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 \JIU A 
 
 THE AFGHAN QUESTION
 
 Reprinted from " The Eastern Question,'' by the 
 Duke of Argyll. 
 
 {
 
 THE AFGHAN QUESTION 
 
 FROM 1841 TO 1878 
 
 By the duke OF ARGYLL 
 
 fisishssra. 
 
 STRAHAN & COMPANY LIMITED 
 
 34 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON 
 
 All rights rtseri'ed
 
 , ^ t V •M. j.jMr. T -^a;^ 
 
 :-:^^ 
 
 / SO oEann 
 
 t^rrcAL- 
 
 •SaHantpne pteasf 
 
 IIALLANTYNE AND HANSON, EDINBURGH 
 CHANDOS STREET, LONDON
 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 I REPUBLISH In a separate form those Chapters 
 of my recent work on the History of the Eastern 
 Question which refer to the conduct of the Govern- 
 ment towards the late Ameer of Afghanistan. 
 
 In doing so, I had been prepared to alter any 
 part of the narrative which might be shown to be 
 Incorrect, and to retract or to modify accordingly 
 any of the charges against the Ministry and Its 
 Aofents In India, which, if that narrative be 
 accurate, are certainly not over-stated. But, al- 
 though I have seen many hostile observations. I 
 have not seen any attempt at a reply. It has not 
 been denied that we have shuffled with our 
 obligations under the Treaty of 1857. It has not 
 been denied that the Viceroy, under Instructions 
 from iiome, prepared a new Treaty with the 
 Ameer, which was built up of " tricky saving 
 clauses." It has not been denied that the same 
 high functionary gave one account of the effect
 
 vi PREFACE. 
 
 of this Treaty when speaking of it to the Ameer, 
 and a directly opposite account when speaking of 
 it to the Government at home. It has not been 
 denied that the Viceroy dictated the discreditable 
 communication addressed to the late Noor 
 Mohammed, by Captain Grey. It is not denied 
 that in the final letter to Shere Ali, for which the 
 Cabinet is responsible, we made at least two 
 statements, in respect to our own motives and 
 conduct, which were disingenuous, and at least 
 two accusations, as regards the conduct and 
 language of the Ameer, which were absolutely 
 false. It seems to be considered by those who 
 support the policy of the Government, that it is a 
 matter of no consequence whether these things 
 are true or not, provided we have gained some 
 new security against our own recurring fits of 
 nervous panic on the subject of the advances of 
 Russia. 
 
 It is more than probable, however, that a 
 course of action which has been characterised by 
 such conduct, will turn out to be as injurious as 
 it has been immoral. We have yet to see the 
 final results of the Afghan war. We have indeed 
 hunted our victim, Shere Ali, to the death. We 
 have overrun, with the most perfect ease, a great
 
 PREFACE. vii 
 
 portion of his country. But our " scientific 
 frontier" is not yet defined. The wild tribes of 
 Afghanistan have not been yet reconciled to our 
 dominion. The cost and waste of our operations 
 are enormous. We are throwing that cost and 
 waste on the heavily burdened shoulders of the 
 people of India. The finances of our Eastern 
 .Empire are in a condition raising the most serious 
 anxieties for the future. We have diverted to 
 the purposes of a foreign war, which was the 
 direct consequence of our policy in Europe, taxa- 
 tion which we had promised to devote to 
 insurance against the effects of famine. So long 
 as we are under the necessity of holding a country 
 very poor, very wild, and very far from the base 
 of our operations, there is no possibility of effecting 
 those economies, or those wiser outlays, which 
 are demanded by the most vital interests of the 
 people of India. The Minister of Finance has 
 been obliged to confess that the whole subject of 
 his great charge has been thrown into confusion, 
 and that the Government cannot now tell, even 
 approximately, what income will be required to 
 meet the necessities of the State. 
 
 The catastrophe in Zululand has diverted for a 
 time the public mind from every other anxiety.
 
 viii PREFACE. 
 
 That catastrophe has Indeed been brought about 
 by acts of almost unparalleled rashness. But at 
 least in the policy of the High Commissioner 
 towards Chetwayo, there is nothing worse than 
 rashness to be ashamed of. Sir Bartle Frere 
 is probably right in holding that sooner or later 
 the armed and disciplined savagery of the Zulus 
 would have had to be met and broken. He 
 undertook the task without authority, and with 
 means almost ridiculously inadequate. But he has 
 had high aims in view. He has violated no 
 Treaties. He has not repudiated any solemn 
 pledges. He has not pretended that, in his 
 ultimatum to Chetwayo, he was offering to that 
 Chief exactly what he himself had long desired. 
 Sir Bartle Frere has been high-handed, and per- 
 haps wrong-headed. But he has been so in the 
 interests of civilisation, and of a distant future. 
 He has been open and straightforward in all his 
 dealings, and has done nothing to compromise the 
 honour of the Crown, or the fair name and fame 
 of England. The Government, indeed, has had 
 a technical right to repudiate his action. But they 
 did not arrest that action when they had time to 
 do so, and we may be sure there would have been 
 no such repudiation had his action been successful.
 
 PREFACE. ix 
 
 When the scare of Isandlana has passed away, 
 we shall awake once more to the far more serious 
 problems involved in our new policy on the Fron- 
 tiers of India, and to the embarrassments which 
 must be entailed upon us by a long course of 
 conduct devoid of conscience and of principle 
 alike in Europe and in Asia. 
 
 ARGYLL. 
 
 Cannes, April, 1879.
 
 CONTENTS, 
 
 CHAPTER L 
 
 PAGS 
 
 Our Relations with Afghanistan from the first 
 Afghan War to the Agreement with Russia 
 IN 1873 ..,.,. I 
 
 CHAPTER IL 
 From the Agreement with Russia in 1873 to 
 the Frere Note in January, 1875 , ' « ' • • 9° 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 From January, 1875, to the Beginning of the 
 
 ViCEROYALTY OF LORD LytTON IN APRIL, 1876 . . 137 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 From the Beginning of the Vicerovalty of Lord 
 Lytton, in April, 1876, to the Opening of the 
 Peshawur Conference on the 30TH January, 
 1S77 179 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 From the Peshawur Conference in January, 1877, 
 TO the War in November, 1878 221
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 OUR RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN FROM THE FIRST 
 AFGHAN WAR TO THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA 
 IN 1873. 
 
 Our Indian Empire is having a very marked effect on 
 the national temper. We regard it with a passionate 
 pride and v/ith a passionate jealousy. These feelings are 
 but slightly founded on any deliberate estimate of the 
 good we may be doing there. That good may be very 
 great, but the contemplation of it is an after-thought. 
 It has been so with conquering races in all times. The 
 spread of the Roman Empire carried with it the spread 
 of Roman civilisation, and scattered wide over the world 
 the seeds of Roman law. But this thought was not in 
 the mind of Roman senators or of Roman generals. It 
 did not inspire the march of Caesar, or build the walls of 
 Trajan. Many of those who are most proud and most 
 jealous of India would be the first to disclaim, almost with 
 disgust, the purely humanitarian estimate of our position 
 in the East. They are not thinking, unless in a very 
 secondary degree, of extended civilisation, — of the dif- 
 fusion of Christian knowledge — -of the wider area given
 
 2 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 to just and equal laws. Neither the Schoolmaster, nor 
 the Missionary, nor the Jurist, is the symbol of that which 
 we adore. It is the Imperial Sceptre of the Moguls. It 
 is the Throne of Delhi. 
 
 The small group of clever Englishmen who call them- 
 selves Positivists, and who bow down before the dry bones 
 of Comte's Philosophy, have lately been good enough to 
 intimate that they disapprove of our Indian Empire. It 
 is always inspiriting to see the courage or the audacity 
 of small minorities. If these writers would help to make 
 their countrymen a little less nervous and a little more 
 just, in questions affecting our interests in India, they 
 would be doing good service. But if they preach the 
 doctrine that we ought to have no interests and no duties 
 there — then dogs baying at the moon are creatures em- 
 ployed in an avocation quite as useful and quite as hope- 
 ful. The pure Instinct of Dominion, unadulterated by 
 any other feeling more rational than itself, is one of the 
 very strongest of human passions. It has always been 
 strongest with the strongest races ; and through them it 
 has been the most powerful of all agencies in the history 
 of human progress. Never perhaps has it had a more 
 egitimate field of application than in the British con- 
 quest of India. That conquest came upon us unawares, 
 without forethought and without design. It was begun 
 by a few servants of a " Company of Merchants trading 
 to the East Indies," and its strong foundations were laid 
 by men who acted against the orders of Directors, against 
 the policy of the Crown, and against the jealousy of 
 Parliament. It grew out of the pure ascendency of
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 3 
 
 superior mind. It upset nothing which was worth pre- 
 serving. The Mahomedan conquerors of India had 
 spent their force, and the Empire they founded had sunk 
 far in that irremediable decHne which is now visibly 
 affecting every Moslem Government in the world. The 
 thrones of Hindostan had long been the prize of every 
 Palace intriguer, or the prey of every soldier of fortune. 
 Our conquest of India has not been effected by foreign 
 troops, but mainly by the native races yielding them- 
 selves to our cause, and fighting for it with incorruptible 
 devotion. The ^ower of inspiring that devotion, and of 
 yoking it to our service, are the best title and the best 
 justification of the Empire which it has won. 
 
 But the pride of possession and the instinct of dominion, 
 like all other primary passions of the mind, are liable to 
 irrational excesses and dangerous abuse. And never has 
 this abuse been more signally illustrated than in the 
 temper of mind which has been engendered in a very large 
 section of English politicians. In particular, the jealousy 
 and the fear of Russia have become a mania. It dictates 
 towards that Power a policy of chronic suspicion, only 
 varied by paroxysms of undignified alarm. This is bad 
 enough, but it is not the worst. The fact that Russia is 
 a Power possessed of an Asiatic Empire much older than 
 that of England, that she is advancing her possessions 
 there from analogous causes and with like effects, and that 
 she may therefore ultimately come into a geographical 
 position coterminous with our own — this is a fact and a 
 prospect which it is wise to bear in mind, and which must 
 influence our conduct in many ways. But that influence 
 
 B 2
 
 4 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 ceases to be safe or legitimate when it overbears every 
 other consideration, and sits Hke a nightmare on every 
 conception we have of our duties in foreign policy, whether 
 in Europe or in Asia. It is not too much to say that 
 this is what the fear and the hatred of Russia have come 
 to be. On account of it, the Government of Lord Aber- 
 deen was seriously blamed for not having widened the 
 area of bloodshed in the Crimean contest, and for not 
 having aimed at raising revolutionary wars in Poland and 
 in the Caucasus. On account of it^ we have a man so 
 able and so experienced as Sir Henry 4lawlinson imply- 
 ing regret that we had not then spent the blood and the 
 treasure of England in securing the assistance and in 
 establishing the independence of the most ruthless savages 
 that exist in any portion of the world."^ On account of 
 it, we think it legitimate to support in Europe the corrupt 
 and desolating Government of the Turks, and to proclaim 
 openly that we consider the welfare of the subject popula- 
 tions of Turkey as a matter of secondary consideration. 
 On account of it, forty years ago, we plunged into a most 
 unrighteous war beyond the boundaries of India, shedding 
 the blood, and interfering with the independence, of a 
 people with whom we had not even a decent pretext of 
 quarrel. On account of it, we desire that the vast spaces 
 of Central Asia, with their few swarming areas of popu- 
 lation, should be kept the perpetual hunting-ground oi 
 tribes whose whole business is to rob caravans and to 
 steal men. On account of it, we exhibit ourselves to the 
 princes and peoples of India as in a state of constant 
 
 See Memorandum, No. I2B, p. 31, in Afghanistan Corresp., 1878-
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO i^u- 5 
 
 trepidation whenever some Kaufmann moves, and when 
 he subjects to a Government comparatively civilised some 
 barbarous Khan who has hitherto lived upon the Slave 
 Trade. On account of it — and this is, perhaps, worst of all 
 — we are now to see English Secretaries of State instruct- 
 ing the Viceroy of India to practise deceit in our dealings 
 with a neighbour, and to make " ostensible" demands 
 upon him which are to cover a direct breach of faith. 
 
 In "The Eastern Question"'^ we traced the working 
 of this spirit in the politics of Europe. Let us now 
 trace its workings in the politics of India. 
 
 Two separate narratives have been given to us, on 
 the authority of her Majesty's Government, of the events 
 and transactions which I am about to review. One of 
 these is contained in Lord Lytton's Despatch, dated May 
 loth, iSy/.f It was written at Simla when it became 
 necessary for the Viceroy to give an account of his policy. 
 The other of these narratives is contained in the de- 
 spatch of Lord Cranbrook, dated November i8th, 1878.+ 
 It was published in the newspapers a fortnight before 
 the Session of Parliament which began on the 5th 
 December, 1878, when it became necessary for the 
 Cabinet to present its policy in the most favourable aspect, 
 and when, for that purpose, it was very important to 
 anticipate the production of the Papers. Both of these 
 narratives are misleading on matters of fundamental 
 
 * The Eastern Question, from the Treaty of Paris, 1856, to the 
 Treaty of Beriin, 1878, and to the Second Afghan War. By the 
 Diike of Argyll. Two Vols. Stralian & Co. 
 
 t Afghan Corresp. I. 1878, No. 36, p. 160. 
 i Ibid., No. j^if P- -26a
 
 6 RELA2I0NS IVJ2B AI^GHANISTAN 
 
 importance. Fully to expose all the inaccuracies woven 
 into the very texture of these documents, it would be 
 necessary to occupy much more space than I can here 
 afford. But the narrative now presented will traverse 
 both those other narratives at many points ; and these 
 will be noticed as we proceed. For convenience, and to 
 avoid personality as far as it may be possible to do so, 
 I shall refer to Lord Lytton's Despatch as the " Simla 
 Narrative,"' and to Lord Cranbrook's Despatch as the 
 " London Narrative," 
 
 The lesson on Frontier Policy which during many years 
 most powerfully impressed the Anglo-Indian mind was 
 the lesson read by that solitary horseman who, on the 
 13th of January, 1842, staggered, half-unconscious, into 
 the gate of Jellalabad."^ He was the sole survivor of 
 a British army — the only man who, out of that army and 
 out of all its followers, had escaped captivity or death. It 
 may be true that the terrible completeness of this memor- 
 able catastrophe was due to the incapacity of the officers 
 in command of the British Army of Occupation in Cabul. 
 It is certainly true that, so far as the mere military honour 
 and reputation of England is concerned, these were 
 speedily re-asserted and vindicated v/ith complete success. 
 But it was impossible for the Indian Government of that 
 time, and it is impossible for any historian of it now, to look 
 back upon the political struggle in Afghanistan which 
 had been gallantly maintained by Sir William Macnagh- 
 ten and Sir Alexander Bumes, without seeing and feeling 
 that the position in which we had been placed by Lord 
 * Kaye's War in Afghanistan, vol. ii. p. 217.
 
 I'ROM flRSl AI^GHAN WAR 76" 1873. 7 
 
 Palmerston's or Lord Auckland's Afghan expedition had 
 been a thoroughly false position. We had interfered with 
 the independence of a people with whose independence 
 we had no right to interfere, and whose independence, 
 moreover, it was above all things our interest to maintain. 
 The particular object of our interference had been as 
 foolish as it was unjust. We had opposed ourselves to 
 a brave and an able Prince, and we had sought to set up 
 in his stead a man who was naturally weak, and whom we 
 had induced to be a traitor to his country and to his race. 
 For this miserable purpose we had been drawing heavily 
 on the resources of the people of India, and were involved 
 in an undertaking which must have taxed those resources 
 more and more. Above twenty millions of money had 
 been spent out of the revenues of India, first in inducing, 
 and then in retrieving, a great disaster. It is possible, 
 indeed, that by reckless perseverance, and by an enor- 
 mous military expenditure, we might have completed the 
 conquest of Afghanistan. But the cost and the embar- 
 rassment of such a conquest, so far in advance of our 
 own frontiers, of our resources, and of our bases of 
 operation, had been brought home to the convictions of 
 every statesman both in India and at home. With 
 universal approbation, and with complete success, con- 
 fession was made of the great error we had committed. 
 We soon found it to be our best policy to swear friendship 
 with the gallant man whom we had for a time expelled 
 from his throne, and we made him during the rest of his 
 life our firm and faithful ally. 
 
 But if that terrible Afghan expedition made an in-
 
 8 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 delible impression on the minds of English and of Indian 
 statesmen, we cannot wonder if it made an impression 
 not less indehble on the minds of the Afghans. Not 
 to dwell on the personal grievances which many of them 
 had borne from the conduct of our men and officers when 
 resident in the country — grievances which the historian 
 of the war, however unwilling, has been compelled to 
 mention — the proud chiefs of a proud race had seen us 
 disposing of the Government of their country at our 
 pleasure, pulling down one and setting up another. They 
 had seen us conferring the Crown upon a man who at our 
 instigation had consented to make her people tributary to 
 their great enemy, Runjeet Singh, and to his Sikh Empire. 
 Our Political Agents, wherever they were stationed, as- 
 sumed to be, and actually were, the supreme governors 
 of the country. It was impossible that the Afghans could 
 assign this conduct to any other motive than a desire to 
 subjugate their country, and reduce it to the condition of 
 a province of our Empire. And if this impression was 
 strong at the close of the Afghan war, there was much 
 to keep it alive in subsequent events. We talk coolly 
 of the gigantic strides — this is the stock phrase — made by 
 Russia in her career of Asiatic conquest. But her gains 
 have been as nothing to the gains of the British Empire 
 during the same period in conquests and annexations. 
 The strides must be gigantic which an Empire takes 
 when it has to cross deserts which are two thousand 
 miles long by more than a thousand miles in breadth.'^ 
 
 Rawlinson Memorandum, Afghan Corresp. I. 1878, p. 31.
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO i^n- 9 
 
 But the gigantic length of such strides takes something 
 out of the vigour of the organism which is impelled to 
 make them, and does not necessarily bring it much nearer 
 to new sources of vitality. During the forty years which 
 have elapsed since the first Afghan war, we have con- 
 quered and annexed provinces containing many times 
 more millions of men than exist in all the Khanates of 
 Central Asia between the Volga and the Wall of China.^ 
 Afghans, who in their youth may have assisted in the 
 massacres of Macnaghten and of Burnes, are not now old 
 men. But they have lived to see the Government of 
 British India annex Oudewith eleven millions of popula- 
 tion ; conquer the Punjaub, with a population of more 
 than seventeen millions ; and subdue the country of the 
 Ameers of Scinde, with a population of more than two 
 millions. That is to say that within a period of less than 
 forty years we have absorbed and conquered countries 
 with a population of upwards of thirty millions. These 
 are "gigantic strides" indeed, not "gigantic" like the 
 strides of Russia, in the width and in the poverty of the 
 distances traversed and of the regions gained, — but 
 gigantic in the resources they have opened up, and in the 
 treasures of which they have put us in possession. They 
 are all annexations and conquests lying well into our 
 
 * The whole population of the immense stretch of country in- 
 habited by the Tekeh Turcomans, which extends from Kizil Arvat 
 to beyond Merve, is roughly calculated at about one million souls. 
 See Article VI II. m Quarterly 7?t'7v/Vw, January, 1879, which I 
 think I cannot be wrong in assigning to the authorship of Sir 
 Henry Rawlinson.
 
 10 RELATJOAS WITH AI^GHANISTAN 
 
 former possessions, filling up and consolidating the boun- 
 daries of Empire. They are Provinces prolific as 
 recruiting grounds, and some of them rich in the resources 
 of revenue. The Afghans have seen from their hill-tops 
 all these leaps and bounds of British dominion, bringing 
 that dominion close up to the foot of their own mountains, 
 and giving ready access to the defiles by which their 
 Capital is approached. Nor have they been unobservant 
 spectators of the method by which some of these 
 annexations have been brought about. They must have 
 seen that this method has often stood in close connexion 
 with the previous establishment of resident British officers, 
 political or military, in the States which have been ab- 
 sorbed. The demands these officers have made on the 
 Native Governments, the interferences they have practised 
 with Native rule, the reports they have sent up of Native 
 abuses and of Native maladministration, have been the 
 usual and regular preliminaries of British annexation. 
 And even where the internal independence of tributary 
 or protected States is professedly respected it is no- 
 torious in India, and is well known to all our neighbours, 
 that the presence of British officers in an official position 
 in Native States — however necessary it may be for our 
 purposes — is an arrangement which generally ends in 
 making those officers the centre of authority. 
 
 It is in the light of these facts and of these memories 
 that we are to estimate every jealousy of the Afghans, 
 and every promise given to them in the way of re- 
 assurance by ourselves. It was our object to convince 
 them of the reality of our reformed intentions, and of
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAA WAR TO 1873. 11 
 
 the sincerity with which we desired to avoid for the 
 future every approach to interference. The pledges on 
 this subject which we gave with a view to regain their 
 confidence are to be construed in the spirit as well as 
 in the letter. We knew what they had in their minds, 
 and they knew what we had in ours. The Treaty 
 concluded by Lord Dalhousie with Dost Mohammed, in 
 1855, was signed and negotiated by Sir John Lawrence 
 as Chief Commissioner of the Punjaub. In him the 
 restored Sovereign of Cabul had to deal with one whose 
 powerful character, and whose resolute sincerity of 
 purpose, constitute the very type of all that is best and 
 noblest in the Indian Services. Through him mainly 
 the confidence of the Ameer was securely gained ; 
 and it is important to observe what the engagement on 
 our part was which Dalhousie and Lawrence knew to 
 be the one most desired. The first Article of the Treaty 
 may be considered formal ; but the second contains the 
 promise which was the price of friendship. We promised 
 to respect the territories then in the possession of the 
 Ameer, " and never to interfere therein."* In the third 
 Article a similar engagement on the part of the Ameer 
 towards us and towards our territories, gave a sort of 
 diplomatic reciprocity to the transaction : but in the 
 third Article the Ameer gave a pledge to us for which in 
 reality there was no other return on our part than the 
 promise we had given in the second. For at the con- 
 clusion of the third Article, after the words of mere 
 
 * Ibid., No. I, p. I.
 
 12 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 reciprocity, these words were added as a special 
 engagement on the part of the Ameer, — " and to be 
 the friend of the friends and enemy of the enemies 
 of the Honourable East India Company." This was a 
 really onerous undertaking on the part of the Ameer, 
 and one which was of great value to us. It was a 
 Treaty binding him to assist us against all enemies, 
 whilst on our part it was a Treaty involving no similar 
 obligation towards the Ameer. As against the Ameer 
 it was a Treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive. As 
 against us, it had no such character. In this respect the 
 covenant was essentially one-sided. And yet the Ameer 
 did not hesitate to sign it — under no other inducement 
 than the one great promise we gave him in the second 
 clause, that we should never interfere in his dominions. 
 
 The next Treaty which we concluded with Dost 
 Mohammed was one which arose out of a temporary 
 cause, and the greater part of which ceased to be 
 operative when that cause had been removed. England 
 in 1857 went to war with Persia on account of the 
 seizure of Herat by that Power, and on account of 
 the farther intentions which were ascribed to it of 
 attacking the possessions of Dost Mohammed. We 
 agreed to subsidise the Ameer largely during the war 
 with Persia to enable him to defend his territories. But 
 we gave this subsidy on conditions. The object of these 
 conditions was to see that the money was properly 
 applied to the purposes of defence for which it was 
 given. There was no other possible method of doing 
 this than that of sending British officers with suitable
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 13 
 
 establishments to the cities and frontiers of Cabul. 
 wherever an Afghan army might be assembled to act 
 against the Persians. Accordingly, a Treaty was con- 
 cluded for this purpose on the 26th of January, 1857. 
 By the fourth Article, British officers were to be our 
 Agents in Afghanistan for the prosecution of that 
 particular war. But this was strictly the limit of their 
 Mission, both as regarded their duties, and as regarded 
 the spots at which they were to be stationed. Three 
 places, and three places only, were specifically men- 
 tioned as points where British officers might be sta- 
 tioned. These were Cabul, Kandahar, and Balkh. But 
 the sole purpose of the Mission was still more clearly 
 indicated in the words which followed — " or wherever 
 an Afghan army may be established against the Per- 
 sians." Their duty was specified with equal jealousy. 
 " It will be their duty to see generally that the subsid}' 
 granted to the Ameer be devoted to the military purpose 
 for which it is given, and to keep their own Government 
 informed of all affairs."'^ But even this was not deemed 
 enough. Lest it should be construed as even approach- 
 ing " interference," the same Article limited the infor- 
 mation which the Ameer promised to give our officers 
 to " all military and political matters connected with 
 the war." And yet, although this mission of British 
 officers into Cabul was for the purpose of defending 
 the Ameer, or of assisting him at least to defend him- 
 self, so clearly was it recognised as an arrangement 
 
 * Ibid , No. 2, p. 2.
 
 14 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 which in itself would be distasteful to the Ameer, 
 and a departure from the promises given in the previous 
 and permanent Treaty of 1855, that a special Article, 
 the seventh, was inserted in the new Treaty, expressly 
 providing that, " Whenever the subsidy should cease, 
 the British officers were to be withdrawn from the 
 Ameer's country." 
 
 There could be no more emphatic testimony than this 
 as to the understanding both of the Ameer and of 
 the Indian Government as to inseparable connexion 
 between the residence of British officers in the Afghan 
 country and the " interference" which we had promised 
 never to repeat. But the seventh Article does not end 
 there. It proceeds to indicate another arrangement 
 which would be in consonance with the promises of 
 185 s, and which, therefore, it was agreed by both 
 parties might be adopted instead of that which was 
 forbidden. The Ameer did not desire to be without 
 official intercourse with the British Government. But 
 he did desire, above all things, that such intercourse 
 should not be carried on through a British, that is to 
 say, a European officer, resident in Afghanistan. 
 Accordingly, the seventh Article concluded by declaring 
 it to be understood that the British Government might 
 at its pleasure appoint an Agent (Vakil) at Cabul, with 
 the express reservation and condition in respect to the 
 nationality of such Agent, that he was " not to be a 
 European officer."^ 
 
 * Ibid., p. 2.
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 15 
 
 There could be no more conclusive evidence than 
 this of the complete understanding of both contract- 
 ing parties as to what was, and as to what was not, 
 consistent with the solemn promise we had given to 
 Dost Mohammed "never to interfere" in his dominions. 
 And it is the more important to observe this evidence^ 
 as it is contained in an Article of the Treaty of 1857, 
 which necessarily survives all the Articles which were of 
 a purely temporary character. It remained as binding 
 on us in 1878 as it was in 1857. 
 
 There are few parts of the Simla Narrative more 
 inaccurate than the paragraphs in which it refers to 
 this Treaty of 1857. I must add that there are few 
 parts of it in which the inaccuracies have a more 
 obvious bearing upon the object with which that Nar- 
 rative was composed. That object was to defend a 
 policy of insisting on the residence of British officers 
 as Political Agents in Afghanistan. For this purpose 
 it is, of course, convenient so to represent the transac- 
 tions recorded in the Treaty of 1857 as to give them 
 the aspect of a precedent. But in order to support 
 this view it is necessary either wholly to suppress, or 
 to throw into the shade, those parts of the Treaty which 
 define and limit so very strictly the duties assigned to 
 the British officers who were then to be sent into 
 Afghanistan. Accordingly, in the Simla Narrative 
 (paragraphs 3, 4) all this is boldly and at the same 
 time dexterously done. There is no mention whatever 
 made of the principal duty of the officers — namely, that 
 of seeing that the subsidy was applied to the purposes
 
 1 6 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 for which it was given. This limitation of the Treaty 
 is suppressed. Next, in obvious connexion with the 
 same purpose, exaggerated prominence is given to the 
 duty of " keeping the Indian Government informed of 
 all affairs" — this duty being so represented as if it were 
 the principal one, — as it would be the principal duty of 
 officers sent as Residents. Again, no mention is made 
 of the limitation of the Article at its close — a limitation 
 which distinctly points to " matters connected with the 
 war" as the only matters on which the Ameer was 
 to keep our officers informed. But, lastly — and this 
 is worst of all — in the Simla Narrative a duty is 
 expressly assigned to our " officers" under the Treaty 
 of 1857, which is not only not included in the Treaty, 
 but which is therein expressly excluded. It so hap- 
 pens, moreover, that is precisely the kind of duty for 
 which it was most desirable to assert a precedent. 
 The words of the Simla Narrative are these : — " Their 
 duty (in the performance of which the Ameer was 
 expected to afford them every facility) being simply 
 to give advice when required, and to obtain all the 
 information needed by our Government."'^ Now, the 
 words of the Treaty carefully and expressly exclude 
 this duty of " advice," which the Simla Narrative as 
 carefully and as expressly asserts. The words of the 
 Treaty are these:— "They will have nothing to do with 
 the payment of the troops, or advising the Cabul 
 Government." (Art. 4.)! It cannot, therefore, be too 
 
 * Ibid., p. 160. t Ibid, p. 2.
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 17 
 
 emphatically asserted, that so far from the Treaty 
 of 1857 affording any precedent for attempting to 
 force European officers upon the Ameers of Afghan- 
 istan, as our Agents in the country for any purpose 
 whatever, the Treaty of 1857, on the contrary, proves 
 to demonstration that we bound ourselves not to do 
 so, and placed on record in a solemn Treaty our full 
 and free acquiescence in that well-known policy of the 
 Afghan Government, which made them irreconcilably 
 hostile to any such arrangement. 
 
 We have the evidence of Lord Lawrence, that when 
 he personally met Dost Mohammed at Peshawur in 
 February, 1857, immediately after the conclusion of 
 this Treaty, the Ameer showed no inclination to regard 
 with any favour even such interference on the part of 
 the British Government as might be required to secure 
 his own dynastic succession, and thus avert the evils of 
 civil war. He told Sir J. Lawrence " that it was his wish 
 and the earnest desire of all Afghans that we should 
 not interfere in their quarrels, but should allow them 
 to manage their own concerns and to fight out and settle 
 their own domestic broils in their own way."^ The 
 attempt to settle those feuds in our way had, indeed, not 
 been so successful as to hold out any inducement to the 
 Indian Government to try the experiment again. 
 
 It was in compliance, therefore, not only with the 
 settled policy, but with the definite engagements of the 
 British Government, that when in June, 1863, Dost 
 
 * Ibid., p. 60. 
 C
 
 1 8 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 Mohammed died, and a contest arose among the members 
 of his family for the vacant throne, the Indian Govern- 
 ment acknowledged the right of the Afghan Chiefs and 
 people to settle the right of succession for themselves. 
 It was impossible for us to settle it. We had not the 
 knowledge enabling us to do so with justice, or with any 
 prospect of success. Even, if we could be sure of the 
 best man, he might very easily become the worst on 
 account of our patronage. The Afghans had not for- 
 g-otten the disgraceful conditions to which we had forced 
 Shah Soojah to submit, as our client, and as the vassal 
 of the Sikhs. Presumably the best Ruler of Afghanistan 
 would be the man who in such a contest should, without 
 any help from us, prove himself to be the strongest. 
 
 There is, however, in such matters no possibility of 
 acting upon any rule so absolute as to dispense with the 
 exercise of some discretion. It is obvious that the 
 policy of recognising every Ruler of Cabul who was able 
 to make good his position, and had secured the allegiance 
 of the people, was a policy which left open to the 
 Government of India the exercise of a very important, 
 and, it might be, of a very difficult discretion, namely, 
 that of deciding on the measure of success which was 
 to be regarded as conferring on any one of the con- 
 tending Princes a fair claim to be recognised as de facto 
 Ameer. In the condition of society which prevails in 
 Afghanistan, it is impossible to be sure of the per- 
 manence of any victory, or to foresee the counter- 
 revolutions which may arise. Defeated Chiefs have the 
 habit of retiring to the protection of neighbouring and
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO i^n- ^9 
 
 rival Governments, and of thence emerging as opportuni- 
 ties may arise, to gain or re-establish their ascendency. 
 It was therefore perfectly consistent with the declared 
 policy of the Government of India to prolong or to cut 
 short, in each particular case, the period of suspense, and 
 to confer the benefit of its recognition, whatever that 
 might be, upon any Ruler whom it could fairly regard as 
 having won his crown. 
 
 The action taken by the Government of India on the 
 death of Dost Mohammed, and during the civil war 
 which followed, was governed by an honest desire to do 
 what was just and prudent. The severe illness of the 
 Viceroy, Lord Elgin, at the moment when Shere Ali 
 announced his father's death and his own succession to 
 the throne, together with the doubts entertained as to 
 the security of his position, led to some delay in 
 acknowledging him as Ameer of Cabul. But as he had 
 been designated to the succession by his father, and as 
 he was in actual possession of Cabul, this recognition 
 was accorded to him by the acting Governor-General, 
 Sir William Denison, on the 23rd of December, 1863.^ 
 
 When Sir J. Lawrence assumed the Government of 
 India, in the same month, as successor of Lord Elgin, 
 he found this question settled and this recognition given. 
 After nearly two years and a half of civil war, however, 
 the fortunes of Shere Ali were reduced to so low an ebb 
 that the British native Agent at Cabul, overstepping the 
 limits of his functions, was induced to make overtures of 
 
 * Ibid, p. 8. 
 C 2
 
 20 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 friendship on behalf of the British Government to Sirdar 
 Azim Khan, one of the rival brothers. For this act he 
 was recalled by the Government of India, and Sir J. 
 Lawrence recorded in a despatch, dated the 21st April, 
 1866, his opinion that "the cause of the Ameer Shere 
 Ali was by no means finally lost, and that the Govern- 
 ment considered that until such a result was reached, 
 they were bound equally by good faith and by considera- 
 tions of policy to recognise no other chief as Ameer of 
 Afghanistan."^ At last, however — in February, 1867 — 
 Shere Ali was driven from Cabul, and took refuge in 
 Herat. The Government of India then thought it 
 necessary to recognise the successful brother as Ameer of 
 Cabul and Candahar, but continuing to recognise Shere 
 Ali as Ameer of the Province of Herat, of which he 
 still held possession.! 
 
 Sir J, Lawrence explained to Ufzul Khan that the 
 British Government deplored the dissensions of the great 
 Barukzye House, and the calamities they had brought 
 on the Afghan people : that though the Viceroy felt pity 
 for Shere Ali Khan, he was disposed to hail hopefully 
 any event which might bring Afghanistan nearer to the 
 attainment of a strong Government. He assured Ufzul 
 Khan that he had not interfered by any secret aid to 
 Shere Ali, as had been falsely alleged. He gave him to 
 understand that the recognition of the British Govern- 
 ment was due to nothing but his own gallantry and 
 success ; and he declared that if, unhappily, the struggle 
 
 * Ibid., p. 9. t Ibid., No. 7, pp. 12, 13.
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO i^w 21 
 
 for supremacy was not concluded, the Viceroy would 
 pursue the same course of siding with neither party. 
 
 It is important to observe that in this official com- 
 munication to the new Ameer, Ufzul Khan, the Viceroy 
 of India was careful to intimate still more in detail his 
 own scrupulous adherence to the promises given in 1856 
 and in 1857 to Dost Mohammed. He reminded the 
 Ameer of the seventh Article of the Treaty of 1857, 
 which entitled the British Government to accredit to 
 Cabul " a Vakeel," not a European officer ; he intimated 
 that in accordance with this provision of the Treaty, " a 
 Mahomedan gentleman of rank and character would be 
 deputed as representative of the Viceroy at his Highness' 
 Court."* 
 
 It has been represented in recent controversy that this 
 policy of abstention and non-interference in the internal 
 affairs of Afghanistan was a policy founded entirely on 
 local considerations, and did not take into contemplation 
 the questions which were looming in the distance beyond 
 the farthest boundaries of that country. But there is 
 no truth whatever in this representation. The advances 
 of Russia in Central Asia, and also the possibility of 
 her acting as she had already done through the agency 
 of Persia, were contingencies not only present to the 
 mind of Sir J. Lawrence and of his Council, but 
 expressly referred to as an important element in the 
 consideration of the best and safest course to be pursued. 
 With reference to both contingencies, he considered non- 
 
 * Ibid., p. 14.
 
 22 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 interference in the Afghan civil war expedient, because 
 whatever Ruler might gain the upper hand would be 
 disposed by the necessities of his position to rely rather 
 upon the British Government than upon any other Power; 
 and because whatever temporary alliances he might have 
 been induced to form during the contest would probably 
 be abandoned when he had attained success. But in the 
 contrary event Sir J. Lawrence did not intend to bind 
 himself to the same course. On the contrary, the 
 Viceroy never had it out of view that any external 
 interference on the part of other Governments with the 
 affairs of Afghanistan, or any intriguing on the part of 
 its Rulers with our enemies beyond, would of necessity 
 bring the policy of abstention to an end, and would 
 compel us to adopt counter-movements. Accordingly, 
 when in September, 1867, reports reached the Govern- 
 ment of India that Shere Ali, then Ameer or Ruler of 
 Herat, was entering into intrigues with Persia, the 
 Viceroy and his Council at once expressed their opinion 
 in an important despatch to the Government at home,"^ 
 that it " might be highly for the interests of British India 
 to declare the Treaty then subsisting between us and 
 Shere Ali at an end," and openly to assist his opponents 
 at Cabul, with money and with arms, if they were at all 
 likely to form a stable rule. In pursuance of this policy, 
 — not of abstention, but of active interference, — Shere 
 Ali was warned by the Viceroy, that if he allied himself 
 with Persia, the British Government would at once take 
 part against him.f 
 
 * Ibid., No. 10, pp. 18, 20. t Ibid., paras. 6, 7, pp. 19, 20.
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1^1 z- 23 
 
 It was in this despatch that the Government of India 
 first drew special attention to the advances of Russia in 
 Central Asia, which Sir J. Lawrence and his colleagues 
 said had been lately rapid, and which had from time to 
 time been forced upon their notice. It was pointed out 
 that the influence of Russia would soon be, or had already- 
 become, paramount in Samarcand and Bokhara, as for 
 some time past it had been in Kokhand. It was in this 
 despatch also that the Viceroy suggested to Her 
 Majesty's Cabinet the expediency of coming to some 
 understanding, or even some engagement with the 
 Government of Russia, which would enable us to look 
 without anxiety or apprehension at the proceedings of 
 Russia on her southern frontier, and to welcome the 
 civilising effects of her Government on the wild Turks of 
 the Steppe, and on the bigoted and exclusive Govern- 
 ments of Bokhara and Kokhand ; while Russia, on the 
 other hand, assured of our loyal feeling in the matter, 
 would have no jealousy in respect of our alliance with 
 the Afghan and neighbouring tribes. The principle 
 indicated as the basis of such an agreement was this : 
 "that up to a certain border the relations of the 
 respective Governments should be openly acknowledged 
 and admitted as bringing them into necessary contact 
 and Treaty with the Tribes and Nations on the several 
 sides of such a line."* 
 
 In the face of this despatch it is impossible to contend 
 that the Government of India, under Sir J. Lawrence, 
 
 ♦ Ibid., pp. 20, I.
 
 24 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 was not fully awake to the contingencies arising out of 
 the progress of Russia in Central Asia. And be it 
 observed, that no subsequent event has brought these 
 contingencies nearer home than the events indicated by 
 Sir J. Lawrence and his colleagues. Bokhara is a 
 country actually marching with Afghanistan for many 
 hundred miles, and the paramount influence of Russia 
 there is a much more significant fact than her advance 
 on distant Khiva, or the absorption of a part of that 
 Khanate into her own dominions. In all the revolutions 
 of Afghanistan Bokhara had played an important part. 
 It has been the refuge of every fugitive Ameer, and the 
 two States have with each other many hereditary causes 
 of difference and quarrel. Yet the Minister, who was 
 my own immediate predecessor in the India Office — 
 Sir Stafford Northcote — after a cordial and intelligent 
 approval of Sir J. Lawrence's policy in respect to our 
 relations with Afghanistan, replied on the 26th December, 
 1867, to the Government of India in a spirit of the 
 utmost incredulity as to the existence of any danger 
 from the advances of Russia : " Upon this point Her 
 Majesty's Government see no reason for any uneasiness 
 or for any jealousy. The conquests which Russia has 
 made, and apparently is still making in Central Asia, 
 appear to them to be the natural result of the circum- 
 stances in which she finds herself placed, and to afford 
 no ground whatever for representations indicative o' 
 suspicion or alarm on the part of this country. Friendly 
 communications have at various times passed between 
 the two Governments on the subject, and should an
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO \Zii. 25 
 
 opportunity offer, Her Majesty's Government will avail 
 themselves of it for the purpose of obviating any possible 
 danger of misunderstanding, either with respect to the 
 proceedings of Russia or to those of England. This is 
 all that it appears necessary or desirable to do."* It 
 will be seen that this confidence was expressed not only 
 in view of the fact that Russia had made rapid advances 
 in Central Asia, but also in the calmest contemplation 
 of the probability that she was likely to make more. 
 It was all in the natural course of things, and Her 
 Majesty's Government had no anxieties on the subject. 
 
 In the meantime — on the 7th of October, 1867 — the 
 Ameer Ufzul Khan died at Cabul, and his brother Azam 
 Khan was elected in his stead. This succession was at 
 once acknowledged by the Government of India on the 
 13th of November, i867.f It was followed, however, by 
 an immediate renewal of the civil war, by a sudden 
 revival of the cause of Shere Ali, and by a revolution 
 which, in the course of nine months, restored him to his 
 father's throne. On the 8th of September, 1868, he took 
 triumphant possession of Cabul, and lost no time in 
 announcing to the Viceroy of India his desire to con- 
 tinue the relations of amity and friendship which had 
 been established between the two States.J 
 
 The Viceroy replied to this intimation on the 2nd of 
 October, in a frank and friendly letter, expressing his 
 sorrow that the family of his great father, Dost Moham- 
 
 * Ibid., No. 12, pp. 24, 26. t Ibid., p. 24. 
 
 X Ibid., No. 13, Inclos. 2, p. 43.
 
 26 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 med; should have been broken up into contending factions, 
 advising him to deal leniently with those who had opposed 
 him, and assuring him that he was prepared not only to 
 maintain the bonds of amity and goodwill which had been 
 established with his father, but " so far as was practic- 
 able" to strengthen them.* In proof of this disposition 
 Sir John Lawrence very soon after, in the same month 
 of September, 1868, proceeded to assist Shere Ali with 
 money to the extent of ^^'60,000, as well as with a supply 
 of arms. This assistance was so important at the time 
 that Shere Ali publicly acknowledged at a later time 
 that it materially contributed to the completion of his 
 success and to the consolidation of his power. 
 
 It is curious that a little more than two months before 
 this event, but at a time when the success of Shere Ali 
 had become probable, Sir Henry Rawlinson had written 
 an able and elaborate Memorandum, in which he en- 
 deavoured to arouse the languid interest and the slumber- 
 ing alarms of the Secretary of State for India on the 
 Central Asian Question. From his well-known point of 
 view, he urged the immediate importance which attached 
 to the Russian victories in Bokhara, and the necessity 
 of taking certain measures of precaution. Of these mea- 
 sures, the first was simply the immediate recognition and 
 active support of Shere AH, by subsidies and by the close 
 association of British representation at Cabul ; the second 
 was the re-establishment of our lost influence at the 
 Court of Persia ; and the third was the completion of our 
 
 * Ibid., Inclos. 3, p. 43.
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO \%^z. 27 
 
 Indian military lines of railway leading to the frontier. 
 A fourth measure was indeed suggested, and that was the 
 occupation of Quetta at the western end of the Bolan 
 Pass. But the distinguished author of this Memorandum 
 distinctly declared that unless this step could be taken 
 with the cordial approval of the Ruler and Chiefs of 
 Afghanistan, he was not prepared to recommend it, and 
 considered that if the tribes in general regarded it as a 
 menace, or as a preliminary to a farther hostile advance, 
 we should not be justified for so small an object in risking 
 the rupture of our friendly intercourse.^ 
 
 This Memorandum, dated 20th July, seems to have 
 been forwarded on 2 1st August, 1868, to the Government 
 of India by Sir Stafford Northcote, the Secretary of State, 
 unaccompanied by any expression of his own opinion, or 
 of the opinion of her Majesty's Government.f That 
 opinion, therefore, so far as known to the Government of 
 India, remained as it had been set forth in the despatch 
 of December, 1867. This is very remarkable, because 
 the Memorandum of Sir H. Rawlinson was full not only 
 of what Russia had done, but of the alleged violation of 
 promises which had been involved in doing it. It referred 
 to the pacific Manifesto published by Prince Gortchakow 
 in 1864, declaring that recent annexations had taken 
 place against the will of the Government, and asserting 
 with categorical precision that the expansion of the Em- 
 pire had now reached its limit. It assumed — or without 
 directly assuming, it implied — that these declarations or 
 
 * Ibid., p. 41. t Ibid., p. 31, foot-note.
 
 28 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 intimations of policy and of intention were "promises" 
 in the sense of being engagements taken towards other 
 Powers. It reminded the Government that the " ink had 
 been hardly dry with which this Manifesto was written 
 before its specific promises were completely stultified." 
 It pointed out how hostilities had been almost imme- 
 diately resumed in the valley of the Jaxartes ; how 
 Chemkend and Tashkend and Khojend had been cap- 
 tured in succession ; how Romanofski had proceeded to 
 invade Bokhara, and had established the Russian power 
 within hail of Samarcand. All these proceedings were 
 denounced in the Memorandum as " flagrant departures " 
 from Prince Gortchakow's Manifesto, and as having been 
 adopted under " various pretexts.""^ Nevertheless under 
 all this fire of warning, and a perfect tempest of predic- 
 tion, the Cabinet of Mr. Disraeli gave no sign, — allowed 
 their expressed confidence in Russia to remain on record 
 as a dissent even from the guarded suggestions of Sir 
 John Lawrence, and simply forwarded the Rawlinson 
 Memorandum to form the subject of elaborate Minutes 
 by the Viceroy and his Counsellors. 
 
 Sir H. Rawlinson, in a late edition of his work " Eng- 
 land and Russia in the East," has indicated his impres- 
 sion that the action of Lord Lawrence in subsidising 
 Shere Ali was due to the influence of his Memorandum, 
 and he describes that action as one which " threw to 
 the winds at once and for ever the famous policy of 
 masterly inactivity."t The dates, however, do not favour 
 
 * Ibid., pp. 31, 32. t Chap. VI., p. 302.
 
 FR OM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO i&)z. 29 
 
 this view, because the Memorandum was only sent from 
 England on the 21st of August, and does not seem to 
 have been under the consideration of the Government of 
 India when Lord Lawrence determined to subsidise the 
 Ameer. The truth is that Sir H. Rawlinson has always 
 misconceived what the Lawrence policy was, and very 
 naturally regards as departures from it, acts which were 
 really in complete accordance with its fundamental object 
 and intention. We have already seen that so early as 
 1867 Sir J. Lawrence had spoken of subsidising any Ruler 
 at Cabul whom, for any reason, it might be our interest 
 to support. The aid he gave to Shere Ali in Septem- 
 ber, 1868, was in perfect consistency with the plan of 
 helping any de facto Ruler, and of keeping ourselves 
 free to judge according to circumstances, of the measure 
 of success which sufficiently indicated possession of 
 power, and the assent of the Afghan people. Sir J. 
 Lawrence was not the man to lay down for himself any 
 such wooden rules as have been ascribed to him by 
 ignorant friends and zealous opponents. 
 
 Such was the position of the Central Asian Question 
 in connexion with the declared policy of the British 
 Government when the Cabinet of Mr. Gladstone came 
 into power. In that Cabinet I had the honour of being 
 Secretary of State for India, and was the organ of the 
 Administration in Indian affairs during the whole of the 
 Viceroyalty of Lord Mayo, and during two years of the 
 Viceroyalty of Lord Northbrook. In Lord Mayo we 
 had to deal with a new Viceroy who had been sent out 
 by our predecessors in office, and who had actually left
 
 30 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 England to assume his government before we had our- 
 selves received our appointments from the Queen. I 
 had not therefore the advantage of having any personal 
 communication whatever with Lord Mayo, or of ascer- 
 taining from him any one of his opinions on any Indian 
 question, or of expressing to him any opinions of my 
 own. I mention this not at all by way of complaint, for 
 it was the result of peculiar and accidental circum- 
 stances ; but for the purpose of explaining how it was 
 that of necessity more than usual remained to be done 
 by means of private letters. I call these letters private 
 letters only to distinguish them from formal despatches, 
 because they were not the letters of a private friend on 
 the personal aspect of public questions. It so happens 
 that I had never enjoyed the honour and advantage of 
 Lord Mayo's acquaintance. Our communications, there- 
 fore, were essentially of an official character, although 
 in a form which admitted of the more free handling of 
 delicate affairs, sometimes containing passages which 
 were confidential then, and must remain confidential 
 still. Some of these letters are referred to in the 
 despatches which have been lately published as essential 
 parts of our official intercourse. The Viceroy's letters 
 to me were very full, and as I soon found that our views 
 were in complete accordance, I am able to present the 
 following account of our policy, and of what was done in 
 pursuance of it, drawn mainly from the circumstantial 
 details given by himself. 
 
 And here I must begin by pointing out another of 
 the innumerable inaccuracies of the London Narrative.
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 31 
 
 It is one which concerns a very important point, and one 
 which, as usual, has a direct connexion with the views 
 which it was convenient for the Government to present. 
 They have departed, as I am about to show, from Lord 
 Mayo's policy quite as much as from the policy of Lord 
 Lawrence. In order to defend this departure it is their 
 interest to make out that circumstances have greatly 
 altered, and in particular, that Lord Mayo had not to 
 deal with those " gigantic strides" of Russia which, it is 
 implied, are of later date. I have already pointed out 
 that there is no foundation whatever for this representa- 
 tion of the historical facts. Yet in the fourth paragraph^ 
 of the London Narrative this erroneous representation is 
 made in the broadest terms. Referring to the period of 
 Lord Lawrence's administration it says : " The outposts 
 of Russia were then distant from the borders of Afghan- 
 istan." The fact, on the contrary, I believe to be, that 
 the Russian outposts which are nearest to Afghanistan 
 — namely, those which she acquired in the subjection of 
 Bokhara — were then almost exactly where they are now. 
 When Lord Mayo succeeded to the Viceroyalty of India, 
 Russia had completed every one of those conquests 
 which were most formidable as regarded the interests of 
 India. During no previous period had her " steps" been 
 more gigantic than during the four years from 1864 to 
 1869. In 1865 the Russians had taken Tashkend. In 
 1866 th^y had taken Khojend and had broken the power 
 of the Khanat of Kokhand. In 1867 they had invaded 
 
 * Afghan Corresp. I. 1878, No. Ti), p. 261.
 
 32 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 Bokhara, and had established fortified positions far south 
 of the Jaxartes. In the same year they had estabhshed 
 the new Province of Turkistan, and had erected it into 
 a separate Viceroyalty with Tashkend for its Capital. 
 In 1868 they had taken Samarcand, and had estabhshed 
 complete power over the Khanate of Bokhara. 
 
 This conquest, and the establishment of this power, 
 virtually brought Russia into contact with Afghanistan. 
 No later Russian movement in Central Asia is to be 
 compared in importance with this movement which had 
 been completed in 1869. Sir Henry Rawlinson was quite 
 right when he pointed out in his Memorandum the 
 .peculiar significance of Russian domination in Bokhara. 
 It meant Russian domination over a Government which 
 marched with Afghanistan along the greater part of J^ts 
 northern frontier, and which had special relations with 
 the people and Rulers of Cabu l. What, then, are we to 
 say of the accuracy of the London Narrative when (para. 
 7) it says, speaking of the early days of Lord Mayo's 
 Government, " The advances of Russia in Central Asia 
 had not, up to this period, assumed dimdhsions such as 
 to cause uneasiness to the Indian Government .'*" No 
 doubt there is an ambiguity in this phrase. It mig ht be 
 construed to mean that the Indian Government had not. jas 
 a matter of fact, felt uneasiness. Even this is not correct, as 
 Sir J. Lawrence's Despatch of 1867 proves. But its real 
 meaning evidently is that the advances of Russia had not 
 then " assumed dimensions" sufficiently large to attract 
 much attention, and that later advances have wholly 
 altered the position. The fact is that no later advances
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO i^n- ZZ 
 
 have been made by Russia comparable in importance to 
 those which made_hermistre;ss of Bokhara and Kokhand. 
 And another fact is that the Indian Government had its 
 eyes wide awake to the significance of these events, and 
 that Lord Mayo's pohcy was deUberately adopted in full 
 contemplation of all the; possible dangers they might 
 involve. If the Government of India felt no serious alarm 
 on account of these events it was_because that Government 
 consisted at that time of men with some nerve. a nd_ with 
 some common sense. 
 
 It is a curious illustration of the historical accuracy as 
 well as of the argumentative value of this 7th paragraph 
 of the London Narrative, that the leading expeditionary 
 columns which were directed in 1878 by Russia towards 
 the frontiers of Afghanistan, moved from territories which 
 had been either actually or virtually acquired in 1869, 
 and that no military movement was found practicable 
 from the Caspian base.'^ 
 
 Although the specific measures which were summarised 
 in the last paragraph of the Rawlinson Memorandum 
 were not in themselves of any very formidable kind, and 
 although the first and most important of them, — the 
 recognition and support of Shere Ali, — had actually been 
 adopted by Sir J. Lawrence and his Government before 
 or about the time of the arrival of the Memorandum in 
 India ; yet the general tone of the Memorandum, and 
 
 * One of the columns was to move from a point on the borders 
 of Kokhand, and a small remnant of this once-powerful Khanate was 
 allowed by Russia to remain nominally independent till 1876. But 
 this remnant had been completely at the mercy of Russia since 1867. 
 
