w 
 
 
 M 
 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
 ur TIIK 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. 
 
 Received 
 Accessions No.- 
 
 G a 
 
 c*- 
 
 
 ,8S6> 
 
 S/ielf J\v. 
 
V . 
 
THE 
 
 REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 BY THE DUKE OF ARGYLL., 
 
 Let knowledge grow from more to 
 
 But more of reverence in us dwell ; 
 Thai mind and soul^ according welt, 
 May make one music as before, 
 
 But -vaster. 
 
 IN MEMORIAM. 
 
 NEW YORK: 
 JOHN B. ALDEN, PUBLISHER. 
 
 1884. 
 

PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION. 
 
 IN preparing a Fifth Edition of this work, I have to ac- 
 knowledge the favor far greater than I expected with which 
 it has been received. The argument which it maintains is at 
 variance with the philosophy of some of the most active and 
 popular thinkers of the time ; and on a few important points it 
 deviates from the view commonly adopted by men with whom I 
 am more generally agreed. Some adverse comment was there- 
 fore not only to be expected but desired. Most sincerely do I 
 thank those who, in numerous Journals and Reviews, have 
 undertaken this duty, for the uniformly courteous and even 
 kindly spirit in which their criticisms have been expressed. 
 
 In this Edition no alteration has been made involving any 
 change of principle or opinion. Here and there words have 
 been added or removed according as individual passages appear 
 to have been misunderstood. Throughout some of the chap- 
 ters substantial additions have been made in reply, direct or 
 indirect, to my principal opponents, whilst discussions, more 
 detailed than were suitable for the text, have been committed 
 to Notes at the end of the volume. 
 
 These additions and Notes have reference chiefly to the fol- 
 lowing articles which appeared in review of the " Reign of 
 Law : " 
 
 i st. An Article, by Mr. Alfred R. Wallace, in the Quarterly 
 Journal of Science, for October, 1867. This article is in defence 
 and illustration of Mr. Darwin's " Theory on the Origin of Spe- 
 cies." The eminence of Mr. Wallace as a Naturalist, the ex- 
 tent of his researches in some of the most remarkable Faunas 
 of the world, and the fact that, before the publication of Mr. 
 Darwin's book, he had come to kindred, if not identical conclu- 
 sions, all render him peculiarly competent to defend the " The- 
 
IV PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION. 
 
 ory," and to present it in the strongest light. I have therefore 
 added to the text several passages suggested by the challenge 
 he makes, and by the reasoning he employs. A further discus- 
 sion of his paper will be found in Note A. 
 
 2d. An Article, by Mr. George H. Lewes, in the Fortnightly 
 Review, for July, 1867, dealing with the main argument and 
 conclusion of this work from the well-known point of view of 
 the " Positive Philosophy." Wherever in the text there seemed 
 a fitting place for doing so, I have inserted passages which deal 
 with the reasoning of his paper, or with the same reasoning as 
 it appears in a more systematic form in the Prolegomena to Mr. 
 Lewes's " History of Philosophy." 
 
 3d. An Article in the Dublin Review, for April, 1867, which I 
 am permitted to attribute to the learned editor of that periodi- 
 cal, Dr. Ward. The more special object of his adverse com- 
 ment is the view I have taken of the doctrine of Free Will a 
 doctrine which Dr. Ward, with some warmth, accuses me of 
 having virtually abandoned whilst professing to defend it. A 
 slight alteration in the text may perhaps help to remove some 
 objections, which rest entirely upon a misunderstanding of the 
 sense in which particular words are used. But behind and be- 
 yond any misunderstanding of this kind, there lies apparently a 
 substantial difference in respect to which my view remains un- 
 altered. This difference will be found discussed in Note F, at 
 the end of the volume. 
 
 4th. An Article in the Contemporary Review, for May, 1867, 
 by Mr. J. P. Mahaffy. With reference to his observations, as 
 well as to those of some other critics, I have somewhat ex- 
 panded several passages which deal with the Supernatural, and 
 with the various relations in which miracles have been con- 
 ceived to stand towards the " Reign of Law." I have also, in 
 a special Note (G), replied to a criticism in this paper, referring 
 to the subject of Necessity and Free Will. 
 
 Other Notes have been added in illustration or support of 
 various passages in the text. 
 
 As regards the intention I had at one time entertained of 
 adding a chapter on " Law in Christian Theology," further re- 
 flection has only confirmed me in the feeling that this is a sub- 
 ject which cannot be adequately dealt with in such a form. J 
 
PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION. V 
 
 can only again ask my readers to remember that although some 
 ideas which belong to this subject, or touch it at various points, 
 cannot be, and have not been, avoided, yet the desire and in- 
 tention to postpone it, in so far as it was possible to do so has 
 left blanks which every careful eye must see. 
 
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. 
 
 SOME portions of this work have already appeared at various 
 times in the Edinburgh Review in Good Words and in Addresses 
 to the Royal Society of Edinburgh during the years in which I 
 had the honor of being President of that Body. The deep in- 
 terest of the matter dealt with in those Papers has induced me 
 to expand them, to add new chapters on other aspects of the 
 same subject, and to publish the whole in a connected form. 
 
 Among many other deficiencies which may be observed in 
 this Volume, there is one which demands explanation, lest a 
 serious misunderstanding should arise. I had intended to con- 
 clude with a chapter on " Law in Christian Theology." It was 
 natural to reserve for that chapter all direct reference to some 
 of the most fundamental facts of Human nature. Yet without 
 such reference the Reign of Law, especially in the " Realm of 
 Mind," cannot even be approached in some of its very highest 
 and most important aspects. For the present, however, I have 
 shrunk from entering upon questions so profound, of such crit- 
 ical import, and so inseparably connected with religious con- 
 troversy. In the absence of any attempt to deal with this 
 great branch of the inquiry, as well as in many other ways, I 
 am painfully conscious of the narrow range of this work. I 
 can only offer it as a very small contribution to the discussion 
 of a boundless subject. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 THE SUPERNATURAL 1-33 
 
 The term Supernatural employed in different and contradictory 
 senses The Natural casting out the Supernatural Nature, in 
 its widest sense, to be understood as including all causal agen- 
 cies, especially Man's Mind and Will Man's agency the most 
 Natural of all agencies Man's Mind and Will regarded as be- 
 longing to the Supernatural Relation of Man's agency to the 
 physical laws of Nature " Supernatural " power Is it Power 
 independent of the use of means ? Relation of God to the rules 
 of His Government called " Laws" Mansel's position, that a 
 Miracle is a Superhuman work Gibbon's attempt to account 
 for the spread of Christianity by Natural causes Preservation 
 of the Jews by means employed to effect a Divine Purpose 
 Nothing in Religion incompatible with the belief that all exer- 
 cises of God's power, ordinary and extraordinary, are effected 
 through the instrumentality of means Principal Tulloch's view 
 of Miracles Locke's idea of Miracles The great truth he 
 misses Truths and Difficulties of Religion their type in the 
 course and constitution of Nature Guizot's argument, that 
 Man is the result either of Material forces or Supernatural 
 power The Development hypotheses No distinction in 
 Scripture between Natural and Supernatural " Silent Mem- 
 bers " in animal frames Perception of Correspondences as 
 much a fact as the sight or touch of the things in which they 
 appear Fertilization of Orchids Intention the one thing 
 which Darwin sees Orchids in all their marvellous forms de- 
 veloped out of the archetypal arrangements of Threes within 
 Threes Ideas of Order based on Numerical Relations meet us 
 at every turn in Nature The distinction drawn between the 
 Natural and the Supernatural a distinction artificial, arbitrary, 
 and unreal Belief in the existence of a Personal God essential 
 to all Religion Decay of many Creeds and Confessions 
 through dissociating the doctrines of Christianity from the anal- 
 ogy of Nature. 
 
Vlll CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 LAW: ITS DEFINITIONS , 34-75 
 
 Reign of Law in the world around us and within us Importance of 
 looking sharply on Forms of Words professing to represent 
 scientific truths Religion and Science closely connected The 
 Instinct which seeks for harmony in the truths of Science and 
 the truths of Religion a higher Instinct than the disposition 
 which pretends there is no relation between them The idea 
 that Prayer to God is only a good way of preaching to our- 
 selves Essence of the belief in Prayer, that the Divine Mind 
 is accessible to supplication, and the Divine Will capable of 
 being moved thereby Law, human and Divine, the authorita- 
 tive expression of Will enforced by Power The FIVE differ- 
 ent Senses in which Law is habitually used : First, as applied 
 to an observed Order of Facts Secondly, to that Order, as in- 
 volving the action of some Force, or Forces, of which nothing 
 more maybe known Thirdly, as applied to individual Forces, 
 the measure of whose operation has been more or less defined 
 Fourthly, as applied to those Combinations of Force which 
 .have reference to the fulfilment of Purpose, or the discharge of 
 Function Fifthly, as applied to Abstract Conceptions of the 
 Mind These great leading significations circle round the 
 Three great questions Science asks of Nature the What, the 
 How, and the Why The Three Laws of Kepler the simplest 
 illustration of Law applied in the First Sense An Observed 
 Order of Facts can only arise out of the action of some com- 
 pelling Force Law of Gravitation the great example of Law 
 in the Third Sense The " Verifiable Element "Laws in the 
 first three senses explain nothing, save that the order of sub- 
 ordinate phenomena is due to Force Law of Gravitation the 
 best example of what Law is, and what it is not Languages 
 grow according to rules of which the men who speak them are 
 unconscious What happens around us in Nature the result of 
 /different and opposing Forces nicely balanced Principle of 
 Adjustment as the instrument and result of Purpose always 
 reached at last in the course of every physical inquiry Law 
 in the highest Sense Combination for the accomplishment of 
 Purpose Some Philosophers say the question " Why ? " should 
 never be asked The facts of Adjustment and of Function 
 constitute not Final but Immediate Purpose The Function of 
 an organ is its Purpose Doctrine of Contrivance and Adjust- 
 ment not so metaphysical as the doctrine of Homologies 
 Impossible in describing physical phenomena to avoid phrase- 
 ology moulded on our own conscious Personality and Will 
 Ultimate fact of Astronomical Science not the Law of Gravi- 
 
CONTENTS. IX 
 
 PAGE 
 
 tation, but the Adjustment between that Law and others less 
 known Revolution of the Seasons depend on a multitude of 
 Laws, Astronomical, Chemical, Electrical, Geological, etc. 
 Chemical Science rich in illustration of Forces in mutual Ad- 
 justment " Theine " and " Strychnine " differ from each other 
 only in the proportions in which they are combined How our 
 Wills exercise a large and increasing power over the Material 
 World Laws of Nature immutable only in one Sense Laws 
 of Nature employed in the System of Nature in a manner pre- 
 cisely analogous to that in which we employ them Examples 
 furnished in the Shells of Barnacles and in the Menai Bridge 
 Purpose never attained in Nature save by the enlistment of 
 Laws as instruments Battery of the Torpedo compared with 
 Man's Electric Battery The Ptirpose what we know in the Bat- 
 tery of the Electric Fish We forget that Man's works, no less 
 than Nature's are done through the means of Law Fifth mean- 
 ing of Law the designation of some purely Abstract Idea, as, 
 for instance, the First Law of Motion in Mechanics This Law 
 never operates in itself, but is complicated with other Laws, 
 producing a corresponding complication in result Suggestions 
 of Materialism lie thickest to the eye on the surface of things 
 rather than below it Physical Science cannot do more than 
 widen the foundation of intelligent Spiritual beliefs The 
 modern idea of Law known instinctively to Man since first he 
 made a Tool and used it as the Instrument of Purpose Two 
 great enemies to Materialism ; one rooted in the Affections, 
 the other in the Intellect Transcendental character of the re- 
 sults of Physical research All Nature's realities are in the re- 
 gion of the Invisible Life, according to Huxley and Carpen- 
 ter, the Cause of Organization Material Force, a force which 
 acts on Matter Our Conceptions of Force traced to their foun- 
 tain-head Force of Gravitation regarded by Herschel as " the 
 direct, or indirect, result of a Consciousness, or a Will, existing ' 
 somewhere " The idea of a Personal Will apart from the 
 Forces which work in Nature, is said by some men to be a 
 mere Projection of our own Personality into the world beyond 
 A Watch the abode of a " Watch-force " The greatest mys- 
 tery of all the analogy between Man's works and the Crea- 
 tor's. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY ARISING OUT OF THE REIGN 
 
 OF LAW 76-102 
 
 Necessity of Contrivance for the accomplishment of Purpose 
 Contrivance in the Navigation of the Air "The Way of an 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Eagle in the Air " Force of Gravitation the principal Force in 
 flight Resisting Force of the Atmosphere the next Law ap- 
 pealed to Elasticity and reacting Force of the Air another 
 Law Great Force of a downward Blow from a Bird's Wing 
 Convex and Concave Surfaces required in Wings The 
 Feathers must underlap each other How the power of for- 
 ward Motion is given to Birds This Theory of Flight may be 
 tested by the eye Experiment with a Heron's stretched Wing 
 Why no Bird can fly backwards The heavier a Bird the 
 greater its possible velocity Erroneous notion of Birds having 
 Air-cells for the inhalation and stowage of heated Air What 
 Forces the movements of flying animals are governed by 
 Birds whose Wing is adapted for diving and flight Wings 
 rather long than broad in Birds of great powers of flight A 
 long Wing nothing but a long Lever Description of the Al- 
 batross sailing or wheeling round a ship Sharp-pointed 
 Wings also possessed by such Birds What sharpness, or 
 roundness, of Wing depends on On what the propelling 
 power of a Bird's Wing depends How Birds can remain sta- 
 tionary in the Air Use of the Tail in Birds How Birds turn 
 in flight Humming Birds the most remarkable examples of 
 the machinery of flight Adjustments to Purpose in a Wing- 
 feather Why Man has failed in Air Navigation. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 APPARENT EXCEPTIONS TO THE SUPREMACY OF PUR- 
 POSE 103-123 
 
 Structures of which we cannot see the use Mr. Darwin's curious 
 mistake about Green Woodpeckers Adapted coloring in 
 Nature for purposes of Concealment Only employed under 
 certain conditions The Green Woodpecker does not come 
 under these conditions Strongly contrasted coloring in Wood- 
 peckers Birds amongst whom the assimilated coloring pre- 
 vails Purpose of Concealment in the Woodcock's plumage 
 In the Snipe Insects in which imitation, with a view to Con- 
 cealment, extends to Color, Form, and Structure Beauty in 
 Nature a Purpose, an Object, and an End Ornament as much 
 an End in the Workshop of Nature as in the Jeweller's Work- 
 shop Instance in Nature where Ornament takes the Form of 
 Pictorial Representation In many Animal structures, perhaps 
 in all save one, there are parts the presence of which cannot 
 be explained Those aborted limbs parts of a universal Plan 
 A Plan of this kind itself a purpose African Notion that the 
 Ostrich's toes correspond to Man's thumb and forefinger 
 
CONTENTS. XI 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Aborted Wings of the Ostrich really correspond to the Fingers 
 in Man Homology in Structure and Analogy in Use Origi- 
 nal conception of the framework of Organic Life has its last 
 development in Man In Nature, Use must be interpreted as 
 including Actual Use, Potential Use, and Ornament. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 CREATION BY LAW 124-162 
 
 Law, according to Physiology, is never absent as a Servant A like 
 Order in the existing World, and in the past History of Crea- 
 tion Gradual modification of Type in Animals No knowl- 
 edge of the Forces to which the phenomena of Life can be 
 traced Development Theory in its earlier forms Conse- 
 quences of hiding our Ignorance of the causes of Phenomena 
 by declaring them the result of Law Darwin does not profess 
 to trace the Origin of New Forms to any definite Law Dar- 
 win's Theory not a Theory on " The Origin of Species " His 
 Theory incurs the risk of being self-condemned Humming 
 Birds as exhibiting Mysteries of Creation Absolute Distinct- 
 iveness from all other Families of Birds Bond that unites all 
 the forms of this Family " Centres of Creation " as regards 
 Humming Birds Differences generic and specific between 
 Humming Birds Plan in which mere Variety has been an aim 
 No connection between the Humming Bird's splendor and 
 any Function essential to life " Coquette " Humming Birds 
 Curious example in Humming Birds of Variety for Ornament's 
 sake Mere Beauty and mere Variety for their own sake 
 "Natural Selection" does not account for the origin and 
 spread of Humming Birds Each new Variety must be born 
 Male and Female Possibility of new Births being the means 
 of introducing new Species Principle of " Natural Selection " 
 has no bearing on the " Origin of Species " " Correlation of 
 Growth " Correlation of Growth in the Inorganic world 
 Correlation of Growth having reference to Mental Purposes 
 Mr. Darwin has not pointed out clearly the distinction between 
 these two kinds of Correlation Wonders of Correlation re- 
 vealed by Disease and Malformation, etc. Correlation between 
 the internal Structure of the Teeth in Animals and the Struct- 
 ure of distant portions of their frame One Force directs the 
 Form and Structure of every Organism No conception of any 
 Force emanating from external things, and moulding the Struct- 
 ture of an Organism in harmony with themselves Forces of 
 Organic Growth worked under rules of close Adjustment to ex- 
 ternal conditions, Examples of this in Ducks, Gulls, and 
 
PAGE 
 
 Xll CONTENTS. 
 
 Divers More correlated Correlations. Wing-feathers and 
 Auricular-feathers in Birds New Species can be created only 
 by a Creative Will giving to Organic Forces a foreseen direc- 
 tion Scientific men, in seeking expression for ultimate ideas 
 arrived at by physical research, are forced to borrow the lan- 
 guage of mechanical invention Mr. Darwin presenting under 
 one phase two Ideas radically distinct " Adherence to Type " 
 and " Correlation of Growth " not in the nature of Physical 
 Causes but of Mental Purposes Correlation of Growth, in the 
 sense of external adaptations, the most general of Nature's 
 Laws The only senses in which we get a glimpse of Creation 
 by Law No reason why Inheritance should produce Organ- 
 isms unlike, or only very partially like, each other Affinities 
 and Differences between Man and the Lower Animals The- 
 ory of Creation by Birth clashes with the Theory of " Natural 
 Selection " No fictions in Nature, and no bad jokes Some 
 essential Resemblances between all forms of Life The two 
 Theories of Man's Origin We see the Purpose, not the Method 
 All ultimate Truth beyond the reach of Science The Reign 
 of Law the reign of Creative Force, directed by Creative 
 Knowledge, worked under the control of Creative Power, and 
 in fulfilment of Creative Purpose. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 THE REIGN OF LAW IN THE REALM OF MIND 163-192 
 
 Phenomena of Mind under the Reign of Law One Force in Na- 
 ture the Source and Centre of all the rest, and all governed by 
 Principles of Arrangement purely Mental ; we know nothing 
 directly of the ultimate Seat of Force in any form ; the nearest 
 conception we can have of it is derived from our consciousness 
 of Vital Power If these conclusions be true, it need not sur- 
 prise us to see that Law, in the same Sense, prevails in the 
 phenomena both of the Material world and of the world of 
 Mind The Mind not conscious of its dependence on Material 
 Organs No Series of Facts more complete and conclusive 
 than the chain connecting the functions of the Brain with the 
 phenomena of Mind Thought not to be confounded with 
 Brain Phrenology mere Confusion of Thought Physiology 
 can never be the basis of Psychology Connection between 
 Mind and Brain a Law only in the Sense of Law as applied to 
 "an Observed Order of Facts" Severe Thinking attended 
 with expenditure of Force Difficulties from misconception of 
 what Matter is and the Forces we call Material Large class 
 of phenomena connected with Mind, of which Consciousness 
 
CONTENTS. Xlll 
 
 PAGE 
 
 does not inform us Men often impelled by Motives they are 
 unconscious of How we can detect the action of Forces 
 which have told upon our Minds Origin of Ideas ; how far 
 due to Experience or to Intuition Muscular Contractions of 
 two kinds Almost certain that the Mind has automatic facul- 
 ties and others which work independently by Experience In- 
 tuitive Power of numerical Computation In discussing the 
 Origin of Ideas, there is great want of Definition in the use of 
 terms An Idea is as it were an organic Growth : its Materials 
 from the external world, its Structure from within Intuition 
 in the Young of the Lower Animals, when removed from their 
 Parents In Birds, which have comparatively no Infancy In- 
 heritance of Physical and Mental qualities Orderly progress 
 of Events in the history of Nations The aggregate of Motives, 
 or Forces, which move the Mind, may be called the Laws 
 which determine Human Action and Opinions The Lower 
 Animals moved by fewer Motives than Men, and Savages by 
 fewer Motives than civilized Men Difficulty of predicting Con- 
 duct proportional to the number and kind of Motives Secret 
 of the boundless Difference between Man and the highest An- 
 imals below htm Man never free from relations pre-estab- 
 lished between the Structure of his Mind and the System of 
 Things in which it is formed to move Real Progress on the 
 question of Necessity and Free Will Still clearer Definitions 
 needed Perfect Knowledge must be perfect Twr-knowledge 
 " Spiritual Antecedents " Reconcilement of Freedom of Will 
 with the idea of Causation Mr. Mill's contradictory positions 
 as to the Interference of Will Comte on " Changeable Will " 
 Stability of Character inseparably connected with a variable 
 Will An " Arbitrary " or a " Capricious " Will To operate 
 on Human Character we must place it under favorable outward 
 Conditions. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 LAW IN POLITICS 193-232 
 
 Direct appeals to the Reason, or the Feelings, of men, useless 
 when those faculties have not been placed under favorable 
 Conditions How far these Conditions are Subject to the Con- 
 trol of Will through the Use of Means The Collective Will 
 of Society operates on the Conduct of its members in two 
 Ways by Authority, and by altering Conditions True Con- 
 ception of Natural Law founded on the Progress of Physical 
 Investigation Plato's odious Conception of Human Society 
 Aristotle occasionally and almost unconsciously resorts to true 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 methods of Scientific Reasoning Why he missed the great 
 Secret of modern Political Science Necessity of groping 
 among little and common things a hard lesson for the Intellect 
 Forces in Human Nature so constant that they affect the 
 great majority of men How these are to be controlled The 
 word " Natural " Laws founded on a right exercise of Reason 
 are Natural Laws in the best and highest sense The most dif- 
 ficult Problem in the Science of Government Two great recent 
 Discoveries in this Country in the Science of Government The 
 one great Error of Ancient Systems of Political Philosophy 
 How opposite the doctrine of modern Politicians Law of Spain, 
 prohibiting Gold from leaving the country Essential idea of the 
 Old Commercial Policy Of the New Adam Smith's Denunci- 
 ation of Laws restricting free Interchange in the Products of La- 
 bor and in the free Employment of Labor itself Connection of 
 the work of James Watt and Adam Smith Watt's reduction 
 to obedience of one of the most tremendous Forces of Nature 
 How Adam Smith's work was harder than James Watt's 
 Watt's history a signal illustration of the P'ollies of Restriction 
 Order of Progress in Mankind Long Ages of comparative 
 Silence and Inaction brought to an end by shorter Periods of 
 almost preternatural Activity. Illustrations Statute of Ap- 
 prenticeship in the time of Adam Smith Spinning and Weav- 
 ing in 1760 How the Survivance of the Ancient domestic In- 
 dustries became no longer possible Beginning of the Factory 
 System System of Apprenticeship in the earlier Mills Phys- 
 ical Degeneracy, Mental Ignorance, and Moral Corruption in 
 the Factories The first Factory Act, introduced by the elder 
 Sir Robert Peel Abandonment of the Apprenticeship System 
 Exhausting and demoralizing Labor in Factories by Children 
 The great Parliamentary Debate : How far it is wise or legiti- 
 mate to interfere for Moral ends with the Freedom of the Indi- 
 vidual Will In what Sense the Children's Labor was " free " 
 and was " not free "Arguments, founded on the Constancy of 
 Natural Laws, against Legislative Interference with the "free- 
 dom " of Individual Will The supporters of Restriction them- 
 selves ignorant of the fundamental Principles at issue The 
 true doctrine of Necessity exemplified in the Conduct of Em- 
 ployers and Employed Antagonism between Natural Law 
 and Human Law Results to be attained only by the higher 
 Faculties of our Nature imposing their Will in authoritative Ex- 
 pressions of Human Law The Factory Acts the first Legisla- 
 tive Recognition of a great Natural Law Double Movement 
 in Legislation since the First Factory Act Principle on which 
 the great counter-movement depends Progress in Political 
 Science nowhere happier than in Factory Legislation Exam- 
 ple how External Conditions and Mental Character can be af- 
 
CONTENTS, XV 
 
 
 
 PAGE 
 
 fected powerfully by positive Institution Adjustment in the 
 Realm of Mind by setting one Motive to counteract another 
 How new Motives may be evoked The Spirit of Association 
 a Force in the Realm of Mind - The Law of Competition 
 Good effected by Combination a higher Good than that result . 
 ing from Factory Legislation Combination, an Appeal to the 
 Law of Contrivance ; the Power of Adjustment Sources of 
 Error which pervert the Aims of voluntary Association His- 
 tory of Combination among the Working Classes until lately a 
 sad history of Misdirected Effort Difficulties of our time to 
 be met by unshaken Faith in great Natural Laws and in the 
 free Agency of Man to secure by appropriate means the work- 
 ing of those Laws for good The Law of Inequality not to be 
 violated with impunity Substantial economic Advantage se- 
 cured wherever the Hours of Labor are reduced without a cor- 
 responding Reduction in Wages The very attempt of the 
 Working Classes to govern through Combination their own 
 Affairs is an Education in itself Nature a great Armory of 
 Weapons and Implements for the service and use of Will As 
 regards the great Science of Politics, men still, as it were, only 
 at the break of day We look on the Facts of Nature and 
 Human Life through the dulled eyes of Custom and Tradi- 
 tional Opinion Natural Openness and Simplicity of Mind 
 characteristic of the individual men who have exerted the most 
 powerful Influence for good on Society Power of the Agen- 
 cies which the whole Constitution and Course of things offers 
 to Knowledge and Contrivance Instinct on her own narrow 
 path a surer Guide than Reason Some Causes no longer in 
 existence which produced the Overthrow of the great historical 
 Nations of Antiquity Memorable Examples, in the last and 
 present generations, of the Reign of Law over the course of 
 Political Events Modern Civilization presents the phenomena 
 of Development and Growth The most certain of all the 
 Laws of Man's Nature This the Law to which Christianity 
 appeals An immense satisfaction to know that the Result of 
 Logical Analysis but confirms the Testimony of Consciousness, 
 and runs parallel with the Primeval Traditions of Belief Our 
 Freedom a Reality not a Name Laws of Nature come visi- 
 bly from One pervading Mind Their Purposes best fulfilled 
 when made the Instruments of intelligent Will and the Ser- 
 vants of enlightened Conscience. 
 
 NOTES 233.248 
 
 INDEX 249-265 
 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 The Swift .facing 88 
 
 Wing of Gannet 92 
 
 Wing of Golden Plover 94 
 
 Sparrow-Hawk Merlin Kestrel Hovering 96 
 
THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE SUPERNATURAL. 
 
 THE Supernatural what is it ? What do we mean by it ? 
 How do we define it ? M. Guizot * tells us that belief in it is 
 the special difficulty of our time that denial of it is the form 
 taken by all modern assaults on Christian faith ; and again, 
 that acceptance of it lies at the root, not only of Christianity, 
 but of all positive religion whatever. These questions, then, 
 concerning the Supernatural, are questions of first importance. 
 Yet we find them seldom distinctly put, and still more seldom 
 distinctly answered. This is a capital error in dealing with 
 any question of philosophy. Half the perplexities of men are 
 traceable to obscurity of thought hiding and breeding under 
 obscurity of language. " The Supernatural " is a term em- 
 ployed often in different, and sometimes in contradictory, senses. 
 It is difficult to make out whether M. Guizot himself means to 
 identify belief in the Supernatural with belief in the existence 
 of a God, or with belief in a particular mode of Divine action. 
 But these are ideas quite separable and distinct. There may 
 be some men who disbelieve in the Supernatural only because 
 they are absolute atheists; but it is certain that there are 
 others who have great difficulty in believing in the Supernat- 
 ural, who are not atheists. What they doubt or deny is, not 
 that God exists, but that He ever acts, or perhaps can act, 
 unless in and through what they call the " Laws of Nature." 
 M. Guizot, indeed, tells us that " God is the Supernatural in a 
 
 * " L'Eglise et la Societe Chretienne en 1861," ch. iv. p. 19. 
 
2 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 Person." But this is a rhetorical figure rather than a defini- 
 tion. He may, indeed, contend that it is inconsistent to be- 
 lieve in a God, and yet to disbelieve in the Supernatural ; but 
 he must admit, and indeed does admit, that such inconsistency 
 is found in fact. 
 
 Theological and philosophical writers frequently use the Su- 
 pernatural as synonymous with the Superhuman. But of course 
 this is not the sense in which any one can have any difficulty 
 in believing in it. The powers and works of Nature are all 
 superhuman more than Man can account for in their origin 
 more than he can resist in their energy more than he can un- 
 derstand in their effects. This, then, cannot be the sense in 
 which so many minds find it hard to accept the Supernatural , 
 nor can it be the sense in which others cling to it as of the 
 very essence of their religious faith. What, then, is that other 
 .sense in which the difficulty arises ? Perhaps we shall best find 
 it by seeking the idea which is competing with it, and by which 
 it has been displaced. It is the Natural which has been cast- 
 ing out the Supernatural the idea of Natural Law, the uni- 
 versal reign of a fixed Order of things. This idea is a product 
 of that immense development of the physical sciences which 
 is characteristic of our time. We cannot read a periodical, or 
 go into a lecture-room, without hearing it expressed. Some- 
 times, but rarely, it is stated with accuracy, and with due recog- 
 nition of the limits within which Law can be said to compre- 
 hend the phenomena of the world. But generally it is ex- 
 pressed in language vague and hollow, covering inaccurate 
 conceptions, and confounding under common forms of expres- 
 sion ideas which are essentially distinct. The mere ticketing 
 and orderly assortment of external facts is constantly spoken 
 of as if it were in the nature of Explanation, and as if no highei 
 truth in respect to natural phenomena were to be attained ot 
 desired.* And herein we see both the result for which Bacor* 
 labored, and the danger against which Bacon prayed. It has 
 
 * Those wh(? have followed the course of recent speculation will recognize this 
 sentence as intended to describe the characteristic principle of the Positive Philosophy. 
 I am glad to observe that so competent a judge as Mr. George H. Lewes says of it : 
 " Although not, perhaps, the most dignified or explicit statement of the Positive 
 point of view, this may be accepted as essentially correct." Fortnightly Review , 
 July, 1867. 
 
THE SUPERNATURAL. 
 
 been a glorious result of a right method in the study of Nature, 
 that with the increase of knowledge the " human family has 
 been endowed with new mercies." But every now and then, 
 for a time at least, from "the unlocking of the gates of sense, 
 and the kindling of a greater natural light, incredulity and in- 
 tellectual night have arisen in our minds."* 
 
 But let us observe exactly where and how the difficulty arises. 
 The Reign of Law in Nature is, indeed, so far as we can ob- 
 serve it, universal. But the common idea of the Supernatural 
 is that which is at variance with Natural Law, above it, or in 
 violation of it. Nothing, however wonderful, which happens 
 according to Natural Law, would be considered by any one as 
 Supernatural. The law in obedience to which a wonderful 
 thing happens may not be known ; but this would not give it a 
 supernatural character, so long as we assuredly believe that it 
 did happen according to some law. Hence, it would appear to 
 follow that a man thoroughly possessed of the idea of Natural 
 Law as universal, never could admit anything to be supernat- 
 ural ; because on seeing any fact, however new, marvellous, or 
 incomprehensible, he would escape into the conclusion that it 
 was the result of some natural Law of which he had before 
 been ignorant. No one will deny that, in respect to the vast 
 majority of all new and marvellous phenomena, this would be 
 the true and reasonable conclusion. It is not the conclusion 
 of pride, but of humility of mind. Seeing the boundless ex- 
 tent of our ignorance of the natural laws which regulate so 
 many of the phenomena around us, and still more of so many 
 of the phenomena within us, nothing can be more reasonable 
 than to conclude, when we see something which is to us a won- 
 der, that somehow, if we only knew how, it is " all right " 
 all according to the constitution and course of Nature. But 
 then, to justify this conclusion, we must understand Nature 
 in the largest sense, as including all that is 
 
 " In the round ocean, and the living air 
 And the blue sky, and in the mind of man" 
 
 " Tintern Abbey." WORDSWORTH. 
 
 * " This also we humbly beg, that human things may not prejudice such as are 
 Divine, neither that from the unlocking of the gates of sense, and the kindling of a 
 greater natural light, anything of incredulity or intellectual night may arise in our 
 minds towards Divine mysteries." " The Student's Prayer." Bacon's Works. 
 
4 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 We must understand it as including every agency which we see 
 entering, or can conceive from analogy as capable of entering, 
 into the causation of the world. First and foremost among 
 these is the agency of our own Mind and Will. Yet, strange 
 to say, all reference to this agency is often tacitly excluded 
 when we speak of the laws of Nature. One of our most dis- 
 tinguished living teachers of physical science, Prof. Tyndall, 
 began, not long ago, a course of lectures on the phenomena of 
 Heat by a rapid statement of the modern doctrine of the Cor- 
 relation of Forces how the one was convertible into the other 
 how one arose out of the other how none could be evolved 
 except from some other as a pre-existing source. "Thus," 
 said the lecturer, " we see there is no such thing as sponta- 
 neousness in Nature." What ! not in the lecturer himself ? 
 Was there no " spontaneousness " in his choice of words 
 in his selection of materials in his orderly arrangement 
 of experiments with a view to the exhibition of particular 
 results ? It is not probable that the lecturer was intending to 
 deny this ; it simply was that he did not think of it as within 
 his field of view. His own Mind and Will were then dealing 
 with the " laws of Nature," but they did not occur to him as 
 forming part of those laws, or, in the same sense, as subject 
 to them. 
 
 Does Man, then, not belong to Nature ? Is he above it or 
 merely separate from it, or a violation of it ? Is he supernat- 
 ural ? If so, has he any difficulty in believing in himself ? Of 
 course not. Self-consciousness is the one truth, in the light of 
 which all other truths are known. Cogito, ergo sum, or volo, 
 ergo sum this is the one conclusion which we cannot doubt, 
 unless Reason disbelieves herself. Why, then, are the facul- 
 ties of the human mind and body not habitually included 
 among the " laws of Nature ? " Because a fallacy is getting 
 hold upon us from a want of definition in the use of terms. 
 "Nature" is being used in the narrow sense of physical nature. 
 It is conceived as containing nothing beyond the properties of 
 Matter. Thus the whole mental world in which we ourselves 
 live, and move, and have our being, is excluded from it. But 
 these selves of ours do belong to Nature. At all events if we 
 are ever to understand the difficulties in the way of believing 
 
THE SUPERNATURAL. 5 
 
 in the Supernatural, we must first keep clearly in view what we 
 intend to understand as included in the Natural. Let us never 
 forget, then, that the agency of Man is of all others the most 
 natural the one with which we are most familiar the only 
 one, in fact, which we can be said, even in any measure, to 
 understand. When any wonderful event can be referred to 
 the contrivance or ingenuity of Man, it is thereby at once re- 
 moved from the sphere of the Supernatural, as ordinarily un- 
 derstood. 
 
 It must be remembered, however, that we are now only 
 seeking a clear definition of terms ? and that provided this 
 other meaning be clearly agreed upon, the Mind and Will of 
 Man may be considered as separate from " nature," and be- 
 longing to the Supernatural. This view is taken in an able 
 treatise on " Nature and the Supernatural," by Dr. Bushnell, 
 an American clergyman.* Dr, Bushnell says: "That is su- 
 pernatural, whatever it be, that is either not in the chain of 
 natural cause and effect, or which acts on the chain of cause 
 and effect in nature, from without the chain,," Again : " If 
 the processes, combinations, and results of our system of 
 nature are interrupted or varied by the action, whether of God, 
 or angels, or men, so as to bring to pass what would not come 
 to pass in it by its own internal action, under the laws of mere 
 cause and effect, such variations are in like manner super- 
 natural." There is no other objection to this definition of the 
 Supernatural, than that it rests upon a limitation of the terms 
 " Nature " and " natural," which is very much at variance with 
 the sense in which they are commonly understood. There is, 
 indeed, a distinction which finds its expression in common lan- 
 guage between the works of Man and the works of Nature, A 
 honeycomb, for example, would be called a work of Nature, 
 but- a steam-engine would not. This distinction is founded on 
 a true perception of the fact that the Mind and Will of Man 
 belong to an order of existence very different from physical 
 laws, and very different also from the fixed and narrow in- 
 stincts of the lower animals. It is a distinction bearing wit- 
 ness to the universal consciousness that the Mind of Man has 
 
 * ' Nature and the Supernatural, as together constituting the one System of God." 
 By Horace Bushnell, D.D. Edinburgh, 1860, 
 
6 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 within it something of a truly creative energy and force that 
 we are in a sense " fellow-workers with God," and have been 
 in a measure " made partakers of the Divine nature." Never- 
 theless, it would be using the word in a sense very different 
 from that in which it is generally accepted, were we to call the 
 steam-engine a supernatural work. Yet it does answer strictly 
 to the definition of Dr. Bushnell in being " the result of natural 
 Law varied by the action of men/' It is made by " acting on 
 the chain of cause and effect in nature from without the chain." 
 But then, be it observed, that under the same definition all the 
 contrivances of Nature become Supernatural the moment they 
 are conceived as the work of a Mind using what we call the 
 elements of nature for the accomplishment of its designs. If, 
 for example, it is open to us to conceive that such a creature 
 as a Bee cannot have been made out of those elements " by 
 their own internal action," then we must regard both this 
 creature and the wonderful products of its instinct as belong- 
 ing to the Supernatural The honeycomb and the steam- 
 engine would thus come under the same category with this 
 only difference, that the mind which made the steam-engine, 
 being connected with a Body, is visibly known to us, whereas 
 the Mind which made the Bee is withdrawn from sight But 
 both can be equally regarded as the result of Mind "acting on 
 the chain of cause and effect from without the chain," Nor 
 can we stop here. The same process of analysis will carry us 
 farther in the same direction. We often speak, as Dr. Bush- 
 nell does here, of the elementary forces of Nature as " acting " 
 by themselves. But there is no other meaning in these words 
 than an expression of the fact that we neither see nor under- 
 stand the connection of those elementary forces and Mind. 
 But this ignorance of ours affords no manner of presumption 
 that such connection does not exist. On the contrary, though 
 the manner of that connection be unknown, it is much more 
 conceivable to us that some connection does exist than that it 
 does not If therefore the distinction between the Natural 
 and the Supernatural be the distinction between that which is 
 and that which is not the work of Mind, then it becomes a 
 purely arbitrary distinction. It assumes that we can distin- 
 guish between cases in which the properties of matter work 
 
THE SUPERNATURAL. J 
 
 under the direction of Mind, and other cases in which they 
 work " of themselves." But this is a line which we draw for 
 ourselves. There is no reason to suppose that it has any 
 reality in the constitution of things. It is not in those things, 
 but in the point of view from which we regard them, that the 
 distinction lies. We have only to change that point of view, 
 and the distinction vanishes. All Nature becomes Super- 
 natural, because all her elements, both in themselves and in 
 their combinations, are only conceivable as first established, 
 and then employed by the powers of Mind. 
 
 But if this definition of the Supernatural displeases us, as 
 tending to confound distinctions which we had thought were 
 clear, let us take another definition. Let us take the Natural 
 in that larger and wider sense, in which it contains within it 
 the whole phenomena of Man's intellectual and spiritual na- 
 ture, as part, and the most familiar of all parts of the visible 
 system of things. This is a definition more consonant with com- 
 mon language. In all ordinary senses of the term, Man and his 
 doings belong to the Natural, as distinguished from the Super- 
 natural. 
 
 We are now from another point of view coming nearer to 
 some precise understanding of what the Supernatural may be 
 supposed to mean. But before we proceed, there is another 
 question which must be answered What is the relation in which 
 the agency of Man stands to the physical laws of Nature ? The 
 answer, in part at least, is plain. His power in respect to 
 those laws extends only, first to their discovery and ascertain- 
 ment, and then to their use. He can establish none : he can 
 suspend none. All he can do is to guide, in a limited degree, 
 the mutual action and reaction of the laws amongst each other.. 
 They are the tools with which he works they are the instru- 
 ments of his Will. In all he does or can do he must employ 
 them. His ability to use them is limited both by his want of 
 knowledge and by his want of power. The more he knows of 
 them, the more largely he can employ them, and make them 
 ministers of his purposes. This, as a general rule, is true ; but 
 it is subject to the second limitation just pointed out. Our 
 power over Nature does not necessarily keep pace with our 
 knowledge of her Laws. Man already knows far more than he 
 
8 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 has power to convert to use. It is a true observation of Sir 
 George Lewis,* that Astronomy, for example, in its higher 
 branches, has an interest almost purely scientific. It reveals 
 to our knowledge perhaps the grandest and most sublime of 
 the physical laws of Nature. But a much smaller amount 
 of knowledge would suffice for the only practical applications 
 which we have yet been able to make of these laws to our own 
 use. Still, that knowledge has a reflex influence on our knowl. 
 edge of ourselves, of our powers; and of the relations which 
 subsist between the constitution of our own minds and the con- 
 stitution of the universe. And in other spheres of inquiry, ad- 
 vancing knowledge of physical laws has been constantly accom- 
 panied with advancing power over the physical world. It has 
 enabled us to do a thousand things, any one of which, a few 
 generations ago, would have been considered supernatural. 
 Nor can it be said that this judgment of their character would 
 have been erroneous, These things would have been superhu- 
 man then, though they are not superhuman now. The same 
 lecturer who told his audience that there was nothing sponta- 
 neous in Nature proceeded, by virtue of his own knowledge of 
 natural laws, and by his selecting and combining power, to pre- 
 sent a whole series of phenomena such as ice frozen in contact 
 with red-hot crucibles which certainly did not belong to the 
 " ordinary course of Nature." Such an exhibition a few cent- 
 uries ago would, beyond all doubt, have subjected the lecturer 
 on Heat to painful experience of that condition of matter. 
 Nevertheless the phenomena so exhibited were natural phenom- 
 ena in this sense, that they were the product of natural laws. 
 Only these laws were combined in action under extraordinary 
 conditions, and -these conditions were governed by the purpose 
 and design of the lecturer, which design was " spontaneous," 
 if there is any meaning in the word. In like manner, if the 
 progress of discovery is as rapid during the next four hundred 
 years as it has been during the last period of the same extent, 
 men will be able to do many things which would now appear 
 to be " supernatural." There is no difficulty in conceiving how 
 a complete knowledge of all natural laws would give, if not 
 complete power, at least degrees of power, immensely greater 
 
 * " Astronomy of the Ancients," p. 25;. 
 
THE SUPERNATURAL. 9 
 
 than those which we now possess. Power of this kind, then, 
 however great in degree, clearly does not answer that idea of 
 the Supernatural which so many reject as inconceivable. What, 
 then, is that idea ? Have we not traced it to its den at last ? 
 By *' supernatural " power, do we not mean power independent 
 of the use of means, as distinguished from power depending 
 on knowledge even infinite knowledge of the means proper 
 to be employed ? 
 
 This is the sense probably the only sense in which the 
 Supernatural is, to many minds, so difficult of belief. No man 
 can have any difficulty in believing that there are natural laws 
 of which he is ignorant ; nor in conceiving that there may be 
 Beings who do know them, and can use them, even as he him- 
 self now uses the few laws with which he is acquainted. The 
 real difficulty lies in the idea of Will exercised without the use 
 of means not in the idea of Will exercised through means 
 which are beyond our knowledge, or beyond our reach. 
 
 Now, have we any right to say that belief in this is essential 
 to all Religion ? If we have not, then, it is only putting, as so 
 many other hasty sayings do put, additional difficulties in the 
 way of Religion. The relation in which God stands to those 
 rules of His government which are called " laws,." is, of course, 
 an inscrutable mystery to us. But the very idea of a Creator 
 involves the idea not merely of a Being by whom the proper- 
 ties of Matter are employed, but of a Being from whose Will 
 the properties of Matter are derived. This, indeed, is the 
 proper work of Creation, as nearly as we can form a concep- 
 tion of it. It is true that in forming this conception we pass 
 beyond the bounds of our own experience, because " we pass 
 from that in God of which there is an image in Man, to that 
 which is distinctive of God as God." But this we must do in 
 forming any idea of a God at all. We must conceive the Crea- 
 tor as first giving existence to the means, and then using them 
 for the accomplishment of ends. " We cannot conceive of the 
 original relation of this Universe to God as that of an infinite 
 multitude of laws to an infinite Mind, having (only) perfect 
 knowledge of them, and using this knowledge in turning them 
 to account, in accomplishing designs of infinite wisdom. We 
 cannot conceive of infinite wisdom thus, as it were, finding in* 
 
JO THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 finite resources already existing." * All this is true. But those 
 who believe that God's Will does govern the world, must be- 
 lieve that ordinarily, at least, He does govern it by the choice 
 and use of means, which means were again pre-established by 
 Himself. Nor have we any certain reason to believe that He 
 ever acts otherwise. Extraordinary manifestations of His Will 
 signs and wonders may be wrought, for aught we know, by 
 similar instrumentality only by the selection and use of laws 
 of which Man knows and can know nothing, and which, if he 
 did know, he could not employ.t 
 
 Here, then, we come upon the question of miracles how we 
 understand them ? what we would define them to be ? The 
 common idea of a miracle is, a suspension or violation of the laws 
 of Nature. This is a definition which places the essence of a 
 miracle in a particular method of operation. But there is 
 another definition which passes over the question of method 
 altogether, and dwells only on the agency by which, and the 
 purpose for which, a wonderful work is wrought. " We would 
 confine the word miracle," says Dr. M'Cosh,$ "to those events 
 which were wrought" in our world as a sign or proof of God 
 making a supernatural interposition, or a revelation to Man." 
 The two most essential conditions in this view of a miracle, are 
 that it is a work wrought by a Divine power for a Divine purpose, 
 and is of a nature such as could not be wrought by merely 
 human contrivance. This definition of a miracle does not neces- 
 sarily exclude the idea of God working by the use of means, pro- 
 vided they are such means as are out of human reach. Indeed, 
 
 * I am glad to be able to quote these passages from one of my earliest and most 
 valued friends, the Rev. J. McLeod Campbell. They occur in an Introduction to a 
 new edition of his work on the " Nature of the Atonement " (Macmillan and Co., 1867) 
 an Introduction marked by characteristic depth of thought and feeling. 
 
 t This chapter, originally published as an article in the Edinburgh Review for OcU 
 1862, has been referred to in the remarkable work of Mr. Lecky on " The Rise and 
 Influence of Rationalism in Europe" (vol. i. ch. ii. p. 195 note), as conveying " a no- 
 tion of a miracle which would not differ generically from a human act, though it 
 would still be strictly available for evidential purposes." I am quite satisfied with 
 this definition of the result. Beyond the immediate purposes of benevolence, which 
 were served by almost all the miracles of the New Testament, the only other purpose 
 which is ever assigned to them is an " evidential purpose "that is, a purpose that 
 they might serve as signs of the presence of superhuman knowledge, and of the work- 
 ing of superhuman power. They were performed in short to assist faith, and not 
 to confound reason. 
 
 % " The Supernatural in Relation to the Natural." By the Rev. James M'Cosh, LL.D. 
 Macmillan, Cambridge, 1861. 
 
THE SUPERNATURAL. II 
 
 in an important note (p, 149), Dr. M'Cosh explains that miracles 
 are not to be considered '' as against Nature " in any other sense 
 than that in which " one natural agent may be against another 
 as water may counteract fire." This eminent writer has ap- 
 proached the subject by the right method, because he has ad- 
 dressed himself first to the solution of the one question which 
 is an essential preliminary to all subsequent discussion : " How 
 much is contained in the Natural ? " Not until this question is 
 answered, can the Supernatural be defined. Yet the answer 
 given by Dr. M'Cosh shows the inherent and the insuperable 
 difficulty which attends the giving of any answer at all. " In 
 this world," he says, "there is a set of objects and agencies 
 which constitute a system or Cosmos which may have relations 
 to regions beyond, but is all the while a self-contained sphere, 
 with a space around it an Island so far separated from other 
 lands. This system we call Nature " (p. 1 01). This definition 
 of the Natural is perhaps as accurate and as full as any that can 
 be given. It assumes, however, that the boundaries of the 
 Natural are known. But the essential difficulty of separating 
 between the Natural and the Supernatural is this that the 
 boundaries of the Natural are not known that we cannot trace 
 the shores of this " island " that even if we could see any 
 distinct separation between them and the space around them, 
 we have not explored the " island " itself completely, and there- 
 fore we cannot say of any agency working therein, that it comes 
 from beyond the Sea. Mr. Mansel, in his " Essay on Miracles," 
 adopts the word " superhuman " as the most accurate expression 
 of his meaning. He says, " A superhuman authority needs to 
 be substantiated by superhuman evidence ; and what is super- 
 human is miraculous" * It is important to observe that this 
 definition does not necessarily involve the idea of a " violation 
 of the laws of Nature." It does not involve the idea of the 
 exercise of Will apart from the use of means. It does not 
 imply any exception to the great law of causation. It does not 
 involve, therefore, that idea which appears to many so difficult 
 of conception. It simply supposes, without any attempt to 
 
 * " Aids to Faith," p. 35. In another passage (p. 21), Mr. Mansel says, that in re- 
 spect to the great majority of the miracles recorded in Scripture, " the supernatural 
 element appears . . . in the exercise of a personal power transcending the limits of 
 man's will. They are not so much supermaterial as superhuman" 
 
12 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 fathom the relation in which God stands to His own " laws," 
 that out of His infinite knowledge of these laws, or of His 
 infinite power of making them the instruments of His Will, He 
 may and He does use them for extraordinary indications of His 
 presence.* 
 
 The reluctance to admit, as belonging to the domain of 
 Nature, any special exertion of Divine power for special pur- 
 poses, stands really in very close relationship to the converse no- 
 tion, that where the operation of natural causes can be clearly 
 traced, there the exertion of Divine power and Will is rendered 
 less certain and less convincing. This is the idea which lies 
 at the root of Gibbon's famous chapters on the spread of 
 Christianity. He labors to prove that it was due to natural 
 causes. In proving this, he evidently thinks he is disposing of 
 the notion that Christianity spread by Divine power ; whereas 
 he only succeeds in pointing out some of the means which were 
 employed to effect a Divine purpose. In like manner, the 
 preservation of the Jews as a distinct People during so many 
 centuries of complete dispersion, is a fact standing nearly, if not 
 absolutely, alone in the history of the world. It is at variance 
 with all other experience of the laws which govern the 
 amalgamation with each other of different families of the human 
 race. The case of the Gypsies has been referred to as somewhat 
 parallel. But the facts of this case are doubtful and obscure, 
 and such of them as we know involve conditions altogether dis- 
 similar in kind. It is not surprising, therefore, that the pres- 
 ervation of the Jews, partly from the relation in which it stands 
 to the apparent fulfilment of Prophecy, and partly from the ex- 
 traordinary nature of the fact itself, is tacitly assumed by many 
 persons to come strictly within the category of miraculous events. 
 Yet in itself it is nothing more than a striking illustration how 
 a departure from the " ordinary course of nature " may be ef- 
 fected through the instrumentality of means which are natural 
 and comprehensible. An extraordinary resisting power has 
 
 * I agree with Mr. J. M. Campbell when he says, in the Introduction already quoted, 
 " It appears to me that we do not know enough to say as regards anything transcend- 
 ing our knowledge of Law, in which way we should view it whether as belonging to 
 the system of Law, but to a region of it out of our sight, or as outside of that 
 system, and as having the same immediate relation to God which the system of Law 
 ultimately has." P. xxxv. 
 
THE SUPERNATURAL. 13 
 
 been given to the Jewish People against those dissolving and 
 disintegrating forces which have caused the disappearance of 
 every other race placed under similar conditions. They have 
 been torn from home and country, and removed, not in a body, 
 but. in scattered fragments, over the world. Yet they are as 
 distinct from every other people now as they were in the days of 
 Solomon. Nevertheless this resisting power, wonderful though 
 it be, is the result of special laws, overruling those in ordinary 
 operation. It has been effected by the use of means. Those 
 means have been superhuman they have been beyond human 
 contrivance and arrangement. But they belong to the region 
 of the Natural. They belong to it not the less, but all the 
 more, because in their concatenation and arrangement they 
 seem to indicate the purpose of a living Will seeking and ef- 
 fecting the fulfilment of its designs. This is the manner after 
 which our own living wills in their little sphere effect their 
 little objects. Is it difficult to believe that after the same man- 
 ner also the Divine Will, of which ours is the image only, works 
 and effects its purposes ? 
 
 Our own experience shows that the universal Reign of Law 
 is perfectly consistent with a power of making those laws sub- 
 servient to design even when the knowledge of them is but 
 slight, and the power over them slighter still. How much 
 more easy, how much more natural, to conceive that the same 
 universality is compatible with the exercise of that Supreme Will 
 before which all are known, and to which all are servants 1 
 What difficulty in this view remains in the idea of the Super- 
 natural ? Is it any other than the difficulty in believing in the 
 existence of a Supreme Will in a living God ? If this be the 
 belief of which M. Guizot speaks when he says that it is essen- 
 tial to religion, then his proposition is unquestionably true. In 
 this sense the difficulty of believing in the Supernatural, and 
 the difficulty of believing in pure Theism, is one and the same. 
 But if he means that it is necessary to religion to believe in 
 even the occasional "violation of law," if he means that with- 
 out such belief, signs and wonders cease to be evidences of 
 Divine power, then he announces a proposition which cannot 
 be sustained. There is nothing in Religion incompatible with 
 the belief that all exercises of God's power, whether ordinary 
 
14 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 or extraordinary, are effected through the instrumentality of 
 means that is to say, by the instrumentality of natural laws 
 brought out, as it were, and used for a Divine purpose. To 
 believe in the existence of miracles, we must indeed believe 
 in the Superhuman and in the Supermaterial. But both these 
 are familiar facts in Nature. We must believe also in a Supreme 
 Will and a Supreme Intelligence ; but this our own Will and 
 our own Intelligence not only enable us to conceive of, but 
 compel us to recognize in the whole laws and economy of Na- 
 ture. Her whole aspect " answers intelligently to our intelli- 
 gence mind responding to mind as in a glass."* Once admit 
 that there is a Being who irrespective of any theory as 
 to the relation in which the laws of Nature stand to His Will- 
 has at least an infinite knowledge of those laws, and an infinite 
 power of putting them to use then miracles lose every element 
 of inconceivability. In respect to the greatest and highest 
 of all that restoration of the breath of life which is not more 
 mysterious than its original gift there is no answer to the ques- 
 tion which Paul asks, " Why should it be thought a thing in- 
 credible by you that God should raise the dead ? " 
 
 This view of miracles is well expressed by Principal Tul- 
 loch : 
 
 " The stoutest advocate of interference can mean nothing 
 more than that the Supreme Will has so moved the hidden 
 springs of nature that a new issue arises on given circumstances. 
 The ordinary issue is supplanted by a higher issue. The es- 
 sential facts before us are a certain set of phenomena, and a 
 Higher Will moving them. How moving them ? is a question 
 for human definition ; but the answer to which does not and 
 cannot affect the Divine meaning of the change. Yet when 
 we reflect that this Higher Will is everywhere reason and wis- 
 dom, it seems a juster as well as a more comprehensive view to 
 regard it as operating by subordination and evolution rather 
 than by ' interference ' or * violation.' According to this view, 
 the idea of Law is so far from being contravened by the Chris- 
 tian miracles, that it is taken up by them and made their very 
 
 * '' Beginning Life : Chapters for Young Men on Religion, Study, and Business, 
 Chap, iii., The Supernatural " By John Tulloch, D.D., Principal of St. Mary's College, 
 St. Andrew's. Edinburgh, 1860. P. 29. 
 
THE SUPERNATURAL. 1 5 
 
 basis. They are the expression of a Higher Law, working out 
 its wise ends among the lower and ordinary sequences of life 
 and history. These ordinary sequences represent nature 
 nature, however, not as an immutable fate, but*a plastic medi- 
 um through which a Higher Voice and Will are ever addressing 
 us, and which, therefore, may be wrought into new issues when 
 the Voice has a new message, and the Will a special purpose 
 for us."* 
 
 It is well worthy of remark, that Locke, who laid great stress 
 on the Christian miracles, as attesting the authority of those 
 who wrought them, declines, nevertheless, to adopt the common 
 definition of that in which miraculous agency consists. "A 
 miracle then," he says,t " I take to be a sensible operation, 
 which, being above the comprehension of the spectator and, in 
 his opinion, contrary to the established course of nature, is 
 taken by him to be Divine." And in reply to the objection, that 
 this makes a miracle depend on the opinions or knowledge of 
 the spectator, he points out that this objection cannot be avoided 
 by any of the definitions commonly adopted ; because " it be- 
 ing agreed that a miracle must be that which surpasses the 
 force of nature in the established steady laws of cause and 
 effect, nothing can be taken to be a miracle but what is judged 
 to exceed those laws. Now every one being able to judge of 
 those laws only by his own acquaintance with nature, and his own 
 notions of its force, which are different in different men, it is 
 unavoidable that that should be a miracle to one man which is 
 not so to another." In this passage Locke recognizes the great 
 truth, that we can never know what is above Nature unless we 
 know all that is within Nature. But he misses another truth, 
 quite as important, that a miracle would still be a miracle 
 even though we did know the laws through which it was accom- 
 plished, provided those laws, though not beyond human knowl- 
 edge, were beyond human control. We might know the con- 
 ditions necessary to the performance of a miracle, although 
 utterly unable to bring those conditions about. Yet a work 
 performed by the bringing about of conditions which are out of 
 
 * " Beginning Life," etc., pp. 85, 86. By John Tulloch, D.D. 
 t " A Discourse on Miracles. 
 
1 6 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 human reach, would certainly be a work attesting superhuman 
 power. 
 
 Nevertheless so deeply ingrained in popular theology is the 
 idea that miracles, to be miracles at all, must be performed by 
 some violation or suspension of the laws of Nature, that the 
 opposite idea of miracles being performed by the use of means 
 is regarded by many with jealousy and suspicion. Strange that 
 it should be thought the safest course to separate as sharply 
 and as widely as we can between what we are called upon to 
 believe in Religion, and what we are able to trace or under- 
 stand in Nature ! With what heart can those who cherish this 
 frame of mind follow the great argument of Butler ? All the 
 steps of that argument the greatest in the whole range of 
 Christian philosophy are founded on the opposite belief, that 
 all the truths, and not less all the difficulties of Religion, have 
 their type and likeness in the " constitution and course of Na- 
 ture." As we follow that reasoning, so simple and so profound, 
 we find our eyes ever opening to some new interpretation of 
 familiar facts, and recognizing among the curious things of 
 earth, one after another of the laws which, when told us of the 
 spiritual world, seem so perplexing and so hard to accept or 
 understand. To ask how much further this argument of the 
 " Analogy " is capable of illustration and development, is to 
 ask how much more we shall know of Nature. Like all central 
 truths, its ramifications are infinite as infinite as the appear- 
 ance of variety, and as pervading as the sense of oneness in the 
 universe of God. 
 
 But what of Revelation ? Are its history and doctrines in- 
 compatible with the belief that God uniformly acts through the 
 use of means ? The narrative of Creation is given to us in ab- 
 stract only, and is told in two different forms, both having ap- 
 parently for their main, perhaps their exclusive object, the 
 presenting to our conception the personal agency of a living 
 God. Yet this narrative indicates, however slightly, that room 
 is left for the idea of a material process. " Out of the dust of 
 the ground ; " that is, out of the ordinary elements of Nature, 
 was that Body formed which is still upheld and perpetuated by 
 organic forces acting under the rules of Law. Nothing which 
 Science has discovered, or can discover, is capable of traversing 
 
THE SUPERNATURAL. 17 
 
 that simple narrative. On this subject M. Guizot lays great 
 stress, as many others do, on what he calls the Supernatural in 
 Creation, as distinguished from the operations now visible in 
 Nature. " De quelle fagon et par quelle puissance le genre hu- 
 main a-t-il commence' sur la terre ? " In reply to this question, 
 he proceeds to argue that Man must have been the result either 
 of mere material forces, or of a supernatural power exterior to,, 
 and superior to Matter. Spontaneous generation, he argues,, 
 supposing it to exist at all, can give birth only to infant beings 
 to the first hours, and feeblest forms of nascent life. But 
 Man the human pair must evidently have been complete 
 from the first ; created in the full possession of their powers and 
 faculties. " C'est a cette condition seulement qu'en appar- 
 aissant pour la premiere fois sur la terre 1'homme aurait pu y 
 vivre s'y perpetuer, et y fonder le genre humain. Evidem- 
 ment 1'autre origine du genre humain est seul admissible, seul 
 possible. Le fait surnaturel de la creation explique seul la 
 premiere apparition de 1'homme ici-bas." 
 
 This is a common but not a very safe argument. If the Su- 
 pernatural that is to say, the Superhuman and the Super- 
 material cannot be found nearer to us than this, it will not be 
 Sfecurely found at all. It is very difficult to free ourselves from 
 this notion that by going far enough back, we can " find out 
 God " in some sense in which we cannot find Him now. The 
 certainty not merely of one, but of many successive Creations 
 in the history of our Planet, and especially of a time compara- 
 tively recent, when Man did not exist, is indeed an effectual 
 answer to the notion, if it be now ever entertained, of " all 
 things having continued as they are since the Beginning." But 
 those who believe that the existing processes of Nature can be 
 accounted for by " Law," may believe that those processes were 
 also commenced by the same vague and mysterious agency. To 
 accept the primeval narrative of the Jewish Scriptures as com- 
 ing from authority, and as bringing before us the personal agency 
 of the Creator, but without purporting to reveal the method of 
 His work, this is one thing. To argue that no other origin 
 for the first parents of the human race is conceivable than that 
 they were moulded perfect, without the instrumentality of any 
 means, this is quite another thing. The various hypotheses o 
 
1 8 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 Development, of which Darwin's theory is only a new and 
 special version, whether they are probable or not, are at least 
 advanced as affording a possible escape from the puzzle which 
 M. Guizot puts. These hypotheses are indeed destitute of proof ; 
 and in the form which they have as yet assumed, it may justly 
 be said that they involve such violations of, or departures from, 
 all that we know of the existing order of things, as to deprive 
 them of all scientific basis. But the close and mysterious rela- 
 tions between the mere animal frame of Man, and that of the 
 lower animals, does render the idea of a common relationship 
 by descent at least conceivable. Indeed, in proportion as it 
 seems to approach nearer to processes of which we have some 
 knowledge, it is, in a degree, more conceivable than Creation 
 without any process, of which we have no knowledge and can 
 have no conception. 
 
 But whatever may have been the method or process of Crea- 
 tion, it is Creation still. If it were proved to-morrow that the 
 first man was "born" from some pre-existing Form of Life, it 
 would still be true that such a birth must have been, in every 
 sense of the word, a new Creation. It would still be as true that 
 God formed him "out of the dust of the earth," as it is true that 
 He has so formed every child who is now called to answer the first 
 question of all theologies. And we must remember that the 
 language of Scripture nowhere draws, or seems even conscious 
 of, the distinction which modern philosophy draws so sharply 
 between the Natural and the Supernatural. All the operations 
 of Nature are spoken of as operations of the Divine Mind. 
 Creation is the outward embodiment of a Divine idea. It is in 
 this sense, apparently, that the narrative of Genesis speaks of 
 ever}' plant being formed "before it grew." But the same 
 language is held, not less decidedly, of every ordinary birth. 
 " Thine eyes did see my substance, yet being imperfect. In 
 Thy book all my members were written, which in continuance 
 were fashioned, when as yet there were none of them." And 
 these words, spoken of the individual birth, have been applied 
 not less truly to the modern idea of the Genesis of all Organic 
 Life. Whatever may have been the physical or material rela- 
 tion between its successive forms, the ideal relation has been 
 now clearly recognized, and reduced to scientific definition. 
 
THE SUPERNATURAL. 19 
 
 All the members of that frame which has received its highest in- 
 terpretation in Man, had existed, with lower offices assigned to 
 them, in the animals which flourished before Man was born. All 
 theories of Development have been simply attempts to suggest 
 the manner in which, or the physical process by means of which 
 this ideal continuity of type and pattern has been preserved. 
 But whilst all these suggestions have been in the highest degree 
 uncertain, some of them violently absurd, the one thing which 
 is certain is the fact for which they endeavor to account. 
 And what is that fact ? It is one which belongs to the world of 
 Mind, not to the world of Matter. When Professor Owen tells 
 us, for example, that certain jointed bones in the Whale's pad- 
 dle are the same bones which in the Mole enable it to burrow, 
 which in the Bat enable it to fly, and in Man constitute his hand 
 with all its wealth of functions, he does not mean that physically 
 and actually they are the same bones, nor that they have the 
 same uses, nor that they ever have been, or ever can be, transfer- 
 able from one kind of animal to another. He means that in a 
 purely ideal or mental conception of the plan of all Vertebrate 
 skeletons, these bones occupy the same relative place relative, 
 that is, not to origin or use, but to the Plan or conception of 
 that skeleton as a whole. 
 
 Here the Supermaterial, and in this sense the Supernatural, 
 element, that is to say, the ideal conformity and unity of con- 
 ception, is the one unquestionable fact, in which -we recognize 
 directly the working of a Mind with which our own has very 
 near relations. Here, as elsewhere, we see the Natural, in the 
 largest sense, including and embodying the Supernatural ; the 
 Material, including the Supermaterial. No possible theory, 
 whether true or false, in respect to the physical means em- 
 ployed to preserve the correspondence of parts which runs 
 through all Creation, can affect the certainty of that mental 
 plan and purpose which alone makes such correspondence in- 
 telligible to us, and in which alone it may be said to exist. 
 
 It must always be remembered that the two ideas, that of 
 a Physical Cause and that of a Mental Purpose, are not 
 antagonistic ; only the one is larger and more comprehensive 
 than the other. Let us take a case. In many animal frames 
 there are what have been called " silent members " members 
 
20 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 which have no reference to the life or use of the animal, but only 
 to trie general pattern on which all vertebrate skeletons have 
 been formed. Mr. Darwin, when he sees such a member in 
 any animal, concludes with certainty that this animal is the 
 lineal decendant by ordinary generation of some other animal 
 in which that member was not silent but turned to use. Pro- 
 fessor Owen, taking a larger and wider view, would say, with- 
 out pretending to explain how its presence is to be accounted 
 for physically, that the silent member has relation to a general 
 purpose or plan which can be traced from the dawn of Life, but 
 which did not receive its full accomplishment until Man was 
 born. This is certain : the other is a theory. The assumed 
 physical cause may be true or false. But in any case the men- 
 tal purpose and design the conformity to an abstract idea 
 this is certain. The relation in which created Forms stand to 
 our own mind and to our understanding of their Purpose, is 
 the one thing which we can surely know, because it belongs to 
 our own consciousness. It is entirely independent of any be- 
 lief we may entertain, or any knowledge we may acquire, of 
 the processes employed for the fulfilment of that Purpose. 
 
 And yet scientific men sometimes tell us that " we must be 
 very cautious how we ascribe intention to nature. Things do fit 
 into each other, no doubt, as if they were designed ; but all we 
 know about them is that these correspondences exist, and that 
 they seem to be the result of physical laws of development and 
 growth." Very likely; but how these correspondences have 
 arisen, and are daily arising, is not the question, and it is im- 
 material how that question may be answered. Do those cor- 
 respondences exist, or do they not ? The perception of them 
 by our mind is as much a fact as the sight or touch of the 
 things in which they appear. They may have been produced 
 by growth they may have been the result of a process of de- 
 velopment, but it is not the less the development of a men- 
 tal purpose. It is the end subserved that we absolutely know. 
 What alone is doubtful and obscure is precisely that which We 
 are told is the only legitimate object of our research, viz., 
 the means by which that end has been attained. Take one 
 instance out of millions. The poison of a deadly snake let 
 us for a moment consider what this is. It is a secretion of 
 
THE SUPERNATURAL. 21 
 
 definite chemical properties which have reference, not only 
 not even mainly to the organism of the animal in which it is 
 developed, but specially to the organism of another animal 
 which it is intended to destroy. Some naturalists have a 
 vague sort of notion that, as regards merely mechanical weap- 
 on^, or organs of attack, they may be developed by use, that 
 legs may become longer by fast running, teeth sharper and 
 longer by much biting. Be it so : this law of growth, if it exist, 
 is but itself an instrument whereby purpose is fulfilled. But 
 how will this law of growth adjust a poison in one animal with 
 such subtle knowledge of the organization of another that the 
 deadly virus shall in a few minutes curdle the blood, benumb 
 the nerves, and rush in upon the citadel of life ? There is but 
 one explanation a Mind, having minute and perfect knowl- 
 edge of the structure of both, has designed the one to be capa- 
 ble of inflicting death upon the other. This mental purpose 
 and resolve is the one thing which our intelligence perceives with 
 direct and intuitive recognition. The method of creation, by 
 means of which this purpose has been carried into effect, is 
 utterly unknown. 
 
 It is no answer or objection to this view that poisons exist 
 also in plants and minerals where no similar adjustment to 
 function is perceived. 1 * Even in these cases there are wonder- 
 ful relations between our own human frame and many poisons 
 of the mineral and vegetable world which render them invalu- 
 able agents in the mitigation of suffering and the prevention 
 or removal of disease. It is impossible to believe that these 
 complicated relations of action and reaction between things 
 separated apparently from each other by the whole width of 
 being, have been the result of forces with which Mind and 
 Prevision have had no concern. But even if the use of such 
 poisons were absolutely unknown even if that use lay, which 
 it does not, beyond the possibility of our conception, this 
 would not deduct by the value of a fraction from the certainty 
 of a conclusion which is founded on different conditions. The 
 relations of adjustment between a given number of elements 
 
 * " To what intention are we to ascribe the poisons liberally distributed through 
 plants and minerals? " asks Mr. G. H. Lewes in his review of this work. Fortnight- 
 ly Review, July 1867, p. 100. 
 
22 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 are none the less a certain fact because similar elements may 
 be found elsewhere without any such adjustment being visible 
 to us. It is the very fact of their not being separate but com- 
 bined in the one case which justifies and compels a conclusion 
 different from that which arises in the other case. This is the 
 law of evidence on which we act and judge in other matters 
 with conviction which is both intuitive and capable of being 
 confirmed by the rules of reason. And this reply is applicable 
 to all objections of the same kind. Those portions of the sys- 
 tem of Nature which are wholly dark to us do not necessarily 
 cast any shadow on those other portions of that system which 
 are luminous with inherent light. Rather the other way. The 
 shining tracts which thus reflect the light of Reason and of 
 Mind send abundant rays into all the dark places round them. 
 The new discoveries which Science is ever making of adjust- 
 ments and combinations, of which we had no previous concep- 
 tion, impress us with an irresistible conviction that the same 
 relations to Mind prevail throughout. It matters not in what 
 department of investigation inquiry is conducted, it matters not 
 what may be the Philosophy or Theology of the inquirer. 
 Every step he takes he finds himself face to face with facts 
 which he cannot describe intelligibly either to himself or 
 others, except by referring them to that function and power of 
 Mind which we know as Purpose and Design. 
 
 Perhaps no illustration more striking of this principle was 
 ever presented than in the curious volume published by Mr. 
 Darwin on the " Fertilization of Orchids." * It appears that 
 the fertilization of almost all Orchids is dependent on the trans- 
 port of the pollen from one flower to another by means of in- 
 sects. It appears, further, that the structure of these flowers 
 is elaborately contrived, so as to secure the certainty and effect- 
 iveness of this operation. Mr. Darwin's work is devoted to 
 tracing in detail what these contrivances are. To a large ex- 
 tent they are purely mechanical, and can be traced with as 
 much clearness and certainty as the different parts of which a 
 steam-engine is composed. The complication and ingenuity of 
 these contrivances almost exceed belief. "Moth-traps and 
 
 * " On the Various Contrivances by which British and Foreign Orchids are Fertil- 
 ized by Insects." By Charles Darwin, F.R.S,, London, 1862. 
 
THE SUPERNATURAL. 
 
 spring-guns set on these grounds," might be the 
 Orchids. There are baits to tempt the nectar-loving Lepidop- 
 tera, with rich odors exhaled at night, and lustrous colors to 
 shine by day ; there are channels of approach along which they 
 are surely guided, so as to compel them to pass by certain 
 spots ; there are adhesive plasters nicely adjusted to fit fheir pro- 
 bosces, or to catch their brows ; there are hair triggers carefully 
 set in their necessary path, communicating with explosive shells, 
 which project the pollen-stalks with unerring aim upon their 
 bodies. There are, in short, an infinitude of adjustments, for 
 an idea of which I must refer my readers to Mr. Darwin's in 
 imitable powers of observation and description adjustments 
 all contrived so as to secure the accurate conveyance of the 
 pollen of the one flower to its precise destination in the struct- 
 ure of another. 
 
 Now there are two questions which present themselves when 
 we examine such a mechanism as this. The first is, What is 
 the use of the various parts, or their relation to each other with 
 reference to the purpose of the whole? The second question 
 is, How were those parts made, and out of what materials ? It 
 is the first of these questions that is to say, the use, object, 
 intention, or purpose of the different parts of the plant which 
 Darwin sets himself instinctively to answer first ; and it is this 
 which he does answer with precision and success. The second 
 question, that is to say, how those parts came to be developed 
 and out of what " primordial elements " they have been derived 
 in their present shapes, and converted to their present uses 
 this is a question which Darwin does also attempt to solve, but 
 the solution of which is in the highest degree difficult and un- 
 certain. It is curious to observe the language which this most 
 advanced disciple of pure naturalism instinctively uses when 
 he has to describe the complicated structure of this curious 
 order of plants. " Caution in ascribing intentions to nature," 
 does not seem to occur to him as possible. Intention is the 
 one thing which he does see, and which, when he does not see, 
 he seeks for diligently until he finds it. He exhausts every 
 form of words and of illustration by which intention or mental 
 purpose can be described. " Contrivance " " curious contriv- 
 ance " " beautiful contrivance," these are expressions which 
 
^4 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 recur over and over again. Here is one sentence describing 
 the parts of a particular species : " The Labellum is developed 
 into a long nectary, in order to attract Lepidoptera, and we 
 shall presently give reasons for suspecting that the nectar is 
 purposely so lodged that it can be sucked only slowly, in order 
 to give time for the curious chemical quality of the viscid matter 
 setting hard and dry." * Nor are these words used in any sense 
 different from that in which they are applicable to the works 
 of Man's contrivance to the instruments we use or invent for 
 carrying into effect our own preconceived designs. On the 
 contrary, human instruments are often selected as the aptest 
 illustrations both of the object in view, and of the means taken 
 to effect it. Of one particular structure, Mr. Darwin says : 
 " This contrivance of the guiding ridges may be compared to 
 the little instrument sometimes used for guiding a thread into 
 the eye of a needle." Again, referring to the precautions taken 
 to compel the insects to come to the proper spot, in order to 
 have the " pollinia " attached to their bodies, Mr. Darwin says : 
 " Thus we have the rostellum partially closing the mouth of 
 the nectary, like a trap placed in a run for game, and the trap 
 so complex and perfect ! " f But this is not all. The idea of 
 special use, as the controlling principle of construction, is so 
 impressed on Mr. Darwin's mind, that, in every detail of struct- 
 ure, however singular or obscure, he has absolute faith that 
 in this lies the ultimate explanation. If an organ is largely 
 developed, it is because some special purpose is to be fulfilled. 
 If it is aborted or rudimentary, it is because that purpose is no 
 longer to be subserved. In the case of another species whose 
 structure is very singular, Mr. Darwin had great difficulty in 
 discovering how the mechanism was meant to work, so as to 
 effect the purpose. At last he made it out, and of the clue 
 which led to the discovery he says : " The strange position of 
 the Labellum perched on the summit of the column, ought 
 to have shown me that here was the place for experiment. 
 I ought to have scorned the notion that the Labellum was 
 thus placed for no good purpose. I neglected this plain guide, 
 and for a long time completely failed to understand the 
 flower."$ 
 * P. 29. t P. 30. t P. 262. 
 
THE SUPERNATURAL. 25 
 
 An attempt has, indeed, been made to explain away Mr. 
 Darwin's language in such cases as "metaphorical."* But 
 this explanation is powerless to expel from that language the 
 inference it involves. Indeed, it is an explanation which only 
 repeats the same idea in another form. The very essence of a 
 metaphor is that it expresses the resemblances of things. But 
 it is in seeing the resemblances, and in seeing the correlative 
 differences of things, that all knowledge consists. This per- 
 ception is the raw material of Thought it is the foundation of 
 all intellectual apprehension. In proportion as resemblances 
 are complete, the language which expresses those resemblances 
 is the language of truth. Such language very often carries 
 within it the most certain conclusions which are accessible to 
 reason. One mind looking at the workings of another mind 
 can see likeness of agency only by recognizing likeness in the 
 processes of thought. That likeness can only be expressed in 
 words which convey the idea of it to other minds. But in this 
 sense all language is metaphorical. The commonest words we 
 use to indicate ideas are essentially metaphorical, bringing 
 home into the world of Mind images derived from material 
 force, and carrying forth again into the outward world concep- 
 tions born of that mental power which alone is capable of con- 
 ceiving. In one aspect, all human speech is what the Poet 
 calls it, " Matter-moulded forms of speech." t In another 
 aspect it is all spirit-moulded, since we can only think of Mat- 
 ter in the light of those impressions which it has power to make 
 on Mind. All language is thus but a system of signs whereby 
 we express the analogies the differences and resemblances 
 perceived by us in those two great departments of Nature of 
 which the union and the separation are both imaged in our- 
 selves that is, in the union and in the difference of the Body 
 and the Mind. The most absolute certainties we can ever 
 know are only known by the translation of ideas or conceptions 
 from one of these departments to the other, and the language 
 in which these certainties are expressed carries, and must carry, 
 
 * Quarterly Journal of Science, Oct. 1867. *' Creation by Law," by Alfred Wal- 
 /ace. " Mr. Darwin has laid himself open to much misconception, and has given to 
 his opponents a powerful weapon by his continual use of metaphor in describing the 
 wonderful coadaptations of organic beings." P. 473. 
 
 t "In Memoriam," xciv. 
 
