umfang zu garantieren. 2. Deutschland verpflichtet sich unter obiger Voraussetzung, das Gebiet des Konigreichs wieder zu raumen, sobald der Friede geschlossen ist. 3. Bei einer freundschaftlicher Haltung Belgiens ist Deutschland bereit, im Einvernehmen mit den Koniglich Belgischen Behorden alle Bedurfnisse seiner Truppen gegen Barzahlung anzukaufen und jeden Schaden zu ersetzen, der etwa durch deutsche Truppen verursacht werden konnte. 4. Sollte Belgien den deutschen Truppen feindlich entgegen tre- ten, insbesondere ihrem Vorgehen durch Widerstand der Maas- Befestigungen oder durch Zer- storungen von Eisenbahnen, Strassen, Tunneln oder sonstigen Kunstbauten Schwierigkeiten be- reiten, so wird Deutschland zu seinem Bedauern gezwungen sein, das Konigreich als Feind zu be- trachten. In diesem Falle wiirde against herself the fact that the measures of Germany's op- ponents force Germany, for her own protection, to enter Belgian territory. In order to exclude any possi- bility of misunderstanding, the German Government make the following declaration : — 1. Germany has in view no act of hostility against Belgium. In the event of Belgium being prepared in the coming war to maintain an attitude of friendly neutrality towards Germany, the German Government bind them- selves, at the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the possessions and independence of the Belgian Kingdom in full. 2. Germany undertakes, under the above-mentioned condition, to evacuate Belgian territory on the conclusion of peace. 3. If Belgium adopts a friendly attitude, Germany is prepared, in co-operation with the Belgian authorities, to purchase all neces- saries for her troops against a cash payment, and to pay an indemnity for any damage that may have been caused by German troops. 4. Should Belgium oppose the German troops, and in particular should she throw difficulties in the way of their march by a re- sistance of the fortresses on the Meuse, or by destroying railways, roads, tunnels, or other similar works, Germany will, to her re- gret, be compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy. In this event, Germany can undertake no obligations towards 404 Official Diplomatic Documents Deutschland dem Konigreich Belgium, but the eventual adjust- gegeniiber keine Verpflichtungen ment of the relations between the iibernehmen konnen, sondern two States must be left to the miisste die spatere Regelung des decision of arms. Verhaltnisses beider Staaten zu einander der Entscheidung der Waffen iiberlassen. Die Kaiserliehe Regierung The German Government, giebt sich der bestimmten however, entertain the distinct Hoffnung hin, dass diese Even- hope that this eventuality will tualitat nicht eintreten, und dass not occur, and that the Belgian die Konigliche Belgische Regie- Government will know how to rung die geeigneten Massnahmen take the necessary measures to zu treffen wissen wird, um zu prevent the occurrence of inci- verhinderen, dass Vorkommnisse, dents such as those mentioned, wie die vorstehend erwahnten. In this case the friendly ties sich ereignen. In diesem Falle which bind the two neighbouring wiirden die freundschaftlichen States will grow stronger and Bande, die beide Nachbarstaaten more enduring, verbinden, eine weitere und dauernde Festigung erfahren. France : From Luxemburg French Yellow Book No. 131 M. Eyschen, Minister of State for Luxemburg, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Luxemburg, August 2, 1914- I HAVE the honour to bring to your Excellence's notice the follow- ing facts : — On Sunday, the 2nd August, very early, German troops, according to the information which has up to now reached the Grand Ducal Government, penetrated into Luxemburg territory by the bridges of Wasserbillig and Remich, and proceeded particularly towards the south and in the direction of Luxemburg, the capital of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armoured trains with troops and am- munition have been sent along the railway line from Wasserbillig to Luxemburg, where their arrival is expected. These occurrences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The Luxemburg Government have not failed to address an energetic pro- test against this aggression to the representatives of His Majesty the German Emperor at Luxemburg. An identical protest will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin. The Minister of State, President of the Government. Eyschen. August 2, French Yellow Book No. 134 405 From Luxemburg French Yellow Book No. 132 ^ M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to M. Rene Viviani, Presi- dent of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Luxemburg, August 2, 191 4. The Minister of State for Luxemburg, M. Eyschen, has just re- ceived, through Herr von Buch, German Minister at Luxemburg, a telegram from Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor of the German Empire, saying that the military measures taken by Germany in Luxemburg do not constitute a hostile act against this country, but are solely measures tended to assure the use of the railways which have been leased to the Empire against the eventual attack of a French army. Luxemburg will receive a complete indemnity for any damage. Mollard. From Berlin French Yellow Book No. 133 Note handed in by the German Ambassador. Paris, August 2, 1914. The German Ambassador has just been instructed, and hastens to inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the military measures taken by Germany in the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg do not con- stitute an act of hostility. They must be considered as purely pre- ventive measures taken for the protection of the railways, which, under the treaties between Germany and the Grand Duchy of Luxem- burg, are under German administration. Von Schoen. From St. Petersburgh French Yellow Book No. 134 W. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Rene: Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. St. Petersburgh, August 2, 1914- Yesterday at ten minutes past seven in the evening the German Ambassador handed to M. Sazonof a declaration of war by his Govern- ment ; he will leave St. Petersburgh to-day. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has not received any instruc- tions from his Government as to the declaration of war. Paleologue. 1 Cf. British Blue Book No. 129, same day. 4:06 Official Diplomatic Documents To the Representatives of France Abroad French Yellow Book No. 135 M.Rene Viviani, President of the Coum^il, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Representatives of France abroad. Paris, August 2, 1914. The Russian Ambassador informs me that Germany has just de- clared war on Russia, notwithstanding the negotiations which are proceeding, and at a moment when Austria-Hungary w^as agreeing to discuss with the Powers even the basis of her conflict with Servia. Rene Viviani. To London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Con- stantinople French Yellow Book No. 136 M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna^ RomCy Madrid, Constantinople. Paris, August 2, 1914- This morning, French territory was violated by German troops at Ciry and near Longwy. They are marching on the fort which bears the latter name. Elsewhere the Custom House at Delle ^ has twice been fired upon. Finally, German troops have also violated this morning the neutral territory of Luxemburg. You will at once use this information to lay stress on the fact that the German Government is committing itself to acts of war against France without provocation ^ on our part, or any previous declaration of war, whilst we have scrupulously respected the zone of ten kilo- metres which we have maintained, even since the mobilisation, between our troops and the frontier. Rene Viviani. From London French Yellow Book No. 137 M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, August 2, 1914. After the meeting of the Cabinet held this morning, Sir Edward Grey made the following declaration ^ to me : — "I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile 1 See below, French Yellow Book No. 139, same day. 2 The German Chancellor in his speech in the Reichstag on August 4 laid the blame for the first border hostilities on the French. For translation of this speech see pp. 573- 676. See also for the German charges, Belgian Gray Book No. 21, August 3. 3 For different wording see French Yellow Book No. 143, August 3, and notes to British Blue Book No. 148, August 2. August 2, French Yellow Book No. 138 407 operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power. "This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place." Afterwards in speaking to me of the neutrality of Belgium and that of Luxemburg, the Secretary of State reminded me that the Conven- tion of 1867, referring to the Grand Duchy, differed from the Treaty referring to Belgium, in that Great Britain was bound to require the observance of this latter convention without the assistance of the other guaranteeing Powers, while with regard to Luxemburg all the guaran- teeing Powers were to act in concert. The protection of Belgian neutrality is here considered so important that Great Britain will regard its violation by Germany as a casu^ belli. It is a specially British interest ^ and there is no doubt that the British Government, faithful to the traditions of their policy, will insist upon it, even if the business world, in which German influence is making tenacious efforts, exercises pressure to prevent the Govern- ment committing itself against Germany. Paul Cambon. To London French Yellow Book No. 138 M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London. Paris, August 2, 1914. I NOTE the points contained in your telegrams of the 27th,2 30th,^ 31st ^ July and the 1st August,^ and in that which you have sent to me to-day.^ In communicating to the Chambers the declaration which Sir Edward Grey has made to you, the text of which is contained in your last telegram, I will add that in it we have obtained from Great Britain a first assistance which is most valuable to us. In addition, I propose to indicate that the help which Great Britain intends to give to France for the protection of the French coasts or the French merchant marine, will be used in such a way that our navy will also, in case of a Franco-German conflict, be sup- ported by the British fleet in the Atlantic as well as in the North 1 This is a very important statement, for if it is true, Great Britain, even if entering the war because Belgian neutrality was infringed, did so for reasons of national self- interest, and not merely to defend the rights of a smaller nation. 2 French Yellow Book No. 63. Other despatches of the same day but without bearing on the question at hand here, are Nos. 68, 69, and 71. 3 Ih. No. 108. 4/6. No. 110. 5/6. No. 126. 6/6. No. 137. . . J . .T .o^ The coupling of these despatches shows that the final promise contained in No. 137 is the result of diplomatic efforts begun by France, certainly not later than on July 27. Cf. French Yellow Book No. 63, July 27. 408 Official Diplomatic Documents Sea and Channel. In addition I would note that British ports could not serve as places for revictualling for the German fleet. Rene Viviani. To Berlin French Yellow Book No. 139 M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin. Paris, August 2, 1914. German troops having to-day violated the eastern frontier at several points I request you immediately to protest in writing to the German Government. You will be good enough to take as your text the following note which, in the uncertainty of communications between Paris and Berlin, I have addressed directly to the German Ambassador : — " The French administrative and military authorities in the eastern district have just reported several acts which I have instructed the Ambassador of the Republic at Berlin to bring to the knowledge of the Imperial Government. " The first has taken place at Delle in the district of Belfort ; on two occasions the French Customs station in this locality has been fired upon by a detachment of German soldiers. North of Delle ^ two German patrols of the 5th mounted Jaegers crossed the frontier this morning and advanced to the villages of Joncherey and Baron, more than ten kilometres from the frontier. The officer who com- manded the first has blown out the brains of a French soldier. The German cavalry carried off some horses which the French mayor of Suarce was collecting and forced the inhabitants of the commune to lead the said horses. "The Ambassador of the Republic at Berlin has been instructed to make a formal protest to the Imperial Government against acts which form a flagrant violation of the frontier by German troops in arms, and which are not justified by anything in the present situation. The Government of the Republic can only leave to the Imperial Government the entire responsibility for these acts." Rene Viviani. Great Britain: From Luxemburg British Blue Book No. 129 ^ . Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 2.) (Translation.) Luxembourg, 2 aout, 1914- Luxemburg, August 2, 1914. (Telegraphique.)^ (Telegraphic.) MiNiSTRE d'Etat du Luxem- The Luxemburg Minister of bourg Eyschen vient de recevoir State, Eyschen, has just received 1 Cf. above, No. 136, same day. 2 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 132, same day. August 2, British Blue Book No. 138 409 par rintermediaire du Ministre through the German Minister in d'Allemagne a Luxembourg, M. Luxemburg, M. de Buch, a tele- deBuch,untelegrammeduChan- gram from the Chancellor of the eelier de TEmpire allemand Beth- German Empire, Bethmann- mann-Hollweg disant que les Hollweg, to the effect that the mesures militaires a Luxembourg military measures taken in ne constituent pas un acte hostile Luxemburg do not constitute a contre le Luxembourg, mais sont hostile act against Luxemburg, uniquement des mesures destinees but are only intended to insure a assurer contre attaque even- against a possible attack of a tuelle d'une armee fran9aise. French army. Full compensa- L'exploitation des voies ferrees tion will be paid to Luxemburg affermees a I'Empire Luxembourg for any damage caused by using recevra complete indemnite pour the railways which are leased to dommages eventuels. the Empire. [For British Blue Book Nos. 130 to 137 see under August 1.] From Berlin British Blue Book No. 138 Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received August 2.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 1, 1914. Your telegram of to-day.^ I have communicated the substance of the above telegram to the Secretary of State, and spent a long time arguing with him that the chief dispute was between Austria and Russia, and that Germany was only drawn in as Austria's ally. If therefore Austria and Russia were, as was evident, ready to discuss matters and Germany did not desire war on her own account, it seemed to me only logical that Germany should hold her hand and continue to work for a peaceful settlement. Secretary of State said that Austria's readiness to dis- cuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, and, had not Russia mobilised against Germany, all would have been well. But Russia by abstaining from answering Germany's demand that she should demobilise, had caused Germany to mobilise also. Russia had said that her mobilisation did not necessarily imply war, and that she could perfectly well remain mobilised for months without making war. This was not the case with Germany. She had the speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide dominions. The situa- tion now was that, though the Imperial Government had allowed her several hours beyond the specified time, Russia had sent no answer. Germany had therefore ordered mobilisation, and the German repre- sentative at St. Petersburgh had been instructed within a certain 1 British Blue Book No. 131, August 1. 410 Official Diplomatic Documents time to inform the Russian Government that the Imperial Govern- ment must regard their refusal to an answer as creating a state of war.^ From St. Peter sburgh British Blue Book No. 139 Sir G. Bicchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward ^ Grey. — {Received August 2.) (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, August 1, 191^. My telegram of 31st July.^ The Emperor of Russia read his telegram to the German Emperor to the German Ambassador at the audience given to his Excellency yesterday.^ No progress whatever was made. In the evening ^ M. Sazonof ^ had an interview with the Austrian Ambassador who, not being definitely instructed by his Government, did his best to deflect the conversation towards a general discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia instead of keeping to the question of Servia. In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his desire that these relations should remain friendly, and said that, taken in general, they were perfectly satisfactory ; but the real question which they had to solve at this moment was whether Austria was to crush Servia and to reduce her to the status of a vassal,^ or whether she was to leave Servia a free and independent State. In these circumstances, while the Servian question was unsolved, the abstract discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia was a waste of time. The only place where a successful dis- cussion of this question could be expected was London, and any such discussion was being made impossible by the action of Austria- Hungary in subjecting Belgrade, a virtually unfortified town, to bombardment. M. Sazonof ^ informed the French Ambassador and myself this morning of his conversation ^ with the Austrian Ambassador. He went on to say that during the Balkan crisis he had made it clear to the Austrian Government that war w^ith Russia must inevitably follow an Austrian attack on Servia. It was clear that Austrian domination of Servia was as intolerable for Russia as the dependence 1 Russian Orange Book No. 76, August 1. 2 British Blue Book No. 120, under date of August 1. 3 i.e. yesterday of July 31 or July 30. See French Yellow Book 102, July 30. There is no apparent reason why an event reported in Paris of July 30 and so printed in the French Yellow Book should appear in the British Blue Book under date of August 2. * The date of this interview is doubtful. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador re- ceived his instructions by telegram sent from Vienna July 30, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 50, and acknowledged by him,i6. No. 55, July 31. In this latter despatch he refers to an " uninstructed " interview on July 29. "In the evening" cannot refer to July 31. It may refer to July 30, but since no such interview is mentioned by the Ambassador in Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 55, it possibly refers to July 29. ^ Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. * This occurred in interview between Sazonof and th& German Ambassador on July 29. See British Blue Book No. 97, July 30. ^ Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. * From the preceding notes it is clear that the date of this conversation cannot be fixed. August 2, British Blue Book No. HI 411 of the Netherlands on Germany would be to Great Britain. It was, in fact, for Russia a question of life and death. The policy of Austria had throughout been both tortuous and immoral, and she thought that she could treat Russia with defiance, secure in the support of her German ally. Similarly the policy of Germany had been an equivocal and double-faced policy, and it mattered little whether the German Government knew or did not know the terms of the Austrian ultimatum ; what mattered was that her intervention with the Aus- trian Government had been postponed until the moment had passed when its influence would have been felt. Germany was unfortunate in her representatives in Vienna and St. Petersburgh: the former was a violent Russophobe who had urged Austria on, the latter had reported to his Government that Russia would never go to war.^ M. Sazonof was completely weary of the ceaseless endeavours he had made to avoid a war. No suggestion held out to him had been re- fused. He had accepted the proposal for a conference of four, for mediation by Great Britain and Italy, for direct conversation between Austria and Russia ; but Germany and Austria-Hungary had either rendered these attempts for peace ineffective by evasive replies or had refused them altogether. The action of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the German preparations had forced the Russian Government to order mobilisation, and the mobilisation of Germany had created a desperate situation.^ M. Sazonof added that the formula, of which the text is contained in my telegram of 31st July,^ had been forwarded by the Russian Government to Vienna, and he would adhere to it if you could obtain its acceptance before the frontier was crossed by German troops. In no case would Russia begin hostilities first. I now see no possibility of a general war being avoided unless the agreement of France and Germany can be obtained to keep their armies mobilised on their own sides of the frontier, as Russia has expressed her readiness to do,^ pending a last attempt to reach a settlement of the present crisis. [For British Blue Book No. 140 see under August 1.] From Vienna British Blue Book No. 141 Sir M, de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received August 2.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 1, 1914. I AM to be received to-morrow by Minister for Foreign Affairs. This afternoon he is to see the French and Russian Ambassadors. I have just be^n informed by the Russian Ambassador of German 1 For a similar statement see British Blue Book No. 71, July 29. ^ .,. ^ 2 This almost sounds as if Russia claimed that she had a right to mobilise, but that her neighbor had not. 3 British Blue Book No. 120, under date of August 1. , , ., , * For Germany's reason for her belief that Russia could wait, while she could not, see previous despatch. 412 Official Diplomatic Documents ultimatum ^ requiring that Russia should demobilise within twelve hours. On being asked by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs whether the inevitable refusal of Russia to yield to this curt sum- mons meant war, the German Ambassador replied that Germany would be forced to mobilise if Russia refused. Russian Ambassador at Vienna thinks that war is almost inevitable, and that as mobilisa- tion is too expensive to be kept for long, Germany will attack Russia at once. He says that the so-called mobilisation of Russia amounted to nothing more than that Russia had taken military measures cor- responding to those taken by Germany.^ There seems to be even greater tension between Germany and Russia than there is between Austria and Russia. Russia would, according to the Russian Am- bassador, be satisfied even now w^ith assurance respecting Servian integrity and independence.^ He says that Russia had no intention to attack Austria. He is going again to-day to point out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that most terrific consequences must ensue from refusal to make this slight concession. This time Russia would fight to the last extremity. I agree with his Excellency that the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from the first, and that his strong personal bias probably coloured his action here.^ The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German Government also desired war from the first. ^ It is the intention of the French Ambassador to speak earnestly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day on the extreme danger of the situation, and to ask whether proposals to serve as a basis of mediation from any quarter are being considered.^ There is great anxiety to know what England will do. I fear that nothing can alter the determination of Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed on their present course, if they have made up their mind with the approval of Germany. From Berlin British Blue Book No. 142 Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 2.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 1, 1914- Orders have just "^ been issued for the general mobilisation of the navy and army, the first day of mobilisation to be 2nd August. 1 This ultimatum was presented on July 31. German White Book, Exhibit 25. It seems incredible that the Russian Ambassador refrained from telling this to Sir M. de Bunsen until the next day. 2 The despatches of the previous days disprove this. Germany sent her ultimatum after Russia had mobilised, and did not herself order general mobilisation until August 1 to take effect on August 2. See British Blue Book No. 138 under date of August 2, and next number. 3 They were guaranteed by Germany on July 29. See British Blue Book No. 97, July 30. * Cf . previous despatch where he is called a Russophobe. ^ This is contradicted by the statement discussed in note 1 (page 411) to the previous despatch. No. 140. « This statement is unsupported by any evidence contained in the French Yellow Book. ' This despatch disposes of the statements found in previous despatches to the effect that Germany had mobilised earlier. Augmt 2, British Blue Book No. IJfi 413 From Berlin British Blue Book No. 143 Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 2.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 1, 191Jf. Detention of British merchant ships at Hamburg. Your telegram of 1st August ^ acted on. Secretary of State, who expressed the greatest surprise and annoy- ance, has promised to send orders at once to allow steamers to pro- ceed without delay. From Berlin British Blue Book No. 144 Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received August 2.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 2, IVI4. Secretary of State has just informed me that, owing ^ to certain Russian troops having crossed frontier, Germany and Russia are now in a state of war. From Berlin British Blue Book No. 145 Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 2.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 2, 191 4. My telegram of 1st August.^ Secretary of State informs me that orders were sent last night to allow British ships in Hamburg to proceed on their way. He says that this must be regarded as a special favour to His Majesty's Government, as no other foreign ships have been allowed to leave. Reason of detention was that mines were being laid and other pre- cautions being taken. From Brussels British Blue Book No. 146 Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 2). (Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 2, 1914. The news that a German force has entered Grand Duchy of Luxemburg has been officially confirmed to the Belgian Government.^ 1 British Blue Book No. 130, August 1. ^, t^ . ^ -,, , 2 The declaration of war does not contain this reason. Cf . Russian Orange Book No. 76, August 1. 3 c^ee No. 143. * Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 18, August 2, and British Blue Book next despatch. 414 Official Diplomatic Documents From Luxemburg British Blue Book No. 147 Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received August 2.) (Translation.) (Telegraphique.) Luxembourg, le 2 aout, 19H. J'ai rhonneur de porter a la connaissance de votre Excellence les faits suivants : Dimanche, 2 aout, de grand matin, les troupes allemandes, d'apres les informations qui sont parvenues au Gouvernement Grand ducal a Theure actuelle, ont penetre sur le territoire luxembourgeois par les ponts de Wasserbillig et de Remich, se dirigeant specialement vers le sud du pays et vers la ville de Luxembourg, capitale du Grand Duche. Un certain nombre de trains blindes avec des troupes et des munitions ont ete ache- mines par la voie de chemin de f er de Wasserbillig a Luxembourg, ou Ton s'attend de les voir arriver. D'un instant a Tautre, ces faits impliquent des actes manifeste- ment contraire a la neutralite du Grand Duche garantie par le Traite de Londres de 1867. Le Gouvernement luxembourgeois n*a pas manque de protester energiquement contre cette agres- sion aupres des representants de Sa Majeste I'Empereur d'Alle- magne a Luxembourg. Une protestation identique va etre transmise telegraphiquement au Secretaire d'Etat pour les Affaires Etrangeres a Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Luxemburg, August 2, 1914- I HAVE the honour to bring to your Excellency's notice the following facts : — On Sunday, the 2nd August, very early, the German troops, according to the information which has up to now reached the Grand Ducal Government, penetrated into Luxemburg terri- tory by the bridges of Wasser- billig and Remich, and proceeded particularly towards the south and in the direction of Luxem- burg, the capital of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armoured trains with troops and ammunition have been sent along the railway line from Wasserbillig to Luxemburg, where their arrival is expected. These occurrences constitute acts which are mani- festly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy as guaran- teed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The Luxemburg Govern- ment have not failed to address an energetic protest against this aggression to the representatives of His Majesty the German Em- peror at Luxemburg. An iden- tical protest will be sent by tele- graph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin. August 2, British Blue Book No. I48 415 To Paris Bkitish Blue Book No. 148 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 2, 1914. After the Cabinet this morning ^ I gave M. Cambon the follow- ing memorandum : — "I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power. "This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding^ His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place." ^ I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difiicult issues to consider, and that Government felt that they could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out between France and Germany to-morrow, but it was essential to the French Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them this assurance^ It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German fleet took the action indicated, but it did give a security to France that would enable her to settle the disposition of her own Mediterranean fleet. M. Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him the doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in 1867. He asked me what we should say about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much more important matter; we were considering what statement we should make in Parliament to-morrow — in effect, whether we should declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a casv^ belli. I told him what had been said to the German Ambassador on this point .^ 1 At two previous meetings the Cabinet had refused to make any promises to France; see French Yellow Book Nos. 110, July 31, and 126, August 1, and note 4. This promise was given before Germany's ultimatum to Belgium, see Belgian Gray Book No. 201, August 2. 2 This is the very opposite of French Yellow Book No. 143, August 3 : "is to be regarded as binding the British Government. Sir E. Grey assured me of this." 3 This iformula is different from the one given in French Yellow Book No. 143, August 3, and quoted by Viviani in the Chamber of Deputies, French Yellow Book No. 159, August 4. In both the last sentence reads "from that moment on England and Germany would be in a state of war." There are then two distinct formulas. The one appears in British Blue Book No. 148, French Yellow Book No. 137, Aug. 2, and in the Speech in Parliament by Sir E. Grey printed as an appendix to the British Blue Book. The other occurs in French Yellow Book No. 143, August 3, and No. 159, August 4. * British Blue Book No. 123, August 1. 416 Official Diplomatic Documents To Berlin British Blue Book No. 149 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Gosclien, British Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 2, 1914. Your telegram of 1st August.^ I regret to learn that 100 tons of sugar was compulsorily unloaded from the British steamship Sappho at Hamburg and detained. Similar action appears to have been taken with regard to other British vessels loaded with sugar. You should inform Secretary of State that, for reasons stated in my telegram of 1st August,^ I most earnestly trust that the orders already sent to Hamburg to allow the clearance of British ships covers also the release of their cargoes, the detention of which can- not be justified. Russia : Russian Orange Book No. 77 Announcement by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting Recent Events. July 20 {August 2), 1914. A GARBLED version of the events of the last few days having ap- peared in the foreign press, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs considers it his duty to publish the following brief account of the diplomatic discussions during the period under review : — On the 10th (23rd) July, 1914, the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade presented a note to the Prime Minister of Servia, in which the Servian Government were accused of having fostered the pan- Serb movement, which had led to the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne. Austria-Hungary, therefore, demanded of the Servian Government, not only the condemnation in the most formal manner of the above-mentioned propaganda, but also the adoption, under Austrian supervision, of a series of measures for the discovery of the plot, for the punishment of any Servian subjects who had taken part in it, and for the prevention of any future attempts at assassination upon Austrian soil. A time limit of forty- eight hours was given to the Servian Government within which to reply to this note. The Russian Government, to whom the Austro-Hungarian Am- bassador at St. Petersburgh had communicated the text of the note seventeen hours after its presentation at Belgrade, having taken note of the demands contained therein, could not but perceive that some of these demands were impossible of execution as regards their substance, whilst others were presented in a form which was incom- patible with the dignity of an independent State. Russia considered that the humiliation of Servia, involved in these demands, and 1 British Blue Book No. 143, under date of August 2. 2 British Blue Book No. 130, August 1. August 2, Russian Orange Book No. 77 417 equally the evident intention of Austria-Hungary to secure her own hegemony in the Balkans, which underlay her conditions/ were in- admissible. The Russian Government, therefore, pointed out to Austria-Hungary in the most friendly manner that it would be desirable to re-examine the points contained in the Austro-Hun- garian note. The Austro-Hungarian Government did not see their way to agree to a discussion of the note. The moderating influence of the four Powers at Vienna was equally unsuccessful. Despite the fact that Servia had reprobated the crime,^ and had shown herself ready to give Austria satisfaction to an extent beyond the expectations,^ not only of Russia, but also of the other Powers — despite these facts, the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade con- sidered the Servian reply insufficient and left the town. Recognising the exaggerated nature of the demands made by Austria, Russia had previously ^ declared that she could not remain indifferent, while not desisting from doing her utmost to find a peace- ful issue which might prove acceptable ^ to Austria, and spare the latter's self-respect as a Great Power. At the same time Russia let it be clearly understood that she could accept a peaceful settlement of the question only so far as it involved no humiliation of Servia as an independent State. Unhappily all the efforts of the Russian Government to this end were fruitless. The Austro-Hungarian Gov- ernment, which had shunned any attempt at conciliatory interven- tion by the Powers in the Austrian dispute with Servia, proceeded to mobilise and declared war officially against Servia, and the follow- ing day Belgrade was bombarded. The manifesto which accom- panied the declaration of war openly accuses Servia of having pre- pared and carried out the crime of Serajevo. Such an accusation of a crime at common law, launched against a whole people and a whole State, aroused, by its evident inanity,^ widespread sympathy for Servia throughout all classes of European society. In consequence of this behaviour of the Austro-Hungarian Gov- ernment in spite of Russia's declaration that she could not remain indifferent to the fate of Servia, the Russian Government considered it necessary to order mobilisation in the military districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan. This decision was rendered necessary by the fact that since the date when the Austro-Hungarian note was communicated to the Servian Government, and since the first steps taken by Russia, five days had elapsed, and yet the Vienna Cabinet had not taken one step to meet Russia halfway in her efforts towards peace. Indeed, quite the contrary; for the mobilisation of half of the Austro-Hungarian army had been ordered. The German Government were kept informed of the steps taken 1 This implies to Austria-Hungary a motive which may or may not have been hers. 2 No evidence for. this has been given. 3 This is denied by Austria-Hungary. See the despatches of July 26, especially Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27. s Cf. British Blue Book No. 120, under date of August 1, note 4. 6 The "dossier," Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25, takes a different view. 418 Official Diplomatic Documents by Russia. At the same time it was explained to them that these steps were only the result of the Austrian preparations, and that they were not in any way aimed at Germany. Simultaneously, the Russian Government declared that Russia was ready to continue discussions with a view to a peaceful settlement of the dispute, either in the form of direct negotiations with Vienna or, as suggested by Great Britain, in the form of a conference of the four Great Powers not directly interested, that is to say. Great Britain, France, Ger- many, and Italy. This attempt on the part of Russia was, however, equally unsuc- cessful. Austria-Hungary declined ^ a further exchange of views with Russia, and the Vienna Cabinet was unwilling to join the pro- posed conference of the Powers. Nevertheless Russia did not abandon her efforts for peace. When questioned by the German Ambassador as to the conditions on which we would still agree to suspend our preparations, the Minister for Foreign Affairs declared ^ that these conditions were Austria^s recog- nition that the Austro-Serbian question had assumed a European character, and a declaration by her that she agreed not to insist upon such of her demands as were incompatible with the sovereign rights of Servia. Germany considered ^ this Russian proposal unacceptable to Austria-Hungary. At that very moment news of the proclamation of general mobilisation ^ by Austria-Hungary reached St. Petersburg. All this time hostilities were continuing on Servian territory, and Belgrade was bombarded afresh. The failure of our proposals for peace compelled us to extend the scope of our precautionary military measures.^ The Berlin Cabinet questioned us on this, and we replied that Russia was compelled to begin preparations ^ so as to be ready for every emergency. But while taking this precautionary step, Russia did not on that account abandon her strenuous efforts to find some solution of the situation, and she announced that she was ready to accept any pro- posed settlement of the problem that might be put forward, provided it complied with the conditions laid down by her. In spite of this conciliatory communication, the German Govern- ment on the 18th (31st) July demanded of the Russian Government that they should suspend their military measures by midday on the 19th July (1st August), and threatened, should they fail to comply, to proceed to general mobilisation.^ 1 This is denied by Austria-Hungary. See Red Book No. 50, July 30. 2 British Blue Book No. 97, July 30. ' There is no evidence of this anywhere. The formula was changed at England's request, British Blue Book No. 132, August 1. * Russia's general mobilisation took place on July 31. That of Austria-Hungary on August 1. See British Blue Book No. 127, August 1. ^ This is contradicted by the previous note. * "Begin preparations" is hardly the word for general mobilisation. ' In this sentence the Russian general mobilisation of July 31 is called "military measures" while the German order of August 1 as of August 2, is properly called what it is, general mobilisation. August 2, Russian Orange Book No. 78 419 On the following day, the 19th July (1st August), the German Ambassador, on behalf of his Government, forwarded a declaration of war ^ to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. To Russian Representatives Abroad Russian Orange Book No. 78 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Representatives abroad. (Telegram.) St. Petersburg, July 20 {August 2), 1914. It is quite evident that Germany is now doing her utmost to foist upon us the responsibility for the rupture. We were forced to mobilise by the immense responsibility which would have fallen upon our shoulders if we had not taken all possible precautionary measures at a time when Austria, while confining herself to discus- sions of a dilatory nature, was bombarding Belgrade and was under- taking ^ general mobilisation. The Emperor of Russia had promised the German Emperor that he would take no aggressive action ^ as long as the discussions with Austria continued. With such a guarantee, and after so many proofs of Russia's desire for peace,^ Germany neither could, nor had the right to, doubt our declaration that we would joyfully accept any peaceful settlement compatible with the dignity and independ- ence of Servia. Any other solution, besides being entirely incompat- ible with our own dignity, would assuredly have upset the European balance of power by securing the hegemony of Germany. The European — nay, the world-wide — character of this dispute ^ is infinitely more important than the pretext from which it springs. By her decision to declare ivar upon us, at a moment when negotia- tions were in progress between the Powers, Germany has assumed a heavy responsibility. 1 Russian Orange Book No. 76, August 1. 2 This statement is more accurate than that contained in previous despatch. See Russian Orange Book No. 77 note 10. 3 General mobiHsation is universally looked upon as an aggressive act in itself. * Nobody before had called a general mobilisation a "proof of a desire for peace." ^ The previous sentence shows that so far as Russia is concerned she did not believe that Prussianism or frightfulness or the invasion of Belgium, but the European balance of power, would supply the motive for England to enter the war. 420 Official Diplomatic Documents Monday, August 3, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary Belgium London, etc. King George German Minister London France London, London, etc. The Hague, Brussels, All representatives Berlin, Munich London German Ambassador Germany Great Britain Paris Berlin, Brussels Russia Serbia Austria-Hungary is silent on this day. Belgium refuses to accede to the German ultimatum and appeals to Great Britain for ''diplomatic intervention." To the informal offer of military assist- ance she replies, to the French Minister, that she is "making no appeal at present to the guarantee of the Powers." France offers her military assistance to Belgium, who declines it with thanks. She denies the German accusations of having violated Belgian neutrality, and having committed hostile acts against Germany. When the latter declares war on her, she recalls her diplomatic agents from Germany, and lodges with the latter formal protest against her violations of Luxemburg and Belgian neutrality. Germany declares war on France at 6.45 p.m. citing as reasons several unlawful and hostile acts on the part of France, whom she also charges with having violated Belgian neutrality. Great Britain issues only one important despatch. It contains the Italian intention not to enter the war on the side of her allies of the Triple Alliance. This Italian declaration is sent by Sir E. Grey to the British Ambassador in Paris on the authority of the French Ambassador in London. Russia is silent on this day. Serbia is silent. Belgium : From Berlin Belgian Gray Book No. 21 Meinorandum of an Interview asked for at 1.30 A.M., on August 3, by Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister, with Baron van der Elst, Secretary-General to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. At 1.30 A.M. the German Minister asked to see Baron van der Elst. Pie told him that he had been instructed by his Government to inform the Belgian Government that French dirigibles had thrown bombs, and that a French cavalry patrol had crossed the frontier in violation of international law, seeing that war had not been declared.^ The Secretary-General asked Herr von Below where these incidents had happened, and was told that it was in Germany. Baron van der 1 Similar charges against Germany were made by France ; see French Yellow Book No. 136, August 2. August 3, Belgian Gray Book No. 22 421 Elst then observed that in that case he could not understand the object of this communication. Herr von Below stated that these acts, which were contrary to international law, were calculated to lead to the supposition that other acts, contrary to international law, would be committed by France. To Berlin Belgian Gray Book No. 22 Note communicated by M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister. Brussels, August 3, 1914 (^ A.M.). The German Government stated in their note of the 2nd August,^ 1914, that according to reliable information French forces intended to march on the Meuse via Givet and Namur, and that Belgium, in spite of the best intentions, would not be in a position to repulse, without assistance, an advance of French troops.^ The German Government, therefore, considered themselves com- pelled to anticipate this attack and to violate Belgian territory. In these circumstances, Germany proposed to the Belgian Government to adopt a friendly attitude towards her, and undertook, on the con- clusion of peace, to guarantee the integrity of the Kingdom and its possessions to their full extent. The note added that if Belgium put difficulties in the way of the advance of German troops, Germany would be compelled to consider her as an enemy, and to leave the ultimate adjustment of the relations between the two States to the decision of arms. This note had made a deep and painful impression^ upon the Bel- gian Government. The intentions attributed to France by Germany are in contra-* diction to the formal declarations made to us on August 1, in the name of the French Government. Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, Belgian neutrality should be violated by France, Belgium intends to fulfil her inter- national obligations and the Belgian army would offer the most vigorous resistance to the invader.* The treaties of 1839, confirmed ^ by the treaties of 1870, vouch for the independence and neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the Powers, and notably of the Government of His Majesty the King of Prussia. 1 Belgian Gray Book No. 20, August 2. 2 This is exactly the same argument advanced by Great Britain in the second of the Brussels documents (see p. 580) when the British officer claimed that the British troops would enter Belgium even unasked. 3 The ring of sincerity in this sentence is lessened after having studied the document mentioned in the previous note. * It would, however, have been almost hopeless, for since Great Britain had the mil- itary secrets of Belgium, France had them also, undoubtedly. See documents men- tioned in preceding notes. 6 It had been claimed in Parliament in 1870 that the treaties of 1870 invalidated those of 1839. See the editor's Germany's Point of View, the chapters on Belgium. 422 Official Diplomatic Documents Belgium has always been faithful to her international obligations/ she has carried out her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality, and she has left nothing undone to maintain and enforce respect for her neutrality. The attack upon her independence ^ with which the German Government threaten her constitutes a flagrant violation of inter- national law. No strategic interest justifies such a violation of law. The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the proposals sub- mitted to them, would sacrifice the honour of the nation and betray their duty towards Europe. Conscious of the part which Belgium has played for more than eighty years in the civilisation ^ of the world, they refuse to believe that the independence of Belgium can only be preserved at the price of the violation of her neutrality. If this hope is disappointed the Belgian Government are firmly resolved to repel, by all the means in their power, every attack upon their rights. To St. Petersburgh, Berlin^ London, Paris, Vienna, and The Hague Belgian Gray Book No. 23 M. Damgnon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at St. Petersbiirgh, Berlin, London, Paris, Vienna, The Haggle. (Telegram.) Brussels, August 3, 1914. At 7 P.M. last night Germany presented a note proposing friendly neutrality. This entailed free passage through Belgian territory, while guaranteeing the maintenance of the independence of Belgium and of her possessions on the conclusion of peace, and threatened, in the event of refusal, to treat Belgium as an enemy. A time limit of twelve hours was allowed within which to reply. Our answer ^ has been that this infringement of our neutrality would be a flagrant violation of international law. To accept the German proposal would be to sacrifice the honour of the nation. Conscious of her duty, Belgium is firmly resolved to repel any attack by all the means in her power. To Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petershurgh Belgian Gray Book No. 24 M. Damgnon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petershurgh. Sir, Brussels, August 3, 1914 U^ noon). As you are aware, Germany has delivered to Belgium an ultima- tum which expires this morning, 3rd August, at 7 a.m. As no act of ^ Germany claims that this is not true in view of the Brussels documents. 2 Germany had explicitly disclaimed making any attack on the "independence" of Belgium. 2 The writer here forgot the chapter of Belgian atrocities in the Congo. * See preceding despatch. August 3, Belgian Gray Book No, 25 423 war has occurred up to the present, the Cabinet has decided that there is, for the moment, no need to appeal to the guaranteeing Powers. The French Minister has made the following statement to me upon the subject : — (Translation.) "Sans etre charge d'une decla- "Although I have received no ration de mon Gouvernement, je instructions ^ to make a declara- crois cependant, m'inspirant de tion from my Government, I feel ses intentions connues, pouvoir justified, in view of their wtII- dire que si le Gouvernement known intentions, in saying that Royal faisait appel au Gouverne- if the Belgian Government were ment fran^ais, comme Puissance to appeal to the French Govern- garante de sa neutralite, nous ment as one of the Powers repondrions immediatement a guaranteeing their neutrality, the son appel; si cet appel n'etait French Government would at. pas formule, il est probable, a once respond to Belgium's ap- moins bien entendu que le souci peal ; ^ if such an appeal were de sa propre defense ne determine not made, it is probable that des mesures exceptionnelles, qu'il — unless of course exceptional attendra pour intervenir que la measures were rendered necessary Belgique ait fait un acte de in self-defence — the French resistance effective." Government would not intervene until Belgium had taken some effective measure of resistance." I thanked M. Klobukowski for the support which the French Government had been good enough to offer us in case of need, and I informed him that the Belgian Government were making no appeal at present to the guarantee of the Powers, and that they would decide later what ought to be done.^ To King George Belgian Gray Book No. 25 His Majesty the King of the Belgians to His Majesty King George. (Telegram.) Brussels, August 3, 1914. Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England 1 It is unusual for diplomatic agents to speak without instructions or, as it is called, de suo, and even more unusual to include such informal remarks in the official books of despatches. The French Minister to Belgium had once before spoken de suo. See Belgian Gray Book No. 9, July 31. When M. Davignon gave a running review of the events leading up to August 4, and quoted this despatch (No. 24) in No. 38, he felt constrained to explain the unusual procedure of the French Minister by interpolating the words "in view of the rapid march of events." 2 This appeal it was decided not to make as late as 10 o'clock, August 4. See Belgian Gray Book No. 38. 3 For this reply see also French Yellow Book No. 142, and British Blue Book No. 151, both August 3. In the British Blue Book the French offer consists of "five French army corps." Since that can hardly be interpolated, the above declaration cannot be accurate, although it has been printed in quotation marks. 424 Official Diplomatic Documents in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention^ of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium. From London Belgian Gray Book No. 26 Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Bel- gian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) . London, August 3, 1914- 1 SHOWED your telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who has laid it before the Cabinet. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed me that if our neutrality is violated it means war with Germany. 2 France : From The Hague French Yellow Book No. 140 M. Marcelin Pellet, French Minister at The Hague, to M. Rene Vi- mani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Hague, August 3, 1914- The German Minister called yesterday on the Minister for For- eign Affairs to explain the necessity under which, as he said, Ger- many was placed of violating the neutral territory of Luxemburg, adding that he would have a fresh communication to make to him to-day. He has now this morning announced the entry of German troops into Belgium in order, as he has explained, to prevent an occupation of that country by France. p From Brussels French Yellow Book No. 141 M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Brussels, August 3, 1914- Yesterday evening the German Minister handed to the Belgian Government an ultimatum ^ stating that his Government, having learnt that the French were preparing for operations in the districts ^ Cf. No. 24, same day, and No. 38, August 4. The appeal here made is only for "diplomatic intervention." Such diplomatic intervention was of course out of the question, since the British Cabinet, on August 2, had authorised Sir Edward Grey to promise to France British assistance in the war against Germany. Cf . British Blue Book No. 148, August 2. 2 See note to preceding despatch, and to French Yellow Book No. 143 and British Blue Book No. 148, both of August 2, and Belgian Gray Book No. 23, August 3. « Belgian Gray Book No. 20, August 2. August 3, French Yellow Book No. I4S 425 of Givet and of Namur, were compelled to take steps, the first of which was to invite the Belgian Government to inform them, within seven ^ hours, if they were disposed to facilitate military operations in Belgium against France. In case of refusal the fortune of war would decide. The Government of the King answered ^ that the information as to the French movements appeared to them to be inaccurate in view of the formal assurances which had been given by France, and were still quite recent ; that Belgium, which since the establishment of her Kingdom, has taken every care to assure the protection of her dignity and of her interests, and has devoted all her efforts to peaceful development of progress, strongly protests against any violation of her territory from whatever quarter it may come : and that, sup- posing the violation takes place, she will know how to defend with energy her neutrality, which has been guaranteed by the Powers, and notably by the King of Prussia. t^ *^ "^ ^ Klobukowski. From Brussels French Yellow Book No. 142 M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Brussels, August 3, 1914. To the assurance which I gave him that if Belgium appealed to the guarantee of the Powers against the violation of her neutrality by Germany, France would at once respond to her appeal, the Minister for Foreign Affairs answered : " It is with great sincerity that we thank the Government of the Republic for the support which it would eventually be able to offer us, but under present conditions we do not appeal to the guarantee of the Powers. At a later date the Government of the King will weigh the measures which it may be necessary to take." ^ From London French Yellow Book No. 143 M. Paul Camhon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, August 3, 1914- Sir Edward Grey has authorised me to inform you that you could state to Parliament that he was making explanations to the 1 This is an error. It was 12 hours, see also Belgian Gray Book No. 38, August 4. The ultimatum was presented at 7 p.m. on August 2, and expired at 7 a.m. on August 3. It was presented several hours after Great Britain had promised her support on the sea to France, which made her an ally of France without any reference to Belgium. See British Blue Book No. 148, August 2. 2 Belgian Gray Book No. 22, August 3. ' Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 24, August 3, and note 3. Also British Blue Book. No. 151, August 3. 426 Official Diplomatic Documents Commons as to the present attitude of the British Government, and that the chief of these declarations would be as follows : — "In case the German fleet came into the Channel or entered the North Sea in order to go round the British Isles with the object of attacking the French coasts or the French navy and of harassing French merchant shipping, the British fleet would intervene in order to give to French shipping its complete protection, in such a way that from that moment Great Britain and Germany would be in a state of war." ^ Sir Edward Grey explained to me that the mention of an opera- tion by way of the North Sea implied protection against a demon- stration in the Atlantic Ocean. The declaration concerning the intervention of the British fleet must be considered as binding ^ the British Government. Sir Edward Grey has assured me of this and has added that the French Government were thereby authorised to inform the Chambers of this. On my return to the Embassy I received your telephonic ^ com- munication relating to the German ultimatum addressed to Belgium. I immediately communicated it to Sir Edward Grey. Paul Cambon. From London French Yellow Book No. 144 M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, August 3, 1914. Just as Sir Edward Grey was starting this morning for the meet- ing of the Cabinet, my German colleague, who had already seen him yesterday, came to press him to say that the neutrality of Great Britain did not depend upon respecting Belgian neutrality. Sir Edward Grey refused all conversation on this matter.^ The German: Ambassador has sent to the press a communique saying that if Great Britain remained neutral Germany would give up all naval operations and would not make use of the Belgian coast as a point d'appui.^ My answer is that respecting the coast is not respecting the neutrality of the territory, and that the German ultimatum is already a violation of this neutrality. Paul Cambon. 1 For the different wording of this formula see notes to British Blue Book No. 148, August 2, and French Yellow Book No. 137, August 2. 2 See despatches mentioned in preceding note. ' This is very important, because it suggests that besides the loritten communications which are printed in the official Books of documents, other communications were ex- changed between London and Paris, and undoubtedly other places too. * This may account for the fact that this matter is not mentioned in the British Blue Book. * Obviously done to allay any fear of Germany in Great Britain. August 3, French Yellow Book No. 14? 427 From London French Yellow Book No. 145 M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene Vivianiy President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, August 3, 1914. Sir Edward Grey has made the statement regarding the inter- vention of the British fleet. ^ He has explained, in considering the situation, what he proposed to do with regard to Belgian neutrality ; and the reading of a letter from King Albert asking for the support of Great Britain has deeply stirred the House. The House will this evening vote the credit which is asked for; from this moment its support is secured to the policy of the Govern- ment, and it follows public opinion which is declaring itself more and more in our favour. Paul Cambon. To London French Yellow Book No. 146 M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London. Paris, August 3, 1914. I AM told that the German Ambassador is said to ha\ : stated to the Foreign Office that yesterday morning eighty French officers in Prussian uniform had attempted to cross the German frontier in twelve motor cars at Walbeck, to the west of Geldern, and that this formed a very serious violation of neutrality on the part of France. Be good enough urgently to contradict this news, which is pure invention, and to draw the attention of the Foreign Office to the German campaign of false news which is beginning. Rene Viviani. From Berlin French Yellow Book No. 147 Letter handed by the German Ambassador to M. Rene Viviani, Presi- dent of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, during his fare- tvell audience, August 3, 1914, at 6.45 P.M. M. le President, The German administrative and military authorities have estab- lished a certain number of flagrantly hostile acts committed on Ger- man territory by French military aviators. Several of these have openly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the terri- 1 Which statement did he make, the one of French Yellow Book No. 137, August 2, or of ih. No. 143, August 3? In Sir E. Grey's speech given in British Blue Book of Sept. 28, the former is given. In Viviani's speech of August 4, French Yellow Book No. 159, the latter is quoted as having been given by Sir E. Grey. 428 Official Diplomatic Documents tory of that country ; one has attempted to destroy buildings near Wesel ; others have been seen in the district of the Eifel, one has thrown bombs on the railway near Carlsruhe and Nuremberg.^ I am instructed, and I have the honour to inform your Excellency, that in the presence of these acts of aggression the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with France in consequence of the acts of this latter Power. At the same time I have the honour to bring to the knowledge of your Excellency that the German authorities will detain French mercantile vessels in German ports, but they will release them if, within forty-eight hours, they are assured of complete reciprocity. My diplomatic mission having thus come to an end, it only remains for me to request your Excellency to be good enough to furnish me with my passports, and to take the steps you consider suitable to assure my return to Germany, with the staff of the Em- bassy, as well as with the staff of the Bavarian Legation and of the German Consulate General in Paris. Be good enough, M. le President, to receive the assurances of my deepest respect. (Signed) Schoen. To the French Representatives Abroad French Yellow Book No. 148 M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Representatives abroad. Paris, August 3, 1914- The German Ambassador has asked for his passports and is leav- ing this evening with the staffs of the Embassy, the German Consu- late General and the Bavarian Legation. Baron von Schoen has given as his reason the establishment by the German administrative and military authorities of acts of hostility which are said to have been committed by French military aviators accused of having flown over territory of the Empire and thrown bombs. The Ambassador adds that the aviators are said to have also violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over Belgian territory. "In the presence of these acts of aggression," says the letter of Baron von Schoen, "the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with France in con- sequence of the acts of this latter Power." I formally challenged the inaccurate allegations of the Ambassa- dor, and for my part I reminded him that I had yesterday addressed to him a note ^ protesting against the flagrant violations of the French frontier committed two days ago by detachments of German troops. Rene Viviani. 1 Cf . New York Evening Post, July 22, 1916, referring to "Facts about the War" published by the Paris Chamber of Commerce, in which Dr. Schwalbe is cited as writing in the Deutsche Medizinische Wochenschrift, on May 18, to the effect that his investigations cleared the French of the charge of having dropped bombs on Nuremberg. 2 French Yellow Book Nos. 136 and 139, August 2, and note to No. 136. August 3, French Yellow Book No. 150 429 To Berlin French Yellow Book No. 149 • M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegram communicated to French Representatives abroad.) Paris, August 3, 1914. I REQUEST you to ask for your passports and to leave Berlin at once with the staff of the Embassy, leaving the charge of French interests and the care of the archives to the Spanish Ambassador. I request you at the same time to protest in writing against the viola- tion of the neutrality of Luxemburg by German troops, of which notice has been given by the Prime Minister of Luxemburg ; against the ultimatum addressed to the Belgian Government by the German Minister at Brussels to force upon them the violation of Belgian neutrality and to require of that country that she should facilitate military operations against France on Belgian territory; finally against the false allegation of an alleged projected invasion of these two countries by French armies, by which he ^ has attempted to justify the state of war which he declares henceforth exists between Germany and France. Rene Viviani. To Munich French Yellow Book No. 150 M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Allize, French Minister at Munich. Paris, August 3, 191^. Be good enough to inform the Royal Bavarian Government that you have received instructions to adapt your attitude to that of our Ambassador at Berlin and to leave Munich. Rene Viviani. 1 " He " does not refer to the last person mentioned, which was the "German Minister at Brussels" (for whose remarks see Belgian Gray Book No. 20, August 2, 1914), but to the German Ambassador in Paris, not mentioned in this despatch, for it was he who "attempted to justify, etc." (see French Yellow Book No. 147, August 3). This proves parts of the original despatch have been excised. 430 Official Diplomatic Documents To London, St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Berne, Constan- tinople, The Hague, Copenhagen, Christiania, Stockholm, Bucha- rest, Athens, Belgrade. French Yellow Book No. 151 M. Rene Vimani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Representatives at London, St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Berne, Constantinople, The Hague, Co- penhagen, Christiania, Stockholm, Bucharest, Athens, Belgrade. Paris, August 3, 1914- I LEARN from an official Belgian source ^ that German troops have violated Belgian territory at Gemmerich in the district of Verviers. Rene Viviani. Great Britain: From Berlin British Blue Book No. 150 Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 3.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 3, 1914- Your telegram of 2nd August : Detention of British ships at Hamburg. No information available. From Brussels British Blue Book No. 151 Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 3.) (Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 3, 1914- French Government have offered through their military attache the support of five French army corps to the Belgian Government.^ Following reply has been sent to-day : — " We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering eventual support. In the actual circumstances, however, we do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the Powers. Belgian Govern- ment will decide later on the action which they may think it neces- sary to take." ^ No such account is contained in the Belgian Gray Book, according to which, (No. 40, August 4,) the "armed forces of Germany" entered Belgium "this morning." Cf. also Belgian Gray Book No. 30, August 4, which announces the violation of Belgian territory at Gemmerich. This French despatch is, therefore, probably erroneously dated August 3, because no "ofl&cial Belgian source " could have made the above state- ment truthfully on August 3. 2 Cf . Belgian Gray Book No. 24 and French Yellow Book No. 142, both of August 3, and note 3 to Belgian despatch. August 3, British Blue Book No, 152 431 To Paris British Blue Book No. 152 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, Sir, Foreign Office, August 3, 1914, On the 1st instant the French Ambassador made the following communication : ^ — "In reply to the German Government's intimation of the fact that ultimatums had been presented to France and Russia, and to the question as to what were the intentions of Italy, the Marquis di San Giuliano ^ replied : — "'The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which might result, had, in the words of the German Ambassador himself, an aggressive object. Both were therefore in conflict with the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, and in such circumstances Italy would remain neutral.'" In making this cominunication, M. Cambon ^ was instructed to lay stress upon the Italian declaration that the present war was not a defensive but an aggressive war, and that, for this reason, the casus fcederis under the terms of the Triple Alliance did not arise. I am, etc. E. Grey. 1 No reason is apparent why this Italian declaration should be sent by Sir E. Grey to the British Ambassador in Paris on the authority of the French Ambassador in London. There should have been an official Italian declaration available. 2 Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 3 French Ambassador in London. y 432 Official Diplomatic Documents Tuesday, August 4, 1914. SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary London Belgium London, Paris The Hague, Berlin, Madrid, Berlin London German Minister Belgian Ministers at German Minister Entente capitals Entente Ministers in British Minister Brussels France Representatives of the Brussels Powers in Paris London Copenhagen Germany Great Britain Berlin, Brussels Brussels, Berlin Russia Serbia Berlin Austria-Hungary is discussing the possibility of maintaining friendly relations with Great Britain. Belgium dismisses the German Minister, and issues to the Entente Ministers her version of the events leading up to the break with Germany. She decides, at first, not to call on the armed intervention or assistance of the guaranteeing Powers under the Treaty of 1839, but late in the day decides to do so. France issues a protest on what she calls Germany's violation of the Hague Conventions and the Treaty of 1839, addressing her protest to **the Representa- tives of the Powers at Paris." Germany notifies Belgium that to her ''deep regret" she finds herself "compelled to take those measures of defence already foreshadowed as indispensable in view of the menace of France;" and orders her troops to enter Belgian territory. Great Britain sends an ultimatum to Germany concerning the neutrality of Belgium. Since she, however, announces herself to be the ally of France, who is at war with Germany, even the acceptance by Germany of the terms of the ultima- tum could not have kept Great Britain neutral. At the same time she urges Belgium to resist the expected invasion with force of arms, this being her reply to Belgium's appeal for diplomatic intervention, which as the ally of France she could, of course, not render. Russia does not enter into the discussion on this day. Serbia recalls her minister and consuls from Germany. Austria-Hungary : From London AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 58 Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) London, August 4) 1914- I HAVE just seen Sir E. Grey. The British Government have sent to Germany an ultimatum ^ on account of Belgium. They expect a reply at 12 o'clock to-night. Sir E. Grey said to me that at present there was no reason why he 1 British Blue Book No. 159, same day. August 4, Belgian Gray Book No, 27 433 should make any communication to the Imperial and Royal Govern- ment, and there was no cause why a conflict should arise between us, so long as we were not in a condition of war with France. In any case, he hoped that we would not begin hostilities without the for- mality ^ of a previous declaration of war. He does not intend to recall Sir M. de Bunsen. Should we be at war with France, it would indeed be difficult for Great Britain, as the ally ^ of France, to co-operate with her in the Atlantic, and not in the Mediterranean. Belgium : From Berlin Belgian Gray Book No. 27 Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (The original is in French.) Brussels, August 4, 1914 {6 A.M.). (Translation.) Monsieur le Ministre, Sir, J'ai ete charge et j'ai I'honneur In accordance with my instruc- d' informer votre Excellence que tions, I have the honour to inform par suite du refus oppose par le your Excellency that in con- Gouvernement de Sa Majeste le sequence of the refusal of the Roi aux propositions bien inten- Belgian Government to entertain tionnees que lui avait soumises the well-intentioned proposals le Gouvernement Imperial, celui- made to them by the German ci se verra, a son plus vif regret, Government, the latter, to their force d'executer — au besoin par deep regret, find themselves la force des armes — les mesures compelled to take — if necessary de securite exposees comme indis- by force of arms — those meas- pensables vis-a-vis des menaces ures of defence already fore- fran9aises. shadowed ^ as indispensable, in Veuillez agreer, etc. view of the menace of France. (Signe) VON Below. 1 The use of this word is strange here in view of III Convention 2d Hague Con- ference, Article 1 : . "The contracting powers recognize that hostilities between themselves must not commence without previous and explicit warning." This Convention had been ratified by Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Russia. In this connection it may be asked how Belgium could ratify a Convention con- cerning the opening of hostilities, if she was regarded, in 1907, as possessing a neutrality guaranteed by treaty. 2 If Sir E. Grey is correctly quoted, the use of this word is significant ; and the ques- tion naturally arises "Since when was Great Britain the ally of France? " Sir E. Grey had been authorised by the British Cabinet in the morning of August 2 (British Blue Book No. 148) to promise France their support. If Great Britain was the ally of France when she sent her ultimatum about Belgium to Germany, the ethics of such a course are doubtful, in view of the fact that France and Germany were at war. Cf. also French Yellow Book No. 158, August 4, where President Poincar6 refers to Great Britain as an ally of France. Cf. also Serbian Blue Book No. 38, July 25. The whole sentence is, of course, a future condition, refering to the possibility of a war between Austria-Hungary and France. No futurity idea, however, attaches to the term " as the ally of France." 3 Belgian Gray Book No. 20, August 2. 2f 434 Official Diplomatic Documents From London Belgian Gray Book No. 28 Note communicated by Sir Francis Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Brussels, August 4-, 1914. I AM instructed to inform the Belgian Government that if Germany brings pressure to bear upon Belgium with the object of forcing her to abandon her attitude of neutrality, His Britannic Majesty's Gov- ernment expect Belgium to resist with all the means at her disposal.^ In that event, His Britannic Majesty's Government are pre- pared to join Russia and France, should Belgium so desire, in ten- dering at once joint assistance to the Belgian Government with a view to resisting any forcible measures adopted by Germany against Belgium, and also offering a guarantee ^ for the maintenance of the future independence and integrity of Belgium. From the Hague Belgian Gray Book No. 29 Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, Bel- gian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, The Hague, August 4, 1914- The Minister for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday evening that the Netherlands Government would perhaps be obliged, owing to the gravity of the present situation, to institute war buoying on the Scheldt. M. Loudon read me the draft of the note which would announce this decision to me. I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the note in question which was communicated to me yesterday evening. As you will observe, the Scheldt will only be closed at night. By day navigation will be possible, but only with Dutch pilots who have been furnished with the necessary nautical instructions. In this way both Dutch interests in the defence of their territory, and Belgian interests in the navigation of Antwerp will be safeguarded. You will note that the Netherlands Government further ask that in the event of the war buoying being carried out, we should cause the lightships Wielingen and Wandelaar to be withdrawn in order to facilitate the maintenance of the neutrality of Dutch territory. I would point out that the phrase used in this note, "sailing up the Scheldt," is not sufficiently explicit; sailing down would be 1 Belgium had asked for British "diplomatic intervention," Belgian Gray Book No. 25, August 3. 2 This is the same guarantee as was offered by Germany, who guaranteed "the possessions and the independence of the Belgian Kingdom in full" (Belgian Gray Book No. 20, August 2). "Neutrality" is omitted both in the British and German guarantees. Of. British Blue Book No. 155, August 4. August 4, Belgian Gray Book No. 31 435 permitted under the same conditions. The Minister has, how- ever, given me this assurance. As soon as the Netherlands Government have decided upon this exceptional measure I shall be informed of it. About six hours are necessary to carry out war buoying. I will at once telegraph to you. Note enclosed in No. 29 The Netherlands Government may be compelled, in order to maintain the neutrality of Dutch territory, to institute war buoying upon the Scheldt, that is to say, to move or modify a portion of the actual arrangement of buoys and lights. At the same time this special arrangement of buoys has been so drawn up that when it is brought into force it will still be possible to sail up the Scheldt as far as Antwerp by day, but only with Dutch pilots who have been furnished with the necessary nautical instruc- tions. In thus acting the Netherlands Government are convinced that they will be able to serve equally both the Dutch interests in the defence of Netherlands territory and Belgian interests in the navigation of Antwerp. After the establishment of war buoying on the Scheldt, there would be no further reason to enter the tidal water of Flushing at night, and as the presence of the lightships Wielingen and Wandelaar is not indispensable to navigation by day, the Netherlands Govern- ment* would be much obliged if the Belgian Government would be good enough, in the event of the establishment of war buoying, to with- draw these boats in order to facilitate the maintenance of the neu- trality of Dutch territory. To London and Paris Belgian Gray Book No. 30 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Min- isters at London and Paris. (Telegram.) Brussels, August ^, 1914' The General Staff announces that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.^ To Berlin Belgian Gray Book No. 31 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels. Sir, Brussels, August 4, 1914- I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that from to-day the Belgian Government are unable to recognise your diplomatic 1 See French Yellow Book No. 151, August 3, and note. 436 Official Diplomatic Documents status and cease to have official relations with you. Your Excel- lency will find enclosed the passports necessary for your departure with the staff of the legation. From Berlin Belgian Gray Book No. 32 Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Britssels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Brussels, August 4, 1914- I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excel- lency's note of the 4th August, and to inform you that I have en- trusted the custody of the German Legation of Brussels to the care of my United States colleague. To Madrid Belgian Gray Book No. 33 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid. (Telegram.) Brussels, August 4, 1914- Please ask the Spanish Government if they will be good enough to take charge of Belgian interests in Germany, and whether in that event they will issue the necessary instructions to their Ambassador at Berlin. To Berlin Belgian Gray Book No. 34 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Barcm Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin. (Telegram.) Brussels, August 4, 1914- The German Minister is leaving to-night ; ^ you should ask for your passports. We are requesting the Spanish Government to authorise the Spanish Ambassador to be good enough to take charge of Belgian interests in Germany. From Berlin Belgian Gray Book No. 35 Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Berlin, August 4, 1914- I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of part of the speech made to-day in the Reichstag by the Imperial 1 At the request of Belgium ; see Belgian Gray Book No. 31, same date. August 4f Belgian Gray Book No. 36 437 Chancellor on the subject of the infamous violation of Belgian neutrality : — "We are in a state of legitimate defence, and necessity knows no law. " Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and have perhaps already entered Belgium. This is contrary to the dictates of international law. France has, it is true, declared at Brussels that she was pre- pared to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as it was respected by her adversary. But we knew that France was ready to invade Belgium. France could wait; we could not. A French attack upon our flank in the region of the Lower Rhine might have been fatal. We were, therefore, compelled to ride roughshod over the legitimate protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium. For the wrong which we are thus doing, we will make reparation as soon as our military object is attained. " Anyone in such grave danger as ourselves, and who is struggling for his supreme welfare, can only be concerned with the means of extricating himself; we stand side by side with Austria." It is noteworthy that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg recognises, without the slightest disguise, that Germany is violating international law by her invasion of Belgian territory and that she is committing a wrong against us. From London Belgian Gray Book No. 36 Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Bel- gian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, London, August 4, 1914- I HAVE the honour to inform you that in the House of Commons this afternoon the Prime Minister made a fresh statement with regard to the European crisis. After recalling the principal points set forth yesterday by Sir E. Grey, the Prime Minister read : — 1. A telegram received from Sir F. Villiers this morning which gave the substance of the second ultimatum ^ presented to the Bel- gian Government by the German Government, which had been sent to you this morning (see No. 27). 2. Your telegram informing me of the violation of the frontier at Gemmenich,2 a copy of which I have given to Sir A. Nicolson. 3. A telegram which the German Government addressed to its Ambassador in London this morning with the evident intention of misleading popular opinion as to its attitude. Here is the translation as published in one of this evening's newspapers : — "Please^ dispel any mistrust which may subsist on the part of 1 Belgian Gray Book No. 27, same day. This is in no sense a second ultimatum, but rather a declaration of the entrance of armed German forces. 2 Ih. No. 30, same day. 3 See British Blue Book No. 157, August 4. 438 Official Diplomatic Documents the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeat- ing most positively the formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conjQiict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory. "Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. "It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian terri- tory without making at the time territorial acquisitions at the expense of Holland. "Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information.^ "Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance." Mr. Asquith then informed the House that in answer to this note of the German Government the British Government had repeated their proposal ^ of last week, namely, that the German Government should give the same assurances as to Belgian neutrality as France had given last week both to England and to Belgium. The British Cabinet allowed the Berlin Cabinet till midnight to reply .^ From London Belgian Gray Book No. 37 * Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M, Davignon, Bel- gian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) London, August 4, 1914. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed the British Min- ters in Norway, Holland, and Belgium, that Great Britain expects that these three kingdoms will resist German pressure and observe neutrality.^ Should they resist they will have the support of Great Britain, who is ready in that event, should the three above-mentioned Governments desire it, to join France and Russia, in offering an alli- ance to the said Governments, for the purpose of resisting the use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain the 1 Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 20, August 2. Germany has not published this in- formation. 2 Germany could have, and according to British Blue Book No. 123, August 1, last two paragraphs, probably would have accepted this proposal if Great Britain would have coupled with it the promise that she would do what she had done in 1870, i.e. agree to make common cause in the interest of Belgium with either France or Germany against the one who would violate Belgian neutrality. This Great Britain, however, could not do, because she had promised her support to France on August 2. British Blue Book No. 148. ' Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 58, same day. Mr. Asquith neglected to tell Parliament that when Great Britain sent her request to Germany concerning Belgium, she was no longer neutral, but bound by a vote of the Cabinet (cf . British Blue Book No. 148, August 2) to support France who since 6.45 p.m. the previous day had been at war with Germany. * This despatch was later cancelled, Belgian Gray Book No. 39, same day. It has been omitted from the British Blue Book. 5 This despatch is important, because Sir E. Grey is here quoted as placing the neutrahty of Norway, Holland, and Belgium on a par. It has often been claimed since that Belgian neutrality was of a different order, not voluntary, but imposed by the treaty of 1839. August 4y Belgian Gray Book No. 38 439 future independence and integrity of the three kingdoms.^ I ob- served to him that Belgium was neutral in perpetuity. The Minister for Foreign Affairs answered: This is in case her neutrality is violated.^ To Paris, London, and St. Petersburgh Belgian Gray Book No. 38 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Min- isters at Paris, London, and St. Petersburgh. Sir, Brussels, August 4, 191 4. I HAVE the honour to inform you of the course of recent events as regards the relations of Belgium with certain of the Powers which guarantee her neutrality and independence. On the 31st July the British Minister made me a verbal com- munication^ according to which Sir E. Grey, in anticipation of a European war, had asked the German and French Governments separately if each of them were resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium should that neutrality not be violated by any other Power. * In view of existing treaties. Sir F. Villiers was instructed to bring this step to the knowledge of the Belgian Government, adding that Sir E. Grey presumed that Belgium was resolved to maintain her neutrality, and that she expected other Powers to respect it. I told the British Minister that we highly appreciated this com- munication, which was in accordance with our expectation, and I added that Great Britain, as well as the other Powers who had guaranteed our independence, might rest fully assured of our firm determination to maintain our neutrality; nor did it seem pos- sible that our neutrality could be threatened by any of those States, with whom we enjoyed the most cordial and frank relations. The Belgian Government, I added, had given proof of this resolution by taking from now on all such military measures as seemed to them to be necessitated by the situation. In his turn the French Minister made a verbal communication ^ on August 1st to the effect that he was authorised to inform the Belgian Government that in case of an international war the French Government, in conformity with their repeated declarations, would respect Belgian territory, and that they would not be induced to modify their attitude except in the event of the violation of Belgian neutrality by another Power^ 1 There is no promise here of maintaining the "treaty-imposed neutrality" of Belgium, 2Cf. the "Brussels documents," pp. 577 ff. The Belgian Minister wished to dis- tinguish between the neutrality of his country, and the neutrality of the other two kingdoms. The omission of Sweden and Denmark in this despatch is noteworthy. 3 Belgian Gray Book No. 11, July 31. < Belgian Gray Book No. 15, August 1, but see also ih. No. 9, July 31. 440 Official Diplomatic Documents I thanked his Excellency, and added that we had already taken all the necessary precautions to ensure respect of our independ- ence and our frontiers. On the morning of the 2nd August I had a fresh conversation ^ with Sir F. Villiers, in the course of which he told me that he had lost no time in telegraphing our conversation of July 31st to his Government, and that he had been careful to quote accurately the solemn declaration which he had received of Belgium's intention to defend her frontiers from whichever side they might be invaded. He added : "We know that France has given you formal assurances, but Great Britain has received no reply from Berlin on this subject." The latter fact did not particularly affect me, since a declaration from the German Government might appear superfluous in view of existing treaties. ^ Moreover, the Secretary of State had reaffirmed, at the meeting of the committee of the Reichstag of April 29th, 1913, "that the neutrality of Belgium is established by treaty which Ger- many intends to respect." The same day Herr von Below Saleske, the German Minister, called at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at 7 o'clock, and handed to me the enclosed note (see No. 20). The German Government gave the Belgian Government a time limit of twelve hours within which to communicate their decision. No hesitation was possible as to the reply called for by the amaz- ing proposal of the German Government. You will find a copy enclosed. (See No. 22.) The ultimatum expired at 7 a.m. on August 3rd. As at 10 o'clock no act of war had been committed, the Belgian Cabinet decided that there was no reason for the moment to appeal to the guaranteeing powers. Towards mid-day the French Minister questioned me upon this point, and said : — " Although in view of the rapid march of events ^ I have as yet received no instructions to make a declaration from my Govern- ment, I feel justified, in view of their well-known intentions, in saying that if the Belgian Government were to appeal to the French Government as one of the Powers guaranteeing their neutrality, the French Government would at once respond to Belgium's appeal; if such an appeal were not made it is probable that — unless, of course, exceptional measures were rendered necessary in self-defence — the French Government would not intervene until Belgium, had taken some effective measure of resistance." I thanked M. Klobukowski for the support which the French Government had been good enough to offer us in case of need, and I informed him that the Belgian Goveri^ent were making no appeal at present to the guarantee of the Powers, and that they would decide later what ought to be done. 1 Not previously mentioned in the Belgian Gray Book. 2 "Treaties" do not seem to have been mentioned in the conversation with the German Minister. See Belgian Gray Book No. 19, August 2. * These words are added here to the despatch as published Belgian Gray Book No. 24, August 3. August 4, Belgian Gray Book No. Jfi 441 Finally, at 6 a.m. on August 4th, the German Minister made the following communication to me. (See No. 27.) The Cabinet is at the present moment deliberating on the ques- tion of an appeal to the Powers guaranteeing our neutrality. From London Belgian Gray Book No. 39 Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Bel- gian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) , London, August 4, 1914. Great Britain this morning called^ upon Germany to respect Belgian neutrality. The ultimatum says that whereas the note addressed by Germany to Belgium threatens the latter with an appeal to the force of arms if she opposes the passage of German troops; and whereas Belgian territory has been violated at Gem- menich; and whereas Germany has refused to give Great Britain a similar assurance to that given last week by France; therefore Great Britain must once again demand a satisfactory reply on the subject of the respect of Belgian neutrality and of the treaty to which Germany, no less than Great Britain, is a signatory. The ultimatum expires at midnight. In consequence of the British ultimatum to Germany, the British proposal which I telegraphed to you is cancelled for the time being. (See No. 37.) To London, Paris, and St. Petersburgh Belgian Gray Book No. 40 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to British, French, and Russian Ministers at Brussels. Sir, Brussels, August 4, 1914- The Belgian Government regret to have to announce to your Excellency that this morning the armed forces of Germany entered Belgian territory in violation of treaty engagements. . The Belgian Government are firmly determined to resist by all the means in their power.^ Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France, and Russia to co- operate as guaranteeing Powers in the defence of her territory.^ There should be concerted and joint action, to oppose the forcible measures taken by Germany against Belgium, and, at the same time, to guarantee the future maintenance of the independence and integrity ^ of Belgium. 1 British Blue Book No. 159, August 4. 2 This is in reply to Great Britain's request, Belgian Gray Book No. 28, August 4. 3 This decision was apparently reached at the Cabinet meeting mentioned in the last paragralph of No. 38, same day. See also Belgian Gray Book No. 42, August 5. * Of. note 2 to Belgian Gray Book No. 28, same day. 442 Official Diplomatic Documents Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will undertake the defence of her fortified places, France : From Brussels French Yellow Book No. 152 M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Brussels, August ^, 1914. The Chief of the Cabinet of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sends me a letter by which "the Government of the King declare that they are firmly decided to resist ^ the aggression of Germany by all means in their power. Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France and Russia to co-operate as guarantors in the defence of her territory. "There would be a concerted and common action having as its object the resistance of forcible measures employed by Germany against Belgium, and at the same time to guarantee the maintenance of the independence and integrity of Belgium in the future. "Belgium is glad to be able to declare that she will ensure the defence of her fortified places." Klobukowski. From London French Yellow Book No. 153 M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, August 4, 1914- Sir Edward Grey has asked me to come and see him immediately in order to tell me that the Prime Minister would to-day make a statement ^ in the House of Commons that Germany had been invited to withdraw her ultimatum to Belgium and to give her answer to Great Britain before 12 o'clock to-night. Paul Cambon. From Brussels French Yellow Book No. 154 M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Brussels, August 4t 1914' This morning the German Minister informs ^ the Belgian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, that in consequence of the refusal of the Belgian 1 Belgian Gray Book No. 40, same day. 2 Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 36, same day. « Belgian Gray Book No. 27, same day. August 4, French Yellow Book No. 157 443 Government the Imperial Government jBnd themselves compelled to carry out by force of arms those measures of protection which are rendered indispensable by the French threats. Klobukowski. [For French Yellow Book No. 155 see under August 6, and for No. 156 see under August 5.] To the Representatives of all the Powers at Paris French Yellow Book No. 157 Notification hy the French Government to the Representatives of the Powers at Paris. The German Imperial Government, after having allowed its armed forces to cross the frontier, and to permit various acts of murder and pillage on French territory; after having violated the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg in defiance of the stipulations of the Convention of London, 11th May, 1867, and of Convention V. of the Hague, 18th October, 1907, on the rights and duties of Powers and persons in case of war on land (Articles 1 and 2), Conventions which have been signed by the German Govern- ment; after having addressed an ultimatum to the Royal Govern- ment of Belgium with the object of requiring passage for German troops through Belgian territory in violation of the Treaties of the 19th April, 1839, which had been signed by them,^ and in violation of the above Convention of the Hague Have declared war on France at 6.45 p.m. on the 3rd August, 1914. In these circumstances the Government of the Republic find themselves obliged on their side to have recourse to arms. They have in consequence the honour of informing by these presents the Government of . . . that a state of war exists between France and Germany dating from 6.45 p.m. on 3rd August, 1914. The Government of the Republic protest before all civilised nations, and especially those Governments ^ which have signed the Conventions and Treaties referred to above, against the violation by the German Empire of their international engagements, and they reserve full right for reprisals which they might find themselves brought to exercise against an enemy so little regardful of its plighted word. The Government of the Republic, who propose to observe the principles of the law of nations, will, during the hostilities, and assuming that reciprocity will be observed, act in accordance with the International Conventions signed by France concerning the law of war on land and sea. 1 Only in so far as one assumes that signatures of the kingdom of Prussia are bind- ing on the German Empire. In 1871 the kingdom of Prussia ceased to exist as a Power in relation to foreign Powers, voluntarily sinking herself in the Federation of German States, called the German Empire. See chapter on German Constitution in the editor's Germany's Point of View. 2 This includes the Government of the United States. The American Government has not published its reply. 444 Official Diplomatic Documents The present notification, made in accordance with Article 2 of the Third Convention of the Hague of the 18th October, 1907, relat- ing to the opening of hostilities and handed to . . . Paris, August 4, 1914, ^ P-M. French Yellow Book No. 158 Message from M. Poincare, President of the Republic, read at the Extraordinary Session of Parliament, August 4, 1914- {Journal Officiel of the 5th August, 1914-) {The Chamber rises and remains standing during the reading of the message.) " Gentlemen, "France has just been the object of a violent and premeditated attack, which is an insolent defiance of the law of nations. Before any declaration of war had been sent to us, even before the German Ambassador had asked for his passports, our territory has been violated.^ The German Empire has waited till yesterday evening to give at this late stage the true name to a state of things which it had already created. "For more than forty years the French, in sincere love of peace, have buried at the bottom of their heart the desire for legitimate reparation. "They have given to the world the example of a great nation which, definitely raised from defeat by the exercise of will, patience and labour, has only used its renewed and rejuvenated strength in the interest of progress and for the good of humanity. " Since the ultimatum ^ of Austria opened a crisis which threat- ened the whole of Europe, France has persisted in following and in recommending on all sides a policy of prudence, wisdom and modera- tion. "To her there can be imputed no act, no movement, no word, which has not been peaceful and conciliatory. "At the hour when the struggle is beginning, she has the right, in justice to herself, of solemnly declaring that she has made, up to the last moment, supreme efforts ^ to avert the war now about to break out, the crushing responsibility for which the German Empire will have to bear before history. ( Unanimous and repeated applause.) " On the very morrow of the day when we and our allies ^ were 1 Cf . note to French Yellow Books No. 136, also ih. No. 139, both of August 2 ; also Belgian Gray Book No. 21, August 3. 2 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 8 under date of July 22. 2 See the discussion of these efforts in the editor's Germany's Point of View, chapters on the French Yellow Book. * Since Russia was the only other ally of France at tliis time, this includes Great Britain, although the time limit of her ultimatum had not expired when this speech was delivered. See also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 58, same day. Even more important is the time reference here, August 1, implying that France considered Great Britain an ally even then in spite of the fact that the British Government had repeatedly denied that an alliance existed between them and France. Cf. below, note 7. August 4, French Yellow Book No. 158 445 • publicly expressing our hope of seeing negotiations which had been begun under the auspices of the London Cabinet carried to a peace- ful conclusion, Germany suddenly declared war upon Russia, she has invaded the territory of Luxemburg, she has outrageously in- sulted the noble Belgian nation {loud and unanimous applause), our neighbour and our friend, and attempted treacherously to fall upon us while we were in the midst of diplomatic conversation. (Fresh and repeated unanimous applause.) "But France was watching. As alert as she was peaceful, she was prepared ; ^ and our enemies will meet on their path our valiant covering troops, who are at their post and will provide the screen behind which the mobilisation of our national forces will be methodi- cally completed. " Our fine and courageous army, which France to-day accompanies with her maternal thought (loud applause) has risen eager to defend the honour of the flag and the soil of the country. (Unanimous and repeated applause.) " The President of the Republic, interpreting the unanimous feeling of the country, expresses to our troops by land and sea the admira- tion and confidence of every Frenchman (loud and prolonged applause). "Closely united in a common feeling, the nation will persevere with the cool self-restraint of which, since the beginning of the crisis, she has given daily proof. Now, as always, she will know how to harmonise the most noble daring and most ardent enthu- siasm with that self-control which is the sign of enduring energy and is the best guarantee of victory (applause). "In the war which is beginning France will have Right on her side, the eternal power of which cannot with impunity be disregarded by nations any more than by individuals (loud and unanimous applause) . "She will be heroically defended by all her sons; nothing will break their sacred union before the enemy; to-day they are joined together as brothers in a common indignation against the aggressor, and in a common patriotic faith (loud and prolonged applause and cries of ' Vive la France'). " She is faithfully helped by Russia, her ally (loud and unanimous applause) ; she is supported by the loyal friendship ^ of Great Britain (loud and unanimous applause). "And already from every part of the civilised world sympathy and good wishes are coming to her. For to-day once again she stands before the universe for Liberty, Justice and Reason (loud and re- peated applause) . ' Haut les coeurs et vive la France ! ' (unanimous and prolonged applause) . "Raymond Poincare." 1 Much injustice has been done to France by her pro-allies friends who have claimed that France was unprepared. 2 Cf. above, note 6. Here, but not there, a distinction is made between the re- lations of France with Russia and those with Great Britain. 446 Official Diplomatic Documents French Yellow Book No. 159 Speech delivered by M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council in the Chamber of Deputies, August 4, 1914. {Journal Offix;iel, August 5, 1914-) M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Gentlemen, The German Ambassador yesterday left Paris after notifying us of the existence of a state of war. The Government owe to Parliament a true account of the events which in less than ten days have unloosed a European war and compelled France, peaceful and valiant, to defend her frontier against an attack, the hateful injustice of which is emphasised by its calcu- lated unexpectedness. This attack, which has no excuse, and which began before we were notified of any declaration of war, is the last act of a plan, whose origin and object I propose to declare before our own democracy and before the opinion of the civilised world. As a consequence of the abominable crime which cost the Austro- Hungarian Heir-Apparent and the Duchess of Hohenburg their lives, difficulties arose between the Cabinets of Vienna and Belgrade. The majority of the Powers were only semi-officially informed of these difficulties up till Friday, July 24th, the date on which the Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors communicated to them a circular which the press has published. The object of this circular was to explain and justify an ultimatum delivered the evening before to Servia by the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade. This ultimatum in alleging the complicity of numerous Servian subjects and associations in the Serajevo crime, hinted that the official Servian authorities themselves were no strangers to it. It demanded a reply from Servia by 6 o'clock on the evening of Satur- day, July 25th. The Austrian demands, or at any rate many of them,^ without doubt struck a blow at the rights of a sovereign State. Notwith- standing their excessive character, Servia, on July 25th, declared that she submitted to them almost without reserve.^ This submission, which constituted a success for Austria-Hungary a guarantee for the peace of Europe, ^as not unconnected with the advice tendered to Belgrade from the first moment by France, Rus- sia and Great Britain.^ The value of this advice was all the greater since the Austro- * Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 31, July 27, where Sazonof "found seven of the ten points admissible without very great difficulty ; only the two points . . . seemed to him to be unacceptable in their present form," etc. 2 Cf, Introductory remarks to the despatches of July 26. ' Cf . the despatches of July 24, 25, 26 where it is pointed out that no such advice was actually given. August 4) French Yellow Booh No. 159 447 Hungarian demands had been concealed ^ from the Chanceries of the Triple Entente, to whom in the three preceding weeks the Austro- Hungarian Government had on several occasions given an; assurance that their claims would be extremely moderate. It was, therefore, with natural astonishment that the Cabinets of Paris, St. Petersburgh and London learned on 26th July that the Austrian Minister at Belgrade, after a few minutes' examination, declared that the Servian reply was inacceptable, and broke off diplomatic relations. This astonishment was increased by the fact that on Friday, the 24th, the German Ambassador came and read to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs a note verbale ^ asserting that the Austro-Servian dispute must remain localised, without intervention by the great Powers, or otherwise " incalculable consequences " were to be feared. A similar demarche was made on Saturday, the 25th,^ at London and at St. Petersburgh.^ Need I, Gentlemen, point out to you the contrast between the threatening expressions used by the German Ambassador at Paris and the conciliatory sentiments which the Powers of the Triple Entente had just manifested by the advice which they gave to Servia to submit ? ^ Nevertheless, in spite of the extraordinary character of the Ger- man demarche, we immediately, in agreement with our Allies ^ and our friends, took a conciliatory course and invited Germany to join in it. We have had from the first moment regretfully to recognise that our intentions and our efforts met with no response at Berlin. Not only did Germany appear wholly unwilling to give to Austria- Hungary the friendly advice which her position gave her the right to offer, but from this moment and still more in the following days, she seemed to intervene between the Cabinet at Vienna and the com- promises suggested by the other Powers.^ On Tuesday, 28th July, Austria-Hungary declared war on Servia. This declaration of war, with its aggravation of the state of affairs brought about by the rupture of diplomatic relations three days before, gave ground for believing that there was a deliberate desire for war, and a systematic programme for the enslavement ^ of Servia. Thus there was now involved in the dispute not only the inde- pendence of a brave people, but the balance of power ^ in the Bal- 1 France knew of them before Austria-Hungary published them, French Yellow Book Nos. 13 and 14, July 19. 2 French Yellow Book No. 28, July 24. 3 This is a mistake. See British Blue Book No. 9, July 24. ^ Russian Orange BooJk: No. 8, also July 24. B See note 3, p. 446. ^ Note the plural which seems to include Great Britain. ^ For the error of this view see the French despatches of those days, and the dis- cussion of them in the editor's Germany's Point of View, chapters on the French Yellow Book. 8 Cf . Austria-Hungary's promise not to annex Serbian territory nor to touch the sovereignty of Serbia. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29. « This was the question which interested Russia most ; cf . British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, last paragraph. 448 Official Diplomatic Documents kans, embodied in the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913, and consecrated by the moral support of all the great Powers. However, at the suggestion of the British Government with its constant and firm attachment to the maintenance of the peace of Europe, the negotiations were continued, or, to speak more accurately, the Powers of the Triple Entente tried to continue them. From this common desire sprang the proposal for action ^ ])y the Four Powers, England, France, Germany and Italy, which was intended, by assuring to Austria all legitimate satisfaction, to bring about an equitable adjustment of the dispute. On Wednesday, the 29th,2 the Russian Government, noting the persistent failure of these efforts, and faced by the Austrian mobi- lisation and declaration of war, fearing the military destruction of Servia, decided as a precautionary measure to mobilise the troops of four military districts, that is to say, the formations echeloned along the Austro-Hungarian frontier exclusively. In taking this step, the Russian Government were careful to in- form the German Government that their measures, restricted as they were and without any offensive character towards Austria, were not in any degree directed against Germany. In a conversation with the Russian Ambassador at Berlin, the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs acknowledged this without demur. On the other hand, all the efforts made by Great Britain, with the adherence of Russia and the support of France, to bring Austria and Servia into touch under the moral patronage of Europe were encountered at Berlin with a predetermined negative of which the diplomatic despatches afford the clearest proof. This was a disquieting situation which made it probable that there existed at Berlin intentions which had not been disclosed. Some hours afterwards this alarming suspicion was destined to become a certainty. In fact Germany's negative attitude gave place thirty-six hours later to positive steps which were truly alarming. On the 31st July Germany, by proclaiming "a state of danger of war," ^ cut the com- munications between herself and the rest of Europe, and obtained for herself complete freedom to pursue against France in absolute secrecy military preparations which, as you have seen, nothing could justify. Already for some days, and in circumstances difficult to explain, Germany had prepared for the transition of her army from a peace footing to a war footing.^ From the morning of the 25th July, that is to say even before the expiration of the time limit given to Servia by Austria, she had 1 Cf. the Introductory Remarks to the despatches of these days, and the letter from the Belgian Minister in Petrograd printed under date of July 30. 2 According to the Czar's telegram to the German Emperor of July 30, the Russian mobilisation was decided upon five days before, i.e. July 25. 3 Viviani entirely omits to mention that this was the result of Russia's order of general mobilisation. * There is no evidence for this statement. August 4, French Yellow Book No. 159 449 confined to barracks the garrisons of Alsace-Lorraine. The same day she had placed the frontier-works in a complete state of defence. On the 26th, she had indicated to the railways the measures prepara- tory for concentration. On the 27th, she had completed* requisi- tions and placed her covering troops in position. On the 28th, the summons of individual reservists had begun and units which were distant from the frontier had been brought up to it.^ Could all these measures, pursued with implacable method, leave us in doubt of German's intentions? Such was the situation when, on the evening of the 31st July, the Ger- man Government, which, since the 24th, had not participated by any active step in the conciliatory efforts of the Triple Entente,^ addressed an ultimatum to the Russian Government under the pretext that Russia had ordered a general mobilisation ^ of her armies, and de- manded that this mobilisation should be stopped within twelve hours. This demand, which was all the more insulting in form because a few hours earlier the Emperor Nicholas II., with a movement at once confiding and spontaneous, had asked the German Emperor for his mediation, was put forward at a moment when, on the request of England ^ and with the knowledge of Germany,^ the Russian Gov- ernment was accepting a formula of such a nature as to lay the foundation for a friendly settlement of the Austro-Servian dispute and of the Austro-Russian difficulties by the simultaneous arrest of military operations and of military preparations. The same day this unfriendly demarche towards Russia was sup- plemented by acts which were frankly hostile towards France; the rupture of communications by road, railway, telegraph and tele- phone, the seizure of French locomotives on their arrival at the frontier, the placing of machine guns in the middle of the permanent way which had been cut, and the concentration of troops on this frontier. From this moment we were no longer justified in believing in the sincerity of the pacific declarations which the German representative continued to shower upon us {hear, hear).' We knew that Germany was mobilising under the shelter of the "state of danger of war." We learnt that six classes of reservists had been called up, and that transport was being collected even for those army corps which were stationed a considerable distance from the frontier. As these events unfolded themselves, the Government, watchful and vigilant, took from day to day, and even from hour to hour, the measures of precaution which the situation required; the general mobilisation of our forces on land and sea was ordered. 1 There is no evidence for these statements, all of which seem to be disproved by French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30, where Viviani acknowledges that Germany had taken, up to then, no steps for even partial mobilisation, for if she had, it would have been impossible to urge Russia not to take any measures which "may offer to Ger- many a pretext for a total or partial mobilisation of her forces." 2 This is disproved by the despatches of those days. 3 No excuse for the general Russian mobilisation is offered. * British Blue Book No. 132, August 1, and note. 6 No evidence for this statement has been published. 2g 450 Official Diplomatic Documents The same evening, at 7.30, Germany, without waiting^ for the acceptance by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh of the Enghsh propo- sal, which I have already mentioned, declared war on Russia. The next day, Sunday, the 2nd August, without regard for the extreme moderation of France, in contradiction to the peaceful declarations of the German Ambassador at Paris, and in defiance of the rules of international law, German troops crossed our frontier at three different points. At the same time, in violation of the Treaty of 1867, which guar- anteed with the signature of Prussia the neutrality of Luxemburg, they invaded the territory of the Grand Duchy and so gave cause for a protest by the Luxemburg Government. Finally, the neutrality of Belgium also was threatened. The German Minister, on the evening of the 2nd August, presented to the Belgian Government an ultimatum ^ requesting facilities in Belgium for military operations against France, under the lying pretext that Belgian neutrality was threatened by us; the Belgian Government refused, and declared ^ that they were resolved to defend with vigour their neutrality, which was respected by France and guaranteed by treaties, and in particular by the King of Prussia. {Unanimous and prolonged applause.) Since then. Gentlemen, the German attacks have been renewed, multiplied, and accentuated. At more than fifteen points our fron- tier has been violated. Shots have been fired at our soldiers and Customs officers. Men have been killed and wounded. Yesterday ^ a German military aviator dropped three bombs on Luneville.^ The German Ambassador, to whom as well as to all the great Powers, we communicated these facts, did not deny them or express his regrets for them. On the contrary, he came yesterday evening to ask me for his passports, and to notify us of the existence of a state of war, giving as his reason, in the teeth of all the facts, hostile acts committed by French aviators in German territory in the Eifel district, and even on the railway near Carlsruhe and near Nuremberg. This is the letter ^ which he handed to me on the subject : — "M. le President, "The German administrative and military authorities have established a certain number of flagrantly hostile acts committed on German territory by French military aviators. Several of these have openly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory of that country; one has attempted to destroy buildings near Wesel ; others have been seen in the district of the Eifel, one has thrown bombs on the railway near Carlsruhe and Nuremburg. 1 Because the time limit had expired. 2 Belgian Gray Book No. 20, August 2. ' Belgian Gray Book No. 22, August 3. * Belgian Gray Book, August 3. 5 For a similar charge made by Germany against France, see Belgian Gray Book, No. 21, August 3. Since the interview there mentioned took place at 1.30 a.m. the French attacks there mentioned must have taken place on August 2. « French Yellow Book No. 147, August 3. August 4, French Yellow Book No. 159 451 " I am instructed, and I have the honour to inform your Excellency that in the presence of these acts of aggression the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with France in consequence of the acts of this latter Power. "At the same time, I have the honour to bring to the knowl- edge of your Excellency that the German authorities will retain French mercantile vessels in German ports, but they will release them if, within forty-eight hours, they are assured of complete reciprocity. "My diplomatic mission having thus come to an end it only re- mains for me to request your Excellency to be good enough to fur- nish me with my passports, and to take the steps you consider suit- able to assure my return to Germany, with the staff of the Embassy, as well as with the staff of the Bavarian Legation and of the German Consulate General in Paris. "Be good enough, M. le President, to receive the assurances of my deepest respect. (Signed) Schoen." •Need I, Gentlemen, lay stress on the absurdities of these pre- texts which they would put forward as grievances ? At no time has any French aviator penetrated into Belgium, nor has any French aviator committed either in Bavaria or any other part of Germany any hostile act. The opinion of Europe has already done justice to these wretched inventions. {Loud and unanimous applause.) Against these attacks, which violate all the laws of justice and all the principles of public law, we have now taken all the necessary steps ; they are being carried out strictly, regularly, and with calmness. The mobilisation of the Russian army also continues with remark- able vigour and unrestrained enthusiasm {unanimous and pro- longed applause, all the deputies rising from their seats.) The Belgian army, mobilised with 250,000 men, prepares with a splendid passion and magnificent ardour to defend the neutrality and independence of their country. {Renewed loud and unanimous applause.) The entire British fleet is mobilised ^ and orders have been given to mobilise the land forces. ^ {Loud cheers, all the deputies rising to their feet.) Since 1912 ^ pourparlers had taken place between English and French General Staffs and were concluded by an exchange of letters between Sir Edward Grey and M. Paul Cambon. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs yesterday evening communicated these letters to the House of Commons, and I have the honour, with the consent of the British Government, to acquaint you with the con- tents of these two documents. My dear Ambassador, Foreign Office, November 22, 1912. From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been 1 And had been mobilised since July 24. See French Yellow Book No. 66, July 27. 2 No date is given for this order, nor is it mentioned in the British Blue Book. 3 This is an error. The letters referred to were of 1912, but these pourparlers had been taking place for years previous. See first line of first letter below. 452 Official Diplomatic Documents understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engage- ment that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war. You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed resistance of the other. I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threat- ened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be pre- pared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them. Yours, etc., E. Grey. To this letter our Ambassador, M. Paul Cambon, replied on the 23rd November, 1912 : — Dear Sir Edward, London, November 23, 1912, You reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22nd November, that during the last few years the military and naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time to time; that it had always been understood that these consulta- tions should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the support of their armed forces ; that, on either side, these consultations between experts were not and should not be considered as engagements bind- ing our Governments to take action in certain eventualities; that, however, I had remarked to you that, if one or other of the two Governments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third Power, it would become essential to know whether it could count on the armed support of the other. Your letter answers that point, and I am authorised to state that, in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reasons to fear either an act of aggression from a third Power, or some event threatening the general peace, that Government would immediately examine with the other the question whether both Governments should act together in order to prevent the act of aggression or pre- serve peace. If so, the two Governments would deliberate as to the measures which they would be prepared to take in common ; if those August 4) French Yellow Book No. 159 453 measures involved action, the two Governments would take into immediate consideration the plans of their general staffs and would then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans. Yours, etc., Paul Cambon. In the House of Commons the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs spoke ^ of France amidst the applause of the members in a noble and warm-hearted manner and his language has already found an echo deep in the hearts of all Frenchmen {loud and unani- mous applause). I wish in the name of the Government of the Republic to thank the British Government from this tribune for their cordial words and the Parliament of France will associate itself in this sentiment {renewed, prolonged and unanimous applause). The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made in particular the following declaration : ^ "In case the German fleet came into the Channel or entered the North Sea in order to go round the British Isles with the object of attacking the French coasts or the French navy and of harassing French merchant shipping, the British fleet would intervene in order to give to French shipping its complete protection in such a way that from that moment Great Britain and Germany would be in a state of war." From now onwards, the British fleet protects our northern and western coasts against a German attack. Gentlemen, these are the facts. I believe that the simple recital of them is sufficient to justify the acts of the Government of the Republic. I wish, how- ever, to make clear the conclusion to be drawn from my story and to give its true meaning to the unheard-of attack of which France is the victim. The victors of 1870 have, at different times, as you know, desired ^ to repeat the blows which they dealt us then. In 1875, the war which was intended to complete the destruction of conquered France was only prevented by the intervention of the two Powers to whom we were to become united at a later date by ties of alliance and of friendship {unanimous applause), by the intervention of Russia and of Great Britain {prolonged applause, all the deputies rising to their feet]. Since then the French Republic, by the restoration of her national forces and the conclusion of diplomatic agreements unswervingly adhered to, has succeeded in liberating herself from the yoke which even in a period of profound peace Bismarck was able to impose upon Europe. She has re-established the balance of power in Europe,^ a guarantee of the liberty and dignity of all. 1 No date is here given. It was August 3. See Sir E. Grey's speech of that date. 2 For the wording of this declaration which is different from that published in the British Blue Book see French Yellow Book Nos. 137, August 2 ; and 143, August 3 and notes. ^ Germany has always denied this desire. * A noteworthy reference to this bugbear of European politics. 454 Official Diplomatic Documents Gentleman, I do not know if I am mistaken, but it seems to me that this work of peaceful reparation, of liberation and honour finally ratified in 1904 and 1907, with the genial co-operation of King Edward VII of England and the Government of the Crown (applause), this is what the German Empire wishes to destroy to-day by one daring stroke. Germany can reproach us with nothing. Bearing in silence in our bosom for half a century the wound which Germany dealt us we have offered to peace an unprecedented sacrifice (loud and unanimous applause). We have offered other sacrifices in all the discussions which since 1904 German diplomacy has systematically provoked, whether in Morocco or elsewhere in 1905, in 1906, in 1908, in 1911.^ Russia also has given proof of great moderation at the time of the events of 1908, as she has done in the present crisis. She observed the same moderation, and the Triple Entente with her, when in the Eastern crisis of 1912 Austria and Germany formu- lated demands, whether against Servia or against Greece, which still were, as the event proved, capable of settlement by discussion. Useless sacrifices, barren negotiations, empty efforts, since to-day in the very act of conciliation we, our allies and ourselves, are attacked by surprise {prolonged applause). No one can honestly believe that we are the aggressors. Vain is the desire to overthrow the sacred principles of right and of liberty to which nations, as well as individuals, are subject ; Italy with that clarity of insight possessed by the Latin intellect, has notified us that she proposes to preserve neutrality {prolonged applause, all the deputies rising to their feet) . This decision has found in all France an echo of sincerest joy. I made myself the interpreter of this feeling to the Italian Charge d'Affaires when I told him how much I congratulated myself that the two Latin sisters, who have the same origin and the same ideal, a common and glorious past, are not now opposed to one another {renewed applause). Gentlemen, we proclaim loudly the object of their attack — it is the independence, the honour, the safety, which the Triple Entente has regained in the balance of power ^ for the service of peace. The object of attack is the liberties of Europe, which France, her allies and her friends, are proud to defend {loud applause). We are going to defend these liberties, for it is they that are in dispute, and all the rest is but a pretext. France, unjustly provoked, did not desire war, she has done everything to avert it. Since it is forced upon her, she will defend herself against Germany and against every Power which has not yet declared its intentions, but joins with the latter in a conflict between the two countries. {Applause, all the deputies rising to their feet.) ^ For France's attitude toward Germany as it appears from the despatches of the French Yellow Book, see the editor's Germany's Point of View, chapters on the French Yellow Book. 2 See above. August 4, British Blue Book No. 153 455 A free and valiant people that sustains an eternal ideal, and is wholly united to defend its existence; a democracy which knows how to discipline its military strength, and was not afraid a year ago to increase its burden as an answer to the armaments of its neighbour ; a nation armed, struggling for its own life and for the independence of Europe — here is a sight which we are proud to offer to the on- lookers in this desperate struggle, that has for some days been pre- paring with the greatest calmness and method. We are without reproach. We shall be without fear. {Loud applause, all the depu- ties rising to their feet.) France has often proved in less favourable circumstances that she is a most formidable adversary when she fights, as she does to-day, for liberty and for right (applause). In submitting our actions to you. Gentlemen, who are our judges, we have, to help us in bearing the burden of our heavy responsibility, the comfort of a clear conscience and the conviction that we have done our duty (prolonged applause, all the deputies rising to their feet), Rene Viviani. Great Britain: To Berlin British Blue Book No. 153 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4, 1914. The King of the Belgians has made an appeal ^ to His Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the following terms : — "Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium." His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government have delivered to the Belgian Government a note ^ proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of . the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours. We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused^ this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations. His Majesty's Government are bound to protect against this vio- lation of a treaty^ to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made 1 Belgian Gray Book No. 25, August 3. 2 Belgian Gray Book No. 20, August 2. 3 Belgian Gray Book No. 22, August 3. * Of. Sir E. Grey's despatch, Belgian Gray Book No. 37, August 4. 456 Official Diplomatic Documents upon Belgium will not be proceeded with and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply. From Brussels British Blue Book No. 154 Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received August 4-) (Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 4, 1914. German Minister has this morning addressed note ^ to Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that as Belgian Government have declined the well-intentioned proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable in view of the French menaces. To Brussels British Blue Book No. 155 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4, 1914- You should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, His Majesty's Government expect that they will resist by any means in their power,^ and that His Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that His Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and France, if desired, in offer- ing to the Belgian Government at once common action for the pur- pose of resisting use of force by Germany against them, and a guaran- tee to maintain their independence and integrity in future years. To Berlin British Blue Book No. 156 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4, 1914- I CONTINUE to receive numerous complaints from British firms as to the detention pf their ships at Hamburg, Cuxhaven, and other German ports. This action on the part of the German authorities is totally unjustifiable. It is in direct contravention of international 1 Belgian Gray Book No. 27, same day. 2 This is in reply to the appeal for "diplomatic intervention," see British Blue Book No. 153, same day, and notes to Belgian Gray Book No. 24, August 3, and No. 38, August 4. August 4, British Blue Book No, 159 457 law and of the assurances given to your Excellency by the Imperial Chancellor. You should demand the immediate release of all British ships if such release has not yet been given. From Berlin British Blue Book No. 157 ^ German Foreign Secretary to Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador in London. — {Communicated by German Embassy, August 4.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 4, 1914. Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most positively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neu- trality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance. From Brussels British Blue Book No. 158 Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received August 4-) (Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 4, 1914- Military attache has been informed at War Office that German troops have entered Belgian territory,^ and that Liege has been sum- moned to surrender by small party of Germans who, however, were repulsed. To Berlin British Blue Book No. 159 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4j 1914- We hear that Germany has addressed note ^ to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be com- 1 Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 36, same day. 2 Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 30, same day. 8 Belgian Gray Book No. 27, same day. 458 Official Diplomatic Documents pelled to carry out, if necessary, by force of arms, the measures con- sidered indispensable. We are also informed ^ that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich. In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined ^ to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning ^ be received here by 12 o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves. Serbia : From Nish Sei^bian Blue Book No. 49 M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Dr. M. Yovanomtch, Charge d' Affaires at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Nish, July 22/ August 4, 1914. Please inform the Imperial Government that you have received instructions to leave ^ Germany, together with the staffs of the Lega- tion and Consulate. You should leave immediately. 1 Belgian Gray Book No. 30, same day. 2 British Blue Book No. 122, under date of August 1. 3 British Blue Book No. 153, same date. * This was a natural order, because Austria-Hungary was at war with Serbia, and Germany was the former's ally. The diplomatic documents do not contain the dec- laration of war between Germany and Serbia. August 5, Au^tro-Hungarian Red Book No. 59 459 Wednesday, August 5, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary Petrograd Belgium Ministers at Entente London, Berlin, Mad- Capitals ^ rid All Representatives Paris, The Hague abroad British Minister Madrid France President's message Viviani's speech Luxemburg Germany Great Britain Russia Serbia Austria-Hungary sends note to her Ambassador in Russia declaring war on Russia. Belgium protests against the invasion of her territory to all ''Countries having Diplomatic Relations" with her. France joins Great Britain and Russia in declaring their willingness to co- operate '*in the defence of Belgian territory." Germany requests the departure from Luxemburg of the Entente Ministers. Great Britain declares war on Germany as of 11 a.m., and informs Belgium that she considers "joint action with a view to resisting Germany to be in force." Russia declares her willingness to cooperate with France and Great Britain "in the defence of Belgian territory." Austria-Hungary : To St. Petersburgh AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 59 Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburgh. {Translated from the French.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 5, 1914. I ASK Your Excellency to hand over the following note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs : — "On the instructions of his Government, the undersigned, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, has the honour to inform His Excel- lency the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs as follows : — "In view of the threatening attitude adopted by Russia in the conflict between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Servia ; and of the fact that, according to a communication from the Berlin Cabi- net, Russia has seen fit, as a result of that conflict, to open hostilities against Germany; and whereas Germany is consequently at war with Russia; Austria-Hungary therefore considers herself also at war with Russia from the present moment." After handing over this note Your Excellency will ask that pass- ports may be prepared, and you will leave withiout delay with the 460 Official Diplomatic Documents entire staff of the Embassy with the exception of any members who are to be left behind. At the same time M. Schebeko is being fur- nished with his passport by us. Belgium : From London Belgian Gray Book No. 41 Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M, Damgnon, Bel- gian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) London, August 5, 1914- Germany, having rejected the British proposals, Great Britain has informed her that a state of war existed between* the two coun- tries as from 11 o'clock. To Paris, London, and St. Petersburgh Belgian Gray Book No. 42 M. Damgnon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburgh. (Telegram.) Brussels, August 5, 1914. After the violation of Belgian territory at Gemmenich,^ Belgium appealed ^ to Great Britain, France, and Russia through their repre- sentatives at Brussels, to co-operate as guaranteeing Powers in the defence of her territory. Belgium undertakes the defence of her fortified places. To Paris, London, and St. Petersburgh Belgian Gray Book No. 43 M. Damgnon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburgh. Sir, Brussels, August 5, 1914- In my despatch of August 4 (see No. 38) I had the honour to in- form you of the sequence of events which had attended the inter- national relations of Belgium from July 31st to August 4th. I added that the Cabinet was considering the question whether Belgium, whose territory had been invaded since the morning, should appeal to the guarantee of the Powers. The Cabinet had decided in the affirmative when the British Minister informed me that the proposal which he had communicated to me, and according to which the British Government were disposed to respond favourably to our appeal to her as a guaranteeing Power, was cancelled for the time being.^ (See No. 37.) 1 Belgian Gray Book No. 30, August 4. 2 Belgian Gray Book No. 40, same day. 3 This paragraph is txot clear. What had Sir E. Grey's offer, Belgian Gray Book No. 37, or Its cancellation, ib. No. 39, to do with the decision of the Cabinet ? August 5, Belgian Gray Book No. 44 461 A telegram from London made it clear that this change of atti- tude was caused by an ultimatum from Great Britain giving Ger- many a time limit of ten hours within which to evacuate Belgian territory and to respect Belgian neutrality. (See No. 39.) During the evening, the Belgian Government addressed to France, Great Britain, and Russia, through their respective representatives at Brus- sels, a note, of which a copy is enclosed herewith. (See No. 40.) As you will observe, Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France, and Russia to co-operate as guaranteeing Powers in the defence of her territory and in the maintenance for the future of the independ- ence and integrity of her territory. She will herself undertake the defence of her fortified places. As yet we are not aware how our appeal has been received. To the Belgian Heads of Missions in all Countries having Diplomatic Relations with Belgium. Belgian Gray Book No. 44 M. Damgnouy Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Heads of Missions in all Countries ^ having Diplomatic Relations with Belgium. Sir, Brussels, August 5, 1914- By the treaty of April 18th, 1839, Prussia, France, Great Britain, Austria, and Russia declared themselves guarantors of the treaty concluded on the same day between His Majesty the King of the Belgians and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands. The treaty runs : " Belgium shall form a State independent and perpetually neutral." Belgium has fulfilled all her international obligations, she has accomplished her duty in a spirit of loyal impartiality,^ she has neglected no effort to maintain her neutrality and to cause that neu- trality to be respected. In these circumstances the Belgian Government have learnt with deep pain that the armed forces of Germany, a Power guaranteeing Belgian neutrality, have entered Belgian territory in violation of the obligations undertaken by treaty. It is our duty to protest with indignation against an outrage against international law provoked by no act of ours. The Belgian Government are firmly determined to repel by all the means in their power the attack thus made upon their neutrality, and they recall the fact that, in virtue of article 10 of The Hague Convention of 1907 respecting the rights and duties of neutral Powers and persons in the case of war by land, if a neutral Power repels, even by force, attacks on her neutrality such action cannot be considered as a hostile act. I have to request that you will ask at once for an audience with 1 This includes the United States. 2 This is denied by Germany in view of the Brussels documents which show that Belgium had given her military secrets to Great Britain. 462 Official Diplomatic Documents the Minister for Foreign Affairs and read this despatch to his Excel- lency, handing him a copy. If the interview cannot be granted at once you should make the communication in question in writing. From Berlin Belgian Gray Book No. 45 Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin^ to M. Damgnon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Berlin, August 5, 19H, I HAVE received my passports and shall leave Berlin to-morrow morning for Holland with the staff of the legation. From Madrid Belgian Gray Book No. 46 Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) St. Sebastian, August 5, 1914- The Spanish Government undertake the custody of Belgian in- terests in Germany, and are to-day sending telegraphic instructions to their Ambassador at Berlin. (See No. 33.) From Paris Belgian Gray Book No. 47 Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Paris, August 5, 1914. I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith a copy of the notification of a state of war between France and Germany, which has been communicated to me to-day. Enclosure in No. 47. (See French Yellow Book No. 157, August 4.) From London Belgian Gray Book No. 48 Communication of August 5, from Sir Francis Villiers, British Minis- ter at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. I AM instructed to inform the Belgian Government that His Bri- tannic Majesty's Government consider joint action with a view to August 5, Belgian Gray Book No. 52 463 resisting Germany to be in force and to be justified by the Treaty of 1839. From London Belgian Gray Book No. 49 Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Bel- gian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) London, August 5, 1914. Great Britain agrees to take joint action in her capacity of guaranteeing Power for the defence of Belgian territory. The British fleet will ensure the free passage of the Scheldt for the pro- visioning of Antwerp. From The Hague Belgian Gray Book No. 50 Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, Bel- gian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) The Hague, August 5, 191^. The war buoying is about to be established. (See No. 29.) To Madrid Belgian Gray Book No. 51 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid. (Telegram.) Brussels, August 5, 1914- Please express to the Spanish Government the sincere thanks of the Belgian Government. (See No. 46.) To Paris, London, and St. Petersburgh Belgian Gray Book No. 52 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburgh. Sir, ~ Brussels, August 5, 1914. I have the honour to inform you that the French and Russian Ministers made a communication to me this morning informing me of the willingness of their Governments to respond to our appeal, and to co-operate with Great Britain in the defence of Belgian terri- tory. 464 Official Diplomatic Documents France : From Luxemburg French Yellow Book No. 156 M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to M. Doumergue, Minis- ter for Foreign Affairs. Paris, August 5, 1914- The Minister of State came to see me at the Legation this morn- ing, Tuesday, 4th August, 1914, at about half-past eight o'clock, in order to notify me that the German military authorities required my departure. On my answering that I would only give way to force M. Eyschen said that he understood my feelings in this matter, and it was just for that reason that he had himself come to make this communication which cost him so much, for it was just because force was used that he asked me to leave. He added that he was going to bring me written proof of this. I did not conceal from M. Eyschen the grief and anxiety which I had in leaving my fellow-countrymen without defence, and asked him to be good enough to undertake their protection ; this he promised to do. Just as he was leaving he handed me the enclosed letter (En- closure I.) which is the answer of the Luxemburg Government to the declaration which I had made the evening before, according to tele- graphic instructions of M. Viviani. About 10 o'clock, the Minister of State came again to the Lega- tion and left me with a short note from himself, a certified copy of the letter which the German Minister had addressed to him on the subject of my departure from Luxemburg. (Enclosures IL and III.) At the same time he told me that he had informed Herr von Buch that the Luxemburg Government would be entrusted with the pro- tection of the French and would have charge of the Legation and the Chancery. This news did not seem to be agreeable to my Ger- man colleague, w^ho advised M. Eyschen to move me to entrust this responsibility to the Belgian IMinister. I explained to the Minister of State that the situation was peculiar. As I was accredited to Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess and as my country was not in a state of war with Luxemburg, it was in these circumstances clearly indicated that it should be the Luxemburg Government which should look after the safety of my fellow-countrymen. M. Eyschen did not insist, and again accepted the service which I entrusted to him. The Minister of State then asked me to be good enough to leave quietly in order to avoid any demonstration, which, as he said, would not fail to bring about reprisals on the part of the German military authorities against the French. I answered that I attached too much value to the safety of my countrymen to compromise it and that he had nothing to fear. August 5, French Yellow Book No. 156 465 ^ My departure, which was required to take place as soon as pos- sible, was fixed for two o'clock ; it was at the same time understood that I should leave in my motor car. As to a safe conduct, M. Eyschen told me that the German Minister was at that very moment at the German headquarters to ask for it, and that he would take care that I received it in good time. At a quarter-past two the Minister of State accompanied by M. Henrion, Councillor of the Government, came to take leave of me and to receive the keys of the Legation and those of the Chancery. He told me that orders had been given for my free passage, and that I must make for Arlon by way of the Merle, Mamers and Arlon roads. He added that a German officer would wait for me at the Merle road in order to go in front of my motor car. I then left the Legation and made my w^ay to Arlon by the road which had been determined on, but I did not meet anyone. Your Excellency will have the goodness to find the enclosed text of the letter which I sent to the Minister of State before leaving my post (Enclosure IV.). Mollard. Enclosure I M. Eyschen, Minister of State, President of the Government, to M, Mollard, French Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipoten- tiary at Luxemburg. Sir, Luxemburg, August 4, 1914. In an oral communication made yesterday evening, your Excel- lency has had the goodness to bring to my knowledge that in accord- ance with the Treaty of London of 1867, the Government of the Re- public intended to respect the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg as they had shown by their attitude, but that the viola- tion of this neutrality by Germany was nevertheless of such a kind as to compel France henceforth to be influenced in this matter by the care for her defence and her interests. You will allow me to point out clearly that the decision of the Government of the Republic is based solely on the act of a third Power for which in truth the Grand Duchy is not responsible. The rights of Luxemburg must then remain intact. The German Empire has formally declared that only a temporary occupation of Luxemburg entered into their intentions. I am glad to believe that the Government of the Republic will have no difficulty in establishing with me the fact that at all times and in all circumstances the Grand Duchy has fully and loyally ful- filled all the obligations of every kind which rested on it in virtue of the Treaty of 1867. I remain, etc., Eyschen. Minister of State, President of the Government. 2h 466 Official Diplomatic Documents Enclosure II Private Letter from M. Eyschen, Minister of State, President of the Government, to M. Mollard, French Minister, at Luxemburg. Sir, A SHORT time ago I had with very great regret to inform you of the intentions of General von Fuchs with regard to your sojourn in Luxemburg. As I had the honour to tell you, I asked for confirmation in writ- ing of the decision taken by the military authorities in this matter. Enclosed is a copy of a letter which I have at this moment re- ceived from the German Minister. He has assured me that in carrying out this step there will be no want of the respect due to your position and person. Be good enough to receive the renewed expression of my regret and my deep regard. Eyschen. Enclosure III To His Excellency the Minister of State, Dr. Eyschen, Your Excellency, In accordance with the instructions of his Excellency General Fuchs, I have the honour to ask you to be good enough to request the French Minister, M. Mollard, to leave Luxemburg as soon as possible and to return to France; otherwise the German military authorities would find themselves under the painful necessity of placing M. Mollard under the charge of a military escort and in the last extremity of proceeding to his arrest. I beg your Excellency to have the goodness on this occasion to receive the assurance of my deepest regard. Von Buch. Enclosure IV M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to His Excellency M. Eyschen, Minister of State, President of the Government of Luxem- burg. Sir, Luxemburg, August 4) 1914- I HAVE just received your communication and I submit to force. Before leaving Luxemburg it is my duty to provide for the for- tunes and safety of my fellow-countrymen. Knowing the spirit of justice and equity of the Luxemburg Government, I have the honour to ask your Excellency to take them under your protection, and to watch over the safety of their lives and goods. August 5, French Yellow Book No. 156 467 At the same time I will ask your Excellency to take charge of the Legation and the offices of the Chancery. I should be much obliged to your Excellency if you would be good enough to lay before Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess the expression of my deepest respect, and my excuses for not having been able myself to express them to her. In thankmg you for all the marks of sympathy which you have given me I beg you to receive renewed assurances of my deep regard. Armand Mollard. Sent Despatches to Received Despatches fkom London The Hague The Hague German Legation Austro-Hungarian Ambassador BerHn 468 Official Diplomatic Documents Thiirsday, August 6, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Austria-Hungary Belgium France Germany Great Britain Russia Serbia Austria-Hungary presents her declaration of war to Russia. Belgium is informed by Holland of war regulations established for the naviga- tion of the Scheldt. Germany and Serbia sever diplomatic relations, and the former in so doing lays the entire blame for the war on Russia for having ordered general mobiUsation just when Germany was hopeful of success in her attempt at mediation. Austria-Hungary : To London Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 60 Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 6, 1914. I HAVE received Your Excellency's telegram of the 4th August.^ I ask you to assure Sir E. Grey that we will in no case open hostili- ties against Great Britain without a previous formal declaration of war, but that we also expect that Great Britain will observe towards us a similar attitude, and that she will not undertake any hostile act against us before formally declaring war. Belgium : From The Hague Belgian Gray Book No. 53 Jonkheer de Weede, Netherlands Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Brussels, August 6, 1914- I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Excellency herewith a copy of the special edition of the Staatscourant, containing the declara- tion of the neutrality of the Netherlands in the war between Bel- gium and Germany, and between Great Britain and Germany. 1 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 58, August 4. August 6, Belgian Gray Book No. 53 469 Enclosure to No. 53 Laws, Decrees, Nominations, etc. Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Marine, War, and the Colonies, (Translation.) The Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Marine, War, and the Colonies, authorised to that effect by her Majesty the Queen, make known to all whom it may concern that the Nether- lands Government will observe strict neutrality in the war which has broken out between Great Britain and Germany, and Belgium and Germany, Powers friendly to the Netherlands, and that, with a view of the observ- ance of this neutrality, the fol- lowing dispositions have been taken : — ^ Les Ministres des Affaires Etrangeres, de la Justice, de la Marine, de la Guerre et des Colonies, autorises a cette fin par Sa Majeste la Reine, portent a la connaissance de tons ceux que la chose concerne, que le Gouverne- ment neerlandais observera dans la guerre qui a eclate entre les Puissances amies des Pays-Bas, Grande-Bretagne et Allemagne, et Belgique et Allemagne, une stricte neutralite, et qu'en vue de I'observation de cette neutralite les dispositions suivantes ont ete arretees : Article 1 Dans les limites du territoire de I'Etat, comprenant le territoire du Royaume en Europe, outre les colonies et possessions dans d'autres parties du monde, aucun genre d'hostilites n'est.permis et ce territoire ne pent servir de base pour des operations hostiles. Article 2 Ni I'occupation d'une partie quelconque du territoire de I'Etat par un belligerant, ni le passage a travers ce territoire par voie de terre par des troupes ou des con- vois de munitions appartenanta un des belligerants ne sont permis non plus que le passage a travers le territoire situe a Finterieur des eaux territoriales neerlandaises par des navires de guerre ou des batiments des belligerants as- similes a ceux-ci. Article 1 Within the limits of the terri- tory of the State, including the territory of the Kingdom in Europe and the colonies and possessions in other parts of the world, no hostilities of any kind are permitted, neither may this territory serve as a base for hostile operations. Article 2 Neither the occupation of any part of the territory of the State by a belligerent nor the passage across this territory by land is permitted to the troops or con- voys of munitions belonging to the beUigerents, nor is the pas- sage across the territory situated within the territorial waters of the Netherlands by the warships or ships assimilated thereto of the belligerents permitted. 470 Official Diplomatic Documents Article 3 Les troupes ou les militaires, appartenant aux belligerants ou destines a ceux-ci et arrivant sur le territoire de I'Etat par voie de terre seront immediatement desarmes et internes jusqu'a la fin de la guerre. Les navires de guerre ou bati- ments assimiles a ces derniers, appartenant a un belligerant, qui contreviendront aux prescriptions des articles 2, 4 ou 7, ne pourront quitter ce territoire avant la fin de la guerre. Article 4 Les navires de guerre oubati- ments assimiles a ces derniers, qui appartiennent a un belli- gerant, n'auro^nt pas acces au territoire de TEtat. Article 3 Troops or soldiers belonging to the belligerents or destined for them arriving in the territory of the State by land will be imme- diately disarmed and interned until the termination of the war. Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent, who contravenes the provisions of articles 2, 4, or 7 will not be per- mitted to leave the said territory until the end of the war. Article 4 No warships or ships assimi- lated thereto belonging to any of the belligerents shall have access to the said territory. Article 5 La disposition de Tarticle 4 n'est pas applicable : 1° aux navires de guerre ou batiments d'un belligerant assi- miles a ces derniers, et qui par suite d'avarie ou de I'etat de la mer sont tenus d'entrer dans un des ports ou rades de I'Etat. Les navires pourront quitter les dits ports ou rades des que les circon- stances qui les ont contraints de s'y refugier auront cesse d'exister ; 2° aux navires de guerre ou batiments assimiles, appartenant a un belligerant, et qui font escale dans un port ou une rade situes dans le territoire des colonies et possessions d'cutre-mer, exclu- sivement dans le but de completer leur provision de denrees alimen- taires ou de combustibles. Ces navires devront repartir des que les circonstances qui \es ont forces Article 5 The provisions of article 4 do not apply to : — L Warships or ships assimi- lated thereto which are forced to enter the' ports or roadstead of the State on account of damages or the state of the sea. Such ships may leave the said ports or roadsteads as soon as the circum- stances which have driven them to take shelter there shall have ceased to exist. 2. Warships or ships assimi- lated thereto belonging to a bel- ligerent which anchor in a port or roadstead in the colonies or oversea possessions exclusively with the object of completing their provision of foodstuffs or fuel. These ships must leave as soon as the circumstances which have forced them to anchor shall have ceased to exist, subject to August 6, Belgian Gray Book No. S3 471 a faire escale ont cesse d'exister, avec cette condition que le sejour en rade ou dans le port ne pourra durer plus de vingt-quatre heures ; 3° aux navires de guerre ou batiments assimiles, appartenant a un belligerant, et qui sont utilises exclusivement pour une mission religieuse, scientifique, ou humanitaire. the condition that their stay in the roadstead or port shall not exceed twenty-four hours. 3. Warships or ships assimi- lated thereto belonging to a bel- ligerent employed exclusively on a religious, scientific, or human- itarian mission. Article 6 Les navires de guerre ou bati- ments assimiles appartenant a un belligerant, ne peuvent reparer leurs avaries dans les ports ou rades de I'Etat qu'en tant que cette reparation est indispensable a la securite de la navigation, et ils ne pourront en aucune fa9on accroitre leurs capacites de combat. Article 6 Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent may only execute such repairs in the ports and roadsteads of the State as are indispensable to their seaworthiness, and they may in no way increase their fighting capacities. Article 7 Les navires de guerre ou bati- ments assimiles, appartenant a un belligerant, et qui, au com- mencement de la guerre, se trou- veraient sur le territoire de I'Etat, sont tenus de le quitter dans les vingt-quatre heures de la publi- cation de la presente. Article 7 Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent who may at the commencement of war be within the territory of the State must leave within twenty-four hours from the mo- ment of the publication of this declaration. Article 8 Si des navires de guerre ou batiments assimiles appartenant a divers belligerants se trouvent en meme temps, dans les con- ditions visees a I'article 5, dans une meme partie du monde, et sur le territoire de TEtat, un delai d'au moins vingt-quatre heures doit s'ecouler entre le depart des navires de chacun des belli- gerants. A moins de circon- stances speciales, I'ordre de de- part est determine par Tordre Article 8 If warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to different bel- ligerents find themselves at the same time, in the conditions set forth in article 5, in the same part of the world and within the terri- tory of the State, a delay of at least twenty-four hours must elapse between the departure of each respective belligerent ship. Except in special circumstances, the order of departure shall be determined by the order of arrival. 472 Official Diplomatic Documents d'arrivee. Un navire de guerre ou un batiment assimile, appar- tenant a un belligerant, ^ne pent quitter le territoire de TEtat que vingt-quatre heures apres le depart d'un navire de commerce portant le pavilion de Tautre belligerant. A warship or ship assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent may only leave the territory of the State twenty-four hours after the departure of a merchant ship which flies the flag of another belligerent. Article 9 Les navires de guerre ou bati- ments assimiles, appartenant a un belligerant, vises a I'article 5 et a I'article 7, ne peuvent etre ravitailles en denrees alimentaires dans les ports et les rades du pays que dans la mesure necessaire pour parfaire leurs provisions jusqu'a la limite normale du temps de paix. De meme, ils ne peuvent charger de combustible que dans la mesure necessaire pour pouvoir atteindre, avec la provision qu'ils ont encore a bord, le port le plus rapproche de leur propre pays. Un meme batiment ne pent etre ravitaille a nouveau en com- bustible qu'a I'expiration d'une periode de trois mois au moins apres son precedent ravitaille- ment dans le territoire de I'Etat. Article 9 Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent to which articles 5 and 7 are appli- cable may only be provisioned with foodstuffs in the ports and roadsteads of the country to the extent necessary to bring their provisions up to the normal limit in time of peace. Similarly they can only be supplied with fuel to the extent necessary to enable them, with the stock they already have on board, to reach the nearest port of their own country. The same vessel cannot again be provided with fuel until a period of at least three months shall have elapsed since it was last provisioned in the territory of the State. Article 10 Une prise ne pent etre amenee dans le territoire que lorsqu'elle est incapable de naviguer, qu'elle tient mal la mer, qu'elle manque de combustible ou de denrees alimentaires. Elle doit s'eloigner des que la cause de son entree dans le terri- toire cesse d'exister. Si elle ne le fait pas, Tordre lui sera donne de partir imme- diatement; en cas de refus, il Article 10 A prize may only be brought into Dutch territory if such prize is unnavigable, or unseaworthy, or short of fuel or foodstuffs. Such prize must leave as soon as the reasons which caused her to enter Dutch territory cease to exist. Should such prize fail to do so, immediate orders shall be given her to leave. In the event of a August 6, Belgian Gray Book No. 53 473 sera fait usage des moyens dis- ponibles pour liberer la prise avec ses officiers et son equipage et pour interner I'equipage place a bord par le belligerant qui a fait la prise. refusal, all possible means shall be employed to liberate the prize, with her officers and crew, and to intern the crew placed on board by the belligerent who has taken it as prize. Article 11 II e^st interdit, sur le territoire de TEtat, de former des corps combattants ou d'ouvrir des bureaux de recrutement au profit des belligerants. Article U It is forbidden in State terri- tory, to form a corps of com- batants or to open recruiting offices on behalf of the bellig- erents. Article 12 II est interdit, sur le territoire de I'Etat, de prendre du service a bord de navires de guerre ou de batiments assimiles. Article 12 It is forbidden, in State terri- tory, to take service on board warships or ships assimilated thereto. Article 13 II est interdit, sur le territoire de TEtat, d'amenager, d'armer ou d'equiper des navires destines a des fins militaires au profit d'un belligerant, ou de fournir ou con- duire a un belligerant de tels navires. Article 13 It is forbidden, in State terri- tory, to equip, arm, or man vessels intended for military purposes on behalf of a belligerent, or to furnish or deliver such vessels to a belligerent. Article 14 II est interdit, sur le territoire de I'Etat, de fournir des armes ou des munitions a des navires de guerre jdu batiments assimiles appartenant a un belligerant, ou de leur venir en aide d'une maniere quelconque en vue de I'augmentation de leur equipage ou de leur amenagement. Article 14 It is forbidden in State terri- tory to supply arms or ammu- nition to warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent, or to come to their assistance in any manner what- soever with a view to augment their crew or their equipment. Article 15 II est interdit, sur le territoire de I'Etat, sauf autorisation pre- alable des autorites locales com- petentes, de faire des reparations Article 15 It is forbidden in State terri- tory failing previous authorisa- tion by the competent local au- thorities, to repair warships or 474 Official Diplomatic Documents aux navires de guerre ou bati- .ments assimiles appartenant a un belligerant, ou de leur fournir des provisions de bouche ou de combustible. ships assimilated thereto belong- ing to a belligerent, or to supply them with victuals or fuel. Article 16 II est interdit, sur le territoire de I'Etat, de cooperer au degree- ment ou a la reparation de prises, sauf en ce qui est necessaire pour les rendre propres a tenir la mer ; ainsi que d'acheter des prises ou des marchandises confisquees, et de les recevoir en echange, en don ou en depot. Article 16 It is forbidden in State terri- tory to take part in the dis- mantling or repairing of prizes except in so far as is necessary to make them seaworthy; also to purchase prizes or confiscated goods, and to receive them in exchange, in gift, or on deposit. Article 17 Le territoire de FEtat comprend la mer cotiere sur une largeur de 3 milles marins a raison de 60 par degre de latitude, a partir de la laisse de la basse mer. En ce qui concerne les bales cette distance de 3 milles marins est mesuree a partir d'une ligne droite tiree a travers la bale aussi pres que possible de I'entree, au point ou I'ouverture de la bale ne depasse pas 10 milles marins, a raison de 60 par degre de latitude. Article 17 The State territory comprises the coastal waters to a distance of 3 nautical miles, reckoning 60 to the degree of latitude, from low-water mark. As regards inlets, this distance of 3 nautical miles is measured from a straight line drawn across the inlet at the point nearest the entrance where the mouth of the inlet is not wider than 10 nautical miles, reckoning 60 to the degree of latitude. Article 18 . En outre, Tintention est attiree sur les articles 100, 1°, et 205 du Code penal ; Indisch Staats- blad, 1905, No. 62 ; Art. 7, 4°, de la loi sur la qualite de Neer- landais et sur le domicile {Nederlandsch Staatsblad, 1892, No. 268; 1910, No. 216); art. 2, No. 3, de la loi sur la qualite de sujet neerlandais (Nederlandsch Staatsblad, 1910, No. 55 ; Indisch Staatsblad, 1910, No. 296; art. 54 et 55 Article 18 Further, attention is called to Articles 100, Section l,^and 205 of the Penal Code; Indisch Staatsblad, 1905, No. 62; Ar- ticle 7, Section 4, of the Law respecting the status of Nether- lands nationality, and respecting domicile {Nederlandsch Staats- blad, 1892, No. 268; 1910, No. 216); Article 2, No. 3, of the Law respecting the sta- tus of Netherlands nationality (Nederlandsch Staatsblad, 1910, August 6, Belgian Gray Book No. 5^ 475 du Code penal de Suriname; art. 54 et 55 du Code penal de Cura9ao). De meme, Fattention des com- mandants de navires, armateurs et affreteurs, est attiree sur le danger et les inconvenients, aux- quels ils s'exposeraient en ne respectant pas le blocus effectif des belligerants, en transportant de la contrebande de guerre ou des depeches militaires pour les belligerants (a moins qu'il ne s'agisse du service postal regulier) ou en executant pour eux d'autres services de transport. Quiconque se rendrait coupable d'actes prevus ci-dessus, s'ex- poserait a toutes les consequences de ces actes, et ne pourrait obtenir a cet egard aucune pro- tection ni intervention du Gou- vernement neerlandais. No. 55; Indisch Staatsblad, 1910, No. 296 ; Articles 54 and 55 of the Penal Code of Suri- nam; Articles 54 and 55 of the Penal Code of Cura9oa). Similarly, the attention of com- manding officers, owners, and charterers of ships is called to the dangers and inconveniences to which they would expose themselves by disregarding the effective blockade of belligerents, by carrying contraband of war, or military despatches for bel- ligerents (except in the course of the regular postal service), or by rendering them other trans- port services. Any person guilty of the acts aforesaid would expose himself to all the consequences of those acts and would not be able, as regards them, to obtain any protection or intervention on the part of the Netherlands Government. To the Hague Belgian Gray Book No. 54 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague. (Telegram.) Brussels, August 6, 1914- Please communicate the following note to the Netherlands Government : — The Belgian Government have taken note of the establishment of war buoying on the Scheldt and of the fact that the Netherlands Government will ensure the maintenance of navigation. It would be convenient that navigation should be possible from 30 minutes before sunrise to 30 minutes after sunset, and that the exchange of pilots should take place at Bath. With every desire to fall in with the requests of the Netherlands Government, the Belgian Government think that it is desirable in the interests of the littoral ports to retain the lightships of Wielingen and of Wandelaar, and also the buoys of the Wielingen Channel. 476 Official Diplomatic Documents (See No. 50.) From The Hague Belgian Gray Book No. 55 Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Damgnon, Bel- gian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) The Hague, August 6, 1914. Navigation on the Scheldt is allowed from daybreak and so long as it is light. The Wielingen buoys will be replaced. The exchange of pilots at Hansweert is easier and better organised. Are you par- ticularly anxious to have Bath? France : From Copenhagen French Yellow Book No. 155 M. Bapst, French Minister at Copenhagen, to M. Doumergue, Minis- ter for Foreign Affairs. Copenhagen, August 6, 1914- The French Ambassador at Berlin asks me to communicate to your Excellency the following telegram : — I have been sent to Denmark by the German Government. I have just arrived at Copenhagen. I am accompanied by all the staff of the Embassy and the Russian Charge d' Affaires at Darm- stadt with his family. The treatment which we have received is of such a nature that I have thought it desirable to make a complete report on it to your Excellency by telegram. On the morning of Monday, the 3rd August, after I had, in ac- cordance with your instructions, addressed to Herr von Jagow a protest against the acts of aggression committed on French territory by German troops, the Secretary of State came to see me. Herr von Jagow came to complain of acts of aggression which he alleged had been committed in Germany, especially at Nuremberg and Co- blenz by French aviators, who according to his statement "had come from Belgium." I answered that I had not the slightest in- formation as to the facts to which he attached so much importance and the improbability of which seemed to me obvious ; on my part I asked him if he had read the note v/hich I had addressed to him with regard to the invasion of our territory by detachments of the German army. As the Secretary of State said that he had not yet read this note I explained its contents to him. I called his attention to the act committed by the officer commanding one of the detach- ments who had advanced to the French village of Joncherey, ten kilometres within our frontier, and had blown out the brains of a French soldier whom he had met there. After having given my opinion of this act I added : " You will admit that under no circum- August 6, French Yelloiv Book No. 155 477 stances could there be any comparison between this and the flight of an aeroplane over foreign territory carried out by private persons animated by that spirit of individual courage by which aviators are distinguished. "An act of aggression committed on the territory of a neighbour by detachments of regular troops commanded by officers assumes an importance of quite a different nature." Herr von Jagow explained to me that he had no knowledge of the facts of which I was speaking to him, and he added that it was diffi- cult for events of this kind not to take place when two armies filled with the feelings • which animated our troops found themselves face to face on either side of the frontier. At this moment the crowds which thronged the Pariser Platz in front of the Embassy and whom we could see through the window of my study, which was half-open, uttered shouts against France. I asked the Secretary of State when all this would come to an end. "The Government has not yet come to a decision," Herr von Jagow answered. "It is probable that Herr von Schoen will receive orders to-day to ask for his passports and then you will receive yours." The Secretary of State assured me that I need not have any anxiety with regard to my departure, and that all the proprieties would be observed with regard to me as well as my staff. We w^ere not to see one another any more and we took leave of one another after an interview which had been courteous and could not make me anticipate what w^as in store for me. Before leaving Herr von Jagow I expressed to him my wish to make a personal call on the Chancellor, as that would be the last opportunity that I should have of seeing him. Herr von Jagow answered that he did not advise me to carry out this intention as this interview would serve no purpose and could not fail to be painful. At 6 o'clock in the evening Herr von Langwerth brought me my passports. In the name of his Government he refused to agree to the wish which I expressed to him that I should be permitted to travel by Holland or Belgium. He. suggested to me that I should go either by way of Copenhagen, although he could not assure me a free passage by sea, or through Switzerland via Constance. I accepted this last route ; Herr von Langwerth having asked me to leave as soon as I possibly could it was agreed, in consideration of the necessity I was under of making arrangements with the Spanish Ambassador, who was undertaking the charge of our interests, that I should leave on the next day, the 4th August, at 10 o'clock at night. At 7 o'clock, an hour after Herr von Langwerth had left, Herr von Lancken, formerly Councillor of the Embassy at Paris, came from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to tell me to request the staff of my Embassy to cease taking meals in the restaurants. This order was so strict that on the next day, Tuesday, I had to have recourse to the authority of the Wilhelmstrasse to get the Hotel Bristol to send our meals to the Embassy. 478 Official Diplomatic Documents At 11 o'clock on the same evening, Monday, Herr von Langwerth came back to tell me that his Government would not allow our return by way of Switzerland under the pretext that it would take three days and three nights to take me to Constance. He announced that I should be sent by way of Vienna. I only agreed to this altera- tion under reserve, and during the night I wrote the following letter to Herr von Langwerth : — "M. le Baron, Berlin, August 3, 1914-. " I have been thinking over the route for my return to my coun- try about which you came to speak to me this evening. You pro- pose that I shall travel by Vienna. I run the risk of finding myself detained in that town, if not by the action of the Austrian Govern- ment, at least owing to the mobilisation which creates great difficul- ties similar to those existing in Germany as to the movements of trains. " Under these circumstances I must ask the German Government for a promise made on their honour that the Austrian Government will send me to Switzerland, and that the Swiss Government will not close its frontier either to me or to the persons by whom I am accompanied, as I am told that that frontier has been firmly closed to foreigners. " I cannot then accept the proposal that you have made to me unless I have the security which I ask for, and unless I am assured that I shall not be detained for some months outside my country. "Jules Cambon." In answer to this letter on the next morning, Tuesday, the 4th August, Herr von Langwerth gave me in writing an assurance that the Austrian and Swiss authorities had received communications to this effect. At the same time M. Miladowski, attached to the Consulate at Berlin, as well as other Frenchmen, was arrested in his own house while in bed. M. Miladowski, for whom a diplomatic passport had been requested, was released after four hours. I was preparing to leave for Vienna when, at a quarter to five, Herr von Langwerth came back to inform me that I would have to leave with the persons accompanying me at 10 o'clock in the even- ing, but that I should be taken to Denmark. On this new require- ment I asked if I should be confined in a fortress supposing I did not comply. Herr von Langwerth simply answered that he would re- turn to receive my answer in half an hour. I did not wish to give the German Government the pretext for saying that I had refused to depart from Germany. I therefore told Herr von Langwerth when he came back that I would submit to the order which had been given to me but "that I protested." I at once wrote to Herr von Jagow a letter of which the following is a copy : August 6, French Yellow Book No. 155 479 "Sir, Berlin, August 4, 1914- ''More than once your Excellency has said to me that the Imperial Government, in accordance with the usages of international courtesy, would facilitate my return to my own country and would give me every means of getting back to it quickly. "Yesterday, however, Baron von Langwerth, after refusing me access to Belgium and Holland, informed me that I should travel to Switzerland via Constance. During the night I was informed that I should be sent to Austria, a country which is taking part in the present war on the side of Germany. As I had no knowledge of the intentions of Austria towards me, since on Austrian soil I am noth- ing but an ordinary private individual, I wrote to Baron von Lang- werth that I requested the Imperial Government to give me a promise that the Imperial and Royal Austrian authorities would give me all possible facilities for continuing my journey and that Switzerland would not be closed to me. Herr von Langwerth has been good enough to answer me in writing that I could be assured of an easy journey and that the Austrian authorities would do all that was necessary. "It is nearly five o'clock, and Baron von Langwerth has just an- nounced to me that I shall be sent to Denmark. In view of the present situation, there is no security that I shall find a ship to take me to England and it is this consideration which made me reject this proposal, with the approval of Herr von Langwerth. " In truth no liberty is left me and I am treated almost as a prisoner. I am obliged to submit, having no means of obtaining that the rules of international courtesy should be observed towards me, but I hasten to protest to your Excellency against the manner in which I am being treated. Jules Cambon." Whilst my letter was being delivered I was told that the journey would not be made direct but by way of Schleswig. At 10 o'clock in the evening, I left the Embassy with my staff in the middle of a great assembly of foot and mounted police. At the station the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was only repre- sented by an officer of inferior rank. The journey took place with extreme slowness. We took more than twenty-four hours to reach the frontier. It seemed that at every station they had to wait for orders to proceed. I was accom- panied by Major von Rheinbaben of the Alesandra Regiment of the Guard and by a police officer. In the neighbourhood of the Kiel Canal the soldiers entered our carriages. The windows were shut and the curtains of the carriages drawn down; each of us had to remain isolated in his compartment and was forbidden to get up or to touch his luggage. A soldier stood in the corridor of the carriage before the door of each of our compartments which were kept open, revolver in hand and finger on the trigger. The Russian Charge d 'Affaires, the women and children and everyone were subjected to the same treatment. 480 Official Diplomatic Documents At the last German station about 11 o'clock at night, Major von Rheinbaben came to take leave of me. I handed to him the follow- ing letter to Herr von Jagow. "Sir, Wednesday Evening, August 5, 1914- "Yesterday before leaving Berlin, I protested in writing to your Excellency against the repeated change of route which was imposed upon me by the Imperial Government on my journey from Germany. "To-day, as the train in which I was passed over the Kiel Canal an attempt was made to search all our luggage as if we might have hidden some instrument of destruction. Thanks to the interference of Major von Rheinbaben, we were spared this insult. But they went further. "They obliged us to remain each in his own compartment, the windows and blinds having been closed. During this time, in the corridors of the carriages at the dcor of each compartment and fac- ing each one of us, stood a soldier, revolver in hand, finger on the trigger, for nearly half an hour. "I consider it my duty to protest against this threat of violence to the Ambassador of the Republic and the staff of his Embassy, vio- lence which nothing could even have made me anticipate. Yester- day I had the honour of writing to your Excellency that I was being treated almost as a prisoner. To-day I am being treated as a dan- gerous prisoner. Also I must record that during our journey which from Berlin to Denmark has taken twenty-four hours, no food has been prepared nor provided for me nor for the persons who were travelling with me to the frontier. Jules Cambon.'' I thought that our troubles had finished, when shortly afterwards Major von Rheinbaben came, rather embarrassed, to inform me that the train would not proceed to the Danish frontier if I did not pay the cost of this train. I expressed my astonishment that I had not been made to pay at Berlin and that at any rate I had not been forewarned of this. I offered to pay by a cheque on one of the largest Berlin banks. This facility was refused me. With the help of my companions I was able to collect, in gold, the sum which was re- quired from me at once, and which amounted to 3,611 marks 75 pfennig. This is about 5,000 francs in accordance with the present rate of exchange.^ After this last incident, I thought it necessary to ask Major von Rheinbaben for his word of honour as an officer and a gentleman that we should be taken to the Danish frontier. He gave it to me, and I required that the policeman who was with us should accompany us. In this way we arrived at the first Danish station, where the Danish Government had had a train made ready to take us to Copenhagen. I am assured that my British colleague and the Belgian Minister, although they left Berlin after I did, travelled by the direct route to 1 Subsequently the sum thus required from M. Jules Cambon was given to the Spanish Ambassador to be repaid to the French Ambassador. Aiigust 6, Serbian Blue Book No. 60 481 Holland. I am struck by this difference of treatment, and as Den- mark and Norway are, at this moment, infested with spies, if I suc- ceed in embarking in Norway, there is a danger that I may be arrested at sea with the officials who accompany me. I do not wish to conclude this despatch without notifying your Excellency of the energy and devotion of which the whole staff of the Embassy has given unceasing proof during the course of this crisis. I shall be glad that account should be taken of the services which on this occasion have been rendered to the Government of the Republic, in particular by the Secretaries of the Embassy and by the Military and Naval Attaches. Jules Cambon. Russia : From Vienna Russian Orange Book No. 79 Note presented by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs on July 24 (August 6), 1914, at 6 P.M. On the instructions of his Government, the undersigned, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, has the honour to inform his Excel- lency the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs as follows : — (Translation.) "Vu I'attitude mena^ante "in view of the threatening prise par la Russie dans le con- attitude adopted by Russia in flit entre la Monarchic austro- the conflict between the Austro- hongroise et la Serbie et en Hungarian Monarchy and presence du fait qu'en suite de Servia; and of the fact that, ce conflit la Russie d'apres une according to a communication communication du Cabinet de from the Berlin Cabinet, Russia Berlin a cru devoir ouvrir les has seen fit, as a result of that hostilites contre TAllemagne et conflict, to open hostilities que celle-ci se trouve par conse- against Germany; and whereas quent en etat de guerre avec la- Germany is consequently at war dite Puissance, I'Autriche-Hon- with Russia; Austria-Hungary grie se considere egalement en therefore considers herself also etat de guerre avec la Russie a at war with Russia from the partir du present moment." present moment." Serbia : To Berlin Serbian Blue Book No. 50 The Royal Serbian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the German Lega- tion at Nish. Nish, July 21 /August 6, 1914. The Royal Serbian Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honour to inform the Imperial Legation that, in view of the state of war 2i 482 Official Diplomatic Documents which now exists between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, and of that between Russia and Germany, the ally of Austria-Hungary, the Royal Serbian Government, in view of the solidarity of her interests with Russia and her allies, considers the mission of Baron Gieslingen, the Imperial German Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraor- dinary, to be at an end. The Royal Serbian Government requests His Excellency to leave Serbian territory with the staff of the Lega- tion. The necessary passports are enclosed herewith. From Berlin Serbian Blue Book No. 51 Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 24/ August 6, 1914. On the occasion of my visit to the Under-Secretary of State, M. Zimmermann, for the purpose of breaking off diplomatic relations, he stated, in the course of conversation, that Germany had always cherished friendly feelings towards Serbia, and that he regretted that owing to the political groupement our relations had to be broken off. He blames Russia only, as the instigator of Serbia, for the develop- ments which have occurred, and which will have grave consequences for all nations. If Russia, at the last moment — just when it ap- peared possible that an armed conflict might be avoided — had not ordered the mobilisation of her whole forces, there would have been no war, for Germany had used her whole influence in Austria-Hungary in order to bring about an understanding with Russia. Austria- Hungary would have probably been satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade, when negotiations would have begun with a view to regu- larising the relations between Serbia and Austria. Friday, August 7, 1914 Despatches published only by Belgium who suggests that the European war between the white races be not carried into Africa. To the Hague Belgian Gray Book No. 56 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs^ to Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at the Hague. (Telegram.) Brussels, August 7, 191J,.. Please express to the Netherlands Government the sincere thanks of the Belgian Government for the measures taken to secure navigation on the Scheldt. The Belgian Government are in agree- August 7, Belgian Gray Book No. 58 483 ment with the Netherlands Government on the subject of the ex- tent of navigation. They had proposed Bath, but accept Hanswert, since this port has better facilities for the exchange of pilots. To Paris and London Belgian Gray Book No. 57 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris and London, (Telegram.) Brussels, August 7, 1914. Belgium trusts that the war will not be extended to Central Africa. The Governor of the Belgian Congo has received instruc- tions to maintain a strictly defensive attitude. Please ask the French Government [British Government] whether they intend to proclaim the neutrality of the French Congo [British colonies in the conventional basin of the Congo], in accordance with article 11 of the General Act of Berlin. A telegram from Boma reports that hostilities are probable between the French and Germans in the Ubangi. To Paris and London Belgian Gray Book No. 58 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris and London. Sir, Brussels, August 7, 191^. With reference to my telegram of this morning, I have the honour to request you to bring to the notice of the French [British] Govern- ment the following information : — While instructions have been sent to the Governor-General of the Congo to take defensive measures on the common frontiers of the Belgian colony and of the German colonies of East Africa and the Cameroons, the Belgian Government have suggested to that officer that he should abstain from all offensive action against those colonies. In view of the civilising mission common to colonising nations, the Belgian Government desire, in effect, for humanitarian reasons, not to extend the field of hostilities to Central Africa. They will, therefore, not take the initiative of putting such a strain on civilisa- tion in that region, and the military forces which they possess there will only go into action in the event of their having to repel a direct attack on their African possessions. I should be glad to learn whether the French [British] Govern- ment share this view and in that case whether it is their intention, during the present conflict, to avail themselves of article 11 of the General Act of Berlin to neutralise such of their colonies as are con- tained in the conventional basin of the Congo. I am addressing an identic communication to your colleague at London (Paris). 484 Official Diplomatic Documents Saturday, August 8, 1914 France complains of Austro-Hungarian troops having been sent to Germany ; and seems favorably inclined to accept the Belgian proposal that the war be not carried into Africa. Great Britain publishes as an addition to her White Papers (later called Blue Book) Sir E. Goschen's final report including a description of the last interview with the German Chancellor in which the now famous expression **a scrap of paper" occurs. Austria-Hungary : From Paris AusTRO-HuNG - JiiAN Red Book No. 61 Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold. (Translated from the French,) (Telegraphic.) Paris, August 8, 1914. The Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to go and see him in order to communicate to me that, according to positive information which has reached him, the Innsbruck Army Corps has been brought to the French frontier. M. Doumergue wishes to know without delay if this information is correct, and if it is so, what is the intention of the Imperial and Royal Government. As France is at war with Germany the despatch of our troops to the French frontier is, according to the views held by the Minister, not consistent with the existing condition of peace between Austria-Hungary and France. M. Dumaine is commissioned to make a similar communication to Your Excellency. Belgium : From Paris Belgian Gray Book No. 59 Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Paris, August 8, 1914- I HAVE had the honour of speaking to the President of the Republic with respect to your telegram of yesterday. I had received it during the evening and had immediately communicated it to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. They asked for time to consider it before answering. M. Poincare has promised me to speak on this subject to-day to the Minister of the Colonies. At first sight he could see little difficulty in proclaiming the neutrality of the French Congo, but he nevertheless reserves his reply. He believes that acts of war have already taken place in the Ubangi. He has taken the opportunity to remind me that the protection accorded us by France extends also to our colonies and that we have nothing to fear. August 8, British Blue Book No. 160 485 Great Britain: From Berlin British Blue Book No. 160 ^ Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. Sir, London, August 8, 1914, In accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the 4th instant ^ I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and enquired, in the name of His Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow ^ at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be "No," as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through with- out formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this fait accompli of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences, which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back. During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date,^ and, in compliance with the instructions therein con- tained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary of State that unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government that His Majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves. Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave 1 This despatch was not contained in the original edition of the Blue Book. It con- tains Sir E. Goschen's recollections of his last day in Berlin. 2 See No. 153, August 4. ^ German Secretary of State. * See No. 159, August 4. 486 Official Diplomatic Documents his Excellency a written summary of your telegram and, pointing out that you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even twenty- four hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my passports. This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow ^ expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our engagements, His Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done. i 1 then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of see- ing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agi- tated.^ His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Gov- ernment was terrible to a degree ; just for a word — " neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been disregarded — just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who de- sired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable ; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow ^ wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life and death" for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for break- ^ German Secretary of State. 2 For the Chancellor's account of this interview see his speech in the Reichstag, June 5, 1916 : " Sir Edward Goschen was during this interview so shaken to his depths that from a natural feeling of decency I have always refrained from speaking of it publicly, since what happened was personal and human." August 8, British Blue Book No. 160 487 ing solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evi- dently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfor- tunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation from our late fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted this more than I. After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 p.m. It was accepted by that office, but apparently never despatched.^ At about 9.30 p.m. Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of State, came to see me. After expressing his deep regret that the very friendly official and personal relations between us were about to cease, he asked me casually whether a demand for passports was equivalent to a declaration of war. I said that such an authority on international law as he was known to be must know as well or better than I what was usual in such cases. I added that there were many cases where diplomatic relations had been broken off, and, nevertheless, war had not ensued ; but that in this case he would have seen from my instructions, of which I had given Herr von Jagow ^ a written summary, that His Majesty's Government expected an answer to a definite question by 12 o'clock that night and that in default of a satisfactory answer they would be forced to take such steps as their engagements required. Herr Zimmermann ^ said that that was, in fact, a declaration of war, as the Imperial Government could not possibly give the assurance required either that night or any other night. In the meantime, after Herr Zimmermann ^ left me, a flying sheet, issued by the Berliner Tageblatt, was circulated stating that Great Britain had declared war against Germany. The immediate result of this news was the assemblage of an exceedingly excited and unruly mob before His Majesty's Embassy. The small force of police which had been sent to guard the embassy was soon overpowered, and the attitude of the mob became more threatening. We took no notice of this demonstration as long as it was confined to noise, but when the crash of glass and the landing of cobble stones into the drawing- room, where we were all sitting, warned us that the situation was 1 This telegram never reached the Foreign Office. 