 D
 
 34 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 the ulterior measures which it indicated for the future, 
 led to its being closely criticised by the Government of 
 India, and by many of the most able and experienced 
 ofificers to whom it was referred by the Viceroy. The 
 general result_\va_s summed. .up,. J^^^ a dp^patrh <;tgnprl hy 
 Sir John Lawrence and his Cou ncil, addr essed to me^ and 
 dated the 4th of January, 1869. They were strongly 
 adverse to any advance, beyond our own__frontie r, on 
 political, on military, and on financial grounds. They 
 declared for the policy of husbanding the resources_gf 
 India, and not wasting them on costly and difficult ex- 
 peditions, or in the maintenance of distant outposts. 
 They objected to any active interference in the affairs of 
 Afghanistan by the deputation of British officers, or to 
 the occupation, whether forcible or amicable, of any post 
 or tract in that country, as a measure sure to engender 
 irritation, defiance, and hatred, in the minds of Afghans. 
 On the other hand, they agreed with the RawHnson 
 Memorandum in desiring that greater attention in the 
 interests of India should be paid to the strength and 
 character of our Mission to Teheran. They announced 
 that the Government of India had already conferred upon 
 Shere Ali a subsidy of six lacs of rupees, and was prepared 
 to give him arms. They requested authority to repeat 
 this kind and measure of support at the discretion of the 
 Government of India. With regard to the advances of 
 Russia in Central Asia, they repeated the recommenda- 
 tion that some clear understanding should be come to 
 with the Court of St. Petersburg as to its projects and 
 designs in those regions. They complained that this
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO i^tz- 35 
 
 subject had been pressed on Sir Stafford Northcote 
 without any result, except his despatch of December, 
 1867. And, finally, they advised that Russia should be 
 told, in firm but courteous language, that she cannot be 
 permitted to interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan, or in 
 those of any State which lies contiguous to our frontier."^ 
 
 Such was the policy which Lord Mayo found the 
 Government of India had declared to be its own when 
 he assumed the functions of his great office. It was a 
 policy distinct and definite both in its negative and 
 affirmative aspect ; both in the things which it proposed 
 to do, and in the things which it resolutely refused to 
 undertake. It was in pursuance of this policy that Lord 
 Clarendon began those negotiations with the Cabinet 
 of St. Petersburg which had for their object some under- 
 standing and agreement respecting the limits not only of 
 our respective possessions in Asia, but also, beyond these, 
 of our respective fields of predominant influence. It was 
 in pursuance of the same policy in its Indian branch that 
 Lord Mayo had immediately to prepare for a personal 
 meeting with the Ameer of Cabul, a meeting which had 
 been suggested and sought by Shere Ali, and which Sir 
 John Lawrence had recommended to the favourable 
 consideration of his successor. 
 
 On the 26th January, 1869, Lord Mayo wrote to me 
 the first letter in which he indicated his views in respect 
 to our policy towards the Ameer. It is remarkable as 
 indicating incidentally (i) that he recognised the utility 
 
 *Ibid., No. 14, pp. 43-5. 
 D 2
 
 36 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 of having a European official in Cabul, if this measure 
 could properly be adopted ; (2) that he did not consider 
 the difficulties in the way of it as difficulties that would 
 be necessarily permanent ; and (3) that he was fully aware 
 of the fact that, as matters then stood, it would be in- 
 expedient to attempt it. On this subject his language 
 was as follows : — " With the friendly feelings that Shere 
 Ali entertains towards us in consequence of the assistance 
 in money and arms that we have given him, we may, 
 without sending at present any European official to 
 Cabul, exercise sufficient influence over him to keep him 
 on the most amicable terms with us." It is clear from 
 this passage that Lord Mayo had this question fully before 
 him, and that what he was about to determine in regard 
 to it, was so determined on overruling considerations of 
 policy or of good faith. 
 
 On the 30th of January, 1869, a letter was address ed to 
 the Viceroy by Sir Donald Macleod, Lieut.-G,Qi:£jriin_iif 
 the Punjaub, informing him that the defeat of Azim 
 Khan, and of his nephew Abdul Raman Khan, had 
 terminated the civil war in Afghanistan, but that _the 
 portion of country north of the Hindoo Koosh, comm only 
 called Afghan Turkistan, remained but imperfectly sub- 
 ject to the Ameer Shere Ali. Macleod added that " this 
 _disln£t was likely ere long to become. .the„area_QfJntrigue 
 on the part of the Russians, whose high officials avowed 
 that their projects comprised the whole country up to the 
 Hindoo Koosh." He further informed the Viceroy that 
 the Ameer was most anxious to arrange an interview, and 
 that he was so set upon it that, in all probability, if it were
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 37 
 
 necessary, Shere Ali would even be prepared to undertake 
 a journey to Calcutta. 
 
 This communication was forwarded to me by Lord 
 Mayo in a letter, dated the 7th of February, in which he 
 informed me that he expected to be able to arrange for 
 the desired interview, and that, if it were prudently con- 
 ducted, he anticipated great good as its result. In 
 particular, he explained that he anticipated that a 
 considerable effect would be produced " throughout all 
 Central Asia." 
 
 This letter, added to the facts which have been already 
 narrated, puts a final extinguisher on the plea which has 
 been already dealt with on a previous page, that Lord 
 Mayo's policy is out of date because it was before the 
 advances of Russia in Central Asia had become serious, 
 or had attracted the attention they deserved. The recent 
 establishment of Russian influence in Bokhara, on the 
 very borders of Afghanistan, the Memorandum of Sir H. 
 Rawlinson, and the discussions in India to which it had 
 given rise, the alarming intimation freshly conveyed by 
 Sir D, Macleod that Russian high officials were claiming 
 Afghan Turkistan as one of their legitimate fields of 
 operation, and Lord Mayo's own explanation above given 
 of the importance he attached to his coming interview 
 with the Ameer — all prove conclusively that the Central 
 Asian Question in its most urgent aspects was fully 
 before Lord Mayo in 1869, and that the policy he pursued 
 was the policy which he considered the wisest and the best 
 in full view of all the contingencies of a close Russian 
 approach to the borders of India.
 
 38 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 Nor is this all : the same letter of the 7th of February- 
 shows that Lord Mayo was exposed to all those influences 
 of an excited atmosphere of opinion which, under such 
 circumstances, are apt not only to disturb the judgment, 
 but to pervert the moral sense. In that letter, Lord 
 Mayo informed me that the Press of India was teeming 
 with articles representing Shere Ali as " completely in the 
 hands of Russia and of Persia." Reports and assertions 
 of this Icind, the offspring of Barracks and of Bazaars, 
 are never wanting. They have very often a tremendous 
 effect upon nervous politicians, inspiring them with silly 
 fears and incurable suspicions. Let it then be clearly 
 understood what were the circumstances under which 
 Lord Mayo went into the Umballa Conference, and in 
 the full contemplation of which he deliberately shaped 
 his course. He knew all the dangers — when he deter- 
 mined not to bully. He knew all the suspicions — when he 
 determined to be himself perfectly truthful and sincere. 
 He knew all the fresh advances which Russia had been 
 making, and the farther advances she had still to make — 
 when he resolved to keep with absolute good faith all the 
 promises, whether verbal or written, which had been 
 given by those who had preceded him in the great office 
 of Viceroy of India. 
 
 On the 2nd, and again on the 8th of March, Lord Mayo 
 addressed to me farther communications on the ap- 
 proaching Conference, which had then been arranged 
 for the 25th of that month. In the first of these he 
 repeated an expression of the importance he attached to 
 it, not only as likely to have the most beneficial effect
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 39 
 
 on public opinion in Central Asia, Persia, and Hindostan, 
 but also as likely to lead to some definite arrangement 
 with the Ameer. The nature of that arrangement he 
 explained to be, that we should assist him to form a 
 strong and durable Government, whilst he, on the other 
 hand, was to give facilities to our trade, and to maintain 
 order on those portions of our frontier over which he had 
 any influence. Lord Mayo, however, declared himself to 
 be entirely opposed to any attempt being made " to take 
 any direct part in the internal affairs of Afghanistan." 
 In the second letter, the Viceroy specified further, as 
 one of the objects he had in view, " the obtaining of 
 accurate information as to the events that occur in 
 Central Asia." So that this aspect also of the value to 
 be attached to the presence of British officers in Cabul, 
 was fully in the Viceroy's mind before he went to the 
 Umballa Conference. 
 
 Two days later, on the lOth of March, Lord Mayo 
 wrote to me another letter on the same subject, entering 
 more fully into an explanation of his views : " With 
 regard to the approaching interview with the Ameer, my 
 intention is to avoid any engagements of a permanent 
 character. I am opposed to Treaties and subsidies. 
 Sir J. Lawrence gave him 60,000/., and had engaged to 
 give him 60,000/. more. This probably placed him on 
 the throne, as it enabled him to pay his army, which 
 his rival could not do, and he is, I am told, very 
 
 grateful I believe his visit will do much good. 
 
 It will show him that we have no other wish than to 
 see a strong Government in Afghanistan, where we have
 
 40 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 no thought of interfering with him in any way. We 
 want no resident at Cabul, or poHtical influence in his 
 kingdom." Here we see coming, link by link, more 
 distinctly into view, that chain of evidence which connects 
 the subsequent transactions of the Conference with Lord 
 Mayo's knowledge of the promises and engagements 
 which would be most valuable to the Ameer. We have 
 seen him indicating how well he knew that British 
 residents would be useful if they were acceptable to the 
 Ruler and people of Cabul. We see him now indicating 
 his perfect knowledge that those favourable conditions 
 did not exist, and that one of the great advantages to be 
 derived from the approaching Conference would be the 
 opportunity it would afford the Viceroy of satisfying the 
 Ameer that we did not want to press any residents upon 
 him. 
 
 But further evidence is not wanting, even during the 
 few days which yet remained before the Conference. In 
 every letter I received which was written by Lord Mayo 
 about this time, further links in the same chain of 
 evidence are supplied. On the very day on which he left 
 Calcutta, and, as he told me, just as he was about to 
 step into the train, he addressed to me a letter, in which 
 it might almost seem that he spoke as a prophet on the 
 sad transactions of recent years. After assuring me of 
 his entire agreement with the opinions I had expressed 
 to him on the policy to be pursued towards Afghanistan, 
 he proceeded thus : — " I see that there is to be a 
 Central Asiatic debate in the House of Commons. I 
 hope that sensible men will not advocate the extreme
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO i^tz- 4i 
 
 lines of absolute inaction, and the worse alternative of 
 meddling and interfering by subsidies and emissaries. 
 The safe course lies in watchfulness, and friendly inter- 
 course with neighbouring States and Tribes." 
 
 At last, in the early morning of the 27th of March, the 
 Viceroy of India rode into Umballa, where the Ameer 
 had already ai rived two days before. Every pains had 
 been taken to give to the meeting something more even 
 than the usual pomp and state of an Indian Durbar. 
 As an important part — or, at least, as an important 
 indication — of the policy to be pursued, Lord Mayo 
 endeavoured, in all matters of reception and ceremonial, 
 to give the visit the character of a meeting between equals, 
 and to show to the world that we looked on the Ameer 
 as an independent, and not as a feudatory Prince. With 
 this view former precedents were so far departed from as 
 to show that an occurrence of a precisely similar kind 
 never took place before in India. At first the old Sikh 
 chiefs of the Punjaub, who detest an Afghan, were dis- 
 posed to be jealous of these proceedings. But when it 
 was explained to them that the Viceroy expected them 
 to aid him in welcoming to their country a distinguished 
 guest, they entered heartily into the position in which 
 they were placed. 
 
 When the Conference began it was Lord Mayo's first 
 object to find out what it was that the Ameer really 
 expected and desired. After the dignified reserve which 
 seldom deserts an Oriental had been somewhat overcome, 
 the Viceroy found no difficulty in understanding the 
 feelings of Shere AH. He gave expression to them at
 
 42 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 last with much vehemence. They were perfectly natural 
 feelings ; and looking at the facts from his point of view, 
 it is impossible not to regard them with much sympathy. 
 His fundamental grievance was the " one-sided" character 
 of the Treaty of 1855. The terms of this Treaty have 
 already been explained. They were extremely unequal 
 as regards the obligations imposed on the two contracting 
 parties. The Indian Government promised nothing ex- 
 cept to respect the territories of Afghanistan, and never 
 to interfere therein. But the corresponding obligation 
 on the Ameer was very different. He promised to be 
 '' the friend of the friends, and the enemy of the enemies, 
 of the Honorable East India Company." Thus, on the 
 part of the Ameer, it was a Treaty of Alliance, offensive 
 and defensive. On the part of the Indian Government 
 it had no such character. 
 
 Accordingly, the moment Shere Ali opened his mouth 
 at Umballa, this inequality was the burden of his song. 
 He complained that our friendship with his father had 
 been a " dry friendship," and " one-sided." We had not 
 helped Shere Ali himself, as we ought to have done, to 
 secure the throne. We had simply acknowledged him 
 when, by his own good sword, he had secured it, or at 
 least had very nearly secured it, for himself. We had 
 equally recognised others when they had gained tem- 
 porary success. What he now wanted was that we should 
 guarantee, not himself only, but his lineal descendants on 
 the throne which he had won. He could not be content 
 with our system of recognising any dc facto Ruler. But 
 if the British Government would recognise himself and
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO yZ-^i. 43 
 
 his dynasty as the dc jure Sovereigns of Afghanistan, 
 then he would be our friend indeed. For this purpose, 
 what he desired was, that we should accept the same 
 obligation as that which the Treaty of 1855 had imposed 
 upon his father. We must make with him a Treaty 
 offensive and defensive. His enemies must be our 
 enemies, and his friends must be our friends. He re- 
 quired, also, that we should give him a fixed subsidy, in 
 the form of an annual payment. 
 
 Lord Mayo refused all these demands. He intimated 
 to the Ameer that they were altogether inadmissible. 
 They would have bound us to support the Ameer against 
 internal insurrection, however much rebellion may have 
 been justified by his own misgovernment. They would 
 have bound us to support his own nomination of a 
 successor, however unjust his selection might be, and 
 however obnoxious to his people. But this result, which 
 was most objectionable to us, was precisely what Shere 
 Ali most desired. It was not against external attack 
 that he was really anxious to secure from Lord Mayo a 
 binding guarantee. He and his Minister fought his case 
 with pertinacity, and always with one great end in view 
 — a British guarantee for himself and for his family, as 
 the rightful rulers of Afghanistan. Foreign aggression 
 was hardly present to his mind at all. " It is most 
 remarkable," said Lord Mayo in his private letter to me, 
 giving an account of the Umballa Conference, " that 
 during all the Ameer's conversations here, he has hardly 
 ever mentioned the name of Russia. Whether it is that 
 he is so wrapped up in his own affairs, or knows little
 
 44 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 of their proceedings, he does not give them a thought, 
 and when we have casually referred to them, he generally 
 says that we shall not hear much of them in Afghanistan 
 for a long time." 
 
 It is needless to say that the offensive and defensive 
 Treaty which he desired would have been equally open 
 to objection in its relation to foreign affairs. It would 
 have placed the resources of India unreservedly and 
 unconditionally at the disposal of Shere Ali. He would 
 have been far more than the Foreign Minister for England 
 in the politics of the frontier. In either point of view it 
 was impossible to give him what he asked, and the only 
 course left open to Lord Mayo was to offer him every- 
 thing which it was safe to give. 
 
 Accordingly, in the letter which the Ameer finally 
 accepted from Lord Mayo as the utmost in the direction 
 of his wishes which could be conceded to him, the 
 phraseology is such as to have little or no special reference 
 to the case of external attack. "Although, as already 
 intimated to you, the British Government does not desire 
 to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, yet 
 considering that the bonds of friendship between that 
 Government and your Highness have lately been more 
 closely drawn than heretofore, it will view with severe 
 displeasure any attempt to disturb your position as 
 Ruler of Cabul, and rekindle civil war; and it will further 
 endeavour from time to time to strengthen the govern- 
 ment of your Highness to enable you to exercise with 
 equity and justice your rightful rule, and to transmit to
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO i^u- 45 
 
 your descendants all the dignities and honours of which 
 you are the lawful possessor,"'^ 
 
 It will be seen that this sentence "sailed very near the 
 wind." It caused some uneasiness at first to the Go- 
 vernment at home lest it should have led the Ameer to 
 suppose that he had actually got the guarantee which 
 he desired. But Lord Mayo's ample explanations set 
 this anxiety at rest, and I had the satisfaction of con- 
 veying to the Viceroy, in a despatch dated the 27th 
 August, i869,t the full approbation of her Majesty's 
 Government of the course which, under very difficult 
 circumstances, he had taken. Lord Mayo had carefully 
 and repeatedly explained to the Ameer that " under no 
 circumstances was he to expect that British troops would 
 cross the frontier to put down civil war or domestic 
 contention." 
 
 General assurances were given to Shere Ali that from 
 time to time we should give him such assistance and 
 support as the circumstances of the case might seem in 
 our judgment to justify or require. As an earnest of 
 our friendly intentions in this matter a considerable sum 
 of money, and a further supply of arms, were given to him. 
 
 It may well be asked if this was enough to satisfy the 
 Ameer as a substitute for all the demands he had made 
 — for the treaty offensive and defensive, for the guarantee 
 against domestic enemies, for the assurance of his 
 succession, for the annual subsidy. No ; there was one 
 
 * Ibid., No. 17, Inclos. 3, p. 90. 
 t Ibid., No. 20, p. 100.
 
 46 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 more concession which Lord Mayo made, and made 
 willingly— he promised to the Ameer "that no European 
 officers should be placed as Residents in his cities." 
 
 It has been since contended on the evidence of Captain 
 Grey, who acted as the Viceroy's interpreter at the 
 Umballa Conference, that in the course of that Conference 
 "the Ameer did freely consent to the appointment of 
 European British officers in Balkh, Herat, or anywhere 
 but actually in Cabul."* Even if there were no evidence 
 against the accuracy of this impression on the mind of 
 Captain Grey, — even if it were strictly and undeniably 
 accurate, — it could have no bearing on the question of 
 our obligations to the Ameer. That which alone is 
 binding on the parties to such a Conference is the con- 
 clusion arrived at. It must happen in every negotiation 
 that suggestions and proposals are made on both sides 
 which are set aside in the course of the discussion. The 
 utmost use that can be made of such suggestions, even 
 when all the circumstances and conditions under which 
 they are made are correctly recollected and reported, is 
 to throw light on the processes of elimination by which 
 the final results were reached. The fact of any particular 
 suggestion having been made, coupled with the fact that 
 it was not adopted, but, on the contrary, was thrown 
 aside, can have no other effect than to prove that the 
 rejection of it did not arise from accident, but from a 
 deliberate decision. 
 
 So far, therefore, very little importance attaches to 
 
 * Ibid., No. 32, Inclos. 12, p. 144.
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 47 
 
 Captain Grey's impression that at one moment during 
 the Conferences, and probably on conditions which 
 were never granted, the Ameer evinced a wiUingness to 
 admit European officers as Residents in his dominions. 
 It so happens, however, that there is the strongest, 
 and, indeed, conckisive evidence, that Captain Grey 
 must have misconstrued the language of the Ameer. 
 
 In the first place, it is not borne out by the only 
 documents upon which he himself relies. These docu- 
 ments are (i) a Note submitted by himself to Lord 
 Mayo, reporting certain conversations held on the 29th 
 of March with Noor Mohammed, the confidential 
 Minister of the Ameer, and (2) a relative passage in 
 his own private memoranda. Now, on turning to the 
 words of that Note, we find that the reported con- 
 versation had reference to the supposed case of Russian 
 aggression against the Northern frontier of Afghanistan. 
 The Minister is said to have expressed doubts of any 
 Russian power of aggression for years to come, but still 
 thought precautions should be taken. He is then re- 
 ported to have said that he would construct forts on 
 his own part or under British superintendence, and 
 admit European garrisons, "if ever desired;" and further, 
 that he "would be glad to see an Agent or Engineer 
 Superintendent in Balkh, Herat, or anywhere but 
 actually in Cabul." These words, even if reported with 
 perfect accuracy not only in themselves, but in their 
 connexion, do not at all justify the construction put 
 upon them by Captain Grey. That the Ameer should 
 have beten willing to admit English garrisons into his
 
 48 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 forts in the event of a Russian attack upon his frontiers, 
 is probable enough, and all the more probable from the 
 fact that Noor Mohammed evidently regarded such a 
 danger as not a very near contingency. But this has 
 nothing whatever to do with the proposal to station 
 European officers as permanent Political Agents in his 
 dominions. Neither have the succeeding words quoted 
 from the Note, any reference to this proposal. He 
 was willing to see " an Agent" or " Engineer Superin- 
 tendent" in Balkh, or anywhere else except in Cabul. 
 The Ameer never objected to British " Agents" any- 
 where, so long as they were not Europeans, and this 
 passage of the Note does not specify the nationality 
 of the Agent. But even if this passage did distinctly 
 refer to an European, it probably referred to one who 
 should be in charge of the fortifications previously 
 referred to, and this connexion of ideas is still more 
 plainly indicated by the alternative expression which 
 is used, "or Engineer Superintendent." 
 
 As regards the second document relied upon by 
 Captain Grey — viz., his own private memoranda, the 
 passage he quotes is still more insufficient for the 
 heavy superstructure he builds upon it. Indeed such 
 evidence as it affords seems to me to point strongly 
 the other way. The Ameer was asked to "accede 
 to our deputation of Native Agents wherever we 
 pleased " — a demand, on our part, plainly indicating 
 how well we knew his objections to European Agents. 
 The Ameer is then said to have been asked if he would 
 be "agreeable to the deputation of an Envoy at some
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR rO 1873. 49 
 
 future date." This question is obviously of the vaguest 
 kind, and it was clearly impossible for the Ameer to say 
 that never at any future time, or under any possible 
 circumstances, could he receive an Envoy, But the 
 reception of an Envoy does not necessarily mean the 
 reception of a permanent resident Envoy. On the 
 contrary, the wording of the question rather implies a 
 special Embassy, " At some future date" is hardly the 
 expression that would be used to describe the establish- 
 ment of a permanent Mission. Yet even to this very 
 vague question Captain Grey reports a very cautious 
 answer : — " The Ameer expressed his willingness to 
 receive an Envoy as soon as things had somewhat 
 settled down, anywhere except at Cabul, where he 
 thought it would affect his power with the people." 
 
 It appears, then, that even in the entire absence of any 
 extraneous evidence against the assertion of Captain Grey, 
 it is one which is not justified by the only documentary 
 witness which he can summon in support of it. 
 
 But we have abundant other evidence in refutation 
 of Captain Grey's interpretation of the facts. Mr. Seton 
 Karr, who held the high ofifice of Foreign Secretary to 
 the Government of India, and who filled it foi*'i i M i ai i y 
 ^^rgfiwe with acknowledged ability, was present during the 
 whole of the Umballa Conferences, and has declared 
 that neither the Ameer nor his Minister ever expressed 
 any willingness to receive British officers as residents 
 in his Kingdom. If this evidence stood alone it would 
 be quite enough. On a question of such capital im- 
 portance, which was the subject of Treaty stipulations of 
 
 E
 
 50 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 subsisting force — a question, as I have shown, on which 
 the mind of the Viceroy had been specially dwelling 
 for several weeks up to the moment of the Conference — 
 it is not possible that such a communication can have 
 been made either by the Ameer or by his Minister with- 
 out attracting the attention of the Foreign Secretary to 
 the Government of India. 
 
 But this is not all. On the 4th of April, before Lord 
 Mayo had left Umballa, and when every minutest 
 feature of the Conferences was still fresh in his recol- 
 lection, he addressed to me a very long and very minute 
 account of every important circumstance connected with 
 his own communications to the Ameer, and of the 
 Ameer's communications to him. In particular, he gave 
 a detailed narrative of what passed at the Conference on 
 the 29th of March — the very day to which Captain 
 Grey's note refers. There is not a word in that account 
 to indicate that the Ameer or his Minister made any 
 such intimation as that to which Captain Grey refers. 
 It was at this interview that the Ameer insisted not only 
 with vehemence, but with great excitement, on the one 
 object which he had most at heart, namely, that of an 
 absolute dynastic guarantee from the British Govern- 
 ment in favour of himself and his heirs of blood. To 
 obtain this it is possible that he might have consented, 
 or might have proposed to consent, to very hard terms. 
 But the very hardest of those terms would have been the 
 admission of resident British officers in his dominions. 
 Lord Mayo was determined not to give him a dynastic 
 guarantee, and he was equally determined not to press
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO \^ii. 51 
 
 upon him a demand which would have been in violation 
 of a subsisting engagement, and which the Viceroy 
 had apparently come to regard as likely to be really 
 injurious, under existing circumstances, to the authority 
 of the Ameer. It was in this spirit that he assured Shere 
 All that whilst the British Government desired to sup- 
 port him, and had already done so in a most effective 
 way, it did not desire that this support should be mani- 
 fested in a form which might suggest the idea of his 
 " being maintained mainly by extraneous aid." And so, 
 having felt himself obliged by imperative considerations 
 of public policy to decline giving to the Ameer that on 
 which he had set his heart, the Viceroy wisely deter- 
 mined to give him every compensation in his power, and 
 instead of pressing on him the acception of European 
 officers, he promised him, on the contrary, that no such 
 demand would be made at all. 
 
 The extreme jealousy of the Ameer and of his Minister 
 on the subject of European Agents of the British Govern- 
 ment was strongly shown at the Conferences which were 
 held on the ist and on the 3rd of April, of which notes 
 were appended to Lord Mayo's letter to me of the 4th. 
 One of the questions asked on the 1st was, " Would the 
 Ameer sanction native Agents in Afghanistan, either as 
 visitors or as permanent residents, supposing the British 
 Government wished it .?" Even on this question Noor 
 Mohammed did not wish to commit himself, and showed 
 the suspicion and the fear which was deeply rooted in 
 the mind of every Afghan, by " asking, rather anxiously, 
 whether European Agents were intended .''" Before the 
 
 E 2
 
 52 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 close of the day's proceedings the Foreign Secretary 
 assured the Minister that he " had reserved nothing, and 
 had nothing to reserve." 
 
 The Viceroy continued his correspondence with me on 
 the subject of the Conferences for several weeks after he 
 left Umballa. One of his letters, which was written on the 
 1 8th of April, is remarkable, as that which contained 
 the summary of the results arrived at in the Umballa 
 Conferences, which is quoted in the public Despatch 
 dated July i, 1869.* The summary arranges those results 
 on the principle which was explained in the Preface to "The 
 Eastern Question,"t— that, namely, of giving a separate 
 list, first of the proposals which had been negatived, and 
 next, of the proposals which had been affirmed. Among 
 the proposals which had been negatived were those of 
 sending into Afghanistan either troops, or officers, or 
 Residents. Troops the Ameer might sometimes have 
 liked to get — provided they were to be entirely at his 
 own disposal. Officers also he might sometimes have 
 desired to get — provided they were to be nothing more 
 than his drill-sergeants, and to retire when he ceased to 
 need them. " Residents," that is to say, officers resident 
 in his country as Political Agents were, above all things, 
 his dread and his abhorrence. But as he was not to have 
 the things which he might have accepted as a boon, so 
 neither was he to have thrust upon him a burden which he 
 disliked. All those proposals, therefore, some for one 
 reason, some for another reason, were equally negatived. 
 
 * Ibid., No. 19, p. 95, parag. 22. f See Appendix,
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO \%ii. 53 
 
 But this letter of the i8th of April is further remark- 
 able as containing expressions of opinion which throw 
 an important light on the reasons for Lord Mayo's 
 silence with the Ameer regarding causes of anxiety 
 which, nevertheless, he had full in view. In that letter 
 he expressed it as his opinion (in which I did then 
 and do now entirely agree) that our policy towards 
 Afghanistan " ought to be the basis of our Central 
 Asian policy." But one of the most essential parts of 
 that policy, in the Viceroy's opinion, was not to feel and 
 not to exhibit nervous anxiety and unreasonable fears. In 
 his letter to me of the 4th of April Lord Mayo had, as 
 we have seen, explained to me that the Ameer hardly 
 ever mentioned Russia at all. Under these circumstances 
 it was the Viceroy's wise policy not to exhibit ourselves 
 in the light in which too many English and Indian poli- 
 ticians are never weary of exhibiting themselves to the 
 world. They are perpetually assuring us that they do 
 not dread the actual invasion of India by Russia, but 
 that they do dread the disturbance and unsettlement of 
 mind which the advances of that Power will occasion in 
 the minds of the Indian Princes and people. But it is 
 plain that this evil, whatever it may amount to, is aggra- 
 vated by nothing so much as exhibitions of alarm on the 
 part of the English Government. Lord Mayo was deter- 
 mined that no such apprehensions should be exhibited 
 by himself. In this same letter he said upon this subject, 
 " Sanguine politicians at home will be disappointed that 
 what is termed the Central Asian question did not pro- 
 minently appear at Umballa. I am sure you will agree
 
 54 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 with me that it was a great blessing it did not. I cer- 
 tainly determined not to broach it, because I am of 
 opinion that it is most desirable to show the Ameer that 
 we have no apprehensions from the North. He, on the 
 other hand, is so intent on establishing himself on the 
 throne of Cabul, that he appears to think very little at 
 present of either Russia or Persia." 
 
 The result was in one respect most important with 
 respect to the whole scope and effect of the engagements 
 made at Umballa. It dissociated those engagements 
 entirely from the contingency of foreign aggression on 
 Afghanistan. We have seen that Sir J. Lawrence, when 
 Shere Ali was reported to be acting in alliance with 
 Persia, at once intimated to the Government at home 
 that his policy of abstention would not apply to such a 
 case. In like manner Lord Mayo pointed out to me 
 that, " as the question of the invasion by a foreign Euro- 
 pean Power of his territory was never alluded to by the 
 Ameer or by me, our course of action in the event of such 
 an occurrence taking place is not affected by anything 
 that took place at Umballa." 
 
 I now come to one of the most important of this series 
 of letters, dated June 3rd, 1869. It was written by the 
 Viceroy expressly to explain various misapprehensions 
 which he found had arisen respecting what he had said 
 and done at the Umballa Conferences, and was, indeed, 
 intended to anticipate, among others, those misconcep- 
 tions which led to my Despatch of the 14th of May.* 
 
 * Ibid., No. 18, p. 91.
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO iZu- 55 
 
 In fact this Despatch and Lord Mayo's letter of June 3rd 
 crossed each other. In this letter he says emphatically, 
 " The only pledges (to the Ameer) given were : that we 
 would not interfere in his affairs ; that we would support 
 his independence ; that we would not force European 
 officers or Residents upon him against his wish." There 
 is no ambiguity here. We have here Lord Mayo's 
 distinct declaration that at Umballa he did renew and 
 repeat that " pledge" to the Ameer which had been 
 embodied in the 7th Article of the Treaty of 1857 with 
 his father. It was a pledge which he and his family had 
 always valued almost above all others, and the fulfil- 
 ment of which was doubly due to him now when Lord 
 Mayo had felt himself compelled to refuse so much that 
 he had eagerly desired. This letter of June 3rd places 
 beyond all doubt Lord Mayo's estimate of the binding 
 character of those promises which he had given to the 
 Ameer, and of the rank and place among those promises 
 which had been assigned to the engagement on the 
 subject of the residence of European officers in Cabul. 
 
 And now having concluded my account of the Umballa 
 Conferences, taken from the most authentic of all sources, 
 I must express my opinion, as the Secretary of State 
 under whom the sanction and approval of the Crown was 
 given to Lord Mayo's conduct, as to the binding charac- 
 ter of the promises which were given by that Viceroy, 
 Sir James Stephen, in a letter lately communicated to 
 the Times, has put forward the doctrine that in our 
 relations with semi-barbarous States like that of Afghan- 
 istan, we are not bound by the somewhat technical and
 
 56 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 elaborate code of rules which go by the name of Inter- 
 national Law, and which are recognised as binding 
 between the more civilised nations of the w'orld. In this 
 general proposition I agree. I have too sincere a respect 
 for the high character as well as for the great abilities of 
 Sir James Stephen to suppose that in laying down this 
 proposition he intended to defend, or even to palliate 
 any departure from the strictest good faith with such 
 nations where engagements, direct or indirect, have been 
 made with them. I am sure he cannot have intended 
 to " use this liberty as a cloak of licentiousness." The 
 truth is, Sir James Stephen's doctrine — in the only sense 
 in which I agree in it, and in the only sense in which, 
 as I believe, he ever can have intended to propound it — 
 is a doctrine which leaves us free to apply to all engage- 
 ments with half-civilised Governments, even a higher 
 standard of honour than is usually applied to inter- 
 national dealings between equal States. For example, 
 there are technical distinctions, well known and recog- 
 nised among them, which establish different degrees of 
 obligation as attaching to different forms of diplomatic 
 documents. It would be dishonourable, in my opinion, 
 and dishonourable in the highest degree, to take advan- 
 tage of any such distinctions, in cases where they cannot 
 be equally known and equally recognised by both parties. 
 If the pledged word of a Viceroy of India is not to be 
 held as good and as binding as any Treaty, there is an 
 end of our claim to confidence in the East. We ought 
 not to tolerate the smallest trifling with this absolute 
 demand upon us. We have only to look at the 54th
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 57 
 
 paragraph of Lord Mayo's public despatch on the 
 Umballa Conference,* to see what a high place must be 
 given in the Court of Honour to the pledges which he 
 gave to the Ameer. He says, he thought it undesirable 
 to engage in voluminous written communications with 
 the Ameer, because " the visit was one of a personal 
 character, conceived in the spirit of amity and good faith." 
 
 The pledges given at the Umballa Conference are 
 all the more binding on us from the effect which they 
 actually produced. Except these pledges, there was 
 nothing to account for the good humour with which 
 Shere Ali returned to his Kingdom from his conference 
 with the Viceroy. Beyond the repetition of some imme- 
 diate assistance in money and in arms, and beyond the 
 promise not to embarrass him with the presence of 
 European Agents, we had given him nothing that he 
 desired to have. Behind these promises, indeed, there 
 remained the personal influence of Lord Mayo. His 
 manly presence, his genial open-hearted countenance, and 
 his transparent sincerity of character — these had pro- 
 duced a great effect, even on an angry and suspicious 
 Asiatic. 
 
 It would, however, be a very great mistake to suppose 
 that the Ameer was ever really satisfied ; or that, if he 
 was so for a moment, his discontent did not soon return. 
 The unhappy relations which he speedily established 
 with the ablest and most powerful of his sons, and the 
 usual influence of the harem which induced him to desire 
 
 * Ibid., No. 18, p. 98.
 
 58 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 the succession of a later child — these things kept con- 
 stantly before him the dangers of intestine strife, and the 
 prospect of a disputed throne. An Afghan does not 
 readily abandon any purpose, and the steady refusal of 
 the British Government to pledge itself to one party or 
 another in the family feuds of Afghanistan, while every 
 day that refusal became more and more clearly necessary 
 as well as just, became also more and more a practical 
 grievance to the Ameer. 
 
 Shere Ali had brought with him to Umballa the boy 
 Abdoolah Jan, and this young prince had, at all the 
 Durbars, sat on the left hand of the Ameer, whilst the 
 Viceroy sat upon the right.* This position seemed to 
 point to the acknowledgment, by the Ameer at least, of 
 Abdoolah Jan as his heir-apparent. But no nomination 
 of his successor had as yet been formally announced by 
 the Ameer. It is now evident that this was the very 
 matter which made Shere Ali so bent on obtaining a 
 dynastic guarantee, and it is probable that if this 
 guarantee had been given, Abdoolah would have been at 
 once proclaimed the successor of the Ameer. In this 
 event, and in the event of the death of Shere Ali, the 
 British Government would have been committed to the 
 support of Abdoolah in the civil war, which would have 
 been immediately raised by Yakoob Khan. But failing 
 in his demand for a dynastic guarantee, Shere Ali seems 
 to have hesitated to avow his intentions. During one 
 of the Conferences at Umballa, Lord Mayo did make 
 
 * Ibid., No. 17, Inclos. 2, p. 90.
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO i^n- 59 
 
 inquiries of the Ameer upon the subject, and intimated 
 that it was a question on which the British Government 
 could not but feel a friendly interest. The Ameer, how- 
 ever, parried the inquiry, and said that his determination 
 in that matter when it was come to, would be com- 
 municated from Cabul. 
 
 The progress of events soon showed the danger attach- 
 ing to such guarantees as that which Shere Ali had 
 desired. In 1870, Yakoob Khan raised the standard of 
 rebellion; and in June, 1871, had made himself master 
 of Herat. In the same month Lord Mayo heard that 
 Yakoob had made advances to his father for a recon- 
 ciliation, and he determined to take the very delicate 
 step of writing to the Ameer, advising him to come to 
 terms with his son. This accordingly he did. The letter 
 of the Viceroy reached our native Agent at Cabul on the 
 1 6th of June, and was immediately communicated to the 
 Ameer. The advice of Lord Mayo probably corre- 
 sponded at that moment with the Ameer's own estimate 
 of the wisest policy to be pursued towards his powerful 
 and successful son. He therefore immediately addressed 
 a letter to Yakoob Khan in the sense of Lord Mayo's 
 advice, and assured Yakoob that if he came to express 
 repentance, and make his submission at Cabul, he would 
 be forgiven and received. The result was that Yakoob 
 came to Cabul, and that his father deemed it expedient 
 to send him back to Herat, with the appointment of 
 Governor of that important City and Province. This 
 result gave much satisfaction to the Viceroy, and it was 
 indeed a very remarkable proof of the influence which he
 
 6o RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 had acquired over the mind of Shere AH by the pursu- 
 ance of a perfectly open and friendly policy. 
 
 It is, however, a signal illustration of Lord Mayo's 
 excellent judgment and good sense that the success, or 
 apparent success, of this friendly intervention in the 
 internal affairs of Afghanistan did not for a moment 
 shake his former views as to the serious danger and 
 impolicy of anything approaching to formal engage- 
 ments with the Ameer in relation to such affairs. On 
 the contrary, the whole transaction confirmed him in 
 those views, because they brought out in a vivid light the 
 essential instability of Shere Ali's throne, and the still 
 greater instability of any predetermined order of succes- 
 sion. Accordingly, on the 7th of July, before Lord 
 Mayo had, as yet, heard of the final result, but when 
 he knew that his letter had been successful, and that 
 Yakoob was then on his way to Cabul, he addressed to 
 me a letter in which he reiterated, in the strongest 
 language, his confidence in the policy which had been 
 pursued by Sir J. Lawrence and himself, in opposition to 
 the policy which recommended more active interference. 
 " It is impossible," he said, " to express in too strong terms 
 how entirely I disapprove of the policy of interfering in 
 the family quarrels of the Barukzyes." He proceeds 
 to illustrate this opinion by illustrations in detail, which 
 it is unnecessary to quote, because they contain allusions 
 and references to persons which are among the very few 
 passages of a really private character which occur in our 
 correspondence on the subject. Sufhce it to say that Lord 
 Mayo indicated his opinion that Yakoob Khan would
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 61 
 
 probably be the future Ruler of Cabul, and that it would 
 be most unfortunate if we were ever again to be in the 
 position of maintaining on the throne of Cabul a " hated 
 Sovereign." 
 
 Meanwhile, however, the immediate effects of the 
 Umballa Conference were such as to keep Shere Ali in 
 good humour. The measure of assistance which had been 
 given to the Ameer, first by Sir J. Lawrence and then by 
 Lord Mayo, both in the moral effect produced by the 
 support of the British Government, and by the actual 
 funds put at his disposal, had enabled Shere Ali to esta- 
 blish his authority over the whole of Afghanistan, and 
 of the country called Afghan Turkestan, lying between 
 the Hindoo Koosh and the Oxus. So soon after the 
 Umballa Conference as the ist of May, 1869, Colonel 
 Pollock, the Commissioner of Peshawur, had reported 
 as the direct and immediate result of the Umballa 
 meeting, that the Ameer had been able to recover Balkh 
 without a struggle, and had secured the submission of 
 Badakshan. 
 
 Whilst the opinions and policy of the Government on 
 the Central Asian question were thus being carried into 
 execution in India, through the Viceroy, with a dignity 
 of conduct and a steadiness of judgment which left us 
 nothing to desire, the same opinions and the same policy 
 were being prosecuted at home through the Foreign 
 Office. During the same weeks in which Lord Mayo was 
 preparing to receive Shere Ali at Umballa, Lord 
 Clarendon was in communication with the Russian Am- 
 bassador in London, intimating the desire of the Cabinet
 
 62 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 to arrive at some understanding with the Government of 
 Russia on the questions which might be raised by the 
 rapid advances of the Russian Empire in Central Asia. 
 In these communications with Baron Briinow, Lord 
 Clarendon explained that the main object of such an 
 understanding was to pacify the public mind both in 
 England and in Asia. So far as the Government was 
 concerned, we felt that "we were strong enough in 
 India to repel all aggression." We made no complaint, 
 and we repudiated any feeling of alarm. On the other 
 hand, we expressed no sucn implicit confidence as had 
 been expressed by Sir Stafford Northcote. On the 
 contrary, we pointed out that the progress of Russia in 
 Central Asia was, like our own progress in Hindostan, the 
 effect of tendencies and of causes which were more or 
 less in constant operation, and that certain results would 
 naturally and almost necessarily follow from them which 
 it would be wise on the part of both Governments to 
 foresee and to prevent. In indicating what those results 
 were, we did not pretend to any right or to any desire of 
 stopping Russia in her career of conquest over the desert 
 wastes and the robber tribes of Central Asia. We did not 
 hint that a large portion of the world was to be kept in 
 a state of hopeless barbarism, to save us from having 
 nervous fears. We specified and limited the demands 
 which we thought we had a fair right to make, — and these 
 were that measures should be taken to prevent any 
 aspiring Russian general from intriguing with malcontent 
 Indian Princes, or disturbing the States and populations 
 which touch our frontiers. For this purpose, moreover,
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 63 
 
 a definite arrangement was suggested, and that was, that 
 " some territory should be recognised as neutral between 
 the possessions of England and of Russia in the East, 
 which should be the limit of those possessions, and should 
 be scrupulously respected by both Powers." Baron 
 Briinow concurred with Lord Clarendon in the suggestion. 
 He made a report of it to his Government, and on the 
 very day on which Lord Mayo was receiving Shere Ali 
 at Umballa he brought to the Foreign Office a letter from 
 Prince Gortchakow, specifying Afghanistan as a territory 
 and a State well fitted to occupy the position which 
 was indicated in Lord Clarendon's suggestion. He was 
 therefore authorised to give a " positive assurance that 
 Afghanistan would be considered as entirely beyond the 
 sphere in which Russia might be called upon to exercise 
 her influence."* 
 
 It is of great importance to look closely at the language 
 of the letter from Prince Gortchakow to Baron Briinow. 
 dated on the 7th and which Lord Clarendon received on 
 the 27th of March. That language was quite distinct 
 that the object in view was to be that of keeping " a zone 
 between the possessions of the two Empires in Asia, to 
 preserve them from any contact." It is clear, therefore, 
 that whatever territory might be fixed upon by the two 
 Governments as constituting this zone, it was contem- 
 plated that the actual possessions of Russia and of 
 England might come to touch it on opposite sides. But 
 Russia was as yet very far from actually touching any 
 
 * Central Asia, II., 1873, No. i, p. i.
 
 64 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 part of the Afghan frontier. Bokhara touched it, if 
 Afghanistan was fully understood to extend to the Oxus. 
 And Bokhara was now under the command of Russia. 
 But if Afghanistan were not understood as extending 
 to the Oxus on its northern frontier, then the acceptance 
 of that country and Kingdom as constituting the pro- 
 posed zone would leave room for a large advance on the 
 part of Russia, to the south of her then acknowledged 
 frontier, and might thus possibly be held to sanction her 
 absorption of the whole territory between Bokhara and 
 the Hindoo Koosh. Lord Clarendon, therefore, with very 
 proper caution, in thanking the Russian Government for 
 the spirit of their communication, and in expressing 
 general agreement in the principle of the proposal, 
 reserved his acceptance of Afghanistan as the territory to 
 be selected, upon the ground that " he was not sufficiently 
 informed on the subject to express an opinion as to 
 whether Afghanistan should fulfil the conditions of cir- 
 cumstances of a neutral territory between the two Powers, 
 such as it seemed desirable to establish."* 
 
 It was of course at this time my duty to inform Lord 
 Clarendon upon those political and geographical facts 
 which were of importance to the question then under 
 discussion, and which were only known, or best known, 
 to the Government of India and its officers. I was at 
 that very time receiving communications from Lord 
 Mayo which, as I have already explained, represented 
 Russian officials as holding very suspicious language on 
 
 * Ibid., No. I, Inclos.j p. 3.
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 65 
 
 the subject of the limits of the Afghan Kingdom.* These 
 reports might not be correct. But, on the other hand, 
 they might be true ; and at all events, they suggested 
 caution and inspired serious doubt whether it would be 
 safe to accept Afghanistan as fulfilling the required con- 
 ditions, unless it were clearly understood by both 
 Governm.ents what were the territories included under 
 that name. Accordingl}^ after hearing all that could be 
 ascertained from our Indian experts as to the somewhat 
 obscure geography of the northern frontier of Shere All's 
 dominions, I came to the conclusion that it vv^ould be 
 unsafe and inexpedient to accept Afghanistan as the 
 farthest limit of Russian advances, unless it were at the 
 same time admitted as a fact that Afghanistan extended 
 to the Upper Oxus. It appeared to us farther that it 
 would be best to take that great river as the boundary of 
 the "zone" for some distance even beyond the point 
 where it ceased to touch the Afghan dominions. The 
 effect of this would have been to include in the territory 
 which was to be intermediate between the possessions 
 of England and of Russia,not only the whole of Shere All's 
 dominions, but also a large tract of country, for the most 
 part desert, which was laid down in the maps as belonging 
 to the Khan of Khiva. 
 
 Accordingly, these proposals were communicated to 
 Baron Brlinow by Lord Clarendon on the 17th of April 
 1869, and it was specially explained that they were 
 founded on " the decided opinion of the Secretary of State 
 
 * See ante, p. 37. 
 F
 
 66 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 for India," after consultation with those members of 
 Council who were best acquainted with the country.* 
 
 This proposal at once compelled the Government of 
 Russia to show its cards : and on the 2nd of June Prince 
 Gortchakow avowed that very opinion of which the Indian 
 Gov^ernment had been suspicious, namely, that Afghan- 
 istan did not reach the Oxus, and that, on the contrary, 
 the territory of Bokhara extended to the south of that 
 river.f 
 
 In the discussions which followed, the last of our two 
 proposals came to be abandoned. That proposal, 
 namely, the extension of the proposed "zone" beyond 
 the Afghan Kingdom to some point farther westward 
 upon the Oxus as yet undefined, was a proposal which 
 was completely overshadowed by the paramount im- 
 portance of a clear and definite understanding as to the 
 extent of territory which was included in Afghanistan. 
 The discussions on this subject were protracted during 
 the long period of three years and a half The discussion 
 was conducted in a most friendly spirit, generally of 
 course through the Foreign Office, but at one time also, 
 in a subordinate degree, through an officer of the Indian 
 Government, Mr. Douglas Forsyth. He visited St. 
 Petersburg in October, 1869, furnished with instructions 
 and private letters from Lord Mayo, in which full ex- 
 planations were given to the Russian Cabinet as to the 
 views and intentions of the Government of India. The 
 result of these communications was an entire agreement 
 
 • Central Asia, II., 1873, No, 3, p. 4. f Ibid., No. 7, p. 6,
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO id>iz. C; 
 
 on three important principles : ist, that the territory in 
 the actual possession, at the present moment, of Shere 
 AU Khan should be considered to constitute the limits 
 of Afghanistan ; 2nd, that beyond those limits the Ameer 
 should make no attempt to exercise any influence or 
 interference, and that the English Government should do 
 all in their power to restrain him from any attempts at 
 aggression ; 3rd, that, for their part, the Imperial Govern- 
 ment should use all their influence to prevent any attack 
 by the Emir of Bokhara upon Afghan territory. 
 
 These general principles were for the moment quite 
 sufficient to have a most useful practical result, in en- 
 abling the Indian Government to give assurances to Shere 
 Ali, and to give him advice also which tended to keep 
 the peace, and to prevent any practical questions being 
 raised. They were sufficient also to determine Russia in 
 similar conduct in her relations with Bokhara, and in her 
 relations also with fugitive members of Shere Ali's family 
 who were pretenders to his throne. In all these matters 
 both Russia and England acted with good faith on the 
 spirit of the Agreement, during the whole of the three 
 years and a half occupied by the discussion. But so long 
 as there was no clear and definite understanding with 
 Russia as to what she meant by " the territories in the 
 actual possession of Shere Ali," and so long especially 
 as she avowed that she did not admit Badakshan and 
 Wakhan to be a part of those territories, the Agreement 
 had no permanent value. Accordingly, after the return 
 of Mr. Forsyth to India, and after Lord Mayo and his 
 Council had obtained the fullest information, both his- 
 
 F 2
 
 68 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 torical and geographical, on the northern extension of the 
 Afghan Kingdom, they embodied their information in a 
 despatch to me, dated May 20, 1870. It gave a precise 
 definition to the northern and north-western frontiers of 
 Afghanistan, emphatically asserted that they extended to 
 the Upper Oxus, and indicated the point on the westward 
 course of that river where they marched with provinces 
 belonging to Bokhara.^ 
 
 The Russian Government contested this definition of 
 Afghanistan with some keenness, and especially insisted 
 on representing Badakshan and Wakhan as dependencies 
 of Bokhara. So late as December, 1872,! Prince Gort- 
 chakow maintained this view with extraordinary per- 
 tinacity, and offered a compromise on the western portion 
 of Lord Mayo's boundary, which would have expressly 
 abandoned the claim of Shere Ali to the disputed province 
 of Badakshan. At last the Emperor of Russia personally 
 intervened, and sent Count Schouvalow on a mission to 
 London, for the purpose of conceding the contention of 
 the British Government that the Upper Oxus should be 
 admitted as the northern frontier of Afghanistan. His 
 Majesty said that "there might be arguments used re- 
 spectively by the departments of each Government ; but 
 he was of opinion that such a question should not be a 
 cause of difference between the two countries, and he 
 was determined that it should not be so."| On the 24th 
 of January, 1873, this admission of the Emperor was 
 
 * Ibid., No. 60, Inclos., p. 45-7. 
 
 t Correspondence with Russia, 1873, No. 2, p. 4. 
 
 + Ibid., No. 3, p. 12.
 
 FEOM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 69 
 
 •suitably acknowledged by Lord Granville,'^' and the dis- 
 cussion terminated.t 
 
 I know it will be asked by scoffers what was the 
 worth of this understanding when it had been laboriously 
 attained ? what was the worth of these assurances when 
 they had been mutually exchanged ? My answer is a 
 very short one. They were of no value at all when the 
 foreign policy of England came to be directed in the 
 spirit of those by whom this question is asked. Neither 
 international Agreements of this kind, nor even formal 
 Treaties, are worth anything in the event of war, or in 
 the event of avowed preparations for war. Governments 
 are not ooliged to wait till the first actual blow has been 
 struck by another Government, using, in the meantime, 
 the language of insult and of menace. When the Prime 
 Minister, speaking at Russia, boasted after a Guildhall 
 dinner, that England could stand more than one, or even 
 two, or even three campaigns; when the Home Secretary, 
 speaking of Russia, told the House of Commons with 
 mimetic gestures, that she was " creeping, creeping, 
 creeping," where that Minister had known for months 
 that Russia had openly declared she would go if she 
 were required to do so ; when the Cabinet as a whole 
 had summoned the Reserves at home, and had ordered 
 
 * Ibid., No. 4, p. 13. 
 t It has been represented by Sir Henry Rawlinson that the ad- 
 mission by the Emperor of Russia of our contention respecting the 
 limits of Afghanistan was conceded in order to secure our ac- 
 quiescence in the Khivan Expedition. I see no proof of this. No 
 British Government in its senses would have gone to war with 
 Russia to prevent that Expedition,
 
 7c} RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 troops from India to enable them to act in the spirit of 
 these harangues — then, indeed, peaceful understandings 
 and Agreements became of no avail. 
 
 But if it is asked by reasonable men, and in a reasonable 
 spirit, what the actual force and value of the understand- 
 ing with Russia was, during the years when it was un- 
 affected by passionate suspicions, and by undignified 
 threats, then the question deserves a much more careful 
 exammation than has yet been given to it. 
 
 In the first place, then, it was not an Agreement which 
 was understood by either party as prohibiting Russia 
 from having any communication whatever with the 
 Ameer of Cabul. This has been pretended or assumed, 
 but it is not true. In the despatch of Prince Gortchakow, 
 dated the 7th of March, 1869,'^ which is one of the most 
 authoritative documents in the case, the promise of 
 Russia to abstain from the exercise of any influence in 
 Afghanistan was given, indeed, in positive terms. But 
 it was given also with an explanatory addition, which 
 makes it quite clear wherein the whole force and mean- 
 ing of that promise was understood to lie. What the 
 Emperor disclaimed and abjured as " entering into his 
 intentions" was, any " intervention or interference what- 
 ever opposed to the independence of that State." Com- 
 munications of courtesy, or even communications having 
 for their sole aim the promotion of commercial inter- 
 course, were certainly not excluded by this engagement. 
 