26 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 signs of this origin in itself. The question, therefore, in respect 
 to Mr. Darwin's language, is not whether it is " metaphorical " 
 that is, whether it applies to material phenomena conceptions 
 derived from the world of Mind. This, of course, it does, and 
 in the nature of the case it must do. But the question is, 
 whether the correspondence it expresses between the order of 
 these material phenomena and a known order of Thought is 
 or is not a real correspondence, and one, therefore, indicating 
 the known effects of. a known originating cause. 
 
 And here it is well worthy of observation, that alt-hough Pur- 
 pose and Intention are, of course, involved in all mental opera- 
 tions, yet the conception of contrivance is not the only mental 
 conception which, in like manner, is recognized as constituting 
 the order of natural phenomena. Other conceptions equally 
 familiar to the mind of Man are instinctively recognized by all 
 Naturalists who bring high intellectual powers into that contact 
 with Nature which consists in close and thoughtful observation 
 of her facts. Other mental conceptions, such as those of Num- 
 ber and Proportion, are then found to emerge, and make an 
 ineffaceable impression on the mind which sees them. 
 
 Thus, when we come to the second part of Mr. Darwin's 
 work, viz., the Homology of the Orchids, we find that the in- 
 quiry divides itself into two separate questions, first, the ques- 
 tion what all these complicated organs are in their primitive re- 
 lation to each other; and, secondly, how these successive mod- 
 ifications have arisen, so as to fit them for new and changing 
 uses. Now, it is very remarkable that of these two questions, 
 that which maybe called the most abstract and transcendental 
 the most nearly related to the Supernatural and the Superma- 
 terial is again precisely the one which Darwin is able to solve 
 most clearly. We have already seen how well he solves the 
 first question What is the use and intention of these various 
 parts ? The next question is, What are these parts in their 
 primal order and conception ? The answer is, that they are 
 members of a numerical group, having a definite and still trace- 
 able order of symmetrical arrangement. They are expressions 
 of a numerical idea, as so many other things perhaps as all 
 things of beauty are. Mr. Darwin gives a diagram, showing 
 the primordial or archetypal arrangement of Threes within 
 
SUPERNATURAL. 27 
 
 Threes, out of which all the strange and marvellous forms of 
 the Orchids have been developed, and to which, by careful 
 counting and dissection, they can still be ideally reduced. But 
 when we come to the last question By what process of natural 
 consequence have these elementary organs of Three within 
 Three been developed into so many various forms of beauty, 
 and made to subserve so many curious and ingenious designs ? 
 we find nothing but the vaguest and most unsatisfactory con- 
 jectures. Let us take one instance as an example. There is a 
 Madagascar Orchis the " Angraecum sesquipedale " with an 
 immensely long and deep nectary. How did such an extraor- 
 dinary organ come to be developed ? Mr. Darwin's explana- 
 tion is this : The pollen of this flower can only be removed by 
 the proboscis of some very large Moth trying to get at the nec- 
 tar at the bottom of the vessel. The Moths with the longest 
 probosces would do this most effectually; they would be re- 
 warded for their long noses by getting the most nectar ; whilst, 
 on the other hand, the flowers with the deepest nectaries would 
 be the best fertilized by the largest Moths preferring them. 
 Consequently, the deepest-nectaried Orchids, and the longest- 
 nosed Moths, would each confer on the other a great advan- 
 tage in the " battle of life." This would tend to their respective 
 perpetuation, and to the constant lengthening of nectaries and 
 of noses. But the passage is so curious and characteristic, 
 that it is well to give Mr. Darwin's own words : 
 
 " As certain Moths of Madagascar became larger, through 
 natural selection in relation to their general conditions of life, 
 either in the larval or mature state, or as the proboscis alone 
 was lengthened to obtain honey from the Angraecum, those in- 
 dividual plants of the Angraecum which had the longest necta- 
 ries, (and the nectary varies much in length in some Orchids,) 
 and which, consequently, compelled the Moths to insert their 
 probosces up to the very base, would be the best fertilized. 
 These plants would yield most seed, and the seedlings would 
 generally inherit longer nectaries ; and so it would be in suc- 
 cessive generations of the plant and Moth. Thus it would ap- 
 pear that there has been a race in gaining length between the 
 nectary of the Angraecum and the proboscis of certain Moths ; 
 but the Angraecum has triumphed, for it flourishes and abounds 
 
28 THE REIGN OF LAW 
 
 in the forests of Madagascar, and still troubles each Moth to 
 insert its proboscis as far as possible in order to drain the last 
 drop of nectar. . . . We can thus," says Mr. Darwin, "par- 
 tially understand how the astonishing length of the nectar} 7 
 may have been acquired by successive modifications." 
 
 It is indeed but a " partial " understanding.* How came 
 this Orchis to require any exact adjustment between the length 
 of its nectary and the proboscis of an insect ? This is not a 
 general necessity even among the Orchids. " In the British 
 species, such as Orchis Pyramidalis, it is not necessary that 
 any such adjustment should exist, and thus a number of insects 
 of various sizes are found to carry away the pollinia, and aid in 
 the fertilization. "f This would obviously be the most favorable 
 condition for all Orchids in the battle of life. Does not the 
 hypothesis, then, begin by assuming the very condition of 
 things for which it professes to account ? We must start with 
 this Madagascar Orchis already in possession of a larger nec- 
 tary than other species, and with a structure already depending 
 on particular Moths also already existing, and already provided 
 with probosces of nicely adjusted length. If the nectaries be- 
 gan first to lengthen, how came the Moths not to leave them 
 for other flowers ? And if, on the contrary, they began to 
 shorten, how came they not to be favored and resorted to by 
 other Moths of a smaller size ? Can we assume that somehow 
 there were always ready some Moths still larger to favor the 
 longer variety, and that somehow also there were no smaller 
 Moths to favor the shorter ? $ Why should the race in this par- 
 ticular species be always in the direction of nectaries getting 
 longer, and not rather in the direction of nectaries getting 
 shorter ? Obviously the same hypothesis might be so turned 
 as to account for either result with equal ease, and therefore it 
 does not account at all for one of those results as against the 
 
 *The passage which follows I have added to meet the objection taken by Mr. 
 Wallace, that I have " not shown what point the explanation fails to meet." A sam- 
 ple only of such points can be given here. See also Note A. 
 
 t " Creation by Law." G. A. R. Wallace. Journal of 'Science \ October, 1867, p. 475. 
 
 t Mr. Wallace sees no difficulty whatever in making any supposition of this kind 
 which the Theory may require. " Now let us start," he says, " from the time when 
 the nectary was only half its present length, or about six inches, and was chiefly fer- 
 tilized by a species of Moth -which appeared at the time of the plants flowering, and 
 whose proboscis was of the same length." Ibid. p. 475. 
 
THE SUPERNATURAL. 29 
 
 other. And then there is a larger question than any of these 
 which remains behind. How came Orchids to be dependent at 
 all upon insects for fertilization ? It cannot be argued that 
 this is a necessity arising mechanically from the nature of 
 things, because, as we are truly told by an eminent naturalist 
 who warmly supports the Darwinian hypothesis, "exactly the 
 same end is attained in ten thousand other flowers " which do 
 not possess the same structure.* But what is the bearing of 
 this fact upon the theory ? Is it not this that the origin of 
 such curious structures, and complicated relations, cannot be 
 accounted for on any principle of mere mechanical necessity ? 
 Elementary forces may indeed always be detected, for they are 
 always present. But the manner in which they are worked ir- 
 resistibly suggests some directing power, having as one of its 
 aims mere increase and variety in that ocean of enjoyment 
 which constitutes the sum of Organic Life. Some idea of this 
 kind, however unconsciously, however reluctantly conceded, 
 lurks in every form of words in which the facts of science can 
 be generalized to the mind. Thus we find Mr. Wallace him- 
 self saying, in the same paper in which he regrets the language 
 of Mr. Darwin, that the conception he prefers is, that the " con- 
 trivances " referred to " are some of the results of those gen- 
 eral laws which were so co-ordinated at the first introduction of 
 Life upon the earth, as to result necessarily in the utmost pos- 
 sible development of varied forms." Eliminating the word 
 " necessarily," which, if it has any meaning, does not apply, as 
 we have seen, to the case of the Orchids, this language pre- 
 sents an intelligible idea. It satisfies the mind precisely in 
 proportion as it brings into view, however distant, the attri- 
 butes of Mind, and gives us a glimpse of " the reason why." 
 The production of variety in beauty and in enjoyment is the 
 purpose which those words suggest. In like proportion is Mr. 
 Darwin's language the truest and the best. His explanations 
 of the mechanical methods by which a wonderful Orchis hate 
 come to be are indeed, as he himself says, with great candor, 
 " partial " and partial only. How different from the clearness 
 and the certainty with which Mr. Darwin is able to explain to 
 us the use and intention of the various organs ! or the primal 
 
 * " Creation by Law," p. 474. 
 
30 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 idea of numerical order and arrangement which governs the 
 whole structure of the flower ! It is the same through all Na- 
 ture. Purpose and intention, or ideas of order based on nu- 
 merical relations, are what meet us at every turn, and are more 
 or less readily recognized by our own intelligence as corre- 
 sponding to conceptions familiar to. our own minds. We know, 
 too, that these purposes and ideas are not our own, but the 
 ideas and purposes of Another- of One whose manifestations 
 are indeed superhuman and supermaterial, but are not " super- 
 natural," in the sense of being strange to Nature, or in viola- 
 tion of it. 
 
 The truth is, that there is no such distinction between what 
 we find in Nature, and what we are called upon to believe in 
 Religion, as that which men pretend to draw between the 
 Natural and the Supernatural. It is a distinction purely 
 artificial, arbitrary, unreal. Nature presents to our intelligence, 
 the more clearly the more we search her, the designs, Ideas, 
 and intentions of some 
 
 " Living Will that shall endure, 
 When all that seems shall suffer shock." 
 
 Religion presents to us that same Will, not only working equally, 
 through the use of means, but using means which are strictly 
 analogous referable to the same general principles and which 
 are constantly appealed to as of a sort which we ought to be able 
 to appreciate, because we are already familiar with the like. Re- 
 ligion makes no call on us to reject that idea, which is the only 
 idea some men can see in Nature the idea of the universal Reign 
 of Law the necessity of conforming to it the. limitations which 
 in one aspect it seems to place on the exercise of Will, the es- 
 sential basis, in another aspect, which it supplies for all the 
 functions of Volition. On the contrary, the high regions into 
 which this idea is found extending, and the matters over which 
 it is found prevailing, is one of the deepest mysteries both of 
 Religion and of Nature. We feel sometimes as if we should 
 like to get above this rule into some secret Presence where its 
 bonds are broken. But no glimpse is ever given us of any- 
 thing, but " Freedom within the bounds of Law." The Will re- 
 vealed to us in Religion is not any more than the Will re- 
 
THE SUPERNATURAL. 31 
 
 vealed to us in Nature a capricious Will, but one with which, 
 in this respect, " there is no variableness, neither shadow of 
 turning." 
 
 We return, then, to the point from which we started. M. 
 Guizot's affirmation that belief in the Supernatural is essential 
 to all Religion is true only when it is understood in a special 
 sense. Belief in the existence of a Living Will of a Personal 
 God is indeed a requisite condition. Conviction " that He 
 is " must precede the conviction that " He is the rewarder of 
 those that diligently seek Him." But the intellectual yoke in- 
 volved in the common idea of the Supernatural is a yoke which 
 men impose upon themselves. Obscure thought and confused 
 language are the main source of difficulty. 
 
 Assuredly, whatever may be the difficulties of Christianity, 
 this is not one of them, that it calls on us to believe in any 
 exception to the universal prevalence and power of Law. Its 
 leading facts and doctrines are directly connected with this be- 
 lief, and directly suggestive of it. The Divine mission of Christ 
 on earth does not this imply not only the use of means to an end, 
 but some inscrutable necessity that certain means, and these only, 
 should be employed in resisting and overcoming evil ? What 
 else is the import of so many passages of Scripture implying 
 that certain conditions were required to bring the Saviour of 
 Man into a given relation with the race he was sent to save ? 
 " It behoved Him .... to make the Captain of our Sal- 
 vation perfect through suffering." " It behoved Him in all 
 things to be made like unto His brethren, that he might be" etc. 
 with the reason added : " for in that He Himself hath suffered 
 being tempted, He is able to succour them that are tempted." 
 Whatever more there may be in such passages, they all imply the 
 universal reign of Law in the moral and spiritual, as well as in 
 the material world : that those laws had to be behoved to be 
 obeyed ; and that the results to be obtained are brought about 
 by the adaptation of means to an end, or, as it were, by way 
 of natural consequences from the - instrumentality employed. 
 This, however, is an idea which systematic theology generally 
 regards with intense suspicion, though, in fact, all theologies in- 
 volve it, and build upon it. But then they are very apt to give 
 explanations of that instrumentality which have no counterpart 
 
32 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 in the material or in the moral world. Perhaps it is not too 
 much to say that the manifest decay which so many creeds and 
 confessions are now suffering, arises mainly from the degree in 
 which at least the popular expositions of them dissociate the 
 doctrines of Christianity from the analogy and course of 
 Nature. There is no such severance in Scripture no shyness 
 of illustrating Divine things by reference to the Natural. On 
 the contrary, we are perpetually reminded that the laws of the 
 spiritual world are in the highest sense laws of Nature, whose 
 obligation, operation, and effect are all in the constitution and 
 course of things. Hence it is that so much was capable of be- 
 ing conveyed in the form of parable the common actions and 
 occurrences of daily life being often chosen as the best vehicle 
 and illustration of the highest spiritual truths. It is not merely, 
 as Jeremy Taylor says, that " all things are full of such 
 resemblances," it is more than this more than resemblance. 
 It is the perpetual recurrence, under infinite varieties of applica- 
 tion, of the same rules and principles of Divine government, 
 of the same Divine thoughts, Divine purposes, Divine affections. 
 Hence it is that no verbal definitions or logical forms can con- 
 vey religious truth with the fulness or accuracy which belongs 
 to narratives taken from Nature Man's nature and life being, 
 of course, included in the term : 
 
 " And so, the Word had breath, and wrought 
 With human hands the Creed of creeds." 
 
 " In Memoriam" TENNYSON. 
 
 The same idea is expressed in the passionate exclamation of 
 Edward Irving : " We must speak in parables, or we must 
 present a wry and deceptive form of truth ; of which choice the 
 first is to be preferred, and our Lord adopted it. Because 
 parable is truth veiled, not truth dismembered ; and as the eye 
 of the understanding grows more piercing, the veil is seen 
 through, and the truth stands revealed." Nature is the great 
 Parable ; and the truths which she holds within her are veiled, 
 but not dismembered. The pretended separation between that 
 which lies within Nature and that which lies beyond Nature is a 
 dismemberment of the truth. Let both those who find it difficult 
 to believe in anything which is " above " the Natural, and those 
 
THE SUPERNATURAL. 33; 
 
 who insist on that belief, first determine how far the Natural 
 extends. Perhaps in going round these marches they will find 
 themselves meeting upon common ground. For indeed, long 
 before we have searched out all that the Natural includes, there 
 will remain little in the so-called Supernatural which can seen* 
 hard of acceptance or belief nothing which is not rather es- 
 sential to our understanding of this otherwise " unintelligible 
 world." 
 3 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 LAW ; ITS DEFINITIONS. 
 
 THE Reign of Law is this, then, the reign under which we 
 live ? Yes, m t a sense it is. There is no denying it. The 
 whole world around us, and the whole world within us, are ruled 
 ,by Law. Our very spirits are subject to it those spirits which 
 yet seem so spiritual, so subtle, so free. How often in the 
 darkness do they feel the restraining walls bounds within 
 \vhich they move conditions out of which they cannot think ! 
 The perception of this is growing in the consciousness of men. 
 It grows with the growth of knowledge ; it is the delight, the 
 reward, the goal of Science. From Science it passes into every 
 domain of thought, and invades, amongst others, the Theology 
 of the Church. And so we see the men of Theology coming 
 -out to parley with the men of Science, a white flag in their 
 hands, and saying, " If you will let us alone we will do the same 
 by you. Keep to your own province, do not enter ours. The 
 ;Reign of Law which you proclaim, we admit outside these 
 walls, but not within them : let there be peace between us." 
 But this will never do. There can be no such treaty dividing 
 the domain of Truth. Every one Truth is connected with every 
 other Truth in this great Universe of God. The connection 
 may be one of infinite subtlety, and apparent distance running, 
 as it were, underground for a long way, but always asserting it- 
 self at last, somewhere, and at some time. No bargaining, no 
 fencing off the ground no form of process, will avail to bar 
 this right of way. Blessed right, enforced by blessed power ! 
 Every truth, which is truth indeed, is charged with its own con- 
 sequences, its own analogies, its own suggestions. These will 
 not be kept outside any artificial boundary; they will range 
 over the whole Field of Thought, nor is there any corner of it 
 from which they can be warned away. 
 
 And therefore we must cast a sharp eye indeed on every form 
 
LAW ; ITS DEFINITIONS. 35 
 
 of words which professes to represent a scientific truth. If it 
 be really true in one department of thought, the chances are 
 that it will have its bearing on every other. And if it be not 
 true, but erroneous, its effect will be of a corresponding 
 character : for there is a brotherhood of Error as close as the 
 brotherhood of Truth. Therefore, to accept as a truth that 
 which is not a truth, or to fail in distinguishing the sense in 
 which a proposition may be true, from other senses in which it 
 is not true, is an evil having consequences which are indeed 
 incalculable. There are subjects on which one mistake of this 
 kind will poison all the wells of truth, and affect with fatal error 
 the whole circle of our thoughts. 
 
 It is against this danger that some men would erect a feeble 
 barrier by defending the position, that Science and Religion 
 may be, and ought to be, kept entirely separate ; that they 
 belong to wholly different spheres of thought, and that the ideas 
 which prevail in the one province have no relation to those 
 which prevail in the other. This is a doctrine offering many 
 temptations to many minds. It is grateful to scientific men who 
 are afraid of being thought hostile to Religion. It is grateful 
 to religious men who are afraid of being thought to be afraid of 
 Science. To these, and to all who are troubled to reconcile 
 what they have been taught to believe with what they have come 
 to know, this doctrine affords a natural and convenient escape. 
 There is but one objection to it but that is the fatal objection 
 that it is not true. The spiritual world and the intellectual 
 world are not separated after this fashion : and the notion that 
 they are so separated does but encourage men to accept in each, 
 ideas which will at last be found to be false in both. The truth 
 is, that there is no branch of human inquiry, however purely 
 physical, which is more than the word " branch " implies ; none 
 which is not connected through endless ramifications with every 
 other, and especially that which is the root and centre of them 
 all. If He who formed the mind be one with Him who is the 
 Orderer of all things concerning which that mind is occupied, 
 there can be no end to the points of contact between our differ- 
 ent conceptions of them, of Him, and of ourselves. 
 
 The instinct which impels us to seek for harmony in the truths 
 of Science and the truths of Religion, is a higher instinct and a 
 
36 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 truer one than the disposition which leads us to evade the diffi- 
 culty by pretending that there is no relation between them. 
 For, after all, it is a pretence and nothing more. No man who 
 thoroughly accepts a principle in the philosophy of Nature 
 which he feels to be inconsistent with a doctrine of Religion, 
 can help having his belief in that doctrine shaken and under- 
 mined. We may believe, and we must believe, both in Nature 
 and Religion, many things which we cannot understand ; but 
 we cannot really believe two propositions which are felt to be 
 contradictory. It helps* us nothing in such a difficulty, to say 
 that the one proposition belongs to Reason and the other prop- 
 osition belongs to Faith. The endeavor to reconcile them is 
 a necessity of the mind. We are right in thinking that, if they 
 are both indeed true, they can be reconciled, and if they really 
 are fundamentally opposed, they cannot both be true. That is 
 to say, there must be some error in our manner of conception 
 in one or in the other, or in both. At the very best, each can 
 represent only some partial and imperfect aspect of the truth. 
 The error may lie in our Theology, or it may lie in what we are 
 pleased to call our Science. It may be that some dogma, de- 
 rived by tradition from our fathers, is having its hollowness 
 betrayed by that light which sometimes shines upon the ways 
 of God out of a better knowledge of His works. It may be that 
 some proud and rash generalization of the schools is haying its 
 falsehood proved by the violence it does to the deepest instincts 
 of our spiritual nature, to 
 
 " Truths which wake to perish never ; 
 Which neither man nor boy, 
 Nor all that is at enmity with joy, 
 Can utterly abolish or destroy." 
 
 " Ode to Immortality? WORDSWORTH. 
 
 Such, for example, is the conclusion to which the language of 
 some scientific men is evidently pointing, that great general 
 Laws inexorable in their operation, and Causes in endless 
 chain of invariable sequence, are the governing powers in 
 Nature, and that they leave no room for any special direction 
 or providential ordering of events. If this be true, it is vain to 
 deny its bearing on Religion. What then can be the use of 
 
LAW ; ITS DEFINITIONS. 37 
 
 prayer ? Can Laws hear us ? Can they change, or can they 
 suspend themselves ? These questions cannot but arise, and 
 they require an answer. It is said of a late eminent Professor 
 and clergyman of the English Church, who was deeply imbued 
 with these opinions on the place occupied by Law. in the econo- 
 my of Nature, that he went on, nevertheless, preaching high 
 doctrinal sermons from the pulpit until his death. He did so 
 on the ground that propositions which were contrary to his rea- 
 son were not necessarily beyond his faith. The inconsisten- 
 cies of the human mind are indeed unfathomable : and there 
 are men so constituted as honestly to suppose that they can 
 divide themselves into two spiritual beings, one of whom is 
 sceptical, and the other is believing. But such men are rare 
 happily for Religion, and not less happily for Science. No 
 healthy intellect, no earnest spirit, can rest in such self-betrayal. 
 Accordingly we find many men now facing the consequences to 
 which they have given their intellectual assent, and taking 
 their stand upon the ground that prayer to God has no other 
 value or effect than so far as it may be a good way of preach- 
 ing to ourselves. It is a useful and helpful exercise for our 
 own spirits, but it is nothing more. But how can they pray 
 who have come to this ? Can it ever be useful or helpful to 
 believe a lie ? That which has been threatened as the worst 
 of all spiritual evils, would then become the conscious attitude 
 of our " religion," the habitual condition of our worship. This 
 must be a bad science, as it is bad religion. It is in violation 
 of a law the highest known to Man the Law which insepara- 
 bly connects earnest conviction of the truth in what we do or 
 say, with the very fountains of all intellectual and moral 
 strength. No accession of force can come to us from doing 
 anything in which we disbelieve. Such a doctrine will be in- 
 deed 
 
 " The little rift within the lute 
 
 That by and by will make the music mute, 
 And ever widening slowly silence all. " 
 
 "Idyls of the King Vivien" TENNYSON. 
 
 If there is any helpfulness in Prayer even to the Mind itself, 
 that helpfulness can only be preserved by showing that the 
 
38 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 belief on which this virtue depends is a rational belief. The 
 very essence of that belief is this that the Divine Mind is ac- 
 cessible to supplication, and that the Divine Will is capable of 
 being moved thereby. No question is, or indeed can be, raised 
 as to the powerful effect exerted by this belief on Man's nature. 
 That effect is recognized as a fact. Its value is admitted ; and 
 in order that it may not be lost, the compromise now offered by 
 some philosophers is this that although the course of external 
 nature is unalterable, yet possibly the phenomena of Mind and 
 character may be changed by the Divine Agency. But will 
 this reasoning bear analysis ? Can the distinction it assumes 
 be maintained ? Whatever difficulties there may be in recon- 
 ciling the ideas of Law and of Volition, they are difficulties 
 which apply equally to the Worlds of Matter and of Mind. 
 The Mind is as much. subject to Law as the Body is. The 
 Reign of Law is over all ; and if its dominion be really incom- 
 patible with the agency of Volition, Human or Divine, then the 
 Mind is as inaccessible to that agency as material things. It 
 would indeed be absurd to affirm that all Prayers are equally 
 rational or equally legitimate. Most true it is that " we know 
 not what we should pray for as we ought." Prayer does not 
 require us to believe that anything can be done without the use of 
 means ; neither does it require us to believe that anything will 
 be done in violation of the Universal Order. " If it be possi- 
 ble," was the qualification used in the most solemn Prayer ever 
 uttered upon Earth. What are and what are not legitimate 
 objects of supplication, is a question which may well be open. 
 But the question now raised is a wider one than this even the 
 question whether the very idea of Prayer be not in itself 
 absurd whether the Reign of Law does not preclude the pos- 
 sibility of Will affecting the successive phenomena either of 
 Matter or of Mind. This is a question lying at the root of our 
 whole conceptions of the Universe, and of all our own powers, 
 both of thinking and of acting. The freedom which is denied 
 to God is not likely to be left to Man. We shall see, accord- 
 ingly, that precisely the same denials are applied to both. 
 
 The conception of Natural Laws of their place, of their na- 
 ture, and of their office which involves us in such questions, 
 
LAW ; ITS DEFINITIONS. 39 
 
 and which points to such conclusions, demands surely a very 
 careful examination at our hands. 
 
 What, then, is this Reign of Law ? What is Law, and in what 
 sense can it be said to reign ? 
 
 Words, which should be the servants of Thought, are too often 
 its masters ; and there are very few words which are used more 
 ambiguously, and therefore more injuriously, than the \*ord 
 " Law." It may indeed be legitimately used in several different 
 senses, because in all cases as applied in Science it is a metaphor, 
 and one which has relation to many different kinds and degrees 
 of likeness in the ideas which are compared. It matters little 
 in which of these senses it is used, provided the distinctions 
 between them are kept clearly in view, and provided we watch 
 against the fallacies which must arise when we pass insensibly 
 from one meaning to another. And here it may be observed, 
 in passing, that the metaphors which are employed in Language 
 are generally founded on analogies instinctively, and often un- 
 consciously, perceived, and which would not be so perceived if 
 they were not both deep and true. In this case the idea which 
 lies at the root of Law in all its applications is evident enough. 
 In its primary signification, a " law " is the authoritative expres- 
 sion of human Will enforced by Power. The instincts of man- 
 kind finding utterance in their language, have not failed to see 
 that the phenomena of Nature are only really conceivable to us- 
 as in like manner the expressions of a Will enforcing itself 
 with Power. But, as in many other cases, the secondary or 
 derivative senses of the word have supplanted the primary sig- 
 nification ; and Law is now habitually used by men who deny 
 the analogy on which that use is founded, and to the truth of 
 which it is an abiding witness. It becomes therefore all the 
 more necessary to define the secondary senses with precision. 
 There are at least Five different senses in which Law is habit- 
 ually used, and these must be carefully distinguished : 
 
 First, We have Law as applied simply to an observed Order 
 of facts. 
 
 Secondly, To that Order as involving the action of some 
 Force or Forces of which nothing more may be known. 
 
 Thirdly, As applied to individual Forces the measure of whose 
 operation has been more or less defined or ascertained. 
 
40 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 Fourthly, As applied to those combinations of Force which 
 have reference to the fulfilment of Purpose, or the discharge of 
 Function. 
 
 Fifthly, As applied to Abstract Conceptions of the mind 
 not corresponding with any actual phenomena, but deduced 
 therefrom as axioms of thought necessary to our understanding 
 of them. Law, in this sense, is a reduction of the phenomena 
 not merely to an Order of facts, but to an Order of Thought. 
 
 These great leading significations of the word Law all circle 
 round the three great questions which Science asks of Nature, 
 the What, the How, and the Why : 
 
 {i) What are the facts in their established Order ? 
 
 (2) How that is, from what physical causes, does that Order 
 come to be ? 
 
 (3) Why have these causes been so combined ? What rela- 
 tion do they bear to Purpose, to the fulfilment of intention, to 
 the discharge of Function ? 
 
 It is so important that these different senses of the word Law 
 should be clearly distinguished, that each of them must be 
 more fully considered by itself. 
 
 The First and, so to speak, the lowest sense in which Law is 
 applied to natural phenomena is that in which it is used to ex- 
 press simply " an observed Order of facts " that is to say, facts 
 which under the same conditions always follow each other in 
 the same order. In this sense the laws of Nature are simply 
 those facts of Nature which recur according to a rule. It is 
 not necessary to the legitimate application of Law in this sense 
 that the cause of any observed Order of facts should be at all 
 known, or even guessed at. The Force or Forces to which that 
 Order is due may be hid in total darkness. It is sufficient that 
 the Order or sequence of phenomena be uniform and constant. 
 The neatest and simplest illustration of this, as well as of the 
 other senses in which Law is used, is to be found in the exact 
 sciences, and especially in the history of Astronomy. It is 
 nearly 250 years since Kepler discovered, in respect to the dis- 
 tances, velocities, and orbits of the Planets, three facts, or 
 rather three series of facts, which, during many years * of in- 
 
 * The " Third Law " of Kepler was made known to the world in 1619. Newton's 
 M Principia " appeared in 1687. 
 
LAW ; ITS DEFINITIONS. 41 
 
 tense application to physical inquiry, remained the highest 
 truths known to Man on the phenomena of the Solar System. 
 They were known as the Three Laws of Kepler. It is not nec- 
 essary to describe in detail here what these laws were. Suffice 
 it to say, that the most remarkable among them were facts of 
 constant numerical relation between the distances of the dif- 
 ferent Planets from the Sun, and the length of their periodic 
 times ; and again, between the velocity of their motion and the 
 space enclosed within certain corresponding sections of their 
 orbit. These Laws were simply and purely an " Order of 
 facts " established by observation, and not connected with any 
 known cause. The Force of which that Order is a necessary 
 result had not then been ascertained. A very large proportion 
 of the laws of every science are laws of this kind and in this 
 sense. For example, in Chemistry the behavior of different 
 substances towards each other, , in respect to combination and 
 affinity, is reduced to system under laws of this kind, and of 
 this kind only. Because, although there is a probability that 
 Electric or Galvanic Force is the cause or one of the causes 
 of the series of facts exhibited in chemical phenomena, this is 
 as yet no better than a probability, and the laws of Chemistry 
 stand no higher than facts which by observation and experiment 
 are found to follow certain rules. 
 
 But the ascertainment of a law in this First and lower sense 
 leads immediately and instinctively to the search after Law -in 
 another sense which is higher. An observed Order of facts, 
 to be entitled to the rank of a Law, must be an Order so con- 
 stant and uniform as to indicate necessity, and necessity can 
 only arise out of the action of some compelling Force. Law, 
 therefore, comes to indicate not merely an observed Order of 
 facts, but that Order as involving the action of some Force or 
 Forces, of which nothing more may be known than these visi- 
 ble effects. Every observed Order in physical phenomena 
 suggests irresistibly to the mind the operation of some physical 
 cause. We say of an observed Order of facts that it must be 
 due to some " law," meaning simply that all Order involves the 
 idea of some arranging cause, the working of some Force or 
 Forces (whether they be such as we can further trace and de- 
 
42 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 fine or not) of which that Order is the index and the result. 
 This is the Second of the five senses specified above. 
 
 And so we pass on, by an easy and natural transition, to the 
 Third sense in which the word Law is used. This is the most 
 exact and definite of all. The mere general idea that some 
 Force is at the bottom of all phenomena, which are invariably 
 consecutive, is a very different thing from knowing what that 
 Force is in respect to the rule or measure of its operation. Of 
 Law in this sense the one great example, before and above all 
 others, is the Law of Gravitation, for this is a Law in the sense 
 not merely of a rule, but of a cause that is, of a Force accurately 
 defined and ascertained according to the measure of its opera- 
 tion, from which Force other phenomena arise by way of nec- 
 essary consequence. Force is the root-idea of Law in its scien- 
 tific sense. And so the Law of Gravitation is not merely the 
 " observed order " in which the heavenly bodies move ; neither 
 is it only the abstract idea of some Force to which such move- 
 ments must be due, but it is that Force the exact measure of 
 whose operation was numerically ascertained or defined by 
 Newton the Force which compels those movements and (in a 
 sense) explains them. Now the difference between Law in the 
 narrower and Law in the larger sense cannot be better illus- 
 trated than in the difference between the Three special Laws dis- 
 covered by Kepler, and the One universal Law discovered by 
 Newton. The Three Laws of Kepler were, as we have seen, 
 simply and purely an observed Order of facts. They stood by 
 themselves disconnected, their cause unknown. The higher 
 Law, discovered by Newton, revealed their connection and their 
 cause. The " observed Order " which Kepler had discovered, 
 was simply a necessary consequence of the Force of Gravita- 
 tion. In the light of this great Law the " Three Laws of Kep- 
 ler " have been merged and lost. 
 
 When the operations of any material Force can be reduced 
 to rules so definite as those which have been discovered in re- 
 spect to the Force of Gravitation, and when these rules are 
 capable of mathematical expression and of mathematical proof, 
 they are, so far as they go, in the nature of pure truth. Mr. 
 Lewes, in his very curious and interesting work on the " Philos- 
 ophy of Aristotle," has maintained that the knowledge of Meas- 
 
LAW ; ITS DEFINITIONS. 43 
 
 ure or what he calls the " verifiable element " in our knowl- 
 edge is the element which determines whether any theory be- 
 longs to Science, strictly so called, or to Metaphysics; and 
 that any theory may be transferred from Metaphysics to Sci- 
 ence, or from Science to Metaphysics, simply by the addition 
 or withdrawal of its "verifiable element." In illustration of 
 this, he says that if we withdraw, from the Law of Universal 
 Attraction, the formula, "inversely as the square of the dis- 
 tance, and directly as the mass," it becomes pure Metaphysics. 
 If this means that, apart from ascertained numerical relations, 
 our conception of Law, or our knowledge of natural phenomena, 
 loses all reality and distinctness, I do not agree in the position 4 
 The idea of natural Forces is quite separate from any ascer- 
 tained measure of their energy. The knowledge, for example, 
 that all the particles of matter exert an attractive force upon 
 each other, is, so far as it goes, true physical knowledge, even 
 though we did not know the further truth, that this force acts 
 according to the numerical rule ascertained by Newton. To 
 banish from physical Science, properly so called, and to rele- 
 gate to Metaphysics, all knowledge which cannot be reduced 
 to numerical expression, is a dangerous abuse of language. 
 
 Force, ascertained according to some measure of its opera- 
 tionthis is indeed one of the definitions, but only one, of a 
 scientific Law. The discovery of laws in this sense is the 
 great quest of Science, and the finding of them is one of her 
 great rewards. Such laws yield to the human mind a peculiar 
 delight, from the satisfaction they afford to those special fac- 
 ulties whose function it is to recognize the beauty of numerical 
 relations. This satisfaction is so great, and in its own meas- 
 ure is so complete, that the mind reposes on an ascertained 
 law of this kind as on an ultimate truth. And ultimate it is as 
 regards the particular faculties which are concerned in this 
 kind of search. When we have observed our facts, and when 
 we have summed up our figures, when we have recognized the 
 constant numbers, then our eyes, our ears, and our calculat- 
 ing faculties have done their work. But other faculties are 
 called into simultaneous operation, and these have other work 
 to do. For let it be observed that laws in the first three senses 
 we have now examined, cannot be said to explain anything ex- 
 
44 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 cept the Order of subordinate phenomena. They set forth that 
 order as due to Force. They do nothing more. Least of all 
 do laws, in any of these three senses, explain themselves. 
 They suggest a thousand questions much more curious than 
 the questions which they solve. The very beaut)- and simplic- 
 ity of some laws is their deepest mystery. What can their 
 source be ? How is their uniformity maintained ? Every law 
 implies a Force, and all that we ever know is some numerical 
 rule or measure according to which some unknown Forces oper- 
 ate. But whence come those measures those exact relations 
 to number, which never vary ? Or, if there are variations, how 
 comes it that these are always found to follow some other rules 
 as exact and as invariable as the first ? 
 
 And as there can be no better example of what Law is, so 
 also there can be no better example of what it is not than the 
 Law of Gravitation. The discovery of it was probably the 
 highest exercise of pure intellect through which the human 
 mind has found its way. It is the most universal physical law 
 which is known to us, for it prevails, apparently, through all 
 space. Yet of the Force of Gravitation all we know is that it is 
 a force of attraction operating between all the particles of mat- 
 ter in the exact measure which was ascertained by Newton, 
 that is " directly as the mass, and inversely as the square of 
 the distance." This is the Law. But it affords no sort of ex- 
 planation of itself. What is the cause of this Force what is 
 its source what are the media of its operation how is the exact 
 uniformity of its proportions maintained ? these are questions 
 which it is impossible not to ask, but which it is quite as im- 
 possible to answer. Sir John Herschel, in speaking of this 
 Force, has indicated in a passing sentence a few questions out 
 of the many which arise : " No matter," he says, " from what 
 ultimate causes the power called gravitation originates be it a 
 virtue lodged in the sun as its receptacle, or be it pressure from 
 without, or the resultant of many pressures, or solicitations of 
 unknown kinds, magnetic or electric, ethers or impulses," * etc., 
 etc. How little we have ascertained in this Law, after all ! Yet 
 there is an immense and an instinctive pleasure in the contem- 
 plation of it. To analyze this pleasure is as difficult as to ana- 
 
 * Herschel's " Outlines of Astronomy," fifth edition, p. 323. 
 
LAW ; ITS DEFINITIONS. 45 
 
 lyze the pleasure which the eye takes in beauty of form, or the 
 pleasure which the ear takes in the harmonies of sound. And 
 this pleasure is inexhaustible, for these laws of number and 
 proportion pervade all Nature, and the intellectual organs 
 which have been fitted to the knowledge of them have eyes 
 which are never satisfied with seeing, and ears which are never 
 full of hearing. The agitation which overpowered Sir Isaac 
 Newton as the Law of Gravitation was rising to his view in the 
 light of rigorous demonstration, was the homage rendered by 
 the great faculties of his nature to a harmony which was as new 
 as it was immense and wonderful. The same pleasure in its 
 own degree is felt by every man of science who, in any branch 
 of physical inquiry, traces and detects any lesser law. And it 
 is perfectly true that such laws are being detected everywhere. 
 Forces which are in their essence and their source utterly mys- 
 terious, are always being found to operate under rules which 
 have strict reference to measures of number, to relations of 
 Space and Time. The Forces which determine chemical com- 
 bination all work under rules as sharp and definite as the Force 
 of Gravitation. So do the Forces which operate in Light, and 
 Heat, and Sound. So do those which exert their energies in 
 Magnetism and Electricity. All the operations of Nature the 
 smallest and the greatest are performed under similar 
 measures ajid restraints. Not even a drop of water can be 
 formed except under rules which determine its weight, its vol- 
 ume> and its shape, with exact reference to the density of the 
 fluid, to the structure of the surface on which it maybe formed, 
 and to the pressure of the surrounding atmosphere. Then that 
 pressure is itself exercised under rigorous rules again. Not one 
 of the countless varieties of form which prevail in clouds, and 
 which give to the face of heaven such infinite expression, not 
 one of them but is ruled by Law, woven, or braided, or torn, 
 or scattered, or gathered up again and folded, by Forces which 
 are free only " within the bounds of Law." 
 
 And equally in those subjects of inquiry in which rules of 
 number and of proportion are not applicable, rules are dis- 
 cernible which belong to another class, but which are as certain 
 and as prevailing. All events, however casual or disconnected 
 they may at first appear to be, are found in the course of time 
 
46 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 to arrange themselves in some certain Order, the index and 
 exponent of Forces, of which we know nothing except their ex- 
 istence as evidenced in these effects. It is indeed wonderful 
 to find that in such a matter, for example, as the develop- 
 ment of our Human Speech, the unconscious changes which 
 arise from time to time among the rudest utterances of 
 the rudest tribes and races of Mankind, are all found to fol- 
 low rules of progress as regular as those which preside over 
 any of the material growths of Nature. Yet so it is ; and it is 
 upon this fact alone that the science of Language rests a 
 science in which all the facts are not yet observed, and many 
 of those which have been observed are not yet reduced to 
 order ; but in which enough has been ascertained to show that 
 languages grow, and change from generation to generation, 
 according to rules of which the men who speak them are 
 wholly unconscious. It is the same with all other things. 
 And as it is now, so apparently has it been in all past time of 
 which we have any record. Even the work of Creation has 
 been and is being carried on under rules of adherence to 
 Typical Forms, and under limits of variation from them, 
 which can be dimly seen and traced, although they cannot 
 be defined or understood. The universal prevalence of laws 
 of this kind cannot therefore be denied. The discovery of 
 them is one of the first results of all physical inquiry. In this 
 sense it is true that we, and the world around us, are under the 
 Reign of Law. 
 
 It is true, but only a bit and fragment of the truth. For 
 there is another fact quite as prominent as the universal pres- 
 ence and prevalence of laws and that is, the number of them 
 which are concerned in each single operation in Nature. No 
 one Law that is to say, no one Force determines anything 
 that we see happening or done around us. It is always the 
 result of different and opposing Forces nicely balanced against 
 each other. The least disturbance of the proportion in which 
 any one of them is allowed to tell, produces a total change in 
 the effect. The more we know of Nature, the more intricate 
 do such combinations appear to be. They can be traced very 
 near to the fountains of Life itself, even close up to the confines 
 of the last secret of all how the Will acts upon its organs in 
 
LAW ; ITS DEFINITIONS. 
 
 the Body. Recent investigations in Physiology seem 
 the hypothesis that our muscles are the seat of two opposing 
 Forces, each so adjusted as to counteract the other ; and that 
 this antagonism is itself so arranged as to enable us by acting on 
 one of these Forces, to regulate the action of the other. One 
 Force an elastic or contractile Force is supposed to be 
 inherent in the muscular fibre another Force that of Animal 
 Electricity in statical condition holds the contractile Force in 
 check ; and the relaxed, or rather the restful, condition of the 
 muscle when not in use, is due to the balance so maintained. 
 When, through the motor nerves the Will orders the muscles into 
 action, that order is enforced by 'a discharge of the Electrical. 
 Force, and upon this discharge the contractile Force is set free 
 to act, and does accordingly produce the contraction which is 
 desired.* 
 
 Such is, at least, one suggestion as to the means employed 
 to place human action under the control of human Will, in 
 that material frame which is so wonderfully and fearfully made. 
 And whether this hypothesis be accurate or not, it is certain 
 that some such adjustment of Force to Mechanism is involved 
 in every bodily movement which is subject to the Will. Even 
 in this high region, therefore, we see that the existence of in- 
 dividual laws is not the end of our physical knowledge. What 
 we always reach at last in the course of every physical inquiry, 
 is the recognition, not of individual laws, but of some definite 
 relation to each other, in which different laws are placed, so as 
 to bring about a particular result. But this is, in other words, 
 the principle of Adjustment, and adjustment has no meaning 
 except as the instrument and the result of Purpose. Force so 
 combined with Force as to produce certain definite and orderly 
 results, this is the ultimate fact of all discovery. 
 
 And so we come upon another sense the Fourth sense, in 
 which Law is habitually used in Science, and this is perhaps 
 the commonest and most important of all. It is used to 
 designate not merely an observed Order of facts not merely 
 the bare abstract idea of Force not merely individual Forces 
 according to ascertained measures of operation but a number 
 
 * This theory of muscular and nervous action is set forth with much ingenuity and 
 force of illustration in " Lectures on Epilepsy," etc., by Charles Bland Radcliffe, M.D. 
 
48 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 of Forces in the condition of mutual adjustment, that is to say, 
 as combined with each other, and fitted to each other for the 
 attainment of special ends. The whole science of Animal 
 Mechanics, for example, deals with Law in this sense with 
 natural Forces as related to Purpose and subservient to the dis- 
 charge of Function. And this is the highest sense of all Law 
 in this sense being more perfectly intelligible to us than in any 
 other ; because, although we know nothing of the real nature 
 of Force, even of that Force which is resident in ourselves, we 
 do know for what ends we exert it, and the principle that 
 governs our devices for its use. That principle is, Combination 
 for the accomplishment of Purpose. 
 
 Accordingly it is, when natural phenomena can be reduced 
 to Law, in this last sense, that we reach something which 
 alone is really in the nature of an explanation. For what do 
 we mean by an explanation ? It is an unfolding or a " mak- 
 ing plain.'* But as the human mind has many faculties, so 
 each of these seeks a satisfaction of its own. That which is 
 made plain to one faculty is not necessarily made plain to 
 another. That which is a complete answer to the question 
 What, or to the question How, is no answer at all to the ques- 
 tion Why. There are some philosophers who tell us that this 
 last is a question which had better never be asked, because it 
 is one to which Nature gives no reply. If this be so, it is 
 strange that Nature should have given us the faculties which 
 impel us to ask this question ay, and to ask it more eagerly 
 than any other. It is, indeed, true that there is a point beyond 
 which we need not ask it, because the answer is inaccessible. 
 But this is equally true of the questions What, and How. 
 We cannot reach Final Causes any more than Final Purposes. 
 For every cause which we can detect, there is another cause 
 which lies behind ; and for every purpose which we can see, 
 there are other purposes which lie beyond. 
 
 And so it is true that all things in Nature may either be re- 
 garded as means or as ends for they are always both only 
 that Final Ends we can never see. For. as Bishop Butler 
 truly says in his "Analogy," Chapter IV., "We know what we 
 ourselves aim at as final ends, and what courses we take merely 
 as means conducing to these ends. But we are greatly igno- 
 
LAW ; ITS DEFINITIONS. 49 
 
 rant how far things are considered by the Author of Nature 
 under the simple notion of means and ends, so as that it 
 may be said this is merely an end, and that merely means, in 
 His regard. And whether there be not some peculiar absurdity 
 in our very manner of conception concerning this matter, some- 
 what contradictory, arising from an extremely imperfect view of 
 things, it is impossible to say." This is indeed a wise caution, 
 and one which has been much needed to check the abuse of 
 that method of reasoning which has been called the doctrine of 
 Final Causes. When Man makes an implement, he knows 
 the purpose for which he makes it he knows the function 
 assigned to it in his own intention. But as in making it there 
 are a thousand chips and fragments of material which he casts 
 aside, so in its final use it often produces consequences and 
 results which he did not contemplate or foresee. But in Na- 
 ture all this is different. Nature has no chips or fragments 
 which she does not put to use ; and as on the way to her ap- 
 parent ends there are no incidents which she did not foresee, 
 so beyond those ends there are no ulterior results which do 
 not open out into new firmaments of Design. Of nothing, 
 therefore, can- we say with even the probability of truth that 
 we see its Final Cause ; that is to say, its ultimate purpose. 
 All that we can ever see are the facts of Adjustment and of 
 Function, and these constitute not Final, but Immediate Pur- 
 pose. But a purpose is not less a purpose, because other 
 purposes may lie beyond it. And not only can we detect 
 Purpose in natural phenomena, but, as we have already seen, 
 it is very often the only thing about them which is intelligible 
 to us. The How is very often incomprehensible, where the 
 Why is apparent at a glance. And be this observed, that 
 when Purpose is perceived, it is a " making plain " to a 
 higher faculty of the mind than the mere sense of Order. It 
 is a making plain to Reason. It is the reduction of phenomena 
 to that Order of Thought which is the basis of all other Order 
 in the works of Man, and which, he instinctively concludes, 
 is the basis also of all Order in the works of Nature. 
 
 And here it is important to observe, that although this gen- 
 eral conclusion, like all other general conclusions, belongs to 
 the category of mental inferences, and not to the category of 
 
$0 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 physical facts, yet each particular instance of Purpose on 
 which the general inference is founded, is not an inference 
 merely, but a fact. The function of an organ, for example, 
 is a matter of purely physical investigation. But the function 
 of an organ is not merely that which it does, but it is that 
 which some special construction enables it to do. It is, not 
 merely its work, but it is the work assigned to it as an Appa- 
 ratus, and as fitted to other organs having other functions re- 
 lated to its own. The nature of that Apparatus, as being in 
 itself an adjustment for a particular purpose, is not an inference 
 from the facts, but it is part of the facts themselves. The very 
 idea of Function is inseparable from the idea of Purpose. The 
 Function of an organ is its Purpose ; and the relation of its 
 parts, and of the whole to that Purpose, is as much and as 
 definitely a scientific fact as the relation of any other phenom- 
 enon to Space, or Time, or Number, 
 
 This distinction between Purpose as a general inference and 
 Purpose as a particular fact, has not been sufficiently observed. 
 The just condemnation pronounced by Bacon on the pursuit of 
 Final Causes as distorting the true Method of Physical Investi- 
 gation,, has been applied without discrimination to two very dif- 
 ferent conceptions. Even Philosophers who believe in the Su- 
 premacy of Purpose in Nature have been willing to banish this 
 conception from the Domain of Science, and to classify rt as 
 belonging altogether to Metaphysics or Theology. Thus in the 
 very able Harveian Oration for 1865 by Dr. H. W. Acland, he 
 says, " Whether there be any Purpose, is the object of Theo- 
 logical and Metaphysical, but not of Physical inquiry." : And 
 again, " The evidence of intention is metaphysical, and de- 
 pends on probabilities. It is not positive. It is inferential 
 from many considerations." f I venture to dissent from these 
 conclusions. They involve, I think, a confounding of two sep- 
 arate questions. The nature and character of the intending 
 Mind this is indeed a question of Theology ; but not the exist- 
 ence of intention. Neither in any restrictive sense of the word 
 can it be called Metaphysical. Even as a general doctrine, the 
 doctrine of Contrivance and Adjustment is not so metaphysical 
 as the Doctrine of Homologies ; and when we come to particular 
 
 * P. 61. 
 
LAW ; ITS DEFINITIONS. 5 I 
 
 cases there can be no question whatever that the relation of a 
 given Structure to its Purpose and Function comes more un- 
 equivocally under the class of physical facts than the relation 
 of that same Structure to some corresponding part in another 
 animal. It is less ideal, for example, less theoretical less 
 metaphysical to assert of the little hooked claw which is at- 
 tached to the (apparent) elbow of a Bat's wing, that it was 
 placed there to enable the Bat to climb and crawl, than to affirm 
 of that same claw that it is the " homologue " of the human 
 thumb. Yet who can deny that this doctrine of Homologies 
 has been established as a strictly scientific truth ? There is a 
 sense, of course, in which all Knowledge and all Science be- 
 longs to Metaphysics. Mere classification, which is the basis 
 of all Science, what is it but the marshalling of physical facts 
 in an Ideal Order an arrangement of them according to the 
 relation which they bear to the laws of Thought ? But this does 
 not constitute as a branch of Metaphysics, the division of ani- 
 mals into Genera, and Families, and Orders. And what rela- 
 tion can physical facts ever have to Thought so directly cogniz- 
 able or so susceptible of Demonstration as the relation of an 
 animal organ to its purpose and function in the animal econ- 
 omy ? Whether Purpose be the 1 basis of all natural Order or 
 not is a separate question. It is at least one of the facts of that 
 Order. Combination for the accomplishment of Purpose there- 
 fore in particular cases, such as the relation between the struct- 
 ure of an Organ and its function, is not merely a safe conclu- 
 sion of Philosophy, but an ascertained fact of Science. (See 
 note B.) 
 
 This question has acquired additional importance since the 
 revival in our own day, and with new resources, of that old phi- 
 losophy which assumes to banish from the domain of Knowl- 
 edge no small part of the richest and surest acquisitions of Rea- 
 son. That Philosophy must be tested by a rigid analysis of 
 thought and language. This is the weapon with which the as- 
 sault is made, and it is by the same weapon better handled that 
 it can alone be met. An arbitrary limitation of the word " knowl- 
 edge," to a particular kind of knowledge, can only be tolerated 
 on condition that the arbitrary nature of the limitation be con- 
 stantly kept in view. In like manner the word " verification " 
 
52 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 may be confined to a particular kind of proof applicable only 
 to a particular class of truths. So again, in regard to " Meta- 
 physics," it may be considered with reference to its subject- 
 matter as denoting a particular branch of inquiry such as 
 Psychology or as a method of investigation which may be ap- 
 plied equally to all subjects which furnish the mind with the 
 materials of thought. But we must watch against the substitu- 
 tion of one of these meanings for another ; and against the jug- 
 glery by which men first use Metaphysical Analysis to pull down 
 conceptions which they dislike, and then denounce Metaphysics 
 as incapable of establishing any conclusions on which we can 
 rely. The fact to which I have previously referred,* is a fact 
 of immense significance, that one of the most able supporters 
 of the Positive Philosophy in England relegates to Metaphysics 
 the great scientific fact of Physical Attraction, when it is con- 
 sidered apart from its numerical relations. But if this be con- 
 sidered Metaphysics, then let it be remembered that many of 
 the most certain truths we know belong to the same category. 
 From a similar point of view, it might be argued, and it has 
 actually been argued, that Number and all numerical relations 
 are purely abstract conceptions of the mind, having no other 
 reality than as there conceived. (See note C.) The same rea- 
 soning may be applied to all our most fundamental conceptions 
 without which Science could not even begin her work. The 
 existence of Force under any form, of which the existence of 
 Matter is only a special case, may be regarded as a purely 
 metaphysical conception. It is surely a comfort to find that, if 
 all ideas of Plan and of Design in the Adjustments of Organic 
 Life are to be condemned as Metaphysical, they stand at least 
 in goodly company among the necessities of Thought. Mr. 
 Lewes, indeed, himself confesses that " Science finds it indis- 
 pensable to co-ordinate all the facts in a general concept, such 
 as a Plan." f But he pronounces it one of the " Infirmities of 
 Thought " to " realize the concept." But no accurate thinker ever 
 " realized " such an idea as a " Plan " that is to say, no one 
 ever conceived it as existing by itself, separate from an intend- 
 ing Mind. Mr. Lewes complains that " Matter and Force are 
 
 * P. 42. t " History of Philosophy," Prologue, p. IxxxVi. 
 
LAW ; ITS DEFINITIONS. 53 
 
 mysterious enough " without a " new mystery of Architectural 
 Plan, shaping Matter and directing Force." * But, substitut- 
 ing here " Mind " for Plan, it may surely be argued that if 
 Science finds it " indispensable " to co-ordinate all the facts in 
 some such general concept, this is of itself a proof that the ele- 
 ment so introduced does not add to the mystery, but helps to 
 remove it. Even if it be an " artifice of thought," it can only 
 be resorted to as rendering the facts not less but more conceiv- 
 able. And this it plainly does by appealing to an agency hav- 
 ing known power in the production of analogous phenomena. 
 The instinctive wisdom which lies in this " infirmity " of the 
 mind becomes more apparent when we turn to the efforts of an 
 acute intellect to cast such infirmities away. The most abstract 
 metaphysical conceptions are substituted for those which are 
 denounced : the only difference being that, whilst the old con- 
 ceptions are intelligible as connecting the Phenomena by a link 
 of thought which the mind can feel and follow, the new concep- 
 tions are unintelligible because they try to describe facts with- 
 out any reference to the ideas' they involve. No new light 
 nothing but denser darkness is cast on the phenomena of 
 Organic Life by calling " Life the connexus of the organic ac- 
 tivities." f Yet meaningless words are heaped on each other 
 in the desperate effort to dispense with those conceptions which 
 can alone render the order of Nature intelligible to us. Thus 
 we are told again, that " The Organism is the synthesis of di- 
 verse parts, and Life is the synthesis of their properties ; " t 
 and again, that " Vitality is the abstract designation of certain 
 special properties manifested by Matter under certain special 
 conditions." Surely there is more light in the old reading : 
 " Finding," says Mr. Lewes, " in an organism a certain adjust- 
 ment of parts, which may be reduced to a plan, we are easily 
 led to conceive that this plan was made before the parts, and that 
 the adjustment was determined by the plan." No doubt ! 
 This is the easiest conception, and it is the easiest because it is 
 most conformable to the laws of Thought ; and that which is 
 the most conformable to the laws of Thought is that which makes 
 the nearest approach to absolute Truth attainable by the Mind. 
 
 * " History of Philosophy," p. Ixxxvi. 
 
 t Ibid. p. Ixxx. \ Ibid. p. Ixxxiii. Ibid. p. Ixxxiv. 
 
54 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 The universal prevalence of this idea of Purpose in Nature 
 is indicated by the irresistible tendency which we observe in 
 the language of Science to personify the Forces, and the com- 
 binations of Force by which all natural phenomena are pro- 
 duced. It is a great injustice to scientific men too often com- 
 mitted to suspect them of unwillingness to accept the idea of 
 a Personal Creator merely because they try to keep separate 
 the language of Science from the language of Theology. 1 * But 
 it is curious to observe how this endeavor constantly breaks 
 down how impossible it is in describing physical phenomena 
 to avoid the phraseology which identifies them with the phe- 
 nomena of Mind, and is moulded on our own conscious Person- 
 ality and Will. It is impossible to avoid this language simply 
 because no other language conveys the impression which innu- 
 merable structures leave upon the mind. Take, for example, 
 the word " contrivance." How could Science do without it ? 
 How could the great subject of Animal Mechanics be dealt 
 with scientifically without continual reference to Law as that by 
 which, and through which, special organs are formed for the 
 doing of special work ? What is the very definition of a ma- 
 chine ? Machines do not increase Force, they only adjust it. 
 The very idea and essence of a machine is that it is a contriv- 
 ance for the distribution of Force with a view to its bearing on 
 special purposes. A man's arm is a machine in which the law 
 of leverage is supplied to the vital force for the purposes of 
 prehension. We shall see presently that a bird's wing is a ma- 
 chine in which the same law is applied, under the most compli- 
 cated conditions, for the purpose of flight. Anatomy supplies 
 
 * A remarkable instance of this injustice has been lately brought to light. Professor 
 Huxley, in an article in the Fortnightly Review, had used one of those vague phrases, 
 so common with scientific men, about the " unknown and the unknowable " being the 
 goal of all scientific thought, which not unnaturally suggest the notion that all idea of 
 a God is unattainable. A writer in the Spectator accordingly dealt with Professor 
 Huxley as avowing Atheism, and was rebuked by the Professor in a letter published 
 in the Spectator of Feb. 10, 1866. Professor Huxley says ; " I do not know that I care 
 very much about popular odium, so that there is no great merit in saying that if I 
 really saw fit to deny the existence of a God, I should certainly do so, for the sake of 
 my own intellectual freedom, and be the honest Atheist you are pleased to say I am. 
 As it happens, however, I cannot take this position with honesty, inasmuch as it is^ 
 and always has been, a favorite tenet of mine, that Atheism is as absurd, logically 
 speaking, as Polytheism." On the subject of miracles, in the same letter, Professor 
 Huxley says, that " denying the possibility of miracles seems to me quite as unjustifi- 
 able as speculative Atheism." The question of miracles c*jns now to be admitted on 
 all-hands to be simply a question of evidence 
 
LAW ; ITS DEFINITIONS. 55 
 
 an infinite number of similar examples. It is impossible to de- 
 scribe or explain the facts we meet with in this or in any other 
 branch of Science without investing the " laws " of Nature with 
 something of that Personality which they do actually reflect, or 
 without conceiving of them as partaking of those attributes of 
 Mind which we everywhere recognize in their working and re- 
 sults. 
 
 We may, again, take the Forces which determine the Plane- 
 tary motions as the grandest and the simplest illustrations of 
 this truth of Science. Gravitation, as already said, is a Force 
 which prevails apparently through all space. But it does not 
 prevail alone. It is a Force whose function it is to balance 
 other Forces, of which we know nothing, except this, that 
 these, again, are needed to balance the Force of Gravitation. 
 Each Force, if left to itself, would be destructive of the Uni- 
 verse. Were it not for the Force of Gravitation, the centrifugal 
 Forces which impel the Planets would fling them off into Space. 
 Were it not for these centrifugal Forces, the Force of Gravita- 
 tion would dash them against the Sun. The orbits, therefore, 
 of the Planets, with all that depends upon them, are determined 
 by the nice and perfect balance which is maintained between 
 these two Forces ; and the ultimate fact of astronomical science 
 is not the Law of Gravitation, but the Adjustment between this 
 law and others which are less known, so as to produce and 
 maintain the existing Solar System. 
 
 This is one example of the principle of Adjustment ; but no 
 one example, however grand the scale may be on which it is 
 exhibited, can give any idea of the extent to which the principle 
 of Adjustment is required, and is adopted in 'the works of Na- 
 ture. The revolution of the seasons, for example seed-time 
 and harvest depend on the Law of Gravitation in this sense, 
 that if that law were disturbed, or if it were inconstant, they 
 would be disturbed and inconstant also. But the seasons 
 equally depend on a multitude of other laws, laws of heat, 
 laws of light, laws relating to fluids, and to solids, and to gases, 
 and to magnetic attractions and repulsions, each one of which 
 laws is invariable in itself, but each of which would produce ut- 
 ter confusion if it were allowed to operate alone, or if it were 
 not balanced against others in the right proportion. It is very 
 
56 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 difficult to form any adequate idea of the vast number of laws 
 which are concerned in producing the most ordinary operations 
 of Nature. Looking only at the combinations with which As- 
 tronomy is concerned, the adjustments are almost infinite. 
 Each minutest circumstance in the position, or size, or shape of 
 the Earth, the direction of its axis, the velocity of its motion 
 and of its rotation, has its own definite effect, and the slightest 
 change in any one of these relations would wholly alter the 
 world we live in. And then it is to be remembered that the 
 seasons, as they are now fitted to us, and as we are fitted to 
 them, do not depend only on the facts or the laws which As- 
 tronomy reveals. They depend quite as much on other sets of 
 facts, and other sets of laws, revealed by other sciences, such, 
 for example, as Chemistry, Electricity, and Geology. The mo- 
 tion of the Earth might be exactly what it is, every fact in re- 
 spect to our Planetary position might remain unchanged, yet 
 the seasons would return in vain if our own atmosphere were 
 altered in any one of the elements of its composition, or if any 
 one of the laws regulating the action were other than it is. 
 Under a thinner air even the torrid zone might be wrapped in 
 eternal snow. Under a denser air, and one with different re- 
 fracting powers, the Earth and all that is therein might be burnt 
 up. And so it is through the whole of Nature : laws every- 
 where laws in themselves invariable, but so worked as to pro- 
 duce effects of inexhaustible variety by being pitched against 
 each other, and made to hold each other in restraint. 
 
 I have already referred to Chemistry* as a science full of 
 illustrations of Law in the First and simplest sense that is, of 
 facts in observed orders of recurrence. But Chemistry is a 
 science not less rich in illustration of Law in the Fourth sense 
 that is, of Forces in mutual adjustment. Indeed, in Chemis- 
 try, this system of adjustment among the different properties 
 of matter is especially intricate and observable! Some of the 
 laws which regulate Chemical Combination were discovered in 
 our own time, and are amongst the most wonderful and the 
 most beautiful which have been revealed by any science. 
 They are laws of great exactness, having invariable relations to 
 number and proportion. Each elementary substance has its 
 own combining proportions with other elements, so that, except 
 
LAW ; ITS DEFINITIONS. 57 
 
 in these proportions, no chemical union can take place at all. 
 And when chemical union does take place, the compounds 
 which result have different and even opposite powers accord- 
 ing to the different proportions employed. Then, the relations 
 in which those inorganic compounds stand to the chemistry of 
 Life, constitute another vast series in which the principle of 
 adjustment has applications, infinite in number, and as infinite 
 in beauty. How delicate these relations are, and how tremen- 
 dous are the issues depending on their management, may be 
 conceived from this single fact, that the same elements com- 
 bined in one proportion are sometimes a nutritious food or a 
 grateful stimulant, soothing and sustaining the powers of life ; 
 whilst, combined in another proportion, they may be a deadly 
 poison, paralyzing the heart and carrying agony along every 
 nerve and fibre of the animal frame. This is no mere theoreti- 
 cal possibility. It is actually the relation, for example, in which 
 two well-known substances stand to each other Tea and 
 Strychnia. The active principles of these two substances, 
 " Theine " and " Strychnine," are identical so far as their 
 elements are concerned, and differ from each other only in the 
 proportions in which they are combined. Such is the power 
 of numbers in the Laboratory of Nature ! What havoc in this 
 world, so full of Life, would be made by blind chance gambling 
 with such powers as these ! What confusion, unless they were 
 governed by laws whose certainty makes them capable of fine 
 adjustment, and. therefore subject to accurate control! How 
 fine these adjustments are, and how absolute is that control, is 
 indicated in another fact and that is the few elements out of 
 which all things are made. The number of substances deemed 
 elementary has varied with the advance of Science ; but as 
 compared with the variety of their products, that number may 
 be considered as infinitesimally small ; whilst the progress of 
 analysis, with glimpses of laws as yet unknown, renders it 
 almost certain that this number will be found to be smaller 
 still. Yet out of that small number of elementary substances, 
 having fixed rules, too, limiting their combination, all the in- 
 finite varieties of organic and inorganic matter are built up by 
 means of nice adjustment. As all the faculties of a powerful 
 mind can utter their voice in language whose elements are 
 
58 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 reducible to twenty-four letters, so all the forms of Nature, with 
 all the ideas they express, are worked out from a few simple 
 elements having a few simple properties. 
 
 Simple ! can we call them so ? Yes, simple by comparison 
 with the exceeding complication of the uses they are made to 
 serve : simple also, in this sense, that they follow some simple 
 rule of numbers. But in themselves these laws, these forces 
 are incomprehensible. That which is most remarkable about 
 them is their unchangeableness. The whole mind and imagi- 
 nation of scientific men is often so impressed with this character 
 of material laws, that no room is left for the perception of other 
 aspects of their nature and of their work. We hear of rigid 
 and universal sequence necessary invariable ; of unbroken 
 chains of cause and effect, no link of which can, in the nature 
 of things, be ever broken. And this idea grows upon the 
 mind, until in some confused manner it is held as casting out 
 the idea of Purpose in creation, and inconsistent with the 
 element of Will. If it be so, the difficulty cannot be evaded 
 by denying the uniformity, any more than the universality, of 
 Law. It is perfectly true that every law is, in its own nature, 
 invariable, producing always precisely and necessarily the 
 same effects, that is, provided it is worked under the same 
 conditions. But then, if the conditions are not the same,. the 
 invariableness of effect gives place to capacities of change 
 which are almost infinite. It is by altering the conditions 
 under which any given law is brought to bear, and by bringing 
 other laws to operate upon the same subject, that our own 
 Wills exercise a large and increasing power over the material 
 world. And be it observed to this end the uniformity of laws 
 is no impediment, but, on the contrary, it is an indispensable 
 condition. Laws are in themselves if not unchangeable at 
 least unchanging, and if they were not unchanging, they could 
 not be used as the instruments of Will. If they were less 
 rigorous they would be less certain, and the least uncertainty 
 would render them incapable of any service. No adjustment, 
 however nice, could secure its purpose if the implements 
 employed were of uncertain temper. 
 
 The notion therefore that the uniformity or invariableness of 
 the Laws of Nature cannot be reconciled with their subordina- 
 
LAW ; ITS DEFINITIONS. 59 
 
 tion to the exercise of Will, is a notion contrary to our own ex- 
 perience. It is a confusion of thought arising very much out 
 of the ambiguity of language. For let it be observed that, of 
 all the senses in which the word Law is used, there is only one 
 in which it is true that laws are immutable or invariable , and 
 that is the sense in which Law is used to designate an individ- 
 ual Force. Gravitation, for example, is immutable in this re- 
 spect that (so far as we know) it never operates according to 
 any other measure than " directly as the mass, and inversely 
 as the square of the distance." But in all the other senses in 
 which the word Law is used, laws are not immutable , but, on 
 the contrary, they are the great instruments, the unceasing 
 agencies, of change. When, therefore, scientific men speak, 
 as they often do, of all phenomena being governed by invaria- 
 ble laws, they use language which is ambiguous, and in most 
 cases they use it in a sense which covers an erroneous idea of 
 the facts. There are no phenomena visible to Man of which 
 it is true to say that they are governed by any invariable Force. 
 That which does govern them is always some variable combi- 
 nations of invariable forces. But this makes all the difference 
 in reasoning on the relation of Will to Law, this is the one 
 essential distinction to be admitted and observed. There is 
 no observed Order of facts which is not due to a combination 
 of Forces ; and there is no combination of Forces which is in- 
 variable none which are not capable of change in infinite de- 
 grees. In these senses and these are the common senses in 
 which Law is used to express the phenomena of Nature Law 
 is not rigid, it is not immutable, it is not invariable, but it is, 
 on the contrary, pliable, subtle, various. In the only sense in 
 which laws are immutable, this immutability is the very charac- 
 teristic which makes them subject to guidance through endless 
 cycles of design. We know this in our own case. It is the 
 very certainty and invariableness of the laws of Nature which 
 alone enables us to use them, and to yoke them to our service. 
 Now, the laws of Nature appear to be employed in the sys- 
 tem of Nature in a manner precisely analogous to that in which 
 we ourselves employ them. The difficulties and obstructions 
 which are presented by one law in the way of accomplishing a 
 given purpose, are met and overcome exactly on the same 
 
60 THE REIGN OF LAW 
 
 principle on which they are met and overcome Man viz., 
 by knowledge of other laws, and by resource in applying them, 
 that is, by ingenuity in mechanical contrivance. It cannot 
 be too much insisted on, that this is a conclusion of pure 
 Science. The relation which an organic structure bears to its 
 purpose in Nature can be recognized as certainly as the same 
 relation between a machine and its purpose in human art. It 
 is absurd to maintain, for example, that the purpose of the 
 cellular arrangement of material in combining lightness with 
 strength, is a purpose legitimately cognizable by Science in the 
 Menai Bridge, but is not as legitimately cognizable when it 
 is seen in Nature, actually serving the same use. The little 
 Barnacles which crust the rocks at low tide, and which to live 
 there at all must be able to resist the surf, have the building of 
 their shells constructed strictly with reference to this necessity. 
 It is a structure all hollowed and chambered on the plan which 
 engineers have so lately discovered as an arrangement of ma- 
 terial by which the power of resisting strain or pressure is mul- 
 tiplied in an extraordinary degree. That shell is as pure a bit 
 of mechanics as the bridge, both being structures in which the 
 same arrangement is adapted to the same end. 
 
 " Small, but a work divine ; 
 Frail, but of force to withstand, 
 Year upon year, the shock 
 Of cataract seas that snap 
 The three-decker's oaken spine." 
 
 " Maud?* TENNYSON. 
 
 This is but one instance out of a number which no man can 
 count. So far as we know, no Law that is, no elementary 
 Force of Nature is liable to change. But every Law of Na- 
 ture is liable to counteraction ; and the rule is, that laws are 
 habitually made to counteract each other in precisely the man- 
 ner and degree which some definite result requires. 
 
 Nor is it less remarkable that the converse of this is true : 
 no Purpose is ever obtained in Nature, except by the enlist- 
 ment of Laws as the means and instruments of attainment. 
 When an extraordinary result is aimed at, it often happens 
 that some common law is yoked to extraordinary conditions, 
 
LAW ; ITS DEFINITIONS. 6 1 
 
 and its action is intensified by some special machinery. For 
 example, the Forces of Electricity are in action, probably, in 
 all living Organisms, but certainly in the muscular and ner- 
 vous system of the higher animals. In a very few (so far as 
 yet known, in only a very few animals among the millions 
 which exist, and these all belonging to the Class of Fishes), the 
 electrical action has been so stored and concentrated as to 
 render it serviceable as a weapon of offence. Creatures which 
 grovel at the bottom of the sea, or in the slime of rivers, have 
 been gifted with the astonishing faculty of wielding at their will 
 the most subtle of all the powers of Nature. They have the 
 faculty of " shooting out lightning " against their enemies or 
 their prey. But this gift has not been given without an exact 
 fulfilment of all the laws which govern Electricity, and which 
 especially govern its concentration and destructive force. The 
 Electric Ray, or Torpedo, has been provided with a Battery 
 closely resembling, but greatly exceeding in the beauty and 
 compactness of its structure, the Batteries whereby Man has 
 now learned to make the laws of Electricity subservient to his 
 will. There are no less than 940 hexagonal columns in this 
 Battery like those of a bee's comb, and each of these is subdi- 
 vided by a series of horizontal plates, which appear to be an- 
 alogous to the plates of the Voltaic Pile. The whole is sup- 
 plied with an enormous amount of nervous matter, four great 
 branches of which are as large as the animal's spinal cord, and 
 these spread out in a multitude of thread-like filaments round 
 the prismatic columns, and finally pass into all the cells.* 
 This, again, seems to suggest an analogy with the arrangement 
 by which an electric current, passing through a coil and round 
 a magnet, is used to intensify the magnetic force. A complete 
 knowledge of all the mysteries which have been gradually un- 
 folded from the days of Galvani to those of Faraday, and of 
 many others which are still inscrutable to us, is exhibited in 
 this structure. The laws which are appealed to in the accom- 
 plishment of this purpose are many and very complicated ; be- 
 cause the conditions to be satisfied refer not merely to the 
 generation of Electric force in the animal to which it is given, 
 but to its effect on the nervous system of the animals against 
 
 * Owen's " Lectures on Comp. Anat." vol. ii. (Fishes). 
 
62 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 which it is to be employed, and to the conducting medium in 
 which both are moving. 
 
 When we contemplate such a structure as this, the idea is 
 borne in with force upon the mind, that the need of conform- 
 ing to definite conditions seems as absolute a necessity in mak- 
 ing an Electric Fish as in making an Electric Telegraph. But 
 the fact of these conditions existing, and requiring to be satis- 
 fied, or, in other words, the fact of so many natural laws de- 
 manding a first obedience, is not the ultimate fact, it is not 
 even the main fact, which Science apprehends in such phenom- 
 ena as these. On the contrary, that which is most observa- 
 ble and most certain, is the manner in which these conditions 
 are met, complied with, and, by being complied with, are over- 
 come. But this is, in other words, the subordination of many 
 laws to a difficult and curious Purpose, a subordination which 
 is effected through the instrumentality of a purely mechanical 
 contrivance. 
 
 It is no objection to this universal truth, that the machines 
 thus employed in Nature are themselves constructed through 
 the agency of Law. They grow or, in modern. phraseology, 
 they are developed. But this makes no difference in the case 
 or, rather, it only carries us farther back to other and yet 
 other illustrations of the same truth. This is precisely one of 
 those cases already referred to, in which Causes are unknown, 
 whilst Purposes are clear and certain. The Battery of an Elec- 
 tric Fish is both a means and an end. As respects the electric 
 laws which it puts in motion that is, as respects the Force 
 which it concentrates it must be regarded as a means. As 
 respects the organic laws by which it is itself developed it is 
 an end. 
 
 What we do know in this case is why the apparatus was 
 made ; that is to say, what we do know is the Purpose. What 
 we do not know, and have no idea of, is how it was made ; that 
 is to say, what we do not know is the Law, the Force or Forces, 
 which have been used as the instrument of that Purpose. 
 When Man makes a voltaic Battery, he selects materials which 
 have properties and relations with each other previously as- 
 certained metals worked out of natural ores, acids distilled 
 out of other natural substances ; and he puts these together in 
 
LAW ; ITS DEFINITIONS. 63 
 
 such fashion as he knows will generate the mysterious Force 
 which he desires to evoke and to employ. But how can such a 
 machine be made out of the tissues of a fish? Well may Mr. 
 Darwin say, " It is impossible to conceive by what steps these 
 wondrous organs have been produced." * We see the Purpose 
 that a special apparatus should be prepared, and we see that 
 it is effected by the production of the machine required ; but 
 we have not the remotest notion of the means employed. Yet 
 we can see so much as this, that here again other laws, belong- 
 ing altogether to another department of Nature laws of organic 
 growth are made subservient to a very definite and very pecul- 
 iar Purpose. The paramount facts disclosed by Science, how- 
 ever, in this case, are these : first, the adaptation of the ani- 
 mal tissues to form a battery ; and, secondly, the Purpose or 
 function of the apparatus, when made, to discharge electric 
 shocks. 
 
 There is indeed one objection to this method of conception, 
 which would be a fatal objection if it could be consistently 
 maintained. But all the strength of this objection lies in the 
 obscure terrors which a very long word is sometimes capable of 
 inspiring. This word is " Anthropomorphism." Purpose and 
 Design, it is said, is a human conception. Unquestionably it 
 is, and so is all knowledge in every form. We can never stand 
 outside ourselves. We can never get behind or above our own 
 methods of conception. The human mind can know noth- 
 ing, and can think of nothing except in terms of its own ca- 
 pacities of thought. But if this be fatal to our knowledge of 
 any of the meanings in creation, it must be equally fatal to 
 our having any knowledge, of the very existence of a Crea- 
 tor. Once grant it to be true, " that if we are to apply our 
 human standard to the Creator in one direction, we must apply 
 it in all,"t then it will follow that we cannot conceive any 
 Creator unless it be one as weak, and as corrupt, and as ig- 
 norant as ourselves. If this be not bad logic, as on the face of 
 it it clearly is, then it is not " Theology " alone which goes by 
 the board. The purest and most naked Theism is equally 
 destroyed. If it can be said with truth that " the Universal 
 
 * " Origin of Species," p. 192, ist edition. 
 
 t Mr. G. H. Lewes, Fortnightly Review, July, 1867, p. 109. 
 
64 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 Mind is essentially other than the Human Mind," * so that no 
 recognizable relations can exist between them, then that Uni- 
 versal Mind is to us as if it were not. But those who take 
 objection to Anthropomorphism, are not generally prepared 
 to follow it to this extreme conclusion. Mr. Lewes speaks 
 of the sceptical philosophy he supports as " rejecting Athe- 
 ism " of Atheism being " an error which it has not main- 
 tained," of Atheism being not only rash, but " contradictory."! 
 But every conception of a " Mind," even though it be described 
 as "Universal," must be in some degree Anthropomorphic. 
 Our minds can think of another mind only as having some 
 powers and properties which in kind are common with our own. 
 Nor is this objection avoided by any of the other methods of 
 conception which are devised to eliminate from the Order of 
 Nature one of the most patent of its facts. The idea of nat- 
 ural forces working " by themselves " is pre-eminently Anthro- 
 pomorphic. This is undoubtedly the way in which they seem 
 to us to work when we employ them. The idea of those forces 
 having been so co-ordinated at the first as to produce "neces- 
 sarily " and " by themselves " all the phenomena of Nature 
 this is an idea essentially formed on those higher efforts of human 
 ingenuity in virtue of which " self-acting " machines are made. 
 It is quite true, no doubt, that this is one aspect in which the 
 adjustments and contrivances in Nature present themselves to 
 us. But it does not render this idea more Anthropomorphic, 
 but rather less, when we add to it other conceptions such as 
 the idea of a Mind which is the source of all power, and a Will 
 which is present in all effects. There may be other difficulties 
 in the way of this conception, but not the difficulty of Anthro- 
 pomorphism. From neither of these conceptions, however, can 
 we eliminate the idea of Purpose and Design. 
 