2 German Secretary of State. ^ German Under-Secretary of State. 488 Official Diplomatic Documents getting unpleasant, I telephoned to the Foreign Office an account of what was happening. Herr von Jagow ^ at once informed the Chief of Police, and an adequate force of mounted police, sent with great promptness, very soon cleared the street. From that moment on we were well guarded, and no more direct unpleasantness occurred. After order had been restored Herr von Jagow ^ came to see me and expressed his most heartfelt regrets at what had occurred. He said that the behaviour of his countrymen had made him feel more ashamed than he had words to express. It was an indelible stain on the reputation of Berlin. He said that the flying sheet circulated in the streets had not been authorised by the Government ; in fact, the Chancellor had asked him by telephone whether he thought that such a statement should be issued, and he had replied, "Certainly not, until the morning." It was in consequence of his decision to that effect that only a small force of police had been sent to the neighbour- hood of the embassy, as he had thought that the presence of a large force would inevitably attract attention and perhaps lead to dis- turbances. It was the "pestilential 'Tageblatt/ " which had some- how got hold of the news, that had upset his calculations. He had heard rumours that the mob had been excited to violence by gestures made and missiles thrown from the embassy, but he felt sure that that was not true (I was able soon to assure him that the report had no foundation whatever), and even if it was, it was no excuse for the disgraceful scenes which had taken place. He feared that I would take home with me a sorry impression of Berlin manners in moments of excitement. In fact, no apology could have been more full and complete. On the following morning, the 5th August, the Emperor sent one of His Majesty's aides-de-camp to me with the following mes- sage : — "The Emperor has charged me to express to your Excellency his regret for the occurrences of last night, but to tell you at the same time that you will gather from those occurrences an idea of the feelings of his people respecting the action of Great Britain in joining with other nations against her old allies of Waterloo. His Majesty also begs that you will tell the King that he has been proud of the titles of British Field-Marshal and British Admiral, but that in consequence of what has occurred he must now at once divest himself of those titles." I would add that the above message lost none of its acerbity by the manner of its delivery. On the other hand, I should like to state that I received all through this trying time nothing but courtesy at the hands of Herr von Jagow ^ and the officials of the Imperial Foreign Office. At about 11 o'clock on the same morning Count Wed el handed me my passports — which I had earlier in the day demanded in writing — and told me that he had been instructed to confer with me as to the route which I should follow for my return to England. He said that he had understood 1 German Secretary of State. August 8, British Blue Book No. 160 489 that I preferred the route via the Hook of Holland to that via Copen- hagen ; they had therefore arranged that I should go by the former route, only I should have to wait till the following morning. I agreed to this, and he said that I might be quite assured that there would be no repetition of the disgraceful scenes of the preceding night as full precautions would be taken. He added that they were doing all in their power to have a restaurant car attached to the train, but it was rather a difficult matter. He also brought me a charming letter from Herr von Jagow couched in the most friendly terms. The day was passed in packing up such articles as time allowed. The night passed quietly without any incident. In the morning a strong force of police was posted along the usual route to the Lehrter Station, while the embassy was smuggled away in taxi-cabs to the station by side streets. We there suffered no molestation whatever, and avoided the treatment meted out by the crowd to my Russian and French colleagues. Count Wedel met us at the station to say good-bye on behalf of Herr von Jagow and to see that all the arrange- ments ordered for our comfort had been properly carried out. A retired colonel of the Guards accompanied the train to the Dutch frontier and was exceedingly kind in his efforts to prevent the great crowds which thronged the platforms at every station where we stopped from insulting us ; but beyond the yelling of patriotic songs and a few jeers and insulting gestures we had really nothing to complain of during our tedious journey to the Dutch frontier. Before closing this long account of our last days in Berlin I should like to place on record and bring to your notice the quite admirable behaviour of my staff under the most trying circumstances possible. One and all, they worked night and day with scarcely any rest, and I cannot praise too highly the cheerful zeal with which counsellor, naval and military attaches, secretaries, and the two young attaches buckled to their work and kept their nerve with often a yelling mob outside and inside hundreds of British subjects clamouring for advice and assistance. I was proud to have such a staff to work with, and feel most grateful to them all for the invaluable assistance and support, often exposing them to considerable personal risk, which they so readily and cheerfully gave to me. I should also like to mention the great assistance rendered to us all by my American colleague, INIr. Gerard,^ and his staff. Undeterred by the hooting and hisses with which he was often greeted by the mob on entering and leaving the embassy, his Excellency came repeatedly to see me to ask how he could help us and to make arrange- ments for the safety of stranded British subjects. He extricated many of these from extremely difficult situations at some personal risk to himself, and his calmness and savoir-faire and his firmness in dealing with the Imperial authorities gave full assurance that the protection of British subjects and interests could not have been left in more efficient and able hands. j }^ave etc. W. E. GOSCHEN. 1 American Ambassador in Berlin. 490 Official Diplomatic Documents Sunday, August 9, 1914 Austria-Hungary denies the participation of her troops in the war against France. Belgium receives a courteous note from Germany offering peace, the fortress of Liege having fallen into German hands. France wishes to offer to Germany the neutrahty of the possessions in the Congo basin in Africa. Austria-Hungary : To Paris AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 62 Count Berchtold to Count Szecsen at Paris. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 9, 1914. With reference to Your Excellency's telegram of the Sth instant.^ After conferring with the General Staff I authorise Your Excellency to inform the French Government that the information regarding the participation of our troops in the Franco-German war is a complete invention. I have expressed myself in a similar manner to M. Dumaine. Belgium : From The Hague Belgian Gray Book No. 60 Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Damgnon, BeU gian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) The Hague, August 9, 1914- The Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs has begged me to convey to you the following information, the United States Minister at Brussels having declined to do so : ^ The fortress of Liege has been taken by assault after a brave de- fence. The German Government most deeply regret that bloody- encounters should have resulted from the attitude of the Belgian Government towards Germany. Germany is not coming as an enemy into Belgium, it is only through the force of circumstances that she has had, owing to the military measures of France, to take the grave decision of entering Belgium and occupying Liege as a base for her further military operations. Now that the Belgian army has upheld the honour of its arms by its heroic resistance to a very superior force, the German Government beg the King of the Belgians and the Bel- gian Government to spare Belgium the further horrors of war. The German Government are ready for any compact with Belgium which can be reconciled with their arrangements with France. (See No. 70.) Germany once more gives her solemn assurance that it is not 1 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 61. August 10, Au^tro-Hungarian Red Book No. 63 491 her intention to appropriate Belgian territory to herself and that such an intention is far from her thoughts. Germany is still ready to evacuate Belgium as soon as the state of war will allow her to do so. The United States Ambassador had asked his colleague to under- take this attempt at mediation. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has accepted this mission without enthusiasm. I have undertaken it to oblige him. From Paris Belgian Gray Book No. 61 Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Paris, August 9, 1914. The French Government are strongly inclined to proclaim the neutrality of the possessions in the conventional basin of the Congo and are begging Spain to make the suggestion at Berlin. Monday, August 10, 1914 France breaks off diplomatic relations with Austria-Hungary. Belgium refuses the German offer of peace. Austria-Hungary : From Paris AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 63 Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold. (Translated from the French.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, August 10, 1914. I HAVE received your telegram of the 9th August ^ and communi- cated at once the contents to M. Doumergue. The Minister, who had received a similar telegraphic report from M. Dumaine concerning his conversation with Your Excellency, admitted that our troops are not on the French frontier, but he maintains that he has positive informa- tion that an Austro-Hungarian army corps has been brought to Ger- many, and that this makes it possible' for that Empire to withdraw her troops from those districts which are occupied by our soldiers, and that in the opinion of the Minister this amounts to a facilitation of German military operations. I repeatedly drew the attention of the Minister to the wording of the answer of Your Excellency, and he has admitted that it is not possible to speak of an effective participation of our troops in the Franco-German war, but he insisted that it is unde- niable that our troops are present on German territory, and that this is equivalent to the provision of military assistance to Germany. In 1 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 62. 492 Official Diplomatic Documents these circumstances he has authorised the French Ambassador at Vienna to ask for his passports without delay, and to leave Vienna to-day with the entire staff of the Embassy. The Minister informed me that in view of this position, my presence here can be of no use ; indeed in view of the excitement of the populace it might give occa- sion to regrettable occurrences which he desired to avoid. He offered to place a train at my disposal from to-night onwards in order that I might leave France. I answered that it was impossible for me to receive instructions from Your Excellency before the evening, but that in view of the recall of M. Dumaine, I asked him to have my passport prepared. Belgium : From The Hague Belgian Gray Book No. 62 Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, The Hague, August 10, 1914. In response to a call on the telephone, yesterday evening at 9 o'clock, I went to the Department for Foreign Affairs. Jonkheer Loudon told me that my German colleague had just left his room, and had handed him a document which the United States representative at Brussels had declined to forward to you. The United States official in charge of the German Legation at Brussels stated that he had received no special instructions from Washington to intervene officially with the Belgian Government in the interest of Germany. The United States Minister consequently telegraphed to his col- league at The Hague, who informed the German representative of Mr. Whitlock's refusal. The German Government, therefore, took the initial step by approaching the United States Ambassador at Berlin. In these circumstances, and in view of the urgency of these mat- ters, Herr von Miiller begged Jonkheer Loudon to act as the inter- mediary of the German Government in this negotiation with you. His Excellency read me the German text of the document. I did not hide my astonishment at this attempt at mediation, and its poor chance of success in this form; but, solely in order to oblige the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, I promised to telegraph to you immediately; and this I did yesterday. You will find the German document enclosed in original and translation. Enclosure 1 in No. 62. Enclosure 2 in No. 62. (Translation) Die Festung Liittich ist nach The fortress of Liege has been tapfrer Gegenwehr im Sturm ge- taken by assault after a brave August 10, Belgian Gray Book No, 62 493 nommen worden. Die Deutsche Regierimg bedauert es auf das tiefste, dass es infolge der Stellungnahme der Belgischen Regierung gegen Deutschland zu bliitigen Zusammenstossen gekommen ist. Deutschland kommt nicht als Feind nach Belgien. Nur unter dem Zwang der Verhaltnisse hat es angesichts der militarischen Massnahmen Frankreichs den schweren Ent- schluss fassen miissen, in Belgien einzuriicken und Liittich als Stiitzpunkt f (ir seine weiteren mi- litarischen Operationen besetzen zu miissen. Nachdem die Belg- ische Armee in heldenmutigem Widerstand gegen die grosse Uberlengenheit ihre Waffenehre auf das glanzendste gewahrt hat, bittet die Deutsche Regierung seine Ma jest at den Konig und die Belgische Regierung, Belgien die weiteren Schrecken des Krieges zu ersparen. Die Deutsche Regierung ist zu je- dem Abkommen mit Belgien bereit das sich irgendwie mit Riicksicht auf seine {voir piece No. 70) Auseinandersetzung mit Frankreich vereinigen lasst. Deutschland versichert nochmals feierlichst, dass es nicht von der Absicht geleitet gewesen ist sich Belgisches Gebiet anzueignen, und dass ihm diese Absicht durchaus fern liegt. Deutsch- land is noch immer bereit das Belgische Konigreich unverziig- lich zu raumen, sobald die Kriegs- lage es ihm gestattet. " Der hie- sige Amerikanische Botschafter ist mit diesem Vermittlungsver- such seines Briisseler Kollegen einverstanden." defence. The German Govern- ment most deeply regret that bloody encounters should have resulted from the Belgian Gov- ernment's attitude towards Ger- many. Germany is not coming as an enemy into Belgium. It is only through the force of cir- cumstances that she has had, owing to the military measures of France, to take the grave de- cision of entering Belgium and occupying Liege as a base for her further military operations. Now that the Belgian army has upheld the honour of its arms in the most brilliant manner by its heroic resistance to a very su- perior force, the German Gov- ernment beg the King of the Belgians and the Belgian Gov- ernment to spare Belgium the horrors of war. The German Government are ready for any compact with Belgium which can in any way be reconciled with their arrangements with France. (See No. 70.) Germany gives once more her solemn assurance that she has not been animated by the intention of appropriating Belgian territory for herself, and that such an intention is far from her thoughts. Germany is still ready to evacuate Belgium as soon as the state of war will allow her to do so. The United States Ambassa- dor here concurs in this attempt at mediation by his colleague in Brussels. 494 Official Diplomatic Documents To The Hague Belgian Gray Book No. 63 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague. (Telegram.) Brussels, August 10, 1914. The Belgian Government have received the proposals made to them by the German Government through the intermediary of the Netherlands Government. They will forward a reply shortly. (See No. 62 Enclosures.) To The Hague Belgian Gray Book No. 64 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague. (Telegram.) Brussels, August 10, 1914- Doubt exists as to the meaning of the word " Auseinander- setzung,'' which you translate by "arrangement." Please ascertain whether the German Government have in mind any arrangements which we may have come to with France, or a settlement of the dis- pute between France and Germany. To London, St. Petersburgh, and Paris Belgian Gray Book No. 65 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the British, Russian, and French Ministers at Brussels. Sir, Brussels, August 10, 1914- I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the Belgian Minister at The Hague, at the request of the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, has forwarded to us the following proposal from the German Government. (See No. 62, Enclosure 2.) The Belgian Government propose to return the following reply to this communication : — (Translation.) "La proposition que nous fait "The proposal made to us by le Gouvernement allemand re- the German Government repeats produit la proposition qui avait the proposal formulated in their ete formulee dans Tultimatum du ultimatum of August 2. Faith- 2 aoiit. Fidele a ses devoirs ful to her international obliga- internationaux, la Belgique ne tions, Belgium can only reiterate pent que reiterer sa reponse a cet her reply to that ultimatum, the ultimatum, d'autant plus que more so as since August 3 her August 10 y Belgian Gray Book No. 66 495 depuis le 3 aout sa neutralite a neutrality has been violated, a ete violee, qu'une guerre dou- distressing war has been waged loureuse a ete portee sur son ter- on her territory, and the guar- ritoire, et que les garants de sa antors of her neutrality have neutralite ont loyalement et im- responded loyally and without mediatement repondu a son delay to her appeal/' appel." The Belgian Government consider that the Powers guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium should have cognisance of these documents. To London, Paris, and St. Petersburgh Belgian Gray Book No. 66 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at london, Paris, and St. Petersburgh. Sir, Brussels, August 10, 1914- I HAVE the honour to inform you of the circumstances which led to the departure of the Belgian representative from Luxemburg. The General Officer commanding the German troops in the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg informed the German Minister in that town, on August 8, of the desire of the military authorities for the de- parture of the Belgian representative at the Grand Ducal Court. Herr von Buch addressed to Monsieur Eyschen, President of the Government, a note, of which the following is a translation : — "Your Excellency, ''Luxemburg, August 8, 1914- "In consequence of the completely hostile attitude adopted by Belgium towards Germany, the military authorities find themselves obliged to insist upon the departure of the Belgian Minister from Luxemburg. "His Excellency the General Officer commanding begs Count van den Steen de Jehay to arrange his journey home in such a way that he may be able, within twenty-four hours, to see General von Ploetz at Coblentz, with a view to settling the details of the further stages of his journey. It is impossible for him to travel except via Treves-Coblentz. (Signed) "von Buch.'^ Monsieur Eyschen forwarded this note the same day to Count van den Steen de Jehay, accompanied by a letter in the following terms : — "Sir, ''Luxemburg, August 8, 1914- "I greatly regret to have to communicate to you the enclosed copy of a note from the German Minister, informing me that the German military authorities demand your departure. "You will find in it the conditions which they attach thereto. "Herr von Buch told me that the military authorities advise you 496 Official Diplomatic Documents to travel by railway, as an attempt to carry out your journey by motor would expose you to being too frequently stopped for reasons connected with the control of the roads. But the choice is left to you. "The German Minister will come to me for your answer. "I cannot tell you how painful it is to me to fulfil my present task. I shall never forget the pleasant relations which have existed between us, and I hope that your journey may be carried out under the best possible conditions. ^Si^^^j^ "Eyschen." The Belgian Government, considering that the Grand Ducal Government had no choice in their attitude, and that the course they had been obliged to adopt in no way implied any discourteous intentions towards the King of the Belgians or towards Belgium, decided that there was no reason, in these circumstances, for request- ing- the Luxemburg Charge d'Affaires to leave Belgium. Tuesday, August 11, 1914 Austria-Hungary endeavors to maintain friendly relations with Great Britain. Austria-Hungary : To London AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 64 Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London. Vienna, August 11, 1914- The French Government have commissioned their Ambassador here to ask for his passports on the ground that an Austro-Hungarian army corps has been sent to Germany, whereby it has been possible for the German army staff to withdraw their troops from those Ger- man districts which are occupied by our contingents. This measure of our general staff indicates in his view the grant of military assist- ance to Germany. Your Excellency should bring to the knowledge of the British Government that according to information obtained from a reliable source the assertion made by the French Government is unfounded. Belgium : From Washington Belgian Gray Book No. 67 Mr. Wkitlock, United States Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Brussels, August 11, 1914.. The United States Legation received a telegram to-day from Washington, conveying the information that the United States Government had, at the request of the German Government, con- August 11, Belgian Gray Book No. 69 497 sented, as a matter of international courtesy, to undertake the pro- tection of German subjects in Belgium. In accordance with the instructions contained in this telegram, we will, therefore, if you see no objection, undertake to use our good and friendly offices with the Belgian Government for the protection of German subjects. The pleasant relations which we have had with you in this matter up to the present convince me that we may continue them with the same object on the same pleasant footing. From London Belgian Gray Book No. 68 Sir Francis Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Brussels, August 11, 1914- I HAVE telegraphed to Sir E. Gray the German communication and the proposed reply. I have received instructions to express to your Excellency the entire concurrence of His Britannic Majesty's Government. The latter can only declare their approval of the terms of the reply which the Belgian Government propose to give to this attempt to sow dis- cord between the Powers at present united for the defence of the treaties violated by Germany. From Paris Belgian Gray Book No. 69 M. Klohukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Bel- gian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Brussels, August 11, 1914- I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the French Government give their entire concurrence to the reply which the Belgian Government propose to return to the new German ultimatum. That reply is one which was to be expected from a Government and a people who have so heroically resisted the hateful violation of their territory. France will continue to fulfil her duties as a guaranteeing Power of Belgian neutrality and as a faithful friend of Belgium. (See No. 65) 498 Official Diplomatic Documents Wednesday, August 12, 1914 Great Britain declares war on Austria-Hungary. Austria-Hungary : From London AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 65 Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold. {Translated from the French.) (Telegraphic.) London, August 12, 1914. I HAVE just received from Sir E. Grey the following communica- tion : — At the request of the French Government, who are not in a position to communicate direct with your Government, I have to make to you the following communication : — The Austro-Hungarian Government, after declaring war on Servia, and thus taking the first initiative to the hostilities in Europe, have, without any provocation on the part of the Government of the French Republic, extended the war to France : — (1) After Germany had in succession declared war on Russia and France, the Austro-Hungarian Government have joined in the con- flict by declaring war against Russia, which was already fighting on the side of France. (2) According to information from numerous trustworthy sources Austria has sent troops to the German frontier under circumstances which amounted to a direct menace to France. In view of these facts the French Government are obliged to inform the Austro-Hungarian Government that they will take all measures which make it possible for them to answer these actions and these threats. Sir E. Grey adds : — As a breach with France has been brought about in this way the British Government feel themselves obliged to announce that Great Britain and Austria-Hungary will be in a state of war as from 12 o'clock to-night. Belgium : From The Hagy£ Belgian Gray Book No. 70 Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hagu£, to M. Davignon, Bel- gian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) The Hague, August 12, 1914. The German text contained a mistake: instead of ^^ seine Aus- einandersetzung,'^ it should read ''ihre,'' and thus be translated "their conflict with France." (See No. 64.) August 13, Belgian Gray Book No. 73 499 To The Hague Belgian Gray Book No. 71 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague. (Telegram.) Brussels, August 12, 1914-. Please communicate the following telegram to the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs : — "The proposal made to us by the German Government repeats the proposal which was formulated in the ultimatum of August 2nd. Faithful to her international obligations, Belgium can only reiterate her reply to that ultimatum, the more so as since August 3rd, her neutrality has been violated, a distressing war has been waged on her territority, and the guarantors of her neutrality have responded loyally and without delay to her appeal. Thursday, August 13, 1914 Belgium : From St. Petershurgh Belgian Gray Book No. 72 M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) St. Petershurgh, August 13, 1914. Please thank the Belgian Government for their communication, and express to them the pleasure which the Russian Government feel at their firm and dignified attitude, upon which they are heartily to be congratulated. (See No. 65.) From The Hague Belgian Gray Book No. 73 Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, Bel- gian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, The Hague, August 13, 1914. I HAD the honour to receive your telegram of yesterday, and I at once communicated to the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Aifairs, the Belgian reply to the second German proposal. His Excellency undertook to forward the Belgian communication to the German Minister forthwith. (See No. 71.) [Of Friday, August 14, and Saturday, August 15, no despatches are published.] 500 Official Diplomatic Documents Sunday, August 16, 1914 France changes her attitude about not carrying the war into Africa. Serbia pubHshes the recollections of her former Minister in Vienna of the events leading up to the war. Belgium : From Paris Belgian Gray Book No. 74 Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Paris, August 16, 1914. In the course of a conversation which I had this morning with M. de Margerie, I turned the conversation to colonial affairs and to the action which you had instructed me to take in your telegram and your despatch of the 7th instant. M. de Margerie reminded me that the French Government had approached Spain, but the latter had not answered before knowing the views of Great Britain. It seems that the latter has still given no answer. M. de Margerie considered that in view of the present situation Germany should be attacked wherever possible; he believes that such is also the opinion of Great Britain, who certainly has claims to satisfy ; France wishes to get back that part of the Congo which she had been compelled to give up in consequence of the Agadir incident. M. de Margerie added that a success would not be difficult to obtain. (See Nos. 57 and 58.) Serbia : From Vienna Serbian Blue Book No. 52 M. Yox. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Nish, August 3/16, 1914. From June 17/30 the Serbian Legation at Vienna was practically surrounded by police and gendarmes, while the staff were under constant police supervision. Our movements and our communica- tions with the outer world were, as you can imagine, rendered ex- tremely difficult ; the attitude of the population towards the Legation and its staff was inclined to be menacing. After the beginning of July (o.s.) even telegraphic communication with you became difficult, while matters developed with such rapidity August 16, Serbian Blue Book No. 52 501 that I was unable to report to you some of the events which preceded our armed conflict with Austria-Hungary. I accordingly do so now. Up to the end of June (o.s.) the whole question of the Serajevo outrage appeared to be developing normally. At the commencement of July, however, a change took place as regards the question of the consequences of the Serajevo affair. There were no tangible proofs that a radical change had taken place, but it was to some extent indicated by certain vague signs and symptoms which betrayed the existence of some hidden intentions. First of all, the Vienna and Budapest press, in conformity with instructions issued by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, ceased to publish reports of the magis- terial enquiry relating to the Serajevo outrage. The press began also to represent the whole matter as a question which must be settled between Serbia and Austria-Hungary alone — eventually by war. Moreover, statements to this effect were communicated to the leading Vienna newspapers by the German Embassy.- Exceptions were : the semi-official Fremdenblatt, which was, in general, more moderate in the tone of its articles; Die Zeit; and the Arbeiter Zeitung. Simultaneously with this new attitude on the part of the press, a very unsettled condition of affairs developed on the Bourse, such as it had not witnessed during the whole course of recent events in the Balkans. In private conversations also and in high financial circles the "settlement with Serbia" was declared to be the only way out of the general financial and economic crisis prevailing in Austria- Hungary ever since the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under secret instructions it was ordered that gold should be gradually withdrawn from circulation, and a corresponding rise in exchange took place. A further indication was the clumsy explanation given of the reasons which had induced the Minister for War, Krobatin, and the Chief of the General Staff, Hetzendorf, to interrupt their leave of absence and return to Vienna. The Chief of Staff constantly trav- elled to the south, east, and north of Austria, and at that time had had an interview with the Chief of the German General Staff, Count Moltke, in Bohemia, I believe, at Carlsbad. All the reserves which had been called out for the June manoeuvres in Bosnia and Herzegovina were kept with the colours beyond the stipulated period. The number of soldiers belonging to the permanent establishment in Austria-Hungary allowed to go home on short leave of absence in order to gather in the harvest, and to attend to other private affairs, was much larger than is usually the case; at the same time those whose duties were of a military-administrative nature were called upon in ever increasing numbers. Another indication was the non-committal nature of the answers given to several interpellations in the Hungarian Diet by the Hun- garian Prime Minister, Count Tisza, a statesman who is very clear in his political statements. 502 Official Diplomatic Documents The attitude of the Ballplatz was especially characteristic. None of the usual weekly receptions by Count Berchtold was held. They suddenly ceased at the Ballplatz to discuss the Serajevo outrage with the representatives of foreign countries; or, if discussion did arise, it seemed as if instructions had been issued on the subject ; that is to say, it was mentioned to everyone in such a manner as to dispel all apprehensions and suspicion that Austria-Hungary was preparing some serious step against Serbia. They acknowledged that some step would be undertaken at Belgrade as soon as the results of the magis- terial enquiry should have sufficiently established the connection between Belgrade and the Serajevo outrage. But at the same time it was said that this step would not be such as to give rise to any uneasiness. The Russian Ambassador, who spoke several times on the subject with Count Forgach, in the absence of Count Berchtold, was unable to discover the true nature of Austria's intentions. M. Schebeko told me that Count Szapary, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Petrograd, who, for family reasons, was at that time stopping in Vienna, had said to him that the step to be taken at Belgrade would be of conciliatory character. According to M. Schebeko, Count Szapary had also assured M. Sazonof that the intended Austro-Hungarian Note to Serbia would not be such as to cause Russia any dissatisfaction. The French Ambassador, M. Dumaine, who, under instructions from his Government, had drawn the attention of the Ballplatz to the complications which might arise should the eventual demands which it was intended to make of Serbia not be of a moderate nature, was told by the principal Under-Secretary Baron Macchio, that the Austro-Hungarian Government, appreciating the friendly and conciliatory action of the French Government, would only put forward such demands, embodied in a note to the Serbian Government, as Serbia would be able to accept without difficulty. I drew the attention of the Ambassadors of the Triple Entente to the fact that such an assurance might well conceal the true nature of the intentions of the Austro-Hungarian Government, and that the Powers of the Triple Entente might then be confronted by certain faits accomplis which Europe would be compelled to accept in order to avoid a general European war. ' The line followed by the Ballplatz was, moreover, comparatively successful, as all those of my colleagues whom I saw during that period were more or less dissuaded from believing that Austria- Hungary contemplated any serious step which could provoke Euro- pean complications. Many of the members of the diplomatic body were so firmly convinced of this that they were preparing at that time to quit Vienna on long leave of absence at various watering places. Nevertheless, it was known that a note was being drawn up at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs which would contain the accusations against Serbia, and also the demands of Austria-Hungary. This task was entrusted to Count Forgach, formerly Austro-Hungarian Min- ister in Serbia. At the same time it was universally believed that of the foreign representatives, the German Ambassador, Herr von August 16, Serbian Blue Book No. 52 503 Tschirsky, was the only one who was kept informed of the note even in its minutest details, while I had reason to believe that he was also co-operating in drafting it. In view of the above, the representatives of the friendly Powers agreed with me in thinking that the note would impose very difficult terms on Serbia, but that there would be no inacceptable demands. When the contents of the note were pub- lished all of them were surprised, not to say dumfounded. In the same way as the contents of the note were kept secret, a similar amount of secrecy was observed in regard to the date of its presentation. On the very day that the note was presented at Bel- grade, the French Ambassador had a prolonged conversation with the Principal Under-Secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs — Count Berchtold was again absent at Ischl — on the subject of the note. Yet Baron Macchio did not tell M. Dumaine that the note would be presented at Belgrade that afternoon, and published in the newspapers on the following day. On the publication in the Vienna papers on the morning of July 11/24 of the contents of the note, which Baron Giesl had presented to the Serbian Government, a feeling of dejection came over the friends both of Serbia and of the peace of Europe. It was only then realised that serious European complications might ensue, though it was not believed that it was the intention of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment to provoke them. This feeling of depression was increased by the tone of the articles in the Viennese newspapers, with the exception of Die Zeit and Arheiter Zeitung, and by demonstrations in the streets, which clearly showed that war would be a most welcome solution — a war with Serbia, of course. On that day, after having two or three conversations, I realised that an armed conflict between Serbia and the Dual Monarchy was inevitable, even should Serbia accept all the demands contained in the Austro-Hungarian Note, from the first to the last. The attitude of the people in the streets towards our Legation was such that I expected even personal attacks upon the members of the staff. The French Ambassador, the British Ambassador, and the Russian Charge d'Affaires held the view that the step taken by Austria-Hun- gary should be considered not as a note but as an ultimatum. They disapproved of the form, the contents, and the time limit of the note; they also declared it to be inacceptable. In the course of conversation with them on the subject of the note I pointed out that those passages in it which dealt with the order by the King to the Army, with the dismissal of officers and Govern- ment officials, and especially that which referred to the co-operation of Austro-Hungarian officials in the "Suppression of the subversive movement in Serbia against the territorial integrity of the Mon- archy," would be inacceptable as not being compatible with the dignity and sovereignty of Serbia. Only a victorious war, I said, could enforce the acceptance of conditions which were so humiliat- ing to an independent State. In reply to their enquiry whether it would not perhaps be better to accept the conditions and avoid war 504 Official Diplomatic Documents for the present, I said that the Austro-Hungarian Note, which amounted in fact to a declaration of war upon Serbia, was worded in such a way that, even if Serbia should accept all the conditions without reserve, Austria-Hungary would still find an excuse for her army to march into Serbia at any time. It was in the belief that the conflict would be limited to Serbia and Austria-Hungary that Austria- Hungary had drafted such a note. To M. Dumaine, Sir M. de Bunsen, and the Russian Charge d'Affaires, the unexpected character of the note was the cause not only of surprise but also of alarm, in view of the complications which they feared might ensue. The Russian Ambassador, M. Schebeko, previously to the presentation of the note, had stated on several occasions to his colleagues that Russia could not remain indifferent to any step taken by Austria-Hungary, w^hich might have as an object the humiliation of Serbia. He also expressed the same view at the Ballplatz. Hence the apprehension felt by the three Ambassa- dors, who at once foresaw the possibility of war between Russia and Austria-Hungary. The day after the note was presented. Prince Koudacheff went to see Count Berchtold to discuss the matter. In reply to his statement, that the note as it stood was inacceptable, and that Russia could not watch with indifference the humiliation of Serbia, Count Berchtold said that Austria-Hungary had been obliged to take this step, as her very existence was threatened; that she could not withdraw nor alter the demands made in the note, and that he considered that the matter in dispute concerned Serbia and Austria-Hungary alone and that no other Power had any grounds for interference. Count Berchtold's reply did not allow of any further doubts as to the intention of Austria-Hungary to chastise Serbia by force of arms without the consent of the European concert. From conversations which I had at that time with the Ambassadors of the Triple Entente — who during the whole of that difficult period showed every kind- ness and attention to me and to the staff of the Legation — it seemed quite clear that Austria-Hungary had been assured, and felt con- vinced, that the Serbo-Austro-Hungarian conflict would be localised, as she would otherwise not have decided upon a note which undoubt- edly meant war. It was also clear that Austria-Hungary was con- firmed in this impression especially — and perhaps solely — by Herr von Tschirsky, the German Ambassador in Vienna. Herr von Tschirsky was the only one who thought, and even stated publicly, that Russia would remain quiet while Austria-Hungary carried out her punitive expedition against Serbia. He declared that the Rus- sian Minister for Foreign Affairs would easily control the Panslavists, in the same way as he had done last year, and that Russia was not disposed at the moment to begin a discussion of the many vexed questions in Europe and Asia which were her main concern. It was necessary, according to Herr von Tschirsky, to give Serbia a lesson. Russia had no right to interfere. As far as Germany, he said, was concerned, she was in the fullest sense of the word conscious of Augmt 17, Belgian Gray Book No. 75 505 what she was doing in giving Austria-Hungary her support in the matter. These statements of Herr von Tsehirsky have induced many to hold the opinion that Germany desired to provoke a European war, on the ground that it was better to have war with Russia before the latter had completed her military reorganisation, i.e., before the spring of 1917. This point of view had formerly been freely discussed and even written about in Vienna. "The longer the matter is postponed the smaller will become the chances of success of the Triple Alliance." On the other hand, rumours from the most authoritative diplomatic sources in Berlin reached me in Vienna, to the effect that the Wilhelm- strasse did not approve of Austria's policy on this question, and that Herr von Tsehirsky has exceeded the instructions given to him. The Russian Ambassador, M. Schebeko, on his return from Petrograd, did his utmost at the Ballplatz to obtain an extension of the brief time limit given the Serbian Government for a reply to the Austro-Hungarian Note, and to discover some way which might lead to an exchange of views between Vienna and Petrograd in regard to the whole question, but until July 13/26, when we met, his efforts had proved unavailing. From the conversations I then had with him, I gathered that the Austro-Hungarian Note, in its contents and in its form, was regarded as a challenge to Russia and not to Serbia, and that Russia would not permit the humiliation of Serbia, even if war were to be the price. On the day of my departure from Vienna, M. Schebeko told me that, in spite of the many great difficulties to be overcome, there was a prospect of arriving at a solution by which an armed conflict might be avoided by means of discussion between the Russian Government and Count Szapary. A feeling of depression, however, prevailed in Vienna as soon as reports began to be spread that the Austro-Serbian conflict would bring about a war between Russia and the Dual Monarchy. Monday, August 17, 1914 Great Britain declines the Belgian proposal not to carry the war into Africa. Belgium : From London Belgian Gray Book No. 75 Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Bel- gian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, London, August 17, 1914- In reply to your despatch of August 7th, I have the honour to inform you that the British Government cannot agree to the Bel- 506 Official Diplomatic Documents gian proposal to respect the neutrality of the belligerent powers in the conventional basin of the Congo. German troops from German East Africa have already taken the offensive against the British Central African Protectorate. Furthermore, British troops have already attacked the German port of Dar-es-Salaam, where they have dsetroyed the wireless telegraphy station. In these circumstances, the British Government, even if they were convinced from the political and strategical point of view of the utility of the Belgian proposal, would be unable to adopt it. The British Government believe that the forces they are sending to Africa will be sufficient to overcome all opposition. They will take every step in their power to prevent any risings of the native population. France is of the same opinion as Great Britain on account of Ger- man activity which has been noticed near Bonar and Ekododo. (See Nos. 57 and 58.) [Of Tuesday, and Wednesday, August 18, and 19, no despatches have been published.] Thursday, August 20, 1914 Austria-Hungary receives from Japan a copy of the latter's ultimatum to Ger- many. Austria-Hungary : From Tokio AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 66 The Japanese Ambassador to Count Berchtold. (Translated from the English.) My Lord, Vienna, August 20, 1914- Your Excellency will doubtless have already received information from his Excellency Baron Miiller of the communication which was addressed to the German Government by my Government on the 15th inst. Nevertheless I take the liberty, although I have not received any instructions to do so, to enclose herewith for your Excel- lency's personal information, a copy of a telegram bearing on the matter which I have received from Tokio. Enclosure The Japanese Government, who have taken the present situation into their earnest consideration, have, in accordance with a complete understanding made with the British Government, for the purpose of strengthening and maintaining general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia, which is one of the aims of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, decided to take common action with Great Britain in giving effect to August 22y Au^tro-Hungarian Red Book No. 67 507 the necessary measures for this purpose. Nevertheless, before pro- ceeding with measures of this kind, the Japanese Government have thought it proper to address a friendly request to the German Govern- ment, which was communicated to them on the 15th August, 1914, in the following words : — "(1) All German warships must be withdrawn at once from the waters in the neighbourhood of Japan and China. The ships that cannot be withdrawn must be disarmed. " (2) The German Government must unconditionally and without compensation hand over to the Japanese authorities the whole of the leased territory of Kiao-chau before the 16th September, 1914, for the purpose of handing this territory back to China. " The Japanese Government have informed the German Government that, in case an answer intimating unconditional compliance with the above-mentioned demands is not received before Sunday, the 23rd, at mid-day, they will proceed as appears necessary to them. " It is earnestly to be hoped that the above-mentioned demands, for a reply to which so ample time is given, will be agreed to by the German Government ; should they, however, not comply with this demand, a course of action which would be deplored, the Japanese Government will be obliged to take the necessary measures to attain their end." The grounds on which the Imperial Government base their present attitude is, as already mentioned, none other than to maintain the common interests of Japan and Great Britain, which are set out in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, by establishing a basis of a lasting peace in the territory of Eastern Asia. The Japanese Government have in no respect the intention of embarking upon a policy of terri- torial expansion, nor do they entertain any other selfish designs. For this reason the Imperial Japanese Government are resolved to respect with the greatest care the interests of third Powers in Eastern Asia and to refrain from injuring them in any degree. [Of Friday, August 21, no despatches have been published.] Saturday, August 22, 1914 Austria-Hungary declares war on Belgium. Austria-Hungary : To Brussels AusTRO-HxmGARiAN Red Book No. 67^ Count Berchtold to Count Clary at Brussels. (Translated from the French.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 22, 1914. I ASK your Excellency to communicate the following to the Royal Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs at once : — "I have the honour to bring the following to the knowledge of 1 See Belgian Gray Book No. 77, August 28. 508 Official Diplomatic Documents your Excellency in accordance with the instructions of our Govern- ment : — Whereas Belgium, having refused to accept the proposals made to her on several occasions by Germany, is affording her military assistance to France and Great Britain, both of which Powers have declared war upon Austria-Hungary, and whereas as has just been proved, Austrian and Hungarian nationals in Belgium have had to submit, under the very eyes of the Belgian authorities, to treatment contrary to the most primitive demands of humanity, and inadmis- sible even towards subjects of an enemy State, therefore Austria- Hungary finds herself obliged to break off diplomatic relations, and considers herself, from this moment, in a state of war with Belgium. I am leaving the country with the staff of the Legation, and I am entrusting the protection of my countrymen to the Minister of the United States in Belgium. Count Errembault de Dudzeele has received his passports from the Imperial and Royal Government. Sunday, August 23, 1914 Germany refuses to reply to the Japanese ultimatum and gives the Japanese Ambassador his passports. Austria-Hungary : From Berlin AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 68 Prince Hohenlohe to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 23, 1914. The Foreign Office has informed the Japanese Charge d' Affaires that the Imperial German Government do not intend to send an answer to the Japanese ultimatum. The German Government have instructed their Ambassador at Tokio, after the expiration of the time allowed by Japan at 12 o'clock to-day, to leave Japan, and they will, at the same time, furnish the Japanese Charge d'Affaires here with his passports. At mid-day the Charge d'Affaires was furnished with his passports, and he will leave Berlin early to-morrow morning with the staff of the Embassy. Monday, August 24, 1914 Austria-Hungary makes common cause with Germany against Japan. Austria-Hungary : To Tokio AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ReD BoOK No. 69 Count Berchtold to Freiherr von Miiller at Tokio. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 2 4, 1914- The Commander of S.M.S. Elisabeth has been instructed to take part in the fighting at Tsingtau. I ask your Excellency, in view August 28, Belgian Gray Book No. 77 509 of the action taken by Japan against our Ally, the German Empire, to ask for your passports. You should inform the Consulates, and you should travel to America with the colony and the staff of the Embassy and of the Consulates. Your Excellency should entrust the protection of our countrymen and their interests to the American Ambassador. The Japanese Ambassador here is being furnished with his passports. Wednesday, August 26, 1914 Belgium : From Elizabethmlle Belgian Gray Book No. 76 M. Tomheur, Belgian Vice-Gowrnor of the Katanga, to M. Renkin, Belgian Minister for the Colonies. (Telegram.) Elizahethville, August 26, 1914- The Germans are continuing their skirmishes on Tanganyika and attacked the port of Lukuga, on August 22nd. Two of their natives were killed and two wounded. Fresh attacks are expected. [Of Thursday, August 27, 1914, no despatches have been published.l Friday, August 28, 1914 Belgium : From The Hague Belgian Gray Book No. 77 ^ Count Clary and Aldringen, Au^tro-Hungarian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Forwarded through the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs.) (Telegram.) The Hague, August 28, 1914. On the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to in- form your Excellency as follows : — (Translation.) "Vu que la Belgique, apres "Whereas Belgium, having re- avoir refuse d'accepter les pro- fused to accept the proposals positions qui lui avaient ete made to her on several occasions adressees a plusieurs reprises par by Germany, is affording her TAllemagne, prete sa cooperation military assistance to France and militaire a la France et a la Great Britain, both of which Grande-Bretagne, qui, toutes Powers have declared war upon deux ont declare la guerre a I'Au- Austria-Hungary, and whereas 1 See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 67, August 22. No reason appears why this despatch is printed here with a delay of six days. 510 Official Diplomatic Documents triche-Hongrie, et en presence du fait que, comme il vient d'etre constate, les ressortissants autri- chiens et hongrois se trouvant en Belgique ont, sous les yeux des autorites Royales, du subir un traitement contraire aux exi- gences les plus primitives de rhumanite et inadmissibles meme vis-a-vis des sujets d'un Etat ennemi, TAutriche-Hongrie se voit dans la necessite de rompre les relations diplomatiques et se considere des ce moment en etat de guerre avec la Belgique. Je quitte le pays avec le personnel de la legation et coniie la protec- tion de mes administres au Mi- nistre des Etats-Unis d'Amerique en Belgique. De la part du Gouvernement Imperial et Royal les passeports sont remis au Comte Errembault de Dudzeele. (Signe) " Clary." as has just been proved, Austrian and Hungarian nationals in Bel- gium have had to submit, under the very eyes of the Belgian authorities, to treatment con- trary to the most primitive de- mands of humanity and inadmis- sible even towards subjects of an enemy State, therefore Austria finds herself obliged to break off diplomatic relations and con- siders herself from this moment in a state of war with Belgium. I am leaving the country with the staff of the legation and I am entrusting the protection of Austrian interests to the United States Minister in Belgium. The Austro-Hungarian Government are forwarding his passports to Count Errembault de Dudzeele." Saturday, August 29, 1914 Belgium defends herself against the charge of having committed, previous to August 1, "certain hostile acts" against Germany. Belgium : To The Hague Belgian Gray Book No. 78 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague. (Telegram.) Antiverp, August 29, 1914- Please inform the Austrian Legation through the Minister for Foreign Affairs that I have received Austria-Hungary's declaration of war against Belgium, and add the following : — "La Belgique a toujours entre- tenu des relations d'amitie avec tous ses voisins sans distinction. Elle a scrupuleusement rempLi les devoirs que la neutralite lui impose. Si elle n'a pas cru "Belgium has always enter- tained friendly relations with all her neighbours without distinc- tion. She had scrupulously ful- filled the duties imposed upon her by her neutrality. If she August 29 J Belgian Gray Book No. 78 511 pouvoir accepter les propositions de rAllemagne, c'est que celles-ci avaient pour objet la violation des engagements qu'elle a pris a la face de I'Europe, engagements qui ont ete les conditions de la creation du Royaume de Bel- gique. Elle n'a pas cru qu'un peuple, quelque faible qu'il soit, puisse meconnaitre ses devoirs et sacrifier son honneur en s'incli- nant devant la force. Le Gou- vernement a attendu, non seule- ment les delais de I'ultimatum, mais la violation de son territoire par les troupes allemandes avant de faire appel a la France et a I'Angleterre, garantes de sa neu- tralite au meme titre que I'Alle- magne et I'Autriche-Hongrie, pour cooperer au nom et en vertu des traites a la defense du terri- toire beige. " En repoussant par les armes les envahisseurs, elle n'a meme pas accompli un acte d'hostilite aux termes de Tarticle 10 de la Convention de La Haye sur les droits et devoirs des Puissances neutres. " L'Allemagne a reconnu elle- meme que son agression constitue une violation du droit des gens, et ne pouvant la justifier elle a invoque son interet strategique. " La Belgique oppose un de- menti formel a I'affirmation que les ressortissants autrichiens et hongrois auraient subi en Bel- gique un traitement contraire aux exigences les plus primitives de I'humanite. " Le Gouvernement Royal a donne, des le debut des hostilites, les ordres les plus stricts quant a la sauvegarde des personnes et des proprietes austro-hongroises. (Signe) "Davignon." has not been able to accept Ger- many's proposals, it is because those proposals contemplated the violation of her engagements toward Europe, engagements which form the conditions of the creation of the Belgian Kingdom. She has been unable to admit that a people, however weak they may be, can fail in their duty and sacrifice their honour by yield- ing to force. The Government have waited, not only until the ultimatum had expired, but also until Belgian territory had been violated by German troops, be- fore appealing to France and Great Britain, guarantors of her neutrality, under the same terms as are Germany and Austria- Hungary, to co-operate in the name and in virtue of the treaties in defence of Belgian territory. By repelling the invaders by force of arms, she has not even committed an hostile act as laid down by the provisions of article 10 of The Hague Convention respecting the rights and duties of neutral Powers. "Germany herself has recog- nised that her attack constitutes a violation of international law, and, being unable to justify it, she has pleaded her strategical interests. "Belgium formally denies the allegation that Austrian and Hungarian nationals have suf- fered treatment in Belgium con- trary to the most primitive de- mands of humanity. "The Belgian Government, from the very commencement of hostilities, have issued the strictest orders for the protection of Austro-Hungarian persons and property." 512 Official Diplomatic Documents To Belgian Ministers Abroad Belgian Gray Book No. 79 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Minis- ters abroad. Sir, Antwerp J August 29, 191 4. Under date of the 17th August, I addressed a despatch ^ to the Belgian Minister at London, in which I felt bound to call attention to certain allegations made by the German Government which are mentioned in the Blue Book^ recently published by the British Government. I have the honour to enclose for your information a copy of the despatch in question and of its enclosures. I request that you will bring its contents to the notice of the Government to which you are accredited. Enclosure 1 in No. 79. M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count de La- laing, Belgian Minister at London. Sir, Brussels, August 17, 1914- The Blue Book recently published by the British Government contains (see No. 122, p. 92) the text of a telegram despatched from Berlin on the 3 1st July by Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, in w^hich the following passage occurs : — "It appears from what he [his Excellency the Secretary of State] said, that the German Government consider that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo already." The incident to which the German Secretary of State alluded in his conversation with Sir E. Goschen, and which he considered as a hostile act on the part of Belgium, doubtless refers to the application of the Royal decree of the 30th July, which provisionally prohibited the export from Belgium of certain products. As you will see from the explanation in the following paragraph, the incident with which we are reproached has in no wise the character which Germany has wished to attribute to it. The Royal decrees dated the 30th July and published in the Moniteur beige the following day forbade, provisionally, the export, both by land and by sea, of a series of products, more especially of cereals. On the 31st July the German Minister at Brussels called my attention to the fact that the Antwerp customs were detaining cargoes of grain addressed to Germany, which, as they were merely transshipped in our port, were in reality only in transit. Herr von 1 Not previously printed. 2 British Blue Book No. 122, July 31, printed under date of August 1. August 29, Belgian Gray Book No. 79 ' 513 Below Saleske requested that the vessels carrying these cargoes should be allowed to depart freely. The very day on which the German Minister's request was received, the Foreign Office brought the matter to the notice of the Mihistry of Finance, and the follow- ing day, the 2nd August, that Department informed us that instruc- tions had been forwarded to the Belgian Customs giving full and entire satisfaction to Germany. I cannot do better than enclose, for your information, copies of the correspondence exchanged on this subject with Herr Below Saleske. You will observe that nothing in our attitude can be taken as show- ing any hostile dispositions towards Germany; the steps taken by the Belgian Government at that time were nothing more than those simple precautions which it is the right and duty of every State to adopt in such exceptional circumstances. It would be as well that you should address a communication to the British Government in order to explain the real facts of the case. Enclosure 2 in No. 79. Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, to M. Bavignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sir, Brussels, July 31, 1914- I AM informed from Antwerp that the Customs have forbidden the despatch of vessels containing cargoes of grain for Germany. In view of the fact that it is not in this case a question of the export of grain, but of grain in transit, the goods in question having been merely transshipped at Antwerp, I have the honour to ask your good offices in order that the vessels in question may be allowed to leave for Germany. At the same time I beg your Excellency to inform me if the port of Antwerp is closed for the transit of those goods specified in the Moniteur of to-day. Awaiting your Excellency's reply at your earliest possible con- venience, I have, etc. Enclosure 3 in No. 79. M. Bavignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels. Sir, Brussels, August 1, 1914- In reply to your Excellency's note of the 31st July, I have the honour to inform you that the Belgian decree of the 30th July con- cerns only the export and not the transit of the products mentioned. I at once communicated your note to the Minister of Finance and begged him to issue precise instructions to the Customs officials in order that any error in the application of the above-mentioned decree might be avoided. 2l^ 514 Official Diplomatic Documents Enclosure 4 in No. 79. M. Damgnon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Be- low Saleske, German Minister at Brussels. Sir, Brussels, August 3, 1914. With reference to the note which your Excellency was good enough to address to me on the 31st July, I have the honour to in- form you that the Minister of Finance has instructed the Customs that the prohibitions established by the Royal decrees of the 30th July last, only apply to actual exports, and do not, therefore, extend to goods regularly declared in transit at the time of import. More- over, when duty-free goods are declared to be for actual consump- tion, although they are really intended for export, they are commonly the object of special declarations of free entry which are considered as transit documents. In short, if it should happen that such goods had been declared as for consumption without restriction, as though they were to remain in the country, the Customs would still allow them to leave the country as soon as it had been duly established by despatch receipts, bills of lading, etc., that they were to be exported forthwith in transit. I would add that the export of grain with which your note deals was authorised on the 1st August. (See note, page 509.) Tuesday, September 1, 1914 Great Britain publishes as an addition to her White Papers (later Blue Book) Sir Maurice de Bunsen's, former British Ambassador in Vienna, recollections of the events of the last days preceding the war. From Vienna British Blue Book No. 161 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador in Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. Sir, London, September 1, 1914- The rapidity of the march of events during the days which led up to the outbreak of the European war made it difficult, at the time, to do more than record their progress by telegraph. I propose now to add a few comments. The delivery at Belgrade on the 23rd July of the Austrian note to Servia was preceded by a period of absolute silence at the Ballplatz. Except Herr von Tschirscky,^ who must have been aware of the tenour if not of the actual words of the note, none of my colleagues were allowed to see through the veil. On the 22nd and 23rd July, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, had long interviews with Baron Macchio, one of the Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, 1 German Ambassador at Vienna. September 1, British Blue Book No. 161 515 by whom he was left under the impression that the words of warning he had been instructed to speak to the Austro-Hungarian Government had not been unavailing, and that the note which was being drawn up would be found to contain nothing with which a self-respecting State need hesitate to comply. At the second of these interviews he was not even informed that the note was at that very moment being presented at Belgrade, or that it would be published in Vienna on the following morning. Count Forgach, the other Under-Secre- tary of State, had indeed been good enough to confide to me on the same day the true character of the note, and the fact of its presen- tation about the time we were speaking. So little had the Russian Ambassador been made aware of what was preparing that he actually left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of absence about the 20th July. He had only been absent a few days when events compelled him to return. It might have been supposed that Duke Avarna, Ambassador of the allied Italian Kingdom, which was bound to be so closely affected by fresh complications in the Balkans, would have been taken fully into the confidence of Count Berchtold ^ during this critical time. In point of fact his Excellency was left completely in the dark. As for myself, no indication was given me by Count Berchtold of the impending storm, and it was from a private source that I received on the 15th July the forecast of what was about to happen which I telegraphed to you the follow- ing day. It is true that during all this time the Neue Freie Presse and other leading Viennese new^spapers were using language which pointed unmistakably to war with Servia. The official Fremderb- blatt, however, was more cautious, and till the note was published, the prevailing opinion among my colleagues was that Austria would shrink from courses calculated to involve her in grave European complications. On the 24th July the note was published in the newspapers. By common consent it was at once styled an ultimatum. Its integral acceptance by Servia was neither expected nor desired, and when, on the following afternoon, it was at first rumoured in Vienna that it had been unconditionally accepted, there was a moment of keen disappointment. The mistake was quickly corrected, and as soon as it was known later in the evening that the Servian reply had been rejected and that Baron Giesl ^ had broken off relations at Belgrade, Vienna burst into a frenzy of delight, vast crowds parading the streets and singing patriotic songs till the small hours of the morning. The demonstrations were perfectly orderly, consisting for the most part of organised processions through the principal streets ending up at the Ministry of War. One or two attempts to make hostile manifestations against the Russian Embassy were frustrated by the strong guard of police which held the approaches to the principal em- bassies during those days. The demeanour of the people at Vienna and, as I was informed, in many other principal cities of the Mon- 1 Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 2 Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade. 516 Official Diplomatic Documents archy, showed plainly the popularity of the idea of war with Servia, and there can be no doubt that the small body of Austrian and Hun- garian statesmen by whom this momentous step was adopted gauged rightly the sense, and it may even be said the determination, of the people, except presumably in portions of the provinces inhabited by the Slav races. There had been much disappointment in many quarters at the avoidance of war with Servia during the annexation crisis in 1908 and again in connection with the recent Balkan war. Count Berchtold's ^ peace policy had met with little sympathy in the Delegation. Now the flood-gates were opened, and the entire people and press clamoured impatiently for immediate and condign punish- ment of the hated Servian race. The country certainly believed that it had before it only the alternative of subduing Servia or of submitting sooner or later to mutilation at her hands. But a peaceful solution should first have been attempted. Few seemed to reflect that the forcible intervention of a Great Power in the Balkans must inevitably call other Great Powers into the field. So just was the cause of Austria held to be, that it seemed to her people inconceivable that any country should place itself in her path, or that questions of mere policy or prestige should be regarded anywhere as super- seding the necessity which had arisen to exact summary vengeance for the crime of Serajevo. The conviction had been expressed to me by the German Ambassador on the 24th July that Russia would stand aside. This feeling, which was also held at the Ballplatz, in- fluenced no doubt the course of events, and it is deplorable that no effort should have been made to secure by means of diplomatic nego- tiations the acquiescence of Russia and Europe as a whole in some peaceful compromise of the Servian question by which Austrian fears of Servian aggression and intrigue might have been removed for the future. Instead of adopting this course the Austro-Hungarian Government resolved upon war. The inevitable consequence en- sued. Russia replied to a partial Austrian mobilisation and decla- ration of war against Servia by a partial Russian mobilisation against Austria. Austria met this move by completing her own mobilisa- tion, and Russia again responded with results which have passed into history. The fate of the proposals put forward by His Majesty's Government for the preservation of peace is recorded in the White Paper on the European Crisis.^ On the 28th July I saw Count Berchtold and urged as strongly as I could that the scheme of media- tion mentioned in your speech in the House of Commons ^ on the previous day should be accepted as offering an honourable and peace- ful settlement of the question at issue. His Excellency himself read to me a telegraphic report of the speech, but added that matters had gone too far ; Austria was that day declaring war on Servia, and she could never accept the conference which you had suggested should take place between the less interested Powers on the basis of the ^ Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 2 "Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914)." 'See "Hansard," Vol. 65, No. 107, columns 931-933. , September 1, British Blue Book No. 161 517 Servian reply. This was a matter which must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said His Majesty's Government would hear with regret that hostilities could not be arrested, as you feared they would lead to European complications. I disclaimed any British lack of sympathy with Austria in the matter of her legitimate grievances against Servia, and pointed out that whereas Austria seemed to be making these the starting point of her policy, His Majesty's Government were bound to look at the question primarily from the point of view of the maintenance of the peace of Europe. In this way the two countries might easily drift apart. His Excellency said that he too was keeping the European aspect of the question in sight. He thought, however, that Russia would have no right to intervene after receiving his assurance that Austria sought no territorial aggrandisement. His Excellency remarked to me in the course of his conversation that, though he had been glad to co-operate towards bringing about the settlement which had re- sulted from the ambassadorial conferences in London during the Balkan crisis, he had never had much belief in the permanency of that settlement, which was necessarily of a highly artificial character, in- asmuch as the interests which it sought to harmonise were in them- selves profoundly divergent. His Excellency maintained a most friendly demeanour throughout the interview, but left no doubt in my mind as to the determination of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment to proceed with the invasion of Servia. The German Government claim to have persevered to the end in the endeavour to support at Vienna your successive proposals in the interest of peace. Herr von Tschirscky ^ abstained from inviting my co-operation or that of the French and Russian Ambassadors in carrying out his instructions to that effect, and I had no means of knowing what response he was receiving from the Austro-Hungarian Government. I was, however, kept fully informed by M. Schebeko, the Russian Ambassador, of his own direct negotiations with Count Berchtold. M. Schebeko endeavoured on the 28th July to persuade the Austro-Hungarian Government to furnish Count Szapary ^ with full powers to continue at St. Petersburgh the hopeful conversations which had there been taking place between the latter and M. Sazonof .^ Count Berchtold ^ refused at the time, but two days later (30th July), though in the meantime Russia had partially mobilised against Aus- tria, he received M. Schebeko ^ again, in a perfectly friendly manner, and gave his consent to the continuance of the conversations at St. Petersburgh. From now onwards the tension between Russia and Germany was much greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the latter an arrangement seemed almost in sight, and on the 1st August I was informed by M. Schebeko^ that Count Szapary ^ had at last conceded the main point at issue by announcing to M. 1 German Ambassador in Vienna. 2 Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. 3 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. < Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. ' Russian Ambassador in Vienna. 518 Official Diplomatic Documents Sazonof ^ that Austria would consent to submit to mediation the points in the note to Servia which seemed incompatible with the maintenance of Servian independence. M. Sazonof/ M. Schebeko ^ added, had accepted this proposal on condition that Austria would refrain from the actual invasion of Servia. Austria, in fact, had finally yielded, and that she herself had at this point good hopes of a peaceful issue is shown by the communication made to you on the 1st August by Count IMensdorff,^ to the effect that Austria had neither "banged the door" on compromise nor cut off the conversa- tions.^ M. Schebeko ^ to the end was working hard for peace. He was holding the most conciliatory language to Count Berchtold,^ and he informed me that the latter, as well as Count Forgach,^ had re- sponded in the same spirit. Certainly it was too much for Russia to expect that Austria w ould hold back her armies, but this matter could probably have been settled by negotiation, and M. Schebeko ^ repeat- edly told me he was prepared to accept any reasonable compromise. Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburgh and Vienna were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on the 31st July by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburgh and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which only one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on the 1st August, and on France on the 3rd August. A few days' delay might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history. Russia still abstained from attacking Austria, and M. Schebeko ^ had been instructed to remain at his post till war should actually be declared against her by the Austro-Hungarian Government. This only happened on the 6th August, when Count Berchtold ^ informed the foreign missions at Vienna that "the Austro-Hungarian Ambas- sador at St. Petersburgh had been instructed to notify the Russian Government that, in view of the menacing attitude of Russia in the Austro-Servian conflict and the fact that Russia had commenced hostilities against Germany, Austria-Hungary considered herself also at war with Russia." M. Schebeko ^ left quietly in a special train provided by the Austro- Hungarian Government on the 7th August. He had urgently re- quested to be conveyed to the Roumanian frontier, so that he might be able to proceed to his own country, but was taken instead to the Swiss frontier, and ten days later I found him at Berne. M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, stayed on till the 12th August. On the previous day he had been instructed to demand his passport on the ground that Austrian troops were being employed against France. This point was not fully cleared up when I left Vienna. ^ Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. ' Russian Ambassador in Vienna, ' Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. French Yellow Book No. 160 521 early in the morning of the 17th August. At the first halting place there had been some hooting and stone throwing on the part of the entraining troops and station officials, but no inconvenience was caused, and at the other large stations on our route we found that ample measures had been taken to preserve us from molestation as well as to provide us with food. I was left in no doubt that the Austro-Hungarian Government had desired that the journey should be performed under the most comfortable conditions possible, and that I should receive on my departure all the marks of consideration due to His Majesty's representative. I was accompanied by my own family and the entire staff of the embassy, for whose untiring zeal and efficient help in trying times I desire to express my sincere thanks. The Swiss Government also showed courtesy in providing comfortable accommodation during our journey from the frontier to Berne, and, after three days' stay there, on to Geneva, at which place we found that every provision had been made by the French Government, at the request of Sir Francis Bertie, for our speedy conveyance to Paris. We reached England on Saturday morning, the 22nd August. I have, etc. Maurice de Bunsen. (See note, p. 509.) Friday, September 4, 1914 France : To the French Ambassadors and Ministers Abroad French Yellow Book No. 160 DECLARATION OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE (September 4, 1914) Declaration M. Delcasse, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors and Ministers abroad. p^^^^ September 4, 1914. The following declaration has this morning been signed at the Foreign Office at London : — "The undersigned duly authorised thereto by their respective Governments hereby declare as follows : — "The British, French and Russian Governments mutually engage not to conclude peace separately during the present war. The three Governments agree that when terms of peace come to be discussed, no one of the Allies w ill demand terms of peace without the previous agreement of each of the other Allies. (Signed) "Paul Cambon. Count Benckendorff. Edward Grey.'' This declaration will be published to-day. Delcasse PART TWO THE PARTS OF THE SEVERAL OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS NOT PRINTED UNDER PART ONE I. The Austro-Hungarian Red Book Servian names are spelt as in the German original according to the Croatian system. The following is the signification of the sounds : — s = sh in the English " ship." c = ch in the English " church." c = (the same, softer). c = ts in the English " mats." j = y in the English " yell." gj = dj in the EngUsh " adjourn." z = j in the French "jour." INTRODUCTION Since the dynasty of the Karageorgevic ascended the blood-stained throne of Servia, and surrounded itself with those who had conspired against the life of King Alexander, the Kingdom has continually, though by different paths and with varied intensity, pursued the aim of undermining by hostile propaganda and revolutionary plots, those territories of Austria-Hungary which are inhabited by the Southern Slavs, in order to tear them away from the Monarchy, whenever the general political condition might be favourable to the realisation of the Great-Servian claims. To what a pitch the hopes of the kingdom on the Save had been raised, and how near she thought herself to the attainment of their aspirations, appeared in the embittered animosity and the deep dis- appointment which were created in this crazy and deluded country by the anexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and which brought her to the verge of war. Left in the lurch by Russia, the protecting Power, who did not at the moment consider herself sufficiently prepared, in the spring of 1909 the Servian Government found themselves compelled to give a solemn declaration before Europe, that they recognised the new political and international conditions which had been created by the annexation, and to acknowledge that the interests of Servia had not been affected thereby. They were also compelled to dissolve the gangs of armed men which had been raised against the Monarchy, and to undertake for the future to maintain friendly relations with Austria-Hungary. The expectations were not fulfilled that it would now be possible for the Monarchy to live in peace and good neighbourly relations with Servia, as she had lived during the rule of the Obrenovic, and, as was then the case, to show good will to, and further the interests of this State, which owes to Austria-Hungary the recognition of her independence at the Berlin Congress. The Servian Government who, 525 526 Official Diplomatic Documents by their promise, were under an obligation to maintain friendly and neighbourly relations with Austria-Hungary, permitted their press to foment hatred against the Monarchy in an unprecedented way ; they permitted associations formed on Servian territory under the leader- ship of high officers, civil servants, teachers and judges, publicly to pursue their aims with the object of stirring up revolution in the territories of Austria-Hungary; they did not prevent prominent members of their military and civil administration from poisoning the public conscience in such a way that common assassination was regarded as the best weapon in the struggle against the Monarchy. From the atmosphere created by this malicious agitation there sprang up a whole series of murderous attacks on high functionaries of the Monarchy, which ended in the execrable crime against the exalted person of the heir to the throne, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, which had been carefully prepared in Servia. However, the sacrifice of his life for the Fatherland, by which our enemies in their mad folly expected that the downfall of the Monarchy would be accelerated, brought all the peoples of Austria-Hungary together in fiery unanim- ity around the dynasty. The whole world learned how unshakable were the foundations on which the Monarchy rests, and how firmly and loyally her sons cling to one another. All felt it ; there was no room for any doubt that our honour, our self-respect and our deepest interest peremptorily demanded that we should deal with the criminal conspiracies of Servia and obtain guarantees for the security of Austria-Hungary. The unhappy experience which the Imperial and Royal Govern- ment had had with this dishonest neighbour showed us the only way by which our interests could be secured. It was necessary to present to Servia all such demands and to require from her such guarantees as would ensure the punishment of the accomplices in this shameful outrage and the suppression of the Great-Servian projects. Since the unparalleled patience of Austria- Hungary had been interpreted as weakness by Servia, the Belgrade Government must be made to understand that the Monarchy was determined if necessary to go to the utmost limit in order to maintain her prestige and the integrity of her territories ; and that she could not tolerate any longer the intrigues of the Save Kingdom, which were meant to deceive the Powers, by an apparent agreement to the de- mands of Austria-Hungary, while at the same time she kept open the possibility of continuing her underhand attack against the Monarchy as she had done after the solemn promise of 1909. Against the usual Servian tactics of using the most reprehensible means to work for the separation of the Southern-Slav territories of Austria-Hungary, and then, when the Monarchy called her to account, of seeking protection and impunity from the Powers, there was only one way open to the Imperial and Royal Government of protecting their territory, and making an end of the injury done to their commercial life by the constant repetition of the intolerable attacks engendered by Servian aspirations if they were to avoid endangering the peace AiLstro-Hungarian Red Book 527 of Europe. From the beginning, the Imperial and Royal Government met the apprehensions of the Powers with the assurance that the Monarchy would not go beyond what was necessary for the protection of her own interests, and did not propose any annexation of territory. Within these limits, which she had imposed upon herself, she must, however, insist that the controversy with Servia should be carried through as a question directly concerning Austria-Hungary and this State. The request made by Russia for an extension of the time given to Servia for answering our demands would have given the Belgrade Government an opportunity for new subterfuges and for further procrastination, and would have opened the door to the inter- ference of single Powers in the interests of Servia. It was therefore necessary to refuse any prolongation of the time limit. Although before sending her crafty and evasive answer, Servia had ordered general mobilisation, and thereby publicly proclaimed her hostility, the Monarchy waited two days before proceeding to a declaration of war. The suggestion of the British Government that the settle- ment of the Servian controversy should be entrusted to a conference of the Powers did not reach Vienna until after the opening of hostili- ties, and was therefore outstripped by events. This proposal was, however, in itself, not well suited to securing the interests of the Monarchy. Nothing but the integral acceptance of the Austro- Hungarian demands on the part of the Belgrade Government would have given a guarantee for a tolerable relationship with Servia. The Entente Powers, however, were guided by the desire of substituting for the effective demands of Austria-Hungary, which were painful to Servia, a method of compromise, by which every security for a future correct attitude on the part of the Save Kingdom would have been lost, and Servia would have been encouraged to continue her en- deavours to bring about a separation of the Southern territories of Austria-Hungary. When the Imperial and Royal Government demanded from Servia that she should punish those accomplices in the crime of Serajevo who were in Servian territory, and fulfil the duties which are a necessary condition for friendly relationship between neighbouring States, their only object was to protect our dynasty from outrage and the territory of the Monarchy from criminal intrigues. They w^ere repre- senting the common interest of the civilised world that murder and outrage should not be used with impunity as a weapon in political controversy, and that Servia should not continue incessantly to menace the peace of Europe by her aspirations. The Entente Powers were guilty of a serious wrong when, under the spell of their own political interests, they closed their ears to these postulates of public morality and humanity, and ranged themselves beside the Kingdom with its load of guilt. Had they listened to the assurances of the Monarchy which, by her conservative policy and her love of peace during the violent changes which had taken place in the Balkan Peninsula, had gained full right to their confidence, and had they maintained a waiting attitude towards the Servian conflict, the 528 Official Diplomatic Documents world-war would have been avoided. It is they who must be made answerable before history for-^the immeasurable suffering which has come upon the human race. There can be no doubt that the small Servian State would never have ventured, with an animosity which was scarcely concealed, to work for the separation from the great neighbouring Monarchy of the territories which were inhabited by Southern Slavs, if she had not been sure of the secret approval and protection of Russia, and if she had not been able to depend on the powerful pan-Slavist tendency in the Empire of the Czar forcing the Russian Government, if necessary, to come to the aid of the Kingdom in her struggle for the realisa- tion of the Great-Servian projects. In the course of the two last centuries the Russian Empire has extended over gigantic areas with the elementary force of a glacier, and has, again and again, subdued fresh races under the Musco- vite rule, suppressing their culture, religion and language. As the supreme and inflexible aim of this restless pressure towards universal dominion there stands before her the possession of the Dardanelles, which would secure to the Russian Empire predominance in the near East and in Asia Minor, and gain for Russian exports an opening independent of the will of other countries. As the realisation of these plans would injure important interests of Austria-Hungary and Germany, and as it was therefore bound to encounter the inevitable opposition of these Powers, it was the en- deavour of Russian policy to weaken their power of resistance. The powerful central European union which barred the way to the uni- versal dominion of Russia must be shattered, and Germany must be isolated. The first step was to hem in the Hapsburg Monarchy by the creation of the Balkan Union, and to undermine its authority by the pan-Slavist and Servian intrigues in its frontier territories. A necessary condition for carrying out this plan was the overthrow and expulsion of the Turks in order that the increased power of the Christian Balkan States should be available against the two central Powers. When the Balkan Union broke up owing to the quarrel over the territory which had been torn from Turkey, and the Russian plans were threatened with failure, "the Protector of the Slavs" allowed Bulgaria to be overthrown, humiliated and deprived of the largest share of the territory which she had won. The Balkan Union which, after the overthrow of the Turks, could now be directed rather against Austria-Hungary and Germany, and could be used by Russia and France for changing the relations of the European Powers, was to be set on foot again by the prospect of the acquisition of fresh terri- tories, planned at the cost of the jNIonarchy, through a successive pushing forward of frontier from east to west. In this criminal game of Russian diplomacy, which threatened the existence of the Monarchy and the peace of the world, Servia was a catspaw^ which Russia would not give up even in order to avoid general war. The Imperial and Royal Government — and the documents pro- Austro-Hungarian Red Book 529 vided in this collection give ample evidence of this — again and again almost up to the outbreak of war assured the Cabinet of St. Peters- burgh that they would not violate any Russian interest, would not annex any Servian territory, and would not touch the sovereignty of Servia, and that they were ready to enter into negotiations with the Russian Government on Austro-Hungarian and Russian interests. ' Russia, however, had not expressed herself as satisfied with the solemn declarations of the Imperial and Royal Government; as early as the 24th July, in the communique of that date, she assumed a threatening tone, and on the 29th July, although Austria-Hungary had not mobilised a single man against Russia, she ordered the mobilisation of the military districts of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow and Kasan ; this was a threat to the Monarchy ; on the 31st July she ordered general mobilisation, disregarding the repeated warnings of the Imperial and Royal Ambassador, and the declaration of the German Goverment, which had been made on the 26th, that prepara- tory military measures on the part of Russia would force Germany to counter measures w^hich must consist in the mobilisation of the army, and that mobilisation meant war. On the 24th July the Imperial and Royal Ambassador in conversa- tion with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, laid stress on the peaceful disposition of the Monarchy. Her only object was to make an end to the menace to our dynasty from Servian bombs, and to our territory from the revolutionary machinations of Servia. The attainment of this end was a vital question to the Monarchy. She could not, therefore, allow herself to be terrorised by the possi- bility of a conflict with Russia, in the event of that country taking Servia under her protection ; she must make an end of the intolerable situation, that a Russian charter should give the Servian Kingdom continued impunity in her hostility to Austria-Hungary. On the 30th July the British Secretary of State again suggested that Austria-Hungary, in her conflict with Servia, should avail herself of the mediation of the Powers. Guided by their desire to do the utmost in their power to maintain general peace, the Imperial and Royal Government declared themselves ready to accept this media- tion. The honour and the interest of Austria-Hungary, however, required that this should not take place under the pressure of the threatening measures of Russia. It was, therefore, a paramount necessity for her to require that the hostile measures of mobilisation in the Empire of the Czar should, first of all, be revoked. This demand the St. Petersburgh Cabinet answered by mobilising the whole of the Russian forces. In alliance with the self-seeking policy of Great Britain, and the desire for revanche of the French Republic, the St. Petersburgh Government disdained no means of securing predominance in Europe to the Triple Entente and paving the way for their boldest schemes. Russia's unscrupulous hands tried to weave the threads of her policy into a snare to be cast over the head of the Monarchy. When Austria-Hungary, following the dictates of self-preservation, deter- 2m 530 Official Diplomatic Documents mined to tear the web to pieces, Russia attempted to stay the hand of the Imperial and Royal Government and to humiliate the Monarchy. Exposed to the greatest danger in their vital interests, Austria- Hungary and Germany saw themselves confronted with the choice of protecting their rights and their safety, or of giving way before the threats of Russia. They took the road pointed out by honour and duty. French Yellow Book 531 n. The French YeUow Book CHAPTER I WARNINGS (1913) No. 1 M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Jonnart, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, March 17, 1913. Our naval and military attaches are sending to their respective Ministers reports on the new German military law. I take this opportunity of drawing the attention of your Excellency to these important documents. The consideration of the financial expedients by which Germany intends to provide for these military measures is the sole cause of the delay in the publication of the definite proposals of the Government. In spite of the patriotism with which the rich classes affect to accept the sacrifices asked of them, they are none the less, particularly the business circles, dissatisfied with the financial measures which have been announced, and they feel that a compulsory levy imposed in times of peace creates a formidable precedent for the future. On the other hand, the Federal Governments have strongly opposed an innovation which grants to the Empire resources derived from direct taxation. Hitherto, taxation of this kind has been reserved to the Federal States, and the latter see in the surrender of this principle a new declaration of the corporate unity (personalite) of the Empire, constituting a distinct diminution of their own sovereign power. However this may be, in increasing the strength of the German army the Empire desires to leave nothing to chance in the event of a possible crisis. The German changes have produced a result unexpected by that country, viz., the proposal of the Government of the Republic to re- establish the three years' service, and the manly determination with which this proposal has been welcomed in France. The surprise occasioned by these proposals has been utilised by the Imperial Government for the purpose of insisting on the absolute necessity of an increase of German military strength ; the German proposals are represented as a reply to our own. The reverse is the case, since the immense military effort which France is undertaking is but the conse- quence of German initiative. The Imperial Government is constantly rousing patriotic senti- ment. Every day the Emperor delights to revive memories of 1813. Yesterday evening a military tattoo went through the streets of Berlin, and speeches were delivered in which the present situation was com- pared to that of a hundred years ago. The trend of public opinion will find an echo in the speeches which will be delivered next month 532 Official Diplomatic Documents in the Reichstag, and I have reason to fear that the Chancellor himself will be forced to allude in his statements to the relations of France and Germany. It was of course to be expected that national patri- otism would be worked up just when fresh sacrifices are being required, but to compare the present time to 1813 is to misuse an historical analogy. If, to-day, there is anything corresponding to the movement which a hundred years ago roused Germans to fight the man of genius who aspired to universal dominion, it is in France that such a counter- part would have to be sought, since the French nation seeks but to protect itself against the domination of force. Nevertheless, it is true that the state of public opinion in both countries makes the situation grave. Jules Cambon. Enclosure I Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Serret, Military Attache to the French Embassy at Berlin, to M. Etienne, Minister of War. Berlin, March 15, 1913. The patriotic movement which has manifested itself in France has caused real anger in certain circles. I do not, indeed, mean to say that the virulent article in the Kolnische Zeitung is the expression of prevalent opinion. It is rather the angry outburst of an impulsive journalist, which has been im- mediately disavowed by the Government. However, in spite of its want of good manners the article in the Kolnische Zeitung cannot be disregarded; several important news- papers have approved of its substance, if not of its form, and it appears to express a real feeling, a latent anger. It is interesting to note this fact, because it throws very vivid light on the meaning of the present armaments. For some time now it has been quite a common thing to meet people who declare that the military plans of France are extraordinary and unjustified. In a drawing room a member of the Reichstag who is not a fanatic, speaking of the three years' service in France, went so far as to say, "It is a provocation; we will not allow it." More moderate persons, military and civil, glibly voice the opinion that France with her forty million inhabitants has no right to compete in this way with Germany. To sum up, people are angry, and this anger is not caused by the shrieking of certain French papers, to which sober-minded people pay little attention. It is a case of vexation. People are angry at realis- ing that in spite of the enormous effort made last year, continued and even increased this year, it will probably not be possible this time to outrun France completely. To outdistance us, since we neither will nor can be allied with her, is Germany's real aim. I cannot insist too much on the fact that the impending legislation, which French public opinion is too apt to con- French Yellow Booh 533 sider as a spontaneous outburst, is but the inevitable and expected consequence of the law of June, 1912. This law, while creating two new army corps, had deliberately, according to German fashion, left regiments and other large units incomplete. It was evident that there would be no long delay in filling in the gaps.^ The Balkan crisis, coming just at the right mo- ment, furnished a wonderful opportunity for exploiting the centenary of the War of Liberation, and obtaining with greater ease sacrifices through the memory of those made in days gone by, and that too at a time when Germany was opposed to France. In order to show clearly the genesis of this military programme, I beg to recall what was written by my predecessor Colonel Pelle a year ago, when the law of 1912 was published : " We are discovering every day how deep and lasting are the feelings of injured pride and revenge provoked against us by the events of last year. "The Treaty of the 4th November 1911 has proved a complete disillusion. " The feeling is the same in all parties. All Germans, even the Socialists, bear us a grudge for having taken away their share in Morocco. " It seemed a year or so ago, as if the Germans had set out to con- quer the world. They considered themselves so strong that no one would dare to oppose them. Limitless possibilities were opening out for German manufactures, German trade, German expansion. "Needless to say, these ideas and ambitions have not disappeared to-day. Germany still requires outlets for commercial and colonial expansion. They consider that they are entitled to them, because their population is increasing every day, because the future belongs to them. They consider us, with our forty million inhabitants, as a second rate power. "In the crisis of 1911, however, this second rate power successfully withstood them, and the Emperor and the Government gave way. Public opinion has forgiven neither them nor us. People are deter- mined that such a thing shall never happen again.'' And at the moment when the second and formidable part of the programme is about to be realised, when German military strength is on the point of acquiring that final superiority which, should the occa- sion arise, would force us to submit to humiliation or destruction, France suddenly refuses to abdicate, and shows, as Renan said, " her eternal power of renaissance and resurrection." The disgust of Germany can well be understood. Of course the Government points to the general situation in Europe and speaks of the "Slav Peril.'' As far as I can see, however, public opinion really seems indifferent to this "Peril," and yet it has ac- cepted with a good grace, if not with welcome, the enormous burdens of these two successive laws. 1 The problem which is set us to-day would, therefore, only be set again a few years later, and in a much more acute fashion, since the decrease of our contingents is con- tinually lowering the number of our effectives on a peace footing. 534 Official Diplomatic Documents On the 10th March last, being the centenary of the levee en masse of Germany against France, in spite of a downpour of rain, a huge crowd surged to the miUtary parade in front of the Schloss, in the middle of the Tiergarten, in front of the statues of Queen Louise and Frederick William III., which were surrounded by heaps of flowers. These anniversaries, recalling as they do the fight with France, will be repeated the whole year through. In 1914 there will be a centenary of the first campaign in France, the first entry of the Prussians into Paris. To sum up, if public opinion does not actually point at France, as does the Kolnische Zeitung, we are in fact, and shall long remain, the nation aimed at. Germany considers that for our forty millions of inhabitants our place in the sun is really too large. Germans wish for peace — so they keep on proclaiming, and the Emperor more than anyone — but they do not understand peace as involving either mutual concessions or a balance of armaments. They want to be feared and they are at present engaged in making the neces- sary sacrifices. If on some occasion their national vanity is wounded, the confidence which the country will feel in the enormous superiority of its army will be favourable to an explosion of national anger, in the face of which the moderation of the Imperial Government will perhaps be powerless. It must be emphasised again that the Government is doing every- thing to increase patriotic sentiment by celebrating with eclat all the various anniversaries of 1813. The trend of public opinion would result in giving a war a more or less national character. By whatever pretext Germany should justify the European. conflagration, nothing can prevent the first decisive blows being struck at France. Enclosure II M. de Faramond, Naval Attache to the French Embassy at Berlin, to M. Baudin, Minister of Marine. Berlin, March 15, 1913, In reporting on the examination of the Naval budget by the Finan- cial Committee of the Reichstag, I said that no Naval law would be introduced this year having as its object an increase of the fleet, and that the whole of the military effort would be directed against us. Although the new Bill, having for its object the increase of the German effectives, has not yet been presented to the Reichstag, we know that it deals with " an increase of military strength of immense scope," to use the expression of the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung. The official newspapers have also referred to the military proposal in terms which enable us to consider the communique of the Lokal Anzeiger as accurate. The German effectives reach at the present moment 720,000 men. We are, therefore, entitled to conclude that on the 1st October, 1914, French Yellow Book 535 the Imperial army will be raised to a figure not far removed from 860,000. The importance of this figure would not be so great if the provisions of the proposed legislation (as far as one can gather from the official newspapers) did not tend, as, in fact, those of the law of 1912 tend, to place the army corps nearest to our frontier in a state which most nearly approaches a war footing, in order to be able on the very day of the outbreak of hostilities, to attack us suddenly with forces very much stronger than our own. It is absolutely imperative for the Imperial Government to obtain success at the very outset of the operations. The conditions under which the German Emperor would nowadays commence a campaign against France are not those of forty years ago. At the commencement of the war of 1870 the Prussian General Staff had considered the possibility of a victorious French offensive, and Moltke, seeing that we might conceivably get as far as Mayence, remarked to his sovereign, " There they will come to a stop." William II. cannot allow a retreat to enter into his calculations, although the German soldier is no longer to-day what he was forty years ago, a plain religious man, ready to die at the order of his king. When it is remembered that at the last elections 4,000,000 votes were cast by the Socialists and that the franchise is only obtained in Germany at the age of 25, it may be presumed that the active army, composed of young men from 20 to 25, must contain in its ranks a considerable proportion of Socialists. It would indeed be foolish to think that the German Socialists will throw down their rifles on the day when France and Germany come to blows ; but it will be very important that the Imperial Government should persuade them that on the one hand we are the aggressors, and on the other that they can have entire confidence in the direction of the campaign and its final result. On the last occasion when the recruits for the Guard took the oath at Potsdam I was struck to hear the Emperor take as a theme for his address to the young soldiers "the duty of being braver and more disciplined in adversity than in success.'' And it is because a German defeat at the outset would have such an incalculable effect on the Empire, that we find in all the plans worked out by the General Staff proposals for a crushing offensive movement against France. In reality the Imperial Government wishes to be in a position to meet all possible eventualities. It is from the direction of France that the danger seems to them greatest. The Kdlnische Zeitiing has said as much in an article both spiteful and violent, the form rather than the substance of which has been disavowed by the Wilhelmstrasse. But w^e must be willing to realise that the opinion expressed by the Kdlnische Zeitung is at the present moment that of the immense majority of the German people. In this connection I think it is interesting to quote a conversation which a member of our Embassy had the other evening with the old 536 Official Diplomatic Documents Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck, as it may serve to reflect the opinions which dominate Court circles. Referring to the new German miHtary proposals Prince Donners- marck spoke as follows : — " French people are quite wrong in thinking that we harbour evil designs and want war. But we cannot forget that in 1870 popular opinion forced the French Government to make a foolish attack on us before they were ready. Who can assure us that public opinion, which in France is so easily inflamed, will not force the Government to declare war? It is against this danger that we wish to protect ourselves." And the Prince added : " I have even been considered in France as one of those responsible for the war of 1870. That is quite false. Even if I took part in the war after it had begun, I did my utmost to prevent its outbreak. A short time before the war, happening to be at a dinner where there were some of the most important personages of the Imperial Government, I expressed my regret at the hostile sentiments which were already becoming manifest between France and Prussia. The answer was that, if I spoke like that, it was because I was afraid of a struggle in which the issue would certainly be un- favourable to Prussia. I replied, * No, it is not because I am afraid that I repudiate the idea of war between France and Prussia, but rather because I think that it is in the interest of both countries to avoid war. And since you have referred to the possible result of such a struggle I will give you my opinion. I am convinced that you will be beaten and for this reason. In spite of the brilliant qualities which I recognise are possessed by the French and which I admire, you are not sufficiently accurate ; by accuracy I do not mean arriving in time at a meeting, but I mean punctuality in the whole sense of the word. Frenchmen, who have a great facility for work, are not as punctual as Germans in the fulfilment of their duty. In the coming war that na- tion will be victorious whose servants from the top of the ladder to the bottom will do their duty with absolute exactitude, however important or small it may be.' " And Prince Donnersmarck added : " An exacti- tude which played so great a role forty years ago in moving an army of 500,000 men will have a far greater importance in the next war, when it will be a question of moving masses far more numerous." In this way the old Prince gave expression to the confidence shared by all Germans in the superiority of their military organisation. When I spoke above of the new German proposal I only alluded to increased effectives. But the proposal will include also an increase of material and of defence works, the details of which are not known, but some idea of which may be gained by the figure estimated to be neces- sary to meet the expenses, viz., 1,250,000,000 francs. The carrying into effect of the law of the quinquennium of 1911 did not necessitate any special financial measures. The military and naval law of 1912 has been provisionally covered by the Budget surplus of the years 1910 and 1911, by the reform of the law with regard to alcohol and by delaying the reduction French Yellow Book 537 of the tax on sugar. (These last two resources only represent to- gether the sum of 60,000,000 francs.) It must also be remembered that large loans have recently been raised by the Empire and Prussia : 500,000,000 marks on the 29th January, 1912, and 350,000,000 marks on the 7th March, 1913. Quite an important part of these loans must have been applied to military expenses. The military law of 1913 will require quite exceptional financial measures. According to the indications given by the semi-official press, the "non-recurring" expenditure will amount to a milliard marks, while the "permanent" annual expenditure resulting from the increase of effectives will exceed 200,000,000 marks. It seems certain that the "non-recurring" expenditure will be covered by a war contribution levied on capital. Small fortunes would be exempted and those above 20,000 marks would be subject to a progressive tax. Presented in this guise the war tax would not be objected to by the Socialists, who will be able, in accordance with their usual tactics, to reject the principle of the military law and at the same time to pass the votes which assure its being carried into effect. The Government are afraid that among the rich and bourgeois classes this extraordinary tax of a milliard levied exclusively on acquired capital will cause permanent discontent. Accordingly they are doing everything in their power to persuade those on whom so heavy an exaction is to be levied that the security of the Empire is threatened, establishing for the purpose an analogy between the war- like times of 1813 and the present day. By noisy celebrations of the centenary of the War of Independence it is desired to convince people of the necessity of sacrifice, and to remind them that France is to-day, as 100 years ago, their hereditary enemy. If it is established that the German Government are doing their utmost to secure that the payment of this enormous tax should be made in full, and not by way of instalment, and if, as some of the newspapers say, the whole payment is to be complete before 1st July, 1914, these facts have a formidable significance for us, for nothing can explain such haste on the part of the military authorities to ob- tain war treasure in cash to the amount of a milliard. With regard to the manner in which the permanent expenditure resulting from the application of the laws of 1912 to 1913 is to be met, nothing has yet been said. Further legislation will certainly be neces- sary in order that the required annual amounts may be forthcoming. To sum up : In Germany the execution of military reforms always follows very closely the decision to carry them out. All the provi- sions made by the law of the quinquennium of 1911 and by the law of 1912 have already been put into operation. It is quite possible that part of the material, the purchase of which will be authorised by the new law, is already in course of manufacture. Military secrets 538 Official Diplomatic Documents are so well kept here that it is extremely difficult to follow the changes in personnel and materiel. With 700,000 men under arms (without counting the very large number of reservists who are at the present time in training), a perfect military organisation and a public opinion which can be swayed by the warlike appeals of the Military and Naval Leagues, the German people is at the present moment a very dangerous neighbour. If the three years' service is adopted and immediately applied in France, the conditions will be less unequal next year. The German effectives will still be considerably more numerous than ours, but the call to the Colours of all available contingents will no longer allow any selection, and will bring into the ranks of the German army elements of inferior quality and even some undesirable individuals. The morale of the active army will deteriorate. Germany has wished to upset the equilibrium of the two camps which divide Europe by a supreme effort beyond which they can do little more. They did not think that France wa3 capable of a great sacrifice. Our adoption of the three years' service will upset their calculations. Faramond. No. 2 M. EtiennCf Minister of War, to M. Jonnart, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Paris, April 2, 1913. I HAVE just received from a reliable source an official secret report concerning the strengthening of the German army. The report is divided into two parts; the first consisting of general statements, the second dealing with technicalities and describing in the greatest detail, for each branch of the service, the measures to be adopted. Especially striking are the instructions with regard to the employ- ment of motor-traction and the utilisation of aircraft. I have the honour to enclose a copy of the first part of ^ this docu- ment, which seems to merit your attention. Etienne. Enclosure Memorandum on the strengthening of the German Army. Berlin, March 19, 1913. I. — General Memorandum on the new Military Laws The increase has taken place in three stages : — (1) The Conference of Algeciras has removed the last doubt with regard to the existence of an Entente between France, Great Britain, and Russia. Moreover we have seen that Austria-Hungary was French Yellow Book 539 obliged to keep some of her forces mobilised against Servia and Italy; finally our fleet was not at that time sufficiently strong. At the end of the dispute the first matter taken in hand was the strengthen- ing of our coast defences and the increase of our naval forces. To meet the British plan of sending an Expeditionary Force of 100,000 men to the Continent, it would be necessary to make a better forma- tion of reserves to be used according to circumstances in the protec- tion of the Coast, in fortresses and in siege operations. It was already clear at that time that it would be absolutely necessary to make a great effort. (2) The French having violated the Morocco Conventions brought on the incident of Agadir. At that time the progress made by the French army, the moral recovery of the nation, the technical advance in the realm of aviation and of machine guns rendered an attack on France less easy than in the previous period. Further, an attack by the British fleet had to be considered. This difficult situation opened our eyes to the necessity for an increase in the army. This increase was from this moment considered as a minimum. (3) The war in the Balkans might have involved us in a war in support of our ally. The new situation in the south of Austria- Hungary lessened the value of the help which this ally could give us. On the other hand, France was strengthened by a new hi des cadres; it was accordingly necessary to anticipate the date of execution con- templated by the new military law. Public opinion is being prepared for a new increase in the active army, which would ensure Germany an honourable peace and the possibility of properly ensuring her influence in the affairs of the world. The new army law and the supplementary law which should follow will enable her almost completely to attain this end. Neither ridiculous shriekings for revenge by French chauvinists, nor the Englishmen's gnashing of teeth, nor the wild gestures of the Slavs will turn us from our aim of protecting and extending Deutsch- tum (German influence) all the world over. The French may arm as much as they wish, they cannot in one day increase their population. The employment of an army of black men in the theatre of European operations will remain for a long time a dream, and in any case be devoid of beauty. II. — Aim and Obligations of our National Policy, of our Army, AND OF THE SPECIAL ORGANISATIONS FOR ArMY PURPOSES Our new army law is only an extension of the military education of the German nation. Our ancestors of 1813 made greater sacrifices. It is our sacred duty to sharpen the sword that has been pyt into our hands and to hold it ready for, defence as well as for offence. We must allow the idea to sink into the minds of our people that our armaments are an answer to the armaments and policy of the French. We must accus- tom them to think that an offensive war on our part is a necessity, in order to combat the provocations of our adversaries. We must act 540 Official Diplomatic Documents with prudence so as not to arouse suspicion, and to avoid the crises which might injure our economic existence. We must so manage matters that under the heavy weight of powerful armaments, con- siderable sacrifices, and strained political relations, an outbreak (Losschlagen) should be considered as a relief, because after it would come decades of peace and prosperity, as after 1870. We must prepare for war from the financial point of view ; there is much to be done in this direction. We must not arouse the distrust of our financiers, but there are many things which cannot be concealed. We must not be anxious about the fate of our colonies. The final i;esult in Europe will settle their position. On the other hand we must stir up trouble in the north of Africa and in Russia. It is a means of keeping the forces of the enemy engaged. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that we should open up relations, by means of well-chosen agents, with influential people in Egypt, Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco, in order to prepare the measures which would be necessary in the case of a European war. Of course in case of war we should openly recog- nise these secret allies; and on the conclusion of peace we should secure to them the advantages which they had gained. These aims are capable of realisation. The first attempt which was made some years ago opened up for us the desired relations. Unfortunately these relations were not sufficiently consolidated. Whether we like it or not it will be necessary to resort to preparations of this kind, in order to bring a campaign rapidly to a conclusion. Risings provoked in time of war by political agents need to be carefully prepared and by material means. They must break out simultaneously with the destruction of the means of communication ; they must have a controlling head to be found among the influential leaders, religious or political. The Egyptian School is particularly suited to this purpose ; more and more it serves as a bond between the intellectuals of the Mohammedan World. However this may be, we must be strong in order to annihilate at one powerful swoop our enemies in the east and west. But in the next European war it will also be necessary that the small states should be forced to follow us or be subdued. In certain conditions their armies and- their fortified places can be rapidly conquered or neutralised ; this would probably be the case with Belgium and Hol- land, so as to prevent our enemy in the west from gaining territory which they could use as a base of operations against our flank. In the north we have nothing to fear from Denmark or Scandinavia, espe- cially as in any event we shall provide for the concentration of a strong northern army, capable of replying to any menace from this direction. In the most unfavourable case, Denmark might be forced by Great Britain to. abandon her neutrality ; but by this time the decision would already hav^ been reached both on land and on sea. Our northern army, the strength of which could be largely increased by Dutch formations, would oppose a very active defence to any offen- sive measures from this quarter. In the south, Switzerland forms an extremely solid bulwark, and French Yellow Book 541 we can rely on her energetically defending her neutrality against France, and thus protecting our flank. As was stated above, the situation with regard to the small states on our northwestern frontier cannot be viewed in quite the same light. This will be a vital question for us, and our aim must be to take the offensive with a large superiority from the first days. For this purpose it will be necessary to concentrate a large army, followed up by strong Landwehr formations, which will induce the small states to follow us or at least to remain inactive in the theatre of operations, and which would crush them in the event of armed resistance. If we could induce these states to organise their system of fortification in such a manner as to constitute an effective protection for our flank we could abandon the proposed invasion. But for this, army reorganisa- tion, particularly in Belgium, would be necessary in order that it might really guarantee an effective resistance. If, on the contrary, their defensive organisation was established against us, thus giving definite advantages to our adversary in the west, we could in no circumstances offer Belgium a guarantee for the security of her neutrality. Accordingly, a vast field is open to our diplomacy to work in this country on the lines of our interests. The arrangements made with this end in view allow us to hope that it will be possible to take the offensive immediately after the complete concentration of the army of the Lower Rhine. An ultima- tum with a short time-limit, to be followed immediately by invasion, would allow a sufficient justification for our action in international law. Such are the duties which devolve on our army and which demand a striking force of considerable numbers. If the enemy attacks us, or if we wish to overcome him, we will act as our brothers did a hun- dred years ago; the eagle thus. provoked will soar in his flight, will seize the enemy in his steel claws and render him harmless. We will then remember that the provinces of the ancient German Empire, the County of Burgundy and a large part of Lorraine, are still in the hands of the French; that thousands of brother Germans in thei Baltic provinces are groaning under the Slav yoke. It is a national question that Germany's former possessions should be restored to her. No. 3 M. Jules Camhon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Stephen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, May 6, 1913. I WAS talking this evening to the Secretary of State about the conference of Ambassadors and the results obtained at the meeting in London yesterday. The crisis with which Europe was threatened is in his opinion over, but only temporarily. "It seems to me," said Herr von Jagow, "that we are travelling in a mountainous district. We have just reached a difficult pass and we see other heights rising 542 Official Diplomatic Documents in front of us/' "The height which we have just surmounted," I repUed, "was, perhaps, the most difficult to cross." The crisis which we have just gone through has been very serious. Here the danger of war has been considered imminent. I have proof of the anxiety of the German Government by a number of facts which it is important that your Excellency should know. I received yesterday a visit from one of my colleagues with whom I maintain special and cordial relations. On the occasion of the visit he paid to Herr von Jagow, the latter asked my colleague confiden- tially what was exactly the situation of Russia in the Far East, and whether this Power had at the present time any cause for fear which, might necessitate the retention of its troops in that quarter. The Ambassador answered him that he knew of nothing, absolutely noth- ing, which could be a cause of preoccupation for the Russian Govern- ment, and that the latter have their hands free in Europe. I said above that the danger of war had been regarded here as extremely near. The Government have not been satisfied with investigating the position in the Far East ; preparations have even been made here. The mobilisation of the German army is not restricted to the recall of reservists to their barracks. There is in Germany a preliminary measure which we have not got, and which consists in warning officers and men of the reserve to hold themselves ready for the call, in order that they may make the necessary arrangements. It is a general call to "attention," and it requires an incredible spirit of submission, discipline, and secrecy such as exists in this country, to make a step of this kind possible. If such a warning were given in France, a thrill would run through the whole country, and it would be in the papers the next day. This warning was given in 1911 during the negotiations which I was carrying on w^ith regard to Morocco. Now it has been given again about ten days ago — that is to say, at the moment of the Austro- Albanian tension. I know that this is so, and I have it from several different sources, notably from officers of the reserve who have told it to their friends in the strictest con- fidence. These gentlemen have taken the necessary measures to put aside in a safe the means of existence for their families for a year. It has even been said that it was for this reason that the Crown Prince, who was to make the trial trip on the Imperator, did not embark. The decision which occasioned this preliminary mobilisation order IS quite in keeping with the ideas of the General Staff. On this point I have been informed of some remarks made in a German milieu by General von Moltke, who is considered here as the most distinguished officer of the German army. The intention of the General Staff is to act by surprise. " We must put on one side," said General von Moltke, "all commonplaces as to the responsibility of the aggressor. When war has become necessary it is essential to carry it on in such a way as to place all the chances in one's own favour. Success alone justifies war. Germany French Yellow Book 543 cannot and ought not to leave Russia time to mobilise, for she would then be obliged to maintain on her Eastern frontier so large an army that she would be placed in a position of equality, if not of inferiority, to that of France. Acordingly," added the General, "we must anticipate our principal adversary as soon as there are nine chances to one of going to war, and begin it without delay in order ruthlessly to crush all resistance." This represents exactly the attitude of military circles and it cor- responds to that of political circles ; the latter, however, do not con- sider Russia, in contradistinction to us, as a necessary enemy. This is what was being thought and said privately a fortnight ago. From these events the following conclusions may be drawn which comprise the facts stated above ; these people are not afraid of war, they fully accept its possibility and they have consequently taken the necessary steps. They wish to he always ready. As I said, this demands qualities of secrecy, discipline and of per- sistence ; enthusiasm alone is not sufficient. This lesson may form a useful subject of meditation when the Government of the Republic ask Parliament for the means of strengthening the defences of the country. Jules Cambon. No. 4 M. Allize, French Minister in Bavaria, to M. Stephen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Munich, July 10, 1913. From a political point of view people are asking what is the object of the new armaments. Recognising that no one threatens Germany, they consider that German diplomacy had already at its disposal forces sufficiently large and alliances sufficiently powerful to protect German interests with success. As I pointed out the day after the Morocco agreement of 1911, it is thought that the Imperial Chancery will be as incapable in the future as in the past, of adopting an active foreign policy and of achieving, at least in this sphere, successes which would justify the burdens which the nation has assumed. This frame of mind is all the more a cause of anxiety as the Imperial Government would find themselves supported by public opinion in any enterprise on which they might energetically embark, even at the risk of a confiict. The state of war to which all the events in the East have accustomed people's minds for the last two years appears no longer like some distant catastrophe, but as a solution of the polit- ical and economic difficulties which will continue to increase. May the example of Bulgaria exercise a salutary influence on Ger- many. As the Prince Regent recently said to me, " The fortune of war is always uncertain ; every war is an adventure, and the man is a fool who risks it believing himself sure of victory." Allize. 544 Official Diplomatic Documents No. 5 Report to M. Stephen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs (on Public Opinion in Germany according to the Reports of the Diplomatic and Consular Agents). Paris, July 30, 1913. From observations which our agents in Germany have been able to collect from persons having access to the most diverse circles, it is possible to draw the conclusion that two feelings sway and irritate men's minds : — (1) The Treaty of the 4th November, 1912, is considered a dis- appointment for Germany ; (2) France — a new France — undreamed of prior to the summer of 1911 is considered to be a warlike country, and to want war. Members of all the parties in the Reichstag, from the Conservatives to the Socialists, representing the most different districts of Germany, university people from Berlin, Halle, Jena, and Marburg, students, elementary school teachers, commercial clerks, bank clerks, bankers, artisans, merchants, manufacturers, doctors, law^^ers, editors of Democratic and Socialistic newspapers, Jewish publicists, members of trade unions, clergymen and shopkeepers from the Mark of Branden- burg, country squires from Pomerania and shoemakers from Stettin celebrating the 505th anniversary of their association, country gentle- men, officials, priests, and large farmers from Westphalia, are unan- imous on these two points, with very slight differences corresponding to their position in society or their political party. Here is a syn- thesis of all these opinions : The Treaty of the 4thiNovember is a diplomatic defeat, a proof of the incapacity of German diplomacy and the carelessness of the Government (so often denounced), a proof that the future of the Empire is not safe without a new Bismarck ; it is a national humilia- tion, a lowering in the eyes of Europe, a blow to German prestige, all the more serious because up to 1911 the military supremacy of Ger- many was unchallenged, and French anarchy and the powerlessness of the Republic were a sort of German dogma. In July, 1911, the "Coup of Agadir'' made the Morocco question for the first time a national question affecting the life and expansion of the Empire. The revelations and the press campaign which followed, have sufficiently proved how the campaign has been organ- ised, what Pan-German greed it had awakened, and what hatred it had left behind. If the Emperor was discussed, the Chancellor unpopular, Herr von Kiderlen was the best-hated man in Germany last winter. However, he begins to be merely thought little of, for he allows it to be known that he will have his revenge. Thus, during the summer of 1911, German public opinion became restive when confronted with French opinion with regard to Morocco. And the attitude of France, her calmness, her re-born spiritual unity, her resolution to make good her rights right up to the end, the fact that she has the audacity not to be afraid of war, these things are the French Yellow Booh 545 most persistent and the gravest cause of anxiety and bad temper on the part of German public opinion. Why then did not Germany go to war during the summer of 1911, since pubhc opinion although not so unanimous and determined as French public opinion, was certainly favourable? Apart from the pacific disposition of the Emperor and the Chancellor, military and financial reasons made themselves felt. But these events of 1911 have caused a profound disillusionment in Germany. A new France united, determined, resolved not to be intimidated any longer, has emerged from the shroud in which she had been seen burying herself for the last ten years. Public opinion in Germ-any, from December to May, from the columns of the press of all parties, which reproached the Imperial Government for their incapacity and cowardice has discovered with surprise mingled with irritation that the country conquered in 1870 had never ceased since then to carry on war, to float her flag and maintain the prestige of her arms in Asia and Africa, and to conquer vast territories ; that Ger- many on the other hand had lived on her reputation, that Turkey is the only country in which during the reign of William II. she had made moral conquests, and these were now compromised by the disgrace of the Morocco solution. Each time that France made a colonial conquest this consolation was offered: — "Yes, but that does not prevent the decadence, anarchy, and dismemberment of France at home." The public were mistaken and public opinion was misled. Given this German public opinion that considers France as longing for war, what can be augured for the future as regards the possibility and proximity of war ? German public opinion is divided into two currents on the question of the possibility and proximity of war. There are in the country forces making for peace, but they are unorganised and have no popular leaders. They consider that war would be a social misfortune for Germany, and that caste pride, Prussian domination, and the manufacturers of guns and armour plate would get the greatest benefit, but above all that war would profit Great Britain. The forces consist of the following elements : — The bulk of the workmen, artisans and peasants, who are peace- loving by instinct. Those members of the nobility detached from military interests and engaged in business, such as the grands seigneurs of Silesia and a few other personages very influential at Court, who are sufficiently en- lightened to realise the disastrous political and social consequences of war, even if successful. Numerous manufacturers, merchants and financiers in a moderate way of business, to whom war, even if successful, would mean bank- ruptcy, because their enterprises depend on credit, and are chiefly supported by foreign capital. Poles, inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, and Schleswg-Holstein — 2> 546 Official Diplomatic Documents conquered, but not assimilated and sullenly hostile to Prussian policy. There are about 7,000,000 of these annexed Germans. Finally, the Governments and the governing classes in the large southern states — Saxony, Bavaria, Wurtemburg, and the Grand Duchy of Baden — are divided by these two opinions : —'an unsuc- cessful war would compromise the Federation from which they have derived great economic advantages; a successful war would only profit Prussia and Prussianisation, against which they have diffi- culty in defending their political independence and administrative autonomy. These classes of people either consciously or instinctively prefer peace to war ; but they are only a sort of makeweight in political matters, with limited influence on public opinion, or they are silent social forces, passive and defenceless against the infection of a wave of warlike feeling. An example will make this idea clear : — The 110 Socialist members of the Reichstag are in favour of peace. They would be unable to prevent war, for war does not depend upon a vote of the Reichstag, and in the presence of such an eventuality the greater part of their number would join the rest of the country in a chorus of angry excite- ment and enthusiasm. Finally it must be observed that these supporters of peace believe in war in the mass because they do not see any other solution for the present situation. In certain contracts, especially in publishers' contracts, a clause has been introduced cancelling the contract in the case of war. They hope, however, that the will of the Emperor on the one side, France's difficulties in Morocco on the other, will be for some time a guarantee of peace. Be that as it may, their pes- simism gives free play to those who favour war. People sometimes speak of a military party in Germany. The expression is inaccurate, even if it is intended to convey the idea that Germany is the country where military power is supreme, as it is said of France that it is the country where the civil power is supreme. There exists a state of mind which is more worthy of attention than this historical fact, because it constitutes a danger more evident and more recent. There is a war party, with leaders, and followers, a press either convinced or subsidised for the purpose of creating public opinion ; it has means both varied and formidable for the intimida- tion of the Government. It goes to work in the country with clear ideas, burning aspirations, and a determination that is at once thrilling and fixed. Those in favour of war are divided into several categories ; each of these derives from its social caste, its class, its intellectual and moral education, its interests, its hates, special arguments which create a general attitude of mind and increase the strength and rapidity of the stream of warlike desire. Some want war because in the present circumstances they think it is inevitable. And, as far as Germany is concerned, the sooner the better. Others regar^ war as necessary for economic reasons based on over- French Yellow Book 547 population, over-production, the need for markets and outlets; or for social reasons, i.e., to provide the outside interests that alone can prevent or retard the rise to power of the democratic and socialist masses. Others, uneasy for the safety of the Empire, and believing that time is on the side of France, think that events should be brought to an immediate head. It is not unusual to meet, in the course of conversa- tion or in the pages of patriotic pamphlets, the vague but deeply rooted conviction that a free Germany and a regenerated France are two historical facts mutually incompatible. Others are bellicose from " Bismarckism " as it may be termed. They feel themselves humiliated at having to enter into discussions with France, at being obliged to talk in terms of law and right in negotiations and conferences where they have not always found it easy to get right on their side, even when they have a preponderating force. From their still recent past they derive a sense of pride ever fed by personal memories of former exploits, by oral traditions, and by books, and irritated by the events of recent years. Angry dis- appointment is the unifying force of the Wehrvereine, and other asso- ciations of Young Germany. Others again want war from a mystic hatred of revolutionary France ; others finally from a feeling of rancour. These last are the people who heap up pretexts for war. Coming to actual facts, these feelings take concrete form as follows : — The country squires represented in the Reichstag by the Conserva- tive party want at all costs to escape the death duties, which are bound to come if peace continues. In the last sitting of the session which has just closed, the Reichstag agreed to these duties in principle. It is a serious attack on the interests and privileges of the landed gentry. On the other hand this aristocracy is military in character, and it is instructive to compare the Army List with the year book of the nobility. War alone can prolong its prestige and support its family interest. During the discussions on the Army Bill, a Conser- vative speaker put forward the need for promotion among officers as an argument in its favour. Finally, this social class which forms a hierarchy with the King of Prussia as its supreme head, realises with dread the democratisation of Germany and the increasiilg power of the Socialist party, and considers its own days numbered. Not only does a formidable movement hostile to agrarian protection threaten its material interests, but in addition, the number of its political representatives decreases with each legislative period. In the Reichstag of 1878, out of 397 members, 162 belonged to the aristocracy ; in 1898, 83 ; in 1912, 57. Out of this number 27 alone belong to the Right, 14 to the Centre, 7 to the Left, and one sits among the Socialists. The higher bourgeoisie, represented by the National Liberal Party, the party of the contented spirits, have not the same reasons as the squires for wanting war. With a few exceptions, however, they are bellicose. They have their reasons, social in character. 548 Official Diplomatic Documents The higher bourgeoisie is no less troubled than the aristocracy at the democratisation of Germany. In 1871 they had 125 members in the Reichstag ; in 1874, 155 ; in 1887, 99 ; in 1912, 45. They do not forget that in the years succeeding the war they played the leading role in parliament, helping Bismarck in his schemes against the country squires. Uneasily balanced to-day between Conservative instincts and Liberal ideas, they look to war to settle problems which their parliamentary representatives are painfully incapable of solving. In addition, doctrinaire manufacturers declare that the difficulties between themselves and their workmen originate in France, the home of revolutionary ideas of freedom — without France industrial unrest would be unknown. Lastly, there are the manufacturers of guns and armour plate, big merchants who demand bigger markets, bankers who are speculating on the coming of the golden age and the next war indemnity — all these regard war as good business. Amongst the " Bismarckians " must be reckoned officials of all kinds, represented fairly closely in the Reichstag by the Free Con- servatives or Imperial Party. This is the party of the "pensioned," whose impetuous sentiments are poured out in the Post. They find disciples and political sympathisers in the various groups of young men whose minds have been trained and formed in the public schools and universities. The universities, if we except a few distinguished spirits, develop a warlike philosophy. Economists demonstrate by statistics Ger- many's need for a colonial and commercial empire commensurate with the industrial output of the Empire. There are sociological fanatics who go even further. The armed peace, so they say, is a crushing burden on the nations, it checks improvement in the lot of the masses, and assists the growth of socialism. France by clinging obstinately to her desire for revenge opposes disarmament. Once for all she must be reduced, for a century, to a state of impotence ; that is the best and speediest way of solving the social problem. Historians, philosophers, political pamphleteers and other apolo- gists of German Kultur wish to impose upon the world a way of think- ing and feeling specifically German. They wish to wrest from France that intellectual supremacy which according to the clearest thinkers is still her possession. From this source is derived the phraseology of the Pan-Germans and the ideas and adherents of the Kriegsvereine, Wehrvereine and other similar associations too well known to need particular description. It is enough to note that the dissatisfaction caused by the treaty of November 4th has considerably swelled the membership of colonial societies. We come finally to those whose support of the war policy is inspired by rancour and resentment. These are the most dangerous. They are recruited chiefly among diplomatists. German diplomatists are now in very bad odour in public opinion. The most bitter are those who since 1905 have been engaged in the negotiations between France and Germany; they are heaping together and reckoning up their French Yellow Book 549 grievances against us, and one day they will present their accounts in the war press. It seems as if they were looking for grievances chiefly in Morocco, though an incident is always possible in any part of the globe where France and Germany are in contact. They must have their revenge, for they complain that they have been duped. During the discussion on the Army Bill one of these warlike diplomatists exclaimed, "Germany will not be able to have any serious conversation with France until she has every sound man under arms." In what terms will this conversation be couched ? The opinion is fairly widely spread, even in Pan-German circles, that Germany will not declare war in view of the system of defensive alliances and the tendencies of the Emperor. But when the moment comes, she will have to try in every possible way to force France to attack her. Offence will be given if necessary. That is the Prussian tradition. Must war then be considered as inevitable ? It is hardly likely that Germany will take the risk, if France can make it clear to the world that the Entente Cordiale and the Russian alliance are not mere diplomatic fictions but realities which exist and will make themselves felt. The British fleet inspires a wholesome terror. It is well known, however, that victory on sea will leave everything in suspense. On land alone can a decisive issue be ob- tained. As for Russia, even though she carries greater weight in political and military circles than was the case three or four years ago, it is not believed that her co-operation will be sufficiently rapid and energetic to be effective. People's minds are thus getting used to consider the next war as a duel between France and Germany. No. 6 M, Jules Camhon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Stephen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, November 22, 1913. I HAVE received from an absolutely reliable source an account of a conversation which took place a fornight ago between the Emperor and the King of the Belgians, in the presence of the Chief of the General Staff — General von Moltke. This conversation, it appears, has made a profound impression on King Albert. I am in no way surprised at the impression he gathered, which corresponds with what I have myself felt for some time. Enmity against us is increas- ing, and the Emperor has ceased to be the friend of peace. The person addressed by the Emperor had thought up till then, as did all the world, that William II., whose personal influence had been exerted on many critical occasions in support of peace, was still in the same state of mind. He found him this time completely changed. The German Emperor is no longer in his eyes the champion of peace against the warlike tendencies of certain parties in Germany. William 550 Official Diplomatic Documents II. has come to think that war with France is inevitable, and that it must come sooner or later. Naturally he believes in the crushing superiority of the German army and in its certain success. General von Moltke spoke exactly in the same strain as his sovereign. He, too, declared war to be necessary and inevitable, but he showed himself still more assured of success, "for," he said to the King, "this time the matter must be settled, and your Majesty can have no con- ception of the irresistible enthusiasm with which the whole German people will be carried away when that day comes." The King of the Belgians protested that it was a travesty of the intentions of the French Government to interpret them in that sense ; and to let oneself be misled as to the sentiments of the French nation by the ebullitions of a few irresponsible spirits or the intrigues of unscrupulous agitators. The Emperor and his Chief of the General Staff nevertheless per- sisted in their point of view. During the course of this conversation the Emperor moreover seemed overstrained and irritable. As William II. advances in years, family traditions, the reactionary tendencies of the court, and espe- cially the impatience of the soldiers, obtain a greater empire over his mind. Perhaps he feels some slight jealousy of the popularity ac- quired by his son, who flatters the passions of the Pan-Germans, and who does not regard the position occupied by the Empire in the world as commensurate with its power. Perhaps the reply of France to the last increase of the German army, the object of which was to establish the incontestable supremacy of Germany, is, to a certain extent, responsible for his bitterness, for, whatever may be said, it is realised that Germany cannot go much further. One may well ponder over the significance of this conversation. The Emperor and his Chief of the General Staff may have wished to impress the King of the Belgians and induce him not to make any opposition in the event of a conflict between us. Perhaps Germany would be glad to see Belgium less hostile to certain aspirations lately manifested here with regard to the Belgian Congo, but this last hypothesis does not seem to me to fit in with the interposition of Gen- eral von Moltke. For the rest, the Emperor William is less master of his impatience than is usually supposed. I have known him more than once to allow his real thoughts escape him. Whatever may have been the object of the conversation related to me, the revelation is none the less of extreme gravity. It tallies with the precariousness of the gen- eral situation and with the state of a certain shade of public opinion in France and Germany. If I may be allowed to draw a conclusion, I would submit that it would be well to take account of this new factor, namely, that the Emperor is becoming used to an order of ideas which were formerly repugnant to him, and that, to borrow from him a phrase which he likes to use, "we must keep our powder dr}." Jules Cambon. German White Book 551 III. The German White Book Foreign Office, Berlin, August, 1914. On June 28th the Austro-Hungarian successor to the throne, Arch- Duke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, were assassinated by a member of a band of Servian conspirators. The investigation of the crime through the Austro-Hungarian authorities has yielded the fact that the conspiracy against the hfe of the Arch- Duke and successor to the throne was prepared and abetted in Bel- grade with the co-operation of Servian officials, and executed with arms from the Servian State arsenal. This crime must have opened the eyes of the entire civilised world, not only in regard to the aims of the Servian policies directed against the conservation and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but also concerning the criminal means which the pan-Serb propaganda in Servia had no hesitation in employing for the achievement of these aims. The goal of these policies was the gradual revolutionising and final separation of the southeasterly districts from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and their union with Servia. This direction of Servians policy has not been altered in the least in spite of the repeated and solemn declarations of Servia in which it vouchsafed a change in these policies towards Austria-Hungary as well as the cultivation of good and neighbourly relations. In this manner for the third time in the course of the last 6 years Servia has led Europe to the brink of a world-war. It could only do this because it believed itself supported in its intentions by Russia. Russia, soon after the events brought about by the Turkish revolu- tion in 1908, endeavoured to found a union of the Balkan states under Russian patronage and directed against the existence of Turkey. This union, which succeeded in 1911 in driving out Turkey from a greater part of her European possessions, collapsed over the question of the distribution of spoils. The Russian policies were not dis- mayed over this failure. According to the idea of the Russian states- men a new Balkan union under Russian patronage should be called into existence, headed no longer against Turkey, now dislodged from the Balkans, but against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. It was the idea that Servia should cede to Bulgaria those parts of Macedonia which it had received during the last Balkan war, in exchange for Bosnia and the Herzegovina which were to be taken from Austria. To oblige Bulgaria to fall in with this plan it was to be isolated, Roumania attached to Russia with the aid of French propa- ganda, and Servia promised Bosnia and the Herzegovina. Under these circumstances it was clear to Austria that it was not compatible with the dignity and the spirit of self-preservation of the monarchy to view idly any longer this agitation across the border. The Imperial and Royal Government appraised Germany of this con- ception and asked for our opinion. With all our heart we were able 552 Official Diplomatic Documents . to agree with our ally's estimate of the situation, and assure him that any action considered necessary to end the movement in Servia directed against the conservation of the monarchy would meet with our approval. We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of Austria- Hungary against Servia might bring Russia upon the field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war, in accordance with our duty as allies. We could not, however, in these vital interests of Austria- Hungary, which were at stake, advise our ally to take a yielding attitude not compatible with his dignity, nor deny him our assistance in these trying days. We could do this all the less as our own interests were menaced through the continued Serb agitation. If the Serbs continued with the aid of Russia and France to menace the existence of Austria-Hungary, the gradual collapse of Austria and the subjec- tion of all the Slavs under one Russian sceptre would be the conse- quence, thus making untenable the position of the Teutonic race in Central Europe. A morally weakened Austria under the pressure of Russian pan-Slavism would be no longer an ally on whom we could count and in whom we could have confidence, as we must be able to have, in view of the ever more menacing attitude of our easterly and westerly neighbours. We, therefore, permitted Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Servia, but have not participated in her preparations. Austria chose the method of presenting to the Servian Govern- ment a note, in which the direct connection between the murder at Serajievo and the pan-Serb movement, as not only countenanced but actively supported by the Servian Government, was explained, and in which a complete cessation of this agitation, as well as a punishment of the guilty, was requested. At the same time Austria-Hungary demanded as necessary guarantee for the accomplishment of her desire the participation of some Austrian officials in the preliminary examina- tion on Servian territory and the final dissolution of the pan-Serb societies agitating against Austria-Hungary^ The Imperial and Royal Government gave a period of 48 hours for the . unconditional ac- ceptance of its demands. The Servian Government started the mobilisation of its army one day after the transmission of the Austro-Hungarian note. As after the stipulated date the Servian Government rendered a reply which, though complying in some points with the conditions of Austria-Hungary, yet showed in all essentials the endeavour through procrastination and new negotiations to escape from the just demands of the monarchy, the latter discontinued her diplomatic relations with Servia without indulging in further negotiations or accepting , further Servian assurances, whose value, to its loss, she had sufficiently experienced. From this moment Austria was in fact in a state of war with Servia, which it proclaimed officially on the 28th of July by declaring war. From the beginning of the conflict we assumed the position that there were here concerned the affairs of Austria aloney which it would German White Book 553 See exhibits 1 and 2. See exhibit 3. See exhibit 4. See exhibit 5. have to settle with Servia. We therefore directed our efforts toward the locaHsing of the war, and toward con- vincing the other powers that Austria-Hungary had to appeal to arms in justifiable self-defence, forced upon her by the conditions. We emphatically took the position that no civilised country possessed the right to stay the arm of Austria in this struggle with barbarism and politi- cal crime, and to shield the Servians against their just punishment. In this sense we instructed our representa- tives with the foreign powers. Simultaneously the Austro-Hungarian Government com- municated to the Russian Government that the step undertaken against Servia implied merely a defensive measure against the Serb agitation, but that Austria- Hungary must of necessity demand guarantees for a continued friendly behaviour of Servia towards the mon- archy. Austria-Hungary had no intention whatsoever to shift the balance of power in the Balkan. In answer to our declaration that the German Govern- ment desired, and aimed at, a localisation of the conflict, both the French and the English Governments promised an action in the same direction. But these endeavours did not succeed in preventing the interposition of Russia in the Austro-Servian disagreement. The Russian Government submitted an official com- munique on July 24th, according to which Russia could not possibly remain indifferent in the Servo-Austrian conflict. ^ The same was declared by the Russian Secre- tary of Foreign Affairs, M. Sasonof, to the German Ambassador, Count Pourtales, in the afternoon of July 26th. The German Government declared again, through its Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, that Austria-Hungary had no desire for conquest and only wished peace at her frontiers. After the official explanation by Austria- Hungary to Russia that it did not claim territorial gain in Servia, the decision concerning the peace of the world rested exclusively with St. Petersburgh. 1 Note, — This passage takes a somewhat different form in the German text, a translation of which is as follows : — "The same was declared by the Russian Secretary for Foreign Affairs, M. Sasonof, to the Imperial Ambassador, Count Pourtales. (See exhibit 4.) On the afternoon of July 26th the Imperial and Royal {that is the Austrian) Government declared again through its Ambassador at St. Petersburgh that Austria-Hungary had no desire for conquest and only wished peace on her frontiers. (See exhibit 5.) In the course of the same day, however, the first news of Russian mobilisation reached Berlin. (See exhibits 6, 7, 8, and 9.) On the evening of the 26th, the German Ambassadors at London, Paris, and St. Petersburgh were instructed energetically to point out the danger of this Russian mobilisation. (See exhibits 10, 10a, and 106.) After the official explanation by Austria- Hungary to Russia that she did not claim territorial gain in Servia, the decision concerning the peace of the world rested exclusively with St. Petersburgh. On the same day the Imperial Ambassador at St. Peters- ■ burgh was also directed to make the following declaration to the Russian Government." 554 Official Diplomatic Documents See exhibits 10. 10a, 10b. The same day the first news of Russian mobiUsation g^^ exhibits reached BerKn in the evening. 6, 7, 8, 9. The German Ambassadors at London, Paris, and St. Petersburgh were instructed to energetically point out the danger of this Russian mobilisation. The Imperial Am- bassador at St. Petersburgh was also directed to make the following declaration to the Russian Government : ^ " Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to counter-measures which must consist in mobilising the army. " But mobilisation means war. " As we know the obligations of France towards Russia, this mobilisation would be directed against both Russia and France. We cannot assume that Russia desires to unchain such a European war. Since Austria-Hungary will not touch the existence of the Servian kingdom, we are of the opinion that Russia can afford to assume an attitude of waiting. We can all the more support the desire of Russia to protect the integrity of Servia as Austria-Hungary does not intend to question the latter. It will be easy in the further development of the affair to find a basis for an understanding." On July 27th the Russian Secretary of War, M. Suchom- linof, gave the German military attache his word of honour that no order to mobilise had been issued, merely preparations were being made, but not a horse mustered, nor reserves called in. If Austria-Hungary crossed the Servian frontier, the militar^^ districts directed towards Austria, i.e., Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, would be mobi- lised, under no circumstances those situated on the German frontier, i.e., St. Petersburg, Vilna, and Warsaw. Upon gge exhibit inquiry into the object of the mobilisation against Austria- n. Hungary, the Russian Minister of War replied by shrugging his shoulders and referring to the diplomats. The military attache then pointed to these mobilisation measures against Austria-Hungary as extremely menacing also for Germany. In the succeeding days news concerning Russian mobili- sation came at a rapid rate. Among it was also news about preparations on the German-Russian frontier, as for instance the announcement of the state of war in Kovno, the departure of the Warsaw garrison, and the strengthening of the Alexandrovo garrison. On July 27th, the first information was received con- cerning preparatory measures taken by France : the 14th Corps discontinued the manoeuvres and returned to its garrison. In the meantime we had endeavoured to localise the conflict by most emphatic steps. 1 See note on preceding page. German White Book 555 See exhibit 12. See exhibits 13, 14. See exhibit 15. See exhibit 16. See exhibit 17. On July 26th, Sir Edward Grey had made the proposal to submit the differences between Austria-Hungary and Servia to a ^conference of the Ambassadors of Germany, France, and Italy under his chairmanship. We declared in regard to this proposal that we could not, however much we approved the idea, participate in such a con- ference, as we could not call Austria in her dispute with Servia before a European tribunal. France consented to the proposal of Sir Edward Grey, but it foundered upon Austria's declining it, as was to be expected. Faithful to our principle that mediation should not extend to the Austro-Servian conflict, which is to he considered as a purely Austro-Hungarian affair, but merely to the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, we continued our endeavours to bring about an understanding between these two powers. We further declared ourselves ready, after failure of the conference idea, to transmit a second proposal of Sir Edward Grey's to Vienna in which he suggested Austria-Hungary should decide that either the Servian reply was sufficient, or that it be used as a basis for further negotiations. The Austro-Hungarian Government remarked with full apprecia- tion of our action that it had come too late, the hostilities having already been opened. In spite of this we continued our attempts to the utmost, and we advised Vienna to show every possible advance com- patible with the dignity of the monarchy. Unfortunately, all these proposals were overtaken by the military preparations of Russia and France. On July 29th, the Russian Government made the official notification in Berlin that four army districts had been mobilised. At the same time further news was received concerning rapidly progressing military preparations of France, both on water and on land. On the same day the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburgh had an interview with the Russian Foreign Secretary, in regard to which he reported by telegraph, as follows : " The Secretary tried to persuade me that I should urge my Government to participate in a quadruple conference ^ to find means to induce Austria-Hungary to give up those demands which touch upon the sovereignty of Servia. I could merely promise to report the conversation and took the position that, after Russia had decided upon the baneful step of mobilisation, every exchange of ideas ap- 1 Note. — The German word translated " conference" is Konversation : the German text also contains the words auf freundscha/tlichem Wege ("in a friendly manner"). 556 Official Diplomatic Documents peared now extremely difficult, if not impossible. Besides, Russia now was demanding from us in regard to Austria- Hungary the same which Austria-Hungary was being blamed for with regard to Servia, i.e., an infraction of sovereignty. Austria-Hungary having promised to con- sider the Russian interests by disclaiming any territorial aspiration — a great concession on the part of a state engaged in war — should therefore be permitted to attend to its affairs with Servia alone. There would be time at the peace conference to return to the matter of forbearance towards the sovereignty of Servia. " I added very solemnly that at this moment the entire Austro-Servian affair was eclipsed by the danger of a general European conflagration, and I endeavoured to present to the Secretary the magnitude of this danger. "It was impossible to dissuade Sasonof from the idea that Servia could not now be deserted by Russia." On July 29th, the German Military Attache at St. Petersburgh wired the following report on a conversation with the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian army : "The Chief of the General Staff has asked me to call on him, and he has told me that he has just come from His Majesty. He has been requested by the Secretary of War to reiterate once more that everything had remained as the Secretary had informed me two days ago. He offered confirmation in writing and gave me his word of honour in the most solemn manner that nowhere there had been a mobilisation, viz., calling in of a single man or horse up to the present time, i.e., 3 o'clock in the afternoon. He could not assume a guarantee for the future, but he could emphasise that in the fronts directed towards our frontiers His Majesty desired no mobilisation. "As, however, I had received here many pieces of news concerning the calling in of the reserves in different parts of the country, also in Warsaw and in Vilna, I told the general that his statements placed me before a riddle. On his officer's word of honour he replied that such news was wrong, but that possibly here and there a false alarm might have been given. "I must consider this conversation as an attempt to mislead us as to the extent of the measures hitherto taken in view of the abundant and positive information about the calling in of reserves." In reply to various inquiries concerning reasons for its threatening attitude, the Russian Government repeatedly pointed out that Austria-Hungary had commenced no conversation in St. Petersburgh. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in St. Petersburgh was therefore instructed on July 29th, at our suggestion, to enter into such conversa- German White Book 557 See exhibit 19. See exhibits 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 23a. tion with Sasonof. Count Szapary was empowered to explain to the Russian minister the note to Servia, though it had been overtaken by the state of war, and to accept any suggestion on the part of Russia as well as to discuss with Sasonof all questions touching directly upon the Austro-Russian relations. Shoulder to shoulder with England we laboured inces- santly and supported every proposal in Vienna from which we hoped to gain the possibility of a peaceable solution of the conflict. We even as late as the 30th of July forwarded the English proposal to Vienna, as basis for negotiations, that Austria-Hungary should dictate her conditions in Servia, i.e., after her march into Servia. We thought that Russia would accept^ this basis. During the interval from July 29th to July 31st ^ there appeared renewed and cumulative news concerning Russian measures of mobilisation. Accumulation of troops on the East Prussian frontier and the declaration of the state of war over all important parts of the Russian west frontier allowed no further doubt that the Russian mobilisation was in full swing against us, while simultaneously all such measures were denied to our representative in St. Peters- burgh on word of honour. Nay, even before the reply from Vienna regarding the Anglo-German mediation, whose tendencies and basis must have been known in St. Petersburgh, could possibly have been received in Berlin, Russia ordered a general mobilisation. During the same days, there took place between His Majesty the Kaiser and Czar Nicolas an exchange of telegrams in which His Majesty called the attention of the Czar to the menacing character of the Russian mobilisation during the continuance of his own mediating activities. On July 31st, the Czar directed the following telegram to His Majesty the Kaiser : " I thank You cordially for Your mediation which per- mits the hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It is technically impossible to discontinue our military prepa- rations which have been made necessary by the Austrian mobilisation. It is far from us to want war. As long as the negotiations between Austria and Servia continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give You my solemn word thereon. I confide with all my faith in 1 Note. — The following words appear here in the German text : wahrend diese unsere Bemuhungen um Vermittelung, von der englischen Diplomatie unterstiXtzt, mit steigender Dringlichkeit fortgefuhrt wurden ("whilst these endeavours of ours for mediation were being continued with increasing energy, supported by English diplomacy "). 558 Official Diplomatic Documents the grace of God, and I hope for the success of Your medi- ation in Vienna for the welfare of our countries and the peace of Europe. " Your cordially devoted "Nicolas." This telegram of the Czar crossed with the following, sent by H. M. the Kaiser, also on July 31st, at 2 p.m. : " Upon Your appeal to my friendship and Your request for my aid I have engaged in mediation between Your Government and the Government of Austria-Hungary. While this action was taking place. Your troops were be- ing mobilised against my ally Austria-Hungary, whereby, as I have already communicated to You, my mediation has become almost illusory. In spite of this, I have con- tinued it, and now I receive reliable news that serious preparations for war are going on on my eastern frontier. The responsibility for the security of my country forces me to measures of defence. I have gone to the extreme limit of the possible in my efforts for the preservation of the peace of the world. It is not I who bear the responsi- bility for the misfortune which now threatens the entire civilised world. It rests in your hand to avert it. No one threatens the honour and peace of Russia which might well have awaited the success of my mediation. The friendship for You and Your country, bequeathed to me by my grandfather on his deathbed, has always been sacred to me, and I have stood faithfully by Russia while it was in serious affliction, especially during its last war. The peace of Europe can still be preserved by You if Russia decides to discontinue those military preparations which menace Germany and Austria-Hungary." Before this telegram reached its destination, the mobili- sation of all the Russian forces, obviously directed against us and already ordered during the afternoon ^ of the 31st of July, was in full swing. Notwithstanding, the telegram of the Czar was sent at 2 o'clock that same afternoon. After the Russian general mobilisation became known in Berlin, the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburgh was instructed on the afternoon of July 31st to explain to the Russian Government that Germany declared the state See exhibit of war as counter-measure against the general mobilisa- tion of the Russian army and navy which must be fol- lowed by mobilisation if Russia did not cease its military measures against Germany and Austria-Hungary within 12 hours, and notified Germany thereof. At the same time the Imperial Ambassador in Paris was instructed to demand from the French Government a » Note. — The German text says here Vormittag (morning). 25 German White Book 559 declaration within 18 hours, whether it would remain neu- See exhibit tral in a Russo-German war. The Russian Government destroyed through its mobili- sation, menacing the security of our country, the labori- ous action at mediation of the European cabinets.^ The Russian mobilisation, in regard to the seriousness of which the Russian Government was never allowed by us to en- tertain a doubt, in connection with its continued denial, shows clearly that Russia wanted war. The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburgh delivered his note to M. Sasonof on July 31st at 12 o'clock midnight. The reply of the Russian Government has never reached us. Two hours after the expiration of the time limit the Czar telegraphed to H.M. the Kaiser, as follows : "I have received Your telegram. I comprehend that . You are forced to mobilise, but I should like to have from You the same guarantee which I have given You, viz., that these measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts. With the aid of God it must be possible to our long tried friendship to prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence Your urgent reply." To this H.M. the Kaiser replied : " I thank You for Your telegram. I have shown yester- day to Your Government the way through which alone war may yet be averted. Although I asked for a reply by to-day noon, no telegram from my Ambassador has reached me with the reply of Your Government. I there- fore have been forced to mobilise my army. An immedi- ate, clear and unmistakable reply of Your Government is the sole way to avoid endless misery. Until I receive this reply I am unable, to my great grief, to enter upon the subject of Your telegram. I must ask most earnestly that You, without delay, order Your troops to commit, under no circumstances, the slightest violation of our frontiers." As the time limit given to Russia had expired without the receipt of a reply to our inquiry, H.M. the Kaiser ordered the mobilisation of the entire German Army and Navy on August 1st at 5 p.m. The German Ambassador at St. Petersburgh was in- structed that, in the event of the Russian Government not giving a satisfactory reply within the stipulated time, he should declare that we considered ourselves in a state of war after the refusal of our demands. However, before a 1 Note. — The German text adds here kurz vor dem Erfolge ("just aa it was on the point of succeeding"). 560 Official Diplomatic Documents confirmation of the execution of this order had been re- ceived, that is to say, already in the afternoon of August See exhibit 1st, i.e., the same afternoon on which the telegram of the Czar, cited above, was sent, Russian troops crossed our frontier and marched into German territory. Thus Russia began the war against us. Meanwhile the Imperial Ambassador in Paris put our question to the French Cabinet on July 31st at 7 p.m. The French Prime Minister gave an equivocal and unsatisfactory reply on August 1st at 1 p.m., which gave See exhibit no clear idea of the position of France, as he limited him- ^^* self to the explanation that France would do that which her interests demanded. A few hours later, at 5 p.m., the mobilisation of the entire French Army and Navy was ordered. On the morning of the next day France opened hostili- ties. British Blue Book 561 IV. The British Blue Book INTRODUCTORY NARRATIVE OF EVENTS (1) On the 23rd June, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, nephew of the Emperor of Austria, Heir to the Throne, and Commander-in- Chief of the Army, left Vienna to attend army manoeuvres in the Province of Bosnia. On Sunday, the 28th, he visited Serajevo, the capital of the province, and made a progress through the town accom- panied by his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg. While passing through the streets their automobile was fired on by an assassin. Both the Archduke and Duchess were killed. No crime has ever aroused deeper or more general horror throughout Europe; none has ever been less justified. Sympathy for Austria was universal. Both the Governments and the public opinion of Europe were ready to support her in any measures, however severe, which she might think it necessary to take for the punishment of the murderer and his accomplices. It immediately appeared, from the reports of our representatives abroad, that the press and public opinion of Austria-Hungary attrib- uted much of the responsibility for the crime to the Servian Govern- ment, which was said to have encouraged a revolutionary movement amongst the Serb populations of Bosnia and Herzegovina. That there had for many years been a strong Serb nationalist movement in these two provinces there is no doubt. This movement in an earlier form had swept the provinces, then part of the Turkish Empire, into the insurrection against the Turkish Government in the seventies of last century, culminating in the war of 1877-8 between Russia and Turkey. It had continued when Austria took over the administration of the provinces under the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. Austria then pledged her word to Turkey that her occupation should not " detract from the rights of sovereignty of His Majesty the Sultan over these provinces.'' Thirty years later, however, in 1908, she suddenly proclaimed their annexation to her Empire. On the 7th October of that year, the annexation was celebrated in Serajevo by the firing of salutes and ringing of cathedral bells, amid scenes of official rejoicing and popular apathy. Servian nationalist feeling immediately asserted itself, and the Servian Government protested to the Powers against the annexation as a "deep injury done to the feelings, interests, and rights of the Servian people." Servia's atti- tude, coupled with the resentment felt by Russia and certain other Great Powers, nearly brought about a European war ; but after six months of extreme tension she was induced to make a declaration abandoning her protest and promising to live on good terms with Austria. Her nationalist aspirations still continued, however, and were strengthened by her successes in the Balkan wars of 1912-13 2o 562 Official Diplomatic Documents — successes which were compromised by Austria's opposition to her territorial expansion. As Servia grew, Austrian suspicion of her designs deepened. (2) In the light of this history the storm of anti-Servian feeling which swept Austria-Hungary after the Serajevo murders is easily under- stood. It was a feeling based on patriotism and loyalty. Europe was disposed to excuse its exaggerations and to sympathise with its motives. But the dangers to European peace which it involved were imme- diately evident from the reports which reached the Government in London. Anti-Serb riots took place at Serajevo and Agram. The members of the Serb party in the Provincial Council of Croatia were assailed by their colleagues with cries of "Servian assassins." Mobs in Vienna threatened the Servian Legation. The Austrian press, almost without exception, used the most unbridled language, and called for the condign punishment of Servia. There were signs that the popular resentment was shared, and perhaps encouraged, by the Austrian Government. Both the British and also the German Government knew that the peace might be disturbed. In view of these reports, it naturally became incumbent on dis- interested Powers to exercise what influence they possessed in a direc- tion which would reconcile justice with peace. Unfortunately, though the attitude of public opinion in Austria, and, to a less degree, also in Germany, was plain, the intentions of the Austrian Govern- ment remained almost equally obscure. The Austrian Foreign Office maintained an attitude of reticence towards the British and Russian Ambassadors. On the 7th July the Government were careful to make a public announcement that a joint meeting of the Cabinets of Austria and Hungary, which had just taken place, was only concerned with the question of domestic measures to repress the Pan-Serb propaganda in Bosnia. On the 8th July the Minister-President of Hungary made, on the whole, a pacific speech in the Hungarian Parlia- ment, defending the loyalty of the majority of the Serb subjects of the Empire. On the 11th July the Servian Minister at Vienna had no reason to anticipate a threatening communication from the Austrian Government, and as late as the 22nd July, the day before the Aus- trian ultimatum was delivered at Belgrade, the Minister-President of Hungary stated in Parliament that the situation did not war- rant the opinion that a serious turn of events was necessary or even probable. His Majesty^s Government had therefore largely to fall back on conjecture. It was known that the situation might become serious, but it was also known that Servia had made professions of readiness to accept any demands compatible with the sovereignty of an inde- pendent State. It was known that the opinibn of the Russian and French — and also of the German — Governments was that the > British Blue Book 563 Servian Government was not itself to blame for the crime, but that Servia must be ready to investigate and put an end to the propaganda which had apparently led to it, and which was said to have originated in part on Servian soil. Sir E. Grey advised Servia to show herself moderate and conciliatory. He promised the German Ambassador to use his influence with the Russian Governmeat in the same direc- tion. More could not be done, for no actual evidence had yet been furnished that Servian territory had in fact been made the base for revolutionary operations. It was only known that a court-martial had been set up at Serajevo, the proceedings before which were secret. The Servian Government stated that they were only waiting for the Austrian Government to communicate the evidence thus collected before setting their own investigations on foot. The Servian Govern- ment also stated that both the assassins implicated were Austrian subjects, and that on a previous occasion the Austrian Government had informed the Servian Government, in reply to enquiries, that one of these men was harmless and was under their protection. It was remembered that Austria had tried on previous occasions to fasten guilt on the Servian Government by means of police evidence brought forward in Austrian courts, and had failed. It was therefore assumed on all sides that, before Austria took any action, she would disclose to the public her case against Servia. When Sir E. Grey said this to the German Ambassador on the 20th July, the latter replied that he certainly assumed that Austria would act upon some case that would be known; but, as a matter of fact, His Majesty's Government did not receive any statement of the evidence on which Austria had founded her ultimatum till the 7th August. It was, therefore, necessary to wait. The situation was as clear as it could be made till Austria would consent to throw off her reticence. There was nothing doubtful in the general international situation, no incalculable element which Austria could not take into full considera- tion. Whatever she did, she would know accurately the consequences of her action. The Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente remained as they had always been. We had been quite recently assured that no new secret element had been introduced into the former, and Sir E. Grey had stated emphatically in Parliament on the 11th June that the latter had remained unchanged so far as we were concerned. Russia's interest in the Balkans was well known. As late as the 23rd May the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had reaffirmed in the Duma the policy of the "Balkans for the Balkans," and it was known that any attack on a Balkan State by any great European Power would be regarded as a menace to that policy. If Servia was, as the Austrian Ambassador said to Sir E. Grey on the 29th July, " regarded as being in the Austrian sphere of influence"; if Servia was to be humiliated ; then assuredly Russia could not remain indifferent. It was not a question of the policy of Russian statesmen at St. Peters- burgh, but of the deep hereditary feeling for the Balkan populations bred in the Russian people by more than two centuries of development. These things had been, as Sir E. Grey said to Parliament in March, 564 Official Diplomatic Documents 1913, in discussing the Balkan war, "a commonplace in European diplomacy in the past." They were the facts of the European situa- tion, the products of years of development, tested and retested during the last decade. Patient work might change them, but the product of years could not be pushed aside in a day. (3) Yet two days were as much as Austria decided to allow for the task. On the 23rd July she showed her hand. She delivered an ultimatum at Belgrade and required an answer in forty-eight hours. She made ten demands, directed towards the elimination from Servian national life of everything which was hostile to Austria. These demands involved the suppression of newspapers and literature, the suppression of nationalist societies, a reorganisation of the Government schools, the dismissal of officers from the army, the participation of Austrian officials in judicial proceedings in Servia, the arrest of two specified men, the prevention of all traffic in arms across the frontier, a full explanation of anti-Austrian utterances, and immediate notification of the enforcement of these measures. In addition, the Servian Government was to publish on the front page of the Official Journal a prescribed statement, which amounted to a full recantation of her alleged errors, and a promise of amendment. A very brief summary was annexed to the ultimatum, giving the bare findings of the secret trial at Serajevo, with no corroborative evidence. No independent nation had ever been called on to accept a greater humiliation. Between the delivery of this ultimatum and the declaration of war between Great Britain and Germany there was an interval of only twelve days. In the whirl of negotiations which now followed, there was no time to draw breath and ponder. At the outset, therefore, it may be well to explain definitely the British attitude towards the Austrian ultimatum. Austria was under provocation. She had to complain of a danger- ous popular movement against her government. What evidence she might have against the Servian Government no one in Europe then knew. Great Britain had no interest in the Balkans, except one. She desired the consolidation and progressive government of the Balkan States ; she desired, in the words recently used by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs before the Duma, that "the Balkan Governments should recognise that, in the matter of strengthening a State, the acquisition of territory is insufficient; the devotion and confidence of the new citizens must be enlisted." The dispute between Austria and Servia did not necessarily affect that interest ; it was a dispute between two Governments with which Great Britain had nothing to do. Sir E. Grey, therefore, consistently stated that he had no concern in that dispute ; that he had no title to intervene between Austria and Servia ; that he would express no opinion on the merits of the ultimatum. But there was the other side. If the dispute af- fected the interests of Russia, then the peace of Europe was at stake ; British Blue Book 565 and, from the first, Sir E. Grey told the Austrian Government that he did not see how Russia, interested as she was in Servia, could take any but a most serious view of such a formidable document as the ultimatum. The peace of Europe must be maintained, and it could only be maintained, as Mr. Asquith had said to Parliament in March, 1913, in discussing the Balkan crisis, by a "spirit of forbearance, patience, and self-sacrifice" — by a "loyal spirit of give and take on the part of the Great Powers directly concerned.'' It was as the agent of this spirit of conciliation alone that Great Britain intervened in the European crisis. (4) On the 23rd July the Austrian Ambassador told Sir E. Grey that an ultimatum was being handed to Servia. For the first time Sir E. Grey heard that "there would be something in the nature of a time limit." He immediately expressed his grave alarm. Next morning the text of the ultimatum was handed to him, and he learnt that the time limit was forty-eight hours. He confessed to the German Am- bassador that, as no time had been left for deliberation, he felt helpless. There was no time to advise Russia or to influence Servia. At this critical moment everything depended on Germany. As the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs said a little later, " the key of the situation was to be found in Berlin." What was Germany's attitude ? Privately, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his doubts as to the ultimatum ; officially, the German Government called it " equitable and moderate," and said that they " desired urgently the localisation of the conflict." Everyone desired that ; but it was no time for phrases. The same morning the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had summoned the French and British Ambassadors in St. Petersburgh, had said that Austria's step meant imminent war, and had asked for the support of Great Britain and France. The French Ambassador had pledged the support of France, as was well known to be inevitable under the terms of her alliance. The next morning the Russian Government stated publicly that Russia could not remain indifferent to the Austro-Servian conflict. The next evening troops in Vienna had to be called out to guard the Russian Embassy from hos- tile crowds. "Localisation" was a good phrase, but we had to deal with facts. Austria had surprised Europe, and with surprise had come universal alarm. During these forty-eight hours Great Britain made three attempts at peace. Before all things, the time-limit of the ultimatum had to be extended. Great Britain and Russia urged this at Vienna. Great Britain urged Germany to join in pressing the Austrian Government. All that Berlin consented to do was to "pass on" the message to Vienna. Secondly, Sir E. Grey urged that Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy should work together at Vienna and St. Petersburgh in favour of conciliation. Italy assented; France assented; Russia 566 Official Diplomatic Documents declared herself ready; Germany said she had no objection, "if relations between Austria and Russia became threatening." Thirdly, the Russian, French, and British representatives at Bel- grade were instructed to advise Servia to go as far as possible to meet Austria. But it was too late. The time-limit, which Austria would not ex- tend, had expired ; and after all Servia did not need advice. On the afternoon of Saturday, the 25th, she returned to Austria a reply which amounted to an acceptance of all Austria's demands, subject on certain points to the delays necessary for passing new laws and amending her Constitution, and subject to an explanation by Austria- Hungary of her precise wishes with regard to the participation of Austro-Hungarian officials in Servian judicial proceedings. The reply went far beyond anything which any Power — Germany not excepted — had ever thought probable. But the same day the British Am- bassador at Vienna reported that the tone of the Austrian press left the impression that a settlement was not desired, and he later reported that the impression left on his mijid was that the Austrian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable. In spite of the conciliatory nature of Servia's reply, the Austrian Minister left Belgrade the same evening, and Servia ordered a general mobilisation. But an outline of the Servian reply had been communicated to Sir E. Grey an hour or two before it was delivered. He immediately expressed to Germany the hope that she would urge Austria to accept it. Berlin again contented itself with "passing on" the expression of Sir E. Grey's hope to Vienna through the German Ambassador there. The fate of the message so passed on may be guessed from the fact that the German Ambassador told the British Ambassador directly afterwards that Servia had only made a pretence of giving way, and that her concessions were all a sham. (5) During the next four days, 26th to 29th July, there was only one question before Europe — how could Russia and Austria be brought to an agreement? It was evident that Russia did not believe that Austria would, or could, stop short of the absolute ruin of the Servian State, if she once actually attacked it. Here again, the question was not merely one of Government policy ; the popular sentiment of two nations was involved. Austria indeed professed, no doubt with per- fect honesty, that she would take no territory from Servia. But the Austrian Ministers were being borne along on a wave of violent popu- lar enthusiasm. They said themselves that they would be swept from power if they did not follow the popular desire for a conflict with Servia. Would this popular enthusiasm be content with any mere punitive expedition against the enemy? Surely not. Russia, there- fore, openly said that she would have to intervene if Servia were attacked ; but she promised Austria on the 27th that she would use all her influence at Belgrade to induce the Servian Government to British Blue Book 567 give satisfaction to Austria, and only asked Austria to delay hostili- ties in order to give time for deliberation. Austria refused, saying it was too late. She declared war on Servia on the 28th. Russia ordered a partial mobilisation on the 29th. But meanwhile Sir Edward Grey had proposed that the German, Italian, and French Ambassadors should meet him in London, to dis- cuss the best means towards a settlement. Italy and France at once accepted ; Russia said she was ready to stand aside ; but Germany refused. She did not like what she called "a court of arbitration," and proposed instead direct negotiations between Russia and Austria. These negotiations actually began, as we have seen in the last para- graph, but they were cut short by the Austrian declaration of war against Servia. Austria then apparently considered that the moment for such negotiations was passed. She had, moreover, refused to dis- cuss the Servian reply in any way, and it was difficult to see, after that refusal, what Russia could negotiate with her about. Russia, there- fore, fell back on Sir E. Grey's proposal for a conference of Ambassa- dors in London, which she had originally expressed her readiness to accept. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs urged Sir E. Grey to induce Germany to indicate in what way she w^ould consent to work for a settlement. This brings the narrative of events down to Wednesday, the 29th July. Russia was mobilising partially in her southern provinces. Austrian troops were bombarding Belgrade. But, on the other hand, better news was coming from Berlin. Up to the 28th at least, both Germany and Austria had seemed unwilling to admit that the situ- ation was really serious ; Russia, it was said, was unprepared, and France was in no condition to go to war. Germany had said, in reply to Sir E. Grey's repeated advances, that she did not like to make representations to Vienna for fear of stiffening Austria's attitude. But on the evening of the 28th the German Chancellor assured the British Ambassador that he was trying to mediate at Vienna and St. Petersburgh. On the strength of this assurance and similar assur- ances made by the German Ambassador in London on the 29th, Sir E. Grey telegraphed to Berlin once more, in accordance with the request of the Russian Government, urging the German Government, if they did not like the idea of the Ambassadors' conference m the form he had suggested it, to suggest any other form they pleased. "Mediation," he said, "was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would press the button on the interests of peace." The telegram was despatched at about 4 o'clock on the evening of the 29th. (6) This appeal was followed almost immediately by a strange re- sponse. About midnight, a telegram arrived at the Foreign Office from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin. The German Chancellor had sent for him late at night. He had asked if Great Britain would 568 Official Diplomatic Documents promise to remain neutral in a war, provided Germany did not touch Holland and took nothing from France but her colonies. He refused to give any undertaking that Germany would not invade Belgium, but he promised that, if Belgium remained passive, no territory would be taken from her. Sir E. Grey's answer was a peremptory refusal, but he added an exhortation and an offer. The business of Europe was to work for peace. That was the only question with which Great Britain was concerned. If Germany would prove by her actions now that she desired peace. Great Britain would warmly welcome a future agree- ment with her whereby the whole weight of the two nations would be thrown permanently into the scale of peace in years to come. For the next two days peace proposals and negotiations continued, some initiated and all supported by Great Britain. There remained a spark of hope. But from the British point of view the face of Europe henceforward was changed. On the 29th July the only conflict in progress had been on the frontiers of Servia and Austria ; the only fear of further war had lain in the relations of Russia and Austria. Germany's declarations were pacific ; Russia had said she desired nothing but a period of peace to allow for her internal develop- ment ; France would not fight except to help her ally. There had seemed no insuperable difficulty in keeping the peace ; it was only a question of allaying the mutual suspicion between Vienna and St. Petersburgh. But now a new element of danger had been introduced. Great Britain now knew that Germany was contemplating an attack on France. She knew more. The independence of the Low Countries had for centuries been considered as one of the strongest means of securing the peace of Europe. Their position and the nature of the country rendered them the natural battlefield of Northern Europe. If it was made impossible for a Great Power to invade them, war would become increasingly difficult and dangerous. With the growth of the idea of a fixed system of international law founded on treaties, the neutrality of Belgium had been devised as a permanent safeguard to this end. As such, it had been consecrated by two international treaties signed by all the Powers, and recognised by two generations of statesmen. Now, when the peace of Europe was our one object, it was found that Germany was preparing to tear out the main rivet of that peace. Germany's position must be understood. She had fulfilled her treaty obligations in the past ; her action now was not wanton. Bel- gium was of supreme military importance in a war with France; if such a war occurred, it would be one of life and death; Germany feared that, if she did not occupy Belgium, France might do so. In face of this suspicion, there was only one thing to do. The neutrality of Belgium had not been devised as a pretext for wars, but to prevent the outbreak of wars. The Powers must reaffirm Belgian neutrality in order to prevent the war now threatened. The British Govern- ment, therefore, on Friday, the 31st July, asked the German and French Governments for an engagement to respect Belgium's neutral- British Blue Book 569 ity, and the Belgian Government for an engagement to uphold it. France gave the necessary engagement the same day ; Belgium gave it the day after ; Germany returned no reply. Henceforward there could be no doubt of German designs. Meanwhile, on the 30th and 31st negotiations continued between Russia and Austria. On the 29th Germany had suggested to Austria that she should stop as soon as her troops had occupied Belgrade. Late on the same night Russia offered to stop all military preparations, if Austria would recognise that the conflict with Servia had become a question of general European interest, and would eliminate from her ultimatum the points which involved a violation of the sovereignty of Servia. As the result of this offer, Russia was able to inform His Majesty's Government on the 31st that Austria had at last agreed to do the very thing she had refused to do in the first days of the crisis namely, to discuss the whole question of her ultimatum to Servia. Russia asked the British Government to assume the direction of these discussions. For a few hours there seemed t^ be a hope of peace. (7) At this moment, on Friday, the 31st, Germany suddenly despatched an ultimatum to Russia, demanding that she should countermand her mobilisation within twelve hours. Every allowance must be made for the natural nervousness which, as history has repeatedly shown, overtakes nations when mobilisation is under way. All that can be said is that, according to the information in the possession of His Majesty's Government, mobilisation had not at the time proceeded as far in Russia as in Germany, although general mobilisation was not publicly proclaimed in Germany till the next day, the 1st August. France also began to mobilise on that day. The German Secretary of State refused to discuss a last proposal from Sir E. Grey for joint action with Germany, France, and Italy until Russia's reply should be received, and in the afternoon the German Ambassador at St. Peters- burgh presented a declaration of war. Yet on this same day, Satur- day, the 1st, Russia assured Great Britain that she would on no account commence hostilities if the Germans did not cross the frontier, and France declared that her troops would be kept 6 miles from her frontier so as to prevent a collision. This was the situation when very early on Sunday morning,. the 2nd August, German troops invaded Luxemburg, a small independent State whose neutrality had been guaranteed by all the Powers with the same object as the similar guarantee of Belgium. The die was cast. War between Germany, Russia, and France had become inevitable. Only one question now remained for this country. His Majesty's Government failed in their attempts to secure a general peace. Should they now remain neutral ? The grounds on which that question was decided are clearly set forth in the statements of Sir E. Grey and Mr. Asquith in Parliament, which are contained in this volume,^ and no 1 See Part II. 570 Official Diplomatic Documents additional explanations are needed here. But one fact may be em- phasised. From the 24th July, when Russia first asked for British support, to the 2nd August, when a conditional promise of naval assistance was given to France, Sir E. Grey had consistently declined to give any promise of support to either of our present allies. He maintained that the position of Great Britain was that of a disinter- ested party whose influence for peace at Berlin and Vienna would be enhanced by the knowledge that we were not committed absolutely to either side in the existing dispute. He refused to believe that the best road to European peace lay through a show of force. We took no mobilisation measures except to keep our fleet assembled, and we confined ourselves to indicating clearly^ to Austria on the 27th July, and to Germany on the 29th July, that we could not engage to remain neutral if a European conflagration took place. We gave no pledge to our present allies, but to Germany we gave three times — on the 30th July, the 31st July, and the 1st August — a clear warning of the effect which would be produced on our attitude and on the sentiment of the British people by* a violation of the neutrality of Belgium. After Germany's declaration of war on Russia on the afternoon of the 1st, the Tsar telegraphed to His Majesty the King as follows : " In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more that I have done all in my power to avert war." It is right to say that His Majesty's Government believe this to be a true statement of the attitude both of Russia and France throughout this crisis. On the other hand, with every wish to be fair and just, it will be admitted that the response of Germany and Austria gave no evidence of a sincere desire to save the peace of Europe. Foreign Office, Sept 28, 1914. PART THREE DOCUMENTS FREQUENTLY QUOTED BUT NOT CON- TAINED IN THE OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF COL- LECTED DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS I. THE CHANCELLOR'S SPEECH IN THE REICHSTAG August 4, 1914 [Translated from the Berliner Tageblatt of August 5, 1914] A TERRIBLE fate is breaking over Europe. For forty-four years after winning in war the respect of the world for our German Em- pire, we have lived in peace, and have guarded the peace of Europe. In peaceful labour we have grown strong and mighty ; and people have envied us. In nervy patience we have suffered hostilities to be fanned in the east and the west, and fetters to be forged against us. The wind was sown there and now we have the whirlwind. We wanted to go on living and working in peace, and like a silent vow, from the Emperor down to the youngest recruit, this was the will: "Our sword shall not be drawn except in a just cause." Now the day has come when we must draw it. Russia has put the torch to our house. We have been forced into a war with Russia and France. Gentlemen, a number of papers penned in the stress of hurrying events have been distributed to . you. Let me single out the facts which characterise our action. From the first moment of the Austrian conflict we strove and la- boured that this conflict might be confined to Austria-Hungary and Servia. All the cabinets, notably the English cabinet, took the same ground, only Russia insisted that she should have to say a word. This was the beginning of the danger threatening Europe. As soon as the first definite news of military preparations in Russia reached us we declared in St. Petersburgh, kindly but firmly, that military prep- arations against us would force us to take similar steps, and that mobilisation and war are not far apart. Russia assured us in the most friendly way that she was taking no measures against us. Eng- land in the meanwhile was trying to mediate between Austria and Servia, and was receiving our hearty support. On July 28, the Emperor telegraphed to the Czar asking him to consider that Austria had the right and the duty to protect herself against the Greater- Servian plots which threatened to undermine her existence. The Emperor called the Czar's attention to their common monarchical interest against the crime of Serajevo, and asked the Czar to help him personally to smooth away the difficulties between Vienna and St. Petersburg. At about the same time, and before he had received this telegram, the Czar asked the Emperor to help him and to counsel moderation in Vienna. The Emperor accepted the part of mediator, but he had hardly begun to act, when Russia mobilised all her troops 573 574 Official Diplomatic Documents against Austria-Hungary. Austria-Hungary on the other hand had mobihsed only her army corps on the Servian frontier, and two other corps in the north, but far removed from Russia. The Emperor at once pointed out to the Czar that the Russian mobilisation made his mediation, undertaken at the Czar's request, very difficult if not impossible. We nevertheless continued our mediation, — even to the extreme limit permitted by our alliance. During this time, Russia of her own accord repeated her assurance that she was mak- ing no military preparations against us. Then came July 31. In Vienna a decision was due. We had already succeeded so far that Vienna had renewed her personal exchange of opinion with St. Petersburgh, which had stopped for some time. But even before a decision was taken in Vienna, we received the news that Russia was mobilising her entire army — that is, she was mobilising also against us. The Russian Govern- ment, which from our repeated representations knew what a mobili- sation on our frontier meant, did not notify us, and gave us no ex- planatory reply. Nor until the afternoon of July 31st a telegram was received from the Czar in which he said that his army was tak- ing no provocative attitude toward us. The Russian mobilisation, however, on our frontier had been vigorously begun as early as dur- ing the night of July 30th. Thus while we were still trying to medi- ate in Vienna, at Russia's request, the whole Russian military force rose on our long, almost open frontier. And France, while she was not yet mobilising, confessed that she was making military prepara- tions. And we? We had intentionally refrained, up to that mo- ment, from calling a single reservist to the colors — for the sake of the peace of Europe. Should we now be waiting longer, and until the Powers between whom we are wedged in would choose their own moment of attack ? To expose Germany to this danger would have been a crime ! For this reason we demanded at once, on July 31st, that Russia demobilise, which action alone could still have preserved the peace of Europe. The Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburgh was simul- taneously instructed to declare that we should have to consider ourselves at war with Russia if she declined. The Imperial Ambas- sador has followed his instructions. Even to-day we do not yet know Russia's reply to our demand that she demobilise. No telegraphic news has reached us, although the telegraph went on for a while communicating many less impor- tant matters. So it came that when the time limit was long past the Emperor was obliged to mobilise our military forces, at five o'clock in the afternoon of August 1st. At the same time, we had to ask for assurances as to the attitude of France. She replied to our definite enquiry whether she would be neutral in a Russian-German war by saying that she would do what her interests demanded. This was an evasion of our question, if not a negative reply. The Emperor nevertheless ordered that the French frontier be respected in its entirety. This order has been The Chancellor's Speech in the Reichstag 575 rigorously obeyed with one single exception. France, who mobi- lized at the same hour that we did declared that she would respect a zone of ten kilometers on our frontier. And what did really happen ? Bomb throwing, flyers, cavalry scouts, and companies invading Alsace-Lorraine. Thus France attacked us before war had been declared. As regards the one exception mentioned, I have received this report from the General Staff: "As regards France's complaints concerning our transgressing her frontier, only one case is to be ac- knowledged. Contrary to definite orders, a patrol of the 14th Army Corp^, led it would seem by an officer, crossed the frontier on August 2d. It appears that all were shot except one man, ^ho returned. But long before this one act of crossing the frontier took place, French flyers dropped bombs as far from France as South Germany, and near the Schlucht pass, French troops made an attack on our frontier guards. Thus far our troops have confined themselves to the protection of our frontier." This is the report of the General Staff. We have' been forced into a state of self-defence, and the necessity of self-defence knows no other law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg, and have perhaps already been obliged to enter Belgian territory. That is against the rules of international law. It is true that the French government announced in Brussels that it would respect Belgian neutrality as long as its opponents would do so. But we knew that France was ready for an invasion of Belgium. France could afford to wait. We could not wait. An attack on our flank might have been fatal. We were therefore obliged to disregard the protest of the Luxemburg and Belgian governments. For the wrong we have done thereby we shall try to atone, as soon as our military end is obtained. People, who like ourselves, are fighting for their lives and homes must think of naught but how they may survive.^ Gentlemen, we are standing shoulder to shoulder with Austria- Hungary. As regards the attitude of England, Sir Edward Grey's remarks in the lower house of Parliament yesterday have shown what her stand will be. We have assured the English government that we shall not attack the north coast of France as long as England remains neutral, and that we shall not infringe the territorial integrity and independence of Belgium. This assurance I here repeat before the whole world ; and I may add, that as long as England remains neutral, we shall not even take any hostile measures against the French merchant marine, provided France will treat our merchant- men in the same way. Gentlemen, this was the course of events. Germany enters this war with a clear conscience. We are fighting to protect the fruits 1 The German word durchhauen has been translated in the English press "hack their way through." While the German word hauen and the English word "hack" are akin, their meanings, and even more their connotated meanings are very different. "Hack their way through" suggests brutal methods, which the word durchhauen does not. 576 Offixiial Diplomatic Documents of our peaceful labor and our heritage of the great past: We are fighting for our future. The fifty years are not yet past during which Moltke used to say we should have to remain armed if we were to protect our heritage and our achievements of 1870. Now the supreme hour has come which will test our people. But it finds us ready and full of confidence. Our army is in the field, our fleet is well prepared, and back of them stands the whole Ger- man people. — The Whole German People ! [For Sir E. Grey's two speeches, August 3, 1914, and Mr. Asquith's three speeches, August 4, 5, 6, 1914, see the facsimile reproduction of the British Blue Book, pp. 89 to 98. For President Poincare's message August 5, and M. Viviani's speech on the same day, see French Yellow Book Nos. 158, 159, August 5, 1914.1 The ''Brussels''' Documents 577 II. THE "BRUSSELS" DOCUMENTS Found by the German Government in Brussels and published in facsimile in a special Supplement to the " Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" of November 25, 1914. (1) (Translation) Letter [from the Chief of the Belgian General Staff] to the [Belgian] Minister of War respecting the Confidential Interviews. (Confidential.) Sir, Brussels, April 10, 1906. I HAVE the honour to furnish herewith a summary of the conversa- tions which I have had with Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, which I have already reported to you verbally. His first visit was in the middle of January. Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston told me of the pre-occupation of the British General Staff concerning the general political situation and the existing possi- bilities of war. Should Belgium be attacked, it was proposed to send about 100,000 men. The lieutenant-colonel having asked me how we should interpret such a step, I answered that, from the military point of view, it could only be advantageous; but that this question of intervention had also a political side, and that I must accordingly consult the Minister of War. Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston replied that his Minister at Brussels would speak about it to our Minister for Foreign Affairs. He continued as follows : The disembarkation of the British troops would take place on the French coast, in the neighbourhood of Dunkirk and Calais, in such a manner that the operation might be carried out in the quickest possible way.^ Landing at Antwerp would take much longer, as larger transports would be required, and, more- over, the risk would be greater. This being so, several other points remained to be decided, viz., transport by rail, the question of requisitions to which the British Army might have recourse, the question of the chief command of the allied forces. He enquired whether our arrangements were adequate to secure the defence of the country during the crossing and transport of the British troops — a period which he estimated at about ten days.^ I answered that the fortresses of Namur and Liege were safe against a surprise attack, and that in four days our field army of 100,000 men 1 The following marginal note occurs in the facsimile : — (Translation) "The entry of the Enghsh into Belgium would only take place after the violation of our neutrality by Germany." 2p 578 Official Diplomatic Documents would be ready to take the field. After having expresssed his entire satisfaction at what I had said, my visitor emphasised the following points: (1) Our conversation was absolutely confidential ; (2) it was in no way binding on his Government ; (3) his Minister, the British General Staff, he, and myself were the only persons then aware of the matter ; (4) he did not know whether his Sovereign had been consulted. At a subsequent meeting Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston assured me that he had never received any confidential information from other military attaches about our army. He then gave me a detailed statement of the strength of the British forces : we might rely on it that, in twelve or thirteen days, two army corps, four cavalry brigades, and two brigades of mounted infantry would be landed. He asked me to study the question of the transport of these forces to that part of the country where they would be most useful, and with this object in view he promised me a detailed statement of the com- position of the landing force. He reverted to the question of the effective strength of our field army, and considered it important that no detachments from that army should be sent to Namur and Liege, as those fortresses were provided with adequate garrisons. He drew my attention to the necessity of letting the British Army take full advantage of the facilities afforded under our regulations respecting military requirements. Finally, he laid stress on the ques- tion of the chief command. I replied that I could say nothing on the latter point, and I promised that I would study the other questions with care. Later, the British military attache confirmed his previous estimate : twelve days at least were indispensable to carry out the landing on the coast of France. It would take much longer (from one to two and a half months) to land 100,000 men at Antwerp. On my objecting that it would be useless to wait till the disembarka- tion was finished, before beginning the transport by rail, and that it would be better to send on the troops by degrees as they arrived on the coast, Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston promised me precise details of the daily disembarkation table. With regard to the question of military requirements, I informed my visitor that that question would easily be arranged. As the plans of the British General Staff advanced, the details of the problem were worked out with greater precision. The colonel assured me that half the British Army could be landed in eight days, and the remainder at the end of the twelfth or thirteenth day, except the mounted infantry, on which we could not count till later. Nevertheless, I felt bound once more to urge the necessity of know- ing the numbers to be landed daily, so as to work out the railway arrangements for each day. The British attache then spoke to me of various other questions, viz. : (1) The necessity of maintaining secrecy about the operations, and of ensuring that the Press should observe this carefully ; (2) the advantages there would be in attaching a Belgian officer to each The " Brussels " Documents 579 British staff, an interpreter to each commanding officer, and gen- darmes to each unit to help the British miUtary poUce. At another interview Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston and I examined the question of combined operations in the event of a German attack directed against Antwerp, and on the hypothesis of our country being crossed in order to reach. the French Ardennes. Later on, the colonel signified his concurrence in the scheme I had laid before him, and assured me of the assent of General Grierson, Chief of the British General Staff. Other questions of secondary importance were likewise disposed of, particularly those respecting intermediary officers, interpreters, gendarmes, maps, illustrations of uniforms, English translations of extracts from certain Belgian regulations, the regulation of customs dues chargeable on the British supplies, hospital accommodation for the wounded of the allied army, etc. Nothing was settled as to the possible control of the Press by the Government or the military authorities. In the course of the last meetings which I had with the British attache he communicated to me the daily disembarkation table of the troops to be landed at Boulogne, Calais and Cherbourg. The distance of the latter place, included owing to certain technical considerations, would cause a certain delay. The first corps would be landed on the tenth day, the second corps on the fifteenth day. Our railways would carry out the transport operations in such a way that the arrival of the first corps, either towards Brussels-Lou vain or towards Namur- Dinant, would be completed on the eleventh day and that of the second corps on the sixteenth day. I finally urged once again, as forcibly as was within my power, the necessity of accelerating the transport by sea in order that the British troops might be with us between the eleventh and the twelfth day ; the very best and most favourable results would accrue from the concerted and simultaneous action by the allied forces. On the other hand, a serious check would ensue if such co-operation could not be achieved. Colonel Barnardiston assured me that everything would be done with that end in view. In the course of our conversations I took the opportunity of con- vincing the military attache of our resolve to impede the enemies' movements as far as lay within our power, and not to take refuge in Antwerp from the outset. Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, on his side, informed me that he had at present little confidence in the sup- port or intervention of Holland. He likewise confided to me that his Government intended to move the British base of supplies from the French coast to Antwerp as soon as the North Sea had been cleared of all German warships. At all our interviews the colonel regularly communicated to me any confidential information he possessed respecting the military condi- tion and general situation of our eastern neighbour, etc. At the same time he laid stress on the imperative need for Belgium to keep herself well informed of what was going on in the neighbouring Rhine country. 580 Official Diplomatic Documents I had to admit to him that in our country the intelligence service beyond the frontier was not, in times of peace, directly under our General Staff. We had no military attaches at our legations. I took care, however, not to admit to him that I was unaware whether the secret service, prescribed in our regulations, was organised or not. But it is my duty here to call attention to this state of affairs, which places us in a position of glaring inferiority to that of our neighbours, our possible enemies. Major-General, Chief of General Staff. (Initialled) Note. — When I met General Grierson at Compiegne at the ma- noeuvres of 1906 he assured me that the reorganisation of the British army would result not only in ensuring the landing of 150,000 men, but in enabling them to take the field in a shorter period than had been previously estimated. End of September 1906, (Initialled) (2) (Translation) (Confidential.) The British military attache asked to see General Jungbluth. These gentlemen met on the 23rd April. Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges told the general that Great Britain had, available for despatch to the Continent, an army composed of six divisions of infantry and eight brigades of cavalry, in all 160,000 men. She had also all that she needed for home defence. Every- thing was ready. The British Government, at the time of the recent events, would have immediately landed troops on our territory, even if we had not asked for help. The general protested that our consent would be necessary for this. The military attache answered that he knew that, but that as we were not in a position to prevent the Germans passing through our territory. Great Britain would have landed her troops in any event. As to the place of landing, the military attache was not explicit. He said the coast was rather long ; but the general knows that Mr. Bridges made daily visits to Zeebrugge from Ostend during the Easter holidays. The general added that, after all, we were, besides, perfectly able to prevent the Germans from going through. April 24, 1912, The Allied Ansioer to the '' Brussels ^^ Documents 581 III. THE ALLIED ANSWER TO THE "BRUSSELS" DOCUMENTS No. 1 Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Sir F, Villiers, British Minister at Brussels} Sir, Foreign Office, April 7, 1913. In speaking to the Belgian Minister to-day I said, speaking unoffi- cially, that it had been brought to my knowledge that there was apprehension in Belgium lest we should be the first to violate Belgian neutrality. I did not think that this apprehension could have come from a British source. The Belgian Minister informed me that there had been talk, in a British source which he could not name, of the landing of troops in Belgium by Great Britain, in order to anticipate a possible despatch of German troops through Belgium to France. I said that I was sure that this Government would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and I did not believe that any British Government would be the first to do so, nor would public opinion here ever approve of it. What we had to consider, and it w^as a somewhat embarrassing question, was what it would be desirable and necessary for us, as one of the guarantors of Belgian neutrality, to do if Belgian neutrality was violated by any Power. For us to be the first to violate it and to send troops into Belgium would be to give Germany, for instance, justification for sending troops into Belgium also. What we desired in the case of Belgium, as in that of other neutral countries, was that their neutrality should be respected, and as long as it was not violated by any other Power we should certainly not send troops ourselves into their territory. I am, etc., E. Grey. No. 2 Extract from a Despatch from Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated December 23, 191 1 . {From the " Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung,'' October 13, 1914.) (Translation) From the French side the danger threatens not only in the south from Luxemburg ; it threatens us along our whole common frontier. For this assertion we are not dependent only on surmises. We have positive facts to go upon. The combinations of the Entente cordiale include, without doubt, the thought of an enveloping movement from the north. If that were 1 A record of this dispatch was communicated by Sir F. Villiers to the Belgian Minis- ter for Foreign Affairs. 582 Official Diplomatic Documents not the case, the plan of fortifying Flushing would not have evoked such an outcry in Paris and London. No secret was made there about the reasons why it was wished that the Scheldt should remain unfortified. The object was to be able to ship a British garrison with- out hindrance to Antwerp, and to obtain in our country a base of oper- ations for an offensive in the direction of the Lower Rhine and West- phaha, and then to carry us along with them, which would not have been difficult. For after giving up our national place of refuge, we should by our own fault have deprived ourselves of any possibility of resisting the demands of our doubtful protectors after being so foolish as to admit them to it. The equally perfidious and naif revelations of Colonel Barnardiston at the time of the conclusion of the Entente cordiale showed us clearly what was intended. When it became evident that we were not to be intimidated by the alleged threaten- ing danger of the closing of the Scheldt, the plan was not indeed abandoned, but altered in so far as the British auxiliary force was not to be landed on the Belgian coast, but in the nearest French harbours. The revelations of Captain Faber, which have been no more denied than the information of the newspapers by which they were confirmed or elaborated in certain particulars, are evidence of this. This British army, landed at Calais and Dunkirk, would not march along our frontier to Longwy in order to reach Germany. It would immediately invade us from the north-west. This would gain for it the advantage of going into action at once, of meeting the Belgian army in a region where we cannot obtain support from any fortress, in the event of our wishing to risk a battle. It would make it possible for it to occupy provinces rich in every kind of resource, but in any case to hinder our mobilisation or to allow it only when we had formally pledged ourselves to complete mobilisation solely for the benefit of Great Britain and her allies. I would strongly urge that a plan of action should be drawn up for this eventuality also. This is demanded as much by the require- ments of our military defence as by the conduct of our foreign policy in the case of a war between Germany and France. No. 3 Circular Telegram addressed to His Britannic Majesty^ s Representatives abroad} (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, October H, 1914. The story of an alleged Anglo-Belgian agreement of 1906 published in the German press, and based on documents said to have been found at Brussels, is only a story which has been reproduced in various forms and denied on several occasions. No such agreement has ever existed. As the Germans well know, General Grierson is dead, and Colonel 1 This telegram was sent on receipt of a summary of the documents contained in No. 4, issued by the German Government on the 13th October in advance of the publi- cation of the documents themselves. The Allied Answer to the " Brmsels " Documents 583 (now General) Barnardiston is commanding the British forces before Tsing-tao. In 1906 General Grierson was on the General Staff at the War Office and Colonel Barnardiston was military attache at Brussels. In view of the solemn guarantee given by Great Britain to protect the neutrality of Belgium against violation from any side, some academic discussions may, through the instrumentality of Colonel Barnardiston, have taken place between General Grierson and the Belgian military authorities as to what assistance the British army might be able to afford to Belgium should one of her neighbours violate that neutrality. Some notes with reference to the subject may exist in the archives at Brussels. It should be noted that the date mentioned, namely, 1906, was the year following that in which Germany had, as in 1911, adopted a threatening attitude towards France with regard to Morocco, and, in view of the apprehensions existing of an attack on France through Belgium, it was natural that possible eventualities should be discussed. The impossibility of Belgium having been a party to any agree- ment of the nature indicated, or to any design for the violation of Belgian neutrality, is clearly shown by the reiterated declarations that she has made for many years past that she would resist to the utmost any violation of her neutrality from whatever quarter and in whatever form such violation might come. It is worthy of attention that these charges of aggressive designs on the part of other Powers are made by Germany, who, since 1906, has established an elaborate network of strategical railways leading from the Rhine to the Belgian frontier through a barren thinly-popu- lated tract, deliberately constructed to permit of the sudden attack upon Belgium which was carried out two months ago. No. 4 Viscount Haldane, Lord High Chancellor, to Dr. A. E. Shipley, Master of Christ's College, Cambridge. Dear Master of Christ's, November 14, 1914- The enclosed memoranda have been specially prepared for me by the Foreign Office in answer to your question. Yours truly, (Signed) Haldane. Enclosure 1 Memorandum It is quite untrue that the British Government had ever arranged with Belgium to trespass on her country in case of war, or that Belgium had agreed to this. The strategic dispositions of Germany, especially as regards railways, have for some years given rise to the apprehension that Germany would attack France through Belgium. Whatever 584 Official Diplomatic Documents military discussions have taken place before this war have been limited entirely to the suggestion of what could be done to defend France if Germany attacked her through Belgium. The Germans have stated that we contemplated sending troops to Belgium. We had never committed ourselves at all to the sending of troops to the Continent, and we had never contemplated the possibility of sending troops to Belgium to attack Germany. The Germans have stated that British military stores had been placed at Maubeuge, a French fortress near the Belgian frontier, before the outbreak of the war, and that this is evidence of an intention to attack Germany through Belgium. No British soldiers and no British stores were landed on the Continent till after Germany had invaded Belgium, and Belgium had appealed to France and England for assistance. It was only after this appeal that British troops were sent to France; and, if the Germans found British munitions of war in Maubeuge, these munitions were sent with our expedition to France after the outbreak of the war. The idea of violating the neutrality of Belgium was never discussed or contemplated by the British Government. The extract enclosed, which is taken from an official publication of the Belgian Government, and the extract from an official statement by the Belgian Minister of War, prove that the Belgian Government had never connived, or been willing to connive, at a breach of the Treaty that made the maintenance of Belgian neutrality an inter- national obligation. The moment that there appeared to be danger that this Treaty might be violated, the British Government made an appeal for an assurance from both France and Germany, as had been done in 1870 by Mr. Gladstone, that neither of those countries would violate the neutrality of Belgium if the other country respected it. The French agreed, the Germans declined to agree. The appeal made by the British Government is to be found in the Parliamentary White Paper published after the outbreak of the war (see No. 114 of British Correspondence, page 87). The reason why Germany would not agree was stated very frankly by Herr von Jagow, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Sir Edward Goschen, our Ambassador in Berlin ; and it is recorded in the second White Paper (see No. 160 of British Correspondence, page 110) that we published. The attitude of the British Government throughout has been to endeavour to preserve the neutrality of Belgium, and we never thought of sending troops to Belgium until Germany had invaded it, and Belgium had appealed for assistance to maintain the international Treaty. We have known for some years past that, in Holland, in Denmark, and in Norway, the Germans have inspired the apprehension that, if England was at war with Germany, England would violate the neutrality of those countries and seize some of their harbours. This allegation is as baseless as the allegation about our intention to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and events have shown it to be so. But it seems to be a rule with Germany to attribute to others the designs that she herself entertains; as it is clear now that, for some long time past, it has been a settled part of her strategic plans to attack The Allied Answer to the " Brussels " Documents 585 France through Belgium. A statement is enclosed which was issued by us on October 14 last, dealing with this point. This memorandum and its enclosures should provide ample material for a reply to the German statements. Foreign Office, 9th November, 1914- Enclosure 2 Despatch No. 22 in the Belgian Gray Book. Enclosure 3 Extract from " The Times'' of 30th September, 1914. Neutrality of Belgium Official Statement The German press has been attempting to persuade the public that if Germany herself had not violated Belgian neutrality France or Great Britain would have done so. It has declared that French and British troops had marched into Belgium before the outbreak of war. We have received from the Belgian Minister of War an official state- ment which denies absolutely these allegations. It declares, on the one hand, that " before August 3 not a single French soldier had set foot on Belgian territory," and again, "it is untrue that on August 4 there was a single English soldier in Belgium." It adds : — For long past Great Britain knew that the Belgian army would oppose by force a "preventive" disembarkation of British troops in Belgium. The Belgian Government did not hesitate at the time of theAgadir crises to warn foreign Ambassadors, in terms which could not be misunderstood, of its formal intention to compel respect for the neutrality of Belgium by every means at its disposal, and against attempts upon it from any and every quarter. Enclosure 4 Circular Telegram addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Representatives abroad on the 14th October, 1914- See above No. 3 of " The Allied Answer to the Brussels Documents." 586 Official Diplomatic Documents IV. NEGOTIATIONS OF PRINCE LICHNOWSKY WITH SIR EDWARD GREY (Published in the North German Gazette, September 6, 1914) According to reports to hand, Sir Edward Grey declared in the House of Commons that the publication by the German Govern- ment of the German-English exchange of telegrams before the war was incomplete. Prince Lichnowsky, it is declared, cancelled by telegram his report on the well-known telephone conversation imme- diately he was informed that a misunderstanding existed. This telegram, it is asserted, was not published. The Times, appar- ently upon information from official sources, made the same asser- tion, adding the comment that the telegram had been suppressed by the German Government in order that it might accuse England of perfidy and prove Germany's love of peace. In answer to this we are able to state that such a telegram is non- existent. Apart from the telegram already published, which was dispatched from London at 11 a.m.. Prince Lichnowsky on August 1st sent the following telegram : First, at 1.15 p.m. "... Sir Edward Grey's private secretary has just been to see me to say that the Minister desired to make proposals to me regard- ing England's neutrality, even for the event that we should go to war with Russia as well as with France. I shall see Sir Edward Grey this afternoon, and shall report immediately." Second, at 5.30 p.m. " Sir Edward Grey has just read to me the following declaration, which has been unanimously framed by the cabinet : " ' The reply of the German Government with regard to the neu- trality of Belgium is a matter of very great regret, because the neu- trality of Belgium does affect feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way clear to give the same positive reply as that which has been given by France, it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here, while on the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country.' " In answer to my question as to whether, on condition that we respected the Belgian neutrality, he could give me a definite declara- tion concerning the neutrality of Great Britain, the Minister replied that that was impossible for him to do, but that this question would nevertheless play an important part In public opinion here. If we should violate the Belgian neutrality in a war with France, a reversal of sentiment would certainly result and this would make it difficult for the Government here to assume a friendly neutrality. For the Negotiations of Prince Lichnowsky with Sir Edward Grey 587 present there was not the slightest intention of taking hostile action against us. It would be the desire to avoid that if it should be in any way possible. It would, however, be difficult to draw a line marking how far we might go before there would be intervention from here. He recurred again and again to Belgian neutrality and expressed the opinion that this question would play an important part in any event. He had wondered whether it were not possible that we and France should remain armed against each other without attacking each other in case of a Russian war. I asked him whether he was in a position to declare to me that France would enter into a compact to that effect. Since we neither desired to destroy France nor to acquire parts of her territory, I was able to believe that we could enter into an agreement of such a sort, which would insure us the neutrality of Great Britain. " The Minister said he would make inquiries ; he did not overlook the difficulties of holding the armies of both sides inactive." Third, at 8.30 p.m. : "My report made early to-day is cancelled by my report of this evening. Since absolutely no positive English proposal has been submitted, further steps along the line of the instructions given me are superfluous." As will be observed, these telegrams contain no sort of indication that there had been a misunderstanding, and nothing concerning the assertion made from the English side of a clearing up of the alleged misunderstanding. 588 Official Diplomatic Documents V. DOCUMENTS FOUND IN THE POSSESSION OF MR. GRANT-WATSON, SECRETARY OF THE BRITISH LEGATION , (Published in the North German Gazette, December 15th, 1914) New and important proofs have been found of the Anglo-Belgian complicity. Some time ago Mr. Grant- Watson, the Secretary of the British Legation, was arrested in Brussels. He had remained at the legation quarters, after the legation had been transferred to Ant- werp and later to Havre. The said gentleman was recently caught trying to do away with some documents, which he had carried away unnoticed from the legation when arrested. An examination of the papers revealed that they were official documents, with data of the most intimate character concerning the Belgian mobilisation and the defence of Antwerp, dating from the years 1913 and 1914. They include circular orders to the higher Belgian officers in command, bearing the signature in facsimile of the Belgian Minister of War and of the Belgian General Staff, and also a note concerning a con- ference of the " Commission de la base d'approvisionnements a Anvers/* on May 27th, 1913. The fact that these papers were found in the British Legation shows sufficiently that the Belgian Government had no military secrets to hide from the British Government, and that both governments, with regard to military matters, are in very close touch with each other. There is also a hand-written note of special interest which was found among the papers that the British Secretary endeavoured to destroy. It follows : Renseignements ^ 1. Les officiers fran^ais ont re9U ordre de rejoindre des le 27, apres-midi. 2. Le meme jour le chef de Gare de Feignies a re^u ordre de con- centrer vers Maubeuge tous les wagons fermes disponible, en vue du transport de troupes. Communique par la Brigade de gendarmerie de Frameries. Feignies, it may be remarked, is a railway station in France on the road from Maubeuge to Mons, about three kilometres from the Belgian frontier ; Frameries is on the same line in Belgium, ten kilo- metres from the frontier. From this notice it must be gathered that France had already made her first mobilisation plans on July 27, and that the British 1 Translation : 1. The French officers have received orders to join the colors by the 27th in the afternoon. 2. For the same day the Superintendent of the railway station of Feignies has received orders to collect in the direction of Maubeuge all available closed coaches, with a view to the transport of troops. Documents Found in the Possession of Mr. Grant-Watsmi 589 Legation immediately received information thereof from Belgian sources. The material thus discovered furnishes an additional and valu- able proof — if indeed any may be needed — of the relations existing between England and Belgimn. It shows anew that Belgium had sacrificed her own neutrality in favor of the Entente, and that she was an active member of the coalition which had been formed to fight the German Empire. For England, on the other hand, Bel- gian neutrality really was nothing but a "scrap of paper,'' to which she appealed when it was in her interest, and which she disregarded when she found it expedient to do so. It is obvious that the British Government made use of the violation of Belgian neutrality by Ger- many only as a pretext to justify the war against us before the world and before the British people. 590 Official Diplomatic Documents VI. TELEGRAMS AND LETTERS EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE ROYAL AND IMPERIAL COURTS OF LONDON, BERLIN, AND PETROGRAD, AND BETWEEN KING GEORGE AND PRESIDENT POINCARE Telegrams Exchanged between His Majesty King George and His Majesty the Czar (Published in the British Press on the 5th August, 1914) No. 1 Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan {St. Petersburgh) . Foreign Office, 1st August, 191^. You should at once apply for an audience with His Majesty the Emperor, and convey to him the following personal message from the King: — "My Government has received the following statement from the German Government : — " ' On July 29 the Russian Emperor requested the German Emperor by telegraph to mediate between Russia and Austria. The Emperor immediately declared his readiness to do so. He informed the Russian Emperor of this by telegraph, and took the required action at Vienna. Without waiting for the result of this action Russia mobilised against Austria. By telegraph the German Emperor pointed out to the Russian Emperor that hereby his attempt at media- tion would be rendered illusory. The Emperor further asked the Russian Emperor to suspend the military operations against Austria. This, however, did not happen. In spite of this the German Govern- ment continued its mediation at Vienna. In this matter the German Government have gone to the farthest limit of what can be suggested to a Sovereign State which is the ally of Germany. The proposals made by the German Government at Vienna were conceived entirely on the lines suggested by Great Britain, and the German Government recommended them at Vienna for their serious consideration. They were taken into consideration at Vienna this morning. During the deliberations of the ( ?Austrian) Cabinet, and before they were con- cluded, the German Ambassador at St. Petersburgh reported the mobilisation of the entire Russian army and fleet. Owing to this action on the part of Russia the Austrian answer to the German proposals for mediation, which were still under consideration, was not given. This action on the part of Russia is also directed against Germany — that is to say, the Power whose mediation had been in- voked by the Russian Emperor. We were bound to reply with serious counter measures to this action, which we were obUged to consider as hostile, unless we were prepared to endanger the safety of our Royal and Imperial Telegrams and Letters 591 country. We are unable to remain inactive in face of the Russian mobilisation on our frontier. We have therefore informed Russia that unless she were prepared to suspend within twelve hours the warlike measure against Germany and Austria, we should be obliged to mobilise, and this would mean war. We have asked France if she would remain neutral during a German-Russian war.' "I cannot help thinking that some misunderstanding has pro- duced this deadlock. I am most anxious not to miss any possibility of avoiding the terrible calamity which at present threatens the whole world. I therefore make a personal appeal to you to remove the misapprehension which I feel must have occurred, and to leave still open grounds for negotiation* and possible peace. If you think I can in any way contribute to that all-important purpose, I will do everything in my power to assist in reopening the interrupted con- versations between the Powers concerned. I feel confident that you are as anxious as I am that all that is possible should be done to secure the peace of the world." No. 2 His Majesty the Czar to His Majesty King George, 1st August, 1914.' I would gladly have accepted your proposals had not German Ambassador this afternoon presented a note to my Government declaring war. Ever since presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade, Russia has devoted all her efforts to finding some pacific solution of the question raised by Austria's action. Object of that action was to crush Servia and make her a vassal of Austria. Effect of this would have been to upset balance of power in Balkans, which is of such vital interest to my Empire. Every proposal, including that of your Government, was rejected by Germany and Austria, and it was only when favourable moment for bringing pressure to bear on Austria had passed that Germany showed any disposition to mediate. Even then she did not put forward any precise proposal. Austria's declara- tion of war on Servia forced me to order a partial mobilisation, though, in view of threatening situation, my military advisers strongly advised a general mobilisation owing to quickness with which Germany can mobilise in comparison with Russia. I was eventually compelled to take this course in consequence of complete Austrian mobilisation, of the bombardment of Belgrade, of concentration of Austrian troops in Galicia, and of secret military preparations being made in Ger- many. That I was justified in doing so is proved by Germany's sudden declaration of war, which was quite unexpected by me, as I have given most categorical assurances to the Emperor William that my troops would not move so long as mediation negotiations continued. In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more that I have 592 Official Diplomatic Documents done all in my power to avert war. Now that it has been forced on me, I trust your country will not fail to support France and Russia. God bless and protect you. II Telegrams Exchanged between London and Berlin, 30th July- 2nd August, 1914 (Published in the Norddeutsche AUgemeine Zeitung of the 20th August, 1914) No. 1 His Royal Highness Prince Henry of Prussia to His Majesty King George, dated 30th July, 191 Jj.. I ARRIVED here yesterday and have communicated what you were so good as to say to me at Buckingham Palace last Sunday to William, who was very thankful to receive your message. William, who is very anxious, is doing his utmost to comply with the request of Nicholas to work for the maintenance of peace. He is in continual telegraphic communication with Nicholas, who has to-day confirmed the news that he has ordered military measures which amount to mobilisation, and that these measures were taken five days ago. We have also received information that France is making military preparations while we have not taken measures of any kind, but may be obliged to do so at any moment if our neighbours continue their preparations. This would then mean a European war. If you seriously and earnestly desire to prevent this terrible mis- fortune, may I propose to you to use your influence on France and also on Russia that they should remain neutral. In my view this would be of the greatest use. I consider that this is a certain and, perhaps, the only possible way of maintaining the peace of Europe. I might add that Germany and England should now more than ever give each other mutual support in order to prevent a terrible disaster, which otherwise appears inevitable. Believe me that William is inspired by the greatest sincerity in his efforts for the maintenance of peace. But the military prepara- tions of his two neighbours may end in compelling him to follow their example for the safety of his own country, which otherwise would remain defenceless. I have informed William of my telegram to you, and I hope that you will receive my communication in the same friendly spirit which has inspired it. (Signed) Henry. No. 2 His Majesty King George to His Royal Highness Prince Henry of Prussia, dated 30th July, 1914. Thanks for your telegram. I am very glad to hear of William's efforts to act with Nicholas for the maintenance of peace. I earnestly Royal and Imperial Telegrams and Letters 593 desire that such a misfortune as a European war — the evil of which could not be remedied — may be prevented. My Government is doing the utmost possible in order to induce Russia and France to postpone further military preparations, provided that Austria declares herself satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade and the neighbouring Servian territory as a pledge for a satisfactory settlement of her demands, while at the same time the other countries suspend their preparations for war. I rely on William applying his great influence in order to induce Austria to accept this proposal. In this way he will prove that Germany and England are working together to prevent what would be an international catastrophe. Please assure William that I am doing all I can, and will continue to do all that lies in my power, to maintain the peace of Europe. (Signed) George. No. 3 His Majesty the Emperor William to His Majesty King George, dated 31st July, 1914. Many thanks for your friendly communication. Your proposals coincide with my ideas and with the communication which I have this evening received from Vienna, and which I have passed on to London. I have just heard from the Chancellor that intelligence has just reached him that Nicholas this evening has ordered the mobilisation of his entire army and fleet. He has not even awaited the result of the mediation in which I am engaged, and he has left me completely without information. I am travelling to Berlin to assure the safety of my eastern frontier, where strong Russian forces have already taken up their position. (gigged) William. No. 4 His Majesty King George to His Majesty the Emperor William, dated 1st August, 1914-' Many thanks for your telegram of last night. I have sent an urgent telegram ^ to Nicholas, in which I have assured him of my readiness to do everything in my power to further the resumption of the negotiations between the powers concerned. (Signed) George. No. 5 German Ambassador at London to the German Imperial Chancellor, dated 1st August, 1914- ' Sir Edward Grey has just called me to the telephone and has asked me whether I thought I could declare that in the event of 1 See page 590. 2q 594 Official Diplomatic Documents France remaining neutral in a German-Russian war we would not attack the French. I told him that I believed that I could assume responsibility for this. (Signed) Lichnowsky. No. 6 His Majesty the Emperor William to His Majesty King George, dated 1st August, 1914' I HAVE just received the communication of your Government offering French neutrality under the guarantee of Great Britain. To this offer there was added the question whether, under these conditions, Germany would refrain from attacking France. For technical reasons the mobilisation which I have already ordered this afternoon on two fronts — east and west — must proceed according to the arrangements made. A counter order cannot now be given, as your telegram unfortunately came too late, but if France offers me her neutrality, which must be guaranteed by the English army and navy, I will naturally give up the idea of an attack on France and employ my troops elsewhere. I hope that France will not be nervous. The troops on my frontier are at this moment being kept back by telegraph and by telephone from crossing the French frontier. (Signed) William. No. 7 German Imperial Chancellor to the German Ambassador at London, dated 1st August, 1914- Germany is ready to agree to the English proposal in the event of England guaranteeing with all her forces the unconditional neutrality of France in the conflict between Germany and Russia. Owing to the Russian challenge German mobilisation occurred to-day before the English proposals were received. In consequence our advance to the French frontier cannot now be altered. We guarantee, how- ever, that the French frontier will not be crossed by our troops until Monday, the 3rd of August, at seven p.m., in case England's assent is received by that time. (gjg^^d) Bethmann-Hollweg. No. 8 His Majesty King George to His Majesty the Emperor William, dated 1st AugvM, 1914- In answer to your telegram, which has just been received, I be- lieve that there must be a misunderstanding with regard to a sugges- tion which was made in a friendly conversation between Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey when they were discussing how Royal and Imperial Telegrams and Letters 595 an actual conflict between the German and the French army might be avoided, so long as there is still a possibility of an agreement being arrived at between Austria and Russia. Sir Edward Grey will see Prince Lichnowsky early to-morrow morning in order to ascertain whether there is any misunderstanding on his side. (Signed) George. No. 9 German Ambassador at London to the German Imperial Chancellor^ dated 2nd August j 1914- The suggestions of Sir Edward Grey based on the desire of creat- ing the possibility of lasting neutrality on the part of England, were made without any previous inquiry of France and w^ithout knowledge of the mobilisation, and have since been given up as quite imprac- ticable. (Signed) Lichnowsky. Ill Telegrams from the German Ambassador at London to the German Imperial Chancellor, 1st August, 1914 (Published in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of the 6th September, 1914) No. 1 1st August, 1.15 p.m. . . . Sir Edward Grey's Private Secretary has just been to see me in order to say that the Minister wishes to make proposals to me for the neutrality of England, even in the case that we had war with Russia and France. I see Sir Edward Grey this afternoon and will communicate at once. No. 2 1st August, 5.30 p.m. Sir Edward Grey has just read to me the following declaration which has been unanimously adopted by the Cabinet : — " The reply of the German Government with regard to the neutral- ity of Belgium is a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium does affect feeling in this country. If Germany could see her w^ay to give the same positive reply as that which has been given by France, it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here, while, on the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, 596 Official Diplomatic Documents it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this coun- On my question whether, on condition that we would maintain the neutrality of Belgium, he could give me a definite declaration with regard to the neutrality of Great Britain, the Minister answered that that was impossible, but that this question would play a great part in public opinion in this country. If we violated Belgian neutral- ity in a war with France there would certainly be a change in public opinion which would make it difficult for the Cabinet here to maintain friendly neutrality. For the time there was not the slightest intention to proceed in a hostile manner against us. It would be their desire to avoid this if there was any possibility of doing so. It was, however, difficult to draw a line up to which we could go without intervention on this side. He turned again and again to Belgian neutrality, and was of opinion that this question would also play a great part. He had also thought whether it was not possible that we and France should, in case of a Russian war, stand armed opposite to one another without attacking. I asked him if he would be in a position to arrange that France would assent to an agreement of this kind. As we wanted neither to destroy France nor to annex portions of French territory, I could think that we w^ould give our assent to an arrange- ment of this kind which would secure for us the neutrality of Great Britain. The Minister said he would make inquiries ; he also recog- nised the difficulties of holding back the military on both sides. No. 3 1st August, 8.30 p.m. My communication of this morning is cancelled by my communica- tion of this evening. As there is no positive English proposal before us, any further step in the sense of the message I sent is superfluous. IV Telegram from His Majesty the Czar to His Majesty the Emperor William (Published in the Russian Press on the 31st January, 1915) 29th July, 1914. Thanks for your telegram,^ which is conciliatory and friendly, whereas the official message presented to-day by your Ambassador to my Minister was conveyed in a very different tone. I beg you to explain this divergency. It would be right to give over the Austro- Serbian problem to The Hague Tribunal. I trust in your wisdom and friendship. 1 German White Book, No. 20. Royal and Imperial Telegrams and Letters 597 Letters exchanged between His Majesty King George and THE President of the French Republic (Published in the British Press on the 20th February, 1915) No. 1 The President of the French Republic to His Majesty King George. Dear and Great Friend, Paris, July 31, 1914. In the grave events through which Europe is passing, I feel bound to convey to your Majesty the information which the Government of the Republic have received from Germany. The military prepara- tions which are being undertaken by the Imperial Government, especially in the immediate neighbourhood of the French frontier, are being pushed forward every day with fresh vigour and speed. France, resolved to continue to the very end to do all that lies within her power to maintain peace, has, up to the present, confined herself solely to the most indispensable precautionary measures. But it does not appear that her prudence and moderation serve to check Germany's action ; indeed, quite the reverse. We are, perhaps, then, in spite of the moderation of the Government of the Republic and the calm of public opinion, on the eve of the most terrible events. From all the information which reaches us it would seem that war would be inevitable if Germany were convinced that the British Government would not intervene in a conflict in which France might be engaged ; if, on the other hand, Germany were convinced that the entente cordiale would be affirmed, in case of need, even to the extent of taking the field side by side, there would be the greatest chance that peace would remain unbroken. It is true that our military and naval arrangements leave complete liberty to your Majesty's Government, and that, in the letters ex- changed in 1912 ^ between Sir Edward Grey and M. Paul Cambon, Great Britain and France entered into nothing more than a mutual agreement to consult one another in the event of European tension, and to examine in concert whether common action were advisable. But the character of close friendship which public feeling has given in both countries to the entente between Great Britain and France, the confidence with which our two Governments have never ceased to work for the maintenance of peace, and the signs of sympathy which your Majesty has ever shown to France, justify me in informing you quite frankly of my impressions, which are those of the Government of the Republic and of all France. It is, I consider, on the language and the action of the British Government that henceforward the last chances of a peaceful settle- ment depend. We, ourselves, from the initial stages of the crisis, have enjoined upon our Ally an attitude of moderation from which they have not 1 See pp. 337 f ., and Facsimile of British Blue Book, pp. 90 f. 598 Official Diplomatic Documents swerved. In concert with Your Majesty's Government, and in con- formity with Sir E. Grey's latest suggestions, we will continue to act on the same lines. But if all efforts at conciliation emanate from one side, and if Germany and Austria can speculate on the abstention of Great Britain, Austria's demands will remain inflexible, and an agreement between her and Russia will become impossible. I am profoundly convinced that at the present moment, the more Great Britain, France, and Russia can give a deep impression that they are united in their diplomatic action, the more possible will it be to count upon the preservation of peace. I beg that your Majesty will excuse a step which is only inspired by the hope of seeing the European balance of power definitely re- affirmed. Pray accept the expression of my most cordial sentiments. R. PO INC ARE. No. 2 His Majesty King George to the President of the French Republic. Dear and Great Friend, Buckingham Palace, August 1, 1914- I MOST highly appreciate the sentiments which moved you to write to me in so cordial and friendly a spirit, and I am grateful to you for having stated your views so fully and frankly. You may be assured that the present situation in Europe has been the cause of much anxiety and preoccupation to me, and I am glad to think that our two Governments have worked so amicably together in endeavouring to find a peaceful solution of the questions at issue. It would a be a source of real satisfaction to me if our united efforts were to meet with success, and I am still not without hope that the terrible events which seem so near may be averted. I admire the restraint which you and your Government are exercis- ing in refraining from taking undue military measures on the frontier and not adopting an attitude which could in any wise be interpreted as a provocative one. I am personally using my best endeavours with the Emperors of Russia and of Germany towards finding some solution by which actual military operations may at any rate be postponed, and time be thus given for calm discussion between the Powers. I intend to prosecute these efforts without intermission so long as any hope remains of an amicable settlement. As to the attitude of my country, events are changing so rapidly that it is difficult to forecast future developments; but you may be assured that my Government will continue to discuss freely and frankly any point which might arise of interest to our two nations with M. Cambon. t> t Uelieve me, M. le President, (Signed) George R. I. INDEX Africa, British Attacks on German Territory, 506. C»ngo. See that Title. German Offensive against British Cen- tral African Protectorate, 506, 509. Great Britain declines proposal not to carry war into Africa, 506. Alsace-Lorraine, Inhabitants forbidden to cross frontier, 325. Austria-Hungary, Belgium — War declared with, 507, 509. Belgian Reply, 510. British Ambassador — Comments on events from 22 July, 514. Final Interview with Count Berch- told, 520. British relations with, 432, 468. War declared by Great Britain, 498. Communications with Representatives at — Belgrade, 2, 3, 36, 40, 141, 241. Berlin, 51, 101, 180, 203, 241, 246, 247, 278, 280, 400, 507, 508. Constantinople, 51, 101. London, 12, 51, 57, 65, 66, 101, 180, 203, 243, 244, 276, 345, 432, 468, 496, 498. Nish, 14. Paris, 12, 67, 68, 51, 180, 203, 276, 277, 347, 484, 490, 491. Rome, 51, 101, 180, 203, 276. St. Petersburgh, 51, 68, 69, 71, 101, 141, 145, 148, 179, 180, 202, 203, 243, 276, 278, 280, 318, 345, 346, 347, 373, 459. Semlin, 142. Tokio, 241, 508. Uskub, 6. Vienna, 140, 346, 506. General Mobilization of Army and Fleet, 197, 272, 356, 391. Japan — Relations broken off, 508. Mediation proposals. Attitude towards, 68, 142, 484, 490,-252, 287, 329, 392, 393, 394,-302, 385, 386,-237, 270, 274, 310, 312. Military Preparations, 285. Notification to Powers of Great-Ser- bian propaganda and its con- nection with the Serajevo mur- der, 101. Notification of state of war with Servia, 276. Austria-Hungary — CorU. Russia, Relations with — Direct Conversations, proposals for mediation &c., 277, 301, 302, 310, 336, 347, 363. Refusal by Austria of Russian sug- gestions, 297, 309, 328. German efforts to prevent danger, 297. Mediation proposals. See that Sub- head, above. Russia will stop military preparations only upon certain conditions, 331, 333. Russia's threatening attitude leads to war, 459. War declared by Austria, 459. Sandjak, no intentions to advance into or occupy the, 385, 389. Serbia, Relations with — Austrian Attitude, 19, 85, 329, — 67, 68, 69, 140, 180, 277, 373, 484, — 34, 56, 61, 86, 87, 89, 90, 92, 93, 160, 161, 163, 164, 165, 166, 168, 192, — 77, 82, 153. See also Title: Mediation proposals. Austrian Dossier sent to the Powers, 101. Austrian Intentions, 85, 329, 385, 389, — 218, 302. Austrian official reports as to Ser- bian feelings towards Austria, 2, 3, 6, 14, 36. British Attitude, 164, 165, 174, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 226, 265, 268, 332, 359. See also Title: Mediation Proposals. French Attitude and French Reports of Events from Date of Serajevo Murder to Austria's Declaration of War, 1, 8, 12, 15, 19, 23, 29, 38, 39, 53, 54, 58, 59, 74, 77, 78, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 181, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 190, 213, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 224, (247), 286. See also Title: Mediation Proposals. German Attitude, 39, 53, 54, 59, 78, 80, 81, 90, 92, 97, 151, 153, 155, 157, 181, 186, 187, 213, 215, 226, 254, 255, 256, 257, 283, 293, 327, 328, 551. See also Title: Mediation Proposals. Localization of the Dispute, German View and Efforts, 35, 56, 78, 91, 159, 194, 226, 256, 257, 552, 553, 554. 599 600 Index Austria-Hungary — Cont. Mediation Proposals, See separate Title. Military action not intended by Austria, 153, 167. Military Operations not to be under- taken immediately, 166, 167. Non-interference by other Powers — German View and Efforts. See Subheading : Localization of the Dispute, above. Narodna Odbrana, 101. Narodna Odbrana, Extract from (1911), 116. Narodna Odbrana Society — Confidential Reports of the — , 130. Nish Local Committee — , Attitude on Serajevo Murders, 138. Organization and Work of, 101. Servian Official Gazette in the Service of the — , 123. Work of — , Deposition by Trifko Krstanovio, 124. Occupation of Belgrade or other Towns as a Basis for Negotiations, 332, 335, 353. Russian Attitude, 191, 225, 328, 358, — 71, 179, 202, 243, 246, 278, 280, 347, 373,-87, 89, 161, 193, 228, 261, 193, 228, 261, 367, — 15, 54, 58, 74, 82, 83, 84, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 181, 184, 185, 217. See also Title: Mediation Proposals. Serbia's alleged willingness to enter- tain Austrian requirements, pro- vided that only judicial coopera- tion is asked, 38. Serbian Attitude, 14, 51, 53, 54, 58, 78, 180. Serbia's General Mobilization before delivery of answer to Austrian Note, 180. Serbian Note of 1908, 65, 262. Serbian Press, opinions of, prior to the Serajevo Murders, 112. Serbian Press on the Assassination, 135. Serbian sovereign rights, no infraction of — , 395. Serbian Territory not to be seized, 69, 190, 203, 308, 309, 385, 395. Serbian War Office — Pictures of a nature hostile to Dual Monarchy, 140. Situation before Presentation of Ulti- matum of 23 July, 2, 3, 6. Sokol Society Dusan the Strong — Report of the activities of, in Kragu- jevac (1912-13), 121. Special Points for Great Britain, 243. Telegrams between French and Russian Representatives delayed, 236. Turkish Views, 217. Ultimatum of 23 July, 63, 64, 75, 78, 84, 86, 97, 99, 158. Austrian Commentary, 523. Austrian Statement that Note is not an Ultimatum, but a Demarche with a time-limit, 65, 150, 160. Austria- Hungary — Cont. Ultimatum — Cont. Austro-Hungarian Views, 86, 89. British Attitude, 86, 91, 92, 93, 162, 165, — 66. French Attitude and Views, 67, 87, 91, 160, 161. Germany had no knowledge, 39, 53, 75, 82, 149, 154, 163, 165, 173, 174, 187, 189, 250. Germany approves Austrian point of view, 173, 174. Italian Views, 267. Point 5 — , Austrian Explanation, 146. Redrafting of certain Articles proposed by Russia, 197. German Attitude, 237. Russian Attitude and Views, 87, 89, 94, 161, 171, 228, 261, 367. See also Title: Mediation Proposals. Serbian Reply, 142, 156, 157, 158, 175, 180, 243. Austrian Commentaries, 529. Austrian Views, 221, 251. British Views, 227, 229, 231. German Views, 192, 193, 194. Non-publication of, in German Press, 272. Refusal of Austria-Hungary to accept, 174, 231, 241. Russian Views, 235. Special Points to be brought before Great Britain, 57, 65. Time Chosen for Presentation, signif- icance of, 36, 149. Time Limit — Dangers of, 62. Proposals for Extension, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 158, 170, 171, 172, 181. Austrian Refusal, 140, 141. British Attitude, 93. German Views, 163, Italian Views, 196. Russian Views, 66, 145, 243. Unconditional acceptance demanded, 164. War declared by Austria-Hungary, 181, 231, 241, 247, 268, 273, 296. Belgium, Agreement for Joint Action to Resist Germany, 462, 463. Appeal to Great Britain, France and Russia, 441, 442, 460. Austria declares War, 507, 509. Belgian Reply, 510. Communications with Representatives at — Belgrade, 149. Berlin, 72, 212, 281, 348, 349, 374, 375, 401, 422, 436, 462. Hague, 148, 281, 375, 422, 434, 490, 492, 494, 498, 499, 509, 510. London, 72, 281, 348, 349, 373, 374, 375, 401, 422, 424, 435, 437, 438, 439, 441, 460, 463, 483. 495, 505, 512. Index 601 Belgium — Cont. Communications with Representatives at — Cont. Luxemburg, 148, 281, 375. Madrid, 436, 462, 463. Paris, 72, 281, 348, 349, 374, 375, 401, 422, 435, 439, 460, 462, 463, 483, 484, 491, 495, 500. Rome, 148, 281, 375. St. Petersburgh, 72, 281, 375, 401, 422, 439, 460, 463, 495. Vienna, 72, 247, 281, 375, 401, 422. Congo. See that Title. Despatch to Representatives Abroad for Presentation to the respective Governments, 461. Documents of Secret Military Arrange- ments between Great Britain and Belgium, 577. French Offer of Support and Belgian Reply, 422, 425, 430. German Assurance that Territory would not be annexed, 457. German Minister, Departure of, 435, 436. German Minister's ♦'Notification to Belgian Foreign Secretary of Breaches of International Law by France, 420. German Proposal to, after Fall of Liege, 490, 492, 494, 498. Belgian Reply, 494, 499. British Approval of Reply, 497. French Approval, 497. Russian Approval, 499. German Request of Free Passage of Troops through, — Belgian Re- fusal and British Protest, 455. German Ultimatum and Reply, 402, 421, 424. Germany declares War, 452. Germany discovers Documents of Secret Military Arrangements between Great Britain and Belgium, 577. Great Britain, Relations with, previous to the Outbreak of War, 577. Hostile Acts against Germany, 387. Belgian Reply, 512. Integrity of — , German Attitude, 303, 357. British Attitude, 456. Interests in Germany entrusted to Span- ish Ambassador, 436, 462, 463. King Albert's Appeal to King George, 423, 455. Military Arrangements between Great Britain and Belgium, 677-680. Military Preparations, 72, 283, 281, 442. Minister at Luxemburg, 495. Minister leaves Berlin, 462. Mobilization ordered, 348. Neutrality of — Belgian Request for Assurance from Germany, 401. British Action in case of Violation, 406, 415, 424, 434, 438, 441, 456, 460, 595. British Inquiry to Belgium, 351, 365, 366, 457. Belgium — Cont. Neutrality of — Cont. French Reply, 221, 358, 373, 374, 378, 389. German Reply (Refusal) 374, 378, 381, 387, 388, 397, 457. French Assurances, 348. German Assurance in 1911, 349. German Assurance in 1913, 349. Violation, alleged Violation of Belgian — ■ by Germany, 424, 430, 435, 441, 442, 457. Violation through Secret Military Ar- rangements between Great Brit- ain and Belgium, 577-580. German Chancellor's View, 436, 437. German Justification, 457. German Note to Belgian Govern- ment, 433, 435, 441. Note sent to Representatives abroad to be delivered to the Various Powers if occasion should arise, 72, 148. Presentation of, 375. Scheldt, Navigation of — , Correspond- ence with Netherlands, 475, 476, 482. Telegram to Representatives abroad announcing German Ultimatum and Reply, 422. Belgrade, Bombardment of, 354. Berlin, Alleged Attack on British Embassy, 485. Demonstrations by Public, 156, 181, 199. Bulgaria, Declaration of Neutrality, 313. Congo, Belgian Attitude as to, 483. British Attitude, 483, 505. French Attitude, 483, 500. France, Ambassador to Germany — , Departure, 476. Army Officers on Leave recalled, 298. Attitude in case of Attack on Great Britain, 337, 451. Attitude in case of War between Ger- many and Russia, German In- quiry concerning, 347, 356. Austro-Hungarian Troops believed on French Frontier, 484, 490, 491, 496. Austro-Serbian Relations — See Title : Austria-Hungary, Serbia, Relations with — , French Re- ports of Events from Date of Serajevo Murders to Austria's Declaration of War. Ultimatum of 23 July — Advice to Servia regarding Reply, 160. Attitude and Views, 87, 91, 161, 167. Views on and Efforts, 53, 74, 77, 78, 81, 84, 187, 286. See also Title : Mediation Proposals. Belgian Reply to German Proposal after Fall of Li6ge. 602 Index France — Cont. Belgian Reply — Cont. Approval of, 497. Belgium — Appeal from — , 348, 442. Assurance to, of Respect for Neu- trality, 348. Neutrality of — Agreement for Joint Action in De- fence, 463. Reply to British Inquiry, 373, 374, 378, 389, 397. Breach of International Law, 420. Offer of Support to Belgium, 422, 425, 430. Colonies — German refusal to give undertakings as to, 303. Communications with Representa- tives at — Athens, 430. Basle, 213. Bavaria, 543. Belgrade, 75, 77, 78, 84, 156, 282, 288, 292, 430. Beriin, 12, 38, 58, 75, 77, 78, 80, 81, 84, 149, 150, 153, 154, 155, 157, 181, 186, 213, 217, 218, 222, 224, 250, 252, 282, 286, 288, 323, 325, 326, 353, 355, 356, 375, 377, 378, 379, 384, 406, 408, 429. Berne, 430. . Brussels, 283, 358, 378, 424, 442. Bucharest, 430. Budapest, 19. Christiania, 190, 430. Constantinople, 217, 282, 288, 355, 379, 406, 430. Copenhagen, 430, 476. Frankfort, 283. Hague, 424, 430. London. 39, 53, 54, 58, 75, 77, 78, 83, 84. 150, 151, 153, 181, 184, 186, 213, 215, 216, 218, 219, 220, 224, 250, 251, 282, 288, 290, 291, 320, 324, 326, 351, 353, 355, 375, 378, 379, 381, 406, 407, 425, 426, 427, 430, 442. Luxemburg, 190, 352, 383, 384, 404, 405, 464. Madrid, 379, 406, 430. Munich, 59, 284, 429. Rome, 39, 53, 58, 75, 77, 78, 84, 155, 181, 183, 184, 186, 213, 221, 250, 281, 282, 288, 289, 353, 355, 375, 379, 406, 430. St. Peterstfurgh, 15, 39, 53, 58, 75, 77, 78, 82, 84, 150, 152, 181, 184, 186, 213, 215, 217, 224, 250, 254, 282, 283, 285, 288, 292, 320, 321, 322, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 375, 379, 405, 406, 430. Stockholm, 1, 8, 23, 29, 53, 75, 77, 78, 84, 150, 152, 156, 158, 181, 185, 186, 213, 215, 224, 250, France — Cont. Belgium, Neutrality of — Cont. 251, 282, 285, 287, 288, 323, 353, 355. 356, 375, 379, 406, 430. Vienna, 1, 8, 23, 29, 53, 75, 77, 78, 84, 150, 152, 156, 158, 181, 185, 186, 213, 224, 250, 251, 254, 282, 285, 287, 288, 323, 353, 355, 356, 375, 379, 406, 430. Congo. See that Title. Declaration of Determination to sup- port Russia, 314, 316. Germany, Relations with — German Ambassador leaves Paris, 389, 390. German assurance not to attack France if France remains neutral in case of German-Russian War, 593. German territory violated by French, and French view, 427, 428, 429, 476. War declared by Germany, 427, 429, 462. Government Notification to Repre- sentatives of the Powers at Paris, 443. London Embassy — Note regarding the interview communicated by, 260. Mediation Proposals, 91, 220, 227, 237, 248, 251, 252, 258, 260, 264, 286, 290, 313, 314. Military Attach6 at Berlin — , Letter to Minister of War, 532. Military Preparations, 277, 320. Mobilisation Ordered, 394, 397. Naval Attache at Berlin — , Letter to Minister of Marine, 534. Peace, Declaration not to conclude separate peace during war, 521. President's Letter to King George, 351, 597. The King's Reply, 598. President's Message to French Parlia- ment (4 August, 1914), 444. President of the Council's Speech in the Chamber of Deputies (4 August, 1914), 446. Press, Note to — suggested by German Ambassador, 187, 215. Report to Minister of Foreign Affairs (30 July, 1913), 541. Summary of Events by Foreign Min- ister, 313. Telegram to French Representatives Abroad on Declaration of War, 429. Territory, German Territory violated, 427, 428, 429, 476. French Allegations of French — vio- lated by Germany, 406, 408, 476. Troops on the Border, 324, 393, 394, 396. Warnings from Reports of Ambassadors in 1913, 531. Index 603 Germany, Africa — Attacks, 505, 509. Aims and Ambitions (French View in 1913), 531. Ambassador preparing to leave Paris, 389, 390. Army Officers on Leave Recalled, 213, 298. Attitude if Russia mobilized on Aus- trian Frontier only, 218, 326. Attitude toward France if she remains Neutral in case of German- Russian War, 544. Austro-Russian Relations, Advice to Austria, 297. See also Title: Mediation Proposals. Austro-Serbian Relations, Localisation of the Dispute desired, 56, 78, 90, 150, 172. Mediation Proposals. See that Title. Ultimatum of 23 July — Denial of Prior Knowledge, 163, 166,-38, 53, 81, 149, 150, 153, 157, 250, — 172, 173, 174. Prior Knowledge of — , "Private In- formation unable to verify," 329. Redrafting of certain articles pro- posed by Russia, 197, 237. Serbian Reply — Non-publication of — (July 15), 272. Views on, 192, 194. Support of Austrian Action, Views on, 90, 92, — 12, 39, 53, 54, 58, 59, 78, 80, 81, 151, 153, 155, 157, 181, 186, 187, 213, 215, 254, 282, 283, 286, 288, 379,-97, 172, 173, 174, 198,-21, 25, 27,— 500, 551. See also Title: Mediation Proposals. Belgian Minister leaves Berlin, 462. Belgium, Brussels Documents, 577. Corn for Germany placed under Embargo, 378. Hostile Acts committed by Belgium against Germany, 378. Military Preparations — Secret Ar- rangements with Germany, 577. Belgian Defence against charges, 510. Neutrality of — Alleged Violation of, 424, 430, 435, 441, 442, 457. Belgian Request for Formal Decla- ration, 401. French Attack upon Germany through Belgium, 457. Necessity to protect German Army from French attack through Belgium, 457. Notification to Belgian Govern- ment, 433, 435, 441. Refusal to Reply to British Inquiry, 374, 387, 388, 397, 475. Proposal after Fall of Li^ge, 490, 492, 494, 498. Germany — Cont. Belgium, Neutrality of — Cont, Belgian Reply, 494, 499. British Approval, 497. French Approval, 497. Russian Approval, 499. Request for free Passage of Troops — Belgian Refusal, British Pro- test, 455. Ultimatum to, and Reply, 402, 421, 442. War declared by Germany, 442. British Ambassador's final Interview and Departure from Berlin, 485. Communications with Representatives at — Berne, 225. Kovno, 225. London, 59, 159, 191, 226, 457. Paris, 59, 191, 192, 292, 385, 395. Rome, 358. St. Petersburg, 59, 86, 159, 190, 191, 192, 225, 256, 327, 358, 384. Vienna, 85, 257. Congo. See that Title. Emperor — British Military and Naval Titles, Renunciation of, 488. Conversation with King of the Belgians in the presence of General von Moltke in 1913 — Attitude, 549. Czar's Telegrams from and to, 362, 367, 410, 557, 596. King George, Telegrams to and from, 592, 593, 594. Returns to Berlin (26 July), 193. France, relations with — Allegations of Violations of Terri- tory, 420, 427, 428, 429, 477, — 406, 408, 477. Inquiry as to Attitude in event of War between Germany and Russia, 347. French Reply: "France would do that which her interests dic- tated," 347, 385. War declared by Germany, 427, 429. French Ambassador's Departure (Re- port) , 476. French Colonies — Refusal to give Undertaking as to, 303. French Military and Naval Attache's Letter to Ministers (1913), 532, 534. Great Britain — Military and Naval Preparations, Assurance that Measures had no aggressive character, 343. Neutrality — Efforts to obtain Assurance of, 303, 381, 426. British Reply, 334, 362. Views on, 286. Ships, Detention of, 391, 413, 416, 430, 456. Ultimatum from, 432, 437, 441, 442. 604 Index Germany — Cont. Great Britain — cont. War declared by Great Britain, 460. Imperial Chancellor's Speech before Reichstag, on 4 August, 573. Interests in Belgium entrusted to United States Minister, 436, 496. Japanese Ultimatum, 506. German decision not to reply, 508. * ' Kriegsgef ahrzustand ' ' declared, 356, 364, 394. Luxemburg — Neutrality, 352, 401, 404, 405, 408, 413, 414, 415, 424, 430. Chancellor's View, 436. Mediation proposals. Attitude towards, 34, 163, 227, 229, 261, 265, 294, 301, 303, 310, 329, 360, 361, 362,-213, 218, 222, 249, 250, 252, 286, 325, 326, 355,-198, 235, 312, 313, 314, 341, 342, — 212, — 159, 226, 241, 256, 257, 554, 555, 557, 594, 595. Military and Naval Preparations, 331. Commencement, 284, 340, 364, 365. Minister leaves Serbia, 481. Mobilization, Action to be taken in event of Rus- sian Mobilization, 227, 364. Alleged Mobilization of Army and Navy, 342, 384, 412. Official Denial, 323. Ordered, 409. Preliminary Steps, 323, 324, 356, 364, 370, 394. Secret — Alleged Secret Measures, 357, 381, 397. Naval Preparations, 190, 321. Notification to Belgium of Breaches of International Law by France, 420. Seeking to gain time — Russian view, 322. Prince Henry — Telegrams to and from King George, 592. Reservists ordered to hold themselves in readiness, French Report, 190. Responsibility for War on Russia, — Russian Defence, 419. Russia, relations with — Ultimatum to Russia requiring De- mobilization, 278, 292, 316, 320, 322, 347, 356, 366, 375, 377, 386, 389, 390, 395, 396, 401. War declared by Germany, 398, 400, 405, 406. Secret French Report concerning Arms, Aims and Obligations of the National Policy, 538. Summary of Events, 551. Support of Austria-Hungary, 172, 173, 174, 261. War not desired, 161, 163. Contrary British and French Reports, 375, 377, 411. Great Britain, Ambassador to Austria Hungary — Summary of Events from 22 July, 514. Great Britain — Cont. Ambassador to Berlin, Final Interview and Departure, 485. Assurance to France that Fleet will protect French Coasts and Ship- ping against German Fleet, 415. Attitude if France and Russia reject Reasonable Proposal, 363. Attitude in case of Violation of Bel- gium, 595. Attitude in case of War between Ger- many, Russia and France, 595, 596. Attitude in Event of an Attack on France, or a General War, 174, 216, 238, 241, 305, 307, 326, 334, 335, 337, 351, 366, 368, 381, 388, 415. Correspondence between Sir E. Grey and M. Paul Cambon (Novem- ber, 1912), 337. Russia expects that England will side definitely with her, 172. Austria-Hungary — Relations with, 432, 468. War declared by Great Britain, 498, 520. Austro-Russian Relations — Attitude, 305. Austro-Servian Relations — Attitude, 54, 74, 83, 84, 150, 151, 153, 181, 213, 218, 219, 243, 244, 291, 305. See also Media- tion Proposals. Ultimatum of 23 July — Attitude, 66, 86, 91, 92, 93, 161, 165. Servian Reply, Views on, 93, 165, 229, 238, 281. Time-limit, Extension, Proposals for — Attitude, 92. Belgian King's Appeal to King George, 423, 455. Belgian Reply to German Proposal after Fall of Li6ge, Approval of, 497. Belgium — Appeal from, 442. Neutrality of — Actions to be taken, 406, 415, 424, 426, 434, 438, 441, 456, 460, 595, 596. Agreement for Joint Action, 462, 463. Inquiry to Belgium, 348, 366. Belgian Reply, 391. Inquiry to France and Germany, 351, 365, 366, 457. French Reply, 358, 378. German Refusal to Reply, 378, 381. Protest against German Demand to Belgium to allow Free Pas- sage of Troops, 455. Relations previous to the Outbreak of the War, 577. Index 605; Great Britain — Cont. Communications with Representatives at — Belgrade, 90, 93, 164, 165, 196, 267, 268, 302. Berlin, 34, 56, 92, 163, 166, 168, 193, 194, 227, 229, 265, 268, 270, 294, 297, 298, 299, 303, 306, 307, 308, 332, 334, 335, 361, 362, 364, 365, 386, 387, 388, 391, 392, 393, 409, 412, 413, 416, 430, 455, 456, 457. Brussels, 366, 391, 413, 430, 456, 457. Constantinople, 302. Luxemburg, 408, 414. Paris, 91, 160, 161, 168, 194, 195, 227, 258, 264, 305, 333, 336, 337, 365, 366, 368, 389, 390, 393, 394, 396, 415, 431. Rome, 61, 164, 168, 194, 233, 263, 266, 267, 301, 302, 305, 310, 334, 360. St. Petersburgh, 87, 160, 161, 165, 168, 228, 229, 230, 261, 270, 295, 299, 300, 335, 363, 365, 385, 394, 410. Vienna, 61, 86, 89, 164, 167, 192, 196, 226, 231, 259, 262, 265, 296, 297, 300, 309, 329, 330, 367, 391, 395, 411, 514. Congo. See that Title. Declaration of Intention to support France, 333. Fleet — Mobilized, 381. Non-dispersal of, after Review, 218, 230, 231. Protection assured to French Coasts and French Shipping, 381, 406, 407, 425, 453. Germany — Ultimatum to, 432, 437, 441, 442, 457. War declared by Great Britain, 460, 488. King George — Letters from French President, 351, 392. The King's Reply, 598. Personal Message to the Czar, 590. The Czar's Reply, 591. Telegrams from and to German Em- peror, 593, 594. Telegrams to and from Prince Henry of Prussia, 592. Luxemburg — Neutrality, British Atti- tude, 406. Mediation Proposals, 241, 247, — 91, 92, 194, 195, 228, 265, 268, 270, 294, 305, 306, 308, 363, — - 213 219, 291, — 174, 233, 396, — 590, 592, 593, 594. Military and Naval Preparations — German Inquiry and British Reply, 343. Secret — with Belgium, 577. Navy — See Subheading: Fleet above. Great Britain — '■ Cont. Neutrality of, 87, 161, 165, 230. German Efforts to obtain Assurance of, 303, 381, 426. British Reply, 334, 362. German Views, 286. Parliament — Support of Government PoHcy, 427. Peace — Agreement not to conclude separate Peace during War, 621. Serbian Appeal, 99, 219. Serbian Prime Minister's Thanks for Speech in House of Commons on 27 July, 302. Ships, Detention of, 391, 413, 416, 430, 456. Holland. See Title: Netherlands. Italy, Austro-Serbian Relations — Mediation Proposals, See Title: Me- diation Proposals. Ultimatum of 23 July, Time limit — Extension, proposals for, and atti- tude, 196. Views on, and Efforts, 28, 53, 78, 168, 181, 183, 184, 267. See also Title: Mediation Proposals. Declaration of Neutrality, 379, 431. Mediation Proposals, 194, 220, 221, 233, 263, 281, 360. Position of, with regard to the Austrian Note to Servia, 149, 181, 183, 184, 186, 221. Japan, Austria-Hungary — Relations broken off, 508. Declaration of Neutrality as regards Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia, while having no interest in Servia, 241. Ultimatum to Germany, 506. German Decision not to Reply, 508. Luxemburg, Belgian Minister's Departure, 495. French Minister's Departure, 464. Minister of State — Telegrams to Sir E. Grey (2 August), 408, 414. Neutrality of — British Attitude, 406. Inquiry to France and Germany, 352, 383. French Reply, 384. German Reply, 405. German Military Measures to insure against attack by French Army, 352, 401, 404, 405, 408, 413, 414, 415, 424. Chancellor's View, 436. Mediation Proposals, 163, 165, 166. Austria-Hungary, Attitude, 241, 276, 278, 280, 345, 373,-265, 302, 328, 329, 392, 393, 394, — 254, 375, 377, 397. France, Attitude, 91, 227, 258, 260, 264,-220, 248, 251, 252, 286, 290, — 237, 313, 314. 606 Index Mediation Proposals — Cont. Germany, Attitude, 592, 593, 594, — 34, 163, 227, 229, 261, 265, 294, 301, 303, 310, 329, 360, 361, 362,-213, 218, 222, 249, 250, 252, 286, 325, 326, 355, — 198, 235, 312, 314, 341, 342,-212, — 554, — 159, 226, 241, 256, 257. Great Britain, Attitude, 241, 247, — 590, 592, 593, 594,-91, 92, 194, 195, 228, 265, 268, 270, 299, 305, 306, 308, 363,-213, 219, 291, — 174, 233, 396. Italian Views, 194, 233, 263, 360,— 220, 221, 281. Occupation of Belgrade or other point a condition of accepting Media- tion, 332, 335, 353. Russia, Attitude, — 243, 278, — 590, 596,-260, 261, 262, 294, 297, 299, 328, 385, 392, 393,-283, 321, 322, 323, 353, 354, 381,— 272, 341, 370. Serbia, Attitude, 53, 54, 58, 78. Urgency of Action, 272. Netherlands, British Information that Great Britain expects — will resist German pres- sure and Offer of Support, 195. Declaration of Neutrality, 468. Integrity of — German Assurance, 303. War Buoying in the Scheldt, 434, 463, 475, 476, 482. Norway, British Information that Great Britain expects — will resist German pressure and Offer of Support, 195. Peace, Agreement of Allies not to conclude separate Peace during War, 521. Efforts. See Title: Mediation Proposals. Russia, Austro-Hungary, Relations with — Direct Conversations, proposals for, 185, 229, 251, 252, 254, 286, 323, 363. Refusal, 285, 287, 297. Engagement to stop Military Prep- arations if Austria takes cer- tain course, 331, 333. German Advice, 297. Mediation Proposals. See that Title. War declared by Austria, 459, 481. Austro-Serbian Relations — Austrian Statement that her Declara^ tion of Readiness to respect Ser- bian Integrity and Sovereign Rights had been received by Russia in Silence — Contradic- tion by Russian Ambassador in Paris, 398. Ultimatum of 23 July — Redrafting of certain Articles pro- posed by Russia, 197. German Attitude, 237. Serbian Reply, Views on, 235. Russia — Cont. Austro-Serbian Relations — Cont. Ultimatum of 23 July — Cont. Time limit, Extension, proposals for, views on, 160, 167, 196. Views on and Attitude, 71, 179, 202, 278, 280, 347, 373,-87, 89, 161, 168, 193, 228, 261, 367,— 15, 53, 58, 74, 82, 83, 84, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 181, 184, 185, 217, — 170, 196, 237, 238. *See also Mediation Proposals. Belgium — Appeal from, 442. Neutrality of — Agreement for Joint Action, 463. Reply to German Proposal after Fall of Li6ge, 499. Communications with Representa- tives at — Belgrade, 63, 94, 98, 170, 174. Berlin, 96, 97, 171, 198, 199, 235, 237, 272, 294, 310, 312, 341, 342, 370. Fiume, 270. London, 260, 261, 294, 328,— 94, 96, 171, 172, 174, 233, 234, 235, 238, 270, 272, 312, 314, 341, 333, 370, 371, 396, 397. Nish, 316, 340. Paris, 94, 96, 97, 171, 173, 198, 199, 234, 235, 312, 314, 316, 341, 370, 397, 398. Prague, 197. Rome, 94, 96, 196, 235, 341, 370. Vienna, 94, 170, 197, 235, 238, 271, 272, 328, 341, 369, 370. Czar — Personal Message from King George, 590. The Czar's Reply, 591. Telegrams to and from German Emperor, 362, 367, 410, 454, 596. French Declaration of Determination to Support, 314, 316. Germany puts Responsibility for War on Russia, 215, 282, 381, 482. Germany, Relations with, 63. German Ultimatum requiring De- mobilization, 366, 386, 389, 390, 409, 411, 316, 396, 278, 347. Germany declares War, 405, 406, — 398, — 400. Germany's Reasons for War with Russia, 551. Great Britain, Expectations that England will side with Russia and France, 172. Mediation Proposals, Attitude and Efforts, 260, 261, 262, 294, 297, 299, 328, 385, 392, 393,-283, 321, 322, 323, 353, 354, 381,— 237, 341, 370, — 243, 278, — 586. Mobilisation, 294, 298, 299, 362, 364, 365, 391, 288, 289, 292, 320, 323, 357,-288, 289, Index 607 Russia — Cont. Mobilisation — Cont. 292, 320, 323, 357,-225,— 312, 370, — 246, 280, 346. Denial, Russian — of Mobilisa- tion, 179. Offer to Stop Military Prepara- tions if Austria takes certain course, 322. Suspension of, 321. Vienna Press did not publish Russian Communication, Ex- planation, 323. Mobilisation against Austria immediately, if Austrian Troops Cross Servian Frontier, 295. Peace, Declaration not to con- clude separate Peace during War, 521. Troops Cross German Frontier, 413. Unreadiness for War, 294. Salonica, Austrian Designs as to, British View, 302. Sandjak, Austria has no intentions to advance into or occupy, 385, 389. British View, 302. Scheldt, War Buoying Measures, 434, 464, 475, 476, 482. Serajevo Murders, 1, 2, 3, 4, 8. Austrian Dossier sent to the Powers, 101. Austrian a^d Serbian View, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 15, 18, 20, 21, 22, 25, 27, 28, 31, 500, 527. Austrian Official Reports of State of Serbian Feeling, 2, 3, 6, 14, 36. Criminal Inquiry, Conclusions of, 86. Extracts from Records of the Court at Serajevo touching the Pro- ceedings against Gavrilo Princip and Confederate, 130. Nish Local Committee of Narodna Odbrana, 138. Origin of the Plot, 131. Origin of the Bombs, 132. Reports from Austria and Serbian Alle- gations, 4, 5, 6, 7. Serbian Press Comments, 135. Transport of Assailants, and of the Wea- pons from Servia to Bosnia, 133. Serbia, Amsfeld Anniversary, Celebration of, 2, 6. Appeal to Great Britain, 99, 219. Appeal to the Powers, 98. Austro-Hungary, Relations with — Austrian Intentions, 302, 369. Austrian Minister leaves Belgrade, 174, — 158, 186, — 165, 192, 194. Austrian Official Reports as to Serbian Feelings towards Austria, 2, 3, 6, 14, 36. Serbia — Cont. Austro-Hungary, Relations with — Cont. Austrian Statement that her Decla- ration of Readiness to Respect Serbian Integrity and Sovereign Rights had been Received by Russia in Silence — Contradic- tion, 398. See also Title; Mediation Proposals. Berlin Press, Attitude, 97. British Attitude, 305, — 54, 74, 83, 84, 150, 151, 153, 181, 213, 218, 219, 291, — 174, — 243, 244. See also Title: Mediation Proposals. Events from Date of Serajevo Mur- ders to Presentation of Austrian Note to Serbia of 23 July — French Reports, and French Attitude and Reports. See Title: Austria-Hungary, French Atti- tude and French Reports. German Views and Attitude, 551, — 21, 25, 27, — 482, 500, — 12, 39, 53, 54, 58, 59, 78, 80, 81, 151, 153, 155, 157, 181, 186, 187, 213, 215, 254, 282, 283, 286, 288, 379,-97, 172, 173, 174, 198. See also Title: Mediation Proposals. Italian Views and Attitude, 53, 78, 181, 183, 184, — 28. Localisation of the Dispute, — German Statement, 56, 78, 90, 150, 172. Mediation Proposals. See that Title. Military Action, 163, 196, 226. Military Operations not to be under- taken immediately, 166, 167. Narodna Odbrana Society — Appeal of, in Servian Official Gazette, 123. Nish Local Committee — Attitude on Serajevo Murders, 138. Organization and Work of — , 101, 116, 124. Work of — , Deposition by Trifko Krstanovic, 124. Non-interference by the Powers. See Subhead, Localisation of Dispute, above. Occupation of Belgrade or other Towns as a Basis for Negotiations, 332, 335, 353. Russian Views and Attitude, 71, 179, 202, 278, 280, 347, 373,-168, 193, — 15, 53, 58, 74. 82, 83, 84, 152, 153, 154, 155, 196, 237, 238. See also Title: Mediation Proposals. Serbia's willingness to entertain require- ments, provided that only judi- cial cooperation is asked by Austria, 38. Serbian Appeal to the Powers, Possi- bility of, 161. Serbian Attitude and Views, 53, 54, 78, — 4, 6, 31. Serbian Note of 1908, 86, 161, 261. 608 Index Serbia — Cont. Serbian Preparations before Delivery of Austrian Note, 141, 180. Serbian Press, Hostile Attitude prior to Serajevo Murders, 112. Serbian Territory not to be seized, 14, 203, — 163, 308, 309, 395. Serbian War Office — Pictures of a nature hostile to Austria-Hungary, 140. Situation before Presentation of Ulti- matum of 23 July, 34, 56, 61, 86. Sokol Society Dusan the Strong — Report on the Activities of — , in Kragujevac, 121. Special Points for Great Britain, 243. Turkish Views, 217. Ultimatum of 23 July, 86, 90, — 63, — 64, 98, 99,-75, 78, 158. Austrian Official Commentary, 51. Austrian Statement that Note is not an Ultimatum but a D-marche with a time limit, 160, 161, 236. Austro-Hungarian Views, 86, 89. British Views regarding Reply, 93, 165. British Attitude, 66,-86, 91, 92, 93, 161, 165. French Advice to Serbia Regarding Reply, 160. French Attitude and Views, 87, 91, 160, 161, — 67. German Attitude and Views, 90, 92. German Denial of Prior Knowledge, 163, 166, — 38, 53, 81, 149, 150, 153, 187, 250, — 172, 173, 174. German Prior Knowledge ("unable to confirm"), 329. German Support of Austrian Action, 172, 173, 174. Italian Views, 267. Point 5 — Austrian Explanation, 148. Redrafting of certain articles proposed by Russia, 197. German Attitude, 237. Russian Attitude and Views, 69, 70, — 87, 161, 228, 261, 367, 191. Serbian Attitude, 90. Serbian Reply, 164, 169, 175, 195, — 156, 157, 158. Austrian Official Commentaries. Austrian Views, 198, 221, 251. British Views, 229, 231, 238. German Views, 192, 194, 235. Non-publication of in German Press, 272. Serbia — Cont. Ultimatum, Serbian Reply to — Cont. Refusal of Austria to accept, 174, 231, 236. Russian Views, 235. Special Points to be brought before Great Britain, 57, 65. Time Limit — Dangers of, 61. Proposal for Extension, 152-158, 170, 171, 181. Austrian Refusal, 140, 141. British Attitude, 290. German Attitude, 163. Italian Attitude, 196. Russian Attitude, 160, 167, 396. Unconditional Acceptance de- manded, 164. War Declared by Austria-Hungary, 241, 268, 296,-247, —273, 344, 359. British Charg6 d'Affaires Leaves Bel- grade with Serbian Government, 165. Government Leaves Belgrade, 165, 174, 176. Integrity to be respected, 264. Kragujevac — Work of Sokol Society Dusan the Strong, 121. Mediation Proposals, Attitude towards, 53, 54, 58, 78. Minister Leaves Berlin, 458. Minister Leaves Vienna, 177. Mobilisation Ordered, 142, 176. Prince Regent — Appeal to the Czar, 292, — 96. The Czar's Reply, 237, 315. Speech from the Throne to the Skupschtina after Declaration of War, 340. Summary of Events by Minister at Vienna, 500. Triple Entente. See also Names of the Powers. Declaration not to conclude separate Peace during War, 531*. Turkey, Austro-Servian Relations, Views on, 217. Vienna, Demonstrations, 8, 9. War between Great Powers, German Attitude, 294. Printed in the United States of America. APPENDIX THE SEVERAL OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF COLLECTED DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS IN PHOTOGRAPHIC RE- PRODUCTION K. U. K. MINISTERIUM DES AUSSERN. DIPLOMATISCHE ARTENSTUCKE ZUR YORGESCHICHTE des RRIEGES 1914. WIEN 1915. AUS DER K. K. HOF UND STAATSDRUCKEREI. m INHALTSVERZEICHNIS. Seitc 1. Legationsrat Ritter von Storck, Belgrad, 29. Juni 1914. Freudenkund- gebungen in Belgrad bei der Nackriclit von der Ermordong des *Herm Erzherzogs Thronfolgers 1 2. Legationsrat Ritter von Storck, Belgrad, 30. Juni 1914. Die serbische Polizei hat keine Mafinahmen getroffen, um die Faden des Attentates in Serbien zu verfolgen 2 3. Generalkonsul Jeblitscbka, tlskiib, 1. Juli 1914. Freudenkundgebungen in tiskiib und Pristina bei Bekanntwerden des Attentates in Sarajevo 2 4. Graf Sz^csen, Paris, 4. Juli 1914. Der Prasident der franzosischen Republik spricbt die Uberzeugung aus, die serbische Regierung werde Osterreich-Ungarn bei der gerichtlichen Untersuchung und der Verfol- gung eventueller Mitschuldiger Entgegenkommen zeigen 3 5. Gerent Herr Hoflehner, Nisch, 6. Juli 1914. Freudige Genugtuung in Nisch liber das Sarajevoer Attentat 4 6. Freiherr von Giesl, Belgrad, 21. Juli 1914. Die Politik Serbiens verfolgt nur ein Ziel, die Abtrennung der von Siidslawen bewohnten Gebiete Osterreich-Ungarns und dessen schlieMche Vemichtung als Groiimacht. Serbische Prelikampagne voU Liige, Hali und Geringschatzung. Eine weitere Schadigung der Stellung der Monarchie kann nicht mehr zu- gelassen werden 4 7. An FreiheiTn von Giesl in Belgrad, Wien, 22. Juli 1914. Note der k. u. k. Regierung an die serbische Regierung 7 8. An die k. u. k. Botschafter in Berlin, Rom, Paris, London, St. Petersburg und Konstantinopel, Wien, 22. JuH 1914. Mitteilung der an die serbische Regierung gerichteten Note. Kommentar zu dieser Note, in welchem die serbischen Machenschaften und Umtriebe gegen die Monarchie, sowie die Gninde dargelegt werden, aus denen die k. u. k. Regierung der provokatorischen Haltung Serbiens gegeniiber so yiel Langmut bewahrte 11 IV Seite 9. An Graf Mensdorff in London, Wien, 23. Juli 1914. Die serblsche Regierung hat keinerlei Mafinahmen zur Aufdeckung der nach Belgrad weisenden Spuren des Sarajevoer Attentates ergriifen, sondern vieliiiehr getrachtet, diese Spuren zu verwischen. Die kurze Befristung der an Serbien gerichteten Forderungen war unerlaOlich, uni den der k. u. k. Regierung aus langjahrigen Erfahrungen woUbekannten serbischen Ver- scbleppungskiinsten keine Handbabe zu bieten . 13 10. Graf Mensdorff, London, 24. Juli 1914. Mitteilung der an Serbien ge- richteten Note an Sir E. Grey, der Bedenken gegen die kurze Be- fristung und Besorgnis wegen der Riickwirkung auf den europaischen Frieden aulierte. Darlegung des Standpunktes der k. u. k. Rjegierung; Verteidigung unserer vitalsten Interessen; Volikommener Milierfolg der Serbien gegeniiber bisher stets beobachteten konzilianten Haltung . . 14r 11. Graf Sz6csen, Paris, 24. Juli 1914. Mitteilung der an Serbien gerich- teten Note und Darlegung des Standpunktes dejr k. u. k. Regierung: Es handle sich um eine Frage, welche direkt zwischen Osterreich- Ungarn und Serbien ausgetragen werden muli; das Aufhoren der durch die serbische Wiihlarbeit seit Jahren verursaohten Unruhe liege aber im allgemeinen europaischen Interesse. Der interimistische fran- zosi.sche Minister des Auliern vermied, die Haltung Serbiens irgend- •wie zu beschbnigen oder zu yerteidigen 15 12. Graf Sz6esen, Paris, 24. Juli 1914. Deutscher Botschafter ist beauf- tragt, dem franzbsisohen Kabinett die Auffassung seiner Regierung mitzuteilen, dafi serbischer Streitfall Angelegenheit sei, die nur Oster- reich-Ungarn und Serbien angehe 1$' 13. Graf Sz6csen, Paris, 24. Juli 1914. Deutscher Botschafter hat Auftrag ausgefuhrt. Franzosische Regierung teilt deutsche Auffassung und hofft, dafi die Kontroverse eine direkte und friedliche Losung finden werde < . . 1& 14. Graf Szdpary, St. Petersburg, 24. Juli .1914. Mitteilung der an Serbien gerichteten Note und Erorterung des osterreichisch-ungari-^ schen Standpunktes. Einwendungen Herrn Sazonows. Auf seine Dar- stellungsweise, als ob Osterreich-Ungarn den Krieg -wolle, wurde erwidert, die Monarchie sei die friedliebendste Macht der Welt, dock miisse der Bedrohung unserer Dynastie durch serbische Bomben und unseres Territoriums durch die serbischen revolutionaren Umtriebe ein Ende bereitet werden 1? 15. Russisches Communiqu6, 24. Juli 1914. Rutland konne einem oster- reichisch-ungarisch-serbischen Konflikte gegeniiber nicht indifferent bleiben , 1$ V Seitd 16. Graf Szapary, St. Petersburg, 24. Juli 1914. Der Bemerkung des russischen Ministers des AuBem gegeniiber, Streitfall zwiscben Cster- reicb-Ungarn und Serbien sei keine auf diese Staaten bescbrankte Angelegenbeit und Ruliland konne es nicbt gleicbgiltig binnebmen, wenn Osterreicb-Ungarn die Absicbt hatte, Serbien „aufziifressen"^ antwortete deutscber Botscbafter, Osterreicb-Ungarn liege dies voUig feme, eine Einmiscbung in seine Differenz riiit Serbien konne es. jedocb nicbt zugeben . IS 17. An Gr^af MensdorfF in London, Wien, 24. Juli 1914. Schritt in Belgrad bat nicbt Cbarakter eines formellen Ultimatums, sondern einer befristeten Demarcbe • 19 18. An Graf Szapary in St. Petersburg, Wien, 24. Juli 1914. Es .wurde dem russiscben Gescbaftstrager erklart, dali Osterreicb-Ungarn keiner Demiitigung Serbiens und keine Gebietserwerbung bezwecke, sondern. nur die Erbaltung des Bestebenden, sowie die Verurteilung und Unter- driickung der gegen den Bestand der Monarcbie gericbteten grofi- serbiscben Stromungen , ■ . . 20 19. An die k. u. k. Botscbafter in Berlin, Rom, Paris, London, St. Peters- burg und Konstantinopel, Wien, 25. Juli 1914. Dossier, betrefiend die groftserbis'cbe Propaganda und ibre Zusammenbange mit dem Sarajevoer Attentate ..,..., 21 20. An Sektionscbef Freiberrn von Maccbio in Wien, Lambacb, 25. Juli 1914. Dem vom russiscben Gescbaftstrager in Wien gestellten Ver- langen einer Fristerstreckun^ fiir die an Serbien gericbteten Forde- rungen kann nicbt stattgegeben werden ............ 69 21. An. Graf Szdpary in St. Petersburg, Bad Iscbl, 2.5. Juli 1914. Mit- teilung und Begriindung dieses ablebnenden Standpmiktes ..... 69 22. Freiberr von Giesl, Belgrad, 25. Juli 1914. Administrative und mili- tariscbe Vorbereitungen in Serbien »..-.. 70 23. Freiberr von Giesl, Semlin, 25. Juli 1914. Allgemeine Mobilisierung in Serbien angeordnet 70 24. Freiberr von Giesl, Semlin. 25. Juli 1914. Abbrucb der diploma- tiscben Beziebungen zu Serbien infolge ungeniigender Antwort der Beigrader Regierung auf die osterreicbiscb-ungariscbe Note . . . , 71 ' ."25. Note der konigHcb serbiscben Regierung vom 12./25. Juli 1914 . . 71 26. An Graf Szapary in St. Petersburg, Wien, 25. Juli 1914. Die k. u. k. Regierung konnte sicb durcb die Moglicbkeit eines. Zusammenstofies mit Ruliland nicbt in ibrer Stellungnabme gegen Serbien beirren lassen, weil grundlegende staatspolitiscbe Konsiderationen Osterreicb- Ungarn vor die Notwendigkeit stellten, der Situation ein Ende zu bereiten, dafi ein russiscber Freibrief Serbien die dauernde ungestrafte b "VI • Seitd und anstrafbare Bedrohnng der MonarcHe ermogliclie. Die k. n. k. Regiercng hofft, dafi Euiiland im Hinblicke 'auf das den Balkanstaaten bisher bewiesene WoblwoUen Osterreich-Ungarns und auf die Erkla- rung der k. u. k. Regierung, dafi sie keinerlei territorialen Gewinn anstrebe und die Souveranitat Serbiens nicht antasten wolle, niclit in die Aktion Osterreicb-Ungams gegen Serbien eingreifen werde . . 74 27. An Graf Szdpdry in St. Petersburg, Wien, 25. Juli 1914. Die For- derung der Beteiligung von k. u. k. Funktionaren bei der Unter- driickung der subversiven Bewegung in Serbien entsprang lediglich praktiscben Eiicksichten und niclit der Absicbt, die Souveranitat Serbiens zu tangieren . . . . , » . . . 77 28. Graf Szdpdry, St. Petersburg, 26. Juli 1914. Deutscher Botschafter in St. Petersburg warnt russischen Minister des Auliern, dali russiscbe Mobilisierungsmafinahmen gegen Deutschland unaufhaltsam den Krieg herbeifiiliren wiirden. Deutscber Militarattach6 erklart russischem Kriegsminister, Mobilmachung gegen Osterreicb-Ungam wiirde eine sehr bedrohlicbe Situation ber\^orrufen. Kriegsminister gibt sein Ehrenwort, dafi keinerlei Mobilmachungsordre ergangen 77 29. An Graf Mensdorff in London, Wien, 26. Juli 1914. Auftrag, Sir E. Grey aufmerksam zu machen, dafi die scbon drei Stunden vor Uber- reichung der serbiscben Antwortnote angeordnete allgemeine Mobi- Hsierung der serbiscben Armee beweise, wie wenig Neigung in Belgrad zu einer friedlicben Austragung des Streifalles bestand und wie unauf- ricbtig der angeblicb versobnlicbe Tenor der serbiscben Erklarung sei . 78 30. An die k. u. k. Botscbafter in Berlin, Rom, London, Paris und St. Peters- burg, Wien, 26. Juli 1914. Angesicbts der Ablebnung der bsterreicbisch- ungariscb.en Forderungen seitens der serbiscben Regierung sielit sicb die ki u. k. Regierung in die Notwendigkeit versetzt, Serbien zu einer grundsatzlicben Anderung seiner bisberigen feindseligen Haltung zu zwingen 78 31. Graf Szdpdry, St. Petersburg, 27. Juli 1914. Der k. u. k. Botschafter erklart dem russischen Minister des Aufiem, daft Osterreich-Ungarn ein Vorstofi am Balkan oder gar ein Praventivkrieg gegen Ruftland vollig feme liege. Das Ziel unserer Aktion sei Selbsterhaltung und Notwehr. Osterreich-Ungarn babe keineswegs die Absicbt, russiscbe Interressen zu bedrohen oder gar mit Ruftland Streit suchen zu wollen. Erorterung der an Serbien gestellten Forderungen Osterreich- Ungarns 79 32. An Graf Szdpiry in St. Petersburg, Wien, 27. Juli 1914. K. u. k. Regierung erklart, daft die Monarchic, solange der Krieg zwischen VII Seite Gsterreicli-Ungarn und Serbien lokalisiert bleibe, keinerlei territoriale , Eroberungen beabsicbtige 80 33. Graf Szogy^ny, Berlin, 27. Juli 1914. „Militarische Vorsorgen" in Ruliland 80 34. An die k. u. k. Botscbafter in Berlin, Rom, London, Paris und St. Petersburg, Wien, 27. Juli 1914. Mitteilung der Note der konig- licb serbiscben Regierung vom 12./25. Juli 1914 und des Kom- mentares der k. u. k. Regierung zu dieser Note . 1 80 35. Graf Szogy^ny, Berlin, 28. Juli 1914. Der engliscbe Vorscblag, den osterreicbisch-ungariscb-serbiscben Streitfall einer in London abzu- baltenden Konferenz zur Regelung zu iiberlassen, wurde ^ron Deutscb- land abgelebnt, da es seinen . Bundesgenossen in der Auseinander- setzung mit Serbien nicbt vor ein europaiscbes Gericbt zieben lassen konne 90 36. Freiberr von Miiller, Tokio, 28. Juli, 1914. Erklarung der offiziosen japaniscben „ Times", dali die japaniscbe Regierung im Kriegsfalle strengste Neutralitat bewahren werde 90 37. Note an das koniglich serbiscbe Ministerium des Auliern, Wien, 28. Juli 1914. Kriegserklarung an Serbien 90 38. An Graf Szogy6ny in Berlin, Wien, 28. JuH 1914. Es ist Sir E. Grey dargelegt worden, dali Osterreicb-Ungarn weder territoriale Erobe- rungen nocb die Vernicbtung der serbiscben Unabbangigkeit beab- sicbtige, sondern Genugtuung fiir die Vergangenbeit und Garantien •fiir die Zukunft verlange. Der engliscbe Konferenzvorscblag erscbeint, insoweit er sicb auf unseren Konflikt mit Serbien beziebt, angesicbts des eingetretenen Kriegszustandes durcb die Ereignisse uberbolt. Konzentrierung der engliscben Flotte 91 39. An Graf Mensdorff in London, Wien, 28. Juli 1914. Auftrag, Sir E. Grey die groGserbische Propaganda und ibre Zusammenbange mit dem Sarajevoer Morde auseinanderzusetzen und ibm darzulegen, dali das Entgegenkommen der serbiscben Antwortnote nur ein scbein- bares war, bestimmt, Europa zu tauscben, so dali keinerlei Garantien fiir die Zukunft geboten waren 92 40. An Graf Szdpdry in St. Petersburg, Wien, 28. Juli 1914. Wunscb der russiscben Regierung, mit dem Wiener Kabinette bebufs Abanderung einzelner seitens Osterreicb-Ungarns an Serbien gerichteten Forde- rungen zu verbandeln. Dieser Wunscb muiite abgelebnt werden, da die gestellten Forderungen unerlalilicb sind, um die gegen den Be- stand der Monarcbie gericbtete serbiscbe Bewegung zum Stillstand zu bringen. Serbien babe bereits durcb Anordnung der allgemeinen vm Seite Mobilisierung einen feindseligen Akt begangen. Trotzdem habe die k; u. k. Kegierung noch drei Tage gewartet. Nun babe Serbien die ' Feindseligkeiten an der ungarischen Grenze eroffnet. Eine friedlicbe Sanierung des Yerhaltnisses zu Serbien sei, nunmebr unmoglicb . . 93 41. An Graf Mensdorfif in London, Wien, 28. Juli 1914. Der engliscbe Botschafter bat den Konferenzvorscblag Sir E. Greys dem k. u. k. Minister des AuBem auseinandergesetzt und Englands Vermittlung im Konflikte zwiscben Osterreicb-Ungarn und Serbien angeboten. Es wurde ibm erwidert, dali die Verbinderung der Feindseligkeiten infolge Kriegsausbrucbes nicbt mebr moglicb sei. Ein Transigieren auf Grund der serbiscben Antwortnote sei angesicbts der woblbekannten serbiscben Winkelzuge nicbt moglicb. Der Friede wiirde nicbt dadurcb gerettet werden, dali sicb Groiimacbte binter Serbien stellen und fiir dessen Straffreibeit eintreten. Serbien wiirde crmutigt und der Friede bald wieder in Frage gestellt werden 94^ 42. An Graf Szogy^ny in Berlin, Wien, 28. Juli 1914, Ersucben an die deutscbe Kegierung, das russiscbe Kabinett darauf aufmerksam zu macbenj daC die Mobilisierung der Militarb^zirke Kiew, Odessa, Moskau und Kasan Buier Bedrobung Osterreicb-Ungams gleicbkame und von der Monarcbie und Deutscbland mit den weitestgebenden militariscben Gegenmaliregeln beantwortet werden miiiite 96 43. An Graf Szogy^ny in Berlin, Wien, 28. Juli 1914. Deutscbe Regierung bat Anregung Sir E. Greys, dali das Wiener Kabinett die Ant- wortnote der serbiscben Regierung als gentigend betracbte oder als Grundlage fur Besprecbungen unter den Kabinetteii annebme, der k. u. k. Regierung zur Ervvagung iibermittelt 96 .44. An die k. u. k. Botschafter in St. Petersburg, London, Paris und Rom, Wien, 29. Juli 1914. Im Hinblicke auf die oben erwabnte Anregung Sir E. Greys werden die Griinde wiederbolt, wesbalb die ser- biscbe Antwortnote ungeniigend und binterbaltig ist. Die Annabme, als ob die Aktion Osterreicb-Ungams gegen Serbien Rutland und dessen Einfluii am Balkan treffen wolle, batte zur Yoraussetzung, daG die gegen die Monarcbie gericbtete Propaganda nicbt allein serbiscben, sondern aucb russischen Ursprunges sei. Im Zeitpunkte des in Wien gemacbten Scbrittes der deutscben Regierung war Angelegenbeit der serbiscben Antwortnote durcb ELriegsausbrucb scbon iiberbolt. Einfluii- • nabme der engliscben Regierung auf Ruliland im Sinne der Erbaltung des Friedens zwiscben den Grolimacbten wiirde dankbar begriiiit werden 97 45. Graf Sz^csen, Paris, 29. Juli 1914. Deutscber Botschafter in Paris wurde beauftragt, dortige Regierung aufmerksam zu macben, dali IX Seite franzosische militarische "Vorbereitungen Deutschland zu gleiclien Mafi- nalimen zwingen wiirden, wodurcli beide Staaten trotz ihrer Friedens- liebe zu gefahrlicher Mobilisierung gedrangt we.rden kbnnten. Deutsch- land zahle auf die Unterstiitzung Frankreicbs zur Lokalisierung des Konfliktes zwiscben Osterreich-Ungarn und Serbien 98 46. Graf Szogy^ny, Berlin, 29. Juli 1914. Deutsche Regierung hat am 26. Juli in St Petersburg erklaren lassen, daii sich Deutschland bei einer Fbrtsetzung der milifarischen Riistungen Ruftlands veranlalit sehen konnte, zu mobilisieren 99 47. Graf Szdpdry, St. Petersburg, 29. Juli 1914. Der k. u. k. Botschafter betonte Herm Sazonow gegeniiber, dafi daa Wiener Kabinett, welches kein russisches Interesse zu vferletzen, kein serbisches Territorium zu erwerben und die Souveranitat Serbiens nicht anzutasten wunsche, immer bereit sei, mit St. Petersburg iiber osterreichisch-ungarische und russische Interessen Fiihlung zu nehmen. Die Bedenken, dafi die gegen Serbien mobilisierten siidlichen Korps RuMand bedrohen, konnten nicht ernst genommen werden. Es sei dringend geboten, dem zu befiirchtenden militarischen lizitieren ein rasches Ende zu bereiten. Der k. u. k. Botschafter machte in ernsten Worten auf den Eindruck aufmerksam, den die bevorstehende umfangreiche russische Mobili- sierung in Osterreich-Ungarn hervorrufen wvirde 99 48. An Graf Szogy^ny in Berlin, Wien, 29. Juli 1914. Anregung bei der deutschen Regierung, dali die k. u. k. und die deutschen Bot- schafter in St. Petersburg und Paris angewiesen werden, zu erklaren, daO die Fortsetzung der russischen Mobilisierung Gegenmaliregeln in Deutschland und Osterreich-Ungarn zur Folge hatte, die zu ernsten Konsequenzen fiihren miiliten. Osterreich-Ungarn werde sich naturlich in seiner kriegerischen Aktion gegen Serbien nicht beirren lassen . * 101 49. An Graf Szdpdry in St. Petersburg, Wien, 30. Juli 1914. Die k. u.k. Regierung ist zu einer freundschaftlichen Atissprache mit dem St. Peters- burger Kabinette iiber die die Beziehungen Osterreich-Ungarns zu Ruliland direkt betreffenden Fragen stets bereit 101 50. An Graf Szdpdry in St. Petersburg, Wien, 30. Juli 1914. Den Klagen Herrn Sazonows gegeniiber, dali kein Gedankenaustausch zwischen Graf Berchtold und dem russischen Botschafter stattgefunden habe, wird auf die jungste Ausspracbe hingewiesen, in welcher weitgehendo Zusicherungen beziiglich der Respektierung der territorialen und sou- veranen Rechte Serbiens erteilt wurden. Es wird hervorgehoben, wie sehr die russische Diplomatic an dem unleidlichen Yerhaltnisse Oster- reich-Ungarns zu Serbien schuld sei. Die Mobilisierung Ruiilands ' Sfito gegen OsteiTeict-Ungam zwingt die Monarcliiei itre Mobilisienmg zq erweitem 102 51. An die k. u. k. Botschafter in London und St. Petersburg, Wien, .31. Juli 1914. Russisches Kabinett hat 6nglisclie Regierung ersucht, ihre Vermittlung zwiscben Osterreicb-Ungarn nnd Serbien wieder axif- zunebmen unter der Bedingung der vorlaufigen Einstellung der Feind- seligkeiten. Sir E. Grey bat die Vermittlung Frankreichs, Englands, Italiens und Deutschlands angeregt. Die k. u. k. Regierung ist geme bereit, dem Vorscblage Sir E. Greys naberzutreten unter der Voraus- setzung, daii die militariscbe Aktion gegen Serbien vorlaufig ihren Fortgang nebme und daO Ruliland die gegen Osterreicb-Ungam gericbtete Mobilisierung zum StUlstande bringe 103 52. Graf Szdpdry, St. Petersburg, 31. Juli 1914. .AUgemeine Mobilisierung. der russiscben Armee und Flotte . . . :• .. . . .104 53. An die k. u. k. Missionen, Wien, 31. Juli 1914. Notwendigkeit mili- tariscber Malinebmen in Galizien angesicbts der russiscben Mobilisie- rung. Diese sind rein defensiven Cbarakters . 104 64. Graf Sz^csen, Paris, 31. Juli 1914. Erklarung der deutscben Regie- rung in Paris, dali Deutscbland gleicbfalls mobilisieren werde, wenn die russiscbe Mobilisierung nicbt binnen zwolf Stunden eingestellt wird. Anfrage, ob Frankreicb im Falle deutscb-russiscben Krieges neutral bleiben werde 3l05 55. Graf Szdpdry, St. Petersburg, 31. Juli 1914. Ruliland gibt sich selbst mit der formellen Erklarung nicbt zufrieden, dali Osterreicb-Unganx weder das serbisebe Territorium schmalem nocb die serbiscbe Souve* ranitat antasten, nocb aucb die russiscben Balkan- oder sonstigen Interessen verletzen werde, und hat die allgemeine Mobilisierung angeordnet .....'......... 10& 56. Graf Szdpdry, St. Petersburg, 1. August 1914. Der k. u. k. Botschafter bringt nochmals den guten Willen des Wiener Kabinettes zum Aus- druck, mit RuRland auf breitester Basis zu verhandeln. Herr Sazonow spricht Ansicht aus, daO ihm Unterhandlungen in St. Petersburg weniger erfolgversprecbend erscheinen als solche auf dem neutralen Londoner Terrain 106 67. Graf Szogy6ny, Berlin, 2. August 1914. Ruliland bat Kriegsmalinahmen gegen Osterreicb-Ungarn und Deutscbland nicbt eingestellt. Russiscbe, Truppen haben die deutsche Grenze iiberschritten. Deutscbland, das somit angegriflfen ist, betrachtet sich als im Kriegszustande mit Ruliland 107 68. Graf Mensdorff, London, 4. August 1914. Ultimatum Englands an Deutscbland. Erklarung Sir E. Greys, solange Osterreicb-Ungari^ XI ' Seife nicht im Kriegszustande mit Frankreich, sei keine Veranlassung zu einem Konflikte zwischen England und der Monarchle . . . . . . lOt .59, An Graf Szdpdry in St.' Petersburg, Wien, 5. August 1914. Kriegs- zustand zwischen Osterreich-Ungarn und RuBlatid infolge der drohen- den Haltung Rufilands im osterreicliiscli-ungariscli-serbisclien Konflikte und der Eroffnung der Feindseligkeiten gegen Deutschland , . . . 10& 6^0. An Graf Mensdorff -in London, Wien, 6. August 1914. Osterreich- Ungam vsdrd keinesfalls ohne vorliergehende tormelle Kriegserklarung die Feindseligkeiten gegen England eroflFnen. Erwartet analoges Ver- lialten Englands 108 61. Graf Sz6csen, Paris, 8. August 1914. Anfrage der franzosischen Regierung, ob die Nacbriclit ricbtig sei, dali das Innsbrucker Armee- korps an die franzosische Grenze verscboben worden sei . . . . . 109 62. An Graf Sz6csen in Paris, Wien, 9. August 1914. l^acbricht von der Teilnahme eines osterreicbiscb-ungariscben Armeekorpers am deutscb- franzosiscben Kriege ist vollsfandig erfunden 109 63. Graf Sz6csen, Paris, 10. August 1914. Franzosiscbe Regierung, welcbe Nacbricbt erbielt, daO ein osterreicbiscb-ungariscbes Armeekorps nacb Deutscbland gebracbt worden sei, erblickt bierin eine militariscbe "Hilfeleistung an Deutscbland und bat daber den franzbsiscben Bot- scbafter in Wien beauftragt, seine Passe zu verlangen 109^ 64. An Graf Mensdorff in London, Wien, 11. August 1914. Auftrag, engliscber Regierung mitzuteilen, daft die Nacbricbt der Entsendung eines osterreicbiscb-ungariscben Armeekorps nacb Deutscbland vollig unbegriindet sei 110 65. Graf Mensdorff, London, 12.' August 1914. Kriegserklarung Frank- reicbs und Englands an Osterreicb-Ungam Ill 66. Note des japaniscben Botscbaffcers in Wien an Graf Bercbtold, Wien, 20. August 1914. Mitteilung des am .15. August seitens Japans an Deutscbland gericbteten Ultimatums 112 .67. An Graf Clary in Brussel, Wien, 22. August 1914. Auftrag, der belgiscben Regierung mitzuteilen, daft Osterreicb-Ungam angesicbts der militariscben Kooperation Belgiens mit Frankreicb und England gegen Deutscbland und der inbumanen Bebandlung der oster- reicbiscben und ungariscben Staatsangeborigen in Belgien gezwungen ist, die diplomatiscben Beziehungen zu dem Konigreicbe abzubrecben und daft nunmebr der Kriegs;z;ustand eingetreten ist 114 xn Seite 6S. Prinz Hohenlohe, Berlin, 23. August 1914. Deutsche Regierung Tafit japanisches Ultimatum unbeantwortet mid stellt japardscliem Gesoliafts- trager in Berlin seine Passe zu 114 69. An Freiherrn von Miiller in Tokio, Wien, 24. August 1914. Angesichts des Vorgetens Japans gegen das Deutsche Reich erhielt der Kom- mandant S. M. S. „ Elisabeth" den Auftrag, in Tsingtau mitzu- kampfen, nnd wird der k. u. k. Botschafter von Tokio abberufen . .115 Legationsrat Ritter von Storck an Graf Berchtold. Belgrad, 29. Juni 1914, Wir alle stehen noch immer derart unter dem erschiitternden Eindruck der gestrigen Katastrophe, daO es mir schwer fallt, mit der notigen Fassung, Sacli- lictkeit und Ruhe das blutige Drama in Sarajevo von hier aus entsprechend zu beurteilen. Ich bitte daher, mich vorlaufig auf die Registrierung einiger Tat- sachen beschranken zu diirfen. Gestem — den 15./28. — wurde der Jahrestag der Schlacht am Amsel- felde festlicber als sonst begangen und der serbiscbe Patriot Milos Obilid ge- feiert, der 1389 mit zwei Gefahrten den siegreicben Murad meuchlings er- stocben bat. Wo Serben leben, gilt. Obilier Bericht des Kassiers fiihrt vorerst alle jene an, die dem Verein ihre Unterstiitzung liehen. Nebst einer Reihe von Mitgliedern des Kragujevacer Kreisausschusses werden hiebei dankend erwahnt: Der Kreisausschuli der „Narodna odbrana" in Kragujevac, insbesonders dessen Eittersektion,. die dem -Sokolvereine ofters mit reichlichen Uhterstutzungen zu Hilfe kam; der Diiektor des Gymnasiums in Kragujevac, der den Sokolen „ Stan dig seine vaterliche Ailfmerksamkeit zeigte" ; der Divisionskommandant der Sumadija, der den Verein reichlich unterstiitzte ; der Prasident deS Kreis- gerichtes in Kragujevac, der Kreisvorstand und der Gemeindevorstand in Kragujevac. Nachdem der Kassier der im Kriege gefallenen Vereinsmitglieder gedacht hat, schliefit er seinen Bericht mit folgenden Worten: „Nach dem so glanzenden Siege iiber einen Teil unseres Feindes hofft die Vereinsleitung, daii Ihr alle von nun ab noch mehr, fester und lieber Euch der Tatlgkeit des Sokoltums widmen werdet, damit Ihr in unserem Falkenhorst Falken erzieht, die im gegebenen Zeitpunkte eines Tages in der Lage sein werden, hoch aufzufliegen und auf ihren machtigen Schwingen auch alien unseren noch nicht befreiten Briidern Briiderschaft, Liebe und Freiheit zu biingen." Der Jahresbericht ist unterfertigt von dem Majore M. J. KovaCevid als Prases, dem Gerichtssekretar D. V. Brzakovid als Sekretar und von 10 Vor- standsmitgliedern, unter denen sich zwei Professoren (Emil Lukid und Milan Jankovid) sowie- ein weiterer Offizier (Infanterie major Michael Vasid) befinden. Aus diesem Jahresberichte und aus einer von dem Kragujevacer Sokol- vereine dem „Srpski Soko" in Tuzla zur Ausfiillung zugesendeten, gleichfalls vom Major Kovadevid und Gerichtssekretar Brzakovid gezeichneten Tabelle geht hervor, daO die Sokolvereine in Serbien mit einzelnen derartigen Vereinen in der Monarchie in einem bisher nicht bekannt gewesenen engeren Verbande stehen. 48 Beilago 4. Das serbische Amtsblatt im Dieniste der Narodna odbrana. Dem serbischen Amtsblatte' „Srpski no vine" vom 28. Jqni 1914 (n. St.) lag als Beilage ein Aufruf der , Narodna Odbrana" bei, der alien Abonnenten des Blattes zugestellt wurde. In diesem Aufrufe finden sich die tblgenden Stellen: „Bruder und Schwestern! Nur ein Teil des .Kossovo wurde geracht, nur ein Teil des St. Veittages (Vidovdan) gesiihnt. Ebenso weit und breit, wie die Gebiete sind. in denen unsere Volkssprache gehort wird — die serbiscbe, kroatische und sloweniscbe — von Kikinda bis Monastir, von Triest bis Carevo- Solo, ebenso weit und breit ist die Bedeutung des St. Veittages und des Kossovo. So viel nationale Seelen auf diesem Territorium weinen, so viel Ketten unserer Briider knirscben, so viel Arbeit ist noch zu leisten, so viel baben wir noch zu opfern. Der St. Veittag konnte friiher fur uns einen Tag der Trauer be- deuten, aber beute, wo wir schon tief in die neue .Geschiclite des Volkes gescbritten sind, wo binter uns groGe und glorreiche nationale Geschehnisse steben und uns nocb groliere und glorreicbere erwarten, heute, wo wir in der Mitte des Scbaffens des groGen nationalen Staates steben, beute raufi fiir uns der St. Veittag ein Tag grolier Freude und Stolzes wegen des Geschehenen sein, da es aus ihm entsprossen ist und nocb mebr wegen dessen, was kommen wird. Serben und Serbinnen! Millionen unserer Briider. Slowenen, Kroaten und Serben auOerhalb unserer Grenzen schauen heute auf uns, die Kinder des Konigreiches, und ihre Brust wolbt die Freude und die Hofinung, indem sie unsere heutige majestatische Manifestation fiir die nationale Sacbe betrachten. Dem Mutlgen hilft Gott! Vorwarts alle! Es ruft uns derjei\ige Teil unserer geheiligten Aufgabe, der nocb unverwirklicht geblieben ist. Am St. Veittage 1914 in Belgrad. 49 Beilago 5* Zeugenaussage des Trifko Krstanovic Uber die Narodna odbrana. Der Backergehilfe Trifko ICrstanovid m Zavldovici wurde von einep Gendarmeriepatroiiille in der Nacht vom 6. zum 7. Juli 1914 verhaftet, weil durch eine, kurz nach Veriibung des Attentates gegen den Herrn Erzlierzog Franz Ferdinand von ihm gemachte x\.uiierung, dieses Attentat sei zu erwarten gewesen, der Verdaclit entstanden war, dali er von dem Komplotte Kenntnis gehabt habe. Er wurde deshalb dem Kreisgericlite in Sarajevo eingeliefert. Bei der Abhorung des Verhafteten ergab sicb, daO seine Aufierung den gegen ihn reg& gewordenen Verdaclit nicbt rechtfertigte, da sie, lediglich auf seinen friilieren Kenntnissen von der Tatigkeit der Narodna odbrana berahend, blofi der Aus- druck seiner Uberzeugung gewesen war, daft bei der in Serbien gegen die osterr.-ungar, Monarchic und speziell gegen den Plerrn Erzherzog Franz F-erdinand entfalteten Agitation eine derartige Tat erwartet werden mulite. Das gegen Kjrstanovid eingeleitete Verfabren wurde" desbalb mangels jedes Tatbestandea eingestellt und der Genannte mit Eiicksicbt auf seine fiir die Untersuchung wichtigen Kenntnisse uber die Tatigkeit der Narodna odbrana als Zeuge ein- vernommen. Ein die hier interessierenden Umstande betrefifender Auszug aus diesem am 19. Juli 1914 aufgenommenen ZeugenprotokoUe folgt hiemit: „Im Herbste des Jahres 1908 iiberscbritt icb auf der Mokra Gora bei ViSegrad die Grenze nach Serbien, um mir Besch'aftigung zu suchen. Zuerst kam ich nacb Bajina Basta im Bezirke Uzice und da ich dort keinerlei Be- sch'aftigung fand, ging ich nach Belgrad, wo ich gerade zu der Zeit der Ver- kiindigung der Annexion Bosniens und der Herzegowina emlangte. Da ich sah, daO wegen der Annexion in der iBevolkerung eine grolie Bewegung und Erregung entstanden war und daft ich keinerlei Beschaftigung werde finden konnen, ging ich in das k. n. k. K^nsulat und ersuchte, mich nach Hause abzufertigen. Dort sagte man mir, daft ich nachmittags kommen moge und daft man mich dann in die Heimat abfertigen werde. Als ich jedoch aus dem Konsulate hinausging, erwischte mich auf der Strafte ein Gendarm und fragte mich, woher ich sei; in der Meinung, ich sei ein Spion, fiihrte er mich in eine Karaula. Hier verhorte man mich und als ich ihnen sagte, daft ich gerne nach Hause mochte, begann mich ein Unteroffizier zu schmahen, wieso ich jetzt aus Serbien wolle, da sie gera,de jetzt mehr Leute brauch'en, weil es zu 50 eincm Kriege mit Osterreich kommen konnte. Als ich ihm sagte, daft ich nichts zum Leben babe, antwortete er mir, dafi icb voUe Versorgung finden werde, vvenn icb micb in das Komitee einscbreibe. Icb war in jener Not damit ein- verstanden und ein Gendarm fiibrte micb ^in das Gasthaus „Zelenom Vijencu" („zum gi-iinen Kranz") und stellte micb dort dcm Voja Tankosid, dem Fiihrer des Komitees und Kapifan im regularen Heere vor. Hier beim ^griinen Kranze" wurdc icb in Kost und Wobnung genommen und wie icb sab, waren bier aucb andcre vom Komitee wobnbaft. Voja Tankosid sagtc mir, daft es der Zweck des Komitees sei, sicb zu unterricbten im Bombenwerfen, in der Zerstorung von Briicken, Tunnels, Telegij-apben und Eisenbabnen, und zwar desbalb, weil es Iciclit zu einem Kriege zwiscben Serbien und Osterreicb kommen konnte. Hierauf fiibrte micb ein Mann in ein aiariscbes kleineres Plans ncben dem Fiiianzministcrium, wo die Kanzleien des Komitees sicb befanden und bier in der Kanzlei traf icb Milan Pribii^evir, welcber micb in das Komitee einscbrieb. Bei dieser Einscbreibung fragte micb Milan Pnbi(?evid, ob mir Voja Tankosid gesagt babe, welcbe Pflicbten icb als Komita babo, worauf icb antwortete: „ja". Er sagte mir, daft die Eingescbriebenen tiicbtig, stark und opferwillig sein miifiten. Damals waren wir etwa 70 eingescbrieben. In Belgrad baben w'ir nicbts gemacbt. Nacb etwa iVt Monaten teilte uns unser FUbrer Tankosid mit, daft die Groftmacbte unser Komitee verboten baben und daft wir uns aus Belgrad entfernen und irgendwo in einem verlorenen Orte vcrstecken miissen, wobin Fremde nicbt konmien. Auf diese Weise sandten sie uns in die Stadt Cuprija. Hier iibten uns ein die Oftiziere Voja Tankosic, Dusan Putnik, Zivko Gvozdid und Mitar Djinovid, der in die montenegriniscbe Bombenaffaire verwickelt war und in Montenegro erscbossen wurde. Es war uns verboten, mit den ubrigen Leuten zu verkebren, damit man nicbts von unserem Zwecke erfabre und aucb nichts davon, wie viele wir waren. Wir iibten uns in dem Werfen von Bomben, in dem Enicbten von Minen und in der Zerstorung von Telegrapben, Eisen- babnen, Tunnels und Briicken. AUe 14 Tage kamen zu uns Milan Pribicevid, General Bozo Jankovi«;, der Apotbeker .Skaric, der Abgeordnete Zivko Rafajlo- vid, ein gewisser Glisid Milutin, Beamtcr im Finanzministerium, und diese sahen zu, wie wir iibten und beglicben jedesmal fiir uns die Kosten der Ver- pflcgung. Unsere Lebrer sagten uns, daft wir Komitees, sobald der Krieg ver- kiindigt sei, voraus gcben werden, binter uns die Freiwilligen und dann das regulare Heer. In Cuprija waren wir etwa 140 Mann. Wir bekamen aufier der Kost, Wobnung und Kleidung je 25 Para faglicb fiir Tabak. Die Scbule dauerte beilaufig 3 Monate, d. h. bis Marz 1909. Dann sagten uns die Mit- glieder des Ausscbusses, daft wir entlassen waren, daft jeder geben konne, wobin er wolle, denn die Annexion Bosniens und der Herzegowina sei von den Groftmacbten anerkannt und unser Komitee babe keinen Zweck mebr. Bei der Auflosung des Komitees sagte mir General Bozo Jankovid, daft icb in 51 den Dienst des Bozo Milanovid in Sabac trete und 50 Dinar monatlich Lohn erhalte. Er sagte mir nicht, welcher Dienst das sein werde. Icb nahm an, weil ich mich als Komitee gegeniiber dem General Jankovid zu folgen verpflichtet fiihlte und auch da ich nichts zum Leben hatte und mir ein Bret suchen mulite. So kam^ ich im Marz 1909 nach Sabac und meldete mich bei Bozo Milanovid, Kaufmaiin in Sabac. General Jankovid hatte mir gesagt, dafi Bozo MiJanovid der Vorstand der Narodna odbrana in Sabac sei und daft ich bei ihm in dicser Narodna odbrana dienen werde. Als ich dem Bozo Milanovid das Schreiben des Generals gab und er es gelesen hatte, sagte er mir, daft ich ihm treu dienen und seine Auftriige ausfuhren miisse. Der hauptsachlichste Dienst uerde fiir mich sein Briefe auszutragen, wohin sie eben lauten. Falls ich einen Brief nicht dorthin tragen werde, wohin er gerichtet sei und falls irgend jemand anderer zu diesem Briefe kame, so sei das mit meinem Leben verbunden. Gleich nachsten Tages gab mir Bozo Miranovid einen geschlossenen Brief, den ich ^u Cedo Lukid, Finanzwachtmeister in Serbisch-Raca, tragen soUte. Am Wege nach Raca', im Orte. Bogatid, stelite mich der Bezirkskapetan, nahm mir den Brief ab, offnete und las ihn. In dem Brief stand, daft Lukid sofort drei Boote kaufen solle, dam it sie fertig waren, falls sie gebraucht wiirden. Dem Briefe waren 100 Dinar beigeschlo§sen. Bei dieser Gelegenheit sagte mir der Kapetan, daft vom Ministerium der strenge Auftrag gekommen sei, daft die Komitatschi auf eigene Faust nichts tun diirfen, damit nicht eine internationale diplomatische Intervention provoziert werde. Ich kehrte nach •Sabac zuriick und meldete dem Bozo Milanovid, was mir geschehen war. Bozo Milanovid wendete sich an den Kreisprafekten und dieser ordnete an, daft mir der Revolver, den mir der Kapetan in Bogatid abgenommen hatte, zuriick- gestellt werde. Auch ordnete er an, daft der Kapetan den Brief an Cedo Lukid, an welchen er lautcte, zu expedieren habe. Deraitige Briefe habe ich vom Marz 1909 bis zum Oktober 1910 ausgetragen, und zwar habe ich wahrend dieser Zeit nach Serbisch-Raca 43 Briefe, nach Loznica 55 Briefe, nach Zvornik 5, nach Ljubivija 2 Briefe getragen und nach Koviljada wcift ich nicht wie viele. Ich habe mir deswegen gemerkt, vvie oft ich in jedem Orte war, weil diese Orte von Sabac sehr weit entfernt sind. Die Briefe habe ich an die Leiter der Zollamter in den betreffendcn Oiten getragen und von diesen habe ich wieder Briefe als Antwort erhalten und zu Bozo Milanovid getragen. Ich erinnere mich, daft ich auch einigemale Briefe nach Sepadka Ada getragen habe. Mein Gehilfe im Austragen von Briefen war ein gewisser Vaso Erid, gebiirtig aus Srebrenica. Nach Belgrad habe ich Briefe von Bozo Milanovid jede Woche getragen und an Milan Pribicevid und Bozo Jankovid zugestellt. Von dem Inhalte dieser Briefe habe ich nichts gewuftt und hat mir auch niemand hieriiber etwas gesagt. Soviel ich sehen konnte, waren die Briefe, welche Bozo Milanovid absandte, nicht chiffriert, wahrend die Briefe, welche 52 die Zollamtsleiter sendeten, mit besondeien Zeichen geschrieben waren, was ich beobachtet habe, als sie Bozo Milanovid offnete. Einmal brachte ich dem Bozo Milanovid ein solches chiffriertcs Scbreiben, ich glaube aus Zvornik, und dieser sendete mich mit dem Sclireil^en zu Mika Atanasijevid, Professor in Sabac, darait er es dechiffriere. Dieser vollfiihrte das, wie cr das gewohnlicli tat; aber vielleicht vergaO er den Brief zu schlielien, so daft ich ihn lesen konnte. In dem- Briefe stand, dafi von sicherer Seite gemeldet werde, daft Geld mit dem Bildnisse des Thronfolgers zu pragen sei und daft dies ein Zeichen sei, dafi Kaiser Franz Joseph abdizieren werde. Etwa nach 8 Monaten meiner Dienst- leistung bei Bozo Milanovid gab mir Bozo seine Visitkarte, auf welcher ein Totenkopf aufgezeichnet war und auf der aufgeschrieben stand, daO ich zum Vertrauten (povjerenik) der Narodna odbrana ernannt sei. Bei dieser Gelegen- heit sagte er mir, dali es sich um Spionage handle "Von dem Offizier Dusan Opterkid, dem, Mitgliede der Narodna odbrana, erfuhr ich einmal, dali die Narodna odbrana in Bosnien und Herzegowina 23 Mit- glieder habe. Sonst ist mir aber nicht bekannt, ob und welche Organisation die Narodna odbrana in Bosnien hat. Hin und wieder gab mir Milan Pribi(!evid einen Revolver oder aber Geld zum Ankauf eines Revolvers, damit ich ihn den Finanzem an der Grenze gebe, welche als Komitatschis dienten, da sie keinen Revolver batten und auch kein Geld, um sich einen solchen selbst zu kaufen. Wie mir scheint, gab ihnen Milan Pribic'^evid diese zur Ehrung, weil sie cben Komitatschis waren. Eine andere Beschaftigung mit Waffen hatte ich nicht. Einmal bekam ich zur Zeit meiner Dienstleistung von Bozo Milanovic derr Auftrag, mit einem Manne zu einem Bauern in Lijesnica an der Drina zu gehen und dieser Bauer werde una informieren und alles, was notwendig wird, zeigen, damit wir zwei den Ljubo StanariCi('*, serbischen Reserveoffizier, der nach Bijeljina gefliichtet war, toten. Der AusschuO dor Narodna odbrana hatte namlich erfahren, daft Ljubo Stanari^ii^ fiir • den serbischen Staat gefahrlich sei und hatte beschlossen, daii er getotet werden solle. Von Bozo Milanovid erhielten ich und jener Mann den Auftrag, an einem bestimmten Orte iiber die Drina zu gehen und Ljubo Stanaricid, der gerade am Ufer der Drina auf der bosnischen Seite im Bijeljiner Bezirke wohnhaft ist, zu toten. Ich und jener Mann waren in die Drina gestiegen, aber weil das Wasser tief war und wir auch sahen, daO Ljubo mit dem Gewehr auf der Schulter um sein Haus herumgehe, kehrten wir ' zum Hause jenes Bauern zuriick. Weil ich sah, dali wir ihn mit dem Messer nicht toten konnen, sendete ich jenen Mann nach Sabac, damit er Bozo Milanovid melde, dafi es nicht moglich sei, den Stanaridid auf diese Weise, wie er ^wolie, namlich mit dem Messer, zu toten. Daraufhin erhielt ich vom Bozo Milanovid den Auftrag, dafi wir ihn auf jeden Fall toten. Dann haben wir uns entschlossen, ihn mit dem Gewehre zu erschielien. Dieser Mann, der mit mir war, hatte nach, dem Au/- 53 trage des Bozo auf Stanari^id zu schieften und ilin zu toten und ich hatte zu kontrollieren, ob dieser Auftrag ausgefiihrt werde. Inzwischen jedoch kam ein berittener Gendarm und brachte vom Kreispr'afekten in Sabac den Auftrag, daO wir zuriickkehren und von der urspriinglichen Absicht abstehen sollen. Und so kehiten wir nach Sabac zuriick. Im Oktober 1910 verlangte icb vom Bozo Milanovid, daft er mir den Lohn erhohe und als er mir das nicht tun woUte, bedankte ich raich fiir den Dienst. Aus Sabac ging ich nach Belgrad, wo ich mit dem General Jankovid zusammentraf, der mich verhaften lieft, deshalb, weil ich den Gehorsam auf- gesagt habe. Sie zogen mich durch verschiedene Gefangnisse, etwa durch zwei Monato und alles deswegen, weil ich ihnen den Gehorsam aufgesagt hatte und sie sich fiirchteten, daft ich ihre Geheimnisse venate. Zum Schlusse entschieden sich die Behorden, mich nach Bosnien zu expediereu. In Sabac sagte mir ein Gefangener, daft es sich um mein Leben handelt. Die Gendarmen begleitetcn mich bis Zvornik, wo sie mich den bosnischen Gendarmen ubergaben. So Icam ich im Dezember 1910 nach Bosnien. Von irgend einer Schwarzen Hand weiB ich nichts Bestimmtes mit Aus- nahme dessen, was ich von dieser Hand in serbischen Zeitungen gelesen habe. Heute erinncre ich mich nicht daran, was von dieser Schwarzen Hand in Zeitungen geschrieben war. Ebenso weili ich nichts von der Schwarzen Liste. In Serbien herrschte nach dei- Annexion ein allgemeiner Unwille und Hali gegen die Person des osterreichischen Thronfolgers, denn er war allgemein als ein Blutfeind der Serben angesehen. Im iibrigen berief sicb Krstanovid auf seine friiheren Angaben, von denen bloft die folgenden zur Erganzung der vorstehenden Aussage von Interesse sind. Das Komitee, in das Krstanovid durch Milan Pribidevid aufgenommen wurde, gelangte von der Norodna odbrana zur Aufstellung. In der Schule in Cuprija befanden sich 20 — 22 Angehorige aus der Monarchie. Unter den Schiilem war auch Milan Ciganovid. In der Schule zu Cuprija wurde gelehrt, daft die Komitees bereit sein miissen, auf Befehl der Norodna odbrana nach Bosnien zu gehen und dort nach 'den von ihren Vorgesetzten erhaltenen Auftragen zu handeln. 54 BeHago. G. Auszug aus den Akten des Kreisgerichtes in Sarajevo Uber das Strafverrahren gegen Jovo Jagiicic und Genossen wegen Verbrechens der Ausspahung. Im Jahre 1913 wurde eine von Jovo Jagli6id und mehreren Komplizen in Bosnien zugunsten Serbiens betriebene Ausspahungsaktion aufgedeckt. Das hierauf in Sarajevo eingeleltete Strafverfahren lieferte unter anderem auch folgendes, einen Einblick in die Methoden der grofiserbischen Propaganda und speziell der Narodna odbrana bietendes Materiale. Jovo JagliCi(? gab an, dafi er im Monate August oder September 1912 zum ersten Male dem gewesenen Viehrevisor in Foua, Petar Klarid genannt Pesut, begegnete, welcher im Herbst 1912 nach Montenegro gefluehtet und dann Komitatschi geworden war. Bei der ersten Zusammenkunft fragte Klarid den Jaglieid, ob er den Rade Milosevid aus Kalinovik kenne und meinte auf die Antvvort des letzteren, dali Milosevic im Spital scbwer krank liege: „Sehade, wenn er stirbt, wir haben Merkwiirdiges gesprochen, hat er Dir nichts davon erwahnt?" Auf die ver- neinende Antwort erwiderte Klarid: ,.Ich hatte Dir etwas Wichtiges mitzuteilen, wir sind Serben und miissen etwas Wichtiges fiir Serbien tun, komme zu mir in meine Kanzlei". Dort entspann sich nun zwischen ihnen folgendes Gesprach: „Jovan, ich will Dir etwas erzahlen, ich kenne Dich noeh nicht, ob Du mich verraten wirst? Ich sage es Dir trotzdem und wenn Du das Herz hast verrate mich!" Auf die Frage des Jaglidid, um was es sich denn handle, antwortete Klarid: „Bruder, in Serbien existiert ein Verein „Narodna odbrana". In diesen Verein sollen ^^ele Leute eintreten; es sind auch schon viele in Bosnien und der Herzegowina sowie in der ganzen Monarchic angeworben; es gibt Leute dabei von Intelligenz und Wohlhabende, das sind grofie Kopfe, und wenn es die konnen, waipum sollen es nicht auch wir tun, damit wir auch etwas dazu bei- tragen". Auf die Frage, welche Ziele dieser Verein verfolgt, antwortete Klarid: „Der Verein verfolgt den Zweck: z. B. Du bist in Kalinovik, Du meldest mir, was es dort. Neues gibt, wie viel Militar, Kanonen, Munition, verschiedene Gewehre, wer kommt, wer geht u. dgl. Wir haben eine geheime Schrift „Chiffre" und korrespondieren mit derselben. Wenn Du treu bist, erhaltst Du sie auch." 55 Jaglicid hatte Furcbt, da(i Klarid ihri nur ausforsche, um ihn dann zu' verraten und ersuchte ihn daher, er solle .ihm einige Namen von Mitgliedern nennen, worauf Klarid eine Zeitlang nachdaclite und dem JagliCid dann einen Namen nannte, der diesem Vertrauen einflolite. Hierauf sagte ihm IClarid: ^SoU ich Dir den „^Chiffre''" geben?" Jaglicid war damit einverstanden. Klarid, welcher den Chiffre auswendig kannte, schrieb ihn auf einen Zettel auf und vibergab ihn dem Jaglicid. Bei einer anderen Gelegenheit erzahlte Klarid von seinem Aufenthalt in Banja-Koviljaca (bei Loznica), wo er durch den serbischen Hauptmann Todorovid*) Unterricht im Bombenwerfen erhalten hat und sagte auf die Frage des Beschuldigten, warum er dies gelernt habe: „Wenn eS zu etwas kommt, wie ich Dir bereits gesagt habe, ist es notwendig, dali ich mit Bomben umzu- gehen verstehe, daft ich Dich einiibe und Du dann die anderen, damit Pulver- magazine und sonstige wichtige Objekte in die Luft gesprengt werden, weil wir in diesem Falle Bomben aus Serbien erhalten werden" Hierauf beschrieb Klarid das Aussehen der Bomben und sagte, dafi er bereits Leute angeworben habe, welche im Falle eines Krieges die Telegraphen- und Telephondiahte durchschnelden werden. Bei diesen Zusammenkiinften erfuhr Jaglicid von Klarid auch, daB es zu den Aufgaben der Mitglieder der Narodna odbrana gehort, osterreichisch-unga- rische Soldaten zur Fahnenflucht zu verleiten, Freiwlllige (Komitatschis) anzu- werben, Banden zu organisieren, Objekte und Depots zu sprengen u. s. w. Auch teilte ihm Klarid mit, dali selbst die chififrierte Korrespondenz zwischen den serbischen und bosnischen Mitgliedern nicht der Post anvertraut, sondern durch sichere Boten iiber die Grenze befordert wird. Klarid hat dem Jaglicid weiters erzahlt, daft gelegentlich der Prosvjetafeier (im September 1912) mit der zu dieser enlsendeter) Deputation aus Serbien auch ein serbischer Major in Sarajevo im Hotel „Europe" gewohnt hat**} welchem Klarid Mitglieder der Narodna odbrana zufiihrte, die dieser beeidete. Von einem Spione erfuhr Jaglidid, daft Bomben nach Sarajevo kommen werden odei schon gekommen sind, daft diese das Aussehen von Seifenstiicken haben***j und daft man auch diesem Spione 2 — 3 Stiicke senden oder daft er sich solche abholen werde. *) Hauptmann Kosta Todorovic war damals latsjiclilich Grcnzkommissiir und Leiter des serbischen Kundscliaftsdienstcs fiir die Grcnzstrecke Raca— Ljuboija. **) Zu der Prosvjetafeier war der scrbisclie Major Mika Jankovic als serbiselier Delegierier ersciiicnen. ***) Die bei dem Sarajevoer Attentate gegen Er/lierzog Franz Ferdinand verwendeten und die im Jahre 1913 in der Save bei Brcko gefundenen, aus dem konigl. serbischen Arsenale in Kragujevac stammen- tlen Bomben ktinnen tatsachlich mit Seifenstiicken verglichen werden. 56 Beilage 7. Aus konfidentielien Meldungen iiber die „Narodna odbrana". Die Leitung der Narodna odbrana besteht aus Vertretem aller Partei- richtungen, um auch die Fortschrittler und die Gegner der Versehworer zu gewinnen. Ihr eigentlicher Spiritus rector ist der jetzige Major Pribi6evi(5. Die Sekretarstelle ist immer mit einem beurlaubten Offizier besetzt. Aufgabe der Narodna odbrana ist es, in den siidslawischen Teilen Oster- reich-Ungarns eine wirksame Propaganda in Miiitar- und Zivilkreisen zu ent- wickeln, um so eine Revolution vorzubereiten, evenluelle Mobilisierungen zu storen, Paniken und Revolten hervorzurufen u. s. w. Die Organisation besitzt in der Monarchie mehrere Vertrauensmiinner und Emissare, die eine stille Propaganda von Mann zu Mann betreiben. Einzelne haben spezielle Missionen, am bei wichtigen Briicken, Knotenpunkten etc. einige Leute — womoglich Eisenbahnbeamte — anzuwerben, welche die Aufgabe haben, im geeigneten Momente etwa erhaltene Weisungen durchzufuhren oder durchfiihren zu lassen. Der Verkehr zwischen den Mitgliedern der Narodna odbrana wird moglichst durch personliche Fuhlungnahme bewerkstelligt. Als Mitglieder werden hauptsachlich junge Leute, Arbeiter, Eisenbahner geworben. 57 Bcilairc 8. Auszug aus den Akten des bosnisch-herzegowinischen Kreisgerichtes in Sarajevo Uber die dort anhangige Untersuchung gegen Gavrilo Princip und Genossen wegen des am 28. Juni 1914 an Seiner k. und k. Hoheit dem Herrn Erzherzoge Franz Ferdinand von Osterreich-Este und Ihrer Hoheit der Frau Herzogin Sophie von Hohenberg verUbten Yerbreohens des IMeucheimordes. I. Die Tat and die T'aterscliaft. Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovid, Trifko Grabez, Vaso Cubrilovid und Cetres Popovid sind gestandig, in Gemeinscbaft mit dem fliichtigen Mebemed Mehmedbasid ein Komplott zur Ermordung des Herrn Erzberzogs Franz. Ferdinand gebildet und mit Bomben, teilweise aucb mit Browningpistolen ausgeriistet, Hochstdemselben am 28. Juni 1914 auf Seiner Rundfabii; durcb Sarajevo zwecks Veriibung des geplanten Attentates aufgelauert zu baben. Nedeljko Cabrinovid ist gestandig, als erster unter den Verscbworern gegen den Wagen des Herrn Erzberzogs eine Bombe gescbleudert zu haben, die ibr Ziel verfeblte und die beim Explodieren lediglicb Insassen des dem erzberzog- licben Automobile folgenden Wagons verletzte. Gavrilo Princip ist gestandig, aus einer Browningpistole zwei Scbiisse gegen das erzherzoglicbe Automobil abgegeben zu baben, durch welcbe der Herr Erz- herzog Franz Ferdinand und die Frau Herzogin Sopbie von Hobenberg totlicb Terletzt wurden. Beide Tater geben die Mordabsicbt bei Veriibung der Tat zu. Diese Gestandnisse haben durcb die gepflogenen Erbebungen ibre voile Bestatigung gefunden und ist festgestellt, dali weiland Herr Erzberzog Franz Ferdinand und weiland Frau Herzogin Sopbie von Hobenberg an den Folgen der von Gavrilo Princip auf sie abgegebenen Eevolverscbiisse gestorben sind. n. Entstebung des Komplotts. Die Bescbuldigten baben, im wesentlicben tibereinstimmend, vor dem Unter- sucbungsricbter nacbstpbende Angaben gemacbt: Im April 1914 fafite Princip wabrend seines Aufentbaltes in Belgrad, wd er in dortigen Kaffeebausern mit vielen serbiscben Studenten verkebrte, den Plan zm- Ausfubrung eines Attentates auf weiland Herrn Erzberzog Franz Ferdiniand. 58 Diese Absicht hat er mit dem ihm bekannten, damals gleichfalls in Belgrad anwesenden Cabrinovid besprocben, der sich damals schon mit dem gleichen Gedanken trug und der zur Teilnahme an dem Attentate sofort bereit war. tJber dieVeriibung eines Anschlages auf den Herm Erzberzog wurde in dem Kreise, in dem Princip mid Cab^ino^d<5 verkebrten, oft gesprocben, da der Herr Erzberzog als gefabrlicber Feind des serbischen Yolkes gait. Die zur Ausfiibrang der Tat notigen Bomben und Waffen wollten sich Princip und Cabrinovid, da sie selbst die Mittel zu deren Ankauf nicbt besalien, zuerst von dem serbischen Major Milan Pribice\i(5 oder von der Narodua odbrana beschaffen. Da aber Major Pribi(5evi(5 und das mafigebende Mitglied des genannten Vereines, Zivojin Dadid, zu jener Zeit verreist waren, beschlossen sie zu trachten, die Waffen von dem ihnen bekannten ehemaligen Komitatschi und derzeitigen Staatsbahnbeamten Milan Ciganovid zu erhalten. Nun trat Princip durch Vermittlung eines intimen Bekannten des Ciganovid mit diesem in Verbindung. Ciganovid suchte hierauf den Princip auf, sprach mit ihm iiber das geplante Attentat, das er vollkommen billigte und erklarte zunachst, daii er es sich noch iiberlegen woUe, ob er die Waffen hiezu beistellen solle. Auch Cabrinovid sprach mit Ciganovid wegen der Waffen. Zu Ostern zog Princip den gleichfalls iil Belgrad anwesenden Trifko Grabez ins Vertrauen, der sich nach seinem Gestandnisse gleichfalls zur Mitwirkung an dem Attentate bereit erklarte. In der folgenden Zeit hatte Princip wiederholt Gesprache mil Ciganovid liber die Ausfiihrung des Attentates. Inzwischen hatte sich Ciganovid wegen des geplanten Attentates auch mit dem ihm eng befreundeten serbischen Major Voja Tankosid ins Einvernehmen gesetzt, der dann fiir diese Zwecke die Browningpistolen zur Verfugung stellte. Grabez gesteht in Cbereinstimmung mit den Angaben des Princip und Cabrinovid zu, am 24. Mai in Begleitung des Ciganovid den Major Tankosid fiber dessen Wunsch in seiner Wohnung besucht zu haben. Nach der Vorstellung babe Tankosid dem Grabez gesagt: „Bist Du dieser, bist Du entschlossen?" worauf Grabez erwiderte: „Ich bin es". Als Tankosid dann fragte: „Versteht Ihr aus dem Revolver zu schiefien?" und Grabez hierauf verneinend antwortete, sagte Tankosid zu Ciganovid: „Ich werde Dir einen Revolver geben^ gebe und unterrichte sie im Schiefien". Hierauf fuhrte Ciganovid den Princip und den Grabez zur Militarschieli- statte in Topdider und erteilte ihnen in einem bei der Schielistatte liegendera Walde Unterricht im Schieiien mit Browningpistolen auf Ziele. Hiebei erwies sich Princip als der bessere Schiitze. Ciganovid hat den Princip, Grabez und Cabrinovid auch mit dem Gebrauche der ihnen spater ubergebenen Bomben vertraut gemacht. 59 Am 27. Mai 1914 iibergab Ciganovic?, dem Princip, Cabrinovid and GrabeX nach deren iibereinstimmenden Gestandnissen 6 Bomben, 4 Browningrevolver und geniigende Mengen Munition, sowie eine Glastubc mit Zyankali, damit sie sich zwecks Wabrung des Geheimnisses nach veriibter Tat vergiften. Uberdies gab ihnen Ciganovid Geld. Scbon zu Ostern hatte Princip den Danilo T\i6 von seinem Attentatsplane unterrichtet. Bei der Riickkehr nacb Sarajevo ersuclite er nun diesen, einige weitere Personen zu werben, die sich an dem Attentate beteiligen, damit es sicher gelinge. Hierauf hat Hid nach seinem Gestandnisse den Jaso Cubrilovid, Cetro Popovid und Mehemed Mehmedbasid hiezu geworben. ni. Herkunft der Bomben. Bei Veriibung des Attentates war nur eine der Bomben zur Verwendung gelangt. Die iibrigen fiinf Bomben wurden spater von der Polizei in Sarajevo zustande gebracht. Diese Bomben sind nach dem Gutachten der gerichthchen Sachverstandigen serbische Handgranaten, die fabriksmafiig erzeugt wurden und fur militiirische Zwecke bestimmt waren. Sie sind identisch mit den 21 Bomben, die im Jahre 1913 in der Save bei Brdko gefunden wurden und die sich zum Teile noch in der Originaipackung befanden, aus.der sich mit Sicherheit ergab, dali sie aus dem serbischen Waffenlager in Kragujevac stammten. Damit ist festgestellt, daii auch die bei dem Attentate gegen den Herrn Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand verwendeten Granaten aus den Vorraten des Kragujevacer Armeedepots stammen. Grabez nennt die ihm und seinen Komplizen libergebenen Granaten ganz spontan „ Kragujevacer Bomben" IV. Transport der drei Attentater und der Waffen von Serbien nach Bosnien. Prinzip gibt hieriiber folgendes an: Ciganovid sagte dem Cabrinovid, Grabez und Princip, sie sollten ihren Weg tiber Sabac und Loznica nach Tuzla nehmen und sich dort an Misko Jovanovid wenden, der die Waifen iibernehmen werde. Zunachst sollten sie nach Sabac gehen und sich dort beim Grenzhauptmanne Major Rade Popovid melden, fiir den er ihnen einen Zettel mitgab, den Princip ubernahm. Am 28. Mai verlieCen die drei Komplizen mit den Waffen Belgrad. In Sabac tibergab Prinzip den Zettel, den er von Ciganovid erhalten hatte dem Major Popovid, der hierauf alle drei auf das Kommando fiihrte und ihnen einen Passierschein ausstellte, in welchem bestatigt wurde, dali einer von ihnen Finanzwachmann und die beiden 60 anderen dessen Kameraden seien. Der Passiersclieiii entliielt auch den Namen dieses angebliclien Finanzwaclimannes, doch habe er den Namen vergessen. Gleichzeitig iibergab ilmen Major Popovid ein geschlossenes Scbreiben fiir den Grenzbauptmann in Loznica, der Pravanovid, Prdanovid oder Predojevid hieli. » Pfincip, Cabrinovid und Grabez iibernacbteten in §abac und reisten am nacbsten Morgen mit der Babn nacb Loznica, und zwar auf Grand des ibnen vom Major Popovid ausgefertigten Passierscheines mit balber Fabrkarte. Mittags kamen sie in Loznica an mid iibergaben dem dortigen Grenzhauptmanne den Brief des Majors Popovid, in dem es bieli: ^Scbau, daft Du diese Leute empfangst und sie durcbfiibrst, wo Du vv^ilit." Der Grenzbauptmann, sagte, er werde seine Finanzwacbleute von der Grenze rufen und die drei dem sicbersten Manne an- vertrauen. Darauf telepbonierte er und bestellte die drei Komplizen fur den nacbsten Morgen, 7 Ubr, in seine Kanzlei. Am anderen Morgen vereinbarten die drei Verscbworer, dafi Cabrinovid mit avi- , gnon. M. Davignon :aux Legations k Berlin, Paris .^t Londres. Communication du texte de I'ultiinatum aus- tro-hongrois k la.'Serbie. , . Envoi d'une note k remettre 6ventuellement aux Ministres respectifs des Affaires Etran- g6res pour leur faire connaltre la volont^ de la Belgique de rester neutre en cas de conflit europ6en. . . . . , . , .... . Les dites Legations remettront aux Ministres des Affaires Etrangferes une note identique k celle qui aura et6 communigu6e aux cinq Puissances, garantes de la neutralit6 beige. Communication de la r^ponse du Gouveme- ment serbe a Tultimatum austro-hongrois. Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois juge la r6ponse de la Serbie insuffisante et rompt les relations diplomatiques avec elle. . . . Le Gouvernement britannique propose I'inter- vention k Vienne et k Saint-P6tersbourg de I'Angleterre, de la France, de I'AUemagne et de ritalie pour trouver un terrain de con- ciliation. L'Allemagne seule n'a pas encore r6pondu , Nbtification de . la declaration de guerre de I'Autriche-Hongrie k la Serbie. . . . , . Le Gouvernement beige a mis I'armSe sur le pied de paix renforc6. Cette mesure ne doif pas 6tre confondue avec la mobilisation. . La France donne^ I'assurance k la Belgique qu'aucune incursion des troupes francaises n'aura lieu en Belgiigue m6me si des forces importantes 6taient mass6es sur les fron- ti6res beiges. La mobilisation de I'^armSe beige est d6cr6- Ue et le samedi 1" aout en. est le- premier jour. . Le Gouvernement anglais a demand^ s6par6- ment aux Gouvernements francais et alle- mand si chacun d'eux etait pr6t a respecter la neutrality de la Belgique pourvu que I'autre Puissance ne la viole pas Le Baron van der Elst rappelle au Ministre d'AUemagne les assurances donn^es par I'Empire k la Belgique au sujet -du respect de sa neutrality La France a accept6 la proposition de. I'An- gleterre de ne pas violer la neutralit6 beige dans le cas ou ce\le-ci serait respect6e par. I'AUemagne. (Voir n° 11.) ........ L'Allemeigne refuse de r6pondre k la proposi- tion anglaise de respecter la neutrality de la Belgique. 50.) 18 55 6aout Le Bafon Fallon & M. Davi- gnon. MSme sujet 18 56 7 aoul M. Davignon au Baron Fal- lon. M6me sujet 19 57 7 aoul M. Davignon aux L6gations a Paris et 4 Londres (tel6- gramme). Le Gbuvernement beige souhaite que la guerre ne s'etende pas en .Afrique centrale. Les Gou- vernements frangais et anglais se rallient- ils k .notre proposition de neutraliesr le bassin conventionnel du Congo 19 58 7 aoul M. Davignon aux L6gations k Paris et ft Londres. Lettre pour expliquer le t616gramme precedent. 19 59 8 aoul Le Baron Guillaume h M. Davignon. La France reserve sa r6ponse k la proposition beige de neutraliser le bassin du Congo. . . 19 60 9adai Le Baron Fallon k M. Davi- gnon (t616gramme) . Communication d'une nouvelle proposition de I'Allemagne reproduisant Tultimatum du 2 aoOt 19 01 9 aoul Le Baron Guillaume h M. Davignon. Le Gouvemement francais est dispos6 k pro- clamer la neutralit6 du bassin du Congo. (Voir n" 59.) 20 62 10 aoul Le Baron Fallon k M. Davi- gnon. Transmission du texte allemand (contenant une faute) de la seconde proposition de I'Empire et d'une traduction (contenant une autre erreur) de cette pifece. ...... 20 63 10 aoul M. Davignon au Baron Fal- lon. Le Gouvemement a regu les nouvelles propo- sitions du Gouvemement allemand et y repondra prochainement 20 64 fOaoCil M. Davignon au Baron Fal- lon. Demandez au Gouvemement allemand le sens qu'il attache au mot t auseinandersetzung». 21 65 • 10 aoul M. Davignoil aux Ministres d'Angleterre. de Russia et de France. Le Gouvemement du Roi communique aux Repr6s6ntants des Puissances garantes le texte de la seconde note allemande ainsi que celui de la r6ponse qu'il se propose de faire k cette communication 21 66 10 aofll M. Davignon aux Legations k Londres. Paris et Saint- P6tersbourg. Les autorit^s luxembourgeoises ont pri6 le Ministre du Roi pr6s la Cour Grand-Ducale de quitter Luxembourg. Vu les circonstances le. Gouvemement beige n'a pas pris une me- sure analogue k I'dgard du Repr6sentant du Luxembourg k Bruxelles 21 67 Haoat M. Brand WhiUock k M. Da- vignon. Les Etats-Unis d'Am6rique acceptent de pro- t6ger les int6r6ts allemands en Belgique. . 21 68 11 aoai Sir F. H. Villiers k M. Davi- .gnon. La Grande Bretagne approuve la r6ponse que le Gouvemement beige propose de faire au second ultimatum de I'Allemagne. (Voir no 65 ) • 22 69 11 aofli M. Klobukowski k M. Davi- gnon. Le Gouvemement de la R6publlque donne 6galement son entifere adh6sion k ce projet Ho r/Snr>r>c*» /Vnir n* G.5 1 .... 22 % 12 aoiil Le Baron Fallon h. M- £>&vi- trnon. Le texte allemand contenait une faute. Le sens est : « son conflit avec la France » . . . . . 22 ii lUotl M. Davison eu 'pajroh Pftl- ion. La nouvelle proposition allemande reproduit. la proposition formul6e dans I'ultlmatum du 2 aotit. La Belgique ne peut inftr>QP A p.pt ultimatum 22 Date RESUME Le Gouvernement russe f61icite la Belgique de son attitude ferme et digne. (Voir n° 65.) . La r6ponse du Gouvernement beige k la se- conde proposition allemande a 6te remise le 13 aout La France n'est plus d'avls de neutraliser le bassin conventionnel du Congo. (Voir n°* 57 et 58.) . . Le Gouvernement anglais refuse de se rallier k la proposition beige de neutraliser le bas- sin du Congo Les Allemands ont attaRoyale par un ordre du jour de Sa Majeste le Roi et sera publiee dans le "Bulletin officiel» de I'armee. Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'engage en outre: r a supprimer toute publication qui excite a la haine et au mepris de la Monarchic et dont la tendance generale est dirigee contre son integrite territoriale, 2° a dissoudre immediatement la societe dite « Narodna Odbrana », a confisquer tous ses moyens de propagande, et k proceder de la m6me mani^re contre les autres societes et affiliations en Serbie qui s'adonnent a' la pro- pagande contre la Monarchic austro-hongroi- se; le Gouvernement Royal prendra les mesu- res necessaires pour que les societes dissoutes ne puissent pas continuer leur activite sous un autre nom et sous une autre forme, 3° a eliminer sans delai de I'instruction publique en Serbie, tant en ce qui concerne le corps enseignant que les moyens d'instruc- tion, tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir a fomenter la propagande contre I'Autriche- Hongrie, ^ 4° h Eloigner du service militaire et de I'administration en general tous les officiers et fonctionnaires coupables de la propagande contre la Monarchic austro-hongroise ef dont le Gouvernement linp^rial et Royal, se reserve de communiquer les noms et les fails au Gou- vernement Royal, 5° k accepter la collaboration en Serbie des organes du Gouvernement Imperial et Royal dans la suppression du mouvement subversif dirige contre I'int^grite territoriale de la Mo- narchie, 6° k ouvrir une enquSte judiciaire contre les partisans du complot du 28 juin se trouvant sur territoire serbe; des organes, del6gues par le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal, prendront part aux recher- ches y relatives, T k proceder d'urgence k I'arrestation du Commandant Voija Tankosic et du nomme Milan Ciganovic, employ^ de I'Etat serbe, com- promis par les r^sultats de instruction de Sarajevo, 8° k empgcher, par des mesures efficaces, le concours des autorit6s serbes dans le trafic illicite 'd'armes et d'explosifs k travers la frontiers; k licencier et punir s^v^rement les fonction- naires du service-fronti^re de Schabatz et de Loznica coupables d'avoir aid6 les auteilrs du crime de Sarajevo en leur facilitant le passage de la fronti^re, 9° k donner au Gouvernement Imperial et Royal des explications sur les propos injus- lifiables de hauls fonctionnaires serbes tant en Serbie qu'k I'^tranger, qui, malgr6 leur position officielle, n'ont pas h6sit6 aprfes I'at- tentat du 28 juin de s'exprimer dans des interview's d'une maniere hostile envers la Monarchic austro-hongroise, enfin 10° d'avertir, sans retard, le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal de I'execution des mesures comprises dans les points precedents. Le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal attend la reponse du Gouvernement Royal au plus tard jusqu'au samedi, 25 de ce mois, a 6 heu- res du soir- Un memoire concernant les resultats de I'in- struction de Sarajevo a I'egard des fonction- naires mentionnes aux points 7 et 8 est annexe a cette note. J'ai I'honneur d'inviter votre Excellence de vouloir porter le contenu de cette note a la connaissance du Gouvernement aupres duquel vous etes accredite, en accompagnant cette communication- du commentaire que voici : Le 31 mars 1909, le Gouvernement Royal serbe a adresse a I'Autriche-Hongrie la decla- ration dont le texte est reproduit ci-dessus. Le lendemain mgme de cette declaration la Serbie s'est engagee dans une politique ten- dant k inspirer des id6es subversives aux res- sortissants serbes de la Monarchic austro-hon- groise et a preparer ainsi la separation des territoires austro-hongrois, limitrophes k la Serbie. La Serbie devint le foyer d'une agitation criminelle. Des societes et affiliations ne tarderent pas a se former qui, soit ouvertement, soit clan- destinement, 6taient destinees k cr6er des des- ordres sur le territoire austro-hongrois. Ces societes et affiliations comptent parmi leurs membres des generaux et des diplomates, des fonctionnaires d'Etat et des juges, bref les sommites du monde officiel et inofficiel du royaume. Le journalisme serbe est presque entifere- ment au service de cette propagande, dirig6e contre I'Autriche-Hongrie, et pas un jour ne passe sans que les organes de la presse serbe- n'excitent leurs lecteurs k la haine et au me- pris de la Monarchic voisine ou a des attentats dirig^s plus ou moins ouvertement contre sa surete et son int6grit6. Un grand nombre d'agents est appel6 k sou- tenir par tous les moyens I'agitation contre I'Autriche-Hongrie et k corrompre dans les provinces limitrophes la jeunesse de ces pays. L'esprit conspirateur des politiciens serbes, esprit dont les annales du royaume portent les sanglantes empreintes, a subi une recru- descence depuis la derniere crise balkanique; des individus ayant fait partie des bandes jus- que-la occupees en Mac6doine sont venus se mettre a la disposition de la propagande ter- roriste contre I'Autriche-Hongrie. En presence de ces agissements, auxquels I'Autriche-Hongrie est expos6e depuis des an- n^es, le Gouvernement de la Serbie n'a paf cru devoir prendre la moindre mesure. C'est ainsi que le Gouvernement serbe a manqu6 au devoir que lui imposait la declaration solen- nelle du 31 mars 1909, et c'est ainsi qu'il s'est mis en contradiction avec la volont6 de I'Eu- rope et avec I'engagement qu'il avait pris vis- ^-vis de I'Autriche-Hongrie. La longanimity du Gouvernement Imperial et Royal k I'egard de I'attitude provocatrice d3 la Serbie 6tait inspir6e du d6sint6ressement territorial de la Monarchic austro-hongrois9 et de I'espoir que le Gouvernement serbe fini- - 3 - fait tout de m6me par appr^cier a sa juste valeur I'amitie de I'Autriche-HoTigrie. En ob- servant une attitude bienveillante pour ies intergts politiques de la Serbie, le Gouverne- ment Imperial et Royal esperait que le royau- me se deciderait finalement a suivre de son cote une ligne de conduite analogue. L'Autri- che-Hongrie s'attendait surtout a une pareille evolution dans Ies idees politiques en Serbie, lorsque, apres Ies evenements de I'annee 1912, le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal rendit pos- sible, par une attitude desinteressee et sans rancune, Tagrandissement si considerable de la Serbie. Cette bienveillance manifestee par I'Autri- che-Hongrie a I'egard de FEtat voisin n'a ce- pendant aucunement modifie Ies procedes du royaume, qui a continue a tolerer sur son territoire une propagande, dont Ies funestes consequences se sont manifestees au monde entier le 28 juin dernier, jour ou I'heritier presomptif de la Monarchie et son illustre epouse devinrent Ies victimes d'un complot trame a Belgrade. En presence de cet 6tat de choses le. Gou- vernement Imperial et Royal a du se decider ci entreprendre de nouvelles et pressantes de- marches a Belgrade afin d'amener le Gouver- nement serbe a arreter le mouvement incen- diaire menagant la surete et I'integrite de la Monarchie austro-hongroise. Le Gouvernement Impetial et Royal est per- suade qu'en entreprenant cette demarche il se trouve en plein accord avec Ies sentiments de toutes Ies nations civilisees,qui ne sauraient admettre que le regicide devint une arme dont on puisse se servir impunement dans la lutte politique, et que la paix europeenne fut con- tinuellement troublee par Ies agissements par- tant de Belgrade. C'est a I'appui de ce qui- precede que le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal tient a la disposition du Gouvernement Royal de Gran- de-Bretagne un dossier elucidant Ies menees serbes et Ies rapports existanfentre ces menees et le meurtre du 28 juin- Une communication identique est adress6e aux representants Imperiaux et Royaux au- pres des autres Puissances signataires. Vous etes autorise de laisser une copie de cette depeche entre Ies mains de M. le Mi- nistre des Affaires Etrangeres. Vienne, le 24 juillet 1914. Annexe. L'instruction criminelle ouverte par le Tri- bunal de Sarajevo contre Gavrila Princip et consorts du chef d'assassinat et de complicite y relative — crime commis par eux le 28 juin dernier — a jusqu'ici abouti aux constatations suivantes • r Le complot ayant pour but d'assassiner, lors de son sejour a Sarajevo, I'Archiduc Frangois-Ferdinand fut forme a Belgrade par Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, le nom- ine Milan Ciganovic et Trifko Grabez avec le concours du commandant Voija Tankosic. 2° Les 6 bombes et Ies 4 pistolets Browning avec munition, moyennant lesquels les mal- faiteurs ont commis I'attentat, furent livr6s ci .Belgrade a Princip, Cabrinovic et Grabez par le nomm6 Milan Ciganovic et le comman- dant Voija Tankosic 3' Les bombes sont des grenades 2l la mam provenant du depdt d'armes de I'arm^e- serbe a Kragujevac. 4" Pour assurer la r6ussite de Fattentat, Ciganovic enseigna a Princip, Cabrinovic et. Grabez la mani^re de se servir des grenades et donna, dans une foret pres du champ de tir a Topschider, des legons de tir avec pistolets Browning a Princip et Grabez. 5° Pour rendre possible a Princip, Cabri- novic et Grabez de passer la frontiere de Bos- nie-Herzegovine et d'y introduire clandestine- ment leur contrebande d'armes, . un, systeme de transport secret^ fut organise par Ciganovic. D'apres cette organisation I'introduction en Bosnie-Herzegovine des malfaiteurs et de leurs armes fut operee par leS capitaines-frontieres de Chabac (Rade Popovic) et de Loznica ainsi que par le douanier Rudivoj Grbic de Loz- nica avec le concours de divers particuliers. N° 2. Lettre adressSe par M. Davignon, Mmistre des Affaires etrangeres, aux Ministres du Rot a Paris, Berlin, Londres, Vienne et Saini- Petersbourg. Bruxelles, le 24 juillet 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, Le Gouvernement du Roi s'est demande si, dans les circonstances actuelles^ il n'y aurait pas lieu d'adresser aux Puissances qui ont garanti son independance et sa neutralite, une communication destinee a leur confirmer sa resolution de remplir les devoirs internatio- naux que lui imposent les traites au cas ou une guerre viendrait a 6clater aux frontieres de la Belgique- II a ete amene ci la conclusion qu'une telle communication serait prematuree. a I'heure presente mais que les evenements pourraient S3 precipiter et ne point lui laisser le temps de faire parvenir, au moment voulu, les instructions opportunes a ses repres6ntants a I'etranger. Dans cette situation, j'ai propose au Roi et a mes collegues du Cabinet, qui se sont ral- lies a ma maniere de voir, de vous donner, des a present, des indications precises sur la demarche que vous auriez a faire si I'eventua- lite d'une guerre franco-allemande deven^it plus menagante. Vous trouverez, sous ce pli, une lettre sign6e, mais non datee dont vous aurez k don- ner lecture et a laisser copie au Ministre des Affaires etrangeres si les circonstances exigent cette communication. Je vous indiquerai par t^legramme le mo- ment d'agir. Le telegramme vous sera adresse a I'heure ou la mobilisation de I'armee beige sera de- cretee, si, contrairement ci notre sincere espoir, et aux apparences de solution paeifique, nos renssignements nous amenaient k prendre cette mesure extreme de precaution. Veuillez agreer, etc. (s) Davignon. Annexe au N" 2. Monsieur le Ministre, La situation internationale est grave; I'^ven- tualit6 d'un conflit entre plusieurs puissances 4 — ne peut Sire 6cart6e des preoccupations du gouvernement du Roi. La Belgique a observ6 avec la plus scrupu- leusG exactitude les devoirs d'Etat neutre que lui imposent les traites du 19 avril 1839. Ges devoirs, elle s'attachera inebranlablement. a les remplir, quelles que soient les circonstan- ces. Les dispositions amicales des puissances k son egard ont ete affirmees si souvent que la Belgique a la confiance de voir son territoire demeurer hors de toute atleinte si des hosti- lites venaient a se produire a ses frontieres. Toutes les mesuves necessaires pour assurer I'observation de sa neutralite n'en ont pas moins ete prises par le Gouvernement du Roi. L'armee beige est mobilisee et se porte sur les positions strategiques choisies pour assurer la defense du pays et le respect de sa neutra- lite. Les forts d'Anvers et de la Meuse sont en etat de defense. II est a peine necessaire, Monsieur le Mi- nistre, d'insister sur le caractere de ces mesu- res. Elles n'ont d'autre but que de mettre la Belgique en situation de remplir ses obliga- tions Internationales; elles ne sont et n'ont pu 6tre inspirees, cela va de soi, ni par le dessein de prendre part a une lutte armee des puis- sances, ni par un sentiment de defiance envers aucune d'elles. Me conformant aux ordres regus, j'ai I'hon- neur de remettre a Votre Excellence une copie de la declaration du gouvernement du Roi et de La prier de bien vouloir en prendre acte. Une communication identique a ete faite aux autres Puissances garantes de la neutralite beige. Je saisis, etc. Nf> 3. Letlrc adressee par M. Davignon, Minislre des Affaires E/rangeres, aux Ministres du Roi a Rome, La Uaije et Luxembourg . Bruxelles, le 25 juillet 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, J'ai adresse h. vos Collegues accredit^s au- pres des Puissances garantes de I'indepen- dance et de la neutralite de la Belgique une circulaire, sans date, dent vous trouverez le texte sous ce pli. Si la menace d'une guerre franco-allemande devenait imminente, cette circulaire serait communiquee aux Gouvernements des Puis- sances garantes, pour leur faire connaitre no- tre resolution bien arret^e de remplir les de- voirs internationaux que nous imposent les traites de 1839. La communication dont il s'agit ne serait effectuee que sur un ordre tel6graphique de ma part. Si les circonstances m'amenent a donner cet ordre, je vous prierai, egalement par la voie lelegraphique, de donner connaissance de no- ire demarche au gouvernement aupres duquel vous etes accredite, en lui communiquant une copie de la circulaire ci-jointe, a titre de ren- seignement, et sans demander qu'il vous soit donne acte de cette communication. Mon t616gramme vous indiquerait, eventuel- lement, la date qui devrait etre attribute a la circulaire, date que vous auriez soin d'in- scrire sur la copie que vous remettriez au Ministre des Affaires Etrang^res. !1 va de soi que la pr6sente d^peche et son annexe doivent conserver un caractere stric- tement confidentiel, jusqu'au recu de nouvel- les instructions de ma part. (s) Dg.vignon, Annexe au N" 3. (Voir Vannexe au N° 2.) N" 4. Lethe adressee par le Ministre du Roi d. Bel- grade a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Elranghres. Belgrade, le 25 juillet 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, J'ai I'honneur de vous faire parvenir, sous ce pli, le texte de la reponse faite par le gou- vernem.ent serbe k la communication austro- hongroise du 10/23 juillet. Veuillez agr^er, etc. (s) Michotte de Welle. Annexe au N° 4. Le Gouvernement Royal serbe a rcQu la communication du Gouvernement Imperial et Royal du 10 de ce mois et il est persuade que sa reponse eloignera tout malentendu qui me- nace de gatcr les bons rapports de voisinage entre la Monarchic auslro-hongroise et le Royaume de Serbie. Le Gouvernement Royal conscient que les protestations qui ont apparu tant de la tribune de la Skoupchtina nationale que dans les de- clarations et les actes des representants res- ponsables de I'Elat, protestations qui furent coupees court par les declarations du Gouver- nement serbe, faites le 18 mars 1909, ne se sont plus renouvel6es vis-a-vis de la grande Monarchic voisine en aucune occasion et que, depuis ce temps, autanl de la part des Gouver- nements Royaux qui se sont succede que de la part de leurs organes, aucune tentative n'a ete faite dans le but de changer I'etat de choses politique et juridique cre6 en Bosnie et Herz6govine, le Gouvernement Royal con- state que sous ce rapport le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal n'a fait aucune represen- tation, sauf en ce qui concerne un livre sco- laire, et au sujet de laquelle le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal a regu une explication en- tierement satisfaisante. La Serbie a de nom- breuses fois donn6 des preuves de sa politique pacifique et moderee pendant la duree de la crise balkanique, et c'est grace a la Serbie et au sacrifice qu'elle a fait dans I'interet exclusif de la paix europeenne que cette paix a ete pr6serv6e. Le Gouvernement Royal ne peut pas etre rendu responsable pour les manifestations d'un caractere priv6, telles que les articles des journaux et le travail paisible des societes, manifestations qui se produisent dans prcsque tous les pays comme une chose ordinaire et qui 6chappe, en regie generale, au controle officiel,d'autant moins que le Gou- vernement Royal, lors de la solution dc toute une s6rie de questions qui se sont presentees entre la Serbie et I'Autriche-Hongrie, a montr6 une grande provenance et a r6ussi, de cette fagon, a en regler le plus grand nombre au profit du progrOs des deux pays voisins. 5 - C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement Royal, 4 dt6 peniblement surpris par les affirmations, d'apres lesquelles des personnes du Royaume de Serbie auraient participe a la preparation de Tattentat commis a Sarajevo; il s'attendait a ce qu'il soit invite a collaborer a la recherche de tout ce qui se rapporte a ce crime, et \\ etait pret, pOur prouver son entiere correc-. tion, a agir contre toules les personnes a re- gard desquelles des communications lui se- raient faites, se rendant done au desir du Gouvernement Imperial et Royal, est dispos6 h, remettre au Tribunal tout sujet serbe, san^ 6gard ci sa situation et a son rang, pour la complicity duquel, dans le crime de Sarajevo, des preuves lui seraient fournies, et speciale- ment, il s'engage a faire publier h la premiere page du "Journal of ficiel» en date du 13 .(26) juillet, Fenonciation suivante : «Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie condam- ne toute propagande qui serait dirigee contre I'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-a-dire I'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu a deta- cher de la Monarchic austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il deplore sin- cerement les consequences funestes de ces agissements criminels.Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que certains officiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient participe, d'apres la communica- tion du Gouvernement Royal et Imperial, a !Ia propagande susmentionnee, et compromis par la les relations de bon voisinage auxquel- les le Gouvernement Royal serbe etait solen- nellement engage par sa declaration du 31 mars 1909, qui desapprouve et repudie toute idee ou tentative d'une immixtion dans les destinees des habitants de quelque partie de I'Autriche-Hongrie que ce soit, consid^re de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers et fonctionnaires et toute la population du royaume que, dorenavant, il procedera avec la derniere rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements, qu'il mettra tous ses efforts a prevenir et a r6primer.» Gette enonciation sera portee h la connais- sance de I'arm^e Royale par un ordre du jour, au nom de Sa Majeste le Roi, par Son Altesse Royale le Prince heritier Alexandre, et sera public dans le prochain bulletin officiel de I'armee. Le Gouvernement Royal s'engage en outre : 1. D'introduire dans la premiere convocation reguliere de la Sk6upchtina uhe disposition dans la loi de la presse,par laquelle sera punie de la maniere la plus severe la provocation a la haine et au mepris de la Monarchic austro-hongroise, ainsi que contre toute publi- cation dont la tendance generale serait dirigee contre I'integrite territoriale de I'Autriche- Hongrie. II se charge^ lors de la revision de la Constitution, qui est prochaine, a faire introduire dans I'article 22 de la Constitution un amendement de telle sorte que les publi- cations ci-dessus puissent etre confisquees, ce qui actuellement aux termes categoriques de Particle 22 de la Constitution est impossible. 2. Le Gouvernement ne possede aucune preuve et la note du Gouvernement Imperial et Royal ne lui en fournit non plus aucune que la soci6te «Narodna Odbrana» et autres societes similaires aient commis, jusqu'a ce jour quelques actes criminels de ce genre, par le fait d'un de leurs membres. Neanmoins, le Gouvernement Royal acceptera la demande du Gouvernement Imperial et Royal et dissoudra la societe «Narodna Odbrana» et toute autre society qui agirait contre I'Autriche-Hongrie. 3. Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'engage a eliminer sans delais de I'rnslruction publi- ,que en Serbie dans ce qui sert ou pourrait servir ^ fomenter la propagande contre I'Au- triche-Hongrie, quand le Gouvernement Im- perial et Royal lui fournira des fails et des preuveS de cette propagande. 4. Le Gouvernement Royal accepte de meme h, Eloigner du service militaire ceux pour qui I'enquete judiciaire aura prouve qu'ils sont coupables d'actes diriges contre I'integrite du territoire de la. Monarchic austro-hongroise, et il attend que le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal lui communique ult6rieurement les noms et les fails de ces officiers et fonction- naires aux fins de la procedure qui doit s'en- suivre. . , 5. Le Gouvernement Royal doit avouer qu'il ne se rend pas clairement compte du sens et de la portee de la demande du Gouverne- ment Imperial et Royal que la Serbie s'engage ci accepter sur son territoire la collaboration des organes du Gouvernement Imperial et Royal, mais il declare qu'il admettra la colla- boration qui repondrait aux principes du droit international et h la procedure criminelle ainsi qu'aux bons rapports de voisinage. 6. Le Gouvernement Royal, cela va de soi, considere de son devoir d'ouvrir une enquete. contre tous ceux qui sont ou qui, eventuelle- ment, auraient ete meles au complot du 15 juin, et qui se trouveraient sur le territoire du royaume. Quant ci la participation a cette enquSte des agents ou autorites austro-hon- grois qui seraient delegues a cet effet par le Gouyernement Imperial et Royal, le Gouver- nement Royal ne pent pas I'accepter, car ce serait une violation de la Constitution et de- la loi sur la procedure criminelle; cependant dans des cas concrets des communications sur les r6sultats de I'instruction en question pour- raient etre donnees aux agents austro-hon- grois. 7. Le Gouvernement Royal a fait proceder, d^s le soir meme de la remise de la note, a I'arrestation du Commandant Voislav Tankos- sitch. Quant a Milan Ziganovitch, qui est su- jet de la Monarchic austro-hojigroise et qui jusqu'au 15 juin 6tait employe (comme aspi- rant) a la direction des chemins de feri il h'a pas pu encore Stre arrSte. Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois est prie de vouloir bien, dans la forme accoutumee, faire connaitre le plus tot possible,, les pr^somptions de culpabilite ainsi que les preuves 6ventuelles de leur pulpabilite qui ont et6 recueillies jus- qu'^ ce jour par I'enquSte h Sarajevo, aux fins d'enquete ult6rieure. 8. Le Gouvernement serbe renforcera et etendra les mesures prises pour emp§cher le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explpsifs h travers la frontiere. II va de soi qu'il ordonnera de suite une enquete et punira s6verement les fonctionnaires des frontiferes sur la ligne Scha- batz-Loznitza qui ont manqu6 k leurs devoirs et laisse passer les auteurs du crime de Sara- jevo. 9. Le Gouvernement Royal donnera volon- tiers des explications sur les propos que ses fonctionnaires, tant en Serbie qu'a I'^tranger, ont eu apres I'attentat dans des entrevues et qui, d'apres I'affirmation du Gouvernement Imperial et Royal, ont 6t6 hostiles envers la Monarchic, d^s que le Gouvernement Impe- rial et Royal lui aura communique les passa- ges en question de ces propos, et des qu'il aura demontre que les propos employes ont, en effet, 616 tenus par lesdits fonctionnaires, 6 - quoique le Gouvernement Royal Iu)-m6mt aura soin de. recueillir des preuves et con victions. 10. Le Gouvernement Royal informera le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal de I'ex^cu tion des mesures comprises dans les points precedents en tant que cela n'a pas ete dejcJ fait par la presente note, aussitot que chaque mesure aura ete ordonnee et executee Dans le cas ou le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal ne serait pas satisfait de cette reponse, le Gouvernement serbe, considerant qu'il est de I'interet commun de ne pas precipiter la solution de cette question, est pret comme toujours d'accepter une entente pacifique, soit en remettant cette question a la decision du Tribunal international de La Haye, soit aux Grandes Puissances qui ont pris part a I'ela- boration de la declaration que le Gouverne- ment serbe a faite le 18 (3l) mars 1909 Belgrade, le 12 (25) juUlet 1914. N° 5, Communication faite le 26 juillet 1914 par la Legation d" Autriche-Hongrie a Bruxelles a M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. M. Pachitch a donne hier avant 6 heures la reponse du' Gouvernement serbe a la note austro-hongroise. Cette reponse n'ayant pas ete jugee satisfaisante, les relations diploma- tiques ont ete rompues et le Ministre et le personnel de la Legation d'Autriche ont quitt6 Belgrade. La mobilisation serbe avail et6 de- cretee deja avant 3 heures. No 6. T^legramme adresse par le Baron Beyens, Ministre du Roi a Berlin, a M Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Berlin, 27 juillet 1914. D'apr^B un t§legramme du Charge d'Affaires Britannique a Belgrade, le Gouvernement ser- be a cede sur tous les points de la note autri- chienne. II admet meme I'immixtion de fonc- tionnaires autrichiens si c^lle-ci pent s'accor- der avec les usages du droit des gens. Le Charge d'Affaires Britannique estime que cette reponse devrait satisfaire I'Autriche dans le cas ou celle-ci ne voudrait pas la guerre. N^anmoins I'impression est plus favorable ici aujourd'hui, surtout parce que les hostilites centre la Serbie n'ont pas commence. Le Gou- vernement Britannique propose I'intervention de I'Angleterre, de I'Allemagne, de la France et de ritalie a Sainl-Petersbourg et a Vienne pour trouver un terrain de conciliation. L'Al- lemagne seule n'a pas encore repondu. L'Em- pereur d6cidera. Lettre adressee par M Damgnon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, awr Minis/res du Roi d Berlin, Pari!,, Londrrs, Vienne. Saint-Pe lersbourg, Romi- La Hayr.- Luxembourg Bruxelles, le 29 juillet 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, Le Gouvernement du Roi a decid6 de mettre I'armee sur le pied de paix renforce Cette mesure ne doit etre en aucune fa^on confondue avec la mobilisation. A cause du peu d'etendue de son territoire, la Belgique toute entiere constitue en quelque sorte une zone frontiere. Son armee, sur le pied de paix ordinaire, ne comporte qu'une classe de milice sous les armes. Sur le pied de paix renforce ses divisions d'armee et sa division de cavalerie, grace au rappel de' 3 classes ont des effectifs analogues a ceux des corps entretenus en permanence dans les zones frontieres des Puissances voisines. Ces renseignements vous permettraient de repondre aux questions qui pourrafent vous etre posees. Veuillez agr6er, etc. (s) DavigTion. NO 9. Lettre adressie par M. Vavignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, aux Ministres du Roi a Berlin, Paris et Londres. Bruxelles, le 31 juillet 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, M. le Ministre de France 6tant venu me montrer un telegramme de I'Agence Havas, decretant I'etat de guerre en Aliemagne, m'a dit : Je profite de cette occasion pour vous declarer qu'aucune incursion des troupes fran- ^aises n'aura lieu en Belgique, meme si des forces importantes 6taient massees sur les frontieres de votre pays. La France ne veut pas avoir la responsabilit6 d'accomplir vis-^- vis de la Belgique, le premier acte d'hostilit6. Des instructions dans ce sens seront donn6es aux autorites frangaises. J'ai remerci6 M. Klobukowski de sa com- munication et j'ai cru devoir lui faire remar- quer que nous avions toujours eu la plus grande con fiance dans la loyaute que nos deux Etats voisins mettraient a tenir leurs engagements a notre 6gard. Nous avons £Cussi tout lieu de croire que I'attitude du Gouver- nement allemand sera identique k celle du Gouvernement de la Republique frangaise. Veuillez agr6er, etc. (s) Davignon. NO ,7. T^gramme adressi par le Comte Err em- bault de Dudzeele, Ministre du Roi a Vienne, t M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etran- gkres. Vienne, 28 juniet 1914. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres me no- Ufie la declaration de .guerre de I'Autriche- Hongrie a la Serbie. No 10. TSlSgramme adres&S par M. Davignon, Mi- nistre des Affaires "Etrang^Tes, h tous les Chefs de mission d. VMranger Bruxelles, 31 juillet 1914. Le Ministre de la Guerre me fait savoir que la mobilisation est d6cr6t6e et que le samedi l" aoiit est le premier jour de la mobilisation, Cs) Davignon. - 7 — NO 11. Lettre adrcssee par M .Davignon,Ministre des Affaires Eirangercs, aux Ministres du Roi «: Berlin, Londrcs et Paris. Bruxelles, le 31 juillet 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, Le Ministre. d'Angleterre a demande a me voir d'urgence et m'a fait la communication suivante. qu'il souhaitait etre a meme de m'ex- poser depuis plusieurs jours. En raison de la possibilite d'une guerre europeenne. Sir Edward Grey a demande aux Gouvernemenls frangais et allemand, separement, si chacun d'eux etait pret a respecter la neutralite de la Belgique pourvu qu'aucune puissance ne la viole. «Vu les traites qui existent, je suis charge d'informer le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres de Belgique de ce qui precede et de dire que Sir Edward Grey presume que la Belgique fera tout son possible pour maintenir sa neu- tralite et qu'elle desire et s'attend'a ce que les autres puissances I'observent et la main- tiennent". •Je me suis empresse de remercier Sir Fran- cis Villiers de cette communication que le Gouvernement beige apprecie particulierement et j'ai ajoute que la Grande-Bretagne et les autres nations garantes de notre independance pouvaient etre assurees que nous ne neglige- rions aucun effort pour maintenir notre neu- tralite, et que nous etions convaincus que les autres puissances, vu les excellents rapports d'amitie et de confiance, que nous avions toujours entretenus avec elles, observeraient et maintiendraient cette neutralite. .Je n'ai pas manque d'affirmer que nos forces militaires, considerablement developpees a la suite de notre reorganisation recente, etaient a meme de nous permettre de nous defendre energiquement en cas de violation de notre territoire. Au cours de la conversation qui a suivi, Sir. Francis m'a paru un peu surpris de la rapidite avec laquelle nous avions decide la mobilisation de notre armee. J'ai fait remar- quer que les Pays-Bas avaient pris une resolu- tion identique avant nous et que d'autre part Ici date recente de notre nouveau regime mili- taire et les mesures transitoires que nous avions dij decider a cette occasion, nous impo- saient des mesures urgentes et completes. Nos voisins et garants devaient voir dans cette resolution le desir de manifester notre pro- fonde volonte de maintenir nous-memes notre neutralite. Sir Francis m'a paru satisfait de ma reponse et m'a annonce que son Gouvernement atten- dait cette reponse pour continuer les n6gocia- tions avec la France et rAllemagne, liegocia- tions dont la conclusion me serait communi- quee. Veuillez agreer, etc. (s) Davignon. No 12. Lettre adressec par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, aux Ministres'du Roi a Berlin, Londres et Paris. Bruxelles, le 31 juillet 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, Ce matin, au cours d'une conversation que le Secretaire General de mon Departem^nt a eue avec M. de Below, 11 a.expliqul^ au Mi. nistre d'Allemagne la portee des mesures mili- taires que nous avons prises et lui a dit qu'el- les etaient une consequence de notre. volonte d'accomplir nos obligations internationales, qu'elles n'impliquaient en aucune facon une attitude de defiance envers nos voisins.- Le Secretaire General a demande ensuite au Ministre d'Allemagne s'il avait connaissance de la conversation qu'il avait eue avec son predecesseur M. de Flotow, et de la reponse que le Chancelier de I'Empire avait charge celui-ci'de lui faire. Au cours de la polemique so.ulev6e en 1911 par le depot du projet hollandais concernant les fortifications de Flessingue, certains jour- naux avaient affirme qu'en cas de guerre fran- co-allemande. notre neutralite serait violea par VAllemagne. Le Departement des Affaires Etrangeres avait suggere I'idee qu'une declaration faitc au Parlement allemand a I'occasion d'un debat sur la politique etrangere serait de nature a apaiser I'opinion publique et a calmer ses defiances, si regrettables au point de vue des relations des deux pays. M. de Bethman-Holweg fit repondre qu'il avait ete tres sensible aux sentiments qui avaient inspire notre demarche. II declarait que I'Allemagne h'avait pas I'intention de vio- ler notre neutralite, mais il estinrtait qu'en faisanf publiquement une declaration, I'Alle- magne affaiblirait sa situation militaire vis-a- vis de la France qui, rassuree du cote du Nord, porterait toutes ses forces du cote de I'Est. Le Baron van der Elst poursuivant, dit qu'il comprenait parfaitem'ent les objections qu'a- vaient faites M. de Bethman-Holweg a la declaration publique suggeree et il rappela que depuis lors en 1913, M. de Jagow avait fait a la Commission du budget du Reichstag, de« declarations rassurantes quant au respect de la neutralite de la Belgique. M. de Below repondit qu'il 6tait au courant de la conversation avec M. de Flotow et qu'il etait certain que les sentiments exprimes a cette epoque n'avaient pas change. Veuillez agreer, etc. (s) Davignon. Annexe aun° 12< Lettre adressee par le Ministre du Roi a. Ber- lin, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Berlin, le 2 mai 1913. Monsieur le Ministre, J'ai I'honneur de vous faire connaitre, d'apr^s I'officieuse «Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung", les declarations faites, au cours de- la seance du 29 avril de la commission du budget du Reichstag, par le secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires Etrangeres et le Ministre de la Guerre, relativement a la neutralite de la Belgique. ,. . . « Un membre du parti social-d6mocrate dit : En Belgique on voit avec apprehension s'ap- procher une guerre franco-allemande, car on craint que I'AUfemagne ne respectera pas la neutralite de la Belgique. » M. de Jagow, Secretaire d'Etat aux Af- faires Etrangeres repondit: la neutralite de la' Belgique est determinee par des conventions internationales et I'Allemagne est decid^e h. respecter ces conventions. - 8 » Cette declaration ne satisfit pas un autre membre du parti social-d6mocrate. M. de Jagow observa qu'il n'avait rien ^ aj outer aux paroles claires qu'il avait pron'oncees rela- tivement aux relations de i'AIlemagne avec la Belgique. » A de nouvelles interrogations d'un mem- bre du parti social-democrate M.de Heeringen, Ministre de la Guerre, repondit: la Belgique .ne joue aucun role dans la justification du, projet de reorganisation militaire allemand; celui-ci se trouve justifie par la situation en Orient. L'AIlemagne ne perdra pas de-vue que la neutralite beige est garantie par les trait6s internationaux. » Un membre du parti progressiste ayant encore parle de la Belgique, M. de Jagow fit remarquer a nouveau que sa declaration con- cernant la Belgique 6tait suffisamment cj|^ire.» Veuillez agreer, etc. (s) Baron Beyens. No 13. Tiligramme adress^ par le Comte de La- laing, Ministre du Roi a Londres, a M. Davi- gnon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Londres, i" aout 1914. L'Angleterre a demande s^parement a la France et a I'AIlemagne si elles respecteraient le territoire de la Belgique dans le cas ou leur adversalre ne la violerait pas. On attend la r^ponse ailemande. La France a accepte. N" 14. Tilegramme adresse par le Baron Beyens, Ministre du Roi a Berlin, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Berlin, i" aout 1914. L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a 6te charge de demander au Ministre des Affaires Etran- geres si en cas de guerre, I'AIlemagne respec- terait la neutrality de la Belgique et le Ministre aurait dit qu'il ne peut pas repondre h cette question. No 15. Lettre adressie par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, aux Ministres du Roi d. Berlin, Paris et Londres. Bruxelles, 1" aout 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, J'ai I'honneur de vous faire savoir que le Ministre de France m'a fait verbalement la communication suivante : «Je suis autorise a declarer qu'en cas de conflit international, le Gouvernement de la, Republique, ainsi qu'il I'a toujours declare,' respectera la neutralite de la Belgique. Dans rhypothese ou cette neutralite ne serait pas respectee par une autre puissance, le Gouver- nement fran^ais, pour assurer sa propre de- fense, pourrait Stre amene a modifier son atti- tude." J'ai remerci6 Son Excellence .et ai ajout6 que de notre cote nous avions pris sans aucun retard toutes les mesures voulues pour faire respecter notre ind6pendance et nos f rontieres, Veuillez agreer, etc. (s) Davignon. NO le. Td^gramme adresse par le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres aux Ligations du Roi a- Paris, Berlin, Londres, Vienne, Saint-Peters- bourg. Bruxelles. 