 That this was the clear understanding of both parties 
 
 i 
 
 * Central Asia, II., 1873, Inclos. p. 3.
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO v^w 7i 
 
 before the passionate jealousy of our Ministers was 
 roused by their own policy in the Turkish question, is 
 proved by the whole course of events up to the appearance 
 o^ that question above the political horizon. In June, 
 1870, after the Agreement had been fully established 
 between the two Governments, Prince Gortchakow him- 
 self'^ communicated to our Ambassador at St. Petersburg 
 a letter which General Kaufmann had addressed to Shere 
 Ali on the very important and delicate subject of the 
 asylum given at Tashkend to the fugitive Abdul Rah- 
 man Khan, one of the aspirants to the throne of Cabul. 
 This letter is a very full one, entering freely and frankly 
 into an explanation of the political relations between 
 Russia and Cabul, as well as of the relations between 
 both and the Khanate of Bokhara. It addressed the 
 Ameer as " under the protection of the Indian Govern- 
 ment," intimated that with that Government Russia was 
 in friendly relations, warned him gently against inter- 
 fering with Bokhara, as being under the protection of 
 the Czar.| No hint was dropped by the British«Am- 
 bassadorthat this direct communication from the Russian 
 Governor-General to the Ameer of Cabul was considered 
 as involving any departure whatever from the spirit or 
 from the letter of the understanding between the two 
 Governments. Within six days of the same date this 
 very same letter came under the special notice of Lord 
 Mayo, to whom it was referred by the Ameer as having 
 somewhat puzzled and alarmed him. Lord Mayo took 
 the trouble of writing an elaborate letter to Shere Ali, 
 
 * Ibid., No. 58, p. 43. t Ibid., No. 58, Inclos., p. 44.
 
 72 RELATIONS V/ITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 explaining- the true meaning of General Kaufmann's let-- 
 ter, and expressing the highest satisfaction with it.^ In 
 December, 1873, the Government of India were ac- 
 quainted with the fact that a letter of similar purport 
 had been addressed to the Ameer in August of that 
 year, informing him of the Russian conquest of Khiva.f 
 No adverse notice was taken of this fact by the Govern- 
 ment of India, or by the Government at home. These 
 facts, then very recent, were in possession of the present 
 Government when they succeeded to office. But as 
 neither Lord Mayo, nor Lord Northbrook, nor Lord 
 Granville had remonstrated with Russia on the subject 
 of these letters, so neither did Lord Derby nor Lord 
 Salisbury. It is remarkable that the first of these 
 letters from General Kaufmann which was transmitted 
 to Lord Salisbury was one dated the 25th of February, 
 1874, acknowledging the nomination by the Ameer of 
 Abdoollah Jan as his heir-apparent, and congratulating 
 him on this selection.]: Not one word of remonstrance 
 was uttered — not one word of suspicion breathed. In 
 May of the same year Lord Northbrook drew Lord 
 Salisbury's attention — not to the mere fact that Shere 
 Ali had received another letter from the Russian officer 
 then in command at Tashkend, — but to the fact that in 
 this letter allusion was made to some unknown request 
 which the Ameer had made.§ Still I find no record of 
 any warning to Russia that her officers were violating 
 the Agreement with England. In the Autumn of 1875 
 
 * Central Asia, I., 1878, p. 184. t Ibid., No. 5, Inclos. 2, p. 8. 
 + Ibid., No, 13, Inclos. 2, p. 15. § Ibid., No. 15, Inclos. i, p. 16.
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO i^ro- 73 
 
 matters went still farther ; not only was another letter 
 sent from the Russian Governor-General of Russian 
 Turkestan, but it was sent by a messenger who is called 
 an " Envoy." It was a letter informing the Ameer of 
 the return to Tashkend of General Kaufmann after his 
 absence for half a year at St. Petersburg. But it con- 
 tained a sentence which caught the ever-wakeful atten- 
 tion of the Cabul authorities. Kaufmann spoke of the 
 alliance between England and Russia as an " omen for 
 those countries which, under the protection of the Emperor 
 of Russia and the Queen of England, live in great peace 
 and comfort."^ The Afghan politicians seem to have 
 put the somewhat overstrained interpretation upon this 
 sentence that the Russian Government had made itself 
 partner in the protection of Afghanistan. They said 
 " this paragraph is in a new tone. God knows what State 
 secrets are concealed in it." Still no alarm was taken. 
 This news from the Cabul Diaries was forwarded to the 
 Foreign Office without note or comment from the Indian 
 Secretary. The reply of the Ameer was forwarded in 
 similar silence on the 6th of January, i876.t On the 
 25th of August the same ceremony was repeated, t and 
 this time a very long letter from General Kaufmann to 
 the Ameer was enclosed to the Foreign Office by Lord 
 Lytton's Government, but still without any indications, 
 even of uneasiness, on the subject. The letter gave a 
 detailed narrative of the transaction which had led to 
 the Russian conquest of Kokhand.§ 
 
 * Ibid., No. 58, Inclos. 6, p. 65. t Ibid., No. 60, p. 66. 
 
 X Ibid., No. 69, p. 75. § Ibid., Inclos. 6, p. yj.
 
 74 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 It is established therefore by a long series of trans- 
 actions, extending over several years, and passing under 
 the view of successive Ambassadors, Viceroys, and Secre- 
 taries of State, that the Agreement with Russia was not 
 understood by either Power to preclude direct com- 
 munications of courtesy passing between Russian officials 
 and the Ameer of Cabul. 
 
 At last, on the i6th of September, 1876, but not 
 sooner, the new Viceroy of India, Lord Lytton, tele- 
 graphed to Lord Salisbury that he had sent off a de- 
 spatch expressing a decided opinion that her Majesty's 
 Government ought to remonstrate with Russia on Kauf- 
 mann's repeated correspondence with the Ameer by hand 
 of Russian agents, two of whom were reported to be then 
 in Cabul. Lord Lytton added words which imply that 
 the Government of India had before entertained ob- 
 jections to this intercourse, but " had not hitherto asked 
 her Majesty's Government to formally remonstrate on 
 this open breach of repeated pledges."* This assertion is 
 unsupported by any evidence so far as regards the Govern- 
 ment of India under previous Viceroys, and as Lord 
 Lytton had then occupied that position for only five 
 months, the self-restraint of the Government of India 
 under the Russian provocation cannot have been of long 
 endurance. 
 
 On the 22nd of September, 1876, Lord Salisbury for- 
 warded this telegram to the Foreign Office, with the 
 wholly new and very important information that he 
 
 * Ibid., No. 71, Inclos. pp. 79, 80.
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 75 
 
 " concurred in the views expressed by the Viceroy, and 
 was of opinion that, as suggested by his Excellency, a 
 remonstrance against General Kaufmann's proceedings 
 should be addressed to the Russian Government without 
 delay.""^ 
 
 It is remarkable that the Foreign Secretary, in com- 
 plying with the request of his colleague, the Secretary of 
 State for India, indicated a consciousness that Kauf- 
 mann's letters were not a breach of the Russian Engage- 
 ment, and did not constitute a legitimate ground of 
 diplomatic remonstrance. He took care to found his 
 remonstrance not upon the letters, but upon " reports 
 from other sources that the instructions of the Asiatic 
 agent (who took the letter to Cabul) were to induce 
 Shere Ali to sign an offensive and defensive alliance 
 with the Russian Government, as well as a Commercial 
 Treaty." This, of course, is an entirely different ground 
 of complaint — and a legitimate one, if there had been 
 the smallest evidence of its truth. But Lord Derby, 
 without committing himself to belief in this report, con- 
 fined himself strictly to it as the only ground on which 
 remonstrance was to be made by our Ambassador. Lord 
 Augustus Loftus was not ordered to ask from the Rus- 
 sian Government a promise that Kaufmann should write 
 no more letters. He was only ordered to ask "a written 
 disclaimer of any intention on their part to negotiate 
 treaties with Shere Ali without the consent of her 
 Majesty's Government."! 
 
 * Ibid., No. 71, p. 79. t Ibid., No 72, p. So.
 
 76 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 It is impossible not to ask when and how this new Hght 
 came to flash on the Government of India and on the 
 Indian Secretary of State. A Uttle attention to dates, 
 and to the character of contemporary events, may perhaps 
 help to explain the mystery. 
 
 It was in December, 1875, that the Cabinet of London 
 had become aware that Russia was moving in concert 
 with Austria-Hungary and with Germany for some inter- 
 vention on behalf of the Christian subjects of the Porte.* 
 On the 30th of that month the Andrassy Note had 
 been signed at Buda-Pesth. This union of the " Three 
 Emperors" had excited the jealousy and the fear of the 
 Turkish party in England ; and we have seen that on the 
 25th of January, 1876, the Cabinet of London had felt 
 itself compelled, but with extreme and avowed reluctance, 
 to g'ive its adhesion to that celebrated Instrument. 
 During the months of February, March, and April, 1876, 
 further negotiations were being carried on between the 
 same dreadful "Three" to secure the peace of Europe, by 
 putting some effectual pressure on the Turks for the 
 reform of their administration. During the month of 
 April especially, the influence and the power of Russia in 
 these negotiations was becoming more and more apparent, 
 and were leading to some real concert among the Powers 
 of Europe in spite of the dilatory and evasive policy of 
 the Cabinet of London. They did at last produce in 
 May the Berlin Memorandum, which, as a means of 
 arriving at peace, was destroyed by the Queen's Govern- 
 
 * See "The Eastern Question," Vol. I. Ch. iv., p. 159.
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO xZ-ji. 77 
 
 ment, but which as a means of fortifying Russia in the 
 alternative of war, was immensely strengthened by the 
 solitary resistance of the English Government. 
 
 It was in the midst of these transactions that the new 
 Viceroy of India was appointed, and was charged with 
 personal and with written instructions which will be 
 examined presently. Before the i6th of September, the 
 day on which Lord Lytton sent off his excited telegram 
 about Kaufmann's letters, the European embroglio had 
 become very thick indeed. Russia by her firm yet 
 moderate attitude and language, — the public feeling of 
 the British people and their just indignation against the 
 Turks, — were compelling the Government to bow beneath 
 the storm, and to threaten Turkey with complete aban- 
 donment in the event of Russia declaring war. But the 
 keener spirits in the Cabinet were restive and fretful 
 under this position of affairs. On the 20th of September, 
 Mr. Disraeli had made his celebrated speech at Ayles- 
 bury,* and we can therefore understand without much 
 difficulty the feelings under which, two days later. Lord 
 Salisbury declared, for the first time, and in the face 
 of his own previous acquiescence, — that Kaufmann's 
 letters to the Ameer were a breach of the Engagement 
 between England and Russia in respect to their relations 
 with Afghanistan. 
 
 Before proceeding, however, to trace the career of the 
 new Viceroy of India in the Imperial policy which he 
 went out to prosecute, I must return for a moment to the 
 
 * Ibid., Vol. I. Ch. vi., p. 270.
 
 78 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 Agreement with Russia, for the purpose of pointing out 
 one other condition of things, and one other course of 
 conduct, which was almost as effectual as warlike threats 
 in depriving it of all force and value. The course of 
 conduct I refer to is that of dealing with the advances 
 of Russia in Central Asia after the Agreement had been 
 made, precisely in the same way in which we might have 
 been entitled, or at least disposed, to deal with them, if 
 no such Agreement had been come to. The whole 
 object and purpose of the Agreement was to establish a 
 boundary line beyond which we need not be in a constant 
 fuss about Russian aggression. If there was any sense 
 or meaning in an understanding that Afghanistan was 
 not to be encroached upon, even by the influence of 
 Russia, that meaning was that Russian advances which 
 did not come near that Kingdom should cease to be the 
 object of our jealousy and resentment. Even before 
 that Agreement was made I never could see that, inter- 
 nationally, we had any more right to remonstrate with 
 Russia on her advances in Central Asia, than she would 
 have had to remonstrate with us on our advances in 
 Hindostan. Of course nations may make anything they 
 choose a ground of quarrel and of war. But it is in the 
 highest degree undignified on the part of any Government 
 to be perpetually remonstrating with another upon acts 
 which it is not prepared to resist, and which it is not in 
 a position to prevent. For this reason, even before the 
 Agreement with Russia was made, I have always regarded 
 with a feeling akin to mortification the language of those 
 who in the press, or in Parliament, or in diplomacy, have
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 79 
 
 been continually declaiming against the natural and 
 inevitable advances of Russia in Central Asia. But since 
 the Agreement with Russia was concluded, acknow- 
 ledging Afghanistan as under our predominant influence, 
 and as excluded from the influence of Russia, it has 
 always appeared to me that the continuance of this 
 language is tainted, in addition, with something very like 
 a breach of faith. It is not only undignified, but it is 
 unfair, to accept that Agreement as binding Russia not 
 to advance, either by actual conquest or by establishing 
 influence, beyond a certain line, and at the same time as 
 leaving us as free as ever to denounce her operations 
 when conducted far within that line. Outside of Afghan- 
 istan, Russia unquestionably kept her freedom. We, of 
 course, kept our freedom also. But there is no truth in 
 representing any Russian movement beyond Afghanistan 
 as a breach of the Agreement of 1873. ^^t this has 
 been the actual conduct, I will not say of the English 
 people, but of too many who assume to speak on their 
 behalf. It has appeared even in the official language of 
 Ambassadors and of Secretaries of State, and it has led 
 public writers of high authority with their countrymen, to 
 make accusations against Russia which on the face of 
 them are unjust, and which have had a powerful effect in 
 stimulating national animosities, and inspiring unmanly 
 fears. 
 
 Of this a signal example is to be found in the language 
 we have held upon the subject of Khiva. It is generally 
 asserted, and widely believed, that in the conquest of 
 Khiva, Russia has been guilty towards us of flagrant
 
 8o RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 breaches of engagement. The papers presented to 
 Parhament disprove this accusation altogether. They 
 do more than this : they convact those who make these 
 accusations of that kind of reckless misquotation, which, 
 although often the effect of mere passion, approaches 
 very nearly to the bad faith which they charge against 
 Russia. We have habitually treated certain intimations 
 made to us by Russia of her intentions, and certain 
 declarations of her policy, as if those intimations and 
 declarations were in the nature of binding promises and 
 of international engagements. But the intimation of an 
 intention is not necessarily a promise. A declaration, or 
 an assurance as to policy is not necessarily an engage- 
 ment. It is not so in private life, and it is still less so in 
 the intercourse of nations. There may, of course, be 
 circumstances which give a higher value to the intimation 
 of an intention than would otherwise attach to it. If it 
 is made, for example, as part of a negotiation, and in 
 connexion with benefits received on account of it ; or, 
 again, if it is made by a powerful nation to a weak one as 
 an assurance on which it may rely, — then, indeed, such 
 an intimation may assume the character of a promise. 
 But this character entirely depends on the context not 
 merely of words, but of circumstances and events. The 
 mere intimation of an intention by one Government to 
 another does not in itself amount to, or even imply, an 
 engagement. This would be true, even if the intimations 
 of intention, or the declarations of policy on which we 
 rely, had been made without express reservations and 
 explanations limiting their effect. But the intimations of
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO i^tz- 8i 
 
 intention, and the declarations and assurances as to 
 policy which have been made to us by Russia, on the 
 subject of her relations with the States of Central Asia, 
 have been almost uniformly made under express and 
 emphatic reservations which it is customary with us to 
 suppress or to ignore. In the Circular Despatch to the 
 Russian Ambassadors at the various Courts of Europe 
 which was issued by Prince Gortchakow in November, 
 1864, the Cabinet of St. Petersburg set forth, for the in- 
 formation of the world, the principles which would guide 
 her policy in Central Asia. In this State Paper not only 
 was everything like a promise avoided, but declarations 
 were made obviously inconsistent with the possibility of 
 any such promise being given. Russia likened her own 
 position in Central Asia to the position of the British 
 Government in India, and pointed out that annexations 
 had been, and might still be, the necessary results of 
 contact with semi-barbarous States. It is true that she 
 expressed her desire to avoid this result if it were possible 
 to do so. But she expressed also her determination to 
 establish free commercial routes, and to punish tribes 
 who lived on plunder. This in itself was tantamount to 
 a declaration of war against all the Khanates of Central 
 Asia. Russia did not conceal the import and the possible 
 consequences of her determination in the matter. It 
 demanded, as the Circular very truly said, " a complete 
 transformation of the habits of the people." But no such 
 transformation could be effected without " teaching the 
 populations in Asia that they will gain more in favouring 
 and protecting the caravan trade than in robbing it.'
 
 82 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 Nor was the Circular silent on the methods of operation 
 which were contemplated for the purpose of teaching this 
 lesson. " It is a peculiarity of Asiatics," it said, " to 
 respect nothing but visible and palpable force."' "If, the 
 robbers once punished, the expedition is withdrawn, the 
 lesson is soon forgotten : its withdrawal is put down to 
 weakness." Finally, with a downrightness of expression 
 which leaves nothing to be misunderstood, the Circular 
 declared in its concluding sentence that " the Imperial 
 Cabinet, in assuming this task, takes as its guide the 
 interests of Russia."* 
 
 Such is the nature of the Manifesto which, it is pre- 
 tended, held out a promise to Europe that Russian 
 annexations and conquests in Central Asia were to cease 
 for ever. It would be much nearer the truth to say, on 
 the contrary, that it was a Manifesto rendering it certain 
 that those conquests could not and would not be restrained. 
 Yet public writers of the highest authority never speak 
 of this document without that kind of misrepresentation 
 which is the natural result of strong antipathies or of 
 overmastering hobbies. Among these writers no one is 
 more justly distinguished than Sir Henry Rawlinson. 
 With unequalled knowledge of those regions, and with 
 great powers of statement, he never loses an opportunity 
 of insisting on the danger arising to us out of the ad- 
 vances of Russia in Central Asia. Yet whilst treating 
 the subject much more ably than most other writers, and 
 whilst trying to state fairly the physical and military 
 
 * Central Asia, No. II., 1873, pp. 72-5.
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 83 
 
 necessities to which these advances are often due, he nevCf 
 refers to this Russian Manifesto without unconsciously 
 misquoting it, and misinterpreting it. Thus in the 
 Memorandum of 1869, he speaks of it as "asserting 
 with categorical precision that the expansion of the 
 Empire had now reached its limit." I look in vain in the 
 Manifesto for any such declaration, or for anything which 
 is at all equivalent. It is true, indeed, that the Manifesto 
 speaks of a military line which had then been established 
 between Lake Issyk-Kaul and the Syr-Daria River 
 (Jaxartes), as a line which had the advantage of " fixing 
 for us with geographical precision the limit up to which 
 we are bound to advance and at which we must halt." 
 But the very next words demonstrate th^t the " must" 
 in this sentence referred entirely to physical and political 
 difficulties which the Russian Government were unwilling 
 to encounter, but which they did by no means promise 
 never to encounter, if by circumstances they should be 
 led or forced to do so. On the contrary, the whole tone 
 and the whole argument of the Manifesto is directed to 
 reserve to the Russian Government perfect freedom for 
 the future in her dealings with the States of Central Asia, 
 and to emphasise with the greatest care the conditions 
 which rendered it absolutely necessary that this freedom 
 should be maintained. 
 
 Let us now look at the treatment which Russia has 
 received at our hands in respect to later declarations, in 
 their connexion with later conquests. 
 
 In 1869 rumours began to get abroad that the military 
 activities of the Russian Government were likely soon to 
 
 G 2
 
 84 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 take the direction of Khiva. Towards the end of 
 February in that year, our Ambassador at St. Petersburg 
 had a conversation with the Emperor on the general 
 subject of Central Asian politics, when the Emperor, 
 whilst disclaiming any feeling of coveteousness in those 
 regions, took care to remind her Majesty's Government 
 of their own experience in India, and to point out that the 
 Russian position in Asia was " one of extreme difficulty, 
 in which our actions may depend not so much upon our 
 own wishes as upon the course pursued towards us by the 
 Native States around us." Nothing could be clearer than 
 this for the purpose of distinguishing between engage- 
 ments or promises of any kind, and explanations or 
 assurances of policy, of wishes, and of intentions. But if 
 anything more clear on this subject were desired, it was not 
 long before it was supplied. On the 31st of November, 
 in the same year (1869), Sir Andrew Buchanan had 
 another conversation with Prince Gortchakow on the 
 rumoured expedition against Khiva, in which the Russian 
 Minister gave expression to very strong assurances of his 
 policy and intention against farther extensions of territory 
 in Asia, and resting the departures which had taken place 
 from former intentions of a like kind, on the force of 
 circumstances. Our Ambassador reported this conversa- 
 tion in a despatch dated December i, 1869.''^ But as more 
 definite information soon reached him in regard to the 
 formidable character of the Expedition which was said to 
 be in contemplation, he returned to the charge with Prince 
 
 * Ibid., No. 21, p. 19.
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 85 
 
 Gortchakow on the 29th of December. He placed in the 
 Prince's hands an extract from his despatch reporting 
 the previous conversation. The Prince read it with entire 
 approval of its accuracy, but when he came to the passage 
 that " he would not consent to an extension of the 
 Empire" he stopped to observe and to explain that this 
 " could only mean that he would disapprove of it, as he 
 could not prevent such an eventuality, were the Emperor 
 to decide in its favour."^ 
 
 Under these circumstances, we have no excuse for the 
 unfairness of representing the repeated intimations and 
 assurances of Russia on this subject as meaning anything 
 more than the Emperor and his Minister carefully ex- 
 plained them to mean. The unfairness is all the greater 
 as we are generally guilty of it without the smallest 
 reference to the question whether Russia had or had not 
 a just ground of quarrel with the Khan of Khiva. Yet 
 the case stated by Russia against the Khan, as reported 
 by Sir A. Buchanan, is a case of indisputable justice, and 
 even necessity. In June, 187 1, Sir A. Buchanan ex- 
 plained that the principal object of Russia seemed to be 
 " to secure a safe commercial route to Central Asia from 
 the Caspian and her Trans- Caucasian provinces" This 
 is in strict accordance with the declared policy of Russia 
 in the Manifesto .of 1864. But more than this. The 
 suppression and punishment of piracy on land is as just 
 a cause of war as the suppression of piracy by sea. It 
 is not denied that the Khan of Khiva was simply the 
 ruler of robber tribes, and that he lived upon the revenues 
 * Ibid., No. 25, p. 22.
 
 86 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 of plunder. But in addition to these just causes of quarrel 
 the Russian Government asserted that he held Russian 
 subjects in captivity and slavery. No attempt is made 
 to deny or to refute this asseition. 
 
 I am informed by my relative, Sir John McNeill, that 
 as long as forty years ago, when he represented the 
 British Government at the Court of Persia, he had to 
 use his endeavours to redeem from captivity in Khiva a 
 number of Russian subjects. I am also informed by 
 Lord Northbrook that the Khivan Envoy who came to 
 him at Simla in 1873 confessed that the Khan was in 
 possession of Russian captives. The assertion, therefore, 
 of the Russian Government, that it had just cause of com- 
 plaint against the Khan, has not only never been refuted, 
 but is one which we know to be consistent with all the 
 probabilities of the case. Yet we, a Nation and a Govern- 
 ment which spent some eleven millions in redeeming from 
 captivity in Abyssinia a few subjects of the Queen, are 
 never tired of complaining that the Emperor of Russia 
 for similar reasons and for other reasons quite as good, and 
 of far more permanent value, sent a military expedition 
 against Khiva, and finally reduced that Khanate to a 
 condition under which it could rob no more."^ It is quite 
 
 * Sir Henry Rawlinson tells us that one of the consequences of 
 the Russian conquest of Khiva was that the Khan lost his revenue 
 from the outlying Turcoman tribes, " whose allegiance to him, never 
 very willingly paid, has been further shattered by the abolition of the 
 slave-trade in the Khiva market, and the consequent suppression 
 of their means of livelihood." — England and Russia in the East, 
 
 P- 330-
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 87 
 
 true that in 1873, Russia was induced by our persistent 
 expressions of jealousy and remonstrance to repeat her 
 assurances of intention, in words less guarded by express 
 limitations than they had been before. These new 
 assurances were given to Lord Granville on the 8th of 
 January, 1873, by Count Schouvalow, when he was sent 
 by the Emperor to London to communicate to the British 
 Government his Majesty's assent to our long contention 
 on the boundaries of Afghanistan. This was the main 
 object of his mission ; and the new assurances of policy in 
 respect to Khiva seem to have been volunteered as upon 
 subjects not immediately connected with the principal 
 matter in hand. But those assurances of policy and of 
 intention, strong as they were in particular expressions, 
 have, as usual, been habitually misrepresented. Count 
 Schouvalow declared that " not only was it far from the 
 intentions of the Emperor to take possession of Khiva, 
 but positive orders had been prepared to prevent it, and 
 directions given that the conditions imposed should be 
 such as could not in any way lead to a prolonged occu- 
 pancy of Khiva."* These words, even if they were to be 
 strictly construed as the record of a definite international 
 engagement, which they certainly were not, would not 
 prevent the subjugation of Khiva to the condition of a 
 dependent State, nor would they prevent the annexation 
 of some Khivan territory to the Russian Empire. It is 
 probable that neither of these contingencies was then 
 contemplated by the Emperor. But neither of them is 
 
 * Corresp. with Russia, Central Asia, 1873, No. 3, p. 13.
 
 88 RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN 
 
 definitely excluded by the terms of Count Schouvalow's 
 assurance. It is true that the general limitations which 
 Russia had so often placed upon her assurances of in- 
 tention in Central Asia, were not repeated by Count 
 Schouvalow when he spoke of the Khivan Expedition. 
 But most undue advantage is taken of this fact, when 
 weforget that those limitations had always been explained 
 to be inherent in the nature of the case, and that even 
 if they had never been formally recorded, as they fre- 
 quently had been, they ought to have been understood. 
 
 Accordingly, when in January, 1874, Lord Granville 
 had to acknowledge the receipt of the Treaty with the 
 Khan of Khiva which recorded the results of the Russian 
 conquest, he very wisely declared that he saw no advan- 
 tage in comparing those results with the " assurances of 
 intention" which had been given by Count Schouvalow. 
 Lord Granville carefully avoided calling them promises. 
 He gave to them the correct name, and he absolutely 
 refrained from those accusations of bad faith in which 
 irresponsible writers have so freely indulged.^ 
 
 We have now brought the narrative of events, so far 
 as our direct relations with Russia through the Foreign 
 Office are concerned, down to the Khivan Expedition, and 
 to her acknowledgment of our contention respecting 
 the boundaries and respecting the political position of 
 Afghanistan. We have also, in connexion with this sub- 
 ject, somewhat anticipated the parallel events which were 
 taking place in India, by indicating the changed conditions 
 
 * Russia, II., 1874, No. 2, p. 7.
 
 FROM FIRST AFGHAN WAR TO 1873. 89 
 
 of feeling under which Lord Lytton was sent out to India. 
 But in order to understand clearly what was to follow, 
 we must go back for a little to fill up the interval which 
 elapsed between the Umballa Conference in 1869, and 
 the violation of Lord Mayo's pledges which immediately 
 followed when Lord Northbrook ceased to be the Viceroy 
 of India, in April, 1876.
 
 90 FROM THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 FROM THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA IN 1 873 TO 
 THE FRERE NOTE IN JANUARY, 1 875. 
 
 We have seen the impression which Lord Mayo derived 
 from the language of Shere Ah at Umballa, — that the 
 Ameer thought very httle and cared even less about the 
 Russian advances in Central Asia. Yet this was at a 
 time when Russia had just established her paramount 
 influence over his nearest neighbour — a neighbour inti- 
 mately connected with all the revolutions in his own 
 country — a neighbour whose country had been, and still 
 was, the habitual refuge of defeated candidates for his 
 throne. But although Lord Mayo was fully justified in 
 this impression, and although it was evident that the mind 
 of the Ameer was engrossed by the contest in which he 
 had been engaged, and which was not even then absolutely 
 closed, — so that he thought of nothing so much as his 
 desire for a dynastic guarantee, — it does not follow that 
 he was ignorant of the place which Russian advances had 
 in the policy of the English Government. It is a vain 
 attempt to conceal anything from Afghans as to the 
 motives of our policy towards the Kingdom of Cabul. 
 Even if it were our object to deceive them, it would be
 
 TO THE FRERE NOTE. 91 
 
 impossible. Their suspicions outrun every possibility of 
 concealment. Accordingly, there is curious evidence that 
 at the Umballa Conference, Noor Mohammed, the trusted 
 Minister of the Ameer, indicated a perfectly correct 
 appreciation of the position of his country in its relation 
 both to Russia and to England. At a meeting held on 
 the 1st of April, 1869, he showed considerable suspicion 
 about our professed eagerness to promote trade with 
 Afghanistan. Mr. Seton Karr, the Foreign Secretary, 
 and Major Pollock, the Commissioner, tried to reassure 
 him. Noor Mohammed then said, " You have given us 
 guns, treasure, &c. &c. You would not do so without 
 some special motive. What is your motive .-'" The 
 Foreign Secretary answered, " In order that the Govern- 
 ment on our borders may be independent and strong, just 
 as Cashmere and Khotul are ;" explaining further what 
 had been done in respect to the Cashmere succession. 
 Upon this Noor Mohammed replied, apparently with 
 some touch of fun, that he accepted the explanation, and 
 " would not credit us with ulterior motives," and then 
 added these significant words : " He hoped we should 
 have a good understanding, and the advantage of it to us 
 (the English) would be, that were the Russians or other 
 enemy to come, even though the Afghans themselves 
 could not successfully keep them out of the country, ■ 
 they could harass them in every way."* 
 
 The inference I draw from this remarkable observation 
 
 * Notes of Umballa Conference enclosed in Lord Mayo's letter 
 of April 4, 1869.
 
 92 FROM THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA 
 
 of the Afghan Minister is that he was perfectly aware of 
 the poHtical object we had in view in supporting and 
 strengthening the Afghan Kingdom, and that the in- 
 difference exhibited at that time both by him and by the 
 Ameer on the subject of Russian advances, was due not 
 only to the fact that they regarded foreign aggression 
 as a distant danger, but also to the fact that they knew 
 they could count on our own self-interest leading us to 
 assist them if the danger should ever come nearer. 
 
 If, however, the mind of the Ameer had been under 
 any anxiety on the subject of danger from Russia, that 
 anxiety would have been removed by the information 
 which Lord Mayo was able to communicate to him soon 
 after the Umballa Conference — namely, the information 
 that Russia had agreed to recognise, as belonging to 
 Afghanistan, all the territories then in his actual pos- 
 session. He had further, the friendly assurances of 
 General Kaufmann, which Lord Mayo himself had taken 
 the trouble of explaining to him as assurances with 
 which the Viceroy was highly pleased. Further, he had 
 the actual conduct of the Russian Governor-General in 
 refusing to allow Abdul Rahman Khan to excite distur- 
 bances in Afghanistan, and also in arresting movements 
 on the part of the Khan of Bokhara which compromised 
 the peace of the Afghan frontier. On the other hand, 
 Shere Ali himself had shown that he was fully aware of 
 the condition on which our support was given to him — 
 namely, the condition that he would abstain from 
 aggression upon his neighbours, and especially on those 
 immediate neighbours who were avowedly under the
 
 TO THE PRE RE NOTE. 93 
 
 influence and protection of Russia. In compliance with 
 this condition, Shere AH, under the influence and by the 
 advice of the Government of India, had refrained from 
 several frontier operations to which he would have been 
 otherwise inclined, and in particular from annexing Kir- 
 kee and Charjui.* The Emperor of Russia had heartily 
 acknowledged the good faith and the success with which 
 the Government of India had been acting in this matter, 
 and considered it as a gratifying proof of the good 
 effects of the Agreement which had been arrived at 
 between the two Powers in respect to their mutual 
 relations in the East. 
 
 No occasion for any special communication with the 
 Ameer arose during the rest of Lord Mayo's viceroyalty, 
 which was terminated by his calamitous death in the 
 spring of 1872, nor during the first year of the vice- 
 royalty of his successor. Only one annoyance to the 
 Ameer arose out of the policy of Lord Mayo, acting under 
 the direction of the Government at home. There had 
 been a long-standing dispute in respect to the boundaries 
 of the Afghan and Persian Kingdoms in the province 
 of Seistan. Lord Mayo, thinking that it might some day 
 lead to complications, had readily agreed to a proposal 
 that it should be settled by the arbitration of British offi- 
 cers, sent expressly to survey the country, and to adjust 
 the line of frontier. The duty was assigned to, and was 
 carefully ebcecuted by, General Sir F. Goldsmid, one of 
 the ablest officers at the disposal of the Government of 
 
 * Afghanistan, I., 1878, No. 22, p. 105.
 
 94 FROM THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA 
 
 India, and having special qualifications for the service. 
 General Sir Frederick Pollock lent his aid to Noor Mo- 
 hammed, the Afghan Minister, in watching the Afghan 
 case. The decision was one which did not give to the 
 Ameer all that he considered to be his own. The device 
 of settling such matters by arbitration, although emi- 
 nently reasonable in itself, is one not yet familiar to 
 Asiatics, and not readily understood by them. They do 
 not easily believe in the perfect impartiality of anybody, 
 and it is natural that in such cases they should regard 
 an adverse decision with mortification and distrust. 
 
 We now come to the transactions which led to the 
 Conferences at Simla in 1873 between Lord Northbrook 
 and the Prime Minister of the Ameer. As on these 
 transactions both the Simla Narrative of Lord Lytton, 
 and the London Narrative of Lord Cranbrook, are little 
 better than a mass of fiction, it will be necessary to state 
 the facts accurately, and to confront them with those 
 Narratives. 
 
 Early in March, 1873,"^ it became theduty of the Secre- 
 tary of State for Foreign Affairs to confirm the award 
 which had been given in the Seistan Arbitration. Under 
 the terms of the Arbitration this confirmation was final 
 and binding, both on the Shah of Persia and on the 
 Ameer of Cabul. It was well known how distasteful the 
 result had been to the Ameer. 
 
 In connexion, therefore, with this Seistan Arbitration, 
 and also in connexion with the final transactions between 
 
 * Afghan Corresp., II., 1878, p. 4. 
 
 I
 
 TO THE PRE RE NOTE. 95 
 
 the Cabinets of London and St. Petersburg on the 
 boundaries of Afghanistan, it became desirable, in the 
 spring of 1873, that the Government of India should have 
 some more direct communication than usual with the 
 Ameer, Shere Ali. On both these subjects, but especially 
 on the first, Lord Northbrook thought it would be expe- 
 dient to give him personal explanations tending to soothe 
 irritation or to prevent misunderstanding. For these 
 purposes. Lord Northbrook, through a letter from the 
 Commissioner of Peshawur, which reached Cabul on the 
 27th of March,* requested the Ameer to receive a British 
 officer at Cabul, or Jellalabad, or Candahar, or at any- 
 other place in Afghanistan which the Ameer might name 
 — not, of course, as a resident Envoy, but on a special 
 mission. True to the traditional policy of his family and 
 race, the Ameer availed himself of the right which he had 
 by Treaty and by the pledges of Lord Mayo, to intimate 
 that he would prefer, in the first place at any rate, not to 
 receive a British officer at Cabul, but to send his own 
 Prime Minister to Simla. This reply was not given until 
 the 14th of April, after long discussions in Durbar, at one 
 of which the " Moonshee " of the British Agency was per- 
 mitted to be present.t These debates showed great re- 
 luctance to abide by the Seistan award, and a disposition 
 to use the Ameer's assent as a price to be given only in 
 return for certain advantages which he had long desired. 
 They show that the Ameer was reluctant even to send 
 an Envoy of his own, and that this measure was referred 
 
 * Ibid., p. 5. Enclos. 2 in No. 2. 
 t Ibid., Enclos. 5, p. 7.
 
 96 FROM THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA 
 
 to as a concession on his part to the wishes of the Vice- 
 roy.* They showed also the usual jealousy and dread of 
 the presence of a British Envoy in Cabul, and of the 
 pressure he might put upon the Ameer to accept pro- 
 posals which might be distasteful to him. In all this, 
 however, Shere Ali was acting within his right — standing 
 on the faith of Treaties, and on the pledges of Lord 
 Mayo. The Viceroy, therefore, true, on his side, to the 
 engagements and to the wise policy of his predecessors, 
 abstained from pressing his request upon the Ameer, and 
 at once, on the 25th of April, accepted the alternative he 
 preferred.! 
 
 Let us now see how these facts are dealt with in the 
 Simla and in the London Narratives. It suited the pur- 
 pose with which both these Narratives were drawn up to 
 represent the Ameer as having been at this time greatly 
 alarmed by the advances of Russia, because this repre- 
 sentation of the case helps to throw blame on Lord 
 Northbrook for having (as alleged) refused to reassure 
 him. Of course the fact that the Ameer did not seek any 
 Conference at this time, but, on the contrary, only con- 
 sented to it rather reluctantly, when it was proposed to 
 him by the Government of India — is a fact which stands 
 much in the way of such a representation of the case. 
 Accordingly, both in the Simla Narrative and in the 
 London Narrative, this fact is entirely suppressed, whilst, 
 both by implication and by direct assertion, the im- 
 pression is conveyed that the Ameer sought the 
 
 * Ibid., Enclos. 5 and 6, pp. 7, 8. 
 t Ibid., Enclos. 8, p. 9.
 
 TO THE FRERE NOTE. 97 
 
 ference, — ^that he did so under the fear of Russian 
 advances in Central Asia, and for the purpose of getting 
 securities against them. Tlie Simla Narrative, after 
 quoting passages from the Durbar debate above men- 
 tioned, which did refer to Russia, proceeds thus (para. 
 12): "With these thoughts in his mind, his Highness 
 deputed Synd Noor Mohammed Shah, in the summer of 
 1873, to wait upon Lord Northbrook, and submit this and 
 other matters to the consideration of the Viceroy."* 
 
 It would be quite impossible to gather from this that 
 it was the Viceroy who had desired to open special com- 
 munications with the Ameer, and that Shore Ali only 
 offered to send his Minister in order to avoid receiving a 
 British Envoy. But the London Narrative improves upon 
 its Simla prototype. It not only represents that the 
 Ameer was moved to send his Minister from his fear of 
 Russia, but it professes to tell us more exactly how that 
 fear then specially arose. It was the fall of Khiva. " The 
 capture of Khiva," says paragraph 8 of the London Nar- 
 rative, "by the forces of the Czar, in the spring of 1873, 
 and the total subordination of that Khanate to Russia, 
 caused Shere Ali considerable alarm, &c. Actuated by 
 his fears on this score, his Highness sent a special Envoy 
 to Simla in the summer of that year, charged with the 
 duty of expressing them to the Government of India."! 
 Now it so happens, as we have seen, that the Ameer's 
 proposal to send his Minister was made on the 14th of 
 April, whilst the capture of Khiva did not take place till 
 
 * Ibid., p. 162. t Ibid., p. 262. 
 H
 
 9S FROM THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA 
 
 the lotli of June. Even if the Ameer had possessed the 
 power of seeing what was then going on at the distance 
 of some 800 or 900 miles across the deserts of Central 
 Asia, he would not have been much alarmed on account 
 of Russian advances. On that very day, the 14th of 
 April, Kaufmann and all his force were at the point of 
 death from thirst and fatigue, in their advance on Khiva. 
 They were saved only by the timely intervention of a 
 " ragged Kirghiz," who led them to some wells. It was 
 not till the 23rd of May, that Kaufmann reached the 
 Oxuswith only 1200 camels remaining out of the 10,000 
 with which the Expedition had been provided."^ As for 
 the " total subordination of the Khanate of Khiva to 
 Russia," this was not effected till the date of the Treaty, 
 which was not concluded till the 12th of August, and was 
 not published at St. Petersburg till the 12th of December.f 
 The statement, therefore, in the London Narrative, as to 
 the circumstances which led to the Simla Conferences of 
 1873, is entirely misleading, and points to conclusions, in 
 respect to the Ameer's motives, with which the real facts 
 are entirely inconsistent. These facts must have been 
 well known both at Calcutta and at the India Office, and 
 they ought to have been correctly given. 
 
 The statement made both in the Simla and in the 
 London Narrative as to the Ameer's condition of mind 
 when he sent his Minister, Noor Mohammed, to confer 
 with the Viceroy, is a statement founded mainly on the 
 
 * Schuyler's Turkistan, Vol. ii. p. 341. 
 t Russia, II., 1874, No. 2, p. 6.
 
 TO THE FEE RE NOTE. 99 
 
 reports of the Ameer's conversations with our native 
 Agent at Cabul, and especially on those which were 
 reported by that Agent on the 5th of May, 1873.'^ In 
 the Simla Narrative (par. ii), some quotations are given 
 from this Report of the language held by the Ameer ; 
 but these quotations are very partial, and avoid any 
 reference to the most important passages which best 
 indicate the opinions, the feelings, and the desires of the 
 Ameer. 
 
 When we turn to the account given by our native 
 Agent of the talk of the Ameer, it will be found that 
 he referred, indeed, to the probability that Russia would 
 soon take possession both of Khiva and of Merve, as one 
 of the well-known sources of British anxiety and alarm. 
 Any information he possessed about " the preparations 
 for an advance of a Russian Army" seems to have been 
 derived from "the English papers."t From this source 
 apparently, he said that Merve would be taken by Russia 
 " either in the current year or the next." This was over- 
 shooting the mark indeed. But it shows what his mark 
 was. It was his object and his game to work upon our 
 alarm, and he dwelt upon the dangers of Russian aggres- 
 sion, as these had been long known, and long familiar to 
 the Ameer, ever since the Umballa Conference, — to which 
 strange to say, he expressly referred, as the starting-point 
 of his communications with the Government of India upon 
 the subject. Considering the impression of Lord Mayo 
 
 * Ibid., No. 26, Inclos. 2, pp. no, iii. 
 
 t Afghan Corresp., II., 1878, No. 2, Enclos. 3. p 6. 
 
 H 2
 
 I o o FR OM THE A G REE ME NT WITH R USSIA 
 
 that he did not then attach any importance to it, and con- 
 sidering that the Viceroy's express statement to me that 
 Russia was never mentioned except incidentally during 
 the whole conferences, it becomes clear that in the pre- 
 ceding narrative I have not over-estimated the signifi- 
 cance of the language — apparently incidental — which 
 was held on the ist of April, 1869, at Umballa, by Noor 
 Mohammed, in reference to the real position of the Af- 
 ghan Kingdom in the policy of the British Government. 
 The whole language of Shere Ali in the first week of 
 May, 1873, was simply an amplification of the language 
 of his Minister on that occasion in April, 1869. Shere 
 Ali knew that we should defend him against external 
 aggression, not for his sake, but for our own. He in- 
 dicated unmistakabl}' that he put the same interpretation 
 upon all our efforts on his behalf which Noor Mohammed 
 had put upon our presents at Umballa of money and of 
 guns. He even went the length of implying that the 
 security of the Afghan border was more our affair than 
 his. He declared that at the Umballa Conference he 
 had said so to Lord Mayo, " exonerating himself from 
 making arrangements for that security."* This con- 
 viction that our fear of Russia, and our own interests in 
 resisting her, had got for him all he had received, ani- 
 mates the whole of his conversation. He trades upon 
 our fear of Russia as a means of getting more. In the 
 handling of this subject he shows great inteUigence, and 
 a very considerable extent of information. It may be 
 
 * Afghan Corresp., I., 1878, No. 26, Enclos. 2, p. no.
 
 TO THE FRERE NOTE. ici 
 
 said that the whole literature of Anglo-Indian Russo- 
 phobia seems to have been familiar to him. All the 
 points common to that school of opinion are adroitly- 
 brought to bear. He refers to the Russian denunciation 
 of the Black Sea clauses in the Treaty of 1856, and 
 founds upon it the usual inferences about the slipperiness 
 of Russian diplomacy. He excites our jealousy about 
 Merve as an approach to Herat, and he uses this jealousy 
 to denounce our approval of the Seistan Arbitration. He 
 rather sneers at the long difficulty which had arisen with 
 Russia about the definition of the northern boundaries of 
 his Kingdom, and says, " he was at a loss to surmise" 
 what that difficulty was. He warns us that very soon 
 the Russians would make communications which would 
 exercise some influence in his country. Alternating with 
 these stimulants to our fears and to our jealousy, he holds 
 out certain promises based upon his estimate of our policy, 
 and that estimate he explains to be, " that the border of 
 Afghanistan is in truth the border of India." And again 
 that the " interests of the Afghan and English Govern- 
 ments are identical." Counting on the efficacy of these 
 motives, heated to red heat by his warnings and exhorta- 
 tions, he expected us to give him " great assistance in 
 money and in ammunition of war," and "great aid for 
 the construction of strong forts throughout the Afghan 
 northern border." But more than this. These anxieties 
 for a frontier which was " also ours" were associated with 
 other anxieties about himself personally. Domestic 
 troubles were never out of his mind ; and his old de- 
 mand for a dynastic guarantee betrays itself with little
 
 I02 FROM THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA 
 
 disguise. But feeling also that he wanted some personal 
 security in the event of misfortune, " it was rather ad- 
 visable," he said, " that the British Government, for its 
 own and for his satisfaction, should set apart some 
 property, either in India or in Europe, for his support, 
 that he might retire there with his family and children, 
 and find both accommodation and maintenance there." 
 Finally, he expresses a wish that we should " commence 
 forthwith to organise the Afghan troops, and to send 
 from time to time large amounts of money with great 
 numbers of guns and magazine stores, in order that he 
 might steadily be able in a few years to satisfactorily 
 strengthen the Afghan Kingdom."^ 
 
 Such is the condition of mind and such the conversation 
 on the part of the Ameer, which is represented in the 
 Simla and London Narratives as indicating on the part 
 of Shere AH a sincere alarm on account of the advances 
 of Russia, and an anxiety to be reassured by fresh pro- 
 mises supplementary to those which had been already 
 given. This representation of the conversation of the 
 Ameer seems to me obviou'-ly erroneous. It is a con- 
 versation, on the contrary, which demonstrated that Shere 
 Ali relied absolutely on our own sense of self-interest as 
 our inducement to defend his Kingdom, and that he en- 
 tertained an overweening confidence in his power of work- 
 ing on this motive to get out of us almost anything he 
 wished to ask. 
 
 The inconvenience of this condition of affairs lay in 
 
 * Ibid. p. iii.
 
 TO THE PRE RE NOTE. 103 
 
 the fact that the Ameer's estimate of our position and of 
 our policy was substantially correct. He was right in 
 thinking that our interest in Afghanistan was an interest 
 of our own. It was perfectly natural that he should 
 count upon this, and that he should desire to discount 
 it also to the largest possible extent. 
 
 Although the particular conversation of May was not 
 known to us at the India Office in the spring and sum- 
 mer of 1873, we did know quite enough to make us sure 
 that the Ameer of Cabul had been aware, ever since 
 the Umballa Conference, that we considered it part of 
 our Indian Policy to maintain the "integrity and inde- 
 pendence" of Afghanistan. The whole course of nego- 
 tiations since, and our repeated communications both to 
 him and to the Russian Government, had made this clearly 
 understood between all the parties concerned. General 
 Kaufmann had formally addressed the Ameer as a Prince 
 under British protection, and two successive Viceroys had 
 approved the letters and communications between the 
 Ameer and Russian authorities in which this relation was 
 assumed. We knew that the Ameer was disposed to 
 make this acknowledged policy of the British Govern- 
 ment the ground and the plea for making demands upon 
 us which it would have been very unwise to grant, — the 
 risk of which had been indicated by sad experience,— 
 and the impolicy of which had been denounced at a later 
 period by the detailed arguments of Lord Lawrence and 
 of Lord Mayo. 
 
 It was under these circumstances that Lord North- 
 brook, in anticipation oi the approaching Conference
 
 I04 FROM THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA 
 
 with Noor Mohammed, telegraphed to me that he pro- 
 posed to inform the Cabul Envoy of the sense of a para- 
 graph in a despatch which had not then reached me. It 
 was a despatch summing up the results of the long nego- 
 tiations with Russia which had then been concluded, and 
 its 1 8th ])aragraph was devoted to setting forth the 
 fundamental principle of that negotiation, that the " com- 
 plete independence of Afghanistan was so im.portant to 
 the interests of British India, that the Government of 
 India could not look upon an attack on Afghanistan with 
 indifference." It added that " so long as the Ameer con- 
 tinued, as he had hitherto done, to act in accordance 
 with our advice in his relations with his neighbours, he 
 would naturally receive material assistance from us, and 
 that circumstances might occur under which we should 
 consider it incumbent upon us to recommend the Indian 
 Government to render him such assistance."* This was 
 the paragraph, of which Lord Northbrook proposed, by 
 telegraph on the 27th of June, to communicate the sense 
 to the Envoy of the Ameer.t 
 
 It did not appear to me at the time that this proposed 
 communication to the Ameer would be of much value. 
 In its terms, carefully guarded as they were, it seemed to 
 contain nothing that the Ameer did not know before, and 
 indeed to fall greatly short of the interpretation he had 
 shown signs of putting upon the assurances already given 
 to him. Having, however, the greatest confidence in the 
 discretion of the Viceroy, I contented myself with reply. 
 
 * Ibid., No. 21, p. 102. t Ibid.
 
 TO THE PRE RE NOTE. 105 
 
 ing, by telegraph on the ist of July, that, whilst I did 
 not object to the general sense of the paragraph as a 
 fitting " communication to Russia from the Foreign 
 Office," I considered that "great caution was necessary in 
 assuring the Ameer of material assistance which might 
 raise undue and unfounded expectation." I added, " He 
 already shows symptoms of claiming more than we may 
 wish to give."* 
 
 Accordingly when, eleven days after this telegram had 
 been sent, the Conferences with the Cabul Envoy began 
 at Simla, Lord Northbrook found that his first business 
 was to disabuse the mind of the Afghan Minister of the 
 extravagant and unwarrantable interpretations which he 
 and the Cabul Durbar were disposed to entertain. In- 
 stead of under-estimating, they immensely over-estimated 
 the sweep and bearing of the friendly assurances which 
 had been given to them by Lord Lawrence and by Lord 
 Mayo. They spoke as if the British Government " had 
 bound itself to comply with any request preferred by the 
 Ameer." This is the account given by Lord Northbrook 
 himself in his subsequent account of the Simla Con- 
 ferences. f 
 
 It will be seen that Lord Northbrook found himself 
 very much in the same position as that in which Lord 
 Mayo had found himself at Umballa in 1869. That is 
 to say, he found himself in the presence of extravagant 
 expectations, and of demands which it was impossible for 
 him to concede. The Viceroy pursued the same wise 
 
 Ibid., No. 23, p. loS. t Ibid., No. 26, p. 109.
 
 io6 FROM THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA 
 
 course which, under similar circumstances, had been 
 pursued by his predecessor. He determined to offer the 
 Ameer everything that could be reasonably given, but 
 resolutely to maintain the freedom of the British Go- 
 vernment to judge of every contingency as it might arise. 
 The first formal Conference with the Minister of the 
 Ameer took place on the I2th of July. At this meeting 
 the Viceroy explained fully to the Envoy the terms and 
 the effect of the final Agreement between England and 
 Russia as to the boundaries of Afghanistan, and the 
 effect it had in giving practical force and definite meaning 
 to the long-standing Agreement that the Kingdom of 
 Cabul was to be outside the sphere of Russian influence 
 in Asia. He told the Afghan Minister that " the British 
 Government would be prepared to use their best en- 
 deavours to maintain the frontier intact, so long as the 
 Ameer or the Ruler of Afghanistan followed their advice 
 as regards his external relations, and abstained from 
 encroachments upon his neighbours." Again, somewhat 
 more definitely, the Viceroy told him that " in the event 
 of any aggression from without, if British influence were 
 invoked, and failed by negotiation to effect a satisfactory 
 settlement, it was probable that the British Government 
 would in that case afford the Ruler of Afghanistan material 
 assistance in repelling an invader." The Envoy declared 
 tiiat the " rapid advances made by the Russians in 
 Central Asia had aroused the gravest apprehensions in 
 the minds of the people of Afghanistan," who " could 
 place no confidence in them, and would never rest 
 satisfied unless they were assured of the aid of the
 
 TO THE PRE RE NOTE. 107 
 
 British Government." The further discussion of the sub- 
 ject was reserved for another day.* 
 
 It now appeared to Lord Northbrook that whatever 
 might be the real aims or motives of the Cabul Envoy in 
 giving expression to these fears of Russia, and in asking 
 for further engagements on the part of the British 
 Government, it would be possible with safety to give a 
 somewhat fuller, and more definite, expression to the 
 settled policy of the Government than had been given in 
 Lord Mayo's letter of 1869, or in any subsequent formal 
 communications. Under this impression, twelve days after 
 the first Conference with the Envoy, and six days before 
 the next, he telegraphed to me on the 24th of July that 
 the Ameer of Cabul was alarmed at Russian progress, 
 was dissatisfied with general assurances, and was anxious 
 to know definitely how far he could rely on our help if 
 invaded. The Viceroy proposed to " assure him that if 
 he unreservedly accepted and acted on our advice in all 
 external relations, we would help him with money, arms, 
 and troops, if necessary, to expel unprovoked invasion. 
 We to be the judge of the necessity."t To this I replied 
 on the 26th, after consulting the Cabinet, that we thought 
 the Viceroy should " inform the Ameer that we did not at 
 all share his alarm, and considered there was no cause for 
 it ; but that he might assure him we should maintain our 
 settled policy in favour of Afghanistan, if he abided by 
 our advice in external affairs.":!: The Viceroy interpreted 
 this reply as we intended him to interpret it— namely, as 
 
 * Ibid., No. 26, Inclos. 4, p. 112. 
 t Ibid., No. 24, p. 108. J Ibid., No. 25, p. loS.
 
 io8 FROM THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA 
 
 sanctioning his proposed communication to the Envoy, 
 but with the important prehminary declaration that we 
 did not share in those fears, or alleged fears, of Russian 
 aggression, on which he and his master seemed dis- 
 posed to found the most unreasonable and extravagant 
 expectations. 
 
