B 3 
 
MEMORIAM 
 
 3864- 
 
^mericatt 
 
 EDITED BY 
 
 JOHN T. MORSE, JR. 
 
Stnierican 
 
 ANDREW JACKSON 
 
 AS A PUBLIC MAN 
 
 WHAT HE WAS, WHAT CHANCES HE HAD, AND 
 WHAT HE DID WITH THEM 
 
 BY 
 
 WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER 
 
 PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE IX YAJJE COLLEGE 
 
 BOSTON 
 
 HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY 
 NEW YORK: 11 EAST SEVENTEENTH STREET 
 Cbe fttersibe $res 
 
 1892 
 
38 
 
 /s s 
 
 Copyright, 1882, 
 BY WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER 
 
 All rights reserved. 
 IN MEMORIAM 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER L 
 
 PA81 
 
 THE FIRST FORTY-PIVE YEARS OP JACKSON S LIFE 1 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 THE CREEK WAS AND THE WAB WITH ENGLAND . 26 
 
 CHAPTER m. 
 JACKSON IN FLORIDA ... 49 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 ELECTION OP 18? ; ..,.< 73 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 ADAMS S ADMINISTRATION 100 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 THE RELIEF SYSTEM OF KENTUCKY . . . .119 
 
 CHAPTER VH. 
 
 INTERNAL HISTORY OF JACKSON S FIBST ADMINISTRA 
 TION 136 
 
 CHAPTER VEIL 
 
 PUBLIC QUESTIONS OF JACKSON S FIRST ADMINISTRA- 
 
 IION --1 164 
 
 (a.) I. West India Trade; 2. Spoliation Claimg. 
 (6.) 1 Federal Judiciary ; 2. Indians. 
 
 MlAMoU 
 
VI CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 MM 
 
 PUBLIC QUESTIONS OF JACKSON S FIRST ADMINISTRA 
 TION. II 184 
 
 3. Land; 4. Internal Improvements; 5. Tariff. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 PUBLIC QUESTIONS OP JACKSON S FIRST ADMINISTRA 
 TION. in 207 
 
 6. Nullification. 
 
 CHAPTER XL 
 
 PUBLIC QUESTIONS OP JACKSON S FIRST ADMINISTRA 
 TION. iv ... 224 
 
 7. Bank. 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832 250 
 
 CHAPTER Xin. 
 
 TARIFF, NULLIFICATION, AND BANK DURING JACKSON S 
 SECOND ADMINISTRATION 277 
 
 CHAPTER XIV 
 
 SPECULATION, DISTRIBUTION, CURRENCY LEGISLATION, 
 AND END OP THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES . 322 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 IHE NEW SPIRIT IN VARIOUS POINTS OF FOREIGN 
 *ND DOMESTIC POLICY 343 
 
 CHAPTER XVL 
 r*HB ELECTION OF 1836. END OP JACKSON S CAREER 374 
 
 FULL TITLES OP BOOKS RKFERREB TO IN THIS VOLUME 387 
 ... ... 393 
 
ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE FIRST FORTY-FIVE YEARS OF JACKSON S LIFE. 
 
 IN the middle of the last century a number of Scotch 
 men and Scotch-Irishmen migrated to the uplands of 
 North and South Carolina. Among these was Andrew 
 Jackson, who came over in 1765, with his wife and two 
 sons, being accompanied also by several neighbors and 
 connections from Carrickfergus, County Antrim, Ireland. 
 They appear to have been led to the spot at which they 
 settled, on the upper waters of the Catawba river, by 
 the fact that persons of their acquaintance in Ireland 
 had previously found their way thither, under special 
 inducements which were offered to immigrants. 1 The 
 settlement was called the Waxhaw Settlement, and was 
 in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, but close to the 
 South Carolina boundary. Andrew Jackson had no capi 
 tal, and never became an owner of land. In 1767 he 
 died. His son Andrew was born within a few days of 
 the father s death, March 15, 1767. Parton fixes his 
 birthplace in Union County, North Carolina; KendaD 
 
 1 2 Hewitt, 13, 268, 272. A bounty was offered equal to the 
 ;ost of passage. Ship captains became immigration agents. (Foi 
 full titles of books referred to see the list at the end of the vol 
 
 IBM.) 
 
 1 
 
ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 in South Carolina. In Jackson s Proclamation of 1832^ 
 in a letter of December 24^, 1830, 1 and in his will, he 
 speaks of himself as a native of South Carolina. 
 
 It appears that Andrew Jackson s mother abandoned 
 the settlement which her husband had commenced, and 
 it is probable that she owed much to the assistance of 
 her relatives and connections while Andrew was a child. 
 Circumstances of birth more humble than those of this 
 child can scarcely be imagined. It was not, probably, 
 hard to sustain life in such a frontier community. 
 Coarse food was abundant ; but to get more out of life 
 than beasts get when they have enough to eat was no 
 doubt very difficult. The traditions of Jackson s educa 
 tion are vague and uncertain. Of book-learning and 
 school-training he appears to have got very little indeed. 
 
 The population of the district was heterogeneous, and, 
 when the Revolutionary War broke out, the differences 
 of nationality and creed divided the people by oppos 
 ing sympathies as to the war. The English penetrated 
 the district several times in the hope of winning re 
 cruits and strengthening the tories. On one of these 
 raids Andrew Jackson was wounded by an officer, who 
 struck him because he refused to brush the officer s boots. 
 He and his brother were taken prisoners to Camden. 
 The war cost the lives of both Andrew s brothers, and 
 also that of his mother, who died while on a journey to 
 Charleston to help care for the prisoners there. An 
 drew Jackson accordingly came to entertain a vigorous 
 Viatred of the English from a very early age. In 1781 
 ae was alone in the world. What means of support he 
 had we do not know, but, after trying \) .e saddler s trade, 
 he became, in 1784, a student of law at Salisbury, North 
 1 39 Hiles, 385, 
 
THE STUDY OF LAW. 2 
 
 Carolina. The traditions collected by Parton of Jack- 
 Bon s conduct at this time give us anything but the pict 
 ure, so familiar in political biography, of the orphan boy 
 hewing his way up to the presidency by industry and 
 self-denial. If the information is trustworthy, Jackson 
 was gay, careless, rollicking, fond of horses, racing, 
 cock-fighting, and mischief. Four years were spent in 
 this way. 
 
 It is necessary to note the significance of the fact that 
 a young man situated as Jackson was should undertake 
 to " study law." 
 
 In the generation before the Revolution the intellectual 
 activity of the young men, which had previously been 
 expended in theology, began to be directed to the law. 
 As capital increased and property rights became more 
 complicated there was more need for legal training. In 
 an agricultural community there was a great deal of 
 leisure at certain seasons of the year, and the actual 
 outlay required for an education was small. The stand 
 ard of attainments was low, and it was easy for a farm 
 er s boy of any diligence to acquire, in his winter s lei 
 sure, as much book-learning as the best colleges gave. 
 In truth the range of ideas, among the best classes, 
 .tbout law, history, political science, and political econ 
 omy, was narrow in the extreme. What the aspiring 
 lass of young men who were self-educated lacked, as 
 Compared with the technically " educated," was the bits 
 of classical and theological dogmatism which the colleges 
 taught by tradition, and the culture which is obtained 
 by frequenting academical society, however meagre may 
 be the positive instruction given by the institution. 
 What the same aspiring youths had in excess of the 
 regularly educated was self-confidence, bred by igno> 
 
I ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 ranee of their own short-comings. They were therefore 
 considered pushing and offensive by the colonial aris 
 tocracy of place-holders and established families, who 
 considered that " the ministry " was the proper place 
 for aspiring cleverness, and that it was intrusive when 
 it pushed into civil life. The restiveness of the aspiring 
 class under this repression was one of the great causes 
 of the Revolution. The lawyers became the leaders in 
 the revolt everywhere. The established classes were, as 
 classes, tories. After the war the way was clear for 
 every one who wanted office, or influence, or notoriety, to 
 attain these ends. The first step was to study law. If 
 a young man heard a public speaker, and was fired by 
 the love of public activity and applause, or if he became 
 engaged in political controversy, and was regarded by 
 his fellows as a good disputant, or if he chanced to read 
 something which set him thinking, the result was very 
 sure to be that he read some law. The men, whose bi 
 ographies we read because they rose to eminence, present 
 us over and over again the same picture of a youth, with 
 only a common school education, who spends his leisure 
 in reading law, while he earns his living by teaching or 
 by farm work. Those, however, whose biographies we 
 read are only the select few who succeeded, out of the 
 thousands who started on the same road, and were ar 
 rested by one circumstance or another, which threw 
 them back into the ranks of farmers and store-keepers. 
 We shall see that Andrew Jackson so fell back into the 
 position of a farmer and store-keeper. Chance plays a 
 great role in a new community, just as it does in a primi 
 tive civilization. Jhance had V3ry much to do with 
 fackson s career. We have no evidence that he was 
 dissatisfied with his circumstances, and set himself to 
 
JACKSON GOES TO TENNESSEE. 5 
 
 work to get out of them, or that he had any strong am 
 bition towards which the law was a step. There is no 
 proof that he ever was an ambitious man ; but rather 
 the contrary. He never learned any law, and never to 
 the end of his life had a legal tone of mind ; even his 
 admirer, Kendall, admits this. 1 His study of law had 
 no influence on his career, and no significance for his 
 character, except that it shows him following the set or 
 fashion of the better class of young men of his gener 
 ation. If conjecture may be allowed, it is most probable 
 that he did not get on well with his relatives, and that 
 he disliked the drudgery of farming or saddle-making. 
 A journey which he made to Charleston offers a very 
 possible chance for him to have had his mind opened 
 to plans and ideas. 
 
 In 1788, Jackson s friend, John McNairy, was ap 
 pointed judge of the Superior Court of the Western 
 District of North Carolina (I. e., Tennessee), and Jack- 
 son was appointed public prosecutor. Jackson arrived 
 in Nashville in October, 1788. Tennessee was then a 
 wild frontier country, in which the Whites and Indians 
 were engaged in constant hostilities. It was shut off 
 from connection with the Atlantic States by the mount 
 ains, and its best connection with civilization was down 
 the Ohio and Mississippi rivers. Such frontier com 
 munities have always had a peculiar character. In 
 them the white man has conformed, in no small degree, 
 to the habits and occupations of the Indians. Cut off 
 from tools, furniture, clothing, and other manufactured 
 articles such as civilized men use, he has been driven to 
 such substitutes as he could produce by bringing hit 
 ntelligence to bear on the processes and materials 
 1 Jackson, 109. 
 
6 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 by the Indians. Living where game is abundant, and 
 where the forests make agriculture difficult, he has often 
 sunk hack to the verge of the hunting stage of civili 
 zation. 1 The pioneers, so much lauded in song and 
 story, were men who first broke the path into the wil 
 derness, but who derogated from the status of their race 
 to do it. They became incapacitated for the steady 
 labor of civilized industry, and when the country became 
 BO filled up that game was scarce, agriculture a necessity, 
 and " law " began to be recognized and employed, the 
 pioneers moved on into the wilderness. In their habits 
 they were idle and thriftless, and almost always too 
 fond of strong drink. The class of settlers who suc 
 ceeded them were but little better in their habits, al 
 though they began to clear the forests and till the soil. 
 They were always very litigious. Court day was an 
 occasion which drew the men to the county town, form 
 ing an event in a monotonous existence, and offering 
 society to people oppressed by isolated life. This con 
 course of people furnished occasion for gossip and news- 
 mongering, and the discussion of everybody s affairs for 
 miles around. " Public opinion " took control of every 
 thing. Local quarrels involved the whole county sooner 
 or later. Friendships, alliances, feuds, and animosities 
 grew up and were intensified in such a state of society. 
 If there was an election pending the same concourse of 
 oeople furnished an opportunity for speech-making and 
 argument. The institution of "stump-speaking" was 
 born and developed in these circumstances. In the 
 *ourt itself the parties to the suits and the jury enjoyed 
 % place before the public eye. The judge and the counsel 
 
 * See Collins s Kentucky, Pntoam s M^idk Tennetsee, an< 
 Kendall s Jackson. 74. 
 
FRONTIER SOCIETY. 7 
 
 made reputation day by day. The lawyers, as actual 
 or prospective candidates for office, were directly and 
 constantly winning strength with the electors. They 
 passed from the bar to the stump or the tavern parlor, 
 and employed the influence which their eloquence had 
 won in the court room to advance the interests which 
 they favored in the election. There are features of 
 American democracy which are inexplicable unless one 
 understands this frontier society. Some of our greatest 
 political abuses have come from transferring to our now 
 large and crowded cities maxims and usages which were 
 convenient and harmless in backwoods county towns. 
 
 Another feature of the frontier society which it is 
 important to notice is, that in it the lack of capital and 
 the intimacy of personal relations led to great abuses 
 of credit. Idleness, drink, debt, and quarrels produced 
 by gossip have been the curses of such society. The 
 courts and the lawyers were always busy with the per 
 sonal collisions which arose where no one was allowed 
 to practise any personal reserve, where each one s busi 
 ness was everybody s business, where gossip never rested, 
 and where each one was in debt to some others. 
 
 In such a state of society the public prosecutor is the 
 general of the advancing army of civilization. He has 
 to try to introduce law and order, the fulfilment of con 
 tracts, and the recognition of rights into the infant so 
 ciety. This was the task which Jackson undertook in 
 Tennessee. It required nerve and vigor. The westerr 
 counties of North Carolina were in a state of anarchy 
 resulting from the attempt to set up the state of Frank 
 dn, and the population were so turbulent and lawless 
 that the representative of legal order was at open w;u 
 tfith them. The Indians and Whites were also engaged 
 
6 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 in the final struggle of the former before yielding theii 
 hunting-grounds to the cultivation of the white man. 
 Jackson had to travel up and down the country in the 
 discharge of his duties, when he was in danger of his 
 life upon the road. He brought all the required force 
 and virtue to the discharge of the duties of this office. 
 He pursued his way without fear and without relenting. 
 He made strong enemies, and he won strong friends. 
 Kendall says that Jackson settled at Nashville, because 
 the debtors there tried to drive him away, he having 
 taken some collection cases. 1 His merits as prosecutor 9 
 are vouched for by the fact that Governor Blount said 
 of him, in reference to certain intruders on Indian lands 
 who were giving trouble, "Let the District Attorney, 
 Mr. Jackson, be informed. He will be certain to do 
 his duty, and the offenders will be punished." 8 
 
 Among the earlier settlers of Tennessee was John 
 Donelson, who had been killed by the Indians before 
 Jackson migrated to Tennessee. 4 Jackson boarded with 
 the widow Donelson. In the family there were also 
 Mrs. Donelson s daughter, Rachel, and the latter s hus 
 band, Lewis Robards. Robards, who seems to have 
 been of a violent and jealous disposition, had made in 
 jurious charges against his wife with reference to other 
 persons, and he now made such charges witli reference 
 to Jackson. Robards had been married in Kentucky 
 k older Virginia law. There was no law of divorce ID 
 Virginia. Robards, in 1791, petitioned the Legislature 
 
 1 Kendall s Jackson, 90. 
 
 2 He was appointed district atto>iey bj Washington in 179" 
 tfter the western counties of North Carolina were ceded. 
 
 * Putnam, 351. 
 Putnam, 613 fg. 
 
JACKSON S MARRIAGE. 9 
 
 of Virginia to pass an act of divorce in his favor, mak 
 ing an affidavit that his wife had deserted him, and wa. 
 living in adultery with Jackson. The Legislature of Vir 
 ginia passed an act authorizing the Supreme Court of 
 Kentucky to try the case with a jury, and, if the facts 
 proved to be as alleged, to grant a divorce. Robards 
 took no action for two years. September 27, 1793, he 
 obtained a divorce from the Court of Quarter Sessions of 
 Mercer County, Kentucky. In the mean time, Jackson 
 and Mrs. Robards, upon information of the legislative act 
 of 1791, which they assumed, or were informed, to be 
 an act of divorce, were married at Natchez, in July or 
 August, 1791. In January, 1794, upon hearing of the 
 action of the Mercer County Court, they were married 
 again. 1 The circumstances of this marriage were such 
 as to provoke scandal at the time, and the scandal, 
 which in the case of a more obscure man would have 
 died out during thirty years of honorable wedlock, came 
 up over and over again during Jackson s career. It 
 is plain that Jackson himself was to blame for contract 
 ing a marriage under ambiguous circumstances, and 
 for not protecting his own wife s honor by proper pre 
 cautions, such as finding out the exact terms of the act 
 of the Legislature of Virginia. He clung to this lady 
 until her death, with rare single-mindedness and devo 
 tion, although she was not at all fitted to share the des 
 tiny which befell him. He cherished her memory until 
 his own death in a fashion of high romance. An im 
 putation upon her, or a reflection upon the regularity of 
 us marriage, always incensed nim more than any other 
 personal attack. Having put her in a false position, 
 
 1 Telegraph Extra, p. 33. Report of a Jackson committee ii 
 328. 
 
10 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 against which, as man and lawyer, he should have pro 
 tected her, he was afterward led by his education and 
 the current ways of thinking in the society about him 
 to try to heal the defects in his marriage certificate by 
 shooting any man who dared to state the truth, that 
 said certificate was irregular. 
 
 Jackson was a member of the convention which met 
 at Knoxville, January 11, 1796, and framed a Constitu 
 tion for the State of Tennessee. There is a tradition 
 that he proposed the name of the river as the name of 
 the State. 1 This Constitution established a freehold 
 qualification for voting and holding the chief offices, and 
 declared that the people of Tennessee had an inalien 
 able right to navigate the Mississippi river to its mouth, 
 The federalists in Congress opposed the admission of 
 Tennessee, because it was a raw frontier community ; 
 but it was admitted June 1, 1796. In the autumn Jack 
 son was elected the first federal representative. A year 
 later, Blount, one of the senators from Tennessee, hav 
 ing been expelled, Jackson was appointed senator in his 
 place. He held this position only until April, 1798, 
 when he resigned. 
 
 In December, 1796, therefore, at the age of thirty, 
 ackson first came in contact with a society as cultivated 
 as that of Philadelphia then was. Except for the brief 
 visit to Charleston in 1783, above referred to, he had 
 seen no society but that of Western North Carolina and 
 Tennessee. He came to Philadelphia just as the presi 
 dential election of 1796 was being decided. Tennessee 
 roted for Jefferson, and we may believe that whatever 
 political notions Jackson had were Jeffersonian. He 
 identified himself with the opposition to Washington l 
 1 Ramsey, 655. 
 
IN CONGRESS. 11 
 
 administration in the most factious and malicious act 
 which it perpetrated, namely, the vote against the ad 
 dress to Washington at the close of his administration. 
 He and Edward Livingston were two out of twelve in 
 the House who refused to vote for the address. It is 
 not known what Jackson s reasons were. Some refused 
 to vote that Washington s administration had been wise. 
 Others objected to the hope that Washington s example 
 would guide his successors. 1 The grounds of objection 
 to the administration were Jay s treaty and Hamilton s 
 financial measures. In the light of history the " irrec 
 oncilable" minority which opposed these measures to 
 the bitter end must stand condemned. The republican 
 party, in 1796, was filled with ill-informed and ill-regu 
 lated sympathy for the French Revolutionists, and, if it 
 could have had its way, it would, under the lead of ref 
 ugee editors filled with rancor and ignorant zeal, have 
 committed this country to close relations with France, 
 and would, by importing Jacobinism into this country, 
 have overthrown constitutional liberty here. The feder 
 alists, on the other hand, fell into a panic about sedition 
 and sans-culottism quite similar to that which prevailed 
 in England at the same time. Washington s adminis 
 tration had the hard task of maintaining statesman-like 
 steadiness and wisdom between these two tendencies, 
 and of establishing sound precedents for the details of 
 the government under the Constitution. It succeeded 
 BO well in this task that the wider the perspective of 
 history in which it is regarded the more clearly does the 
 
 1 In 1830 Livingston attempted an elaborate defence of hia 
 rote. He tried to distinguish between. Washington and his ad 
 ministration, a vicious anil untenable distinction Hunt s Ltv 
 340. 
 
12 ANDJtEW JACKSON. 
 
 moderation, wisdom, and statesmanship of that admiiiia 
 tration appear. Jay s treaty was a masterpiece of di 
 plomacy, considering the time and the circumstances of 
 this country. Those who objected to it could propose 
 nothing but a policy of bluster, which the country was 
 not prepared to follow up, or the imbecile device of a 
 commercial war. Jefferson, in 1806, had a renewal of 
 this treaty offered to him. He took the opposite course 
 from that which Washington had taken : he rejected it. 
 He tried the commercial war ; adopting legislation as 
 tyrannical as any that ever stained a statute-book in the 
 effort to carry it out, subjecting the Union to the sever 
 est strain, accomplishing nothing, and finally leading to 
 a fruitless war. 
 
 As for Hamilton s funding scheme, few will now be 
 found, whether lawyers, statesmen, or financiers, to ques 
 tion its propriety or the ingenuity and skill with which 
 it was carried out. His bank is open to more question. 
 He and the other federalists had too much of a feeling 
 that they must invent artificial bonds and clamps to hold 
 the Union together. They did not sufficiently perceive 
 that the Union must consolidate itself in time by the ex 
 perience which the people would win of its inestimable 
 value and political necessity. Public credit and Union, 
 however, were then, as they always have been, insepa 
 rably bound up with each other. The history of the 
 old bank is so obscure that it is difficult to form a judg 
 ment about it. In making any attempt to do so, it is 
 necessary to bear in mind the fact that the currencies of 
 Europe were nearly all confused and depreciated during 
 the existence of this bank, and that this fact acted as 
 protection to save the Bank of the United States froir 
 ;he ordinary penalties of a certain measure of bad bank 
 
EARL 1 POLITICAL OPINIONS. IS 
 
 fog. It is certain that there was a great deal of job 
 bing in the shares of the bank when it was first founded, 
 and it very probably over-issued its notes. It did not 
 publish statements of its affairs. After 1793 the risks 
 of neutral commerce and its gains were both very great 
 American merchants made and lost fortunes by violat 
 ing belligerent regulations. In 1797 and 1798 these 
 transactions culminated in a crisis and commercial panic 
 here, connected, to judge from all the information we 
 can obtain, with the crisis of 1797 and the bank re 
 striction in England. All this trouble was charged, 
 without further discussion, to the bank. Every time 
 since the formation of the Union, when the strain on the 
 national finances has been great, we have been forced 
 to have recourse to national banks ; 1781, 1792, 1816, 
 1863. 
 
 History has not, therefore, justified the position on 
 these great political questions taken by the party with 
 which Jackson allied himself while he was in the na 
 tional legislature. 
 
 In the Senate, Jackson voted, with only two others, 
 against a bill to authorize the President to buy or lease 
 cannon foundries, in view of possible war with France. 
 He voted against a bill to authorize the arming of mer 
 chant ships, in favor of an embargo, and against a pro 
 viso that the United States should not be bound to 
 cancel the Indian title to land on behalf of any State. 1 
 
 We know nothing of any activity or inter 3st shown 
 by Jackson in any measure save a claim of Hugh L. 
 White, an 1 an act to reimburse Tennessee for expenses 
 incurred in an Indian war. TLd latter case was one 
 hich has been constantly renewed in the frontier States. 
 1 Annals of Congress; 5th Congre3S, I. 485-532 
 
14 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 Tennessee thought that the federal government was slo\i 
 iind negligent about defending her against the Indians. 
 The federal government thought that Tennessee was 
 hasty and aggressive towards the Indians. Jackson 
 gained this point on the claim of Tennessee while he 
 was in the House, to the great advantage of his popu 
 larity at home. 
 
 We must infer from his conduct that he did not enjoy 
 political life and did not care for it. He certainly did 
 not become engaged in it at all, and he formed no ties 
 which he found it hard to break at a moment s warn 
 ing. He does not appear to have made much impres 
 sion upon anybody at Philadelphia. Gallatin recalled 
 him years afterwards as " a tall, lank, uncouth-looking 
 personage, with long locks of hair hanging over his 
 face, and a cue down his back tied in an eel-skin ; his 
 dress singular, his manners and deportment that of a 
 rough backwoodsman." 1 There is, however, ample tes 
 timony that Jackson, later in life, was distinguished and 
 elegant in his bearing when he did not affect roughness 
 and inelegance, and that he was able to command enco 
 miums upon his manners from the best bred ladies in 
 the country. Jefferson said of him, in 1824 : " When I 
 was President of the Senate he was a senator, and he 
 could never speak on account of the rashness of his feel 
 ings. I have seen him attempt it repeatedly, and as 
 often choke with rage." 2 
 
 Ir 1798 Jackson was made judge of the Supreme 
 Court of Tennessee. Nothing is known of his conduct 
 in this position. No records or decisions of the cour"" 
 from that period remain. 
 
 1 4 Ilildreth, 692. 
 
 2 1 Webster s Corr. 371. 
 
MAJOR-GENERAL OF MILITIA. 16 
 
 While Jackson was on the bench of the Supreme 
 Court, he and ex-Governor Sevier were in feud with each 
 other. The origin of the quarrel is obscure and not 
 worth picking out from the contradictory backwoods 
 gossip in which it probably originated. It is enough to 
 notice that the two men were too much alike in temper 
 to be pleased with each other. Sevier was fifty-seven 
 years old in 1801, and had been a leading man in the 
 country for years. Jackson was only thirty-four in that 
 year, and a rising man, whose success interfered with 
 Sevier s plans for himself. In 1801 the field officers of 
 the militia triecf to elect a major-general. Sevier and 
 Jackson were the candidates. The election resulted in 
 a tie. The governor, Archibald Roane, who had the 
 casting vote, threw it for Jackson. Jackson had not 
 taken part in the Nickajack expedition, or otherwise 
 done military service, so far as is known, except as a 
 private in an Indian fight in 1789. On that occasion 
 one of his comrades described him as "bold, dashing, 
 fearless, and mad upon his enemies." 1 In 1803 Sevier 
 was elected governor, and he and the judge-major- 
 general drew their weapons on each other when they 
 met. Each had his faction of adherents, and it was 
 only by the strenuous efforts of these persons that they 
 were prevented from doing violence to each other. Ken 
 dall says that Jackson s popularity was increased by his 
 quarrel with Sevier. 2 In 1804 Jackson resigned his 
 position as judge. Parton gives letters of Jackson from 
 this period which are astonishingly illiterate for a man 
 in his position, even when all the circumstances are 
 taken into consideration. Jackson was made a truste 
 rf the Nashville Academy in 1793. 8 
 
 Putnam, 318. 2 Kendall s Jackson, 108. 
 
 Putnam, 410. 
 
ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 In 1804 Jackson was once more a private citizen, a 
 planter, and a store-keeper. Neither politics nor law had 
 apparently touched any chord of interest in him. The 
 turning point in his career was the vote which made 
 him major-general of militia, but the time had not yet 
 arrived for him to show that all there was in him could 
 be aroused when there were public enemies to be crushed. 
 He had been engaged in trade for six years or more 
 before 1804, and was now embarrassed. He devoted 
 himself to business for several years. 
 
 Mention has already been made of the general abuse 
 of credit in the frontier communities. * Money is scarce 
 because capital is scarce, and is so much needed that 
 the community is unwilling to employ any of it in secur 
 ing a value currency. It is true that the people always 
 have to pay for a value currency, whether they get it or 
 not, but they always cheat themselves with the notion 
 that cheap money is cheap. Food and fuel are abun 
 dant, but everything else is scarce and hard to get, 
 Hopes are strong and expectations are great. Each 
 man gives his note, which is a draft on the glorious 
 future ; that is, every man makes his own currency a* 
 he wants it, and the freedom with which he draws hia 
 drafts is as unlimited as his own sanguine hopes. The 
 hopes are not unfounded, but their fruition if often de 
 layed. Continued renewals become necessary, and liqu 
 dation is put off until no man knows where he stands. 
 A general liquidation, with a period of reaction and 
 stagnation, therefore, ensues upon any shock to credit. 
 hi Tennessee, between 1790 and 1798, land was used as 
 a kind of currency ; prices were set in it, and it was 
 transferred in payment for goods and services. During 
 the same period there was a great speculation in ne^i 
 
FRONTIER CODE. 17 
 
 land throughout the country. Prices of land were in 
 flated, and. extravagant notions of the value of raw land 
 prevailed. 1 After the crisis of 1798 land fell in value all 
 over the country, to the ruin of thousands of speculators. 
 Values measured in land all collapsed at the same time. 
 Jackson was entangled in the system of credit and 
 land investments, bat he seems to have worked out of 
 his embarrassments during the next three or four years, 
 after which he abandoned trade and became a planter 
 only. 
 
 Another feature of this early southwestern frontier 
 society which excites the surprise and contempt of the 
 modern reader is, that store-keepers and farmers and 
 lawyers, who lived by their labor, and had wives and 
 children dependent on them, are found constantly quar 
 relling, and in all their quarrels are found mouthing the 
 " code of honor." The earlier backwoodsmen quarrelled 
 and fought as above described, but they fought with fists 
 and knives, on the spur of the moment, as the quarrel 
 arose. It was a genteel step in advance, and marked 
 a new phase of society, when the code of the pistol came 
 into use, and the new higher social caste prided itself 
 not a little on being " gentlemen," because they kept up 
 in the backwoods a caricature drawn by tradition and 
 hearsay from the manners of the swaggerers about the 
 courts of France and England a century before. An 
 drew Jackson was a child of this society, an adherent 
 of its doctrines, and in his trim i propagandist and ex 
 pounder of them. He proved himself a quarrelsome 
 man. Instead of making peace he exhausted all the 
 chances of conflict which offered themselves. He was 
 remarlcably genial and gentle when things Tent on to 
 
 * On the fallacies about the value of land, see p. 1 
 2 
 
18 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 tu.it him, and when he was satisfied with his companions. 
 He was very chivalrous about taking up the cause ol 
 any one who was unjustly treated and was dependent. 
 Yet he was combative and pugnacious and over-ready 
 to adjust himself for a hostile collision whenever there 
 was any real or fancied occasion. The society in which 
 he lived developed, by its fashions, some of his natural 
 faults. 
 
 In 1795 he fought a duel with a fellow lawyer named 
 Avery, over some sparring which had taken place be 
 tween them in a court room, when they were opposing 
 counsel. His quarrel with Sevier has been mentioned. 
 While on the bench he also quarrelled with his old friend 
 Judge McNairy, on account of an appointment made by 
 the judge which injured an old friend of both. 1 In 
 1806 he fought a duel with Charles Dickinson, who had 
 spoken disparagingly of Mrs. Jackson in the course of 
 a long quarrel which involved, besides Jackson, three 
 or four others, and which was a capital specimen of the 
 quarrels stirred up by the gossip and backbiting of men 
 who had too much leisure. This was the real cause of 
 Jackson s anger, although on the surface the quarrel 
 was about a strained and artificial question of veracity 
 concerning a bet on a horse-race, and it was inflamed 
 by some sarcastic letter-writing in the local newspaper, 
 and by some insulting epithets. Jackson s friends de 
 clared that there was a plot to drive Jackson out of the 
 country. Each man meant to kill the other. They 
 met May 30, 1806. Jackson was wounded by a bullet 
 tvhich grazed his breast and weakened him for lifa 
 Dickinson was mortally wounded, and died the sam* 
 
 Kendall s Jackson. 
 
WESTERN FEELING ABOUT LOUISIANA. 39 
 
 Jackson had made the acquaintance of Burr when in 
 Congress. In 1805 Burr visited Jackson, and made a 
 contract with him for boats for the expedition down the 
 Mississippi. The people of Kentucky and Tennessee 
 had always regarded it as a vital interest of theirs to 
 have the free navigation of the Mississippi. 80 long as 
 a foreign power held the mouth of the river, plots were 
 formed for separating the trans- All eghany country from 
 the Atlartic States, the strength of which plots lay in the 
 fact that the tie of interest which made the basis of a 
 union with the holder of New Orleans was stronger than 
 the tie of interest which united the two sides of the 
 Alleghanies. In 1795 the United States by treaty with 
 Spain secured a right of deposit at New Orleans for 
 three years, and these separation plots lost all theii 
 strength. The " Annual Register " for 1796 (anti-fed 
 eralist) very pertinently pointed out to the Western 
 people the advantages they enjoyed from the Union. 
 " If they had been formed into an independent republic, 
 the court of Madrid would have scorned to grant such 
 a free navigation " l (i. e., as it granted in the treaty of 
 1795). Spain ceded Louisiana to France by the secret 
 treaty of St. Ildefonso, October 1, 1800. This treaty 
 >ecame known in 1802 after the peace of Amiens. In 
 the same year Spain, which still held possession of 
 Louisiana, withdrew the right of deposit, and the West 
 ern country was thrown into great excitement. In 1803 
 the whole matter of the navigation of the Mississippi 
 was settled by the purchase of Louisiana by the United 
 States, but then a new set of questions was opened. In 
 the treaty of 1795 Spain had acknowledged the parallel 
 of 31 as the boundary of Florida from the Mississippi 
 l Ann. Reg. (1796) p. 83. 
 
20 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 to the Chattalioochee, although she had been slow about 
 surrendering posts held by her north of this line and 
 east of the Mississippi. Hence there had been com 
 plaints and bad feeling. Now a new question arose aa 
 to how far Louisiana extended east of the Mississippi 
 river, and this question was of great importance to the 
 Gulf territories, because if, by the Louisiana purchase, 
 the United States had become owner of the territory east 
 as far as the Perdido, then the Gulf coast with the valu 
 able harbor of Mobile was available for the whole South 
 west. Spain denied that Louisiana included anything 
 east of the Mississippi except the city of New Orleans, 
 and the bit of territory south and west of the Iberville 
 and the two lakes. 1 The territory remained in dispute, 
 and the relations between the two countries continued to 
 be bad, until Florida was purchased in 1819. In 1802 
 a treaty was made with Spain for the payment by her 
 of claims held by American citizens, but Spain did not 
 ratify the treaty until 1818. She had her grievances 
 alao, at first about Miranda s expedition, and afterwards 
 about aid to her revolted colonies. In 1810 the Presi 
 dent ordered the Governor of Orleans to occupy the 
 territory as far as the Perdido, and to hold it in peace 
 and order, subject to the final decision of the pending 
 controversy with Spain. In 1812, Congress, by two 
 acts, divided the country east as far as the Perdido into 
 two parts, and added one part to Louisiana, which was 
 admitted as a State, and the other part to the Missis- 
 <ippi territory. 
 
 It has seemed convenient to pursue these proceedings 
 dp to this point, because future reference to them wiL 
 
 1 See the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States 
 a Foster v. Neilson, 2 Teters, 253. 
 
BURR S SCHEMES. 21 
 
 be necessary. To re-turn now to Burr and liis expe 
 dition : It will be understood what were the relations 
 of the United States to Spain in 1805 and 1806, and 
 especially what part of those relations peculiarly affected 
 the people of the Southwest at that time. Their col 
 lisions with Spain no longer concerned New Orleans, 
 but West Florida and Mobile. It is still a mystery 
 what Burr really intended. Napoleon s career had fired 
 the imagination of men of a military and romantic turn 
 all over the world. It is quite as reasonable an expla 
 nation of Burr s scheme as any other that he was re 
 serving all his chances, and meant to do much or little, 
 according to the turn of events, and that he did not 
 himself define to himself what he was aiming at. His 
 project had an unmistakable kinship with the old plans 
 for setting up a republic of the Mississippi, with its 
 capital at New Orleans. For that, however, he was ten 
 years too late. If he had intended to go on a filibus 
 tering expedition against the Spaniards in Mexico, he 
 would have obtained secret aid and sympathy in Ken 
 tucky and Tennessee, and the aid which he did get was 
 given under that belief. 1 If his scheme was aimed in 
 any manner against the United States he could not find 
 any aid for it. Since the purchase of Louisiana, and 
 the accession to power in the Union of the party to 
 which the great majority of the Western people be 
 longed, there was no feeling for Burr to work on. 2 
 
 In 1805 Burr found a cordial welcome and aid. He 
 was evidently trying to use Jackson without startling 
 him. His letter of March 24. 1806, which Parton 
 gives, 8 is a very crafty letter, for the purpose of engag 
 
 1 2 Amer. Reg. ( 80/) 103, note. 
 
 2 Cf. Jefferson s Message of January 22, 1807. 
 8 1 Parton, 313. 
 
2 ANDREW JACKSUll. 
 
 ing Jackson s name and influence to raise troops for 
 his enterprise without defining it. In 1806 Burr was 
 ugain in Nashville. His proceedings then aroused sus 
 picion. It appears that Jackson was mystified. He did 
 not know whether he ought to aid Burr or oppose him, 
 or aid him secretly and oppose him openly. It seems 
 to be very clear, however, that he took sides against 
 Burr, if Burr was against the United States. January 
 15th he wrote to Campbell, member of the House of 
 Representatives, and gave November as the time when 
 he first heard of a plan to seize New Orleans, conquer 
 Mexico, carry away the Western States, and set up a 
 great empire. 1 He says that he was indignant at being 
 the dupe of such an enterprise, and that he called Burr 
 to account. Burr denounced and ridiculed the notion 
 that he intended anything hostile to the United States. 3 
 He claimed to have the secret countenance of the Sec 
 retary of War. It seems that Jackson must have been 
 convinced afterwards that Burr had been calumniated 
 and unjustly treated. He was at Richmond as a witness 
 in Burr s trial. He there made a public speech against 
 Jefferson. Jackson had previously been ill-disposed to 
 wards Jefferson because Jofferson did not give him the 
 >ince of Governor ol Orleans, for which he had applied. 
 Jackson s strong personal contempt and dislike for Gen 
 eral Wilkinson, the commander at New Orleans, who 
 appeared as Burr s accuser, also influenced his judg 
 ment. 8 Throughout his life he was unable to form a 
 
 1 Telegraph Extra, 481 fg. 
 
 2 When Burr was arrested in Kentucky he g;ive his wo** 4 o. 
 honor to his counsel that he intended nothing against the United 
 States. ( Kendall s Jackson, 120.) 
 
 3 His hatred of Wilkinson was greatly strengthened after 
 wards, but he shows it, and the influence of it, in hi* letter u 
 Oampboll. 
 
BILA8 DINSMORE. 23 
 
 anbiassed opinion on a question of fact or law, if he 
 dad any personal relations of friendship or enmity with 
 the parties. 1 
 
 From 1806 to 1811 Jackson appears to have led the 
 life of a planter without any noticeable incident. The 
 next we hear of him, however, he is committing another 
 act of violence. Silas Dinsmore, the Indian agent, re 
 fused to allow persons to pass through the Indian coun 
 try with negroes unless they had passports for the ne 
 groes. It was his duty by law to enforce this rule. 
 There were complaints that negroes ran away or were 
 stolen. His regulation, however, interfered with the 
 trade in negroes. This trade was then regarded as dis 
 honorable. It has been charged that Jackson was en 
 gaged in it, and the facts very easily bear that color. 
 He passed through the Indian country with some ne 
 groes without hindrance, because Dinsmore was away, 
 but he took up the quarrel with the agent, and wrote to 
 Campbell to tell the Secretary of War that, if Dinsmore 
 was not removed, the people of West Tennessee would 
 burn him in his own agency. There is a great deal of 
 fire in the letter, and not a little about liberty and free 
 government. 2 Dinsmore was suspended, an! things took 
 -uch a turn that he lost his position and was reduced to 
 poverty. Parton gives a story of an attempt by Dins- 
 more, eight years later, to conciliate Jackson. This at 
 tempt was dignified, yet courteous and becoming. Jack 
 son repelled it in a very brutal and low-bred manner, 
 Dinsmore did not know until 1828, when he was a pe 
 titioner at Washington, and the papers were called for 
 Uiat Jackson had been the cause of his ruin. 8 
 
 1 On Burr, see 2 Pickett, cnao. xxix. 
 
 * ** Niles. 110. 8 Adama, 61 
 
24 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 The time was now at hand, however, when Andrew 
 Jackson would have a chance to show how he could 
 serve his country. At the age of forty-five he had com 
 menced no career. He was a prominent man in his 
 State, but he had held no political offices in it, and had 
 not, so far as we know, been active in any kind of pub 
 lic affairs, although we infer that he had discharged all 
 his duties as general of militia. He had shown himself 
 a faitlif ul friend and an implacable enemy. Every man 
 who has this character is self-centred. He need not 
 be vain or conceited. Jackson was not vain or con 
 ceited. He never showed any marked selfishness. He 
 had a great deal of amour propre. All things which 
 interested him at all took on some relation to his person, 
 and he engaged his personality in everything which in 
 terested him. An opinion or a prejudice became at 
 once for him a personal right and interest. To approve 
 it and further it was to win his gratitude and friend 
 ship. To refute or oppose it was to excite his animos 
 ity. There was an intensity and vigor about him which 
 bhowed lack of training. His character had never been 
 cultivated by the precepts and discipline of home, or by 
 the discipline of a strict and close society, in which 
 extravagances of behavior and excess of amour propre 
 are promptly and severely restrained by harsh social 
 penalties. There is, to be sure, a popular philosophy 
 that home breeding and culture are of no importance. 
 The fact, however, is not to be gainsaid that true honor, 
 truthfulness, suppression of undue personal feeling, self 
 control, and courtesy are inculcated best, if not exclu 
 sively, by the constant precept and example, in earlies* 
 rhildhood, of high-bred parents and relatives. There 
 b nothing on earth which it costs more labor to produce 
 
STRONG PERSONAL FEELING. 25 
 
 lhan a high-bred man. It is also indisputable that home 
 discipline and training ingrain into the character of 
 men the most solid and valuable elements, and that, 
 without such training, more civilization means better 
 food and clothes rather than better men. It is charac 
 teristic of barbarians to put their personality always at 
 stake, and not to distinguish the man who disputes their 
 notions from the man who violates their rights. It is 
 possible, however, that the military virtues may flourish 
 where moral and social training are lacking. Jackson 
 was unfortunate in that the force of his will and the en 
 ergy of his executive powers had never been disciplined, 
 but the outbreak of the second war with England af 
 Corded him an arena on which his faults became riff* 
 
CHAFPER H. 
 
 THE CREEK WAR AXD THE WAR WITH ENGLAND. 
 
 IN no place in the world was Napoleon more ardently 
 admired than in the new States of this country. The 
 popular enthusiasm about him in those States lasted 
 long after lie was rated much more nearly at his true 
 value everywhere else in the world. The second war 
 with England was brought on by the policy, the opin 
 ions, and the feelings of the South and West, repre 
 sented by a young and radical element in the Jeffer- 
 sonian party. The opinion in the South and West, 
 in 1811 and 1812, was that Napoleon was about to 
 unite the Continent for an attack on England, in which 
 he was sure to succeed, and that he would thus become 
 master of Europe and the world. It was thought that 
 it would be well to be in at the death on his side. It is 
 not necessary to point out in any detail the grounds for 
 this opinion which might have been put forward at that 
 time, or to show the partial and distorted information 
 on which it was founded. It is certain that the persons 
 who held this notion were very ill-informed on Euro 
 pean politics, and their opinions were strongly biassed 
 by party conflicts at home. For twenty years the do 
 mestic politics of the United States had been organized 
 on sympathy with one or the other of the belligerent 
 parties in Europe. This country was weak in a military 
 point of view, but commercially it would have been a 
 
JEFFERSOWS POLICY. 27 
 
 great advantage to either belligerent to have free inter 
 course with the United States, and to keep his enemy 
 from it. The English policy towards the United States 
 was arrogant and insolent. That of France was marked 
 by duplicity and chicanery. Party spirit here took pos 
 session of the people to such an extent that the federal 
 ists made apology for any injury from England, no mat 
 ter how insolent, and the democrats could not see any 
 wrong in the acts of Napoleon, in spite of the evident 
 fact that he was using this country for his own selfish 
 purposes while cajoling it with shameless lies. The 
 course of the weak neutral between two such belligerents 
 was very difficult. 
 
 Washington succeeded in maintaining neutrality by 
 Jay s treaty, but at the cost of bitter hostility at home. 
 Adams was driven to the verge of war with France by 
 his party, but succeeded in averting war, although his 
 party was destroyed by the reaction. Jefferson cannot 
 be said to have had any plan. The statesmen of his 
 party tried to act on the belligerents by destructive 
 measures against domestic commerce and industry, chas 
 tising ourselves, as Plumer said, with scorpions, in order 
 to beat the enemy with whips. They tried one measure 
 after another. No measure had a rational origin or 
 effect calculated and adjusted to the circumstances of 
 he case. Each was a new blunder. The republican 
 "ilers in France in 1792 could do nothing better for a 
 man who claimed protection from the Jacobin mobs 
 than to put him in prison, so that the mob could not get 
 at him. Jefferson s embargo offered the same kind of 
 protection to American shipping. Before the embargo, 
 merchants and ship-owners went to sea at great risk of 
 capture and destruction ; after it, they stayed at home 
 
28 ANDREW 
 
 and were sure of ruin. Jefferson has remained a popu 
 lar idol, and has never been held to the responsibility 
 which belonged to him for his measures. The alien and 
 sedition laws were not nearly so unjust and tyrannical * 
 as the laws for enforcing the embargo, and they did not 
 touch one man where the embargo laws touched hun 
 dreds. The commercial war was a device which, if it 
 had been sensible and practical, would have attained 
 national ends by sacrificing one group of interests and 
 laying a much inferior burden on others. New England 
 was denounced for want of patriotism because it re 
 sisted the use of its interests for national purposes, but 
 as soon as the secondary effects of the embargo on agri 
 culture began to be felt, the agricultural States raised 
 a cry which overthrew the device. Yet criticisms which 
 are justified by the most conclusive testimony of history 
 fall harmlessly from Jefferson s armor of popular plati 
 tudes and democratic sentiments. He showed the traits 
 which we call womanish. He took counsel of his feel 
 ings and imagination ; he planned measures like the 
 embargo, whose scope and effect he did not understand. 
 He was fiery when deciding initiatory steps, like the re 
 jection of the English treaty ; vacillating and timid 
 when he had to adopt measures for going forward in 
 the path which he had chosen. His diplomacy, besides 
 being open to the charge that it was irregular and un 
 usual, was transparent and easily turned to ridicule. It 
 was a diplomacy without lines of reserve or alternatives, 
 BO that, in a certain very possible contingency it had no 
 coarse open to it. Jefferson finally dropped the reins of 
 government in despair, and, on a theory which would 
 
 1 See Carey s Olive Branch, page 50, for the opinion of a dem 
 ocrat on these laws after party spirit had cooled down. 
 
CAUSES OF THE SECOND WAR. 29 
 
 make each presidential term last for three years and 
 eight months, with an interregnum of four months, he 
 Left the task to his successor. He had succeeded in 
 keeping out of war with either belligerent, hut he had 
 Bhaken the Union to its foundations. The extremists in 
 the democratic party now came forward, and began to 
 push Madison into a war with England, as the extreme 
 federalists had pushed Adams into war with France. 
 Madison, therefore, had to inherit the consequences of 
 Jefferson s policy. An adherent of Jefferson describes 
 the bequest as follows : " Jefferson s honest experiment, 
 bequeathed to Madison, to govern without army or 
 navy, and resist foreign enemies without war, proved 
 total failures, more costly than war and much more 
 odious to the people, and dangerous to the Union." 1 
 
 The young and radical democrats, amongst whom 
 Clay was prominent, were restive under the predomi 
 nance of the older generation of democrats of revolu 
 tionary fame, and their favorites. The young democrats 
 wanted to come forward without the patronage of the 
 Virginia leaders. The presidential election of 1812 was 
 the immediate occasion of their action. The Jefferso- 
 nian policy had produced irritation at home and humili 
 ation abroad. The natural consequence was a strong 
 war spirit. It was believed that the country would not 
 eally be engaged in military operations, because Eng- 
 jand would be fully occupied in Europe ; that Canada 
 could be conquered ; that we should cojie in on the win 
 ning side at the catastrophe of the great conflict in 
 Europe ; and that all this would be very popular in the 
 South and West. Madison was compelled greatly against 
 lis will to yield to the war party, as a condition of hii 
 1 Ingersoll, 70 : grammar of the original. 
 
80 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 reelection. 1 England pointed out that Naj/olcon had 
 not complied with the terms of the American demands 
 on both belligerents, but had falsified a date and told a 
 lie. She withdrew her orders in council, and there re 
 mained only impressment as the ostensible cause of war. 
 September 12, 1812, Admiral Warren offered an armis 
 tice. Madison refused it unless the practice of impress 
 ment was suspended. Warren had not power to agree 
 to this. For purposes of redress the war was, therefore, 
 unnecessary, and the United States was duped into it by 
 Napoleon, so far as its avowed causes were concerned. 2 
 
 General Jackson offered his services, with those of 
 2,500 volunteers, as soon as he heard of the declaration 
 of war. January 7, 1813, he set out under orders for 
 New Orleans, an attack on that place being regarded as 
 a probable movement of the enemy. Jackson threw 
 himself into the business with all his might, and at once 
 displayed activity, vigilance, and skill. His letter to the 
 Secretary of War when he started shows with what en 
 thusiasm he set to work. He assured the Secretary 
 that his men had no " constitutional scruples," but 
 would, if so directed, plant the American eagle on the 
 walls of Mobile, Pensacola, and St. Augustine. In 
 March he was at Natchez engaged in organizing his 
 force, and waiting for orders. While there he had a 
 quarrel with General Wilkinson on a question of rank. 
 Thomas H. Benton, who was serving under Jackson, 
 thought Jackson wrong on the point in question. This 
 produced discord between him and Jackson. 
 
 Suddenly Jackson received orders to dismiss hif 
 troops, as it did not appear that the enemy were intend 
 
 1 1 Statesman s Manual. 348. 1 Colton s Clay, 161. 
 See 1 Gallatin s Writings, 517 ; 2 ditto, 196, 211, 499. 
 
QUARREL WITH THE BENTONS. 31 
 
 mg to attack New Orleans. He was, of course, greatly 
 chagrined at this order. He was also enraged at the 
 idea of disbanding his men, without pay or rations, five 
 hundred miles from home, to find their way back as 
 best they could. A subsequent order repaired part of 
 this error by ordering pay and rations, but Jackson hired 
 transportation on his own responsibility, and marched 
 his men home in a body. Thomas H. Benton, in June 
 following, succeeded in obtaining from the federal au 
 thorities reimbursement of the expenses which Jackson 
 had incurred. 
 
 This act of Benton would perhaps have extinguished 
 the memory of the trouble about rank at Natchez, but, 
 in the mean time, Jackson had stood second to another 
 man in a duel with Jesse Benton, brother of Thomas. 
 A feud was speedily created out of this by the gossip 
 and tale-bearing already described. Up to this time 
 Jackson had had as many enemies as friends, but his 
 course in leading home the troops from Natchez had 
 made him very popular, and his conduct in acting as 
 second in the duel, although chivalrous in one point of 
 view, was overbearing in another. He threatened to 
 horsewhip Thomas Benton, and a rencontre between 
 him and the two brothers took place in a tavern at 
 Nashville. Blows and shots were exchanged, and Jack- 
 Bon came away with a ball in his shoulder, which he car 
 ried for twenty years. This affair occurred September 
 4, 1813. 
 
 The great Indian chief Tecumseh had been trying for 
 
 years to unite all the red men against the whites. 1 
 
 There would have been an Indian war if there had 
 
 *eeu no war with England out the latter war 
 
 1 Drake s Tecumseh. 
 
52 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 to be Tecumseh s opportunity. Among the southwest 
 ern Indians he found acceptance only with the Creeks, 
 who were already on the verge of civil war, because 
 Borne wanted to adopt civilized life, and others refused. 
 The latter became the war party, under Weatherford, 
 a very able half-breed chief. The first outbreak in the 
 Southwest, although there had been some earlier hos 
 tilities, was the massacre of the garrison and refugees 
 at Fort Minis, at the junction of the Alabama and Tom- 
 bigbee rivers, August 30, 1813. There were 553 per 
 sons in the fort, of whom only five or six escaped. 2 If 
 Tecumseh had lived, and if the English had been able 
 to give their attention to an alliance with him, he would 
 have united the Indians from the Lakes to the Gulf, 
 and the " young democrats " would have found out what 
 Bort of a business it may be to start a war for party 
 effect. The result of the massacre at Fort Mims was 
 that Alabama was almost abandoned by whites. Terror 
 and desire for revenge took possession of Georgia and 
 Tennessee. September 25th the Tennessee Legislature 
 voted to raise men and money to aid the people of the 
 Mississippi territory against the Creeks. Jackson was 
 still confined to his bed by the wound which Benton had 
 given him. He and Cocke were the two. major-generals 
 of the militia of Tennessee. They concerted measures. 
 As soon as he possibly could, Jackson took the field. 
 Georgia had a force in the field under General Floyd. 
 General Claiborne was acting at the head of troops frorc 
 Louisiana and Mississippi This Indian war had a 
 ocal character and was outside the federal operations 
 J though in the end it had a great effect upon them 
 
 Folio State Papers, 1 Indian Affairs, 845 fg. 
 a 2 Pickett, 266. 
 