1" aout 1914. Executez instructions donnees par lettre du 24 juillet. (s) Davignon. (Voir pihce N" 2.) No 17. TiUgramme adressS . par le Ministre des Affaires. Etrangeres aux Ligations a Rome, La. Haye, Luxembourg. Bruxelles, le 1"" aoiit 1914. Executez instructions donnees par lettre du 25 juillet. (s) Davignon. (Voir piece n° 3.) No 18. Tiligramme adressi par M. Eyschen, Pri- sident du Gouvernement Ivxemhourgcois, a M, Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangires. Luxembourg,. 2 aoflt 1914. J'ai I'honneur de porter k la connaissance de Votre Excellence les faits suivants: Diman- che 2 aout, de grand matin, les troupes, alle- mandes, d'apres les. informations qui sont parvenues au Gouvernement Grand. Ducal ^ I'heure actuelle, ont p6n6tr6 sur le territoire luxembourgeois par les ponts de Wasserbillig et de Remich, se dirigeant specialement vers le Sud du pays et vers la ville.de Luxembourg, capitale du Grand Duch6. Un certain nombre de trains blind^s avec des troupes et des muni- tions ont 6t6 achemin6s par la voie de chemin de fer de Wasserbillig k Luxembourg, ou Ton s'attend a. les voir arriver d'un instant a I'au- tre. Ces faits impliquent des actes manifeste- ment contraires k la neutrality du Grand Du- che, garantie par le traits de Londres de 1867. Le Gouvernement Luxembourgeois n'a pas manqu6 de protester 6nergiquement contre cette agression aupr^s du Repr^sentant de Sa Majeste I'Empereur d'Allemagne k Luxem- bourg. Une protestation identique va 6tre transmise t^legraphiquement au Secretaire d'Etat pour les Affaires Etrangeres a Berlin. Le Ministre d'Etat, President du Gouvernement : (s) Eyschen. No 1^. Lettre adressie par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, aux Ministres du Roi a Paris, Berlin^ Londres^ Vienne et Saint-Pi- tersbourg. Bruxelles, le 2 aoiit 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, J'avais eu soin de faire avertir par M. de Baesompierre ie Ministre d'Allemagne qu'un communique de M. Klobukowski, Ministre de France,, k la presse bruxelloise, annoncerait ^ 9 - la declaration formelle que ce'dernier m'avait faite le 1" aout. Rencontrant M. de Below, ce dernier m'a remercie de cette attention et a ajoute "que jusqu'a present il n'avaif pas 616 charg6 de nous faire une communication offi- cielle, mais que nous connaissions son opinipTi personnelle sur la securite avec laquelle npus ayions le droit de considerer* nos voisins de I'Est, J'ai immediatement r^pondu que tout ce que nous connaissions des intentions de ceux-ci, intentions indiquees dans les multi- ples entretiens anterieurs, ne nous permet- tait pas de douter de leur parfaite correction vis-a-vis de la Belgique; je tenais cependant t ajouter que nous attacherions le plus grand prix a gtre en possession d'une declaration formelle dont 1^ nation prendrait connaissanqe avec joie et reconnaissance. Veuillez agr^ei*, etc. (s) Davignon. No 20. Note remise le 2 aoUt, d. 19 heures, par M. Below Saleske, Ministre d'Allemagne, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangbre^. Briissel, den 2 August 1914. Kaiserlich Deutsche Gesandtschaft In Belgien. TRES CONFIDENTIEL. Der Kaiserlichen Regierung liegen zuyeriaa- sige Nachrichten vor ueber den beabsichitigten Aufmarsch franzosischer Streitkraft.e an der Maas-Strecke Givet-Namur. Sie lassen keinen Zweifel ueber die Absicht Frankreichs, durch belgisches Gebiet gegen Deutschland vorzu- gehen. Die Kaiserliche Regierung kann sich der Begorgniss nicht erwehren, dass Belgien, trotz besten Willens, nicht im Stande sein wird, ohne Hiilfe einen franzosischen Vormarsch mit so grosser Aussicht auf Erfolg abzuweh- ren, dass darin eine ausreichende Sicherheit gegen die Bedrohung Deutschlands gefunden werden kann. Es ist ein Gebot der Selbster- haltung fiir Deutschland, dem feindlichen An- griff zuvorzukonjmen. Mit dem grossten Be- dauern wiirde es daher die deutsche Regie- rung erfiillen, wenn Belgien einen Akt der Feindseligkeit gegen sich darin erblicken wiir- de, dass die Massnahmen seiner Gegner Deutschland zwingen, zur Gegenwehr auch seinerseits belgisches Gebiet zu betreten. Um jede Missdeutung auszuschliessen, er- klart die Kaiserliche Regierung das Folgende: 1. Deutschland beabsichtigt keinerlei Feind- seligkeiten gegen Belgien. Ist Belgien gewillt, in dem bevorstehenden Kriege, Deutschland gegeniiber eine wohlwollende Neutral itat ein- zunehmen, so verpflichtet sich die deutsche Regierung, beim Friedensschluss Bezitzstand und Unabhangigkeit des Konigreichs in vol- lem Umfang zu garantieren. 2. Deutschland verpflichtet sich unter obi- .ger Voraussetzung, das Gebiet des Konigreichs wieder zu raumen, sobald der Friede geschlos- sen ist. 3. Bei einer freundschaflticher Haltung Bel- giens ist Deutschland bereit,im Einvernehriien mit den Koniglich Belgischen Behorden alle Bediirfnisse seiner Truppen gegen Barzahlung anzukaufen und, jeden Schaden zu ersetzen, der etwa durch deutsche Truppen verursacht werden konnte. 4. Sollte Belgien den deutschen Truppen feindlich entgegen treten, insbesondere ihrem' vorgehen durch Widerstand der Maas-Befes- tigungen oder durch Zerstorungen von Eisen- bahnen, Strassen, Tunneln oder sonstigen Kunstbauten Schwierigkeilen bereiten, so wird Deutschland zu seinem Bedauern ge- zwungen sein, das Konigreich als Feind zu betrachten. In diesem Falle wiirde Deutsch- land dem Konigreich gegeniiber keine Ver- pflichtungen iibernehmen konnen, sondern miisste die spatere Regelung des Verhaltnisses beider Staaten zu einander der Entscheidung- der Waff en -iiberlassen. Die Kaiserliche Regierung giebt sich der bestimmten Hoffnung bin, dass diese Eventua- litat nicht eintreteh, und dass die Konigliche Belgische Regierung die geeigneten Massnah- men zu treffen wissen wird, um zu verhinde- ren, dass Vorkommnisse, wie die vorstehend erwahnten, sich ereignen. In diesem Falle wiirden die freundschaftlichen Bande, die bei- de Nachbarstaaten verbinden, eine weitere und dauernde Festigung erfahren. Annexe au N° 20. Traduction de Vultimatum de CAllemagne. Le Gouvernement allemand a regu des noa- velles sures d'apres lesquelles les forces fran- caises auraient I'intention de marcher sur la Meuse par Givet et Namur.' Ces nouvelles ne laissent aucun doute sur I'intention de la France de marcher sur I'Allemagne par le territoire beige. Le Gouvernement Imperial al- lemand ne pent s'empecher de craindre que la Belgique, malgr6 sa meilleure volont6, ne sera pas en mesure de repousser sans secours une marche frangaise d'un si grand d6velop- pement. Dans ce fait on trouve une certitude suffisante d'une menace dirig6e centre I'Al- lemagne. C'est un devoir imp6rieux de conservation pour I'Allemagne de prevenir cette attaque de I'ennemi Le Gouvernement allemand regretterait tr6s vivement que la Belgique regardit comme un acte d'hostilit6 contre elle le fait que les me- sures des ennemis de I'Allemagne I'obligent de violer de son c6t6 le territoire beige. Afin de dissiper tout malentendu le Gou- vernement allemand declare ce qui suit: 1. L'Allemagne n'a en vue aucun acte d'hos- tilite contre la Belgique. Si la Belgique con- sent dans la guerre qui va commencer a pren- dre une attitude de neutralite amicale vis-a-vis de I'Allemagne, le Gouvernement allemand de son c6t6 s'engage; aii moment de la paix, h. garantir le royaume et ses possessions dans tcute leur etendue. 2. L'Allemagne s'engage sous la condition 6nonc6e k 6vacuer le territoire beige aussitdt la paix conclue 3. Si la Belgique observe une attitude ami- cale, I'Allemagne est prete, d'accord avec les autorit6s du Gouvernement beige, k acheter contre argent comptant tout ce qui est n6ces- saire k ses troupes et a indemniser pour les dommages causes en .Belgique. 4 Si la Belgique se comcorle d'une fagon hostile contre les troupes allemandes et par- ticuli^rement fait des difficult6s k leur marche en avant par une opposition des fortifications de la Meuse ou par des destructions de routes cbemins de fer, tunnels ou autres ouvrages 10 — d'art, I'Allemagne sera obligee de consid^rer la Belgique en'ennemie. Dans ce cas TAllemagne ne prendra aucun engagement vis-a-vis du royaume, mais elle laissera le .reglement ulterieur des rapports des deux Etats I'un vis-a-vis de I'autre a la decision des armes. Le Gouvernement allC: mand a I'espoir justifie que cette eventualite ne se produira pas et que le Gouvernement beige saura prendre les mesures appropriees pour I'empecher de se produire. Dans ce cas les relations d'amitie qui unissent les deux Etats voisins deviendront plus etroites et du- rables. No 21. Note SUT Ventrevue dernandee le 3 aoUt d. une heure et demie, par M. de Below Sales ke, Ministre d" Allemagne , a M. le Baron van der Elst, Secretaire General au Ministere des Af- faires Etrangeres. A une heure et demie de la nuit, le Ministre d'AIlemagne a demand^ a voir le Baron van der Elst. II lui a d.it qu'il etait charge par son Gouvernement de nous informer que des dirigeables frangais avaient jete des bombes et qu'une patrouille de cavalerie francaise, vio- lant le droit des gens, attendu que la guerre h'etait pas declaree, avait traverse la fron- ti^re. Le Secretaire G^n^ral a demande a M. de Belovi^ ou ces faits s'^taient passes; en Alle- magne, lui fut-il r^pondu. Le Baron van der Elst fit remarquer que dans ce cas 11 ne pouvait s'expliquer le but de sa communica- tion. M. de Belov^^ dit que ces actes, contraires au droit des gens, 6taient de nature h faire supposer d'autres actes contre le droit des gens que poserait la France. No 22. l^ote remise par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, a M. de Below Saleske, Ministre d'AIlemagne. Bruxelles, le 3 aout 1914. (7 heures du matin). Par sa note du 2 aout 1914, le Gouvernement allemand a fait connaitre que d'apr^s des nou- velles silres les forces frangaises auraient I'in- tention de marcher sur la Meuse par Givet et Namur, et que la Belgique, malgre sa meil- leure volenti ne serait pas en 6tat de repousser sans secours une marche en avant des troupes francaises. Le Gouvernement allemand s'estimefait dans I'obligation de pr6venir cette attaque et de violer le territoire beige. Dans ces condi- tions, I'Allemagne propose au- Gouvernement du Roi de prendre vis-^-vis d'elle une attitude amicale et s'engage au moment de la paix a garantir I'int^grit^ du Royaume et de ses pos- sessions dans toute leur 6tendue. La note ajou- te que si la Belgique fait des difficult^s h la marche en avant des troupes allemandes, I'Al- lemagne sera obligee d© la consid^rer comme ennemie et de laisser le rfeglement ulterieur des deux Etats I'un vis-a-vis de I'autre k la decision des armes. Cette note a provoqu6 chez le Gouverne- ment du Roi un profond et douloureux 6tonne- ment. Les intentions qu'elle attribue h la France sonten contradiction avec les declarations for- melles qui nous ont ete faites le ler aout, au nom du Gouvernement de la Republique. D'ailleurs si contrairement a notre attente une. violation de la neutralite beige venait a etre commise par la France, la Belgique rem- plirait tous ses devoirs internationaux et son armee opposerait a I'envahisseur la plus vi- goureuse resistance. Les traites de 1839 confirmes par les traites de 1870 consacrent I'independance et la neu- tralite de la Belgique sous la garantie des Puissances et notamment du Gouvernement de Sa Majeste le Roi de Prusse. La Belgique a tou jours ete fidele k ses obli- gations Internationales; elle a accompli ses devoirs dans un esprit de loyale impartialite; elle n'a neglige aucun effort pour maintenir ou faire respecter sa neutrality. L'atteinte a son independance dont la me- nace le Gouvernement allemand cOnstituerait une flagrante violation du droit des gens. Aucun interet strategique ne justifie la viola- tion du droit. Le Gouvernement beige en acceptant les propositions qui lui sont notifiees sacrifierait I'honneur de la nation en meme temps qu'il trahirait ses devoirs vis-a-vis de I'Europe. Conscient du role que la Belgique joue depuis plus de 80 ans dans la civilisation du monde, il se refuse ci croire que I'independance de la Belgique ne puisse etre conserv^e qu'au prix de la violation de sa neutrality. Si cet espoir etait d^gu le Gouvernement beige est fermement decide k repousser par tous les moyens en son pouvoir toute atteinte k son droit. No 23. Telegramme adrress^ par M. Davignon, Mi- nistre des Affaires Etrangeres, aux Minis tres du Roi, d. Saint-Petersbourg, Berlin, Londres, Paris, Vienne, La Haye. Bruxelles, le 3 aout 1914. L' Allemagne a remis hier soir 7 heures une note proposant la neutrality .amicale compor- tant le passage libre par notre territoire, pro- mettant le maintien de I'jnd^pendance du Royaume et de ses possessions a conclusion de la paix, menacant en cas de refus de traiter la Belgique comme ennemie, d61ai de la re- ponse fixe a douze heures. Nous avons r^pondu que l'atteinte k notre neutrality serait une vio- lation flagrante du droit des gens. L'accepta- tion de la proposition allemande sacrifierait I'honneur de la nation. Consciente de son de- voir, la Belgique est ferinement d^cid6e k re- pousser une agression par tous moyens. (s) Davignon. No 24. Lettre adressie par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, aux Ministres du Roi a Paris, Berlin, Londres, Vienne et Saint-Pi- tersbourg. Bruxelles, le 3 ao et "W^andelaarw en vue de faciliter le maintien de la neutralite du territoire des Pays-Bas. Je vous ferai remarquer que le terme eni- ploy6 dans cette note «remonter I'Escaut" n'est pas assez explicite; descendre le fleuve sera permis dans les mSmes conditions. Le Minis- tre vient de m'en donner Tassurance. - 12 - Aussit6t que le Gouvernement n^erlandais aura decid6 cette mesure d'exception j'en serai inform^. 11 faut environ six heures pour effectuer ce balisage de guerre. Je vous telegraphierai aussitdt. Veuillez agreer, etc. (s) Baron Fallon. Note annexee au.N<» 29. Le Gouvernement de la Reine pourrait se voir oblige dans I'interel du maintien de la neutralite du territoire des Pays-Bas d'insti- tuer sur I'Escaut le balisage de guerre, c'est- a-dire d'enlever ou de modifier une partie do 'balisage actuel et des phares. Toutefois, ce balisage de guerre a ete congu de maniere a ce qu'apres son institution il sera encore possible de remonter I'Escaut pour gagner Anvers pendant le jour, mais seule- ment avec des pilotes neerlandais, qui ont et6 munis -des indications nautiques necessaires a ce sujet. En agissant de la sorte, le Gouver- nement de la Reine est convaincu de pouvoir tenir compte egalement des int^rets de la de- fense du territoire neerlandais et de ceux de la navigation beige d' Anvers. Apres I'institution du balisage de guerre sur I'Escaut, il n'y aurait plus de raison d'entrer dans la passe de mer de Flessingue pendant Ja nuit et comme la presence des bateaux- phare «Wielingen» et «Wandelaarj) n'est pas indispensable pour la navigation pendant le jour, le Gouvernement Neerlandais mettrait un haut prix a ce que le Gouvernement Royal Beige voulM bien, au cas ou le balisage de guerre serait institu6 par lui, faire retirer lesdits bateaux en vue de faciliter le maintien de la neutrality du territoire des Pays-Bas. N° 30. Tiligramme adressS par M. Davignon, Mi- nistre des Affaires Etrangkres, aux Ministres du Roi d. Londres et a Paris. Bruxelles, le 4 aout 1914. L'Etat Major fait savoir que le territoire national a 6t6 viql6 k Gemmenich. (s) Davignon. No 31. Leltre adress^e par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, a M. de Below Sales- ke, Ministre d'Allemagne. Bruxelles, le 4 aout 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, J'ai I'honneur de faire savoir a Votre Ex- cellence que des aujourd'hui le Gouvernement du Roi ne saurait plus Lui reconnaitre de caractere diplomatique et cesse d'avoir des relations officielles avec Elle. Votre Excellence trouvera sous ce pli les passeporls qui sont necessaires a son depart et a celui du per- sonnel de la Legation. Je saisis, etc. (s) Davignon. NO 32. Lettre adressee par M. de Below SaUske, Mi/nistre d'Allemagne, a M. Davignon, Mi- nistre des Affaires Etrangbres. Bruxelles, le 4 aout 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, J'ai I'honneur d'accuser reception k Votre Excellence de sa lettre du 4 aout et de Lui faire savoir que j'ai remis la garde de la Legation Imperiale k Bruxelles aux soins de n^on collegue des Etats-Unis. Je saisis, etc. (s) de Below. No 33. Telegramme adresse par M. Davignon, Mi- nistre des Affaires Etrangeres, d. M. le Baron Grenier, Ministre du Roi a Madrid. Bruxelles, le 4 aout 1914. Veuillez demander au Gouvernement espa- gnol s'il veut bien se charger de la protection des interets beiges en Allemagne et, dans ce cas, donner les instructions necessaires a son Ambassadeur a Berlin. (s) Davignon. N" 34. Teligramme adresse par M. Davignon, Mi- nistre des Affaires Etrangeres, a M. le Baron Bey ens, Ministre du Roi a Berlin. Bruxelles, le 4 aout 1914. Le Ministre d'Allemagne quitte le pays ce soir; demandez vos passeports. Nous prions le gouvernement de Madrid d'autoriser I'Am- bassadeur d'Espagne de vouloir bien se char- ger de la protection des interets beiges en Allemagne. (s) Davignon. No 35. Lettre adrissie par le Ministre de Belgique a Berlin a M. Davignon^ Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Berlin, 4 aoCit 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, J'ai I'honneur de vous faire parvenir, ci- apres en traduction, la partie du discours pro- nonce aujourd'hui k la tribune du Reichstag par le Ghancelier de I'Empire et relative a I'odieuse violation de notre neutralite : «< Nous nous trouvons en 6tat de legitime defense et la necessite ne connait pas de lois. » Nos troupes ont occupe Luxembourg et ont, peut-etre, deja penetre en Belgique. Cela est en contradiction avec les prescriptions du droit des gens. La France a, il est vrai, declare k Bruxelles qu'elle etait resolue a res- pecter la neutrality de la Belgique, aussi longtemps que I'adversaire la respecterait. Mais nous savions que la France se tenait prete pour envahir la Belgique. La France pouvait attendre. Nous pas. Une attaque fran- caise sur notre flanc dans la region du Rhin inferieur aurait pu devenir fatale. C'est ainsi que nous avons ete forces de passer outre aux protestations justifi6es d«;s Gouvernements lu^ 13 xembourgeois et beige. L'injustice que nous commettons de cette faQon, nous la reparerons des que notre but militaire sera atteint. >« A celui qui est menace au point oii nous le sommes et qui lutte pour son bien supreme, il n'est permis que de songer au moyen de se degager; nous nous trouvons cote a cote avec I'Autriche.)) II est a remarquer que M. de Bethmann- HoUweg reconnait, sans le moindre detour, que I'Allemagne viole le droit international en envahissant le territoire beige et qu'elle commet une injustice a notre egard. Veuillez agreer, etc. (s) Baron Beyens. N°-36. Lettre adressee par le Ministre du Roi d. Londres a M. Davignon, Mmistre des Affmres Etrangbres. Londres, le 4 aout 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, J'ai I'honneur de vous faire savoir que le Premier Ministre a fait cet apres-midi ci la Chambre des Communes une nouvelle de- claration relativement a la crise europeenne. Apres avoir rappele les principaux . points exposes hier par Sir E. ' Grey, le Premier Ministre a donne lecture : r d'un telegramme de Sir F. Villiers, regu ce matin, qui fait connaitre la teneur du se- cond ultimatum adresse par le Gouvernement allemand au Gouvernement beige et qui vous a et6 remis ce matin; (voir N" 27). 2° du telegramme par lequel vous m'annon- cez la violation de la frontiere a Gemmenich, dont j'ai remis copie a Sir A. Nicolson; 3° d'un telegramme adresse ce matin par le Gouvernement allemand a son Ambassa- deur a Londres dans le but evident d'egarer I'opinion publique sur son attitude. En voici la traduction d'apres un journal de ce soir : «Veuillez dissiper toute mefiance que. le Gou- vernement Britannique pourrait avoir au su- jet de nos intentions, en repetant, de la ma- niere la plus positive, I'assurance formelle que' meme en cas de conflit armeavecla Belgique, I'Allemagne n'annexera sous aucun pretexte le territoire beige. » La sincerite de cette declaration est cor- roboree par le fait que I'Allemagne a solen- nellement donne sa parole a la Hollande de son intention de respecter sa neutralite.- >' II est evident que nous ne pourrions nous annexer le territoire beige d'une mani^re avantageuse sans faire, en meme temps, une acquisition territoriale au detriment de la Hollande. » Priere de faire bien comprendre a Sir E. Grey qu'il etait impossible d'exposer I'ar- m6e allemande a une attaque frangaise portee en traversant la Belgique, attaque qui, d'apres des informations absolument incontestables, etait projetee. » En consequence I'Allemagne n'a pas tenu compte de la neutralite beige afin d'eviter ce qui est pour elle une question de vie ou de mort, une attaque frangaise par la Bel- gique." M. Asquith a ensuite expose a la Chambre qu'en reponse a cette note du Gouvernement allemand le Gouvernement britannique lui avait renouvel6 sa proposition de la semaine derni^re, a, savoir de donner au sujet de la neutralite beige les memes assurances que la France en avait donnees la semaine derniere, tant a I'Angleterre qu'a la Belgique. Le Cabi- net anglais accordait k celui de Berlin jusqu'a minuit pour lui faire connaitre sa reponse. Veuillez agreer, etc. (s) Comte de Lalaing. No 37. TeUgramme adresse par le Ministre du Roi a. Londres a M. Davignon, Mindstre des Af- faires Btra/ngeres. Londres, 4 aoiit 1914. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a fait savoir aux Ministres anglais en Norvege, Hol- lande, Belgique, que I'Angleterre s'attend k ce que ces trois Royaumes resistent a la pres- sion de I'Allemagne etr gardent la neutralite. Dans leur resistance ils seront soutenus par I'Angleterre qui, dans ce cas, est prete a coop6rer avec la France et la Russie si tel est le desir de ces trois Gouvernements en off rant alliance aux dits Gouvernements, pour repousser I'emploi'contre eux de la force par rAllemagrie, et garantie, pour le maintien futur de I'independance et de' I'integrit^ des trois Royaumes. J'ai fait remarquer que la Belgique est neutre a perpetuite. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a repondu : c'est pour le cas de neutralit6 violee. (s) Comte de Lalaing. No 38. Lettre adressie par M. Davigyion, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, aux Ministres du Roi Ci Paris, Londres et Saint-Petersbourg. Bruxelles, le 4 aoiit 1914. Monsieur le Ministre., J'ai I'honneur de porter a votre connaissan- ce I'ordre des fails successifs qui ont marqu6 pendant les derniers jours les relations de la Belgique avec certaines des Puissances garan- tes de sa neutralite et de son independance. Le 31 juillet le Ministre d'Angleterre me fit une communication verbale aux termes de laquelle, en prevision d'une guerre europeen- ne. Sir E. Grey avait demande aux Gouver-^ nements allemand et frangais, separement, si chacun d'cux etait resolu a respecter la neutralite de la Belgique dans I'^ventualit^ ou cette neutralite ne serait pas violee par aucune autre puissance. En' raison des traites existants. Sir Francis Villiers etait charge de porter cette d-marche a la connaissance du Gouvernement du Roi en ajoutant que Sir E. Grey presumait que la Belgique 6tait resolue a maintenir sa neu- tralite et qu'elle s'attendait k ce que les autres puissances la respectent. J'ai dit k M. le Ministre d'Angleterre que nous appr6ciions hautement cette communcia- lion qui repondait a notre attente et j'ai ajoute que la Grande-Bretagne ainsi que les autres Puissances garantes de notre independance pourraient etre pleinement assurees de notre ferme volonte de maintenir notre neutralite; celle-ci ne nous paraissant d'ailleurs pas pou- voir etre menacee par aucun de ces Etats avec lesquels nous entretenons les rapports les plus cordiaux et les plus confiants. Le Gouverne- ment, ai-je fait remarquer, avait donn6 une 14 - preuve d^ celte resolution en prenant des a present toutes les mesures militaires que la situation lui paraissait coinporter. A son tour, M. le Ministre.de France se declara, le l" aoiit, dans une conversation verbale, autorise ~a faire connaitre au Gou- -vernement beige, qu'en cas de con flit inter- ^national, le Gouvernement de la Republique, econformement a ses declarations constantes, respecterait le territoire de la Belgique et qu'il ne serait amene a modifier son attitude que dans le cas de violation de la neutralite beige par une autre Puissance. Je remerciai Son Excellence et ajoutai que nous- avipns deja pris toutes les dispositions requises pour assurer le respect de notre independance et de nos frontieres. Le 2 aout, dans la matinee, j'eus avec Sir Francis Villiers un nouvel entretien au cours duquel il me fit part de ce qu'il avait transmis telegraphiquement samedi, des la premiere heure, a son Gouvernement notre conversation du 31 juillet en ay ant soiri de reproduire fide- lement la declaration solennelle qu'il avait. irecueillie de la volonte de la Belgique de defendre ses frontieres, de quelque cote qu'el- jles soient envahies. II ajouta : «Nous savons {que la France vous a donne des assurances iformelles;mais I'Angleterre n'a regu a ce sujet aucune reponse de Berlin. Ce dernier fait ne provoqua en moi aucune Amotion particuliere, parce que la declaration ^u Gouvernement allemand pouvait paraitre surabondante en presence des trait6s exis- tants. D'ailleurs le Secretaire d'Etat aux af- faires Etrangeres avait affirme a la seance de la commission du Reichstag du 29 avril 1913 «que la neutralite de la Belgique est etablie -conventionnellement et que I'Allema- ,gne a I'intention de respecter ce traite.» he meme jour, M. de Below Saleske, Minis- tre d'Allemagne, se presenta au Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres a 19 heures et me remit la note ci-jointe (voir piece N" 20). Le Gou-. vernement allemand accordait au Gouverne- ,ment beige un delai de douze heures p.our 'lui faire connaitre sa decision. Aucune hesitation ne pouvait se manifes- (er au sujet de la reponse qu'appelait la pro- .position surprenante du Gouvernement alle- mand. Vous en trouverez une copie sous ce pli. (Voir piece N° 22.) L'Ultimatum expirait le 3 aout, a 7 heures du matin ; comme a 10 heures aucun fait de guerre ne s'etait produit, le Conseil des Minis- .tres decida qu'il n'y avait pas lieu, pour le imoment, de faire appel aux Puissances ga- Tantes. Vers midi, le Ministre de France m'inter- frogea sur ce point et me dit : « Bien qu'en raison de la soudainet6 des evenements je ne sois encore charg6 d'aucune declaration, je crois cependant, m'inspirant des intentions bien connues de mon Gouver- nement, pouvoir dire que si le Gouvernement Tloyal faisait appel au Gouvernement fran- gais comme puissance garante de sa neutra- lite, il repondrait immediatement a son appel. Si cet appel n'etait pas formule il est proba- ble, a moins bien entendu que le souci de sa propre defense ne determine des mesures ex- ceptionnelles, qu'il attendrait, pour interve- nir, que la Belgique ait fait un acte de resis- tance .effective. » J'ai remercie M. Klobukowski de I'appui flue le Gouvernement frangais voulait bien nous offrir 6ventueTlemenl el lui ai dit que le Gouvernement du Roi ne faisait pas appel, pour I'inslant, a la garantie des Puissances et se r6servait d'apprecier ulterieurement ce qu il y aura lieu de laire. Enfin, le 4 aoilt, a 6 heures du matin, le Ministre d'Allemagne me fit la communica- tion suivante : (voir piece N" 27). Le Conseil des Ministres delibere en ce mo- ment au sujet de I'appel aux Puissances ga- rantes de notre neutralite. Veuillez agreer, etc. (s) Davignon. NO 39. TeUgramme adressS par le Ministre du Roi a Londres a M. Davignon^ Ministre des Af- faires Etrangeres. Londres, 4 aout 1914. L'Angleterre a somme ce matin I'Allemagne de respecter la neutralite beige. L'ultimatum dit que vu la note adressee par I'Allemagne k la Belgique menagant cette derniere de la for- ce des armes si elle s'oppose au passage de ses troupes, vu la violation du territoire beige a Gemmenich, vu le fait que I'Allemagne a refuse de donner k I'Angleterre la meme as- surance que celle donnee la semaine derniere par la France, I'Angleterre doit demander a nouveau une reponse satisfaisante au sujet du respect de la neutralite beige et d'un traite dont I'Allemagne est signataire aussi bien qu'elle-meme. L'ultimatum expire a minuit. En consequence de l'ultimatum de I'Angle- terre k I'Allemagne, la proposition anglaise que je vous ai transmise par tel^gramme est annul6e 'pour le moment. (s) Comte de Lalaing. {Voir piice N" 37.) No 40. Lettre adressie par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, aux Ministres de Orande-Bretagne, de France et de Russie. Bruxelles, le 4 aoiit 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, Le Gouvernement beige a le regret de de- voir annoncer a Votre Excellence que ce ma- tin les forces armies de I'Allemagne ont p6- netre sur le territoire beige en violation des engagements qui ont 6te pris par traite. Le Gouvernement du Roi est fermemenl decide a resister par tous les moyens en son pouvoir. La Belgique fait appel a I'Angleterre, a la France et a la Russie pour cooperer, comme garantes, a la defense de son territoire. • II y aurait une action concertee et commune ayant pour but de resister aux mesures de forces employees par I'Allemagne contre la Belgique et en meme temps de garantir le maintien de l'ind6pendance et de i'int6grite de la Belgique dans I'avenir. La. Belgique. est heureuse de pouvoir decla- rer qu elle assumera la defense des places for- tes. Je saisis, etc. ^s^ Davignon. — 15 — N041 Teligramme adresse par le Ministre du Rot sh Londres a M. Davignon, Ministre des Af- faires Etrang^res Londres, 5 aout 1914. L'Allemagne ayant fejete les propositions anglaises, TAngleterre lui a declare que I'etat de guerre existait entre les deux pays, a partir de onze heares (s) Comte. de Lalaing NO 42. Telegramme adresse par M. Davignon, Mi- nistre des Affaires Etrang^res, aux Ministres du Roi a Paris, Londres et Saint-Petersbourg. Bruxeiles, le 5 aout 1914. Apr^s la violation du territoire a Gemme- nich, la Belgique a fait appel, par I'interme- diaire de leurs Representants accredites a Bruxelles, a I'Angleterre, a la France et a la Russie pour coop6rer, connme garantes, a la defense de son territoire. La Belgique assume la defense des places fortes. (s) Davignon. No 43. Lettre adressie par M. Davignon, Ministre ides Affaires Etrangbres, aux Ministres du Roi [d Paris. Londres et Saint-Petersbourg. Bruxelles, le 5 aoiit 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, Par ma d6p§che du 4 aout (voir pikce N° 38), j'ai eu rhonneur de vous exposer la suite des evenements qui ont rriarqu6 les relations in- ■ternationales de la Belgique du 31 juillet au 4 aout. J'ajoutais que le Conseil des Ministres €xaminait la question«de savoir si la Belgique, dont le territoire avait 6te envahl depuis le matin, ferait appel k la garantie. Le Conseil venait de se decider en faveur de I'affirmative, lorsque le Ministre d'Angle- terre me fit savoir que la proposition dont il m'avait saisi et d'apr^s laquelle le Goaverne- ment britannique 6tait dispose a r^pondre a notre appel en garantie, 6tait annul^e pour le moment. (Voir pibce N° 37). On telegramme de Londres m'apprit que ce changement d'attitude etait motiv6 par un ultimatum de I'Angleterre laissant h I'Alle- m.agne un delai de dix heures pour 6vacuer le sol beige et respecter la neutrality de la Belgique. (Voir pihce N° 39). Dans la soir6e, le Gouyernement du Roi a adress6, par Tin tcrmediaire de leurs representants respectifs a Bruxelles. a la France, h la Grande-Breta- gne et a la Russie, la note dont vous trouverez la copie ci-jointe. (Voir pibce N° 40) Comme vous le remarquerez la Belgique fait appel k I'Angleterre, k la "France et k la Russie pour coop6rer comme garants a la defense de son territoire et au maintien dans I'avenir de ri-nd^pendance et de I'int6grit6 du territoire. Elle assurera -la defense des places fortes. Jusqu'ici nous ne connaissons pas raccueil qui a 6te reserve a notre appel. Veuillez agreer, etc. (s) Davignon, No 44. Lettre adrcssee par M Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, aux Chefs de mission dans tous les pays entretenant avec la Belgi- que des nupports dvplomatjiques Bruxelles, le 5 aout 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, Par le traite du 18 avril 1839, la Prusse, la France, I'Angleterre, I'Autriche et la Russie se sont declarees garantes du traite conclu le meme jour entre S. M. le Roi des Beiges et S. M. le Roi des Pays-Bas.Ce traite porte .'« La Belgique formera un Etat independant et per- petuellement neutre.» La Belgique a rempli toutes ses obligations Internationales, elle a accompli ses devoirs dans un esprit de loyale impartialite, elle n'a neglige aucun effort pour maintenir et faire respecter sa neutra- lite. Aussi est-ce avec une penible emotion que le Gouvernement du Roi a appris que les forces armees de rAllcmagne, puissance ga- rante de notre neutralite, ont penetre sur le territoire de la Belgique en violation des en- gagements qui ont ete pris par traite. II est de notre devoir de protester avec in- dignation cohtre un attentat au droit des gens qu'aiicun acte de notre part n'a pu provoquer. Le Gouvernement du Roi est fermement decide a repousser par tous les moyens en son pouvoir I'atteinte portee a sa neutralite et il rappelle qu'en vertu de I'article 10 de la convention de La Haye de 1907, concernant les droits et les devoirs des Puissances et .des personnes neutres en cas de guerre su-r terre, ne peut etre considere comme un ^cte hostile le fait, par une Puissance neutre, de repousser. meme par la Torce, les atteintes a sa neutralite. Vous voudrez bien demander d'urgence une audience au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres et donner lecture a Son Excellence de la presente lettre dont vous lui laisserez copie. Si I'audience ne pouvait vous etre immediate- men t accordee, vous ferez par ecrit la conv munication dont il s'agit. Veuillez agreer. etc. (s) Davigno.n. No 45. Telearam/tne adressi par le Ministre du Roi a Berlin, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affai- res Etrangkres. Berlin, le 5 aout 1914. J'ai recu mes passeports. Je quitterai Berlin demain matin avec personnel pour la Hollan- de. (s) Baron Beyens. No 46. T6leqramme adressi par le Ministre du Roi a Madrid, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Af- faires Etrangeres. Saint-Sebastien, 5 aoAt 1914. Le Gouvernement espagnol se charge des mterets beiges en Allemagne. Il donne au- - 16 — jourd'hui telegraphiquenitnt des instructions a son Ambassadt'ur a Berlin. (s) Baron Grenier. (Voir pihcc N" 35.) N° 47. Let Ire adressec par le M mist re du Roi d. Paris a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Paris, le 5 aout 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, J'ai I'honneur de vous faire parvenir, sous ce pli, une copie de la notification de I'etat de guerre existant entre la France et TAlle-. magne, qui m'a et6 remise aujoufd'hui. Veuillez ag'r^er, etc. (s) Baron Guillaume. Annexe au N^ 47. Le Gouvernement Imperial AUemand, apres avoir laisse ses forces armees franchir la fron- tiere et se livrer sur le territoire frangais a divers actes de meurtre et de violence; apres avoir viole la neutrality du Grand Duche de Luxembourg au mepris des stipulations de la convention de Londres du 11 mai 1867 et de la convention de La Haye du 18 octobre 1907, sur Ics droits el devoirs des Puissances et des personnes neutres en cas de guerre sur lerre (articles 1 a 11), conventions signees de lui; apres avoir adresse un ultimatum au Gouvernement royal de Belgique, tendant ^ exiger le passage des forces allemandes par le territoire beige, en violation des Trailes du 19 avril 1839 egalement signes par lui et de la susdite convention de La Haye; A declare la guerre a la France le 3 aoiit 1914, a 18 heures 45; Le Gouvernement de la Republique se voit dans ces conditions oblige de son cote de recourir a la force des armes. II a en consequence I'honneur de faire sa- voir par la presente au Gouvernement Royal que I'etat de guerre existe entre la France et I'Allemagne a dater du 3 aoilt, 18 heu- res 45. Le Gouvernement de la Republique pro- teste aupres de toutes les nations civilisees et sp^cialement aupres des Gouvernements signataires des conventions et trait^s sus- rappeles, contre la violation par I'Empire al- lemand de ses engagements internationaux; il fait toutes reserves quant aux repr^sailles qu'il pourrait se voir amene a exercer contre un ennemi aussi peu soucieux de la parole donn^e. Le Gouvernement de la Republique, qui entend observer les principes du droit des gens, se conformera durant les hostilites et sous reserve de r6ciprocite aux dispositions des conventions inlemationales sign6es par la France concernant le droit de la guerre sur terre et sur mer. La pr6sente notification faite en conformity de I'article 2 de ladite IP Convention de La Haye du 18 octobre 1907 relative a I'ouverture des hostilites est remise ci M. le Ministre de Belgique k Paris, le 5 aoiit 1914, a 14 heures. N" 48. Communication faite le 5 aout par Sir Fran- cis Villiers, Ministre d'Angletcrre, a M. Da- vignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Je suis charge d'informer le Gouvernement beige que le Gouvernement de S. M. Bri- tannique considere Taction commune dans le but de resister k I'Allemagne comme etant en vigueur et justifiee par le Iraite de 1839. No 49. Tiligramme adresse jmr le Ministre du Roi a Londres a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affai- res Etrangeres. Londres, 5 aout 1914. L'Angleterre accepte de cooperer comme garante a la defense de notre territoire. La flotte anglaise assurera le libre passage de i'Escaut pour le ravitaillement d'Anvcrs. (s) Comte de Lalaing. NO 50. TeUgramme adresse par le Ministre du Roi d La Haye a. M. Davignon, Ministre des Af- faires E tr ang.br es. La Haye, 5 aoilt 1914. Le balisage de guerre va etre etabli. (s) Baron Fallon. (Voir pihce N" 29). NO 51. Telegramtne adresse par M. Davignon, Mi- ndsPre des Affaires Etrangeres, a M. le Baron Grenier, Ministre du Roi a Madrid. Bruxelles, 5 aout 1914. Exprimez au Gouvernement espagnol les remerciements tr^s sinceres du Gouverne- ment du Roi. (s) Davignon. (Voir jnhce N^ 46.) . No 52. Lettre adresskc par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres aux Ministres du Roi h Paris, Londres et Saint-Pitersbourg. Bru.xelles, le 5 aoiit 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, .rai I'honneur de vous faire savoir que les Ministres de France et de Russie ont fait ce matin une demarche aupres de moi, pour me faire connaitre la volonte de leurs gou- vernements de repondre k notre appel et de cooperer avec I'AngleteYre k la defense de notre territoire. Veuillez agr6er, etc. (s) Davignon; 17 No 53. Lettre adressee par le Minislre des Pays- Bas t M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Bruxelles, le 6 aoilt 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, J'ai rhonneur de faire parvenir ci-joint k Votre Excellence un exemplaire du numero extraordinaire du «Staalscourant)>, contenant la declaration de neutralite des Pays-Bas dans la guerre entre la Belgique et I'Allemagne, et I'Angleterre et TAUemagne. Veuillez agreer, etc. (s) Jonkheer de Weede./ Annexe au N° 53. LOIS, ARR£t£S, nominations, etc. Ministere des Affaires etrangeres, de la Justice, de la tAarine, de la Guerre et des Colonies. Les Ministres des Affaires Etrangeres, de la Justice, de la Marine, de la Guerre et des Colonies, autorises a cette fin par Sa Majeste la Reine, portent a la connaissance de tous ceux que la chose concerne, que le Gouvernement neerlandais observera dans la guerre qui a eclate entre les Puissances amies des Pays-Bas, Grande-Bretagne et Allemagne, et Belgique et Allemagne, une stride neu- tralite et qu'en vue de Tobservation de cette neutralite les dispositions suivantes ont ete arretees : .\RTICLE I. Dans les limites du territoire de I'Etat, com- prenant le territoire du Royaume en Europe, outre les colonies et possessions dans d'autres parties du monde, aucun genre d'hostilites n'est permis et ce territoire ne pent servir de base pour des operations hostiles. ARTICLE 2. Ni I'occ.upation d'une partie qu^lconque du territoire de I'Etat par un belligerant, ni le passage a travers ce territoire par voie de terre par des troupes ou des convois de muni- tions appartenant a un des belligerants ne sont permis, non plus que le passage a travers le territoire situ6 a I'interieur des eaux terri- toriales neerlandaises par des navires de guer- re oil des batiments. des belligerants assimiles a ceux-ci. ARTICLE 3. Les troupes ou les niilitaires, appartenant aux belligerants ou destines a ceux-ci et arri- vant sur le territoire de I'Etat par voie de terre seront immediatement desarmes et in- ternes jusqu'a la fin de la guerre. Les navires de guerre ou batiments assimi- les a ces derniers, appartenant a un belli- gerant, qui contreviendront aux prescriptions des articles 2, 4 ou 7, ne pourront quitter ce territoire avant la fin de la guerre. Les navires de guerre ou batiments assimi- les a. ces derniers, appartenant a un bellige- rant, qui contreviendront aux prescriptions des articles 2, 4 ou 7, ne pourront quitter ce territoire avant la fin de la guerre. ARTICLE 4. Les navires de guerre ou batiments assi- miles a ces derniers, qui appartiennent h un belligerant, n'auront pas acces au territoire de I'Etat. ARTICLE 5. La disposition de I'article 4 n'est pas appli- cable : r aux navires de guerre ou batiments d'un belligerant assimiles a ces derniers, et qui par suite d'avarie ou de I'etat de la mer sont tenus d'entrer dans un des ports ou rades de I'Etat. Les navires pourront quitter les dits ports ou rades des que les circonstances qui les ont contraints de s'y r6fugier auront cess6 d'exister; 2° aux navires de guerre ou batiments assimiles, appartenant ci un belligerant, et qui font escale dans un port ou une rade situes dans le lerritoire des colonies. et pos- sessions d'outre-mer, exclusivement dans le but de completer leur provision de denrees alimentaires ou de combustibles. Ces navires devront repartir des que les circonstances qui les ont forces k faire escale ont cess6 d'exister, avec cette condition que le sejour en rade ou dans le port ne pourra durer plus de 24 heu- res. 3° aiix navires de guerre ou batiments as- similes, appartenant a un belligerant, et qui sont utilises exclusivement pour une mission religieuse, scientifique, ou humanitaire. ARTICLE 6. Les navires de guerre ou batiments assi- miles, appartenant a un belligerant, ne peu- vent reparer leurs avaries dans les ports ou rades de I'Etat qu'en tant que cette reparation est indispensable a la securite de la naviga- tion, et ils ne pourront en aucune fa^on ac- croitre leurs capacites de combat. ARTICLE. 7. Les navires de guerre ou batiments assimi- les, appartenant k un belligerant, et qui, au commencement de la guerre, se trouveraient sur le territoire de I'Etat, sont tenus de le quitter dans les 24 heures de la publication de la presente. ARTICLE 8. Si des navires de guerre ou batiments assi- miles appartenant k divers belligerants se trouvent, en meme temps, dans les condi- tions visees ci I'article 5, dans une meme par- tie du monde, et sur le territoire de I'Etat, un deiai d'au moins 24 heures doit s'ecouler entre le depart des navires de chacun des belligerants. A moins de circonstances spe- ciales, I'ordre de depart est determine par I'ordre d'arrivee. Un navire de guerre ou un bMiment assimiie, appartenant a un belli- gerant, ne pent quitter le territoire de I'Etat que 24 heures apres le depart d'un navire de commerce portant le pavilion de I'autre belligerant. ARTICLE 9. Les navires de guerre ou batiments assimi- les, appartenant a un belligerant, vises k I'art. 5 et i I'art. 7, ne peuvent etre ravitailles 18 en denrees alimentaires dans les ports et les rades du pays que dans la mesure necessaire pour parfaire leurs provisions jusqu'^ la li- nnite normale du temps de paix. De meme, ils ne peuvent charger de coni* bustible que, dans la mesure n^cessaire pour pouvqir atteindre, avec la provision qu'ils ont encore h bord, le port le plus rapproche de leur propre pays. Un m6me batiment ne peut §tre ravitaille h nouveau en combustible qu'a I'expiration d'une periode de trois mois au moins apres son precedent ravitaillement dans le terri-. toire de I'Etat. ARTICLE iO. Une prise ne peut etre amende dans le territoire que lorsqu'elle est incapable de na- viguer, qu'elle tient mal la mer, qu'elle man^ que de. conibustible ou de derir^es alimen- taires. Elle doit s'^loigner d6s que la cause de son entree dans le territoire cesse d'exister. Si elle ne le fait pas, I'ordre lui sera donne |de partir imm^diatement; en cas de refus, il [sera fait usage des moyens disponibles pour lib^rer la prise avec ses officiers et son equi- page et pour interner Tequipage place k bord par le bellig6rant qui a fait la prise. ARTICLE il. II est interdit, sur le territoire de I'Etat, de former des' corps combattants ou d'ouvrir des bureaux de recrutement au profit des bellig^rants. ARTICLE i2. II est interdit, sur le territoire de I'Etat, de prendre du service k bord de navires de guer- re ou de batiments assimil6s, ARTICLE 13. II est interdit, . sur le territoire de I'Etat, d'am^nager. d'armer ou d'^quiper des navires destines k des fins militaires au profit d'un belligerant, ou de fournir ou conduire k un bellig6rant de tels navires. ARTICLE 14. n est interdit, sur le territoire de I'Etat, de fournir des armes ou des munitions k des navi- res de guerre ou batiments assimil6s apparte- nant k un belligerant, ou de leur venir en aide d'une mani^re quelconqije en vue de I'aug- mentation de leur ecjuipage oil de leur ame- nagement. ARTICLE 15. II est interdit. sur le territoire de I'Etat, sauf autorisation pr^alable des autorit§s locales comp6tentes, de faire des reparations aux na- vires de guerre ou batiments assimil6s appar- tenant k un bellig6rant, ou de leur fournir des provisions de.bouche ou de combustible. ARTICLE 16. II est interdit, sur le territoire de I'Etat, de cooperer au degr6ement ou a la reparation de prises, sauf en ce qui est necessaire pour les rendre propres a tenir la mer; ainsi que d'acheter des prises ou des merchandises con- fisqu^es, et de les recevoir en ^change, en don ou en depdt. ARTICLE 17. Le territoire de I'Etat- comprend -la mer cdtiere sur une largeur de 3 milles marins a raison de 60 par degre de latitude, a partir de la laisse de la basse mer. En ce qui concerne les bales, cette distance do 3 milles marins est mesuree a partir d'une ligne droite tiree a travers la bale aussi pres que possible de I'entree, au point ou I'ouver- ture de la baie ne depasse pas dix milles ma- rins, k raison de 60 par degre de latitude. ARTICLE 18. En outre, i'attention est attiree sur les arti- cles 100, 1°, et 205 du Code penal ; Indisch Staatsblad 1905, N" 62 ; Art. 7, 4°, de la loi sur ja qualite de Neerlandais et sur le domicile (Nederlandsch Staatsblad 1892, N° 268; 1910, N° 216); art. 2, N° 3, de la loi sur la qualite de sujet neerlandais (Nederlandsch Staatsblad 1910, N" 55; Indisch Staatsblad 1910, N" 296; art. 54 et 55 du Code p^nal de Suriname; art. 54 et 55 du Code penal de Curagao). De meme, I'attention des commandants de navirps, armateurs et affreteurs, est attiree sur le danger et les inconvenients auxquels ils s'exposeraient en ne respectant pas le blocus effectif des belligerants, en transportant de la contrebande de guerre ou des depeches mili- taires pour les belligerants {k moins qu'il ne s'agisse du service postal regulier) ou en exe- cutant pour eux d'autres services.de transport. Quiconque se rendrait coupable d'actes pr6- vus ci-dessus, s'exposerait a toutes les conse- quences de ces actes, et ne pourrait obtenir k cet egard aucune protection ni intervention du Gouvernement neerlandais. N" 54. TiUgramme adressi. -par M. Davignon, Mi- nislre des Affaires Etrangkres, a M. le Barori Fallon, Ministre du Roi d. La Haye. Bruxelles. 6 aout 1914. Veuillez communiquer au Gouvernement neerlandais la note suivante : Le Gouvernement beige a pris note de I'eta- ^blissement du balisage de guerre sur I'Escaut et de ce que le Gouvernement hollandais a&- surera le maintien de la navigation. II conviendrait que la navigation put se faire k partir de 30 minutes avant le lever du soleil jusqu'k 30 minutes apres son coucher et que I'echange des pilotes se fit k Bath. - Si desireux qu'il soit de consentir aux de- mandes du gouvernement hollandais, le Gou- vernement beige estime qu'il y a lieu, ci raison des ports du littoral, de maintenir les bateaux- phares de Wielingen et de Wandelaar, ainsi que les bouees du chenal de Wielingen. (s) Davignon. (Voir pihce N" 50.) NO 55. TUigramme adressi -po-'r le Ministre du Roi d. La Hage, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrang^res. La Haye, 6 aoflt 1914. La navigation sur I'Escaut peut se faire d^s I'aube et tant qu'il fait clair. Les bouees de - 19 Wielingen seront r^tablies. L'echange des pi- lotes a Hansweert est plus facile et mieux organise. Insistez-vous pour Bath. (s) Baron Fallon. N" 56. Telegramme adresse par M .Davignon,Minis- tre des Affaires Etrangeres, a M. le Baron Fallon, Ministre du Roi a La Haye. Bruxelles, 7 aout 1914. Veuillez exprimer au Gouvernement neer- landais les remerciements sinceres du Gou-" vernement beige pour les niesures prises pour assurer la navigation sur I'Escaut. Le Gou- vernement est d'accord avec le Gouvernement hollandais au sujet de la duree de la naviga- tion. II avait propose Bath, mais accepte Hans- weert, puisque ce port est mieux outille pour I'echange des pilotes. (s) Davignon. No 57. Tdlegramme adresse par M . Davignon, Mi- nistre des Affaires Etrangeres, aux Ministres du Roi a Paris et a Londres. Bruxelles, 7 aout 1914. La Belgique souhaite que la guerre ne soit pas etendue en Afrique centrale. Le Gouver- neur du Congo beige a regu pour instructions d'observer une attitude strictement defensive. Priez le Gouvernement frangais (anglais) de faire savoir si son intention est de proclamer la neutralite au Congo frangais (colonies bri- tanniques du bassin conventionnel du Congo), conformement a I'article onze de TActe gene- ral de Berlin. Un telegramme de Boma an- nonce que les hostilites sont probables entre Frangais et Allemands dans I'Ubangi, (s) Davignon. No 58. Lettre ddressSe par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, aux Ministres du Roi a Paris et a Londres. Bruxelles, le 7 aout 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, Comme suite a mon telegramme de ce ma- tin, j'ai I'honneur de yous prier de porter a la connaissance du Gouvernement frangais (anglais) I'information suivante: Tout en prescrivant au Gouverneur General du Congo de prendre des mesures de defense sur ies frontieres communes de la colonie beige et des colonies allemandes de I'Est afri- cain et du Kameroun, le Gouvernement du Roi a invite ce haut fonctionnaire a s'abstenir dfe toute action offensive centre ces colonies. Vu la mission civilisatrice commune aux na- tions colonisatrices, le Gouvernement beige d6sire, en effet, par un souci d'humanite, ne pas ^tendre le champ des hostilites k I'Afrique centrale. II ne prendra done point I'initiativc d'infliger une pareille epreuve a la civilisation dans cette region et les forces militaires qu'il y poss6de n'entreront en action que dans le cas ou elles devraient repousser une attaque ;directe contre ses possessions africaines. J'attacherais du prix ^ savoir si le Gouver- nement de la Republique (de S. M. britanni- que) partage cette mahiere de voir et, le cas echeant, s'il entre dans ses intentions, k Toc- casion du conflit actuel, de se prevaloir de la disposition de I'article II de I'Acte general de Berlin pour placer sous le regime de la neutrality celles de ses colonies qui sont com- prises dans le Bassin conventionnel du Congo. J'adresse une communication identique a votre collegue a Londres (Paris). Veuillez agreer, etc. (s) Davignon. NO 59. Lettre adressee par le Ministre du Roi a Paris a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Paris, le 8 aout 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, J'ai eu I'honneur de parler au President de la Republique de votre telegramme d'hier. Je I'avais regu dans la soiree et I'avais immedia- tement communique au Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres. On avait demande a reflechir^ avant de me repondre. M. Poincare m'a promis de parler de cette question aujourd'hui au Ministre des Colo- nies. A premiere vue, il ne verrait guere d'in- convenient a proclamer la neutralite du Congo frangais, mais il reserve cependant sa reponse. II croit que des faits de guerre ont deja eclat6 dans I'Oubanghi. II a profile de la circonstance pour me rappeler que la protection que nous accorde la France s etend aussi a nos colonies et que nous n'avons rien a craindre. Veuillez agreer, etc. (s) Baron Guillaume. No 60. Telegramme adresse par le Ministre du Roi a La Haye d M. Davignon, Ministre des Af- faires Etrangeres. La Haye, 9 aout 1914, Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres m'a prie de vous transmettre les informations suivan- tes, parce que le Ministre d'Amerique a Bru- xelles s'y refuse. . La forteresse de Liege a ete prise d'assaut apres une defense courageuse. Le Gouverne- ment Allemand regrette tres profondement que par suite de I'attitude du Gouvernement beige contre I'Allemagne, on en est arrive a des rencontres sanglantes. L'Allemagne ne vient pas en ennemie en Belgique, c'est seule- ment par la force des 6venements qu'elle a dii, a cause des mesures militaires de la Fran- ce, prendre la grave determination d'entrer en Belgique et d'occuper Liege corhme point d'ap- pui pour ses operations militaires ulterieures. Apres que I'armee beige a par sa resistance h6roique contre une grande superiority, main- tenu I'honneur de ses armes, le Gouverne- ment allemand prie le Roi des Beiges et le Gouvernement beige d'eviter k la Belgique les horreurs ult6rieures de la guerre. Le Gouver- nement est pr§t a tous accords avec la Bel- gique qui peuvent se concilier avec ses arran- gements (voir piece N° 70) avec la France. L'Allemagne assure encore solennellement qu'elle n'a pas rintention de s'approprier le ter- 20 - ritoire beige et que cette intentioh est loin d'elie. L'Allemagne est toujours prete a eva- cucr lu Belgique aussitot que I'etat de guerre ie lui permetlra. L'Ambassadeur des Etats-Unis avait prie son collegue de se charger de cette tentative de mediation. Lc Ministre des Affaires Etran- geres a accepte sans enthousiasme cette mis- sion. Je m'en suis charge pour lui faire plai^ sir. (s) Baron Fallon. N"61. Telegramme adresse par le Ministre du Roi a Paris a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Elrang&res. Paris, 9 aout 1914. Le Go'uvernement frane Annexe aO N^ 62.- (Traduction-) La forteresse de Liege a et6 prise d'assaut apres une defense courageuse. Le Gouverne- ment allemand regrette le plus profondement que par suite de I'at.titude du. Gouvernement beige contre I'AUemagne on en soit arrive a des rencontres sanglantds. L'AUemagne ne vient. pas en ennemie en Belgique. C'est seu« lement par la force des evenements qu elle a du, a cause des mcsurfis militaires de la Fran- ce, prendre la grave, determination d'entrer en Belgique et d'occuper Liege- comme point d'appul pour ses operations militaires ulte- rieures. Apres que rarfnee beige a, dans une resistance heroique contre une grande supe- riorite, maintenu I'honneur de ses armes de de la fagon la plus brillante, le -Gouvernement allemand prie Sa Majeste le Roi et le Gou- vernement beige d'eviter a la Belgique les horreurs ulterieures de la guerre. Le Gou- vernement allemand est pret k tout accord ■avec la Belgique, qui peut se concilier de n'im- porte quelle maniere avec ses arrangements avec la France. L'AUemagne assure encore une fois solennellement qu'elle n'a pas ete di- rigee par I'intention de s'approprier le terri- toire beige et que cette intention est loin d'elle. . L'AUemagne est encore toujours prete a 6va- cuer ia Belgique aussitdt que I'etat de la guerre le lui permettra. L'Ambassadeur des Etats-Unis ici est d'ac- cord avec cette tentative de mediation de son collegue de Bruxelles. No 63. TiUgramme adressS par -M. Davignon, Mi- nistre des Affaires Etrangeres, a M. le Baron Fallon, Ministre du Roi 4' la Haye. Bruxelles, le 10 aotit 1914. Le Gouvernement du Roi a regu les propo- sitions que le Gouvernement allemand lui a - 21 - fait parvenir par rentremise du gouvernement neerlandais. II vous transmeltra prochaine- ment sa reponse. (s) Davignon (Voir piece N° 62 el annexes.) N" 64. Telegrarmne adresse par M Davignon, Mi- nistfe des Affaires Elranghres^ nu Minislre du Roi a La Haye. Bruxelles, 10 aout 19i4. Un doute subsiste. quant a la signification du mot «auseinanderselzung» que vous traduis.ez par "arrangement". Veuillez vous informer si dans la pens6e du Gouvernement allemand il s'agit des arrangements que nous aurions pris avec la France ou du reglement du differend entre la France et I'Allemagne. (s) Davignon. Leitre adressie par M. Davignon, Minis Ire des Affaires Etrangeres, aUx Ministres de Grande Bretagne^ Hussie et France, accredites en Bel-^ gique. Bruxelles, le 10 .aout 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, J'ai rhonneur de faire savoir a Voire Ex- cellence que le Ministre du Roi a La Haye, a la demande du Minislre des Affaires Etran- geres des Pays-Bas, nous a Iransmis la pro- position suivante du Gouvernement allemand (voir piece N° 62, annexe 2). Voici le texte de la reponse que le Gou- vernement du Roi se propose de faire a cette communication : «La proposition que nous fait le Gouverne- ment allem.and reproduit la proposition qui avait ete formulee dans I'ultimatum du 2 aout. Fidele a ses devoirs internationaux,la Belgique ne peut que reiterer sa reponse a cet ultima- tum, d'autant plus que depuis le 3 aoiit sa neutralite a ete violee, qu'une guerre dou- loureuse a ete portee sur son territoire et que les garants de sa neutralite bnt loyalement et immediatement repondu a son appel.)> Le Gouvernement du Roi tient a ce que les Puissances garantes de la neutralite de Bel- gique aient connaissance de ces- documents. Je saisis, etc. (s) Davignon. N0 66. M. von Buch adressa a M. Eyschen. Presi- dent du Gouvernement, une lettre dont la traduction suit: «Luxembourg, le 8 aout 1914. Excellence, En consequence de Vattrtude compretement hostile que la Belgique a prise vis-a-vis dd TAllemagne, les autorites militaires se voient contraintes d'insister pour le depart d'ici du Ministre de Belgique. Son Excellence le general commandant fait prier le Comte van, den Steen de Jehay, d'or- ganiser son voyage de depart.de telle fagon qu'il puisse, end6ans les 24 heures, enlrer en relation personnellement a Coblence avec le general, de Ploetz, au sujet de son voyage ulterieur. Le depart n'est possible que par la VQie Treves-Coblence.w (s) de Buch. M. Eyschen transmit cette lettre le ni&me jour au Comte van den Steen de Jehay» dans les termes suivants : « Luxembourg, le 8 aoiit 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, J'ai le tres vif regret de vous communiquer ci-joint copie dune lettre du Ministre d'AUe^ magne m'informar.t que I'autorite militaire allemande demande vofre d6part. Vous y trouverez les conditions y attach6es-. M. von Buch me dit que les autorites mili taires conseilleraient plutot le voyage par che- min de fer, parce que le voyage par automo- bile vous exposerait a etre arrete trop souvent pour des motifs de controle. Mais le choix vous est abandonn6. Le Ministre d'Allemagne viendra chez moi prendre votre reponse. Je ne saurais vous dire combien la tache que je remplis en ce moment m'est "p^nible. Je n'oublierai jamais les relations si agreables que nous avons eues et je fais des voeux pour que votre voyage se fasse dans les meilleures conditions. (s) Eyschen.)) Le Gouvernement beige estimant que le Gou-j, vernement Grand Ducal n'avait pas eu le choix de son attitude et que celle qu'il avail 6t6 oblige d'adopter n'impliquait en aucune maniere une intention discourtoise ci l'6gard du Roi et de la Belgique, decida qu'il n'y avait pas lieu, dans ces conditions, de prier le Charge d'Af f aires du Grand Duch6 de quit- ter la Belgique. Veuillez agreer, etc. (s) Davignon. Lettre adressee par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etranghres, dux Ministres du Roi a LondreSy Paris et Saint-Petersbourg. Bruxelles, le 10 aout 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, J'ai I'honneur de vous faire connaitre les Circonstances qui ont amene le depart de' Lu- xembourg du Representant du Roi. Le general commandant des troupes alle- mandes dans le Grand-Duche de. Luxembourg lit part, le 8 aout, au Ministre d'Allemagne en cette ville, de la volonte des autorites mili- taires de provoquer le depart du Representant du Roi pres la Cour, Grand Ducale.. N» 67. Lettre adressee d M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres,. par le Ministre des Etats- Unis, accrMdte a Bruxelles. Bruxelles, le 11 aoat 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, La L(§gation a regu aujourd'hui de V^ashing- ton une depeche I'informant que le Gouver- nement des Etats-Unis avait, k la demande du Gouvernenient allemand, consenti a litre de courtoisie internationale,^ accepter la pro- tection des int^rets des sujets allemands en Bejgique. 22 - En vertu des instructions qui accompa- gnaienl cette depeciie, nous nous occuperons done, si vous n'y voyez pas d'incorivenient^ d'exercer nos bons et amicaux offices aupres du Gouvernement du Roi, pour la protection de§ sujets allemands. Les agreables rapporls ■que nous avons eus a ce sujet jusqu'a present me donnent la conviction que c'est avec le me- me et mutuel sentiment que nous pourrorls les poursuivre, dans le meme but. Je saisis cette occasion, Monsieur le Mi- .nistre, pour vous renouveler I'assurance de ma haute consideration. (s) Brand Whitlock. N« 68. Leltre adressee d. M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, par sir Francis H. Vil- liers, Ministre d'Angleterre. (Traduction.) Bruxellies, le ll.aout 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, J'ai telegraphic a Sir Edward Grey la com- munication allernande et la reponse projetee. J'ai reQu I'ordre d'exprimer a Voire Excel- lence I'entiere approbation du Gouvernement de Sa Majeste britannique. Ce dernier ne peut que se declarer d'accord sur les termes de la reponse que le Gouvernement beige se propose de faire a une tentative de semer la desunion, parmi les pays maintenant unis, pour la de- fense des Traites violespar I'Mlemagne. Je saisis, etc. (s) F. H. Villiers. (Voir piece N" 65.) No 69 Lettre adressee d. M, Davignon^ Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, par le Ministre de France, accredite a Bruxelles. Bruxelles, le 11 aoiit 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, J'ai I'honneur de faire savoir a Votre Ex- cellence que le Gouvernement frangais donne son entiere adhesion a la reponse que le gou- vernement beige se propose de faire au nouvel ultimatum de I'Allemagne. Cette reponse est bien celle qu'on pouvait attendre d'un Gouvernement et d'un peuple qui ont resists aussi heroiquement a la viola- tion odieuse de leur territoire. La France cohtinuera a remplir ses devoirs de garante de la neutralite beige et de fidele amie de la Belgique. Je saisis, etc. (s) Klobukovvski. (Voir pihce N° 65.) No 70. TiUgramme adresse a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, par le Ministre du f{Qi a La Haye. La Haye, 12 aout 1914. Le texte allemand contenait une faute; au .lieu de «seine auseinandersetzung» il faut lire <(ihre» et done traduire "Son conflit avec la France". (s) Baron Fallon. (Voir pikce N° 64.) NO 71. Telegramme adressd par M. Davignon, Mi- nistre des Affaires Etrangeres, a M. le Baron Fallon, Ministre du Roi a La Haye. Bruxelles. 12 aout 1914. Priere de remettre le telegramme suivant au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres : La propo- sition que nous fait le Gouvernement allemand reproduit la proposition qui avail ete formulee dans rultimatum du 2 aout. Fidele a ses devoirs internationaux, la Belgique ne peut que reiterer sa reponse a cet ultimatum, d'au- tant plus que depuis le 3 aout sa neutralite a ete violee, qu'une guerre douloureuse a ete portee sur son territoire et que les garanls de sa neutralite ont loyalement et immedia- tement repondu a son appel. (s) Davignon. No 72. Telegramme adressi a M. Davignon, Minis- tre des Affaires Etrangeres, par S. E. M. Sazo- noff. President du Conseil des Ministres de Russie. Saint-Petersbourg, 13 aotit 1914 Veuillez remereier le Gouvernement Royai pour sa communication et lui exprimer le plaisir que le Gouvernement Imperial eprouve k voir son attitude ferme et digne dont il le fClicite tr^s vivement. (s) Sazonoff. (Voir piece N" 65.) No 73. Lettre adressie a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, par le Ministre du Roi a La Haye. La Haye, le 13 aoiit 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, J'ai eu I'honneur de recevoir votre tele- gramme d'hier et j'ai remis aussitot h. M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres la reponse de la Belgique a la seconde proposition alle- mande. Son Excellence m'a promis de faire parvenir •immediatement au Ministre d'Allemagne la communication du Gouvernement du Roi. Veuillez agreer, ete. (s) Baron Fallon. (Voir pibce N° VI.) No 74. Lettre adressie par le Ministre du Roi a Paris a M. Davignon, Ministre des AJiaires Etrangeres. Paris, le 16 aoiit 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, Au cours de I'entretien que j'ai eu ce matin avec M. de Margerie, j'ai amene la conversa- tion sur les affaires coloniales et sur la de- 23 — marche.que vous m'arez charg6 de faire par votre telegramme et votre dep^che. du 7 de ce. mois. Mon interlocuteur m'a rappele que le Gou- vernement de la Republique s'etait adresse a I'Espagne qui n'avait pas donne reponse avant d'avoir I'avis de I'Angleterre. II parait que celle-ci continue h ne pas donner de reponse. M. de Margerie estime qu'en presence de la situation actuelle, il importe de frapper I'Al lemagne partout ou on peut I'atteindre ; il croit que telle est aussi I'opinion de I'Angle- terre qui aura certes des pretentions a faire valoir; la France desire reprendre la partie du Congo, qu'elle a dti c6der k la suite des incidents d'Agadir. Un succ^s, me dit mon interlocuteur, ne serait pas difficile k obtenir. Veuillez agreer, etc. (s) Baron Guillaume. (Voir pieces N"' 51 et 58.) No 75. Lettre adressee par le Ministre du Roi h Londres, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Elranghes. Londres, le 17 aoiit 19t4. Monsieur le Ministre, En reponse a votre dep§che du 7 aoilt, j'ai I'honneur de vous faire savoir que le Gou- vernement britannique ne peut se ralliet k la proposition beige tendant a respecter la neu- tralite des possessions des Puissances bellig^- rantes dans le bassin xon ventionnel du Congo. Les troupes allemandes de I'Est Africain al- lemand ont dej^ pris Toffensive contre le protectorat anglais de I'Afrique centrale. D'au- tre part, des troupes britanniques ont dejci attaqu6 le port allemand de Dar-Es-Salaam, oii. elles ont d^truit la station de t^legraphie sans fil. Dans ces circonstances, mgme si le Gouver- nement anglais 6tait persuade de I'utilit^ po- litique et strat6gique de la proposition beige, irne pourrait I'adopter. Le Gouvernement de Londres croit que les forces qu'il envoie en Afrique seront suffi- santes pour vaincre toute opposition. II fera tous ses efforts . pour emp§cher des souleve- ments dans la population indigene. La France est du meme avis que I'Angle- terre, vu I'activite allemande que Ton remar- que pr^s de Bonar et Ekododo. Veuillez agr6er, etc. (s) Comte de Lalaing. (Voir pieces N"* 57 et 58.) No 76. TSligramrfie adress6 vat le Vice-Gouverneur du Katanga it M . Renkin, Ministre des Colo- nies. Elisabethville, 26 aoilt 1914. Allemands continuant leurs escarmouches au Tanganika ont attaqu6 le 22 aoClt le port de Lukuga. lis ont eu deux noirs tu6s et deux blesses. De nouvelles attaques sont attendues. (s) TombeuP. No 77. Telegramme adresse' par le Comte Clary H Aldringcn, Ministre d' Aittriche-Hongrie, d. M . Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Efrangeres, et transmis par VintermSdiaire du Ministre des, Affaires Etrangercs des Paijs-Bas. La Haye, le 28 aout 1914. D'ordre de mon Gouvernement j'ai I'hon- neur de notifier a Votre Excellence ce qui suit : «Vu que la Belgique, apres avoir refuse d'accepter les propositions qui lui avaient ete adressees a plusieurs reprises par rAllemagne, prete sa cooperation militaire a la France et a la Grande-Bretagne qui, toutes deux ont declare la guerre a I'Autriche-Hongrie, et en presence du fait que, comme il vient d'etre constate, les ressortissants autrichiens et hon- grois se trouvant en Belgique ont sous les yeux des autorites Royales, du subir un traite- ment contraire aux exigences les plus primi- tives de I'humanite et inadmissable meme vis-a-vis des sujets d'un Etat ennemi, I'Autri- che-Hongrie se voit dans la n6cessite de rom- pre les relations diplomatiques et se considere des ce moment en etat de guerre avec la Bel- gique. Je quitte le pays avec le personnel de la Legation et confie la protection de mes administres au Ministre des Etats-Unis d'Ame- rique en Belgique. De la part du Gouverne- ment Imperial et Royal les passeports sont remis au Comte Errembault de Dudzeele." (s) Clary. No 78. TkUgramme adressi par M. Davignon, Mi- nistre des Affaires Etrangbres a M. le Baron Fallon, Ministre du Roi a La Haye. Anvers, le 29 aoilt 1914. Pri^re accuser reception k Legation Au- triche par interm§diaire Ministre Affaires Etrangeres declaration de guerre Autriche- Hongrie a Belgique et ajouter ce qui suit: «La Belgique a toujours entretenu des re- lations d'amitie avec tous ses voisins sans distinction. Elle a scrupuleusement rempli les devoirs que la neutrality lui impose. Si elle n'a pas cru pouvoir accepter les propositions de I'AUemgane, c'est que celles-ci avaient pour objet la violation des engagements qu'elle a pris k la face de I'Europe, engagements qui ont ete les conditions de la creation du Royau- me de Belgique. Elle n'a pas cru qu'un peuple, quelque.faible qu'il soit, puisse meconnaitre ses devoirs et sacrifier son honneur en s'incli- jiant devant la force. Le Gouvernement a attendu, non seulement les d61ais de I'ultima- tum, mais la violation de son territoire par les troupes allemandes avant de faire appel k la France et k I'Angleterre, garantes de sa neutrality au mSme titre que I'Allemagne et I'Autriche-Hongrie, pour coop^rer au nom et en vertu des trait^s a la defense du territoire beige. En repoussant par les armes les envahis- seurs, elle n'a mSme pas accompli un acte d'hostilite aux termes de I'article 10 de la convention de La Haye, sur les droits et de- voirs des Puissances neutres. w. 24 ^ L'Ai'leina'gn^ g, rqconnu elle-'mlme qoe son agression constitue Urte violation du droit des gens et ne pouvant la justified ellea mvoquef son inter^t slrat^gique. La Belgique oppose urt dementi formel b, Taffirniation q\ie les ressortissants aulrichicins et hongi'ois auraient subi en Belgique uii ti-ai- tement contraire aux exigen<;es leS plua primi- tives de I'humanite. . Le Gouvernement Royal a donne, des 16 d4- but des hostilites, les' ordres les plus stricts quant a la sauvegafde de's personnes et-des proprietes austrO'Eptigroises. (s) Davignou. LettT6 adressed par M. Davignon, Minimi de$ Affaires Htfangdres, aux Legations. ■ 4u Hoi a Vetrang^f. Anvjers, le 29 aout 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, Sous la date du 17 aout, j'ai adress6 au Mi- nistre du Roi a Londres une lettre dans laquelle j'ai cru devoir relever certaines alle- gations produites par le Gouvernement alle- mand, et dont faisait mention le Blue Book public recemment par le Gouvernement an- glais. J'ai I'honneur de placer sous vos yeux une copie de cette lettre et de ses annexes. Veuil-. lez, je vous prie, en donner connaissance au Gouvernement aupres duquel vous etes accr©* dite. Veuillez a^eer, etc. % (s) Davignon. 1'^ Annexe au N" 79. Lettre adressee par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrang^res, au, Comte de La» laing, Ministre du Roi a Londres. Bruxelles, le 17 aoiit 1914. Monsieur le Comte, Le Blue BooJc public recemment par le Gou- vernement britannique reproduit, sous le n° 122 (page 65), le. texte d'un telegramme adress6 de Berlin, le 31 juillet, par Sir E. Gro- schen k Sir E. Grey, telegramme dont i'ex- trais le passage suivant : « It appears from what he (His Excellency >> The Secretary of State) said that German » Government consider that certain hostile » acts have been already committed by Bel- » gium. . As an instance af this, he alleged » that a consignement of corn of Germany »> had been placed under an embargo al- » ready. » Le fait auquel le Secretaire d'Etat allemand des Affaires Etrangeres a fait allusion dans son entretien avec Sir E. Groschen, et qu'il consid6rait comme un acte hostile de la part de la Belgique, se rapporte sans doute a I'ap- plication des arretes royaux du 30 juillet, qui ont prohib6 provisoirement I'exportation de Belgique de certains produits. Comme vous le constaterez par I'expose que je tiens a vous faire ci-apres, le fait qui nous est reproche n'a nullement le caractere qu'on a voulu lui don- ner en AUemagne. pes arrgtfis' royaux- dat$s du 30 j'uiUet el publics au Moniie'ur beige du lendemain ont prohibe ci titre provisoire, par toutes les fron- litres de terre et de mer, I'exportation d'une s6rie de produits, des cereales notamment. Sous la date du 31 juillet, M. le Ministre d' AUemagne a Bruxelles m^ signala que la douane d'Anvers retenait des chargements de grains a destination de TAllemagne qui, sim- plemen.t transbordes dans notre port, ne fai-^ saient 6n realite qu'y Iransiter. M. de Below Saleske demandait la libre sortie des bateaux portant ces chargements. Le jour meme oii il recut la reclamation du Ministre d'Allema- gne, mon Departement en saisit le Minister^ des Finances, .et des le surlendemain 2 aout» Celui-ci nous annonga qu'il avait ete transmis k la douane beige des instructions donnanl pleine et eiitiere satisfaction h I'Allemagne, Je crois ne pouvoir mieux faire, Monsieuf le Comte, que de placer sous vos yeux uno copie de la correspondance echangee ^ ce sujet avec M. de Below Saleske. Vous y ver- rez que rien dans notre, attitude ne pouvait etre considere comme teihoignant de dispo- sitions hostiles a I'egard de I'Allemagne ; les mesuries prises par le Gouvernement beige a ce moment ne constituaient que les simples precautions que tout Etat a le droit et le de- voir de prendre. dans des circonstances aussi exceptionnelles. II serait bon que vous adressiez au Gouver- nement de S. M. Britannique une communi- cation afin de I'eclairer sur la realite de» faits. Veuillez agreer, etc. (s) Davignon. 2™« Annexe au N* 79. Lettre ddress6e par M. Dstvignon, Ministry' des Affaires Etrangeres, diM.de Below 5 par .les arretes royaux du 30 juillet ecoule he visent que I'exportation proprement dite et ne s'6tendent done pas aux marchan- dises regulierement a6clarees en transit lors de I'importatioh.Au surplus, lorsque des mar- chandises libres de droits sont declarees en consommation, bien qu'elles soient en reality destinies a I'exportation, elles font commune- ment I'objet de declarations de libre entree specialeSi qui sont considerees comme des documents de transit. Enfin, s'il arrivait que de telles marchandises avaient ete declarees en consommation sans restrictions, comme si elles devaient rester effectivement dans le pays, la douane en permettrait encore la sor- tie du moment oii il serait dument etabli, par les documents d'expedition-manifestes, connaissements, etc., qu'elles devaient etre export6es immediatement en transit. Je puis ajouter que I'exportation des grains auxquels se rapportait la lettre pr6citee de la Legation Imperiale a 6te autorise le 1" aofit. Je saisis, etc. (s) Davignon. *- 29 - 3""^ Annexe au N" 79. tettte adressee par M. Davignon, MifiiStfe des Affaires Elrangcres, d. M. de BelOw Sa- teske, Ministre d'Allemagne. Bruxelles, le T" aout 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, En reponse a la lettre de Votre Excellence 4"» Annexe au N» 79. 'Lettra adressee par M. de Below Saleske^ ministre d'Allemayne, 'a M. Davignon, Mi- nistre des Affaires Etrangeres. Bruxelles, le 31 juillet 19U. Monsieur le Ministre, On m'a informe d'Anvers que la douane a defendu le depart des bateaux charges de grains pour rAllemagne. Vu qu'il ne s'agit pas dans ces cas d'une exportation de grains, mais d'un transit, parce que la marchandise a et^ seulement transbor- dee k Anvers,' j'ai I'honneur de recourir a votre .bienveillante entremise afin qu'on laisse partir pour VAllemagne les bateaux en question. En m§me temps, je prie Votre Excellence de me faire savoir si le port d'Anvers est fer- me pour le transit des marchandises 6nume- rees au Moniteur daujourd'hui. En attendant la reponse de Votre Excel! en* ce dans le plus bref delai possible, je profile do cette occasion, etc. (s) de Below Saleske. MINISTfeRE DES AFFAIRES filRANGfeRES DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES 1914 LA GUERRE EUROPEENNE I PlfeCES RELATIVES AUX NEGOCIATIONS QUI ONT PR]^C6di5 LES DECLARATIONS DE GUERREi DE L'ALLEMAGNE A LA RUSSIE (T" AOUT 19U) ET A LA FRANCE (3 AOUT 191^) Dl^CLARATION DU ft SEPTEMBRE 1914 PARIS IMPRIMERIE NATIONALE MDCCCCXIV MINISTfeRE DES AFFAIRES filRANGfeRES DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES GUERRE EUROPfiENNE TABLE DES JVfATlfeRES. NUMB- ROS. NOMS BO SIGilATAIRE. LIEU et DATE D'ENVOI. SOMMAIRE. CHAPITRE premier; AVERTISSEMENTS. (1913. M. Jules Camroh. 1913. Berlin, 17 mars . M. ElfENNE. M. Jules Camhon. M. ALLrzE. Note au Ministrc. . Jules Cambon; . .., Paris, 2 avril Berlin, 6 mai. Munich, lojuilici. Paris, 3o juiilet Berlin, 22 nov. "ransmission de rapports de I'altache militaire et de I'atta che naval a Berlin sur la nouvelle loi militaire. Efforts du Gouvernement allemand pour representer cette loi comme une reponse au.projet fran^ais de loi de Irois ans et pour exalter dans les masses le sentiment guerrier. . Annexe 1. — Rapport du lieutenant-colonel Serret. Les armemehts allemands sont destines a mettre la France dans un etat d'inferiorite deGnitif. Colere provoqu^e dans les milieux olTiciels par les mesures de precaution francaises. ANME-tE II. — Rapport de M. de Faramond. Le projet de loi militaire a pour objet de rendre facile une offen- sive foudroyante contre la France. Coafiance des Alle- mands dans la superiorite de leur armee. Mesures Cnan- cieres projetees pour couvrir les depenses militaires. Envoi d'un rapport officiel et secret allemand sur le renfor- cement de I'armee Annexe. — Texte de ce rapport. Aper?u rctrospectif sur les armcments successifs provoques par la Conference d'Algesiras, I'affaire d'Agadir ct la guerce balkanique. Necessite d'accomplir un nouvel effort, d'habitucr I'opi- nion publique a I'idee de guerre, de susciter des troubles dans les colonies francaises ou anglaises et de prevoir I'in- vasion de la Bela;ique et de la Hollande. Fin de la crise balkanique. Elle a faiili amener fAllemagne a une guerre d'agression contre la France et a provoque, dps preparatifs de mobilisation , L'opinion bavaroise n'accepte les nouveaux armements qUe comme destines a provoquerune guerre dans laquelle elle s'habitue a voir la seule solution possible aux dinTiculles interieures Sentiments dominants dans l'opinion allemande : desir d'une revanche d'Agadir, crainte de resurrection d'une FraMce foFte. Impuissance du parti de la paix. Formation, com- position et developpement croissant d'un parti de la guerre, encouragd dans ses ambitions par la faiblesse pre- sum^e de la Triple-Entente . . . > Conversation du Roi des Beiges avec I'Empereur, qui a cesse d'etre pacifique, cede au courant belliqueux dont son fils est le centre, et se familiarise avec la perspective d'un conflit prochain avec la France. 21 VI ROS. NOMS on SICNATiTBK. LIEU et DATE D'EirvOI. SOMMAIRE. PAGES. CHAPITRE U. PRELIMINAIRES. DE LA MORT DE L'ARCHIDUC HERITIER (28 JUIN igiA) i X LA REMISE DE LA NOTE AUTRICHIENNE X LA SERBIE (SO JUILLET igiAj. 1914. 7 Mr PTyM*!?"?- t • • • 1 1 > . . . . Vienne, aS juin... Nouvelle de I'assassinat de I'arcbiduc Franjois-Ferdinand k 2! 8 M. DcMAIHE ••••• Vienne, ajuiUet.. Exploitation de cet evdnement par le parti militaire autri- chien 2; 9 M. DE Mabreviixb Beriin. AjniUet.. Confiance afiectee du Gouvernement allemand da^ns un ar- rangement a I'amiable du differend auslro-serbe 2< 10 M. Paleolo&de. . .^ . . . . . Petersbourg,6juill. M. Sazonoffa averti I'Ambassadeur d'Aulriche que le Gou- vernement russe ne saurait accepter que I'assassinat de I'Arcbiduc servit de pretexle a une action sur terriloire serbe 2i 11 Budapest, 11 juill.. Optimisme officiel de commande, contrastanl avec de s^- rieuz preparatifs uilitaires en Horcrie ..••••••..•... 27 12 Vienne, iSjuiUet. Les journaux odlcieux autricbiensprechent une guerre a fond au panserbisme, la Russie el la France leur paraissant bors d'etat d'intervenir 1 13 M. DtHAnfB «...c.. Vienne, ig juillet. Transmission d'un rapport consulaire 14 Rapport • consulaire de Vienne.. Vienne, igjuiUel. Les milieux polillques autricbiens semblent resolus a une guerre d'agression contre la Serbic, et les milieux mili- taires envisagent I'evenlualild d'un conflit europ^en 1 15 M. Jules Cambon Berlin, ai juiHet.. Le Gouvernement allemand, qui a deja envoyd des tavis prdliminaircs de mobilisation*, declare calegoriquement qu'il ignore la teneur de la note que I'Autricbe doit en- voyer a la Serbie 3 16 M. BtENTERC-MARTIIf Paris, 31 juillet.. L'AHemagne appuiera fortement les demarches aulri- cbiennes, sans cbercher a jouer un role de mddialion. . . 3 17 18 M. Bientbhd-Marti5 M, Dduaine. ► Paris, a a juillet.. Vienne, a a juUlet. Le Gouvernement fran^ais prescrit a I'Ambassadeur de France de donner amicalement a Vienne des conseils de 3 3 Dispositions con cilianfes de la Russie et de la Serbie. Indi- cations rassurantes fournies aux diplomales etrangers. Propos violents de I'Ambassadeur d'AUemagne 19 M. Paul Cambok Londres, a a juillet. Graves inquietudes de sir Edward Grey h la suite d'une conversation ayec I'Ambassadeur d AHemagne. Conseils de prudence et de moderation donnes a I'Ambassadeur d'Au. tricbe-Uongrie , 3 20 M. Bientenc-Martw.'. . . . Paris, aS juillet.. Remise procbaine de la Note autrichienne a la Serbie. Im- pressions conlradicloires des diplomates sur son conlenu et sa portee. Assurances apaisanles donndes a Vienne. . . . 3 21 M. ALLni Munich, a 3 juillet. Pessimisme des milieux ofliciels'bavarois, en particuller du President du Conseil, qui a eu connaissance de la Note 3 1 , NUME- NOMS LIEU el SOMMAIRE. PAGES. ROS. DO SIGNATAIBE. DATE D'ENVOI. 1 CHAPITRE m. tA NOTE AUTRICHIENNE ET LA REPONSE SERBE.] (Du vendredi 24 juillet au samedi 25 juillet.) 22 M. Rene Viviani Reval, 3 4 juillet.. D'accord avec M. Sazonoff, M. Viviani p'rie M. Bienvenu- Martin, Ministre interimaire des Affaires elrangeres. de donner des instructions pour que de Paris et de Londres des conseils de moderation soient adresses au Comte Berchtold , ia remise de la Note autrichienne la veilie au 23 M. Bienvend-Martin Paris. 2 A juiUet.. soir ctant encore i^noree 39 Instructions transmises dans ce sens a Vienne, oil elles ne parviennent qu apres la remise de la Note a Belgrade. . . 40 24 Note actrichienne Vienne, 24 juillet. Texte de la Note autrichienne a la Serbie, communiqu^e 25 M. Bienvenu-Martin Paris, 2^ juillet.. dans ia matinee du 2 4 juillet par le Comte Szecsen a 40 Analyse de cette Note. Le Comte Szecsen a ete avise, lors- qu'il I'a apportee, de la penible impression que ne pou- vaient manquer de produire, specialement dans les conditions actuelles, I'etendue des exigences autrichiennes. • comme la brievete du delai fixe a la Serbie pour la re- ponse 45 26 M. Bienvenu-Martin Paris, 2 4 juillet.. Conseil donne par le Gouvernement fran?ais au Gouverne- ment serbe d'accepter les demandes de i'Autriche dans tout ce qu'elles peuvent avoir d'admissible et de proposer de soumettre la question a I'arbitrage de i'Europe 46 2, M. Biekvenu-Martin Paris, 24 juillet.. Renseignements donnes a nos ambassadeurs sur ies ten- dances belliqueuses du parti militaire autrichien, sur la difficulte pour la Serbie d'accepter I'inlegralite des exi- 28 M. Bienvend-Martin Paris, 2 4 juillet.. gences autrichiennes et sur ie ton mdnacant de ia presse 47 D-marche de M. de Schoen au Quai d'Orsay pour appuyer, au nom de son Gouvernement, ia demarche de I'Autriche- Hongrie, approuver sa Note, et faire ressortir les « conse- quences incalculables » qu entratnerait , en raison du jeu des alliances, toute .tentative d'immixtion d'une tierce 29 M. Jules Cambon Berlin, a 4 juillet. . puissance dans le conflit austro-serbe 48 Manifestations austrophiles et chauvines a Berlin; pessi- misme des milieux diplomatiaues 49 30 Ml Jules Cambon Berlin, 24 juillet.. M. de Jagow declare approuver la Note autrichienne, mais se defend absolument d'en avoir connu prealabiement le contenu. II espere que .la Serbie recevra de ses amis le conseil de ceder. La presse officielle se solidarise egale- ment avec i'Autriche 50 31 32 M. Paleologde Petersbourg, 2 4j'. Londres, 24 juillet. Dispositions pacifiques du Gouvernement russe, malgre i'emolion profonde produite dans le public par la remise 5i M. Paul Cambon Sir E. Grey expose a M. Paul Cambon son projet de media- lion a quatre. Pessimisme du Comte Benckeadorf au sujet des dispositions de I'Ailemagne 52 D0£DMENTS 0IPL0MATIQUES» — > Guerre europdenne. - - vm If NOMB- ROS. NOMS DU SIGNATAIRK. LIEU et DATE D'ENVOI. SOMMAIRE. PAGEi 33 34 35 36 37 .. 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 M. Paul Cambon M. Bienveno-Martin M. Jules Cambon M. BiervehuMartiw M. DE Fleuriau M. PALEOtOGCE. >.....». Londres, a^juillet. Paris, 24 juiilet.. . Beriin, 2 5 juiilet.. Paris, 2 5 juiilet... LoDch-es,25 juillef. Petersboarg, 25j'. Pam, 35jaillet... Londres, aSjurllet. Berlin, 25 juHiet. . Berlin, 2 5 juiilet. . Berlin, 25 juiUel. . Rom^, 25 juiHfit. , Vienne, 25 juiilet. Belgcadfr, 2SjuiUet. Beriini, a5 juiilet. . Une intervention officieuse de TAUemagne a Vienne scmLlc a M. Paul Cambon le meilleur moyen d'arreter le conflit. Sir E. Grey veut proposer a I'Allemagne d'agir en commun a Vienne et a Petersbourg, en vue de sdumettre le conflit austro-serbe a la mediation des quatre puissances non inleressees dans la question. Conseils de prudence donnes au Mfnistre de Serbie a Paris ', 53 53 54' 55 56 56 57 58 58 Le ]VIinistre de Belgique a Berlin voit.dans la' crise en cours Texecution de projets de guerre premedites par I'AUe- magne Resume de la situation. A Paris, M. de Schoen vient de- i mentir au Quai d'Orsay le caractere menacant de^a de- marche de la veiHe. A Londres , I'Ambassadeur d'Autriche declare que la Note autrichienne n'a pas le caractere d 'iin ultimatum. Sir E. Grey fait donner des conseils de prudence a Belgrade et expose a I'Ambassadeur d'Alie- Le Gouvernement allemand se refusant a intervenir entre Vienne et Belgrade, Sir E. Grey fait remarquer au prince Licbnowsky que cette attitude contribuera a araener un conflit general dans lequel I'Angleterre ne saurait rester Efforts de conciliation de M. Sazonoff : il demande a Vienne une prolongation du delai imparti a la Serbie pour sa M. Bienvknu-Martin M. DE Flecriaxi M. Jules Ca5!B05 M, Jules Cambon 1 M. Jules Cambon »,. M. Barrere w . . Le Gouveriiement francais appuie cette demande ^e prolon^ gation Le Gouvernement anglais s'associe egalement a cetle de- M. de Jagow declare de nouveau categoriquement n'avoir pas eu connaissance de la Note autrichienne avant sa re- mise. 11 repond evasivement a une demande du Chargd d' Affaires d'Angleterre pour intervenir a Vienne en vue idle prevenir un conflit et de prolongcr le delai de I'ultimatum Le Charge d'Affaires de Russie presentc a son tour cette dcraiere demande a Berlin. 11 insiste sur I'urgence d'unc reponse que M. de Jagow cherche a ajourner Sac une nouvelle demarche pressante du Charge d'Afi'aires de Russie, M. dt Jagow declare qu'il consiclere le diffu- pend austro-serbe comme une afffiire purcment locale, qui doit rester limitee a I'Autriche et a la Serbie et qui ne lui paraitpas susceptible d'amener des difficultes inter- nationales 59 59 L'Ambassadeur de Russie a Rome demande au gouverne- ment ilalien d'intervenir pour la prolongation du delai 60 Le Gouvernement autrichien elude la demande de prolon- gation du delai, qu'a presentee a Vienne le Charge d'Af- faires de Russie. ,^ Resume de la reponse serbe a la Note autrichienne La nonvelle du depart de Belgrade du Minislrft d'Autriche provoquc a Berlin des manifestations de chauvinisme. Les iioanciers croient a la guerre M Boppe 60 61 62 M. Jules Camdor IX >UME- ROS. NOMS DES SIG.NATAIRES. UEU ET DATE D'ENTOI. SOMMAIRE. ■ H— ill III' PAGES. 48 49 Vienne, 25 juillel. Belgrade, sBjuillet. L'Ambassadeur de France a Vienne, en raison du retard impose au telegramme qui lui a ete envoye de Paris, ne recoit pas asscz t6t ses instructions pour s'associer en temps 62 63 Texte de la reppnse serbQ a la Note auslro-hongroise CHAPITRE IV, De la rupture des relations diplomatiques (25 juiiiet 191 4) A. la declaration de gtjerre (28 juillet 1914) DE l'Autriche a Ca Serbie, 50 M. Bienvenu-Mahtin . 58 59 M. Barrebe M. Barrerb M. Bienvenc-Martin . . M. Paleologce. . . . . . M. Ddmaine.. ....... M. Bienveno-Martin . . Note pour le Ministre. M. Chevalley. M. d'Annoville M. Faroes.... Paris, 26 juiiiet. Rome, 26 juiiiet. , Rome, 26 juillet. Paris, 26 juillet. Petersbourg , juillet. 26 Vienne, 26 juillet. Paris, 26 juillet .. Paris, 26 juillet. Christiania, 2 6 juil- let. Luxembourg ,26 juillet. Bale. 27 juillet... Resume de la situation le 2 5 au soir, telle qu'elle r6sulte de I'attitude intransigeante de I'Autricbe-Hongrie. Im- pressions ressenties dans les difFerentes capitales et ten- tatives pour emp^cher I'aggravation du conflit qui resul- terait de mesures militaires contre la Serbie prises par le Gouvernement austro-hongrois. Sir E. Grey espere encore pr6venir un conflit par i'intervention des quatre Puissances non int^ressees , L'ltalie participera aux efforts pour le maintien de la paix, mais veut se tenir en dehors du conflit s'il edate La Russie conserve I'espoir d'une solution paciiique; I'opi- nion italienne se montre hostile a l'Autriche.. . ... ...... Le Gouvernement fran^ais appuie la demande de "mediation que la Serbie adresse au Gouvernement anglais, sur les conseils de; la Russie M. Sazonoff, toujours anime du mfime esprit de conciliation, propose une conversation directe entre Vienne -et Peters- bourg sur les modifications a introduire dans rultimatum pour le rendre acceptable L'Ambassadeur de Russie, de retour a Vienne, se propose d'y presenter une nouvelle proposition d' arrangement . . . Demarche de M. de Schoen au Quai d'Orsay pour que la France intervienne avec I'Allemagne a Petersbourg seule- ment, pour donner des conseils pacifiques. Son refus de repondre, faute d'instructions , a la demande de mediation a quatre a Petersbourg et a Vienne i . Nouvelle visile de I'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne pour afllrmer et accentuer le sens pacifique de sa pr6cedente demarche. 11 refuse de se prononcer sur I'opportunite de conseils de mo- deration a donner par I'Allemagne h Vienne, et persiste a tenter d'engager le Gouvernement francais dans la voie d'une demarche commune de «solidarite pacifique* a Pe- tersbourg uniquement, de qui, selon lui, depend la paix. Ordre a la flotte allemande de Norvege de rentrer en Alle- magne Premiers preparatifs de mobilisation a Thionville Premiers preparatifs de mobilisation dans ie Grand-Duche de Bade NUME- ROS. 61 NOMS DES SIGNATAIRES. M. Bienvend-Mabtis. 02 M. BlENVESD-MABTJiX . 65 66 07 08 M. D£ pLEnllUO M. Paleol06UE. . . . i^ M. BOMPARD M. D-E. FtECRlAU M. Jules Cambor. . . . M. DE Fleuriau. M. DE Fleuriau. M. Bienvenu-Martin. M. DE Fleuriau M. Barrere M« Joles Camdon.. . . .M. Jules Camdon. . . . M. Biwvesd-Martim. LIEU ET' DATE D'ENVOI. Paris. 27 juillet. Paris, 27 juiUet . Londres, 27 juillet Saint-PetcrsbQUfg, 27 juillet. Constantinople, 37 juillet. Londres, 27 juiJlet. Berlin, 27 juillet.. Londres, 27 juillet. Londres, 27 juillet. Paris, 27 juillet . . Londres, 27juiljet. Rome, 27 juillet. . Berlin, 27 juillet.. Bfiriin, a 7 juillet.. Piaus,»7. juillet.. SOMMAIRE. Resume des trois demarches successives de M. -de Schoen. La situation s'aggrave, I'Autriche refusanl a la fois de se contenter des concessions de la Serbie et d'enlrer en con- versation a ce sujet avec les Puissances. — Nouvelle proposition anglaise de rechercher a Paris, Berlin, Rome et Londres les moyens deviter une-crise , la Russie et I'Au- triche, les Puissances directement inleressees, restanl a I'ecart Nouvelle demarche de M. de Schoen au Quai d'Orsay, tehdant visiblement a comprometire la France a legard de la Russie, tout en gagnant du temps pour faciliter une ac- tion militaire de I'Autriche en Serbie, que I'Allemagne ne fait rien pour retarder Les ambassadeurs d'Allemagne et d'Autriche laissent en- tendre quils sont surs de la neutrality anglaise, malgre le langage qui a ele tenu par Sir A. Nicolson au prince Lichnovrski Dispositions concilianles de M. Sazonoff. On estime a Constantinople que le conQit austro-serbe res- tera localise et que la Russie n'interviendra pas en faveur de la Serbie La Grande-Bretagne arr^le la demobilisation de sa Oottc et averlit i'Allemagne qu'une invasion de la Serbie par I'Au triche risque d'amener une guerre europeenne M. de Jagow donne de vagues assurances pacifiques et de dare, en reponse a une question, que I'Allemagne n? mobiiiserait pas. si ia Russie nc mobilisait que sur la fron liere autrichienne. Le Secretaire d'Etat temoigne de vives inquietudes Sir E. Grey propose que les Ambassadeurs de France, d'Al- lemagne et d'llalie a Londres examinent, de concert avec lui , le moyen de resoudre les -difliculles actucUes La Serbie n'a pas demande la mediation anglaise; il faut done s'en tenir au projet de mediatioii a qua\re preconise par I'Anglelerre Le Gouvernement francais accepte la proposition anglaise, qu'une action siacerement moderatrice de I'Allemagne a Vienne pourrait toutefois seule faire aboutir Le Gouvernement italien acicepte quatre la mediation a Le Marquis de San Giuliano declare n'avoir pas eu connais- sance prealable de la Note autrichienne et adhere, sans hesiler, a la proposition de Sir E. Grey M. de Jagow repousse I'idee d'une conference des Puis- sances, lout en protestant de son desir d'une solution paciGque » II se derobe a de nouvelles instances de M. Jules Cambon a cet egard. Opportunite de renouveler sous une forme dif- ferente la proposition anglaise, pou^ jvellre i'Allemaghe au pied du mur Le Comte Szecsen vient remetlrf.au .Quai. d'Orsay un me- morandum de son Gouvernement pour justifier les me- sures de coercilion qu'il annonce comme imminentes contre la Serbie. — Texte de ce memorandum XI NOME- ROS. 15. bis. 76 73 79 80 81 , 83 NOM DU SIGNATAIRK. Communique da Bureau tie la Pressc. M..Ilene Vitiani M. Biervenu-Mabtir. M. BlENVEira-MARTpf . IVr. BlEPiVESU-MARTIPt ^- M1 R&ul.GvMBOB ..^. M. Jules Camoor. M. Paleologce. ... M. DOMAJNE LIEU et DATE D'ENVOI. Vienne, 28 juillet. A Lord (le la Fr«rt- ce. 28 juillet. Paris, '28 juillet. . Paris, 28 juillet. . Paris, 28 juillet. . Londres, 28 juillet. Berlin, 28 j.uillel.^ Saint- Petersbourg, 28 juillet. Vienne, 28 juillet. SOMMAIRE. Communique oflicieux du Bureau de la Presse viennoise au sujet de la reponse serl)e, representee comme insuffisante. Accuse de reception des communications revues de M. Bien- venu-Martin et approbation des reponses qu'il a faites, soit a M. de Schoen , soit a la proposition de Sir E. Grey. Resume de la situation : refus de I'Allemagne d'intervenir a Vienne, objection qu'elle oppose a la proposition anglaise. remise du memorandum autrichieo. Dangers de.la situa- tion Yisite de M. de Scboen au Quai d'Orsay. 11 proteste a nou- •veau de ses sentiments pacifiques, maij se derobe tou jours a I'examen des moyens pratiques de prevenir ie conDit. . Recommandation a M. Dumaine de se tenir en contact avec son collegue d'Angleterre, pour presenter a Vienne- la demande de mediation anglaise.. »-...^. ...... .*..... L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a Londres insiste, comme M. de Schoen a Paris, sur i'utilite d*une action modera- trice de I'Angleterre a Petersbourg uniquement. D'autre par J , M. Sa/.onofT a accepte la proposition anglaise de mediation, mais il voudrait la faire preceder d'une conversation directe avec Viennef, dont il attend de Jjons resultals ._....* •..^.. . .. .^. . .., M. de Jagow se montre toujours hostile a la conference proposec par Sir E. Grey, etappuie son attitude dilatoire sur la nouveile des efforts russes pour une entente directe entre Vienne et Petersbourg v.-- .... M. Sazonoff c^t oblige de cohstater que I'Autriche se derobe a ses propositions d'crttente directe . — . ...... . — La declaration de guerre de I'Autriche a la Serbie rend inutile toute tentative de conciliation, au dire du comle Berchtold qui romptainsi tout pourparler avec Petersbourg. 96 97 ds- 98 ^9 99 100 102 i.02 CHAPITRE V. De la declaration Dte guerre de l'Autriche X la Serbie {28 juillet igi^)' a L'ULTiMAxosr^ DE l'Allemagne a. la Russie (3 1 juillet 191/i}. 84 M, Barrere, 85 JVJ. BlENVEMUrMABTIN ... . . . M. Paleoiocde. . M. Kloqckoivski. M.Rqrssqi ...... Rome. ;» 9 juillet.. Paris... 29 Juillet., Saint - Petersbourg , 29 juillet. Bruxelles, a^ juil- let. -Francforl, a^^juil leh. La Consulta estime que la declaration de guerre de I'Au- triche ne doit pas empdcher la continuation des efforts diplomatiques pour Ja reunion d'une conference .a Londres... ..^ ... .v.. .,. . . .;-...-. .,. ,. — ^.\.«^ L'Allemagne semble renoncer a I'espoir d'une pression franco-anglaise sur la Russie seule, mais continue de se refuser a agir sur Vienne. Dans ces conditions il parait indispensable que la Russie se raUie definitivement et de suite a la proposition anglaise de mediation aquatrci, pour -la faire accepter par ' Berlin avant que les mesurcs mili- taires de I'Autriclie ne compromettent definitivement la paix. .. _, . .-»- .-^ > >.. > ,^,>...^..;>. . .....,■.. .... . Le Gouvernemenl russe adhere enticremenl a cetle pro- position. ... ...... .^...... ......... ^^.^-..-.^.^ ........ . . .. Inquietudes soulevees a Bruxelles par raltitude enigmatique et mena^ante de l'Allemagne...,..-. .«.^. ..... ....... . . . . . Importants motlveihcnts ^de .troupes 5tgaoles autour de lOS 105 106 J 07 107 XII NDME- BOS. NOM DD SIGNATAIRE. LIEU el DATE D- ENVOI. SOMMAIRE. PAGES. 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 M. AUittE Munich, ag juHlet Vienne, 29 juiUet. Saint -Petersbourg, 29 juillet. Berlin , sgjuiUet. Vienne, sg juillet. Parts, 29 juillet . . P«ris, ag juiUet. . Rome, 39 juiUet. . Paris, *9 juillet.. . Londrcs, 99 juillet Bdgrade, agjuiU. Saint -Petersbourg, 19 juillet. Paris, So joillet . . Saint- Paersbourg, 30 juillet Saint -Petersbourg, 3o juillet. . 108 108 109 109 Ul 111 112 113 114 ii4 115 115 116 117 117 KAutriche se derobe a la conversation directe a laquelle elie M. Jui«8 Cambon M. de Jagow sest maintenu dans son attitude dilatoire, Taguement pacifique, rejetant la responsabilite evenluene du conflit sur la Russie, tout en declarant placer son espoir dans une entente directe de Vienne el Petersbourg , au succes de laquelle il pretend chercher a travailler. . . . L'Autriche semble decidee a la guerre; elle y est poussee energiquement par M. de Tcbirsky, ambassadeur d'AUe- M. Bientend-Maktbi , , . . . M. BreNVESXJ-MARXTO M. de Scboen est vCYiu dire que rAUemagne allait consuller Vienne sur ses intentions, que cda fournirait une base de discussion , el que les operations militaires ne seraient La Russie en- presence de Tattitude inquielanle de rAUe- magne et du refus du comte Bercbtod de continuer les pourparlers et des preparatifs militaires de TAutriche, «st obligee de proceder a une mobUisation partielle M. de San Giuliano explique Taltitude de I'AUemagne et de TAutriche par leur conviction erronee que la Russie aban- M.R^eVxmM M.P«al.CAMBOH. M. BOPPB Les conversations directes austro-russes ayanl ete inter- rompues par la declaration de guerre de I'Autriche a la Serbie, les gouvemements franrais et russe prient Sir E. €rey de reprendre a Berlin sa proposition d'inlervenlion a qualre, et d'agir sur I'ltalie pour obtenir son plein L'AUemagne n'ayant voulu accepter que le principe de la mediation a qualre. Sir E. Grey, pour eviter toute nouvelle reponse dilatoire, laissera au gouvernement allemand le choix de la forme sous laquelle cette intervention lui paraitra praticable. 11 considere la situation comme tres grave ....'...• Le Gouvernement serbe a obtenu de la Russie I'assurance que cette puissance ne se desinteressera pas du sort de la M. Palsologub. L'ambassadeur d'AUemagne a Petersbourg est venu declarer que son pays mobiliserait si la Russie n'arrfitait pas ses prdparatifs militaires M.ReniVrmia M. Paleologoe Informe de cette demarche mena^ante, le Gouvernement francais se declare resolu a remplir toutes les obligations de I'aUiance russe, tout en continuant de travaiUer a une solution pacifique, et en demandant au Gouvernement russe d'agir de son cote dans le meme sens Le Gouvernement russe se declare pr6t a n^gocier jusqu'au bout, tout en restant convaincu que TAUemagne ne veut pas agir it Vienne en faveur de la paix ;....... . . . M. PALioi,oa5s Sur une nouveUe demarche moins comminatoire de l'am- bassadeur d'AUemagne, M. Sazonoff s'esl empresse de faire une nouvelle proposition, indiquant que la Russie interrompra ses preparatifs militaires si I'Autriche se -. -declare pr^e a eliminer de son ultimatum les clauses qui ^ portent atteinte a la souverainete de ia Serbie no 111 112 13 114 115 116 117 NOMS DU SIGNATAIRE. M. Ddmaine M. Jnles Caaibon. M. Rene VnruNi M. Jules Cambon. M. Paul Cambon , M. Jules Cambon. M. Paul Cambon , LIEU et DATE D'ENVOI. Vienna, 3o juillel . Berlin, 3o juillet. . Paris , 3o juillet. . . Berlin, 3o juillet. . Londres, 3o juillet, M. MOLLAKD ■ M. Rene Vivuni M. PALEOLOCXiS . M. Ren6 Viviani M. Ddmaink .... M. Jules Cambon M. Ren6 VvfUKh Berlin, 3o juillet. Londres , 3 1 juillet Luxembourg, 3i juillet. Paris, 3i juillet.. Saint -Petersbourg 3i juillet ■ Paris, 3i juillet... SOMMAIRE. Vienne, 3i juillet.. Berlin, 3^ juillet., Paris, 3 1 juillet.,. A la suite d'un entretien tres cordial entre I'ambassadeur de Russie et le comte Bercbtold, une nouvelle tentative de conversation directe austro-russe sera faite a Petersbourg pour le reglement a Tamiable de Taffaire serbe Le Gouvernement allemand dement la nouvelle de la mobi- lisation, mais prend toules les mesures necessaires pour la hater. . M. Paul Cambon est invite a porter a la connaissance du Gouvernement anglais tous les renseignements concor- dants qui prouvenl les mesures militaires actives et mena- cantes prises par I'Allemagne depuis le 26 juillet, tandis que la France maintient ses troupes de couverture a dix kilometres environ de la frontiere. M. de Jagow declare inacccptablc pour I'Autricbe la propo- sition de M. Sazonoff L'Ambassadeur d'AUema^ne n'a pas apporte de reponse a la demande de sir Edward Grey que le Gouvernement allemand propose lui-meme une formule de mediation a quatre. Le prince Lichnowski a queslionne le Gouverne- ment anglais sur ses preparatifs militaires. Les renseigne- ments dbnnes a Sir E. Grey sur les preparatifs militaires de I'AQemagne I'ont amene a estimer, comme M. Paul Cambon , que le moment est venu d'envisager en commun toutes les hypotheses M. de Jagow declare que, pour gagner du temps, il va agir directement a Vienne en demandant les conditions autri- chiennes, eludant ainsi de nouveau la demande de sir Edouard Grey. 11 recrimine contre la Russie Sir E. Grey avertit I'Ambassadeur d'AlIemagne a Londres que TAngieterre ne pourrait pas rester neutre dans un conflit general ou ia France serait impliquee. 11 a dit d'autre part a M. Paul Cambon que le Gouvernement anglais ne pouvait nous garantir son intervention. La lettre autographe que i\I. le President de la Republique a adressee au Roi d'Angleterre a ete remise a celui-ci. , Le Ministre d'Etat luxembourgeois signale les preparatifs militaires a la frontiere allemande et demande a la France I'engagement de respecter la neutralite du Grand- Duche, quelle ne pent obtenir de I'Allemagne Le Gouvernement francais demande a Petersbourg, en vue de repondre au desir de I'Angleterre, de modifier la proposition de M. Sazonoff a I'Autricbe pour la rendre acceptable par cette puissance et a permettre une solution pacifique du conflit Le Gouvernement russe a accepte de modifier sa formule , malgreTemotion provoqueepar le bombardement de Bel- grade et Taction constamment provocatrice de TAulriche- Hongrie Les efforts paralleles poursuivis par I'Anglelerre et la Russie en vue du maintien de la paix se sont rejoints et perraet traient d'esperer une entente avec I'Autricbe-Hohgrie qui s'y montre plus disposee. Mais I'attitude de I'Allemagne donne I'impression que cette puissance n'a poursuivi de- puis ie debut que rhumiliation de la Russie, la desagre- gation de la Triple-Entente, et, si ce resultat ne pouvait Itre bbtenu , la guerre La mobilisation generale autrichienne est decretee. ...... A son tour, I'Allemagne decrete « Tetat de danger de guerre et demande a la Russie de demobiliser En annoncant a Paris I'ultimatum adresse a la Russie, M. de Schoen demande au Gouvernement francais de lui dire, avant le lendemain a une heure de I'aprfes-midi ^elle sera I'attitude de la France en cas de conflit russo alLemand — XIY BOS. NOM DD SlGNiTAIBK. LIEU et DATE DENVOI. SOMMAIRE. PAGES. U8 Saint -Petersbourg, 3i juiUet, La mobilisation generale de I'armee ausJro-hongroise enlrainB la mobilisation generale russe 129 119 M. KloBimowsKi Bruxelles.Sijuillet. Le Gouvernemenl beige recoit I'assurance ofTicielle que la France respeclera la neutralite beige 129 CHAPITRE VI. Declaration de guerr e de l'Allemagne a la Russie (samedi i" aout, a 7 h. 10 du soir) et X LA France (lundi 3 aout, a i8 h. d5). 120 M. Rene Viviaki Paris. i"aout.. . . Les Ambassadeurs d'Aulricbe a Paris et a Petersbourg font deux demarcbes dans un sens conciliant. Malbeureusement I'attitude de l'Allemagne nc permet plus guere d'esperer 133 12J M. Jules Cambon Berlin, i"aoul.. . L'Autriche-Hongrie annonce a Petersbourg quelle accepte de discuter le fond de sort differend avec la Serbie; mais la sommation adressee^iar rAllemagne a la Russie d'avoir a demobiliser dans les dou/.e heures parait emporter les dernieres esperanccs de paix 134 122 M. Rene Viviani Paris, i"aoul.... Le Gouvernement francais declare au Gouvernemenl anglais 135 123 124 M. Jules Cambon M. Barbere Berlin, i",aoiit... Rome, 1" aout. . . Le Gouvernement allemand se refuse a prendre un engage- 135 136 M. de San Giuliano declare a TAmbassadeur d'AUemagne que rilalie gardcra la neutralite 125 126 M. Rene VmAtii M.Paul Cambon Paris, 1" aout.. . . Londres, 1" aout^ Informe des dispositions concilianles de I'Autriche ct de I'acceptation par la Russie de la formule anglaise, M. de Schoen ne parle plus de son depart et protesle de.scs dis- positions pacifiques, tout en declarant qu'il n'a pas rccu 136 137 Sir E. Grey declare que TAngleterre a refuse la promesse de garder la neutralite que lAllemagne lui demandail. Le respect de la neutralite beige imporle beaucoup a I'Angleterre et TAHemagne n'a pas reponda a la question posee .. . ...... 127 M.Ren6 Viviani..., Paris, I "aout La mobilisation francaise a ete ordonnee dans la journee. 138 128 Luxembourg, 1" aout. Le Ministre d'Etat luxembourgeois demande au Gouverne- ment francais une assurance de neutralite semblable a celle qu'a recue la Belcique .•••••••... 139 129 M. Rene Viviani Paris, 1" aout. . . . Cette assurance est donnee par le Gouvernement francais . . 140 130 131 132 M. Jules Cambon M. Eyscum Berlin, 1" aout... Luxembourg, 2 aout Luxembourg, aao6t La mobilisation generale est ordonnee a Beriin. • 140 140 Violation de la neutralite luxembourgeoise par les troupes allemandes. Protestation du Ministre d'Etat • ..... • M MOLLARD ...» Explications fournies par le Gouvernement allemand qui declare que les mesures prises en Luxembourg sont Uni- quement preventives et n'on taucun caractere d'hoslilite centre, le.Grand-Duche . . 141 133 Note de M. de Scuoen. . . . Paris, 3 aout .... Meme explication loucbant I'entree des troupes allemandes dans le Grand-Duchi 'le Luxembourz. >,.«»•«»«. 1/42 xy — NOME- ROS. 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 NOMS DO SIGNATAIRE. 147 148 149 150 151 isiz M. PaLeologue. . , ^. . , . . M. Rbne Vituni?/ : : , — M. Rene VivrANi ,.. M. Paul Cambon ^. . M. Rene Viviani* M. Rene Vivuni.-. .1..^,. l/i. Pkllet. . , . . ^.-. . , . . . M. Klobokowski. ,,.,... M. Klobukowski. ...,.». M. Paof Cambon..*'. . . » . . M. Paul Cambon. ...;,,. M. Paul Cambon-. ......... M. Rene Viviani. ..*..... M. DE SCHOEJI M. Rene Viviani... . ,. . . . M. Rene Viviani. ,. . . . . . M. Rene Vivuni. ....... M. Rene Vivun... ...... M. Elobdkowski LIEU et DATE D'BNVOr. PetersboOrg,' a ao&t Paris; 5 aoiktt .•>;.■. Paris, a aoQt. Londres. a ao&t. Paris, a aoiit. Paris, a aoftt.. . . La Haye , 3 aout . Bruxeiles, 3 aout. Bruxelles , 3 aofit. , Londres , 3 aoilif . Londres, 3 aout. , Londres, 3 aoilt. , Paris , 3 aout . . . . Paris , 3 ao6t P^ris, 3. aout P4)ris:, 3 aoiit. . . . . PAris, 3 aout Paris, 3 aofit Bruxelles, 4 aoM.. SOMMAIRE. L'AUemagne vient de declarer la guerre a la Russie. . .-..., Communication de cetle nouvelle aux agents diplomatiques frangais a I'etranger t. , Les agents diplomatiques francais a i'etranger sont invites k faire connaitre cette situation aux gouvernements aupres desquels ils sont accredites Sir E. Grey a donne I'assurance que la flotte britannique defendrait les c6tes francaises contre toute attaque alle- mande par mer. La violalion de la neutralite de la Bel- gique serait consideree comme un casus belli Le President du Conseil communique aux Cbambres fran- caises les declarations de Sir E. Grey relatives au concours de la flotte britannique ; , - . Protestation adressee a Berlin contre les violations de la frontiere francaise Le Ministre d'AUemagne a La Haye annonce au Gouverne- ment neerlandais I'entree des troupes imperiales en Luxembourg et en Belgique, a litre de mesures preven- tives Le Gouvernement beige repousse la sommation qui lui est adressee d'avoir a laisscr aux troupes allemandes le libre passage a travers son terriloire 11 ne croit pas encore le moment venu de faire appel a la garantie des puissances pour defendre son independance. La declaration concernant l*intervention-de la flotte anglaise lie le Gouvernement britannique Dcmarcbe infructueuse de TAmljassadeur d'AUemagne a Londres aupres de Sir E. Grey pour obtenir i'assurance que la neutralite de I'Angleterre ne dependrait pas du res- pect de la neutralite beige Sir E. Grey fait aux Communes la declaration relative a rinlerventiori de la flotte anglaise et lit une iettre du roi Albert demandant I'appui de I'Angleterre Le Gouvernement francais dement a Londres la nouvelle d'apres iaquelle la frontiere allemande aurait ete violee par des ofliciers francais Declaration de guerre remise par i'Ambassadeur d'AUe- magne a Paris au President du Conseil. Communication de cette nouvelle aux agents diplomatiques francais a I'etranger Instructions envoyees a M. Jules Cambon, a Berlin, pour demander ses passeports Le Ministre de France a Municb recoit I'instruction de de- mander ses passeports Violation du territoire beige par les troupes allemandes. . , . Appel adresse par la Belgique a I'Angleterre , a la France et a la.Russie i 142 142 143 143 144 145 145 146 146 147 147 148 \ti8 149 149 150 150 151 151 VOCVMRHTS oiPLOHATiQUS$. — Guerre europeenne. >CME- ROS. NOMS DC SIGNATAIRE. LIEU et DATE D'ENVOI. SOMMAIRE. PAGES. 153 M. Paul Cambon Londres , 4 aoiil. . . Le Gouvernement allemand sera invite par le Gouvernemenl anglais a retireir avant minuil son ultimatum a la Bei- 152 154 155 M. Klobdkowsm M. Bapst Broxefles, 4 aout.. Copenhague, 6 aout Le Gouvernement allemand declare a Bruxelles qu'il se voit 152 Transmission d'un rapport d'apres lequel M. Jules Cambon rend compte au Gouvernement des circonstances de son voyage de relour et des vexations dont il a ete I'objet. . . . 152 156 M. MOLLARD Paris, h aout .... Rapport adresse au Gouvernement par M. Mollard au sujel de son depart de Luxembourg , impose par les auloriles mililaires aliemandes 157 157 M. Rene ViviANi (Circulaire aux puissances.) Paris , 4 aout Texte de la notiGcation aux Puissances de I'etat de guerre existant entre la France et I'Allemagne 100 158 M. Raymond Poincare , President de la Republique. (Message au Parlement.) Paris, 4 aout Message du President de la Republique lu a la seance du Parlement du 4 aout ibt4<<-*>>>- • • 161 159 M. Rene Viviani, Presi- dent du Conseil. (Dis- cours aux Chambres. ) Paris , 4 aout Texte du discours prononce par le President du Conseil a la Chambre des Deputes , le 4 aofit i Q 1 4 • 163 CHAPITRE VII. DECLARATION DE LA TRIPLE-ENTENTE. 160 M. Delcasse. Paris , 4 septembre Declaration de I'Angleterre, de la Russie et de la France , relativement a leur engagement reciproque de ne pas con- dure de paix separee, et de ne pas poser de conditions de paix sans accord prealable avec chacun des autres allies . ANNEXES. ANNEXE I. EXTRAiTS DU Livre blea relatifs a la position prise par L'angleterre PENDANT LES POURPARLERS QUI ONT PRECEDE LA GUERRE. Sir J. Bdchanan. Sir E. Grey. Sir E. Gret. Saint- Petersbourg , i4 juillet. Londres, agjuillet. Londres, agjuillet. Conversation entre M. SazonofT, M. Palcologue et Sir .1. Bu- chaiian concernant une declaration eventuelle de solid a - rile de I'Angleterre avec la Russie et la France dans 1 a crise europeenne. Renseignements donnes a M. Paul Cambon sur les vues du Gouvernement anglais au sujet de son attitude : ne pas donner a I'Allemagne de fausse impression sur I'abstention possible de I'Angleterre, ne pas prendre d'engagement precis des maintenant a I'egard de la France Compte-rendu d'un entretien avec rAmbassadeuB d'Alle- magne pour I'avertir que I'Angleterre ne s'engageait nul- lement k ne pas intervenir si la crise se developpait el si I'Allemagne et la France y etaient impliquees XVII NOME- ROS. 99 119 148 NOM DU SIGNATAIRE. SirFr. Bertie. Sir K GiiE¥. Sir E. Gret. LIEU et DATE D'EN vox. Paris, 3o juiilet. Londres, 3i juilleL Londres , 2 aout. . . SOMMAIRE. Conversation avec le President de la Republique, qui estime qu'une declaration de I'Angleterre aEDrmant son inten- tion de soutenir la France, don't la volonte pacifique est certaine, arreterait rAllemagne dans ses velleit^s de guerre , » Declaration faite a I'Ambassadeur de France que, au point ou en est la crise , le Gouvernement anglais ' ne peut prendre aucUn engagement deGnitif , Assurance donnee relativement a la protection des cdtes et de la marine frafiqaises par la flotte anglaise contra toute atlaque de la flotte allemande par le Pas-de-Calais oula mer du Nord ANNEXE n. EXTRAITS DU LIVRE BLEU RELATIFS AUX PROPOSITIONS FAITES PAR LE GOUVERNEMENT ALLEMAND AU GOUVEBNEMENT ANGLAIS EN VUE D'OBTENIR LA NEUTRALITE DE LUNfiLETERRE. 8> Sir E. GoscHEN . 101 123 Sir E. Gret Sir E. Grey. Berlin, 29 juiilet.. Londres , So juiilet, Londres, i"aout. Offres faites piar le Chancelier de I'Empire a I'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre pour tenter d'obtenir la neutralite anglaise : promesse de respecter I'integrite du territoire francais, mais non de ses colonies; intentions a I'egard de la HoUande et de la Belgique. Proposition d'une entente g^nerale de neutralite enlre I'Allemagne et I'Angleterre . . Refus des propositions allemandes, non seulement ina;ccep- tables en fait, mais dont I'acceptation sei'ait une honte pour la reputation de I'Angleterre. Inutilite d'examiner la perspective d'une convention generale de neutralite entre I'Angleterre et I'AHemagne pour I'avenir. L'Angleterre veiit garder son entiere liberie d'action et continuer a cooperer au maintien de la paix en Europe : c'est pour I'Allemagne la seule facon de maintenir de bonnes rela- tions avec rAngleterre Compte rendu d'une conversation avec I'Ambassadeur d'Alle- magne relativement a la neutralite beige. Le prince Lichnowsky insiste pour que le Gouvernement anglais formule les conditions anxquelles I'Angleterr^ garderait la neutralite; il lui est repondu qile le Gouvernement anglais refuse definitivement toute promesse de rester neutre et veut garder les mains libres ANNEXE 11 his. TENTATIYES ALLEMANDES POUR OBTENIR, SOUS LE COUVERT D'UN « MALENTENDU » , LA GARANTIE, PAR L'ANGLETERRE DE LA MEUTRALITE DE LA FRANCE DANS UNE GUERRE GERMANO-RUSSE [Gazette de I'Allemagne duNord), 20 aout i9i4). Prince Lichnowsky . Sa Majeste I'Empereur Gdil- laume U. Londres, 3i juiilet. Berlin, i"aoiit. Compte rendu d'une soi-disant demande telephonique visant nn engagemient eventuel de I'Allemagne de ne pas attaquer la France si celle-ci reste neutre dans une guerre entre I'Allemagne et la Russie Telegramme de I'Empereur Guillaumeau Roi George V pour declarer qu'il ne peut arr^ter sa mobilisation contre la Russie et la France, mais n'attaquera pas la France. dans rhypothcsft oii cette puissance ofFrirait sa neutrality gftrantie par I'armee et la flotte anglaises XVIII >TME- BOS. NOM DO SIGNATAIHE. M. DE BeTHMAKN HOLLWEG. S.M. IcRoi George V. Prince L1CHSOWSK.Y . LIEU et DATE D'E-NVOI. Beriin, 1" aout. Londres,.i"ao{it.. Lon3res, »aoiil.. SOMMAIRE. Telegramme au prince Lichnowsky. reprodulsant I'engage- ment de I'Allema'rne Telegramme du Roi d'Angleterre a I'Empereur d'AUemagne declarant que I'Ambassadeur d'AUemagne s'est mepris et quie sir Edward Grey n'a parl6 avec le prince Lichnowsy, que des moyens de retander un conflit arme entre la France et I'Allemagne jusqu'i ce qu'un terrain d'enlente definitif ait ete trouve entre I'Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie Avis donne a M. de Bethmann HoHweg que les conversatfons dont il avaitfaitetat ontete abandonnees comme « futiles f. ANNEXE m. EXTBAITS DO LIVRE BLEU VISANT LE REFUS DE L'ANGLETERRE D'ADMETTRE LE POINT DE VUE ALLEMAND DANS LA QUESTION DE LA VIOLATION DE LA NEUTRALITE BELGE. 153 155 157 159 160 Sir E. Ghet. Sir £. Grex. M. DE Jagow Sir £. Grey . . . Sir E. GoscHEN , Londres, 4 aout . Londres, 4 aout. Berlin, 4 aout. Londres, 4 aoiit. . Londres, 8 aotA.. Demande d'engagement immediat de I'Allemagne qu'elle respectera la neutralite beige Declaration a la Belgique que I'Angleterre est pr^te a s'unir a la France et a la Russie pour resister a une attaque de TAllemagne contre la Belgique ;et pour garantir i'inte- grite et I'independance de ce pays ^. . . Declaration communiquee par I'Ambassadeur d'AUemagne a Londres que malgre la violation jugee necessaire de la Belgique aucune annexion de territoire n'aura lieu. Preuve donnee de la sincerite de celte declaration par laflirma- tion que la neutralite de la Hollande sera respectee, une annexion du territoire beige ne pouvant itre profitable sans une annefcion simultanie du territoire hollandais Ultimatum de I'Angieterre a TAlIemagne . Rapport de I'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre k Berlia sur ses dernieres conversations avec M. de Jagow, M. de Beth- mann HoHweg et M. de Zimmermann. Le Cbancelier de I'Empire ne pent s'expliquer que, «pour un mot, neutra- lite », que, tpour un chiffon de papier > I'Angleterre aille faire la guerre a une nation a laquelle elle est appa- rentee et qui ne desirait rien tant que d'etre son amie. L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre essaye de faire comprendre a son interlocuteur que c'est une question de vie ou do mort pour I'honneur de la Grande-Bretagne que de lenir I'engagement solennel qu'elle a sign6 de d^fendre la neu- tralite de la Belgique ANNEXE IV. BXTBAITS DU UVRE GRJS INDIQUANT LES CONDITIONS DANS LESQUELLES L*ALLEMAGNB A VIOLE LA NEUTRALITE BELGE : Dep6che$ n** 9, 8,9, 11, 13, i3, li, i5, 19, 9o, aa, 37. 38. 3o, 3i. 35. 39. 4o. 4i. 44. 48, 5s. 60. 71.. 195 XIX NOM DO DESTINATAIRE. LIEU et DATE D'KNVOI. SOMMAIRE. ANNEXE V. EXTRAITS DU LIVRB BLANC. Telegrammes ^changes entre TEmpereur d'Allemagne Guil- laume II et I'Empereur de Russie Nicolas II, du 28 juii- let au i" aout ipereu '9» 209 76 77 78 ANNEXE VI. EXTRAITS DU LIVRE ORANGE RELATIFS \ LA DECLARATION DE GUERRE DE L'ALLEMAGNE X LA RUSSIE. Comte DE POURTALES. M. Sazonoff. M. Sazonofp. Saint -Petersbourg , 1" avril. Saint-Petersbourg, 2 aout. Saint - Petersbourg , 2 aout. Note remise par I'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne i Saint- Petersbourg au Ministre des Affaires etrangeres de Russie Communique du Ministre des Aflalres etrangeres de Russie resumant les evenements qui se sont succede du 33 juillet au 1" aout 1 9 1 /j Circulaire du Ministre des Affaires etrangeres de Russie aux Representants de I'Empire a I'etranger 213 213 215 MINISTfeRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES &<8» Le probleme qui nous est pos^ aujourd'hui se serait done pose quelques ann^es plus lard et d'une maniere plus angoissanle encore, puisque la diminution de nos contingents amoindrit sans cesse le chiffre de noire effectif de paix. — 6 — Ces anniversaires , rappelant la lutte contre la France, vont se r^peter toute I'annee. En I gill on cei^brera le centenaire de la premiere campagne de France , de la premiere entree des Prussiens k Paris. En resum6,si I'opinion publique allemande ne montre pas la France du doigt, comme le fjdt la Gazette de Cologne , c est cependant contre nous qu'elle est et restera iongtemps braquee. Elle trouve que pour nos ho millions d'babitants nous tenons au soleil une place vraiment trop grande. Les Allemands desirent la paix , ne cesse-t-on de proclamet, et I'Empereur plus que tout autre, piais ils ne I'entendent pas dans le sens de concessions mutuelles ni dequilibre des armements. lis veulent qu'on les craigne et ils sont en train de faii'e les sacrifices necessaires. Si, a quelque occasion, leur orgueil national se trouve bless6, la confiance que pourra avoir le pays dans I'^norme superiorite de son armee favorisera une explosion de colere nationale devant laquelle la moderation du Gouvernement imperial sera peut-etre impuissante. II faut constater d'ailleurs que le Gouvernement met tout en ceuvre pour chauffer le sen- timent national, en felanl avec eclat tous les anniversaires de 1 8 1 3. Au reste, la tournur& de Topinion n'aurait pour effet que de donner a une guerre un caractere plus ou moins national. Par quelque pretexte que I'AIlemagne justifie une confla- gration europeenne, nul ne.peut faire que les premiers coups d^cisifis ne soient pas portes contre la France. Annexe II. M. DE Faramond, attache naval pres TAmbassade de France k Beiiin, a M. Baudin, Ministre de la Marine. Berlin, le i5 mars 19 13. En vous rendant compte de I'examen du budget de la marine par la Commission du Reichstag, j'ai dit qu'aucune loi navale ayant pour objet un accroissement de la flotte ne serait pr^sent^e cette ann^e et que tout Teffort militaire serait dirig6 contre nous. Bien que le nouveau projet de loi destin^ a augmenter les effectifs allemands ne soit pas encore d^pos^ devant ie Reichstag, nous savons qu'il s'agit d'un « renf'orcement militaire de grande envergure», suivant I'expression de la Gazette de I'AIlemagne du Aoz-rf. Les joumaux officieux ont d'ailleurs commente le projet militaire dans des termes qui permeltent de tenir pour exact le communique du Lokal Anzeiger. Les ettectifs allemands s'elevent actuellement a 720,000 hommes; nous sommes autoris^s k conclure que , le 1 " octobre 1916, I'armee imp^riale sera port^e k un chiflre voisin de 860,000 hommes, L'importance du chiffre serait moindre si les provisions "de la nouvelle loi ( d'apres ce que nous ont laiss6 entrevoir les feuilles officielles) n'avaient pas pour tendance, comme du reste. les dispositions de la loi de 1912, de mettre les corps d'armee voisin^ de notre fronti^ro — 7 — . dans un etat aussi rapproch6 que possible du pied de guerre, afln de pouvoir, le jour m^me de I'ouverture des. hostiiites, nous attaquer brusqiiement avec des forces tres sup^rieures aux notres. C'est pour, ie Gouvernement imperial une n^cessite imperieuse d'obtenir un succ^s des le debut des operations. Les conditions dans lesquelle§ I'Empereur allemand engagerait aujourd'hui une I utte contre la France ne sont plus les memes qu'il y a quarante ans. Au d6but de la guerre de 1870, I'Etat-Major prussien avait envisage la possibilite d'une offensive victorieuse des Fraiicais et Moltke, prevoyant que nous pourrions k la rigueur parvenir jusqu'a Mayence, avait dit a son souverain : « La ils se heurteront ». Guillaume II ne peut pas admettre une retraite clans ses calculs, quoique le soldat allemand ne soit plus aujourd'hui, cdmme il y a quarante ans , un homme simple , religieux et pret a mourir sur un ordre de son roi. Tenant compte des quatre millions de suffrages social istes exp rimes aux dernieres Elections et du fait que le droit de vote n'est acquis en AUemagne qu'ci 2 5 ans , on peut penser que Tarmee active, composee de jeunesgens de 20 i 26 ans, doit comporter dans ses rangs une propor- tion sMeuse de socialistes. Certes, ce serait folie de croire que les socialistes allemands leveront la crosse en I'air ie jour ou la France et I'Allemagne en viendront aux mains; mais il sera extremement impor- tant, pour le Gouvernement imperial de leur persuader, d'une part que nous sommes les agresseurs, et d'autre part qu'ils peuvent avoir pleine confiance dans le commandement et le resultat. Lors du dernier serment des recrues de la garde ii Potsdam, j'ai ete frappe d'entendre I'Empereur prendre pour theme de son di^cours aux jeunes soldats « le devoir d'etre plus- courageux et plus discipline dans la mauvaise fortune que dans la bonne ». Et c'est parce qu'une premiere d^faite allemande aurait pour I'Empire une port^e incal- culable que Ton trouve dans tous les projets militaires ^labor^s par le grand Etat-Majof I'objectif d'une offensive fovidroyante contre la France. En r^alite, le Gouvernement imperial veut se mettre en etat de faire face a toules les 6ventualites possibles. C'est du cote de la Frartce que le danger lui parait le plus grand. La Gazette de Cologne I'a dit dans un article haineux et violent dont la Wilhelmstrasse a desa- vou^ la forme plut6t que le fond. Mais nous devons nous persuader que I'opinion exprimee par la Gazette de Cologne est k I'heure actuelle celle de I'immense majorite du peuple allemand. A cet egard, je crois interessant de citer une conversation qu'un membre de notre ambassade a eue I'autre soir avec le vieux prince Henckel de Donnersmark , parce qu'elle pourrait bien refl^ter la pensee qui domine dans les milieux de la Cour. Faisant allusion au nouveau projet militaire allemand, le prince de Donnersmark a dit : « Les Francais ont tout a fait tort de croire que nous nourrissons de sombres desseins et que nous d^sirons une guerre. Mais nous ne pouvons pas oublier qu'en 1870 i'opinion populaire a force le Gouvernement Francais a nous attaquer foUement, sans etre pret. Qui peut nous assurer c[ue I'opinion publique, si prompte a s'enflammer en France, ne mettra pas queique Jour le Gouvernement.de la R6publique dans robligalion de nous faire la guerre.^ C'est contre ce danger que nous voulons nous premiinir ». Et le prince a ajoute : « On m'a souvcnt regards en France comme un des artisans de la guerre de 1870. Cela est tout a fait faux. Si j'ai travaille aux consequences de la guerre, j'avais au contraire fait mon possible pour en empecher I'explosion. Queique tenlps avant la guerre, me trouvant a un diner ou etaient reunies les personnalites les plus considerables du regime imperial, je pris la parole pour deplorer les sentiments d'inimitie qui se manifes- taient deja entre la France et la Prusse. On me^r6pondit que si je parlais ainsi, c'est que — 8 — j'avais peur dune lutte dont Tissue serait certainement defavorable k la Prusse. Je repliquai : «Non, ce n'est pas parce que j'ai peur que je repudie I'idee dune guerre entre la France et la Prusse, mais bien parce que je crois qu'il est de I'interet des deux pays de I'eviter. Et puisque vous avez fait allusion aux chances d'une telle iutte, je vais vous dire mon ppinion. J'ai la conviction que vous serez battus pour la raison que voici : en depit des brillantes qualites que je reconnais aux Frangais et que j admire, vous netes pas exacts. Par exacti- tude, je n'entends pas le fait d'arriver a I'heure a un rendez-vous, mais j'entends la ponc- tualite dans toute I'etendue du mot. Le Francais, qui a une grande facilite de travail, n'est ]pas aussi ponctuel que I'Allemand dans I'accomplissement de ses devoirs. Dans la prochaine guerre, ia nation victorieuse sera celle dont tous les servjteurs du haut en bas de i'echelle seront exacts a remplir leur devoir, si important ou si infime que soit ce devoir. » Et le prince de Donnersmark a ajoute : « La ponctualite, qui a joue un si grand role lorsqu'il s'est agi, il y a quarante ans, de mouvoir une armee de 5 00,000 homm^s, aura une impor- tance encore bien plus grande au cours de la prochaine guerre ou Ton devra mettre en action des masses autrement nombreuses ». Sous cctte forme, le vieux prince a.exprime ia confiance qu'ont tous les Allemands dans la superiorite de leur organisation militaire. Lorsque j'ai parle plus haut du nouveau projet aliemand, je n'ai fait allusion qua un accroissement des effectifs. Mais le projet comportera aussi une augmentation du materiel et des ouvrages de defense dont le detail n'est pas connu , mais dont on peut se faire une idee par le chiflre des depenses envisagees pour y faire face : 1 ,2 5o, 000, 000 de francs. L'execution de la ioi du quinquennat de 1911 n'avait pas n^cessite de mesure financiere sp^ciale. La Ioi militaire et navale de 1912 avait 6te provisoirepient couverte par les excedents budgetaires des annees 1 9 1 o et 1911, par une r^forme de la Ioi sur i'alcool et par I'ajourne- ment de I'abaissement de I'impdt sur les sucres (ces deux dernieres ressources ne repr^sen- tent d'ailleurs ensemble qu'une somme d'une soixantaine de millions de francs). 11 faut en outre rappeler que de gros emprunts ont el6 fait r^ceniment par i'Empire et la Prusse : cinq cents millions de marks le 29 Janvier 1912 et trois cent cinquante millions de marks le 7 mars 1913. Une part assez importante de ces emprunts a du etre afiect^e aux depenses mililaires. La Ioi militaire de 1913 exigera des mesiires fmancieres tout a fait exceptionnelles. D'apres les indications donnees par la presse officieuse, les depenses dites « d'une fois » s'eleveraicnt k un milliard de marks et les depenses « permanentes » annuelles resultant de i'augmentation des eflectifs depasseraient deux cents millions de marks. II parait a peu pres certain que les depenses non renouvelables seront couvertes par une contribution de guerre pr6Iev6e sur le capital. On exempterail lespetites fortunes el I'on frapperait d'une taxe progressive les fortunes superieures k 20,000 marks. Present^ sous cotte forme I'impot de guerre ne saurait deplaire aux socialistes , qui pourront ainsi , sui- vant leur tactique habituelle, repousser le prin6ipe de la Ioi militaire et voter les credits qui en assurent Texecution. Le Gouvernement craint que parmi les classes riches et bourgeoises » cette imposition extraordinaire d'un milliard portant exclusivement sur la fortune acquise ne cr^e up durable m^contentement; aussi fait-il tout ce qui est en son pouvoir pour persuader ceux qu'il va ranconner si durement que la securite de I'Empire est menacee et pour etablir une analogic entre les temps belliqueux de 1 8 1 3 et la periode actuelle. En fStantbruyammenllecentenaire de la guerre de I'Jndependance^ on veut convaincre — 9 — \e peuple de la n^cessit^ du sacrifice et. lui rappeler que la Frande e$t , aujourd'hui. comme il y a oenl ans, rennemi h^redilaire. Si nous constatons que le Gouvernement ailemand s'efforce d'obtenir que. cette ^norme taxe ne soit pas acquiltee en plusieurs ^ch^ances; et si comrne le disent certains journaux, le payement integral devait etre realise avantle i" juillet 1914, il y auraitla pour nous une indication redoutable, car rien ne saurait expliquer une telle hate des autorit^s militaires ^ posseder un tr^sor de guerre liquide dun milliard dans leur caisse. En ce qui concerne la couverture des depenses permanentes qui r^sullerorit de I'applica- tion des lois de 1912 et 1913, rien n'a encore 6t^ dit. Une houvelle legislation sera i^vi denlment necessaire pour procurer les ressoUrces annuelles. Je conclus : en Allemagne I'execution d'une reforme militaire suit toujours de tres pres la decision prise de I'accomplir. Toutes les dispositions nouvelles pr^vues par la loi du. quinquennat de 1 9 1 1 et par la loi de 19 1 2 sont deja mises en vigueur, II est fort possible? qu'une partie du materiel dont la noiivelle loi va autoriser I'achat soit en cours de fabri- cation. Les secrets militaires sont si bien gardes ici qii'il est extr^mement difficile de suivre les mouvements du personnel et du materiel. Avec 700,000 hommes sous les armes (sans compter les reservistes fort nombreux qui sont actuellement en instruction) une organisation militaire parfaite et une opinion publiqpe qui se laisse dominer par les appels belliqueux de la Ligue militaire et de la Ligue navale, ie peuple ailemand est a cette heure xm voisin bien dangereux. Si le service de trois ans est adopte et imm^diatement appliqu6 en France, les conditions seroni moins inegales Tan prochain. Les effectifs allemands seront encore sensiblement plus considerables que les notres , mais I'appel de tout le contingent disponible ne permettra plus la selection et amenera dans les rangs de Tarm^e allemande des elements de second ordre et meme des unites peu desirables. La valeur morale de I'armee active y perdra. Les Allemands ont voulu rompre 1 equilibre des deux camps qui divisent I'Europe , par un grand eCfort supreme, au deli duquel ils ne peuvent plus grand'chose. lis n'avaient pas cru la France capable dun grand sacrifice. L'adoption du service de trois ans chez nous dejouera ieurs calculs. Farahond. r 2. M.Etienne, Ministre de la Guerre, ^ a M. JoNNART, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres. 1 W§ Je viens de recevoir d'une source sure communicalion d'un rapporl.officiel et secret ^ur le renforcement de I'armee allemande : il se divise en deux parties : une premiere de generalites, et une secoude, d'ordre technique, precisant dans le plus grand DocuME>'TS DiPLOMATXQUES. — Guerrc europeenne. 2 Paris, le 2 avril 191 3. \ — 10 — detail, arme par arme, les mesures a prendre ; ce qui concerne Temploi des aiKcKJ mobiles et I'utilisation de Faeronautique est particulierement frappant. TdLi rhonneur de vous adresser ci-joint une copie de la premiere partie de ce docu- ment, qui me parait devoir retenirvotre attention. Etienne. Annexe. Note snr le renforcement de Varmee allemande. Berlin , ie 1 9 mars 1 9 1 3. I. — ^ GeNERALITES SUfl LES NODVELLES LOIS MILITAIRES. L'augmentation a eu lieu en trois eta pes : 1° La Conference d'Alg6siras a enleve les derniers doutes sur i'existence dune entente entre la) France, I'Angleterre et la Russie. Nous avons vu, d autre part, que rAutriche- Hongrie etait obligee d'immobiiiser des forces contre la Serbie et I'ltalie ; enfm, notre flotte n etait pas , u ce moment-la , assez forte. A la fin du conflit , on s'occupa done en premiere ligne de renforcer la defense de nos c6tes, d'augmenter notre force navale. Contre I'inten-s tion anglaise d'envoyer un corps d'expedition de 100,000 hommes sur le continent, on devait repondre par une meilleure formation des reserve^ qui devaient etre employees, d'aprea les circonstances , au service sur les cotes, dans les lorleresses et dans les sieges. 11 etait clair deji a cette 6poque qu il serait indispensable de faire un grand effort. 2° Les Fran9ais ayant viole les conventions marocaines, amenerent I'incident d'Agadir. A cette 6poque, les progres de I'arm^e fran9aise, le relevement moral de la nation, I'avancej technique prise dans le domaine de Tavialion et dans celui des mitrailleuses, rendait une attaque contre les Francais moins facile que dans la periode precedente. De plus, il fallait s'attendre a une attaque de la flotte anglaise, Cette situation difficile ouvrit les yeux sur la Ii6cessit6 d'une augmentation de I'armee. Cette augmentation fut, d6s cette epoque , consi- der^e comme un minimum. 3' La guerre des Balkans aurait pu nous entrainer a la guerre pour soutenir notre alli6 La nouvelle situation au sud de rAutriche-Hongrie diminuait la valeur de I'aide que cet allid pouvait nous appprter. D'autre part, la France s etait renforc6e par une nouvelle loi dea cadres; il fallait done avancer les dates d'execution prevues pour la nouvelle loi militaire. On prepare I'opinion k un renforcement nouveau de Tarm^e active^ qui assurerait a I'Al lemagne une paix honorable, et la possibilite de garantir comme il convient son influence dans les affaires du monde. La nouvelle loi militaire et le complement qui doit la suivre permettront presque completement de repondre a ce but. Ni les ridicules criailleries de revanche des chauvinistes francais, ni les grincements de dents des Anglais, ni les gestes desordonnes des Slaves ne nous d^tourneront de notre but qui est de fortifier et d'^tendre le Deutschthum (puissance germanique) dans le monde entier Les Fran9ais peuvent armer tant qu'ils voudront; ils ne peuvent, du jour au lendemain augmentcr leur population. L'emploi d'une armee noire sur les theatres d'operations e p^ens restera pour longtemps un reve, du reste d^pourvu de beauty. 11 — II. — But et devoirs de notre politique HATIONALE, DE NOTRE ARMEE ET DE NOS ORGANES SPECIAUX AU SERVICE DE L'ARMEE. Notre nouvelle loi militaire n est qu'une extension de I'oeuvre d'education mililaire du peuple allemand. Nos ancetres de 1 8 1 3 , ont fait de plus gros sacrifices. Cest notre devoir sacre d'aiguiser I'epee que Ion nous a mise en main , et de ia tenir prete pour nous defendre comme pour porter des coups a notre ennemi. 11 fautfaire pen^trer dans le peaple I'idie que nos armcmenU sont une reponse aux armements et a la politique fran^aise. H faut I'habituer a penser qu'une guerre offensive de notre part est unc necessite pour combattre les provoca- tions de fadversaire. II faudra agir avec prudence pour n'eveiller aucun soup9on , et 6viter les crises qui pourraient nuire a notre vie ecouomique. 11 faut mener les affaires de telle facon que sous la pesante impression d'armements puissants, de sacrifices considerables, et d'une situation politique tendu^, un dechainement (Lo^c/iZa^fen) soil considere comme une deiivrance , parce qu'apres lui viendraierit des decades de paix et de prosp6rite comme -apr^s 1870. II faut preparer la guerre ati point de vue financier; il y a beaucoup a faii'e de ce c6te-la. 11 ne faut pas eveiller la mefiance de nos financiers , mais bien des choses cependant no pourront ctre cachees. 11 n'y aurait pas a s'inquieter du sort de nos colonies. Le r^sultat final en Europe le reglera pour elles. Par contre , il faudra susciter des troubles dans le Nord de I'Afrique et en Russie. Cest un moyen d absorber des forces de I'adversaire. II est done absolument necessaire que nous nous meltions en relations, par des organes bien choisis^ avec des gens influents en Egypte, a Tunis, a Alger et au Maroc, pour preparer lesmesures n^cessaires en cas de guerre europeenne. Bien entendu, en cas de g:uerre, on reconnaitrait ouvertement ces allies secrets; et on leur assurerait, a la conclusion de ia paix, la conservation des avantages conquis. On peut realiser ces ddsiderata. Un premier essai, qui a ete fait il y a quelques annees, nous avait procure le contact voulu. Malheureuscment , on n'a pas consolide suflisamment les re- lations obtenucs. Bon gre mal gr^, il faudra en venir a des pr^paratifs de ce genre, pour mener rapidement a sa fin une campagne. Les soulevenients provoques en temps de guerre par des agents poliliques demandent a elre soigneusemcnt prepares, et par des moyens materiels. lis doivent eclater simultanement avec la destruction des moyens de communication; ils doivent avoir une tete dirigeante que Ton peut trouver dans des chefs influents, religieux ou politiques. L'ecole 6gyptienne y est pnrticulierement apte, elle relie de plus en plus entre eux les intellectuels du monde musulman. Quoi qu il en soit, noiv*; devons ctre forts pour pouvoir aueantir d'un puissant elan nos enncmis de fEst et de I'Ouest. Mais dans la prochaine guerre europeenne, il faudra aussi que les petils Etats soicnl contraints a nous suivre, ou soient domptes. Dans certaines con- ditions, leurs annees et leurs places fortes pcuventetre rapidement vaincues ou neutralis6es , ce qui pourrail elre vraisemblablement l,e cas pour la Belgique et la Hollandc, afin d'inter- dire a notre ennemi de I'Ouest un territoire qui pourrait lui servir de base d'operation dans notre flanc. Au Nord, nous n'avons a craindre aucune menace du Danemark ou des Etats scandinaves, d'autant plus que dans tous les cas, nous pourvoirons a la concentration d'une forte arm^e du Nord , capable de repondre a toute mauvaise intention de ce cote. Au cas le plus defavorable , le Danemark pouirait etre force par I'Angleterre a abandonner sa neu- tralite; mais a ce moment, la decision serait deja intervenue sur terrc ct sur mer. Notre arniee du Nord , dont les forces pourraient etre notablement augmentees par les formations — 12 — hollandaises , r^pondrait par une defensive extremement active k toute offensive de cft cdl6. Au Sud, la Suisse forme un boulevard extremement solide, et nous pouvons compter quelle defendra energiquement sa neutralite contre la France, protegeant ainsi notre flanc. Comme on I'a dit plus haut, on ne peut considerer de meme la situation vis-^-vis des petits Etats de notre frontiere Nord-Ouest. Lk , ce sera pour nous une question vitale , et le but verslequel il faudra tendre, c'est de prendre I'offensive avec une grande superiorite des les premiers jours. Pour cela, il faudra concentrer une grande arm6e, suivie de fortes for- mations de landwehr, qui d6termineront les armees des petits Etats a nous suivre , ou tout au moins a rester inactives sur le Itieatre de la guerre , et qui les ecraseraient en cas de resistance armee. Si Ton pouvait decider ces Etats a organiser leur systeme fortifie de telle facon qu'il constitue une protection elTicace dd notre flanc , on pourrait renoncer a I'invasion projet^e. Mais, pour cela, il faudrait aussi, particulierement en Beigique, qu'on reformat I'armee, pour quelle offrit des garanties serieuses de resistance elficace. Si, au contraire, son organisation defensive etait 6tablie contre nous, ce qui donnerait des avantages evi dents k notre adversaire de I'Ouest, nous ne pourrions, en aucune facon, offrir a la Beigique une garantie de la s6curit6 de sa neutralite. Un vaste champ est done ouvert a notre diplomatic pour travailler, dans ce pays, dans le sens de nos int^rlts. Les dispositions arret6es dans ce sens permettent d'esp^rer que I'offensive peut 6tre prise [aussitdt apr^s la concentration complete de I'arm^e du Bas-Rhin. Un ultimatum h br^ve ^ch^ance, que doit suivre imm^diatement I'invasion, permettra de justifier sulTisamment [notre action au point de vue dif droit des gens. . Tels sont les devoirs qui incombent k notre arm^e, et qui exigent un effectif 61ev6. Si I'ennemi nous atlaque. ou si nous voulons le dompter, nous ferons comme nos freres d'il y I a cent ans; I'aigle provoqu^ prendra son vol, saisira I'ennemi dans ses serres acerees, et le • rendra inoffensif. Nous nous souviendrons alors que les provinces de I'ancien empire alle- mand : Comt6 de Bourgogne et une belle part de la Lorraine, sont encore aux mains des I Francs; que des milliers de freres allemands des provinces balliques g^missent sous le joiig [^lave. C'est une question nationale de rendre a I'AUemagne ce qu'elle a autrefois poss6d6. r 3. M. Jules Cambon , Ambassadeur de France k Berlin , k M. Stephen Pichon , Ministre des Affaires ^trang^res. Berlin, le 6 mai 19 13. Je paiiais ce soir avec le Secretaire d'Etat de la Conference des Ambassadeurs et des resullats obtenus k la seance d'hier k Londres. La crise dent TEurope etait me- nacee est, k ses yeux, ecartee, mais seulement pour quelque temps: « II semble, me disait M. de Jagow, que nous marchons dans un pays de montagnes* Nous venons de passer un col difficile et nous voyons d'autres hauteurs se dresser devant nous. » — « Celle que nous venons de surmonter, lui repondis-je, etait peut-dtre la plus dure k Tasser. » — 13 — ; La crise que nous venons de traverser a ete tres serieuse. Ici, on a consider^ le danger de guerre comme imminent. J ai eu la preuve des preoccupations de I'Allemagne par un certain nombre de faits qu'il importe que Votre Excellence connaisse. J'ai re^u hier la visite d'un de mes coUegues avec qui j'entretiens des relations particulieres et cordiales. Lors de ia visite qu'il a faite a M. de Jagow, celui-ci lui a de- mande, a tilre confidentiel quelle etait exactement la situation de la Russie en Extreme-Orient et si cette Puissance a, en ce moment, quelque chose a redouter de ce cote qui y puisse retenir ses forces. L'Ambassadeur lui repondit qu d ne voyait rien , absolument rien , qui put etre une cause de preoccupation pour le Gouverne- ment russe et que celui-ci avait les mains libres en Europe. Je disais plus haut que le danger d'une guerre avait ete envisage ici comme tres proche. Aussi ne s'est-on pas contente de tater le terrain en Extreme-Orient, on s'est prepare ici-meme. La mobilisation de I'armee allemande ne se borne pas h Tappel des reservistes k la caserne. H y a, en AUemagne, une mesure preparatoire qui n'existe pas chez nous et qui consiste a prevenir les officiers et les hommes de la reserve de se tenir prets pour Tappel , afm qu'ils puissent prendre les arrangements qui leur sont necessaires. Cestun « garde k vous » general, etil faut I'incroyable esprit de soumission, de disci- pline et de secret qui existe en ce pays, pour qu'une pareille disposition puisse exister. Si un pareil avertissement etait donne en France, le pays fremirait tout en- tier et la presse le dirait le lendemain. Get avertissement a ete lance, en 1 9 1 1 , au cours des negociations que je poursui- vais sur le Maroc. Or, il a ete lance de nouveau, il y a une dizaine de jours, c'est-^-dire aii moment de la tension austro-albanaise. Je le sais, et le tiens de plusieurs sources differentes, nolamment d'officiers de reserve qui Tont dit a des amis dans la plus stricte intimite. Ges messieurs ont pris les mesures necessaires pour assurer a leur famille , en coffre- fort, les moyens de vivre pendant un an. On a meme dit que c'etait pour cette meme raison que le Kronprinz , qui devait faire le voyage d'essai de VImperator, ne s'est pas embarque. La decision qui a fait prendre cette mesure preparatoire a la mobilisation repond aux idees du Grand Etat-Major general. Sur ce point, j'ai ete mis au courant d'une conversation tenue dans un milieu allemand par le general de Moltke , qui est consi- dere ici comme I'officier le plus distingue de I'armee allemande. La pensee de I'Etat-Major general est d'agir par surprise. « II faut laisser de cote, a dit le general de Moltke, les lieux communs siu* la responsabilite de I'agresseur. Lorsque la guerre est devenue necessaire , il faut la faire en mettant toutes les chances de son cote. Le succes seul la justifie. L' AUemagne ne pent ni ne doit laisser a la Russie le temps de mobiliser; car eile serait obligee de maintenir sur sa frontiere Est une force telle qu'elle se trouverait en situation d'egalite, sinon d'inferiorlte, avec la France. Done, a ajoute le general , il faut prevenir notre principal adversaire des qu'il y aura neuf chances sur dix d'avoir la guerre, et la commencer sans altendre pour ecraser brutalement toute resistance. » — 14 — Voil^ exactement r^tat d'ame des milieux militaires, qui repond ^ Vetat d'ame des milieux poiitiques, ceux-ci ne considerant pas la Russie, au coairaire de nous» comme un ennemi necessaire. Voili ce qu'on pensait et disait entre soi il y a quinze jours. II faut relenir de cetle aventure la legon que renferment les fails que j ai presentes plus hant : ces gens-ci ne craignent pas la guerre , ils en acceptent pleinemeat la pos- sibilite et ils ont pris leurs niesures en consequence. Ih veulent elre toujnurs prels. Comme je le disais, cela exige des conditions de secret et de discipline et une volonte perseverantc : lenthousiasme ne suffit pas a tout. Cette leqon peut etre utile a mediter dans le moment ou le Gouvernement de la Uepublique demande au Par- lement les moyens de fortifier le pays. Jules Cambon. N" 4. M. Allize, Ministre de la Republique en Baviere, a M. Stephen Pichon, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres. Munich, le 10 juiliet 19 13. Au point de vue politique , on se demande a quoi serviront les nouveaux arme- ments. Reconnaissant que personne ne menace I'AUemagne, on considere que la diplomatic allemande disposait deja de forces assez considerables et d'alliances assez puissantes pour defendre avec succes les interets allemands. Comme je le relevais d^ja au lendemain de faccord marocain de 1911, on estime que la Chancellerie imperiale sera aussi incapable dans I'avenir que dans le passe d'adopter une politique exterieure active et de remporter, tout au moins sur ce terrain, des succes qui justi- fieraient les sacrifices que la nation s'impose. Cet etat d esprit est d'autant plus inquietant que le Gouvernement imperial se trouverait actuellement soutenu par fopinion publique dans toute entreprise ou il s'engagerait vigoureusement , meme aux risques d'un conflil. L'etat de guerre, auquel tous les evenements d'Orient habituent les esprits depuis deux ans, apparait, non plus comme une catastrophe lointaine, mais comme une solution aux difficultes poiitiques et economiques qui n'iront qu'en s aggravant. Puisse I'exemple de la Bulgarie exercer en Allemagne une influence salutaire. Comme me le disait naguere le Prince-Regent : << Le sort des armes est toujours incertain; toute guerre est une aventure, et bien fou est celui qui la court se croyant assure de la victoire. » Allize. — 15 - r 5. Note a M. Stephen Pichon , Ministre des Affaires etrangeres ^ i{surl'opinion publique en Allemagne, d'apres les rapports des agents diplomatiques et consulaii-es)» Paris, le 3o juillet 19 13. Des observations que nos agents en Allemagne ont pu recueilllr aupres de per- sonnes en mesure de penetrer dans les milieux les plus divers. Ton peut tirer cettb conclusion que deux sentiments dominent et irritent les esprits : 1° Le traite du 4 novembre 1911 serait, pour I'Allemagne, un deboire; a'* La France — une France nouvelle — insoup^onnee jusqu'a I'ete de 1911 — serait belliquease. Elle voudrait la guerre. Deputes de tous les partis du Reichstag , depuis les. conservateurs jusqu'aux socia- listes, et representant les contrees les plus differenles de I'Allemagne, universitaires de Berlin, de Halle, d'lena et de Marbourg, etudiauts, instituteurs, employes de commerce, commis de banque, banquiers, artisans, commer^ants, industriels, me- decins, avocats, redactcurs de journaux democrates et de journaux socialistes, publicistes juifs, membres des syndicats ouvriers, pasteurs et boutiquiers de la Marche de Brandebourg, hobereaux de Pomeranie el cordonniers de Stettin fetant le 5o5® anniversaire de leur association, chatelains, fonctionnaires, cures et gros cultivateurs de Westphalie sont unanimes sur ces deux points, sans nuances notables, selon les milieux et les partis. Voici la synthese de toutes ces opinions : Le traite du l\. novembre est une defaite diplomatique, une preuve de 1 incapacity de la diplomatic allemande et de Tincurie du Gouvernement, si souvent denonc^es, la preuve que I'avenir de TEmpire n'est pas assure sans un nouveau Bismarck, une humiliation nationale, une deconsideration europeenne, une atleinte au prestige allemand, d'autant plus grave que, jusquen 1911, la suprematie mihlaire de TAlle- magne etait incontestee et que I'anarchie frangaise, Timpuissance de la Bepublique etaient une sorte de dogme allemand. En juillet 1911, le « coup d'Agadir « posa vraiment, pour la premiere fois,.la question marocaine comme une question nationale, important a la vie et a Texpan- sion de TEmpire. Les revelations et proces de presse qui suivirent ont sulTisamment demontre comment la campagne avait ete organisee, quelles convoitises panger- maniques elle avait allumees et quelles rancunes elle a laissees. Si TEmpereur est discute, le Chancelier impopulaire, M. de Kiderlen, fut I'homme le plus hai de I'Allemagne, I'hiver dernier. Cependant il commence a n etre plus que deconsidere, car il laisse entendre qu'il prendra sa revanche. Done, pendant I'ete de 1911, I'opinion publique allemande se cabra en face de I'opinion fran9aise pour le Maroc. Et I'attitude de la France, son calme tranquille, son unite morale refaite, sa resolution de faire valoir son droit jusqu'au bout, Ic ^H — 16 — fait qu'elle a Imsoleiice de n'avoirpas peur de la guerre, sont le plus constant, \^ plus grave sujet d'inquietude et de mauvaise humeur de I'opinion pubiique allemandei. Pourquoi done rAllemagne n'a-t-elle pas fait la guerre pendant I'ete de 1 9 1 i » puisque lopinion pubiique, encore que moins unanime et resolue que ropiniom frangaise, y etait cependant favorable? Oulre la volonte pacifique de TEmpereur ef du Ghancelier, on fait valoir dans les milieux competents des raisons militaires ei financieres. Mais ces evenements de 191 1 ont cause une profonde desillusion en Allemagne Une France nouvelle, unie, resolue, decidee a ne plus se laisser intimider, est sortie du suaire dans lequel on la contemplait s'ensevelissant depuis dix ans. Avec une surprise melee d'irritation , Topinion pubiique allemande a decouvert, de de- cembre a mai, a travers la presse de tous les partis qui reprochaient au Gouvernement imperial sonr incap a cit6, sa lachete : que la vaincue de 1870 n'avait cesse depuis de guerroyer, de promener en Asie et en Afrique son drapeau et le prestige de ses armes, de conquerir de v^stes territdires; que I'AUemagne avait vecu d'heroisme honoraire, que la Turquie est le seul pays ou elie ait fait, sous le regne de Guil- laume n, des conquetes morales, bien compromises maintenant par la honte de la solution marocaine. Chaque fois que la France faisait une conquete coloniale, on consolait cette meme opinion en disant « Oui, mais cela n'empeche pas la decadence, i'anarchie, la decomposition de la France a I'interieur. B On se trompait, et on trompait Topinion. j Etant donne ces sentiments de I'opinion pubiique allemande, qui tient la France pour belliqueuse, que peut-on augurer de I'avenir au point de vue d'une guerre pos- sible et prochaine ? L'opinion pubiique allemande est divisee, sur la question de I'eventualite d'une guerre possible et prochaine , en deux courants. Jl y a dans le pays des forces de paix , mais inorganiques et sans chefs populaires. •EUes considerent que la guerre serait un malheur social pour I'Allemagne , que I'or- gueil de caste, la domination prussienne et les fabricants de canons et de plaques il faut compter les fonctionnalres de toutes carrieres, representes assez exactement au Reichstag par les conservateurs libres ou parti d'Em- pire, parti des retraites dont les idees fougueuses se deversent dans la Post, lis font ecole et souche dans les groupements de jeunes gens doiit Tesprit a ete prepare et tendh par lecole ou Tuniversite. L'uhiversite , exception faite pour quelques esprits distingues, developpe une ideologie guerriere. Les ecOnomistes demontrent a coups de statistiques " la necessite pour I'Allemagne d'avoir un empire colonial et commercial qui reponde au rende- ment industriel de I'Empire. H y a des sociologues fanatiques qui vont plus loin. La paix armee, disent-ils, est un ecrasant fardeau pour les nations, elle empeche Tame- lioration du sort des masses et favorise la poussee socialiste. La France, en s'obsti- nant a vouloir la revanche , s'oppose au desarmement. H faut une fois pour toutes la reduire a I'impuissance pour un siecle, c'est la meilleure et la plus rapide fagon de resoudre la question sociale. Historiens, philosophes, publicistes politiques et autres apologistes de la » deutsche Kultur » veulent imposer au monde une maniere de sentir et de penser qui soit spe- cifiquement allemande. lis veulent conquerir la suprematie intellectuelle qui, de I'avis des esprits lucides, reste a la France. C'est a cette source que s'alimente la phraseologie des pangermanistes comme. aussi les sentiments et les contingents des Kriegesvereine. des Wehrvereine et autres associations de ce genre, trop connues pour qu'il soit necessaire d'insister sur ce point. II convient de noter seulement que le mecontentement cause par le traite du 4 novembre a considerablemGnt accru le nombre des menlbres des societes coloniales. II y a enfm les partisans de la guerre par rancune, par • ressenliment. Ce sont les plus dangereux. Us se recrutent surtout parmi les diplomates. Les diplomates alle- mands ont tres mauvaise presse dans Topiniou pidalique. Les plus acharnes sont ceux qui, depuis 1906, ont ete meles aux negociations entre ia France et I'Alle^ magne; ils accumulent et additionnent les griefs contre nous, et un jour, ils preseijb- leront des comptes dans la presse belliqueuse. On a I'impression que c'est surtout au Maroc qu'ils les chercheront, bien qu'un incident soit toujours possible sur tous les points du globe ou la Frauce et I'Allemagne sont en contact. II leiir faut une revanphe, car ils se plaignent d'avoir ete dupes. Pendant la discus- sion de la loi niilitaire, un de ces diplomates belliqueux declarait : « L'Allemagne ne pourra causer serieusement .avec la France que quand elle aura tous ses hommes valides sous les armes ». Comment s'engagera .cette conversation .►^ C'est une opinion assez repandue» meme dans les milieux pangermanistes, que I'Allemagne ne declarerait pas la guerre» etant donne le systeme d'alliances. defensives et les dispositions de I'Empereur. Mais quand le jmoment sera venu, il devra, par tous les moyens, contraindre ta France a I'attaquer. On I'offensera, s'il le faut. C'est la tradition prussienne. Faut-il done tenir la guerre pour fatale.^ II est peu probable que I'Allemagne ose risquer I'aventure, si la France pent faire aux yeux de I'opinion la preuve decisive que I'entente cordiale et Talliance russe ne soiit pas seulement des fictions diplomatiques » mais des realites qui existent et qui 3. — 20 — joueront. La flotle anglaise inspire une salulaire terreur. Mais on sail bienque la vic- toire sur mer laissera tout en suspens, que c'est sur terre que se regleront les comples decisifs. Quant a la Russie, si elle a dans Toplnion un. poids plus considerable qu'il y a trois ou quatre ans, dans les milieux poliliques et militaires, on ne croit pas que son concours soit assez rapide et energique pour etre efficace. Les esprits s'habiluent ainsi a considerer la prochaine guerre comme un duel enlre la France et TAllemagne. N° 6. M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de la Republique frangaise a Berlin, a M. Stephen Pichon , Ministre des Affaires etrangeres. Berlin V le 22 novembre 1913. Je tiens dune source absolument sure la relation d'une conversation que FEmpe- ifBur aurait eue avec le Roi des Beiges, en presence du Chef d'Elat-Major General de Moltke, il y a une quinzaine de jours, conversation qui aurait, parait-il ,- vivement frappe le Roi Albert; je ne suis nuUement surpris de son impression, qui repond a celle que moi-meme je ressens depuis queique temps : I'hoslilite contre nous s'ac- centue et TEmpereur a cesse d'etre partisan de la paix. L'interlocuteur de i'Empereur d'Allemagne pensait jusqu'ici , comme tout le monde , que Guillaume II, dont Tinfluence personnelle s'etait exercee dans bien des circop- stances critiques au profit du maintien de la paix, etait toujours dans les memes dispositions d'esprit. Cette fois, il faurait trouve complelement change : TEmpereur d'Allemagne n'est plus k ses yeux le champion de la paix contre les tendances belli- queuses de certains partis allemands. Guillaume II en est venu a penser que la guerre avec la France est inevitable et qu'il faudra en venir la un jour ou I'autre. II croit naturellement a la superlorite ecrasante de I'armee allemande et a son succes certain. Le General de Mollke parla exactemeni comme son souverain. Lui aussi, il declara la guerre necessaire et inevitable, mais il se montra plus assure encore du succes, « car, dit-ilau Roi, cetlefois, il faut en finir, et Votre Majeste ne peut se douter de Tenthousiasme irresistible qui, ce jour-la, entrainerale peuple allemand tout entier ». Le Roi des Beiges prolesta que c'elait travestir les mtentions du Gouvernement fran^ais que les traduire de la sorie ei se laisser abuser sur les sentiments de la nation fran^aise par les manifestations de quelques esprits exaltes ou d'intrigants. sans conscience. L'Empereur et son Chef d'Etat-Major n'en persisterent pas moins dansleurmaniere de voir. Au cours de cette conversation I'Empereur etait, du resle, apparu surmene et irritable. A mesure que les annees s'appesanlissent sur Guillaume II, les traditions -^ 21 — famlliales,. les senlimenls retrogrades de la Cour» et surtout i'impalience des militaires prennent plus d'empire sur son esprit. Peut-etre eprouve-t-il on ne salt quelle jalousie de la popul^rite . acqulse. par son fils, qui llalte les passions des pangermanlstes et lie trouve pas la situation de TEmpire dans le monde legale a sa puissance. Peut-dlre aussl la replique de la France a la derniere augmentation de Tarmee allemande, dont i'objet etait d'elabllr sans conleste la supe- riorite germanlque, est-elle pour quelque chose dans ces amerlumes, car, quol qu'on disfi, on sent qu'on ne pent guere aller plus loin. On pent se demander ce qu'il y a au fond de celte conversation. L'Empereur et son Chef d'Etat-Major General ont pu avoir pour objeclif d'impresslonner le Roi des Beiges et de le disposer a ne point opposer de resistance au cas ou un conflit avec nous se produirait. Peut-etre aussi voudralt-on la Belgique moins hostile k cerlalnes ambitions qui se manlfestent Ici a propos du Congo beige, mais celte derniere hypp- these ne me parait pas concorder avec Tlnterventlon du General de Mollke.. Au reste, I'Empereur Guillaume est moirts maitre de ces Impatiences qu'on he le crolt communement. Je I'ai vu plus d une fols laisser echapper le fond de sa pensee. Quel qu'alt ete son objeclif dans la conversation qui m'a ete rapportee, la confidence n'en a pas moins le caraclere le plus grave. EUe correspond a la precarite de la situa- tion generale et a fetal d'une certalne partie de f opinion en France et en AUemagne. S'U m etait pe'rmis de conclure , je dirais qu'Il est bon de tenir compte de ce fait nouveau que I'Empereur se familiarise avec un ordre d'Idees qui lul repugnalt autre- fois, et que, pour lul emprunter une locution qu'il alme a, employer, nous devons tenIr noire poudre seche. Jules Cambon, — 23 - CHAPITRE II PRELIMINAIRES DE LA MORT DE L'ARCHIDUC HERITIER (28 JUIN 1914) A LA REMISE DE LA NOTE AUTRICHIENNE A LA SERBIE (23 JUILLET 1914) ^ 25 — N^7, M. DuMAiNE, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne, a M. Ren^ Viviani, President du Cons^il, Ministre des. Affaires etran- geres. Vienne, le 28 juin 1914. La nouvelle vient de parvenir a Vienne que rArchiduc heritier d'Autriche et sa femme ont ete assassines aujourd'hui a Serajevo par un etudiant origlnaire de Grahovo. Quelques instants avant ['attentat auquel ils ont succombe, ils avaleut echappe a I'explosion d'une bombe qui a blesse plusieurs officiers de leur suite. L'Empereur, en ce moment a Ischl, en a ete aussitot avise telegraphiquement. DUMAINE. ]N?8. M. DuMAiNE, Amba'ssadeur de France a Vienne, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran-» geres. Vienne, le 2 juillet igi/i- Le crime de Serajevo suscite les plus vives rancunes dans les milieux miiilaires autrichiens et chez tons ceux qui ne se resignent pas a iajsser la Serbie garder dans ies Balkans le rang qu'elle a conquis. L'enquete sur les origines de I'attentat qu'on voudrait exiger du Gouveinement de Belgrade dans des conditions intolerables pour sa dignite, fournirait, k la suite d'un refus, le grief permettant de proceder a une execution militaire. Dumaine. Docdmehts diplomatiQCEs — Guerre europeenne. — 26 r 9. M. DE Man NEVILLE, Charge d'affaires de France a Berlin, a ^L Ren^ Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- geres. Berlin, ie k juillet 1914. Le Sous-Secretaire d*Etat des Affaires etrangeres ma dit hier, et a repete aujour- d'hui a I'Ambassadeur de Russie, qu'ii esperait que la Serbie donnerait satisfaction aux demandes que TAutriche pouvait avoir k lui adresser en viie de la recherche et de la poursuite des complices du crime de Serajevo. D a ajoute qu il avait confiance qu'il en serait ainsi parce que la Serbie , si elle agissait autrement, aurait centre elle Topinion de tout le monde civilise. Le Gouvernement allemand ne parait done pas partager" les inquietudes qui se manifestent dans une partie de la presse allemande au sujet d'une tension possible des rapports entre les Gouvernements de Vienne et de Relgrade, ou du moins il n« veut pas en avoir I'apparence. DE Manneville. K 10. M. P/LEOLOGDE, AmbassadeuF de France k Saint-P^tersbonrg, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- geres. Sainl-Petersbourg, 6 juillet igi^- Au cours d*un entretien qu'il avait tenu a avoir avec le Charge d'affaires d'Autriche- Hongrie, M. Sazonoff a signale amicalement a ce diplomate I'irritation inquietante que les attaques de la presse aiitrichienne contre la Serbie risquent de produire dans son pays. Le Comte Czemin ayant laiss6 entendre que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois — 27 — serait peut-etre oblig^ de rechercher sur le tenitoire serbe les instlgateurs de Tattentat de Serajevo, M. Sazonoff rinterrompit : « Aucun pays plus que ia Russie, a-t-il dit, n'a eu a souffrir des attentats pr^par^s sur tenitoire Stranger. Avons-nous jamais pretendu employer contre un pays quelconque les precedes dont vos journaux menacent la Serbie ? Ne vous engagez pas dans cette voie ». Puisse cet avertissement n etre pas perdu. Pal^ologue. r 11. M. d'Apchier le Maugin, Consul general de France a Budapest, a M. Ren6 Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- geres. Budapest, le ii juillet 19 14. Interpelle a la Chambre surl'etat de la question austro-serbe , M. Tisza a declare qu'il fallait avant toute cbose attendre le resultat de I'enquete judiciaire, dont il s'est refuse pour I'instant a reveler quoi que ce soit. Et la Chambre I'a approuve haute- ment. II s'est montre tout aussi discret sur les decisions prises dans la reunion des ministres h Vienne, et n'a pas laisse deviner si on donnerait suite au projet de demarche a Belgrade dont les journaux des deux mondes out retenti. La Chambre s'est inclinee derechef. En ce qui concerne cette demarche, il semble qu'il y ait un mot d'ordre pour eu attenuer la portee : la colere hongroise s'est comme evaporee a travers les articles virulents de la presse , unanime maintenant a deconseiller ce pas qui pourrait etre dangereux. Les journaux officieux notamment voudraient que Ton substituat k ce mot de « demarches aux apparences comminatoires, le terme qui leur parait plus arnical et plus poii de « pourparlers ». Ainsi, officiellement, pour le quart d'heure, tout est k la paix. Tout est a la paix, dans les journaux. Mais le gros pubHc ici croit a la guerre et la craint. Et par ailleurs, des personnes en qui j'ai toute raison d'avoir confiance m'ont afFirme savoir que chaque jour des canons et des munitions etaientdiriges en masse vers la frontiere. Vrai ou non, ce bruit ma ete rapporte de divers cotes avec des details concordants; il indique au moins quell es sont les preoccupations generales Le Gouvernement, soit qu'il veuille sincerement la paix, soit qu'il prepare un coup, — 28 — fait mainteilant tout son possible pbur calmer ces inquietudes. Et c'est poufquol I^ ton des journaux gouvernementaux a baisse dune note, puis de deux, pour etre k] rheure actuelle presque optimlste. Mais ils avaient eux-memes propage I'alarme k plaisir. Leur optimisme de commande est acluellement sans echo , la nervosity de la Bourse, barometre que Ton ne saurait negliger, en est une preuve certaine; les valeurssans exception sont tombees a des cours invraisemblablement bas; la rente hongroise 4 o/o etait cotee hier 79,96, cours qui n a jamais ete cote depuis la pre- miere emission. d'Apchier le Maugin. r 12. M. DuMAiNE, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires 6lran- geres. Vienne, ie i5juillet 191 4, Certains organes de la presse viennoise, discutant I'organisation militaire de la France et de la Russie, presentent ces deux pays comme hors d'etat de dire leur mot dans les affaires europeennes, ce qui assurerait a la monarchie dualiste, soutenue par I'AUemagne, d'appreciables facilites pour soumettre la Serbie au regime quil plairait de lui imposer. La MUildrische Rundschau I'avoue sans ambage. « L'instant nous est encore favorable. Si nous ne nous d^cidons pas a la guerre, celle que nous devrons faire dans deux ou trois ans au plus tard s'engagera dans des circonstances beaucoup moins propices. Actuellement, c'est k nous qu'appartient I'initialive : la Russie n'est pas prete, les facteurs moraux et le bon droit sont pour nous, de meme que la force. Puisqu'un jour nous devrons accepter la lulte, provoquons-la lout de suite. Notre prestige , notre situation de grande Puissance , notre honnei^r sont en question : plus encore, car vraisemblablement il s'agirait de notre existence, d'etre ou ne pas etre, ce qui reellement est aujourd'hui la grande affaire. » En rencherissant sur elle-nieme, la Neue Freie Presse de cejour s'en prend au Comte Tisza de la moderation de son second discours, ou il a dit : « nos relations avec la Serbie auraient toutefois besoin d'etre clarifiees ». Ces mots provoquent son indignation. Pour elle, I'apaisement, la securite ne peuvent resulter que d'une guerre au couleau contre le panserbisme, et c'est au nom de I'humanite qu'elle reclame I'ex- termination de la maudite race serbe. DUMAINE. 29 — M. DuMAiNE, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne, a M. Ren6 Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires 6tran- geres. Vienne, ig juillet igiii. Le Chancelier du Consulat qui m'a remis son rapport semestriel resumant les fails divers d'ordre economique qui 0nt fait I'objet de ses etudes depuis le debut de I'annee, y a joint une partie d'information politique provenant dune source serieuse. Je I'ai prie de rediger brievement les renseignements qu'il a recueilHs surla remise^ prochaine de la Note autrichienne a la Serbie, que les journaux anrioncent depuis quelques jours avec insistance. Vous trouverez ci-joint le texte de cette note d'information, interessante en raison de sa precision. DUMAINE. r 14. V Note. {Extrait d'un rapport consulaire sur la situation economique et politique en Autriche.) Vienne, le 20 juillel 191 A. Il.resulte de renseignements fournis par une personnalite particulierement au courant des nouvelles oflGcielles que le Gouverneinent frangais aurait tort de s'en rapporter aux semeurs d'optimisme : on exigera beaucoup de la Serbie, on lui imposera la dissolution de plusieurs societes de propagande, on la sommera de reprimer le nationalisme, de surveilier la frontiere eh collaboration avec des com- missaires autrichiens, de faire la police des ecoles au point de vue de I'esprit ariti- autrichien, et il est bien difficile qu'un Gouvernement accept^ de se faire ainsi le sergent de ville d'un Gouvernement etranger. On comple avec les echappatoires par lesquelles ia Serbie voudra sans doute esquiver une repoose claire et directe; c'est — 30 — pourquoi on lui fixera peul-etre un delai bref pour declarer si elle accepte oui ou non. La teneur de la Note et son allure imperative garantissent presque sArement que Belgrade refusera. Alors", on operera militairement, H y a ici, et pareillenaent a Berlin, un clan qui accepte Tidee du conflita dimen- sions generalisees, en d'autres termes, la conflagration. L'idee directrice est pro- bablement qu'il faudrait marcher avant que la Russie ait termine ses grands perfec- tionnements de I'armee et des voies ferrees, et avant que la France ait mis au point son organisation mililaire. Mais ici, il n'y a pas accord dans les hautes spheres : du cote du comte Berchtold et des diplomates, on voudrait tout au plus une operation localisee contre la Serbie. Mais tout doit etre envisage comme possible. On signage un fait singulier : generalement I'agence telegraphique officielle, dans ses resumes et revues de presse etrangere, ne lient compte que des journaux oilicieux et des organes les plus importants; elle omet toute citation, toute mention des autres. Cest une regie et une tradition. Or, depuis une dizaine de jours, I'agence offi- cielle fournit quotidiennement a la presse d'Autriche-Hongrie une revue complete de toute la presse serbe, en donnant une large place aux journaux les plus ignores, les plus petits et insignifiants, qui par cela meme ont un langage plus libre, plus hardi, plus agressif et souvent injurieux. Ce travail de I'Agence officielle a visible- ment pour but d'exciter le sentiment public et de creer une opinion favorable a la guerre. Le fait est significatif. W 15. M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Berlin, le 21 juillet igiA- n me revient que le representant de la Serbie a Berlin aurait fait hier une demarche a la Wilhelmstrasse pour dire que son Gouvernement 6tait pret a accueillir la requete de I'Autriche motivee par Tattentat de Serajevo, pourvu qu'elle ne demandikt que des concoursjudiciaires en vue de la repression et de la prevention des attentats politiques, mais il aurait ete charge de prevenir le Gouvernement allemand qu'il serait.dangereux de chercher par cette enquete i porter atteinte au prestige de la Serbie. Confidentiellement, je puis dire egalement k Votre Excellence que le Charge d'affaires de Russie, i Taudience diplomatique d'aujourd'hui , a parle de cette ques- — 31 — tion a M. de Jagow. II lui a dit qu'il supposait que le Gouvernement' allemand con- naissait actuellemeht tres bien la Note preparee par I'Autriche et etait par suite k meme de donner I'assurance que les difficultes austro-serbes seraient localisees. Le Secretaire d'Etat a proteste qu'il ignorait absolument le contenu de cette Note et s'est exprime de meme avec moi. Je n ai pu que m'etonner dune declaration aussi peu conforme a ce que les circonstances conduisent a penser. II m'a ete assure d'ailleurs que, des mainlenant, les avis preliminaires de mobili- sation qui doivent meltre I'Allemagne dans une sorte de « garde h. vous » pendant les epoques de tension, ont ete adresses ici aux classes qui doivent les recevoir en pareil cas. C'est la une mesure a laquelle les AUemands, etant donne leurs habitudes » peuvent recourir sans s exposer a des indiscretions et sans emouvoir la population. Elle ne revet pas un caractere sensationnel , et n'est pas forcement suivie de mobili- sation effective ainsi que nous Tavons deja vu, mais elle n'en est pas moins signifi-^ cative. Jules Cambon. r 16. ;M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i., . a Londres, Saint-Petersbourg, Vienne, Rome. Paris, le 21 juiliet 19 id. J'attire specialement votre attention sur des informations que je re^ois de Berlin : I'Ambassadeur de France signale Textreme faiblesse de la Bourse de Berlin d'hier, et i'attribue aux inquietudes que la question serbe commence a provoquer. I M. Jules Cambon a des raisons tres serieuses de croire que lorsque TAutriche fera k Belgrade la demarche quelle juge necessaire a la suite de I'attentat de Serajevo» TAllemagne I'appuiera de son autorite , sans chercher k jouer un role de mediation. Bienvenu-Martin. — 32 — r 17, M, Bienvenu-Martln, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i..» a MM. les Ambassadeurs de France a Londres, Saint-Petersbourg,] Vienne, Rome. Paris, le 2 2 juillet 19 id. ' M. Jules Cambon ayant interroge M. de Jagow sur la leneur de la Note autri-: chienne k Belgrade, ce dernier lui a repondu qu'il n'en connaissait nullement le.' libelle ; notre Ambassadeur en a marque toute sa surprise. II constate que la baisse de| la Bourse de Berlin continue et que des nouvelles pessimistes circulent. M. Barrere a egalement entretenu de la meme question le Marquis de San Giu- liano, qui sen montre inquiet et assure qu'il agit k Vienne pour qu'il ne soit demande a la Serbie que des choses realisables , par exemple la dissolution du Club bosniaque et non une enquete judiciaire sur les causes de I'attentat de Serajevo. Dans les circonstances presentes,la supposition la plus favorable qu'on puisse faire est que le Cabinet de Vienne , se sentant deborde par sa presse et par le parti mili-i taire, clierche^ obtenir le maximum de la Serbie par une intimidation prealable, directe et indirecte, et s'appuie sur I'AUemagne a cet elfet. • J'ai prie I'Ambassadeur de France k Vienne d'user de toute son influence sur le Comte Berchtold pour lui representor, dans une conversation amicale , combien la^ moderation du Gouvernement autrichien serait appr^ciee en Europe, et quelle repercussion risquerait d'avoir une pression brutale sur la Serbie. * Bienvenu-Martin. r 18. M. Du MAINE, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Vienne, le 22 juillet 1914. On ne sait rien encore des decisions que le Comte Berchtold, prolongeant son sejour k Ischl, lenle d'oblenir de I'Empereur. On attribuait au Gouvernement Tinlen- — 33 — lion d'aglr avec la plus grande rigueur envers la Serble, d'en fmir avec elle, «de la trailer comme une autre Pologne ». Huit corps d'armee seraient prets a entrer ea campagne, mais M. Tisza, tres inquiet de Tagitation en Groatie, serait intervenu acti- vement dans un sens moderateur. En tous cas, on croit que la d-marche a Belgrade aura lieu cette semaine. Les de- mandes du Gouvernement austro-hongrois relative ment a la repression de Tattentat ct k certaines garanties de surveillance et de police paraissent acceptables pour la di^^nile des Serbes; M. Jovanovich croit qu elles seront accueillies. M. Pacbitcb desire un arrangement pacifique, mais se declare pret k toute resistance. 11 a confiance dans la force de Tarmee serbe ; il comple, en outre, sur Tunion de tous les Slaves de la Monarcbie pour paralyser Teffort dirige contre son pays. A moins d'un aveuglement absolu , on devrait reconnaitre ici qu'un coup de force a les plus grandes chances d'etre funeste, aussi bien aux troupes austro-bongroises qua la cohesion dejk si compromise des national! les gouvernees par I'Empereur. L'Ambassadeur d'AlIemagne , M. de Tcbirsky, se monlre partisan des resolutions violentes, tout en laissant volontiers entendre que la Chancellerie imp^riale ne serait pas entierement d'accord avec lui sur ce point. L'Ambassadeur de Russie, parti hier pour la campagne, en raison des declarations rassurantes qui lui ont ete faites au Minislere des Affaires etrangeres, m'a confie que son Gouvernement n aura pas d ob- jection contre des demarches visant la punition des coupables et la dissolution des associations notoirement r^volutionnaires, mais ne pouvait admettre des exigences bumiliantes pour le sentiment national serbe. DUIIAINE. N**19. M. Paul Cambon , Ambassadeur de France k Londres , a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires i^trang^res p. i. Londres , ie 2 2 j uillet 1914* Voire Excellence a bien voulu me faire part des impressions recueillies jpar notre Ambassadeur k Berlin, relativement aux consequences de la d-marche que le Gou- vernement austro-hongrois se propose de faire k Belgrade. Cos impressions lii'ont ^t^ confirmees par une conversation que j*ai eue hier avec le Principal Secretaire d'Etat pour les Affaires etrangeres. Sir E. Grey ma dit avoir re^ula visite de I'Ambassadeur d'AlIemagne, qui lui a d6clar6 qu'i Berlin on s'attendait k une demarche du Gouvernement austro-hongrois aupres du Gouvernement serbe. Le Prince Lichnowski a assure que le Gouvernenient allemand s'employait k retenir ct k moderer le Cabinet de Vienne, mais que jusqu'i present il n'y r6ussissait pas et qu'il n'etait pas sans inquietude sur les suites d'une telle demarche. Sir E. Grey a r6- DoctiMBMS DiPLOMATiQUES. — Guerre europdcnne. 5 — 34 — pondu au Prince Lichnowski qu*il voulait croire qu'avant d'intervenir k Belgrade » ie Gouvernement austrohongrois se serait bien renseigne surles circonstances du corn- plot dont I'archiduc heritier et la duchesse de Hohenberg ont 6te victimes, se serait assure que le Gouvemement serbe en avail eu connaissance et n'avait pas fait tout ce qui dependait de lui pour en prevenir les effets. Car s'il ne pouvait pas etre prouve que la responsabilite du Gouvemement serbe fut impliquee dans une certaine mesure , Tintervention du Gouvemement austro-hongrois ne se justifierait pas et souleverait centre lui I'opinion europeenne. La communication du Prince Lichnowski avait laisse Sir E. Grey sous une impres- sion d'inqui^tude qu'il ne m'a pas dissimulee. La meme impression m'a ete donnee par I'Ambassadeur d'ltalie qui redoute, lui aussi, I'^ventualite dune nouvelle ten- sion des rapports austro-serbes. Ce matin , j'ai recu la visile du Ministre de Serbie , qui partage egalement les ap- prehensions de Sir E. Grey. II craint que TAutriche ne mette le Gouvemement serbe en presence d'une demande que la dignite de celui-ci et surtout la suscepti- bihte de Topinion publique ne lui permettent pas d'accueillir sans protestation. Comme je lui objectais le calme qui parait regner a Vienne et dont temoignent tous les Ambassadeurs accredites dans cette capitale , il m'a repondu que ce calme officiel n'etait qu apparent et recouvrait les dispositions les plus foncierement hostiles contre la Serbie. Or, a-t-il ajoute, si ces dispositions viennent a se manifester par une de- marche depourvue de la mesure desirable, il y aura lieu de tenir compte de I'opinion publique serbe, surexcitee par les mauvais procedes dont TAutriche a abreuve ce pays et r endue moins patiente par le souvenir encore tout frais de deux guerres vic- torieuses. Malgre les sacrifices dont la Serbie a paye ses re'centes victoires, elle pent ; mettre encore sur pied 4oo,ooo hommes et Topinion publique, qui le sait, nest pas disposee k tolerer une humiliation. Sir E. Grey dans un entretien avec I'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie I'a pri6 de recommander a son Gouvemement de ne pas s'ecarter de la prudence et de la moderation necessaires pour eviter de nouvelles complications, de ne demander k la Serbie que des mesures auxqueiles celie-ci puisse raisonnablement se preter et de ne pas se laisser entrainer au del^» Paul Cambon. — 35 - r 20. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des AiFaires etrangeres p. i., a Londres, Berlin, Saint-Petersbourg et Rome. Paris, le 23 juillet 19 1 4. Les premieres intentions du Gouvernement austro-hongrois avaient ete, selon les informations recueillies par TAmbassadeur de France a Vienne , d'agir avec la plus grande rigueur contre la Serbie, en tenant huit corps d'armee prets k entrer en campagne. Ses dispositions actuelles seraient plus conciliantes : en reponse a une question que lui posait M. Dumaine, a qui j'avais prescrit d'appeler I'attention du Gouvernement autrichien sur les inquietudes eveillees en Europe, le baron Macchio a affirme a notre Ambassadeur que le ton et les demandes qui seront formulees dans la note autrichenne permettent de compter sur un denouement pacifique. Je ne sais quelle foi il faut accorder a ces assurances, en raison des habitudes de la chanceilerie im- periale. Dans tons les cas, la note autrichienne sera remise dans un tres bref delai. Le Ministre de Serbie estime que M. Pacbitch acceptera, par desir dun arrangement, les demandes relatives a la repression de I'attentat et a des garanties de surveillance et de police, mais qu'il resistera a ce qui attenterait a la souverainete et k la dignite de son pays. Dans les cercles diplomatiques de Vienne, I'Ambassadeur d'AUemagne preconise des resolutions violentes, tout en convenant que peiit-etre la Chanceilerie impe- riale nest pas entierement d'accord avec lui sur ce point; I'Ambassadeur de Russie, se fiant aux assurances qui lui ont ete donnees, s'est absente de Vienne et a confie, avant son depart, a M. Dumaine, que son Gouvernement n'elevera pas d'objections contre la punition des coupables et la dissolution des associations revolutionnaires, mais qu'il ne pourrait tolerer des exigences humiliante§ pour le sentiment national de la Serbie. Bienvenu-Martin. r 21. M. Allize, Ministre de France a Munich, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des AiFaires etrangeres p. i. Munich, le i!3 juiilet 191 4» La presse bavaroise parait croire qu une solution pacifique de i'incident au'stro- serbe est non seulement possible, mais ncieme vraisemblable; dans les spheres pffi- 5. — 56 — cielles, auconlraiVc, on alTecle, depuis quelque temps, avec plus ou moins de since- rite, un reel pessimisme. Le President da Conseil nolamment m'a dit aujourd'hui que la note aulrlchlenne, donl il avait connaissance , etait, i son avis, redigoe dans des lermes acceplables pour la Serbie, mais que la situation acluelle ne lui en paraissait pas moins tres serieuse. Allize. — 37 — CHAPITRE III LA NOTE AUTRICHIENNE ET LA R^PONSF SERBE DU VENDRfDI 24 JUILLET AU SAMEDl 25 JUILI ET) — 39 — N** 22. M. Ren6 Viviani, President du Conseil, a M.JBienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Je voiis serais oblige de transmettre d'urgence a M. Dumaine les informations et instructions suivantes : Reval, le 2 A juillet 1914, a i heure du matio. Au cours de mes entretiens avec le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres russe , nous avons ete amenes a envisager les dangers qui pourraient resulter d'une demarche eveiituelle de I'Autriche-Hongrie a Tegard de la Serbia vrelativement a Tattentat dont a ete victime Tarchiduc heritier. Nous sommes tombes d accord pour penser qu'il convenait de ne rien negliger pour prevenir vme demande d'explications ou quelque mise en demeure qui equivaudraient k une intervention dans les affaires interieures- de la Serbie , et que celle-ci pourrait considerer conune tme atteinte k sa souverai- nete et k son independance. En consequence , nous avons estime qu'il y avait lieu , dans une conversation amicale avecle ComteBerchtoId, delui donner des conseils de moderation, propres a lui faire comprendre combien seralt mal inspiree une intervention aBelgrade,ou Ton pourrait voir une menace de la part du Cabinet de Vienne. L'Ambassadeur d' Angle terre, mis au courant par M. Sazonow, a exprime I'idee que son Gouvemement se joindrait sans doute k une demarche tendant a ecarter un danger qui pent menacer la paix genersde, et a telegraphic dans ce sens a son Gou- vemement. M. Sazonow a adress6 des instructions k cet effet k M. Schebeko. Sans qu'il s'agisse ici d'une action collective ou concertee des representants de la Triple Entente k Vienne, je vous prie de vous entret^nir de la question avec les Ambassadeurs de Russie et d'Ang^eterre , et de vous entendre avec eux sur le meilleur moyen, pour chacun de vous, de faire entendre sans retard au Comle Berchtold les conseils de moderation que nous parait reclamer la situation pr^sente. J'ajoute qu'il y aurait lieu de prier M. Paul Cambon de faire valoir aupres de Sir E. Grey Tutilit^ de cette demarche, et d'appuyer la suggestion que TAmbassadeur d'Angleterre en Russie a du presenter k cet effet au Foreign Office. Le Comte Benc- kendorff est charg6 de faire ime reconmiandation analogue. Rend Viviani. — . 40 r 23. M. Bienvenu-Martin, MInistre des Affaires ^trang^res p. i. a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, a bord de la France. Paris, le 24 juillet 191^. J'ai transtnis d'urgence k'Vienne vos instructions, mals il resulte des informations de presse de ce matin que la Note aulrichienne a 6le remise hier soir a six heures a Belgrade. Cette note, dont I'Ambassadeur d'Aulriche-Hongrie ne nous a pas encore remis le texte officiel, parait tres accentuee ; elie tendrait non seulement a obtenir la pour- suite des Serbes meles' directement k Tatlenlat de Serajevo, mais demanderait ia repression immediate dans ia presse et dans i armee serbe de toute propagande anti- autrichienne. Elie donnerait jusqu'a samedi soir, a six heures, k la Serbie pour s'executer. En transmettant vos instructions k M. Dumaine, je i'ai prie de se concerler avec ses collegues anglais et russe. Bienvenc-Martin. W 24. Texte de la Note autrichienne. (Note communiquce par le Comte Szecsen, Ambassadeur d'Autriche Hongrie , a M. Bienvenu-Martin , Miaistre des Affaires etrangeres p. i., le veadredi 24 juillet 1914, a jo h. 1/2 du matin.) Vienne, le 2 4 juillet 1914. Le Gouvemement imperial et royal s'est vu oblig6 d'adresser jeudi 28 juillet cou- rant, par Tentremise du Ministre imperial et royal a Belgrade, la note suivante au Gouvemement royal de Serbie : « Le 3 1 mars 1 909 le Ministre de Serbie k Vienne a fait, d'ordre de son Gouver^ nement au Gouvemement imperial et royal la declaration suivante : « La Serbie reconnait qu'elle n'a pas et6 atleinte dans ses droits par le fait accompli cr^e en Bosnie-Herzegovine et qu'elle se conformera par consequent a telle decision que les Puissances prendront par rapport k I'arlicle XXV du Traite de Berlin. Se ren- dant aux conseils des grandes puissances, la Serbie s'engage des a present a a])andonner I'attilude de protestation et d'opposition qu'elle a observee k I'egard de I'annexion depuis I'automne dernier et elie s'engage, en outre, k changer le cours de sa politique actuelle envers TAutriche-Hongrie pour vivre desormais avec cette derniere sur le pied d'un bon voisinage. » — 41 — Or, riiisloire des dernieres annees, et notamment les evenements douloureux du 28 juin ont demonlre Texistcnce en Serbia d un mouvemcnt subversif dont le but est de detacher de la Monarchie auslro-hongroise certaines parties de ses territoires. Ce mouvement, qui a pris jour sous les yeux du Gouvernement serbe est arrive k se manifeslcr au delk du lerriloire du royaume par des actes de terrorisme , par une seriei d'atlenlats et par des meurlres. Le Gouvernement royal serbe , loin de satisfaire aux engagements formels contenus dans la declaration du 3i mars 1909, n'a rien fait pour supprimer ce mouvement. II a tolero I'activile criminelle des dififerentes socieles et affiliations dirigees contre la Monarchie, le langage eOrene de la presse, la glorification des auteurs d'attentats, la participation d'olficiers et de fonctionnaires dans des agissements subversifs, une propaganda malsaine dans I'instruction publique, tolere enfm toutes les manifestations qui pouvaient induire la population serbe a la haine dc la Monarchie et au mepris de ses institutions. Celtc tolerance coupable du Gouvernement royal de Serbie n'avait pas ccsse au moment ou les evenements du 28 juin dernier en ont demontre au monde entier les consequences funestcs. II resulte des depositions et aveux des auteurs criminels de fattentat du 28 juin que le meurtre de Serajevo a ete trame k Belgrade ,^ue les armes et explosifs dont les meurtriers se trouvaient etre munis, leur ont ete donnes par des ofQciers et fonc- tionnaires serbes faisant partie de la « Narodna Odbrana » et enfm que le passage en Bosnie des criminels et de leurs armes a ete organisevct eflectue par des chefs du service-frontiere serbe. $■- Les resultats mentionnes de I'instruction ne permettent pas au Gouvernement im- perial et royal de poursuivre plus longtemps I'attitude de longanimite expectative qu'il avait observee pendant des annees vis-a-vis des agissements concentres k Belgrade et propages dc la sur les territoires de la Monarchie : ces resultats lui imposent au contraire le devoir de mettre fm a des menees qui forment une menace perpetuelle pour la tranquillite de la Monarchie. C'est pour atteindre ce but que le Gouvernement imperial et royal se voit oblige de demander au Gouvernement serbe I'enonciation officielle qu'il condamne la pro- pagande dirigee contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise , c'est-i-dire I'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu a detacher de la Monarchie des territoires qui en font partie, et qu'il s'engage a supprimer, par tous les moyens, cette propaganda criminelle et tcrroriste. Afin de donncr un caractere solennel a cet engagement le Gouvernement royal de Serbie fera publier a la premiere page du Journal ojjicicl en date du 13/26 juillet I'enonciation suivanle : n Le Gouvernement royal de Serbie condamne la propagande dirigee contre I'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-^-dire fensemble des tolerances qui aspirent en dernier lieu a detacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il deplore sincerement les consequences funestes de ces agissements criminels. Le Gouvernement royal rcgrelte que des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient jparticipe a la propagande sus mentionnee et compromis par la les relations dc bon DocDMENTS DiPLOMATiQUES. — Guerre europecnne. 6 - 42 — voisi&aige auquel ie Gouvernement royal s'etait solennellemeiit engage par ses decla- rations du 3 1 mars 1909. Le Gouvernement royal qui d^sapprouve et repudie toute idee ou tentative d'im- mixtion dans les destinees des habitants de quelque partie de rAutriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considere de son devoir d'avertir formellement les olliciers, les fonctionnaires et toute la population du royaume que dorenavant il procedera avec la derniere- rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissemenls, agissements qu'il mettra tous ses efforts k prevenir et a reprimer. » Cette enonciation sera portee simultanement a la connaissance de Tarmee royale par un ordre du jour de Sa Majeste le Roi et sera publiee dans le Biillelin officiel de. I'armee, Le Gouvernement royal serbe s'engage en outre : 1" A supprimer toute publication qui excite k la haine et au mepris de la Mo- narchie, et dont la, tendance generale est dirigee contre son integ'rite territoriale. 2° A dissoudre immediatement la societe dite <> Narodna Odbrana «» a confisquer, tous ses moyens de propagande , et a proceder de la meme maniere contre les autres societes et aflQliations en Serbie qui s'adonnent k la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise , le Gouverneqpjent royal prendra les mesures necessaires pour que les societes dissoutes ne puisseo^ pas continuer leur activite sous un autre nom et sous ime autre forme. 3° A eliminer sans delai de rinstructiou publique en Serbie, tant en ce qui con- cerne le corps enseignant que les moyens d'instruction , tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir k fomenter la propagande contre rAutriche-Hongrie. A** A eloigner du service militaire et de I'administration en general tous les offi- ciers et fonctionnaires coupables de la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hon- groise et dont le Gouvernement imperial et royal se reserve de communiquer les tooms et les fails au Gouverriement royal. 5** A accepter la collaboration en Serbie des organes du Gouvernement imperial et royal dsuis la suppression du mouvement subversif dirige contre Tintegrite territo- riale de la Monarchie. 6° A ouvrir une enquete judiciaire contre les partisans du complot du 28 juin se trouvant sur territoire serbe; des organes delegues par le Gouvernement imperial et royal prendront part aUx recherches y relatives. 7° A proceder d'urgence i I'arrestation du commandant Voij a Tankosic et du nomme Milan Ciganovic, employe de I'Etat serbe, compromis par les resultats de Tinstruction de Serajevo. 8** A emp6cher, par des mesures efiicaces, le concours des autorites serbes dans Je irafic illicile d'armes et d'explosifs a travers la frontiere; A licencier el punir severemcnt les fonctionnaires du service-frontiere de Schabatz et de Loznica coupables d'avoir aide les auteurs du crime de Serajevo en leur facilir ifiiA ie passage j<7 heures du soir. Notre Ministre a Belgrade n'ayant remis sa'note hier qu'a six heures du soir, le delai pour la reponse se Irouve proroge de ce fait jusqu'a demain samedi six heures du soir. ' « J'ai cru de mon devoir d'informer Voire Excellence de cette legere- modification dans Vex^ii^ation da delai fixe pour la reponse du Gouvemement serl)e. » 6. 1 — /i4 — En presence de ces agissements auxquels I'Autriche-Hongrie est exposee depuis des annees, le Gouvernement de la Serbie n'a pas cru devoir prendre la moindre mesure. C'est ainsi que le Gouvernement serbe a manque au devoir que lui imposait la declaration solennelle du 3i mars 1909, et c'est ainsi qu'il sest mis en contra- diction avec la volonte de TEurope et avec I'engagement qu'il avait pris vis-a-vis de TAutriche-Hongrie. La longanimite du Gouvernement imperial et royal k I'egard de I'atlitude provo- catrice de la Serbie etait inspiree du desinteressement territorial de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et de I'espoir que le Gouvernement serbe finirait tout de meme par apprecier a sa juste valeur I'amitie de TAutriche-Hongrie. En observant unc altitude bienveillante pour les interets politiques de la Serbie, le Gouvernement imperial et royal espdrait que le royaume se deciderait finalement a suivre de son cole une ligne de conduite analogue. L'Aulriche-Hongrie s attendait surloul a une pareille evolution dans les idees politiques en Serbie, lorsque, apres les evenements de I'annee 1912, le Gouvernement imperial et royal rendit possible, par une attitude desinteressee et sans rancune, I'agrandissement si considerable de la Serbie. Cetle bienveillance manlfestee par I'Autriche-Hongrie k I'egard de I'Etal voisin n'a cependant aucunement modifie les procedes du royaume, qui a continue k lolerer sur son territoire une propagande dont les funestes consequences se sont manifestees au monde entier le 28 juin dernier, jour ou Theritier presomptif de la Monarchie et son illustre epouse devinrent les victimes d'un complot trame a Belgrade. En presence de cet elat de choses, le Gouvernement imperial et royal a du se decider a entreprendre de nouvelles et pressantes demarches a Belgrade afm d'amener le Gouvernement serbe k arreter le mouvement incendiaire mena^ant la surele et 4'integrite de la Monarchie austro-hongroise. Le Gouvernement imperial et royal est persuade qu'en enlreprenant cette demarche, il se trouve en plein accord avec les sentiments de toutes les nations civilisees qui ne sauraient admettre que le regicide devint une arme dont on puisse se servir impune- ment dans la lutte politique, et que la paix europeenne fut conlinuellement troublee par les agissements parlant de Belgrade. C'est a I'appui de ce qui precede que le Gouvernement imperial et royal tient a la disposilion du Gouvernement de la Republique fran^aise un dossier elucldant les menees serbes et les rapports existant entre ces menses et le meurtre du 28 juin. Une communication identique est adressee aux represenlants imperiaux et royaux aupres des autres Puissances signataires. Vous etes autorise de laisser une copie de cettB depeche entre les mains de M. le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres. Annexe. L'inslruction criminelle ouverte par le tribunal de Serajevo contre Gravillo Princip et •consorts du chef d'assassinat et de complicite y relative, crime commis par eux le 28 juin dernier, a jusqu'ici abouli aux conslatations suivanles : — 45 — i" Le complot ayant pour but d'assassiner, lors de soa sejour a Serajevo, I'archiduc Francois-Ferdinand fut form6 a Belgrade par Gravillo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, le nomme Milan Ciganovic et Trifko Grabez avec le concours du commandant Voija Tanlcosic. 2" Les six bombes et les quatre pistolets Browning avec munitions, moyennant lesquels les malfaiteurs ont commis I'attentat, furent livres 6 Belgrade a Princip, Cabrinovic et Grabez par le nomme Milan Ciganovic et le commandant Voija Tankosic. 3° Les bombes sont des grenades 4 main provenant du depot d'armes de I'armee serbe a Kragnjevaks. k" Pour assurer la rdussite de I'attental, Ciganovic enseigna a Princip, Cabrinovic et Grabez la mani^re de se servir des grenades et donna, dans une foret pres du champ de tir a Topschider, des lecons de tir avec pistolets Browning a Princip et a Grabez. 