 At the next Conference, on the 30th of July, Lord 
 Northbrook soon found that all our caution and his own 
 were fully needed. He found the Afghan Minister under 
 the impression that the British Government were already 
 " pledged to comply with any request for assistance 
 preferred by the Ameer." The language of Noor 
 Mohammed seems to have been almost a repetition of 
 the Ameer's absurd talk to our native Agent at Cabul 
 early in May. He wanted supplies of money and of 
 arms. He pretended that the army he had already 
 raised had been so raised on the faith of the promises of 
 Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo. He demanded that 
 the British Government, besides promising to assist the 
 Ameer with money and with arms, according to the 
 circumstances of the case, should also engage to have 
 an army at his disposal, to be sent in at his request, to 
 take whatever route he might require,* and to be im- 
 mediately sent out again when it had done his work for 
 him. No concessions towards the British Government 
 were offered on behalf of the Ameer in return for these 
 demands — no proposal that it should enjoy greater powers 
 of control, or even larger opportunities of observation. 
 
 Lord Northbrook's Memorandum, para. 18.
 
 TO THE PRE RE NOTE. 109 
 
 No offer was made to receive Envoys, or to let go the 
 hold of the Ameer on Lord Mayo's pledge on the subject 
 of British officers* 
 
 Such were the m.odest and reasonable demands, made 
 by Noor Mohammed, and urged upon the Viceroy by 
 all those appeals to our fear and to our jealousy of 
 Russia in which, doubtless, he had been well instructed 
 by the Anglo-Indian press. 
 
 It was indeed high time to give some intimation to the 
 Ameer in the sense of the message from the Cabinet. 
 It was important to let him understand that we were not 
 quite so timorous as he supposed, and to remind him 
 that at the close of a long and difficult negotiation, during 
 which Russia had behaved with entire good faith towards 
 him and towards ourselves, we did not consider him 
 justified in the pleas he put forward for unlimited de- 
 mands \ipon us. 
 
 On the other hand, not to deal too seriously with the 
 natural and transparent devices of the Ameer, the 
 Viceroy determined to give to Noor Mohammed the 
 fuller and more definite assurance which he had sought 
 and had obtained our permission to give. Accordingly, 
 on the 30th of July, Lord Northbrook, after having 
 explained to the Envoy that the British Government did 
 not share the Ameer's apprehensions in respect to Russia, 
 informed him that in the event of any actual or 
 threatened aggression, it would be his duty to refer the 
 question to the British Government, who would endeavour 
 
 Afghan Corresp., I., 187S, No. 26, Inclos. 5, pp. 112, 113.
 
 no FROM THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA 
 
 by negotiation and by every means in their power to 
 settle the matter and avert hostilities. Should these 
 endeavours to bring about an amicable settlement prove 
 fruitless, Lord Northbrook gave the formal pledge that 
 the British Government " were prepared to assure the 
 Ameer that they would afford him assistance in the shape 
 of arms and money, and would also, in case of necessity, 
 aid him with troops."* 
 
 It will be observed that in this assurance the qualifying 
 word " probably," which had been used before, was in- 
 tentionally omitted. Besides this very definite assurance 
 for the future, a present supply of ten lacs of rupees, 
 besides five lacs more to be spent in arms, were placed 
 at the disposal of the Ameer. Moreover, further dis- 
 cussion was by no means refused on the large and vague 
 demands made by the Ameer in reference to the frontier 
 defences of Afghanistan. The subject was one of great 
 importance, and must necessarily involve many conditions 
 on our part. But the Envoy manifested doubt how far 
 his instructions justified him in committing himself to 
 any definite arrangement. It is, indeed, evident from 
 the debate in the Cabul Durbar, which had been reported 
 by our native Agent in April, that the Ameer had sent 
 his Minister mainly to find out what we had to tell him, 
 and how much he could get out of us, but with no 
 instructions or authority to offer anything on his own part. 
 Mr. Aitchison, who was Foreign Secretary to the Go- 
 vernment of India at that time, and who conducted the 
 
 * Ibid., p 114.
 
 TO THE FRERE NOTE. in 
 
 Conferences with Noor Mohammed, has informed Lord 
 Northbrook in a recent letter (dated Dec. i r, 1878) that 
 the Afghan Envoy led him to believe that his master 
 would not receive British officers as residents in his 
 Kingdom, even in consideration of a guarantee that we 
 should defend Afghanistan as we should defend British 
 territory. Mr. Aitchison adds that Noor Mohammed 
 had no instructions even to discuss such a subject with 
 the Viceroy. Lord Northbrook, under these circum- 
 stances, had no other course open to him than to post- 
 pone the settlement of any further questions to a more 
 favourable opportunity.* 
 
 Such are the transactions of which, in the London 
 Narrative, the Government have presented the following 
 as a truthful account : — 
 
 Paragraph 8. — "The capture of Khiva by the forces of 
 the Czar in the spring of 1873, and the total sub- 
 ordination of that Khanate to Russia, caused Shere Ali 
 considerable alarm, and led him to question the value of 
 the pledges with reference to Afghanistan which had 
 been given by his Imperial Majesty, and which had been 
 communicated to his Highness by the British Govern- 
 ment, actuated by his fears on this score. His Highness 
 sent a special Envoy to Simla in the summer of that 
 year, charged with the duty of expressing them to the 
 Government of India." 
 
 Paragraph 9. — " Finding that the object of the Ameer 
 was to ascertain definitely how far he might rely on the 
 help of the British Government if his territories were 
 threatened by Russia, Lord Northbrook's Government 
 
 * Ibid., No. 26, p. 109.
 
 1 1 2 FROM THE A G REE ME NT WITH R USSIA 
 
 was prepared to assure him that, under certain conditions, 
 the Government of India would assist him to repel 
 unprovoked aggression. But her Majesty's Government 
 did not share his Highness's apprehension, and the 
 Viceroy ultimately informed the Ameer that the dis- 
 cussion of the question would be best postponed to a 
 more convenient season." 
 
 It will be seen that this statement of the facts is 
 erroneous in everything except in a few particulars. Like 
 one of those specimens of quartz in which no gold is 
 visible, but which is rich in the uniform diffusion of the 
 precious metal, this narrative presents no actual misstate- 
 ment to the eye, but is permeated with misrepresentation 
 throughout its substance. It purports to set forth the 
 circumstances which led Shere Ali to send his Minister 
 to meet Lord Northbrook. It purports to give us the 
 reply of the Government at home to a micssage from the 
 Viceroy. It purports to tell us what the action of the 
 Viceroy was when he received that message. It purports 
 to explain why certain parts of the discussion were 
 postponed to another time. Of every one of these things 
 it gives a wrong account. It is not true, as is implied, 
 that the Ameer sent his Envoy because he was alarmed 
 by the Russian conquest of Khiva. It is not true that 
 the Government reply to Lord Northbrook's message 
 consisted of a disclaimer of the alleged apprehensions of 
 the Ameer. It is not true that the Viceroy was prevented 
 by that message from giving to Shere Ali the assurance 
 which he had asked leave to give. It is not true that 
 the final postponement of certain questions stood in the 
 connexion in which it is presented.
 
 TO THE PRE RE NOTE. 113 
 
 But such mere negations do not at all exhaust the 
 wealth of these famous paragraphs in the peculiar charac- 
 teristics for which they have acquired a just celebrity. 
 There is in them a perfect union between the two great 
 elements of all erroneous representation — namely, the 
 suppression of things which are important facts, and the 
 suggestion of things which are not facts at all. The 
 ingenuity of the composition is a study. In the minute- 
 ness of the touches by which an immense breadth of 
 effect is produced, we recognise the hand of a master. 
 The introduction of the single word " but" just at the 
 proper place, does great service. It suggests opposition 
 and antagonism where there was none ; and like the 
 action of a pointsman upon a railway, it turns off all the 
 following train of facts into the track which is desired. 
 Some of the devices, however, are rather gross. For 
 example, the quotation of one half of a telegraphic 
 message, and the suppression of the other half, exhibits 
 more recklessness than skill. In like manner the total 
 suppression of the fact that the Viceroy gave any assur- 
 ances at all to the Ameer, is an expedient similar in kind. 
 Perhaps it was too much to expect that the authors of 
 the London Narrative should have pointed out the differ- 
 ence between the assurance which Lord Northbrook gave 
 on the 1 2th of July, before he had asked and received 
 fresh authority from the Government, and the much more 
 unqualified assurance which he gave on the 24th after he 
 had received that authority. This is one of the facts 
 which is of the highest importance in itself and in its 
 bearings. It is one which could not have been omitted by 
 
 I
 
 114 FROM THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA 
 
 an historian of those facts who was careful and conscien- 
 tious in his account of them. It might, however, be 
 easily overlooked by a careless reader, or by a heated 
 partisan. But to omit in a narrative which professes to 
 give an account of these transactions any notice whatever 
 of the fact that the Viceroy did give some assurances to 
 the Ameer in the sense in which he had desired to give 
 them, is to be guilty of an unpardonable suppression of 
 the truth. In like manner, the statement that Lord 
 Northbrook postponed certain discussions on the condi- 
 tions to be attached to our support of the Ameer, and 
 to conceal the fact that this postponement arose out of 
 the circumstance that the Envoy doubted his own autho- 
 rity to agree to any conditions at all, is another very 
 wide departure from historical fidelity. Finally, the 
 phrase selected to express the mind in which the Viceroy 
 resorted to this postponement — the " convenient season " 
 which carries us back to the words of Felix — is an un- 
 mistakable indication of the animus of the whole. 
 
 So far from Lord Northbrook having gratuitously 
 postponed further discussion with the Ameer on the de- 
 fences of his frontier to a " more convenient season," he 
 expressed in his official despatch his " trust that the 
 matter might be discussed with the Ameer in person.'"* 
 With reference to some important frontier questions, the 
 Envoy was charged on his return to his master with a 
 Memorandum, in which it was suggested that a British 
 officer of rank, with a competent staff, should be sent to 
 
 * Ibid., No. 26, p. 109.
 
 TO THE FRERE NOTE. 115 
 
 examine thoroughly the Northern and North-Western 
 frontiers of Afghanistan, and then should confer person- 
 ally with the Ameer regarding the condition of the 
 border, and might submit the opinions he had formed on 
 the whole question of the defences of his frontier.* In 
 forwarding this proposal to me. Lord Northbrook ex- 
 plained that although the Government of India thought 
 that the presence of accredited British officers at Cabul, 
 Herat, and possibly also at Candahar, would for many 
 reasons be desirable, they were fully alive to the diffi- 
 culties in the way of such a measure, until the objects 
 and policy of the British Government were more clearly 
 understood and appreciated in Afghanistan. It was pos- 
 sible that some of those difficulties might be removed by 
 personal communication. 
 
 We have seen that in the private and confidential 
 conversations which had taken place at Simla with Noor 
 Mohammed, this subject had been broached. A very 
 large amount of respect seems to me to be due to that 
 Minister from the accounts we have of his conduct on 
 these occasions. He seems to me to have put the very 
 unreasonable demands of the Ameer in the least un- 
 reasonable aspect which could be given to them, and to 
 have uniformly explained his own views with truth and 
 candour. In this matter of the mission of British ^officers 
 his language was that, " speaking as a friend, and in the 
 interests both of his own and of the British Government, 
 he could not recommend that a specific request should 
 
 • Ibid, No. 26, Inclos. 6, p. 115. 
 I 2
 
 1 16 FROM THE A G REE ME NT WITH R US SI A 
 
 be preferred to the Ameer for British officers to be 
 stationed at certain given places." To this measure it is 
 evident that the Ameer's objections still continued to be 
 insuperable, and as he knew or suspected that special 
 Envoys would probably enter upon the subject, and urge 
 upon him a change of policy, his objection very rationally 
 extended even to such temporary missions. On the other 
 hand, the Government of India knew its own pledges, 
 and was determined to fulfil its promises. To put upon 
 the Ameer any pressure upon this subject would have 
 been an unquestionable breach of these. Shere Ali did 
 not respond to the proposal of Lord Northbrook, and it 
 necessarily fell through in consequence. There was 
 nothing new in this — nothing in the least suspicious. 
 Shere Ali simply continued in the same mind upon this 
 question in which Lord Mayo found him at Umballa, 
 and Lord Northbrook respected the pledges which had 
 been given there. 
 
 On the 13th of November the Ameer replied to the 
 Viceroy's letter of the 15th of September. It is un- 
 doubtedly rather a sulky letter. But much allowance 
 ought to be made for the position of the Ameer. 
 Considering the expectations which we have seen that he 
 entertained, — considering the immense and uncon- 
 ditional advantages which he had expected to extract 
 from us by playing on our fear of Russia, — considering, 
 too, the deep mortification with which he evidently 
 regarded the Seistan arbitration, it is not surprising that 
 he should have expressed dissatisfaction. After all, he 
 only intimated that if he was to get no more than Lord
 
 TO THE FRERE NOTE. 117 
 
 Lawrence and Lord Mayo had given him, it was useless 
 to send Noor Mohammed to Simla. He had got some- 
 thing more in an assurance which was more distinct. 
 But as compared with what he wanted, the difiference 
 may have been inappreciable to him. He showed his 
 irritation also by the terms in which he declined to allow 
 a British officer to pass through his dominions. He 
 showed, likewise, another feeling, — that of suspicion, by 
 not taking possession of the sum of money which the 
 Viceroy placed at his disposal. There is the best reason 
 to believe that the cause of this was that he suspected 
 the money to be the price of some renewed proposal to 
 send British officers into his country. He accepted the 
 arms at once, because he had no such fear in respect to 
 them. Under all these circumstances his dissatisfaction 
 was not unnatural. But in spite of it all, in his letter 
 of the 13th November the Ameer fell back with confi- 
 dence on the written pledges which he held from Lord 
 Lawrence and Lord Mayo. " The understanding arrived 
 at in Umballa was quite sufficient" — a significant obser- 
 vation, which probably referred to the revival of the 
 question about British officers. " As long as the bene- 
 ficent British Government continued its friendship, we 
 might be assured of his."* 
 
 The Viceroy's answer to this eft'usion, which was dated 
 January 23rd, 1874, was the model of what such an 
 answer ought to be, from a powerful Government to a 
 semi-barbarous Sovereign, whose irritation was under the- 
 
 * Ibid., No. 28, Inclos. i, p. 119.
 
 1x8 FROM THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA 
 
 circumstances not unnatural, — whom it was inexpedient 
 to offend, and undignified to bully. Lord Northbrook 
 expressed regret that the Ameer had not favoured him 
 with an expression of his views on the proposals made 
 in the Viceroy's former letter. Passing from this, he 
 reminded Shere Ali that the assurances of support 
 he had just given at Simla were " even more explicit 
 than those contained in the auspicious writings of Lord 
 Lawrence and Lord Mayo." He reproached the Ameer 
 gently — not for refusing a passage through his dominions 
 to the British officer for whom the leave had been asked, 
 but — for the want of courtesy with which this refusal had 
 been marked in the absence of any expression of regret. 
 The letter concluded by a cordial sympathising assur- 
 ance that the difficulties of his position in receiving 
 guests in Afghanistan were fully understood, as well as 
 the more important political anxieties by which he was 
 beset.* 
 
 This letter drew from the Ameer a remarkable reply. 
 It was dated the loth of April, 1874, It was much more 
 courteous in tone. It gave a reasonable excuse for ob- 
 jecting to the return of Mr. Forsyth from Yarkand 
 through Afghanistan, on the ground that he was about to 
 commence hostilities against his son Yakoob Khan. But 
 the most important paragraph seems to be one in 
 which he agam refers to the cherished memories of Lord 
 Lawrence and Lord Mayo. It is evident that his fears 
 and suspicions had been deeply stirred by the renewed 
 
 Ibid., No. 28, Inclos. 2, p. 120.
 
 TO THE FRERE NOTE. 119 
 
 discussion about the reception of British officers, even 
 although the Government of India had carefully abstained 
 from doing more than suggesting a mission in response 
 to what seemed to be one of his own requirements. 
 His language of appeal to the authority and to the pro- 
 mises of his old friends is almost passionate. " Your 
 Excellency ! Since Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo, 
 especially the former, possessed an intimate knowledge 
 of Afghanistan and its frontiers, and your Excellency 
 must certainly have also acquired the same knowledge, 
 I, therefore, am desirous that your Excellency, after full 
 and careful consideration of the approval expressed by 
 her Majesty the Queen, the 'Sunnud' of Lord Lawrence, 
 and the decision of Lord Mayo, will remain firm and 
 constant, in order that Afghanistan and its territories 
 may be maintained inviolate and secure."^ 
 
 About three months after the Simla Conferences Shere 
 Ali at last announced to the Government of India that 
 he had appointed Abdoolah Jan his Heir-apparent. He 
 had come to this resolution, as of course he had a perfect 
 right to do, without taking any counsel or advice from 
 the British Government. Yet that Government knew 
 that a decision which set aside Yakoob Khan, to whom 
 the Ameer was mainly indebted for the recovery of his 
 throne, was a decision which in all human probability 
 doomed the country to another disputed succession, and 
 to another bloody civil war. Lord Northbrook therefore 
 sent a letter of acknowledgment, strictly confined to the 
 
 * Ibid,, No. 29, Inclos. i, p. 123.
 
 i2o FROM THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA 
 
 language which had been used in 1858 in reply to Dost 
 Mohammed, when he intimated the selection of Shere AH 
 in supercession of his elder brother.* 
 
 In November, 1874, the Viceroy had to make a com- 
 munication to the Ameer which, though a real proof of 
 friendship, could not fail to disturb him much, Shere AH 
 had invited his son Yakoob Khan to come under a " safe 
 conduct" to Cabul : and when the Sirdar came, on the 
 faith of the safe conduct, it had been violated, and he 
 had been placed under arrest. It appeared to Lord 
 Northbrook, as it had before appeared under less serious 
 pircumstances to Lord Mayo, that this was a matter on 
 which it was right and necessary to express the friendly 
 opinion of the head of the Indian Government. This 
 opinion was communicated to the Ameer by our native 
 Agent at Cabul. It urged upon him strongly to keep 
 faith with his son, and added that by so doing he would 
 maintain his own good name, and the friendship of the 
 British Government.f Although this message from the 
 Viceroy was afterwards referred to as having offended 
 the Ameer, he sent on the 14th December, 1874, through 
 our Agent at Cabul, a civil answer, and acknowledged the 
 advice given to him as dictated by " friendship and well- 
 wishing."J 
 
 In February, 1874, there was a change of Government 
 at home. Subsequent to this date I have, of course, no 
 personal knowledge of the course of Indian affairs. But 
 
 * Ibid., No. 27, p. 117. t Ibid., No. 30, Inclos. 5, p. 126. 
 :!: Ibid., No. 30A, Inclos. 2, p. 128.
 
 TO THE FRERE NOTE. 121 
 
 as in the preceding narrative, subsequent to the Umballa 
 Conference in 1869, I have rehed exclusively on the 
 papers presented to Parliament, or on papers equally- 
 authentic, so now for the period subsequent to February, 
 1874, 1 shall follow the indications of a change of policy 
 as they are to be found there. 
 
 In the first place, then, it is to be observed that the 
 present Government had been very nearly a year in office 
 before any such indications were given. The Government 
 came into office in February, 1874, and the first de- 
 spatch of Lord Salisbury, desiring the Government of 
 India to reopen the question of British officers as Poli- 
 tical Agents in Afghanistan, was dated January 22nd, 
 1875.* 
 
 Before examining the terms of that despatch it is 
 natural to look round us and see whether any, and if any, 
 what events had happened during the year from Feb- 
 ruary, 1874, to January 22, 1875. 
 
 Just before the late Government left office, Lord Gran- 
 ville was called upon to reply to the Russian announce- 
 ment of the Khivan Treaty. He did so in a despatch 
 dated January 4, 1874. It recapitulated, in significant 
 but friendly terms, the oft-repeated story of the Russian 
 advances in Central Asia, acknowledged the good faith 
 with which Russia had acted on the Agreement about 
 Afghanistan since it had been concluded, set forth that 
 the Ameer had equally acted on our advice in restraining 
 Turkomans, and intimated that Shere Ali was then again 
 disturbed by rumours of a Russian expedition against 
 
 * Ibid., No. 31, p. 128.
 
 12 2 FR OM THE A GREEMENT WITH R US SI A 
 
 Merve. Lord Granville then repeated the declaration 
 that we looked upon the independence of Afghanistan 
 as a matter of great importance to the security of Bri- 
 tish India, and to the tranquillity of Asia. If Russia, by 
 any new expedition, were to drive the Turkomans into 
 the Ameer's dominions, he might labour under a double 
 hardship, first in the disturbance of his dominions, and 
 secondly in being held responsible for the control of those 
 wild tribes."^ 
 
 To this the Russian Government replied on the 21st of 
 January, 1874, that they remained as faithful as ever to 
 the old Agreement. It repeated the assurance that the 
 Imperial Cabinet "continued to consider Afghanistan 
 as entirely beyond its sphere of action." But here the 
 Russian Cabinet stopped. They would not import into 
 that Agreement a new and a different line of limitation 
 than that of the Afghan frontier. This was what they 
 had agreed to, and by this they would abide. They 
 declared, indeed, that Shere All's fear of an expedition 
 against Merve was groundless, inasmuch as they " had 
 no intention of undertaking an expedition against the 
 Turkomans." But, warned apparently by accusations of 
 bad faith, founded on the assumption that intimations 
 of intention or denials of intention, are equivalent to 
 pledges. Prince Gortchakow, in this despatch, took care 
 to add that he spoke of nothing but a simple intention. 
 " It depended entirely on them (the Turkomans) to live 
 on eood terms with us ... . but if these turbulent 
 
 Russia, II., 1874, No. 2, pp. 6, 9.
 
 TO THE FRERE NOTE. 123 
 
 tribes were to take to attacking or plundering us, we 
 should be compelled to punish them. Russia would 
 rely on the Ameer to warn the Turkomans not to expect 
 protection from him, and she would rely also on the influ- 
 ence of the EngUsh Government to give him effective 
 advice upon the subject."* There was at least no decep- 
 tion in this despatch. Russia kept her freedom. Her 
 Agreement had regard to Afghanistan, and not to any- 
 thing beyond it. It concluded by saying that the " two 
 Governments had an equal interest in not allowing their 
 good relations to be disturbed by the intrigues of Asiatic 
 Khans, and that so long as they both acted together 
 with a feeling of mutual confidence and good will, the 
 tranquillity of Central Asia would be sufficiently guaran- 
 teed." 
 
 Such was the condition of things when the present 
 Government came into office. It was a condition of things 
 in which Russia had given ample notice, that while she 
 held by the engagement with us on the subject of Afghan- 
 istan, she would not extend it to any part of Central 
 Asia outside that Kingdom, and, in particular, that she 
 held herself free to deal, as occasion might require, with 
 the predatory Turkomans, whether in Merve or else- 
 where. In March, 1874, however. Prince Gortchakow 
 directed Baron Briinow to assure Lord Derby that the 
 Emperor had given positive orders to stop any expedi- 
 tion ac^ainst the Turkomans in the direction of Merve. 
 This was expressly said in connexion with the approach- 
 
 * Ibid., No. 3, pp. 10, II.
 
 124 FR OM THE A G REE ME NT WITH R USSIA 
 
 ing visit of the Emperor to England, and appears to 
 have been a sort of condescension to a national weak- 
 ness, " so that no cloud might be on the political horizon 
 during his august master's visit to London."^ In June, 
 1874, the Russian Government had its turn of asking us 
 whether certain reports were true of our giving aid to 
 the ruler of Yarkand, and this was categorically denied 
 by the Viceroy. 
 
 Nevertheless, at this very time, the vigilance of our 
 diplomatists had discovered a fresh cause of anxiety in 
 the reported proceedings of a General Llamakin, who was 
 the newly-appointed Governor of the Russian Provinces 
 on the Caspian (Krasnovodsk). On the 23rd of June, 
 1874, our Ambassador at St. Petersburg had heard that 
 this functionary had addressed a Circular Letter to the 
 Turkoman tribes of the Attrek and Goorgan Rivers, 
 giving them warnings and advice. An account of this 
 letter had appeared in the Times oi the 17th of June, 
 which pointed out that the Turkomans thus addressed 
 were tribes which " nomadised" between the Caspian and 
 the fort ofKaris, "the latter being half-way to Merve." 
 The same account mentioned as a fact that several Rus- 
 sian caravans had been recently plundered by the Turko- 
 mans of Merve, and that a Russian soldier was kept in 
 captivity there. The despatch from Lord Augustus 
 Loftus reporting the explanations given to him on these 
 matters, was dated the 23rd, and was received in London 
 on the 29th of June.f No anxiety, however, seems to 
 
 * Central Asia, I., 1878, No. 9, p. 12. 
 t Ibid., No. 18, p. 18.
 
 TO THE PRE RE NOTE. 125 
 
 have been expressed upon the subject, either by the 
 Foreign Office or by the India Office. A month later, 
 on the 2nd of August, a copy of the Circular Letter of 
 General Llarnakin was received at the Foreign Office 
 from our Envoy at the Court of Persia."^ He explained 
 that he was informed on good authority that this Circular 
 had been addressed to the whole of the Turkoman tribes 
 occupying the line of country between the Caspian, 
 Merve, and Charjui on the Oxus. The Circular itself does 
 not say so, but as the roving tribes of those regions have 
 no fixed limits to their wanderings, it was probable that 
 it was addressed to " all whom it might concern." Ex- 
 pressly, however, it seems to be addressed to the Turko- 
 mans on " the Attrek and Goorgan," this being the area 
 over which the General intimated that he had " supreme 
 authority." It was simply an elaborate warning against 
 the plundering of caravans, an exhortation to peace, and 
 a recommendation of the benefits of commerce. It im- 
 plies, indeed, throughout, the assertion of supremacy, and 
 of the power and will to enforce obedience. 
 
 Again, no notice was taken of this more definite infor- 
 mation either by the Foreign Secretary or the Indian 
 Secretary of State. It does not seem to have occurred 
 to either of them that the Circular of General Llamakin 
 could form the subject of remonstrance or even of in- 
 quiry. It was not until it had gone round by way of 
 Calcutta that anything appears to have occurred to any- 
 body on the subject. But the Indian Government, 
 
 * Ibid., No. 20, p. 19.
 
 T26 FROM THE AGREEMEN7 WITH RUSSIA 
 
 habitually wakeful and susceptible on Central Asian 
 politics, took alarm. On the 8th of September, Lord 
 Northbrook wrote a despatch to Lord Salisbury, point- 
 ing out that if the Circular sent by Mr. Thomson, from 
 Teheran, were genuine, " the Persian territory between 
 the Attrek and the Goorgan is now practically annexed 
 to the Russian dominions, and authority is assumed in 
 respect to the whole Turkoman country to the borders 
 of Afghanistan." The Government of India added — " We 
 are of opinion that these proceedings cannot fail to excite 
 uneasiness and alarm in the minds of our Persian and 
 Afghan allies, and that they demand the serious atten- 
 tion of her Majesty's Government."* 
 
 This despatch from Lord Northbrook did not reach 
 London till the 30th of October, and was at once for- 
 mally referred to the Foreign Office " for the information 
 and consideration of Lord Derby." 
 
 The Foreign Secretary was then awakened to the fact, 
 of which no previous notice had been taken, that the 
 Circular of General Llamakin, in styling himself " Com- 
 mander of the Turkoman tribes of the Attrek and the 
 Goorgan," involved an assumption of Russian Sove- 
 reignty over a country which had always been considered 
 to belong to Persia. If this was so, it ought not to 
 have been left to Lord Northbrook to point it out. It 
 was no matter of rumour, or of constructive inference. 
 It was on the face of the document. Yet it was not 
 until it had been three months in possession of the Foreign 
 
 * Ibid., No. 21, p. 20.
 
 TO THE PRE RE NOTE. 127 
 
 Office, and not until the Government of India had fas- 
 tened on the point, that the Government awoke to it as 
 a fact of any significance whatever. It was only on the 
 6th of N*ovember, that Lord Derby directed Lord Augus- 
 tus Loftus to point out to the Russian Chancellor that 
 the " territory between the Attrek and the Goorgan was 
 unquestionably Persian territory, in which General Llama- 
 kin would not be justified in interfering." Finally, he was 
 instructed to " express a hope that the Government of 
 the Emperor would impress upon General Llamakin the 
 expediency of abstaining from molesting the tribes who 
 frequent the country to the south of the Attrek."* 
 
 When this despatch reached St. Petersburg, on the 14th 
 December, 1874, it led to a little sparring between the 
 British Ambassador and M. de Westmann, who was the 
 Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in the absence of 
 Prince Gortchakow. M. de Westmann very naturally ob- 
 served, that if Russia had done any wrong to Persia it was 
 the business of Persia, and not of England, to complain. 
 He did not refuse to explain that there had been a cor- 
 respondence between the Imperial and Persian Govern- 
 ments on the subject, and that the explanations offered 
 by Russia had been perfectly satisfactory to the Shah. 
 Nordid M.de Westmann deny that the Circular of General 
 Llamakin had given to the tribes he addressed a name or 
 description which was liable to misapprehension. But 
 he gave the not unreasonable explanation that the Turko- 
 man tribes referred to,though theymight generallyinhabit 
 
 * Ibid., No. 22, p. 20.
 
 128 FROM THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA 
 
 territories which were Persian, were also in the habit of 
 dweUing for a part of the year in territories which were 
 Russian. He repeated, however, that although he gave 
 these explanations, " it was not customary to interfere in 
 the international relations of two independent States." 
 To this Lord Augustus Loftus replied that the interests 
 of the neighbouring States were more or less mixed up 
 with those of our Indian Empire, and both Persia and 
 Afghanistan might be considered as " limitrophe States to 
 India." He added," that the integrity of Persian territory 
 had been the subject of a formal understanding and 
 agreement between England and Russia in 1835 and 
 1838." M. de Westmann rejoined that this understanding 
 had reference to the succession to the Persian throne, a 
 subject on which he hoped the two Governments would 
 always be able to come to a common understanding. But 
 the incident now referred to by the British Ambassador 
 was one affecting Persia alone, in which he could not admit 
 the right of a third party to interfere. All this, however, 
 was reported by our Ambassador as having been said in 
 the most courteous and conciliatory manner.* Lord 
 Derby replied to it by desiring Lord Augustus to point 
 out to M. de Westmann that he was mistaken in saying 
 that the agreement in 1835 and 1838 referred only to the 
 succession to the Persian throne ;| and on this representa- 
 tion being made, M. de Westmann at once said that he had 
 not meant to deny the validity of that understanding at 
 the present moment. He denied, however, that the in- 
 
 * Ibid., No. 23, pp. 21, 22. t Ibid., No. 24, p. 22.
 
 TO THE FRERE NOTE. 129 
 
 tegrityof Persia had been menaced by General Llamakin's 
 Circular any more than it had been menaced by the 
 Seistan Arbitration — a matter which concerned Persian 
 territory, but on which England had made no communica- 
 tion whatever to the Government of Russia.* 
 
 I have given this episode somewhat at length, because 
 we shall see some reason to believe that the Proclama- 
 tion of General Llamakin to the Turcoman Tribes 
 ''between the Attrek and the Goorgan" was one of the 
 circumstances which started the Government on its new 
 line of policy in India, and because it explains the condi- 
 tion of things down to the end of the year 1874 — the last 
 despatch of our Ambassador concerning it having been 
 dated December 23rd in that year. It contains a record of 
 transactions which prove that the Government at home 
 had no need to call the attention of the Indian Viceroy 
 to any part of the Central Asian question. Lord North- 
 brook and his Council had shown himself far more wakeful 
 than either the Foreign or the Indian Secretary of State, 
 and had exercised a vigilance in respect to the most distant 
 frontiers of Persia, which did not appear in the despatches 
 even of our Envoy at Teheran. 
 
 It was towards the end of these occurrences that an 
 important event happened. Sir Bartle Frere wrote a 
 Note. It was dated the nth of January, 1875, ^"ci 
 as it has since been published by the Government in 
 the Times o^ November 14, 1878, in anticipation of the 
 late session of Parliament, it cannot be doubted that it 
 
 * Ibid., No. 25, p. 2^. 
 K
 
 1 3 o FROM THE A GREEMENT WITH R USSIA 
 
 represents, to a considerable extent at least, the argu- 
 ments which had weight with the Cabinet in the action 
 which we are now about to trace. The Rawlinson 
 Memorandum, written in a similar sense, which had been 
 drawn up in 1868, had not, as we have seen, induced my 
 predecessor, Sir Stafford Northcote, to change his course, 
 — notwithstanding the then recent conquest of Bokhara, 
 and the occupation of Samarkand. But the new Note 
 by Sir Bartle Frere fell upon a mind at once more re- 
 ceptive and more impetuous, and it must be regarded as 
 the beginning of all that followed. It had been preceded 
 by a letter from the same distinguished member of the 
 Indian Council, which was written in May, 1874, and was 
 addressed to Sir J. Kaye, the Secretary of the Foreign 
 Department in the India Office. This letter had 
 reconimended the occupation of Ouetta, and the estab- 
 lishment of British officers at Herat, Balkh, and Candahar. 
 In reply to this letter a Memorandum had been written by 
 Lord Lawrence, dated November 4, 1874. The Note, 
 therefore, by Sir Bartle Frere, dated January 11, 1875, 
 is to be regarded in the light of, and has all the marks of 
 being, a controversial reply to Lord Lawrence, and an 
 elaborate defence of his own opinion. It is remarkable 
 that none of these papers — to one of which the Govern- 
 ment evidently attaches so much importance — were ever 
 communicated to the Government of India. It is evident 
 from the dates that the Note of Sir Bartle Frere cannot 
 have been communicated even privately to the Viceroy 
 before action was taken in the sense it recommended. 
 This is not surprising. When Secretaries of State take
 
 TO THE PRE RE NOTE. 131 
 
 to acting under the inspiration of others, who are not in a 
 responsible position, they do not always like the sources 
 >of that inspiration to be known."^ 
 
 It is one of the advantages of the Indian Council that 
 the members of it are generally men of very different 
 views, who are accustomed to contest each other's opinions, 
 sometimes with the utmost keenness, and very often witn 
 the most varied knowledge. Thus the Secretary of State 
 may always hear every question of importance thoroughly 
 sifted ; whilst, on the other hand, it is never or very 
 rarely safe to accept without careful examination either 
 the facts or arguments which are put forward in such 
 controversies by individual men. It has always been 
 the favourite device of Parliamentary tacticians, when 
 Indian questions happen to become the subject of party 
 contention, to quote as conclusive on their side the 
 opinions and arguments of some very able and dis- 
 tinguished man, — concealing altogether the fact that these 
 opinions and arguments had been successfully traversed 
 by others quite equal, or perhaps superior, in weight of 
 metal. This was the method pursued, I recollect, a good 
 many years ago, by the present Prime Minister, in a 
 famous attack he made on the administration of the 
 Marquis of Dalhousie. 
 
 Considering, then, the importance which evidently 
 attaches to Sir Bartle Frere's Note of the nth January, 
 
 * I have taken these facts concerning thd Papers referred to 
 principally from the explanatory paragraph in the Times of 
 November 14th, 1878. 
 
 K 2
 
 132 FR OM THE A GREEMENT WITH R US SI A 
 
 1875, not only on account of the eminent abilities and 
 many accomplishments of its distinguished author, but 
 also on account of the effect it seems to have produced, 
 it may be well to indicate here some of the statements and 
 arguments it contains. 
 
 The first characteristic which strikes me is the elaborate 
 endeavour which this Note makes to establish a great 
 distinction between the policy of Lord Lawrence and 
 the policy of Lord Mayo in respect to Afghanistan. I 
 have shown in the previous narrative that there was no 
 such distinction. Lord Mayo always represented himself 
 as having acted strictly on the lines of policy laid down 
 by his predecessor. The Umballa Conference itself was 
 in pursuance of that policy. All that was said and done 
 there, and, moreover, all that Lord Mayo carefully 
 avoided saying and doing, was strictly in pursuance of 
 the same policy. The money and arms which Lord 
 Mayo gave to the Ameer was either in implement or in 
 supplement of the assistance which had been given or 
 promised by Lord Lawrence. The assurances for the 
 future were confined within the same general limits of 
 principle which had been traced by Lord Lawrence. 
 There is not the shadow of ground for establishing the 
 distinction which Sir Bartle Frere endeavours to establish, 
 still less for the contrast to which he points. Sir Bartle 
 is quite mistaken when he says that " Shere Ali and 
 all the Afghans are among those who have shared his 
 opinion " in the matter. We have seen that Shere Ali 
 rarely failed to couple the names of Lord Lawrence and 
 of Lord Mayo together as those of two great and equal
 
 TO THE PRE RE NOTE. 133 
 
 friends. We have seen that in the very latest communica- 
 tion to the Government of India, when he was trembling 
 under communications which he erroneously interpreted 
 as indications of a change of policy, he not only made an 
 earnest appeal to those joint names, but he singled out 
 Lord Lawrence as his special benefactor, and as the 
 Viceroy from whom he held a " Sunnud " of the highest 
 value. 
 
 This mistake of Sir Bartle Frere is not accidental. It 
 arises from a fundamental misapprehension of the prin- 
 ciple of Lord Lawrence's policy, and from a kind of 
 misapprehension concerning it which is one of the 
 commonest fruits of political controversy. In order to 
 combat our opponent's policy, we are very apt, first, to 
 caricature it. Lord Lawrence's policy has been in this 
 way absurdly caricatured. It never was a policy of ab- 
 solute or unconditional abstention in Afghanistan. It 
 was not this even in internal affairs ; still less was it this 
 in external relations. He began his assistance to Shere 
 Ali before the civil war had been absolutely decided ; 
 and Sir Henry Rawlinson, as we have seen, has actually 
 represented this as a departure by Lord Lawrence from 
 his own policy. It was not so, as I have shown. It may 
 have been a departure from the conception of that policy 
 which had arisen in the minds of his opponents. But we 
 must take Lord Lawrence's policy not from his opponents, 
 but from himself As regards the external relations of 
 Afghanistan, it was a policy of abstention still more 
 conditional. In the event of foreign interference in 
 Afghanistan, Lord Lawrence not only neverrecommended
 
 134 FROM THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA 
 
 abstention, but we have seen that he emphatically re- 
 commended resolute and immediate action. 
 
 It was my duty as Secretary of State for India during 
 a period of five years, to form as clear and definite a 
 conception as I could of the policy which Lord Mayo 
 always declared to be his own, and the conception of 
 it, which I have here indicated, was that on which Lord 
 Mayo acted, and was prepared to act. 
 
 The next observation which occurs to me on Sir 
 Bartle Frere's Note is, that he discusses the principal 
 measure he recommends — namely, the establishment of 
 British officers in Afghanistan — without the slightest 
 reference to the question whether it had or had not formed 
 the subject of direct engagement with the Ameer, either 
 by Treaties, or by the pledges and promises of Indian 
 Viceroys. Not only does he omit all reference to this 
 question, but he assumes on hearsay evidence, and, as I 
 have shown, quite incorrectly, that the Ameer had ex- 
 pressed his willingness to receive such officers. He treats 
 with ridicule, and even with indignation, one of the objec- 
 tions which Afghan Rulers have always put forward — 
 namely, the difficulty of insuring the safety of such officers 
 among a fanatical people. But, even supposing that this 
 objection had been (what it certainly has not been) wholly 
 ostensible, and only serving to cover the real ground of 
 objection— namely, the fear entertained by the Ameer 
 that he would soon cease to rule in his own Kingdom if 
 British officers were permanently located there — Sir 
 Bartle Frere does not deal satisfactorily with this fear. 
 Indeed, by implication, he admits it to have much
 
 TO THE FRERE NOTE. 135 
 
 foundation. One of the two things which he says we 
 ought especially to keep in view as the main objects of 
 our action, is to impress the Afghans with a conviction 
 that we have no desire " to interfere with their inde- 
 pendence and self-government." He admits that this 
 will require " much self-control and abstinence from 
 unnecessary interference on the part of our representa- 
 tives." It will, indeed ; and no man who considers the 
 position of British officers in contact with such a con- 
 dition of political society as that presented by Afghan- 
 istan, can reasonably deny that the traditional fears of 
 the Rulers of Cabul on this subject have a reasonable 
 foundation. 
 
 The occupation of Quetta is recommended, to prevent 
 its falling into the hands of any other Power. But as 
 there was then as little possibility of this as there is now, 
 Sir Bartle Frere is obliged to argue it as part of a much 
 larger plan — namely, that of our meeting Russia on the 
 western frontiers of Afghanistan — a necessity which, in- 
 deed, no Anglo-Indian politician can exclude from his 
 view as a possible contingency, but which, on the other 
 hand, considering all the consequences it must involve, 
 no wise man would willingly precipitate. This formidable 
 proposal of " meeting Russia on the western frontier of 
 Afghanistan" is the principle of the whole argument. It 
 points to a course of conduct which could not be pursued 
 without a breach of faith. But this is never mentioned 
 It is a course which could not be pursued without military 
 expenditure on the largest scale. Yet the Note gravely 
 maintains that only when this course has been conducted
 
 T36 THE PRE RE NOTE. 
 
 to its conclusion, can we hope for Peace Establishments 
 in India. Propositions which seem so careless in respect 
 to our Treaty obligations, and so rash and extravagant 
 in respect to policy — are the basis of the Paper on which 
 the new Policy was founded.
 
 FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO APRIL, 1876. 137 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO THE BEGINNING OF THE 
 VICEROYALTV OF LORD LYTTON IN APRIL, 1 876. 
 
 It was only eleven days after the date of this Note — on 
 the 22nd of January, 1875 — that Lord Salisbury ad- 
 dressed his first despatch* to the Government of India, 
 directing the Viceroy to take measures with as much 
 expedition as the circumstances of the case permitted, 
 for procuring the assent of the Ameer to the establish- 
 ment of a British Agency at Herat. When this was 
 accomplished, it might be desirable to take a similar step 
 with regard to Candahar. With respect to Cabul itself, 
 the Secretary of State did not suggest any similar step, 
 as he " was sensible of the difficulties interposed by the 
 fanatic violence of the people." The reasons for this 
 instruction are calmly and temperately stated in the 
 despatch, these reasons being principally connected with 
 the acknowledged importance of having accurate in- 
 formation from the western frontiers of Afghanistan. It 
 was admitted that " no immediate danger appeared to 
 threaten the interests of her Majesty in the regions of 
 Central Asia." But "the aspect of affairs was sufficiently 
 grave to inspire solicitude, and to suggest the necessity of 
 
 * Afghan Corresp., I., 1878, No. 31, p. 128.
 
 138 FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO 
 
 timely precaution." The effect of the Llamakin Procla- 
 mation seems to be indicated in the opening sentence, 
 which intimated that " Her Majesty's Government had 
 followed with anxious attention the progress of events in 
 Central Asia, and on the frontiers of Persia and Afghan- 
 istan." 
 
 There are two very remarkable circumstances to be 
 observed about this despatch. The first is that, although 
 written some eighteen months after Lord Northbrook's 
 Conferences with the Envoy of Shere Ali, at Simla, it 
 indicates no symptom whatever of the opinion that the 
 Viceroy had on that occasion taken an impolitic course 
 towards the Ameer, or had failed to give him anything 
 that could have been safely offered. On the contrary* 
 the whole object of the despatch is to endeavour to force 
 upon the Ameer a proposal of which he was known to be 
 extremely jealous, whilst it did not instruct Lord North- 
 brook, or even authorise him, to offer any concession 
 whatever in return. If it were true that the Ameer was 
 then sulky or estranged, this was not a very conciliatory, 
 or even a just method of dealing with him. The only 
 excuse for Lord Salisbury is to suppose that at that 
 time it had not occurred to him that any conciliation of 
 the Ameer was required, or that Lord Northbrook's course 
 eighteen months before had given to Shere Ali any just 
 cause of complaint. This circumstance is a sui^cient 
 comment on the candour and the fairness of the attempts 
 lately made by the Government to ascribe to the policy 
 of Lord Northbrook the results produced by the new 
 policy inaugurated by themselves.
 
 LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. 139 
 
 The next circumstance observable about this despatch 
 is that, Hke Sir Bartle Frere's Note, it makes no allusion 
 whatever to the engagements of the Indian Government 
 with the Ameer on the subject of British officers resident 
 in his dominions. This was excusable on the part of Sir 
 Bartle Frere, who did not know all the facts. I venture 
 to think it was a grave and culpable omission on the part 
 of a Secretary of State for India, who ought to have 
 known the engagements by which it was his duty to abide* 
 Not only does the despatch make no allusion to Treaties 
 or pledges on this subject, but it dwells on the loose 
 private gossip which reported the Ameer as having been 
 willing to admit an Agent at Herat ; and it makes the 
 still more serious assumption that, " if his intentions were 
 still loyal, it was not possible that he would make any 
 serious difficulty now.""^ 
 
 After the facts which I have narrated in the previous 
 pages, it is needless to produce any farther proof that 
 this despatch was written either in unaccountable forget- 
 fulness, or in more unaccountable disregard, of the 
 plighted faith of the Government of the Queen. 
 
 The only indication in the despatch that the Secretary 
 of State at all bore in mind the honourable obligations 
 in this matter under which we lay, is that he did instruct 
 the Viceroy to procure the Ameer's consent. It may be 
 well, therefore, to point out here what this really involved- 
 It is, of course, true that it would be no breach of our 
 engagement with the Ameer, to send British Agents to 
 
 * Ibid., p. 129, para. 6.
 
 i40 FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO 
 
 his country if it could be done with his free consent. 
 But the whole essence of Lord Mayo's promise lay in the 
 pledge that we were not to force that consent by the 
 undue pressure which a powerful Government can put 
 upon a weak one. In the case of two Powers perfectly 
 equal making such an agreement between themselves, it 
 might be always legitimate for either of them to try to 
 persuade the other to abandon the agreement, and to 
 make some other arrangement in its stead. Nor do I 
 deny that it might be perfectly legitimate for the Govern- 
 ment of India to sound the disposition of the Ameer 
 from time to time, and to try by gentle means to ascertain 
 whether he could not be persuaded, freely and willingly, 
 to let us off from the promises we had made. This had 
 just been done by Lord Northbrook when he proposed 
 to send an officer to examine the frontier, and to seek an 
 interview with the Ameer at Cabul. The result was to 
 prove that Shere Ali retained all his dread and all his 
 suspicion of the consequences of any change. It was for 
 the very purpose of leaving the Ameer in perfect freedom 
 to act upon his feelings and opinions in this matter — to 
 make him feel comfortable in regard to it — that Lord 
 Mayo had given him the pledge at Umballa. No such 
 freedom could be left to him if the powerful Government 
 of India were to press him unduly to yield upon the sub- 
 ject. The application of such pressure was, therefore, in 
 itself a departure from the understanding ; and to visit 
 a refusal on the part of the Ameer with resentment or 
 with penal consequences of any kind, was the distinct 
 violation of a promise, and a direct breach of faith.
 
 LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. 141 
 
 The other circumstance connected with this despatch 
 which deserves notice is the curious Departmental jealousy 
 which the second paragraph incidentally displays of the 
 Foreign Office. After noticing the scantiness of the in- 
 formation which it was in the power of the Viceroy to 
 supply, the paragraph in question proceeds thus : — " For 
 knowledge of what passes in Afghanistan, and upon its 
 frontiers, they (her Majesty's advisers) are compelled to 
 rely mainly upon the indirect intelligence which reaches 
 them through the Foreign Office." 
 
 This passage is connected with a very important part 
 of the whole subject, which has not been sufficiently 
 attended to. The observation of Lord Salisbury seems 
 to have been immediately suggested by the circumstance 
 which has been just narrated, namely, that the information 
 in respect to General Llamakin's proclamation to the 
 Turkomans, and his reported movements on the Attrek, 
 had come from our Mission at Teheran, reporting, as that 
 Mission does, not to the India Office, but to the Secretary 
 of State for Foreign Affairs.^ It has, however, been a 
 favourite doctrine at the India Office, that the Persian 
 Mission ought to be now, as it once was, in direct com- 
 munication with that Office— that it ought to represent 
 the Government of India, and be officered and directed 
 from Calcutta. An emphatic recommendation that we 
 should return to this arrangement was a prominent feature 
 of the advice urged upon the Government in 1868 in the 
 
 * I believe that, strictly speaking, the Persian Mission reports 
 both to the Home Government and to the Government of India, 
 duplicate despatches being sent to Calcutta.
 
 142 FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO 
 
 Rawlinson Memorandum of that year. During the time 
 I was at the India Office I have heard the question fre- 
 quently discussed, and although there are undoubtedly 
 some arguments in favour of the Departmental view, I 
 never could agree with my colleagues who supported it. 
 Teheran is the Capital where Indian and European 
 politics meet. But the centre of interest is European. 
 Even as regards Indian questions, the methods of ope- 
 rating upon them in Persia are essentially connected with 
 the main currents of European diplomacy. I am informed 
 by my relative, Sir John McNeill, who for many years 
 occupied with distinguished ability the post of British 
 Envoy in Persia, that in the disastrous year of the first 
 Afghan war, he felt very strongly that he never could 
 have maintained the influence of England against Russia, 
 if he had been in the position at Teheran of representing 
 merely the Indian Government, and of not directly repre- 
 senting the Queen. It is, of course, true that the Govern- 
 ment of India is, and always has been in political matters, 
 the Government of the Queen. But the question depends 
 not on what we know to be the fact, but on what foreign 
 Governments understand to be the fact. There can be 
 no doubt on this — that at any Court, but especially at 
 such a Court as that of Persia, the British Representative 
 would lose in authority and in influence if he were not 
 understood to be the direct representative of the British 
 Sovereign. 
 
 This, however, is only part of the question which is 
 suggested rather than raised by the paragraph in Lord 
 Salisbury's despatch of the 22nd of January, 1875, in
 
 LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. 143 
 
 which he refers to the " indirectness" of the information 
 coming through the Foreign Office. That passage does 
 not necessarily indicate any opinion on the constitution 
 of the Persian Mission adverse to that which I have now 
 expressed. But it does indicate an opinion on the im- 
 portance and value of the information upon Central 
 Asian politics which is to be derived through our inter- 
 course with Persia, which has a direct and a very im- 
 portant bearing on the new policy which was about to be 
 pursued towards the unfortunate Ameer. Although I 
 do not agree with Sir Henry Rawlinson that the Persian 
 Mission should represent directly the Government of 
 India, I do most thoroughly agree with him that it ought 
 to be, and that, geographically, it is specially fitted to be, 
 the main source of our information on that branch of 
 Central Asian politics which excites most alarm in the 
 Anglo-Indian mind. The point on which that mind is 
 fixed with special anxiety is Merve, and the affection 
 which the very mention of that word produces is so 
 peculiar, that it almost deserves a special name, and 
 may be called " Mervousness." Now, what is Merve, 
 and where is it .' It is a wretched village, or, at the best, 
 a very small and poor town of Turkoman mud huts, 
 undefended, or, if not wholly so, at least defended only 
 by mud walls. It is a nest of robbers. This seems to 
 be admitted on all hands, and the principal circumstance 
 which gives rise to any anxiety about it is, that its inha- 
 bitants are always plundering some Russian caravan, or 
 kidnapping some Russian subjects. Geographically, its 
 importance is represented to be that it is not in a desert,
 
 144 FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO 
 
 but in a tract of country well watered, and more or less 
 cultivated ; and that the country intervening between it 
 and Herat, the frontier province of Afghanistan, is of a 
 similar character. The argument is that, if Russia were 
 once established in Merve, there would be no physical 
 impediment to the march of an army upon Herat. It is 
 one thing, however, for Russia to send a force capable of 
 taking Merve, and a very different thing for Russia either 
 to collect at Merve, or to march from Merve, a force 
 capable of taking Herat — which is a place defended by 
 the strongest walls of earthwork which exist anywhere 
 in the world. Sir Henry Rawlinson describes them as 
 "stupendous." It is stated on the same high authority 
 that even Merve, if it were defended by a concentration 
 of the Turkoman tribes, could not safely be attacked by 
 a smaller force than 20,000 men ; whilst an assault on 
 Herat would require not less than 40,000.* Putting 
 aside, however, all these considerations, which, after all, 
 can only abate our " Mervousness" a little, the point on 
 which I wish to dwell now is, that Merve is within about 
 fifty miles of the Persian frontier, and not more than 
 about 150 miles from the Persian City of Meshed, at 
 which we have an Agent of our Persian Mission. Meshed 
 is much nearer to Herat than Merve, and an active 
 British Agency at that important Persian town would 
 command the earliest and most complete information on 
 every possible Russian movement even upon Merve, and 
 still more easily upon every preparation made there for a 
 
 Quarterly Review, Jan. 1879, p. 255.
 
 LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. 145 
 
 further movement upon Herat. Most of the information 
 forwarded by our Envoy at Teheran on the subject of 
 movements in Central Asia has been information pro- 
 cured by our Agent at Meshed. The whole line of 
 advance which is feared on the part of Russia, from the 
 Ca.spian up the valley of the Attrek river, and beyond it 
 in the direction of Merve, is a line of advance parallel 
 with the Persian frontier, along the whole length of the 
 province of Khorassan. It is in the country of tribes 
 which have more or less direct relations with the Persian 
 Government. This was the reason, and an excellent 
 reason it is, why the information touching General Lla- 
 makin's proceedings, which aroused Lord Northbrook, 
 but did not arouse Lord Salisbury till the Viceroy had 
 shaken him on the subject, was information procured 
 from our Envoy at Teheran. Sir Henry Rawlinson, in 
 his article in the Nincteaith Century for December, 1878, 
 has informed us that a Russian expedition of any formi- 
 dable strength, attempting to approach the western 
 frontiers of Afghanistan along this line of country, would 
 be dependent for the enormous amount of carriage re- 
 quisite for the purpose, upon Persian sources of supply. 
 We have it, therefore, as a certainty arising out of geo- 
 graphical facts, and admitted by the highest authority, 
 that the danger of such a proceeding on the part of 
 Russia is a danger in respect to which we ought always 
 to receive the earliest information from an efficient British 
 Agency in Persia. Such an Agency ought to get, and 
 certainly would get, information of Russian preparations 
 on the Caspian, and of Russian movements from that 
 
 L
 
 146 FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO 
 
 region, long before any such information could reach a 
 British officer stationed in Herat. Indeed, it is most 
 probable that the rumours reaching an officer in that city 
 would be altogether unworthy of trust, or could only be 
 verified by careful inquiry through our Agents in Persia. 
 