ANNOYANCES IN THE FIELD. 33 
 
 Up to this time little had oeen known at Washington oi 
 Jackson, save that he had been a friend of Burr, an 
 enemy of Jefferson, and that he had just acted in a 
 somewhat insuuordinate manner at Natchez, reflecting 
 on the administration and winning popularity for him- 
 Mii 
 
 The Creek war l was remarkable for three things : 
 (1) the quarrels between the generals, and the want of 
 concert of action ; (2) lack of provisions ; (3) insubor 
 dination in the ranks. Partly on account of the lack 
 of provisions, for which he blamed General Cocke (as 
 it appears, unjustly), Jackson fell into a bitter quarrel 
 with his colleague and junior officer. The lack of pro 
 visions, and consequent suffering of the men, was one 
 cause of insubordination in the ranks, but the chief 
 cause was differences as to the term of enlistment. The 
 enlistment was generally for three months, and constant 
 recruiting was necessary to keep up the army in the 
 field. A great deal of nonsense has been written and 
 spoken about pioneer troops. Such troops were always 
 insubordinate 2 and homesick, and very dependent for 
 success on enthusiasm for their leader and a prosperous 
 course of affairs. For these reasons the character of 
 the commander was all-important to such an army. On 
 three occasions Jackson had to use one part of his army 
 to prevent another part from marching home, he and 
 they differing on the construction of the terms of enlist 
 ment. He showed veiy strong qualities under these 
 trying circumstances. He endured delay with irnpa- 
 ience, but with fortitude, and without a suggestion of 
 
 See Eaton s Jackson and ?ickett s Alabama. 
 2 See descriptions of Kentucky militi* in Kendall s Autobiog 
 tophy, 124, 131. 
 
34 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 abandoning tbe enterprise, 1 although lie was in wretched 
 health all the time. He managed his soldiers with en 
 ergy and tact. He understood their dispositions. He 
 knew how to be severe with them without bringing them 
 to open revolt, and he knew how to make the most effi 
 cacious appeals to them. 
 
 In the conduct of the movements against the enemy 
 his energy was very remarkable. So long as there was 
 an enemy unsubdued Jackson could not rest, and could 
 not give heed to anything else. Obstacles which lay in 
 the way between him and such unsubdued enemy were 
 not allowed to deter him. This restless and absorb 
 ing determination to reach and crush anything which 
 was hostile was one of the most marked traits in Jack 
 son s character. It appeared in all his military opera 
 tions, and he carried it afterwards into his civil activity. 
 He succeeded in his military movements. This gave 
 him the confidence and adherence of his men. The 
 young men of the State then hastened to enlist with him, 
 and his ranks were kept well filled, because one who 
 had fought a campaign with him, and had a story to tell, 
 became a hero in the settlement. Jackson s military 
 career and his popularity thus rapidly acquired mo 
 mentum from all the circumstances of the case and all 
 the forces at work. He was then able to enforce disci 
 pline and obedience, by measures which, as it seems, no 
 other frontier commander would have dared to use. 
 
 On the 14th of March, 1814, he ordered John Wood 
 to be shot for insubordination and assault on an officer 
 This was the first of the acts of severity committed by 
 
 1 To Governor Blount, who proposed that he should retire frou 
 ,ke expedition, Jacksou wrote a strenuous remonstrance, even at 
 .dmonition. (Eaton s Jackson, 101.) 
 
EXECUTION OF WOOD. 35 
 
 Jackson as a commanding officer, which were brought 
 ap against him in the presidential campaigns. Wood 
 was technically guilty. He acted just as any man in 
 the frontier army, taught to reverence nobody and sub 
 mit to no authority, would have acted under the cir 
 cumstances. If it had not been for the great need of 
 enforcing discipline, extenuating circumstances which 
 existed would have demanded a mitigation of the sen 
 tence. Party newspapers during a presidential cam 
 paign are not a fair court of appeal to review the acts 
 which a military commander in the field may think 
 necessary to maintain discipline. Jackson showed in 
 this case that he was not afraid to do his duty, and that 
 he would not sacrifice the public service to curry popu 
 larity. 
 
 At the end of March Jackson destroyed a body of 
 the Creeks at Tohopeka, or Horse-Shoe Bend, in the 
 northeast corner of the present Tallapoosa County, Ala 
 bama. With the least possible delay he pushed on to the 
 last refuge of the Creeks, the Hickory Ground, at the 
 confluence of the Coosa and Tallapoosa, and the Holy 
 Ground a few miles distant. The medicine men, ap 
 pealing to the superstition of the Indians, had taught 
 them to believe that no white man could tread the latter 
 ground and live. In April the remnant of the Creeks 
 surrendered or fled to Florida, overcome as much by 
 the impetuous and relentless character of the campaign 
 against them as by actual blows. Fort Jackson was 
 built on the Hickory Ground. The march down through 
 Alabama was a great achievement, considering the cir- 
 . umstances of the country at the time. Major-General 
 Thomas Pinckney, of the regular army, came to Fort 
 Va^kson, April 20th, and took command. He gave t* 
 
86 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 Jackson s achievements the most generous recognition 
 both on the spot and in his reports. April 21, 1814 
 the West Tennessee militia were dismissed, and they 
 marched home. 
 
 The Creek campaign lasted only seven months. In 
 itself considered, it was hy no means an important In 
 dian war, but in its connection with other military 
 movements it was very important. Tecumseh had been 
 killed at the battle of the Thames in Canada, October 
 5, 1813. His scheme of a race war died with him. 
 The Creek campaign put an end to any danger of hos 
 tilities from the southwestern Indians, in alliance either 
 with other Indians or with the English. It was hence 
 forth possible to plan military operations and pass 
 through the Indian territory without regard to the dis 
 position of the Indians. This state of things had been 
 brought about very summarily, while military events 
 elsewhere had been discouraging. 
 
 This campaign, therefore, was the beginning of Jack- 
 Bon s fame and popularity, and from it dates his career. 
 He was forty-seven years old. On the 31st of May he 
 was appointed a major-general in the army of the United 
 States, and was given command of the department of 
 the South^ He established his headquarters at Mobile 
 in August, 1814. That town had been occupied by 
 Wilkinson, April 13, 1813. There were fears of an at 
 tack either on Mobile or New Orleans. English forces 
 appeared, and took post at Pensacola. Jackson natu 
 rally desired to attack the enemy where he found him 
 The relations of the parties must be borne in mind. 
 Spain was a neutral and owned Florida, but the boun 
 daries of Florida were in dispute between Spain and tht 
 1 See page 20 
 
CAPTURE OF PEN 8 AC OLA. 37 
 
 United States. Jacksoc would not have been a South 
 western man if he had not felt strongly about that 
 dispute. We have seen 1 that one of Jackson s first 
 thoughts when war with England broke out, was that 
 Florida might be conquered. Now Spain allowed Eng 
 land to use Florida as a base of operations. Jackson 
 wrote to Washington for leave to attack Pensacola. It 
 
 O 
 
 did not suit his temper to sit still under a great anxiety 
 as to which spot on a long coast might be chosen by the 
 enemy as the point of attack. The Secretary of War 
 (Armstrong) replied to Jackson s application that it 
 was necessary, before invading Spanish territory, to 
 know certainly whether Spain voluntarily yielded the 
 use of her territory to England. This letter did not 
 reach Jackson until the war was over. All Jackson s 
 letters of this period to the state and federal authori 
 ties have a tone of lecturing which gives deep insight 
 into the character of the man. He meant no disre 
 spect, but the case seemed so clear to him that he set 
 it forth with an unconscious directness of language. 
 
 Jackson had but a very small force at Mobile, very 
 inadequately provided with any of the necessaries of war. 
 The government at Washington was falling to pieces. 
 On the 24th of August the English captured. Washing 
 ton and burned the public buildings. Jackson could not 
 obtain either assistance or orders. September 14th the 
 English attacked Fort Bowyer, on Mobile Point, and 
 were repulsed with energy and good fortune. They 
 retired to Pensacola. Jackson advanced against Pen 
 sacola without orders from Washington j and reached 
 that place November 6th, irith S,000 men. He easily 
 itormed the town. The Spaniards surrendered the fort* 
 1 See page 30. 
 
38 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 near the town. The English blew up the fort at Bar* 
 rancas and departed. 1 Jackson immediately returned 
 to Mobile, fearing a new attack there. This energetic ac 
 tion against Pensacola, which a timid commander would 
 have hesitated to take, although the propriety of it could 
 not be seriously questioned, was the second great step 
 in the war in the Southwest. If the Creeks had not 
 been subdued, Mobile could not have been defended. 
 If Pensacola had not been captured, New Orleans could 
 not have been defended three months later. Jackson 
 had extraordinary luck. All the accidents fell out in his 
 favor, and all contributed to his final success. 
 
 On the 2d of December, 1814, Jackson reached New 
 Orleans, where he expected the next blow to fall. Noth 
 ing had been done there to prepare for defence, and no 
 supplies were there, not even arms. Edward Liv 
 ingston and a Frenchman named Louaillier were alone 
 active in preparing even the minds of the people for 
 defence. Jackson declared martial law as a means of 
 impressing soldiers and sailors, and began preparations 
 for defending the city, in spite of discouragements and 
 ^he lack of all proper means. He seemed to be pos 
 sessed by a kind of frenzy or fanaticism at the idea 
 of any oi*e invading " American territory. As soon 
 as he heard of the landing effected by the English 
 After they had destroyed the flotilla on the lakes, he set 
 out to meet them with such forces as he had. He ar 
 rested their advance as far from the city as possible, 
 pushed on his preparations with redoubled energy and 
 Activity, and was indefatigable in devising and combin- 
 ng means of defence. "The energy manifested by 
 General Jackson spread, as it were, by contagion, ana 
 i 7 Niles,271. Latour, 44 fg. 
 
BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS. 39 
 
 communicated itself to the whole army. I shall add, 
 that there was nothing which those who composed it did 
 not feel themselves capable of performing, if he ordered 
 it to be done. It was enough that he expressed a wish, 
 or threw out the slightest intimation, and immediately 
 a crowd of volunteers offered themselves to carry his 
 views into execution." * He made the utmost of all the 
 means he possessed and devised substitutes for what he 
 lacked. Thus, with every day that passed, his position 
 became stronger. The enemy were veteran troops, 
 amply provided with all the best appliances of war, but, 
 as it appears, not well commanded. An energetic ad 
 vance on their part, at the first moment, would have won 
 the city. It was, however, Jackson who made the en 
 ergetic advance at the first moment, and he never let 
 them get any farther. The story of the battle which 
 took place is a strange one. Everything fell out favor 
 ably for Jackson as if by magic. The English lost their 
 way, fired into each other, adopted foolish rumors, dis 
 obeyed orders, neglected precautions. The two parties 
 built redoubts out of the same mud, and cannonaded 
 each other all day through a dense smoke. At night the 
 American works were hardly damaged, while the Eng 
 lish works were battered to pieces and the cannon dis 
 mounted. On the 8th of January, 1815, the English 
 made their grand assault on Jackson s works. Latour 
 Bays that they were over-confident, and that they disre 
 garded the obstacles. They were repulsed with great 
 slaughter. Their loss in general and field officers was 
 especially remarkable. Only on the west bank of the 
 river did the English gain some advantage. General 
 Jackson said then and he always afterwards refused 
 1 Latour. Preface, p. 17 
 
40 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 to withdraw the assertion, in spite of the remonstrances 
 of General Adair, and in spite of a long controversy 
 that the Kentucky troops on the west side " ingloriously 
 fled." 1 This is worth noticing only because it shows 
 that Jackson would not recede from what he thought 
 true, either to soothe wounded pride or to win popular 
 ity. If the English had had a little larger force on the 
 west side, they would have won that position, and would 
 have more than counterbalanced all Jackson s success 
 on the east bank, for the batteries on the west bank 
 could easily have been made to command Jackson a 
 camp and works. The English withdrew after their 
 repulse. Their loss, January 8th, was over 2,000 killed, 
 wounded, and missing ; Jackson s was seven killed and 
 six wounded. 2 The treaty of peace had been signed at 
 Ghent December 24, 1814, two weeks before the battle 
 took place. Before the English attempted any further 
 operations in Louisiana, the news of the peace was re 
 ceived. They captured Fort Bowyer in a second attack, 
 February 12, 1815. 
 
 A brilliant victory was the last thing any one in the 
 United States had expected to hear of from New Or 
 leans. The expectations under which the war had been 
 undertaken had all been disappointed. Canada had not 
 been conquered. The United States had ranged itself 
 with the defeated, and not with the successful party in 
 Europe. The war had been more than nominal, but 
 on land it had been anything but glorious. Only on the 
 sea did the few frigates which the federalists had built 
 while they controlled the federal government, vindicate 
 
 1 7 Niles, 373. Latour, App. 52. Latour makes an apology 
 r the Kentuckiaiis, p. 1 74. 
 
 2 Latour, App. 55, 153. 
 
THE WAR AND THE WAR PARTY. 41 
 
 ihe national honor by brilliant successes. Jefferson s 
 a priori navy of gunboats had disappeared and been for 
 gotten. The war party had looked upon Gallatin as 
 their financier. He had told them in 1809 that war 
 could be carried on without taxes, but they had squan 
 dered, against his remonstrances, resources on which 
 he relied when he so declared, and they had refused to 
 re-charter the bank as he desired. When the war broke 
 out he went out to Russia as one of the peace commis 
 sioners. There was no one competent to succeed him, 
 and the democrats never forgave him for the embar 
 rassments which they suffered in trying to manage the 
 finances. 1 He did not resign his secretaryship, bu 
 was superseded February 9, 1814. Good democrats 
 thought that sending him abroad was a repetition of 
 the course they had blamed in Jay s case. 2 It certainly 
 was a very strange policy to leave the treasury without 
 a regular head in war-time. The banks suspended, the 
 currency fell into confusion, heavy taxation became nec 
 essary, and the public finances were brought to the verge 
 of bankruptcy. The party which had made such an 
 outcry about direct taxes, national bank, and eight per 
 cent loans imitated Hamilton s system of direct taxes 
 and excise throughout. They were discussing a big 
 paper-money bank on the day (February 13th) when 
 news of the Treaty of Ghent reached Washington, and 
 they would have adopted it if the war had continued. 
 They sold six per cent bonds for eighty and eighty -five 
 in a currency of bank rags depreciated twenty or twenty- 
 five per cent. A grand crnscriptJon bill was also ir 
 preparation, and the Hartford convention had just ad 
 
 1 See Ingersoll, 74. 
 
 2 Carey s Olive Branch. 63. 
 
42 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 journed, having done much or little according as peace 
 or war might make it expedient to put one sense OT 
 another on ambiguous phrases. When Napoleon fell, 
 and England was left free to devote her attention to 
 this country as her only remaining foe, the war took on 
 a new aspect. June 13, 1814, Gallatin wrote home that 
 a large force was fitting out in England against Amer 
 ica. Admiral Cochrane wrote to Monroe that he had 
 orders to devastate the coasts of the United States. 
 The first conditions of peace talked of by England in 
 volved cession of territory in Michigan and the Ohio 
 territory, as well as concessions of trading privileges 
 and navigation of the Mississippi, terms which could 
 not be accepted until after a great deal more hard 
 fighting. The feeling here in the autumn of 1814 was 
 one of deep despondency and gloom. 1 The victory of 
 New Orleans was the cause of boundless delight, espec 
 ially because the news of it reached the North at just 
 about the same time as the news of peace, and there 
 was no anxiety about the future to mar the exultation. 
 The victory was a great consolation to the national 
 prido, which had been sorely wounded by military fail 
 ures, and by the capture of Washington. The power 
 of Great Britain had been met and repulsed when put 
 forth at its best, and when the American resources 
 were scanty and poor. To the administration and the 
 war party the victory was political salvation. The pub 
 lic plainly saw, however, that the federal administration 
 had done nothing for the victory. Jackson had been 
 
 1 See Niles s Register, vol. 7 ; Pres. Message, 1814 ; 1 Goodrich 
 Letter xxx ; Carey s Olive Branch, preface 4th and 6th ed. In 
 gersoll finds room for the opinion that the prospects for 1815 werf 
 bright. 
 
RESULTS OF THE WAR. 43 
 
 the soul of the defence from the beginning, and to his 
 energy and perseverance success was due. He therefore 
 got all the credit of it, and the administration was only 
 too glad to join in the plaudits, since attention was 
 thereby diverted from its blunders and failure. These 
 facts explain Jackson s popularity. In the space of 
 time between September, 1813, and January, 1815, he 
 had passed from the status of an obscure Tennessee 
 planter to that of the most distinguished and popular 
 man in the country. 
 
 In the treaty of peace nothing was said about im 
 pressment, the " principle " of which was what the 
 United States had been striving about ever since 1806, 
 and which was the only cause of the war. The war 
 was therefore entirely fruitless as to the causes which 
 were alleged for it at the outset. Nevertheless, the 
 second war with England was a great and beneficial 
 event in our history. What the course of things might 
 have been, if a wiser statesmanship had adopted Monroe 
 and Pinkney s treaty, and pursued a steady course of 
 peace and industrial growth, so far as the state of the 
 world would allow, is a matter of speculation ; but, in 
 the course which things did take, there are especial and 
 valuable features of our history which are to be traced 
 to the second war with England as their origin. The 
 discontent of New England faded away at once, and 
 there was a stronger feeling of nationality and confi 
 dence throughout the country than there ever had beer, 
 before. 1 From that time on the Union had less of the 
 character of a temporary experiment. The country had 
 also won respect abroad, and w;s recognized in the 
 family of nations as it had not ueer, oefore. From 1789 
 
 1 Gallatin expressed this opinion. 1 Gallatin s Writings, 700. 
 
14 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 to 1815 the European nations were absoibect by Euro- 
 pean politics and war. At the end of this period they 
 turned to find that a new nation had begun to grow up 
 on the Western continent. The Americans had shown 
 that they could build ships of war, and sail them, and 
 fight them, on an equal footing. To the military states 
 of Europe this was a fact which inspired respect. 
 
 To return to our more immediate subject : There had 
 been another dispute about terms of enlistment at Fort 
 Jackson in September, 1814. About 200 men, some of 
 whom broke open a store-house to get supplies, marched 
 home without the consent of their commanding officer. 
 Most of them came back : some being compelled, others 
 thinking better of it, and others after assuaging their 
 homesickness. Six were put under arrest and tried by 
 court-martial. They were condemned to death, and, 
 by Jackson s orders, were executed at Mobile, February 
 21, 1815. 1 The question of law involved was a difficult 
 one. The men took the risk of acting on their own 
 view of that question, while they were under military 
 law. Jackson s reason for his course was to enforce 
 discipline. There had never been such discipline in an 
 American army, 2 least of all in the West ; but that was 
 just his contention. He said that there must be disci 
 pline, and that this was the only way to establish it. 
 Some of the cases were very sad, and a less penalty 
 would probably have accomplished all the purpose. 
 
 After the English departed from New Orleans Jack 
 son relaxed none of his vigilance, but continued to 
 itr-:ngthen his force by all the means at his command- 
 
 1 The documents are given in 34 Nile8, 55. 
 3 Jackson s apologists made much of an alleged parallel caw 
 nude: Washington. 
 
MARTIAL LAW AT NEW ORLEANS. 45 
 
 hi this he acted like a good and wise commander, who 
 iid not mean to be caught. He could not assume that 
 the enemy would not make another attack, and he knew 
 nothing yet of the peace. He maintained the attitude 
 of alert preparation until he was sure that the war was 
 at an end. He maintained martial law in the city, and 
 ne administered it with rigor. The possession of abso 
 lute and arbitrary power did not have a good effect on 
 him. The exhilaration and self-confidence of success 
 and flattery affected his acts. It appears that he did not 
 thorouglily respect all the inhabitants of the city. They 
 were a motley crowd, and he thought that some of them 
 were not ready to do what he thought they ought to do 
 to defend the city. 1 Any one who would not go to the 
 last extreme for that object could count on Jackson s 
 contempt. He meant to hold the city in such shape that 
 he could make every man in it contribute to its defence, 
 if the occasion should arise. Frenchmen had certain 
 privileges for twelve years, under the treaty of 1803. 
 They had generally cooperated in the defence, but, after 
 the English departed, they sought certificates of nation 
 ality in order to secure the privileges and exemptions to 
 which they were entitled. To Jackson this seemed like 
 shirking a share of the common burdens. Livingston, 
 who had been on an embassy to the English fleet, 
 brought back news on the 18th of February 2 of the 
 peace. Jackson would not alter his attitude or proceed 
 ings on account of this intelligence, which came through 
 
 1 See his defence in reply tf Hall s writ, 8 Niles, 246. 
 
 a Latour says on the 10th. This date is important for the 
 juestion whether Jackson knew, at least unofficially, before he 
 Allowed the six militiamen to be executed, that peace had been 
 bade. 
 
40 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 the enemy. On February 28th he ordered all who had 
 certificates of French nationality to go to Baton Rouge 
 before March 3d, on the ground that he would have no 
 man in the city who was not bound to help defend it 
 March 8th he suspended this order, except as to the 
 French consul. March 3d the same Louaillier who 
 had been conspicuous as an advocate of energetic de 
 fence, wrote an article for a local paper, criticising the 
 order of February 28th, and urging that martial law 
 should be abolished. The editor, when called to ac 
 count for this article, gave up his contributor. Louail 
 lier was arrested March 5th. Judge Hall, of the United 
 States District Court, issued a writ of habeas corpus for 
 him. Jackson received news of the peace from Wash 
 ington on March 6th, but by some blunder the courier 
 did not bring the document containing the official notifi 
 cation. On that day Jackson convened a court-martial 
 to try Louaillier. He sent an officer to arrest Judge 
 Hall, and to obtain from the clerk of the court the orig 
 inal writ of habeas corpus. On the 8th he disbanded 
 the militia. The court-martial struck out all the charges 
 against Louaillier except one (illegal and improper con 
 duct), for want of jurisdiction, and acquitted him on 
 lhat. Jackson disapproved of this finding, and defended 
 his own proceedings. On the llth of March he sent 
 Hall four miles out of the city and released him. Lou 
 aillier was kept in prison until the official document an 
 nouncing the peace was received. On the 22d of March 
 the United States District Court ordered Jackson to 
 Bhow cause why an attachment should not issue against 
 aim for contempt of court in wresting an original docu 
 nent from the court, disobeying the writ of habeas wr 
 pis, and imprisoning the judge. Jackson refused t 
 
JACKSON S FINE. 47 
 
 answer save by a general vindication of his proceedings. 
 This the judge refused to hear, and fined him $1,000.* 
 In 1842 Tyler recommended Congress to refund this 
 fine without reflecting on the court. J. Q. Adams said 
 in a speech, January 6, 1843, that this was auctioneering 
 for the presidency, all the factions desiring Jackson s 
 support. 2 In 1844 Congress refunded the fine with 
 interest, total $2,700. In a letter to L. F. Linn, 
 March 14, 1842, 8 Jackson refers to the fine as having 
 been laid because he declared martial law. 
 
 In this incident Jackson displayed some of the faults 
 of which he afterwards showed many instances. He 
 spoiled his military success by this unnecessary collision 
 with the civil authority. He proved himself wrong- 
 headed and persistent in a course in which every step 
 would have warned him of his error, if he had been 
 willing to learn. Being committed by his first passion 
 ate and hasty step, he was determined to push through 
 on the course he had adopted. He knew to a moral 
 certainty from the 6th of March that the war was at an 
 end. All these mischievous proceedings took place on 
 and after that date. A very little concession and good 
 will at any time would have avoided the whole trouble, 
 but Jackson acted as if he was determined to grind out 
 rf the opposing opinions all the friction of which they 
 were capable. 
 
 April 12th, Dallas, acting Secretary of War, wrote a 
 
 1 Report of a committee of the House of Representatives ; 64 
 Niles, 61 (1843). Cf. the account in 8 Niles, 246, and Judge 
 Hall s response, Ibid. 272 (1815). 
 
 63 Niles, 312. 
 
 8 62 Niles, 212. For Jackson s own story of the fine, see 63 
 
48 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 dispatch to Jackson, expressing the President s " sur 
 prise and solicitude," and asking for explanations of the 
 proceedings of which reports had reached Washington ; 
 but as the matter was all past and dead, and no one 
 desired to mar the exultation of the public or the per 
 sonal satisfaction of Jackson, it was allowed to drop. 
 
 In the autumn of 1815 Jackson was in Washington ; 
 conferring with the War Department about the peace 
 footing of the army. In the spring of 1816 he was at 
 New Orleans on business of his military department. 
 
CHAPTER HI. 
 
 JACKSON IN FLORIDA. 
 
 ANDREW JACKSON took no important part in the elec 
 tion of 1816. He had favored Monroe in 1808, and h*s 
 preferred him to the other candidates in 1816. Craw 
 ford was, at this time, Jackson s pet dislike. The 
 reason for this was that Crawford, as Secretary of War, 
 had modified Jackson s treaty with the Creeks, about 
 which the Cherokees, deeming the terms unjust to them, 
 had appealed to the President. Jackson resumed the 
 negotiation, and bought again the lands ceded before. 
 As the people of Tennessee, Georgia, and Alabama were 
 interested in the cession, Jackson, by re-obtaining it 
 after it had been given back, greatly increased liis pop 
 ularity. 1 
 
 In October, 1816, a letter, signed by Jackson, was ad 
 dressed to Monroe, in anticipation of his election to the 
 presidency, urging the appointment of Wm. Drayton, 
 of South Carolina, as Secretary of War. Wm. B. Lewis, 
 Jackson s neighbor and confidential friend, husband of 
 me of Mrs. Jackson s nieces, wrote this letter. As Par- 
 ion says, one has no trouble in distinguishing those let 
 ters signed Jackson which have been copied and revised 
 by Lewis, Lee, Livingstoi:, and others, from those which 
 have not been through that process. 2 It is difficult to 
 
 i 11 Niles, 143. 
 
 a A specimen of an unpolished Ta^kson letter may be 
 the extract on page 384. 
 4 
 
ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 tee the significance of this letter and others which Jack 
 BOH wrote during this winter (1816-17), unless he was 
 being used to advance an intrigue on behalf of Drayton. 
 Drayton had been a federalist. He belonged to the 
 South Carolina aristocracy. No ties of any kind are 
 known to have existed between him and Jackson, either 
 before or after this time. Jackson said (in 1824) that 
 ho did not know Drayton in 1816. 1 Drayton was not 
 appointed. These well-cotnposed letters failed entirely 
 of their immediate object ; and they reposed in obscu 
 rity for seven years. Lewis was an astonishingly far- 
 sighted man. We shall see abundant proofs, hereafter, 
 of his power to put down a stake where he foresaw that 
 it would be needed a little later, but it does not seem 
 credible that he can have foreseen and prepared for the 
 ultimate purpose which these letters served. In the 
 course of his argument on behalf of Drayton, Jackson 
 was led (in the letters) to discuss the general theory of 
 appointments, and to urge Monroe to abandon the pro 
 scription of the federalists, to appoint them to office, 
 and to promote reconciliation and good will. In the 
 same letter he declared that he would have hung the 
 leaders of the Hartford convention, if he had been in 
 command in the eastern department in 1815. In 1823 
 and 1824 the letters were used with great effect to draw 
 federalists to the support of Jackson. They were de 
 lighted with the tone and sentiment of them, 2 although 
 a few winced at the reference to the Hartford conven 
 tion. In 1828 the other aspect of the letters rather 
 predominated. The democrats were not quite pleased 
 that Jackson should have urged Monroe to appoint fed 
 sralists and disregard party. 8 
 
 1 26 Niles, 162. a Binns, 249. 
 
 8 The whole correspondence, 26 Niles, 163 fg. See com men t 
 
INSUBORDINATION. 51 
 
 Monroe was being acted upon, when Jackson wrote to 
 him, from the other side, by those who wanted him to 
 favor the Monroe faction in the republican party. He 
 had enough to do to maintain himself between the two 
 demands. He answered Jackson, admitting the high 
 principle of the course Jackson advocated, but setting 
 forth a theory of appointments more conformable to the 
 exigencies of party politics. 
 
 April 22, 1817, Jackson published an order to hia 
 department forbidding his subordinates to obey any or 
 der from the War Department not issued through him. 
 He had been much and justly annoyed at incidents in 
 the service under him, of which he had not been in 
 formed beforehand, and also by direct orders issued from 
 Washington, which interfered with his arrangements and 
 frustrated them without his knowledge. On the merits 
 of the question he was in the right, but his public " or 
 der " produced an unnecessary scandal and public col 
 lision in a case where a proper private representation to 
 the department would have answered every purpose. 
 Crawford was transferred to the treasury in October, 
 
 1816. There was difficulty in filling the position of 
 Secretary of War. Calhoun was appointed October 8, 
 
 1817. He conceded the point claimed by Jackson, re 
 serving only the cases of emergency. 
 
 Some persons informed Jackson that General Scott 
 had animadverted upon his action in the matter just 
 mentioned, and had characterized ft as mutiny. Sep 
 tember 8, 1817, Jackson vrote a fiery letter to Scott, 
 tailing him to account. Scott replied that, in private 
 eonversation, he had said that the order of April 22d 
 
 quoted, Ibid. p. 219. For th^ disapproval of the democrats, e 
 Bums, 246. 
 
52 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 was i lutinotis as to the future, and a reflection on the 
 President, the Commander-in-Chief, as to the past. He 
 disclaimed any personal feeling. Jackson replied in a 
 very insulting letter, in which the well-battered question, 
 Who of us two is the gentleman ? did good service 
 again, and wound up with a challenge to a duel. Scott 
 declined the challenge on the ground of religious scru 
 ples and patriotic duty. The correspondence was almost 
 immediately published. It created another scandal, for 
 the public was not edified to see two of the first officers 
 of the army engaged in such a quarrel. 1 Niles, who 
 at this time greatly admired Jackson, and who is al 
 ways a good representative of the average citizens of 
 his time, refrained from publishing the correspondence 
 until April, 1819. 2 In this case, again, Jackson showed 
 evidence of an ungovernable temper and a willingness 
 to profit by every opportunity for a quarrel. 
 
 There was, however, more public fighting at hand. 
 
 There were in Florida many refugee Indians of the 
 Creek nation, who were hostile to the United States, and 
 many runaway negroes. During the war the English 
 had sought such aid as they could get from these per 
 sons in their operations against the United States. They 
 had built a fort on the Appalachicola River, about fif 
 teen miles from its mouth, and had collected there an 
 immense amount of arms and ammunition. The Eng 
 lish officers who were operating in Florida acted with a 
 great deal of arbitrary self-will. They were not under 
 Etricfc responsibility to their own government. They 
 were operating on Spanish territory. They were stirring 
 up Indians and negroes, and were not commanding i 
 
 1 14 Niles, 295; 4 Adams, 323- 
 8 16 Niles, 121. 
 
THE NEGRO FOR i\ 58 
 
 regular or civilized force. It is difficult to understand 
 some of their proceedings in any point of view, and 
 other of their doings certainly would not have been 
 sanctioned by the English government, if known. The 
 officers were able to gratify their own malice without 
 responsibility. 
 
 When the war ended, the English left the arms and 
 ammunition in the fort. The negroes seized the fort, 
 and it became known as the " Negro Fort." The au 
 thorities of the United States sent General Gaines to the 
 Florida frontier with troops, to establish peace on the 
 border. The Negro Fort was a source of anxiety both 
 to the military authorities and to the slave-owners of 
 Georgia, and, according to some accounts, the first step 
 was its investment. It is otherwise stated that the 
 American authorities undertook to bring supplies up the 
 Appalachicola for a fort which they were building in 
 Georgia, and that the boats were fired on, after which 
 the troops marched down from Georgia and invested the 
 fort, having received permission to do so from the 
 Spanish authorities at Pensacola, who also very unwill 
 ingly saw a great fortress established in their territory, 
 and held by negroes and Indians. 1 - The fort was bom 
 barded. A hot shot penetrated one of the magazines, 
 and the whole fort was blown to pieces, July 27, 1816. 
 There were three hundred negro men, women, and chil 
 dren and twenty Choctaws in the fort ; two hundred and 
 seventy were killed. Only three came out unhurt, 2 and 
 these were killed by the allied Indians. 
 
 Spain was engaged in hostilities with her revolted colo 
 nies in America. Filibusters and privateers took advan 
 tage of this state of things to carrv on a certain grade of 
 1 Document A, 55. a Document A, 69. 
 
54 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 piracy and the slave-trade. Amelia Island, on the north 
 east coast of Florida, had been infested by smugglers, 
 Blavers, and freebooters ever since the war with England. 
 In 1817 the island was occupied by a filibuster named 
 McGregor, and later by another named Aury. They 
 pretended to desire to render Florida independent, and 
 there was a measure of honest intention in their plans, 
 but the island was a nest of outlaws and a nuisance. 
 The troops of the United States took possession of the 
 island and drove the freebooters out, because Spain was 
 not able to do so. Old causes of annoyance have been 
 described above. 1 The hostile Indians and the free 
 booters were new causes of annoyance. The Georgians 
 were also annoyed that their slaves found an easy ref 
 uge in Florida. It had been amply proven that Spain 
 could not fulfil the duties which devolved upon her as 
 owner of Florida. Yet she strenuously insisted that 
 her sovereignty should be respected. 2 For all these 
 reasons the United States was very anxious to buy 
 Florida. 
 
 During 1817 there were frequent collisions on the 
 
 frontiers between Whites and Indians. Ex-Governor 
 
 Mitchell of Georgia, the Indian agent, the fairest and 
 
 best informed witness who appeared before the com- 
 
 aittee of Congress in 1818-19, deposed that the blame 
 
 or these collisions was equal, that one party was as 
 
 often the aggressor as the other, and that the lawless 
 
 persons in Florida were especially to blame for acts oi 
 
 injury which provoked retaliation. 8 When Gaines wrote 
 
 to the chief Kenhigee that his Indians had killed Whites, 
 
 Jie chief replied that four Indians had been killed foj 
 
 i See page 20. 2 Document A, 55. 
 
 16 Nilei, 85. 
 
ATTACK ON FOWLTOWN. 55 
 
 every White. 1 The reports which were sent North were, 
 as usual in such cases, only such as tended to show an 
 aggressive disposition on the part of the Indians. 2 
 
 On the 20th of November, General Gaines sent a 
 force of two hundred and fifty men to Fowltown, the 
 headquarters of the chief of the " Redsticks," or hos 
 tile Creeks. They approached the town in the early 
 morning, and were fired on. An engagement followed. 
 The town was taken and burned. Gaines s dispatch to 
 the Governor of Georgia puts the number of Indians 
 killed at four. 8 Ex-Governor Mitchell of Georgia, 
 quoted above, said, " This fact was, I conceive, the 
 cause of the Seminole war." It is, however, fair to say 
 that Mitchell was unfriendly to Gaines and to Jackson. 4 
 The Indians of that section, after this, began general 
 hostilities, attacked the boats which were ascending the 
 Appalachicola, and massacred the persons in them. 
 Gaines states no reason at all for sending a force against 
 Fowltown, except that he had invited the chief to visit 
 him, in order to find out " whether his hostile temper 
 had abated." The chief refused to come. The friendly 
 Indians said that the Fowltown Indians had been hos 
 tile ever since the last war. Therefore Gaines sent a 
 force equal to the number of Indians in the town " to 
 bring the chief and warriors, and, in the event of re 
 sistance, to treat them as enemies." When the Indians 
 saw this force approaching they fired on it, stood fire 
 once, and then ran away. Their property was then aU 
 destroyed, and the United States had an Indian war on 
 Its hands. 
 
 1 Document A, HO. 
 
 2 See the items of news <rom Florida in 13 Niles. 
 13 Niles, 296. * 45 Nilea, 80. 
 
56 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 In December, on receipt of intelligence of the battle 
 at Fowltown and the attack on the boats, Jackson waa 
 ordered to take command in Georgia. He wrote to 
 President Monroe : " Let it be signified to me through 
 any channel (say Mr. J. Rhea) that the possession of 
 the Floridas would be desirable to the United States, 
 and in sixty days it will be accomplished." Much was 
 afterwards made to depend on this letter. Monroe waa 
 ill when it reached Washington, and he did not see or 
 read it until a year afterward:?, when some reference 
 was made to it. Jackson construed the orders which 
 he received from Calhoun with reference to this letter. 
 He also afterwards affirmed that Rhea wrote to him 
 hat the President approved of his suggestions, 1 but he 
 could not produce that letter. He had burned it. He 
 certainly supposed, however, that he had the secret con 
 currence of the administration in conquering Florida. 
 
 When the orders to take command reached Jackson, 
 the Governor of Tennessee was absent from Nashville. 
 Jackson proceeded to raise troops > in Tennessee on his 
 own responsibility ; he being authorized to call on the 
 Governors of the States which were neighbors to. the 
 scene of war. He pushed on his preparations with great 
 energy and celerity. His acts were approved both by 
 the state and federal authorities. He advanced through 
 Georgia with great haste, and was on the Florida fron 
 tier in March, 1818. He ordered part of his provisions 
 sent to Fort Scott by the Appalachicola, on which the 
 Spaniards had no fort, and he sent word to the Spanish 
 commander at Pensacola that if the fort at Barrancas 
 hindered his supply boats from ascending the Escambir 
 le should consider it an act of hostility to the Unitcx? 
 1 8 Adams, 404. 
 
NOTIONS ABOUT SPANIARLx. 57 
 
 States. These were, to say the least, very aggressive 
 proceedings against a nation with which we were at 
 peaeo, for a man who had been thrown into paroxysms 
 of rage and energy at the idea of a redcoat resting on 
 the soil of Louisiana during a public war. Jackson im 
 mediately advanced to St. Mark s, which place he cap 
 tured. On his way down the Appalachicola he found 
 the Indians and negroes at work in the fields, and un 
 conscious of any impending attack. Some of them fled 
 to St. Mark s. His theory, in which he supposed tjiat 
 he was supported by the administration, was that he was 
 to pursue the Indians until he caught them, wherever 
 they might go ; that he was to respect Spanish rights as 
 far as he could consistently with that purpose ; and that 
 the excuse for his proceedings was that Spain could not 
 police her own territory, or restrain the Indians. Jack 
 son s proceedings were based on two positive but arbi 
 trary assumptions : (1) That the Indians got aid and 
 encouragement from St. Mark s and Pensacola. (This 
 the Spaniards always denied, but perhaps a third as 
 sumption of Jackson might be mentioned : that the word 
 of a Spanish official was of no value.) (2) That Great 
 Britain kept paid emissaries employed in Florida to stir 
 up trouble for the United States. This latter assump 
 tion was a matter of profound belief generally in the 
 United States. Niles s reports and criticisms of events 
 in Florida all proceed from that assumption. 1 The 
 English government disavowed every act of Colonel 
 Nichols with the Indians which took definite shape and 
 eould be dealt with at all. The Indians whom he took 
 lo England were kindly treated, but were not encouraged 
 so look to England for any assistance or countena*<* 
 1 14 Niles ; all the articles on Florida. 
 
58 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 It was not easy to break off the connections which had 
 been established, and destroy the hopes which had been 
 raised, during the war, but there is not the slightest 
 evidence that the English government did not act in 
 good faith, or that it was busy in such contemptible 
 business as employing emissaries to stir up some 2,000 
 savages to wage a frontier war on the United States. 
 Jackson s assumption, however, had serious import for 
 two unfortunate individuals. 
 
 A Scotchman, Alexander Arbuthnot. was found by 
 Jackson in St. Mark s. When the fort was taken Ar 
 buthnot mounted his horse to ride away, but he was 
 seized, and put in confinement. He was an Indian 
 crader, who had been in Florida for many years. He 
 had established as intimate and friendly relations as 
 possible with the Indians for his own security and ad 
 vantage in trade. He had also sympathized with the 
 Indians, and had exerted himself in their behalf in many 
 quarters. 
 
 Several American vessels of war lay in the bay of St. 
 Mark s to cooperate with the land forces. By display 
 ing English colors on these ships, two Indian chiefs, 
 Hillis Hajo (or Francis) and Himollemico, were enticed 
 on board and made prisoners. They were hung by 
 Jackson s order. They had tortured and massacred 
 prisoners after the Indian fashion, but no one has ever 
 explained by what law or usage known in the service of 
 the United States they were put to death, when thus 
 captured by stratagem, and not even on the field of bat 
 tle. 
 
 Jackson pushed on with the least possible delay to the 
 Suwanee River, where were the headquarters of Boleck 
 (Billy BoAvlegs), the Seminole chief. Arbuthnot hao 
 
ARBUTHNOT AND AMBRISTE*. 59 
 
 ft trading-post there. When he had heard of Jackson s 
 advance, he had written to nis son, who was his agent 
 at Boleck s village, to carry the goods across the river. 
 Through this letter the Indians got warning in time to 
 cross the river and take to the swamps. Their escape 
 enraged Jackson. He had already regarded Arbuthnot 
 as one of the British emissaries. He now considered 
 Arhuthnot s letter an overt act of interference in the 
 war. The town was burned by Jackson. In its neigh 
 borhood he captured an Englishman named Robert Am- 
 brister, an ex-lieutenant in the British marines, and 
 nephew of the Governor of New Providence. This man 
 was taken prisoner to St. Mark s, the troops being on 
 their way homewards, and the war being over. A 
 court-martial was convened at St. Marks. Arbuthnot 
 was tried for (1) inciting the Creek Indians to war 
 against the United States ; (2) being a spy and aiding 
 the enemy ; (3) inciting the Indians to murder two 
 white men named. The court found him guilty of the 
 first charge and of the second except of being a spy, and 
 condemned him to be hung. There was no evidence at 
 all against him on any charge. 1 Hie. business in Florida 
 was open and obvious. He had always? advised the In 
 dians to peace and submission. His letter to his son 
 was not open to censure. Can traders be executed if 
 their information, not transmitted through the lines, 
 frustrates military purposes ? As Arbuthnot construed 
 the Treaty of Ghent the Indians were to have their 
 lands restored, and he told them so. There was so 
 much room for this construction that diplomatic meas- 
 
 1 Report of the trial in full, .5 Nlies, 270. All the documents 
 ibout the Negro Fort and the nvasioj oi Florida are in Docu 
 incut A. 
 
00 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 ares were necessary to set it aside. Peace had been 
 made with the Creeks before the Treaty of Ghent was 
 made. 
 
 Ambrister was tried for inciting the Indians and 
 levying war. His case was different. He had no osten 
 sible business in Florida. He was an adventurer, and it 
 is not clear what he hoped or intended. He threw him 
 self on the mercy of the court. He was condemned to be 
 shot. This sentence was reconsidered, and he was then 
 condemned to fifty lashes and a year of hard labor. 
 Jackson disapproved of the reconsideration, revived the 
 first sentence, and ordered both men to be executed 
 April 29, 1818, he left St. Mark s, having detached a 
 force- to hold that place and to execute the sentence. 
 The same day both men were executed. Arbuthnot 
 was seventy years old ; Ambrister was thirty-three. 
 
 It was as a mere incident of his homeward march 
 that Jackson turned aside and captured Pensacola, May 
 24, 1818, because he was told that some Indians had 
 taken refuge there. He deposed the Spanish govern 
 ment, set up a new one, and established a garrison. He 
 then continued his march homewards. On his way he 
 heard of an attack by Georgia militia on the villages of 
 friendly and allied Indians, and he became engaged in a 
 fiery correspondence with Governor Rabun of Georgia 
 about that affair. He was in the right, but it was an 
 other case in which by violence he provoked anger and 
 discord, when he might have accomplished much more 
 by a temperate remonstrance. 
 
 In the whole Florida matter we see Jackson proceed 
 ing to summary measures on inadequate facts and in 
 formation. He " knew " how the matter stood by the 
 surrent prejudices and assumptions, not by evidence an< 
 
THE 8EMINOLE CAMPAIGN. 61 
 
 information. This was the tone of his mind. Notions 
 and prepossessions which once effected a lodgment in his 
 mind, because circumstances gave them a certain plausi 
 bility, or because they fell in with some general preju 
 dice or personal bias of his, immediately gained for him 
 the character of obvious facts or self-evident truths. He 
 then pursued such notions and prepossessions to their 
 last consequences, and woe to any one who stood in the 
 way. 
 
 General Jackson had, in five months, broken the In 
 dian power, established peace on the border, and sub 
 stantially conquered Florida. This five months and the 
 eighteen months service in 1813-15 is all the actual 
 service he ever saw. The Seminole war was in its re 
 lations and effects one of the most important events in 
 our history, but in itself it was one of the most insignifi 
 cant of our Indian campaigns. Jackson had an over 
 whelming force. The report of the Senate committee of 
 1819 puts his force at 1,800 whites and 1,500 friendly 
 Indians. The hostile Indians were never put by any 
 body at a higher number than 2,000. This committee 
 put them at 1,000, not over half of whom, at any one 
 time, were in front of Jackson. The allied Indians did 
 11 the fighting. They lost twenty men in the campaign. 
 Not one white man was killed. The number of hostile 
 Indians killed is put at sixty. 1 
 
 The trouble with Jackson s achievements was that he 
 had done too much. The statesmen and diplomatists 
 could not keep up with him, and the tasks he threw on 
 them were harder than those h^ performed in the field. 
 The administration was not aware that it had authorized 
 trim to violate neutral territory. Federal administrations 
 1 Perkins. 113. 
 
82 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 in those days were always timid. They did not, know the 
 limits of their power, or what they dared do. Monroe 
 was especially timid. His administration wanted to buy 
 Florida, not conquer it. They did not thank Jackson 
 for plunging them into such a difficulty with Congress 
 and with England and Spain all at once. The two In 
 dian captives who had been hung had no friends, but 
 their execution was an awkward thing to justify be 
 fore the civilized world. The execution of the two 
 Englishmen was likely to provoke a great deal of diplo 
 matic trouble. Jackson had been perfectly sure about 
 the law. He laid it down in the order for the execu 
 tion. " It is an established principle of the law of 
 nations that any individual of a nation making war 
 against the citizens of any other nation, they being at 
 peace, forfeits his allegiance, and becomes an outlaw and 
 a pirate." If the facts are admitted, such a person un 
 doubtedly forfeits his allegiance, and cannot demand the 
 protection of his sovereign, whatever may happen to 
 him. On this ground the English government took no 
 steps in relation to the execution of Arbuthnot and Am- 
 blister, beyond an inquiry into the facts of their alleged 
 complicity in the war, 1 and that inquiry was not pushed 
 as we may hope that the government of the United 
 States will push the inquiry, if an American citizen is 
 ever executed as Arbuthnot was. The doctrine of Jack- 
 Bon s order, that a person who engages in a war to which 
 his country is not a party becomes an outlaw and pirate 
 will not stand. As has been well said, there were a large 
 number of foreigners in the American army during the 
 Revolution, who, on this doctrine, would, if captured bj 
 
 1 1 Rush, 473. " War might have been produced on this o* 
 t&sion if the ministry had but held up a finger. " (488.) 
 
JACKSON d INTERNATIONAL LAW. 68 
 
 the English, have forfeited their lives. The United 
 States would have protected any such persons by retalia 
 tion or otherwise. The Creeks were not a nation in in 
 ternational law, they were not the possessors of the soil 
 on which they lived and fought ; there had never been 
 a declaration of war ; yet they were not rebels against 
 the United States, and it could not be denied that they 
 had some belligerent rights. Whatever rights they had, 
 the Englishmen, even if they had been complete and un 
 questioned allies, must also have been entitled to from 
 the American authorities. If, then, the Indians were not 
 to be hunted down like wild beasts, or executed by court- 
 martial, if captured, for levying war on the United 
 States, the Englishmen were executed without right or 
 law. There never was any proof that anybody incited 
 the Indians. The attack on Fowltown precipitated hos 
 tilities in a situation where lawless men and savages, by 
 mutual annoyance, outrage, and retaliation, had prepared 
 the warlike temper. When the matter was investigated 
 this appeared, and it was seen that Jackson had acted 
 unjustifiably, because without evidence or law. The 
 popular feeling, however, would not allow him to be 
 censured. Niles, who well represents the popular tem 
 per, believed in the emissary theory, and when that 
 theory broke down he became angry. 1 He also ex 
 pressed the popular feeling with great exactness in this 
 paragraph : " The fact is that ninety-nine in a hundred 
 of the people believe that General Jackson acted on 
 every occasion for the good of his country, and success 
 universally crowned his efforts. He has suffered more 
 hardships and encountered higher responsibilities than 
 tny man living in the United States to serve us, and has 
 * See his editorial 1 6 Nile* 25. 
 
64 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 his reward in the sanction of his government and the 
 approbation of the people." With this dictum the case 
 was dismissed, and the matter stood so that General 
 Jackson, having done important public service, could 
 not be called to account, although he had hung four 
 persons without warrant of law. His popularity had 
 already begun to exercise a dispensing power m his 
 favor. A committee of the House of Representatives, 1 
 at the next session, reported a vote of censure on him 
 for the execution of the Englislimen, but the House, 
 after a long debate, refused to pass it. 
 
 Jackson s proceedings came up in Monroe s cabinet 
 on the question what to do with him and his conquests. 
 Calhoun was vexed at Jackson s insubordination to the 
 War Department. He wanted Jackson censured. The 
 President and the whole cabinet, with the exception of 
 Adams, disapproved of Jackson s conduct in invading 
 Florida, and were ready to disavow his proceedings and 
 make reparation. On Adams would fall the labor of 
 vindicating Jackson s proceedings diplomatically, if the 
 administration should assume the responsibility for them. 
 He avowed himself ready to undertake the task, and to 
 perform it substantially on the grounds on which Jackson 
 justified himself. It was agreed that Pensacola and St. 
 Mark s should be restored to Spain, but that Jackson s 
 course should be approved and defended on the grounds 
 that he pursued his enemy to his refuge, and that Spain 
 could not do the duty which devolved on her. The 
 President, however, countermanded an order which 
 Jackson had given to Gaines to seize St. Augustine be 
 cause some Indians had taken refuge there. All tin 
 members of the cabinet agreed to the policy decided 
 1 15 Niles, 394. 
 
8 EM IN OLE WAR IN CONGRESS. 65 
 
 "i, and all loyally adhered to it. the secret of their first 
 opinion being preserved for ten years. Calhoun wrote 
 to Jackson in accordance with the agreement, congratu 
 lating and approving. Jackson inferred that Calhoun 
 had been his friend in the cabinet all the time, and that 
 his old enemy, Crawford, had been the head of the hos 
 tile party. The political history of this country was 
 permanently affected by the personal relations of Jack 
 son to Calhoun and Crawford on that matter. Monroe 
 had a long correspondence with Jackson to try to rec 
 oncile him to the surrender of the forts to Spain. In 
 that correspondence Jackson did not mention the Rhea 
 fetter. 
 
 At the next session of Congress (181819) the pro 
 ceedings in Florida were made the subject of inquiry, 
 and were at once involved in the politics of the day. 
 Clay was in opposition to the administration because he 
 had not been made Secretary of State. He refused the 
 War Department and the mission to England. His 
 opposition was factious. After the administration as 
 sumed the responsibility for Jackson s doings, Clay 
 opened the attack on them. Here began the feud be 
 tween Clay and Jackson. The latter was in a doubly 
 irritable state of mind between the flatterers on one side 
 and the critics on the other. The personal element 
 came to the front. Any one who approved of his acts 
 was his friend ; any one who criticised was his enemy ; 
 whether any personal feeling was brought to the dis 
 cussion of a question of law and fact or not. There are 
 Borne facts which look as if Clay and Crawford had be 
 gun to regard Jackson as a possible competitor for the 
 presidency. Crawford was in communication with the 
 *ommittees on the Seminole war, apparently instigating 
 
Ob ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 action, while Calhoun tried to quell the excitement and 
 avert action, out of loyalty to the decision adopted by 
 the administration of which he was a member. 1 The 
 Georgian friends of Crawford in Congress led the attack 
 on Jackson. 2 Crawford and Calhoun were enemies, 
 Adams was writing dispatches and preparing instruc 
 tions, by which, both with England and Spain, he suc 
 ceeded in vindicating Jackson s proceedings. He and 
 Jackson were, at this time, friends, and one scheme waa 
 to make Jackson Vice-President on a ticket with Adams. 8 
 Adams s defence of Jackson was very plausible, and it 
 was fortified line by line with references to the docu 
 mentary proofs, yet if it had been worth any one s while* 
 either in England or this country, to examine the al 
 leged proofs, all the case against Arbuthnot would have 
 been found baseless. Adams quotes a certain letter as 
 proof that Arbuthnot was not truly a trader, but had 
 concealed purposes. The letter bears no testimony at 
 all to the fact alleged. 4 Rush cited to the English 
 minister another proof of this, which is equally frail, and 
 only proves that Arbuthnot had taken trouble to try to 
 serve the Indians out of pity for them. 6 His letter to his 
 son, besides warning him to save as much as possible of 
 their property, contained a message to Boleck not to 
 
 1 See Lacock s letter of June 25, 1832, in answer to Jackson s 
 interrogatories. (43 Niles, 79.) 
 
 2 8 Adams, 240. 
 
 3 Adams said (in 1824) that the vice-presidency would be a 
 nice place for Jackson s old age. Jacksou was four months oldei 
 than Adams. This is not so ridiculous as it would be if Jacksoi? 
 fisul not pleaded old age and illness as a reason why he should 
 not go to the Senate in 1823. (See 6 Adams, 633.) 
 
 4 Document A, 20, cf. 147. 
 
 * 2 Bush, 52, cf. Document A, 815. 
 
