U Jv 
 
 EX 
 
 o 
 
 057 
 
 037
 
 II r: II 
 
 THE TARKASANGRAHA 
 
 OF 
 
 HIS O"^ATiT C3-LOSS 
 
 STYLED THE DIPIKA 
 
 AND 
 
 AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION. 
 
 PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY THE PROPRIETOR 
 
 OF 
 
 THE ' NIRNAYASAGAEA ' PRESS. 
 1876
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 IN* publishing this work, the chief object the Editor has in vie\r 
 is to supply a want which has long been felt by the students of 
 Sanskrit connected with Bombay University of an edition of 
 the TARKASANGRAHA, embodying not only a correct text with the 
 Bipika or gloss usually accompanying it, but also a close, faithful, 
 and faultless, translation of the original. That this want is most 
 peculiarly felt in these days when the Kyaya Philosophy is intro- 
 duced among the subjects prescribed for higher University Exami- 
 nations, is most clearly shown by the fact, that College students 
 are one and all dissatisfied with the only edition of the Tarka- 
 sangraha which is at present procurable. This edition is printed at 
 Calcutta and appears to have been based on one published at Allaha- 
 bad in 1849 for the use of the students of Benares College. Both 
 these editions, indeed, contain a correct text ; but the versions which 
 they give of the text are so carelessly, executed, tliat they are for the 
 most part inaccurate and faulty, and, what is more, even misleading. 
 They throw little or no light on such portions of the book as are 
 obscure, whilst they attempt at illustration, where illustration is not 
 required. They are, therefore, useless and unsafe guides to follow. 
 Hence arises the necessity for a better edition of the Tarkasangraha , 
 free from the blemishes which blot the editions of Calcutta and 
 Allahabad. 
 
 Under these circumstances, the Editor has ventured to publish 
 this work, with the view of rendering some service to the students 
 of the Tarkasangraha. The translation which accompanies the text 
 in the present edition is for the most part copied, with such altera- 
 tions as seemed necessary, from the translation which appeared in an 
 edition of the Tarkasangraha published in 1851 at Allahabad, which 
 is now out of print. Both the text and the gloss are copied from 
 an edition which was published some years ago in Bombay. Thh 
 
 2005614
 
 publication Ls further recommended by a very carefully prepared 
 Index of the most important and technical terms used in the text, 
 which will be found to add greatly to the utility of the present 
 undertaking. Little remains now to be said except that no pains 
 are spared to make the work as useful as possible. It is, therefore, 
 to be hoped that the efforts of the Editor in making this attempt at 
 facilitating the study of Sanskrit Literature will meet with favour 
 and approval from the students of the Sanskrit Language. 
 
 ERRATA. 
 
 <* *>? 
 
 P. L. 
 
 14. 10 For Sfq^pffa. Jrw/ 
 
 15. 7 
 9 
 
 20. 8 
 
 9 
 
 22. 1G 
 27. 12 
 20 
 33. 2 
 3G. 29
 
 II F: II 
 
 : II 
 
 
 
 nrenr 
 
 ; ' f 'Having placed in my heart tlm J,ord of the world. [ liaving 
 meditated on God ], and having saluted my preceptor, I compose this 
 Compendium of Logical results for the pleasant comprehension of the 
 uninstructed.'
 
 f 
 
 i 
 
 : i =r 3 ^^P^T: H T% 
 I 
 
 : II 
 
 II R II 
 
 1. 'There are seven Categories; Substance, Quality, Action, 
 Genus, Difference, Co-inherence and Non-existence.' 
 
 '2. ' Amongst those ( categories ), Substances [ the abodes of 
 Qualities] are nine; Earth, Water, Light, Ail', Ether, Time, Place, 
 Soul and Mind.'
 
 ^ q JT 
 
 rn 'tr- 
 
 I 
 
 I =TTR 
 
 'ft:
 
 n n 
 
 -* 
 
 Ci- 
 
 n 8 n 
 
 I 
 
 i 
 
 Wft^! || 
 
 u 
 
 i TO i 
 n 
 
 n 
 
 3. 'There are twenty-four Qualities; Colour, Savour, Odour, 
 Tangibility, Number, Dimension, Several ty, Conjunction, Disjunction, 
 Priority, Posteriority, Weight, Fluidify, Viscidity, Sound, Under- 
 standing, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion, Effort, Merit, Demerit and 
 Faculty.' 
 
 4. ' There are five Actions; Throwing upwards, Tin-owing down- 
 wards, Contraction, Expansion and Going.' 
 
 5. 'Genus [a common nature ] is of two kinds; Higher and 
 Lower.' 
 