5° Pour rcndre possible i Princip, Cabrinovic et Grabez de passer la frontiere de Bosnie- Herz^govine et d'y introdiiire clandestinement leur contrebande d'armes, im systeme de transport secret fut organise par Ciganovic. D'apres cette organisation , Tintroduction en Bosnie-Herzegovine des malfaiteurs et de leurs armes fut operee par les capitaines-frontieres de Sabac (Popovic) et de Loznica, ainsi que par le douanier Rudivoj Grbic de Loznica , avec le concours de divers particuliers. r 25 •. • M. Bienvenu-Martin , Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i., a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, a bord de la France, et a Londres, Berlin, Vienne, Saint-Petersbourg, Rome, Belgrade. Paris, le 2/ijuillet 1914. J'ai Thonneur de vous informer que la Note autrichienne , remise a Belgrade jeudi solr, m'a ete laissee en copie, ce matin, par i'Ambassadeur d'Aulriche-Hongrie. Le comte Szecsen m'a fait connaitre que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois attend la reponse du Gouvernement serbe jusqu^ samedi 26, a cinq heures du soir (1). La Note s'appuie sur Tengagement pris par la Serbie, le 3 1 mars 1 909, de recon- nailre Tannexion de la Bosnie-Herzegovine el reproche au Gouvernement serbe d'avoir tolere une propaganda anti-aulrichienne, k laqueile ont pris part les fonction- naires, I'armee el la presse, propagande mena^ante pour la securite etTinlegrile de I'Autriche, et donl le crime du 28 juin, Irame a Belgrade, selon les constatalions de rinstruclion, a demonlre les dangers. Le Gouvernement autrichien se declare oblige de metlre fin k une propagande qui constitue un danger permanent pour sa Iranquilllte, el d'exiger du Gouvernement serbe une enoncialion oflicielle de sa volonle de la condamner et reprimer, par ia publication, au Journal ojjlcicl du 26, d une declaration donl les termes sont indiques, reprouvant, regrettant el mena^anl de sevir. Un ordre du jour du Roi a I'armee serbe porterait egalemenl cette declaration i sa connaissance. En outre, le Gouver- ■ (l) Voir note page /i 3. — 46 — nement serbe s'engagerait a supprimer les publications, k dissoudre les Soci^les , ^ revo- quer les officiers et fonctionnaires dont les noms seraient communiqnes par ie Gou- Teniement aulriclilen, a accepter la collaTjotation de fonctlomiaires autricliiens pour la suppression de Taction subversive signalee, ainsi que pour Tenquete sur i'attentat de Serajevo, enlin a proceder a Tarrestation immediate' d'un officier et dun employe serbes qui y sont compromis. Au memorandum autrichien est annexee une Note, resumant les constat ationsde Tinstruction du crime de Serajevo et affirmant qu'il a ete trame a Belgrade, que les bombes ont ete fournies aux assassins et emanent d'un depot de Tarmee serbe, enfm qae les assassins a Stockholm (pour le President du Conseil), Belgrade, Saiht-Peters- bourg, Berlin, Vienne, Home. Paris, le 2d juillet 19 id- L' Ambassadeur d'Autriche ayant commuqiqu^ la Note de son Gouvernement k Sir Ed. Grey, celui-ci a fait observer que jamais declaration aussi formidable n'avait ete adressee par un Gouvernement a un autre; il a attire I'attention du Comte Mensdorff siff les responsabilit6s assumees par I'Autriche. — 54 — Envisageant une possibilite de coufllt entre I'Autriche et k Russie, Sir Ed. Grey se propose de reclamer le concours du Gouvernement allemand en vue d'une mediation des quatre Puissances non interessees directement dans rafiaire Serbe : Angleterre, France, Italie et Aliemagne; cette mediation s'exercerait a la fois i Vienne et a Petersbourg. J'ai donne au Ministre de Serbie des conseils de prudence et suis dispose k m'associer a toute action conciliante a Vienne, dans I'espoir que I'Autriche ne main- tiendra pas I'integralite de ses exigences vis-^-vis d'un petit Etat, si celui-ci se montre dispose k donner toutes les satisfactions jugees compatibles avec son independance et sa souverainete. Bienvenu-Martin. N" 35. M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i, Berlfnje 2 5 juiHet 1914. Le Ministre de Belgique se montre tres preoccupe des evenements. II considere que lAutriche et lAUemagne ont voulu profiter du concours de cir- constances qui fait qu'en ce moment la Russie et TAngleterre leur paraissent mena- cees de troubles interieurs, et qu'en France le regime militaire est discute; aussi ne croit-il pas a i'ignorance que le "Gonvemement de Berlin affecte au sujet de la demarche de I'Autriche. D pense que si la forme n'en a pas ete soumise aii cabinet de Berlin, le moment en a ete habilement choisi avec lui pour §urprendre la Triple Entente dans un monfient de desorganisation. n a vu lAmbassadeur d'ltalie qui vient d'interrompre son conge pour rentrer. II paraitrait que fllalie ^erait surprise, pour ne pas dire plus, d'avoir ete tenue ^ I'ecart de toute I'aflaire par ses deux alliees. Jules Cambon, — 55 — r 36. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i., a Stockholin (pour le President du Conseil), et a Londres, Berlin, P^tersbourg, Vienne. Paris, le 25 juiliet 1914. L'Ambassadeur d'Ailemagne est venu protester k midi contre un article de L'Echo de Paris, qui qualifiait de « menace allemande » sa demarche d'hier. M. de Schoen a dit k un certain nombre de journalistes, et est venu affirmer k la Direction politique , qu il n'y a pas eu « concert » entre TAutriche et TAilemagne pour la Note autrichienne et que le Gouvernement allemand ignorait celle-ci, bien qu'ii i'eut approuvee ulterieurement , quand elle lui a ele communiquee, en meme temps qu'aux autres Puissances. Le Baron de Schoen a ajoute qu,'iL n'y ^vait pas davantage « menace » : le Gouver- nement allemand s'etait contente d'indiquer qu'il estimait desirable de localiser le conflit et que I'intervention d'autres Puissances risquerait de I'aggraver. Le Directeur politique p. L a pris acte de la demarche du Baron de Schaen. L'ayant prie de repeter bs termes memes des deux, derniers paragraphes de sa Note , il lui a fait remarquer que les termes indiquaient la volonte de TAUemagne de s'in- terposer entre les Puissances et I'Autriche. M. Berthelot a ajoute qu'aucune confi- dence n'ayant d'aiileurs ete faile k aucun journaliste, I'information de L'Echo de Paris n'engageait que ce journal , et marquait seulement que la demarche allemande parais- sait avoir ete connue autre part qu au Ouai d'Orsay, et en dehors de lui. L'Ambas- sadeur d'Ailemagne n'a pas releve I'allusion. D'autre part, TAmbassadeur d'Autriche k Londres est venu egalement rassurer Sir Edward Grey, en lui disant que la Note autrichienne ne constituait pas un « ulti- matum » , mais une « demande de reponse avec limitation de temps » ; ce qui signifiait que, si les demandes autrichiennes ne sont pas acceptees ce soir k six heures, le Ministre d'Autriche quittera Belgrade, et le Gouvernement auslro-hongrois commen- cera les actes de « preparation » mihtaire, mais non les « operations » militaires. Le Cabinet de Londres, comme ceux de Paris et de Petersbourg, a fait donner k Belgrade le conseil d'exprimer des regrets pour les complicites qui pourraient etre prouvees dans I'attentat de Serajevo et de promettre a cet egard les plus larges satisfactions. II a ajoute que, pour le reste, c'est k la Serbie qu'il appartient de repondre, dans les termes que I'interet du pays lui paraitra conseiller. Le Ministre d'Angleterre a Belgrade doit consulter ses CoUegues franQais et russe et conseiller au Gouvernement serbe, si ceux-ci en ont egalement I'instruction, de donner satisfac- tion sur tous les points ou il jugcra pouvoir le faire. Sir E. Grey a dit au Prince Lichnovvsky (qui ne lui a fait jusqu'ici aucunc commu- nication analogue a celle de M. de Schoen k Paris) que, si la Note autricliienne n'ame- nait aucune difliculte entre I'Autriche et la Piussie, le Gouvernement anglais n'aurail, — 56 — pas k s'ea occuper, mais qu'il elait a craindre que h raldeur de la Note et la brievete du delai indique n'amenassent une tension. Dans ces conditions, la seule chance qu'on aper^oive d'eviter un conflit consisterait dans une mediation de la France, de I'Alleniagne , de I'ltalie et de I'Angleterre , TAllemagne seule pouvant exercer dans ce sens une action sur le Gouvernement de Vienne. L'Anabassadeur d'AUemagne a repondu qu'il transmettrait cette suggestion k Berlin , mais a laisse entendre k I'Ambassadeur de Russie, qui est son parent, que TAllemagne ne se preterait a aucune demarche a Vienne. Bienvenu-Martin, N° 37. M. DE Fleuriau, Charge d'AfFaires de France a Londres, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Londres, le aS juillet 1914. L'Ambassadeur d'AUemagne est venu au Foreign Office affirmer que son Gouver- nement refuserait de s'immiscer dans le conflit qui divise I'Autriche et la Serbie. Sir E. Grey a repondu que, sans le concours de I'AUemagne a Vienne, I'Angleterre ne saurait agir a Petersbourg. Si cependant I'Autriche et la Russie mobilisaient toutes deux, ce serait bien I'occasion d'une intervention des quatre autres Puissances. Le Gouvernement allemand mainliendrait-il alors son attitude passive et refuserait-il de se joindre a I'Angleterre , k la France et a I'ltalie ? Le Prince Lichnowsky ne le pense pas, puisqu'il ne s'agirait plus de difficultes €ntre Vienne et Belgrade, mais dun conflit entre Vienne et Petersbourg. Sir E. Grey a ajoute cette observation que, si la guerre venait k eclater, aucune Puissance en Europe ne pourrait s'en desinteresser. DE Fleuriau. N^ 38. M. PAl]§OJ.OGtJE, Ambassadeur de France a Saint-P^tersbourg, a WL Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i, Petersbourg, le 25 juillet j^iii. Le Gouvernement Russe va s^effbrcer d'obtenir du Gouvernement austro-hongrois une prolongation du ddlai assigne par I'ultimatum, afm que les Puissances puissent — 57 — se former une opinion sur \e dossier judicialre dont ia communication leuf est offerte. M. Sazonoff a prie I'Ambassadeur d'AlIemagne de signaler k son Gouvcmement le danger de la situation; il s'est abstenu toutefois de faire allusion aux mesures que la Russie serait sans doute amenee a prendre, si la Serbie etait menacee dans* son independance nationale ou dans I'integrite de son territoire; les reponses evasives et les recriminations du Comte de Pourtales ont laisse a M. SazonofF une impression defavorable. Un Conseil des ministres sera tenu demaln sous la presidence de I'Empereur. M. SazonofF garde toute sa moderation : « II faut eviter, m'a-t-il dit, tout ce qui pour- rait precipiter la arise. J'eslime que, meme si le Gouvernement austro-hongrois passait k Taction contre la Serbie, nous ne devrions pas rompreles negociations. » Paleologue. r 39. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des AfFaires ^trangeres p. i.* , a M. DuMAiNE, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne. Paris, le 25 juiilet igi/i. Le Gouvernement russe a donne comme instructions a son representant a Vienne de demander au Gouvernement autrichien une prolongation du delai fixe k la Serbie, pour permettre aux Puissances de se faire une opinion sur le dossier que I'Autriche a offert de leur communiquer, et en vue d'eviter des consequences regrettables pour tons. Un refus oppos6 par rAutriche-Hongrie k cette demande oterait toute signification a la demarche qu'elle a fait.e aupres des Puissances, en leur communiquant sa Note, et la mettrait en contradiction avec la morale internationale. Le Gouvernement russe a demande que vous fassiez d'urgence une d-marche analogue aupres du Comte Berchtold; je vous prie d'appuyer la demande de votre Coliegue. Le Gouvernement russe a adresse la meme demande k Londres, Rome, Berlin et Bucarest. Bienvenu-Martin. DocoMENTS OIPLOMATIQOES. — Guerfc europeennc. 58 — r 40. M, DE Fleuriau, Charge d'affaires de France a Londres, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeresp. i. Londres, h 25 juilldt igid- Sir Ed. Grey a re^u communication ce -matin des instructions quiprescrivenl a I'Am- bassadeur de Russie a Vienne , de demander la prolongation du delai donne a la Serbie par la Note autrichienne d'avant-hier. M. Sazonoff demandait que la demarche russe fut appuyee par I'Ambassade d'Angleterre. Sir Ed. Grey a telegraphic a Sir M. de Bunsen de s'exprimer dans le meme sens que son collegue russ6 et de rappeler la communication autrichienne qui lui a ete faite hier soir tard par le Comte Mensdorf,. communication aux termes de laquelle le defaut d'adhesion de la Serbie aux conditions de Tultimatum n'entrainerait, des aujourd'hui, quune rupture diplomatique et non des operations militaires imme- diates. Sir Ed. Grey en concluait que le temps serait laisse aux Puissances pour intervenir, et chercher les moyens de denouer la crise. DE Fleuriau. M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires ^trangeres p. i. Berlin, le 2 5 juillet' 19 14. Ce matin, *le Charge d'affaires d'Angleterre a demande a M. de Jagovv, d'apres leS ordres de son Gouvernement, siTAllemagne voudrait se joindre a I'Angleterre, a la France et a Titalie , pour intervenir aupres de "PAutriche et de la Russie afm d'empe- cher un conflit et, en premier lieu, pour demander 'k Vienne une prolongation du delai imparti a "la Serbie par Tultlmatum. Le Secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires etrangeres a repondu qu il Tivait dejik, des la reception de Ha depeche du Prince Lichnowsky lui faisant part des intentions de Sir E. Grey, telegraphic ce matin meme a I'Ambassadeur de la Grande-Bretagne a Vienne pour quil demandat cette prolongation au Comte Berchtold. Malheureusement le Comte Berchtold est a Ischl. Au resle, M. de Jagow ne croit pas que cette demande soit accueillie. Le Charge d'affaires d'Angleterre s'est egalement.enquis aupres de M. de Jagow, -^ 59 — c amine je l^avais fait hier, si rAllemagne n'ayait eUi aucune cojanaissance de la Note- auitrichienne .avant quelle fut lanceev et a re^u. une repouse- si; riettement negative' qu'il ne pourrait insister; mais- il n*a pu s'empechei: de s'^tonnej: du blanc-seing, doime par rAllemagne a rAutriche-. M. de Jagow lui ayant repondu que la question etait pour rAutriche une qjijestioo interieure, iia remarque qu'elle etait devenue au premier chef iotemationaie.. Jules Carbon. M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, a M. le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Berlin, le 25 juillet 191A. Le Charge d'affaires de Russie a reQu pour instruction de demander au Gouver- nement allemand d'insister aupres du Cabinet de Vienne , en vue de faire prolonger le delai de Tultimatum. M. de Jagow ne lui ayant donne rendez-vous qu'a la fin de Fapres-midi, c'iest-k- dire au moment oii ['ultimatum viendra a echeance, M. Broniewski a envoye d'urgence une note ecrite au Secretaire d'Etat, dans laquelle il marque que le retai:d de la communication faite par I'Autriche aux Puissances rend I'elfet de cette communi- cation iUusoire, puisqu'elle ne leur laisse pas le temps de prendre, conn aissance des faits allegues, avant Texpiration du delai fixe. II insiste tres vivement sur la necessity de le prolonger, si Ton n'a pas en vue de creer une grande crise. Jules CAMBort. M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des AifFaires etrangeres p. i. Berlin, le 25 juillet 1914. Le Charge d'affaires de Russie a fait aupres du Secretaire d'Etat la demarche qui lui etait prescrite, en vue d'une prolongation du delai de I'ultimatum; M. de Jagow lui a repondu qu'il avait deja transmis une indication de ce genre i Vienne, mais qu'il eslimait que toutes ces d-marches etaienttrop tardives. M. Broniewski a insiste, en disant que si le delai ne pouvait etre prolonge, les — 60 — mesures d'execution pouvaient au moins etre retardees, de maniere a permettre aux Puissances de s'employer k eviter un conflit. H a ajoute que la Note autrichienne etait con9ue dans des termes calcules pour blesser la Serbie et la forcer a la guerre. M. de Jagow lui a repondu qu'il ne s'agissait pas d'une guerre, mais d'une « execution » dans une affaire locale. Le Charge d'affaires a repris, en exprimant le regret que le Gouvernement allemand ne mesurat pas ses responsabilites dans le cas ou des hostilites se produiraient , qui pourraient s etendre au reste de I'Europe : a quoi , M. de Jagow a repondu qu'il se refusait k croire a de pareilles consequences. Le Charge d'aff'aires de Russie a recueilli comme moi le bruit que TAutriche , tout en declarant ne vouloir aucune annexion de territoire, occuperait des parlies de la Serbie jusqu'a cequ'elle ait complete satisfaction. « On sait, m'a-t-il dit, ce quesignifie ce mot satisfaction. » Les impressions de M. Broniewski sur les arrieres-pensees de I'Allemagne sent tres pessimistes. Jules Cambon. M Barrere, Ambassadeur de France a Rome, a M. BiENVENU-MARTiN,Ministre des Affaires etrang^res p. i. Rome, le 25 juillet 1914. L' Ambassadeur de Russie a fait k la Consulta la demarche prescrite par M. Sazonoff aux representants de la Russie k Paris, Berlin, Rome, Bucarest, et qui tendait a obtenir de ces differents Cabinets qu'ils associent leur action a celle de la Russie k Vienne en vue d'obtenir une prolongation du d^lai imparti a la Serbie. En I'absence du Marquis de San Giullano, M. Salandra et M. de Martino ont repondu qu'ils semettraient en rapport avec le MInlstre des Affaires ^trangeres, mais que sa reponse ne pourrait leur parvenir que vers six heures, c'est-a-dire trop tard pour entreprendre une demarche a Vienne. Barrere. M. DuMAiNE, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne, a M* Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires ^trangeres p. i. Vienne, le 25 juiilet 1914. Le Charge d'affaires de Russie a re^u de son Gouvernement I'ordre de demander un delai pour rultimatum a la Serbie, au moment m^me ou le Comie Berchtold — 61 — partailpour Ischl avec I'intenlion, au dire des journaux, d'y rester pres de TEmpereur jusqu'i la fin de la crise. Le Prince Koudachefl I'a neanmoins informe de la, demarche qu'il avail a remplir par deux' telegrammes en clair, Tun en cours de route, I'autre a destination. II nen attend aucun effet. Le Baron Macchio, Secretaire general du Ministere des Affaires etrangeres, a qui le Prince a communique le sens de ses mslructions et de sa demarche telegraphique » a temoigne une froideur glaciale quand son interlocuteur lui a represents que donner a juger des griefs avec pieces justificatives, sans laisser le temps d'etudier le dossier, est contraire a la courtoisie internationale ; le Baron Mftcchio a repHque que parfois I'interet dispense d'etre courlois. Le Gouvernement autrichien est resolu a infliger k la Serbie une humiliation : il n'acceptera Tintervention d'aucune puissance , jusqu'a ce que le coup ait ete porte et re9u en pleine face par la Serbie. DUMAINE. r 46. M. BoppE, Ministre de France a Belgrade, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Belgrade, 25 juillet 1914. M. Paohilch vient de me donner connaissance de la reponse qui sera remise ce soir au Ministre d'Autriche. Le Gouvernement serbe accepte de publier demain au Journal ojjiciel la declaration qui lui est demandee; il la communiquera egalement a Tarmee, par un ordre du jour ; il dissoudra les societes de defense nationale et toutes autres associations suscep- tibles d'agir contre I'Autriche-Hongrie; il s'engage a modifier la loi sur la presse, a renvoyer du service de Tarmee, de I'instruction publique et des autres administrations, tons fonctionnaires dont la participation dans la propagande sera prouvee ; il demande seulement que le nom de ces fonctionnaires lui soit communique. Quant a la participation dans I'enquete de fonctionnaires autrichiens, il derhande qu'on lui explique comment elle s'exercerait; il ne pourrait accepter que celle qui correspondrait au droit international ou aux relations de bon voisinage. II accepte toutes les autres exigences de Tultimatum et declare que si le Gouver- nement austro-hongrois ne s'en contente pas, il est pret k s'enremettre k la decision du tribunal de La Haye,.ou k celle des grandes Puissances qui ont pris part a lelabo- ration de la declaration du 3 1 mars i 909. BOPPE. — 62 — r 47. M. Jules Cambon, AmBassadeur de Fpance k Berlin, a M. BiENVENt^-MARTiN ^ Ministre des Affaires etrang^res p. i^ Beriia, 1© a^ juJiJMi 1914. Pendant tout rapres-midi le bruit a couni avec persistance que la. Serbie se sou- mettait aux exigences autrichiemies; ce soir les journaux publient des supplements annon^ant la rupture a Belgrade et le depart du Ministre d'Autricbe-Hongrie. Ce bruit vient d'etre confirme au correspondant de TAgence Hayas a la Wilhelm.^ stcasse, Des groupes considerables de plusieurs centaines de personnes stalionnent ict devant les bureaux des journaux, et une nombreuse manifestation de jeunes gens vient de passer sur Pariser-platz en poussant des cris de « hurrah ! » pour rAllemagne» €t en chantant des chants palriotiques ; elle se rend a la Golonne de la Victoire, k VAmbassade d'Autricbe» puis ^ celle ditalie. C'est une explosion significative de chauvinisme. Une personnalite allemande, que j'ai xne ce soir, m'a avoue qu'on avait craint ici que la Serbie n'acceptat en bloc la note autrichienne , en se reservant d'en discuter I'application , pour gagner du temps et permettre aux efforts des Puissances de se produire utilement avant la rupture. Dans les milieux, financiers » on prend deja des mesures pour parer a toute even- tualite, car on n'y aper^oit pas le moyen d'enrayer la crise, en presence de I'appui determine que donne TAUemagne a I'Autriche. Je ne vois, pour moi, que I'Angleterre qui puisse, en Europe, etre ecoutee k Berlin. Quoi qu'il arrive, Paris, Petersbourg et Londres ne parviendront a mainlenir diguQ^' menC la paix quea se montrant fermement et absolument unis. Jules CamboS). M. DuMAiNE, Ambassadeur de France a ViennCt a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrang^res p. i. Vienne, le 25juillet 19 id- On me remel votre t^legramme precisement a I'heure ou expire le delai imparli ^ la Serbie. D^autre part, je viens de vous fairesavoir dansquelles conditions le Charge d'affaires de Russie a du executer sa demarche. II semble inutile de I'appuyer quand^ il n'en est plus temps. Dans I'apres-midi, le bruit s'etait repandu que la Serbie avait cede k Tultimatum tout en ajoutant qu'elle en appelait aux Puissances. Mais on assure, au dernier ^ 53 — Jnoment, que le Ministre d'Autriche vient de quitter precipitamment Belgrade ; il auraitjuge insuffisante fadhesion du Gouvernement serbe aux conditions posees par son GouvernemenL DUMAINE. r 49. Repovse da Goavernament serhe a la Note austrd^komjroise. (Communique par M; Ydsnitch, Ministre de Serbie, le Z7 juillet.) Belgrade, de 2 5 juillet 191 4. Le Gouvernement royal serbe a re9u la communication du Gouvernement imperial et royal du 10/23 de ce mois et il est persuade que sa reponse eloignera tout nialen- iQudu qui menace de comprometlre les bons rapports de voisinage enlre la Monarchie austro-hongroise et le Hoyaume de Serbie. Le Gouvernement royal a conscience que les protestations qui ont apparu tant a la tribune de la Skoupchtina nationale que dans les declarations et les actes des representants responsables de I'Etat, protestations auxquelles coupa court la declaration du Gouvernement serbe faite le i8/3i mars 1909, ne se sont plus renouvelees vis- a-vis de la grande Monarcbie voisine en aiicune occasion, et que depuis ce temps, 'autant de la part des Gouvernements royaux qui se sont succede que de la part de leurs organes, aucune tentative n'a ete faite dans le but de cbanger Tetat de choses politique et juridique cree en Bosnie-Herzegovine. Le Gouvernement royal constate que sous ce rapport le Gouvernement imperial et royal n'a fait aucune representatio"n , sauf en ce qui concerne un livre scolaire, representation au sujet de laquelle le Gouvernemeat imperial et Toyal a vequ une explication entierement satisfaisante. La Serbie a, a de nombreuses reprises, donne despreuves de sa politique pacifique et moderee pendant la duree de la crise balkanique, et c'est grace a la Serbie et aux sacrifices qu'elle a faits dans Tinteret exclusif de la paix europeenne» que cette paix a ete preservee. Le Gouvernement royal ne ,peut pas etre .rendu responsable des manifestations d'un caractere priye telles que les articles des journaux et les agissemerits des socieles» manifestations qui se produisent dans presquc tous les pays comme une chose ordi- naire et qui echappent en regie generale au controle officiel, d'autant moins que le Gouvernement royal, lors de la solution de toute une s^rie de questions qui se sont preseritees entre la Serbie et TAutriche-Hongrie, a montre une grande prevenance et a reussi, de cette fa^on, a en regler le plus grand nombre au profit du progi'es des deux pays voisrns. Cest pourquoi'le Gouvernement royal a ete penfblement surpris par les affirma- tions d'apres lesquelles dcB personnes du royaume de Serbie aurarent pariicip6 h la preparation de Tattentat commis it Sarajevo. II s'attendait i etre invito a collaborer a la reoherche de tout ce qui.6e rapporte a ce crime etal etait pret, paur^rouver par — Ci- ties actes son enliere correction , a agir contre loules les personnes a I'egard desquelles des communications lui seraient faites. Se rendant done au desir du Gouvernement imperial et royal, le Gouvernemenl royal est dispose k remettre aux Iribunaux tout sujet serbe, sans egard a sa situation ei k son rang, pour la complicite duquel, dans le crime de Sarajevo, des preuves lui seraient fournies. II s'engage specialement a faire publier a la premiere page du Journal ojjiciel en date du 13/26 juiilet Tenonciation suivante : « Le Gouvernement royal de Serbie condamne toute propagande qui serait dirigee contre TAutnche-Hongrie, c'est-a-dire I'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en der- nier lieu a detacher de la Monarchic austro-hongroise des terriloires qui en font partie , et il deplore sincerement les consequemces funestes de ces agissements criminels. « Le Gouvernement royal regrette que certains officiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient partlcipe, d'apres la communication du Gouvernement imperial et royal, a la propagande susmentionnee et (Tompromis par \k les relations de bon voisinage aux- quelles le Gouvernement royal s'etait solennellement engage par la declaration du 18/3 1 mars 1 909. Le Gouvernement, qui desapprouve et repudie toute idee ou tentative d'une immixtion dans les destinees des habitants de quelque partie de I'Autriche-Hongrie que cesoit, considere qu'il est de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers, les fonctionnaires et toute la population du royaume que dorenavant il procedera avec la derniere rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils* agissements, qu'il mettra tons ses efforts a prevenir et k reprimer. » Cette enonciation sqra porlee a la connaissance de I'armee royale par un ordre du jour, au nom de Sa Majeste le roi par S. A. R. le prince heritier Alexandre, et serai publiee dans le prochain Bulletin officiel de i'armeo Le Gouvernement royal s'engage en outre : .1* A introduire dans la premiere convocation reguliere de la Skoupchtina une disposition dans la loi de la presse par laquelle sera punie de la maniere la plus severe la provocation a la haine et au mepris de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, ainsi que contre toute publication dont la tendance generale serait dirigee contre I'integrite territoriale de rAutriche-Hongrie. II se charge, lors de la revision de la Constitution, qui est prochaine, de faire introduire dans Tarticle 22 de la Constitution un amendement de telle sorte que les publications ci-dessus puissent etre confisquees, ce qui, actuellement, aux termes categoriques de I'article 2 2 de la Constitution , est impossible. 2° Le gouvernement ne possede aucuhe preuve et la Note du gouvernement imperial et royal ne lui en fournit non plus aucune que la ^ociete Norodna Obrana et les autres societes similaires aient commis jusqu'a ce jour quelque acte criminel de ce genre par le fait d'un de leurs membres. Neanmoins le gouvernement royal acceptera la demande du gouvernement imperial et royal et dissoudra la Societ6 Norodna Obrana et toute autre societe qui agirait contre I'Autriche-Hongrie. 3<* Le gouvernement royal serbe s'engage a eliminer sans delai de Tinstruction — 65 — publique en Serbie tout ce qui sert ou pourralt servir a fomenter la propagande centre I'Autriche-Hongrie , quand le gouvernement imperial et royal lui fournira des fails et des preuves de cette propagande. /i" Le gouvernement royal accepte du moins d'eloigner du service militaire ceux dont Tenquete judiciaire aura prouve qu'ils sont coupables d'actes diriges contre I'integrite du territoire de la monarchie austro-hongroise ; il attend que le gouverne- ment imperial et royal lui communique ulterieurement les noras et les faits de ces officiers et fonctionnaires aux fms de la procedure qui doit s'ensuivre. 5° Le gouvernement royal doit avouer qu'il ne se rend pas clairement compte du sens et de la portee de la demande du gouvernement imperial et royal tendant k ce que la Serbie s'engage a accepter sur;son territoire la collaboration des organes du gouvernement imperial et royal. Mais il declare qu'il admettra toute collaboration qui repondrait aux principes du droit international et a la procedure criminelle, ainsi qu'aux bons rapports de voisi- nage. 6** Le gouvernement royal, cela va de soi, considere de son devoir d'ouvrir une enquete contre tous ceux qui sont ou qui, 6ventuellement , auraient ete meles au complot du i5/2 8juinetquise trouveraient sur le territoire du royaume. Quant a la participation a cette enquete des agents des autorites austro-bongroises qui seraient delegues a cet effet par le gouvernement imperial et royal, le gouvernement royal ne peut pas I'accepter, car jce serait une violation de la Constitution et de la loi sur la procedure criminelie. Cependant, dans des cas concrets, des communications sur les resultats de I'instruction en question pourraient etre donnees aux organes austro- hongrois. 7° Le gouvernement royal a fai^ proceder des le soir meme de la remise de la note a Tarrestation du commandant Voija^Tankositch. Quant a Milan Ciganovitch, qui est sujet de la Monarcbie austro-hongroise et qui jusqu^au 1 6/28 juin etait employe (comme aspirant) a la direction des chemins de fer, il n'a pas pu encore etre joint. Le gouvernement imperial et royal est prie de vouloir bien, dans la forme accou- tumee, faire connaitre le plus tot possible les presomptions de culpabilite, ainsi que les preuves eventuelles.de culpabilite qui ont ete recueillies jusqu'^ ce jour par I'enquete a Sarajevo, aux fins d'enquetes ulterieures. 8° Le gouvernement serbe renforcera et etendrales mesures prises pour empecher le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs a travers la frontiere. II va de soi qu'il ordon- nera tout de suite une enquete el punira severement les fonctionnaires des fron- tieres sur la ligne Schabac-Loznica, qui ont manque k leur devoir et laisse passer les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo. 9° Le gouvernement royal donnera volontiers des explications sur les propos que ces fonctionnaires, tant en Serbie qua Tetranger, ont tenus apres I'attenlat dans des interviews et qui, d'apres I'affirmation du gouvernement imperial et royal, ont ete bostiles a la Monarchie, des que le gouvernement imperial et royal lui aura commu- nique les passages en question de ces propos, et des qu'il aura demontre que les propos employes ont en effet ete tenus par lesdits fonctionnaires, propos au sujet Documents diplomatiques. — Guerre europeeane. desquels le gouvemement royal lui-meme aura soin de recueiHir des preuves et con- victions. 10° Le gouvemement royal informe le gouvemement imperial et royal de I'exe- culion des inesures comprises dans les points precedents en tant que cela n'a pas ete deja fait par la presente note. Aussitot que chaque mesure aura ete ordonnee et executee, dans le cas ou le gouvemement imperial et royal ne serait pas satisfaitde cettereponse, le gouvemement royal serbe, considerant qu'il est de I'interet com- mun de ne pas precipiter la solution de cette question, est pret, comme toujours, accepter une entente pacifique , en remettant cette question soit a la decision du Tribunal international de La Haye, soit aux grandes Puissances qui orit pris part a I'elaboration de la declaration que, le gouvemement serbe a faite le i8/3i mars 1909- 67 -- CHAPITRE IV DE LA RUPTURE DES RELATIONS DIPLOMATIQUES (25 JUILLET 19U), A LA DECLARATION DE GUERRE DE L'AUTRICHE A LA SERRIE (28 JUILLET 1914) — 69 — r 50. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires ^trangeres p. L^ a bord de la France (pour le President du Conseil), et a MM. les Am* bassadeurs de France a Londres , Petersbourg , Berlin , Vienne , Rome. Paris, le 26 juillet igi^- On pent resumer ainsi les evenements de samedi : refus de rAutriche d acceder a la prolongation de delai demandee par la Russie, — depart du Ministre d'Autrichede Belgrade apres remise dune reponse a la Serbie, estimee insuffisante, bien quelle eut atteint la limite des concessions jugees possibles, — ordre de mobilisation donne en Serbie, dont le Gouvernement sest retire a Kragoujewatz, pu il est suivi par les Ministres de France et de Russie. Le Gouvernement italien, a qui la note autrlchienne a ete communiquee ven-. dredi, sans demande d'appui ni meme d'avis, n'apas, en I'absence du Marquis de San Giuliano qui ne rentre que mardi, pu repondre k la suggestion du Gouverne- ment russe qui proposait d'insister a Vienne pour une prolongation de delai. II resulte d'une confidence de i'Ambassadeur d'ltalie k M. Paleologue qu'a Vienne on continue k se bercer de I'illusion que la Russie « ne tiendra pas le coup ». II ne faut pas oublier que ritalie nest tenue par les engagements de la Triple Alliance que si elle a ete prea- iablement consultee. De Petersbourg, nous apprenons que M. Sazonoff a conseille k la Serbie de demander la mediation anglaise. Dans le Conseil des Ministres du 26, tenu en pre- sence de TEmpereur, la mobilisation des treize corps d'armee eventuellement destines k operer centre I'Autriche a ete envisagee; cette mobilisation ne serait toutefois rendue effective que si TAutriche contraignait la Serbie par la force des armes, et seulement apres avis du Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, a qui le soin incombe de fixer la date, liberie lui etant laissee de continuer les negociations meme dans le cas ou Belgrade serait occupee. L'opinion russe manifeste I'impossibilite politique et morale pour la Russie de laisser ecraser la Serbie. A Londres, la demarche allemande a ete faite le aS, dans les memes lermes que par le Baron de Schoen a Paris. Sir E. Grey a repondu au Prince Lichnowski que, si la guerre venait a eclater, aucune puissance en Europe ne pourrait s'en desinte- resser. II n'a pas precise. davantage et a tenu un langage tres reserve au Ministre de Serbie. La communication faite le 2 5 au soir par I'Ambassadeur d'Autriche rend Sir E. Grey plus optimiste; puisque la rupture diplomatique ne doit pas entrainer des operations militaires immediates, le Secretaire d'Etat veut encore esperer que les Puissances auront le temps d'intervenir. A Berlin, le langage tenu par le Secretaire d'Elat au Charge d'Affaires de Russie est pen satisfaisant el dilatoire ; comme celui-ci lui demandait de s'associer a une de- marche a Vienne pour une prolongation de delai, il a repondu qu'il avail deja agi dans ce sens, maisque c'elait trop lard; k la demande d'oblenir un delai pour prolonger — 70 — les mesures d*executIon , il a replique qu'il s*agissait dune question Interieure et non pas dune guerre mais dune execution locale. M. de Jagow feint de ne pas croire que Taction autrichienne puisse entrainer des consequences generales. n se produit une veritable explosion de chauvinisme a Berlin. L'Empereur d*Alle- magne revient directement k Kiel. M. Jules Canabon estime que, aux premieres mesures militciires de la Russie , I'Allemagne repondrait immediate ment et n'attendrait vraisembfablement pas un pretexte pour nous attaquer. A Vienne, TAmbassadeur de France n'a pas eu le temps de se joindre a la de- marche de son collegue russe pour obtenir une prolongation du delai fixe a la Serbie; il ne le regrette pas, celte demarche ayant ete repoussee categoriquement, .. et I'Angleterre n'ayant pas non plus eule temps de donner des instructions a cet egard I a son agent. Une note de TAmbassade d'Angleterre m'a ete remise: elle rend compte de la conference de TAmbassadeur britannique a Petersbourg avec M. Sazonoff et M. Paleologue. Sir Edward Grey estime que les quatre Puissances non interessees devraient insister aupres de la Russie et de I'Autriche pour que leurs armees ne fran- chissent pas la frontiere et donnent le temps H I'Angleterre, a la France , a I'Allemagne et a ritalie d'exercer leur mediation. Si I'Allemagne accepte, le Gouvernement anglais a des raisons de penser que I'ltalie serait heureuse de s*associer egalement a Taction jointe de I'Angleterre et de la France: I'adhesion de I'Allemagne est essentielle, car pas plus TAutriche que la Russie ne lolererait d'autre intervention que d*amis impar- tiaux ou d'allies. Bienvenu-Marthl r 51. M. Babrere, Ambassadeur de France a Rome, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre de3 Affaires ^trang^res p. i. Rome, le 26 juiilet 1914. Uh telegramme de Vienne re^n k i'inslant k la Consulta lui fait connaitre que la \ rupture diplomatique est effective entre TAutriche et la Serbie. et que I'Autriche procede i des mesures militaires. Le Marquis- di San Giuliano, qui est a Fiu^i, ne reviendra k Rome qo'apres- demain. J'ai eu aujourd'hui avec le President du Conseil un interessanl entretien sur la situation, dont il reconnait toutela gravite. De I'ensemble de ses propos, j'ai emporte le sentiment que le Gouvernement italien vdudrait, en cas de conflit, se tenir en dehors et rester dans une attitude d'observation. M. Salandra m'a dit, a ce propos : « Nous ferons les plus grands efforts pour em- — 71 -* pecher la paix d'etre rompue : notfe situation est un peu analogue h telle de TAngle* terre. Peut-elre pourrions-nous Iair6 quelque chose dans un sens pacifique avec les Anglais ». M. Salandratm'a confirme que la note autrichieUne avail ete c6mmumque6 a Rome a la derniere heure. I r 52. M. Barrjere, Ajnbassadeur de France a Rome, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires ^trang^res p. L Rome, le 26 juillet 191 A* M. Sa7onoff a dit hier & l*Ambassadeur dltalie a Petersbourg que la Russie se servirait de tous les moyens diplomatiqaes pour eviter le conflit et qu elle ne renon- ^ait pas k I'espoir qu.une mediation pourrait amener I'Auiriche a une attitude moins intransigeanle ; mais qu'on ne pouvait cependant lui demander de laisser ecraser la Serbie. Je remarque que ia majeure partie de ropinion publique italienu'e est liostile k TAutriche daris cetie grave affaire. Barrere. r 53. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i., a M. DE Fleuriau, Charge d'affaires a Londres. Paris, le 26 juillet iQizi. M. Paleologue m'adresse ie telegramme survant : « M. Sazonofif oonseille au Gou* vernement serbe de solliciter la mediation du Gouvernement brilannique. » D'accord avec M. Paul Cambon, je pense que le Gouvernement franqais ne pent qu exprimer I'espoir de voir le Gouvernement anglais accepter^ si une offre de oelle nature lui etait faite. Veuillez vous exprimer dans ce sens aupres du Foreign Office. BlENYENU-M.UmX. — 72 — N'' 54, M. Paleologue, Ambassadeur de France a Saint-Petersbourg» a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Saint-Petersbourg, le 26 juillet 1914. Le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres continue avec une louable persevfe'ance k rechercher les moyens de faire prevaloir une solution pacifique. « Jusqu au dernier instant, m'a-t-il declare, je me montrerai pret k negocier. » C'est dans cet esprit qu il vient de mander le Comte Szapary pour le convier k une « franche et loyale explication*. Article par article, M. Sazonoff a commerite devant lui rultimatum austro-hongrois, en faisant ressortir le caractere injurieux des princi- pales clauses. « L'intention qui a inspire ce document, a-t-il dit, est legitime si vous n'avez poursuivi d'autre but que de proteger votre territoire contre les menees des anarchistes serbes; mais le procede auquel vous avez eu r^cours n'est pas defen- dable. » II a conclu : « Reprenez votre ultimatum, modifiez-en la forme, et je vous garantis le resuUat ». L' Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie s'est montre touche de ce langage; toutefois, en attendant des instructions, il reserve I'opinion de son Gouvernement. Sans se de- courager, M. Sazonoff a decide de proposer, des ce soir, au Comte Berchtold Tou- verture d'une conversation directe entre Vienne et Petersbourg sur les changements k introduire dans Tullimatum. Celte entremise amicale et olficieuse de la Russie entre 1 Autrlche et la Serbic a I'avantage d'etre expeditive. Je la crois done preferable a loute autre procedure » et de nature k aboutir. Paleologue. r 55. M. DuMAiNE, Ambassadeur de France si Vienne, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Vienne, le 26 juillet igii^. M. Scbebeko est revenu pr^cipitamment d'un voyage en Russie; il ne Tavait entrepris qu'apres I'assurance donnee par le Comte Berchtold que les reclamations contre la Serbie seraient des plus acceplables. L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie a Petersbourg avait parle dans le meme sens a M. Sazonoff la veille de la remise de la note. Ce procede, tres habitue! dans la diplo- matic de la Monarchic, el qui a servi egalement au Baron Macchio envers moi, parail avoir beaucoup ajoute k I'irritation du Gouvernement russe. — 73 — M. Schebeko va s'efforcer, cependant, de profiler du delai indispensable a la nio- bilisation pour introduire.une proposition d'arrangement, qui aura au moins I'avan- tage de permettre de mesurer ia valeur des declarations pacifiques de TAllemagne. Pendant que nous en deliberions ce soir, en compagnie de Sir M. de Bunsen-, celui-ci a regu des instructions du Foreign 0£Gce concernant la demarche a tenter par les representants des quatre Puissances moins directement interessees. Je m at- tends done a ce que nous ayons a nous concerter demain avec le due d'Avarna et M. de Tschirsky, lequel se retranchera presque surement derriere le principe de la localisation du conflit pour refuser son concours. Mon impression est, d'ailleurs, que le Gouvernement auslro-hongrois , quoique surpris et pent etre au regret de I'energie qu'on lui a inspiree, se croira oblige a un commencement d action riiilitaire. DuifAINE. r 56. ,M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. a bord de la France (pour le President du Conseil) et a MM. les Ambas- sadeurs de France a Londres, Saint-P^tersbourg, Berlin, Vienne, Rome. Paris, ie 26 juillet igid- Le resume de la reponse serbe a la note autrichienne ne nous est parvenu qu'avec vjngt heures de retard. Bien que le Gouvernement serbe eut cede sur tous les points, saufdcuxpetites reserves, le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongne a rompules relations, prou- vant ainsi la volonte arretee de son gouvernement de proceder a I'execution de la Serbie. D'apres un telegramme de M. Jules Cambon, VAmbassadeur d'Anglet'erre ale sen- timent dun peu de flechissement; comme il faisait observer k M. de Jagow que Sir Ed. Grey ne lui demandait pas d'intervenir entre I'Autriche et la Serbie, mais, cette question cessant d'etre localisee, d'intervenir avec TAngleterre, la France et ritalie k Vienne elPelersbourg, le SecretJ\ire d'Etat a declare qii'il ferait son possible pour maintenir la paix. Au cours d'un entretien de M. Bairere avec le Secretaire general du Ministere des .Affaires etrangeres italien, celui-ci a indique que le Gouvernement italien naurait vi-aisemblablement pas approuve la note autricihienne ; mais comme elle ne lui a pas ete prealablement communiqu^e. Use trouve, de cefait, liber^ de toute responsabi- iite dans la grave initiative prise par TAutriche. L'Ambassadeur d'AUemagne est venu cet apres-midi me faire uae communication, tendant a line intervention de la France aupres de la Russie dans un sens pacifique. L'Autriche, mVt-iJ dit, a fait declarer a la Russie qu'elle ne poursuivait ni agrandis- sement territorial, ni atteinte a Vintegrite du Royaume de Serbie; sa seule intention estd'assurer sa propre tranqiiillite et de fair6 la police. C'est des decisions de la Russie qu'il depend quune guerre soit evitee; i'Allemagne se sent solidaire de la France dans i'ardent desir que la paix puisse etre .maintenue, tji a le femoe espoir que la France ttsera de son influence dans un sens apaisant k Petersbourg. OoGritSinrs diplomatiqcbs. — Cuerre curopeenne. »o — 74 ^ J'ai repondu k cette suggestion que la Russie ^tait mod^r^e*, (ju'elle n'avait accom" jpli aucun acte qui put faire douter de sa moderation et que nous etions d'accord avec elie pour rechercher la solution pacifique de ce conflit. II nous paraiss ait doncqu a tltre de contre-partie, TAllemagne devait agir k Vienne, ou refficacite de son action ^tait icertaine en vue d'eviter des operations. miiitaires tendant-a I'occupation de la ^erbie. L'Ambassadeur m'ayant fait remarquer que cela etait iiiconciliable avec la position prise par TAllemagne « que la question ne regardait que TAutriche et la Serbie » , je iui ai dit que la mediation a Vienne et k Petersbourg pourrait etre le. fait des quatre autres Puissances moins interessees dans la question. M. de Schoen se retrancha alors derrlere le manque d'instructions a cet egard, et je lui.dis que, dans ces conditions, je ne me sentais pas en mesure d'exercer une ac- tion seulement a Petersbourg. La conversation se termina sur I'assurance , renouvelee par I'Ambassadeur , des in- tentions pacifiques de I'Allemagne, qu'il declarait solidaire, sur (ie* point, de la France. Btenvenu-Martin. N° 57. Note pour le Ministre. Dimanche soir, 26 juillet 1916. Apres la visite qu'il avait faite au Ministre a 5 heures de Tapres-midi, le Baron de Schoen s'est rendu , ce soir a 7 Heures , k la Direction politique , pour demander qu'en vue d'eviter des commentaires tendancieux des journaux, comme celui de VEcho de Paris la veille , et afm de bien preciser le sens des demarches du Gouvernement allemand, un bref communique ful donne k h presse sur I'entrevue de I'Ambas- sadeur d'Alliemagne et du Ministre des Affaires etrangeres. M. de Schoen suggera, pour preciser sa pensee , les termes suivants, dont le Direc- teur politique p. i. prit note sous sa dictee : « L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne et le Ministre des Affaires 6trangeres ont eu, pendant fapres-midi, un nouvel entretien, au cours duquel ils ont examine, dans I'esprit le plus amical et dans un sentiment de solidarite pacifique, les moyens qui pourraient etre employes pour maintenir la paix gene- rale. » Le Directeur politique p. i. repondit aussitot.: « Alors, tout est regie dans votre esprit, et vous nous apportez I'assurance que I'Autriche accepte la note serbe, ou se pretera aux conversations avec les Puissances ^cet egard? » L'Ambassadeur ayant paru surpris et fait une vive denegation, il Iui fut expose que si rien n'etait modifie dans I'attitude negative de fAllemagne , les termes de la « Note a la presse » suggeree ^taient excessifs et de nature a donner a I'opinion frauQaise une fausse securite, en creant des illusions sur la situation reelle, dont les dangers n'etaient que trop ^vidents. Aux assurances que prodiguait I'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne sur I'impression opti- — 75 — misle qu'il eprouvait, le Directeur politique p. i. repondit en lui demandant s'il lui pei- mettait de lui parler a titre tout personnel et prive, d'homme a homme, en toute iiberte, et sans tenir compte de ieurs fonctions respectives. Le B^on de Schoen le pria de le faire. M- Berthelot dit alors qae pour tout esprit simple, I'attitude de TAUemagne ne pouvait s'expliquer, si elle ne tendait pas a la guerre : une analyse purement objective des faits et la psychologie des rapports austro-allemands conduisaient logiquement a cette conclusion. Devant Taffirmation repetee que TAUemagne ignorait le contenu de la note autrichienne, il netait plus permis d'elever de doutes sur ce point; etait-il vraisem- blable, cependant, que I'Allemagne se fut rangee, les yeux fermes, a cote de I'Au- triche, dans une pareille aventure? La psychologie de toutes les relations passees de Vienne etde Berlin permeltait-elle d'admettre querAutricheeutpris une position sans recul possible, avant d'avoir pese, avec son alliee , t(^tes les consecpienccs de son intransigeance? Combien le refus de TAUemagne de donner un conseil de mediation a Vienne paraissait surprenant, maintenant qu'elle connaissait le texte extraordinaire de k note autrichienne! Quelle responsabilite le Gouvernement allemand prendrait, €t quelifes suspicions peseraient sur lui, s'il persistait a s'interposer entre I'Autriche et les Puissances,- apres la soumission pour ainsi dire absolue de la Serbie, et quand le moindre conseil donne par lui k Vienne mettrait fin au.cauchemar qui pesait sur I'Europe ! La rupture des relauons diplomatiques par I'Autriche, ses menaces de guerre et la mobihsation quelle powsuit, donnent One particuliere urgence'a Taction pacifica- trice de I'Allemagne , car du jour ou les troupes autrichiennes auraient franchi la frontiere serbe,, op se tronverait en presence dun fait qui obligerait sans doute le Cabinet de Petersbourg a intervenir et risquerait de dechainer une guerre que I'Al- lemagne declare vouloir eviter. M. de Schoen, qui ecoutait en^ouriant, affirma de nouveau que I'Allemagne avait ignore le texte de la note autrichienne ( i ) et ne I'avait appro uvee qu'apressa remise ; elle. estimait toujours que la Serbie avail besoin d'une le^on assez severe pour qu'elle ne put I'oublier, et que I'Autriche se devait k elle-meme de mettre fin a une situation dangereuse et intolerable pom; une grande puissance. II declara, d'ailleurs, ne pas connaitre le texte de la reponse serbe, et se montra personnellement surpris qu'elle n'eut pas satisfait I'Autriche, si tpiitefois elle etait telle que les journaux, souvent mal informes, la representaient. II insista encore sur les intentions pacifiques de I'Allemagne et donna son impres- sion sur TelTet que pourraient avoir de bons conseils adresses, par exemple a Vienne, par r Angle terre, sur un ton amical. Selon lui, I'Autriche n'etait pas intransigeante; ce qu'elle repousse, c'est I'idee d'une mediation formelle, le « spectre » d'une confe- rence : un mot pacifique venu de Petersbourg , de bonnes paroles dites d'un ton con- (i) Voir pifece n* 21. Lettre du Ministre de France a Munich relatant que le President du Conseil bavarois a dil, le 23 juillet, avoir coni;iaissance du texte de la note autrichienne a la Serbie. V. aussi Livre Bleu, la pi^ce n° g5 oil Sir M. de Bunsen, ambassadeur d'Angleterre k Vienne, declare : « Quoique je ne puisse p£is le verifier, je tiens d'une source privee que TAmbassadeur allemand connaissait le texte de I'uhimatum aulrichien a la Serbie avant qu'il ne fut expedie et qu'il I'a telegraphic a TEmpe- reur d'Allemagne ; je sais par TAmbassadeur allemand lui-mSme qu'il en approuve chaque ligne. » ~ 76 - ciliant par les Puissances de la Triple Entente, auraient chance d'etre bien accueillles. H ajouta enfm quil ne disait pas que TAUeniagne, de son cote, ne donnerait pas quelques conseils a Vienne. Dans ces conditions, leDirecteur pplitique declara quil demanderait au Ministre s'il lui paraissait opportua de conaoiuaiquer a la presse une courte note de ton modere. N^ 58. M. Chevalley, Ministre de France a Christiania, a M. Bien^venu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Christiania , le 26 juillct 1914. Toute la flotte allemandc en Norvege a re^u I'ordre de prendre la mer. Les auto- rites allemandesa Bergen declarent que c'est pourrallier directement TAlleniagne. Les navires allemands disperses dans les fiords au nord de Bergen rejoindraient ceux qui sont aux Environs de Stavanger. Chevalley. N^ 59. M. d'Annoville, Charge d'affaires de France a Luxembourg, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Luxembourg, \e 26 juillet 191/i. D'apres des renseignements que je viens de recevoir de Thionville, les qualre der- nieres classes liberees ont ordre de se tenir a la disposition de la Komniandatur a toule heure. Sans elre completement mobilises, les reservistes ont interdiction de s'absenter du lieu de leur domicile. d'Annoville. — 77 -^ N° 60. M. Faroes, Consul general de France a Bale» a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministredes Affaires etrangeres p^L Bale, le 27 juillet igiil* Les ofEciers allernands en vacances dans cette region ont recu, il y a quatre jours, 1 ordre de les inlerrompre pour regagner TAllemagne. D'autre part, j'apprends de deux sources serieuses qu*avis a ete donne aux pro- priclaires de yoitures automobiles du Grand-Duche de Bade dese preparer a les mettre a la disposition des autorites railitaires, deux jours apres un nouvel ordre. Le secret, sous peine d'amende, a ete recommande sur cet avi^. La population baloise est tres inquiete et les facilites bancaires se resserxent. Farges* r 61. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i.* a M. Jules Cambon, Arabassadeur de France a Berlin, communique a bord de la France (pour le President du Conseil) et a MM. les Ambassadeurs de France a Londres, Saint-Petersbourg, Vienne, Rome. Paris, ie 27 juiilet 1914. Les trois demarches de I'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a Paris semblent caracteris- liques : — le vendredi, il lit une note ou le Gouvernement allemand se pose categorique- ment enlre TAulriche et les Puissances, approuvant I'ultimatum autrichien a la Serbie et ajoutant que « I'Allemagne desire ardemment que le conflit r^ste localise, toute isilervention d'une autre Puissance devant, par le jeu de ses alliances, provoquer d'iricalculables consequences »; — le second jour, le samedi, Teffet ayant ete produitet les Puissances ayant, en raison de la surprise, dela brievete du delai et des risques de guerre generale, conseille kla. Serbie de ceder, M. de Schoen revient attenuer sa demarche, feignant de s'etonner de I'impression produite et proteste quon prete h I'Allemagne des intentions quelle n'apas, puisque, dit-il, il n'y a eu ni concert avaat, ni menace apres ; — le troisieme jour, le dimanche, le resultat ayant ete obtenu, puisque la Serbie a cede en fait pour ainsi dire a toutes les exigences de TAulriche, TAmbas- sadeur d'Allemagne repai^ait k deux reprises, pour insisler sur les intentions pacifiques — 78 — de FAllemagne et sur son desir ardent de collaborer au mainllen de la paix, apres avoir enregistre le succes autrichien, qui clot ja premiere phase de la crise. La situation a i'heure actuelle reste inquietante, en raison du refus incomprehen- sible de i'Autriche d accepter la soumission serbe, de ses operations de mobilisation et de'ses menaces d'envahir la Serbie. L attitude prise depuis le debut, avec I'appui allemand, par le Gouvemement autrichien, son refus d'accepteraucune conversation des P uissances ne permettant pas, en pratique, a celles-ci d'intervenir utilement aupres deluisans Tintermediait-e de I'Allemagne. Cependant le temps presse, car si I'armee autrichienne franchit la frontiere, ilsera Ires difficile d'enrayer la crise, laRussie ne paraissant p-as pouvoir tolerer I'occupalion de la Serbie, apre^ que celle-ci s'e'st en realite soumise k la Note autrichienne en lui donnant toutes satisfactions et garanties. L'Allemagne, du fait meme de la position prise par elle, est qualifiee pour intervenir utilement et etre ecoutee a Vienne; si elle ne le fait pas, elle justifie tous les soupgons et assume la responsabilite de la guerre. Les Puissances, et en particulier la Russie, la France et I'Angleterre ont determine par leurs pressants conseils Belgrade a ceder;-elles ont done rempli leur role; main- tenant c'est a I'Allemagne, seule en situation d'etre entendue rapidement a Vienne, k donner des conseils k I'Autriche qui a obtenu satisfaction et ne peut, pour un detail facile. i regler, dechainer la guerre generale. C'est dans ces CO nditions que se presente la proposition faite par le cabinet de Lon- dres; M. Sazonoff ayant dit k I'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre qu'a la suite de I'appel dela Serbie aux Puissances, la Russie accepteraitde se tenir ^I'ecart, SirE. Grey a formule aupres des Cabinets de Paris, Berlin et Rome, la suggestion suiyante : les Ambassa- deurs de France, d'Allemagne et d'ltalie a Londres seraient charges de chercher avec Sir E. Grey un moyeti de resoudre les difEcultes actuelles , etant entendu que pendant cette conversation, la Russie, TAutriche et la Serbie s'abstiendraient de toute opera- tion militaire active. Sir A. Nicolson a parle de cette suggestion a TAmbassadeur d'Alle- magne, qui s'y est monlre favorable; elle sera egalement bien accueillie a Paris et aussi a Rome, selon toute vraisemblance. Ici encore, la parole est k I'Allemagne, qui a I'occasion de temoigner autrement qu'en paroles sa bonne volonte. Je vous prie de vous concerter avec votre coUegue anglais et d'appuyer aupres du Gouvernemenl allemand sa demarche dans la forme qui vous paraitra opportune. Bienvenu-Martin. K 62; M. Bienvewu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires ^trangeres p. i., a bord de la France (pour le President du Conseil) et a MM. les x\mbassadeurs de France a Londres, Saint-Petersbourg, Berlin, Vienne. Paris, le 27 juiilet 1914. Apres sa demarche d'hier tendant k une intervention apaisante de la France k Petersbourg, I'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne etait revenu, ainsi que je vous en ai in- forme , a la Direction politique , sous le pretexte qu'il pourrait y avoir interet a com- — 79 — muniquer k la presse une courte note indiquant le sens pacifiquc et arnica! de la conversation; il avait meme suggere les termes suivants : « L'Ambassadeur et le Mi- nistre des Affaires etrangeres ont eu, pendant I'apres-midi , un nouvel entretien au cours duquel on a examine , dans I'esprit le plus amical et dans un sentiment de solidarite pacifique , les moyens qui pourraient etre employes pour maintenir la paix generale. » II fut repondu de suite que les termes paraissaient excessifs et de nature k donner a I'opinion des illusions sur la situation reelle, que cependarit une breve note dans le sens indiqu6, c'est-a-dire*.rendant compte dune conversation oii avaient ete examines les moyens employes pour sauvegarder la paix, pourrait etre donnee si je I'approuvais. La note communiquee a ete la suivante : « L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne et le Mi- nistre des Affaires etrangeres ont eu un nouvel entretien, au cours duquel ils ont recherche les moyens d'action des Puissances pour le maintien de la paix. » Cette redaction, volontairement terne, evitait une solidarite avec TAllemagne qui pourrait etre mal interpretee. Ce matin , M. de Schoen a adresse une lettre particuliere dn Directeur politique , sous le pretexte de resurher son entretien avec le Ministre , et a ajoute : « Notez bien la phrase sur la solidarite des sentiments pacifiques. Ce n'est pas une phrase banale , mais la sincere expression ^e la realite. >- Le resume jomt k la lettre etait ainsi con^u : a Le Cabinet de Vienne a fait formellement et oJ0B.ciellement declarer a celui de Petersbourg qu'il ne poursuit aucune acquisition territoriale en Serbie et qu'il ne veut point porter atteinte k I'integrite du royaume ; sa seule intention est celle d'assurer sa tranquillite. En ce moment, la decision, si une guerre europeenne doit eclater, depend uniquement de la Russie. Le Gouvernement AUeo^and a la ferme confiance que le Gouvernement Fran(5ais, avec lequel il se skit solidaire dans I'ardent desir que la paix europeenne puisse etre maintenue,.usera de toute son influence dans un esprit apaisant aupres du Cabinet de Petersbourg. » Je vous ai fait connaitre ia reponse qui avait et^ faite (une demarche frangaise a Petersbourg s'expliquait mal et devait avoir pour coroUaire une d-marche allemande k Vienne, ou, a defaut, une mediation, dans les deux capitales, des quatre Puissances moins interessees). La lettre de M. de Schoen est susceptible de diverses interpretations : la plus vrai- semblable est qu'elle t^nd, comme sa demarche meme» a chercher k compronaettre la France au regard de la Russie, quitte, en cas d'echec, a rejeter sur la Russie et sur la France la responsabilite dune guerre eventuelle , enfin a masquer, par des assu- rances pacifiques non ecoutees, une action militaire de rAutriche'en Serbie, destinee k completer le succes aulrichien. Je vous^ communique ces renseignements k titre d'information el a toutes fins utiles. BlENVENU-MABTm. 80 — r 63. 1 M. DE Fleuriau, Charge d'Affaires de France a Londres, a M. Bienvenu-Martin. Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. L Londres, ie 27 juillet 191/i. L'Ambassadeur d'AUemagne ct I'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie laissent en-' lendre qu'ils sont surs qne I'Angleterre garderait la neulralite si un confllt venait 6. eclaler. Sir Arthur Nicolson m'a dit que, cependant, le Prince Lichnowski ne pou- vait, apre ia conversation qu il a eue avec lui aujourd'hui, conserver aucun doute sur la liberte qu'enlendait garder le Gouvernement britannique d'inlervenir, au cas ou il le jugerait utile. L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne n'aura pas manque d'etre frappe de cette declaration , mais pour peser sur I'Allemagne et pour eviter un conflit, il semble'indlspensahlQ que celle-ci soil amenee a tenir pour certain quelle Irouveralt I'Anglelerre et la Russie aux cotes de la France. DE Fleuriau. N" 64. M. Paleologue, Ambassadeur de France a Saint-P^tersbourg, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Saint-Pelersbourg, 2 7 j uillet 1 9 1 A- M. Sazonoff a tenu a tous mes collegues un ^ang.^ge conciliant. Malgre I'emotion publique , le Gouvernement Russe s applique et reussit k conlenir ia presse; on a notamment recommande une grande moderation envers TAUemagne. Depuis bier, M. Sazonoff n'a re9u de Vienne ni de Berlin aucune information. Paleolggue. N** 65. M. BoMPARD, Ambassadeur de France a Constantinople, ' a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres p. i. Therapia, Ic 2 7 juillet 191 4. Le conflit au^lro-serl)e retient I'altention du Gouvernement Olloman et les Turcs. se rejouissent des epreuves de la Serbie, mais on est porte a croirc ici en general ((ue — si- ce conflit restera localise. L'on eslime generalement que, celle fois encore, la Riissie n'interviendra pas en faveur de WSerbie dans des conditions qui 6tendraienl le conflil arme. Le sentiment unanime, dans les milieux politiques ottomans, est que TAutriche, avec Tappui de I'AHemagne, arrivera k sesfms et quelle fera entrer la Serbie, apres la Bulgarie, dans Torbile de la Triple Alliance. BOMPARD. r 66. M. DE Fleuriau, Charge d'affaires a Londres, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires ^Irangeres p. i. Londres, le 27 juillet 191 4. Sir Ed. Grey a dil ce matin k I'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que si TAutriche envahissait la Serbie apres la reponse serbe, elle demontrerait qu'elle ne poursuivail pas seulement le re^ement des questions mentionnees dans sa note du 2 3 juillet, mais qu'elle voulait ecraser un petit Etal. «Alors, a-t-il ajoute, se poserait une question europeenne, et il s'ensuivrait une guerre, a laquelle d'autres Puissances seraient amen^es a prendre part ». L'attitude de la Grande-Bretagne s'affirme par I'arret de la demobilisation de sa flotte. Le Premier Lord de I'Amiraute avait pris discretement cette mesure des vendredi, de sa propre initiative; cette nuit, sir Edward Grey et ses collegues ont decide de la publier. Ce resultat est du a I'altitude concilfante de la Serbie et de la Russie. - DE Fleuruu. r 67. M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin , a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires ^trang^res p. i. Berlin, ic 27 juillet 1914. J'ai entretenu aujourd'hui le Secretaire d'Etat de la demarche de I'Angleterre ten- dant k ce que I'Allemagne se joigne aux Cabinets de Londres, Paris et Rome pour empecher les hostilites entre Petersbourg et Vienne. Documents diplomatiques. — Guerre europeenne. n — 82 — Je lui ai fait remarquer que la proposition de sir Edward Grey ouvrait la voie a une issue pacifique. M. de Jagow m'a repondu qu'il etait dispose k y entrer, mais il m'a fait Temarquer que si la Russie mobilisait, rAUemagrte serait obligee de mobiliser aussitot, que nous y serions forces egalement et qu'alors le con flit serait presque inevitable. Je lui ai demande si i'Allemagne se croirait engagee a mobiliser dans le cas oii la Russie ne mobiliserait que sur la frontiere autricliienne ; ii m'a dit que non et m'a autorise formellement k vous faire connaitre Cette restriction. Aussi attacherait-il la plus grande importance k ce que les puissances amies e& all lees de la Russie intervinssent aupres d'elle. Enfm il a remarque que si la Russie attaqualt rAutficlie, TAllemagne' devralt attaquer aussitot de son cote. L'interventlon proposee par VAngleterre a Petersbo ucg et a Vienne nepourrait done s'exercer a sesyeux que si les evenements' ne . se preci- pitaient pas. II ne desespere pas dans ce cas qu elle puisse reussir. J'ai exprime le regret que rAutriche, par son inlransigeance, eul conduit I'Europe au pas difficile que nous traversons, mais j'ai temolgne I'espoir que 1 intervention aboutirait. Jules Cambox. N" 63. M. DE Fleuriau, Charge d'affaires a Londres, 4 M. Bienvenu-Martin , Ministre des AiBaires ^trangeres p, i.. Londres, le 27 juillet 1914- Hier, au conrs d'une conversation entre M. Sazonoff, M. Paleologue et Sir G. Bu- chanan, le Ministre russe aurait dit que la Serbie etait dlsposee a en appeler aux Puissances, et, qu*en ce cas, son Gouvernement accepteralt de se lenir k lecart. Sir Ed. Grey a pris texte de ces paroles pour formuler aupres des Cabinets de Paris, de Berlin et de Rome une proposition dont Sir Francis Bertie salslra Votrc Excellence. Les quatre puissances interviendraient dans le conflit, et les Ambassadeurs de France, d'Allemagne et d'ltalie k Londres seraient charges de chercher, avec Sir Ed. Grey, un moyen de resoudre les diflicultes actuelles. II serait entendu que, pendant les debats de cette petite conference, Ja Russie, I'Autriche et la Serbie s'abstiendraient de to«te operation milltaire active. Sir A. Ni- colson a parle de cette suggestion a TAmbassadeur d'Allemagne qui s'y est montre favorable. DE Fleuriau. -. 83 -^ r 09. M. DE Fleuriau, Charge d'affaires a Londres, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires ^trang^res p. i. Londres, le 27 juillet 1914. Le Ministre de Serbie n'a pas re^u d'instructions de son Gouvernement en vue de demander la mediation de I'Angieterre; il est d'ailleurs possible que les telegrammes de son Gouvernement soient arretes en route. La proposition anglaise d'intervenir a quatre, indiquee dans mon telegramme; precedent, est d'ailleurs lancee, et me parait devoir etre soutenue en premier lieu. DE Fleuma-U, r 70. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. a M. DE Fleuriau, Charge d'affaires de France a Londres. Paris, le 27 juillet 1914. L'Ambassadeurd'Angleterre m'a communique la proposition de Sir Ed. Grey ten- dant a une action commune de VAngleterre, de TAUemagne, de la France et de Tllalie a Vienne, Belgrade et Petersbourg pour arreter les operations militaires actives, pea- dant que les Ambassadeurs d'AUemagne, d'ltalie et de France a Londres examine- raient, avec Sir E. Grey, les moyens de trouver une solution aux complications presentes. J'ai prescrit ce matin a M. Jules Cambon de se concerter avec I'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a Berlin, et d'appuyer sa demarche, dans la lorme ou il le jugerait opportun. Je vous autorise a prendre part a la reunion projetde par Sir E. Grey. Je suis pret egalement a donner a nos agents a Vienne, Petersbourg et Belgrade des instructions dans le sens demande par le Gouvernement anglais. Toutefois, j'estime que les chanoes de succes de la proposition de Sir E. Grey reposent essemiellement sur Taction qi>e Berlin serait dispose k exercer a Vienne; une demarche de ce cote pour amener la suspension des operations militaires nae paraitrait vouee a lechec, si Tinfluence de I'AUemagne ne setait pas exercee au prealable. J ai egalement note parmi les observations de M. de Scboen, que le Gouvernement — u — austro-liongrois etalt speclalement susceptible quand on prononQalt les termes de « mediation » , « intervention » , « conference » , el plus capable d'admettre des « conseils amicaux » et des t conversations ». Bienvenu-Martin, r 71. M. DE Fleoriau, Charge d affaires de France, k Londres, a M.Biewvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Londres, ie 27 juillet 1914. J'ai fait connailre k Sir E. Grey voire adhesion a sa proposition de mediation k quatre et de confereribe a Londres. L*Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a Vienne a re9U les instructions necessaires pour saisir le Gouvernement austro-hongrois des que ses collegues fran9ais, allemand ou italien auront ete autorises a laire la meme de- marche. Le Gouvernement italien a accepte I'intervention k quatre en vue de prevenir les operations militaires; il consulte le Gouvernement allemand sur la proposition de conference et la procedure a suivre k legard du Gouvernement austro-hongrois. Le Gouvernement allemand n a pas encore repondu. DE Fleobiap. N** 72. M. BarkeRe, Ambassadeur de France a Rome. a M. BienvEnd-Martin, Mmistre des Affaires ^trang^res p. i. Rome, le 27 juillet 1914. Le Marquis de San Giuliano, est rentre a Rome ce soir et je Tai vu aussitot apres son arrivee. 11 m'a parle du contenu de la Note autrichienne et m'a assure formel- lement qu'iln'en a eu aucune connaissance prealable. II savait bien que celte Note devait avoir un caraclere rigoureux el energique ; mais il ne s'etait pas doute qu*elle put prendre une telle forme. Je lui ai demande s'il etait vrai qu'il eut fait exprimer k Vienne k ce propos , comme le pretendent certains joumaux, une approbation de Taction autrichienne et Tasstirance que lltalie re.mplirait a I'egard de rAulriche ses devoirs d'alliee. « En aucune fa9on, m'a repondu ie Minislre c nous n avons pas ete consultes, on ne nous a rien dit; nous n'avons done eu k faire aucune communication de cette nature k Vienne ». — 85 -. Le Marquis de San Giuliano eslime que la Serbie aurait agi plus sagement en acceptanl la note dans son iniegralite; aujourd'hui encore il eslime que ce serait la seule chose a faire, etant convaincu que I'Autriche ne retirera aucune de ses pre- tentions, etlesmaintiendra, meme au risque d'amener une conflagration generale; il doute que TAllemagne soil disposee a se preler a une action aupres de son alliee. II constate toutefois que rAllemagne tient en ce moment un grand compte de ses rapports avec Londres, et il croit que si une Puissance pent determiner Berlin a une action pacifique, c'est TAngleterre. Quant a ritalie, elle continuera h faire tous ses efforts en faveur de la paix. C'est a cet effet qu il a adhere sans hesiter a la proposition de Sir Ed. Grey de r6unir a Londres les Ambassadeurs des Puissances, qui ne sont pas directement interessees dans le conflit auslro-serbe. Barrebe. r 73. M. Jule. Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires ^trang^res p. i. Berlin, le 27Juillet igid. L' Ambassadeur d'Anglelerre , qui est renlr6 aujourd'hui, a vu le Secretaire d'Etat et I'a entretenu de la suggestion de Sir Ed. Grey. M. de Jagow lui a repondu en manifestant toujours son desir de la paix, mais en ajoulant qu'il ne pourrait consentir a ce qui ressemblerait a une conference des Puissances; ce serait inslituer une espece de cour d'arbilrage, dont I'idee ne serait acceptable que si elle etait demandee par Vienna el Petersbourg. Le langage de M. de Jagow confirme celui de M. de Schoen [a Voire Excellence. A la verite une demarche des quatre Puissances a Vienne et Petersbourg pent se produire par la voie diplomatique, sans prendre la forme d'une conference et est susceptible de bien des modalites ; ce qui importerait c'est de manifester a Vienne et a Petersbourg le desir commun des quatre Puissances qu'un conflit soil evite* La lemporisation permettrait seule d'arriver k 'une issue pacifique des difficultes ,pre- sentes. Jules Cambon. — 86 — r iL M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a BerJin, a M. Bienvend-Martiw, Ministre des Affaires ^trang^es p. i Berlin, le 27 juillet igid* Je me suis entretenu aujoiird'hui avec le Secretaire d'Elat et j'ai appuye aupres de lui la demarche que venait de faire Sir E. Goschen. M. de Jagow m'a repondu, comme il I'avait fait a TAmbassadem- d'Anglelerre , qu'il ne pouvait accepter la proposition de charger les Ambassadeurs d'ltalie, de France et d'Ailemagne de chercher avec Sir Ed. Grey les moy^ns de resoudre les difficultes actuelles, parce que ce serait instituer une veritable conference pour traiter des affaires de I'Autriche et de la Russie. J'ai r^plique k M. de Jagow que je regrettais sa reponse, mais que le grand objet que Sir Edw. Grey avait en vue depassait une question de forme ; que ce qui impor- tait c'eiait I'association de I'Angleterre et de la France avec I'AUemagne et I'ltalie pour travailler a une oeuvre de paix; que cette association pouvait se manifester par des demarches communes a Petersbourg et k Vienne ; qu'il m'avait souvent exprime son regret de voir les de^ix groupes d'alHance opposes toujours inn a I'autre en Europe; qu'il: avait \k I'occasion de prouver qu'il y avait un esprit europeen, en mon- trant quatre Puissances appartenant aux deux groupes agissant d'un commun accord, pour empecher un conflit. M. de Jagow s'est derobe en disant que TAllemagne avait des engagements avec I'Autriche. Je lui ai fait remarquer que les rapports de I'Allemagne avec Vienne n'etaient pas plus etroits que ceux de la France avec la Russie et que c'etait lui-meme qui mettait dans I'espece les deux groupes d'alliance en opposition. Le Secretaire d'Etat m'a dit alors qu'il ne se refusait pas a agir pour ecarter le conflit austro-russe , mais qu'il ne pouvait pas intervenir dans le conflit austro-serbe. « L'un est la consequence de I'autre, ai-je dit^ et il importe d'empecher quii ne sur- •« vienne un etat de fait nouveau, de nature a amener une intervention de la Kussie. » Comme le Secretaire d'Etat persistait a dire qu'il etait oblige de tenir ses engage- ments ad'egard de I'Autriche, je lui ai demandi§ s'il s'etait engage k la suivre partout, lesyeux bandes, et s'il avait pris connaissance dela reponse dela Serbie a TAutriche, que le Charge d'affaires de Serbie lui avait remise ce matin. « Je n'en ai pas encore « eu le temps, » me dit-il. « Je le regrette. Yous verriez que, sauf sur des points de * detail, Ta Serbie se soumet entierement. II semble dome que, puisque I'Autriche a * oblenu les satisfactions que votre appui lui a procurees, vous pouvez aujourd'hui ii lui conseiUer de s'en contenter ou d'examiner avec la Serbie les termes de la reponse f de celle-ci* » Comme M. Jagow ne me repondait pas clairement, je lui ai demande si I'Alle- magne voulait la guerre. II a proteste vivement, disant qu'il savait que c'etait ijpaa pens^e, mais que c'etait tout k fait inexact. « D faut done, ai-je repris, agir en — 87 - « consequence. Quand vous lirez la reponse serbe , pesez-en les terraes avec votre • conscience, je Vous en prie, au nom de I'huinanite, et n'assumez pas persoonelle- € ment une part de respoosabilite dans les caitastrophes que vous laissez preparer. » M. de Jagow a proleste de nonveau, ajoutant qu il etait prel a s'unir a I'Anorleterre el k la France dans un effort commun, mais qu il fallait trouver a cette intervention line forme qu'il put accepter et que les Cabinets devaieat s'entendre a ce sujet. « Au reste, a-t-il ajoute, les conversations directes entre Vienne et Petersbourg « sont entamees et se poursuivent : j'en augure beaucoup de bien et j'espere. » Au moment de le quitter, je lui dis que j'avals eu ce matin Timpression que Theiire de la detente avait sonne, mais que je voyais bien qu'il n'en etait rien.Il m'a repondu que je me trompais; qu'il esperait que les choses etaient en bonne v6ie et abouti- raient peut-etre rapidement. Je lui ai demande d'agir a Vienne pour qu'elles marchent vite-, parce qu'il importait de ne pas.- laisser se creer en Russie un de ces courants d'opinion qui emportent tout. A mon sentiment., il y aurait lieu de demander k Sir E. Grey„ qui a dti etre avise par Sir E. Goschen du refua oppose a sa proposition dans la forme qui lui ^tait donnee, de la renoiiveler sous une autre forme, de telle fa^on que TAUemagne n'ait pas de pretexte pour refuser de s'y associer et prenne jesresponsabilites aux yeux de i'Angleterre. Jules Cambon. N* 75. ML Biewvenu-Martiis, Minislre des Affaires 6trangeres p^. i. a MM. les Ambassadeurs de France a Londres, Saint-Petersbcmrg, Berlin, Vienne, Rome. Paris, ie nj juillct i9i4« L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongi^ie est venu me voir pour me remettre un me- moire, veritable acte d'accusation contre k Serbie; il m'a declare, d'ordre de soq Gouvememenl, que la Serbie n'ayant pa& repondu d'une maniere satisfaisanle aux demandes du Gouvernement imperial, celui-ci 5e voit contraint d'employer des moyens energiques pour amener la Serbie a domier les satisfactions et garanties qui sont reciamees d'elle. Cest demain que le Gouvernement autrichien prendra ies mesures k eel effet. Tai prie FAmbassadeur de me faire connailre les mesures envisagees par I'Autriche, et le Comte Szecsen m'a repondu que cela pourrail etre soil un ultimatum, soil une declaration de guerre, soil le passage de la frontiere, mais qu'il n'avait aucuue indi- cation precise sur ce point. J'ai alors fait remarquer k TAmbassadeur que la Serbie avait accepte sur presque tous ies points ies exigences de l'Aulricbe» que la divergence qui subsistail sur — 88 — quelques points pounail disparaiire avec un peu de bonne volonte reciproque, et par i'aide des Puissances amies de la paix; en fixant a demain Texeculion de ses resolu- tions, TAutriche rendait, pour la seconde fois, leur concours presque impossible et assumait une lourde responsabilite en risquant de dechainer une guerre, dont oa ne pourrait mesurer I'exlension. Je vous communique, a litre d'information , le memoire que ma remis le Comte Szecsen. Bienvenu-Martin. Annexe. Memoirs da Gouvemement aaslro-hongrois , remis par le Comte Szecsen A M. Bienvena-Martin le 27 jaillet 19 U. L'agitation serbe, qui s'est dojxne pour but d'arriver a ia separation de la Monarchie aulri- ehienne des jiartis slaves du Sud pour les rattacher a un grand Etat serbe, remonle tres loin en arriere. Celte propaganda sur le sol serbe, toujours la meme quant a son but final, quoique diverse dans ses moyens et intensit^s, avait atteint son plus haut point lors de la crise de Tannexion. Rejetant le manteau protecteur du secret, elle s'^tait montr^e alors avec toute la franchise de ses tendances et avait montre sous le patronage du Gouvernement serbe son intention de realiser ses desseins avec tous les moyens disponibles. Tandis que la Presse serbe tout entiere appelait au combat centre la Monarcbie par des cris haineux ct en denaturant les faits, il se creait des associations pour encourager a celte lutte — meme abstraction faite d'autres moyens de propagande. L association qui est devenue la plus importante est la « Narodna Odbrana ». Issue d'un comite r^volutionnaire qui existait alors, elle fut constituee en Society priv^e, cependant, sous forme d'organisation dependant du Departement des AfTaires ^trangere? de Belgrade par des fonctionnaires serbes militaires et civils. Parmi ces fondateurs, on doit citer notam- ment : le general Buzo Jankovic, les anciens ministres Ljuba Jovanovic, Ljuba Davidovic et Valislav Valovic, le directeur de I'lmprimerie nationale Zivojin Dacic, et les anciens capi- taines, maintenant commandants, Voja Tankovic et Milan Pribicevic. Cette association s'etait impose comme but la creation et i'organisation de bandes en vue de la guerre esperee contre la Monarchie. On trouvera une description saisissante de I'activil^ d'alors de la « Narodna Odbrana », notamment dans les declarations du sujet bosn^o-herz^govinien Trifko Krstanovic, entendu comme temoin par le conseii de guerre de Sarajevo, qui se trouvait alors a Belgrade et qui, avec d'autres sujets de la Monarchie, a ^te accept^ comme comi- tadji par la « Narodna Odbrana ». Avec environ cent quarante autres, Krstanovic avait ^te amen^ a une dcole Cr^ee pour la formation de nouveHes bandes k Cuprija, district de Jago- dina, et dirigce par les, capitaines Voja Tankosic et Dusan Putnick. 11 n'y avait comme maitresdans cette ecole que des officiers serbes; le general Bozo Jankovic et le capitaine Milan Pribicevic donnerent une grande r^gularite a ces. cours d'organisation de bandes, qui duraient trois mois. Les comitadji y recevaient un enseignement complet du tir, du jet des bombes, des mines, de la destruction des chemins de fer, timnels , ponls et tel6graphes. Leur devoir 6tait, d'apres — 89 — leurs chefs, de mettre en pratique les connaissances nouvcllement acquises en Bosnie-Her- z^govine. Par cette aclion de la « Narodna Odbrana » exerc^e de la maniere la plus publique et favo- ris6e par le Gouvernement Serbe, a ^t6 r^pandue la guerilla des bandes centre la Monar- chic. Par la, les sujets de la Monarchic 6taient conduits a la Irahison contre leur patrie, et amenes syst6matiquement a pratiquer comme ^missaires serbes des attaques secretes contre les moyens de defense de leur patrie. Cette periode des aspirations agressives s'est termin^e avec la declaration faite par le Gou- vernement serbe le 3i mars 1909, dans laquelle celui-ci se d^clarait pret k accepter le nouvel ^tat de choses cr6e par I'annexion de la Bosnie-Herzegovine au point de vue du droit public, et a promis solennellement vouloir vivre en relations amicales de bon voisinage, dans I'avenir, avec la Monarchie. Avec cette declaration , il semblait que dut prendre fm I'agitation con§tituant une source permanente de troubles contre TAutriche-Hongrie et qu'on eut trouve un moyen de, rappro- chement amical entre la Serbie et la Monarchie. Privee de Tappui du Gouvernement serbe, et combattue par lui conformement a ces engagements, la propagande hostile n'aurait pii durer que dune nianiere occulte, vou^e a une prompte destruction. Par contre, les points de contact existant entre les partis slaves du Sud de la Monarchie et la Serbie dans le domaine de la langue, des races et de la culture auraient du conduire h la realisation dun travail de developpement commun inspire d'amities r^ciproques et d'interets paralleles. Cependant ces espoirs ne se sont pas realises. Les aspirations hostiles a la Monarchie ont subsist^, et, sous les yeux du Gouvernement serbe qui n'a rien fait pour etouffer cette agi- tation, la propagande institute contre I'Autriche n'a fait que gagner en 6tendueet prolondeur. La haine contre la Monarchie a et4 tenue en haleine et s'est transform^e en un sentiment irreconciliable. Le peuple serbe, tant paries moyens anciens, mieux adaptes a la situation, que par des methodes plus completes, a et^ appele « au combat d'aneantissement in^luc table » contre I'Autriche. Systematiquement, des fils secrets ont ele. tiss^s vers les donaaines slaves du sud de la Monarchie, dont les sujets ont et^ incites ^ la trahison. Par-dessus tout, c'estla presse serbe qui n'a cesse d'agir dans cet esprit. Pas moins de quatre-vingt un journaux paraissant en Serbie ont du ^tre retires de la circu- lation postale jusqu'aujourd'hui, en raison de leur contenu qui tomba sous le coup de la loi p^uale. II n'est guere une loi penale protegeant la personne sacr6e du Monarque et des membres de la famille imp^riale ou fint^grite de I'Etat qui n'ait ete viol^e par les feuilles serbes. On trouvera k I'annexe I quelques-unes des uonabreuses preuves donndes par la presse dans I'ordre d'idees ci-dessus. Sans entrer dans un examen d6taill6 des manieres de voir de Topuiion publique serbe, il y a lieu d observer que la presse n'a cesse de considerer i'annexion .de la Bosnie-Herz6govine , malgre la reconnaissance formelle serbe, apres comme avant, comme un rapt exerc^ contre la Serbie ayant besoin d'etre repare. Cette pens6e ne revient pas seulement dans les feuilles d'opinion avancee, mais aussi dans la nSamupfavaw qui tient de si pres k I'OiEce des Affaires etrangeres de Belgrade , ou elie est exprim^e sous une forme k peine envelopp^e (voir annexe IP). On ne peut pas non plus n^gliger de considerer comment I'attentat commis le 1 5 juin 1910 4 Sarajevo par Bogdan Zerajic contre le Gouverneur de Bosnie-Herzegovine, mailre de camp von Varesanin , a ete loue par la presse. On se souvient que Zerajic s'^tait tue immediatement apres son acte et avait brul6, avant de le commettre, tous ses papiers. Pour ces raisons, il n'avait pas ^t^ possible de mettre en lumiere pleinement les motifs de cet attentat , on a cependant pu coiiclure d'une piece trouvee DocQMEKTS DIPL0MATIQCB8. — GuciTe europcennc. >.♦ — 90 — pr^ de lui qu'il etait partisan des ide^ de Kropotkine. Les indicBs relev^s ont egalement conduit a penser quil s'agissait d un attentat d un caractere anarchiste, Ceci n'empecha pas cependant la presse serbe de celebrer le criminal comrae un heros •national serbe et deiouer son acte. Meme, ie « Politika s'est eleve contre i'idee que Zerajic fut un anarchiste et la reclame comme un « heros serbe dont le nom sera repete par (ous ies Serbes avec respect et douleur «. Le« Politika » considere la date du 18'aout de la meme annee a jour de naissance de S. M. ImpSriale et Royale » comme une occasion favorable pour parler a nouveau de Zerajic « dont le nom sera dans le peuple qaelque chose comme celui d'un saint « et pour iouer solennellement Tattentat en une poesie (annexe if I). Cest ainsi qua, etc exploit^ ce crime n ayant rien de commun avec les aspirations sur des territoires de la Monarchie , pour le progres de cette idee et que le meurtre a ete reconnu de la maniere la pins explicite comme un moyen glorieux et digne d'imitation dans ia lutte pour la realisation de cette pensee. Cette sauclification du meurtre comme une methode pleinement admissible dans la lutte contre la Monarchie revient plus tard dans les feuilles parlant de I'attentat commis pal- Jukic contre le Commissaire royal de Cuvaj (annexe I^). Ces journauxrepahdus, uon pas.seulement en Serbie, mais comme on I'a vu plus tard par des voies secretes bien organisees et par fraudes dans la Monarchie qui ont arnen^ et maintenu ^veillee dans les grandes masses cette disposition , laquelle a fourni un terrain nourricier, favorable pour les m^faits des associations hostiles h la Monarchie. Cest !a R Narodna Odbrana y> qui est devenue le centre de Tagitation menee par les asso- 'dations. Les mSmes personnes qui, au temps de I'annexion, etaient a sa tete, sont encore celles qai la dirigent. On retrouve parmi elles comme organisateurs energiques et pleins d'aclion les plus violents opposants de la Monarchie cites plus haut. Organis^e sur une base large et profonde et possedant une hierarchie (voir annexe II « organisation »), la « Narodna Odbrana D posseda bientot environ quatre cents adherents, qui repandirent une agitation tres active. En outre , la Narodna s'est mise en association etroite avec la « Federation des Tireurs » (762 societes), Tassociation des Sokol « Dusan Silni (2,600 membres), le Club olympique, f Association des cavaliere « Knez Mihajlo d, ia Societe des chasseurs et la Ligue de d^velop- pement, ainsi que de uombreuses autres associations, qui toutes, conduites et protegees par la Narodna , agissaient dans le m^me esprit. Se penetrant de plas en plus les unes les autres, ces associations parvinrent a une fusion complete , de telle maniere qu^elles ne sont plus aujourdTiui que des membres du Corps unique de la Narodna. Ainsi cette derniere a con- stitue sur toute la Serbie un reseau tres serre d'agitation et a attire a toutes ses idees tous ceux capables de les recevoir. Quel est lespril de Taction de la Narodna, cest ce que demontre avec tme suffisaiite dart^ les publications officielles de cette Spciete. Dans ses statuts , revetus de Vapparence d une societe de developpement ne se pr^occu- pant que du perfectionnement spirituel et cprporeldeia population serbe et de son renfor- cement materiel, la Narodna devoile dans sou organe corporatif (voir annexe U) le vrai et unique mobile de son existence, en ce quelle appelle son « programme reorganise ». Precher au peuple serbe notammeut « la verite sainie par un travail fanatique et infati- gable »sous I'allegation que la Monarchie Veut « lui.prendre sa liberte et sa langue et m^me detruirela Serbie)); qu'il est une necessite ineluctable de conduire cOutre TAutriche-Hon- grie, son premier et plus grand entwmi, ie « combat de destruction avec fusils et canons i» et de preparer le peuple a ce combat « par tous ies moyens » , pour la liberation des territoires soamis, dans lesquels sont sous I'opprobe el ie joug sept millions de freres. Tous les « efforts - 91 -^ pour le dldveloppement » de la Narodlna sont au service exclusif do cetie idl^e cdmme simple moyen poiir rorganisation et i'eduCation du peuple en vue dekiutte poiir l'an6anli$$emen* prevu. C'est dans le meme esprit que travaillcnt toytes les associations affiliees k la Narodna ^ regard desquelles rassociation des « Sokol » de Kragujevac peut seryir comme exemple (voir annexe III). Comme pour la Narodna, ce sont des officiers, professeurs et agents de i'Etat qui sont a sa tete. LediscotDEs par lequel son President, major Kovacevic, a ouvert Tassemblee annuelie de igi4 renonb'e. total ement h mentionner la gymnastique, ce qui est cependant ie but veri- table des « Sokol » et ne parle que de {a a preparation k la guerre » contre « I'Ennemi danger reux, sans coeur, odieux et envahissant du Nord» qui enleve h des millions de freres serbes leurs libertes et leurs droits et Ifes maintient dans I'esclavage et les fers. Dans les rapports administratifs de cette association, les developpements techniques passcnt totalement h I'arriere-plan et ne servent que de rubriques pour ia connaissance da veritable « but de 1 activite de I'administration », notamment « la preparation da dSveloppemenf nallonai et la necessity de fortifier la « nation Scrasee » dans VobjectiffjaeUe puisse ainsi mener &. lien son >■<■ procjramme non encore rempli, sa idcke nan encore accompliej>, et accomplir cette ngrande action qui doit s'accomplir dans I'avenir prochain : la liberation des freres vivant au dela de la Drina qui endurent le martyre des crucifiSs ». II n est pas jusqu'au tresorier qui ne fasse servir son rapport financier pour lancer cet appel que Ton doit « elever des faucons » qui sont en mesure « d'apporter la iiberte aux freres non encore liberes. » De meme que les aspirations au developpement dans la Narodna, I'activite en gymnastique' des « Sokol » n'est pas le but lui-meme, mais un simple moyen au service de la meme propa-- gande menee avec les memes intentions pour ne pas dire avec les metoes mots exactement.' Lorsque la Narodna appelle au combat daneantissement contre la Monarcbie, elle ne) s'adresse pas, seulement au peuple de la Monarchic, mais h tous les peuples slaves du sud.l Pour la Narodna, les territoires slaves du sud de la Monarchic font partie de « nos terri-' toires serbes soumis » (voir aussi annexe IV). De m^me les sujets slaves du sud de la mo- narcbie doivent prendre part a cette « oeuvre natio.nale » ». de mSme cette activite a saine et necessaire » doit s'exercer de I'autre cote de la frontiere serbe et meme sur le sol de la monarcbie, la Narodna recherche ses « heros pour la guerre sainte », dont Obilic, lassassin de Mourad , est cite comme exemple digne d'imitation du sacrifice a la patrie. Mais , pour amener les freres militaires.^ Vienne, Belgrade etPetersbourg, et dans une reunion. a. Londres des A[hbassadeurs.d'AUeinagne, de France et d'ltalte, sous la presidence. de Sir E- Grey en vue de chercher une solution aux. difflcidtes. austro- serJies, rencontre, a Berlin des objections de nature ala faire echouer. L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche a fait une demarche pour annoncer que son gouverae- ment pTjendrait demain des mesures energiques pour contraindre la Serbie a lui donner les satisfactions et les garanties qu'il exige de cette puissance; 1© Comte Szecsenme s'est pas explique surces mesures; la mobilisation, k partir du 28 juillet, parait.certaine d'lgpres notre attache militaire k Vienne. Bienvenu-Martin. r 78. M..BiENVB5}U-^ARTiN% Mini&tre dcs Affaires Elrangeres p. L. a Londies, Berlin, P^tersbourg, Vienne, Rome. Paris, le 28 juiHeti^jiii. J'ai eu de nouveau la visite de I'Ambassad^ar d'AUemagne ce matin;. il. ma dit qu'il n'avait pas de communication, pas de proposition officielle k me faire, mais qu'il venait,,commelaveille, causer de la situation et des moyens k employer pour eviter des actes irreparables. Interroge sur les intentions de I'Autriche, il a declare ine pas les connaitre, et ignorer la nature des moyens de coercition qu'elle prepare. L'AUemagne, selon le Baron de Schoen, ne den;iande qu k agir avec la France pour le mainti^n de la paix. Sur I'observation qui lui etait faite qu'un projet de mediation des quatre puissances , auquel nous avons adhere , et qui a obtenu I'assentiment dc prin- cipe de Fltalie et de TAUemagne , a ete mis en avant par TAngleterre , Tambassadeur a dit qi^e le Gouvemenient allemand ne demandait en effet qu'^ s'associer a Taction des — 09 — . puissances, pourvu que «ette action n'affecte pas la fomie d'un arbitrage ou d'une Gonference , repousses' par TAutricfie. J'ai repondu que $i le mot seul arrete le Gouvernement autrichien , le but p«ut ^tre atteint par d'autres moyens; le Gouvernement allemand est bien place pour demandera TAutriche de laisser awx puissances le temps d'intervenir, de trouver une conciliation. M. de Schoen m'a fait alors observer quil n'a pas d'instructions et sail seulement que I'Allemagne se refuse k exercer une pression sur TAutriche, qui ne veut pas de conference. II reproche aux journaux frangais de preter a TAllemagne une attitude quelle n'a pas, en pretendant qu'elle pousse TAutriche : sans doute elle approuve son attitude, mais elle n'a pas connu sa note; elle ne saurait Tarreter trop brusque- ment, car I'Autriche a besoin de garanties contre les'procedes serbes. Bienvbnu-Martin. W 79. M. Bienvenu-Martun,, Ministre des Affaires etrsngeres p. i. a M. DuMAiNE, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne, Paris, le,2.8:jiuUet igiA- Vous connaissez, par les telegrammes de nos Ambassades, que je vous ai transmis, la proposition anglaise de mediation a quatre et de conference a Londres, ainsi que notre adhesion a cette suggestion, Tacceptation conditionnelle de lltalie et'les reserves de Berlin. Je vous prie de vous tenir en contact a ce siijet avec votre CoUegue d' Angleterre , qui a regu les instructions necessaires pour saisir le Gouvernement austro-hongrois de la suggestion anglaise, des que ses trois CoUegues auront ete autorises a faire la meme demarche; vous vous conformerez a son attitude. r 80. M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres, a M. Bienvej^u-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Londres, le 28 juiliet 19 14.. Sir' Ed. Greya re9u hiermes'Collegues d'Autriche Hongrie^ et d'Ailemagne. Le pre- Tnier a' coiltiniie asoutenir que la reponse sel'be ^tait inaceeptable. Le second attenu . _ iOO — un langage analogue k celui de M. de Schoen a Paris. II a insiste sur, I'utilite d'une action moderatrice de TAngleterre a Petersbourg. Sir Ed. Grey lui a repondu que la Russie s'etait montree tres moderee d*epuis I'ouverture de la crise , notamment dans ses conseils au Gouvernement serbe, et qu'il serait tres embarrasse de lui faire des recommandations pacifiques. II a ajoute que c'eta[it a Vienne qu'il convenait d'agir et que le concours de I'Allemagne etait indispensable. D'autre part I'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a Petersbourg a telegraphic que M. Sazo- noCP avait propose a TAmbassadeur d'Autriche une conversation sur I'affaire serbe. Cette infornaation a ete confirmee par TAmbassadeur d'Angleterre a Vienne qui a fait savoir qu'un premier entretien entre le Ministre russe des Affaires etrangeres et le Comte Szapary avait produit un bon effet au Ballplatz. Sir Ed. Grey et Sir A. Nicolson m'ont dit que, si un accord pouvait s'etablir directe-' ment entre Petersbourg et Vienne, il faudrait s'en feliciter, mais ils ont eleve quelques doutes sur le succes de I'initiative de M. Sazonoff . Interroge par Sir G. Buchanan sur la convocation eventuelle a Londres d'une Conference des Representants de I'Angleterre, de la France, de I'Allemagne et de I'ltalie pour chercherune issue k la situation actuelle, M. Sazonoff a repondu : « qu'il avait entame des pourparlers avec I'Ambassadeur d'Autriche dans des conditions qu'il esperait favorables; que cependant il n'avait pas encore re^u de reponse a sa proposi- tion d'une revision de la Note serbe par les deux Cabinets. » Si des explications directes avec le Cabinet de Vienne sont irrealisables , M. Sazonoff se declare pret a accepter la proposition anglaise ou toute autre de nature a resoudre favorablement le conflit. II serait, en tous cas, tres desirable que cette negociation directe, a un moment ou le moindre retard pent avoir de si serieuses consequences , fut menee de maniere k ne pas entraver faction de Sir Ed. Grey et a ne pas fournir a I'Autriche un pretexte pour se derober a f intervention amicale des quatre puissahces . L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a Berlin ayant insiste aupres de M. de Jagow pour obtenir une adhesion a la suggestion de Sir Ed. Grey, le Ministre allemand des Affaires etrangeres a repondu qu'il convenait d'attendre te resultat de la conversation engagee entre Petersbourg et Vienne. Sir Ed. Grey a, en consequence, prescrit a Sir Ed. Goschen de suspendre pour le moment ses demarches. Au surplus I'annonce que fAutriche vient de notifier officiellement sa declaration de guerre k la Serbie fait entrer la question dans une nouvelle phase. Paul Cambon. N** 81. M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Berlin, le 28 juillet 191 A. La conversation que M. Sazonoff a eue avec le Comte Szapary a ete portee k la connaissance de M. de Jagow par le Charge d'Affaires de Russie. Le Secretaire d'Etat — 101 — lui a dit que, conformement aux remarques de I'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne en Russie, pulsque apres rexpiralion de ruitimatum de I'Autriche le Gouvernement de Vienne ne se refusait pas k causer avec le Gouvernement de Petersbourg, il y avait lieu d'esperer que de son cote le Gomte Berchtold pourrait causer avec M. Schebeko et qu'une issue pourrait etre trouvee aux difBcultes actuelles. Le Charge d affaires russe Yoit avec faveur cette disposition des esprits, qui correspond aux desirs de M. de Jagow de voir Vienne et Petersbourg s'entetidre directement et degager TAllemagne. D y a lieu de se demander seulement si I'Autriche ne cherche pas a gagner du temps pour se preparer. J'ai aujourd'hui appuye la demarche de mon CoUegue d'Angleterre aupres du Secretaire d'Etat. Gelui-ci m'a repondu comme a Sir Ed. Goschen, qu'il lui etait impossible d'accepter I'idee d'une sorte de conference a Londres entre les Ambas- sadeurs des quatre Puissances, et quil faudrait donner a la suggestion anglaise une autre forme, pour quelle put etre realisee. Je lui ai fait valoir le danger d'un retard, qui pouvait amener la guerre , et lui ai demande s'il la souhaitait. II a proteste et a ajoute que les conversations directes entre Vienne et Petersbourg etaient entamees, et que, des maintenant, il en attendait une suite favorable. L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre et I'Ambassadeur d'ltalie sont venus me voir ce matin ensemble , pour m'entrelenir des conversations qu'ils avaient eues avec M. de Jagow hier au sujet de la proposition de Sir Ed. Grey. Le Secretaire d'Etat leur a, somme toute, tenu le mem6 langage qua moi : acceptant en principe de s'unir dans une demarche commune a I'Angleterre , a I'ltalie et a nous-memes, mais repoussant toute idee de conference. Nous avons pense, mes collegues et moi, qu'il n'y avait la qu'une question de forme et I'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre va suggerer a son Gouvernement de libeller autrement sa proposition, qui pourrait prendre le caractere d'une demarche diplo- matique a Vienne et a Petersbourg. En raison de la repugnance manifestee par M. de Jagow contre toute demarche a Vienne, Sir Ed. Grey pourrait le mettre au pied du mur, en lui demandant de for- muler lui-meme comment pourrait se produire Taction diplomatique des puissances pour eviter la guerre. Nous devons nous associer a tons les efforts en faveur de la paix compatibles avec nos engagements vis-a-vis de notre alliee; mais, pour laisser les responsabilit^s ou elles sont, il importe d'avoir soin de demander i I'Allemagne de preciser ce qu'elle veut. Jules Cambon. ^ 102 N'* 82. M. Paleologue, Amhassadeur de France a Petersbourg, a M. BiEM£N.u-MARTmvMinistre des Affaires etrangeres ,p. i. Petersbourg, le 28 juillet igi4- Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois n'a pas encore repondu a la proposition du Gouvemement rnsse, tendant.a I'ouverture d'unc conversation directe entrc Peters- bourg et Vienne. M. Sazonoir a re^u cet apres-midl les Ambassadeurs d'Allemagne et d'Autriche- Hongrie;rimpressioi5 qu'il a.gardee de son double entretien est mauvaise.: «.Decid6- ment, ma-t-il dit, TAutriche ne veut pas causer ». A la suite dune conversation que je viens d'avoir avec.mes deux collegues, j'e- prouvcla meme injpression de pessimisme. Paleqlogue. r 83. M. DuMAiNE, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne, a M. BiENVENU-MARTiNvMinistre des Affaires etrangeres p, i. Vienne, le 28 juiliet 1914. Le'Comte Berchtold vient de declarer a Sir M. deBuusen que to.ute intervention tendant a la reprise de la discussion entre I'Autriche et la Serbie> sur la base de la reponse serbe, serait inutile, et d'ailleurs trop tardive, la guerre ayant ete oiTicielle- ment declaree a midi. L'attitude de mon collegue russe n'a jusqu a present pas varie : il ne s agissait pas a son avis de localiser le conflit, mais bien de Tempecher. La declaration de guerre rendra bien difficile Tengagemeilt des pourparlers aquatre, ainsi que' la continuation des etitretiens directs entre M. Sazonoff et le Comte Szapary. On pretexte ici que laformiile qui paraissait pouvoir obtenir I'adhesion de TAlle- magne, « me'diation entre I'Autriche et la Russie », a I'inconvenient d'accuser entre ces deux empires un conflit qui n'existe pas,jusqu'a present. Parmi les soup^ons qu'inspire la soudaine et violente resolution de I'Autriche, le plus inquietant est que I'Allemagne Taurait poussee a I'agression contre la Serbie afin de pouvoir elle-meme entrer en lutte avec la Russie et la France, dans les circon- stances quelle suppose devoir lui etre le plus favorables, et dans des conditions deliberees. DOMAINE. — 103 — CHAPITRE V DE U DfiCLARATION DE GUERRE DE L'AUTRICHE A LA SERRIE (28 JWLLET 19U A L'ULTIMATUM DE L'ALLEMAGNE A LA RUSSIE (31 JUILLET 1914) — 105 — N" 84. r ■ M. Barrere, Ambassadeur de France a Rome, I a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires ^trangeres p. i. Rome, le 29 juUlet 19 14. La Consulta estlme que, malgre fa declaration de guerre de I'Autriche kh Serbie, il n'y a pas lieu d'interrompre ies efforts diplomatiques tendant a la reunion dune Conference ^ Londres en vue d une mediation. Barrere. N° 85. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires ^trangeres p. i., a Saint-Petersbourg, Londres, Berlin, Rome, Vienne, Constantinople, Belgrade. Paris, le 29 juillet 191 4. L'attitude austro-allemande se precise. L'Autriche, inquiete de la propagande slave, a saisi Toccasion do lattentat de Serajevo pour chatier Ies menees serbes, el prendre de ce cote, des garanties qui peuvent, selon que Ton laissera ou non se developper Ies evenements, ne porter que sur le Gouvernement et I'armee serbes, ou devenir territoriales. L'AUernagnc s'interpose entre son alliee et Ies autres puis- sances, en declarant qu'il s'agit d'une question locale, chatiment d'un crime politique dans le passe, garanties "certaines pour favenir que Ies menees anti-autricbiennes prendront fin. Le Gouvernement allemand estime que la Russie doit se contenter des assurances officielles et formelles donnees par I'Autricbe qu elle ne poursuit pas d'agrandissement territorial et respectera fintegrite de la Serbie; dans ces con- ditions, c'est de la Russie seule, si elle voulait intervenir dans une question bien delimitee, que pent venir un danger de guerre. Dans ces conditions c'est a Peters- bourg seulement qu'il faut agir pour le maintien de la paix. Ce sophisme, qui dispenserait TAUemagne d'inlervenir k Vienne, a ete soutenu sans succes k Paris par M. de Sch'oen, qui a vainement tenle de nous entratner dans une action solidaire franco-allemande a Petersbourg; il a 6te egalement developpe a Londres aupres de Sir E. Grey : en France comme en Angleterre, on a repondu que le cabinet de Petersbourg a donne, depuis le d^but, Ies plus grandes preuveiS de sa moderation, en particulier en s'associant aux puissances pour donner k la Documents DiPLOMATigt^ES. '— Gaerre europdenne. 1 4 ~- 106 — Serbie \e conseil de ceder aux exigences de la note autrichienne. La Russle ne menace done nuUement la paix ; c'est a Vienna qu'il faut agir, c'esl de la que vient le danger, du moment qu'on y refuse de se conlenter de la soumission presque totale de la Serbie a des exigences exorbitantes et qu'on ne veut pas accepter la collaboration des puissances pour la discussion des points restant a regler entre I'Autricbe et la Serbie, et enfin qu'on n'hesile pas devant une declaration de guerre aussi precipitee que la note primitive de I'Autriche-Hongrie. L attitude a Berlin, comme a Vienne, reste dilatoire. Dans la premiere capitale, tout en protestant du d^sir allemand de sauvegarder la paix generate par une action conunune des quatre puissances, on repousse I'idee d'une Conference, sans suggerer aucun autre moyen et en refusant d'agir positiyement a Vienne. Dans la capitale autrichienne, on voudrait amuser Petersbourg par I'illusion d'une entente pouvant resulter de conversations directes, et Ton agit contre la Serbie. Dans ces conditions, il parait essentiel que le cabinet de Petersbourg, dont le desir de denouer pacifiquement la crise est manifeste , adhere immediatement a la proposition anglaise. Celle-ci a besoin d'etre tres appuyee k Berlin pour decider M. de Jagow a une action reelle sur Vienne, susceptible d'arreter I'Autriche et d'empecher que son avanlage diplomatique se double d'un succes mililaire. Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois ne manquerait pas en effet d'en profiler pour imposer a la Serbie, sous le nom elastique de garanties, des conditions qui modifieraient en fait, malgre toutes les assurances de desinteressement territorial, le statut de TEurope orientale, et risqueraient de compromettre gravement, soit des main tenant, soit dans un avenir prochain, la paix g6n6rale. Bienvenu-Martin. N° 86. M. Paleologue, Ambassadeur de France a Saint-Petersbourg , k M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des AfF&ires ^trangeres p. i. Saint-Petersbourg, le 29 juillet 1914. Des maintenant, je suis en mesure d'assurer a Votre Excellence que le Gouverne- ment russe acquiesce a toutes les procedures que la France et I'Angleterre lui propo- seront pour sauvegarder la paix. Mon coUegue d'Anglelerre telegraphic dans le m6me sens k Londres. Pal^ologue. ' 107 — N** 87, M. Klobukowski, Ministre de France a Bruxelles, a M. BiENVENU- Martin, Ministre des Affaires toang^resp. i. Bruxeiles, le 29 juillet 191 4. De mon entretien avec M. Davignon et diverses personnes en mesure d'etre exac- tement informees, je rapporte rimpression suivante : Tattitude de rAilemagne est enigmatique et autorise toutes les apprehensions. II parait invraisembiable que le Gouvemement austro-hongrois ait pris une initiative le conduisant, suivant un plan precongu, k une declaration de guerre sans accord prealable avec I'empereur Guil- laume. Le Gouvemement allemand reste I'arme au pied, reservant, selon les circon- stances, son action pacifique ou guerriere, mais I'inquietude est telle dans tous les milieux qu'une intervention brusque contre nous ne surprendrait ici personne. Mes Collegues de Russie et d'Angleterre partagent ce sentiment. Le Gouvemement beige prend des dispositions conforaaes ^la declaration que m*a faite hier soir M. Davignon que tout sera mis en oeuvre pour la defense de la neu- tralite du pays. Klobukowski. r 88. M. RoNSSiN, Consul g^n^ral de France a Francfort, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Francfort, le 29 juillet 1914. Je vous signals d'importants mouvemenls de troupes hier et cette nuit. Ce matin, plusleurs regiments sont arrives en tenue de campagne, notamment par jes routes de Darmstadt, CasseletMayence, qui sont remplies de militaires. Les ponts et chemins de fer sont gardes sous pretexte de preparer les manoeuvres d'automne. RONSSIN. tA 108 — r 89. M. Allize, Ministre de France a Munich, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Munich, le 29 juillet 1914. On m'assure que les moulins d'lUkirch (Alsace-Lorraine) ont ele invites a cesser de livrer a leur clientele ordinaire et a reserver toule leur production pour Tarmee. De Strasbourg sont signales des transports de canons automobiles employes pour le tir sur aeroplanes et dirigeables. Sous pretexte de modification dans les exercices d'automne, les sous-officiers el soldats des regiments d'infanterie bavaroise de Metz, qui etaient en permission en Bavierc a Toccasion des recoltes, ont re^u Tordre hier de rentrer immedial^ment, Allize. r 90. M. DuMALNE, ambassadeur de France a Vienne, a M. Bienvenu-Martin,. Ministre des Affaires elrangeres p. i. Vienne, le 29 juillet 191 A. Le Consul de France a Prague me confirme la mobilisation du 8*= corps d'armee dejii annoncee, et celle de la division de landwehr de ce corps d'armee. Les divisions de cavalerie de Galicie mobilisent egalemenl; des regiments, des divisions de cava- lerle de Vienne et de Buda-Pest ont deja ete transportes a la frontiere russe. Des convocations de reservistes ont actuellement lieu dans cette region. En vue de faire face h toute menace, el peut-elre pour en imposer a Petersbourg, Ic bruit court que le Gouvernemcnl auslro-hongrois aurait Tinlenlion de decider le '60 juillet on le i*"" aout, la mobilisation generale des armees. Enfin le retour de TEmpereur d'Iscbl a Vienne est assure pour demain. DUMAINE. — 109 — ^ r 91. m M. Paleologue, Ambassadeur de France a Saint-Petershourg, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires ^Irangeres p. i. Saint-Petersboarg, le agjuillet 1914. La conversation directe k laquelle le Gouvernemenl russe avail amicalement convie le Gouvernenient austro-hongrois est refusec par celul-ci. D'autre part^TEtat-Major russe a constate que TAutiiche precipite ses preparalifs militaires contre la Russie et active sa mobilisation, qui a commence sur ia frontiere de Galicie". En consequence, Tordre de mobilisation sera expedie, cette nuit, aux treize corps d'armee destines i operer eventuellement contre TAutriche. Malgre I'echec de sa proposition, M. Sazonoff accepte I'idee d'une conference des quatre Puissances a Londres; il n'attache d'ailleurs aucune importance autitre officiel de cette deliberation et se pretera k toutes les tentatives anglaises en faveur de la paix. Paleologue. 1\° 92. M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France h. Berlin, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Bciiin, le 29 juillet 19l4> J'ai demande aujourd'hui au Secretaire d'Etal ou en etait la question des conver- sations directes entre Vienne et Petersbourg, qui lui semblait bier la meilleure pro- cedure pour arriver k une detente. II m'a repondu qu i Petersbourg les dispositions sur ce point etaient bonnes et qu'il avail demande k V,ienne d'entrer dans cette voie. 11 altendail la reponse. Le Gouvernemenl britannique, apres avoir vu rep6usser la suggestion d'une conference, avail fait connaitre qu'il verrail avec faveur ces conver- sations s'ouvrir entre TAutrichc el la Russie et avail demande que I'Allemagne y poussat I'Autriche, ce que le Gouvernemenl imperial ne manque pas de faire. J'ai demande a M. de Jagow sll avail enfih la reponse de la Serbie a I'Autriche, ot ce qu'il en pensait. II m'a repondu qu'il y voyait une base de negocialion possible. J'ai repris que c'esl juslemenl pour cela que je trouvais inexplicable la rupture de I'Autriche apres la reception d'un document pareil. Le Secretaire d'Elat a alors fail remarquer qu'avec les peuples d'Orienl on n'avait jamais assez de suretes et que I'Autriche voulait conlroler rexecutioa des promesses — 110 — qui lui etaient faites, controle que ia Serbie refusait. C'est la aux yeux du Secretaire d'Etat, le point capital. J'ai replique a M. de Jagow que, voulant rester indepen- dante, la Serbie devait repousser le controle d'une seule Puissance, mais qu'une Commission Internationale ne presenterait pas le meme caractere. Les Etats Balka- niques en comptent pins d'kme, a commencer par la Commi^ion finartciere a Athenes. On pourrait par exenjple,. ai-je dit,, imaginer, entre- autres combinaisor^s, une Com- mission internalionale provisoire chargee de controler I'enquete de police demandee par rAutciche;.ii etait clairpar cet exemple que la reponse de la Serbie ouvrait la porte a des conversations et ne justifiait pas ime rupture. Tai ensuite demarlde au Secretaire d'Etat si, en dehors des conversations direcles entre Vienne et Petersbourg^, auxqiielles Sir Ed. Grey s'etait rallie, il ne peinsait pas que Taction conimiine des quatre Puissances pourrait s'exercer par Tintermediaire de leurs Ambassadeurs; 11 ma repondu affirmativemeijt ajoutant qu'acluellemeni lie Cabinet de Londres se confentait dappuyer dans le sens des conversations directes. A la fin de I'apres-midi, le Chancelier de I'Empire a prie 'VAmbassadeur d'Angle- terre de venir le Voir. II lui a parle de la proposition de Sir E; Grey tendant a .la reunion d'une Conference ; il lui adit qu'il n'avait pas pu accepter une proposition qui semblait imposer" Tautortte des Puissances a TAiitnche; il a assure mon Collegue de son sincere desir de la paix et des efforts qu'il faisait a Vienne, mais il a ajoute que; la Russie etait seule la maitresse de maintenir la paix ou de dechainer la guerre. Sir Ed. Goschen lui a repondu qu'il ne partageait pas son sentiment et que si la guerre eclatait, I'Autriche aurait la plus grosse part de responsabilite , car il etait inadmissible qu'elle eut rompu avec la Serbie apres la reponse de celle-ci. Sans discuter sur ce point, le Chancelier a dit qu'il poussait autant qu'il le pouvait aux conveY-sations directes entre I'Autriche et la Russie; il savait que I'Angleterre voyait cette conversation d'un ceil favorable. H a ajoute que sa propre action serait bien difficile k Vienne , s'il etait vrai que la Russie eut mobilise sur la Irontiere au- trichienne quatorze corps d*armee. II a prie moa collegue d'appeler sur toules' ces observations raitefitiOD de Sir Ed. Grey. Sir E. Goschen a telegraphic dans ce sens 6 Londres* Lattitude du Chancelier est tres probablement la consequence du dernier entre- lien de Sir Ed. Grey avec le prin6e Lichnowslci. Jusqu'^ ces tout derniers joUrs, on s*est flalte ici que TAngleterre reslerait hers du d^bat, et Timpression produite par son altitude est profonde sur le Goiivemement allemand et sur les financiers et hommes .d'affaires. Jules Cambon. ~ 111 — r 93. M. DuMAiNE, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Allaires etrangeres p. i. Vienne, le 29 juillet 1914. L'opinion de mes coUegues anglais, russe et italien concorde avec la mienne con- cernant Timpossibilite d'empecher une premiere lutte entre rAutriche et la Serbia, toutes les tentatives pour retarder le choc ayanl echoue. M. Schebeko avail demande que les pourparlers engages a Petersbourg entre MM. Sazondff et Szapary fussent poursuivis et renduspliis efficaces par des pouvoirs specialement conferes a celui-ci, le comle Berchtold s y est n'etlement oppose. II marquait ainsi que TAutriche-Hongrie ne tolere aucune intervention qui rempeche- rait d'infliger a la Serbie un chatiment et une humiliation. Le due d'Avarna adinet comme Ires vraiseojblable que Timminence d'une insurrec- tion generale de ses sujets Sud-Slaves ait precipite les resolutions de la Monarchie. II s'attache encore a lespoir qu'apres un premier succes des armees auslro-hongroises, mais pas plus tot, une mediation pourrait limiter le conffit. Du MAINE. W 94, M. Bienvenu-Martin, Miflistre des Allaires Etrangeres, p. i. ^ a Londres, Berlin^ Saint-PEtersbourg, Rome, Vienne, Constantinople, Belgrade. Paris, le 29 juillet 1914. Ce matin , la communication suivante m'a ete faite par TAmbassadeur d'Allemagne a litre ofiicieux : le Gouvernement allemand poursuit ses efforts en tue d'amener le Gouvemement autrichien a une conversation amicale qui permettra a ce dernier de faire connaitre exactement le but et I'extension des operations en Serbie. Le Cabinet de Berlin espere recevoir des precisions qui seraient de nature a donner satisfactioa a la Russie. Les efforts allemands ne sont aucunement enlraves par la declaration de guerre intervenue. Une communication semblable sera faite k Petersbourg. Au cours d'une conversation que j'ai eue ce matin avec le baron de Schoen, celui-ci m'a declare que le Gouvernement allemand ignorait les intentions de Vienne. Quand Berlin saura jusqu'ou I'Autriche veut aller, on aura une base de discussion, qui rendra plus faciles les conversations en vue d une intervention. — 112 — Sur mon observation que les operations militaires engagees ne laisseraient peut- etre pas le temps de causer, el que le Gouvernement allemand devraiit user de son influence a Vienne en vue de les retarder, Fambassadeur m'a repondu que Berlin ne pouvait exercer de pression, mais qu'il esperait que les operations ne seraient pas poussees tres activement. Bienvenu-Martin. N° 95. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires ^trangeres p. i., a Londres, Berlin, Saint-Petersbourg, Vienne, Constantinople, Rome,^ Belgrade. Paris, le 29Juillet 191 A. D'ordre de son Gouvernement, M. Iswolsky est venu me communiquer un tele- gramme adresse par M. Sazonoff ^ Berlin. 11 resulte de cette information que la Russie, a la suite de la declaration de guerre de rAutriche-Hongrie k la Serbie , des mesures de mobilisation deja appliquees a la plus grande parlie de I'armee austro-hongroise , enfm du refus du comte Berchtold de continuer les pourparlers entre Vienne et Saint-Petersbourg, avail decide la mobilisation dans les arrondissements d'Odessa, Kiew, Moscou et Kazan. En portant ce fait a la connaissance du Gouvernement alle- mand, I'Ambassadeur de Russie a Berlin a ete charge d'ajouler que ces precautions militaires n'etaient a aucun degre dirigees contre TAllemagne, et ne prejugeaient pas non plus des mesures agressives contre rAutriche-Hongrie ; I'Ambassadeur de Russie a Vienne n'etait, d'ailleurs, pas rappele de son poste. L'Ambassadeur de Russie m'a donne egalement le sens de deux telegrammes adresses & Londres par M. Sazonoff : le premier, indiquant que la' decoration de guerre a la Serbie mettait fin aux conversations du Ministre russe avec I'Ambassadeur d'Autriche, demandait k I'Angletcrre d'exercer aussi rapidement que possible^ son action dans le sens> de la mediation et de I'arret immediat des operations de guerre de I'Autriche (dont la continuation donnait le temps k I'Autriche d'ecraser la Serbie pendant que ia mediation Irainerait); le second communiquait I'impression gardee par M. Sazonoff de ses Conversations avec I'Ambassadeur allemand, que I'AlIemagne favorise I'intran- si^eance de I'Autriche et n'exerce pas d'action sur elle. Le Ministre russe considere I'attilude de I'AlIemagne comme Ires inquietante et croit que I'Angleterre est en meil- leure posture que les aulres Puissances pour entreprendre des demarches k Berlin , en vue d'une action sur Vienne. Bienvenu-Martin. 113 — . r 96. M. Barrere, Ambassadeur de France a Rome, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeresjp. i. Rome, ie 29 juillet 191 4. Le Ministre des Aflaires etrangeres a ete informe officiellement par TAmbassadeur. de Russie que son Gouvernement, a la suite de la declaration de guerre de TAutriche. a laSerbie et des mesures de mobilisation prises d'ores et deja par rAutriche, avait donne I'ordre de mobiliser dans les districts de Kiew, Odessa, Moscou et Kazan. II a ajoute que celle mesure n'avait pas un caractere agressif contre TAUemagne et que I'Ambassadeur de Russie a Vienne n'avait pas ete rappele. En commentant cette conamunication , le Marquis de San Giuliano m'a dit que malheureusement dans toute cette affaire la conviction de TAutriche et celle de TAl- lemagne avaient ete et etaient encore que la Russie ne marcherait pas. II m'a lu k ce propos une depeche de M. BoUati lui rendant compte d'un entretien qu'il avait eu aujourd'hui avec M. de Jagow, et ou ce dernier lui avait encore repete qu'il ne croyait pas que la Russie marcherait. II fondait cette croyance sur le fait que le Gouverne- ment russe venait d'envoyer a Berlin un agent pour traiter de certaines questions linancieres. L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche a Berlin a dit egalement a son Gollegue anglais qu'il ne croyait pas k une guerre generale , la Russie n'etant ni en humeur ni en etat de faire la guerre. Le Marquis de San Giuliano ne partage pas du tout cette opinion. II estime que si I'Autriche se contente d'humilier la Serbie, et d'exiger, en outre de 1' ac- ceptation de la note, certains avantages materiels qui ne touchent pas k son terri- toire, la Russie peut encore trouver matiere a composition avec elle. Mais si I'Au- triche veut soit demembrer la Serbie, soit la detruire comme Etat independant, il considere comme impossible k la Russie de ne pas intervenir militairement. Malgre I'extreme gravite de la situation, le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres ne me parait pas desesperer de la possibilite d'un arrangement. II croit que I'Angleterre peut encore exercer beaucoup d'influence k Berlin dans un sens pacifique. II a eu hier soir, m'a-t-il dit, une longue conversation avec I'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, Sir R. Rodd, pour lui demontrer combien I'inlervention anglaise pourrait etre effi- cace. II m'a dit en terminant : « Si tel est aussi I'avis de votre Gouvernement, il pour- rait, de son cote, insister dans ce sens a Londres. » BARRlfcRE. Documents diplomatiooes. — Guerre europecnne. l5 116 r 97. 1 M. Ren6 Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires ^trang^res, a M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France, a Londres. Paris, le 29 juillet 1914. Je vous serais oblige de prier Sir Ed. Grey de bien vouloir reprendre le plus tot possible k Berlin, sous la forme qu'il jugera la plus opportune et la plus efficace, sa proposition de mediation des quatre Puissances, qui avait obtenu I'adhesion de principe du Gouvemement allemand. Le Gouvemement russe a du, de son cote, faire exprimer directement le meme d6sir au Gouveraement anglais; la declaration de guerre de TAutriche a la Serbie, ses envois de troupes sur la frontiere austro-russe , la mobilisation russe consecutive sur la frontiere de Galicie, ont en effet mis fin aux conversations directes austro-russes. Les precisions que le Gouvemement allemand va demander k Vienne, conforme- ment k la declaration du baron de Schoen que je vous ai fait connaitre, pour s'infor- mer des intentions du Gouvemement autrichien, permettront aux quatre Puissances d'exercer une action utile entre Vienne et Petersbourg pour le maintien de la paix. Je vous prie de signaler egalement au Secretaire d'Elat anglais combien il serait important qu'il obtint du Gouvemement italien le maintien de son concours le plus entier pour sa collaboration a faction des quatre Puissances en faveur de la paix. Ren4 Viviani. N- 98. M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France, a Londres, a M. Bienvenu-Martin , Ministre des Affaires Mrang^res p. i. / Londres, le 29 juiHet 19 14- Dans son entretien d'aujourd'hui avec mon collegue d'Allemagne, Sir Ed. Grey a fait observer que I'ouverture de M. Sazonoff pour une conversation directe entre la Russie et I'Autriche n'ayant pas ete accueillie k Vienne , il conviendrait d'en revenir a sa proposition d 'intervention amicale des quatre Puissances non directement interessees. Cette suggestion a ete acceptee en principe par le Gouvemement Allemand , mais il a fait des objections k I'idee d'une conference ou d'une mediation. Le Secretaire d'Etat des Affaires etrangeres a invite le Prince Lichnowski k prier son Gouvemement de — 115 — proposer lui-meme une formule. Quelle quelle soit, si elle permet de maintenir la paix, elle sera agreee par I'Angleterre, la France et I'ltalie. L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a du transxnettre.immediatement k Berlin la demande de Sir Ed. Grey. En me rendant compte de cette conversation, le Secretaire d'Etat des Affaires etrangeres a ajoute que la reponse de TAllemagne a cette communication , ainsi qu a celle de la Russie relative* a la mobilisation de quatre corps d'armee sur la frontiere autrichienne , nous permettra de nous rendre compte des intentions du Gouvernement allemand. Mon collegue d'Allemagne ayant interroge Sir Ed. Grey sur les intentions du Gouvernement britannique, le Secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires etrangeres a repondu qu'il n'avait pas a se prononcer quant a present. Sir Ed. Grey ne m'a pas cache qu'il trouvait la situation tres grave et qu'il gardait peu d'espoir dans une solution pacifique. Paul Cambon. X 99. M. BoppE, Ministre de France a Belgrade, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Belgrade, le 29 juiliet 191 A. Le Prince heritier avait, des la remise de Tultimatum austro-hongrois, telegraphic au Tzar pour demander sa protection. Mon collegue de Russie me confie qil'il vienl de communiquer a M. Pachitch la reponse de Sa Majeste. Le Tzar remercie le Prince de s'elre adresse a lui dans une circonstance aussi cri- tique ; il declare que toutes les dispositions sont prises pour arriver a une solution pacifique du conflit , et donne au Prince I'assurance formelle que , si ce but ne peut etre atteint, la Russie ne se desinteressera jamais du sort de la Serbie. BOPPE. r 100. ~~ » M. Paleologue, Ambassadeur de France a Saint-Petersbourg, a M. Bienvenu-Martijs, Ministre des Aff'aires etrangeres p. i. Saint-Petcrsbourg, le 29 juiliet 1914. L' Ambassadeur d'Allemagne est venu declarer a M. Sazonoff" que si la Russie n'ar- rele pas ses preparatifs militaires, I'armee allemande recevra I'ordre de mobiliser. — 116 — M. Sazonoff a repondu que les preparalifs russes sont motives: dun cote, par rintransigeance obstinee de I'Autriche; d'autre part, par le fait que huit corps austro-hongrois sont dejk mobilises. Le ton sur lequel le comte de Pourtales s'est acquitte de la notification a decid6 le Gouvernement russe, cette nuit meme, k ordonner la mobilisation des treize corps destines a operer contre I'Autriche. Paleologue. IN*' 101. M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, aux. Ambassadeurs de France a Saint-Pete rsbourg et Londres. Paris, ie 3ojuillet 1914 . M. Iswolski est venu cette nuit me dire que I'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a nollfie k M. Sazonoff la decision de son Gouvernement de mobiliser ses forces armees, si la Russie ne cesse pas ses preparatifs militaires. Le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres du Tsar fait remarquer que ces preparatifs n'ont ete commences qu'^ la suite de la mobilisation par I'Autriche de huit corps d'armee et du refus de celle puissance de r^gler pacifiquement son differend avec la Serbie. M. Sazonoff declare que, dans ces conditions, la Russie ne peut que hdter ses armements et envisager I'imminence de la guerre , qu elle compte sur le secours d'alliee de la France et qu'elle considere comrae desirable que I'Angleterre se joigne sans perdre de temps k la Russie et k la France. La France est resolue a remplir toutes les obligations de ralllance. Elle ne negligera, d'ailleurs, aucun effort en vue de la solution du conflit dans il'interet de la paix generale. La conversation engagee enlre les Puissances moins direc- tement interessees permet d'esperer encore que la paix puisse etre preservee; j'estime done qu'il serait opportun que, dans les mesures de precaution et de defense aux- quelles la Russie croit devoir proceder, elle ne prit immediatement aucune dispo- sition qui offrit k I'Allemagne un pretexle pour une mobilisation totale ou parlielle de ses forces. L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne est venu a la fin de I'apres-midl d'hier me parler des mesures militaires que prenait le Gouvernement de la Republlque en ajoutant que la France etait libre d'agir ainsi, mais qu'en Allemagne les preparatifs ne pouvaient etre secrets et qu'il ne faudrait pas que I'opinion fran^aise s'alarmat si I'Allemagne s'y decidait. J'ai r6pondu que le Gouvernement fran^ais n'avait pris aucune mesure dont ses — 117 — voisins pussent etre inquiets et que sa volonte de se preter a toute negociation pour! le maintien de la paix ne pouvait elre mise en doute. Ren^ VivjANi. r 102. M. Paleologue, Ambassadeur de France a Saint-P^tersbourg, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires ^tran- geres. Si^int-Petersbourg, le 3o juillet igi'd- M. SazonofF, k qui j'ai fait connaitre votre desir de voir eviter toute mesure mili- taire qui pourrait oQrir k TAllemagne un pretexte k la mobilisation generale, m'a repondu que juslement, dans le cours de la nuit derniere, I'Etat-Major avait fait surseoir k des mesures de precaution militaire pour eviter toute equivoque. Hier, le Chef d'Etat- Major general russe a convoque I'Attache militaire del'Ambassade d'Allemagne, et lui a donne sa parole d'honneur que la mobilisation ordonnee ce matin vise exclusiv«- ment I'Autriche. Toutefois, dans un entretien qu'il a eu cet apres-midi avec le comte de Pourtales, M. SazonofI a du se convaincre que TAUemagne ne veut pas prononcer k Vienne la parole decisive qui sauvegarderait la paix. L'empereur Nicolas garde la meme impres- sion d un echange de telegrammes qu'il vient d'avoir personnellement avec fempereur Guillaume. D'autre part, I'Etat-Major et I'Amiraute russes ont requ. d'inquietants renseigne- ments sur les preparatifs de farmee et de la marine allemandes. En me donnant ces informations, M. Sazonolf a ajoute que le Gouvernement russe ne continue pas moins ses elfoi-ls de conciliation. II m'a repete : « Jusqu'au der- nier instant, je negocierai. » Paleologue. r 103. M. Paleologue, Ambassadeur de France a Saint- Petersbourg, a M. Ren^ Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires ^tran- geres. Saint-Petersbourg, le 3o juillet 19' 4. L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne est venu cette nuit insister de nouveau , mais dans des termes moins categoriques, aupres de M. Sazonoff pour que la Russia cesse — 118 — ses preparatifs militaires, en affirmant que TAutriche ne porterait pas atteinte k I'inlegrite territoriale de la Serbie : « Ce n est pas seulement Tintegrite territoriale de la Serbie que nous devons sau- « vegarder, a repondu M. SazonolT, c'est encore son independance et sa souverainete. « Nous ne pouvons pas admettre que la Serbie devienne vassale de TAutriche, » M. Sazonoff a ajoute : « L'heure est trop grave pour que je ne vous declare pas toule ma pensee. En intervenant a Pelersbourg, tandis qu'elle refuse d'intervenir a Vienne, I'Allemagne ne cherche qu'i gagner du temps, afm de permettre a I'Au- triche d'ecraser le petit royaume serbe avant que la Russie n'ait pu le secourir. Mais I'empereur Nicolas a un tel desir de conjurer la guerre que je vais vous faire en son nom une nouvelle proposition : « Si I'Autriche, reconnaissant que son conflit avec la Serbie a assume le caractere d'une question d'interet europeen, se declare prete k eliminer de son ultimatum les clauses qui portent atteinte a la souverainete de la Serbie , la Russie s'engage a cesser loutes mesures militaires. » Le comle de Pourtales a promis d'appuyer cette proposition aupres de son Gou^ vernement. Dans la pensee de M. Sazonoff, Tacceptation de sa proposition par TAutriche aurait pour corollaire logique Touverture d'une deliberation des Puissances a Londres. Le Gouvernement russe montre, une fois encore, par son attitude, qu'il ne neglige rien pour enrayer le conflit. pALtOLOGUE. I no4. M. DuMAiNE, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne, a M. Rene Viviani, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres. Vienne, ie 3o juillet 19 1 4- Malgre la communication faite hier par I'Ambassadeur de Russie a plusieurs de ses collegues, dont celui d'Allemagne, au sujet de la mobilisation partielle dans son pays, la presse de Vienne s'etait abstenue den publier la nouvelle. Ce silence impose vient de s'expliquer dans un entretien de haule importance entre M. Schebeko et le comte Berchtold, qui ont longuement envisage les redoutables difficultes pre^entes, avec une egale bonne volonte d'y adapter des solutions reciproquement acceptablcs. Les preparatifs militaires du cote russe, a explique M. Schebeko, n'ont d'autre but que de repondre k ceux de I'Autriche et d'indiquer I'intention et les droits du Tzar d'emettre son avis dans le reglemenl de la question serbe. Les mesures de mobilisa- tion prises en Galicie, a repondu le comte Berchtold, n'impliquent non plus aucune intention agressive et visent seulement a maintenir la situation sur le meme pied. De — 119 — part' et d autre on s appliquera a ce que ces mesures ne soient pas interpr§tees comme des marques d'hostilite. Pour ie reglement du conflit austro-serbe , il a ete convenu que les pourparlers seraient repris a Petersbourg entre M. Sazonoll" et Ie comte Szapary ; s'ils ont ete interrompus c'est par suite d'un malentendu, Ie comte Berchtold croyant que Ie Mlnistre des Affaires etrangeres de Russie reclamait pour son interlocuteur des pou- voirs qui iui permettraient de modifier les termes de Tultimatum autrichien. Le comte Szapary sera seulemenl autorise a discuter quel accommodement serait com- patible avec la dignite et le prestige dont les deux Empires ont un souci egal. Ce serait done, pour le moment, sous cette forme directe et reduite aux deux plus interessees qu'aurait lieu fexamen que Sir Ed. Grey proposait de confier aux quatre Puissances non directement interessees. Sir M, de Bunsen, qui se trouvait chez moi, a aussitot declare a M. Schebeko que le Foreign Office approuvera entierement cette nouvelle procedure. Repetant fexpose fait par Iui au Ballplatz, I'Ambassadeur de Russie a affirme que son Gouvernement tiendra un compte beaucoup plus large qu'on ne le suppose des exigences de la Mo- narchic ; rien n'a ete neglige par M. Schebeko pour convaincre le comte Berchtold de la sinc6rite du desir de la Russie d'arriver a une entente acceptable pour les deux Empires. L'entretien s'etait maintenu dans un ton amical et permettait de croire que toute chance de localiser le conflit n'etait pas perdue, lorsque la nouvelle de la mobilisation allemande est parvenue a Vienne. Dlmaine. r 105. M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Gonseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- geres. Berlin, le 3o juillet 191 4- M. de Jagow m'a telephone a deux heures que la nouvelle de la mobilisation alle- mande, repandue une heure auparavant, etait fausse, etm'a prie de vous en informer d'urgence; le Gouvernement imperial faitsaisir les supplements de journaux qui fan- nonqaient. Mais ni cette communication ni ces mesures ne diminuent mes apprehen- sions au sujet des projets de rAllemagne. H parait certain que le Gonseil extraordinaire tenu hier soir a Potsdam avec les autorites militaires et sous la presidence de I'Empereur avait decide la mobilisation, ce qui explique la preparation de fedition speciale du Lokal Anzeiger, mais que sous des influences diverses (declaration de I'Angleterre quefle reserve son entiere liberte — uo — d action, echange de telegrammes entre le Tzar et Guillaume II) les graves mesures arretees ont ete suspendues. Un des Ambassadeurs avec lequel je suls le plus lie a vu, a deux heures, M. Zini- mermann. D'apres le Sous-Secretaire d'Etat, les autorites militaires pressent beaucoup pour que la mobilisation soit decretee, parce que tout retard fait perdre a TAllemagne quelques-uns de ses avantages. Cependant, jusqu a present on aurait reussi a com- battre la bate de TEtat-Major qui, dans la mobilisation, voit la guerre. Quoi qu'il en soit, la mobilisation pent etre decidee dun moment a I'autre. Je ne sais qui a lance dans le Lokal Anzeiger, journal generalement officieux, une nouvelle prematuree de nature a soulever les esprits en France. J'ai les plus fortes raisons de penser, d'ailleurs, que toutes les mesures de mobi- lisation qui peuvent etre realisees avant la publication de I'ordre general de mobilisa- tion sont prises ici, ou Ton voudrait nous faire publier notre mobilisation les pre- miers pour nous en attribuer la responsabilite. Jules Cambon. r 106. M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires ^trangeres, a M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres. Paris, le 3o juillel 1914. Je vous prie de porter k la connaissance de Sir Edward Grey les renseignemenls suivants touchr.nt les preparatifs militaires fran^ais et allemands. L'Angleterre y verra que si la France est resolue, ce n'est pas elle qui prend des mesures d'agression. Vous atlirerez Tattcntion de Sir Edward Grey sur la decision prise par le Conseil des Ministres de ce matin : bien que I'Allemagne ait pris ses dispositifs de couverture k quelques centaines de metres de la frontiere, sur tout le front du Luxembourg aux Vosges, et porte ses troupes de couverture sur leurs positions de combat, nous avons retenu nos troupes k 1 o kilometres de la frontiere , en leur interdisant de s'en rappro- cher davantage. Notre plan, con^u dans un esprit d'oflensive, prevoyait pourtant que les positions de combat de nos troupes de couverture seraient aussi rapprochees que possible de la frontiere. En livrant ainsi une bande du territoire sans defense k I'agression sou- daine de I'ennemi, le Gouvernement de la Republique tient a montrer que la France, pas plus que la Russie, n'a la responsabilite de Tattaque. Pour s'en assurer, il suffit de comparer les mesures prises des deux cotes de noire frontiere : en France, les permissionnaires n'ont ete rappeles qu'apres que nous avons acquis la certitude que I'Allemagne I'avait fait depuis cinq jours. « I — 121 — En Allemagne, non seulemenl les troupes en garnison a Metz ont ete poussees jusqua la frontiere , mais encore elles ont ete renforcees par des elements transportes en cheniin de fer de garnisons de Tinteneur, telles que celles de Treves on de Cologne. Rien d'analogue n a ete fait en France. L'armement des places de la frontiere (deboisements, mise en place de Tarme- nient, construction de batteries, renforcement des reseaux de fil de fer) a ete com- mence en Allemagne des le samedi 25; chez nous, il va fetre, la France ne pouvanl plus se dispenser de prendre les meines mesures. Les gares ont ete occupees militairement en Allemagne le samedi 2 5 , en France le mardi 28. Enlln, en Allemagne, les reservistes, par di-zaine de milliers, ont dte rappeles par convocations individuelles, ceux residant a I'etranger (classes de 1 goS a 1911) rappe- les, les ofTiciers de reserve convoques; a I'interieur, les routes sent barrees, les auto- mobiles ne circulent qu'avec un permis. G'est le dernier stade avant la mobilisation. Aucune de ces mesures n'a ete prise en France* L'armee allemande a ses avant-postes sur nos bornes frontieres; par deux fois» hier, des patrouilles allemandes ont penetre sur notre territoire. Tout le XVP Corps de Metz, renforce par une partie du VHP venu de Treves et de Cologne, occupe la frontiere de Metz au Luxembourg; le XV*" Corps d'armee de Strasbourg a serre sur la frontiere. Sous menace d'etre fusilles, les Alsaciens-Lorrains des pays annexes ont defense de passer la frontiere. Rene Viviani. r 107. M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires ^tran- geres. Berlin , le 3o juillet 1914. L' Ambassadeur d'Angleterre n'a pas regu communication de la reponse de I'Alle- magne a la demande de Sir E. Grey. II ma dit que Berlin avail consulte Vienne et attendait encore favis de son allie. Mon collcgue de Russie vient de me faire connaitre, de son cote, que M. de Jagow (auquel le Comte de Pourtales avail communique la formule de conciliation suggeree par M. Sazonoff pour une entente austro-russe) venait de lui declarer qu'il Irouvait cette proposition inacceptable pour fAutriche, marquanl ainsi Taction nega- tive de la diplomatic allemande a Vienne. Jules Cambon. Documents diplomatiques. — Guerre ciiropdenne. , 16 - 122 — r 10^. M. Paul Cambon , Ambassadeur de France a Londres , a M. Ren^ Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des AfFaires etran- geres. Londres, le 3o juiilet 1914. Le Prince Lichnowski n'a pas apporte de reponse k la demande que lui avail adressee hier Sir Ed. Grey pour obtenir du Gouvemement allemand une formula d'intervention des quatre puissances dans Imteret de la paix, Mais mon collegue d'AHemagne a questionne le Secretaire d'Etat des Aflaires etrangeres sur les prepa- raiifs jnilitaires de I'Angleterre. . Sir Ed. Grey lui a repondu qu'ils n avaient aucun caractere offensif , mais que , dans I'etat actuel des aflaires sur le continent, il etait naturel de prendre quelques precautions; qu'en Anglelerre, comme en France, on desirait le maintien de la paix, et que si, en Angleterre, comme en France, on envisageait des mesures defensives, ce n'etait pas dans le but de preparer une agression. ' Les renseignements que Votre Excellence m'a adress6s au sujet des mesures mili- taires prises par I'Allemagne sur la frontiere Iran^aise m'ont permis de marquer k Sir Edward Grey qu'il ne s'agit plus seulement au jourd'hui d'un conflit d'influence entre ia Russie et rAutricbe-Hongrie; une agression risque d'etre commise qui pourrait provoquer une guerre generale. Sir Edward Grey a parfaitement compris mon sentiment et, comme moi, il estime que le moment serait venu d'envisager toutes les hypotheses et de les discuter en commun. Paul Cambon^ N^ 109. M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France h Berlin, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- geres. Berlin , le 3o j uillet 1 9 1 4- Dans Tentreyue que jai eue aujourd'hui avec le Secretaire d'Etat, j'ai demande k M. de Jagow quelle reponse il avait faite k Sir Ed. Grey, qui lui avait demande de dpnner lui-meme la formule de I'intervention des puissances desinteressees. — 123 — II m'a repondu que, « pour gagner du temps », il avail decide d'agir directemenl €t qu'il avail demaiide a rAutriche de dire sur quel lerrain on pourrait causer avec elle. Celte reponse a pour effel» sous pretexle d'ailer plus vile, d'eliminer TAn- gleterre , la France el I'llalie el de confier a M. de Tehirsky, donl les senlimenls pangermanisles el russophobes sonl conuus, le soin d'amener I'Aulriche k une altilude conciliante. M. de Jagow m'a parle ensuile de la mobilisalion russe sur la froutiere autrichiennei ii m'a dil que cette mobilisation compromeltait Ic succes de loute intervention aupres <3e rAutriche , el que lout dependail de \k. II a ajoute qu il craignail que TAulricbe ne mobilisat completement a la suite de la mobilisation parlielle russe, ce epii pou- yait entrainer par contre-coup la mobilisation lolale russe, el par suite celle de FAl- iemagne. J'ai fait remarquer au Secretaire d'Elat qu'il m avail dit lui-meme que TAUemagne ne se considererait comme obligee de mobiliser que si la Russie mobilisaiit sur les frontieres aHemandes el que lei n'etait pas le cas, II m'a repondu que c'etait vrai, mai^ que les chefs de I'Artoee insistaienl, car tout retard est une perle de force* pour I'armee allemande, el « que les paroles que je rappelais ne constituaienl pas, de sa part, un engagement ferme ». L'impression 'que je rapporte de cet entretien est que les chances de paix ont encore decru. Jules Cambon. r no. M. Paul Cambon i AmLassadeur de France h Londres, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires ^tran- geres. Londres, le3i juiflet 191 4. Au debut de notre entretien d'aujourd'hui , Sir E. Grey nia dit que le Prince Lichnowski lui avail demande ce matin si TAngleterre observerait la neulralite dans le conflit qui se prepare. Le Secretaire d'Elat aux Affaires etrangeres lui a repondu que, si le conflit devenail general, I'Angleterre ne pourrait pas rester neutre el, nolamment, que si la France y elait impliquee, I'Anglelerre y serail enlrainee. J'ai interroge alors Sir E. Grey sur la deliberation du Cabinet qui avail eu lieu ce matin. II m'a repondu qu'apres avoir examine la situation, le Cabinet avail pense que pour le moment le Gouvernemenl britannique ne pouvail nous garanlir son inter- vention, qu'il avail I'intention de s*entremellre pour obtenir de I'Allemagne el de la France Tengagement de respecter la neulralite beige, mais que pour envisager une intervention il convenait d'atlendre que la situation se developpslt. J'ai demande a Sir E. Grey si, pour intervenir, le Gouvernemenl britannique altendrait Tenvahissement du territoire fran^ais. J'ai insiste sur le fail que les me- — 124 — sures deja adoptees sur notre frontiere par I'Allemagne revelaient des intentions d'agression prochaine, et que si Ton voulait eviter devoir se renouveier I'erreur de i'Europe en 1870, il convenait que TADgleterre erivisageat des maintenant les con- ditions dans lesquefles elle nous donnerait le concours sur lequel la France comptait. Sir E. Grey m'a repondu que I'opinion du Cabinet ne s'etait formee que sur la situation actuelle, que cette situation pouvait se modifier et ^ue, dans ce cas, on appellerait aussitot le Conseil des Ministres a en deliberer. Sir A. Nicolson, que j'ai vu en sortant du Cabinet du Secretaire d'Etal, ma dit que le Conseil se reunirait de nouveau demain, et, confidentiellement, m'a fait entendre que le Secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires etrangeres nemanquerait pas de reprendre la discussion. Conformement a vos instructions, j'ai fait le necessaire pour que la lettre auto- graphe que M. le President de la Republique adresse a Sa Majeste le Roi d'Angleterre soit remise ce soir au Roi. Cette demarche, qui sera cerlainement communiquee au Premier Ministre, des demain matin, sera, je n'en doute pas, prise en serieuse con- sideration par le Cabinet britannique. Paul C AMBON. N° 111. M. MoLLARD, Ministre de France a Luxembourg, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Etran- geres- Luxembourg, ie3i juiilet 1914. Le Ministre d'Etat sort de la Legation, il venait de me dire que les AUemands avaient ferme les ponts sur la Moselle de Schengen el de Remich avec des voilures, celui de Wormeldange avec des cordes. Sur la Sure, les ponts de Wasserbillig et d'Echternach ne sont pas condamnes, mais les AUemands ne laissent plus sortir de Prusse ni ble, ni betail, ni automobiles. M. Eyschen m'a prie, el c'est le vrai but de sa visile, de vous demander une decla- ration officielle assuranl que la France respeclera .en cas de conflit la neutrality du Luxembourg. Comme je lui demandais s'il avail re^u une declaration analogue du Gouvememenl allemand, il m'a dit qu'il allait se rendre chez le Ministre d'Allemagne pour avoir la meme declaration. Post-scn'pium. — Jusqu'i present, aucune mesure particuliere n'a ete prise par le Gouvememenl luxembourgeois. M. Eyschen revient de la Legation d'Allemagne, il s'esl plaint des mesures de suspicion prises contre un voisin neutre. Le Ministre d'Etat a demande au Ministre d'Allemagne une declaration officielle de son Gouvememenl, prenant fengagement de respecter la neutralite. M, de Buch lui aurait repondu : « Cela va de soi mais il laudrait que le Gouvememenl fran^ais prit le meme enga- gement », MOLLARD. — 125 — r 112. M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Aflaires ^trangeies, a MM. les Ambassadeurs de France a Londres, Saint-P^tersboiirg, Berlin , Vienne et Rome. ^ Paris, le 3i juillet 1914. L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre m'a remis une note de son Gouvernement demandant au Gouvernement frangais d'appuyer k Saint-Pel ersbourg une proposition tendant k la solution pacifique du conflit austro-serbe. Cette note expose que I'Ambassadeur d'Aliemagne a inform^ Sir Edw. Grey de I'intention qu'a son Gouvernement de s'efforcer d'agir sur le Gouvernement austro- hongrois, apres la prise de Belgrade et I'occupation des regions voisines.de la fron- tiere, pour obtenir la promesse de ne pas avancer davantage, pendant que les Puis- sances chercheraient a obtenir que la Serbie donnat des satisfactions suffisantes a I'Aulriche; le territoire occupe serait evacu6 une fois quelle aurait regu satisfaction. Sir Edw. Grey a fait cette suggestion le 2 9 juillet et exprime Tespoir que les preparatifs militaires seront suspendus de tons cotes. Bien que I'Ambassadeur de Russie a Londres ait informe le Secretaire d'Etat qu'il craint que la condition russe [si rAairiche, reconnaissant que son conflit avec la Serbie a assume le caractere (Pane question d'lnleret europeen, se declare prete a eliminer de son ultimatum les points qui portent atteinte au principe de la souverainete serhe, la Russie s engage a arreter ious prSparatifs militaires). ne puisse elre modifiee, Sir Edw. Grey pense que, si I'Au- triche arrete son avance apres Toccupation de Belgrade, le Gouvernement russe pourrait accepter de cbanger sa formule, dans ce sens que les Puissances examineraient comment la Serbie donnerait des satisfactions completes a I'Autriche sans porter atteinte a la souverainete ou a I'independance du Royaume. Dans le cas ou TAutriche, ayant occupe Belgrade et le territoire serbe voisin , se declarerait prete , dans Tinterct: de I'Europe, a cesser d'avancer et k discuter comment Ton pourrait arriver a un arrangement, la Russie pourrait aussi consentir k la discussion et suspendre ses pre- paratifs militaires, pourvu que les autres Puissances agissent de meme. Gonformemeht a la demande de Sir Edw. Grey, le Gouvernement frangais s'esl rallie a la suggestion anglaise et a prie dans les termes suivants son Ambassadeur k Petersbourg de s'efforcer d'obtenir sans retard Tassentiment du Gouvernement russe : « Je vous prie de faire connaitre d'urgence a M. Sazonoff que la suggestion de Sir Ed. Grey ,me par ait foumir une base utile de conversation entre les Puissances ega- lement desireuseis de travailler k un reglement honorable du conflit austro-serbe et d'ecarter ainsi les dangers qui menacent la paix g^nerale. «Le plan propose par le Principal Secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires ^trangeres, en arretantla marcbe en avant de Farmee autrichienne, et en confiant aux Puissances le soin d'examiner comment la Serbie pourrait donner pleine satisfaction a I'Autriche "^mm ~ 126 — sans porter alteinte aux droits souverains et k I'ind^pendaace du Royaume , en donnant ainsi un moyen a la Russie de suspendre lous preparatifs militaires, les autres Puis- sances devant agir de meme , est de nature a donner egalement satisfaction a la Russie et a I'Autriche et a menager a la Serbie une sortie acceptable de la difficulte actuelle. « Je vous prie de vous inspirer des considerations qui precedent pour engager tres instamment M. Sazonoff k donner sans retard son adhesion k la proposition de Sir Ed. Grey donl il a du etre saisi de son cole. » / Rene Viviani. W 113. M. Paleologde, Ambassadeur de France a Saint-Petersbourg, a M. Ren6 Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- geres. Saint-Petersbourg, le 3i juillet 191^. La nouvelie du bonobardement de Belgrade dans la nuit el la matinee d'hier a provoque en Russie la plus vive emotion. On ne parvienl pas a s'expliquer Tattitude de rAulriche, donl les provocations ont constaniment suivi, depuis le debut de la crise, les tentatives de conciliation de la Russie el les conversations satisfaisantes echangees entre Petersbourg et Vienne. Quoi qu'il en soil, deslreux de ne rien n^gliger pour prouver la sincerlle de son deslr de sauvegarder la paix, M. Sazonofl minforme qu'il a modifie sa formula, k la demande de Tambassadeur d'Angleterre, de la maniere suivante : « Si rAulriche consent k arreter la marche de ses troupes sur le lerritoire serbe el si , reconnaissant que le conOit auslro-serbe a assume le caractere dune (jueslion d'in- l^rel europeen, elle admet que les grandes Puissances examinent les satisfactions que la Serbie pourrait accorder 'au Gouvernement austro-hongrois, sansi porter atteinte a ses droits souverains et a son independance, la Russie s'engage a conserver son attitude expectante. » PALtOLOGUE. — 127 r 114. M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires ^trangeres, a MM. les Ambassadeurs de France, a Londres, Saint-P^tersbourg', Berlin, Vienne, Rome, Constantinople. Paris, le 3i jaillet igiA. Les efforts poursiiivis jusqu'ici parallelement par TAngleterre et la Russie, avec le concours empresse de la France (acquis d'avance k toute tentative pacifique), en vue d'une entente directe entre Vienne et Saint-Petersbourg ou d'une mediation des quatre puissances sous la forme la plus appropriee, se rejoignent aujourd'hui : la Russie ,donnant une nouvelle preuve de sondesir d'entente , s^est empressee de repondre k la premiere apparence d'ouverture faite par I'Allemagne depuis le debut de la crise (sur les conditions auxquelles la Russie arreterait ses preparatifs militaires), en indi- quant une formule et la modifiant de suite confoimement k la demande de I'Angle- terre; on devrait done esperer, les pourparlers ayant repris d'autre part entre les ambass^deiirs russe et autrichien, que la mediation anglaise viendra achever k Londres Teffort des negociations directes de Vienne et Saint-Petersbourg. Toutefois I'attitude constante de I'Allemagne qui, depuis le commencement du conflit, tout en protestant sans cesse aupres de chacuue des puissances de ses inten- tions pacifiques, a iait echouer en fait, par son attitude ou dilatoire ou negative, toutesles tentatives d'accord etna pas cesse d'encourager^par son ambassadeur I'in- transigeance deVienne;lespreparatifsmilitairesallemands, commences desle 26 juillet et poursuivis sans arret depuis; I'opposition immediate de I'Allemagne a la formule russe, declaree a Berlin inacceptable pour I'Autriche avant meme d'avoir consulte cette Puissance; enfin toutes les impressions venues de Berlin imposent la conviction que I'Allemagne a poursuivi I'humiliation de la Russie, la desagregalion de la Triple- Entente et, si ces resultats ne pouvaient elre obtenus, la guerre. Rene Viviani. r 115. M. DuMAiNE, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne, a M. Ren6 Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires 6tran- geres. Vienne, le 3i juillet 1914. La mobilisation generale atteignant tous les homnies de 19 k 4 2 ans a ete decr^ tee par le Goiivemement austro-hongrois ce matin k !a premiere heure. Mon collegue russe estime encore que cette mesure n'est pas nettement en contra- idiction avec le:> declarations du Comte Berchtold d'hier. DUMAINE. 128 r 116. M. Jules Cambon, Anibassadeur de France a Berlin, a M. Rene Viviam, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- gores. Berlin, le 3i juillet 191/1. M'ayanl fait demander, M. de Jagow vient de me dire qu'il avait le grand regret de me faire connaitre quen presence de la mobilisation totale de I'armee russe, I'Al- lemagne, dans Tinteret de la securite de I'Empire, se voyait obligee de prendre de graves mesures de precaution. On a decrete ce qu'on appelle « Kriegsgefahrzustand » (I'etat de danger de guerre), qui permet k Tautorite de proclamer, si elle le juge utile, letat de siege, de suspendre certains services publics et de fermer la frontiere. En njeme temps, on demande a Petersbourg de demobiliser, aussi bien du cote aulrichien que du cote allemand, sans quoi I'Allemagne serait obligee de mobiliser de son cote. M. de Jagow m'a fait connaitre que M. de Scboen etail charge d'informer le GoCivernement fran^ais des resolutions du cabinet de Berlin, et de lui demander quelle attitude il pensait adopter. Jules Cambon.. r 117. M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, a M. Paleologue, Ambassadeur de France a Petersbourg. Paris, le 3i juillet 1914. Le Gouvernement allemand a decide k midi de prendre toutes les dispositions militaires .que comporte Tetat dit « etat de danger de guerre ». En me communiquant cette decision, ce soir a 7 heures, le Baron de Schoen a ajoute que le Gouvernement exigeait en meme temps que la Russie demobilise. Si'le Gouvernement russe n'a pas donne une r6ponse satisfaisante dans un delai de douze heures, I'Allemagne mobllisera a son tour. J'ai repondu a I'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que je n etais nuUement renseigne sur une pretendue mobilisation totale de Tarmee et de la flotte russes, que le Gouver- nement allemand invoquait comme raison des nouvelles mesures militaires quil prend des. aujourd'hul. Le Baron de Schoen m'a demands en terminant, au nom de son Gouvernement, quelle serait, en cas de condit entre TAllemagne et la Russie, Tattitude de la France, 11 m'a dit qu'il viendrait prendre ma reponse demain samedi k une heure. ~ 129 — Je n*ai pas rintention de lui faire une declaration a ce sujet et je me bomerai k lui dire que la France s'inspirera de ses interets. Le Gouvernement de Ja R^publicjue ne doit, en effet, compte de ses intentions qu'i son alli6e. Je vous prie de porter imm^diatement ce qui precede k la connaissance de M. Sazonoff. Ainsi que je vous I'ai dej^ fait connaitre, je ne doute pas que le Gou- vernement imperial, dans Tint^ret superieur de la paix, n'evite pour sapart tout ce qui pourrait rendre inevitable ou precipiter la crise. Rene Viviani. r 118. M. Paleologue, Ambassiadeur de France a Saint-P^tersbourg, a M. Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Ajffaires ^trang^res. Saint-P^tersbourg, le 3i juijlet 1914. En raison de la mobilisation generate de TAutriche et des mesures de mobilisatioa prises secretement, mais d'une maniere continue, par TAllemagne depuis six jours, Tordre de mobilisation generale de I'armee russe a ete donne, la Russie ne pouvant, sans le plus grave danger, se laisser davantage devancer; en rdalite, elle ne fait que prendre des mesures militaires correspondant k celles prises par TAllemagne. Pour des raisons strategiques imperieuses, le Gouvernement russe ne pouvait plus, sachant que I'AUemagne s'armait, retarder la conversion de sa mobilisation par- tielle eu mobilisation generale. Paleologue. r 119. M. Klobukowski, Ministre de France a Bmxelles, a M. Ren6 Viviani, PrfSsident du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires ^tran- g^res. Bruxelles, le 3i juiUet 1914. L*Agence Havas ayant annonc6 que Tetat « de danger de guerre » etait d6cret6 en Allemiagne, j*ai dit k M. Davignon que je pouvais lui donner I'assurance que le Gouvernement de la RepubUque respettei-ait la oeutrdiit^ de la Belgique. PocoiiBNTS fiipjipAUTiQUEs* — Guerre. euro^'eooe. 17 I — 130 — Le Minislre des Affaires etrangeres m'a repondu que le Gouvernemeht royal avaft loujours pense qu'il en serait ajjnsi et m'a remercie. Le Ministre de Russie et le Ministre d'Angielerre, que j'ai vns ensuite, se sont monlres tres satisfaits qu'en la circonsUucc j'aie donne cette assurance, conforme d'ailleurs^ m'a ditle Ministre anglais, k ia declaration de Sir Edw. Grey. Klobukowskl — 131 — CHAPITRE VI DECLARATION DE GUERRE DE L'ALLEMAGNE A U RUSSIE (SAMEDI r AOUT, A 19' 10) ET A LA FRANCE (LUNDI 3 AOUT, A 18" 45) ^ 133 ^, N* 120. M.Tlene Viviani, President dn Conseil, Ministre des Affaires ^trang^res* k MM. Jes Ambassadeurs de France a Londres, Saint-P^tetsbourg-; Berlin » Vienne, Rome. t*aris, le i" aoAt 1914. Deux demarches ont ete failes hier soir par les Ambassadeurs d'Autriche, Tune assez vague a Paris, i'aulre precise a Pelersbourg dans un sens conciliant. Le Comle Szecsen est venu me declarer que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois avail avise officiellemenl la Russie qu'il n'avait aucune ambition territoriale et ne tou- chera pas i la souverainete d'Etat de la Serbie; qu'il repudie ^galement toute intention d'bccuper le sandjak; mais que ces declarations de desinteressement ne conservent leur valeur que si la guerre reste iocalisee a I'Autriche et k la Serbie, une guerre europeenne ouvrant des eventualites impossibles a prevoir. L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche, en commentant ces declarations, a laisse entendre que, si son Gouverne- ment ne pouvait repondre aux questions des Puissances parlant en leur propre nom, ii pourrait sans doute repondre a la Serbie ou a une Puissance iui demandant ses conditions au nom de la Serbie. 11 ajoutait qu'il y aurait Ik peut-etre encore une possibilite. APetersbourg, I'Ambassadeur d'Autriche est venu voir M. Sazonoff et luL a de- clare que sou Gouvernement consentait k enlamer une discussion quant au fond de I'ultimatum adresse k la Serbie.. Le Ministre russe s'est declare satisfait de cette declaration et a propose que les pourparlers aient lieu k Londres avec la parti- cipation des Puissances. M. Sazonoff a du demander au Gouvernement anglais de se charger de la direction de la negociation ; il a indique qu'il serait tres important que I'Autriche arretat ses operations en Serbie. II resulte de ces faits que rAutricbe se montrerait enlin disposee a un arrangement, de meme que le Gouvernement russe est pret k entrer en negociations sur la base de la proposition anglaise. Malheureusement ces dispositions, qui permettraient d'esperer une solution paci- lique, paraissent en fait devoir etre annulees par I'attitude de I'Allemagne. Cette Puissance a en effet pose un ultimatum donnant douze heures au Gouvernement russe pour accepter de dembbiliser, non seulement du cote allemand, mais aussi da cote autrichien; c'est a midi que le delai expire. L'ultimatum ne se justifie pas, puisque la Russie a accepte la proposition anglaise qui imphque un arret des pr6- paralifs militaires de toutes les Puissances. L'altitude de I'Allemagne prouve qu'elie veut la guerre. Et elle la veut contre la France. Hier, lorsque M. de Schoen est venu demander au quai d'Orsay quelle atti- tude la France comptait prendre en cas de conflit russo-allemand, I'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, bien qu'il n'y ait directement entre la France et I'Allemagne aucun conflit etque nous ayons employe depuis le debut de la crise et employions encore jtous nos efforts en vue d'une solution pacifique, a ajoute qu'il me priait de presenter — 134 — au Presideni de la Republique ses hommages et remerciements, et demandait que I'on voulut bien prendre « des dispositions pour sa propre personne » ; nous savons egalement qu'il a deja mis en siirete les archives de TAmbassade. Celte attitude de rupture des relations diplomatiques sans conflit direct , et bien qu'aucune reponse negative precise ne lui ait ete faite , est caracteristique de la volonte arretee de TAlle- magoe de faire ia guerre A la France. Le defaut de slncerite de ses protestations pacifiques est demontre par la rupture quelle impose k TEurope, lorsque les nego- ciations etaient enfin acceptees par TAutriche, d'accord avec la Russie. Rene Viviani. r 121. M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, .a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre -des Affaires etran- geres.. Berlin, le i" aoilt 19 li, Mon Collegue de Russie a regu bier soir deux lelegrammes de M. Sazonoff I'avi- sant que I'Ambassadeur d'Aulrichc a Petersbourg avait declare que son Gouverne- ment etait pret a discuter avec le Gouvernement russe la note a la Serbie, meme quant au fond ; M. Sazonoff lui aurait repondu que ces conversations devraient, k] ses yeux , avoir lieu a Londres. L' ultimatum a la Russie ne pent qu'ecarter les dernieres chances de paix que ces conversations semblaient laisser subsister. On peut se demander si, dans de pareilles conditions, Tacceptation de rAutriche etait serieuse et n avait pas pour objet de faire peser la responsabilite du conllit sur la Russie. Mon Collegue d'Angleterre a fait dans la nuit un appel pressant aux sentiments d'humanile de M. de Jagovv. Celui-ci lui a repondu (jue la question elait trop enga- gee et qu'il fallait attendre la reponse russe a I'ultimatum allemand. Or il a dit a sir E. Goschen que ruUimatum recdamait le retrait de la mobilisation russe non seule- ment du cote de I'Allemagne, mais encore du cote de I'Autriche; mon Collegue anglais s'en est vivement elonne et lui a declare que ce dernier point scmblait inac- ceplable pour la Russie. L'ultimatumde I'Allemagne, inlervenant a.l'heure precise ou I'accord semble pres de s'elablir entre Vienne et Saint-Pctersbourg, est significatif de sa politique belli- queuse. Le conllit n'exislait en fait quenlre la Russie ct rAutriche , I'Allemagne n'ayant h intervenir que comme alliee de TAutriche; dans ces conditions, les deux Puissances principalement inleressees etant disposees a causer, si I'Allemagne ne desirait pas la — 135 — guerre pour son propre compte, il est inconaprehensible qu elle envoie un ultima- tum a la Russle, au lieu de continuer a travaiiier, comme toutes ies autres Puis- sances, k une solution pacifique.. J. Cambok. r 122. M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseit, Ministre des A.ffaires etrangeres, k MM. Ies Ambassadeurs de France a Londres, Berlin, et au Ministre de France a Bruxelles. Paris, le i*' aoiit igti. L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre est venu, d'ordre de son GoavernemeQt»me deman- der quelle serait„ en cas de conflit avec TAllemagne, rattitude du Gouvernement Franqais vis-a-vis de la Belgique. J'ai declare que^ comme nous I'avions repete k plusieurs repri^ses au Gouverne- ment Beige , nous entendions respecter sa neutralite. ' Ce serait seulement dans le cas oii cette neutralite serait violee par une autre Puis- sance que la France, pour remplir ses obligations de Puissance garante, pourrait etre amenee a penetrer sur le territoire belse. Rene Yiviani. r 123. M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, a M. Rene Viyiani, President du Conseil^ Ministre des Affaires etran- geres. Berlin J le i"" aeiit 19 14. L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a ^te charge par son Gouvernement defaire aupres du Gouvernement AUemand la meme demarche qui a ete faite aupres de vous au sujet de la neutralite de la Belgique. M. de Jagow a repondu qu'il prendrait Ies ordres de rEmpereuret du Cbancelier» mais qu'il doutait qu^une reponse put etre donnee, car FAllemagne ne pouvait ainsi decouvrir ses projets militaires. L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre reverra demain M. do Jagow dans Tapres-midi. J. GmBON. — 136 — N° 124. M. Barrere^ Ambassadeur de France a Rome, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- geres. Rome, le i"" aout 1914. J*ai ete ce matin a 8 heures 1/2 chez le Marquis de San Giuliano pour connaitre de lui d'une fa^on precise quelle serait I'allitude de lltalie en presence des actes provocateurs de I'Allemagne et des suites qu'ils peuvent avoir. Le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres m'a repopdu qu il avait re^u hier soir la visite de TAmbassadeur d'Allemagne. M. de Flotow liii aurait dit que TAllemagne avait demande au Gouvernement Russe de suspendre sa mobilisation et au Gouvernement Fran9ais d'indiquer ce qu'il avait I'intention de faire; TAllemagne avait donne a la France un delai de dix-huit heures et a la Russie un delai de douze heures pour repondre. M. de Flotow a demande, k la suite de cette communication, quelles etaient les intentions du Gouvernement Italien. Le Marquis de San Giuliano a repondu que la guerre ehtreprise par TAutriche, etant donne surtout les consequences qui pouvaient en sortir d'apres les paroles de TAmbassadeur d'Allemagne, ayant un caractere agressif ne cadrant pas avec le caractere purement defensif de la Triple-Alliance, I'ltahe ne pourrait participer k la guerre. BARRiRE. r 125. M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil , Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, a MM. les Ambassadeurs de France a Londres, Saint- Petersbourg, Berlin, Vienne, Rome, Madrid, Constantinople. Paris, le i"" aout 191 4- L'AmbassadeuT d'Allemagne est revenu me voir ce matin k 1 1 heures. Apres lui avoir rappele tous les efforts poursuivis par la France en vue d'un reglement hono- rable du conflit austro-serbe et de la difficulte qui s'en est suivie entre TAiitriche et la Russie, je Tai mis au courant des pourparlers continues depuishier : 1" Proposition transactionnelle anglaise pr^voyant, entre autres, de la part de la Russie, la suspension des preparatifs militaires, k condition que les autres Puissances en fassent autant; adhesion de la Russie k cette proposition; 2° Communications du Gouvernement Autrichien declarant ne vouloir ni s'agrandir en Serbie, ni meme penetrer dans le sandjak et se disant pret k discuter k Londres avec les autres Puissances lefond meme de la question austro-serbe.* J'ai mis en regard I'attilude de I'Allemagne qui, abandonnant tout pourparler,, posait a la Russie un ultimatum au moment meme ou cette Puissance vient d'accepter la formule anglaise (qui implique I'arret des preparatifs militaires de tous les pays ayant mobilise) et envisageail comme imminente une rupture diplomatique avec la France. ~ 137 — Le Baron de Schoen m'a repondu qu'il ignorait les developpemenls survenus dans cette question depuis vingt-qiialre heures, qu'il y avail peul-etre la une «lueur d'espoir » pour un accommodement, qu'il n'avait re^u aucune nouvelle communication de son Gouvernement et qu'il allait s'iriformer. II a de nouveau proteste de son sin- cere desir de joindre ses efforts a ceux de la France pour arriver a la solution du conflit, J'ai insiste sur la grave responsabilite qu'a'ssumerait le Gouvernement Imperial si, dans de pareilles circonstances, ilprenait des initiatives non justifiees et de nature k compromettre irremediablement la paix. Le Baron de Schoen n'a plus fait allusion k son depart immedial et ne m'a plu^ demande de repondre a sa question concernant I'attitude de la France en cas de conflit auslro-russe. II s'est borne a dire de lui-meme qu'elle n'etait, pas douteuse. II ne convient a aucun degre d'exagerer les possibilites qui peuvent resulter de ma conversation avec I'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, car, de son cote, le Gouvernement Imperial continue les plus dangereux preparatifs sur notre frontiere. II ne faut pas les negliger cependant et nous ne devons pas cesser de travailler a un arrangement. La France, de son cote, procede a toutes les mesures militaires propres a la garantir contre une avance trop grande des preparatifs militaires allemands. EUe estime que ses tentatives de conciliation n'auront de chances d'aboutir que dans la mesure ou on lasentira prete et resolue, si la lutte lui est imposee. Rene Viviani. r 126. M. Paul C AMBON, Ambassadeur de France a Londres, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Paris, le i" aoiit 1914. Sir Edward Grey m'a dit que , dans le Conseil de ce matin , le Cabinet avait de nouveau envisage la situation. L'Allemagne ayant reclame de I'Angleterre une decla- ration de neutralite et ne I'ayant pas obtenue , le Gouvernement britannique demeu- rait maitre de son action et celle-ci pourrait se manifester dans differentes hypotheses. En premier lieu, la neutralite beige importe beaucoup a I'Angleterre. La France a renouvele immedialement I'engagement de la respecter. L'Allemagne a declare « n'etre pas en etat de repondre ». Sir Edward Grey saisira le Cabinet de cette reponse et demand era Tautorisation de dire lundi a la Chambre des Communes que le Gouver- nement britannique ne permettra pas une violation de la neutralite beige. En second lieu, les escadres anglaises sont mobilisees et Sir Edward Grey propo- sera k ses collegues de declarer qu'elles s'opposeront au passage du Detroit par les escadres allemandes ou , si elles venaient a le passer, k toute demonstration sur les cotes fran9aises. Le Conseil de lundi traitera ces deux questions ; j'ai fait remarquer au Principal Secretaire d'Etat que si, d'ici U, quelque incident venait a se produire, il ne fallait pas se laisser surpren^re et qu'il conviendrait de songer a intervenir a temps. Paul Cambon. X —————— MMIM^ _— — Documents DtPtOMAxiQUES. — Guerre europeenae. 18 — 138 — r 127. M..Ren6 ViviANi, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Elrsing^res,. a M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France, a Londres. Paris, le i" aout 1914. Nous sommes avises par plusieurs voies que le Gouvernement allemand et le GouTemement autrichien essaient en ce moment d'impressionner I'Angleterre en lui faisant croire que la responsabilite de la guerre, si elle eclate, incombera k la Russie. On fait eftort pour- obtenir la neutralile de TAngleterre en denaturant la verite; La France n'a cesse de donner, d'accord avec I'Angleterre, des conseiis de moderation a Petersbourg ; ces conseiis ont ete ecoutes. Des le debut, M. Sazonoff a fait pression sur la Serbie pour qu'elle acceptal toutes celles des clauses de I'ultlmatum qui etaient compatibles avec sa souverainete. II a ensuite engage avec I'Autriche une conversation directe qui etait un nouveau temoignage de son esprit de conciliation. II a enfm accept^ de laisser les puissances, les moins interessees rechercher les moyens d'apaiser le conflit. Conformement au desir qui lui a ete exprime par Sir G. Buchanan, M. Sazo- noff a consenti k modifier la premiere formule qu'il avait presentee et il en a redige une seconde qui ne s'eloigne pas sensiblement des declarations qui ont ete faites hier a M. de Margerie par le comte Szecsen. Ce dernier affirme que fAutriche n'a aucune intention d'acquisition territoriale et qu'elle ne veut pas toucher a la souve- rainete de la Serbie. II ajoute express^ment que I'Autriche n'a aucune vis^e sur ie Sandjak de Novi-Bazar. II semblerait done que faccord fut facile a ^tablir entre la suggestion de Sir Edward Grey, la formule de M. Sazonoff et les declarations de rAutriche. La France est r^solue k poursuivre jusqu'au bout, avec I'Angleterre, la realisation de cet accord. Mais pendant que Ton negociait et que la Russie montfait dans la negociation une bonne volonte incontestable, TAutriche a , la premiere , procede a une mobilisation generale. La Russie s'est vue I'orcee de fimrter pour ne pas se trouver en etat d'inferiorite , mais elle eist toujours restee prete k negocier. Je n'ai pas besoin de rep^ter^ue , quant k nous, nous continuerons k travail|er, avec I'Angleterre, au succes de ces pourparlers! Mais I'attilude de TAllemagne nous a mis dans I'obligation absolqe de prendre au- jourd'hui le d^cret de mobilisation. Bien avant la mobilisation russe, des mercredi dernier, ainsi que je vous I'ai deji t^Ugraphie , M. de Schoen m'avait annonce la publication prochaine du « Kriegsgefahr- — 139 — - zustand ». Cette mesure a dte prise par rAUemagne et, k Tabri de ce paravent, elle a immediatement commence sa mobilisation proprement dite. Aujourd'hui M. Paleblogue a telegrapbie que le Gomte de Pourtales avait an-! nonce au Gouvernement russe la mobilisation allemande. Des renseignements parvenus au Ministere de la Guerre confirment que cette mobilisation est elTectivement en pleine execution. Notre decret de mobilisation est done une mesare ^ssentielle de presei'vation. Le Gouvernement I'a accompagnee dune proclamation signee du President de la Re- publique et de tous les Ministres, et dans laquelle il explique que la . mobilisation n est pas la guerre, quen I'etat actuel c'est pour la France le meilleur moyen de sauvegarder la paix, et que le Gouvernement de la Republique multipliera ses efforts pour faire aboutir les negociations. Veuillez transmeltre d'urgence toutes ces indications k Sir Edward Grey et lui marquer que nous avons obei constamment k la preoccupation de ne commettre aucun acte de provocation. Je suis persuade que, au cas ou la guerre, eclaterait, Topinlon anglaise verrait clairement de quel cote vient I'agression ^ et qu'elle saisirait les raisons si fortes que nous avons donnees k Sir Edward Grey pour reclamer une intervention armee de lAngleterre dans Tint^ret de I'avenir de Tequilibre europeen. Rene Viviani. N° 128; M. MoLLARD, Ministre de France a Luxembourg, a M, Rene YiYiAm, President du Conseii, Ministre des Afiisdres ^tran- geres. Luxembourg, le i" aout 1914. Le Ministre d'Etat me charge de demander, au Gouvernement fran9ais une assu- rance de neutralite semblable k celle qui a ete donnee k la Belgique. M, Eyschen m'a declare qu a present, du fait que <;'est le Ministre de France k Bruxelles qui a fait la declaration en question au PriRsid^nt du Conseil du Gouvernement beige, il a pense que la meme procedure conviendrait le mieux vis-a-vis du Graud-Duche- G'est pourquoi il s'est abstenu de faire la demande directement au Gouvernement de la Republique. Comme la Chambre des deputes se reunit lundi, M. Eyschen desire etre en possession de la reponse a cette date ; une demarche analogue est faite en meme temps aupr^s du Ministre d'Allemagne k Luxembourg. MOLLABJO. — 140 — r 129, M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires ^trangeres, a M. MoLLARD, Ministre de France a Luxembourg. Paris, le i" aout igxh. Veuiliez declarer au President du Conseil que , conformement au traite de Londres de 1867, le Gouvernement de la Republicjue entend respecter la neutialite du Grand-Duche du Luxembourg, comme il Ta demontre par son attitude. La violation de cettc neutralite par I'Allemagne serai t toutefois de nature a oblige r la France k s'inspirer desormais, a cet egard, du souci de sa defense et de ses int^rets. Rene Viviani. r 130. M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin. a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- geres. Berlin, le i"aout 191^. On distribue dans les rues de Berlin des editions specialesdesjournaux annon^ant que la mobilisation generale de I'armee et de la flotte efet ordonnee etque le i^'^jour de la mobilisation est le dimanche 2 aout. Jules C AMBON. r 131. M. Eyschen, Ministre d'Etat du Luxembourg, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires ^tran- g^res. Luxembourg, le 2 aout 1914. J'ai Thonneur de porter a la connaissance de Vptre Excellence les fails suivants. Dimanche 2 aout de grand matin les troupes allemandes, d'apres les informations qui sont parvenues au Gouvernement Grand-DuCal k I'heure actuelle, ont penetre sur ie territoire Luxen)bourg;e9is par les ponts de Wasserbiilig et de Remich, se — 141 — dirigeant specialement vers le Sud du pays et vers ia ville de Luxembourg, capitale du Grand-Duche ; un certain nombre de trains blindes avec des troupes et des mu- nitions ont ete achemines par la voie de cliemin de fer de Wasserbillig a Luxembourg ou Ton s'atlend a les voir arriver d'un instant k I'autre. Ces fails impliquent des acles manifestement contraires a la neutralite du Grand- Duche, garantie par le traite de Londres de 1867. ^® Gouvernement Luxembour- geois n'a pas manque de protester energiquement contre celte agression aupres des representants de Sa Majeste I'Etnpereur d'AUemagne a Luxembourg ; une protesta- tion identique va etre transmise telegraphiquement au Secretaire d'Etat pour les Affaires etrangeres k Berlin. Le Minisire d'Etat, President da Gouvernement , Eyschen, K 132. M. MoLLARD, Ministre de France a Luxembourg, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- geres. Luxembourg, le 2 aoAt 19 1^. Le Ministre d'Etat du Luxembourg, M. Eyschen, vient de recevoir, par Tinterme- diaire du Ministre d'AUemagne a Luxenabourg, M. de Buch, un telegramme du Chancelier de I'Empire allemand Bethmann Hollweg, disant que les mesures militaires prises par I'Allemagne en Luxembourg ne constituent pas un acte hostile contre ce pays, "naais sont uniquement des mesures destinees a assurer contre I'attaque 6ven- luelle d'une armee frangaise I'exploitation des voies ferrees affermees a I'Empire, Le Luxembourg recevra une complete indemnite pour les dommages evenluels. MOLLARO. — 142 — r 133. JVoTE remise par V Amhassadenr ^Allemacjue,, Paris, le 2 aoAt 1914. UAmbassadeur d'Allemagne vient d'etre charge et s'empresse de faire savoir air Ministere d«s Affaires etrangeres que les mesures mililaires prises par I'Allemagne dans le Grand-Duche de Luxembourg ne constituent pas un acte d'hostilite. Elles doivent etre considerees comme des mesures purement preventives prises pour la protection des chemins de fer qui, par suite des traites existant entre I'Allemagne e* le Grand-Duche de Luxembourg, se trouvent sous I'administration allemande. DE SCHOEN, M. Paleologue, Ambassadeur de France a Saint-P^tersbourg, k M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires ^trati- geres. P^tersl)ourg, le a aoAt igiA* L' Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a remis k M. Sazonoff, hier, 37 h. 10 du soir, la declaration de guerre de son Gouvernement; il quittera Petersbourg aujourd'hui. L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie n'a re^u aucune instruction de son gouverne- ment pour la declaration de guerre. Paleologue. r 135. M. Ren6 Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres , k MM. les Repr^sentants de la France h. I'Etranger. Paris, le 2 aoiit igiil. L* Ambassadeur de Russia me fait connaitre que FAllemagne vient de declarer la gaerre i la Russie, malgr6 les negociations en cours, et au moment ou TAutriche- Hongrie acceptait de discuter avec- les. puissances le fond m^me de son conflit avep l^a Serbie. Ren6 Viviani. 143 — N* 136. M. Ben6 ViviANi, President du Conseii, Ministre des Affaires ^trangeres, a MM. les Ambassadeurs de France a Londres, Saint-P^tersbourg, Berlin, Vienne, Rome, Madrid, Constantinople. Paris, le 2 aoAt rgi^. Le territoire fraiiQais a ete viole ce matin par les troupes allemandes k Cirey et pres de Longwy. Elies marchent sur le fort qui porte ce dernier horn. D'autre part, le poste douanier de Delle a et6 assailli par une double fusillade. Enfm, les troupes allemandes oht viole ce matin aussi le territoire neutre du Luxembourg. Vous utiliserez ces renseignements sans retard pour faire constater comment le Gouvernement AUemand se iivre conlre la France k des actes de guerre sans provo- cation de notre part, ni declaration de guerre prealable, alors que nous avons scrupuleusement respecte la zone de dix kilometres que nous avons maintenue memo depuisla mobilisation, entre nos troupes et la frontiere. Ren6 ViviANi. N° 137. M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres, a M. Ren6 Viviani, Px^sideot du Conseii, Ministre des Affaires §tran- geres. Londres, le 2 aout 1914. A i'issue du Con^efl des IWSmstres tenu ce matin. Sir Edward Grey m'a fait la dd- claration^uivante : « Jci^^uis autoiise k donner rassxirance (jue si la flotte allemande p^netre dans la ^'lanche ou traverse la mer du Nord afin d'entreprendre des Operations de guerre contre la cote fran^iseoula marine marchande frauQaise, la flotte britannique don- nera touXe la protection en son pouvoir. « C6tte assurance est naturellement donnee sous la reserve que la politique du Gouvernement de Sa Majeste sera approuvee par le Parlement britannique et ne doit 4 — 144 — pas etre consideree comme obligeant le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste k agir jusqu a ce que leventualite ci-dessus mentionnee d'une action de la flotte allenxande se soil produite ». Me parlant ensuite de la neutralile de la Belglqiie et de celle du Luxembourg, le Principal Secretaire d'Etat m'a rappele que la Convention de 1867 relative au Grand- Duche differait du Traite relatif a la Belgique en ce sens que I'Angleterre etait tenue de faire respecter cette derniere convention sans le concours des autres Puissances garantes, tandisque, pour- le Luxembourg, toutes les Puissances garantes devaient agir de concert. La sauvegarde de la neutralite beige est consideree ici comme si importante que I'Angleterre envisagerait sa violation par TAIlemagne comme un casus belli. Cast la un interet proprement anglais , et on ne pent douter que le Gouvernement britan- nique, fidele aux traditions de sa politique, ne le fasse prevaloir, meme si le monde des affaires, ou I'influence allemande poursuit des efforts tenaces, pretendait exercer une pression pour empecher le Gouvernement de s'engager contre I'AUemagne. Paul Cambon. r 138. M. Rene ViviANi, President du Conseii, Ministre des Affaires ^trang^res, a M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres. Paris , le 2 aout 1 9 1 4. Je prends note des indications contenues dans vos telegrammes des 27, 3o» 3i juillet.et 1*' aout et dans celui que vous m'avez adresse aujourd'hui. En communiquaut aux Chambres la declaration meme que vous a faile Sir Edward Grey el dont votre dernier telegramme me donne le texle , j'ajouterai que nous avons oblenu la de la Grande-Bretagne un premier concours dont la valeur nous est pre- cieuse. Je me propose, en outre, d'indiquer que Fassistance de la Grande-Bretagne a Tin- tention de donner a la France en vue de protdger les cotes de France ou la marine marchande fran9aise s'appliquerait de telle fa^on que notre marine de guerre fut egalement soutenue par la flotte anglaise, en cas de conflit franco-allemand , dans I'Atlantique, comme dans la mer du Nord et dans la Manche. Je noterais, en outre, que les ports anglais ne pourraient pas servir de points de ravitaillement k la flotte allemande. Rene Viviani. 145 r 139. M. Ren6 Vivtatii, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires ^tranjg^res, k M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin. Paris, le 2 aoilt igiA. Les troupes aliemandes ayani aujourd'hui yiole la frontiere de I'Est sur plusieurs points, je vous prie de protester sans retard par 6crit aupres du Gouvernenaent alle- mand. Vous youdrez bien vous inspirer de la note suivante que, dans I'incertitude des communications entre Paris et Berlin, j'ai adresse directement k TAmbassadeur d'Allemagne : « Les autorit^s administratives et militaires fran^aises de la region d& I'Est viennent de signaler plusieurs faits que j'ai charge TAmbassadeur de ia Republique k Berlin de porter k la connaissance du Gouvernement Imperial. « L'un s'est produit k Delle, dans la region de Belfort : k deux reprises, le poste de douaniers fran^ais stationne. dans cette localite a ete Tobjet dune fusillade de la part d'un detachement de soldats allemands. Au nord de Delle, deux patrouilles alie- mandes du 5** chasseurs k cheval ont franchi la frontiere dans la matinee d'aujourd'hui et pen6tre jusqu'aux villages de Joncherey et Baron a plus de i o kilometres de la frontiere. L'officier qui commandait la premiere a brule la cervelle k un soldat fran^ais. Les cavaliers allemands ont emmene des chevaux que le maire fran^ais de Suarce etait en train de reunir et ont force les habitants de la commune k conduire les dits chevaux. « L'A.mbassadeur de la Republique k Berlin a ete charge de protester formellement aupres du Gouvernement Imperial contre des faits qui constituent une violation caracteri see de la frontiere par des troupes aliemandes en armeset que rien ne justifie dans I'etat actuel. Le Gouvernement de la Republique ne peut que laisser au Gou- vernement, Imperial I'entiere responsabilite de ces actes ». Rene Viviani. N'' 140. M. Marcelin Pellet, Ministre de France a La Haye, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires ^tran- geres. La Haye, le 3 aodt 1914. Le Ministre d'Allemagne s'est rendu hier chez le Ministre des Affaires etrang^res pour lui expliquer la necessite 011 s etait trouvee I'Allemagne, a-t-il dit, de violer la DocDMENTS DiPLQMATiQUES. — Gucrrc curopeennc. , ig — 146 — neutralite du Luxembourg, ajoutant qu'il aurait aujourd'hui une nouvelle commu- nication a lui faire. En efFet,ce matin, il a annonce I'entr^e des troupes allemandes en Beigique pour eviter, a-t-il declare, une occupation de ce pays par la France. Pellet. N° Ul. M. Klobdkowski, Ministre de France A Bruxeite^ a M. Ren6 Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires ^tran- g^res. Bruxelles, le 3 aoAt 191^. Le Ministre d'Ailemagne a remis hier soir au Gouvemement beige un ultimatum oti il est dit que son Gouvemement, ayant appris que les Fran^ais se preparaient k des operations dans les regions de Givet et de Namur, se voyait dans Tobligation de prendre desmesures dont la premiere etait d'inviter le Gouvemement beige k lui faire savoir, dans les sept heures, s'il etait dispose k lui faciliter en Beigique les operations mili- taires contre la France. En cas de refus, le sort des armes d^ciderait. Le Gouvemement du Roi a repondu que les renseignements sur les mouvements franijais lui paraissaient inexacts en raison des assurances formelles, toutes r^centes encore, donnees par la France; que la Beigique qui, depuis sa constitution, s'est pr^- occupee d'assurer la sauvegarde de sa dignite et de ses interets et a consacr6 tous ses efiforts au developpement pacifique du progr^s, proteste hautement contre toute violation de son territoire, d'ou quelle vienne, et que, dans cette eventualite, elle saura defendre energiquement sa neutrality, garar.tie par les puissances et notammentpar le Roi de Pmsse. Klobukowski. N" U2. M. Klobukowski, Ministre de France a Bruxelles, a M. Ren6 Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrang^es. Bruxelles, le 3 aoAt 1914. A I'assurance que je lui donnais que , si la Beigique faisait appel k la garantie des Puissances, contre la violation de sa neutralit6 par I'AUemagne , la France r^pondrait imm6diatement^ son appel, le Ministre des Affaires 6trangeres m'a repondu : — 147 — « C'est bien sincerement" que nous remercions le Gouvememeut de la Repu- blique de I'appui eventuel. qu'O pourrait nous oft'rir, mais dans la circonstance actueiie, nous ne faisons pas appel k la garantie des Puissances. Ulterieuremeht le Gouvernement du Roi appreciera ce qu il y a lieu de faire ». r 143. M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres, a M. Ren6 Viviani^ President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres. Londres, le 3 aoi!lt iQi^* Sir Ed. Grey m'a autorise k vous faire savoir que vous pourriez declarer au Parle - ment qu'il ferait aux Communes des declarations sur Tattilude actueiie du Gouver- nement Britannique et que la principale de ces declarations serait la siiivante : « Dans le cas oii I'escadre allemande franchirait le detroit ou remonterait la Mer du Nord pour doubler les iles britanniques dans le but d'attaquer les cotes frangaises ou la marine de guerre fran^aise et d'inquieter la marine marcbande frangaise, I'escadre anglaise interviendrait pour preter k la marine frangaise son entiere protec- tion, en sorte que des ce moment I'Angleterre et I'Allemagne seraient en etat de guerre. » Sir Ed. Grey m'a fait observer que la mention d'une operation par la Mer du Nord impliquait la protection contre une demonstration dans I'Ocean Atlantique. La declaration concemant I'intervention de la flotte anglaise doit etre consider^e comme liant le Gouvernement britannique. Sir E. Grey m'en a donne I'assurance et a ajoute que le Gouvernement fran^ais etait par Ik meme en mesure d'en donner con- naissance aux Chambres. A mon retour a I'Ambassade, j ai eu conniissance de votre communication t6le- phonique relative k fultimatum allemand adresse k la Belgique. J^en ai fait part immediatement k Sir Ed. Grey. Paul Caiibon,. N' 144. M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires ^trang^res., Londres, le 3 aput 1914. Au moment ou Sir Ed. Grey partait ce matin pour le Conseil, ^mon coUegue alle- mand, qui favait deja vu bier, est venu le prier avec insist^iace de lui dire que la >97 — 148 — neutralite de I'AngleteiTe ne dependait pas du respect de la neulralite beige. Sir Ed. Grey s*est refuse a toute conversation k ce sujet. X'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a adresse k la presse un commtfniqu6 disant que si TAnglelerre restait neutre, TAllemagne renoncerait a toute operation navale etne se servirait pas des cotes beiges comme point d'appui. Je fais repondre que le respect des coles n'est pas le respect de la neutralite du terriloire, et que rultimatum alle- mand est deja une violation de cette neutralite. Paul Cambon. N" 145. M. Paul Cambon* Ambassadeur de France a Londres, a M. Ren6 Viyiani^ President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres. Londres, le 3 aoAt igiA. Sir E. Grey a fait la declaration relative a I'intervention de la flotte anglaise ; il a precise, en raison des evenements, celle qu'il comptait faire au sujet de la neutralite beige ; et la lecture d une lettre du Roi Albert demandant I'appui de I'Angleterre a vivement emu I'Assembl^e. La Cbambre votera ce soir les credits demandes; des k present son appui est acquis k la politique du Gouvemement et elle suit Topinion publique, qui se pro- nonce de plus en plus en notre faveur. Paul Cambon. r 146. M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires ^trangeres, k M, Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France k Londres. Paris, le 3 aoiit 1914. n me revient que I'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne aurait d6clar6 au Foreign Office que bier matin quatre-vingts officiers fran9ais en uniforme prussien auraient essaye de traverser la frontiere allemande dans douze automobiles i Walbeck a I'ouest de Gel-' dern, et que ceci conslituait une tres serieuse violation de la neutralite de Ta part de la France. Veuillez d^mentir d'urgence cette nouvelle de pure invention et attii er I'attention du Foreign Office sur ia campagne allemande de fausses nouvelles qui commence. Rene VrviANi. - 149 — r U7. Lettre remise par VAmhassadeur d'Allemagne a M. Rene Viviani^ President da Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres^ au cours de son audience de depart, le 3 aout 1914, a 18 h. 45. Monsieur le President, Les aulorltes administratives et militaires allemandes ont constate un certain Tiombre d'actes d'hostiiite caracterisee commis sur le territoire allemand par des avia- teurs militaires fran^ais. Plusieurs de ces derniers ont manifestement viole la neutra- lity de la Belgique survolant le territoire de ce pays; I'un a essaye de detruire des constructions pres de Wesel, d'autres ont ete apergus sur la region de TEiffel, un autre a jete des bombes sur le chemin de fer pres de Karlsruhe et de Nuremberg. Je suis charge, et j'ai I'honneur de faire connaitre k Votre Excellence qu'en pre- sence de ces agressions, TEmpire allemand se considere en etat de guerre avec ia France, du fait de cette derniere Puissance. J'ai en meme temps I'honneur de porter a la connaissance de Votre Excellence que les autorites allemandes retiendront les navires marchands fran^ais dans des ports allemands, mais qu'elles les relacheront si, dans les quarante-huit heures, la reci- procite complete est assuree. Ma mission diplomatique ayant ainsi pris fm, il ne me reste plus qu'k prier Votre Excellence de vouloir bien me munir de mes passeports et de prendre les mesures quelle jugera utiles pour assurer mon retour en AUemagne avec le personnel de I'Ambassade, ainsi quavec le personnel de la Legation de Baviere et du Gonsulat general d' AUemagne a Paris. Veuillez agreer, Monsieur le President, i'expression de ma tres haute conside- ration, Signe: SGHOEN; r U8. M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires 6trangeres, a MM. les Representants de la France a Tetranger. Paris le 3 aout 19 id' L'ambassadeur d' AUemagne a demande ses passeports et part ce soir avec le per- sonnel de I'Ambassade et du Gonsulat general d'AUemagne, et de la Legation de Baviere. Le Baron de Schoen a donne pour pretexte la constatation par les autorites administratives et militaires allemandes d'actes d'hostiiite qui auraient 6te commis — 150 — sur territoire alleman^ par des aviateurs militaires fran^ais accuses d'avoir survole le tenitoire de I'empire et jete des bombes; I'ambassadeur ajoute que des aviateurs auralent 6galement viole la neutralite de la Belgique en survolant son territoire. « En presence de ces agressions, dit la lettre de M. de Schoen, I'Empire allemand se considere en 6tat de guerre avec la France du fait de cette demiere puissance ». J'ai formellement contest^ les allegations inexactes de rambassadeur et, de mon cote, j'ai rappele que des hier, je lui avais adresse une note protestant contre les violations caracterisees de la frontiere fran^aise commises depuis deux jours par des detachements de troupes aliemandes. Ren6 Viviani. N° 149. M. Ren6 ViviANi, President du Conseil, Ministre des AfiFaires ^tranglres, k M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin^ ( Telegramme commanique aux Repriseniants de la France a Vetranger.) Paris, le 3 aout 1914. Je vous invite a demander vos passeports et i. quitter immediatement Berlin avec le personnel de I'ambassade en laissant la charge des interets fi'an9ais et la gai'de des ' archives k I'ambassadeur d'Espagne. Je vous prie de protester en meme temps par icni contre la violation de la neutrality du Luxembourg par les troupes allemande^ signal^e par le premier ministre luxembourgeois , contre Tultimatum adresse au , gouvemement beige par le Ministre d'Allemagne k Bruxelles pour lui imposer la violation de la neutralite de la Belgique et exiger de celle-ci quelle lui facilite sur territoire beige les operations militaires contre la France ; enlin contre la fausse alle- gation d'un pretendu projel d'invasion de ces deux pays par les armees fran^aises, par lequel il a cssaye de justifier I'etat de guerre qu'il declare exister desormais entre PAUemagne et la France. Ren6 VrvriANi. N' 150, M. Ren^ YiviANi, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires ^ti'ang^reSi k M. Allize, Ministre de France a Munich. Parisle Saoiit igid* Veuillez faire connaitre au Gouvemement royal bavarois que vous ave^ re^u pour 'instruction de conformer votre attitude k celle de TAmbassadeur de la R^publique k ^Berlin et de ^tter Munich^ Ren6 Viviawi. — 151 r 151. M. Ren6 ViviANi, President du Gonseil, Ministre des Affaires ^trang^res, a MM. les Repr^sentants de la France a Londres, Saint-P^tersbourg, Vienne, Rome, Madrid, Berne, Constantinople, La Haye, Copen- hague, Christiania, Stokholm, Bucarest, Athenes, Belgrade. Palis, le 3 aoiit igi4. J'apprends de source officielle beige que les troupes allemandes out vioU le terri' toire beige k Genimerich dans la region de Verviers. Rene Vivuni. N'' 152. M. Klobukowski, Ministre de France a Bruxelles, k M. Ren6 Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires ^tran- g^res. Bruieltes, le d aoAt igi/i. Le Chef de Cabinet du Ministere des Affaires etrangeres me remet une lettre par laquelle le « Gouvemement du Roi declare etre lermemenl decide k resister par tons les moyens en son pouvoir a ragression de I'Allemagne. La Belgique fait appel a rAngleterre , ia France et la Russie pour cooperer comme garantes k la defense de .son territoire. < fl y aurait une action concertee et commune ayant pour but ae resister aux mesures de .force, employees par TAiiemagne contre la Belgique, et en meme temps de garantir le maintien de I'independance et de I'integrite de la Bejgique dans Tavenir. i La Belgique est heureuse de pouvoir declarer qu'elle assurera la defense des places fortes. » Klobukgws&i. -- 152 — r 153. M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres, a M. Rene ViViani, President du Gonseil, Ministre des Affaires %an* geres. Londres, le 4 ao6t i9i.4« Sir Edw. Grey m'a pri6 de venir ie voir a I'lnstant pour me dire que le premier Ministre declarerait aujoiu-d'hui k la Chambre des Communes que I'Ailemagne avait 6le invitee a retirer son ultimatum k la Belgique et a donner sa reponse a I'Angleterre ce soir avant minuit. Paul Gambon. r 154. M. Klobukowski^ Ministre de France a BruxeHes, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseii, Ministre des Affaires ^tran- geres. Bruxelles, Ic 4 aout 1911. Le Ministre d'Allemagne informe ce matin le Ministere des Affaires elrangeres beige que, par suite du refus du Gouverment beige, le Gouvernement imperial se voit force d'ex^cuter, par la force des armes, les mesures de securite indispensables vis-a-vis des menaces fran9aises. Klobukowskl 155. M. Bapst, Ministre de France a Copenbague, a M. DouMERGUE, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres. Copenhague, 6 aout 1914- L'Ambassadeur de France a Berlin me prie de communiquer k votre Excellence le telegramme suivant : J'ai ele dirige par le Gouvernement allemand sur le Danemark. Je viens d'arriver a Copenhague. Tout le personnel de I'Aoibassade et le Charge d'affaires de Russie a Darmstadt avec sa famille, m'accompagnaient. On a use de tels procedes k notre egard que je crois. utile d'en faire le rapport complet a Votre Excellence par le telegraphe. Lundi matin, 3 aout, apres que j'avais, conformement k vos instructions, adress6 a M. de Jagow une protestation contre les actes d'agression commis sur le territoire — 153 — fran^ais par ies troupes allemandes>, le Secretaire d'Etatvint me voir. M. de Jagovv venait se plaindre d'actes d'agression qu il pretendait avoir ete commis en Allemagne, a Nuremberg et a Coblentz riotamment, par des aviateurs fran^ais qui, selon lui, « seraient venus de Belgique ».