PURCHASE OF FLORIDA. 67 
 
 resist the Americans. 1 The Senate committee reported 
 February 24, 1819 (Lacock s Report), strongly against 
 Jackson on all the points from the independent recruit 
 ing down to the taking of Pensacola. 2 No action was 
 taken. Jackson had been in Washington during the 
 winter watching the proceedings. In February he made 
 an excursion as far north as New York. He was re 
 ceived everywhere with enthusiasm. There was a story 
 that he was so angry at some of the proceedings in 
 censure of him that he went to the Senate chamber 
 to waylay some persons who had displeased him. He 
 denied this. 
 
 In 1819 the purchase of Florida was effected, al 
 though the treaty was not ratified until February 22, 
 1821. In this treaty the western boundary of the 
 Louisiana purchase was for the first time defined. 
 Adams, while the negotiations were pending, called on 
 Jackson, and consulted him about the boundary to be 
 contended for. 3 Jackson s interest then centred in 
 Florida, and he cared comparatively little for the wilder 
 ness of Texas. He thought that the line of the Sabine 
 might well be accepted, if Florida could thereby be 
 secured. Monroe and his cabinet seem to have cared 
 just as little for Texas. Adams s diary shows that he 
 was not heartily supported in the efforts he was willing 
 to make to push the line westward. Jackson s opinion 
 about claiming Texas was of no value, but the fact that 
 he was consulted showed the amount of respect and con 
 sideration which the administration was willing to pay 
 him. In 1836, and again in 1843, \dams, citing his 
 diary, declared that Jackson had been consulted, and 
 had approved the Florida treaty. Jackson contradicted 
 Mid denied it in a violent and insulting manner 
 
 t \ i*? 2 16Niles. 33. 8 8 Adams. 238-9 
 
08 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 In the spring of 1821 Jackson was appointed Gov 
 ernor of Florida, under the belief that the public would 
 be glad to see him so honored. On July 21st of the 
 same year he published general orders, 1 taking leave of 
 his army, a reduction having been made by which he 
 had been thrown out. In these orders, or in a post 
 script to them, he managed to come into collision with 
 his colleague and senior, Major-General Brown, then 
 chief in command of the army of the United States, by 
 taking up and criticising an order " signed Jacob 
 Brown," especially in regard to the punishment for 
 desertion. Brown was a New York militia general, 
 some eight years younger than Jackson, who had dis 
 tinguished himself, in the general ill-success of the war, 
 by some small successes on the northern frontier. He 
 seemed to be the coming military hero of the war until 
 he was eclipsed by Jackson. He took precedence of 
 Jackson by seniority of appointment, and so became 
 chief in command. It had become evident now that 
 Jackson needed much room in the world for all his 
 jealousies and animosities, and that his fellow-men must 
 put up with a great deal of arrogance and misbehavior 
 on his part. His popularity shielded him. He had 
 become a privileged person, like a great nobleman of 
 the last century. To offend him was to incur extraor 
 dinary penalties. To get in his \vay was to expose 
 one s self to assaults which could not be resented as 
 they would be if they came from another man. Ail 
 this he had won by military success. One is led, then, 
 to inquire, what was the measure of this military ser 
 vice ? It was but a little over two years of India! 
 tilting, with only one battle against a civilized foe 
 1 21 Niles, 53. 
 
GOVERNOR OF FLORIDA. 09 
 
 At least it seemed fair to expect that he would observe 
 military discipline and decorum. Bat he did not do so, 
 mid no one dared call him to account. 
 
 Congress did not have time to legislate for the terri 
 tory of Florida, after the treaty was ratified, before the 
 end of the session. An act was passed extending to tho 
 new territory only the revenue laws and the law against 
 the slave-trade. Jackson was appointed Governor in 
 April, with all the powers of the Captain-General of 
 Cuba and the Spanish Governors of Florida, except that 
 he could not lay taxes or grant land. His position was 
 therefore a very anomalous one, an American Gov 
 ernor, under Spanish law, of an American territory not 
 yet under the Constitution and laws of the United 
 States. Long delays, due to dilatoriness and inef 
 ficiency, postponed the actual cession until July 17th. 
 Meanwhile Jackson was chafing and fuming, and 
 strengthening his detestation of all Spaniards. 
 
 In September certain persons represented to Jackson 
 that papers which were necessary for the protection of 
 their interests were being packed up, and would be car 
 ried away by the Spanish ex-Governor, contrary to the 
 treaty. There were five or six sets of papers about 
 property and land grants l which were in demand. 
 There had been complaints against the Spaniards foi 
 granting lands belonging to the crown between the 
 making and the ratification of the treaty. Jackson no 
 doubt believed the worst against them. The persons 
 who claimed his aid were weak and poor. With charac 
 teristic chivalry and impetuosity he sent an officer to 
 ieize the papers. The ex-GoYer_or, Callava, refused 
 x> give up any papers unless they wert described, and 
 i 21 Nileu, 50. 
 
70 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 a demand for them was addressed to him as Spanish 
 commissioner. He and Jackson seem to have worked 
 at cross-purposes unnecessarily. It is hard to make 
 out what the misunderstanding was (although the use 
 of two languages might partly account for it), unlpse 
 Jackson was acting under his anti-Spanish bias. Jack 
 son ended by sending Callava to the calaboose. Parton, 
 who gives some special and interesting details derived 
 from Brackenridge, the alcalde and interpreter, says that 
 Callava saw the ridiculous side of the affair, and that 
 he and his friends " made a night of it " in the calaboose. 
 Jackson sent an officer to Callava s house to take the 
 papers, and then ordered Callava to be discharged. 
 
 Eligius Fromentin, of Louisiana, had been appointed 
 judge of the western district of Florida. He, upon 
 application, issued a writ of habeas corpus for Callava. 
 Jackson summoned Fromentin before him to show cause 
 why he had interfered with Jackson s authority as Gov 
 ernor of the Floridas with the powers of the Captain- 
 General of Cuba, as " Supreme Judge," and as tk Chan 
 cellor." Fromentin sent an excuse on the ground of 
 illness. The next day he went to see Jackson, and aftei 1 
 a fierce interview each prepared a " statement " to send 
 to Washington. Callava went to Washington to seek 
 satisfaction. Some of his friends published, at Pensa 
 cola, a statement in his defence. Thereupon Jackson 
 ordered them out of Florida at four days notice, on 
 lain of arrest for contempt and disobedience, if thev 
 vere found there later. After all, the heirs of Vidal, 
 who stirred up the whole trouble, were, according to 
 Parton, indebted to the Forbes firm, against which they 
 ranted to protect themselves. 1 This would not affec> 
 1 2 Parton, 638. 
 
AFFAIR OF CALLAVA. 71 
 
 their right and interest in securing papers properly 
 theirs. Whether the papers were being carried away> 
 and did properly belong to the claimants, is not known. 1 
 
 About the time of the trouble with Callava, Worth- 
 ington, the Secretary and acting Governor of East Flor 
 ida, was having a contest with Coppinger, the Spanish 
 Governor of East Florida, about papers which the former 
 seized under Jackson s orders. 
 
 Here, then, was another trouble which Jackson had 
 prepared in about six months service for his unhappy 
 superiors. He was ill and disgusted with his office. 
 He resigned and went home in October. It is plain 
 that he had acted from a good motive against Callava, 
 and, being sure of his motive, he had disregarded diplo 
 matic obligations, evidence, law, propriety, and forms 
 of procedure. Those things only enraged him because 
 they balked him of the quick purpose, born of his sense 
 of justice and of his sympathy with an ex parte appeal 
 to his power. Such a man is a dangerous person to be 
 endowed with civil power. As to his quarrel with Fro- 
 mentin, it was a farce. If Jackson had been a man of 
 any introspection, he must have had, ever after, more 
 sharity for the whole class of Spanish governors, when 
 he saw what an arrogant fool he had made of himself 
 while endowed with indefinite and irresponsible power. 
 
 Monroe s cabinet unanimously agreed that, as the only 
 laws which had been extended to Florida were the rev- 
 enue laws and those against the slave-trade, Fromentin s 
 jurisdiction was limited to those laws, 2 and he could not 
 
 1 All the documents are in Folio State Papers, 2 Miscdlan 
 99. The important papers are in 21 Niles. 
 
 3 For Fromcntin s own thec 7 of bis action, which was plainly 
 *rroneous, see 21 Niles, 252. 
 
72 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 issue a writ of habeas corpus. The President, Calhoun, 
 and Wirt thought that he was not amenable for his er 
 ror to Jackson. Adams took Jackson s part in thia 
 matter also. He said that Fromentin had violated Jack 
 son s authority. 1 The cabinet discussed the subject for 
 three days without reaching a decision. They were 
 greatly perplexed as to the law and justice of the mat 
 ter, and also as to its political effect. Congress took h 
 up, and the newspapers were filled with it. At first tho 
 tide of opinion was against Jackson, but his popularity 
 reacted against it, and the affair did not hurt him. 
 
 In 1823 Jackson was offered the mission to Mexico. 
 He declined it. Soon afterwards he published in the 
 Mobile " Register " a letter stating his reasons for de 
 clining. These reasons were a reflection on the adminis 
 tration, because they showed cause why no mission ought 
 to be sent. The letter was calculated to win capital out 
 of the appointment at the expense of the administra 
 tion which had made it. 2 Monroe must have been often 
 reminded of what Jefferson said to him, in 1818, when 
 he asked whether it would not be wise to give Jackson 
 the mission to Russia : " Why, good G d, he would 
 breed you a quarrel before he had been there a month ! " " 
 
 1 5 Adams, 359, 368 to 380. a 34 Nilea, 280. 
 
 * 4 Adams, 76. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 ELECTION OP 1824. 
 
 THE congressional caucus met April 8, 1820. The 
 question was whether to nominate any candidates for 
 President and Vice-President. Adams says that the 
 caucus was called as part of a plan to nominate Clay 
 for Vice-President. About forty members of Congress 
 attended. R. M. Johnson offered a resolution that it 
 was inexpedient to nominate candidates. This resolu 
 tion was adopted, and the caucus adjourned. 1 Monroe 
 received, at the election, every electoral vote save one, 
 which was cast by Plumer, in New Hampshire, for 
 Adams. Tomkins was reflected Vice-President, but he 
 received fourteen less votes than Monroe. His repu 
 tation was declining. In raising money for the pub 
 lic service during the war he had engaged his own 
 security. His book-keeping was bad, and his accounts 
 and the public accounts became so entangled that he 
 could not separate them. 2 On the one hand, he claimed 
 that he was a creditor and heavy loser by the steps 
 which he had taken out of patriotic zeal for the pub 
 lic service, which steps had been of great benefit to 
 the country. On the other hand, the controller of the 
 State of New York found that Tomkins could not ac 
 count for all the money which had passed through his 
 hands, and which amounted to over three million dol 
 1 5 Adams, S8, 60. 2 1 Hammond, 508 fg. 
 
74 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 lars. The affair was immediately entangled in the fac 
 tion fights of New York, the Bucktails taking sides with 
 Tomkins, and the Clintonians against him. The con 
 troller of the State and the Vice-President of the United 
 States were engaged, in 1818 and 1819, in a bitter cor 
 respondence. 1 Tomkins became bankrupt, and acquired 
 the reputation of a defaulter. Finally, in 1821, an act 
 was passed by the state Legislature to balance his ac 
 counts without payment either way. 2 He was not able 
 for some years to draw his salary as Vice-President, 
 because he stood a defaulter also on the books of the 
 federal treasury. He stood a suit in 1822 in the United 
 States District Court and won it. 8 In 1823 a qpmmittee 
 of the House reported in his favor, 4 and an act appropri 
 ating $35,190 for his relief was passed. In April, 1824, 
 Monroe sent in a message, the matter having been re 
 ferred to him, in which he found $60,239 6 due Tom 
 kins. The trouble was that, in order to show himself a 
 creditor, Tomkins had to include in his accounts interest, 
 commissions, damages, allowances, etc., with interest on 
 them all ; that is, all the ordinary and extraordinary 
 charges which a broker would make for finding funds 
 lor an embarrassed client. If these charges were all 
 allowed, Tomkins could claim no credit for patriotism. 
 If he was to keep the credit of extraordinary patriotism, 
 he was a debtor. In 1816 he was very popular and had 
 high hopes of the presidency. In 1825 he retired neg 
 lected and forgotten. He died in June, 1825. 
 
 During Monroe s second term each of the persona 
 factions was intriguing on behalf of its chief, and striv 
 
 1 15 Niles, 425 ; 17 Niles, 21. 2 1 Hammond, 542. 
 
 22 Niles, 242. 4 23 Niles, 406. 
 
 26 Niles, 168 
 
TARIFF IN 1820. 76 
 
 ing to kill off all the others. There were no real issues. 
 On the return of peace in 1815, the industries which had 
 grown up here during the war to supply needs, which 
 could not, under the then existing laws, be supplied 
 by importation, found themselves threatened with ruin. 
 The tariff of 1816, although its rates were of course far 
 below the " double duties " which had been levied dur 
 ing the war, was supposed at the time to be amply pro 
 tective. It had been planned to that end. The embargo, 
 non-intercourse, and war had created entirely artificial 
 circumstances, which were a heavy burden on the na 
 tion as a whole, but which had given security and favor 
 to certain manufacturing industries. There was no way 
 to " protect " the industries after peace returned except 
 to reproduce by taxes the same hardship for everybody 
 else, and the same special circumstances for the favored 
 industries, as had been produced by embargo and war. 
 In 1819 a great commercial crisis occurred, which pros 
 trated all the industry of the country for four or five 
 years. So long as vicious and depreciated currencies 
 existed in Europe, there was less penalty for a vicious 
 currency here ; but as fast as European currencies im 
 proved after the return of peace, gold and silver began 
 to go to the countries of improving currency, and away 
 from the countries where the currency still remained 
 bad. The " hard times " were made an argument to 
 show that more protection was needed ; that is, that the 
 country had been prosperous during war, and that the 
 return of peace had ruined it, unless taxes could be de 
 vised which should press as hard as the war had done. 
 The taxes had not indeed been made so heavy as that, 
 and so more were needed. Currency theorists also arose 
 to anticipate all the wisdom of *ater days. JTii-y proved 
 
"6 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 -hat <ae people of the United States, with a great conti 
 nent at their disposal, could not get out of the continent 
 an abundance of food, clothing, shelter, and fuel be 
 cause they had not enough bits of paper stamped " one 
 dollar" at their disposal. The currency whims, how 
 ever, hardly got into politics at that period. 
 
 In 1820 a strong attempt was made to increase the 
 tariff, to do away with credit for duties, and to put a 
 check on sales at auction. As the presidential election 
 was uncontested, power to carry these bills could not be 
 concentrated. In 1824 the case was different. No fac 
 tion dared vote against the higher tariff for fear of losing 
 support. 1 The tariff was not, therefore, a party ques 
 tion. The act was passed May 22, 1824, by a combi 
 nation of Middle and Western States against New Eng 
 land, and on a combination of the iron, wool, hemp, 
 whiskey, and sugar interests. New England, as the 
 commercial district, was then for free trade. 
 
 Jackson had been elected to the Senate in the winter 
 of 1823-24. Parton brings the invaluable testimony of 
 William B. Lewis as to the reason why and the way in 
 which Jackson was elected. 2 John Williams had been 
 senator. His term expired. He was an opponent of 
 Jackson. He was a candidate for reelection, and was 
 so strong that no Jackson man but Jackson himself 
 could defeat him. Hence the men who were planning 
 to make Jackson President, of whom Lewis was the 
 chief, secured Jackson s election to the Senate. While 
 the tariff question was pending, a convenient person 
 Dr. Coleman, of Warrenton, Va. was found to in 
 torrogate Jackson about it. His letter in reply was the 
 first of the adroit letters or manifestoes by means a 
 1 24 Niles, 324. 2 3 Parton, 21. 
 
WIRE-P UL L ING 7 7 
 
 frhich the Jackson managers carried on the campaign in 
 Jackson s favor. They developed this art of electioneer 
 ing in a way then not conceived of by other factions. 
 The Colemaii letter was a model letter of its kind. It 
 said nothing clear or to the point on the matter in ques 
 tion. It used some ambiguous phrases which the reader 
 could interpret to suit his own taste. It muddled the 
 question by contradictory suggestions, bearing upon it 
 from a greater or less distance, and from all points of 
 view, and it failed not to introduce enough glittering 
 platitudes to make the whole pass current. Jackson 
 voted for the tariff and for a number of internal im 
 provement schemes, which votes were afterwards quoted 
 against him. 1 
 
 Jackson was therefore fairly started as a candidate 
 for the presidency. Among all the remarkable acci 
 dents which opened his way to the first position in the 
 country, it was not the least that he had William B. 
 Lewis for a neighbor and friend. Lewis was the great 
 father of the wire-pullers. He first practised in a mas 
 terly and scientific way the art of starting movements, 
 apparently spontaneous, at a distance, and in a quarter 
 from which they win prestige or popularity, in order 
 that these movements may produce, at the proper time 
 and place, the effects intended by the true agent, who, 
 in the mean time, prepares to be acted on by the move 
 ment in the direction in which, from the beginning, he 
 desired to go. On this system political activity is ren 
 dered theatrical. The personal initiative is concealed. 
 There is an adjustment of ro/vs, a mise en scene, and 
 ft constant consideration of effect Each person acts on 
 the other in prearranged wavs. i^ues are given and 
 1 38 Niles, 285. 
 
78 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 taken, and the effect depends on the fidelity of eacl 
 to his part. The perfection of the representation is 
 reached when the audience or spectators are disre 
 garded until the finale, when the chief actor, having 
 reached the denoument towards which he and his com 
 rades have so long been laboring, comes to the foot 
 lights and bows to the "will of the people." Lewis 
 showed great astuteness in his manoeuvres. There was 
 nothing vulgar about him. There was a certain breadth 
 of generalship about his proceedings. He was very far- 
 sighted and prudent. He had the great knowledge re 
 quired by the wire-puller, knowledge of men. He 
 knew the class amongst whom Jackson s popularity was 
 strongest. He knew their notions, prejudices, tastes, 
 and instincts. He knew what motives to appeal to. He 
 wrote very well. When he wanted to go straight to a 
 point he could do so. When he wanted to produce 
 effects or suggest adroitly, without coming to the point, 
 he could do that too. He also knew Jackson well. He 
 no doubt sincerely loved and admired Jackson. He 
 threw his whole soul into the undertaking to elect Jack- 
 Bon, but he never showed any selfish or interested pur 
 poses in that connection. So long as Jackson was unin 
 formed or unprejudiced on any matter he was at the 
 disposition of any one who had won his confidence, and 
 who desired to influence him on that matter. He could 
 then be led to accept any view of it which was put be 
 fore him in a way to strike his mind. Lewis knew how 
 to put a thing before Jackson s mind. However, when 
 Jackson had adopted any view or notion, his mind be 
 came set or biassed, and it was not easy, even for those 
 \vho first influenced him, to deflect his mind from rigid 
 ity of inference, or his conduct from direct deduction 
 
PROJECT TO NOMINATE JACKSON. 79 
 
 tie often outstripped the wishes and intentions of those 
 who had moved him first. To contradict him, at that 
 stage, would have been to break friendship. Lewis 
 treated him with great tact and influenced him very 
 often, but he did not control him or manage him. It 
 would have been a good thing for the country if no 
 worse man than Lewis had ever gained influence over 
 Jackson. 
 
 Parton obtained from Lewis a description of the first 
 steps -towards Jackson s nomination. Lewis tells how 
 he used Jackson s letters to Monroe to win influential 
 federalists to Jackson s support. It was after Jack 
 son s return from Florida, in 1821, that the project was 
 definitely decided upon. At first Jackson rejected, with 
 some temper, the suggestion that he could or would run 
 for President. He did not consider himself the right 
 Bort of man, and he felt old and ill. In the spring of 
 1822 Lewis went to North Carolina, and worked up his 
 connections there for Jackson. On the 20th of July, 
 1822, the Tennessee Legislature made the formal nom 
 ination. During the next two years Jackson s sup 
 porters were gaining connections and undermining the 
 caucus, for he was an independent candidate and a 
 " disorganize! ," because he was raised up outside of 
 the machine, and without any consultation with the es 
 tablished party authorities. 
 
 Certain features of Jackson s character have appeared 
 already. We have seen some of his elements of strength 
 and some of his faults. The- nation wanted to reward 
 him for military achievements and tor a display of mil- 
 .tary virtues. They had discarded dukedoms, pensions, 
 ribbons, and orders, and they had no sign of national 
 gratitude to employ but election to civil office. So far 
 
80 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 Jackson had not made public display of any qualities but 
 those of a military man, and violence, indiscretion, obsti 
 nacy, and quarrelsomeness. In the campaign, those who 
 opposed him called him a " murderer." The only in 
 cidents of his life which the biographer can note, aside 
 from his military service, are successive acts of impro 
 priety and bad judgment. Negatively, however, there 
 was more to be said for Jackson. He was above every 
 species of money vice ; he was chaste and domestic in 
 his habits ; l he was temperate in every way ; ke was 
 not ambitious in the bad sense. 
 
 There were already four other candidates in the field, 
 who all belonged to the democratic-republican party. 
 Niles gives an instance in which seven democrats met 
 at Philadelphia, who all were for Schulze, the democratic 
 candidate for Governor. Each candidate for President 
 had a supporter among them, and no candidate had 
 over two. 2 De Witt Clinton was not altogether out of 
 consideration. A caucus of the South Carolina Legisla 
 ture nominated Lowndes. 8 
 
 John Quincy Adams stood first among the candi 
 dates by his public services and experience. He was 
 fifty-seven years old. He went to Europe with his 
 father when he was eleven years old, and studied there 
 for several years. He was, through his father, intimate 
 from his earliest youth with public and diplomatic af 
 fairs. As far as education and early training could go, 
 he had the best outfit for a statesman and diplomat. He 
 enjoyed great respect. Those who thought that a man 
 ought to advance to the presidency through lower grade* 
 of public employment looked upon him as the most sui* 
 
 1 The only contrary suggestion known is in Binns, 245. 
 24 Niles, 369. 8 i Adams, 468. 
 
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS. 81 
 
 able candidate. He was not a man of genius, but one 
 of wide interests, methodical habits, and indefatigable 
 industry. It is hard to see what he ever did, from his 
 earliest youth, for amusement and entertainment. He 
 would have been a better statesman if he had been more 
 frivolous. He was unsocial in his manners, had few 
 friends, and repelled those who would have been his 
 friends. So far as we can learn, he engaged in no in 
 trigues for the presidency. He certainly had the small 
 est and least zealous corps of workers. His weakness 
 was that the great body of the voters did not have any 
 feeling that a man with the qualifications which he pos 
 sessed was needed for the presidential office. He had 
 been a democrat since 1807, when he went over to the 
 administration party because he believed that the New 
 England federalists were plotting secession. His sound 
 ness in " democratic principles " was doubted. He 
 was earnestly disliked by all the active politicians. In 
 the campaign he was called a " tory." Adams was 
 charged with offering, at Ghent, to yield to the English 
 the right of navigating the Mississippi, if they would 
 renew the rights to fish in Canadian waters ; that is, 
 with offering to sacrifice a Western interest to serve an 
 Eastern one. He published a small volume to expose 
 the untruth of this charge and the character of the evi 
 dence by which it was supported. 1 In his own opinion, 
 this attack helped him. 2 He was in favor of the tar 
 iff as it stood in 1824. He thought that it gave enough 
 protection. He was also in favor of internal improve 
 ments, but thought they might be abused. 8 He was ao 
 
 * The Duplicate Letters, ;he Fisheries and the Mississippi. 
 
 * 6 Adams, 263. 
 
 * 6 Adams, 353, 451 
 
82 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 eased of undemocratic care for etiquette, and also ol 
 slovenliness in dress. 
 
 Calhoun enjoyed great popularity in New England, 
 in New York city, and in Pennsylvania, as well as at 
 home. He was forty -two years old, and was the " young 
 men s candidate." He had actively favored the tariff oi 
 1816 and the bank, and also plans for internal improve 
 ments. In October, 1822, Adams wrote : " Calhoun 
 has no petty scruples about constructive powers and 
 state rights." 1 Calhoun and Adams had been strong 
 friends, and there was some idea of putting Calhoun on 
 the ticket with Adams until 1822, when some members 
 of Congress nominated Calhoun for President. 2 Web 
 ster preferred Calhoun to all the other candidates. 3 His 
 brother wrote that Calhoun was the second choice of 
 New Hampshire. 4 Calhoun took the War Department 
 in 1817, when it was in great disorder. He had to bear 
 a great deal of abuse before he got it in order, but later 
 he was much praised for the system he had introduced. 6 
 He and Crawford were especial rivals, because Crawford 
 was the " regular " Virginia and Southern candidate. 
 In 1822 attempts were made to injure Calhoun by an 
 investigation of a contract for building the Rip Raps at 
 Old Point Comfort. The contract was private, not com 
 petitive. He was exonerated by a committee of the 
 House. 6 As we shall see, Calhoun withdrew his nain* 
 before the election. 
 
 1 6 Adams, 75. 2 6 Adams, 42. 
 
 3 1 Curtis s Webster, 218, 236. 
 
 * I Webster s Correspondence, 323. 
 
 6 28 Niles 5C. Adams thought this praise undeserved. (7 Ad 
 tins, 446.) 
 
 22 Niles. 251. 
 
WILLIAM HARRIS CRA W FORJ. S3 
 
 Crawford was the regular candidate. He was fifty- 
 two years old. In 1798 he had been an " Addresser/ 
 that is, an orthodox federalist. 1 He had also been a 
 supporter of the old bank, and had been the leader in 
 the Senate for the renewal of its charter. He had also 
 opposed the embargo. 2 He had been very eagerly work 
 ing for eight years to reach the presidency. In the 
 campaign he was called an " intriguer." As Secretary 
 of the Treasury during the crisis of 1819, he had a very 
 difficult task to perform. He had undertaken even 
 more than his duty required, for he had aimed to "do 
 justice " between the banks, and to keep them from en 
 croaching upon each other. To this end he distributed 
 his deposits, and in some cases favored certain banks. 
 When the crash came his funds were locked up in some 
 of these banks. He was then open to the charge, which 
 Ninian Edwards made over the signature " A. B.," 
 that he had used the treasury funds to win political 
 capital, and had corruptly put the funds in unsound 
 banks. Crawford was exonerated by a committee of the 
 House, but he barely escaped ruin. 8 He introduced the 
 limited period of service, by the Act of May 15, 1820, 
 into the Treasury Department. This act limits the pe 
 riod of office of all persons engaged in collecting the rev 
 enue to four years, at the expiration of which time they 
 go out of office or come up for reappointment. 4 It is 
 one of the most important steps in the history of the 
 abuse of the civil service. Crawford was believed by 
 his colleagues to have sacrificed the administration to 
 make capital for himself. Adams says that Crawford 
 
 * 24 Niles, 132. * Cobb, 143 
 Folio State Papers ; 5 Finance, . 
 
 * f Adams, 424. 
 
84 AX DREW JACKSUfi. 
 
 and Monroe quarrelled to the verge of violence during 
 the last months of the administration. 1 In order to win 
 strength for Crawford, Van Buren was nominated for 
 Vice-President by the Legislature of Georgia. Thia 
 proposition was overwhelmed by ridicule. 3 Crawford 
 was physically disabled from September, 1823, to Sep 
 tember, 1824. He could not sign his name, and was 
 apparently a wieck. He used a fac-simile stamp on 
 public papers, or it was used by a member of his family 
 under his direction. 
 
 Clay had already assumed the championship of the 
 protective system. He had been one of the strongest op 
 ponents of the re-charter of the first bank. He had also 
 made " sympathy with nations struggling for liberty " 
 one of his points, and had been zealous for the recog 
 nition of the South American republics. He was a 
 great party leader. He had just the power to win men 
 to him and to inspire personal loyalty which Adams 
 had not. On the other hand he lacked industry. He 
 was eloquent, but he never mastered any subject which 
 required study. His strength lay in facility and practical 
 tact. He was forty-seven years old. He was stigma 
 tized as a " gambler " by his opponents in the campaign. 
 From 1820 to 1823 he was not in public life, but was 
 retrieving his private fortunes. His enemies said that 
 his affairs had been embarrassed by gambling. He was 
 Speaker from 1815 to 1820, and again from 1823 to 
 1825. He was one of the commissioners who made tlio 
 treaty of Ghent. 
 
 The Crawford men wanted a congressional caucus ir 
 I S24, because they had control of the machine. The 
 uipporters of the other candidates opposed any caucus 
 1 7 Adams, 81. 2 Cobb, 209. 
 
CAUCUS OF 1824. 85 
 
 but secretly, because the caucus was now an established 
 institution. The opponents of the caucus found a strong 
 ally in Niles, who opened fire on the caucus in his 
 " Register " without any reserve. His sincerity and 
 singleness of purpose are beyond question. He did not 
 use his paper to support any candidate. He was an old 
 Jeffersonian republican of 1798, and he believed sin 
 cerely in all the "principles." He assailed the caucus, 
 because in his view it usurped the right of the people to 
 govern themselves. He denounced it steadily for more 
 than a year, and he succeeded in casting odium upon it. 
 The Legislatures of New York and Virginia passed reso 
 lutions in favor of a caucus, because these two States, 
 while united, could control the presidency through the 
 caucus. New York being rent by democratic faction 
 fights, and Virginia being led by a close oligarchy, New 
 York became an appendage to Virginia in their co 
 alition. Tennessee, South Carolina, Alabama, and Ma 
 ryland adopted resolutions against the caucus. The 
 Legislature of Pennsylvania declared against a " partial 
 caucus." l As the time for the caucus approached, ne 
 gotiations for bargains between the candidates became 
 active, but it would be tedious to gather the recorded 
 reports and rumors of such transactions. 
 
 The caucus met in the chamber of the House of Rep 
 resentatives February 14, 1824. 2 Of 216 democrats in 
 Congress, 66 were present. Two, who were ill at home, 
 sent proxies. If proxies were allowable, the members 
 of Congress, when assembled IE presidential caucus, 
 must have been regarded as independent powers, pos 
 sessed of a prerogative, like peers or sovereigns. The 
 ote was : Crawford, 64 ; A Jams, 2 ; Jackson, 1 ; Macon, 
 i 6 Aaams, 232. a 5 Niles, 388. 
 
86 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 1 : i. ., all but the Crawford men stayed away. Gal- 
 latin was nominated for Vice-President by 57 votes. 
 An address was published, defending the caucus, and 
 arguing its indispensability to the party. 1 Some ques 
 tion was raised about Gallatin s eligibility on account of 
 his foreign birth, but he possessed the alternative quali 
 fication allowed by the Constitution. He had been a 
 commissioner at Ghent and a friend of Crawford. Hid 
 nomination did not strengthen the ticket. There was 
 still a great deal of rancor against him for forsaking the 
 Treasury Department when the war broke out. He 
 soon withdrew his name because the caucus was so un 
 popular. 
 
 Martin Van Buren was chief engineer of this last con 
 gressional caucus. He was senator from New York. 
 He and his friends, under the new Constitution of 1821, 
 had established a very efficient party organization, which 
 they had well in hand. They were known as the 
 Regency, and they had renewed the alliance with Vir 
 ginia to control the machine and elect Crawford. A 
 project which threatened to mar their scheme was the 
 proposition, in 1823, to take the election of presidential 
 electors from the Legislature of New York and give it 
 to the people. The Regency-Tammany party opposed 
 this, as it would render useless all their machinery 
 The advocates of the change (being the opponents of 
 Crawford, Tammany, and the Regency), formed the 
 " people s party." Clinton was for Jackson, so he was 
 allied with the people s party against Crawford. Al 
 though Clinton was the soul of the canal enterprise, he 
 vas removed from his office of canal commissioner tc 
 fry to break up this combination. It would never d 
 1 25 Niles, 391. 
 
INTRIGUES IN NEW YORK. 87 
 
 for the Regency to oppose directly and openly a propo 
 sition to give the election to the people. When the law 
 was proposed, the Regency managed to twist it into such 
 preposterous shape that a general ticket was to be voted 
 for, and if there should not be a majority (which, with 
 four in the field, was a very probable result) the State 
 would lose its vote. The bill passed the House, but was 
 defeated in the Senate. 1 The popular indignation was 
 BO great that the next Legislature was carried by the 
 people s party, and a joint ticket of electors was elected, 
 on which were 25 Adams men, 7 Clay men, and 4 
 Crawford men. 2 Some of them must have changed 
 their votes before the election. 
 
 A federalist convention at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 
 February 22, 1824, nominated Jackson. 8 At a primary 
 meeting at Philadelphia, Dallas withdrew Calhoun s 
 name from the first place and nominated him for the 
 second. Calhoun was strong in Pennsylvania, but Jack 
 Bon had superseded him. This move was a coalition of 
 Jackson and Calhoun. The democratic convention at 
 Harrisburg, March 4th, was stampeded for Jackson. 
 Only one vote was given against him. 4 Another demo 
 cratic convention, called " regular," was convened Au 
 gust 9th. It repudiated Jackson and adhered to Craw 
 ford. 6 Jackson and his followers were denounced as 
 " disorganizes." The Albany " Argus " said of Jackson, 
 " It is idle in this State, however it may be in others, to 
 strive even for a moderate support of Mr. Jackson. He 
 \s wholly out of the questior. as far as the votes of New 
 
 1 2 Hammond, If 2. 
 
 2 27 Niles, 186. Hammond statement is obscure. (See 9 
 ffwnmond, 177.) 3 1 Sargeiit, 41. 
 
 * 26 Niles. 20. 6 I Sargent, 4S. 
 
88 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 York are in it. Independently of the disclosures of hii 
 political opinions, he could not be the republican candi 
 date. He is respected as a gallant soldier, but he stands, 
 in the minds of the people of this State, at an immeasur 
 able distance from the executive chair." * After the 
 " Argus " changed its mind about Jackson, any one who 
 held the very judicious opinion embodied in this para 
 graph was regarded by it as a " federalist," which was 
 as much as to say, an enemy of the American people. 
 Niles says that John Randolph opposed Jackson in a 
 public speech in 1822 because he was the candidate of 
 the Bank of the United States, and his election would 
 unite " the purse and the sword." 2 Jefferson said, " I 
 feel very much alarmed at the prospect of seeing Gen 
 eral Jackson President. He is one of the most unfit 
 men I know of for the place. He has had very little 
 respect for laws or constitutions, and is, in fact, an able 
 military chief. His passions are terrible. . . . He 
 has been much tried since I knew him, but he is a dan 
 gerous man." On the contrary, Jackson s courtly 
 bearing won for him all the ladies. Webster wrote, 
 " General Jackson s manners are more presidential than 
 those of any of the candidates. He is grave, mild, and 
 reserved. My wife is for him decidedly." 4 Jackson s 
 friends induced him to have a kind of reconciliation 
 with Scott, Clay, and Benton. The last was a supportei 
 of Clay, but when Clay was out of the contest he turned 
 to Jackson. 5 Adams says that Benton joined Jackson 
 ifter Jackson s friends obtained for him the nominatior 
 
 1 Quoted 49 Niles, 188. 2 22 NMes, 73. 
 
 3 1 Webster s Correspondence, 371. 
 * 1 Webster s Correspondence, 346. 
 He went first to Crawford, then to Jackson. (Cobb, SIS., 
 
VOTE OF 1824. 89 
 
 48 minister to Mexico. When Adams came in he would 
 not ratify the appointment. 1 During the winter some 
 sort of a peace was made between Jackson and Craw 
 ford. 2 
 
 The result of the electoral vote was : Jackson, 99 ; 
 Adams, 84 ; Crawford, 41 ; Clay, 37. For Vice-Presi- 
 dent the vote was : Calhoun, 182 ; Sanford, 30 ; Macon, 
 24 ; Jackson, 13 ; Van Buren, 9 ; Clay, 2 ; blank, 1. 
 New York voted : Jackson, 1 ; Adams, 26 ; Crawford, 
 5 ; Clay, 4. The electors were chosen by the Legislature 
 in Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, New York, South 
 Carolina, and Vermont. In the other States the popular 
 vote stood (in round numbers) : Jackson, 155,800 , 
 Adams, 105,300; Crawford, 44,200; Clay, 46,500. 
 The second choice of Clay s States (Ohio, Kentucky, 
 and Missouri) was Jackson. In Pennsylvania Jackson 
 had 36,000 votes, and all the others together had less 
 than 12,000. Only about one third of the vote of the 
 State was polled, because it was known that Jackson 
 would carry it overwhelmingly. 8 
 
 The intriguing for the election now entered on a new 
 stage. Clay was out of the contest in the House, but 
 he had great influence there, and it has often been as 
 serted that the House would have elected him if his 
 name had come before it as one of the three highest. 
 He was courted by all parties. It would be tedious to 
 collect the traces of various efforts to form combinations. 
 The truth seems to be this : Washington was filled dur 
 ing the winter with persons, members of Congress and 
 others, who were under great excitement about the 
 election. All sorts of busybodbs were running about 
 
 1 f. Adams, 522. a 6 Adams, 478, 485. 
 
 27 NiUs, 18C. 
 
ANDREW JACK SOU. 
 
 talking and planning, and proposing what seemed to 
 each to be good. Persons who were in Washington, 
 and were cognizant of some one line of intrigue, 01 
 of the activity of some one person, have left records oi 
 what they saw or heard, and have vehemently main 
 tained each that his evidence gives the only correct 
 clew to the result. Every candidate s name is connected 
 with some intrigue, or some proposition for a coalition. 
 In no case is the proposition or intrigue brought home 
 to the principal party as a conscious or responsible par 
 ticipator, and yet it appears that the negotiations were 
 often of such a character that they could have been 
 taken up and adopted if they had proved satisfactory. 
 
 The election in the House took place February 9, 
 1825. On the first ballot, Adams obtained the votes of 
 thirteen States, Jackson of seven, and Crawford of four. 
 For the first few days Jackson seemed to bear his defeat 
 good-naturedly. He met Adams on the evening of the 
 election at the President s reception, and bore himself 
 much the better of the two. 1 
 
 It was soon rumored that Clay was to be Secretary of 
 State. After a few days Clay accepted that post. The 
 charge of a corrupt bargain between Clay and Adams 
 was then started. It was an inference from Clay s ap 
 pointment, and nothing more. Any man can judge to 
 day as well as any one could in 1824 whether that fact 
 leads straight and necessarily to that inference. Not a 
 particle of other evidence ever was alleged. We have 
 naver had any definition of the proper limits of combi 
 nations, bargains, and pledges in politics, but an agree- 
 ment to make Clay Secretary of State, if made, could 
 not be called a corrupt bargain. He was such a rnai 
 i Cobb, 226. 
 
CHARGE OF CORRUPT BARGAIN. 91 
 
 that he was a fit and proper person for the place. No 
 one would deny that. Therefore no public interest 
 would be sacrificed or abused by his appointment. A 
 corrupt bargain must be one in which there is collusion 
 for private gain at the expense of the public welfare. 
 Bargains which avoid this definition must yet be toler 
 ated in all political systems, although they impair the 
 purity of any system. 
 
 The men around Jackson Eaton, Lewis, Livingston, 
 Lee, Swartwout knew the value of the charge of 
 corrupt bargain for electioneering purposes, and the 
 political value of the appeal to Jackson s supporters 
 on the ground that he had been cheated out of his 
 election. Did not they first put the idea into Jackson s 
 head that he had been cheated by a corrupt bargain ? 
 Is not that the explanation of his change of tone from 
 the lofty urbanity of the President s assembly to the 
 rancorous animosity of a few days afterwards ? Such a 
 conjecture fits all the circumstances and all the charac 
 ters. The men around Jackson might see the value^ of 
 the charge, and use it, without ever troubling themselves 
 to define just how far they believed in it ; but Jackson 
 would not do that. Such a suggestion would come to 
 him like a revelation, and his mind would close on it 
 with a solidity of conviction which nothing ever could 
 shake. 
 
 Benton always scouted the notion of the bargain. 1 
 He says that he knew before Adams did, that Clay in 
 tended to vote for A lams. Benton would not follow 
 Clay. Clay s reason for voting for Adams was that 
 Crawford was incapacitated by his broken health, 2 and 
 
 1 1 Benton, 48. 
 
 * Crawford was taken to -he Capitol for a few hours, a day or 
 
92 ANDREW JACKSOK. 
 
 that a military hero was not a fit person to be President 
 January 8th Clay wrote to F. P. Blair 1 that the friends 
 of all the candidates were courting him, hut that ha 
 should vote for Adams. January 24th Clay and the ma 
 jority of the Ohio and Kentucky delegations declared 
 that they would vote for Adams. In a letter to F. 
 Brooke, January 28, 1825, Clay stated that he would 
 vote for Adams for the reasons given. 2 The Clay men 
 generally argued that if Jackson was elected he would 
 keep Adams in the State Department. It would then 
 be difficult, in 1828, to elect Clay, another Western 
 man ; but Adams would have more strength. If Adams 
 should be elected in 1824, the election of Clay, as a 
 Western man, in 1828, would be easier, especially if Ad 
 ams would give him the Secretaryship. 8 On the 25th of 
 January, the day after the Western delegations came out 
 for Adams, an anonymous letter appeared in the " Co 
 lumbian Observer," of Philadelphia, predicting a bar 
 gain between Adams and Clay. Kremer, member of 
 the House from Pennsylvania, avowed his responsibility 
 for the letter, although it has generally been believed 
 that he could not have written it. Clay demanded an 
 investigation in the House, and a committee was raised, 
 but Kremer declined to answer them. The letter was 
 Another case of the general device of laying down anch 
 ors for strains which would probably need to be ex 
 erted later. It would not do for Kremer to admit that 
 
 two before the election, but he was apparently a wreck. (Gobi 
 818.) 
 
 1 Blair and Kendall, in 1824, were Clay men. They were botl 
 ictive, <n 1825, in urging Clay men to vote for Adams. (40 Nilei 
 73; Telegraph Extra, 300 fg.) 
 
 9 27 Nilas, 386. Telegraph Extra. 381- 
 
ADAMS AND CLAY. 93 
 
 the assertion in the letter was only a surmise of his. It 
 eertainly was a clever trick. The charge would either 
 prevent Clay from going into Adams s cabinet, lest he 
 should give proofs of the truth of the imputation, or, if 
 he did go into the cabinet, this letter would serve as a 
 kind of evidence of a bargain. Immediately after the 
 inauguration Kremer made this latter use of it in an 
 address to his constituents. 1 On the 20th of February 
 Jackson wrote a letter to Lewis, in which he affirmed 
 and condemned the bargain. Lewis published this letter 
 in Tennessee. February 22d Jackson wrote a letter to 
 Swartwout, in which he spoke very bitterly of Clay, and 
 resented Clay s criticism of him as a " military chief 
 tain." He sneered at Clay as not a military chieftain. 
 But he did not allege any bargain. Swartwout published 
 this letter in New York. 2 Both letters were plainly pre 
 pared by Jackson s followers for publication. Clay re 
 plied at the end of March in a long statement. 8 
 
 Jackson remained in Washington until the middle of 
 March. He was present at the inauguration, and pre 
 served all the forms in his public demeanor towards 
 Adams. 4 His rage was all directed against Clay. In 
 the Senate there were fifteen votes against Clay s con 
 firmation, but no charges were made there. 5 On his way 
 home Jackson scattered the charge as he went. It is to 
 his own lips that it is always traceable when it can be 
 brought home to anybody. Up to this time it is ques 
 tionable whether Jacksoy was more annoyed or pleased 
 it being run for President. Now that the element of 
 
 l 28 Niles, 21 2 28 Niles, 20. 
 
 8 28 Niles, 71 28 Niles, 19. 
 
 6 Branch made some allusions an 1 vague cc Timer ta. (33 Wilai 
 
94 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 personal contest was imported into the enterprise hia 
 whole being became absorbed in the determination to 
 achieve a victory. There was now a foe to be crushed 
 a revenge to be obtained for an injury endured. He 
 did not measure his words, and the charge gained ampli 
 tude and definiteness as he repeated it. In March, 1827, 
 Carter Beverly, of North Carolina, wrote to a friend an 
 account of a visit to Jackson, and a report of Jackson s 
 circumstantial assertion, at his own table, that Clay s 
 friends offered to support Jackson if Jackson would 
 promise not to continue Adams as Secretary of State. 
 Beverly s tetter was published at Fayetteville, North 
 Carolina. 1 In June Jackson wrote to Beverly an explicit 
 repetition over his own signature. 2 The charge had now 
 a name and a responsible person behind it, Jackson 
 himself. Clay at once called on him for his authorities 
 and proofs. Jackson named Buchanan as his authority. 8 
 Buchanan had been one of the active ones 4 that win 
 ter, but he had blundered. He now made a statement 
 which was not straightforward either way, but it did not 
 support Jackson s statement. He distinctly said that he 
 had never been commissioned by the Clay men for any 
 thing he said to Jackson about appointing Adams. 5 
 Clay then called on Jackson to retract, since his only 
 authority had failed. Jackson made no answer. He 
 never forgave Buchanan. In 1842 Carter Beverly 
 wrote to Clay that the charge had never been substan 
 tiated, and that he regretted having helped to spread it. 1 
 4.t Maysville, in 1843, Adams made a solemn denial oJ 
 
 i 32 Niles, 162. 2 32 Niles, 315. 
 
 J2 Niles, 415. 
 
 * Markley s Letter, 33 Niles, 167. 
 
 82 Nile*, 416. 61 NflM. 408 
 
ADAMS AND CLA Y 95 
 
 ihe charge. 1 May 3, 1844, Jackson reiterated the 
 charge in a letter to the " Nashville Union." He said : 
 " Of the charges brought against Mr. Adams and Mr. 
 Clay at that time I formed my opinions, as the country 
 at large did, from facts and circumstances which were 
 indisputable and conclusive, and I may add that this 
 opinion has undergone no change." 2 Of course this 
 means that he inferred the charge from Clay s appoint 
 ment, never had any other ground for it, and therefore 
 had as much ground in 1844 as in 1825. Clay never 
 escaped the odium of this charge while he lived. At 
 Lexington, Ky., in 1842, he said that he thought he 
 would have been wiser if he had not taken office under 
 Adams. 3 
 
 On the publication of Adams s "Diary," probably all 
 students of American political history turned to see 
 what relations with Clay were noted in the winter of 
 182425. Clay and Adams had never been intimate. 
 Their tastes were by no means congenial. There was 
 an " adjourned question of veracity " outstanding be 
 tween them, because Clay had given vague support to 
 the charge against Adams about the fisheries and the 
 Mississippi, and Adams had challenged him to produce 
 the proof which would impeach Adams s own story of 
 he negotiations at Ghent. Clay had never answered. 
 Jecember 17, 1824, Letcher, as one of Clay s nearest 
 friends, called on Adams. u The drift of all Letcher a 
 discourse was . . . that Clay would willingly support 
 me, if he could thereby serve himself, and the substance 
 ttf his meaning was that if Clay s friends could know 
 that he would have a prominent s^are in the administra 
 1 11 Adams, 431. ^ f6 Nile, 247. 
 
 2 Nilea, 291. 
 
96 ANDKEIV JACKSON. 
 
 tion, that might induce them to vote for me, even in the 
 face of instructions. But Letcher did not profess to 
 have any authority from Clay for what he said, and he 
 made no definite propositions." ]l January 1, 1825, Clay 
 and Adams met by Letcher s intervention. Adams re 
 corded in 1828 2 that Letcher told him, January 2, 1825, 
 that Kentucky would vote for him. January 9th Clay 
 told Adams that he should vote for him, arid said that 
 Crawford s friends and Adams s friends had approached 
 him with personal considerations. January 21st Scott, 
 of Missouri, who held the vote of that State, told Ad 
 ams that he wanted Clay to be in the administration. 
 Adams replied that he could give no assurances, but 
 that, in looking for a Western man, he could not over 
 look Clay. On the same day, in answer to fears that 
 he would proscribe the federalists, he answered that he 
 would try to break up the old parties. February 3d Web 
 ster called on Adams about the proscription of the feder 
 alists. 8 Adams said that he could give no assurances 
 about his cabinet, but would try to harmonize parties. 4 
 
 The Jackson men found another grievance in the elec 
 tion of Adams. They revived a doctrine which had 
 been advocated in 1801, to the effect that the House of 
 Representatives ought simply to carry out " the will of 
 the people," as indicated by the plurality vote. Benton 
 is the chief advocate of this doctrine. 6 He faces all 
 
 l 6 Adams, 447. 2 7 Adams, 462. 
 
 The federalists all hated Adams for "ratting." In 1828 
 Timothy Pickering was a Jackson man ; not that he loved de- 
 uocracy more, out that he hated Jackson less. (34 Niles, 246/ 
 
 4 1 Curtis s Webster, 237. 
 
 * 31 Niles, 98, gives a homely but very pungent criticism o 
 Bentc-i s doctrine. It consists in showing what the " will of th 
 people " is, when the state divisions, Senate equality, and negw 
 representation are taken into account. 
 
DEMOCRACY VERSUS THE CONSTITUTION 97 
 
 Ihe consequences of it without flinching. He says 
 plainly that there was a struggle " between the theory 
 of the Constitution and the democratic principle." The 
 Constitution gives to the House of Representatives the 
 right and power to elect the President in a certain con 
 tingency. There is no provision at all in the Constitu 
 tion for the election of President by a great national 
 democratic majority. The elected President is the per 
 son who gets a majority of the votes constitutionally 
 described and cast, and the power and right of the House 
 of Representatives in the contingency which the Consti 
 tution provides for is just as complete as that of the 
 electoral college in all other cases. But the electoral 
 college by no means necessarily produces the selection 
 which accords with the majority of the popular vote. 
 The issue raised by Benton and his friends was there 
 fore nothing less than constitutional government versus 
 democracy. The Constitution does not put upon the 
 House the function of raising a plurality vote to a ma 
 jority, for the obvious reason that it would be simpler 
 to let a plurality elect. The Constitution provides only 
 specified ways for ascertaining " the will of the people," 
 and that will does not rule unless it is constitutionally 
 expressed. That is why we are, fortunately, under a 
 constitutional system, and not under an unlimited and 
 ever-changing democracy. Benton and those who agreed 
 with him we9, as he avows, making an assault on the 
 Constitution, when they put forward their doctrine of the 
 unction of the House. On that doctrine the Constitu- 
 ion is every one s tool while it answers his purposes, and 
 the sport of every faction which finds it an obstacle, if 
 they can only manage to carry in election. Their might 
 nd their right become one and the same thing, 
 
98 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 guarantees of each other. Such a doctrine is one of the 
 most pernicious political heresies. A constitution is tc 
 a nation what self-control under established rules of con 
 duct is to a man. The only time when it is of value i 
 just the time when the temptation to violate it is strong, 
 and that is the time when it contravenes temporary and 
 party interests. 
 
 In its practical aspects, also, the election of 1824 
 showed how pernicious and false Benton s doctrine is. 
 " The will of the people," to which he referred as par 
 amount, was an inference only. The moment we de 
 part from constitutional methods of ascertaining the will 
 of the people, we shall always be driven to inferences 
 which will, in the last analysis, be found to rest upon 
 nothing but party prejudices and party hopes. In the 
 vote of 1824 the facts were as follows : Clay s states 
 indicated, as their second choice, Jackson. Jackson s 
 friends inferred that, if Clay had not been running, 
 Jackson would have carried those States and would 
 have been elected. Going farther, however, we find 
 that in New Jersey and Maryland the Crawford men 
 supported Jackson to weaken Adams. In North Car 
 olina Adams men supported Jackson to weaken Craw 
 ford. In Louisiana, Adams men and Jackson men 
 combined to weaken Clay. 1 Hence. Jackson got the 
 whole or a part of the vote of these four States by bar 
 gain and combination. How many more undercurrents 
 of combination and secondary intention there may hav 
 been is left to conjecture. What then becomes of the 
 notion of " the will of the people," as some pure and 
 sacred emanation, only to be heard and obeyed ? Nc 
 election produces any such pure and sacred product, bu* 
 1 1 Annual Register, 40. 
 
DEMOCRACY VERSUS THE CONSTITUTION. 99 
 
 only a practical, most limited, imperfect, and approxi 
 mate expression of public opinion, by which we manage 
 to carry on public affairs. The " demos krateo princi 
 ple," to use Benton s jargon, belongs in the same cate 
 gory with Louis Fourteenth s saying : L etat c est moL 
 One is as far removed from constitutional liberty as 
 the other. 
 
 Crawford went home to Georgia, disappointed, broken 
 in health, his political career entirely ended. He re 
 covered his health to some extent. He became a cir 
 cuit judge, and gave to Calhoun, five years later, very 
 positive evidence that he was still alive. He died in 
 1834. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 ADAMS S ADMINISTRATION. 
 
 THE presidency underwent a great change at the elec 
 tion of 1824. The congressional caucus had, up to that 
 time, proceeded on the theory that the President was to 
 be a great national statesman who stood at the head 
 of his party, or among the leaders of it. There were 
 enthusiastic rejoicings that " King Caucus " was de 
 throned and dead. What killed the congressional cau 
 cus was the fact that, with four men running, the ad 
 herents of three of them were sure to combine against 
 the caucus, on account of the advantage which it would 
 give to the one who was expected to get its nomination. 
 However, it was a great error to say that King Caucus 
 was dead. Looking back on it now, we see that the 
 caucus had only burst the bonds of the chrysalis state 
 and entered on a new stage of life and growth. * 
 
 Jackson was fully recognized as the coming man. 
 There was no fighting against his popularity. The 
 shrewdest politician was he who should seize upon that 
 popularity as an available force, and prove capable of 
 controlling it for his purposes. Van Buren proved him 
 self to be the man for this function. He usurped the 
 position of Jackson leader in New York, which seemed by 
 priority to b >long to Clinton. He and the other Crawford 
 leaders had had a hard task to run a man who seemed 
 to be physically incapacitated for the duties of the pre 
 
THE OPPOSITION. J.01 
 
 iency, but when Crawford s health broke doAvn it was 
 too late for them to change the whole plan of their 
 campaign. After the election they joined the Jackson 
 party. The "era. of good feeling" had brought into 
 politics a large number of men, 1 products of the con 
 tinually advancing political activity amongst the least 
 educated classes, who were eager for notoriety and 
 spoils, for genteel living without work, and for public 
 position. These men were ready to be the janissaries 
 of any party which would pay well. They all joined the 
 opposition because they had nothing to expect from the 
 administration. All the factions except the Adams fac 
 tion, that is to say, all the federalists, and all the non- 
 Adams personal factions of the old republican party 
 went into opposition. These elements were very inco 
 herent in their political creeds and their political codes, 
 but they made common cause. 2 They organized at once 
 an opposition of the most violent and factious kind. 
 Long before any political questions arose, they devel 
 oped a determination to oppose to the last whatever 
 the administration should favor. They fought for four 
 years to make capital for the next election, as the chief 
 business of Congress. John Randolph, who by long 
 practice had become a virtuoso in abuse, exhausted his 
 powers in long tirades of sarcasm and sensational denun 
 ciations, chiefly against Clay. The style of smartness 
 which he was practising reached its climax when he 
 called the administration an alliance of Blifil and Black 
 George, the Puritan and the Black-leg. He and Clay 
 fought a duel, on which occasion, however, Randolph 
 
 * 3 Ann. Keg. 10 
 
 2 The new groupings caused intense astonishment to simple* 
 ninded observers. /See 32 tfiles, 339.) 
 
102 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 fired in the air. After Jackson s election, Randolph 
 was given the mission to Russia, and was guilty of a 
 number of the abuses which he had scourged most freely. 
 He had to endure hostile criticism, as a matter of course, 
 and he learned the misery of a public man forced to 
 make " explanations " under malignant charges. He 
 proved to be as thin-skinned as most men of his stamp 
 are when their turn comes. 1 
 
 Van Buren initiated the opposition into the methoda 
 and doctrines of New York politics. Ever since the 
 republicans wrested the State from the federalists in 
 1800, they had been working out the methods by which 
 an oligarchy of a half dozen leaders could, under the 
 forms of democratic-republican self-government, control 
 the State. As soon as the federalists were defeated, the 
 republicans broke up into factions. Each faction, when 
 it gained power, proscribed the others. Until 1821 the 
 patronage, which was the cohesive material by which 
 party organization was cemented, was in the hands of a 
 council " at Albany. After 1821 the patronage, by 
 way of reform, was converted into elective offices. It 
 then became necessary to devise a new system adapted 
 to this new arrangement, and all the arts by which the 
 results of primaries, conventions, committees, and cau 
 cuses, while following all the forms of spontaneous ac 
 tion, can be made to conform to the programme of the 
 oligarchy or the Boss, were speedily developed. If now 
 the presidency was no longer to be the crown of public 
 service, and the prize of a very limited number of states 
 men of national reputation, if it was conceivable that 
 an Indian fighter like Jackson could come within thf 
 of choice, then the presidency must be evea 
 * 2 Garland s Randolph, 339. 
 
THE SPOILS SYSTEM. 103 
 
 ifter the position reserved for popular heroes, or, in tht 
 absence of such, for " available " men, as the figure 
 heads with and around whom a faction of party leaders 
 eould come to power. King Caucus was not dead, then. 
 He had lost a town and gained an empire. It remained 
 to develop and extend over the whole country an or 
 ganization of which the public service should constitute 
 the network. There would be agents everywhere to re 
 ceive and execute orders, to keep watch, and to make 
 reports. The central authority would dispose of the 
 whole as a general disposes of his army. The general 
 of the " outs " recruited his forces from those who hoped 
 for places when the opposition should come in. As 
 there were two or three " outs " who wanted each place 
 held by those who were " in," recruits were not lacking. 
 It was during Adams s administration that the opposition 
 introduced on the federal arena the method of organiz 
 ing federal parties by the use of the spoils, which method 
 had been previously perfected in the state politics of 
 New York. 
 
 The opposition invented and set in action two or three 
 new institutions. They organized local Jackson com 
 mittees up and down the country, somewhat on the plan 
 if the old revolutionary committees of correspondence 
 and safety. It was the duty of these committees to 
 carry on a propaganda for Jackson, /to contradict and 
 refute charges against him, to make known his services, 
 to assail the administration, and to communicate facts, 
 arguments, reports, etc., to each other. Partisan news 
 paper writing was also employed to an unprecedented 
 extent. The partisan editor, who uses his paper to 
 reiterate and inculcate statements of fact and doctrine 
 iesigned to affect the mind of the voter, was not a new 
 
104 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 figure in politics, but now there appeared all over the 
 country small local newspapers, edited by men who as 
 sumed the attitude of party advocates, and pursued one 
 side only of all public questions, disregarding truth, 
 right, and justice, determined only to win. In 1826, at 
 Calhoun s suggestion, an " organ " was started at Wash 
 ington, the " Telegraph," edited by Duff Green, of Mis 
 souri. The organ gave the key to all the local party 
 newspapers. 
 
 Adams showed, in his inaugural, some feeling of the 
 unfortunate and unfair circumstances of his position. He 
 said, " Less possessed of your confidence in advance 
 than any of my predecessors, I am deeply conscious of 
 the prospect that I shall stand more and oftener in need 
 of your indulgence." In October the Legislature of 
 Tennessee nominated Jackson for 1828, and he ap 
 peared before the Legislature to receive an address and 
 to make a reply. He resigned the senatorship in a very 
 careful and well-written letter, 1 in which he urged (re 
 ferring, as everybody understood, to Clay s appointment) 
 that an amendment to the Constitution should be adopted 
 forbidding the appointment to an office in the gift of the 
 President of any member of Congress during, or for two 
 years after, his term of office in Congress. 2 In this let- 
 
 1 29 Mies, 156. 
 
 2 Robert G. Harper once testified in a court of law his personal 
 belief, founded on general knowledge and inference, that Burr 
 could have been elected in 1801 if he would have used "certain 
 means," and bis belief that Jefferson did use those means. (23 
 Niles, 282.) He referred to the appointment by Jefferson to hi- 
 trative offices of Linn, of New Jersey, and Claiborne, of Ten 
 Bessee (each of whom controlled the vote of a State), and also 
 ftf Livingston, who could have divided the vote of New York 
 36 Niles, 197.) According to a return ma:te to a call by Con 
 
METHODS OF THE OPPOSITION. 105 
 
 ter he said that the senatorship had been given to him 
 ji 1823 without effort or solicitation ; also that he made 
 it a rule neither to seek nor decline office. In his speech 
 before the Legislature he spoke more freely of the cor 
 ruption at Washington, from which he sought to escape 
 by resigning. 1 He now had Livingston, Eaton, Lee, 
 Van Buren, Benton, Swartwout, Duff Green, and Lewis 
 managing his canvass, some of them at Washington and 
 some in Tennessee. They kept close watch over him, 
 and maintained constant communication with each other. 
 The first overt acts of the opposition were the objec 
 tion to Clay s confirmation and the rejection of the 
 treaty with Colombia. Clay had been a champion of 
 the South American republics, and everything in the 
 way of intimacy with them was capital for him. These 
 votes occurred in March, 1825. The " Annual Regis 
 ter," commenting, over a year later, on these votes, said : 
 " The divisions which had been taken on the foregoing 
 questions [those mentioned] left little doubt that the 
 new administration was destined to meet with a sys 
 tematic and organized opposition, and, previous to the 
 next meeting of Congress, the ostensible grounds of op 
 position were set forth at public dinners and meetings, 
 BO as to prepare the community foi a warm political 
 contest until the next election." 2 The public was 
 greatly astonished at the uproar among the politicians. 
 The nation acquiesced in the result of the election as 
 perfectly constitutional and regular, and it cost great ef- 
 
 press in 1826, the number of members of Congress appointed to 
 sffice by the Presidents dowu to that time was, by Washington, 
 0, by Adams, 13 ; by Jefferson, 25; by Madison, 29; by Mon- 
 oe, 35 ; by J. Q. Adams, in his Srst year, 5. (36 Niles, 267.) 
 l 1 Ann. Reg. 21. 2 I Ann. tieg. 38. 
 
106 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 fort to stir up an artificial heat and indignation about it 
 The " bargain " formed the first stock or capital of the 
 opposition. The claim that Jackson had been cheated 
 out of his election was the second. Some attempt was 
 made to get up a cry about " family influence," but this 
 did not take. The charge of bargain and fraud was so 
 assiduously reiterated that, in 1827, there were six sena 
 tors and forty representatives who would not call on the 
 President. 1 It was during the session of 1825-26 that 
 the discordant elements of the opposition coalesced into 
 a party, 2 the modern democratic party. Near the end 
 of the session a prominent Virginia politician declared 
 that the combinations for electing Jackson were alread 
 formed. 8 
 
 It was proposed to adopt a constitutional amendment 
 taking away the contingent power of the House to elect 
 a President, but no agreement could be reached. A 
 committee on executive patronage was raised, in reality 
 to provide electioneering material. This committee re 
 ported six bills, the most important of which provided 
 that the President might not appoint to office any person 
 who had been a member of Congress during his own 
 term in the presidential office, and that the President, ii 
 he should remove any officer, should state his reasons 
 to the Senate on the appointment of a successor. No 
 action was taken. 
 
 The topic, however, on which the opposition most dis 
 tinctly showed their spirit was the Panama mission 
 Benton misrepresents that affair more grossly than any 
 other on which he touches. The fact is that the opposi 
 
 1 7 Adams, 374. The federal members of Congress wolf 
 act Tisit Madison in 1815. (1 Curtis s Webster, 135.) 
 * 1 Ann. Reg. 22. 8 Ibid. 
 
THE PANAMA MISSION. 107 
 
 don were forced by their political programme to oppose 
 a measure which it was very awkward for them to op 
 pose, and they were compelled to ridicule and misrepre 
 sent the matter in order to cover their position. Sar 
 gent l tells a story of an opposition senator, who, when 
 rallied on the defeat of the opposition in- the vote on 
 confirming the commissioners, replied, " Yes, they have 
 beaten us by a few votes after a hard battle ; but if they 
 had only taken the other sid and refused the mission, 
 we should have had them ! " 
 
 When the Spaniards withdrew from South America, 
 in 1824, the newly independent States of South America 
 and Mexico drew together by natural instinct, and hav 
 ing borrowed their new political institutions from the 
 United States, which institutions were for them exotic 
 and ill-understood, they sought friendly intercourse with 
 the Northern Union. There were then questions of in 
 ternational law pending, in which the new continent 
 needed to make a stand against the old. The United 
 States, on its part, wanted commercial intercourse with 
 the states of Central and South America. It was pro 
 posed by the Central American states to hold a Con 
 gress for consultation. This scheme grew into one of a 
 general American Congress, in which the United States 
 was asked to join. Adams accepted the invitation and 
 appointed two commissioners. The question on the con 
 firmation of these commissioners, and on appropriating 
 money for their salaries, gave rise to wordy and violent 
 debates in Congress, in which very extraordinary doc 
 trines were laid down aoont the power of the Executive 
 in diplomatic affairs. It \ras declared that the mission 
 meant a general policr of foreign interference and " en- 
 1 Sargent, 117. 
 
108 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 tangling alliances." The Monroe doctrine was vehe 
 mently denounced. The commissioners were finally con- 
 firmed. One died on the way ; the other arrived too 
 late for the meeting, which took place June 22, 1826. 
 The Congress adjourned to meet again, but, political 
 troubles breaking out, nothing came of it. Benton says 
 that the result proved the folly of the original plan. In 
 order to judge of that, it is necessary to form some 
 opinion as to what would have been the advantage polit 
 ically to the South American republics of a close and 
 friendly relation with us, and what would have been the 
 advantage commercially to us of a close and friendly 
 relation with them. It is not at all improbable that a 
 grand chance for good to all concerned was lost. As to 
 " entangling alliances," the Congress was no doubt a 
 grand chance for a " jingo " policy. Everything de 
 pended on the instructions with which the commis 
 sioners were sent. The opposition would not print the 
 instructions, because they plainly refuted all the in 
 flated denunciations. It was not until 1829 that public 
 opinion forced the printing of the instructions, 1 but then 
 the whole matter was dead. It has passed into history 
 and popular tradition under a very false light. 
 
 Adams had strong convictions about points of public 
 policy. He held that it was the duty of the President 
 to advise and recommend to Congress such measures as 
 he thought desirable in the public interest, and then to 
 leave to Congress the responsibility if nothing was done. 
 He therefore set out in his messages series of acts and 
 measures which he thought should be adopted. Ha 
 thereby played directly into the hands of the opposition 
 for they then had a complete programme before them o) 
 1 They are to be found 4 Ann. Reg. 29. 
 
ADAMS S POLICY. 109 
 
 what they had to attack. Adams held the active theory 
 f statesmanship. He was not content to let the people 
 alone . He thought that a statesman could foresee, plan, 
 prepare, open the way, set in action, encourage, and 
 otherwise care for the people. To him the doctrine of 
 implied powers meant only that the Constitution had 
 created a government complete and adequate for all the 
 functions which devolved upon it in caring for all the 
 interests which were confided to it. He regarded the 
 new land as a joint possession of all the States, the sale 
 of which would provide funds which ought to be used to 
 build roads, bridges, and canals, and to carry out other 
 works of internal improvement, which, as he thought, 
 would open up the continent to civilization. 1 He cared 
 more for internal improvements than for a protective 
 tariff. 2 He wanted a national university and a naval 
 school. He favored expenditures on fortifications and a 
 navy and an adequate army. He wanted the federal 
 judiciary enlarged and a bankruptcy law passed. Some 
 of the opposition found the party exigency severe which 
 forced them to oppose all the points in this programme. 
 In 1824 Crawford had been the only stickler for state 
 rights and strict construction. Men of that stamp were 
 now called " radicals." Calhoun and his friends had 
 oeen on the other side. The old-fashioned pettifogging 
 of the strict constructionists, and the cast-iron dogma 
 tism of the state-rights men, were developed in the heat 
 of the factious opposition of 1825-29. All that, how 
 ever, was at that time considered extreme or " radical." 
 Van Buren, on his reelecticr tc the Senate in 1827, 
 wrote a letter in which he promised co recover for the 
 States the " rights of which they had been deprived by 
 1 9 Adams. 162. * 8 Adams, 444. 
 
110 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 construction," ancl to save what rights remained. 1 Ham 
 mond expresses the quiet astonishment which this cre 
 ated in the minds of the people, even democrats like 
 himself, who were not aware that the States had suf 
 fered any wrong, especially at the hands of the exist 
 ing administration. The country was in profound peace 
 and stupid prosperity, and the rancor of the politicians 
 Beemed inexplicable. The public debt wap being re 
 funded advantageously. Immigration was large and 
 growing. The completion of the Erie Canal in 1825 
 opened up the great lakes to navigation, and the adja 
 cent country to settlement. Public affairs were in fact 
 dull. The following passage from the " Annual Reg 
 ister " shows the impression made by the agitation at 
 Washington : 2 
 
 " Nearly all the propositions which were called for by 
 the popular voice were defeated, either from want of 
 time for their consideration, or by an influence which 
 seemed to exert itself for the sole purpose of rendering 
 those who administered the government unpopular. The 
 community was generally disappointed as to the results 
 of the session. . . . Many of the members were new to 
 political life. . . . Others were predetermined to oppo 
 sition, and from the first assembling of Congress devoted 
 themselves to thwarting the measures which its [the ad 
 ministration s] friends urged upon the consideration of 
 Congress. The Vice-President and his friends were most 
 prominent in this class of politicians. . . . The manner, 
 too, in which the opposition attacked the administration 
 displayed an exasperated feeling, in which the commu 
 nity did not sympathize, and a general suspicion wai 
 felt that its leaders were actuated by private griefs, anc 
 * 2 Hammond, 246. 8 1 Ann. Reg. 149. 
 
ADAMS AND THE CIVIL SERVICE. 11] 
 
 hat the public interests were neglected in their earnest 
 itruggle for power. The pride of the country, too, had 
 received a deep wound in the prostration of the dignity 
 of the Senate." 
 
 Calhoun appointed committees hostile to the adminis 
 tration, which could not bring their own party to the 
 support of their reports. Calhoun also ruled that it was 
 not the duty of the Vice-President to preserve order 
 save upon the initiative of some senator on the floor. 
 Great disorder occurred, and John Randolph especially 
 took advantage of this license. The Senate was led at 
 the end of the session of 182526 to take from the 
 Vice-President the duty of appointing the committees of 
 the Senate. Letters which appeared in one of the Wash 
 ington newspapers, signed " Patrick Henry," criticising 
 Calhoun s course, were ascribed to the President. An 
 swering letters, signed u Onslow," were ascribed to the 
 Vice-President. 1 
 
 Adams took no steps to create an administration 
 party. He offered the Treasury to Crawford, who re 
 fused it. He then gave it to Rush, who had voted 
 against him. The Secretaries of War and of the Navy 
 had likewise supported other candidates. 2 Adams re 
 fused to try to secure the election of Jeremiah Mason, 
 an administration man, to the Senate. 8 He had de 
 clared, before the election, that he should reward no 
 one, and proscribe no one. He adhered to this faith 
 fully. Clay urged him to avoid pusillanimity on the 
 one hand, and persecution on the otter. 4 The election 
 being over, Clay said that no officer ought to be allowed 
 14 to hold a conduct in open and continual disparage- 
 
 1 Harper s Calhoun, 3! 2 Perkins, 289. 
 
 7 A(la.8. 14. * 6 Adams, 546. 
 
112 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 mont of the administration and its head." Adams re 
 plied that, in the particular case under discussion (coL 
 lector at New Orleans), there had been no overt act 
 that four fifths of all the custom-house officers had been 
 unfavorable to his (Adams s) election, and were now in 
 his power ; that he had been urged to sweep them all 
 away ; that he could not do this as to one without open 
 ing the question as to all, and that he would enter on no 
 such policy. In 1826 Clay urged Adams to remove 
 the custom-house officers at Charleston and Philadelphia. 
 Adams refused, although he thought that these officers 
 were using the subordinate offices in their control against 
 the administration. 1 He appointed federalists when he 
 thought that they were better qualified than other can 
 didates. This did not conciliate the federalists, and it 
 aroused all " the wormwood and the gall " of the old 
 party hatred. 2 In 1827 Clay and others urged him to 
 confine appointments to friends. He refused to adopt 
 that rule. 8 He expressed the belief that the opposition 
 were spending money to poison public opinion through 
 the press, but he would not do anything for Binns, an 
 administration editor. 4 In June, 1827, he refused to 
 go to Philadelphia, to make a speech in German to the 
 tanners at the opening of the canal, because he objected 
 to this style of electioneering. 6 In October, 1827, Clay 
 made a warm protest against Adams s action in retain 
 ing McLean, the Postmaster-General. Clay alleged that 
 McLean was using the post-office patronage actively 
 against the administration. McLean hated Clay and 
 loved Calhoun, 6 but he claimed to be a loyal friend o j 
 
 * 7 Adams, 163. 2 7 Adams, 207. 
 7 Adams, 257. * 7 Adams, 262. 
 
 * Adams, 297. 6 7 Adamg, 364. 
 
ADAMS ON ELECTIONEERING. 113 
 
 the administration. Adams would not believe him a 
 traitor. 1 A campaign story was started that Adams s 
 accounts with the Treasury were not in order. Clay 
 desired that Adams would correspond with an election 
 committee in Kentucky, and refute the charge. Adams 
 refused, because he disapproved of the Western style 
 of electioneering and stump-speaking. 2 Binns, an Irish 
 refugee, editor of the " Democratic Press " of Phila 
 delphia, ought by all affinities to have been a supporter 
 of Jackson, but he took the wrong turning after Craw 
 ford s disappearance, and became a supporter of Adams. 
 He plaintively describes the results. He tried to talk 
 to Adams about appointments. " I was promptly told 
 that Mr. President Adams did not intend to make any 
 removals. I bowed respectfully, assuring the President 
 that I had no doubt the consequence would be that he 
 would himself be removed so soon as the term for which 
 he had been elected had expired. This intimation gave 
 the President no concern, and assuredly did in no wise 
 affect his previous determination." 8 Binns, however, 
 was wise in his generation. 
 
 Adams s administration had a majority in the Senate 
 until the 20th Congress met in 1827, when both Houses 
 had opposition majorities. Adams says this was the 
 first time in the history of the country that such had 
 been the case. 4 The session of 1827-28 was almost en 
 tirely occupied in manufacturing political capital. A 
 committee on retrenchment and reform presented a 
 majority and a minority report. The majority ex 
 pressed alarm at the increasing expenditures of the 
 federal government and th" eytravagance of the ad 
 
 1 7 Adams, 343. 2 7 Adams, 347. 
 
 8 Binns, 250. * 7 Adama, 367 
 
 8 
 
114 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 ministration. The minority said that no expenditures 
 had been made which Congress had not ordered, and 
 that the expenditures had not increased unduly, when 
 the size and population of the countiy were considered. 
 It was charged that large sums had been spent in dec 
 orating the President s house, especially the * 4 East 
 Room." Congress had appropriated $25,000 for the 
 White House, of which $6,000 had been spent. The 
 rest was returned to the Treasury. As soon as Jack 
 son was elected, the " Courier and Enquirer " said that 
 the " East Room " was very shabby, and would at once 
 be made decent. 1 There was no attempt to be fair or 
 truthful in these charges. They were made solely 
 with a view to effect. Clamor and reiteration availed 
 to spread an opinion that the administration had been 
 extravagant. 
 
 The campaign was conducted, on both sides, on very 
 ruthless methods. Niles said it was worse than the cam 
 paign of 1798. 2 Campaign extras of the " Telegraph " 
 were issued weekly, containing partisan material, ref 
 utations of charges against Jackson, and slanders on 
 Adams and Clay. The Adams party also published a 
 monthly of a similar character. The country was del 
 uged with pamphlets on both sides. These pamphlets 
 were very poor stuff, and contain nothing important on 
 any of the issues. They all appeal to low tastes and 
 motives, prejudices and jealousies. Binns issued a 
 number of hand-bills, each with a coffin at the head, 
 known as " coffin hand-bills," setting forth Jackson s 
 bloody and lawless deeds. 8 One Jackson hand-bill hat, 
 
 1 Quoted 37 Ni>s, 229. 2 35 Niles, 33. 
 
 8 Biiius says he issued these hand-bills and was mobbed in 1824 
 It eeins that his memory Bailed him. 
 
TONE OF THE CAMPAIGN. 115 
 
 A broad-axe cut of John Quincy Adams driving off with 
 a horsewliip a crippled old soldier who dared to speak 
 to him, to ask an alms. In short, campaign literature 
 took on a new and special development in this cam 
 paign, and one is driven to wonder whether the Ameri 
 can people of that day were such that all this drivel and 
 vulgarity could affect their votes. It appears certain 
 that they had not yet learned the art of reading news 
 papers, more especially campaign literature ; an art in 
 which the average American citizen has since become a 
 great adept. It requires a very active party interest 
 now to break down the cynicism and skepticism with 
 which everything in a partisan newspaper is read by an 
 educated man of forty. 
 
 Against Jackson was brought up his marriage, and 
 all the facts of his career which could be made the sub 
 ject of unfavorable comment. Against Adams were 
 brought charges that he gave to Webster and the fed 
 eralists, in 1824, a corrupt promise ; that he was a 
 monarchist and aristocrat ; that he refused to pay a sub 
 scription to turnpike stock on a legal quibble ; that his 
 wife was an Englishwoman ; that he wrote a scurrilous 
 poem against Jefferson in 1802 ; that he surrendered a 
 young American servant-woman to the Emperor of 
 Russia ; that he was rich ; that he was in debt ; that he 
 had long enjoyed public office ; that he had received 
 immense amounts of public money, namely, the aggre 
 gate of all the salaries, outfits, and allowances he had 
 ever received ; that his accounts with the Treasury were 
 not in order ; that he had charged tor constructive 
 journeys ; that he had put a billiard-table in the White 
 House at the public expense ; 1 tha, he patronized duel- 
 
 1 Levi Woodbury was especially shocked a^ this. ( Plainer 
 , 513.) 
 
116 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 lists (Clay) ; that he had had a quarrel with his father 
 who had disinherited him ; that he had sent out men in 
 the pay of the government to electioneer for him ; that 
 he had corrupted the civil service ; that he had used 
 the federal patronage to influence elections. The fed 
 eralists, in their turn, charged him with not having kept 
 his promise to Webster. 
 
 McLean s conduct towards the end of Adams s term 
 caused more and more complaint. He had been a 
 Methodist minister, and some administration men did 
 not want him dismissed lest the Methodists should be 
 offended. 1 Bache, the postmaster at Philadelphia, was 
 a defaulter. McLean had known it for eighteen months. 
 Finally he removed Bache, and appointed Thomas Sar 
 gent, who had been allied with Ingham, Dallas, and 
 other Jackson men. Adams would not remove McLean. 3 
 
 In October, just before the election, but too short a 
 time before it to have any effect 011 it, Adams became 
 involved in a controversy with William B. Giles about 
 the circumstances and motives of his (Adams s) going 
 over to the administration in 1807. On account of reve 
 lations which were made in this controversy, Adams was 
 involved in another with the descendants of the old high 
 federalists, who called him to account for allegations 
 that the federalists of 1803-1809 were secessionists. 
 The controversy developed all the acrimony of the old 
 quarrel between the Adamses and the high federalists. 
 John Quincy Adams prepared a full statement of the 
 facts on which he based his opinions and statements, but 
 it was not published until 1877. 8 
 
 i 7 Adams, 540. 2 8 Adams, 8, 25, 51. 
 
 8 New England Federalism, by Henry Adams. See alao Pl 
 ner s Plumer, and Lodge s Cabot 
 
THE VOTE IN 1828. 117 
 
 In September, 1827, the Tammany General Commit 
 tee and the Albany u Argus came out for Jackson, 1 as 
 it had been determined, in the programme, that they 
 should do. A law was passed for casting the vote of New 
 York in 1828 by districts. The days of voting through 
 out the country ranged from October 31st to November 
 19th. 2 The votes were cast by the Legislature in Dela 
 ware and South Carolina ; by districts in Maine, New 
 York, Maryland, Tennessee ; elsewhere, by general 
 ticket. Jackson got 178 votes to 83 for Adams. The 
 popular vote was 648,273 for Jackson ; 508,064 for 
 Adams. 8 Jackson got only one vote in New England, 
 namely, in a district of Maine, where the vote was, Jack 
 son, 4,223 ; Adams, 4,028. 4 New York gave Jackson 
 20 ; Adams, 16. New Jersey and Delaware voted for 
 Adams. Maryland gave him 6, and Jackson 5. Adams 
 got not a single vote south of the Potomac or west of 
 the Alleghanies. In Georgia no Adams ticket was 
 nominated. 5 Tennessee gave Jackson 44,293 votes, 
 and Adams 2,240. Parton has a story of an attempt, 
 in a Tennessee village, to tar and feather two men who 
 dared to vote for Adams. 6 Pennsylvania gave Jackson 
 101,652 votes ; Adams, 50,848. For Vice-President, 
 Richard Rusli got all the Adams votes ; Calhoun got all 
 the Jackson votes except 7 of Georgia, which were given 
 to William Smith, of South Carolina. 
 
 General Jackson was therefoie triumphantly elected 
 President of the United States, A n the name of reform. 
 
 1 2 Hammond, 258 2 Telegraph Extra, 565. 
 
 8 3 Ann. Reg. 31. The figires for the popular vote vary in 
 iifferent authorities. 
 
 4 35 Niles, 177. 6 See page 179. 
 
 8 3 Parton, 151. 
 
118 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 and as the standard-bearer of the people, rising in theii 
 might to overthrow an extravagant, corrupt, aristocratic, 
 federalist administration, which had encroached on the 
 liberties of the people, and had aimed to corrupt elec 
 tions by an abuse of federal patronage. Many people 
 believed this picture of Adams s administration to be 
 true. Andrew Jackson no doubt believed it. Many 
 people believe it yet. Perhaps no administration, ex 
 cept that of the elder Adams, is under such odium. 
 There is not, however, in our history any administration 
 which, upon a severe and impartial scrutiny, appears 
 more worthy of respectful and honorable memory. 1 Its 
 chief fault was that it was too good for the wicked world 
 in which it found itself. In 1836 Adams said, in the 
 House, that he had never removed one person from 
 office for political causes, and that he thought that was 
 one of the principal reasons why he was not reflected. 2 
 The " Annual Register " 8 aptly quotes, in regard to 
 Adams, a remark of Burke on Lord Chatham : " For a 
 wise man he seemed to me, at that time, to be governed 
 too much by general maxims. In consequence of having 
 put so much the larger part of his opposers into power, 
 his own principles could not have any effect or influence 
 in the conduct of affairs. When he had executed his 
 plan he had not an inch of ground to stand upon. When 
 he had accomplished his scheme of administration h 
 iras no longer a minister." 
 
 i See Morse s Adam* * 50 Nilet, 194. 
 
 - Ann. Reg. 34. 
 
CHAPTER VL 
 
 THE w BELIEF " SYSTEM OF KENTUCKY. 
 
 BEFORE entering upon the history of Jackson s ad 
 ministration it is necessary to notice a piece of local 
 history, to which frequent subsequent reference must be 
 made, on account of influences exerted on national poli 
 tics. A great abuse of paper money and banking took 
 place in the Mississippi Valley between 1818 and 1828. 
 It was an outcome of the application of political forces to 
 the relations of debtor and creditor. It necessarily fol 
 lowed that political measures were brought into collision 
 with constitutional provisions, and with judicial insti 
 tutions as the interpreters and administrators of the 
 same, in such points as the public credit, the security 
 of contracts, the sanctity of vested rights, the indepen 
 dence of the judiciary, and its power to pass on the con 
 stitutionality of laws. Kentucky was the scene of the 
 strongest and longest conflict between the constitutional 
 guarantees of vested rights and the legislative measures 
 for relieving persons from contract obligations, when the 
 hopes under which those obligations were undertaken 
 had been disappointed by actual experience. It was 
 from Kentucky, also, that the influe.i^es arose which were 
 brought to bear on national politic^. 
 
 Some very early incidents in the history of Kentucky 
 snow the spirit which was at work n the later troubles. 
 A.n insurance company was chartered in 1801, an ob- 
 
1 20 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 scure clause in whose charter gave the power to issue 
 currency. At that time the Jeffersonian party was 
 under its anti-bank impulse, and, that party then being 
 in control, the power to issue currency would not have 
 been given intentionally. 1 In 1803, Judge Muter, of 
 the Court of Appeals, " being very poor and rather super 
 annuated," was induced to resign by a pension of $300 
 guaranteed by the Legislature. The following year 
 the pension was repealed, as being unconstitutional. Iij 
 1809 the Bank of Kentucky was founded, with a capital 
 of a million. The State owned part of the capital stock. 
 In 1816 great popular hostility was manifested to the 
 practice of quoting English decisions in the courts. 
 This was one of Duane s 2 pet points of hostility to the 
 judiciary. Of course it appealed to popular prejudice. 
 All the English decisions breathed the spirit of perma 
 nent institutions and traditions established to control 
 moving interests and wishes. A law was passed in 
 Kentucky forbidding the citation of any English cases 
 since July 4, 1776. The negative was left out of this 
 law. The cases were cited in the reports, but were not 
 read in court. The law fell into disuse. 
 
 During the period of inflation east of the Alleghanies 
 (1812-18), 8 the States west of the Alleghanies had 
 plenty of silver, and were free from financial disturbance. 
 At the session of 1817-18, the Legislature of Kentucky 
 plunged that State into the inflation system by charter 
 ing forty banks, which were to issue notes redeemable 
 in Bank of Kentucky notes. The popular party was 
 now under the dominion of a mania for banks, as th 
 l irttitutiyns for making the poor rich. Clamorous de 
 
 1 Collins, 56. a Sec page 369 
 
 1 See page 229. 
 
BANK MANIA. 121 
 
 jnands were, at the same time, made for a share in the 
 blessings which the Bank of the United States was to 
 shower over the country, and two branches were es 
 tablished, one at Lexington and one at Louisville. 
 Prices immediately began to rise, specie was exported, 
 contracts were entered into, in the expectation of a con 
 stant advance of the " wave of prosperity." All has 
 tened to get into debt, because to do so was not only the 
 way to get rich, but the only way to save one s self from 
 ruin. In June, 1819, it is reported : " The whole State 
 is in considerable commotion. The gross amount of 
 debts due the banks is estimated at ten millions of 
 dollars. . . . Several county meetings have been held. 
 Their purpose is : (1) a suspension of specie payments ; 
 (2) more paper money ; (3) an extra session of the 
 Legislature to pass some laws on this emergency. What 
 did we tell the people of Kentucky when they littered 
 their banks ? " 1 
 
 In 1819 the banks of Tennessee and Kentucky and 
 nearly all in Ohio suspended specie payments. They 
 generally ascribed their ruin to the Bank of the United 
 States. They overissued their notes, which accumulated 
 in the branch of the bank, that being the strongest 
 holder. These notes were presented for redemption. 
 The local banks construed that as u oppression," and 
 eagerly warded off ill responsibility from themselves by 
 representing themselves as the victims of an alien mon- 
 Bter, which crushed them whiJ<p they were trying to con 
 fer blessings on the people about them. The big bank 
 was bad enough, but the plea of the local banks was in 
 geniously false. It availed, however, to turn the popu 
 lar indignation altogether against the Bank of the United 
 States. 
 
 1 l6Niles, ifl. 
 
122 ANDKEW JACKSON. 
 
 Illinois chartered the Bank of Illinois, a private insti 
 tution, in 1816 ; also the City and Bank of Cairo, tc 
 build a city, and to issue notes as a means of getting 
 other people s capital to do it with. In 1819 the State 
 Bank of Illinois was founded, 1 hut its charter was soon 
 repealed, because it was too preposterous to stand. An 
 other State Bank was founded in 1821. which was a 
 great paper-money machine, and produced ten years of 
 confusion and loss. 2 As early as 1816, Illinois had an 
 endorsement and replevin law. 
 
 July 26, 1820, the Bank of Tennessee was established, 
 to last until 1843, with a branch at Knoxville. Its 
 amount of issue was a million. Its notes were to be 
 loaned on mortgage security under an apportionment be 
 tween the counties, according to the taxable property 
 in 181 9. 8 There was already a Bank of Tennessee, 
 which would have nothing to do with the new " bank." 
 The Legislature of Tennessee also passed a law that both 
 real and personal property sold under execution should 
 be redeemable within two years by paying the purchaser 
 ten per cent advance. Jackson is mentioned as having 
 been a prominent and energetic opponent of the relief 
 system. 4 In June, 1821, the Court of Appeals of Ten 
 nessee pronounced the replevin law unconstitutional, and 
 the relief system in that State came to an end. 5 
 
 Ohio, Indiana, and Missouri were, at the same period, 
 more or less entangled in the same system. 
 
 In 1817 the circulation of the Bank of Kentucky was 
 $417,000. The forty banks and the two branches ol 
 the national bank went into operation in that year 
 
 1 16 Nilos, 208. * Edwards, 165, 174, 204. 
 
 * 18 Nileg, 452 ; Gouge, 39. * Ibid. 
 
 * 21 Niles, 402. 
 
fURCED LIQUIDATION. 123 
 
 The Bank of Kentucky could not therefore sustain its 
 former circulation. It imported $240,000 in silver, and 
 reduced its circulation, November, 1818, to 195,000. 
 Nevertheless, it fell neavily in debt during 1818 and 
 1819 to the branches of the Bank of the United States/ 
 In November, 1819, the latter bank ordered the debt tc 
 be collected. The Bank of Kentucky suspended a.id 
 compromised. Its notes were at fifteen per cent dis 
 count. A great reduction of the paper was forced, be 
 cause the Bank of the United States came in to demand 
 payment. Where any one strong creditor did that the 
 credit system fell. May 4, 1820, the stockholders of 
 the Bank of Kentucky voted to suspend specie payments. 
 This suspension became permanent. Intense rage was 
 excited against the Bank of the United States, but if the 
 facts are as alleged the Bank of Kentucky must have 
 been extending its loans, and if the Bank of the United 
 States had not called for payment it would have been 
 forced to stand back, and see the Bank of Kentucky use 
 the capital of the Bank of the United States as a means 
 of profit. Kentucky had laid a tax of $60,000 on each 
 of the branches of the national bank, in January, 1819. 
 At the same time the Sup-erne Court of the United 
 States declared the bank constitutional. 2 In December 
 the Kentucky Court of Appeals unanimously sustained 
 the state tax, on the ground that the bank was uncon 
 stitutional. Two judges thought they must yield to the 
 Supreme Court of the United States. The third, Rowan, 
 thought they ought to stand out and force further trial 
 In the interest of state rights. 8 
 
 December 15, 1819, the Legis\ature of Kentucky 
 
 Kendall s Autobiography, 203. 8 See page 128. 
 
 * Kendall s Autobiography, 20? 
 
124 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 passed, over a veto, a law l to suspend for sixty dayi 
 Bales under executions, if the defendant gave bonda 
 that the goods levied on should be forthcoming at the 
 end of that time. The Bank of the Commonwealth oi 
 Kentucky was established November 29, 1820, as a 
 further " relief " measure for the benefit of the debtors, 
 victims of the forty kanks of 1818. As a further meas 
 ure of relief a replevin law was passed, December 25, 
 1820, according to which the debtor was to have two 
 years in which to redeem, under an execution, unless 
 the creditor should endorse on the note that he would 
 take notes of the Bank of the Commonwealth, if the 
 debtor could pay them. Another act was passed, De 
 cember 21, 1821, which forbade the sale of land on 
 execution, unless it should bring three fourths of its 
 value as appraised by a jury of neighbors. The Bank 
 of the Commonwealth was authorized to issue notes for 
 three millions of dollars. It had no stockholders. The 
 president and directors were elected annually by the 
 Legislature. Their salaries were paid by the State. 
 They were incorporated. The notes were issued in 
 loans on mortgage security, and were apportioned be 
 tween the counties in proportion to the taxable property 
 in each in 1820. Loans were to be made, in 1820, only 
 to those who needed them, " for the purpose of paying 
 his, her, or their just debts," or to purchase the products 
 of the country for exportation. The bank had twelve 
 branches. Its funds were to be : all money thereafter 
 paid in for land warrants, or land west of the Tennessee 
 river ; the produce of the stock owned by the State in 
 the Bank of Kentucky after that bank should be wouiu) 
 np ; the unexpended balances in the treasury at the enf 
 i Kendall s Autobiography, 227. 
 
JUDGE-BREAKING: 125 
 
 D the year. The profits of the bank were to go to the 
 State. Stripped of all pretence, therefore, the bank waa 
 the state treasury, put into the hands of a commission 
 elected by the Legislature, and incorporated. Its funds 
 were the current receipts of the treasury from land, 
 and its current balance, if it had one ; also the capital 
 already invested in the old bank, whenever that should 
 be released, which never was done. The notes of the 
 bank were legal tender to and from the State. The 
 Legislature appropriated $7,000 to buy books, paper, 
 and plates for printing the notes. This is all the real 
 capital the bank ever had. It was, therefore, just one 
 of the grand swindling concerns common at that period, 
 so many of which are described in the pages of Niles 
 and Gouge. 1 
 
 In 1822 Judge Clark, of the Circuit Court of Ken 
 tucky, declared the replevin law of that State unconsti 
 tutional. 2 He was cited before the House of Represen 
 tatives of the State, and an effort was made to have him 
 removed by the Governor on the resolution of the Legis 
 lature. The vote was 59 to 35 ; not two thirds, as re 
 quired by the Constitution for this method of removal. 
 In this year the Legislature used its power in the election 
 of directors of the old Bank of Kentucky to put in " re 
 lief " men who would make that bank accept Common 
 wealth notes. The effect was that the stock of the oil 
 bank at once fell to fifty, an j it suspended. 8 In Oc 
 tober, 1822, a specie dollar was worth $2.05 in Com- 
 
 1 See 8 Peters, 118 ; 11 Peters 257. 
 
 2 23 Niles, Supp. 153; -.supplfnen* :o the 22d vol.). The 
 fudge s decision, the legislative proceeding* and tr 3 judge s de 
 fence are there given. 
 
 8 Collins, 89. 
 
126 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 monwealth notes. 1 A Kentucky correspondent writes, 
 February, 1823 : The Bank of the Commonwealth " haa 
 nearly destroyed all commerce or trade, extinguished 
 personal credit, and broken down confidence between 
 man and man, as well as damped and depressed tho 
 industry of the State ; but the people are beginning to get 
 tired of its blessings, and its paper-mill will soon cease 
 working, leaving a debt, however, due to it from the 
 poorest of the people to the amount of two and a half 
 or three millions of dollars." 
 
 In 1823 the notes of the Bank of the Commonwealth 
 began to be withdrawn and burned. Governor Adair, in 
 his message of that year, approved of the relief system, 
 and denounced the courts for deciding the replevin laws 
 unconstitutional. This proceeding of the courts seems 
 to have been then regarded very generally by the people 
 of Kentucky as a usurpation by the judges, and an as 
 sault on the liberties of the people. After Adair s term 
 expired, he petitioned for redress, on account of the 
 payment of his salary in depreciated paper. 
 
 In 1823 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky declared 
 the relief laws unconstitutional. The Legislature, in 
 January, 1824, affirmed the constitutionality of said 
 laws, and an issue was made up on the right and power 
 of courts to annul, on the ground of unconstitutionality, 
 laws passed by the representatives of the people. The 
 relief system thus brought directly to the test the power 
 of a system of constitutional guarantees, administered 
 by an independent judiciary, to protect rights against an 
 interested and corrupt majority of debtors, which was 
 
 1 23 Niles, 96. 
 
 2 2\ Niles, 337. Kendall justly described the relief system ii 
 1891. (Autobiography, 246.) 
 
OLD COURT AND NEW COURT. 127 
 
 using its power, under democratic-republican self-govern 
 ment, to rob the minority of creditors. The state elec 
 tion of 1824 was fought on the effort to elect a Legis 
 lature two thirds of which would memorialize the Gov 
 ernor for the removal of the judges who had decided the 
 relief laws unconstitutional. A majority was obtained, 
 but not two thirds. Another course was then taken, 
 The legislative act by which the state judiciary was 
 organized and the Court of Appeals created was re 
 pealed. Reference was made, in defence of this action, 
 to the repeal of the federal judiciary act, at the begin 
 ning of Jefferson s administration. 1 A new Court of Ap 
 peals was constituted by a new act. William T. Barry 
 was appointed chief justice. The old court denied the 
 constitutionality of the repeal and of the new court, antf 
 continued its existence, so that there were two courts. 
 In 1825 the parties in the State were " Old Court " and 
 " New Court." 2 The new court party affirmed, some 
 times with vehemence, sometimes with solemnity, that 
 liberty and republicanism were at stake, and that the 
 contest was to see whether the judges should be above 
 the law. The old court party won a majority in the 
 lower House. The Senate, which held over, was still of 
 the new court party. The House voted to abolish the 
 new court, but the Senate did not agree. By this time 
 the contest had developed a whole school of ambitious, 
 rising politicians, who appealed with demagogical ad 
 dress to the passions and distress of the embarrassed 
 debtors. In November, 1825, Niles quotes a Ken 
 tucky paper that more persons had left that State than 
 nad come to it for many years. It is plain "-hat two 
 tlass^s of persons were driren *tway by the relisf system . 
 Collins, 90. 2 28 Nilee, 2*7. 
 
1 28 ANDRP1W JACKSON. 
 
 (1) those who wanted, by steady industry and accumula 
 tion without borrowing, to acquire capital and to be se 
 cure in the possession of it; and (2) those who could not, 
 ander the prevailing depression, work off the mortgages 
 which they had eagerly given to the Bank of the Com 
 monwealth for its notes, in the hope of thus escaping 
 from old embarrassments. After five years their con 
 dition was hopeless, and if they had any energy they 
 started westward to begin again. 
 
 In the mean time there had been a number of decisions 
 by the Supreme Court of the United States which irri 
 tated the people of Kentucky, and enhanced their alarm 
 about the assaults of the judiciary on liberty. We have 
 seen how the state banks used the Bank of the United 
 States as a scapegoat for all their sins, and for all the 
 bad legislation of the States. The next swing of the 
 pendulum of popular feeling was over into hatred of the 
 Bank of the United States. Several States, of which 
 Kentucky was one, tried to tax the branches out of ex 
 istence. In McCulloch vs. Maryland (1819), l and in 
 Osborn vs. Bank of the United States (1824), 2 the Su 
 preme Court of the United States declared that the 
 States could not tax the bank. In Sturges vs. Crownin- 
 shield (1819), 8 the same court set limits to the state in 
 solvent laws and thereby prevented the favor to debtors 
 which the embarrassed States desired to provide. R. M. 
 Johnson, of Kentucky, proposed an amendment to the 
 Constitution, January 14, 1822, giving appellate juris 
 diction to the Senate in any case to which a State was 9 
 party, arising under the laws, treaties, etc., of the United 
 8lat.es. 4 In Bank of the United States vs. rialsteavj 
 
 : 4 Wheaton, 316. 2 9 Wheaton, 739. 
 
 4 Wheaton. 122. * 7 Benton s Abridgment, 145. 
 
ALLEGED FEDEPAL ENCROACHMENTS. 129 
 
 (1825), 1 the Supreme Court decided that it had juris 
 diction in suits to which the Bank of the United States 
 was a party, and that a law which forbade sales of land 
 under execution for less than three fourths of the ap 
 praised value did not apply to writs of execution issued 
 h} federal courts. The question of the constitutionality 
 of such a law was avoided. In Wayman vs. Southard 
 (1825), 2 the Supreme Court of the United States decided 
 that the replevin and endorsement law of Kentucky did 
 not apply to a writ of execution issued from a federal 
 court. In the Bank of the United States vs. the Plant 
 ers Bank of Georgia (1824) , 3 it decided that if a State 
 became a party to a banking or commercial enterprise 
 the State could be sued in the course of the business. 
 This Decision seemed to threaten the Bank of the Com 
 mon wealth of Kentucky. In Green vs. Biddle (1823), 4 
 the Supreme Court of the United States decided that 
 the laws of Kentucky of 1797 and 1812, which reduced 
 the liability of the occupying claimant of land to the 
 successful contestant, on account of rent and profits, as 
 compared with the same liability under the law of Vir 
 ginia at the time of the separation, and which in a cor 
 responding manner increased the claims of the occupying 
 claimant for improvements, were null and void, being in 
 violation of the contract between Kentucky and Virginia 
 at the time of separation. 5 In Dartmouth College vs. 
 
 i 10 Wheaton, 51. 2 10 Wheaton, 1. 
 
 8 9 Wheaton, 904. 8 Wheaton, 1. 
 
 6 Kentucky sent to Congress, May 2>, 1824, a remonstrance 
 against this decision. Letcher, of Kentucky, introduced a reso 
 lution to amend the law, so that more than a majority of judges 
 should be necessary tr declare a state law void. (8 Benton i 
 Abridgment, 51.) 
 
 9 
 
130 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 Woodward (1819), 1 the Supreme Court had decided 
 that the charter of a private corporation was a contract 
 which a state Legislature might not violate, and had thus 
 put certain vested rights beyond legislative caprice. 2 
 
 Other decisions had also been made, bearing on state 
 rights and the powers of the federal judiciary in a more 
 general way. In Martin vs. Hunter s Lessee (1816),* 
 the constitutionality of the 25th section of the judi 
 ciary act (power of the Supreme Court to pass upon 
 the constitutionality of state laws) was affirmed, and 
 the authority of the court in a case under a federal 
 treaty was maintained against the Court of Appeals of 
 Virginia. In Gibbons vs. Ogden (1824) , 4 the court 
 overruled the Supreme Court of New York, and declared 
 an act of the Legislature giving exclusive privileges in 
 the waters of New York unconstitutional and void. In 
 Cohens vs. Virginia (1821), 5 it was decided that, if a 
 citizen of a State pleads against a statute of his own 
 State an act of Congress as defence, the 25th section 
 of the judiciary act gives the federal Supreme Court 
 jurisdiction to test whether that defence be good. In 
 the case of the " Marmion " (1823), the Attorney-Gen 
 eral of the United States (Wirt) had rendered an opin 
 ion 6 (1824) that a law of South Carolina (1822), 
 according to which any free negro sailors who should 
 come into that State on board a ship should be impris 
 oned until the ship sailed again, was incompatible with 
 the Constitution .and with the international obligations 
 of the United States. The District Court of the Unite* 
 States had decided (1823) to the same effect. 7 
 
 1 4 Wheaton, 518. 2 1 Webster s Correspondence^ 283. 
 
 8 1 Wheatou, 304. * 9 Wheaton, 1. 6 6 Wheaton, 264, 
 6 1 Opinions of the Attorneys-General, 659. 
 T 25 Niles, 12. 
 
GROWTH OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. 131 
 
 From our present stand-point of established doctrine 
 n the points of constitutional law above enumerated, 
 it is difficult to understand the shocks which many or 
 nil of these decisions gave to the Jeffersonian school of 
 politicians. The assertion that the reserved rights of 
 the States had been invaded 1 is to be referred to these 
 judicial decisions, not to executive acts. The strict- 
 construction, state-rights school felt every one of these 
 decisions as a blow from an adversary against whom 
 there was no striking back, and the fact undoubtedly is 
 that the Supreme Court, under the lead of Marshall and 
 Story, was consolidating the federal system, and secur 
 ing it^against fanciful dogmas and exaggerated theories 
 which would have made the federal government as 
 ridiculous as the German Bund. Readers of to-day are 
 surprised to find that a great many people were alarmed 
 about their liberties under the mild and timid rule of 
 Monroe. 2 It was, however, by no means the scholastic 
 hair-splitters and hobby-riders in constitutional law 
 alone who were astonished and bewildered by the course 
 of the decisions. It needs to be remembered that the 
 system of the Constitution, even after the second war, 
 was yet, to a great degree, unestablished and unformed. 
 Actual experience of any legislative act or constitutional 
 provision is needed to find out how it will work, and 
 what interpretation its terms will take on from the 
 growth of institutions and from their inter-action. It is 
 impossible, upon reading a constitutional provision, to 
 figure to one s self, save in the vaguest way, what will 
 be the character and working of the institution which it 
 
 1 See page 109-10. 
 
 8 See Garland s Randolph, especially II 211, on Giobona v 
 dgden. 
 
132 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 creates. It was one of the most fortunate circumstances 
 in the history of the United States that the judicial in 
 terpretation and administration of the Constitution was, 
 during its formative period, for a long time in the handa 
 of men who shaped the Constitution in fidelity to ita 
 original meaning and spirit, to secure at once dignity 
 and strength to the federal system, and constitutional 
 liberty to the nation. It is fortunate that they were 
 men of profound legal attainments and historic sense, 
 and neither abstractionists of the French school, nor 
 dialecticians under the state-rights and strict-construc 
 tion dogmas. The history of the country has proved 
 the soundness and wisdom of the constitutional princi 
 ples they established, but while they were doing this 
 they had to meet with a great deal of criticism and 
 abuse. Kentucky had furnished a number of the cases, 
 and at least two important interests of hers (relief sys 
 tem and contested land titles) had been decided ad 
 versely to the interests of the classes which had least 
 education and property. 
 
 The message of Governor Desha of Kentucky, No 
 vember 7, 1825, 1 deserves attentive reading from any 
 one who seeks to trace the movement of decisive forces 
 in American political history. The Governor denounces 
 all banks, and especially the Bank of the United States, 
 because they are all hostile to the power and rights 
 of the States. He says that the Bank of the United 
 States has been taken under the protection of the federal 
 Supreme Court, and that these two foreign powers, s 
 illied, have overthrown the sovereignty of Kentucky 
 fie complains of the State Court of Appeals, which haA 
 loclared the law taxing the Bank of the United State* 
 i 29 Niles, 219. 
 
DESHAS MESSAGE OF 1825. 
 
 lo be constitutional, for not maintaining its ground, but 
 receding, and deferring to the contrary decision of the 
 Supreme Court of the United States. He congratulates 
 the State, however, that the abolition of the old court 
 has removed the compliant head from the state judiciary, 
 and that the new court will maintain the sovereignty of 
 the State against federal encroachments. He declares 
 that the emigration from the State was due to the de 
 cision about the occupying claimant law. He denounces 
 the federal courts for not recognizing the state relief laws 
 in regard to writs issued by themselves, and he regards 
 the State as robbed of self-government by this intrusion 
 of foreign courts, which bring with them an independent 
 code of procedure. He defends the relief system, and, 
 although he does not distinctly say so, what he means is 
 that the federal courts, by their intrusion, enable foreign 
 creditors to escape the treatment which Kentucky cred 
 itors have to submit to under the laws of their country. 
 This was the invasion of the " sovereignty " of Ken 
 tucky which was resented most. 
 
 In the same message Desha suggested that the Legis 
 lature should abolish both the Courts of Appeals, and he 
 promised that, if this should be done, and a new court 
 should be established, he would select the judges for it 
 equally from the two existing ones. In 1826 the state 
 election was again a contest between old court and new 
 court. The old court carried both Houses. 1 The re 
 plevin laws were repealed. The acts of the new court 
 were treated as null. The new court seized the records, 
 and held them by military force. CivU war was avoided 
 mly by the moderation of the old court party. The 
 Y,egislature repealed the law constituting the new court. 
 1 Collins, 93 
 
134 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 but the Governor vetoed the repeal. 1 It was passed 
 over his veto December 30, 1826. By resignations 
 and new appointments among the judges, the court was 
 reconstituted as a single anti-relief body in the years 
 1828-9. 
 
 In 1827 the currency of the States in the Mississippi 
 Valley was fairly good. There remained only $800,000 
 of Commonwealth paper out, and this was merchandise, 
 not currency. 2 The bank held notes of individuals to 
 the amount of one and a half millions, and real estate 
 worth $30,592. Hence there was due to it a balance 
 from the public, after all its notes should be paid in, of 
 $600,000. Its debtors had this to pay in specie or its 
 equivalent, or else the bank would get their property. 
 This sum, therefore, fairly represents the net final swin 
 dle which the relief system perpetrated on its dupes, to 
 say nothing of its effects on creditors and on the general 
 prosperity of the State. The bank never had over 
 $7,000 capital even spent upon it. Its total issue of 
 bits of paper was printed with the denomination dollars 
 up to three millions. By this issue it had won $600,000 
 worth of real property, or twenty per cent in five years. 
 Who got this gain ? It seems that there must have been 
 private and personal interests at stake to account for 
 the rage which was excited by the decisions which 
 touched this bank, and by the intensity of friendship 
 for it which was manifested by a leading political clique. 
 
 In 1828 the parties were still relief and anti-relief . 
 the former for Jackson, the latter for Adams. The 
 ideas, however, had changed somewhat. A " relief 
 man, in 1828, meant a state-rights man and strict con- 
 itructionist, who wanted to put bounds to the supposec 
 1 31 Nilee 310. - .".2 Niles. 37. 
 
OTHER DECISIONS. 135 
 
 encroachments of the federal power, especially the 
 judiciary, and indeed to the constitutional functions 
 of the judiciary in general. Metcalf, the anti-relief 
 candidate for Governor, in 1828, defeated Barry, the 
 relief candidate, after a very hard fight, 1 but the State 
 gave 7,912 majority for Jackson. 
 
 Two later decisions of the Supreme Court may here 
 be mentioned, because they carried forward the same 
 constitutional tendency which has been described. 
 They *were connected with the political movements 
 which have been mentioned, and with those which came 
 later. 
 
 In the Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky vs. 
 Wister et al. (1829) , 2 it was held that the bank must 
 pay specie on demand in return for a deposit which had 
 been made with it of its own notes, although these notes 
 were, when deposited, worth only fifty cents on the 
 dollar. It had been provided in the act establishing the 
 bank that it should pay specie. The bank tried to plead 
 the non-suability of a State, but it was held that, if the 
 State was sole owner and issued as a sovereign, it would 
 be non-suable. Then, however, the notes would be bills 
 of credit. If the State issued as a banker, not a sover 
 eign, then it was suable under the decision in the case 
 of the Planter s Bank of Georgia. In Craig vs. Mis 
 souri (1830) , 8 a law of Missouri (1821) establishing 
 loan offices to loan state currency issues on mortgages 
 was declared unconstitutional as to the notes issued, 
 which were bills of credit In this decision bills of 
 5redit were defined. 
 
 i Collins, 93. 2 2 leters, SI 8. 
 
 4 Peters, 410. 
 
CHAPTER VH. 
 
 INTERNAL HISTORY OP JACKSON S FIRST ADMINIBTRA 
 TION. 
 
 JACKSON came to power as the standard-bearer of a 
 new upheaval of democracy, and under a profession of 
 new and fuller realization of the Jeffersonian demo 
 cratic republican principles. The causes of the new. 
 strength of democracy were economic. It gained j 
 strength every year. EverytTimg~m the situation of the ! , 
 country favored it. x ^ The cotton culture advanced with 
 great rapidity, and led to a rapid settlement of the 
 Southwestern States, % The Ohio States filled up with a 
 very strong population. .* ? Steamboats came into common 
 use, and they had a value for this country, with its poor 
 roads, but grand rivers, bays, sounds, and lakes, such as 
 they had for no other country. Other forces have al 
 ready been mentioned. Vh Railroads began to be built 
 just after Jackson s election. The accumulation of 
 capitid in the country was not yet great. It was inade 
 quate for the chances which were offered by the opening 
 up of the continent. Hence the industrial organization 
 did not take the form of a wages organization. Indi 
 viduals, however, found the chances of very free and 
 independent activity, which easily produced a simpli 
 abundance. The conditions were such as to give to eaclr 
 a sense of room and power. Individual energy am 1 
 enterprise were greatly favored. Of course, the effecf 
 
SOCIAL NOTIONS AND CHANGES. 137 
 
 on the character of the people was certain. They be- 
 eame bold, independent, energetic, and enterprising 
 They were versatile, and adapted themselves easily to 
 circumstances. They were not disturbed in an emer 
 gency ; and they were shrewd in dealing with difficul 
 ties of every kind. The state constitutions became more 
 and more purely democratic, under the influence of this 
 character of the people. Social usages threw off all the 
 forms which had been inherited from colonial days. 
 The tone of mind was developed which now marks the 
 true, unspoiled American, as distinguished from all 
 Europeans, although it has scarcely been noticed by the 
 critics who have compared the two : namely, the tone of 
 mind which has no understanding at all of the notion 
 that A could demean himself by talking to B, or that B 
 could be raised in his own estimation or that of other 
 people by being spoken to by A, no matter who A and 
 B might be. Ceremonies, titles, forms of courtesy and 
 etiquette, were distasteful. Niles did not like it that 
 members of Congress were called " honorable." l He 
 criticised diplomatic usages. He devoted a paragraph 
 to denunciation of a fashionable marriage in Boston, 
 which took place in King s (!) Chapel, and at which the 
 people cheered the groom. He objected to the term 
 "cabinet," 2 and said, very truly, that there is no 
 cabinet in our system. He was displeased by public 
 honors to the President (Monroe). 
 
 The people of the period found themselves happy and 
 prosperous. Their lives were easy; free from gross 
 cares, and free from great political anxieties. They 
 knew little and cared less about other countries. They 
 were generally satisfied with some crude notions and 
 l 37 Niles. 378. 2 40 Niles. 145. 
 
138 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 easy prejudices about institutions and social states oi 
 which they really had no knowledge. Niles knew no 
 more of the English Constitution and English politics 
 than a Cherokee Indian knew of the politics of the 
 United States. The American people did not think of 
 their economic and social condition as peculiar or ex 
 ceptional. They supposed that any other nation could 
 be just like the United States if it chose. They 
 thought the political institutions, or, more strictly, the 
 political "principles," of this country made all the 
 difference. They gave their confidence to the great 
 principles, accordingly, all the more because those prin 
 ciples flatter human nature. One can easily discern in 
 Jackson s popularity an element of instinct and personal 
 recognition by the mass of the people. They felt, " He 
 is one of us." " He stands by us." " He is not proud, 
 and does not care for style, but only for plenty of what 
 is sound, strong, and good." " He thinks just as we do 
 about this." The anecdotes about him which had the 
 greatest currency were those which showed him tramp 
 ling on some conventionality of polite society, or shock 
 ing 5 the tastes and prejudices of people from "abroad." 
 In truth Jackson never did these things except for effect, 
 or when carried away by his feelings. 
 
 The Jackson party flocked to Washington to attend 
 the inauguration. "They really seem," said Webster, 1 
 " to think that the country has been rescued from some 
 trreat danger." There was evidently a personal and 
 class feeling involved in their triumph. At the in- 
 Figuration ball a great crowd of people assembled who 
 had not been accustomed to such festivities. JacksoE 
 
 i 1 Curtis s Webster, 340. On the crow^, see Webster s Cot 
 reipondence, 470, 473. 
 
JACKSOWS INAUGURATION. 189 
 
 refused to call or. Adams, partly because, as he said, 
 Adams got his office by a bargain, and partly because he 
 thought that Adams could have stopped the campaign 
 references to Mrs. Jackson. That lady had died in the 
 previous December, and Jackson was in a very tender 
 frame of mind in regard to her memory. 1 Adams was 
 hurt at the slight put upon him, and thought that he had 
 deserved other treatment from Jackson. 2 In March, 
 1832, R. M. Johnson came to Adams to try to bring 
 about a reconciliation with Jackson. Nothing came of 
 it. 8 
 
 The inaugural address contained nothing of any im 
 portance. There was a disposition to give Jackson a 
 fair chance. Every one was tired of party strife, 4 and 
 there was no disposition in any quarter to make factious 
 opposition. The opposition had taken the name of 
 national republicans. They never acknowledged any 
 succession to the federalists. They claimed to belong 
 to the true republican party, but to hold national theo 
 ries instead of state-rights theories. The Jackson party 
 was Heterogeneous. In opposition it had been held to 
 gether by the hope of success, but it had not been 
 welded together into any true party. No one yet 
 knew what Jackson thought about any political question. 
 It had been an unfortunate necessity to send him to the 
 Senate in 1823. He had made a record on tariff and 
 internal improvements. His Coleman letter, it is true, 
 left him safely vague on tariff, but he could only lose, 
 he could not possibly gain, by making a record on any- 
 
 1 The New York Amen-ai followed her even beyond the 
 grave with a scurrilous epitaph 
 
 2 8 Adams, 128. i A iama, 484. 
 5 Ann. Reg. 1. 
 
140 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 thing. His advantage over the " statesmen " was tnat 
 every one of them was on record a dozen times on every 
 public question. 
 
 Calhoun had been reflected Vice-President. He now 
 understood that Jackson would take only one term, and 
 that he (Calhoun) would have all Jackson s support in 
 1832. Van Buren, however, who had come into 
 Jackson s political family at a late date, had views and 
 ambitions which crossed this programme of Calhoun. 
 These two men came into collision in the formation of 
 the cabinet. Jackson introduced two innovations. He 
 put the Secretaries back more nearly into the place in 
 which they belong by the original theory of the law. 
 He made them executive clerks or staff officers. The 
 fashion has grown up of calling the Secretaries the 
 President s " constitutional advisers." It is plain that 
 they are not anything of the kind. He is not bound to 
 consult them, and, if he does, it does not detract from 
 his responsibility. Jackson, by the necessity of his 
 character and preparation, and by the nature of the 
 position to which he had been elected, must lean on 
 somebody. He had a number of intimate friends 
 and companions on whom he relied. They did not 
 hold important public positions. They came to be called 
 the "Kitchen Cabinet." The men were William B. 
 Lewis, Amos Kendall, Duff Green, and Isaac Hill. 
 If the Secretaries had been the " constitutional advisers " 
 of the President, their first right and duty would have 
 bten to break off the intimacy with these irresponsible 
 peisons, and to prevent their influence. Jackson 
 second innovation was that he did not hold cabinet 
 councils. Hence his administration lacked unity and 
 discipline. It did not have the strength of hearty aiW 
 
JACKSON S CABINET. 141 
 
 jonscious cooperation. Each Secretary went his way, 
 Mid gossip arid newsmongering had a special field of 
 activity open to them. The cabinet was not a strong 
 one. Van Buren was Secretary of State. S. D. Tug- 
 ham was Secretary of the Treasury. He had been an 
 active Pennsylvania politician, and a member of the 
 House for the last seven years. John H. Eaton, of 
 Kentucky, was^Secretary of War. He had married, for 
 his first wife, one of Mrs. Jackson s nieces, and had been 
 an intimate friend of Jackson. He was brother-in-law 
 of Lewis. He finished, in 1817, a life of Jackson, which 
 had been begun by Major John Reid. He had been in 
 the Senate since 1818. John Branch, of North Caro 
 lina, was Secretary of the Navy. He had been in the 
 Senate since 1823. l John M. Berrien, of Georgia, waa 
 Attorney-General. He had been in the Senate since 
 T824. William T. Barry, of Kentucky, was Postmaster- 
 Jjtejieral, with a seat in the cabinet, a privilege to which 
 that officer had not previously been admitted. McLean 
 passed into high favofwilh the new administration, and 
 was asked to keep the postmaster-generalship with its 
 new rank. When the general proscription began he 
 would not admit it as to his department. He was trans 
 ferred to the bench of the Supreme Court. 2 Ingham, 
 Branch, and Berrien were understood to be the Calhoun 
 men in the cabinet. 
 
 The men who controlled the administration were the 
 members of the kitchen cabinet. Lewis does not ap 
 pear to have had any personal ambition. He wanted 
 to return to Tennessee, but Jackson remonstrated that 
 l^ewis must not abandon him : n the posit; in to which h 
 
 1 See page 9? and note 5. 
 
 2 8 Adams, 112. 
 
U2 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 had been elevated. 1 Lewis was made Second Auditoi 
 of the Treasury. He only asked for an office with 
 little work to be done. 2 His character and antecedents 
 have already been noticed. Amos Kendall was born in 
 Massacnusetts in 1789. He was a graduate of Dart- 
 mouth College. In 1814 he went to Washington. In 
 1815 he was a tutor in Henry Clay s family. He 
 edited a newspaper, the " Frankfort Argus," and prac 
 tised law, and was postmaster at Georgetown, Kentucky. 
 He became a leading "relief" man, director in the 
 Bank of the Commonwealth, and as such an enemy of 
 the Bank of the United States. Many of Clay s old 
 supporters, who became relief men, were carried over to 
 Jackson between 1824 and 1828. Kendall was one of 
 these. He had expected an office from Clay, and was 
 offered one, but it did not satisfy him. He had an 
 acrimonious correspondence with Clay in 1828. 8 He 
 was in debt. Clay was one of his creditors. His war 
 with Clay won him Jackson s favor. Kendall was an 
 enigmatical combination of good and bad, great and 
 small traits. His ability to handle important state ques 
 tions and his skill as a politician are both beyond ques 
 tion. He prostituted his talents to partisan purposes, 
 and was responsible for the bad measures adopted by 
 Jackson as much as any other one man. In his private 
 character he showed admirable traits of family devotion 
 and generosity. As a public man he belonged to the 
 worst school of American politicians. He brought the 
 vote of Kentucky to Washington, and was appointed 
 Fourth Auditor of the Treasury. As time went on he 
 proved more and more the master spirit of the adminis 
 
 1 3 Parton, 180. 2 Kendall s Autobiography, 308. 
 
 Telegraph Extra, 3O5. 
 
THE KITCHEN CABINET. 143 
 
 tration. Harriet Martineau wrote of him, in 1836, as 
 follows : "I was fortunate enough once to catch a 
 glimpse of the invisible Amos Kendall, one of the most 
 remarkable men in America. He is supposed to be the 
 moving spring of the whole administration, the thinker, 
 planner, and doer ; but it is all in the dark. Documents 
 are issued of an excellence which prevents their being 
 attributed to persons who take the responsibility of 
 them ; a correspondence is kept up all over the country 
 for which no one seems to be answerable ; work is done, 
 of goblin extent and with goblin speed, which makes 
 men look about them with a superstitious wonder ; and 
 the invisible Amos Kendall has the credit of it all. 
 . . . He is undoubtedly a great genius. He unites 
 with his * great talent for silence a splendid audac 
 ity." 1 She goes on to say that he rarely appeared in 
 jublic, and seemed to keep up the mystery. She at- 
 j ibutes some of Lewis s work to Kendall, but the pas 
 sage is a very fair representation of the opinions of 
 Washington society about Kendall. He had very great 
 executive and literary ability. Duff Green was a fight 
 ing partisan editor. He had the virtue of his trade. 
 He was loyal to the standard to which he had once 
 sworn. He was a Calhoun man, and he continued to be 
 a retainer of the most unflinching loyalty. For the 
 first years of Jackson s administration, Green, as editor 
 of the " organ," stood on guard all the time to advance 
 the cause of the administration. Isaac Hill was born in 
 "Massachusetts in 1788. His education was picked up 
 >n a printing-office. In 1810 he bought and began to 
 idit the " Patriot," published at Concord, New Hamp 
 
 1 1 Marti aeau s Western Travt , 155. C? also 1 Society in 
 America, 45. 
 
144 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 shire. He edited his paper with skill and ability, prop 
 agating " true republicanism " in partibus infidelium, 
 for the people about him were almost all federalists. 
 He gained adherents. His paper became influential, 
 and he built up a democratic party in New Hampshire. 1 
 He had long favored strict party proscription. In 1818 
 he remonstrated with Governor Plumer for appointing 
 a federalist sheriff. 2 He had the rancorous malignity 
 of those men who have been in a contest with persons 
 who have treated them from above downwards. He 
 was not able to carry New Hampshire for Jackson in 
 1828, but the vote was 24,000 for Adams to 20,600 for 
 Jackson. Hill was immediately taken into the inner 
 most circle at Washington. The election of Jackson 
 meant that an uneducated Indian fighter had been 
 charged with the power of the presidency, and that 
 these four men wielded it through and for him. Van 
 Buren followed, in order to win the aid of Jackson 
 for the succession. He did not put forth any guiding 
 force. Eato n had some share in the kitchen cabinet. 
 No other member of the cabinet had any influence. 
 Barry, another relief man, but personally quite insignifi 
 cant, was at the disposal of the kitchen cabinet. Henry 
 Lee had made himself " impossible " by an infamous 
 domestic crime. He was offended at the poor share in 
 
 i He had kept a boarding-house, at which members of the 
 Legislature, etc., hoarded. In 1823 he is referred to as a power 
 (1 Webster s Correspondence, 324.) During the New Hampshire 
 election of 1830, forged documents were sent on from Washing- 
 ,011 to prove Upliam, the anti- Jackson candidate for Governor 
 guilty of smuggling under the embargo. (39 Niles, 156.) Mason 
 erarged llill with having seat the papers. / Webster s Com 
 tpondence, 495.) f L**? 
 
 Pinner, 471. 
 
THE VICTORS AND THE SPOILS. 145 
 
 the spoils offered to him, and withdrew, relieving the 
 administration of a load. Edward Livingston was in 
 the Senate, but no direct influence by him on the ad 
 ministration, during the first two years, is discernible. 
 The same may be said of Benton. 
 
 Some vague expressions in the inaugural about " re 
 form " and the civil service frightened the office-holders, 
 who had already been alarmed by rumors of coming 
 proscription. There was an army of office-seekers and 
 editors in Washington, who had a very clear and posi 
 tive theory that the victory which they had won, under 
 Jackson s name, meant the acquisition and distribution 
 amongst them of all the honors and emoluments of the 
 federal government. They descended on the federal 
 administration as if upon a conquered domain. The 
 office-holders of that day had generally staked their ex 
 istence on the mode of getting a living which the civil 
 service offered. It did not pay well, but it was supposed 
 to be easy, tranquil, and secure. All these persons who 
 were over forty years of age saw ruin staring them in 
 the face. It was too late for them to change their 
 habits or acquire new trades. 1 All the stories by eye 
 witnesses testify to the distress and terror of the " ins," 
 and the rapacity of the " outs," at that time. It is cer 
 tain that the public service lost greatly by the changes. 
 Sometimes they were made on account of trivial dis 
 respect to Jackson. 2 It is not clear who was the author 
 or instigator of the policy. Lewis is said to have op- 
 
 1 Washington removed nine persons, one a defaulter; Adams, 
 ten, one a defaulter ; Jefferson, thirty-nine ; Madison, five, threa 
 defaulters; Monroe, nine ; Adams, two, both for cause. (5 A*m 
 Reg. 19.) 
 
 2 I Curiis s Webster, 348. 
 
 10 
 
146 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 posed it. Kendall does not appear to have started with 
 the intention of proscription. March 24, 1829, h 
 wrote to the editor of the Baltimore " Patriot " * : " The 
 interests of the country demand that the [Fourth Audit 
 or s] office shall be filled with men of business, and not 
 with babbling politicians. Partisan feelings shall not 
 enter here, if I can keep them out. To others belongs the 
 whole business of electioneering." Probably Jackson 
 believed that the departments were full of corrupt per 
 sons, and that Adams and Clay had demoralized the 
 whole civil service, so that a complete change was 
 necessary. It would be quite in character for Jackson 
 to take all the campaign declamation literally. One 
 man, Tobias Watkins, Fourth Auditor, was found short 
 in his accounts. 2 This seemed to offer proof of all that 
 had been affirmed. The proscription was really en 
 forced by the logic of the methods and teachings of the 
 party while in opposition. The leaders had been taken 
 literally by the party behind them, and by the workers, 
 writers, and speakers who had enlisted under them. If 
 they had failed to reward their adherents by the spoils, 
 or if they had avowed the hollowness and artificiality of 
 their charges against the last administration, they would 
 
 1 49 Niles, 43. Cf. Kendall s Autobiography, 292. 
 
 2 Adams calls this " the bitterest drop in the cup of my afflic 
 tions" (8 Adams, 144) ; and again he says, " The wrong done to 
 me and my administration by the misconduct of Watkins de 
 serves a severer animadversion from me than from Jackson. 
 
 8 Adams, 290.) He there depicts Jackson s rancor agains - 
 Watkins. Niles describes the virulent political animus of th 
 prosecution. (36 Niles, 421.) After Watkins s term of imprison 
 ment was over, he was detained on account of an unpaid fine 
 By Jackson s personal order a label, " Criminal s Apartment, 
 WB& put over the door of the room in which he was kept. 
 
ORIGIN OF THE SPOILS SYSTEM. 147 
 
 have thrown their party into confusion, and would have 
 destroyed their power. It has been shown above how 
 the spoils system had been developed, since the begin 
 ning of the century, in Pennsylvania and New York. 1 
 It is a crude and incorrect notion that Andrew Jackson 
 corrupted the civil service. His administration is only 
 ""the date aTwhlcli a corrupt use of the spoils of the pub 
 lic service as a cement for party organization under 
 democratic-republican self-government, having been per 
 fected into a highly finished system in New York and 
 Pennsylvania, was first employed on the federal arena. 
 The student who seeks to penetrate the causes of the 
 corruption of the civil service must go back to study the 
 play of human nature under the political dogmas and 
 institutions of the States named. He cannot rest satis 
 fied with the explanation that " Andrew Jackson did it." 
 Thirty-eight of Adams s nominations had been post 
 poned by the Senate, so as to give that patronage to 
 Jackson. Between March 4, 1829, and March 22, 1830, 
 491 postmasters and 239 other officers were removed, 
 and as the new appointees changed all their clerks, dep 
 uties, etc., it was estimated that 2,000 changes in the 
 civil service took place. 2 Jackson, as we have seen, had 
 made a strong point against the appointment of mem 
 bers of Congress to offices in the gift of the President. 
 In one year he appointed more members of Congress to 
 office than any one of his predecessors in his whole 
 term. 8 The Senate, although democratic, refused to 
 3onfirm many of the nominations made. Henry Lee, 
 a-ppointed consul tc Algiers, and James B. Gardner 
 
 1 Page 102. 
 
 2 Holmes s speech in the Senate, April 28, "830 
 5 Ann. Reg. 20. 
 
L48 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 register of the land office, were unanimously rejected 
 Others were rejected by large votes. 1 Isaac Hill was 
 one of these. Webster said that, but for the fear of 
 Jackson s popularity out-of-doors, the Senate would 
 have rejected half his appointments. 2 The Senate ob 
 jected to the obvious distribution of rewards among the 
 partisan editors who had run country newspapers in 
 Jackson s influence. 8 Eaton had visited Binns, and had 
 made to him a distinctly corrupt proposition to reward 
 him with public printing, 4 if he would turn to Jackson. 
 The rejection of the editors was construed by the Jack 
 son men as a proscription of " printers " by the " aristo 
 cratic " Senate. 6 Kendall was confirmed by the casting 
 vote of Calhoun, for fear that he would, if not confirmed, 
 set up a newspaper in competition with Green s " Tele 
 graph " for the position of administration organ. 6 On 
 subsequent votes some of the appointments were con 
 firmed, for it was found that Jackson was thrown into a 
 great rage against the Senate which dared reject his 
 appointments. He was delighted when Hill, in 1831, 
 was elected by the Legislature of New Hampshire a 
 member of the Senate which had refused to confirm 
 him as Second Comptroller of the Treasury. Jackson 
 threw all the administration influence in favor of Hill s 
 election. Here we have an illustration of a method 
 of his of which we shall have many illustrations here 
 after When he was crossed by any one in a course in 
 which he was engaged, he drew back to gather force 
 with which to carry his point in some mode so much 
 more distasteful to his opponents than his first enterprisi 
 
 1 5 Ann. Reg. 21. 2 1 Webster s Correspondence, 501. 
 
 8 1 Webster s Correspondence, 488. * Binns, 253. 
 
 5 Kendall s Autobiography, 370. 
 * Kendall s Autobiography, 371. 
 
THE EATON AFFAIR. 149 
 
 that it would be a kind of punislunent to them and a re 
 dress to him. 
 
 Van Buren and Calhoun at once began to struggle 
 for the control of the patronage which was made dis 
 posable by the system of proscription. Their contest 
 for the succession rent the administration. 
 
 It was a very noteworthy fact that this administra 
 tion, which represented a certain contempt for social 
 forms and etiquette, should immediately go to pieces on 
 a question of that kind. So true is it that etiquette is 
 never burdensome until we try to dispense with it. 
 
 In January, 1829, John H. Eaton married Mrs. Tim- 
 berlake, widow of a purser in the navy, who had, a 
 short time before, committed suicide, while on service 
 in .the Mediterranean, because he could not conquer 
 habits of excessive drinking. Mrs. Timberlake was the 
 daughter of a Washington tavern keeper. As Peggy 
 O Neil she had been well known about Washington. 
 Eaton had paid her such attention, before her husband s 
 death, as to provoke gossip. He consulted Jackson be 
 fore the marriage. Jackson, having in mind the case of 
 his own wife, was chivalrously ready to take sides with 
 any woman whose reputation was assailed. He made 
 no objection to the marriage. When it occurred, several 
 persons remonstrated with Jackson about it, on the 
 ground that Eaton was to be in the cabinet, and that it 
 would hurt the administration. Jackson replied with 
 pirit to the effect that Mrs. Eaton was not to be in the 
 cabinet. If he had kept that attitude towards the matter 
 there might have been no trouble. By Eaton s appoint 
 ment his wife was introduced to the fbst circle in Wash 
 ington. The wives of the other Secretaries and the wife 
 >f the Vice -President did not recognize her. She tried 
 
150 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 to force her way, and General Jackson tried to help her 
 He made a political question of it. R. M. Johnson war 
 the agent for conferring with the Secretaries to prevail 
 on them to persuade their wives to recognize Mrs. Eaton. 
 The gentlemen were approached individually. Each said 
 that he left such matters to his wife, and could not un 
 dertake to overrule her judgment. This answer had no 
 effect on Jackson. Mrs. Donelson, wife of Jackson s 
 nephew and private secretary, and presiding lady at the 
 White House, was as recalcitrant as any one. She was 
 banished to Tennessee for some months. Mrs. Huyghens, 
 wife of the Dutch minister, refused to sit by Mrs. Eaton 
 at a public ball. Jackson threatened to send her hus 
 band home. September 10, 1829, he held a meeting of 
 his cabinet, before which Ely and Campbell, two clergy 
 men who were held by Jackson partly responsible for the 
 stories about Mrs. Eaton, were called to appear. Jack 
 son interrogated them, argued with them, and strove 
 to refute their statements, as a means of convincing the 
 members of the cabinet that there was no ground for 
 the position their wives had taken. Of course this fool 
 ish and unbecoming proceeding had no result. 
 
 Van Buren, being a widower, was in a certain posi 
 tion of advantage, which he used by showing Mrs. Eaton 
 public and private courtesies. In this way he won Jack 
 son s heart, for as the matter went on Jackson became 
 more and more engaged in it. On the other hand, 
 Calhoun suffered in Jackson s good graces by the fault 
 of Mrs. Calhoun, who had been conspicuous for dis 
 approval of Mrs. p]aton. Jackson had been growing 
 cold towards Calhoun for some time. He doubted if 
 Eallioun was thoroughly loyal to him in 1825 l or in 
 
 1 Wise (p. 82) says that Jackson was very angry with Calhoui 
 iftar the election in 1825. 
 
JACKSON S RELATIONS WITH CALHOUN. 15i 
 
 1828. He thought that Calhoun, in 1825, would have 
 made other arrangements than those with Jackson, if 
 any more convenient ones had been offered him. Cal 
 houn did, in fact, declare, in 1825, that he was quite 
 neutral as between Adams and Jackson. He did not 
 interfere at all with the election. 1 The Eaton affair 
 was either a pretext or a cause of widening the breach 
 between them. The factions opposed to Calhoun tried 
 to increase the bad feeling. Jackson was led to believe, 
 and he often affirmed, that the attack on Mrs. Eaton 
 was a plot to drive Eaton out of the cabinet. When 
 forced to justify his own interference, he put it on this 
 ground. He said that Clay was at the bottom of the 
 attack on Mrs. Eaton. All this trouble in the cabinet 
 remained for the time unknown to the public. 
 
 Lewis s statement, given by Parton, 2 covers the his 
 tory of all Jackson s relations with Calhoun. Lewis had 
 an inkling, in 1819, that Calhoun had not, as Jackson 
 supposed, been Jackson s friend in Monroe s cabinet, in 
 the Seminole war affair. Lewis wrote to the " Aurora," 
 suggesting that opinion, but Jackson wrote to him from 
 Washington to dismiss any suspicion as to Calhoun s un 
 friendliness in that matter. It seems to be necessary to 
 read between the lines of Lewis s statement, on pages 
 315-30. Did he not always retain his suspicion of Cal 
 houn ? Was he not on the watch for any evidence to 
 confirm it ? He speaks as if he had rested content with 
 Jackson s assurance, and Lad been corrected later by ac 
 cident or entirely on the initiative of otners. He does 
 Dot mention the first attempt made by the old Crawford 
 men to get over into the Jackson camp. It was not ao 
 lasy march, for in 1824 the Crawford men, as the " reg 
 
 1 Cobb, 219. 3 Parton, 310. 
 
152 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 olars," hated intensely the Jackson men, as upstarts 
 and disorganizes. Crawford had carried into his re 
 tirement a venomous and rancorous spirit, the chief ob 
 ject of which was Calhoun. He could join any one to 
 hurt Calhoun. In 1828 there was a project to run 
 Crawford for Vice-President with Adams. 1 Adams re 
 fused. 2 Crawford also, in 1828, by private letters to the 
 Georgia electors, tried to persuade them not to vote for 
 Calhoun. 3 In the same year he made friends with Clay, 
 writing to him that the charge of bargain was absurd. 
 In April, 1827, Van Buren and Cambreleng visited Craw 
 ford, and first established ties between him and Jackson. 
 The first effect was a letter from Crawford to Balch, a 
 neighbor of Jackson, December 14, 1827, stating that 
 Calhoun and his friends bandied about the epithet " mili 
 tary chieftain ; " also that Calhoun favored A^ams until 
 Clay came out for Adams ; 4 and adding that it would do 
 Jackson a service to obtain assurances for Crawford that 
 Jackson s advancement would not benefit Calhoun. 6 This 
 letter was meant to separate Jackson and Calhoun, and 
 it may have had a general effect. Specific consequences 
 cannot be traced to it. 
 
 According to Lewis s story, James A. Hamilton, on a 
 Jackson electioneering tour, went to see Crawford, in 
 January, 1828, in order to reconcile him with Jackson. 
 Lewis instructed Hamilton what to say to Crawford on 
 Jackson s part. Hamilton did not see Crawford. He 
 left the business in the hands of Forsyth. Forsyth soot 
 wrote to Hamilton that Crawford affirmed that Jackson i 
 
 ] 33 Niles, 315. 27 Adams, 390. Cobb, 240. 
 
 4 Cf. Lewis, in 3 Par ton, 315, on the allusion to Banquo s ghorf 
 ii Webster s reply to Hayiie. 
 fc 40 Niles, 12. 
 
CRAWFORD S REVELATION. 158 
 
 unmity against him was groundless, since it was not he, 
 but Calhoun, in Monroe s cabinet, who had tried to have 
 Jackson censured for his proceedings in Florida in 1818. 
 In April or May Lewis was in New York. Hamilton 
 showed him Forsyth s letter. For the time, Lewis kept 
 this information quite to himself. He was too clever to 
 spoil the force of it by using it too soon, and he well un 
 derstood how, in the changes and chances of politics, a 
 conjuncture might arise in which such a fact would gain 
 tenfold force. 
 
 In April, 1828, Henry Lee tried to draw Calhoun into 
 a correspondence about the construction of the orders to 
 Jackson in 1818. Calhoun offered to give Jackson any 
 statements or explanations, but declined to correspond 
 with any one else. 1 
 
 In November, 1829, at the height of the Peggy 
 O Neil affair, Jackson gave a dinner to Monroe. At 
 this dinner Ringold affirmed that Monroe alone stood 
 by Jackson in 1818. If Ringold did not have his cue, 
 he was by chance contributing astonishingly to Lewis s 
 plans. After dinner Lewis and Eaton kept up a con 
 versation, within ear-shot of Jackson, about what Ringold 
 had said. Of course Jackson s attention was soon ar 
 rested, and he began to ask questions. Lewis then told 
 him that he had seen, eighteen months before, the above- 
 mentioned letter of Forsyth to Hamilton. Jackson 
 dispatched Lewis to New York the next morning to get 
 that letter. In all this story, it is plain how adroitly 
 these men managed the General, and how skilful they 
 were in producing " accidents." It is evident that they 
 did not think it was time yet to bring about the explo* 
 lion. Lewis came back from New York without For- 
 - 40 Nilea, 14. 
 
154 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 Qyth s letter, and said that it was thought best to get a 
 letter directly from Crawford, containing an explicit 
 statement. In this position the matter rested all winter. 
 It is perfectly clear that the Jackson managers lost faith 
 in Calhoun s loyalty to Jackson and the Jackson party, 
 and that they were hostile to him in 1827-28, hut could 
 not yet afford to break with him. Jackson clung to his 
 friendships and alliances with a certain tenacity. Aa 
 Calhoun was drawn more and more into nullification, 
 the Jackson clique took a positive attitude in opposition 
 to it. 
 
 In the autumn of 1829 the clique around Jackson had 
 decided that he must run again, if he should live, in 
 1832, in order to consolidate the party, which no one 
 else could lead to victory at that time, and that Van 
 Buren must succeed him in 1836. 1 Lewis was already 
 committed to Van Buren, and Partpn brings us some 
 more of Lewis s invaluable testimony as to this arrange 
 ment. 2 .Herfiy -f or once, a wire-puller^ _put on paper _ a 
 c^ear description of his ^procee^dings in a typical case. 
 There was fear in the Jackson camp, in 1829, on ac 
 count of Jackson s very bad health, that he might not 
 live through his term. Lewis says that he and Jackson 
 were both anxious that Van Buren should succeed Jack- 
 Bon, and they believed that, if Jackson should die, a po 
 litical testament left by him would have great influence. 
 Accordingly, Jackson wrote a letter to his old friend, 
 Judge Overton, of Tennessee, dated December 31, 1829, 
 praising Van Buren, and expressing grave doubts about 
 Calhoun. A copy was duly kept, for Judge Overtoil 
 
 1 Parton says that Benton was booked for the period 1844-52 
 3 Parton, 297.) 
 
 2 3 Parton, 293, 297 
 
PLOTS FOR 1832. 155 
 
 was iiot informed of the contingent use for which the 
 letter was intended, and no risk \vas taken as to his 
 care in preserving the letter. This provision having 
 been made for the case that Jackson should die, the 
 next thing was to provide for his reelection, in case he 
 should live. 
 
 December 19, 1829, the "Courier and Enquirer" 
 came out in favor of Van Bur en for the succession, if 
 Jackson should not stand for reelection. The " Tele 
 graph " was annoyed at this, called it " premature," and 
 likely to produce division. 1 These two papers, repre 
 senting the Van Buren and Calhoun factions in the ad 
 ministration party, were engaged, during the winter, in 
 acrimonious strife. 2 Niles no doubt expressed the senti 
 ment of sensible people when he said, April, 1830, that 
 he did not see the necessity of action on the subject at 
 that time. His .statement, however, only showed how 
 little he understood the processes by which the people 
 manifest their power of self-government. 
 
 March 11, 1830, Lewis wrote to Colonel Stanbaugh, of 
 Pennsylvania, suggesting that the Pennsylvania Legis 
 lature should address to Jackson an appeal to stand for 
 reelection. To the end that they might send just the 
 proper appeal, Lewis inclosed it to them, already pre 
 pared for their signatures. Lewis wrote to Stanbaugh 
 that he did not think it would be wise for Jackson s 
 friends in Washington to [be known to] lead in the 
 movement for his reelection, and Pennsylvania, the 
 stronghold of his popularity, seemed to be the most ad 
 vantageous place from which the movement might [ap 
 pear to] start. The address came back duly signed 
 with sixty-eight names. It vis published in the " Penn- 
 i 37 Niles, 300. 2 38 Niles, 169. 
 
166 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 Bylvania Reporter," and copied all over the countiy as a 
 spontaneous and irrepressible call of the people to the 
 rt old hero " not to desert his country. The enterprise 
 did not run off quite so smoothly as Lewis s narrative 
 would imply. There was strong opposition by the Cal- 
 houn faction to Jackson s renomination, and a distinct 
 ronomination could not be carried. 1 In April a caucus 
 of the New York Legislature declared that it responded 
 " to the sentiment of the Legislature of Pennsylvania." 
 This caucus was prompted from Washington, and man 
 aged by the editor of the " Courier." 2 As soon as the 
 example was set, other Legislatures followed it. In 
 January, 1831, the " Globe " said that General Jackson 
 might be regarded as before the country for reelection. 8 
 April 13, 1830 (Jefferson s birthday), while still the 
 letter from Crawford was not received, but while Jack 
 son s mind was full of suspicion against Calhoun, a 
 banquet was prepared at Washington, which was in 
 tended to be a nullification demonstration. 4 Jackson 
 gave as a toast, " Our federal Union : It must be pre 
 served." This was a bomb-shell to the nullifiers, and 
 a declaration of war against Calhoun, who at the same 
 banquet offered a toast and made a speech, the point of 
 which was that liberty was worth more than union. 
 How much the personal element of growing suspicion 
 and ill-will towards Calhoun had to do with the attitude 
 which Jackson took up towards nullification is a matter 
 of conjecture and inference. His opinions, however, 
 deduced from hatred of the Hartford convention, had 
 Always been strongly favorable to the Union, and the 
 tnen in the kitchen cabinet, except Green, were strong 
 
 38Niles, 170. 2 Ibid. 
 
 39 Nilefl, 385. * 1 Benton, 148 
 
THE JEFFERSOWS BIRTHDAY BANQUET. 157 
 
 Unionists, although Jackson and they all were likewise 
 strong state-rights men. Ten years earlier Kendall 
 had maintained the major premiss of nullification with 
 great zeal. 1 
 
 At the same banquet Isaac Hill offered the following 
 toast and " sentiment : J " Democracy : Wherefore do 
 I take my flesh in my teeth, and put my life in mine 
 hand ? Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him. " 
 The quotation is from Job xiii. 14, and u he " is usually 
 interpreted as referring to God. This " sentiment " 
 therefore exalts democracy higher than any other known 
 expression, but it is best worth remembering as an il 
 lustration of the slave-like spirit which is bred by ad 
 herence to absolutist doctrines, whether the absolute 
 sovereign be an autocrat or a popular majority. All 
 together, the Jefferson s birthday banquet was a mem 
 orable occasion. 
 
 A letter from Crawford s own hand, disclosing the 
 attitude of Calhoun in Monroe s cabinet towards Jack- 
 Bon and his proceedings in Florida in 1818, was at last 
 received about May 1, 1830. In this letter the John 
 Rhea letter from Jackson to Monroe first comes into 
 history, and is the pivot on which the whole Seminole 
 \var question, in its revived form, is made to turn. 
 Crawford said that that letter was produced in the cab 
 inet, and that it brought him over to Jackson s side, 
 but that Calhoun persisted in hostility. Monroe and 
 every member of his cabinet, when appealed to, denied 
 ihat the Rhea letter was produced, or brought into con- 
 gideration in 1818 at all. Jackson immediately, May 
 13th, inclosed a copy of Crawford s letter to Calhoun, 
 %nd demanded an explanation of Calhoun s apparent 
 
 i Autobiography, 222. a 38 Niles, 153. 
 
158 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 perfidy, as he construed it. Jackson s main point in this 
 letter, which was evidently " copied " for him, is that 
 Calhoun well knew, by virtue of his position in the cab- 
 inet, and as he had shown by his orders, 1 that Jackson, 
 in all that he did, had the approval and connivance of 
 the administration. This brought out all the tangled 
 misunderstandings about Jackson s letter to Monroe and 
 John Rhea s supposed reply. Calhoun at once recog 
 nized his position. He could not understand the allu 
 sions to previous understandings which had never existed, 
 but it was plain that Crawford had opened an irreparable 
 breach between Calhoun and Jackson, and that all the 
 hopes Calhoun had built upon his alliance with Jackson 
 were in ruins. He also saw that the whole movement 
 was a Van Buren victory over him. He replied on 
 May 20th, complaining and explaining. He really had 
 no charge to repel. He had done nothing wrong, and 
 was guiltless of any injustice or perfidy towards Jack 
 son. The whole matter was a cabinet secret. Crawford 
 had violated confidence in making known the nature of 
 the preliminary discussions which preceded the adoption, 
 by Monroe s cabinet, of a definite policy as to Jackson s 
 proceedings. Calhoun was not to blame for any of the 
 misunderstandings about the previous authorization 
 which Jackson thought he had received. It seems that 
 Calhoun might have set forth this position with dignity. 
 He did not do so. Jackson replied to him, May 30th, in 
 a very haughty tone, declaring a complete breach be 
 tween them on the ground of Calhoun s duplicity. This 
 letter was plainly prepared by the persons who were 
 working on Jackson s strong personal feeling about hia 
 Florida campaign to bring him to a breach with Cal 
 1 See pa^e 5G. 
 
THE "GLOBE" FOUNDED. 159 
 
 houn, and to throw him into a close alliance with Van 
 Buren. The plan was a complete success. Lewis says 
 that Jackson sent Calhoun s letter of May 20th to Van 
 Buren, that he might read it and give advice about it, 
 but that Van Buren would not read it because he did 
 not want to be involved in the affair at all. Lewis 
 further says that Van Buren had nothing to do with 
 getting up the quarrel. We may well believe all this. 
 Lewis was not such a bungling workman in a job of that 
 kind as to commit his principal to any inconvenient 
 knowledge or compromising activity. 
 
 The quarrel with Calhoun brought on a quarrel with 
 Duff Green and the " Telegraph." Amos Kendall sent for 
 Francis P. Blair, an old Kentucky friend and co-worker of 
 his, arid his successor as editor of the " Frankfort Argus." 
 Blair was then thirty-nine years old. He was another 
 old Clay man, converted by Kentucky relief politics into 
 a Jackson man. He was a fanatical opponent of the 
 Bank of the United States, and strongly opposed to 
 nullification. Parton says he was forty thousand dollars 
 in debt. He had been president of the Bank of the 
 Commonwealth of Kentucky, and was indebted to the 
 Bank of the United States. 1 Blair started the " Globe," 
 and took Green s place in the kitchen cabinet, which 
 now contained a very large element of Kentucky relief 
 politics. Blair was the prince of partisan editors, a 
 man made to run an organ. For he was not a mere 
 mouth-piece. He was independent and able to go alone, 
 but had infinite tact, discretion, and shrewdness, so that 
 he was nn easy man to work with. The organ, therefore, 
 worked perfectly. Every expression io it came directly 
 from the "White House. If Blair spoke without consult- 
 1 Kendall s Autobi^J,pny, 372. 
 
160 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 in b Jackson, the harmony and sympathy of their ideas 
 vvas such that Jackson s mind was correctly interpreted. 
 If Jackson wanted anything said, JBlajj^ was in such 
 accord that it cost him nothmg in the way of conces 
 sion to say it. He and Kendall went with Jackson 
 dien no one elsecficl, and_theywere the leading spirits 
 in the government of the country until 1840. The first 
 number of the" (jrl6fce JJ "was issued December 7, 1830. 
 Since Blair had no capital, the paper was at first semi- 
 weekly, but Lewis and Kendall brought their connections 
 to bear on the office-holders to make them transfer their 
 subscriptions from the " Telegraph " to the " Globe." l 
 Parton says that Jackson compelled the departments to 
 give Blair their printing. 
 
 The quarrel between the President and the Vice-Pres- 
 ident did not become known until the end of the year. 
 Adams first refers to it in his diary under date of De 
 cember 22, 1830. Niles mentions it as a rumor January 
 29, 1831. In February, 1831, Calhoun published a large 
 pamphlet about the whole matter. 2 The next thing for 
 his enemies to do was to get his three friends, Ingham 
 Branch, and Berrien, out of the cabinet. To this end 
 those who were in the secret resigned, as a means of 
 breaking up the cabinet and forcing a reconstruction. 
 Barry was asked to remain in his office. Eaton re 
 signed first, April 7, 1831. Van Buren resigned April 
 11, 1831, in a letter which was so oracular that no one 
 could understand it. 8 The main ideas in his letter of 
 resignation and in Jackson s reply were, (1) that Jack 
 son did not intend to have any one in his cabinet who 
 was a candidate for the succession. This indicated Van 
 Buren as such a candidate. (2) That the cabinet wan 
 1 40 Niles, 318. 2 40 Niles, 11. 8 40 Niles, 145. 
 
DISRUPTION OF THE CABINET. 161 
 
 riginally a " unit," and that Jackson wanted to keep his 
 cabinet a unit. This hint had no effect on the other 
 Secretaries. They wanted to be dismissed, and a sepa 
 rate quarrel was necessary in the case of each. It was 
 in this connection that the Peggy O Neil affair l and all 
 the old misunderstanding about the Seminole war came 
 to a public discussion. Van Buren was appointed min 
 ister to Kn^land, and he wont out. At the next session 
 of Congress a great political conflict arose over his con 
 firmation. When McLane was sent out to England, in 
 1829, he had instructions from Van Buren to reopen the 
 negotiations about the West India trade, 2 and, as a basis 
 for so doing, to point out to the English government that 
 the party which had brought that question into the posi 
 tion in which it then stood had been condemned by the 
 people at the election. This introduced the internal 
 party contests of the country into diplomacy, and instead 
 of representing this nation to foreign nations as a unit, 
 having, for all its international relations, a continuous and 
 consistent life, it invited foreigners to note party changes 
 here, as if they had to negotiate at one time with one 
 American nation, and at another time with another. The 
 fact that Van Buren had given these instructions was 
 alleged as a reason for not confirming his appointment, 
 but the debate took a wide range. His confirmation 
 was defeated by the casting vote of Calhoun. This 
 check to Jackson s plans gave just the requisite spur of 
 personal pique to his desire to make Van Buren Presi 
 dent, and he pursued that purpose from this time on 
 with all his powers. It was in the debate on Van 
 
 1 Webster knew of that affair and its poU^ cal bearings in Jan 
 tary, 1830. (1 Correspondence, 483. J 
 * See below, page 169. 
 11 
 
162 4NDREW JACKSON. 
 
 BurerTs confirmation that William L. Marcy cynicall} 
 avowed the doctrine : "To the victors belong the spoils/ 
 
 Eaton was in a state of ungovernable rage at the dis 
 cussion of his wife s reputation by the newspapers from 
 one end of the country to the other. He challenged 
 Campbell, one of the clergymen mentioned above as 
 prominent in connection with the scandal. June 18, 
 1831, he challenged Ingham, Secretary of the Treasury. 
 Ingham declined to fight. A few days later Ingham 
 complained to Jackson that he had been waylaid and 
 hindered in his duties by Eaton, Lewis, Randolph, and 
 others. They denied that they had molested him, or 
 had intended to do so. 1 Jackson s plan had been that 
 Hugh L. White, senator from Tennessee, should resign, 
 and that Eaton should take his place. White was to be 
 Secretary of War. 2 White, however, who perhaps was 
 piqued that he was not made Secretary of War in 1829, 
 declined to fulfil his share of this programme. He became 
 alienated from Jackson. Eaton was made Governor of 
 Florida. From 1836 to 1840 he was minister to Spain. 
 Parton says he quarrelled with Jackson, and was a whig 
 in 1840. 8 He died in 1856. Mrs. Eaton died about 
 1878. 
 
 The new cabinet was: Edward Livingston, of Loui 
 siana, Secretary of State ; Louis McLane, of Delaware, 
 Secretary of the Treasury ; Lewis Cass, of Michigan, 
 Secretary of War ; Levi Woodbury, of New Hampshire 
 (who had given up to Hill his place in the Senate; > 
 Secretary of the Navy ; Roger B. Taney, of Maryland, 
 Attorney-General. Adams mentions a story that th 
 War Department was offered to William Drayton 
 
 1 40 Niles, 30-2. 2 Hunt s Livingston, 358. 
 
 2 3 Parton, 368, 639. See, also, page 273. 
 
THE NEW CABINET. 163 
 
 leader of the Union party of South Carolina. 1 This 
 cabinet was a " unit," and a unit for Jackson and the 
 successor on whom he had determined. 
 
 We have now brought the intimate and personal his 
 tory of Jackson s first administration down to the time 
 when the campaign for his reelection opened. We have 
 seen how Jackson construed the presidential office in its 
 immediate bearings, and how he addressed himself to its 
 immediate and personal duties. 
 
 1 9 Adams, 182. 
 
CHAPTER 
 
 PUBLIC QUESTIONS OF JACKSON S FIRST ADMINISTBA 
 TION. 1. 
 
 IT is proposed in this and the three following chapter 
 to take up, in categorical order, the great questions ol 
 public policy with which Jackson had to deal, to show 
 how each question stood when he was elected President, 
 and to show what was done about it, more especially 
 how he acted upon it, during his first administration 
 down to December, 1831, when the campaign of 1832 
 opened. 
 
 The first two points to be noticed are question^ of 
 foreign relations. 
 
 I. The trade between the United States and the 
 British West Indies had been a source of irritation and 
 dissatisfaction ever since the United States had been in 
 dependent. Great Britain declined, in 1815, to include 
 the West Indies in the commercial treaty then nego 
 tiated. In the negotiations of 1818, Rush and Gallatin 
 offered complete reciprocity as to ships and goods, but 
 England would not give up her colonial system. 1 The 
 act of Congress of April 15, 1818, was intended to coun 
 tervail the English navigation system. It introduced a 
 policy of retaliation in which, at that time, much faith 
 was placed. 2 This act provided that no British ships 
 should come here from any port to which an American 
 i I Rush, 417. 2 Seepage 197. 
 
WEST INDIA TRADE 165 
 
 ihip might not go, and that an English ship, clearing 
 nere, should give bonds not to land her cargo where an 
 American ship might not go. This law hurt the islands. 
 England then made Halifax and St. John s free ports 
 for goods in transit to the West Indies. This arrange 
 ment drew American products to the ports mentioned, 
 from which they were taken to the West Indies in Brit 
 ish ships. Negotiations, which were attempted, came to 
 nothing, because the English insisted on laying differen 
 tial duties to favor their northern colonies. By the act 
 of May 15, 1820, the United States forbade all trade 
 with the British West Indies in British vessels, and all 
 importation of British West India goods save in direct 
 trade from the place of production. This closed the 
 trade with the British colonies and forced concessions 
 from England, which greatly strengthened faith in the 
 "countervailing" policy. By an act of Parliament of 
 June 24, 1822, the British West Indies were opened to 
 foreign vessels, at specified ports, for specified goods, 
 subject to the colonial duties and to a ten per cent dif 
 ferential duty to favor the products of British North 
 America. 1 The voyage of an English ship then was to 
 the United States, thence to Halifax, thence to the West 
 Indies, thence to England. Monroe s proclamation of 
 August 24, 1822, responded to the act of Parliament by 
 opening the ports of the United States to British ships 
 bearing West India goods, under a differential tonnage 
 duty of $1.00 per ton, and a differential impost of ten 
 jjer cent. Neither an American nor a British vessel 
 could then bring TVest India goods from a northern 
 British colony, nor products of a northern colony from 
 tiie West Indies. 2 By the act of March 1, 1823, the 
 1 23 Niles, 28. 2 Treasury Circular, 23 Niles, 86 
 
166 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 United States confined the trade in English bottoms to 
 the direct trade, and the differential tonnage duty was 
 put at ninety-six cents. The demand of the United 
 States then was, to be put on the same footing in the 
 British West Indies as the British North American col 
 onies. If this claim had been made on a general free- 
 trade theory, it would have been wise and laudable, but 
 in advance of the age. Under the idea of trade which 
 then prevailed, it was thought to be an unbecoming de 
 mand. The King of England, by an order in council, 
 July, 1823, laid a retaliatory differential tonnage duty of 
 4s. 3d. per ton on American ships in the West Indies. 
 Thus the statesmen of the two countries were trying to 
 see what mischievous devices they could invent to crip 
 ple trade, and to treat a ship coming from such a port, 
 or with such goods, as if it were a pirate or pest-laden. 
 The English restrictions were aimed at the Americans, 
 but it was very plain to the West Indians that it was 
 they, and not the Americans, who bore the weight of all 
 the taxes and restrictions by which the shipping of 
 Great Britain was protected and the northern colonies 
 were favored. The American ships fell back into the 
 old-fashioned illicit trade, and did more and more of the 
 business, in spite of all the regulations. The geography 
 of the islands offered the greatest facilities for such 
 irade. The islanders connived at it. Why should 
 planters in Jamaica pay ten per went extra duty, at 
 the bidding of statesmen in England, in order to buy 
 inferior flour of farmers in New Brunswick ? No men 
 of the Anglo-Saxon race have been found who would 
 thus sacrifice their interests, if they saw the fact, and li 
 they could in any way help themselves. Adams tells a 
 itory which he got from Foot, of Connecticut, who haa 
 
RELAXATION OF THE NAVIGATION SYSTEM. 167 
 
 aimself been engaged in the West India trade. He took 
 *o the West Indies candles, which were subject to heavy 
 duty. The inspector said they were not candles, but 
 herrings, and passed them. 1 
 
 The whole English navigation system was decrepit. 
 As trade expanded, the old policy became impossible. 
 By the act of Parliament of July 5, 1825, England 
 divided the powers which had colonies from those which 
 had none. To the former she offered complete recip 
 rocity, metropolis against metropolis, colonies against 
 colonies. To the latter she offered the same rights in 
 her colonies which they gave to England and her posses 
 sions. Her empire as a whole was put in reciprocity 
 with any other empire as a whole, but parts of her em 
 pire were to favor each other. The proposition thus 
 made to all the world was to stand open for a year, and 
 was to go into operation in favor of any who, within 
 that time, should give notice of their acceptance of it. 
 On account of politics in Congress in 1825-26, no action 
 was taken by the United States. The protectionists here -j 
 ridiculed the pretended slackening of the navigation 
 system, and they made light of all Huskisson s reforms 
 which were carried out in the same connection, and from 
 j^hichj in fact, modern free trade dates. They thought 
 they saw interested and sinister reasons for the reforms. 
 Interested reasons there certainly were, and no others. 
 There never are, and never ought to be, any others, for 
 this kind of legislation. The navigation system was so 
 cumbersome and burdensome that it could not be sus 
 tained. The act of 1825 was pitiful enough in com 
 parison with sound doctrine, but it was a first breach in 
 wi old system, which was founded in strong prejudice! 
 md sustained by powerful interests. 
 1 7 Adams, 429. 
 
168 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 July 27, 1826, an order in council was issued, closing 
 the ports of the English colonies in America, except 
 Canada and Nova Scotia, to American ships after 
 December 1, 1826. England now interdicted the trade 
 which the United States had interdicted in 1820. Galla- 
 tin had just arrived in England to try to renew negotia 
 tions. Canning refused to negotiate, saying that Eng 
 land meant to regulate her commercial relations by the 
 act of Parliament, not by negotiations. England did 
 not complain, he said, that the United States had not 
 cared to take what others thought worth having. Eng 
 land held that colonial trade was a boon, to be paid for, 
 if granted at all. The United States held that trade is 
 its own reward, and is mutually advantageous. 1 The 
 latter ought to have put itself plainly and consistently 
 on that doctrine in all its bearings. American protec 
 tionism even, at that time, was by no means a barbarian 
 prejudice against trade, or a sacrifice of national inter 
 ests to private cliques, in the measure of their impu 
 dence and rapacity. The United States wanted com 
 plete reciprocity as to ships and the carrying trade, and 
 its doctrine was that each nation should arrange its fiscal 
 system to suit itself ; but it tried to countervail, by taxes 
 on imports, the taxes laid by foreign nations on Ameri 
 can exports of grain, etc. 2 Part of the English regula 
 tions belonged to the domestic fiscal system of Great 
 Britain, but others were part of the navigation system- 
 Hence the conflict arose. 
 
 1 Correspondence, 31 Niles, 269. 
 
 2 See below, page 195 Niles, who was a fanatical protection 
 1st, said, " To all the powers that wish free trade, we say, Lef 
 Jree trade be ; to all that will restrict us, we say Let restricfioi 
 M." (:il Niles, 240: December, 1826.) 
 
MO LANE S MISSION. 169 
 
 The matter had now (1827) been brought into a 
 diplomatic dead-lock, where the next move must be for 
 one party or the other to recede from its position. Can 
 ning s sarcasm was not a little to blame for this state of 
 things. The opposition in the United States made 
 capital out of the entanglement. In the mean time the 
 illicit trade went merrily on, and the smuggler rectified, 
 in his way, the folly of statesmen. Thus the matter 
 stood when Jackson was elected. 
 
 One of his first acts was to send McLane to England 
 to reopen negotiations. This he was to do by pointing 
 to the result of the election as a rebuke to the former 
 administration, which had brought about the dead-lock. 1 
 Pending the negotiations an act of Congress was passed, 
 May 29, 1830, authorizing the President to declare the 
 acts of 1818, 1820, and 1823 repealed, whenever Amer 
 ican ships should be allowed in the West Indies on the 
 same terms as British ships from the United States, and 
 when they should be allowed to carry goods from the 
 colonies to any non-British ports to which British ships 
 might go. This act was sent to England. Lord Aber 
 deen said that it was all that England had ever de 
 manded. 2 The colonial duties were raised, a differen 
 tial duty in favor of the North American colonies was 
 laid, and the trade was opened. The President issued 
 his proclamation October 5, 1830. The administration 
 coasted of this diplomatic achievement. The truth was 
 that the United States set out to force England to let 
 American goods come into the West Indies on the same 
 footing as British North American goods. England was 
 roerced by the acts of 1818 ani 1820. Canning said, 
 n 1826, that England had yielded to coercion, but thai 
 Cf. page 161. 2 39 Niles, 390 fg. 
 
170 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 she escaped from it as soon as she could. She opened 
 her trade to all the world as an escape. The counter 
 vailing system of the United States, then, no longer exer 
 cised any coercion, and the United States, to get the 
 trade reopened, abandoned the demands with which it 
 had started on the experiment of countervailing. This 
 last step was what the Jackson administration had ac 
 complished. Niles and the other protectionists scoffed 
 at the new arrangement. They said that the illicit 
 trade was better than the new arrangement. 1 A proof 
 that this was true is found in the fact that the illicit 
 trade went on. The laws forced products of the United 
 States to reach the islands through Canada and Nova 
 "ScofiaT, and this offered just so much premium to illicit 
 trade. 
 
 II. The claims of the United States for spoliations 
 against France and against all those states of Europe 
 which had been drawn by Napoleon into his Continental 
 system, had been a subject of fruitless negotiation ever 
 since 1815. 2 Jackson took up these claims with new 
 energy and spirit. He sent W. C. Rives to France in 
 1829, under instructions which covered the whole his 
 tory of the claims, to try to get a settlement. In his 
 message of 1829, while these negotiations were pending, 
 Jackson referred to the claims as likely to " furnish a 
 subject of unpleasant discussion and possible collision." 
 This reference was not of a kind to help the negotia 
 tions. In 1830 a revolution put Louis Philippe on the 
 throne under a Constitution. New hopes of a settlement 
 
 1 39 Niles, 298 ; 42 Niles, 143. 
 
 2 Succinct statements of the origin and history of these claimi 
 te the report of a minority of the committee of the House, 41 
 
 and the article 47 Niles, 455. 
 
TREATY OF PARIS. 171 
 
 D the claims were raised by this turn in affairs. A 
 treaty was finally signed at Paris, July 4, 1831, by 
 which France agreed to pay twenty-five million francs, 
 and the United States agreed to pay one and a half 
 million francs, in final settlement of all outstanding 
 claims of citizens of one country against the government 
 of the other country. The treaty was ratified February 
 2, 1832. The first instalment became due February 
 2, 1833. Claims against the other States of the old 
 Continental league were likewise liquidated, and pay 
 ment was secured during Jackson s administration. The 
 administration derived great credit from these settle 
 ments. There was a great deal more in the matter than 
 the money. European nations, which had similar claims 
 against France, had secured payment soon after the 
 peace, but the claims of the United States had been 
 neglected. Payment now meant a concession of con 
 sideration and respect to the United States, and the 
 people felt that Jackson had won this for the nation. 
 
 We have now to notice seven leading questions in the 
 internal policy of the nation up to and during Jackson s 
 first term of office : 
 
 I. The federal judiciary had never yet been organ 
 ized in such a manner as to discharge its functions satis 
 factorily. The federal judiciary act, which was passed 
 at the close of Adams s administration, was hastily re 
 pealed, as a political measure, immediately after Jeffer 
 son s accession. The repeal was an error, for the fed 
 eral judiciary continued weak and inadequate for lack of 
 just what that act had provided. After the decisions 
 on great constitutional points which were rendered be 
 tween 1819 and 1825, a party grew up which was ready 
 *o make any attempt to reorganize the federal judiciary 
 
L72 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 an occasion for an attack, both on the federal authority 
 and on the judicial institution. The strongest disposi 
 tion so to act was evinced by the Kentuckians. 1 
 
 In the session of 1825-26, when a bill for some new 
 circuits of the Supreme Court was pending, Rowan, of 
 Kentucky, 2 moved an amendment that seven judges out 
 of ten (the number which the bill proposed) must con 
 cur in order to declare any state law unconstitutional. 
 The whole bill was lost in a disagreement of the two 
 Houses. 
 
 In the session of 1827-28 a bill was introduced to 
 regulate the procedure of the federal courts in the new 
 States which had been admitted since the laws of Sep 
 tember 29, 1789, and May 8, 1792, which regulated the 
 procedure of the federal courts, were passed. To this 
 bill Rowan proposed an amendment which would take 
 away from the federal courts the power to modify or 
 change any of the rules of procedure, or any of the 
 forms of writs of execution, which were to be those of 
 the State in which the court was sitting. 8 If this amend 
 ment had been passed, the federal courts would not 
 have been allowed to change rules and forms, but the 
 state Legislatures would have had power to do so, and 
 the federal judiciary would have been handed over to 
 state control. This amendment was adopted by the 
 Senate. Webster, who had been away, returned to find 
 that the whole federal judicial system had been thrown 
 nto confusion 4 by this hasty proposition, which had 
 Seen made only with reference to some of the whims of 
 Kentucky relief politics. He exposed the effects of the 
 bill. It was recommitted and recast, establishing foi 
 
 i See chapter VI. 2 Cf. page 123. 
 
 Cf. page 129. * 7 Adams, 455. 
 
JEALOUSY OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, 178 
 
 the new States the procedure then existing, with powei 
 in the courts to modify under the supervision of the 
 Supreme Court, and in this shape it was passed. 
 
 In 1830 an attempt was made to repeal the twenty- 
 fifth section of the judiciary act, by which the Supreme 
 Court is empowered to pass upon the constitutionality 
 of state laws. The bill was lost in the House by the 
 vote of 137 to 51, but the minority consisted of some of 
 the leading administration men. In 1831 the House 
 refused, 115 to 61, to consider a resolution instructing 
 the judiciary committee to report a bill setting terms of 
 years for federal judges. 1 In 1830 Berrien gave an 
 opinion on the South Carolina Police Act, 2 in which he 
 overturned Wirt s opinion. He held that that act was 
 valid because it was an act of internal police. In this 
 opinion he laid down the doctrine of the extreme South 
 ern state-rights men about the limits of federal power. 
 He held that the federal authorities ought not, in exer 
 cising their powers, to make laws or treaties to come 
 into collision with anything which the States had done 
 under their reserved powers, unless it was necessary to 
 do so. The admission of black men into the State 
 was only convenient, not necessary ; hence collision on 
 that point would be improper. 8 
 
 The Jackson party and the Executive Department 
 were on terms of jealousy and distrust with the judiciary 
 for several years. Another expression of these feelings 
 was the impeachment of Judge Peck, of Missouri. The 
 democrats were especially jealous of the prerogative 
 powers of the courts, among the rest of the power to im 
 prison for contempt. Peck wrote out and published in 
 
 1 39 Niles, 405. 2 See page 130. 
 
 2 Opinions of the Attorneys-Ger.ertl, 483. 
 
174 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 a newspaper, in 1826, a decision which he had rendered, 
 Lawless, counsel for the defeated party, published a re 
 view of the opinion. Feck imprisoned him for twenty- 
 four hours, and suspended him from practice in the 
 court for eighteen months, for contempt. Lawless peti 
 tioned the federal House of Representatives during three 
 sessions for redress, in vain. In 1829 the democratic 
 House impeached Peck. Buchanan was the leader. 1 
 The impeachment was in the current of popular feeling, 
 and there was capital to be made out of it. January 
 31, 1831, the vote was, 21 to convict, 22 to acquit. 
 Adams says that Jackson favored acquittal lest Buch 
 anan should gain by a conviction, just as Jefferson, in 
 Chase s case, favored acquittal lest John Randolph 
 should gain power by a conviction. 2 By an act of 
 March 2, 1831, the power of the courts to punish at 
 discretion for contempt was limited to cases of misbe 
 havior in court, or so near to the court as to obstruct 
 the administration of justice. 
 
 II. The Indians of the Gulf States had been in col 
 lision with the Whites ever since the Revolution, when 
 the Cherokees and Creeks were allied with England. 
 The government of the United States restrained the 
 Indians from intercourse with foreign nations, and made 
 them wards of the nation, but it made treaties with 
 them as independent tribes, not to say nations. The 
 history is a monotonous repetition of the same series of 
 ra^ts. The Indians occupied as much territory per man 
 for their hunting-grounds as would have supported a 
 dozen white families. The Whites gained economic ad 
 
 i Charges and specifications, 38 Niles, 245. Cf., also, 2 Kei 
 oedy s Wirt, 308. 
 8 Adams, 306. 
 
TREATIES BETWEEN GEORGIA AXD INDIANS. 175 
 
 vantages by spreading themselves thinly over a great 
 area. Treaties were made by which the Indians ceded 
 land, and a boundary was drawn. The Whites spread 
 over the territory and up to the boundary. The two< 
 races then began to commit outrages on each other. 
 The Whites made no account of white outrages and 
 great account of red outrages. They set out to chastise 
 the Indians. They forced a new treaty, with a new 
 land cession, established a new boundary, and began the 
 pame process over again. 
 
 In November, 1785, Georgia made a treaty with the 
 Creeks at Galphinton, by which they ceded land. The 
 Continental Congress was not a party to this treaty, but 
 it made one with the Cherokees in December of the same 
 year, 1 at Hopewell. In 1786 Georgia made another 
 treaty with the Creeks at Shoulder Bone Creek. In 
 1789 the new federal government sent an agent to in 
 vestigate the treaties made by Georgia. He approved of 
 them, but he failed in his effort to make another on be 
 half of the federal government, because McGillivray, 
 the half-breed chief of the Creeks, opposed any further 
 treaties. 2 In 1790 McGillivray and several other chiefs 
 were persuaded to go to New York. There they made a 
 treaty. Washington s administration was in the attitude 
 uf protecting the Indians against the Georgians. The 
 atter were much displeased by the treaty of New York, 
 because it gave up to the Indians lands which had been 
 extorted from them at Galphinton. McGillivray died 
 in 1793, and Georgia, in the same year, made war on 
 tfie Creeks. Washington wrote to express strong dis 
 approval of this offensive movement on the part of 
 
 1 2 Stevens, 4.0 fg. 
 
 2 See 2 Pickett, 30 fg for the story of McGillivray. 
 
176 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 Georgia. 1 In 1796 the United States made a treaty at 
 Holston with the Cherokees, by which the latter were 
 to be subject to the United States only, and to treat with 
 the United States only. In the same year the federal 
 Indian Intercourse Act forbade any one to go into the 
 Indian territories under penalty of fine or imprisonment. 
 In 1798 the Cherokees made a further cession at Tel- 
 lico, in a treaty with the United States, by which their 
 remaining lands were secured to them, and they were 
 to have their own laws, to which any white person re 
 siding amongst them was to be subject. 2 There was an 
 old treaty of 1777 between Georgia and the Cherokees, 
 which the former always made the basis of its claims. 
 New lands, which were obtained by cession, were, ac 
 cording to the practice of Georgia, distributed by lottery 
 amongst the citizens of the State. Hence the eagerness 
 for land cessions of the people of that State, and the con 
 stantly renewed collisions with the Indians and with the 
 federal government. In 1802 the United States agreed 
 to extinguish the Indian title to lands within the pre 
 scribed boundaries of Georgia, "whenever it could be 
 peaceably done on reasonable terms," and Georgia ceded 
 to the United States the present States of Alabama and 
 Mississippi, with the privilege of settling with the Ya- 
 7<oo land-scrip holders, to do which ultimately cost four 
 million dollars. 
 
 Georgia continually pressed the federal government 
 oo buy off the Indian title to lands in that State, and it 
 was oSne from time to time for certain portions. The 
 treaty of 1802 was supposed to cover Georgia s claims 
 for the expenses of the Indian wars of 1793-94, but 
 
 1 2 Stevens, 454 ; 2 Pickett, 144. 
 
 2 5 Ann. Keg. 45. 3 2 Kennedy s Wirt, 278. 
 
TREATY OF INDIAN SPRING. 177 
 
 those claims were urged until 1827, when Congress voted 
 $129,375 to discharge them. At the urgent solicitation 
 of Georgia, Monroe appointed two commissioners to 
 treat with the Creeks, of whose lands nine and a half 
 million acres were still under the Indian title. The 
 lower Creeks weiv, tin?:* on the land west of the Flint 
 River, and north of 31 30 , and the upper Creeks were 
 almost entirely in Alabama, between the Coosa river and 
 the Georgia boundary, and north of an east and wfcst line 
 through the Hickory Ground (Wetumpka). These boun 
 daries were set by Jackspn s treaty with the Creeks of 
 1814, and he guaranteed to them the lands which were 
 then left to them. 1 The Cherokees were in the north 
 western corner of Georgia, the northeastern corner of 
 Alabama, and the southeastern corner of Tennessee, be 
 tween the Chattahoochee, the Etowah, and the Hiwasee 
 rivers. The Creeks voted to put to death any one who 
 should vote to sell any more land, and refused to treat 
 with Monroe s commissioners. After the council broke 
 up, a few chiefs, headed by Mclntosh, made the treaty 
 of Indian Spring, February 12, 1825, ceding all their 
 lands in Georgia and Alabama for $400,000. The Sen 
 ate confirmed this treaty, March 3, 1825. April 30th 
 the Creeks set Mclntosh s house on fire, and shot him as 
 he came out. Governor Troup of Georgia claimed the 
 lands for Georgia at once, and began to survey them. 
 He also set up a lottery to dispose of them. President 
 Adams appointed an agent to investigate the negotia 
 tion of the treaty. The agent reported that forty-nine 
 fiftieths of the Creeks repudiated the treaty as a fraud 
 on them. The President ordered General Gaines to 
 prevent any trespass on the lands of the Indians, and 
 1 Folio State Papers, 1 Ind^n Affairs, 827. 
 12 
 
178 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 pointed out to Governor Troup the objections to his 
 proceedings. Troup blustered, and asked if the Presi 
 dent would hold himself responsible to the State of 
 Georgia. The Georgia Legislature did not sustain the 
 Governor. The treaty of Indian Spring was annulled, 
 and a new one was made in January, 1826, by which a 
 part of the lands in Georgia were ceded. This treaty 
 was not confirmed, and another, ceding all l the lands 
 in Georgia, was finally made, as Benton says, by appeal 
 ing to the cupidity of the chiefs. The Mclntosh party 
 got an indemnity, and a large sum was given to the 
 chiefs. Land was to be provided west of the Mississippi 
 for all who would go there. This treaty did not satisfy 
 the Georgians. Nevertheless, inasmuch as by the last 
 treaty all the lands in Georgia were ceded, and by the 
 second treaty only part of those lands were ceded, the 
 Georgians claimed a substantial victory, 2 although not 
 all the lands in Georgia and Alabama were ceded, as by 
 the treaty of Indian Spring. The Cherokees still re 
 mained undisturbed. In January, 1828, the Georgia 
 Legislature passed a set of resolutions, the truculency of 
 which is unparalleled, demanding that the United States 
 should extinguisli the title of the Cherokees. 3 
 
 The Cherokees were the most civilized of the Gulf In 
 dians, and perhaps they had reached a higher pitch of 
 civilization than any other Indians have ever yet reached. 4 
 They had horses and cattle, goats, sheep, and swine. They 
 raised maize, cotton, tobacco, wheat, oats, and potatoes, 
 and traded with their products to New Orleans. They 
 had gardens, and apple and peach orchards. They hao 
 built roads, and they kept inns for travellers. They 
 
 1 1 Benton, 59. 2 Hodgson, 141. 
 
 8 3 Ann Reg., Local History, 143. 4 3 Ann. Reg. 77. 
 
CIVILIZATION OF THE INDIANS. 179 
 
 manufactured cotton and wool. Probably all this was 
 very poor in its way. Their numbers were increasing. 
 In 1825 there were 13,563, besides 220 resident whites 
 and 1,277 slaves, in the Cherokee country. One of their 
 number had invented an alphabet for their language. 
 They had a civil government, imitated from that of the 
 United States. The Chickasaws had ten mills and 
 fifty workshops. They lived in the northeast corner 
 of Mississippi. They numbered 4,000, and were in 
 creasing. The Choctaws, in Central Mississippi, num 
 bered 21,000, and ranked next to the Cherokees in civil 
 ization. The Creeks numbered 40,000, and were the 
 lowest in civilization. The money paid them tor their 
 lands had debauched them. It was the facts that the 
 Indians had reached a certain grade of civilization, that 
 they were increasing in numbers, and that they were 
 forming civilized civil and Christian bodies, which made 
 all the trouble, for these facts all led to the probability 
 that the Indians would remain a permanent part of the 
 society, and would occupy definite areas of land in the 
 midst of the States. It certainly was a home question, 
 when, in 1829, Jackson asked whether Maine or New 
 York would tolerate an Indian state within her own 
 civil limits. Peter B. Porter, Secretary of War under 
 Adams, prepared a plan for an Indian territory west of 
 the Mississippi, and for colonizing the Gulf Indians in 
 t. The plan was referred to the next administration. 
 Adams made himself very unpopular in the Southwest 
 by his action to protect the Indians. He did not get a 
 vote in Georgia in 1828. Jackson had abundantly 
 ihown 1 that he held the Southwestern white man s 
 *iews of Indians and Indian rights. 
 1 See page 23. 
 
180 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 As soon as Jackson was elected, December 20, 1828, 
 Georgia passed a law extending her jurisdiction over the 
 Cherokee lands and dividing them into counties, and 
 enacted that no Indian should testify against a white 
 man. In 1829 she modified this so that an Indian 
 might testify against a White who lived in the Indian 
 territory. In 1829 Alabama, and in 1830 Mississippi, 
 passed similar laws, but somewhat milder. The new 
 administration admitted the soundness of the theory of 
 these laws, which were plainly in contravention of the 
 treaties made with the Indians by the federal govern 
 ment. In his message of 1829 Jackson said that he had 
 told th ~ Indians that their pretensions would not be sup 
 ported. In the spring of 1830 Congress passed an act 
 for encouraging and facilitating the removal of the Gulf 
 Indians to a territory set apart for them west of the 
 Mississippi. 
 
 The quarrel between Georgia and the Indians had 
 uow narrowed down to a struggle with the Cherokees, 
 who were the most civilized, and who liad the strongest 
 treaty guarantees from the federal authority for their 
 territory and their self-government. It was proposed to 
 test the proceedings of Georgia before the Supreme 
 Court of the United States. In the summer of 1830, 
 Judge Clayton, a Georgia state judge, charged the grand 
 iury that he intended to allow no case to be withdrawn 
 :rom his jurisdiction by any foreign authority, but that 
 lie should enforce the state laws about the Indians, and 
 he wanted to know whether he was to be supported by 
 the people. 1 The first test arose on a murder case 
 igainst George Tassel, a Cherokee, for killing anotliei 
 Cherokee. The Superior Court of Hall County tried 
 i 39 Nileg, 99. 
 
GEORGIA AND THE FEDERAL AUTHORITY. 181 
 
 Convicted, and sentenced him. The Chief Justice of the 
 Supreme Court of the United States issued a citation to 
 the State of Georgia, December 12, 1830, to appear and 
 show cause, in answer to a writ of error, why the sentence 
 against Tassel should not he corrected. 1 Governor Gil- 
 mer laid this locument before the Legislature, which 
 ordered him to disregard it, and to resist by force any 
 attempt to interfere with the criminal law of the State. 
 On the 28th of December Tassel was hung. 
 
 The Governor of Georgia called on the President 
 to withdraw the federal troops, and leave Georgia to 
 deal with the Indians and gold-diggers. The President 
 complied. The Georgia militia marched in, and com 
 plaints from the Indians at once began to be heard. The 
 President refused to enforce the treaty rights of the In 
 dians. The Cherokees applied to the Supreme Court 
 for an injunction to prevent Georgia from interfering 
 with their treaty rights. In January, 1831, the court, 
 while in effect sustaining the claims and rights of the 
 Cherokees, declared that the remedy prayed for could 
 aot be employed. What was needed was not a judicial 
 but a political remedy. 2 The political remedy belonged 
 to the Executive and the President had refused to use it. 
 
 Georgia ordered all white residents of the Cherokee 
 
 O 
 
 country to obtain state licenses, and to take an oath of 
 allegiance to the State. Two missionaries, sent out by 
 a Boston society, Worcester and Butler, amongst others, 
 did not comply with this law. They were arrested, but 
 were at first released, under the belief that they were 
 disbursing agents of the federal government. The au 
 thorities at Washington denied that they were such. 
 Thereupon they were rearrested, tried, convicted, and 
 1 39 Niles. 338. 2 5 Peters, 1. 
 
L82 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 Condemned to four year s hard labor in the penitentiary. 
 In sentencing them Judge Clayton made another stump 
 speech. 1 On a writ of error in 1832, the Supreme Court 
 held that the law under which these men were convicted 
 was unconstitutional, that the laws of Georgia about the 
 Cherokees contravened federal treaties and were void, 
 and the men were ordered to be released. 2 Georgia re 
 fused to obey. The Georgia doctrine seemed to be that 
 all three Departments of the federal government must 
 concur in holding a state law to be unconstitutional in 
 order to set it aside. 8 Jackson refused to take any exec 
 utive action to give force to the decision of the court. 
 The presidential election was at hand, and he said that 
 he would submit his conduct to the people, who could at 
 the election show whether they approved or disapproved 
 of his refusal to sustain the decision. 4 No case could 
 more distinctly show the vice of the political philosophy 
 which Jackson professed. Twelve persons in all were 
 convicted, in Georgia, of illegal residence in the Indian 
 country. All were pardoned. 5 The missionaries refused 
 at first to accept a pardon. In January, 1833, they with 
 drew their suit in the Supreme Court, and were re 
 leased. 6 
 
 In 1833 Alabama came into collision with the federal 
 government on account of Indians. Federal troops were 
 employed to expel intruders from the Indian territory. 
 
 1 41 Niles, 174. 2 6 Peters, 515* 
 
 9 Adams, 548. 
 
 * Greeley has a story that Jackson said, "John Marshall haa 
 made his decision. Now let him enforce it." (1 Greeley, 106.) 
 Jackson disliked Marshall, although he had no active enmity 
 Ugainst him. Scarcely two men could be found less likely to aj> 
 Dreciate each other personally or politically. 
 
 * 7 Ann. fteg. 265. 6 43 Nile*, 419. 
 
REAIL V AL OF THE GULF INDIANS. 183 
 
 In executing this duty they killed one Owens. The state 
 authorities attempted to try for murder the. soldiers 
 through whose action the man met his death. The mili 
 tary authorities would not consent. The federal govern 
 ment, taught by nullification, took a firmer position than 
 in the case of Georgia. By a compromise, the reserva 
 tion was made smaller, and the white intruders were al 
 lowed to buy titles from the Indians. 1 
 
 In September, 1830, a treaty was negotiated at Danc 
 ing Rabbit Creek with the Choctaws, over whom Missis 
 sippi had extended her laws, by which they ceded their 
 lands and went west of the Mississippi. They were to 
 be provided with land, transportation, houses, tools, a 
 year s subsistence, $50,000 for schools, $20,000 a year 
 for twenty years, $250 each, for twenty years, for four 
 chiefs, and $500 for another, as president of the nation, 
 should such an officer be chosen. When this treaty 
 was before the Senate for ratification the preamble was 
 stricken out, because it recited that " the President of 
 the United States has said that he cannot protect the 
 Choctaw people from the operation of these laws " of 
 Mississippi. 2 During the next eight years the tribes were 
 all half persuaded, half forced, to go. The Indian Terri 
 tory was roughly defined by an act of June 30, 1834. 
 Part of the Cherokees had gone in 1818, because they 
 wanted to follow their old mode of life. In 1836 all 
 the rights of the Cherokees east of the Mississippi were 
 bought for five million dollars and the expenses of re 
 moval. 8 In the same year the Creeks broke into hostili 
 ties, and were forced to migrate. In 1838 the civilized 
 Cherokees migrated, except a few, who disappeared as 
 Indians have disappeared ev 3ry where else. 
 
 l 45 Niles, 155 ; Hodgson, 179. 
 
 >l 40 Nileg. 106. 8 50 Niles. 265. 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
 PUBLIC QUESTIONS OF JACKSON S FIRST .LDMESTWTBA 
 TION. II. 
 
 III. The land system of the United States had been 
 adopted in 1800, when the price was fixed at $2.00 per 
 acre, and long credit was given, or at the rate of $1.64 
 per acre, cash. 1 In 1820 the price was reduced to $1.25 
 per acre, cash, as a minimum price. There were heavy 
 arrears due for lands sold on credit. The policy to be 
 pursued with the lands came to be a great political ques 
 tion. The popular notion was that the lands, while 
 wild and in the hands of the government, were a great 
 property. The earth s surface is an abode for man, and 
 a source from which he can get a supply of the things 
 to satisfy his needs, if he will work hard enough for 
 them. In its natural state the land is only an oper 
 chance, worth a great deal to a man who has no other 
 chance, but not attractive to a man who has any com 
 mand of the resources of life which may be employed 
 in civilized communities. The earth s surface is not a 
 boon or gift of nature to man, and cannot be a thing of 
 value while wild. To subdue the land to the use of man 
 costs hardship, labor, and self-denial. Often it costs dis 
 base, and the premature death of generations. What 
 Ihen, can any one afford to give for wild land ? He car 
 inly afford to give a remuneration for the survey whicl 
 1 Seybert, 354. 
 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAND. 185 
 
 secures him a definite description and identification of 
 the land which he has appropriated, and for the author 
 ity of a civil government which protects his title. If, 
 then, the purchaser does not occupy and till, he looks to 
 the demand for land, which will advance as the country 
 fills up with population, to give him a profit on his out 
 lay. He has appropriated part of a natural monopoly, 
 and advancing demand will give him profit. In the 
 mean time interest and taxes are running against him. 
 Hence it has happened again and again that land spec 
 ulators have been ruined in financial revulsions. If the 
 purchaser occupies and tills the land, he is putting cap 
 ital into it all the time, and he and his neighbors, as 
 they build up a commonwealth, gain incidentally by the 
 monopoly principle, and by cooperation. Any holder 
 who seeks only the monopoly profit on raw land is work 
 ing against himself, unless he can divide his possessions, 
 and sell part and withhold part in a judicious adjust 
 ment. Then, however, a great capital and a long time 
 are necessary. The federal government was in this last 
 position. Its lands, therefore, were not a source of in 
 come or a valuable possession to it. Down to Septem 
 ber 30, 1832, the lands had cost $49.7 million, and the 
 total revenue received from them had amounted to 
 $38.3 million. 
 
 Various plans for dealing with the lands had been 
 proposed previous to Jackson s accession. One was that 
 the States should seize the lands by virtue of their " sov 
 ereignty." This short and easy method recommended 
 itself to the politicians of the emphatic. and metaphy 
 sical school. It meant simply that the first settlers should 
 buy some land, organize a State, and get " sovereignty," 
 \nd then take possession of the rest of the land within 
 
186 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 the civil jurisdiction. Another plan was to sell to the 
 States at a nominal price. Another : to sell all the land 
 at graduated prices, for what it would bring. Another : 
 to give the land to actual settlers (since realized in the 
 homestead law). Another: to use the lands as a fund 
 for internal improvements and education (since realized 
 in the railroad subsidies and agricultural college land 
 grants). It is plain that if the federal government buys 
 territory by treaties like those of Louisiana and Florida, 
 and surveys the lands, and. maintains civil institutions 
 over all the territory, and then gives the lands away, 
 what it gives is the outlay necessary to bring the land to 
 the point where a civilized man can begin to use it. Of 
 course the new States wanted population, and were 
 eager that the federal government should encourage im 
 migration by making this outlay and giving away the 
 product of it. 
 
 The old States, especially the tariff States, then saw 
 distinctly the relation of the lands to the tariff. Every 
 thing which enhanced the attractiveness of the land and 
 made it easier to get at it was just so much force draw 
 ing the man who had no land and no capital away from 
 the old States and out of the wages class. Every im 
 provement in transportation; every abolition of taxes 
 and restrictions like the corn laws, which kept American 
 agricultural products out of England; every reduction 
 in the price of land, increased the chances of the man 
 who had nothing to become by industry and economy 
 an independent land-owner. The capitalist employer 
 in the old States was forced to offset this attractiveness 
 of the land byj^ising wages. This of course is the rea 
 son wTTy wages uT tfie United States are highland jvvhy 
 no wages class has ever yet been distinctly differentiated 
 
TARIFF ANL LAND. 187 
 
 here. It might justly be argued that it was improper 
 for the federal government to raise funds by taxation on 
 the old States, and expend them in buying, surveying, 
 and policing wild land, and then to give the land away 
 to either " the poor " or the rich ; but the protectionists 
 distinctly faced the issue which was raised for their pet 
 dogma, and demanded that the lands should not be sur 
 veyed and sold abundantly and cheaply, but should be 
 kept out of the market. The effect of this would be 
 to prevent the population from spreading thinly over 
 the whole continent, to make it dense in the old States, 
 to raise the value and rent of land there, to produce a 
 class dependent on wages, i. e., a supply of labor, and 
 to keep wages down. At the same time all the taxes 
 on clothing, furniture, and tools would reduce the net 
 return of the agriculturist and lower the attractiveness 
 of the land. Lower wages would then suffice to hold 
 the laborer in the East. These two lines of legislation 
 would therefore be consistent and support each other ; 
 but they were sorely unjust to the man who had noth 
 ing save his stout hands with which to fight the battle 
 of life and his good-will to work. 
 
 The free-trade States of the South and the free-land 
 States of the West, therefore, fell most naturally into 
 the " coalition " which the tariff men and national re 
 publicans denounced. The latter said that the Southern 
 ers had agreed to surrender the lands to the West as a 
 price for the assistance of the West against the Eastern 
 States and the tariff. 1 The sudden and unaccountable 
 popularity of Jackson in rural Pennsylvania threw that 
 State, in spite of the tariff interests of her capitalists, into 
 the combination to which JacKson belonged section ally, 
 1 9 Adamj, 235. 
 
[88 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 and the amtitious politicians of New York, seeing the 
 need of joining Jackson, brought as much as they could 
 of that State to liis support. These combinations con 
 stituted the Jackson party, in regard to the incoherency 
 of whose elements something has been said and more 
 will appear. Clay was operating his political career 
 through tariff and internal improvements, with the lands 
 as a fund for colonization, canals, roads, and education. 
 This gave him no strength in the West, and he could 
 not break Jackson s phalanx in Pennsylvania, where his 
 own policy should have made him strong. Hence he 
 never could consolidate a party. Benton antagonized 
 Clay in the West by taking up the policy of free lands. 
 In 1827 Rush, Secretary of the Treasury, included in 
 his annual report a long dissertation on lands, tariff, 
 and internal improvements. I He sees and states dis 
 tinctly and correctly the relation between free land and 
 tree trade, restricted land sales and protection. 1 ^ He 
 makes an argument out of it for protection and for not 
 selling the lands cheaply, although he does not venture 
 positively to urge the latter. He lays down the dogma 
 that " the creation of capital is retarded by the diffusion 
 of a thin population over a great surface of soil," a 
 dogma which is the very opposite of the truth. He also 
 declares that the price at which the lands were being 
 sold was an encouragement by legislation to agriculture, 
 which is not true, and would not be true unless the 
 lands were sold for less than the cost of buying, survey 
 ing, and policing. The figures above given show that 
 the lands had been sold as nearly as possible at cost 
 pi -ce. Leaving out these errors, his recognition of the 
 economic relations and their effects is correct ; yt they 
 i 33 Niles, 250. 
 
FOOTS RESOLUTIONS. 189 
 
 seem to him to sustain an argument for restriction on 
 trade and restriction on the sales of land, and he dis 
 tinctly favors the plan of making it hard for the non- 
 capitalist to get upon the land, in order that the non- 
 capitalist may be kept in the old States, and may be 
 more willing to work there for wages. One thing, at 
 least, must be admitted to the credit of the statesmen of 
 chat day who believed in the restrictive system. They 
 did not give away the lands by a homestead law, and 
 distribute them to railroads which were to render the 
 new land easily accessible, while they laid restrictions on 
 imports to encourage manufacturing, and they did not 
 propose to pay subsidies to ships for bringing goods in, 
 while they were laying duties to keep goods out. Their 
 system was vicious, but the abuse was perpetrated only 
 once ; it was not multiplied into itself three or four 
 times. It was based on an error, but the error was at 
 least logical and consistent with itself. 
 
 In January and February, 1829, Illinois and Indiana 
 adopted resolutions questioning the right of the federal 
 government to the lands in those States. They did not 
 adopt the Georgia tone, but they seemed disposed to 
 adopt the Georgia policy in case of a disagreement with 
 the federal government. 
 
 Jackson had no settled policy in regard to land. In 
 his first message he favored distribution of the surplus 
 revenue among the States, so soon as the debt should 
 be paid. 
 
 December 29, 1829, Foot, of Connecticut, offered in 
 the Senate a resolution that the Committee on Public I 
 ^ands should inquire into tin expediency of restricting \ 
 sales of land to inds not yet sold at the minimum price, 
 (. ., within the areas which rp to that time had been 
 
190 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 put upon the market. It was in the debate on thii 
 resolution that Webster and Hayne became involved in 
 their famous argument on the theory of the confedera 
 tion. Benton introduced a bill for selling the lands 
 at graduated prices, so that those remaining unsold at 
 $1.25 should not be reserved, but sold at lower prices, 
 after they had been three years on the market. The 
 Senate passed this bill May 7, 1830. It was not acted 
 on in the House. 
 
 In January, 1831, the subject came up again in the 
 House, on an appropriation for surveys, 1 and produced 
 a long debate, in which all the views of the question were 
 represented. In his annual report for 1831, McLane, 
 Secretary of the Treasury, proposed that _ the lands 
 should be sold to the States in which they lay at a fair 
 price, and that the sum thus obtained should be divided 
 amongst the States. March 22, 1832, Bibb moved, 2 in 
 tKe Senate," "that the Committee on Manufactures should 
 report, as a preliminary to the consideration of the tariff, 
 on the expediency of reducing the price of the lands, 
 and also on the expediency of surrendering the lands to 
 the States. Clay reported from that committee against 
 both propositions, and in favor of giving ten per cent o.f 
 the proceeds of the lands to the new States, in addition 
 to wh^t they were already entitled to, and dividing the 
 residue among all the States. Clay s report was re 
 ferred to +he Committee on Public Lands, which re 
 ported, May 18th, adversely to his propositions, ami 
 recommended a minimum price of $1.00 ; lands remain 
 ing unsold at that price for five years to be then sold 
 for fifty cents ; fifteen per cent of the proceeds to 1)6 
 divided amongst the new States. No action was take* 
 
 i 6 Ann. Reg. 81 . * 7 Ann. Reg. 57. 
 
EARLY POLICY ABOUT IMPROVEMENTS. 191 
 
 on account of the disagreement of the two Houses, but 
 the administration, by its attitude on the land question, 
 gained strength in the Western States for the presiden 
 tial election of 1832. 
 
 IV. Internal improvements. In 1802 appropria 
 tions were made for a road to the northwestern terri 
 tory. In 1807 Gallatin made an elaborate report on 
 public works, laying down doctrines which no one would 
 dispute about the advantage of public highways and 
 means of transportation. The Jeffersonians were timid 
 on the point of constitutionality, but they did not raise 
 the question of expediency, and there was no party 
 question about internal improvements. By the act of 
 May 11, 1812, provision was made for the survey of a 
 road from Robinstown, Maine, to St. Mary s, Georgia. 
 This was a north and south road, proposed, in the inter 
 est of justice, to offset the Cumberland road from east 
 to west. The vice of the policy, therefore, presented 
 itself at once. It was impossible to select only the 
 enterprises which were of a national character, and 
 were really demanded by public necessity and con 
 venience. Local jealousy and self-interest demanded 
 " equal " favor, and the enterprises were either all im 
 possible, or could be carried out only by log-rolling to 
 include them all. 
 
 February 16, 1816, Calhoun moved for a committee 
 "o inquire into the expediency of setting apart the bonus 
 ind profits from the Bank of the United States as a 
 ind for internal improvements. At the next session 
 a bill to that effect was passed. JVIadison vetoed it, 
 because the federal government had not the power te 
 engage in sucli enterprises. Monroe declared, in his 
 tirst message, that he held the same views as Mad 
 
192 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 tson on this subject. 1 In 1817 the subject of internal 
 improvements was much agitated, but without action, 
 on account of Monroe s well-known views on the sub 
 ject. Popular opinions were strong to the effect that 
 all government expenditures were a boon or favor which 
 the government ought to distribute equally, and it was 
 very common to hear a congressman complain that the 
 federal government derived more revenue from his dis 
 trict than the sums expended there. Congressmen were 
 also beginning to find out how the public expenditures 
 could be used to make capital for themselves. May 4, 
 1822, Monroe vetoed a bill for collecting tolls on the 
 Cumberland road, and keeping it in repair. In this veto 
 message he discussed the whole subject of internal im 
 provements. He admitted that expenditures for that 
 purpose were advantageous and proper, if the enter 
 prises were national in character ; but he objected to 
 them strenuously when they were local and special, and 
 he thought that Congress had no constitutional power j 
 to carry them out in either case. 
 
 By the act of April 30, 1824, $30,000 were appropri 
 ated as an annual appropriation for surveys, to be made 
 by the board of engineers, of such roads, canals, and 
 river improvements as the President might designate. 
 The theory of this act was that the engineers might be 
 advantageously employed, in time of peace, in finding 
 out what works were practicable and likely to be worth 
 executing. In the session of 1827-28 the whole subject 
 tame up again on a question of passing the annual ap 
 propriation of $30,000. The question of internal im 
 provements then first took on a party character, and 
 party exigency forced not a few men on either side t* 
 * 6 Ann. Keg. 68. 
 
VETO OF THE MAYSVILLE ROAD. 193 
 
 ihange their opinions. Crawford alone of the candi 
 dates in 1824 had been understood to be a strict con- 
 Btructionist. Calhoun had favored improvements. Clay 
 was not, at this time, earnestly in favor of them. 1 The 
 opposition assailed the policy as unconstitutional, and 
 some of the finest pettifogging of the political scholastics 
 and casuists was done on this question. Little was said 
 about the expediency of the policy Oakley, of New 
 York, in the House, March 1, 1828, declared that 
 under the act of 1824 the President had been exposed 
 to a constant assault from Governors, members of Con 
 gress, Legislatures, mayors, and corporations, to cause 
 the surveys for local and private enterprises to be made 
 at the expense of the United States. The opposition 
 did not dare to oppose directly all projects under the 
 vicious system. Their proposition was to distribute 
 funds for internal improvements to the States. The 
 appropriation, in 1828, was finally carried, with a pro 
 viso that the surveys were to be made only for works of 
 a national character. 
 
 Jackson, in his first message, indicated hostility to 
 the general policy of internal improvements, and favored 
 distrjljution. 2 May 27, 1830, he vetoed a bill for sub 
 scription, by the United States, to the stock of the 
 Maysville and Lexington road. 3 In his veto message he 
 placed himself on the constitutional doctrine of Madison 
 and Monroe. The local and political interests which 
 had become involved in the system at this time were 
 very numerous and very strong. The evil of special 
 
 1 7 Adams, 191. 2 See page 189. 
 
 8 This road was to run through the strongest Jackson district 
 in Kentucky. (Clay to Webster. 1 \Vebster < Correspondence, 
 *0l. 
 
 13 
 
194 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 legislation was growing. Politicians and interested 
 speculators combined to further each other s interests at 
 the public expense. Jackson affronted the whole inter 
 est ; one would say that he affronted it boldly, if it were 
 not that he acted with such spontaneous will and dis 
 regard of consequences that there was no conscious 
 exercise of courage. He was not able to put an end to 
 Ihe abuse, but he curtailed it. He used the exceptional 
 strength of his political position to do what no one else 
 would have dared to do in meeting a strong and grow 
 ing cause of corruption. He held a bill for the Louis 
 ville canal, and another for light-houses, over the ses 
 sion, and then returned them unsigned. At the session 
 of 1830-31 a bill for improvements was passed by such 
 majorities that a veto was useless. In 1831-32 Jackson 
 signed one such bill and " pocketed " another. In the 
 session of 1832-33 an internal improvement bill was 
 defeated by parliamentary tactics. In the message of 
 1832 Jackson recommended the sale of all the stocks 
 held by the United States in canals, turnpikes, etc. He 
 educated his party, for that generation at least, up to a 
 position of party hostility to special legislation of every 
 kind. 
 
 V, Tariff. The " American system " is an elastic 
 designation, which can be applied to win a presumption 
 in favor of whatever one desires to recommend. In our 
 history it has changed its meaning in every generation 
 &s above stated, 1 the United States, between the second 
 war and 1830, did not favor treaties of commerce. The 
 policy of treaties of commerce was European. Its 
 thoory was that, all nations having restrictions on trade 
 fcnd regarding them as wise, one nation should breat 
 1 Seepage 168. 
 
"RECIPROCITY." 195 
 
 down its restrictions to a specified degree and for a 
 specified counter-relaxation, in favor of another nation 
 with which it might make a commercial treaty. The 
 favors and relaxations granted were therefore special 
 and individual, and the relations of trade between na 
 tions were the result of all the special and peculiar 
 relaxations which had been made, starting from a the 
 ory of isolation and prohibition. The United States, 
 from the first independent acts performed by it as a 
 * nation with any other nation, the commercial treaty 
 \and treaty of alliance with France in 1778, adopted a 
 different policy. It started not from an hypothetical 
 situation of prohibition and isolation, but from an hy 
 pothesis of perfect freedom. It tried to get into the 
 commercial relations of Europe, but it would not grant 
 any special privileges. Its doctrine was that each na 
 tion, while rendering trade as free as possible, should 
 be governed in its fiscal arrangements by its own needs, 
 circumstances, and good judgment, but that, once having 
 adopted its system, it should present a uniform front 
 to foreign nations. This was the "American system" 
 in the first generation. In the second generation the 
 difficulty of combining an independent fiscal system 
 with commercial treaties led to a prejudice against the 
 latter, and they were sought almost exclusively for the 
 sake of receiving reciprocity as to ships and the carry 
 ing trade. Then the " American system " underwent 
 i change. " Reciprocity " did. jiotjnean mutual relaxar 
 turn and concession, but retaliation. The United States 
 departed from" the mrTcrmity and independence of its 
 fiscal system to countervail and resent what it considered 
 discrimination against itself. There was no case in which 
 uiy nation placed on products of the United States a 
 
196 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 heavier tax than was laid on the same products frocr 
 any other country, save in the case of colonies ; but the 
 discrimination complained of lay in the selection for 
 taxation of those commodities which the United States 
 produced, as a means of protecting- the same commod 
 ities when produced in the taxing countries. It was 
 urged that the American system required that the United 
 States should protect the production at home of products 
 similar to those which were produced by the country 
 which taxed the products of the United States. Hence 
 the American system then meant retaliation to force a 
 foreign nation to Tjreak down its protective system, 
 just the policy -advocated by the newest "school "oT " re- 
 ciprocitarians " and " fair traders " in England. Re 
 taliation always amounts to just this : Inasmuch as the 
 other party has cut himself off, by his protective taxes, 
 from the share which he might have had, through trade, 
 in our natural advantages, incidentally narrowing the 
 market for our products, and so injuring us, therefore let 
 us now, in addition, cut ourselves off, by protective taxes, 
 the share which we might obtain, through trade, in 
 his natural advantages, for the sake of incidentally nar 
 rowing the market for his products, and so injuring 
 him. When the scale of operations is small enough for 
 the effects to be perceived, retaliation will generally ac 
 complish its object ; for it is no satisfaction to us, in the 
 long run, when we are suffering from harm done us by 
 eornebody, to know that he is hurting himself more ; but 
 
 vhen the scale of operations is large, retaliation is 
 powerless, because the effects of it then pass under that 
 gr^at class of things, the despair of the reformers ana 
 
 social philosophers, the things which people do no 
 
 -86. 
 
"COUNTERVAILING." 197 
 
 In 1817 an act was passed to retaliate for certain re- 
 itrictions laid by Nova Scotia and New Brunswick on 
 New England ships engaged in the plaster trade. Here 
 the scale of operations was small and the effects were 
 immediate and evident. The provinces repealed their 
 restrictions. This instance greatly stimulated faith in 
 the policy of " countervailing." It was referred to as a 
 demonstration of the power of that policy. 1 The ap- 
 i iication of it to the West India trade has been noticed. 
 
 We have already briefly described the tariff of 1824. 2 
 In anticipation of the passage of that act large quantities 
 of woollen goods were imported. In that and the pre 
 ceding year manufacturing in England had been very 
 active, under a pressure of flush times, and in the ex 
 pectation of a good market in the South American states, 
 which had just won their independence. The expecta 
 tions were disappointed. On the mania followed the 
 crisis and panic in 1825. Then large stocks were thrown 
 on this market and sacrificed for a quick return. In 
 1825 Huskisson brought forward the first reforms in 
 the system of taxation. His propositions, viewed from 
 to-day s stand-point, seem beggarly enough, but at that 
 time they seemed revolutionary. He reduced taxes on 
 raw materials, chemicals, dye-stuffs, and materials of 
 industry. Raw wool was reduced from sixpence to a 
 Denny and a half penny per pound, according to quality. 
 Vfter the tariff of 1824 was passed by Congress, the 
 English woollen producers imported some of their cloths 
 into this country in an unfinished state, in order to get 
 fchem in below the minimum (33^ cents), and then had 
 them finished here. They also sent agents to this com> 
 ry, to whom they invoiced their cloths below the open 
 gna Vet price. 
 
 1 5 Adams, 41. See page 76. 
 
198 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 Every one of the above statements, as will be seen, 
 introduces a fact which affected the relations of the 
 American woollen industry in its competition with the 
 English woollen industry in a way to counteract any pro 
 tection by the tariff. A number of persons had begun 
 the manufacture of woollens because the federal legisla 
 tion encouraged them so to do, not because they under 
 stood that business, or had examined the industrial con 
 ditions of success in it. They were pleased to consider 
 Huskisson s legislation as hostile to the United States, 
 and they called for measures to countervail it. They 
 also construed as fraud the importation of unfinished 
 cloths and the practice of invoicing to agents at manu 
 facturer s cost. The " American system " therefore un 
 derwent another transformation. It now meant to coun-l 
 
 i ^ V ._ ______ 1 
 
 \fi^ tervail and offset any foreign legislation, even in the 
 direction of freedom and reform or advance in civiliza 
 tion, if that legislation favored the American consumer. 
 
 The first complaint came from the old free-trade sec 
 tion. After 1824 the New England States, which up to 
 that time had been commercial States, turned to manu 
 factures. They had resisted all the earlier tariffs. They 
 would have been obliged to begin manufacturing, tariff 
 or no tariff, on account of the growing density of the 
 population ; but there was force in Webster s assertion, 
 in reply to Hayne, that New England, after protesting 
 against the tariff as long as she could, had conformed to 
 a policy forced upon the country by others, and had 
 embarked her capital in manufacturing. 1 October 23, 
 1826, the Boston woollen manufacturers petitioned Con 
 gress for more protection. 2 They said that they hac 
 been led. by the profits of the English woollen industry ii 
 1 3 Webster s Works, 305. * 31 Nileg 145. 
 
TARIFF ON COTTONS AND WOOLLENS. 19 
 
 1824 and the tariff of 1824, to begin manufacturing 
 Woollens, confident that they should not yield to fair com 
 petition, and that such competition would be secured to 
 them by law. They went on to say that the English 
 woollen manufacturers had glutted the market in Eng 
 land, and produced distress there, which had reacted on 
 this country. They said that they could not be relieved 
 "without the aid of their national government." 
 
 This appeal of the woollen manufacturers brought out 
 new demands from other quarters. Especially the wool- 
 growers came forward. They had not gained anything 
 by the tariff. A few shrewd men, who took to breeding 
 sheep and who sold out their flocks to the farmers (who 
 were eager buyers, because they were sure, since they 
 had a protective tax in their favor, that they were to 
 make fortunes out of wool), won by the tariff. No one 
 else did. It is stated that the woollen manufacturers did 
 not dare to ask for higher duties in 1824, because they 
 feared that the wool-growers would only demand so 
 much more. 1 They thought that their want of success 
 was due to want of experience and skill, and they looked 
 to make improvements. In fact, the tax on wool was 
 raised, in 1824, more than that on woollens. 
 