 G. ' Differences, which reside in eternal substances, are endless.'
 
 7. ' Co-inlierence is one only.' 
 
 8. ' Non-existence is of foin- kinds; Antecedent non-existence, 
 Destruction, Absolute non-existence and Miitual non-existence.' 
 
 9. ' That is Earth, in which there is the quality Odour. It is of 
 two kinds; Eternal and Non-eternal. In its atomic character it is 
 Eternal ; and when some product arises out of those atoms, then that 
 is called Non-eternal. This [ earth in the character of a product ] is 
 of three kinds, through the differences of body, organ of sense, and 
 mass. The body is that of us men. The organ is the apprehender 
 of odour, called the Smell, which resides in the fore-part of the nose. 
 And the masses [ what have parts ] are clods, stones, d-c.'
 
 n g 
 
 : i 
 
 n 
 
 10. ' That is Water, which aj)])ears cold on touching it. And it is 
 of two kinds; Eternal and Non-eternal. In the form of atoms, it is 
 Eternal; and when a product is produced by those atoms, then that 
 is called Non-eternal. This [ water in the form of products ] is of three 
 kinds, through the differences of body, organ of sense, and m;iss. 
 The body exists in the world of Varu/ui. The sense is the percipient 
 of savour, which is called the Taste, and which resides in the fore- 
 part of the tongue. The masses are rivers, seas, &c.'
 
 V9 
 
 fit: 
 
 
 i ^TR 
 
 in 3 n 
 
 
 11. ' That is Light, the sensation by touch of which is warm. This 
 is of two kinds; Eternal and Non-eternal. It is Eternal in the form 
 of atoms, and in the form of products it is Non-eternal. This f light in 
 the form of product ] is of three kinds, through the differences 
 of body, organ of sense and mass. That the body exists in the Solar 
 realm, is well-known. The sense, the percipient of colour, which is 
 called the Sight, resides in the fore-part of the pupil of the eye. Masses 
 are of four kinds, through these differences; Produced in earth, 
 Produced in the sky, Produced in the stomach, and Produced in 
 mines. Produced in earth, it is tire, ite. Produced in the sky, it is 
 lightning, <ke., the fuel of which is water. Produced in the stomach, 
 it is the cause of the digestion of things eaten. Produced in mines, 
 it is gold &c.'
 
 : i 
 
 PTSTT- 
 
 12. 'That is Air, which has not colour, and has tangibility. It 
 is of two kinds; Eternal and Non-eternal. In the form of atoms it 
 is .Eternal; and in the form of products it is Non-eternal. This [ air 
 in the form of products ] is of three kinds, through the difference* of 
 body, organ of sense and mass. The body is in the ferial world. The 
 sense is the Touch, the apprehender of tangibility, existing throughout 
 the whole body. The mass is that which is the cause Of the shaking of 
 trees, &c.' 
 
 13. ' Ail' circulating within the body is called Pra^a. Although 
 it is but otie, yet, from the difference of its accidents, it is called 
 by Breath, Flatulence, etc. [ Breath, Flatulence, Cerebral pulsation, 
 General pulsation and Digestion ].'
 
 
 I 
 
 i rr 
 
 T^rl g 
 
 I ?Tn ^ 
 : I ICT^T^T^lt ^TFTT T^-TT 
 
 i rT> ^ in 8 u 
 
 14. 'That is Ether, in which there resides the quality of sound. 
 It is one, all-pervading and eternal.'
 
 r- 
 
 %frf 
 
 n 
 
 3TrfFTFf I 
 
 n 
 
 I srnftRl 1 1 ^rfir gF&rrt 
 
 15. ' That is Time, Avhich IK the caii.se of the employment of 'Past' 
 <tc. [ Past, Present, and Future.] It is one all-pervading and eternal.' 
 
 16. ' That is Space, which is the cause of the employment of 
 ' East ' <fcc. [ East, West, North and South. ] It is one, all-pervading 
 and eternal.' 
 
 17. ' That is Soul, which is the substratum of knowledge [that 
 in which knowledge resides. ] It is of two kinds; the Animal soul 
 and the Supreme soul. The Supreme soul is God, the Omniscient. He 
 is One only and devoid of joy or sorrow. The Animal soul is distri- 
 buted to each body. It is all-pervading and eternal.'
 