— - Je repondis que je n'avais pas la moindre donnee sur les faits dont il voulait faire etat et dont Tinvraisemblance me paraissait evidente; je lui demandai a mon tour s'il avait^pris connaissance de la Note que je lui avais adressee au sujet de Tenvahissement de notre territoire par des detachements de I'armee allemande. — Comme le Secretaire d'Etat me disait n'avoir pas encore lu cetteNote, je lui en donnai connaissance. J'appelai son attention sur Tacte commis parl'officier commandant un de ces detachements, qui s'etaitavance jusqu'au village francais de Joncherey, a lo kilometres a I'interieur de nos frontieres, et avail briile la cervelle a un soldat frangais qu'il y avait. rencontre. Apres avoir qualifie cet acte, j'ajoutai : — « Vous reconnaitrez qu'en aucune hypothese il ne saurait etre compare a un vol d'aeroplane sur territoire etranger, accompli par des particuliers animes de cet esprit daudace individuelle qui distingue les aviateurs. Un act€ d'agression commis sur le territoire d'un voisin par des detachements de troupes regulieres commandes par desofficiers presente unegravite toute autre. » M. de Jagpw me declai-a qu'il ignorait les fails dont je lui parlais et ilconclut qu'il etait difficile qu'il ne s'en produisit pas de cette nature lorsque deux armees,. remplies des sentiments qui animaient nos troupes, se trouvaienl face k face de chaque cote de la frontiere. A ce moment, les attroupements qiii se trouvaient sur la Parezer Platz, devant I'Ambassade et que nous apercevions ^travers la. fenetre entr'ouverle demon cabinet, pousserent des cris contre la France. Je demandai au Secretaire d'Etat quand lout cela fmirail. « Le Gouvernement n'a pas encQre pris de decision , me repondit M. de Jagovv. II est probable que M. de Schoen recevra aujourd'hi I'ordre de demander ses passe- ports, et ensuite, vous recevrez les votres ». — Le Secretaire d'Etat m'assura que du reste je n'avais aucune preoccupation k avoir au sujet de mon depart et que toutes les convenances seraient pbservees a mon egard ainsi qu'^ I'egard de-mon personnel. Nousne devious plus nous voir et nous primes conge I'un de I'auire ,. apres un entre-^ tien qui avait ete courtois et qui ne pouvait me faire prevoir ce que Ton me reser- vail. Avantde quitter M. de Jagow, je lui avais exprime le desir de faire une visile personnelle au Chancelier, puisque ce serait la derniere fois q^ue j'aurais I'occasion de le voir. M. de Jagow me repondit qu il ne m'engageait pas k donner suite a cette intention,, car cette entrevue ne servirait k rien et ne pourrait elre que penible. A -6 heures du soir, M. de Langwerlh m'a apporte mes, passeports. II refusa au nom de son Gouvernement d'acceder au desir qiie je lui exprimais de me laisser par- tir par la Hollande ou la Belgique. II me proposa de parlir soil par Copenhague „ bien qu'il ne put m'assurer le libre passage de la mer, soil par fa Suisse, via Constance. J'^cceptai cette derniere voie; M. de Langwerlh m'ayant demande de parlir le plus tot possible, il fut convenu, en raison de la necessite oii j'elais de m'entendre avec DoccMENTS 0IPLOM4TIQCES. — Gucrre europeenne." ao I — 154 — I'Ambassadeur d'Espagne, qui prend nos int6rets en main, que je quitterais I'Ambas- sade le lendemain mardi 4 aout, k i o heures du soir. Une Iieure apres le depart de M. de Langwerth, a 7 heures, M. de Lancken, ancien Conseiller d'Ambassade k Paris, vint me dire de la part du Ministere des Affaires etrangeres, d'inviter le personnel de mon Ambassade a ne plus prendre ses repas dans les restaurants. Cette consigne etait si stricte que le lendemain mardi j'eus besoin de recourir a I'autorite de la Wilhelmstrasse pour que I'hotel Bristol nous envoyat nos repas a I'Ambassade. Le meme soir, lundi a 1 1 heures, M. de Langwerth revint mapprendre que son Gouvernement me refusait le retour par la Suisse sous le pretexte qu'il faudrait trois jours et trois nuits pour me conduire a Constance. II m'annon^a que je serais dirige sur Vienne. Je ne consentis k ce changement que sous reserve et dans la nuit j'ecrivis k M. de Langwerth la lettre suivante : , « Berlin , 3 ao6t 191^. M. LE Baron, « Je reflechis a la route dont vous etes venu me parler ce soir pour me faire rentrer dans mon pays. Vous me proposez de passer par Vienne. Je suis expose a me irouver retenu dans cette ville , sinon du fait du Gouvernement autrichien , du moins du fait des circonstances de sa mobilisation , qui lui cr^e des difficultes analogues a celles de I'AUemagne pour la circulation des trains. • Dans ces conditions, je crois devoir reclamer du Gouvernement allemand fengage- raent d'honneur que le Gouvernement autrichien me dirigera sur la Suisse et que le Gouvernement suisse ne fermera ni k moi, ni aux personnes qui m'accompagnent, sa fronti^re qu'on me ditjustementfermee aux elrangers. « Je ne puis done accepter la proposition que vousm'avez faite que si j'ai les suretes que je reclame et si je suis assure de ne pas etre retenu quelques mois hors de mon pays. . Jules Cambon. En reponse k cette lettre, le lendemain matin, mardi 4 aout, M. de Langwerth me donna par ecrit Tassurance que les autorites autrichiennes et suisses avaient recu les communications n6cessaires. En meme temps, on arretait chez lui, dans son lit, M. Miladowski , attache au Consulat de Berlin, ainsi que d'autres Fran^ais. M. Miladowski, pour qui un passe- port diplomatique avait ete demands , put ^tre relftche au bout de 4 heures. Je me preparais a partir pour Vienne, quand, a 4 heures 45, M. de Langwerth revint m'annoncer que je devrais partir avec les personnes m'accompagnant k 1 o heures du soir, mais que je serais conduit en Danemark. Devant cette exigence nouvelle, je demandai si Ton me mettrait dans une forteresse, au cas ou je ne I'accep- terais pas. M, de Langwerth me repondit simplement qu'il reviendrait chercher la reponse dans une demi-heure. Je ne voulais pas donner au Gouvernement allemand le pretexte de dire que je m'etais refuse k sortir d'Allemagne. Je declarai done a M. de Langwerth, lorsqu'il revint, que je me soumetlrais a I'ordre qui m'etait donne, mais « que je protestais »» — 155 — J'ecrivis aussitot k M* de Jago^ la kltre* dont ia copiesuit-; « Berlin, 4 aodt 1914* « Monsieur le Secretaire d'Etat, « Votre Excellence m'avait dit a plusleurs reprises que le Gouvernement imperial, conformement aux usages de la courtoisie internationale , me faciliterait mon retoiu" dans mon pays et me donnerait tous les moyens d'y rentrer rapidement. « Cependant bier, apres m' avoir refuse I'acces de ia Belgique et de la Hollande, M. le baron de Langwerth m'a informe que je passerais par la Suisse via Constance. Danslanuit, j'al ete avis6 que je serais envoye en Autriche, pays qui preud part du cote de TAllemagne k ia presente guerre. Comme j'ignorais les intentions de TAu- tricbe a mon egard, puisque sur son sol je ne suis qu'un simple particulier, j*ai 6crit au baron de Langwerth que je demandais au Gouvernement imperial Tengagement que les autorites imperiales et royales autrichiennes me donneraient toutes les faci- lites possibles pour continuer ma route, et que la Suisse ne se fermerait pas devant moi. M. de Langwertb a bien voulu me r^pondre par ecrit que je pouvais etre assure d'un voyage facile et que les autorites autrichiennes feraient tout le necessaire. « II est pres de 5 heures et le baron de Langwerth vient de m'annoncer que je serai dirige sur le Danemark. Etant donne les evenements, je ne. suis pas assure de trou- ver un bailment pour me transporter en Angleterre, et c'est cette consideration qui m'avait fait ecarter cette proposition, d^accord avec M. de Langwerth. « En realite, on ne me laisse aucune liberte, et on me traite presque en prisonnier, Je suis oblige de me soumettre, n'ayant aucun moyen d'obtenir qu'il soit tenu compte des regies de la courtoisie internationale k mon egard, mais je tiens a protes- ter entre les mains de Votre Excellence centre lafacon dont je suis traite. Jules C AMBON. Pendant qu'on portait ma leltre, j'6tais avis6 que le voyage ne s'efTectuerait pas direclement, mais par la voie du Schleswig. A 10 heures du soir, je quittais I'Am- bassade, avec mon personnel, au milieu d'un grand concours de police a pied et k cheval. A la gare , un employe inferieur du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres representait seul cette administration. Le voyage s'est efTectu6 avec une lenteur extreme. Nous avons mis plus de vingt- quatre heures pour gagner la frontiere. II a sembl^ qu'a chaque station on attendait des ordres pour repartir. Jetais accompagne du major von Rheinbaben, du regi- ment Alexandre de la Garde, et d'un fonctionnaire de la police. Aux environs du canal de Kiel, la troupe a envahi nos wagons. On a fait fermer les fenetres et les rideaux des voitures; chacun de nous a dii se tenir isolement dans son compartiment avec defense de se lever el de toucher k ses sacs de voyage. Dans le coidoir des wagons, devant la porte de chacun de nos compartiments maintenue ouverte, se tenait un soldat, le revolver an poing et le doigt sur la gachette. Le charge d'affaires de Russie, les femmes, les enfants, tout le monde a ete soumis au meme traitement. A la demiire station allemande, vers 1 i heures du soir, le major von Rheinbaben — 156 — est Tenu prendre conge de moi. Je lui ai remis, pour M. de Jagovv, ia lettre qui suit : • Mercredi soir, 5 aodt 191^1. « Monsieur le Secretaire d'Et/^, • Hier, avant de quitter Berlin, ^'ai proteste par ecrit aupres de Voire Excellence contre les changements successifs de direction qui m'ont ete imposes par le Gouver- nement imperial , pour sortir d'AUemagne. « Aujourd'hui, lors du passage du train qui m'emportait au-dessus du canal de Kiel, on a voulu visiter tons nos bagages, comme si nous pouvions cacher quelque instrument de destruction. Grace a I'intervention du major von Rheinbaben, cet affront nous a ete epargne. « Mais on a fait plus. « On nous a oblige de rester cbacun dans nos compartiments, dont les fenetres et les rideaux etaient fermes. Pendant ce temps, dans le couloir des voilures, a laporte de chaque compartiment et faisanl face k chacun de nous, se tenait un soldat, le revolver a la main, le doigt sur la gachette, durant pres d une demi-heure. « Je crois devoir protester contre cette menace de violences a Tegard de I'Ambassa- deur de la Republique et du personnel de son Ambassade , violences que rien n'avait pu seulement me faire pressentir. J'avais Thonneur d'ecrire hier a Votre Excellence que j'etais traite presque en prisonnier. Aujourd'hui , c'est en prisonnier dangereux que j'ai ete traite. Je dois noter que, dans le cours du voyage qui, depuis Berlin jusqu'au Danemark, a pris vingt-quatre heures, aucun repas n'a ete prepare , ni fourni a moi, non plus quaux personnes reconduites avec moi jusqu'k la frontiere. Jules Cambon. Je croyais tout termine, lorsque peu apres le major von Rheinbaben vint, un pen confus, m'annoncer que le train ne poursuivrait pas jusqu'a la frontiere danoise si je ne payais pas le prix de ce train. Je m'etonnai qu'on ne me Teut pas fait payer a Berlin et, quen tout cas, on ne m'eut pas prevenu. Je proposai de payer parun cheque sur une des plus grandes banques de Berlin ; cette facilite me fut refusee. Avec le concours de mes compagnons , je pus reunir en or la somme qui m'elait demandee immediatement et qui s'elevait a 3,Ci 1 marks 76, soit a environ 5,000 francs au taux actuel du change (1). Apres ce dernier incident , je crus devoir demander k M. de Rheinbaben sa parole d'officier et de gentilhomme qu on allait me conduire jusqu i la frontiere danoise. II me la donna et j'exigeai que I'hommede police qui etait avec nous nous accompagnat. Nous arrivames ainsi a la premiere station danoise oii le Gouvernement danois avait fait preparer un train pour nous conduire a Copenhague. On m'assurfe que mon coUegue d'Angleterre et le Ministre de Belgique, bien qu'ils aient quitte Berlin apres moi, sont partis directement pour la Hollande. Je suis frapp6 de cette difference de Iraitement. Et coinme le Danemark et la Norvege sont remplis en ce moment d'espions, si je reussis a m'embarquer en Norvege, on craint que je ne sois arrete en mer, avec, les officiers qui m'accompagnent. ' ^1) UU^rieurement la somme ainsi demandee a M. Jules Cambon a ete reversee a I'Ambassadeur d'Es- pagoe 4 JBeriin poor &lre remboursi^e at I'Ambassadeur de France, — 157 — Je ne veux pas terminer cette d^peche sans signaler a voire Excellence le devoue- ment et T^nergie dont tout le personnel de I'Ambassade n a pas cesse de faire preuve pendant la duree de cette crise; je serais heureux quil lui fiit tenucompte des ser- vices rendus a cette occasion au Gouvernement de la Republique , en particulier par les Secretaires de I'Ambassade ainsi que par I'Attach^ militaire et I'Attaqhe naval. Jules Gambon. r 156. M. MoLLARD, Ministre de France a Luxembourg, a M. DouMERGUE. Ministre des AfFaires etrangeres. Paris, le 4 aout 191 4. Le Ministre d'Etat est venu mardi matin 4 aout, vers huit heures et demie, a la Legation pour me notifier que les autorites mililaires allemandes exigeaient mon depart, Sur ma reponse que je ne cederais que devant la force, M. Eyschen me dit qu'il connaissait mes sentiments a ce sujet et que c etait precisement pour cela qu'il etait venu lui-meme me faire cette communication qui lui coiitait beaucoup , car c' etait effeclivement devant la force qu'il me priait de partir. II ajouta qu'il allait men apporter la preuve ecrite. Je ne cachai pas a M. Eyschen la tristesse et I'inqui^tude que j'avais de laisser mes compatriotes sans defense et lui demandai de vouloir bien se charger de leur pro- tection, ce quil accepta. Au moment de partir, il me remit la lettre ci-jointe (annexe I), qui est la reponse du Gouvernement luxembourgcois a la declaration que j'avais faite la veille au soir, selon les instructions telegraphiques de M. Viviani. Vers dix heures, le Ministte d'Etat vint de nouveau a la Legation et me laissa, avec un mot de lui, une copie certifiee de la lettre que lui avait adressee le Ministre d'Allemagne au sujet de raon depart du Luxembourg (annexes 11 et III). lime ditegalement qu'il avait fait connaitre a M. von Buch que le Gouvernement luxembourgcois serait charge deJa protection des Fran^ais et aurait la garde de la Legation et de la Chaucellerie. Cette nouvelle ne parut pas plaire a mon collegue d'Allemagne, qui conseilla a M. Eyschen de m'inciter k confier ce soin au Ministre de Belgique. J'expliquai au Ministre d'Etat que la situation etait particuliere. Etant accredite aupres die S, A. R. la. Grande-Duchesse et mon pays n'etant pas en etat de guerre avec le Luxembourg, il etait^ dans ces conditions, lout indique que ce fut le Gouvernement luxembourgcois qui assurat la sauvegarde de mes , compatriotes. M. Eyschen n'insista pas et accepta de nouveau la miission que je lui confiai. Le Ministre d'Etat me demanda dors de vouloir bien partir sans bruit, afin d'eviler des manifestations qui ne manqueraient pas, me dit-il, d'amener des represailles vis- a-vis des Fran^ais de la part des autorites mililaires allemandes. Je lui repondis que j'atlachais Irop de'prix a la s6curite de mes compatriotes pour la comprometlre et qu'il n avail rien k craindre. — 158 — Mon depart, qu'on exigeait le plus tot possible, fut fixe a 2 heures, ii ful egale- ment entendu que je partirais dans mon automobile. Pour le sauf-conduit, M. Eyschen me dit que le Ministre d'Allemagne etait actuellement au quartier general allemand pour le demander et qu'il aurait soin de me le faire lenir en temps utile. A 2 heures un quart, M. le Ministre d'Etat , accompagne deM. Henrion, Conseiller du Gouvernement , vint me faire ses adieux et recevoir les clefs de la Legation et «celles de la Chancelierie. II me fit connaitre que les ordres avaient ete donnes pour mon fibre passage el que je devais gagner Arlon par la route de Merle, la route de Mamers et la route d'Arlon. II ajouta qu'iin oflicier allemand m'attendrait route de Merle pour preceder ma voiture. Je quittai alors la Legation et me rendis a Arlon par I'itineraire fixe, mais je ne rencontrai personne. Votre Excellence voudra bien trduver ci-contre (annexe IV) le texte de la lettre que j'ai remise a M. le Ministre d'Etat avant de quitter mon poste. MOLLARD. Annexe I. M. Eyschen, Ministre d'Etat, President du Gouvernement, a M. MoLLARD, Envoye extraordinaire et Ministre plenipotentiaire de France k Luxembourg. Luxembourg, le 4 aoi!^t 1914. Monsieur. LE Ministre, Par sa communication verbale dliier soir. Voire Excellence a eu la haute obfigeance de porter a ma connaissance que, conform^ment au lrait6 de Londres de 1867, le Gouverne- ment de la Republique entendait respecter la neutraUt6 du Grand-Duche de Luxembourg, comme il Tavail montre par son altitude, mais que la violation de cette neutrality par TAlle- magne etait toulefois de nature k obliger la France a s'inspirer d^sormais a cet egard du souci de sa defense et de ses int^rets. Vous me permettrez de constater, Monsieur le Ministre, que la decision du Gouverne- ment de la Republique est uniquement bas^e sur le fait d'une tierce Puissance dont, certes, le Grand-Duche nest pas responsable. Les droits du Luxembourg doivent done rester inlacls. L'Empire allemand a formellement declare que seule une occupation teraporaire du Luxembourg enlrait dans ses intentions. Jaime a croire, Monsieur le Ministre, que le Gouvernement de la Republique n'aura pas de peine a constater avec moi que de tout temps et en toules circonstances , le Grand-Duch6 a pleinement et loyalement rempli toules les obligations generalement quelconques qui lui incombaient en verlu du Iraite de 1867. Veuiliez agreer, etc. ^ Le Ministre d'Etat, President du Gouvernement, Eyschen. ^ 159 — Annexe II. Lettre particuliere adressee par M. Eyschen, Ministre d'Etat, President du Gouverne- ment, a M. MoLLARD, Ministre de France k Luxembourg. Monsieur le Ministre, Tout a I'heure, j'ai eu le tres vif regret de vous faire connaitre les intentions du General von Fuchs au sujet de votre sejour h Luxembourg. Comme j'ai eu Thonneur de vous le dire, j'avais demande une constatation par ^crit de la decision prise a ce sujet par Tautorite militaire. Ci-joint copie dune lettre que je viens de recevoir a I'instant de la part du Ministre d'Allemagne. II m'a ete assure que, dans I'ex^cution de la mesure, on ne manquera d'avoir tons les |(5gards dus a votre quality et k votre personne. Veuiliez recevoir I'expression r^iteree de tous mes regrets et de mes sentiments les meii-. leurs. Eyschbn. Annexe III. A Son Excellence le Ministre d'Etat , M. le D' Evschen. Excellence J ai I'honneur, conformement aux instructions de Son Excellence M. le general Fuchs, de vous prier de vouloir bien inviter le Ministre de France, M. Mollard, a quitter aussitot que possible le Luxembourg et a se rendre en France; autrement les autorites militaires allemandes se trouveraient dans la penible obligation de placer M. Mollard sous la surveillance dune escorte militaire et en cas extreme de proceder a son arrestation. Je prie Votre Excellence de vouloir bien agreer a cette occasion lassurance de ma consi- deration la plus distinguee. VON BucH. 160 -- IV. M. MoLLARD, Ministre de France k Luxembourg, a Son Excellence M. Eyschen, Ministre d'Etat, President du Gouveniement de Luxembourg. Monsieur le Ministre, Luxemboui^, le 4 aoiit 191.4. Je viens de recevoir votre comaiunicalion et m'incline devant la force. Avant de quitter le Luxembourg, jai le devoir de me preoccuper du sort et de la securile de mes compatriotcs. Connaissant I'csprit de justice et d'equite du Gouvernement luxem- bourgeois, j'ai I'honneur de prier Votre Excellence de les prendre sous sa haute protection et de veiiler a la sauvegarde de leur vie et de leurs biens. Je demanderai egalement a Votre Excellence d'assurer la garde de i'hotel de la Legation et des bureaux de la Chancellerie. Je serais tres oblige a Votre Excellence de vouloir bien .fairc agreer a S. A. R. Madame la Grande-Duchesse THommage de mon profond respect et toutes mes excuses de n'avoir pu aller ie lui exprimer moi-meme. En vous remerciant, Monsieur le Ministre, do toutes les marques de sympathic que vous m'avez donnees, je vous prie d'agreer la nouvelle assurance de ma haute consideration. Armand Mollard. N" 157, Notification du Gouvernement fran(^ais Aux Representants des Puissances A Paris., Le Gouvernement imperial allemand, apres avoir laisse ses forces armees franchir la frontiere et se livrer sur le territoire fran^ais k divers actes de meurtre et de pillage; apres avoir viole la neutralite du Grand-Duch6 de Luxembourg, au mepris des stipulations de la Convention de Londres du 1 i mai 1 867 et de la Convention V de la Have du 1 8 octobre 1907, sur les droits et devoirs des puissances tt des personnes en cos de guerre sur terre (articles I el U), conventions signees de lui; apres avoir adresse un ultimatum au Gouvernement royal de Belgique tendant k exiger le passage des forces allemandes par le territoire beige, en violation des Traites du 19 avril 1889, Egalement slgneS de lui et de la susdite Convention de La Haye A declar6 la guerre k la France le 3 aout 1916, k 18 heures 45. Le Gouvernement de la Republique se voit, dans ces conditions, oblige, do son A4« de.recounr k la force des armes. — J61 — II a,, en consequence, i'honneur de laire savoir, par la presente, au Gouvernement de que I'etat de guerre exrste entre la France et TAUemagne a dater du 3 aout 1914, 18 h. ^5. Le Gouvernement de la Republique proteste aupres de toutes les nations civilis^es €t specialement aupres des Gouvernements signataires des Conventions et Traites sus rappeles, contre la violation par TEmpire allemand de ses engagements interna- tionaux; il fait toutes reserves quant aux represailles qu'il pourrait se voir amener k exercer contre un ennemi aussi peu soucieux de la parole donnee. Le Gouvernement de la Republique qui entend observer les principes du droit des gens, se conformera, durant les hostilites et sous reserve de reciprocite, aux disposi- tions des Conventions Internationales signees par la France , concernant le droit de la guerre surierre et sur mer. La presente notification, faite en conformite de I'article 2 de la IIP Convention de LaHaye du 18 octobre 1907, relative k I'ouverture des hostilites, et renodse k. . , .\ A Paris, le ./i aout 1914,^ 1 4 heures. r 158. Message de M. Poincare, President de la Republique, a la seance extraordinaire du Parlement, le ^ aout 19 iU, [Journal officiel du 5 aout 19 1 4.) (La Chamhre ecoute, debout, la lecture du message.) "Messieurs LES Deputes, «La France vient d'etre Tobjet dune agression brutale et premeditee, qui est un insolent defi au droit des gens. Avant qu'une declaration de guerre nous eut encore ete adressee , avant meme que I'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne eut demands ses passe- ports, notre territoire a ete viole. L'Empire d'Allemagne n'a fait hier soir que donner lardivement le nom veritable k un etat de fait qu'il avait deja cree. « Depuis plus de quarante ans, les Fran^ais, dans un sincere amour deia paix, ont refoule au fond de leur coeur le desir des reparations legitimes. « lis ont donne au monde I'ex^emple d'une grande nation qui , definitlvement relevee de la defaite par la volonte, la patience et le travail, n'a us6 de sa force re- nouvelee et rajeunie que dans I'interet du progres et pour le bien de I'humanite. « Depuis qlie I'ultimatum de I'Autriche a ouvert une crise menagante pour I'Europe entiere , la France s'est attachee k suivre et a recommander partout une politique de prudence, de sagesse et de moderation. « On ne pent lui imputer aucun acte, aucun geste, aucun mot qui n'ait ete paci- fiqute et conciliant. « A I'heure des premiers combats, elle a le droit de se reridre solennellement cette Documents diplomatiques. — Guerre europ^enne. 9 1 — 162 — justice, (ju'elle a fait» jusqu'au demier moment, des efforts supreroes pour conjurer la guerre qui vient d*eclater et dont I'Empire d'AUemagne supportera, devant i'his- toire, Tecrasante responsabilite. [Applaudissements unanimes et repetes.) « Au lendemain meme du jour ou nos allies et nous, nous exprimions publique-* ment Tesperance de voir se poursuivre pacifiquement les negociations engagees sous les auspices du Cabinet de Londres, I'Allemagne a declare subitement la guerre a la Russie, elle a envahi le territoire du Luxembourg, elle a outrageusement insulte la noble nation beige (Vifs applaudissements unanimes)^ notre voisine et notre amie, et elle a essaye de nous surprendre traitreusement en pleine conversation diploma- tique. [Noaveaax applaudissements unanimes ei repetes. ) « Mais la France veillait. Aussi attentive ; tion de solidarity de la part du Gouvernement de Sa Majeste qui enirainerait un engagement absolu de sa part de soutenir la Russie et la France par la force des armes. ^Les interetS directs de la Grande-Bretagne en Serbic etaient nuls , et une guerre en faveur de ce pays ne serait jamais sanctionn^e par Topinion publique de la Grande-Bretagne. A ceci, M. SazonofF r^pondit qu'il ne fallait pas que nous dubliiohs que la question gen^rale europ^enne etait impliquee, la question de la Serbie n'en form ant qu'une partie et que la Grande-Bretagne ne pourrait pas en fait se degager des problemes maintenant en jeu. En reponse a ces remarques, j'ai fait observer que je comprenais, de ce qu'il disait, que Son Excellence proposait que la Grande-Bretagne se joignit k une communication qui serait' faite a I'Autriche a I'effet qu'une intervention active par elle dans les affaires interieures de la iSerbie ne pourrait pas elre tolej?ee, Mais supposant que I'Autriche, neanmoins, allait, avoir ^ecours a des mesures militaires contre la Serbie malgre nos representations , 6tait-ce I'inten- Won du Gouvernement russe de declarer de suite la guerre a I'Autriche ? M. Sazonoff dit que lul-m6me pensait que tout au moins la mobilisation russe devait dtre faite, mais qu'il y avait un Conseil des Ministres cet apres-midi pour examiner la question dans toute son etendue. Un autre Conseil, preside par i'Empereur, serait tenu probablement demain , quand une decision serait prise. s3. — 180 — Jai dit qu il me paraissait que le point important 6tait de persuader i'Autriche d etendre •la iimite de temps, et que la premiere qhose a faire ^tait de faire peser sur I'Autriche une influence ayant ce but en vue. L'Ambassadeur de France, cependant, croyait que, ou TAutriche avait decide d'agir de suite ou eile blufTail. Dans n'importe quel cas, notre seule chance d'eviter la guerre etait d'adopter une attitude ferme et unie. 11 ne pensait pas qu'il y avait le tomps de donner suite a ma proposition. La-dessus, j'ai dit qu'il me semblait desi- rable pour nous de connaitre exactement jusqu'a quel point la Serbie serait disposee a aller pour accepter les demandes formulees par I'Aulriche dans sa note. M. Sazonoffrepondit qu'il faijait d'abord qu'il consultat ses collegues a ce sujet, mais que, sans cloute, quelques-unes des demandes de I'Autriche pourraient etre acceptees par la Serbie. L'Ambassadeur de France et M. Sazonoffconlinuerent tous deux a me pressor pour une declaration de solidarite complete du Gouvernement de Sa Majeste avec les Gouvernements francais et russe, et j'ai, en consequence, dit qu'il me semblait possible que vpus voudriez, peut-etre, consentir a faire de fortes representations aux deux Gouvernements allemand et autrichien , faisant valoir aupres d'eux qu'une attaque sur la Serbie par rAutriche mettrait en danger la paix entiere de I'Europe. Peut-etre pourriez-vous trouver -moyen de leur dire qu'uhe telle action de la part de I'Autriche amenerait probablement une intervention russe, qui impliquerait la France et I'Aliemagne, et qu'il serait difficile k la Grande-Bretagne de rester a I'ecart si la guerre devenait generale. M. Sazonoff repondit que tot ou tard nous serious enlraines a la guerre si elle eclatait; nous aurions rendu la guerre plus probable si, des le debut, nous nefaisions pas cause commune avec son pays et avec la France; en tout cas, il esperait que le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste exprimerait une forte reprobation de la deci- sion prise par rAutriche. G. Buchanan. r 87. Sir Edward Grey, k Sir F. Bertie, Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne k Paris. Foreign Office, 29 juillet 1914. Monsieur, Apres avoir expose i M.Cambon aujourd'hui combien la situation me paraissait grave, je lui ai declare que j'avais I'intenlion de dire a I'Ambassadeur allemand aujourd'hui qu'il ne fal- lait pas qu'il se laissat aller, a raison du ton amical de nos conversatious , a un sentiment de fausse certitude que nous resterions a I'ecart si tous les efforts pour conserver la paix, que nous faisions actuellement en commun avec I'Aliemagne , ^chouaient. Mais j'ai continue en disant a M. Cambon que je trouvais n^cessaire de liii dire aussi que I'opinion publique ici envisageait la difficult^ acluelle d'un point de vue tout k fait different de celui qu'on avait adopts pendant la difficulte au sujet du Maroc il y a quelques annees. Dans le cas du Maroc, il s'agissait d'uaconflit dans lequel la France ^tait la principale int6- ress^e etou il paraissait que I'Aliemagne, dans un effort pour ^eraser la France, lui cherchait querelle a Toccasioh d'une question qui formait I'objet d'une convention sp^ciale entre la France et nous-mfimes. Dans le cas.acl^ei, U differend «nlre TAutriohe et la Serbie n'etait pas — 181 — un cas oil nous nous sentions appeles h jouer un role actif. MSme si la question airivait k se poser entre I'Autriche et la Russie , nous ne nous sentirions pas appeles a y jouer un r6le. Ce serait alors une question de suprematie entre le Teuton et le Slave dans les Balkans et notre idee .avail toujours et6 d'eviter d'etre entraines dans une guerre pour une question balka- nique. Si I'Allemagne se trouvait entrainee dans la lutte et si par suite la France y ^tait 5 son tour impliquee, nous n'avions pas decide ce que nous ferions. Ce serait un cas que nous aurions a examiner. La France aurait ^te alors enlrainee dans une querelle qui n'^tait pas la sienne, mais dans laquelle , par suite de son alliance , son honneur et ses interets Tobligeaiient k s'en-* gager. Nous etions libres d'engagements et nous aurions a decider ce que les interets britan- niques exigeaient que nous fissions. J'estimais qu'il etait necessaire de dire cela, parce que, conime il le savait, nous prenions tomes les precautions ausujel de notre Flotte, etquej'^tais sur le point d'avertir le Prince Licbnowski de ne pas compter que nous restions a I'ecart; mais il ne serait pas jusle que je laisse M. Cambon s'egarer jusqu a supposer que ceci voulait dire que nous avions decide ce que nous ferions dans une evenlualite, qui comme je I'esp^rais |Cncore, pouvait ne pas se presenter. M. Cambon n)'a dit que j'avais expose la situation tres clairement. II comprenait que je voulais dire que dans une querelle balkanique et dans une lutte pour la suprematie entre le Teuton et le Slave, nous ne nous sentirions pas appeles a intervenir; mais que si d'aulres questions surgissaient et si la France et I'Allemagne se trouvaient impliquees de telle sorteque Ja question de fhcgemonie en Europe seposat, nous d^ciderions alors ce qu'il nous serait ne- cessaire de faire. II a paru tout a fait prepare a cette declaration et n'y fit aiicune objec- tion. L'Ambassadeur de France ajouta que I'opinion fran9aise 6tait calme mais decidee. II s'at- tendait a ce que I'Allemagne demandat que la France restat neutre pendant que I'Allemagne attaquerait la Russie. Cette assurance naturellement la France ne pouvait pas la donner;elle etait obligee a aider la Russie si la Russie 6tait attaquefe. E. Gret. N'' 88. Sir Edward Gbey, a Sir E. GoscHEN, Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne a Berlin. Foreign Office , 2 9 j uillet 1914. Monsieur, Apres avoir cause cet apres-tnidi avec 1' Ambassadeur allemand au sujet de la, situation eu- ropeenne , j'ai dit que'je desirais lui dire, dune fa90n tout a fait particuliere et amicale, quelque chose que j'avais dans I'esprit. La situation ^tait tres grave. Tant qu'elle se limitait aux questions actuellement posees , nous n avions aucune intention d'inlervenir. Mais si I'Al- iemagne s y trouvait engagde et ensuite la France , la question pourrait ^tre si vaste qu'elle impliquerait tous" les interets europ^ens; el je ne voulais pas qu'il fut trompe par le ton ami- cal de notre conversation — le^oi per$ister^t.| comme je Tesp^rais —- jusqua croire que nous resterfons k Vacant, — 182 — II a dit qu'il comprenait parfaitement , mais il a demande si je voulais dire que nous inter- viendrions dans certaines circonstances. Je r^pondis que je ne desirais pas dire cela, ni quoi que ce fut qui ressemblat a une me- nace ou k un essai d'exercer une pression en declarant que , si ies choses allaient plus mal , nous interviendrions. II ne serait pas question de noire intervention si TAllemagne netaitpas impliquee, ou m^me si la France netail pas impliquee; mais nous savions fort bien que si la question devenait telle que nous croyions que Ies int^rets britanniques exigeaient notre in- tervention , il faudrait que nous intfervenions imm^diatement, et que la decision fut tres ra- pide, exactement comme Ies decisions des autres puissances auraient a letre. J'esperais que le ton amical de nos conversations continuerait comme a present, et queje pourrais conser- verdes rapports aussi etroits avec le Gouvernement allemand en travaiUant pour la pais. Mais si nous 6cbouions dans nos efforts pour conserver la paix, et si la question s'elargissait de fa- 9on a. impliquer pour ainsi diretous Ies interets etirop6ens, je ne voulais pas etre expose a aucun reproche de sa part, que le ton amical de toutes nos conversations I'avait egare, lui ou son gouvernemenl, a supposer que nous n'agirions pas au reproche que s'il n'avait pas 6t6 ainsi ^gar6, le cours des 6venements aurait pu etre different. L'Ambassadeur allemand n'a fait aucune objection a ce que j ai dit , au contraire , il m'a dit que cela s*accordait avec ce qu il avait deja fait savoir k Berlin comme sa maniere per- sonnelle d'enyisager la sitilation. N'* 99. Sir F. Bertee, Ambaasadeur de Grande-Bretagne, k Paris, a Sir Edward Grey. Paris, 3o juillet igiA. Le President de la R6publique me fait savoir que le Gouvernement russe a et^ inform^ par le Gouvernement allemand que I'Allemagne mobiliserait a moins que la Russie n arr^tat sa mobilisation. Mais un rapport suppl^mentaire recu depuis de Saint-P^tersbourg declare que le communique allemand avail die modifie et prenait maintenant la forme d'une demande d'information a quelles conditions la Russie consentirait a ddmobiliser. La r^ponse donnde est quelle consent ile faire k la condition que I'Autriche-Hongrie donne I'assurance quelle respectera la souverainetd de la Serbie et soumettra certaines demandes formulees dans la noleautricbienne, et non acceptdes par la Serbie a une discussion internationale. Le President est d'avis que ces conditions ne seront pas accept6es par rAutriche ; il est convaincu que la paix entre Ies Puissances est enlre Ies mains de la Grande-Bretagne. Si le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste annon9ait que I'Angleterre viendi*ait en aide k la France, dans le cas dun conflit entre la France et TAllemagne, resultant des differences acluelles enlre I'Autricbe etla Serbie, il ny aurait pas de guerr&, car I'Allemagne modifierail aussitot son attitude. Je luiai expliqudcombien il serait difficile au Gouvernement deSa Majesty de faire une telle declaration , mais il m'a repondu qu'il maintenait que cela serait dans I'interet de la paix. La France, disait-il, est pacifique. Elle ne desire pas la guerre et tout ce qu'elle a fait jusqu'^ present est de se prdprer pour une mobilisation afin de ne pas ^tre prise au depourvu. Le Gouvernement fran9ais tieodra le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste au courant de tout ce qui s& - 183 — {era dans ce sens. On a des rensoignements s^rieux quia Us troupes allemahdes sont concen- trees dans les environs, de THiooville et de Metz, prates h la giierre. S'ii y avail une guerre gen^rale sur le continent, TAngleterre y serait entralnee pour la protection de ses int^rfits vitaux. Une declaration d^s k present de son intention de soutenir la France, dont c'est le desir que la paix soit maitttenue, emp^cherait presque cerlainement rAIlemaghe de partit en guerre. F« Beatis. r 119. Sir Ed. Grey, k Sir Francis Bertie/ Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne, k Paris. Foreign-Office, 3i juillet 1914. MONSIEDR, M. Cambon s'est refere aujourd'hui k un tel6gramme qui avait 6td montre ce matin a Sir Ar^hu^ Nicolson qui provenait de TAmbassadeur de France a Berlin et qui disait que Tincertitude concernant notre intervention etait I'^lemerit encourageant k Berlin et que,:si nous voulions seulement nous declarer definitivement du 66te de la Russie et de la Franbe, cela d^ciderait rattitude allemande eri faveur de la paix. J'ai dit qu'il ^tait tout a fait injuste de supposer que nous avions laissd rAHemagne sous I'impression que nous n'interviendrons pas. J'avais refuse des ouvertures pour promettre que nous resterions neutres. Non seulement j'avais refuse de dire que nous resterions neutres, mais j'avais ete ce matin jusqu'i dire k i' Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que, si la France et I'Ailemagne se trouvaient engag^es dans une guerre, nous y serions entraines. Cela, bien entendu, n'etait pas la m^me chose que de prendre un engagement avec la France, ^et j'ai dit cela a M. Cambon, seulement pour montrer que nous n'avions pas laiss^ I'AHemagne' sous I'impression que nous resterions a I'ecart. M. Cambon m'a aiors demande ma reponse k ce qu'il avait dit hier. J'ai dit que nous etions arrives a la conclusion, dans le Cabinet d'aujourd'hui, que nous ne pouvions donner aucun gage en ce moment. Bien que nous ayons a exposer notre poli- tique devant le Parlement, nous ne pouvions pas engager le Parlemenl d'avance, Jusqu'a present, nous ne ressentions pas, et I'opinion publique ne ressentait pas, qu'aucun traite ni obligation de ce pays fussent engages. Des developpements ulterieurs pourraient modifier cette situation et obliger Je Gouvernement et le Parlement k consid^rer qu'une intervention etait justifi^e. La protection de la neutralite de la Belgique pourrait etre, je ne dirai pas un d^cisif , mais un important facteur, dans la determination de notre attitude. Que nous pro- posions au Parlement d'intervenir ou de ne pas intervenir dans une guerre, le Parlement d^sirerait savoir comment nous etions places a I'^gard de la neutralite de la Belgique, et il se pourrait que je demande et a la France et k I'Ailemagne si chacune etait disposee a prendre I'engagement qu'elle ne serait pas la premiere a violer la neutrality de la Belgique. M. Cambon a renouveld la question pour savoir si nous seconderions la France au cas oili I'Ailemagne I'attaquerait. J'ai dit que je pouvais seulement m'en tenir k la reponse et que, au point oil les cboses en sont en ce moment , nous ne pouvions prendre aucun engagement. M. Cambon a fait valoir que TAUemagne avait, depuis le commencement, rejet6 les pro- ^ 184 — positions qui auraient peut-^tre aimsn^ ia paix. li ne pouvait p$is 6lre dans I'inter^t de I'An- gleterre que la France soit ecrasee par TAIIemagne, nous serions alors dans une position trfes amoindrie vis-a-vis de i'AlIemagne. En 1870, nous avions commis une grande faute en permettant un accroissement enorme de la force allemande , et nous r^peterions raaintenant cette faute. II m*a demande si je ne pouvais pas soumettre a nouveau cette question au Cabinet. JTai dit que le Cabinet serait certainement convoque aussit6t qu'ii y aurait de nouveaux developpements , mais quant a present, la seule r^ponse que je pouvais donner etait que nous nepouvions prendre aucun engagement d^finitif. E. Grey. N" 148. Sir Edward Grey k Sir F. Bertie , Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne a Paris. Foreign Office, 2 aout 1914. Apres le Conseil de Cabinet de ce matin , j'ai remis a M. Carabon la note suivante : « Je suis autoris^ a donner I'assurance que si ia flotte allemande p^netre dans le Pas-de- Calais ou dans la mer da Nord pour entreprendre des lioslilites contre les cotes ou les bateaux fran^ais, la flotte anglaise donnera toute la protection en son pouvoir. « Cette assurance est nalurellement soumise a I'approbation du Parlement et ne doit pas ^tre consider^e comme engageant le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste jusqu'^ ce qu'une telle action se produise de la part de la flotte allemande. » J'ai fait remarquer que nous avions des questions extremement graves et delicates a consi- d^rer et que le Gouvernement ne pouvait s'engager a declarer la guerre k I'AlIemagne si la guerre eclatait demain enire la France et I'Allemagnd, mais qu'il etait essentiel que le Gou- vernement francais, donl la flotte etait depuis longtemps concentric dans la Mediterranee , sut quelles dispositions prendre, ia cdte septentrionale etant enliereirient sans defense. II nous a done paru n^cessaire de lui donner cettte assurance. Cela ne nous engage pas a declarer la guerre a rAllemagne, a moins que la flotte allemande n'agisse comme il est indiqu6 ci-dessus, mais cela donne a la France une s6curite qui lui permettra de regler la disposition de sa flotte mediterraneenne. M. Cambon m'a interrog^ au sujet de la violation du Luxembourg. Je lui ai fait part de la doctrine etablie sur ce point en 1867 par lord Derby et lord Clarendon. II m'a demands ce que nous dirions en cas de violation de la neutralite beige. J'ai repondu que c'etait la une aflaire beaucoup plus importante et que nous examinions quelle declaration nous ferions demain a ce sujet au Parlement, cest-a-dire si nous d^clarerions que la violation de la neutralite beige est un 00505 belli. Je lui ai rapport^ ce qui avait ete dit sur ce point k i' Ambassadeur aliemand. E. Grey. — 185 — Annexe n** H. Extraits du wLivre bleu» relatifs aux propositions faites par le Grouvernement allem and au Gouvernement anglais pour obtenir la neutrality de I'Angleterre. r 85. I Sir E. GoscHEN, Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne a Berlin, k Sir Edward Grey. Berlin , 2 9 j uillet 1 9 1 4- On m'a prie d'aller voir le Ghancelier ce soir. Son Excellence venait de rentrer de Potsdam. II me dit que, si la Russie attaquait I'Autriche, il craignait^qu'une conflagration eurpp^enne ne devint inevitable, etant donnees les obligations quimposaita I'Allemagne son alliance avec I'Autriche, malgre les efforts quil ne cessait de faire pour le maintien de la paix. Ceci dit, il continua la conversation en olFrant une forte enchere pour s'assurer la neutra- lite britannique. II me dit que, selon sa conception du principe essentiel de la politique bri- tannique, la Grande-Bretagne ne consentirait jamais a se tenir a 1 ecart de facon a laisser ^eraser la France dans un conflit qui pourrait avoir lieu. La , cependant , n'etait pas le but de lAUemagne. Si la neutralite de la Grande-Bretagne etait assui'ee, son Gouvernement rece- vrait toutes les assurances que le Gouvernerrient imperial n'avait pour but aucune acquisition territoriale aux frais de la France, en supposant que la guerre s'ensuivit et quelle se terminal a I'avantage de I'Allemagne. J'ai pose k Son Excellence une question au sujet des colonies francaises. II me repondit qu il ne pouvait s'engager d'une maniere semblable k cet egard, Pour la Hollande, Son Excellence me dit que, tant que les adversaires de TAllemagne- res- pecteraient I'integrit^ et la neutralite des Pays-Bas, I'Allemagne serait pr^te a assurer le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste quelle en ferait autant. Les operations que I'Allemagne pourrait se trouver dans la necessite d entreprendre en Belgique dependraient de ce que ferait ia France ; apres la guerre , I'integrite de la Bel- gique serait respectee, si ce pays ne se rangeait pas contre I'Allemagne. En terminant, Son Excellence me d^clara que, depuis lejour ou ii devint Ghancelier, il avait eu pour but, ainsi que vous le saviez, d'arriver a une entente avec I'Angleterre; il espe- rait que qes assurances pourraient devenir la base de 1' entente qui lui tenait tant a coeur. II pensait a une entente g^nerale de neutrality entre TAllemagne et I'Angleterre ; et , quoi-. qu'il fut encore trop tot pour en discu'ter les details , I'assurance de la neutralite britannique dans le conflit que pourrait peut-^tre provoquer ia crise actuelle lui permettrait d'entrevoir la realisation de son d^sir. Son Exceflepce m'ayant demand^ men opiriioh en ce qui Goncerne ia maniere dent vous pocotiENTs DiPLOMATiQDEs. — Guerw «ttroj>4enne. a 4 — 186 — envisageriez sa demande, je lui r^pondis qua mon avis 3 ^tait peu probable que, dans les circonstances acluelles , vous fussiez dispose a vous engager dune facon quelconque el que vous desireriez garder une entiere liberty d'action. E. GOSCHEN. r 101. Sir Edward Grey, h. Sir E. GoscHEN, Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne a Berlin. Foreign Office, 3o juillet 1914. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste ne peut pas accueillir un seul instant la proposition du Chancelier de s'engager a rester neutre dans de telles conditions. Ce qu'il nous demande, en effet, c'est de nous engager a rester a I'^cart, en attendant qu'on saisit des colonies francaises et que la France fut battue, pourvu que rAUemagne ne prenne pas de territoire francais, exception faite des colonies. Au point de vue materiel, une telle propoisition est inacceptable , car la France, sans qu'on lui enlevat de territoire en Europe , pourrait ^tre 6crasee au point de perdre sa posi- tion de grande puissance et de se trouver desormais subordonnee a la politique allemande. En g6n6ral , tout ceci k part , ce serait une honte pour nous que de passer ce inarcb6 avec TAUemagne aux depens dela France, une honte de laqueUe la bonne renommee de cepays ne se remettrail jamais. Le Chancelier nous demande en outre' de marchander tontes les obligations ou int^rlts que nous pouvons avoir dans la neutrality de la Belgiqae. Nous ne saurions en aucune facon accueilhr ce march6 non plus. Ceci dit, il.n'est pas n^cessaire d'examiner si la perspective dune convention g^n^rde de neutralite dans I'avenir entre VAngletenre et TAllemagne ofFrirait des avantages positifs suffi- sants pour nous d^dommager de nous 6tre lie les mains aujourd'hui. Nous devons conserver notre enti^ liberty d'agir comme les circonstances nous paraitront I'exiger en cas d'un d6ve- loppement defavorable et regrettable de la crise actuelle, tel que le Chancelier lepr^voit. Je vous prie de parler au Chancelier dans le sens susindiqu6 et d'ajouter tres serieusement que la seuie facon de maintenir les bonnes relations entre I'Angleterre et TAliemagne est qu'elles continuant a coop6rer au maintien de la paix de I'Europe. Si nous obtenons ce r^sultat, les relations mutuelles de I'Allemagne et de I'Angleterre seront, j'en suis convaincu, am^lior^es et renforcees ipso facto. A cet effet, le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste traivaillera dans ce sens avec un bon voidoir et une sincerite entiers. Et j'ajouterai ceci : Si Ton peut conserver la paix de f Europe et traverser sans accident la crise actuelle, mon effort personnel sera de prendre linitiative d'un arrangement auquel I'Allemagne puisse souscrlre et par lequel elle pourra 6tre assur^e qu aucune politique agres- sive ou hostile ne sera poursuivle centre elle ou ses allies par la France , la Russie et nous- mSmes, soit ensemble, soit s6par^ment. J'ai d^sir^ ceci et travailli dans ce sens autant que je fai pu pendant la derni^re crise balkanique, et, comme TAilemagne avait un but sem- blable, nos relations se sont sensiblement am^lior^es. Cette id^e a 6t6 jusqu^aujourd'hui trop utopique pour faire I'objet de propositions d^finies, mais si la crise actuelle, beaucoup plus aigue que toutes celles par lesquelles f Europe a pass6 depuis plusieurs generations , est — 187 — traversee sans accident, j'ai Tespoir que le soulagenient et la reaction qui suivront rendront possible un rapprochement plus precis entre les Puissances qu'il n a iti possible jusqu'au- jourd'hui. E. Grey. r 123. Sir Edward Grey, k Sir GoscHEN", Ambassadeur de Grande-Brelagne k Berlin. Foreign Office, i"aout 1914. Monsieur, J'ai dil k I'Ambassadeur allemand aujourdliui que la r^ponse du Gonvefnenoent alle- mand au sujet de la neutralite de la Belgique 6tait tres regrettable, car cette neutralite affecte I'opinion publique en Angleterre. Si TAilemagne pouvait donner les memes assurances que ia France, cela contribuerait dune manierc appreciable a diminuer ici I'inquietude et la tension generales. D'autre part, si Tun des Belligerants violaitla neutredit^ de la Belgique pendant que I'autre la respectait , il serait tres difficile de contenir le sentiment piiblic en Angleterre. J'ai dit que nous avions disout^ cette question auConseil de Cabinet et que, etant autoris6 a faire cette declaration, je lui remettais une note a cet efFet. II ine demanda si, au cas oil I'Allemagne promettrait de ne pas violer la neutralite beige, nous nous engagerions a rester neutres. J'ai repondu queje ne pouvais pas faire de promesses, que nos mains ^taient encore libres et que nous etions en voie de considerer quelle serait notre attitude. Tout ce que je pouvais dire, cest que notre attitude serait en grande partie dict^e par I'opinion publique en Angleterre, pour qui la neutrality beige ayait une grande importance. Je ne pensais pas pouvoir donner une assurance de neutralite sous cette seule condition. L'Ambassadeur me pressa de formukr les conditions moyemiant lesquelles nous garde- rions la neutralite. II suggera meme que I'Allemagne pourrait garantir I'int^grit^ de la France et de ses colonies. J'ai repondu que j'etais oblige de refuser d6fmitivement toute promesse de rester neutre dans de telles conditions et que je ne pouvais que repeter qu'il nous falfait garder les mainis libres. ^ E. Grey. — 188 — Annexe n° II bis. Tentatives allemandes pour obtenir, sous le couvert d'un «malentendu», la garantie par TAngleterre de la neutrality de la France dans une guerre germano-russe. (Publication officieuse de la Gazette de VAUemagne du Nord, 20 aoiat 1914.) r 1. Le Prince Lichnowsky, Ambassadeur d'AUemagne a Londres, a M. de Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancelier de i'Empire d'Allemagne. Londres, 3i juillet 191^. Sir Edward Grey vient de m'appeler au telephone et m'a demands si je pensais pouvoir declarer que nous n attaquerions pas la France si la France restait neutre dans une guerre germano-russe. J'ai dit que je pensais pouvoir assumer la responsabilite de cette declaration. Lichnowsky. N° 2. TiiiGRAMME de VEmpereur GuiUaume an Roi George V. ^ Berlin, i*'aodt 191 A. Je viens de recevoir la communication de voire Gouvemement m'offrant la neutralite de la France avec la garantie de la Grande-Bretagne. A cette offre elait li^e la question de savoir si , k cette condition , I'Allemagne n'attaquerait pas la France. Pour des raisons techniques, ma mobilisation, qui a i\i ordonn6e cet apres-midi sur les deux fronts, Est et Quest, doit s'accomplir selon les pr6paratifs commences. Des contre-ordres ne peuvent etre donnas et votre t^l^gramme est malheureusement venu Irop tard. Mais si la France offre sa n6utralite, qui sera alors garantie par la flotte et I'arm^e anglaises, je m'abstiendrai d'attaquer la France et j'emploierai mes troupes ailleurs. Je sou- haite que la France ne monlre aucune nervosity. Les troupes, sur ma frontiere, sont en ce moment arrdtees par ordres tel^graphiques et t^l^phoniques, dans leur marche en avant au dela de la frontiere fran9aise. GCILLADME. — 189 — N** 3. M. de Bethmann-Hollweg, Chanceller de I'Empire, a M. le Prihce Lichnowsky, Ambassadeur d'AUemagne h Ldndres. Berlin, i" aoiit 191 4. L'Allemagne est prete a acquiescer aux propositions anglaises si I'Angleterre garantit avec ses forces militaires et navales la neutralite fran^aise dans le conflit russo-allemand. La mobilisation allemande s'est effecluee aujourd'hui, en r^ponse aux provocations russes, et avant Tarrivee des propositions anglaises. Par consequent , noire concentration a la frontiere francaise ne pent etre modifi^e. Nous garantissons dailleurs que, d'iciaulundi 3 aovA, a sept heures du soir, la frontiere francaise ne sera pas franchie si Tassentiment de I'Angleterro nous est parvenu a ce moment. Bethmann-Hollweg. r 4. TiiEGRAMME du Roi George V a rEmperear Gaillaume. Londres, i** aout 191 A. En reponse a votre telegramme qui vient de me parvenir, je pense qu'il s'est produit un malentendu a propos de la suggestion qui aurait ete faite au cours dune conversation ami- cale entre le prince Lichnowsky et Sir Edward Grey, ou ils discutaient comment un conflit arme entre I'AHemagne et la France pourrait etre retarde jusqu a ce qu'on ait trouve un moyen d'entente entre rAutriche-Hongrie et la Bussie. Sir Edward Grey verra le prince Lichnowsky demain matin pour determiner qu'il y a bien eu malentendu de la part de ce dernier. George. r 5. Le Prince Lichnowsky, Ambassadeur d'AUemagne k Londres, a M. de Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancelier de TEmpire d'AUemagne. Londres, 2 aoM 191^. Les suggestions de Sir Edward Grey, bashes sur le d^sir de garder la neutralite, de la part de I'Angleterre, orit 6te faites Sans accord pr^aiable avec la France et ont ^t^, depuis, aban- donnees comme filtiles. LiGBNOWS&T. i — 190 — Annexe III. Extx^ts dn «Livre Bleu» relatifs an refits de I'Angleterre d'admettre le point de allemand dans la question de la violation de la neutrality beige. r 153. Sir Edward Grey, a Sir E. Goschen, Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagtie a Berlin. Foreign Office, 4 aotlt 19 1 A. Le Roi des Beiges a adresse un appel a S. M. le Roi en vue dune intervention diploma- tique en faveur de la Belgique dans les termes suivants : « Me rappelant les nombreuses preuves d'amitie de Votre Majest6 et de son pr^decesseur, ainsi que llattitude amicale de I'Angleterre en 1870 et le temoignage d'amitie que vous venez de nous donner encore, je fais un supreme appel a I'intervention diplomatique du Gouver- nement de Votre Majeste pour la sauvegarde de I'integrite de la Belgique. » Le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste est egalement informe que le Gouvernement allemand a remis au Gouvernement beige une note proposant ime neutralite amicale permettant le libre passage en territoire beige et s'engageant a maintenir Imdependance du royaume et de ses possessions h la conclusion de la paix; au cas contraire, la Belgique serait trait6e en ennemie. Une r^ponse est exigee dans un d^lai maximum de douzeheures. Nous apprenons aussi que la Belgique a oppose un refus forme! k ce quelle considere comme une violation flagrante de la loi des nations. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste est oblige de protester confre cette violation d'un traits que r AUemagne a signe aussi bien que nous-m^mes ; il lui faut des assurances que la demande faite a la Belgique ne sera pas suivie d'effet et que sa neutralite sera respectee par I'Alle- magne. Vous demanderez une reponse immediate. E. Grey. N*' 155. Sir Edward Grey, k Sir F ViLLiERS, Ministre de Grande-Bretagne k Bruxelles. Foreign Office, 4 aoAt l^iA. Informez le Gouvernement beige que , si I'Allemagne exerce une pression sur lui pour le faire se departir de la neutralite, le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste sattendra k ce que la Bel- gique resiste par tous les moyens en son pouvoir; que le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste I'aldera h resister; que, dans ce cas, le Gouvernement deSa Majeste est pr^t a s'unir a la Russie et k la France, s'il y a lieu, pour offirir immediatement au Gouvernement beige une action commune pour resister k i'emploi par I'Allemagne de la force centre la Belgique et une garantie pour le maintien de son integrite et de son independance dans Vavenir. £. Grey. I — 191 — NM57* Le Secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires gtrangeres d'Aflemagne, au Prince Lichnowsky, Ambassadeur d'AUemagne k Londres (communique par TArobassade allemande, 4 aout). Berlin, i aoftt 1914. Priere de dissiper tout soupcon qui pourrdt subsister dans I'esprit du Gouvemement bri- tannique au sujet de nos intentions. Repetez positivement Tassurance formelle que, meme en cas de conflit arme avec la Bel gique, I'AHemagne ne s'annexera du territoire beige sous aucun pretexte. La sincerite de cette declaration estprouvee parnotre engagement solennel a I'egard de la Hollande de respecter strictement sa neutralite. II est evident qvie noas ne poarrions annexer profitahlement du territoire beige sans nons agrandir en meme temps anx d^pens de la Hollande. Faites bien comprendre a Sir Edward Grey que I'armee allemande ne saurait s'exposer a une attaque francaise par la Belgique, attaque qui a ete envisagee selon des informations absolument sures. L'AUemagne est done obligee de ne pas tenir compte dela neutralite beige: c*est pour elie une question de vie ou de mort de prevenir f avance d^ 1 armee frangaise. Jagow. Tf 159. Sir Edward Grey, a Sir E. Goschen, Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne a Berlin. Foreign Oflfice, 4 aotit 1914. Nous apprenons que I'AHemagne a adresse une note au Ministre des Affaires etrangeres beige, declarant que le Gouvemement alleraand serait oblige de mettre a execution, au besoin par la force des armes, des mesures considerees comme indispensables. Nous sommes egaiement informes quele territoire beige a ete viole a Gemmerich. Dans ces conditions et etant donne que i'AUemagne a refuse de nous donner au sujet de la Belgique les m^mes assurances que celles que nous a donnees la France la semaine der- niere en reponse a notre demande laite simultanement a Berlin et a Paris, il nous faut reiterei' cette demande et exiger ime reponse satisfaisante, ainsiqua mon t61egramrae die ce matin , qui devra etre recue avant minuil ce soir. Sinon, vous demanderez vos passeports et vous d^clarerez que le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste se voit oblig^ de prendre toutes les mesures en son pouvoir pour maintenir la neu- trality de la Belgique et le respect d'un traits auquel I'AHemagne a souscrit autant que nous nl^mes. E, Gr£X. ^ 192 ~ N' 160. Sir E. GoscHEN, k Sir Edward Gret. MONSIEUB. Londres, 8 aout 1914. Conform^inent aiu instructions contenues dans votre t616gramme du 4 courant, je suis all6 voir cet apres-midi le Secretaire d'Etat et lui ai demands, au nom du ,Gouvernem,ent de Sa Majesty britannique, si le Gouvernement imperial sabstiendrait de violer la neutrality dc la Belgique. M. de Jagow a r^pliqu^ tout de suite qu'il ^tait facb6 d'avpir a dire que sa r^ponse de- vaitetre : «NQn », 6tant donn^ que, puisque les troupes aliemandes avaient franchi la fron- tiere ce matin, la neutrality de la Belgique se trouvait d ores et deja viol^e. M, de Jagow s'est ^tendu a nouveau sur les raisons qui avaient oblig^ le Gouvernement imperial k prendre cette mesure : c'est a savoir qu'il leur fallait p6n6trer en France par la vpie la plus rapide et la plus facile, de maniire k prendre une bonne avance dar>s leurs operations et s'efForcer de frapper quelque coup decisif le plus tot possible. C'est pour nous, a-t-il dit, une question de vie ou de mort, car, si nous avions pass6 par la route pl,us au Sud, nous n'aurionspu, vu le petit nombre de chemins et la force des forteresses, esperer passer ^ans rencontrer une opposition formidable, impliquant une grosse perte de temps. Cetle perte de temps aurait ^t^ autant de temps gagnd par les Russes pour amener leurs troupes sur la fronli^re allemande. Agir avec rapidit^, voila, a-t-il ajoute, le raiaitre-atout de TAHemagne; celui de la Russle est d'avoir d'in^puisables ressources en soldats. J'ai fait remarquer k M. de Jagow que ce fait accompli, la violation de la frontiere beige , rendait, comme il le comprenait facilement, la situation excessivement grave, etje lui ai demands s'il n'6tait pas temps encore de faire un pas en arri^re et d'eviter la possibilite de consequences que lui et moi d^plorerions. II a r^pondu que, pour les raisons qu'il m'avait donn^es, il ^tait maintenant impossible au Gouvernement allemand de faire un pas en arri^re. Au cours de rapres-midi, j'ai re9U votre nouveau teidgramme dela mSme date, et, ob6is- sant aux instructions y contenues, me suis rendu a nouveau au Ministere imperial des AlFaires ^trangeres, 011 j'ai inform^ le Secretaire d'Etat. qu'k moins que le Gouvernement imperial piit donner ce soir ayant minuitlassurance de ne pas pousser plus loin sa violation de la frontiere beige et d'arr^ter sa marcbe, j'avais regu des iiistructions pour demander mes p^^ssepo^ts et pour informer [1^ Gouvernement imperial que le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste britannique prendrait toutes les mesures en son pouvoir pour maintenir la neulra- lite de la Belgique et Tobservaljion d'un trait6 auquel TAtlemagne etait autant partie que Iqi-mSme, M. de Jagow a r^pondu qu'^ son grand regret il nepouvait donner aucune reponse autre que celle qu'il m'avait donn^e plus t6t dans la journee, c'est k savoir que la s^curite do I'Empire rendait absolument necessalre la marche des troupes imperiales ii travers la Bel-, glque. J'ai remis a Son Excellence un resum6 ^crit de votre teiegramme et, en faisant remarquer que vous indiquiez minuit comme I'heure k laquelle le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste britannique s'attendrait k une reponse, lui ai demand^ si, vu les consequences tcrriblesqui suivraient necessairement, il ne serail pas possible, m§me au dernier moment,. — 193 — au Gouvernement imperial de reviser sa reponse. H m'a repondu que quand bien mdme le temps accords serait de vingt-quatre heures ou davantage, il faliait que sa reponse restat la meme. J'ai dit que dans ce cas j'aurais a demander mes passeports. L'entrevue dont il s'agit a eu lieu vers sept heures. Au cours d'un bref entretien qui la suivit, M. de Jagow a exprime son poignant regret de voir s'6crouler toute sa politique et celle du Chancelier, qui a ete de devenir amis avec la Grande-Bretagne et ensuite, par elle, de se rapprocher de ia France. Je lui ai dit que cetle terminaison soudaine de mon travail a Berlin etait pour moi aussi une cause de profond regret et de deconvenue; mais qu'il lui failait bien comprendre que dans les circonstances et vu nos engagements, il eut ete tout a fait impossible au Gouvernement de Sa Majesty britannique d'agii' autrement qu'il n'avait fait. J'ai dit ensuite que j'etais d^sireux d'aller faire visile au Chancelier, car ce serait peut-etre la derniere fois que j'aurais I'occasion de le voir. II m'a pri6 de le faire. J'ai trouve le Chancelier tres agit^. Son Excellence a commence tout de siiite une harangue qui a dure environ vingt minutes. 11 a dit que la mesure prise par le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste britannique ^tait terrible au dernier point; juste pour un mot — « neutralite », un mot dont en temps de guerre on n'a si souvent tenu aucun compte, — juste pour un chiffon de papier la Grande-Bretagne allait faire la guerre k une nation k elle apparent^e, qui ne d^sirait rien tant que d'etre son amie. Tous ses efforts en ce Sens ont, a-t-il continue, et6 rendus inutiles par cette derniere et terrible mesure; la politique k laquelle, comme je le savais, il s'etait voue depuis son arriv^e au pouvoir, etait tombee comme un chateau de cartes. 11 s'est eerie que ce que nous avons fait est inconcevable; c'est comme frapper par derriere un homme au moment oil il defend sa vie contre deux assaillants. II tient la Grande-Bretagne pour responsable de tous les terribles ^venementsquipourrontse produire. J'ai proteste avec force contre cette declaration et ai dit que, de meme que lui-meme et M. de Jagow desiraient me faire comprendre que pour des raisons strategiques , c'^tait pour I'AHemagne une affaire de vie ou de mort d'avancer a travers la Belgique et de violer la neutralite de cette derniere, de meme je d^sirais qu'il comprit que c'etait pour ainsi dire une affaire de « vie ou de mort » pour Thonneur de la Grande-Bretagne que de tenir I'en- gagement solennel pris par elle de faire en cas d'attaque tout son possible pour defendre la neutralite de la Belgique. II est, ai-je insisle, tout simplement necessaire de tenir ce pacte solennel, sans quoi quelle confiance n'importe qui pourrait-il avoir a I'avenir dans les en- gagements pris par la Grande-Bretagne? Le Chancelier a repris : « Mais a quel prix ce pacte aura-t-il ^t^ tenu ? Le Gouvernement britannique y a-t-il songe? » J'ai insinue h. Son Excellence, avec toute la clarte qui me fut possible, que la crainte des consequences ne pouvait guere etre consideree comme une excuse pour la rupture d'engagements solennels; mais Son Excellence etait dans un tel etat d' exci- tation, il etait si evidemment d^monte parla nouvelle de notre action et si peu dispose a entendre raison que je m'abstins de jeter de I'huile siir le feu en argumentant davantage. Comme je prenais conge de lui, il a dit que le coup que la Grande-Bretagne portait a I'AUemagne en s'unissant a ses ennemis etait d'aufant plus violent que presque jusqu'au dernier moment lui £t son Gouvernement avaient travaille avec nous et appuye nos efforts en vue du maintien de la paix entre I'Autriche et la Russie. Je repondis que c'etait bien ce qu'il y avait de tragique que de voir deux nations tomber en garde precisemeht au moment ou les rapports entre elles se trouvaient plus amicaux et plus cordiaux qu'ils ne I'avaient ete depuis des annees. J'ai ajoute que, par malheur, nonobstant nos efforts pour sauvegarder la paix entre la Russie et I'Autriche, la guerre s'etait propagee et nous avait mis face a face avec une position qu'il nous etait impossible d'esquiver si nous tenions nos engagements » Documents diplomatiques. — Guerre europecnne. ai — 194 — sitaatioQ qui malheureusemeni impUquait separation d aveo nos anciens coilaborateups. Xai termini en, disant qu'il n aurait point de difficult^ a comprendfe que personne ne. le regretr tait plus que moi-mSme. Apres cette entrevue plutdt p6nible , je suis rentr^ k TAmbassade et ai r^dige un compte rendu tel^graphique de ce qui s etait passe. Ce t^i^gramme a ete remis au bureau de t6U- graphe central de Berlin, un peu avant 9 heures du spir. II a ete accepte par iedit bureau, mais semble n'a voir jamais 6t6 transnais. Vers 9 heures et demie du soir, ie Sous-Secretaire d'Etat, M, de Zinamermann, est venu me voir. Apres avoir exprime son profond regret que ies rapports officiels et personnels, si cordiaux entre nous , fussent sur le point de cesser, il me demanda incidemment si la demande de mes passeports 6quivaudrait k une declaration de guerre, Je lui ai dit quune personne faisant aussi notoirement que lui autorit^ en matiere de droit international devait savoir aussi bien ou mieux que moi quelle 6tail la coutume en pareil cas. J'ai ajoute qu il y avail des exemples nombreux oh. ia rupture des rapports diplomatiques n avait point 6t6 suiviede guerre; mais que dans le cas aclael il avait sans doute vu d'apres rues instructions , dont j'avais donnS un r6sume par ecrit kM- de Jagow, que le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste britannique s'altendait k une r6ponse k une question d^finie ce soir avant minuit et qu*^ d6faut de r^ponse satisfaisante Iedit Gouvernement se verrait forc6 de prendre Ies mesui^es necessities par ses engagements. M. de Zimmermann declara que cela etait, de fait, une declaration de guerre, ^tant donn6 quil ^tait de toute impossibility pour le Gouvernement Imperial de donner ies assurances requises ni ce soir, ni aucun autre soir. £. GoscBEN. — 195 — Annexe IV. Extraitfi du nlivre Gris» indiquant les conditions dans lesquelles I'AIlemagne a viole la neutrality beige. r 2. Lettre adressee par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, aux Ministres du Roi a Paris, Berlin, Vienne, Londres et Saint-Petersbourg. Bruxelles, le 24 juillet 1914. Monsieur le Ministre , Le Gouvernement duRoi s'esl demands si, dans les circonstances actuelles, il n'y aurait pas lieu dadresser aux Puissances, qui ont garanti son independance et sa neutrality, une connmunicalion destin^e a leur confirmer sa resolution de remplir les devoirs intern ationaux que lui imposent les trait^s au cas ou. une guerre viendrait h eclater aux fronti^res de la Belgique. H a et6 amene a la conclusion qu'une telle communication serait premaluree k I'heure presente mais que les evenements poiirraient se precipiter et ne point lui laisser le temps de faire parvenir, au moment voulu, les instructions opportunes a ses repr^senlants a letranger. Dans cette situation , j'ai propose au Roi et a mes collegues du Cabinet , qui se sont rallies a ma maciere de voir, de vous donncr, des a present, des indications precises sur la demarche que vous auriez. a faire si T^ventualite d'une guerre franco-allemande devenait plus menaQante. Vous trouverez, sous ce pli, une lettre signee, mais non datee, dont vous aurez a donner lecture et a laisser copie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres si les circonstances exigent cette communication. Je vous indiquerai par telegramme le moment d'agir. Le telegramme vous sera adresse a I'heure oii la mobilisation de Tarm^e beige sera decretee, si, contrairement a notre sincere espoir, et aux apparences de solution pacifique, nos renseignements nous amenaient a prendre cette mesure extreme de precaution. Veuillez agreer, etc, Davignon, Annexe au n' 2. Monsieur le Ministre, La situation internationale est grave; I'eventualite d'un conflit entre plusieurs Puissances ne peut ^tre ecartee des preoccupations du Gouvernement du Roi. La Belgique a observe avec la plus scrupuleuse exactitude les devoirs d'Etat neutre que lui aS. -— 196 -- imposent les traites du 19 avril 1889. Ces devoirs, elle s'attachera inebranlablement A les remplir, quelles que soient les circonstances. Les dispositions amicales des Puissances k son egard ont ^te affirm^es si souvent que la Belgique a la confiance de voir son territoire demeurer hora de toute atteinte si des hostilites venaient a se produire a ses frontieres. Toutes les mesures necessaires pour assurer Tobservation de sa neutrality n'en ont pas moins 6te prises par le Gouvernement du Roi. L'armee beige est mobilisee et se porte sur les positions strategiques choisies pour assurer la defense du pays et le respect de sa neutrality. Les forts d'Anvers et de la Meuse sont en etat de defense. II est a peine necessaire , Monsieur le Ministre , d'insister sur le caractere de ces mesures. EUes n'ont d'autre but que de mettre la Belgique en situation de remplir ses obligations internationales; elles ne sont et n'ont pu etre inspir^es, cela va de soi, ni par ie dessein de prendre part a una lutte armee des Puissances, ni par un sentiment de deGanorenvers aucune d'elles. Me conformant aux ordres requs, j'ai I'honneur de remettre a Votre Excellence une copie de la declaration du Gouvernement du Roi et de La prier de bien vouloir en prendre acta. Une communication identique a et^ faite aux autres Puissances garantes de ia neutralite beige. Je saisis, etc. N'' 8. Lettre adressee par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires etrangSres, aupc Ministres da Roi a Berlin, Paris, Londres, Vienne, Saint -Petersbourg, Rome, La Haye, Luxembourg. Bruxelies, le 29 juiliet i9i4> MONSIEDR LE MiNISTRE, Le Gouvernement du Roi a d^cid^ de mettre l'armee sur ie pied de paix renforc^. Cette mesure ne doit 6tre en aucune fa9on confondue avec la mobilisation. A cause da peu d'etendue de son territoire , la Belgique tout entiere constitue en quelque sorte une zone frontiere. Son arm^e, sur le pied de paix ordinaire, ne comporte qu'une classe de milice sous les armes. Sur le pied de paix renforce, ses divisions d'arm6e et sa division de cavalerie, grace au rappel de trois classes ont des effectifs analogues k ceux (des corps entretenus en permanence dans les zones frontieres des Puissances voisines. Ces renseignements vous permettraient de r^pondre aux questions qui pourrslient vous «tre poshes. 1 Veuiliez agreer, etc Davignon. r 9. Lettre adressee par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires eirangeres, aux Ministres da Roi a Berlin , Paris et Londres. Bruxelies, ie 3i juiliet 1914. Monsieur LE Ministre, M. le Ministre de France etant venu me montrer un t616gramme de I'Agence Havas, d^cr^tant i'6tat de guerre en Ailemagne, m'a dit : « Je profile de cette occasion pour vous — 197 — declarer qu*aucune incursion des troupes frangaises n'aura lieu en Belgique, inSme si des forces importantes 6taient mass^es sur ies fronti^res de votre pays. La France ne veut pas avoir la responsabilit6 d'accomplir, vis-k-vis de la Belgique , le premier acle d*hostilite. Des instructions dans ce sens seront donn^es aux autorit^s franQaises. » J'ai remercie M. Klobukowski de sa communication et j ai cru devoir lui faire remarquer que nous avions toujours eu la plus grande confiance dans la loyaute que nos deux Etats voisins mettraient a tenir leurs engagements h notre 6gard. Nous avons aussi tout lieu de croire que I'attitude du Gouvernement allemand sera idenlique k celle du Gouvernement de la Republique fran9aise. Veuiilez agreer, etc. Dayignon. r 11. LettAe adressie par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires dtrangkres, aux Ministres du Roi a Berlin, Londres et Paris* Bruxelies , le 3 1 juiilet 1 9 1 4r MoNsiBUR LE Ministre, Le Ministre d'Angleterre a demands a me voir d'urgence et m'a fait la communication suivante, qu'il souhaitait etre i mdme de m'exposer depuis plusieurs jours. En raison de la possibility dune guerre europ6enne, sir Edward Grey a demands aux Gouvernements fran- 9ais et allemand, s6par6ment, si chacun deux 4tait pr^t k respecter la neutrality de la Bel- gique pourvu qu'aucune Puissance ne la viole. « Vu Ies trait^s qui existent, je suis cbarg6 d'informer le Ministre des Affaires 6trangeres de Belgique de ce qui precede et de dire que Sir Edward Grey presume que la Belgique fera tout son possible pour maintenir sa neutrality et quelle desire et s'attend k ce que Ies autres Puissances I'observent et la maintiennenl. » Je me suis empress^ de remercier Sir Francis Villiers de cette communication que le Gouvernement beige appr^cie particuli^rement et j'ai ajout^ que la Grande-Bretagne et Ies autres nations garantes de notre ind^pendance pouvaient 6tre assur^es que nous ne neglige- rions aucun effort pour maintenir notre neutralite, et que nous ^tions convaincus que Ies autres Puissances , vu Ies exoellents rapports d'amiti^ et de confiance, que nous avions tou- joiirs entretenus avec elles^ observeraient et maintiendraient cette neutrality. Je n'ai pas manqu6 d'affirmer que nos forces militaires , corisid^rablement developp^es k la suite de notre reorganisation recente, ^taient a m^me de nous permettre denous d^fendre ^ergiquement en cas de violation de noire territoire* Au cours de la conversation qui a suivi , 3ir Francis m'a paru un peu surpris de la rapidity avec laquelie nous avions d6cid6 la mobilisation de notre arm^e. J'ai fait remarquer que Ies Pays-Bas avaient pris une resolution identique avant nous et que d'autre, part la date recente de notre nouveau regime militaire et Ies mesures transitoires que nous avions du decider k cette occasion nous imposaient des mesures urgentes et completes. Nos voisins et garants devaient voir dans cette resolution le d^sir de manifester notr^ profonde volonte de mainr tenir nous-m^mes notre neutrality. — 198 — Sir Francis ma pani satisfait de ma r^ponse et m'a annonc^ que son Gouvernement atlendait cette reponse pour continuerles n6gociations avec la France et TAllemagne, nego- ciations dont la conclusion me serait commmiiqu^e. Veuiilez agreer, etc. ' Davignon. r 12. Lettre adressee par M. Davignon, Minislre des Affaires etrangeres, aux Ministres da Roi a Berlin, Londres et Paris. Bmxeiles, le 3i juiUet 1914. Monsieur ie Ministre, Ce matin, au cours dune conversation que le Secretaire general de mon departementa eue avec M. de Bulow, il a explique au Ministre d'Allemagne la portee des mesures miii- taires que nous avons prises et lui a dit qu'elles 6taieht une consequence de notre volonte d'accomplir nos obligations internationales, qu'elles n'impliquaient en aucune fa9on une atti- tude de defiance envers nos voisins. Le Secretaire general a demands ensuite au Ministre d'Allemagne s'il avait connaissance de la conversation qu'il avait eue avec son predecesseur, M. de Flotow, et de la reponse que le Chancelier de I'Empire avait charge ceiui-ci de lui faire. Au cours de la polemique soulevee en 1911 par le depot du projet hoilandais concernant les fortifications de Flessingue, certains journaux avaient affirme qu'en cas de guerre franco- allemande, notre neutrality serait violee par i'Allemagne. Le departement des Afifaires ^trangeres avait suggere i'idee qu'une declaration faite au Parlement allemand a I'occasion d'un debat sur la politique etrangere serait de nature k apaiser I'opinion publique et a calmer ses defiances, si regrettables au point de vue des rela- tions des deux pays. M. de Bethman-Holweg fit repondre qu'il avait ^t^ tres sensible aux sentiments qui avaient inspire notre demarche. 11 declarait que I'Allemagne n'avait pas I'intention de violer notre neutralite, mais il estimait qu'en faisant publiquement une declaration, TAllemagne affaibli- rait sa situation militaire vis-i-vis de la France qui, rassuree du cot^ du Nord, porterait toutes ses forces du cot^ de I'Est. Le baron ven der Der Elst, poursuivant, dit qu'il comprenait parfaitement les objections qu'av^dent faites M. de Bethman-Holweg a la declaration pubhque sugg^r^e et il rappela que depuis lors en igiS, M. de Jagow avait fa\t, ki la Commission du budget du Reichstag, des declarations rassurantes quant au respect de la neutralite de la Belgique. M. de Bulow repondit qu'il etait au courant de la conversation avecM. de Flotow et qu'il etait certain que les sentiments exprimes a cette ^poque n'avaient pas chang^. Veuiilez agreer, etc* Davignon. -^ 199 Annbxb AUN* 12. Lettbe adressie par le MinisUe du Ibi d. Berlin d Af. Davignm, Ministre des Ajfairei etrangeres. • Berlin lea mai 191$ Monsieur le Ministre, J'ai rhonneur de vou^ faire connaitre, d'apr^ Tofficieuse Norddeatsche Allgemeine Zeitang, les 6. 204 — r 3i< Lettre adressee par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, a M. de Below Saleske, Ministre d'AUemagne. Bruxelles, le 4 aout 1914. Monsieur le Ministre , J'ai I'honneur de faire savoir k Votre Excellence que des aujburd'hui le Gouvernement du Roi ne saurait plus Lui reconnaitre de caract^re diplomatique et cesse d'avoir des relations oflicielies avec Elle. Votre Excellence trouvera sous ce pli ies passeports qui sont nedessaires ^ son depart et a celui du personnel de la Legation. Je saisis, etc. Davignon. r 35. Lettre adressee par le Ministre de Belgique a Berlin a M. I)avignon, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres. Berlin, 4 aout 1914. MONSIEDR LE MiNISTRE, J'ai I'honneur de vous faire parvenir, ci-apres en traduction , la partie du discours pro- nonc6 aujourd'hui a la tribune du Reichstag par le Chancelier de I'Empire et relative k I'odieuse violation de notre neutrality : « Nous nous trouvons en etat de legitime defense et la necessity ne connait pas de lois. «Nos troupes ont occup6 Luxembourg H ont, peut-etre, deja penetre en Belgique. Cela est en contradiction avec Ies prescriptions du droit des gens. La France a, il est vrai, declard 4 Bruxelles qu'elle ^tait r^solue a respecter la neutrality de la Belgique aussi longtemps que I'adversaire la respecterait. Mais nous savions que la France se tenait prete pour envahir la Belgique. La France pouvait attendre. Nous, pas. Une attaque francaise sur notre flaiic dans la region du Rhin inferieur aurait pu devenir fatale. C'est ainsi que nous avons ^le forces de passer outre aux protestations justifiees des Gouvernements Luxembourgeois et Beige. L'injustice que nous commettons de cette facon , nous la reparerons des que notre but mililaire sera alteint. « A celui qui est mehac^ au point oil nous le sommes et qui lutte pour son bien supreme, il nest permis que de songer au moyen de se d^ager; nous nous trouvons cote k cote avec VAutriche. » II est i remarquer que M. de Bethmann-Hollvveg reconndit, sans le moindre detour, que I'AUemagne viole le droit international en envahissant le territoire beige et qu'elle comraet une injustice k tiotre 6gard.. Yeuillez agr^er, etc. Baron Beyens. 205 — r 39. Telegramme adresse par le Ministre du Roi a Londres a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires etrangires. Londres, A aout 19 14. L'Angleterre a somm6 ce malin rAIIemagne de respecter la neutrality beige. L'ultiinatum dit que, vu la note adressee par TAllemagne a la Belgique, menacant cette derniere de la force des armes si elle s'oppose au passage de ses troupes; vu la violation du territoire beige a Gemmenich; vu le fait que TAllemagne a refuse de donner a I'Angleterre la meme-assu- rance que celle donnee la semaine derniere par la France, TAngleterre doit demander k nouveau una reponse satisfaisante au sujet du respect de la neutrality beige et d'un traite ,dont I'Allemagne est signataire aussi bien qu'elle-m^me. L'ultimatum expire k minuit. En consequence de rultimatum de I'Angleterre a I'Allemagne, la proposition anglaise que je vous ai transraise par telegramme est annul^e pour le moment. Gomte m Lalajng. r 40. Lettre adressee par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, aux Minislres de Grande-Brelagne , de France et de Russie. Bruxelles, le 4 aoiit 191^. Monsieur leJMinistre, Le Gouvernement Beige a le regret de devoir annoncer a Votre Excellence que, ce matin, les forces armies de I'Allemagne ont p^netr^ sur le territoire beige, en violation des engagements qui ont 6t6 pris par traite. Le Gouvernement du Roi est fermement decide a r^sister par tous les moyens en son pouvbir. La Belgique fait appel a I'Angleterre, a la France et k la Russie pour coop^rer, comme garantes, k la defense de son territoire. II y aurait une action concertee et commune ayant pour but de resister aux mesures de force employees par I'Allemagne contre la Belgique et en meme temps de garantir le main- tien de I'ind^pendance et de i'int^grite de la Belgique dans I'avenir. La Belgique est heureuse de pouvoir declarer quelle assumera la defense des places fortes. Je saisis, etc» Davignon. — 206 N'* 41. TiLicRAMME adressipar le Ministre da Roi a Londres, a M. Davignon, Ministre del Affaires elrangires. Londres, 5 aoAt 19 1^. L'Allemagne ayant rejele les propositions anglaises, I'Ang^eterre lui a d^ciar^ que I'^tat de guerre existait entre les deux pays, a partir de onze heures. Gomte o£ Lalmng. Lettre adressee par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires ^tranghes, aux Chefs de mis- sion dans ious les pays entretenant avec la Belgique des rapports diplomatiques. Bruxeiles, le 5 aout 19 id. Monsieur le Ministre, Par le traite du 18 avril 1 83 9, la Prusse, la France, rAngleterre, I'Autriche et la Russia se sont declarecs garantes du traite conclu le m^me jour entre S. M. le roi des Beiges et S. M. le roi des Pays-Bas. Ce traits porte : «La Belgique formera un Elat independant et perp^tuellement neutre ». La Belgique a rempli toutes ses obligations internationales , elle a accompli ses devoirs dans un esprit de loyale iinpartialil^, elle n*a n6glig6 aucun effort pour maintenir et faire respecter sa neutralite. Aussi est-ce avec une penible Amotion que le Gouvernement du Roi a appris que les forces armies de I'AHemagne, puissance garante de notre neutrality ont p6n6tr6 sur ieterri- toire de la Belgique en violation des engagements qui ont et6 pris par traits. n est de notre devoir de protester avec indignation centre un attentat au droit des gens qu aucun acte de notre part n'a pu provoquer. Le Gouvernement du Roi est fermement ddcidd a repousser par tous les moyens en son pouvoir I'atteinte port^e a sa neutrality et il rappelle qu'en vertu de I'article 10 de k Con- vention de La Haye de 1 907 concernant les droits et les devoirs des Puissances et des per- sonnes neutres en cas de guerre sur terre ne peut 6tre consid^re comme un acte hostile le fait, par une puissance neutre, de repousser mSme par la force les atteintes a sa neu- tralite. Vous voudrez bien demander d'urgence audience au Ministre des Affaires ^trangeres et donner lecture k Son Excellence de la presente lettre dont vous lui laisserez copie. Si f au- dience ne pouvait vous ^tre imm^diatement accord^e, vous ferez par 6crit la communica- tion dont il sagit. * Veuiliez agreer, etc. Davignon. 207 rr 48. Communication faite le 5 ao6,f par Sir Francis Villiers, Ministre ctAngh^erre, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires elrangeres. Je suis charge d'informer le Gouvemement Beige que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesty britannique considere Taction commune dans le but de r^sister a TAUemagne comme 6tant en vigueur et justifi^e par le traits de 1 889. . r 52. Lettre adressee par M. Davignon, Ministre dfis Affaires dirangires, aax Ministres da Roi a Paris, Londres et Saint-Petersbourg. Bruxelles, le 5 aodt I9i4> Monsieur le Ministre, J'ai I'honneuT de vous faire savoir que les Minislres de France et de Russie ont fait ce matin une demarche aupr^s de moi pour me faire connaitre la volonte de leurs Gouverne- ments de repondre k notre appel et de coop^rer avec TAngleterre a la defense de notre territoire. Veuillez agreer, etc. Davignon. N'' 60. Telegramme adresse par le Ministre da Roi a La Haye a M. Davignon,, Ministre des Affaires Strangeres. La Haye, le 9 aout 1,9 14« Le Ministre des Affaires 6trangeres m'a prie de vous transmettre les informations suivantes parce que le Ministre d'Amerique k Bruxelles s y refuse. La forteresse de Liege a ^t^ prise d'assaut apres une defense courageuse. Le Gouverne- ment Allemand regrette tres profond^ment , que par suite de I'attitude du Gouvernement Beige centre I'Allemagne, on en est arriv^ a des rencontres sanglantes. L'Allemagne ne vient pas en ennemie en Belgique, c'est seulement par la force des evenements quelle a du, a cause des mesures militaires de la France, prendre la grave determination d'entrer en Belgique et d'occuper Li6ge comme point d'appui pour ses operations militaires uit^rieures. Apres que I'arm^e beige a , par sa resistance heroique contre une grande superiorite , main- teny I'honneur de ses armes, le Gouvernement Allemand prie le Roi des Beiges et le Gou- vemement Beige deviter a la Belgique les horreurs vdterieures de'la guerre. Le Gouverne- ment est prSt a tous accords avec la Belgique qui peuvent se concilier avec son conflit avec I ^ 208 — la France. L'Allemagne assure encore solennellement qti*eile n'a pas Hntention de s'appro- prier le territoire beige et que cette intention est loin d elle. L'Allemagne est toujours prMe a evacuer la Belglque aussitot que I'etat de guerre le lui permettra. L'Ambassadeur des Etats-Unis avait prie son collegue de se charger de cette tentative de mediation. Le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres a accepte sans enlhousiasme cette mission. Je m'en suis charge pour lui faire plaisir. Baron Fallon. N° 71. I Telegram ME adresse par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres a M. le baron Fallon, Ministre du Roi a La Eaye. Bruxelles, le 12 aoiit 19 14. Priere de remettre le t^legramme suivant au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres : « La propo- sition que nous fait le Gouvernement Allemand reproduit la proposition qui avait etE for- mulee dans rultimatum du 2 aout. Fidele k ses devoirs internationaux, la Beigique ne peut que r^it^rer sa r^ponse a cet ultimatum, d'autant plus que depuis le 3 aout sa neutralite a ete violee, qu'une guerre douloureuse a ete port^e sur son territoire et que les garants de sa neutrality ont ioyalement et imm^diatement r^pondu k son appel. » Davignon. — 209 ~ Annexe V. T^l^grammes ^changte entre rEmperenr GuUlatime n et rEmpereur lYicolas n. (Extraits du Livre Blanc allemand) L'Empereur Guillaume k I'Empereur Nicolas. 28 juillet 1914 (10 h. ii5 du soir.) C'est avec la plus vive inquietude que j'ai appris I'impression qua produite dans ton Em- pire , ia marche en avant de rAutriche-Hongrie centre la Serbie. L'agitation sans scrupule qui se poursuit depuis des ann^es en Serbie, a conduit au mcnstrueux attentat dont I'Ar- chiduc Francois-Ferdinand a 6t6 la victime. L'6tat d'esprit qui a amen6 les Serbes a assassiner leur propre roi et son dpouse regne encore dans ce pays. Sans dopte conviendras-tu avec raoi que tous deux, toi aussi bien que moi, nous avons, comme tous les souverains, un interet commun a insister pour que ceux qui sont moralement responsables de ce terrible meuitre recoivent le chatiment qu'ils m^ritent. D'autre part, je ne me dissimule aucunement combien il est difficile pour toi et ton Gou- vernement de resister aux manifestations de i 'opinion publique. En souvenir de la cordiale amitie qui nous lie tous deux ^troitement depuis longtemps, j'use de toute men influence pour decider I'Autricbe-Hongrie a en venir k une entente loyale et satisfaisante avec la Russie. Je compte bien que tu me secourras dans mes efibrt* tendant a ^carter toutes les difficult^s qui pourraient encore s elever. Ton ami et cousin tr^s sincere et d^vou^ Guillaume. n L'Empereur Nicolas a TEmpereur Guillaume. Palais de Peterhof, le 29 juillet 1914 (1 heure apr^s-midi.) Je suis heureux que tu sois rentr6 en Allemagne. En ce moment si grave, je te prie instamment de venir a mon aide. Une guerre honteuse a ^t^ declar^e a une laible nation ; je partage enli^rement I'indignation , qui est immense en Russie. Je pr^vois que tres prochainement je ne pourrai plus longtemps resister a ia pression qui est exerc6e sur moi et que je serai force de prendre des mesures qui conduiront a la guerre. Pour pr^venir le malheur que serait une guerre europ^enne, je te prie, au nom da notre vieille amiti6 , de faire tout ce qui te sera possible pour empecher ton alli^e d aller trop loin. Nicolas DocmoDiTS piPLOMAnQOBs. — Guerre europ^nne.. - 210 — m 29 juillet 1914 (6 h. 3o du sofr.) L'Empereur Guillaume a I'Empereur Nicolas. J'ai recu ton telegramme et partage ton desir de maintenir la paix. Cependant, je ne puis, ainsi que je le disais dans mon premier telegramme, considerer la marche en avant de rAutriche-Hongrie comme « une guerre honteuse ». L'Autriche-Hongrie sail par experience qu'on ne peut absolument pas se fier aux promesses de la Serbie taut qu'elles n'existent que sur le papier. A mon aVis , la conduite de rAutriche-Hongrie doit 6tre consider^e comme une tentative d'obtenir toule garantie que les promesses de la Serbie seront executees aussi en fait. La declaration du cabinet autricbien me fortifie dans mon opinion que rAutriche-Hongrie ne vise a aucune acquisition territoriale au detriment de la Serbie. Je pense done qu il est tres possible h. la Russie de pers^verer, en presence de la guerre austro-serbe , dans son role de spectatrice, sans entrainer I'Europe dans la guerre la plus eflfroyabie qu elle ait jamais vue. Je crois qu'une entente directe entre ton Gouvernement et Vienne est possible et desirable attendu que, comme je te I'ai deji telegraphic, mon Gouvernement essaie de toutes ses forces de la favoriser. Naturellement des mesures militaires de la Russie, que fAutriche-Hongrie pourrait con- siderer comme une menace, hateraient une calamite que tous deux nous cherchons a eviter, et rendrait Cgalement impossible ma mission de m^diateur que j'ai acceptCe avec empres- sement lorsque tu as fait appei k mon amitiC et a mon aide. GuiLLAUME. IV L'Empereur Guillatjme k TEmpereur Nicolas. 3o juillet 1914(1 heure du matin.) Mon Ambassadeur a dt6 chargC d'appeler Tattention de ton Gouvernement sur les dangers et les graves consequences d une mobilisation ; c est ce que je t'avais dit dans mon dernier telegramme. L'Autriche-Hongrie n'a mobilise qne contre la Serbie et seulement une partie de son arrnee. Si la Russie, comme cest le cas d'apres ton telegramme et la communication de ton Gouvernement, mobilise centre i'Autriche-Hongrie, la mission de mCdiateur que tu mas amicalement confiee et qaej'ai acceptee sur ton instante priere, sera compromise sinon rendue impossible. Tout le poids dc la decision k prendre p^se actuellement sur tes epaules , qui auront k supporter la responsabilit6 de la guerre ou de la paix. GOILLAUME. — 211 - V L'Empereur Nicolas k TEmpereur Guillaume. PIterhof, Te 3o Jufllet 1914 ( i h- 20 apr^midi.) Je te remeroie cordialement de ta prompte reponse, Jeavoie aujourdlrai soir Taticiheff avec meg instructions. Les decisions militaires qui sOQt niises maintenant en vigneur, ont 6.i}h ^te prises ii y a cinq jours a litre de defense contre les preparatifs de i'Autriche. J'espere de tout mon coeur que ces mesures n'influeront en rien sur ton role de m^diateur que j apprecie grandement. Nous avons besoin de ton intervention ^nergique aupres de I'Autriche , afin quelle arrive k une entente avec nous. Nicolas. 1 VI L'Empereur Nicolas a I'Eiupereur Guhxaume. 3i juillet 1914. Je te remercie de tout coeur de ton intention, qui iaisse percer une lueur d'espoir que tout se terminera encore a I'amiabie. Techniquement, il est impossible de suspendre nos preparatifs militaires qui ont ete necessites par la mobilisation de i'Autriche. Nous sommes loin de d^sirer la guerre; aussi longtemps que dureront les pourpariers avec I'Autriche! au sujet de la Serbie, mes troupes ne se livreront a aucun acte de provoca- tion. Je t'en donne ma parole d'honneur. J'ai confiance absolue dans la grace divine et souhaite la r^ussite de ton intervention k^ Vienne pour le bien de nos pays et ia paix de TEurope. Bien cordialement a toi. Nicolas. vn L'Empereur Guillaume k I'Empereur Nicolas. 3i juillet 1914 {2 heures apr^s ZttmftMe Sim 28. 3«ni b. % ijl bet oficrrcic^ifd^.unganfc^c .^^^ronfolgcr tr^i^crjog^ f^tatij f^erbinanb unb [eine ®ema[}lm, bic ^crjogiu bon ^ol)tnhtxQ burd^ SRcDolber* fc^iip bc§ 9)iitglieb§ ciner ferbifc^eu Scrj'c^njoterbanbc nicbergcjltedft njorben. ^ic Hnter.- fuelling beg 53ct6rec^en§ burcf) bic opcrrcic^ifc^-ungaiifcl^cn Sc^orben ^at crgc6en, ha^ ba3 ^omptott gegeii ha^ Co6cn be3 Gq^erjog-^^ronfoJgerS in 23c(grab untet 9}lith)irfung amtlic^er ferbifdbcr ^erfonen borbereitct unb gcf 5rbert, mit SBaffen ou§ ben jtaatlic^cn ferbi[d}cn ©epotg auggcfuC)rt wurbe. ^ic§ 5}ecbrc£§en mufjic ber ganjen jiDilifiettcn Sclt bic Slugctt offncn, nic^t nnr iiber bic gcgcn ben 53c[1:anb unb bic ^wt^QT^i^^ ber ojlcttcic^ifc^'ungarifc^en SDiouarc^ic gct;i(f)tctcn giclc ber fcrbi[c^en ^olitif, fonbern mdi) iiber bic t)erbrcc^crifc^cn Wliiid, bic bic grofferbifc^c ^ropaganba in ©crbicn jur ^rteid^ung biefcr giete an^uwenben jtc^ nic^t fd^cute. ^a§ Snbjicl bicfcr ^olitiE tear bic aO[ma[}(icL)e Dieootutionierung unb fd)(ie^li(^c SoStrcnnung ber fiibofllic^en ®ebiet§tei(c ber ojierrcic^ifd^'Ungarifc^en 9}ionarc^ie unb i^rc Sereinigung mit ©crbien. Sin bie[er SHic^tung ber ferbi[rf)en ^olitif. ^aben bie n)ieber^o[ten unb. feicrlicfien Srflarungen, in bcnen ©erbicn Oj^erreid^'Ungam ^i^tn' liber bie 5lbfe^r t)on biefer ^olitit uv.b bic ^{lege gutcr nac^barlid^er ^esie^imgcn gelobt ^at, nic^t ha^ gcringjle geanbert. gum britten SRole im Caufe ber ie|ten fec^g ^af)xt fu[)rt ©evbicn auf biefc ffieifc Guropa an ben SRonb cineS 5BcIitrieg8. g§ fonnte bie8 nur tun, loeil eg fir^ bei feinen 53e|lrcbungen burc^ Sftu^lanb gep^t •glaubtc. ^ie ruffifc^c $olitif Yoai balb md) ben burd^ bic tiirEifd)e SHetJolution J^crbcigefii^rtcn (Sreigniffcn beS '^a^u^ 1908 baran gegangen, eincn gegen ben ^ejtanb ber 2:iLirfei gerid)tcten Sunb ber SalEanjlaaten unter feinem ^atronat gu begriinben. on biefcr 5luffajfung unb erbat unfcrc Slnfic^t. Slug Doffcm ^crjen 1* — 4 — . fonntcn trir unfctcm 55unbc8gcnoffcn unfct SinbcrftanbniS mit fcinct (Sinfc^a^ung ber ©ac^Iagc gcbcii unb i^m Dcr[i(f)ern, ba^ einc %ition, bic cr fiir notmcnbig l^icltc, um bet gcgcn ben 55cflanb ber TD^onard^ie gcric^teten 53en)cgung in Scrbicn tin Gnbe 511 macficn, imfcrc 53ifligung finbcn ttjurbe. 5Bit luarcu un§ §icr6ei h)ot)[ bctru^t, baj3 ein etmaigcg friegeri[(^c§ 33orge^en Cjlerreic^-UngarnS gcgen 8evDicn SRii^laub auf ben ^lan bringcn unb un§ [}icrmit uiiferer 5^unbc8« pflic^t cntfprerf)cr.b in eincn 5^rieg Demicfcfn fonntc. 50ir fonnten abec in ber Sr* fcnntnig bet oitafen ^ntei^effen Ojlcrvcic^'Ungarng, bic auf bcm Spicfc flanben, unferem Sunbeggcncjfen n?cbcr 5U cincr mit fcincr SGurbc nic^t ju cereinbarenbcn 9^acl^gie6igfeit ratcn noc^ auc^ i^m unferen ^eij^anb in biefem [d^rocrcn 5)^oinent oerfagcn. 2Bir fonnten bic§ um fo iccnigcr, a[8 and) unferc ^ntercffen burd^ bie anbauernbc fcrbifc^c Su^t* atbcit auf ha^ enipfinblici^j^c bebrof}t tt)arcn. Senn e§ ben 8erbcn mit 5RuJ3tanb§ unb granfreic^g ioiffe noc^ tanger geftattct gcblieben Ujarc, ben SScftanb ber ^Rac^bor* monarchic ju gefd^rbcn, fo miirbc bic§ ben offma^Uc^en Sufammcnbruc^ £)jlerrcid)§ unb eine Untcrnjerfung beS gefaui ten (S(an)entum§ unter ruffifd^em (33cptcr jur ^ofgc ^aben, moburc^ bie ©tcUung ber germanifc^en iRaffe in S^iitteleuropa un^attbor h)urbc. Gin moraiifcf) ge|d)ti>ac^tc§, burc^ ba^ 5^orbringcn beg ruffifc^cn \panf(an)i8mu§ ju* fammenbrcc^cnbeg Ofterrcic^ tcdre fiir un8 fcin ^^unbeggcnoffc mc^r, mit bcm tt)ir rec^ncn fonnten, unb auf ben mir un§ Dcrlaffen fonnten, wie njir eg angcfic^tg ber immcr brof}cnbcr wcvbenben .^altung unferer ofilic^en unb tt)eft(irf)en SRac^barn miiffcn. etbrec^ermoral Oftcrrcic^ in ben 5lrm ju fallen unb bie 8er6en i^rcr gcvec^tcn 8trafc ju cnt3ic[}en. 3" ^ic[eni ©innc ^aben n)it unferc S3crtrcter im 2lu§lanb inflruieit. ^ ®(eid)5eitig tei(tc bie Ofterrcid}ifd)4lngarif(^c JKcgierung bcr 9\u[fif(^cn mit, ^^B^^^^^ ber Pon i^r 6ei (Ecr6ien unternommene S>rf)fitt (ebiglicf) eine bcfciifiDc SJ^a^regct gcgen« ^^^n^ ubet ben [erbifc^en 5Bii^(eveicn jum 3ie(c ^q6c, ba^ abcr Oflericic^ ♦ Ungarn notgc* brungen ©nrantien fiir cin meitere^ freunbfc^aftUdieS SSer^alten ®erbicn3 Hx SJionarc^ie gcgcnuber ocrlange. G§ liege ,£)j^etrei(^=Ungarn gdnjlic^ fern, ctoa einc 5?et|"(^ie6ung ber 3)iac^tDer^Q[tni[[e auf bem SSalfan (}er6cijufiiljrcn. 3lnf unfere Gr* ffdrung, ba^ bie -Deutfc^e 9iegierung bie Cofalifierung beg ^onfliftS miinfc^c unb et- jltebe, iDurbe fomo^t Don ber granjofifc^en qI§ ber (Englifc^en JRegicrung einc ffiir* fung in bem glcic^en 6innc jugcfagt. ®ie[en SSeftrebungen gclang e§ inbeffcn nic^t, cine ginmifc^ung JRu^lanb§ in bie 6fterveid}i[c^'fer6ifd}c 2lu§cinanber[e^ung ju Pcr^inbern. T)ic SRuffifc^c ^Rcgierung erlicfj am 24. ^uli ein. amt(id)e§ Communique, njo* mdi) Diu^tanb unmoglirf) in bem [evbifd)'6fterrcid)ifd;cn 5lonflift inbifferent bleiben fimnte. ©q§ glcic^e erflartc ber ru|"ft[c^e 9}^inijler be§ Slugmdrtigcn, ^err ©affonom, bem Caiferfic^en 58ot[c^Qfter ©rafen erfut^ Bctrac^tcn, un8 u6er ben Umfan^ bet big^crigen SRapna^mcn ivTCjufu^ren «; ■Da bic 9Ru[ft[c^c 9tegierung auf bic berfc^iebenen Slnfragen ubct bie ©runbc i§i*er brof)enben ^altung bc^ ofteren baraiif §intt)ic§, ha^ 6flerreic^>llngaru noc^ feinc ^on&erfatiou in Petersburg bcgonncn f)abt, cr^ielt ber 6[terveid)i[c^'Ungavi[c§c 53ot[c^aftcr in Petersburg om 29. 3uli ^wf unferc 5lnregung bie ffieifung, mit §errn ©af)onoiD bie ^ontjerfation ju beginnen. ®raf ©^aparp ij^ crmdc^tigt morbcu; bie burti^ ben 53eginn ,be§ ^riegS^uJtanbeg allcrbingg iiber^olte Dtote an ©erbicn bcm ruffifd^en- 9)iinifier gegenuber ju erlduteni unb jebc Slnregung entgegen3unc[)men, bie t)on rufjifd^et ©eite auS noc^ meiter crfolgeu fottte, fonjie mit ©affonoto aHe birctt bie ■ 5jlcrreic^i(^'ruffi[c^cn Se^ief^ungen tongierenbcn <}ragen 311 6efpred)en. ©clutter an 8cE)u(ter mit Sugfanb ^aben n)it uuauggefc^t an bet ^etmitte* fung§a!tion fortgearbeitet unb jeben S3ot[c^[ag in 3Cien unterj^ii|t, toon bem tt)it bic 9)J6glic^fcit einet ftieblid^eu Cofung be§ 5!on|lift§ er^otfcn ju fonncn gfaubtcn. Sir l^oben noc^ am 30. cinen engdfi-fien 33orfc^(ag nad^ Sien njeitergegeben, bet ol§ SajtS bet SBet^anblungen auffteUte, ^fterteic^'Ungarn [oHe nac^ erfotgtem din* matfc^ in (Setbien bott feinc 53ebingungcn biftieten. 3Cit mu^tcn anne^men, ha^ SRu^Ianb biefe S3ofi§ afjeptiercn teurbc. Sa()teub in bet ^^it ^om 29. biS Bl.^ufi bicfc unfete ^Scmii^ungen urn Setmitteiung, toon bet englifc^en Diplomatic untctf^u^t, mit ftei^cnbet Dtinglid^feit fottgefu^rt wurben, famen immet crneute unb fid) ^dufcnbc 5)^e(bungeu ubet tuj'fifc^e !S^o6i(ifietung§mn§nal^men. ^ruppenanfammtungen an bet oftptcupfcfien ©rcnjc, bie SSet^angung beg ^tiegg3uj!anbeg iibet famtlic^e n^ic^tigen ^[d^e bet tuffifc^cn ffiefl' gtenje He^en fcinen 3^cifel nie^t batan, ba^ bie tuf|i[d)e 3J?o6i(ijietung and) gegen un§ in toollem ©ange wat, n?d^renb gleic^^eitig unfctem 53ertrctet in ^ctetSburg aHc bctattigen 9)k^tcgcln etncut c^rcnnjortQc^ abgeteugnet njutben. ^lod) c^e bic 2C>ienct ^Intnjott auf ben te^ten englifc^.beutfi-^cn 33etmitte[ung8Dotfc|[ag, bcjfen ^enbcnj unb ©tunblagc in ^etetgbutg bcfannt genjefen fein mu^tCj. in Settin einttcffen fonnte, otbnctc JKu^lanb bie affgemeinc 5)b6i[marf)ung an. 3" ^^^ gteid^en ^agen fanb jujifc^en 8einet 9J^ajejtdt bem i^aifet unb ^onig unb bem %aitn 9^ifo(aug ein ^ctegtammmec^fcr jlatt, in bem ©cine 2)^a)cj^dt ben 2^xm ouf htn 4ih^i^' bto^enbcn (E^ataftet bet tuffifd)cn 9J^obi(mac^ung unb bie gottbauct feinet eigencn toetmittedibcn ^dtigfeit aufmetffam mac^tc. Sim 31. 3"^i tic^tetc bet '^ai an ©cine QJlajeftdt ben ^aifet foigenbeS ^elegtamm : »3c^ feanfe Dit toon ^ctjcn fiit Deinc 53etmitt(ung, bic cine ipoffnung aufleuc^ten ia^i, ha^ boc^ noc^ atteS ftieblic^ enben fonnte. (£g ijt tcc^nifc^ unmoglid;, unfete militdtifc^cn 53orbercitungen einjuftelten, bie burc^ 6petreid^§ SJlobilifietung notwenbig getootben fmb. 2Cit fmb n?eit batoon entfetnt, cinen ^tieg ju tt)unfc§en. .©olangc itoic bic 5Jet^anbrungen mit Oj^etteid^ iibet ©ctbien anbauetn, hjctben meine ^tuppen feinc ^ctaugfotbetnbc Slftion untetne^mcn. 3^ 9^^^ ®i^ *"c^" feietUc^eg 2Cott batauf. ^d) Dctttauc mit allet ^raft auf ©otteg Qinabe unb i)offe auf ben (£tfoIg Deiner 93etmittlung in SBieu fiit bic ®o(}lfa^tt unferet Cdnbet unb ben ^^ticben SutopaS. Dcin Dit ^ctjlic^ etgcbencr 9^ico(aug.< — 9 — 5JJit bicfcm ^c(cgramm bc8 '^axm frcujtc [i(t [olgcubcg c6cn[all^ (jm 31. ^\i\\ urn 2- U^r p.m. abgefanbteg ^cfegramm (Seiner 'l^^ajejltat be8 i^nifevS: »Sluf ^cincn 5lppe(l on 5}Jeinc ^reunbfc^nft uub T)eiuc 55itte urn 5}ieluc ."oilfc §a6e icE) eine S3crmitte(ung8afHon 5ix)i[rf)cu ©cincr unb bcr 6fieiTcic^il'd)'llngnrifif>cii $Regicrung aufgenommcn. 2Ba[)rcnb biefe ?lfticii im @angc tuar, fiiib T^einc ^vuppcu gegen ba§ mir Dcrbunbete Oj^crreid)4lngavn mobilifiert morben, luobuvc^, trie 3^) *55i^ [d^on mitgeteid ^abe, 5]^cinc 53ermittc[ung bcina^c ittuforifc^ gcmad)t luovbeii i[l. 3:ro|5bem [)abe 5anb, eg ab^^umenben. 9^iemanb bcbro^t bic d^rc unb 3)^ad)t JRufjfanbg, bag n.'io^l auf ben (Svfotg 5)^cincr S3eriuitte[ung ^citte n^artcn fonnen. T)ic "iD^it t)on SD^einem ©vo^Datet auf bent ^otcnbettc uberfotninenc J^reunbfc^aft fiir T)ic^ unb ^cin 9fieic^ ijl Wiz intmcr ^eilig genjcfcn, unb ^d) i)abt treu ju $Ru§[anb gef^anben, n)enn c§ in fc^merct S3ebrdngni§ n^ar, befonbetS in fcinem lc|ten ^riegc. ^er ^mht (Europag fann t)on ^ir nod) je^t erl)a(tcn roerbcn, menn SRu|» (anb fid^ cntfd}(ie(3t, bic niititdrifd^cn 5Jia^na§men einjujUellcn, bic Deutfc^tanb unb 6fterrcid)'llngartt bebro^cn. « '^od) c^c bieg ^ctegramnt feinc Scjlimntung crreicfitc, n^at bic bereitg am 53ot' mittag bcgfclbcn ^ageg angcorbnete, offenfic^tlic^ gegcn ung gcric^tctc, 9Kobi(iftcvung bcr gcfamtcn rufftfd^en Streitfrdftc in Dollem ®ange, ^a8 ^etegramm beg '^aitn aber loar um 2 H§r nad^mittagg aufgegcbcn. S^ac^ "iBcfanntttierben ber ruffifd)en ®cfamtntobi(ifation in 53er(in cr^ictt am ?Rad^mittag beg 31. 3"^^ ^^^ ^aifer(id)c 5?Dtfd)after in ^ctcrgburg ben S3efe[)( SRuffifd^en 3Rcgierung gu eroffncn, ^eutfd^lanb l^abc a[g ®cgenma§regel gegcn bic aff* gcincine ^JJiobilifierung ber ruffifcbcn Slrmec unb <}(ottc ben ^ricggjujlanb tjcrfiinbct, bem bic ^Jlobitifation fo[gcn miiffe, njcnn JKu^fanb nic^t binncn 12 ©tunben feinc mifitdrifc^en 9}^a§na^tnen gegen ^cutfc^lanb unb 6[lerreid)»Ungarn cinfteUe unb ^cutfc^* (anb bat)on in ^enntnig fc^e. ©leic^jcitig n>urbc ber ^aifcrlir^c 5?otfc^after in ^arig angcwicfen, t)on bcr gran36fifc^cn JHegierung binncn 18 8tunben cine (Srfldruiig ju t^crfangcn, ob fic in eincm ruffifc^>beutfd)en ^riegc neutral blciben tt)offc. ©ic 9?ufftfc^c JRcgicrung f)at burc^ il^rc bic ©ic^er^cit beg 9lcic^g gcfd^rbcnbc 9J^obi(maci^ung bic mii^famc SScrmittetunggarbcit bcr europdifc^cn ®taatgfan3(cicn furj t)or bem Srfotge jerfc^tagcn. ©ie SJiobilifierunggma^regcln, fiber bercn ^rnfl bcr SRuffifc^cn SKegicrung oon Slnfang an feinc gtocifet gcfaffen tDurbcn, in SScrbinbuitg ihit i^rer fortgefe|tcn Slblcugnung ^eigcn flar, ba^ $Ru0[onb ben ^ricg iDoCtc. ^Dcr ^aiferlic^c ^Sotfc^after in ^etergburg i)ai bic i^m aufgctragenc 5)^ittci(ung an Qtxxn (Safonon) am 31. ^^ili utn 12 ll^r nad^tg gemad)t. (£inc 5lntaiort ber 3Ruffifc^en JRcgicrung ^ierauf f)at ung nic crrcic^t. 2 8tunben nad) Slbtauf ber in biefer 3}Jittcilung gcjleUten (^jrijl l^at bcr '^aXu an j8cinc tDlajcjldt ben ^aifcr telcgrap^icrt: 3 — 10 ^ •^di) ^aht ic note (Dtlerreict)'i(n^arn0 art Serbien. S3ctan, ben 24. ^uti, ©cr ojlcrrcic^ifd^'ungarifc^c ©cfanbtc in Sclgrab ubcrrcic^tc gejletn a6enb 6 U^r bet ferbi[c^en SHcgictung einc 5Jer6a-htote mit bcu gotbcrungcn bet oflcrreic^ifc^'UngaTifc^cn 5Regietung. • ^n bet 9iotc mrb bic Slnttuort 6i8 ©onnabenb, ben 25. 3uli/ 6 U^t abenbg, oertangt. — cvcing'*9^arobnn Obtnaiin- uor5ucjc()cu, bcffcn ^efamtc ^propaganbainittct ju fonfi^^^iciv.i unb in bcr[c(6cu Scifc gcgcii Me anbcvcii ?Oercinc uiib S3crcinigungcn in ^erbien ciii^ufd^veitcu, bic [iif) mit bcv "IT^ropaj-^nnba. gegen 6jierrcid)'Ungarn bcfc^af tigcn. ^ic .^onignd}c a^cgicrung iwirb bic iiotigcii !Dkprcgchi treffen, bamlt bie aufgcloflcn Sercine nic[}t etira . iJ^re ^dtrgfeit unter anbcrcm 9iamen ober in anberev ^orm f ortfc^en, 3. o^nc Serjug aii§ bem offcntlic^en llntevrid)t in ©evbien, [oiDof;! \m^ bcu Cc^rforpet nl§ duc^ bie Ce^rmittct betrifft, alleS ju befeitigeii, tDa§ bo^u bicnt obcr biencn fonnte, bie ^rppaganba gegen Oj^erreicb-llngarn ^u nd^ren, 4. au§ bem 5)?ilitdrbienft linb ber SSerlDattung im nflgemeinen aCc Offijierc unb 53eamtc ju entferncn, bie ber ^ropaganba gegen Oflcrreid}'Ungarn fi-§nlbig finb, unb beren SRamen nnter 9Jiittci(uug be§ gegen fie toortiegenben 9)^Qtcrin(§ ber ^5uig» lichen 5Regierung befanntjugeben, ftd^ bie !. unb t Stegierung uorbct)d(t, 5. einjutDiHigen, ba^ in 8erbien Organe ber f. unb t, JKegicrung bci bet Unterbrudung ber gegen bie territoriate .3ntegritdt ber S)ionavd)ic gcrid)teten ful>* ocrfiDcn 33elocgung mitloirfcn, 6. eine gerid)tHd)e Unterfuc^ung gegen jene ^eifne[}mer be8 ^omplottS Dom. 28. 3uni einjuleiten, bic fid) auf ferbi[d)em 3:erritoiium befinben. Son ber t u. f. 9{egicrung ^ierju belegiette Organe njerbcn on ben bcjiig* lic^ctt (^r^ebungen tei(ne[}men, 7. mit aQer Se[cf)(eunigung bie 53erf)a[tung be§ 9)kior§ SSoja ^anffofic unb- ;einc8 genjiffen SJiitan GiganoDic, ferbifc^cn ©taat§beamtcn, oorjuneljnicn, luetc^e butd^ bic Srgcbnifjc ber Untcrfud^ung fompromittiert fmb, 8. buxd^ toirffamc 3}ta^nQ^men bie ^ei(na()me ber [erbifdien Sef)6rben an bem 6ittfd)muggeln Don Saffcn unb Gjplofujforpcrn iiber bie ©ren^e ju uer^inbcrn, jenc Organe be§ ©ren^bienfte^ »on 3tc(Iung ungcac^tet nic^t ge36gert ^aben, fic^ nac^ bem Sltt«ntat ;»om^8. 3«ni in ^nteroiem^ in fcinbtic^er 2Bei[c gegen Oftcrreii^^Ungarn au^^ufprccben, 10. bie f. u. t $Regicrung o^uc ^Ser^ug Don ber ©urc^fu^rung ber in ben toorigctt '•^unftcn ^ufammengefaften 9J^a{3na^men 5U Derjldnbigen. afft unb ubcrgcben.' 3. 1)16 53om6en fmb io^nbgranatcn, bic bcm 5Baffenbcpot bcr fcrbifd^en Slrmec in ^agujcDac cntjtammcn. 4. Urn ha^ ©clingcn bc§ 5lttcntnt§ ju fic^crir, untcrnjieS !9h(an (EiganoDtc bcu' ^rittcip, bcu ©abrinouic unb ®xxibq in ber io«"b^a6ung bcr ©rnuatcn unb ga& in cinem ^S^albc nebcn bcm ©c^icpfctbc »on 2;opf(^ibcr bcm ^rincip unb ©rabcj Untcr* rid^t tm 8c^icpen mit Sron^ningpiftolcn, 5. Um bcm ^rincip, ©abrinooic unb ©rabc^ ben lUcrgang fiber bic 6o2ini[c^'' [jcrjcgolDinifcbc ©tenjc unb bic 6in[c6muggc(ung i[)rer SBaffcn ju crmoglicficn, tt)urbc cin ganjcg ge§cimc§ ^rangportf^flcm burd) (SiganoDic organificrt. ^tx ^intritt bcr 53cr6rcc^cr [amt i^rcn ©off en nac^ So§nicn unb bcr i^cr^egoioiua ujurbc Don ben ©rcnji^auptrcutcn t)on ©cl^aba| (3?abc ^opouic) unb eD3nica fomic con ben gott* organen 9iubiDoj ©rbic Don Cojnica mit Sci[)ilfe mcl^rcrcr onbercr ^erfoucn burd^* gefu^rt. Xlovifbmtfd?c 2lUc(emeine deitrxng. 29. Suit 1914» (5tterreict)=^ngarn nnb bic ferbif4>e XTote. SBicn, 27. 3uli. 1)ic 9lote bcr ^oniglic^ 6er6ifc^cn JRcgicrung Dom 12./25. Juli !9l4 (autet in bcutfc^cr flbcrfc^ung wic folgt: Die ^oniglic^c JKcgicrung ^at bic 9)iitteilung bcr f. unb f. JRegierung com 10. b. 5)i. er^attcn unb ijl ubcrjcugt, baji i[)rc ^IntlDort jebeS 5}ii^Dcrfianbni§ jcrftreucn toirb, hai bie freunbnad^bnrUd^en S3c3ic[)ungcn jn)ifrf)en bcr ojlerrcic^ifdEicn 3)iouard^it unb bem 5?6nigrcicfe ©erbicn ju ftoren bro^t Die ^oniglid^c JRegierung ijl fic^ bemu^t, bo^ ber groJ3en 9^QC^6armonorc^ie gcgeuuber 6ei tcincm SlnCa^ jcnc ^rotcflc cmeucrt tourben, bic [cincrjcit fomo^l in bet @fup[ci^tina a(3 and) in grflaruitgen unb }OQ»l>fungen ber Dcrantmortlic^cn S^cr- treter bc§ 8taatcg jum Slu8brucf gcbrac^t wurbch unb bic burrb bie Grfldrung ber fctbifc^cn SRcgicrung Dom 18. tKarj 1909 i^ren Slbfc^fu^ gefunben tjaben, fon}ic toeiter, ba^ [eit jener S^it mcber Don ben Dcrfc^icbcnen cinanbcr folgcnbcn Sicgierungcn fcc8 ^6nigrcic^3 nod^ Don bcrcn Organen bcr 5Jcrfu(^ untcrnommen iDurbe, ben in S3o8nien unb bcr ^cr3egotDinQ gefd)affcflen politifc^cn unb red}tlic^cn 9ufla»b ju anbcrn. Die ^oniglic^c JKegierung jleCt fefl, ha^ bie f. unb f. 3iegicrung in biefer SRic^tung fcincrlci 5?orflcffung cri^oben ^at, obgefe^cn Don bcm J^qUc cine§ Cc^rbud^cS, ^injic^t- tic^ beffen bic f. unb f. SRcgicrung cine Dollfommcn befricbigenbe ?lufE(drung crl^altcn. §at. ©erbien i)at n?d^renb ber Dauer ber 53Q[fQnfri[c in ^a^lreidicn gdaen SciDcifc fur feinc pojififtifc^e unb gcmdgigtc ^oUtif gelicfcrt, unb c3 ijt nur (Berbien unb ben Opfern, bie eg au§[c^(ic^[id) im ^ntcreffc beg europdifc^en griebeug gebrac^t ^ot, ju banfcn; »enn bic(er gricbc er^altcn geblicben ijl. — 15 — ^aju Bcmcrft bie Ojlcrrcic^ifc^.Ungarifc^e JRccjictun^: ^ie^oniglic^ ®erbifc^c 9^egicrung bcfc^tanft fic^ bavauf, fcjljiiflcHcn, ba& fcifi tl6ga6c bex eillarung uom 18. Wlati 1909 Don [citcu bcr 6i:t&i0cu JKccvicruuflj unb i[}vcr Organc fein 2)crfuc[) jur flnbcvung ber ©tertuug '^o§nicn§ uiib t>£C j^erjc" QOiDina untcruommen luurbe. ^omit »ctf(^ic6t fic in 6cimi§t midfuvlic^cr Seifc bie ©vuubragcn unfcrct abc befi|t, in ptaufibfer SCeifc bie SBitroirfung unfcrcr Orgone an bem polijcilic^cn Scrfa^ren abjule^nen (5lna(ogien fur folc^c polijcitic^cn 3ntcrt)cntioncn bcjlef)en in grower 3)^engc), i}at fie fic^ auf einen 8tanbpunft begeben, ber i^ret Slbtc^ung ben ©c^ein bet 53ercd^tigung gcben unb unferem ^erlangcn ben 8tempel bcr Unerfuttbarfcit aufbriiden foU. — 20 — Vlott bet ®cr6if(^cn JRegicrung: 7. ^ie ^onigfid^c 9legierung f)at noc^ am Slbcnb bc8 ^ageS, nn bem i^t bie !^ote 3ufam, bie 23et^aftung be8 SJiajorS 53oigIar ^anfofic Dcrfiigt. 5Ba8 abet ben Wlilan Siganoctc anbefangt, bet eiit Slngc^ottgct bet ofletteid^ifc^-uugartfc^eu Wlori' Qtc^ic ifl, unb bet big jum 15. 3uni (Q^^ Slfpitaut) bei bet 6i[en6a^nbiteftion bt' bienjlct njat, fo fonnte biefet bi§^et nic^t auggefotfc^t tuetben, m^alb ein ©tecfbtief gegen ii^n etfaffcn toutbe. T)ie t unb f. 9f?egietung tt)itb gebeten, jnjccfg ^Durd^fiil^tung bet Untetfud^ung fobolb a[§ mogHc^ bie bcfie^enben 53etbacl^t§gtuubc unb bie bei bet Untctfuc^ung in ©etajenjo gefammeften @ci^ulbben)ei[e in bet be^cic^neten ^^otm befannt^ugeben. Slnntetfung bet !. unb f. JRegictung: ^iefc 5lntn)otl: ifl §intetf)a[tig. 6igano»ic ging (out bet toon un8 bctanra^ten 9lac^fotfc^ung btei 2:age nac^ bem 5lttentat, aU bcfannt xoniht, ha^ (Eiganobic an bem ^omplotte beteiiigt toat, auf Utlaub unb begab jic^ im Slufttag bet ^*o[ijei» ptdfeftut in S3efgtab noc^ SRibati. 68 ift a[\o junac^jl unti(f)tig, ba^ Siganooic fd^on am 15./28. 3uni au3 bem fetbifc^en <5taat§bienjt fd^ieb. ioift:ju fommt, bo^ bcr ^oHjeiptafcft Don SSefgtob, bet bie 5lbtei[e be§ Siganobic felbjl oetanta^t f)at unb bet tou^te, mo biefet fid^ auf^ielt, in einem 3"tci^^i*^ etfldtte, ein 23^ann namenS Mian giganotoic csijlictc in ^elgtab nic^t. g^ote bet 8etbifd)cn JRcgietung: 8. ©ie 6etbi[c^e 5Rcgictung mitb bie bejlei)cnben SJiapnatjmen gegen bie Untet' btucfung bc§ 6cbmugge{n§ Don ffiaffen unb (Jjplofiojloffen octfc^dtfen unb ctmcitctn. (Sg ijt fc(bftDftjlanblirf), baf fie fofott eine llntetfud()ung einieiten unb jene SSeamtcn bc§ ®tenjbienfle§ in bet Cinie Sabnc-^ojuica jlvcng bejltrafen mitb, bie i^te ^fli(f)t Detle^t unb bie llr[}ebet bes SSetbiec^cng bie ©ren^c [}a6en iibetfc^rciten (affen. 9i ^ie ^oniglic^c JRegictung ift getn bereit, (^ttldtungen libct bie 5iu§etungcn ju gcben, meicbe i^te 5^eamten in ©etbien unb im Slu§fanb nac^ bem 3lttentat in 3nteroicmg gemac^t ^aBen unb bie nad^ hex 5Bc§auptung bet f. unb t 9f?egierung bet SJionarc^ie feinbfelig morcn, fobalb bie f. unb f. JRcgierung bie ^UHm biefet tlugfii^tungcn bejeic^nct unb bcmicfen §aben mitb, ba^ biefc flu^etungen Don bm betteffenben ^unftiondven tatfdc^lirf) gemac^t morbcn fmb. Die 5!onig(i(^c JRegietung mitb felbjl 6otge tragcn, bie notigeu Semcife unb lUetfii^tunggmittel ^ietfut ju fammetn. Slnmetfung bet f. unb f. JRegictung: 15et ^oniglic^ Sctbifc^cn JRegietung miiffcn bie bejiiglid^cn ^ntetoiemS ganj genau bcfninit fein. Senn fie Don bn t. unb f. JRegierung Detlangt, ba^ biefe i^t nCerfei § (iefcte unb fi(^ eine formlic^c Untctfuc^ung l^ietubet Dotbe^dU, ^cigt fie, ba^ fie auc^ bie ^^otbcning nic^t ctnjltic^ etfuflen mifl. ^Xoit bet ifct>*un0atif4>en Material ffiien^ 27. 3"li- ^^^ in ber ojltetteid^ifc^'Ungatifc^cn gipfurornotc an bic flugtoartigen Sotfc^aften in Slngctegen^cit b'eS fcrbifc^en ^onjiift§ crroa^nte orfenen ©ebicte, in benen tjietc !D?iUioncn untcrjoc^tcr Sriiber fc^mad)ten. 1)ic in bem 2)^cmolre jitierten 5lufrufc unb JKcben d^nlic^en (i^araftcr§ beleuc^teu bie Dicifeitige auSivartige 5;dtigfeit bcr 9^arobna Obbrana unb i^rcr affiliertcn SScrcine, bie in Sortragsrcifen, in ber ^eil* na^mc an T^cfien con bo8ni[c^en l^ereinen, bci bcnen offcn SJ^itglieber [iir bic crrod^nte ferbifc^e 53ereinigung gcmorben njurben, bcftel^t. ©egcnn?drtig ift noc^ bie Unterfuc^ung bariiber im 3uge, ba§ bie 8ofolDcrcinc (BerbicnS analoge SScrcinignngen ber 3}^onar(^ic bejlimmten, jic^ mit i^nen in cinem bigger gc^eim gc^altenen 33cr« 6anbe 3U Dcreinigen. ^urd^ 53ertrauen8mdnner unb 3)^i[fiondrc iDutbc bie Sluf* toicgelung in bie ^reife Grnjoc^fener unb ber urtcilgfofen 3"9^'^b gebracf)t. ©0 tt)urbcn Don Wlilan ^ribiceh)itfc^ e^cmalige ioonbeboffijicre unb ein ©enbarmcrie* tcutnant jum SSertaffen bc8 ^eereSbienjleS in ber 9)ionarc^ie untcr bcbenflid^en Um* jtdnbcn oerleitet. 3" ^^n ©cf)uren ber Ce^rerbi(bung§anjlaltcn njurbc cine meit* ge^enbe 5lgitation entmicfett. ^er gemiinfc^te ^ricg gegen bie 9)^Dnord)ie murbe militdtifc^ aucf) infoferu Dorbercitet, al^ ferbif(f)e Gmipre im gatte be§ Slu§bruc[)8 ber geinbfeligfeiten mit ber S^i^f^orung Don 2iran8portmitteln u[n)., ber 5lnfad}ung toon SRctooltcn unb ^onifen betraut njurben. 5lIIe3 bie3 h?irb in eirter befonberen Scilage betegt. 'Dag 9J?emoire [c^itbert ferncr ben 3"ffln^^^"^o"9 S^Jifcfien bie[er 3:dtigfeit ber 9larobna Obbrana unb ben affitiierten Organifationen mit ben Stttentaten gcgcn ben i^oniglic^cn ^ommiffdr in Slgram (Euoaj im 3"^^ 1912, bem Slttcntat Don ©ojcic in Slgram 1913 gcgen ©fcrlcq unb bem mi^gtiirften ^tUntat (£c^d[er8 am 20. ^a'x im Slgramcr 3:l^eater. Sg Derbrcitct fic^ ^ierauf iibcr ben gufammen^ang — 23 — l)c§ 5lttcntat8 ouf ben ^^ronfolgct unb bcffcn ©cma^Iin, uDct bic Slrt; Xoit [xd) bic 3""9^" f^o" '" ^^'^ ©d[)ufc an bent ©ebonfcn bet 9^Qrobna Obbrana Dcrgiftcten unb xo'it fic^ ble 5lttcntdtct mit 5i[fe Don ^tibiccmic unb ©acic bic 5Bcrf^cuge ju bcm Slttcntat Deifd^apcn, njobci ins6c[onbcrc bic SRoUc beg !S)laior8 Xanfofic bargelegt n)itb, bcr bie 9Jlorbn)affcn liefcrte, n.ne and) bic SRoHc cinc3 gcn)if[en (Eiganocic, eine§ geiuefcncn 5^omitat[c§i unb jc^igen Seamten bcr ferbifc^cu (Eifenba^nbircftion 53elgrab, bet fc^on 1909 aU Sogling bet Sanbenfd^ulc bet batnaligcn 5Ratobna Obbrana auftauc^te. gernct njitb bic Slrt bargelcgt, n^ic 53omben unb SBaffcn un6cmev!t iiad) S3o§iiicn eingc[c^mugge(t ttjutben, bie feinen ^njcifcl borubct Id^t, ha^ bie§ ein toot)! Dorbcreitetet unb fur bic ge^cimnigoollcn '^totdt bet 9iarobna oft begangenet @c^(cic^n)eg n^at. Sine Scitngc ent^att eincn SluS^ug au§ ben Slftcn bc§ ^rei8gcrid[)tg in ©ctajenjo uber bie Untctfud)ung be§ 5lttentat8 gcgen ben ©r^f)erjog granj ^^erbinanb unb beffen ©emal^lin. ©anad^ fmb ^rincip, SabrinoDic, ®ta6e3, (ErupiJoDic unb ^apooic gejldnbig, in ©emcinfc^aft mit bcm fliic^tigcn SJic^mebbofic ein 5^ont|)[ott jut Srmorbung beg Sr^^erjogg gcbiibct unb i^n 3U biefem 3tt>c(fe aufgclaucrt ju l^abcn. (iabrinoDic ift geftdnbig, bic Sombc getoorfen unb ®abri(o ^rincip ha^ Slttentat mit bet SBro^ningpiflole auSgefiifirt ju l^aben. Seibe 5;dter gaben 3U, bei ber SSetiibung bcr %at bie 5l6fic^t beg 9)^orbe8 gc^abt ju ^abcn. ©ic meitereu ^cilc bcr Slniogc crl^aiten n)eitctc Slngabcn bcr Sefc^ulbigten Dor bem Untcrfud^unggric^ter iiber Sntj^c^ung beg ^omplottg, ioerfunft bcr 23omben; teeic^c fabrifmdjjig ^crgc|icO[t ftjurbcn, fiit militdrifc^c 3tt}ccEc bcjlimmt tt)aren unb i^rcr Originalpadung md) aug bem ferbifc^en SCaffcntager aug ^ragujcDQC jtammtcn. Snblic^ gibt bie Scilage Slugfunft uber ben ^rangport bet brci Slttentdter unb ber SBaffen Don ©erbien nad) ^ognien. Slug bcm toeiteren geugenprotofoK crgibt fic^, ha^ ein Slngc^origcr ber 9}?onard^ie einigc ^agc Dor bcm Stttentat bem oftcrrcid^ifc^'ungarifc^en ^onfufat in 53eigrab 9}ie(bung Don ber 33ermutung erftotten njoUte, ha^ ein ^ian jur^Scrilbung beg Slttcntatg gcgcn ben grj^er^og h)d^renb beffen Slnttjcfcn^cit in Sognien bej^el}e. 1)iefer Wlann fott nun burd) .53e(graber ^olijeiorgane, mcld^e i^n immittcibar Dor Sctreten beg ^onfulatg aug nic^tigen ©riinbcn Dcr^aftctcn, an ber ©rjlottung bcr 5)icibung Dcri^inbert njorben fein. fficiter ge^e aug bem 3f"9^"' protofoil §erDor, ba^ bie bctveffcnben ^olijciorgane Don bcm gepianten ?lttcntat ^enntnig gel^abt ^dtten. ^a biefe Slngabcn nod^ nid^t nad^gepriift fmb, fann iibet beren (Sti(i}^a[tigfcit Dorldufig nod) fein Urteif abgegcben njcrben. 3" ^^^ S3ei(agc jum tD^cmoire §ci^t eg: S3or bem (Smpfanggfaai beg ferbifcfien ^ri^gg* minij^criumg befinben fic^ an bet 5Canb Diet aHcgorifc^e 53i(bcr, Don bcnen brci T)ar|iteffuiigen ferbifc^er ^rieggcrfo(ge fmb, n^d^renb bag Dicrte bic 33ern)irf(ic^ung bcr monard^iefcinb[icf)cn ^enbenjen ©erbicng Dcrfinnbitbtid^t. IJibcr ciner 5?anbfrf)aft, bic teilg ©ebirgc (Sognien), tei(g ©bene (©ubungarn), barjlcttt, gc[)t bic "^oxa, bic 5Jiorgcnrote ber ferbifd^en ^offnungcn, auf. ^m SSorbcrgmnbc jtc^t cine bch)affnctc ^rauengejlalt, auf beren ©c^ilbc bic 9iamcn aller »nod^ ju befrcicnben ^roDin^cn*: S3ognicn, ^txit^oto'inai 5Boin)obina, ©^rmien, ittuf[en butc^ bie bcfonnt gcgebcncn ^at[acf)cn bie [c|ten glucifel baru6er fdbiuinben, ha^ ha^ 5lftion83entrum bet S3e{ltc6ungen, bic auf Coglofung bcr [ubf(atoi[dben ^ro* D^injcn Don bcr oftcrreic^ifd^'Ungarifc^cn 5Jtonarrf)ic unb bercn ISercinigung mit bcm tfcrbifc^cn 5?onigreic^ ^inau8laufcn, in Sefgrab ju fur^cn ifl, unb bort jum minbcjlcn iinit bcr 5?onni»cnj Don 5lngc§origen ber JRcgierung unb Slrmec [cine 2;atigteit entfaltct 3)ic ferbifd)cn ^rcibercien ge^cn au[ cine (angc JRcil^c Don 3a^^cn juriicf. 3^ j^cfonbcrg ma'rfnnter ^orm hat ber gvo^ferbifc^c S^auDiniSmuS iDo^renb ber 6o8' [nifc^cn ^ri[i§ in bic Srfd^einung. 9iur ber njcitgc^cnbcn ©cibjlBc^crrfc^ung unb pia^igung ber 5perueic^i[rf)'Ungarifcl^en JKcgicrung unb bcm cnergifd}cn Sinfc^rciten '5)er @ro|mdc^tc loar e3 jujufrfjreiben, n^enn bie "iproDofotioncn, njeld^en Ofterreid^* f^ngarn in biefcr 3^^* Don fciten (Berbicng au8gc[e^t "max, nir^t jum ^onfliftc ^fii^rtcn. 1)it ^uf\d)txm^ funftigen 5Bo^rDerl^a(tcn§, bic bic ©evbi[d)c JRcgicrnng il)amo(3 gegcben ^ot, ^at fie nic^t einge^alten. Untcr htn Slugcn^ juni minbejlen- anter flidfc^melgenber bic Sfiegicrung in ©erbien in tester '^t'lt eingenommcii [)at, bic ^cfurd)tung nic^r aug/ ha^ bie a^ eg \\d) in ber Dorlic^cnbcn ^ragc urn einc (cbiglic^ ^mifc^eii Oj^erreicb' -- 25 ~ Ungarn unb (SctSicn jum 2lu8trag ju bringcnbe. Slnger^gcn^cit ^anbefe, bic ouf Ut. Beibcit biteft ^^cteitigtcn ju Bcfc^ranfcn ha^ ernjlc 23c|trcbcn bet 9}ta(^te fcin muffe. 5Bir h)un[i^en bringcnb bic l?ofa(ificrung bc8 ^onfliftg, iPciC jcbc§ ©ingtcifcn einet anbereu 9)k(^t infofgc ber »er[c^icbenert 58unbnig»crpfiic^tungcn unabfe^bare^onfcqucnjcn nad) fic^ ^ie^en tt?urbc. eincm gefdlligcu tclegra^.'^^ifc^cn ^cric^t xibtx ben S3crtauf 3^}^^^ Untevvebung werbe i($ mit 3"tfi^c[ic cntgcgcn[e§cn. mutate Z. t>cv Xeic|>0tan?ler an i)ie 23ttn&C0regieruttcten, X>erfrauti<:^! Scrtin, ben 28. ^uU 1914. (£uer pp. tDoCen ber 9^cgicruiig, bei bet (Bit bcgraubigt ftnb", fpfgenbe Wit*' teitung madden: ?lngefid)tg ber ^atfarf)en, bic bie 6ficrrcirf)ifci^«llngarifci^c JRegierung in i^rec 9^Dte an bie 6erbifd[)c ^Regievung befauntgegeben i)ai, miiffen bie [e|ten 3^eif«t bariibct [d^njlnben, ba^ ba§ 5lttentdt, bem ber ofterreid^ifc^'ungarifd^e ^^ronfotgcr unb feinc @emaf)Itn gum Opfer gefaHcn jinb, in ©erbien jum minbej^en mit ber ^onniDcng. Don 2tngcl)origen ber UngaiH[c^e SRcgicrung bem ^reiben jenfeitg ber ®rcn3C noc^- (dngcr tatcnfog 3u[e[)en, burd) bag bic ©ic^cr^eit unb bic 3"^f9i^itdt i^rer ©cbictc bauernb bcbro^t njirb. ^ci biefer Ungarn jum 9tad)gebcn toctanla^t ^ie tuffifc^c ^rejfc ficttt §icrmit bie Set^dltniffc auf ben ^opf. DHd^t Ofletteic^'llngatn \)at ben ^onflift mit (Sevbien ^crootgctufen, fonbetn (Serbicn ijl c8 gcn^efcn, ba^ burc^ cine ffrupc((o[c Segunftigung gtoBferbifc^ct Slfpirationen auc^ in 3:ci(en bet 6jletreici^i[d)'ungati[c^en SDionaid^ic bicfc [clbjt in i[)tet Gjijlenj ge* fd^tbet unb 3"l^fli^^c Qcfi^afffn ^^^i ^^^ fc^lie^lic^ in bet ftcDei^aften %at Don ©ctajeroo i^tcn $lu8btuct gcfunbcn §a6cn. ®enn 5Ku^(anb in biefem 5^onflifte fiit ©ctbicn cinttetcn ju miiffen glaubt, fo ijl bag an fic^ gcn3i^ cin giiteg JRcc^t. 68 mu| fic^ abet batiibet flat fcin, ba^ c§ bamit bic fetbifc^en 53cfltcbungen auf llntct« l^o^iung bet Gjijlcn^bebingungen bet ofletteid^ifd^'Ungatifc^cn 'iT^onatdjie ju ben feinigen madjt, unb ba^ c8 aCfein bie 33etantwortung bafiit ttdgt, toenn au8 bem oftetteid^ifci^' fctbifc^cn Qanbti, ben aHe iibtigcn ©to^nidd)tc ju lofalifictcn n)unfd)en, ein eutopd- ifd^ct ^tieg cntpe^t. ^iefe 53etanttt}ottung SRu|(anb8 licgt Hat jutagc unb h)iegt urn fo fd)n}etCT, al8 ®taf 53etc^to(b JHu^lanb offi^icd erftdrt \)a\, e8 bcabjld^tigc ivebet fcrbifc^c ®ebiet8tei(e ju etujctbcn nocb ben 5^ejlonb be8 fcrbifc^en ^6nigteic^8 anjutaflen, fonbetn tootte (cbiglic^ 9iu()e Dot ben feine G^ijlenj gefd^tbcnben fetbifc^en Umttiebeu ^abcn. ^ic fioltung bet ^aifetiic^cn SRcgietung in biefet ^tage ifl bcutlic^ botgc- 3eid)net. ©ic uon ben ^anflaiDiflen gegen 6(lettcic^'Ungatn betttebene §igitation ctfltebt in intern 6nbjie(, mittc(8 bet 3^'f^^"^*"f^""9 ^^^ T)onaumonatd)ie bie ©ptengung obet 8c^tt)d(f)ung be8 en ^otf4>aftcr0 in 5Pien an &en Xei4)0fan?ler t>om 24. 0uli 1914. ©raf 53erc^to(b l^dt l^cutc ben $Ru[fifc^cn ®efc§aft§tragct 511 fid^ gcbetcn, urn i^m cingcf)eiib iinb freuubfc^aftlic^ ben ©tanbpuutt Ojlerrcic^'UngarnS Setbicn gcgcn^ iibct augeiudnbei-^ufelcn 9^ac5 5Rcfapituliening bcr ()i[li)tifc^cu 6iitluicfc[iing bcr fcl^ten 3a^rc bctontc er, baf bic 9)^onarci^ic nic^t baraii bcnfc, ©crbieii gegeniibct erobernb aufjutretcn. Oflcrrcid^-Hngarn ircrbc fcin fcrbifd)eg ^evvitortum beniifprurf}cn. (!g f^aik ftricft baran fe|^, ba^ bcr ©cbritt nut cine bcfinitiDc S}?a^regcl gcgcniibcv ben ferbifc^en 5Bu^[ereien jum ^\tk [)abc. 5Rotgebrungcn miiffc Ofterrcid^'Ungarn ©avantieu fiir ein rocitereS frcunbfd^aftlid^eS 23er[)a[ten ©crblcnS bet 5)^onavcl^ic gcgeniibcr Dcr^ (angen. S§ liege iC}m fern, cine 53cr[c^iebung bcr 5J^acl^tDcr[)a[tni[fc im Saltan ^cv* beifii^ren ju njoHen. aftev^ in Peterebutcf an ben Kei4>etan?ler t>om 24. Juli 1914. ©en 3n^a(t t)c8 erlajfcS 592' l^abe ic^ foeben in ciner (angen Unterrcbung mit ©afanoh) eingcr}enb Dcrmertet. 'Der 9}lini|lcr crging fic^ gegen Oj^crrcic^-Ungarn in ma§(o[en ?lnflagen unb ttjar fe^r crrcgt. 2luf ba8 bcjlimmtcftc erf [arte er: ba^ bie fcrbi[d)'bj!crrcic^i[c^c Diffcrcnj jraifc^cn ben SSctciligtcn oUcin ouggctragcn njcrbc, fonne Stu^lanb nnmoglic^ jutaffen. 3Mafle 5> t)er 'Kaifexlid?c :»otf4>after in pctcv^bmg an &m Xeic^0tan?ler. Zcie^vamm uotn 26. 3uU 1914. '£)ti Oj^crreic^ifc^'Ungorifc^e 55ot[c^after §attc [)eutc nad^mittag cine (angcre Unterrcbung mit ©afanoh). Seibc SetciUgte fatten, trie fic mir nac^^cr fagten, eincn bcfriebigcnben einbrucf. aftct^ in Petersburg an t>en Xei4>0fan?ler t>om 25. 0uli J9)4. S)^clbun3 fiir 6. 9Jt. Don ©cncrat oon (E^cHuS. 3^ ^raSnoeragcr iDurbcn f)cute bic 2:ru))pcnu6ungen ptollic^ a6ge6rocE)cn, unb bic jReglmcntcr fe^ren in i^rc ©arnifonen fofort juriicf. 'Die SJlanooer fmb aBgcfogt n)orbcn. ^Dic ^ricgSfc^uter icutbcn [}eutc flatt im y^txb^ ju Offi.^icrcn beforbevt. JJbet haB 53orgel^en CJtcrrcic^S ^crtfc^t im ^anptquartict gro^c Slnfrcgung. 3^) '^^^^ ^f" (Sinbrucf, boj} attc SSot* bctcitungcn fiir bic 9)b6i(mac^ung gcgcn Oj!erteic^ gctroffcn Jverben. ^elegrantm i>c^ Kaiferli4>en 15otfd?aftcve^ in Petersburg an ben Xei4>0fan?ler t>om 26. Juli 1914. ^ct IS^ilitarattac^c bittct urn flbermittcfung nad^jlcl^enber !D^c(bung an ben ©cncratftab : 3f^ §artc eg fur f4er, baB fiir ^\m unb Dbeffa bie SJlobiimoci^ung befofjCcn ttjorben ift. ^ei 5Qar[c^au unb 3]Rogfau ijl bieS frogiic^ unb 6ci htw anbercu n?ol^t norf) nic^t bcr (^att. ^Telegramm &e0 5Caiferlict>en 3{onfulaf6t>ertt>efer0 in Hovono an ben Xei4>stan?ler t>om 27. Juli 1914. 3n S^oreno .^rieggjuflaiib evflort. ^elegramm J^ee 'Kaiferlict>en 6efan&ten in Hem an ben Xeic^sfan^ler vom 27.0ulil914. erfnf)rf juDcrtaffig, bojj fvanj6[i[c^e8 XIV. S^orpg SJianovcr abbrad^. — 29 — 3Ittrage 10, Teiegvamm bcB Xeic|)0fan?ler0 an J)en T^aifetiid^m 23otfc|)after in Conbon. Dringenb. 26. JuU 19J4. 0|!en:cic6'Ungain §at in ^etcr86urg offijieH unb fcicrlic^ crflort, bo^ c8 fcinen tcrritoriarcn ©ctoinn in ©crbicn 6ea6fic^tigt, ben S3cf!anb .bc8 ^onigreic^S nic^t antajlten, fonbern nur JRu^c [c^ajfen toottc. 9lac^ [)iet cingcgangcncn ^ady rid^tcn fte§t in SRuptanb Sinbcxufung mc§rcrct SRcfcrDijUcn'^Q^tgonge unmittelbat bcDor, tDa§ ciner 9)lD6i(ifterung quc^ gcgcn un8 glcic^fommcn. njutbc. fficnn fic^ bicfc 9iad)tic^ten bctoa^r^citen, fo toerbcn tt)it gcgcn unfcrn SBunfc^ ju ©cgcnma^rcgcln gcjtDungcn. Sluc^ ^cutc noc^ gc^t unfcr ©ttcben ba^in, ben ^onflift ju (ofalificrcn nnb ben curopdifc^cn gricben ju cr^alten. Sir bitten ba^ct in bicfcm ©innc in Petersburg mit aUcm 9iac^brucf ju teirfen. STelecframm be^ Kcid^&tan^tcvfd an ben Haiievlid^m 15otf(i?aftcv in Paria. X>om 26. Onli i9H. 9kc^bcm Ojtcrreic^'llngarn JRu^ronb offijieU crftart ^ot, ba^ e8 feinen tcrritorialcn ©ctuinn bcabfid^tigc, ben 53ejtonb beS ^onigreic^g nic^t Qntojten tooUt, iiegt bie Sntfc^eibung, 06 ein europaifc^cr ^rieg entjle^en foil, nur 6cl 9lu^lanb, ba^ bie gefamte 53cranttt>oitung ju tragcn l^at. Sir oertrauen auf ^^ranfreii^, mit bem roir un8 in bem Sunfc^e um bie Sr^altung bc8 europdifc^en griebenS ein8 tt>iffen, bo^ eg in Petersburg feinen (Sinflu^ in beru^igenbcm ^Sinne gettenb madden toirb. glttlage 10 b. ^elegramm &C0 Xcic^efan^kr^ an ben Haifexlid^en 15otf0tan?ler0 an ben Kaiferlict>en 25otfc^after in Conbon vom 27.0uli 1914. Soil einem SSotfc^rag ©ir ©bmatb ©tcp'g, einc ^onfetcnj in Gonbon ju Dieten abju^oUen, i|l ^icr bisect nic^tg befannt. 68 ijl fut ung unmoglicfe, unfeten Sunbeg^ genoffcn in fcinct 2lugeinanbcr[e|ung mit ©ctbien Dot cin eutopaift^eg ©ctic^t ju. jic^cn, Unfetc 53ctmitte(unggtatigtcit mu^ fic^ auf bic ©cfa^t eincg oflcttcic^ifc^' ruffifc^cn ^onjiifteg bcfc^tdnfcn. glitrage 13. Celegramm dee Xeic|)0fan?ler0 an i>en Haifevlid^en 15otfd?aftev in Condon vom 25. Onli 1914. T)ie con ©it Gbmatb &xt\) jttjifc^cn 6ftcttcic^ifc^'[erbi[c^cm unb 6|letteic6ifcl^' tu[fi[d)em ^onflitte gemac^te Untetfc^cibung ttifft ooUfommen ju. 2Bit njollcn cben* fowcnig loie (Englanb ung in etj^eten cinmifc^cn, unb nac^ n)ie Dot octtteten mx ben — 31 — €tanbpunft, ha^ bicfc ^xa^t baburc^ fofalificrt Bteibcn imij}, ba^ otte !Diac^tc fid) ber (Sinmifc^ung tntijaikn. (Eg ifl beS^nlb imfcrc briugenbc §ot[nung, bn{5 Shijjfnnb fic^ eine§ jcben oftben 6ingrip cnlf)a[tcn tDivb, iin "BcttjuBtfciu [cincr 55evnntivorhing unb be§ grn|!c§ bcr (Situation. SBir fiiib, falls ein 5[tcrrcirf)i[c^'Vu[fi[rf)cr Stvcit entf^el^cn fofltc, bcreit, oor&e^attlic^ unfercr bcfannteu 53unbni§pflicE)teu, 5n)i[cl)en Shij}- lanb unb Ojlerrcic^ mit ben nnberen ©ro^mdc^tcn jufamuien cine SSermittlung cin* treten ju lajfen. C^elegramm ftee Kcid^^tan^Uve an ben Haifevlid^cn 15otfd?aftcv in pctcv^bmg t)om 28. Juli 1914. Sit bcmii^en unS unauggc[e|t, Sim ju oerantaffcn, in Petersburg 2^td unb Hmfang be§ ofterreic^ifc^en 5?orge[)en8 in ©erbien in einer unan[ec^tborcn unb ^offent* [id) Sflujjianb befriebigenbeu Sei[e flarjulegen. Micron anbert auc^ bie in3n)i[c^cn cr* folgte ^riegSerfldrung nic^tS. ZekQvamm bc^ Xeic|)0tan?ler0 an &en HaifetUd^en 23otf4)after in Conbon vom 27. 3nli 1914. 2Bir l^aben bic SetmittcrungSaftion in SBien in bcm »on ©ir (Sbnjatb ©ret) gcnjiinfc^ten ©inne fofort cingeleitet. llberbieS ^abcn njir ®raf Serc^tolb auc^ ben Sunfc^ beS 5cvrn ©afanon? Quf birefte SluSfprac^c mit Sien mitgeteitt. TdcQvamm be& 2{aiferlicJ>en Sotfc|)after0 in 5Pien an ben Xeic|>0tan?ler vom 28. Juli 1914. ®raf Serc^tolb bitkt mid), (guerer ©jjctleuj feinen i)er6inblid)en T)anf fur S)^itteilung beS cnglifd)en SermittelungSDorfc^lagS ju fagen. Sr bemerft jeboc^ baju, ta^ md) ©roffnung ber geinbfeligfeiten fcitenS ©erbienS unb nac^ ber in^roifd^wi crfolgten ^ricgSerflarung er ben (Sdiritt ^ngfanbg alS berfpatet anfe^en muffe, — 32 — Zde^amm i)e0 Xeic|)0tan?ter£> an ben HaifctUd^m Hotfd^aftct in Pavi^ vom 29. Oniu ©ic un8 u6ct franjojifc^e ^ricgSoorBcreitungcn jugc^cnben 5Rac^ric^tcn mc^rcn fic^ oon ©tunbc 3U ©tunbe. 3<^ ^^^tc bieg 6ei bcr i5ran36fifc^en Sicgicrung jur ©prad^c ju bringen unb fic einbringlic^jl barauf ^itijutocifcn, bo^ un8 berartigc SRafno^men ju ©d^u^ma^regetn jhjingen njurben. ©it ttJiirbcn ^rieg§gefa^r profta* mieren mujfcn, unb tomn bic8 aud^ tioc^ fcinc (Sinbcriifungen unb noc^ nid^t SJlobitiftcrung ^ebcute, fo njurbc babutc^ immcr^in hit 8pannung cr^o^t n^crben. tffiir ^ojften fortgcfc^t noc| auf (Sr^altung bc8 gricbcnS. ^elegftamm &C0 5JtilMrbet)oUtnd4)ttc(ten in* St. peters* burof an S. ill. ben Haifev vom 30. Juli. ®c|!etn fagtc mir (^iirji Stroube|fi, noc^bcm cr toeranlap §otte, bog (Suet SB^ojel^Qt ^elegtamm on ^aifet ?RifolQu8 fofort ubermittclt hjiitbc: ®ott(ob, ba^ cin ^clcgtomm 3^«8 ^ai[ct& gefommcn ijt. (£t fagte mit nun foebcn, baS Stclcgtomm l^dttc ouf ben ^Qifet tiefen Ginbtucf gemac^t, abet ha blc 5Jio6i(i|ietung gegcn Ojlctteic^ beteitS befo^lcn genjcfcu unb ©afonoro ©cine 9)^ajeflat tuo^l baoon uber* jeugt f)attt, ha^ c8 ni(^t me^t moglit^ fei, jutucfjunjeic^en, fo fonnc ©einc !!)^ojcj^dt .teibet ntd^tS mcl^t anbctn. 3^*^ 1^9*^ ^W batauf, bic ©d^ulb an ben unabfe^botcn ^olgen ttagc bic ftii^jeitige 3Jiobi(ifietung gcgen ha^ boc^ nut in eincn tofalcn ^ticg mit ©etbicri Dcrmicfclte ^jlettcic^-Ungarn, bcnn ^cutfc^lanbg 5(nttt)ott botauf [ci tt)o^C flat unb bic 33ctanttt}ottung fielc auf 5Ru^[anb, n)clrf)C§ 6petrcic^'Ungatn§ 3uprf)erung, ba§ e8 tcttitotiafc Gtn?ct6ungcn in ©crbicn in fcinet 5Bcife bcabfic^tige, ignoricrt l^abc. 6ftettcic^'Ungatn §a6e gegcn ©ctbicn unb nirf)t gcgen JHu^lanb mobilifiett, unb jum fofottigcn Singteifcn fei fcin ®tunb fut 9Ru|(anb. 3<^ f"9t^ ^^^ toeiteten j^inju, ba^ man in n)it fSnnen unfcrc Stiibct in ©ctbicn nic^t im ©tic^ (affcn« nac^ bem futc^tbatcn 53ct6tc(^en »ou ©ctajcmo nic^t mc§t octjlc^e. 3'^ W^ ^^^ fd}nc^lid^, et mogc, toenn ©cutfc^ianbg ©tteitmad^t mobilijictt hjctbc, fic^ nit^t njunbetn. — 33 — gfttlage 19. ^clegramm ^ee Xei4)0fan?ler0 an bm %aifcvlid?cn :&otfMftev in Xom vom dh Juli 1914. ^ortge[e|t ijt Don un8 3VuifcI)en JRuplanb unb 5flcri'cicl^'Utigarn fowo^r burc^ bireEten 1)epe[f^einvec§[e[ ©elncr 3)^Qiej^dt be8 ^aiferS mit ©eincr 9)taj[cjidt bcm ^Q^'C" aU and) im 55enc[)mcn mit 6it Gbiuarb ®rc^ tjermitteft iDOvbcu. ^urc^ bic 3]RobUi« fictung $Hu^(anb§ jinb jebod) alle unferc Semii^ungen fe^t crfc^mctt, toenn nic^t unmogfid) gemac^t. ^tD| beru^igenber 53erfic^ctungen ttifft 5Kup[anb affen un8 ju* gegangcnen 9kc^tid}ten §ufo(ge fo n)eitger)enbc 9)^apna^mcn aiic^ gcgcn un§, baf3 bie Sage immer bebro^lic^cr mtb. I. Seine iRajeftdt an ben 3aven. 28. 3ua 10-45 p.m. S)lit bet gr5pten 53eunru[)igung ^otc ic^ oon bcm (Sinbrucf, ben Oflcrreic^'Ungarng 53orgel^en gcgen ©erbien in ^einem Sicic^c l^eri)orruft. ^ic ffrupeUofc §lgitation, bie feit ^^^^en in ©erbien getrieBcn toorben ijt, §at ju bem emporcnben S3er6tec^ett gcfii^rt, beffen Opfer (Etjl^erjog ^ranj ^erbinanb gettjorben ift. 3)et ®t\% bcr bic ©ctbcn i^ren cigencn ^onig unb [cine ©ema^lin morben tiep, ^ctrfc^t §cutc nod^ in jencm Canbc. gnjcifcUog n^irj^ ^u mit mit barin ubcrcinjlimmen, ha^ tt)ir beibc, T!u unb ic^ fowo^f, al§ dk ©ouDevdnc ein gcmcinfame§ 3"*f^^P boTan l^abcn, barauf ju bcfte^cn, ba^ offe bicienigen, bic fur ben fc^eu^lic^en 9}lorb mo» Tatifrf) l?etantn)ort[ic^ fmb, i^re berbicntc ©ttafc erlcibcn. 2lnbcrcrfcit§ ubctfe^e ic^ feinc8n)eg§, n)ic fd)micrig c8 fiir €5ic^ unb ©cine 5Rcgierung ift, ben ©tromungcn bcr offenttic^cn SJ^cinung cntgcgcn^utrctcn. Singebenf bcr rjcrjlic^cn grcunbfc^aft, bic unS beibc feit (anger geit mit feftcm Sanb t)cr« binbet, fe|e ic^ ba^cr mcinen gan^en Sinfluf ein, um Oj^crrcid^'Ungarn ba^u ju beftimmcn, einc offcne unb bcfriebigenbe SScrj^dnbi^ung mit SRuptanb anjuftreben. 3'^ §offe ju* bcrfic^ttic^, ha^ ©u mid^ in meinen Scmii^ungen, atle ©d^njicrigfeiten, bic noc^ cnt* fle^cnfonnen, ju befeitigcn, unter|tu|cn mirft. ©ein fe^r aufric^tigcr unb ergcbencr ^^^^""^ W"^ Setter gcj. SBil^etm. — 34 — II. Der 3ar an Seine ^aje^dt ^etcrS^off. ^ftlaig, 29. ^uJi 1 p. m. 3c^ Bin crfreut, ba^ 'Du jurucE in txm ©ojonoto mittcilen unb (Stunbc bet Slittcilung bra^tcn. — 36 — '^ckQvamm ba^ Xei4)0fan?ler0 an J)en 1{aiferli4)m 23otf4>after in pavie vom 3K Onli 1914, J)rinc(en&- JRu^fanb ^at tro| unfctcr nod^ fc^meBcnben Scrmittcrunggaftion unb obttjo^t n)it felbj^ .fcinerici SJlobifmac^unggmapna^mcn gctroffcn ^abcn, 3)^o6Umac^ung fetncr gcfamtcn 5Irmec unb ^^totte, alfo nuc^ gcgcu unS; tjcrfiigt. S!Bit ^aben batnuf bro^cnbcn ^ricgg^ujlanb crfldrt, bcm !D^obi[mQc^ung folgen mufj, faUS nic^t 5Ruf (anb binncn 12 ©timbcu atte ^ricg§maJ3iia§mcn gcgen uni unb 6|tcrrcic^ clnf!eD[c. ^ic 2)lo6i(mQcbung bcbeutct unDcrmeibfic^ ^rieg 53ittc franjoftfc^c 3Regicrung fragcn, d6 jic in cittern ru[fifc^-bcut[c^ctt ^tiegc ticutral blciben ttjid. 2lntn)ort tnuf binncti 18 ©tutibcn crfotgen. ©ofort ©tunbc bet gcficttten Slnftagc bro^ten. ©ro^tc (Ei(e gebotctt. STelecframm t)ee Xeic|)6fart?ler0 an ben Tiaifetlid^cn 23offct>after in petereburcf t>om K Ttuguft 12^^ p. m. T>vinsenb. j^qDS bie JRuffifc^e JRegierung fcinc befriebigenbe Slntttjort auf unfere gorberung trteilt, fo ivoHen (Sucre ©jcKcnj i^r ^eutc ttad)tnittag8 5 Ul^t (tttittcrcuropdifc^c '^tii) forgcnbc Grffarung ubcrrcic^cn: Le Gouvernement Imperial s'est efforce des les debuts de la crise de la mener a une solution pacifique. Se rendant a un desir que lui en avait ete exprime par Sa Majeste I'Empereur de Russie, Sa Majeste I'Empereur d'Allemagne d'accord avec I'Angleterre etait applique a accomplir un r61e mediateur aupres des Cabinets de Vienne et de St. Petersbourg, lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le resultat, proceda a la mobilisation de la totalite de ses forces de terre et de mer- A la suite de cette mesure menacante motivee par aucun preparatif militaire de la part de I'AUemagne, I'Empire Allemand se trouva vis-a-vis d'un danger grave et imminent. Si le Gouvernement Imperial eut manque de parer k ce peril 11 aurait compromis la securite et I'existence m6me de I'Allemagne. Par consequent le Gouvernement Allemand se vit force de s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majeste I'Empereur de toutes les Russies en sistant sur la cessation des dits actes militaires. La Russie ayant refuse de faire droit a cette demande et ayant manifeste par ce refus, que son action — 37 — etait dirigee centre TAlleinagne, j'ai Thonneur d'ordre de mon Gouveme- ment de faire savoir a Votre Excellence ce qui suit: Sa Majeste I'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain, au nom de TEmpire releve le defi et Se considere en etat de guerre avec la Russie. Sittc eingang unb ^eitpunft bet Slu8fu§rung biefer 3nfttuftion nac^ ruf jtfd^er 5cit bringenb bra^tcn. Sittc 3§te ^ajfc forbem* unb ©d^u^ unb ©efc^aftc Slmerifanifd^cr Sotfc^aft ubergebcn. ?^kcframm ^e0 Haifctlid^cn Hotfd^aftcv^ in parte an i>en Xeict>0fan?kr t>om K 2tugutl 1 >t^r 5 ixiin, nm. ?luf mcinc njiebcr^ofte bcjlimmte ^ragc, 06 3^^"f^^i<^ ii" S^ttc cinc3 beutfd^' rufflfc^cn ^riege§ neutral bfcibe, txtiattt bet 9)iinijler^)rafibent mix, ha^ granfteid^ ha^ tun njcrbe, nja? feine ^ntcreffcn ii^m ge^otcn. ©tilin/ gfbtuctt in in iRrit^«6ru(Jrtfi 3309. U. Ilia. 10 [Crown Copyright jReserved* GREAT BRITAIN AND THE EUROPEAN CRISIS. CORRESPONDENCE, AND STATEMENTS IN PARLIAMENT, TOGETHER WITH AN INTRODUCTORY NARRATIVE OF EVENTS. LONDON: PRINTED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OP HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE By HAZELL. WATSON & VINEY, Ld., London and Aylesbury, Printers by Appointment to His Majesty the King. To be purchased, either directly or through any Bookseller, from WYMAN & SONS, Ltd., 29, Breams Buildings, Feiter Lane, E.G., and 54, St. Mary Street Cardiff ; or H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE (Scottish Branch), 23, F«rth Street, Edinburgh • oi- B. PONSONBY, Ltd , IIG, Grafton Street, Dublin; ' or from the Agencies in the British Colonies and Dependencies, the United States of America, the Continent of Europe and Abroad, of T. FISHER UN WIN, London, W.C. 1914. Price One Penny, CONTENTS. Introductory Narrative of Events Table of Contents of Correspondence laid before Parliament List of Principal Persons mentioned in the Corre- spondence, showing their official positions Part I. — Correspondence laid before Parliament Part II. — Speeches in the House of Commons: — (1) Sir Edward Grey (August 3, 1914). (2) Sir Edward Grey (August 3, 1914). (3) Mr. Asquith (August 4, 1914) (4) Mr. Asquith (August 5, 1914) (5) Mr. Asquith (August 6, 1914) Page iii. xi. xxvi. 1 89 97 97 98 98 INTRODUCTORY NARRA.TIVE OF EVENTS. (1.) On the 23rd June, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, nephew of the Emperor of Austria, Heir to the Throne, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army, left Vienna to attend army manoeuvres in the Province of Bosnia. On Sunday, the 28th, he visited Sarajevo, the capital of the province, and made a progress through the town accompanied by his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg. While passing through the streets their automobile was fired on by an assassin. Both the Archduke and Duchess were killed. No crime has ever aroused deeper or more general horror throughout Europe ; none has ever been less justified. Sympathy for Austria was universal. Both the Governments and the public opinion of Europe were ready to support her in any measures, however severe, which she might think it necessary to take for the punishment of the murderer and his accomplices. It immediately appeared, from the reports of our representatives abroad, that the press and public opinion of Austria-Hungary attributed much of the responsibility for the crime to the Servian Government, which was said to have encouraged a revolutionary movement amongst the Serb populations of Bosnia and Herzegovina. That there had for many years been a strong Serb nationalist movement in these two provinces there is no doubt. This movement in an earlier form had swept the provinces, then part of the Turkish Empire, into the insurrection against the Turkish Government in the seventies of last century, culminating in the war of 1877-8 between Russia and Turkey. It had continued when Austria took over the administration of the provinces under the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. Austria then pledged her word to Turkey that her occupation should not '' detract from the rights of sovereignty of His Majesty the Sultan over these provinces." Thirty years later, however, in 1908, she suddenly pro- claimed their annexation to her Empire. On the 7th October of that year, the annexation was celebrated in Sarajevo by the firing of salutes and ringing of cathedral bells, amid scenes of official rejoicing and popular apathy. Servian nationalist feeling immediately asserted itself, and the Servian Government protested to the Powers against the annexation as a "deep injury done to the feelings, interests, and rights of the Servian people." Servia's attitude, coupled with the resentment felt by Russia and certain other Great Powers, nearly brought about a European war ; but after six months of extreme tension she was induced to make a declaration abandoning her protest and promising to live on good terms with Austria. Her nationalist aspirations still continued, however, and were strengthened by her successes in the Balkan wars of 1912-13 —successes which were compromised by Austria's opposition to her territorial expansion. As Servia grew, Austrian suspicion of her designs deepened. (2.) In the light of this history the storm of anti-Servian feeling which swept Austria-Hungary after the Sarajevo murders is easily understood. It was a feeling based on patriotism and loyalty. Europe was disposed to excuse its exaggerations and to sympathise with its motives. But the dangers to European peace which it involved were inimcdiately evident from the reports wliich reached the Government in London. Anti-Serb riots took place at Sarajevo and Agram. The members of the Serb party in the Provincial Council of Croatia were assailed by their colleagues with cries of "Servian assassins." Mobs in Vienna threatened the Servian Legation. The Austrian press, almost without exception, used the most unbridled lan- guage, and called for the condign punishment of Servia. There were signs a2 IV that the popular resentment was shared, and perhaps encouraged, by the Austrian Government. Both the British and also the German Government knew that the peace might be disturbed. In view of these reports, it naturally became incumbent on disinterested Powers to exercise what influence they possessed in a direction which would reconcile justice with peace. Unfortunately, though the attitude of public opinion in Austria, and, to a less degree, also in Germany, was plain, the inten- tions of the Austrian Government remained almost equally obscure. The Austrian Foreign Ofl&ce maintained an attitude of reticence towards the British and Russian Ambassadors. On the 7th July the Government were careful to make a public announcement that a joint meeting of the Cabinets of Austria and Hungary, which had just taken place, was only concerned with the question of dom.estic measures to repress the Pan-Serb propaganda in Bosnia. On the Sth July the Minister-President of Hungary made, on the whole, a pacific speech in the Hungarian Parliament, defending the loyalty of the majority of the Serb subjects of the Empire. On the 11th July the Servian Minister at Vienna had no reason to anticipate a threatening communication from the Austrian Government, and as late as the 22nd July, the day before the Austrian ultimatum was delivered at Belgrade, the Minister-President of Hungary stated in Parliament that the situation did not warrant the opinion that a serious turn of events was necessary or even probable. His Majesty's Government had therefore largely to fall back on conjecture. It was known that the situation might become serious, but it was also known that Servia had made professions of readiness to accept any demands com- patible with the sovereignty of an independent State. It was known that the opinion of the Russian and French — and also of the German — Governments was that the Servian Government was not itself to blame for the crime, but that Servia must be ready to investigate and put an end to the propaganda which had apparently led to it, and which was -said to have originated in part on Ser- vian soil. Sir E. Grey advised Servia to show herself moderate and conciliatory. He promised the German Ambassador to use his influence with the Russian Government in the same direction. More could not be done, for no actual evidence had yet been furnished that Servian territory had in fact been made the base' for revolutionary operations. It was only knoAvn that a court-martial had been set up at Sarajevo, the proceedings before which were secret. The Servian Government stated that they were only waiting for the Austrian Govern- ment to communicate the evidence thus collected before setting their own investi- gations on foot. The Servian Government also stated that both the assassins implicated were Austrian subjects, and that on a previous occasion the Austrian Government had informed the Servian Government, in reply to enquiries, that one of these men was harmless and was under their protection. It was remem- bered that Austria had tried on previous occasions to fasten guilt on the Ser- vian Government by means of police evidence brought forward in Austrian courts, and had failed. It was therefore assumed on all sides that, before Austria took any action, she would disclose to the public her case against Servia. When Sir E. Grey said this to the German Ambassador on the 20th July, the latter replied that he certainly assumed that Austria would act upon some case that would be known ; but, as a matter of fact, His Majesty's Govern- ment did not receive any statement of the evidence on which Austria had founded her ultimatum till the 7th August. It was, therefore, necessary to wait. The situation was as clear as it could be made till Austria would consent to throw off her reticence. There was nothing doubtful in the general international situation, no incalculable element which Austria could not take into full consideration. Whatever she did, she would know accurately the consequences of her action. The Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente remained as they had always been. We had been quite recently assured tliat no new secret element had been introduced into the former, and Sir E. Grey had stated emphatically in Parliament on the 11th June that the latter had remained unchanged so far as we were concerned. Russia's interest in the Balkans was well known. As late as the 23rd IMay the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had reaffirmed in the Duma the policy of the "Balkans for the Balkans," and it was known that any attack on a Balkan State by any great European Power would be regarded as a menace to that policy. If Servia was, as the Austrian Ambassador said to Sir E. Grey on the 29th July, " regarded as being in the Austrian sphere of influence " j if Servia was to be humiliated; then assuredly Russia could not remain indifferent. It was not a question of the policy of Russian statesmen at St. Petersburgh, but of the deep hereditary feeling for the Balkan populations bred in the Russian people by more than two centuries of development. These things had been, as Sir E. Grey said to Parliament in March, 1913, in discussing the Balkan war, "a commonplace in European diplomacy in the past." They were the facts of the European situation, the products of years of development, tested and retested during the last decade. Patient work might change them, but the product of years could not be pushed aside in a day. (3.) Yet two days were as much as Austria decided to allow for the task. On the 23rd July she showed her hand. She delivered an ultimatum at Belgrade and required an answer in forty-eight hours. She made ten demands, directed towards the elimination from Servian national life of everything which was hostile to Austria. These demands involved the suppression of newspapers and literature, the suppression of nationalist societies, a reorganisation of the Government schools, the dismissal of officers from the army, the participation of Austrian officials in judicial proceedings in Servia, the arrest of two specified men, the prevention of all traffic in arms across the frontier, a full explanation of unti- Austrian utterances, and immediate notification of the enforcement of these measures. In addition, the Servian Government was to publish on the front page of the " Official Journal " a prescribed statement, which amounted to iv full recantation of her alleged errors, and a promise of amendment. A very brief summary was annexed to the ultimatum, giving the bare findings of the secret trial at Sarajevo, with no corroborative evidence. No independent nation had ever been called on to accept a greater humiliation. Between the delivery of this ultimatum and the declaration of war between Great Britain and Germany there was an interval of only twelve days. In the whirl of negotiations which now followed, there was no time to draw breath and ponder. At the outset, therefore, it may be well to explain definitely the British attitude towards the Austrian ultimatum. Austria was under provocation. She had to complain of a dangerous popular movement against her government. What evidence she might have against the Servian Government no one in Europe then knew. Great Britain had no interest in the Balkans, except one. She desired the consolidation and pro- gressive government of the Balkan States; she desired, in the words recently used by tTie Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs before the Duma, that "the Balkan Governments should recognise that, in the matter of strengthening a State, the acquisition of territory is insufficient; the devotion and confidence of the new citizens must be enlisted." The dispute between Austria and Servia did not necessarily affect that interest; it was a dispute between two Govern- ments with which Great Britain had nothing to do. Sir E. Grey, therefore, consistently stated that he had no concern in that dispute; that he had no title to intervene between Austria and Servia; that he would express no opinion on the merits of the ultimatum. But there was the other side. If the dispute affected the interests of Russia, then the peace of Europe was at stake; and, from the first. Sir E. Grey told the Austrian Government that ho did not see how Russia, interested as she was in Servia, could take any but a most serious view of such a formidable document ias the ultimatum. The peace of Europe must be maintained, and it could only be maintained, as Mr. Asquith had said to Parliament in March, 1913, in discussing the Balkan crisis, by a "spirit of forbearance, patience, and self-sacrifice "—by a "loyal spirit of give and take on the part of the Great Powers directly concerned."" It was as the agent of this spirit of conciliation alone that Great Britain intervened in the European crisis. (4.) On the 23rd July the Austrian Ambassador told Sir E. Grey that an ulti- matum was being handed to Servia. For the first time Sir E. Grey heard that "there would be something in the nature of a time limit." He immediately expressed his grave alarm. Next morning the text of the ultimatum was handed to him, and he learnt that the time limit was forty-eight hours. He confessed to the German Ambassador that, as no time had been left for delibera- tion, he felt helpless. There was no time to advise Russia or to influence Servia. At this critical moment everything depended on Germany. As the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs said a little later, "the key of the situation was to be found in Berlin." What was Germany's attitude? Privately, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his doubts as to the ultimatum ; officially, the German Government called it *' equitable and moderate," and said that they "desired urgently the localisation of the conflict." Everyone desired that ;, but it was no time for phrases. The same morning the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had summoned the French and British Ambassa- dors in St. Petersburgh, had said that Austria's step meant imminent war, and had asked for the support of Great Britain and France. The French Ambassador had pledged the support of France, as was well known to be in- evitable under the terms of her alliance. The next morning the Russian Government stated publicly that Russia could not remain indifferent to the Austro-Servian conflict. The next evening troops in Vienna had to be called out to guard the Russian Embassy from hostile crowds. " Localisation " was a good phrase, but we had to deal with facts. Austria had surprised Europe, and with surprise had come universal alarm. During these forty-eight hours Great Britain made three attempts at peace. Before all things, the time-limit of the ultimatum had to be extended. Great Britain and Russia urged this at Vienna. Great Britain urged Germany to join in pt^ssing the Austrian Government. All that Berlin consented to do was to " pass on " the message to Vienna. Secondly, Sir E. Grey urged that Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy should work together at Vienna and St. Petersburgh in favour of con- ciliation. Italy assented; France assented; Russia declared herself ready j Germany said she had no objection, "if relations between Austria and Russia' became threatening." Thirdly, the Russian, French, and British representatives at Belgrade were instructed to advise Servia to go as far as possible to meet Austria. But it was too late. The time-limit, which Austria would not extend, had expired ; and after all Servia did not need advice. On the afternoon of Saturday, the 25th, she returned to Austria a reply which amounted to an acceptance of all Austria's demands, subject on certain points to the delays necessary for passing new laws and amending her Constitution, and subject to an explanation by Austria-Hungary of her precise wishes with regard to the participation of Austro-Hungarian officials in Servian judicial proceedings. The reply went far beyond anything which any Power — Germany not excepted — had ever thought probable. But the same day the British Ambassador at Vienna reported that the tone of the Austrian press left the impression that a settlement was not desired, and he later reported that the impression left on his mind was that the Austrian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable. In spite of the conciliatory nature of Servia's reply, the Austrian Minister left Belgrade the same evening, and Servia ordered a general mobilisation. But an outline of the Servian reply had been communicated to Sir E. Grey an hour or two before it was delivered. He immediately expressed to Germany the hope that she would urge Austria to accept it. Berlin again contented itself with " passing on " the expression of Sir E. Grey's hope to Vienna through the German Ambassador there. The fate of the message so passed on may bo guessed from the fact that the German Ambassador told the British Ambassador directly afterwards that Seryia had only made a pretence of giving way, and that her concessions were all a shanL (5.) During the next four days, 26th to 29th July, there was only One question "before Europe — how could Russia and Austria be brought to an /agreement? It was evident that Russia did not believe that Austria would, or could, stop short of the absolute ruin of the Servian State, if she once actually attacked it. Here again, the question was not merely one of Government policy ; the popular sentiment of two great nations was involved. Austria indeed pro- fessed, no doubt with perfect honesty, that she would take no territory from Servia. But the Austrian Ministers were being borne along on a wave of vii; violent popular enthusiasm, Tliey said themselves that they would bo swept from power if they did not follow the popular desire for a conflict with Servia. Would this popular enthusiasm be content with any mere punitive expedition against the enemy? Surely not. Russia, therefore, openly said that sho would have to intervene if Servia were attacked; but she promised Austria on the 27th that sho would use all her influence at Belgrade to induce the Servian Government to give satisfaction to Austria, and only asked Austria to delay hostilities in order to give time for deliberation. Austria refused, saying it was too late. Sho declared war on Servia on the 28tli. Russia ordered a partial mobilisation on the 29th. But meanwhile Sir Edward Grey had proposed that the German, Italian, and French Ambassadors should meet him in London, to discuss the best means towards a settlement. Italy and France at once accepted; Russia said sho was ready to stand aside; but Germany' refused. She did not like what she called "a court of arbitration," and proposed instead direct negotiations between Russia and Austria. These negotiations actually began, as we have seen in the last paragraph, but they were cut short by the Austrian declaration of war against Servia. Austria then apparently considered that the moment for such negotiations was passed. She had, moreover, refused to discuss the Servian reply in any way, and it was difficult to see, after that refusal, what Russia could negotiate with her about. Russia, therefore, fell back on Sir E. Grey's proposal for a conference of Ambassadors in London, which she had originally expressed her readiness to accept. The Russian Minister for Foreign Aff'airs urged Sir E. Grey to induce Germany to indicate in what way she would consent to work for a settlement. This bring!5 the narrative of events down to Wednesday, the 29th July. Russia was mobilising partially in her southern provinces. Austrian troops wet"o bombarding Belgrade. But, on the other hand, better news was coming from Berlin. Up to the 28th at least, both Germany and Austria had seemed unwilling to admit that the situation was really serious; Russia, it was said, was unprepared, and France was in no condition to go to war. Germany had said, in reply to Sir E. Grey's repeated advances, that she did not like to make representations to Vienna for fear of stiffening Austria's attitude. But on the evening of the 28th the German Chancellor assured the British Ambassador that he was trying to mediate at Vienna and St. Petersburg!!. On the strength of this assurance and similar assurances made by the German Ambassador in London on the 29t]i, Sir E. Grey telegraphed to Berlin once more, in accord- ance with the request of the Russian Government, urging the German Govern- ment, if they did not like the idea of the Ambassadors' conference in the form he had suggested it, to suggest any other form they pleased. "Mediation," he said, " was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would press the button in the interests of peace." The telegram was despatched at about 4 o'clock oYi the evening of the 29th. (6.) This appeal was followed almost immediately by a strange response. About midnight, a telegram arrived at the Foreign Ofi&ce from His Majesty's. Ambassa- dor at Berlin. The German Chancellor had sent for him late at night. He had asked if Great Britain would promise to remain neutral in a war, provided Germany did not touch Holland and took nothing from Franco but her colonies. He refused to give any undertaking that Germany would not invade Belgium, but he promised that, if Belgium remained passive, no territory would be taken from her. Sir E. Grey's answer was a peremptory refusal, but he added an exhortation and an offer. The business of Europe was to work for peace. That was the only question with which Great Britain was concerned. If Germany would prove by her actions now that she desired peace, Gseat Britain would warmly welcome a future agreement with hei- whereby the whole weight of the two nations would be thrown permanently into the scale of peace in years to come. For the next two days peace proposals and negotiations continued, s(fmo initiated and all supported by Great Britain. There remained a spark of hope. But from the British point of view the face of Europe henceforward was changed. On the 29th July the only conflict in progress had been on tho frontiers of Servia and Austria ; the only fear of further war had lain in the Vlll relations of Russia and Austria. Germany's declarations were pacific ; Russia had said she desired nothing but a period of peace to allow for her internal development ; France would not fight except to help her ally. There had seemed no insuperable difliculty in keeping the peace ; it was only a question of allaying the mutual suspicion between Vienna and St. Petersburgh. But now a new element of danger had been introduced. Great Britain now knew that Gei many was contemplating an attack on France. She knew more. The independence of the Low Countries had for centuries been considered as one of the strongest means of securing the peace of Europe. Their position and the nature of the country rendered them" the natural battlefield of Northern Europe. If it was made impossible for a Great Power to invade thein, war would become increasingly diii;calt and dangerous. With the growth of the idea of a fixed system of \nternational law foundt^d on treaties, the neutrality of Belgium had been devised as a permanent safeguard to this end. As such, it had been consecrated by two international treaties signed by all the Powers, and recognised by two generations of statesmen. Now, when the peace of Europe was our one object, it was found that Germany was preparing to tear out the main rivet of that peace. Germany's position must be understood. She had fulfilled her treaty obliga- tions in the pnst ; her action now vwa« not wanton. Belgium was of supremo military importance in a war with France ; if such a war occurred, it would be one of life and death ;- Germany feared that, if she did not occupy Belgium, France might do so. In face of this siLspioon, there was only one thing to do> The nejitrality of Belgium had not been devised as n pretext for wars, but to prevent the outbreak of wars. The Powers must reaffirm Belgian neutrality iu order to prevent the war now threatened. Tbe Bntisb Government, therefore, on Friday, the 31st July, ask^d the German and French Governments for an fingag§nient to respect Belgium's neutrality, and the Belgian Got-ernment for an engngement to uphold it. France gave the necessary engagement the same day; Belgium gave it the day after; Germany returned no reply. Hence- forward there could be no doubt of Gorman designs. Meanwhile, on the 30th and 31st negotiations continned between Russia and Austria. On the 29th Gerniany had suggested to Austria that she "should s;top as soon ^ her troops had occupied Belgrade. Late on the same night Russia ofi'ered to stop all military preparations, if Austria would recognise that the conflict with Seryia had become a question of general European interest, and would eliminate from her nitimotum the points which involved a violation of the sovereignty of Servia- As the result of this offer, Russia wa« able t^ inform His Majesty's Government on the 31st that Austria had at last agreed to do the very thing she had refused to do in the first days of the crjsis, namely, to discuss the whole question of her ultimatum to Servfa. Russia asked the British Government to assume the
  • i French Government have given Servia advice similar to that advocated by His Majesty's Government (see No. 12) .,.. ... ... ... Acting French Minister for Foreign Affairs suggests that moderating advice be given at Vienna as well as at Belgrade ; Russian Government consider^ that, in view of early expiry of time-limit, it is too late to counsel modera- tion at Belgrade Russia prepared to stand aside if mediation of four Powers is accepted. Minister for Foreign Affairs urges that Great Britain should act with FFance and Russia. Situation will be des- perate unless Germany can restrain Austria-Hungary German Secretary of State adrnits intention of Austria- Hungary to take military action against Servia. His Excellency considers crisis might be localised. He disclaims all previous knowledge of terms of Austro-Hungarian note Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs says Austria- Hungary will only be satisfied with unconditional acceptance of her note Austro-Hungarian press comments sliow that Servian surrender is neither expected nor desired. Austro- Hungarian Minister will leave Belgrade failing un- conditional acceptance of note by 6 P.M. to-day ... Brief summary of projected Servian 'reply Russian and French representatives still without in- structions. In view of this and of proposed con- ciliatory Servian reply he has abstained from advising Servian Government. Probable that Russia has already urged utmost moderation on Servian Government ; Departure of Austro-Hungarian Minister. Govern- ment has left for Nish with diplomatic representa- tives Refers to No. 6. Approves statement as to attitude of His Majesty's (government. Latter cannot do more, but are anxious to ^prevpnr war. Suggests that four other Powers should mediate at Vienna and St. Petersburgh if Austria-Hungary and Russia mobilise. German co-operation essential Conversation with German Ambassador respecting questionfor mediation between Austria-Hungary and Russia. Ambassador thinks Austria might accept it Russian communication to Austria-Hungary, asking for an extension^ of time limit of ultimatum to Servia, and enquiring data on which Austria bases her demands. He should support his Russian colleague XIV I^ABLE OF CONTENTS. Name. Date, Subject. To Sir F. Bettie ... „ Sir H. Rumboid ;, Sir -G. Buchanan ToBivl^ Eoda To Mr. Grackan- tliorpe Sir M. de Bunsen ... (Telegraphic) (Telegraphic) Sir H, Rumboid ... ^Telegraphic) (Telegraphic) Sir R. Rodd (Telegraphic] To Sir F. Bertie ... ,) Sir H. Rumboid „ Sir R. Rodd ... (Telegraphic) To Sir F. Bertie Sir R. Rodd Communicated by Servian Minister Sir M. de Bunsen ... (Telegraphic) (Telegraphic) Sir F. Bertie (Telegraphic) Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic) 1914. July 25 25 25 25 26 26 26 26 26 23 27 26 27 27 27 Has informed German Ambassador of projected Ser- vian reply (see No. 21), and expressed hope that Germany will influence Austria-Hungary to receive it favourably ... Has informed Italian Ambassador of statements madd to German Ambassador (see No. 25). His Excel* lency states that Italy is anxious to see. war avoided Conversation with Servian Minister. Although ready to meet any^ reasonable demands of Austria- Hungary, Servian Government could not agree to abandon certain political ideals ... Servian reply considered unsatisf'actofy. War regarded as imminent ... .« ... Reports conversation with German Ambassador. Latter considers that Russia will remain inactive ... Reports sudden return of Emperor to Berlin. German Under-Secretary of State of opinion that Russia will not move unless Servian territory is annexed ... German Ambassador at Vienna instructed to pass on to AuStro-Hungarian Government hope of His Majesty's Government that they will take favourable view of Servian reply. German Government cannot go beyond this Minister for Foreign Affairs welcomes proposal for conference, and Italian Ambassador at Vienna will be instructed accordingly - To ascertain whether Minister for Foreign Affairs will agree to a conference in London, and to ask that French, German, and Italian representatives at Vienna, St. Petersburgh, and Belgrade should urge on Tespective Governments that, pending deci- sion, all active military operations should be sijs- pended " It is important to know if France will agree to sug- gestion that the four Powers should urge moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburgh Conversation with Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who considers gravity of situation lies in conviction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that their prestige is involved Text of Servian reply to Austro-Hungarian note ... Conversation with Russian Ambassador. Russian Government will not press for more time. Russia cannot possibly remain indifferent if Servia is attacked Considers that Austria-Hungary is fully determined on war with Servia Freiich Government accept proposals respecting con- ference. Necessary instructions sent to French repre- sentatives at Berlin, Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh German Secretary of State is opposed to British pro- posal for a conference. In favour of direct exchange of views between Vienna and St. Petersburgh. Ger- many's position in the event of Russian mobilisation. Secretary of State more hopeful TABLE OP CONTENTS. XV 44 45 4G 47 48 $5 Sir G. Buchanan ... (Telegraphic) (Telegraphic) To Sir E. Goschen.., (Telegraphic) To Sir G. Buchanan (Telegraphic) To Sir M, de Buasen To Sir R. Rodd ... Sir M. de Bunsen ... Sir F. Bertie French Ambassador Communicated by Russian Ambassa- dor »» »t Sir G. Buchanan ... (Telegraphic) 1914. July 27 27 27 27 28 27 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' conversation with Austro-Hungarian Ambassador respecting note to Servia. Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that Entente Po^yers should present solid front to Germany Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has decided to propose direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburgh German Ambassador informed that Sir E. Grey desires to keep in touch with Germany so long as the latter works for peace. Germany should urge moderation at Vienna. Servian reply might form basis for dis- cussion Russian^ Ambassador informed of British attitude. Question whether Russia would . take action if Austria-Hungary agreed not to annex Servian territory Conversation with Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, who reviewed Servian question at length. Sir E. Grey expressed surprise at Austrian attitude towards Servian reply, which seems already to involve deep humiliation of Servia. British fleet will be kept assembled, but this is no more than proof of anxiety felt in coimtry Conversation with Italian Ambassador, who agrees in proposal for conference. His Excellency will recom- mend to (German Government that Austria-Hun- gary, Russia, and Servia should suspend military operations pending- conference , Text of declaration of war by Austria-Hungary against Servia French Government agree to proposals of His Majesty's Government for conference between the four Powers in London French Government in favour of British proposal ifor conference, and are ready to send instructions accordingly Communicates telegram from Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the effect that Russian GJovern- mcnt are in favour of British proposal for confer- ence, failing commencement of direct Austro-Rus- sian conversations Communicates telegram received from Russian Minis- tor for Foreign Affairs to effect that German Govern- ment appear to have taken no measures to induce Austria-Hungary to modify attitude towards Servia, and suggesting His Majesty's Government approach- ing the Gorman Government. Key of the situation really at Berlin Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs will use all his influence at Belgrade to induce Servia to give, satis- faction to Austria, but Servian territorial integrity must be guaranteed and sovereign rights be re- spected. He has proposed direct conversations with Austria, ^ but would be perfectly ready to stand aside if idea of conference accepted tvi TABLE OF CONTENTS. No. Name. Date. Subject. ^♦i Sir M. de Bunsen (Telegraphic) B7 58 59 60 61 62 ♦53 64 65 €6 67 68 Sir R. Rodd , (Telegraphic) Sir F. Bertie (Telegraphic) (Telegraphic) Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic) Sir m. as Bunsen ... (Telegraphic) (Telegraphic) Sir R. Rodd (Telegraphic) (Telegraphic) Mr. Crackanthorpo... (Telegraphic) (Telegraphic) To Sir E. Gcschen... (Teiegraphic) 1914. July 27 27 (Telegraphic) Reports conversation between Russian Ambassador and Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Russia will be unable to localise war. Russia will restrain Servia as long as possible, in oi'dor to give time for a settlement. Russian Am- bassador urged that conversations should be con- tinued at St. Petcrsburgh Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs* views as to con- ference and suspension of hostilities.^ Possibility of Servia accepting Austrian note in its entirety on recommendation of four Powers ., Has communicated substance of No. 46 to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is confident that Sir E. Grey's observations to German Ambassador will tend towards peace ... Has communicated No. 47 to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who fully appreciates standpoint of His Majesty's Government. 'German Ambassadov has informed Minister for Foreign Affairs that Austria- Hungary would respect integrity of Servia, but gave no assurance respecting her independence ... " ... Refer.g to No. 43. German Secretary of State has used similar language to French and Italian Ambas- sadors. Agrees with his two colleagues in thinking that German Government object only to form of proposal respecting conference. Suggests Hcrr von Jagow might himself bo induced to suggest lines of co-operation 28 Minister for Foreign Affairs states that Austria cannot delay proceedings against Servia, and would decline any negotiations on basis of Servian reply. Nothing could now prevent conflict 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 Conversation with Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who says that war will bo declared to-day, and that no mediation could bo accepted. Has appealed to him to place peace of Europe first and quarrel with Servia second Has informed Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs of substance of No. 27. He is telegraphing similar instructions to Berlin and Vienna Informs _ of conversation between Servian Charge d'Affaires and Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs^ Servia might still accept whole Austrian note if certain explanations were given her. Such e.xplana- tions should bo given to the Powers, who should then advise Servia to accept without conditions ... Has urged greatest moderation on Servian Govern- ment pending result of efforts for peaceful solution Declaration of war by Austria-Hungary against Servia '. Refers to No. 43. Proposed confcrcnco would not be arbitration, but private and informal discirssion to find a settlement. Agrees that direct con- versations between St. Petcrsburgh and Vienna would be preferable Ready to propose that German Secretary of State should suggest method of mediation by four Powers. Will keep the idea in reserve till result of Austro- Russian conversations is seen 39 TABLE OP CONTENTS. 69 To Sir G. Buchanan (Tekgraphic) 70 Communicated by Count Bencken- dorff 75 76 77 78 79 Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic) Sir G. Buchanan ... (Telegraphic) S'ir M. de Bunsen ... (Telegraphic) (Telegraphic) Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic) 1914. July 28 29 (Telegraphic) Tq Sir E. Goschen... (Telegraphic) Sir G. Buchanan ... (Telegraphic) Sir M. de Bunsen ... (Telegraphic) 28 28 28 23 29 29 29 29 29 Refers to No. 55. Expresses satisfaction at prospect of direct Austro-Russian conversations. Enquires fur- ther as to proposed action at Belgrade ' Communicates text of two telegrams from Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the effect that Rus- sian Government will announce partial mobilisation on the 29th July; that. Russian Ambassador at Vienna has not been recalled; and thaib mediation by His Majesty's Government is most urgent Conversation with Imperial Chancellor, who ex- pressed anxiety to work in concert with England. Reasons for German refusal to support proposed con- ference. As Russia had mobilised, he could no longer urge moderation at Vienna. General opinion at Berlin that Russia is unprepared for war Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs grateful for Sir E. Grey's language to Gei-man Ambassador (see No. 46). If. Austria crossed Servian frontier Russia would mobilise. Has informed German Ambassador that Germany should use her inftuence at Vienna ... Informs of Austrian declaration of war against Servia Russian Ambassador states that Austro-Hungarian Government have declined Russian Government's suggestion of direct discussion between Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Austrian Ambas- sador at St. Petersburgh. Russian Ambassador con- siders conference in London of less interested Powers the only solution Chancellor states it is too late to act on British sug- gestion that Servian reply might form basis of dis- cussion. German Government had informed Aus- trian Government that they quite «nderstood that latter could not rest satisfied unless guaranteed that demands on Servia should be carried out in their entirety. Austrian Government had been advised to say openly that hostilities had that exclusive object German Secretary of State states that any appearance of pressing moderation on Austria would probably precipitate matters. His Excellency is troubled by reports of military measures in Russia and Franco Refers to No. 75. Much appreciates language of Chan- cellor, and will be very grateful if he can save the peace of Europe. This country will continue to make every effort in that direction Partial Russian mobilisation ordered. Has communi- cated substance of No. 68 to Minister for Foreign Affairs. Mobilisation only directed against Austria. As Austria has definitely^ declined direct conversa- tions, Minister for Foreign Affairs will suggest to German Ambassador return to idea of conference. Views of Minister for Foreign Affairs on Italian proposals (see Nos. 57 and 69). German Ambassador says his Government are continuing to exert friendly influence at Vienna French and Italian Ambassadors agree that no steps can now be taken to stop war with Servia. ^ Italian Ambassador thinks that Russia might remain quiet if Austro-Hungarian Government gave binding engagement to Europe not to acquire Servian terri- tory or destroy independence of Servia 39 40 40. 41 41 41 42 42 42 43 SVUl TABLE OP CONTENTS. 80 Sir R. Rodd (Telegraphic) 81 82 84 85 87 90 To Sir R. Rodd ... (Telegraphic) Mr. Beaumont (Telegraphic) Mr. Crack enthorpe... (Telegraphic) To Sir E. Goschen... (Telegraphic) Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic) Sir R.- Rodd (Telegraphic) To 3ir F. Bertie .. 1914. July 29 29 To Sir E. Goschen. ■*• •• 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs suggests that German Secretary of State might propose formula, and that this might be concomitant with direct Austro-Russian conversations Understands that Austria will not accept any form of mediation bet\yeen Austria and Servia. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs should speak at Berlin and Vienna Designs of Austria likely to extend considerably beyond the sanjak and the punitive occupation of Servian territory. Expected assistance for Austrian army from Mussulman population in Servia Has been asked by Servian Prime Minister to convey his thanks for statement in the House of Commons on the 27th July German Ambassador states that Chancellor is endea- vouring to mediate between Austria and Russia. His Majesty's Government urge that Germany should suggest some method by which the four Powers could preserve the peace between Austria and Russia German Secretary of State offers that in return for British neutrality German Government would give every assurance that they would make no territorial acquisitions at thq expense of France. He was .unable to give similar assurance as regards French colonies. If neutrality of Holland were respected by Germany's adversaries, Germany would give^ assur- ances to do likewise. Operations of Germany in Bel- gium depend oh action of France, but at end of war Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany In view of partial Russian mobilisation, Italian Minis- ter for Foreign Affairs thinks moment is passed for further discussions on basis of Servian note. His utmost hope is that Germany will influence Vienna to prevent or moderate any further Austrian demands on Servia . ... Conversation with French Ambassador respecting policy of His Majesty's Government. Has told M. Cambon of intention to warn German Ambassador that His Majesty's Government will not necessarily stand aside if efforts for peace fail. On the other hand, the present case is different from that of Morocco a few years back, and if France becomes involved His Majesty's Government, who are free from engagements, will have to decide on their attitude in the light of British interests Conversation with German Ambassador. Austro- Hungarian declaration of war having rendered direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburgh impossible, it is most important, in the event of German Chancellor failing in his efforts at media- tion, that Germany should propose some method of co-operation between the four Powers Has warned German ^ Ambassador ojf iDossibility British intervention in certain , eventualities ... of Has communicated to German Ambassador text of Italian proposals and of reply returned thereto (see Nob. 64 and &1). Discussion of question of mediation TABLE OF CONTENTS. Name. Date. Subject. 91 92 93 To Sir M. de Bilnsen To Sir R. Rodd Communicated by Count Bencken- dorff 1914. July 29 29 94 95 m 97 Sir M. de Bunsen ... (Telegraphic) (Telegraphic) (Telegraphic) Sir G. Buchanan ... (Telegraphic) Sir E, Gosohen -... (Telegraphic) 99 Sip F. Bertie (Telegraphic) 80 29 30 30 80 Conversation with Austro-Hungarian ^ Ambassador, who attempted to justify attitude of his Government in spite of readiness of Powers to assist in obtaining •satisfaction from Scrvia Conversation with Italian Ambassador. Italian Govern- ment suggest that German objections to mediation might be met by some change in procedure Communicates telegraphic correspondence between himself, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Russian Ambassador* at Vienna. (1) Austro- Hungarian Government have been urged by Russian Ambassador at Vienna to bo moderate towards Servia; (2) negotiations with German Government through Russian Ambassa,dor at Berlin; (3) Atistro-Hungarian Government decline direct conversations with Russian Government In present temper of Austria-Hungary, irrevocable steps may be taken unless Germany with the other three Powers can mediate at once. Russian Ambas- sador fears effect on Russian opinion if serious engagement takes place before agreement is reached. Reports interviews between the Russian and French Ambassadors and the German Ambassador ... Conversation with Russian Ambassador. Russia could not see Servia crushed, but would acquiesce in mea- sures that would safeguard Austria-Hungary's Slav provinces from further hostile propaganda. Extreme anti-Servian and anti-Russian sentiments of German Ambassador to whom text of Austro-Hungarian note was probably known beforehand Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed Russian Ambassador that, as Russia had mobilised, Austria must do likewise. No threat meant. No objection to direct Austro-Hungarian conversations being continued at St. Petersburgh. Russian Ambassador more hopeful German Ambassador has informed Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that his Government would guarantee that Austria should respect Servian in- tegrity. Russia could not, however, agree to vas- salage of Servia to Austria. Formula of conditions subject to which Russia would stop military pre- parations German Government .have asked Austrian Govern- ment whether they would accept mediation on basis of occupation of Belgrade by Austrian troops and issue of conditions from there. Gould His Majesty's Government induce Russia to agree to above basis for ^n arrangement? German Secretary of State says that Russian mobilisation has increased diffi- culties of situation. German Government have made no special military preparations Conversation with President of the "Republic regard- ing German communication to St. Petersburgh as to Russian mobilisation. Russia constants to demo- bilise subject to assurance from Austria to respect sovereignty of Servia and submit certain point, in the Austrian note to international discussion. Peace depended on attitude of His Majesty's Government. Pacific attitude of France. A British declaration to support France would prevent Germany going to war. Explained difficulty of such a declaration XX TABLE OF CONTENTS. 100 101 102 103 Sir R. Rodd (Telegraphic) To Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic) 10-1 105 106 107 IOh 109 110 (Telegraphic) To Sir G. Buchanan (Telegraphic) To Sir F. B«rtie ... (Telegraphic) ** »> •Sir R. Rorld (Telegraphic) Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic) (Telegraphic) >» . »» (Telegraphic) To Sir G. Buchanan (Telegraphic) 1914 July 30 30 30 30 30 30 80 SO 31 31 31 German Ambassador at Rome thinks Germany Could prevent Austria from making exorbitant dohiands if Servia would submit on occupation of Belgrade ... Replies to No. 85. His Majesty's Government cannot entertain German proposals to secure British neu- trality. For many reasons sudi a bargain with Ger- many at the expense of Franco would be a disgrace to Great Britain. His Majesty's Government cannot bargain away her obligations regarding Belgian neutrality. His Majesty's Government must pre- serve full freedom of action. Best way of main- taining good relations with Great Britain is for Germany to work with her for the preservation of peace ; Has warned German Ambassador that Germany must not count on Great Britain standing aside in all circumstances •.. German Ambassador states that German Government would advise Austria not to advance beyond Bel- grade and adjoining territories, whilst Powers urged Servia to give satisfaction sufficient to placate Austria. Earnest hope that this may bo agreed to. Suggests change in the formula proposed by Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs (see No. 97) in order, to meet existing situation To inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of telegram to Sir G. Buchanan (see No 103). Trusts that French Ambassador at St. Potersburgh will be able to induce Russian Government not to precipi- tate a crisis Conversation with French Ambassador respecting atti- tude of Great Britain in event of conflict between France and Germany ; encloses copies of notes ex- changed ^vith French Ambassador in 1912, and dis- cusses their scope. Cabinet to meet to-morrow ... Austria has declined to continue direct conversations with Russia. Germany believed to be more dis- posed to g_ivo conciliatory advice at Vienna owing to likelihosd of British support for Russia and France. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs is in favour of working with His Majesty's Government oven if idea of discussions betwceii four Powers is impossible Has asked German Secretary of State if he can sug- gest any course of action. Latter replied that he' was in communication with Vienna to save time. ChancoUor was ''pressing the button" at Vienna to utmost of his power, and feared ho had perhaps gone too far German Chancellor states that owing to Russian mobilisation Germany cannot remain quiet. These proceedings had come just when the Czar had ap- pealed to the Empeix>r and when the hitter was about to mediate at Vienna Reports having read to Chancellor reply of His Majesty's Government to his appeal for British neutrality (seo No. 101). Chancellor desires time to reflect on it German Ambassador states that Austro-Russian con- versations have been resumed at Vienna and St. Petersburgh. German Ambassador has asked that Russia should suspend military preparations in mean- while. Has informed his Excellency that His TABLE OF CONTENTS. XXI 111 112 113 To Sir E. Goechen... (Telegraphic) Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic) Sir G. Buchanan ... (Telegraphic) 114 To Sir F. Bertie ... Sir E. Goschen... (Telegraphic) 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 1914 July 31 To Sir. F. Villiers ... (Telegraphic) To Sir E. Bertie ... (Telegraphic) Sir F. Bertie (Telegraphic) Sir M. de Bunsen ... (Telegraphic) To Sir F. Bertie Sir: Gr. Buchanan ... (Telegraphic) Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic) 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 Majesty's Government cannot ask Russia to do this unless Austria consents to limit advance of her troops into Servieu Expresses satisfaction at i-esumption of conversations If settlement cannot be reached by direct Austro- Russian conversations, suggests that four Powers should undertake to obtain full satisfaction of Aus- trian demands from Servia, provided latter's sovereignty and integrity remain intact. Has in- formed German Ambassador that if Austria and Ger- many could bring forward any fair proposal, His Majesty's Government would support it strongly at Paris and St. Petersburgh German Government are about to proclaim . " Kriegs- gefahr," to be followed by immediate mobilisation. Germany preparing for all emergencies Russian general mobilisation ordered, ovying to Austro-Hungarian movements of troops against her. Germany also making military preparations. Russia cannot allow 'Germany to get a start Enquires whether France and Germany will engage to respect neutrality of Belgium To inform Belgium Government of No. 114. Sir E. Grey assumes that Belgium will do her utmost to maintain her neutrality French Ambassador informed that His Majesty's Government cannot undertake definite pledge to intervene in war, but that situation will be recon- sidered in presence of any new development Informs of German ultimatum to Russia. German Ambassador demands answer from French Govern- ment by 1 P.M. to-morrow aS to French attitude ... Under-Secretary of State says that mobilisation was not necessarily a hostile act. Austria-Hungary re- sents Russian intervention on behalf of Servia. Rus- sian Ambassador states that his Government have advised Servian compliance with Austrian demands so far as compatible with independence Has denied to French Ambassador that His Majesty's Government had given German Government the impression that they would remain neutral. . His Majesty's Government could not, however, at the present moment giye France any pledge, though fur- ther developments might justify intervention New formula proposed by Russian Government. Rus- sian Government will maintain waiting attitude if Austria agrees to stop advance of her troops and to allow consideration by Great Powers of satisfac- tion to be given by Servia to Austria-Hungary with- out prejudice to her independence. ^ Czar has under- taken that no Russian soldier will cross frontier so long as conversation with Austria, continues German Government appreciate Sir E. Grey's efforts to, maintain peace, but cannot consider any pro- posal pending Russian reply to ultimatum presented by Germany relating to Russian, mobilisation , xxu TABLE OF CONTENTS. No. Name. Date. Subject. 122 123 .124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 m Sir E. Gosohen (Tekgraphio) To Sir E. Gosohen... Sir F. Bertie (Telegraphic) (Telegraphic) it >f ••• (Telegraphic) Sir M. de Bunsen ... (Telegraphic) Sir F. Villiers (Telegraphic) Luxemburg Minister of State To Sir E. Goschen... (Telegraphic) (Telegraphic) r> i» 1914 July 31 Aug. 1 July 31 31 Aug, 1 1 1 tu (Telegraphic) (Telegraphic) Sir P. Bertie (Telegraphic) Belgian neutrality. Refers to No. 114. Secretary of State cannot reply to British request until he has consulted Emperor and Chancellor. ' He doubts, however, whether Gei-man Government can "give any ansver. German Government alleges commis- sion of hostile acts by Belgium Conversation with German Ambassador respecting the possible effect on British public opinion of any violation of the neutrality of Belgium. Any pro- mise that His Majesty's Government should stand aside definitely refused ... » German ultimatum to Russia. French Government anxious to know at once attitude of His Majesty's Government NeutrS-lity of Belgium (see No. 114). French Govern- ment are resolved to respect neutrality of Belgium unless compelled to act otherwise by reason of violation at the hands of another Power German AmbassaxJor has been informed that French Government fail to understand reason for Gei-man communication respecting attitude of France in the event of a Russo-German war (see No. 117) Ger- man Ambassador will see Mmister for Foreign AGPairs in the evening Mpbilisation of Austrian army and fleet Belgian neutrality. Refers to No. 115. Belgium ex- pects Powers to observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power German Government have informed Luxemburg that the German military measures in that country do not constitute a hostile act. but are only to insure against attack from France British merchant ships have been detained at Ham- burg To request immediate release Points out deplorable effefct on British public opinion if deten- tion continued Russian Government report readiness of Austria to di.scuss with Russia and to accept basis of mediation not open to obiections raised in regard to original Russian formula (see No 97> Hopes that German Government may be able to make use of Russian communication m order to avoid tension Russia consents to British formula for basis of media- tion (see No. 103) Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has informed Russian Government that Austro-Hungarian Government are ready to discuss substance of Austrian ultimatum to Seryia. Russian Government hope that these discussions will take place in London with partici- Sation of Great Powers, and that His Majesty's rovernment will assume direction of then\ Conversation with President of Republic. German Government are trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility for present situation. President jus- tifies Russian action. Germany is practically mobi- lising, so France must also. French troops are kept 10 kilom. from frontier, whereas Germans have made incursions into French territory. French Govern- ment do not yet despair of possibility of avoiding war TABLE OF CONTENTS. XXUl No. Name. Date. Subject. 135 13G 137 138 130 1-10 141 142 143 .144 To Sir G. Buchanan iTele graphic) Sir F. Bcirtie (Telegrapliic) To Sir M. de Bunseoi (Telegraphic) Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic) Sir G. Buchanan ... (Telegraphic) Sir F. Bea-tie (Tel^raphic) Sir M. do Bun6e.n ... (Telegraphic) Sir E. Gosohe-n (Telegraphic) (Telegraphic) (Telegraphic) 1914. Aug. 1 Has received reliable information that Austria-Hun- gary has informed German Government that she would accept Sir E. Grey's proposal for mediation bet\ Austria-Hungary and ;ervia. Military action would continue against Servia for present, but Russian mobilisation and Austro-Hungarian counter measures would cease. He chould inform Minister for Foreign Affairs General mobilisation in France ordered owing to Ger- man military measures. French troops have left a zone of 10 kilom. between them and the frontier ... Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has given assurance that Austrians will respect territorial integrity of Servia, and will not occupy sanjak. Austria has not "banged the door" on further conversations with Russia Conversation with German Secretary of State. Ger- man Government have ordered mobilisation. Ab- sence of reply to German ultimatum must be re- garded as creating a state of war, ment will be so inform.ed Russian Govcrn- Unsatisfactory result of discussions between German and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors with the Czar and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs respectively. Russian Miiiister for Foreign Affairs says that • Austrian domination of Servia would vitally affect Russia, and that he is weary of his ceaseless efforts to avoid war. Action of Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment and German preparations have forced Rus- sian Government to order mobilisation, and mobi- lisation of Germany has created desperate situation. M. Sazonof v.ould adhere to formula contained in No. 120, if its acceptance could be secured before the Germans cross frontier. In no case will Russia commence hostilities. Fear of general conflagration in the Balkans French Minister for War has impressed on British military attache that only way of securing peace v/as for Great Britain to take military action. Minis- ter cf War maintains that France has, by w'ith- dra\>'ing from frontier, given proof of her desire to abstain from any provocative act Conversation with Russian Ambassador at Vienna respecting German ultimatum to Russia. His Ex- cellency thinks that German Government desired war from the first. Explains nature of Russian mobilisation, and says that Russia had no intention of attacking Austria. French Ambassador to speak earnestly to Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Anxiety us to attitude of Great Britain General mobilisation of German army and navy Detention of British steamers. German Secretary of State has promised to send ordei-s to release steamers without delay German Secretary of State says that, owing to certain Russian troops having crossed frontier, Germany and Russia arc in a state of war XXIV TABLE OP CONTENTS. No. Name. Date. Subject. 145 .116 147 US 149 150 151 162 153 15t 155 15G 167 158 Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic) Sir F. VilHers (Telegraphic) Luxemburg Minister of State (Telegraphic) To Sir F. Bertie ... (Telegraphic) To Sir E. Goschen.. (Telegraphic) Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic] Sir F. Villiers (Telegraphic) To Sir F. Bertie ... To Sir E. Goschen... (Telegraphic) 1914. Aug. 2 Sir F. Villiers (Telegraphic) To Sir F. Villiers .. To Sir E. Goschen... (Telegraphic) Communicated by German Ambassa- dor (Telegraphic) Sir F. Villiers (Telegraphic) Orders sent last night to allow British ships detained in Hamburg to proceed. This as a special favour to His Majesty's Government. Reason of detention was that mines were being laid and other pre- cautions taken Belgian Government confirms report that German force has entered Grand Duchy of Luxemburg ... Acts of German troops in Luxemburg territory are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy guaranteed by Treaty of London of 1867. Protest has been made to the German representa- tives at Luxemburg and also to German Secretary of State Assurance given to French Ambassador respecting protection by British fleet of P'rench coasts or ship- ping subject to consent of Pai'liament. Question of despatch of British force to assist France. Effect of violation of Luxemburg and Belgian neutrality ... Detention of British steamers. Sugar unloaded by force from British vessels at Hamburg and detained. Should inform Secretary of State that His Majesty's Government trust that order already sent for release of British vessels covers also release of cargoes (see No. 143) ... Detention of British steamers. Refers to No. 149. No information available French Government have offered five army corps to Belgian Government. Belgian Government reply that whilst sincerely grateful they do not- propose to appeal to the guarantco of the Powers, and wiU decide later on their action Communication of French Ambassador to effect that Italy does not consider casus fccderis has arisen ... Belgian neutrality. His Majesty's Government have been informed that German Government have pro- posed to Belgium friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and of German threat in case of refusal. Belgian .Government have declined offer. Should ask for immediate assurance from German Government that they will not pro- ceed with threat or violate Belgian territory Belgian neutrality (see No. 153). In view of Belgian reply, German Government have threatened to carry out their proposals by force To inform Belgian Government that His Majesty's Government expect that thoy will resist attempt to infringe their neutrality. His Majesty's Govern- ment prepared to join with Russia and France in assisting Belgian Government to resist German aggression and to guarantee independence and in- tegrity in future years To demand immediate release of British ships detained in German ports Assurance that Germany will in no case annex Belgian territory. Germany forced to disregard Belgian neutrality owing to knowledge of French plans ... German troops have entered Belgian territory, summoned to surrender , Liego TABLE OF CONTENTS. IXV ^o. Name. Date. Subject. 159 160 161 To Six E. Goach^'in... (Tolegrapbic) Sir E. Goschea Sir M. de Buufiran ... 1914. Aug. 4 Sept. 1 Belgian neutrality threatened by Germany. Unless Gorman Government prepared to give assurance by 12 midnight to respect neutrality of Belgium. His Majesty's Ambassador is to ask for passports and to' say that His Majesty's Government fee) bound to take all steps in their power to uphold their treaty obligations Reports final negotiations at Berlin. Records depar- ture from Berlin and journey to England Reviews negotiations with Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment at Vionna, and incidents upon rupture of diplomatic negotiations. Reports departure from Vienna upon declaration of war % ... 77 77 81 XXVI LIST OF PRINCIPAL PERSONS MENTIONED IN THE COR. RESPONDENCE, SHOWING THEIR OFFICIAL POSITIONS. GREAT BRITAIN/ Secretanj of State for Foreign Affairs ... Sir Edward Grey. Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreif/n Affairs ... .. . Sir A. Nicolson. French Ambassador Monsieur Paul Catnbon. liussian Ambassador Count Benckendorff. Monsieur de Etter {Counsellor Einhas^'j'). German Ambassador . Prince Lichnowsky. Austro-HiingariaJi Ambasmdor ... ... Count Mcusdorff. Belgian 3Iinister Count Lalaing, Servian Minister Monsieur Boschkovitch. of FRANCE. Prfsldentoftheltepuhlio Prenident of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs Minister of Jiistice and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs British Ambassador Russian Ambassador ... German Ambassador ... A u&trian A m bassador Monsieur Poincare. Monsieur Viviani. Monsieur Bienvenu-Martin. Sir Francis Bertie. Monsieur Isvolsky. Baron von Sclioen. Count Seczsen, RUSSIA. Minister for Foreign Affairs British Ambassador ... French A m bassador German A m bassa dor ... Austro-Hungdrian Ambassador GERMANY. Imperial Chancellor Secret ary of State Under Secretary rf State British Ambassxdjr Raissian Ambassador French Ambassador ... Austro- JIangarian A mbassadoT .. Monsieur Sazonof. ,.. Sir George Buchanan. ,.. Monsieur Paloolofjue. ... Count Pourtales. ,.. Count Szup^ry. ,. Dr. von Betlimann-HoUweg, .. Herr von Jagow. .. Herr von Zimmermann. ,. Sir Edward Goschen. Sir Horace Kumbold {CoitnseUci* Embassy). .. Monsieur Swerbeiev. .. iVEonsienr Jules Cambon. ,. Count S^ogycny. of AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs ... Count Berchtold. Under Secretaries of State for Foreign f Baron Macchio. Affairs , { Count Forgach British Ambassador Sir Maurice de Bunsen. French Ambis-^adcr ... ... ... ... IMonsieur Dumaino. Russian Ambas ador Monsieur Schebeko. German Ambassador Herr von Tschirscky, ITALY. M-nisterfor Foreign Affairs. British Ambassador ... BELGIUM. British Minister .. Marquis di Pan Giuliano* .. Sir Rennell Rodd. ... Sir Francis Villiers. 