 It is very difficult to divest ourselves of the notion, that 
 whatever happens by way of natural consequence is thereby 
 removed, at least by one degree, from being the expression of 
 Will and the effect of Purpose. We forget that all our own 
 works, not less than the works of Nature, are works done through 
 the means and instrumentality of Law. All that we can effect 
 
 *Mr. G. H. Lewes, Fortnightly Review, July, 1867, p. 109. 
 tlbid. p. 107. 
 
LAW ; ITS DEFINITIONS. 6$ 
 
 is brought about by way of natural consequence. All our ma- 
 chines are simply contrivances for bringing natural Forces into 
 operation , and these machines themselves we are able to con- 
 struct only out of the materials and by application of the laws ; 
 of Nature. The Steam-engine works by way of natural conse- 
 quence ; so does Mr. Babbage's Calculating Machine ; so does 
 the Electric Telegraph, so does the Solar System. It is true, 
 indeed, that in all human machinery we know by the evidence 
 of sight the ultimate agency to which the machinery is due, 
 whereas in the machinery of Nature the ultimate agency is con- 
 cealed from sight. But it is the very business and work of 
 Science to rise from the Visible to the Invisible from what we 
 observe by Sense to what wo know by Reason. 
 
 And this brings us to the Fifth meaning in which the word 
 Law is habitually used in Science, a meaning which is indeed 
 well deserving of attention. In this sense, Law is used to des- 
 ignate, not any observed Order of facts, not any Force to 
 which such Order may be due, neither yet any combination of 
 Force adjusted to the discharge of function, but some purely 
 Abstract Idea, which carries up to a higher point our concep- 
 tion of what the phenomena are and of what they do. There' 
 may be no phenomena actually corresponding to such Idea, 
 and yet a clear conception of it may be essential to a right 
 understanding of all the phenomena around us. A good ex- 
 ample of Law in this sense is to be found in the law which, in 
 the Science of Mechanics, is called the First Law of Motion. 
 The law is, that all Motion is in itself (that is to say, except as 
 affected by extraneous Forces) uniform in velocity, and rectilin- 
 ear in direction. Thus according to this law a body moving, and 
 not subject to any extraneous Force, would go on moving forever 
 at the same rate of velocity, and in an exactly straight line. 
 
 Now, there is no such motion as this existing on the earth or 
 in the heavens. It is an Abstract Idea of Motion which no 
 man has ever, or can ever, see exemplified. Yet a clear appre- 
 hension of this Abstract Idea was necessary to a right under- 
 standing and to the true explanation of all the motions which 
 are actually seen. It was long before this idea was arrived at - r 
 and for want of it, the efforts of Science to explain the visible 
 phenomena of Motion were always taking a wrong direction.- 
 5 
 
66 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 There was a real difficulty in conceiving it, because not only is 
 there no such motion in Nature, but there is no possibility by 
 artificial means of producing it. It is impossible to release any 
 moving body from the impulses of extraneous Force. The 
 First Law of Motion is therefore a purely Abstract Idea. It 
 represents a Rule which never operates as we conceive it, by 
 itself, but is always complicated with other Rules which pro- 
 duce a corresponding complication in result. Like many other 
 laws of the same class, it was discovered, not by looking out- 
 wards, but by looking inwards ; not by observing, but by think- 
 ing. The human mind, in the exercise of its own faculties and 
 powers, sometimes by careful reasoning, sometimes by the intu- 
 itions of genius unconscious of any process, is able, from time 
 to time, to reach now one, now another, of those purely Intel- 
 lectual Conceptions which are the basis of all that is intelligi- 
 ble to us in the Order of the Material World. We look for 
 an ideal order or simplicity in material Law ; and the very 
 possibility of exact Science depends upon the fact that such 
 ideal order does actually prevail, and is related to the abstract 
 conceptions of our own intellectual nature. It is in this way 
 that many of the greatest discoveries of Science have been made. 
 Especially have the great pioneers in new paths of discovery 
 been led to the opening of those paths by that fine sense for 
 abstract truths which is the noblest gift of genius. Copernicus, 
 Kepler, and Galileo were all guided in their profound interpre- 
 tations of visible phenomena by those intuitions which arise in 
 minds finely organized, brought into close relations with the 
 -mind of Nature, and highly trained in the exercise of speculative 
 thought. They guessed the truth before they proved it to be 
 true ; and those guesses had their origin in Abstract Ideas of 
 the mind which turned out to be ideas really embodied in the 
 Order of the Universe. So constantly has this recurred in the 
 history of Science, that, as Dr. Whewell says, it is not to be 
 considered as an exception, but as the rule.* 
 
 Here again it is very instructive to observe how " Law " in 
 
 * Whewell's " History of the Inductive Sciences," zd edition, vol. i. page 434. Speak- 
 ing of Copernicus, Dr. Whewell says, in another place : " It is manifest that in this, as 
 in other cases of discovery, a clear and steady possession of abstract Ideas, and an 
 aptitude in comprehending real Facts under these general conceptions, must have 
 teen leading characters in the Discoverer's mind." Vol. i. p. 389. 
 
LAW ; ITS DEFINITIONS. 67 
 
 this last sense is dealt with by the Positive Philosophy. Scien- 
 tific men are accustomed to reckon such Laws as the First Law 
 of Motion among the surest possessions of pure Intellect, and 
 the faculty by which they are conceived among the noblest 
 proofs of its energy and power. Positivism, on the contrary, 
 regards such laws as mere "artifices" of thought, and the 
 Power by which they are conceived not as a Strength, but as 
 an " Infirmity " of Mind.* I do not deny that the process by 
 which these Abstractions are attained is a metaphysical proc- 
 ess> that is to say, they are purely mental conceptions. But 
 the process which denies " reality " to these conceptions is also 
 purely a metaphysical process, with this only difference, that it 
 is bad metaphysics instead of good. The analysis which 
 evolves these abstract Laws out of the phenomena of Nature is 
 an analysis which truly co-ordinates the order of those phe- 
 nomena with an Order of Thought. The counter. Analysis 
 which pronounces them to be mere artifices of Thought, and 
 " preliminary falsifications of fact," is an attempt to make Rea- 
 son disbelieve herself, and immerses us at once in the worst 
 kind of Metaphysics that which has made the name almost 
 opprobrious even the old Scholastic subtleties of the Nomi- 
 nalistic and the Realistic controversy. 
 
 And now having traced the various senses in which Law is 
 used, we can form some estimate on the value of those con- 
 clusions of which some men are so boastful and of which other 
 men are so much afraid. We can see how much and how 
 little is really meant when it is said that Law can t>e traced in 
 all things, and all things can be traced to Law. It is a great 
 mistake to suppose that, in establishing this conclusion, the 
 progress of modern investigation is in a direction tending to 
 Materialism. This may be and always has been the tendency 
 of individual minds. There are men who would stare into the 
 very Burning Bush without a thought that the ground on which 
 they stand must be Holy Ground. It is not now of wood or 
 stone that men make their Idols, but of their own abstract con- 
 ceptions. Before these, borrowing for them the attributes of 
 
 * " Science is distinguished from common knowledge by its conscious employment 
 of artifices which our infirmity renders indispensable." Again, u Abstraction is one 
 of the necessary (from infirmity) artifices of research." Lewes's " Prologue," p. 
 Ixxxix. 
 
68 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 Personality, they bow down and worship. Nothing is more 
 common than to find men who may be trusted thoroughly on 
 the facts of their own Science, who cannot be trusted for a 
 moment on the place which those facts assume in the general 
 system of truth. Philosophy must include Science ; but 
 Science does not necessarily include Philosophy. There are, 
 and there always have been, some special misconceptions con- 
 nected with the prosecution of physical research. It is, how- 
 ever, on the surface of things, rather than below it, that the 
 suggestions of Materialism lie thickest to the eye. They 
 abound among the commonest facts which obtrude themselves 
 on our attention in Nature and in human life. When the burst- 
 ing of some small duct of blood upon the Brain is seen to de- 
 stroy in a moment the Mind of Man, and to break down all the 
 powers of his Intellect and his Will, we are in presence of a 
 fact whose significance cannot be increased by a million of 
 other facts analogous in kind. 
 
 Yet on every fresh discovery of a few more such facts, there 
 is generally some fresh outbreak of old delusions respecting 
 the forms and the Laws of Matter as the supreme realities of 
 the world. But when the new facts have been looked at a 
 little longer, it is always seen that they take their place with 
 others which have been long familiar, and the eternal problems 
 which lie behind all natural phenomena are seen to be unaf- 
 fected and unchanged. Like the most distant of the Fixed 
 Stars, they have no parallax. The whole orbit of human 
 knowledge shows in them no apparent change of place. No 
 amount of knowledge of the kind which alone physical Science 
 can impart can do more than widen the foundation of intelli- 
 gent spiritual beliefs. We think that Astronomy and Geology 
 have given to us in these latter days ideas wholly new in re- 
 spect to Space and Time. Yet, after all, can we express those 
 ideas, or can we indicate the questions they suggest, in any 
 language which approaches in power to the majestic utterances 
 of David and of Job ? We know more than they knew of the 
 magnitude of the Heavenly Bodies ; but what more can we say 
 than they said of the wonder of them, of Orion, of Arcturus, 
 and the Pleiades ? * We know that the earth moves, which 
 
 * Job ix. 9. 
 
LAW ; ITS DEFINITIONS. 69 
 
 they did not know ; and we know that the rapid rotation of a 
 globe on its own axis is a means of maintaining the steadiness 
 of that axis in its course through Space. But what effect, ex- 
 cept that of increasing its significance, has this knowledge 
 upon the praise which David ascribes to that ultimate Agency 
 which has made the round world so sure " that it cannot be 
 moved ? " * 
 
 And so of other departments of Science. Even the modern 
 idea of Law, of the constancy and therefore the trustworthi- 
 ness of Natural Forces, has been known, not indeed scientific- 
 ally but instinctively, to Man since first he made a Tool, and 
 used it as the instrument of Purpose. What has Science added 
 to this idea, except that the same rule prevails as widely as the 
 Universe, and is made subservient in a like manner to Knowl- 
 edge and to Will ? In the enthusiasm awakened by the dis- 
 covery of some new facts, or of some new forces, and in the 
 freshness with which they impress the idea of such agencies on 
 )ur minds, we sometimes very naturally exaggerate the length 
 t ?f way along which they carry us towards the great ultimate 
 objects of intellectual desire. We forget altogether that the 
 ;^nowledge they convey is in quality and in kind identical with 
 knowledge already long in our possession, and places us in no 
 new relation whatever to the vast background of the Eternal 
 and the Unseen. Thus it is that the notions of Materialism 
 are perpetually reviving, and are again being perpetually swept 
 away swept away partly before the Intuitions of the Mind, 
 partly before the Conclusions of the Reason. For there are 
 two great enemies to Materialism, one rooted in the Affec- 
 tions, the other in the Intellect. One is the power of THINGS 
 HOPED FOR a power which never dies : the other is the evi- 
 dence of THINGS NOT SEEN and this evidence abounds in all 
 we see. In re-enforcing this evidence, and in adding to it, 
 Science is doing boundless work in the present day. It is not 
 the extent of our knowledge, but rather the limits of it that 
 physical research teaches us to see and feel the most. Of 
 course, in so far as its discoveries are really true, its influence 
 must be for good. To doubt this were to doubt that all truth 
 is true, and that all truth is God's. 
 
 * Ps. xciii. i. 
 
70 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 There are eddies in every stream eddies where rubbish will 
 collect, and circle for a time. But the ultimate bearing of 
 scientific truth cannot be mistaken. Nothing is more remark- 
 able in the present state of physical research than what may be 
 called the transcendental character of its results. And what is 
 transcendentalism but the tendency to trace up all things to the 
 relation in which they stand to abstract Ideas ? And what is 
 this but to bring all physical phenomena nearer and nearer 
 into relation with the phenomena of Mind ? The old specula- 
 tions of Philosophy which cut the ground from Materialism by 
 showing how little we know of Matter, are now being daily 
 re-enforced by the subtle analysis of the Physiologist, the 
 Chemist, and the Electrician. Under that analysis Matter dis- 
 solves and disappears, surviving only as the phenomena of 
 Force ; which again is seen converging along all its lines to 
 some common centre " sloping through darkness up to God."* 
 
 Even the writers who have incurred most reasonable suspicion 
 as to the drift of their teaching, give nevertheless constant wit- 
 ness to what may be called the purely mental quality of the 
 ultimate results of physical inquiry. It has been said with 
 perfect truth that "the fundamental ideas of modern Science are 
 as transcendental as any of the axioms in ancient philosophy, f 
 We have seen that one of the senses in which Law is habitually 
 used is to designate abstract ideas and doctrines of this kind. 
 So far from these doctrines and ideas having a tendency to 
 Materialism, they serve rather to bring inside the strict domain 
 of Science ideas which in the earlier stages of human knowl- 
 edge lay wholly within the region of Faith or of Belief. For 
 example, the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews specially de- 
 clares that it is by Faith that we understand " that the things 
 which are seen were not made of the things which do appear." 
 Yet this is now one of the most assured doctrines of Science, 
 that invisible Forces are behind and above all visible phe- 
 nomena, moulding them in forms of infinite variety, of all 
 which forms the only real knowledge we possess lies in our 
 perception of the Ideas they express of their beauty, or of their 
 fitness, in short, of their being all the work of " Toil co- 
 operant to an End." 
 
 * Tennyson's u In Memoriam." t Lewes's " Philosophy of Aristotle," p. 66, 
 
LAW ; ITS DEFINITIONS. 7 I 
 
 Every natural Force which we call a law is itself invisible the 
 idea of it in the mind arising by way of necessary inference out 
 of an observed Order of facts. And very often, if not always, 
 in our conception of these Forces, we are investing them with 
 the attributes of Intelligence and of Will at the very moment, 
 perhaps, when we are stumbling over the difficulty of seeing in 
 them the exponents of a Mind which is intelligent and of a 
 Will which is Supreme. The deeper we go in Science, the 
 more certain it becomes that all the realities of Nature are in 
 the region of the Invisible, so that the saying is literally, and 
 not merely figuratively true, that the things which are seen are 
 temporal, and it is only the things which are not seen that are 
 eternal. For example, we never see the phenomena of Life dis- 
 sociated from Organization. Yet the profoundest physiologists' 
 have come to the conclusion that Organization is not the cause 
 of Life, but, on the contrary, that Life is the cause of Or- 
 ganization, Life being something a Force of some kind, by 
 whatever name we may call it which precedes Organization,, 
 and fashions it, and builds it up. This was the conclusion come 
 to by the great anatomist Hunter, and it is the conclusion en- 
 dorsed in our own day by such men as Dr. Carpenter and Pro- 
 fessor Huxley, men neither of whom have exhibited in their 
 philosophy any undue bias towards either theological or 
 metaphysical explanations. One illustration referred to by 
 these writers is derived from the shells the beautiful shells 
 of the animals called the " Foraminifera." * No Forms in Na- 
 ture are more exquisite. Yet they are the work and the abode 
 of animals which are mere blobs of jelly without parts, with- 
 out organs absolutely without visible structure of any kind. In 
 this jelly, nevertheless, there works a " vital Force " capable 
 of building up an Organism of most complicated and perfect 
 symmetry. 
 
 But what is a vital Force ? It is something which we cannot 
 see, but of whose existence we are as certain as we are of its 
 visible effects nay, which our reason tells us precedes and is 
 superior to these. We often speak of Material Forces as if we 
 could identify any kind of Force with Matter. But this is only 
 one of the many ambiguities of language. All that we mean 
 
 * " The Elements of Comparative Anatomy," (Huxley,) pp. 10, n. 
 
*J2 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 by a Material Force is a force which acts upon Matter, and 
 produces in Matter its own appropriate effects. We must go a 
 step further therefore and ask ourselves, What is Force ? What 
 is our conception of it ? What idea can we form, for example, 
 of the real nature of that Force, the measure of whose operation 
 has been so exactly ascertained the Force of Gravitation ? It 
 is invisible imponderable all our words for it are but cir- 
 cumlocutions to express its phenomena or effects. 
 
 There are many kinds of .force in Nature which we distin- 
 guish after the same fashion according to their effects or ac- 
 cording to the forms of Matter in which they become cogniz- 
 able to us. But if we trace all our conceptions on the nature 
 of Force to their fountain-head, we shall find that they are 
 formed on our own consciousness of Living Effort of that 
 force which has its seat in our own vitality, and especially on 
 that kind of it which can be called forth at the bidding of the 
 Will. In saying this I do not mean to borrow from that false 
 philosophy which pretends by the exercise of reason to get be- 
 hind all the intuitive convictions on which reason rests. It is 
 in this way that men have come to argue on what they call the 
 " reality of an external world." Even if there were no process 
 of reasoning capable of defending that reality, this would not 
 lend a reasonable character to doubts regarding it. Reason 
 must start from some postulate some primary truths which 
 cannot be denied. But we need not assume the reality of an 
 external world to be one of these. Yet if it be not a first step, 
 it is a second step hardly distinguishable from the first. Self- 
 existence is of course the truth which may be regarded as the 
 first of all, but in the very idea of Self the existence of that 
 which is Not-Self is necessarily involved. In connecting, how- 
 ever, our conceptions of Force with the consciousness of Living 
 Effort in ourselves, we must guard against mistaking analogy 
 for identity, and against confounding together two items of 
 knowledge which are quite distinct. Correlative with the con- 
 sciousness of Living Effort in ourselves, and inseparable from 
 it, there is the consciousness of Force acting on us, as well as 
 acting in us. And this argument applies equally whether Self 
 be regarded as a perceiving Mind, or as a physical Organism 
 through which Mind perceives. Thus the knowledge of an ex- 
 
LAW ; ITS DEFINITIONS. 73 
 
 ternal world that is to say, the knowledge of external Force 
 stands side by side with the knowledge of Self. Nothing can 
 be known except as distinguished from other things ; and all 
 things which are distinguishable from each other, are, in a 
 sense, and in the measure of that distinction, known. And so 
 we know the existence both of internal and of external Force. 
 But if we come to ask ourselves farther questions, as to the na- 
 ture and seat of Material Force, we can only think of it in the 
 terms of the Vital Force exerted by ourselves. If we can ever 
 know anything of the nature of any Force, it ought to be of this 
 one. And yet the fact is that we know nothing. If, then, we 
 know nothing of that kind of Force which is so near to us, and 
 with which our own Intelligence is in such close alliance, much 
 less can we know the ultimate nature of Force in its other 
 forms. 
 
 It is important to dwell on this, because both the aversion 
 with which some men regard the idea of the Reign of Law, and 
 the triumph with which some others hail it, are founded on a 
 notion that, when we have traced any given phenomena to what 
 are called Natural Forces, we have traced them farther than 
 we really have. We know nothing of the ultimate nature, or 
 of the ultimate seat of Force. Science, in the modern doctrine 
 of the Conservation of Energy, and the Convertibility of 
 Forces, is already getting something like a firm hold of the idea 
 that all kinds of Force are but forms or manifestations of some 
 one Central Force issuing from some one Fountain-head of 
 Power. Sir John Herschel has not hesitated to say, that " it is 
 but reasonable to regard the Force of Gravitation as the direct 
 or indirect result of a Consciousness or a Will existing some- 
 where." * And even if we cannot certainly identify Force in 
 all its forms with the direct energies of One Omnipresent and 
 all-pervading Will, it is at least in the highest degree unphilo- 
 sophical to assume the contrary to speak or to think as if the 
 Forces of Nature were either independent of, or even separate 
 from, the Creator's Power. 
 
 It follows, then, from these considerations, that whatever 
 difficulty there may be in conceiving of a Will not exercised by 
 a visible Person, it is a difficulty which cannot be evaded by 
 
 * " Outlines of Astronomy," 5th edition, p. 291. 
 
74 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 arresting our conceptions at the point at'which they have ar- 
 rived in forming the idea of Laws or Forces. That idea is- 
 itself made up out of elements derived from our own conscious- 
 ness of Personality. This fact is seen by men who do not see 
 the interpretation of it. They denounce as a superstition the 
 idea of any Personal Will separable from the Forces which 
 work in Nature. They say that this idea is a mere projection 
 of our own Personality into the world beyond the shadow of 
 our own Form cast upon the ground on which we look. And 
 indeed this, in a sense, is true. It is perfectly true that the 
 Mind does recognize in Nature a reflection of itself. But if 
 this be a deception, it is a deception which is not avoided by 
 transferring the idea of Personality to the abstract Idea of 
 Force, or by investing combinations of Force with the attributes 
 of Mind. 
 
 We need not be jealous, then, when new domains are claimed 
 as under the Reign of Law an agency through which we see 
 working everywhere some Purpose of the Everlasting Will- 
 There are many things in Nature of which we do not see the 
 reason ; and many other things of which we cannot find out the 
 cause ; but there are none from which we exclude the idea of 
 Purpose by success in discovering the cause. It has been said r 
 with perfect truth, by a living naturalist who is of all others most 
 opposed to what he calls Theological explanation^ in Science, 
 that we may just as well speak of a watch as the abode of a 
 " watch-force," as speak of the organization of an animal as the 
 abode of a " vital Force." * The analogy is precise and accurate. 
 The Forces by which a watch moves are natural Forces. It is 
 the relation of interdependence in which those Forces are placed 
 to each other, or, in other words, the adjustment of them to a 
 particular Purpose, which constitutes the " watch-force ;" and 
 the seat of this Force which is in fact no one Force, but a 
 combination of many Forces is in the Intelligence which con- 
 ceived that combination, and in the Will which gave it effect. 
 The mechanisms devised by Man are in this respect only an 
 image of the more perfect mechanism of Nature, in which the 
 same principle of Adjustment is always the highest result which 
 Science can ascertain or recognize. There is this difference, 
 
 * Lewes's " Philosophy of Aristotle," p. 87. 
 
LAW; ITS DEFINITIONS. 75 
 
 -\ 
 
 indeed, that in regard to our works we see that our knowledge 
 of natural laws is very imperfect, and our control over them is 
 very feeble; whereas in the machinery of Nature there is evi- 
 dence of complete knowledge and of absolute control. The 
 universal rule is, that everything is brought about by way of 
 Natural Consequence. But another rule is, that all natural 
 consequences meet and fit into each other in endless circles of 
 Harmony and of Purpose. And this can only be explained by 
 the fact that what we call Natural Consequence is always the 
 conjoint effect of an infinite number of elementary Forces, 
 whose action and reaction are under direction of the Will which 
 we see obeyed, and of the Purposes which we see actually at- 
 tained. 
 
 It is, indeed, the completeness of the analogy between our 
 own works on a small scale, and the works of the Creator on 
 an infinitely large scale, which is the greatest mystery of all. 
 Man is under constraint to adopt the principle of Adjustment, 
 because the Forces of Nature are external to and independent 
 of his Will. They may be managed, but they cannot be dis- 
 obeyed. It is impossible to suppose that they stand in the same 
 relation to the Will of the Supreme ; yet it seems as if He took 
 the same method of dealing with them never violating them, 
 never breaking them, but always ruling them by that which we 
 call Adjustment or Contrivance. Nothing gives us such an idea 
 of the immutability of Laws as this ! nor does anything give us 
 such an idea of their pliability to use. How imperious they are, 
 yet how submissive ! How they reign, yet how they serve ! 
 
 THE 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY ARISING OUT OF THE REIGN OF LAW 
 EXAMPLE IN THE MACHINERY OF FLIGHT. 
 
 THE necessity of Contrivance for the accomplishment of 
 Purpose arises out of the immutability of Natural Forces. They 
 must be conformed to, and obeyed. Therefore, where they do 
 not serve our purpose directly, they can only be made to serve 
 it by ingenuity and contrivance. This necessity, then, may be 
 said to be the index and the measure of the power of Law. 
 And so, on the other hand, the certainty with which Purpose 
 can be accomplished by Contrivance, is the index and the meas- 
 ure of mental knowledge and resource. It is by wisdom and 
 knowledge that the Forces of Nature even those which may 
 seem most adverse are yoked to service. This idea of the re- 
 lation in which Law stands to Will, and in which Will stands to 
 Law, is familiar to us in the works of Man : but it is less familiar 
 to us as equally holding good in the works of Nature. We feel, 
 sometimes, as if it were an unworthy notion of the Will which 
 works in Nature, to suppose that it should never act except 
 through the use of means. But our notions of unworthiness 
 are themselves often the unworthiest of all. They must be 
 ruled and disciplined by observation of that which is, not 
 founded on a priori conceptions of what ought to be. Nothing 
 is more certain than that the whole Order of Nature is one vast 
 system of Contrivance. And what is Contrivance but that kind 
 of arrangement by which the unchangeable demands of Law 
 are met and satisfied ? It may be that all natural Forces are 
 resolvable into some One Force ; and indeed in the modern 
 doctrine of the Correlation of Forces, an idea which is a near 
 approach to this, has already entered the domain of Science. 
 It may also be that this One Force, into which all others return 
 again, is itself but a mode of action of the Divine Will. But 
 we have no instruments whereby to reach this last analysis. 
 
CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY. 77 
 
 Whatever the ultimate relation may be between mental and 
 material Force, we can at least see clearly this, that in Nature 
 there is the most elaborate machinery to accomplish Purpose 
 through the instrumentality of means. It seems as if all that 
 is done in Nature as well as all that is done in art, were done 
 by knowing how to do it. It is curious how the language of the 
 great Seers of the Old Testament corresponds with this idea. 
 They uniformly ascribe all the operations of Nature the great- 
 est and the smallest to the working of Divine Power. But 
 they never revolt as so many do in these weaker days from 
 the idea of this Power working by wisdom and knowledge in the 
 use of means ; nor, in this point of view, do they ever separate 
 between the work of first Creation, and the work which is going 
 on daily in the existing world. Exactly the same language is 
 applied to the rarest exertions of power, and to the gentlest and 
 most constant of all natural operations. Thus the saying that 
 " The Lord by wisdom hath founded the Earth ; by under- 
 standing hath He established the Heavens," is coupled in the 
 same breath with this other saying, " By His knowledge the 
 depths are broken up, and the clouds drop down the dew." * 
 
 Every instance of Contrivance which we can thoroughly fol- 
 low and understand, has an intense interest as casting light 
 upon this method of the Divine government, and upon the anal- 
 ogy between the operations of our own minds and the operations 
 of the Creator. Some instances will strike us more than others 
 and those will strike us most which stand in some near com- 
 parison with our own human efforts of ingenuity and contrivance. 
 There is one such instance which I propose to consider in this 
 chapter the machinery by which a great purpose has been ac- 
 complished in Nature a purpose which Man has never been 
 .able to accomplish in art, and that is the Navigation of the Air. 
 No more beautiful example can be found, even in the wide and 
 rich domain of Animal Mechanics none in which we can trace 
 more clearly, too, the mode and method in which laws the most 
 rigorous and exact are used as the supple instruments of Pur- 
 pose. 
 
 " The way of an Eagle in the air " was one of the things of 
 which Solomon said, that " he knew it not." No wonder that 
 
 * Prov. iii. 19. 20. 
 
78 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 the Wise King reckoned it among the great mysteries of Nature! 
 The Force of Gravitation, though its exact measure was not as- 
 certained till the days of Newton, has been the most familiar of 
 all Forces in all ages of Mankind. How, then, in violation of 
 its known effects, could heavy bodies be supported upon the 
 thin air and be gifted with the power of sustaining and direct- 
 ing movements more easy, more rapid, and more certain than 
 the movements of other animals upon the firm and solid, earth ? 
 No animal motion in Nature is so striking or so beautiful as the 
 
 " Scythe-like sweep of wings, that dare 
 The headlong plunge through eddying gulfs of air." 
 
 " Wayside Inn" LONGFELLOW. 
 
 Nor will the wonder cease when, so far as the mechanical prob- 
 lem is concerned, the mystery of flight is solved. If we wish 
 to see how material laws can be bent to purpose, we shall study 
 this problem. 
 
 In the first place, it is remarkable that the Force which seems 
 so adverse the Force of Gravitation drawing down all bodies 
 to the earth is the very Force which is the principal one con- 
 cerned in flight, and without which flight would be impossible. 
 It is curious how completely this has been forgotten in almost 
 all human attempts to navigate the air. Birds are not lighter 
 than the air, but immensely heavier. If they were lighter than 
 the air they might float, but they could not fly. This is the 
 difference between a Bird and a Balloon. A Balloon rises 
 because it is lighter than the air, and floats upon it. Conse- 
 quently, it is incapable of being directed, because it possesses 
 in itself no active Force enabling it to resist the currents of the 
 air in which it is immersed, and because, if it had such a force, 
 it would have no fulcrum, or resisting medium against which to 
 exert it. It becomes, as it were, part of the atmosphere, and 
 must go with it where it goes. No Bird is ever for an instant 
 of time lighter than the air in which it flies ; but being, on the 
 contrary, always greatly heavier, it keeps possession of a Force 
 capable of supplying momentum, and therefore capable of over- 
 coming any lesser Force, such as the ordinary resistance of the 
 atmosphere, and even of heavy gales of wind. The Law of 
 Gravitation, therefore, is used in the flight of Birds as one of 
 
CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY. 79 
 
 the most essential of the Forces which are available for the ac- 
 complishment of the end in view. 
 
 The next law appealed to, and pressed into the service, is 
 again a law which would seem an impediment in the way. 
 This is the resisting force of the atmosphere in opposing any 
 body moving through it. In this force an agent is sought and 
 found for supplying the requisite balance to the Force of 
 Gravity. But in order that the resisting force of air should be 
 effectual for this purpose, it must be used under very peculiar 
 conditions. The resisting force of fluids, and of airs or gases, 
 is a force acting equally in all directions, unless special means 
 are taken to give it predominant action in some special direc- 
 tion. If it is a force strong enough to prevent a body from fall- 
 ing, it is also a force strong enough to prevent it from advanc- 
 ing. In order, therefore, to solve the problem of flight, the 
 resisting power of the air must be called into action as strongly 
 as possible in the direction opposite to the Force of Gravity, 
 and as little as possible in any other. Consequently a body 
 capable of flight must present its maximum of surface to the 
 resistance of the air in the perpendicular direction, and its 
 minimum of surface in the horizontal direction. Now, both 
 these conditions are satisfied (i) by the great breadth or 
 length of surface presented to the air perpendicularly 
 in a Bird's expanded wings, and by (2) the narrow lines 
 presented in its shape horizontally, when in the act of forward 
 motion through the air. But something more yet is required 
 for flight. Great as the resisting force of air is, it is not strong 
 enough to balance the Force of Gravity by its mere pressure 
 on an expanded wing unless that pressure is increased by an 
 appeal to yet other laws and other properties of its nature. 
 Every sportsman must have seen cases in which a flying Bird 
 has been so wounded as to produce a rigid expansion of the 
 wings. This does not prevent the Bird from falling, although 
 it breaks the fall, and makes it come more or less gently to the 
 ground. 
 
 Yet further, therefore, to accomplish flight, another law must 
 be appealed to, and that is the immense elasticity of the air, 
 and the reacting force it exerts against compression. To en- 
 able an animal heavier than the air to support itself against the 
 
So THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 Force of Gravity, it must be enabled to strike the air down- 
 wards with such force as to occasion a rebound upwards of 
 corresponding power. * The wing of a flying animal must, there- 
 fore, do something more than barely balance Gravity. It must 
 be able to strike the air with such violence as to call forth a 
 reaction equally violent, and in the opposite direction. This 
 is the function assigned to the powerful muscles by which the 
 wings of Birds are flapped with such velocity and strength. 
 We need not follow this part of the problem further, because 
 it does not differ in kind from the muscular action of other 
 animals. The connection, indeed, between the Wills of ani- 
 mals and the mechanism of their frame, is the last and highest 
 problem of all in the mechanics of Nature ; but it is merged 
 and hid forever in the one great mystery of Life. But so far 
 as this difficulty is concerned, the action of an Eagle's wing 4 is 
 not more mysterious than the action of a Man's arm. There 
 is a greater concentration of muscular poWer in the organism of 
 Birds than in most other animal frames ; because it is an es- 
 sential part of the problem to be solved in flight, that the 
 engine which works the wings should be very strong, very com- 
 pact, of a special form, and that; though heavier than the air, it 
 should not have an excessive weight. These conditions are 
 all met in the power, in the outline, and in the bulk of the 
 pectoral muscles which move the wings of Birds. Few persons 
 have any idea of the force expended in the action of ordi- 
 nary flight. The pulsations of the wing in most Birds are so 
 rapid that they cannot be counted. Even the Heron seldom 
 flaps its wings at a rate of less than from 120 to 150 strokes in 
 a minute. This is counting only the downward strokes, pre- 
 paratory to each one of which there must be an upward stroke 
 also ; so that there are from 240 to 300 separate movements 
 per minute. Yet the Heron is remarkable for its slow and 
 heavy flight, and it is difficult to believe, until one has timed 
 the pulsations with a watch, that they have a rapidity approach- 
 ing to two in a second. But this difficulty is an index to the 
 enormous comparative rapidity of the faster-flying Birds. Let 
 any one try to count the pulsations of the wing in ordinary 
 flight of a Pigeon, or of a Blackcock, or of a Partridge, or, still 
 more, of any of the diving sea-fowl. He will find that though, 
 
CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY. 8'l 
 
 in the case of most of these Birds, the quickness of sight ena- 
 bles him to see the strokes separate from each other, it is ut- 
 terly impossible to count them ; whilst in some Birds, especially 
 in the Divers, as well as in the Pheasant and Partridge tribe, 
 the velocity is so great that the eye cannot follow it at all, and 
 the vibration of the wings leaves only a blurred impression on 
 the eye. 
 
 Our subject here, however, is not so much the amount of 
 vital force bestowed on Birds, as the mechanical laws which 
 are appealed to in order to make that force effective in the 
 accomplishment of flight. The elasticity of the air is the law 
 which offers itself for the counteraction of gravity. But, in 
 order to make it available for this purpose, there must be some 
 great force of downward blow in order to evoke a correspond- 
 ing rebound in the opposite, or upward direction. Now, what 
 is the nature of the implement required for striking this down- 
 ward blow ? There are many conditions it must fulfil. First, 
 it must be large enough in area to compress an adequate vol- 
 ume of air ; next, it must be light enough in substance not to 
 add an excess of weight to the already heavy body of the Bird ; 
 next, it must be strong enough in frame to withstand the press- 
 ure which its own action on the air creates. The first of 
 these conditions is met by an exact adjustment of the size or 
 area of the wing to the size and weight of the Bird which it is- 
 to lift. The second and the third conditions are both met by 
 the provision of a peculiar substance, feathers, which are very 
 light and very strong ; whilst the only heavy parts of the 
 framework, namely, the bones in which the feathers are in- 
 serted, are limited to a very small part of the area required. 
 
 But there is another difficulty to be overcome a difficulty 
 opposed by natural laws, and which can only be met by another 
 adjustment, if possible more ingenious and beautiful than the 
 rest. It is obvious that if a Bird is to support itself by the 
 downward blow of its wings upon the air, it must at the end of 
 each downward stroke lift the wing upwards again, so as to be 
 ready for the next. But each upward stroke is in danger of 
 neutralizing the effect of the downward stroke. It must be 
 made with equal velocity, and if it required equal force it must 
 produce equal resistance, an equal rebound from the elas- 
 6 
 
82 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 ticity of the air. If this difficulty were not evaded somehow, 
 flight would be impossible. But it is evaded by two mechan- 
 ical contrivances, which, as it were, triumph over the laws of 
 aerial resistance by conforming to them. One of these contriv- 
 ances is, that the upper surface of the wing is made convex, 
 whilst the under surface is concave. , The enormous difference 
 which this makes in atmospheric resistance is familiarly known 
 to us by the difference between the effect of the wind on an um- 
 brella which is exposed to it on the under or the upper side. 
 The air which is struck by a concave or hollow surface is gath- 
 ered up, and prevented from escaping : whereas the air struck 
 by a convex or bulging surface escapes readily on all sides, 
 and comparatively little pressure or resistance is produced. 
 And so, from the convexity of the upper surface of a Bird's wing, 
 the upward stroke may be made with comparatively trifling in- 
 jury to the force gained in the downward blow. 
 
 But this is only half of the provision made against a conse- 
 quence which would be so fatal to the end in view. The other 
 half consists in this that the feathers of a Bird's wing are 
 made to underlap each other, so that in the downward stroke the 
 pressure of the air closes them upwards against each other, and 
 converts the whole series of them into one connected mem- 
 brane, through which there is no escape ; whilst in the upward 
 stroke the same pressure has precisely the reverse effect it 
 opens the feathers, separates them from each other, and con- 
 verts each pair of feathers into a self-acting valve, through 
 which the air rushes at every point. Thus the same imple-. 
 ment is changed in the fraction of a second from a close and 
 continuous membrane which is impervious to the air, into a se- 
 ries of disconnected joints through which the air passes without 
 the least resistance the machine being so adjusted that when 
 pressure is required the maximum of pressure is produced, and, 
 when pressure is to be avoided, it is avoided in spite of rapid 
 and violent action. 
 
 This, however, exhausts but a small part of the means by which 
 Law is made to do the work of Will in the machinery of flight. 
 It might easily be that violent and rapid blows, struck down- 
 wards against the elastic air, might enable animals possessed of 
 such power to lift themselves from the ground and nothing 
 
CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY. 83 
 
 more. There is a common toy which lifts itcelf in this manner 
 from the force exerted by the air in resisting, and reacting upon 
 little vanes which are set spinning by the hand. But the toy 
 mounts straight up, and is incapable of horizontal motion. So, 
 there are many structures of wing which might enable animals 
 to mount into the air, but which would not enable them to ad- 
 vance or to direct their flight. How, then, is this essential 
 purpose gained? Again we find an appeal made to natural 
 laws, and advantage taken of their certainty and unchangeable- 
 ness. 
 
 The power of forward motion is given to Birds, first oy the 
 direction in which the whole wing feathers are set, and next by 
 the structure given to each feather in itself. The wing feath- 
 ers are all set backwards, that is, in the direction opposite to 
 that in which the Bird moves ; whilst each feather is at the 
 same time so constructed as to be strong and rigid toward its 
 base, and extremely flexible and elastic towards its end. On 
 the other hand, the front of the wing, along the greater part of 
 its length, is a stiff hard edge, wholly unelastic and unyielding 
 to the air. The anterior and posterior webs of each feather are 
 adjusted on the same principle. The consequence of this dis- 
 position of the parts as a whole, and of this construction of each 
 of the parts, is, that the air which is struck and compressed in 
 the hollow of the wing, being unable to escape through the 
 wing, owing to the closing upwards of the feathers against each 
 other, and being also 'unable to escape forwards owing to the 
 rigidity of the bones and of the quills in that direction, finds its 
 easiest escape backwards. In passing backwards it lifts by its 
 force the elastic ends of the feathers ; and thus whilst effect- 
 ing this escape, in obedience to the law of action and reaction, 
 it communicates, in its passage along the whole line of both 
 wings, a corresponding push forwards to the body of the Bird. 
 By this elaborate mechanical contrivance the same volume of 
 air is made to perform the double duty of yielding pressure 
 enough to sustain the Bird's weight against the Force of Grav- 
 ity, and also of communicating to it a forward impulse. The 
 Bird, therefore, has nothing to do but to repeat with the requi- 
 site velocity and strength its perpendicular blows upon the air, 
 
84 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 and by virtue of the structure of its wings the same blow both 
 sustains and propels it.* 
 
 The truth of this explanation of the mechanical theory of 
 flight may be tested in various ways. In the first place it is 
 quite visible to the eye. In many birds flying straight to us, 
 or straight from us, the effect of aerial resistance in bending 
 upwards the ends of the quill feathers is very conspicuous. 
 The flight of the common Rook affords an excellent example 
 where the Bird is seen foreshortened. In Eagles the same effect 
 is very marked the wing tips forming a sharp upward curve. 
 I have seen it equally obvious in that splendid Bird the Gan- 
 net, or Solan Goose ; and when we recollect the great weight 
 which those few quill feathers are thus seen sustaining, we be- 
 gin to appreciate the degree in which lightness, strength, and 
 imperviousness to the passage of air are combined in this won- 
 derful implement of flight. 
 
 But perhaps the simplest test of the action and reaction of 
 the air and the wing feathers in producing forward motion is 
 an actual experiment. If we take in the hand the stretched 
 wing of a Heron, which has been dried in that position, and 
 strike it quickly downwards in the air, we shall find that it is 
 very difficult indeed to maintain the perpendicular direction of 
 the stroke, requiring, in fact, much force to do so , and that if 
 we do not apply this force, the hand is carried irresistibly for- 
 ward, from the impetus in that direction which the air com- 
 municates to the wing in its escape backwards from the blow 
 
 Another test is one of reasoning and observation. If the ex- 
 planation now given be correct, it must follow that since no 
 Bird can flap its wings in any other direction than the vertical 
 i.e., perpendicular to its own axis (which is ordinarily horizon- 
 tal) and as this motion has been shown to produce necessa- 
 rily a forward motion, no Bird can ever fly backwards. Accord- 
 ingly no Bird ever does so no man ever saw a Bird, even for 
 an instant, fly tail foremost. A Bird can, of course, allow it- 
 self to fall backwards by merely slowing the action of its wings 
 
 * The upward stroke has no sustaining power, but has considerable propelling 
 power ; because some air, failing to escape between the feathers, must always pass 
 along the convex surface of the wing, and, escaping backwards, must exert upon the 
 ends of the quills a similar reactive force to that which is exerted in the downward 
 stroke. 
 
CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY. 85 
 
 so as to allow its weight to overcome their sustaining power; 
 and this motion may sometimes give the appearance of flying 
 backwards, as when a Swift drops backwards from the eaves 
 of a house, or when a Humming Bird allows itself to drop in 
 like manner from out of the large tubular petals of a flower. 
 But this backward motion is due to the action of gravity, and 
 not to the action of the Bird's wing. In short, it is falling 
 downwards, not flying backwards. Nay, more, if the theory of 
 flight here given be correct, it must equally follow that even 
 standing still, which is the easiest of all things to other ani- 
 mals, must be very difficult, if not altogether impossible, to a 
 Bird when flying. This also is true in fact. To stand still in 
 the air is not indeed impossible to a flying Bird, for reasons to 
 be presently explained, but it is one of the most difficult feats 
 of wingmanship, a feat which many Birds, not otherwise 
 clumsy, can never perform at all, and which is performed only 
 by special exertion, and generally for a very short time, by 
 those Birds whose structure enables them to be adepts in their 
 glorious art. 
 
 It cannot be too often repeated because misconception on 
 this point has been the cardinal error in human attempts to 
 navigate the air that in all the beautiful evolutions of birds 
 upon the wing, it is weight, and not buoyancy, which makes 
 those evolutions possible. It supplies them, so to speak, with 
 a store of Force which is constant, inexhaustible, inherent in 
 the very substance of themselves, and entirely independent of 
 any muscular exertion. All they have to do is to give direc- 
 tion to that internal Force, by acting on the external Force of 
 aerial currents, through the contraction and expansion of the 
 implements which have been given them for that purpose. 
 Those who have watched the flight of Birds with any care, must 
 have observed that when once they have attained a certain ini- 
 tial velocity and a certain elevation, by rapid and repeated 
 strokes upon the air, they are then able to fly with compar- 
 atively little exertion, and very often to pursue their course for 
 long distances without any flapping whatever of the wings. 
 The contrast between the violent efforts required for the first 
 acquisition of the initial velocity, and the perfect ease with which 
 
86 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 flight is performed after it has been acquired, is a contrast de- 
 scribed by Virgil in lines of incomparable beauty : 
 
 " Qualis spelunca subito commota columba, 
 Cui domus et dulces latebroso in pumice nidi, 
 Fertur in arva volans, plausumque exterrita pennis 
 Dat tecto ingentem ; mox, acre lapsa quieto, 
 Radit iter liquidum, celeres neque commovet alas." 
 
 ALH. lib. v. 213-17. 
 
 Still more remarkable, as showing the power and the value of 
 weight in flight, is the fact that Birds are able to resume rapid 
 and easy motion not only as the result of a previously-acquired 
 momentum, but after "soaring" in an almost perfectly station- 
 ary position. Nothing, for example, is more common than to 
 see Sea Gulls, and some large species of Hawks, " soaring " 
 one moment (that is, all the forces bearing on the Bird brought 
 to an equilibrium, and all motion brought consequently to 
 nearly a perfect standstill), and the next moment sailing on- 
 wards in rapid and apparently effortless progression. Now, 
 how is this effect produced ? If we only think of it, the question 
 ought rather to be, How is it ever prevented ? The soaring is 
 a much more difficult thing to do than the going onwards. It 
 cannot be done at all in a perfectly still atmosphere. It can 
 only be done when there is a breeze of sufficient strength. Grav- 
 ity is ceaselessly acting on the Bird to pull it downwards : and 
 downwards it must go, unless there is a countervailing Force to 
 keep it up. This force is the force of the breeze striking against 
 the vanes of the wings. But in order to bring these two forces to 
 nearly a perfect balance, and so to " soar," the Bird must expand 
 or contract its wings exactly to the right size, and hold them 
 exactly at the right angle. The slightest alteration in either of 
 these adjustments produces instantly an upsetting of the 
 balance, and of course a resulting motion. The exact direc- 
 tion of that motion will depend on the degree in which the 
 wing is contracted, and the degree in which its angle to the 
 wind is changed. If the wing is very much contracted, and at 
 the same time held off from the wind, that motion will be 
 steeply downwards. Accordingly this is the action of a Hawk 
 when it swoops upon its prey from a great height above it. I 
 
CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY. 87 
 
 have seen a Merlin dash down from a great distance with its- 
 wings so closed as to seem almost wholly folded. The Gannet 
 in diving for fish does not close its wings at all, but turning 
 them and the whole axis of its body into the perpendicular, and 
 thus allowing its great weight to act without any counteraction, 
 dashes itself into the sea with foam. But every variety of 
 forward motion is attained by different degrees of contraction 
 and exposure, according to the strength of the breeze with 
 which the Bird has to deal. The limit of its velocity is the 
 limit of its momentum, and the limit of its momentum is the 
 limit of its weight. The lightness of a Bird is therefore a 
 limit to its velocity. The heavier a Bird is, the greater is its 
 possible velocity of flight because the greater is the store of 
 Force or to use the language of modern physics, the greater 
 is the quantity of " potential energy " which, with proper imple- 
 ments to act upon aerial resistance, it can always convert into 
 upward, or horizontal, or downward motion, according to its 
 own management and desires. 
 
 It will be at once seen from this view of the forces concerned 
 in flight, that the common explanation of Birds being assisted 
 by air-cells for the inhalation and storage of heated air, must 
 not only be erroneous, but founded on wholly false conceptions 
 of the fundamental mechanical principles on which flight 
 depends. If a Bird could inhale enough warm air to make it 
 buoyant, its power of flight would be effectually destroyed. It 
 would become as light as a Balloon, and consequently as help- 
 less. If, on the other hand, it were merely to inflate itself with 
 a small quantity of hot air insufficient to produce buoyancy, 
 but sufficient to increase its bulk, the only effect would be to 
 expose it to increased resistance in cleaving the air. It is 
 true, indeed, that the bones of Birds are made more hollow and 
 lighter than the bones of Mammals, because Birds, though 
 requiring weight, must not have too much of it. It is true, 
 also, that the air must have access to these hollows, else they 
 would be unable to resist atmospheric pressure. But it is no 
 part whatever of the plan or intention of the structure of Birds, 
 or of any part of that structure, to afford balloon-space for 
 heated air with a view to buoyancy. , 
 
 And here, indeed, we open up a new branch of the same 
 
'88 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 inquiry, showing, in new aspects, how the universality and 
 unchangeableness of all natural laws are essential to the use of 
 them as the instruments of Will, and how by being played off 
 against each other they are made to express every shade of 
 thought, and the nicest change of purpose. The movement of 
 all flying animals in the air is governed and determined by 
 Forces of muscular power, and of aerial resistance and elastic- 
 ity, being brought to bear upon the Force of Gravity, whereby, 
 according to the universal laws of motion, a direction is given 
 .to the animal which is the resultant, or compromise, between 
 .all the Forces so employed. Weight, as we have seen, is one 
 of these Forces absolutely essential to that result, and no fly- 
 ing animal can ever for a moment of time be buoyant, or lighter 
 than the air in which it is designed to move. But it is obvious 
 that, within certain limits, the proportion in which these differ- 
 ent Forces are balanced against each other admits of immense 
 variety. The limits of variation can easily be specified. 
 Every flying animal must have muscular power great enough 
 to work its own size of wing : that size of wing must be large 
 enough to act upon a volume of air sufficient to lift the animal's 
 whole weight : lastly, and consequently, the weight must not 
 be too great, or dispersed over too large a bulk. But within 
 these limits there is room for great varieties of adjustments, 
 having reference to corresponding varieties of purpose. To 
 some Birds the air is almost their perpetual home the only 
 region in which they find their food a region which they never 
 leave, whether in storm or sunshine, except during the hours of 
 darkness, and the yearly days which are devoted to their nests. 
 Other Birds are mainly terrestrial, and never betake themselves 
 to flight except to escape an enemy, or to follow the seasons 
 and the sun. Between these extremes there is every possible 
 variety of habit. And all these have corresponding varieties 
 of structure. The Birds which seek their food in the air have 
 long and powerful wings, and so nice an adjustment of their 
 weight to that power and to that length, that the faculty of 
 self-command in them is perfect, and their power of direction 
 so accurate that they can pick up a flying gnat whilst they are 
 passing through the air at the rate of more than a hundred 
 miles an hour. Such especially are the powers of some species 
 
"i 
 
 
CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY. 89 
 
 of the Swallow tribe, one of which, the common Swift, is a 
 creature whose wonderful and unceasing evolutions seem part 
 of the happiness of summer and of serene and lofty skies.* 
 
 There are other Birds in which the wing has to be adapted 
 to the double purpose of swimming, or rather of diving, and of 
 flight. In this case, a large area of wing must be dispensed 
 with, because it would be incapable of being worked under 
 water. Consequently in all diving Birds the wings are reduced 
 to the smallest possible size which is consistent with retaining 
 the power of flight at all ; and in a few extreme Forms, the 
 power of flight is sacrificed altogether, and the wing is reduced 
 to the size, and adapted to the function, of a powerful fin. 
 This is the condition of the Penguins. But in most genera of 
 swimming Birds, both purposes are combined, and the wing is 
 just so far reduced in size and stiffened in texture as to make 
 it workable as a fin under water, whilst it is still just large 
 enough to sustain the weight of the Bird in flight. And here 
 again we have a wonderful example of the skill with which in- 
 exorable mechanical laws are subordinated to special purpose. 
 It is a necessary consequence of the area of the wing being so 
 reduced, in proportion to the size of the Bird, that great muscu- 
 lar power must be used in working it, otherwise the Force of 
 Gravity could not be overcome at all. It is a farther conse- 
 quence of this proportion of weight to working power, that there 
 must be great momentum and therefore great velocity of flight. 
 Accordingly this is the fact with all the oceanic diving Birds. 
 They have vast distances to go, following shoals of fish, and 
 moving from their summer to their winter haunts. They all fly 
 with immense velocity, and the wing-strokes are extremely 
 rapid. But there is one quality which their flight does not pos- 
 sess because it is incompatible with their structure, and be- 
 cause it is not required by their habits they have no facility 
 in evolutions, no delicate power of steering ; they cannot stop 
 with ease, nor can they resume their onward motion in a mo- 
 ment. They do not want it : the trackless fields of ocean over 
 which they roam are broad, and there are no obstructions in 
 the way. They fly in straight lines, changing their direction 
 
 * For the form of the wing m this remarkable bird, see the beautiful drawing here 
 engraved from the pencil of Mr. Wolf. 
 
go THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 only in long curves, and lighting in the sea almost with a tum- 
 ble and a splash. Their rising again is a work of great effort, 
 and generally they have to eke out the resisting power of their 
 small wings, not only by the most violent exertion, but by rising 
 against the wind, so as to collect its force as a help and addi- 
 tion to their own. 
 
 And now, again, we may see all these conditions changed 
 where there is a change in the purpose to be served. There is 
 another large class of oceanic Birds whose feeding ground is 
 not under water, but on the surface of the sea. In this class 
 all those powers of flight which would be useless to the Divers 
 are absolutely required, and are given in the highest perfection, 
 by the enlistment of the same mechanical laws under different 
 conditions. In the Gulls, the Terns, the Petrels, and in the 
 Fulmars, with the Albatross as their typical Form, the mechan- 
 ism of flight is carried through an ascending scale, to the high- 
 est degrees of power, both as respects endurance and facility of 
 evolution. 
 
 The mechanical laws which are appealed to in all these mod- 
 ifications of structure require adjustments of the finest kind , 
 and some of them are so curious and so beautiful that it is well 
 worth following them a little further in detail. 
 
 There are two facts observable in all Birds of great and long- 
 sustained powers of flight : the first is, that they are always 
 provided with wings which are rather long than broad, some- 
 times extremely narrow in proportion to their length ; the sec- 
 ond is, that the wings are always sharply pointed at the ends. 
 Let us look at the mechanical laws which absolutely require 
 this structure for the purpose of powerful flight, and to meet 
 which it has accordingly been devised and provided. 
 
 One law appealed to in making wings rather long than broad 
 is simply the law of leverage. But this law has to be applied 
 under conditions of difficulty and complexity, which are not ap- 
 parent at first sight. The body to be lifted is the very body 
 that must exert the lifting power. The Force of Gravity, which 
 has to be resisted, may be said to be sitting side by side, occu- 
 pying the same particles of matter, with the Vital Force which 
 is to give it battle. Nay, more, the one is connected with the 
 other in some mysterious manner which we cannot trace or un- 
 
CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY. 9! 
 
 derstand. A dead Bird weighs as much as a living one. Noth- 
 ing which our scales can measure is lost when the Vital Force 
 is gone. It is The Great Imponderable. Nevertheless, vital 
 forces of unusual power are always coupled with unusual mass 
 and volume in the matter through which they work. And so it 
 is that a powerful Bird must always also be comparatively a 
 heavy Bird. And then it is to be remembered that the action 
 of gravity is constant and untiring. The Vital Force, on the 
 contrary, however intense it may be, is intermitting and capa- 
 ble of exhaustion. If, then, this Force is to be set against the 
 Force of Gravity, it has much need of some implement through 
 which it may exert itself with mechanical advantage as regards 
 the particular purpose to be attained. Such an implement is 
 the lever and a long wing is nothing but a long lever. The 
 mechanical principle, or law, as is well known, is this, that a 
 very small amount of motion, or motion through a very small 
 space, at the short end of a lever, produces a great amount of 
 motion, or motion through a long space, at the opposite or 
 longer end. This action requires indeed a very intense force 
 to be applied at the shorter end, but it applies that force with 
 immense advantage for the purpose in view : because the mo- 
 tion which is transmitted to the end of a long wing is a motion 
 acting at that point through a long space, and is therefore equiv- 
 alent to a very heavy weight lifted through a stiort space at the 
 end which is attached to the body of the Bird. Now this is 
 precisely what is required for the purpose of flight. The body 
 of a Bird does not require to be much lifted by each stroke of 
 the wing. It only requires to be sustained ; and when more 
 than this is needed as when a Bird first rises from the ground 
 or from the sea, or when it ascends rapidly in the air greatly 
 increased exertion in many cases, very violent exertion is re- 
 quired.* And then it is to be remembered that long wings 
 economize the vital force in another way. When a strong cur- 
 rent of air strikes against the wings of a Bird, the same sustain- 
 
 * The Albatross, when rising from the sea, is described (" Ibis," July, 1865) as l% stretch- 
 ing out his neck, and with great exertion of his wings, running along the top of the 
 'water for seventy or eighty yards, until at last having got sufficient impetus, he tucks 
 up his legs, and is once more fairly launched into the air ." The contrast here described 
 between the violent exertion required in first rising, and the perfect ease of flight after 
 this first momentum has been acquired, is a striking illustration of the true mechani- 
 cal principles of flight. 
 
92 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 ing effect is produced as when the wing strikes against the air. 
 Consequently Birds with very long wings have this great advan- 
 tage, that with pre-acquired momentum, they can often for a 
 long time fly without flapping their wings at all. Under these 
 circumstances, a Bird is sustained very much as a boy's kite is 
 sustained in the air. The string which the boy holds, and by 
 which he pulls the kite downwards with a certain force, per- 
 forms for the kite the same offices which its own weight and 
 balance and momentum perform for the Bird. The great long- 
 winged oceanic Birds often appear to float rather than to fly. 
 The stronger is the gale, their flight, though less rapid, is all the 
 more easy so easy indeed as to appear buoyant , because the 
 blasts which strike against their wings are enough to sustain the 
 bird with comparatively little exertion of its own, except that of 
 holding the wing vanes stretched and exposed at proper angles 
 to the wind. And whenever the onward force previously ac- 
 quired by flapping becomes at length exhausted, and the cease- 
 less inexorable Force of Gravity is beginning to overcome it, 
 the Bird again rises by a few easy and gentle half-strokes of the 
 wing. Very often the same effect is produced by allowing the 
 Force of Gravity to act, and when the downward momentum 
 has brought the Bird close to the ground or to the sea, that 
 force is again converted into an ascending impetus by a change 
 in the angle at which the wing is exposed to the wind. This Is 
 a constant action with all the oceanic Birds. Those who have 
 seen the Albatross have described themselves as never tired of 
 watching its glorious and triumphant motion : 
 
 " Tranquil its spirit seemed, and floated slow ; 
 Even in its very motion there was rest." 
 
 " A Cloud? PROF. WILSON. 
 
 Rest where there is nothing else at rest in the tremendous 
 turmoil of its own stormy seas ! Sometimes for a whole hour 
 together this splendid Bird will sail or wheel round a ship in 
 every possible variety of direction without requiring to give a 
 single stroke to its pinions. Now, the Albatross has the ex- 
 treme form of this kind of wing. Its wings are immensely long 
 about fourteen or fifteen feet from tip to tip and almost as 
 
UNIVERSITY 
 
CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY. 93 
 
 narrow in proportion as a ribbon.* Our common Gannet is an 
 excellent, though a more modified, example of the same kind of 
 structure. On the other hand, Birds of short wings, though 
 their flight is sometimes very fast, are never able to sustain it 
 very long. The muscular exertion they require is greater, be- 
 cause it does not work to the same advantage. Most of the 
 Gallinaceous Birds (such as the common Fowl, Pheasants, Par- 
 tridges, etc.) have wings of this kind ; and some of them never 
 fly except to escape an enemy, or to change their feeding- 
 ground. 
 
 The second fact observable in reference to Birds of easy and 
 powerful flight namely, that their wings are all sharply pointed 
 at the end will lead us still further into the niceties of adjust- 
 ment which are so signally displayed in the machinery of flight. 
 
 The feathers of a Bird's wing have a natural threefold divi- 
 sion, according to the different wing-bones to which they are at- 
 tached. The quills which form the end of the wing are called 
 the Primaries ; those which form the middle of the vane are 
 called the Secondaries ; and those which are next the body of 
 the Bird are called the Tertiaries. The motion of a Bird's 
 wing increases from its minimum at the shoulder-joint to its 
 maximum at the tip. The primary quills which form the ter- 
 mination of the wing are those on which the chief burden of 
 flight is cast. Each feather has less and less weight to bear, and 
 less and less force to exert, in proportion as it lies nearer the body 
 of the bird ; and there is nothing more beautiful in the struct- 
 ure of a wing than the perfect gradation in strength and stiff- 
 ness, as well as in modification of form, which marks the series 
 from the first of the Primary quills to the last and feeblest of 
 the Tertiaries.f Now, the sharpness or roundness of a wing 
 
 * The mechanical principle involved in the sufficiency of very narrow wings has, I 
 believe, been adequately explained in a very ingenious pape* read before the Aeron- 
 autical Society, by Mr. F. H. Wenham, C.E. It is .the same mechanical principle 
 which accounts for the narrow blades of a Screw Propeller having a resisting force 
 as great as would be exerted upon the whole area of rotation by a solid Disc. In the 
 case of a flat body, such as the wing of a bird, being propelled edgeways through the 
 air, nearly the whole resisting and sustaining force is exerted upon the first few inches 
 of the advancing surface. 
 
 1 1 owe to the accurate pencil of Mr. J. Wolf the accompanying engraving of the 
 wing of the Golden Plover, a Bird of powerful flight. In this wing the gradation of 
 the feathers is very perfect. It will be observed that the first of the Secondaries, 
 the eleventh feather from the tip of the wing, is marked by a slight variation in the 
 form of the margin. 
 
94 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 at the tip depends on the position which is given to the longest 
 Primary quill. If the first, or even the second, primary is the 
 longest, and all that follow are considerably shorter, the wing 
 is necessarily a pointed wing, because the tip of a single quill 
 forms the end ; but if the third or fourth Primary quills are the 
 longest, and the next again on both sides are only a little shorter, 
 the wing becomes a round-ended wing. Round-ended wings 
 are also almost always open-ended that is to say, the tips of 
 the quills do not touch each other, but leave interspaces at the 
 end of the wing, through which, of course, a good deal of air 
 escapes. Since each single quill is formed on the same princi- 
 ple as the whole wing that is, with the anterior margin stiff 
 and the posterior margin yielding this escape is not useless 
 for progression ; but the air acts less favorably for this purpose 
 than when struck by a more compact set of feathers. The com- 
 mon Rook and all the Crows are examples of this. The Per- 
 egrine Falcon, the common Swallow, and all Birds of very pow- 
 erful flight, have been provided with the sharp-pointed struct- 
 ure.* 
 
 The object of this structure, and the mechanical laws to which 
 it appeals, will be apparent when we recollect what it is on 
 which the propelling power, as distinct from the sustaining 
 power, of a Bird's wing depends. It depends on the reaction 
 of the air escaping backwards that is, in the direction exactly 
 opposite to that of the intended motion of the Bird. Any air 
 which escapes from under the wing, in any other direction, will 
 of course react with less advantage upon that motion. But 
 from under a round wing a good deal of air must necessarily 
 escape along the rounded end that is, in a direction at right 
 angles to the line of intended flight. All the reaction produced 
 by this escape is a reaction which is useless for propulsion. 
 Accordingly, in all Birds to which great velocity of flight is 
 essential, this structure, which is common in other Birds, is care- 
 fully avoided. 
 
 The Hawks have been classified as " noble " or " ignoble," 
 according to the length and sharpness of their wings : those 
 which catch their prey by velocity of flight having been uni- 
 
 * The illustrations of Mr. Wolf will here again be the best explanation to the reader 
 of the difference between the sharp and the round structure, p. 93. 
 
CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY. 95 
 
 formly provided with the long-pointed structure. The Sparrow- 
 Hawk and the Merlin are excellent examples of the difference. 
 The Sparrow-Hawk, with its comparatively short and blunt 
 wings, steals along the hedgerows and pounces on its prey by 
 surprise ; seldom chasing it, except for a short distance, and 
 when the victim is at a disadvantage. And well do the smaller 
 Birds know this habit, and the limit of his powers. Many of 
 them chase and " chaff " the Sparrow-Hawk, when he is seen 
 flying in the open, perfectly aware that he cannot catch them 
 by fast flying. But they never play these tricks with the Merlin. 
 This beautiful little Falcon hunts the open ground, giving fair 
 chase to its quarry by power and speed of flight. The Merlin 
 delights in flying at some of the fastest Birds, such as the Snipe. 
 The longest and most beautiful trial of wingmanship I have ever 
 seen was the chase of a Merlin after a Snipe in one of the Heb- 
 rides. It lasted as far as the eye could reach, and seemed to 
 continue far out to sea. In the Merlin, as in all the fastest 
 Falcons, the second quill feather is the longest in the wing; 
 the others rapidly diminish ; and the point of the wing looks as 
 sharp as a needle in the air. 
 
 There is yet one other power which it is absolutely necessary 
 to some Birds that their wings should enable them to exert : 
 and that is, the power of standing still, or remaining suspended 
 in the air without any forward motion. One familiar example 
 of this is the common Kestrel, which, from the frequent exer- 
 cise of this power, is called in some counties the " Windhover." 
 The mechanical principles on which the machinery of flight is 
 adapted to this purpose, are very simple. No Bird can exercise 
 this power which is not provided with wings large enough, long 
 enough, and powerful enough to sustain its weight with ease, 
 and without violent exertion. Large wings can always be di- 
 minished at the pleasure of the Bird, by being partially folded 
 inwards ; and this contraction of the area is constantly resorted 
 to. But a Bird which has wings so small and scanty as to com- 
 pel it to strike them always at full stretch, and with great veloc- 
 ity in order to fly at all, is incapable of standing still in the air. 
 No man ever saw a Diver or a Duck performing the evolution 
 which the Kestrel may be seen performing every hour over 
 so many English fields. The cause of this is obvious, if we re- 
 
96 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 fer to the principles which have already been explained. We 
 have seen that the perpendicular stroke of a Bird's wing has 
 the double effect of both propelling and sustaining. The reac- 
 tion from such a stroke brings two different forces to bear upon 
 the Bird one whose direction is upwards, and another whose 
 direction is forwards. How can these two effects be separated 
 from each other ? How can the wing be so moved as to keep 
 up just enough of the sustaining force without allowing the pro- 
 pelling force to come into play ? The answer to this, although 
 it involves some very complicated laws connected with what 
 mechanicians call the " parallelogram of forces," is practically 
 a simple one. It can only be done by shortening the stroke 
 and altering the perpendicularity of its direction. Of course, 
 if a Bird, by altering the axis of its own body, can direct its 
 wing-stroke in some degree forwards, it will have the effect of 
 stopping instead of promoting progression. But in order to do 
 this, it must have a superabundance of sustaining force, because 
 some of this force is sacrificed when the stroke is off the perpen- 
 dicular. Hence it follows that Birds so heavy as to require the 
 whole action of their wings to sustain them at all, can never 
 afford this sacrifice of the sustaining force, and, except for the 
 purpose of arresting their flight, can never strike except directly 
 downwards, that is, directly against the opposing force of 
 gravity. But Birds with superabundant sustaining power, and 
 long sharp wings, have nothing to do but to diminish the length 
 of stroke, and direct it off the perpendicular at such an angle 
 as will bring all the forces bearing upon their body to an exact 
 balance, and they will then remain stationary at a fixed point 
 in the air.* 
 
 They are greatly assisted in this beautiful evolution by an 
 adverse current of air ; and it will always be observed that the 
 Kestrel, when hovering, turns his head to wind, and hangs his 
 whole body at a greater or less angle to the plane of the hori- 
 zon. When there is no wind, or very little, the sustaining force 
 is kept up by a short rapid action of the pinions, and the long 
 tail is spread out like a fan to assist in stopping any tendency 
 to pnward motion. When there is a strong breeze, no flapping 
 
 * Mr. Wolf's illustration of a Kestrel hovering shows accurately the position of the 
 bird when the action is performed in still air. 
 
C, SPARROW HAWK ROVXD WING. 
 
 A, KESTREL HOVERING. 
 
CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY. 97 
 
 is required at all the force of the wind supplying the whole 
 force necessary to counteract the force of gravity ; and in pro- 
 portion to the increasing strength of the wind, the amount of 
 vane which must be exposed to it becomes less and less. I 
 have seen a Kestrel stand suspended in a half gale with the 
 wings folded close to the body, and with no visible muscular 
 motion whatever. And so nice is the adjustment of position 
 which is requisite to produce this exact balance of all the forces 
 bearing on the Bird, that the change in that position which 
 again instantly results in a forward motion is very often almost 
 insensible to the eye. It is generally a slight expansion of the 
 wings, and a very slight change in the axis of the body. 
 
 And here it may be observed that the tails of Birds have not r 
 as is often supposed, any function analogous to the rudder of a 
 ship. Birds which have lost the tail are not thereby rendered 
 incapable of turning. If the steering function had been as- 
 signed to Birds' tails, the vane of the tail must have been set, 
 not, as it is, horizontally, but perpendicularly to the line of 
 flight. But a Bird's tail has in flight no lateral motion what- 
 ever. It does, indeed, materially assist the Bird in turning, be- 
 cause it serves to stop the way of a Bird when it rises or turns 
 in the air to take a new direction. The feathers of the tail are 
 also capable of being depressed unequally, that is, more at 
 one side than at the other ; and when the whole are spread out 
 like the leaves of a fan, this depression at one side is a means 
 whereby the Bird can exert against the air which is passing un- 
 der it greater muscular pressure upon one side than upon the 
 other, and can thus help the turning action of the wings. With 
 a telescope I have seen this action of the tail very marked in 
 the soaring flight of the Buzzard, when the Bird is wheeling 
 round in spiral circles. The tail contributes also largely to the 
 general balance of the body, which in itself is an important 
 element in the facility of flight. Accordingly, almost all Birds 
 which depend on great ease of evolution in flight or on the 
 power of stopping suddenly, have largely developed tails. 
 This is the case with all the Birds of prey with the Kestrel in 
 a conspicuous degree. But there are some exceptions which 
 show that great powers of flight are not always dependent ort 
 the possession of a large tail as, for example, the Swift. 
 7 
 
9^ THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 Another explanation has been given of the means by which 
 Birds are able to turn in flight, which is a curious example 
 how preconceived theories founded on false analogies will 
 vitiate our observation of the commonest facts in nature. I do 
 not know of any modern work that gives any account of the 
 theory of flight, which is even tolerably correct. But in most 
 points an admirable account is to be found in the celebrated 
 work of Borelli, " De Motu Animalium." On the question, 
 however, of steerage in flight, he gives a solution which the 
 most ordinary observation is sufficient to contradict. Borelli is 
 quite aware that the tail in Birds has no such function as that 
 which is usually assigned to it, and he points out the true theo- 
 retical objection to the possibility of its having any guiding 
 power viz., its horizontal position, and its immobility in the 
 lateral direction. But the theory which he himself propounds 
 is equally erroneous. It is this, that Birds deflect their 
 course to the right or to the left, as rowers turn a row-boat by 
 striking more quickly and more strongly with one wing than 
 with the other.* To this theory there are two objections 
 first, that as matter of fact Birds can turn, and do turn ? even to 
 the extent of describing complete circles in the air, without any 
 flapping either of one wing or the other : and secondly, that 
 when Birds do flap and turn at the same time, not the slight- 
 est difference in time between the two wing-strokes can ever 
 be detected. The beats of a Bird's two wings are always ex- 
 actly synchronous. But the first of these two objections is of 
 itself quite sufficient to disprove the theory. No man can have 
 watched even for a moment the flight of the common Swallow, 
 and especially the flight of the Swift, without seeing it perform 
 complete gyrations in the air without any strokes of either wing. 
 The only change which can ever be detected by the eye is a 
 slight elevation on one side of the whole body, and a slight de- 
 pression of the other. The depression is always on that side 
 
 * Referring to a boat, he says:" Si remi dexteri lateris celerius quam sinistri aquam 
 retrorsum impellant semper prora revolvetur versus sinistrum latus ; ergo eodem 
 modo dum avis in medio fluido aeris innatat, volando aequilibrata in centre gravitatis 
 ejus, si sola dextra ala deorsum sed oblique flactatur, aer<jm subjectum impellando 
 versus caudam necessario ad instar navis mox memoratae, permovetur latus ejus dex- 
 trum, quiescente aut tardius moto sinistro latera. Ex quo fit, ut avis pars anterior 
 circa centrum gravitatis ejus revoluta, flectatur versum sinistrum latus." Borellus, 
 ** De Motu Animalium," Pars Prima. Propositio cxcix. 
 
CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY. 99 
 
 towards which the Bird is turning. On the opposite side, that 
 from which the Bird is turning, there is of course a correspond- 
 ing elevation. Sometimes this is very obvious ; but in general 
 it is so slight as to require close observation to detect it. In 
 the Albatross, when sweeping round, the wings are often 
 pointed in a direction nearly perpendicular to the sea.* The 
 effect of this, of course, is to expose the two vanes at different 
 angles to the aerial currents and it must be remembered that 
 in flight the balance of all the forces employed is so extremely 
 fine that the most minute alteration in the degree in which 
 they bear upon each other will produce an immense change in 
 the result. It is not surprising, therefore, that the muscular 
 movements which serve to turn the axis of a flying Bird from 
 one direction to another, are very often so extremely minute as 
 generally altogether to elude the sight. But in general terms, 
 it may be said that a Bird turns in flying essentially on the 
 same principle as that on which a Man turns in walking. It is 
 done in both cases by change in the direction of muscular press- 
 ure upon a resisting medium. By an exquisite combination 
 of different laws, and by mechanical contrivance in the adjust- 
 ment of them, it has been given to a Bird to find in the thin 
 and yielding air a medium of resistance against which its own 
 muscular force may act, as firm and as effective as that which 
 Man finds in the solid earth. 
 
 The Humming Birds are perhaps the most remarkable exam- 
 ples in the world of the machinery of flight. The power of 
 poising themselves in the air, remaining absolutely stationary 
 whilst they search the blossoms for insects, is a power essen- 
 tial to their life. It is a power accordingly which is enjoyed 
 by them in the highest perfection. When they intend progres- 
 sive flight, it is effected with such velocity as to elude the eye. 
 The action of the wing in all these cases is far too rapid to en- 
 able the observer to detect the exact difference between that 
 
 * See a very interesting account of the flight of the Albatross by Captain T. W. 
 Hutton, in the " Ibis " for July, 1864. Captain Hutton says : u If he wishes to turn to 
 the right, he bends his head and tail slightly upwards, at the same time raising his 
 left side and lowering the right in proportion to the sharpness of the curve he wishes 
 to make, the wings being kept rigid the whole time." This is the only paper I have 
 seen on the flight of birds in which observation of the facts is not vitiated by some 
 false preconceived theory on their cause. Captain Hutton has thoroughly seized the 
 true mechanical principles of flight. 
 
TOO THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 kind of motion which keeps the Bird at absolute rest in the air, 
 and that which carries it along with such immense velocity. 
 But there can be no doubt that the change is one from a short 
 quick stroke delivered obliquely forward, to a full stroke, more 
 slow, but delivered perpendicularly. This corresponds with 
 the account given by that most accurate ornithological ob- 
 server, Mr. Gould. He says : " When poised before any ob- 
 ject, this action of the wing is so rapidly performed that it is 
 impossible for the eye to follow each stroke, and a hazy semi- 
 circle of indistinctness on each side of the Bird is all that is 
 perceptible." There is another fact mentioned by those who 
 have watched their movements most closely which corresponds 
 with the explanation already given viz., the fact that the axis 
 of the Humming Bird's body when hovering is always highly 
 inclined, so much so as to appear almost perpendicular in the 
 air. In other words the wing-stroke, instead of being delivered 
 perpendicularly downwards, which would infallibly carry the 
 body onwards, is delivered at such an angle forwards as to 
 bring to an exact balance the upward, the downward, and the 
 forward forces which bear upon the body of {he Bird. Mr. 
 Darwin says, " When hovering by a flower, the tail is constantly 
 shut and expanded like a fan, the body being kept in a nearly 
 vertical position" Mr. Wallace, another accurate observer, de- 
 scribes the Humming Birds as " balancing themselves vertically 
 in the air." 
 
 These are a few, and a few only, of the adjustments required 
 in order to the giving of the power of flight ; adjustments of 
 organic growth to intensity of vital force of external structure 
 to external work of shape in each separate feather to definite 
 shape in the series as a whole of material to resistance of 
 mass and form to required velocities ; adjustments, in short, of 
 law to law, of force to force, and of all to Purpose. So many 
 are these contrivances, so various, so fine, so intricate, that a 
 volume might be written without exhausting the beauty of the 
 method in which this one mechanical problem has been solved. 
 It is by knowledge of unchanging laws that these victories over 
 them seem to be achieved ; yet not by knowledge only, except 
 as the guide of Power. For here as everywhere else in Nature, 
 we see the same mysterious need of conforming to imperative 
 
CONTRIVANCE A NECESSITY. IOI 
 
 conditions, side by side with absolute control over the forces 
 through which this conformity is secured. When any given 
 purpose cannot be attained without the violation of some law, 
 unless by some new power, and some new machinery the req- 
 uisite power and mechanism are evolved generally out of old 
 materials, and by modifications of pre-existing forms. There 
 can be no better example of this than a wing-feather. It is a 
 production wholly unlike any other animal growth an imple- 
 ment specially formed to combine strength with lightness, elas- 
 ticity, and imperviousness to air. Again, the bones of a Bird's 
 wing are the bones of the Mammalian arm and hand, specially 
 modified to support the feathers. The same purpose is effected 
 by other means in connection with precisely the same bones in 
 the flying Mammalia the Bats. In these animals the finger- 
 bones instead of being compressed or soldered together to sup- 
 port feathers, are separated, attenuated, and greatly lengthened 
 to afford attachment to a web or flying membrane which is 
 stretched between them. In other ages of the world there 
 were also flying Lizards. But in all these cases the mechanical 
 principle is the same, and there has been the same ingenious 
 adaptation of material and of force to the universal laws of 
 motion. 
 