 The result of these considerations is to show tliat, 
 whilst Lord Salisbury was now beginning to urge upon 
 the Viceroy a course towards the Ameer which involved 
 a breach of Treaty engagements, and a breach of Lord 
 Mayo's solemn promises, and whilst he was doing so for 
 the sake of a comparatively small advantage, he was, at 
 the same time, overlooking, or treating in the spirit of 
 mere departmental jealousy, another course not connected 
 with any difficulty, or involving any risks, by which the 
 same objects could be, and were actually being, much 
 more effectually obtained. A well-organised system of 
 intelligence in respect to events in Central Asia, in con- 
 nexion with our Missions and Agencies in Persia, would 
 enable us to watch every movement of Russia in the 
 direction of Merve, and would be exposed to none of the 
 dangers and objections attending a breach of Lord 
 Mayo's engagements to the Ameer. 
 
 There is yet another circumstance connected with this 
 despatch of the 22nd of January, 1875, on which it is 
 necessary to observe. As a justification of the new 
 policy about to be pursued, it became a great object with 
 the Indian Secretary to make out that our native Agency 
 at Cabul was nearly useless. Accordingly, in this first 
 despatch, and in others that follow, we have this point 
 much laboured, and, as usual, the evidence of the Indian
 
 LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. 147 
 
 Government on the subject not very fairly quoted. Our 
 native Agent at Cabul was Nawab Atta Mohammed 
 Khan, a Mahomedan gentleman " of rank and character," 
 appointed by Lord Lawrence in 1867, as one in "whose 
 fidelity and discretion " he had "full confidence."* We 
 have seen that this Agent, or his Moonshee, had been 
 admitted to hear discussions in the Durbar of Shere Ali, 
 and had repeatedly conveyed the most valuable and 
 authentic accounts of the feelings and dispositions of the 
 Cabul Government. But it now suited the policy of the 
 Government, and was, indeed, a necessary part of it, to 
 disparage this Agency as compared with that which it 
 was desired to establish. The truth on this matter is not 
 very far to seek. There are certain purposes for which a 
 native Agent, however faithful, is of no use. If it is 
 authority that we wish to exercise, we can only do it 
 through a British officer. Even if it be the commanding 
 influence which is tantamount to authority that we wish 
 to have, we can only have it by employing a European 
 officer. In short, if we want to domineer, we must have 
 an Agent of our own race. And it is precisely for this 
 reason that the Rulers of Cabul have always objected to 
 such an Agent. But, on the other hand, if we want 
 simply to gain information through an Agent who is at 
 once faithful to us, and at the same time in sympathy 
 with the Court to which he is sent, then a Mahomedan 
 gentleman, such as Atta Mohammed, is not only as good 
 as, but better than, a European. It is inconceivable that 
 
 * Afghan Corresp., I., 1878, p. 14. 
 L 2
 
 148 FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO 
 
 a British officer would ever be allowed to be present at 
 Durbars as our native Agent seems to have been. The 
 evidence is, indeed, conclusive that Atta Mohammed has 
 reported to us the truth, with just that degree of sym- 
 pathy with the Court to which he was accredited which, 
 if we were sincere, it was most desirable that he should 
 possess. 
 
 The despatch of the 22nd Jan.. 1875, seems to have 
 given infinite trouble to the Government of India. There 
 was no difficulty in answering it, but very great difficulty 
 in answering it with that respect which is due to official 
 superiors. It would have been easy to point out that it 
 made no reference whatever to Treaties and pledges 
 which the Government of India was bound to respect, — 
 that it alleged certain things to have been said by the 
 Ameer which, even if they had been said, had nothing 
 to do with the agreement ultimately arrived at, — that it 
 made this allegation on evidence which was not quoted, 
 whilst authentic records were left unnoticed, — that it 
 made the unjust and very unreasonable assumption that, 
 if the Ameer desired to claim the protection of Lord 
 Mayo's promises, he could not possibly be loyal in his 
 intentions to Lord Mayo's successors in office, — all this 
 it would have been easy to point out. But, in the mean- 
 time, what seemed to be a positive order must be either 
 obeyed or disobeyed. Under these circumstances. Lord 
 Northbrook telegraphed to the Secretary of State on the 
 1 8th of February that, in the judgment of the Govern- 
 ment of India, it was inexpedient to take the initiative 
 at that tmie in the matter referred to - that nothing was
 
 LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. 149 
 
 traceable in the records at Calcutta showing that the 
 Ameer had ever expressed his readiness to receive a 
 British Agent at Herat, and that he might object to such 
 an arrangement without being at all disloyal in his in- 
 tentions towards the British Government. Lord North- 
 brook, therefore, asked whether Lord Salisbury's direc- 
 tion was peremptory, or whether a discretion was in- 
 tended to be left to the Government of India.* On the 
 23rd of February, 1875, Lord Salisbury replied that a 
 delay of three or four months would be within the dis- 
 cretion contemplated by her Majesty's Government, and 
 the Viceroy was referred to three officers in India for the 
 truth of the reports as to what the Ameer had been heard 
 to say. They were now scattered in different parts of 
 India and beyond it — one of them. Mr. Girdlestone 
 being Resident in Nepal. The other two were Sir Richard 
 Pollock, Commissioner of Peshawur, and Mr. Thornton, 
 Secretary to the Governor of the Punjaub. But, strange 
 to say. Lord Salisbury does not seem to have made any 
 inquiry of Mr. Seton Karr, who was then in England, 
 and who, as Foreign Secretary to the Government of 
 India under Lord Mayo, was of all men most competent 
 to give trustworthy evidence on the subject. His evidence 
 has been given since, under a sense of what he owed " to 
 truth," and to the memory of the Viceroy under whom 
 he served in 1869. It is characteristic of the spirit in 
 which the matter has been pursued, that, on account of 
 this evidence, he was censured by an Under-Secretary 
 
 * Ibid., No. 32, para. 4, p. 129.
 
 ISO FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO 
 
 of State in the late debates in the House of Commons, 
 and was represented by that official as having been too 
 imperfectly acquainted with the Native languages to be 
 accurately informed. Mr. Seton Karr has had no diffi- 
 culty in exposing this attempt to suppress or damage 
 truthful but unwelcome testimony. 
 
 The information on which Lord Salisbury was acting 
 was not confirmed even by the officers to whom he 
 expressly referred. 
 
 That information mainly rested on a note written by 
 Mr. Girdlestone on the 26th of March, 1869, purporting 
 to report what he had heard " in conversation with Pun- 
 jaub officials." But on being asked by Lord Northbroolc 
 to give some more definite information as to the sources 
 of his impression, that officer very frankly confessed that 
 he had really none to give. Mr. Girdlestone did not hear 
 the Ameer say one word upon the subject. His memory 
 even failed to recall with certainty the authority from 
 which he had derived an impression that Shere Ali had 
 expressed himself to the effect supposed. His recollec- 
 tion, however, was that the information given to him had 
 come "either from Major Pollock or Mr. Thornton." The 
 *' only other Punjaub official" whom he could specify was 
 Colonel Reynell Taylor, who was Commissioner of Um- 
 balla in 1869.* 
 
 Let us now see what was said by the other two officers 
 named by Lord Salisbury. 
 
 As regarded the present time. Sir R. Pollock was con- 
 
 * Ibid., No. 32, Inclos. 2, 3, p. 136.
 
 LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. 151 
 
 vinced that the Ameer would not willingly consent to 
 receive British officers as Residents in his Kingdom ; and 
 that " as regarded the past, it was well known to 
 Government that the strongest objection has hitherto 
 existed " to any such arrangement."^ 
 
 Mr. Thornton said that he was not himself at any of 
 the Conferences between Lord Mayo and the Ameer in 
 1869, and could not consequently speak from personal 
 knowledge of what passed on those occasions. Of Shere 
 Ali's feelings at the present time Mr. Thornton had no 
 doubt. He believed the deputation of European officers 
 into Afghanistan to be highly distasteful to the Ameer 
 and his Councillors. As regarded the past, he could 
 give no other evidence than that of a certain mysterious 
 personage, designated as " X. Y.," who is explained to 
 have been an Afghan, and who, in the secret records of the 
 *■ Persian Office," was said to have reported the substance 
 of certain conversations of the Ameer, not at Umballa, 
 but before the Conferences, when he was at Cabul and at 
 Lahore. What makes this mysterious " X. Y." still more 
 mysterious is that he undertook to report private discus- 
 sions which are expressly stated to have been held 
 between the Ameer and his Minister, Noor Mohammed, 
 "at which no third person was present."! This is one 
 of the great privileges of the writers of fiction. Whether 
 it be of ministers in the most secret conclave, or of con- 
 spirators in the darkest den, or only of lovers 
 
 * Ibid., Inclos. 5, p. 137. 
 t Ibid., No. 32, Inclos. 11, p. 143.
 
 152 FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO 
 
 " Sitting in a pleasant shade, 
 Which a grove of myrtles made," 
 
 novelists have an equal privilege of reporting all that 
 is said. And, stranger still, such is the power of their 
 craft, that it never occurs to any of us to be surprised 
 by the superhuman knowledge they display. It is, how- 
 ever, somewhat new to find grave Secretaries of State 
 opening their ears to this kind of fiction, and preferring 
 it to the evidence both of written documents and of 
 men telling us what they knew. Of this more authentic 
 kind of evidence Lord Northbrook's inquiries elicited 
 abundance. For example, General Taylor, Seefet a-py to 
 the Government of the Eunjaub, an officer who had excep- 
 tional means of information, not only reported his own 
 opinion that the Ameer would not be willing to consent 
 to the proposed measure, and that for many reasons it 
 would not be just to blame him, — but as regarded the 
 past, he reported it to be well known that the Ameer and 
 his advisers had more than once embodied their feelings 
 and their opinions on the subject in the very strong expres- 
 sion, " Do anything but force British officers on us."'^ 
 
 The result, then, of Lord Northbrook's inquiries was 
 to leave nothing whatever in support of the gossip on 
 which Lord Salisbury had proceeded, except the Note 
 and the private Memorandum Book of Captain Grey, the 
 value of which has been already analysed in a previous 
 page. 
 
 Having ascertained all this, having gathered the nearly 
 
 * Ibid., No. 32, Inclos. 6, p. 139.
 
 LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. 153 
 
 unanimous opinion of all its ablest and most experienced 
 officers on the frontier, and having duly considered and 
 re-considered the formal obligations under which it lay, 
 the Government of India, on the 7th of June, 1875, ad- 
 dressed to the Government at home a despatch setting 
 forth in detail all the arguments upon which it had come 
 to the decided opinion, that there was no evidence of the 
 alleged former willingness of the Ameer to receive Euro- 
 pean officers, sufficient to justify them in founding upon 
 it any new representation on the subject ; and that on 
 all other grounds it would not be wise or politic to make 
 the proposal. Lord Northbrook and the Council denied 
 that the reluctance of the Ameer to accept it could be 
 fairly interpreted as indicative of disloyal intentions 
 against the British Government. They referred to the 
 fact that without the same special reasons and historical 
 causes the same feeling had always been expressed by 
 the Ruler of Cashmere. They explained that Sir Richard 
 Pollock, who was intimately acquainted with Noor Mo- 
 hammed, and had confidential information on the real 
 sentiments of the Ameer, was convinced that Shere Ali 
 had no inclination whatever to look for help elsewhere 
 than to the British Government. They pointed out that, 
 though he had been displeased at not having got all he 
 wanted in 1873, he had nevertheless acted on our advice, 
 although most reluctantly, in accepting the Seistan Arbi- 
 tration. They recalled to the mind of the Secretary of 
 State the recorded and specific assurances given to the 
 Ameer by Lord Mayo at Umballa ; they suggested that a 
 change of policy on our part in this matter might throw
 
 154 FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO 
 
 Afghanistan into the arms of Russia on the first favour- 
 able opportunity. They admitted that the presence of 
 a British Agent at Herat would be in itself desirable 
 and they emphatically explained that if the threatened 
 movement of Russia upon Merve did actually take place, 
 or even if Russia assumed authority over the whole Turko- 
 man country, they would then deem it necessary to make 
 some new arrangement, and to give additional and more 
 specific assurances to the Ruler of Afghanistan against 
 attack from without ; they indicated their opinion that 
 this new arrangement should probably take the form of 
 a new Treaty, and that then the establishment of a British 
 officer at Herat might naturally be brought about. In 
 the meantime, they recommended a steady adherence to 
 the patient and conciliatory policy which had been pur- 
 sued for many years towards Afghanistan, and that every 
 reasonable allowance should be made for the difficulties 
 of the Ameer.^ 
 
 The Government at home did not reply to this despatch 
 until the 19th of November, 1875. By this time the 
 Eastern Question had risen above the horizon in its 
 European aspects. The insurrection had begun in 
 Bosnia and the Herzegovina in the month of July.t 
 On the 1 8th of August a dim vision of the "Three 
 Emperors" had appeared in the common action of 
 their Ambassadors at Constantinople. They were ac- 
 tually seen consulting together for the purpose of inter- 
 fering with Turkey, and of sending out the Consular 
 
 * Ibid., No. 32, p. 129-135. 
 t See "The Eastern Question," Vol. I. p. 131.
 
 LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. 155 
 
 Mission.'^ On the 24th of August the Cabinet had been 
 dragged by the force of circumstances, but most reluct- 
 antly, to join in this first step taken by the other Powers 
 of Europe. In October it had become apparent that the 
 insurrection was of a most serious character — that the 
 Porte was greatly alarmed — that it was making profuse 
 explanations and promises of reform — that these were 
 being received with contempt by the insurgents, and by 
 incredulity on the part of every Cabinet except that of 
 London. In November it became known that Austria- 
 Hungary was moving forward in the direction of inter- 
 vention or of interference of some kind, and was in 
 consultation with the Governments of Germany and of 
 Russia. The jealousy and suspicion of the English Min- 
 istry had been aroused, and at the very time when Lord 
 Salisbury was preparing his rejoinder to Lord Northbrook, 
 his colleague at the Foreign Office was inditing the first 
 despatch which intimated to our Ambassador at Vienna 
 that the "gravity of the political situation had been un- 
 doubtedly aggravated" by the rumours that Austria- 
 Hungary was concerting " some scheme in regard to the 
 Herzegovina without consultation with the Powers, parties 
 to the Treaty of i856."t The despatch of Lord Derby 
 was dated November 20th, that of Lord Salisbury was 
 dated November 19th. Written in all probability with- 
 out any direct connexion, they were nevertheless con- 
 temporary events, and are alike illustrations of the 
 atmosphere of opinion prevalent at the time. 
 
 * Ibid., p. 136. t Ibid., p. 157.
 
 156 FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO 
 
 To this atmosphere various breezes had contributed. 
 As in 1874 Sir Bartle Frere had written a Note, so in 
 1875 Sir Henry Rawlinson had published a book — 
 " England and Russia in the East." In this very inter- 
 esting and important work, full of local knowledge, and 
 marked by great powers of systematic statement, every- 
 thing which had hitherto been said in private memoranda 
 for official information, was published to the world- 
 Coinciding with a time when the public mind was be- 
 ginning to be excited against Russia on other grounds, 
 it could not fail to have a considerable effect. And yet, 
 like every other work full of solid information and of 
 real ability, it ought not to have been without its calming 
 influence if it had been studied and interpreted with care. 
 Although representing Russia as a Power engaged in 
 the attack of a fortress — which fortress was India — and 
 advancing by " parallels" to the attack across the whole 
 length and breadth of Central Asia from Orenburg to the 
 Upper Oxus, it nevertheless set forth very fully not only 
 the immense spaces she had yet to traverse, but the still 
 more immense political and military preparations which 
 she had yet to make. Especially in regard to the 
 " parallel" which started from the eastern shore of the 
 Caspian Sea, and was directed towards Herat, it showed 
 how closely connected it was with the Persian frontier, 
 and how any advance upon that line must depend much 
 on securing the goodwill and co-operation of the Persian 
 Government.* So close was this connexion that the 
 
 * Second Edition, p. 294.
 
 LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. 157 
 
 possible ultimate contingency was described to be — that 
 Russia might, after having first taken Herat, launch from 
 that base upon India a force of 50,000 men of Persian 
 "Sirbaz, "disciplined and commanded by Russian officers. 
 Men disposed to be in a panic are neither able nor willing 
 to estimate with any care either the time required or the 
 number of steps to be taken before such a contingency 
 as this could be brought about. The Government, in 
 particular, never seem to have bestowed a thought upon 
 the just importance which Sir Henry Rawlinson set upon 
 the Persian Mission as the agency through which all 
 possible Russian movements in that direction can be 
 most effectually watched, and without the knowledge 
 of which, if it is well organised, it is impossible that any 
 movement towards the capture of such a place as Herat 
 could be made without months, or perhaps even years of 
 warning.* 
 
 The entire neglect of all modifying considerations of 
 this kind is conspicuous in the Despatch of the 19th of 
 November, 1875. The consequence was, that treating, 
 as we have seen, all Foreign Office information as 
 " indirect" and comparatively valueless to India, Lord 
 Salisbury had come to attach a most exaggerated value 
 to the establishment of a British Agency at Herat. 
 Every conceivable cause of trouble was conjured up in 
 
 t The Article in the Quarterly Review for January, 1879, before 
 referred to, sets forth even more distinctly than Sir Henry Raw- 
 linson had previously done, the dependence upon Persian complicity 
 and support, of any Russian adv^ance upon Herat from the Cas- 
 pian base.
 
 158 FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO 
 
 support of the proposal to press on the Ameer his consent 
 to the reception of a British officer there. The objection 
 to it as a breach of engagement with him, and as highly 
 offensive to him, and the danger of it as liable to throw 
 him into the hands of Russia, are treated with silence or 
 with contempt. The importance of it was argued in con- 
 nexion with the fear that Russia might acquire by intrigue 
 a dominant influence over the Ameer — with the fear that 
 civil disturbances might arise and lead to the same result 
 — with the fear that the Ameer himself might offend 
 Russia by military expeditions on his frontier — with the 
 fear, above all, of the permanent occupation by Russia 
 of Merve. The Government of India had treated that 
 occupation as a contingency which, if not necessarily 
 distant, could not arise without warning, and which, if it 
 did arise, must yet leave ample time for the British Go- 
 vernment to take measures against any possible move- 
 ment upon Herat. Lord Salisbury, on the contrary, 
 treated it as if it might happen at any moment, and as 
 if, when it did happen, the " time might have passed by 
 when representations to the Ameer could be made with 
 any useful result." Shere AH already knew that Samar- 
 kand was Russian, and that Bokhara was under Russia, so 
 that he had Russia on his very borders. But if the mud 
 village of Merve were ever to be occupied by the 
 Russians, although it was lOO miles at least from his 
 most distant frontier, then, indeed, he would conclude 
 " that no Power exists which is able to stop their pro- 
 gress." Such is the fever-heat that had been attained 
 under the influence of that condition of mind to which.
 
 LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. 159 
 
 as being something quite peculiar, and different from 
 anything else, I have ventured to apply the word " Mer- 
 vousness." 
 
 Accordingly, under the influence of these feelings, the 
 Secretary of State, in his Despatch of the 19th of 
 November, 1875, still insisted on his previous instructions, 
 that measures should be taken to procure the assent of 
 the Ameer to a British Mission at Herat. What these 
 measures were to be, I think it safest to describe in the 
 language of the Despatch itself : — 
 
 "The first step, therefore, in establishing our relations 
 with the Ameer upon a more satisfactory footing, will be 
 to induce him to receive a temporary Embassy in his 
 capital. It need not be publicly connected with the estab- 
 lishment of a permanent Mission within his dominions 
 There would be many advantages in ostensibly directing 
 it to some object of smaller political interest, which it 
 will not be difficult for your Excellency to find, or, if 
 need be, to create."^ 
 
 The Viceroy was, therefore, instructed to find some 
 occasion for sending a Mission to Cabul, and to " press the 
 reception of this Mission very earnestly upon the Ameer." 
 The Envoy was not directed to make any definite offers 
 to the Ameer — any new Treaty — any new dynastic 
 guarantee — or any one of the things which the Ameer 
 had desired. The only reward to be given him for 
 agreeing to sacrifice the surviving Article of the Treaty 
 of 1857 and the pledges of Lord Mayo, was an assurance 
 
 * Afghan Corresp., I., 1878, No. 33, para. 15, p. 149.
 
 i6o FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO 
 
 " of the earnest desire of Her Majesty's Government that 
 his territories should remain safe from external attack." 
 But as this assurance had been given to him over and over 
 again, and with special emphasis and formality by Lord 
 Northbrook, at Simla, in 1873,— as, moreover, he knew it 
 to be true, because it was an assurance founded on our 
 own interests, — this despatch did, in fact, demand of the 
 Ameer to give up that which he valued above all the 
 other boons he had received from former Viceroys, and 
 offered him nothing whatever that was new in return. 
 But more than this — it directed that the new demand 
 should be made upon him, not as a friendly request if 
 he should be really willing to grant it, but under threats. 
 The Envoy was, indeed, to maintain a friendly " tone." 
 But these significant words were added : " It will be the 
 Envoy's duty earnestly to press upon the Ameer the risk 
 he would run if he should impede the course of action 
 which the British Government think necessary for 
 securing his independence.""^ 
 
 The Government of India is a subordinate Government, 
 and owes ultimate obedience to the responsible advisers 
 of the Crown. But from the traditions of its history, and 
 from the necessities of its position, its subordination is 
 qualified by a large and a well-understood measure of 
 independence. There were some things in this despatch 
 which that Government could not be made the instrument 
 of doing without remonstrance. In the first place, they 
 objected to the practice of dissimulation towards the 
 
 * Ibid., No. iz, pp. 147-9-
 
 LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. i6i 
 
 Ruler of Afghanistan. They objected to make upon 
 him some demand which was to be only " ostensible," 
 with the view of keeping back the real object we desired 
 to gain. They wished to be allowed to speak the truth. 
 In the second place, they thought that if the thing were 
 to be done at all, something more definite should be 
 offered to the Ameer than the mere repetition of assurances 
 already given, and which he well knew to be securely 
 punded on a just estimate of our own political interests. 
 They thought that the Viceroy should inform the Ameer 
 that the " condition of affairs in Central Asia made it 
 expedient that the relations between the British Govern- 
 ment and Afghanistan should be placed on a more 
 definite footing than at present" 
 
 Holding these views. Lord Northbrook and his Council 
 determined that they could not act on the instructions 
 conveyed by the Despatch of November 19, 1875, with- 
 out another reference to the Government at home, and 
 another full representation of their unaltered opinion on 
 the impolicy of the whole proceeding. This accordingly 
 they did in a Despatch dated the 28th of January, 1876. 
 They had to deal delicately and yet firmly with the 
 suggestion that the Viceroy of India should begin a 
 negotiation with the Ameer by an attempt to cajole and 
 to deceive him, I think it will be acknowledged that 
 they did so deal with it in the following passage: — " The 
 result of our deliberations is that we are convinced that 
 if a Mission is to be sent to Cabul, the most advisable 
 course would be to state frankly and fully to the Ameer 
 the real purpose of the Mission." Lord Northbrook also 
 
 M
 
 1 62 FROM JANUARY, \^i^, TO 
 
 took occasion, once more, and more decidedly than ever, 
 to remind the Secretary of State that the proposal was 
 " a departure from the understanding arrived at between 
 Lord Mayo and the Ameer at the Umballa Conferences 
 of 1869." He declared that he was in possession of no 
 information which led him to believe that the Russian 
 Government had any intention or desire to interfere with 
 the independence of Afghanistan. He pointed out that 
 the Ameer up to the very latest date, September, 1875, 
 had continued to act on the policy recommended to him 
 by the British Government, and had prevented his 
 people from showing sympathy with a rising in Kokhand 
 against Russian authority. Finally, the Government of 
 India declared that they continued to "deprecate, as in- 
 volving serious danger to the peace of Afghanistan and 
 to the interests of the British Empire in India, the 
 execution, under present circumstances, of the instructions 
 conveyed" in the Despatch of November, 1875."'^ 
 
 As Lord Northbrook had now resigned, and as the 
 Government had the prospect of appointing a Viceroy 
 after their own heart, this resolute resistance of the Govern- 
 ment of India was suffered to stay proceedings for a time. 
 
 The instructions to the new Viceroy were signed on 
 the 28th of February, 1876.! It will be observed that 
 the date of this Despatch is just one month after the 
 Cabinet had been reluctantly compelled to join in the 
 Andrassy Note.| Whatever fears and jealousy of Russia 
 
 * Ibid., No. 34, pp. 149-155- 
 
 t Ibid., No. 35, Inclos., pp. 156-9. 
 
 X See " The Eastern Question," Vol. I., p. 164-
 
 LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. i63 
 
 had been long affecting the minds of the Government were 
 not likely at that moment to be working with abated 
 force. Accordingly, in its very first paragraph, the Des- 
 patch set forth that the '' increasing weakness and un- 
 certainty of British influence in Afghanistan constitutes 
 a prospective peril to British interests." This was at 
 least quite honest. There is no attempt here to pretend 
 that the new policy was animated by a disinterested 
 anxiety for the welfare of the Ameer. In his former 
 Despatches, as v/e have seen, Lord Salisbury had not 
 even pretended to offer him any compensation. 
 
 But Lord Northbrook's parting remonstrances had 
 effected something. The new instructions adopted his 
 suggestion, that an endeavour should be made to offer 
 to the Ameer something in return for the sacrifice we 
 were demanding of him, and that he should be invited 
 to enter into a larger and more definite arrangement than 
 had heretofore existed. So far the Government had 
 profited by the remonstrances of Lord Northbrook and 
 his Council. Their instructions to him had contemplated 
 no such course, and had enjoined upon him nothing but 
 to make an "ostensible" demand upon the Ameer which 
 was to cover another demand still more obnoxious. 
 
 But when we come to examine closely the method in 
 which the new Despatch worked out the suggestion of 
 Lord Northbrook, that if this unjust and inexpedient 
 demand were to be made at all, it should be accom- 
 panied by some other proposals of a more soothing 
 character, we find nothing but a series of ambiguities, 
 with a strong under-current of the former tendency to 
 
 M 2
 
 i64 FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO 
 
 deception. I do not deny that many of these ambiguities 
 arise out of the insuperable difficulty attending the policy 
 to be pursued. The centre of that difficulty lay in this — 
 that the only things which the Ameer really cared to get, 
 were things which no British Government could possibly 
 give him, whilst, on the other hand, the only things 
 which we could give him, were things which he knew 
 we must give him from motives of our own. How Lord 
 Northbrook would have overcome this difficulty, if he 
 had continued to be Viceroy, it is needless to speculate 
 because the policy was one of which he disapproved, — 
 on account, partly, of those very difficulties which were 
 inseparable from it. But one thing was clearly indicated 
 in his last Despatch — namely, this, that everything would 
 have been explained to the Ameer with perfect openness, 
 in a friendly spirit, and without aggravating the injustice 
 of violated Treaties and broken promises, by the still 
 greater injustice of menaces and threats. 
 
 Let us now see how these difficulties were met by the 
 instructions to the new Viceroy. On the subject of the 
 compensating advantages which might be offered to the 
 Ameer in return for the new demands which were to be 
 made upon him, we shall find that the one great object 
 kept in view by the Secretary of State, was — to offer 
 as little as possible in reality, and as much as possible 
 in appearance. 
 
 The first thing which the Ameer was well known to 
 desire was a fixed annual subsidy of considerable amount. 
 Even with this question the Despatch shows a disposition 
 to fence. It was one of " secondary magnitude." But
 
 LORD LYTTOJSrS VICE ROYALTY. 165 
 
 on the whole the Secretary of State points to an adverse 
 decision, and tells the new Viceroy that he " would 
 probably deem it inexpedient to commit his Government 
 to any permanent pecuniary obligation" (par. 13). The 
 same liberty, however, which had been given by former 
 Cabinets to Lord Lawrence and to Lord Mayo, was 
 given to Lord Lytton, as to occasional subsidies, to be 
 granted to the Ameer, at discretion, and from time to 
 time. 
 
 Next comes the dynastic guarantee — one of the 
 greatest objects of Shere Ali's desire— that the British 
 Government should commit itself to him and to his 
 family, and should promise to support by arms whatever 
 nomination to the succession might be determined by 
 the influence of some favourite inmate of his harem. 
 
 With this question Lord Salisbury fences still more 
 obviously. The paragraphs dealing with it (pars. 14, 15, 
 16)* remind one of the action of a heavy fish rising shyly 
 at a fly, not touching it with its mouth, but giving it a 
 flap with its tail. The Secretary of State refers to the 
 passage of Lord Mayo's letter in 1869 which had been 
 the subject of correspondence between that Viceroy and 
 myself, and respecting the sense of which we had arrived 
 at a clear and definite understanding. He styles that 
 passage a "solemn and deliberate declaration ;" and in 
 the next paragraph he calls it an " ambiguous formula." 
 He says that former Governments had not based upon 
 that declaration any " positive measures." He says that. 
 
 * Afghan Corresp., I., 1878, No. 35, p. 158,
 
 i66 FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO 
 
 havingbeen given "undercircumstancesof some solemnity 
 and parade, it appears to have conveyed (to the Ameer) 
 a pledge of definite action in his favour." He does not 
 venture to affirm directly that Lord Mayo had bound 
 himself to support by arms any succession that Shere 
 Ali might determine to appoint. But he implies it — in 
 the teeth of Lord Mayo's published explanation, that he 
 had specially warned the Ameer that, under no circum- 
 stances, should a British soldier cross the frontiers of 
 India in support of any such course. 
 
 Having got so far in misrepresenting what had been 
 already done, the Government at last approach the point 
 where it becomes necessary to say something as to what 
 they themselves were prepared to do„ But, again, they 
 come up to that point only to go round about it. " Her 
 Majesty's Government do not desire to renounce their 
 traditional policy of abstention from all ////^ra^j-^rr inter- 
 ference in the internal affairs of Afghanista,n."* The 
 stress here is on the word " unnecessary." Had it be- 
 come necessary to pledge the British Government to 
 support a nomination virtually made by the mother of 
 Abdoolah Jan } Surely it was possible to say Yes or 
 No to that question. But neither Yes nor No is defi- 
 nitely spoken. Refuge is taken in the " ambiguous 
 formula" of an abstract proposition. It is an ambiguous 
 formula, however, which has a very obvious purpose. 
 " But," says the Despatch, "the frank recognition of a de 
 facto order in the succession established by a de facto 
 
 * Ibid., para. 16, p. 158.
 
 LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. 167 
 
 Government to the throne of a Foreign State does not, 
 in their opinion, imply or necessitate any intervention in 
 the internal affairs of that State." 
 
 The ingenuity of this passage is great. It enabled 
 Lord Lytton to give to Shere Ali an "ostensible" 
 dynastic guarantee, without giving him the reality. He 
 might recognise the order of succession established in 
 favour of Abdoolah Jan simply as a fact, — ^just as Shere 
 Ali's own actual occupation of the throne had been 
 acknowledged as a fact. But this acknowledgment need 
 not imply, and ought not to imply, any pledge whatever 
 to support it by force of arms if ever it came to be 
 contested. Thus Shere Ali might be allowed to get the 
 appearance of that which he desired, without the sub- 
 stance. 
 
 Having laid this trap for the unfortunate Ameer, and 
 laid it, I must say, with incomparable ingenuity and 
 skill, the Government proceeds to deal with the remain- 
 ing difficulties of the case precisely in the same spirit. 
 The next thing which the Ameer desired was some gua- 
 rantee against foreign aggression, which should be 
 practically unconditional — a guarantee which should 
 place the resources of England and of India, in money, 
 in men, and in arms, at his disposal, without any trouble- 
 some restrictions or control. The Government were in 
 possession of ver}^ recent information that such was 
 really the aim of Shere Ali. The only part of the Secret 
 Note of that mysterious individual, " X. Y.," on which 
 any reliance can be placed — because the only part of it 
 which is corroborated by other evidence — is that part in
 
 i68 FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO 
 
 which " X. Y." describes what Noor Mohammed told his 
 master it would be desirable and practicable to obtain. 
 It was this : — " That the money and arms be given by 
 the British Government ; the men composing the troops 
 should be provided by us, and the power and manage- 
 ment should rest with ourselves."'^ How was this state 
 of things to be dealt with in the new instructions ? Let 
 us see. 
 
 The first thing to be done, as in the former case, was 
 to put a suitable gloss upon what had been done by 
 former Viceroys, — that the contrast with what was to be 
 done now might be the more imposing. In the case of 
 Abdoolah Jan, this gloss had to be put upon the doings 
 of Lord Mayo. It had now to be put upon the doings 
 of Lord Northbrook. Not much consideration was due 
 to him. He had thwarted the designs of the Govern- 
 ment, and he had been compelled to do so in terms 
 which, however respectful, involved reproach. It was 
 all the more natural to discover now, although it had not 
 been discovered before, that there had been something 
 seriously wrong in his proceedings at Simla in 1873. 
 The Government had been in office for two years, and 
 had never hinted this opinion to the Government of 
 India ; but an occasion had arisen when the expression 
 of it became convenient. Accordingly (in pars. 21, 22), 
 we have the intimation that the assurance given by Lord 
 Northbrook to the Ameer in 1873 was only a " personal 
 assurance." This is the first hint of a distinction between 
 
 * Ibid., No. 32, Inclos. 11, p. 143.
 
 LORD LYTTON'S VICEROY ALTY. 169 
 
 the promise of a Viceroy and a pledge binding on the 
 Government, of which we shall find great use made in 
 the sequel. In this place it is of no other use than to 
 prepare the way for a disparagement of the proceedings 
 at Simla, which had become necessary for the purposes 
 of the Despatch. That disparagement is proceeded with 
 in the next paragraph (22). Lord Northbrook's declara- 
 tion is described as just "sufficient to justify reproaches 
 on the part of Shere Ali if, in the contingency to which 
 it referred, he should be left unsupported by the British 
 Government," and yet as " unfortunately too ambiguous 
 to secure confidence or inspire gratitude on the part of 
 his Highness." The suggestion is then made that on 
 account of this conduct of Lord Northbrook the Ameer 
 had " remained under a resentful impression that his 
 Envoy had been trifled with." If, therefore, Shere Ali 
 were to be frank with Lord Lytton's Envoy, he could 
 probably renew the demand addressed to Lord North- 
 brook in 1873, "that in the event of any aggression on 
 the Ameer's territories the British Government should 
 distinctly state that it regards the aggressor as its enemy ; 
 and, secondly, that the contingency of an aggression by 
 Russia should be specifically mentioned in the written 
 assurance to be given to the Ameer."* 
 
 Here, then, was a suggested demand on the part of 
 the Ameer, which, though by no means expressed in a 
 very extreme form, did indicate a guarantee without 
 definite conditions, and tending to compromise the free- 
 
 * Ibid., p. 159.
 
 I70 FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO 
 
 dom of the British Government. It would have been 
 easy to tell Lord Lytton at once, and without circum- 
 locution, whether he was to comply with it or not. But, 
 again, we have a very " shy rise," and a sheer-off into 
 the safe obscurity of a foam of words. In the first place, 
 it is explained that the answer must not be made iden- 
 tical " in terms" with the answer of Lord Northbrook. 
 That would be only to prejudice instead of to improve 
 our relations with the Ameer, "by the evasion of an 
 invited confidence."* But then follows a passage which 
 implies that, although the terms were not to be identical, 
 the substance was to be the same. It had been Lord 
 Northbrook's object to keep the freedom of the British 
 Government, and not to let the Ameer have a guarantee 
 without conditions. Again, it would have been easy to 
 say, frankly and openly, whether the Government did 
 or did not mean to keep this freedom. But, again, they 
 evade the point by the following carefully- balanced 
 ambiguities (par. 24) : — " Her Majesty's Government are 
 therefore prepared to sanction and support any more 
 definite declaration which may, in your judgment, se- 
 cure to their unaltered policy the advantages of which it 
 has been hitherto deprived by an apparent doubt of its 
 sincerity. But they must reserve to themselves entire 
 freedom of judgment as to the character of circumstances 
 involving the obligation of material support to the 
 Ameer, and it must be distinctly understood that only 
 in the case of unprovoked aggression would such an 
 obligation arise." 
 
 * Ibid., para. 23, p, 159.
 
 LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. 171 
 
 It is needless to point out that this is merely a verbose, 
 obscure, and not very ingenuous repetition of the assur- 
 ance given by Lord Northbrook, — the very same limita- 
 tions being carefully reserved, and Lord Lytton being 
 simply authorised to go as near as he could to the appear- 
 ance of an unconditional guarantee without actually 
 giving it. The whole paragraph is an elaborate repeti- 
 tion of the expedient by which it had been suggested 
 that the Ameer should be cajoled on the dynastic gua- 
 rantee in support of Abdoolah Jan. 
 
 In return for these illusory and deceptive guarantees, 
 the largest and most absolute demands were to be made 
 on the unfortunate Ameer. These demands were con- 
 cealed in terms quite wide enough to cover that which 
 the Ameer had always dreaded and suspected— the 
 complete transfer to us of the whole government of his 
 country. The British Government was not only to have 
 for their Agents "undisputed access to the frontier 
 positions" of the Afghan Kingdom : not only were 
 they to "have adequate means of confidentially con- 
 ferring with the Ameer upon all matters as to w^hich the 
 proposed declaration would recognise a community of 
 interests ;" but much more — " they must be entitled to 
 expect becoming attention to their friendly counsels ; 
 and the Ameer must be made to understand that, sub- 
 ject to all fair allowance for the condition of the country 
 and the character of the population, territories ultimately 
 dependent upon British power for their defence must 
 not be closed to those of the Queen's officers or subjects 
 who may be duly authorised to enter them."
 
 172 FROiM JANUARY, \^n, TO 
 
 < 
 
 It is needless to point out that there is nothing in the 
 way of interference that might not be brought within 
 the range of this sweeping declaration. The first Article 
 of the Treaty imposed by Russia on the Khan of Khiva 
 was a more honest, but not a more complete, announce- 
 ment of political subjection. "The Khan acknowledges 
 himself to be the humble servant of the Emperor of All 
 the Russias." This is at least plain and honest speaking, 
 whilst it is to be observed that in that Treaty Russia did 
 not inflict on the vassal Khan the additional humiliation 
 of pretending to respect his independence. The demand 
 to establish an Agency in Herat, or even at several of the 
 cities of Afghanistan, sinks into insignificance when com- 
 pared with the intimation that the country might be filled 
 with European officers and emissaries, to any extent the 
 British Government might please, and with the intimation 
 also that the Ameer was expected to pay " becoming 
 attention" to whatever that Governm.ent might consider 
 to be " friendly counsel," whether on domestic or on 
 foreign affairs. 
 
 Having thus instructed Lord Lytton to make these 
 tremendous demands upon the Ameer, in complete con- 
 tempt and violation of Treaties and of the pledges of Lord 
 Mayo, it seems to have occurred to Lord Salisbury that 
 he had not even yet sufficiently guarded against the 
 possibility of too much being off"ered in return. He re- 
 verts, therefore, in the 26th paragraph to the subject of 
 the guarantees to be held out to the Ameer. He tells the 
 Viceroy that any promise to be given to Shere Ali of 
 " adequate aid against actual and unprovoked attack by
 
 LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. 173 
 
 any foreign Power" must be "not vague, but strictly 
 guarded and clearly circumscribed." As if in mockery 
 it was added, that, if a personal promise — in itself so 
 equivocal — were offered to the Ameer, it would "probably 
 satisfy his Highness," "if the terms of it be unequivocal." 
 But the Viceroy was free to consider the advantages of a 
 Treaty "on the above-indicated basis." The Despatch 
 then proceeds to inform the new Viceroy that the "conduct 
 of Shere Ali has more than once been characterised by 
 so significant a disregard of the wishes and interests of the 
 Government of India, that the irretrievable alienation of 
 his confidence in the sincerity and power of that Govern- 
 ment, was a contingency which could not be dismissed 
 as impossible." This is an accusation which is not sup- 
 ported by a single proof, or even by a single illustration. 
 It is in the teeth of the evidence which had just been given 
 on the subject by the Government of India. The Ameer 
 had given no other indication of a "disregard of the 
 wishes and interests of the Government of India" than 
 was involved in a desire to keep that Government to 
 the promises it had given him. It is, however, the common 
 resource of violent men to traduce those whom they are 
 about to wrong. 
 
 There is one other passage in these Instructions which 
 cannot be passed over without notice. It is a passage 
 which refers to what may be called the Russophobian 
 literature of England and of India. It states very truly 
 that translations of that literature were carefully studied 
 by the Ameer. " Sentiments of irritation and alarm at 
 the advancing power of Russia in Central Asia find
 
 174 FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO 
 
 frequent expression through the English press, in lan- 
 guage which, if taken by Shere Ali for a revelation of the 
 mind of the English Government, must have long been 
 accumulating in his mind impressions unfavourable to its 
 confidence in British power." ♦ The conclusion drawn 
 from this seems to be, — to judge from the rest of the Des- 
 patch, — that it would be well to convince him of our 
 power at the expense of giving him the most just reason 
 to distrust both our moderation and our good faith. 
 How different is the conclusion from that drawn from the 
 same premises by Lord Mayo ! I have shown how, in 
 going to Umballa, he wrote to me of the accusations 
 made against the Ameer by the Anglo-Indian press, — 
 then in one of its periodical fits of excitement about the 
 " advances of Russia," — to the effect that Shere Ali was 
 a mere Russian tool. The inference Lord Mayo drew 
 was, that it was all the more necessary for him to show 
 the silence of conscious strength, — to treat the Ameer 
 with kindness and with confidence, — to give him every 
 possible indication that we had a sincere desire to respect 
 his independence, and to strengthen his Government. 
 In the instructions of Lord Lytton his independence was 
 trampled under foot, and the new Viceroy was educated 
 in every sentiment towards him which could inspire a 
 treatment of distrust and of indignity. 
 
 It is the authors and admirers of this Despatch — so 
 imperious in its tone, so violent in its demands, so hollow 
 in its promises — who, in the late debates in Parliament, 
 have pretended that Lord Northbrook in 1873 did not
 
 LORD LYTTON'S VICEROY ALTY. 175 
 
 sufficiently favour the Ameer by giving him an uncon- 
 ditional guarantee. 
 
 It is not to be understood, however, that this Despatch 
 of the 28th of February, 1876, exhausted the instructions 
 with which Lord Lytton was sent out to India. In the 
 first place, the Despatch as given to Parliament, long and 
 detailed as it is, is only an " extract." We do not know 
 what other injunctions may have been laid upon him. 
 But, in the second place, Lord Lytton did not leave 
 England till towards the end of March. During that time 
 he had been in personal conference with Her Majesty's 
 Government, and also with the Russian Ambassador in 
 England.* We know nothing of the results of these 
 conferences, except by occasional allusions to them, in 
 later speeches and writings of the Viceroy. From several 
 passages in these we derive one fact which is not unim- 
 portant, although, indeed, it is a fact which makes itself 
 sufficiently apparent from other evidence — and that is, 
 that during these months of conference at home, every 
 Indian question was regarded from the one point of view 
 which was engrossing all attention at the time — namely, 
 the point of view which connected it with the Central 
 Asian question. Not only Afghan questions, but all 
 questions affecting what was called border or frontier 
 policy — however local they would have been considered 
 in other days — were canvassed and discussed entirely 
 in their " Mervous" aspects f 
 
 * Ibid. (Simla Narrative), para. 21, p. 165. 
 t See Pari. Pap. Biluchistan, II., 1877, No. 194, para. 17, p. 356. 
 It is here distinctly stated that the Viceroy, " having had the advan-
 
 176 FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO 
 
 A remarkable illustration of this was afforded by- 
 transactions which were going on at the very time of 
 Lord Lytton's appointment. It so happened that one 
 of those questions was in a condition which lent itself 
 very handily to their state of mind. For many years 
 there had been troubles in Beloochistan — troubles be- 
 tween the Khan of Khelat and his nobles and chiefs which 
 often threatened civil war, and were very inconvenient to 
 our trade through Scinde. The Government of India had 
 long been in Treaty relations with this " Khanate," which 
 entitled them to intervene, and to send troops for the 
 occupation of the country. Lord Northbrook had to deal 
 with this matter, and had been advised by his frontier 
 officers to occupy the country with a military force. 
 Instead of this, he had sent an officer. Major Sandeman, 
 who, by less violent measures, had made some progress 
 in remedying the evils which had arisen. But just before 
 he left India, he found it necessary to despatch this officer 
 again into Khelat, and this time attended by a consider- 
 able escort, — upwards of 1000 men, — which amounted 
 to at least a military demonstration. Now, as the occupa- 
 tion of Ouetta, a town in the Khan of Khelat's territory 
 was one of the favourite measures always recommended 
 
 tage before leaving England of personal communications" with the 
 Secretary of State, " was strongly impressed by the importance of 
 endeavouring to deal with them (viz., our frontier relations) as 
 indivisible parts of a single Imperial question mainly dependent for 
 its solution on the foreign policy of Her Majesty's Government." It 
 is by this means that the people of India are to be made to pay for 
 the policy of the Government in the Balkan Peninsula.
 
 LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. 177 
 
 by those who were nervous on the Central Asian Oues- ■ 
 tion, it was obviously not only possible, but easy to take 
 advantage of this state of things to make the occupation 
 of Ouetta appear to arise out of a purely local exigency, 
 and so to gain an important step in a n»ew policy, quietly 
 and almost without observation. Accordingly, this seems 
 to have been the design of the Government in the con- 
 ferences with Lord Lytton before he left London. The 
 last step taken by Lord Northbrook did not nt in quite 
 conveniently with this design, and a somewhat unusual 
 incident occurred. The Viceroys of India always con- 
 tinue in the full exercise of their powers until their 
 successors are actually sworn in at Calcutta. Those who 
 succeed them are generally men not previously well versed 
 in Indian questions, and they usually approach the duties 
 and responsibilities of that great office with a strong sense 
 of the necessity of learning, and of not proceeding hastily 
 on preconceived opinions. Lord Lytton, however, on 
 this occasion, took the unprecedented step of endeavour- 
 ing to interfere with the action of the existing Viceroy in a 
 very delicate matter, before he himself had been installed 
 in office, if not before he had even set foot in India."^ 
 Lord Northbrook very properly declined to divest himself 
 of his functions whilst it was still his duty to discharge 
 them. It had been his duty during a very considerable 
 
 * I owe this fact to a statement made during the late debates in 
 the House of Commons by Lord George Hamilton. The inter- 
 ference of Lord Lytton with the then existing Government of India 
 is stated to have been by telegraph. 
 
 N
 
 lyS FROM JANUARY, 1875, TO APRIL, [876. 
 
 time to consider carefully all that was involved in the 
 method of dealing with the Khan of Khelat, and he 
 determined to prosecute the measures on which he and 
 his Government had decided, notwithstanding the un- 
 precedented conduct of Lord Lytton in endeavouring 
 to interfere. But the fact of this endeavour having been 
 made at all is a sufficient indication of the impulse under 
 which the new Viceroy went out, to consider everything 
 in connexion with the prevalent excitement on the 
 " Eastern Question," and to start in India what was called 
 " an Imperial policy." 
 
 Let us now follow the course which was taken in this 
 spirit with reference to our relations with Afghanistan.
 
 LORD LYTION'S VICEROYALTY. 179 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE VICEROYALTY OF LORD 
 LYTTON IN APRIL, 1 876, TO THE OPENING OF THE 
 PESHAWUR CONFERENCE ON THE 30TH JANUARY, 
 1877. 
 
 The first thing done by the Government, in communi- 
 cation with Lord Lytton, was to select Sir Lewis Pelly as 
 the Special Envoy who was to be sent to the Ameer. 
 Sir Lewis Pelly is an active and very energetic ofificer. 
 But he is the very type of all that makes a British 
 Resident most dreadful in the eyes of an Indian Prince 
 who values or who desires to keep even the shadow of 
 independence. His name was at this time notorious 
 over India, on account of his connexion with the very 
 strong measures the Government of India had been com- 
 pelled to take in the case of the Guicowar of Baroda. 
 There have been, and there still are, many officers in our 
 service in India who have obtained a great reputation for 
 their influence over native Princes, and over the Sove- 
 reigns of neighbouring States, by virtue of qualities which 
 seldom fail to secure their confidence. To pass over all 
 of these, and to single out Sir Lewis Pelly, was a very 
 clear publication to the Indian world how Shere Ali was 
 
 to be treated. 
 
 N 2
 
 I So FROM LORD LYTTON'S VTCEROYALTY 
 
 The next thing which Lord Lytton did was to revert to 
 the scheme to which Lord Northbrook refused to be a 
 party — the scheme, namely, of not telHng at once to the 
 Ameer the truth respecting the real intention of the 
 Mission, — of finding some artificial "pretext" for sending 
 it at all, — and of setting forth in connexion with it certain 
 objects which were to be merely "ostensible." In the 
 23rd paragraph of the Simla Narrative* Lord Lytton 
 gives his account of this proceeding as if it were one of 
 a perfectly creditable kind. He tells us that the " oppor- 
 tunity and pretext " which had hitherto been wanting for 
 the despatch of a complimentary Special Mission to 
 Cabul were " furnished " by two circumstances. The 
 first of these was his own recent accession to the office of 
 Viceroy of Lidia, whilst the second was the recent as- 
 sumption by the Queen of the title of Empress of India. 
 With this "ostensible" object, but with "secret instruc- 
 tions" of a very different kind, the Special Envoy was to 
 be preceded by a "trusted native officer, charged to 
 deliver a letter to the Ameer from the Commissioner of 
 Peshawur." This "pretext" was surely rather too trans- 
 parent. Shere Ali had seen Lord Lawrence succeeded by 
 Lord Mayo, and he had seen Lord Mayo succeeded by 
 Lord Northbrook ; but neither of these Viceroys had 
 announced their recent accession to office in so formal a 
 manner. There did not seem to be any special reason 
 why Lord Lytton should blow such a trumpet before 
 him, which had not been blown by his predecessors. 
 
 Afghanistan, 1878, I., No. 36, p. 166.
 
 TO THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE. i8i 
 
 Then, as regarded the new title of the Queen, unless it 
 was to make some change, not merely in the form, but 
 in the substance of our relations, both with our own feu- 
 datory Princes and with neighbouring Sovereigns whom 
 we professed to regard as independent, it did not seem 
 obvious why it should be announced to Shere Ali by a 
 Special Envoy. Under the peculiar circumstances of 
 the case, such a method of intimating this event would 
 naturally rather rouse suspicion than allay it. 
 
 The letter of the Commissioner of Peshawur, written on 
 behalf of the new Viceroy, was dated May 5, and reached 
 the Ameer on the 17th of May, 1876. It opened by 
 telling him that at a long interview which he had with 
 Lord Lytton, his Excellency had "enquired very cordially 
 after his Highness's health and welfare, and those of his 
 Highness Abdoollah Jan." It informed him of the Vice- 
 roy's intentions of sending his friend. Sir Lewis Pelly, for 
 the purposes already explained. No consent was asked 
 on the part of the Ameer — thus departing at once from 
 all previous usage and understanding on the subject. It 
 expressed confidence that the Ameer would fully recipro- 
 cate the friendly feelings of the Viceroy. It begged the 
 favour of an intimation of the place at which it would be 
 most convenient for the Ameer to receive the Envoy ; 
 and it concluded by informing him that Sir Lewis Pelly, 
 who was honoured by the new Viceroy with his Excel- 
 lency's fullest confidence, would be able to discuss with 
 his Highness matters of common interest to the two 
 Governments.'^ As it was perfectly well known that the 
 * Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 6, p. 174.
 
 X 8 2 FR OM LORD L YTTON'S VICER OVAL TV 
 
 Ameer thought it unsafe for him to leave Cabul, on 
 account of Yakoob Khan's presence there, this letter of 
 the Viceroy was a peremptory message, not only that a 
 Mission would be sent, but practically also that it must 
 be received at the Capital. 
 
 The Ameer's reply, which was dated May 22nd, is a 
 modelof courtesy and of what he himself calls "farsighted- 
 ness." He was delighted to hear of the interviews of the 
 Commissioner with the new Viceroy. He was delighted 
 to hear of the accession to office of his Excellency. He 
 was delighted to hear that the Queen had become "Shah- 
 inshah." He added, with much significance, that he had 
 a "firm hope" that from this most excellent title of the 
 Great Queen, " an additional measure of repose and 
 security in all that belonged to the affairs of the servants 
 of God would be experienced in reality." 
 
 It is never pleasant for any man who is dealing with 
 a neighbour through " pretexts " to be told so gently 
 and so civilly that they are seen through. It must have 
 been particularly provoking to the new Viceroy to be 
 assured of a firm hope on the part of the Ameer that the 
 new Imperial title of the Queen was to be connected 
 with new securities for a peaceful and reassuring policy. 
 
 But the Ameer now proceeded to make another intima- 
 tion which must have been still more provoking. It was 
 part of the case, as we have seen, which the Government 
 and Lord Lytton desired to put forward, that the assur- 
 ances given to the Ameer in 1873 had not been sufficient 
 and that on account of this he had no sufficient confidence 
 in our support. This case was seriously damaged by the
 
 TO THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE. 183 
 
 declaration of the Ameer, which immediately followed, 
 that he saw no use in the coming of new Envoys, inas- 
 much as his Agent had " formerly, personally, held 
 political parleys at the station of Simla," when "those 
 subjects full of advisability for the exaltation and perma- 
 nence of friendly and political relations, having been 
 considered sufficient and efficient, were entered in two 
 letters, and need not be repeated now."* So awkward 
 was this passage for Lord Lytton that in the subsequent 
 Simla Narrative we find him compelled to put a gloss 
 upon it, in order to extract its sting. In the same 
 twenty-third paragraph of that Narrative to which I have 
 already referred, the Ameer is represented as having said 
 that he " desired no change in his relations with the 
 British Government, which appeared to have been defined 
 by that Government to its own satisfaction at the Simla 
 Conference." The letter of the Ameer does not say this. 
 It does not say or imply that the satisfaction arising out 
 of the Simla Conference was a one-sided satisfaction, 
 felt by the British Government, but not felt by himself. 
 And when we find the Viceroy resorting to this gloss 
 upon the words we understand where the words them- 
 selves were found to pinch. 
 