8ERYIA. Prime Minister British Minister ^intrO'Hungarian Minister Monsieur Pashitch. Mr. des Graz. Mr. Crackanthorpe {First Secretary), Baron Gieel. PART I COERESPONDENCE LAID BEFORE PARLIAMENT. No. 1. Sir Edward Grey to Sir H, Rumhold^ British Charge d^A^aires at Berlin, Sir, Foreign Office, July 20, 1914. I ASKED the German Ambassador to-day if he had any news of what was going on in Vienna with regard to Servia. He said that he had not, but Austria was certainly going to. take some step, and he regarded the situation as very uncomfortable. I said that I had not heard anything recently, except that Count Berchtold,* in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had deprecated the suggestion that the situation was grave, but had said that it should be cleared up. The German Ambassador said that it would be a very desirable thing if Russia could act as a mediator with regard to Servia. I said that I assumed that the Austrian Government would not do anything until they had first disclosed to the public their case against Servia, founded presumably upon what they had discovered at the trial. The Ambassador said that he certainly assumed tha't they would act upon some case that would be known. I said that this would make it easier for others, such as Russia, to counsel moderation in Belgrade. In fact, the more Austria could keep her demand within reasonable limits, and the stronger the jilstification she could produce for making any demand, the more chance there would be of smoothing things over. I hated the idea of a war between any of the Great Powers, and that any of them should be dragged into a war by Servia would be detestable. The Ambassador agreed wholeheartedly in this sentiment. I am, &c., E. GREY. * Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. No. 2. Sir H. Rwmhold, BriUsh Charge d'AffoAjres at Be7'Un, to Sir Bdward Grey. — (deceived July 22.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 22, 1914. Last night I met Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the forthcoming Austrian demarche at Belgrade was alluded to by his Excellency in the conversation that ensued. His Excellency was evidently of opinion that tl^is step on Austria's part would have been made ere this. He insisted that question at issue was one for settlement between Servia and Austria alone, and that there should be no interference from outside in the discussipns between those two countries. He had therefore considered it inadvisable that the Austro-Hungarian Government should be approached by the German Govern- ment on the matter. He had, however, on several occasions, in conve'rsation v.'ith the Servian Minister, emphasised the extreme importance that Austro- Servian relations should be put on a proper footing. Finally, his Excellency observed to me that for a long time past the attitude adopted towards Servia by Austria bad, in his opinion, been one of great forbearance. No. 3. Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen^ Britdsh Ambassador at Yierma. Sir, Formgn Office, July 23, 1914. CoTJNt * Mensdorff* told me to-day that he would be able to-morrow morning to let me have officially the communication that he understood was being made to Servia to-day by Austria. He then explained privately what the nature of the demand would be. As he told me that the facts would all be set out in the paper that he would give me to-morrow, it is unnecessary to record them now. I gathered that they would include proof of the com- plicity of some Servian officials in the plot to murder the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and a long list of demands consequently made by Austria on Servia. As regards all this, I said that it was not a matter on which I would make any comment until I received an official communication, and it seemed to me probably a matter on which I should not be able to make any comment at first sight. But, when Count Mensdorff told me that he supposed there would be something in the nature of a time-limit, which was in effect akin to an ultimatum, I said that I regretted this very much. To begin with a time- limit might inflame opinion in Russia, and it would make it difficult, if not impossible, to give more time, even if after a few days it appeared that by giving more time there would be a prospect of securing a peaceful settlement and getting a satisfactory reply from Servia, I admitted that, if there was no time-:limit, the proceedings might be unduly protracted, but I urged that a time-limit could always be introduced afterwards ; that if the demands were made without a time-limit in the first instance, Russian public opinion might bo less excited, after a week it might have cooled down, and if the Austrian case was very strong it might be apparent that the Russian Government would be in a position to use their influence in favour of a satisfactory reply from Servia. A time-limit was generally a thing to be used only in the last resort, after other means had been tried and failed. Count Mensdorff said that if Servia, in the interval that had elapsed since the murder of the Archduke, had voluntarily instituted an enquiry on her own territory, all this might have been avoided. In 1909, Servia had said in a note that she intended to live on terms of good neighbourhood with Austria; but she had never kept her promise, she had stirred up agitation the object of which was to disintegrate Austria, and it was absolutely necessary for Austria to protect herself. I said that I would not comment upon or criticise what Count Mensdorff had told me this afternoon, but I could not help dwelling upon the awful consequences involved in the situation. Great apprehension had been expressed to me, not specially by M. Cambon and Count Benckendorff, but also by others, as to what might happen, and it had been represented to me that it would be very desirable that those who had influence in St. Petersburgli should use it on behalf of patience and moderation. I had replied that the amount of influence that could be used in this sense would depend upon how reasonable were the Austrian demands and how strong the justification that Austria might have discovered for making her demands. The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible. If as many as four Great Powers of Europe — let us say, Austria, France, Russia, and Germany — were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money, and such an interference with trade, that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit and industry. In these days, in great industrial States, this would mean a state of things worse than that of 1848, and, irrespective of who were victors in the war, many things might be completely swept away. Count Mensdorff did not demur to this statement of the possible con- sequences of the present situation, but he said that all would depend upon Russia. I made the remark that, in a time of difficulties such as this, it was just as true to say that it required two to keep the peace as it was to say, ordinarily, that it took two to make a quarrel. I hoped very much that, if there were difficulties, Austria arid Russia would be able in the first instance to discuss them directly with each other. * Aiistro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. Count Mensdorff said tliat h(^ hoped this would be possible, but he was under the impression that the attitude in St. Petersburgh had not been very favourable recently. I am, &c., E. GREY. No. 4. Cov/nt Berchtcldj AustHam Mimster for Foreign Affairs, to Count Mensdorff ^ Austrimi Ambassador in London. — {Qormriv/mcated hy Couni Mensdorff^ July 24, 19U.) Le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal s'est vu oblige d'adresser jeudi le 23 de ce mois, par I'entremise du Ministre Imperial et Royal a Belgrade, la not6 suivante au Gouvernement Royal de Sorbie : "Le 31 mars, 1909, le Ministre de Serbie a Vienne a fait, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, au Gouvernement Im- perial et Royal la declaration sui- vante :— " * La Serbie reconnait qu^elle n'a pas ete atteinto dans ses droits par le fait accompli cree en Bosnie- Herzegovine et qu'elle se confor- mera par consequent a telle de- cision que les Puissances prendront par rapport a I'article 25 du Traite de Berlin. Se rendant aux conseils des Grandes Puissances, la Serbie s'engage des a present a abandonner I'attitude de protestation et d'opposition qu'elle a observee a I'egard de 1' annexion de- puis I'automne dernier, et elle s'en- gage, en outre, a changer le cours de sa politique actuelle envers I'Autriche- Hongrie pour vivre desormais aveo cette derniere sur le pied d'un bon voisinage.' " Or, I'histoire des d^rnieres annees, ;et notamment les evenements dour jloureux du 28 juin, ont demontre il'existence en Serbie d'un mouvement jsubversif dont le but est de detacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise cer- taines parties de ses territoires. Ce mouvement, qui a pris jour sous les yeux du Gouvernement serbe, est arrive a se manifcster au dela du terri- toire du royaume par des actes de ter- roisme, par unc serie d' attentats et par des meurtres. "Lg Gouvernement Royal serbe, loin de satisfaire aux engagements formels contenus dans la declaration du 31 mars, 1909, n'a rien fait pour sup- primer ce mouvement: il a tolere I'activite criminelle des differentes societes et affiliations dirigees centre la Monarchie, le langage effrene de la presse, la glorification des auteurs d'attentats, la participation d'officiers et de fonctionnaires dans les agisse- (Translation.) The Austro-Hungarian Government felt compelled to address the following note to the Servian Government on the 23rd July, through the medium of the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Bel- grade : — "On the 31st March, 1909, the Servian Minister in Vienna, on the in- structions of the Servian Government, made the following declaration to tho Imperial and Royal Government : — " ' Servia recognises that the fait accompli regarding Bosnia has not aflected her rights, and consequently she will conform to the decisions that the Powers may take in conformity with article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great Powers, Servia undertakes to re- nounce from now onwards the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexa- tion since last autumn. She under- takes, moreover, to modify the direc- tion of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary and to live in future on good neighbourly terms with the latter.' "The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events of the 28th June last, have shown the exist- ence of a subversive movement with the object of detaching a part of the territories of Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy. The movement, which had its birth under the eye of the Servian Government, has gone so far as to make itself manifest on both sides of- the Servian frontier in the shape of acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and murders. " Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in the declara- tion of the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done nothing to repress these movements. It has permitted the criminal machina- tions of various societies and associa- tions directed against the Monarchj'^, and has tolerated unrestrained lan- guage on the part of the press, the glorification of the perpetrators ot ments subversifs, ime propaganda nlal- saine dans Tinstruction publique, tolere enfin toutes les manifestations qui pouvaient induire la population serbe a la haine de la Monarehie et au mepris d6 ^es institutions. "Cette tolerance coupable du 6ou- vernement Royal de Serbie n'avait pas cesse au moment ou les evenements du 28 juin dernier en ont demontre au monde en tier les consequences funestes, "II resulte des depositions et aveux des auteurs criminels de I'attentat dn 28 juin que le meurtre de Sarajevo a ete trame a Belgrade, que les armes et explosifs dont les meurtriers se trou- vaient etre munis leur ont ete donnes par des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes faisant partie de la * Narodna Odbrana,' et enfin que le passage en Bosnie des criminels et de leurs armes a ete organise et eflfectues par des chefs du service-frontiere serbe. "Les resultats mentionnes de I'in- struction ne permettent pas au Gou- vernement Imperial et Royal de pour- suivrc plus longtemps I'attitude de longanimite expectative qu'il avait observee pendant des annees vis-a-vis des agissements concentres a Belgrade et propages de la sur les territoires de la Monarchic; ces resultats lui im- posent au contraire le devoir de mettre fin a des menees qui forment une menace perpetuelle pour la tranquillite de la Monarchic. "C'est pour atteindre ce but que le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal se voit oblige de demander au Gouverne- ment serbe I'enonciation officielle qu'il condamne la propagande dirigee centre la Monarchic austro-hongroise, c'est- a-dire I'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu a detacher de la Monarchic des territoires qui en font partie, et qu'il s' engage a sup- primer, par tous les moyens, cette pro- pagande criminelle et terroriste. "Afin de donner un caractere solen- nel a cet engagement, le Gouverne- ment Royal de Serbie fera publier a la premiere page du ' Journal oflficiel ' en date du 13/26 juillet renonciation sui- vante :— outrages, an^ the participation ol officers and functionaries in subversive! agitation. It has permitted an xini wholesome propaganda in public in-* struction, in short, it has permitted all manifestations of a nature to incite the Servian population to hatred of the Monarchy and contempt of its institu^ tions. "This culpable tolerance of the Royal Servian Government had not ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th June last proved its fatal conse* quences to the whole world. "It results from the depositions and confessions of the criminal perpetra- toi*s of the outrage of the 28th June that the Serajevo assassinations were planned in Belgrade ; that the arms and explosives with which the mur- derers were provided had ]jeen given to them by Servian officers and func- tionaries belonging to the Narodna Odbrana; and finally, that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organised and effected by the chiefs of the Servian frontier service. " The above-mentioned results of the magisterial investigation do not permit the Austro-Hungarian Government to pursue any longer the attitude of ex- pectant forbearance which they have maintained for years in face of the machinations hatched in Belgrade, and thence propagated in the territories of the Monarchy. The results, on the contrary, impose on them the duty of putting an end to the intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tran- quillity of the Monarchy^. "To achieve this end the Imperial and Royal Government see themselves compelled to demand from the Royal Servian Government a formal assurance that they condemn this dangerous propa- ganda against the Monarchy ; in other words, the whole series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of which is to detach from the Monarchy territories belong- ing to it, and that they undertake to suppress by every means this criminal and terrorist propaganda. " In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the Royal Servian Government shall publish on the front page of their ' Official Journal ' of the 13/26 July the following declaration :— " * Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie condamne la propagande dirigee centre I'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-a-dire I'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu a detacher de la Monarehie austro-hongroise des terri- toires qui en font, partie, et il deplore " * The Royal Government of Servia condemn the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary — i.e., the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hun- garian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the sincerement les consequences funestca de ces agissements criminels. "*Le Gouvernement Royal regrette quo des ofliciers et fonctionnaires serbes aient participe k la propagande susmentionnee et compromis par la les relations de bon voisinage auquel le Gouvernement Royal s'etait solennelle- jnent engage par sa declaration du 31 mars, 1909. " ' Le Gouvernement Royal, qui des- approuve et repudie toute idee ou ten- tative d'immixtion dans les destinees des habitants de quelque partie de I'Autriche-Hongrie que ce soit, con- Bide re de son devoir d'avertir formelle- ment les officiers, les fonctionnaires et toute la population du royaume que dorenavant il procedera avec la der- niere rigueur centre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements qu'il mettra tous ses efforts a prevenir et a reprimer.' " Cette enonciation sera portee simul- tanement a la connaissance de I'Armee Royale par un ordre du jour de Sa Majeste le Roi et sera publiee dans le * Bulletin officiel ' de I'armee. "Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'en- gage en outre : "1° a supprimer toute publication qui excite a la haine et au mepris de la Monarchic et dont la tendance generale est dirigee centre son inte- grite territoriale ; "2° a dissoudre iramediatement la societe dite ' Narodna Odbrana,' a con- fisquer tous ses moyens de propagande, et a proceder de la meme maniere centre les autres societes et aflSliations en Serbie qui s'adonnent a la propa- gande centre la Monarchic austro-hon- groise; le Gouvernement Royal pren- dra les mesures necessaires pour que les societes dissoutes ne puissent pas con- tinuer leur activite sous un autre nom et sous une autre forme ; "3° a eliminer sans delai de I'instruc- tion publique en Serbie, tant en ce qui concerne le corpa enseignant que les moyens d'instruction, tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir a fomenter la propa- gande centre I'Autriche-Hongrie ; "4° a eloigner du service militaire et de 1' administration en general tous les officiers et fonctionnaires coupables de la propagande centre la Monarchic austro-hongroise et dont le Gouverne- ment Imperial et Royal se reserve de communiquer les noms et les faits au Gouvernement Royal ; fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings. " ' The Royal Government regret that Servian ofl&cers and functionaries parti- cipated in the above-mentioned propa- ganda and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Government were solemnly pledged by their declaration of the 31st March, 1909. " ' The Royal Government, who dis-^ approve and repudiate all idea of inter- fering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, consider it their duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the kingdom, that henceforward they will proceed with the utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which they will use all their efforts to anticipate and suppress.' "This declaration shall simulta- neously be communicated to the Royal army as an order of the day by His Majesty the King and shall be pub- lished in the ' Official Bulletin ' of the Army. "The Royal Servian Government further undertake : "1. To suppress any _ publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial in- tegrity ; "2. To dissolve immediately the society styled ' Narodna Odbrana,' to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Servia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hun- garian Monarchy. The Royal Govern- ment shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name and form ; " 3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia, both as regards the teaching body and- also as regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary j "4. To remove from the military service, and from the administration in general, all officers and function- aries guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hun- garian Government reserve to them- selves the right of communicating to the Royal Government ; I "5" a accepter la collaboration en Serbia des organes du Gouvernemcnt Imperial et Koyal dans la suppression du mouvement subversif dirige contra rintegrite tcrritoriala da la Monarchie ; "6° a ouvrir iinc enquote jiidiciaire centre les partisans du complot du 28 juin se trouyant sur territoire serbe; "des organes, delegues par le Gou- vcrnoment Imperial et Royal, pren- dront part aux recherches y relatives ; "7° a proceder d'urgence a I'arresta- tion du Commandant Voija Tankosic et du nomme Milan Ciganovic, employe de I'Etat serbe, compromia par les resuU tats de I'instruction de Sarajevo ; "8° a empechcr, par des mesures eflBcaces, le concours des autorites serbes dans le trafic illicitc d'armes et d'explosifs a travers la frontiere ; "a licencier et punir severement les fonctionnaires du service-frontiere de Schabatz et de Loznica coupables d'avoir aide les auteurs du crime do Sarajevo en leur facilitant le passage de la frontiere ; "9° a donner au Gouvernemcnt Im- perial ct Royal des explications sur les propos injustifiables de hauts fonctipn- naires serbes tant en Serbie qu'a I'etranger, qui, malgre leur position officielle, n'ont pas hesite apres I'atten- tat du 28 juin de s'exprimer dans des interviews d'une. maniere hostile en- vers la Monarchie austro-hongroise ; enfin "10° d'avertir, sans retard, le Gou- vernemcnt Imperial et Royal de I'exe- cution des mesures comprises dans les points precedents. " Le Gouvernemcnt Imperial et Royal attend la reponsc du Gouvernement Royal au plus tard jusqu'au samedi, 25 de ce mois, a G heures du soir. "Un memoire concernant les resul- tats do I'instruction de Sarajevo a regard des ionctionnaires mentionnes aux points 7 et B efet annexe a cette note." J'ai I'honneur d'invitcr votre Excel- lence de vouloir porter le contenu de ■cette note a la connaissance du Gou- vernemcnt • aupres duquel vous etes .accredite, en accompagnant cette com- munication du commentaire que voici : Le 31 mars, 1909, le Gouvernement Royal serbe a adrcsse a I'Autrichc- Hongrie la declaration dont le texte est reproduit ci-dessus. Le lendemain meme de cette declara- tion la Serbie s'est engagee dans une politique tendant a inspirer des idees "5. To accept the collaboration m Scrvia of representatives of the Austro- Hungarian Government for the sup- pression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial in- tegrity of the Monarchy ; "6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of tho 28th June who are on Servian terri- tory ; delegates of the Austro-Hun- garian .Govenunent will take part in the investigation relating thereto ; "7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of. Major Voija Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian State employe, who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial enquiry at Sarajevo ; "8. To prevent by effective measures the co-operation of the Servian autho- rities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, to dis- miss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz and Loznica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier ; "9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian officials, both in Scrvia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position, have not hesi- tated since the crime of the 28th Juno to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hun- garian Government ; and, finally, "10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of tho measures com- prised under the preceding heads. "The Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment expect the reply of the Royal Government at the latest by G o'clock on Saturday evening, the 25th July. "A memorandum dealing with the results of the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo with regard to the officials mentioned under heads (7) and (8) is attached to this note." I have the honour to request your Excellency to bring the contents of this note to the knowledge of tho Government to which you are accredited, accompanying your com- munication with the following obser- vations : — On the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government addressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced above. On the very day after this declara- tion Scrvia embarked on a policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into tho subversives aux ressortissants serbes de la MonarcKie aiistro-hongroise et a pre- parer ainsi la separation des territoires austfo - hongrois, limitrophes a la Serbie. La Serbie devint' le foyer d'lmo agi- tation criminello. Des societes et affiliations ne tar- derent pas a se former qui, soit ouyer- tement, soit clandestinement> etaient destinees a creer des desordres sur le territoire austro-hongrois. Ces societes et affiliations comptent parmi leurs membres des generaux et des diplo- mates, des fonctionnairfes d'Etat et des juges, bref les sommites du monde officiel et inofficiel du royaume. Lo journalisme serbe est presque en- tierement au service de cetto propa- gande, dirigee contro TAutriche-Hon- grie, et pas un jour ne passe sans quo les organes de la presse serbe n'excitent leurs lecteurs a la haine et au niepris de la Monarchie voisine ou a des atten- tats diriges plus ou moins ouvertement centre sa surete et son integrite. Un grand nombre d'agents est appele h soutenir par tous les moyens I'agita- tion. centre rAutriche-Hongrie et a cor- rompro dans les provinces limitrophes la jeunesse de ces pays. L'esprit conspirateur des politiciens serbes, esprit dent les annales du royaume portent les sanglantes em^ preintes, a subi une recrudescence de- puis la derniere crise balkanique; des individus ayant fait partie des bandes jusque-la occupees en Macedoine sent venus se mettre a la disposition de la propagande terreriste contre 1' Autriche- Hongrie. En presence de ces agissements, auxquels rAutriche-Hongrie est ex- posee depuis de^ annees, le Geuverne- ment de la Serbie n'a pas cru devoir prendre la moindre mesure. C'est ainsi quo le Gouvernement serbe a manque au. devoir que lui imposait la declaration solennelle du 31 mars, 1909, et c'est ainsi qu'il s'est mis en contradiction avec la volonte de I'Europe et avec I'engagement qu'il avait pris vis-a-vis de I'Autriche- Hongrie. La longanimite du Gouvernement Imperial et Royal a I'egard de I'atti- tude provocjitrice de la Serbie etait inspireo du desinteressement territorial do la Monarchie austro-hongroise et de I'espoir que le Gouvernement serbe finirait tout de meme par apprecier a sa juste valeur I'amitie de I'Autriche- Hongrie. En observant une attitude bienveillante pour les interets poli- tiques de la Serbie, le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal esperait que le Serb subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and so preparing for the separation of the Austro-Hungarian territory on the Servian frontier. Servia became the centre • of a criminal agitation. No time was lost lii the formation of societies and groups, whose object either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on Austro-Hun- garian territory. These societies and groups count among their members generals and diplomatists, Government officials and judges— in short, men at tho top of official and unofficial society in the kingdom. Servian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propaganda, which is directed against Austria-Hun- gary, and not a day passes without tho organs of the Servian press stirring up their readers to hatred or contempt for tho neighbouring Monarchy, or to outrages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity. A large number of agents are em- ployed in carrying on. by every means the agitation against Austria-Hungary and corrupting the youth in the fron- tier provinces. Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence of the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which has left such san- guinary imprints on the history of the kingdom ; individuals belonging for- merly to bands employed in Macedonia have come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against Austria-Hungary. In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary has been ex- posed for years, the Servian Govern- ment have not thought it incumbent on them to take the slightest step. The Servian Government have thus failed in the duty imposed on them by the solemn declaration of the 31st March, 1909, and acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the under- taking given to Austria-Hungary. The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in the face of the provocative attitude of Servia was in- spired by the territorial disinterested- ness of the Austro-Hungarian Mon- archy and the hope that the Servian Government would end in spite of everything by appreciating Austria- Hungary's friendship at its true value. By observing a benevolent attitude to- wards the political interests of Servia, the Imperial and Royal Government 8 royaume se deciderait fmalement h suivre de son cote une ligne de con- duite analogue. L'Autriche-Hongrie s attendait surtout a une pareille evo- lution dans les ideas politiques en Serbie, lorsque, apres les evenements de I'annee 1912, le Gouvernement Im- perial et Royal rendit possible, par une attitude desinteressee et sans rancune, Tagrandissement si considerable de la Serbie. Cette bienveillance manifestee par ; I'Autriche-Hongrie a I'egard de I'Etat JToisin n'a cependant aucunement mo- ' difie les precedes du royaume, qui a continue a tolerer sur son territoire une propagande, dont les funestes con- sequences se sent manifestees au monde entier le 28 juin dernier, jour ou I'heritier presomptif de la Monarchic et son illustre epouse devinrent les vic- times d'un complot trame a Belgrade. En presence de cet etat de choses le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal a du se decider a entreprendre de nou- velles et pressantes demarches a Bel- grade afin d'amener le Gouvernement serbe a arreter le mouvement incen- diaire mena9ant la surete et I'integrit^ de la Monarchie austro-hongroise. Le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal est persuade qu'en entreprenant cette demarche il se trouve en plein accord avec les sentiments de toutes les nations civilisees, qui ne sauraient ad- mettre que le regicide devint une arme dont on puisse se servir impunement dans la lutte politique, et que la paix europeenne fut continuellement troublee par les agissements partant do Belgrade. C'est a I'appui de ce qui precede que le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal tient a la disposition du Gouvernement Royal de Grande-Bretagne un dossier elucidant les menees serbes et les rap- ports existant entre ces menees et le meurtre du 28 juin. Une communication identique est adressee aux reprcsentants Imperiaux et Royaux aupres des autres Puis- sances signataires. Vous etes autorise de laisser' une copie de cette depeche entre les mains de M. le Ministre des Affaires Etran- geres. Vienne, le 24 juillet, 1914. hoped that the kingdom would finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its own side. In particu- lar, Austria-Hungary expected a de- velopment of this kind in the political ideas of Servia, when, after the events of 1912, the Imperial and Royal Government, by its disinterested and ungrudging attitude, made such a con- siderable aggrandisement of Servia possible. The benevolence which Austria-Hun- gary showed towards the neighbouring State had no restraining effect on tho proceedings of the kingdom, which continued to tolerate on its territory a propaganda of which the fatal con- sequences were demonstrated to the whole world on the 28th June last, when the Heir Presumptive to the Monarchy and his illustrious consort fell yictims to a plot hatched at Bel- grade. In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Government have felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to inducing the Servian Government to stop the incendiary movement that is threatening tho security and integrity of the Austro* Hungarian Monarchy. The Imperial and Royal Govern- ment are convinced that in taking this step they will find themselves in full agreement with the sentiments of all civilised nations, who cannot permit regicide to become a weapon that can be employed with impunity in political strife, and the peace of Europe to bO continually disturbed by movements emanating from Belgrade. In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government hold at the disposal of the British Government a dossier elucidating the Servian in- trigues, and the connection between these intrigues and the murder of the 28th June. An identical communication has been addressed to the Imperial and Royal representatives accredited to the other signatory Powers. You are authorised to leave a copy of this despatch in the hands of tho Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, Juhj 24, 1914. Annexe. L'instruction criminelle ouverte par le Tribunal de Sarajevo centre Gavrilo Princip et consorts du chef d'assassinat et de complicite y relative— crime com- Annex. The criminal enquiry opened by the Court of Serajevo against Gavrilo Princip and his accessories in and before the act of assassination com- 9 mis par eux le 28 juin dernier— a jus- qu'ici abouti aiix constations sui- vantes: 1°. Le complot ayant pour but d'assassiner, lors de son sejour a Sara- jevo, de I'Archiduc Fran9ois-Ferdi- nand fut forme a Belgrade par Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Oabrinovic le nomme Milan Ciganovic et Trifko Grabez, avec le concours du comman- dant Voija Tankosi6. 2°. Les six bombes et les quatre pis- tolets Browning avec munition, moyen- nant lesquels les malfaiteurs ont com- mis I'attentat, furent livres a Bel- grade a Princip, Cabrinovic. et Grabez par lo nomme Milan Ciganovic et le commandant Voija Tankosic. 3^. Les bombes sont des grenades a la main provenant du depot d'armes do I'armee serbe a fCragujeva<5 4°. Pour assurer la reussite de I'at- tentat, Ciganovic enseigna a Princip, Cabrinovic et Grabez la mani^ro der se servir des grenades et donna, dans un foret pres du champ de tir a Topschider, des le9oris de tir avec pistolets Brown- ing a Princip et Grabez. 5*^. Pour re'ndre possible a Princip, Cabrinovio et Grabez de passer la fron- tiere de Bosnie-Herzegovine et d'y in- troduire clandestinement leur contre- bando d'armes, iin systems de trans- port secret fut organise par Ciganovic. D'apres cette organisation I'intro- duction en Bosnie-Herzegovine des malfaiteurs et de leurs armes fut operee par les capitaines-frontieres de Chabac (Rade Popovic) et de Loznica ainsi que par le douanier Rudivoj Grbic de Loznica avec le concours de divers particuliers. mitted by them on the 28th Juno last; has up to the present led to the follow- ing conclusions: — 1. The plot, having as its object the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand at the time of his visit to Serajevo, was formed at Belgrade by Gavrilo Princip* Nedeljko Cabrinovic, one Milan Ciganovic, and Trifko Grabez, with the assistance of Com- mander Voija Tankosic. 2. The six bombs and the four Browning pistols and ammunition with which the guilty parties com- mitted the act were delivered to Princip, ('cabrinovic and Grabe'2. by the man Milan 6iganovi6 and Com- mander Voija Tankosi6 at Belgrade. 3. The bombs are hand-grenades coming from the arms depot of tho Servian Army at Kragujevac. 4. In order to ensure the succesis of the act, Ciganovic taught Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez how to use the bombs, and gave lessons m firing Browning pistols to Princip dnd Grabez in a forest near the shooting ground at Topschider. 5. To enable Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabe2 to cross the frontier of Bosnia-Herzegovina and smuggle in their contraband of arms secretly, a secret system of transport was orga- nised by Ciganovic. By this arrangement the introduc- tion into Bosnia-Herzegovina of crimi- nals and their arms was effected by. the officials controlling the frontiers at Chabac (Eade Popovic) and Loznica,' as well as by the customs officer Eudivoj Grbic, of Loznica, with the assistance of various individuals. No. 5. Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bv/nsen^ British Ambassador at Vienna. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 24, 1914. Note addressed to Servia, together with an explanation of the reasons leading up to it, has been communicated to me by Count Mensdorff.*. In the ensuing conversation with his Excellency, I remarked that it seemed to me a matter for great regret that a time limit, and such a short one at that, had been insisted upon at ^this stage of the proceedings. The murder of the Archduke and some of the circumstances respecting Servia quoted in the note aroused sympathy with Austria, as was but' natural, but at the same time I had never before seen one State address to ahother independent State a document of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Servia's independent sovereignty if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of Servia. I added that I felt great apprehension, and that I should concern myself- with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of the peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between Austria and Servia were not the concern of His Majesty's Government, ahd such comments as I had made above v/ere not made in order to discuss those merits, * Austro-Hungarkn Ambassador ia London. 2 2 10 I ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an exchange of views with other Powers, and that I must await their views as to what could done to mitigate the difficulties of the situation. Count Mensdorff* replied that the present situation might never have arisen if Servia had held out a hand after the murder of the Archduke ; Servia had, however, shown no sign of sympathy or help, though some weeks had already elapsed since the murder ; a time limit, said his Excellency, Avas essential, owing to the x^rocrastination on Servia's part. I said that if Servia had procrastinated in replying, a time limit could have been introduced later ; but, as things now stood, the terms of the Servian reply had been dictated by Austria, who had -not been content to limit herself to a demand for a reply within a limit of forty-eight hours from its presentation./' * Austro-Huagarian Ambassador in London. No. 6. Sir G, Buchanan, Bntish AmhassadoQ" at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edioard Chrey^ — (Becdved Jtdy 24.) (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 24, 1914. I HAD a telephone message this morning from M. Sazonof* to the effect that /the text of the Austrian ultimatum had just -reached him His Excellency added that a reply within forty-eight hours was demanded, fRnd' he begged me 1o meet him at the French Embassy to discuss matters, as Austrian step clearly meant that waf was imminent. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's conduct was both provoca- tive and immoral ; she would never have taken such action unless Germany had first been consulted ; some of her demands were quite impossible of acceptance. He hoped that His Majesty's Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France. The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfil all the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia, if necessity arose, besides, supporting Russia strongly in any diplomatic negotiations. I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their Excellencies }iad just said to .me. I could not, of course, speak in the name of His Majesty's Government, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from His Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional .engagement on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion. To this M. Sazonof replied that we must not forget that the general European question was involved, the Servian question being but a part of the former, and that Great Britain could not afford to efface herself from the problems now at issue In reply to these remarks, I observed that I gathered from Avhat he said that his Excellency was suggesting that Great Britain should join in making a communication tp Austria to the effect that active intervention by her in the internal affairs of Servia could not be tolerated. But supposing Austria nevertheless proceeded to embark on military measures against Servia in spite of our representations, was it the intention of the Russian Government forth- with to declare v.ar on Austria ? M. Sazonof* said that he himself thought that Russian mobilisation would at any rate have to be carried out ; but a council of Ministers was being held this afternoon to consider the whole question. A further council would be held, probably to-morrow, at which the Emperor would preside, when a decision would be come to I said that it seemed to me that the important point was to induce Austria 'to extend the time limit, and that the first thing to do was to bring an influence to bear on Austria with that tsnd in view; Freiich Ambassador, however, thought that either Austria had made up her mind to act at once or that she was bluffing. Whichever it might be, our only chance of averting war was for lis to adopt a firm and united attitude. He did not think there was time to carry out my suggestion. Thereupon I said that it seemed to mo desirable that we should know just how far Servia was prepared to go to meet the * Russian Minister- for Foreign Affairs. 1 ws 1 bo 1 11 demands formulated by Austria in her note. M. Sazonof replied that he must first consult his colleagues on this point, but that doubtless some of the Austrian demands could be accepted by Servia. French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continued to press me for a declaration of complete solidarity of His Majesty's Government with French and Eussian Governments, and I therefore said that it seemed to me possible •that you might perhaps be willing fo make strong representations to both German and Austrian Governments, urging upon them that an attack by Austria upon Servia would endanger the whole peace of Europe. Perhaps you might see your way to saying to them that such action on the part of Austria would probably mean Russian intervention, which would involve France and Germany, and that it would be difficult for Great Britain to keep out if the war were to become general. M. Sazonof answered that we would sooner or later be dragged into war if it did break out ; we should have rendered war more likely if we did not from the outset make common cause with his country and with France; at any rate, he hoped His Majesty's Government would' express strong reprobation of action taken by Austria. , President of French Republic and President of the Council cannot reach France, on their return from Russia, for four or five days, and it looks as though Austria purposely chose this moment to present their ultimatum. It seems to me, from the language held by French Ambassador, that, even if we decline to join them, France and Russia are determined to make a strong stand. No. 7. Sir M. de JBwisen, British Ambassador at Vienna^ to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 2i.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna^ Jtihj 24, 1914. Before departing on leave of absence, I was assured by Russian Ambassador that any action taken by Austria to humiliate Servia could not leave Russia indifferent. ^ Russian Cliarge d'Affaires was received this morning by Minister for Foreign Affairs, and said to him, as his own personal view> that Austrian. not© was drawn up in a form rendering it impossible of acceptance as it stood, and . that it was both unusual and peremptory in its terms. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that Austrian Minister was under instructions to leave Bel- grade unless Austrian demands were accepted integrally by 4 r.M., to-iiiorrow. His Excellency added that Dual Monarchy felt that its very existence was at stake ; and that the step taken had caused great satisfaction throughout the country. He did not think that objections to what had been done could be raised by any Power. No. 8. Mr. Cracka/nthorpej British Charge d^ Affaires at Belgrade^ to Sir Edward Grey. — {^Received July 24.) (Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 24, 1914. Austrian demands are considered absolutely unacceptable by Servian Government, who earnestly trust that His Majesty's Government may see their way to induce Austrian Government to moderate them. This request was conveyed to me by Servian Prime Minister, who returned early this morning to Belgrade. His Excellency is dejected, and is clearly very anxious as to developments that may arise. No. 9. JSfote communicated by German Ambassador*, July 24, '19 14. The publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning the bircumstances under which X\>:q assassination of the Austrian heir presumptive and bfs consort has taken place disclose unmistakably the aims which the Great Servian propaganda has set itself, and the means it employs to realise ihem. " The facts now made known must also do away with the last dqubts 12 that the centre of activity of all those tendencies which are directed towards the detachment of the Southern Slav provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their incorporation into the Servian Kingdom is to be found in Belgrade, and is at work there with at least the connivance of members of Government and army. The Servian intrigues have been going on for many years. In an especially marked form the Great Servian chauvinism manifested itself during the Bosnian crisis. It was only owing to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and to the energetic inter- ference of the Great Powers that the Servian provocations to which Austria- Hungary was then exposed did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of good conduct in future which was given by the Servian Government at that time has not been kept. Under the eyes, at least with the tacit permission of official Servia, the Great Servian propaganda has continuously increased in extension and intensity ; to its account must be set the recent crime, the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It' has become clearly evident that it ^'ould not be consistent either with the dignity or with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy still longer to remain inactive in face of this movement on the other side of the trontler, by "which the security and the integrity of her territories are constantly menaced. Under these circum- stances, the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as equitable and moderate. In spite of that, the attitude which public opinion as well as the Government in Servia have recently adopted does not exclude the. apprehension that the Servian Govern- ment might refuse to comply with those demands, and might allow themselves to be carried away into a provocative attitude against Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Government, if it does not wish . definitely to abandon Austria's position as a Great Power, would then have no choice but to obtain the fulfilment of their demands from the Servian Government by strong pressure and, if necessary, by using military measures, the choice of the means having to be left to them. The Imperial Government want to emphasise their opinion that in the present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that the Great Powers ought seriously to endeavour to reserve it to those two immediately concerned. The Imperial Government desire urgently the localisation of the conflict, because every interference of another Power would, owing to the different treaty obligations, be followed by incalculable consequences. No. 10. Sir Edijcard Grey to Sir F. Bertie^ British Ambassador at Paris. Sir, Foreign Office, July 24, 1914. After telling M. Cambon* to-day of the Austrian communication to Servia, which I had received this morning, and of the comment 1 had made to Count Mensdorflt upon it yesterday, I told M. Cambon that this afternoon I was to see the German Ambassador, who some days ago had asked me privately to exercise moderating influence in St. Petersburgh. I would say to the Ambas- sador that, of course, if the presentation of this ultimatum to Servia did not' lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, we need not concern ourselves about it ; but, if Russia took the view of the Austrian ultimatum., which it seemed to me that any Power interested m Servia would take, I should be quite powerless, in face of the terms of the ultimatum, to exercise any moderating influence. I would say that I thought the only* chance of any mediating or moderating influence being exercised was that Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves, who had not direct interests in Servia, should act together for* the sake of peace, simultaneously in Vienna and St. Petersburgh.. M. CamboTi said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the four Powers, he had no doubt that his Government T\'ould be glad to join in it; but he pointed out that we could not say anything in St. Petersburgh till Russia had expressed some opinion or taken some action. But, when two days were over, Austria would march into Servia, for the Servians could not possibly accept, * French Ambassador in London. t Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. 13 the Austrian demand. Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Servia, and therefore, once the Aiistrians had attacked Servia, it would be too late for any mediation. I said that I had not contemplated anything being said in St. Petersburgh until after it was clear that there must be trouble between Austria and Russia. I had thought that if Austria did move into Servia, and Russia then mobilised, it would bo possible for the four Powers to urge Austria to stop her advance, and Russia also to stop hersy pending mediation. But it would be essential for any chance of success for such a step that Germ.any should partioipato in it. M. Cambon said that it would be too late after Austria had once moved agains^t Servia. Tho important thing was to gain time by mediation in Vienna. The best chance of this being accepted woukl be that Germany should propose it to the other Powers. I said that by this he meant a mediation between Austria and Servia. He replied that it was so. I said that I would talk to the German Ambassador this afternoon on tho subject. I am, &c. E. GREY. No. 11. Sir Edward Grey to /Sir 11. Buinbold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 24, 1914. German Ambassador ' has communicated to me the view of the German Government about the Austrian demand in Servia. I understand the German Government is making the same communication to tho Powers. I said that if the Austrian ultimatum to Servia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia I had no concern with it ; I had heard nothing yet from St. Petersburgh, but I was very apprehensive of tho view Russia would take of the situation. I reminded tho German Ambassador that some d^ys ago he had expressed a personal hope that if need arose I would endeavolir to exercise moderating influence at St. Petersburgh, but now I said that, in view of the extraordinarily stifF character of the Austrian note, the shortness of the time allowed, and the wide scope of the demands upon Servia, I felt quite helpless as far as Russia was concerned, and I did not believe any Power could exercii*^ influence alone. The only chance I xjould see of mediating or moderating influence being, effective, was that the four Powers, Germany, Italy, France, and ourselves, should work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburgh in favour of moderation in tho event of tlie relations between Austria and Russia becom- ing threatening. The immediate danger was that in a few hours Austria might march into Servia and Russian Slav opinion demand that Russia should march to help' Servia ; it would bo very desirable to get Austria not to precipitate military action and so to gain more time. But none of us could influence Austria in this direction unless Germany would propose and participate in such action at Vienna. You should inform Secretary of State. Prince Lichnowsky* said that Austria might be expected to move when the time limit expired unless Servia could give unconditional acceptance of Austrian demands in tofo. Speaking privately, his Excellency suggested that a negative reply must in no case be returned by Servia ; a reply favourable on some points must be sent at once, so that an excuse against immediate action might be afforded to Austria. ■•• German Ambassador in London. No. 12. Sir Edicard Grey to Mr. Crackardhorpej British Cluv(jt d' Affaires at Btlfjrade. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 24, 1914. Servia ought to promise that, if it is proved that Servian officials, however subordinate they may be, were accomplices in tho murder of. the Archduke at 14 Serajevo, she will give Austria the fullest satisfaction. She certainly ought to express concern and regret. For the rest, Servian Government must reply to Austrian demands a?? they consider best in Servian interests. It is impossible to say whether military action by Austria when time limit expires can be averted by anything but unconditional acceptance of her de- mands, but only chance appears to lie in avoiding an absolute refusal and replying favourably to as many points as the time limit allows. Servian Minister here has begged that His Majesty's Government will- express their views, but T cannot undertake responsibility of saying more than I have said above, and I do not like to say even that without knowing what is being said at Belgrade by French and Russian. Governments. You should therefore consult your French and Russian colleagues as to repeating what my views are, as .expressed above, to Servian Government. I have urged upon German Ambassador that Austria should not precipitate military action. No. 13. Note communicated by Russian Ambassador, .Tnbf 25. (Translation.) M;- Sazonof telegraphic au Charge d' Affaires de Russie a Vionne en date dull (24) juillet, 1914: "La communication du "Gouverne- ment austro-hongrois aux Puissances le lendemain de la presentation de r ultimatum a Belgrade ne laisse aux Puissances qu'un dtlai tout a tait in- ^uffisant pour entreprendre quoi qu'il Boit d'utile pour I'aplanissement des complications surgies. "Pour prevcnir les consequences in- calculables et egalement nefast*^^ pour toutes les Puissances qui peuvent suivre le mode d'action du Gouverne- ment austro-hongrois, il nous parait indispensable qu'avant tout le delai donne a la Serbie pour repondre soit prolonge. L'Autriche-Hongn^. se de- clarant disposee a informer le?^ Puis- sances des donnees de I'enqnete sur lesquelles le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal base ses accusations, devrait leur donner egalement le temps de s'en rendre compte. "En ce cas, si les Puissances; se con- vainquaient du bien-fonde de oprtames des exigences autrichiennes, elles se trouveraient en mcsure de fairo par- venir au Gouvernem.ent serbe des con- seils en consequence. " Un ref us de prolonger le terme de i'ultimatum priverait de toute portee la demarche du Gouvernement austro- hongrois aupres des Puissances et se trouvcrait en contradiction avec les bases meme des relations interna- tional es. "Le Prince Koudachef est charge de communiquer ce qui precede au Cabi- net de Vienne." M. Sazonof espere que le Gouverne- ment de Sa Majeste britanniquc ad- M. Sazonof telegraphs to the Russian Charge d Affaires at Vienna on the Uth (24th^ Ti.ly. 1914- The communication made by Austria- Hungary to the Powers the day after the presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade I^.aves a period to the Pnwors which is quite insuffi- cient to enable them to take any «4teps which might help to smooth away the difficulties that have arisen. "In order to pr^vpnt the conse- quences, equally incalculable and fatal to all the Power**, which may result from the course of action followed by the Austro-Hunganan Government, it seems to us to be above all essential that the period allowed for the Servian reply should be extended. Austria- Hungary, having declared her readiness to inform the Powers of the results of the enquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal Govern- ment bnse their accusations, should eqna^ly si How them sufficient time to studv them. " In this CH.se. if the Powers were convinced that certain of the Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in a position to offer advice to the Servian Government. "A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory the proposals made by the Austro- Hungarian Government to the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of international I'elations. "Prince Kudachef is instructed to communicate the above to the Cabinet at Vienna.'' M. Sazonof hopes that His Britannic Majesty's Government will adhere to 15 herera au point de vue expose, et il the point of view set forth above, and exprime I'espoir que Sir Edward Grey he trusts that Sir E. Grey will see his voudra biei> munir TAmbassadeur way to furnish similar instructions to d'Angleterre a Vienne d'instructions the British Ambassador at Vienna, conformes. No. 14. /SVr Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie^ British Ambassador at Paris, and to Sir G, Buchanan, British Ambassador at St, Peter sburgh. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. Austrian Ambassador has been "authorised to explain to me that the step taken at Belgrade was not an ultimatum, but a demarche with a time limit, and that if the Austrian demands were not complied with within the time limit the Austro-Hungarian Government would break off diplomatic relations and begin military preparations, not operations. In case Austro-Hungarian Government have not given the same informa- tion at Paris (St, Petersburgh), you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs as soon as possible ; it makes the immediate situation rather less acute. No. 15. Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — {RfXiived'July 26.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 25, 1914. I LEARN from the Acting Political Director that the French Government have not yet received the explanation from the Austrian Governmeijt con- tained in your telegram of to-day.* They have, however, through the Sebvian Minister here, given similar advice to Servia as was contained in your telegram to Belgrade of yesterday.t * See No. U. f See No. 12. No. 16. Sir F. Berlie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 25.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 25, 1914. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has no suggestions to make except that moderating advice might be given at Vienna as well as Belgrade. Ho hopes that the Servian Government's answer to the Austrian ultimatum will be sufficiently favourable to obviate extreme measures being taken by the Austrian Government. He says, however, that there would be a revolution in Servia if she were to accept the Austrian demands in their entirety. No. 17. Sir G. Buchanan^ British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward ^rey, — -{Received July 25.) (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 25, 1914. I SAW the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, and communicated to his Excellency the substance of your telegram of to-day to Paris,* and this afternoon I discussed witli him the communication which the French Ambassa- dor suggested should be made to the Servian Government, as recorded in your telegram of yesterday to Belgrade. t The Minister for Foreign Affairs said, as regards the former, that tho explanations of the Austrian Ambassador did not quite correspond with tho information which had reached him from German quarters. As regards the latter, both his Excellency and the French Ambassador agreed that it is too late to make such a communication, as the time limit expires this evening. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Servia was quite ready to do as you had suggested and to punish those proved to be guilty, but that no inde- pendent State could be expected to accept the political demands which had been put forward. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thought, .from a conversa- * See No, 14. + See No. 12. 16 tion which he had with the Servian Minister yesterday, that, in the event^ of the Austrians attacking Servia,' the Servian Qovernment would abandon Belgrade, and withdrauj: their forces into the interior, while they would at the B&mo time appeal to the Powers to help them. His Excellendy was in favour of their making this appeal. He would like to see the question placed on an international footing, as the obligations taken by Servia in 1908, to which reference is made in the Austrian ultimatum, were given not to Austria, but to the Powers. If Servia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready tq stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. It was possible, in his opinion, that Servia might propose to submit the question to arbitration. On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilising until you had had time to use j^our influence in favour of peace, his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions, and she would take fio action until it was forced upon her. Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present statiLS quo in the Balkans, and establishing her OAvn hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany really, wanted war, but her attitude .was decided by purs. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no, war. If we failed them now, rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war. I said that England could play the role of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to better purpose as friend who, if her eounsels of moderation were disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if she were to declare herself Russia's ally at once. His Excellency said that unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count upon our neutrality. I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilised, Germany would not be content with mere mobilisation, or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once. His Excellency replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush Servia and become the predominant Power in the Balkans, End, if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war. He assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflipt, but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I could regard the situation as desperate. No. 18. Sii' H, Rumholdj British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin^ to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 25.) ^Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 25, 1914. Your telegram of the 24th July* acted on. Secreti^ry of State says that on receipt of a telegram at 10 this morning from German Ambassador at London, he immediately instructed German Ambassador at Vienna to pass on to Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs your suggestion for an extension of time limit, and to speak to his Excellency about it. Unfortunately it appeared from press that Count Berchtoldt is at Ischl, and Secretary of State thought that in these circumstances there would be delay and difficulty in getting time limit extended. Secretary of State said tliat lie did not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the spot, but he admitted quite freely that Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give the Servians a lesson, and that they meant to take military action. He also .admitted that Servian Goternment could not swallow certain of the Austro- Hungarian demands. Secretary of State said that a reassuring feature of situation was that Count Berciitold had sent for Russian representative at Vienna and had told him that Austria-Hungary had no intention of seizing Servian territory. This step should, in his opinion, exercise a calming influence at St. Petersburgh. I asked whether it was not to be feared that, in taking military action against Servia. Austria would dangerously excite public opinion in Russia. He said he thought not. Ho remained of opinion that crisis could be localised. I said that telegrams from Russia in this morning's papers did not look very reassuring, but he maintained his optimistic view '^ith regard to Russia. He * Sec No. 11. t Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 17 said that he had given the Russian Government to understand that last thing Germany wanted was a general war, and he would do all in his power to prevent such a calamity. If the relations between Austria and Russia beca«me threatening, he was quite ready to fall in with your suggestion as to the^four Powers working in favour of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburgh. Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the note left much' to be desired as a diplomatic document. He repeated very earnestly that, though he had been accused of knowing all about the contents of that note, he had in fact had no such knowledge. No. 19. /SVr A*, liodd, Briiish Ambassador at Rome, to Svr Edivard Gr&y. — (heceived July 25.) (Telegraphic.) 7?ome, JvXy 25, 1914. I SAW the Secretary-General this m.orning and found that he knew of tho suggestion that France, Italy, Germany, and ourselves should work at Vienna and St. Petersburgh in favour of moderation, if the relations between Austria and Servia become menacing. In his opinion Austria will only be restrained by the unconditional accept- ance by tho Servian Government of her note. There is reliable information that Austria intends to seize the Salonica Railway. • No. 20. ISir M. de Bunsen, Bi'itish Amhass'idor at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 25.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 25, 1914. Language of press this morning leaves the impression that the surrender ' of Servia is neither expected nor really desired. It is officially announced that the Austrian Minister is instructed to leave Belgrade with staff pf legation failing unconditional acceptance of note at 6 p.m. to-day. Minister for Foreign Affairs goes to Ischl to-day to communicate personally to the Emperor Servian reply when it comes. No. 21. Mr, Crackanthoiye, British Charge d* Affaires at Belgrade^ to Sir Edward Grey, — {Received July 25.) (Telegraphic.) ' Bplgrade, Jvly 25, 1914. The Council of Ministers is now drawing up their reply to the Austrian note. I am informed by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that it will be most conciliatory and will meet the Austrian demands in as large a measure as is possible. The following is a brief summary of the projected reply: — The Servian Government consent to tho publication oi,a declaration in the '"Official Gazette." The ten points are accepted with reservations. Serviau Government declare themselves ready to agree to a mixed commission of enquiry so long as the appointment of the commission can be shown to be in accordance with international usage. They consent to dismiss and prosecute those officers who can be clearly proved to be guilty, and they have already arrested tho officer referred to in the Austrian note. They are prepared to suppress the Narodna Odbrana. The Servian Government consider that, unless the Austrian Government 'want war at any cost, they cannot but be content with the full satisfaction offered in the Servian reply. No. 22. Mr. CrachantJior'pe] British Chan^ge d' Affaires at Belgrade^ to Sir Edivard Grey.— {Recemed July 25.) (Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914. I HAVE seen the new French Minister, who has just arrived from Con- stantinople, and m^y Russian colleague, and informed them of your views. \ They have not yet received instruoiions from their Governments, and itx 18 fiew of this and of the proposed conciliatory terms of the Servian reply, 1 nave up tq now abstained from offering advice to the Servian Government. I think it is highly probable that the Russian Government have already urged the utmost moderation on the Servian Government. i>Io. 23. M?'. Crachanthorpey British Charge cC Affaires at Belgrade^ to !bir Edivard Grey, — {Received Jxdy 25.) (Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914. The Austrian Minister left at 6.30. The Government nave left for Nish, where the Skuptchina* will meet on lilonday. I am leaving with my other colleagues, but the vice-consul is remaining in charge of the archives. * The Servian Parliament. No. 24. Sir Edicard Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Feiei'sburgh, (Telegraphic.) - Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. You spoke quite rightly in very difficult circumstances as to the attitude cf His Majesty's Government. I entirely approve what you said, as reported in your telegram of yesterday,* and I cannot promise more on behalf of the Government. I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to sanction our going to war over a Servian quarrel. If, however, war does take place, the development of other issues may draw us into it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent it. The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian demarche makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will have mobilised against each other. In this event, the only chance of peace, in my opinion, is for the other four Powers to join in asking the Austrian and -Russian Governments not to cross the frontier, and to give time for the four Powers acting at Vienna and St. Petersburg!! to try and arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this view, I feel strongly that. France and ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly co-operate. No diplomatic intervention or mediation would be tolerated by either Russia or Austria unless it was clearly impartial and included the allies or friends of both. The co-operation of Germany would, therefore, be essential. * See No. 6. No. 25. Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rwnhold, British Charge dJ Affaires at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. The Austrian Ambassador has been authorised to inform me that the Austrian method of procedure on expiry of the time, limit would be to break off diplomatic relations and commence military preparations, but not military operations. In informing the German Ambassador of this, I said that it inter- posed a stage of mobilisation before the frontier was actually crossed, which I had urged yesterday should be delayed. Apparently we should now soon 1)0 face to face with the mobilisation of Austria and Russia. The only chance of peace, if this did happen, would be for Germany, France, Russia, and ourselves to keep together, and to join in asking Austria and Russia not to cross the frontier till we had liad time to try and arrange matters between them. The German Ambassador read me a telegram from the German Foreign Office saying that his Gavernment had not known beforehand, and had had no more than other Powers to do with the stiff terms of the Austrian note to Servia, but once she* had launched that note, Austria could not draw back. Prince Lio'inojvsky* said, however, that if what I contemplated was mediation Ocrman Ambassador in London. 19 betwoen Austria and Russia, Austria might be able with dignity to accept it^ He expressed himself as personally favonrablo to this suggestion. I concurred in his observation, and said that I felt I had no titld to inter- vene between Austria and Servia, but as soon as the question became one as between Austria and Russia, the peace of Europe was affected, in which we must all take a hand I impressed upon the Ambassador that, in the event of Russian and Austrian mobilisation, the participation of Germany would be essential to any diplomatic action for peace. Alone Ave could do nothing. The French Govern- ment were travelling at the moment, and I had had no time to consult them, and could not therefore be sure of their views, but I was prepared, if tho German Government agreed with my suggestion, to tell the French Govern- ment that I thought it the right thing to act upon it. No. 2G. Sw Eckum-d Grey to Sw M. de Bvmse/ii, British Ambassador at Vienna. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office July 25, 1914. The Russian Ambassador has communicated to me the following telegram which his Government have sent to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, with instructions to communicate it to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs: — ''The delay given to Servia for a reply is so limited that the Powers are prevented from taking any steps to avert the complications which are threatening. The Russian Government trust that the Austrian Government will prolong the time limit, and as the latter have declared their willingness to inform the Powers of the data on which they have based their demands on Servia, the Russian Government hope that these particulars will be furnished in order that the Powers may examine the matter. If they k>und that some of the Austrian requests were well founded, they would be in a position to advise the Servian Government accordingly. If the Austrian Government were indisposed to prolong the time limit, not only would they be acting against international ethics, but they would deprive their communication to the Powers of any i)ractical meaning." You may support in general terms the step taken by your Russian colleague. Since the telegram to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna was sent, it has been a relief to liear that the steps, which the Austrian Government were taking were to be limited for the moment to the rupture of relations and to military preparations, and not operations. I trust, therefore, that if tho Austro-Hungarian Government consider it too late to prolong the time limit, they will at any rate give time in the sense and for the reasons desired by Russia before taking any irretrievable steps. No. 27. JSvr EdAoa/rd Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Biitish Ambassador at PariSy Sir II. Rimibold, British Charge dAffaires at Berlin, and Sir G. Buchanan, British jlmhassador at St. Fetershurgh. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office. July 25, 1914. I HAVE communicated to German Ambassador the forecast of vthe Servian reply contained in Mr. Crackanthorpe's telegra;m of to-day.* I have said that, if Servian reply, when received at Vienna, corresponds to this forecast, I hope tho German Government will feel able to influence the Austrian Government to take a favourable view of it. • See No. 21. No. 28. [Nil.] I 20 No. 29. Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, BHtish Ambassador at Rome. ( Sir, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. The Italian Ambassador came to see me to-day. I told him in general terms what I had said to the German Ambassador this morning. The Italian Ambassador cordially approved of this. He jnade no secret of- the fact that Italy was most desirous to see war avoided. I am, &c. E. GREY. No. 30. Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade. Sir, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. The Servian Minister called on the 23rd instant and spoke to Sir A. Nicolson^ on the present strained relations between Servia and Austria-Hungary. He said that his Government were most anxious and disquieted. They were perfectly ready to me^t any reasonable demands of Austria-Hungary so long as such demands were kept on the "terrain juridique." If the results of the enquiry at Sarajevo — an enquiry conducted with so much mystery and secrecy — disclosed the fact that there were any individuals conspiring or organising plots on Servian territory, the Servian Government would be quite ready to take the necessary steps ^ give satisfaction; but if Austria trans- ported the question on to the political ground, and said that Servian policy, being inconvenient to her, must undergo a radical change, and that Servia must abandon cci-tain political ideals, no independent State would, or could, submit to such dictation. He mentioned that both the assassins of the Archduke were Austrian subjects — Bosniaks ; that one of them had been in Servia, and that the Servian authorities, considering him suspect and dangerous, had desired to expel him> but on applying to the Austrian autht)rities found that the latter protected him, and said that he was an innocent and harmless individual. Sir A. Nicolson,^on being asked by M. Boschkovitcht his opinion on the whole question, observed that there were no data on which to base one, though it was to be hoped that the Servian Government would endeavour to meet the^ Austrian demands in a conciliatory and moderate spirit. I am, &c. ^ , E. GREY. * British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, t Servian Minister in London. No. 31. Sir M. de Buns'-.n^ British Ambassador at Vienna^ to Sir Edward Grey.-^ ^ {Received July 26.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 25, 1914. Servian reply to the Austro-Hungarian demands is not considered satis- factory, and the Austro-Hungarian Minister has left Belgrade. War is thought to be imminent. No. 32. Sir M. de Bunsen^ British Ambassador at Vienna ^ to Sir Edward Grey* — * {Received July 26.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 26, 1914. According to confident belief of German Ambassador, Russia will keep quiet during chastisement of Servia, which Austria-Hungary is resolved to inflict, having received assurances that no Servian territory will be annexed by Austria-Hungary. In reply to my question whether Russian Government might not be compelled by public opinion to intervene on behalf of kindred nationality, ho said that everything depended on the personality of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who could resist easily, if he chose, the pressure of a few newspapers. He pointed out that the days of Pan-Slav agitation in Russia were over and that Moscow was perfectly quiet. The Russian Minister 21 for Foreign Affairs would not, his Excellency thought, be so imprudent as to take a step which wourd probably result in many frontier questions in which Russia is interested, such as Swedish, Polish, Ruthene, Roumanigin, and Persian questions being brought into tho melting-pot. France, too, was not at all in a condition for facing a war. I replied that matters had, I thought, been made a little difficult for other Powers by the tone of Austro-Hungarian Government's ultimatum to Servia. One naturally sympathised with many of the requirements of the ultimatum, if only the manner of expressing them had been more temperate. It was, however, impossible, according to the German Ambassador, to speak effectively in any other way to Servia. Servia was about to receive a lesson which she required ; the quarrel, however, ought not to be extended in any way to foreign countries. He doubted Russia, who had no right to assume a protectorate over Servia, acting as if she made any such claim. As for Germany she knew very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter. The German Ambassador had heard of a letter addressed by you yesterday to the German Ambassador in London in which you expressed the hope that the Servian concessions would be regarded as satisfactory. Ho asked whether I had been informed that a pretence of giving way at the last moment had been made by the Servian Government. I had, I said, heard that on practically every point Servia had been willing to give in. His Excellency replied that Servian concessions were all a sham. Servia proved that she well knew that they were insufficient to satisfy the legitimate demands of Austria-Hungary by the fact that before making her offer she had ordered mobilisation and retirement of Government from Belgrade. No. 33. Sir H. Bumhold, British Charge cV Affaires at Berlin^ to Sir Edivard Grey. — [Received Jidij 2G.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 26, 1914. Emperor returns suddenly to-night, and Under-Secretary of State says that Foreign Office regret this step, which was taken on His Majesty's own initiative. They fear that His Majesty's sudden return may cause speculation and excite- ment. Under-Secretary of State likewise told me that German Ambassador at St. Petersburgh had reported that, in conversation with Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, latter had said that if Austria annexed bits of Servian territory Russia would not remain indifferent. Under-Secretary of State drew conclusion that Russia would not act if Austria did not annex territory. No. 34. Sir H. Rumbold, British Charge d^ Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 26.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 26, 1914. Under-Secretary of State has just telephoned to me to say that German Ambassador at Vienna has been instructed to pass on to Austro-Hunf^arian Government your hopes that they may take a favourable view of Servian'^reply if it corresponds to the forecast contained in Belgrade telegram of 25th JuW.* Under-Secretary of State considers very fact of their making this communi- cation to Austro-Hungarian Government implies that they associate themselvefi to a certain extent with your hope. German Governm.ent do not see their way to going beyond this. * See No. 21. No. 35. Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. {Received July 26.) (Telegraphic.) Borne, July 26, 1914. Minister for Foreign Affairs welcomes your proposal for a conference, and will instruct Italian Ambassador to-night accordingly.' xiustrian Ambassador has informed Italian Government this evening that Minister in Belgrade had been recalled, but that this did not imply declaration of war. 22 No. 36. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F, Bertie, 'British Ambassador at Paris, Sir IT, Rumbold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, and Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome. (Telegraphic.) Forcig)i Office, Jidy 26, 1914. Would Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct Ambassador here to join with representatives of France, Italy, and Germany, and myself to meet here in conference immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications? You should ask -Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he would do this. If so, when bringing the above suggestion to the notice of tlio Governments to whicli they are accredited, representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh should be authorised to request that all active military operations should be suspended pending results of conference. No. 37. Sir EdiLKird Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 26, 1914. Berlin telegram of 25tli July.* It is important to know if France will agree to suggested action by the four Powers if necessary. * Sec No. 18. No. 38. Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edivard Grey. — [Received Jidy 27.) Sir, Rome, July 23, 1914. I FATHER that the Italian Government have been made cognisant of the terms of the communication which will be addressed to Servia. Secretary- General, whom I saw this morning at tlie' Italian Foreign Office, took the view that the gravity of the situation lay in the conviction of the Austro- Hungarian Government that it was absolutely necessary for their prestige, after the many disillusions which the turn of events in the Balkans has occasioned, to score, a definite success. I have, &c. RENNELL RODD No. 39. Reply of Servian Government to Aitstro-Hungarian Xote. — {Communicated by the Servian Minister, July 27.) (Translation.) Le Gouvernenicnt Royal serbe a The Royal Servian Government rccu la communication du Gouvcrne- have received the communication of ment Imperial et Royal du *10 de. co the Imperial and Royal Government mois et il est persuade que sa reponse of the 10th instant,* and are con- eloignera tout malcntendu qui menace vinced that their reply v\'ill remove de gater les bons rapports de voisinage any misunderstanding which may cntre la Monarchic austro-hongroise et threaten to impair the good ncigh- lo Iloyaurac de Serbie. bonrly rclatiouij between the Austro- Hungarian Monarchy and the King- dom of Servia. Le Gouvernement Royal conscient Conscious of the fact that the pro- que les protestations qui ont apparu tests which were made botii from the tant de la tribune de la Skoupchtina tribune of the national Skuptchinat nationale que dans les declarations et and in the declarations and actions of le.s actes des representants respon- the responsible representatives of the sables de I'fitat, protestations qui State — protests which were cut short furent coupees court par les declara- by the declarations made by the tions du Gouvernement serbe, faites le Servian Government on the 18th* *18 mars, 1909, ne se sent plus renou- March, 1909— have not been renewed * Old style. f The Servian Parliament. velees vis-a-vis de la grande Monarchic voisine en aucune occasion et que, de- piiis ce temps, aiitant de la part des Couvernements Royaiix qui se sont succede que de la part de leurs or- gancs, aucune tentative n'a ete faite dans Ic but de changer I'etat de choses politique et juridique cree en Bosnie et Hcrzegovine, le Gouvernement Royal constate que sous cc rapport le Gou- vernement Imperial et Royal n'a fait aucune representation, sauf en ce qui concerno un livre scolaire, et au sujet de laquelle le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal a rc^u une explication en- tieroment satisfaisantc. La Serbic a de nombreuses fois donne des preuves de sa politique .pacifique et moderee pendant la duree de la crise balkanique, et c'cst grace a la Serbie et^au sacrifice qu'ello a fait dans Finteret excliisif de la paix europeenne que cette paix a ete preservee. Le Gouvernement Royal no pout pas etre rendu responsable pour les manifestations d'un caractere prive, telles que les articles des jour- naux et le travail paisible des societes, manifestations qui se produisent dans prcsque tous les pays comme une chose ordinaire et qui echappent, en regie generale, au controle officiel, d'autant moins que le Gouvernement Royal, lors de la solution de toute une serie de questions qui se sont presentees entre la Serbie et I'Autriche-Hongrie, a montre une grande prevenance et a re- ussi, de cette fa9on, a en regler le plus grand nombre au profit du progres des deux pays voisins. C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement Royal a ete peniblement surpris par les affirmations, d'apres lesquclles des per- sonnes du Royaumc de Serbie auraient participe a la preparation de I'attentat commis a Sarajevo; il s'attendait a ce qu'il soit invite a collaborer a la re- cherche de tout ce qui se rapporte a ce crime, et il etait pret, pour prouver son cntiere correction, a agir contre toutcs les personnes a I'egard des- quelles des communications lui seraient faiteS, se rendant- done au desir du Gouvernement Imperial et Royal, est dispose a remettre au Tribunal tout sujct serbe, sans egard a sa situation et a son rang, jjour la complicite du- quel, dans le crime de Sarajevo, des preuves lui seraient foutnies, et spe- cialement, il s'engage a faire publier a la premiere page du "Journal officiel " en date du 13 (26) juillet, renonciation suivante: "Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie on any occasion as regards the great neighbouring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their organs, to change the political and legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herze- govina, the Royal Government draw attention to the fact that in this con- nection the Imperial and Royal Government have made no representa- tion except one concerning a school book, and that on that occasion the Imperial and Roj'al Government re- ceived an entirely satisfactory explana- tion.. Servia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Servia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private charac- ter, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies— mani- ■festations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which, as a general rule, escape official control. The Royal Government are all the less respon- sible, in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of ques- tions which arose between Servia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two neighbouring countries. For these reas6ns the Royal Govern- ment have been pained and surprised at the statements, according to which members of the Kingdom of Servia are supposed* to have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at Serajevo ; the Royal Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to them. Palling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Govern- ment, they are prepared to hand over'- for trial any Servian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Sera- jevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the "Journal officiel," on the date of the 13th (26th) July, the following declara- tion : — "The Royal Government of Servia 24 condamne toute propagande qui serait dirigee centre FAutriche-Hongrie, c'est- a-dire Tensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu a detacher de la Monarchic austro-hongroise des terri- toires qui en font partie, et il deplore sincerement les consequences funestes de ces agissements criminels. Le Gou- vernement Royal regrette que certains officiers en fonctionnaires serbes aient participe, d'apres la communication du Gouvernement Royal et Imperial, a la propagande susmcntionnee, et compro- mis par la les relations de bon voisi- nage aiixquelles le Gouvernement Royal serbe etait solennellement en- gage par sa declaration du 31 mars, 1909,* qui desapprouve et repiidie toute idee ou tentative d'une immix- tion dans les destinees des habitants de quelque partie de I'Autriche-Hongrie que se soit, considere de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers et fonctionnaires et toute la population du royaume que, dor^enavant il proce- dera avec la derniere rigueur centre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements, qu'il mettra tons ses efforts a prevenir et a re- primer." Cette enonciation sera portee a la connaissance de I'armee Roy ale par un ordre du jour, au nom de Sa Majeste lo Roi, par Son Altesse Royale le Prince heritier Alexandre, .et sera publie dans le prochain bulletin officiel de I'armee. Le Gouvernement Royal s'engage en outre : 1. D'introduire dans la premiere con- vocation reguliere de la Skoupchtinat une disijosition dans la loi de la presse, par laquello sera punie de la maniere la plus severe la provocation a la haine et au mepris de la Monarchic austro- hongroise, ainsi quo centre toute publi- cation dent la tendance generale serait dirigee centre I'integrite territoriale de I'Autriche-Hongrie. II se charge, lors de la revision de la Constitution, qui .est prochaine, a faire introduire dans I'article 22 de la Constitution un ame.ndement de telle sorte que les publications ci-dessus puissent etre confisquees, cc qui actiiellement aux termes categeriques de I'article 22 de la Constitution est impossible. 2. Le Gouvernement ne possede au- cjine preuve et la note du Gouverne- ment Imperial et Royal ne lui en four- nit non plus aucune que la societe condemn all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, all such tendencies as aim at ultimately detaching from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy terri- tories which form part thereof, and they sincerely deplore the baneful consequences of these criminal move- ments. The Royal Government regret that, according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Govern- ment, certain Servian oflficers and officials sliould have taken part in the above-mentioned propaganda, and thus compromised the good neighbourly re- lations to which the Royal Servian Government was solemnly engaged by the declaration of the 31st March, 1909,* which declaration disapproves and repudiates all idea or attempt at interference with the destiny of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, and they consider it their duty formally to warn the officers, officials, and entire population of the kingdom that henceforth they will take the most rigorous steps against all such persons as are guilty of such acts, to prevent and to repress which they will use their utmost endeavour." This declaration will bo brought to the knowledge of the Royal Army in an order of the day, in the name of His IMa.jesty the King, by his Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alex- ander, and will be published in the next official army bulletin. The Reyal Government further undertake : — 1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skuptchinat a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of in- citement to hatred or contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial in- tegrity of Austria-rfungary. The Government engage at the approach- ing revision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categori- cal terms of article 22 of the Constitu- tion. 2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the Im- perial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the " Narodna * New style. t The Scrvi;in Parliament. 25 "Narodna Oditrana " et aiitres soeietes similaires aient commis, jiisqu'a ce jour quelques actes criminols de ce genre, par le fait d'un de leurs membres. Neaiinioins, Je Gouvernoment Royal acceptera la deiiiaiido dii Gouvernc- ment Imperial et Royal et dissoiidra la societe "Narodna Od))rana " et tonte autre societe qui a;;irnit contre rAiitriche-Hon;[;rie. 3. Le Gouvernement lloyal serbe s'engngo a eliminer sans delais de I'in- strnction publique en Serbie tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir a fomenter la propagande contre I'Autiiche-Hon- grie, quand le Gouvernement Imperial et lloyal lui fournira des faits et des preuves de cette propagande. 4. Le Gouvernement Royal accepte de meme a eloigner du service mili- tairo ceux pour qui I'enquete judi- ciaire aura prouve qu'ils sent coupables d'actes diriges contre I'integrite du territoire de la Monarchie austro-hon- groise, et il attend que le. Gouverne- ment Imperial et Royal lui com- munique ulterieurement les noms et les faits de ces officiers et fonctionnaires aux iins de la procedure qui. doit s'en- suivre. 5. Le Gouvernement Royal doit avouer qu'il ne se rend pas clairemcnt compto du sens et de la -portee de la demande du Gouvernement Imperial et Royal que la Serbie s'engage a accepter sur son territoire la collaboration des organes du Gouvernement Imperial et Royal, mais il declare qu'il admettra la collaboration qui repondrait aux. prin- cipes du droit international et a la procedure criminelle ainsi qu'aux bons I'apports do voisinage. G. Le Gouvernement Royal, cela va de soi, considere de son devoir d'ouvrir une cnquetc contie tons ceux qui sont ou^ qui, event uellement, auraient cte meles au complot du 15* juin, et qui se trouveraient sur le territoire du royaume. Quant a la participation a cette enquete des agents ou autoj-ites austro-liongrois qui seraient delegues a cet effet par Ic Gouvernement Imperial ot Royal, le Gouvernement Royal ne pent pas I'accepter, car ce serait une violation do la Constitution et de la loi sur la proce'dure criminelle; cependant dans des cas concrets des communica- tions sur les resultats do I'instruction Odbrana " and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government, and will dis- solve the "Narodna Odbrana" Society and every other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria- Hungary. 3. The Royal Servian Government undertake to remove without delay from their public educational estab- lishments in Servia all that serves or could serve to foment jpropaganda against Austria-Hungary," whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda. 4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from military service all such persons as the judicial enquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Im- perial and Royal Government to com- municate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and officials for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be -taken against them. 5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the de- mand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Servia shall under- take to accept the collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the prin- ciple of international law, Avith crimi- nal procedure, and with good neigh- bourly relations. 6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it their duty to open an enquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15th* June, and who happen to be within the t<3rritory of the kingdom. ' As regards the participation in this enquiry of Austro-JIungarian agents or authori- ties appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a viola- tion of the Constitution and of the law. of criminal procedure; neverthe- less, in concrete casses communications * Old style. 26 en question pourraient etre dennees aux agents austro-hongrois. 7. Le Gouvernement Royal a fait proceder, des le soir meme de la remise de la note, a I'arrestation du Com- mandant Voislav Tankossitch. Quant a Milan Ziganovitch, qui est sujet de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et qui jusqu'au 15* juin etait employe (comme aspirant) a la direction des chemins de fer, il n'a pas pu encore etre arrete. Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois est prie de vouloir bien, dans la forme ac- coutumee, faire connaitre le plus tot possible, les presomptions de culpabilite ainsi que les preuves eventuelles de leur culpabilite qui ont ete recueillies jusqu'a ce jour par I'enquete a Sara- jevo, aux fins d'enquete ulterieure. 8. Le Gouvernement serbe^ renfor- cera et etendra les mesurea prises pour empecher le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs a travers la frontiere. II va de soi qu'il ordonnera de suite une enquete et punira severement les fonc- tionnaire^ des frontiores sur la ligne Schabatz-Loznitza qui ont manque a lours devoirs et laisse passer les au- teurs du crime de Sarajevo. 9. Le Gouvernement Royal donnera vofontiers des explications sur • les propos que ses fonctionnaires, tant en Serbie qu'a I'etranger, ont eu apres Tattentat dans des entrevues et qui, d'apres I'aflSrmation du Gouvernement Imperial et Royal, ont ete hostiles envers la Monarchie, des que le Gou- vernement Imperial et Royal lui aura communique les passage^s en question de ces propos, et des qu'il aura demontre que Jes propos employes ont, en effet, ete ten us par lesdits fonctionnaires, quoique le Gouvernement Royal lui- meme aura soin de recueillir des preuves et convictions. 10. Le Qouverneraent Royal infor- mora le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal de I'execution des mesures com- prises dans les points precedents en tant que cela n'a pas ete deja fait par la, pvesento note, aussitot que chaque mcsuro aura ete ordonnce et ex^cutse. Dans lo cas oii le Gouvernpment Im- perial et Royal ne serait pas satisfait de cctt© reponse, le Gouvernement serbe, considerant qu'il est de Tin- t^ret commun de ne pas precipiter la solution de cette question, est pret comme toujours d'accepter une en- . as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents. 7. The Royal Government pro- ceeded, on the very evening of the delivery of the note, to -arrest -Com- mandant Voislav Tankossitch. As re- gards Milan Ziganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15th* June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him. The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the cus- tomary form, the presumptive evi- dence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been col- lected up to the present, at the enquiry at Serajevo for the purposes of the later enquiry.. 8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit traflBc df arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without sao^ing that they will immediately order an enquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Sohabatz-Loznitza line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass. 9. The Royal » Government will gladly give explanations of the re- marks made by thpir officials, whether in Servia or abroad, in interviews after the crime which according tp the statement of the Imperial and Roval Government were hostile to- wards the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the Said officials, although the Royal Government will it^ielf take steps to collect evidence and proofs. 10. The Royal Government will in- form the Imperial and Royal Govern- ment of the execution of the measures comprised under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the. present note, as Soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out If the Imperial and Royal Govern- ment are not satisfied with this reply, the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this ques- tion, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by refer- Old Stylo. 27 ' tente pacifique, soit en remeftarit cette ring this question to the decision of question a la decision du Tribunal in-, the International Tribunal of The ternational de La Haye, soit aux Hague; or to the Great Powers which Grandes Puissances qui ont pris part a took part in the drawing up of tho I'elaboration de la declaration que le declaration made by the Servian Gouvernement serbe a faite le 18 (31) Government on the 18th (31st) March, mars, 1909. 1909. Belgrade, le 12 (25) juillet, 1914. Belgrade, July 12 (25), 1914. No. 40. Sir M. de JBunsen^ British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward G^^ey. — \Receivei July 27.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 26, 1914. RUSSIAN Ambassador just returned from leave thinks that Austro-Hun- garian Government are determined on war, and that it is impossible for Russia to remain indifferent. He does not propose to press for more time in the sense of your telegram of tho 25th instant* (last paragraph). When the repetition of your telegram of the 26th instant to Parist arrived, I had the French and Russian Ambassadors both with me. They expressed great satisfaction with its contents, which I communicated to them. They doubted, however, whether the principle of Russia .being an interested party entitled to have a say in the settlement of a purely Austro-Servian dispute would be accepted by either the Austro-Hungarian or the German Government. Instructions were also given to the Italian Ambassador to support tho request of the Russian Government that the time limit should be postponed. They arrived, however, too late for aAy useful action to be taken. * See No. 26. t See No. 36. No. 41. Sir M, de Bunsen, British -Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 27.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 27, 1914. I HAVE had conversations with all my colleagues representing the Great Powers. Tlie impression left on my mind is that the Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable ; that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved to have war with Servia ; that they consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake ; and that until punishment has been administered to Servia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation. This country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Servia, and its postponement or prevention "would undoubtedly be a great disappointment. I propose, subject to any special directions you desire to send me, to express to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs the hope of His Majesty's Government that it may yet be possible to avoid war, and to ask his Excellency whether he cannot suggest a way out even now. No. 42. Sir F, Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 27.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 27, 1914. YOUR proposal, as stated in your two telegrams of yesterday,* is accepted by the French Government. French Ambassador in London, who returns there this evening, has been instructed accordingly. Instructions have been sent to the French Ambassador at Berlin to concert with his British colleague as to the advisability of their speaking jointly to the German Government. Necessary instructions have also been sent to the French representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh, but until it is known that the Germans have spoken at Vienna with some success, it would, in the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, be dangerous for the French, Russian, and British! Ambassadors to do so. • Nos. 36 and 37. 28 No. 43. Sir E, Goschen^ Bntish Amhassadw at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received JvXy 27.) (Telegraphic.) BtTMn, July 27, 1914. YOUR telegram of 26th July.* Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not therefore fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to co-operate for the maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do with arbitration, biit meant that representatives of the. four nations not direetly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that such a conference as you proposed was not practicable. He added that news he had just received from St. Petersburgh showed that there was an intention on the part of M. de Sazonoft to exchjinge views with Count Berchtold.if He thought that this method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result, and that it would be be^, before doing anything else, to await outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian Governments. In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said that as yet Austria was only partially mobilising, but that if Russia mobilised against Ger- many latter, would have to follow suit. I asked him what he meant by "mobilising against Germany." He said that if Russia only mobilised in south ' Germany would not mobilise, but if she mobilised in north, Germany would have to do so too, and Russian system of mobilisation was so complicated that it misht be difficult exactly to locate hpf mobilisation. Germany would there- fore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise. Finally, Secretary of State said that news- from St. Petersburgh had caused him to take more hopeful view of the general situation. * See No. 36, t Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. t Austro-Hungarian Minieter for Foreign Affairs. No. 44. Sir O, Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey. — {^Received Jvly 27.) (Telegraphic) ^i. Petershvrgh\ July 27, 1914. AUSTRIAN Ambassador tried, in a long conversation which he had yesterday with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to explain away objectionable features of the recent action takdn by .the Austro-Hungarian Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that, althongh he perfectly understood Austria's motives, the ultimatum had been so drafted that it could not possibly be accepted as a whole by the Servian Government. Although the demands were reasonable enough in some cases, others not only could not possibly be put into immediate. execution seeing that they entailed revision of existing Servian laws, bub were, moreover, incompatible with Servia's dignity as an independent State. It would be useless for Russia to offer her good offices at Belgrade, in view of the fact that she was the object of such suspicion in Austria. In order, however, to put an end to tne present tension, he thought that England and Italy might be willing to coUaboratP vvith Austria. The Austrian Ambas- sador undertook to communicate his Excellency's remarks- to his Government. On thr; Minister for Foreign Affairs questioning me, 1 told him that I had correctly defined the attitude of Hij Majesty's Gover-nment in my conversation with him, which I reported in my telegram of the 24th instant.* I added that you could not promise to do anything more, and that his Excellency was mistaken if ho believed that the cause of peace could be promoted by our telling the German Government that they would have to deal with us as well] as with Russia and France if they supported Austria by force of arms. Their attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace, and we could only induce her to use her influence at Vienna to avert war by approaching her in the capa'^ity of a friend who was anxious to preserve peace. His Excellency must not, if our efforts were to be successful, do anything to precipitate a conflict. ^SoqNo.'6. 29 In these circumstances I trusted that the Russian Government would defer mobilisation ukase for as long as possible, and that troops would not be allowed to cross the frontier even when it was issued. In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that until the issue of the Imperial ukase no effective steps towards mobilisation could bo taken, and the Austro-Hungarian Government would profit by delay in order to complete her military preparations if it was deferred too long. No. 45. Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petershurgh, to Sir Edward Grey. — [Received July 27.) (Telegraphic.) St. VetcrsburgK July 27, 1914. SINCE my conversation with the Minister for. Foreign Affairs, as reported in my telegram of to-day,-^ I understand that his Excellency has proposed that the modifications to be introduced into Austrian demands should be the subject of direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburgh. * Sco No. 4*. No. 46. Sir Edicard Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin: (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 27, 1914. GERMAN Ambassador has informed me that German Government accept in principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, reserving, of -course, their right as an ally to help Austria if attacked. He has also been instructed to request me to use influence in St. Petersburgh to localise the war and to keep up the peace of Europe. I have replied that the Servian reply went farther than could have been expected to m.eet the Austrian demands. German Secretary of State has him- self said that there were some things in the Austrian note that Servia could hardly be expected to accept. I assumed that Servian reply could not have gone as far as it did unless Russia had exercised conciliatory influence at Belgrade, and it was really at Vienna that moderating influence was now required. If Austria put the Servian reply aside as being worth nothing and marched into Servia, it meant that she was determined to crush Servia at all costs, being reckles§ of the consequences that might be involved. Servian reply should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause. I said German Government should urge this at Vienna. I recalled what German Government had said as to the gravity of the situation if the war could not be localised, and observed that if Germany assisted Austria against Russia it would be because, without any reference to the merits of the dispute, Germany could not afford to see Austria crushed. Just so other issues might be raised that would supersede the dispute between Austria and Servia, and would bring other Powers in, and the war would be the biggest ever known ; but as long as Germany would work to keep the peace. I would keep closely in touch. I repeated that after the Servian reply it was at Vienna that some moderation must be urged. No. 47. Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanom, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 27, 1914. SEE my telegram of to-day to Sir E. Goschen.* I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian circles impression, prevails that in any event we would stand aside. His Excellency deplored the effect that such an impression must produce. This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland, not to disperse for manoeuvre leave. But I explained to the Russian Ambassador that my reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything^ more than diplomatic action was promised. "We bear from German and Austrian sources that they believe Russia will * Soo No. 46. 30 take no action so long as Austria agrees not to take Servian territory. I pointed this out, and added that it would be absurd if we were to appear more Servian than the Russians in our dealings with the German and Austrian Governments. No. 48. jSir E. Grey to Sir M. de BimseUj BrUish Ainhassador at Vienna. Sir, ForelgM Office, July 27, 1914. COUNT MENSDORFF". told me by instruction to-day that the Scrviaa' Government had not accepted the demands which the Austrian Government were obliged to address to them in order to secure permanently the most vital Austrian interests. Servia showed that she did not intend to abandon her subversive aims, tending towards continuous disorder in the Austrian frontier territories and their final disruption from the Austrian ^ilonarchy. Very reluctantly, and against their wish, the Austrian Government were compelled to take more severe measures to enforce a fundamental change in the attitude of enmity pursued up to now by Servia. As the British Government knew, the Austrian Government had for many years endeavoured to find a way to get on with their turbulent neighbour, though tiiis had been made very difficult for them by the continuous provocations of Servia. The Scrajevo murder had made clear to everyone what appalli'ng consequences the Servian propaganda had already produced and what a permanent threat to Austria it involved. We would understand that the Austrian Government must consider that the moment had arrived to obtain, by means of the strongest pressure, guarantees for the definite suppression, of the Servian aspirations and for the security of peace and order on the south-eastern frontier of Austria. As the peaceable means to this effect were exhausted, the Austrian Government must at last appeal to force. They had not taken this decision without reluctance. Their action, which had no sort oi aggressive tendency, could not be represented otherwise than as an act of self-defence. Also they thought that they would serve a European interest if they prevented Servia from being henceforth an element of general unrest such as she had been for the last ten years. The high sense of justice of the British nation and of British statesmen could not blame the Austrian Governm.ent if the latter defended by the sword what was theirs, and cleared up their position with a country whose hostile policy had forced upon them for years measures so costly as to have gravely injured Austrian national prosperity. Finally, the Austrian Government,- confiding in their amicable relations with us, felt that they could count on our sympathy in a fight that was forced on them, and on our assistance in localising the fight, if necessary. Count Mcnsdorff added on his own account that, ' as long as Servia was confronted with Turkey, Austria never took very severe measures because of her adherence to the policy of the free development of the Balkan States. Now that Servia had doubled her territory and population without any Austrian interference, the repression of Servian subversive aims was a matter of self- defence and self-preservation on Austria's part. He reiterated that Austria had no intention of taking Servian territory or aggressive designs against Servian territory. I said that I could not understand the construction put by the Austrian Government upon the Servian reply, and I told Count Mensdorff the substance of the conversation that I had had with the German Ambassador this morning about that reply. Count Mensdorff admitted that, on paper, the Servian reply might seem to be satisfactory ; but the Servians had refused the one tiling — the co-operation of Austrian officials and police — which would be a real guarantee that in practice the Servians would not carry on their subversive campaign against Austria. I said that it seemed to me as if the Austrian Government believed that, even after the Servian reply, they could make war upon Servia anyhow, without risk of bringing Russia into the dispute. If they could make war on Servia an J at the same time satisfy Russia, well and good; but, if not, the consequences would be incalculable. I pointed out to him that I quoted this phrase from an expression of the views of the German Government. I feared that it would be expected in St. Petersburgh that the Servian reply would diminish the tension, * Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. 31 and now, when Russia found that there was increased tension, the situation would become increasingly serious. Already the eftect on Europe was one of anxiety. I pointed out that our fleet was to have dispersed to-day, but we had felt unable to let it disperse. We should not think of calling up reserves at this moment, and there was no menace in what we had done about our fleet; but, owing to the possibility of a European conflagration, it was impossible for us to disperse our forces at this moment. I gave this as ah illustration of the anxiety that was felt. It seemed to mc that the Servian reply alreadj involved the greatest humiliation to Servia that I had ever seen a country undergo, and it was very disappointing to me that the. reply was treated by the Austrian Government as if it v/cre as unsatisfactory as a blank negative. I am, &c. E. GREY. No. 49. Sir Edivard Grey to Sir R Rodd^ British Ambassador at Rome. Sir,^ Foreign Office, July 27, 1914. THE Italian Ambassador informed Sir A. Nicolson* to-day that the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed entirely with my proposal for a conference of four to be hold in London. As regards the question of asking Russia, Anstria-Hungary, and Servia to suspend military operations pending the result o? the oonfcronco, the Marquis di San Giulianot would recommend the suggestion warmly to the German Government, and would enquire what procedure they would propose should be followed at Vienna. I am, &c. E. GREY. * British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. t Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs No. 50. Sir M. de Bunsen^ British Atnhassador at Vienna^ to Sir Edward Grey, — {Received July 31.) Sir, Vifana, July 28, 1914. I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the t«xt of the Austro Hungarian note announcing the declaration of war against Servia. I have, &c. MAURICE DE BUNSEN. Enclosure in No. 50, Copy of Note verbale, dated Vienna^ July 28, 1914. (Translation.) POUR mctti'o fin aux menees sub- IN order to brmg to an end the Tcrsives partant de Belgrade et diri- subversive intrigues originating from gees rontre Tintegiite territoriale de 13iel2radG and aimed at the territorial la iMonarrhie austro-hongroise, le Gou- intf'gnty of the Austro-Hnnganan vprnement Imperial <^t Royal a fait par- Monarchy, the Inippnal and Royal vohir a la date du 23 juillet, 1914, au Govpirwropnt has d»^hvpred to the Gouvernement Royal de Seihie rine Royal Servism Government a note, note dans laquelle se trou^ait fornndee dated luly 23, 1914, in which a series une serio de demandes pour I'arcppta- of demands were formulated, for the lion desqnelles im delai de quarante- acceptanr'e of which a dMny of forty- buit heures a ete acoord^ au Gouverne- ci.^ht honrs has been granted to the ment Royal. Le Gouvernement Royal Royal Government. The Royal Servian d(,^ Scrbie n'ayant pas repondu a ce'tte Government not having answered this note d'une maniere satisfaisante, le note in a satisfactory manner, the Gouvernement Imperial et Royal se Imperial and Royal Government are trouve dnns la necessite de pourvoir lui- themselves compelled to see to the meme a la sauvegarde de ses droits et satee^uarding of their rights and in- interets et do recourir a cet effet a la terests, and, with this object, to have force des armes. recourse to force of arms. L'Autriche - Hongrie, qui vient Austria-Hungary, who has just ad- 32 d'adresser a la Serbie une declara- tion formelle conformement a Tarticle 1'''" de la convention du 18 octobre, 1907, relative a I'oiiverture des hos- tilites, se considore des lors en etat de guerre avec la Serbie. En portant co qui precede a la con- naissanco do I'Ambassade Royale de Grande-Bretagne le Minister© des Affaires Etrangeres a Thonneur de declarer que I'Autriclie-Hongrie se conformera au cours des liostiiites, sous la reserve d'un precede analogue de la part de la Serbie, aux stipulations des conventions de La Hayo du 18 octobre, 1907, ainsi qu'a celles de la Declaration de Londres du 26 fevrier, 1909. L'Ambassado est price de vouloir bien comranniquer, d'urgence, la presente notification a son Gouvernement. dressed to Servia a formal doclaraiiou^ in conformity with article 1 of the con- yention of the 18th October, 1907, rela- tive to the opening of hostilities, con- siders herself henceforward in a state of war with Servia. In bringing the above to notice of His Britannic Majesty's Embassy, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs lias the honour to declare that Austria- Hungary will act during the hostilities in conformity with the terms ot tlio Conventions of The Hague of the 18tli October, 1907, as also with those of the Declaration of London of the 28th February, 1909, provided an analogous procedure is adopted by Servia. The embassy is requested to be so good as to communicate the present notification as soon as po:?siblc to the' British Government. No. 51. Sir F. BerVky BHt/ish Ambassador at PariSy to Sin" Echoanl Grey. — [Received Juhj 28.) Sir, Faris, JuJ/y 27, 1914.. I HAVE tho honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a memorandum from the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the steps to bo takcii to prevent an outbreak of hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Servia. I have, &c. FRANCIS BERTIE. Enclosure in No. 51. I^ote communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. Bienvenu-Martia, (Translation.) PAR uno note en date du 25 de ce mois, son Excellence TAmbassadeur d'Angleterrc a fait connaitre au Gou- vernement de la Republique que, d'apres Sir Edward Grey, la seule manicre d'assurer, si c'etait possible, 1'3 maintien de la paix dans lo cas ou les rapports cntro la Ru.ssie et I'Au- triche deviendraient plus tendus serait uno demarche commune a Vienne et a Saint-Petersbourg des reprcsentants de rAngleterrc, do la France, do rAllemagne et de I'ltalio en Autriche et en Russie; et il a cxprime le desir de savoir si le Gouvernement do la Re- publique etait dispose a accucillir favorablement cette suggestion. Le Ministre dos Affaires £lran. gercs par interim a I'hcnneur de faire connaitre a son Excellence Sir Francisj Bertie qu'il a invite M. Jules Cambon* a se concerter avfc I'Ambassadeur d'Augleterro en Allemagne et a ap- puyer la demarche qu'ils jugeront op- portune de faire auprcs du Cabinet de Berlin. Le Gouvernement de la Repiiblique * French Ambassador, in Berlin. IN a note of the 2oth of this month, his Excellency tho British Ambassador informed the Government of tho Republic that, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, the only pos.siblo way of assuring the maintenance of pcaco in case of the relations between Russia j and Austria becoming more strained' would be if the representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy in Austria and Russia were to take joint action at Vienna and at] St. Petersburg!! ; and he expressed the wish to know if the Government of the Republic were disi)oscd to welcome such a suggestion. The Minister for Foreign Affairs] ad inierim has the honour to inform' his Excellency Sir F. Bertie that ho has requested M. Jules Cambon"" to concert with the British Ambassador in Germany and to support any repre- sentation which they may consider it advisable to make to tho Berlin Cabinet. In accordance with the desire ox- 33 a, d' autre part, confornaement au desir exprime par le Gouvcrnemeiit britan- nique et que son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie lui a transmis par une note en date du 26 de ce mois, autorise M. Paul Cambon* a prendre part a la re- union proposee par Sir Edward Grey pour rechercher avec lui et les Ambas- Badeurs d'Allemagne et d'ltalie a Londres, les moyens de resoudre les difficultes actuelles. Lc Gouvernement de la Republique est pret egalement a donncr aux agents f ran9ais a Petersbourg, a Vienne et a Belgrade des instructions pour qu'ils obticnnent des Gouvernements russe, autrichien et serbe do s'abstenir de toute operation militaire active en attendant les resultats de cette confer- ence. II estime toutefois que les chances de succes de la proposition de Sir Edward Grey reposent essentielle- mont sur Taction que Berlin serait dis- posee a Vienne [sic]. Une demarche alipres du Gouvernement austro-h6n- grois pour amener la suspension des operations militaires parait vouee a I'echec si Tinflueuce de I'AUemagne lie s'est pas exercee au prealable sur le Cabinet de Vienne. Le Garde des Sceaux, President du Conseil et >Iinistre des Affaires £tran- geres par interim, saisit cette occasion de irenouveler, &c. Paris, U 27 juilkt, 1914. pressed by the British Government and conveyed to them by Sir F. Bertie in his note of the 26th ot this month, the Government of-the Republic have also authorised M. Taul Cambon* to take part in the conference which Sir E. Grey has proposed with a view to discovering in consultation with him- self and the German and Italian Ambassadors in London a means of settling the present difficulties. The Government of the Republic is likewise ready to instruct the French representatives at St. Petersburgh, Vienna, and Belgrade to induce the Russian, Austrian, and Servian Gov- ernments to abstain from all active military opei^ations pending the results of this conference. He considers, how- ever, that the chance of Sir E. Grey's proposal being successful depends essentially on the action which the Berlin Government would be willing to take at Vienna. Representations made to the Austrian-Hungarian Government for the purpose of bring- ing about a suspension of military- operations would seem bound to fail unless the German Government do not beforehand exercise their inflaence on the Vienna Cabinet. The President of the Council ad, interim takes the opportunity, «&c. Paris, July 27, 1914. French Ambassador in. London. No. 52. I^ote communicated by French Embassy, July 28, 1914. (Translation.) LE Gouvernement de la Republique accepte la proposition de Sir Edward Grey relative a une intervention do la Grande-Bretagne, de la France, de TAlleraagne et de I'ltalie en vue d'eyi- ter les operations militaires actives sur les frontieres autrichiennes, russes et serbes; il a autorise M. P. Cambon* a prendre part aux deliberations de la reunion a quatre, qui doit se tenir a Londres. L'Ambassadeur de France a Berlin a recu pour instructions, apres s'etre conccrte avec I'Ambassadeur d'Angle- tene a Berlin, d'appuyer la demarche de ce dernier dans la forme et la mesure qui seraient Jugees opportunes. M. Vivianit est pret a envoyer aux representants fran9ais a Vienne, Saint- THE Government of the Republic accept Sir Edward Grey's proposal in regard to intervention by Great Britain, France, Germany, and Ital^ with a view to avoiding active mili- tary operations on the frontiers of Austria, Russia, and Servia ; and they have authorised M. P. Cainbon* to take part in the deliberations of the four representatives at the meeting which is to be held in London. The French Ambassador in Berlin has received instructions to consult first the' British Ambassador in Berlin, and then to support the action taken by the latter in such manner and degree as may be considered appro- priate. M. Vivianit is ready to send to the representatives of France in Vienna, * French Ambassador in London. t French Minister for Foreign Affairs. 3i Petersbourg et Belgrade des instruc- tions dans le sens suggere par le Gou- vernoment britanniqiie. Ambassade de France, LondreSy le 27 niillct, 1914. St. PetersUurgh, and Belgrade instruc- tions in the sense suggested by the British Government. French Embassy , July 27, 1914. No. 53. M, Sazonoff RuLssian Mmister for Foi^eign Affairs, to Count Benckendmff, Russian Ambassador in London. July 28.) Saint-Fetersbourgy le 14 (27) juillet, 1914. (Telegraphique.) L'AMBASSADEUR d'Angleterre est venu s'informer si nous jugeons utile quo I'Angleterre prenne I'initiative de convoquer a Londres une conference des representants de TAngleterre, la France, rAllemagne et I'ltalie, pour etudier une issue a la situation actuelle. J'ai repondu a I'Ambassadeur que j'ai entame des pourparlers avec TAm- bassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie, en con- ditions que i'espere favorables. Pour- tant je n'ai pas encore re9u de reponse h, la proposition que j'ai faite d'une re- vision de la note entre les deux Cabinets. Si des explications directes avec le Cabinet de Vienne se trouvaient ir- realisables, je suis pret a accepter la proposition anglaise, ou toute autre de nature a resoudre favorablement le conflit. Je voudrais pourtant ecarter des aujourd'hui un malentendu qui pour- rait surgir de la reponse donnee par le Ministre de la Justice fran9ais ^ I'Am- bassadeur d'Allemagne, concernant des conseils de moderation a donner au Cabinet Imperial. -( Communicated hy Count Benchend&tff^ (Translation.) >Sf. Fetershurgh, (Telegraphic.) July 27, 1914. THE British Ambassador came to ascertain whether we think it desirab'o that Great Britain should take tlio initiative in convoking a conference in London of the representatives, of JEngland, France, Germany, and- Italy to examine the possibility of a way out of the present situation. I replied to the Ambassador that I have begun conversations with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador under conditions which, I hope, may be favourable. I have not, however, re- ceived as yet any reply to the proposal made by me for revising the note be- tween the two Cabinets. If direct explanations with the Vienna Cabinet were to prove impos- sible, I am ready to accept the British proposal, or any other proposal of a kind that would bring about a favourable solution of the conflict. I wish, however, to put an end from this day forth to a misunderstanding which might arise from the answer' given by the French Minister of Justice to the German Ambassador, regarding counsels of moderation to bo! given to the Imperial Cabinet. No. 54. M, Sazonof Russicm Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Coimt Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London.— {Communicated hy Coimt Benckendorff\ , July 28, 1914.) Baini'Feiersbourg, le 15 (28) Quillet, 1914. (Telegraphique.) MES entretiens avec I'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne confirmeiit mon impres- sion que I'Allemagne est plutot favor- able a I'intransigeance de I'Autriche. Le Cabinet de Berlin, qui aurait pu arreter tout le developpement de la crise, parait n'exercer aucune action sur soil alliee. L'Ambassadeur trouve insufiisante la reponse de la Serl)ic. (Translation.) hose contained in my telegram of yesterday, will enable you to prove to the British Government the pacific intentions of the one party and the aggressive in- tentions of the other. * Sic: in original. The actual date of th^ preseoitafcibn of the Austrian ultimatum wad, in fact, Thursday, July 23. The Servian reply was da^ed Saturday, July 25, and ^it is clearly to the latter dooumeoit that refereaioe is intended. No. 106. Sir E. Roddy British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey, — {Received. July 31.) (Telegraphic.) Borne, July 30, 1914. I LEARNT from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who sent for me this evening, that the Austrian Government had declined to continue the direct 59 exchange of views with the Kussian Government. But he had reason to be- lieve that Germany was now disposed to, give more conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed convinced that we should act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid issue with us. He said he was telegraphing to the Italian Ambassador at Berlin to ask the German Government to suggest that the idea of an exchange of views between the four Powers should be resumed in any form which Austria would consider acceptable. It seemed to him that Germany might invite Austria to state exactly the terms which she would demiind from Servia, and give a guarantee that she would neither deprive her of independence nor annex territory. It would be useless to ask for anything less than was contained in the Austrian ultimatum, and Germany would support no proposal that might imply non-success for Austria. We might, on the other hand, ascertain from Russia what she would accept, and, once we knew the standpoints of these two countries, discussions could be commenced at once. There was still time so long as Austria had received no check. He in any case was in favour of continuing an exchange of views with His Majesty's Government if the idea of discussions between the four Powers was impossible. No. 107. Sir E, Goschen^ British Ambassador at Berlin^ to Sir Edward Grey. (Received Judy 31.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin^ July 30, 1914. I DO not know whether you have received a reply from the German Govern- ment to the communication* which you made to them through the German Ambassador in London asking whether they could suggest any method by which the four Powers could use their mediating influence between Russia, and Austria.' I was informed last night that they had not had time to send an answer yet. To-day, in reply to an enquiry from the French Ambassador as tc whether the Imperial Government had proposed any course of action, the Secretary of State said that he had felt that time would be saved by com- municating with Vienna direct, and that he had asked the Austro-Hungarian Government what would satisfy them. No answer had, however, yet been returned. The Chancellor told me last night that he was "pressing the button " as hard as he could, and that he was not sure whether he had not gone so far in urging moderation at Vienna that matters had been precipitated rather than otherwise. * See No. 84. No. 108. Sir E, Goschen^ British Ambassador at Berlin^ to Sir Edtcard Grey. — (Received July 31.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 31, 1914. CHANCELLOR informs me that his efforts to preach peace and modera- tion at Vienna have been seriously handicapped by the Russian mobilisation against Austria. He has done everything possible to attain his object at Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was altogether palatable at the Ball- platz. He could not, however, leave his country defenceless while time was being utilised by other Powers ; and if, as he learns is- the case, military measures are now being taken by Russia against Germany also, it would be ipipossible for him to remain quiet. He wished to tell me that it was quite possible that in a very short time, to-day perhaps, the German Government would take some very serious step; he was, in fact, just on the point of going to have an audience with the Emperor. His Excejlency added that the news of the active preparations on the Russor German frontier had reached him just when the Czar had appealed to the lEmpefor, in the name of their old friendship, to mediate at Vienna, and when the Emperor was actually conforming to £hat request. 60 No. 109. Sir E. GoscJieriy British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — (^Received July 31.) (Telegraphic.) BerlinyJuXy ^l, 191^. I READ to the Chancellor this morning your answer to Iiis appeal .for British neutrality in the event of war, as contained in your telegram of yesterday ."* His Excellency was so taken up with the news of the Russian measures along the frontier, referred to in my immediately preceding telegram, that he received your communication without comment. He asked me to let, him have the message that I had just read to him as a memorandum, as he would like to reflect upon it before giving an a,nswer, and his mind; was so full of grave matters that he could not be certain of remembering all its points. I therefore handed to him the text of your message on the understanding that it should be regarded merely as a record of conversation, and not as an official document. His Excellency agreed. * See No. 101. No. 110, Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador' at St. Petersburgh, (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. I LEARN from the German Ambassador that, as a result of suggestions by the German Government, a conversation has taken place at Vienna between the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Russian Ambassador. The Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh has also been instructed that he may converse with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that he should give explanations about the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and discuss sug- gestions and any questions directly affecting A ustro- Russian relations. If the Russian Government object to the Anstrians mobilising eight army corps, it might be pointed out that this is not too great a number against 400,000 Servians. The German Ambassador asked me to urge the Russian Government to show goodwill in the discussions and to suspend their military preparations. It is with great satisfaction that I have learnt that discussions are being resumed between Austria and Russia, and you should express this to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and tell him that I earnestly hope he will encourage them. I informed the German Ambassador that, as regards military preparations, I did not see how Russia could be urged to suspend them unless some limit were put by Austria to the advance of her troops into Servia. No. 111. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E, Goschen, British Arabassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. 1 liOPE that the convei-sations which are now proceeding between Austria and Russia may lead to a satisfactory result. The stumbling-block hitherto has been Austrian mistrust of Servian assurances, and Russian mistrust of Austrian intentions with regard to the independence and integrity of Servia. It has occurred to me that, in the event of this mistrust preventing a solution being found by Vieiana and St. Petersburgh, Germany might sound Vienna, and I would undertake to sound St. Petersburgh, whether it i\'ould be poss'ble for the four disinterested Powers to offer to Austria that they would under- take to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Servia, provided that they did not impair Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory. As your Excellency is aware, Austria has already declared her willingness to respect them. Russia might be informed by the four Powers that they would undertake to prevent Austrian demands going the length of impairing- Servian sovereignty and integrity. All Powers would of course iuispond further military operations or preparations. You may sound the Secretary of State about this proposal. 61 I said to German Ambassador this morning that if Germany could get any 'reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European p^ace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable, if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburgh and- Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the conse- quences ;• but, otherwise, I told German Ambassador that if Fra"fice became involved we should be drawn in. You can add this when sounding Chancellor or Secretary of State as to proposal above. No. 112. Sii' E, GoscheUj British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Eduo'xrd Grey. — [Received July 31.) (Telegraphic.) Bciiih, July 31,-1914. ACCORDING to information just received by German Government from their Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, whole. Russian army and fleet are being mobilised. Chancellor tells me that " Kriegsgefahr "* will bo proclaimed at once by German Government, as it <;an only be against Germany that Russian general mobilisation is directed. Mobilisation would follow almost immediately. His Excellency'added in explanation, that " Kriegsgefahr "* signified the taking of certain precautionary measures consequent upon strained relations Avith a foreign country. This news from St. Petersburgh, added his Excellency, seemed to him to put an end to all hope of a peaceful solution of the crisis. Germany must Certainly prepare for all emergencies I asked him whether he could not still put pressure on the authorities at Vienna to do something in general interests to reassure Russia and to show themselves disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis. He replied that last night he had begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, and that he had received a reply to the effect that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs would take wishes of the Emperor this morning in the matter. * "Imminence of War." No. 113. ISir G. Buchanan^ British Ambassador at St. Petersburyhf to Sir Eduxird Grey. — [Received July 31.) <;Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July ai, 1914. IT has been decided to issue orders for general mobilisation. This decision was taken in consequence of report received from Russian Ambassador in Vienna to the effect that Austria is determined not to yield to intervention of Powers, and that she. is r.ioving troops against Russia as well as n gainst Servia. Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start. No. 114. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at PariSf anX Sir E. Goschev^ British Ambassador at Berlin, (Telegraphic.; Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. I STILL trust that situation is not irretrievable, but in view of prospect of mobilisation in- Germany it becomes essential to His Majesty's Government, in view of existing treaties, to ask whether French (German) Government aro prepared to engage to respect neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power violates it. A similar request is being addressed to German (French) Government. It is important to have an early answer. 62 No. 115. Sir Edward Grei/ to Sir F, Villisrs, British Minister at Brussels. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914, IN view of existing treaties, you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that, in consideration of the possibility of a European war, I have asked French and German Governments whether each is prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium provided it is violated by no other Power. You should say that I assume that the Belgian Government will maintain to the utmost of their power their neutrality, which I desire and expect other Powers to uphold and observe^ You should inform the Belgian Government that an early reply is desired. No. 116. Sir Edward Grfiy to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. I HAVE received your telegram of yesterday's date.* Nobody here feels that in this dispute,' so far as it has yet gone, British treaties or obligations are involved. Feeling is quite different from what it was during the Morocco question. That crisis involved a dispute directjy involving France, whereas in this case France is being drawn into a dispute which is not hers. I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a decisive factor in situation. German Government do not expect our neutrality. We cannot undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a war. I have so told the French Ambassador, who has urged His Majesty's Government to reconsider this decision. I have told him that we should not be justified in giving any pledge at the present moment, but that we will certainly consider the situation again directly there is a new development. * See No. 99. No. 117. Sir F!' Bertie, British Ambassador ut Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Peceived Jvly 31.) (Telegraphic.) . Paris, July 31, 1914. AT 7 o'clock this evening I wa£< sent for by Minister for Foreign Affairs. When I arrived the German Ambaj-sador was leaving his Excellency. German Ambassador had informed his Excellency that, in view of the fact that orders had been given for the total mobilisation of Russian army and fleet, German Government have in an ultimatum which they have addressed to the Russian Government required that Russian forces should be demobilised. The German Government will consider it necessary to order the total mobilisation of the German army on the Russian and French frontiers if within twelve hours the Russian Government do not give an undertaking to comply with German demand. Thb Minister for Foreign Affairs asks me to communicate this to you, and enquires what, in these circumstances, will be the attitude of England. German Ambassador could not say when the twelve hours terminates. He is going to call at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to-morrow (Saturday) at 1 p.m. in order to receive the French Government's answer as to the attitude they will adopt in the cir cum. stances. He intimated the possibility of his requiring his passports. I am inforiiied by the Russian Ambassador that he is not aware of any general mobilisation of the Russian forces having taken place. ,63 No. 118. Sir M. de Buneen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July Z\.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 31, 19X4. I AM informed by Count Forgach, Under-Secretary of State, that although Austria was compelled to respond to Russian mobilisation, which he deplored, the Austrian Ambassador in London has received instructions to inform you that mobilisation was not to bo regarded as a necessarily hostile act on either side. Telegrams were being exchanged between the Emperpr of Russia and the German^ Emperor, and conversations were proceeding between Austrian Ambassador a,t St. Petersburgh and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. A general war might, he seriously hoped, be staved off by these efforts. On my expressing my feaf that Germany would mobilise, he said that Germany must do something, in his opinion, to secure her position. As regards Russian intervention on behalf of Servia, Austria-Hungary found 't difficult to recognise such a claim. I caviled his attention to the fact that during the discussion of the Albanian frontier at the London Conference of Ambassadors the Russian Government had stood behind Servia, and that a compromise between the viiews of Russia and Austria- Hungary resulted with accepted frontier line. Although iie spoke in a conciliatory tone, and did not regard the situation as de^sperate,. I could not get from him any suggv-stion for a similar compromise in the present casd. Count Forgach is going this afternoon to see the Russian Ambassador, whom T have informed of the above conversation. The Russian Ambassador has explained that Russia has no desire to interfere unduly with Servia ; that, as compared with the late Russian Minister, the present Minister at Belgrade is a man of very moderate^ views ; and that, as regards Austrian demands, Russia had counselled Servia to yield to. them as far as she possibly could without sacrificing her independence. His Excellency is exerting himself strongly in the interests of peace. No. 119. Sir Edward Qrey to Sir F, Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris* Sir, Foreign Office, July 31, 1914. M. CAMBON* referred to-day to a telegram that had been shown to Su Arthur Nicolsonf this morning from the French Ambassador in Berlin, saying that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether we would intervene which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and that, if we would only declare definitely on the side of Russia and France, it would decide the German attitude in favour of peace. I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany under the impression that we would not intervene. I had refused overtures to promisd that we should remain neutral. I had not only definitely declined to say that we would remain neutral, I had even gone so far this morning as to say bo the German Ambassador that, if France and Germany beoarae involved in war. we should be drawn into it. That, of course, wyis not th« same thing a« taking an engagement to France, and I told M. Cambon of n only to show that we had not left Germany under the impression that we would stand aside. M. Camboil then asked me for my reply to what he had said ypsterday. I said that we had come to the conclusion, in the Cabinet to-day, that we could not give any pledge at the present time. Though wp should have to put our policy before Parliament, we could not pledge Parliament in advance. Up to the present moment, we did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that any treati'es or obligations of this country were involved. Further develop- ments might alter this situation and cause the Government and Parliament to take, the view that mtervention was justified. The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important factor, in determining our attitude. Whether we proposed to Parliament to intervene or not to intervene in a war, Parliament would wish to know how we stood with regard to the neutrality of Belgium; and it might be that I should ask * French Ambassador in London. t British Under Secretary of State fox Foreign Affairs. 64 both France and Germany whether each was prepared to undertake an engage- ment that she would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium. M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help Trance if Germany made an attack on her. I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement. M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning rejected proposals that might have niiide for peace. It could not be to England's interest thiat France should be crushed by Germany. We should then be in a very diminished position with regard to Germany. In 1870 wc had made a great mistake in allowing an enormous increase of German strength, and we should now be repeating the mistake. He asked me whether I could not submit his question to the Cabinet again. I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as there was some new development, but at the present moment the only -answer I could give was that wo could not undertake any definite engagement. I am, (Src, E. GREY. No. 120. Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador' at St. Peter sburgh, to Sir Edivard Grey. — {Rtctived A^cgnst 1.) (Telegraphic.) 6'f. Petcrsburgh, July 31, 1Q14. MINISTER for Foreign AiTairs sent for mo and French Ambassador and asked us to telegraph to our respective Governments subjoined formula as best calculated to amalgamate proposal made by you in your telegram of 30th July* with formula recorded in my telegram of 30th July.t He trusted it would meet with your approval : — " Si TAutricho consentira a arreter marche des sea troupes sur le territoire serbe, si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a assume le caractere d'une question d'interet europeen, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbic pourrait accorder au Gouvernement d'Autriche- Hongric sans laisser porter atteinte a ses droits d'£tat souverain et a son indepoudance, la Russie s'engage a conserver son attitude expectante."t His Excellency then alluded to the telegram sent to German Emperor by Emperor of Russia in reply to the former's telegram. He said that Emperor Nicholas had begun by thanking Emperor William for his telegram and for the hopes of peaceful solution which it held out. His Majesty had then proceeded to assure Emperor William that no intention whatever of an aggres- sive character was concealed behind Russian military preparations. So long as conversation with Austria continued, His Imperial Majesty undertook that not a single man should be moved across the frontier ; ii was, however, of course impossible, for reasons cxi>lained, to stop a mobilisation which was already in progress. M. Sazonof§ said that undoubtedly there would bo better prospect of a peaceful solution if the suggested conversation were to take i>lace in London, where the atmosphere was far more favourable, and he therefore hoped that you Avould see your way to agreeing to this. His Excellency ended by expressing his deep gratitude to His Majesty's Government, who had done so much to save the situation. It would be largely due to them if war were prevented. The Emperor, the Russian Government, and the Russian people would never forget the firm attitude adopted by Great Britain. * Sec No. 103. ' f See No. 97 t Tkanslation.— "If Austria will agree to check the advance, of her troops on Servian territory; if, recognising thafe the dispute between Austria and Servia has assumed a character of European interest, she will allow the Great Powers to look into the matter and determine whs-ther Servia could satisfy the Aastro-Hungariaa Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign State or hor indepondenco, Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude." § Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 65 No. 121. Sir E. Goscherif British Ambassador at .Berlin^ to Sir Edioard Grey, — {Received, Avz/iosi 1.) (TeJegraphic.) Berliriy July 31, 1914. 'YOUR telegram of 31st July.* I spent an hour witn Secretary of State .urging liim most earnestly to accept your proposal and make another effort to prevent terrible catastropho of a European war. Ho expressed himself very sympathetically towards your , proposal, and appreciated your continued efforts to maintain peace, but said it was impos- sible for the Imperial Government to consider any proposal until they had received an answer from Russia to their communication of to-day; this com- munication, which he admitted had the form of an ultimatum, being that, unless Russia could inform the Imperial Government within twelve hours that she would immediat^jly countermand her mobilisation against Germany and Austria, Germany would be obliged on her side to mobilise at once. I asked his Excellency why they had made their demand even more difficult for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilise m south as well. , He replied that it was in order to prevent Russia from saying all her mobilisation was only directed against Austria. ^ His Excellency said that if the answer from Russia was satisfactory he thought personally that your proposal merited favourable consideration', and in any case he would lay it before the Emperor and Chancellor, but he repeated that it was no use discussing it until the Russian Government had sent in their answer to the German demand. He again assured me that both the Emperor William, at the request of the Emperor of Russia, ana the German Foreign Office had even up till last night been urging Austria to show willingness to continue discussions — and tele- graphic and telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a promising nature — but Russia's niobilisation had spoilt everything. ♦ Sco No. 111. No. 122. Sir E. Gosckeriy British Aviihassador at Berlin^ to Sir Edward Grey, — {Received August 1.) 8t 2, 1914, (Telegraphique.) (Telegraphic.) MINISTRE d'£tat du Luxembourg The Luxemburg Minister of State, Eyschen vient de recevoir par Pinter- JEyshen, has just received through the mediaire du Ministre d'Allemagne a German Minister in Luxemburg, M. de Luxembourg, M. de Buch, un tele- Buch, a telegram from the Chancellor gramme du Chancelier de I'Empire of the German Empire, Bethmann- 68 allemand Bethmann-Hollweg disant HoUweg, to the effect that the military que les mesures militaires a Luxem- measures taken in Luxemburg do not bourg ne constituent pas un acte hos- constitute a hostile act against Luxem- tilc centre le Luxembourg, mais sont burg, but are only intended to insure uniquement des mesures destinees a against a possible attack of a French assurer centre attaque eventuelle d'une army* Full compensation will be paid armee fran9aise. L' exploitation des to Luxemburg for any damage caused voies ferrees affermees a TEmpire by using the railways which are leased Luxembourg recevra complete indem- to the Empire, nite pour dommages eventuels. No. 130. Sir Edward Gre^j to Sir E. Goschen^ British Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreian Office, August 1, 1914. WE are informed that authorities at Hamburg have forcibly detained steamers belonging to the Great Central Company and other British merchant- ships. I cannot ascertain on what grounds the detention of British ships has been ordered. You should request German Government to send immediate orders that they should be allowed to proceed without delay. The effect on public opinion here will be deplorable unless this is done. His Majesty's Government, on their side, are most anxious to avoid any incident of an aggressive nature, and the German Government will, I hope, be equally careful not to take any step which would make the situation between us impossible. No. 131. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E, Goschcn, British Amh'iss:tdor at Berlin^ (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1S14. I STILL believe that it might be possible to secure peace if only a little respite in time can be gained before anj' Great Power begins war. The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness of Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness of Austria to accept a basis of media- tion which is not open to the objections raised in regard to the formula which Russia originally suggested. Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready to converse, and I hope that German Government may be able to make use of the Russian communications referred to above, in order to avoid tension. His Majesty's Government arc carefully abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters. No. 132. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Gosc/ccUy British Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Fore'gn Office, Auguat 1, 1014. FOLLOWING telegram from M. Sazonof* to Count Benckendorfft of the Slst July communicated to me to-day : — ' (Urgent.) " Formule amendee conf ormemcnt a la proposition anglaise : "* Si Autriche consent a arretcr la marclie de ses troupes sur le territoire serbc et si, recon- naissant que le conflit austro serbe a assume le caractere d'une question d'interet puropeen, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait accorder au Gouvernement austro-hongrois sans laisser ported * Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, + Russian Ambassador in London. 69 atteinte a ses droits d'etat souverain et a son independance, la Russie s* engage a conserve!' son attitude expectante.' "* (Above communicated to all>the Powers.) * Tkaxslation.— "Formula amended in accordance with the English proposal: * If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Servian territory, and if, recognising that the Austro-Servian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Poanxvs may examine the satisfaction which Servia can accord to the Austxo-Hungarian Government without injury to her sovereign rights as a State and to her independence, Russia undertakes to preserve her waiting attitude.' " No. 133. fSh" Edward Grey to Sir E. Goscheriy BHtish Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1914. M. DE ETTER* came to-day to communicate the contents of a telegram from M. Sazonof ,t dated the 31st July, which are as follows : — "The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared the readiness of his Govern- ment to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatiim to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the dis- cussions should take place in London with the participation of the Great Powers. "M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume the direction of these discussions. The whole of Europe would be thankful to them. It would be very important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop provisionally to 'her military action on Servian. territory." (The above has been communicated to the six Powers.) * Counsellor of Russian Embassy in London, t Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. No. 134. JSir F, Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey, — [Received August 1.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, August 1, 1914. PRESIDENT of the Republic has informed me that German Government were trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility ; that it was only after a decree of general mobilisation had been issued in Austria that the Emperor of Russia ordered a general mobilisation; that, although the measures which the German Government have already taken are m effect a general mobilisa- tion, they are not so designated; that a French general mobilisation will become necessary in self-defence, and that France is already forty-eight hours behind Germany as regards German military preparations ; that the French troops have orders not to go nearer to the German frontier than a distance of 10 kilom. so as to avoid any grounds for accusations of provocation to Germany, whereas the German troops, on the other hand, are actually on the French frontier and have made incursions on it ; that, notwithstanding mobilisations, tljG Emperor of Russia has expressed himself ready to continue his conversa- tions with the German Ambassador with a view to preserving the peace ; that French Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific, sincerely desire the preservation of peace and do not quite despair, even now, of its being possible to avoid war. No. 135. Sir Edwa/rd Grey to Sir G, Buchanan^ British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. CTelegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1914. INFORMATION reaches me from a most reliable source that Austrian Government have informed German Government that though the situation has been changed by the mobilisation of Russia they would in full appreciation of the efforts of England for the preservation of peace be ready to consider favour- ably my proposal for mediation between Austria and Servia. The effect of 70 I this acceptance would naturally be that the Austrian military action against Servia would continue for the present, and that the British Government would urge upon Russian Government to stop the mobilisation of troops directed against Austria, in which case Austria would naturally cancel those defensive military counter-measures in Galicia, which have been forced upon Austria by Russian mobilisation. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and say that if, in the con- sideration of the acceptance of mediation by Austria, Russia can agree to stop mobilisation, it appears still to be possible to preserve peace, Presumably the matter should be discussed with German Government, also by Russian Government. No. 136. Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edioard Grey.— (Received August i.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, August 1, 1914. MINISTER of AVar informed military attache this afternoon that orders had been given at 3.40 for a general mobilisation of the French Army. This became necessary because the Minister of War knows that, under the system of " Kriegszustand,"* the Germans have called up six classes! Three classes are sufficient to bring .their covering troops up to war strength, the remaining three being the reserve. This, he says, being tantamount to mobilisation, is mobilisation under another name. The French forces on the frontier have opposed to them eight army co;rps on a war footing, and an attack is expected at any moment. It is therefore of the utmost importance to guard against this. A zone of 10 kilom. has been left between the French troops and German frontier. The French troops will not attack, and the Minister of War is anxious that it should be explained that this act of mobilisation is one for purely defensive purposes.- * ''State of war." No. 137. Sir Edward Grey to Sir M, de Bunsen, British Ambassador" at Vienna. (Telegraphic.) ^ Foreign Office, August 1, 1914. I SAW the Austro-Hungaxiah Ambassador this morning. He supplied me with the substance of a telegram which the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs had sent to the Austrian Ambassador in Paris. In this telegram his Excellency was given instructions to assure the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was no intention in the minds of the Austro-Hungarian Government to impair the sovereign rights of Servia or to obtain territorial aggrandisement. The Ambassador added that he was further instructed to inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was no truth in the report which had been published in Paris to the effect that Austria-Hungary intended to occupy the sanjak. Count Mensdorff* called again later at the Foreign Office. He informed me of a telegram sent yesterday to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at .St. Petersburgh by Count Berchtold,t and gave me the substance. It states that Count Berchtold begged the Russian Ambassador, whom he sent for yesterday, to do his best to remove the wholly erroneous impression in St. Petersburgh that the " door had been banged " by Austria-Hungary on all .further convei-sations. The Russian Ambassador promised to do this. Count Berchtold repeated on this occasion to the Russian Ambassador the assurance which had already been given at St. Petersburgh, to the effect that neither an infraction of Servian sovereign rights nor the acquisition of Servian territory was being contemplated by Austria-Hungary. 'Special attention was called by Count Mensdorff* to the fact that this tele- gram contains a statement to the effect that conversations at St. Petersburgh had not been broken off by Austria-Hungary. * AustTo-Hungarian Ambassador in London. f Ausbro-Hungarian Mirw'sber for Foreign Affairs. No. 138. Sir E, GoscJieriy British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Fdvjard Grey,-r (Received August 2.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 1, 1914. YOUR telegram of to-day.* I have communicated the substance of the above telegram to the Secretary of State^ and spent a long time arguing with him that the chief dispute was between Austria and Russia, and that Germany was only drawn in as Austria's ally. If therefore Austria and Russia were, as was evident, ready to discuss matters and Germany did not desire wgr on her own account, it seemed to me only logical that Germany should hold her hand and continue to work for a peaceful settlement. Secretary of State said that Austria's readiness to discuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, and, had not Russia mobilised against Germany, all would have been well. But Russia by abstaining from answering Germany's demand that she should demobilise, had caused Germany to mobilise also. Russia had said tha,t her mobilisation did not necessarily imply war, and that she could perfectly well remain mobilised for months without making war. This was not the case with Germany. She had the speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide dominions. The situation now was that, though the Imperial Government had allowed her several hours beyond the specified time, Russia had sent no answer. Germany had therefore ordered mobilisation, and the German representative at St. Petersburgh. had been instructed within a certain time to inform the Russian Government that the Imperial Government must regard their refusal to an answer as creating a state of war,. * See No. 131. No. 139. Sir G. Buchanan^ British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edicard Grey. — {Received August 2.) (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburghy August 1, 1914. ■ MY telegram of 31st July.* The Emperor or. Russia read his telegram to the German Emperor to the German Ambassador at the audience given to his Excellency yesterday. No progress whatever was made. In the evening M. Sazonoft had an interview with the'Austrian Ambassa- dor, who, not being definitely instructed by his Government, did his best to deflect' the conversation towards a general discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia instead of keeping to the question .of Seryia. In reply the Minister for Foreign Aifairs expressed his desire that these relations should remain friendly, and said that, taken in general, they were perfectly satisfactory ; but the real question which they liad to solve at this moment was whether Austria was to crush Servia and to reduce her to the status of a vassal, or whether she was to leave Servia a free and independent State. In the.se circumstances, while the Servian question was unsolved, the abstract discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary arid Russia was a waste of time. The only place where a successful discussion of this question could be expected was London, and any such discussion was being made impos- sible 'by the action of Au§tria-Hungary in subjecting Belgrade, a virtually unfortified town, to bombardment. M. Sazonoft informed the French Ambassador and myself this morning of his. conversation with the Austrian Ambassador. He went on to say that "during the Balkan crisis he had made it clear to the Austrian Government, ihat war with Russia must inevitably follow an Austrian attack on Servia. It was clear that Austrian domination of Servia was as intolerable for Russia as the dependence of the Netherlands on Germanv would be to Great Britain. It was, in fact, for Russia a question of life and death. The policy of Austria had throughout been both tortuous and immoral, and she thought that she could treat Russia with defiance, secure in the support oi her German ally. * See No. 120. t Russian Minister for Foreign Aflfairs. D 7^ Similarly the policy of Germany had been a:a equivocal and double-faced policy, ,and it mattered little whether the German Gbvernmcnt linew or did not know tlie t<}rms of the Austrian ultimatum; w^hat mattered was that her intervention with the Austrian Government had been postponed until the moment had passed when its. influence would have been felt. Germany was unfortunate .in her representatives in Vienna and St. Petersburgh : tho former was a violent Russophobe who had urged Austria on, the latter had reported to his Government that Russia would never go to war. M. Sazonof* was completely weary of the ceaseless endeavours he had made to avoid a war. No suggestion held out to him had been refused. He had accepted the pro- posal for a conference of four, for mediation by Great Britain and Italy, for direct conversation between Austria and Russia; but Germany and Austria- Hungary had either rendered these attempts for peace ineffective by evasive replies or had refused them altogether. The action of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the German preparations had forced the Russian Government to order mobilisation, and the mobilisation of Germany had created a desperate situation. M. Sazonof* added that the formula, of which the text is contained in my telegram of 31st July,+ had been forwarded by the Russian Government to Vienna, and he would adhere to it if you could obtain its acceptance before the frontier was crossed by German troops. . In no case would Russia begin hos- tilities first. I now see no possibility of a general war being avoided unless the agree- ment of France and Germany can be obtained to keep their armies mobilised on their ov/n sides of the frontier,* as Russia has expressed her readiness to do, pending a last attempt to reach a settlement of the present crisis. * Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. t See No. 120. No. 140. Sh' F. Bertie, British Amhassaclor at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received Aiorican Ambassador in Berlin. No. 161. Sir 31. de Bimsen, British Amhas^ador in Vienna, to Sir Edioard Grey. Sir, London. September I, 1914. THE rapidity of the march of events during the days which led up to the outbreak of the European war made it difiicult, at the time, to do more than record their progress by telegrai>li. I propose now to add a few comments. The delivery at Belgrade on the 2tird July of the Austrian note to Servia was preceded by a period of absolute silence at the Ballplatz. Except Herr von Tschirscky,* who must have been aware of the tenour, if not of the actual words of the note, none of my colleagues were allowed to see through the veil On the 22nd and 23rd July, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, had long interviews with Baron Macchio, one of the Under-Secretaries of State- for Foreign Aflairs, by whom he was left under the impression that the words of warning he had been instructed to speak to the Austro-Hangarian Government had not been unavailing, and that the note which was being drawn up would be found to contain nothing with which a self-respecting State need hesitate to comply. At the second of these interviews he was not even informed that the note was at that very moment being presented at Belgrade, or that it would be pub- lished in Vienna on- the following morning. Count Forgach, the other Under- Secretary' of State, had indeed been good enoug-h to confide to me on the same day the true character of the note, and the fact of its presentation about tho time we were speaking. So little had the Russian Ambassador been made aware of what was pre- paring that he actually left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of absence about the 20th July. He had only been absent a few days when events compelled him to return. It miQ;ht have been supposed that Duke Avarna, Ambassador of tho allied Italian Kingdom, which was bound to be so closely affected by fresh complications in the Balkans, would have been taken fully into the confidence of Count BerchtoUlt during this critical time. In no"^t of fact his Excellency was left completely in the dark. As for myself, no indication was given me by Count Berchtold of the inr^ending storm, and it was from a private source that i received on the 15th Julv the forecast of what was about to happen which I telegraphed to you the following day. It is true that during all this time the " Neue Freie Presse " and other leading Viennese newspapers were using language which pointed unmistakably to war with Servia The official '• Fremdenblatt," however, was more cautious, and till the note was published, tho prevailing opinion amoiifi: my colleagues was that Austria would shrink from courses calculated to involve her in grave European complications: On the 24th July the note was published in the newspapers. By common consent it was at once styled an ul'imatum. Its integral acceptance by Servia was neither expeotod nor desired, and when, on the following: afternoon, it was at first rumoured in Vienna that it had boon unconditionally accepted, th^^ro was a mom-^nt of keen disappointment. The mistake was quickly corrocted. and as soon as it was known la+er in the evening that the Servian roply had ])eon veipct'^d .ind thnt "Hnron G'<^s1t hnd brokon off rf^ntions at Bo^nrrndo Vienna burst into a frenzv of delight, vast crowds parading the -streets and singing patriotic songs till the smMl hours of the morriing. The demonstrations were perfe-^tly ord^rlv. conri=ting for the most part of organised processions through the prin'^ipa) streets cndino: \^v at the Ministry of^'War. One or two attempts to make hostile manifostations against tho * German Ambassador at Vienna. t A LIS tro -Hungarian Minister for Foreign AfTaire. :;: Aiistro-Hungiarian Minister at Belgrade. 82 Russian /Embassy were frustrated by the strong guard of police which held the approaches to the principal embassies during those days. The demeanour of the pcoplo at Vienna and^ as I was infornied, in many other principal cities of ths Monarchy, showed plainly the popularity of the idea of war with Servia, and there can be no doubt that the small body of Austrian and Hungarian £:tatesnion by whom this momentous step was adopted gauged rightly the sense, and it may even be said the determination, of the people, except presumably in pcrlions cf the provinces inhabited by the Slav races. There had been much di.sappointment in many quarters at the avoidance of war with Servia during the annexation crisis in 1903 and again in connection with the recent Balkan war. Count Bcrchtold's* peace policy had met with little sympathy in the Delegation. Now the flood-gates were opened, and the entire people and press clamoured impatiently for immediate and condign punishment of the hated Servian race. The country certainly believed that it had before it only the alternative of subduing Servia or of submitting sooner or later to mutilation at her hands. But a peaceful solution should first have been attempted. Few seemed to reflect that the forcible intervention of a Great Power in the Balkans must inevitably call other Great Powers into the field. So just was the cause of Austria held to be, that it seemed to her people inconceivable that any country should place itself in her path, or that questions of mere policy or prestige should be regarded anyAvhere as superseding the necessity which had arisen to exact summary vengeance for the crime of Serajevo. The conviction had been expressed to me by the German Ambassador on the 24th July that Russia would stand aside. This feeling, which was also held at the Ballplatz, influenced no doubt the course of events, and it is deplorable that no effort should have been made to secure by means of diplomatic negotiations the acquiescence of Russia and Europe as a whole in some peaceful compromise of the Servian question by which Austrian fears of Servian aggression and intrigue might have been removed for the future. Instead of adopting this course the Austro-Hungarian Government resolved upon war. Tlie inevitable consequence ensued. Russia replied to a partial Austrian mobilisation and declaration of war against Servia by a partial Russian mobilisation against Austria. Austria met this move by completing her own mobilisation, and Russia again responded with results which have passed into history. The fate of the proposals put forwarcl by His Majesty's Government for the pre- servation of peace is recorded in the "White Paper on the European Crisis. t On the 28th July I saw Count Berchtold and urged as stronglj" as I could that the scheme of mediation mentioned in your speech in the House of Commonst on the previous day should be accepted as offering an honourable and peaceful settlement of the question at issue. His Excellency himself read to me a tele-; graphic report of the speech, but added that matters hj^d gone too far ; Austria was that day declaring war on Servia, and she could never accept the confer- ence which you had suggested should take place between the less interested Powers on the basis of the Servian reply. This was a matter wJiich must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said His Majesty's Government would hear with regret that hostilities could not be arrested, as you feared they would lead to European complications. I disclaimed anj- British lack of sympathy with Austria in the matter of her legitimate grievances against Servia, and pointed out that whereas Austria seemed to be making these the starting point of her policy. His Majesty's Government were bound to look at the question primarily from the point of view of the maintenance of the peace of Europe. In this way the two countries might easily drift apart. His Excellency said that he too was keeping the European aspect of the question in sight. He thought, however, that Russia would have no right to intervene after receiving his assurance that Austria sought no territorial aggrandisement. His Excellency remarked to me in the course of his conversa- tion that, thouerh he had been glad to co-operate towards bringing about the settlement which had resulted from the ambassadorial conferences in London during the Balkan crisis, he had never had mucli belief in the nermanency of that settlement, which was necessarily of a highly artificial character, inasmuch a.s the interests, which it sought to liarmonise were in themselves pro- foundly divergent. His Excellency maintained a most friendly demeanour * Au :tro-Hungarian Minister for Fproign Affairs. + "'Miscolkjieous. No. 6 (1914)." :;: Sec Han^Trd, Vol. -65, No. 107, columns 931-933. 83 throughout the interview, but left no doubt in my mind as to the determination of the Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed with the invasion of Servia. The German Government claim to have i^ersevered to the end in the endeavour to support at Vienna your successive proposals in the interest of peace. Herr von Tschirscky* abstained from inviting ray co-operation or that of the French and Russian Ambassadors in carrying out his instructions to that effect, and I had no means of knowing what response he was receiving from the Austro- Hungarian Governm-ent. 1 was, however, kept fully informed by M. Schebeko, the Russian Ambassador, of his own direct negotiations with Count Berchtold. M. Schebeko endeavoured on the 28th July to persuade the Austro-Hungarian Government to furnish Count Szaparyt with full powers to continue at St. Petersburgh the hopeful conversations which had there been taking place between the latter and M. Sazonof.it Count Berchtold§ refused at the time, but two days later (30th July), though in the meantime Russia had partially mobilised against Austria, he received M. Schebekojl again, in a perfectly friendly manner, and gave his consent to the continuance of the conversations at St. Petersburgh. 1^'rom now onwards the tension between Russia and Ger- many was much greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the latter an arrangement seemed almost in sight, and on the 1st August I was informed by M. Schebekoll that Count Szapary+ had at last conceded the main point at issue by announcing to M. Sazonoft that Austria would consent to submit to mediation the points m the note to Servia which seemed incompatible with the maintenance of Servian independence. M. Sazonof.I M. Schebekoll added, had accepted this proposal on condition that Austria would refrain from the actual invasion of Servia. Austria, in fact, had finally yielded, and that she herself had at this point good hopes of a peaceful issue is shown by the communication made to you on the 1st August by Count Mensdorff,1^ to the effect that Austria had neither "banged the door" on ropi promise nor cut off the conversations.*'* M. Schebekoll to the end was working hard for peace. He was holding the most conciliatory language to Count Berchtold, § and he informed me that the latter, as well as Count Forgach,t+ had responded in the same spirit. Certainly it was too much for Russia to expect that Austria would hold back her armies, but this matter could probably have been settled by negotiation, and M Schebekoll repeatedly told me he was prepared to accept any reasonable compromise. Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburgh and A"^ienna were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on the 31st July by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburgh and Paris. The ulti- matums were of a kind to which only one answer is po.ssible, and Germany declared war on Russia on the 1st August, and on France on the Srd August. A few days' delay miglit in all probability have sjived Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history. Russia still abstained from attacking Austria, and IVl Schphekol! had been instructed to remain at his post till war should actually hp declared against her by the Austro-Hungarian Government. This only happened on the 6tfi August when Count Berchtold§ informed the foreign ; -is-inns at Vienna that '' the Austro-ITungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh had been instructed to notify the Russian Government that, in view of the menacing attitude of Russia in the Austro-Servian conflict and the fact that Russia had commenced hostilities against Germany, Austro-Hungary considered herself also at war with Russia." M. Schebekoll left quietly in a sr)ocial train provided by th^ Austro- Hungarian Government on the 7th August. He had urgently requested to be conveyed to the Roumanian frontier, so that he might be ab'e to proceed to his own country, bub was taken instead to the Swiss frontier, and ten days later I found him at Borne. M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, stayed on till the 12th August. On the previous day he had been instructed to demand his passport on the ground that * German Ambassador in Vienna. t Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. t Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. § Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. II Russian Ambassador in Vienna. IT Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. *" See No. 137 +t Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 84 Austrian troops were being employed against France. This point was not fully cleared up when I left Vienna. On the 9th August, M. Dumaine had received from Count Berchtold* the categorical declaration that no Austrian troops were being moved to Alsace. The next day this statement was supplemented by a further one, in writing, giving Count Berchtold's assurance that not only had no Austrian troops been moved actually to the French frontier, but that none were moving from Austria in a westerly direction into Germany in such a way that they might replace German troops employed at the front. These two statements were made by Count Berchtold in reply to precise questions put to him by M. Dumaine, under instructions from his Government. The French Ambassador's departure was not attended by any hostile demonstration, but liis Excellency 'before leaving had been justly offended by a harangue made by the Chief Burgomaster of Vienna to the crowd assembled before the steps of the town hall, in which he assured the people that Paris 'was in the throes of a revolution, and that the President of the Republic had been assassinated. The British declaration of war on Germany was made known in Vienna by special editions of the newspapers about midday on the 4th August. An abstract of your speeches in the. House of Commons, and also of the German Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag of the 4th August, appeared the same day, as well as the text of the German ultimatum to Belgium. Otherwise few details of the great events of these days transpired. The "Neue Freie Presse " was violently insulting towards England. The " Fremdenblatt " was not offensive, but little or nothing was said in the columns of any Vienna paper to explain that "the violation of Belgium neutrality had left His Majesty's Government no alterna- tive but to take part in the war. The declaration of Italian neutrality was bitterly felt in Vienna, but scarcely mentioned in the newspapers. On the 5th August I had the honour to receive your instruction of the previous day preparing me for the immediate outbreak of war with Germany, but adding that, Austria being understood to be not yet at that date at war with Russia and France, you did not desire me to ask for my passport or to make any particular communication to the Austro-Hungarian Government. You stated at the same time that His Majesty's Government of course expected Austria not to commit any act of war against us without the notice required by diplomatic usage. On Thursday morning, the 13th August, I had the honour to receive your* telegram of the 12th, stating that you had been compelled to inform Count Mensdorff ,t at the request of the French Government, that a complete rupture had occurred -between France and Austria, on the ground that Austria had declared war on Russia who was already fighting on the side of France, and th^t Austria had sent troops to the German frontier under conditions that were a direct menace to France. The rupture having been brought about with France in -this way, I was to ask for my passport, and your telegram stated, in con- clusion, that you had informed Count Mensdorff that a state of war would exist between the two countries from midnight of the 12th August. After seeing Mr. Penfleld, the United States Am\)assador, who accepted immediately in the most friendly spirit my request that his Excellency would take charge provisionally of British interests in Austria-Hungary during the unfortunate interruption of relations, I proceeded, with Mv. Theo Russell, Counsellor of His Majesty's Embassy, to the Ballplatz. Count Berchtold* received me at midday. I delivered my message, for which his Excellency did not seem to be unprepared, although he told me that a long telegram from Count Mensdorfft had just come in but had not yet been brought to him. His Excellency received my communication with the courtesy which never leaves liim. He deplored the unhappy complications which were drawing such good friends as Austria and England into war. In point of fact, he added, Austria did not. consider herself then at war with France, though diplomatic relations with that country had been broken off.- I explained in a few words how cir- cumstances had forced this unwelcome conflict upon us. Wo both avoided use- less argument. Then I ventured to recommend to his Excellency's consideration the case of the numerous stranded British subjects at Carlsbad, Vienna, and * Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. i Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. 85 other pljtces throughout the country. I had -already had some correspondence with him on the subject, and his Excellency took a no*e of what I said, and promised to see what could be done to get them away when the stress of mobilisation should be over. Count Berchtold agreed to Mr. Phillpotts, till then British consul at Vienna under Consul-General Sir Frederick Duncan, being left by me at the Embassy in the capacity of Charge des Archives. He pre- sumed a similar privilege would not be refused in England if desired on behalf of the Austro-Hungarian Government. I took leave of Count Berchtold with sincere regret, having received from the day of my arrival in Vienna, not quite nine months before, many marks of friendship and consideration from his Excellency. As I left I begged his Excellency to present my profound respects to the Emperor Francis Joseph, together with an expression of my hope that His Majesty would pass through these sad times with unimpaired health and strength. Count Berchtold was pleased to say he would deliver my message. Count Walterskirchen, of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, was deputed the following morning to bring me my passport and to acquaint me with the arrangements made for my departure that evening (14th August). In the course of the day Countess Berchtold and other ladies of Vienna society called to take leave of Lady de Bunsen at the embassy. We left the railway station by special train for the Swiss frontier at 7 p.m. No disagreeable incidents occurred. Count Walterskirchen was present at the station on behalf of Count Berchtold. ^ The journey was necessarily slow, owing to the encumbered state of the line. We reached Buchs, on the Swiss frontier, early in the morning of the 17th August. At the first halting place there had been some hooting and stone throwing on the part of the entraining troops and station officials, but no inconvenience was caused, and at the other large stations on our route we found that ample measures had been taken to preserve us from molestation as well as to provide us with food. I was left in no doubt that the Austro-Hungarian Government had desired that the journey should be performed under the most comfortable con- ditions possible, and that I should receive on my departure all the marks of consideration due to His Majesty's representative. I was accompanied by my own family and the entire staff of the embassy, for whose untiring zeal and efficient help in trying times I desire to express my sincere thanks. The Swiss Government also showed courtesy in providing comfortable accommodation during our journey from the frontier to Berne, and, after three days' stay there, on to Geneva, at which place we found that every provision had been made by the French Government, at the request of Sir Francis Bertie, for our speedy conveyance to Paris. We reached England on Saturday morning, the 22nd August. I have, &Q.; MAURICE DE BUNSEN. PART II, SPEECHES IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. (1) Sir Eciwaid Giey (August 3, 19U) (2) Sir Edward Grey (August 3, 1914) (3) Mr. Asquith (August 4, 1914) ... (4) Mr. Asquith (August 5, 1914) ... (5) Mr. Asquith (August 6, 1914) e-.- Pago 89 97 97 98 98 0^ PART II. SPEECHES IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. (1) STATEMENT BY SIR EDWARD GREY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AUGUST 3, 1914. Last week I staied that we were working for peace not only for this country, but to preserve the peace of Europe. To-day events move so rapidly that it is exceedingly difficult to state with technical accuracy the actual state of affairs, but it is clear that the peace of Europe cannot be preserved. Russia and Germany, at any rate, have declared war upon each other. Before I proceed to state the position of His Majesty's Government, I would like to clear the ground so that, before I come to state to the House what our attitude is with regard to the present crisis, the House may know exactly under what obligations the Government is, or the House can be said to be, in coming to a decision on the matter. First of all let me say, very shortly, that we have consistently worked with a single mind, with all the earnestness in our power, to preserve peace. The House may be satisfied on that point. We have always done it. During these last years, as far a^ His Majesty's Government are con- cerned, we would have no difficulty in proving that we have done so. Through- out the Balkan crisis, by general admission, we worked for peace. The co- operation of the Great Powers of Europe was successful in working for peace in the Balkan crisis. It is true that some of the Powers had great difficulty in adjusting their points of view. It took much time and labour and discussion before they could settle their differences, but peace was secured, because peace was their main object, and they were willing to give time and trouble rather than accentuat^e differences rapidly. In the present crisis, it has not been possible to secure the peace of Europe ; because there has been little time, and there has been a disposition — at any rate in some quarters on which I will not dwell — to force things rapidly to an issue, at any rate to the great risk of peace, and, as we now know, the result of that is that the policy of peace as far as the Great Powers generally are concerned, is in danger. I do not want to dwell on that, and to comment on it, and to say where the blame seems to us to lie, which Powers were.niost in favour of peace, which were most disposed to risk or endanger peace, because I would like the House to approach this crisis in which we are now from the point of view of British interests, British honour, and British obligations, free •from all passion as to why peace has not been preserved. We shall iDublish papers as soon as we can regarding what took place last week when we were working for peace; and when those papers are published I have no doubt that to every human being they will make it clear how strenuous and genuine and wHole-hearted our efforts for i)eace Were, and that they will enable people to form their own judgment as to what forces were at work which operated against peace. I come first, now, to the question of British obligations. I have assured the House — and the Prime Minister has assiired the House more than once — that if any crisis such as this arose we should come before the House of Commons and be able to say to the House that it was free to decide what the British attitude should be, that we would have no secret engagement which we should spring upon the House, and tell the House that because we had entered into that engagement there was an obligation of honour upon the country. I will deal with that point to clear the ground first. There have been in Europe two diplomatic groups, the Triple Alliance and what came to be called the Triple Entente, for some years past. The Triple Enten'G was not an alliance— it was a diplomatic group. The House will remember that in 1908 there was a crisis— also a Balkan crisis— originating in the annexation -of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Russian Minister, M. Isvolsky, came to London, or happened to come to London, because his visit wa? planned before the crisis broke out. I told him definitely then, this being a Balkan crisis, a Balkan affair, I did not consider that public opinion in this country would justify us in promising to give anything more than diplomatic 90 Buppoi t. More was never asked from us, more was never given, and more was never promised. In this present crisis, up till yesterday, we have also given no promise of anything more than diplomatic support — up till yesterday no promise of more than diplomatic support. Now I must make this question of obligation clear to the House. I must go back to the first Moroccan crisis of 1906. That was the time of the Algeciras Conference, and it came at a time of very great difiiculty to His Majesty's Government when a general election was in progress, and Ministers were scattered over the country, and I — spending three days a week in my constituency, and three days at the Foreign Office— was asked tho question whether, if that crisis developed into war between France and Oermany, we would give armed support. I said then that I could promise nothing to any foreign Power unless it H'as subsequently to receive tho whole- hearted support of public opinion here if the occasion arose. I said, in my opinion, if war was forced upon France then on the question of Morocco— a question which had just been the subject of agreement between this country and France, an agreement exceedingly popular on both sides — that if out of that agreement war was forced on France at that time, in my view public opinion in this country would have rallied to the material support of France. I gavh no promise, but I exp-essed that opinion during the crisis, as far as I remember almost in the same words, to the French Ambassador and the German Ambassador at the time. I made no promise, and I used no threats ; but I expressed that opinion. That position was accepted by the French Government, but they said to me at the time, and I think very reasonably, *' If you think it possible that the public opinion of Great Britain might, should a sudden crisis arise, justify you in giving to France the armed support which you cannot promise in advance, you will not be able to give that, support, even if you wish it, when the time comes, unless some conversations have already taken place between naval and military experts." There was force in that. I agreed to it, and authorised those conversations to take place, but on the distinct understanding that nothing which passed beween military or naval experts should bind either Government or restrict in any way their freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they would give that support when the time arose. As I have told the House, upon that occasion a general election was in prospect; I had to take the responsibility of doing that without the Cabinet. It could not be summoned. An answer had to be given. I consulted Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Prime Minister ; I consulted, I remember, Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of State for War; and the present Prime Minister, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer. That was tho most I could do, and they authorised that, on the distinct understanding that it left the hands of the Government free whenever the crisis arose. The fact that conversations between military and naval experts took place was later on — I think much later on, because that crisis passed, and the thing ceased to be of importance — but later on it was brought to the knowledfre of the Cabinet. The Aga^Jir crisis came — another Morocco crisis — and throughout that I took precisely the same line that had been taken in 1906. But subsequently, in 1912, after discussion and consideration in the Cabinet, it was decided that we ought to have a definite understanding in writing, which was to be only in the form of an unofficial letter, that these conversations which took place were not binding upon the freedom of either Government ; and on the 22nd of November, 1912, I wrote to the French Ambassador the letter which I will now read to the House, and I received from him a letter in similar terms in reply. The letter which I have fo read to the House is this, and it will be known to the piiblic now as the record that, .whatever took place between military and naval experts, they were not binding engagements upon the Governments : — " My dear Ambassador, "From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted togpther. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either- Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not, to be regarded as an engage- ment that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not yet arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for m instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operato in war. " You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other. "I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggres- sion and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would bo prepared to take in common." Lord Charles Beresford.—Wlvdt is the date of that? , Sir E. Gre)/.