 On the earth and on the sea Man has attained to powers of 
 locomotion with which, in strength, endurance, and in velocity, 
 no animal movement can compare. But the air is an element 
 on which he cannot travel an ocean which he cannot navigate. 
 The Birds of heaven are still his envy, and on the paths they 
 tread he cannot follow. As yet ! for it is not certain that this 
 exclusion is to be perpetual. His failure has resulted quite as 
 much from his ignorance of natural laws, as from his inability 
 to meet the conditions which they demand. All attempts to 
 guide bodies buoyant in the air must be fruitless. Balloons 
 are mere toys. No flying animal has ever been formed on the 
 principle of buoyancy. Birds and Bats, and Dragons, have 
 been all immensely heavier than the air, and their weight is one 
 of the forces most essential to their flight. Yet there is a real 
 impediment in the way of Man navigating the air and that is 
 the excessive weight of the only great mechanical moving pow- 
 ers hitherto placed at his disposal. When Science shall have 
 
102 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 discovered some moving power greatly lighter than any we yet 
 know, in all probability the problem will be solved.* But of 
 one thing we maybe sure that if Man is ever destined to nav- 
 igate the air, it will be in machines formed in strict obedience 
 to the mechanical laws which have been employed by the Cre- 
 ator for the same purpose in flying animals.t 
 
 * The men of Science in France are ahead of the men of Science in England upon 
 this subject. There is a society established in Paris which announces in its very title 
 the true fundamental principle of flight" Socie'te d, Encouragement pour la Locomo- 
 tion aeVienne au moyen d'Appareils PLUS LOURDS que 1'Air." The false principle of 
 Buoyancy is thus eliminated and banished from the question. 
 
 t I owe to my father (John, 7th Duke of Argyll) my knowledge of the Theory of 
 Flight which is expounded in this chapter. The retired life he led, and the dislike he 
 had of the work of literary composition, confined the knowledge of his views within 
 a comparatively narrow circle. But his love of mechanical science, and his study of 
 the problem during many years of investigation and experiment, made him thoroughly 
 master of the subject. In his devices for testing and illustrating the truth of his 
 Theory, he was chiefly assisted by two very ingenious men, the late Mr. John Hart, 
 of Glasgow, and the late Mr. Robert Bryson, of Edinburgh. The result of his inves- 
 tigations led him to the opinion that until a lighter moving power than steam is dis- 
 covered, it will be impossible to construct successfully machines for the navigation 
 of the air. I shall only add, that having made ornithology a favorite pursuit, I have 
 been led during many years to test this theory by close observation of the flight of 
 Birds ; and that from the manner in which it fits into, and explains all the facts, I 
 have been always more and more satisfied of its truth. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 APPARENT EXCEPTIONS TO THE SUPREMACY OF PURPOSE. 
 
 YET, as we look at Nature, the fact will force itself upon us 
 that there are structures in which we cannot recognize any use ; 
 that there are contrivances which often fail of their effect ; and 
 that there are others which appear to be separated from the 
 conditions they were intended to meet, and under which alone 
 their usefulness could arise. Such instances occur in many 
 branches of inquiry; and although in the great mass of nat- 
 ural phenomena the supremacy of Purpose is evident enough, 
 such cases do frequently come across our path as cases of 
 exception cases in which Law does not seem to be subser- 
 vient to Will, but to be asserting a power and an endurance of 
 its own. 
 
 The degree of importance which may be attached to such 
 cases as a source of real difficulty, will vary with the character 
 of the individual mind, and its capacity of holding by the great 
 lines of evidence which run through the whole Order of Nature. 
 It is with these cases as with the local currents which some- 
 times obscure the rising and falling of the tides. When 
 watched from hour to hour, the greater law is clearly discernible 
 by well-marked effects ; but when watched from minute to 
 minute, that law is not distinct, and there are waves which 
 seem like a rebellion of the sea against the force which is 
 dragging it from the land. The Order of Nature is very com- 
 plicated, and very partially understood. It is to be expected 
 therefore that there should be a vast variety of subordinate 
 facts, whose relation to each other and to the whole must be a 
 matter of perplexity to us. It is so with the relation in which 
 different known laws of Nature stand to each other ; much more 
 must it be so with the far deeper subject of the relation which 
 these laws bear to the Will and the intentions of the Supreme. 
 
104 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 But as cases of intention frustrated, of structure without ap- 
 parent purpose, of organs dissociated from function and from 
 the opportunities of use, are sometimes sources of difficulty, it 
 may be well to consider this subject a little nearer. Let us 
 look at it both in the light of abstract reasoning, and also in 
 the light of particular illustration. 
 
 In the first place, then, we must remember that results which 
 may appear as exceptions to the attainment of one Purpose 
 may be nothing more than fulfilments of another. This follows 
 from the truth which has been dealt with in a former page,* 
 ;that we are " greatly ignorant," as Bishop Butler says, how far 
 anything in Nature is to be regarded as a means or as an end, 
 and that ultimate or final purposes we can never see. The 
 difficulty hence arising has often been represented as a funda- 
 mental objection to the whole doctrine of Intention. But this 
 view is founded on a very great, although a very natural con- 
 fusion of thought. The perception of Purpose and Intention 
 is inseparable from the perception of Adjustment and Function 
 .as these are exhibited in Nature. As such it belongs to 
 Knowledge. It is the perception of a relation between those 
 phenomena and certain well known phenomena of Mind. But 
 to perceive a relation is not necessarily to perceive all that this 
 relation involves. To perceive intention is a very different 
 thing from perceiving all that is intended. Our own human 
 experience should make this distinction familiar to us. Many 
 things we do and many things we contrive are done and con- 
 trived with more than one intention. In the light of this ex- 
 perjence it is altogether irrational to regard as an exception to 
 the attainment of Purpose in Nature the fact, for example, 
 " that of fifty seeds she often brings but one to bear." It 
 throws no doubt or difficulty in the way of our conviction, for 
 example, that one purpose of seed-bearing in Plants is the re- 
 production of their kind, because it appears that another pur- 
 pose to which that seed-bearing is applied is the support of 
 animal life. The intention with which a grain of wheat is so 
 constituted as to be capable of producing another wheat plant, 
 is not the less in the nature of Purpose because it co-exists 
 with another intention, that the same grain should be capable 
 
 * A nte^ p. 48. 
 
APPARENT EXCEPTIONS TO THE SUPREMACY OF PURPOSE. 105 
 
 of sustaining the powers and the enjoyments of Life in the 
 Body and in the Mind of Man. On the contrary, the power 
 possessed by most plants, and by this plant especially, of pro' 
 ducing seed in a ratio far beyond that which would be required 
 for one purpose, is the sure indication and the proof that an- 
 other purpose larger and wider was in view. Yet the seeds of 
 corn which, as seeds, are destroyed when they are converted 
 into bread, may in that aspect be represented and regarded as 
 " failures." In reference to this kind of failure, it has been 
 actually argued that in Nature " the prodigality of waste is far 
 more conspicuous than the wise economy of which so much is 
 said."* When applied to the case of the wheat plant the 
 fallacy is apparent, and would probably be admitted. But this 
 is only one example of a class to which an infinite number of 
 other examples in Nature may be referred. There may be, 
 indeed, and there are, innumerable examples where the mean- 
 ing of like " failures " is not equally evident to us some which 
 may be involved in utter and hopeless darkness some which 
 may run up into the great master difficulty that which we are 
 accustomed to call the " Origin of Evil." But the same argu- 
 ment applies to all. It is not that Purpose and Intention solve 
 all difficulties. But it is that no difficulty in perceiving what 
 may be the purpose and intention of a particular fact can affect 
 the. reality and truth of that perception in other cases where no 
 such difficulty exists. Let us now look at the same subject in 
 the light of particular examples. 
 
 There is one explanation which, it cannot be doubted, applies 
 to many cases ; and this is, the simple explanation that we 
 often mistake the purpose of particular structures in Nature, 
 and connect them with intentions which are not, and never 
 were, the intentions really in view. The best naturalists are 
 liable to such mistakes. A very curious illustration is afforded 
 by an observation of Mr. Darwin, in his " Origin of Species." 
 He says that " if green Woodpeckers alone had existed, and 
 we did not know that there were any black and pied kinds, I 
 daresay we should have thought that the green color was a 
 beautiful adaptation to hide this tree-frequenting bird from its 
 enemies." Now, this introduces us to a very curious subject, 
 
 * Mr. G. H. Lewes, Fortnightly Review, July, 1867, p. 100. 
 
IO6 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 and one as well adapted as any other to illustrate the relation 
 in which Law stands to Purpose in the economy of Nature. 
 
 There can be no doubt that the principle of adapted coloring 
 with the effect and for the purpose of concealment, prevails 
 extensively in various branches of the Animal Kingdom. It 
 arises, probably, like all other phenomena, by way of Natural 
 Consequence, out of some combination of forces which are the 
 instruments employed. We have no knowledge what these 
 forces are ; but we can imagine them to be worked into a law 
 of assimilation, founded on some such principle as that which 
 photography has revealed. It is true that Man has not yet dis- 
 covered any process by which the tints of Nature can be trans- 
 ferred, as the most delicate shades of light can be transferred, 
 to surfaces artificially prepared to receive them. Such a proc- 
 ess is, however, very probably within the reach even of human 
 chemistry, and it is one which is certainly known in the labora- 
 tory of Nature. The Chameleon is the extreme case in which 
 the effect of such a process is proverbially known. Many Fish 
 exhibit it in a remarkable degree, changing color rapidly in 
 harmony with the color of the water in which they swim, or of 
 the bottom on which they lie. The law on which such changes 
 depend is very obscure : but it appears to be a natural process, 
 as constant as all other laws are that is, constant whenever 
 given conditions are brought together. It is possible that the 
 effect may be due to a cause which is well known to be capable 
 of producing somewhat analogous results. Even before the 
 days of Jacob and of Laban, it seems to have been known that 
 through the eyes of the female parent color can be determined 
 in her young ; and although this is certainly not the law which 
 commonly determines color operating as it does, so far as we 
 know, seldom, and only in a small degree it is quite conceiv- 
 able that, under special conditions, it is capable of being 
 worked as a great power in Nature. But, then, these condi- 
 tions are not brought together except with a view to purpose. 
 For now let us see how this law, whatever it may be, is regulat- 
 ed and applied. 
 
 One thing is certain : assimilated coloring is not applied uni- 
 versally ; on the contrary, it is applied very partially. Is it, 
 therefore, applied arbitrarily at hap-hazard, or without refer- 
 
APPARENT EXCEPTIONS TO THE SUPREMACY OF PURPOSE. 107 
 
 ence to conditions in which we can trace a reason and a rule ? 
 Far from it. The rule appears to be this : adaptive coloring, 
 as a means of concealment, is never applied (i) to any animal 
 whose habits do not expose it to special danger, or (2) to any 
 animal which is sufficiently endowed with other more effective 
 means of escape. 
 
 This is the higher Law of Purpose which governs the lesser 
 law, whatever it may be, by which assimilative coloring is pro- 
 duced. Now, no man who had observed this higher law could 
 ever fall into the error of supposing that the color of the Green 
 Woodpecker was given to it as a means of concealment. Few 
 Birds are so invisible as Woodpeckers, because their structure 
 and habits give them other methods of escaping observation, 
 which are most curious and effective. They have few natural 
 enemies but Man ; and when in danger of being seen by him, 
 they slip and glide round the bole of a tree or bough on which 
 they may be climbing, with a swift, silent, and cunning motion, 
 and from behind that shelter, with nothing visible but their 
 head, they keep a close watch upon the movements of the en- 
 emy. With such sleight of feet, there is no need of lazier 
 methods of concealment. 
 
 Accordingly, in this family of Birds, the law of assimilation 
 is withheld from application, and the most violent and strongly 
 contrasted coloring prevails. Jet black, side by side with pure 
 white, and the most brilliant crimsons, are common in the plu- 
 mage of the Woodpeckers. No birds are more conspicuous in 
 coloring, yet none are more seldom seen. The Green Wood- 
 pecker itself, with its yellow tints and crimson hood, contrasts 
 strongly with the bark on which it climbs. The purpose of con- 
 cealment being effected by other means, gives way to the pur- 
 pose of beauty or of adornment in the disposition of colors. 
 And in general the same rule applies to all Birds whose life is 
 led among woods and forests. Comparatively inaccessible to 
 Birds of prey, they exhibit every variety of tint, and the princi- 
 ple of invisibility from assimilated coloring is almost unknown. 
 
 It must always be remembered, that animals of prey are as 
 much intended to capture their food, as their victims are in- 
 tended to have some chances and facilities of escape. The 
 purpose here is a double purpose a purpose not in all cases 
 
108 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 to preserve life, but to maintain its balance and due proportion. 
 In order to effect this purpose, the means of aggression, and of 
 defence, or of escape, must bear a definite relation to each 
 other both in kind and in degree. When arboreal Birds leave 
 their sheltering trees, they are exposed to the attacks of Hawks, 
 but they have fair opportunities of retreating to their coverts 
 again ; and the upward spring of the disappointed Falcon in 
 the air, when his quarry reaches the shelter of trees, tells how 
 effective such a retreat is, and how completely it ends the chase. 
 On the other hand, there is a great variety of Birds whose 
 habitat is the open plain the desert the unprotected shore 
 the treeless moor the stony mountain-top. These are the 
 favorite hunting-grounds of the Eagles, and the Falcons, and 
 the Hawks. There they have free scope for their great powers 
 of wing, and uninterrupted range for their piercing powers of 
 sight. And it must be remembered, that even the slowest of 
 the Hawks can on such ground capture with ease Birds which, 
 when once on the wing, could distance their pursuer by superior 
 speed, because the Hawk, sweeping over the ground, takes the 
 prey at a disadvantage, pouncing on it before it can get fairly 
 into the air. Birds whose habitat is thus exposed could not 
 maintain their existence at all without special means of conceal- 
 ment or escape. Accordingly it is among such Birds almost 
 exclusively that the law of assimilative coloring prevails. And 
 among them it is carried to a perfection which is wonderful in- 
 deed. Every ornithologist will recognize the truth of the ob- 
 servation, that this law prevails chiefly among the Grouse, the 
 Partridges, the Plovers, the Snipes, Woodcocks, Sandpipers, 
 and other kindred families, all of which inhabit open ground. 
 There can be no better examples than the Grouse and the 
 Ptarmigan of our Scottish mountains. The close imitation in 
 the plumage of these Birds of the general tinting and mottling 
 of the ground on which they lie and feed is apparent at a glance 
 and is best known to those who have tried to see Grouse or 
 Ptarmigan when sitting, and when their position is indicated 
 within a few feet or a few inches by the trembling nostrils and 
 dilated eyeballs of a steady Pointer-Dog. In the case of the 
 common Grouse, as the ground is nearly uniform int color 
 throughout the year, the coloring of the Bird is constant also.. 
 
APPARENT EXCEPTIONS TO THE SUPREMACY OF PURPOSE. 109 
 
 But in the case of the Ptarmigan, it changes with the changing 
 seasons. The pearly grays which in summer match so exactly 
 with the lichens of the mountain peaks, give place in winter to 
 the pure white which matches not less perfectly with the wreaths 
 of snow. 
 
 This is indeed a change which requires for its production the 
 agency of other laws than those merely of reflected light, be- 
 cause the substitution of one entire set of feathers, for another 
 of a different color, twice in every year, implies arrangements 
 which lie deep in the organic chemistry of the Bird. The 
 various genera of Sand-Grouse and Sand-Partridges which fre- 
 quent the deserts and naked plains of the Asiatic continent, 
 are colored in exquisite harmony with the ground. Our com- 
 mon Woodcock is another excellent example, and is all the 
 more remarkable as there is one very peculiar color introduced 
 into the plumage of this Bird which exactly corresponds with a 
 particular stage in the decay of fallen leaves I mean that in 
 which the browns and yellows of the Autumn rot away into 
 the pale ashy skeletons which lie in thousands under' every 
 wood in winter. This color is exactly reproduced in the 
 feathers of the Woodcock, and so mingled with the dark 
 browns and warm yellows of fresher leaves, that the general 
 imitation of effect is perfect. And so curiously is the purpose 
 of concealment worked out in the plumage of the Woodcock, 
 that one conspicuous ornament of the bird is covered by a 
 special provision from the too curious gaze of those for whose 
 admiration it was not intended. The tail-feathers of the Wood- 
 cock can be erected and spread out at pleasure like a fan, and, 
 being tipped on their under surface with white of a brilliant 
 and silvery lustre, set off by contrast with an adjacent patch of 
 velvety black, they then produce a most conspicuous effect. 
 But the same web which on its under surface bears this beau- 
 tiful but dangerous ornament, is on its upper surface dulled 
 down to a sombre ashy-gray, and becomes as invisible as the 
 rest of the plumage. These are all provisions of Nature, 
 which stand in clear and intelligible relation to the habits of 
 the Bird. It rests all day upon the ground, under trees.; and 
 were it not for its ingeniously adapted coloring, it would be pe- 
 culiarly exposed to destruction. Man is an enemy whose cun- 
 
IIO THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 ning inventions overcome all such methods of protection, and 
 the Woodcock, when in his most rapid flight, is now an easier 
 prey than in older times when sitting on the ground. But be- 
 fore fire-arms had reached the perfection which has enabled us 
 to shoot flying Birds, the coloring of the Woodcock served it 
 in good stead, even against the Lords of the Creation. In old 
 times it required special skill and practice to see Woodcocks on 
 the ground, and the large lustrous black eye which is adapted 
 for night-vision was the one spot of color which enabled the 
 fowler of a century and a half ago to detect the bird. Thus 
 Hudibras has it : 
 
 " For fools are known by looking wise, 
 As men find woodcocks by their eyes." 
 
 " Hudibras to Sidrophel," 79, 80. 
 
 In Snipes, again, there is are markable series of straw-col- 
 ored feathers introduced along the back and shoulders, which 
 perfectly imitate the general effect of the bleached vegetable 
 stalks common on the ground which the Bird frequents. 
 
 There are other animals in which the principle of imitation 
 with a view to concealment is carried very much farther than 
 the mere imitation of color, and extends also to form and 
 structure. There are some examples of this in the Class of 
 Insects, so remarkable that it is impossible to look at them 
 without ever fresh astonishment. I refer to some families of 
 the Orthopterous order, and especially to some genera of the 
 MantidcE and Phasmidce. Many species^ of the genus Mantis 
 are wholly modelled in the form of vegetable growths. The 
 legs are made to imitate leaf-stalks, the body is elongated and 
 notched so as to simulate a twig; the segment of the shoul- 
 ders is spread out and flattened in the likeness of a seed-vessel ; 
 and the large wings are exact imitations of a full-blown leaf, 
 with all its veins and skeleton complete, and all its color and 
 apparent texture. There is something startling and almost 
 horrible in the completeness of the deception very horrible it 
 must be to its hapless victims. For in this case the purpose of 
 the imitation is a purpose of destruction, the Mantis being a 
 predacious insect, armed with the most terrible weapons, hid 
 under the peaceful forms of the vegetable world. It is the 
 
APPARENT EXCEPTIONS TO THE SUPREMACY OF PURPOSE. Ill 
 
 habit of these creatures to sit upon the leaves which they so 
 closely resemble, apparently motionless, but really advancing 
 on their prey with a slow and insensible approach. Their 
 structure disarms suspicion. Wonderful as this structure is, 
 it would be none the less, but all the more wonderful, if it should 
 arise by way of Natural Consequence from some law of de- 
 velopment or of growth. It must be a law of which at present 
 we have no knowledge, and can hardly form any conception. 
 But certain it is that here, as in all other cases, the purpose 
 which is actually attained, is attained by a special adaptation 
 of ordinary structure to a special and extraordinary purpose. 
 No new members are given to the Mantis ; there is no depart- 
 ure from the plan on which all other Insects of the same Order 
 are designed. The body has the same number of segments, 
 the legs are the same in number, and are composed of the 
 same joints ; every part of this strange creature which seems 
 like a bit of foliage animated with insect life, can be referred 
 to its corresponding part in the ordinary anatomy of its Class. 
 The whole effect is produced by a little elongation here, a little 
 swelling there, a little dwarfing of one part, a little develop- 
 ment of another. The most striking part of the whole imita- 
 tion that of the " nervation " of the leaf is produced by a 
 modification, not very violent, of a structure which belongs to 
 all flying Insects. Their wings are constructed of a thin filmy 
 material stretched upon a framework of stronger substance, as 
 the sails of -a windmill are stretched upon a trellis-work of 
 spars. This framework is designed in a great variety of pat- 
 terns more elaborate and more beautiful than the tracery 
 of Gothic windows. In the Mantis this tracery, instead of 
 being drawn in a mere pattern, is drawn in imitation of the 
 nervature of a leaf. And imitative coloring is added to imita- 
 tive structure so that nothing should be wanting to its com- 
 pleteness and success. 
 
 It must always be remembered, however, that Contrivance 
 in Nature can never be reduced to a single purpose, and to 
 that alone. Almost every example of it is connected with a 
 number of effects which fit into each other in endless ramifica- 
 tions of adjustment. For example, this imitative structure of 
 the Mantidce serves as well for their own protection from in- 
 
112 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 sectivorous birds as for the procuring of their food in the cap- 
 ture of other Insects. And this, which is perhaps the subordi- 
 nate purpose in the case of the Mantidce, emerges as the main 
 purpose in another family of imitative Insects, the Phasmida. 
 These last are vegetable feeders, and their imitative structure 
 is, if possible, even more wonderful, as it certainly is more 
 beautiful. In some species the wings are not only made like 
 leaves in form, in structure, and in general color, but they 
 are tinted at different seasons of the year with the varying 
 colors of spring, of summer, or of autumn. The fundamental 
 green is shaded off into browns, and reds, and yellows, with 
 a few of those crimson touches which are so common in the 
 " Pageant of the year." There is one specimen in the British 
 Museum where the imitative effect is pursued, as it were, into 
 a region of still more minute and curious observation. The 
 general aspect of summer vegetation is much affected by the 
 ravages of insect life. Minute larvae eat into the cuticle of 
 leaves, and mark them with various spots of bleached or faded 
 color. Now the specimen of Phasma I refer to has its wing 
 covered with spots which exactly imitate this appearance of a 
 larva-eaten leaf. Can it be that this effect is itself produced 
 by a really similar cause the eating of some larval parasite 
 into the tissue of the wing ? If so, the combination of means 
 to the production of so wonderful an effect becomes only the 
 more bewildering in the endless vistas of adjustment which are 
 opened out. And there is another fact connected with these 
 Insects which is as astonishing as any other. It is this that 
 the idea and purpose of imitation is carried into effect consist- 
 ently and perseveringly through all the stages of the creature's 
 metamorphoses. The eggs are as perfect imitation's of vegeta- 
 ble seeds as the adult insect is of. the expanded leaf. In the 
 larval form they are like bits of stalk, or chips or cuttings of 
 leaves. 
 
 But although the laws which determine both form and col- 
 oring are here seen to be subservient to use, we shall never 
 understand the phenomena of Nature unless we admit that 
 mere ornament or beauty is in itself a purpose, an object, and 
 an end. Mr. Darwin denies this ; but he denies it under the 
 strange impression, that to admit it would be absolutely fatal to 
 
APPARENT EXCEPTIONS TO THE SUPREMACY OF PURPOSE. 113 
 
 his own theory on the Origin of Species. So much the worse 
 for his theory, if this incompatibility be true. There is indeed 
 a difference, at least in words, between the doctrine now asserted 
 and the doctrine which Mr. Darwin denies. What he denies 
 as a purpose in nature is beauty " in the eyes of Man." But 
 this evades the real point at issue. The relation in which 
 natural beauty stands to Man's appreciation of it, is quite a 
 separate question. It is -certain enough that the gift of orna- 
 ment in natural things has not been lavished, as it is lavished, 
 for the mere admiration of mankind. Ornament was as uni- 
 versal applied upon a scale at once as grand and as minute as 
 now during the long ages before Man was born. Some of 
 the most beautiful forms in Nature are the shells of the marine 
 Mollusca, and many of them are the richest, too, in surface 
 ornament. But, prodigal of beauty as the Ocean now is in the 
 creatures which it holds, its wealth was even greater and more 
 abounding in times when there was no man to gather them. 
 The shells and corals of the old Silurian Sea were as elaborate 
 and as richly carved as those which we now admire : and the 
 noble Ammonites of the Secondary ages must have been glo- 
 rious things indeed. Even now there is abundant evidence- 
 that although Man was intended to admire beauty, beauty was> 
 not intended only for Man's admiration. Nowhere is orna- 
 ment more richly given, nowhere is it seen more separate from 
 use, than in those organisms of whose countless millions the 
 microscope alone enables a few men for a few moments to see 
 a few examples. There is no better illustration of this than 
 a class of forms belonging to the border-land of animal and 
 vegetable life called the Diatomacece, which, though invisible to 
 the naked eye, play an important part in the economy of Na- 
 ture. They exist almost everywhere, and of their remains 
 whole strata, and even mountains, are in great part composed. 
 They have shells of pure silex. and these, each after its own 
 kind, are all covered with the most elaborate ornament 
 striated, or fluted, or punctured, or dotted in patterns which 
 are mere patterns, but patterns of perfect, and sometimes of 
 most complex, beauty. No graving done with the graver's- 
 tool can equal that work in gracefulness of design, or in 
 delicacy and strength of touch. Yet it is impossible to look at 
 8 
 
114 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 these forms in all the variety which is often crowded under a 
 single lens without recognizing instinctively that the work of the 
 graver is work strictly analogous, addressed to the same percep- 
 tions, founded on the same idea, having for its object the same 
 end and aim. And as the work of the graver varies for the mere 
 sake of varying, so does the work on these microscopic shells. 
 In the same drop of moisture there may be some dozen or 
 twenty forms, each with its own distinctive pattern, all as con- 
 stant as they are distinctive, yet having all apparently the same 
 habits, and without any perceptible difference of function. 
 
 It would beto doubt the evidence of our senses and of our 
 reason, or else to assume hypotheses of which there is no proof 
 whatever, if we were to doubt that mere ornament, mere vari- 
 ety, are as much an end and aim in the workshop of Nature as 
 they are known to be in the workshop of the goldsmith and the 
 jeweller. Why should they not ? The love and desire of these 
 is universal in the mind of Man. It is seen not more distinctly 
 in the highest forms of civilized art than in the habits of the 
 rudest savage, who covers with elaborate carving the handle of 
 his war-club, or the prow of his canoe. Is it likely that this 
 universal aim and purpose of the mind of Man should be 
 wholly without relation to the aims and purposes of his Creator ? 
 He that formed the eye to see beauty, shall He not see it ? 
 He that gave the human hand its cunning to work for beauty, 
 shall His hand never work for it ? How then, shall we account 
 for all the beauty of the world for the careful provision made 
 for it where it is only the secondary object, not the first ? Even 
 in those cases, for example, where concealment is the main ob- 
 ject in view, ornament is never forgotten, but lies as it were un- 
 derneath, carried into effect under the conditions and limita- 
 tions imposed by the higher law and the more special purpose. 
 Thus the feathers of the Ptarmigan, though confined by the law 
 of assimilative coloring to a mixture of black and white or 
 gray, have those simple colors disposed in crescent bars and 
 mottlings of beautiful form, even as the lichens which they im- 
 itate spread in radiating lines and semi-circular ripples over the 
 weather-beaten stones. It is the same with all other Birds 
 whose color is the color of their home. For the purpose of 
 concealment, their coloring would be equally effective if it 
 
APPARENT EXCEPTIONS TO THE SUPREMACY OF PURPOSE. 115 
 
 were laid on without order or regularity of form. But this is 
 never done. The required tints are always disposed in pat- 
 terns, each varying with the genus and the species ; varying for 
 the mere sake of variation, and for the beauty which belongs 
 to ornament. And where this purpose is not under the re- 
 straint of any other purpose controlling it and keeping it down 
 as it were within comparatively narrow limits, how gorgeous 
 are the results attained I What shall we say of flowers those 
 banners of the vegetable world, which march in such various 
 and splendid triumph before the coming of its fruits ? What 
 shall we say of the Humming Birds whose feathers are made 
 to return the light which falls upon them, as if rekindled from 
 intenser fires, and colored with more than all the colors of all 
 the gems ? 
 
 There is one instance in Nature (and, as far as I know, only 
 one) in which ornament takes the form of pictorial representa- 
 tion. The secondary feathers in the wing of the Argus Pheas- 
 ant are developed into long plumes, which the bird can erect 
 and spread out like a fan, as a Peacock spreads his train. 
 These feathers are decorated with a series of conspicuous spots 
 or " eyes," which are so colored as to imitate the effect of 
 balls. The shadows and the " high light " are placed exactly 
 where an artist would place them in order to represent a sphere.* 
 The " eyes " of the Peacock's train are wonderful examples of 
 ornament ; but they do not represent anything except their own 
 harmonies of color. The " eyes " of the Argus Pheasant are 
 like the " ball and socket " ornament which is common in the 
 decorations of human art. It i& no answer to this argument in 
 respect to beauty, that we are constantly discovering the use of 
 beautiful structures in which the beauty only, and not the use- 
 fulness, had been hitherto perceived. The harmonies on which 
 all beauty probably depends are so minutely connected in Na- 
 ture that " use " and ornament may often both arise out of the 
 same conditions. Thus, some of the most beautiful lines on 
 the surface of shells are simply the lines of their annual growth, 
 which growth has followed definite curves, and it is the " law " 
 of these curves that is beautiful in our eyes. Again, the forms 
 
 * I owe the observation of this curious fact to my friend Mr. James Nasmyth, so 
 well known as the inventor of the Steam Hammer, and as a distinguished astronomer. 
 
Il6 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 of many Fish which are so beautiful, are also forms founded on 
 the lines of least resistance. The same observation applies to 
 the form of the bodies and of the wings of Birds. Throughout 
 Nature, ornament is perpetually the result of conditions and 
 arrangements fitted to use and contrived for the discharge of 
 function. But the same principle applies to human art, and 
 few persons are probably aware how many of the mere orna- 
 ments of architecture are the traditional representation of parts 
 which had their origin in essential structure. Yet who would 
 argue from this fact that ornament is not a special aim in the 
 works of Man ? When the savage carves the handle of his 
 war-club, the immediate purpose of his carving is to give his 
 own hand a firmer hold. But any shapeless scratches would be 
 enough for this. When he carves it in an elaborate pattern, 
 he does so for the love of ornament, and to satisfy the sense of 
 beauty. 
 
 There is, however, another department of natural phenomena 
 which, much more than the one we have been now considering, 
 does at first sight suggest to the mind the subordination of 
 Purpose and the supremacy of Law. Is is the department of 
 Comparative Anatomy. It is a fact now well known and uni- 
 versally accepted, that in many animal structures, perhaps in 
 all except one, there are parts the presence of which cannot be 
 explained, from their serving any immediate use, or discharging 
 any actual function. For example, the limbs of all the Mam- 
 malia, and even of all the Lizards, terminate in five jointed 
 bones or fingers. But in many animals the whole five are not 
 needed, but only some one, or two, or three. In such cases 
 the remainder are indeed dwarfed, sometimes almost extin- 
 guished ; but the curious fact is that rudimentally the whole 
 number are always to be traced. Even in the Horse, where 
 one only of the five is directly used, and where this one is en- 
 larged and developed into a hoof, parts corresponding to the 
 remaining four fingers can be detected in the anatomy of the 
 limb. Other examples of the same principle might be given 
 without number. Thus there are Monkeys which have no 
 thumbs for use, but only thumb-bones hid beneath the skin : 
 the wingless Bird of New Zealand, the " Apteryx," has useless 
 wing-bones similarly placed ; snakes destined always to creep 
 
APPARENT EXCEPTIONS TO THE SUPREMACY OF PURPOSE. 117 
 
 " upon their belly " have nevertheless rudiments of legs, and the 
 common " Slowworm " has even the " blade bone " and " collar 
 bone " of rudimentary or aborted limbs : the Narwhal has only 
 one tusk, on the left side, developed for use, like the horn of 
 an heraldic Unicorn, but the other tusk, on the right side, is 
 present as a useless germ : the female Narwhal has both tusks 
 reduced to the same unserviceable. condition : young whalebone 
 Whales are born with teeth which never cut the gum, and 
 which are afterwards absorbed as entirely useless to the crea- 
 ture's life. 
 
 At first sight it may appear as if these were facts not to be 
 reconciled with the supremacy of Purpose : at first sight, but 
 at first sight only. For as we look at them and wonder at 
 them, and set ourselves to discover how many of a like nature 
 can be found, our eye catches sight of an Order which had not 
 been at first perceived. Exceptions to one narrow rule such as 
 we might have laid down and followed for ourselves, they are now 
 seen to be in strict subordination to a larger rule which it would 
 never have entered into our imagination to conceive. These 
 useless members, these rudimentary or aborted limbs which 
 puzzled us so much, are parts of an universal Plan. On this 
 plan the bony skeletons of all living animals have been put 
 together. The forces which have been combined for the mould- 
 ing of Organic Forms have been so combined as to mould them 
 after certain types or patterns. And when Comparative Anat- 
 omy has revealed this fact as affecting all the animals of the 
 existing world, another branch of the same science comes in 
 to conform the generalization, and extend it over the innumer- 
 able creatures which have existed and have passed away. This 
 one Plan of Organic Life has never been departed from since 
 Time began. , 
 
 When we have grasped this great fact, all the lesser facts 
 which are subordinate to it assume a new significance. In the 
 first place a Plan of this kind is in itself a Purpose. An Order 
 so vast as this, including within itself such variety of detail, and 
 maintained through such periods of Time, implies combination 
 and adjustment founded upon, and carrying into effect, one 
 vast conception. It is only as an Order of Thought that the 
 doctrine of Animal Homologies is intelligible at all. It is a 
 
Il8 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 Mental Order, and can only be mentally perceived. For what 
 do we mean when we say that this bone in one kind of animal 
 corresponds to such another bone in another kind of animal ? 
 Corresponds in what sense ? Not in the method of using it 
 for very often limbs which are homologically the same are put 
 to the most diverse and opposite uses. To what standard, then, 
 are we referring when we say that such and such two limbs are 
 homologically the same ? It is to the standard of an Ideal Order 
 a Plan a Type a Pattern mentally conceived. This sounds 
 very recondite and metaphysical ; and yet the habit of referring 
 physical facts to some ideal standard and order of thought is a 
 universal instinct in the human mind. It is one of the earliest 
 of our efforts in endeavoring to understand the phenomena 
 around us. The science of Homologies, as developed by Cu- 
 vier and Hunter and Owen and Huxley, is indeed an intricate, 
 almost a transcendental science. Yet Dr. Livingstone found the 
 natives of Africa debating a question which belongs essentially 
 to that science and involves the whole principle of the mental 
 process by which it is pursued. The debate was on the question 
 " whether the two toes of the Ostrich represent the thumb and 
 forefinger in Man, or the little and ring-finger." 1 * This is 
 purely a question of Comparative Anatomy. It is founded 
 on the instinctive perception that even between two frames 
 so widely separated as those of an Ostrich and a Man, there is 
 a common Plan of structure, with reference to which plan, 
 parts wholly dissimilar in appearance and in use can never- 
 theless be identified as " representative " of each other : 
 that is, as holding the same relative place in one Ideal Order 
 of arrangement. 
 
 The recognition of this idea in minds so rude is not the less 
 remarkable from the fact that both sides in this African debate 
 were wrong in their practical application of the idea to the 
 particular case before them. Unity of design amidst variety 
 of form is so conspicuous and universal in the works of Nature 
 that the perception of it 'could not possibly escape recognition 
 even by the rudest human mind, formed as that Mind is to see 
 Order, and to work for it, and to admire it. But though instinct 
 is enough to give us the general idea, and to trace it in a thou- 
 
 * " The Zambesi and its Tributaries," p. 424. 
 
APPARENT EXCEPTIONS TO THE SUPREMACY OF PURPOSE. 119 
 
 sand instances where it can hardly be overlooked, yet it needs 
 close and laborious study, and high powers of analysis and of 
 thought, to trace correctly the true Order and Plan through the 
 fine and subtle passages of Nature. It would have astonished 
 those poor natives of Africa to be told, as is the truth, that if 
 they wished to find in the Ostrich the parts corresponding to 
 their own middle finger, or ring-finger, or any other finger, 
 they must look, not to the toes of the Ostrich, but to her little 
 aborted wings, which, though useless for trfe purposes of flight, 
 are still retained as representing the wings of other Birds, and 
 the forearms of all the Mammals. 
 
 For here we come upon the interchange and crossing as it 
 were of two distinct ideas, which seem to stand the one as the 
 warp and the other as the woof in the fabrics of Organic Life. 
 There is the idea of Homology in Structure and the idea of 
 Analogy in Use. The one represents the Unity of Design, the 
 other represents Variety of Function. It might have been sup- 
 posed that these could not easily be reconciled that where 
 great differences in use and application are essential, rigid ad- 
 herence to one pattern of structure would be an impediment in 
 the way. But it is not so. The same bones in different ani- 
 mals are made subservient to the widest possible diversity of 
 function. The same limbs are converted into paddles t and 
 wings, and legs, and arms. And so it is with every other part 
 of the skeleton and every other organ of the body. Indeed it 
 is difficult to say whether the law of unity in design, or the law 
 of variety in adaptation, is pushed to the greatest length. There 
 are some cases in which the adaptation of form to special func- 
 tion is carried so far that all appearance of common structure 
 is entirely lost. It is very difficult, for example, to persuade 
 persons ignorant of the principles of anatomy that the Whale 
 and the Porpoise are not Fish, that they breathe with lungs as 
 Man breathes, that they would be drowned if kept long under 
 water, and that, as they suckle their young, they belong to the 
 same great Class, Mammalia. Living in the same element as 
 Fish, and feeding very much as fishes feed, a similar outward 
 form has been given to them, because that form is the best 
 adapted for progression through the water. * But that form has 
 been, so to speak, put on round the Mammalian skeleton, and 
 
120 THE REIGN OF 
 
 covers all the organs proper to the Mammalian Class. Whales 
 and Porpoises, notwithstanding their form, and their habitat, 
 and their food, are as separate from Fishes as the Elephant, or 
 the Hippopotamus, or the Giraffe. 
 
 And when we remember that the immense variety of Organic 
 Forms in the existing world does not exhaust the adaptability 
 of their Plan, but that the still vaster varieties of all the extinct 
 creations have circled round the same central Types, it be- 
 comes evident that Ihese Types have had from the first a Pur- 
 pose which has been well and wonderfully fulfilled. As a mat- 
 ter of fact, we see that the original conception of the framework 
 of Organic Life has included in itself provisions for applying 
 the principle of adaptation in infinite degrees. Its last devel- 
 opment is in Man. In his frame there is no abortive member. 
 Fvery part is put to .its highest use : highest, that is, in refer- 
 ence to the supremacy of mind.* There are stronger arms, 
 there are swifter limbs, there are more powerful teeth, there are 
 finer ears, there are sharper eyes. There are creatures which 
 go where he cannot go, and can live where he would die. But 
 all his members are co-ordinated with one power the power of 
 Thought. Through this he has the dominion over all other 
 created things whilst yet as regards the type and pattern of 
 his frame he has not a single bone or joint or organ which he 
 does not share with some one or other of the Beasts that perish. 
 It is not in any of the parts of his structure, but in their combi- 
 nation and adjustment, that he stands alone. 
 
 All these facts must convince us that we must enlarge our 
 ideas as to what is meant by Use in the Economy of Nature. 
 In the first place, it must be so interpreted as to include orna- 
 ment ; and in the second place, it must include also not merely 
 Actual Use, but Potential Use, or the capacity of being turned 
 to use in new creations. Of course this is one of the ideas 
 which Philosophers of the Positive School denounce as " Meta- 
 physical." But here again their opposition is itself based upon 
 metaphysics, only upon metaphysics which are bad. " Poten- 
 tial existence," says Mr. Lewes,f " is ideal, not real." " A 
 
 * " Quid reliqua descriptione omnium corporis partium, in qua nihil inane, nihil sine 
 causa, nihil supervacaneum est ? " Cicero, " De Nat. Deor.," lib. i. cap. 33. 
 t u History of Philosophy," Prologue, p. Ixxxviii. 
 
APPARENT EXCEPTIONS TO THE SUPREMACY OF PURPOSE. I 2 I 
 
 fact is not a fact until it is accomplished. Nothing exists be- 
 fore it exists. This truism is disregarded by those who talk of 
 potential existence." So it is, and it ought to be disregarded, 
 because it has no bearing on the question. May not the forma- 
 tion of a plan or conspiracy to murder be " a fact " although the 
 murder is not " accomplished ? " Is not the capacity in the 
 different pieces of a puzzle of being fitted together, a fact 
 even when the pieces are all huddled confusedly in a box ? Is 
 there no potential use in the udder of a cow-calf before it can 
 have had any calves of its own ? Is the idea of Potential use 
 in all these cases an idea which has no " reality ? " Are they 
 mere "artifices of thought," or "preliminary falsifications of 
 fact ? " If the metaphysics of Positivism are available to estab- 
 lish this conclusion, they must be equally available to condemn 
 knowledge in all its forms as " Ideal " and not " real." Bad met- 
 aphysics of this kind are indeed, what Dr. Newman dreads the 
 human mind may be, a " universal solvent," casting doubt on 
 the most certain of its own conclusions, and landing itself in 
 universal scepticism. 
 
 We have not far to go to find the same kind of reasoning, 
 and the same methods of analysis, employed to establish the 
 converse proposition, that so far from Potentiality having no 
 existence, it is the only form under which the existence of any- 
 thing beyond ourselves can be known to us. No less eminent 
 a thinker than Mr. J. S. Mill reduces Matter itself, and the very 
 idea of the existence of an external world, to a " Permanent 
 Possibility of Sensation." * Nay, he is not sure he only sees 
 some " intrinsic difficulties " in the way whether our knowledge 
 of Self-existence may not be brought under the same " Poten- 
 tial " category as a mere " Possibility of Sensation." f In re- 
 gard to Matter, Mr. Mill distinctly says that so far from a mere 
 Possibility having no real existence, it is the only reality the 
 one thing which is constant and abiding behind the flux and 
 uncertainty of actual sensations. My own opinion is that the 
 metaphysical process by which these opposite paradoxes are ar- 
 rived at is nearly as worthless in the one case as in the other. 
 Of the two I prefer the paradox of Mr. Mill to the paradox of 
 Mr. Lewes so far at least as the reality of Potential Existences 
 
 * u Mill on Hamilton," chap. xi. t Ibid. chap. xii. 
 
122 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 is concerned. But I prefer it only in the very case to which 
 Mr. Mill shrinks from applying it. I can think of my own mind 
 or existence as a " Possibility of Sensation " (whether " perma- 
 nent" or not). It is a method of conception indeed which 
 casts no light on anything, and it is highly artificial ; but at 
 least it is not false. It involves no confounding of two differ- 
 ent elements of thought. But I cannot transfer the word or 
 the idea of sensation from myself to the external things which 
 cause sensation in me. This transfer involves a fundamental 
 confusion of thought and of language as the instrument of 
 thought. (See note D.) But such paradoxes are the natural 
 result of one great error the endeavor to get rid of, or to ex- 
 plain away, or to dissolve by analysis, such simple and element- 
 ary conceptions of the Mind as the idea of External Force and 
 of Causation, or the idea of Purpose and Intention. Matter 
 may very well be conceived as " That which produces, or has a 
 Possibility of producing, Sensation in Sentient beings." But 
 this is a definition which involves the idea of Causation. And 
 if this be rejected as an elementary conception, (or as a distinct 
 conception, whether elementary or not,) then the paradox of 
 Mr. Mill is the natural result. In like manner, if the idea of 
 Purpose and Intention be repudiated, as representing no " n - 
 ality " in Nature, then the opposite paradox of Mr. Lewes is 
 reached along the same slippery and deceptive ways. We know 
 at least, as a matter of experience, that we are .capable of form- 
 ing plans which exist as such before they are carried into ef- 
 fect. We know too that one plan may be large enough to in- 
 clude another, and that even within the fractional limits of our 
 foresight we can provide for contingent as well as for actual 
 use. We can therefore easily conceive the existence of the 
 same kind of prevision in the Mind which works in Nature, and 
 we can easily understand how the apparent difference between 
 actual and contingent use should be greater in proportion as 
 the Plan is larger, and is designed to operate during vaster pe- 
 riods of Time. 
 
 In this point of view rudimentary or aborted organs need no 
 longer puzzle us, for in respect to Purpose they may be read 
 either in the light of History, or in the light of Prophecy. 
 They may be regarded as indicating always either what had 
 
APPARENT EXCEPTIONS TO THE SUPREMACY OF PURPOSE. 123 
 
 already been, or what was yet to be. Why new creations 
 should never have been made wholly new ; why they should 
 have been always moulded on some pre-existing Forms ; why 
 one fundamental ground-plan should have been adhered to for 
 all Vertebrate Animals, we cannot understand. But as a mat- 
 ter of fact it is so. For it appears that Creative Purpose has 
 been effected through the instrumentality of Forces so com- 
 bined as to arrange the particles of organic matter in definite 
 forms : which forms include many separate parts having a con- 
 stant relation to each other and to the whole, but capable of 
 arrestment or development according as special organs are 
 required for the discharge of special functions. Each new 
 creation seems to have been a new application of these old 
 materials. Each new House of Life has been built on these 
 old foundations. Among the many wonders of Nature there 
 is nothing more wonderful than this the adaptability of the 
 one Vertebrate Type to the infinite variety of Life to which it 
 serves as an organ and a home. Its basement has been so 
 laid that every possible change or addition of superstructure 
 could be built upon it. Creatures destined to live on the earth 
 or in the earth, on the sea or in the sea, under every variety of 
 condition of existence, have all been made after that one pat- 
 tern ; and each of them with as close an adaptation to special 
 function as if the pattern had been designed for itself alone. 
 It is true that there are particular parts of it which are of no 
 use to particular animals. But there is no part of it which is 
 not of indispensable use to some member of the group ; and 
 there is one Supreme Form in which all its elements receive 
 their highest interpretation and fulfilment. It is indeed won- 
 derful to think that the feeble and sprawling paddles on a Newt, 
 the ungainly flippers of a Seal, and the long leathery wings of 
 a Bat, have all the same elements, bone for bone, with that hu- 
 man hand which is the supple instrument of Man's contrivance, 
 and is alive, even to the finger-tips, with the power of express- 
 ing his Intellect and his Will. Here again the Laws of Nature 
 are seen to be nothing but combinations of Force with a view 
 to Purpose : combinations which indicate complete knowledge, 
 not only of what is, but of what is to be, and which foresees 
 the End from the Beginning. 
 
UHI7BHSITT 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 CREATION BY LAW. 
 
 WE see, then, how the existence of Organs separated from 
 Function, and of structures without immediate use, find their 
 natural place among all the other phenomena of the world. 
 They do not show that " Law " is ever superior to Will, or can 
 ever assert, even for a moment, an independence of its own. 
 On the contrary, they show, as nothing else can show, the pa- 
 tient movements, and the incalculable years, through which 
 material laws have been made to follow the steps of Purpose. 
 
 But, then, let us remember this : these discoveries in Phys- 
 iology, though they are helpless to prove that Law has ever 
 been present as a Master, are eminently suggestive of the idea 
 that Law has never been absent as a Servant , that as, in 
 governing the world, so in forming it, Material Forces have 
 been always used as the instruments of Will. 
 
 It is no mere theory, but a fact as certain as any other fact 
 of Science, that Creation has had a History. It has not been a 
 single act, done and finished once for all, but a long series of 
 acts a work continuously pursued through an inconceivable 
 lapse of time. It is another fact, equally certain, respecting 
 this work, that as it has been pursued in Time, so also it has 
 been pursued by Method. There is an " observed Order of 
 facts " in the history of Creation, both in the organic and in the 
 inorganic world. I speak here, however, of the organic world 
 alone, and chiefly of those higher Forms which are the seat of 
 Animal Life. In these, there is an observed Order in the most 
 rigid scientific sense that is, phenomena in uniform connection, 
 and mutual relations which can be made, and are made, the basis 
 of systematic classification. These classifications are imperfect, 
 not because they are founded on ideal connections where none 
 exist, but only because they fail in representing adequately the 
 subtle and pervading Order which binds together all living things. 
 
CREATION BY LAW. 125 
 
 But the Order which prevails in the existing world is not the 
 only Order which has been recognized by science. A like 
 Order has prevailed through all the past history of Creation. 
 Nay, more ; it has, I think, been clearly ascertained, not only 
 that relations similar to those which now exist have existed 
 always among all the animals of each contemporary Creation, 
 but that Order of a like kind has connected with each other all 
 the different Creations which were successively introduced. In 
 almost all the leading Types of Life which have existed in the 
 different geological ages, there is an orderly gradation connect- 
 ing the Forms which were becoming extinct with the Forms 
 which were for the first time appearing in the world. It is still 
 disputed by some geologists, whether we have certain evidence 
 that this gradation has been the gradation of a rising scale of 
 progressive Creations from lower to higher Types. But this 
 dispute is maintained only on the ground that we cannot safely 
 trust to negative evidence. It is an unquestionable fact, that 
 so far as this kind of evidence can go, it does testify to the 
 successive introduction of higher and higher Forms of Life. 
 Very recently a discovery has been made, to which Mr. Darwin 
 only a few years ago referred as " a discovery of which the 
 chance is very small " viz. of fossil Organisms in beds far be- 
 neath the lowest Silurian strata. This discovery has been 
 made in Canada in beds far down, near the bottom even, of 
 the rocks hitherto termed " Azoic." But what are the Forms 
 of Life which have been found here ? They belong to the very 
 lowest of living types to the " Rhizopods." So far as this dis~ 
 covery goes, therefore, it is in strict accordance with all the 
 facts previously known that, as we go back in time, we lose, 
 one after another, the higher and more complex organisms : 
 first, the Mammalia ; then the Vertebrata ; and now, lastly, 
 even the Mollusca. It is in accordance, too, with another fact 
 which has been observed before, viz. that particular Forms of 
 Life have attained, at particular epochs, a maximum develop- 
 ment, both in respect to size and distribution the favorites, 
 as it were, of Creation for a time. These earliest Rhizopods 
 seem to have been of enormous size, and developed on an enor- 
 mous scale ; since there is good reason to believe that beds of 
 immense thickness are composed of their remains. All that is 
 
126 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 new in this discovery is the vast extension which it gives in 
 Time to the same rules which had been already traced through 
 ages which we cannot number. 
 
 Then, there is another observed Order. For each Class of 
 animal some definite Type or pattern has been adhered to; 
 and the modifications of that Type have been gradual and 
 successive. In many cases the science of fossil remains ena- 
 ble us to trace the intermediate Forms through which existing 
 animals can be connected with animals long since extinct. It 
 must be remembered that the fact of this connection is quite a 
 separate thing from any theory as to its physical cause. Pro- 
 fessor Owen pointed out some years before the publication of 
 Mr. Darwin's theory, the existence of fossil animals which 
 showed an increasing approximation to the forms of the Horse 
 and of the Ox ; and he showed that this approximation was 
 related in Time, as it seemed to be in Purpose, with the com- 
 ing need of them for the service and use of Man. These are 
 the facts on which the idea of " Creation by Law ' is founded. 
 Let us look a little nearer what this idea is, and what it in- 
 volves. It is an idea much'vaunted by some men, much feared 
 by others. Perhaps it may be found, on closer investigation, 
 that they are fearing or worshipping, as the case may be, an 
 idol of the imagination. 
 
 It being certain that Creation exhibits an Order of facts 
 which can be so clearly defined and traced, it follows, that at 
 least in this first sense of the word, Creation has been "by Law. 
 We are, therefore, led on to the farther question, whether Law 
 in any other sense can be traced or detected in the work of 
 Creation ? Is the observed Order which prevails in the organic 
 world an Order of which we can even guess the physical cause ? 
 Is it an Order which contains within itself any indications of 
 the Force or combination of Forces which have been con- 
 cerned in producing it ? 
 
 In considering this question, there is one thing to be ob- 
 served at the outset. It is certain that nothing is known, or 
 has been even guessed at, in respect to the history and Origin 
 of Life, which corresponds with Law in its strictest and most 
 definite sense. We have no knowledge of any one or more 
 Forces such as the Force of Gravitation, or of magnetic at- 
 
CREATION BY LAW. 127 
 
 traction and repulsion to which any one of the phenomena 
 of Life can be traced. Far less have we any knowledge of any 
 laws of the like kind which can be connected with the succes- 
 sive creation or development of new Organisms. Professor 
 Huxley, in a recent work,* has indeed spoken of " that combi- 
 nation of natural forces which we term Life." But this lan- 
 guage is purely rhetorical. I do not mean to say that Life may 
 not be defined to be a kind of Force, or a combination of 
 Forces. All I mean is, that we know nothing of any of these 
 Forces in the same sense in which we do know something of the 
 Force of Gravity, or of Magnetism, or of Electricity, or of 
 Chemical Affinity. These are all more or less known, not, in- 
 deed, in respect to their ultimate nature, but in respect to cer- 
 tain methods and measures of their operation. No such 
 knowledge exists in respect to any of the Forces which have 
 been concerned in the development of Life. No man has ever 
 pretended to get such a view of any of these as to enable him 
 10 apply to them the instruments of his analysis, or to trace in 
 their working any definite relations to Space, or Time, or Num- 
 ber. 
 
 Since, then, laws, in this most definite sense of the word, 
 have not been discovered in the existing phenomena, or in the 
 past history of Organic Life, let us look a little closer at the 
 ideas which these phenomena have suggested to the mind of 
 those who have speculated on the Origin and Development of 
 Species. 
 
 There is one idea which has been common to all theories of 
 Development, and that is, the idea that ordinary generation 
 has somehow been producing, from time to time, extraordinary 
 effects, and that a new Species is, in fact, simply an unusual 
 birth. It is worthy of observation, that the earlier forms in 
 which the theory of Development appeared, did suggest some- 
 thing more nearly approaching to a Law of Creacion than is 
 contained in the later form which that theory has assumed in 
 the hands of Mr. Darwin. The essential idea of the theory of 
 Development, in its earlier forms, was, that modifications of 
 structure arose somehow by way of natural consequence from 
 the outward circumstances or physical conditions which re- 
 
 * " Elements of Comparative Anatomy," p. 2. 
 
128 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 quired them, and from the living effort of Organism sensible in 
 some degree of that requirement. Now, inadequate and even 
 grotesque though this idea may be as explaining the Origin of 
 new Species it cannot be denied, that it makes its appeal to a 
 process which, at least to a limited extent, does operate in 
 producing modifications of organic structure. For example, 
 the same species of Mollusc has often a shell comparatively weak 
 and thin, or a shell comparatively robust and strong, accord- 
 ing as it lies in tranquil or in stormy water. The shell which 
 is much exposed needs to be stronger than the shell which is 
 less exposed. But it is obvious that the mere fact of the need 
 cannot supply the thing needed, unless by the adjustment of 
 some machinery for the purpose. How the vital forces of the 
 Mollusc can thus be made to work to order, under a change 
 of external conditions, we do not know. But we do know, as a 
 matter of fact, that the shell is thickened and strengthened, 
 according as it needs resisting power. This result does not 
 appear to arise from any difference in the amount of lime held 
 in solution in the water, but from some power in the secreting 
 organs of the animal to appropriate more or less of it accord- 
 ing to its own need. The effects of this power are seen where 
 there is no difference of condition except difference of ex- 
 posure. It is said that they are observable, for example, in 
 the shells which lie on the different sides of Plymouth Break- 
 water, the sheltered side and the exposed side. The same 
 power of adaptation is seen in many other forms. Trees which 
 are most exposed to the blast are the most strongly anchored 
 in the soil. Limbs which are the most used are the most de- 
 veloped. Organs which are in constant use, are strengthened, 
 whilst organs in habitual disuse have a tendency to become 
 weaker. 
 
 All these results arise by way of natural consequence. How 
 shall we describe them ? Shall we say that they are the result 
 of Law ? We may safely do so, remembering only that by 
 Law, in this sense, we mean nothing but the co-operation of 
 different natural Forces, which, under certain conditions, work 
 together for the fulfilment of an obvious intention. Of the 
 nature of those Forces we know nothing ; nor is it easy to 
 conceive how they have been so co-ordinated as to produce 
 
CREATION BY LAW. 1 29 
 
 effects fitting with such exactness into the conditions requisite 
 for the preservation of Organic Life. If there were any evidence 
 that by the same means new Forms of Life could be developed 
 from the old, I cannot see why there should be any reluctance 
 to admit the fact. It would be different from anything that we 
 see ; but I do not know that it would be at all less wonderful, 
 or that it would bring us much nearer than we now stand to 
 the great mystery of Creation. The adaptation and arrange- 
 ment of natural forces, which can compass these modifications 
 of animal structure, in exact proportion to the need of them, is 
 an adaptation and arrangement which is in the nature of Crea- 
 tion. It can only be due to the working of a power which is 
 in the nature of Creative power. 
 
 We are so accustomed to these and other similar phenomena, 
 and so apt to hide our own ignorance of their cause, by de- 
 scribing them as the result of " Law," that we forget what a 
 multitude of natural Forces must be concerned in their produc- 
 tion, and what complicated adjustmemts of these amongst 
 each other for the accomplishment of Purpose. It is purely, 
 therefore, in my view a question of evidence, whether this par- 
 ticular law of adaptation has or has not been the means of 
 introducing new Forms of Life. There is no evidence that it 
 has. So far as we know, this power of self-adaptation, wonderful 
 as it is, has a comparatively limited application ; when that 
 limit is outrun by changes in outward conditions, which are too 
 great or too rapid, whole Species die and disappear. Never- 
 theless, the introduction of new Species to take the place of 
 those which have passed away, is a work which has been not 
 only so often but so continuously repeated, that it does suggest 
 the idea of having been brought about through the instrumen- 
 tality of some natural process. But we may say with confidence, 
 that it must have been a process different from any that we yet 
 know a process not the same as that (obscure as that is) which 
 produces the lesser modifications of Organic Forms. 
 
 It has not, I think, been sufficiently observed, that the theory 
 of Mr. Darwin does not address itself to the same question, and 
 does not even profess to trace the Origin of new Forms to any 
 definite law. His theory gives an explanation, not of the proc- 
 esses by which new Forms first appear, but only of the proc- 
 9 
 
130 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 esses by which, when they have appeared, they acquire a pref- 
 erence over others, and thus become established in the world. 
 A new Species is, indeed, according to his theory, as well as 
 with the older theories of Development, simply an unusual 
 birth. The bond of connection between allied specific and 
 generic Forms, is in his view simply the bond of Inheritance. 
 But Mr. Darwin does not pretend to have discovered any law 
 or rule according to which new Forms' have been born from 
 old Forms. He does not hold that outward conditions, how- 
 ever changed, are sufficient to account for them. Still less 
 does he connect them with the effort or aspirations of any Or- 
 ganism after new faculties and powers. He frankly confesses 
 that " our ignorance of the laws of variation is profound ; " and 
 says, that in speaking of them as due to chance, he means only 
 " to acknowledge plainly our ignorance of the cause of each 
 particular variation." * Again he says " I believe in no law 
 of necessary development." t 
 
 This distinction between Mr. Darwin's theory and other the- 
 ories of Development, has not, I think, been sufficiently ob- 
 served. His theory seems to be far better than a mere theory 
 to be an established scientific truth in so far as it accounts, 
 in part at least, for the success and establishment and spread 
 of new Forms when they have arisen. But it does not even 
 suggest the law under which, or by which, or according to 
 which, such new Forms are introduced. Natural Selection 
 can do nothing except with the materials presented to its 
 hands. It cannot select except among the things open to se- 
 lection. Natural Selection can originate nothing; it can only 
 pick out and choose among the things which are originated by 
 some other law. Strictly speaking, therefore, Mr. Darwin's 
 theory is not a theory on the Origin of Species at all, but only 
 a theory on the causes which lead to the relative success or 
 failure of such new Forms as may be born into the world. It 
 is the more important to remember this distinction, because it 
 seems to me that Mr. Darwin himself frequently forgets it. 
 Not only does he speak of Natural Selection " producing " this 
 and that modification of structure, but he undertakes to affirm 
 
 * " Origin of Species," p. 131 (first edition), 
 i Ibid. p. 351. 
 
CREATION BY LAW. 131 
 
 of one class of changes that they can be produced, and of an- 
 other class of changes that they cannot be produced by this 
 process.* 
 
 Now, what are the changes for the preservation of which 
 Natural Selection does, in some sense, account ? They are 
 such changes, and these only, as are of some direct use to the 
 Organism in the " struggle for existence." Any change which 
 has not this direct value, is not provided for in the theory. All 
 structures, therefore, are unaccounted for not only as respects 
 their origin, but even as respects their preservation in which 
 the variations have no other value than mere beauty or variety. 
 Accordingly, Mr. Darwin is tempted, as I have already had oc- 
 casion to observe, to deny that any such structures exist in Na- 
 ture. Any theory of which this denial is really a necessary 
 part, is self-condemned. Yet a theory may be good as account- 
 ing for the preservation of some structures, although it fails to 
 account for the preservation of others. And so the fact that 
 Natural Selection cannot have operated on structures of mere 
 beauty and variety is no proof that the theory of Natural Selec- 
 tion is false, but only that it is incomplete. It does not ac- 
 count for the origin of any structure ; and it accounts for the 
 preservation of only a certain number. Surely, then, Mr. 
 Darwin assigns to his " law " of Natural Selection a range far 
 wider than really belongs to it, when, on the strength of it, he 
 denies that beauty for its own sake can be an end or object in 
 Organic Forms. He says " This doctrine, if true, would be 
 absolutely fatal to my theory." Why should this be fatal to his 
 theory, except on the supposition that Natural Selection gives 
 a complete account both of the Origin of new Forms, (of which, 
 in reality, it gives no account at all,) and of their preservation, 
 of which it does give some account, but one which is only par- 
 tial ? I dwell on this, because it lies at the very root of the 
 question, how far Mr. Darwin's theory can be said to suggest 
 anything in the nature of a Creative Law of a kind to explain 
 the Method which has been followed in the introduction of 
 new Forms. 
 
 We may test this question by bringing to bear upon it some 
 particular example of specific variation. I select for this pur- 
 
 % 
 
 * " Origin of Species," p. 200 (first edition). 
 
132 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 pose one example,, which will illustrate the subject better than 
 any abstract discussion. It is the case of the Humming Birds. 
 
 This groerp of Birds seems to exhibit, in the most striking 
 form, not a few of those mysteries of Creation which at once 
 tempt us to speculate on the Origin of Species, and at the same 
 time confound every endeavor to bring it into relation with any 
 process which we know or can conceive. In the first place, they 
 are sharply defined from all other forms in that Class of the 
 animal kingdom to which they belong. It is most difficult to 
 say what is their nearest affinity, and the nearest, when it is 
 found, is very distant. Secondly, they are absolutely confined 
 to one Continent of the Globe. In the third place, the various 
 Species as amongst themselves are very closely united, ranging, 
 indeed, over a great variety of forms, but for the most part con- 
 nected with each other by very nice gradations. In the fourth 
 place, there are, so to speak, some gaps in the scale, which sug- 
 gest that some Species have either been lost, or have not yet 
 been discovered. In the fifth place, each of these Species, how- 
 ever nearly allied to some other, appears to be absolutely fixed 
 and constant, there being not the slightest indication of any 
 mixture of any hybrid forms. In the sixth place, there is the 
 most wonderful adaptation of special organs for the performance 
 of special functions, and for the relation of these organs to 
 particular structures in the vegetable kingdom. In the seventh 
 place, there is a development, for which, in extent and variety, 
 there is no parallel in the world, of structures designed appar- 
 ently for mere ornament, and entirely separate from any other 
 known or conceivable use. 
 
 A few words on some of these characters will show their 
 separate and joint bearing on the idea of Creation by Law. 
 
 In the first place, then, the absolute distinctiveness from all 
 others of this Family of Birds, coupled with its immense extent 
 gives the idea of some common bond, some physical cause, to 
 which such an identity in physical characters must be due. 
 This identity prevails not only in such essential matters as the 
 structure of the bill and tongue, in the form of the feet and of 
 the wings, in the habits of flight, and in the nature of the food, 
 but runs also into some very curious details, as, for example, 
 in the number of feathers in the tail and in the wings, which 
 
[TIN 
 
 CREATION BY LAW. 133 
 
 are constant numbers adhered to even when some of the 
 feathers, not being used even for ornament, are reduced almost 
 to rudiments. But under degrees of development which are 
 very variable, the number is invariable. This identity of 
 structure is the more remarkable from the immense extent of 
 the group which it characterizes. There are now known to 
 science no less than about 430 different species of Humming 
 Bird ; and it cannot be doubted that many more remain to be 
 discovered among the immense forests and mountain ranges of 
 Central America. 
 
 Now, what is the bond that unites so closely, in a common 
 structure, all the forms of this great Family of birds? We 
 think it a sufficient explanation sometimes of the likeness of 
 things, that they are made for a common purpose. And so it is 
 an explanation in one sense, but not in another. It gives the 
 reason why likeness should be aimed at, but not the cause or 
 the means through which it has been brought about. Sameness 
 in the purpose for which things are intended, is a reason why 
 those things should be made alike ; but it is no explanation of 
 the process to which the common aspect is due. It is an expla- 
 nation of the "why;" but -it is no explanation of the "how." 
 Purpose is attained in Nature through the instrumentality of 
 means ; and community of aspect in created things suggests 
 the idea of some common process in the creative work. Thus, 
 the likeness which is due to common parentage serves the most 
 important purposes ; but it is not the less the result of a physi- 
 cal cause out of which it arises by way of natural consequence. 
 The likeness of the Humming Birds to each other suggests this 
 kind of cause. It is true that the organs which it principally 
 affects are specially adapted for a special habit of life. They 
 are fitted to enable the Bird to feed on the nectar, and the 
 insects which frequent the nectar of flowers, or the leaves or 
 bark of trees. But there are flowers and insects in abundance 
 in other quarters of the globe where there are no Humming 
 Birds. 
 
 And here we come on the curious facts of geographical dis- 
 tribution, a class of facts which, as much as any other, suggest 
 some specific methods as having been followed in the work of 
 Creation. Humming Birds are absolutely confined to the great 
 
134 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 Continent of America with its adjacent islands. Within those 
 limits there is every range of climate, and there are particular 
 species of Humming Bird adapted to every region where a 
 flowering vegetation can subsist. It is therefore neither climate 
 nor food which confines the Humming Birds to the New World. 
 What is it, then? The idea of "centres of Creation" is at 
 once suggested to the mind. It seems as if the Humming Birds 
 were introduced at one spot, and as if they had spread over 
 the whole Continent which was accessible to them from that 
 spot. They are absent elsewhere, simply because from that 
 spot the other Continents of the world were inaccessible to them. 
 But if these ideas are suggested to the mind by the general as- 
 pect of this family as a whole, they are strengthened by some 
 of the facts which we discover when we examine and compare 
 with each other the genera and species of which it is composed. 
 There is a beautiful gradation between the different genera and 
 the different species, so much so, that it has been found im- 
 possible to divide the Humming Birds into more than two sub- 
 families, from the absence of sufficiently well-marked divisions. 
 And yet on the other hand, they cannot be arranged in anything 
 like a continuous series, because some links appear to be 
 missing in the chain. 
 
 But these general facts terminate in nothing more definite 
 than a vague surmise. When we enter farther into details, we 
 feel at once how little they agree with any physical law which is 
 known or even conceivable by us. If the likeness which pre- 
 vails in the whole group reminds us of the likeness which is due 
 to community of blood, it is equally true that the differences be- 
 tween the species are totally distinct, both in kind and degree, 
 from the variation which we ever see arising among the off- 
 spring of the same parents. Let us look at what these differ- 
 ences are. The generic and specific distinctions between the 
 Humming Birds are mainly of two kinds, ist, Differences in 
 the form of essential organs, such as the bill and the wings ; 20?, 
 Differences in those parts of the plumage which are purely or- 
 namental. Now, of these two kinds of variation, the only one 
 on which the law of Natural Selection has any bearing at all is 
 the first. And on that kind of variation, the only bearing which 
 Natural Selection has is this that if any Humming Bird were 
 
CREATION BY LAW. 135 
 
 born with a new form of bill, or a new form of wing, which en- 
 abled it to feed better and to range farther, then that improved 
 bill and wing would naturally tend to be perpetuated by ordi- 
 nary generation. This is unquestionably true ; but it really 
 does not touch the facts of the case. The bills and wings of 
 the different genera do not differ from each other in respect of 
 any comparative advantage of this kind, but simply in respect 
 to variety corresponding with the variety of certain vegetable 
 Forms. One form of bill is as good as another, but some forms 
 are adapted to some special class of flower. Some bills, for ex- 
 ample, are formed of enormous length, specially adapted to ob- 
 tain access to the nectar chambers of long tubular flowers, such 
 as the Brugmansia. Some, on the other hand, as if to show 
 that the same end may be attained by different means, obtain 
 access to the same flowers by a shorter process, and pierce the 
 bases of the corolla instead of seeking access by the mouth. 
 Some have bills bent downwards like a sickle, adapted to 
 searching the bark of Palm-trees for the insects hid under the 
 scaly covering ; others have bills curved in the opposite direc- 
 tion, fitted, apparently, to the curious construction of some of 
 the great family of Orchids so immensely developed in the for- 
 ests of Central America. Some have bills equally well adapted 
 for searching a vast variety of flowers and blossoms, and 
 these, accordingly, migrate with the flowering season, and, is- 
 suing from the great stronghold of the family in tropical 
 America, spread like our own summer Birds of passage, north- 
 wards to Canada, and southwards to Cape Horn, in the corre- 
 sponding seasons of the year. In contrast with these species 
 of extended range, there are many species whose habitat is con- 
 fined, perhaps to a single mountain, and there are a few which 
 never have been seen beyond the edges of some extinct volcano, 
 whose crater is now filled with a special flora. Many of the 
 great mountains of the Andes have each of them species pecul- 
 iar to themselves. On Chimborazo and Cotopaxi, and other 
 summits, special forms of Humming Birds are found in special 
 zones of vegetation even close up to the limits of perpetual 
 snow. Again, many of the Islands have species peculiar to 
 themselves. The little island of Juan Fernandez, 300 miles 
 from the mainland, has three species peculiar to itself, of which 
 
136 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 two are so distinct from all others known, that they cannot for 
 a moment be confounded with any of them.* 
 
 It is impossible not to see, in such complicated facts as these, 
 that the creation of new Species has followed some plan in 
 which mere variety has been in itself an object and an aim. 
 The divergence of form is not a divergence which can have 
 arisen by way of natural consequence, merely from comparative 
 advantage and disadvantage in the struggle for existence. 
 Bills highly specialized in form are certainly not those which 
 would give the greatest advantage to birds which have equal 
 access to the abundant Flora of an immense Continent. Some 
 form of bill adapted to the probing or piercing of all flowers 
 'with almost equal ease, would seem to be the form most favor- 
 able to the multiplication and spread of Humming Birds. Con- 
 tinued approximation to some common type would seem to be 
 quite as natural a change, and a much more advantageous kind 
 of change as regards advantage in the struggle for existence, 
 than endless divergence and special adaptation to limited 
 spheres of enjoyment. At all events, we may safely say that 
 mere advantage, in Mr. Darwin's sense, is not the rule which 
 has chiefly guided Creative Power in the Origin of these new 
 Species. It seems rather to have been a rule having for its ob- 
 ject the mere multiplying of Life, and the fitting of new Forms 
 for new spheres of enjoyment, according as these might arise 
 out of corresponding changes in other departments of the or- 
 ganic world. 
 
 If, now, we turn to the other kind of specific distinction be- 
 tween Humming Birds, viz., that which consists in differences 
 in the mere coloring and disposition of the plumage, we shall 
 find the same phenomena still more remarkable. In the first 
 place, it is to be observed of the whole group that there is no 
 connection which can be traced or conceived between the 
 splendor of the Humming Birds and any function essential to 
 their life. If there were any such connection, that splendor 
 could not be confined, as it almost exclusively is, to one sex. 
 The female Birds are of course not placed at any disadvantage 
 in the struggle for existence by their more sombre coloring. 
 Mere utility in this sense, therefore, can have had no share in 
 
 * Gould's " Trochilidae." 
 
CREATION BY LAW. 137 
 
 determining one of the most remarkable of all the characteris- 
 tics of this family of Birds. It is obviously beside the question 
 to account, as Mr. Wallace and Mr. Darwin do, for the beauty 
 of the Humming Birds upon the ground that the males are 
 thus rendered more attractive to the females. This attractive- 
 ness can only operate as between different individuals of the 
 same species, since no one ever heard of the females of a dull- 
 colored species wandering in their affection from their rightful 
 lords to the more brilliant males of some other species. Every 
 animal, however little beautiful it may be in our eyes, has 
 sufficient attractiveness as between the sexes to secure the 
 great object of the continuation of its race. Utility, indeed, 
 in a different sense, can be quoted with probability, as account- 
 ing for the comparative plain coloring of females in this and in 
 almost all other genera of Birds. But then it is Utility con- 
 ceived as operating by way of motive in a Creative Mind, and 
 not operating as a physical cause in the production of a me- 
 chanical result. And here we find Mr. Wallace instinctively 
 testifying to this great distinction, and employing language 
 whidi indicates the passage from one order of ideas to another. 
 He says, "The REASON WHY female birds are not adorned 
 with equally brilliant plumes is sufficiently clear ; they would 
 be injurious by rendering their possessors too conspicuous 
 during incubation." * This is, no doubt, the true explanation 
 of the purpose which the plain coloring of female Birds is in- 
 tended to serve ; but it is no explanation at all of the physical 
 causes by which this special protection is secured. 
 
 Those who, by special study, have laid their minds alongside 
 the Mind of Nature in any of her Provinces, have generally 
 imparted to them a true sense, so far as it goes, in the interpre- 
 tation of her mysteries. Let us then hear what Mr. Gould says 
 on the beauty of the Humming Birds : " The members of most 
 of the genera have certain parts of their plumage fantastically 
 decorated ; and in many instances most resplendent in color. 
 My own opinion is, that this gorgeous coloring of the Humming 
 Birds has been given for the mere purpose of ornament, and 
 for no other purpose of special adaptation in their mode of 
 life; in other words, that ornament and beauty, merely as 
 
 * Quarterly Journal of Science, Oct., 1867, p. 481. 
 
138 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 such, was the end proposed." * Different parts of the plumage 
 have been selected in different genera as the principal subject 
 of ornament. In some, it is the feathers of the crown worked 
 into different forms of crest ; in some, it is the feathers of the 
 throat, forming gorgets and beards of many shapes and hues ,. 
 in some, it is a special development of neck plumes, elongated 
 into frills and tippets of extraordinary form and beauty. In a 
 great number of genera the feathers of the tail are the special 
 subjects of decoration, and this on every variety of plan and 
 principle of ornament. In some, the two central feathers are 
 most elongated, the others decreasing in length on either side, 
 so as to give the whole the wedge form. In others, the con- 
 verse plan is pursued, the two lateral feathers being most de- 
 veloped, so that the whole is forked after the manner of the 
 common Swallow. In others, again, they are radiated or pointed 
 and sharpened like thorns. In some genera there is an ex- 
 traordinary development of one or two feathers into plumes of 
 enormous length, with flat or spatulose terminations. Mere 
 ornament and variety of form, and these for their own sake, is- 
 the only principle or rule with reference to which Creative 
 Power seems to have worked in these wonderful and beautiful 
 Birds. And if we cannot account for the differences in the 
 general style and plan of ornament followed in the whole group r 
 by referring them to any sort of use in the struggle for exist- 
 ence, still less is it possible to account, on this principle, for 
 the kind of difference which separates from each other the 
 different species in each of the genera. These differences are 
 often little more than a mere difference of color. The radiance 
 of the ruby or topaz in one species, is replaced perhaps by the 
 radiance of the emerald or the sapphire in another. In all 
 other respects the different species are sometimes almost exact 
 counterparts of each other. As an example, let me refer to 
 the two species figured by Mr. Gould as the Blue-tailed and the 
 Green-tailed Sylphs ; and also to two species of the " Comets," 
 in which two different kinds of luminous reds or crimsons are 
 nearly all that serve to distinguish the species. 
 
 A similar principle of variation applies in other genera, where 
 the amount of difference is greater. For example, one of the 
 
 * Gould's "Trochilidae," Introduction. 
 
CREATION BY LAW. 139 
 
 most singular and beautiful of all the tribe is comprised within 
 the genus Lophornis, or the " Coquettes." The principle of 
 ornament in this genus is, that the different species are all pro- 
 vided both with brilliant crests, and with frills or tippets on the 
 neck. The feathers of these parts are generally of one color, 
 ending in spots or spangles of another ; the spangles being 
 generally of metallic lustre. There seems to be a rule of inverse 
 proportion between the two kinds of ornament. The species 
 which have the neck plumes longest have the shortest crests 
 and vice versa. In the shape and structure of all essential 
 organs there is hardly any difference between the species. 
 
 One very curious example of variety for the sake of ornament 
 may be mentioned in connection with this wonderful family of 
 Birds. It is a law in the sense of an observed order of facts 
 regulating the ornament of Humming Birds, that where white 
 is introduced into the coloring of the tail feathers, it is not 
 applied to the central feathers, but is confined to the marginal 
 feathers on either side. There is, however, one species (Uros- 
 ticte Bengamini), recently discovered, which affords the only ex- 
 ample yet known of a departure from this rule. It is a species 
 in which white is one of the principal ornaments of the Bird, and 
 is used in places where it can be placed in conspicuous contrast 
 with the darkest tints. Tufts and lines of purest white shine 
 among the greens and violets of the neck and head ; whilst, in 
 exquisite harmony with this, the four central feathers of the tail 
 are alone dipped, as it were, in a solid glaze of the same white, 
 and the marginal feathers on either side are kept wholly dark. 
 Then, as if to mark with emphasis the meaning of this departure 
 from the ordinary rule, it is a departure confined to the or- 
 namented sex : and the Female Form of the same species fol- 
 lows the ordinary law white being introduced in the marginal 
 feathers, and in these alone. 
 
 Now, what explanation does the law of Natural Selection give 
 I will not say of the origin, but even of the continuance and 
 preservation of such specific varieties as these ? None what- 
 ever. A crest of topaz is no better in the struggle for existence 
 than a crest of sapphire. A frill ending in spangles of the 
 emerald is no better in the battle of life than a frill ending in 
 the spangles of the ruby. A tail is not affected for the purposes 
 
140 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 of flight, whether its marginal or its central feathers are dec- 
 orated with white. It is impossible to bring such varieties into 
 relation with any physical law known to us. It has relation, 
 however, to a Purpose, which stands in close analogy with our 
 own knowledge of Purpose in the works of Man. Mere beauty 
 and mere variety, for their own sake, are objects which we 
 ourselves seek when we can make the Forces of Nature subor- 
 dinate to the attainment of them. There seems to be no con- 
 ceivable reason why we should doubt or question, that these 
 are ends and aims also in the Forms given to living Organisms, 
 when the facts correspond with this view, and with no other. 
 In this sense, we can trace a creative law, that is, we can see 
 that these Forms of Life do fulfil a purpose and intention, which 
 we can appreciate and understand. 
 
 But then it may be asked, has this purpose and intention been 
 attained without the use of means ? Have no physical laws 
 been used, whereby these new forms of beauty have been evolved, 
 the one from the other, in a series so wonderful for its variety 
 in unity, and its unity in variety ? I am not now seeking to 
 answer this question in the negative. All I say is, that the 
 physical laws which are made subservient to this purpose are 
 entirely unknown to us. That particular combination of a great 
 many natural laws, which Mr. Darwin groups under the name 
 of Natural Selection, does not in the least answer the conditions 
 which we seek in a law to account for either the origin or the 
 spread of such creatures as the various kinds of Humming Birds. 
 On the other hand, if I am asked whether I believe that every 
 separate Species has been a separate creation not born, but 
 separately made I must answer, that I do not believe it. I 
 think the facts do suggest to the mind the idea of the working 
 of some creative Law, almost as certainly as they convince us 
 that we know nothing of its nature, or of the conditions under 
 which it does its glorious work. Our experience of the existing 
 Order of Nature is, that the young of each species repeat the 
 form and the colors .of their parent, and that even where 
 variations occur, they are inconstant, and tend to disappear. 
 We have no knowledge, for example, that from the eggs of the 
 Blue-tailed Sylph a pair of Green-tailed Sylphs can ever be pro- 
 duced. We have no reason to believe that a species of Lophornis 
 
CREATION BY LAW. 141 
 
 with a tippet of emerald spangles, can ever hatch out a pair of 
 young adorned with spangles of some other gem. And yet we 
 cannot assert that such phenomena are impossible, nor can it be 
 denied that, as a matter of speculation, this process is natural 
 and easy of conception, as compared with the idea of each 
 Species being separately called into existence, out of the in- 
 organic elements of which its body is composed. 
 
 Such new births if they do take place would perfectly ful- 
 fil, I think, the only idea we can ever form of new creations. 
 For example, it would appear that every variety which is to 
 take its place as a new Species must be born male and female; 
 because it is one of the facts of specific variation in the Hum- 
 ming Birds, that although the male and female plumage is gen- 
 erally entirely different, yet the female of each species is as 
 distinct from the female of every other, as the male is from the 
 male of every other. If, therefore, each new variety were not 
 born in couples, and if the divergence of Form were not thus 
 secured in the organization of both the sexes, it would fail to 
 be established, or would exhibit for a time the phenomena of 
 mixture, and terminate in reversion to the original type. Now 
 here again we have the emphatic declaration of Mr. Gould, that 
 among the thousands of specimens which have passed through 
 his hands, from all the genera of this great family, he has never 
 seen one case of mixture or hybridism between any two Spe- 
 cies, however nearly allied. But this passage is so important, 
 that I quote it entire. " It might be thought by some persons 
 that four hundred species of birds so diminutive in size, and of 
 one family, could scarcely be distinguished from each other ; 
 but any one who studies the subject, will soon perceive that 
 such is not the case. Even the females, which assimilate more 
 closely to each other than the males, can be separated with per- 
 fect certainty ; nay, even a tail-feather will be sufficient for a 
 person well versed in the subject to say to what genus and spe- 
 cies the Bird from which it has been taken belongs. I mention 
 this fact to show that what we designate a Species has really 
 distinctive and constant characters ; and in the whole of my 
 experience, with many thousands of Humming Birds passing 
 through my hands, I have never observed an instance of any 
 variation which would lead me to suppose that it was the result 
 
142 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 of a union of two species. I write this without bias, one way 
 or the other, as to the question of the Origin of Species. I am 
 desirous of representing Nature in her wonderful ways as she 
 presents herself to my attention at the close of my work, after 
 a period of twelve years of incessant labor, and not less than 
 twenty years of interesting study." * 
 
 If, therefore, new Species are born from the old, it is not by 
 accidental mixture ; it is not by the mere nursing of changes 
 advantageous in the battle of life ; it must be from the birth of 
 some one couple, male and female, whose organization is sub- 
 jected to new conditions corresponding with each other, and 
 having such force of self-continuance as to secure it against re- 
 version. It matters not how small the difference may be from 
 the parent Form ; if that difference be constant, and if it be 
 associated with some difference equally constant in the female 
 Form, it becomes at once a new Species. There are some cases 
 mentioned by Mr. Gould which may possibly be examples of 
 the first founding of a new Species. In the beautiful genus 
 Cynanthus, he tells us that there are some local varieties near 
 Bogota, in which the ornament is partially changing from blue 
 to green and it is a curious fact that this variation appears to 
 be taking effect under the direction of some definite rule or 
 "law," inasmuch as it is only the eight central feathers of 
 the tail which are tipped with the new color. Mr. Gould 
 expressly says of one such variety from Ecuador, that it pos- 
 sesses characters so distinctive as to entitle it, in his opinion, 
 to the rank of a separate Species. The very discussion of 
 such a question shows the possibility of new births being the 
 means of introducing new Species. But my object here is sim- 
 ply to point out that Mr. Darwin's theory offers no explanation 
 of such births, either as respects their origin or their preserva- 
 tion, neither does it even approach to tracing these births to 
 any physical law whatever. It fails also to recognize, even if 
 it does not exclude, the relation which the birth of new Species 
 has to the mental purpose of producing mere beauty and mere 
 variety. Nevertheless it may be true that ordinary generation 
 has been the instrument employed ; but if so, it must be em- 
 
 * Gould's 11 Trochilidae," Introduction. 
 
CREATION BY LAW. 143 
 
 ployed under extraordinary conditions, and directed to extraor- 
 dinary results. 
 
 It will be seen, then, that the principle of Natural Selection 
 has no bearing whatever on the Origin of Species, but only on 
 the preservation and distribution of Species when they have 
 arisen. I have already pointed out that Mr. Darwin does not 
 always keep this distinction clearly in view, because he speaks 
 of Natural Selection " producing " organs, or " adapting " them. 
 It cannot be too often repeated that Natural Selection can pro- 
 duce nothing whatever, except the conservation or preservation 
 of some variation otherwise originated. The true Origin of 
 Species does not consist in the adjustments which help varieties 
 to live and to prevail, but in those previous adjustments which 
 cause those varieties to be born at all. Now what are these ? 
 Can they be traced or even guessed at ? Mr. Darwin has a 
 whole chapter on the Laws of Variation , * and it is here, if 
 anywhere, that we look for any suggestion as to the physical 
 causes which account for the Origin as distinguished from the 
 mere preservation of Species. He candidly admits that his doc- 
 trine of Natural Selection takes cognizance of variations only 
 after they have arisen, and that it regards those variations as 
 purely accidental in their origin, or, in other words, as due to 
 chance. This, of course, he adds, is a supposition wholly in- 
 correct, and only serves " to indicate plainly our ignorance of 
 the cause of each particular variation." Accordingly, the Laws 
 of Variation which he proceeds to indicate are merely, for the 
 most part, certain observed facts in respect to Variation, and do 
 not at all come under the category of Laws, in that higher sense 
 in which the word Law indicates a discovered method under 
 which Natural Forces are made to work. There is, however, in 
 this chapter, one Law which approaches to a Law in the higher 
 sense. Mr. Darwin, whilst candidly confessing our profound 
 ignorance of the cause or origin of varieties, yet groups together 
 a great class of facts as connected by a tie which he calls the 
 " Correlation of Growth." Now what is this law this observed 
 Order of facts ? It is, that variation in one part of an organism 
 is, as a rule, accompanied with corresponding variations in other 
 parts, and especially in those parts which are " homologous," 
 
 * " Origin of Species," chap. v. 
 
144 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 that is to say, which occupy the same relative place in the geiv 
 eral Plan. 
 
 This, however, is but a very imperfect definition of the vast 
 Order of mysterious facts which are covered by the words, 
 " Correlation of Growth." The fundamental idea which these 
 words express is an Idea of wider and deeper significance in 
 Nature, than Mr. Darwin seems to have perceived. There is a 
 correlation between all natural organic growths ; that is to say, 
 that any variation of form in a single part has a constant rela- 
 tion to other variations of form in some other part or parts of 
 the same organism. But " relation " is a vague word. There 
 are many kinds of " relation " there are indeed an infinite vari- 
 ety of kinds. What is the kind of relation that we detect in 
 Correlated Growths ? It is not until we ask ourselves this 
 question that we discover what a deep question it is how end- 
 less are the avenues of thought and of inquiry which it opens 
 up. ^ 
 
 First, one relation which we detect in all variations of organic 
 growth, is simply the relation of symmetry. This kind and 
 degree of Correlation of Growth prevails even in the world which 
 we call Inorganic. The corresponding sides and angles of a 
 crystal, for example, may be said to be correlated together. 
 The nature of this relation is geometrical and numerical. It is 
 a relation having reference to invariable rules of number. As 
 regards its physical cause, all we can say is, that it is the result 
 of forces whose property it is to aggregate the particles of mat- 
 ter in definite forms, which forms are symmetrical that is to 
 say, they are forms having an axis with equal developments on 
 either side. Correlation of Growth, therefore, in this sense 
 points to the work of Forces, one of whose essential properties 
 is Polarity that is, equal and similar action in opposite direc- 
 tions. Now, this kind of Correlation of Growth may be traced 
 upwards from simple Minerals through all the infinite compli- 
 cations of the organic world. It is unquestionably the basis of 
 many of the Correlations of Growth prevailing in Plants and 
 Animals. It is seen in the symmetrical arrangement of all veg- 
 etable and of all animal Forms. A central axis is traceable in 
 them all ; and the Bilateral or Radiated arrangement of their 
 
CREATION BY LAW. 14$ 
 
 subordinate parts is one of the most fundamental and uthiver- 
 sal of all the Correlations of Growth. 
 
 This is one, but it is one only, of the Correlations of Growth 
 which are constantly observed. It would lead us to expect 
 that any change of form on one side of an animal would be ac- 
 companied by an exactly corresponding change on the other 
 side : so that limbs on one side of the central axis, if changed at 
 all, would change in exact and symmetrical accordance with the 
 limbs on the opposite and corresponding side. This, accord- 
 ingly, is one of the Correlations of Growth most constantly ob- 
 served. 
 
 Now, it will be seen that Correlation of Growth, in this first 
 and simplest sense, runs alongside, as it were, of Correlation in 
 another and higher sense. The relation between two equal and 
 opposite growths, which is a relation, in the first place, of sim- 
 ple symmetry as between themselves, is always accompanied by 
 another relation, in the second place, of correspondence or fit- 
 ness as between these growths and external, conditions. An 
 organism which is developed unsymmetrically, unequally, would 
 be not only ugly in its form, but it would be maimed and im- 
 perfect in its functions. Here, then, we see one kind and one 
 idea of Correlation rising above another. Two growths might 
 be correlated as regards each other, and might yet be wanting 
 in any corresponding correlation of fitness and of function to- 
 wards outward things. But the first of these two kinds of corre- 
 lation would be useless without the last. And this last is obvi- 
 ously the higher and more complex Correlation of the two. It 
 is higher, not only in the sense of being more complex, but as 
 involving an idea which lifts us at once from a lower to a higher 
 region of thought. Growths correlated as between each other 
 according to mere symmetry of arrangement suggest nothing, 
 except the work of Forces with inherent Polarity of action.. 
 But growths correlated with things outside the organism in- 
 which those growths occur, and which can exert no physical 
 effect upon it, suggest at once the operation of Forces work- 
 ing under Adjustment with a view to Purpose. 
 
 When we see a Mineral salt crystallizing under the power of 
 a Voltaic Current, we see Correlation of Growth in its simplest 
 form, and in visible connection with its immediate cause. The- 
 
 10 
 
146 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 particles of salt are marshalled in a constant Order an Order 
 the principle of which is some central axis, with branches and 
 branchlets grouped around it in equal and exquisite arrangement. 
 Wonderful as this arrangement is, it suggests no other question 
 to the mind than that which may be asked in respect to the ulti- 
 mate nature and source of Polarity in Magnetic Force. But 
 when we see two growths in an organism which not only are 
 correlated to each other with reference to a centre, but are cor. 
 related also to external things with reference to Function, we 
 see something which raises questions altogether different in 
 kind. We have passed at once from the region of the What, 
 and the How, into the region of the Why. The one kind of 
 Correlation has reference to Physical Causes, the other kind of 
 correlation has reference to those Mental Purposes which 
 Physical Causes are made to serve. These two kinds of Cor. 
 relation are perfectly distinct. They are as distinct as the cor- 
 relation of equal pressures which a given volume of steam ex- 
 erts upon the opposite sides of a boiler is distinct from the cor- 
 relation between that pressure and its conversion into the driv- 
 ing-force of cranks and wheels, with all their adaptations for 
 running on the rails, or for paddling in the sea. They are as 
 distinct as the correlations of force developed in a Voltaic Bat- 
 tery are distinct from the adjustments which convert those 
 forces into the means of communicating Thought. 
 
 Mr. Darwin has not pointed out this distinction clearly. In- 
 deed, he does not seem to have had it in his view. He groups 
 under one name, the Correlation of Growth, two classes of 
 Phenomena, which are indeed always combined in fact, but 
 which are entirely separate in idea. Correlation of Growth, 
 in one sense, is that law of vital force which secures that 
 any change in the shape of one limb in an animal shall be ac- 
 companied by a corresponding change in all the other limbs. 
 Correlation of Growth in the other sense, is that adjustment of 
 vital forces to the contingencies of external circumstance, which 
 secures that all the changes which do take place shall be 
 changes adapted to the discharge of new functions to the ful- 
 filment of new conditions of life to command over new sources 
 of enjoyment. 
 
 Keeping, then, clearly in our view the distinction between 
 
CREATION BY LAW. 147 
 
 these two different kinds of Correlation of Growth, let us look 
 at the phenomena actually presented in the aspect and history 
 of Organic Forms, as respects both these kinds of Correlation. 
 As regards the first kind of Correlation, I have referred to 
 the law of Bilateral Symmetry as the simplest and most obvious 
 illustration. It is a law which at once connects itself with the 
 idea of Polarity of Force. But though this be one kind of Cor- 
 relation, almost universal, and may very probably be the foun- 
 dation of every other, there are many Correlations of Growth 
 between which and mere Polarity there is no visible connection. 
 The truth is that all the parts of an organism are bound to- 
 gether as one whole by a pervading system of correlations as 
 intricate as they are obscure. When the organism is in health, 
 and all its parts are working in harmony, the wonder of these 
 correlations is not perceived. But they are brought out in a 
 marked degree by the phenomena of disease, and also by the 
 phenomena of monstrosity or malformation. The " sympathy " 
 which the most distant and apparently unconnected parts of an 
 organism show with each other, when one of them is affected 
 by disease, is the index of correlations whose nature is utterly 
 beyond the reach of our anatomy, It is the same with malfor- 
 mations. Mr. Darwin mentions one case of curious unintelli- 
 gible correlation viz., that a blue iris is associated in Cats 
 with deafness ; and, again, that the tortoise-shell color of the 
 fur is associated with the female sex in the same animal. In 
 like manner the bright colors, and the more conspicuous orna- 
 ments of plumage in Birds, are correlated with the male sex. 
 So likewise are vocal organs with the wonderful gift of song. 
 In many insects the differences of form which are correlated 
 with the differences of sex, are far greater than the differences 
 which separate species and even genera. There are insects of 
 which the male is a fly, whilst the female is a worm. There 
 are many other cases of corfelation between different growths 
 in respect to which the nature and source of the connection is 
 equally unknown. For example, the complex stomachs of the 
 Ruminant Order are uniformly associated with a particular 
 form of hoof. Sometimes correlations the most constant and 
 invariable are at the same time the most subtle and the most 
 secret, because they are hid under other growths which are not 
 
148 THE REIGN O7 LAW. 
 
 so correlated, and which produce total diversities of outward 
 aspect. One very curious class of correlations is the correla- 
 tion between the internal structure of the teeth in animals, and 
 the structure of other very distant portions of their frame. 
 There lately was, for example, in the Zoological Gardens, a lit- 
 tle animal, the Hyrax, not unlike a Rabbit in general appear- 
 ance, and very like it in habit. It is the " Cony " of Scripture. 
 Now this little animal will be found on examination to have 
 limbs which do not terminate in a foot like a Rabbit, but in a 
 divided hoof of peculiar form. This hoof is in miniature like 
 the hoof of a Rhinoceros. If next we examine the teeth of the 
 Hyrax we shall find that the materials of these teeth are also 
 combined in the same manner, and after the same pattern as 
 the teeth of the Rhinoceros. So it is with other parts of the 
 same two animals. Along with the teeth and the hoofs there 
 are certain other shapes of bones which seem to be under the 
 same bond of likeness. Now these are Correlations of Growth 
 between different parts of the same animal, and between the 
 corresponding parts in two different species. 
 
 The conception, then, which we are led to form by this kind 
 of Correlation between organic growths, is more complex than 
 we had at first supposed. Mere Polarity of Force, leading to 
 equal and opposite arrangement of subordinate parts, is not 
 enough to satisfy the facts. This, indeed, may continue to be 
 the type to which our thoughts refer, and by which we are 
 helped to some more adequate idea of the facts. But the 
 general impression left on the mind is this that some 
 One Force directs the form and structure of every organism, 
 so that any change in one part of it is but the index of 
 changes which run visibly or invisibly throughout the whole. 
 The growths between which we detect a correlation, are not 
 really separate things connected only by the few correspond- 
 ences which we may be able to detect, but are part and parcel 
 of one operation, the result of one Force, exerting its energies 
 through channels which we cannot see, and according to laws 
 of which we can form but a distant and faint conception. The 
 truth is that Correlation in this sense is involved in the very 
 word " Growth." Each part of every structure which is the 
 result of growth must be correlated to every other part. This 
 
CREATION BY LAW. 149 
 
 is essential to the very idea of growth, and to the very idea of 
 an organism due to growth. When, therefore, Mr. Darwin says 
 that one of the laws on which variation of form depends is 
 Correlation f Growth, he simply says that variations of 
 Growth depend on growth for all growths must be correlated. 
 
 But Correlation in this sense helps but a little way indeed in 
 conceiving the origin of a new Species. There might be the 
 most minute and perfect harmony between the changes effected 
 in an animal newly born without those changes tending even in 
 the most remote degree towards the establishment of a new 
 Form of Life. In order to that establishment there must be an- 
 other correlation, and a correlation of a higher kind. There must 
 be a correlation between those changes and all the outward con- 
 ditions amidst which the new Form is to be placed and live. 
 If this correlation fails the new Form will die. Yet, so far as 
 we can see, this kind of correlation is without any physical 
 cause. It is not necessarily involved, as the other kind of cor- 
 relation is, in the very idea of Growth. On the contrary, it is 
 not only entirely separable in thought, but, as we see in mon- 
 strosities, it is sometimes separated in fact. We have no con- 
 ception of any Force emanating from external things which 
 shall mould the structure of an organism in hatmony with them- 
 selves. Mr. Darwin freely confesses this, and says that many 
 considerations " incline him to lay very little weight on the di- 
 rect action of the conditions of life " in producing variety of 
 Form. We can conceive, dimly indeed, but still we can con- 
 ceive, how in the Humming Birds a special form of Wing shall 
 be correlated with a special form of Bill. But we have no con- 
 ception whatever how a special form of Bill should be correlated 
 with a special form of Flower from which the Bill is to extract 
 its food. Mr. Darwin has shown how an improved Bill, when 
 once produced, will be preserved by finding external conditions 
 to which it is adapted. But he has not shown, and he frankly 
 confesses he has no idea, how the adapted variation of Bill 
 comes to be born at all. 
 
 Yet it is this higher and more complex Correlation which is 
 the most constant and the most obvious of 'all the facts of Na- 
 ture. In these facts we see that the forces of Organic Growth 
 are worked under rules of close adjustment to external con- 
 
150 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 ditions ; and that particular shapes which might seem insepara- 
 bly associated, if we looked at one Genus or one Family alone, 
 are at once disjoined where different adaptations to Function 
 are required. Let us take another example from the great 
 Class of Birds. If we were to look only to the family of the 
 A/iatida (Ducks and Geese), we might suppose that there is 
 a constant Correlation of Growth between webbed feet and 
 spoon-shaped bills. But the real and efficient Correlation of 
 Growth in this case is not between the spoon-bill and the web- 
 foot, but between both of these and certain external conditions 
 of life. The web-foot is correlated to an aquatic habitat : and 
 the spoon-bill is correlated to spoon-food. And accordingly 
 this association of form in foot and bill is at once dissolved 
 where different external functions require a separation. In the 
 Gulls, the Fulmars, and the Petrels, the web-foot is retained, 
 because action upon the element of water is still required ; but 
 the correlated form of bill vanishes, and shapes altogether dif- 
 ferent are given, shapes adapted, that is correlated, to different 
 kinds of food, and to different methods of capture. 
 
 Again, there is another great family of Birds where some of 
 the same forms are correlated with other forms entirely differ- 
 ent, because of the different external Correlations which are re- 
 quired by Function. In the Divers the web-foot is mounted 
 upon a flattened leg-bone, with the sharp edge set " fore and 
 aft." Now what is this Correlation of Growth ? It is, first, the 
 Internal Correlation of those parts to each other, but secondly 
 and principally, it is the External Correlation of both to their 
 function of propelling under water. The form of the foot is 
 correlated to the function of opposing the largest possible area 
 of resistance to that medium, exactly where, for the purpose of 
 swimming, the maximum of resistance is required ; the knife- 
 shaped leg-bone is correlated to the function of opposing the 
 least possible resistance, precisely where, for the same purpose, 
 the minimum of resistance is required. In Australia we have, 
 in the Ornithorynchus paradoxus, the webbed feet correlated 
 with the Duck-shaped Bill in an animal which does not belong 
 to the Class of Birds at all. 
 
 There is another case of what may be called Correlated 
 Correlations, which brings out very clearly the distinction which 
 
CREATION BY LAW. 151 
 
 is so important in the philosophy of this great subject. Feathers 
 are a kind of covering peculiar to the Class of Birds. Under 
 every variety of modification they have one fundamental plan 
 a central shaft or quill to which lateral filaments are attached. 
 Now there is a vast range of correlations between the different 
 kinds of feather and the different Families or Species, and be- 
 tween different parts of the body in the same Species. But 
 there are two Correlations of Growth in respect to feathers 
 which are constant. In all cases, (excepting, of course, the 
 Wingless Birds,) the feathers which grow from the fore-arm and 
 finger-bones, constituting the Wings, are comparatively long, 
 strong, tapering, elastic, and with thin lateral filaments, which 
 filaments are closely hooked together by means of minute teeth 
 fitting into each other, so that the whole shall form one con- 
 tinuous surface or web. This is a Correlation of Growth be- 
 tween one particular kind of feather, and one particular member 
 of the body, which, in all Birds capable of flight, is constant, and 
 amounts to a universal Law. Now let us contrast this with 
 another Correlation of Growth which is equally constant. On 
 the side of the head of all Birds, there is a patch of feathers of 
 peculiar structure, with fine and slender shafts, and with the 
 lateral filaments not hooked together as in the other case, but, 
 on the contrary, always separated from each other the whole 
 series forming a fine and open network spread over the surface 
 which they cover and protect. These feathers cover the orifice 
 of the ear, and are called the auriculars. They are correlated 
 with the curious passages, the finely hung clapper-bones, and 
 all the elaborate mechanism of that organ. Such are the 
 Internal Correlations. But they are intelligible only when con- 
 sidered in the light shed by other correlations which are external. 
 The wing feathers with close continuous webs are correlated to 
 the laws by which the passage of air may be prevented the 
 auricular feathers, with open unconnected webs, are correlated 
 to the laws by which the passage of sound maybe rendered easy. 
 The one set of feathers are adapted to the active function of 
 evoking and resisting atmospheric pressure by striking strong, 
 yet light and elastic blows, upon the air the other set of 
 feathers are adapted to the passive function of allowing the free 
 access of thf waves of sound into the passages of the ear. 
 
152 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 These are but a few examples out of millions. Throughout the 
 whole range of Nature the system of Internal Correlation is 
 .entirely subordinate to the system of External Correlation. 
 Forms or growths which are inseparably joined with each other 
 in one group of animals, are wholly divorced from each other 
 in another group; whereas Forms which have correlations 
 adapted to external conditions, are repeated over and over again 
 across the widest gaps in the scale of Natural affinity. 
 
 If, then, it be true that New Species, are created out of 
 small variations in the form of Old Species, and this by 
 way of Natural Generation, there must be some bond of con- 
 nection with determines those variations in a definite direction, 
 and keeps up the External Correlations part pas su with the 
 Internal Correlations. Natural Selection can have no part in 
 this. Natural Selection seizes on these External Correlations 
 when they have come to be. But Natural Selection cannot 
 Center the secret chambers of the womb, and there shape the 
 new Form in harmony with modified conditions of external life. 
 How, then, are these external correlations provided for before- 
 ,hand ? There can be but one reply. It is by Utility, not act- 
 ing as a Physical Cause upon organs already in existence, but 
 acting through Motive as a Mental Purpose in contriving organs 
 before they have begun to be. And where obvious utility does 
 result, the only connecting Bond which can be conceived as 
 capable of maintaining the Internal Correlations, in harmony 
 with the External Correlations, is the bond of Creative Will giv- 
 ing to Organic Forces a foreseen direction. It is, in short, 
 precisely the same bond which in all mechanism produces 
 Structure in harmony with intended Function. 
 
 Hence it is that scientific men, in seeking expression for the 
 ultimate ideas arrived at in the course of Physical research, find 
 themselves compelled to borrow the language of Mechanical 
 Invention. There is no other language which conveys an 
 impression of the facts, or of the tie by which the facts are con- 
 nected with each other. In the first chapter of this work I have 
 had occasion to point out how true this is of Mr. Darwin's de- 
 scription of the Orchids, and of the curious functions of their 
 structure. The correlations there are all external. But the 
 same result appears in every other department of Science. In a 
 
CREATION BY LAW. 153 
 
 remarkable paper on the " Constitution of the Universe," Pro- 
 fessor Tyndall has occasion to speak of the non-luminous rays 
 of heat emitted by all incandescent bodies, rays which, though 
 intensely hot, are altogether insensible to the eye. Now the 
 Retina of the eye is a piece of mechanism whose Correlations 
 are essentially External. It is the expansion of a special nerve 
 whose function it is to be sensitive to certain particular vibra- 
 tions, and to no other vibrations whatever. Light itself, there- 
 fore, is discovered to be merely a relative term a word, in 
 short, denoting nothing but an external Correlation between the 
 Retina and vibrations of a certain kind and quality. Now what 
 is the language which Professor Tyndall is constrained to use 
 in explanation of facts so difficult of conception ? It is the 
 language of Mechanism, of mental Purpose and Design. " It 
 is not," he says, " the size of a wave which determines its power 
 of producing light ; it is, broadly speaking, the fitness of the 
 wave to the Retina. The ethereal pulses must follow each other 
 with a certain rapidity of succession before they can produce 
 light, and if their rapidity exceed a certain limit, they also fail 
 to produce light. The Retina is attuned, if I may use the term, 
 to a certain range of vibrations, beyond which, in both directions, 
 it ceases to be of use." These are indeed wonderful Correla- 
 tions which reveal to us fittings and adjustments of which we had 
 no previous conception : but they give us no glimmering, even, 
 of knowledge as to the physical causes which have " attuned " 
 a material organ so as to catch certain ethereal pulsations in 
 the external world, and to make these the means of conveying 
 to Man's Intelligence the enjoyment and the power of sight. 
 
 It will be seen, then, that when Mr. Darwin speaks of the 
 Law of Correlation of Growth as a Law which determines va- 
 riation in organic growths, he is really presenting to us under 
 one phase two separate ideas which are radically distinct. 
 One is the idea of different growths in the same organism, cor- 
 responding with each other in respect to arrangement, or in 
 respect to texture, or in respect to form, or to some other 
 point of comparison. The other idea is that these growths 
 (each and all) correspond with the conditions of external na- 
 ture in such a way as to fit them for the discharge of Func- 
 tion with some new adaptation, and consequently with some 
 
I$4 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 new advantage. In one aspeet the Law of Correlation of 
 Growth is (or at least may probably be) a Law in the strictest 
 sense of the word ; that is to say, the result of a Force acting 
 according to its own definite modes and measures of operation. 
 But the Law of Correlation of Growth in the other aspect, is a 
 law only in the sense (i) of an observed order of facts ; and (2) 
 of that Order depending on Adjustment with a view to Pur- 
 pose. 
 
 Many naturalists have spoken of the facts of organic like- 
 ness as sufficiently accounted for by referring them to Adher- 
 ence to Type. Mr. Darwin complains that this phrase, as an 
 explanation of organic likeness, is no explanation at all, but 
 amounts only to a re-statement of the facts in another form of 
 language. This is true , but it is equally true of his own 
 phrase of Correlation of Growth.* " Adherence to Type " is 
 not in the nature of a Physical Cause, but in the nature of a 
 Mental Purpose. It is no explanation, therefore, to those fac- 
 ulties, of the mind which seek for Methods of operation. In 
 like manner " Correlation of Growth," in the only sense in 
 which it is possible to connect it with the Origin of Species, is 
 not a Physical Cause, but a Mental Purpose. The physical 
 means by which that purpose is secured remain as dark as ever ; 
 and such of them as are conceivable by us, are seen, like all 
 other physical forces, working to order, subject to direction, 
 and having that direction determined by foresight, forethought, 
 and contrivance. 
 
 Correlation of Growth, in the sense of external adaptations, 
 may be said to be the most universal of all the Laws of Nature. 
 But it accounts for the Origin of Organic Forms only in the 
 same sense in which it accounts for the origin of all other 
 phenomena, which in their result exhibit adaptations, or fittings 
 into use and service. Let us take, as an example, the origin, 
 nature, and capacities of Coal. That substance is correlated 
 in a truly wonderful manner with the needs, the powers, and the 
 capacities of Man. It contains within itself, in a form con- 
 densed and portable, a store of physical Force of incredible 
 
 * Mr. Wallace traces the whole Darwinian theory to six " general laws of the sim 
 plest kind laws which," he emphatically adds, " are in most cases mere statements 
 of admitted facts.' 1 ' 1 Again he says, " This series of facts or laws are mere state- 
 ments ofiuha* J s the condition of nature." Journal of Science, No. XVI. p. 472. 
 
CREATION BY LAW. 155 
 
 amount. The particles of one pound weight of it are held 
 together by a Force which, when liberated and applied in the 
 form of heat, is capable of lifting one million times its own 
 weight to the height of one foot.* No other substance known 
 to Man is to be compared with this as a furnisher of Force. 
 This is its function in the world. It is a function relating to 
 Man's mechanical and inventive powers, and coal has been 
 rendered capable of discharging this function by processes of 
 preparation which began millions of ages before Man was 
 born. But these External Correlations are a result arising by 
 way of natural consequence out of certain physical causes work- 
 ing to order, that is to say, out of Internal Correlations of 
 Growth between Solar Heat and Vegetable Structure, and 
 again between these and the causes which occasion interchange 
 between sea and land. No explanation so definite as this can 
 be given of the method in which Vital Forces are made to 
 evolve a new Form of Life. But even if such explanation 
 could be given, it would render no account at all of the fittings 
 of that Form into the outward requirements" of its life. These 
 are Correlations which in their very nature belong to Mind, 
 are the work of Mind, and are intelligible only in the light of 
 Mind. 
 
 I do not represent this conclusion as one necessarily adverse 
 to Mr. Darwin's Theory on the Origin of Species. It is a con- 
 clusion which he would probably be willing to accept. I only 
 desire to point out in how very limited a sense that Theory can 
 be said to trace Creation to a " Law " at all; and how entirely 
 inadequate that Theory is to account by any physical cause for 
 the Origin of Species. 
 
 The only senses, therefore, in which we get any glimpse of 
 Creation by Law are these ist, That the close physical con- 
 nection between different Specific Forms is probably due to the 
 operation of some Force or Forces common to them all ; 2d, 
 That these Forces have been employed and worked, with others 
 equally unknown, for the attainment of such ends as the multi- 
 plication of Life, in Forms fitted for new spheres of enjoyment, 
 and for the display of new kinds of beauty. 
 
 Is there anything in this conclusion to conflict with such 
 
 * " The Coal Question." W. S. Jevons, 1865. 
 
156 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 knowledge as we have from other sources of the nature and 
 working of Creative Power ? I do not know on what authority 
 it is that we so often speak as if Creation were not Creation un- 
 less it work from nothing as its material, and by nothing as its 
 means. We know that out of the "dust of the ground " that 
 is, out of the ordinary elements of Nature are our own bodies 
 formed, and the bodies of all living things. Nor is there any- 
 thing which should shock us in the idea that the creation of 
 new Forms, any more than their propagation, has been brought 
 about by the use and instrumentality of means. In a theologi- 
 cal point of view it matters nothing what those means have 
 been. I agree with M. Guizot, when he says that " Those only 
 would be serious adversaries of the doctrine of Creation who 
 could affirm that the universe the earth, and. Man upon it 
 have been from all eternity, and in all respects, just what they are 
 now." * But this cannot be affirmed except in the teeth of facts 
 which Science has clearly ascertained. There has been a 
 continual coming-to-be of new Forms of Life.f This is Crea- 
 tion, no matter what have been the laws or forces employed by 
 Creative Power. 
 
 The truth is, that the theory which fixes upon Inheritance as 
 the cause of organic likeness, startles us only when it is applied 
 to Forms in which unlikeness is more prominent than resem- 
 blance. The idea, for example, that the different kinds of 
 Pigeon, or of Humming Birds, have all descended through suc- 
 cessive variation from some one ancestral pair, whether it be 
 true or not, would not startle any one. Yet, if this be true, we 
 must be prepared for the same surmise extending farther. The 
 advocates of Development urge that Time is a powerful factor. 
 They say that if changes small, but constant enough, and defi- 
 nite enough, to constitute new Species, can and do arise out of 
 born varieties, it is impossible to fix the limits of divergence 
 which may be reached in the course of ages. It does not follow, 
 on the other hand, that there is no such limit because we cannot 
 fix it. It does not necessarily follow that because we admit 
 the idea of the Rock-dove, and the Turtle-dove, and the Ring- 
 
 * " Meditations sur I'Essenqe de la Religion Chretienne," p. 49. 
 
 t u We discern no evidence of a pause or intromission in the creation of coming-to- 
 be of new plants and animals." Instances of the Power of God as manifested in His 
 Animal Creation, by Professor Owen. 
 
CREATION BY LAW. 157 
 
 dove being all descended from one ancestral Pigeon, we are 
 bound to accept the idea of the Whale, and the Antelope, and 
 the Monkey being all descended from some one primeval Mam- 
 mal. Mr. Darwin says, truly enough, that Inheritance " is that 
 cause which alone, as far as we positively know, produces or- 
 gar\isms quite like, or nearly like, each other." But this is no 
 reason why we should conclude that Inheritance is the only 
 cause which can produce Organisms quite unlike, or only very 
 partially like each other. We are surely not entitled to assume 
 that all degrees and kinds of likeness can arise only from this 
 single cause. Yet until this extreme proposition be proved, or 
 rendered probable, we have a sound scientific basis for doubting 
 the application of the theory, precisely in proportion to the un- 
 likeness of the animals to which it is applied. 
 
 And this is the ground of reasoning, besides the ground of 
 feeling, on which we revolt from the doctrine as applied to 
 Man. We do so because we are conscious of an amount and 
 of a kind of difference between ourselves and the lower animals, 
 which is, in sober truth, immeasurable, in spite of the close 
 affinities of bodily structure. Yet the closeness of these affin- 
 ities is a fact ; and it may with truth be said that in contrast 
 with the gulf of separation in all resulting characters, these 
 affinities are among the profoundest mysteries of Nature. 
 Professor Huxley, in his work on " Man's Place in Nature," 
 has endeavored to prove that, so far as mere physical structure 
 is concerned, " the differences which separate him from the 
 Gorilla and the Chimpanzee are not so great as those which 
 separate the Gorilla from the lower Apes." On the frontispiece 
 of this work he exhibits in series the skeletons of the Anthropoid 
 Apes and of Man. It is a grim and grotesque procession. 
 The Form which leads it, however like the others in general 
 structural plan, is wonderfully different in those lines and 
 shapes of Matter which have such mysterious power of ex- 
 pressing the characters of Mind. And significant as those 
 differences are in the skeleton, they are as nothing to the dif- 
 ferences which emerge in the living creatures. Huxley himself 
 admits that these differences amount to " an enormous gulf," 
 to a " divergence immeasurable practically infinite." What 
 more striking proof could we have than this, that Organic Forms 
 
158 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 are but as clay in the hands of the Potter, and that the " Law " 
 of Structure is entirely subordinate to the " Law " of Purpose 
 and Intention under which the various parts of that structure 
 are combined for use ? 
 
 But Science will continue to ask, even if she never gets an 
 answer, What is the community of physical cause which pro- 
 duces this community of resulting structure ? The fact which 
 it is most difficult to disengage from the theory of Development, 
 or, in other words, from the theory of Creation by Birth, is the 
 existence of rudimentary or aborted organs ; the existence of 
 teeth, for example, in the jaws of the Whale teeth which never 
 cut the gum, and which are entirely useless to the animal. We 
 have an inherent conviction that this must have some use in the 
 future, that is, in some organism to be born from this one, 
 or else it must have had some use in the past, that is, in some 
 organism from which this one has descended. In either case 
 the power of Inheritance is suggested to the mind. We think 
 instinctively of the existence of some Derivative Form in which 
 these teeth have been, or are to be turned to use. It is only 
 fair towards the Theory of Creation by Birth, to admit that it 
 does explain the existence of useless organs in a sense in which 
 no other Theory explains them. It would be almost a neces- 
 sary consequence of Creation by Birth, that there must be 
 stages in which the ultimate use of new Forms could not be yet 
 apparent. And if mere beauty or variety were in themselves 
 objects which Creative Power sets before itself, then, also, we 
 might expect to meet with modifications of structure having no 
 other apparent use. Both these explanations, however, exclude 
 Mr. Darwin's idea of Natural Selection ; because this is a proc- 
 ess which can never operate, except through the agency of act- 
 ual use and disuse, upon organs already existing and capable 
 of discharging function. The only theory of Creation by Birth 
 which really does afford some explanation of the facts, is a the- 
 ory which assumes modifications of structure to be entirely in- 
 dependent of the effect of actual use or disuse. Mr. Darwin 
 himself candidly admits that 'in flowers, at least, the forces of 
 Correlated Growth do " modify important structures independ- 
 ent of Utility, and therefore of Natural Selection." This ad- 
 mission must be extended to all organic growths. There must 
 
CREATION BY LAW. 159 
 
 have been a time with all of them when they began to be ; and, 
 therefore, a time before Natural Selection had room to play. 
 These considerations, however, only serve to put a higher inter- 
 pretation on the Theory of Creation by Birth. They do not 
 condemn it. 
 
 One suggestion, indeed, has been made on this subject which 
 I think it is impossible to accept. When men were yet unwill- 
 ing to admit the existence of life and death upon the globe so 
 long before the creation of Man, it used to be said that fossils 
 were only " sports of nature." So in our own day, I have 
 heard it said that rudimentary organs are merely intended to 
 satisfy that condition of our finite minds in virtue of which we 
 are unable to conceive Cr&ation, except in connection with some 
 History and Method of growth. And so, as a condescension to 
 this weakness, aborted members are given to suggest a History 
 which was never true, and a Method which was never followed ! 
 Now of one thing we may be sure, that there are no fictions of 
 this kind in Nature, and no bad jokes. Whatever natural 
 things really point to, they point to faithfully ; and the conclu- 
 sions really indicated are never false. Abortive organs mean 
 something, and they mean it truly. 
 
 Still, there is no proof that Inheritance is the only cause from 
 which such structures can arise. In the inorganic world we know 
 that not mere similarity, but absolute identity of form, as in 
 crystals, is the result of laws which have nothing to do with In- 
 heritance, but of forces whose nature it is to aggregate the par- 
 ticles of matter in identic shapes. It is impossible to say how 
 far a similar unity of effect may have been impressed on the 
 forces through which vital Organisms are first started on their 
 way. There are some essential resemblances between all 
 Forms of Life which it is impossible even in imagination to con- 
 nect with community of blood by descent. For example, the 
 Bilateral arrangement is common to all Organisms, down at 
 least to the Radiata, and in this great class we have the same 
 principle of Polarity developed in a circle. Again, the general 
 mechanism of the digestive organs by which food is in part as- 
 similated and part rejected, is also common through a range of 
 equal extent. Indeed, it may be said with truth, that never in 
 all the changes of Time has there been any alteration through- 
 
l6o THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 out the whole scale of Organic Life, in the fundamental princi- 
 ples of chemical and mechanical adjustment, on which the great 
 animal functions of Respiration, Circulation, and Reproduction, 
 have been provided for.* These are fundamental similarities 
 of plan, depending probably on the very nature of Forces which 
 necessitate these adjustments in order to the production of the 
 phenomena of Life Forces of which we know nothing, but 
 which we have not the slightest reason to suppose to be due to 
 Inheritance. Other similarities of plan may depend on the 
 same laws, equally unconnected with Inheritance by descent. 
 
 Inheritance, indeed, has been suggested as the cause of or- 
 ganic likeness, mainly because there is a difficulty in conceiv- 
 ing any other. But there is at least an equal difficulty in con- 
 ceiving the applicability of this cause to Man. We have 
 already seen f that M. Guizot lays it down as a physical im- 
 possibility that Man the human pair can have been intro- 
 duced into the world except in complete stature : in the full 
 possession of all his faculties and powers. He holds it as cer- 
 tain that on no other condition could Man, on his first appear- 
 ance, have been able to survive and to found the human family. 
 Even those who question whether this argument is entitled to 
 the rank of a self-evident physical truth, must admit that it is 
 at least quite as good as the opposite assertion that any origin 
 except the origin of natural birth is inconceivable. Where our 
 ignorance is so profound, no reasoning of this kind is of much 
 value. There is undoubtedly much to be said in support of M. 
 Guizot's position. Certainly, Man as a mere animal is the 
 most helpless of all animals. His whole frame has relation to 
 his mind, and apart from that relation, it is feebler than the 
 frame of any of the brutes. All its members are Correlated 
 amongst each other with the functions of his Brain, so that 
 action may follow upon Knowledge so that embodiment may 
 be possible to Thought. Yet in its plan and structure his 
 frame is homologically, that is ideally, the same as the frame of 
 the brutes organ answering to organ, and bone to bone. 
 
 The words " Adherence to Type " are words expressive of an 
 Idea, of a Purpose, which we see fulfilled in Organic Forms. 
 
 * Agassiz' " Geological Sketches," p. 41. London, 1860. 
 t Ante, page 28. 
 
CREATION BY LAW. l6l 
 
 But this purpose must have sought its own accomplishment by 
 the use of means, and the question of Science always is, what 
 were these means ? Love of beauty is equally a Purpose which 
 we see fulfilled in Nature, but in the case of the Humming 
 Birds this has been accomplished by giving to their plumes the 
 structure of " Thin Plates," a structure which decomposes 
 light and flings back its prismatic colors to the eye. Fitness 
 and special adaptation is another of the purposes of Creation, 
 but this also is attained through the careful arrangement, and 
 pliability to use, of physical laws. In like manner, " Adher- 
 ence to Type " is the expression of a fact, or the statement of a 
 Purpose, which, like all the other purposes fulfilled in Nature, 
 invites to an investigation of the instrumentality employed. 
 We see the Purpose, but we do not see the Method. We see 
 the purpose, for example, in the wonderful adaptability of the 
 Vertebrate Type to the infinite varieties of Life to which it 
 serves as an organ and a home. Science should be allowed 
 without suspicion or remonstrance to pursue her proper object, 
 which is to detect, if she can, what the method of this work has 
 been. There is no point, short of the last and highest, at 
 which Science can be satisfied. Her curiosity is insatiable. It 
 is a curiosity representing man's desire of knowledge. But 
 that desire extends into regions where the means of investiga- 
 tion cease, and in which the processes of Verification are of no 
 avail. Above and behind every Detected Method in Nature 
 there lies the same ultimate question as before What is it by 
 which this is done ? 
 
 It is the great mystery of our Being that we have powers im- 
 pelling us to ask such questions on the history of Creation, 
 when we have no powers enabling us to solve them. Ideas 
 and faint suggestions of reply are ever passing across the outer 
 limits of the Mind, as meteors pass across the margin of the 
 atmosphere, but we endeavor in vain, to grasp or understand 
 them. The faculties both of reason and of imagination fall 
 back with a sense of impotence upon some favorite phrase 
 some form of words built up out of the materials of analogy, 
 and out of the experience of a Mind, which, being finite, is not 
 creative. We beat against the bars in vain. The only real 
 rest is in the confession of ignorance, and the confession, too y 
 
1 62 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 that all ultimate physical Truth is beyond the reach of Science * 
 It is probable that even the nearest methods of Creation, 
 though far short of ultimate truths, lie behind a veil too thick 
 for us to penetrate. It is here surely, if it is anywhere in the 
 sphere of natural investigation, that the Man of Science may 
 lay down the weapons of his analysis, and say, " I do not exer- 
 cise myself in great matters, or in things which are too high for 
 me."t 
 
 There is at least one conclusion which is certain, namely, this 
 that no theory in respect to the means and method employed 
 in the work of Creation provided such theory takes in all the 
 facts can have the slightest effect in removing that work from 
 the relation in which it stands to the attributes of Will. All 
 such theories are, and can only be " simply questions of how 
 the Creator has worked." This is the confession made in re- 
 spect to Mr. Darwin's theory by one of the most competent of 
 its supporters. $ Creation by Law Evolution by Law De- 
 velopment by Law, or, as including all those kindred ideas, the 
 Reign of Law, is nothing but the reign of Creative Force 
 directed by Creative Knowledge, worked under the control of 
 Creative Power, and in fulfilment of Creative Purpose. 
 
 * I have slightly altered this passage as it stood in the earlier editions, because, 
 although the c ntext clearly indicates its reference to Physical truth, it has been 
 quoted by Mr. Lewes as granting all that the Positive Philosophy demands. There 
 is a sense of course, in -a'hich it may be said that no Truth knowable by man can be 
 "ultimate." That is to say, there is m Trath even conceivable, respecting which we 
 might not ask, or desire t ask, farther questions. But there is no use in appearing to 
 agree with those from whom in reality I so widely differ. The definition of Truth 
 which Mr. Lewes would consider u ultimate," and therefore unattainable, is very 
 different from the definition which I should give, and have given. 
 
 t Psalm cxxxi. 
 
 $ Mr. Wallace. Journal of Science, No. XVI, p. 473, 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE REIGN OF LAW IN THE REALM OF MIND. 
 
 WHEN we pass from the phenomena of Matter to the phe- 
 nomena of Mind, we do not pass from under the Reign of Law. 
 Here, too, facts do range themselves in an observed Order: 
 here, too, there is a chain of cause and effect running through- 
 out all events : here, too, we see around us, and feel within us, 
 the work of Forces which have always a certain definite ten- 
 dency to produce certain definite results : here, too, it is by 
 combination and adjustment among these Forces that they are 
 mutually held in check : here, too, accordingly, special ends 
 can only be accomplished by the use of special means. 
 
 But then the question immediately occurs to us can we 
 speak of Law, or of Force, or of " cause and effect," as applied 
 to the phenomena of Mind, in the same sense in which we 
 speak of them as applied to the phenomena of Matter? Is it 
 only by distant analogy, or as expressing ideas really the same, 
 that we use the same terms of both ? 
 
 Undoubtedly the first thought which suggests itself to the 
 mind is, that a material Force and a moral or intellectual 
 Force are essentially different in kind, not subject to condi- 
 tions the same, or even similar. But are we sure of this ? Are 
 we sure that the Forces which we call Material are not, after 
 all, but manifestations of mental energy and Will ? We have 
 already seen that such evidence as we have is all tending the 
 other way. The conclusions forced upon us have been these : 
 first, that the more we know of Nature the more certain it 
 appears that a multiplicity of separate forces does not exist, 
 but that all her forces pass into each other, and are but modifi- 
 cations of some One Force which is the source and centre of 
 the rest : secondly, that all of them are governed in their 
 mutual relations by principles of arrangement which are purely 
 mental : thirdly, that of the ultimate seat of Force in any form 
 
164 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 we know nothing directly : and fourthly, that the nearest con- 
 ception we can ever have of Force is derived from our own 
 consciousness of vital power. 
 
 If these conclusions be true, it follows that, whether as 
 regards that in which Force in itself consists, or as regards the 
 conditions under which Force is used, it need not surprise us 
 if in passing from the material world to the world of Mind, we 
 see that Law, in the same sense, prevails in the phenomena of 
 both. But as this is a subject of much difficulty, and of much 
 importance, it may be well to examine it a little nearer. 
 
 The first and most palpable form in which we see that Mind 
 is subject to Law, is in its connection with the Body. And 
 this connection is so close that we know neither where it begins 
 nor where it ends. The extent and nature of it can be known 
 only by the same kind of reasoning and observation by which 
 we attain to any knowledge of the external world. For indeed 
 our Bodies seem part of the external world to us. We see 
 their form as we see the form of other things, but we do not 
 see their structure, neither do we feel it, nor can we arrive at 
 it, except as a matter of obscure and difficult research. It is 
 literally true that some of the most distant objects in the Uni- 
 verse are more accessible to our observation, and in some 
 respects more intelligible to our understanding, than the ma- 
 terial frame in which we live- Man had discovered much 
 concerning the circulation of the Planets before he had discov- 
 ered anything concerning the circulation of his own blood.* 
 Yet so near is the current of that blood to him, so much is it a 
 part of himself, that when it stops, in an instant " all his 
 thoughts perish." Nevertheless, the Mind is not conscious of 
 its own dependence on material organs. Even in respect to 
 those exertions of the Will which are expressed in movements 
 of the Body, we are conscious only of the Will, and of the Will 
 being exerted with success ; but we are entirely unconscious of 
 the machinery, which intervenes between the intention and the 
 accomplishment of the act intended. Such movements of the 
 Body appear to us as if they were direct acts of Will. Yet 
 nothing can be more certain than that the communication is 
 
 * Kepler and Harvey were contemporaries ; but Copernicus had preceded them by 
 nearly a hundred years. 
 
THE REIGN OF LAW IN THE REALM OF MIND. 165 
 
 not direct but indirect and even elaborately circuitous. It is 
 only when the ropes and pulleys are broken that we discover 
 how that which we call our Will can only run in appointed 
 channels which channels are material, and are laid down 
 upon a plan, like conducting wires, as if for the conveyance of 
 a material Force. 
 
 Nor does it end here this close connection between Mind 
 and Matter. So far from being less close, it seems to be only 
 closer and closer when we pass to mental operations in which 
 no apparent movements of the Body are concerned. In the 
 exercise of pure Reason, in passing from one mental concep- 
 tion to another, when by an effort of our Will we turn our atten- 
 tion to a new question, and in the twinkling of an eye pursue a 
 fresh train of thought, above all, when our affections go forth 
 towards those who are the objects of them in all these opera- 
 tions, if anywhere, we feel as if we were free from mechanism 
 from " organs " from Matter in any form. So it seems till we 
 are brought face to face with the terrible phenomena of dis- 
 ease. Then our delusion is dispelled, and we know how frail we 
 are. Then we find that the same stroke which paralyzes the 
 movement of a limb, may paralyze, not less effectually, all the 
 powers of Reason, of Memory, and of Will. And the Affec- 
 tions, what becomes of them ? These too, which seem so 
 purely spiritual, we find out to be dependent on material struct- 
 ure. Every physician knows that a frequent consequence of 
 cerebral disease is a total change of character. There is no 
 symptom of insanity more common than the growth of dislike 
 and aversion to those who, in health, had been the most loved 
 on earth. Change of every kind and degree in the character 
 and structure of Mind is the immediate result of corresponding 
 changes in the structure and substance of the Brain. The pure 
 may become impure , the loving may become malignant ; the 
 simple-minded may become suspicious ; the generous may be- 
 come engrossed with self , the strong-minded may become im- 
 becile, the whole man may be broken down, and may live for 
 years without consciousness and without emotion. How pain- 
 fully does the Brain sometimes indicate its functions ! What 
 is it in the aspect of Idiotcy, in many of its forms, which we 
 instantly recognize, and never can mistake ? In that low, 
 
1 66 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 pinched, and retiring brow, we see instinctively that Reason 
 cannot hold her seat. These facts do not stand alone. Not 
 only are there some parallel facts, but all the living world is full 
 of them. The whole range of animal creation, from Man down 
 to the Reptile and the Fish, testifies to the universal law of an 
 ascending scale of mental capacity being coincident with an 
 ascending degree of cerebral organization. No series oMacts, 
 tending to the establishment of any physical truth, is more com- 
 plete or more conclusive than the chain which connects the 
 functions of the Brain with the phenomena of Mind. 
 
 But here, again, let us beware of the fallacies which may 
 arise from a failure to recognize the exact import of the words 
 we use. In the ears of many it sounds' like Materialism to say 
 that Thought is a function of the Brain. But it has been already 
 shown in a previous chapter that Function is merely the word 
 by which we describe that work which any given piece of mech- 
 anism has been adjusted to perform. The Power, or Force, 
 which is developed by means of an "organ," is not identical 
 with that organ, nor with any of its parts, nor with the materials 
 of which it is composed, nor even with its mechanism as a whole. 
 It does not follow, for example, that Electricity is identical with 
 the tissues of a fish, because it is developed out of the battery 
 of a Torpedo or a Gymnotus. Yet it is true that the develop- 
 ment and discharge of Electricity is the " function " of those 
 Fish-organs : that is to say, this is the work which they have 
 been adjusted to perform. Still less do we confound Thought 
 with Brain when we acknowledge the fact that Brain in our Or- 
 ganism is inseparably connected with the power of thinking. 
 
 Yet inferences as false as this, and very nearly related to it, 
 have actually been drawn by eminent men from the facts of cer- 
 ebral action. Thus it has been declared that a knowledge of 
 Brain, under a name which is in itself a -fallacy Phrenology- 
 is the only sure foundation of Mental Science. This is a mere 
 confusion of thought, even if the phrenological mapping of the 
 Brain were as certainly correct as it is really doubtful. That 
 particular faculties of the Mind may be connected with particu- 
 lar portions of the Brain, is not in itself more difficult to under- 
 stand or to believe than that the Mind, as a whole, is connected 
 with the Brain as a whole. Whether it be so or not is a ques- 
 
THE REIGN OF LAW IN THE REALM OF MIND. 167 
 
 tion purely of observation and of fact. But this, at least, is 
 certain, that the different faculties and affections of the Mind 
 must be discriminated from each other before it is possible to 
 assign to them a local habitation. The Mind must be mapped 
 first, and then its Organ. No additional knowledge is given to 
 us of any one mental faculty, by proving that it is connected 
 with some special bit of the mysterious substance of which that 
 organ is composed. Love is Love, and nothing else ; Hatred 
 is Hatred, and nothing else ; Reverence is Reverence, and noth- 
 ing else ; the pure, intellectual perception of a Logical Neces- 
 sity is itself, and nothing else ; however clearly it may be 
 proved that each of these is a function of some separate re- 
 gion of the Brain. When the phrenologist, taking in his hand 
 a human skull, and lifting its upper cover, tells us that the oval 
 of convoluted matter which is thus exposed to view " manifests 
 the moral sentiments," what light does he throw on these ? 
 The moral sentiments ! what do these include ? The power 
 of seeing Moral Beauty, and of loving Truth the sense of 
 Justice, and the desire of serving in her cause Conscience and 
 Benevolence, Charity and Faith all that is best and noblest 
 in the human spirit these are " manifested " in that bit of 
 Matter ! What new information does this give us on the nature 
 or the office of those glorious attributes which are the joy of 
 Earth and Heaven? None at all. They are just what we 
 knew them before to be. 
 
 Phrenology is no longer popular, as it once was, among Phys- 
 iologists. Its mapping of the Brain is now generally admitted 
 to be imaginary. But the fundamental error of the Phrenolog- 
 ical School did not lie merely, or even mainly, in any mistake 
 as to the mapping of the Brain. It lay in the idea that a Sci- 
 ence of Mind can be founded in any shape or form upon the 
 discoveries of anatomy. Their error lay in the notion that Phys- 
 iology can ever be the basis of Psychology. And this is an 
 error, and a confusion of thought, which survives Phrenology. 
 A profound interest indeed attaches to every new fact which 
 connects together the parallel phenomena of Mind and of Or- 
 ganization. But it is the phenomena of Mind, and it is these 
 alone, of which we are directly cognizant, and it is from these 
 that we must start as the basis of all Psychological research, 
 
1 68 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 This is true even of those phenomena of the mind which are 
 most purely animal. Sensation, for example, may be traced 
 with absolute demonstration to certain nerves. This may 
 throw a new light on the method by which Sensation is ren- 
 dered possible ; but it throws no new light whatever upon what 
 Sensation is. It is that which we know and feel it to be, and 
 it is neither more nor less since the knife of the anatomist has 
 laid bare the channels along which it comes. Still more is this 
 true of the Intellectual Powers. Yet there are Philosophers 
 who appear to think that some new light is cast upon Sensation 
 when they call it an affection of the " Sensory Ganglia ;' that 
 Thought is in some measure explained when it is called " Cere- 
 bration," and that the Laws of Intellect are reduced to scien- 
 tific expression when they are described as the working of the 
 4t Cerebral Ganglia." All this is a mere idle play on words. It 
 is an attempt to put that first which must be last, and that last 
 which must be first. The general fact of the dependence of 
 Mind on a Bodily organization is a fact which contains within 
 itself all the lesser facts of Physiological discovery. They are 
 not, and they cannot be, new in kind. They do not even help 
 us to conceive how, through any mechanism, the power of 
 Thought can be evolved. Still less do they give us any new 
 view of that which Thought, in itself, is. 
 
 This connection, therefore, between Mind and Brain, al- 
 though it is a universal " law " of our being, is a law recognized 
 by us only in the sense in which Law is applied to " an observed 
 Order of facts." But like every other Order of this kind, 
 it implies a Force or an arrangement of Forces out of which the 
 Order comes. It implies, too, that this arrangement of Forces is 
 necessary to the evolution and play of mental faculties in the 
 form in which they are possessed by us. Consequently these 
 faculties are seen taking their place among all the other phe- 
 nomena of the world. They are seen to be under the Reign of 
 Law in this largest and highest sense of all that they depend 
 upon Adjustment, and that adjustment so delicate that the 
 slightest disturbance of it deranges the whole resulting phe- 
 nomena of Mind. Mind, as developed in us, has its very ex- 
 istence and working dependent on imperative physical con- 
 ditions, which conditions are met only by elaborate contrivance. 
 
THE REIGN OF LAW IN THE REALM OF MIND. 169 
 
 We have no knowledge what the Forces are which demand 
 this obedience, and which call for this contrivance. We have 
 even an insuperable difficulty in conceiving what they can be. 
 It almost seems as if there were a barrier in the very nature of 
 our minds against the possibility of conceiving how any com- 
 bination of material forces can either result in Mind, or can be 
 necessary to the working of its powers, or can be concerned 
 even in giving it an abode.* " We cannot conceive," says Dr. 
 Andrew Combe, " even in the remotest manner, in what way 
 the Brain a compound of water, albumen, fat, and phosphate 
 salts operates in the generating of Thought." And yet there 
 is one experience which brings the fact of this close connection 
 within the direct recognition of Consciousness. We know and 
 feel that the act of severe thinking is attended with the expen- 
 diture of Force. The close, steady, continuous application of 
 the mind to any subject requiring the exercise of our higher in- 
 tellectual faculties, is well known to be " hard work." With- 
 out causing any bodily movement of which we are conscious, 
 it produces, nevertheless, bodily exhaustion. It occasions 
 the expenditure of a physical force, or at least of a force 
 for which we have no other name. It is not uncommon for 
 men of great age to be able to exert undiminished powers of 
 mind for one or two hours, and then to lapse into comparative 
 imbecility. Thus the exertion of the Brain is like the exertion 
 of a muscle, and is attended with the same effects. There is 
 fatigue ; and with excessive fatigue the power of motion stops. 
 
 Yet such facts as these only puzzle us they do not help us to 
 any clear idea of the nature or manner of a connection which is 
 indeed incomprehensible. We know of Mind only as itself, 
 and as nothing else. The difference between it and all other 
 things seems infinite and immeasurable. No doubt this diffi- 
 culty, or at least part of it, arises not from any misconception 
 as to what Mind is, (for of this our knowledge is direct,) but 
 from a misconception as to what Matter is and what the Forces 
 are which we call material. Close analysis of the phenomena 
 of Nature, and of our own ideas in regard to them, has already 
 
 * " Aperta simplexque mens, nulla re adjunctaquse sentire possit, fugere intelligen- 
 tiae nostrae vim et notionem videtur." Cicero, " De Nat. Deor." lib. x. c. u. 
 
 This is true only in one sense. It is very far from being true, that the connection 
 between Mind and Matter is a necessity of thought. 
 
170 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 prepared us to believe, that these Forces which work in Matter 
 and produce in us the impressions from which we derive our 
 conceptions of it, are themselves immaterial, and can be traced 
 running up into a region where they are lost in the light of 
 Mind. The Christian doctrine of the Resurrection of the 
 Body sanctions and involves the notion that there is some deep 
 connection between Spirit and Form which is essential, and 
 which cannot be finally sundered even in the divorce of Death. 
 The affections hold to this idea even more firmly than the intel- 
 Ject. Hence the noble and passionate exclamation of the 
 
 Poet 
 
 " Eternal Form shall still divide 
 The Eternal Soul from all beside, 
 And I shall know him when we meet." 
 
 " In Memoriam" xlvi. TENNYSON. 
 
 But this first sense in which Mind is under the Reign of Law 
 that is, its dependence on the Body, prepares us for yet other 
 senses in which it lies under the same dominion. The very 
 fact that the Mind is itself unconscious of its dependence upon 
 Matter, and of the manner and conditions of its connection 
 with " organs," teaches us that there is a large class of phe- 
 nomena connected with Mind, of which we should be entirely 
 ignorant if we trusted to the direct evidence of Consciousness 
 alone. This ought not to inspire us with any distrust of Con- 
 sciousness in those matters in which it is a competent and indeed 
 the only witness. But there is a large class of phenomena of 
 which Consciousness properly so called, that is, the direct per- 
 ception of the Mind of its own present workings, does not inform 
 us. The Mind looking in upon itself sees itself only, and does 
 not see either the mechanism through which it is able to work 
 at all, nor many of the forces which operate in it and upon 
 it. These, some of them at least, can only be arrived at by the 
 same processes of reasoning and observation which we apply 
 to the external world, and by which we ascertain the action and 
 reaction of involuntary agents. 
 
 There is nothing of which it is so difficult to persuade ourselves 
 as of this. In the apprehension of Consciousness the sense of 
 Will is so strong within us that it blinds us to the insuperable 
 conditions which limit both what we will and what we do. That 
 
THE REIGN OF LAW IN THE REALM OF MIND. . 171 
 
 our Wills, of whose freedom we are conscious, should often be 
 determined by influences of which we have no consciousness at 
 all ; that our opinions should as often be the result of causes 
 and not of reasons ; that our actions should follow a course 
 marked out by conditions which we fail to recognize as having 
 any determining effect upon them these are conclusions against 
 which we are apt to rebel as depriving us of a part of our free 
 and intelligent agency. Hence the indignation with which 
 men resent being told that they have been impelled by motives 
 other than the motives which are avowed, and other than the 
 motives which are consciously entertained. Yet the fact of 
 their being so impelled is often perfectly plain to those around 
 them. The reply, however, is always ready : " You seem to 
 know my motives, and the causes of my conduct better than I 
 know them myself," as if the proposition so stated were evi- 
 dently absurd. But it is, on the contrary, a proposition which 
 may well be true. Bystanders very often see the forces telling 
 upon our Will much more clearly than we see them ourselves. 
 It is possible, indeed, by a vigorous effort of self-analysis to see 
 all that others see, and a great deal more. Those who are able 
 really to look in upon themselves, can often detect the influences 
 which have been acting on their minds, coloring their opinions, 
 and determining their conduct in a degree which the higher 
 faculties would be glad to disown and disavow. There is noth- 
 ing more wonderful in the constitution of our minds than -the 
 power we have of standing aside, as it were, for a time, from 
 the ordinary channel of our own thoughts, and of looking back 
 upon their currents coming down from the hills of Memory and 
 Association to join their issues in our present life. But this 
 sort of looking in upon ourselves, and treating ourselves as a 
 subject of natural history, is to all men a difficult, and to most 
 men an impossible, operation. They have neither time for it 
 nor thought for it. The conscious energies of the Will are so 
 near us, and so ever present with us, that they shut out our 
 view of the forces which lie behind. Yet there are some facts 
 common in the experience of all men which may help us to a 
 conception of the truth. One of these is the fact of Mind 
 growing with the growth of years a fact determined by the rec- 
 ollection of childhood, of youth, and of maturity. By compar- 
 
172 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 ing ourselves with ourselves at former periods of life by the 
 memory of feelings, and of opinions, and of methods of thought 
 which we have outgrown and left behind us, we can detect the 
 action of forces which have told upon our minds traces, in 
 short, of the laws to which they have been subject. Some of 
 these laws have been nothing more than laws of physical growth 
 the conceptions of the Mind undergoing a development con- 
 sequent on the growth of our Material Organism. 
 
 Another fact bearing on the same question, but which is 
 more easily observed in others than in ourselves, is the fre- 
 quent determination of mental qualities by hereditary trans- 
 mission. The famous question, as to the Origin of our Ideas, 
 and how far they are due respectively to Experience, to Associa- 
 tion, or to Intuition, has been discussed by Metaphysicians with 
 far too little reference to the organic phenomena which are so 
 closely related to the phenomena of Mind. It is not true, in- 
 deed, that Psychology is subordinate to Physiology , but it is 
 true that these two are so intimately connected, that neither is 
 independent of the other. Man is not a disembodied Spirit, 
 but a Being whose mental powers are subject to the laws of a 
 material organization. And so it is that almost every fact in 
 Physiology has an intimate bearing on some question or other 
 in the Philosophy of Mind. No better illustration could be 
 given than one which arises out of this question of the Origin 
 of our Ideas. In one of the many formula? of expression to 
 which Mr. J. S. Mill has reduced the assertion that Experience 
 is the source and origin of all our thoughts and actions, he is 
 obliged to except from the sweep of that assertion the volun- 
 tary movements of the Body. He says, " We bring about any 
 fact, other than our own muscular contractions, by means of some 
 other fact which experience has shown to be followed by it." 
 Now let us observe the immense significance which attaches 
 to this exception. Why is Mr. Mill compelled to make it ? 
 Because he mixes up in one assertion two propositions which 
 are totally distinct, one being true universally, and the other 
 being true only partially. The first proposition is, that all 
 facts which we can " bring about," must be so brought about 
 by the use of means. This is true universally. The second 
 
 * " Auguste Comte and Positivism,'' by J. S. Mill, p. 7. 
 
THE REIGN OF LAW IN THE REALM OF MIND. 173 
 
 proposition is, that we are guided to the knowledge of those 
 means by Experience alone. Now, this last proposition is not 
 true, as Mr. Mill is obliged to confess, of the whole class of 
 facts which are brought about by vital effort. But the mus- 
 cular contractions of the Body are no exception whatever to the 
 mere general affirmation that all actions must have a cause, or 
 in other words, must be brought about by the use of means. 
 Exceptions they are, however, to the affirmation that the nature 
 of those means is made known to us by Experience. The 
 sentence, in so far as it asserts the universal Law of Causation, 
 might have been so framed as to require no abatement or ex- 
 ception whatever. "We bring about any fact by means of 
 some other fact which we know either by experience or by 
 Intuition to be followed by it." In this form the sentence is 
 absolutely true, and applies to " our own muscular contrac- 
 tions," as well as to every other action. But philosophers who 
 support the doctrine of Experience do not like the word " in- 
 tuition ;" and though they cannot do without it altogether, they 
 use it as seldom as they can. They feel very naturally, and 
 very truly, that if Intuition be admitted in regard to the ultimate 
 phenomena of Volition, the idea will not easily be dispelled that 
 Intuition may extend also to the ultimate phenomena of 
 Thought. Now the muscular contractions of the Body stand 
 at the very fount and origin of all we do ; and it is more than 
 probable that analogous movements of the Brain stand as near 
 to the origin of all we think. 
 
 The bearing of this question on the Philosophy of Mind cannot 
 be mistaken. The muscular contractions of the Body are of two 
 kinds one kind is constant, automatic, and lasting with the dura- 
 tion of life itself. The other kind is intermittent, voluntary, and 
 capable of being destroyed whilst the Consciousness, and the 
 Intelligence, and the Will are still in use. Both these kinds of 
 action are rendered possible by the use of means : but it is 
 only in the case of one of them that those means are placed 
 at the bidding of the Will. Yet it is not Experience which 
 teaches us how to use those means. It is purely Instinct or 
 Intuition. We are not even conscious of the very existence 
 of the means which we employ, and the profoundest researcl^s 
 of Science do not even yet give us the faintest notion what 
 
174 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 their ultimate nature is. No experience whatever is required 
 to teach a child how to extend its limbs or how to exert its 
 voice. Nevertheless, neither of these things can be done ex- 
 cept through the use of means. The only difference between 
 these actions and actions of a more complicated kind is. that 
 the appropriate means are resorted to and employed by Intui- 
 tion. The Will which moves the limbs, and moves them 
 through the use of a complicated machinery, is born with the 
 Organism of which that machinery forms a part, and has an 
 instinctive knowledge how to use it. Now, it is against the 
 analogy of Nature to suppose that this great class of facts re- 
 specting the powers of the Body are without some corresponding 
 facts respecting the powers of Mind. Indeed, all vital phenom- 
 ena of this kind are in themselves necessarily phenomena 
 both of Body and of Mind. The close connection which exists 
 between the two, and the inseparable analogies which unite all 
 their workings, render it therefore almost certain that the Mind 
 is to be regarded as having both kinds of movement which the 
 physical Organism possesses that is, faculties which are auto- 
 matic in their action and other faculties which, though sub- 
 ject to direction by the Will, yet work upon the materials pre- 
 sented to them in a manner strictly intuitive and independent 
 of all experience. 
 
 And as the abnormal phenomena of disease, or of malfor- 
 mation, often throw an important light on the structure of the 
 body, so do certain abnormal intellectual phenomena give us 
 strange glimpses occasionally into the powers of Mind. Among 
 those phenomena, none are more curious than the intuitive 
 powers of numerical computation which a few individuals have 
 possessed. There are well attested cases of this power in virtue 
 of which the mind reaches the result of difficult calculations by 
 a species of Intuition that is to say, without any consciousness 
 of the process by which that result is made apparent to the Mind. 
 This is not a proof that there is no process, but only that it is a 
 process gone through as a machine goes through a process 
 that is, according to its own pre-adjusted laws of Motion. Per- 
 haDs, indeeed, this process may not be different in kind from 
 thPprocess by which the average mind reaches the most ele- 
 mentary of arithmetical truths. . The product of one and one, 
 
THE REIGN OF LAW IN THE REALM OF MIND. 175 
 
 or of two and two, may be self-evident to all of us only in the 
 same way in which the product of a long series of figures may 
 be self-evident to minds with an abnormal gift of the arithmetical 
 faculty. Thus the distinction breaks down between self-evident 
 truths and truths which are not self-evident. A truth may be 
 self-evident to one mind which is not self-evident to another, 
 but may require, on the contrary, a laborious process of verifi- 
 cation. And does not this again lead us to see how entirely 
 dependent are the phenomena of Mind upon the power of 
 special Faculties, and how this power is itself dependent on the 
 Adjustments of Organization ? In the world of Physics, we 
 know that we are surrounded by movements which never make 
 themselves sensible to us pulsations which excite in our eyes no 
 sense of light and others which excite in our ears no sense of 
 sound, and all this for want of adjusted organs. And so it 
 would seem as if the Mind of Man were an Instrument attuned 
 only to a certain range of knowledge, but as if within that range 
 it were capable of finer and finer adjustments to the harmonies 
 of Truth. These cannot make themselves heard where there is 
 no organ to catch the sound. Nor could that organ translate 
 them into Thought into that conscious apprehension of which 
 an Idea essentially consists, had it not its own preadjusted 
 relation to the Verities of the World. 
 
 It must be remembered, however, that in the discussion of 
 such questions as to the Origin of our Ideas, there has been a 
 great want of definition in the use of terms. Are fear, and love, 
 and hatred, and anger, and jealousy, and remorse, and joy, 
 are these " ideas," or are they only conditions or powers of mind ? 
 If by Ideas we mean those imaginings which, as the very word 
 implies, involve " images " of external things, it is certain that 
 contact with external impressions, and, in this sense, Experience, 
 is essential to the formation of them. But if by Ideas we mean 
 the elementary passions, or if we mean even those peculiarities 
 of thought those special tendencies of mind which lead us to 
 view things in some particular light rather than in others, and 
 which constitute the essential distinction between the ideas of 
 different men if, in short, we include in the term anything 
 which belongs to the Thinking Faculty itself, or anything of the 
 method according to which it works up the raw material of 
 
176 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 Thought then it is equally certain that Ideas in this sense are 
 born with all of us, and that Imitation, and Experience, and 
 Association, do but pour their material into moulds already cast 
 for their reception. 
 
 But in reality here, as in many other questions, the rival dis- 
 putants have each had some portion of the truth. They have 
 been both right and both wrong. An Idea is not a simple, but 
 a composite thing. It has not one origin, but a plurality of 
 origins. An Idea is, as it were, a fabric of which the threads 
 come from the spinner, and the weaving from the loom. Or it 
 is, as it were, an organic growth, of which the materials are 
 supplied from the external world, and the structure from the 
 world within. There are many elements in every Idea which 
 come, and can only come, from without. There are other ele- 
 ments, and among them the Formative Power, which come, and 
 only can come, from within. The Mind stands in pre-established 
 relations to the things around it bound to them by the infinite 
 adjustments which may be called External Correlations of 
 Growth. Out of these relations it is not itself, nor do its powers 
 possess the materials whereon to work. We cannot conceive a 
 mind having no points of contact with the external world. 
 From that world must come all the exciting causes of Thought 
 and of Emotion. But the form into which these are cast the 
 tissue into which these are woven the force by which Ideas 
 become a Power all, in short, that constitutes Thought as dis- 
 tinguished from the things about which we think all this comes 
 from, and belongs to, the Mind itself. 
 
 Among the lower animals, young ones, taken from the litter 
 or the nest, and brought up under conditions wholly removed 
 from the teaching of their parents, whether by imitation or 
 otherwise, will reproduce exactly all those habits of their race 
 which belong to their natural modes of life. Many of these 
 habits, perhaps it may be safely said all of them, imply Ideas 
 that is to say, they imply instincts ; and instincts are in the 
 nature of ideas that is to say, they belong to the phenomena 
 of Mind. And of this there is another indication in a fact 
 which at first sight may seem trivial or irrelevant. It has been 
 often said that one great difficulty in reasoning on this subject, 
 is the inaccessibility to observation of the mental condition of 
 
THE REIGN OF LAW IN THE REALM OF MIND. 177 
 
 all infant creatures. But even if this were more true than it 
 really is, there are some creatures, not low in the scale of crea- 
 tion, of which it may be said that, comparatively, they have no 1 
 infancy at all. These are the Gallinaceous Birds in general, 
 and some Species in particular. They come forth from the egg 
 perfect miniatures of their parents, and with minds as fully 
 equipped with parental instincts as their bodies are provided 
 with feather or their wings with quills. Antecedent to all ex- 
 perience of injury, they exhibit fear, and not only fear, but fear 
 of the proper objects. They will flee when they see a hawk r 
 and they will carefully avoid a stinging insect. In Europe the 
 young of the Woodgrouse or Gelinotte are able to fly from the 
 moment they break the shell. In Australia, and the great 
 group of islands which connect Australia with the Asiatic con- 
 tinent, there is a still more curious example of the same fact. 
 There is a Family of Birds (Megapodidce) of which the young 
 are hatched, not by the incubation of the parents, but by the 
 heat of fermentation generated in earthen mounds, scraped to- 
 gether for the purpose. From the moment the young are 
 hatched they feed themselves, and run, and fly, and roost on- 
 trees, as if the world on which they have just opened their eyes' 
 had been long familiar. It is said, indeed, that the Parent 
 Bird watches the Hatching Mound, and is ready to escort the- 
 chicks upon their first appearance in the surrounding scrub. 
 But the recognition of the Parent by the young, and the answer 
 to her call, are the most remarkable of all among these proofs 
 of intuitive ideas. " As a moth emerges from a Chrysalis, dries 
 its wings, and flies away, so the young Telegallus, when it 
 leaves the egg, is sufficiently perfect to be able to act indepen- 
 dently.* .Nor is this all ; the curious instinct by which the Bird 
 prepares an artificial Incubator for its young is an instinct born 
 with it an Innate Idea expressing itself in congenital habits 
 of body. The chick of another Species of this singular family 
 of Birds, the Megapode, was found in confinement to be inces- 
 santly scraping up sand and gravel into heaps, and the rapidity 
 and power with which it effected this operation is described 
 with astonishment by its captor. 
 
 These may seem far-fetched illustrations, and of slight value: 
 
 * Gould's " Birds of Australia." 
 12 
 
178 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 in so dark a subject ; but let us remember that there are no 
 solitary facts in Nature. There are indeed extreme cases, 
 extreme examples of universal laws, that is to say, of laws 
 whose operation is ordinarily restrained within narrower limits. 
 But there is no fact standing really alone net one which is not 
 bound to the whole Order of Nature by deep analogies. That 
 any creatures should be ushered into life so completely organ- 
 ized and furnished as the young of the Gallinaceous Birds and 
 of the Megapodes, is a fact of immense significance in the phe- 
 nomena of Organic Life. (See note E.) 
 
 In Man analogous facts appear, modified by his infinitely 
 wider range of character, and the infinite degrees in which the 
 different elements of Mind are capable of being mixed in him. 
 But although these conditions greatly complicate the result, the 
 general phenomena are the same. Orphans, who have never 
 had any opportunities of acquiring, by imitation, the peculiari- 
 ties of their parents, will often, nevertheless, reproduce these 
 peculiarities with curious exacntess. This is a familiar fact, 
 and how much this fact implies ! Even when the inheritance is 
 merely some congenital habit of body, or some trick of manner, 
 it may, probably, imply some resemblance deeper than appears. 
 For the Body and the Mind are in such close relationship, that 
 congenital habits of Body are sure to be connected with con- 
 genital habits of Mind. But the inheritance is very often, so 
 far as we can see, purely mental. How often do we recognize 
 the tone, character, and the very turn of thought of dead 
 friends, in the conversation and conduct of their children ! 
 The innate tendency to look at things in the same point of 
 view, is evidenced in the reproduction of the same mental com- 
 binations, of the same images, of the same opinions, in short, 
 of the same ideas. Cases, more remarkable than others of this 
 kind, attract our attention, and we at once recognize ideas as 
 innate which are so obviously determined by the forces of her- 
 editary transmission. But we forget how often these laws of 
 inheritance must be working invisibly where they never break 
 ground upon the surface. And thus it is brought home to us 
 how the Mind may be subject to laws of which it is uncon- 
 scious how its whole habit of thought, and the aspect in which 
 different questions present themselves to its apprehension, are 
 
THE REIGN OF LAW IN THE REALM OF MIND. 179 
 
 in a great measure determined by the mysterious forces of con- 
 genital constitution. And what is true in one measure of the 
 individual mind, is true, also, in other measures, of whole fami- 
 lies and of races of Men. 
 
 But the laws of Material Organization are not the only laws 
 to which Mind is subject. Obscure as these laws are, there 
 are others which are obscurer still. What we cannot see in 
 detail, we can see in the gross. What we cannot recognize in 
 ourselves, we are able to recognize in others. We can see 
 that the actions and opinions of men, which are the phenomena 
 of Mind, do range themselves in an observed Order, upon 
 which Order we can found, even as we do in the material 
 world, very safe conclusions as to the phenomena which will 
 follow upon definite conditions. And when we go back to 
 former generations to the history of nations, and the prog- 
 ress of the human race we can detect still more clearly an 
 orderly progress of events. In that order the operation of 
 great general causes become sat once apparent. On the 
 recognition of such causes the Philosophy of History de- 
 pends ; and upon that recognition depends not less the possi- 
 bility of applying to the exigencies of our own time, and of our 
 own society, a wise and successful legislation. 
 
 But what are these causes, and what is the nature of those 
 " laws " to which voluntary agents are unconsciously obedient ? 
 Is man's Voluntary agency a delusion, or is it, on the contrary, 
 just what we feel it to be, and is it only from misconception of 
 its nature that we puzzle over its relation to Law ? We speak, 
 and speak truly, of our Wills being free ; but free from what ? 
 It seems to be forgotten that Freedom is not an absolute but a 
 relative term. There is no such thing existing as absolute free- 
 dom that is to say, there is nothing existing in the world, or 
 possible even in thought, which is absolutely Alone entirely 
 free from inseparable relationship to some other thing or 
 things. Freedom, therefore, is only intelligible as meaning the 
 being free from some particular kind of restraint or of induce- 
 ment to which other beings are subject. From what, then, is 
 it that our Wills are free ? Are they free from the influence of 
 motives ? Certainly not. And what are motives ? A motive 
 is that which moves, or tends to move, the mind in a particular 
 
l8o THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 direction. Like all other words which are used to describe the 
 phenomena of Mind, it is taken from the language applicable to 
 material things, and suggests the analogies which exist between 
 them. It belongs to the profound but unconscious metaphysics 
 of Human Speech. That which moves the Mind in a partic- 
 ular direction is best conceived of as something which exerts 
 a force upon it, and the aggregate of such forces may, in a gen- 
 eral sense, be called the laws which determine human action 
 and opinions. 
 
 But here we come upon the great difficulty which besets every 
 attempt to reduce to system the laws or forces which operate on 
 the Mind of Man. It is the immense, the almost boundless 
 variety and number of them. This variety corresponds with 
 the variety of powers with which his Mind is gifted. For pre- 
 established relations are necessary to the effect of every force 
 whether in the material or in the moral world. Special forces 
 operate upon special forms of matter, and except upon these, 
 they exert no action whatever. For no force can operate ex- 
 cept where there are pre-established relations between its ener- 
 gies and the things upon which its energies are to work. The 
 Polar Force of magnetism acts on different metals in different 
 degrees, and there is a large class of substances which are al- 
 most insensible to its power. In like manner there are a thou- 
 sand things that exercise an attractive power on the mind of a 
 civilized man, which would exercise no power whatever upon 
 the mind of a savage. And in this lies the only difference be- 
 tween subjection to Law under which the lower animals are 
 placed, and the subjection to law which is equally the condition 
 of Mankind. Free Will, in the only sense in which this expres- 
 sion is intelligible, has been erroneously represented as the pe- 
 culiar prerogative of Man. But the Will of the lower animals 
 is, within their narrow spheres of action, as free as ours. A 
 man is not more free to go to the right hand or to the left than 
 the Eagle, or the Wren, or the Mole, or the Bat. The only dif- 
 ference is, that the Will of the lower animals is acted upon by 
 fewer and simpler motives. And the lower the organization of 
 the animal, the fewer and simpler these motives are. Hence 
 it is that the conduct and choice of animals that is, the deci- 
 sion of their Will under given conditions can be predicted with 
 
THE REIGN OF LAW IN THE REALM OF MIND. l8l 
 
 almost perfect certainty. Their faculties, few in number and 
 limited in range, are open only to the small number of forces 
 which are related to them ; and in the absence of higher facul- 
 ties accessible to other motives, these few attractions exert a 
 determining effect upon their Will. (See note F.) 
 
 Accordingly we may see that, in proportion as there is an ap- 
 proach among the lower animals to the higher faculties of 
 Mind, there is, in corresponding proportion, a difficulty in pre- 
 dicting their conduct. Perhaps the best illustration of this is 
 a very homely one it is the effect of baits and traps. Some 
 animals can be trapped and caught with perfect certainty ; 
 whilst there are others upon which the motive presented by a 
 bait, is counteracted by the stronger motive of caution against 
 danger, when a higher degree of intelligence enables the animal 
 to detect its presence. Yet the Will of the cunning animal is 
 not more free than the Will of the stupid animal, nor is the 
 Will of the stupid animal more subject to Law than the Will of 
 the cunning one. The Will of the young Rat, which yields 
 to the temptation of a bait, and is caught, is not more sub- 
 ject to Law than the Will of the old Rat, who suspects strata- 
 gem, resists the temptation and escapes. They are both sub- 
 ject to Law in precisely the same sense and in precisely the 
 same degree that is to say, their actions are alike determined 
 by the forces to which their faculties are accessible. Where 
 these are few and simple, the resulting action is simple also ; 
 where these are many and complicated, the resulting action has 
 a corresponding variety. Thus the conduct of animals is less 
 capable of being predicted in proportion as it is difficult or im- 
 possible to foresee the nature or number of the motive forces 
 which are brought to bear upon the Will. Man's Will is free 
 in the same sense, and in the same sense only. It is subject to 
 Law in the same sense, and in the same sense alone. That is 
 to say, it is subject to the influence of motives, and it can only 
 choose among those which are presented to it, or which the 
 mind has been given the power of presenting to itself. (See 
 note G.) 
 
 But in this last power we touch the secret of that boundless 
 difference which separates Man from the highest of the animals 
 
l82 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 below him. There is such a gulf between the faculties of his 
 mind and those of the lower animals, that the forces acting on 
 the human spirit become, by comparison, innumerable, and in- 
 volve motives belonging to a wholly different class and order. 
 He is exposed, indeed, to the lower motives in common with 
 the beasts. But there are others which operate largely upon 
 him which never can and never do operate upon them. Fore- 
 most among these are the motives which Man has the power of 
 bringing to bear upon himself, arising out of his power of 
 forming Abstract Ideas, out of his possession of Beliefs, and, 
 above all, out of his Sense of Right and Wrong. So strong 
 are these motives that they are able constantly to overpower, 
 and sometimes almost to destroy, the forces which are related 
 to his lower faculties. Again, among the motives which oper- 
 ate upon him, Man has a selecting power. He can, as it were, 
 stand out from among them, look down from above them, 
 compare them among each other, and bring them to the test of 
 Conscience. Nay, more, he can reason on his own character as 
 he can on the character of another Being, estimating his own 
 weakness with reference to this and the other motive, as he is 
 conscious how each may be likely to tell upon him. When he 
 knows that any given motive will be too strong for him, if he 
 allow himself to think of it, he can shut it out from his mind by 
 " keeping the door of his thoughts." He can, and he often 
 does, refuse the thing he sees, and hold by another thing which 
 he cannot see. He may, and he often does, choose the Invisi- 
 ble in preference to the Visible. He may, and he often does, 
 walk by Faith and not by Sight. It is true that in doing this 
 he must be impelled by something which is itself only another 
 motive, and so it is true that our Wills can never be free from 
 motives, and in this sense can never be free from " Law." 
 But this is only saying that we can never be free from the 
 relations pre-established between the structure of our minds, 
 and the system of things in which they are formed to move. 
 From these, it is true indeed, that we never can be free. But 
 as a matter of fact, we know that these relations do not involve 
 compulsion. It is from compulsion that our Wills are free, and 
 from nothing else ; and for this freedom we have the only 
 
THE REIGN OF LAW IN THE REALM OF MIND. 185 
 
 evidence we can ever have for any ultimate truth respecting 
 the powers of Mind the evidence of Consciousness that is, 
 the evidence of observation turned in upon ourselves. 
 
 The discussions of many centuries seem to have resulted, at 
 last, in some real progress upon this vexed question of Neces- 
 sity and Free-will. That progress lies mainly in a clearer defi- 
 nition of terms. The most eminent living philosopher who rep- 
 resents the doctrine, commonly called the Doctrine of Necessity, 
 repudiates that name as incorrect, expressly on the ground 
 that the word Necessity, as commonly applied, signifies com- 
 pulsion. Undoubtedly it does ; and if this meaning be repudi- 
 ated, then the word is not used in its ordinary and legitimate 
 sense. This, indeed, Mr. Mill confesses, whilst yet*he casts- 
 upon his opponents the blame of a misunderstanding, which 
 assuredly lies with those who do not employ ordinary words in 
 the ordinary signification. " The truth is," he says, " that the 
 assailants of the doctrine (of Necessity) cannot do without the 
 associations engendered by the double meaning of the word 
 Necessity, which in this application signifies only invariability, 
 but, in its common employment, compulsion" * He believes, 
 therefore, in .Necessity only in the sense of Invariability. But 
 if the doctrine which Mr. Mill favors has suffered from one 
 ambiguity, it seeks to shelter itself under the protection of 
 another ambiguity much more deceptive. If there is a double 
 meaning in the word Necessity which has exposed the 
 Necessitarian doctrine to unjust objections, it is equally true 
 that there is a double meaning in the word Invariability 
 which lends to that doctrine an undue advantage. Invaria- 
 bility can be predicated of mental action in this vague general 
 sense that all the movements of Mind must invariably arise 
 from some motive. But this is a kind of " Invariability " which 
 admits of any amount of variation. For, as in the language 
 of this philosophy, Necessity does not mean compulsion, so by 
 Invariability, as applied to the phenomena of Mind, nothing 
 more is meant than that, in respect to mental action, there is 
 an " abstract possibility of its being foreseen." " If," says Mr, 
 Mill, " necessity means more than this abstract possibility of 
 being foreseen ; if it means any mysterious compulsion, apart 
 
 * " Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy," by J. S. Mill, p. 492, note. 
 
184 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 from simple invariability of sequence, I deny it as strenuously 
 as any one." * 
 
 But now let us insist, as in such subjects we are bound to do, 
 on still clearer definitions. We shall find, in the first place, 
 that the " abstract possibility of foreseeing mental action de- 
 pends on nothing less than such absolute knowledge of charac- 
 ter and of motive as can belong to God alone. We shall then 
 find, in the second place, that this favorite phrase, " invariability 
 of sequence," is as ambiguous as others of the same class. It 
 does not mean that any particular sequences are invariable, but 
 only that there must always be some sequence that it is in- 
 variably true that everything which happens has proceeded 
 from something as a cause, and leads to something as a conse- 
 quence. But this is a proposition which evidently, when re- 
 duced to its true dimensions, has no adverse bearing whatever 
 on the doctrine of Free Will. The " abstract " possibility of 
 foreseeing mental action depends on these two propositions : 
 first, that where all the conditions of that action are constant, 
 the resulting action will be constant also ; and, secondly, that 
 absolute and perfect knowledge of the whole of those con- 
 ditions would carry with it sure foreknowledge also of the 
 choice to which they lead. But surely this is not only true. 
 but something very like a truism. t There is nothing to object 
 to or deny in the doctrine, that if we knew everything that de- 
 termines the conduct of a man, we should be able to know 
 what that conduct will be. That is to say, if we knew all the 
 motives which are brought by external agencies to bear upon 
 his mind, and //"we knew all the other motives which that mind 
 evolves out of its own powers, and out of previously acquired 
 materials, to bear upon itself ; and if we knew the character 
 and disposition of that mind so perfectly as to 'estimate exactly 
 
 * " Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy," p. 517. See Note H. 
 
 t Mr. Mansel, following other philosophers on this point, reduces the modified 
 doctrine of Necessity to this identical proposition, " that the prevailing motive pre- 
 vails." Mr. Mill's reply is altogether unsatisfactory. Examination of Sir W. Ham- 
 ilton's Philosophy^ pp. 518, 519. 
 
 I cannot help adding here although the observation has reference to another sub- 
 jectthat Mr. Mill appears to me to have exposed with great force and clearness the 
 verbal fallacies involved in Mr. Mansel'' s work on the " Limits of Religious Thought," 
 and especially in the use he makes of such forms of expression as " The Absolute,'' 
 ''The Infinite," etc See the chapter (vii.) on "The Philosophy of the Conditioned, 
 AS applied by Mr. Mansel to Religion," in the same work. 
 
THE REIGN OF LAW IN THE REALM OF MIND. 185 
 
 the weight it will allow to all the different motives operating 
 upon it, then we should be able to predict with certainty the 
 resulting course of conduct, 
 
 This is true, not only as an abstract conception, but as a mat- 
 ter of experience in the little way towards perfect knowledge 
 along which we can ever travel. We can predict conduct with 
 almost perfect certainty when we know character with an equal 
 measure of assurance, and when we know the influences to which 
 that character will be exposed. In proportion as we are sure of 
 character, in the same proportion we are sure of conduct. Yet 
 we never think of the Will being the less free, because we can 
 predict its course. What we know in such cases is simply the 
 use which, under given conditions, will be made of freedom. 
 There is no certainty in the world of Physics more absolute 
 than some certainties in the world of Mind. We know that a 
 humane man will not do a uselessly cruel action. We know 
 that an honorable man will not do a base action. And if in 
 such cases we are deceived in the result, we know that it is be- 
 cause we were ignorant of some weakness or of some corrup- 
 tion ; that is to say, we were ignorant of some elements of char- 
 acter. But we never doubt that if those had been known, we 
 could have foreseen the resulting lapse. Perfect knowledge 
 must therefore be perfect foreknowledge. To know the pres- 
 ent perfectly, is to know the future certainly. To know all that 
 is, is to know all that will be. To know the heart of Man com- 
 pletely, is to know his conduct completely also ; for " out of the 
 heart are the issues of -life." So far from this conclusion be- 
 ing dangerous or hostile to any part of the Christian system, it is 
 a conclusion which enables us, in a dim way, not merely to hold 
 as a Belief, but to see as a necessary truth, that there can be no 
 chance in this world, and how it is, and must be, that to the 
 All-seeing and All-knowing the Future is as open as the Present 
 and the Past. But none of these ideas involve the idea of com- 
 pulsion ; and the absence of compulsion is all that can be 
 meant by Freedom. 
 
 And as by Freedom, we do not mean freedom from motives, 
 so neither do we mean that any of the phenomena of Mind, any 
 more than any of the phenomena of Matter, can arise without 
 " an antecedent." In this sense there is no contradiction be- 
 
1 86 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 tween the doctrine of Free Will and the amended doctrine of 
 Necessity. Man is subject to law of Causation in this sense, 
 " that his volitions are not self-caused, but determined by spirit- 
 ual antecedents in such sort that when the antecedents are the 
 same, the volitions will always be the same." * But this word 
 " antecedent " is one of the many vague words in which meta- 
 physicians delight. The highest antecedents which we can 
 ever trace as determining conduct, are to be found in the con- 
 stitution of mind itself. Love is an antecedent, so is Reverence, 
 so is Gratitude, so is the Hunger after Knowledge, so is the De- 
 sire of Truth. So also is the action of other Spirits upon our 
 own. Higher than these further up the chain of Cause and 
 Effect we cannot go. And yet we need not conceive of these 
 as " Final Causes," nor does the doctrine of our Free Will as- 
 sign to the human Mind any self-originating power. Man has 
 nothing which he did not receive. Such freedom as his Will 
 possesses has been given to him, and given him, too, as we have 
 dimly seen, by the employment and by the device of means. It 
 is a power belonging to his structure, and derived from Him by 
 whom that structure has been devised. 
 
 " Our Wills are ours, we know not how," 
 
 The power which in health we possess of preferring one motive 
 to all others, whilst yet the influence of those others may be 
 strongly felt, is a power which, like every other, must have its 
 own " antecedent " that is to say, its own cause, and its own 
 purpose. But these are to be found in the* Adjustment from 
 which the power arises, in the Mind by which that adjustment 
 has been contrived, and in the Purposes which it reveals. The 
 freedom of Man's Will is not more mysterious, when it is exert- 
 ed in directing the Mind to one motive, and averting it from 
 another, than when it is exerted in turning the Body to the 
 right hand rather than to the left.f 
 
 * " Mill on Hamilton," pp. 492, 493. 
 
 t The whole of this passage on Necessity and Free Will has been severely criticised 
 in an article in the Dublin Re-view for April 1867, as involving a practical abandonment 
 of the very doctrine which I profess to defend. The argument there maintained seems 
 to me altogether erroneous ; and I have seen no reason to alter the text in any mate- 
 rial point. The subject, however, is so important in itself, and so interesting as regards 
 the history of Philosophy, that I have thought it right to deal with it in a separate 
 note (F) already referred to. 
 
THE REIGN 'OF LAW IN THE REALM OF MIND. 187 
 
 The difficulty of reconciling, in one clear Order of Thought, 
 the idea of the Freedom of our own Will with the idea of Caus- 
 ation, is not really so great a difficulty as the use of ambitious and 
 ambiguous language has made it appear to be. There are two 
 sentences in Mr. J. S. Mill's work, on the Philosophy of Comte, 
 which afford the best possible illustration both of the true doc- 
 trine on the relation in which Will stands to Law, and of the 
 false doctrine into which it may be merged by the ambiguous 
 use of words. In one passage Mr. Mill defines the Positive as 
 distinguished from the Theological Mode of Thought to be 
 " that all phenomena, without exception, are governed by invari- 
 able laws, with which no volitions either natural or supernatural 
 interfere"* It is at least satisfactory to find in this sentence 
 so clear an avowal that the idea of free Divine Volition in the 
 region of the Supernatural, and the idea of free Human Volition 
 in the region of the Natural, stand on the same ground, are ex- 
 posed to the same intellectual difficulties, and are both equally 
 denied by the new Philosophy. But as a definition of the 
 Positive mode of thought it stands in curious contrast with an- 
 other passage of the same work, in which Mr. Milt says that 
 " the Theological mode of explaining phenomena was once uni- 
 versal, with the exception, doubtless, of the familiar facts which be- 
 ing even then seen to be controllable by human Will belonged al- 
 ready to the Positive Mode of Thought" f 
 
 These two sentences involve, on the face of them, contradic- 
 tory positions. The one affirms that no volitions can interfere 
 with the laws which govern phenomena, and that the recogni- 
 tion of this is the very essence of the Positive Philosophy. The 
 other affirms that the Positive Mode of Thought is involved in 
 the very idea of facts being controllable by human Will. 
 
 It is not, perhaps, very important to ask which of these two 
 sentences gives the most accurate description of the Positive 
 Philosophy ; but it is of much importance to ask which of these 
 two positions is nearest to the truth ? Beyond all doubt, it is 
 the last. If the Positive Philosophy were content with the as- 
 sertion that the power of Will over facts depends on the invaria- 
 
 * " Aug. Comte and Positivism," p. 12. 
 t Ibid. pp. 31, 32. 
 
l88 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 bility of Laws that is, on the constancy of Natural Forces it 
 would be sound enough. And so, the second of the two sent- 
 ences I have quoted sets forth the central idea of that Philos- 
 ophy in its most favorable light. But in the first of those two 
 sentences we have a concentration of all that is erroneous in 
 Positivism, and at the same time a typical example of the am- 
 biguities and obscurities of language on which the fallacies of 
 that Philosophy depend. There is hardly a single word in that 
 sentence which is not ambiguously used. " Phenomena " and 
 "facts," "govern" and "control," and "interfere with," are all 
 used in ambiguous senses ; whilst, as usual, the words " Law " 
 and " Invariable," are used not only ambiguously, but unintelli- 
 gibly. In order to test these ambiguities we have only to com- 
 pare the two sentences together. " Phenomena " in the one 
 sentence seems to correspond with "facts " in the other. Yet, 
 we have this result, that " phenomena " are governed by Inva- 
 riable Law, whilst " facts " are controllable by human Will. It 
 would appear, then, that the " phenomena " which are governed 
 by Law cannot be the same with the "facts," which are con- 
 trollable by Will : or else, if they be the same, then there must 
 be some essential distinction between " controlling " and " gov- 
 erning." What is this distinction ? It is not defined, or even 
 suggested. Then, again, if no volitions can "interfere with " 
 Laws, how can volitions " control " facts ? If Will controls 
 facts, and yet can't " interfere with " Laws, how is the control 
 over facts exercised ? What is the relation between the Laws 
 which no volitions can " interfere with," and the " facts " which 
 volitions do actually " control ? " Can Will control facts, which 
 again are governed by laws, (in some sense or other) either by 
 interfering with those laws, or controlling them ? 
 
 If it were possible to get any definite meaning out of this con- 
 fusion of words, perhaps it might be said that Will can " con- 
 trol " Law, but cannot " interfere with " it. There is at least a 
 glimmering of the truth in this. But no man could gather from 
 those two sentences of Mr. Mill what the truth is, although, 
 after all, the truth is plain enough if only some care be taken 
 to confine definite words to some sort of definite meaning. If 
 by Laws are meant the elementary Forces of Nature, and if by 
 " interfering " with them is meant any power of altering their 
 
THE REIGN OF LAW IN THE REALM OF MIND. 189 
 
 own essential energies then it is true that no volitions of ours 
 can interfere with them. But then it cannot be too often re- 
 peated that, in this sense, phenomena are NOT governed by In 
 variable Laws ; because phenomena are never the result of in 
 dividual Forces, but are always the result of the conditions un 
 der which several Forces are combined, and these conditions 
 are always variable. If, again, " interference " means or in- 
 cludes the power of setting Natural Forces (Laws) to work un 
 der new conditions, then it is the reverse of truth to affirm that 
 they cannot be " interfered " with. Man controls facts only be- 
 cause (in this sense) he can, and he does, interfere with Laws. 
 His volitions can, and do, govern those combinations of Force 
 which are the immediate cause of all phenomena. 
 
 There is no fault in philosophical discussion more pestilent 
 than that of using common words in some technical or artificial 
 sense, without any warning to the reader, (often apparently with- 
 out any consciousness on the part of the writer,) that ideas fun- 
 damentally involved, in the ordinary use of the word, are elim- 
 inated and set aside. We have seen one instance of this in 
 the word " necessity," emptied of its meaning of compulsion. 
 We have another example in the use made of such words as 
 " changeable," and others of a like kind. Thus Mr. Mill * 
 quotes, with approbation, a remark of Comte, that ".our power 
 of foreseeing phenomena, and our power of controlling them, 
 are the two things which destroy the belief of their being gov- 
 erned by changeable Wills." All through this sentence there 
 run the same confusions which have been pointed out in the two 
 sentences already quoted. But there is, in addition, another con- 
 fusion which has a special bearing on the subject of this chap- 
 ter. Phenomena which can be controlled are phenomena which 
 can be changed. There is no other meaning in the words. 
 The assertion, therefore, is, that the changeability of phenom- 
 ena through human agency is a fact which must destroy our be- 
 lief in the changeability of the human Will itself. The sent- 
 ence thus r endered is, of course, either pure nonsense, or else 
 must be dependent for a rational sense upon some artificial 
 meaning being attached to the word " changeable." A Will 
 under the guidance of some settled principle that is to say, 
 
 * " Auguste Comte and Positivism," p. 48. 
 
190 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 following habitually some prevailing motives might, by a cer- 
 tain licence of language, be called an unchangeable Will. But 
 this has nothing to do with that kind of changeability which 
 can alone concern the power of altering and controlling mate- 
 rial phenomena. Stability of character, whether moral or 
 purely intellectual, is not only compatible with a variable Will, 
 but it is inseparably connected with it. No man can pursue 
 one rule of conduct under changing conditions unless he him- 
 self retains his own capacities of change. He cannot control 
 phenomena without changing them, and he cannot change phe- 
 nomena without changing his own course of action ; and a 
 change in the course of action is a change in the course of Will. 
 That which is really at the bottom of all this ambiguity of 
 language, is a constant endeavor to get rid altogether of an 
 essential element in the very idea of Will, to reduce it to 
 something different from that which we all know and feel it to 
 be. The word Will is indeed retained in the Positive vocabu- 
 lary, but some other word is generally inserted before it, to 
 prejudice the common understanding of it, or to impart some 
 element of meaning which can with more plausibility be de- 
 nounced. Thus the Will which is denied in Nature is often de- 
 scribed as an " arbitrary " Will or a " capricious " Will. But 
 surely thes*e qualifying epithets do but add to the confusion. 
 It is true, indeed, that the Will we see in Nature is not a ca- 
 pricious Will. But this is not the question. The question is, 
 whether there is, or is not, such a thing possible as caprice in 
 Will. If there be such a thing as caprice, then the existence 
 of it, and the power of it " to control phenomena/' cannot be 
 denied. If there be no such thing, then " capricious " is of no 
 meaning as an epithet applied to Will. Caprice implies not 
 only changeableness, but, so to speak, a double degree of 
 changeableness a changeableness which has no rule or reason 
 in its shiftings. It is a fact that there are human Wills of this 
 character, and the mischief they have done in the world arises 
 from the power they possess, in common with all other Wills, 
 of changing phenomena after their own unreasonable nature. 
 The truth is, that if the human Will can be described as un- 
 changeable, then there is no such thing as changeability even 
 conceivable in thought. There is no contrast so absolute be- 
 
THE REIGN OF LAW IN THE REALM OF MIND. 191 
 
 tween any two different forms of Matter, as there is between 
 two different states of the same Mind. There is no transition 
 in Nature from one physical condition to another so absolute 
 or so radical as the transition to which human character is sub- 
 ject when it passes under the power of new convictions. There 
 is no change like the change from hatred to affection, from vice 
 to virtue, from evil to good. And this change in Mind is the 
 efficient cause of a whole cycle of other changes among the 
 phenomena which the human Will can and does alter, regulate, 
 and control. 
 
 There is, then, not much real difficulty after all in disengag- 
 ing the great facts of our own Free Will from the verbal con- 
 
 o o 
 
 fusions of the Positive Philosophy. Nor will the same meth- 
 ods of solution fail us when we apply them to the further ques- 
 tion, How far, and in what sense, are our own volitions them- 
 selves subject to law that is, to the influence of Adjusted 
 Forces ? For as one great consequence of the Reign of Law 
 over material things is the necessity of resorting to the use of 
 appropriate means for the accomplishment of Purpose, so 
 does the same necessity arise out of the same conditions among 
 the phenomena of Mind. If we wish to operate upon human 
 action, we must go to work by presenting to the Will some 
 motive tending to produce the action we desire. Above all, if 
 we seek to operate not merely on individual actions, but upon 
 that which mainly determines conduct, viz. human character, 
 we must direct our efforts to place that character under out- 
 ward conditions which we know to have a favorable effect upon 
 it. In the material world we should be powerless to control 
 any event if we did not know it to be subject to laws that is, 
 to Forces which, though not liable to change in essence, are 
 subject to endless change in combination and in use. The 
 same impotency would affect us, if in the moral world also defi- 
 nite conditions had not always an invariable tendency to pro- 
 duce certain definite results. It is a mere confusion of thought 
 and of language which confounds the " invariability " of " Laws," 
 either moral or material, with the denial of the power of Will 
 to vary, alter, and modify in infinite degrees the course of 
 things. It is the fixedness of all Forces in one sense which 
 constitutes their infinite pliability in another. It is the un- 
 
THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 changing relation which they bear to those mental faculties by 
 which we discover them and recognize them, that renders them 
 capable of becoming the supple instruments of those other 
 faculties of Will, of Reason, and of Contrivance by which we 
 can work them for altered and better purposes. 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 LAW IN POLITICS. 
 
 AT first sight it may be thought that the means by which we 
 can operate on the Wills of individual men, and of communities 
 of men, are contained within a narrow compass, and are such 
 as to be all, if not within easy reach, at least within easy recog- 
 nition. And it is true that some methods of operating on the" 
 minds of men we do know instinctively, just as in the material 
 world we know by the first rudiments of intelligence how to ac- 
 complish a few physical results. But experience and observa-- 
 tion teach us, although they teach us very slowly, that direct 1 
 appeals to the reason, or direct appeals to (he feelings of men,, 
 are entirely useless, when those faculties have nofbeen placed 
 under conditions favorable to their exercise in a right direc- 
 tion. And as in the material world, the knowledge we have' 
 acquired of the powers of Nature, and of the methods of turn- 
 ing them to use, has been slowly gained in the lapse of ages, 
 and as all we discover does but reveal how much we have yet 
 to know ; so in the immense world of the Mind and Character 
 of Man, our knowledge of the methods by which it maybe well 
 and wisely governed, has advanced only by slow degrees. 
 There is a boundless field of discovery still open to those who 
 investigate the laws which govern the development of our na- 
 ture. When we look at the high degrees of excellence which 
 that nature so often attains under favorable conditions for the 
 growth and exercise of its better powers, and when we contrast 
 this with its stunted and distorted growth as exhibited among 
 large portions of Mankind, it becomes a question of deep and 
 endless interest to know how far these conditions are subject 
 to the control of Will through the use of means. If such 
 means can ever be devised, it must be by knowledge, first of 
 the elementary forces which have a constant operation on Hu-- 
 man Character, and secondly by contrivance in so combining: 
 
THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 them as to make them operate in the direction we desire. And 
 it is in this search that we discover the intimate blending and 
 inseparable connection between mental and material laws that 
 is, between the forces which operate on the material frame and 
 the forces which operate on the Mind and Character of Man. 
 
 And here we come on a great subject the function of Hu- 
 man Law as distinguished from Natural Law. Just as the Will 
 of the individual can operate upon itself by the use of means, 
 some of which are known instinctively, whilst others are found 
 out by reason ; so can the collective Will of Society operate 
 upon the conduct of its members in two ways first, directly by 
 authority; and .secondly, indirectly by altering the conditions 
 out of which the most powerful motives spring. This last is a 
 principle of government, which has been distinctly recognized 
 only in modern times, and which admits of applications not yet 
 foreseen. The idea of founding Human Law upon the Laws 
 of Nature, is an idea which, though sometimes instinctively 
 acted upon, was never systematically entertained in the ancient 
 world. Indeed, the true conception of Natural Law is one 
 founded on the progress of physical investigation, and growing 
 out of the habits of scientific thought. It was long before Man 
 came to apprehend the prevalence of Law in the phenomena 
 of Matter; and it was still longer before he could even enter- 
 tain the notion of Natural Law as applicable to himself. The 
 ancient lawgivers were always aiming at standards of Political 
 Society, framed according to some abstract notions of their 
 own as to how things ought to be, rather than upon any attempt 
 to investigate the constitution of human nature as it actually is. 
 It was a mistake in the science of Politics analogous to that 
 which Bacon complained of so bitterly in the science of Phys- 
 ics. Men were always trying to evolve out of their own minds 
 knowledge which could only be acquired by patient inquiry into 
 facts. How worse than useless this method is, received an il- 
 lustration in ancient philosophy still more striking than in an- 
 cient legislation. Fortunately for mankind, no actual legisla- 
 tors have ever been quite so foolish as some philosophers. 
 Perhaps, all things considered, the most odious conceptions of 
 Human Society which the world has ever seen, were the con- 
 ceptions of an intellect certainly among the loftiest which has 
 
LAW IN POLITICS. 
 
 ever exercised its powers in speculative thought. Plato's Re- 
 public is an Ideal State, founded on abstract conceptions of 
 the mind, and one of its leading ideas is the destruction of 
 Family Life, and the annihilation of the family affections. And 
 yet this result, odious and irrational as it is, was arrived at from 
 reasoning which is not in itself odious, but which is false, 
 chiefly because it takes no account of the facts of Nature. The 
 welfare of the State was to be the one object of desire in every 
 mind. All separate interests and affections were to be sup- 
 pressed, and amongst these the very idea of special property in 
 Wife or Child. The highest type of man was to be bred by the 
 Republic as the highest type of dogs and horses is bred by an 
 intelligent owner.* Such are the humiliating results of abstract 
 reasoning, pursued in ignorance of the great Law, that no pur- 
 pose can be attained in Nature except by legitimate use of the 
 means which Nature has supplied. For as in the material 
 world, all her Forces must be acknowledged and obeyed before 
 they can be made to serve, so in the Realm of Mind there can 
 be no success in attaining the highest moral ends until due 
 honor has been assigned to those motives which arise out of 
 the universal instincts of our race. 
 
 Accordingly it is remarkable that the system of ancient phi- 
 losophy, which for so many ages continued to rule the thoughts 
 of men the philosophy of Aristotle owes almost all the 
 strength it has in Politics as in other matters, to occasional and 
 almost unconscious resort to the true methods of scientific 
 reasoning and investigation. Aristotle founds his adverse crit- 
 icism on Plato, where it is most successful, upon the actual 
 facts of what men, under specified conditions, naturally do, and 
 think, and feel. From these facts he argues justly as to what 
 they would do under the artificial restrictions of a theoretical 
 philosophy. When, for example he argues against communism, 
 and in favor of private property, upon the ground of the watch- 
 fulness and attention which self-interest produces in the con- 
 duct of business,! and when he adds, " It is unspeakable how 
 advantageous it is that a man oald think he has something 
 
 * u The breeding is regulated, like that of noble horses or dogs, by an intelligent 
 proprietor." Grote's " Plato," vol. iii. p. 203. 
 
 t /adTi^ov 6' emti&aovGiv wf Troof idiov EKCLCTOV Trpoaedpeiovrog. " Aristot. Pol." 
 Bk. ii. c. 5. 
 
196 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 which he may call his own, for it is by no means to no purpose 
 that each person should have an affection for him self, for that 
 is natural" * he touches the very root idea of the modern sci- 
 ence of Political Economy. He touches it, but he does not 
 grasp it. It is a line of argument which is never consistently 
 maintained ; and though there are perpetual appeals to " na- 
 ture " to that which is " natural " to that which nature 
 teaches no definite meaning can be attached to these expres- 
 sions : and dogmas are laid down as " natural " which are purely 
 abstract and metaphysical conceptions. Nature is called as 
 a witness, and then the witness she gives is condemned and put 
 out of court. Industry is occasionally praised, whilst the means 
 and the motives to industry are systematically despised. The 
 exercise of any mechanical employment, or the following of 
 merchandise, is condemned in an Ideal Government as " igno- 
 ble and destructive to virtue."t A maritime situation is recom- 
 mended, because of its convenience in enabling a city to receive 
 from others produce which its own country does not afford, and 
 to export those necessaries of life of which it has more than 
 plenty. This looks like a perception of the soundest maxims of 
 Commerce. But in the next breath, the whole richness and 
 blessing of Commerce, as an element of civilization, is repudi- 
 ated and destroyed by the stupid and selfish maxim that a city 
 must traffic to supply its own wants only, and not the wants 
 of others; "for those who make themselves into an open 
 market for every one, do it for the sake of revenue ; but if a 
 State ought to have no part in this kind of gain, neither ought 
 it to furnish such a mart." \ 
 
 It is surely wonderful that such a mind as that of Aristotle 
 should have supposed that it was either possible, or, if possible, 
 desirable that the benefits of traffic should all be on one side ; 
 
 * eri 6e Koi Trpof rj8ovr]v afj.v6ffTov bcov diatiepet TO vo/iti^eiv I6i6v rr p.rj yap 
 ov adrrjv rrfv Trpof avrbv ambg ^et tyddav f/cajro?, a/U,' can TOVTO (f>vci.K.6v. 
 -Bk. ii. c. 5. 
 
 t ovre fiavavcov (3iov ovf ayopalov del (,rjv rovt; Tro/Urftf ayevvr/q yap 6 roiovTog 
 j&'of Kal fl-pdf aperyv vTrevavrio^.Ek. vii. c. 9. In Mr. Congreve's edition, Bk. iv. 
 c. 9. 
 
 J amij yap efiTropiKT/v, aD! ov rolg d/l/loff dfc! elvai rrfv Trdhiv. ol 6e Trapexovreg 
 <T0df Gvrovf Traaiv ayopav irpooodov x.apiv ravra Trpdrrovciv f]V 6e /j.^ del nokiv 
 ;, ovd' efwdpiov del KEKTyadai Tocovrov.Bk. vii. c.6. 
 
LAW IN POLITICS. 197 
 
 nor is it less wonderful that, with his hands, as it were, upon the 
 spot, and touching with his very fingers the foundation-facts, 
 he should yet have failed to feel and to seize the great secret 
 of modern Political Science the links of Natural Consequence 
 in which the blessedness of Commerce lies. But all this comes 
 of thinking that we can be wiser than Nature, and of failing to 
 see that every natural instinct has its own legitimate field of 
 operation, within which we cannot do better than let it alone. 
 It comes from the notion that we can arrive at that which ought 
 to be, without taking any note of that which actually is. 
 
 The bondage under which all true Science lies to fact the 
 necessity of groping among the detail of little and common 
 things this is a hard lesson for the human Intellect to learn 
 conscious as that Intellect is of its own great powers of its own 
 high aims of its own large capacities of intuitive understand- 
 ing. But it is a lesson which must be learnt. There are no 
 short cuts in Nature. Her results are always attained by Meth- 
 od. Her purposes are always worked out by Law. So must 
 ours be. For our bodies and our spirits are both parts of the 
 great Order of Nature ; and our Wills can attain no end, an*d 
 can accomplish no design, except through knowledge and 
 through use of the appropriate and appointed means. Nor can 
 those means be ascertained except by careful observation, and 
 as careful reasoning. It is a hard thing to know all the forces 
 which operate even on our own individual minds , and it is a 
 much harder problem to understand the forces which arise out of 
 the complicated conditions of human society. But the very idea 
 of Natural Law as affecting mankind is founded on the possibility 
 of tracing in human nature the existence and operation of forces 
 which under given conditions do actually determine the course 
 of human conduct in particular directions. Amongst these 
 forces there are a certain number which are constant, or at least 
 so constant that they may be calculated upon as certainly affect- 
 ing the great majority of mankind. These are chiefly the mo- 
 tives which arise out of our physical constitution the desires 
 and affections which are common to the race. To follow these 
 motives to be actuated by them is, therefore, natural. And 
 yet to follow these motives exclusively, may, and generally does, 
 lead to great evils, often to calamities, sometimes to destruction. 
 
190 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 How, then, can these motives be controlled ? Only by ap- 
 pealing to other motives to forces lying in the higher re- 
 gions of the mind, and placed there like the forces of external 
 Nature, to be at the disposal of the Intelligence and the Will. 
 
 Are, then, these higher motives not also natural ? are they 
 above nature ? are they supernatural ? It would really seem 
 as if this were the idea involved in the distinction which is so 
 vaguely drawn between that which is said to be natural and that 
 which is said to be not natural between Natural Law and 
 Positive Institution. Yet Reason, and Conscience, and Fancy, 
 and Imagination, and Belief, or whatever other faculties may 
 direct, wisely or unwisely, the course of legislation, are all 
 equally natural to Man. They are all as much parts of his men- 
 tal constitution as the desires and instincts to which the term 
 natural is usually confined. There is no entravagance of the 
 individual Will there is no folly of blind and irrational legisla- 
 tion which has not been the fruit of some part or another of 
 Man's nature. I dwell on this only because it is important here 
 as in other cases, to attach a definite meaning to the words we 
 use, and especially to a word which plays so important a part ' 
 in the language both of Philosophy and of Politics. 
 
 It appears, then, that, as applied to human conduct, we mean 
 by " natural " conduct that which men are prompted to pursue 
 rather by instinct and impulse than by calculation of conse- 
 quences and by reason. Human Laws, or Positive Institutions, 
 as being the result of deliberation, stand contrasted with Natural 
 Law in this sense, and in this sense alone. For as Reason and 
 Reflection are natural to Man, and are as important parts of 
 his nature as the highest of his instincts, so Laws founded on a 
 right exercise of that Reason are Natural Laws in the best and 
 highest sense of all. Laws, however, whether in this sense 
 natural or not that is, whether founded on a right or a wrong 
 exercise of reason are always intended to act as restraints on 
 the actions of individuals, and to interfere with the motives by 
 which their conduct would be otherwise determined. This re- 
 straint may be said to be artificial as opposed to the natural re- 
 straints of the individual reason ; and this, perhaps, is the dis- 
 tinction most generally intended when the natural conduct of 
 men is contrasted with their conduct under the control of Posi- 
 
LAW IN POLITICS. 
 
 I 99 
 
 tive Institution. But as the motives which determine individual 
 conduct are not always reasonable motives, so it is clear that 
 what men naturally do is no sure test either of what they ought to 
 do, or of what they ought to be allowed to do. It is their nature,, 
 under certain conditions, to do all that is bad and injurious to 
 themselves and others. Hence it is the most difficult of all prob- 
 lems in the Science of Government to determine when, where, 
 and how it is wise to interfere by the authority of Law with the 
 motives which are usually called the natural motives of men. 
 The question is no other than this : How far the abuse of 
 those motives can be checked and resisted by that public author- 
 ity whose duty and function it is to place itself above the influ- 
 ences which, in individual men, overpower the voice of reason 
 and of conscience ? 
 
 No more signal illustration has been ever given of the rela- 
 tion between Natural Law and Human Law of the circum- 
 stances in which Natural Law may be trusted, and of those in 
 which it absolutely requires to be controlled than the illustra- 
 tion afforded by the history of Legislation in our own country 
 within the present century. During that period two great dis- 
 coveries have been made in the Science of Government : the 
 one is the immense advantage of abolishing restrictions upon 
 Trade ; the other is the absolute necessity of imposing restric- 
 tions upon Labor. The rise, the growth, and the final accept- 
 ance of these two ideas as the basis of practical Legislation, is 
 a history so curious, and having such close relation to the sub- 
 ject of this chapter, that I propose to deal with it somewhat in 
 detail. 
 
 Since the dissolution of the Greek and Roman Common- 
 wealths, no nation has acted on the one great error of all the 
 ancient systems of political philosophy that the natural desire 
 of men for the accumulation of wealth is an evil to be dreaded 
 and repressed. So far as this goes there is a sharp and strik- 
 ing contrast between the spirit of ancient and of modern poli- 
 cy. The great object of the ancient policy, says Dugald Stew- 
 art, " was to counteract the love of money and a taste for luxu- 
 ry by positive institutions, and to maintain in the great body of 
 the people habits of frugality and a seventy of manners. The 
 decline of States is uniformly ascribed by philosophers and 
 
200 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 historians, both of Greece and Rome, to the influence of riches 
 on national character ; and the laws of Lycurgus, which, during 
 a course of ages, banished the precious metals from Sparta, are 
 proposed by' many of them as the most perfect model of legis- 
 lation devised by human wisdom. How opposite to this is the 
 doctrine of modern politicians ! Far from considering poverty 
 as an advantage to a State, their great aim is to open new 
 sources of national opulence, and to animate the activity of all 
 classes of the people by a taste for the comforts and accommo- 
 dations of life." : This is true, and has been true more or less 
 ,of all the modern nations of the world. But although they 
 never held the absurd doctrine that Nature was wrong when 
 .she taught men to desire wealth, they did hold the doctrine, 
 hardly less mischievous that Nature was incompetent to teach 
 .them how best to acquire it. It would be difficult to say 
 whether the law of ancient Sparta, prohibiting gold from ever 
 -coming into the State, was worse than the law of modern Spain, 
 which prohibited gold from ever being allowed to leave it. It 
 is certain that the Spanish law was at least the more irrational 
 .of the two. If a State wishes to be poor, it is not absurd to 
 .prohibit the making of money. But if a State wishes to be 
 jich, it is mere stupidity to prohibit the natural use of the me- 
 dium of exchange. Yet this law of Spain is only an extreme 
 example of the system and the theories which governed, until 
 the other day, the legislation of all the nations of Europe, and 
 which still largely prevails amongst them. 
 
 It was no oratorical exaggeration, but a strict and literal 
 description of the truth, when Mr. Gladstone said f of the old 
 commercial policy that it was " a system of robbing and plun- 
 dering ourselves." And how was it so? What was the es- 
 sence of its error ? These questions are best answered by 
 another. What was the central idea of the new system which 
 has superseded the old one ? The essential idea of these new 
 opinions cannot be better given than in the words of Dugald 
 Stewart : " The great and leading object of Adam Smith's 
 speculations is to illustrate the provision made by Nature in 
 
 * " Account of the Life and Writings of Adam Smith," by Dugald Stewart." Col- 
 lected Works of Dugald Stewart," vol. x. p. 57. 
 t In his Speech at Glasgow, Oct., 1865. 
 
LAW IN POLITICS. 2OI 
 
 the principles of the human mind, and in the circumstances of 
 man's external situation, for a gradual progressive augmenta- 
 tion in the means of national wealth , and to demonstrate 
 that the most effectual plan for advancing a people to great- 
 ness is to maintain that order of things which Nature has 
 pointed out ; by allowing every man, as long as he observes 
 the rules of justice, to pursue his own interest in his own way, 
 and to bring both his industry and his capital into the freest 
 competition with those of his fellow-citizens." * 
 
 Adam Smith found Positive Institutions regulating and re- 
 stricting natural human action in two different directions. There 
 were laws restricting free interchange in the products of labor : 
 and there were other laws, restricting the free employment of 
 labor itself. He denounced both. Labor was deprived of its 
 natural freedom by laws forbidding men from working at any 
 skilled labor, unless they had served an apprenticeship of a 
 specified time. It was also deprived of its natural freedom by 
 monopolies, which prevented men from working at any trade 
 within certain localities, unless allowed to do so by those who 
 had the exclusive privilege. The first mode of restriction pre- 
 vented labor from passing freely from one employment to 
 another, even in the same place. The second mode of restric- 
 tion prevented labor passing freely from place to place, even 
 in the same trade. Both of these restrictions were as mischiev- 
 ous, and as destructive of their own object, as restrictions in 
 the free interchange of goods. They both depended on the 
 same vicious principle of attempting to obtain by Legislation 
 results which would be more surely attained by allowing every 
 man to sell his goods or his labor when, where, and how he 
 pleased. The labor of a poor man was his capital. He had a 
 natural right to employ it as he liked. And as for protecting 
 the community from- bad or imperfect work, that would be best 
 secured by unrestricted competition. The natural instincts and 
 respective interests of producers and consumers would secure 
 mutual adaptation. Perfect freedom of exchange in goods, the 
 products of labor, and perfect freedom in the application of 
 labor itself this was the rule to follow. Natural Law was the 
 
 * Account, see p. 72. 
 
202 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 best regulator of both. Such were the doctrines of Adam 
 Smith, then new in the world. 
 
 It is not a little remarkable that, during {he same years in 
 which Adam Smith was working out his memorable Inquiry,, 
 other minds, working in a very different department of human 
 thought, were preparing events which were to bring to a speedy 
 test how far these doctrines of Natural Law were true absolutely,, 
 or true only under limitations, which he did not foresee. When 
 Adam Smith was lecturing with applause in Glasgow from 
 the chair of Moral Philosophy, James Watt was selling mathe- 
 matical instruments in an obscure shop within the precincts 
 of the same University. It may seem as if no two depart- 
 ments of human thought are^more widely separated than those 
 in which these two men were working. One was a region purely 
 mental. The other was a region purely physical. The one 
 had reference to the Laws of Matter. The other had refer- 
 ence to the Laws of Mind. Yet the work of James Watt and 
 the work of Adam Smith were inseparably connected, not only 
 as involving analogous methods of investigation, but as show- 
 ing in their result the blending and co-operation of mental and 
 material laws. 
 
 It was the labor of Watt to reduce to obedience, under the 
 power of Mind, one of the most tremendous Forces of Nature,. 
 and this he did through many years of curious inquiry, and 
 of laborious contrivance. He found only a rude and imperfect 
 mechanism through which this great Force had been misdirected 
 and dissipated and lost. He collected it in fitter vessels ; he 
 led it into smoother channels ; he opened for it doors of pas- 
 sage, through which the rushing of its escape did for him what 
 he wanted it to do. Other forces, which before had conspired 
 against it, were so guided as to work along with it, not only in 
 perfect harmony, but in close alliance. He made, in short r 
 itsj invariable energies subject to the variable conditions of 
 Adjustment. And so, he governed it and controlled it, and 
 handed it over to the Human Family as the servant of their 
 Will forever. 
 
 The work of Adam Smith was not dissimilar in its relation 
 to the Reign of Law. It was his labor to prove that in the 
 rude contrivances of Legislation, due account had not been 
 
LAW IN POLITICS. 203 
 
 taken -of the natural forces with which it had to deal. He 
 showed that among the very elements of human character 
 there were instincts, and desires, and faculties of contrivance, 
 all of which by clumsy machinery had been impeded, and ob- 
 structed, and diverted from the channels in which they ought 
 to work. He could not, however, test his reasoning as the 
 Inventor could, by continual experiment. He had to rely on 
 abstract reasoning, and on such verification as could be drawn 
 from the complicated phenomena of the Body Politic. In this 
 respect the work of Adam Smith was harder than the work of 
 Watt. And why it was harder is a question which it may be 
 well to ask. It is not surprising that the methods of applying 
 to our own use the Powers of external Nature, should be 
 matter of difficult research. But it may well seem strange 
 that the forces which have their seat within ourselves in the 
 Mind and Character of Man should be so unknown to us as to 
 require careful reasoning and observation before we know how 
 to use them with success for the attainment of our ends. Yet 
 so it is. The conscious energies of the Will are ever tempted 
 to march directly upon objects which can only be reached by 
 circuitous methods of approach. And so the Wealth of Na- 
 tions, and the skill of Crafts, and the success of Trade, had 
 all been hindered by the measures designed for their protec- 
 tion. The promptings of individual interest had been checked 
 and thwarted and driven into channels less fruitful than those 
 which they would have naturally found. 
 
 On the other hand, the discovery of the Steam Engine, like 
 every other weapon placed at the disposal of Mind, gave a new 
 stimulus to the motives, and a new form to the conditions, 
 by which the conduct of thousands was determined. Little 
 did the brilliant Professor know that the discoveries of 
 his humble friend would yet, in their results, serve to limit 
 the conclusions of his own Philosophy. In the mean time,' 
 all that he knew of Watt and of his personal history seemed 
 to be, and really was, a signal illustration of the follies of 
 restriction. For no other reason than that he had not been 
 born in Glasgow, Watt could not legally sell the products of 
 his ingenuity and labor in that City. The spirit and the laws 
 of corporate monopoly rigidly excluded him ; and the company 
 
2O 4 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 of " Hammermen " insisted on the exclusion being maintained, 
 for fear of " loss and skaith to the Burgesses and Crafts- 
 men of Glasgow, by the intrusion of strangers." * The work- 
 ing-classes themselves were among the most strenuous support- 
 ers of a system which diminished the value by restricting the 
 area of their labor. Fortunately the University had privi- 
 leges of its own, which, within its own property, excluded the 
 jurisdiction of a Municipality and a Craft not more ignorant 
 or more selfish than their contemporaries at the time. It may 
 well be supposed, that Adam Smith's opinions on freedom of 
 labor must have been influenced by personal observation of the 
 working of such laws in the case of a man who, though still 
 obscure, was even then appreciated by those who knew him for 
 ingenuity and resource. 
 
 In looking at restrictions such as these, there was nothing 
 then to suggest to Adam Smith the consequences which might 
 arise from the entire freedom of labor, when that labor was 
 placed under new conditions. He had no knowledge, and he 
 could then have no conception, what these new conditions were 
 to be. Yet they were being silently prepared and determined in 
 the very years in which he spoke and wrote. His friend Watt 
 was a principal agent in the great impending change. But 
 Watt was not alone. Other minds were working at the same time 
 whose labors were to match with a curious fittingness into his. 
 Indeed, the work which was going on in those years is only 
 one example of a law of which many other examples may be 
 found. It is an order of facts observable in the progress of 
 Mankind, that long ages of comparative silence and inaction 
 are broken up, and brought to an end, by shorter periods of 
 almost preternatural activity. And that activity is generally 
 spent in paths of investigation, which, though independent, are 
 converging. Different minds, pursuing different lines of 
 thought, find themselves meeting upon common ground. Such, 
 in respect to literature, was the period of the Revival of Learn- 
 ing : such, in respect to Religion, was the period of the Reforma- 
 tion : such, in respect to the abstract sciences, was the period 
 of Tycho Brahe, of Galileo, and of Kepler. Hardly less mem- 
 orable than these, certainly not less powerful, as affecting the 
 
 * Smiles' " Life of Watt," p. 105. 
 
LAW IN POLITICS. 205 
 
 condition of society, were those few years in the last quarter 
 of the eighteenth century, which were marked by such an ex- 
 traordinary burst of Mechanical Invention. Hargreaves, and 
 Arkwright, and Watt, and Crompton, and Cartwright, were all 
 contemporaries. They were all working at the same time, and 
 in the same direction. Out of their inventions there arose for 
 the first time what is now known as the Factory system ; and 
 out of the Factory system arose a condition of things as affect- 
 ing human labor, which was entirely new in the history of the 
 world. The change thus effected is a signal illustration of the 
 relation in which Natural Law stands to Positive Institution in 
 the realm of Mind. Let us look for a moment at its history 
 and results. 
 
 The Common Law of England had placed no restrictions 
 upon labor. The only restrictions which existed arose either 
 from the special monopolies of Corporate Bodies, or from the 
 General Statute of Apprenticeship. This statute had been 
 passed in the reign of Elizabeth. It provided that no man 
 should work at any craft on his own account until he had served 
 an apprenticeship of seven years. But the Statute of Appren- 
 ticeship being in derogation of common rights, had always been 
 construed strictly by the Courts of Law ; and so it had come to 
 pass that two great rules of limitation had been applied to it. 
 First, it was held to apply only to such crafts of skill as were 
 known at the time of its being passed ; and secondly, it was held 
 not to apply at all to rural districts, but only to market towns. 
 From these two rules of limitation, it resulted, first, that all 
 trades and employments were free which had arisen since the 
 commencement of the seventeenth century, and, secondly, 
 that even the older crafts were free also if they were prosecuted 
 outside the boundaries of towns. 
 
 Such was the condition of the law when the inventions of 
 Adam Smith's contemporaries brought into existence employ- 
 ments which were entirely new, and opened them to that unre- 
 stricted competition, the advantage of which he had laid down 
 as a universal doctrine. 
 
 Spinning and weaving were not new. They were as old as 
 the memory of Mankind. But the simple mechanism by which 
 these arts were prosecuted were almost equally old, and had 
 
206 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 undergone little change and little improvement. In 1760 the 
 Spinning- Wheel, and the common Loom, as used by the peo- 
 ple of Yorkshire, were little in advance of the implements for 
 the same purpose which had been in use beyond the reach of 
 History. The Spindle which is depicted on the monuments of 
 Egypt was, until a few years ago, familiar in the Highlands. 
 The essential feature of this ancient industry, so far as its ef- 
 fects upon social conditions are concerned, was that it was sep- 
 arate and not gregarious. It did not interfere with, but rather 
 was congenial to, Family Life, for thousands of years, 
 
 " Maids at the Wheel, the Weaver at his Loom, 
 Sat blithe and happy." * 
 
 But the pressure of new necessities had arisen, and these 
 could be met only by new inventions. Towards the middle of 
 the eighteenth century, the greatest difficulty was experienced 
 by weavers and spinners in England in maintaining their posi- 
 tion in the markets of the world. It is curious how each new 
 mechanical invention gave rise to the necessities out of which 
 the next arose. The invention of the Fly Shuttle in weaving, so 
 early as 1733, seems to have given the first impulse to all that 
 followed. By means of this invention the power of weaving 
 overtook the power of spinning. An adequate supply of yarn 
 could not be procured under the ancient methods of that most 
 ancient industry. New conditions gave rise to new motives, 
 and new motives called into play the latent energies of Mind. 
 The time and the cost of collecting the products of so many 
 scattered laborers enhanced unduly the cost of manufacture, 
 and even when the remuneration was reduced to the lowest 
 point compatible with existence, that cost was still too high. 
 Something was imperatively required to economize the work of 
 human hands some more elaborate contrivance to make that 
 work go further than before. And so Hargreaves' invention 
 arose, not before the time.f And when his Spinning Jenny 
 had been invented, a still more elaborate and powerful combi- 
 nation of mechanical adjustments was soon perfected in the 
 
 * Wordsworth's noble sonnet 
 
 " Nuns fret not at their convent's narrow room." 
 1 1765-67. 
 
LAW IN POLITICS. 2 07 
 
 hands of Arkwright.* When the Spinning Frame was invented, 
 and when Crompton's farther invention of the Mule Jenny 
 speedily followed,f the new order of things had been fairly in- 
 augurated. The great change had come, and the survivance 
 of the ancient domestic industries of so many centuries was no 
 longer possible. 
 
 And just as Hargreaves and Arkwrigh't and Crompton were 
 inventing the new machines which were to be moved, Watt 
 was laboring at the new Power which was to move them. But 
 meanwhile, before the Steam Engine had been made available, 
 the Factory system had begun under the old motive-power of 
 Water ; and here it is very curious to observe how each stage 
 in the progress of discovery had, by way of natural conse- 
 quence, its own special effect on the conduct and the Wills of 
 men. Very soon the course of every mountain stream in Lan- 
 cashire and Yorkshire was marked by Factories. This again 
 had another consequence. It was a necessity of the case that 
 such Factories must generally be situated at a distance from 
 pre-existing populations, and, therefore, from a full supply of 
 labor. Consequently they had to create communities for them- 
 selves. From this necessity, again, it arose that the earlier 
 mills were worked under a system of Apprenticeship. The 
 due attendance of the requisite number of "hands" was se- 
 cured by engagements which bound the laborer to his work for 
 a definite period. 
 
 And now for the first time appeared some of the conse- 
 quences of gregarious labor under the working of Natural Laws, 
 and under no restrictions from Positive Institution. The mill- 
 owners collected as Apprentices boys and girls, and youths and 
 men, and women, of all ages. In very many cases no provision 
 adequate, or even decent, was provided for their accommoda- 
 tion. The hours of labor were excessive. The ceaseless and 
 untiring agency of machines kept no reckoning of the exhaus- 
 tion of human nerves. The Factory system had not been many 
 years in operation when its effects were seen. A whole gener- 
 ation were growing up under conditions of Physical degener- 
 acy, of mental ignorance, and of moral corruption. 
 
 * 1769-71. 
 
208 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 The first public man to bring it under the notice of Parlia- 
 ment with a view to remedy, was, to his immortal honor, a 
 master manufacturer, to whom the new industry had brought 
 wealth, and power, and station. In 1802 the elder Sir Robert 
 Peel was the first to introduce a bill to interfere by law with the 
 natural effects of unrestricted competition in human labor. It 
 is characteristic of the slow progress of new ideas in the Eng- 
 lish mind, and of its strong instinct to adopt no measure which 
 does not stand in some clear relation to pre-existing laws, that 
 Sir Robert Peel's bill was limited strictly to the regulation of 
 the labor of Apprentices. Children and young persons who were 
 not Apprentices might be subject to the same evils, but for 
 them no remedy was asked or provided. The notion was, that 
 as Apprentices were already under Statutory provisions, and 
 were subjects of a legal contract, it was permissible that their 
 hours of labor should be regulated by positive enactment. But 
 the Parliament which was familiar with restrictions on the pro. 
 ducts of labor, and with restrictions of monopoly on labor itself 
 which restrictions were for the purpose of securing supposed 
 economic benefits, would not listen to any proposal to regulate 
 "free" labor for the purpose of avoiding even the most fright- 
 ful moral evils. These evils, however great they might be, 
 were the result of " natural laws," and were incident to the per- 
 sonal freedom of Employers and Employed. In the case of 
 Apprentices, however, it was conceded that restriction might 
 be tolerated. And so through this narrow door the first of the 
 Factory Acts was passed. It is a history which illustrates, in 
 the clearest light, the sense in which human conduct, both in- 
 dividually and collectively, is determined by Natural Law. If 
 Watt's Steam Engine had been invented earlier if mills had 
 not been at first erected away from the centres of population, in 
 order to follow the course of streams if consequently the evils 
 of the Factory system had not begun to be observable in the 
 labor of Apprentices, there is no saying how much longer those 
 evils might have been allowed to fester without even an asser- 
 tion of the right to check them. The Act of 1802,* though 
 useless in every other sense, was invaluable at least in making 
 this assertion. 
 
 * 42 and 43 Geo. III., cap. 73. 
 
LAW IN POLITICS. 
 
 Meanwhile Watt's great invention had been completed. And 
 now a new cycle of events began, arising by way of natural 
 consequence out of the Reign of Law. When the perfected 
 Steam Engine became applicable to mills, it was no longer al- 
 ways cheaper to erect them in rural districts ; on the contrary,, 
 it was often cheaper to have them in the towns, near a full sup- 
 ply of labor, and a cheap supply of fuel. With this change 
 came the abandonment of the system of Apprenticeship. It 
 was now "free " labor which more and more supplied the mills. 
 But this only led to the same evils in an aggravated form. 
 Children and women were especially valuable in the work of 
 mills. There were parts of the machinery which might be fed' 
 by almost infant " hands." The earnings of children became 
 an irresistible temptation to the parents. They were sent to 
 the factory at the earliest age, and they worked during the 
 whole hours that the machinery was kept at work. The result 
 of this system was soon apparent. In 1815, thirteen years af- 
 ter he had obtained the Act of 1802, Sir Robert Peel came 
 back to Parliament and told them that the former Act had be- 
 come useless that mills were now generally worked, not by 
 water, but by steam that Apprentices had been given up, but 
 that the same exhausting and demoralizing labor, from which' 
 Parliament had intended to relieve Apprentices, was the lot of 
 thousands and thousands of the children of the free poor. In the 1 
 following year, 1816, pressing upon the House of Commons a 
 new measure of restriction, he added, that unless the Legislat- 
 ure extended to these children the same protection which it 
 had intended to afford to the Apprentice class, it had come to> 
 this that the great mechanical inventions which were the glory 
 of the age would be a curse rather than a blessing to the coun- 
 try. These were strong words from a master manufacturer; 
 but they were not more strong than true.* 
 
 Thus began that great debate which in principle maybe said 
 to be not ended yet : the debate, how far it is legitimate or wise 
 in Positive Institution to interfere for moral ends with the free- 
 dom of the individual Will ? Cobbett denounced the opposi- 
 tion to restrictive measures as a contest of " Mammon against 
 
 *" Hansard Parl. Deb." vols. xxxi. and xxxiii. Sir Robert's Speech on Motion for 
 a Committee, April 3, 1816. 
 14 
 
210 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 Mercy." No doubt personal interests were strong in the form- 
 ing of opinion, and some indignation was natural against those 
 who seemed to regard the absolute neglect JJL" a whole genera- 
 tion, and the total abandonment of them to the debasing effects 
 of excessive toil, as nothing compared with the slightest check 
 on the accumulations of the Warehouse. But the opposition 
 was not in the main due either to selfishness or indifference. 
 False intellectual conceptions false views both of principle 
 and of fact were its real foundation. Some of the ablest men 
 in Parliament, who were wholly unaffected by any bias of per- 
 sonal interest, declared that nothing would induce them to in- 
 terfere with the labor which they called "free." Had not the 
 working classes a right to employ their children as they pleased ? 
 Who were better able to judge than fathers and mothers of the 
 capacities of their children ? Why interfere for the protection 
 of those who already had the best and most natural of all pro- 
 tections ? Such were some of the arguments against interfering 
 with free labor. 
 
 Now in what sense was this labor free ? It was free from 
 legal compulsion that is to say, it was free from that kind of 
 compulsion which arises out of the public Will of the whole 
 community imposed by authority upon the conduct of individ- 
 uals. But there was another kind of force from which this 
 labor was not free the force of overpowering motive operating 
 on the Will of the laborers themselves. If one parent, more 
 careful than others of the welfare of his children, and moved 
 less exclusively by the desire of gain, withdrew his children at 
 .an earlier hour than others from Factory Work, his children 
 were liable to be dismissed and not employed at all.* On the 
 other hand, motives hardly less powerful were in constant oper- 
 ation on the masters. The ceaseless, and increasing, and unre- 
 stricted competition amongst themselves, the eagerness with 
 which human energies rush into new openings for capital, for 
 enterprise, and for skill, made them, as a class, insensible to 
 the frightful evils which were arising from that competition for 
 the means of subsistence which is the impelling motive of labor. 
 
 Nor were there wanting arguments, founded on the constancy 
 
 *This was very forcibly explained, both by Sir Robert and by his son, Mr. Peel, in 
 fhe debate of Feb. 23, 1818. 
 
LAW IN POLITICS. 21 1 
 
 of Natural Laws, against any attempt on the part of Legislative 
 authority to interfere with the " freedom " of individual Will. 
 The competition between the possessors of capital was a com- 
 petition not confined to our own country. It was also an inter- 
 national competition. In Belgium especially, and in other 
 countries, there was the same rush along the new paths of in- 
 dustry. If the children's hours of labor were curtailed, it would 
 involve of necessity a curtailment also of the adult labor, which 
 would not be available when left alone. This would be a cur> 
 tailment of the working time of the whole mill ; and this would 
 involve a corresponding reduction of the produce. No similar 
 reduction of produce would arise in Foreign mills. In compe- 
 tition with them the margin of profit was already small. The 
 diminution of produce from restricted labor would destroy that 
 margin. Capital would be driven to countries where labor was 
 still free from such restrictions, and the result would be more 
 fatal to the interest of the working classes of the English towns 
 than any of the results arising from the existing hours of work. 
 All these consequences were represented as inevitable. They 
 must arise out of the operation of invariable laws. 
 
 Such were the arguments urged in every variety of form, 
 and supported by every kind of statistical detail by which the 
 first Factory Acts were vehemently opposed. 
 
 And, indeed, in looking back at the debates of that time, we 
 cannot fail to see that the reasoning of those who opposed 
 restriction on Free Labor met with no adequate reply. Not 
 only were the supporters of restriction hampered by a desire to 
 keep their conclusions within the scope of a very limited 
 measure ; not only were they anxious to repudiate consequences 
 which did legitimately follow from their own premises ; but they 
 were themselves really ignorant of the fundamental principles 
 which were at issue in the strife. Their conclusions were 
 arrived at through instincts of the heart. The pale faces of 
 little children, stunted and outworn, carried them to their re- 
 sult across every difficulty of argument, and in defiance of the 
 alleged opposition of inevitable laws. And yet, if the support- 
 ers of the Factory Acts had only known it, all true abstract 
 argument on the subject was their own. The conclusions to 
 
212 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 which they pointed were as true in the light of Reason, as they 
 felt them to be true in the light of Conscience. 
 
 The truth is, that some of the finest distinctions in Philos- 
 ophy were then for the first time emerging on the stage of 
 Politics. The newest debates of Parliament were circling uncon- 
 sciously round one of the oldest disputations of the Schools. 
 A question of practical legislation had arisen which involved 
 one of the most difficult problems in metaphysical analysis. On 
 the one hand, Freedom was asserted for the Will under con- 
 ditions and in a sense in which it did not exist. On the other 
 hand, Freedom was denied to the Will in a sense in which the 
 instincts of humanity testified to its presence, and to the possi- 
 bility of its being exerted with effect. The true Doctrine of 
 Necessity was exemplified in the conduct of Employers and 
 Employed that conduct being determined in a wrong direction 
 by the force of overpowering motives. The false Doctrine of 
 Necessity was exemplified in the argument, that this conduct 
 could not be changed under the force of higher motives assert- 
 ing themselves through the Will of the Community in the form 
 of Law. 
 
 The antagonism which was and still is so often assumed 
 between Natural Law and Human Law, or in other words 
 between Natural Law and Positive Institution, is an antagonism 
 which may indeed exist, and does very often exist. But it is 
 also an antagonism which may be eliminated, and must be 
 eliminated, if Legislation is ever to be attended with permanent 
 success. It is, alas, a Natural Law that men should be thoughtless 
 and selfish, and reckless of moral consequences, when they are 
 bent exclusively on material results. But when the consequences 
 of this conduct have been brought home to their convictions by 
 the force of imminent danger or of actual calamity, it is a law not 
 less natural that they should take alarm, that they should retrace 
 their steps, and that by walking in another course they should 
 bring about conditions of a better kind. The Laws of Man 
 are also Laws of Nature, when founded on a true perception of 
 natural tendencies and a just appreciation of combined results. 
 On the other hand, Human Laws are at variance with, or 
 antagonistic to the Laws of Nature, when founded either on 
 the desire of attaining a wrong end, or on the attempt to reach 
 
LAW IN POLITICS. 213 
 
 a right end by mistaken means. In either of these cases Posi- 
 tive Institution and Natural Law become opposed, and thus a 
 bad contrivance in Legislation, like a bad contrivance in me- 
 chanics, comes always to some dead-lock at last. Time and 
 Natural Consequence are great Teachers in Politics as in other 
 things. Our sins and our ignorances find us out. Both in con- 
 duct and in opinion Natural Law is ever working to convict 
 error, to reveal and to confirm the truth.* 
 
 And so it was that the sad phenomena of Factory labor were 
 beginning to indicate the great difference between the results 
 of perfect freedom of exchange in the products of labor and 
 the results of perfect freedom of competition in labor itself. 
 Perhaps that difference ought to have been foreseen, for the 
 cause of it is plain enough. There are certain results for the 
 attainment of which the natural instincts of individual men not 
 only may be trusted, but must be trusted as the best and in- 
 deed the only guide. There are other results of which as a 
 rule those instincts will take no heed whatever, and for the 
 attainment of which, if they are to be attained at all. the higher 
 faculties of our nature must impose their Will in authoritative 
 expressions of Human Law. In all that wide circle of opera- 
 tions which have for their immediate result the getting of 
 wealth, there is a sagacity and a cunning in the instincts of 
 labor and in the love of gain compared with which all legisla- 
 tive wisdom is ignorance and folly. But the instincts of labor, 
 having for their conscious purpose the acquisition of wealth, 
 are instincts which, under the stimulus and necessities of 
 modern society, are blind to all other results whatever. They 
 override even the love of life; they silence even the fear of 
 death. Trades in which the laborers never reach beyond 
 middle life trades in which the work is uniformly fatal within 
 a few years trades in which those who follow them are liable 
 to loathsome and torturing disease all are filled by the enlist- 
 ment of an unfailing series of recruits. If, therefore, there be 
 some things desirable or needful for a Community other than 
 the acquisition of wealth, if mental ignorance, and physical 
 degeneracy, be evils dangerous to social and political pros- 
 
 * 4i Opinionum enim commenta delet dies ; naturae judicia confirmat." Cicero, 
 " De Nat. Deor." lib. ii. c. 3. 
 
214 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 perity, then these results cannot and must not be trusted to the 
 instincts of individual men. And why ? Because the few 
 motives which bear upon them, and which consequently de- 
 termine their conduct, have become almost as imperious as the 
 motives which determine the conduct of the lower animals. Ob- 
 servers whose duties have called them to a close investigation of 
 the facts have never failed to be impressed with those facts as the 
 result of Laws against which the individual Will is unable to con- 
 tend. Overpowering motives arise out of the conditions of society 
 out of the force of habit out of the helplessness of poverty 
 out of the thoughtlessness of wealth out of the eagerness of 
 competition out of the very virtues even of industrial skill. 
 These constitute an aggregate of power tending in one direc- 
 tion, which make the resulting action of Mind as certain as the 
 action of Inanimate Force. " Thus," says Mr. Baker, one of 
 the most experienced of our Factory Inspectors, " most of the 
 workshops of this great commercial country are found to have 
 fallen into the inevitable track of competitive industry, when un- 
 restricted by law, namely, to cheapen prices by the employ- 
 ment of women and children in the first instance, and then to 
 increase production by protracted hours of work, without much 
 regard to age, to sex, or to physical capability." This is the 
 result of Nature of Nature, at least, such as ours now is. But 
 it is the result of that Nature with all its nobler powers allowed 
 to sleep. Power to control such evils has been given to Man, 
 and he is bound to use it. " Free labor, even in a free coun- 
 try," as Mr. Baker says, " requires the strong arm of the law 
 to protect it from the cupidity and ignorance of parents."* 
 And by the " strong arm of the law " is meant nothing but the 
 law of Conscience and of Reason asserting itself over the lower 
 instincts of our nature. If under such conditions of society 
 higher motives are ever to prevail, they must be supplied from 
 without, and must be imposed in authoritative form through 
 the legitimate organs of Positive Institution. f 
 
 And so the Factory Acts instead of being excused as excep- 
 
 * " Reports of the Inspectors of Factories, half-year Oct. 1864," p. 84. 
 
 t Bad as the consequences were of individual freedom under unrestricted compe- 
 tition in the case of labor in factories, the results were still more horrible in the case 
 of labor in mines. In 1842 it was found absolutely necessary to prohibit altogether 
 the labor of women and young children in mines and collieries. 
 
LAW IN POLITICS. 215 
 
 tional, and pleaded for as justified only under extraordinary 
 conditions, ought to be recognized as in truth the first Legisla- 
 tive recognition of a great Natural Law, quite as important as 
 Freedom of Trade, and which like this last, was yet destined 
 to claim for itself wider and wider application. 
 
 Accordingly, since the year when the first Sir Robert Peel 
 pleaded the cause of Factory Apprentices, there has been go- 
 ing on a double movement in Legislation, one a movement of 
 retreat, the other a movement of advance. Step by step Legis- 
 lation has retired from a Province once considered peculiarly 
 its own : step by step it has advanced into another Province 
 within which the Schools of Political Economy would have de- 
 nied it a foot of ground. Since 1802, there have been passed 
 a long series of laws removing, one after another, all restric- 
 tions which aimed at guiding the individual Will in its sharp 
 and sagacious pursuit of material wealth. During the same 
 period there have been passed another long series of Acts im- 
 posing restrictions more and more stringent on the individual 
 Will in its blind and reckless disregard of moral ends.* In 
 neither of these movements was Parliament impelled by the 
 light of reason, but under the blessed teaching which belongs 
 to the Reign of Law. False theory and mistaken conduct have 
 been found out by the working of Natural Consequence. The 
 abstract reasonings of Adam Smith had indeed long before pre- 
 pared the minds of a few to perceive the true theory of unre- 
 stricted competition in the interchange of goods. But as it 
 needed the practical results of restriction distress, discontent, 
 and the danger of civil commotion to bring home to the 
 national understanding the economic error of the old commer- 
 cial systems ; so also as regards the grievous results of unre- 
 
 *It was not till 1819 that Sir Robert Peel succeeded in passing an Act restricting" 
 the labor of unapprenticed children. This Act (59 Geo. III. c. 66) is therefore, prop- 
 erly speaking, the first of the Factory Acts the first which affirmed the principle of 
 restriction as legitimately applicable to " Free " Labor. But this, as well as a subse- 
 quent Act passed in 1825, at the instance of Sir J. Hobhouse, were practically inopera- 
 tive from defective enforcing clauses. It was thus apparent that the State must 
 charge itself not only with laying down the law, but also with the duty of seeing it 
 obeyed. It was not till this great question was taken in hand by Lord Ashley that 
 any effectual measure was passed. His Bill became Law in 1833, as 3 and 4 Will. IV. 
 c. 103. Nothing but a stringent system of Government Inspection was of any avail 
 against the powerful combination of motives, out of which the evils of the Factory 
 system arose. 
 
2l6 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 stricted competition in human labor, our only effective teach- 
 ing has been that of hard experience. The doctrines of Adam 
 Smith, when applied here, were a hindrance and not a help. 
 The Political Economists were, almost to a man, hostile to re- 
 strictive legislation. They did not see what would be the work, 
 ing of Natural Law upon the Human Will, when that Will was 
 exposed to overpowering motives under debased conditions of 
 understanding and of heart. They did not see the higher Law 
 which Parliament was asserting when it was driven by sheer 
 instinctive horror of actual results, to prohibit "free " laborers 
 from disposing as they pleased of the labor of their children. 
 