 cftlt 
 
 I ^T: i 
 
 I 
 
 : II 
 
 < u 
 
 18. 'That is Mind, whose sense is the cause of the perception of 
 pleasure, pain, &c. It is innumerable, for it remains with each Hou). 
 |t is in the form of an atom and is eternal,'
 
 u 
 
 
 gnr 
 
 gfq^rr HFTT^ i $T<HT- 
 
 n n n 
 
 TT- 
 
 %?T 
 
 ii 
 
 10. -That (jUiility, \vhichis apprehended only by the sen.se of 
 Si^'lit. is called Colour. And it is of seven kinds, through the dif- 
 ferences of White, Blue, Yellow, Red, (Jreen, Brown and Variegated, 
 residing in earth, water and light, fn earth, colour of all the seven 
 kinds resides ; in water, white colour not lustrous resides, and in 
 liyht, lustrous white colour resides.'
 
 n 
 
 sfMrfrr n 
 
 gorr 
 
 n ^ \\ 
 
 i n 
 
 : n 
 
 i ^PTT% 
 
 n 
 
 20. ' That quality wliicli is known through the sense of Taste, Is 
 called Savour. And it is of six kinds, through the differences of Sweet, 
 Sour, Saline, Bitter, Astringent and Pungent, residing in earth and 
 water. In earth, there is savour of the six kinds ; and in water, 
 there is only the sweet savour.' 
 
 21. ' The quality which is apprehended by the sense of Smell, IK 
 called Odour. And it is of two kinds; Fragrance and Stench, resi- 
 ding in earth alone.' 
 
 22. 'That quality which is perceived only l>y the organ of Touch. 
 is called Tangibility. And it is of three kinds, through the differences 
 of Cold, Warm and Temperate. This quality resides in earth, water, 
 light and air. Coldness resides in water; Warmth in light, and Temper- 
 
 in earth and air.'
 
 (1 
 
 . 
 
 \ 
 
 n n 
 
 : I 
 
 II F*rirfrr 
 
 j ii 
 
 i cfr ^srrRgr n *8 u 
 
 23. ' The four of which colour is the first [ Colour, Savour, Odour 
 and Tangibility ] may be produced in Earth [in earthy things ] by 
 matur&tion [a special conjunction of Heat], and they are then. transient; 
 In others (in Water, Light and Air ] Colour &c. are not produced 
 )>y maturation. They are tlien Eternal or Transient. When tlit-\ 
 reside in eternal things, they are Eternal; and when they reside in 
 things not eternal, they are said to be Transient.' 
 
 24. 'That (jiiality, which is the peculiar cause of the concep- 
 lion of Unity Ac., is called Number. This resides in the tiin> 
 substances. Reckoning from Unity, it is as far as a l\n\irdlnt 
 | 100,000,000,000,000,000 ]. Unity is both Eternal and Non-eternal. 
 In an eternal thing, it is Eternal ; and in a non-eternal thing, it is 
 Non-eternal. But Duality etc., is even- where Non-eternal,'
 
 J 
 
 1 ?rar ^nfa^ I 3*<JT *f f f ' 
 n v* 11 
 
 n ^ u 
 
 : H 
 
 : I fefaft 
 
 '2~i. ' The peculiar cause of the conception of Bulk, is called 
 Measure. It resides in the nine substances. And it is of four kinds ; 
 
 Small. (Jreat, Long and Short.' 
 
 I'*;. 'The peculiar canst; of the conception of distinct things is 
 calU-d Severally. It resides in all the substances.' 
 
 11. 'The peculiar eatise of the conception of conjoined things is 
 called Conjunction. It resides in all the substances.' 
 
 '1$. That quality which annihilates Conjunction, i* called Dis- 
 junction. It resides in all the substance*.'
 
 ?T ft- 
 
 u 
 
 II 
 
 29. ' The peculiar cause of the conception of tilings Far and "Near. 
 is called Remoteness and Proximity. These reside in the four suits 
 tances beginning with earth, [ earth, water, light, air ] and mind. They 
 are of two kinds; Made ly Space and Made hy Time. Remoteness 
 made by Space is in that thing which remains in a distant place ; and 
 Proximity made by Space is in that thing which remains in a place 
 near. In the person who is elder, there is Remoteness made by Time; 
 and in the person who is younger, there is Proximity made by Time.' 
 
 30. * The quality which is the non-intimate cause of incipient 
 falling, is called. Weight. It resides in earth and in water.'
 
 r: I g 
 
 i 
 
 n 
 
 n n 
 
 : t 
 ^ 
 : n n 
 
 31. ' The quality which is the non-intimate cause of incipient 
 trickling, is called Fluidity. It affects earth, water and light. It is 
 of two kinds; Natural [ established by its own nature ], and Adsci- 
 titious [ produced by some cause ]. Natural fluidity resides in water, 
 and Adscititious fluidity resides in earth and light. In earthy sub- 
 stances, such aa butter <tc., fluidity is produced by the conjunction of 
 fire. In light, ( it is produced ) in gold &c.' 
 
 32. ' The quality which is the cause why particles &c., become a 
 heap, is called Viscidity. It resides in water alone.' 
 
 33. ' The quality which is apprehended by the or/.'an of hearing, 
 is called Sound. It resides only iu the ether. It is of two kinds; In- 
 articulate and Articulate. In-articulate sound is produced by the 
 instrumentality ot a drum itc. ; Articulate sound is that, which is in 
 the oha}'0 "i ike ban;,krit 01 any other language.'
 
 
 
 
 : ii fft 
 
 |?rfj u 
 
 I 
 
 34. ' Knowledge, which is the cause of every conception ( that can 
 bo put in words ) is called Understanding. It is of two kinds; Re- 
 membrance and Notion. The knowledge which is produced only by 
 its own antecedence, is called Remembrance ; and knowledge which 
 is different from that, is called Notion. It is of two kinds; Righb 
 and Wrong. Of whatever description anything is, when our idea 
 of that thing is of that same description, it is called a Right 
 notion; as, in the case of silver, the idea of its being silver. Thia 
 is called Pramd [ commensurate with its object. ] The supposing a 
 thing to be as the thing is not, is called a Wrong notion; as, in the 
 case of a shell, the notion of ite being bilver. This is called Apratud'.
 
 U- / 13 
 
 u 3^ n 
 
 
 IOC - - . - > '-v n vra-r- vJT-7 T .' ' 
 
 35. ' Eight notion is of four kinds, through the divisions of Per- 
 ceptions, Inferences, Conclusions from .similarity and authoritative 
 Assertions understood. The efficient [peculiar] cause of those, also 
 is of four kinds, through the^ divisions of Perception, .Inference, 
 Recognition of similarity and authoritative Assertion/ 
 
 36. ' Whatever tiling, through its operating, is the cause, not com- 
 mon to all effects, of some given effect, that is the instrumental cause 
 thereof. That which is invariably antecedent to some product, and 
 is not otherwise constituted [ is not l>y any tiling else except the 
 result in question constituted a cause j is the cause (of that product). 
 That which annuls it:; UMH Hiitt'cnK-j;' non-existence is called an Kfu-et
 
 ^J t-ct 3T^T*r<7/4 c 
 
 A^t, 
 
 \ 
 
 : I 
 
 i 
 
 I 
 
 ^T[rf ^ q^T q 
 ! 
 
 i 
 
 n 
 
 37. ' Cause is of three kindw, through th<; distinctions of Intimate, 
 Non-Intimate und Instnimental. Thnt in which an effect intimately 
 relative to it takes its rise, is an Intimate eauae; as, threads are of 
 cloth, and the cloth, itb'elf of its own colour <fec. Where this intimate 
 elation exists, that cruise which fe associated in one and the same 
 object with such effect or cause, is Non-intimate; as, the conjunction 
 of the fhread,s is the nuu-inliuuita cause of the cloth, and the colour 
 of the threads, that of the colour of the cloth. The cause which is 
 distinct from both of thrr.e L the Instrumental CRU,SH ; as. the weaver's
 
 
 * / i 
 
 . ^ y t c-Mft^ 
 
 
 
 II \< II 
 
 
 
 brush, the loom &c. aro of cloth. Among these three kinds of causes, 
 that only ia called an instrumental cause which is not a universally 
 concurrent cause or condition ( of all effects as Go<l, time &c. are ).' 
 
 38. ' The Cause of the knowledge, called sensation is an organ of 
 sense; knowledge produced by the conduction of an organ of sense and 
 its object, ia sensation. It is of two kinds; Where it does nut pay 
 regard to an alternative, and Whei'e it does. The knowledge which 
 does not pay regard to an alternative is that which involves no speci- 
 fication, as, in the simple cognition that ' this is something that exists.' 
 The knowledge which contemplates an alternative is that which 
 includes a specification, as, ' This is DiUht',' ' Thiy is 
 ' Thw is black."
 
 fif 
 
 - 
 
 : i 
 
 v -\ 
 
 H H
 
 39. ' The relative proximity of a sense and its object, which is tho 
 cause of perception, is of six kinds; Conjunction, Intimate union 
 with that which is in conjunction, Intimate union with what is inti- 
 mately united with that which is in conjunction, Intimate union, Inti- 
 mate union with that which is intimately united, and the Connection 
 which arises from the relation between that which qualities and the 
 thing qualified. When ajar is perceived by the eye, there is (bet- 
 ween the sense and the object) the proximity of Conjunction. In 
 the perception of the colour of the jar, there is the proximity of 
 Intimate union with that which is in conjunction ; because the colour 
 ' is intimately united with the jar, which is in conjunction with the 
 sense of vision. In the perception of the fact that colour generi- 
 cally is present, there is the proximity of intimate union with what 
 is intimately united with that which is in conjunction ; because the 
 generic property of being a colour is intimately united with tho 
 particular colour which is intimatly united with the jar which is in 
 conjunction with the sense of vision. In the perception of sound by the 
 organ of hearing there is the proximity of Intimate union; because 
 the organ of hearing consists of the ether which resides in the cavity 
 of the car, and sound is a quality of ether, and there is Intimate union 
 between a quality and that of which it is the quality. In the percep- 
 tion of tho nature of sound, the proximity is that of intimate union 
 with what is intimately united; because the nature of sound is inti- 
 mately united with sound which is intimately united with the organ 
 of hearing. In the perception of non-existence, the proximity is 
 dependent on the relation between a distinctive quality and that 
 which is so distinguished ; because when the ground is ( perceived 
 to be ) possessed of the non-existence of a jar, the non-existence of a 
 jar distinguishes tho ground which is in conjunction with the organ of 
 vision. Knowledge produced by these six kinds of proximity is Per- 
 ception. Its instrumental cause i Sense. Thus it is settled that an 
 organ of sense is what gives us the knowledge culled sensation.'
 
 .' #7>7~ 
 
 -~ v . 
 
 I~ff\cil 
 
 if 
 
 ^T: II 
 
 * 5 
 
 40. ' The instrument ( in the production) of an inference is a gene 
 ralized Fact. An Inference is the knowledge that arisee from deduction. 
 Deduction is the ascertaining that the subject possesses that cii, 
 fcer which is invariably attended [ by what we then predicate of it. j 
 For example, the knowledge that, ' this hill is characterised bv 
 :;moke, which is always attended by fire,' is a deductive application 
 of a general principle; tho knowledge produced from which, vis:.
 
 fim 
 
 TO*T$f 
 I 5T =*T 
 
 II TO^fafiWfa 
 
 i rf^r^Ffrr i TO?is n 
 
 : n 
 
 ?r^r% ^^^ 
 
 
 "ITT- 
 
 that ' the hill is fiery', is an inference. Invariable attendedness is the 
 fact of being constantly accompanied; as, in the example 'Wher- 
 ever there is smtfke, there is fire [ by which it is invariably attended ]'. 
 By ' the subject's possessing acliaractvr etc.,' is meant that in a moun- 
 tain <fcc. there is prwciit that which is invariably attended.' 
 V
 
 JjfrT 
 
 I 
 
 u ^ H 
 
 41. 'A general principle is of two kinds, in so far as it may be 
 useful for One's self, and for Another. That which is employed for 
 One's self is the cause of a private conclusion in one's own mind. 
 For example, having repeatedly and personally observed, in the case 
 of culinary hearths &c., that where there is smoke there is fire, having 
 assumed that the concomitancy is invariable, having gone near a 
 mountain, and being doubtful as to whether there is fire in it, having 
 seen smoke on the mountain, a man recollects, the invariable atten- 
 dance of fire where there is smoke. Then the knowledge arises that 
 ' this mountain is characterised by smoke, which is invariably attended 
 by fire'. This is called the Consideration of a sign. Thence is pro- 
 duced the knowledge that ' the mountain is fiery,' which is the Con 
 elusion. This is the process of inference for One's self. But, after 
 having, to the satisfaction of his own mind, inferred fire from smoke, 
 when one makes use of the five-membered form of exposition for the 
 instruction of another, then is the process one of inference for the 
 sake of Another. For example : 
 
 ( 1 ) The mountain is fiery ; 
 
 ( 2 ) Because it smokes ; 
 
 ( 3 ) Whatever smokes is fiery, as a culinary hearth , 
 
 ( 4 ) And this is so ; 
 
 ( 5 ) Therefore it is fiery as aforesaid. 
 
 In consequence of the token here rendered, the other also admits 
 that there is fire.'
 
 
 
 42. 'There are five members of this syllogism; the Proposition, 
 the Reason, the Example, the Application and the Conclusion, ' The 
 mountain is fiery', is the Proposition; 'Because it smokes,' is the 
 Reason ; ' Whatever smokes &c.,' is the Example ; ' And so this moun- 
 tain is,' is the Application ; ' Therefore it is fiery', is the Conclusion, 
 
 43. ' The cause of an inference, whether for one's self or for an* 
 other, is simply the Consideration of a sign ; therefore the anumdna 
 [ the cause of an inference ] is just this Consideration of a sign.'
 
 I j =r 
 
 3TT%^KI I sqpn^T^Roi 1 
 TO^T^SKT 
 
 i 
 
 : I 
 
 n 8 u 
 
 44. ' A sign is of three sorts ; That which may betoken by its 
 presence or by its absence ; That which betokens only by its presence ; 
 and That which betokens only by its absence. The first is that tpken 
 ^liich is possessed of pervading inherence both in respect of its asso-
 
 c f^ Ok ) 
 
 'Sr & 
 
 
 'Sr&lrf 7^&n3( 
 
 ^ 
 fi -HTjfjf fretf , ifffr > <%r/ 
 
 : n 
 
 %fct II 
 
 ( with the thing which it betokens ) and its absence ( when the 
 thing it betokens is absent) us, for example, ' smokiness' when 'fire' is 
 to be proved. When it is said, 'where there is smoke there is fire, 
 sis on a culinary hearth/ we have a case of concomitant presence. 
 When it is said, ' where fire is not, there smoke also is not, as in a 
 great deep lake,' we have a case of concomitant absence. The second 
 is that token which has no negative instance, as when it is said ' the 
 jar is nameable because it is cognizable, as cloth is,' there is no instance 
 of nameableness or of cognizableness being present where the other 
 is absent, because everything ( that we can be conversant about ) 
 is both cognizable and nameable. The third is that token in regard 
 to which we can reason only, from its invariable absence. For 
 example : 
 
 ( 1 ) Earth is different from these ( other elements ); 
 
 ( 2 ) Because it is odorous ; 
 
 ( 3 ) Nothing that is not different from these is odorous; aa 
 water ; 
 
 ( 4 ) But this is not so ; 
 
 ( 5 ) Therefore it is different from the other elements.. 
 But if [ in the third member of the argument ] we had argued [ affi- 
 matively ] that ' what possesses odour is different from the other ele- 
 ments,' we should have had no example to cite in confirmation, seeing 
 that of earth alone can that property be asserted.'
 
 i 
 
 : II 2^ II 
 
 %fT 
 
 n 
 I ftfm \\ 
 
 >^r|^Rr^T: I 
 : i 
 
 
 f R: 
 
 45. ' That whose possession of what is to be established is doubt- 
 ful is called the Subject; as the mountain, when the fact of its 
 smoking is assigned as the reason (for inferring the presence of fire). 
 That which certainly possesses the property in question is called an 
 instance on the same side ; as the culinary hearth, in the same exam- 
 ple. That which is certainly devoid of -the property in question is 
 called an instance on the opposite side ; as the great deep lake, in 
 the same example.'
 
 
 
 TST^Tf w ^TTKrT I 
 
 "\ ^ 
 
 i snn ?i5?r RSI: 
 f 
 
 : I 3PTT 
 
 : i 
 
 5
 
 XX 
 
 > 
 
 II 
 
 46. The five, that merely present the appearance of a reason, are: 
 That which goes astray; That which would prove the contradictory; 
 That where there is an equally strong argument on the other side ; 
 the Unreal; and the Futile. The alleged reason which goes astray, 
 is that which has not just the one conclusion. It is of three kinds; 
 What would prove two much ; What belongs to none besides the in- 
 dividual ; and the Non-exclusive. The fallacy falls under the first 
 head, when that which is alleged as the proof may be present whilst 
 that which is to be proved is absent ; as for instance, if one should 
 say, ' The mountain is fiery, because it is an object of right knowledge,' 
 [ the reason assigned would be liable to this objection ] because the 
 being an object that may be rightly known is predicable also of a 
 lake, which is characterised by the absence of fire. That ( pretended 
 token ) which belongs neither to any similar instance nor to any one 
 dissimilar, is one devoid of community. As, when one says ' Sound 
 is eternal, for it has the nature of sound. 1 Now the nature of sound 
 belongs to sound alone, and to nothing else, whether eternal or un- 
 eternal. The pretended argument, which can bring an example 
 neither in support nor in opposition, is Non-exclusive. For example, 
 should one say, ' Everything is non-eternal because it is cognizable,' 
 there would be no example to cite, because ' every thing' ( leaving 
 nothing over ) is the subject of the conclusion. A reason proving the 
 reverse, is that which invariably attends the absence of what is to be 
 proved. For example suppose one should say, ' sound is eternal be- 
 cauae it is created.' ( We should reject his argument at once, because 
 the fact of having been created implies non-eternity the negation of 
 being eternal). A counter-balanced reason is that along with which 
 there exists another reason, which ( equally well ) establishes the 
 non-existence of what is to be proved. As if one should argue, 
 ' Sound is eternal, because, it is andible, as the nature of sound is 
 ( by both parties admitted to be ),' ( it might be argued, with equal 
 force on the other bide, that ) ' bound is non-eternal, because it is a,
 
 w 
 
 product, as a jar is. An unreal reason is threefold Where there is 
 not established the existence of any such locality as that where the 
 property is alleged to reside ; Where the nature alleged does not 
 really reside in the subject; and Where the alleged invariableness of 
 concomitancy is not real. ( As an example of), the fallacy of non- 
 existent locality, ( suppose that one argues ), ' The sky-lotus is fra- 
 grant, because the nature of a lotus resides in it, as in the lotuses of 
 the lake' here the sky-lotus is ( alleged as ) the locality ^ of the 
 nature of a lotus, ) and in fact it [ the sky -lotus ] does not 
 exist. As (an example of) an argument where the nature does not 
 really exist in the subject ( suppose one were to argue ), ' Sound is a 
 quality, because it is visible' here ( every one would perceive at once, 
 that) visibility does not reside in sound, for sound is recognised by 
 the hearing ( not by vision). A reason, when there is an iridispen- 
 sable condition, is faulty as regards comprehensiveness. Such an 
 indispensable condition is what always attends property to be esta- 
 blished, but does not always attend what is brought forward in 
 proof. Invariable attendance on the property to be established consists 
 in the not being the counterentity of the absolute non-existence, which 
 has the same location as that which is to be proved. Non-invariable 
 attendance on what is brought forward in proof consists in the being 
 the counterentity of the non-existence which has what is brought 
 forward in proof. ( Suppose it to be argued that ), ' The mountain 
 must smoke, because it is fiery' in this case the contact of wet 
 fuel is an indispensable condition. For ' wherever there is smoke, 
 there is the conjunction of wet fuel' so that we have here invariable 
 attendance on what is to be proved. But it is not true that ' wher- 
 ever there is fire, there there is conjunction of wet fuel' for there is 
 no conjunction of wet fuel in the case of an ( ignited ) iron ball so we 
 have here non-invariable attendance on the proof. As there is thus its 
 invariable attendance on what is to be proved, the contact of wet 
 fuel is an indispensable condition for the sufficiency of the reason 
 alleged. .As it would require this additional condition ( in order to 
 prove that smoke must be present), fieriness (in the argument before 
 us) is faulty as regards comprehensiveness. An argument is futile 
 when the reverse of what it seeks to prove is established for certain 
 by another proof. For example ( it may be argued that), ' Fire is cold.
 
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 because it is a substance.' There coldness is to be proved ; and its op- 
 posite, warmth, is apprehended by the very sense of touch. Hence the 
 argument is futile.'
 
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 47. ' Comparison or the recognition of likeness, is the cause of an 
 inference from similarity. Such an inference consists in the know- 
 ledge of the relation between a name and the thing so named. Its 
 instrument is the knowledge of a likeness. The recollection of the 
 purport of a statement of resemblance is the operation of that ins- 
 trument. For example a person not knowing what is meant by the 
 word ' gavaya,' having heard from some inhabitant of the forest 
 that a gavaya is like a cow, goes to the forest. Remembering the 
 purport of what he has been told, he sees a body like that of a cow. 
 Then this inference from similarity arises (in his mind), that < this 
 is what is meant by the word gavaya.' 
 
 48. ' A word [ right assertion ] is the speech of one worthy ( of 
 confidence). One worthy, is a speaker of the truth. A speech [sen- 
 tence ] is a collection of significant sounds ; as, for example, ' Bring 
 the cow.' A significant sound is that which is possessed of power 
 ( to convey a meaning). The power ( of a word ) is the appointment, 
 in the shape of God's will, that such and such an import should be 
 recognizable from such and such a significant sound.'
 
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 49. ' The cause of the knowledge of the sense of a sentence is the 
 Tnter-dependance, Compatibility and Juxta-position ( of the words.) 
 Inter-dependaiice means the inability in a word to indicate the inten- 
 ded sense in the absence of another, word. Compatibility consists in 
 (a word's) not rendering futile the sense ( of the sentence.) Juxta-posi- 
 tion consists in the enunciation of the words without a { long ) pause 
 between each.' 
 
 50. ' A collection of words devoid of inter-dependence &c, is no 
 valid sentence for example ' cow, horse, man, elephant,' gives no in- 
 formation, the words not looking out for one another. The expres- 
 sion ' He should irrigate with fire' is no cause of right knowledge, 
 for there is no compatibility ( between fire and irrigation.) The words 
 ' Bring the cow,' not pronounced close together but with an in- 
 terval of some three hours between each, are not a cause of cor- 
 rect knowledge, from the absence of ( the requisite closeness of) 
 juxta-position."
 