 But the next sentences of the Ameer's reply must have 
 been still more unpleasant. He ventured to intimate 
 that he knew quite well that the Viceroy had some ul- 
 terior designs, and that the pretexts he had put forward 
 were "ostensible." Ilq begged that if any new con- 
 
 * Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 7, p. i75-
 
 1 84 FROM LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY 
 
 ferences were intended " for the purpose of refreshing and 
 benefiting the State of Afghanistan," " then let it be 
 hinted," in order that a confidential Agent of the Ameer 
 " being presented with the things concealed in the gener- 
 ous heart of the English Government should reveal them'' 
 to the Ameer. 
 
 This letter of Shere Ali was accompanied by a letter 
 from our Native Agent, Atta Mohammed Khan, explain- 
 ing all that he knew of the motives which had actuated 
 the Ameer, and all the arguments which had been put 
 forward in his Durbar, upon the proposals of the Viceroy. 
 In this letter, the real fundamental objection which has 
 always actuated the Rulers of Afghanistan in resisting 
 the reception of European officers, is fully set forth. 
 That objection is the fear that these Agents would be 
 perpetually interfering — making demands or proposals 
 which it would be equally embarrassing for the Ameer to 
 grant or to refuse. One of the other arguments put for- 
 ward, as supporting and more or less covering this one 
 great actuating motive, was the argument that if the 
 British Government were to urge European officers on 
 the Ameer the Russian Government might follow its 
 example. If this argument had been used in the letter 
 of the Ameer it would have formed a legitimate ground 
 of some temperate and friendly remonstrance on the part 
 of the Viceroy ; because it implies a misrepresentation 
 of the well-known relative positions of the British and 
 Russian Governments towards Afghanistan. But this 
 argument was not used in the letter of the Ameer. It 
 was only reported as having been used in the private con-
 
 TO THE PESHAWVR CONFERENCE. 185 
 
 sultations of the Durbar.* Our knowledge of the fact 
 that it had been used at all is, indeed, a signal illustra- 
 tion of the fidelity with which we were served by our 
 native Agency, and of the fallacy of at least one of the 
 pretences on which the new policy was founded. 
 
 The letter of the Ameer must have reached the Com- 
 missioner of Peshawur about the 3rd of June, 1876.! 
 But no reply was given to it for more than a month. In 
 the Simla Narrative, the Viceroy, who himself avows that 
 his own letter had been sent upon a " pretext," and had 
 made proposals which were only " ostensible," has the 
 courage to describe the reply of the unfortunate Ameer 
 as a response of "studied ambiguity;"+ the truth being 
 that there was about it no ambiguity whatever, and that 
 it was a reply representing straightforwardness itself 
 when contrasted with the letter of Lord Lytton. 
 
 Cajolery having failed, it was now determined to try 
 the effect of threats. Accordingly, after the lapse of 
 more than a month, on the 8th of July, the Commissioner 
 of Peshawur addressed another letter to the Ameer — 
 the terms of which were dictated, of course, by the 
 Government of India. We have no official information 
 how this interval of a month had been employed. But 
 we have the best reason to believe that Lord Lytton had 
 difficulties with his Council. Three of its most distin- 
 
 * Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 8, pp. 175, 176. 
 t I have assumed here that it takes twelve days to send a 
 letter from Peshawur to Cabul, because in several cases this 
 time seems to have been actually taken. But I am informed 
 that four days only are required. 
 
 X Ibid., No. 36, para. 24, p. 167.
 
 1 86 FROM LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY 
 
 guished members, Sir William Muir, Sir Henry Norman, 
 and Sir Arthur Hobhouse, were opposed altogether to the 
 new " Imperial" policy. Somehow, the expression of 
 their opinions has been suppressed. But it is at least 
 extremely probable, from the time spent in discussion 
 and from information which has been published, that their 
 remonstrances had some effect, and that the letter to the 
 Ameer finally decided upon may have been delayed by 
 their resistance. The purport of this letter, and the spirit 
 which it was intended to express, was more fully ex- 
 plained in a covering letter which was not addressed 
 directly to the Ameer, but to the British Agent at his 
 Court. This covering letter was written not only to 
 comment upon what the Ameer had said in his own 
 official reply, but also upon the report which had been 
 furnished by our Agent of the debates in the Durbar- 
 It was, therefore, in itself, a very remarkable exposure of 
 that other pretext so long put forward by the Indian 
 Secretary, that our Mohammedan Agent at Cabul did not 
 give us full and trustworthy information as to what was 
 going on in the Capital of the Ameer. Assuming the 
 perfect correctness of our Agent's information, it com- 
 mented with severity and even bitterness on one or two 
 of the motives and arguments of the Government of 
 Cabul. Some of these arguments it misrepresents. For 
 example, it refers to the fear lest the Envoy " should 
 address to the Ameer demands incompatible with the 
 interests of His Highness.""^ This is not a correct or a 
 
 Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 10, p. 177.
 
 TO THE PESHAWUR CONTERENCE. 187 
 
 fair account of the fear which had been reported by our 
 Agent. That fear was that the Envoy might "put for- 
 ward such weighty matters of State that its entertainment 
 by His Highness, in view of the demands of the time,, 
 might prove difficult," and that the Ameer should find 
 himself obliged to reject it verbally. There is all the 
 difference in the world between ihese two representations. 
 The one implies a charge against the British Government, 
 or a suspicion of its intentions, that it might desire to 
 injure the Ameer ; whereas, the other implies nothing 
 more than that he feared proposals which might to him 
 appear inexpedient, and that he desired to keep his 
 freedom and his political independence in not being 
 exposed to undue pressure upon such matters. 
 
 The letter does indeed give assurances to the Ameer of 
 a desire to consider in a friendly spirit all that he might 
 have to suggest. But behind all these assurances the 
 Ameer knew that the real object was to force upon him 
 the abandonment of the engagement made, and the 
 pledges given, by previous Viceroys on the subject of 
 British officers resident in his dominions. He knew, 
 moreover, that this object was aimed at not by persuasion 
 but by threats. He was warned of the "grave responsi- 
 bility " he w^ould incur if he deliberately rejected the 
 opportunity afforded him. But the bitterest passage of 
 this letter was that which referred to the frank indication 
 given by the Ameer that he knew there was some object 
 behind, — which had not been explained to him in the 
 " ostensible" purport of the proposed Mission. This de- 
 tection of the truth by Shere AH rouses all the indigna-
 
 1 8 8 FR OM L ORD L YTTON'S VICER OYALTY 
 
 tion of the Viceroy. He has the courage to talk of the 
 " sincerity" of his own intentions. He denounces the 
 " apparent mistrust" with which his letter had been re- 
 ceived by the Cabul Durbar, and he angrily declines to 
 receive an Agent from the Ameer who was to be sent 
 with a view of becoming acquainted with what the Ameer 
 " designated" as the " objects sought" by the British 
 Government. Finally, the Ameer was warned that the 
 responsibility of refusing would rest entirely on the 
 Government of Afghanistan.* 
 
 The letter which was addressed personally to the 
 Ameer, and which bore the same date, was much shorter_ 
 But it is remarkable in several ways. In the first place 
 it reiterated the " ostensible" pretext that the Envoy was 
 intended to announce Lord Lytton's accession to office, 
 and also the assumption by the Queen of the Imperial 
 title. But, in the second place, it gave renewed assurances 
 that the Viceroy was sincerely desirous, not only of main- 
 taining, but of materially strengthening, the bands of 
 friendship and confidence between the two Governments, 
 and it gave some obscure intimations of the benefits to 
 be conferred. It did not distinctly promise a dynastic 
 guarantee, but it hinted at it. Still less did it explain 
 the device under which it had been discovered how an 
 apparent dynastic guarantee could be given without in- 
 volving any engagement whatever to support a " de facto 
 order of succession" in case of its being disputed. But 
 it did cautiously and carefully, and in very guarded 
 
 * Ibid, pp. 176-177-
 
 TO THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE. 189 
 
 language, just suggest to Shere AH that something 
 might be in store for him " more particularly affecting 
 Afghanistan and the personal welfare of His Highness 
 and his dynasty." Finally, the letter ended with a threat 
 that if the refusal of the Ameer should render nugatory 
 the friendly intentions of the Viceroy, his Excellency 
 would be obliged " to regard Afghanistan as a State 
 which has voluntarily isolated itself from the alliance 
 and support of the British Government,""^ 
 
 These communications, which were dated at Peshawur 
 on the 8th of July, must have reached the Ameer about 
 the 20th of that month. On receipt of the letter to him- 
 self, together with the farther explanations, all conceived 
 in the same spirit, which our native Agent was at the 
 same time ordered to give him, the unfortunate Ameer 
 was naturally at once alarmed and incensed. He saw 
 that the powerful British Government was determined to 
 break — and was then actually breaking — the promises 
 made to him by former Viceroys, and he saw that this 
 determination was unqualified and unredeemed by any 
 promises which were of the slightest value. Whenever a 
 Mohammedan Sovereign gets into a passion, or into a 
 scrape out of which he does not see his way, — whenever, 
 in short, he is driven to the wall, — his uniform resource 
 is to appeal, or to contemplate an appeal, to Moslem 
 fanaticism. On this occasion, Shere Ali was reported to 
 have looked round about him, and to have consulted 
 '• Mollahs " as to whether he could get up what is called 
 
 * Ibid., No. 36. Inclos. 9, p. 176.
 
 190 FROM LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY 
 
 a "Jehad " or religious war. This, however, was merely 
 a personal display of temper, and no symptom of it ap- 
 peared in his official communications. He took some 
 time, but, under the circumstances, by no means an un- 
 reasonable time, to consider his course. His reply was 
 dated September 3, 1876 — or six weeks after he had 
 received the Viceroy's letter. It is characteristic of the 
 spirit in which the Simla Narrative of these transactions 
 was written, and of the accuracy of its statements, that 
 the 25th paragraph of that document calls this interval 
 "a significant delay of two months." Considering that 
 the Viceroy had himself delayed to answer the Ameer's 
 former letter of the 22nd of May from about the 3rd of 
 June, at which date it must have reached Peshawur, till 
 the 8th of July, a period of five weeks, — considering that 
 the British Government had nothing to fear, and nothing 
 to lose — and considering that the Ameer had, or deemed 
 himself to have, everything at stake, and had taken only 
 one week longer to deliberate than Lord Lytton himself, 
 this invidious misstatement of the Ameer's conduct is as 
 ungenerous as it is inaccurate. 
 
 On the 3rd of September the Ameer replied, making 
 three alternative proposals. One was that the Viceroy 
 should agree to receive an Envoy from Cabul, who might 
 explain everything. The next was that the Viceroy 
 would send an Envoy to meet on the frontier a selected 
 representative of the Afghan State. A third was that 
 the British Native Agent at Cabul, who had long been 
 intimately acquainted with all his wishes, should be sum- 
 moned by the Viceroy, and should expound the whole
 
 TO THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE. igi 
 
 state of affairs, and that on his return to the Ameer he 
 should bring a similar explanation from the Government 
 of India."^ 
 
 On the i6th of September the Viceroy replied through 
 the Commissioner of Peshawur, accepting the last of these 
 three alternatives, on the condition that the Ameer should 
 explain his views fully and confidentially to the British 
 Agent. In that case the Agent would be as frankly 
 informed of the views of the British Government, and 
 would explain them to the Ameer on his return to Cabul.f 
 Our Agent, Atta Mohammed Khan, was directed to 
 make all speed to meet the Viceroy at Simla, and not 
 to let the object of his journey be known if any inquiries 
 should be made about it. 
 
 The British Agent at Cabul, the Nawab Atta Moham- 
 med Khan, reached Simla in time to have a conversation 
 with Sir Lewis Pelly and others on behalf of the Viceroy, 
 on the 7th of October. The Ameer had declared that 
 he had nothing to add to the wishes he had expressed at 
 Umballa in 1869, and through his Minister at Simla in 
 1873. But the Agent, on being asked to give his own 
 estimate of the feelings of the Ameer and of the causes 
 " which had estranged him from the British Government," 
 mentioned eight different circumstances or transactions 
 which were " among the causes of annoyance and estrange- 
 ment." At the head of these was the Seistan Arbitration. 
 Our recent doings in Khelat came next. Our inter- 
 
 * Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 14, p. 179. 
 t Ibid., Inclos. 16, p. 179.
 
 192 FROM LORD LYTTOJSTS VICEROYALTY 
 
 ference on behalf of his rebellious son, Yakoob Khan, 
 was third in the list. The fourth was our sending pre- 
 sents to his feudatory, the Khan of Wakhan. The fifth 
 was the results of the Conferences in 1873, during which 
 his Minister had received some personal offence. The 
 sixth was the terms of certain recent letters from the 
 Commissioner of Peshawur. The seventh was that the 
 Ameer counted on our own self-interest as the best 
 security for our protection of his country. The eighth 
 was our refusal to give him the offensive and defensive 
 Treaty which Lord Mayo had refused to him at Um- 
 balla, and which had been refused ever since. 
 
 On the other hand, the Agent specified seven things 
 which the Ameer really desired from us. First and fore- 
 most of these things was an engagement that no Eng- 
 lishman should reside in Afghanistan, or at all events in 
 Cabul. The second was a renunciation of all sympathy 
 or connexion with Yakoob Khan, and a dynastic guaran- 
 tee of the succession as determined by himself The third 
 was a promise " to support the Ameer, on demand, with 
 troops and money, in all and every case of attack from 
 without," as well as against internal disturbance.* The 
 fourth was a permanent subsidy. The fifth was an en- 
 gagement not to interfere in the internal affairs of Af- 
 ghanistan. The sixth was that in any engagement made, 
 words should be introduced making the alliance strictly 
 offensive and defensive on both sides. The seventh was 
 that we should recognise him by some new title, as he 
 considered himself quite equal to the Shah of Persia.f 
 
 * Ibid, p. 182. t Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 18, pp. 181, 182.
 
 TO THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE. 193 
 
 Having ascertained all this, which showed that the 
 Ameer adhered closely and pertinaciously to the very 
 same desires which he had vainly pressed on former Vice- 
 roys, Lord Lytton determined to see the Agent himself, 
 and was, of course, obliged to make up his mind how far 
 he would go in the direction of conceding, or appearing 
 to concede, what his predecessors in ofifice had been com- 
 pelled to refuse. Strange to say, he began the conver- 
 sation by telling the Agent that his information "was 
 very full and interesting, but quite new." It will be seen 
 from the narrative previously given that, on the contrary, 
 there was very little indeed that was new, and that the 
 Ameer's principal objects had been perfectly well known, 
 and very accurately appreciated both by Lord Mayo and 
 by Lord Northbrook. Lord Lytton then proceeded to 
 explain to the Agent that the Ameer was mistaken in 
 supposing that we should support him unless it were our 
 own interest to do so, and that if he did not choose to 
 please us, " the assistance which he seemed at present 
 disinclined to seek or deserve, might, at any moment, be 
 very welcome to one or other of his rivals." He further 
 informed the Agent that the moment we ceased to regard 
 Afghanistan as a friendly and firmly allied State there 
 was nothing to prevent us from coming to " an under- 
 standing with Russia which might have the effect of 
 wiping Afghanistan out of the map altogether." This 
 was very threatening language. There was a good deal 
 more of a similar kind, conceived in the worst possible 
 taste. Thus, the Ameer was to be told that the British 
 military power could either be " spread round him as a 
 
 o
 
 194 FROM LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY 
 
 ring- of iron," or " it could break him as a reed," — and 
 again tliat he was as " an earthen pipkin between two 
 iron pots." But bad as all this was in tone, it did not 
 involve any incorrect statement of facts. It was accom- 
 panied, however, by another announcement for which, so 
 far as I know, there was not the shadow of justification. 
 "If the Ameer does not desire to come to a speedy 
 understanding with us, Russia does ; and she desires it 
 at his expense."* If this passage has any meaning, that 
 meaning appears to be that Russia desired to come to 
 some arrangement with England under which the King- 
 dom of Cabul was to be sacrificed either in whole or in 
 part. No papers justifying this statement have been 
 presented to Parliament. I believe it to be one without 
 the shadow of a foundation. 
 
 The Viceroy next proceeded to make a very satisfac- 
 tory declaration — which was, that the British Government 
 was then "able to pour an overwhelming force into 
 Afghanistan, either for the protection of the Ameer, or 
 for the vindication of its own interests, long before a 
 single Russian soldier could reach Cabul." It is well to 
 remember this : but the confidence expressed is not 
 very consistent with the context either of words or of 
 conduct. 
 
 It now became necessary, however, for the Viceroy to 
 come to the point — how much he was prepared to offer 
 to the Ameer. As preparatory to this he found it con- 
 venient, as his official instructions had done, to disparage 
 
 * Ibid. D. i8^.
 
 TO THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE. 195 
 
 what the Ameer had got from former Viceroys. Lord 
 Lytton, therefore, went on to observe that " the Ameer 
 has hitherto had only verbal understandings with us. 
 The letter given him by Lord Mayo was not in the nature 
 of a Treaty engagement, and was, no doubt, vague and 
 general in its terms." I have already expressed my 
 opinion on this attempt to impair the binding obligation 
 of solemn promises and pledges given by the Viceroys of 
 India, whether they be merely verbal, or written only in 
 the form of letters. It is a doctrine incompatible with 
 that confidence which has hitherto been maintained in the 
 honour of the British Government in India, and cannot 
 be too severely condemned. It is a doctrine incompatible 
 with the faithful fulfilment by the Crown of the assurances 
 given in that very solemn document, the Proclamation 
 issued on the assumption by the Crown of the direct 
 Government of India — " We hereby announce to the 
 Native Princes of India, that all the treaties and eneasre- 
 ments made with them by, or under the authority of the 
 East India Company, are by us accepted, and will be 
 scrupulously maintained." On no other principle can we , ; 
 keep our ground in India, and no Viceroy before Lord 1/ 1 
 Lytton has ever attempted to evade it. 
 
 Lord Lytton then proceeded to detail the concessions 
 he was willing to make. He agreed to the formula, 
 " that the friends and enemies of either State should be 
 those of the other." But the very next concession showed 
 that some reserve was nevertheless maintained. Shere 
 Ali had always asked for an absolute guarantee against 
 aggression. But Lord Lytton would not omit the quali- 
 
 O 2
 
 196 FROM LORD LYTTON'S VICEROY ALTY 
 
 fying word which all former Viceroys had insisted upon 
 — namely, " unprovoked." Of course the insertion of this 
 word kept open the discretion of the British Government 
 in each case, and, moreover, implied some sort of control 
 over the foreign policy of the Ameer. The Viceroy also 
 agreed to " recognise Abdoolah Jan as the Ameer's 
 successor." But this was also qualified with great care 
 and some ingenuity. The qualification of the Cabinet, as 
 we have seen, would have reduced this guarantee practi- 
 cally to a nullity. Lord Lytton tried hard, at a second 
 interview with the Agent, to express the qualification in 
 a manner as little formidable as possible to the Ameer. 
 " If the Ameer, or his heir, were ever actually ejected from 
 the throne of Cabul, the British Government would not 
 undertake a war with the Afghans for their restoration. If, 
 however, the Ameer gave notice in due time, while still in 
 possession of his throne, that he was in difficulties, and 
 needed material assistance, such assistance would be 
 afforded within the limits of what might be found practi- 
 cally possible at the time."^ I do not deny that this was 
 quite as much as the Ameer could reasonably ask. On 
 the contrary, I entirely agree with Lord Lytton that it 
 was so, and quite as much as the British Government 
 could safely give. But it was no appreciable addition to 
 what had been actually done by Lord Lawrence and by 
 Lord Mayo. They had both assisted him with money 
 and with arms — on the very ground that he was in actual 
 possession of his throne, although still in danger of losing 
 
 * Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 20, p. 185.
 
 TO THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE. 197 
 
 it. This indeed had been their declared policy, and to this 
 all their promises and assurances had pointed. But this 
 was not what the Ameer wanted. It kept that element 
 of discretion in the hands of the British Government to 
 judge of the policy to be pursued in each case, which 
 destroyed the whole value of it in the opinion of the 
 Ameer. Lord Lytton did indeed make one rather shy 
 offer connected with this subject, which, I venture to 
 think, might have landed us in a very false position, and 
 in a very unjust course of conduct. He offered, if Shere 
 All wished it, to keep Yakoob Khan in safe custody in 
 India. That is to say, the British Government were to 
 act as jailors for the Ameer of Cabul. If this meant that 
 we were to bind ourselves by Treaty to prevent Yakoob 
 under whatever circumstances, from becoming a candi- 
 date for the throne of his father, it was a most dangerous 
 offer, and we cannot be too thankful that it was not 
 accepted. 
 
 Lastly, Lord Lytton did agree to offer a yearly subsidy 
 to the Ameer, the amount of which, however, and the 
 conditions of which, were left open for detailed con- 
 sideration. 
 
 On the other hand, in return for these very small 
 advances on what Shere Ali had already obtained in the 
 promises and assurances of former Viceroys, Lord Lytton 
 required him to give up absolutely that on which, as we 
 have seen, he set the highest value. His foreign policy 
 and conduct was to be absolutely under our control. This 
 control was to be symbolised, if it was not to be actually 
 exercised, by British officers resident at Herat and else-
 
 198 FROM LORD LYTTON'S VICEROY ALTY 
 
 where on his frontiers. Afghanistan was to be freely 
 open to Englishmen, official and unofficial. The result 
 was that the Ameer was offered nothing of that which he 
 really desired, whilst, on the other hand, he was required 
 to grant to us the whole of that demand which he had 
 always regarded with the greatest dread. 
 
 Primed with this strange mixture of bluster and of 
 baits, our Agent was sent off to Cabul, to translate it all 
 as best he could to the unfortunate Ameer. For this pur- 
 pose he was furnished with an "Aide Memoire." It 
 summed up the promises as plausibly as possible ; it 
 maintained the substantial limitations in terms as sub- 
 dued and obscure as could be devised ; but it distinctly 
 made all these promises absolutely dependent on the new 
 condition about the reception of British officers — and 
 worse than this, it plainly intimated that not only were 
 the new promises to be absolutely dependent on this con- 
 dition, but the maintenance of existing promises also. 
 Without that new condition, the Viceroy " could not do 
 anything for his assistance, whatever might be the 
 dangers or difficulties of his future position."* 
 
 The Agent was also charged with a letter from the 
 Viceroy to the Ameer, in which Shere Ali was referred on 
 details to the full explanations given to our Agent. But 
 in this letter the Viceroy ventures on the assertion that he 
 was now offering to the Ameer what he had vainly asked 
 from former Viceroys. This assertion is thus expressed : 
 •' Your Highness will thus be assured by the Agent that 
 
 * Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 21, pp. 185, 186.
 
 TO THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE. 199 
 
 I shall be prepared to comply with the wishes which 
 you announced through your Agent at Simla in 1873 
 and to which you have adhered in more recent commu- 
 nications.""^ 
 
 But our native Agent was not the only diplomatist 
 charged with this important mission. The Ameer had 
 offered, as one of his alternatives, to send a special Envoy 
 to meet upon the frontier another similar Envoy from the 
 Viceroy. Lord Lytton would now graciously agree to 
 this proposal. Sir Lewis Pelly was to be his Envoy. In 
 anticipation of the Ameer's consent, this officer was fur- 
 nished with a long paper of recapitulations and instruc- 
 tions, dated October 17th, 1876, and also with a Draft 
 Treaty.t 
 
 It is a matter of the highest interest to observe in these 
 papers how deftly the delicate subject is dealt with in 
 regard to the difference between what the Ameer desired 
 to get, and what it was now proposed to give to him. In 
 the fifth paragraph of Sir Lewis Felly's new instructions 
 he is desired to be governed by the terms of Lord 
 Salisbury's despatch of the 28th of February, 1876. J 
 We have seen how very safe and how very dexterously 
 drawn this despatch was. But, on the other hand, as it 
 was desirable to show as fine a hand as possible at this 
 juncture, the following audacious statement is made in 
 the sixth paragraph : — " The conditions on which the 
 Governor-General in Council is now prepared to enter into 
 
 * Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 22, p. 186. 
 
 t Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 23 and 24, pp. 1 87-191. 
 
 X Ibid., No. 36, Inclos, 23, p. 187,
 
 200 FROM LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY 
 
 closer and more definite relations with the Government of 
 Afghanistan are in every particular the same as those 
 desired by the Ameer himself on the occasion of his visit 
 to Umballa in 1869, and again in more or less general 
 terms so urged by him on the Government of India 
 through his Minister, Syud Noor Mohammed Shah, in 
 
 1873." 
 
 I call this statement audacious, because, as regards the 
 transactions of 1869, it is contradicted in every syllable 
 by an authoritative document which the Government of 
 India must have had before it at the time. In certain 
 paragraphs of Lord Mayo's despatch to me, of the ist of 
 July, 1869, we have a full explanation by that Viceroy of 
 the unconditional character of the guarantees which were 
 then desired by the Ameer, and which Lord Mayo had 
 decided it was impossible to give him.* The assertion 
 that the assurances which the Viceroy was now willing 
 to offer to the Ameer corresponded " in every particular" 
 with those thus described by Lord Mayo, is an assertion 
 which it is impossible to characterise too severely. 
 
 Considering that Lord Lytton__had just heard from the 
 mouth of our own Agent at Cabul how very different 
 " in every particular" the Ameer's real demands continued 
 to be from the concessions which it was possible for the 
 Viceroy or for any British Government to make, this 
 broad assertion is one which is truly astonishing. It is 
 all the more so, as in the very same document there is 
 another paragraph (25), which seems to lay down the 
 
 * Ibid., No. 19, paras. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 45, pp. 95 and 97.
 
 TO THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE. 201 
 
 principle that the British Government could not go further 
 than was consistent with the principles laid down by- 
 Lord Mayo in 1869, and the next paragraph (26) pro- 
 ceeds thus: — "For the same reason, the British Govern- 
 ment cannot contract any obligation to support the 
 Princes of Afghanistan against the opposition of the 
 Afghan nation, or any large majority of their subjects 
 whose loyalty has been alienated by misgovernment or 
 oppression."''^ 
 
 In like manner, when we turn to the Draft Treaty 
 which was placed in Sir Lewis Felly's hands, we find the 
 most elaborate precautions taken to prevent the assur- 
 ances given from coming near to the guarantees which 
 the Am.eer really wanted. This is done by the con- 
 stant introduction of qualifying words, and by a perfect 
 wilderness of saving clauses. Let us take the Articles 
 most important to the Ameer. First comes the External 
 Guarantee. The Third Articlef professes to give it. 
 There was less need of caution here, because this 
 guarantee coincides with our own interest in almost every 
 conceivable case. Nevertheless it was not to operate 
 unless the Ameer had acted in strict conformity with the 
 previous Article, which purported to be one of mutually 
 offensive and defensive alliance. Nor was it to operate 
 unless the Ameer had refrained from (i) provocation of, 
 or (2) aggression on, or (3) interference with, the States 
 and territories beyond his frontier. Besides all this, the 
 succeed:ng Article, the Fourth, specifies that the Ameer 
 
 * Ibid., p. 189. t Ibid., p. 190.
 
 202 FROM LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY 
 
 was to conduct all his relations with foreign States in 
 harmony with the policy of the British Government. 
 Next comes the Dynastic Guarantee. It professes to be 
 given by the Ninth Article. But this Article simply 
 "agrees to acknowledge whomsoever his Highness might 
 nominate as his heir-apparent, and to discountenance the 
 pretensions of any rival claimant to the throne." But 
 this is no more than Lord Mayo's promise of " viewing 
 with severe displeasure" any disturbers of the existing 
 order. There is no direct promise whatever to support the 
 Ameer's nomination, if it should turn out to be unpopular 
 in Afghanistan. 
 
 But the provisions of the Tenth Article are the best 
 specimens of Lord Lytton's favours. This Article pro- 
 fesses to provide for our non-interference in domestic 
 affairs, and yet at the same time to hold out a prospect 
 to the Ameer of support in the event of domestic troubles. 
 This required some nice steering. Accordingly the 
 saving clauses are positively bewildering. There is, first, 
 the promise of abstention. Then there is the exception 
 — " except at the invocation of the Ameer." Then there 
 are limitations on such an appeal. It must be to avert 
 the recurrence of civil war, and to protect peaceful 
 interests. The support may be material, or only moral, 
 as the British Government may choose. The quantity 
 of the support in either case was to be measured by their 
 own opinion of what was necessary for the aid of the 
 Ameer. But, again, even this aid was to be limited to 
 the protection (i) of authority which was "equitable," 
 (2) of order which was " settled," and {3) against an
 
 TO THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE. 203 
 
 ambition which was " personal," or (4) a competition for 
 power which was " unlawful." 
 
 I do not say that any one of these limitations was in 
 itself unreasonable, or even unnecessary. But they were 
 all elaborately designed to keep in the hands of the 
 British Government, under the forms of a Treaty, that 
 complete freedom to judge of each case as it might arise, 
 according to times and circumstances, which Lord Mayo 
 and Lord Northbrook had been determined to maintain. 
 It was, however, precisely for the purpose of limiting this 
 freedom that the Ameer had desired to get a Treaty. 
 To offer him a Treaty which kept that freedom as it was, 
 could be no response to his desires. It was, therefore, 
 worse than an " ostensible pretext" to represent such a 
 Treaty as a concession to the Ameer of that for which 
 he had asked. The Viceroy, however, did not trust wholly 
 to these illusory representations of the effect of the 
 offered Treaty. He knew that the Ameer was in want 
 of money. The hooks were therefore heavily baited. If 
 the Ameer agreed to sell his independence, he was to get 
 ;^200,ooo on the ratification of the Treaty, and an annual 
 subsidy of £120,000* 
 
 But, guarded as the Draft Treaty is in all these ways, 
 the Viceroy seems to have been haunted by a nervous 
 apprehension lest, after all, the Ameer should get some 
 promise too definite and entangling. Sir Lewis Pelly was 
 therefore also furnished with another " Aide Memoire,'' 
 for a " Subsidiary, Secret, and Explanatory Agreement."! 
 
 * Ibid., p. 192. t Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 25, p. 191.
 
 204 FROM LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY 
 
 In this document the reservations limiting our pretended 
 guarantee are re-stated with laborious care. 
 
 In the twenty-seventh paragraph of the Simla Nar- 
 rative, a very frank confession is made of the general 
 result of these elaborate precautions. That result was 
 that the poor Ameer, in return for all our demands, was 
 to get practically nothing beyond what Lord Mayo had 
 promised him in 1869. " These concessions, sanctioned 
 by your Lordship's last instructions, would not practically 
 commit the British Government to anything more than a 
 formal re-affirmation of the assurances already given by 
 it, through Lord Mayo, to the Ameer in 1869, and a 
 public recognition of its inevitable obligations to the vital 
 interests of its own Empire." That is to say — the Ameer 
 was to get nothing except what former Viceroys had 
 already given to him, and whatever more we might find 
 it for our own interests to do on his behalf. After this 
 confession, it is not to be denied that all the professions 
 of Lord Lytton that he was now offering to the Ameer 
 what he had desired, must be condemned as " ostensible 
 pretexts." 
 
 I wish I had nothing more to add to the history of 
 these deplorable transactions. But, unfortunately, there 
 is another part of them, which must be told. 
 
 Lord Lytton had with him at Simla Captain Gre}-, 
 who had been Persian Interpreter at the Conference at 
 Umballa. As such he had become intimate with Noor 
 Mohammed Khan, the confidential Minister of the Ameer. 
 It seems to have occurred to the Viceroy that this friend- 
 ship might be used for the purpose of representing to the
 
 TO THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE. 205 
 
 Ameer that the Government of India was now ofifering 
 to him all that he had ever asked or demanded. Accor- 
 dingly, on the 13th of October, which was two days after 
 Sir L. Pelly had been furnished with all these elaborate 
 limitations, and multitudinous saving clauses, Captain 
 Grey was employed to write a private letter to his 
 friend Noor Mohammed. It referred, coaxingly, to the 
 feeling of the Afghan Minister, that he had ground for 
 annoyance at what had passed in 1873. It did not ex- 
 pressly say that the writer concurred in this impression. 
 But Noor Mohammed was asked to " let by-gones be 
 by-gones." It pointed out to him that the Vicero}' had 
 now " accepted all the propositions which he (Noor 
 Mohammed) made in 1873," imposing only the condition 
 that he should be enabled to watch a frontier for which 
 he was to render himself responsible, and that the Ameer, 
 his friend and ally, should receive his Envoys. It then 
 proceeded to remind the Afghan Minister of his alleged 
 expressions at Umballa in 1869, and at Simla in 1873, 
 as to the willingness of the Ameer at some future time 
 to receive British officers in his Kingdom. It went on 
 to represent the difficulty in the way at that time as 
 having been the objection of former Viceroys to assume 
 responsibility for the Afghan frontier. It represented 
 that the existing Viceroy had no such objection, and was 
 now prepared to assume that responsibility. In con- 
 clusion it intimated that hitherto, under former Viceroys, 
 there had been " vacillation," because in the absence of a 
 Treaty, "Ministers at home, and Viceroys in this country, 
 exercised an unfettered discretion," but " where a Treaty
 
 2o6 FROM LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY 
 
 has been entered into everyone would be bound by its 
 conditions.""^ 
 
 What can be said of this letter — of its representations 
 of fact — of its constructions of conduct — of its inter- 
 pretation of the Viceroy's offers ? It seems to me that 
 nothing can be said which could be too severe. It is in 
 the highest degree disingenuous and crooked. No part 
 of it is worse than that in which it re-afifirms by implication 
 the distinction between the binding character of a Treaty, 
 and the not-binding character of a Viceroy's promises. 
 It represents former Viceroys as having taken advantage 
 of this distinction in vacillating conduct. For this accusa- 
 tion, so far as I know, there is no foundation in fact. 
 Lord Mayo and I had objected in 1869 to a Treaty, not 
 because it would have made the promises we did give 
 more binding than we considered them to be when less 
 formally recorded, but because a Treaty was expected 
 by both parties to involve other promises — of a different 
 kind — which we were not willing to give. But another 
 most objectionable part of this letter is that in which 
 the Viceroy endeavours to persuade the Afghan Minister 
 that he was now offering to the Ameer all he wanted. 
 It is to be remembered that besides the knowledge which 
 the Government of India had at its command in respect 
 to the large expectations of the Ameer in 1873 and in 
 1869, this letter was written just six days after our own 
 Agent at Cabul had told the Viceroy that what the 
 
 * Afghan Corresp., II. 1878, No. 3, pp. 9, 10.
 
 TO THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE. 207 
 
 Ameer wanted was that " we should agree to support the 
 Ameer, on demand, with troops and money, in all and 
 every case of attack from without."* 
 
 Before proceeding to the next scene in this strange, 
 eventful history, it will be well to notice how Lord Lytton 
 himself tells his story, in the Simla Narrative, of the 
 transactions through which we have just passed. That 
 narrative professes to be founded on the documents 
 which it enclosed, and yet it departs widely in many most 
 important particulars from the facts which these docu- 
 ments supply. The account given in the 26th paragraph, 
 of the causes of the Ameer's dissatisfaction, does not 
 set forth these causes faithfully, as given by our native 
 Agent, misstating their number, and, above all, putting 
 them in a new order of relative importance. These 
 deviations are not accidental. They appear to be all 
 connected with one idea, — that of throwing as much blame 
 as the Viceroy could on his immediate predecessor in 
 the Government of India, and of keeping as much as 
 possible in the background, or of suppressing altogether, 
 those causes of dissatisfaction on the part of the Ameer 
 which were inseparably connected with the desire of that 
 Ruler to get what no British Government could give him. 
 There is a total omission of one cause of complaint men- 
 tioned (the sixth) by the Agent, for no other assignable 
 reason than that this one reflected directly on the tone 
 and terms of one of Lord Lytton's own recent letters to 
 
 * Ibid., p. 182.
 
 2o8 FROM LORD LYTTONS VICEROYALTY 
 
 the Ameer. In the presence of much graver matter, it 
 is not worth while pursuing this characteristic of the 
 Simla Narrative in greater detail. It is, indeed, of much 
 more than personal — it is of political importance. The 
 Government of India is a continuous body, and does not 
 formally change with a change of Viceroy. Any un- 
 faithfulness to perfect fairness and accuracy in a narrative 
 professing to give an account of its own action under 
 former Viceroys, if it is committed deliberately, is a grave 
 political offence. If it is committed unconsciously, and 
 simply under the impulse of a strong desire to make 
 out a personal or a party case, it is still deserving of 
 serious notice and rebuke. 
 
 The next characteristic observable in the Simla Narra- 
 tive of this time is the endeavour it makes to accumulate 
 charges and innuendos against the unfortunate Ameer in 
 respect to his communications with General Kaufmann. 
 The statement in the 26th paragraph of the Simla Nar- 
 rative is that the Ameer had been losing no opportunity 
 of improving his relations with the Russian authorities 
 in Central Asia, and that between General Kaufmann 
 and his Highness " permanent diplomatic intercourse was 
 now virtually established, by means of a constant suc- 
 cession of special Agents, who held frequent conferences 
 with the Ameer, the subject and result of which were 
 successfully kept secret." There is no justification for this 
 most exaggerated statement in the papers which accom- 
 pany Lord Lytton's narrative. On the contrary, he had 
 been distinctly and emphatically told by our Agent on 
 the 7th October, at Simla, that " the Ameer regarded the
 
 TO THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE. 209 
 
 Agents from Russia as sources of embarrassment."* All 
 the authentic information which had reached the Govern- 
 ment was consistent with this view. Our Agent at Cabul 
 had indeed reported that on the 9th of June a messenger 
 had come with a letter from General Kaufmann, and that 
 this m^essenger had been received for half an hour, at a 
 formal interview, by the Ameer. The letter had not then 
 been seen by our Agent, but he believed it to be " merely 
 a complimentary one, conveying information of the fall 
 of Kokhand."t 
 
 The only other information in support of Lord Lyt- 
 ton's sweeping accusations, is a letter from a native news- 
 writer at Candahar, who retailed, on the 9th of August, 
 certain reports which he had got from a man who " hired 
 out baggage-animals in Turkestan, Bokhara, and Cabul." 
 This man, on being asked for " the news of the country," 
 professed to retail a story which, he said, had been told 
 him by a certain Sirdar, who, however, was now dead. 
 The story was that this Sirdar had taken with him to 
 Cabul, secretly, "a Russian who came from Turkestan." 
 This Russian, it was further said, used to have secret 
 interviews with the Ameer. Shere Ali is then represented, 
 in the tale, as having, " a few days after the arrival" of this 
 Russian, sent for a certain Mulla, Mushk Alam, whom he 
 consulted about a religious war against the English. 
 What the connexion was between a Russian Agent and 
 the " Mulla " is not explained or even suggested.^ This 
 
 * Ibid., Inclos. i8, p. 181. + Ibid., Inclos. 12, p. 178. 
 
 \ Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 13, p. 178. 
 
 P
 
 2IO FROM LORD LYTTON'S VJCER0YAL7Y 
 
 stupid and incoherent story, founded on the gossip of 
 a trader in baggage-animals, and bearing on the face of 
 it all the marks of such an origin, seems to be the only 
 foundation for the circumstantial accusations made by 
 the Viceroy of India against Shere Ali in the 26th para- 
 graph of the Simla Narrative, composed when he was 
 hotly engaged in running that Ruler down. 
 
 There is, indeed, one half-line in that paragraph which 
 leads us to a very curious illustration of the inconsisten- 
 cies and inaccuracies which are characteristic of all Lord 
 Lytton's State Papers referring to the Afghan question. 
 That half-line refers to the communications which had 
 been going on from time to time for several years, be- 
 tween the Russian Governor-General of Turkestan and 
 the Ameer of Cabul. It is, of course, perfectly true that 
 General Kaufmann had sent letters to Cabul. It was 
 just three weeks before our Cabul Agent came to Simla 
 that the Viceroy had sent that alarmed telegram to the 
 Secretary of State, on the i6th of September, touching 
 the letter of General Kaufmann which had been received 
 by the Ameer on the 14th of June. That letter had given 
 to the Ameer a long account and explanation of the con- 
 quest of Kokhand. We have seen in a former page how 
 Lord Lytton, in his telegram of the l6th, and still more 
 in his relative Despatch of the i8th of September, had 
 denounced these letters as a breach of the Agreement 
 of Russia with us, and how the Cabinet at home had 
 taken up this view, and, within certain limits, had acted 
 upon it. But in order to support this view, and make it 
 plausible, the Viceroy had been led to represent the
 
 TO THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE. 211 
 
 correspondence as one which had been always objected 
 to by the Government of India, although they had never 
 before formally remonstrated. The only foundation for 
 this was that on one previous occasion Lord Northbrook 
 had called attention to the tone of one of these letters 
 — an instance of vigilance on the part of that Viceroy 
 which had been entirely thrown away on her Majesty's 
 Government, who had taken no notice whatever of his 
 observation. But with this exception, it was entirely 
 untrue that the Government of India had viewed the 
 correspondence with alarm. On the contrary, as I have 
 shown, both Lord Mayo and Lord Northbrook had 
 encouraged the Ameer to welcome those letters, and to 
 answer them with corresponding courtesy. Suddenly, in 
 the Simla Narrative, Lord Lytton discovers that this is 
 the true view of the case, because he was constructing a 
 paragraph the object of which was to set forth the errors 
 of former Viceroys. He, therefore, not only sets forth 
 this view of the facts, but he sets it forth with emphasis 
 and exaggeration. He says that the Ameer, in " losing- 
 no opportunity of improving his relations with Russian 
 authorities in Central Asia," had acted " in accordance 
 with our own exhortations."'^ It is needless to say that 
 this is in flagrant contradiction of the representation con- 
 veyed in the despatch of September i8th, i876.t It is 
 further interesting to observe that, in that despatch, the 
 "baggage-animal" story about the "secret nightly con- 
 ferences" between a Russian agent and the Ameer, — 
 
 * Ibid., No. 36, para. 26, p. 168. 
 
 t Central Asia, No. I. 1878, p. 83. 
 
 P 2
 
 212 FROM LORD LYTTON'S VICEROY ALTY 
 
 which reappears in the Simla Narrative as if it were an 
 undoubted fact, — is referred to as coming from " an 
 unofficial source of information" which the Government 
 of India were, " of course, unable to verify." 
 
 Having now despatched — and having thus thoroughly 
 prepared — his Agents alternately to frighten, to cajole, 
 and to deceive the Ameer, the Viceroy proceeded on a 
 tour to the frontier, and continued to pursue the same 
 Imperial policy through some very remarkable pro- 
 ceedings. The time had come for converting Major 
 Sandeman's mission to Khelat into the permanent occu- 
 pation of Ouetta. On the 22nd of October the Viceroy's 
 Military Secretary selected a site for permanent barracks 
 at that place. Under the pretext of disposing of Major 
 Sandeman's escort, a detachment of Punjaub Infantry was 
 posted there, and in no long time this force was enlarged 
 to a small brigade of all arms. 0« -or about the same 
 ■day, the 22nd of October, Lord Lytton reached Peshawur, 
 and a few days afterwards he gave orders for the con- 
 struction of a bridge of boats at Khoshalgurh on the 
 Indus. This bridge of boats — of which many months 
 later, in June, 1877, the Indian Secretary of State de- 
 clared he had never heard — was actually made and 
 established in the course of a week. Officers were then 
 sent to Tul, on the Afghan border, to inspect the ground 
 preparatory to the establishment there of a military force. 
 Military and commissariat stores were laid in at Kohat, 
 and a concentration of troops was effected at Rawul 
 Pindi. Following upon these strange and suspicious 
 proceedings, of which no rational explanation has been
 
 TO THE TESHAWUR CONFERENCE. 213 
 
 ever given, the fussy activity of the Viceroy found employ- 
 ment in bribing the Maharajah of Cashmere to advance 
 troops beyond Gilgit and towards Citval, so as to estabhsh 
 his authority over tribes which the Ameer of Cabul 
 claimed as feudatories of his Kingdom. The immediate 
 effect of all these measures combined was to make Shere 
 Ali feel himself threatened on three different sides — on 
 the east through Cashmere, on the south from Rawul 
 Pindi, and on the west from Khelat We cannot safely 
 accept the denials of the Government that these move- 
 ments were unconnected with the pressure which they 
 were exercising on the Ameer. But it is at least ex- 
 tremely probable they had also a larger purpose. At 
 this very time the firmness of the Emperor of Russia at 
 Livadia was confounding all the feeble and dilatory pleas 
 of the English Cabinet. It is highly probable that at 
 least some members of that Cabinet were seriously con- 
 templating a war with Russia both in Europe and in Asia, 
 for the purpose of maintaining in Europe the corrupt 
 government of Turkey. The military preparations of the 
 Viceroy may very probably have been due to personal 
 instructions to prepare for an attack upon Russia in 
 Central Asia — in Avhich attack Afghanistan would have 
 been used as a base. Under any supposition the Ameer 
 was threatened. 
 
 Let us now return to Cabul, and see what was passing 
 there. 
 
 Our Agent returned to that capital in the end of 
 October, 1876. The consultations and deliberations 
 which were held by the Ameer lasted two months — that
 
 214 ^Ji OM L ORD L YTTON'S VICER YAL TY 
 
 is, till the end of December. Lord Lytton says, in the 
 Simla Narrative, that the Ameer evinced a desire to 
 gain time. Of course he did ; that is to say, he wished 
 to delay as long as possible coming to a decision which 
 placed before him the alternatives of sacrificing finally 
 the friendship of the British Government, as well as all 
 the promises, written and verbal, which had been given 
 him by former Viceroys, — or of submitting to proposals 
 which, as he and all his advisers firmly believed, involved 
 the sacrifice of his independence. Lord Lytton again 
 says that he was evidently waiting for the war which was 
 likely to break out between Russia and England, in 
 order that he might sell his alliance to the most suc- 
 cessful, or to the highest bidder. There is not a scrap 
 of evidence in support of this view, as a matter of fact, 
 and it is in the highest degree improbable as a matter 
 of speculation. Shere Ali was far too shrewd a man to 
 suppose that his alliance would be of much practical 
 value to either party in such a contest. The whole idea 
 is evolved out of Lord Lytton's inner consciousness. 
 There is plenty of evidence that both the Viceroy and his 
 official chiefs were all thinking of Russia and of nothing 
 else. There is no evidence whatever that Shere Ali was 
 thinking of them at all. There were, of course, plenty 
 more of those rumours about Russian agents at Cabul 
 which belong to the " baggage-animal" class. But such 
 direct and authentic evidence as we have is to this effect 
 — that the Ameer and his Durbar, and his Chiefs whom 
 he consulted, were engrossed by one prevailing fear — 
 that the violent conduct, threatening language, and im-
 
 TO THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE. 215 
 
 perious demands of the British Government, indicated a 
 design to assume complete dominion in their country. 
 So strong is this evidence that Lord Lytton is compelled 
 to try to damage it, and accordingly he does not scruple 
 to hint that Atta Mohammed Khan, our native Agent, 
 who had for many years enjoyed the confidence of former 
 Viceroys, was unfaithful to the Government he had so 
 long served. In the 29th paragraph of the Simla 
 Narrative, in reference to the delays which the Ameer 
 had interposed on the ground of health. Lord Lytton 
 complains that the Vakeel had accepted the excuse 
 " either through stupidity or disloyalty." Again, he says 
 that the reports of our Agent had become " studiously 
 infrequent, vague, and unintelligible." This is an asser- 
 tion which is not borne out — which, indeed, is directly 
 contradicted — by the papers which have been presented 
 to Parliament. The letters of Atta Mohammed range 
 from the 23rd of November'^ to the 25th of Decemberf 
 inclusive, and, during a period of less than a month, the 
 number of them was no less than eight. Nor is it at all 
 true that they are vague or unintelligible. On the con- 
 trary, they convey a very vivid and graphic account of 
 the condition of things which it was the business of our 
 Agent to describe. The picture presented is one of 
 distracted counsels, and of a sincere desire not to break 
 with the powerful Government which was already 
 violating its own promises, and was threatening a weak 
 State with further injustice. Of course these letters of 
 
 * Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 26, p. 192. 
 t Ibid., Inclos. 33, p. 194.
 
 2i6 FROM LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY 
 
 Atta Mohammed were not pleasant reading for Lord 
 Lytton, and it is, perhaps, natural that he should disparage 
 them.'^ But no impartial man who reads them can fail 
 to see that they convey a very much more correct im- 
 pression of the facts than the haphazard assertions and 
 reckless accusations of the Viceroy. In particular, the 
 very first of these letters, in its very brevity, is eminently 
 instructive. It describes a sort of Cabinet Council to 
 which the Agent was admitted, and its general result. 
 That result was that the Government of Afghanistan 
 was not in a position to receive British officers within the 
 frontiers of that State ; and the Agent adds, with great 
 descriptive power, " The contemplation of such an 
 arrangement filled them with apprehension."| Again, 
 in the two letters dated December 2ist, the Ameer is 
 reported — in observations which described only too faith- 
 fully the hasty and excited action of the Government of 
 India towards him — to have expressed the natural appre- 
 hensions with which this action inspired him, and the 
 difficulty of so defining and limiting the duties of British 
 Agents as really to prevent them from interfering in the 
 government of his Kingdom. These accounts are perfectly 
 clear, rational, and consistent, and the unjust account 
 which is given of them by the Viceroy seems to be 
 
 * It is a curious comment on this most unjustifiable attack by the 
 Viceroy on the character of Atta Mohammed Khan, that on the 13th 
 of October, at the close of the last of the Conferences with him 
 Lord Lytton had presented him with a watch and chain, as well 
 as 10,000 rupees, "in acknowledgment of the appreciation of the 
 Government of his past faithful service." See Ibid., p. 185. 
 t Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 26, p. 192.
 
 TO THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE. 217 
 
 simply the result of the fretful irritation with which the 
 Viceroy regarded every opposition to, or even remon- 
 strance with, his new " Imperial Policy." 
 
 At last, towards the close of December, 1876, the 
 Ameer, frightened by the threats of the Viceroy, and 
 plied by the urgency of our Agent, — half-forced to accept 
 the hated basis, and half-hoping to be still able to escape 
 from it, — made up his mind to send his old confidential 
 Minister, Noor Mohammed, to meet Sir Lewis Felly at 
 Peshawur. In the 29th paragraph of the Simla Narra- 
 tive, it is a comfort to find at least one little bit of fair 
 statement. We are there told that " the Ameer, finding 
 himself unable to evade any longer the issue put to him, 
 without bringing his relations with us to an open rup- 
 ture, dispatched his Minister." So much for the asser- 
 tions, made more than once afterwards, that the Ameer 
 had sought the Conferences, and had volunteered to send 
 his Minister. The Conferences began on the 30th of 
 January, 1877. 
 
 Let us now look back for a moment at the result of 
 the transactions which we have traced. 
 
 First, we have the Secretary of State for India de- 
 scribing, and, by implication, disparaging, the assurances 
 given to the Ameer by former Viceroys, as " ambiguous 
 formulas." * 
 
 Secondly, we have the same Minister instructing the 
 new Viceroy that a dynastic guarantee need be nothing 
 more than " the frank recognition of a de facto order in 
 
 * Afghan Corresp., I., 1878, No. 35, Inclos. para. 15, p. 158.
 
 2 1 8 FR OM L ORD L YTTON'S VICER OYALTY 
 
 the succession established by a de facto Government ;" 
 and that this " does not imply or necessitate any inter- 
 vention in the internal affairs of that State." * 
 
 Thirdly, we have like instructions with regard to the 
 other guarantees which had been desired by the Ameer. 
 and which were all to be framed on the same principle — 
 namely, that of the British Government " reserving to 
 themselves entire freedom of judgment as to the cha- 
 racter of circumstances involving the obligation of mate- 
 rial support to the Ameer."t 
 
 Fourthly, we have the Viceroy preparing, very elabo- 
 rately, a " Draft Treaty,"! and a " Subsidiary Secret 
 and Explanatory Agreement,"§ for carrying into effect 
 the instructions and suggestions of the Secretary of State ; 
 this being done by Articles so full of qualifying words, 
 and so beset with saving clauses, that the Government 
 did indeed effectually reserve to itself the most " entire 
 freedom" under every conceivable circumstance, to give, 
 or not to give, to the Ameer the assistance of which he 
 desired to be assured. 
 
 Fifthly, we have the fact that both the Secretary of 
 State and the Viceroy had before them authoritative 
 documents proving that guarantees or assurances of this 
 kind, which were not only conditional, but wholly made 
 up of conditions within conditions, were not the kind of 
 guarantee or of assurance which the Ameer had asked for 
 
 * Ibid., para. i6. 
 
 t Ibid., para. 24, p, 159. 
 
 X Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 24, p. 189. 
 
 § Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 25, p. 191.
 
 TO THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE. 219 
 
 in 1869, ^r*d which he had ever since continued to 
 desire.* 
 
 Sixthly, we have the fact that this Draft Treaty, with 
 its intricate network of saving clauses, was not to be 
 shown to the Ameer till after he had accepted the Vice- 
 roy's basis ; or, in other words, till he had conceded to 
 the British Government all it wanted. 
 
 Seventhly, we have the fact that the Viceroy endea- 
 voured, in the meantime, by every device in his power, 
 down even to the abuse of private friendship, to persuade 
 the Ameer that the British Government was now offering 
 to him conditions " in every particular the same as those 
 desired by the Ameer himself on the occasion of his 
 visit to Umballa in 1869, and again, in more or less 
 general terms, so urged by him on the Government of 
 India through his Minister, Noor Mohammed Khan, in 
 1873-" t 
 
 Eighthly, we have the fact that the Viceroy, through 
 the letter of Captain Grey to Noor Mohammed, tried 
 still farther to enhance the value of his own offers by 
 contrasting them with the "vacillation" of former Go- 
 vernments, both in India and at home ; which vacillation 
 he ascribed to the absence of a Treaty, and to the conse- 
 quent " unfettered discretion" retained by Ministers and 
 Viceroys.^ 
 
 Lastly, we have the same Viceroy writing home to the 
 
 * Ibid., No. 19, paras. 9, 10, 11 and 45, pp. 93, 94, 96; also, 
 Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 18, p. 182. 
 
 t Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 23, p. 187. 
 X Afghan Corresp., II., No. 3, pp. 9, 10.
 
 220 LORD LYTTON'S VICEROYALTY. 
 
 Secretary of State that the concessions which that 
 Minister had sanctioned, and which he himself had offered 
 to the Ameer, " would not practically commit the British 
 Government to anything more than a formal re-affirma- 
 tion of the assurances already given by it, through Lord 
 Mayo, to the Ameer in 1869."* 
 
 These transactions are but a fitting introduction to 
 those which follow. If General Kaufmann had been 
 detected in such a course of diplomacy towards any of 
 the Khans of Central Asia, we know what sort of lan- 
 guage would have been applied to it, and justly applied 
 to it, in England. 
 
 * Afghan Corresp., I., 1878, No. 36, para. 27, p. !(
 
 THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 FROM THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE IN JANUARY, 1 877, 
 TO THE WAR IN NOVEMBER, 1 878. 
 
 The great object of the British Envoy, from the first 
 moment of the negotiations at Peshawur, was to fix upon 
 the Ameer the position of an appHcant for a new Treaty, 
 in consequence of his dissatisfaction with the previous 
 engagements of the British Government. Assuming him 
 to occupy that position, it was easy to represent the new 
 stipulations which he so much dreaded as necessary and 
 natural conditions of what he desired. 
 
 It will be observed that this misrepresentation of the 
 relative position of the two parties in the negotiation was 
 part of the Viceroy's plan. His difficulty was this — that 
 the British Government wanted to get something from 
 the Ameer, whereas the Ameer did not want to get any- 
 thing from the British Government, knowing, as he did, 
 the price he would have to pay for it. The Viceroy felt 
 the awkwardness of this position, and he determined to 
 get over it, if he could, by the very simple experiment of 
 pretending that the facts were otherwise. In the 27th 
 paragraph^ of the Simla Narrative we have this policy 
 
 Afghan Corresp., I., 1878, No. 36, p. 168.
 
 222 FROM THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE 
 
 explained under forms of language which but thinly veil 
 its terrible unfairness. " The Ameer's apparent object 
 was to place the British Government in the position of a 
 petitioner ; and that position it behoved the British Go- 
 vernment to reverse." Yes, — if it could be done with 
 truth. But the process of "reversing" facts is an awk- 
 ward process. Sir Lewis Pelly did his best. He began 
 at once by pretending that it was the Ameer, and not 
 the British Government, who was desirous of some new 
 arrangement. 
 
 Against this representation of the facts, from the first 
 moments of the Conference, Noor Mohammed resolutely 
 contended. He had one great advantage. Truth was 
 on his side. The Ameer had, indeed, at one time wanted 
 to get some things which had been refused him. But he 
 had got other things which he still more highly valued, 
 and he knew that the great aim of this new Viceroy was 
 to get him to sacrifice what former Viceroys had granted, 
 without really giving him what they had refused. The 
 contention, therefore, that Shere Ali wanted this new 
 Treaty, and was dissatisfied with the pledges he had 
 already received from the British Government, was a 
 contention not in accordance with the facts. Noor Mo- 
 hammed saw at once the true aspect of the case, and 
 the fallacious pretexts which were put forward by Sir 
 Lewis Pelly. The very foremost of these was a reference 
 to the desires which Shere Ali had at first intimated at 
 Umballa, but which he had abandoned before he quitted 
 the presence of Lord Mayo. The Cabul Envoy would 
 not hear of the allegation that the Ameer was dissatisfied
 
 TO THE WAR. 223 
 
 with the promises of his old and firm friends, Lord 
 Lawrence and Lord Mayo, and that the engagements of 
 those Viceroys had any need of being supplemented by 
 the new proposals of Lord Lytton. He repelled with 
 firmness every suggestion, every insinuation, every argu- 
 ment to this effect. It is, indeed, impossible not to 
 admire the ability and the dignity with which Noor Mo- 
 hammed, whilst labouring under a fatal and a painful 
 disease, fought this battle of truth and justice, — in what 
 he considered to be the interests of his master and the 
 independence of his country. 
 
 From the first he took very high ground. At a private 
 and unofficial meeting with the British Envoy on the 3rd 
 of February, Sir Lewis Pelly said, on parting, that it would 
 depend on the Ameer whether the Afghan Envoy's 
 departure should prove as happy as he desired. The 
 Afghan replied, " No, it depends on you ;" and then, cor- 
 recting himself, he added, with a higher and better pride, 
 " In truth, it depends neither on you nor on the Ameer, 
 but on justice."* And yet, when speaking as a private 
 individual, he did not shrink from admitting the depen- 
 dent position of his Sovereign on account of the com- 
 parative weakness of his country. "Your Government," 
 he said, at the close of the first meeting, to Sir Lewis 
 Pelly, " is a great and powerful one : ours is a small 
 and weak one. We have long been on terms of friend- 
 ship, and the Ameer now clings to the skirt of the British 
 Government, and till his hand be cut off he will not 
 
 * Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 37, p. i<
 
 2 24 FROM THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE 
 
 relax his hold of it."^ But when speaking as the Envoy 
 of the Ameer, and conducting the negotiations on his 
 behalf, he spoke with a power and force which evidently 
 caused great embarrassment to his opponent. Some of 
 his simple questions must have been cutting to the quick. 
 Thus, at the meeting on the 5th of February, he asked, 
 " But if this Viceroy should make an agreement, and a 
 successor should say, ' I am not bound by it .-•' " On this 
 a remarkable scene occurred. The British Envoy, not 
 liking apparently so direct a question, began to reply 
 indirectly. Noor Mohammed at once interrupted — 
 feeling, as he had a right to feel, that however inferior 
 his master might be in power, he was the equal of the 
 Viceroy in this contest of argument. The Afghan Envoy 
 said he " wanted Yes or No." The British Envoy took 
 refuge in evasion : "With the permission of the Afghan 
 Envoy he would make his own remarks in the manner 
 which might appear to him to be proper." Again, Noor 
 Mohammed asked, " Whether all the Agreements and 
 Treaties, from the time of Sir John Lawrence and the 
 late Ameer, up to the time of Lord Northbrook and 
 the present Ameer, are invalid and annulled .^"t And, 
 again, when Sir Lewis Pelly had replied that he had 
 no authority to annul any Treaty, but to propose a sup- 
 plementary Treaty to those already existing, the Afghan 
 Envoy asked, "Supposing the present Viceroy makes a 
 Treaty with us, and twenty years after he has gone, 
 another Viceroy says he wishes to revise and supplement 
 
 * Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 35, p. 197. f Ibid, Inclos. 2,^, p. 199.
 
 TO THE WAR. 225 
 
 it, what are we to do ?" To these home-thrusts Sir 
 Lewis Pelly could only reply by insisting on the pretext 
 that it was the Ameer who had expressed dissatisfaction 
 — a reply which Noor Mohammed had no difficulty in 
 disposing of by telling the British Envoy that if the 
 Ameer was dissatisfied, it was " owing to transgression of 
 previous agreements."* Again and again he repudiated 
 any wish on the part of the Ameer to have a new- 
 Treaty. He had " returned from Umballa without 
 anxiety."t 
 
 At last, having maintained this contest with admirable 
 spirit for several days, Noor Mahommed intimated that he 
 desired an opportunity of setting forth his master's views 
 in one continuous statement, during which he was not 
 to be interrupted. Accordingly, this speech of the 
 Afghan Envoy began on the 8th of February. The ex- 
 haustion of anxiety and of disease compelled him twice 
 to stop, and to resume on another day. His statement, 
 therefore, extended over three meetings, beginning on 
 the 8th and ending on the 12th of February, 1877. 
 
 In this long argument he took his stand at once on the 
 firm ground of claiming fidelity to the former engage- 
 ments of the British Government. " If the authorities 
 of the British Government have a regard for their own 
 promises, and act upon them with sincerity, in accordance 
 with the customary friendship which was formerly, and 
 is now" (what courtesy !) " observed between the tw^o 
 
 * Ibid., Tnclos. 38, p. 199. t Ibid., p. 200. 
 
 Q
 
 2 26 FROM THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE 
 
 Governments, there is no ground for any anxiety.""^ 
 He cut off the pretext, which has since been repeated, 
 both in the Simla Narrative and in its fellow, the London 
 Narrative, that the Ameer had shown his desire to get 
 some new Treaty, by sending his Envoy to meet Lord 
 Northbrook in 1873. He reminded Sir Lewis Pelly that 
 it was not the Ameer, but the Viceroy, who had sought 
 that meeting. He repeated this twice, and asked, " The 
 wishes, therefore, on whose part were they?" He ob- 
 jected to the garbled extracts which had been quoted to 
 prove his master's dissatisfaction, and spoke with censure 
 of " one paragraph of many paragraphs being brought 
 forward" to support erroneous interpretations. At great 
 length, and with much earnestness, he contended that 
 the Ameer had been satisfied by Lord Northbrook's 
 confirmation of the assurances and promises of Lord 
 Lawrence and of Lord Mayo, quoted a letter from the 
 Ameer to this effect, and concluded an elaborate ex- 
 planation on the subject by these words : " Therefore, 
 till the time of the departure of Lord Northbrook, that 
 previous course continued to be observed. "f The only 
 complaint he made of that Viceroy was his subsequent 
 intercession on behalf of Yakoob Khan. But, so far as 
 regarded the assurances and engagements of the British 
 Government, he wanted nothing in addition to those 
 which had been concluded with Lord Lawrence and 
 Lord Mayo. 
 
 On the third day of his laborious statement, the Cabul 
 
 Ibid., Inclos. 41, p. 203. t Ibid., No. 42, p. 206.
 
 TO THE WAR. 227 
 
 Envoy entered upon the question of questions — that of 
 the reception of British officers. Here, again, he took 
 his stand on the Treaty of 1857, and on the promises of 
 Lord Mayo. He deprecated a course which would 
 " scatter away former assurances." He declared that the 
 people of Afghanistan " had a dread of this proposal, and 
 it is firmly fixed in their minds, and deeply rooted in 
 their hearts, that if Englishmen, or other Europeans, 
 once set foot in their country, it will sooner or later pass 
 out of their hands.""^ He referred to the explanations 
 given by the father of the present Ameer to Sir John 
 Lawrence, and to the engagements of the Treaties of 
 1855 and of 1857. He referred to the ostensible object 
 put forward by the British Envoy, that he wished to 
 remove anxiety from the mind of the Ameer, and he 
 asked whether the new proposals would not raise fresh 
 anxiety, not only in his mind, but in the mind of all his 
 people,t and he concluded by a solemn appeal to the 
 British Government not to raise a question which would 
 "abrogate the former Treaties and Agreements, and the 
 past usage." J 
 
 In reply to these arguments, Sir Lewis Pelly, on the 
 13th of February, reminded the Ameer that, although 
 the Treaty of 1855 was still in force, and would be ob- 
 served if no revised Treaty could be made, it did not 
 bind the British Government to aid the Ameer against 
 his enemies, whether foreign or domestic. If, therefore, 
 
 * Ibid., No. 43, p. 208. 
 
 t Ibid., p. 208. X Ibid., p. 209. 
 
 Q2
 
 2 28 FROM THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE 
 
 the Ameer rejected the present offers, the Viceroy would 
 " decline to support the Ameer and his dynasty in any 
 troubles, internal or external," and would " continue to 
 strengthen the frontier of British India, without further 
 reference to the Ameer, in order to provide against pro- 
 bable contingencies." * 
 
 It will be observed that this argument and intimation 
 pointed very plainly to two things — first, to the fact that 
 the British Envoy acknowledged no engagement or pledge 
 to be binding except the Treaty of 1855. The pledges of 
 Lord Lawrence, of Lord Mayo, and of Lord Northbrook 
 were all treated as so much waste paper, or as still more 
 wasted breath. And, secondly, that the British Govern- 
 ment considered itself at liberty to threaten adverse 
 measures on the frontier. Noor Mohammed at once took 
 alarm at both these intimations — asked what the last 
 meant, and referred to the Treaty of 1857 ^s also binding. 
 Sir Lewis Felly gave replies that can only be considered 
 as evasive. He declined to give definite explanations on 
 either point, f 
 
 At the meeting on the 19th of February, the Afghan 
 Envoy gave his rejoinder on the subject of the British 
 officers in Afghanistan. He again referred to the pro- 
 mises of Lord Mayo. And as regarded the danger of 
 any external aggression from Russia, he referred to the 
 Agreement between England and Russia, and the formal 
 
 * Ibid., p. 210. 
 t This intimation by Sir L. Pelly looks very like a pre-determina- 
 tion to rectify our "hap-hazard frontier" by picking a quarrel. It 
 is not easy to see what other meaning it can have had.
 
 TO THE WAR. 229 
 
 and official communication which had been made to the 
 Ameer upon that subject by the British Government. He 
 insisted that, as regarded the obhgations of the British 
 Government, it was not fair to quote the Treaty of 1855 
 as standing by itself. It must be read in connexion with 
 the writings and verbal assurances of three successive 
 Viceroys, and in connexion also with the 7th Article of 
 the Treaty of 1857. That Article was of surviving force, 
 and it required that any British Agent sent to Cabul 
 should not be an European. The Government of Afghan- 
 istan would " never in any manner consent to acknow- 
 ledge the abrogation of that Article." But all these 
 engagements were not to be read separately, but as con- 
 nected one with the other. " They are one," said the 
 Envoy."^ They constituted one continued series of en- 
 gagements. He was very glad to hear of the desire of 
 the Viceroy for the advantage of the Ameer. But it was 
 " based upon such new and hard conditions, especially 
 the residence of British officers upon the frontiers." Not 
 once, but many times in the course of this Conference, 
 the Afghan Envoy specified this demand — and not any 
 demand for an Envoy at Cabul — as the one which he 
 considered dangerous and objectionable. He said the 
 Ameer had " not entrusted the protection of those fron- 
 tiers from an external enemy to the English Govern- 
 ment." 
 
 Sir Lewis Pelly had said that if the Ameer rejected 
 his demand as to British officers, no basis was left for 
 
 * Ibid., p. 212.
 
 230 FROM THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE 
 
 negotiations. In reference to this, " I beg to observe," 
 said the Afghan, " in a friendly and frank manner, that 
 the basis which has been laid for you by the wise ar- 
 rangement of previous Councillors and Ministers of Her 
 Majesty the Queen of England in London, of Her Vice- 
 roys in India, after mature deliberation and thought, 
 from time to time, during the course of all these past 
 years, and has been approved of by Her Majesty the 
 Queen, still exists." . . . . " The Government of Afghan- 
 istan is certain that the British Government, of its own 
 perfect honesty, will continue constant and stable to that 
 firm basis." ^ 
 
 This was hard hitting. But it was hard hitting de- 
 livered with such perfect courtesy, that no just offence 
 could be taken. But besides this, it was irrefutable argu- 
 ment. Sir Lewis Pelly had to take refuge in the coarse 
 expedient which was alone possible under the circum- 
 stances, and which was alone consistent with his in- 
 structions. His basis was not accepted, and he declined 
 to enter into controversy. He did, however, try to 
 frighten the Ameer about Russia by asking the Envoy 
 whether he had considered the conquests of Russia in the 
 direction of Khiva, Bokhara, Kokhand, and the Turko- 
 man border. He reminded Noor Mohammed (and this 
 was fair enough) of the former expressions he had made 
 use of in respect to apprehensions of Russia. He then 
 declared " England has no reason to fear Russia." Noor 
 Mohammed must have put his own estimate on the sin- 
 
 * Ibid., p. 213.
 
 TO THE WAR. 231 
 
 cerity of this declaration. He could not have put a lower 
 one than it deserved. But as Sir Lewis Pelly had no- 
 thing to reply to the weighty arguments Noor Mohammed 
 had used, and to the appeals to honourable feeling which 
 he had made, the Afghan begged that they should be 
 reported to the Viceroy, submitted to his consideration, 
 and referred to his written decision. The Envoy would 
 then be prepared either to give a final answer or to refer 
 to the Ameer for further instructions. 
 
 It was not till the 15th of March — an interval of nearly 
 a month — that Sir Lewis Pelly replied to the Afghan 
 Envoy. This reply, I am afraid, must be considered as 
 the reply of the Viceroy, as it is drawn up professedly 
 upon his written instructions. It is very difficult to give 
 any adequate account of this document : of its rude 
 language — of its unfair representations of the Afghan 
 Envoy's argument — of its evasive dealing with Treaties 
 —of its insincere professions — of its insulting tone. 
 There are, indeed, some excuses for the Viceroy. Brought 
 up in the school of British Diplomacy, he must have felt 
 himself beaten by a man whom he considered a Bar- 
 barian. This Barbarian had seen through his " ostensible 
 pretexts," and his ambiguous promises. He had not, 
 indeed, seen the Draft Treaty with its labyrinth of Saving 
 Clauses. But our Agent at Cabul had been told enough 
 to let Noor Mahommed understand what kind of a Treaty 
 would probably be proposed. He had not been deceived 
 by the letter of Captain Grey. The Afghan Minister had 
 challenged, with only too much truth, the shifty way in 
 which the Viceroy dealt with the good faith of the Briti-sh
 
 232 FROM THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE 
 
 Crown, and the pledged word of former Viceroys. He 
 had even dared to tell Lord Lytton's Envoy that he ex- 
 pected a plain answer to a plain question — Yes or No — 
 whether he admitted himself to be bound by the pledges 
 of his predecessors in office ? He had done all this with 
 the greatest acuteness, and with perfect dignity. All 
 this was, no doubt, very hard to bear. But if irritation 
 was natural, it was in the highest degree unworthy of the 
 British Government to allow such irritation to be seen. 
 If the Viceroy really considered the conduct of the Ameer, 
 as then known or reported to him, as deserving or calling 
 for the manifestation of such a spirit, it would have been 
 far better to have no Conference at all. So far as the 
 official language and conduct of the Ameer was con- 
 cerned there was nothing to complain of. The language 
 of his Envoy was in the highest degree courteous and 
 dignified ; and if Lord Lytton could not bear the severe 
 reproaches which undoubtedly were of necessity involved 
 in that Afghan's exposure of the Viceroy's case, it would 
 have been better to avoid a contest in which the British 
 Crown is represented at such signal disadvantage. Let 
 us, however, examine the answer of the Viceroy a little 
 nearer. 
 
 The impression which the Viceroy says he has derived 
 from the first part of the Envoy's statement is an im- 
 pression of regret that the Ameer should feel himself 
 precluded from receiving a British Envoy at his Court, 
 " by the rude and stationary condition in which Afghan- 
 istan had remained under the administration of his High- 
 ness." Returning to this charge, the Viceroy adds that the
 
 TO THE WAR. 233 
 
 " unsettled and turbulent condition of the Afghan popu- 
 lation, and the comparative weakness of the sovereign 
 power, however, appear to have increased rather than 
 diminished, under the reign of his Highness."* Not only 
 was this a gratuitous insult, even if it had been true, but 
 it was an insult in support of which the Viceroy pro- 
 duced no evidence, because, as I believe, he had no 
 evidence to produce. 
 
 The first approach to argument in reply to the Afghan 
 Envoy is an assertion that the 7th clause of the Treaty 
 of 1857 has "nothing whatever to do with the matters 
 now under consideration. "f This, however, is mere as- 
 sertion — no attempt is made to support it. It is an asser- 
 tion, moreover, wholly inconsistent with the facts, and 
 one which, as we shall presently see, it became necessary 
 to retract. 
 
 The next assertion is that the Envoy had taken "so 
 many pains to explain the reasons why the Ameer still 
 declined to receive a British officer at Cabul," and had at 
 the same time as " carefully avoided all references to the 
 reception of British officers in other parts of Afghan- 
 istan." For this assertion there is absolutely no foundation 
 whatever. The Afghan Envoy had not only repeatedly 
 stated his objections as referring to the whole country of 
 Afghanistan, but in the able argument of Noor Moham- 
 med on the 19th February, which Lord Lytton was now 
 professing to answer, and which it concerned the honour 
 of the Crown that he should answer with some tolerable 
 
 * Ibid., p. 214. t Ibid., p. 215.
 
 234 FROM THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE 
 
 fairness, the Afghan Envoy had at least seven times speci- 
 fied the residence of British officers " on the frontiers" as 
 the " chief proposal of the British Government."* Sir 
 Lewis Pelly had, with equal precision, referred to this 
 demand as the one to which the Envoy had objected. 
 
 The next assertion is that the British Government had 
 been induced to believe both from events, and from 
 many previous utterances both of Shere Ali and his 
 father, that the advantages of British Residents in his 
 dominions " would be cordially welcomed and gratefully 
 appreciated by his Highness." Can anybody maintain 
 that this is true .^ Is this a fair representation of the 
 facts, even if Captain Grey's private memorandum-book 
 be accepted as the only faithful record of Umballa .-' 
 
 The next assertion is that if the Ameer was unwilling, 
 " the British Government had not the slightest desire to 
 urge upon an unwilling neighbour an arrangement so 
 extremely onerous to itself" Not content with this, the 
 Viceroy goes the length of declaring that " the proposal 
 of this arrangement was regarded by the British Govern- 
 ment as a great concession."t Again, I ask, was this 
 true .'' Could it be said with any sincerity } Was it 
 consistent with the despatches and instructions which 
 have been examined in the preceding narrative } 
 
 Next we have a repetition of the unfounded assertion 
 that the Envoy had elaborately answered a proposal 
 which the British Government had not made, " and 
 which he had no right to attribute to it," whilst he had 
 
 * Ibid., Inclos. 45, pp. 21 1-2 13. f Ibid., p. 216.
 
 TO THE WAR. 235 
 
 left altogether unnoticed those proposals which alone he 
 had been authorised to discuss. 
 
 The Viceroy has great difficulty in dealing with the 
 telling and dignified passage of Noor Mohammed's speech 
 in which he referred to existing obligations as the true 
 basis for all further negotiations. Lord Lytton could only 
 say that the existing Treaties being old, and not having 
 been disputed by either party, afforded " no basis what- 
 ever for further negotiation." This was in direct con- 
 tradiction with Sir Lewis Felly's language at the previous 
 meetings, in which he had spoken of the new Treaty as 
 a supplement to those already existing. At the meeting 
 held on the 5 th of February, Sir Lewis Pelly had expressly 
 declared that his authority was to propose " to revise and 
 supplement the Treaty of 185 5.""^ 
 
 The Viceroy then went on to say that if there was to be 
 no new Treaty, the two Governments " must revert to 
 their previous relative positions."! But as the Ameer 
 seemed to misunderstand what that position was, Sir 
 Lewis Pelly was instructed to remove a "dangerous mis- 
 conception" from his mind. For this purpose he repeats 
 at length the previous argument on the Treaty of 1855^ 
 that whilst it did bind the Ameer to be the friend of our 
 friends, and the enemy of our enemies, it did not place 
 the British Government under any obligation to render 
 any assistance whatever to the Ameer. He then ac- 
 cumulates against the Ameer charges of unfriendliness, 
 founded on the non-reception of Envoys, on ingratitude 
 
 * Ibid., p. 199. t Ibid., p. 216.
 
 236 FROM THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE 
 
 for subsidies, on refusals to let officers pass through his 
 country, on alleged intentions of aggression on his neigh- 
 bours, and, finally, on the reported attempt of the Ameer 
 to get up a religious war. Some of these accusations 
 mean nothing more than that the Ameer had stuck to the 
 engagements of Lord Mayo. Others were founded on 
 mere rumour, and the last referred to, was conduct on 
 the part of the Ameer which was the direct result of 
 Lord Lytton's own violent conduct towards him, and 
 which had been quite well known to the Viceroy before 
 this Conference began. 
 
 The Viceroy then comes again to the Treaty of 1857, 
 and is at last compelled to admit that the 7th Article is 
 " the only one of all its articles that has reference to 
 the conduct of general relations between the two Govern- 
 ments."'^ As, in a previous paragraph, he had said that 
 the Treaty of 1857 had " nothing whatever to do with 
 the matters now under consideration ;" and in another 
 paragraph that the obligations contracted under it had 
 " lapsed, as a matter of course, with the lapse of time,"t 
 this was an important admission. But the Viceroy gets 
 out of it by evading the force of the 7th Article alto- 
 gether, through a construction of its meaning wholly dif- 
 ferent from the true one. The force of the 7th Article 
 of the Treaty of 1857 lies in this — that it stipulates for 
 the complete withdrawal, not from Cabul, but from the 
 whole of the Ameer's country, of " British officers," after 
 the temporary purpose for which they were sent there 
 
 * Ibid., p. 217. t Ibid., pp. 215, 216.
 
 TO THE WAR. 237 
 
 had been accomplished. It is, therefore, a record of the 
 permanent poHcy of the Rulers of Afghanistan not to 
 admit British officers as Residents in any part of it, and 
 a record also of the acquiescence of the British Govern- 
 ment in that policy. 
 
 It is hardly credible, but it is the fact, that the Viceroy 
 proceeds to argue on this Article as if it referred only to 
 the reception of a British Envoy at the Capital — at Cabul 
 itself It almost looks as if the whole paper had been 
 written without even looking at original documents — even 
 so very short and simple an Instrument as the Treaty of 
 1857. " It is obvious," continues the Viceroy, " that no 
 Treaty stipulation was required to oblige the British 
 Government not to appoint a Resident British officer at 
 Cabul without the consent of the Ameer."* In the same 
 vein Lord Lytton proceeds to argue that it could not 
 bind the Ameer never at any future time or under any 
 circumstances "to assent to the appointment of a Resi- 
 dent British officer at Cabul." All this is absolutely 
 irrelevant, and has, to use his own previous words, " no- 
 thing whatever to do with the matters now under con- 
 sideration." 
 
 The Viceroy then adds one argument which, I think, is 
 sound, if strictly limited — namely, this, that there is 
 nothing in the 7th Article of the Treaty of 1857 "to 
 preclude the British Government from pointing out at 
 any time to the Ameer the advantage, or propriety, of 
 receiving a British officer as its permanent Representative 
 
 * Ibid., p. 217.
 
 238 FROM THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE 
 
 at Cabul, nor even from urging such an arrangement 
 upon the consideration and adoption of his Highness in 
 any fair and friendly manner."* Not only is this true, 
 but I go farther and say that there is nothing even in 
 the later pledges and engagements of Lord Mayo and of 
 Lord Northbrook with the Ameer to prevent this kind of 
 conduct. But the injustice of the conduct of Lord Lytton 
 lay in this — that he was trying to force a new policy on 
 the Ameer in a manner which was neither "fair nor 
 friendly" — but, to use his own words, under threats of an 
 " open rupture." We had, of course, a right to argue 
 with the Ameer, and to persuade him, if we could, to let 
 us off from our engagements. But what we had no right 
 to do was precisely that which Lord Lytton had done 
 and was then doing — namely, to threaten him with our 
 displeasure if he did not agree to our new demands — 
 and to support this threat with the most unjust evasions 
 of the written and verbal pledges of former Viceroys. 
 
 But the Viceroy had not yet done with his strange 
 perversion of the 7th Article of the Treaty of 1857. He 
 again assumes that it refers to the reception of an Envoy 
 at Cabul. He says, tauntingly, that " it so happened 
 that the British Government had not proposed, and did 
 not propose, or intend to propose, that arrangement. 
 Consequently, his Excellency's (the Cabul Envoy's) re- 
 marks on the Treaty of 1857 were not to the point, and 
 did not need to be further noticed."t 
 
 Having thus got rid by misquotations of the real force 
 
 * Ibid., p. 218. t Ibid., p. 218.
 
 TO THE WAR. 239 
 
 and direct language of the Treaties of 1855 and of 1857, 
 the Viceroy proceeds to declare broadly that " neither the 
 one nor the other imposes on the British Government, 
 either directly or indirectly, the least obligation or lia- 
 bility whatever, to defend, protect, or support the Ameer, 
 or the Ameer's dynasty, against any enemy or any 
 danger, foreign or domestic." 
 
 Lord Lytton next proceeds to deal with the pledges 
 of preceding Viceroys. He refers to these as " certain 
 written and verbal assurances received by the Ameer in 
 1869, from Lord Mayo, and by his Highness's Envoy in 
 1873, from Lord Northbrook." He thus starts at once 
 the distinction between Treaty engagements and the 
 formal promises of the representative of the Crown in 
 India. But he does more than this. This would not have 
 been enough for the purposes of his argument. 
 
 It was necessary not only to put a new gloss on the 
 promises of the British Government, but also to put a 
 special interpretation on the claims of the Ameer. At 
 the Simla Conferences, indeed, in 1873, the Ameer had 
 shown a disposition to put an over-strained interpretation 
 on previous promises. But Lord Northbrook had fully 
 explained all the conditions and limitations which had 
 uniformly been attached to tliem. Noor Mohammed, 
 who now argued the case of the Ameer, was the same 
 Envoy to whom these explanations had been addressed, 
 and in the able and temperate representation which he 
 had now made of his master's views he had made no 
 extravagant claims whatever. It was this representation 
 to which Lord Lytton was now replying, and he had no
 
 240 FROM THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE 
 
 right to go back upon former misunderstandings, which 
 had been cleared up, and to assume that they were still 
 cherished by the Ameer. The Afghan Envoy had made 
 no extravagant claim. This constituted Lord Lytton's 
 difficulty. It would have been very difficult indeed 
 to make out that the promises and pledges of Lord 
 Lawrence, of Lord Mayo, and of Lord Northbrook, 
 taking them even at the lowest value, did not imply, 
 directly or indirectly, " the least obligation to defend, to 
 protect, or support" the Ameer. But it was very easy, of 
 course, to make out that they did not promise him an 
 " unconditional support." At first, as we have seen, it had 
 been Lord Lytton's object to fix on the Ameer a con- 
 dition of discontent because Lord Mayo and Lord 
 Northbrook had not given him assurances enough. It 
 now became convenient to represent him, on the contrary, 
 as so over-estimating those assurances as to claim them 
 as having been unconditional. Accordingly, this repre- 
 sentation of the facts is quietly substituted for the other, 
 and the Ameer is assumed as having claimed this " un- 
 conditional support," which he had not claimed, and about 
 which there had not been one word said in the whole 
 course of Noor Mohammed's pleadings — except a single 
 incidental observation* — the purport of which is not very 
 clear, and which, if it had been noticed at all, should have 
 been noticed as incidentally as it arose. 
 
 Having effected this substitution of the case to be proved 
 and of the claim to be met, Lord Lytton proceeds at great 
 
 * Ibid., p. 206.
 
 TO THE WAR. 241 
 
 length to argue from the circumstances under which the 
 previous Viceroys had given their promises, that, in the 
 tirst place, " these utterances," "whatever their meaning, 
 and whatever their purpose," were not "intended to have 
 the force of a Treaty," and, in the second place, that they 
 did not "commit the British Government to an uncondi- 
 tional protection of the Ameer." Having estabished this 
 last proposition to his heart's content, he finds himself con- 
 fronted with the task of describing what all the previous 
 promises had meant and had amounted to. And here, at 
 last, there is a gleam of fairness, hke the sun shining for 
 a moment through a thick bank of stormy clouds. They 
 amounted, says the Viceroy, to neither more nor less 
 than this : — "An assurance that, so long as the Ameer 
 continued to govern his people justly and mercifully, 
 and to maintain frank, cordial, and confidential relations 
 with the British Government, that Government w^ould, on 
 its part also, continue to use every legitimate endeavour 
 to confirm the independence, consolidate the power, and 
 strengthen the Government of his Highness."* 
 
 The value, however, of this gleam of candour is much 
 diminished by two circumstances, which are proved by 
 the context. In the first place, the binding force of this 
 "assurance" was destroyed by the careful explanation 
 that it was not equivalent to a Treaty obligation. In the 
 second place, it was implied that the refusal of the Ameer 
 to accept the new condition of Resident British officers 
 was in itself a departure from the " frank, cordial, and 
 
 * Ibid., p. 218. 
 R
 
 242 FROM THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE 
 
 confidential relations" which were represented to be 
 among the conditions of the " assurance." The first of 
 these circumstances, as affecting the Viceroy's definition, 
 deprived the " assurance" of all value ; whilst the second 
 was in itself a direct breach of that assurance, inasmuch 
 as the whole essence of them lay in the promise that the 
 reception of British officers was not to be forced or 
 pressed upon the Ameer by threats and punishments of 
 this kind. 
 
 Lord Lytton next returns to the plan of representing 
 the Ameer as disappointed at Simla by Lord North- 
 brook's refusal to give to him a Treaty, and argues that 
 the " verbal assurances" of that Viceroy could not be in- 
 terpreted as assuming in favour of the Ameer those very 
 liabilities which had been refused in the Treaty. Of 
 course not ; and Noor Mohammed had never made any 
 such allegation. 
 
 The Viceroy then proceeds to represent himself as 
 simply the giver of all good things — as offering to the 
 Ameer what he had vainly solicited from others. Not 
 very consistently with this, he refers to the acceptance of 
 his conditions as a proof of " sincerity" on the part of 
 the Ameer, thus admitting, by implication, that their 
 acceptance was an object of desire to the British Govern- 
 ment. And yet, not to let this admission stand, he 
 declares that the " British Government does not press its 
 alliance and protection upon those who neither seek nor 
 appreciate them." The Viceroy then retires in a tone 
 of offended dignity, and of mortified benevolence. He 
 harboured " no hostile designs against Afghanistan."
 
 TO THE WAR. 243 
 
 He had " no conceivable object, and certainly no desire 
 to interfere in their domestic affairs." The British 
 Government would scrupulously continue to respect the 
 Ameer's authority and independence. But in the last 
 sentence there is a sting. The promise it contains is 
 carefully, designedly, limited to " Treaty stipulations," 
 which, in the opinion of Lord Lytton, did not include the 
 most solemn written and verbal pledges of the repre- 
 sentatives of the Crown in India. So long as the Ameer 
 remained faithful to " Treaty stipulations" which the 
 Envoy had referred to, "and which the British Govern- 
 ment fully recognised as still valid, and therefore binding 
 upon the two contracting parties," he " need be under 
 no apprehension whatever of any hostile action on the 
 part of the British Government.""^ 
 
 It is not difficult to imagine the feelings with which the 
 Envoy of the unfortunate Ameer must have received this 
 communication of the Viceroy. He must have felt — as 
 every unprejudiced man must feel who reads it — that he 
 was dealing with a Government very powerful and very 
 unscrupulous, — too angry and too hot in the pursuit of 
 its own ends to quote, with even tolerable fairness, the 
 case which he had put before it, — and determined at 
 any cost to force concessions which he and his Sovereign 
 were convinced must end in the destruction of the inde- 
 pendence of their country. During the month he had 
 been waiting for the answer of the Viceroy, his sickness 
 had been increasing. When he did get it, he probably 
 
 * Ibid., p. 220. 
 R 2
 
 .T44 FROM THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE 
 
 felt under the heavy responsibiHty of finally deciding 
 whether he was to yield or not. His master, who had 
 probably been kept informed of the tone and of the de- 
 mands of Sir Lewis Pelly, had become more and more 
 incensed by the treatment he was receiving, and he was 
 acting as most men do when they are driven to the wall. 
 Noor Mohammed made some despairing attempts to 
 reopen the discussion with Sir Lewis Pelly. But that 
 Envoy told him that his orders were imperative to treat 
 no more unless the "basis" were accepted. "The 
 Viceroy's communication" (with all its misquotations) 
 " required only a simple Yes or No." Under these cir- 
 cumstances, it is not surprising that within ten days of 
 the receipt of the Viceroy's message, Noor Mohammed 
 had " gained time" in another world. The Cabul Envoy 
 died on the 26th of March. 
 
 And now a very remarkable transaction occurred, the 
 knowledge of which we derive and derive only from the 
 Simla Narrative.* It appears that the Ameer, either 
 after hearing of the death of his old Minister, or from 
 knowing that he was extremely ill, had determined to 
 send another Envoy to Peshawur, and it was reported to 
 the Viceroy that this Envoy would have authority to 
 accept eventually all the conditions of the British Go- 
 vernment. Lord Lytton himself tells us that he knew 
 ail this before the 30th of March ; on which day he sent 
 a hasty telegram to Sir Lewis Pelly to " close the 
 Conference immediately," on the ground that the basis 
 
 * Ibid., No. 36, para. 36, pp. 170, 171.
 
 TO THE WAR. 245 
 
 had not been accepted. And so eager was the Viceroy 
 to escape from any chance of being caught even in the 
 wily offers which he had made to the Ameer, that it was 
 specially added in the telegram that if new Envoys or 
 messengers had arrived in the meantime, the refusal of 
 farther negotiations was still to be rigidly maintained.* 
 The ostensible reason given for this determination is not 
 very clear or intelligible. It is that ** liabilities which 
 the British Government might properly have contracted 
 on behalf of the present Ameer of Cabul, if that Prince 
 had shown any eagerness to deserve and reciprocate its 
 friendship, could not be advantageously, or even safely, 
 accepted in face of the situation revealed by Sir Lewis 
 Felly's energetic investigations." That is to say, that, 
 having driven the Ameer into hostility of feeling by de- 
 mands which had all along been known to be most 
 distasteful, and even dreadful, in his sight, the Viceroy 
 was now determined to take advantage of this position of 
 affairs, not only to withdraw all the boons he had pro- 
 fessed to offer, but to retire with the great advantage ot 
 having shaken off, like the dust of his feet, even the 
 solemn pledges and promises which the Ameer had 
 obtained from former Viceroys. There was another 
 result of this proceeding which Lord Lytton seems to 
 admit that he foresaw, and which, from the language in 
 which he refers to it, he does not seem to have regarded 
 with any regret. That result was that Shere Ali would 
 be thrown of necessity into the arms of Russia. "Seeing," 
 
 * Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 52, p.
 
 246 FROM THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE 
 
 says Lord Lytton, " no immediate prospect of further 
 support from the British Government, and fearing, per- 
 haps, the consequences of its surmised resentment, he 
 would naturally become more urgent in his advances 
 towards Russia.""*^ This, therefore, was the acknowledged 
 result of the policy of the Government — a result which 
 the Viceroy was not ashamed to acknowledge as one 
 which he regarded, if not with satisfaction, at least with 
 indifference. This feeling could only arise, so far as I 
 can see, from a deliberate desire to fix a quarrel on the 
 Ameer, and then to obtain by violence the objects which 
 he had failed to secure by the proceedings we have now 
 traced. 
 
 One important circumstance connected with the con- 
 duct and policy of the Viceroy at this moment does not 
 appear, so far as I can find, in the papers presented to 
 Parliament, and that is, that he withdrew our Native 
 Agent from Cabul — or, in other words, suspended all 
 diplomatic intercourse with the Ameer, after the Peshawur 
 Conference. This measure, indeed, seems to have been 
 most carefully concealed from public knowledge both in 
 India and at home. Few parts of the London Narrative 
 are more disingenuous than the i8th paragraph,! which 
 professes to give an account of the conduct of the 
 Government on the close of the Conference at Peshawur. 
 It says that no course was open to Her Majesty's Govern- 
 ment " but to maintain an attitude of vigilant reserve." 
 It refers, moreover, to the " imperfect means of obtaining 
 
 * Ibid., para. 37, p. 171. f Ibid., No. 73, p. 264,
 
 TO THE WAR. 247 
 
 information" from Cabul after that event, without even 
 hinting that this imperfection was due entirely to the 
 dehberate action of the Government in withdrawing its 
 Native Agent. All this indicates a consciousness that it 
 was a step to be concealed, and a thing to be ashamed 
 of. And so, indeed, it was. Lord Lytton had no right 
 to fix a quarrel on the Ameer because he had refused to 
 accept what the Viceroy declared to be nothing but 
 concessions in his favour. The rupture of diplomatic 
 relations was in direct breach of the intimation which had 
 been previously made at that Conference — that if the 
 Ameer refused the basis, our relations with him would 
 revert to the footing on which they stood before. If 
 this course had been followed, some amends would have 
 been made for the unjustifiable attempt to force the 
 Ameer by threats of our displeasure to give up his right 
 to the fulfilment of our engagements. But this course 
 was not followed. Our relations with him were not 
 restored to the former footing. Not only was our Agent 
 withdrawn, but, as I have been informed, there was an 
 embargo laid on the export of arms from our frontiers to 
 the Kingdom of Cabul. All this must have tended to 
 alarm Shere Ali, and to give him the impression that he 
 had nothing to hope from us except at a price ruinous to 
 the independence of his Kingdom. It amounted to an 
 official declaration of estrangement, if not of actual 
 hostility. It left the Government of India without any 
 means of knowing authentically what was going on at 
 Cabul, and it must have given an impression to the 
 Ameer that we had deliberately cast him off.
 
 248 FROM THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE 
 
 After all the inaccurate statements which have been 
 already exposed, it seems hardly worth while to point 
 out that the Simla Narrative is particularly loose in its 
 assertions respecting the circumstances of this Conference 
 at Peshawur. For example, it states that " owing to the 
 Envoy's increasing ill-health, several weeks were occupied 
 in the delivery of this long statement."* The fact is that 
 the Conferences began on the 30th of January, 1877, and 
 that the Afghan Envoy's long statement was concluded 
 on the 1 2th of February.t Even this period of twelve 
 days was not occupied by the Envoy's " long state- 
 ment," but, in a great measure, by Sir Lewis Felly's 
 arguments and explanations. The " long statement" of 
 the Afghan Envoy occupied only three days — the 8th, 
 the loth, and the 12th of February. The two next 
 meetings of the 15th and 19th of February were chiefly 
 occupied by the arguments of the British Envoy; whilst 
 the period of nearly one month from that date to the 
 15th of March was occupied by Lord Lytton himself in 
 concocting the remarkable reply of that date. 
 
 There is one very curious circumstance connected with 
 the time when Lord Lytton was on the point of closing 
 the Peshawur Conference which does not appear in the 
 papers presented to Parliament. On the 28th of March, 
 1877, two days after the death of the Afghan Envoy, 
 and something less than two days before the Viceroy 
 sent the imperative order to close the door against 
 further negotiation, there was a meeting at Calcutta of 
 
 * Ibid., para. 32, p. 170. 
 t Afghan Corresp., 1., 1878, No, 36, Inclos. 43, p. 207.
 
 TO THE WAR. 249 
 
 the Legislative Council of India. This is a body before 
 which Viceroys sometimes take the occasion of making 
 speeches for public information. Lord Lytton did so on 
 this occasion, and went out of his way to express his 
 sympathy with the Indian Press in knowing so little of 
 the policy of the Government. But there was one thing, 
 he said, which the Viceroy could do to mitigate this evil. 
 •This was to waive " official etiquette, and seize every 
 opportunity which comes within his reach to win con- 
 fidence by showing confidence, and to dispel fictions by 
 stating facts." In illustration of this, he gave an account 
 of his policy towards the Ameer, and of the Conference 
 just concluded at Peshawur. He told them that he had 
 " invited the Ameer to a friendly interchange of views," 
 and had " complied also with the suggestion made to us 
 by his Highness that Envoys on the part of the two 
 Governments should meet at Peshawur for this purpose." 
 He did not tell them that he had bullied the Ameer into 
 this suggestion as the only means he had of postponing 
 or of evading demands which were new, violent, and in 
 breach of former promises. He told them that the Con- 
 ference had been "prematurely terminated by a sad 
 event"— the death of the Cabul Envoy. He did not 
 tell them that he was himself on the point of closing the 
 Conference in order to prevent a new Envoy coming. 
 He told them that his policy was to maintain, as the 
 strongest frontier which India could have, a belt of 
 frontier States, " by which our advice is followed without 
 suspicion, and our word relied on without misgiving, 
 because the first has been justified by good results, and
 
 250 FROM THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE 
 
 the second never quibbled away by timorous sub-intents 
 or tricky saving clauses." Surely this is the most extra- 
 ordinary speech ever made by a Viceroy of India. At 
 whom was he speaking, when he talked of "sub-intents" 
 and " tricky saving clauses ?" Of whom could he be 
 thinking ? What former Viceroy had ever been even 
 accused of such proceedings ? We seem to be dealing 
 here with a veritable psychological phenomenon. If \\t 
 had read to the Council the Ninth and Tenth Articles of 
 the Draft Treaty which he had just been preparing for 
 the Ameer of Cabul, together with the "Secret and 
 Subsidiary Explanatory Agreement,"— then, and then 
 only, the Legislative Council of India would have under- 
 stood the extraordinary observations which Avere thus 
 addressed to them.'^ 
 
 The Simla Narrative of these events is dated the loth 
 of May, and was, therefore, drawn up within about six 
 weeks of the close of the Conferences at Peshawur. It 
 is important to observe the view which it expresses of 
 the final result of the Viceroy's policy and proceedings in 
 reference to our relations with Afghanistan. It speaks 
 with complete, and no doubt deserved, contempt of the 
 passionate designs to which our violence towards him 
 had driven the Ameer. It admits that the whole move- 
 ment had collapsed even before the Conferences had been 
 summarily closed, and that the Ameer had sent a re- 
 assuring message to the authorities and population of 
 
 * Abstract of the Proceedings of the Council of the Governor- 
 General of India, &c., 28th March, 187^. These Abstracts are, I 
 believe, published in India.
 
 TO THE WAR. 251 
 
 Candahar, on the subject of his relations with the 
 British Government. The truth, therefore, seems to be 
 that the moment the Indian Government ceased to 
 threaten him with the hated measure of sending British 
 officers into his country, his disposition to be friendly 
 returned, thus plainly indicating that any danger of 
 hostility on his part arose solely from our attempts to 
 depart from our previous engagements v/ith him.* The 
 next thing to be observed in the Simla Narrative is 
 this — ^that the Viceroy and his Council did not pretend 
 to be alarmed, or, indeed, to have any fears whatever of 
 external aggression. On the contrary, they declared 
 that whatever might be the future of Cabul politics, they 
 would " await its natural development with increased 
 confidence in the complete freedom and paramount 
 strength of our own position."! 
 
 This is an accurate account — as far as it goes — of that 
 estimate of our position in India which had inspired the 
 policy of Lord Lawrence, of Lord Mayo, and of Lord 
 Northbrook. Lord George Hamilton complained, in the 
 late debate in the House of Commons, that he could find 
 no Despatch in the India Office setting forth the view 
 which I had taken as Secretary of State on the Central 
 Asian Question.^ I had no need to write any such 
 
 * Afghan Corresp., I., 1878, para. 38, p. 171. 
 t Ibid., para. 40, p. 172. 
 X The policy of the Government on the Central Asian Question 
 was more than once stated and defended in the House of Commons, 
 by my honourable friend, Mr. Grant Duff, with all the knowledge 
 which his ability and his indefatigable industry- enabled him to 
 bring to bear upon the subject.
 
 252 FROM THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE 
 
 Despatch, because the policy of the Cabinet was in com- 
 plete harmony with the conduct and the policy of Lord 
 Lawrence, of Lord Mayo, and of Lord Northbrook. In 
 Europe that policy was represented by the Despatches of 
 the Foreign Office. But if I had felt called upon to write 
 a formal Despatch on the Central Asian Question it would 
 have been based upon that confidence in the paramount 
 strength of our own position which Lord Lytton expresses 
 in the paragraph which I have just quoted. It would 
 have been written, however, under this difference of cir- 
 cumstances — that the confidence expressed would have 
 been sincere, and in harmony with our actual conduct. 
 The sincerity of it in Lord Lytton's case had serious 
 doubts thrown upon it by the desperate efforts he had 
 just been making to persuade the Ameer of Cabul to let 
 us off from our engagements on the subject of British 
 officers, and by the transparent insincerity of his repeated 
 declarations that all these efforts were for Shere Ali's 
 benefit, and not for our own. 
 
 As for the Government at home, it was necessary for 
 them, at this time, to keep very quiet. They carefully 
 concealed everything that had happened. It was on the 
 15th of June, 1877, that I asked certain questions in the 
 House of Lords upon the subject. The impression left 
 upon my mind by the reply was that nothing of any im- 
 portance had occurred. Private and authentic informa- 
 tion, indeed, of which I was in possession, prevented me 
 from being altogether deceived. But I hoped that it 
 might at least be the desire of the Cabinet to restrain 
 Lord Lytton. Certainly, nothing could be more mis-
 
 TO THE WAR. 253 
 
 leading as to the past than the answers I received. 
 There had been a Conference at Peshavvur, but it had 
 been arranged at the Ameer's own request. There had 
 been no attempt to force an Envoy on the Ameer " at 
 Cabul." Our relations with the Ameer had undergone 
 no material change since last year. All this was very 
 reassuring, and whatever may now be said or thought of 
 the accuracy of the information which these replies 
 afforded to Parliament, this at least is to be gained from 
 them, that at that time, which was two months and a 
 half after the close of the Peshawur Conference, no alarm 
 whatever was felt as to the disposition or conduct of the 
 Ameer. Now that we had withdrawn our proposal to 
 send Envoys, and had abstained from threatening him, 
 ail was going comparatively well. 
 
 But farther evidence on this important point is to be 
 found at a much later date, and from the same authori- 
 tative source of information. The time came when the 
 Indian Secretary had to review officially Lord Lytton's 
 proceedings. This was done in a Despatch, dated October 
 4th, 1877. In it Lord Sali.sbury dealt almost lightly with 
 the whole subject, — dwelt upon the fact that there were 
 " already indications of a change for the better in the 
 attitude of the Ameer," — trusted the improvement would 
 continue, — and indicated that this end would be " most 
 speedily attained by abstention for the present, on the 
 one hand, from any hostile pressure on his Highness, and, 
 on the other, from any renewed offer of the concessions 
 which have been refused.""^ 
 
 * Ibid., No. y], para. 9, p. 224.
 
 254 FROM THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE 
 
 This important declaration by Lord Salisbury esta- 
 blishes a complete separation and distinction between the 
 Afghan Question as directly connected with the politics 
 of India, and the Afghan Question as it came to be re- 
 vived in an aggravated form by the action and policy of 
 the Cabinet in support of Turkey. 
 
 In the meantime, as we all know, great events had 
 happened. From the date of Lord Salisbury's Despatch 
 of the 4th of October, 1 877, reviewing the situation after 
 the Conference at Peshawur, to the 7th of June, 1878, 
 when the first rumour of the Russian Mission to Cabul 
 reached the Viceroy, we have not a scrap of information 
 as to what had been going on in India in the papers 
 presented to Parliament by the India Office. There is 
 thus a complete hiatus of eight months, for the history 
 of which we must go to the papers connected with the 
 Eastern Question in Europe, and to what are called " the 
 ordinary sources of information." Some of these are at 
 least as worthy of confidence as the narratives and the 
 denials of the Government, and the main facts of the 
 succeeding history are not open to dispute. 
 
 The Russian Declaration of War against Turkey had 
 followed close upon the termination of the Conference at 
 Peshawur. Early in October, when Lord Salisbury wrote 
 the Despatch just quoted, the fortunes of the Russian 
 campaign were doubtful both in Europe and in Asia. 
 Probably this contributed to the spirit of comparative 
 composure which inspires that paper, and which contrasts 
 so much with the nervous fears apparent in the Afghan 
 policy which had so completely failed.
 
 TO THE WAR. 255 
 
 But soon after Lord Salisbury's Despatch of October 
 4th, 1877, the tide had turned both in Europe and in 
 Western Asia, and, when it did turn, the reverse current 
 came in as it does on the sands of Solway or of Dee. 
 The Turks were defeated : Kars was taken : Plevna fell : 
 the Balkans were crossed : and the armies of Russia 
 poured into the Roumelian plains. There is reason to 
 believe that the agitation of the Government at home 
 communicated itself to their representative in India. 
 Long before this, as we have seen, he had begun to play 
 at soldiers, he had been accumulating forces on the 
 frontiers, building a bridge of boats upon the Indus, in- 
 citing border Governments to aggressive movements on 
 or beyond their own frontier, and formally occupying 
 Quetta, — not in connexion with any mere Khelat dis- 
 turbance, but as a part of a new Imperial policy. All 
 round, it had been a policy of fuss and fear, giving in- 
 dications that the obscure threat of Sir Lewis Felly at 
 Peshawur would be carried into effect — namely, that the 
 British Government would adopt some new measure on 
 the frontier which would be regardless of the interests of 
 Afghanistan. The tongue of the Indian press was let 
 loose upon the subject, and the Indian mind was agitated 
 by the expectation of great movements and bold designs. 
 