 To this hour the principle on which this great counter-move- 
 ment rests as. regards our ideas of the legitimate province of 
 Legislation, has never been philosophically treated. The Laws 
 on which it depends, and which it does but recognize, have never 
 been scientifically defined. We are still in a state of tutelage 
 advancing with slow and reluctant steps * in the path indicated 
 by the teachings of Natural Consequence. The last Report 
 on the Employment of Children shows that evils as bad as ever 
 existed before the passing of the Factory Acts, prevail at this 
 .moment among large classes of our operative population, and 
 demand again, as imperatively as before, an authoritative in- 
 terference of Positive Institution with the freedom of the indi- 
 vidual Will. The fact of such legislation has indeed gained a 
 sort of silent acquiescence, and some of the old opponents have 
 admitted that their fear of the results, in an economical point 
 of view, has proved erroneous. But there is still no clear and 
 well-grounded intellectual perception of the deep foundations of 
 
 * The steps here referred to are certainly becoming every year less slow and less re- 
 luctant. Since this work was published, the " Factory Acts' Extension Act " of 1867 
 has extended the provisions of those Acts to all establishments which employ fifty per- 
 sons ; and the u Workshop Regulation Act " of the same year, has carried the protec- 
 tion of the law into the precincts of " any room or place whatever in which any handi- 
 .craft is carried on." Nay more, it extends that protection even to children who are 
 working, not for wages at all, but only " under a parent." The principle of " State 
 interference " is here carried to its utmost length. It is characteristic of the cautious 
 and tentative character of English Legislation that it becomes gradually committed to 
 great general principles, not through any perception of the truth and value of those 
 principles in the abstract, but gradually, and through the compulsion of particular 
 necessities. And to the last possible moment the general application of such princi- 
 ples is always resisted. But no argument can be used in favor of compulsory educa- 
 tion, as regards children in u workshops," which is not equally applicable to all chil- 
 dren whatever. 
 
LAW IN POLITICS. 2 17 
 
 principle on which it rests. Nor is there among a large section 
 of Politicians any adequate appreciation of the powerful influ- 
 ence it has had in improving the physical condition of the peo- 
 ple, and securing their contentment with the Laws under which 
 they live. 
 
 When, however, we think for a moment of the frightful nature 
 of the evils which this Legislation has checked, and which to a 
 large extent it has remedied when we recollect the inevitable 
 connection between suffering and political disaffection when 
 we consider the great moral laws which were being trodden un- 
 der foot from mere thoughtlessness and greediness we shall 
 be convinced that if, during the last fifty years, it has been given 
 to this country to make any progress in Political Science, that 
 progress has been in nothing happier than in the Factory Leg- 
 islation. The names of those who strove for it, and through 
 whose faith and perseverance it was ultimately carried, are, and 
 ever will be, in the history of Politics, immortal names. No 
 Government and no Minister has ever done a greater perhaps, 
 all things considered, none has ever done so great a service. 
 It was altogether a new era in Legislation the adoption of a 
 new principle the establishment of a new idea. Nor is that 
 principle and that idea even now thoroughly understood. The 
 promptings of individual self-interest are still relied upon for the 
 accomplishment of good which it does not belong to them even to 
 suggest, and which they can never be trusted to pursue. Pro- 
 posals for legislative interference with a view to arrest some of 
 the most frightful evils of Society, are still constantly opposed, 
 not by careful analysis of their tendency, but by general asser- 
 tions of Natural Law as opposed to all legislation of the kind. 
 " You cannot make men moral by Act of Parliament " such 
 is a common enunciation of Principle, which, like many others 
 of the same kind, is in one sense a truism, and in every other 
 sense a fallacy. It is true that neither wealth, nor health, nor 
 knowledge, nor morality, can be given by Act of Parliament. 
 But it is also true that the acquisition of one and of all of these 
 can be impeded and prevented by bad laws, as well as aided 
 and encouraged by wise and appropriate legislation. 
 
 There is no doctrine in Physics more certainly true than this 
 doctrine in Politics that every practice which the authority of. 
 
2l8 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 Society recognizes or supports has its own train of consequences 
 which, for evil or for good, can be modified or changed in 
 an infinite variety of degrees according as that sanction is given 
 or withheld. Innumerable illustrations of this truth will arise, 
 wherever we take the trouble to trace any social or political 
 phenomena through the sequences of cause and effect from 
 which they come. Not unfrequently these illustrations are of a 
 melancholy kind, and give us much to think of respecting the 
 better understanding and the better management of our compli- 
 cated nature. Thus, for example, there seems good reason to be- 
 lieve there is a direct relation between the amount of life and 
 property annually sacrificed by shipwreck, and the legislation 
 which recognizes and sanctions Insurance to the full amount 
 of the value of ship and cargo. The cause of this is obvious. 
 Care for life is less eager and less wakeful than care for property. 
 This is true even when men are dealing equally with their own 
 property, and with their own lives. It is still more true when 
 they are dealing not only with property which is their own, but 
 with lives which belong to others. The inevitable effect of such 
 Insurance is therefore to relax the motives of self-interest, which 
 are the strongest incitements to precaution.* Similar results 
 appear in a thousand other cases, both of laws still existing, 
 and of laws which have been repealed. The conduct of men de- 
 pends on the balance of motives which are brought to bear upon 
 them. In supplying those motives, external conditions and 
 mental character act and react upon each other. Both of these 
 can be affected, and affected powerfully, by Positive Institution. 
 The restraints of Positive Institution are not, however, the 
 only means, very often they are not the best means by which 
 to lighten the overpowering pressure of particular motives upon 
 the individual Will. For as the Reason and the Conscience of 
 the whole Political Community can interfere by the exercise of 
 authority, so also may adequate remedies be found in the reason 
 and the conscience of Voluntary Societies. The external con- 
 ditions which tell upon the individual Will are themselves very 
 often nothing but conditions depending on the aggregate Will 
 
 * A curious and instructive Paper upon this subject has been published by Mr. Ed- 
 win Chadwick, having been read before a recent meeting of the Social Science Asso- 
 ciation. 
 
LAW IN POLITICS. 2 19 
 
 of those around us ; and if upon them, by any means, new mo- 
 tives can be brought to bear, then the whole of those external 
 conditions may be changed. The language which is used in the 
 name of Economic Science constantly involves in this matter 
 the same fallacy which has already been pointed out in the lan- 
 guage used in the name of Physical Science. It is often said 
 that the conduct and condition of men are governed by invari- 
 able laws ; and the conclusion is that the evils which arise by 
 way of natural consequence out of the action of those laws, are 
 evils against which the struggles of the Will are hopeless. But 
 the facts on which this conclusion is founded, are, as usual, in- 
 accurately stated. The conditions of human life and conduct, 
 like the conditions of all natural phenomena, are never governed 
 by those separate and individual forces which alone are invari- 
 able, but always by combinations among those forces which 
 combinations are of endless variety, and of endless capability 
 of change. Different motives arise out of the inborn gifts of 
 character, and out of the conditions of external circumstance. 
 It is true, indeed, that there are in the mind of Man, as there 
 are in Nature, certain forces originally implanted, which are un- 
 changeable in this sense, that they have an invariable tendency 
 to determine conduct in a particular direction. But as in Na- 
 ture we have a power of commanding her elementary forces by 
 the methods of adjustment, so in the Realm of Mind we can 
 operate on the same principle, by setting one motive to coun- 
 teract another : and by combination among many motives, we 
 caq influence in a degree, and to an extent as yet unknown, 
 the conduct and the condition of Mankind. 
 
 Nor are the resources of Contrivance limited to adjustment 
 among the motives which arise only out of existing conditions. 
 New motives can be evoked and put in action by the adopting 
 of appropriate means. The mere founding, for example, of a 
 Voluntary Society for any given purpose, evolves out of the 
 primary elements of human character a latent force of the most 
 powerful kind ; namely, the motive the sentiment the feeling 
 the passion as it often is, of the Spirit of Association. This 
 is a passion which defies analysis. The cynic may reduce 
 it to a form of selfishness and undoubtedly the identification 
 of the interests and the desires of Self with the Society for 
 
22O THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 which this passion is conceived, lies at its very root and is of 
 its ver} essence. It is true, also, that it is a passion so power- 
 ful as to need strong control without which control it gener- 
 ates some of the very meanest emotions of the heart. Out 
 of it there has come, and there comes again and again from age 
 to age, a spirit of hatred even against good itself, when that 
 good is the work of any one who " followeth not us." It is a 
 force, nevertheless, rooted in the Nature of Man, implanted 
 there as part of its constitution, and like all others of this char, 
 acter, given him for a purpose, and having its own legitimate 
 field of operation. Nor is that field a narrow one. The spirit 
 of Association is the fountain of much that is noblest in human 
 character, and of much that is most heroic in human conduct. 
 For all the desires and aspirations of Self are not selfish. The 
 interests of Self, justly appreciated and rightly understood, may 
 be, nay indeed must be, the interests also of other men of 
 Society of Country of the Church, and of the World. 
 
 And so it is that when the aim of any given Association is a 
 high aim, directed to ends really good, and seeking the attain- 
 ment of them by just methods of procedure, the spirit it evokes 
 becomes itself a new " Law " a special force operating power- 
 fully for good on the mind of every individual subject to its in- 
 fluence. Some pre-existing motives it modifies some it neu- 
 tralizes some it suppresses altogether some it compels to 
 work in new directions. But in all cases the Spirit of Associa- 
 tion is in itself a power a force a Law in the Realm of Mind. 
 What it can do, and what it cannot do, in affecting the condi- 
 tions of Society, is a problem not to be solved so easily and so 
 summarily as some dogmatists in political philosophy would 
 have us to believe. It is a question which, like so many others, 
 is not likely to be solved by abstract reasoning without the help 
 of actual experiment. And this experiment is being tried. 
 The instincts of men, truer often than the conclusions of phi- 
 losophy, have rebelled against the doctrine that they are the 
 sport of circumstances. Yet finding by hard experience that 
 this is often true of the individual Will when standing by 
 itself, they have resolved to try whether it is equally true of 
 the Collective Will, guided by the spirit and strengthened un- 
 der the discipline of Association. Hence the phenomena of 
 
LAW IN POLITICS. 221 
 
 Combination as a means of affecting the condition of labor 
 phenomena so alarming to many minds, and certainly so well 
 deserving of attention. Let us look for a moment at the im- 
 portant illustrations of the Reign of Law which these phe- 
 nomena afford. 
 
 A moment's consideration will convince us that the same 
 necessities of labor which were found to determine so fatally 
 the condition of women and children, are necessities which 
 apply without any abatement to the labor of adult men. They 
 must be subject to the same pressure of inducements. Nay, 
 more, it is only through them that this pressure can reach the 
 women who are their wives, and the children who are their 
 children. If overpowering motives did not equally determine 
 the conduct and condition of adult men, no legislation would 
 have been required for the protection of their families. If a 
 man is placed under such conditions that he cannot save his 
 wife and child from exhausting labor, it is certain that the same 
 conditions will impose a like necessity upon himself. Never- 
 theless, Parliament has resolutely and wisely refused to inter- 
 fere on his behalf. And why ? Because the argument is that 
 the adult man is able, or ought to be able, to defend himself. 
 And so he can ; but how ? Only by combination. The " law " 
 which results in excessive labor is the law of competition that 
 is, it is the attraction exerted upon the Wills of a multitude 
 of individual men by the rewards of labor. The pressure of 
 this attraction can only be lightened by bringing those Wills 
 under the power of counter motives, which may induce them to 
 postpone, to some higher interest, the immediate appetites of 
 gain. And this is the work which Combination does. It comes 
 in the place of Positive Institution. Those who are under it 
 " are a Law unto themselves." 
 
 Nor is it unimportant to observe that what Combination 
 does for the protection of labor, it does better, and with better 
 consequences, than Positive Institution can ever do. Men are 
 driven to excessive labor, because if they don't work exces- 
 sively, others will. But it is the effect of Combination that 
 others won't. Under Positive Institution they are not allowed. 
 Under Combination they are determined not. And as the 
 forming of an intelligent resolution, and the abiding by it, are 
 
222 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 higher exercises of mind than the mere passive obedience 
 to authority, .so is the good effected by Combination a higher 
 good than that resulting from Factory Legislation. It tends 
 to form and to strengthen character. It tends to subordi- 
 nate the present to the future, and the temporary interests of 
 Self to the permanent welfare of a Brotherhood of men. And 
 this it tends to do in classes otherwise prone to follow only 
 the impulse of the moment, and to consider only the apparent 
 interests of the individual. 
 
 These considerations should disabuse our minds of the un- 
 just and unreasonable prejudice against the principle of Com- 
 bination which still betrays itself so strongly in the language of 
 many politicians. When the Working Classes combine for the 
 protection of their own labor against the effects of unrestricted 
 competition, they are simply taking that course which is recom- 
 mended alike by reason and by experience. It is the course 
 which Parliament has indicated as the right course both by 
 what it has itself done, and by what it has declined to do. Nor 
 can there be any greater mistake than to suppose that this 
 course involves necessarily any rebellion against the laws of 
 economic science. Combination is an appeal to the most 
 fundamental of all Natural Laws to the law of Contriv- 
 ance to the power of Adjustment wielding, through Reason 
 and Conscience, the elementary forces of Human Character. 
 Of the constancy and " invariability " of these no doubt or de- 
 nial is involved. Rather the reverse. It is upon instinctive 
 trust in that constancy that all social and political Contriv- 
 ance rests. And so we need not be surprised to find that, 
 through the organized efforts of communities of men, the 
 evils which arise by way of natural consequence out of the 
 helplessness and thoughtlessness of the individual Will, are 
 evils which to a large extent can be met and overcome. 
 
 But though all this is true, universally, of the principle of 
 Combination, it is vary far from being true, universally, of the 
 particular purposes to which Combination is applied. All the 
 sources of error which have so long perverted Legislation, are 
 equally powerful in perverting the aims, and in misdirecting the 
 efforts of Voluntary Association. If the upper classes, with all 
 the advantages of leisure, and of culture, and of learning, 
 
LAW IN POLITICS. 223 
 
 have been so unable, as we have seen them to be, to measure 
 the effect of the laws they made, how much more must we ex- 
 pect errors and misconceptions of the most grievous kind to 
 beset the action of those who through poverty and ignorance, 
 and often through much suffering have been able to do little 
 more than strike blindly against evils whose pressure they could 
 feel, but whose root and remedy they could neither see nor 
 understand ? 
 
 Accordingly, the history of Combination among the Working 
 Classes has, until a very recent period, been a sad history of 
 misdirected effort of strength put forth only in violence and 
 disorder, and of the virtues of Brotherhood lost in tyrannical 
 suppression of all individual freedom. Its heaviest blows 
 have been often aimed at the most powerful agencies for good. 
 One of the very earliest forms of Combination has been that 
 which was directed against the introduction and improvements 
 of machinery. The Working Classes have always encountered 
 with jealousy and fear those triumphs of Mechanical Invention 
 whose function it is to economize labor and to multiply the 
 fruits of industry, It would be hard to blame them. What 
 class is there which can say with truth that they have themselves 
 been able always to follow with intelligent foresight the links 
 of Natural Consequence through the darkness into which they 
 so often lead ? For almost every great step in the advance of 
 civilization plunges at first through some passage which seems 
 dangerous, or at least obscure. The happiest achievements of 
 Contrivance have their own aspects of apparent danger, and 
 their own real incidents of temporary evil. Every new machine 
 displaces and disorganizes pre-existing forms of labor ; and we 
 have seen that, even in its ultimate effects, the advance of 
 Mechanical Invention developed new dangers to the Working 
 Classes dangers only to be avoided by measures which were 
 not taken, and by precautions which were not adopted. 
 
 It would be well if, from the past convicted errors, both of 
 Legislation and of Combination, we could extract some con- 
 clusions of general principle capable of helping us in the 
 difficulties of our own time. In looking at the root of those 
 errors, it would seem that, in order to avoid them, two things 
 are necessary first, unshaken faith in great Natural Lawsj 
 
224 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 and, secondly, a faith not less assured in the free agency of 
 Man to secure by appropriate means the working of those laws 
 for good. Thus, the love of gain is an instinct implanted in 
 the human mind, and the endeavor to suppress it has always 
 been the violation of a Natural Law. In like manner, Mechan- 
 ical Invention is a Law of Nature in the highest and strictest 
 sense. The power of it and the love of it are among the 
 elementary forces of human character. Each fresh exertion 
 of it is, and must be, according to the constitution and course 
 of Nature leading to higher and higher fulfilments of the 
 original Purpose of Man's Creation, which was, that he should 
 not only inhabit the Earth, as the beasts inhabit it, but that he 
 should subdue it. 
 
 So also combination is natural to Man. The desire for it 
 and the need of it, grow with the growth of knowledge and 
 with the increasing complications of Society. It has now, for 
 the most part, emerged from the stage of rude ignorance which 
 led to the breaking of machinery. It is conducted, compara- 
 tively at least, with high intelligence, and aims for the most 
 part at legitimate objects of desire. Yet in the rebellion which 
 has been roused against the doctrines of Necessity, founded on 
 false conceptions of Invariable Law, there is a constant danger 
 lest the Spirit of Association should attempt to act against 
 Nature instead of acting with it. There is, for example, a Law 
 an observed order of facts in respect to Man, which the 
 working Classes too often forget, but which can neither be 
 violated nor neglected with impunity. That Law is the Law of 
 inequality the various degrees in which the gifts both of Body 
 and of Mind are shared among men. This is one of the most 
 fundamental facts of human nature. Nor is it difficult to see 
 how it should be also one of the most beneficent. But it is a 
 fact against which the spirit of combination is very apt to 
 assume an attitude of permanent insurrection. It is, of course, 
 the business and the function of Combination to subordinate in 
 some things the Individual to the Class ; and the temptation is 
 to make that subordination exclusive and complete. Hence 
 the jealousy so often shown of wages measured by the amount 
 of work performed. This is a jealousy of the superiority of 
 reward which is naturally due to superiority of power, of indus- 
 
LAW IN POLITICS. 
 
 22 S 
 
 try, or of skill. But these are things which God has joined to- 
 gether, and which no man or combination of men have a right 
 to put asunder. It is a marriage made in the morning of the 
 world, and in every step of human progress we see its blessing 
 and its fruit. If it be stupid to break machines and to pro- 
 scribe Mechanical Invention, it is not less stupid to be jealous 
 of this primeval adjustment between the varying energies of 
 human character and the varying results which they are com- 
 petent to attain. 
 
 This is not the place to enter in detail on the difficult and 
 complicated question as to the limits within which Combina- 
 tions can, and beyond which they cannot, affect the rewards of 
 labor. They have certainly succeeded in limiting the hours 
 of labor in cases where Legislation could not well have inter- 
 fered ; * and wherever the hours of labor are reduced without a 
 corresponding reduction in wages, a substantial economic advan- 
 tage is unquestionably secured. Equal confidence is expressed 
 by many Associations, that as a matter of experience and of fact, 
 they have succeeded in establishing higher rates of wages than 
 would have accrued under the system of unrestricted competi- 
 tion. This may very well be true. It is a truth which casts no 
 doubt whatever on the invariability of Economic Laws when 
 these are rightly understood. They are invariable in the same 
 sense, and in no other, in which all other Natural Laws are in- 
 variable. That is to say, they represent tendencies in human 
 character determined by motives, which tendencies are con- 
 stant, and may surely be relied on as producing always, under 
 like conditions, their own appropriate effects. It is upon this 
 constancy that Combination must rely for any power it can 
 ever have ; and it is the same constancy in the action of 
 specific motives which sets bounds to the power of Combina- 
 tion, beyond which it can never pass. The same motive which 
 impels the Workman to secure an adequate reward for his 
 
 * Of this the Baking Trade is a good example. The hours of adult labor in this, 
 trade, under the effects of unrestricted competition, had come to be most injurious 
 and oppressive. In Glasgow and in Edinburgh this condition of things has been- 
 effectually remedied by a Combination, whose exertions were successful, without (I 
 believe) resort being ever had to the extreme measure of a Strike. The Baking Trade 
 in London is still afflicted by the same oppressive hours of labor, because of the 
 difficulty which has hitherto been experienced in organizing there any Combination 
 equally complete 
 I? 
 
226 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 labor, impels the Manufacturer or the Trader to secure an 
 adequate reward for his capital, his knowledge, and his skill. 
 And although the desire of gain is not the only motive, and is 
 often not the strongest motive, which impels men to persevere 
 in enterprises once begun, yet if Combinations of Workmen 
 should attempt to raise wages so high as to trench upon the 
 minimum rate of profit which will induce men to carry on any 
 given trade, then by a natural consequence, not less certain than 
 any other, capital and enterprise and skill will be withdrawn 
 from that trade, and those who depend upon it will be the first 
 to suffer. Short, however, of this extreme result, there is 
 generally a margin of ground upon which Combination may 
 act with more or less effect. It may prevent arbitrary or 
 capricious changes ; and as there are practically many impedi- 
 ments in the way of men moving their capital from one employ- 
 ment to another, Combination may compel them to submit to 
 lower rates of profit than would otherwise content them if those 
 difficulties did not exist. 
 
 But to all these possibilities of influence there is a limit in the 
 nature of things in Natural Laws that is, in the new motives 
 which are brought into operation by new conditions. What that 
 limit is, it must always be difficult to determine except by actual 
 experiment. It is enough here to observe that in this, as in 
 every other department of human conduct, men are being led 
 gradually to a knowledge of the truth by the teachings of Nat- 
 ural Consequence. It is by the experience of actual results that 
 we are taught both as to the objects which are legitimate objects 
 of desire, and as to the proper methods by which these may be 
 attained. The very attempt of the Working Classes to govern 
 through Combination their own affairs, and to determine their 
 own condition, is an Education in itself. On the extended scale 
 in which that attempt is being made, it must accustom them to 
 consider great general causes, and to estimate the manner and 
 the degree in which these can be effected by the methods of 
 Adjustment. Last, not least, it must lead them to study and to 
 recognize the moral duties which are indeed the most funda- 
 mental of all Natural Laws. For it ought to be remembered, 
 that the first and most important object of Combinations is one 
 against which there can be no opposition founded on the doc- 
 
LAW IN POLITICS. 227 
 
 trines of Economic Science. That object is to secure for the 
 Working Classes those provisions against misfortune, sickness, 
 accident, and age, which are amongst the first duties of all or- 
 ganized societies of men. How far through such agency the 
 causes of pauperism may be successfully attacked, is a question 
 on which we are only entering. In like manner, the conditions 
 and limitations under which Combination may succeed in blend- 
 ing the functions and in uniting the profits of Capital and of 
 Labor this also is a question to be determined by Natural 
 Laws, not yet fully explored or understood. But enough is 
 known, and results sufficiently determinate have already been 
 secured, to convince us that in this great department of Natural 
 Law, as in every other, the Will of Man is not powerless when 
 its energies are directed by wisdom, and when the choice of its 
 methods is founded upon knowledge. 
 
 This is, indeed, the great lesson to be learnt from every in- 
 quiry into the constitution and course of things. Nature is a 
 great Armory of weapons, and implements, for the service and 
 the use of Will. Many of them are too ponderous for Man to 
 wield. He can only look with awe on the tremendous Forces 
 which are everywhere seen yoked under the conditions of Ad- 
 justment on the smoothness of their motions, on the magni- 
 tude and the minuteness, on the silence and the perfection, of 
 their work. But there are also many weapons hung upon the 
 walls which lend themselves to human hands lesser tools which 
 Man can use. He cannot alter or modify them in shape or 
 pattern in quality, or in power. The fashion of them and the 
 nature of them are fixed forever. These are, indeed, invariable. 
 Only if we know how to use them, then that use is ours. Then 
 also the lesser contrivances which we can set in motion are ever 
 found to work in perfect harmony with the vaster mechanisms 
 which are moving overhead. And as in the material world no 
 effort gives so fully the sense of work achieved as the subjuga- 
 tion of some Natural Force under the command of Will, so in 
 the world of Mind no triumphs of the Spirit are happier than 
 those by which some natural tendency of Human Character is 
 led to the accomplishment of a purpose which is wise and good. 
 It is for the gaining of these triumphs that Man has been gifted 
 with the desire of Knowledge, and with the sense of Right, 
 
228 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 and with the faculties of Contrivance. In such triumphs lie the 
 aim and purpose of all Natural Laws for these they were all 
 established for these they all work, whether by way of encour- 
 agement, or of restraint, or of retribution. 
 
 Nothing is more striking in the history of Discovery than the 
 ages during which men have been blind to the suggestions of 
 Natural Law suggestions which now appear so obvious that 
 we wonder how the interpretation of them could have been 
 missed so long. It is very easy to feel this wonder concerning 
 others ; it is much more difficult to remember that the same won- 
 der will certainly be felt concerning ourselves. Such as we now 
 see to have been the position of former generations in respect 
 to things which they failed to understand, such, we may de- 
 pend upon it, is precisely our own position in regard to innumer- 
 able phenomena now constantly passing before our eyes. We 
 may be sure of this ; and we ought to be as glad of it as we are 
 sure. For the world is not so prosperous or so happy as that we 
 should readily or willingly believe in the exhaustion of the means 
 which are at our disposal for its better guidance. Especially in 
 the great Science of Politics, which investigates the complicated 
 forces whose action and reaction determine the condition of Or- 
 ganized Societies of men, we are still standing, as it were, only 
 at the break of day. Our command over the external elements 
 of Nature is, beyond all comparison, in advance of our com- 
 mand over the resources of Human Character. 
 
 Special causes retard the progress of knowledge in this de- 
 partment of inquiry. Many problems so difficult and intricate 
 that they never can be solved except by patient observation, pa- 
 tient thought, and yet more patient action, are as yet hardly 
 recognized to be problems at all. We look on the facts of Na- 
 ture and of human life through the dulled eyes of Custom and 
 Traditional Opinion. And when some misery worse than 
 others forces itself upon the acknowledgment of the world, men 
 are slow to discover or admit their own power over the sources 
 whence such miseries come to be. That which is needed to 
 open our eyes to such questions, is not mere intellectual power. 
 Rarer and finer qualities have this work to do. Among the char- 
 acteristics of the individual men who have exerted the most 
 powerful influence for good on the condition of Society, no 
 
LAW IN POLITICS. 229 
 
 
 
 quality has been more remarkable than a certain natural open- 
 ness and simplicity of mind. Readiness to entertain, willing- 
 ness to accept, and enthusiasm to pursue, a new idea, have al- 
 ways been among the most fruitful gifts of genius. 
 
 Is it vain to hope that the thoughtfulness and candor which 
 have been the natural inheritance of a few, may yet be more 
 common among all educated men ? The whole constitution and 
 course of things would receive an earlier fulfilment did we carry 
 about with us an habitual belief in the inexhaustible treasures 
 which it holds in the power of the agencies which it offers to 
 Knowledge and Contrivance. For then the results of Natural 
 Consequence would be accepted for that which they teach, and 
 not simply submitted to for that which they inflict. The dis- 
 orders of Society would not so often be supinely regarded as the 
 result of inevitable laws, but would be seen as the fruit always 
 of some ignorance or of some rebellion ; and so the exhilarating 
 conviction would be ours, that those disorders are within the 
 reach of remedy through larger Knowledge and a better Will. 
 
 We hear much now of the " blessed light of Science , " * and 
 if the methods and conditions of Physical inquiry were applied 
 in a really philosophical spirit to Spiritual Phenomena, the in- 
 fluence of Science for good would be more powerful than it is. 
 Meanwhile it is well to remember that although readiness to ac- 
 cept a new idea is essential to Discovery, it is equally true that 
 new dangers beset and surround all new aspects of the truth. 
 Paradoxical as it may sound to say so, this is a consequence of 
 the splendor of Man's endowments, of his freedom from direc- 
 tion, of the swiftness and the subtlety of his mental powers. 
 On her own narrow path Instinct is a surer guide than Reason, 
 and accordingly it is often the higher faculties of the mind 
 which are the most misleading. The Speculative Faculty is im- 
 patient of waiting upon Knowledge, and is ever as busy and as 
 ingenious in finding out new -paths of error as in supplying new 
 interpretations of the truth. Hence in Philosophy the most 
 extravagant errors have been constantly associated with the 
 happiest intuitions, and it has remained for the successors of 
 great men in another generation to separate their discoveries 
 from their delusions. Hence also in Politics the great move- 
 
 * See a remarkable passage in the concluding pages of " Ecce Homo." 
 
230 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 ments of Society have seldom been accomplished without rais- 
 ing many false interpretations of the Past, and many extrava- 
 gant anticipations of the Future.* It cannot, indeed, be said 
 with truth that the calamities of Nations have generally arisen 
 from too great play being given to novel or theoretical conclu- 
 sions. Rather the reverse. They have arisen, for the most 
 part, from too little attention being paid to the progress of opin- 
 ion, and to the insensible development of new conditions. 
 
 The question has been often raised, whether there is any law 
 of growth, of progress, and of decay prevailing over Nations, 
 as over individual Organisms. Whatever the solution of this 
 question may be, it is certain that some causes are no longer in 
 existence which produced not indeed the corruption, but the 
 final overthrow of the great historical Nations of Antiquity. 
 The epoch of conquering Races destroying the Governments, 
 and reconstructing the Populations of the World, is an epoch 
 which has passed away. Whatever causes there may be now of 
 political decline are causes never brought to such rough detec- 
 tion, and never ending in catastrophes so complete. Yet, in 
 modern days a condition of stagnation and decline has been 
 the actual condition of many Political Societies for long periods 
 of time. It is a condition prepared always by ignorance or 
 neglect of some moral or economic laws, and determined by 
 long-continued perseverance in a corresponding course of con- 
 duct. Then the laws which have been neglected assert them- 
 selves, and the retributions they inflict are indeed tremendous. 
 In the last generation, and in our own time, the Old and the 
 New Worlds have each afforded memorable examples of the 
 Reign of Law over the course of Political events. Institutions 
 maintained against the natural progress of Society have " foun- 
 dered amidst fanatic storms." Other institutions upheld and 
 cherished against justice, and humanity, and conscience, have 
 yielded only to the scourge of War. 
 
 It is in the wake of such convulsions that reactions of opinion 
 so often sweep over the Human Mind, as hurricanes sweep 
 over the surface of the Sea. But whatever new forms of error 
 are begotten of reaction, it is a comfort to believe that there 
 
 * " Nos peres en 1789 ont ete condamnes passer des perspectives du Paradis aux 
 scenes de 1'Enfer." Guizot, " L'Eglise et la Soci^te," p. 218. 
 
LAW IN POLITICS. 231 
 
 are always some steps gained which are never lost. No man 
 can look back on the history of modern civilization without see- 
 ing that it presents the phenomena of development and growth. 
 Nor can it be doubted, surely, that whatever may be the decline 
 of particular Communities, the progress of mankind, on the 
 whole, is a progress to higher and better things. And if this 
 be true, no particular exceptions should shake our faith in the 
 general rule that all safe progress depends on timely recognition 
 being given to the natural developments of Thought. They 
 can never be resisted in the end, and they are most liable to 
 take erroneous directions when they are resisted long. For 
 this is among the most certain of all the laws of Man's nature 
 that his conduct will in the main be guided by his moral and 
 intellectual convictions. " All human society is grounded on a 
 system of fundamental opinions." Such is the Law arrived at 
 by the newest of modern Philosophies,* and it would be well if 
 all its discoveries were as near the truth. This is the Law to 
 which Christianity appeals, and in which its very roots are laid, 
 when it asserts, as no other Religion has ever asserted, the 
 power and virtue of Belief. And in this Law lies the error 
 which those commit who imagine they can hold by the Ethics 
 of Christianity, whilst regarding with comparative indifference 
 its History and its Creed. This, too, is the Law which lends 
 all their importance to the speculations of Philosophy. False 
 conceptions of the truth, in apparently the most distant prov- 
 inces of Thought, may and do relax the most powerful springs 
 of action. Among these false conceptions of the truth, none 
 are now more prevalent than those which concern the defini- 
 tion, and the function and the power of " Law." Instead of 
 regarding the Constancy of Nature as incompatible with the 
 energies of Will, we must learn to see in it the most powerful 
 stimulus to inquiry, and the most cheering encouragement to 
 exertion. 
 
 The superstition which saw in all natural phenomena the ac- 
 tion of capricious Deities was not more irrational than the su- 
 perstition which sees in them nothing but tfye action of Invari- 
 able Law. Men have been right and not wrong, when they saw 
 in the facts of Nature the Variability of Adjustment even more 
 
 * "The Positive Philosophy of Aug. Comte," by J. S. Mill, p. 301. 
 
232 THE REIGN OF LAW. 
 
 clearly and more surely than they saw the Constancy of Force. 
 They were right when they identified these phenomena with the 
 phenomena of Mind. They were right when they regarded 
 their own faculty of Contrivance as the nearest and truest anal- 
 ogy by which the Constitution of the Universe can be conceived 
 and its order understood. They were right when they regarded 
 its arrangements as susceptible of Change , and when they 
 looked upon a change of Will as the efficient cause of other 
 changes without number and without end. It was well to feel 
 this by the force of Instinct ; it is better still to be sure of it in 
 the light of Reason. It is an immense satisfaction to know 
 that the result of Logical Analysis does but confirm the testi- 
 mony of Consciousness, and run parallel with the primeval 
 Traditions of Belief. It is an unspeakable comfort that when 
 we come to close quarters with this vision of Invariable Law 
 seated on the Throne of Nature, we find it a phantom and a 
 dream a mere nightmare of ill-digested Thought, and of 
 " God's great gift of speech abused." We are, after all, what 
 we thought ourselves to be. Our freedom is a reality, and not 
 a name. Our faculties have in truth the relations which they 
 seem to have to the Economy of Nature. Their action is a 
 real and substantial action on the Constitution and Course of 
 things. The Laws of Nature were not appointed by the great 
 Lawgiver to baffle His creatures in the sphere of Conduct, still 
 less to confound them in the region of Belief. As parts of an 
 Order of things too vast to be more than partly understood, 
 they present, indeed, some difficulties which perplex the intel- 
 lect, and a few also, it cannot be denied, which wring the heart. 
 But, on the whole, they stand in harmonious relations with the 
 Human Spirit. They come visibly from One pervading Mind, 
 and express the authority of one enduring Kingdom. As re- 
 gards the moral ends they serve, this, too, can be clearly seen, 
 that the purpose of all Natural Laws is best fulfilled when they 
 are made, as they can be made, the instruments of intelligent 
 Will, and the servants of enlightened Conscience. 
 
NOTES. 
 
 NOTE A. PAGE 28. 
 
 THE article by Mr. Wallace in the Jotirnal of Science (No. XVI.) for Oct. 
 1867, on " Creation by Law," implies much misconception of the whole 
 drift and aim of the observations I have made on Mr. Darwin's " Theory 
 of the Origin of Species." 
 
 Two separate questions arise in respect to that Theory : 
 
 ist. Does it adequately explain the Physical Agencies by which new 
 Forms have come to be ? 
 
 2d. Does it, wen if successful in this explanation, supplant or impair the 
 argument for Purpose and Design, as founded both on the results and on 
 the methods of Creation ? 
 
 Of these questions, which are entirely distinct, the last is by far the most 
 important of the two : and this second question is the one which I have 
 chiefly dealt with in the " Reign of Law." As regards the first question, 
 indeed, I have indicated my opinion that the explanation of Physical 
 Agencies is very far from being complete, and that the hypothesis can 
 always be driven back to some starting point where the very condition of 
 things is assumed for which the theory professes to account. In this edition, 
 and in answer to Mr. Wallace's challenge, I have added some farther indi- 
 cation of the difficulties which remain unsolved, and indeed untouched. 
 
 But my main argument has been addressed to the second question, and 
 has been aimed chiefly at this conclusion that even supposing the theory 
 to be established, so far as it can go, it cannot affect or disturb the insep- 
 arable relation which exists between the intricate adjustments of Nature 
 and Mental Purpose as their sole conceivable origin and cause. In re- 
 spect to this argument, Mr. Wallace virtually admits all I have maintained, 
 when he says, " It is simply a question of how the Creator has worked." * 
 I have said nothing of " incessant interference," of " continual re-arrange- 
 ment of details," or of " the direct action of the Mind and Will of the Creator." 
 On the contrary, I have said that no purpose is ever attained in Nature 
 except by the enlistment of Laws as the means and instruments of 
 attainment ; t that although Law " is never present as a master, it appears 
 never to have been absent as a servant," f that we have " no certain reason 
 to believe that God ever works otherwise than through the use of means ; " 
 
 * Journal of Science, p. 473. t P. 100. $ P. 208. 
 
234 NOTES. 
 
 
 
 or, in other words, through the instrumentality of those elementary forces- 
 or properties of matter and of mind which we call " Laws." The idea of 
 " incessant interference," is one which I hold to be essentially erroneous. 
 It involves the idea of natural forces being agencies altogether external to, 
 and independent of, the Creative Mind. This is the very idea to which 
 Mr. Wallace himself gives expression in its extremest form, when he limits the 
 function of the Creator to that of so co-ordinating general laws " at the first 
 introdiidion of life upon the earth," * as that they shall work " of neces- 
 sity " and " by themselves " the results we see. This is unquestionably the 
 way in which they appear to us to work. It remains true that " no man hath 
 seen God at any time." But even this conception does not make the word 
 " contrivance " (to which Mr. Wallace objects) less applicable to the ad- 
 justments of nature. On the contrary, it makes it more strictly and literally 
 applicable than any other conception, because it likens the creative process 
 more closely to those methods adopted by human ingenuity, to which the 
 word contrivance specially refers. The highest efforts of that ingenuity are 
 precisely those in which natural forces are made to work " necessarily " and 
 "by themselves." Self-acting machines are the most ingenious machines of 
 all. The self-action of the "governor " in a Steam-engine is the most beau- 
 tiful of the contrivances by which the elementary expansivQjforce of steam 
 is made to do the work of Will. Mr. Wallace thinks it " aw extraordinary 
 idea to imagine the Creator of the Universe contriving the various compli- 
 cated parts of an Orchis, as a mechanic might contrive an ingenious toy or 
 puzzle." t But this is precisely the idea he himself supports, when he re- 
 duces the Creator's work to the first starting of the forces of organic life, 
 and to the foresight merely of the consequences which must naturally and 
 necessarily arise from their first co-ordination. This is an accurate descrip- 
 tion of the method in which a mechanic contrives the most ingenious self- 
 operating machines. No doubt the idea of Omnipresence, which is the 
 distinctive idea of God's work as distinguished from Man's work, is an idea 
 which it is difficult for us to grasp or to keep steadily in view. I do not 
 deny or dispute that " self-action " is and must be the aspect in which Nature 
 presents herself to us. It could not be otherwise, unless the Invisible 
 were to become the object of sight and touch. But in proportion as we 
 appreciate the infinite intricacy of Natural Adjustments, in the same pro- 
 portion do we estimate the impossibility of conceiving them as the result 
 of Mechanical Necessity, which indeed is an inadequate explanation even 
 of our own methods of operation upon the material world. 
 
 Mr. Wallace's article is an excellent example of the arguments used in 
 support of the Darwinian theory, both in their strength and in their weak- 
 ness. Their strength lies in the hold they have of the idea and of the fact 
 that nature is one vast system of Invisible Forces in a condition of mutual 
 adjustment. Their weakness lies in the idea that the methods of that 
 adjustment can ever be explained as the result of mechanical necessity, or 
 of the mere elementary properties of matter working " by themselves." 
 
 * Journal of Science^ p. 474. t Ibid. 
 
NOTES. 235 
 
 NOTE B. PAGE 51. 
 
 Although the distinction I have made between Purpose as a general in- 
 ference, and Purpose as a particular fact, is a distinction which seems to 
 me to be clear enough when it is pointed out ; yet it may be well to 
 give some further illustrations here which could not be conveniently added 
 to the text. What Positivists profess to insist upon is, that in describing a 
 scientific fact, we shall not import into it ideas which it does not necessa- 
 rily involve, and which are in the nature of inferences from the fact. 
 What we, their opponents, have an equal right to insist on is this that in 
 describing scientific facts, the description must not Delude any of the ideas 
 which the facts do involve, and that the full and adequate description of 
 those facts be not evaded in order to keep out an idea which the describer 
 may choose to call an inference. Let us take an illustration. Let us sup- 
 pose that we find a tube placed anyhow in such a position that we can look 
 through it to the sky at night. We do so, and we see a star. The facts 
 may be such that this description fully exhausts them. That the tube was 
 intended to bear upon that particular star, or upon any star, would be a 
 mere inference. But now let us suppose that, when we look again after some 
 considerable interval of time, we find that the tube still bears upon the 
 same star, and let us further suppose the same experiment repeated with 
 the same result during some hours, then we should not describe the fact 
 fully by simply stating that the tube bore upon the star. It would be nec- 
 essary, in order to exhaust the facts, to say that the tube was so adjusted as 
 to folltnv the apparent motion of the sidereal heavens, and so to counteract 
 the natural effects of the earth's motion as to keep its axis always upon the 
 same star. Here instantly we have the language of intention, because the 
 idea of intention is inseparable from the facts. We might know nothing of 
 the method by which this adjustment is achieved nothing more of the 
 Mind that had devised the method than the bare fact of the intention. 
 But that bare fact is an essential part of the observed phenomena. And 
 the same argument applies to the mechanism if that also were discovered 
 by which the adjustment is effected between the axis of the tube and the 
 apparent motion of the star. That mechanism could not be fully described 
 unless it were described as a mechanism so contrived as to bring about the 
 adjustment which is actually effected. 
 
 Take again another case, from the organic world. A calf, or any other 
 young animal, discovers by smell or by accident, the fact that milk is con- 
 tained inside a skin or bag, and that, by applying its mouth or its tongue 
 to some opening, it can get at the milk. The whole fact in this case is 
 exhausted when we say that the calf gets the milk. It is no part of this 
 fact that the calf was intended to get it. But when a calf goes for milk to 
 its mother's udder when the lacteal glands of the cow are recognized as 
 an apparatus for secreting that milk, and the teat for delivering it, then 
 the facts are not exhausted, the scientific description is not complete or 
 truthful, unless we use language importing this adjustment of apparatus 
 to Purppse in the plan by which nourishment is afforded to the young in 
 
236 NOTES. 
 
 all mammalia. This idea cannot be expelled from science as a mere " in- 
 ference," except on the same arguments of bad metaphysics, as I hold them 
 to be, by which also the existence of Matter and of an External World are 
 referred to the same category. 
 
 NOTE C. PAGE 52. 
 
 In illustration of the assertion in the text, that the relations of Number, 
 which are the very basis of all "verifiable " knowledge, may be reduced by 
 similar arguments to mere creations of the Mind, I may here remind the 
 reader of the passage which relates to this subject in the famous argument 
 of Berkeley : 
 
 " That number is entirely the creature of the mind, even though the other 
 qualities be allowed to exist without, will be evident to whoever considers 
 that the same thing bears a different denomination of number as the mind 
 views it with different respects. Thus the same extension is one, or three, 
 or thirty-six, according as the mind considers it with reference to a yard, a 
 foot, or an inch. Number is so visibly relative and dependent on men's 
 understanding, that it is strange to think how any one should give it an 
 absolute existence without the mind. We say one book, one page, one line ; 
 all these are equally units, though some contain several of the others. 
 And in each instance it is plain the unit relates to some particular combina- 
 tion of ideas arbitrarily put together by the mind." Prin, of Hum. KnowL, 
 Part I. xii. 
 
 NOTE D. PAGE 122. 
 
 Mr. Mill, in his " System of Logic" (Book I. c. iii., 6, 7, 8) has told us 
 that both of Bodies and of Minds, "philosophers have at length provided 
 us with a definition which seems unexceptionable." As regards body, this 
 definition is " The external cause, and (according to the more reasonable 
 opinion) the unknown external cause, to which we refer our sensations." 
 This definition, though very defective, is at least not erroneous. It is nec- 
 essary, however, to observe that the word " unknown " cannot be accurately 
 predicated of that respecting which the very terms of the definition imply 
 that something is known. The definition of Body is the definition of that 
 which is known respecting it. Three things are involved in this definition, as 
 known respecting Body; these are (i) Externality, (2) Extension, and (3) 
 Causation that is to say, the power of causing or exciting sensations in 
 sentient beings. Or perhaps these three items of knowledge may be merged 
 in one the knowledge of Force acting from outside upon us, and exciting 
 sensations in us. But this is* knowledge. When the word " unknown " 
 therefore is inserted in the terms of the definition given by Mr. Mill, it can 
 only mean that other things still remain to be known respecting the nature 
 and properties of Body. In this sense that is, when translated into " par- 
 tially known " no philosopher would deny the correctness of its applica- 
 tion. The definition of both Body and Mind is given by Mr. Mill in Another 
 
NOTES. 237 
 
 passage, which, also, so far as it goes, is unexceptionable. " As Body is 
 understood to be the mysterious something which excites the mind to feel, 
 so Mind is the mysterious something which feels and thinks." The same 
 two fundamental ideas of Externality and Causation are here also implicitly 
 and inextricably involved. Mr. Mill adds that the farther discussion of this 
 question belongs not to Logic but to Metaphysics, to which science he 
 leaves it. 
 
 Two chapters, accordingly, in Mr. Mill's " Examination of Hamilton " 
 (xi. and xii.), are devoted to a discussion of the " Psychological Theory of 
 the Belief in a'n External World," and of the question how far the same 
 theory may or may not be also applicable to Mind. The conclusion to 
 which I have referred in the text is the conclusion defended in the first of 
 these chapters. It is the conclusion of a Pure Idealism an Idealism much 
 more extreme than the theory of Berkeley. It is true that Berkeley denied 
 the existence of Matter as a thing apart from Mind not, be it observed, as 
 a thing apart from our minds, but as a thing apart from some mind. But 
 this was only because he sublimed it into the action of another Spirit upon 
 our own. In his system the idea of Causation was tenaciously retained. 
 The very essence of his argument was that our ideas must have a cause 
 " some cause whereon they depend, and which produces them and changes 
 them." As this cause could not be the ideas themselves (which ideas are 
 all that we know of matter), " it remained that the cause of Ideas is an 
 incorporeal active substance or spirit." * This argument is repeated in 
 several forms, as again where he says,t that men were " conscious that 
 they were not the authors of their own sensations, which they evidently 
 knew were imprinted/>w/2 without, and which therefore must have some cause 
 distinct from the Minds on which they were imprinted." But the 
 Psychological Theory of Mr. Mill involves all the weak points of the 
 Berkeleian theory with none of its strength. Mr. Mill's formula is expressly 
 framed so as to eliminate as much as possible the idea of Causation, and to 
 keep out of sight the connection which exists between our sensations and 
 that which excites them. The attempt, indeed, is not successful, because 
 Mr. Mill cannot express himself through many consecutive sentences with- 
 out assuming the very ideas which he is trying to account for as a mere 
 product of more elementary conceptions. This has been shown clearly, 
 and with abundant illustration, in Dr. M'Cosh's " Examination of Mr. J. S. 
 Mill's Philosophy." Mr. Mill pleads upon this point that he must use 
 common language, but that the whole of this language has its own special 
 meaning under the Psychological Theory as well as under the common 
 Realistic Theory. This may be true ; but there are certain words which 
 must have the same meaning under all theories ; and, in spite of his efforts, 
 he is compelled to employ words which show that neither he nor any one 
 else can maintain consistently a purely subjective conception of Matter, 
 that is to say, a conception which dispenses with an external agency or 
 force. He says, that " almost all philosophers, who have narrowly exam- 
 
 m 
 
 * " Prin. of Hum. Know." xxvi. 
 t Ibid. Ivi. 
 
238 NOTES. 
 
 ined the subject, have decided that Substance need only be postulated as a 
 support for phenomena, or as a bond of connection to hold a group or series 
 of otherwise unconnected phenomena together. Mr. Mill goes on with 
 much simplicity : " Let us only then think away the support, and suppose 
 the phenomena to remain, and to be held together in the same groups and 
 series by some other agency, or without any agency but an internal law and 
 every consequence follows without Substance, for the sake of which Sub- 
 stance is assumed.* The demand here made upon us, to " think away " 
 the support of phenomena is certainly made less formidable when, in the 
 next breath, we are told to think it back again under another form of words 
 as " another agency," or as an " internal law." 
 
 The same vain attempt to get behind ultimate ideas may be traced in the 
 word " Permanent," with which Mr. Mill qualifies Matter considered as 
 "A Possibility of Sensation." The new formula is "A Permanent Possi- 
 bility of Sensation." Why permanent? Permanent means enduring. But 
 what has the element of Time to do with it ? The percipient minds are not 
 permanent, so far as the sensations of their existing organism is concerned. 
 In what sense, then, are the " Possibilities of Sensation " permanent ? What 
 is it that is described as permanent? Not the sensations not the individ- 
 ual sentient beings. What then ? Clearly the Power or Agency which 
 causes, or is capable of exciting sensations in organisms that are, or that 
 are to be. Here, then, we have the ideas of Externality and of Causation 
 brought back under the covering of Time. " What is it we mean," asks 
 Mr. Mill, "when we say that the object we preceive is external to us, and 
 not a part of our own thoughts ? The reply to this question, in the first 
 Edition, ran as follows : We mean that there is in our perceptions something 
 which exists when we are not thinking of it, which existed before we ever 
 thought of it, and would exist if we were annihilated." In the recent Edition, 
 this reply has been altered so as to avoid the obvious absurdity of supposing 
 that things which are conceived to exist only in "our perceptions," could 
 nex^ertheless continue to exist " if we were annihilated." Accordingly the 
 reply now runs thus : " We mean that there is concerned in our perceptions," 
 etc. Yes ; but how concerned ? As an exciting Force or producing Cause, 
 and in no other way. Similar observations apply to the word " Possibility," 
 as applied in Mr. .Mill's Psychological Theory. Possible can only mean 
 Potential. A Possibility of sensation must mean a Potential cause of sensa- 
 tion. And here, again, we have the same fundamental ideas involved in 
 the very language by which it is attempted to evade them. 
 
 Mr. Mill appears to me to be equally unsuccessful in starting fairly in 
 this .Psychological Theory that is to say, in the definition of postulates 
 which steer clear of involving the very ideas for which he professes to 
 account. His first postulate is that the Human Mind is capable of Expec- 
 tation. Certainly ; but what does Expectation involve ? It involves acts of 
 Memory, and of Comparison, and of Reason. In particular, it involves, 
 or at least he is not entitled to deny that it may involve, the intuitive 
 belief that actual sensations already experienced arose from an external 
 
 * Appendix to chaps, xi. and xii. " Mill on Hamilton," 6th ed. p. 246. 
 
NOTES. 239 
 
 cause, and that the same cause is capable of exciting them again. My belief 
 is that the mind cannot place itself in the attitude of expectation without 
 the presence of ideas which involve the whole question in dispute. 
 
 I am disposed, therefore, to agflee with Mr. Mill, that the existence of an 
 external material world cannot be proved ; just in the same sense, and for 
 the same reason, that the proposition " Things that are equal to the same 
 thing are equal to one another," cannot be proved. 
 
 Mr. Mill thinks that, though the existence of an external Material 
 world cannot be proved, an external Immaterial world can be proved 
 that is to say, the existence of other minds can be proved. I think he only 
 succeeds in showing that our belief in this existence can be confirmed by 
 corroborative evidence. But such corroboration and confirmation is equally 
 available in support of the belief in the existence of Matter, considered as 
 an External Cause of sensation. The truth is, our knowledge of other 
 minds is only reached through our previous knowledge of Matter, and of 
 the impressions it makes upon us. My own mind, as well as the mind of 
 all the beings around me, is, or seems to be, inseparably connected with a 
 Material Organization, and there are no manifestations of Mind which do 
 not come to me directly or indirectly through material signs. 
 
 Mr. Mill has often warned us, and I accept the warning, against the system of 
 discussing metaphysical questions, under the threat, as it were, that the con- 
 clusions to which we are opposed are inconsistent with some one or more The- 
 ological Beliefs. We know that the Ideal Theory, in the form at least which 
 it took in the hands of Berkeley, was put forward in the interests of Religion. 
 41 The existence of matter, or bodies unperceived, has not only been the 
 main support of Atheists and Fatalists, but on the same principle doth 
 Idolatry likewise, in all its various forms, depend. Did men but consider 
 that the sun, moon, and stars, and every other object of the senses, are only 
 so many sensations in their own minds, which have no other existence but 
 barely being perceived, doubtless they would never fall down and worship 
 their own Ideas, but rather address homage to that Eternal Invisible 
 Mind which produces and sustains all things." * Such was the animating 
 principle of the Bishop of Cloyne's famous speculation. I confess I have 
 a profound distrust of all attempts to found the teachings of Faith upon the 
 principles of Scepticism. I am not tempted, in order to escape the danger 
 of Materialism, to deny the existence of that, which I know by my own 
 structure, and by the structure of all around me, to be different from Mind. 
 I am content to understand the world as my own faculties have been co- 
 ordinated with external things to reveal those things to me. I look in my 
 friend's face, and I see the expression of power, and of intellect, and of 
 goodness. These are attributes of Mind. I do not know how these attrib- 
 utes can be shown forth so evidently in the colors and in the lines of flesh 
 and blood. But I do not try to persuade myself that his hand or his face 
 are the same things, either with the perceptions which they excite in me, 
 or with the emotions which they express in him. I do not pretend to un- 
 derstand the nature of the connection between these Material Forms and 
 
 * u Prin. of Hum. Knowl." xciv. 
 
240 NOTES. 
 
 the qualities of Mind. But after their own diverse kinds and measures, 
 they are both equally " real " to me. I will not deceive myself by verbal 
 quibbles pretending to be able to stand outside myself, and to prove by 
 reason that the very tools with which retson works are rotten in her hands. 
 There is but one sentence in these two chapters of Mr. Mill's work which 
 conveys any really important truth. In regard to the existence of Matter, 
 as well as in regard to the nature of Memory and of Mind, we may indeed 
 well say with him : " By far the wisest thing we can do is to accept the inex- 
 plicable facts, without any theory how it takes place ; and when we are 
 obliged to speak of them in terms which assume a theory, to use them with 
 a reservation as to their meaning." 
 
 NOTE E. PAGE 178. 
 
 When I wrote this passage in the text, I had not read a curious note by 
 Sir W. Hamilton in his edition of Reid's Works.* It is almost droll in 
 its confession of the puzzling significance of such facts, in respect to ani- 
 mals, as those I have referred to. " Nothing in the compass of inductive 
 reasoning appears more satisfactory than Berkeley's Demonstration of the 
 necessity and manner of our learning, by a slow process of observation in 
 comparison alone, the connection between the perception of vision and 
 touch, and, in general, all that relates to the distance and real magnitude 
 of external things. But although the same necessity seems in theory equally 
 incumbent on the lower animals as on man, yet this theory is provokingly(!) 
 and that by the most manifest experience found totally at fault with 
 regard to them ; for we find that all the animals who possess at birth the 
 power of regulated motion (and these are those only through whom the 
 truth of the theory can be brought to the test of a decisive experiment),, 
 possess also from birth the whole apprehension of distance, etc., which they 
 are ever known to exhibit. The solution of this difference by a resort to 
 instinct is unsatisfactory ; for instinct is in fact an occult principle a kind 
 of natural revelation, and the hypothesis of instinct, therefore, only a 
 confession of our ignorance : and at the same time, if instinct be allowed 
 in the lower animals, how can we determine whether and how far instinct 
 may not in like manner operate to the same result in man ? 
 
 Well might Sir W. Hamilton ask this question. It is one which Philos- 
 ophers will find it hard to answer. My own conviction is that more than 
 half the " inductive reasoning " by which men have pretended to account 
 for their intuitive perceptions is altogether unsound. Man, besides being 
 man, is also an animal and through his animal organization the mechanics 
 of his mind are to a large extent regulated on the same principles which 
 regulate the lower Intelligences around him that is to say, by processes 
 unconsciously pursued. This is the proper definition of operations which 
 are Instinctive ; and, as Sir W. Hamilton observes, they may best be con- 
 ceived as the result of " Natural revelation." 
 * Vol. I. p. 182, note. 
 
NOTES. 24! 
 
 NOTE F. PAGE 181. 
 
 In the number of the Dud/in Review iox April, 1867, there is an article ore 
 " Science, Prayer, Free Will and Miracles," in which some portions of this 
 work are criticised. With much of that criticism I have every reason to be 
 satisfied. The main objection taken may be stated in two sentences. I 
 have said that (under certain limitations as to the meaning of the words) the 
 " abstract predictability of human conduct " may be admitted without 
 involving the denial of anything essential to the doctrine of Free Will. 
 Dr. Ward denounces this concession as absolutely fatal to that doctrine, 
 and maintains that in making such a concession, as well as in other more 
 direct forms of statement, my view comes to be " precisely identical with 
 Mr. Mill's," which, nevertheless, I am " professing " to oppose. This 
 position he proceeds to support by an elaborate argument, which I shall 
 here examine with all the care due to the gravity of the question raised, 
 and to the duty of using no language upon such a subject which is not 
 justified by as much precision of thought as is attainable in regard to it. 
 
 As Dr. Ward speaks upon this subject with some warmth of feeling, per- 
 haps I may explain at once that he is mistaken in supposing that I am "a 
 Calvinist," in the sense of holding " the Necessitarian Doctrine." I hold 
 the doctrine of Free Will in the only sense in which it is to me intelligible. 
 I set the highest value upon it ; and in the result, though not in this par- 
 ticular argument, I believe I agree with Dr. Ward himself. I am willing to 1 
 accept without reservation the definition which he quotes from certain 
 Jesuit theologians : " Potentia libera est quae, positis omnibus requisitis ad' 
 agendum, potest agere et non agere." But Dr. Ward does not seem to' 
 observe that in this definition the whole question in dispute may be covered 
 under its contingent clause. Everything depends on the further definition; 
 to be given of "all the requisites for action." Is, or is not, the condition 
 of thj mind itself to be considered as one of those "requisites?" Is 
 knowledge, and the possession of those motives which knowledge gives, 
 a "requisite " or not ? Do the " requisites " intended by the Jesuit defini- 
 tion, refer to nothing more than the presence or absence of physical 
 constraint ? The trufh is, that such abstract definitions go very little way 
 in explanation of themselves. I have asserted the freedom of the Will under 
 several forms of statement which are much more explicit, because much 
 more full and more detailed. Thus, I have said, "Among the motives- 
 which act upon mind, Man has a selecting power. He can, as it were, 
 stand out from among them look down from above them compare them 
 among each other, and bring them to the test of conscience." This is 
 freedom, if there be such a thing conceivable in thought. But Dr. Ward's 
 impetuous zeal in favor of Free Will blinds him to certain truths which are 
 perfectly compatible with this doctrine, and which not only must be admit- 
 ted, but must be claimed, if we are ever to wield against Necessitarians the 
 weapon of analysis. The principal object of this work has been to show 
 that, in so far as science has successfully established in physics the idea of 
 the Reign of Law, that idea does not affect or traverse the Reign of Mind,, 
 16 
 
242 NOTES. 
 
 and the supremacy of Purpose. In like manner, I think it can be shown 
 that in so far as Psychology can successfully establish the idea of Causa- 
 tion, as applicable to Mind, that idea is perfectly compatible with the true 
 freedom of the Will. Dr. Ward says very truly that the Necessitarian doc- 
 trine has in all ages been embraced by many powerful minds. This indi- 
 cates that, in so far as it is false at all, its falseness probably depends on 
 some partial aspects of truth mingled with the fallacies of definition. My 
 own opinion unquestionably is, that when Necessitarians have been com- 
 pelled to disown and abjure the idea of compulsion, their doctrine ceases 
 to be the doctrine of Necessity at all in any legitimate sense of the word. 
 What I mean by freedom is freedom from compulsion, and nothing else. 
 When I say that the Will is free, I do not mean that its movements can be 
 separated from the inducements internal and external under which it moves. 
 But then I insist that " Motive " shall have the widest meaning that it 
 shall include such motives, evolved out of the very constitution of the 
 mind itself, as " Love, and Reverence, and Gratitude, and Hunger after 
 Knowledge and Desire of Truth." Of course this is not given as a com- 
 plete list, but only a sample of the things which must be claimed as 
 "motives." In this sense, not only is the determining power of Motive 
 inseparable from the very idea of Mind ; but the higher is the quality of a 
 mind, the more certain and definite will be the motives of its action. By 
 some strange confusion of thought, Dr. Ward seems to regard with horror 
 the idea of the Will being regarded as part of " the constitution of the 
 mind." This is a mere question of words. But if by Will, Dr. Ward 
 does not understand a particular power of mind, I do not know what he 
 means. To analyze Mind at all, we must of course consider its different 
 powers as separate from each other ; but it does not the less remain true 
 that they are all parts of one whole. In this point of view, Dr. Ward's own 
 definition of Free Will is far from clear. " The Will, we maintain, has a 
 .certain power of deciding for itself \i\&.\. weight it shall attach to motives." 
 Certainly, if the Will be understood as including the Deliberative Faculty 
 whose function it is to " weigh." But in coming to this decision it must be 
 guided by something, which something may always itself be resolved into 
 another " motive." 
 
 And if this appears to be a mere play on words, I grant it. It is the 
 very point and object of my argument to show that in so far as the Neces- 
 sitarian doctrine has any apparent force, it does depend on mere ambi- 
 guities of language. For example exclude from the word " motive " all 
 the influences which come upon the spirit from the mind itself from con- 
 science, from the action upon it of another Spirit, human or divine con- 
 fine the word " motive " (as many do, tacitly by implication, though not con- 
 sciously) to that class of motives which come from external and material 
 things, in short, confine it to the appetites or desires, then it absolutely 
 ceases to be true that the Will is determined by " motives." On the other 
 hand, include in the word " motive " all that can ever influence the mind, 
 whether from within or from without, then it ceases as absolutely to be 
 ,true that the Will can ever be " free " from such motives. But then, in this 
 
NOTES. 243 
 
 sense, the Necessitarian doctrine resolves itself, as Mr. Mansei says, into 
 the identical proposition that " the prevailing motive prevails." It becomes 
 perfectly harmless, because in reality perfectly unmeaning. Dr. Ward is 
 very indignant that I should represent my view as " a mere truism." But 
 it is not my own view, but the Necessitarian doctrine, when thus reduced by 
 analysis to its real value, which I have represented as a mere truism. 
 
 All these fallacies and confusions of thought arise, in my opinion, from 
 neglect of the fact that freedom has no absolute, but only a relative mean- 
 ing. Freedom can only mean " the not being bound," and bonds can only 
 consist in something binding. Freedom of the Will can only mean that the 
 Will is free from compulsion. If Necessity does not mean compulsion, it 
 either means nothing at all, or nothing inconsistent with freedom when 
 properly defined and understood. 
 
 We now come to what is called the " Abstract predictability of human 
 conduct." This is the phrase into which Mr. Mill retreats, as containing 
 the residuum of truth which still belongs to the Necessitarian doctrine after 
 it has abjured the idea of compulsion. It is not my phrase, or one which 
 I approve of, because it involves a great number of assumptions which lie, 
 as it were, concealed within it. But I adhere to the opinion that, when 
 strictly defined, the idea it involves is perfectly capable of being reconciled 
 with the freedom of the Will. The truth is, that it is capable of being 
 resolved into the same identical proposition as the Necessitarian doctrine 
 in other forms. 
 
 If by " abstract predictability " is meant that prediction would be pos- 
 sible under the conditions of complete, universal and perfect knowledge, 
 I do not see either how it can be denied, or to what purpose it can be 
 affirmed. The proposition is that, if ALL the conditions were known which 
 determine the Will in deciding for itself, or " in giving weight to motives," 
 the result of that decision would thereby become also known. Of the 
 Necessitarian doctrine expressed in this general form, I have said, and I 
 repeat, that it is " very like a truism." But if it is useless as an affirma- 
 tion, it is at least not capable of denial. Dr. Ward, however, does deny it, 
 and supports his denial by reasoning which is clearly untenable, as an 
 admission made by himself will show. His idea seems to be, that no 
 " predictable " conduct can be " free ; " that nothing which can be abstractedly 
 foreseen can be the result of freedom. But Dr. Ward does not, and cannot 
 maintain this view consistently. He admits that, " taking any given man 
 at any given moment, there are certain things so good, and certain things so 
 bad, that we may infallibly calculate he will do neither the one nor the 
 other." Would Dr. Ward then admit that as regards those " very bad," and 
 those "very good," deeds, this man is not " free ? " Or does he think he 
 escapes this difficulty, by putting the man's conduct in the negative instead 
 of the positive form ? As regards the action of the Will, no such distinc- 
 tion is of any avail. The not doing one thing is the doing of another. The 
 not doing a very good deed which he has power to do (" positis omnibus 
 requisitis ad agendum "), is willing not to do it. The not doing a very bad 
 deed is willing to do something else. If then the conduct of the man in 
 
244 NOTES. 
 
 those cases " can be calculated with perfect certainty," it is so calculable 
 only because knowledge of his character is convertible into knowledge of 
 the manner in which his Will is sure to act. Is it not then a clear violation, 
 both of the ordinary and of the philosophical use of language, to say that 
 a man is not " free " to do a very bad act, because we know certainly before- 
 hand that his character, and the motives on which he habitually acts, will 
 prevent him from doing it ? 
 
 But then Dr. Ward proceeds to argue that though infallible calculation 
 may be possible in respect to deeds very good, and very bad, it will not be 
 possible in regard to deeds only a little good and a little bad. But how 
 does this greater difficulty arise ? Is it not because the number of motives 
 telling on the Will is greater, more nicely balanced, and therefore less 
 known ? And is not this difference precisely the kind of difference which 
 would disappear, if he could pass from knowledge which is partial only, to 
 knowledge which is complete and absolute ? But whatever difficulty may 
 arise from imperfect knowledge is (as I understand the phrase) eliminated 
 by the word " abstract," as qualifying "predictability." No one asserts 
 that prediction can be founded on partial knowledge. But the question 
 raised is whether even perfect knowledge of all the elements of motive and 
 of character can render predictable the conduct of a really Free Agent. 
 The question is one involving a logical principle, which, if applicable to the 
 conduct of a Free Agent in any case, must be equally applicable to his 
 conduct in all cases. If it is abuse of terms, or a confusion of thought, to 
 affirm that a man's Will is not free to do or not to do very bad actions, 
 because we can calculate infallibly the decision of his Will in regard to 
 them, it must be equally fallacious to affirm that his Will would not be free 
 in regard to lesser degrees of vice and virtue, if in like manner, we were able 
 from perfect knowledge of his character to predict his conduct also in 
 respect to them. The doctrine of Free Will, like every other doctrine of 
 Mental Science can only be defended by clear definitions of what it is. Its 
 defenders have in my opinion established their case when they have com- 
 pelled Necessitarians to discard the idea of compulsion. All attempts to 
 deny that the Will is determined by " motives " are futile, and only result 
 in giving a seeming victory to those who have in reality been defeated. 
 
 In order to illustrate what I mean, I will suppose a particular case ; and 
 to comply with the conditions of Dr. Ward's argument, it shall be a case 
 where no determination, either very good or very bad, is involved. I will 
 suppose that in arguing with a friend on the subject of Free Will, a plate 
 of oranges is offered to me. My friend tells me that " he knows which of 
 these oranges I shall choose. " I tell him he cannot possibly know this 
 that my Will is free, and therefore he cannot predict my choice. He in- 
 sists upon it that he can. I then observe that one orange has a smoother 
 skin than the others, and is of a deeper yellow color. I then recollect that 
 I had once mentioned in my friend's hearing that I considered a pale color, 
 or a rough skin, as indications of sour or tasteless oranges ; and remember- 
 ing this fact, I at once perceive that my friend is calculating my conduct 
 from a motive which, as he knows, does habitually determine my choice of 
 
NOTES. 245 
 
 oranges. I am conscious also that in this particular case I should have 
 been so determined if this dispute had not arisen. But in order to show 
 my friend that my Will is really free from this power of "motive," I deter- 
 mine to exert that freedom by choosing the palest, or the roughest orange 
 in the plate, and I accordingly do so. This is an assertion of my Free Will 
 a practical denial of the doctrine that I am the slave of " motives." But 
 is it not clear in this case, that my conduct has been determined after all 
 only by another and a stronger motive than the one which usually acts with 
 me in the matter even by the motive of proving to my friend that he was 
 wrong, and that I was right ? a motive which is strong with all men, and 
 is supposed to have special attractions for a Scotchman. And is it not 
 equally clear, that if my friend had had more perfect knowledge of my 
 character, and had known that I recollected the former conversation, and 
 could therefore guess the grounds of his prediction, he might, and would 
 have been able to foresee correctly the new motive which had thus arisen to 
 overpower the other ? And finally, is it not equally evident that, if he had 
 been able by this extraordinary sagacity to predict my choice correctly, the 
 correctness of that prediction would not have implied the existence of any 
 constraint on the freedom of my Will, but, on the contrary, would have been 
 founded on his knowledge of my freedom to pass from the old motive and 
 to give effect to the new one ? 
 
 A thousand different examples of the same kind might be given. That 
 on which the Will finally determines to act may always be called, and is 
 always properly called, a motive. And this is observable in respect to the 
 whole question, that precisely in proportion to the high qualities of any 
 given mind in proportion to its intellectual power and its moral strength 
 in proportion to its keen insight into the causes and tendencies of things, 
 and its appreciation of truth and righteousness in the same proportion 
 will the distinction vanish in its eyes between things " very bad," and things 
 only a little bad. In the same proportion, therefore, will its own conduct 
 be guided by definite and certain motives: in the same proportion, finally, 
 will that conduct become predictable, because in the exercise of its freedom 
 it is governed by moral laws which never change. 
 
 NOTE G. PAGE 181. 
 
 Mr. Mahaffy, in his article in the Contemporary Review, has taken objec- 
 tion to the breadth of meaning which I have given in this passage to the 
 word " motive." He says, I have " surely fused together two opposite the- 
 ories under the ambiguous meaning of motive" This is precisely what I 
 have done, and what I meant to do. I adopt all that I consider to be true 
 in the so-called Necessitarian Doctrine, which, when cleared from the idea 
 of compulsion, is no doctrine of necessity at all. The residuum of truth is, 
 that the Will must always act on some motive. I have taken also all that 
 is of any value in the Doctrine of Free Will, which is that among the 
 " motives " of the mind must be reckoned those inducements which arise 
 out of its higher, as well as out of its lower faculties. But Mr. Mahaffy is, 
 
246 NOTES. 
 
 in my opinion, clearly wrong when he objects to the word " motive " being 
 employed with this breadth of meaning. His objection indeed is explained 
 to be that the word " motive " ought not to be applied to the " action of the 
 Will upon itself." But I have not so applied it, because I have no notion 
 what " the action of the Will upon itself " means. Mr. Mahaffy gives a 
 farther explanation of this expression, when he speaks of the Will " creat- 
 ing principles of action for itself." But I deny altogether that the " creat- 
 ing " of anything is the function of the Will. It is by an act of Will that 
 we fix our attention upon any given motive, or turn, on the contrary, our 
 attention from it. But if we are to analyze the mind at all, if for the con- 
 venience of thought and of discussion, we are to divide its inseparable 
 Unity into different powers, we must make the division as logical as we can 
 that is, as consistent as possible with definite ideas of distinct mental 
 functions. In considering the Will as a separate Power, we must strictly 
 confine it to what may be called the Executive of the Mind. In this light 
 it would be altogether incorrect to ascribe the " creation " of any motive to 
 the Will. Motives of all kinds, both the highest and the lowest, may rise, 
 and do rise unbidden in the mind. It is by an act of Will that we summon 
 different motives to the presence of the Deliberative Faculties, that we 
 cherish one and dismiss another, or determine to spend thought and time 
 in making our choice between motives which are conflicting. But the Will 
 cannot with accuracy be said to be the creator of motives. Intellectual and 
 moral conceptions, held together by the bonds of Memory, are the foun- 
 tains from which the highest motives come. Mr. Mahaffy admits that " any- 
 thing brought to bear upon the Will from without itself, even from the 
 intellectual part of the mind, is a motive." But according to my definition 
 of the Will all motives come equally from outside the Will, and assuredly 
 I see no ground for the distinction Mr. Mahaffy seems to draw between the 
 Intellectual and the Moral faculties. In denying the name of motive to 
 those inducements which come from the affections or from the sense of 
 right and wrong, he imposes a restriction on the meaning of the word which 
 is not less inconsistent with common usage than with philosophical accu- 
 racy. Affection and gratitude, the love of man and the love of God, are all 
 surely " motives " in the most proper sense of the term. Yet Mr. Mahaffy 
 asks, " Is it not an abuse of language to say that the man who resists 
 temptation by creating within his breast a strong feeling of moral responsi- 
 bility is determined by motives ? " To this question I reply at once (pass- 
 ing over the question of the " creation " of motives) that it is no abuse of 
 language, but, on the contrary, the employment of language in its natural 
 and ordinary sense. On what principle is the love of knowledge (being 
 intellectual) to be called a motive, if the love of God is not ? On what 
 principle is a desire of producing physical results to be called a motive, if 
 the desire of attaining moral ends is denied the name ? No such distinc- 
 tion is tenable in a philosophical point of view, and no such distinction is 
 known in the usual and familiar employment of the word " motive." Mr. 
 Mahaffy, however, in making this objection, has put his finger upon the 
 point on which the whole discussion turns. Like many other metaphysical 
 
NOTES. 247 
 
 questions, it depends almost entirely on a definition of terms. If the word 
 " motive " be arbitrarily limited to mental affections of one or two particu- 
 lar kinds, if it be confined to the lower appetites and desires, or even if it 
 be extended to the higher appetites of the Intellect, whilst it is denied to 
 the inducements of morality, of conscience, of Religion, then it ceases to 
 be true that the mind is determined by motives alone. The result is that 
 the so-called " Necessitarian " Doctrine, in so far as it is true at all, must 
 not only exclude the idea of compulsion, but it must include all that class 
 of inducements, on the pre-existence of which, and on the power of choice 
 among them, the responsibility of the Will depends. 
 
 The view presented in the text of the great question of Necessity and 
 Free Will does fuse together some portions of the two opposite Theories 
 which have so long divided men's minds regarding it. But in this fusion I 
 do but follow the process pursued by Dante in a profound and beautiful 
 passage of his " Purgatorio " (Canto iSth). To Necessity he ascribes the 
 existence and the power of Motive. Motives arise out of the relations pre- 
 established between the Human Spirit and all the Influences by which it is 
 surrounded. No other account can be given of them. Dante sees no diffi- 
 culty, as some modern defenders of the Free Will doctrine do, in compar- 
 ing the ultimate nature and origin of all our mental desires with the nature 
 and origin, equally inexplicable, of the Instincts of the lower animals* 
 Hear the lines, not less musical in sense then they are in sound 
 
 " Per6, la. onde venga lo intelletto 
 Delle prime notizie, uomo non sape 
 E de' primi appetibili 1'affetto ; 
 Che sono in voi, si come studio in ape 
 Di far lo mele." 
 
 To Free Will he ascribes the power of Counsel of deliberation and of 
 choice among the motives which thus arise from the very nature and con- 
 stitution of the Mind. This power guards the " Threshold of Assent :" 
 
 " Innata v' la virtu che consiglia, 
 E dell' assenso de' tener la soglia." 
 
 On this power depends the responsibility of conduct : 
 
 " Quest' e'l principio Ik onde si piglia 
 Cagion di meritare in voi, secondo 
 Che buoni amori o rei accoglie e viglia. 
 
 The passage closes with these beautiful and striking lines : 
 
 " Color che ragionando andaro al fondo 
 S'accorser d'esta innata libertate ; 
 Per6 moralitk lasciaro al mondo. 
 Onde pognam che di necessitate 
 Surga ogni amor, che dentro a voi s'accende ; 
 Di ritenerlo e in voi lapotestate." 
 
 It would be difficult to give so much philosophy in fewer words. 
 
248 NOTES. 
 
 NOTE: H. PAGE 184. 
 
 In the last edition of Mr. Mill's work (1867), he has made an addition to 
 the sentence quoted in the text, so that it now runs thus : " I deny it as 
 Strenuously as any one, in the case of human volitions, but I deny it just as 
 much of all other phenomena. " If Mr. Mill means, by this addition, to 
 imply that he can deny compulsion (for example) in the behavior of a 
 billiard-ball, when it is struck, " just as much " as he can deny it, of the 
 behavior of a man when he is insulted, he renders his previous explana- 
 tion valueless, and restores again to the doctrine of Necessity that very 
 element of meaning which he professes to disclaim. Compulsion is pred- 
 icable of the effects of Physical Force exerted upon Matter, in a sense in 
 which it is not predicable of the effects of Moral or Intellectual induce- 
 ments exerted upon Mind. This is precisely the distinction which Necessi. 
 tarians are perpetually confounding ; and so long as they do confound it, 
 their doctrine is justly open to the objection implied in the name usually 
 assigned to it. Even if it be true, as Mr. Mill holds, that we have no other 
 idea of^Physical Causation than that of uniform and invariable sequence, 
 no idea of Necessity in Causation, still it remains true that Compulsion^, 
 is, apparently to us, involved in the effects of Physical Forces upon Matter, 
 in a sense in which it is not involved in the effects of " Motive " upon 
 Mind. 
 
 UNIVERSITY, 
 
INDEX. 
 
 ABORTED Limbs in various animals, 116 ; 
 Member, no, in man, 120 ; Organs, to be 
 read either in the light of History, or 
 of Prophecy, 122 ; Organs, existence of, 
 the fact most difficult to disengage from 
 the Theory of Development, 158. 
 
 Abstract Conceptions, Law as applied to, 
 40; Men's Idols nowadays their own, 67. 
 
 Acland, Dr. H. W., on u Purpose," 50. 
 
 " Act of Parliament, you cannot make 
 men moral by," in what sense a truism, 
 in what a fallacy, 217. 
 
 Adapted coloring in the Animal Kingdom, 
 106, et seq. 
 
 " Adherence to Type," in the nature of a 
 Mental Purpose, 154 ; these words ex- 
 press a Purpose fulfilled in Organic 
 Forms, 160. 
 
 Adjusted Organs, Man's want of certain, 
 175 Forces, how far our Volitions are 
 subject to, IQI. 
 
 Adjustment, Principle of, no meaning 
 except as the result of Purpose, 47 ; 
 fundamental Principles of, never al- 
 tered through the whole scale of Organ- 
 ic Life, 159 ; as applied to the Mental 
 Faculties, 168 ; how Watt subjected the 
 invariable energies of Steam to the 
 variable conditions of, 202 ; Variability 
 of, in the facts of Nature, 231. 
 
 Adjustments of Organization, phenomena 
 of Mind mediately dependent on, 175. 
 
 Affections, the dependent on material 
 structure, 165. 
 
 African Savages debating a great Homo- 
 logical Question, 118. 
 
 Agassiz' Geological Sketches, 166. 
 
 Air, Navigation of the, a beautiful exam- 
 ple of Animal Mechanics, 77 ; Elasticity 
 of, the Law which, in the flight of birds, 
 counteracts gravity, 79 ; French scien- 
 tific men in advance of English on the 
 subject of locomotion in, 102. 
 
 Albatross, the mechanism of flight in, 90 ; 
 the flight of, described, 91 ; how it sails 
 or wheels round a ship, 92. 
 
 Ammonites, great beauty of, 113. 
 
 Analogy between the operations of God 
 and the operations of men's minds, illus- 
 trated by every known instance of Con- 
 trivance, 77. 
 
 Analogy in Use and Homology in struct- 
 ure, 119. 
 
 Ancient Lawgivers always aiming at 
 Standards of Political Society, 194. 
 
 Andes, the, species of Humming birds 
 peculiar to, 35. 
 
 A ngraecuin Sesquipedale, 27. 
 
 Animal Creation, the Power of God as 
 manifested in ; Professor Owen's work 
 quoted, 156. 
 
 Animals, a definite Pattern for each class 
 of, 126. 
 
 Antecedents, no phenomena, mental or 
 physical, without, 186. 
 
 Anthropoid Apes, skeletons of, 157. 
 
 Apprenticeship, earlier mills worked un- 
 der a system of, 207. 
 
 Apteryx, useless wing-bones m, 116. 
 
 Archetypal arrangement in Orchids, 27. 
 
 Argus Pheasant, 115. 
 
 Aristotle, Philosophy of, 195-196. 
 
 Arkwright, 205-207. 
 
 Ashley, Lord, first effectual measure on 
 the Factory Question passed through 
 the exertions of, 215. 
 
 Asiatic Deserts, Sand-grouse of, their 
 coloring, 109. 
 
 Assimilative Coloring not extended to 
 Woodpeckers, 107. 
 
 Association, conditions under which the 
 spirit it evokes becomes a new " Law," 
 
 220. 
 
 Associations, higher rates of wages es- 
 tablished under, than under unrestricted 
 competition, 225. 
 
 Astronomy, according to Sir G. C. Lewis, 
 an interest almost purely scientific be- 
 longing to, 8 ; Sir J. Herschel's Out- 
 lines of, 73. 
 
 Atheism, false charge of, against Profes- 
 sor Huxley, 54. 
 
 Atmosphere, the, resisting force of, to a 
 body moving through it, 79. 
 
250 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Automatic Faculties in Mind as well as 
 in Body, 173. 
 
 "Azoic" Rocks, the Rhizopods discov- 
 ered near the very lowest of, 125. 
 
 BACKWARD flight in a bird, why : tpnossj- 
 ble, 84. 
 
 Bacon quoted, 3. 
 
 Baking Trade, the, in Edinburgh and 
 Glasgow, good effects of combination 
 in,. 
 
 Bats' fbgei -bones, how modified, 101. 
 
 Beauty, love of, a purpose we see fulfilled 
 in Nature, 161. 
 
 Being, the great mystery of our, 161. 
 
 Beliefs, intelligent spiritual, only widened 
 by the progress of Physical Science, 68. 
 
 Biblical Narrative of Creation, the, room 
 left in it for a Material Process, 16. 
 
 Bilateral Arrangement of Organisms, 147. 
 
 Bird, a, and a Balloon, difference be- 
 tween, 78. 
 
 Birds, aerial evolutions of, made possible 
 by weight, not buoyancy, 85 ; condition 
 of the atmosphere indispensable to the 
 soaring of, 86 ; bones of, lighter and 
 more hollow than those of mammals, 87 ; 
 stationary power of, on what it depends, 
 96 ; the Humming, furnish the most re- 
 markable examples of the machinery of 
 flight, 100 ; species of, amongst which 
 the law of assimilative coloring almost 
 exclusively prevails, 108 ; bright colors 
 and conspicuous ornaments in male, 147. 
 
 " Blessed Light of Science," the, 229. 
 
 Bodies, our, seem part of the external 
 world to us, 164. 
 
 Body,Congenital Habits of the, connected 
 with Congenital Habits of the Mind, 178. 
 
 Body Politic, the, Verification drawn by 
 Adam Smith from the complicated phe- 
 nomena of, 204. 
 
 Borelli's erroneous theory of steerage in 
 flight, 98. 
 
 Brain, the, no additional knowledge 
 gained by proving the connection be- 
 tween any one mental faculty and a 
 special bit of, 166 ; changes in the sub- 
 stance and structure of, cause of changes 
 in the character of the Mind, 165 ; how 
 Thought is a Function of, 166 ; exer- 
 tion of, like the exertion of the Mus- 
 cle, 169. 
 
 Butler, Bishop, on our ignorance of God's 
 notion of means and ends, 48. 
 
 Butler's, Bishop, position, that all the 
 truths and difficulties of Religion have 
 their type in Natures, 16. 
 
 CARPENTER, DR., on Life preceding Organ- 
 ization, 71. 
 
 Cartwright, 205. 
 
 Cats, blue iris in, associated with deaf- 
 ness, 147 ; tortoise-shell color in, asso- 
 ciated with the female sex, 147. 
 
 f'ausatior. of ie World, the, agency of 
 Man's Mind -:md Will, the first and fore- 
 most agency in, 4. 
 
 Central America, Orchids in the forests 
 of, 135- 
 
 u Cerebration," philosophers who fancy 
 Thought is explained by calling it. 
 168. 
 
 Cerebal Organization, ascending scale oi % 
 coincident with ascending scale of Men- 
 tal capacity, 166. 
 
 Chadwick, Mr M on Insurance of ships and 
 cargoes as relaxing the motives of self- 
 interest, 218. 
 
 Chameleon, the, 106. 
 
 Chance, no such thing as, a necessary 
 truth, 185. 
 
 " Changeable Wills," Comte's confused 
 idea of phenomena not being governed 
 by, 189. 
 
 Chemical Combination, laws of, amongst 
 the most wonderful and beautiful, 56. 
 
 Children in Factories, liable to dismissal 
 if properly cared for by their parents, 
 
 2IO. 
 
 Christian miracles, the idea of Law made 
 the very basis of, 14. 
 
 Christianity, what lies at its root, accord- 
 ing to M. Guizot, i ; Gibbon's attempt 
 to account for the spread of, by natural 
 causes, 12 - r does not require a belief in 
 any exception to the universal preva- 
 lence of Law, 31. 
 
 Cicero, De Nat. Dear, 120, 169, 213. 
 
 Circulation of the Blood not discovered 
 before the discovery of much concern- 
 ing the circulation of the Planets, 162. 
 
 Civilization, Modern, its development 
 and growth, 231. 
 
 Classification, the marshalling of physical 
 facts in an ideal order, the basis of 
 Science, 51. 
 
 Coal, how correlated with the needs and 
 powers of man, 154 ; these external cor- 
 relations of, arise out of Internal Cor- 
 relations, 155. 
 
 Cobbett, on the opposition to the restrict- 
 ive measures which were proposed by 
 Sir R. Peel the Elder, 209. 
 
 Cogito, ergo sum, 4. 
 
 Color, power in fish to change rapidly 
 106 j determined in young animals 
 
INDEX. 
 
 25 1 
 
 through the eyes of the female parent, 
 106. 
 
 Coloring, adapted, in the Animal King- 
 dom, object of, 106 ; apparent rule un- 
 der which applied, 106 ; assimilated, 
 not extended, as Mr. Darwin fancies, to 
 Green Woodpeckers, 107. 
 Combe, Dr. A., on our ignorance of how 
 the Brain operates in generating 
 Thought, 169. 
 Combination and affinity in Chemistry, 
 
 laws of, 41, 56. 
 
 Combination, in Nature, for the accom- 
 plishment of Purpose, 48 ; this an ascer- 
 tained fact in Science, 51 ; and adjust- 
 ment as regards the phenomena of the 
 Mind, 163 ; coming in the place of Posi- 
 tive Institution, 221 ; resort to, for the 
 protection of labor, recommended by 
 reason and experience, 222 ; all this true 
 universally of the principle of, but not 
 true universally of the particular pur- 
 poses to which applied, 222 ; its history 
 amongst the Working Classes, until re- 
 cently a sad history of misdirected effort, 
 223 ; desire for, and need of grows with 
 the growth of knowledge, and with the 
 increasing complications of society, 
 224; business of, in some things, to 
 subordinate the individual class, 224 ; 
 what s,ets bounds to, 225 ; most impor- 
 tant objects of, amongst the first duties 
 of organized society, 226 ; conditions 
 under which it may blend the functions, 
 and unite the profits, of Capital and 
 Labor, a question to be determined by 
 Natural Laws not yet explained or un- 
 derstood, 227. 
 
 Combinations of Force, having reference 
 to the fulfilment of Purpose or the dis- 
 charge of Function, 40. 
 
 Combinations, limits of, as affecting re- 
 wards of Labor, 225. 
 
 " Comet " Humming Bird, 138. 
 
 Commercial Policy, Modern, its central 
 idea, 200. 
 
 Common Words, pestilent fault of using 
 them in an artificial sense, 189. 
 
 Community of Aspect in created Things, 
 what it suggests, 133. 
 
 Comparative Anatomy, Professor Owen 
 on, 61 ; Professor Huxley on, 71. 
 
 Competition, International, between Cap- 
 italists, arguments based on, 211. 
 
 Competition, the "Law" of , results in ex- 
 cessive labor, 221. 
 
 Competitive Industry, inevitable track 
 of, 214. 
 
 Comte, Augusie, on " Changeable Wills," 
 
 189. 
 
 Conditions, favorable, uselessness of di- 
 rect appeals to men's faculties and feel- 
 ings when these have not been placed 
 under, 193 ; external, which tell on the 
 individual Will, are but conditions de- 
 pending on the aggregate Will of those 
 around use, 218. 
 
 " Coney " of Scripture, the, 148. 
 Congenital Constitution, character of 
 
 Mind determined by, 178. 
 Conscience, how man, unlike the lower 
 animals, can bring his motives to the 
 test of, 182. 
 Consciousness, direct evidence of, large 
 
 class of phenomena beyond the, 170. 
 Conservation of Energy, modern doc- 
 trine of, 73. 
 Constancy in Nature not incompatible 
 
 with the energies of Will, 231. 
 Constitution and Course of Things, the 
 whole, under what conditions it would 
 receive an earlier fulfilment, 229. 
 Constitution of the Universe, the, man's 
 faculty of Contrivance, the nearest an- 
 alogy by which to understand, 232. 
 Contractions, muscular, two kinds of, 
 stand near the origin of all we do, 123 ; 
 of the Brain, probably stand near the 
 origin of all we think, 173. 
 Contrivance, in Orchids, to be traced as 
 clearly as in the different parts of a 
 steam-engine, 22. 
 
 Contrivance and Adjustment, doctrine of, 
 not so metaphysical as the doctrine of 
 Homologies, 50. 
 
 Contrivance, the word, impossibility of 
 dispensing with it in describing physi- 
 cal phenomena, 54 ; what is ? 76 ; in Na- 
 ture, never reduced to a single pur- 
 pose, in ; happiest achievements of 
 the, have their own aspects of apparent 
 danger, 223. 
 
 " Coquette " Humming Bird, the, Prin- 
 ciple of ornament in, 139. 
 Correlation of Growth, the, Mr. Darwin's 
 idea of, 143 ; has a deeper significance 
 than this, 144 ; in another and higher 
 sense, 145 ; in its simplest form, and 
 in visible connection with its immedi- 
 ate cause, 145 ; having reference to cer- 
 tain mental purposes, 146 ; two entirely 
 separate classes of phenomena grouped 
 by Mr. Darwin under the name of, 146 ; 
 general impression left by the observ- 
 ance of organic, 148 ; required in the 
 establishment of a new form of Life, 
 
2 5 2 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 149 ; high and complex, the most con- 
 stant and obvious of all the facts of 
 Nature, 149 ; apparent, between webb- 
 ed feet and spoon-shaped bills, 150 ; 
 real, between both these conditions and 
 external conditions of Life, 150 ; be- 
 * tween a particular kind of feather and 
 a particular member of the body, in 
 all birds capable of flight, 151 ; in all 
 birds^Jbetween the auricular feathers 
 and tl ie ear-bones, 151 ; Internal, in 
 Nature, entirely subordinate to Exter- 
 nal, 152 ; External correlation between 
 the Retina and certain vibrations, 153 ; 
 as connected with Origin of Species, 
 154 ; Forces of, in flowers, independent, 
 as Mr. Darwin admits, of Natural Se- 
 lection, 158 ; inference from this ad- 
 mission concerning a time before Nat- 
 ural Selection had room to play, 159 ; 
 External, between the Mind and the 
 Things around it, 176 . 
 Correspondences, perception of, as much 
 a fact as the sight, or touch, of the 
 things in which they appear, 20. 
 Cotopaxi, special forms of Humming 
 
 birds, peculiar to, 135. 
 Creation, of Man, the, out of " the dust 
 of the ground/' an indication of the 
 personal agency of God, 16 ; the em- 
 bodiment of a Divine Idea, 18 ; work of, 
 carried on under rules of adherence to 
 Typical Forms, 46 ; history of, " an 
 Observed Order of Facts " in, 124 ; by 
 Law, idea of, on what founded, 126; 
 adaptation and arrangement of Natural 
 Forces, in what sense of the Nature of, 
 129 ; idea of centres of, suggested by 
 the geographical distribution of Hum- 
 ming Birds, 134 ; by Law, only senses 
 in which we get a glimpse of it from 
 the theory of Natural Selection, 155; 
 spoken of as not Creation, unless it work 
 from nothing as its material, and by 
 nothing as its means, 156 ; doctrine of, 
 only possible serious adversaries of, 156; 
 by Birth, how it explains the existence 
 of useless organs, 158 ; nearest methods 
 of, probably behind a veil too thick for 
 man to penetrate, 162. 
 Creative Power, the rule which seems to 
 have guided, in the origin of New 
 Species, 136. 
 
 Creeds, decay in, resulting from dissoci- 
 ating in the popular exposition of them 
 the doctrines of Religion from the an- 
 alogy and course of Nature. 31. 
 Crompton, 205, 207. 
 
 Custom and Traditional Opinion, on the 
 facts of Nature and Human Life, as 
 seen through the dulled eyes of, 228. 
 
 Cuvier's Science of Homologies, 118. 
 
 Cynanthus Humming Bird, ornament in 
 the, changing from blue to green, 
 142. 
 
 DARWIN, MR., his conclusion as to " silent 
 members," 20; his work on the fertil- 
 ization of Orchids, 22 ; answers the 
 question of Intention with precision 
 and success, 23 ; fails to solve the 
 question, out of what " primordial ele- 
 ments" the parts of the Orchids were 
 developed, 23 ; idea of special use as 
 the controlling principle of construction 
 never absent from his mind, 24 ; his 
 reduction of the forms of Orchids to 
 the archetypal arrangement of Threes 
 within Threes, 26 ; cannot conceive 
 how a voltaic battery can be made out 
 of the tissues of a fish, 63 ; his curious 
 mistake concerning Green Woodpeck- 
 ers, 105 ; his reference to the discovery 
 of " Rhizopods " near the bottom of 
 "Azoic" Rocks, 125; his theory of 
 Development suggests less of anything 
 approaching to a Law in Creation than 
 did the earlier theories, 127 ; his theory 
 of Development, to what extent an es- 
 tablished scientific truth, 130 ; his 
 theory self-condemned, 131 ; claims for 
 it a wider range than belongs to it, 
 131 ; mere advantage, in Mr. Darwin's 
 sense, not the rule in the Origin of 
 New Species in Humming Birds, 136 ; 
 his theory does not account for the 
 origin or spread of Humming Birds, 
 139 ; offers no explanation how new 
 Births may be the means of introduc- 
 ing New Species, 142 ; his theory on 
 Natural Selection has no bearing on the 
 Origin of Species, 143 ; admits that the 
 doctrine of Natural Selection " takes 
 cognizance of Variations only after 
 they have arisen, and regards Varia- 
 tion as due to chance," 143 ; groups un- 
 der the name " Correlation of Growth " 
 two classes of phenomena, entirely 
 separate in idea. 146 ; shows how an 
 improved Bill, once produced, will be 
 preserved, 149; on the phrase "Ad- 
 herence to Type," 154 ; on Inheritance, 
 what it is, 156. 
 
 Decaying fallen leaves, imitation of, in 
 the Woodcock's plumage, 109. 
 
 Design and Mental Purpose, exhibited in 
 
INDEX. 
 
 2 53 
 
 the Correlation of the Retina with 
 certain vibrations, 153. 
 
 Detected Method in Nature, the Ulti- 
 mate Question, above and behind 
 every, 161. 
 
 Development, hypotheses of, the, in the 
 form which they have as yet assumed, 
 are deprived of all scientific basis, 18 ; 
 theories of, what they have simply 
 been, 19; theories, idea common to all, 
 that a new species is simply an unusual 
 birth, 127 ; Mr. Darwin's theory of, dif- 
 ference between it and other theories 
 of development, 130; of Man's Nature, 
 boundless discoveries open to those 
 who would investigate the laws gov- 
 erning the, 193 ; and growth of Modern 
 Civilization, 231. 
 
 Diatomacecp, 113. 
 
 Digestive Organs, the, Mechanism of the, 
 extends through a long range of Cre- 
 ation, 159. 
 
 Discovery, outbreak of old Delusions on 
 every fresh, 68 ; the most striking thing 
 in the history of, 228. 
 
 Disease brings out correlations not per- 
 ceived in health, 147. 
 
 Divine Government, Divine Thoughts, 
 Divine Purposes and Divine Affections, 
 rules and principles of, 32. 
 
 Divine Will, the ONE FORCE, perhaps in 
 itself a mode of action of the, 76. 
 
 Diving Birds, Correlation in, 150. 
 
 ECONOMIC Error of the Old Commercial 
 Systems, 215. 
 
 Economic Science, Combination involves 
 no Rebellion against the Laws of, 222. 
 
 Economists, Political, hostile to Restric- 
 tion, 216. 
 
 Electric Ray, or Torpedo, an instance of 
 an extraordinary result produced by a 
 common law yoked to extraordinary 
 conditions, 61 ; Fish and Electric Tel- 
 egraph, absolute necessity of conform- 
 ing to definite conditions in making 
 each, 61 ; Telegraph, the, Babbage's 
 Calculating Machine, the Steam-En- 
 gine, and the Solar System, all work by 
 Natural Consequence, 65. 
 
 Everlasting Will, the, some purpose of 
 it to be seen working everywhere, 74. 
 
 Experience, Association, or Intuition, 
 origin of our ideas how far due, re- 
 spectively to, 172 ; Mr. J. S. Mill on, 172. 
 
 Explanation, the mere ticketing and or- 
 derly assortment of external facts, not, 
 2 ; what it is, 48. 
 
 External Correlations provided before- 
 hand by Utility, 153 ; Elements of Na- 
 ture, our command over the, in advance 
 of our command over the resources of 
 Human Character, 228. 
 
 " Eyes " in the wing of the Argus Pheas- 
 ant, compared to the " ball and socket " 
 ornament in Art, 115. 
 
 FACT, Purpose not an Inference merely, 
 but a, 50 ; Purpose as a general in- 
 ference, and as a particular, distinction 
 between them not sufficiently ob- 
 served , 50. 
 
 Facts, the, of Function, constitute not 
 Final, but immediate Purpose, 49 ; Man 
 controls, only because he interferes 
 with Laws, 189 ; Men always trying to 
 evolve out of their own minds knowl- 
 edge only to be acquired by patient in- 
 quiry into, 194. 
 
 Factories, effects of u free " labor in, 209 ; 
 Labor of children in, in what sense 
 " free," 210 ; in what sense not " free," 
 210 ; Owners of, powerful motives in 
 operation on the, 210; Inspectors of, 
 in 1864, 214. 
 
 Factory System, the, how it arose, 205 ; 
 Act of 1802, in what sense invaluable, 
 208 ; Acts, false intellectual conceptions 
 at the bottom of opposition to, 210 ; 
 Acts, the, the first Legislative recog- 
 nition of, a great Natural Law quite as 
 important as Freedom of Trade, 215 ; 
 Legislation, Progress of Political Sci- 
 ence in nothing happier than in, 217 ; 
 Combination effects a higher good than 
 that resulting from, 221. 
 
 Fallacies, Verbal, of Mr. Mansel exposed 
 by Mr. Mill, 184. 
 
 False Theory and mistaken Conduct 
 found out by the working of Natural 
 Consequence, 215. 
 
 Feather, Wing, a production wholly un- 
 like any other animal growth, 101. 
 
 Feathers, of a bird's wing, three-fold di- 
 vision of the, 93 ; one fundamental plan 
 in, 151. 
 
 Final ends not to be seen, 48. 
 
 Fish, power of many, to change color 
 rapidly, 106. 
 
 Flight, the true theory of, may be tested 
 by the eye, 84. 
 
 Fly Shuttle inWeaving, invention of the, 
 the impulse it gave, 206. 
 
 Flying Animal, no, lighter than the air it 
 moves in, 88. 
 
 Foraminifera, 71. 
 
254 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Force, or Forces, an observed Order of 
 Facts is the Index and the result of the 
 working of some, 41 ; the Law of 
 Gravitation is that, the exact measure 
 of whose operation was numerically 
 ascertained by Newton, 42 ; each, if 
 left to itself, would be destructive of 
 the Universe, 55; what is it? 71; the 
 idea of ^.traced to its Fountain Head, 
 72 ; ON~. all natural Forces resolvable 
 perhaps into, 76 ; this, perhaps, in itself 
 a mode of action of the Divine Will, 
 76 ; of Gravitation, the most familiar 
 of all Forces in all Ages, 78 ; this Force, 
 chiefly that concerned in flight, 78 ; or 
 Forces, to which the phenomena of 
 Life can be traced, no knowledge of 
 the, 126 ; a, emanating from External 
 things, and moulding the structure of 
 an organist^ 1 in harmony with them- 
 selves, no conception of, 149 ; Furnish- 
 er of, no substance comparable as a, to 
 Coal, 155 ; One, the source and centre 
 of the rest, 163 ; ultimate seat of, the, 
 we know nothing directly of, 163 ; near- 
 est conception of this derived from our 
 own consciousness, 164 ; or Power, de- 
 veloped through an organ, not identi- 
 cal with that organ, 166 ; or Forces, 
 implied in an " Observed Order of 
 Facts," 168 ; Expenditure of, in severe 
 Thinking, 169. 
 
 Forces, Correlation of, modern doctrine 
 of the, 4; Law as applied to individ- 
 ual, the measure of whose operation 
 has been more or less defined, or ascer- 
 tained, 39 ; Law in its most habitual 
 sense, as Natural, related to Purpose, 
 and subservient to the discharge of 
 Function, 48 ; irresistible tendency in 
 the language of Science to personify, 
 54 ; no phenomena visible to man gov- 
 erned by zVzvariable, but by variable 
 combinations of invariable forces, 59 ; 
 Convertibility of, modern doctrine of 
 the, 73 ; Natural, Law in what sense the 
 co-operation of, working together for 
 fulfilment of obvious Intention, 128 ; 
 Vital, how made to evolve a new Form 
 of Life, 155 ; all, in their mutual rela- 
 tions, governed by principles of ar- 
 rangement purely Mental, 163 ; Mate- 
 rial, manifestations of mental Energy 
 and Will, 163 ; apparent barrier against 
 our conceiving how any combination 
 of, can result in mind, 169 ; Material, 
 misconception of, 169 ; Immaterial, 
 working in matter, 170; Bystanders 
 
 often see the, telling on our Wills, 
 more clearly than we do ourselves, 171 ; 
 Action of, on our minds, how to be 
 traced, 172 ; aggregate of what, may 
 be called the Laws which determine 
 human action and opinions, 180 ; or 
 Laws which operate on the Mind, 
 exceedingly difficult to reduce them in 
 their boundless variety to system, 180 ; 
 our Volitions how far subject to ad- 
 justed, 191 ; the fixedness of all, in one 
 sense, constitutes their infinite pliabil- 
 ity in another, 191 ; of Nature, one of 
 the most tremendous of the, reduced 
 to obedience by Watt, 202; Separate 
 and Individual, in Man and Nature, 
 alone invariable, 219 ; Combinations of 
 these, of endless variety and endless 
 capability of change, 219. 
 
 Foreknowledge, Perfect knowledge must 
 be perfect, 185. 
 
 Form, of Life, new, correlation required 
 in the establishment of a, 149 ; such 
 correlation, as far as we can see, with- 
 out any Physical cause, 149 ; and Spirit, 
 the connection between, sanctioned by 
 the doctrine of the Resurrection, 170. 
 
 Forms, Typical, work of Nature carried 
 on under rules of adherence to, 46 ; of 
 Life, successive introduction of, higher 
 and higher, 125 ; allied, specific and 
 generic, bond of connection between 
 them, 130. 
 
 Forward Motion, the power of, how 
 given to birds, 83. 
 
 Fossil Remains, what Forms to be traced 
 in, 125 ; Animals, approximating to the 
 Forms of the Horse and the Ox, Pro- 
 fessor Owen on, 126. 
 
 Fossils designated " the Sports of Na- 
 ture," 159. 
 
 Free Agency of Man, faith required in 
 the, to secure the working for good of 
 great Natural Laws, 224. 
 
 Free Labor, those who opposed restric- 
 tions on, met with no adequate reply, 
 211 ; advocates of Restriction on, igno- 
 rant of the principles at issue, 211. 
 
 Free Will, erroneously called the peculiar 
 Prerogative of Man, 180 ; and Neces- 
 sity, progress at last on the vexed ques- 
 tion of, 183. 
 
 Freedom, a relative term, not an abso- 
 lute, 179. 
 
 Freedom of Exchange, in the products of 
 Labor, results of, compared with the 
 results. of perfect freedom of competi- 
 tion in Labor itself, 213. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 2 55 
 
 Freedom of Man's Will not more myste- 
 rious in directing the Mind to one mo- 
 tive, and diverting it from another, 
 than in the turning of the Body to the 
 right hand rather than the left, 186. 
 
 Fulmars, mechanism of flight in, 90. 
 
 Function, definition of, 166 ; of Coal in 
 the world, 154. 
 
 Function of an Organ, the, its Purpose, 50. 
 
 GALILEO, period of, 204. 
 
 Gallinaceous Birds, sort of wings in, 93 ; 
 comparatively no infancy in, 177 ; fact 
 of immense significance connected 
 with, 178. 
 
 Gannet, the, diving for fish, 87. 
 
 Genesis of Organic Life, modern idea of 
 the, 18. 
 
 Geographical distribution of Humming 
 Birds, 133. 
 
 Gipsies, case of the, not parallel with 
 that of the Jews, 12. 
 
 Gladstone's, Mr., description of the old 
 Commercial Policy, 200. 
 
 God's Will, extraordinary manifestations 
 of, how they may be wrought, 10. 
 
 God, operations of, and of Men's Minds, 
 light thrown on the analogy between 
 them by every known instance of Con- 
 trivance, 77. 
 
 Gold, laws relating to, in Ancient Sparta 
 and in Modern Spain, 200. 
 
 Gould, Mr., on the action of the wing in 
 Humming Birds, 100 ; on the reason 
 for the gorgeous coloring of those 
 birds, 137 ; his description of ditto, 138 ; 
 on the absence of Hybridism between 
 any two species of Humming Birds, 
 141 ; on certain local varieties near Bo- 
 gota, whose ornament is changing 
 color, 142 ; his " Birds of Australia," 
 177. 
 
 Government, Divine ; see Divine Gov- 
 ernment. 
 
 Government, principle of, only recog- 
 nized in modern times, 194 ; the Science 
 of, two great discoveries made in, dur- 
 ing the present century, 199. 
 
 Gravitation, Law of, the discovery of it 
 the highest exercise of pure intellect 
 through which the Human Mind has 
 found its way, 44 ; the most familiar of 
 all Forces in all Ages, 78 ; the chief 
 Force in flight, 78. 
 
 Grote's u Plato," 195. 
 
 Grouse, feathers of the, close imitation 
 in, to the tinting and mottling of the 
 ground on which they lie, 108. 
 
 Growth, Correlations of ; see Correlations 
 of Growth. 
 
 Growth, Progress and Decay, whether 
 any Law of, in Nations as in Individual 
 Organisms, 220. 
 
 Gurzot, M., on the Supernatural, i, 13, 17, 
 18, 31 ; on the only serious adversaries 
 of the doctrine of Creation, 156 ; on the 
 introduction of the human pair into the 
 world, 160; on misconceptions of the 
 Past, and false anticipations of the Fu- 
 ture, 230. 
 
 HAMILTON, SIR WILLIAM, examination of 
 the Philosophy of, by Mr. J. S. Mill, 
 183, et seq. 
 
 Hargraves, 205, 207. 
 
 Hawks, classified as "noble," or "igno- 
 ble," 94. 
 
 Hebrides, remarkable chase of a Merlin 
 after a Snipe, in the, 95. 
 
 Hereditary Transmission of Mental 
 Qualities, 172 ; of Innate Ideas, 178. 
 
 Heron's Wing, curious experiment with 
 an outstretched, 84. 
 
 Herschel, Sir John, quoted, 44, 73. 
 
 Homology, of Orchids, 26 ; in Structure, 
 and Analogy in Use, 119. 
 
 Homologies, doctrine of, doctrine of 
 Contrivance and Adjustment not so 
 metaphysical as the, 50 , Science of, as 
 developed by Cuvier, Hunter, Owen, 
 and Huxley, an intricate, almost a 
 transcendental, Science, 118. 
 
 Horse, the, " silent members " in, 116. 
 
 Hudibras quoted, no. 
 
 Hum^n Action and Opinions, aggregate 
 of Forces which may be called Laws 
 which determine, 180. 
 
 Human Character, elementary Forces 
 having a constant operation on, 193. 
 
 Human Law, function of, as distin- 
 guished from Natural Law, 194 ; Law, 
 idea of founding it on the Laws of Na- 
 ture never systematically entertained 
 in the Ancient World, 194. 
 
 Human Society, odious conceptions of, 
 in Plato's Republic, 194. 
 
 Human Instincts, and facuhies of Con- 
 trivance, impeded by clumsy machin- 
 ery, 203. 
 
 Human Labor, Factory System as affect- 
 ing, 205. 
 
 Human Spirit, Natural Laws in harmoni- 
 ous relation with the, 232. 
 
 Humming Birds, the most remarkable 
 examples of the machinery of flight, 
 99 ; peculiarities of, 132 : their distinct- 
 
2 5 6 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 iveness from all other families of 
 birds, 132 ; geographical distribution of, 
 133 ; divisible only into two Sub-fami- 
 lies, 134 ; generic and specific differ- 
 ences between these, 134 ; species of, 
 peculiar to Cotopaxi, to Chimborazo, 
 Juan Fernandez, etc., 135 ; a curious 
 example of Ornament for Ornament's 
 sake, 139 ; the Creation of separate 
 species-jof, suggests the idea of some 
 Creati : Law, of the nature and con- 
 ditions of which we know nothing, 
 140. 
 
 Hunting Grounds of Eagles, Falcons, and 
 Hawks, 108. 
 
 Hutton, Captain, on the flight of the 
 Albatross, 99. 
 
 Huxley, Professor, false charge of Athe- 
 ism against, 54 ; his assertion that Life 
 precedes Organization, 71 ; rhetorical 
 designation of " Life " in his "Elements 
 of Comparative Anatomy," 127; front- 
 ispiece to his " Man's Place in Nature," 
 265. 
 
 Hybridism unknown between two species 
 of Humming Birds, 141. 
 
 Hyrax, or "Coney," the, teeth and hoofs 
 of, resemble those of the Rhinoceros, 
 148. 
 
 IDEAS, in what sense born with us, 176 ; 
 formation of, all that comes from the 
 Mind itself in the, 176. 
 
 Identic Shapes, Forces which aggregate 
 particles of matter in, 159. 
 
 Idols, Men's, nowadays their own ab- 
 stract Conceptions, 67. 
 
 Immediate Purpose, Facts of Adjustment 
 and of Function constitute not Final, 
 but, 49. 
 
 Imponderable, the Great, 91. 
 
 Incubator, Artificial, prepared by the 
 Megapode, 177. 
 
 Individual Force, Law immutable only as 
 an, 58 ; Will, Laws against which, can- 
 not contend, 214 ; Will, the, helpless- 
 ness and thoughtlessness of, to a great 
 extent to be overcome, 222. 
 
 Inductive Sciences, Whewell's History 
 of the, 66. 
 
 Inequality of Men, in the sense of gifts 
 of Mind and Body, 224. 
 
 Inheritance, bond of, according to Mr. 
 Darwin, 130 ; Theory of, when it star- 
 tles us, 156. 
 
 Inorganic Compounds, relations of cer- 
 tain to the Chemistry of Life, 57. 
 
 Inspectors of Factories, Reports of, 214. 
 
 Instinct, or Intuition, not Experience,. 
 teaches us unconsciously how to use 
 the machinery causing Muscular Con- 
 tractions, 173. 
 
 Instincts of the nature of Ideas, 176 ; 
 Natural, when to be trusted, 213 ; when 
 the Higher Faculties must impose their 
 Will on the, 213. 
 
 Institution, Positive, Authoritative In- 
 terference of, with the freedom of the 
 Individual Will, still required in Fac- 
 tories, 216. 
 
 Institutions, Positive, stand contrasted 
 with Natural Law in one sense only, 
 198. 
 
 Intellect, Laws of, Philosophers who- 
 fancy they are reduced to scientific ex- 
 pression when described as the working 
 of the " cerebral ganglia," 168. 
 
 Intention, exhibited in the mechanism of 
 Orchids, the question Mr. Darwin se.ts 
 himself to answer, 23 ; Obvious, Law 
 in what sense meant as the co-operation 
 of Natural Forces, working together 
 for the fulfilment of, 128 ; and Purpose,, 
 the Law of Structure entirely subordi- 
 nate to the Law of, 157. 
 
 Intuition, Origin of our Ideas how far 
 due to, 172 ; a word not liked by sup- 
 porters of the doctrine of Experience, 
 i73- 
 
 Intuitions, Copernicus, Kepler, and 
 Galileo guided in their profound* con- 
 ceptions of visible phenomena by, 66 ; 
 the most extravagant errors in Philoso- 
 phy often associated with the happiest, 
 229. 
 
 Invariability, double meaning of, in the 
 Necessitarian Philosophy, 183 ; of Se- 
 quence, an ambiguous phrase, 184. 
 
 Invariable Law, Phenomena not governed 
 by, 189; Vision of, on the Throne of 
 Nature, 232. 
 
 Invention, Mechanical, Scientific Men 
 forced to borrow the language of, 153 ; 
 triumphs of, regarded often with fear 
 and jealousy by the Working Classes, 
 223; a Law of Nature in the 'strictest 
 sense, 224. 
 
 Invisible, the, all the Realities of Nature 
 are in the region of, 71. 
 
 JELLY, blobs of, without parts, or organs, 
 or visible structure, Vital Force in, 
 
 71- 
 Jevons, Mr. W. S., on the Coal Question, 
 
 155- 
 Jews, preservation of the, a striking il- 
 
INDEX. 
 
 257 
 
 lustration of departure from the ordi- 
 nary course of Nature effected through 
 Natural means, 12. 
 
 Job on the Stars, 68. 
 
 Juan Fernandez, three species of Hum- 
 ming Birds peculiar to, 135. 
 
 KEPLER, three Laws of, 41. 
 Kestrel hovering, 91. 
 
 " Knowing how to do it," in Nature as 
 in Art, all done seems done by, 77. 
 
 LABELLUM in Orchids, its use, 24. 
 
 Labor, Restrictions on, denounced by 
 Adam Smith, 201 ; Children's, in Fac- 
 tories, in what sense " free," in 
 what not "free," 210; instincts of, 
 when blind to all results save money- 
 making, 213 ; resort to Combination for 
 the protection of, recommended by 
 Reason and Experience, 222 ; Rewards 
 of, Limits within which Combinations 
 can, and beyond which they cannot, 
 affect the, 225. 
 
 Languages grow and change by rules of 
 which the men speaking them are un- 
 conscious, 46. 
 
 Law, Idea of, made the basis of the 
 Christian miracles, 14 ; highest, known 
 to Man, 37; the word, in its primary 
 signification, 39 ; FIVE different senses 
 in which the word is habitually used 
 first, as applied to an Observed Order 
 of Facts ; secondly, to that Order as in- 
 volving the action of some Force, or 
 Forces, of which nothing more may be 
 known ; thirdly, as applied to individ- 
 ual Forces, the measure of whose oper- 
 ations has been more or less defined 
 
 ' and ascertained, 39 ; fourthly, as ap- 
 plied to Combinations of Force having 
 reference to the fulfilment of Purpose 
 or the discharge of Function ; fifthly, 
 as applied to abstract conceptions of 
 the Mind these five great leading sig- 
 nifications of, the questions they circle 
 round, 40 ; neatest illustrations of used 
 in the first sense, to be found in Kep- 
 ler's Three Laws, 40 ; in the second 
 sense, the index and result of the work- 
 ing of some Force, or Forces, 41 ; of 
 Gravitation defined, 42 ; in its highest 
 sense, as Natural Forces related to Pur- 
 pose, and subservient to the discharge 
 of Function, 48 ; a, only immutable as 
 an Individual Force, 58 ; the term, as 
 used to designate an Abstract Idea, 
 65 ; illustration of this in the " First 
 
 17 
 
 Law of Motion," 65 ; in what sense 
 meant as the co-operation of Natural 
 Forces working together for the fulfil- 
 ment of Obvious Intention, 128; differ- 
 ence between that to which the Lower 
 Animals are subject and that to which 
 Man is subject, 180. 
 
 Laws of Nature, Man's Mind strangely 
 excluded by Professor Tyndall from 
 the, 4 ; if not unchangeable, could not 
 be used as instruments of Will, 58 ; 
 Natural, unchangeableness and uni- 
 versality of, essential to their use as 
 instruments of Will, 88 ; or Forces, the, 
 which operate on the Mind, exceeding- 
 ly difficult to reduce them to system, 
 180 , interference with, the only way in 
 which Man can control Facts, 189 ; 
 against which Individual Will cannot 
 contend, 214 ; Economic, invariability 
 of, rightly understood, 225. 
 Lecky, Mr., on the Rise and Influence of 
 
 Rationalism in Europe, 10. 
 Legislation, Wise and successful, on the 
 recognition of what causes it depends, 
 179 ; double movement in, ever since 
 the First Factory Act, 215. 
 Leverage, Law of, as applied to Wings, 
 
 90. 
 
 Lewes, Mr. G. H., 42, 70, 74, 121. 
 Lewis, Sir G. C., on Astronomy, 8. 
 Life, the Cause of Organization, 71 ; 
 Leading Types of, in Geological ages, 
 an orderly gradation in, 125 ; Origin of, 
 nothing known or guessed at in, corre- 
 sponding with Law in its strictest sense, 
 126 ; New Forms of, if developed from 
 the Old, the working of Creative 
 Power, 129. 
 
 Living Effort, our conceptions of Force 
 formed from our own consciousness of, 
 72. 
 Lizards, Flying, in other Ages of the 
 
 World, 101. 
 Locke, quoted, 15. 
 Longfellow, Professor, 78. 
 
 MACHINE, Idea and Essence of a, 54. 
 McCosh, Dr., on the Supernatural in re- 
 lation to the Natural, n. 
 Malformation, Correlations brought out 
 
 by, 147. 
 
 Man, Is he Supernatural ? 5. 
 
 Man's agency, relation of, to the Phys- 
 ical Laws of Nature, 19. 
 
 Man and the Lower Animals, common 
 Relationship of, by descent, at least 
 conceivable, 18. 
 
2 5 8 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Man and Nature, works of both done 
 through the means of Law, 64 ; and the 
 Lower Animals, amount and kind of 
 difference between, spite of close affin- 
 ities of bodily structure, 156 ; and the 
 highest Animals below him, secret of 
 the boundless difference between, 182 ; 
 in what sense subject to the Law of 
 Causation, 186 ; Reason, Conscience, 
 Imagination, Belief, as much a part of, 
 as til! desires and instincts, 198 ; Com. 
 bi nation natural to, 224. 
 
 Mankind, Combination, among many 
 Motives, a means of influencing, to an 
 extent as yet unknown, the conduct 
 and condition of, 219 ; progress of, to 
 higher and better things, 231. 
 
 Mansel's, Mr., "Essay on Miracles," n ; 
 his Limits to Religious Thought, its 
 Verbal fallacies, exposed by Mr. J. S. 
 Mill, 184. 
 
 Mantis, strange imitation of Vegetable 
 growths in the body of the, no. 
 
 Marine Mollusca, beautiful shells of, 113. 
 
 Material, World, increasing power exer 
 cised over the, by Man's Will, 58; 
 World, the, and the world of Mind, 
 Law in the same sense prevails in the 
 phenomena of both, 163 ; Frame, in 
 which we live, some of the most distant 
 objects of the Universe more accessible 
 to our observation and intelligible to 
 us than, 164 ; Structure, our Affections 
 dependent on, 165. 
 
 Materialism, Suggestions of, lie thickest 
 on the surface of things, 68 ; two great 
 enemies to, in the heart and the intel- 
 lect, 69. 
 
 Matter, Immaterial Forces working in, 
 176. 
 
 Means, God governing fhe world by the 
 choice and use of, TO ; and Ends, our 
 ignorance of God's notions of, 49. 
 
 " Measure," inaccurately termed the 
 " verifiable element " in our knowledge, 
 42. 
 
 Mechanism of Orchids, Intention exhib 
 ited in the, 24 ; of Flight in the Alba- 
 tross and in Seagulls, 90. 
 
 Megapodes, Innate Ideas in the, 177. 
 
 Memory often paralyzed by the stroke 
 which paralyzes a Limb, 165. 
 
 Men, in what sense " fellow-workers with 
 God," and made " partakers of the Di- 
 vine Nature," 6. 
 
 Mental Purpose and Physical Cause, 
 ideas of, not antagonistic, 19 and Re- 
 solve, the one thing our Intelligence 
 
 perceives with direct and intuitive 
 recognition, 21 ; Purposes, Correlation 
 having reference to certain, 146. 
 
 Merlin, a, swooping on its prey, 87 ; chase 
 of a, after a Snipe in the Hebrides, 95. 
 
 Metaphors, the, employed in Language, 
 generally founded on Analogies in- 
 stinctively and often unconsciously 
 perceived, 79. 
 
 Method of Nature, proper object of Sci- 
 ence to detect, if she can, the, 161. 
 
 Methods, some, of operating on Men's 
 Minds known to us instinctively, 194. 
 
 Mill, Mr. J. S., his admission that our 
 muscular contractions are not the re- 
 sult of " Experience," 172 ; Comments 
 on this admission, 173, et seq. ; on the 
 meaning of the word " Necessity," 183 ; 
 his use of the vague word " Antece- 
 dent," 186 ; his definition in " Auguste 
 Comte and Positivism," of the Positive 
 as distinguished from the Theological 
 Mode of Thought, 187 ; dissection of 
 these phrases, 187, 188 ; on " Change- 
 able Wills," 189. 
 
 Mind and Will of Man in one sense "sep- 
 arate " from " Nature " and belonging 
 to the " Supernatural," 5. 
 
 Mind, Character of, expressed in lines 
 and shapes of matter, 157 ; Phenomena 
 of, an observed Order of Facts in the, 
 163 ; the, unconscious of its dependence 
 on the Body, 165; first to be mapped, 
 and then its Organ, 167 ; and Organi- 
 zation, parallel Phenomena of, 167 ; and 
 Brain, connection between them recog- 
 nized as a Law by us only in the sense 
 of an " Observed Order of Facts," 168; 
 the, to be regarded as having, like the 
 Body, Automatic Faculties, 174 ; Phe- 
 nomena of, words used to describe the, 
 suggestive of analogies between Mental 
 and Material things, 179 ; influences 
 which attract the Polar Force com- 
 pared to, 180; and Character of Man, 
 knowledge of, how it may be governed, 
 to be obtained only by slow degrees, 
 194 ; Human, Love of Gain an instinct 
 implanted in the, 224 ; openness and 
 simplicity of, great characteristics of 
 Men who have exercised an influence 
 for good on Society, 228. 
 
 Mineral Salt, Crystallizing under a Vol- 
 taic current, Correlation of Growth in 
 its simplest form, 145. 
 
 Miracle, a, commonly understood as a 
 suspension or violation of the Laws of 
 Nature, 10. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 2 59 
 
 Miracles, when they loose every element 
 of inconceivability, 14 ; Christian, idea 
 of Law made the very basis of the, 14 ; 
 the idea of, performed by the use of 
 means, regarded by many with jealousy 
 and suspicion, 16. 
 
 Modern Policy and Ancient, striking dif- 
 ference between the spirit of, 200 ; Poli- 
 ticians, great aim of, to open new 
 sources of national opulence, 200 Po- 
 litical Societies, stagnation and decline 
 the actual condition of many, 220. 
 
 Moilusca, the Vital Forces in, made to 
 work to order, 128. 
 
 Monkeys, " Silent members " in, 116. 
 
 Muscles, the seat of two opposing Forces, 
 
 47- 
 
 Muscular Power, great concentration of, 
 in the Organism of Birds, 80. 
 
 NARWHAL, the Aborted Germ in, 117. 
 
 Nasmyth, Mr. James, on the shadows 
 and " high light " in the " eyes " in the 
 wing of the Argus Pheasant, 115. 
 
 Nations, calamities of, their origin in the 
 insensible development of New Con- 
 ditions, 230. 
 
 Natural Consequence, way of, Steam 
 Engine and Solar System both worked 
 by, 65. 
 
 Natural Forces, Idea of, quite separate 
 from the ascertained measure of their 
 energy, 43 ; found to operate under 
 rules having strict reference to Space 
 and Time, 45 ; must be conformed to and 
 obeyed, 76. 
 
 Natural Law, Common Idea of the Su- 
 pernatural as at variance with, above, 
 or in violation of, 3 ; True conception 
 of, on what founded, 194 ; the idea of, 
 as affecting mankind, on what founded, 
 197 ; in what sense contrasted with 
 Positive Institution, 198 ; Law, Signal 
 illustration in England this century 
 of circumstances in which, may be 
 trusted, and of those in which it required 
 to be controlled, 199 ; and Positive Insti- 
 tution, antagonism between, 212 ; ever 
 working to convict error and confirm 
 truth, 213 ; working on the Human 
 Will while exposed to overpowering 
 motives and under debased conditions 
 of the understanding and the heart, 
 216.- 
 
 Natural Laws, founded on the right ex- 
 ercise of Reason in the highest and 
 best sense, 198 ; best fulfilled when 
 made the instruments of intelligent 
 
 Will, and the servants of enlightened 
 Conscience, 232. 
 
 " Natural Selection " can do nothing ex- 
 cept with the materials presented to it, 
 130 ; what it accounts for and what it 
 does not account for, 131 ; the only 
 point, with reference to the Sub-Fami- 
 lies of Humming Birds, in which it has 
 any bearing, though it does not touch 
 the facts of the case, 134 ; does not ac- 
 count for the origin or spread of Hum- 
 ming Birds, 140 ; real bearing of, 143 ; 
 seizes on External Correlations, but 
 cannot enter the womb and shape the 
 New Form in harmony with the modi- 
 fied conditions of External Life, 152 ; 
 operates only through the agency of 
 use and disuse on organs already ex- 
 isting, and capable of discharging 
 function, 158; Selection, idea of, ex- 
 cluded by the theory of Creation by 
 Birth, 158. 
 
 Nature, Power and Works of, all Super- 
 human, i ; glorious result of a right 
 method in the study of, 3 ; what, in the 
 largest sense, to be understood as in- 
 cluding, 3 ; in the narrow sense of 
 Physical Nature, 4 ; and the Super- 
 natural, Dr. Bushnell on, 5 ; Man's, 
 Phenomena of, included in the term 
 " Natural," 7 ; ordinary course of, 8; the 
 superhuman and the Supermaterial, 
 familiar facts in, 14 ; the Great Para- 
 ble, 32 ; Universal Presence of com- 
 binations of Force in, 46 ; Relation of 
 an Organic Structure to its Purpose in, 
 60; comparison illustrative of this be- 
 tween the Menai Bridge and the Shells 
 of Barnacles, 60 ; one vast system of 
 Contrivance, 76 ; Mechanics of, high- 
 est problem in, 80 ; Purpose of partic- 
 ular structures in, often misconceived, 
 
 105 ; Laboratory of, process in the, by 
 which natural tints can be transferred 
 to substances prepared to receive them, 
 
 106 ; Facts of, High and Complex Cor- 
 relation the most constant and obvious 
 of all the, 149 ; no fictions or bad jokes 
 in, 159 ; no short cuts in, 197 ; a great 
 Armory for the use of Will, 227 ; Man's 
 command over the external elements of, 
 in advance of his command over the 
 resources of Human Character, 228 ; 
 Man's most certain of all the Laws, of, 
 231. 
 
 "Necessity," Progress at last on the 
 vexed question of, 183 ; Rebellion 
 against the Doctrines of, founded on 
 
260 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 false conceptions of Invariable Law, 
 224. 
 
 New Forms, Mr. Darwin's Theory, how 
 far it suggests anything of the nature of 
 Creative Law to explain the introduc- 
 tion of, 131. 
 
 New Species, a, according to Mr. Dar- 
 win, snnply an unusual birth, 130 ; 
 Creatioi^ of, has followed some plan in 
 which variety is in itself an aim, 136 ; 
 a, must be born male and female, 141 ; 
 of Humming Birds, if born from the 
 Old, how they must be born, 142. 
 
 Newton, Sir Isaac, his agitation on dis- 
 covering the Law of Gravitation, 45. 
 
 Numerical computation, intuitive powers 
 of, 174 ; Relations, Ideas of Order based 
 on, meet us in Nature at every turn, 30. 
 
 ORCHIS, the Madagascar, its long and 
 deep nectary, how developed, 27. 
 
 Orchids, Fertilization of, 22 ; Intention 
 in the mechanism of, the question Mr. 
 Darwin sets himself to answer, 23 ; 
 Labellum in, its use, 24; large Family of, 
 in the forests of Central America, 135. 
 
 Observed Order of Facts, an, implies a 
 Force, or arrangement of Forces, out 
 of which the Order comes, 168. 
 
 Order, a subtle and pervading, binding 
 together all Living things, 124 ; of Na- 
 ture, the, very complicated, the Mind 
 perplexed by the vast variety of sub- 
 ordinate Facts, 103 ; of Thought, the 
 basis of all other Order in the works of 
 Man and of Nature, 49. 
 
 Organic Forms, Mr. Darwin's denial that 
 Beauty for its own sake can be an end 
 in, 112 ; Growth, symmetry to be 
 detected in all variations of, 144 ; 
 Growths, general impression left by 
 the observance of Correlation between, 
 148 ; Life, never any alteration in the 
 whole scale of, in those principles of 
 Chemical and Mechanical adjustment 
 on which Respiration, Circulation, and 
 Reproduction have been provided for, 
 160. 
 
 Organism, Parts of an, bound together 
 as one whole by a pervading system of 
 Correlations, 147. 
 
 Organisms, Inheritance the only cause 
 which can produce, quite like or nearly 
 like each other, 157 ; Bilateral Arrange- 
 ment common to all, down to the Ra- 
 diata, 159 ; New, no knowledge of the 
 Laws connected with the Creation or 
 development of, 127. 
 
 Origin of New Forms, Darwin's Theory 
 does not profess to trace to a definite 
 Law the, 129 ; of our Ideas, how far 
 due respectively to Experience, Asso- 
 ciation, or Intuition, 172 ; clear defini- 
 tion of terms greatly required in the 
 discussion of such questions as the, 
 
 175; 
 
 Origin of Species, the true, in what it 
 consists, 143 ; only sense in which we 
 can get from the Theory of the, a 
 glimpse of Creation by Law, 155 ; New 
 Species, rule which seems to have gov- 
 erned Creative Power in the, 136. 
 
 Ornament in Nature in itself a Purpose, 
 112 ; was so before Man was born, 113 ; 
 for Ornament's sake, the rule in refer- 
 ence to which Creative Power seems 
 to have worked in Humming Birds, 
 138. 
 
 Ornament and Use ; see Use and Orna- 
 ment. 
 
 Ornithoryncus Paradoxus, 150. 
 
 Owen, Professor, on the Mental concep- 
 tion of the Plan of all Vertebrate Skele- 
 tons, 20 ; on the Battery of the Electric 
 Ray, 61 ; on Fossil Approximations to 
 the forms of the Horse and the Ox, 126. 
 
 PARABLE, why so much can be conveyed 
 in the Form of, 32. 
 
 Parliament, refusing to regulate " Free 
 Labor," 208 ; Combination indicated as 
 the right course by, 222. 
 
 Pauperism, in how far to be attacked 
 through Combination, 227. 
 
 Peel, Sir Robert, the Elder, the first to 
 interfere by law with unrestricted com- 
 petition in Human Labor, 208 , his Bill 
 limited to the regulation of the labor of 
 Apprentices, 208 ; presses a new meas- 
 ure of Restriction, 209. 
 
 Penguins, 89. 
 
 Peregrine Falcon, sharp-pointed struct- 
 ure of wing in the, 93. 
 
 Perfect Knowledge, the little way we can 
 ever travel towards, 185. 
 
 Personal Agency of God, the Creation of 
 Man " out of the dust of the ground " 
 an indication of the, 16. 
 
 Personal Will, the Idea of, separable 
 from the Forces which work in Nature, 
 in a sense the projection of our own 
 Personality, 74. 
 
 Personality and Will, impossibility of de- 
 scribing any facts in Science without 
 investing the Laws of Nature with, 55. 
 
 Petrels, Mechanism of flight in, 90. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 261 
 
 Phasma in the British Museum, Specimen 
 of, with wings spotted like a larva- 
 eaten leaf, 112. 
 
 Phenomena of Life, no knowledge of the 
 Force or Forces to which the, can be 
 traced, 126; of Mind, the, an Observed 
 Order of Facts, 163 ; Law in one sense 
 prevails in the, both of the Material 
 and Mental world, 164 ; never the re- 
 sult of individual Forces, but always 
 of the variable conditions under which 
 several individual Forces are combined, 
 189. 
 
 Philosophy of History, on the recogni- 
 tion of what causes it depends, 179. 
 
 Phrenological School, fundamental error 
 of the, 167. 
 
 Phrenology, a name which is itself a 
 fallacy, 166. 
 
 Physical Cause and Mental Purpose, 
 Ideas of, not antagonistic, 19. 
 
 Physical Cause, Correlation in the estab- 
 lishment of a New Form of Life, so far 
 as we can see, without any, 149. 
 
 Physical Forces all working to Order, 
 i54- 
 
 Physical Laws of Nature, relation of 
 Man's- agency to the, 7 ; advancing 
 knowledge of, accompanied with ad- 
 vancing power over the Physical 
 World, 8. 
 
 Physical Science, advances in, can only 
 widen intelligent Spiritual Beliefs, 68. 
 
 Physics, World of, Certainties in the 
 world of Mind as absolute as any in the, 
 185. 
 
 Physiological Discovery, the Dependence 
 of Mind on Bodily Organization, a fact 
 containing within itself the lesser facts 
 of, 168. 
 
 Physiology, recent Investigations in, as 
 to the Muscles, 47 ; every fact in, its 
 intimate bearing on some question of 
 the Philosophy of Mind, 172. 
 
 Planets, the, much discovered by man 
 concerning the circulation of, before he 
 discovered the circulation of the blood, 
 r,5 4 . 
 
 Plants, basis of many Correlations of 
 Growth in, 144. 
 
 Plato's Republic, 195. 
 
 Polar Force of Magnetism, 180. 
 
 Polarity, in Magnetic Force, ultimate 
 nature and source of, 146. 
 
 Polarity, Principle of, developed in a 
 circle in the Radiata, 159. 
 
 Policy, Modern Commercial, Central 
 idea of, 200. 
 
 Political Society, Ancient Law-givers al- 
 ways aiming at standards of, 194 ; 
 Events, memorable Examples in the 
 last and present generations of the 
 Reign of Law over the course of, 220. 
 
 Positive Institution, and Natural Law, 
 antagonism between, 212 ; Combination 
 coming in the place of, 221. 
 
 Positive Philosophy, the word Will, how 
 used in, 190. 
 
 Positivism, a sentence the concentration 
 of all that is erroneous in, 188. 
 
 Posterity's worfder respecting ourselves, 
 228. 
 
 Potential Use in Nature, 120. 
 
 Power, Law in its primary signification, 
 the authoritative expression of Human 
 Will enforced by, 39 ; of God, Profes- 
 sor Owen's Instances of the, as mani- 
 fested in his Animal Creation, 156. 
 
 Prayer, real Essence of, 37. 
 
 Primeval Traditions of Belief, immense 
 satisfaction to know that Logical An- 
 alysis confirms the testimony of Con- 
 sciousness and runs parallel with the T 
 232. 
 
 Problem, the most difficult of all, in the 
 Science of Government, 199. 
 
 Progress of Mankind, order of facts ob- 
 servable in the, that long ages of silence 
 and inaction are broken up and brought 
 to an end by shorter periods of almost 
 preternatural activity, 204. 
 
 Protection, a hindrance to the Wealth of 
 Nations, the skill of Crafts, and the 
 success of Trade, 203. 
 
 Psychology and Physiology, neither in- 
 depen^dent of the other, 172. 
 
 Ptarmigan, close imitation in the Plu- 
 mage of the, to the mottling of ground,. 
 108. 
 
 Purpose, the only thing we can surely 
 know in the relation of Created Forms- 
 to our own Minds, 20; Principle of Ad- 
 justment no meaning except as the re- 
 sult of, 47 ; Function of an Organ, its r 
 50 ; as a general inference, and as a par- 
 ticular fact, distinction between them 
 not sufficiently observed, 50 ; in Nature 
 attained only by the enlistment of Laws 
 as Means, 60; instance of this in the 
 Electric Ray, where an extraordinary 
 result is produced by a common Law 
 yoked to extraordinary conditions, 61 ; 
 Contrivance necessary for the accom- 
 plishment of, 76 ; Contrivance in Nature 
 never reduced to a single, m ; of the 
 One Plan of Organic Life, 117; how 
 
262 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Material Laws follow the steps of, 124; 
 Mental, Correlation of Growth having 
 reference to a certain, 146 ; Correlation 
 of Growth in the only sense we connect 
 it with the Origin of Species not a Phys- 
 ical cause but a Mental, 154 ; and In- 
 tention-txthe Law of Structure entirely 
 subord ; Tfete to, 158 ; only, to be de- 
 tected in the adaptability of the Verte- 
 brate Type to the Infinite varieties of 
 Life, 161. 
 
 RADCLIFFE'S, DR., Theory of Muscular 
 and Nervous Action, 47. 
 
 Radiata, the, 159. 
 
 Reason, Doctrine that things contrary to, 
 were noc beyond his faith, held by a 
 late eminent clergyman of the English 
 Church, 37 ; and Imagination, falling 
 impotently on analogy and conjecture 
 in endeavoring to get at Nature's 
 method, 161 ; paralyzed by the same 
 stroke which paralyzes a limb, 165 ; and 
 Feelings, direct appeals to the, entirely 
 useless when these faculties have not 
 been placed under favorable conditions, 
 193 ; on what path Instinct a surer 
 guide than, 220. 
 
 Regions where means of investigation 
 cease, and processes of Verification are 
 of no avail, 229. 
 
 Reign of Law, the, in Nature, so far as 
 we can see it, Universal, 3 ; Universal, 
 perfectly consistent with a power of 
 making those laws subservient to de- 
 sign, 13 ; the, the reign of Creative 
 Force, directed by Creative Knowl- 
 edge, worked under the control of 
 Creative Power, and in fulfilment of 
 Creative Purpose, 162. 
 
 Religion, Nothing in, incompatible with 
 the belief that all exercises of God's 
 Power are effected through the instru- 
 mentality of Means, 13, 30 ; or Nature, 
 the Will of the Supreme either in, one 
 in which " there is no variableness," 
 31 ; and Science, Doctrine that they 
 should be thought separate open to one 
 fatal objection, 35 ; disastrous effect of 
 the belief in their separation, 36. 
 
 Research, Physical, Transcendental char- 
 acter of the results of, 70. 
 
 Restrictions on Labor, great discovery 
 of the absolute necessity of imposing, 
 199 ; from Trade, immense advantage 
 of removing, 199. 
 
 Restriction on Free Labor, those who op- 
 posed, met with no adequate reply, 211 ; 
 
 Advocates of, ignorant of the funda- 
 mental principles at issue, 211. 
 
 Resurrection, Connection between Spirit 
 and Form sanctioned by the doctrine 
 of the, 170. 
 
 Retina, external Correlations of, 153. 
 
 Rhizopods of enormous size found near 
 the bottom of " Azoic " Rocks, 125. 
 
 Rudimentary Organs, said to be intended 
 merely to suggest a History which was 
 never true, and a Method which was 
 never followed, 159. 
 
 SAND-GROUSE of Asiatic Deserts and their 
 coloring, 109. 
 
 Sand Partridges of ditto, 109. 
 
 Science, the great Quest of, 43 ; Classifi- 
 cation the basis of, 51 ; Astronomical, 
 ultimate fact of, 55 , included in Phi- 
 losophy, 68 ; the u understanding by 
 Faith" mentioned by the writer of the 
 Epistle to the Hebrews, now an assured 
 doctrine of, 70 ; Proper object of, to 
 detect the method of nature, if she can, 
 161 ; True, bondage under which it 
 lies, 197 ; of Government, two great 
 discoveries made in the, during the 
 present century, 199 ; of Politics, the, 
 still in its infancy, 228. 
 
 Sciences, Physical, remarkable product 
 of the immense development of 
 the, 2. 
 
 Scientific Truth, a sharp eye to be cast 
 on every form of words professing to 
 represent, 34 ; Men who, though trust- 
 worthy on the facts of their own sci- 
 ence, are not to be trusted on the place 
 of those facts in the general system of 
 truth, 68. 
 
 Scripture, Language of, nowhere con- 
 scious of a distinction between the 
 Natural and the Supernatural, 18. 
 
 Seagulls, Mechanism of flight in the soar- 
 ing of, 86, 90. 
 
 Seasons, Revolutions of the, dependent 
 on a multitude of Laws, each of which 
 would produce utter confusion if not 
 balanced against others in the right 
 proportion, 56. 
 
 Seers, great, of the Old Testament, cor- 
 respondence of their language with a 
 great modern Scientific Idea, 77. 
 
 Self-consciousness the truth in the light 
 of which all other truths are known, 4. 
 
 Self-evident Truths, and Truths not self- 
 evident, breakdown of the distinction 
 between, 175. 
 
 Sensation, no new light thrown on, be- 
 
INDEX. 
 
 263 
 
 cause Sensation can be traced to certain 
 nerves, 168. 
 
 11 Sensory Ganglia," Philosophers who 
 think they cast new light on Sensation 
 by calling it an affection of the, 168. 
 
 "Silent members" in Animal Frames, 
 views on the subject by Mr. Darwin, 
 20 ; deeper and wider views of Profes- 
 sor Owen on, 20. 
 
 Silurian Sea, Old, richly carved shells 
 and corals of the, 113. 
 
 " Slowworm," the Common, " Blade 
 bone" and "Collar bone" of, 
 " aborted limbs" in, 117. 
 
 Smiles' Life of Watt, 204. 
 
 Smith, Adam, 200 et seq. : work of, in- 
 separably connected with the work of 
 James Watt, 202 , not dissimilar to 
 Watt's work in its relation to the Reign 
 of Law, 202 , opinions influenced by 
 personal observation of the ill-treat- 
 ment of Watt by the " Burgesses and 
 Craftsmen of Glasgow," 203 : doctrines 
 of, where a hindrance, not a help, 216. 
 
 Snakes, rudiments of Legs in, 117. 
 
 Snipe chased by a Merlin in the Heb- 
 rides, 95. 
 
 Snipes, Feathers of imitating the color of 
 bleached vegetable stalks, no. 
 
 Society, Sanction of, given, or withheld, 
 its influence for evil, or good, 218 ; de- 
 sire and need for Combination grows 
 with the growth of knowledge and 
 with the increasing complications of, 
 224 , openness and simplicity of mind 
 great characteristics of those men who 
 have exerted an influence for good on, 
 228 ; disorders of, the fruit of ignorance 
 or rebellion, 229. 
 
 Solar System, the, like the Steam Engine, 
 works by way of Natural Consequence, 
 
 65- 
 
 Space and Time, can we say more of 
 their wonders than was said by David 
 and Job ? 68. 
 
 Spain, Modern, prohibition of gold from 
 leaving the State, 200. 
 
 Sparrow Hawk chased and " chaffed J> by 
 little birds, 95. 
 
 Sparta, Ancient, Law of, prohibiting gold 
 from ever coming into the State, 200. 
 
 Species, the Preservation and Distribu- 
 tion of, when they have arisen, the real 
 bearing of the doctrine of Natural Se- 
 lection, 143. 
 
 Spindle, the, on Egyptian monuments, a 
 similar instrument familiar in the 
 Highlands until a few years ago, 206. 
 
 Spinning Jenny, the, coming to econo- 
 mize the work of human hands, 206. 
 
 Spinning Wheel in Yorkshire in 1760, 206. 
 
 Spontaneousness of Nature, no such 
 thing as, according to Professor Tyn- 
 dall, 4 ; illustration of "spontaneous" 
 design in the Professor's own mind, 8. 
 
 Statute of Apprenticeship in Watt's time, 
 205. 
 
 Steam Engine, Discovery of the. a new 
 stimulus to the mind's motives, 203. 
 
 Stewart's, Dugald, account of the Life 
 and Writings of Adam Smith, 200. 
 
 11 Strong Arm of the Law," what it really 
 is as proposed by Mr. Baker, the Fac- 
 tory Inspector, 214. 
 
 Structure, Bodily, Affinities between the, 
 of Man and that of the Lower Animals, 
 amongst the profoundest mysteries of 
 Nature, 156. 
 
 " Struggle for Existence," the, of Organ- 
 isms, 131. 
 
 Stunted and distorted growth in large 
 portions of mankind, m how far these 
 conditions are subject to the control of 
 Will through the use of Means, 193. 
 
 Superhuman, much that was once 
 thought, not thought so now, 8. 
 
 Superhuman and the Supermaterial, the, 
 familiar facts in nature, 14. 
 
 Supernatural, Belief in the, essential to 
 all Religion, an assertion true only in a 
 special sense, 31. 
 
 Supreme V7ill and Supreme Intelligence 
 in the Laws of Nature, our own Wills 
 and Intelligence enable us to conceive 
 of a, 14. 
 
 Swallow, Common, sharp-pointed struct- 
 ure of Wing in the, 94. 
 
 Swift, the, dropping, not flying back- 
 wards, 85 , its wonderful and unceas- 
 ing evolutions, 89. 
 
 Sylph Humming Bird, the, 138. 
 
 Symmetry a relation we detect in all 
 variations of Organic Growth, 144. 
 
 TAILS in Birds, 97. 
 
 Taylor, Jeremy, on Resemblances, 32. 
 
 Teachers in Politics, Time and Natural 
 Consequence the great, 153. 
 
 Tennyson's Idylls of the King, 37 ; Maud, 
 60 ; In Memoriam, 32, 70, 170. 
 
 Terns, Mechanism of Flight in, 90. 
 
 " Theine," and "Strychnine," identical 
 in elements, differ only m the propor- 
 tions in which they are combined, 57. 
 
 Theology, Systematic, an idea which it 
 regards with suspicion, 31. 
 
264 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 "THINGS HOPED FOR," the Power of, a 
 Power which never dies, 69. 
 
 Thought and Emotion, exciting Causes 
 of, must come from the external world, 
 176. 
 
 Threes within Threes, Archetypal Ar- 
 rangem^nt of, in Orchids, 26. 
 
 Time, sa-^to be a powerful Factor, 156. 
 
 Torpedo, number of Hexagonal columns 
 in the battery of the, 61. 
 
 Trade, immense advantage of abolishing 
 Restrictions on, 199 ; success in, hin- 
 dered by Protection, 203. 
 
 Triumphs, for which man has been gifted 
 with knowledge, a sense of right, and 
 faculties of Contrivance, 228. 
 
 Truth, every one, connected with every 
 other Truth in the Universe, 34 ; Ulti- 
 mate, beyond the reach of Science, 162. 
 
 Tulloch, Principal, quoted, 14. 
 
 Tycho Brahe, 204. 
 
 Tyndall, Professor, quoted, 4, 153. 
 
 Type, or Pattern, a definite, for each 
 class of Animal adhered to, 126. 
 
 Typical Forms, work of Creation carried 
 on under rules of adherence to, 46. 
 
 ULTIMATE Question, the, What is it by 
 which this is done ? lies above and be- 
 hind every detected Method in Na- 
 ture, 162 ; Force, seat of, we know 
 nothing directly of, 163. 
 
 Unconscious Metaphysics of Human 
 Speech, 180. 
 
 Unity of design amid Variety of Form, a 
 universal feature m Nature, 177. 
 
 Unknown and Unknowable, the, result 
 to Professor Huxley of using this vague 
 phrase, 54. 
 
 Universe, question lying at the root of 
 our conceptions of the, 38 , constitution 
 of the, Man's faculty of Contrivance 
 the nearest analogy by which to under- 
 stand the, 232. 
 
 Unusual Birth, an, Idea common to all 
 Development Theories that a New 
 Species is simply, 127. 
 
 Use and Ornament in Nature may often 
 arise out of the same conditions, 115. 
 
 Useless Organs, how explained by the 
 Theory of Creation by Birth, 158. 
 
 Utility, acting through Motive as a Men- 
 tal Purpose, the provider beforehand 
 of external Correlations, 152 ; Correlated 
 Growth in Flowers, the Forces of, ac- 
 cording to Mr. Darwin, modify struct- 
 ures independent of Utility, and there- 
 fore of Natural Selection, 152. 
 
 VARIABILITY of Adjustment in the facts 
 of Nature, 231. 
 
 Variable Combinations of /^variable 
 Forces, Phenomena governed by, 59. 
 
 Variation, Laws of, Mr. Darwin confesses 
 "our ignorance of the Laws of Varia- 
 tion is profound," 130 ; so-called Laws 
 of, for the most part simply observed 
 Facts in respect to Variation, 143. 
 
 Variety in itself an object in the creation 
 of New Species, 136. 
 
 Velocity of Flight, the heavier a bird the 
 greater its possible, 87. 
 
 Vertebrate Type, Purpose m the adapta- 
 bility of the, to the infinite varieties of 
 Life, 123, 161. 
 
 Verities of the World, a pre-adjusted re- 
 lation to the, 175. 
 
 Virgil, quoted, 144. 
 
 Vital Force, the Great Imponderable, 91. 
 
 Vital Power, the nearest conception we 
 can ever have of Force derived from 
 our consciousness of, 164. 
 
 Volitions, our, how far subject to Ad- 
 justed Forces, 191. 
 
 Voltaic Battery, Mr. Darwin cannot con- 
 ceive how a, can be made out of the 
 tissues of a fish, 63. 
 
 Voltaic Current, Mineral Salt crystalliz- 
 ing under a, correlation of growth in 
 its simplest form, 145. 
 
 Voluntary Society, the mere founding of 
 a, the powerful latent force it evolves, 
 219. 
 
 WAGES, Economic Advantages gained 
 when hours of labor are reduced with- 
 out corresponding reduction in, 225. 
 
 Wallace, Mr., his description of Humming 
 Birds balancing themselves in the air, 
 100. 
 
 vl Watch Force," and " Vital Force," 
 analogy between them precise and ac- 
 curate, 74. 
 
 Water, the Old Motive Power, Factory 
 System begun under, 207. 
 
 Watt, James, 202, et seq. 
 
 Wealth, views of the accumulation of, in 
 Ancient Political Philosophy, 200; of 
 Nations hindered by Protection, 203. 
 
 Wenham, Mr. F. H., on the Mechanical 
 Principle involved in the sufficiency of 
 very narrow Wings, 93. 
 
 Whales, Teeth in young, which never cut 
 the gum, 117. 
 
 What men naturally do, no sure test of 
 what they ought, or ought to be al- 
 lowed, to do, 199. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 265 
 
 Whewell, Dr., on the leading characters 
 in the minds of great Scientific Discov- 
 erers, 125. 
 
 Will, Man's, instruments of, 7 ; real diffi- 
 culty in the idea of, exercised without 
 the use of means, 9 ; God's extraordi- 
 nary manifestations of, how they may 
 be wrought by the use of Laws of 
 which Man knows nothing, 10; God'a 
 seeking and effecting the fulfilment ot 
 designs as our living Wills in their 
 little sphere effect their little objects, 
 13 ; Human, Law in its primary signifi- 
 cation, the authoritative expression of, 
 enforced by Power, 39 ; Man's increas- 
 ing power exercised by, over the Ma- 
 terial World, 58 ; the Everlasting, some 
 Purpose of it to be seen working every-, 
 where, 74 ; relation of, to Law, and 
 Law to Will, in Man's works and in 
 God's, 76 ; Unchangeableness and Uni- 
 versality of the Natural Laws essential 
 to their use as instruments of, 86 cases 
 in which Law does not seem subservi 
 ent to, 103 ; manifested in Material 
 Forces, 163 ; circuitous communication 
 between direct acts of the, and move- 
 ments of the Body, 164 ; the, often 
 paralyzed by the stroke which para- 
 lyzes a limb, 165 ; the, its instinctive 
 knowledge, how to use the Organism 
 born with it, 174 ; in the Lower Ani- 
 mals, acted on by fewer and simpler 
 motives than Will in Man, 180 ; Men's 
 "free" in one sense, and in one only, 
 181 ; a Variable, indispensable to sta- 
 bility of Character, 190; the Human, 
 if unchangeable, then no such thing 
 as changeability conceivable, 190 ; of 
 Society, collective, two ways in which it 
 operates on the conduct, 194 ; conscious 
 energies of the, ever tempted to march 
 directly on objects only to be reached 
 circuitously, 203; Individual, Laws 
 against which it cannot contend, 214 , 
 Natural Law working on Human, 216 ; 
 Individual, Authoritative Interference 
 of Positive Institution with the freedom 
 of still required as regards Factories, 
 216; Individual, external conditions 
 which tell on, often nothing but condi- 
 tions depending on the aggregate Will 
 of, those around us, 218 ; Energies of, 
 Constancy of Nature not incompatible 
 with the, 231 ; Change of, the efficient 
 cause of numberless other changes, 232. 
 
 Wills, conclusions regarding our, against 
 which we are apt to rebel, 171 ; our, not 
 
 free from motives, 179 ; free from com- 
 pulsion, and from nothing else, 182. 
 
 Wilson's, Professor, Sonnet, " A Cloud," 
 92. 
 
 Wing, Bird's, pulsations in a, usually im- 
 possible to count ; instances in the 
 Partridge, Pheasant, Blackcock, Pig- 
 eon, and Diver, 80 ; Birds, downward 
 blow of a, indispensable to flight, 81 . 
 convex and concave surfaces of a, in- 
 dispenable to flight, 82 ; sort of, re- 
 quired by Birds which seek their food 
 in the air, 88 ; peculiarity of, in Divers, 
 89 ; peculiarity of, in Birds which feed 
 on the surface of the sea, 90 ; peculiar- 
 ity of, in Birds of great and long-sus- 
 tained powers of flight, 90 ; a long, the 
 implement used by the Bird's Vital 
 Force against the force of Gravity, 91 ; 
 threefold division of the feathers of a 
 Bird's, 93 ; sharpness of a, on what it 
 depends, 93 ; a Rook's, an example of 
 what, 94 ; Bones of a Bird's, the bones 
 of the Mammalian arm and hand, 101. 
 
 "Windhover," machinery of flight in 
 the, 95. 
 
 Wings, Bird's, Law of Leverage appealed 
 to in, 90 ; sort of, in Gallinaceous 
 Birds, 93 ; Birds with short, 93 ; Birds 
 with short and blunt, how they catch 
 their prey, 95 ; Humming Birds, amaz- 
 ingly rapid motion of, 99. 
 
 Wolf, Mr. J., his drawing of the wing of 
 the Golden Plover, 94 ; his illustration 
 of a Kestrel hovering, 96. 
 
 Woodcock's Plumage, the, colored like 
 decaying leaves, 109 ; Tail Feathers 
 capable of forming a beautifully tinted 
 fan, 109 ; lustrous black eye betrayed 
 it to the fowler, no. 
 
 Woodpeckers. Law of Assimilative color- 
 ing not extended to, 107. 
 
 Words which should be the servants of 
 Thought, too often its masters, 39. 
 
 Wordsworth on Nature, as including all 
 " in the Mind of Man," 3 ; his Ode to 
 Immortality, 36. 
 
 Working Classes, always regard with 
 fear and jealousy those triumphs of 
 mechanical invention which tend to 
 the economizing of labor, 223 ; Combi- 
 nation amongst the, an Education in 
 itself, 226 ; Men, Combination the only 
 means by which adult working, can 
 defend themselves, 221. 
 
 " ZAMBESI and its Tributaries," Dr. 
 Livingstone's work quoted, 118. 
 

Mllp|y 
 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 BERKELEY 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
 THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE 
 STAMPED BELOW 
 
 Books not returned on time arc subject to a fine of 
 50c per volume after the third day overdue, increasing 
 to $1.00 per volume after the sixth day. Books not in 
 demand may be renewed if application is made before 
 expiration of loan period. 
 
 
 FEB 981930 
 
 IN ^Jfrp.V? 
 
 APffl 7*68-5 
 
 ? -OAM 
 
 50m-7,'16 
 

 i i 
 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY 
 
Ml 
 
 m 
 m 
 
 
 il 
 
 
 ; ' 
 
 
 mm 
 
 ill