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 51. ' Speech is of two kinds ; Sacred and Profane. The former 
 being uttered by God, is all-authoritative: but the latter, only if 
 uttered by one who deserves confidence, is authoritative ; any other 
 is not so.'
 
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 52. '-The knowledge of the meaning of speech is verbally com- 
 municated knowledge ; its instrumental cause is language.' 
 
 53. ' Incorrect knowledge is of three sorts, through the divisions 
 of Doubt, Mistake, and ( such opinion as is open to ) Keductio ad 
 absurdum. The recognition, in one ( and the same ) thing possessing 
 a certain nature, of several heterogeneous natures as characterising it, 
 is Doubt. For example ' a post, or a man.' Apprehending falsely 
 is Mistake. For example, in the case of a shell, the idea of silver. 
 Reductio ad absurdum consists in establishing the pervader [ here 
 supposed to be denied] through the allegation of the pervaded [ here 
 supposed to be granted]. For example, ' If there were not fire 
 [which is denied,] then there would be nosuaokc [which is admitted.]'
 
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 54. ' Memory also is of two kinds; Correct and Incorrect. Cor- 
 rect memory is that which arises from correct knowledge, incorrect 
 memory is that which arises from incorrect knowledge.' 
 
 ">"'. What all perceive to be agreeable, is Pleasure.' 
 
 "('>. ' What appears disagreeable, is Pain.' 
 
 57. ' Desire means wishing.' 
 
 ">*. ' Aversion jneans disliking.' 
 
 .')'.'. ' Effort means action.' 
 
 GO. ' Merit arises from the performance of what is enjoined.' 
 
 01. 'But Demerit (arises) from the performance of what is 
 forbidden. 
 
 G2. ' The eight qualities Understanding and the rest [ Un- 
 derstanding, Pleasure, Pain. Desire, Aversion, Effort, Merit, and 
 Demerit are distinctive of Soul alone.'
 
 
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 63. ' Understanding, Desire and Effort are of two kinds; Eternal 
 and Transient. Eternal in God, and Transient in mortals.' 
 
 64. ' Faculty is of three kinds; Momentum, Imagination and 
 Elasticity. Momentum resides in the four beginning with Earth, 
 [ Earth, Water, Light and Air ] and in Mind. Imagination, the cause 
 of memory, and arising from notion, resides only in the Soul. Elasti- 
 city is that which restores to its former position what had been 
 altered. It resides in things like mats &c. formed of the earthy 
 element.'
 
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 G.">. ' Action consists in motion. Throwing upwards is the cause of 
 conjunction with a higher place. Throwing downwards is the cause of 
 conjunction with a lower place. Contraction is the cause of conjunc- 
 tion with what is near the body. Expansion is the cause of con- 
 junction with what is distant. Going is every other variety. 
 Action resides only in the four begining with Earth [ Earth, Water 
 Light and Air] and in Mind.' 
 
 66. ' Genus is eternal, one, belonging to more than one, and re- 
 siding in Substance, Quality and Action. It is of two kinds; Higher 
 and Lower. The higher Genus (iliesummum genus) is existence. The 
 lower Genus is such a one as Substantiality [ the common nature of 
 what are called Substances].' 
 
 67. - ' Differences residing in eternal substances, are excluders 
 (of each from genus of nature with the others).'
 
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 fi8. ' Intimate relation is Co-inherence. It exists in things which 
 cannot exist separately. Two things which cannot exist separately 
 are those of which two, the one exists only as lodged in the 
 other. Such pairs are, parts and what is made up of the parts, qua- 
 lities and the thing qualified, action and agent, species and indivi- 
 dual, and difference and eternal substances.' 
 
 G9. ' Antecedent non-existence is without beginning, and has no 
 end. Such is the non-existence of an effect previously to its produc- 
 tion. Destruction has a beginning, and has no end. ( Such is the non- 
 existence ) of an effect subsequently to its production. Absolute 
 non-existence is that of which the counter-entity is considered inde- 
 pendently of the three times [ past, present and future]. For exam- 
 ple; ( Such is the non-existence in the instance where it is remarked 
 that ) there is not a jar on the ground. Mutual non-existence is 
 that of which the counter-entity is considered with reference to the 
 relation of identity. For example; (Such difference is referred to 
 when it is remarked that ) a jar is not a web of cloth."
 
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 70. ' Since every thing is properly included under the categories 
 that have been now stated, it is established that there are only seven 
 
 categories.'
 
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 * ' Tins Compendium of Logical results was composed by the 
 leai'ned Armani Bliatta, in order to perfect the acquaintance of stu- 
 dents with the opinions of Kmrfilu ;md of the
 
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