 By the tariff of 1816 the tax on cottons was fixed for 
 three years at 25 per cent; after that at 20 per cent. 
 This was a direct application of the theory that a protect 
 ive tax is good to set up an industry, and that it may 
 then be lowered or removed. The device of the jaini- 
 mum was.Jntrojduced, however, and all cottons, except 
 nankeens, which cost less than 25 cents per square yard, 
 were to be held to have cost 25 cents. By this device 
 Jtie tax on the lowest grades was made greatly highei 
 1 2 Ann. Reg. 102. 
 
200 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 than it seemed to be. For the same three years wool 
 lens were to be taxed 25 per cent ; after that, 20 pel 
 cent. In 1824 the tax on cottons was put back to 25 
 per cent, and woollens were raised to 25 per cent if 
 worth not above 33^ cents per square yard, and 30 per 
 cent or 33^ per cent if of greater value. Wool, which 
 was free in 1816, was graded at 15 per cent, 20 per 
 cent, and 30 per cent, in 1824. 
 
 January 10, 1827, Mallary, of Vermont, introduced the 
 " woollens bill," for " adjusting " the .tariff on wool and 
 woollens. 1 Niles had taken up the high tariff doctrine 
 ten years before, ami hud ]>reaeliel it in his " Register " 
 assiduously. His economic notions were meagre and 
 erroneous throughout, and he had absolutely no training. 
 He had no doubt, however, that he was inculcating the 
 rules of prosperity and wise government. He unques 
 tionably exerted a great influence ; for he never tired 
 of his labored prescriptions for " giving a circulation to 
 money," and " encouraging industry." He took up the 
 f ause of the woollen men with his whole heart. Of his 
 sincerity and disinterestedness there can be no question. 
 To him and the economists and statesmen of his school 
 the minimum seemed to be a marvellous invention. Mal 
 lary proposed to use it to the utmost. He proposed to 
 leave the rates of tax unchanged, but to apply them on 
 and between minima of 40 cents, $2.50, and $4.00. 
 Cloth, therefore, which cost 41 cents was to be held to 
 have cost $2.50, and the tax on it was to be 62^ cents. 
 Wool which cost over 10 cents was to be held to have 
 : i ,ost 40 cents. The duty on it was to be 35 per cent for 
 A year ; then 40 per cent. The princijde now proposed 
 rap, therefore, that the duties should advance with time 
 i 31 Nilea, 319. 
 
TEE "WOOLLENS BILL: 201 
 
 The woollens 1)111 passed the House. !()(> to .)">. It 
 tabled in the Semite by tin- castii^ 1 vote of Calhoun. 
 Calhoun was forced into this vote oy a mano3uvre of 
 Van Buren, who " dodged." Calhoun suffered, in conse 
 quence, in Pennsylvania and New York. Politics ran 
 very high on this bill. In fact, they quite superseded 
 all the economic interests. 1 The opposition were afraid 
 of offending either the Pennsylvania supporters of Jack 
 son, or the Southern supporters of Jackson. Passion 
 began now to enter into tariff discussion, not only on 
 the part of the Southerners, but also between the wool 
 men and the woollen men, each of whom thought the 
 other grasping, and that each was to be defeated in his 
 purpose by the other. Niles said that it was more a 
 wool bill than a woollens bill, and the woollen men were 
 much dissatisfied with it. 
 
 May 14, 1827, the Pennsylvania Society for the Pro 
 motion of Manufactures and the Mechanic Arts called a 
 convention of wool growers and manufacturers. The 
 convention met at Harrisburg, July 30, 1827. It was 
 found necessary to enlarge the scope of the convention 
 in order to make allies of interests which would other 
 wise become hostile. The convention went on the plan 
 of favoring protection on everything which asked for it. 
 The result was that iron, steel, glass, wool, woollens, 
 hemp, and flax were recommended for protection. 
 Louisiana was not represented, and so sugar was left 
 out. It was voted to discourage the importation of for 
 eign spirits and the distillation of spirits from foreign 
 products, by way of protection to Western whiskey. The 
 convention proposed, as its idea of a reasonable and 
 proper tax on wool and woollens, the following: " On 
 1 31 Niles, 321 ; 33 Niles, 385. 2 32 Niles, 388 
 
202 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 tvool which cost 8 cents or less per pound, 20 cents pel 
 pound and an advance of 2^ cents per pound per an 
 num until it should be 50 cents ; on woollens, four 
 minima were proposed, 50 cents, $2.50, $4.00, and 
 $6.00, on which the tax was to he 40 per cent for a 
 year, 45 per cent the next year, and 50 per cent there 
 after. The minimum on cottons was to be raised to 40 
 cents. 
 
 When the 20th Congress met, the tariff was the ab 
 sorbing question. Popular interest had become engaged 
 in it and parties were to form on it, but it perplexed 
 the politicians greatly. It was to this Congress at its 
 opening that Rush sent the report described above. 1 
 Stevenson, of Virginia, an anti-tariff man, was chosen 
 Speaker. Adams says that Stevenson won votes by 
 promising to make a committee favorable to the tariff. 3 
 Stevenson put Mallary at the head of the committee, 
 but he put an anti-tariff majority behind him. The 
 " Annual Register " 8 stated the foreign trade of the 
 country then as follows : Twenty-four million dollars 
 worth of cotton, rice, and tobacco were exported to 
 England annually. Four million dollars worth moro 
 were exported to other countries. The imports from 
 England were seven or eight millions worth of wool 
 lens, about the same value of cottons, three or four mil 
 lions worth of iron, steel, and hardware, and miscella 
 neous articles, bringing the total up to twenty-eight 
 millions. From this it was plain that the producers of 
 bread-stuffs in the United States, who were kept out of 
 England by the corn laws, were forced to take theii 
 products to the West Indies and South America, and 
 
 i See page 188. 3 7 Adams, 369. 
 
 * 3 Ann. Reg. 37. 
 
FOREIGN TRADE BALANCE, 1828. 203 
 
 exchange them there for four millions worth of colo 
 nial produce, which England would receive, in order to 
 balance the account. The editor of the " Annual Reg 
 ister " built upon this fact his argument for protection 
 as a retaliation to break down the English corn laws. 
 He saw that the Southern staple products must be the 
 fulcrum for the lever by which the English restrictions 
 were to be broken. He offered the Southerners a cer 
 tain consolation in the hope that $iere would be a larger 
 consumption of their staples at home, but really con 
 cluded that, as between interests, the grain interest of 
 the North and West was worth more than the interests 
 of the South. It is not strange if this mode of reason 
 ing was not relished in the South. 1 
 
 Mallary stated in debate that the consumption of 
 woollens in the United States was then seventy-two mill 
 ion dollars per annum, of which ten millions worth were 
 imported, twenty-two millions worth were manufactured 
 in the United States, and forty millions worth were pro 
 duced by household spinning and weaving (" domestic 
 industry," as the term was then used). If these statistics 
 are worth anything, the twelve millions of population 
 consumed, on an average, six dollars worth of woollens 
 per head per annum. What Mallary proposed to do 
 was to prevent the ten millions worth from being im 
 ported. To do this he would increase the cost of the 
 part imported and the part manufactured at home, the 
 result of which would be that still a larger part of the 
 population would have to be clothed in homespun. 
 Thus his project might eas^y defeat itself, so far as it 
 aimed to benefit the American manufacturer, ^nd it 
 deprive the American people of the rest, leisure 
 i K3e page 90S. 
 
204 ANDREW JACK VON. 
 
 and greater satisfaction, as well as abundance, which 
 new machinery and the factory system were winning 
 out of the textile industries, as compared with the old 
 household spinning and weaving. 
 
 The Committee on Manufactures of the House had 
 been taking testimony on the tariff during the recess. 
 The Southern free-traders had brought this about against 
 the opposition of the Northern protectionists. There 
 were only twenty-eig^it witnesses examined, of whom 
 nine were voluntary and seven were members of Con 
 gress. The evidence amounted to nothing but com 
 plaints of hard times and losses. 1 The deduction that 
 these facts were due to a lack of sufficient tariff was 
 taken for granted. 2 
 
 Silas Wright and other anti-tariff men on the Com 
 mittee on Manufactures would not let Mallary report 
 the propositions of the Harrisburg convention on wool 
 and woollens. 8 Mallary tried to introduce those propo 
 sitions as amendments on the floor of the House. All 
 the interests, industrial and political, pounced upon the 
 bill to try to amend it to their notions. New England 
 and the Adams men wanted high duties on woollens and 
 cottons, and low duties on wool, iron, hemp, salt, and 
 molasses (the raw material of rum). Pennsylvania, 
 Ohio, and Kentucky wanted high taxes on iron, wool, 
 hemp, molasses (protection to whiskey), and low taxes 
 
 1 34 Niles, 1. 
 
 2 As a specimen of the value of such complaints: In April, 
 1828, Niles said that there was dullness in trade and great distress 
 lit Baltimore (34 Niles, 139.) In Octoher he said that he haC 
 bot been through parts of the city for a long time, and that on I 
 recent walk he had been astonished at the signs of prosperity 
 
 35 Niles, 81.) 
 1 Hammond s Wriyht, 104. 
 
TARIFF OF 1828. 205 
 
 Dn woollens and cottons. The Southerners wanted low 
 taxes on everything, but especially on finished goods, 
 and if there were to be heavy taxes on these latter they 
 did not care how heavy the taxes on the raw materials 
 were made. This last point and the unswerving loyalty 
 of rural Pennsylvania to Jackson enabled the Jackson 
 party to hold together its discordant elements. The 
 political and economic alliances of the South were plainly 
 inconsistent. 1 
 
 The act which resulted from the scramble of selfish 
 special interests was an economic monstrosity. The 
 industrial interests of twelve millions of people had been 
 thrown into an arena where there was little knowledge 
 of economic principles, and no information about the in 
 dustrial state of the country, or about the special indus 
 tries. It being assumed that the Legislature could, 
 would, and was about to, confer favors and advantages, 
 there was a scramble to see who should get the most. 
 At the same time party ambitions and strifes seized 
 upon the industrial interests as capital for President- 
 making. May 19, 1828, the bill became a law. The 
 duty on wool costing less than 10 cents per pound was 
 15 per cent, on other wool 20 per cent and 30 per cent. 
 That on woollens was 40 per cent for a year, then 45 
 per cent, there being four minima, 50 cents, $1.00, 
 $2.50, $4.00. All which cost over $4.00 were to be 
 taxed 45 per cent for a year, then 50 per cent. Niles 
 and all the woollen men were enraged at this arrange 
 ment. No South Carolinian was more discontented 
 than they. The " dollar minimum was the especial 
 eause of their rage. Cloth which cost 51 cents they 
 wanted to regard as costing $2.50, and to tax it 40 pel 
 1 Seepage 211 
 
06 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 cent on that, i. <?., $1.00. The dollar minimum let in a 
 large class of cloths which cost from $1.00 to $1.25, 
 and which could be run down to cost from 90 to 99 
 cents. 
 
 The process of rolling iron had not yet been intro 
 duced into this country. It was argued that rolled iron 
 was not as good as forged, and this was made the 
 ground for raising the tax on rolled iron from $30.00 to 
 $37.00 per ton, while the tax on forged iron was raised 
 from $18.00 to $22.40. Rolled iron was cheaper, and 
 was available for a great number of uses. The tax, in 
 this case, " countervailed " an improvement in the arts, 
 and robbed the American people of their share in the 
 advantage of a new industrial achievement. The tax on 
 steel was raised from $20.00 to $30.00 per ton ; that on 
 hemp from $35.00 to $45.00 per ton ; that on molasses 
 from 5 cents to 1 cents per gallon ; that on flax from 
 nothing to $35.00 per ton. The tax on sugar, salt, and 
 glass remained unchanged, and that on tea also, save by 
 a differential tonnage duty. Coffee was classified and 
 the tax reduced. The tax on wine, by a separate act, 
 was reduced one half or more. 1 
 
 This was the " tariff of abominations," so called on 
 account of the number of especially monstrous provi 
 Bions which it contained. In the course of the debate 
 on it the dogma was freely used that protective taxes 
 lower prices, and the exclusion of American grain by 
 the English corn laws was a constantly effective argu 
 ment. Credit varying from nine to eighteen monthi 
 was allowed under this as under the previous tariffs. 
 1 See page 343. 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 
 PUBLIC QUESTIONS OF JACKSCN s FIRST ADMDOSTRA 
 TION. III. 
 
 VI. Nullification. The Southerners bitterly de 
 nounced the tariff of 1828. They had already begun 
 to complain of the operation of the system four or five 
 years before. To understand their complaint, it is 
 enough to notice with what reckless extravagance the 
 tariff theory, even if its truth were admitted, was being 
 handled in 1828. Of course the public argument in 
 favor of the tariff necessarily took the form of asser 
 tions that, by some occult process or other, the taxation 
 proposed would be beneficent to all, and that the pro 
 tective theory was a theory of national wealth. The 
 Southerners were sure that they paid the expenses of 
 the experiment, and they ventured the inference that 
 those who were so eager for the tariff saw their profit 
 in it ; but when the attempt was made to find any com 
 pensation to the nation or to the South, no such thing 
 could be found. Up to that point there was the plain 
 fact of capital expended and capital gained ; at that 
 point all turned into dogma and declamation. 
 
 March 12, 1828, McDufiBe, of South Carolina, pre 
 sented a report from the Committee on Ways and 
 Means 1 against the tariff. He enumerated the varieties 
 if woollens used by the people, and showed the operation 
 i 34 Nile*. 8 1 
 
208 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 of the minima upon each. He then went on to discuss 
 the economic doctrines and the theory of protection as a 
 mode of increasing the wealth of the country, and more 
 especially the effect of the proposed taxes on the agri 
 cultural and exporting sections. The facts and doctrines 
 stated by him were unanswerable, but they did not 
 touch either the political motives or the interested pe* 
 cuniary motives which were really pushing the tariff. 
 He had all the right and all the reason, but not the 
 power. The agricultural States were forced, under the 
 tariff, either to export their products, exchange them 
 for foreign products, and pay taxes on these latter to 
 the federal treasury before they could bring them home, 
 or else to exchange their products with the Northern 
 manufacturers for manufactured products, and to pay 
 taxes to the latter in the price of the goods. All the 
 mysteries of exchange, banking, and brokerage might 
 obscure, they never could alter, these actual economic 
 relations of fact. When the Southerners were put off 
 with the glib commonplace reply to their remonstrance 
 that they would sell more cotton to the North, they 
 were doubly exasperated. If the South, under free 
 trade, produced 100 bales of cotton, of which it exported 
 75 bales for $3,750 and sold 25 bales to the North for 
 $1,250, it got $5,000 for 100 bales. If a ten per cent 
 tax was laid on manufactures, and if that tax availed, 
 as argued, to cause only 60 bales to be exported and 40 
 to be sold at the North, then the 60 exported, at the 
 same price as before, would bring $3,000 worth of man 
 ufactured goods, on which ten per cent must be paid to 
 g-et them home ; net $2,700. The 40 bales sold at the 
 North would bring $2,000, at the same price as before 
 but goods bought with this $2,000 would be enhance*. 
 
THE SOUTHERN GRIEVANCE. 209 
 
 hi price ten per cent by the protection; and, as comparer 
 wdth former returns, the goods now obtained would oe 
 worth $1,800. The South would therefore have ob 
 tained for 100 bales $4,500 worth of products at the 
 old free-trade prices. Therefore the difference in the 
 distribution of the product could make no difference at 
 all in the facts of profit and the incidence of the tax, 
 and at the end of the calculation the intricate device 
 came to nothing but an imposition of ten per cent tax 
 on the agricultural products of the country. 
 
 The protectionists always affected to deride the South 
 ern declaration that the tax fell on the South. The pop 
 ular notion was that the tariff tax bore on the foreigner 
 in some way or other, and helped the domestic producer 
 to a victory over the foreigner. Since the object of the 
 tariff was to prevent importations of foreign goods, it 
 would, if it succeeded, make the foreigner stay at home, 
 and keep his goods there. This of course deprived him 
 of a certain demand for his goods, and prevented him 
 from reaching a gain which, under other conditions, he 
 might have won, but it could not possibly render him or 
 his capital in any way available for " encouraging Amer 
 ican manufactures." The American consumer of Amer 
 ican products is the only person whom American laws 
 could reach in order to make him contribute capital to 
 build up American industry. So far, then, as the Amer 
 ican protected industries were concerned, they preyed 
 upon each other with such results of net gain and loss 
 as chance and stupidity might bring about. So far as 
 American non-protected industries were concerned, they, 
 being the naturally strong and independent industries of 
 the country, sustained the whole body of protected in 
 dustries, which were simply parasites apon them. Tlw 
 14 
 
210 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 protective theory, as a theory of wealth, therefore pro* 
 posed to organize national industry as an independent 
 body with a parasite upon it, while the free-trade theory 
 proposed to let industry organize itself as so many in 
 dependent and vigorous bodies as the labor, capital, and 
 land of the country could support. 
 
 The grievance of the South in 1828 is undeniable. 
 So long as the exports of the country were almost ex 
 clusively Southern products cotton and tobacco and 
 so long as the federal revenue was almost entirely de 
 rived from duties on imports, it is certain that the 
 Southern industries either supported the federal govern 
 ment or paid tribute to the Northern manufacturers. 
 The Southerners could not even get a hearing or patient 
 and proper study of the economic questions at issue. 
 Their interests were being sacrificed to pretended national 
 interests, just as, under the embargo, the interests of New 
 England were sacrificed to national interests. In each 
 case the party which considered its interests sacrificed 
 came to regard the Union only as a cage, in which all 
 were held in order that the stronger combination might 
 plunder the weaker. No amount of precept or emphasis 
 can make the Union, which is the paramount civil inter 
 est of the American people, strong and permanent, if 
 any section or party in it has reason to believe that its 
 interests are sacrificed in the Union ; and the Union 
 neve, can be secure unless there is a disposition in the 
 predominant majority at any time to listen with patience 
 to any remonstrance, and to exercise power with moder 
 ation and justice. 
 
 The more thoroughly the economist and politica 
 philosopher recognizes the grievance of the Southerner! 
 in 1828, the more he must regret the unwisdom of thf 
 
VOTES ON THE TARIFF OF 1828. 211 
 
 Southern proceedings. The opponents of the tariff of 
 1828 adopted the policy of voting in favor of all the 
 " abominations " on points of detail, in the hope that 
 they could so weight down the bill that it would at last 
 fail as a whole. 1 Hence those Southerners who sup- 
 ported Jackson voted with the Pennsylvania and New 
 York high-tariff men for all the worst features of the 
 bill, while New England and the Adams men, who 
 started as high-tariff men, voted on the other side. 
 The Southern Jackson men wanted to give way suffi 
 ciently on the tariff to secure one or two doubtful States. 
 For instance, they were willing to protect whiskey and 
 hemp to win Kentucky from Clay to Jackson. They 
 were, in fact, playing a game which was far too delicate, 
 between their economic interests and their political 
 party affiliations. They were caught at last. In the 
 vote on the previous question in the House, the yeas 
 were 110, of whom 11 were Adams men and 99 Jackson 
 men ; the nays were 91, of whom 80 were Adams men 
 and 11 Jackson men. The nays were those who wanted 
 a tariff, but who wanted to amend the bill before them 
 a great deal more before they passed it ; that is, they 
 wanted to take out the abominations which the anti- 
 tariff men had voted into it. On the final passage of 
 the bill, the yeas were 105, of whom 61 were Adams 
 men and 44 Jackson men ; the nays were 94, of whom 
 35 were Adams men and 59 were Jackson men. Of 
 the yeas only 3 were from south of the Potomac. The 
 policy of the Southern free-traders, like most attempts 
 at legislative finesse, proved an entire failure- The 
 high-tariff men, although every man had intense objec 
 tion to something in the bill voted for it rather than 
 1 35 Niles *2. 
 
212 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 defeat the bill entirely. The New England men did 
 not know how to vote. In the end 23 of them voted 
 against the bill and 16 for it. 1 The bill passed the 
 Senate, 26 to 21. Webster did not know on May 7th 
 how he should vote. 2 He voted for it, and then went 
 home and defended the vote on the ground that he had 
 to take the good and evil of the measure together. 
 After all, the tariff made no capital for anybody. The 
 protectionists by threatening both parties forced both to 
 concede the tariff, after which the protectionists voted 
 with either party, according to their preferences, just as 
 they would have done if both had resisted instead of 
 both yielding. 
 
 Van Buren obtained " instructions " from Albany to 
 vote for the tariff, in order to be able to do so without 
 offending the Southerners. 4 Calhoun declared, in a 
 speech in the Senate, February 23, 1837, that Van 
 Buren was to blame for the tariff of 1828. 5 
 
 The South had already begun to discuss remedies be 
 fore the tariff of 1828 was passed. Colonel Hamilton, 
 of South Carolina, at a public dinner in the autumn of 
 .1827, proposed " nullification " as a remedy, the term 
 being borrowed from the Virginia and Kentucky reso 
 lutions of 1798. Those resolutions now came to have 
 for a certain party in the South the character and 
 authority of an addendum to the Constitution. They 
 
 i 35 Niles, 52. 2 7 Adams, 534. 
 
 1 Webster s Works, 165. 
 
 * Mackeinzie, 103 ; Hammond s Wright, 105. 
 
 6 Green s Telegraph Extra, 271, says Adams wanted to vet 
 the tariff of 1828, and throw himself on the South, uniting witl 
 Calhoun, but that Clay would not let him do so, because thu 
 would ruin him and the American system. Thi* is a very doubt 
 ful 
 
THE RESOLUTIONS OF 1798. 213 
 
 arere, in truth, only the manifesto of a rancorous oppo- 
 lition, and they belong, in the history of the country, in 
 the same box of curious products of political passion 
 with the resolutions of the Hartford convention. Yet, 
 at that time, to call a man a "federalist" would have 
 been a graver insult throughout the South than it would 
 be now, in the North, to call a man a secessionist. 
 
 An examination of the resolutions of 1798, as they 
 were adopted, will fail to find nullification in them. 
 The resolutions, with a number of other most interesting 
 documents connected therewith, are given by Niles in 
 a supplement to his 43d volume. By examination of 
 these it appears that Jefferson s original draft of the 
 Kentucky resolutions contained, in the eighth resolution, 
 these words : " Where powers are assumed which have 
 not been delegated, a nullification of the act is the right 
 remedy." The Legislature of Kentucky cut out this 
 and nearly all the rest of the eighth resolution. The 
 executory resolution, as drawn by Jefferson, ended thus : 
 The co-States [he means those States which adopt these 
 resolutions] . . . will concur in declaring these acts 
 [the alien and sedition laws] void and of no force, and 
 will each take measures of its own for providing that 
 neither of these acts . . . shall be exercised within their 
 respective territories." The Legislature struck this out, 
 and adopted, as the executory resolution : " The co- 
 States . . . will concur in declaring these [acts] void 
 and of no force, and will each unite with this common 
 wealth in requesting their repeal at the next session of 
 Congress." Some of the other States responded to theso 
 resolutions, and in 1799 Kentucky passed a resolution 
 in which occurs this statement . * A nullification by those 
 lovereignties of all unauthorized acts done under coloi 
 
214 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 D that instrument [the Constitution] is the rightful 
 remedy." Madison s Virginia resolutions do not con 
 tain nullification either in form or substance, least ol 
 all as a practical remedy. They declare the alien and 
 sedition acts unconstitutional, and that " the necessary 
 and proper measures will be taken by each [of the con 
 curring States] for cooperating with this State " to pre 
 serve the reserved rights of the States and people. In 
 1799 Madison made a long report to the Virginia House 
 of Delegates, in which he analyzed and defended the 
 resolutions of 1798, and especially defended the rem 
 edy proposed, namely, a solemn resolution and protest, 
 communicated to the other States. He construed this 
 remedy strictly. In May, 1830, Madison wrote to Liv 
 ingston, approving of an anti-nullification speech made 
 by him on March 15th of that year. He thus states 
 the error of the nullifiers : " The error in the late com 
 ments on the Virginia proceedings has arisen from a 
 failure to distinguish between what is declaratory of 
 opinion and what is ipso facto executory ; between the 
 rights of the parties and of a single party ; and between 
 resorts within the purview of the Constitution ard the 
 ultima ratio which appeals from a Constitution can 
 celled by its abuses to original rights, paramount to all 
 Constitutions," In 1830 Madison also wrote two long 
 letters, one to Edward Everett, the other to Andrew 
 Stevenson, in which he interprets the Virginia resolu 
 tions. He certainly softens them down somewhat, 
 which is a proof that party heat influenced him when he 
 wrote them. He lays especial stress on the limited and 
 harmless nature of the proposed action of Virginia 
 His two letters are the best statement of " Madisoniai 
 federalism." 
 
JEFFERSON AND NULLIFICATION. 21/J 
 
 It is certain that the nullification of a federal law in a 
 State, by a state authority, as a practical and available 
 remedy against an offensive measure, found no sanction 
 in 179899, except in the supplementary resolution of 
 Kentucky, when the heat of the controversy favored an 
 extreme position. It was a notion of Jefferson, in 
 which Madison did not join, and which neither Legis 
 lature adopted, except as stated. Never until 1827 was 
 any body of men found to take up the notion, and try 
 to handle it as reasonable and practical. Nullification 
 is jacobinism. It is revolution made a constant political 
 means, and brought into the every-day business of civil 
 Life. Nothing is more astonishing in American political 
 history than the immunity enjoyed by some men, and 
 the unfair responsibility enforced against others. Every 
 school-boy is taught to execrate the alien and sedition 
 laws, and John Adams bears the odium of them, but no 
 responsibility worth speaking of for nullification attaches 
 to Jefferson. He was the father of it and the sponsor 
 of it, and the authority of his name was what recom 
 mended it in 1827. 
 
 In December, 1827, the South Carolina Legislature 
 raised a committee on the powers of the federal govern 
 ment in regard to tariff. In the winter of 1827-28 the 
 Legislatures of several Southern States passed resolutions 
 about protective tariff legislation. South Carolina had 
 been a federal State in the previous generation. She 
 had not been opposed to the federal government save 
 n the matter of her "police bill." Georgia had been 
 lie turbulent State, the one which had had the most 
 Fiequent collisions with the federal government, and had 
 6ehaved on those occasions witn violence and folly. 
 South Carolina in Monroe s time was latitudinarian and 
 
216 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 anti-radical, and as such was opposed to Georgia. 1 
 South Carolina now declared the tariff, internal im 
 provements, and appropriations for the colonization so 
 ciety unconstitutional. Georgia declared the tariff and 
 internal improvements unconstitutional ; declared that 
 Georgia would not submit to the action of Congress, 
 and affirmed the right of secession. 2 The old Crawford 
 party, however, took sides against nullification, and pre 
 vented Georgia from ranging herself with South Caro 
 lina. At a meeting at Athens, August 6, 1828, pre 
 sided over by Crawford, a committee, consisting of 
 Wayne, Berrien, Cobb, Gilmer, Clayton, Troup, and 
 others, reported an address and resolutions denouncing 
 the tariff, but disclaiming all disunion sentiments or 
 purposes, and favoring 8 constitutional remedies. In 
 1832 Crawford advocated a theory that secession was 
 wrong until after a convention to amend the Constitu 
 tion had been tried and proved a failure. 4 North Caro 
 lina protested, in 1828, against the new tariff, declaring 
 that it violated the spirit of the Constitution and opposed 
 the interests of that State. Alabama denied the con 
 stitutionality of the tariff, and denounced it as pillage ( I 
 that State. 
 
 The proceedings of South Carolina did not remedy 
 the matter at all. They altered the issue very much to 
 the satisfaction of the protectionists. The Union and 
 the supremacy of the law were something on which a 
 much better fight could be made than on the tariff, and 
 the protectionists, having secured the law, wanted noth 
 ing better than to draw away attention from the criti 
 tism of it by making the fight on nullification. Cai 
 
 1 38 Niles, 154. 2 3 Ann. Reg. 64. 
 
 3b Niles. 14. 42 Nilea, 389. 
 
AEASONS FOR EXASPERATION. 217 
 
 noun and the South Carolinians had changed the fighting 
 from free trade to nullification, and on that they stood 
 alone. They threw away a splendid chance to secuiro 
 a sound policy on one of the first economic interests 
 of the country. In the debate between Webster and 
 Hayne the latter won a complete victory on tariff and 
 land. Webster made the fighting on the constitutional 
 question, and turned away from the other questions al 
 most entirely. He had no standing ground on tariff 
 and land. He was on record in his earliest speeches as 
 an intelligent free-trader, and his biographer l has in 
 finite and fruitless trouble to try to explain away the 
 fact. When Hayne opened the constitutional question 
 he gave Webster every chance of victory. 
 
 The action of Congress in passing the tariff of 1828, 
 in spite of the attitude of the South, seemed to the 
 Southerners to indicate an insolent disregard of then- 
 expostulations. Of course it was not a question to be 
 settled by a majority. A remonstrance* against injustice 
 and wrong cannot be put down by any majority. There 
 may be many answers to the remonstrance, or it may 
 not be practicable to yield to it, but to disregard it and 
 answer it by a heavier and more reckless imposition of 
 the same kind is not good government, whether it be a 
 democratic majority which levies a tariff, or a despot 
 who levies a forced loan. The supporters of the tariff 
 were forced to argue that it was a wise public and na 
 tional policy, just as it might be argued that a state 
 church or a state theatre is a beneficial public institution, 
 vhich it is expedient to support by taxation ; but the 
 remonstrance of one man, paying only one dollar tax, 
 rho should say that he did not believe in these institi* 
 1 1 Curtis s Webster, 207 fg. 
 
218 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 fcions, and did not want to contribute to their support, 
 would at least be entitled to respectful consideration in 
 any Legislature, and it would suffice to condemn, in 
 the forum of political philosophy, the policy of support 
 ing such institutions by taxation. In the winter of 
 1828-29 the South Carolina Legislature sent to the Sen 
 ate an " Exposition and Protest " against the new law. 
 Georgia wanted to nullify both Indian legislation and 
 tariff. Virginia adopted the principle of nullification. 
 North Carolina denounced the tariff, but nullification 
 also. Alabama denounced the tariff, but recognized the 
 right of Congress to levy revenue duties, with incidental 
 protective effect. In 1829 Alabama went nearer to nul 
 lification. This was the high water mark of nullifica 
 tion outside of South Carolina. All these States were 
 taunted, in answer to their remonstrances, with the votes 
 ctf the Southern members on the details of the tariff of 
 abominations. 
 
 Neither party* could let the tariff rest. A high tariff 
 is in a state of unstable equilibrium. If legislators could 
 ever gain full and accurate knowledge of all the circum 
 stances and relations of trade in their own country, and 
 in all countries with which it trades ; if they had suffi 
 cient wit to establish an artificial tax system which 
 should just fit the complicated facts, and produce the re 
 sults they want without doing any harm to anybody s 
 interests ; and if, furthermore, the circumstances and re 
 lations of trade would remain unchanged, it would oe 
 possible to make a permanent and stable tariff. Each 
 of these conditions is as monstrously impossible as any 
 thing in economics can be. Hence constant new efforts 
 are necessary, as well to suit those to whom the tariff 
 ioes not yet bring what they expected from it as tc 
 
EFFECT OF JACKSOWS TOAST. 219 
 
 silence those who are oppressed by it. The persons 
 whose interests were violated by the tariff of 18-58 tried 
 every means in their power to evade it. January 27, 
 1830, Mallary brought in a bill to render the custom 
 house appraisal more stringent and effective. McDuffie 
 responded with a proposition to reduce all taxes on 
 woollens, cottons, iron, hemp, flax, molasses, and indigo 
 to what they were before the tariff of 1824 was passed. 
 The whole subject was reopened. McDuffie s bill was 
 defeated, and Mallary s was passed. By separate bills 
 the taxes on salt, molasses, coffee, cocoa, and tea were 
 reduced. 
 
 In April, 1830, came Jackson s Union toast. 1 It was 
 a great disappointment to the mass of the Southerners, 
 who had been his ardent supporters, and who had hoped, 
 from his action in regard to Georgia and the Indians, 
 that he would let the powers of the federal government 
 go by default in the case of the tariff also. 2 The per 
 sonal element, which always had such strong influence 
 with Jackson, had become more or less involved in the 
 nullification struggle with which Calhoun was identified. 
 The Georgia case involved only indirectly the authority 
 and prestige of the federal government. The immediate 
 parties in interest were the Indians. Nullification in 
 volved directly the power and prestige of the federal 
 government, and he would certainly be a most excep 
 tional person who, being President of the United States, 
 would allow the government of which he was the head 
 to be defied and insulted. 
 
 On the 22d of Noveml er, 1 S30, a bill for a state con- 
 vention failed to get a two thiids vote in the South 
 Carolina Legislature. An atteir ^t was then made to 
 
 J See page 156. 2 Hodgson, 166- 
 
220 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 test the constitutionality of the tariff in the courts by 
 refusing to pay duty bonds, and pleading " no consider 
 ation " for the taxes levied ; but the United States Dis 
 trict Court, in 1831, refused to hear evidence of " no 
 consideration " drawn from the character of the tariff of 
 1828. 1 
 
 June 14, 1831, Jackson wrote a letter to a committee 
 of citizens of Charleston, in answer to an invitation to 
 attend the celebration of the Fourth of July at that 
 city, in which he indicated that a policy of force would 
 be necessary and proper against nullification. The 
 Governor of the State brought this letter to the notice 
 of the Legislature, which adopted resolutions denounc 
 ing the act of the President in writing such a letter, 
 and denying the lawfulness of the steps which he de 
 scribed. North Carolina now denounced nullification, 
 but the other States as yet held back. 
 
 On the 5th of October, 1831, a free-trade convention 
 met at Philadelphia. On the 26th of October a protec 
 tionist convention met at New York. Gallatin wrote the 
 address published by the former. Of course it was all 
 free trade, no nullification. A. H. Everett wrote the 
 address issued by the New York convention. The public 
 debt was being paid off with great rapidity, and the 
 iced for revenue was all the time declining. The 
 free-traders said : In that case, let us abolish the taxes, 
 and not raise a revenue which we do not need. It will 
 be an additional advantage that we can do away, with 
 out any complicated devices, with all the protective 
 taxes which one citizen pays to another, and which take 
 shelter under the revenue taxes. Let the people keep 
 ind use their own earnings. The protectionists wanted 
 i 7 Ann. Reg. 260. 
 
CLAY S PROGRAMME. 221 
 
 to remove the taxes from all commodities the like of 
 which were not produced here. They argued that, if 
 the country was out of debt, it could afford to enter on 
 great schemes of national development by government 
 expenditure. They therefore proposed to keep up the 
 taxes for protective purposes, and to spend the revenue 
 (in which they regarded the revenue from land as a thing 
 by itself) on internal improvements, pensions, French 
 spoliation claims, etc. These were not yet strictly 
 party positions, but in general the former was the ad 
 ministration policy and the latter the opposition policy. 
 
 The session of 1831-32 was full of tariff. A presi 
 dential election was again at hand. J. Q. Adams was 
 put at the head of the Committee on Manufactures with 
 an anti-tariff majority. McDuffie was chairman of the 
 Committee on Ways and Means. January 19, 1832, the 
 House instructed the Secretary of the Treasury to col 
 lect information about manufactures. A report was 
 rendered in two large volumes in 1833, after the whole 
 subject had been disposed of. Clay was nominated for 
 resident in December, 1831, and was preparing his 
 policy and programme. A conference was held at 
 Washington* by his supporters, at which he presented 
 his views, as it appears, in a somewhat dictatorial man 
 ner. 1 He wanted all the revenue taxes (on tea, coffee, 
 wine, etc.) abolished. The protective taxes he wanted 
 to make prohibitory, so as to stop revenue. He said that 
 the duties on hemp were useless, as our dew-rotted hemp 
 never could compete with the water-rotted hemp which 
 was imported. He was willing to allow a drawback on 
 All rigging exported. Dearborn said that the tax on 
 hemp had closed every rope-walk in Boston. This was 
 1 8 Adams, 445. 
 
222 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 rather hard, considering that the tax on hemp had been 
 laid for the sake of Kentucky, and now the member 
 from Kentucky and father of the " American system " 
 Baid that protection to hemp was useless. Adams said 
 that the House Committee on Manufactures would re 
 duce the duties prospectively ; that is, to take effect 
 when the debt should be paid. Clay wanted to stop 
 paying the debt in order to take away the administra 
 tion "cry." Adams took sides with Jackson on the 
 point of paying the debt. He thought public opinion 
 favored that policy. He also thought Clay s programme 
 would appear like defying the South. Clay said that 
 he did not care whom he defied. "To preserve, main 
 tain, and strengthen the American system he would defy 
 the South, the President, and the Devil." We may say 
 what we like of the nullifiers, but, so far as they met 
 with and knew of this disposition on the part of Clay 
 and his supporters, they would not have been free men 
 if they had not resisted it ; for it must not be forgotten 
 that the real question at issue was whether their prop 
 erty should be taken away from them or not. 
 
 In the annual message for 1831 Jackson recom 
 mended that the tariff be amended so as to reduce 
 revenue. February 8, 1832, McDuffie reported a bill 
 making the taxes on iron, steel, sugar, salt, hemp, flour, 
 woollens, cottons, and manufactures of iron twenty-five 
 per cent for a year after June 30, 1832, then eighteen 
 and three fourths per cent for a year, and then twelve 
 and one half per cent for an indefinite period. All other 
 goods which were taxed over twelve and one half pei 
 cent at the time of passing the bill were to be taxed 
 twelve and one half per cent after June 30, 1832 
 Vpril 27, 1832, the Secretary of the Treasury (Mo 
 
TARIFF OF 1832. 223 
 
 Lane) presented a tariff bill in answer to a call by the 
 House. It was planned to raise twelve millions of 
 revenue. It was proposed to collect fifteen per cent on 
 imports in general, with especial and higher rates on 
 the great protected commodities. This was the adminis 
 tration plan. The House Committee on Manufactures 
 reported a bill May 23d, which was taken up instead of 
 the others. The battle reopened, and ranged over the 
 whole field of politics and political economy. The act, 
 as finally passed (July 14 1832), reduced or abolished 
 many of the revenue taxes. It did not materially alter 
 the protective taxes. The tax on iron was reduced, 
 that on cottons was unchanged, that on woollens was 
 raised to fifty per cent ; wool costing less than eight 
 cents per pound was made free, other wool was taxed as 
 before. Woollen yarn was now first taxed. This was 
 khe position of tariff and nullification when the presi 
 dential election was held. 
 
CHAPTER XL 
 
 PUBLIC QUESTIONS OF JACKSON*S FIRST ADMDOgTBA 
 TION. IV. 
 
 VII. National bank. Democracy l affirms that men 
 are, may be, ought to be, were born, or were created, 
 equal, and it determines that in politics they shall be 
 treated as if they were so, facts to the contrary notwith 
 standing. The inequality of men in their industry, econ- 
 nomy, prudence, self-control, etc., etc., produces the most 
 marked results in the different amounts of capital which 
 they accumulate. For capital is the support and fortifi 
 cation of human existence, and a man of virtuous habits 
 and right life secures his existence against destructive 
 forces by accumulating capital. His capital is at once 
 the reward of right living and the means of better liv 
 ing. At the same time it is a proof of inequality and 
 the cause of inequality. The existence of capital is 
 therefore a refutation of all dogmas of equality. If 
 there were no capital, men would sink to^the level of the 
 other animals, and become approximately equal to each 
 other when they were all equal to brutes. The advocates 
 
 1 Democracy is a theory about sovereign ty, or who ought to 
 rule. Its first dogma is that all men are equal. Its second dogma 
 is that power and rule belong of right to a majority of the equal 
 and undifferentiated units. It therefore affirms that the demos 
 ought to rule, in contradiction to autocracy, theocracy, aristocracy 
 and other theories of who ought to rule. The first principle oj 
 tivil liberty is that there is no one who, of right, ought to rule. 
 
DEMOCRACY AND PLUTOCRACY 225 
 
 of equality consequently rage against capital which con 
 tradicts their theories. The inequality in the distribu 
 tion of capital, which is at once the proof and the reward 
 of unequal effort and virtue, is a still more favorite ob 
 ject of attack, but so long as men strive upwards and 
 away from their original brutishness, the inequalities in 
 their being and doing will inevitably produce inequali 
 ties in their having and enjoying. Of all the supersti 
 tions which have ever been entertained by men, the 
 most astonishing is the one which has been accepted 
 during the last century : That the mass of men are by 
 nature wise and good although universal experience 
 proves that men become wise and good only by severe 
 and prolonged effort. And yet, the fate of modern de 
 mocracy is to fall into subjection to plutocracy. In its 
 struggles against what is called "the money power," 
 democracy strives against its fate, yet hastens it on. 
 Democracy strives to banish the power of capital from 
 open and admitted influence in political affairs. One of 
 two results follows : (1) When the capital is combined 
 with virtue and high principle, it really is banished from 
 all share in politics. The consequence is that the com 
 munity loses the incalculable advantage which it might 
 gain from the experience and good-will of men who 
 have accumulated capital by integrity, or have managed 
 inherited capital with honor and success, and whose 
 assistance in resisting corrupt schemes, or in reforming 
 aws which give chances to corrupt and crafty men to 
 accumulate capital without industry or integrity, would 
 be invaluable. (2) When capital is in the hands of cor 
 rupt and crafty men, it is driven to secret modes of in 
 fluence, which undermine and destroy institutions, and 
 legislation is moulded to suit the ideas and modes oi 
 
226 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 operation of the crafty and lazy, instead of those of the 
 honest and industrious. We might as well expect to 
 free ourselves from the pressure of the atmosphere as 
 to abolish " the money power." The effect would be as 
 mischievous in one case as in the other. What is true 
 is that selfishness and cupidity constantly strive to make 
 use of laws and civil institutions to divert one man s 
 earnings to another man s use. This occurs whenever 
 laws change at all that distribution of products which 
 would be brought about by the free operation of eco 
 nomic forces. The modern industrial organization, in 
 cluding banks, corporations, joint-stock companies, 
 financial devices, national debts, paper currency, na 
 tional systems of taxation, is largely the creation of 
 legislation (not in its historical origin, but in the mode 
 of its existence and in its authority), and is largely regu 
 lated by legislation. Capital is the breath of life to this 
 organization, and every day, as the organization becomes 
 more complex and delicate, the folly of assailing capital 
 or credit becomes greater. At the same time it is evi 
 dent that the task of the legislator to embrace -in his view 
 the whole system, to adjust his rules so that the play of 
 the civil institutions shall not alter the natural play of 
 the economic forces, requires more training and more 
 acumen. Furthermore, the greater the complication 
 and delicacy of the industrial system, the greater the 
 chances for cupidity when backed by craft, and the task 
 of the legislator to meet and defeat the attempts of 
 this cupidity is one of constantly increasing difficulty 
 Finally, the methods and machinery of democratic r& 
 publican self-government, caucuses, primaries, com 
 naittees, and conventions, lend themselves perhaps 
 more easily than any other political methods and ma 
 
BANK OF NORTH AMERICA. 227 
 
 ihinery to the uses of selfish cliques tvhich seek polit 
 ical influence for interested purposes. 
 
 In the United States the democratic element in public 
 opinion has always been jealous of and hostile to the 
 money power. The hostility has broken out at different 
 times in different ways, as an assault on banks, corpora 
 tions, vested rights, and public credit. Sometimes it 
 seems as if the " money power " were regarded super- 
 stitiously, as if it were a superhuman entity, with will 
 and power. The assaults on it are mingled with dread, 
 as of an enemy with whom one is not yet ready to cope, 
 but whose power is increasing rapidly, so that the chance 
 of ultimate victory over him is small. We are now to 
 study one of the greatest struggles between democracy 
 and the money power. 
 
 The Bank of North America was forced, in 1784-85, 
 to weather a storm of popular opposition and prejudice 
 in Pennsylvania. All the elements of the opposition, 
 which has been above described, were well represented 
 there. There was jealousy of capital, fear of the in 
 fluence of a corporation of capitalists in politics, super 
 stition about banking, denunciation of a monopoly, and 
 incoherent denunciations of the bank for the most con 
 tradictory misdeeds. 1 When Hamilton founded the 
 first Bank of the United States 2 there arose the same 
 doubts and complaints, and the same opposition ; and 
 the dissatisfaction, although it was silenced for a time, 
 lasted as long as that bank lasted, and came out again 
 when the question of rechartering it was brought up. 
 Each party regarded the bank as an available power in 
 politics, and each tried to get control of it. The one 
 
 1 3 Sparks s Morris, 440 ; Jorsiderations OL the Bank of North 
 America ; 3 Wilson s Works. 2 See page 12 
 
228 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 failed (the republicans) then denounced the bank 
 as dangerous to the state. Niles affirmed a great many 
 times that, in 1798, no man who was not a "black 
 cockade federalist" could get accommodation at the 
 bank. The bank authorities always denied this, and 
 it is very doubtful indeed if it was true. Niles is far 
 better authority for what the republicans believed at 
 that heated period than he is for the facts as to the 
 management of the bank. State banks at that time 
 were distinctly regarded as political engines. Each 
 bank had a well-defined party character, and " accom 
 modated " only men of its own party. It seems that 
 people then would have been as much astonished if a 
 group of federalists asked for a bank charter from a 
 republican Legislature as \ve would be now if a repub 
 lican should ask a democratic House to elect him clerk. 
 Jefferson, when President, wrote to Gallatin, Secretary 
 of the Treasury : " I am decidedly in favor of making 
 all the banks republican by sharing deposits amongst 
 them in proportion to the disposition they show." ] Pit- 
 kin, who was a federalist, found it quite natural that a 
 republican Congress should not be willing to recharter 
 the Bank of the United States, since it was federalist. 3 
 Very little is known of the banking merits or demerits 
 of the bank. It was favored by the suspension of specie 
 payments by the Bank of England. It published no 
 reports of its condition until January, 181 1. 8 Pitkin 
 gives a generalized statement, in round numbers, 4 of the 
 operations of the bank. It paid, on an average, eight 
 and thirteen thirty-fourths per cent dividend per annum. 
 In 1810, when the question of renewing the chartej 
 
 i 1 Gallaun s Writings, 129. 2 Pitkin, 421. 
 
 Seybert, 523. * Pitkin, 418. 5 Seybert, 521. 
 
FIRST BANK OF THE UNITED STATES. 229 
 
 eame up, a great political and economic controversy 
 arose. It was generally expected that a commercial 
 crisis would occur if the bank was forced to wind up. 
 The business men and men of capital generally wanted 
 the charter renewed. Matthew Carey s letters to Adam 
 Seybert undoubtedly expressed the opinion of that class. 
 The republicans opposed the bank as aristocratic, fed 
 eralist, a dangerous political engine, and because its 
 Btock was partly held by foreign noblemen. Clay was 
 one of the leaders of the opposition to the bank. The 
 recharter was reported to the Senate by William H. 
 Crawford, who ardently favored it. It was defeated 
 by the casting vote of the Vice-President, George Clin 
 ton, of New York. The bank paid back its capital in 
 dividends from time to time down to 1834 ; in all 109|: 
 for 100 paid in. 
 
 The old bank went out of existence without any con 
 vulsion in business. Its place was taken by local banks. 
 During the second war these banks suspended, except 
 in New England, and then went on to issue notes in the 
 most extravagant manner, until the currency of the 
 country was depreciated at least twenty-five per cent, 
 and was furthermore unequally depreciated, so that it 
 was necessary to have a list of all the banks, and a 
 quotation of them, in order to calculate the value of any 
 number of notes. The notes were loaned to the Treas 
 ury, which did its business with the rags which the 
 banks manufactured and loaned to it for its six per cent 
 bonds. There was then no outcry against the money 
 power. The mania was to make more banks, and the 
 state Legislatures were besieged by applicants for bank 
 charters ; that is, by corporation? which desired the priv- 
 lege of issuing paper to be used as currency by the gov 
 
230 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 eminent and the public, who should pay them interest 
 for it, while it cost them nothing but the paper and 
 printing. The mischievous notion has always been held 
 in this country that a bank is an institution whose prime 
 function is to issue circulating notes. To read the 
 doctrines and plans of 1814-16 one would think the 
 people here thought that a bank manufactured capital 
 out of nothing, and could give it away. Its main duty 
 was to dole it out fairly, and if the existing banks did 
 not do this some more ought to be made. They talked 
 about a man s " right " to accommodation, as if a bank 
 resembled a town pump, at which every one might draw. 
 At this juncture there would have been some sense in 
 assailing the "money power," for ninety-nine in one 
 hundred of these banks were pure swindles.. They had 
 no capital, by issuing notes they borrowed instead of 
 lending, and they paid no interest. 
 
 The administration was republican, but its financial 
 distress was so great that it was obliged to put away 
 its constitutional scruples and its party tradition, and 
 to propose a national bank. Many forms of this were 
 suggested, for it was vciy hard for the old republicans to 
 be obliged to reinstate Hamilton s bank. The Senate 
 wanted to make a bank to suit the administration ; that 
 i*, one which should lend to the Treasury. No bank 
 2ould do this in the measure desired and maintain spe 
 cie payments. The House would not consent to a big 
 paper-money machine, not paying specie, but providing 
 notes for the government. In January, 1815, after a 
 long struggle, a bank charter was passed to suit the 
 House. Madison vetoed it, because the bank would not 
 help the Treasury at all if it could make no loans. The 
 (louse was more anxious that it should restore the cur 
 
CHARTER OF THE SECOND BANK. 231 
 
 rency> believing that, if that could be done, prices of 
 supplies would fall, loans could be placed in a sound 
 currency, and real relief would follow. There was 
 especial reason for this view, because the money market 
 of the country was then at Boston, where the currency 
 was not depreciated. It was said that the New Eng- 
 landers would not sustain the public credit, because they 
 would not subscribe to stocks in their currency at the 
 same rates at which the people of Philadelphia and 
 Baltimore subscribed to stocks in their currency. 1 The 
 New Englanders were also denounced for drawing specie 
 from the Middle States and exporting it, 2 because the 
 specie of course left the States where the paper issues 
 were excessive, and went to the States where the paper 
 issues were small. When it accumulated in excess of 
 the requirement in the latter States, it was exported, 
 which was another ground of denunciation. 8 
 
 Another bill was introduced at once, which provided 
 for a bank to conform to the wishes of the administra 
 tion. This bill was before the House on the day on 
 which news of the treaty of Ghent was received at 
 Washington (February 13th). Pitkin says the news 
 was received at the moment of voting. 4 The bill was 
 laid aside and was never revived. 
 
 At the next session (1815-16) the proposition came 
 up for a national bank, not as a financial resource for 
 the Treasury, but to check the local banks and force a 
 return to specie payments. The charter became a law 
 A.pril 10, 1816. It was a perfect imitation of Hamil- 
 
 1 See the Report of the Secretarv of tie Treasury, 1815. See 
 also 3 Webster s Works, 35, his speech on the proposed bank. 
 
 2 Ingersoll, 250. 
 
 Carey s Olive Branch, 294, 298. * Pitkin. 427 
 
232 ANDREW JACK SON. 
 
 ton s bank. In this bank also the government had a 
 big stock note for seven millions of dollars of stock, 
 which it had subscribed for as a resource to pay its 
 debts, not as investment for free capital. The bank was 
 chartered for twenty years. Its capital was thirty-five 
 millions, seven subscribed by the United States in a five 
 per cent stock note, seven by the public in specie, aiid 
 twenty-one by the public in United States stocks. It 
 was to pay a bonus of one and one half millions in two, 
 three, and four years. It was not to issue notes under 
 $5.00, and not to suspend specie payments under a pen 
 alty of twelve per cent on all notes not redeemed on pres 
 entation. Twenty directors were to be elected annually 
 by the stockholders, a^idjive., being stockholders, were 
 to be, appointed by-tke- Pvesitlent ol Jthe United States 
 and confirmed by the Senate. The federal government 
 was to charter no other bank during the period of the 
 charter of this. The Secretary of the Treasury might 
 at any time redeem the stocks in the capital of the bank, 
 including the five per cent subscription stock. He 
 might remove the public deposits if he should see fit, but 
 must state his reasons for so doing to Congress at its next 
 meeting. The bank engaged to transfer public funds 
 without charge. At first it undertook to equalize the 
 currency by receiving any notes of any branch at any 
 branch, but it was soon forced to abandon the attempt. 
 The old bank had never done this. 1 Two things were 
 mixed up in this attempt : (1) The equalization of the 
 different degrees of depreciation existing in the bank 
 notes of different districts. This the bank could no* 
 have corrected save by relentlessly presenting all loca) 
 notes for redemption, until they were made equal t* 
 1 Carey s Letter* 55. 
 
FAULTS OF THE CHARTER. 233 
 
 specie or were withdrawn. So far as the bank did this 
 it won the reputation of a " mo aster " which was crush 
 ing out the local banks. 1 (2) The equalization of the 
 domestic exchanges. This was impossible and undesir 
 able, since capital never could be distributed in exact 
 proportion to local needs for it. The failure of the bank 
 to " equalize the exchanges," and its refusal to take any 
 notes at any branch, earned it more popular condemna 
 tion than anything else. 
 