— The 22nd November, 1912. That is the starting point for the Government with regard to the present crisis. I think it mak«s it clear that what the Prime Minister and I said to the House of Commons was perfectly justified, and that, as regards our freedom to decide in a crisis what our line should be, whether we should intervene or whether we should abstain, the Government remained perfectly free, and a fortiori^ the House of Commons remains perfectly free. That I say to clear the ground from the point of view of obligation. I think it was due to prove our good faith to the House of Commons that I should give that full information to the House now, and say what I think is obvious from the letter I have just read, that we do not construe anything which has previously taken place in our diplomatic relations with other Powers in thjs matter as restricting the freedom of the Government to decide what attitude they should take now, or restrict the freedom of the House of Commons to decide what their attitude should be. Well, Sir, I will go further, and I will say this: The situation in the present crisis is not precisely the same as it was in the Morocco question. In the Morocco question it v/as primarily a dispute which concerned France^— a dispute which concerned France and France primarily — a dispute, as it seemed to us, affecting France out of an agreement subsisting between us and France, and published to the whole world, in which we engaged to give France dii^lomatic. support. No doubt we were pledged to give nothing but diplomatic support; v.e were, at any rate, pledged by a definite public agreement, to stand with France diplomatically in that question. The present crisis has originated differently. It has not originated with regard to Morocco. It has not originated as regards anything with which we had a special agreement with France ; it has not originated with anything which iDrimarily concerned France. It has originated in a dispute between Austria and Servia. I can say this with the most absolute confidence — no Government and no country has less desire to be involved in war over a dispute with Austria and Servia than the Government and the country of France. They are involved in it because of their obligation of honour under a definite alliance with Russia. Well, it is only fair to say to the House that that obligation of honour cannot apply in the same way to us. We are not parties to the Franco-R-ussian Alliance, We do not even know the terms of that alliance. vSo far I have, I think, faithfully and completely cleared the ground V/ith regard to the question of obligation. I now come to wliat we think the situation requires of us. For many years we have had a long-standing friendship with France. I remember well the feeling in the House — and my own feeling — for I spoke on the subject, I think, when the late Government made their agreement with France— the warm and cordial feeling resulting from the fact that those two nations, who had had per- petual differences in the past, had cleared these differences away; I remember saying, I think, that it. seemed to me that some benign influence had been at work to produce the cordial atmosphere that had made that possible. But how far that friendship entails obligation— it has been a friendship between the nations and ratified by the nations— how far that entails an obligation, let every man look into his own heart, and his own feelings, and construe the extent of the obligation for himself. I construe it myself as I feel it, but I do not wish to urge uDon anyone else more than their feelings dictate as to what they should feel about the obligation. The House, individually and collectively, may judge for itself. I speak my personal view, and I have given the House my own feeling in the matter. The French fleet is now in tho Mediterranean, and the northern and western 92 coasts of France are absolutely undefended. The French fleet being concen- trated in the Mediterranean, the situation is very different from what it used to be, because the friendship which has grown up between the two countries has given them a sense of security that there was nothing to be feared frdm us. The French coasts are absolutely undefended. The French fleet is in the Mediterranean, and has for some years been concentrated there because of the feeling of confidence and friendship which has existed between the two countries. My own feeling is that if a foreign fleet, engaged in a war which France had not sought, and in which she had not been the aggressor, came down the English Channel and bombarded and battered the undefended coasts of France, we could not stand aside, and see this going -on practically witliin sight of our eyes, with our arms folded, looking on dispassionately, doing nothing. I believe, that would be the feeling of this country. There are times when one feels that if these circumstances actually did arise, it would be a feeling which would spread with irresistible force throughout the land. But I also want to look at the matter without sentiment, and from the point of view of British interests, and it is on that that I am going to base and justify what I ai. presently going to say to the House. -If we say nothing at this moment, what is France to do with her fleet in the Mediterranean!'' If she leaves it. there, with no statement from us as to what we v/ill do, she leaves her northern and western coasts absolutely undefended, at the mercy of a German fleet coming down the Channel to do as it pleases in a war which is a war of life and death between them. If we say nothing, it may be that the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean. We are in the presence of a European conflagration ; can anj'body set limits to the consequences that may arise out of it? Let us assume that to-day we stand g-side in an attitude of neutrality, saying, "No, we cannot undertake and engage to help either party in this con- flict." Let us suppose the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean; and let us assume that the consequences— which are already tremendous in what has happened in Europe even to countries which are at peace— in fact, equally whether countries are at peace or at war — let us assume that out of that come consequences unforeseen, which make it necessary at a sudden moment that, in defence of vital British interests, we should go to war ; and let us assume — which is quite possible— that Italy, who is now neutral — because^ as I understand, sho considers that this war is an aggressive war, and the Triple Alliance being a defensive alliance, her obligation did not arise — let us assume that consequences which are not yet foreseen and which, perfectly legitimately consulting her own interests, make Italy depart from her attitude of neutrality at a time when wo are forced in defence of vital British interests ourselves to fight — what then will be the position in the Mediterranean? It might be that at some critical moment those consequences would be forced upon us because our trade routes in the Meditemanean might be vital to this country. . Nobody can say that in the course of the next few weeks there is any parti- cular trade route, the keeping open of which may not be vital to this country. What will be our position then? We have not kept a fleet in the Mediterranean which is equal to dealing alone with a combination of other fleets in the Medi- terranean. . It would be the very moment when we could not detach more ships to the Mediterranean, and we might have exposed this country from our nega- tive attitude at the present moment to the most appalling risk. " I say that from the point of view of British interests, We feel strongly that France was entitled to know— and to know at once — whether or not in the event of attack upon her unprotected northern and western coasts she could depend upon British sup- port. In that emergency, and in these compelling circumstances, yesterday afternoon I gave to the French Ambassador the following statement :— " I am authorised to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile opera- tions against the French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power. This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government recoiving the support of Parhament, and must not be tnken as binding His Majesty's Govern- ment to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place." I read that to the House, not as a declaration of war on our part, not as entailing immediate aggressive action on our part, but as binding us to take aggressive action should that contingency arise. Tilings move very hurriedly from hour to hour. Fresh news comes in, and I cannot give this in any very formal 93 iray; but I understand that the German Government would be prepared, if we would pledge ourselves to neutrality, to agree that its fleet would not attack the noilbhern coast of France. I have only heard that shortly before I came to tiie House, but it is far too narrow an engagement for us. And, Sir, there IS the more serious consideration— becoming more serious every hour— there is the question of the neutrality of Belgium. I shall have to put before the House at some length what is our position in regard to Belgium. The governing factor is the treaty of 1839, but this is a treaty with a history— a history accumulated since. In 1870, when there was war between France and Germany, the question of the neutrality of Belgium arose, and various things were said. Amongst other things, Prince Bismarck gave an assurance to Belgium that— confirming his verbal assurance, he gave in. writing a declaration which he said was superfluous in reference to the treaty' in existence— that the German Confederation and its allies would respect the neutraUty of Belgium, it being always understood that that neutrality would be respected by the other belligerent Powers. That i& valuable as a recognition in 1870 on the part of Germany of the sacredness of these treaty rights. What was our own attitude.^ The people who laid down the attitude of the British Government were Lord Granville in the ^ouse of Lords and Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons. Lord Granville on the 8th August, 1870, used these words. He said : — '* We might have explained to the country and to foreign nations, that we could not think this country v,'as bound either morally or inter- nationally, or that its interests were concerned in the maintenance of the neutrality of Belgium; though this course might have had some conveniences, though it might have been easy to adhere to .it, though it might have saved us from some immediate danger, it is a course which Her Majesty's Government thought it impossible to adopt in the name of the country with any due regard to the country's honour or to the country's interests." Mr. Gladstone spoke as follows two days later : — " There is, I admit, the obligation of the treaty. It is not necessary, nor would time permit me, to enter into the complicated question of the nature of the obligations of that treaty ; but I am not able to sub- scribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to an assertion, that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding on every party to it, irrespectively altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises. The great autliori- ties upon foreign policy to whom I have been accustomed to listen, such as Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston, never to my knowledge took that rigid and, if I may venture to say so, that impracticable view of the guarantee. The circumstance that there is already an existing guarantee in force is, of -necessity, an important fact, and a weighty clement in the. case, to which wo are bound to give full and ample consideration. There is also this further consideration, the force of which we must all feel most deeply, and that is, the common interests against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any Power whatever." The treaty is an old treaty— 1839 — and that was the view taken of it in 1870. It is one of those treaties which are founded, not only on consideration for Belgium, Avhich benefits under the treaty, but in the interests of those who guarantee the neutrality of Belgium. The honour and interests are, at least, as strong to-day as in 1870, and we cannot take a more narrow view or a less serious view of our obligations, and of the importance of those obligations, than was taken by ]Mr. Gladstone's Government in 1870. I will read to the House what took place last week on this subject. When mobilisation was beginning, I knew that this question must be a most important element in our policy — a most important subject for the House of Commons. I telegraphed at the same time in similar terms to both Paris and Berlin to say that it was essential for us to know whether the French and German Governments respectively were prepared to undertake an engagement to respect the neutrality of Belgium. These are the replies. I got from the French Government this reply :— "The French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power 94 violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure the defence of her security, to act other- wise. This assurance has been given several times. The President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to-day." From .the German Government the reply was : — " The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs could not possibly give an answer before consulting the Emperor and the Imperial Chancellor." Sir Edward Goschen, to whom 1 had said it was important to have an answer Joon,. said he hoped the answer would not be too long delayed. The German Minister for Foreign Affairs then gave Sir Edward Goschen to understand that lie rather doubted whether they could answer at all, as any reply they might give could not fail, in the event of war, to have the undesirable effect of dis- closing, to a certain extent, part of their plan of campaign. I telegraphed at the same time to Brussels to the Belgian Government, and I got the following reply from Sir Francis Villiers : — "Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will observe and. uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. In so- informing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, in the event of the viola- tion of the neutrality of their territory, they believed that they were in a posi- tion to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations between Belgium and her neighbours were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to "be prepared against emergencies." It now appears from the news 1 have received to-day — which has come quite recently, and I am not yet quite sure how far it has reached me in an accurate form— that an ultimatum has been given to Belgium by Germany, the object of which was to offer Belgium friendly relations with Germany on condition that she would facilitate the passage of German troops through Belgium, Well, Sir, until o;ie has these things absolutely definitely, up to the last moment, I do not Avish to say all that one would say if one were in a position to give the House full, complete, and absolute informatix)n upon the points We were sounded in the course of last week as to whether, if a guarantee were given that, after the war, Belgian integrity would be preserved, that would content lis. We replied that we could not bargain away whatever interests or obliga- tions we had in Belgian neutrality. Shortly before I reached the House I was informed that the following telegram had been received from the King of the Belgians by bur King — King George : — "Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessors, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870, and the proof of friendship she has just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium." Diplomatic intervention took place last week on our part. What can diplomatic intervention do now? We have groat and vital interests in the independence— and integrity is the least part, — of Belgium. If Belgium is compelled to submit to allov/ her neutrality to be violated, of course the situation is clear. Even if by agreement she admitted the violation of her neutrality, it is clear she could only do so under duress. The smaller States in that region of Europe ask but one thing. Their one desire is that they should be left alone and independent. The one thing they fear is, I think, not so much that their integrity but that their independence should be inter- fered with. If in this war which is before Europe the neutrality of one of those countries is violated, if the troops of one of the combatants violate its neutrality arid nonaction be taken to resent it,. at the end of the war, whatever the integrity may be, the independence will be gone. I have one further quotation from Mr. Gladstone as to Vvhathe thought about the independence of Belgium. It will be found in "Hansard," vohuno 203, p. 1787. I have not had time to read the whole speech and verify the context, but the thing seems to me so clear that no context could inake any difference to the meaning of it. Mr. Gladstone said;- "We have an interest in the independence of Belgium, which is wider than that which we may have in the literal operation of the. guarantee. It is found in the answer to the question whether, under- 95 the circumstances of tho, case, this country, endowed as ft is with influence and power, would quietly stand by and witness the perpe- tration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history, and thus become participators in the sin." No, Sir, if it be the case that there has been anything in the nature of in ultimatum to Belgium, asking her to compromise or violate her neutrality, whatever may have been ottered to her in return, her independence is gone if that holds. If her independence goes, the independence of Holland v/ill follow. I ask the House from the point of view of British interests to consider what may "be at stake. If France is beaten in a struggle of life and death, beaten to her knees, loses, her position as a great Power, becomes subordinate to the will and power of one greater than herself — consequences which I do not anticipate, because 1 am sure that France has the power to defend herself with all the energy and ability and patriotism which she has shown so often — still, if that weie to happen, and if Belgium fell under the same dominating influence, and then Holland, and then Denmark, then would not Mr. Glad- stone s words come true, that just opposite, to us there would be a common interest against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any Power? It may be said, I suppose, that we might stand aside, husband our strength, and that, whatever happened in the course of this war, at the end of it intervene with effect to put things right, and to adjust them to our own point of view. If, in a crisis like this, we run away from those obligations of honour and interest as regards the Belgian treaty, I doubt whether, whatever material force we might have at the end, it would be of very much value in face of the respect that we should have lost. .And do not believe, whether a great Power stands outside this war or not, it is going to be. in a position at the end of it to exert its superior strength. For us, with a. powerful fleet, which we believe able to protect our commerce, to protect our shores, and to protect our interests, if we are engaged in war, we shall suffer but little more than we shall suffer even if we stand aside. We are going to suffer, I am afraid, terribly in this war, whether we are in it or whether we stand aside. Foreign trade is going -to stop, not because the trade routes are closed, but because there is no trade at the other end. Continental nations engaged in war — all their populations, all their energies, all their wealth, engaged in a desperate struggle — they cannot carry on the trade with us that they are carrying on in times of peace, whether we are parties to the war or whether we are not. I do not believe for a moment that at the end of this war, even if we stood aside and remained aside, we should be in a position, a material position, to use our force decisively to undo what had happened in the course of the war, to prevent the whole of the West of Europe opposite to us — if that had been the result of the war — falling uiidor the domination of a single Power, and I am quite sure that our moral position ^would be such as to have lost us all respect. I can only say that I have put the question of Belgium somewhat hypothetically, because 1 am not yet sure of all the facts, but, if the facts turn out to be as they have reached us at present, it is quite clear that there is an obligation on this country to xlo its utmost to prevent the consequences to which those facts will lead 4f they are undisputed. i have read to the House the only engagements that we have yet talvcn: definitely with regard to the use of force. I think it is due to the House to say that we have taken no engagement yet with regard to sending an expedi- tionary armed force out of the country. Mobilisation of the fleet has taken place ; mobilisation of the army is taking place ; but we have as yet taken no engagement, because I feel that — in the case of a European conflagration such as this, unprecedented, with our enormous responsibilities in India and other parts of the Empire, or in countries in British occupation, with all the unknown factors — we must take very carefully into consideration the use which we make of sending an expeditionary force out of the country until wo know how we stand. One thing I would say. The one bright spot in the whole of this terrible situation is Ireland. Tlio general feeling throughout Ireland — and I would like this to bo clearly under- stood abroad — does not make the Irish question a consideration which wo feel we have now to take into account. I have-told the House hov/ far wc-havc at present gone in commitments and the conditions which influence our policy, .ind I have put to the House and dwelt at length upon how vital is the condition of the neutrality of Belgium. What other poliov is there before the Hourp? There is but one way in which 9G the Government could make certain at the present moment of keeping outside this war, and that would be that it should immediately issue a proclamation of unconditional neutrality. We cannot do that. We have made the commitment' to France that I have read to the House which prevents us doing that. We have got the consideration of Belgium which prevents us also from any uncon- ditional neutrality, and, without these conditions absolutely satisfied and satis- factory, we are bound not to shrink from proceeding to the i^e of all the force's in our power. If we did take that line by saying, " We will have nothing what- ever to do with this matter " under no conditions— the Belgian treaty obliga- tions, the possible position in the Mediterranean, with damage to British interests, and what may happen to France from our failure to support France — if we were to say that all those things mattered nothing, were as notliing, and to say we would stand aside, we should, I believe, sacrifice our respect and good name and reputation before the world, and should not escape the most serious and grave economic consequences. My object has been to explain the view of the Government, and to place before the House the issue and the choice. I do not for a moment conceal, after what I have said, and after the information, incomplete as it is, that I have given to the House with regard to Belgium, that wo must be prepared, and we are prepared, for the consequences of having to use all the strength we have at any moment— we know not how soon— to defend ourselves and to take our part. We know, if the facts all be as I have stated them, though I have announced no intending aggressive action on our part, no final decision to resort to force at a moment's notice, until we know the whole of the case, that the use of it may be forced upon us. As far as the forces of the Crown are concerned,, we are ready. I believe the Prime Minister and my right lion, friend the First Lord of the Admiralty have no doubt whatever tliat the readiness and the efficiency of those forces Avere never at a higher mark than they are to-day, and never was there a time when confidence was more justified in the power of the navy to protect our commerce and to protect our shores. The thought is with us always of the suffering and misery entailed, from which no country in Europe will escape by abstention, and from which no neutrality will save us. The amount of harm that can be done by an enemy ship to our trade is infinitesimal, compared with the amount of harm that must be done by the economic con- dition that is caused on the Continent. The most awful responsibility is resting upon the Government in deciding what to advise the Holise of Commons to do. W^e have disclosed our mind to the House of Commons. We have disclosed the issue, the information which we have, and made clear to the House, I trust, that we are prepared to face that situation, and that should it develop, as probably it may develop, we will face it. We worked for peace up to the last moment, and beyond the last moment. How hard, how persistently, and how earnestly we strove for peace last week the House will see from the papers that will be before it. But that is over, as far as the peace of Europe is concerned. Wo are now face to face with a situation and all the consequences Avhich it may yet have to unfold. We believe we shall have the support of the House at largo in pro- ceeding to whatever the consequences maj' be and whatever measures may be forced upon us by the development of facts or action takeii by others. I believe the country, so quickly has the situation been forced upon it, has not had time to realise the issue. It perhaps is still thinking of the quarrel between Austria and Servia, and not the complications of this matter which have grown out of the quarrel between Austria and Servia. Russia and Germany we know arc at war. We do not yd know officially that Austria, the ally whom Germany, is to support, is yet at war v.ith Russia. We know that a good deal has been happening on the French frontier. We do not know that the German Ambas- sador has left Paris. The situation has developed so rapidly that technically, ias regards the con- dition of the war, it is most difficult to describe what has actually happened. I wanted to bring out the underlying issues which would affect our own conduct, and our own policy, and to put them clearly. I have now put the vital facts before the House, and if, as seems not improbable, we are forced, and rapidly forced, to take our stand upon those issues, then I believe, when the country realises ' what is at stake, what the real issues are, the magnitude of the impending dangers in the West of Europe, which I have endeavoured to describe to the House, we shall be supported throughout, not only by the House of Commons, but by the determination, the resolution, the courage, and the endurance of the whole country. or (2) FURTHER STATEMENT MADE BY SIR EDWARD GREY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. AUGUST 3, 1914. Germany and Belgium. I want to give the House some information which I have received, and which was not in my possession when I made my statement this afternoon. It is information I have received from the Belgian Legation in London, and is to the following effect — " Germany sent yesterday evening at 7 o'clock a note proposing to Belgium friendly neutrality, covering free passage on Belgian terri- tory, and promising maintenance of independence of the kingdom and possession at the conclusion of peace, and threatening, in case of refusal, to treat Belgium as an enemy. A time limit of twelve hours was fixed for the reply Tlie Belgians have answered that an attack on their neutrality would be a flagrant violation of the rights of nations, and that to accept the German proposal would be to sacri- fice the honour of a nation. Conscious of its duty, Belgium is firmly resolved to repel aggression by all possible means.'* Of course, I can only say that the Government are prepared to take into grave consideration the information which it has received I make no further comment upon it (3) STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE OP COMMONS, AUGUST 4, 1914. Mr Bonar Law — I wish to ask the Prime Minister whether he has any statement that he can now make to the House? The Prime Minister (Mr Asquith). — In conformity with the statement of policy made here by my right hon friend the Foreign Secretary yesterday, a, telegram was early this morning sent by him to our Ambassador in Berlin. It was to this effect — " The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium. His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government has delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the king- dom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an encmy> An answer was requested witlim twelve hours. We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against tjiis violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium may not be proceeded with, and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany Yon should ask for an immediate reply." We received this morning from our Minister at Brussels the following telegram — "German Minister has this morning addressed note to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that, as Belgian Government- have declined the well-intended proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered rndispensable in view of the French menaces." Simultaneously — almost immediately afterwards — we received from the Belgian Legation here m London the following telegram — 'General staff announces that territory has been violated at Gemmenich (near Aix-la-Chapelle).'* Subsequent information tended to show that the German force has pene- trate J still further into Belgian territory We also received this morning from the Go'man Ambassador here the telegram sent to him by the German Foreign Secretary, and communicated by the Ambassador to us. It is in these terms — " Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions by repeating most posi- 98 tively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no i^retence whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this, declaration is borne out by fact that we -solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgic territory withou.t mak-ing at the same time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable informa- tion. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian" neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance." I have to add this on behalf of His Majesty's Government: "VVe cannot regard this as in any sense a satisfactory communication. We have, in reply, to it, repeated the request we made last week to the German Government, that they should give us the same assurance in regard 'to Belgian neutrality as was given to us and to Belgium by France last week. Wo have asked that a reply to that request and a satisfactory answer to the telegram of this porning— which I have read to the House— should be given before midnight. (4) STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AUGUST 5, 1914. Mr. Jionar Xau'.— May I ask the Prime IMinister if he has any information he can give us to-day? TJiC Frimc Minisfcr.— Our Ambassador at Berlin received his passports at 7 o'clock last evening, and shice 11 o'clock last night a state of war has existed between Germany and ourselves. We have received from our Minister at Brussels the following telegram : — "I have just received from Minister for Foreign Affairs" —that is the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs— " a note of which the following is a literal translation : — "'Belgian Government regret to have to inform His Majesty's Govern- ment that this morning armed forces of Germany penetrated into Belgian territory in violation of engagements assumed by treaty. " * Belower. "'Belgium appeals to Great Britain and Franco and Russia to co- operate, as guarantors, in defence of her territory. " ' There would be concerted and common action with the object of resisting the forcible measures employed by Germany against Bel- gium, and at the samo time of guarding the maintenance for future of the independence and integrity of Belgium. " ' Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will assume defence of her fortified places.' " We have also received to-day from the French Ambassador hero the follow- ing telegram received by the French Government from the French Minister at Brussels : — "The Chef du Cabinet of the Belgian Ministry of War has asked the French military attache to prepare at once for the co-operation and contact of French troops with the Belgian army pending the results of the appeal to the guaranteeing Powers nov/ being made. Order:S have therefore been given to Belgian provincial Governors not to regard movements of French troops as a violation of the frontier." This is all the information I am at the moment able to give to the House, but I take the opportunity of giving notice that to-morrow, in Committee of Supply, I sliall move a vote of credit of 100,000,OOOZ. (5) STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AUGUST 6, 1914. Motion made, and Question proposed, "That a sum, not exceeding £100,000.000, be granted to His Majesty, beyond the ordinary grants of Parlia- ment, towards defraying expenses that may be incurred during the year ending March 31st, 1915, for all measures which may be taken for the security of the 99 country, for the conduct of Naval and Military operations, for assisting the food supply, for promoting the continuance of trade, industry, and business com- munications, whether by means of insurance or indemnity against risk, or other- wise for the relief of distress, and generally for all expenses arising out of the existence of a state of war " The Frime Minister {Mr Asquith) —In asking the House to agree to the resolution which i^Ir Speaker has just read from the Chair, I do not propose, because I do not think it is in any way necessary, to traverse the ground again which was covered by my right hon friend the Foreign Secretary two or three nights ago He stated— and I do not think any of the statements he made are capable of answer and certainly have not yet been answered — the grounds upon which, with the utmost reluctance and with infinite regret, His Majesty's Government have bccii compelled to put this country in a state of war with what, for many years and indeed generations past, has been a friendly Power, But, Sir, the papers which have since been presented to Parliament, and which are now in the hands ot hon Members, will, I think, show how strenuous, how unremitting, how persistent, even when the last glimmer of hope seemed to have faded away, were the efforts "of my right hon. friend to secure for Europe an honourable and a lasting peace. Everyone knows, in the great crisis which occurred last year m the East of Europe, it was largely, if not mainly, by the acknowledgment of all Europe, due to the steps taken by my right hon. friend that the area of the conflict was limited, and that, so far as the great Powers are concerned, peace was maintained. If his efforts upon this occasion have, unhappily, been less successful, I am certain that this House and the country, and I will add posterity and history, will accord to 'him what is, after all, the best tribute that can be paid to any statesman ; that, never derogating for an instant or by an inch from tlie honour and interests of his own country, he has striven, as few men have striven, to maintain and preserve the greatest interest of all countries — universal peace. These papers which are now in the hands of hon Members show something more than that. They show what were the terms which were offered to us in exchange for our neutrality. I trust that not only the Members of this House, but all our fellow-subjects everywhere, will read the communications, will read, learn and mark the communications which passed only a week ago to-day between Berlin and London in this matter. The terms by which it was sought to buy our neutrality are contained in the com- munication made by the German Chancellor to Sir Edward Goschen on the 29th July. No. 85 of the published Paper.* I think I must refer to them for a moment. After referring to the state of things as between Austria and Eussia. Sir Edward Gosclien goes on — "He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neu- trality He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be ct-ushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Ger- many aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were cer- tain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government " Let the House observe these words — "aimed at no territorial acquisition at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue." Sir Edv/ard Goschen proceeded to put a very pertinent question :— "I questioned His Excellency about the French colonies" AVhat are the French colonies? They mean every part of the dominions and possessions of France outside the geographical area of Europe — " and ho said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect." Jjct me come to what, in my mmd, personally, has always been tlie crucial, and almost the governing consideration, namely, the position of the small States : — "As regards Holland, however, His Excellency said that so long as Ger- many's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise." Then we come to Belgium; : — "It dtsponded upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter 'upon in Belgium, but, when the war was over^ Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany." * See Part II, No. 85. page 64. 100 Lot the House observe the distinction between those two cases. In regard to Holhmd it was not only independence and integrity but also neutrality ; but m regard to Belgium, there was no mention of neutrality at all, nothing but an assurance that after the war came to an end the integrity of Belgium would be respected. Then His Excellency added :— "Ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been to bring about an understanding with England. He trusted that these assurances " the assurances I have read out to the House — "might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired." What docs that amount to? Let me just ask the House. • I do so, not with the object of inflaming passion, certainly not with the object of exciting feeling against Germany, but I do so to vindicate and make clear the position of the British Government in this matter. What did that proposal amount to? In the first place, it meant this: That behind the back of France— they were not made a party to these communications— we should have given, if we had assented to that, a free licence to Germany to annex, in the event of a successful war, the whole of the extra-European dominions and possessions of France. What did it mean as regards Belgium ? When she addressed, as she has addressed in these last few days, her moving appeal to us to fulfil our solemn guarantee of her neutrality, what reply should we have given ? What reply should we have given to that Belgian appeal? We should have been obliged to say that, with- out her knowledge, we had bartered away to the Power threatening her our obligation to keep our plighted word. The House has read, and the country has read, of course, in the last few hours, the most pathetic appeal addressed by the King of Belgium, and I do not envy the man who can read that appeal with an unmoved heart. . Belgians are fighting and losing their lives. What would have been the position of Great Britain to-day in the face of that spec- tacle, if we had assented to this infamous proposal? Yes, and what are we to get in return for the betrayal of our friends and the dishonour of our obliga- tions? What are we to get in return? A promise — nothing more; a promise as to what Germany would do in certain eventualities ; a promise, be it observed — I am sorry to have to say it, but it must be put upon record — given by a Power which was at that very moment announcing its intention to violate its own treaty and inviting us to do the same. I can only say, if we had dallied or temporised, we, as a Government, should have covered ourselves with dishonour, and we should have betrayed the interests of this country, of v/hich we are trustees. I am glad, and I think the country will be glad, to turn to the reply which my right hon. friend made, and of which I will read to the House two of the more salient passages.. This document. No. 101 of my Paper,* puts on record a week ago the attitude of the British Government, and, as I believe, of the British people. My right hon. friend saj's:— "His ^Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chan- cellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms. What he asks us in eflect is to engage to stand by while French Colonies are taken if France is beaten, so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the Colonies. From the material point of view " My right hon. friend, as he always does, used very temperate language: — "such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further terri- tory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy." That is the material aspect. But he proceeded : — "Altogether, apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover. The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either." He then says:— "We must preserve our full freedom to act, as circumstances may seem to us to require." And he added, I think, in sentences which the House will appreciate : — "You should . . J add most earnestly that the one way of main- tnining the good relations between England and Germany is that * Sec Part II, No. 101, page 77. 101 / they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe. . . . For that object this Government will work in that way With all sincerity and good will. If the peace ci Europe can be preserved and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile pr-licy would be, pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia,* and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have dosired this and worked for it" Th© statement was never more true-^ "as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis and Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto." That document, in my opinion, states clearly, in temperate and convincing language the attitude of this Government. Can anyone who reads it fail to appreciate the tone of obvious sincerity and earnestness which underlies it ; can anyone honestly doubt that the Government of this country in spite of great provocation — and I regard the proposals made to us as proj)osals which we might have thrown aside without consideration and almost without answer-^ can anyone doubt that in spite of great provocation the right hon. Gentleman, who had already earned the title — and no one ever more deserved it — of Peace Maker of Europe, persisted to the very last moment of the last hour in that beneficent but unhappily frustrated purpose ? I am entitled to say, and I do so on behalf of this country — I speak not for a party, I speak for the country as a whole— that we made every effort any Government could possibly make for peace. But this war has been forced upon us. What is it we are fighting for? Every one knows, and no one knows better than the Government, the terrible incalculable suffering, economic, social, personal and political, which war, and especially a war between the Great Powers of the world, must entail. There is no man amongst us sitting upon this bench in these trying days — more trying perhaps than any body of statesmen for a hundred years have had to pass through, there is not a man amongst us who has not, during the whole of that time, had clearly before his vision the almost unequalled suffering which war, even in a just cause, must bring about, not only to the peoples who are for the moment living in this country and in the other countries of the world, but to posterity and to the whole prospects of European civilisation. Every step we took we took with that vision before our eyes, and with a sense of responsibility which it is impossible to describe. Unhappily, if — in spite of all our efforts to keep the peace, and with that full and overpowering consciousness of the result, if the issue be decided in favour of war — ^we have, nevertheless, thought it to be the duty as well as the interest of this country to go to war, the House may be well assured it was because we believe, and I am certain the country will believe, we are unsheathing our sword in a just cause. If I am asked what we are fighting for, I reply in two sentences. In the first place to fulfil a solemn international obligation, an obligation which, if it had been entered into between private persons in the ordinary concerns of life, would have been regarded as an obligation not only of law but of honour, which no self-respecting man could possibly have repudiated. I say, secondly, we are fighting to vindicate the principle which, in these days when force, material force, sometimes seems to be the dominant influence and factor in the develop- ment of mankind, we are fighting to vindicate the principle thai; small nation- alities are not to be crushed, in defiance of international good faith,, by the arbitrary will of a' strong and over-mastering Power. I do not believe any nation ever entered into a great controversy — and this is one of the greatest history will ever know — with a clearer conscience and stronger conviction that it is fighting not for aggression, not for the maintenance even of its own selfish interest, but that it i« fighting in defence of principles, the maintenance of which is vital to the civilisation of the world. With a full conviction, not only of the wisdom and justice, but of the obligations which lay upon us to challenge this great issue, we are entering into the struggle. Let us now make sure that all the resources, not only of this United Kingdom, but of the vast Empire of • Which it is the centre, shall be thrown into the scale, and it is that that object may be adequately secured that I am now about to ask this Committee — to make the very unusual demand upon it — to give the Government a Vote of Credit of 100,000,OOOL I am not going, and I am sure the Committee do nob wish it, into the technical distinctions between Votes of Credit and Supple- 102 mentary Estimates and all the rarities and refinements which arise in that connection. There is a much higher point of view than that. If it were neccsr sary, I could justify, upon purely technical grounds, the course we propose to adopt, but I am not going to do so, because I think it would be foreign to the temper and disposition of the Committee. There is one thing to which I do call attention, that is, the Title and Heading of the Bill. As a rule, in the past, Votes of this kind have been taken simply for naval and military opera- tions, but we have thought it right to ask the Committee to give us its confi- dence in the extension of the traditional area of Votes of Credit so that this money, which we are asking them to allow us to expend, may be applied not only for strictly naval and military operations, but tp assist the food supplies, promote the continuance of trade^ industry, business, and communications — whether by means of insurance or indemnity against risk or otherwise— for the relief of distress, and generally for all expenses arising out of thcj existence of a state of war. I believe the Committee will agree with us that it was wise to extend the area of the Vote of Credit so as to include all these various matters. It gives the Government a free hand. Of course, the Treasury will account for it, and any expenditure that takes place will be subject to the approval of tho House. I think it would be a great pity— in fact, a great disaster— if, in a crisis of this magnitude, we were not enabled to make provision — provision far more needed now than it was under the simpler conditions that prevailed in the old days — for all the various ramifications and developments of expenditure whicli the existence of a state of war between the great Powers of Europe must entail on any one of them. I am asking also in my character of Secretary of State for War— a position which I held until this morning— for a Supplementary Estimate for men for the Army. Perhaps the. Committee will allow me for a moment just to say on that personal matter that I took upon myself the office of Secretary of State for War under conditions, upon which I need not go back but which are fresh in the'-minds of everyone, in the hope and with the object that the condition of things in the Army, which all of u& deplored, might speedily be brought to an end and complete confidence re-established. I believe that is the case ; in fact, I know it to be. There is no more loyal and united body, no body in which the spirit and habit of discipline are more deeply ingrained and cherished than in the British Army. Glad as I should have been to continue the work of that" office, and I would have done so under normal conditions, it would not be fair to the Army, it would not be just to the country, that any Minister should divide his attention between that Department and another," still less that tho First Minister of the Crown, who has to look into the affairs of all departments and who is ultimately responsible for the whole policy of the Cabinet, should give, as he could only give, perfunctory attention to the affairs of our Army in a great war. I am very glad to say that a very distinguished soldier ana administrator, in the person of Lord Kitchener, with that great public spirit and patriotism that everyone would expect from him, at my request stepped into the breach. Lord Kitchener, as everyone knows, is not a politician. His association with the Government as a Member of the Cabinet for this purpose must not be taken as in any way identifying him with any set of political opinions. He has, at. a great public emergency, responded to a great public call, and I am certain he will have with him, in the discharge of one of the most arduous tasks that has ever fallen upon a Minister, the complete confi- dence of all parties and all opinions. I am asking on his behalf for the Army, power to increase the number of men of all ranks, in addition to the number already voted, by no' less than 500,000. I am certain the Committee will not refuse its sanction, for we are encouraged to ask for it not only by our own sense of the gravity and the necessities of the case, but by the knowledge that India is prepared to send us certainly two Divisions, and that every one of our self-governing Dominions," spontaneously and imasked, has already tendered to the utmost limits of theii; Sossibilities, both in men and in monev, every help they can afford to the mpire in a moment of need. Sir, the Mother Country must set the example, while she responds with gratitude and affection to those filial overtures from the outlying members of her family. ^11^' J will say no more. This is not an occasion for controversial discussion. In all that I have said, I believe I have not gone, either in the statement of our case or in my general descriotion of the provision we think it necessary to make, beyond the strict bounds of truth. It is not my purpose— it is not the purpose of any patriotic man— to inflame feeling, to indulge in rhetoric, to excite inter- rational animosities. The occasion is far too grave for that. We have a great duty to perform, we have a great trust to fulfil, and confidently we believe that Parliament and the country will enable us to do it. BAZELL, WATSON AND VINEY, LD., LONDON AND AYLESBURY. PRINTERS BY APPOINTMENT TO HIS MAJESTY THE KING. wmtM m mum Mmim. RECUEIL DE DOCUMENTS DIPLONATIIlllES. lV6^oeialions ayani preeede la guerre. % Juillet - ", S" 1914. Retrograde, Imprimerie de V Etat. 1914. he Charge d'aflTaire^ eii Serbia au AUnistre de» ItTaires Etrang^res. Belgrade, le >%s Juillet 1914. (T^ldgramme). Le Ministre d'Autriche vient de transmettre, k 6 heures du soir, au Ministre dee Finances Patchou, qd remplace Pachitch, une note ultimative de son Gouveraement f ixant un d61ai de 48 heures pour Tacceptation des demandes y contenues. Giesl a ajoute verbalement que pour le cas oii la note ne serait pas acceptee int^gralement dans un d41ai de 48 heures, il avait Tordre de quitter Belgrade avec le personnel de la Legation. Pachitch et les autres Ministres qui se trouvent en toum^e 61ectoraIe ont 6t^ rappel^s et sont attendus k Belgrade demain Vendredi k 10 heures du matin. Patchou qui m'a communique le contenu de la note, sollicite Taide de la Russia et d^lare qu'aucun Grouvemement Serbe tfe pourra accepter les demandes de rAutriche (Sign6) Strandtman. ^2. Le Charge d'aflUres en Serble au Ministre des AflUres Etrangdres* Belgrade, le "/„ Juillet 1914. (T^ldgramme). Textedela note qui a 4t6 transmis** anjonrd'hui par le Ministre d^Autriche-Hongrie au gouvemement Serbe: Le 31 Mars 1909 le Ministre de Serbie 4 Vienne a fait, d'ordre de son Gouvemement, au Gouvemement Let R.la declaration suivante: La Serbie reconnait qu'elle n'a pas ete atteinte dans ses droits par le fait accompli cr^e en Bosnie Herz^govine et qu'elle se conformera par consequent a telle decision que les Puissances prendront par rapi)ort k Tarticle 25 du Traite de Berlin. Se rendant aux Conseils des Grandes Puissances, laSerbie s'engagodes a present k abandtmnei Pattitude de protestation et opposition qu'elle a observee- k Pegard de Pannexion depuis Pautoume dernier, et elle sVngage, en outre, a changer le cours de sa politique actuelle envers PAutriche-Hongrie pour vivTe desormais avec cette demiere sur le pied d'un bon voisinage*. Or, Phistoire des demieres ann^es, et not^mment les 6venenients douloureux du 28 Juin, ont d^montre Pexistence en Serbie d'un mouvement subversif dont le but est de detacher de la Monarchie Austro-Hongroise eertaines parties de ses territoires. Ce mouvement qui a pris jour sous les yeux du Gouvemement Serbe est arrive a se manifester au dela du territoire du Eoyaume par des actes de terro- risrae, par une s4rie d'aftentats et par des meurtres. Le Gouvemement Royal Serbe, loin de satisfaire aux engagements formels contenus dans la declaration du 31 Mars 1909, n'h rien fait pour supprimer ce mouvement: il a tol^re Pactivit6 criminelle des diff^rentes soci^tfe et affiliations dirigees contre la Monarchic, le langage effr^nede la presse, la glorification des auteursde Pattentat, la participation d'officiers et de fonctionnaires dans les agissements subversifs, une propagande malsaine dans Pinstruction publique, tol^re enfin toutes les manifestations qui pouvaient induire la popula- tion serbe k la haine de la Monarchie et au mepris de ses institutions. Cette tolerance coupable du Gouvemement Eoyal de Serbie n'avait pas cess6 au moment oik les 4venements du 28 Juin demier en ont dtoontr^ au monde entier les consequences funestes: II r^sulte des depositions et aveux des auteurs criminels de Patten- tat du 28 Juin que le meurtre de Sarajevo a ^t^ tram6 k Belgrade, que les armes et explosifs dont les meurtri^rs se trouvaient etre munis, leur ont et6 donn6s par des officiers et fonctionnaires Serbes faisant ])artie de la oNarodna Odbrana* et enfin que le passage en Bosnic des criminels et de leurs annes a 6t4 organist et effectu6 par des chefs du ser\ice-frontiere serbe. Les r^sultats mentionnes de Pinstmction ne pemiettent pas au Gouvemement I. et R. de poursuivre plus longtemps Pattitude de longanimity expectative qu'il avait observe pendant des amines vis-^-vis des agissements concentres a Belgrade et propag^s de \k sur les territoires de la Monarchie; ces resultats lui imposent au contraire — 4 — le devoir de inettre fin k des nieiiees qui foriiieiit une menace perpe- tuelle pour la tranquillite de la Monarchic. Cost pour atteindre ce but que le Gouvemement I. et R. se voit oblige de demander au Gouvemement Serbe T^nonciation officiclle qu'il condamne la propagande dirigee contra la Monarchic Austro- Hongroise, c'est a dire, I'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu a detacher de la Monarchic des territoires qui en font partic, et qu'il s'engage a supprimer, par tous les moyens, cettc pro- pagande criminelle et terroriste. Afin de donner un caractdre solennel a cet engagement, le Gouver- nement Royal de Serbie fera publier a la premiere page du journal officiel en date du 26/13 Juillet T^nonciation suivaiite: «Le Gouvemement Royal de Serbie condamne la propaganda dirigee contre TAutriche-Hongrie, c'est a dire Tensemble des ten- dances qui aspirent en demier lieu a detacher de la Monarchic Austro- Hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il deplore sincerement les consequences funestes de ces agissements criminels. Le Gouvemement Royal regrette que des officiers et fonction- naires serbes aient particip6 a la propagande susmentionn^e et com* l)romis par la les relations de bon voisinage auquel le Gouvemement ! Royal s'6tait solennellement engage par sa declaration du 31 Mars 1909. ^ Le Gouvemement Royal, qui d^sapprouve et r^pudie toute id6e ou tentative dMmmixtion dans les destinies des habitants de quelque partie de TAutriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considere de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers, les fonctionnaires et toute la .population du Royaume que dor^navant il procedera avec la der- niere rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements, agissements qu'il mettra tous ses efforts a prevenir et a r^primer^. Cette ^nonciation sera portee simultan^ment k la connaissance de TArm^e Royale par im ordre du jour de Sa Majesty le Roi et sera publiee dans le bulletin officiel de TArmee. Le Gouvemement Royal Serbe s'engage en outre: 1) i supprimer toute publication qui excite k la haine et au mepris de la Monarchic et dont la tendance g^n^rale est dirig^^ contre son integrity territoriale, 2) a dissoudre imniediatement la soci§t4 ditc «Narodna Odbrana». a confisquer tous ses moyens de propagande et k procedor de la meme inauiere contre les autres societes et affiliations en Serbie qui sadonnenta la propiigande contre la Monarchie Austro-Hongroise; le Gouvemement Royal prendra les mesures n6cessaires pour que les soci§t§s dissoutes ne puissent pas continuer leur activity sous un autre nom et sous une autre forme, 3) a 6liininer sans d61ai de Tinstruction publique en Serbie, tant en ce qui conceme le corps enseignant que les moyens d'instruc- tion, tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir 4 fomenter la propagande contre FAutriche-Hongrie, 4) a Eloigner du service militaire et de Tadministration en g6n6- ral tous les officiors et fonctionnaires coupables de la propagande contre la Monarchie Austro-Hongroise et dont le Gouvernement I. et R. se reserve de comrauniquer les noms et les faits au Gouvemement Royal, 5) h accepter la collaboration en Serbie des organes du Gou- vemement I. et R. dans la suppression du mouvement subversif dirig§ contre Tint^grit^ territoriale de la Monarchie, 6) k ouvrir line enquete judiciaire contre les partisans du com^ plot du 28 Juin se trouvant sur territoire serbe; des organes del^^s par le Gouvemement I. et R. prendront part aux recherches y relatives; 7) k proceder d'urgence k Tarrestation du commandant Voija Tankosic et du nomm^ Milan Ciganovic, employ^ de T^tat Serbe ^ compromis par les r6sultats de Tinstmction de Sarajevo, 8) k empecher, par des mesures efficaces le concours des autorit^s Serbes dans le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs k travers la fron- tiere, k licencier et punir s^verement les fonctionnaires du service frontiere de Schabatz et de Loznica coupables d*avoir aid6 les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo en leur facilitant le passage de la frontito, 9) a donner au Gouvemement I. et R. des explications sur les prupos injustifiables de hauts fonctionnaires serbes tant en Serbie qu'4 r^tranger qui, malgr6 leurs positions officielles, n'ont pas h^site apres Tattentat du 28 Juin de s'exprimer dans des interviews d'une mani^re hostile envers la Monarchie Austro-Hongroise, enfin, 10) d'avertir sans retard le Gouvemement I. et R. de Tex^cution Jes mesures comprises dans les points pr6c6dent8. Le Gouvemement I. ct R. attend la r^ponse du Gouverncmont Royal au j)lu8 tard jusqu'au Samedi 25 do ce mois, h 6 heures du soir. Un m^moire concemant les r6sultats de rinstniction de Sarajevo k regard des f onctionnaires mentionn^s axix points 7 et 8 est ann6x§ k c^tte note»» (Sign6) Strandtman. Ko 3. Note Verbale transiiiise persoimellenieut par rAmbas- sadeur d'Autriche-Hoiigrie h St,-Petersboui-g au Ministre des Affaires Etraugeres le "A* Juillet 1914 k 10 heures du matin. Le Gouvemement Imperial et Royal s'est trouve dans la neces- sity de remettre le Jeudi *%3 du mois courant, par IVntremise du Ministre Imperial et Royal k Belgrade, la note suivante au Gouver- nement Royal de Serbie: (Suit le texte de la note). Voir document .\2 2. J\o 4. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres au (liarge cVaffairesen Autriclie-Hongrie. St.-P6tersbourg, le "A4 Juillet 1914- (Tel^anime). Veuillez transmettre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres d'Au- triche-Hongrie ce qui suit. La communication du Gouvemement anstro-hongrois aux Puis- sances le lendemain de la presentation de Tultimatum a Belgrade ne laisse aux Puissances qu'un d^lai tout-a-fait insuffisant pour entreprendre quoi qu'il soit d'utile pour Taplanissoment des complications surgies. Pour pr^venir les consequences incal- - 7 - ciilables et ^alemcut nefastes pour toutes les Puissances qui |H»uvent sui\Te Ic mode d'action du Gouveraeraent austro- aongrois, il nous parait indispensable qu'avant tout le delai donne a la Serbie pour repondre soit prolonge. L'Autriche- Hongrie se declarant disposee a informer les Puissances des donnet^s de Tenquete sur lesquelles le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal base ses accusations, devrait leur donner ^alement le temps de sVn rendre compte. En ce cas, si les Puissances se convainquaient du bienfond^ de certaines des exigences autrichiennes, elles se trouveraient en mesure de faire parvenir au Gouveraeinent Serbe des conseils en consequence. Un refus de prulunger le terme de rnltimatum priverait de toute port^ la demarche du Gouveraemont austro-hongrois aupres des Puis- sances et se trouverait en contradiction avec les bases memes des relations Internationa los. Conmumique a I>mdres, Rome, Paris, Belgrade. (Signe) Sazonow. JV? 5. Le Miiiistre nsciente de ses devoirs intemationaux, la Serbie d6s les premiers jours de Tho- rible crime a d6clar6qu'ellelecondamnaitetqu'elleetaitpreteaouvrir uneenquetesursonterritoire si la complicity de certains de ses sujets etait prouv^ au cours du proces instruit par les aiitoritfe Austrc- boiigroises. Cependant les demandes contenues dans la note Austro- bongroise sont inutilement bumiliantes pour la Serbie et incom- patibles avec sa dignity comme Etat independant. Ainsi on nous de- mandesurun ton peremptoire une declaration du gouvemement dans Tofficiel et un ordre du souverain a Tarmee, ou nous reprimerions Tesprit bostile contre TAutriche en nous faisant a nous memes des reprocbes d'une faiblesse criminelle envers nos menees perfides.— On nous impose ensuite Tadmission des fonctionnaires austro-bon- grois en Serbie pour participer avec les notres a Tinstruction et pour surveiller Texecution des autres conditions indique€*s dans la note. Nous avons re^u un delai de 48 beures pour accepter le tout, faute de quoi la Legation d'Autriche - Hougrie quittera Belgrade. Noo? sorames prets a accepter les conditions austro-bongroises qui sont compatibles avec la situation d'un Etat independant. ainsi que celles dont I'acception nous sera conseillee par Votre Majeste; toutes^ les personnes dont la participition a I'attentat sera demontree seront severement punis par nous. Certaiues parmi ces demandes ne pour- raient etre executees sans des cbangements de notre legislation, ce qui exige du temps. On nous a donne im delai trop court. Nous pouvons etreattaques apres Texpiration du delai par Tannce austro-bongroise qui se concentre sur notre frontiere. II noug est im|)osible de nous de- fendre et nous supplions Votre Majeste de nous donner Son aide le plus tot possible. La bienveillance precieuse de Votre Majeste qui s'est manifestee tant de fois a notre egard nous fait esperer ferme- nient que cette fois encore notre appel sera entendu par Son gen^reux coeur slave. -5- 2 En ces moments difficiles J'int^rprete les sentiments du peuple serbc qui supplie Votre Majeste de vouloir bien s'int6resser au sort du Boyaume de Serbie. (Sign6) Alexandre. JVo 7. Le Charge d'Affalres eii Allemagne au Mlnistre des Affaires Etraugeres* Berlin, le "A* Juillet 1914. (T^l^gramme). Tons les joumaux du matin, meme ceux, rares, qui reconnaissent i*impossibilit6 pour la Serbie d'accepter les conditions posies, accueillent avec une grande sympathie le ton inergique adopts par I'Autriche. L'officieux «Local-Anzeiger» est particulierement agressif; il qualifie de superflus les recours iventuels de la Serbie h St. Piters- bourg, h Paris, k Athenes et a Bucarest, et termine en disant que le peuple allemand respirera librement quand il aura appris que la situation dans la pininsule Balcanique va enfin s'iclaircir. (Sign6) Bronewsky. Le Cliarg^ (VAffalres en France* au Mlnistre des Affalred Etrangires* Paris, le "A* Juillet 1914. (T^l^gramme). La copiedela note officiellement renuse ^ Belgrade a 6ti commu- niquie par i'Ambassadeur d'Autriche au Gouvemement Franoais. Plus tard TAmbassadeur d'Allemagne a visiti le Mlnistre et lui a lu une communication reproduisant les arguments autri- chiens et indiquant qu'en cas de refus de la part de la Serbie, rAutriche serait obligie de recourir k une pression et, en cos - 10 - de besoin, a des mesures militaires; la communication se termi- nait par la remarque qu'^ Tavis de rAUemagne cette question devrait etre r6soIue directement entre TAutriche et la Serbie et qu'il §tait de Tint^ret des Puissances de circonscrire Taffaire en I'abandonnant aux Parties int6ress^es. Le Gerant du Departed mcnt Politique, qui assistait a Tentretien, demanda a PAmbassa* deur s'il fallait consid^rer Paction autrichienne comme un ultimatum— en d'autres termes, si, dans le cas oik la Serbie ne se soumettrait pas entierement aux demandes autrichiennes, les hostilit^s ^taient inevitables? L'ambassadeur 4vita une r^ponse directe en alleguant Pabsence d'instructions. (Signe) Sevastopoulo. Le Charge d' Affaires eii Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrang^res. Belgrade, le "/« Juillet 1914. (T41%raiiime). Pachitch est rentr6 a Belgrade. II a Pintention de donner dans le delai fix6, c'est k dire demain Samedi k 6 heures du soir, une r^ponse k PAutriche indiquant les points accep- tables et inacceptables. On adressera aojourd'hui meme aux Puissances la pri^re de dSfendre Pind6pendance de la Serbie. Ensuite, ajouta Pachitch, si la guerre est inevitable—nous ferons la guerre. (Sign^) Strandtman. JVo 10. Communique du Gonyernemeut Imp^rialc St.-Petersbourg, le "/« Juillet 1914. Les demiers 6venements et Penvoi par PAutriche- Hongrie d'un ultimatum k la Serbie pr^occupent le Gouvemement Imp^- -11 - rial au plus haut degr^. Le Gouvenieinent suit attentivement revolution du conflit serbo-autrichien qui nc peut pas lai^ser la Russie indiffdrente. JV. 11. Le Charge d'Affaires eii Autriche-Moiigrie au Miiiistre des Affaires Etraiigeres. Vienne, le "/„ Juillet 1914. (T^l^ramme). Le comte Berchtold se trouve h, Ischl. Vu rimpossibilit^ d'y arriver a temps, je lui ai telegraphic notre proposition de prolonger le d61ai de Tultimatum et Tai rep6t§e verbale- inent au Baron Macchio. Ce dernier m'a promis de la coniniu- niquer a temps au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, mais a ajout6 qu'il pouvait prMire avec assurance un refus catCgorique. (Sign6) Koudachew. JV? 12. Lc Charge d'Affaires en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires EtrangereSt Vienne, le »%5 Juillet 1914. (T616gramme). Suite a nion telCgramme d'aujourd'hui. Viens de recevoir de Macchio la rCponse negative du Gouvemement Austro-Hongrois i notre proposition de prolonger le deiai de la note. (SignC) Koudachew.. •^ 12 u. m 13. Le Charge d'Affaires en Serbie au Miiiistre lies Affaires Etraiigeres, Belgrade, le "/^g Juillet 1914. (T^legramme). Re^u avec retard le 14—27 Juillet 1914. Je transmets la r^ponse que le President du Conseil des Mi- nistres Serbe a remis au ministre Austro-Hongrois k Belgrade aujourd'hui avant Texpiration du d^lai de rultimatum. «A9 Juillet 1914. (T^I^gramme). '- Aujourd'hui, le Ministre de Bulgarie, au nom de son Gouvemo- ment, a declare h Pachitch que la Bulgarie observerait la ufiutralite. (Signe) Strandtman. -39 JVo53. L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etranj^eres. Paris, le »«Air Juillet 1914. (T^l^gramme). A Voccasion de Tarrivee du President de la Republique Francaise le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres avait prepare un court expose de la situation politique actuelle, k pen pres dans les termes suivants: L'Autriche, craignant la decomposition interieiire, s'est empar6e du pr6texte de Tassassinat de rArchiduc pour essayer d'obtenir des garaiities qui pourront revetir la forme de Toccupation des communi- cations militaires serbes ou meme du territoire serbe. L'Allemagne ^outient TAutriche. Le maintien de la paix depend de la seule Russie, parce qu'il s'agit d'une affaire qui doit etre «localisee» entre FAutriche et la Serbie, c'est a dire de la punition de la politique precedente de la Serbie et des garanties pour Tavenir. De ceci TAUemagne conclue qu'il faut exercer une action moderatrice a Petersbourg. Ce sophisme a 6te rMute a Paris comme a Londres. A Paris, le Baron de Schoen a envaintached'entrainer la France a une action soiidaire avec I'Alle- magne sur la Russie en faveur du maintien de la paix. Les memes tentatives ont et6 faites a Londres. Dans les deux capitales il a ete r6pondu que Paction devrait etre exerc6e a Vienne, car les demandes excessives de I'Autriche, son refus de discuter les rares reserves de la Serbie, et la declaration de guerre menacent de provoquer la guerre gendrale. La France et PAngleterre ne peuvent exercer une action moderatrice sur la Russie laquelle jusqu'ici a fait preuve de la plus grande moderation, surtout en conseillant a la Serbie d'accepter ce qui etait possible de la note autrichienne. Aujourd'hui I'Allemagne parait renoncer k I'idee d'une action sur la Russie seule et incline vers une action mediatrice a Petersbourg et k Vienne, mais en meme temps PAllemagne comme PAutriche tachent de faire trainer Paffaire. L'AUemagne s'oppose a la Conference sans indiquer aucune autre maniere d'agir pratique. L'Autriche mene des pourparlers manifeste- ment dilatoires k Petersbourg. En meme temps elle prend des mesures actives, et si ces mesures sont toierees, ses pretentions augmenteront proportionellcment.. 11 est tr^s desirable que la Russie prete tout — 40 — son appui au projet de ra^diatioa que pr6sentera Sir E. Grey. Dans le cas contraire TAutriche, sous pr^texte de «garantie», pourra, en fait, changer le statut territorial de ['Europe orientale. (Signe) Iswolsky. ^ 54. L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etraiigeres, Londres, le ^V^, Juillet 1914. (T^l^gramme). Ai communique le contenu de Vos tel^grammes du *V«8 Juillet h Grey. 11 a d6clar6 aujourd'hui k TArabassadeur d'AUemagne que les pourparlers directs entre la Russie et rAutriche avaient 6chou6, et que les correspondants des journaux mandaient de St.-Peters- bourg que la Russie mobilisait contre TAutriche k la suite de la mobilisation de cette derniere. Grey dit qu'en principe le Gouver- nement AUemand s'est declare en faveur de la mediation, mais qu'il rencontre des difficultes quant a la forme. Grey a insiste pour que le Gouvernement AUemand indiquat la forme laquelle a I'avis de TAllemagne pourrait permettre aux 4 Puissances d'exercer leur media- tion pour 6viter la guerre; vu le consentement de la France, de Tltalie et de TAngleterre la mMiation pourrait avoir lieu seulement dans le cas ou TAllemagne cionsentirait k se ranger du c6t6 de la paix. (Signe) Benckendorff. JVo 55. L'Ambassadeor en Prance au Ministre des Affaires Etra ng^res. Paris, le 'V,, Juillet 1914. (T^l^gramme). Vivian! vient de me confirmer I'enti^re resolution du Gouveme* ment Fran^ais d'agir d*accord avec nous. Cette resolutioTi est sou- - 41 - 6 tentio par les cereles les plus 6tendus et par les partis y conipris les radicaux-socialistes qui viennent de lui presenter luie declaration exprimant la confiance absolue et les dispositions patriotiques dugroupe. Des sou arrivee a Paris, Viviani a telegraphic d'urgence k Londres que vu la cessation des pourparlers directs entre P6tersbourg et Vienne il etait necessaire que le Cabinet de Londres renouvelat le plus tot possible sous telle ou autre forme sa propesition concemant la me- diation des Puissances. Avant moi Viviani a re(ju aujourd'hui TAmbas- sadeur d'Allemagne qui lui a renouveie Tassurance des tendances pacifiques de rAIlemagne. Viviani ayant fait observer que si TAlle- niagne desirait la paix elle devrait se hater d'adherer a la proposition de mediation anglaise, le Baron Schoen a rCpondu que les mots«confe- r€nce» ou «arbitr.age» effrayaient TAutriche. Viviani a repliqu6 qu'il ne s'agissait pas de mots et qu'il serait facile de trouver une autre forme de mediation. D'apres Tavis du Baron de Schoen, pour le succ^s des negociations entre les Puissances il serait necessaire de savoir ce que TAutriche compterait demander a la Serbie, Viviani a repbndu que le Cabinet de Berlin pourrait bien facilement s'en enqu^rir aupr^s derAutriche, mais qu'en attendant la note responsive serbe pour- rait servir de base a la discussion; il a ajoute que la France desirait sincerement la paix, mais qu'elle etait en meme temps rCsolue d'agir en pleine harmonic avec ses allies et amis,et que lui, le Baron de Schoen, avait pu se convaincre que cette resolution rencontrait la plus vive approbation du pays. (Signer Iswolsky. JV? 56. Telegramme de son Altesse Royale le Prince Alexandre de Serbie a sa Majeste I'tmpereur. Profondement touche par le teiegramme que Votre Majeste a bien voulu M'adresserhier, Je M'empresse de Laremercierde tout mon coeur. Je prie Votre Majeste d'etre persuadeeque la cordialesyrapathie, dont Votre Majeste estanimee en vers Mon pays, nous est particulie- rement precieuse et remplit notre ame de Tespoir que Pavenir de la Serbie est assure etant devenu Pobjet de la Haute sollicitude de - 42 - Votre Majest6.~Ces moments penibles ne peiivent queraffermir les liens de Tattachement profond qui unissent la Serbie a la sainte Russia slave, et les sentiments de reconnaissance etemelle pour Taide et la protection de Votre Majesty seront conserves pieusement dans Tame detous les serbes. (Sign6) Alexandre. Ko 67. Le Charge d'Airaires en SerWe au Ministre des Affaires Etrang^res. Nich le »V„ Juillet 1914. (T^l^gramme). J'ai communique a Pachitch le texte du telegrarame responsif de Sa Majest6 TEmpereur au Prince Alexandre. Pachitch apres Tavoir lu,sesignaet dit: «Seigneurl Le Tzar est grand et clement*! Ensuite il m'embrassa, ne pouvant contenir Temotion qui I'avait gagn6. L'heritier est attendu a Nich dans la.nuit. (Signe) Strandtman. JV?58. Le 3Iinistre des Affaires Btrang^res k TAmbassadeur en France. St. Pctersbourg le *%, Juillet 1914. (T^l^gramme). Aujourd'hui TAmbassadeur dAllemagne m'a communique la resolution prise par son gouvemement de mobiliser, si la Russie ne cessait pas ses preparatifs militaires. Or, nous n'avons commence ces derniers qu'^ la suite de la mobilisation h laquelle avait dej^ procede TAutriche et vu Tabsence §vidente chez cette deniiere du desir d'accepter un mode quelconque d'une solution pacifique de son conflit avec la Serbie. - 43 -- Puisque nous ne pouvons pas aec^der au desir de I'Alleniagne, il ne nous reste que d'acc61erer nos propres armements etde compter avec rinevitabilite probable de la guerre.— Veuillez en avertir le Gouveniement Francais et lui exprimer en nieme temps notre sincere reconnaissance pour la declaration que I'Ambassadeur de Prance m\i faite en son nom en disant que nous pouvons compter enti^- rement sur I'appui de notre alli^e la France. Dans les circonstances actuelles cette declaration nous est particulierement pr§cieuse. Communique aux Ambassadeurs en Angleterre, Autriche-Hongrie, Italic. Allemagne. (Signe) Sazonow. X? 59. Le Charge d'Aflaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etraiigeres. Nich, le "A, Juillet 1914. (T^legramme). Le Prince-R^gcnt a public hier un 'manifeste sign^ par tous les Ministres a Toccasion de la declaration de la guerre par TAutriche a la Serbie. Le manifeste se termine par les paroles suivantes: «De- fendez de toutes vos forces vos foyers et la Serbie». Lors de I'ouver- ture solennelle de la Scouptchina, le Regent lut en son non le discours du trone, au d^but duquel il indiqua que le lieu de la con- vocation demontrait I'importance des evcnements actuels. Suit Texpose des faits des demiers jours— rultimatum autrichien, la reponse serbe, les efforts du gouvemement Royal de faire tout ce qui etait compatible avec la dignity le TEtat pour ^viter la guerre et enfin I'agression armee du voisin plus puissant contre la Serbie, aux cotes de laquelle se tient le Montenegro. En passant a Texaraen de I'attitude des Puissances en presence du conflit, le Prince insista tout d'abord sur les sentiments dont est anim6e la Russie et sur la Toute Gracieuse Conmiunication de sa Majest6 TEmpereur disant que la Russie en aucun cas n'abandonnera la Serbie. A chaque mention du nom de Sa Majeste Imp6riale et de la Russie un «jivio> - 44 - foriniduble et febrile secouait la salle des stances. Les marques de sympathie de la part de la France et de TAngletene furent aussi relev^es s^parement et provoquerent des «jivio» d'approbation de la part des d6put6s. Le discours du trone se tennine par la declaration d*ouverture de la Scouptchina et par Texpression du voeu que toutes les mesures soient prises pour faci liter la tache du Gouvemement. (Signe) Strandtiuan. Xo 60. ].e Miiiistre de5 Affaires Etrangeres aux Aiiibassadeiirs en Allemagiie, «ii Autriche-Hongrie. en France, en Angleterre. et en Italie. St. Paersbourg, le 'V30 Juillet 1914. (T61egramme). L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne qui vient de me quitter m'a de- niande si nous ne pouvions pas nous contenter de la promesse que rAutriche pourrait donner— de ne pas porter atteinte a Tintegrite du Royaume de Serbie — et indiquer h quelles conditions nous pourrions encore consentir a suspendre nos armements; je lui ai dict6, pour etre transmise d'urgence a Berlin, la declaration suivante: «Si rAutriche, reconnaissant que la question austro-serbe a assume le oaractere d'une question europeenne, se declare prete a eiiminer de son ultimatum les points qui portent atteinte aux droits souverains de la Serbie, la Russie s'engage k cesser ses pr^paratifs niilitaires». Veuillez tei^graphier d'urgence quelle sera I'attitude du Gouver: nement Allemand en presence de cette nouvelle preuve de notre d^sir de faire le possible pour la solution pacitique de la question, car nous no pouvons pas admettre que de seniblables pourparlers ne servent qu a faire gagner du temps k rAllemagne et a TAutriciie pour leurs pr^paratifs militaires. (Signe) Sazonow. - 46 - L^Aiiibassadeur eii Alleiiiaj^iie au Miiiistre des Affaires Etraiigdres. Berlin, le 'Vao Juillet 1914. (T^legramme). J'apprends que le d^cret de mobilisation de Tarra^e et de la flotte' allemandes vient d'etre promulgue. (Sign6) Swerb^ew. JVo 62. L'Ambassadeur en AUema^ne au Miiiistre des Affaires Etraug^res. Berlin, le "Ao Juillet 1914. fT^legramme). Le Miuistre des Affaires Etrangeres vient de me telephoner pour me communiquer que la nouvelle lancee tout a I'heure de la mobili- sation de Tarm^e ct de la flotte allemandes est fausse; que les feuillets des journaux etaient imprimes d'avance en prevision de toutes 6ven- tualites, et mis en vente a Theure de Tapres raidi, mais que main- tenant ils sont confisqu6s. (Signe) Swerb6ew. ^0 63. L'Aiabassadeur en Alleniagiie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Berlin, le "Ao Juillet 1914. (T^l^gramme). Ai re^u. Votre t^legramme du 1^—29 Juillet et ai transmis le tfixU de Votre proposition au Ministre des Affaires Etrangtos que je - 46 - viens de voir; il m'a dit qu'il avait re^u un tdl^gramme identique de rAmbassadttur d'Allemagne a St.-P6tosbourg et m*a d^clar^ ensuite qu'il trouvait notre proposition inacceptable pour I'Autriche. (Sign6) Swerb^ew. ^ 64-. L'Aiiibassadciir en Aii^leterrc au Sliuistre des Affaires Etrangeres. Londres, le 17/30 Jiiillet 1914. (T^l^granune). Ai communique le contenu de Vos t^legrammes du 16 el ITJuillet. a Grey lequel considere la situation comme tres serieuse, mais desire continuer les pourparlers. J'ai fait observer a Grey que depuis que Vous lui aviez fait la proposition d'accepter tout ce qu'il propose- rait en faveur du maintien de la paix, pourvu que TAutriche ne {)ut prof iter de ces atermoiements pour ^eraser la Serbie, la ^tuation dans laquelle Vous vous trouviez s'etait apparenmient modifiee. A cette epoque nos rapports avec rAllemagneu'etaient pas comi)romis. Apres la declaration de TAmbassadeur d'Allemagne a St.-P6tersbourg concemant la mobilisation allemande, ces rapports avaient change et sa demande avait re^u de Votre part la seule reponse que pouvait donner une grande Puissance. Lorsque TAmbassadeur d'Allemagne ^tait revenu aupres de Vous et s'etait enquis de Vos conditions, Vous les aviez formul6es dans de^ circonstances tout-a- fait speciales. J'ai en meme temps de nouveau insists aupres de Grey sur la necessite de prendre en consideration la situation uouvelle cr66e par la f ante de rAllemagne a la suite de Taction dePAmbassadeur d'AUemagne. Grey a repondu qu'il le comprenait et qu'il tiendrait compte de ces arguments. (Sign6) Benckendorff. - 47 - JVo G5. L'Ambassadeur en Amt^leterre au Ministre des Affaires £traug^re$. Londres, le "Ao Juillet 1914. '(T616gramme). L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a demand^ k Grey pour quelle raison I'Angleterre prenait des mesures militaires sur terre et sur mer. Grey a r^pondu que ces mesures n'avaient pas un caract^re agressif , mais que la situation 6tait telle que chaque Puissance devait se preparer. (Sign^) Benckendorff. JV^ 66. L'Ambassadeur en Autriclie-Hongrie au Ministre des AftUires Etrangeres. Vienue, le ^Vsi Juillet 1914. (T416gramme). Malgr6 la mobilisation gen^rale je continue k ^changer des vues avec le Comte Berchtold et ses collaborateurs Tous insistent but I'absence chez TAutriche d'intentions aggressives quelconques contre laRussieetde vis6es de conqueteil'^gard delaSerbie, mais tous insistent 6galement sur la n6cessit6 pour TAutriche de poursuivre jusqu'au bout Taction commenc^e et de donner a la Serbie une le(?on s6rleuse qui pourrait constituer une certaine garantie pour Tavenir. (Sign6) Sch6b6ko. 48 JVo 67. Le Mlnistre des Affaires Etrangeres aux Ambassadeiirs en Allemagiie, Autriclie-Hoiigrie, en France, en Angletcrre et en Italie. St. Petersbourg, le »%i Juillet 1914. (T61egrarame). Me r^f^re k mon tel^gramme du *Vjo* Juillet. D'ordre de son gouvernement, rAmbassadeur d'Angleterre m'a transmis le desir du Cabinet de Londres d'introduire quelques modifications dans la for- raule que j'ai propos^e hier k TAmbassadeur d'Allemagne. J*ai r6- pondu que j'acceptais la proposition anglaise. Ci dessous je vous transmets la formule modifide en consequence. «Si TAutriche consent a arreter la niarche de ses arraees sur le territoire Serbe et si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a assum6 le caractere d'une question d'interet europeen, elle adinet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait accorder au gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie sans laisser porter atteinte k ses droits d'Etat souverain et a son independance,— la Russie s'engage a conserver son attitude expectante». (Sign6) Sazonow. J^ 68. L'Ambassadeur en AUeniagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Berlin, le %t Juliet 1914. (T^l^gramme). Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres vient de me dire que nos pourparlers, qui 6taient d6ja difficiles k la suite de la mobilisation contre PAutriche, le deviennent encore davantage en presence des graves mesuresmilitaires que nous prenonscontrePAllemagne; des nouvelles y relatives sont, d'apres lui^reijues ici de tons les cotes et devront prOvo- quer in^vitablement des mesures analogues de la part de PAllemague. — 49 — 1 A cela j\ii r^pondu que, d'apres des renseigiiemcnts surs dont je disposals ct qui ctaient confirmes par tous nos compatriptes iurivant a Berlin, la prise coutre nous des mcsuros susditos se poursuivait 6gale- nient en Allemagne avec graude activite. Malgr6 cela, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres affirme qu'ici on n'a fait que rappeler les offi- ciers de leurs conges et les troupes des champs de manoeuvres. (Sign^) Swerb^w. Xo 69. Le 3Iiiii$tre des Affaires Etrangeres h rAinbassadeiir eii Aiigleterre. S.-Petersbourg, le ^V^i Juilletl914. (T^l^gramme). J'ai prie TAmbassadeur d'^Vngleterre de transmettre a Grey Texpression de ma plus sincere reconnaissance pour le ton amical et ferme dont il a use pendant les pourparlers avecrAllemagiieetrAutri- che, grace a quoi Tespoir de trouver une issue pacifique de la situation actuelle n'est pas encore perdu. Je Tai aussi pri6 de dire au Ministre Anglais que je pensais que ce n'etait qu'a Londres que les pourparlers auraient encore quelques chances d'un succes quelconque, en facilitant ^TAutriche la necessite d'un compromis. Communique k TAmbassadeur en France. (Signe) Sazonow. X? 70. Telegrainiiic secret aux Representaiits de Sa Majeste TEmpereur k Tetraiiger. Le 19 Juillet/1 Aout 1914. (Telegramrae). A minuit TAmbassadeur d'AUemagne m'a d6clar6, d'ordre de son Gouvemcment, que si dans les 12 heures, c'est k dire k midi, Samedi, nous ne commencions pas la demobilisation, non seulement — 60 — a I'^gard de I'Allcmagnc, mais aussi k regard de I'AutricIie, le Gauverac- ment Allemand serait force de donner Tordre de mobilisation. A ma question si c'6tait la 'guerre, i'Ainbassadeur a repondu par la negative, mais en ajoutant que nous etions fort pres d'elle. (Signe) Sazonow. Xo 71. L'Ainbassadeur en Angleterrc au Miuistre des AfTaires Etran^eres. Londres 19 Juillet/1 Aout 1914. (T^legramme). Grey m'a dit qu'il a tel^aphi6 a Berlin q\i*k son avis la der- niere formule acceptee par le Gouvemcment Russe constitue la base de n^ociations qui presente le plus de chimces pour une solution pacifique du conflict. 11 a exprime en meme temps Tespoir qu'aucune grande Puissance ne commencerait les hostilites avant Texamen de cette formule. (Signe) Benckendorff. Xo 72. L'Aiubassadcur cu Aiigletcrre an Ministrc des AfiFaires Etrangeres. Londres, le 19 Juillet/1 Aout 1914. (T^l^gramme). Le Gouvernement de la Grande Bretagne a pos6 aux Gouverneihents Franeais et Allemand la question s'ils respecteraient la neutralite de la Belgique. La France a repondu dans Taffirmative, tandis que le Gouverne- ment Allemand a declare ne pouvoir repbndre a cette question cat^gori- quemcnt. (Signe) Benckendorff. 51 -> Ko 73. L'Aiiibassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrang^res. Paris, le 19 Juillet/1 Aout 1914. (Teli^gramme). L'Anibassadeur d'Autricho a visits hier Viviani et lui a d6clar§ quo TAutrichc non seulement n'avait pas le dessein de porter atteinte a rint^grit^ territoriale de la Serbio, mais etait prete h discuter avee les autres Puissances le fond de son eonflit avec la Serbie. Le GouvemementFrangaisesttrespreoeuppe paries preparatifs militaires extraordinaires de rAllemagne sur la frontiere fran^aise, car il est convaineu que sous le voile du «Kriegszustand» se produit une veri- table mobilisation. (Sign6) Iswolsky. Ko 74. L'Anibassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrang:^res. Paris, la 19 Juillet/1 Aout 1914. (T616gramme). A la reception ici du t^l^gramme de TAmbassadeur de France a St.-P^tcrsbourg contonant la communication que Vous a faite TAnibassadeur Allemand concemant la resolution de I'Allemagne de d^creter aujourd'hui la mobilisation g^n^rale, le President do la Republique a signe le d^cret de mobilisation. Dans les rues on procede a Taffichage des listes d'appel des r^servistes. L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne vient de rendre visite a Viviani, mais ne lui a fait aucune nouvclle communication, en all^guant Timpossibilite de d^chiffrer les t^l^ammes qu'il a reQus. Viviani Pa informe de la signature du decrct de mobilisation en r^ponse a la mobilisation allemande et lui a fait part de son 6t(»nnement de ce que PAllemagne eiit pris une telle raesure a un moment ou se poursuivait encore un ^change de Tucs amical entre la Russie, rAutriche et les Puissances; il a ajoute - 52 - que la mobilisation ne pr^jugeait pas n^cessairement la guerre et que TAmbassadeur d'AlIemagne pourrait rester k Paris coramc TArnbassadeur de Russie est rest6 k Vicnne et cclul d'Autriche k St.-P6tersbourg. (Sign6) Iswolsky. JVo 75. L'Anibassadeur en France au Jlinistre des Affaires Etran^eres. Paris, le 19 Juillet/1 Aout 1914. (T^ldgramme). Jetionsdu President que pendant les demi^res joum^es TAmbaa- sadeur d'Autriche a assure avec force le President du Conseil des Ministres et Ini meme, que I'Autriche nous aurait d6clar6 etre prete a respecter non seulement Tint^grit^ territoriale de la Serbie, mais aussi ses droits souverains, mais que nous aurions inten- tionnellement fait le silence sur cette declaration.* J'ai oppose ua dementi cat^orique k cela.. (Sign6) Iswolsky. \Xo 70. Jiote remise par TAmbassadeur d'Allemagne a S.-Peters- bourg le 19 Juillet 19U a 7 h. 10 du soir. Le Gouvemement Imj^^rial s'est efforc6 des les debuts dc laitise de la mener a une solution pacifique. Se rendant a un d^sir qui lui en avait M exprim^ par Sa Majesty TEmpereur de Eussiti, Sa Majeste TEmpereur d'Allemagne d'accord avee I'AngletHrre s'6tait appliqu6 a accomplir un role m6diateur aupres des Cabinets de Vienne et de St.-Petersbourg, lorsque la Kussie, sans en attendre le resultat, proc^da a la mobili- sation de la totality de ses forces de terre et de mer. A la suite 'de cette mesure mena(?ante motiv6e par aucun presage militaire d^ la part de TAllemagne TEmpire Allemand c'est trouv6 vis-^-vis d'un danger grave et imiiiinent. Si le Gouveme- - 53 - ment Imperial out lUiinque de parer k ce peril, il aurait oompro- mis la security et Texistencc meme de rAllomtigue. Par conse- quent le Gouvemeraent Allemand se vit force do s'adresser au Gouvemement de Sa Majeste TEmpereur de Toutes les Russies en insistant sur la cessation des dits actes miiitaires. La Russie ayant refus6 de faire droit k (n'ayant pas cru devoir repondre a*) cette demande et ayant manifesto par ce refus (cette atti- tude*) que son action etait dirig§e centre TAUeinagne, j'ai riionneur, d'ordre de inon Gouvemement, de faire savoir a Votre Excellence ce qui suit: Sa Majeste TEinpereur Mon Auguste Souvorain au nom de TEiupire, relevant le defi se considere en etat de guerre avec la Russie. St.-Petersbourg, le 19 Juillet/1 Aout 1914. (Signe) F. Pourtales. jYo 77. Communique du 3Iiulstre des AtTaircs Etraui^^^rcs coucer- uaut les evenemeuts des deruiers jours. Le 20 Juillet/2 Aout 1914. Un expos6 dcfigurant les eveneraents des derniers jours ayant paru dans la presse 6trangere, le Ministcre des Affaires Etrangeres croit de son devoir de publier Taper^u suivant des pouri)arlers di[)lomatiques pendant le temps susvise. Le 10/23 Juillct a. c. le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie a Belgrade presenta au Ministre President Serbe une note o^ le Gouvemement Serbe etait accuse d 'avoir favorise le mouve- ment panserbe qui avait abouti h Tassassinat de rentier du trone austro-hongrois. En consequence TAutriche-Hongrie •) Les mots places cntre parentheses se trouvent dans Toriginal. II faut suppuser que deux variantes avaient et6 preparSes d'avance et que par erreur clles ont ete inser^es tiutes les deux dans la note. — 64 — demandait au Gouvemrment Serbc non seulement de condamner sous une forme solennelle la susdite propagandc, mais aussi de prendre, sous le controle de rAutriche-Hongrie, une serie de mesures tendant a la decouvcrte du coniplot, a la punition des sujets swbes y ayant particip^ et a la- prevention dans Tavenir de tout attentat sur le sol du Roavume. Un delai de 48 heures fut fix6 au Gouvemement Serbe pour la reponse a la susdite note. Le Gouvemement Imperial, aiiquel I'Ambassadeur d'Autriche- Hongrie h St.-Petersbourg avait communique le texte de la note 17 heures apres sa remise a Belgrade, ayant pris eonnais- sance des demandes y contenues, dut s'apercevoir que quelques unes parmi elles etaient inexecutables quant au fond, tandisque d'autres etaient presentees sous une forme incompatible avee la dignite d'un Etat independant. Trouvant inadmissibles la diminution de la dignite de la Serbie contenue dans ces deman- des, ainsi que la tendance de rAutriche-Hongrie d'assurer sa preponderance dans les Balcans demontree par ces memes exi- gences, le Gouvemement Russe fit observer dans la forme la plus amicale a I'Autriche-Hongrie qu'il serait desirable de soumettre k un nouvel examen les points contenus dans la note austro-hongroise. Le Gouvemement Austro-Hongrois ne cmt possible de consentir h, une discussion de la note. L 'action moderatrice des autres Puissances a Vienne ue fut non plus couronnee de succes. Malgr6 que la Serbie eut reprouve le crime et se fut mon- tr^e prete a donner satisfaction a rx\utriche dans une mesure qui depassa les provisions non seulement de In Russie, mais aussi des autres Puissances, le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie a Belgrade jugea la reponse serbe insuffisante et quitta cette ville. Reconnaissant le caractere exagOre des demandes presentees par TAutriche, la Russie avait declare encore auparavant qu'il lui serait impossible de rester indifferente, sans se refuser toutefois a employer tons ses efforts pour trouver une issue pacifique qui fut acceptable pour rAutriche et menageatson amour-propre de grande puissance. En meme temps la Russie etablit fernieijient qu'elle admettait une solution pacifique de la question seulement dans une — r>5 — raesure qui n'impliquerait ptos la diminution do la dignity dc la Serbie conime Etat ind6])endant. Mallii^ureuseinent tons Ics efforts d^ploy^s piir lo Gouvenioment Imperial dans cctto direction rrsterent sans effet. LeGouvernemont Austro-Hongfois, apres s'etre derob6 ^touto intervention eonciliatrice des Puissances dans sonconflitavocla Serbie, prot-eda a la mobilisation, d6clara officiellemont la guerre c\ la Serbie, et le jour suivant Belgrade fut bombard^e. Le manifesto qiii a accoin- piigne la declaration de guerre accuse ouvertement la Serbie d'avoir prepare et execute le crime de S^Taiewo. Une parnlle accusation d'un crime de droit commun lancee contre tout un peuple et tout un 6tat attira k la S.^rbie par son inanite cvidente les larges sympathies dos cercles de la society europeemie. A la suiti' de cette maniere d'agir du Gouvernement. Austro- Hongrois, malgre la declaration de la Russic qu'elle ne pourrait rester indifferente au sort de la Serbie, le Gouvernement Imp6rial jugea necessaire d'ordonner la mobilisation des circonscriptions militnires deKiew,d'Odessa,de Moscou etde Kazan. Une telle decision s'iinpo- sait parceque depuis la date de la remiso de la note austro-lion- groise au Gouvernement Serbe et les premieres demarches de la Russie cinq juurs s'etaient ecoules, et cependant le Cabinet d'' Vienne n'avait fait aucun pas pour aller au devant de nos efforts pacifiques; au contraire, la mobilisation de la moiti6 dc Tarinee austro-hongroise Avait ele decretee. Le Gouvernement Allemand fut mis au courant des mesures prises par la Russie; 11 lui fut en meme temps cxpliqu6 qu'elles n'6taient que la consequence des armements autrichiens et nullement dirigees contre rAlli'nuigno. En meme temps, le Gouvernement Imperial dec lara que la Russie 6tait prete a continuer les pourparlers en vue d'une solution pacifique du confiit, soit par la voie de nego- ciations directes avec le Cabinet dc Vienne,soit, en suivant la pro- position de ia Grande Bretagne, par la voie d'une Conference des quatre Grandes Puissancs non interosseosdircctement, voire,, I'Angle- terre, la France, TAllemagne et I'ltalie. Cependant cette tentative de la Russie echoua egalement. L'Au- triche-Hongric declina un echange de vucs ulterieur avec nous, et le Cabinet de Vienne se deroba a la participation a la Conference des Puissances projetee. - 56 - Neanmoins, la Eussie ne discontinua pas ses efforts en faveur de la paix R^pondant h la question de TAmbassadeur d'Allemagne, a quelles conditions nous consentirions encore k suspendre nos armements, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres declara que ces conditions seraient la reconnaissance par TAutriche-Hongrie que la question Austro-Serhe avaitrevetu le caractere d'une question europeenne, et la declaration de cette meme Puissance qu'elle consentait a ne pas insister sur des demandes incompatibles avec les droits souverains de la Serbie. La proposition de la Russie fut jugee par TAllemagne inaccep- table pour I'Autriche-Hongrie. Simultanement onre^uta St.-Peters- bourg la houvelle de la proclamation de la mobilisation generale par TAutriche-Hongrie. En meme temps les hostilites continuaient sur le territoirre Serbe et Belgrade fut bombardee de rechef. L'insucces de nos propositions pacifiques nous obligea d'elargir les mesures de precaution militaires. Le Cabinet de Berlin nous ayant adresse une question a cesujet, il lui fut repondu que la Russie etait forcee de commencer ses arme- nieuts pour se prenmnir contre toutes eventualites. Tout en prenant cette mesure de precaution, la Russie n'en ^f^ continjait pas moins de rechercher de toutes ses forces une issue de cette situation et declara etre prete a accepter tout moyen de solution du conflit qui comport^ait Tobservation des conditions posees par nous. Malgre cette communication conciliante, le Gouvernement Alle- mand, le ^ V31 Jwill^t,adressa au Gouvemement Russelademande d'avoir a suspendre ses mesures militaires a midi du 19 Juil let/1 Aout, en menaQant, dans le cas contraire, de proceder a une mobilisation generale. Le lendemain, 19 Juillet/1 Aout, TAmbassadeur d'Allemagne transmit au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, au nom de son Gouver- nement, la declaration de guerre. - 57 %^ j\o 78. Le Hinistre des Affaires Etraiig^res aux Kepreseiitaiits de 8. M. FEiupereur a retrauji:er. St.-Petersboui^, le 20 Juillet/2 Aout 1914. (T^l^gramme). II est absohiment clair que TAllemagne s'efforce des a present de rejeter sur nous la responsabilit^ de la rupture. Notre mobilisation a ete provoquee par Tenorme responsabilite que nous aurions assumee, si nous n'avions pas pris toutes les mesures de precaution a un moment ou TAutriche, se bomanta des pourparlers d'un caractere dilatoire, bombardait Belgrade et procedait a une mobilisation generale. Sa Majesty TErapereur s'etait engage vis-a-vis de TEmpereur d'Allemagne par sa parole a n'entreprendreaucun acte agressif tant que dureraient les pourparlers avec rAutriche, Apres une telle garantie et apres toutes les preuves de Tamour de la Russie pour la paix, TAlle- magne ne pouvait ni avait le droit de douter de notre declaration que nous accepterions avec joie toute issue pacifique compatible avec la dignite et Tindependance de la Serbie. Une. autre issue, tout en etant completement incompatible avec notre propre dignite, aurait certainement ebranle Tequilibre Europeen, enassurant Th^gemonie de TAllemagne. Ce caractere Europeen, voire mondial, du conflit est infi- niment plus important que le pretexte qui Ta cree. Par sa decision de nous declarer la guerre a un moment oil se poursuivaient les n4go- ciations entre les Puissances, TAllemagne a assume une lourde responsabilite. (Signe) Sazonow. J^79. Note remise par I'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie h St.-Petersboui'g au Miiiistre des Aflfaires Etrangeres le 24 Jiiillet h 6 h. du soir. D'ordre de son Gouvemement le soussigne Ambassadeur d'Au- triche-Hongrie a Thonneur de notifier a Son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Etrangercs de Russie ce qui suit: ■k — 58 — ' itch , ministre a Viennef a M. N. Pachitch, pr^esident du Conseil et mU nistre des Affaires etrangeres. (Telegramme.) Vienne, le 16/29 juin 1914. Les journaux de Vienne affirment que Tins- truction judiciaire, ouverte contre les auteurs de Fattentat, a e tabli que le crime avait ete prepare a Belgrade, que tout un com plot sur une base plus large avait ete organise a Belgrade parmi la jeu- nesse ins]3iree par Tidee panserbe, et que les journaux de Belgrade alarment le public par ieurs peintures de la gravite de la situation en Bosnie. Ceci, d'apr^s euX; exerce une influence 4 PAGES D'raSTOIRE considerable, vu quecesjournaux sont introduits en Bosnie, en cachette, en grand nombre. N« 2 M. Jov. M. Joi>anoQitch, ministre a Viennej^ a M. N. Pachitchy president du Conseil et ministre des Affaires 4trangeres. (Telegramme.) Vienne, le 17/30 juin 1914. La tendance est de plus en plus ^vidente a Vienne de donner a TEurope I'impression que Tattentat commis contre I'archiduc - heritier d'Autriche-Hongrie est le resultat d*un complot l)repare en Serbie. On a I'intention de s'en ser- vir co.mme d'un moyen politique contre nous. Aussi FsLitt-il surveiller avec la plus grande atten- tion le langage de nos journaux sur I'^venement de Serajevo. N«3 M. le D' M. Jomnontch, charge d'affaires a Ber- lin, a M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et ministre des Affaires etrangeres. (T616gramme.) Berlin, le 11/30 juin 1914. Les journaux de Berlin publient, d'apres les informations de Vienne et de Budapest, les ar- LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUE S 5 tides on I'attentat de Serajevo est rattache a la Serbia : on induit ainsi en erreur Fopinion pu- blique allemande. N°4 M. le D"" M. Jo{>ano{>itch^ charge d'affaires a Berlin^ a M. N. Pachitch^ president du Conseil et ministi^e des Affaires etr anger es» (Telegramme.) Berlin, le 17/30 juin 1914. L'hostilite de Fopinion publique en Allemagne envers nous dure toujours, entretenue par des nouvelles mensongeres, envoy ees de Vienne et de Budapest, que j)resque tons les journaux alle- mands, malgre nos dementis, repandent avec zele par Fintermediaire de certains jOurnaux^et N« 5 M. JoQ. M. JoQanovitchy ministre a Vienne^ a M. N. Pachitch, president da Conseil et ministre des Affaires etrangeres. Vienne, le 17/30 juin 1914. Monsieur le President, Gomme le comte Berchtold n'a i)u me rece- voir, j'ai eu, sur Fattcntatdc Serajevo, un entre- 6 PAGES D^HISTOIRE tien avec le premier chef de section du minis- tere des Affaires etrangeres, Au cours de notre conversation, je luiai diten resume ceci : « Le Gouverncment Royal reprouve de. la maniere la plus energique I'attentat de Serajevo et de son cote fera, certainement et le x:>lus loya- lement, tout pour prouver que sur son territoire il ne souffrira aucune agitation ou entreprisc passible d'une j)eine et pouvant nuire a nos relations deja si delicates avec TAutriche-Hon- grie. Jepense que le Gouverncment de Belgrade esti^ret a mettre en jugement les complices, s'il est prouve qu'il y en ait en Serbie, en depit de tons les obstacles qu'y a aj^portes la diplomatic austro-hongroise (creation d'une Albanie inde- pendante, opposition a une sortie libre du Royaume serbe sur I'Adriatique, demande de revision du traite de Bucarest, ultimatum du mois de septembre, etc.), le Gouvernement serbe a persiste dans son desir de retablir sur des bases solides nos relations de voisinage. Vous savez que dans cette voie quelque chose a ete fait et obtenu. La Serbie veut poursuivre cet effort, convaincue qu'il peut et doit etre con- tinue. L'attentat de Serajevo ne doit pas et ne peut pas entraver cette tache. » Le baron Macchio a pris note en se chargeant de communiquer au comte Berchtold tout ce que je lui ai dit. Le m^me jour, j'ai communique le fond de mon entretien aux ambassadeurs de France et de Russie. Veuillez, etc. LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 7 N" 6. M. M. Georgevitch, charge d'affaires a Cons- tantinoplBy a M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et ministre des Affaires itrangeres. Constantinople, le 17/30 juin 1914. Monsieur le President, J'ai eu aujourd'hui, a pivjpos de I'attentat de Serajevo, une assez longue conversation avec Tambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie. J'ai exprime I'espoir que ce triste evenement, quoi qu'on en dise dans certains cei^cles diplomatiques, ne nui- rait pas aux relations entrc la Serbie et I'Au- trich6-Hongrie, considerablement ameliorees dans ces derniers temps. II m'a repondu qu'il ne faut pas m€me avoir de crainte a ce sujet. II tix)uve, lui aussi, que les rapports entre la Serbie et I'Autriche-Hongrie sont devenus bien meilleurs ces derniers temps. II a ajoute qu'il faut continuer dans cette yoie. II m'a dit que ses derniers entretiens avec le comte Berchtold I'avaient convaincu que celui-ci etait content de Tattitudc du Gouvernement serbe et que, pour sa part, il desire sincerement les rela- tions amicales avec la Serbie. Veuillez, etc. NO 7 M. M. S. Bochkovltch^ ministre h Londres, h M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et mi- nistre des Affaires stranger es. (Teiegramme.) Londres, le 18 juin/l" juillet 1914. Pi*esque tous les journaux anglais annoncent, 8 PAGES D'HISTOIRE d'apres les sources autrichiennes, que Tattentat de Serajevo est I'oeuvre des revolutionnaires serbes. N*^ 8 M. N. Pachitch^ president du Conseily ministre des Affaires etrangereSy a touies les Legations Roy ales. Belgrade, le 18 juin/1" juillet 1914. La presse austro-hongroise accuse de plus en plus la Serbie de Tattentat de Serajevo. Le but est evident : ruiner le grand credit moral dont la Serbie jouit aujourd'hui en Europe et exploiter politiquement contre la Serbie la folle entreprise d'un jeune fan^^tique exalte. Gependant I'attentat de Serajevo a rencontre en Serbie la reprobation la plus severe dans toutes les classes sociales; dans les cercles officiels et non officiels, tous ont immediatement compris que cet evenement aurait la repercussion la plus d^favorable sur nos relations de bon voisinage et sur la vie des Serbes d'Autriche-Hongrie, ce que les derniers evenements ont confirme. Au moment ou la Ser- bie fait tout pour que le» relations avec la Mo- narchic voisine deviennent meilleures et de plus en plus amicales, il serait absurde de penser qu'elle aurait pu, soit directement soit indirecte- ment, insj)irer depareils actes. Tout au contraire, il etait dans I'interet vital de la Serbie elle-meme que ce crime fut evite. Par malheur, cela n'etait LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 9 pas en son pouvoir, les deux auteurs de Tattentat etant sujets autrichiens. La Serbie a toujours veille, et depuis les derniers evenements elle re- doublera de vigilance, sur les elements anar- chistes; si elle en decouvre en Serbie, elle pren- dra contre eux, avec energie, les mesures les plus severes. De-plus, elle fera tout son devoir, et par tous les moyens en son pouvoir, pour cal- mer, a I'interieur de ses fronti^res, les esprits exaltes. Seulement, elle ne peut nullement per- mettre que la presse austro-hongroise induise en erreur I'opinion publique en Europe et que, dans un but purement politique, elle fasse re- tomber la lourde responsabilite du crime d'un sujet autricbien sur la Serbie et tout le peuple serbe, auxquels de pareils actes ne peuvent cau- ser que des dommages sans leur apporter aucun profit. Je vous prie d'agir, en cet esprit, par tous les moyens propices, pour mettre fin le plus tot pos- sible a la campagne antiserbe de'vant Topinion publique euroioeenne. N°9 M. Joi>. M. JoQanovitch, ministre a Vienney a M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et mi- nistre des Affaires etrangeres. (Telegramme.) Vienne, le 18 juin/1" juillet 1914. Des demonstrations ont eu lieu bier soir devant la Legation. Je peux dire que la police s'est mon- 10 PAGES D'HISTOIRE tr^e energique. L*ordre et la tranquillity ont ^16 maintenus. Si j'apx^renais que le drapeau national ait et6 brftle, je ferais une d-marche aupr^s de qui de droit et vous informerais du resultat. Ge sont surtout les cercles cathoKques inferieurs, la presse et les cercles militaires qui pr6chent la haine centre les Serbes etla Serbie. Je vous prie de faire le necessaire pour que les demonstrations soient evitees chcz nous et pour que le ton de la presse de Belgrade soit mesurt^ autant que pos- sible. Les dispositions centre nous reslent ici les jnSmes. Oncroit que I'attitude k prendre, vis-a-vis de la Serbie et des Serbes, sera decid^e apres les funerailles de FArchiduc. N° 10 M. le D^ M. R. Vesnitchy ministre d Paris, A M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et mi' nistre des Affaires e tr anger es. (Telegramme.) Paris, le 19 juin/2 juillet 1914. Le Gouvernement frangais nous conseille d'ob- server le plus grand sang-froid et le recueiile- ment aussi bien dans nos cercles officiels que dansropinion publique. LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 11 N« 11 M. JoQ. M. JoQanovitchy ministre a Vienne^ a M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et mi- nistre des Affaires etrangeres. Viennc, le 20 juin/3 juillet 1014. Monsieur le President, Hier, jour du transfert des deponilles mor- telles de rarchiduc Francois-Ferdinand et de sa femme, de Serajevo, j'ai fait hisser et mettre 6n heme, a mon domicile, le drapeau national. Get evenement a donne lieu nier soir aux pro- testations du concierge, des locataires, du gerant et du proprietaire meme de Timmeuble, qui exi- gerent qu'on enlevdt le drapeau. Les explications n'ayant servi a rien, on a requis le concours de la police qui a demande, non officiellement, I'en- l^vement du drai)eau pour eviter les desordres. Le drapeau a ete maintenu , et ce fait a provoque hier soir des demonstrations vehementes devant la Legation. La police fut energique et aucune atteinte ne fut portee ni au bdtiment, ni au dra- peau. Vers 2 heures du matin, les manifes- tants furent re^Dousses de mon domicile. Les jour- naux d'aujourd'hui, surtout ceux de la nuance clerico-populaire, ont public des articles sous le litre : « Los provocations du ministre de Ser- bie » en representant d'une fagon infidele toute cette affaire. Le drapeau est reste hisse sur I'immeuble de la Legation jusqu'a la fin de la messe funebre celebree, dans I'eglise de la Cour, pour les de- funts, puis il a ete retire. IJ^ PAGES D'HISTOIRE lous les habitants du quartier que j'habite sont alles a la police, a THotel de Ville, a la pre- sidence du Gonseil des ministres, pour reclaimer renlevement de notre drapeau. Les manifestants furent harangues ^par le doc- teur Funder, le directcur principal du journal catholique Reichspost, Hermengild Wagner et Leopold Mandl, qui sont connus comme les prin- cijDaux instigateurs de la campagne dirigee dans la presse autrichienne et allemande contre la Serbie et les Serbes. Veuillez, etc. N<» 12 M, Jov. M. Jopano(fitch, ministre a Vienne, a . M. N. Pachitchy president du Conseil et mi- nistre des Affaires etrangeres, Vienne, le 20 juin/3 juillet 1914. Monsieur le President, Dans la conversation que j'ai eue a projDos de I'attentat de Serajevo avec le premier chef de section au ministere des Afiaires etrangeres, le baron Macchio a attaque tres vivement la presse de Belgrade. 11 a cite des exemples afm de prou- ver qu'elle etait efTrene'e et qu'elle faisait die Ileizercien gegen die Monarchie (des excitations contre la Monarchie). Je lui ai dit que la presse etait chez nous completement libre et que les particuliers et le Gouvernement en sou (Trent sou- vent, mais que nous n'avions d'autres moyens contre elle que le recours aux tribunaux. J'ai ajoute que, dans le cas present, la presse autri- LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 13 cliienne et hongroise, que le Gouvernement com- mun tenait entre ses mains, avait commence : n'est-ce j)sis la presse autrichienne et hongroise qui, depuis presque deux ans, administre des coups aux Serbes et a la Serbie, en touchant les points les plus sensibles? Ges jours-ci, il y avait juste un an depuis la malheureuse guerre avec les Bulgares. J'ai ete temoin du manque de res- pect avec lequel la presse de Vienne avait traite la Serbie et son armee pendant et apres la cam- j)agne, i^uis dans beau coup d'autres questions. La presse de Belgrade a ete beaucoup plus moderee. Aujourd'hui aussi, apres cet horrible crime, c'est d'ici qu'on envoie dans le monde des telegrammes accusant tout le peuple serbe et la Serbie comme s'ils avaient ete meles a I'odieux attentat de Serajevo. Tons les journaux de la Monarchie ^crivent en ce sens. Peut-on rester indifferent devant tout cela ? Si I'auteur de I'at- tentat est de race serbe, tout le peuple serbe et le royaume de Serbie n'en sont pas coupables, et on ne pent pas les en accuser comme on le fait a present Le baron Macchio m'a r^pondu : — Personne n'accuse le Royaume, ni le Gou- vernement serbe, ni tout le peuple serbe. Nous accusons seulement . ceux qui entretiennent les projets panserbes et qui travaillent a leur reali- sation... — II m'a paru des le premier moment, lui r^pondis-je, qu'on insistait sur la rac^ de I'auteur pour le rattacher a Belgrade et provoquer Tim- pression que le crime avait ete prepare en Ser- bie. Geci m'a frappe de suite, car je savais que jusqu'a present on appelait les Serbes en Bosnie 14 PAGES D'HISTOIRE die Bosniaken (les Bosniaques), et que Ton disait bosnische Sprache (la laiigue bosniaque), die Orthodoxen aiis Bosnien (les prthodoxes de Bos- nie) ; maintcnant on dit que I'auteur de rattentat est ein Serbe (un Serbe), mais sans ajouter qu'il etait de Bosnia et sujet autrichien... — Je vous repete, reprit le baron Macchio, que nous n'accusons ni le Gcuvernement serbe, ni le ]3euple serbe, mais certains agilateurs... Je I'ai prie d'agir sur la presse de Yienne, afni qu'en ces heures difficilcs oii Ton met a serieuse epreuve les relations entre la Scrbie et I'Au- triche-IIongrie, elle n'aggrave pas cette crise i)ar de telles accusations. Vcuillez, etc, N*> 13 M. le D^ M. R. Vesnitchy ministre a Paris, a M. N. Pachitchy president dii Conseil et mi- nistre des Affaires etrangeres. Paris, le 21 juin/4 juillet 1914. Monsieur le President, J'ai eu, mercredi, a pix)pos de I'attentat de Sera- jevo, un assez long entretien avec le nouveau ministre des Affaires etrangeres, M. Yiviani, que cet evenement a rendu passablement inquiet. J'ai profite de cette occasion pour lui exposer a grands traits les causes qui ont provoque cet attentat, a savoir, en premier lieu, I'intolerable systeme de gouvernement dans les provinces annexees, surtout I'attitude des organes officiels LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 15 et toute la politique du Gouvernement bosniaque vis-a-vis de tout ce qui touche a la religion ortho- doxe. II a compris la situation; cependant il a exprimc le desir et I'espoir que le sang-froid et la dignity seront gardes chez nous, afin de ne pas donner des motifs j)Our de nouvelles accusa- tions de Vienne. Apres la premiere emotion, Topinion publique frangaise s'est ressaisie a tel point que le presi- dent du Conseil lui-mdme a juge convenable d'adoucir au Palais-Bourbon les termes de la declaration qu'ii propos de cct evidnement, 11 avail faite anterieurement au Senat. Veuillez, etc. N* 14 M. leD" M. Spalaikovitch, ministre a Petrogrady a M^ N, Pachitcky president da Conseil^ mi- nistre des Affaires etrangeres. (T616gramme.) Petrograd, le 21 juin/4 juiUet 1914. Le ministre des Affaires etrangeres m'a dit que les cruautes commises sur les Serbes en Bosnie accroitront les sympathies de I'Europe pour nous. II croit que le monde ne pretera pas foi aux accu- sations lancdes de Vienne centre nous. II est essentiel que Topinion publique en Serbie reste calme. 16 PAGES D'HISTOIRE NO 15 M. Jov. Jomnooitch, ministre a Vienne, a M, N. Pachitch, president dii Conseil et mi- nistre des Affaires etrangeres. (T61egramme.) Vienne, le 23 juin/6 jiiillet lOli. Kemotion dans les cercles militaires et gouvcr- nementaux contre la Serbie augmente sans cesse, par suite des articles de nos journaux que la Lega- tion austro-hongroise a Belgrade exploite avee zele. N^ 16 M. JoQ. JovanoQitch, ministre a Vienne, a M. N. Pachitchy president dii Conseil ^ mi- nistre des Affaires etrangeres. Vienne, le 23 juin/6 juillet 1914. Monsieur le President, La tendance generale des journaux de Vienne au sujet de I'attentat est la suivante : Des le diraanche i5 juin, dans Tapres-midi, les editions speciales des journaux annon^aient en gros caracteres que les deux auteurs de I'at- tentat etaient des Serbes, de fagon a faire croire qu'il s'agissait de Serbes de Serbie. Dans les comptes rendus publics plus tard, on remarque la tendance constante d'etablir un lien entre cet evenement et la Serbie, en insistant particuliere- LES POURPARLERS DIPLOIVIATIQUES 17 inent sur deux circonstances qui semblaient prou- ver que les origines de Tattentat devraient etre recherchecs a Belgrade : i^ le sejour de deux au- teurs de rattentat a Belgrade et i" I'origine des hombes. Goinme troisieme et derniere de leurs preuves, les journaux d'ici out commence a pu- blier les dires des auteurs de Tattentat a Tins- truction. II est caracteristique que ces cc dires » n'ont dte connus que par le Bureau hongrois de correspondance et les journaux, magyars, surtout le journal Az Est. Ces dires se resument a ceci : V qu'il est prouve que les auteurs de I'attentat avaient frequents a Belgrade le comitadji Michel Giganovitcb et 2® que I'organisateur et I'instiga- teur de I'attentat avait ete le commandant Pri- bitchevitch. En meme temps, une nouvelle tendance de faire retomber la responsabilite sur I'association « Na- rodna Odbrana » (la Defense nationale) com- mencait a se faire jour, de sorte que le dernier communique du Bureau hongrois de correspon- dance aux journaux, vendredi dernier, a ete eongu dans ces termes : roduit par les jour- naux viennois d'hier, la tendance a faire retom- ber la responsabilite de I'attentat sur la (c Na- rodna Odbrana » est encore plus accentu^e : on pretend que I'accuse Cabrinovitch aurait designe le general Jankovitch comme le principal insti- gateur. Veuillez, etc. P^o ^7 31. Jov. M. JomnoQitchy ministre a Vienney a M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et mi- nistre des Affaires 4trangeres. Vienne, le 24 juin/7 juillet 1914. Monsieur le President, Keraotion produite par I'attentat de Serajevo LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 19 subsiste toujours dans les cerclcs comxoetenls. Bien que TEmpereur ait adresse aux presidents des Conseils autrichien et hongrois et au ministre commun des Finances, M. Bilinski, une lettre qui invite au calmc, on ne iieut tout de memc pas preciser quelle attitude le Gouvernement commun prendra a notre egard. Pour cux, une chose est claire : avec ou sans preuve que I'at- tentat ait ete inspire a Belgrade, ils doivent re- gler une fois pour toutes la question des soi- disant agitations panserbes dans les limites de la Monarchie des Habsbourg. II n'est -psLS encore decide de quelle fagon ils procederont et quels moyens ils emploieront jjour atteindre leur but; on en delibere, surtout dans les hautes spheres catholiqucs et militaires. La decision ne sera X)rise certainement qu'apres qu'on aura appris cc que les juges d'instruction auront trouve a Scrajevo. G'est d'apres ce qu'on aura trouve que la decision sera prise. A cet egard, TAutrichc-Hongrie aura a choisir entre deux solutions : ou considerer le crime de Serajevocomme un m.alhcur national, mais aussi comme un acte criminel qui doit etre juge sui- vant les preuves etablies, en demandant a la Serbie de lui j)i'eter aide dans cette tacbe, afm que les coupables ne puissent pas se soustraire a la condamnation la plus severe; ou faire de I'at- tentat de Serajevo un complot panserbe, jougo- slave, panslavc, avec toutes Ires manifestations de la haine envers le monde slave, haine jusqu'ici dissimulee. II y a plusieurs signes qu'on pousse les cercles competents vers cette seconde solution, et c'est pour cela qu'il faut etre pret pour la de- fense. Au cas oil la premiere solution serait 20 PAGES D'HISTOIRE adoptee, ce qui serait un signe de grande sagesse^ il nous faudrait nous y raUier completement. Veuillez, etc. NO 18 M. "N. Pachitch, president dii Conseil et ministre des Affaires etrangeres, a toiites les Legations toy ales, (Telegramme.) Belgrade, le 26 juin/9 juillet 1914. Presque tous les jours, le Prince-heritier re^oit d' Autriche - Hongrie des lettres de menace de mort. Mettez au courant de ce fait dans vos con- versations vos collogues et les journalistes. N°^19 M. le D* M. Jovanovitchy charge d'affaires a Berlin^ a M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et ministre , des Affaires etrang^res. (Telegramme.) Berlin, le 1«V16 juillet 1914. Le secretaire d'Etat a declare qu'il ne compre- nait pas I'attitude provocante de la presse serbe et ses attaques contre rAutriche-Hpngrie, que celle-ci, comme grand© puissance, ne peut sup* porter; LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 21 M. N. Paehitch, president du Conseil et ministre des Affaires etrangereSj a toutes les Legations royales. (Telegramme.) Belgrade, le 1""-/14 juillet 1914. I* Le Gorrespondenz Bureau imperial et royal alarme roj)iiiioii europeenne dans im but spe- cial. II ne represente pas Fattitude de la press« de Belgrade d'une fayon exacte et vraie. II clioi- sit a dessein les expressions les j)lus fortes dans les articles des journanx qui publient des re- ponses aux injures, aux menaces et aux men- songes tendancieux, et les sert au public en Au- triche-Hongrie ; a"" Le Gorrespondenz Bureau cite surtout les extraits des journaux, qui ne sont les organes ni des partis, ni des corporations; 3*^ L'Autricbe-Hongrie a interdit, depuis I'an- nexion bosniaque, Timporlation sur son terri- toirc des organes de nos partis ainsi que de tous les autres journaux paraissant en Serbie, de sorte que ceux-ci ne pourraient jDas exciter Topx- nion publiqueen Autriche-Hongrieet en Europe, si le Gorrespondenz Bureau ne faisait pas ressor- tir et repandre les nouvelles dont il fait choix dans les differents journaux en aggravant leur contenu. II y a six jours, VOd/ek, organe du parti radical independant, a et6 frappe d'inter- diction; maintenant aucun journal serbe nepeut passer en Autz-iclie-Hongrie ; 4^ La presse est completement libra chez nous; 22 PAGES d'histoire les journaux ne peuvcnt ^tre confisques que pour le crime de lese-majeste ou Lieu au cas d'une excitation a la revolution. Iln'existe aucune cen- sure preventive. En cetetat de choses, expliquez a qui de droit, rien qu'^a titre de renseignement, que nous ne possedons aucun moyen constitutionnel ou legal de changer la maniere d'ecrire de nos journaux, Cependant si Ton compare la maniere d'ecrire des journaux serbes avec celle des journaux d'Au- tricbe-IIongrie, on voit clairement que ce sont ces derniers qui commencent la polemique et que nos journaux ne font que riposter. Insistez de meme sur le fait que I'opinion publique chez nous est relativement calme et que, de notre cote, personne ne desire provoquer ou blesser I'Autriche-Hongrie. De ce que nos journaux. pu- blient, personne en Europe n'en saurait rien, si le Correspondenz Bureau do Vienne ne le re- pandaitdans le setil but de nuire a la Serbie. N° 2X M. N. Pachitchf president da Conseil et minis' tre des Affaires etrangereSy a toutes les Lega- tions royales. (Telegramme.) Belgrade, le 1"/14 juillet 1914. Les journaux austro-hongrois ont repanduces derniers jours le bruit que des demonstrations contra la legation d'Autriche-Hongrie auraient LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 23 lieu a Belgrade, que certains correspondants des journaux austro-hongrois auraientete assassines, que les sujets austro-hongrois sent maltraites et qu'ils soiit pris de panique, que les etudiants serbes ont manifeste contre le ministre d'Autri- che-Hongrie lors des funerailles de feu Hartwig, ministre de Russie, etc... Toutes ces nouvelles sont absolument fausses et inventees. La tran- quillite absolue regne a Belgrade ; aucune de- monstration n'a eu lieu cette annee; personne n'a eu I'intention de provoquer des desordres. Ce n'est pas seulement le ministre d'Autriche- Hongrie et ses fonctionnaires qui se promenent librement en ville ; mais encore aucune injure, soit par des actes soit par des paroles, n'a ete faite a aucun sujet austro-hongrois, comme les journdux de Vienne le pretendent, de meme qu'aucun n'a vu sa maison attaquee ni ses fenetres brisees; aucun sujet austro hongrois n'a eu des motifs pour exprimer la moindre plainte. Toutes ces fausses nouvelles ne sont re- pandues que dans le but d'emouvoir et d'aigrir Topinion publique en Autriche-Hongrie contre la Serbie. Toute la population de Belgrade a pris part aux obseques de M. Hartwig, tout le corps diplo- matique y assistait, et aucune manifestation con- tre qui que ce soit Ji'a ete signalee. Toute la cere- monie s'est passee dans un ordre exemplaire, de sorte que les etrangers en furent surpris. Je vous prie de porter ces renseignements a la connais- sance du Gouvernement et de la presse. Si PAGES lyHISTOmE M. Jo^. M. Jovanovitch, ministre a Vienney a M. N. Pachitchy president du Gonseil et mi- nistre des Affaires etrangeres. yienne,le X-'/U juillQt 1914. Monsieur le President, C'est le Bureau de la presse du imuistere des Affaires etrangeres qui, cette fois encore, a dirige Fopinion publique contre nous. Sauf la Z^i7 et VArbeiter Zeitung jtous les journauxauslro-bon- grois ont etc renseignes et diriges par lui potir leurs articles sur I'attentat de Serajevo. Vous avez vu quels furent ces renseignements et le ton de leurs articles. Je tiens d'une source siire que les cercles offi^ ciels allemands d'ici sont les plus hostiles contre nous. Ces cercles ont exerce une certaino in- fluence sur la fagon d'ecrire des journaux de Vienne, particulierement sur celle de la Nou- pelle Presse Libre. Ce journal esttoujours anim^ d'un esprit anti- serbe a outrance. La NouQelle Presse Libre qui a assez de lecteurs et d'amis dans les hauts cer- cles financiers et qui, lorsqu'il le faut,. ecrit sui- vant les instructions du Bureau de la presse de Vienne, resume Taffaire en quelques mots ; « Nous devons regler nos affaires avec la Serbie par la force des armes ; il est Evident qu'il n'est pas possible d'y arriver par des mojens pacifi- ques. Et puisqu'on arrivera a la guerre plus tard, il vaut mieux en finir tout de suite! » LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES ^5 La Bourse est tres mauvaise. Une pareille baisse n'a pas eu lieu depuislongtemps. Certains papiers ont baisse de 4^ couronnes. Veuillez, etc. N** 23 M, Jov. M. JopanoQitch, ministre a Vienney a M. iV. Pachitchy president du Conseil et ministre des Affaires etrangeres. Viennci le 2/15 juillet 1914. Monsieur le President, La chose qui doit le plus nous interesser, c'est le geste que le Gouvemement austro-hongrois a Tintention de faire a propos de I'attentat de Sera- jevo. Jusqu'k present, je n'ai pas pu me rensei- gner a ce sujet ; mes collegues non plus. La devise est ici maintenant ; « Ne rien communiquer a per Sonne. » Gne reunion des minis tres communs a eu lieu la semaine derniere a Vienne. On n'a pas appxns beaucoup de choses sur les deliberations et les resultats de ce con^eiL Le communique en fut court et peu clair. 11 semble qu*on y a discute longuement sur les consequences de I'attentat de Serajevo, mais qu'aucune decision n'a ete prise. On n'est pais sur que le chef d'^tat-major gene- ral et le chef de la marine aient assiste k cetta seance, comme on I'avait dit. Apres cette seance, le comte Berchtold est alle a Ischl pour eji rendre compte k I'Empereur qui y ^tait reparti 26 PAGES d'histoire apres les funerailles de Francois-Ferdinand, dans un etat de sante et d'esprit loarfait. An Parle- ment de Hongrie, Tisza a repondu aux interpel- lations de I'opposition sur I'evenement de Sera- jevo; voiis savez ce qu'il a dit. Son discours n'etait pas clair; je pense qu'il n'etait pas clair a dessein. D'aucuns y ont vu un ton rassurant pour le developpement des choses et pour I'atti- tude du Gouvernement austro-hong-rois, et d'au- cuns, les intentions dissimulees pour — dirai-je — une action encore non decidee. On s'est aper^u qu'il ne fall ait point s'a venturer avant de con- naitre les resultats de I'instruction. Apres cela, un certain temps se i)assa; on jDarla, on discuta, on ecrivit, on inventa, puis survinrentla mort de Hartwig et I'alarme du baron Giesl. A ce propos, de nouvelles interpellations furent adressees au comte Tisza au Parlement hongrois; vous avcz lu sa seconde reponse egalement. Plusieurs per- sonnes trouvent ici que ce discours est beaucoup plus rassurant que le premier et qu'il est du a la lettre de I'EmjDereur. La Bourse est meilleure maintenant ; les deux ministres de la Guerre et le chef d'etat - major general sont partis en conge. Je m'abstiens de toutc appreciation. Ce qui frappe dans ce dernier discours, c'est que I'hypothese d'une guerre n'est pas cxclue, au cas ou les reclamations austro-liongroises au sujet des consequences de I'attentat de Serajevo n'ob- tiendraient pas satisfaction. Une chose est d'ores et deja siire : I'Autriche- Hongrie fera des demarches diplomatiques a Belgrade aussitot que Tinstruction aura ete close ^Serajevo, et I'affaire presentee au tribunal. Veuillez, etc. LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 27 N1 24 M. Jov. M. Jovanontch, ministre a Vlennef a M. N. Pachilch, president du Conseil et ministre des Affaires etrangeres. Vienne, le 2/15 juillet 1914. Monsieur le President, On est d'avis ici que ni Tinstr action, ni Ten- quete sur I'attentat com mis a Serajevo n'ont fourni de preuve suffisante pour qu'on puisse accuser la Serbie officielle ; mais on croit que la Serbie sera accusee d'avoir tolere sur son terri- toire certains elements re volutionnaires. On cri- tique et on condamne dans les cercles diploma- tiques d'ici les procedes du Gouvernement austro-bongrois, surtout Tattitude du Correspon- denz Bureau, du Ballplatz et de la presse vien- noise depuis I'attentat jusqu'aujourd'bui. Un tres grand nombre de j)ersonnes approuvent notre attitude, la jugeant correcte et digne d'Un pays serieux. Elles desapprouvent seulement les articles de certains de nos journaux, quoiqu'elles reconnaissent toutes que ces articles ont ^te pro- voques par la presse viennoise. Bien qu'il paraisse que le ministere des Affaires etrangeres allemand n'approuve pas la politique de Vienne contre la Serbie, I'ambassade d'Alle- magne a Vienne encourage cette politique preci- s^ment en ce moment-ci.- VeuiUez, etc. 28 PAGES d'ihstoire N° 25 M. Jov. M. Jo0ano9itchy ministre a Vienne, a M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et mi- nistre des Affaires etrangeres. Vienne, le 2/15 juillet m4. Monsieur le President, Quelles demarches seront faites? Sous quelle forme? Que va demander a la Serbie I'Autriche- Hongrie? Je ne crois pas qu'au Ballplatz meme, on puisse repondre aujourd'hui a ces questions d'une maniere claire et precise., Je pense que cela s'elabore maintenant et que le comte For- gach y est redevenu le facteur principal. Dans un de mes rapports precedents, j*ai men- tionne que I'Autriche-Hongrie avait a choisir entre deux voies : consid^rer Tattentat de Sera- jevo comme une affaire interieure en nous invi- tant a lui prSter aide pour decouvrir les cou- pables et les punir ; ou bien faire de la tragedie de Serajevoun proces contre les Serbes et la Ser- bie et meme contre la Jougo-slavie. A en juger par tout ce qui se prepare et ce qui se fait, il me semble que I'Autriclie-Hongrie choisira cette seconde voie. Elle fera cela, convaincue qu'elle obtiendra Tapprobation de I'Europe; pourquoi ne pas en profiter pour nous humilier et, jusqu'a un certain point, justifier le proces Friedjung et celui d'Agram? En outre, elle justifierait devant ses peuples et devant I'Europe les mesures s^v^res et reactionnaires qu'elle a I'intention de prendre dans le pays, pour r^primer la propa- LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUE S 29 gande panserbe et Tidee jougo-slave. Enfin, ce Gouvernement croira faire quelque cHose aiissi en faveur de son prestige, convaincu que cela le relevera a l-exterieur ainsi qu'a Tinterieur de la Monarchie. Je pense que le Gouvernement austro-hon- grois redigera un memoire» plutot une accusa- tion contre la Serbie. Dans cet acte d'accusation, on exposera tout ce qui a ete recueilli contre nous depuis avril 1909 jusqu'aujourd'hui, et je crois que cet acte sera assez long. Get acte d'acr ciisation, il le transmettra aux cabinets des Puissances eurojo^ennes, en ajoutant que les faits exposes lui conferent le droit de faire a Bel- grade des demarches diplomatiques et de deman^ der que la Serbie remplisse a. Tavenir toutes les obligations d'un voisin loyal. En meme temps, le Gouvernement de Vienne nous remettra, a nous aussi, une note ou sera consigne tout ce que la Monarcliie dualiste desire que nous execu- tions saris discussion. Veuillez, etc... N« 36 M. le D^ M. JoQanoQilchf charge d'affaires h Berlin', a M, N.Pachitch, president du Conseil et ministre des Affaires etrangeres, (T6l6gramme<) Berlin, le 3/16-3uiIlet 1914. Le secretaire d'fitat m-a declare qu'il a acquis 30 PAGES D HISTOIRE la conTiction, d'aj)res les rapports du ministre d'AUemagne a Belgrade, de Texistencc d'lme proiDagande j)anserbe, que le Gouvernement devrait eiiergiquement reprimer, dans I'interet de scs bonnes relations avec TAutriche-Hongrie. N° 27 M. M. S. Bochkovltch, ministre a Londres, a M. N. Pachilch, president da Conseil et mi- nistre des Affaires etrangeres. (Telegramme.) Londres, le 4/17juillet 1914. L'ambassade d'Autriche fait Ics plus grands ellbrts pour exciter la presse anglaise contre nous et la gagn3r a I'idee que la Monarchic doit donner une bonne le^on a la Serbia. L'ambas- sade remet aux redactions les coupures de nos journaux comme preuves de la fa^on dont notre presse est redigee. La situation pcut s'aggraver au cours des semaines a venir. 11 ne faut pas se ficr aux declarations pacifiques, bien calculees, des cercles austro-hongrois, car on prepare une pression sur la Serbie, qui pent se transformer en une attaque a main armee. II est a croire que FAutriche-Hongrie changera d'attitude et cher- chera a humilier la Serbie, des qu'elle aura fait une demarche a Belgrade. LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 3f N« 28 M. Ljdub. MickailoQitch, ministre a RomCy a M. N. Pachitch, president du Gonseil et mi- nistre des Affaires etrangeres. (T61egramme.) Rome, le 4/17 juillet 1914. J'ai des informations sures que le marquis de San Giuliano a declare a rambassadeur d*Au- triche-Hongrie, qu'une demarche quelconque de rAutriche-Hongrie, dirigee contre la Serbie et ne lui temoignant pas les egards dus par'un^ nation a une nation, rencontrerait la reproba- tion de ropinion pubiique en italiej et que le Gouvernement italien tient a ce que Tentiere independance de la Serbie soit maintenue. N'' 29 j\L le D^ M. SpalaXkovitchf ministre a Petro- grad, dM. N. Pachitchi president du Gonseil et ministre des Affaires etrangeres. (Telegramme.) Petrograd, le 5/18 juillet 1914. J'ai eu iin entretien avec I'adjoint du ministre des Affaires etrangeres au sujet de I'attitude provocante du Correspondenz Bureau de Vienne et de la presse austro-hongroise. M. Sazonoff m'a dit, il y a quelques jours^ qu'il et.ait dtonne 32 PAGES d'HISTOIRE que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois n'eiit pris aucune mesure pour mettre fm a cette agitation sterile de la x^i^esse de Vienne " qui aboutit a n'emouvoir personne et qui ne nuit qu'a I'Au- triclie-Hongrie. N** 30 M. N. Pachitch, president dii Conseil et ministre des Affaires etrangeres a toutes les Legations royales. (Telegramme.) Belgrade, le 6/19 juillet 1914. Des I'attentat de Serajevo, la x)resse austro- liongroise a commence a rejetei ?ur la Serbie la responsabilitc de ce crime horrible qui, a son avis, etait le resultat de I'idec panserbe. Elle a ensuite affirme que cette idee avait ete soutcnue et propagee par les differentcs associations comme « Narodna Qdbrana », « Kolo Srpskih Sestara » (cercle des Soeurs serbes), etc., que le Gouver- nement serbe avait toler^es. Gependant, des I'arrive'e de la nouvelle de I'at- tentat, la Gour et le Gouvernement serbes ont exprime non seulement leurs condoleances, mais leur vive reprobation et leur borreur contre un tel crime. Toutes les rejouissances qui devaient avoir lieu ce jour-la a Belgrade furent sus- pendues. Neanmoins la presse de la Monarcbie voisine n'a cess^ de rendre la Serbie resix)nsable de I'eve- nement de Serajevo. De plus elle a commence a LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUE S 33 ce.propos a lancer differentes nouvelles tendan- cieuses et fausses qui ont provoque la presse de Belgrade a y repondre, a se defendre et quelque- fois a atlaquer aussi, indignee de la voir denatu- rer ainsi les evenements. Voyant que c'est avec intention que la presse austro-hongroise attirait la presse de Belgrade dans cette discussion deli- cate et desagreable, le Gouvernement serbe s'est empresse de conseiller a la presse de Belgrade et meme de lui recommander de garder le sang- froid et de se borner a dementir et a refuter les fausses et tendancieuses nouvelles. Cette de- maixihe du Gouvernement serbe est restee sans resultat aupres de certains journaux de moindre importance, surtout parce qu'on ne cessait de lancer de nouvelles inventions dont la tendance etait d'exp loiter I'attentat au point de vue poli- tique, non seulement contre la Serbie, mais aussi contre les Serbes d'Autriche-Hongrie. Le Gou- vernement serbe n'a pas ete a meme de mettre fin a cette polemique entre les presses serbe et austro-hongroise; la loi et meme les clauses de la Constitution garantissent en Serbie I'entiere liberie de la px'esse et interdisent tdute mesure preventive et meme la confiscation des journaux. Cette polemique a ete cependant aggravee par ce> fait que les journaux de Vienne et de Budapest avaient pris des extraits de certains de nos jour- naux, qui n'exercent aucune^ influence sur ToxdI- nion publique, aggrave encore leur ton et, de- formes de cette fa^on, les avaient repandus dans la presse etrangere dans le but Evident d'emou- voir I'opinion publique dans les autres Etats euro- peens et de representer la Serbie comme coupable. Ceux qui ont suivi cette polemique savent que 34 PAGES D'HISTOIRE les journaux de Belgrade n'ont fait que se dc- fendre et se borner a repousser des attaqucs, a refuter des mensongss tendancieux. Les Gouver- nements etrangers, occupes j)ai' d'autres affaires, n'ont pas eu le loisir de bien voir le but jioursuivi par la presse austi^o-hongroise qui est d'emou- voir Topinion publique dans la Monarcbie et a I'etranger. Des le commencement, le Gouverne- ment serbe s'est declare pret a traduire devant les tribunaux tout sujet sei^be dont il aurait ete prouv^ qu'il cut pris j)art a I'attcntat de Serajevo. En outre, il a declare qu'il avait prepare un pro- jet de loi pour rendre plus efficaces les mesures deja prises contre tout abus d'explosifs. Ceprojet de loi etait deja soumis au Gonseil d'Etat, mais il n'a pas pu ^tre prdsente a la Skoux^chtina, celle-ci ayant ^t^ dissoute. Enfin, le Gouverne- ment serbe a declare qu'il etait pret k I'avenir comme pai' le passe a remplir tous les devoirs de voisinage, auxquels Toblige sa position d'Etat europeen. Depuis que Tattentat a ete commis, le Gouver- nement austro-hongrois ne s'est jamais adresse au Gouvernement serbe pour un concours quel- conque au sujet de I'attcntat. II n'a "reclame pour aucun des complices. ni Fouverture d'unc instruc- tion ni la mise en jugement. Une seule fois, il a demande des renseignements sur le domicile actuel de quelques eleves expulses de I'P^cole normale primaire de Pakrac, qui avaient ]Dasse en Serble pour continuer leurs etudes. Tous les renseignements qui ont pu 6tx^e recueillis a ce sujet lui ont ete transmis. Gependant la campagne contre la Serbie conti- nuait dans la presse austro-hongroise, et on excl- LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 35 tait contre la Serbie ropinion publique en Au- triche-Hongrie et en Europe. On a pouss^ si loin dans cette voie que des chefs eminents de partis polidques en Autriche-Hongrie ont commence a interpeller au Parlement au sujet de Tattentat, et que le President du Conseil hongrois leur a re- pondu. Des discussions engagees a ce sujet j il apparalt que I'Autriche-Hongrie a I'intention de faire certaines demarches, mais on ne voit pas dans quel sens. On ne dit pas si les mesures prises, surtout . les mesures militaires, depen- dront de la reponse et de 1' esprit de conciliation du Gouvernement serbe. De loin, on fait entre- voir la possibilite d'un conflit, au cas ou le Gou- Ternement serbe ne pourrait pas donner une reponse categorique et satisfaisante, Lors de la mort subite du minisire russe Hartwig a Belgrade, au domicile du ministre d'Autriche, la polemique de presse a ete encore ranimee ; mais ce triste evenement n a provoque aucun desordre, lors des funerailles. Cependant la legation d'Aiitriche-Hongrie, par suite de fausses nouvelles recues parelle, s'etait emue a tel point, que les sujets austro-hongi*ois ayaient commence a S8 cacher dans des hotels de Semlin et de Bel- grade, ct certains a la Legation meme. Le jour de I'anniversaire du Roi, qui s'est j)asse dans un ordre parfait, le ministre d' Autriche-Hongrie, par I'intcrmediaire du vice-consul Podgradski, m'a informe, ver« 5 heures de Tapres-midi, que des agressions contre la l%ation d'Autriche- Hongrie et contre les sujets austro-hongrois a Belgrade etaient projetees pour cette nuit m^nie. II m'a prie de prendre les mesures n^cessaires pour la protection des sujets austro-hongrois et 36 PAGES D'HISTOIRE de la Legation, en ajoutant qu'il rendrait la Serbie responsable de tout ce qui arriverait. Je lui ai repondu que le Gouvernement responsable du Royaume de Serbie n'avait aucun renseigne- ment sur n'importe quels preparatifs de cette nature, mais que j'en informerais tout de meme, sans retard, le ministrc de I'lnterieur et lui de- manderais en mfime temps de prendre toutes les mesures necessaires. Le lendemain a demon tre que la legation d'Autriche-Hongrie avait ete trompee jDarde fauxrenseignements, etantdonne qu*aucune agression n'a ete tentee, aucun prepa- ratif d'attaque n'ayant ete fait. Neanmoins, la i)resse austro-hongroise a exploite cette affaire encore dans le but de prouver que I'opinion serbe est excitee et prete a tout. Eile est allee meme plus loin et a essaye d'affirmer « qu'en effet quel- que chose devait se passer, car M. Pacbitch, lui- meme, avait dit qu'il en avait entendu parler :». Tout ccla demontre d'une fagon evidente Tinten- tion d' exciter I'opinion publique contre la Serbie dans cbaque occasion et a propos de tout evene- ment. Si Ton ]Drend en consideration tout ce qui a ete dit au Parlement bongrois au sujet de la tragedie de Sarajevo, on aura des raisons de s'inquieter ct de croire qu'on prepare contre nous une de- marche qui pourrait avoir des consequences de- sagreables pour les relations entre la Serbie et TAutriche-Hongrie. Cette inquietude est d'autant plus justifiee qu'il semble, d'apres tout, quel'ins- truction ouverte ne se bornerait pas aux seuls coupables et aux complices eventuels de I'at- tentat, mais qu'elle engloberait aussi la Serbie et Tidee nanslave. LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES Sf Par son attitude et ses precedes, le Gouverne- ment serbe a donne des preuves irrefutables qu'il travaille a Fapaisement des esxDrits, dans i'interet de lapaix et du maintien des bons rap- ports avec tons ses voisins. II a donne surtout des preuves de son desirderegler et d'ameliorer ses relations avec la Monarchie austro-hongroise qui, dans ces derniers temps, s'etaient refroidies , a cause de la guerre balkanique et des questions qui en ont decoule. Dans ce but, le Gouverne- ment serbe a x^rocede au reglement des chemins de fer orientaux, de nouveaux cbemins de fer et du transit des produits austro-hongrois pour Constantinople, Sofia, Salonique et Athenes. Le Gouverneraent serbe considere que ses in- terets vitaux lui imposent que la paix et la tran- quillite dans les Balkans soient consolidees au mieux et pour la duree la plus. longue possible. Et c'est parce qu'il desire cela qu'il craint main- tenant que la surexcitation de Topinion publique en Autriche-Hongrie ne fournisse au Gouverne- ment austro hongrois des motifs pour faire une demarclie qui tendrait a liumilier la dignite de TEtat serbe et pour faire presenter des reclama- tions qui ne pourraient pas etre acceptees. C'est pour cela que j'ai I'honneur de vous prier de faire, aupres du Gouvernement aupres duquel vous etes accredite, tout ce qui est neces- saire pour qu'il prenne note de notre desir sin- cere de maintenir des relations amicales avec I'Autriche-Hongrie, et de'reprimer sur notre ter- ritoire toute tentative pouvant porter atteinte a la tranquillite et a la securite de la Monarchie voisine. De meme, nous accueillerons les recla- mations de I'Autriche-Hongrie au cas oii elle 38 PAGES D'HISTOIRE demanderait que certains complices se trouvant en Scrbie — sil y en a, bicn entendu — soient traduits dcrant nos tribunaux indeiDcndants, j)our etre juges. Mais nous ne pourrons jamais accepter des reclamations qui iraient contre la dignite de la Serbie et que ne saurait accepter aucun Etat qui respcctc son independancc ct qui veut la con server. Dans le desir de voir les bons rapports de voi- sinage avec la Monarcbie dualiste se consolider et se maintenir, nous prions les Gouvernements amis de prendre note de notre declaration et d*agir dans un esprit pacinque lorsque Toccasion se prcsentera ou lorsque le besoin I'exigera. K« 31 M. Jov. M. Jovano^itch, ministre a Vienne^ a M. N. Pachiich, president du Conseilj ministre des Affaires etrangeres. Vienne, le 7/20 juillet 1014. Monsieur le President, II est tres difficile, presque impossible d'ap- prendre ici queique chose de jwsitif sur les veri- tables inlenlions de rAutriche-Hongrie. Le mot d'ordre pour tout ce qui se fait est d'en gardcr le secret absolu. A en juger par ce que nos jour- naux ecrivent, on est oi^timiste a Belgrade en ce qui concerne nos rapports avec rAulriche-Hon- LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUEo 39 grie. Cependant, on ne i)eut pas etre oi^timiste. II n'est pas douteux que rAutriche-Hongrie pre- pare quelque chose de serieux. Ge qu'on devrait craindre le j)lus, et ce qui est tres a croire, c'est qu'elle prepare une guerre contre la Serbie. La conviction generale ici est que ne rien faire cette fois-ci encore contre la Serbie equivaudrait pour TAutriche-Hongrie a un vei^itable suicide. En outre, Tidee que- la Serbie, apres deux guerres, est completement epuisee et qu'une guerre en- treiDrise contre elle serait en fait une simple expedition terminee par une prompte occupation, a pris des racines encore plus profondes. On croit aussi qu'une telle guerre serait terminee avant que I'Europe ait pu intervenir. Les i^reparatifs militaircs qu'on est en train dc faire, surlout sur la frontiere serbe, prouvent que les intentions de rAutriche sont serieuses. Veuillez, etc. N" 32 M. le baron Giesl de Gieslingen, ministre d'Au- iriche-Hongrie a Belgrade, a M. Laza PatchoUy president dii Conseil et ministre des Affaires etrangeres par interim. Belgrade, le 10/23 juillet 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, J'ai I'honneur de remettre a Votre Excellence laJiote ci-jointe que j'ai re^ue de mon Gouverne- 40 PAGES D HISTOIRE ment et qui est adressee au Gouvernement da Royaume de Serbie. Yeuillez, etc. Remis p'ersonnellement a 6 heures de rapres-midi. « Le 3 1 mars 1909, le ministre de Serbie a Vienne a fait, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, au Gouvernement imperial et royal, la declaration suivante : « La Serbie recoiinait qu'elle n'a pas ete atteinte dans ses droits par le fait accompli cree en Bos- nie-Herzegovine et qu'elle se conformera par consequent a telle decision que les Puissances prendront par rapport a rarlicle 25 du traite de Berlin. Se rendant aux conseils des grandes Puissances, la Serbie s'engage des a jDresent a abandonner Tattitude de protestation et d oppo- sition qu'elle a observee a I'egard de I'anncxion depuis Tautomne dernier et elle s'engage, en outre, a changer le cours de sa politique actuelle envers I'Autriche-Hongrie pour vivre desormais avec cette derniere sur le pied dun bon voisi- nagc. » Or, I'histoire des dernieres annees et notam- , ment les cvenemenls douloureux du 28 juin ont demontre I'existence en Serbie d'un mouvement subversif dont le but est de detacher de la Mo- narchic austro-hongroise certaines parties de ses territoires. Ce mouvement, qui a pris jour sous les yeux du Gouvernement serbe, est arrive a se mani fester au dela du territoire du royaume par des actes de terrorisme, par une s^rie d'attentats et par des meurtres. Le Gouvernement royal serbe, loin de satis- LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 41 faire aux engagements formels contenus dans la declaration du 3i mars 1909, n'a rien fait pour supprimcr ce mouvemcnt : il a tolere ractivite criminelle des difFerentes societes et affiliations dirigees contre la Monarchie, le langage elTrene de la presse, la glorification des auteurs d'atten- lats, la participation d'officiers et de fonction- naires dans des agissements subversifs, une pro- pagande malsaine dans Tenseignement, tolere enfin toutes les manifestations qui pouvaient induire la population serbe a la haine de la Monarchie et au mepris de ses institutions. Gette tolerance coupable du Gouvernement royal de Serbie n'avait j)as cesse au moment ou Jos evenements du 28 juin dernier en ont de- iaontrc au monde cntier les consequences fu- nestcs. II resulte des depositions et aveux des auteurs de Tattentat du 28 juin que le meurtre de Sera- jevo a ete trame a Belgrade, que les armes et les explosifs dont les meurtriers se trouvaient etre munis leur ont ete donnes par des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes faisant partie de la « Na- rodna Odbrana » et enfin que le passage en Bos- nie des criminels et de leurs armes a ete orga- nise et effectuepar des chefs du service-frontiere serbe. Les resultats mentionnes de Tinstruction ne permettent pas au Gouvernement imperial et royal de poursuivre plus longtemps I'attitude de ionganimite expectative qu'il avait obser- vee pendant des annees vis-a-vis des agissements de Belgrade propage's de la sur les territoires de la Monarchie. Ces resultats lui imposent au contraire le devoir de mettre fm a des menees qui 42 PAGES D^HISTOIKE forment une menace perpetuelle pour la tran- quillitc de la Monarchie. G'est pour atteindre ce but que le Gouverne- ment imperial et royal se voit oblige de deman- der au. Gouvernement serbe d'enoncer officielle- ment qu'il condamne la propagande dirigee contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise, c'est- a-dire Tensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu a detacher de la Monarchie des ter- ritoires qui en font paitie, et qu'il s'engage a supprimer, -par lous les moyens, cette propa- gande criminelle et terrorisle. A fin de donncr un caractere solenncl a cet engagement, le Gouvernement royal de Serbie fera publier a la ^^remiere page du Journal Ofji- del en date du i3/26 juillet I'enonciation sui- vante : i( Le Gouvernement royal de Serbia condamne la propagande dirigee contre rAutriche-Hongrie, c'est-a-dire Fensemble des tendances qui asx:)irent eu dernier lieu a detacher de la -Monarchie aus- tro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partic, et il deplore sincerement les cons(3quences fu- ncstes de ces agissements criminels. tt Le Gouvernement royal regrette que ses of- ficiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient particip^ a la propagande susmentionnee et comj)romis par la les relations de bon voisinage auxquelles le Gouvernement royal s'etait solenncl Icment en- gage par ses declarations du 3i mars 1909. (c Le Gouvernement royal, qui desapprouve et r^pudie toute idee ou tentative d'immixtion dans les deslinees des habitants de quelque ]3artie de rAutriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considere de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers, les LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 43 fonctionnaires et toute la population duroyaume que dorenavant il procedera avec la dernierc ri- gueur contre les per^sonnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements, qu'il mettra tous ses efforts a iDrevenir et a reprimer. » Cette enonciation sera porte'e en mSme temps a la connaissance de Tarmee royale par un ordre du jour de Sa Majeste le Roi et sera publi^e dans le Bulletin Officiel de VArmee. Le Gouvernement royal serbe s'engage, en outre : 1° A interdirc toute publication qui excite a la haine et au mepris de la Monarchie et dont la tendance generate est dirigee contre son integrity territoriale ; 2° A dissoudre immediatement la Societe dite « Narodna Odbrana », a confisquer tous ses raoyens de propagande et a proceder de la m^me maniere contre les autres societes et affiliations en Serbie qui s'adonnent a la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise. Le Gouvernement royal prendra les mesures necessaires pour qiie les societes dissoutes ne puissent pas continuer leur activite sous un autre nom et sous une autre forme ; 3"" A eliminer sans delai de Tenseignement pu- blic en Serbie, tant du corps enseignant que des moyens d'instruction, tout ce qui sert pu pour- rait servir a fomenter la propagande contre I'Au- triche-Hongrie ; 4° A eloigner du service militaire et de Tadmi- nistration en general tous les officiers et fonction- naires coupables de propagande contre la Mo- narchie austro-hongroise et dont le Gouverne- ment imperial et royal se reserve decommuni- 44 PAGES d'histoire quer les noms et les actes au Gouvernement royal; 5** A acceijter la collaboration en Serbie des organes du Gouvernement imperial et royal dans la suppression du mouvement subversif dirige contre Tintegrite territoriale de le Monarchie ; 6^ A ouvrir une enquSte judiciaire contre les partisans du complot du 28 juin se trouvant sur le territoire serbe ; des organes delegues par le Gouvernement imperial et royal prendront j)art aux recherche s; 'j° A proceder d'urgence a Tarrestation du com- mandant Voia Tankositch et du nomme Milan Ciganovitch, employe de TEtat serbe, compromis par les resultats de I'instruction de Serajevo; 8^ A empecher par des mesures efficaces le concours des autorites serbes dans le trafic illi- cite d'armes et d'explosifs a travers la frontiere; a licencier et punir s^verement les fonction- naires du service frontiere de Ghabatz et de Loz- nitza coupables d'avoir aide les auteurs du crime de Serajevo en leur facilitant le passage de la frontiere ; 9"* A donner au Gouvernement imperial et royal des explications sur les propos injustifia- bles de hauts fonctionnaires serbes tant en Ser- bie qu'a I'etranger qui, malgre leur jDosition officielle, n'ont pas hesite, apres I'attenlat du 28 juin, a s'exp rimer dans des interviews d'une maniere hostile envers la Monarchie austro- hongroise ; 10° Avertir, sans retard, le Gouvernement imperial et royal de Fexecution des mesures pre- c^dentes. Le Gouvernement imperial et royal attend la LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 45 reponse du Gouvernement royal au plus tard jiisqu'au samedi 25 de ce mois a 5 heures du soir. Le memoire relatif aux resultats de I'instruc- tion ouverte a Serajevo, en ce qui concerne les fonctionnaires mentionnes sous les n**^ 7 et 8, est joint a cette note. L'instruction criminclle ouverte par le tribu- nal de Serajevo contre Gavrilo Princip et consorts du chef d'assassinat et de complicite y relative, crime commis par eux le 28 juin der- nier, a jusqu'ici abouti aux constatations sui- vantes : i<* Le complot, ayant pour but d'assassincr, lors de son sejour a Serajevo, I'archiduc Fran- Qois-Ferdinancl, fut forme a Belgrade par Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovitch, le nomme Milan Ciganovitch et Trifko Grabez, avec le concours du commandant Voi'a Tankositch ; 2'' Les six bombes et les quatre pistolets brow- nings, au moyen desquels les malfaiteurs ont com- mis Tattentat, furent livres a Belgrade a Princip, Cabrinovitch et Grabez par le nomme Milan Ci- ganovitch et le commandant Voia Tankositch ; 3"" Les bombes sont des grenades a main prove- nant du depot d'armes de I'armee serbe a Kragu- jevats ; 4° Pour assurer la reussite de Fattentat, Ciga- novitch enseigna a Princip, Cabrinovitch et Grabez la maniere de se servir des grenades et donna, dans une foret pres du champ de tir a Topchidere, des lemons de tir avec pistolets brow- nings a Princip et a Grabez ; 48 PAGES D'HISTOIRE 5** Pour rendre possible a Princip, Cabrinovitch et Grabez de passer la frontiere de Bosnie-Herze- govine et d'y introduire clandestinement leur contrebande d'armes, un systeme de transport secret fut organise par Ciganovitch. D'apres cette organisation, I'introduction en Bosnie-Herzegovine des malfaiteurs et de leurs armes fut operee par les capitaines-frontieres de Chabatz (Rado PoiDOvitch) et ceiui de Loznitza^ ainsi que par le douanier Radivoj Grbitch de Loznitza avec le concoux's de divers particuliers. N« 33 M. le ly L. PatchoUj president dii Conseil et mi- nistre des Affaires etran^eres par interim^ a toutes les Legations royales. (Tel^gramme.) Belgrade, le 10/23 juillet 1914. A propos de I'attentat de Serajevo, le ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie m'a remis aujourd'ltui a six heures de I'apres-midi une note contenant les reclamations du Gouvernement austro-hongrois et a demande une reponse du Gouvernement serbe dans un delai de deux jours, c est-a-dire avant samedi a 6 heures de I'apres-midi. II m'a inform^ verbalement qu'il quitterait Belgrade avec son iDersonnel au cas ou il n'aurait pas re^u une rdponse satisiaisante dans le delai fixe. Le Gouvernement serbe n'a encore pris aucune decision, tous les ministres n'etant pas x^resents LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 47 a Belgrade; mais, des mainteaant, je puis dire que ces reclamations sont telles qu'aucun Gou- vernement serbe ne pourrait les accepter eix entier. N'^S^ M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et ministre des Affaires elrangeres, a M. N, Spalaikovitch, ministre a Peirograd. (Telegramme.) Belgrade, le 11/24 juillet 1914. J'ai informe le charge d'affaires russe que je remettrai, la rdponse a rultimatum austro-hon- grois demain samedi avant 6 beures de Fapres- midi. Je lui ai dit que le Gouvernement serbe demandera aux Etats amis de proteger I'indepen- dance de la Serbie. Au cas ou la guerre . serait inevitable, ajoutai-je, la Serbie la fera. N« 35 M, N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et ministre des Affaires etrangeres, a M. M. Bochkovitchj ministre a Londres. (Telegramme.) Belgra(ie, le 11/24 juUIet A9U. J'ai informe aujourd'hui le cbarge d'affaires anglais que les reclamations de I'Autricbe-Hon- 48 PAGES D'HISTOIRE grie etaient telles que le Gouverneinent d'aucun pays independant ne pourrait les accepter en entier. Je lui ai exprime I'espoir que le Gouver- nement anglais pourrait agir aupres du Gouver- nement austro-hongrois pour que ce dernier attenue ses reclamations. Je ne lui ai pas cachd que j'etais inquiet, a cause des evenements qui j)ourraient survenir. NO 36 M. leD"^ N, Spalaikovitchy ministre a Petrograd, a M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et mi- nistre des Affaires etrangeres. (Tel^gramme.) Petrograd, le 11/24 Juillet 1914. En sortant du cabinet de M. Sazonow, a qui j'ai fait connaitrc le texte de rultimatum austro-hon- grois, j'ai rencontre Tambassadcur d'Alleraagne. II avait I'air d'etre de tres bonne humeur. Dans la conversation que j'ai engagee avec le comte de Pourtales au sujet de la demarche austro-hon- groise, je Fai prie de m'indiquer la mauiere dont on jDourrait sortir de la situation creee par Tulti- matum austro-hongrois. L'ambassadeur m'a re- pond u que cela ne dependrait que de la Serbie, puisqu'il s agit d'une question qui doit etre reglee entre rAutriche et la Serbie seules et dont per- sonne autre ne pourrait semeler. J'ai r^pondu au comte de Pourtales qu'il se trompait et qu'il se convaincrait bientot qu'il s'agissait non pasd'une LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 49 question entre la Serble et I'Autriche, mais d'une question europeenne. N^ST S. A. It. le prince heritier Alexandre a S, M. VEmpereur de Russie. (Telcgrammc.) Belgrade, le 11/24 juillet 1911. Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois a remis hier soir au Gouvernement serbe une note eon- cernant I'attentat de Serajevo. Consciente de ses devoirs internationaux, la Serbie, d6s les pre- miers jours qui suivirent I'horrible crime, a declare qu'elle le condamnait et qu'elle etait j)rete a ouvrir line enquete sur son territoire si la com- plicity de certains de ses sujets etait j)rouvee au cours du X3roces instruit par les autorites austro- hongroises. Cependant, les demandes contenues dans la note austro-bongroise sont inutilement humi- liantes pour la Serbie et incompatibles avec sa dignite d'Etat independant. Ainsi on nous de- mande sur un ton peremptoire une declaration du Gouvernement dans VOfJiciel et un ordre du Souverain k I'armee ou nous reprimerions I'esprit hostile contre TAutriche, en nous faisant k nous- m^mes des reproches d'une faiblesse criminelle envers nos menees perfides. On nous impose en- suite I'admission de fonctionnaires austro-hon- grois en Serbie pour participer avec les n6tres a 4 50 PAGES D'HISTOIRE I'instruction et pour surveiller rexecution des autres conditions indiquees dana la note. Nous avons regu un delai de quarante-huit heures pour accepter le tout, faute de quoi la legation d'Autriche-Hong-rie quittera Belgrade. Nous sommes prdts a accepter les conditions austro-hongroises qui sont compatibles avec la situation d'un Etat independant, ainsi que celles dont I'acceptation nous sera conseillee par Votre Majeste ; toutes les personnes dont la participa- tion a I'attentat sera demontree seront severe- ment punies par nous. Certaines, parmi ces de- mandes, ne pourraient etre executees sans des changements de notre legislation, ce qui exige du temj^s. On nous a donne un delai trop court. Nous pouvons etre attaques apres I'expiration du delai par I'armee austro-hongroise qui se con- centre sur notre frontiere. II nous est impossible de nous defendre et nous supplions Votre Ma- jeste de nous donner son aide le plus tot pos- sible. La bienveillance precieuse de Votre Ma- jeste, qui s'est manifestee tant de fois a notre egard, nous fait esperer f ermement que, cette fois encore, notre appel sera entendu par son gene- reux coeur slave. Eu ces moments difficiles, j'interprete les sen- timents du peuple serbe qui supplie Votre Ma- jeste de vouloir bien s'interesser au sort du Royaume de Serbie. Alexandre. LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 51 N° 38 M. N. Pachitch, president dii Conseil et ministre des Affaires etrangeres, a toutes les Legations royales. (Telegramme.) Belgrade, le 12/25 juillet 1914. J'ai communique aujourd'hui aux represen- tants des iitats amis les grands traits do la re- ponse du Gouvernement royal. Je leur ai dit que la reponse sera tout a fait conciliante et que le Gouvernement serbe acceptera toutes les recla- ttiations austro hongroises dans la mesure ou 11 sera possible de le faire. Le Gouvernement serbe espere que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois, sauf dans le cas ou il desirerait a tout prix la guerre, ne pourra qu'accepter la satisfaction com- plete que lui donne la reponse serbe. N« 39 Reponse du Gouvernement royal serbe a la note de VAutriche-Hongrie, Belgrade, le 12/25 juillet 1914. Le Gouvernement royal serbe a requ la com- munication du Gouvernement imperial et royal du 10/23 de ce mois et il est persuade que sa re- ponse eloignera tout malentendu qui menace de 52 PAGES D'HISTOIRE comproinettre les bons rapports de voisinage entre la Mcnarchie austro-hongroise et le Royaume de Scrbie. Le Gouvernemcnt royal a conscieuce que les protestations qui out apparu tant a la tribune de la Skoupcbtina nationale que dans les declara- tions et les actes des representants responsables de I'Etat, protestations auxquelles coupa court la declaration du Gouvernement serbe faite le i8/3i mars 1909, ne se sont plus renouvelees vis- a-vis de la grande Monarcliie voisine en aucune occasion et que, dej^uis ce temps, aulant de la part des Gouvemements royaux qui se sont s.;c- cede que de la part de leurs organcs, aucune ten- tative n'a ete faite dans le but de changer I'etat de choses politique et juridique cree en Bosnie- Herzegovine. Le Gouvernement royal constate que sous ce rapport le Gouvernement imperial et royal n'a fait aucune representation, sauf en ce qui con- cerne un livre scolaire, au sujet de laquelie repre- sentation le Gouvernement imperial et royal a re^u une explication entierement satisfaisante. La Serbie a, a de nombreuses reprises, donne des preuves de sa politique pacifique et moderee pendant la duree de la crise balkanique, et c'est grace a la Serbie et aux sacrifices qu'elle a fails dans I'inter^t exclusif de la'paix europeenne, que cette iDaix a ete preservee. Le Gouvernement royal ne pent pas etre rendu responsable des manifestations d'un caractere prive telles que les articles des journaux et les agissements des societes, manifestations qui se produisent dans presque tous les pays comme une chose ordinaire et qui ^chappent en r^gle LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 53 generale au controle officiel — d'autant moius que le Gouvernement royal, lors dc la solution do toutc une seric de questions qui so sont pre- sentees entrc la Serbie el rAutriche-Hongrie, a montre une grande prevenance et a reus si, de cette fa^on, a en regler le plus grand nombre au profit du progres des deux x^ays voisins. G'est pourquoi le Gouvcrnement royal a ete peniblement surpris par ies affirmations d'apres lesquelles des sujets du Royaume de Serbie au- raient partici]3e a la preparation dc I'attentat commis a Serajevo. II s'atlendait a etre invile a collaborer a la reclierclie de tout ce qui so rai)- porte a ce crime et il etait j)ret, pour prouver imr des actes son entiere correction, a agir contre toutes Ies personnes a Tegard desquelles des communications iui seraient faites. Se rendant done au desir du Gouvernement imperial et royal, le Gouvernement royal est dis- pose a remettre aux tribunaux sans egard a sa situation et a son rang, tout sujet serbe, pour la complicite duquel, dan^^le crirae de Serajevo, des preuves Iui seraient fournics. II s'engage specialement a fairc publicr a la premiere page du Journal Officiel en dale du 13/2G juillet I'enonciation suivante : « Le Gouvernement royal de Serbie condamne toute 2:)ropagandc qui scrait dirigee contre I'Au- triche-Hongrie, c'est-a-dire rensemble des ten- dances qui aspircnt en dernier lieu a detacher de la'Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font parlic et il deplore sinccrement Ies consequences funestes dc ces agissements crimi- nals. « Le Gouvei'nement royal regrette que cer- 54 PAGES d'histoire tains officiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient par- ticipe, d'apres la communication du Gouverne^ ment imperial et royal, a la propagande sus- mentionnee et compromis par la les relations de bon voisinage auxquelles le Gouvernement royal s*etait solennellement engage par la declaration du 1 8/3 1 mars 1909. « Le Gouvernement, qui desapprouve et repu- die toute idee ou tentative d'une immixtion dans les destinees des habitants de quelque partie de I'Autriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considere qu^il est de son devoir d'avertir formellement les offi- ciers, les fonctionnaires et toute la population du Royaume que dorenavant il procedera avec la derniere rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements, qu'il mettra tous ses efforts a pr^venir et a re- primer. » Cette enonciation sera portee a la connaissance de Tarmee royale par un ordre du jour, au nom de Sa Majeste le Roi par S. A. R. le Prince heritier Alexandre, et sera publiee dans le pro- chain Bulletin officiel de VArm^e. Le Gouvernement royal s'engage, en outre r I** A introduire dans la premiere convocation r^guliere de la Skoupchtina une disposition dans la loi sur la presse par laquclle sera punie de la maniere la plus severe la provocation a la haine et au mepris de la Monarchic austro-hongroise, ainsi que contre toute publication dont la ten- dance generale sera dirigee contre I'integrite territoriale de I'Autriche-Hongrie. II se charge, lors de la revision de la Constitu- tion, qui est prochaine, de faire introduire dans Farticle 22 de la Constitution, un amendement LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 55 de telle soHe que les publications ci-dessus puissent etre confisquees, ce qui, aetuellement, aux termes categoriques de I'article 22 de la Constitution, est impossible ; 2*^ Le Gouvernement ne possede aucune preuve et la note du Gouvernement imperial et royal ne lui en fournit non i>lus aucune, que la soci^te « Narodna Odbrana » et les autres societes similaires aient commis jusqu'a ce jour quelque acte criminel de ce genre jyixv le fait d'un de leui*s membres. Neanmoins, le Gouvernement royal accejDtera la demande du Gouvernement imperial et royal et dissoudra la societe « Na- rodna Odbrana » et toute autre societe qui agirait contre TAutriche-Hongrie ; 3** Le Gouvernement royal scrbe s'engage a elimirer sans delai de I'instruction publique en Serbie tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir a fo- mcnter la propagande contre FAutriche-Hon- grie, quand le Gouvernement imperial et royal lui fournira des faits et des preuve s de cette propagande ; 4° Le Gouvernement royal accepte, du moins, d'eloigner du service militaire ceux dont I'en- quete judiciaire aura prouve qu'ils sont cou- pables d'actes diriges contre I'integrite du terri- toire de la Monarchic austro-hongroise ; il attend que le Gouvernement imperial et royal lui com- munique ulterieureraent les noms et les faits de ces officiers et fonctionnaires aux fins de la pro- cedure qui doit s'ensuivre ; 5° Le Gouvernement royal doit avouer qu'il ne se rend pas clairement compte du sens et de la portee de la demande du Gouvernement impe- rial et royal tendant a ce que la Serbie s'engage 56 PAGES D'HISTOIRE a accepter sur sou tem^itoire la collaboration des organes du Gouvernement imperial et royal. Mais 11 declare qu'il admettra toute collabora- tion qui repondrait aux principes du droit inter-^ national et a la procedure criminelle, ainji qu'aux bons raipports de voisinage ; G*' Le Gouvernement royal, cela va de s^i, considere de son devoir d'ouvrir une enquete centre tous ceux qui sont ou qui, eventuellement, auraient ete meles au complot du i5/28 jum et qui se trouvefaient sur le territoire du Royaime. Quant a la participation a cette enquete des agents des autorites austro-bongroises qu se- raient delegues a cet effet par le Gouvernepaent imperial et royal, le Gouvernement royal ne peut pas Taccepter, car ce serait une violation de la Constitution et de la loi sur la procedure criminelle. GejDendant, dans des cas cohere ts, des communications sur les resultats de I'ins- truction en question pourraient dtre donnees aux organes austro-hongrois ; 7* Le Gouvernement royal a fait proceder des le soir me me de la remise de la note a I'arresta- tion du commandant Voia Tankositch. Quant a Milan Ciganovitcb, qui est sujet de la Monarcbie austro-bongroise et qui, jusqu'au 16/28 juin, etait employe (comme aspirant) a la direction des cbemins de fer, il n'a pas pu encore etre joint. Le Gouvernement imperial et royal est prie de vouloir bien, dans la forme accoutumee, faire connaitre le plus t6t possible les presomp- tions de culpabilite, ainsi que les preuves even- tuelles de culpabilite qui ont 6i6 recueillies jus- qu'a ce jour par I'enquete de Serajevo, aux fins d'enquStes ulterieures; LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 57 S*' Le Gouveruement serbe renforcera et eten- dra les mesures j)rises pour empecher le tratic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs a travers la fron- tiere. II ya de soi qu'il ordonnera tout de suite una enquete et punira severement les fonction- naires des frontieres sur la ligne Chabatz-Loz- nitza qui out manque a leur devoir et laisse passer les auteurs du crime dc Serajevo ; 9° Le Gouvernement royal donnera volontiers des explications sur les propos que ses fonction- naires, tant en Serbic qu'a I'etranger, ont tenu apres Tattentat dans des interviews et qui, d'apres I'affirmation du Gouvernement imperial et royal, ont ete hostiles a la Monarchic, des que ]e Gouvernement imperial et, royal lui aura communique les passages en question de ces propos, et des qu'il aura demontre que les pro- pos employes ont en elTet ete tenus par lesdits fonctionnaires, propos au sujet desquels le Gou- vernement royal lui-meme aura soin de re- cueillir des prcuves et convictions ; 10" Le Gouvernement royal informera le Gou- vernement imperial et royal de 1' execution des mesures comprises dans les points pi'ecedents en tant que cela n'a pas ete deja fait par la pre- cedente note. A issitOt que cbaque mesure aura ete ordonnee et executee, dans le cas ou le Gou- vernement imperial et royal ne serait pas satis- fait de cette reponse, le Gouvernement royal serbe, considerant qu'il est de I'interet commun de ne pas precipiter la solution de cette ques- tion, est pret, comme toujours, a accepter une entente pacifique, en remettant cette question soit k la decision du tribunal international de La Haye, soit aux grandes puissances qui ont pris 58 PAGES d'HISTOIRE part a relaboration de la declaration que le Gouvernement serbe a faite le i8/3i mars 1909. N*> 40 M. le baron Giesl de Gieslingen, ministre cTAii- triche-Hongrie a Belgrade^ a M. N. Pachitch, president da Conseil et ministre des Affaires etr anger es. Belgrade, le 12/15 juillet 1914, 6 heures de Tapres-midi. Monsieur le President, Etant donne que le delai fixe par la note que j'ai remise sur I'ordre de mon Gouvernement a Son Excellence M. Patchou avant-hier, jeudi, a six heures de Tapres-midi, a expire, et que je n'ai pas rcQU une reponric satisfaisante, j'ai I'honneur d'informer Votre Excellence que je quitte Bel- grade ce soir avec le personnel de la legation imperiale et royalc. La protection de la legation imperiale et royale avec tout ce qui s'y rattache, avec ses annexes et ses archives, ainsi que la protection des sujets et interets autrichiens et hongrois en Serbic sont confiees a la legation imperiale d'Al- lemagne. Les chanceliers Ferdinand Jovanovitch et Mi- lan Mekovitch, qui resteront a Belgrade, sont rattaches a la legation imperiale d'Allemagne. Enfin, je constate que, des le moment ou Votre Excellence aura re^u cette Icttre, la rup- LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 59 ture des relations diplomatiques entre la Serbie et I'Autriche-Hongrie revdtira le caractere d'un fait accompli. Veuillez, etc... N°41 M. N. Pachitchj president du Conseil ef minis ire des Affaires etrangereSy a toutes les Legations royales, Belgrade, le 12/25 juillet 1914. C'est aujourd'hui a 5 h. et 3/4 de rapres-midi que J'ai remis la reponse a la note austro-hon- groise. V6us en recevrez ce soir le texte integral. Vous y verrez que nous sommes alles jusqu'aux limites extremes ou nous pouyions aller. Lors- qu'il a re^u la note, le ministre d'Autriche- Hongrie a declare qu'il devait la comparer avec les instructions et qu'il donnerait immediate- ment sa reponse. Des mon retour au ministere, le ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie ma informe par lettre qu'il n'etait pas satisfait de notre reponse et qu'il quittera Belgrade ce soir m^me avec tout le personnel de la legation. II remet au ministre d'Allemagne la protection de la legation avec tout le mobilier et les archives, ainsi que la protection des sujets et des interets austro-hon- grois en Serbie. Enfin, 11 declare que, par le fait de la remise de sa lettre, les relations diploma- tiques entre la Serbie et rAutriche-Hongrie sont c6mpletement rompues. Le Gouvernement royal a convoque la Skoup- cbtina pour le 14/27 juillet a Nicb, ou partent 60 PAGES D'HISTOIRE des ce soir tous les minist^res avec leur person nel. Au nom du Roi, le Prince heritier a sign^ Tordre de mobilisation de I'armee; domain ou apres-demain, paraitra una j)roclamation par la- quelle les citoyens qui ne sont pas militaircs seront invites a rester tranquillement cliez eux, et les militaires a rejoindre ieiirs drapeaux et a defendre la Serbie selon leurs forces, au cas oii elle serait attaquee. N° 42 M. le comte Leopold Berchiold, ministre des Affaires etrangeres d* Aiitriche-Hongrie ^ a M. JoQ. M. Jo^anovitch, ministre de Serbie a Vienne, Vienne, Ic 12/25 juillet 1914. Etant donne que la note que I'envoye extraor- dinaire ct ministre plenipotcntiaire imperial et royal a remise au Gouvernement royal le io/i^3 de ce mois, est restee sans reponse favorable, j'ai ete contraint d'envoyer Fordre au baron Giesl de quitter la capitale serbe ct de remettre la protection des sujcts dc Sa Majeste Imperiale et Royale apostolique au ministre d'Allemagne. Ayant le regret de voir par la se terminer les rapports que j'ai eu I'honneur d'entretenir avec vous, Monsieur le Ministre, je n'ai pu manquer de mcttre a votre disposition les passeports ci-joinls pour votre retour en Serbie et pour le retour du personnel de la legation royale. Veuillez, etc. LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUE S 61 N^* 43 Sa Majeste Imperiale VEmpereiir de Riissie a Son Aliesse Royals le Prince heritier de Ser- bie, Alexandre. (Telegi-amme.) Petrograd, le 14/37 juillet 1914. Voire Altesse Royale, en s'adressant a Moi dans un moment iDarticulierement difficile, ne s'est pas trompee sur les sentiments qui m'animent a Son egard et sur Ma symjjathie cordiale pour le peuple serbe. Ma plus serieuse attention est attiree sur la situation actuelle et Mon Gouvernement s'ap- plique de toutes ses forces a aplanir les presentes difficultes. Je no doute point que Votre Altesse et le Gouvernement royal ne yeuillent faciliter cette taclie en ne negligeant rien pour arriver a une solution qui permette de x^revenir les hor- reurs d'une nouveile guerre, tout en sauvegar- dant la dignite de la Serbie. Taiit qu'il y a le moindre espoir d'eviter une effusion de sang, tous mes efforts doivent tendrc vers ce but. Si, malgre notre idIus sincere desir, Nous ne reussissons pas, Votre Altesse pent etre assuree qu'en aucun cas, la Russie ne se desint^- ressera du sort de la Serbie. Nicolas. 62 PAGES d'HISTOIRE NO 44 Son Altesse Roy ale le Prince her i tier de Serbie Alexandre a Sa Majeste Imperiale I'Empereur de Riissie, (T6l6gramme.) Nich, le 17/30 juillet 1914. Profondement touche par le telegramme que Votre Majeste a bien voulu M'adresser hier, je m'empresse de La remercier de tout Mon coeur. Je prie Votre Majeste d'etre j)ersuadee que la cordiale sympathie dont Votre Majeste est ani- mee envers Mon pays nous est particulierement precieuse et remplit notre ame de Tespoir que TavfeDir de la Serbie est assure^ etant devcnu I'objet de la haute soUicitude de Votre Majeste. Ces moments peniblcs ne peuvent que rafler- mir les liens d'attachement profond qui unissent la Serbie a la sainte Russie slave et les senti ments de reconnaissance eternell^ pour I'aide et la protection de Votre Majeste seront conserves precieusement dans I'^me de tous les Serbes. Alexandre. N°45 M. le comte Leopold Berchtold, ministre des Affaires etrangeres dAutriche-Hongriej a M. N. Pachitchf president du Conseil et mi- nistre des Affaires etrangeres de Serbie. (T616gramme.) Vienne, le 15/28 juillet 1914. Le Gouvernement royal serbe n'ayant pas (donne une r^ponse favorable a la note que le LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 63 ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie lui a remise le 23/10 juillet 1914, le Gouvernement imperial et royal se voit oblige de pourvoir lui-merae a la protection de ses droits et interets et de rficou- rir, dans ce but, a la force des armes. L*Au- triche-Hongrie se considere done, des ce mo- ment, en etat de guerre avec la Serbie. N« 46 M. TV". Pachitch, president du Conseil et minis tr^e des Affaires elrangeres, a toutes les Legations royales. (Telegramme.) Nicli, le 15/28 juillet 1914. Le Gouvernement de FAutriche - Hongrie a declare la guerre aujourd'hui, a midi, par un telegramme en clair adresse au Gouvernement serbe. N« 47 M. le D"" Spala'ikontch, ministre a Petrograd^ a M. S. D, SazonoWy ministre russe des Affaires etr anger es. Petrograd, le 15/28 juillet 1914. Excellence, J'ai I'honneur de porter a votre connaissance que je viens de recevoir de M. N. Pachitch, pre- sident du Conseil, ce telegramme urgent envoye 04 PAGES D HISTOIRE de Nich aujourd'hui a a h. lo dans rapr^s-midi. « Le Gouvcrnement de FAutriche-Hongric a declare la guerre aujourd'hui, a midi, par un telegramme en clair adress^ au Gouvernement serbe. » « Pachitch. » En portant a votre connaissance I'acte qu'une grande Puissance a eu le triste courage de com- mettre vis-a-vis d'un petit pays slave qui vient a I)eine de sortir d'une longue serie de luttes aussi heroiques qu'epuisantes, je prends la liberie, en une circonstance si grave pour mon pays, d'ex- primer I'espoir que cct acte, qui brise la paix de TEurope et re volte sa conscience, sera r^jirouve par tout le monde civilise et severement puni par la Russie, protectrice de la Serbie. Je j)rie Votre Excellence de vouloir bien porter devant le tr6ne deSaMajeste cette priere de tout le peuple serbe et de vouloir bien agreer I'assu- rance de mon devouement et de mon respect* Veuillez, etc. N« 48 M. S. D. SazonoWt ministre des Affaires etran- geres russe^ a M, le Jy Spalaikovitch, ministre de Serbie a Petrograd, Petrograd, le 17/30 juillet 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, J'ai eu Thonneur de recevoir votre lettre du 15/28 juillet, n^ 527, par laquelle vous avez bien voulu me communiquer le telegramme de Son LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 65 Excellence M. N. Pachitch au sujet de la cle'cla- ration de guerre de I'Autriche - Honiifrie a la Serbie. En regrettant sincerement ce triste ev^- nement, je m empresse de vous informer, Mon- sieur le Mini^rtt^, que je ne manquerai pas de soumettre a Sa Majesie TErapereur la demand© du peuple serbe, dont vous etes Tinterprele. Veuillez, etc. N» 49 M, N. Pachitchy president du Conseil et minisire des Affaires elrangereSj a M. le D' Jovanovitch» charge d'affaires a Berlin. (T^legramme.) Nich, le 22 juilIet/4 aoul 1914. Je vous prie d'informer le Gouvernement impe- rial que vous avez regu Tordre de quitter TAlle- magne avec le personnel de la legation et du consulat. Je vous prie de partir saus retard. N« 50 . Le Ministere des Affaires etrangeres serbe a la Legation d'Allemagne a Nich, Nich, le 24 juillet/6 aoui 1914. Le Ministere royal des Affaires etrangeres a Thonneur d'informer la Legation imperiale d'Al- 5 66 PAGES b*HISTOIRE lemagne que, vu I'etat de guerre existant entre la Serbie et rAutriche-Hongrie, alliee de I'AUe- magne, ainsi que I'etat de guerre existant entre la Russie et rAllemagne, alliee de rAutriche- Hongrie, le Gouvernement royal serbe, se soli- darisant avec la Russie et ses allies, consid^re comme terminee la mission en Serbie de Son Excellence le baron Griesinger, envoye extraor- dinaire et ministre plenipotentiaire d'Allemagne. II prie Son Excellence de quitter, avec le person- nel de la legation, le territoire de la Serbie et lui remet ci-joint les passeports necessaires. N* 51 M. le ly JoQanoQitchf charge d'affaires a Berlin , d M, Pachltch, president du Conseil et ministre des Affaires etrang-^res. Berlin, le 24 juillet/6 aout 1914. Lors de la visite que j'ai faite au sous-secre- taire d Etat, M. Zimmermann, pour lui notifier la rupture des rapports diplomatiques, il m*a, entre autres choses, declare que rAllemagne avait tou- jours ete animee de sentiments amicaux envers la Serbie et qu'elle regrettait que les relations entre la Serbie et I'AUemagne, a cause des com- binaisons politiques, dussent etre rompues. II tient la Russie, qui a sans cesse excite la Serbie, pour seule responsable des evenements qui sont survenus et qui auront de lourdes consequences LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 67 pour tous les peuples. Si la Russie n'avait pas, au dernier moment, alors qu'il paraissait deja possible d eviter un conflit arme, mobilise toute sa force militaire, on n'en serait pas arrive a la guerre, car TAlIemagne. avait use de toute son influence sur I'Autriche-Hongrie pour qu*elle s'enlendit avee la Russie. Peut-etre I'Autriche- Hongrie se serait-elle contentee d'occuper Bel- grade, et alors des negociations se seraient enga- gees dans le but de regler les rapports austro- serbes. N^- 52 M. JoQ. M: Jos^anovitch, ministre a Vienne^ a AI. jV. Paclutch, president du Conseil et mi- nistre des Affaires e tr anger es, Nich, le 3/16 aout 1914. Monsieur le President, Depuis le i7/3o juin, la legation de Serbia a Vienne a ete assiegee par la police et la gendar- merie, et son personnel soumis sans cesse a la sur- veillance des fonctionnaires de la Surete. Nos mouvements et nos communications avee le monde exterieur furent rendus, com me vous pouvez le penser, considerablement plus diffi- cilcs; Tattitude de la rue avait quelque chose de mena^ant envei^s la legation et son personnel. Des le commencement du mois de juillet, m^me les communications telegraphiques avee vous de- yinrent plus dil'ficiles et les evenements se sont 68 PAGES d'HISTOIRE developpes si vite que je n'ai pas pu vous com- muniquer certains details relatifs a ce qui a pre- cede notre con flit arme avec rAutriche-Hongrie. Cast pourquoi je le fais maintenant. Jusqu'a la fin du mois de juin, il parut que toute FalFaire de Serajevo se developpait normale- ment. Mais au commencement du mois de juillet un revirement s'opera. II n'y avait pas de signes patents de ce revirement : c'etaient plutot des in- dices et des symptomes imprecis qui trahissaient certaines intentions dissimulees. Tout d'abord, les journaux de Vienne et de Budapest, sur les ins- tructions du Bureau de la presse du ministere des Ailaires etrangeres, suspendirent la publica- tion des informations sur le cours de Tinstruc- tion au sujet de I'attentat de Serajevo. Cette meme presse commen^a a representer toute Taf- faire comme une question qui devait ^tre reglee cntre la Serbie et TAutriche-Hongrie, eventuelle- ment par la force des armes D'ailleurs, les grands journaux de Vienne rece- vaient des communications .pareilles provenant de Tambassade d'Allemagne; exception doit etre faite pour le aemi-ofriciei Fremdenblatt qui etait, en general, plus modere, comme aussi pour la Zeit et VArbeiier Zeitang. A cette nouvelle attitude de la presse, vint s'ajouter un etat d'insecurite de la Bourse tel qu'on n'en avait pas connu de pareil durant tout le cours des derniei^ evenements dans les Balkans. Dans les conversations privees des hauts cercles financiers, on denon^ait le « compte a regler avec la Serbie », comme la seule issue de la crise gene- rale, financiere et economique, ou TAutriche- Hongrie etait entree depuis I'annexion de la Bos- LES POURPARLERS DIPL0MATIQUE3 69 ni(3-HerzegoVine. Puis, par une circulaire secrete, on ordonaa le retrait graduel de la monnaie d'or et en meme temps la hausse graduelle de son cours. On ne tarissait pas d' explications sur I'in- terruption du conge du ministre de la Guerre Krobatin rt du chef d'etat-major Hoetzendorf, sur leur retour et leur sejour a Vienne. Le chef d'etat-major general etait tantot dans le Slid, tantot dans TEst, tantot dans le Nord de la Mo- narchic, ou il se rencontrait avec le chef d'etat- major allemand, comte de Moltke, en Boheme, a Karlsl^ad, je crois. Tous les reservistes, qui avaient ele convoques pour les. manoeuvres de juin en Bosnie-Herzego- vine, furent maintenus sous les drapeaux. Les soldats des cadres en Autriche et en Hongrie obtenaient ^n nombre beaucoup plus conside- rable que d'ordinaire de courtes permissions dans le but de terminer les travaux des champs et autres, et les reservistes charges des services administi'atifs dans I'armee elaient convoques de plus en plus. Ajoutez les interpellations au Par- lement hongrois et les reponses ambigues du president du Conseil, le comte Tisza, un homme d'Etat qui, j usque-la, avait ete tres clair dans ses declarations politiques. L' attitude du Ballplatz fut la plus caracteris- tique. Les receptions hebdomadaires chez le comte Berchtold furent suspendues. Tout d'un coup, les conversations au sujet de I'evenement de Serajevo avec les representants des Etats etran- gers cesserent, ou, lorsqu'on en parlait, c'etait toujours com me par ordre et pour dissiper la crainte ou le doute que TAutriche-Hongrie pre- parat une action serieuse contre la Serbie. On y 70 PAGES D*HISTOmE avouait que certaines demarches seraient faites a Belgrade des que les resultats de Tinstruction ouverte au sujet de Tattentat de Serajevo en auraient suffisamment prouve les attaches avec Belgrade. Mais, en meme temps, on disait que ces demarches ne seraient pas telles qu on diit s'en inquieter beaucoup. L'ambassadeur de Rus- sie qui, en Fabsence du comte Berchtold, avait plusieurs Ibis cause a ce sujet avec le comte For- gach, n'a jamais pu saisir les veritables inten- tions de FAutriche-Hongrie. M. Schebeko m'a dit que le comte Szapary, ambassadeur d'Autriche- Hongrie a Petrogi^d, qui, pour des raisons de famille, se trouvait en Autriche-Hongrie, lui avait dit que les demarches qui seraient faites a Belgrade auraient le caractere conciiiant. Le "Comtej d'apres les dires de M. Schebeko a M. Sazonow, a donne I'assurance que la note que TAutriche-Hongrie avait Fintention d'adresser a la Serbie serait telle que les Russes n'en seraient pas mecontents. M. Dumaine, ambassadeur de France, qui, sur Fordre de son Gouvernement, avait attire Fattention du Gouvernement de Vienne sur les complications qui pourraient sur- gir au cas ou les reclamations eventuelles qu'on avait Fintention d'adresser a la Serbie ne seraient pas moderees, rcQut du baron Macchio, premier chef de section au ministere des Allaires etran- geres, la reponse que le Gt^^vernement austro- hongrbis appreciait les demarches amicales et conciliantes de la France et que les conditions de la note a la Serbie seraient de nature a ^tr acceptees par celle-ci sans grande hesitation. Je fis remarquer aux ambassadeurs des puissances de la Triple-Entente que de telles assurances pou- LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 71 vaient cacher les vraies intentions du Gouveme- ment austro-hongrois afin de mettre les puis- sances devant certains iaits accomplis que I'Eu- rope serait obligee d'accepter pour eviter une guerre gene rale. Cependant, les precedes du Ballplatz eurent un certain succes, car tous mes collegues, que j'eus I'occasion de voir ces jours-la, croyaient a peine que T Autriche-Hongrie vouliit entreprendre une action serieuse qui put provoquer des com- plications europeennes. Plusieurs membres du corps diplomatique etaient si confiants que, ces jours-la, ils faisaient des preparatils pour leur depart en long conge ou dans les villes d'eaux. Malgre tout, on savait qu/on preparait au mi- nistere une note qui contiendrait les griefs et les reclamations de I'Autriche-Hongrie contre la Serbie. Ce travail fut confie au comte Forgach, ancien ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie en Serbie. On croyait generalement que, parrai les repr^- sentants etrangers, seul I'ambassadeur d'Alle- magne, M. Tschirsky, avait ete tenu- au courant de ce travail, et j'ai eu des raisons de croire qu'il a meme collabore a la redaction de la note. Aussi les representants des Etats qui nous etaient favo- rables etaient-ils d'accord avec moi pour penser que, redigee par ces deux auteurs, la note con- tiendrait des conditions tres dures pour la Ser- bie, mais non pas telles qu'elle ne put les accep- ter. Lorsque le texte de la note fut public, ils en furent tous surpris, j)our ne pas dire constern^s. Autant on a fait mystere avec soin du contenu de la note, autant on a cache la date ou elle serait presentee. Le jour de la remise de I'ullimatum a Belgrade, I'ambassadeur de France euti a ce 78 PAGES D*HISTOmE ^ujet» Tine longue conversation avec le premier- chef de section au ministere des Affaires etran- g^res, le comte Berchtold s*etant trouvedenou- veau a Ischl. Or, le baron Macchio n'avait pas dit k M. Dumaine que ce jour-la, dans I'apres- midi, la note serait remise a Belgrade et que le Lendemain elle serait publiee par les journaux, Lorsque le 1 1/24 j uillet, au matin, les joumaux viennois publierent le contenu de la note que le baron Giesl avait remise au Gouvernement serbe, une inquietude s'empara de nos amis et des amis de la paix europeeiine. G'est alors seulement qu'on coraprit que de grands evenements euro- peens pourraient survenir, bien qu'on ne crut pas que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois eut Tintention de les i^rovoquer. Ce sentiment fut fortifi« par les violents articles de tous les jour- naux de Vienne, excepte le Zeit et VArbeiter Zeitiing, ainsi que par les demonstrations de la rue qui prouvaient d'une fa^on evidente que la guerre bien entendu une guerre contre la Ser- bie, — serait la solution la plus desirable. Apres deux, trois conversations que j'ai cues ce jour-la, je me suis rendu compte qu'un conllit arme entre la Serbie et la Monaivhie etuit inevi- table, m^me au cas ou la Serbie accepterait tou- tes les conditions austro-hongroises, de la pre- miere a la derniere. L'attitude de la rue erivers notre legation etait deja telle que je m'attendais m^me a des voies de fait contre le personnel de la legation. L'ambassadeur de France aussi bien que celui d*Angloterre, et le charge d*all*aires de Russia considererent que la demarche du Gouverne- ffienl austro-hongrois etait, non x>as une simple UES POUnPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 73 note, mais un ultimatum. lis furent indignes de la forme aussi bien que du fond et du delai fixe par la note, et ils la jugerent, eux aussi, inacceptable. Dans les convei^sations que j*a:i eues avec eux au sujet de cette note,^ je leur exj)liquai qu'en particulier les passages relatifs a I'ordre du jour du Roi a I'armee, a la destitu- tion des fonctionnaires et officiers, et surtout k la participation des fonctionnaires austro-hon- grois a la « repression du mouvement existant en Serbie contre Tintegrite de la Monarchic »,ne pourraient absolument pas ^tre acceptes, etant contraires a la dignite et a la souverainete natio- nales. Ce n'est qu'une guerre victorieuse, dis-je, qui x>ourrait amener Taeceptation de conditions aussi humiliantes poiir un pays independant. A leur question : s 'il ne valait pas mieux les accep- ter pour le moment et eviter la guerre, j'ai repondu que la note austro-hongroise, qui en fait ^tait une declaration de guerre a la Serbie, etait redigee de fa^on que, m^me au cas ou la Serbie I'aurait acceptee sans aucune reserve, I'Autricha- Hongrie y aurait trouve a tout instant des motifs pour faire entrer ses troupes en Serbie. G'est dans la conviction que le conflit resterait iimite a nous deux qu'elle . avait redige une telle note. M. Dumaine, Sir Maurice de Bunsen et le prince KoudacheflV charge d'allaires russe, furent sur- pris de cette note inattendue, autant qu inquiets des complications qu'elle mena^ait d'amener. Avant la remise de la note austro-hongroise, M. Schebeko, ambassadeur de Russie, avait dit a plusieurs reprises a ses collegues que la Russie ne pourrait pas rester indiiferente a une demarche 74 PAGES D*HIST0IRE de TAutriche-Hongrie qui tendrait k humilier la Serbie. Cette opinion, ii Tjivait ouvertement ex- primee au Ballplatz. D'ou, Finqui^tude chez les ambassadeurs qui envisageaient la possibilite d'une ftueri^ entre la Russie et TAutriche-Hon- grie. Le lendemain du jour ou la note fut remise a Belgrade, le prince Koudacheff alia en parler au comte Berchtold. A sa declaration que la note, telle quelle, etait inaccep table et que la Russie ne pouvait pas regarder avec indifference une humi-, liation de la Serbie, le comte Berchtold repondit que TAutriche-Hongrie s'etait trouvee forcee de faire une telle d-marche en SerbiCj son existence mdme etant mise en question, que rAutriclie- Hongriene pourrait jms renoncer a ses demarches ni changer les conditions de la note, et qu^elle esti- mait que ce differend ne regardait que la Serbie et r Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-a-dire qu'aucune autre puissance n*avait de raisons de s'en meler. Cette r^ponse du comte Bei^chtold ne laissait pas de doutes sur I'intention de I'Autriche-Hon- grie d'infliger une correction ^ niain armee k la Serbie, sans jugement de FEurope Fy autorisant. Des conversations que j'ai cues alors avec les ambassadeurs des puissances de la Triple-En- tente, — qui, durant ces jours penibles, furent k tous egards accoeillants et bienveillants envers moi et envers le personnel de la legation, — il ressortait clairement que, du moment ou ell« s'etait decidee k adresser cette note qui signifiait sans aucun doute la guerre, FAutiiche-Hongrie avait re^u des assurances et m^me acquis la con- viction que le conflit serbo-austro-hongrois serait localise. De m^me, 11 6tait clair que FAutriche- LES POUiiPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 75 Hongrie avail ete confirmee dans cette convic- tion particulierement et peut-etre uniquement par M. Tscliirsky, ambassadeur d*Aliemagne a Vienne. M. Tschirsky etait seul a penser eta dire ouvertement que la Russie se tiendrait tranquille pendant que rAutriche-Hongrie infligerait la pu- nition {Straf expedition) a la Serbie. II assurait que le ministre des Affaires etrangeres de Rus- sie viendrait facilementa bout des panslavistes, comme' I'annee prec^dente, et que la Russie n'avait aujourd'hui aucun interet a soulever tant de questions epineuses qui latouchent de plus pres en Europe et en Asie. Selon lui, il etait necessaire qu'une legon fut donnee a la Serbie. La Russie n'avait aucun droit d'intervenir. Quant a TAllemagne, il declarait qu'elle avait pleine conscience de ce qu'elle faisait, enappuyantTAu- triche-Hongrie dans sa demarche* Ge langage de M. Tschirsky a fait penser a beaucoup de personnes que c'est TAUemagne qui a voulu provoquer la guerre europeenne, car, bien auparavant, on a dit et mdme ecrit a Vienne qu'il fallait faire la guerre a la Russie avant qu'elle Cut prete au point de vue militaire, c'est-a-dire avant le printemps de 191 7 ; « Plus on remet TaHaire, moindres seront les chances des puissances de la Triple- Alliance. » Cepen- dant, de Berlin, de sources diplomatiques, les plus authentiques nouvelles me parvenaient que la Wilhelmstrasse n'approuvait pas Taction de TAutriche-Hongrie dans cette question et que M. Tschirsky avait outrepasse ses instructions. A son re tour de Petrograd, M. Schebeko, am- bassadeur de Russie, multiplia ses efforts aupres du Ballpjatz, afin d'obtenir prolongation du ccurt 76 PAGES D*HISTOIRE delai fix^ au Gouvernement serbe pour sa re- ponse a-Ja note austro-hongroise, et de trouver le moyen d'arriver a un echange d'idees sur Ten- semble du diil'erend entre Vienne et Petro- grad; mais ces eftbrts resterent sans s\icc6s jus- qu'au 13/26 juillet, jour de notre entrevue. Par la conversation que j'eus alors avec lui, je com- pris qua Petrograd ia note austro-hongroise ^tait consideree, dans le fond et dans la forme, comme une provocation adressee k la Russie, non pas k la Serbie, et que la Russie ne soull'rirait pas rhumiliation de la Serbie, dilt-elle s'exposer a une guerre. Le jour de mon depart de Vienne, M. Sch^- beko me dit que, en depit de toutes les grandes difficultes, il y avait des chances pour qu'on trouvat a Petrograd, entre le^ Gouvernement russe et le comte Szapary, une solution quel- sonque qui empdcherait I'ouverture du conflit. D'autre part, des que Ton apprit a Vienne que le conflit austro-serbe pouvait provoqUer une guerre entre la Russie et rAutriche-Hongric, on commenga a s'en inquieter. ANNEXE Declarations de M. Giolitti a la Chambre italienne \i) 5 decern bre 1914- « ... Comrae je tiens pour necessaire que la loyaut^ de 1 Italie dans robservation des pactes internationaux soit au-dessus de toute discus- sion| je me sens oblige de rappeler un precedent qui demontre que T interpretation donnee par notre Gouverneraent a nos traites, au debut du conflit, etait exacte et qu'elleaele admise comme TPaie par les Puissances alliees elles-memes. « Au cours dela guerre balkanique, precis^- ment le 9 aout igiS, etant absent de Rome, j'ai re?u de mon coUegue, I'bon. Di San Giuliano, le telegramme suivant : « L'Autricbe nous a communique, ainsi qu'a « FAllemagne, son intention d'agir contre la (1} II semble qu'il yait egalement eu une demarche syme- trique de I'Autiiche aupres de la Roumanie f»n mai 1913. M. Take lon^^s^.o a lormellement declare qu'il en avail trace dans un ttlegramme adresse par le comte Beichtuld au prince de Kiiifeienherg et communique par lui au chef da Gouvernement roumaiu. Les dementis officieux anxquiels cette r6vehit on a donne lieu de la pan de i'Autriche ne nous permetteni pas de lui donner place dans ce recueil sour fonne d'un lextc olficiel. 78 PAGES D'HISTOIRE * SerLie et elle defmit cette action une action « defensive, esperant appliquer a la Triple-Al- * liance le casus foederis, que je crois inappli- « cable. Je cherche a concerter avec TAUemagne re compte; car il n'est pas question de de- « fense, puisque personne ne songe a Tattaquer. « II est necessaire que cela soit declare a TAu- « triche de la fa<;on la plus formelle et il est a « souhaiter que Taction de TAllemagne dissuade « I'Autriche de cette perilleuse aventure. » t Cest ce qui fut fait; et I'interpretation don- « n^e par nous eut le consentement de nos allies « avec lesquels nos rapports d'amitie ne furent « pas le moins du monde troubles. La declara- « tion de neutralite faite au debut du present « conflit est done conforme a I'esprit et a la « lettre des traites. J'ai voulu rappeler ce fait « parce que je juge utile qu'il apparaisse aux « yeux de toute TEurope que lltalie a ete com- « pletement loyale. » NANCY-PARIS. — IMPRIMERIS BERCyER-LEVRAULT FOURTEEN DAY USE RETURN TO DESK FROM WHICH BORROWED This book is due on the last date stamped below, or on the date to which renewed. Renewed books are subject to immediate recall. 13Jul'55PW JUL 12 1 9 55 ty RECEIVED DttiiA*68'RPM ^iffibl t^ REC'D LD LOAN DEPT. i^^l j.$ ta^ ftPR 281969 03 j^^V65«S m REC'D LP ^OW-iopf^ OCT 3 '65 f LOAM DPp-r ftPR 271967 RECEIVED A PR 18 '67 2 PM DEAD 5» n i.D 21-100m-2,'55 (B139s22)476 General Library University of California Berkeley / 2 '■I 3133 ^/^ THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY