R. C. ROSE. 
 
 JVo. 
 
 n 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
 0NWERSITY Of 
 CAUFORtM* 
 
 SANOfQO 
 
 presented to the 
 
 LIBRARY 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA SAN DIEGO 
 
 by 
 FRIENDS OF THE LIBRARY 
 
 MR. JOHN H. RO.SK 
 
 donor
 
 A THEORY OF CONDUCT
 
 A THEORY OF CONDUCT 
 
 BY 
 
 ARCHIBALD ALEXANDER 
 
 FORMERLY PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN 
 COLUMBIA COLLEGE 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
 CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 
 1890
 
 Copyright, 1890, 
 BY CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS. 
 
 All rights reserved. 
 
 The Riverside Press, Cambridge, Mass., U. S. A. 
 Electrotyped and Printed by H. O. Houghton & Company.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGB 
 
 I. INTRODUCTION i 
 
 II. THE THEORY OF RIGHT ... 20 
 
 III. THE THEORY OF DUTY . . .46 
 
 IV. THE NATURE OF CHARACTER . . 58 
 V. THE MOTIVE TO MORALITY . .80
 
 A THEORY OF CONDUCT. 
 
 I. 
 
 Introduction. 
 
 WITHIN the last few years there has 
 been an unusual interest awakened in 
 moral science. The causes of this are not 
 hard to discover. In the first place, the 
 history of philosophy shows that where a 
 decay of belief in the popular religion is 
 manifested among the more intellectual 
 classes, there is likely to be a demand for 
 something to take the place of the popu- 
 lar religion. This demand is usually sup- 
 plied by systems of morality which are 
 often merely dogmatic guides for practi- 
 cal life. For example, the philosophy be- 
 fore Socrates, which was chiefly physical,
 
 2 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 and the philosophy of the Socratic period, 
 which was mainly metaphysical, were fol- 
 lowed by the very practical systems of the 
 Stoics, the Epicureans, and Skeptics, who 
 sought to solve the problem of life and to 
 present a philosophy of character. The 
 systematic philosophy which supplanted 
 the mythology of Greece, the popular 
 creeds associated with the Olympian gods, 
 had in some cases silenced the oracles, in 
 others aroused doubts as to the reality of 
 the heroic and dramatic figures of Homer 
 and ^Eschylus. The Theogony of Hesiod 
 was at length received with incredulity in 
 later times, and new shrines and forms 
 of worship had to be constructed to take 
 the place of those which no longer at- 
 tracted their devotees. Just as the pre- 
 Sophistic thinkers had rested unsatisfied 
 with a mythological explanation of Na- 
 ture, and had set forth a science of the 
 elements or an atomic theory ; so the 
 post-Aristotelian thinkers looked askance 
 at oracles and auguries, and applied, ac-
 
 Introduction. 3 
 
 cording to their lights, the methods of 
 science to the conduct of men. It may 
 indeed be said that the successful ad- 
 vance of Christianity was due in some 
 measure to the fact that the Stoic and 
 Epicurean had taught in vain. The gos- 
 pel addressed to the "weary and heavy 
 laden " spoke to the jaded minds of those 
 whose religion had lost its life, whose phi- 
 losophy was insufficient. 
 
 During the Patristic and Scholastic 
 ages, when the Church supplied the rule 
 of human conduct, and enforced its de- 
 crees through the spiritual direction of 
 the priesthood or the force of the civil 
 authority, there was but little disposition 
 toward original ethical inquiry. But with 
 the religious doubts excited at the time 
 of the Reformation came inquiries as to 
 the application of the Christian code of 
 morals ; and the seventeenth century is 
 noted for the thorough and able discus- 
 sions of the Jesuits and other learned writ- 
 ers on practical ethics. The writings of
 
 4 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 the Spanish and French casuists furnish 
 a striking example of an attempt to place 
 on a more rational foundation rules of ac- 
 tion prescribed by the Church, but sub- 
 jected to the criticism of the unbeliever. 
 
 Ethical reaction in a different form is 
 illustrated by the moral science of Ger- 
 many during the latter half of the eigh- 
 teenth century. The dogmatic philoso- 
 phy which culminated in the system of 
 Wolff did not set forth any original doc- 
 trine of ethics. We must of course ex- 
 cept Spinoza in making this general state- 
 ment. But when the period of the Auf- 
 kldrung came, and with it the skepticism 
 with regard to ecclesiastical claims and 
 Scriptural authority, there was a tendency 
 on the part of many to look for princi- 
 ples of action independent of Revelation. 
 Until the publication of Kant's ethical 
 treatises, some were disposed to borrow 
 from abroad what they did not find at 
 home. The Critique of Practical Reason 
 cannot be well understood unless it is re-
 
 Introduction. 5 
 
 membered that the sentimental ethics of 
 Scotland and the sensualistic ethics of 
 France had found a place in many Ger- 
 man minds. The ethical development in 
 France, just before the revolution, was it- 
 self partly a reaction against the ecclesi- 
 asticism which Voltaire and some of his 
 contemporaries had so vigorously and in- 
 sidiously attacked. 
 
 Analogous to such reactionary changes 
 is the ethical movement in Great Britain 
 and Germany at the present time. It is 
 not that this age is generally over-skep- 
 tical. On the contrary, it may be doubted 
 whether there was ever a time when the 
 great mass of the people in Europe and 
 America were so effectively interested in 
 religious affairs. This is shown in many 
 ways, by financial expenditure, by sta- 
 tistics as to the increased membership of 
 orthodox communions, by energy in the 
 support of missions, by a high class of re- 
 ligious literature, and in some countries 
 by a considerable improvement in moral
 
 6 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 conduct. But among men of science and 
 letters, among the learned and intellect- 
 ual classes, there is a very large number 
 of people who have lost either wholly or 
 in part their faith in revealed religion. 
 There are many, for example, who would 
 not be willing to follow Hume's rigorous 
 logic, but are quite ready to pursue the 
 middle way of Agnosticism. There are 
 many who admire the Old Testament for 
 its literary qualities, and the New Testa- 
 ment for its gracious teachings, but who 
 refuse to accept the book of Genesis as 
 a true account of the world's beginning, 
 and the Sermon on the Mount as a code 
 of action. Whether the doctrine of Evo- 
 lution has been demonstrated to be true 
 or not, whether it can be reconciled 
 with the traditional creed or not, one 
 thing seems to be quite certain : the gen- 
 eral effect of the teachings of that the- 
 ory has been prejudicial to religion, in 
 making men disregard the authority of the 
 Church. This has of course been due, to
 
 Introduction. 7 
 
 a very great extent, to the ignorance and 
 imprudence of many who have had reli- 
 gious zeal, but little scientific knowledge. 
 How far men are justified in losing faith 
 in revealed religion in so far as they ac- 
 quire scientific knowledge is not to be 
 considered here. What must be consid- 
 ered is this, that the advance of natural 
 science by the aid of the evolution-theory 
 has been extraordinary, and has produced 
 a reaction in many minds against what is 
 often called Orthodoxy. This condition 
 of affairs has been aggravated by the de- 
 velopment of that historical school which 
 can trace its lineage to Spinoza, and which 
 in this century has found its most radical 
 representatives at Tubingen. In its mod- 
 ified form it has sympathizers in some 
 Protestant theological seminaries. It has 
 the same kind of respect for the Bible that 
 Luther had for the Pope. It is not nec- 
 essary to estimate here the value of its 
 labors ; it is important to notice that the 
 effect of its teaching has been to lessen
 
 8 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 the authority and influence of Revelation, 
 and to emphasize the importance of Rea- 
 son. There are no longer open enemies 
 to Christianity as able as Voltaire and 
 Hume and the doubters of the eighteenth 
 century. But quite as effective opposi- 
 tion to the supremacy of Revelation in 
 matters of faith can be maintained by 
 men who have taken their degree in Di- 
 vinity. While it is possible, and may be 
 logical, to reject as unworthy of belief 
 certain parts of the teaching of the Scrip- 
 tures, and yet hold that in them is to be 
 found the essence of ethical doctrine, it 
 cannot be denied that the rejection of any 
 part of Revelation on rational grounds in- 
 volves the establishment of a principle on 
 which such rejection is made. If the re- 
 jected doctrine be ethical, and the prin- 
 ciple on which it is rejected ethical, it 
 follows that so far Revelation and ethics 
 are independent. The spread of Agnos- 
 ticism and of belief in the theory of Ev- 
 olution has had a positive as well as a
 
 Introduction. 9 
 
 negative effect in the realm of ethics. 
 It is not merely that unbelief in Revela- 
 tion has been caused by these doctrines ; 
 it is that they have furnished a founda- 
 tion for ethical systems which are held to 
 be in contradiction to those of revealed 
 religion. It is natural, therefore, that 
 those who have been led to doubt that 
 which has been " revealed " should be will- 
 ing to accept the logical conclusions of 
 that which has given rise to the doubt. 
 
 It may be asked, however, Cannot one 
 who believes in the possibility of a ra- 
 tional system of ethics be at the same 
 time a believer in the ethics of Revela- 
 tion ? Is it not possible that the conclu- 
 sions of science and those of religion will 
 be found to coincide ? It may be held 
 that the ethical doctrine founded on Rea- 
 son is in reality a vindication of the eth- 
 ics of Revelation, or conversely that Rev- 
 elation confirms what Reason finds to be 
 true. This point will command our atten- 
 tion elsewhere, and the apparent opposi-
 
 10 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 tion beween Reason and Revelation will 
 be noticed. For the present it is suffi- 
 cient to say that the ethics of Revelation 
 must be absolute, so that a criticism of 
 such ethics from a rational point of view 
 will be in part a criticism of what is called 
 the theory of absolute right, or Intuition- 
 alism. 
 
 A glance at the number of important 
 works on moral science which have lately 
 appeared will, we believe, justify the propo- 
 sitions stated above. The history of Eng- 
 lish ethics during the nineteenth century 
 gives a sufficient proof. The spread of 
 what is popularly known as the utilitarian 
 theory is usually attributed to Jeremy Ben- 
 tham and his followers, but the theory is 
 as old as systematic ethics themselves. It 
 was Bentham who first stated it boldly. 1 
 It was found in a more or less explicit 
 form in the doctrines of Hobbes and 
 Hutcheson. 
 
 The theory of the earlier Epicureans is 
 1 Vol. v. p. 20.
 
 Introduction. // 
 
 a form of utilitarianism. Socrates and 
 Plato in their doctrine that the General 
 Good was the ethical end were stating the 
 principle of utilitarianism in a partial and 
 illogical way ; although Aristotle's view 
 of happiness as something objective can 
 hardly be classified with the doctrines of 
 the school. According to Socrates and 
 to Plato virtue is knowledge of the good. 
 Socrates called it the chief good Plato 
 more often, the ideal good ; but the essence 
 of the good was its utility. This appears 
 distinctly in more than one of the Platonic 
 dialogues, but is directly contradicted in 
 others. The utilitarian theory is a logical 
 result of empiricism, so that John Stuart 
 Mill's ethics was a proper consequence of 
 his psychology as well as a modified form 
 of Bentham's cynical teachings. When 
 Darwin's theory of species and develop- 
 ment had been followed by his crude sug- 
 gestions as to moral doctrine, when Her- 
 bert Spencer had shown implicitly by the 
 principles of his Philosophy and Psychol-
 
 12 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 ogy that those who accepted his teaching 
 must build up a new system of ethics, 
 there was a natural tendency toward an 
 ethical reaction. Accordingly we find pub- 
 lished in rapid succession treatises dealing 
 with all sides of the ethical problem : ju- 
 dicial works like that of Professor Sidg- 
 wick, orthodox and conservative works like 
 that of Dr. Martineau, evolutionary works 
 like those of Mr. Spencer and Mr. Leslie 
 Stephen, works imbued with the spirit and 
 method of the absolute philosophy like 
 those of Mr. Bradley and Mr. Green. It 
 is not too much to say that the writings 
 just referred to are the most valuable con- 
 tributions to the literature of ethical sci- 
 ence which this century has produced. 
 Some of them have been expressions of 
 radical doctrine, while some owe their ori- 
 gin to the controversy which that radical 
 doctrine has excited. Those which bear 
 distinctly the marks of German thought 
 have been more or less inspired by the 
 teaching of Fichte and Hegel.
 
 Introduction. 13 
 
 It is my purpose to discuss as concisely 
 as possible some of the more important 
 principles which are the foundation of all ' 
 moral science, and it is my hope that I 
 may be able in setting aside much that 
 is false, to arrive at conclusions which are 
 beyond doubt. It is also my purpose 
 to notice briefly the harmony of moral 
 science and revealed religion. Moral 
 conduct involves generally two things : 
 i. A standard of Morality. 2. Volition. 
 Where the volition is in agreement with 
 the standard the action is moral or right. 
 Where it is in disagreement, the action is 
 immoral or wrong. There are indifferent 
 actions, however, but these are in reality 
 right actions. The test of an indifferent 
 action is not that its performance is not 
 wrong, but that its non-performance is as 
 right as its performance. It will be ad- 
 mitted on all sides that, if there be a moral 
 science, there must be a moral standard. 
 This standard may or may not be absolute 
 and ultimate. If it be absolute and ulti-
 
 14 A neory of Conduct. 
 
 mate it is unnecessary to analyze it or to 
 attempt its analysis into simple elements. 
 If it be neither absolute nor ultimate, one 
 has a right to inquire what its nature may 
 be. One has a right to ask what makes the 
 standard of right. It is possible to explain 
 without analyzing even an absolute stand- 
 ard. For example, without attempting to 
 unfold the nature of Tightness, one may 
 say that the standard is fixed by an author- 
 ity such as the will of God ; or by an im- 
 mutable principle according to which God 
 directs his will and wills that man should 
 act. But in these cases there is no higher 
 court to which appeal can be made. The 
 question Why is this absolutely right ? can 
 be answered only by saying, Because God 
 wills it or because it is in agreement with 
 an immutable principle. Refuge cannot be 
 taken in the proposition that right is what 
 is in accordance with the " eternal fitness 
 of things," for the term "fitness " becomes 
 the object of inquiry, and fitness must 
 mean Tightness or else the principle of 
 Right is not absolute and ultimate.
 
 Introduction. /5 
 
 But the standard of morality may be re- 
 garded as something relative or derived. 
 It may be said that right actions are right 
 because they are beneficent, because they 
 tend to improve the condition of society, 
 to advance its interests, and so to promote 
 its happiness. It may be said that right- 
 ness will then vary according to the con- 
 ditions of society, so that what is right 
 under some circumstances may be wrong 
 under others. Morality from such a point 
 of view has no absolute meaning, and may 
 be shown to be derived from certain non- 
 moral principles, such as sentiment, self- 
 love, or custom and habit. It is the prob- 
 lem of the scientific moralist who rejects 
 the theory of an absolute right to explain 
 the meaning and derivation of the relative 
 right which is the standard of Moral Ac- 
 tion. This makes a large part of moral 
 inquiry an analysis of the term "ought." 
 We ought to do what is right ? Right is 
 what we ought to do. What ought to be 
 done is a question which can be answered
 
 1 6 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 in two general ways. It may be said the 
 right ought to be done, and the right is 
 ultimate ; or the right ought to be done, 
 right being that which derives its right- 
 ness from certain consequences. 
 
 If a conclusion be reached as to the 
 nature of right, one is forced to inquire, 
 How can that which is right be known ? 
 Is right correlate with knowledge, or with 
 feeling, or with both ? Is right something 
 of which I become aware by the rise of 
 certain emotions, or is its reality deter- 
 mined by an act of knowledge, or do both 
 knowledge and emotion combine to inform 
 me ? Several answers to these questions 
 have been given. For the present I may 
 leave the subject to consider generally the 
 second main object of ethical inquiry which 
 is volition. Every moral action is volun- 
 tary. But every act of volition is complex. 
 It implies a motive according to which the 
 volition is made. It implies the action of 
 the will itself, and the end of the action. 
 As it will be necessary hereafter to dis-
 
 Introduction, 17 
 
 cuss the exact relation of the motive to 
 the will, it is well here to define the terms 
 just used. 
 
 The motive may be said to consist 
 of that state of mind which is the imme- 
 diate occasion of the will's acting in a cer- 
 tain way. It will be found that every act 
 of the will involves an act of knowledge 
 and a desire. The act of knowledge causes 
 the desire. Two men may each have the 
 same knowledge at a given moment, yet 
 the desires awakened by such knowledge 
 may be different. Motive, therefore, should 
 properly comprehend not merely the know- 
 ledge and the desire, but what is called 
 character. It is customary, however, to 
 regard the character as independent, and 
 to confine the term " motive " to some im- 
 pulse, or affection, or desire. But it will 
 be seen that this obscures the important 
 fact that the impulse or desire is so closely 
 connected with the character of the per- 
 son who wills, that the direction of the 
 will in most cases may be said to depend
 
 i8 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 on the character. This may be explained 
 by an illustration. Here are two men, A. 
 and B. To follow a certain course of ac- 
 tion is suggested by worldly considera- 
 tions, such as ambition, enjoyment of ease, 
 love of power. The same course of action 
 lies open to each ; the same object ap- 
 peals to each. In the case of A. the mo- 
 tive of ambition is stronger than the mo- 
 tive to do right. Why is this ? The only 
 explanation to be found is in A.'s char- 
 acter; for the same object is before B. 
 The motives so called are not real mo- 
 tives, but only tendencies. B. prefers to 
 follow a moral course of action, because 
 his desire to be moral is stronger than 
 other desires. And why ? The only ex- 
 planation to be found is in B.'s character. 
 It will be suspected by some that this is 
 urged to support a doctrine of the Free- 
 dom of the Will ; but a later chapter will 
 doubtless dispel such an impression. The 
 end of voluntary action is not the motive, 
 but usually excites the desire which moves
 
 Introduction. 19 
 
 the will. These general suggestions I have 
 made before beginning an analysis of moral 
 principles. 
 
 The importance of such an analysis as 
 I have just suggested is self-evident. It 
 has been often observed that false mo- 
 rality that is, morality founded on false 
 principles is more dangerous than ac- 
 tual immorality. The justification, on sup- 
 posed moral principles, of wrong actions, 
 is far more dangerous to the individual 
 and to society than the performance of 
 immoral actions which are admitted or rec- 
 ognized as such. And it may be learned 
 from history how often false systems of 
 ethics have first corrupted society and 
 
 % 
 
 then led it to martyrdom.
 
 II. 
 
 The Theory of Right. 
 
 Two distinct questions present them- 
 selves in connection with the theory of 
 right, which I shall now attempt to an- 
 swer : 
 
 1. What is the nature of right? 
 
 2. How is right known ? 
 
 It is not necessary to discuss the ety- 
 mology of the term. Right is the contra- 
 dictory of wrong, but is not the contra- 
 dictory of bad. Right is what is morally 
 good. The great fault of ancient ethics, 
 and of a great part of modern ethics, as 
 many know, consists in the failure to dis- 
 tinguish between what is right and what 
 is good. The dialogues of Plato abound 
 in examples of this confusion. The pun- 
 ishment of a criminal, for example, may in 
 some instances be bad for him. It may
 
 The Theory of Right. 21 
 
 cause him pain. It may harden instead 
 of reforming him. It may put his family 
 in distress. The Tightness of punishing 
 him depends on some legal, and ultimately 
 on some moral principle. 
 
 What the nature of this principle is 
 forms a most important question in eth- 
 ics. The theory which is ordinarily called 
 the theory of consequences makes the mo- 
 rality of conduct depend primarily on the 
 results of conduct. The result of moral 
 conduct is happiness. The result of im- 
 moral conduct is unhappiness. There is 
 a difference of opinion as to the extent 
 of happiness or unhappiness so involved. 
 According to some it is the happiness or 
 unhappiness of self which is in question ; 
 according to others it is the happiness of 
 others. In one case we have what is 
 known as Egoism ; in the other what is 
 known as Altruism. The theories are 
 often described as egoistic and altruis- 
 tic Hedonism. In both of them morality 
 is primarily objective. The result, not
 
 22 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 the motive, of conduct must be considered 
 in order that the morality of the conduct 
 may be estimated. To murder a man is 
 wrong, because murder results in unhap- 
 piness ; and so murderous motives are 
 wrong, because they tend to cause mur- 
 derous conduct. If happiness were the 
 result of murderous conduct, and if un- 
 happiness were produced by not murder- 
 ing, then murder would be right and mur- 
 derous motives would be right. To take 
 human life in order to promote my own 
 happiness is to act morally if I am an 
 Egoist. To take it in order to promote 
 the happiness of others is to act morally 
 if I am an Altruist. In this way it is ar- 
 gued that the execution of criminals, the 
 taking of life in war, the taking of life in 
 self-defense, are actions which cannot be 
 judged of per se, but are to be judged 
 from the amount of happiness or unhap- 
 piness which results from them. 
 
 From this point of view, in judging of 
 conduct, the motive has a moral value only
 
 The Theory of Right. 23 
 
 in so far as it influences, or tends to in- 
 fluence, the action. If I perform a be- 
 nevolent action from motives of vanity, and 
 that action is conducive to happiness, then 
 my conduct is moral. It cannot, accord- 
 ing to our premises, be said that the mo- 
 tive is immoral because the consequences 
 of the act produce happiness, and the 
 motives of vanity produce, and tend to 
 produce, the act. If it be said that such 
 motives are moral in so far as they produce 
 beneficent acts, but are immoral because 
 they injure the character and corrupt so- 
 ciety, it follows that our definition of con- 
 duct must be modified, that it includes 
 something more than motive, act, and end. 
 According to the theory of conse- 
 quences, the performance of an action 
 detrimental to the happiness of self or of 
 others is immoral, no matter what the 
 character of the motive may be. It is no 
 justification, then, of murder, or theft, or 
 any interference with happiness, that it is 
 committed with a good motive. However
 
 24 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 good and pure the motive may be, the 
 consequences of its influence are the tests 
 of the moral conduct which it affects. 
 
 The other general theory opposed to 
 that of consequences is the theory that 
 the Tightness or wrongness of actions 
 is to be judged primarily by the motive, 
 and only secondarily by the consequences. 
 It is said fiat justitia mat cesium. Now it 
 would manifestly be a most unhappy con- 
 dition of affairs were the heavens to fall. 
 According to the advocate of the theory 
 of consequences, it would be plain that 
 justice had not been done were the catas- 
 trophe to happen. But to one who adopts 
 the doctrine that the consequences are not 
 the primary tests of moral conduct, it is 
 quite possible that there should be un- 
 happy consequences following a course of 
 moral conduct. It may be remarked, how- 
 ever, that this pessimistic view is rare, 
 and the position of Kant is ordinarily 
 taken that there is an agreement between 
 morality and happiness, so that to follow
 
 The Theory of Right. 25 
 
 the one insures the other. If this view 
 of what may be called intrinsic morality 
 be adopted, there can be no such thing as 
 casuistry. It can never be right to lie, 
 because lying is intrinsically wrong. If it 
 be said there are circumstances in which 
 lying is right, there are occasions in which 
 doing wrong is justified, and becomes right 
 by reason of the consequences, then we 
 abandon the position just referred to, and 
 are taking up the theory of consequences. 
 There are very few men in our time, how- 
 ever, who are willing to follow this the- 
 ory of right to its logical conclusions. 
 Those who do so are usually looked upon 
 as foolish or fanatical, while the social 
 and legal sanctions are here in disagree- 
 ment with the moral sanction. 
 
 For if the consequences justify the sup- 
 posed bad action, it is impossible to deny 
 that the more serious the consequences 
 anticipated from doing right, the more in- 
 advisable it becomes that the right should 
 be done. It is conceivable that the stand-
 
 26 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 ard of right would then vary with the esti- 
 mate made by moral agents as to the prob- 
 able consequences. 
 
 In looking generally at these two the- 
 ories of right, it must be affirmed, with 
 Bentham, that happiness is the end of all 
 human action. It is the prime motive. 
 It is generally admitted that the conduct 
 of all men is consciously directed toward 
 the attainment of happiness. One may 
 go further and say that the conduct of 
 each man is naturally directed toward the 
 attainment of his own happiness. This 
 proposition is different from the proposi- 
 tion that each man ought so to direct his 
 conduct. The selfishness which, accord- 
 ing to writers like Hobbes, and La Roche- 
 foucauld, and Helvetius, is the spring of 
 all action is so common that it has led 
 many to confound what is with what ought 
 to be. If morality were something which 
 would bring unhappiness, and if the road 
 to happiness were the pursuit of immoral 
 ends, no man would care to do what is
 
 The Theory of Right. 27 
 
 right. What does it signify that I break 
 every rule of morality provided that I am 
 happier from so doing? If you say you 
 may be happy now, but eventually pain 
 and remorse will take the place of your 
 present enjoyment, you contradict the 
 proposition with which we set out. We 
 are accustomed to say that "in the end" 
 a virtuous course of conduct will bring 
 happiness. We endure present pains or 
 inconveniences, we make present self-sac- 
 rifices, as means to the furtherance of 
 future and permanent happiness. Even 
 those who sacrifice health, or life, or for- 
 tune for others even martyrs who have 
 forsaken a life of ease, and who have lan- 
 guished in prisons or burned at the stake 
 have had their eyes fixed on an eter- 
 nity of joy which would be lost to them 
 were they not to welcome the immediate 
 pain. I affirm, then, that if there be dis- 
 agreement between happiness and mo- 
 rality, it is useless to attempt to persuade 
 men to be moral. If a man be persuaded
 
 28 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 that adultery, and murder, and theft are 
 the means to eternal happiness, he will 
 follow them in spite of any immutable prin- 
 ciple or the still small voice of conscience. 
 It is useless to tell such a man of the 
 beauty of virtue, of the nobility of self- 
 sacrifice, of the intrinsic Tightness of gen- 
 erosity and kindness, if he believes that 
 the exercise of such qualities will make 
 him unhappy ; then he will prefer happi- 
 ness to virtue, whether he be a sinner or 
 a saint. But, as I said above, there are 
 few who take so pessimistic a view, and 
 men have been accustomed to regard vir- 
 tuous conduct as the means to the high- 
 est and most permanent happiness. So 
 close has this identification of the two be- 
 come, that one school of morals affirms 
 the test of moral conduct to be the quan- 
 tity of happiness which it brings. The 
 most logical supporters of this theory con- 
 sider that the conduct which we should 
 call moral is that which produces the max- 
 imum of happiness, irrespective of the
 
 The Theory of Right. 29 
 
 quality of that happiness ; and, conversely, 
 immoral conduct tends to produce unhap- 
 piness. The only reason why one kind of 
 happiness should be sought rather than 
 another (in so far as the ethical aspect of 
 the matter is concerned) is on account of 
 its greater intensity or more enduring 
 character. As soon as we admit a differ- 
 ence in the quality of pleasures, the theory 
 of " happiness " as the test of morality is 
 abandoned. All pleasures must be re- 
 garded as having the same ethical value. 
 This was the position taken by Bentham, 
 and its modification by John Stuart Mill 
 was inconsistent with the latter's utili- 
 tarianism. For as soon as we admit a 
 difference of moral quality in different 
 kinds of happiness, we are obliged to ask 
 why one kind is more moral than another, 
 and thus set up a standard of morality 
 other than the utilitarian. We have no 
 right, then, to say that the pleasure of a 
 man who is enjoying the delight of good 
 eating and drinking is morally inferior to
 
 jo A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 that of a man whose philanthropic soul 
 is elated at seeing paupers warmed, and 
 clothed, and fed, unless it can be shown 
 that the latter pleasure is more intense or 
 more lasting than the first. Both inten- 
 sity and permanence depend, as will be 
 seen, very largely on the character of the 
 man. 
 
 The prevailing tendency in the field of 
 ethics is to reject Egoism and to advo- 
 cate the altruistic theory. Moral conduct 
 is that which produces the greatest hap- 
 piness, not of self alone, but of the great- 
 est number. What has been said above, 
 however, with regard to the possible dis- 
 agreement of happiness and moral con- 
 duct is applicable here. It is impossible 
 to persuade men to seek after the happi- 
 ness of others unless they are convinced 
 that such conduct will secure their own 
 happiness. An amiable man is one who 
 derives happiness in viewing the welfare 
 of others ; a malevolent man is one who 
 does not. It is important, therefore, to
 
 The Theory of Right. 31 
 
 remember that altruism cannot per se be 
 a theory of morals which is practically 
 valid, unless it be dependent on a theory 
 of egoism. For example, I say to Mr. 
 A. : Do what is right. He asks, What 
 is right ? I reply, Act so as to secure 
 the greatest happiness of the greatest 
 number. He may answer, But why should 
 I do that ? Now if I say, Because it is 
 a law of God, or a law of conscience, or 
 according to the eternal fitness of things, 
 that you should so act, it is apparent that 
 I abandon my theory of utilitarianism. If 
 I say, Your nature is benevolent enough 
 to answer your question, Mr. A. may say 
 to me, thereby showing a most unpleas- 
 ant side of his character, I am not a 
 benevolent man. I do not care what be- 
 comes of society so long as I am happy 
 myself. The happiness of society, or what 
 is often called the social organism, is the 
 happiness of a collection of men. Some 
 of them Mr. A. may care a great deal 
 about : if he cares enough about them to
 
 $2 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 sacrifice his own happiness to theirs, he 
 doubtless finds a recompense for his self- 
 denial. It is irrelevant to say that he 
 has, by his self-denial, set aside his own 
 happiness. The fact that he acts as he 
 does shows that he contemplates greater 
 happiness from his action than if he re- 
 frained and enjoyed immediate happiness. 
 This aspect of conduct will be noticed 
 more fully when the reasons why one 
 should be moral are discussed. I am dis- 
 posed to emphasize this relation which ex- 
 ists between Egoism and Altruism. For 
 it cannot be denied that the advocates of 
 the latter, as well as those who deny both 
 Egoism and Altruism, have encouraged 
 what one might almost describe as hypoc- 
 risy in their dealing with the motives of 
 conduct. A man who conducts his ac- 
 tions in order to promote the greatest 
 happiness of the greatest number would 
 not do so unless he believed that such 
 conduct would promote his own happi- 
 ness. Such a course of action may give
 
 The Theory of Right. 33 
 
 him immediate pain, and may involve the 
 suffering on his part of future pain ; but 
 unless he believed that it would insure 
 him on the whole a greater amount of 
 pleasure than of pain, he would not seek 
 the happiness of others at the expense of 
 his own happiness. It is indeed difficult 
 to understand why the term self-denial 
 should be applied to conduct which gives 
 up immediate pleasure for the sake of 
 pleasure in the future. To gratify one's 
 desire to be benevolent, to act according 
 to the sympathies of one's nature, to sat- 
 isfy the intense longing that a man has 
 to do good to those whom he loves, is 
 not, scientifically speaking, self-denial at 
 all. If I am a Sybarite, self-denial does 
 not consist in preferring ease and the en- 
 joyment of the good things of this life to 
 sacrifice of these things for others. But 
 if I am born with what men call a great 
 and unselfish heart, if I am of a sympa- 
 thetic nature, if I feel remorse and shame 
 at neglecting the happiness of others, even
 
 34 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 though I love the immediate pleasures of 
 life, I shall be a Sybarite unless I desire 
 to benefit others. The act of benefiting 
 others is clearly a following of my own 
 interest. It is not self-denial. What the 
 immediate gratification of the appetites is 
 to the Sybarite, the furtherance of the 
 welfare of others is to the benevolent 
 man. 
 
 It would appear from what has been said, 
 then, that I am identifying moral conduct 
 with conduct in the interest of self, but 
 this is not strictly true. It is one thing to 
 say that all moral conduct promotes the 
 happiness of self. One may go further 
 and affirm that moral conduct is followed 
 because it promotes the happiness of self. 
 But it does not follow that all conduct 
 which promotes the happiness of self is 
 moral. We have to ask whether conduct 
 promotes happiness because it is moral, or 
 whether it is moral because it promotes 
 happiness. There is undoubtedly a dis- 
 tinction between different kinds of happi-
 
 The Theory of Right. 35 
 
 ness, a distinction which men generally 
 recognize even if its scientific validity be 
 questioned. 
 
 For example, a higher moral quality is 
 assigned to the happiness which comes 
 from satisfying desires of an aesthetic and 
 philanthropic kind than those which come 
 from the gratification of the appetites of 
 the body. But independent of the distinc- 
 tion between moral and immoral pleasure 
 or happiness is a recognized distinction 
 between right and wrong apart from the 
 happiness involved in conduct. It is held 
 that what is right means something more 
 than what is expedient or useful, and we 
 are referred to certain broad and generally 
 accepted propositions, such as : It is wrong 
 to harm the innocent, the purity of woman 
 should be respected, it is wrong to steal 
 It is conceivable that a man should think 
 it right to steal, should steal without being 
 found out, in which case nobody's happi- 
 ness would be affected except his own, and 
 he would not necessarily be unhappy be-
 
 36 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 cause no remorse would follow the deed by 
 which he acquired property. It is conceiv- 
 able that a man should kill another who 
 had not wronged him, but who he might 
 suppose had wronged him, who was gener- 
 ally supposed by others to have wronged 
 him, and society and law might assent to 
 the act, the wrongness of which was not 
 to be measured by the happiness produced. 
 As a matter of fact, society passes judg- 
 ment as to the Tightness or wrongness of 
 actions without considering the happiness 
 involved. Men have been led to affirm that 
 there exists an absolute right or wrong 
 which no circumstances can alter. 
 
 Now I believe that the whole difficulty 
 with regard to the nature of right is di- 
 minished if we recognize the agreement 
 between what is right and what brings 
 happiness, in so far as to affirm that what 
 is right tends to promote happiness of a 
 more enduring kind than what is wrong 
 does. We undoubtedly in many cases rec- 
 ognize the right by the happiness which
 
 The Theory of Right. 37 
 
 follows its performance. According to 
 some, our ideas with regard to duty and the 
 moral code which is generally accepted 
 among civilized nations are a result of long 
 experience. It has been found that cer- 
 tain general ways of action promote the 
 general happiness more than others. These 
 we call moral, and embody the results of 
 experience in our customs or laws, in our 
 social and moral rules, even in our religion. 
 What is right, therefore, is determined by 
 the custom or habit of the people. There 
 is no general recognition of an absolute 
 right or wrong ; the customary morality of 
 Patagonia or Borneo is not the morality of 
 England or Ireland. What is right in one 
 country may be wrong in another. What 
 is right in one century is wrong in another. 
 This doctrine is reinforced by the discrep- 
 ancy often noticed between the social and 
 legal sanctions, or between the moral and 
 religious sanction. Much light is thrown 
 on this subject by inquiring into the theory 
 of obligation and the manner in which
 
 $8 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 moral truth is known. For the present I 
 would suggest that the theory which de- 
 nies the existence of absolute morality 
 must show why it is that while the general 
 rules of morality accepted by one nation 
 are undoubtedly promotive of happiness, 
 those of another nation are quite the con- 
 trary. Those who believe that there is an 
 absolute right usually hold that it is uni- 
 versally and intuitively known. The utili- 
 tarian advances against this theory the 
 very fact which he cannot explain in his 
 own the variety of moral judgments. If 
 the ideas of morality prevalent in what we 
 call civilized society are merely a growth, 
 why have they not grown in uncivilized so- 
 ciety ? If these ideas are intuitive, why do 
 the institutions of the Thug or the Dervish 
 differ from those of an English clergyman ? 
 An attempt is sometimes made to show 
 that Right means what is fitting ; and that 
 the moral ideal in man is analogous to the 
 ideal with respect to ordinary objects. A 
 good man is one who is adapted to his sur-
 
 The Theory of Right. 39 
 
 roundings, just as a good knife cuts well, 
 or a good house is comfortable and lasting. 
 This attempt is a mere evasion of the ques- 
 tion, which may be put thus : Why is a 
 moral man adapted to his surroundings, or, 
 as we are sometimes prosily told, fitted to 
 fulfill the end of his being ? Is it because 
 he is happier ? If so, we are utilitarians. 
 Is it because he is conforming to some 
 principle of fitness ? If so, we are no 
 nearer an explanation than before. The 
 ordinary supporter of the ethics of Mr. 
 Darwin's school finds fault with the doc- 
 trine of Absolute Morality, because it does 
 not take into account the growth of man 
 in adaptation to his surroundings or " envi- 
 ronment." The advocate of the Absolute 
 theory may complain that no standard is 
 furnished by the Evolutionist to test the 
 adaptation of conduct to surroundings. 
 Why is it more moral to be adapted to 
 one's surroundings than not to be so 
 adapted ? A country gentleman with a 
 good digestion, an active liver, a warm-
 
 40 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 hearted generosity, is well adapted to his 
 surroundings. It is no trouble for him to 
 keep his temper, his needs are well sup- 
 plied, and he is charitable to his neighbors. 
 Is he a more moral man than the mission- 
 ary who makes his family weep by taking 
 his departure to the coast of Africa to 
 speak for a while to unappreciative negroes 
 and suffer martyrdom like One whose 
 teaching he proclaims ? 
 
 If Right be a growth, the result of de- 
 velopment, we may inquire, Where did the 
 idea come from what was its genesis ? 
 The term evidently is applied, as I have 
 said, to that which one ought to do. Now, 
 however men may differ as to ivhat they 
 ought to do, however they may differ as to 
 the absolute character of right, they agree 
 substantially as to the existence of duty or 
 obligation. We are led to inquire, then, 
 How can we know what we ought to do ? 
 There are two general theories as to the 
 knowledge of moral distinctions. The 
 first of these may be called
 
 The TJjeory of Right. 41 
 
 1. The a priori, or intuitional view. 
 
 2. The a posteriori, or empirical view. 
 
 Neither of these I regard as wholly sat- 
 isfactory, but they may be stated as fol- 
 lows : 
 
 The intuitional theory of knowledge 
 maintains the absolute character of Right 
 and Wrong. This absolute Right and 
 Wrong is known intuitively, consequently 
 the knowledge is uniform, or should be 
 uniform. The problem of the intuitionist 
 is to explain the diversity of moral judg- 
 ments among men. There is no moral 
 proposition as to conduct universally ac- 
 cepted by all men, unless it be that men 
 should do their duty. So soon as the ques- 
 tion is asked, "What is my duty?" a vari- 
 ety of answers is given. The variety is 
 explained by the intuitionist in various 
 ways. Men are perverted, according to 
 him, in their judgment as to right and 
 wrong. But no adequate explanation is 
 offered as to why this perversion is pos- 
 sible. It is said that morality is so often
 
 42 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 opposed to one's apparent interest and ap- 
 petite that the feelings have undermined 
 the judgment, just as a lover may overlook 
 the faults of the woman whom he loves, 
 or the partisan in politics may regard the 
 demagogue as a statesman. If this be so, 
 then the moral judgment cannot be an in- 
 tuitive judgment. Intuitive judgments are 
 necessary, and it is inconceivable that non- 
 essential propositions should overbalance 
 necessary judgments. The apparent con- 
 flict between morality and self-interest may 
 be referred to in order to explain immoral 
 actions, but is in no way sufficient to ex- 
 plain judgments which contradict so-called 
 necessary truths. 
 
 A favorite form of intuitionism may be 
 noticed as affording an illustration of what 
 has just been said. There is said to be a 
 judgment as to the morality of individual 
 actions or states of mind concerning which 
 Tightness or wrongness is predicated ; for 
 example: "Murder is wrong," "Selfish- 
 ness is wrong," "Charity is right." The
 
 The Theory of Right. 43 
 
 subject of the moral judgment is gained 
 from experience. But all moral or immoral 
 actions involve some principle. This prin- 
 ciple is known intuitively by the Reason. 
 If there is an agreement between the fact 
 of experience and the moral principle, we 
 are able to predicate Tightness of the event ; 
 if there is disagreement, we predicate the 
 contrary, just as we compare the reckoning 
 about concrete objects in arithmetic with 
 the general axioms on which our reckoning 
 is based, and just as we refer successive 
 events to the principle of causality. 
 
 Without disputing the psychological cor- 
 rectness of this theory, I would point out 
 the fact that it fails altogether to explain 
 the diversity of moral judgments. Men 
 make mistakes in counting, but when the 
 rules of reckoning are explained to them 
 the necessity of those rules is recognized. 
 In the same way, it may be said, the savage 
 may be civilized and made to appreciate 
 the fact that he should not steal ; but the 
 necessity of the principle that the theft
 
 44 -d Theory of Conduct. 
 
 is wrong is altogether different from the 
 necessity that four is more than two, or 
 that twice five are ten. We conclude that 
 the light of reason or of nature does not 
 give an immediate or intuitive knowledge 
 of moral truth. 
 
 The advocate of the a posteriori school 
 advances at this point and offers the ex- 
 planation of the diversity of moral judg- 
 ments among men, which we have already 
 had occasion to notice and to criticise. 
 
 We are confronted, then, with the fol- 
 lowing problems : If the idea of right is 
 simply the result of what men have found 
 to be conducive to happiness, why do we 
 regard morality as something obligatory in- 
 stead of something merely expedient ? If, 
 on the other hand, the knowledge of Right 
 is necessary, why is it not universal ? I 
 believe that the science of ethics furnishes 
 no answer to the question "What is 
 Right ? " But this does not imply that there 
 is no absolute right. On the contrary, it 
 seems highly probable that such a right
 
 The Theory of Right. 45 
 
 exists, on account of the universal preva- 
 lence of the idea of Duty. The science of 
 ethics thus reveals no definite ideal except 
 that of Happiness as the goal of human 
 conduct. It tells us that there is a right 
 which we ought to regard as the ideal, but 
 what that right is it does not reveal. Men 
 are at sea without a compass on a starless 
 night ; they are bound for a port which 
 they cannot find ; which is not on their 
 charts, for it is still undiscovered. If they 
 can but avoid shipwreck and reach any 
 shore, they have done all that is possible, 
 and must be content to know, after they 
 come to anchor, whether they have been 
 brought into their desired haven.
 
 III. 
 
 The Nature of Duty. 
 
 IN the foregoing chapter the conclusion 
 was reached that man does not know what 
 he ought to do, but that he ought to do 
 something; that is, that there is such a 
 thing as duty, and that it is an universally 
 prevalent idea. The conception of duty 
 or obligation is either original or derived. 
 Those who affirm that duty is not an orig- 
 inal conception may be asked to explain its 
 origin, and attempts have been made to 
 furnish such an explanation. All theories 
 upon this point may be fairly and conven- 
 iently divided into two classes : 
 
 1. The objective theory. 
 
 2. The subjective theory. 
 
 i. The first of these regards duty as a 
 product of law, and law as the product of 
 fear and ultimately of expediency. This
 
 The Nature of Duty. 47 
 
 conclusion has been presented with great 
 force by some who have applied the hy- 
 pothesis of evolution to the explanation of 
 ethical doctrine. Without going further 
 back in development than the beginning of 
 human history, it may be said that the idea 
 of ought comes from the idea of must : so 
 that moral obligation is an idea the source 
 of which is to be found in social and legal 
 obligation. The authority of the parent 
 over the child has given rise to the idea 
 that the commands of the former are bind- 
 ing upon the latter. The unquestioned 
 commands of early years become part and 
 parcel of the rule which guides the child 
 until in more mature years another rule of 
 action is prescribed by the society in which 
 the man lives, and the sanctions of the law 
 bind him to courses of action which soci- 
 ety regards as right, and deter him from 
 actions which he regards as wrong. The 
 rule changes, but the conception of duty 
 remains. The law may be a law of love in 
 family life, a law of sympathy or interest
 
 48 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 in social life, a law of fear in civil life, but 
 the habitual restraint of earlier periods be- 
 comes the imperative "duty" of maturity. 
 This theory fails to account for the author- 
 ity of the parent, of society, of the law, 
 except on the basis of love and fear. The 
 child may obey the parent from love, and 
 obey the law from fear. But suppose that 
 on reaching maturity a question arises, 
 "Ought I to obey my father or obey the 
 law ? " the ought would appear to be an idea 
 independent of both parent and law. Or, 
 if it be said that sympathy or benevolence 
 is the origin of duty, the question arises, 
 Why does man have to ask " ought I to be 
 sympathetic toward this man or that ; 
 ought I to feel this benevolence " ? It is 
 highly probable, if not absolutely certain, 
 that the question of duty is antecedent to 
 the question of love or fear. But it may be 
 said, the fact is that certain acts are expe- 
 dient and others inexpedient, and it may 
 be asked, Is not expediency the source 
 of duty ? But if it be possible to ask the
 
 The Nature of Duty. 49 
 
 question, Is it or is it not my duty to do 
 what is expedient ? then the idea of duty 
 is logically antecedent to that of expedi- 
 ency. 
 
 2. The origin of duty, however, may be 
 said to be subjective, and to be found in 
 self-interest. Just as it is to my interest 
 to obey the law, to respect the mandates 
 of society, and the authority of my par- 
 ents ; so the apprehension of this fact 
 raises in me the idea of duty, because my 
 own self-interest is evidently the most im- 
 portant interest with which I am con- 
 cerned. To this the reply may be made 
 that in this case self-interest and duty 
 should not only always coincide, but that 
 they should seem to coincide. This we 
 know is very far from being the case. 
 Even where the agreement between self- 
 interest and duty is apprehended, so that 
 one cannot ask, Ought I to follow self- 
 interest ? so certainly is the answer affirma- 
 tive, it is plain that the very affirmation, 
 It is my duty to seek my own interest,
 
 50 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 implies a conception of duty not derived 
 from self-interest but independent of it. I 
 am willing to admit that self-interest can- 
 not be resolved into any simpler elements, 
 that egoism is a necessary quality of the 
 human mind, but the history of society 
 shows very plainly that duty too is neces- 
 sary. Let us take an interesting example 
 and consider the ethical position of an ori- 
 ental devotee, who does not believe in a 
 happy immortality but expects eternal an- 
 nihilation. Such an one will inflict horri- 
 ble tortures upon his body, because he 
 thinks such torture is demanded by his 
 duty. According to the doctrine of the 
 foregoing chapter, he would not inflict the 
 torture unless he desired to do it, and so 
 far his motive is egoistic. But the im- 
 mediate thought before his mind is the 
 thought of duty. He inflicts the torture, 
 not because he loves the torture, but be- 
 cause he loves his duty. While he loves 
 duty more than the torture, he does not 
 love duty more than he does himself, be-
 
 The Nature of Duty. 51 
 
 cause his self-interest impels him to do his 
 duty, and to do his duty is to him desira- 
 ble. Self-love, or egoism, is a far broader 
 conception than that of duty, because it 
 includes the conception of all acts which 
 are not morally obligatory and yet are 
 performed for the happiness of self. But 
 duty is independent of egoism. For even 
 if it be claimed that all moral conduct is 
 egoistic, it must be borne in mind that ego- 
 istic conduct is only, the content of duty 
 and not a necessary part of the conception 
 of duty as such. One may believe it to be 
 his duty to help others at his own incon- 
 venience, and may refuse to do his duty. 
 Another may believe it to be his duty to 
 work for his own interest, and he may seem 
 to decline to work for his own interest. 
 Rightly or wrongly, we separate between 
 duty and egoistic conduct. But as I have 
 already said, the moment I ask the per- 
 fectly rational question, Ought I to be 
 selfish? I have thrown into jeopardy the 
 subjective theory of the derivation of duty.
 
 52 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 The conception of obligation is neces- 
 sary. Just as the laws of space and time 
 and of causality are necessary conditions 
 of mathematical and natural science, so 
 the law of duty is a necessary condition of 
 ethical science. That I ought to do my 
 duty is a necessary proposition. The con- 
 tent of duty is various and accidental. Ac- 
 cordingly we find egoism or altruism or re- 
 ligion filling the empty form. Duty will 
 lead one into the temple of Venus, another 
 into the monastery ; in one nation it will 
 make the mother sacrifice her own life for 
 her child, in another to cast the child into 
 the sacred river ; in one nation it will se- 
 cure the condemnation of vice and crime, 
 in another it will make them objects of 
 worship. Like some mysterious oracle, it 
 calls on men to act and does not tell them 
 what to do. 
 
 It will be seen at once, by any one fa- 
 miliar with the Critical Philosophy, that 
 the conclusion I have reached with regard 
 to the nature of obligation is in some
 
 The Nature of Duty. 5 f 
 
 respects analogous to the Kantian doctrine 
 as to synthetic judgments a priori. The 
 judgment of what it is our duty to do is an 
 a posteriori judgment. The judgment that 
 conduct is related to duty as being right or 
 wrong is an a priori judgment. It is im- 
 possible to conceive of conduct which is 
 not either wrong or not wrong, but there 
 may be a variety of conclusions reached as 
 to what is wrong and what is not wrong. 
 An illustration of the principle of causality 
 will make this doctrine of duty still plainer. 
 A certain change in nature is observed. 
 What the cause of that change may be is 
 not known, but investigation may reveal 
 the cause, and yet different investigators 
 may reach different conclusions as to what 
 produced the change. That there was a 
 cause for the change requires no demon- 
 stration. The fact that there was a cause 
 is a necessary truth. A terrific' explosion 
 occurs and a building is found- in ruins. 
 The police attribute the shock to dynamite ; 
 some think that it was due to the weak-
 
 54 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 ness of the boiler, others to gunpowder; 
 the proprietor explains that it came from 
 the carelessness of the engineer who had 
 charge of the boiler. He reaches the con- 
 clusion empirically, and shows empirically 
 that other explanations of the disaster are 
 unfounded, but in every case reference was 
 made to the principle of causality which 
 forbade the idea that the disaster was 
 uncaused. A man kills another. At once 
 the question is asked, Was the killing right 
 or wrong ? Opinions differ. Some say he 
 did right, others that he did wrong, and no 
 decision is reached. All recognize the fact 
 when it is brought to their notice that the 
 action was either right or not right. The 
 form of duty is referred to just as in the 
 purely intellectual case the form of causal- 
 ity is referred to. This I conceive to be the 
 relation subsisting between the That and 
 the What of morality. If it be admitted, 
 however, that duty exists, it becomes im- 
 portant to determine what one's duty is, 
 and here it is that experience comes to our
 
 The Nature of Duty. 55 
 
 aid, and the question may be discussed, 
 What shall we do ? Here, too, is to be ap- 
 plied once more the doctrine already no- 
 ticed, that there must be an agreement be- 
 tween morality and happiness in order to 
 insure the performance of moral conduct. 
 The term duty, then, is to be applied to an 
 aprioriiorm of knowledge. The a posteriori 
 knowledge of which that form is the con- 
 dition is a product of experience. Unless 
 men are Pessimists it must be held that 
 there is an agreement between morality 
 and happiness. It is reasonable to con- 
 clude that the conduct which results in the 
 greatest amount of happiness is the most 
 moral conduct, i. e., is conduct which we 
 ought to follow. 
 
 Such a theory as that which I have just 
 suggested raises the same question with 
 regard to the form of the moral judgment 
 which is raised with regard to other neces- 
 sary forms of judgment. It raises the old 
 issue between the a priori and a posteriori 
 schools of philosophy, Can we explain
 
 56 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 necessary truth by means of experience? 
 Experience is ultimately an appeal to the 
 senses, and it must be shown empirically 
 that what we call the form of obligation or 
 duty has its origin in the ordinary percep- 
 tions of the five senses, or in the more inti- 
 mate sensations of pleasure and pain. The 
 utter dissimilarity between sensations such 
 as color and sound and touch make the ex- 
 planation of the idea of duty from these 
 even more uncertain than the explanation 
 of causality or space or time from such im- 
 pressions. The utter independence of 
 pleasurable conduct and conduct which 
 ought to be performed, in the mature mind, 
 render it extremely improbable that what 
 is pleasurable has given rise to the idea of 
 duty. Such a result could be traced only 
 by a patient following of the development 
 of mind from its earliest stages, even if 
 those stages belong to forms of primitive 
 organic existence. How far this can be 
 done is very uncertain. It seems to me 
 that the most important question that the
 
 The Nature of Duty. 57 
 
 theory of knowledge presents to us is the 
 question whether necessary truth can be 
 shown not to be ultimate. So far no the- 
 ory of the evolution of morality has given 
 any definite account of the origin of moral 
 obligation. Of the development of judg- 
 ments as to right and wrong we have many 
 accounts, but the formation of a moral 
 judgment about anything implies the form 
 of oughtness as the logical condition with- 
 out which the moral judgment, whether 
 mistaken or not, could not be framed.
 
 IV. 
 
 The Nature of Character. 
 
 THE evidence of the nature of Charac- 
 ter is to be determined by experience. 
 A man forms a judgment with respect to 
 his own character by reviewing his past 
 thoughts and actions ; he estimates the 
 character of his fellow-men by inferences 
 from their expressions of thought. In 
 modern ethical science the place of char- 
 acter has acquired great importance, espe- 
 cially in connection with the doctrine of 
 the will. For example, when the deter- 
 minist, in defending his position, argues 
 that the will is governed by motives which 
 are beyond the control of the agent, it is 
 affirmed on the contrary by the advocates 
 of freedom that the effect of the motives 
 is conditioned by the character, and that 
 character determines the will. Character
 
 The Nature of Character. 59 
 
 becomes in this way more or less identi- 
 fied with the person of a man, with his 
 real self. We speak, for example, of a 
 person not merely having, but being, a bad 
 character. Let us suppose, for example, 
 the case of a man whose desire is excited 
 toward some object which he feels that he 
 ought not to possess. The immorality of 
 the pleasurable conduct which is suggested 
 to him is weighed in comparison with the 
 morality of the painful conduct. Now it 
 is argued that the motives alone are not 
 sufficient to determine his conduct, but 
 that character conditions the determina- 
 tion. The problem, then, is to explain char- 
 acter ; to show its origin. If we take the 
 empirical view of the matter, the states of 
 mind antecedent to the action of the will 
 are causes of the will's action, and we are 
 not at liberty to introduce any third some- 
 thing, such as character or ego, to con- 
 dition the effect of the motive. For the 
 ego is not given empirically, and in that 
 case character is either wholly or in part
 
 60 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 unknown, or becomes simply a series of 
 phenomena. A man's character is an 
 inconstant something, changing with the 
 change of phenomena. Abandoning, how- 
 ever, the metaphysical view of character 
 as related to self, we may notice its ethi- 
 cal significance. A character which is 
 morally good is one which has a tendency 
 to effect right actions. Our estimate of 
 what constitutes a good character will 
 therefore vary according to the standard 
 of morality adopted. For example, if we 
 hold that the happiness of others is the 
 standard of conduct, then a good char- 
 acter means one which tends to promote 
 such happiness. 
 
 It happens, however, that either by per- 
 sonal experience or training civilized peo- 
 ple are in agreement generally as to the 
 actions which are called moral, and we 
 need not introduce at this point a discus- 
 sion as to the moral standard. One or 
 two illustrations may serve to make clear 
 the conclusion which I am about to draw.
 
 7 'be Nature of Character. 61 
 
 Let us suppose, in the first place, the 
 case of a person who is born among crim- 
 inals and trained to look upon moral ob- 
 liquity as praiseworthy. He is educated 
 so that he lives by theft, he is punished 
 by the law, he is hardened by association 
 with convicts, and is an outcast from so- 
 ciety. The general tendency of his life is 
 bad, and if he does right it is from the 
 worst of motives. We say of such an one, 
 his character is bad. 
 
 Let us suppose the case of one born 
 amid moral and religious surroundings, 
 and throughout his early life warned and 
 guarded against the "world, the flesh, and 
 the devil ; " educated to respect the prop- 
 erty, the feelings, of others. We say of 
 such an one, his character is good. 
 
 Let us suppose, however, that to the 
 two men the same temptation comes ; 
 for example, the commission of a murder 
 to gain some important end. The former 
 commits it on account of his surroundings 
 having been so bad as to make him look
 
 62 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 with but little horror on the awful conse- 
 quences of taking human life. The sec- 
 ond man resists the temptation because 
 he has been differently trained. It is evi- 
 dent that the character here has a control- 
 ling influence in determining the man's 
 actions ; but character has been modified 
 by circumstances. If these be regarded 
 for the present as typical cases, we may 
 ask, Why did not the bad man resist the 
 evil surroundings in time to make his char- 
 acter good enough to avoid committing the 
 murder ? We may ask in like manner, 
 Why did not the good man resist the bad 
 surroundings, and why did he reach a stage 
 of demoralization which made him suc- 
 cumb to the temptation to murder ? If 
 such a condition of things was not possi- 
 ble, it follows that character is made good 
 or bad by the surroundings of a man ; and 
 if this be so he cannot, according to his 
 character, resist the influence of that which 
 makes his character what it is. If we take 
 the other alternative, then there is a char-
 
 The Nature of Character. 6) 
 
 acter with which a man is born which de- 
 termines whether he is able to resist evil 
 influences. And here it seems to me we 
 have presented to us a subject of surpass- 
 ing importance and difficulty in the science 
 of ethics. I am anxious in discussing it 
 to avoid, as far as possible, needless opposi- 
 tion to doctrines not essential to the point 
 to be noticed. For this purpose I am 
 ready to admit, for the sake of argument, 
 that the will is free, and that motives in- 
 duce, but do not compel, the agent to con- 
 duct himself in such and such a way. 
 Here is the solemn truth, however, which 
 meets every one who observes human con- 
 duct. Every man or woman who comes 
 into the world comes " not in entire forget- 
 fulness and not in utter nakedness." No 
 mind is a tabula rasa, which begins its 
 career on the day when the body is born. 
 No nervous system which belongs to an 
 infant body is isolated and distinct from 
 the lives which have preceded it. On the 
 contrary, every child expresses the result,
 
 64 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 the last effect, of a long one may almost 
 say an infinite series of causes. The 
 parents and grandparents, many genera- 
 tions of parents, may be known, but who 
 can tell through what these ancestors have 
 passed ? It is possible, and indeed almost 
 certain, that in the long line of progeni- 
 tors which aristocrat and pauper alike pos- 
 sess, there have been here and there men 
 of low, mean disposition; there have been 
 men whose character seemed an emana- 
 tion from hell ; men addicted to nameless 
 crimes, to debauchery, to cruelty. There 
 are those whose forefathers have been 
 drunkards, or insane, or convicted felons. 
 I am disposed to think that heirlooms of 
 this kind are seldom wholly lost, for we 
 can see how hereditary characteristics are 
 perpetuated until they are stamped indeli- 
 bly not only on families, but on races. 
 There is a deep physiological and psycho- 
 logical truth in the old-fashioned doctrine 
 of original sin, and it is a serious fact to 
 contemplate. It is impossible to tell when
 
 The Nature of Character. 65 
 
 a boy or girl is born what particular ten- 
 dency may be lurking in his or her mind 
 or body potentially, ready to spring up on 
 some occasion being offered, and bring 
 desolation and ruin. And if the hypothe- 
 sis of Darwin be true, and our ancestry is 
 not limited to the human species, one can- 
 not say definitely that qualities belonging 
 to the brutes have not left indelible marks 
 upon our own highly perfected organisms. 
 If such a view be regarded as fantastical, 
 it is sufficient for us to notice how habits 
 descend in families, even where the sur- 
 roundings of the children differ from those 
 of the parents. If the natural history of 
 many of those who fill our asylums and 
 prisons were studied, it would be found 
 that the causes of these wandering minds 
 and vicious lives were not independent of 
 hereditary influences. The side of these 
 facts which is most often noticed is the 
 serious warning it gives to those about to 
 marry to see to it that they do not know- 
 ingly perpetuate corruption in the phy-
 
 66 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 sique and morals of their children. But to 
 my mind the more serious aspect is that 
 which belongs to the possible moral train- 
 ing of those who have inherited the tram- 
 mels and vices which in many cases have 
 wrecked the lives of their ancestors. It 
 becomes a matter of vital importance to 
 determine whether, if morality be largely 
 dependent on character, and if one's char- 
 acter be an inheritance which one's life 
 simply wastes or puts out at interest, 
 whether, I say, ethical science can furnish 
 a moral code at all and insist that it should 
 be obeyed. 
 
 Whether, then, we adopt the doctrine of 
 freedom or not, it cannot be denied that 
 every man is born with certain inherited 
 dispositions or tendencies, which are more 
 or less eradicable, according to the strength 
 of their persistence and the force of cir- 
 cumstances. And it is an encouragement 
 to the social reformer that in many cases 
 men have not only been raised to a high 
 plane of morality when their birth and sur-
 
 The Nature of Character. 67 
 
 roundings have been degraded, but also 
 that many have been capable of elevation 
 when removed from their low surround- 
 ings. In opposition to these facts may be 
 cited cases of some, the vices of whose 
 ancestry have reappeared in their own 
 lives in spite of all efforts at reform. The 
 science of human nature has not reached 
 a point where it is possible to distinguish 
 between native and acquired qualities; 
 but it is no less certain that inherited 
 character is a powerful, though indetermi- 
 nate, element in the composition of con- 
 duct. When, therefore, it is affirmed that 
 every man is the author of his own charac- 
 ter, we must consider that an element in 
 the formation of such character is inher- 
 ited character. The importance of this 
 view will be appreciated when it is remem- 
 bered how strenuously men are everywhere 
 seeking their own happiness, and how the 
 ideal of happiness differs according to dif- 
 ferent characters. 
 
 There are cases in which a man, accord-
 
 68 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 ing to his own confession and the testi- 
 mony of his friends, lived a pure and ex- 
 emplary life, who nevertheless succumbed 
 to some severe temptation, and committed 
 acts which men with a far worse experi- 
 ence would hesitate to perform. There 
 are virtuous women who commit deeds 
 from which their abandoned sisters would 
 often shrink. There are men of purity 
 and benevolence who, when they fall, fall 
 lower than the average of criminals. It 
 is difficult to affirm of any man or woman 
 that his or her character is good until their 
 respective lives, with the temptations to 
 which they have been subjected, are passed 
 in review ; and it can hardly be called ac- 
 cidental that the tombstone is the place 
 where an estimate of character is most 
 often to be found, although many epitaphs 
 are lies. To those who look upon moral 
 and immoral courses of conduct as effects 
 of mere caprice, the estimate of real charac- 
 ter is unimportant. But no one who looks 
 at conduct scientifically can fail to be per-
 
 The Nature of Character. 69 
 
 plexed at the extraordinary deviations of 
 good men into bad paths. We conclude 
 that character often lies hidden in the 
 realm of the unconscious. It is there- 
 fore a truth of science as well as of re- 
 ligion that in the crucible of life gold is 
 often found in what seemed brass and clay, 
 while many a highly valued gem is con- 
 sumed in the devouring fire of experience. 
 
 The problem of ethics is thus further 
 complicated by the fact that every influ- 
 ence for good may be brought to bear upon 
 a man when his character is such that lit- 
 tle benefit will follow from such influence. 
 
 The principle of heredity is every day 
 becoming more and more important in 
 philosophy. In spite of the fact that it is 
 very difficult to show any regularity or law 
 in the transmission of qualities from parent 
 to child, the fact that there is such a trans- 
 mission is established beyond all doubt. 
 The theory of development clearly shows 
 that the individual life is not sufficient to 
 explain the tendencies which characterize
 
 70 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 it. Particularly in the lower animal world 
 are the effects of heredity clearly appar- 
 ent. This principle must be taken ac- 
 count of by the psychologist as well as by 
 the naturalist, particularly in the relation 
 of the science of mind to neurology. It 
 is clearly established that there is a cer- 
 tain correspondence between the phenom- 
 ena of mind and those of the central ner- 
 vous system. According to some, there 
 is more than a correspondence, and the 
 phenomena of the one are causally related 
 to those of the other. The embryonic 
 brain is comparatively simple and homo- 
 geneous in the earlier stages of its growth, 
 and it is impossible to affirm that it pos- 
 sesses any more psychological significance 
 than the liver or the heart. But the fully 
 developed central nervous system in man, 
 by reason of its complexity, admits of 
 many modifications which are difficult to 
 trace, much less to explain. Yet, just as 
 diseases of other organs are transmitted 
 from parent to child, so peculiarities and
 
 The Nature of Character. // 
 
 disorders of the nervous system are trans- 
 mitted, and often a definite hereditary 
 physical condition may be shown to be the 
 cause of mental changes. But even where 
 the causes of nervous phenomena cannot 
 be traced, it can be observed that mental 
 characteristics, the physical conditions or 
 accompaniments of which are unknown, 
 pass to a man from his progenitors. It 
 is very easy to say that hereditary ten- 
 dencies, however marked, may be over- 
 come by education and training, so that 
 even were a man to be born with a dis- 
 tinctly vicious disposition, such a disposi- 
 tion might be changed by virtuous sur- 
 roundings. It is easy to say that such 
 vicious hereditary characteristics are un- 
 common. Indeed, with the exception of 
 certain forms of disease, the qualities of 
 mind and body which can be proved to 
 be hereditary are in most cases trivial ; 
 but the fact that these qualities are trans- 
 mitted cannot be denied. If the effect 
 of this transmission can be overcome, the
 
 7-2 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 means of the overcoming must be an effort 
 of the will, or of motives effected by one's 
 surroundings, or both. If the hereditary 
 tendency is overcome by an effort of the 
 will, according to our premises the will 
 is dependent on the character. A charac- 
 ter, then, which changes its evil tenden- 
 cies is, according to the hypothesis, an evil 
 character, which is absurd. If the heredi- 
 tary tendency is overcome by motives sup- 
 plied by one's surroundings, then there is 
 no freedom to change. But it can be 
 shown that the same surroundings will 
 produce different results upon different 
 men, the difference in result being the 
 effect of a difference of character. If both 
 surroundings and character combine to ef- 
 fect the change, there cannot be said to 
 be freedom, for the surroundings are not 
 the result of the man's volition, otherwise 
 they are due to his character. But his 
 character, before his surroundings have 
 changed it, is something with which he 
 has had nothing to do. A moral or an
 
 The Nature of Character. 73 
 
 immoral progenitor may have had a great 
 deal to do with it, and such a progenitor 
 may in turn examine his own pedigree to 
 find remote causes for his individual char- 
 acteristics. It may be said, however, that, 
 independent of both character and sur- 
 roundings, is the free ego or self, which 
 controls man's moral action whatever the 
 antecedents, whatever the surroundings. 
 All roads lead to Rome ; and I have yet 
 to find any doctrine of ethics which did 
 not lead one to the question as to the 
 freedom of the will. This is a subject 
 which has been worn absolutely thread- 
 bare in modern philosophy, and it is not 
 my intention to attempt a solution of the 
 problem in this treatise. Believing as I 
 do that change is unthinkable except in 
 the category of causation, the affirmation 
 that the will is free, or that self is free to 
 will, seems to me thoroughly unwarranted 
 either by fact or reason. It has been said 
 that either freedom is a fact or moral re- 
 sponsibility is a delusion. Whether this
 
 y4 4 Theory cf Conduct. 
 
 alternative is to be accepted or not, from 
 a philosophical point of view, it would 
 seem to be inadvisable to make our meta- 
 physics or logic the slave of ethics. If 
 self and character be identical, then the 
 qualities of self are determined in the first 
 instance independently of the will. It may 
 be said, however, that self can modify its 
 own character, that is, character is a spe- 
 cies of veneer that one finds self covered 
 with at birth ; but that on the presentation 
 of motives self acts freely, and, removing 
 one coat of veneer, applies another of a 
 different kind. If we hold that self can 
 be an object of knowledge, then it would 
 be interesting to know wherein the self 
 and the character differ. If, however, we 
 hold the view that self is subject and is 
 anterior to knowledge, the problem as to 
 character and freedom has a very different 
 meaning. Some of the great schools of 
 modern German thought prefer to take 
 the latter view. It is held that self, the 
 ego, is not a phenomenon, is not given in
 
 The Nature of Character. 75 
 
 experience. Causality is a category appli- 
 cable to phenomena only. It is logical, 
 therefore, to regard self as independent 
 of causality as itself a cause, but, even 
 when viewed as changing, not an effect. 
 The noumenal self, as Ding an sick, is not 
 subject to the law of causation, and is 
 therefore free. While this is logically plau- 
 sible, it is an argument which will not bear 
 close inspection. For example, the motive 
 avarice, which is the effect on my charac- 
 ter of the sight of gold, suggests that I 
 should steal ; the motive compassion 
 the effect upon my character of the sight 
 of the owner of the gold suggests that 
 I should not steal. Suppose that there is 
 no third alternative. If the owner is ab- 
 sent the compassion is absent, and theft 
 follows. If the owner is present, it may 
 be said that I can choose between steal- 
 ing and not stealing. If I fail to steal, 
 the failure is related to the motive as ef- 
 fect to cause. It is of no importance that 
 we speak of the ego willing, if the partic-
 
 j6 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 ular act of will would not have taken place 
 in the absence of the motive : the motive 
 is the cause, and the will is not free. 
 
 The continuous action of surroundings 
 on the will through the character produces 
 a more or less decided tendency to will in 
 a certain way. From this practical moral- 
 ists draw the conclusion that indulgence 
 of the appetites, for example, weakens the 
 will, or, to speak more correctly, leads the 
 will to will what satisfies the appetites. 
 On the contrary, if the character of a man 
 is sufficiently strong to overcome the influ- 
 ence of surroundings which tend to make 
 him indulge his appetites, a continued 
 course of such willing increases the resist- 
 ing power. We have in these cases a suf- 
 ficient answer to a statement often made 
 with regard to the comparative strength 
 of character in different men. It is some- 
 times said that a man who has successfully 
 resisted a great temptation deserves as 
 little credit as the one who has yielded 
 to the same temptation ; because in the
 
 The Nature of Character. 77 
 
 former case the effort required was not so 
 great as in the latter case. We are told 
 that X., whose appetites are not so strong 
 as those of Y., deserves less credit than 
 Y. if they are resisted ; while if Y. yields 
 to them his conduct is less culpable. This 
 would be true if their characters were 
 wholly formed and remained unchanged by 
 their habits of volition and their surround- 
 ings. But it may be the case that X. is 
 able to resist the great temptation because 
 he has accustomed himself to resist temp- 
 tations in general, while Y. does not ap- 
 preciate the greatness of the temptation 
 until he is confronted with it. In case Y. 
 does resist the temptation, other things 
 being equal, the sum of the amounts of 
 resistance to previous temptations in the 
 case of X. may be far greater than the 
 whole amount of resistance required by Y. 
 in the great temptation supposed. 
 
 It seems to me very doubtful whether 
 the unconscious element in mental life is 
 sufficiently considered. The qualities of
 
 7<S A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 mind which lie latent or dormant may 
 make or unmake one's happiness. Every- 
 body knows how some chance idea, by its 
 associations, may effect the reproduction 
 of other ideas apparently long forgotten. 
 In my opinion the unconscious tract of our 
 mental life is the source of many of those 
 capacities and abilities which sometimes 
 surprise ourselves and others. Emergen- 
 cies or the hardships of life may rouse an 
 apparently commonplace man to deeds of 
 heroism. The shocks and afflictions of this 
 rough world may convert a sensualist into 
 an ascetic, a doubter into a believer, a sen- 
 timentalist into a cynic. There is many a 
 poor wretch whose whole life has been 
 given to crime, who has hidden in the un- 
 conscious chambers of his mind capacities 
 which may be awakened into high moral 
 activity. And it will not do for us to sneer 
 at the ecstatic fervor of the mystic be- 
 cause he cannot trace in consciousness 
 the causes of his ecstasy, when we reflect 
 that upon that region beyond the reach of
 
 Tbe Nature of Character. 79 
 
 human consciousness there may be moving 
 with irresistible energy the influence of an 
 Infinite Spirit. 
 
 This uncertain element in character, 
 which is not before consciousness, leads 
 one to look with a kind of wonder on the 
 career of one's fellow-men as well as on 
 one's own career. Our moral life is not 
 a smooth plain upon which our past is 
 plainly visible and our destiny discernible. 
 It is a rugged, rolling country, full of hid- 
 den ways, and pits and hills and valleys ; 
 while beyond lies a region of which we 
 know but little, except by the faint light 
 which lingers on the horizon, and is sug- 
 gestive of something which we cannot 
 see.
 
 V. 
 
 The Motive to Morality. 
 
 IF, as I have endeavored to show, the 
 test of morality is the amount of happiness 
 resulting from moral conduct, and if there 
 be no intuitive knowledge of what is right 
 or wrong, it would seem natural that expe- 
 rience should determine wherein morality 
 consists. We have already found, how- 
 ever, that the experience of men as to 
 what constitutes happiness is varied. We 
 have concluded that both character and 
 training determine to a very important ex- 
 tent the view of happiness which may be 
 adopted. The empirical method in ethics 
 can be applied to the solution of this prob- 
 lem. Just as the world is learning every 
 day more and more about natural science, 
 so it is growing more intelligent in ethical 
 science. Just as we understand how to
 
 The Motive to Morality. 81 
 
 apply electricity and steam better than our 
 ancestors understood it, so we can learn 
 from the experience of past generations 
 what the best means are of promoting hap- 
 piness, and so are in a way to reach a 
 higher standard of moral conduct. It is 
 not possible for us to enter here upon the 
 consideration of the old question, whether 
 civilization really increases human happi- 
 ness, for example, whether the average 
 European or American is really happier 
 than the average African or Asiatic ? But 
 assuming that barbarous conduct is less 
 happy in its consequences than the con- 
 duct of those who are civilized, we meet 
 with a difficulty. In what respect is the 
 happiness of civilization superior to that 
 of barbarism ? We have already shown 
 that the quality of happiness is not to be 
 considered, but only its quantity or inten- 
 sity. If, then, a man's character and 
 training are such that he gains happiness 
 from sensuality and debauchery and blood- 
 shed, and would not understand or appre-
 
 82 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 ciate the pleasures of civilization, we must 
 test the morality of his conduct according 
 to another standard than that of happi- 
 ness. It will be generally admitted, how- 
 ever, that the more intelligent men become 
 the better able they are to determine what 
 is conducive to happiness. They pass from 
 the natural state described by Hobbes into 
 a civil state, and discover that their own 
 happiness can be attained only by regard- 
 ing the happiness of others. The way in 
 which society regards human actions, the 
 laws which are made and enforced, are the 
 result of generalizations leading to a cor- 
 rect estimate of the means to happiness. 
 Independently, therefore, of revelation and 
 of intuition, it may be freely admitted that 
 morality is progressive. The different de- 
 grees of happiness are discovered, their 
 relative values estimated, and knowledge 
 is gained as to how that happiness is best 
 to be advanced. What we call the social 
 instincts or feelings are a great aid in 
 reaching this result ; and the lower appe-
 
 The Motive to Morality. 8$ 
 
 tites are largely controlled by the natural 
 benevolence and sympathy which is found 
 in every race of men in some slight de- 
 gree. It is taught that the happiness of 
 others must be the principal object of our 
 action if we would secure our own. The 
 formula of Bentham and the categorical 
 imperative of Kant are admirable general 
 rules of action ; but the difficulty is to 
 determine how to put them into practice. 
 
 I. There is the difficulty of applying the 
 general rule to the special case which gives 
 rise to questions of casuistry. Socrates 
 tells us that only the unwise man will be 
 immoral. This is theoretically true. If 
 morality brings me more happiness than 
 immorality, then, if I know this, and know 
 what brings happiness, I am a fool if I am 
 not moral. If an altruistic course of con- 
 duct will make me happier than an egoistic 
 course, and I know it, then I am a fool if 
 I am an egoistic. But the exceptions are 
 very numerous, and men are extremely 
 willing to make as many exceptions as
 
 84 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 possible. When one man kills another in 
 self-defense, it may be said that his con- 
 duct is altruistic, because society is bene- 
 fited by it ; but it is not supposed to be in 
 accordance with the highest morality for a 
 man to kill his wife's seducer, who takes 
 what is of more value than life. Society 
 excuses me if I slay the highway robber, 
 but is not so lenient if I pursue beyond 
 the law the dishonest bank officer who 
 robs me of my property. Whether soci- 
 ety is right or wrong, it is not necessary 
 for our argument that we should deter- 
 mine. But it is very clear that altruism 
 and morality are not always coincident. 
 
 The ideal way of applying a moral code 
 is to be found in the Catholic theory of 
 spiritual direction, although, unhappily, it 
 is not practically justifiable. The rules of 
 morality are laid down, for example, by 
 the church. They are sufficient for the 
 general guidance of conduct. When a dif- 
 ficulty occurs to any one of the faithful he 
 goes to the confessional for an interpre-
 
 The Motive to Morality. 85 
 
 tation of the moral law, just as we go to 
 the physician for advice when observance 
 of ordinary physiological laws is insuffi- 
 cient to preserve our health ; and the sac- 
 erdotal authority in settling the question 
 is derived from the same source as the 
 moral law. I will not run the risk of criti- 
 cising this religious position and possibly 
 giving offense to those who find in the 
 confessional a source of consolation. It 
 is a system which works admirably in spe- 
 cial cases, and the inviolate secrecy which 
 is its safeguard as well as its danger has 
 been remarkably preserved in the Latin 
 church. Unhappily there are many men 
 in the sacred office of priests who are as 
 unable to deal with ethical difficulties as 
 those who come to them for ghostly coun- 
 sel. My impression is that those who 
 adopt the altruistic theory are not disposed 
 to follow the decrees of Rome. But many 
 of them are equally unfaithful to their own 
 creed. 
 
 Another form of the difficulty just sug-
 
 86 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 gested comes from the limited sphere of 
 human action. The essence of altruistic 
 morality is to be found in conduct which 
 promotes the greatest happiness of the 
 greatest number ; but one can act only 
 with reference to individuals. While I am 
 seeking to further the happiness of those 
 in my immediate neighborhood, I may be 
 seriously endangering the welfare of soci- 
 ety. Society, it is true, protects itself 
 against such a danger by its laws and cus- 
 toms ; but what will further the happiness 
 of society as a whole must be declared by 
 society itself. There arises thus the dan- 
 ger of socialism as a result of such altru- 
 ism ; for it follows that in proportion as 
 society collectively consults its own hap- 
 piness, it will so far limit the action of a 
 great number of individuals, not by the 
 general laws which at present prevail, but 
 by interference with the most petty details 
 of human conduct. The result will be a 
 revolt of society as individuals against the 
 social organism, and men will rebel against
 
 The Motive to Morality. 87 
 
 their own decrees. Mere benevolence and 
 sympathy carried out into action will not 
 necessarily promote the happiness of others. 
 This century has shown, by the lament- 
 able failure of many well-meant philan- 
 thropic schemes, how widely men's ideas 
 as to happiness differ. For example, a 
 benevolent padrone might be a greater 
 moral reformer for an Italian colony in 
 New York than many men of wealth and 
 position who had high ideas of tenement- 
 house improvement and of raising the con- 
 dition of the poor. But the altruist may 
 say, " Rome was not built in a day," and 
 in time proper ways of promoting the hap- 
 piness of society will be forthcoming. It 
 must be confessed that there is a hopeful 
 view of evolution, an evolution like that 
 described by Lessing, which is the unfold- 
 ing of God in history for the moral educa- 
 tion of men. There is an optimism in 
 some of our English theories of evolution 
 which finds its idol in the nineteenth cen- 
 tury as the philosophers of the French Rev-
 
 88 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 olution found their idol in the eighteenth. 
 There is an optimism in the theory of evo- 
 lution which makes the progress of the race 
 the progress of a divine plan, with a glori- 
 ous goal in the future. But there is a 
 view of evolution which is atheistic, which 
 finds no final cause (Zweck) in the prog- 
 ress of events. With materialistic ethics, 
 it finds a civilization built on ruins, and in 
 the uniformity of nature can recognize 
 only the prospect of a condition little bet- 
 ter than that of the present or of a future 
 dissolution. It must be remembered that 
 the rules of morality which are at present 
 prevalent in Europe and America, with 
 respect to person and property, are not all 
 the result of generalizations as to happi- 
 ness. Our moral code rests very consider- 
 ably on the code of dogmatic religion, and 
 our views of happiness have been modified 
 accordingly. I am ready to admit, for the 
 sake of argument, that the problem of hap- 
 piness is soluble by the progress of experi- 
 ence. But the question is, What shall be
 
 The Motive to Morality. 89 
 
 done in the mean time ? We may give the 
 various answers once again : Act for the 
 happiness of others, or act for your own 
 happiness, and in time the standard of 
 happiness will be definitely determined. 
 Even were this hopeful result probable, we 
 should be in the presence of another diffi- 
 culty, which seems to me disastrous to any 
 purely rational system of ethics. 
 
 2. It is when the motives to moral con- 
 duct are considered that the various meth- 
 ods of ethics may be estimated most prac- 
 tically. As has already been said, even 
 were the content of the moral judgment 
 given either a priori or a posteriori, the 
 natural question is, Why should one be 
 moral? And it is at this point that one 
 of the greatest difficulties arises. 
 
 If we take first the altruistic standard, 
 we lay down the law that moral conduct is 
 conduct which promotes the general hap- 
 piness. It is our duty to further the wel- 
 fare of the social organism. But why ? 
 If we say, because it is right, we found
 
 go A Theory of Ccnduct. 
 
 our altruistic maxim on a principle which 
 is more ultimate than that of altruism. If 
 we say, because you are naturally benevo- 
 lent and have social instincts, there is no 
 need of a moral code at all, or else the 
 code cannot have any power with those to 
 whom self-interest is of more importance 
 than benevolence or sympathy. 
 
 But we may say we should seek the hap- 
 piness of others as the best way of secur- 
 ing our own happiness. Altruism in this 
 case is only a form of Egoism. It has 
 been justly observed by a contemporary 
 writer in Germany that utilitarianism gives 
 us the art, but not the science, of conduct. 
 It is as if we were to lay down the golden 
 rule as a maxim of morality, without giv- 
 ing reasons why it should be obeyed. Un- 
 less there is some other than a sentimental 
 reason why we should seek to promote the 
 happiness of others, it would be extremely 
 foolish in a man to sacrifice his interests 
 to those of others. One will lay down his 
 life and sacrifice almost everything for
 
 The Motive to Morality. gi 
 
 the sake of those whom one loves ; but 
 there are very few whose love for the 
 social organism is so great as to submit 
 without question or reason to the demands 
 of society alone, especially when those de- 
 mands interfere seriously with one's hap- 
 piness. 
 
 Egoism is a far more logical theory of 
 conduct. It is needless to explain why a 
 man wishes his own happiness. Altruism, 
 therefore, is only a form of egoism. It 
 is an excellent prescription for happiness, 
 and forms a sound principle of legislation 
 as well as of personal conduct. But if I 
 am only to act for the good of others for 
 the sake of self-interest, it is conceivable 
 that occasions may arise where what in 
 my judgment is for my own interest is in 
 conflict with the interests of others. Is 
 it proper, then, that I should trust so far 
 to the altruistic principle as to act in op- 
 position to what I believe will promote my 
 own happiness ? A logical utilitarian would 
 answer in the affirmative, for he would say
 
 92 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 that the experience of mankind as to the 
 means of happiness is superior to your indi- 
 vidual judgment. If, however, I am willing 
 to give up my altruism for the occasion, 
 there is no ethical reason which can be 
 urged against my decision. The only criti- 
 cism of my conduct can be : It is unwise to 
 put your own judgment in opposition to the 
 general theory. The altruism with which 
 one sets out must in many cases be given 
 up for egoism. Admitting that the altru- 
 istic theory is the best, if I follow it from 
 egoistic motives, I must logically become 
 an egoist. It is the happiness of self which 
 must be secured at any cost ; and, practi- 
 cally, the man who helps others only to 
 promote his own happiness is not morally 
 better than the man who acts for himself 
 alone. 
 
 The egoistic method, however, is seri- 
 ously defective. It is very plainly shown 
 by the experience of the race that to pur- 
 sue happiness as an end of conduct is to 
 encounter failure. To make happiness the
 
 The Motive to Morality. g$ 
 
 object of life is almost certain to result in 
 unhappiness, and the logical result of ego- 
 istic hedonism is pessimism. There are 
 many men born with a good character, and 
 brought up in the midst of favorable con- 
 ditions, whose pleasure is to be useful, and 
 whose idea of happiness is unselfish, the 
 contemplation of the welfare of others ; 
 but these are exceptions. Preach egoism 
 to the virtuous man and you will have but 
 little to fear of the result. Preach egoism 
 to the great multitude who "grunt and 
 sweat under a weary life," whose physical 
 organism is controlling, or at any rate in- 
 fluencing considerably, their mental dis- 
 position, who are without what we call the 
 nobler instincts, and only the chastening 
 influence of law, with its penalties, will 
 prevent society from degradation. The 
 philanthropic person may be safely trusted 
 to follow his darling plan. The aesthetic 
 dilettante may do no harm, even if he does 
 but little good. Those who are " sicklied 
 o'er with the pale cast of thought " may
 
 94 d Theory of Conduct. 
 
 find their pleasure in admirable pursuits. 
 But, if I am not mistaken, the egoistic 
 motive is that which corrupts our society. 
 The mass of men, if their motives be self- 
 ish, will pursue a course of conduct which 
 will be certain to end in unhappiness. It 
 is not necessary for me to dwell upon this 
 familiar theme. History is read to but 
 little purpose if the career of the Epicure- 
 ans at Rome and of the sensualists in the 
 Paris of the eighteenth century do not pre- 
 sent a living illustration of the results of 
 this narrow hedonism. It will be said 
 that the appreciation of this fact by re- 
 peated sad experiences will correct the 
 natural impulse to excessive pleasure and 
 its consequent pain. But it is to be feared 
 that the human race becomes but little 
 wiser as it grows older. One might sup- 
 pose, for example, that an intelligent knowl- 
 edge of the doctrine of chances would pre- 
 vent men from staking their money on a 
 losing game, especially when experience 
 has demonstrated that the odds are against
 
 The Motive to Morality. g$ 
 
 them. But there are always multitudes to 
 be found who rely upon the possibility of 
 an improbable event. In the same way, 
 in spite of experience and of the warning 
 given by others, there are multitudes who 
 willingly take the chances of a painful se- 
 quel to a life of pleasure.. And if to be 
 moral is to seek after happiness, there is 
 no reason why any moral blame should be 
 attached to the drunkard or libertine by 
 an egoistic hedonist. This we shall find 
 to be especially the case if a belief in im- 
 mortality be given up. Any day or hour 
 may end my existence, and I cannot afford 
 to leave any pleasure untouched which lies 
 within my reach. It seems to me, then, that 
 from a purely scientific point of view, ego- 
 ism is the only logical course of conduct, 
 and pessimism is its natural result. It is 
 idle to say that such a course can be reg- 
 ulated by law. The only reason why we 
 have laws which limit the egoist in the 
 pursuit of happiness is that there is leaven 
 in society which is not egoistic. Society
 
 g6 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 will not tolerate such a method ; and his- 
 tory shows that where society has followed 
 an egoistic theory of morals, it has speedily 
 become impotent to preserve its decaying 
 life by any legal sanctions. If murder is 
 avoided only through fear of the gallows 
 or of prison, society will soon do away 
 with the gallows and the prison. If crimes 
 against the purity of women are avoided 
 only from physiological or pathological 
 causes, then there will be but little purity 
 left at the mercy of those who wish to 
 sin. If property be respected only through 
 fears of legal process, society is not likely 
 to tolerate such an institution as property. 
 From a scientific point of view, I fail alto- 
 gether to see what duty I owe to the social 
 organism, about which one hears and reads 
 so much. My own happiness is of far 
 greater importance to me than this con- 
 glomerate of individual men, most of whom 
 are nothing to me. A philanthropy which 
 is pursued at the expense of the happiness 
 of the philanthropist is, it seems to me, 
 the height of folly.
 