 Some of these were soon known to, or surmised by, 
 Russia. Colonel Brackenbury, the military correspondent 
 of the Times, who crossed the Balkans with the force of 
 General Gourko in July, 1877, tells us the following 
 curious story : — " One day in Bulgaria, I think it was the 
 day when Gourko 's force captured the Shipka, and we
 
 256 FROM THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE 
 
 met young Skobeloff on the top of the Pass, that briUiant 
 and extraordinary young General said to me suddenly* 
 ' Have you any news from India ?' I replied that the 
 Russian postal authorities took care that I had no news 
 from anywhere. His answer was, ' I cannot find out 
 what has become of that column of 10,000 men that has 
 been organised by your people to raise Central Asia 
 against us.' '^ Possibly the rumour which had reached 
 the Russian General may have been at that time un- 
 founded. Perhaps it may have ranked with the " bag- 
 gage-animal" rumours against Shere Ali, of which Lord 
 Lytton made so much, But there is reason to believe 
 that if not then, at least at a somewhat later period, the 
 busy brains which were contemplating a call on Eastern 
 troops " to redress the balance of the West," had it also 
 in contemplation, as part of the Imperial policy, to make 
 some serious military movement against Russia beyond 
 the frontiers of India. There is a well-known connexion 
 between the Pioneer, an Indian Journal, and the Govern- 
 ment of India. In the number of that paper, dated 
 September 4th, 1878, there appeared a letter, dated 
 Simla, August 28th, which stated that in anticipation of 
 a war with Russia, it was no secret that an army of 30,000 
 men had been prepared in India, with the intention of 
 forcing its way through Afghanistan, and attacking the 
 Russian dominions in Central Asia. Considering that 
 on a much more recent occasion, as I shall presently 
 show, Lord Lytton, or his Government, seems to have 
 communicated at once to the correspondents of the press 
 the orders sent to him by the Cabinet, on the subject of
 
 TO THE WAR. 
 
 257 
 
 his final dealings with the Ameer, it is not at all impro- 
 bable that the writer of this letter in the Pioneer had 
 authentic information. The British Government was, of 
 course, quite right to take every measure in its power to 
 defeat Russia if it contemplated the probability of a war 
 with that Power. It is notorious that such a war wax 
 anticipated as more or less probable during the whole of 
 the year previous to the signature of the Treaty of Berlin. 
 All the well-known steps taken by the Government in the 
 way of military preparation had reference to that con- 
 tingency, and there is nothing whatever improbable that 
 among those preparations, the scheme referred to in the 
 Pioneer had been planned. 
 
 But if the Government of England had a perfect right 
 to make such preparations, and to devise such plans, it 
 will hardly be denied that Russia had an equal right to 
 take precautions against them. It is true she had an 
 engagement with us not to interfere in Afghanistan. But 
 it will hardly be contended that she was to continue to be 
 bound by this engagement when the Viceroy of India 
 was known or believed to be organising an attack upon 
 her, of which Afghanistan was to be the base. The letter 
 written at Simla, to which I have referred above, ex- 
 pressly states that the Russian Mission to Cabul was 
 sent under the apprehension of such a movement, and 
 having for its object to bribe Shere Ali to oppose our 
 progress. Sir Henry Rawlinson, in his Article in the 
 Nineteenth Century for December, i ^-j"^, professes to give 
 an account in some detail of the proceedings of Russia in 
 connexion with the Cabul Mission. He does not give his 
 
 s
 
 258 FROM THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE 
 
 authorities ; but, as he has better sources of information 
 than most other men upon this subject, we may take that 
 account as the nearest approximation to the truth at 
 which we can arrive at present. He takes no notice 
 of the intentions of the Indian Government to attack 
 Russia. But his whole narrative shows that the Russian 
 movements, of which the Mission to Cabul was only one 
 part, were of a defensive character, and in anticipation 
 of a war with England. He says that they were a mere 
 "tentative demonstration against the Afghan frontier,'- 
 — that " the force was totally inadequate to any serious 
 aggressive purpose," — and that the military expeditions 
 were abandoned when the signature of the Treaty of 
 Berlin removed the danger of war.-^ It is well worthy 
 of observation, as I have already pointed out, that of the 
 three military movements then contemplated by Russia, 
 two were movements directed from territories over which 
 she had acquired command between 1864 and 1869, or 
 in other words, before the Umballa Conferences. The 
 main column was to start from Tashkend, and move by 
 Samarkand to Jam. The right flanking column alone 
 was to move from a point in the former territories of 
 Khiva, whilst the left column was to be directed from 
 the borders of Kokhand, upon the Oxus near Kunduz, 
 crossing the mountains which buttress the Jaxartes Valley 
 to the south. The whole force did not exceed 12,000 
 men Such was the terrible danger to which our Indian 
 Empire was exposed. 
 
 * Nineteenth Century, No. 22, pp. 982, 983.
 
 TO THE WAR. 259 
 
 The Peace of Berlin stopped the whole movement. 
 It has been stated that the Mission proceeded to Cabul 
 after that event was known. But as the Treaty of Berlin 
 was not signed till the 13th of July, and as the Russian 
 Envoy is stated by the Viceroy to have been received in 
 Durbar by the Ameer, at Cabul, on the 26th of July,* it 
 is obviously impossible that this can be correct. Sir 
 Henry Rawlinson, indeed, places the arrival of the Rus- 
 sian Envoy on the lOth of August, but he admits in a 
 note that this date is uncertain. Even if it were correct, 
 it would by no means follow that the Treaty of Berlin 
 had been heard of by the Russian authorities in Central 
 Asia before that time. 
 
 We may, therefore, take it as certain that the whole of 
 the Russian proceedings, including the Mission, were 
 taken in connexion with a policy of self-defence, and that 
 the Mission to Cabul was a direct and immediate con- 
 sequence, not of any preconceived design on the part of 
 Russia to invade India, or gratuitously to break her en- 
 gagement with us in respect to Afghanistan, but of the 
 threatening policy of the British Cabinet in Europe, and 
 of its intention, in pursuance of that policy, to make 
 India the base of hostile operations against Russia. 
 
 This being so, let us now look at the position in 
 which we had placed the Ameer. We had treated him, 
 as I have shown, not only with violence, but with bad 
 faith. We had formally declared that we owed him 
 nothing in the way of assistance or defence against any 
 
 * Afghan Corresp., I., 1878, No. 61, p. 231. 
 S 2
 
 26o FROM THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE 
 
 enemy, foreign or domestic. We had founded this de- 
 claration on unjust and disingenuous distinctions between 
 Treaty engagements, and the solemn promises, whether 
 written or verbal, of former Viceroys. We had withdrawn 
 our Agent from his Capital. We had thrown out ambi- 
 guous threats that we should direct our frontier policy 
 without any reference to his interests or his wishes. 
 
 In spite of all this, there is no proof that the Ameer 
 had the slightest disposition to invite, or even welcome, 
 the agents of Russia. On the contrary, all the evidence 
 of any value goes to show that he was quite as jealous of 
 Russian officers as he was of British officers coming to 
 his country. Our own Agent had told Lord Lytton that 
 this was the real condition of his mind just before the 
 Peshawur Conference, and there had been distinct indi- 
 cations of the truth of this opinion in the language of 
 the Ameer just before that Conference. It was consistent 
 with the frame of mind of the Viceroy to believe against 
 the Ameer every rumour which came to him through 
 his secret agents, of whom we know nothing, and the 
 truth of whose accounts is very probably on a par with 
 that of the dealer in " baggage animals " whose narrative 
 has been quoted on a previous page. 
 
 In spite of all this, there is the best reason to believe 
 that the Ameer received the intimation of the approach- 
 ing Russian Mission with sincere annoyance and alarm. 
 There are indications of it, but only indications of it, in 
 the papers presented to Parliament. One of our spies, a 
 native doctor, had heard the Ameer tell his Minister that 
 the Russian Envoy had crossed the Oxus on his way to
 
 TO THE WAR. 261 
 
 Cabul, "refusing to be stopped."* The Ameer had sent 
 orders to cease the opposition, but this report does not 
 say under what amount of pressure, or with what degree 
 of reluctance. Major Cavagnari, however, dating from 
 Peshawur, on the 21st of July, expressly says : " Chetan 
 Shah has arrived. He corroborates the intelligence I 
 have recently reported regarding Russian pressure on the 
 Ameer, and military preparations in Trans-Oxus."t 
 
 I must at once express my opinion that under whatever 
 circumstances or from whatever motives the Russian 
 Mission was sent and was received, it was impossible for 
 the British Government to acquiesce in that reception as 
 the close of our transactions with the Ameer upon the 
 subject of Missions to his Court. We cannot allow Russia 
 to acquire predominant, or even co-equal, influence with 
 ourselves in Afghanistan. The Cabinet was therefore not 
 only justified in taking, but they were imperatively called 
 upon to take, measures to ascertain the real object of that 
 Mission, and if it had any political character, to secure 
 that no similar Mission should be sent again. 
 
 But considering that under the circumstances which 
 have been narrated, the sending of the Mission could 
 only be considered a war measure on the part of Russia, 
 and had arisen entirely out of circumstances which 
 threatened hostilities between the two countries, — con- 
 sidering farther, that, as regarded the reception of the 
 Mission, we had ourselves placed the Ameer in a posi- 
 tion of extreme difficulty, and had reason to believe and 
 
 * Ibid., No, 42, p. 227. t Ibid., No. 48, Inclos. p. 229.
 
 262 FROM THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE 
 
 to know that he was not in any way party to the Russian 
 poHcy in sending it, — justice absolutely demanded, and 
 our own self-respect demanded, that we should proceed 
 towards the Ameer with all the dignity of conscious 
 strength, and of conscious responsibility for the natural 
 results of our own previous conduct and policy. 
 
 There is, I am happy to acknowledge, some evidence 
 that at the last moment the Cabinet at home did feel 
 some compunction on account of the crisis which they 
 had brought about. There is no evidence that the Vice- 
 roy felt any. He was all for instant measures of threat 
 and of compulsion. But as the last steps in this sad and 
 discreditable history are only in too complete accordance 
 with those which had gone before, I must give them in 
 some detail. 
 
 Lord Lytton, by his own act in withdrawing our native 
 Agent from Cabul, had placed the Government of India 
 in the position of being without any authentic informa- 
 tion from that Capital. It could only hear of what might 
 be going on through spies of untrustworthy character, or 
 by rumour and report. The first rumours of the approach 
 of a Russian Mission, and of the mobilisation of Russian 
 forces in Turkestan, reached the Government of India 
 from the 7th to the 19th of June, 1878.* But it was not 
 till after the lapse of another month, on the 30th and 
 31st of July,t that any definite information was obtained. 
 Even then, it does not seem to have been very accurate, 
 but it was certain that a Russian officer of high rank. 
 
 * Ibid., Nos. 39, 40, p. 226. t Ibid., No. 42, p. 229.
 
 TO THE WAR. 263 
 
 with a large escort, had made his way to Cabul, and 
 had been received there. 
 
 It will be observed that this period of nearly two 
 months was exactly the period during which we passed 
 in Europe from the imminent danger of a war with Russia 
 to the probability of peace. The Salisbury-Schouvalow 
 agreement was only signed on the 30th of May, and 
 nothing of it could be known in India or in Turkestan 
 early in June. But before the end of July the Treaty 
 of Berlin had been signed, and peace with Russia was 
 assured. This was the condition of things when, on the 
 30th of July, Lord Lytton telegraphed that he had 
 certain information of the arrival and of the importance 
 of the Russian Mission. It is only due to Lord Lytton to 
 point out that he saw, and that he raised, the obvious 
 question whether, now that peace with Russia was assured, 
 the Russian Mission should not be dealt with directly 
 between the Cabinet of London and the Russian Govern- 
 ment, rather than indirectly between the Government of 
 India and the Ameer of Cabul. He did not recommend 
 the first of these two courses rather than the last — that 
 was hardly his business. But he did suggest it. The 
 Cabinet, however, simply replied by telling him to make 
 sure of his facts in the first place.'^ On the 2nd of August 
 Lord Lytton proposed! that the Government of India 
 should insist on the reception at Cabul of a British Mission, 
 pomting out that now we might probably secure all our 
 previous demands without paying for them any price in 
 the shape of " dynastic obligations." 
 
 * Ibid., No. 43, P- 228. t Ibid, No. 45, p. 228.
 
 264 FROM THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE 
 
 On the 3rd this course was approved by the Cabinet.''^ 
 Accordingly, on the 14th of August, the Viceroy wrote 
 a letter to the Ameer intimating that a British Mission, 
 would be sent to Cabul, in the person of Sir Neville 
 Chamberlain, who was to visit his Highness "immedi- 
 ately at Cabul," to converse with him on urgent affairs 
 touching the course of recent events at Cabul, and in the 
 countries bordering on Afghanistan.t This letter was 
 sent in advance by a native gentleman, Nawab Gholam 
 Hussein Khan. 
 
 Within three days after this letter was written, an im- 
 portant event happened at Cabul. On the 17th of August 
 the Ameer lost his favourite son, Abdoolah Jan. If the 
 unfortunate Ameer had been perturbed by the conduct 
 of the Indian Government, if he had been still further 
 troubled by the necessity of receiving a Russian Mission, 
 this bereavement must have completed the miseries of his 
 position. When Lord Lytton heard of this event on the 
 26th of August,| he was obliged, out of decency, to 
 arrange for the postponement of Sir Neville Chamber- 
 lain's departure, so that the Mission should not reach 
 Cabul until after the expiry of the customary mourning of 
 forty days. A second letter was also sent to the Ameer, 
 being a letter of condolence. The intention here was 
 good, but unfortunately it was hardly carried into effect. 
 Lord Lytton's impatience could not be restrained, and 
 indeed he confessed that he did not think it expedient 
 to relax preparations for the speedy departure of the 
 
 ♦ Ibid., No. 46, p. 229. t Ibid., No, 49, Inclos. 4, p. 232. 
 
 X Ibid., No. 50, p. 233.
 
 TO THE WAR. 265 
 
 Mission " beyond what was decorous."* The decorum 
 seems to have consisted in spending as many as possible 
 of the forty days in despatching a perfect fire of messages 
 through every conceivable channel, all of them in a more 
 or less imperious tone. The Ameer was plied with threats 
 through native Agents that the Mission would leave 
 Peshawur on the i6th of September, so as to time the 
 probable arrival at Cabul as exactly as possible at the 
 end of the forty days, whilst at the same time he was 
 informed that resistance or delay would be considered as 
 an act of "open hostility." Moreover, these fiery messages 
 were repeated to the subordinate officers of Shere Ali at 
 the forts and citadels on the road — so that no indignity 
 might be spared to the unfortunate Ameer.f 
 
 It must be remembered that all this was being trans- 
 acted at a time when it was known that the Russian Envoy 
 had himself left Cabul on or about the 25th of August,+ 
 leaving only some members of the Mission behind, and 
 when it was quite certain that no hostile movement on 
 the part of Russia could be contemplated, or was possible. 
 But this is not all. The Viceroy's messenger, Nawab 
 Gholam Hussein Khan, reached Cabul on the loth of 
 September, and on the 17th Sir Neville Chamberlain was 
 able to report from Peshawur the result of the first inter- 
 view with the Ameer. From this it clearly appeared 
 that Shere Ali did not intend to refuse to receive a Mission. 
 What he objected to was the " harsh words" and the 
 
 * Ibid., No. 50, p. 233. 
 
 t Afghan Corresp., II., 1878, pp. 16, 17. 
 
 X Ibid., No. 51, p. 234.
 
 266 FROM THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE 
 
 indecent haste. " It is as if they were come by force. I 
 do not agree to the Mission coming in this manner, and 
 until my officers have received orders from me, how can 
 the Mission come ? It is as if they wish to disgrace me. 
 I am a friend as before, and entertain no ill-will. The 
 Russian Envoy has come, and has come with my per- 
 mission. I am still afflicted with grief at the loss of my 
 son, and have had no time to think over the matter." 
 On the following day, the i8th of September, Sir Neville 
 Chamberlain reported a farther message from Nawab 
 Hussein Khan, that he had been assured by the Minister 
 of the Ameer, on his oath, that " the Ameer intimated 
 that he would send for the Mission in order to clear up 
 mutual misunderstandings, provided there was no attempt 
 to force the Mission without his consent being first 
 granted according to usual custom, otherwise he would 
 resist it, as coming in such a manner would be a slight 
 to him." He complained of the false reports against him 
 from news writers. He denied having invited the 
 Russian Mission. " He believed a personal interview 
 with the Briti.sh Mission would adjust misunderstandings." 
 Some of the Russians were detained by sickness in Cabul. 
 The Nawab thought that the Russians would soon be 
 dismissed, and that the Ameer would then send for the 
 British Mission.* 
 
 To all this the Viceroy replied by telegraph, on the 
 rgth of September, that it made no change in the situa- 
 tion, and that the preconcerted movements of Sir Neville 
 
 * Ibid., pp. 242-3.
 
 TO THE WAR. 267 
 
 Chamberlain should not be delayed.* If the Govern- 
 ment wanted war — if they now saw their opportunity of 
 getting by force what they had failed in getting by a 
 tortuous diplomacy — then they were quite right. There 
 was not a moment to be lost. It was evident that at any 
 moment, and in all probability at the end of the forty 
 days, a message might be received taking away all 
 excuse for threats. But if the Government wanted peace, 
 then nothing could be more violent and unjust than their 
 proceedings, nor could anything be more frivolous than 
 the pretexts they put forward. It is said that the 
 Ameer's object was " to keep the Mission waiting in- 
 definitely." It did not stand well in the mouth of the 
 Viceroy to attribute " ostensible pretexts" to others — 
 whose only crime was that they had been able to detect 
 his own. There was no evidence and no probability that 
 the Ameer desired an indefinite postponement. It was 
 only reasonable and natural that he should wish to see 
 the Russian Mission finally cleared out of his Capital 
 before he received the British Mission. And if any in- 
 convenience arose from the Mission having been already 
 sent to Peshawur, that inconvenience was entirely due to 
 the blundering which had sent it there in such unnecessary 
 and unreasonable haste. 
 
 And so — casting aside all decorum as well as all justice 
 — the Mission was advanced to Ali Musjid on the 21st of 
 September, — five or six days before the expiry of the 
 forty days of mourning, — and there, as is well known, by 
 orders of the Ameer it was stopped. 
 * Ibid, p. 243.
 
 268 FROM THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE 
 
 Following on this, on the 19th of October, a letter 
 from the Ameer was received, complaining of the " harsh 
 and breathless haste" with which he had been treated, 
 and of the " hard words, repugnant to courtesy and polite- 
 ness," which had been addressed to himself and to his 
 officers.* The Viceroy now at once telegraphed to the 
 Government at home that " any demand for apology 
 would now, in my opinion, be useless, and only expose 
 us to fresh insult, whilst losing valuable time." He pro- 
 posed an immediate declaration of war, and an immediate 
 advance of troops into Afghanistan. f 
 
 This was on the 19th of October. The Cabinet replied 
 on the 25th that they did not consider matters to be then 
 " ripe for taking all the steps" mentioned in the Vice- 
 roy's telegram. They were of opinion that, before 
 crossing the frontiers of Afghanistan, "a demand, in 
 temperate language, should be made for an apology, and 
 acceptance of a permanent British Mission within the 
 Afghan frontiers, and that a reply should be demanded 
 within a time sufficient for the purpose."| In the mean- 
 time military preparations were to be continued. 
 
 It will be observed that in this reply the Cabinet took 
 advantage of the position to put forward a demand on 
 the Ameer not merely to receive a Mission, but to admit 
 a permanent Mission, and to do this without offering to 
 Shere Ali any one of the countervailing advantages w^hich, 
 before, they had professed a willingness to bestow upon 
 him. 
 
 * Afghan. Corresp., I., 1878, No. 61, p. 263. 
 t Ibid., No. 64, p. 255. X Ibid, No. 65, p. 264.
 
 TO 2HE WAR. 269 
 
 A gap — an interval of five days — here occurs in the 
 papers presented to Parliament. Between the telegram 
 of the 25th and the Ultimatum Letter to the Ameer 
 dated the 30th October, there is nothing to show what 
 was going on. But this gap is in a measure supplied 
 from a singular source of information. On the ist of 
 November a long telegram was published by the Daily 
 News from its well-known correspondent at Simla, which 
 professes to give an account of what had been done, and 
 was then being done, both by the Viceroy and by the 
 Cabinet at home. This account is confirmed by the 
 papers subsequently presented to Parliament, in so far as 
 it relates to particulars which are traceable in them. It 
 is, therefore, a reasonable presumption that the same 
 account is not altogether erroneous as regards those other 
 particulars which cannot be so verified. Whether it is 
 perfectly accurate or not, it gives a striking picture of the 
 atmosphere which prevailed at the head-quarters of the 
 Government of India, and is a signal illustration of the 
 truth of Sir J. Kaye's opinion that the spirit of the Indian 
 services, both civil and military, is almost always in 
 favour of war. The telegram published in the Daily 
 News of November ist is as follows : — 
 
 " Simla, Thursday night (Oct. 31, 1878). 
 
 " The formal decision of the Viceregal Council was 
 made to-day in full self-consciousness of bitter humi- 
 liation. The following is the succinct story of this blow 
 to its prestige : — 
 
 " At the Cabinet Council on Friday last (Oct. 25) the 
 formal decision was telegraphed to despatch an Ultimatum
 
 2 70 FROM THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE 
 
 to the Ameer. At the Viceregal Council held here on 
 Saturday (Oct. 26), there was a unanimous agreement 
 to urge the reconsideration of the matter on the Home 
 Government. Representations were made with an 
 earnestness seldom characterising official communica- 
 tions, the Viceroy throwing all his personal weight into 
 the scale. A continuous interchange of telegrams 
 followed, and yesterday (Oct. 30) there was good hope 
 of a successful issue. The Viceregal Council assembled 
 this morning (Oct. 31) to give effect to the final resolve 
 of the Home Cabinet, which adheres meanwhile to its 
 decision as telegraphed. 
 
 "The emissary despatched on Monday (Oct. 28), 
 bearing the Ultimatum as prescribed by the Cabinet, was 
 instructed to receive at a point e7i route a telegram 
 bidding him go on or stop, as the final resolve might 
 dictate. Thus three days are saved. The emissary 
 proceeds towards the frontier to await his application for 
 admission to Cabul. It is hoped here that the Ameer 
 will forbid his entrance, and decline all communication 
 with him," 
 
 It is impossible not to ask how this correspondent came 
 to be informed on the ist of November of the decision 
 which we now know was actually taken by the Cabinet 
 on the 25th of October. It is impossible to suppose that 
 telegrams so delicate and important were sent othenvise 
 than in cipher. Is it possible that the Viceroy and the 
 Government of India communicated all these messages 
 to the representatives of the press, and thus appealed to 
 the popular opinion of the Indian services against the 
 decision of Her Majesty's Government } 
 
 But now, once more, we emerge into the light of
 
 TO THE WAR. 271 
 
 official day. When the curtain rises on the work of those 
 five days we find the Cabinet sending to the Viceroy, on 
 the 30th of October, an Ultimatum Letter,* which was to 
 be sent to the Ameer. It does not seem certain whether 
 the first draft of this letter was drawn up by the Viceroy 
 or by the Cabinet. The original authorship of the draft 
 matters not. We have the " Text of letter, as approved." 
 The Cabinet is, therefore, responsible for every line, and 
 for every word. Let us see what it says. 
 
 The very first sentence sets forth unfairly the purposes 
 of the Mission on which the Viceroy had intended to 
 send Sir Lewis Pelly to Cabul. It is a repetition of the 
 " ostensible pretexts" which the Indian Secretary and the 
 Viceroy had together devised to cover the secret objects 
 of that Mission. It pretends that it was a Mission of 
 disinterested friendship towards the Ameer, whereas it 
 was a Mission intended to provide against " a prospective 
 peril to British interests"! by forcing on the Ameer a 
 measure which we were pledged not to force upon him. 
 
 But the second sentence of this Cabinet letter is a 
 great deal worse. It asserts, in the first place, that the 
 Ameer left the Viceroy's proposal " long unanswered." 
 It asserts, in the second place, that the Ameer refused 
 that proposal on two grounds, one of which was " that 
 he could not answer for the safety of any European 
 Envoy in his country." 
 
 Neither of these assertions is true. The Ameer did 
 not leave the Viceroy's letter " long unanswered ;" and 
 
 * Ibid., No. 66, p. 254. 
 t Instructions to Lord Lytton, Ibid., p. 156.
 
 272 FROM THE PESHA WUR CONFERENCE 
 
 when he did answer it, he did not ground his refusal 
 on the plea that he could not answer for the safety of 
 an Envoy.* The facts are these : The letter of the Vice- 
 roy proposing the Mission, dated May 5th, reached Cabul 
 on the 17th of May, 1876,! and was probably not brought 
 before the Ameer till the i8th. Shere All's answer was 
 dated May 22nd, J and we happen to know from our own 
 Agent that it was the result of deliberations in his 
 Durbar, v/hich (apparently for the very purpose of 
 avoiding delay), we are expressly told, were held " con- 
 tinuously" for the four days which intervened. § 
 
 So much for the truth of the first assertion made by 
 the Cabinet in the second paragraph of the Ultimatum. 
 Now for the second. 
 
 In the Ameer's answer of May 22nd there is not one 
 word about the safety of a British Envoy in his country. 
 His refusal to receive, or at least his desire to postpone 
 indefinitely, the reception of a British Mission is put 
 wholly and entirely upon a different ground — which, no 
 doubt, it was not convenient for the Cabinet to notice. 
 The reason assigned by the Ameer was the very simple 
 one, that he was perfectly satisfied with the assurances 
 given to him by Lord Northbrook at Simla in 1873, 
 and that he did not desire any reopening of negotiations 
 upon the subject to which those assurances referred. 
 
 The reckless unfairness with which the Ameer of Cabul 
 has been treated by Her Majesty's present Government 
 
 * Simla Narrative, para. 23. f Afghan Corresp., I., 1878, p. 166. 
 X Ibid., No. 36, Inclos. 7, p. 174. 
 § Ibid., Inclos. 8, p. 176.
 
 TO THE WAR. 273 
 
 throughout the transactions which have resulted in war, 
 could not be better illustrated than by this Cabinet 
 Ultimatum. In this case the Cabinet has not even the 
 excuse of having been led astray by similar recklessness 
 on the part of the Viceroy. In the 23rd paragraph of his 
 Simla Narrative he tells this particular part of the story 
 with substantial correctness. He does not accuse the 
 Ameer of leaving his letter " long unanswered." On the 
 contrary, he speaks of the reply as having come " shortly 
 afterwards." But it is much more important to observe 
 that Lord Lytton states, as fairly as the Cabinet states 
 unfairly, the grounds of objection taken by the Ameer : — 
 " On the ground," says Lord Lytton, " that he desired no 
 change in his relations with the British Government."* 
 Lord Lytton also states with fairness that the argument 
 about the safety of Envoys, which is not even mentioned 
 by the Ameer, appears only as one among several " addi- 
 tional reasons" which were reported by our Native Agent 
 as having been used in Durbar during the " continuous" 
 discussion of several days' duration. 
 
 But the unfairness and inaccuracies of the Cabinet 
 Ultimatum do not end even here. It proceeds thus : 
 " Yet the British Government, unwilling to embarrass 
 you, accepted your excuses." Was there ever such an 
 account given of such transactions as those of the Vice- 
 roy, subsequent to the receipt of the Ameer's reply? 
 So far from "accepting his excuses," the Government of 
 India, after leaving that reply " long unanswered" — out 
 
 * Simla Narrative, para. 23, p. i66, 
 T
 
 274 FROM THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE 
 
 of pure embarrassment as to what to do — began addres- 
 sing to the Ameer a series of letters and messages, one 
 more imperious and insulting than another, until, as we 
 have seen, they ended by suspending all diplomatic 
 relations with him, and were now about to declare war 
 against him because he claimed his right to consider as 
 binding upon us the pledges of the British Crown. 
 
 I confess I cannot write these sentences without emo- 
 tion. They seem to me to be the record of sayings and 
 of doings which cast an indelible disgrace upon our 
 country. The page of history is full of the Proclamations 
 and Manifestoes of powerful Kings and Governments who 
 have desired to cover, under plausible pretexts, acts of 
 violence and injustice against weaker States. It may 
 well be doubted whether in the whole of this melancholy 
 list any one specimen could be found more unfair in its 
 accusations, more reckless in its assertions, than this 
 Ultimatum Letter, addressed to the Ameer of Cabul, by 
 the Cabinet of the Queen. 
 
 I repeat here that, holding, as I do, that we cannot 
 allow Russian influence and power to be established in 
 Afghanistan, I hold also, as a consequence, that Her 
 Majesty's Government could not acquiesce in the position 
 in which they would have been placed by the acceptance 
 at Cabul of the Russian Mission, followed by a refusal 
 on the part of the Ameer to receive a Mission from the 
 British Crown. But they were bound to remember that 
 they had themselves brought the Russian Mission upon 
 the Ameer, and upon ourselves ; and they were equally 
 bound to consider that Shere Ali was not refusing to
 
 TO THE WAR. 275 
 
 accept a Mission from the Viceroy, but was, on the con- 
 trary, expressing his opinion that " a personal interview 
 with a British Mission would adjust misunderstandings." 
 All that the Ameer desired was that this Mission should 
 not be forced upon him by open violence in the sight of 
 all his officers and of all his people. They knew that he 
 did not complain of the determination of the Indian 
 Government to send an Envoy, but only of the " blus- 
 tering " messages to himself and to his officers by which 
 he had been incessantly plied even during his days of 
 grief. They knew that if ever there had been real mourn- 
 ing in the world it must have been the mourning of 
 Shere Ali for Abdoolah Jan. For this boy he had sacri- 
 ficed whatever of affection and of fidelity is possible 
 among the children of a harem. With this boy at his 
 side, he had sat enthroned, as an equal, beside the 
 Queen's Viceroy at Umballa. For this boy he had spent 
 his years in endeavouring to procure a dynastic guarantee 
 from the Government of India. Now, all these memories 
 and all these ambitions had vanished like a dream. No 
 prospect remained to him but the hated succession of a 
 rebellious son. Well might Shere Ali say, as he did say, 
 in his letter of October 6th :* " In consequence of the 
 attack of grief and affliction which has befallen me by 
 the decree of God, great distraction has seized the mind 
 of this supplicant at God's threshold. The trusted offi- 
 cers of the British Government, therefore, ought to have 
 observed patience and stayed at such a time." Unless 
 
 * Afghan Corresp., II., 1878, p. 18. 
 T 2
 
 2 76 FROM THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE 
 
 the Government desired to force a quarrel, and were glad 
 of an opportunity to rectify a " haphazard frontier" by 
 means of war, there is nothing to be said in defence of 
 the unjust and indecent haste with which they pushed 
 up the Mission to Ali Musjid even before the forty days 
 of mourning were expired. It cannot be pretended that 
 there was any danger from Russia then. In the mean- 
 time our own position had not long before been described 
 by Lord Lytton himself as a position in which we were 
 '' able to pour an overwhelming force into Afghanistan for 
 the vindication of our own interests, long before a single 
 Russian soldier could reach Cabul."* The haste with which 
 the extreme measure of war was hurried has crowned and 
 consummated the injustice of the previous transactions, 
 and even if the war had been ultimately inevitable, which 
 it was not, the Government cannot escape censure for the 
 conduct from which the supposed necessity arose. 
 
 Unjust and impolitic as I think the conduct of the 
 Government has been in the East of Europe, it has been 
 wisdom and virtue itself in comparison with its conduct 
 in India. I venture to predict that the time is coming, 
 and coming soon, when the reply of Lord Lytton to the 
 statement of the Afghan Envoy at Peshawur, will be read 
 by every Englishman with shame and confusion of face. 
 In a way, but in a very humiliating way, the whole of these 
 transactions carry us back to the days of Clive. We 
 are reminded only too much of the unscrupulousness of 
 his conduct. But we are not reminded, even in the least 
 
 • Ibid., p. 183.
 
 TO THE WAR. 277 
 
 degree, of the violence of his temptations, or of the 
 splendour of his achievements. There has not been, 
 indeed, any such daring fraud as duplicate Treaties, one 
 genuine and the other counterfeit— one on white paper 
 and the other upon red. But, in a timid way, the Draft 
 Treaty which was to be offered to the Ameer, as compared 
 with the representations of it made to him in the instruc- 
 tions to Sir L. Pelly, and in the letter of Captain Grey, 
 comes very near the mark. On the other hand, the 
 Government of India has had none of the excuses which 
 have been pleaded on behalf of Clive. We have not had 
 to deal with any dangerous villains whose own treachery 
 was double-dyed, and who might hold our fate in the 
 hollow of their hand. There has been no Surajah Dowlah, 
 and no Omichund. Shere Ali is a half-barbarian, but his 
 relations with Lord Mayo showed that he could respond 
 to friendship, and could be secured by truth. His Minister 
 was straightforwardness itself when compared with the 
 English Viceroy. It seems almost hke the profanation of 
 a great name to compare anything lately done by the 
 Government of India with the deeds done by the genius 
 of Clive. But I speak of what was bad or doubtful in 
 his conduct, not of what was great. In this aspect of 
 them the proceedings I have recorded have been worse 
 than his. In the first place, Clive was only the agent of 
 a " Company," and even that Company was not really 
 responsible for his proceedings. The Viceroy now re- 
 presents the Sovereign, and all his doings are the doings 
 of the Ministers of the Queen. In the second place, the 
 earlier servants of the Company were not the inheritors
 
 2 78 FROM THE PESHAWUR CONFERENCE 
 
 of obligations of long standing, or of relations with native 
 Princes well understood and regulated by solemn Procla- 
 mations of the Imperial Crown. Lord Lytton was bound 
 by all these, and by traditions of conduct handed down 
 through a long roll of illustrious names. From these 
 traditions he has departed in matters of vital moment. 
 The Government of India has given way to small tempta- 
 tions — to ungenerous anger at cutting but truthful an- 
 swers, and to unmanly fears of imaginary dangers. Under 
 the influence of these, it has paltered with the force of 
 existing Treaties ; it has repudiated solemn pledges ; it 
 has repeated over and over again insincere professions ; 
 and it has prepared new Treaties full of "tricky saving 
 clauses." Finally, it has visited on a weak and unoffend- 
 ing native Sovereign in Asia, the natural and necessary 
 consequences of its own incoherent course in Europe. 
 The policy which brought the Russian army to the gates 
 of Constantinople is the same policy which brought the 
 Russian Mission to Cabul. 
 
 It is always in the power of any Executive Government 
 to get the country into a position out of which it cannot 
 escape without fighting. This is the terrible privilege 
 of what, in the language of our Constitution, is called the 
 Prerogative. It is, in reality, the privilege of every 
 Executive, whether of monarchical or of popular origin. 
 I am not one of those who are of opinion that it could 
 be lodged elsewhere with any advantage, or even with 
 any safety. The majorities which support a strong Go- 
 vernment in power are invariably more reckless than the 
 Ministry. In this Eastern Question, wrong and injurious
 
 V 
 
 TO THE WAR. 279 
 
 as I think their policy has been, it has been wise and 
 moderate as compared with the language of many of 
 their supporters in both Houses of Parliament. I have 
 too vivid a recollection of the difficulty which was expe- 
 rienced by the Cabinet of Lord Aberdeen in moderating 
 within reasonable bounds the excitement of the country, 
 to place the smallest confidence in any scheme for check- 
 ing, through some popular agency, the action of the re- 
 sponsible advisers of tUe Crown. They are always, after 
 all, through a process of " natural selection," the ablest 
 men of the party to which they belong. Except under 
 very rare conditions, they are more disposed, and are 
 more able, to look all round them, than any other body 
 in the State. They may commit — and in this Eastern 
 Question it is my contention that they have committed 
 — terrible mistakes, both in Europe and in India. These 
 mistakes — and errors much more serious than mistakes — 
 I have endeavoured to expose. Some of them afiect 
 the gravest considerations of public duty. They aff"ect 
 the permanent interests of this country and of India, as 
 involved in the good faith and honour of the Crown. I 
 now leave this review of them to the conscience of my 
 countrymen, and to the judgment of later times.
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 (Page 52.) 
 Extract from the Preface to " The Eastern Question!^ 
 
 " Looking at the manner in which witnesses adverse 
 to the Government have been treated when they have 
 produced evidence of the truth, I think it possible that 
 some objection may be taken to the use I have made 
 in the following pages of Lord Mayo's letters to me 
 when I was Secretary of State. I do not myself feel 
 that any explanation on this matter is required, since 
 the passages I have quoted are all of an essentially 
 public character. But there are some points connected 
 with this subject to which I am very glad to have an 
 opportunity of directing public attention. 
 
 " In the Afghan branch of the Eastern Question it has 
 been deemed important by the Government to make 
 out, if they could, that Shere Ali had at one time been 
 perfectly willing, if, indeed, he was not positively eager, 
 Ko receive British officers as Political Agents or Resi- 
 dents in his Kingdom. This question has not really 
 the importance which the Government have attached 
 to it, — because it was their duty to think mainly, not of 
 what that unfortunate Prince may or may not have 
 been willing to do at a former time under unknown 
 circumstances and conditions, — but of what he had a 
 right to object to under the actual engagements made
 
 APPENDIX. 281 
 
 with him by the representatives of the Crown in India. 
 Nevertheless, the Government have shown a very great 
 anxiety to prove that the Ameer had been willing to 
 admit British ofificers as Residents in his Kingdom ; and 
 this is so far well — inasmuch as it shows some conscious- 
 ness that they had no right to force the measure upon 
 him if he were not willing. In the whole of their 
 dealings with Afghanistan, this is the only homage 
 they have paid to virtue. But their method of pro- 
 ceeding has been singular. The only two witnesses of 
 any value on whose evidence they have relied, have 
 been Colonel Burne, who was Lord Mayo's Private 
 Secretary, and Captain Grey, who was Persian Inter- 
 preter at the Umballa Conferences in 1869. Colonel 
 Burne's evidence is given in the ' Afghan Correspon- 
 dence' (I. 1878, No. 36, Enclosure 5, page 174). Of 
 Colonel Burne's perfect good faith there can be no 
 shadow of a doubt. But several circumstances are to be 
 observed in respect to his testimony. In the first place, 
 he is now at the head of the Foreign Department of 
 the India Office, and concerned in all the policy towards 
 Shere Ali which has led to the Afghan war. In the 
 second place, he writes nine years after the events of 
 which he speaks, and wholly, so far as appears, from 
 personal recollection. In the third place, he speaks 
 with extraordinary confidence, considering that other 
 ofificers of the Government who were present at all the 
 Conferences positively deny the accuracy of his im- 
 pressions. In the fourth place, a portion of what he 
 says in respect of Lord Mayo's opinions, appears to 
 me to be distinctly at variance with the evidence of 
 Lord Mayo's own letters to myself In the fifth and 
 last place, it is to be observ^ed that the whole of his
 
 282 APPENDIX. 
 
 evidence is founded on the knowledge he acquired as 
 Private Secretary of Lord Mayo, 'in his full confidence,' 
 and carrying in his mind that Viceroy's private con- 
 versations. 
 
 " Now I am far from saying or implying that the 
 Government had no right to use the information de- 
 rivable from this source. But I do say that in a matter 
 of the highest importance, involving the honour of the 
 Crown, and the peace of India, they were bound to 
 take every means in their power to test and to verify 
 the personal recollections of Colonel Burne. To use 
 evidence of this kind as a means of ascertaining truth, 
 is one thing : — to use it as a means of justifying fore- 
 gone conclusions, is a very different thing. The two 
 methods of handling such evidence are very distinct. 
 We know, on the evidence of Mr. Seton Karr, who was 
 Foreign Secretary to the Government of India at the 
 Umballa Conferences, who was present at them all, and 
 who must have been in constant personal communication 
 both with Lord Mayo and all other principal persons 
 there, that his evidence was never asked by the Govern- 
 ment, and that this evidence, if it had been asked for, 
 would have been given against that of Colonel Burne. 
 I venture to add, that the Government, knowing that I 
 was Secretary of State during the whole of Lord Mayo's 
 Viceroyalty, and in possession of all his letters, might 
 have applied to me for access to them. The whole of 
 them, without reserve, would have been at the disposal 
 of the Government. But if the Government were at 
 liberty to use, and to found important action upon, the 
 private information of Lord Mayo's Private Secretary, 
 speaking of Lord Mayo's private conversations, much 
 more must I be at liberty to correct that evidence by
 
 APPENDIX. 283 
 
 Lord Mayo's own written testimony, conveyed in the 
 most authentic of all forms — letters written at the time. 
 " As regards the purport and the value of Captain 
 Grey's evidence, I have analysed it at the proper place, 
 in the following work. But there is one circumstance 
 in connexion with that evidence which is another illus- 
 tration of the rash and inconsiderate use which the 
 Government has been making of testimony of this 
 kind. Captain Grey, from his position of Persian 
 Interpreter at Umballa, was necessarily in frequent and 
 confidential communication with Noor Mohammed 
 Khan, the favourite Minister and friend of Shere Ali. 
 Now Noor Mohammed being evidently a very able 
 man, and comparatively well acquainted with Europeans, 
 was naturally much considered by all officers of the 
 Indian Government as the best source of information 
 on the policy of the Afghan State, and on the personal 
 feelings and desires of his master. In the course of 
 confidential conversations, wholly private and unofficial, 
 such a Minister is induced to say many things which 
 he would only say in perfect reliance that they would 
 be considered as confidential in the strictest sense of 
 that word. In fact, Noor Mohammed did frequently 
 give information to our Officers and Agents, which it 
 would have been the highest breach of confidence on 
 their part to repeat in such a manner as to render it pos- 
 sible that the sayings of his Minister should get round 
 to the Ameer. Yet this is the very breach of confidence 
 which, in heated pursuit of their object, the Government 
 appear to have committed in regard to the evidence of 
 Captain Grey. At the Peshawur Conference, shortly 
 before his death, among the other just complaints which 
 Noor Mohammed had to make against the conduct of
 
 284 APPENDIX. 
 
 Lord Lytton and of his Government, this was one — that 
 the letter from Captain Grey of October 13th, 1876, 
 quoting- Noor Mohammed as having been wilHng to 
 advise or consent to the reception of British officers as 
 Residents in Afghanistan, had been sent to him under 
 circumstances which brought it before the Cabul Dur- 
 bar. ' It was laid before the Durbar,' said Noor 
 Mohammed to his friend, Dr. Bellew, on the 28th of 
 January, 1877, 'and I was at once pointed out as the 
 encourager of the Government in this design. It was 
 as much as an order for my death.'* Ot the unjusti- 
 fiable character of this letter, in other respects, I have 
 spoken in the text. I refer here only to the breach of 
 confidence involved in its quotations of the most private 
 conversations of the Minister of the Ameer. 
 
 " There was another circumstance connected with the 
 Afghan question which has, in my opinion, imposed it 
 upon me absolutely as a public duty, that I should ex- 
 plain Lord Mayo's engagements at Umballa, as he 
 explained them to me. That circumstance is that one 
 of the most serious misrepresentations made on behalf 
 of the Government on this subject has been founded on 
 a single passage in one of his private letters to me, 
 which Lord Mayo has himself quoted in a public 
 Despatch The case is rather a curious one, and 
 deserves special notice. 
 
 " It will be seen that the first public Despatch of April 
 3rd, i869,t in which Lord Lord Mayo reported the 
 proceedings at Umballa, is a very meagre one. The 
 more detailed despatch which followed on the ist of 
 
 * Afghan Corresp., I., 1878, No. 36, Enclos. 34, p. 195. 
 t Ibid., No. 17, p. 88.
 
 APPENDIX. 285 
 
 July,* was drawn forth from him by my Despatch of 
 the 14th of May,t in which I had stated the objections 
 which the Cabinet felt to one passage in his letter to 
 the Ameer. In that second Despatch, a much fuller 
 account is given. But one of the principal paragraphs 
 (No. 2 2), J namely, that in which the Viceroy summed 
 up the result of his negotiations, expressly refers to, and 
 quotes the summing-up with which he had in the mean- 
 time supplied me in a private letter. 
 
 " In that private letter Lord Mayo had classified the 
 main points of the final arrangement on the principle of 
 giving one list of the proposals which had been decided 
 in the negative, and another list of the proposals which 
 had been decided in the affirmative. It is, of course, an 
 incident of all classifications of this kind — or, indeed, of 
 any kind — that they place together things which are 
 congruous only in some one or two particulars, and may 
 be quite incongruous in every other. This inconvenience 
 was somewhat increased, in the present case, by the 
 heading or title which he attached to the two lists. The 
 proposals which had been negatived were called ' What 
 the Ameer is not to have.' The proposals which had 
 been affirmed were called ' What the Ameer is to have.' 
 
 " It was inevitable that on this principle of classi- 
 fication Lord Mayo should include in the same list, 
 things which the Ameer was " not to have " as a boon, 
 and things which he was "not to have " as a burden. 
 The benefits which he had hoped for, but which had 
 been refused him, and the demands on our side from 
 which he was to be relieved — all came naturally and 
 
 * Ibid., No. 19, p. 92. t Ibid., No. 18, p. 91. 
 
 X Ibid., p. 95.
 
 286 APPENDIX. 
 
 necessarily under the same category. In this way, 
 quite naturally and quite consistently, Lord Mayo 
 included in the things the Ameer was ' not to have,' 
 all of the following miscellaneous items: (i) no Treaty, 
 (2) no fixed subsidy, (3) no European troops, officers, 
 or Residents, (4) no domestic pledges. Some of these 
 are things which he wanted to get ; others, are things 
 which he particularly wanted to avoid. He wanted to 
 have an unconditional Treaty, offensive and defensive. 
 He wanted to have a fixed subsidy. He wanted to 
 have a dynastic guarantee. He would have liked 
 sometimes to get the loan of English officers to drill 
 his troops, or to construct his forts — provided they 
 retired the moment they had done this work for him. 
 On the other hand, officers ' resident' in his country 
 as Political Agents of the British Government were his 
 abhorrence. Yet all these things are classified by 
 Eord Mayo, quite correctly, as equally belonging to 
 the list of proposals which had been considered, or 
 thought of, and had been decided in the negative. 
 
 " Advantage has been taken of this by some sup- 
 porters of the Government, and apparently by the 
 Under-Secretary of State for India, in the late debates 
 of the House of Commons, to argue that all the items 
 in this list were equally things which the Ameer wanted 
 ' to have :' thus representing Shere Ali as consumed 
 by a desire to have British officers as Residents in his 
 cities. This is by no means an unnatural mistake for 
 any one to make who had no independent knowledge 
 of the subject, and who derived all he knew of it from 
 reading by itself the particular paragraph of Lord 
 Mayo's Despatch to which I have referred. But it 
 seems to me to be a mistake wholly inexcusable on
 
 APPENDIX. 287 
 
 the part of any official of the Indian Department, 
 because not even the personal recollections of Colonel 
 Burne and of Captain Grey go the length of repre- 
 senting the Ameer as desirous of having British officers 
 resident as Political Agents in his cities. The utmost 
 length to which their evidence goes, even if it were 
 wholly uncontradicted, is that Shere Ali would have 
 submitted to the residence of British officers in certain 
 cities, as the price of benefits which he could not other- 
 wise secure. 
 
 " But unjustified as this contention is, even on the 
 unsupported testimony of these two officers, and un- 
 justified also even on the 22nd paragraph of Lord 
 Mayo's Despatch of July ist, it is at once refuted by 
 Lord Mayo's letter to me, quoted in the text, of the 
 3rd of June, 1869. That letter was expressly written 
 to warn me against misapprehensions prevalent on the 
 subject of his engagements with the Ameer. In this 
 letter there was no possibility of mistake. The list he 
 gives is a list of the ' pledges given by him ' to the 
 Ameer. The first pledge was that of non-interference 
 in his affairs. The second pledge was that * we would 
 support his independence.' The third pledge was 
 'that we would not force European officers, or Residents, 
 upon him, against his wish.' 
 
 " This is the pledge, given on the honour of the 
 Crown, which has been violated by the present Govern- 
 ment. They have attempted to force Resident Officers 
 upon the Ameer against his will, by threats of our 
 displeasure, and by threats — still more discreditable — 
 that if he did not comply, we should hold ourselves free 
 from all the verbal and written engagements of Lord 
 Lawrence, of Lord Mayo, and of Lord Northbrook.
 
 288 APPENDIX. 
 
 " It had been my intention to close this work with the 
 Treaty of Berlin. A purely Indian War would not 
 naturally have fallen within its scope. But the Afghan 
 War of 1878 was not an Indian War in its origin. 
 The cost and the burden of it are to be thrown on the 
 people of India, although that cost is the price of a 
 divided Bulgaria, and of a ' real military frontier' for 
 a phantom Turkey. It is a mere sequel of the policy 
 of the Government on the Turkish Question in Europe 
 and in Asia. I have, therefore, been compelled to deal 
 with it. In doing so, I have been compelled to deal 
 with transactions which, as it seems to me, can only be 
 read with a sense of humiliation by every man who 
 values the honour of his country. If this be so, no 
 ' overwhelming majorities' in Parliament, and no 
 successful campaigns against half-barbarous tribes, can 
 compensate the country for the guilt into which it has 
 been led, or protect the Government from the censure 
 of posterity. 
 
 "ARGYLL. 
 "Cannes, yanuary, 1879."
 
 BY THE DUKE OF ARGYLL. 
 
 In Two Vols, large post 8vo, price 24s. 
 
 THE EASTERN QUESTION 
 
 FROM THE TREATY OF PARIS, 1856, TO THE TREATY OF BERLIN, 1S7S, 
 AND TO THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR. 
 
 Opinions of the Press. 
 
 The Times. 
 " The Duke of Argyll's two large volumes on the Eastern 
 Question form the most exhaustive brief which has yet been 
 prepared for the service of the Opposition. Liberal Members 
 must be very dull indeed if they fail to draw from the Duke's 
 pages a formidable indictment of what the Government has 
 done in dealing with Turkey, Russia, and Afghanistan. Many 
 Blue Books are analysed with great skill ; the arguments are 
 stated in a style which may sometimes lack elegance, but never 
 force ; and the whole book is spiced with invective of astonish- 
 ing vehemence and strength. We congratulate the Opposition 
 on the immense industry of its champion. It is very doubtful 
 whether there is another European country in which so eminent 
 a public man would take such prodigious pains to strip every 
 vestige of sagacity and political morality oif the reputation of 
 a Ministry."
 
 The Saturday Revinv. 
 " Of all the literary assailants of the Government the Duke 
 
 of Argyll is the most formidable A powerful and 
 
 passionate attack on the Eastern Policy of the Government." 
 
 The Daily Neivs. 
 
 " The Duke of Argyll has rendered a useful service to the 
 
 constituencies, who will shortly be called upon to pronounce 
 
 on the Eastern Policy of the Government, in drawing up a 
 
 detailed review, mainly from Official Documents, of our relations 
 
 .with Turkey since the Treaty of Paris, and with Afghanistan 
 
 since the first Afghan War The whole narrative is so 
 
 lucid that it is an invaluable contribution to a clear under- 
 standing of the question. Though the writer characterizes 
 some of the proceedings on which he has to comment in plain 
 and strong language, his work is conspicuous for its fairness. 
 He brings no charge which he does not substantiate by refer- 
 ences to documents which are at the reader's command." 
 
 The Daily Telegraph. 
 •'The Duke of Argyll has written a work which will form 
 an important addition to the literature already bearing upon 
 British Policy in the East. Historically exhaustive, the book 
 presents a great array fo facts systematically arranged." 
 
 The Observer. 
 " Essentially an arraignment of the policy of the Govern- 
 ment in regard to the Eastern Question since the year 1876, 
 the present work differs from all previous manifestoes on the 
 subject emanating from the opponents to Lord Beaconsfield, 
 not so much on account of the novelty of its views as by 
 reason of its completeness from an historical point of view."
 
 The Echo. 
 " The Duke of Argyll has drawn up a damning indictment 
 
 against the Government, which is simply unanswerable 
 
 Those who will have to take an active part in the coming 
 struggle will find in these volumes an ample storehouse of 
 weapons, offensive and defensive." 
 
 The Nojiconformist. 
 
 "The thoroughness with which the Duke of Argyll has 
 treated his subject is so complete that, so far as we can judge, 
 nothing is left unsaid — no matter of importance is reserved for 
 others to investigate. ... He sheds a clear steady light upon 
 the most obscure and dubious passages in our foreign policy 
 since the accession of the present Government to power ; and 
 he exposes the folly and wickedness of that policy with the 
 force of a resistless logic — a logic from which apparently there 
 is no possibility of appeal or escape." 
 
 The Scotsman. 
 
 "The most elaborate, the most closely reasoned, and, it 
 may be fairly added, the most masterly indictment of the 
 Eastern policy of the present Government that has yet been 
 drawn up." 
 
 The Edinburgh Daily Revierv. 
 
 " By far the most exhaustive and intelligible account of 
 British relations to the Eastern Question which has ever yet 
 been presented to the public."
 
 4 
 
 The Sheffield Independe7it. 
 
 " Nothing that has come from the pen of his Grace the 
 Duke of Argyll has put his countrymen under such weighty 
 
 obligations as has this work Its style is such as will 
 
 secure for it a permanent place in our literature." 
 
 The Dundee Advertiser. 
 
 " A masterly presentation of the case of the Opposition 
 
 against the foreign policy of the Government It is 
 
 the fullest record in a convenient form that has yet been given 
 of the events that have transpired since 1876." 
 
 The Bath Herald. 
 
 " These volumes will stand before posterity as the crushing 
 indictment of the Foreign Policy of the Government at the 
 bar of history, and will serve those candid minds who are 
 really desirous to go into the facts and form as dispassionate a 
 
 judgment as they can Mr. Disraeli went to the ballot 
 
 boxes in 1874 with the promise of 'a spirited Foreign Pohcy.' 
 The Duke of Argyll's Eastern Question will tell to the voters 
 at the next General Election how he has carried out his pro- 
 mise, and has inflicted a humiliation and disgrace upon England 
 in the eyes of Europe which it has not suftered since Van 
 Tromp swept the Thames with a broom at his masthead." 
 
 1 / /^ 7 ^ 
 
 STRAHAN &• CO. LIMITED, n^^/atirnoster Rm: 
 
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