 The Motive to Morality. 97 
 
 It is at this very point that the inquirer 
 is confronted by the great religions of the 
 world with their ethical power. This eth- 
 ical power is twofold. It consists in a con- 
 stant moral code and the presentation of 
 an efficient motive. The general theory 
 of right, of duty, and of character which I 
 have suggested is not inconsistent with 
 any of the prevailing systems of religion. 
 The existence of the idea of duty can best 
 be explained by affirming the existence of 
 a God, who is the author of right. The 
 revelation of the will of God furnishes the 
 material of the moral judgment. This is 
 especially true in the case of the Christian 
 religion. If there be a moral code which 
 it is our duty to follow, the question then 
 arises, How can a man whose character is 
 immoral, who is brought up amid immoral 
 surroundings, be led to obey the moral 
 law ? From a purely scientific point of 
 view, there is no satisfactory answer to the 
 question. The maxims of morality may be 
 presented to such a man, and yet there
 
 9<S A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 will be no motive to insure his obedience. 
 The scientific doctrine that hereditary in- 
 fluences may produce a character with bad 
 tendencies finds its theological counter- 
 part in the Augustinian doctrine of orig- 
 inal sin. The problem is to make moral 
 conduct desirable ; and, so long as the 
 character is bad and the motives insuffi- 
 cient, obedience to moral law cannot read- 
 ily be secured. It is true that if all mo- 
 rality results in happiness, a man in the 
 pursuit of happiness may often attain to 
 morality. It is in this way that non-reli- 
 gious systems of ethics have arisen. But 
 every moral reformer knows that maxims 
 and advice may be absolutely ineffective 
 in inducing men to lead moral lives, just 
 as every clergyman knows that the most 
 persuasive preaching may fail to convince 
 even those whose characters are not alto- 
 gether bad. The Christian solution of the 
 problem is very simple ; and the results of 
 the Christian system, judged empirically, 
 have been extraordinary. Christianity
 
 The Motive to Morality. 99 
 
 maintains that the character acquires a 
 good tendency through supernatural influ- 
 ence, so that in what is called by theolo- 
 gians regeneration, or the new birth, the 
 soul receives an impulse by the action of 
 God himself. The result is that what once 
 seemed undesirable to the man of bad 
 character now seems desirable, and the 
 immoral ideal is exchanged for an ideal of 
 moral perfection a likeness to the source 
 of right. The Christian religion explains 
 this regeneration of character by maintain- 
 ing that God, although hating sin, has 
 personally loved the sinner, and, in the 
 revelation of himself in the person of 
 Jesus Christ, has made it possible for men 
 to be moral and so attain to happiness. I 
 am aware that the above statement of 
 Christian teaching may be criticised for 
 its vagueness, and must be modified ac- 
 cording to various particular creeds. But 
 whatever the specific form of Christianity 
 may be, the important point is that love to 
 God, as revealed in Christ, is the motive
 
 wo A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 of obedience to the moral law. What mo- 
 rality is, is determined empirically by refer- 
 ring to God's revealed will. Why one 
 should be moral is determined by the in- 
 fluence of God on the human character, 
 which makes conduct coincide with the 
 will of God because of love toward God. 
 This is evidently a subject lying outside 
 the limits of scientific method. But I am 
 far from believing that the negative results 
 reached in the earlier part of this book 
 destroy the apologetical value of ethics. 
 At the same time it would seem that 
 Christianity is of vast apologetic impor- 
 tance to any practicable system of ethics. 
 One may make a broader statement, and 
 say that ethics without religion is a body 
 without life. Instead of affirming with 
 Mr. Matthew Arnold, then, that religion 
 is "morality touched with emotion," I 
 should prefer to say that morality without 
 religion is without its most important ele- 
 ment. It has been often observed that 
 the Christian religion, by its exaltation of
 
 The Motive to Morality. 101 
 
 what is called self-denial, is directly op- 
 posed to the systems of the Greek and Ro- 
 man world. But it has been shown that, in 
 it, aside from the question of its truth or fal- 
 sity, are to be found those elements which 
 bind it to the feelings of the world. The 
 doctrine of the Incarnation brings God in 
 direct personal relation to the sympathies 
 of every human soul. It is in this respect 
 that Christianity holds a peculiar position 
 as an ethical power, in spite of its strin- 
 gent moral code and its somewhat pessi- 
 mistic view of the prevalence and power of 
 evil. It is often compared with the other 
 great religions of the world, such as Brah- 
 minism, Buddhism, and Mohammedanism. 
 But these noble or seductive creeds have 
 found no God in a manger. Their divin- 
 ity has never been despised and bleeding. 
 From the heads of those who are its dei- 
 ties no crown of thorns has drawn the 
 blood of our humanity, which is so weak 
 and weary. We find no cross, nor cruel 
 nails, nor soldier's spear. Their sepulchres
 
 IO2 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 are not empty. A strange and wild fanat- 
 icism, an eternal and hopeless annihilation, 
 or a throng of beckoning harlots supply 
 the place of a Redeemer's advocacy and 
 those influences which suggest a life of 
 peace. The form of 'the moral judgment 
 is common to all, but its material content, 
 as presented by Christianity, urges upon 
 the reluctant mind the power of an end- 
 less life as a motive, and the will becomes 
 the servant of the author of right and of the 
 rewarder of morality. And so this power 
 is illustrated most conspicuously in the 
 conduct of many who profess to hold this 
 relationship to God. There are not a few a 
 part of whose lives has been one long, studi- 
 ous attempt to seek pleasure at the sacri- 
 fice of virtue, but who have given up every- 
 thing for the sake of God. In the mind of 
 many a man, hidden altogether from the 
 sight of others, the conflict between duty 
 and desire has been waged as in the old 
 Greek tragedies, and victory has been 
 gained by the change of character, so that
 
 The Motive to Morality. 103 
 
 the sacrifice of that which was the object 
 of one's life and love has been made in or- 
 der that the moral law might be obeyed. It 
 is these instances of asceticism in the in- 
 most part of a man's soul, and this hidden 
 immolation of the dea'rest part of his life, 
 which are the spiritual counterpart of mo- 
 nasticism, that marvelous effect of reli- 
 gion, which, whether founded on Christi- 
 anity or not, is a most remarkable evidence 
 of the power of human will. 
 
 In addition to this, it is held by Chris- 
 tians at least, by the majority of Chris- 
 tians that the world is only an arena of 
 moral conflict preparatory to the period 
 after death, when happiness or unhappi- 
 ness await the moral agent according to 
 his actions here. It is impossible, to exag- 
 gerate the importance of the doctrine of 
 immortality in its relation to ethics, and 
 the prevalence of the doctrine among many 
 races has been supposed by some to point 
 to the reality of a life beyond the grave. 
 It is very difficult to account for the exist-
 
 W4 4 Theory of Conduct 
 
 ence of belief in immortality, unless we 
 refer to Revelation. So far as science 
 teaches us, there is no foundation for the 
 doctrine except its prevalence and the ne- 
 cessity of immortality as a condition of ef- 
 fective moral action. All the arguments 
 which have been employed are either fan- 
 ciful, resting on metaphysical miscon- 
 ceptions, like the arguments of the 
 Phaedo, or they tend simply to show the 
 persistence of force. The analogical argu- 
 ment of Bishop Butler, for example, falls 
 far short of making out a case for the be- 
 liever in personal immortality. The ques- 
 tion is not, Does death end all ? Of course 
 death does not end all. The question is, 
 Do I, do you, survive the death of the 
 body ? .And I have yet to find the science 
 which furnishes premises from which a 
 conclusion can be drawn. 
 
 By Kant and by other able writers im- 
 mortality has been regarded as a necessary 
 postulate of ethics. Suppose, for exam- 
 ple, that a person be told to do what is
 
 The Motive to Morality. 105 
 
 right in order to become happy. He is in- 
 formed that the immediate results of his 
 difficult course of conduct will be unpleas- 
 ant, but that self-denial is the means to hap- 
 piness. Suppose that such an one dies be- 
 fore his happiness is attained, what be- 
 comes of the agreement between virtue 
 and happiness ? Great fault has been found 
 with certain forms of religion for dwelling 
 on the offer of reward to virtue. It is held 
 that men should not be bought to do right, 
 but should do what is right for its own 
 sake, on account of its intrinsic character. 
 It will be an interesting spectacle when 
 the code of action is first introduced for 
 man's acceptance without the promise of 
 reward or punishment. Unquestionably a 
 very large number of men embrace the 
 Christian faith because they are afraid of 
 being punished if they are bad, and expect 
 to go to heaven if they are good ; but the 
 more this idea is rooted in their minds the 
 stronger their feelings are to the Being 
 who rewards them. If it is immoral to
 
 io6 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 follow a code of ethics for the sake of the 
 reward of moral action, what can be said 
 of the morality of the altruist or the ego- 
 ist ? Unless there is a prospect of im- 
 mortal reward, in many instances it will 
 not seem worth the while to be moral 
 where morality seems opposed to self-in- 
 terest. It is at any rate very evident that, 
 if there be no immortal life, this world is 
 an unweeded garden. There is not an 
 ethical writer of importance since the time 
 of Plato who has not dwelt upon the pros- 
 perity which often attends immoral con- 
 duct. Imprudent immorality often brings 
 its punishment immediately ; but " the 
 wicked in great power spreading himself 
 like a green bay tree " is a spectacle not 
 confined to the .time of David. What are 
 we to say of the wrongs which are unre- 
 dressed, of the crimes undiscovered, of hy- 
 pocrisy which passes as virtue, and vice 
 which is pursued through life to be ended 
 by a painless death ? What are we to say 
 of the good actions which go unrewarded,
 
 The Motive to Morality. 107 
 
 of virtues unnoticed, of lives devoted to 
 morality, but hidden from public sight, and 
 often maimed and distorted by injury and 
 persecution ? The answer that naturally 
 comes is, There is an immortal life beyond 
 the grave, where virtue is rewarded and 
 vice receives its punishment. 
 
 " Oh, yet we trust that, somehow, good 
 Will be the final goal of ill." 
 
 And this is where the Christian, who may 
 agree to many of the propositions of the 
 pessimist, takes a widely different view. 
 The thorny path, beyond which the pessi- 
 mist does not raise his eyes, is to the 
 Christian indeed a way to Calvary ; but at 
 the end of the crooked, weary road he has 
 glimpses of unending rest. But there is 
 misery in the world as well as crime. The 
 prison walls do not inclose all the crimi- 
 nals, and not all those inclosed by prison 
 walls are criminal. There are many who 
 have never heard of God, to whom religion 
 is a sham and virtue only another name for 
 vice. There are beside this the wards
 
 io8 A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 of our asylums for the insane, where the 
 mind is struggling to recover its lost throne. 
 The bare walls throw back grotesque or 
 awful images ; the silence seems to be full 
 of unearthly sounds ; sensation is torture ; 
 and life a long, dark way without purpose, 
 without hope, without end. 
 
 Is the wish, then, father to the thought ? 
 Does not the belief in immortality indicate 
 that immortality is a fact ? If every grave 
 is a goal of life, then, when the eyes of the 
 dead are closed, no face can be raised to- 
 wards immortal life with immortal hope. 
 It is the categorical statement of science 
 that dust, not Heaven, is our home. From 
 this point of view every funeral becomes 
 desperate. We say that " our brother is 
 dead, is no more," and science does not 
 tell us that he is asleep or that he is in 
 Paradise. The undertaker is the most ap- 
 propriate clergyman ; the song of Jerusa- 
 lem the golden sounds discordant and false. 
 The Paradise to which we turn our wistful 
 eyes is only a graveyard or a vault. A
 
 The Motive to Morality. 109 
 
 few fading flowers, a few tears, a few frag- 
 ments of earth, fall upon the dead. We 
 leave it all under the sun, or under the 
 stars, or under the gray sky, with the wav- 
 ing grass and nodding trees around it. 
 Religion is no longer ours. We go home 
 and try to imagine that the vacant chair 
 is again occupied, that the echoes of a 
 voice now silent still linger, and that the 
 heart which once was ours is here, and not 
 far away under the cypresses, alone for- 
 ever. And if the pessimistic alternative 
 embitters the contemplation of the death 
 of others, it embitters also the contempla- 
 tion of life upon our own part. 
 
 If science does not tell us of immortal- 
 ity, if justice demands immortality, if 
 the only redress of evil here is redemption 
 from evil and recompense hereafter, and 
 if there be a principle which controls cur 
 lives, pessimism rises and declares that its 
 thesis is proved. To the pessimist there 
 is a Being whom one cannot call God, for
 
 no A Theory of Conduct. 
 
 God is not a fiend There is but one 
 world, and that world is a troubled dream, 
 a hell. With such premises the conclusion 
 is inevitable, and one will be tempted to 
 say, I was born in spite of myself. I have 
 lived, and the world is bad. Behind me is 
 a chaos" of disappointments. As each day 
 dawns I find that what I thought was a 
 real good is at best a shadow, is always an 
 evil. The past is gone ; the present does 
 not realize my expectations ; the future is 
 without hope. I have danced long enough 
 to this devil's music ; I have lived long 
 enough in this tomb. Why should I en- 
 dure this monotony and await this pleasure 
 which is always expected, never realized, 
 so long as there is a strong rope, a sharp 
 knife, a deep stream, or an active poison ? 
 Death is better; but it is not for me to 
 complete the Nunc dimittis of Rabelais. 
 " Let the curtain fall ; " not the farce, but 
 the tragedy, is played. 
 
 It is when Science is dumb that Religion
 
 The Motive to Morality. in 
 
 begins to speak ; and the fact is suggested 
 that supernatural light is rare, and when 
 it shines on earth it is not an undulation 
 of the ether, nor, indeed, any datum of 
 science.
 
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