 The bank charter contained a great many faults. To 
 mention only those which affected its career : The capi 
 tal was too large. There was no reason for lending its 
 capital to the government, i. e., putting it into public 
 stocks, or making it a syndicate of bond-holders. There 
 was every reason why the United States should not hold 
 stock in it, especially when it could not pay for the 
 same. The dividends of the bank from 1816 to 1831, 
 when the government paid its stock note, average^ five 
 per cent per annum, paid semi-annually. The United 
 States paid five per cent on its stock note quarterly. 
 This gave room for another complaint by the enemies of 
 the bank. 
 
 The bank was established at Philadelphia. It began 
 with nineteen branches, and grew to twenty-five. Specie 
 payments were resumed nominally February 20, 1817, 
 after which date, according to a joint resolution of Con 
 gress of April 16, 1816, the Treasury ought to receive 
 .raly specie, or notes of the Bank of the United States, 
 or of specie-paying banks, or Treasury notes. In the 
 first two years of its existence the great bank was 
 carried to the verge of bankruptcy by as bad banking as 
 >ver was heard of. Instead of checking the other 
 1 See page 121. 
 
234 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 oanks in their improper proceedings, it led and sur 
 passed them all. A clique inside the bank was jobbing 
 in its shares, and robbing it to provide the margins. 
 Instead of rectifying the currency, it made the currency 
 worse. Instead of helping the country out of the dis 
 tress produced by the war, it plunged the country into 
 the commercial crisis of 1819, which caused a general 
 liquidation, "lasting "Four or five years. All the old- 
 school republicans denounced themselves for having 
 abandoned their principles. All the ill-doing of the 
 bank they regarded as essential elements in the charac 
 ter of any national bank. Niles denounced the whole 
 system of banking, and all the banks. He had good 
 reason. It is almost incredible that the legislation of 
 any civilized country could have opened the chance for 
 such abuses of credit, banking, and currency as then 
 existed. The franchise of issuing paper notes to be used 
 by the people as currency, that is to say, the license to 
 appropriate a certain amount of the specie circulation of 
 the country, and to put one s promissory notes in the 
 place of it, was given away, not only without any 
 equivalent, but without any guarantee at all. When 
 Niles and Gouge denounced banking and banks, it was 
 because they had in mind these swindling institutions. 
 The great bank justly suffered with the rest, because it 
 had made itself in many respects like them. The popu 
 lar anti-bank party, opposed to the money power, was 
 very strong during the period of liquidation. 
 
 Langdon Cheves, of South Carolina, was elected pres 
 ident of the bank March 6, 1819. He set about re- 
 storing it. In three years he had succeeded, although 
 the losses* were over three millions. Nicholas Biddle 
 was elected president of the bank in January, 1823 
 
BRANCH DRAFTS INVENTED. 235 
 
 He was only thirty-seven years old, and had been more 
 a literary man than anything t-ise. He was appointed 
 government director in 1819. His election in Cheves s 
 place was the result of the conflict between a young and 
 progressive policy, which he represented, and an old 
 and conservative policy. At the nearest date to Janu 
 ary 1, 1823, the bank had $4.6 million notes out ; $4.4 
 million specie ; $2.7 million public deposits ; $1.5 mill 
 ion deposits by public officers ; $3.3 million deposits by 
 individuals ; $28.7 million bills discounted. Congress 
 refused to allow the officers of the branches to sign 
 notes issued by the branches. It is not clear why this 
 petition was refused, except that Congress was in no 
 mood to grant any request of the bank. The labor, for 
 the president and cashier of the parent bank, of signing 
 all the notes of the bank and branches was very great. 
 Accordingly, in 1827, branch drafts were devised to 
 avoid this inconvenience. They were the counterpart 
 of bank-notes. They were drawn for even sums, by the 
 cashier of any branch, on the parent bank, to the order 
 of some officer of the branch, and endorsed by the latter 
 to bearer. They then circulated like bank-notes. They 
 were at first (1827) made in denominations of $5.00 and 
 $10.00. In 1831 the denomination $20.00 was added. 
 Binney, Wirt, and Webster gave an opinion that these 
 drafts were legal. Rush, Secretary of the Treasury, 
 approved of them, and allowed public dues to be paid in 
 them. 1 These branch drafts^were a m^st unlucky in 
 vention, and to them is_Jiii_be_traced mo^t of the^sulSse- 
 nuentTreaT trouble of tin bank ^ThenBranches, espe 
 cially the distant ones, when they issued these drafts, did 
 Mot lend their own capital, but that jf the bank at 
 1 Document JtJ 
 
236 ANDREW JACKSON 
 
 Philadelphia. At the same time, therefore, the) fell in 
 deht to the parent hank. This stimulated their issues. 
 The borrowers used these drafts to sustain what were 
 called " race-horse hills." These were drafts drawn 
 between the different places where there were branches, 
 so that a bill falling due at one place was met by the 
 discount of a bill drawn on another place. This system 
 was equivalent to unlimited renewals. It kept up a 
 constant inflation of credit. Up to the time of Jackson s 
 accession these drafts had not yet done much harm, and 
 had attracted no adverse criticism. 
 
 At the session of 1827-28, P. P. Barbour brought 
 forward a proposition to sell the stock owned by the 
 United States in the bank. A debate arose concerning 
 the bank, and it seems that there was a desire on the 
 part of a portion of the opposition to put opposition to 
 the bank into their platform. 1 The project failed. Bar- 
 hour s resolution was tabled, 174 to 9. 
 
 The facts which are now to be narrated were not 
 known to the public until 1832. They are told here 
 as they occurred in the order of time. 
 
 June 27, 1829, Levi Woodbury, senator from New 
 Hampshire, wrote to~Samuel^ Inghan^ Secretary of the 
 Treasury, making confidential complaints of Jeremiah 
 Mason, the new president of the Portsmouth, New 
 Hampshire, branch of the Bank of the United States, 
 because (1) of the general brusqueness of his manner; 
 (2) of his severity and j>artialitv in the matter of loans 
 and collections. He added that Mason was a friend of 
 Webster. " His political character is doubtless known 
 to you." He also said that the complaints were general 
 and from all political parties. Ingham enclosed th* 
 i 33 Niles, 275. 
 
CORRESPONDENCE OF INGRAM AND BIDDLE. 237 
 
 Better to Biddle, pointing out that the letter seemed to 
 have been called out by the political effects of the action 
 of the branch. He said that the administration wanted 
 no favors from the bank. Biddle replied that he would 
 investigate. 
 
 One great trouble with Biddle, which appeared at 
 once~in this correspondence, was that he wrote too \ 
 easily. t When he got a pen in his hand, it ran away f 
 with him. In this first reply, he went on to write a long 
 letter, by which he drew out all the venomous rancor of 
 Levi Woodbury and Isaac Hill against the old federal 
 ists and Jeremiah Mason and the bank, all which lurked 
 in Ingham s letter, but came out only in the form of 
 innuendo and suggestion. The innuendoes stung Biddle, 
 and he challenged the suggestions instead of ignoring 
 them. Thus he gave them a chance to come forth with 
 out sneaking. He was jauntily innocent and unconscious 
 of what spirit he was dealing with and what impended 
 over him. He stated (1) that Mason had been appointed 
 jo a vacancy caused by the resignation, not by the re 
 moval, of his predecessor; (2) that the salary of the 
 position had not been increased for Mason ; (3) that, 
 lifter Mason s appointment, Webster was asked to per 
 suade him to accept. He quoted a letter from Wood- 
 bury to himself, in July, in which Woodbury said that 
 Mason was as unpopular with one party as the other 
 Biddle inferred, no doubt correctly, that Mason, as 
 banker, had done his duty b} the bank, without re 
 gard to politics. He explained that the branch had 
 previously not been well n.anaged, and that Mason was 
 put in as a competent banker ara lawyer to put it right 
 again. It is easy to see that Mason, in order to put the 
 bank right, had to act severely, and that he especially 
 
238 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 disappointed those who, on account of political sym 
 pathy, expected favors, but did not get them. Politics 
 had run high in New Hampshire for ten or twelve 
 years. Mason and Webster on one side, and Hill, 
 Woodbury, and Plumer on the other, had been in 
 strong antagonism. The relations had been amicable 
 between some of them, but Hill and Mason were two 
 men who could not meet without striking fire. Hill waa 
 now president of a small bank at Concord, and business 
 jealousy was added to political animosity. Woodbury 
 had been elected to the Senate as an Adams man, and 
 the personal and political feelings were only more in 
 tense, because Adams was called a republican. The 
 federalists were first invited to support him, then they 
 were ignored, 1 and Woodbury and Hill were working 
 for Jackson. 
 
 Biddle, as if dissatisfied with whatever prudence he 
 had shown in his first letter, wrote another, in which he 
 declared that the bank had nothing to do with politics ; 
 that people were all the time trying to draw it into 
 politics, but that it always resisted. 
 
 July 23d Ingham wrote again to Bicldle, insisting that 
 there must be grounds of complaint, and that exemption 
 from party preferenco was impossible. He added that 
 he represented the views of the administration. 
 
 In August the Secretary of War ordered the pension 
 agency transferred from the Portsmouth branch to the 
 bank at Concord, of which Isaac Hill had been presi 
 dent. The parent bank forbade the branch to comply 
 urilh this order, on the ground that it was illegal. Th 
 was revoked. 
 
 September 15th Biddle wrote again to Ingham. Hf 
 1 1 Webster s Correspondence, 415, 419. 
 
B1DDLE TO ING BAM 1829 239 
 
 had visited Buffalo and Portsmouth during the *ammer. 
 His letter is sharp and independent in tone. He says 
 tliatrtwo memorials have been sent to him by Isaac Hill r 
 Second Controller of the Treasury, one from the busi 
 ness men of Portsmouth, and the other from sixty mem 
 bers of the Legislature of New Hampshire, requesting 
 Mason s removal, and nominating a new board of di 
 rectors, " friends of General Jackson in New Hamp 
 shire." Those proceedings were evidently planned by 
 the anti-bank clique at Washington to provoke Biddle. 
 He hastened to crown that purpose with complete suc 
 cess. He says that public opinion in the community 
 around a bank is no test of bank management, and that 
 the reported opinion at Portsmouth, upon examination, 
 " degenerated into the personal hostility of a very 
 limited, and for the most part very prejudiced, circle." 
 He then takes up three points which he finds in Ing- 
 ham s letters, suggested or assumed, but not formulated. 
 These are: (1) That the Secretary has some super 
 vision over the choice of officers of the bank, which 
 comes to him from the relations of the government to 
 the bank. (2) That there is some action of the govern 
 ment on the bank, which is not precisely defined, but of 
 which the Secretary is the proper agent. (3) That it is 
 the right and duty of the Secretary to make known to 
 the president of the bank the views of the administra 
 tion on the political opinions of the officers of the bank. 
 He then says that the board acknowledge no responsi 
 bility whatever to the Secretary in regard to the polit- 
 cal opinions of the officers of the bank ; that the bank 
 is responsible to Congress only, and is carefully shielded 
 by its charter from executive control. He indignantly 
 denies that freedom from politica bias is impossible 
 
240 ANDREW JACKSON 
 
 shows the folly of the notion of political " checks and 
 counter-balances " between the officers of the bank, and 
 declares that the bank ought to disregard all parties. 
 He won a complete victory on the argument of his 
 points, but delivered himself, on the main issue, without 
 reserve into the hands of his enemies. 
 
 Iiigham s letter of October 5th is a masterly specimen 
 of cool and insidious malice. In form it is smooth, 
 courteous, and plausible, but it is full of menace and 
 deep hostility. He discusses the points implied by him, 
 but, in form, raised by Biddle. He says that if the 
 bank should abuse its powers the Secretary is authorized 
 to remove the deposits. Hence the three points which 
 Biddle found in his former letter are good. It does not 
 appear that Biddle ever thought of this power as within 
 the range of the discussion, or of the exercise of it as 
 amongst the possibilities. Ingham says there are two 
 theories of the bank : (1) That it is exclusively for 
 national purposes and for the common benefit of all, and 
 that the " employment of private interests is only an 
 incident, perhaps an evil, founded in mere con 
 venience for care and management." (2) That it is 
 intended " to strengthen the arm of wealth, and coun 
 terpoise the influence of extended suffrage in the dispo- 
 tition of public affairs," and that the public deposits are 
 one of its means for performing this function. He says 
 that there are two means of resisting the latter theory : 
 the power to remove the deposits, and the power to ap 
 point five of the directors. He adds that, if the bank 
 should exercise political influence, that would afford him 
 She strongest motive for removing the deposits. Bid 
 jle s reply of October 9th shows that he recognizes a 
 Ust what tamper he has to deal with. He is still g) 
 
THE BANK CORRESPONDENCE. 241 
 
 hud good-natured, and he recedes gracefully, only main 
 Uining that it is the policy of the bank to keep out of 
 
 politics. 
 
 In Ingham s letters of July 23d and October 5th is to 
 be found the key to the " bank war." Inghain argues 
 that TiEe~bank cannot keep out of politics, that its offi 
 cers ought to be taken from both parties, and that, if 
 it meddles with politics, he will remove the deposits. 
 The only road left by which to escape from the situation 
 he creates is to go into politics on his side. No evidence 
 is known to exist that the bank had interfered in poli 
 tics. The administration men are distinctly seen in this 
 correspondence, trying to drive it to use political in 
 fluence on their side, and the bank resists, not on behalf 
 of the other party, but on behalf of its independence. 
 It is the second of the alleged theories in the letter of 
 October 5th, however, which demands particular atten 
 tion. The Jackson administration always pretended 
 that the managers of the bank construed the character 
 and function of the bank according to that theory. It 
 is the Kentucky relief notion of the bank in its extreme 
 and most malignant form. The statement is, on its 
 face, invidious and malicious. It is not, even in form, 
 a formula of functions attributed to the bank. It is a 
 construction of the political philosophy of a national 
 bank. It is not parallel with the first statement. It 
 was ridiculous to allege that the stockholders of the 
 bank had subscribed twenty-eight million dollars, not 
 even for party purposes, but to go crusading against 
 democracy and universal suffrage However, the justice 
 or injustice of the allegations in thest letters, which 
 could be submitted to no tribunal, and which touched 
 Motives, not acts, was immaterial. The administration 
 
242 ANDRE IV JACKSON. 
 
 liad determined to make war on the bank. The ultimate 
 agents were Amos Kendall, who brought the Kentucky 
 relief element, and Isaac Hill, who brought the element 
 of local bank jealousy and party rancor. Ingham pub 
 lished, in 1832, 1 after the above correspondence had 
 been published, an " Address " in his own defence. He 
 says that he found, to his surprise, soon after he entered 
 Jackson s cabinet, that the President and those nearest 
 in his confidence felt animosity against the bank. He 
 saw that the persons who had the most feeling influ 
 enced the President s mind the most. Allegations of 
 fact were reported in regard to political interference 
 by the bank. Ingham says that when he was urged to 
 action about the bank he tried to trace down these 
 stories to something tangible. He quotes the only state 
 ment he ever got. It is a letter by Amos Kendall, 
 giving second or third hand reports of the use of money 
 by officers of the bank in the Kentucky election of 1825, 
 when the court question was at issue. 2 The man whom 
 Kendall gave as his authority failed, when called upon, 
 to substantiate the assertion. In Kendall s Autobioo-- 
 raphy there is a gap from 1823 to 1829, and the origin 
 of his eager hostility to the bank is not known. Jackson 
 is not known to have had any opinion about the bank 
 when he came to Washington. He is not known to 
 have had any collision with the bank, except that, when 
 lie was on his way to Florida, as Governor, the branch 
 it New Orleans refused his request that it would ad 
 vance money to him on his draft on the Secretary of 
 State. 8 Hill and Kendall, either by telling Jackson 
 t.hat the bank had worked against him in the election, 
 9T by other means, infused into his rnind the hostility \> 
 1 42 Niles, 315. 2 See page 127. 2 Parton, 59fi. 
 
HINTS OF THE COMING BANK WAR. 243 
 
 it which had long rankled in theirs. They were soon 
 reenforced by Blair, who was stronger than either, and 
 more zealously hostile to the bank than either. 
 
 In November, 1829, about a week before Congress 
 met, Amos Kendall sent privately 1 a letter to the 
 u Courier and Enquirer," Jackson organ at New York, 
 in which he insinuated that Jackson would come out 
 against the bank in the annual message. A head and 
 tail piece were put to this letter, and it was put in as 
 an editorial. It attracted some attention, but, its origin 
 being of course unknown, it was received with a great 
 deal of skepticism. In its form it consisted of a series 
 of queries, 2 of which the following may be quoted as the 
 most significant, and as best illustrating the methods of 
 procedure introduced in Jackson s administration. Wo 
 must remember that these queries were drawn up by a 
 man in the closest intimacy with the President, who 
 helped to make the message what it was, and we must 
 further remember what we have already learned of 
 William B. Lewis s methods. " Will sundry banks 
 throughout the Union take measures to satisfy the 
 g-eneral government of their safety in receiving deposits 
 of the revenue, and transacting the banking concerns of 
 the United States ? Will the Legislatures of the several 
 States adopt resolutions on the subject, and instruct their 
 senators how to vote ? Will a proposition be made to 
 authorize the government to issue exchequer bills, to the 
 amount of the annual revenue, redeemable at pleasure, 
 L o constitute a circulating medium equivalent to the 
 notes issued by the United States Bank ? " So far as 
 tppears, no one saw in these queries +he oracle which 
 
 1 Memoirs of Bennett, 1L .. 
 
 a It is quoted 37 Niles, 3* S (January 30, 1830.) 
 
844 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 foretold the history of the United States for the next 
 ken or fifteen years. 
 
 Jackson s first annual message contained a paragraph 
 on the bank which struck the whole country with as 
 tonishment. " We had seen," says Niles, " one or two 
 dark paragraphs in certain of the newspapers, which 
 led to a belief that the administration was not friendly 
 to this great moneyed institution, but few had any sus 
 picion that it would form one of the topics of the first 
 message." : After mentioning the fact that the charter 
 would expire in 1836, and that a recharter would be 
 Basked for, the message said that such an important 
 j question could not too soon be brought before Congress. 
 ^^Both the constitutionality and the expediency of the 
 law creating this bank are well questioned by a large 
 portion of our fellow citizens, and it must be admitted 
 by all that it has failed in the great end of establishing 
 a uniform and sound currency." The question is then 
 raised whether a bank could not be devised, " founded 
 on the credit of the government and its revenues," 
 which should answer all the useful purposes of the Bank 
 of the United States. 
 > No period in the history of the United States could 
 be mentioned when the country was in a state of more 
 profound tranquillity, both in its domestic and foreign 
 elations, and in a condition of more humdrum prosper 
 ity in its industry, than 182;). The currency never had 
 been as good as it was then, for the troubles of the 
 early 20 s, both in the East and in the West, had been 
 io a great extent overcome. 2 The currency has nevei 
 
 i 37 Niles, 257. 
 
 See the tables in 2 Macgregor, 1140; also Gallatin on th 
 Banking System of the United State*. 
 
CRITICISM OF THE MESSAGE. 245. 
 
 been better and more uniform, if we take the whole 
 country over, since 1829 than it was then. The pro 
 ceedings, of which the paragraph in the message of 1829 
 was the first warning, threw the currency and banking 
 of the country into confusion and uncertainty, one thing 
 following upon another, and they have never yet re 
 covered the character of established order and routine 
 operation which they had then. The bank charter was 
 not to expire until March 3, 1836 ; that is, three years 
 beyond the time when Jackson s term would expire. 
 He seems to apologize for haste in bringing up the ques 
 tion of its renewal. It certainly was a premature step, 
 and can only be explained by the degree of feeling 
 which the active agents had mingled with their opinions 
 about the bank. It was, moreover, a new mode of state 
 ment for the President to address Congress, not on his 
 own motion, and to set forth his own opinions and rec 
 ommendations, but as the mouth-piece of " a large por 
 tion of our fellow citizens." Who were they? How 
 many were they ? How had they made their opinions 
 known to the President ? Why did they not use the 
 press or the Legislature, as usual, for making known 
 their opinions ? Who must be dealt with in discussing 
 the opinions, the President or the " large portion," etc. ? 
 What becomes of the constitutional responsibility of the 
 President, if he does not speak for himself, but gets his 
 notions before Congress as a quotation from somebody 
 else, and that somebody " a large portion of our fellow 
 citizens " ? Then again the question must arise : Does 
 \he President correctly quote anybody ? No proofs can 
 be found that any hundred persons in the United Statea 
 Uad active doubts of the constitutionality and expediency 
 %f the bank, or were looking forward to its recharter as 
 
246 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 a political crisis to be prepared for. If the theoreticai 
 question had been raised, a great many people would 
 have said that they thought a national bank unconstitu 
 tional. They would have said, as any one must say 
 now, that there was no power given in the Constitution 
 to buy territory, but they did not propose to give up 
 Louisiana and Florida. Just so in regard to a national 
 1 bank. The Supreme Court had decided in McCulloch 
 
 \vs. Maryland that the bank charter was constitutional, 
 and that was the end of controversy. Tlje question of 
 the^ constitutionality of the bank had no life, and oc 
 cupied no place in public opinion, so far as one can 
 learn from newspapers, books, speeches, diaries, corre 
 spondence, or other evidence we have of what occupied 
 the minds of the people. Jackson s statement was only 
 a figure of speech. The observation which is most im 
 portant for a fair judgment of his policy of active hos 
 tility to the bank is, ;r that any great financial institution 
 or system which is in operation, and is performing its 
 functions endurably, has a great presumption in its 
 favor. The only reasonable question for statesman or 
 financier is that of slow and careful correction and im 
 provement. The man who sets out to overturn and 
 lestroy, in obedience to " a principle," especially if he 
 >hows that he does not know the possible scope of his 
 3\vn action, or what he intends to construct afterwards, 
 issumes a responsibility which no public man has any 
 right to take. 
 
 The vague and confused proposition of the President 
 for some new kind of bank added alarm to astonish 
 ment. What did he mean by his bank on the credit 
 *nd revenues of the government? It sounded like a 
 jig paper-money machine. If there was anv intelligible 
 
ACTION OF CONGRESS ON THE BANK. 247 
 
 idea in it, it referred to something like the Bank of the 
 Commonwealth of Kentucky on a still larger scale 
 The stock of the bank declined from 125 to 116 on 
 account of the message. 1 It was supposed that the 
 President must have knowledge of some facts about the 
 bank. 
 
 --* 
 
 The part of the message about the bank was referred 
 in both Houses. April 13, 1830, 2 McDuffie made a 
 long report from the Committee on Ways and Means. 
 He argued that the constitutionality of the bank was 
 settled by the decision of the Supreme Court and by 
 prescription. He defended the history and expediency 
 of the bank, and ended by declaring the bank proposed 
 by the President to be very dangerous and inexpedient, 
 both financially and politically, the latter because it 
 would increase the power of the Executive. In the 
 Senate, Smith, of Maryland, reported from the Com 
 mittee on Finance in favor of the bank. 8 The House, 
 May 10, 1830, tabled, by 89 to 66, resolutions that the 
 House would not consent to renew the charter of the 
 bank, and on May 29th it tabled, 95 to 67, a series of 
 resolutions calling for a comprehensive report of the 
 proceedings of the bank. As yet there were no allega 
 tions against the management of the bank. The stock 
 pose to 130 on the reports of the committees of Con 
 gress. 
 
 A great many politicians had to " turn a sharp cor 
 ner," as Niles expressed it. when Jackson came out 
 Igainst the bank. His supporters in Pennsylvania 
 eities were nearly all bank m in. Van Buren, Marcy, 
 ind Butler had signed a petition, in 1826, for a branch 
 
 1 38 Niles, 177. 2 38 Niles, 183. 
 
 38 Niles, 126. 
 
248 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 of the bank at Albany. 1 The petition was refused. IB 
 January, 1829, Van Buren, as Governor of New York, 
 referred to banks under federal control as objectionable. 
 The administration party was not yet consolidated. It 
 was still only that group of factions which had united in 
 opposition to Adams. The bank question was one of 
 the great questions through which Jackson s popularity 
 and his will hammered them into a solid party phalanx. 
 All had to conform to the lines which he drew for the 
 party, under the influence of Kendall, Lewis, and Hill. 
 If they did not do so, they met with speedy discipline. 
 
 In his message for 1830, Jackson again inserted a 
 paragraph about the bank, and proposed a bank as a 
 "branch of the Treasury Department." The outline is 
 very vague, but it approaches the sub-treasury idea. 
 No notice was taken of this part of the message in the 
 session of 1830-31. On a test question, whether to 
 refer the part of the message relating to the bank to 
 the Committee on Ways and Means or to a select com 
 mittee, the bank triumphed, 108 to 67. Benton offered 
 a joint resolution, in the Senate, February 2, 1831, 
 "That the charter of the Bank of the United State? 
 ought not to be renewed." The Senate refused leave, 
 23 to 20, to introduce it. In July, 1831, the Secretary 
 of War ordered the pension funds for the State of New 
 York to be removed from the New York branch. Bid- 
 die remonstrated, because there was no authority of law 
 for the order, and the Auditor had refused to accept 
 such an order as a voucher in a previous case. Secre 
 tary Cass revoked the order, March 1, 1832. In the 
 message of 1831 Jackson referred to the bank questior 
 is one on which he had discharged his duty and freed 
 1 Mackeinzie, 98 
 
MCLANE IN FAVOR OF THE BANK. 249 
 
 his responsibility. The Secretary of the Treasury, Mc- 
 Lane, in his annual report, December, 1831, made a 
 Long and strong argument in favor of the bank. If we 
 may judge from the tone of the message of 1831, Jack- 
 eon was willing to allow the bank question to drop, at 
 least until the presidential election should be over. 
 There is even room for a suspicion that McLane s argu 
 ment in favor of the bank was a sort of " hedging ; " for 
 although the Secretary s report was not necessarily sub 
 mitted to the President, 1 Jackson was hardly the man to 
 allow a report to be sent in of which he disapproved. 
 
 We have now concluded our review of the public 
 questions which occupied attention during , Jackson s 
 first administration, and have brought the history of 
 those questions, and of his proceedings in regard to 
 them, down to the time when the presidential campaign 
 D 1832 opened, December, 1831. 
 1 See page 302. 
 
CHAFFER XII 
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832. 
 
 CLAY was the leading man in the opposition, but the 
 opposition was by no means united. A new factor had 
 been gaining importance in politics for the last few 
 years. The politicians had ignored it and sneered at 
 it, but it had continued to grow, and was now strong 
 enough to mar, if it could not make, a national election. 
 
 In 1826 a bricklayer, named William Morgan, who 
 lived at Batavia, N. Y., and was very poor, thought that 
 he could earn something by writing an exposure of the 
 Becrets of free-masonry, 1 he being a mason. The 
 masons learned that he had written such a book. They 
 caused his arrest and imprisonment over Sunday on a 
 frivolous civil complaint, and searched his house for the 
 manuscript during his absence. A month later he was 
 arrested again for a debt of $2.10, and imprisoned 
 under an Execution for $2.69, debt and costs. The 
 next day the creditor declared the debt satisfied. Mor 
 gan was released, passed at the prison door into the 
 hands of masked men, was placed in a carriage, taken 
 to Fort Niagara, and detained there. A few days later 
 a body was found floating in the river, which was iden 
 tified as Morgan s body. The masons always denied 
 that this identification was correct. Morgan has never 
 
 1 Report of the Special Agent of the State of New York. 5 
 Ann. Reg. 537. 
 
OUTRAGE ON MORGAN. 251 
 
 been seen or heard of since. In January, 1827, certain 
 persons were tried for conspiracy and abduction. They 
 pleaded guilty, and so prevented a disclosure of details. 1 
 The masons confessed and admitted abduction, but de 
 clared that Morgan was not dead. The opinion that 
 Morgan had been murdered, and that the body found 
 was his, took possessions of the minds of those people of 
 Western New York who were not masons. Popular 
 legend and political passion have become so interwoven 
 with the original mystery that the truth cannot now be 
 known. 
 
 The outrage on Morgan aroused great indignation in 
 Western New York, then still a simple frontier country. 
 Public opinion acted on all subjects. A committee ap 
 pointed at a mass-meeting undertook an extra-legal 
 investigation, and soon brought the matter into such 
 shape that no legal tribunal ever after had much chance 
 of unravelling it. After the fashion of the time, and of 
 the place also, a political color was immediately given to 
 the affair. As Spencer, the special agent appointed by 
 the State to investigate the matter, declared in his re 
 port, the fact of this political coloring was disastrous to 
 the cause of "justice. The politicians tried to put down 
 the whole excitement, because it traversed their plans 
 and combinations. They asked, with astonishment 
 and with justice, what the affair had to do with politics, 
 The popular feeling, however, was very strong, and it 
 was fed by public meetings, committee reports, etc. 
 The monstrous outrage deserved that a strong public 
 opi-iion should sustain the institutions of justice in 
 finding out and punishing tie perpetrators. Some of 
 ihe officers were too lax and indifferent in the discharge 
 1 2 Hamriond, 37f . 
 
252 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 of their duties to suit the public temper. They were 
 masons. Henee the inference that a man who was a 
 mason was not fit or competent to be entrusted with 
 public duties. The political connection was thus ren 
 dered logical and at least plausible. Many persons re 
 solved not to vote for anyone who was a mason for 
 any public office. Moreover, the excitement offered an 
 unexampled opportunity to the ambitious young orators 
 and politicians of the day. It was a case where pure 
 Leat and emphasis were the only requirements of the 
 orator. He need not learn anything, or have any ideas. 
 A number of men rose to prominence on the movement 
 who had no claims whatever to public influence. They 
 of course stimulated as much as they could the popular 
 excitement against masonry, which furnished them their 
 opportunity and their capital. Many masons withdrew 
 from the order. Others foolislily made light of the 
 outrage itself. For the most part, however, the masons 
 argued that masonry was no more responsible, as an in 
 stitution, for the outrage on Morgan than the Christian 
 church is responsible for the wrongs done in its name by 
 particular persons and groups. These discussions only 
 sharpened the issue, and masons and anti-masons came 
 to be a division which cut across all the old party lines 
 in the State of New York. In 1828 the anti-masons 
 were the old Clintonians, 1 the rump of the federalists, 
 and many buck-tails, with whom horror at the Morgan 
 outrage was a controlling motive. Jackson, Clinton, 
 and Van Buren were then allied. Jackson and Clinton 
 were masons. The Clintonians who would not follow 
 Clinton to the support of Jackson, either because they 
 disliked the man or because he was a mason, and tin 
 1 Clintou died February 11, 1828. 
 
POLITICAL EFFECTS OF ANTI-MASONRY. 253 
 
 buck-tails who would not vote for a mason, were Adams 
 toen. The great body of the buck-tails (amongst whom 
 party discipline was stronger than in any other faction), 
 the Clintonians who followed Clinton into the Jackson 
 camp, and the masons who let defence of the order con 
 trol their politics, were Jackson men. Hence the New 
 York vote (which was taken by districts in 1828) was 
 divided. 
 
 The regency buck-tail democrats, being in control 
 of the state government, tried to put down the excite 
 ment by indirect means, because of its disorganizing 
 effects. This made them appear to suppress inquiry, and 
 to be indifferent to the outrage. It only fanned the 
 dame of popular indignation, and strengthened anti- 
 masonry. The anti-masons came out as an anti-ad 
 ministration party in 1830. They held a convention at 
 Utica in August, and framed a platform of national 
 principles. This is the first " platform," as distinguished 
 from the old-fashioned address. The anti-masons had 
 come together under no other bond than opposition to 
 masonry. If they were to be a permanent party, and a 
 national party, they needed to find or make some polit 
 ical principles. This was their great political weakness 
 and the sure cause of their decay. Their party had no 
 root in political convictions. It had its root elsewhere, 
 and in very thin soil too, for a great political organiza 
 tion. Since the masons were not constantly and by the 
 Kfe principle of their order perpetrators of outrages and 
 murders, they could not furnish regular fuel to keep up 
 the indignation of the anti-masons. The anti-masons, 
 then, put on their principles as an after-thought. For 
 this reason, however, they needed an explicit statement 
 of them, if possible, in a categorical form, i. e., a plat- 
 
254 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 form, far more than a party which had an historical 
 origin, and traditions derived from old political contro 
 versies. Anti-masonry spread rapidly through New 
 York and large parts of Pennsylvania and Massachu 
 setts. Vermont became a stronghold of it. It is by no 
 means extinct there now. It had considerable strength 
 in Connecticut and Ohio. It widened into hostility to 
 all secret societies and extra-judicial oaths. Perhaps it 
 reached its acme when it could lead men like J. Q. 
 Adams and Joseph Story to spend days in discussing 
 plans for abolishing the secrecy of the Phi Beta Kappa 
 society of Harvard College. 1 It only showed to what 
 extent every man is carried away by the currents of 
 thought and interest which prevail for the time being in 
 the community. 
 
 The anti-masons next invented the national political 
 convention. 2 They held one at Philadelphia, September 
 11, 1830, 8 which called another, to meet September 
 26, 1831, at Baltimore, to nominate candidates for 
 President and Vice-President. At the latter date 112 
 delegates met. 4 William Wirt, of Maryland, was iiomi 
 nated for President, and Amos Ellmaker, of Pennsy] 
 vania, for Vice-President, almost unanimously. Wirt 
 had been a mason, and had neglected, not abandoned, the 
 
 1 8 Adams, 383. 
 
 2 A convention of delegates from eleven States nominated De 
 Witt Clinton, in 1812. Binns (page 244) claims to have invented 
 the national convention, but his was a project for introducing into 
 the congressional caucus of the republican party special dele- 
 *ate3 from the non -republican States, so as to make that bodj 
 
 epresent the whole party. 
 8 39 Nile*, 58. 
 
 4 41 Xiles, 8.1, 107. Twelve States were represented. W. U 
 Bewaid and Thaddeus Stevens were in the convention. 
 
ANTI-MASONIC NOMINATIONS. 256 
 
 order. In his letter of acceptance * he said that he had 
 often spoken of " masonry and anti-masonry as a fitter 
 subject for farce than tragedy." He circumscribed and 
 tamed down the whole anti-masonic movement, and put 
 himself on no platform save hostility to oaths which 
 might interfere with a man s civic duties. He put the 
 whole Morgan case aside, except so far as, on the trial, 
 it appeared that masonry hindered justice. The anti- 
 masons were, in fact, aiming at political power. They 
 had before them the names of McLean, Calhoun, and 
 J. Q. Adams. 2 New York wanted McLean. He de 
 clined. 8 The anti-masonic convention published a long 
 address, setting forth the history and principles of the 
 party. 4 There was a hope, in which Wirt seems to 
 have shared, that when the anti-masons presented a 
 separate nomination Clay would withdraw, and the 
 national republicans would take up Wirt. 6 When this 
 hope had passed away, Wirt wanted to withdraw, but 
 could not do so. 8 He had from the first desired Clay s 
 election, and had agreed to stand only when assured 
 that Clay could not unite the anti-Jackson men. Clay 
 refused to answer the interrogatories of the anti-masons. 
 He said, " I do not know a solitary provision in the 
 Constitution of the United States which conveys the 
 slightest authority to the general government to inter 
 fere, one way or the other, with either masonry or 
 anti-masonry." He said that if the President should 
 
 1 2 Kennedy s Wirt, 350. 2 8 Adams, 412, 416. 
 
 41 Niles, 259. 4 41 Niles, 166. 
 
 * Judge Spencer thought that Wirt could unite the opposition. 
 if Clay would stand back, and that Wirt could be elected ovei 
 Jackson. (1 Curris s Webster, 402.) 
 
 2 Kennedy s Wirt, 356, 3C2, 366. 
 
256 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 meddle with that matter he would be a usurper and a 
 tyrant. 1 
 
 The opposition therefore went into the contest divided 
 and discordant. The anti-masons were strong enough 
 to produce that state of things, and of course their con 
 duct showed that the opposition was not united on any 
 political policy whatever. Jackson, on the contrary, 
 had been consolidating a party, which had a strong con 
 sciousness of its power and its purpose and a vigorous 
 party will. Jackson had the credit of recovering the 
 West India trade, settling the spoliation claims, and 
 placing all foreign relations on a good footing. He 
 also claimed that he had carried the administration of 
 the government back to the Jeffersonian ideas. In 
 general this meant that he held to the non-interference 
 theory of government, and to the policy of leaving 
 people to be happy in their own way. He had not yet 
 been forced to commit himself on land and tariff, al 
 though he had favored a liberal policy about land ; but 
 on internal improvements he had spoken clearly, and 
 inferences were freely drawn as to what he would do on 
 land and tariff. He had favored state rights and strict 
 construction in all the cases which had arisen. He had 
 discountenanced all heavy expenditures on so-called na 
 tional objects, and had prosecuted as rapidly as possible 
 the payment of the debt. Here was a strong record 
 and a consistent one on a number of great points of 
 policy, and that, of course, is what is needed to form a 
 party. The record also furnished two or three good 
 party " cries." The general non-interference policy 
 strengthens any government which recurs to it. Al" 
 governments in time depart from it, because they al 
 1 41 Niles. 260 ; 8 Adams, 430. 
 
JACKSON S PARTY. 257 
 
 ways credit themselves with power to do better for the 
 people than the people can do for themselves. In 
 1831-32 Jackson had not yet reached this stage in his 
 career. The delicate points in his record were tariff 
 and bank. If he assailed the tariff, would he not lose 
 Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Kentucky ? If he favored it, 
 would he not lose the South ? This was the old division 
 in the body of his supporters, and it seemed that he 
 might now be ruined if that cleft were opened. Also, ii 
 he went on with the " bank war," would he not lose 
 Pennsylvania ? His mild message on the bank in 1831 
 seemed to indicate fear. 
 
 Clay declared unhesitatingly that the campaign re 
 quired that the opposition should force the fighting on 
 tariff and bank, especially on the latter. We have seen * 
 what his demeanor and demands were in the conference 
 at Washington. For the fight out-of-doors he thought 
 that the recharter of the bank was the strongest issue he 
 could make. Of course Benton s assertion 2 that the 
 bank attacked Jackson is a ridiculous misrepresentation. 
 Clay did, however, seize upon the question which Jack 
 son had raised about the bank, and he risked that im 
 portant financial institution on the fortunes of a political 
 campaign. The bank was very unwilling to be so used. 
 Its disinterested friends in both parties strongly dis 
 suaded Biddle from allowing the question of recharter 
 to be brought into the campaign. 8 Clay s advisers tried 
 to dissuade him. The bank, however, could not oppose 
 Uie public man on whom it depended most and the 
 party leaders deferred at last to their chief. Jackson 
 never was more dictatorial and obstinate than Clay was 
 tt this juncture. Clay was the champion of the system 
 
 Page 22? 2 1 Benton, 227. 3 Ingerooll. 868. 
 
 17 
 
258 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 of state-craft which makes public men undertake a tute 
 lage of the nation, and teaches them not to be content to 
 let the nation grow by its own forces, and according to 
 the shaping of the forces and the conditions. His sys 
 tem of statesmanship is one which always offers shelter 
 to numbers of interested schemes and corrupt enter 
 prises. The public regarded the bank, under his polit 
 ical advocacy, as a part of that system of state-craft. 
 
 The national republican convention met at Baltimore, 
 December 1 2, 1831. l It consisted of 155 delegates from 
 seventeen States. Abner Lacock, of Pennsylvania, who 
 as senator had made a very strong report against Jack 
 son on the Seminole war, was president of the conven 
 tion. John Sergeant, of Pennsylvania, was nominated 
 for Vice-President. The convention issued an address, 
 in which the bank question was put forward. It was 
 declared that the President " is fully and three times 
 over pledged to the people to negative any bill that may 
 be passed for rechartering the bank, and there is little 
 doubt that the additional influence which he would ac 
 quire by a reelection would be employed to carry 
 through Congress the extraordinary substitute which he 
 has repeatedly proposed." The appeal, therefore, was 
 to defeat Jackson in order to save the bank and prevent 
 he device proposed by Jackson from being tried. 
 
 Such a challenge as that could have but one effect on 
 Jackson. It called every faculty he possessed into 
 activity to compass the destruction of the bank. Instead 
 of retiring from the position he had taken, the moment 
 there was a tight to be fought, he did what he did at 
 New Orleans. He moved his lines up to the last point 
 he could command on the side towards the enemy Thi 
 1 41 Niles. 301. 
 
PETITION FOR RECHARTER. 259 
 
 anti-bank men, Kendall, Blair, and Hill, must have been 
 delighted to see the adversary put spurs into Jackson s 
 animosity. The proceedings seemed to prove just what 
 the anti-bank men had asserted : that the bank was a 
 great monster, which aimed to control elections, and to 
 set up and put down Presidents. The campaign of 
 1832 was a struggle between the popularity of the bank 
 and the popularity of Jackson. His popularity in rural 
 Pennsylvania had never had any rational basis, and 
 hence could not be overthrown by rational deductions. 
 His spirit and boldness in meeting the issue offered by 
 Clay won him support. His party was not broken ; it 
 was consolidated. 
 
 On the 9th of January, 1832, in prosecution of the 
 programme, the memorial of the bank for a renewal of 
 its charter was presented in the Senate by Dallas, and 
 in the House by McDuffie. These men were both 
 "bank democrats"/ Sargent 1 says Biddle told him 
 that the bank wanted Webster, or some such unequivocal 
 friend of the bank, to present the memorial, but that 
 Dallas claimed the duty as belonging to him. There was 
 great and just dissatisfaction with Dallas for the way in 
 which he managed the business. He intimated a doubt 
 whether the application was not premature, and a doubt 
 about the policy of the memorial, lest "it might be 
 drawn into a real or imaginary conflict with some higher, 
 some more favorite, some more immediate wish or pur 
 pose of the American people." In the Senate the peti 
 tion was referred to a select committee, and in the 
 House to the Committee on Ways and Means. The Sen- 
 nate committee reported favorably March 13th and rec 
 ommended only a few changes in the old charter. They 
 1 1 Sargent, 215. 
 
260 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 proposed to demand a bonus of one and a half millioiis 
 in three annual instalments. In the House, McDuffie 
 reported February 9th. 1 He said that the proposition to 
 recharter had called out a number of wild propositions. 
 The old bank was too large, but one was proposed with 
 a capital of fifty millions. He criticised the notion that 
 all citizens should have an equal right to subscribe to 
 the stock of the bank. If A has $100 on balance and 
 B owes $100 on balance, their " equal right " to sub 
 scribe to bank stock is a strange thing to discuss. 
 
 Benton 2 says that the opponents of the bank in Con 
 gress agreed upon a policy. They determined to fight 
 the charter at every point, and to oring the bank into 
 odium as much as possible. He says that he organized 
 a movement to this effect in the House, incited Clayton, 
 of Georgia, to demand an investigation of the bank, and 
 furnished him with the charges and specifications on 
 which to base that demand. Clayton moved for an 
 investigation, February 23d. He presented Benton s 
 charges, seven important and fifteen minor ones. Mc 
 Duffie answered the charges at once, but the investiga 
 tion was ordered to be made by a special committee. 
 They reported, April 30th. The majority reported that 
 the bank ought not to be rechartered until the debt was 
 all paid and the revenue readjusted. R. M. Johnson 
 signed this report, so as to make a majority, out of good 
 nature. He rose in his place in Congress and said that 
 he had not looked at a document at Philadelphia. The 
 minority reported that the bank ought to be rechartered ; 
 that it was sound and useful. John Quincy Adams 
 made a third report, in which he brought his character 
 <*tic industry to bear on the question, and discussed ai 
 * Document C. a 1 Benton, 236. 
 
CHARGES AGAINST THE BANK. 261 
 
 fche points raised in the attack on the bank. It is fco 
 his report that we are indebted for a knowledge of the 
 Eorrespondence of 1829 between Biddle and Ingham., 
 and the controversy over the Portsmouth branch, which 
 was the first skirmish in the " bank war." ] 
 
 The charges against the bank, and the truth about 
 them, so far as we can discover it, were as follows : 
 
 (1.) Usury. The bank sold Bank of Kentucky notes 
 to certain persons on long credit. When these persons 
 afterwards claimed an allowance for depreciation, it was 
 granted. A case which came to trial went off on tech 
 nicalities, which were claimed to amount to a confession 
 by the bank of a corrupt bargain. 2 The bank had also 
 charged discount and exchange for domestic bills, when 
 these two together amounted to more than six per cent, 
 the rate to which it was restrained by its charter. This 
 charge was no doubt true. The device was used by all 
 banks to evade the usury law. 
 
 (2.) Branch drafts issued as currency. The amount 
 of these outstanding was $7.4 millions. The majority 
 of the committee doubted the lawfulness of the branch 
 drafts, but said nothing about the danger from them 
 as instruments of credit. Adams said they were useful, 
 but likely to do mischief. These drafts were in form 
 redeemable where issued, but in intention and practice 
 they were redeemed hundreds of miles away, and they 
 had no true convertibility. There was no check what 
 ever on the inflation of the currency by them so long as 
 credit was active. Carabreleng very pointedly asked 
 Biddle how the branch draft arrangement differed from 
 
 1 Document B. 
 
 * Cf. Bank of the United State* . William Owens et al, 1 
 527. 
 
62 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 an obligation of a Philadelphia bank to redeem all the 
 notes of all the banks in Pennsylvania. Biddle replied 
 that the Bank of the United States controlled all the 
 branches which issued branch drafts on it. That was, 
 to be sure, the assumption, but he had had hard ex 
 perience all winter that it was not tiae in fact. 1 
 
 (3.) Sales of coin, especially American coin. The 
 bank had bought and sold foreign coin by weight. The 
 majority held that such coins were not bullion, because 
 Congress had fixed their value by law. Adams easily 
 showed the fallacy of this. All gold coins, then, Ameri 
 can included, were a commodity, not money. 2 The 
 bank had sold $84,734.44 of American gold coin. 
 
 (4.) Sales of public stocks. The bank was forbidden 
 by the charter to sell public stocks, the object being to 
 prevent it from manipulating the price of the same. In 
 1824, in aid of a refunding scheme, the bank took 
 some public stocks from the government, and had spe 
 cial permission by act of Congress to sell them. The 
 majority disapproved of the sale. 
 
 (5.) Gifts to roads, canals, etc. The bank had made 
 two subscriptions of $1,500 each to the stock of turn 
 pike companies. The other cases were all petty gifts 
 to fire companies, etc. The majority argued that, since 
 the administration had pronounced against internal im 
 provements, the bank ought not to have assisted any such 
 works. Adams said that the administration had opposed 
 internal improvements, on the ground that they were 
 unconstitutional when undertaken by the federal govern 
 ment ; but he asked what argument that furniehod 
 against such works when undertaken by anybody else. 
 
 (6.) Building houses to rent or sell. The bank had 
 1 See below, page 270-1. 2 See page 333. 
 
CHARGES AGAINST THE BANK. 263 
 
 been obliged, in some cases, to take real estate for debts. 
 When it could not sell, it had, in a few cases, improved. 
 
 These points were the alleged violations of the charter. 
 Biddle denied the seventh charge, of non-user, in failing 
 to issue notes in the South and West for seven years. 
 Adams pointed out that these charges would only afford 
 ground for a scire facias to go before a jury on the 
 facts. The charges of mismanagement, and the truth 
 about them, so far as we can ascertain, were as follows : 
 
 (1.) Subsidizing the press. Webb and Noah, of the 
 "Courier and Enquirer" (administration organ until 
 April, 1831 ; then in favor of the bank), Gales and 
 Seaton, of the " National Intelligencer " (independent 
 opposition), Duff Green, of the "Telegraph" (adminis 
 tration organ until the spring of 1831), and Thomas 
 Ritchie of the Richmond " Enquirer " (administration) 
 were on the books of the bank as borrowers. The 
 change of front by the " Courier and Enquirer " was re 
 garded as very significant. Adams said that there was 
 no law against subsidizing the press, and that the phrase 
 meant nothing. He protested against the examination 
 of the editors. The case stood so that, if the bank dis 
 counted a note for an administration editor, it was said 
 to bribe him ; if for an opposition editor, it was said to 
 subsidize him. 
 
 (2.) Favoritism to Thomas Biddle, second cousin of 
 the president of the bank. Reuben M. Whitney was 
 the witness on this charge. T. Biddle was the brokei 
 >f the bank. N. Biddle admitted that the bank had 
 followed a usage, adopted by other banks, of allowing 
 vash in the drawer to be loaned Out to particular persons, 
 ind replaced by securities, which were passed as casli, 
 for a few days. He said the practice had been discon 
 
264 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 turned. Whitney made a very circumstantial charge 
 that T. Biddle had been allowed to do this, and that he 
 had paid no interest for the funds of the hank of which 
 he thus got the use. N. Biddle proved that he was in 
 Washington when Whitney s statement implied his 
 presence in Philadelphia. Adams said Whitney lied. 
 It was certainly true, and was admitted, that T. Biddle 
 had had enormous confidential transactions with the 
 bank, but Whitney was placed, in respect to all the im 
 portant part of his evidence, in the position of a con 
 victed Calumniator. He went to Washington, where he 
 was taken into the kitchen cabinet and made special 
 agent of the deposit banks. In 1837 he published an 
 " Address to the American People," in which he reit 
 erated the charges against Biddle. 1 
 
 (3.) Exporting specie, and drawing specie from the 
 South and West. The minority state that the usual 
 current was, that silver was imported from Mexico to 
 New Orleans, and passed up the Mississippi and Ohio, 
 and was exported to China from the East. From 
 1820 to 1832, $22.5 million were drawn from the South 
 and West to New York. The bank was charged with 
 draining the West of specie. So far as the current <u : 
 silver was normal, the bank had nothing to do with 
 it. If there had been no banks of issue, the West would 
 have kept enough specie for its use, and the current 
 would have flowed through and past, leaving always 
 enough. The paper issues in the valley drove out the 
 specie, and little stayed. The branch drafts after 1827 
 helped to produce this result, and the charge was, in 
 10 far, just. 2 The bank was also charged with export 
 
 1 52 Kilos, 10G. 
 
 1 Gouge gays that, in 1828, there was no local bai.k in opera 
 
CHARGES AGAINST THE BANK. 265 
 
 ing specie as a result of its exchange operations. It 
 sold drafts on London for use in China, payable six 
 months after sight. They were sold for the note of the 
 buyer at one year. The goods could be imported and 
 sold to meet the draft. This produced an inflation of 
 credit, since one who had no capital, if he could get the 
 bank accommodation, could extend credit indefinitely. 
 The majority made a point on this, but they added the 
 following contribution to financial science : " The legiti 
 mate object of banks the committee believe to be grant 
 ing facilities, not loaning capital." On that theory there 
 would have been no fault to be found with the China 
 drafts, which must have been a great " facility " to those 
 who could get them, and who had no other capital. 
 
 (4.) The improper increase of branches. It was 
 true that there were too many. Cheves, in his time, 
 thought some of them disadvantageous to the bank, but 
 it had been importuned to establish them, and there was 
 complaint if a branch was lacking where the government 
 or influential individuals wanted one. 
 
 (5.) Expansion of the circulation by $1.3 million be 
 tween September 1, 1831, and April 1, 1832, although 
 the discounts had been reduced during the winter. The 
 bank was struggling already with the branch drafts, and 
 the facts alleged were produced by its efforts to cope 
 with the effects of the drafts. 
 
 (6.) Failure of the bank to serve the nation. The 
 majority made another extraordinary blunder here. 
 They said that the duties were paid at New York and 
 Philadelphia, and that drafts on these cities were al- 
 tvays at a premium. Hence they argued that the bank 
 
 lion in Kentucky, Indiana, Illinois, or Misouri, and only one 
 >ach in Tennessee, Mississippi, and Alabama (Gouge, 39.) 
 
ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 gained more the further it transferred funds for the 
 government. The minority ridiculed this as an anni 
 hilation of space, a means of making a thing worth more 
 the further it was from where it was wanted. 
 
 (7.) Mismanagement of the public deposits. The 
 majority state what they think the bank ought to do. 
 It ought to use its capital as a permanent fund, and loan 
 the public deposits on time, so as to be payable near the 
 time when they would be required by the government 
 for the debt payments. If the bank had done this it 
 would have carried to a maximum the disturbances in 
 the money market which were actually produced by the 
 semi-annual payments on the debt. It would have in 
 flated and contracted its discounts by an enormous sum 
 every six months. 
 
 (8.) Postponement of the payment of the three per 
 cents. These stocks were issued in 1792 for the accrued 
 interest on the Revolutionary debt. They were to be 
 paid at 100. The Secretary informed the bank, March 
 24th, just before the bank committee was raised, that 
 he should pay half the three per cents ($6 million) in 
 July. Biddle hastened to Washington to secure a post 
 ponement ; not, as he affirmed, for the sake of the bank, 
 but for two other reasons : (1) that $9 million duty 
 bonds would be payable July 1st, and the merchants 
 would be put to inconvenience if the debt payment feU 
 at that time , (2) a visitation of cholera was to be 
 feared, which would derange industry ; and the payment 
 of the debt, with the recall of so much capital loaned 
 to merchants, would add to the distress. The friends of 
 the bank said that these reasons were good and sufti 
 eient. Its enemies said that they were specious, but weri 
 tnly pretexts. The Secretary agreed to defer the pay 
 
CHARGES AGAINST THE BANK. 267 
 
 meut of $5 million of the three per cents until October 
 1st, the bank agreeing to pay the interest for three 
 months. 1 This matter will be discussed below. 
 
 (9.) Incomplete number of directors. Biddle was 
 both government director and elected director, so that 
 there were only twenty-four in all. 
 
 (10.) Large expenditures for printing : $6,700 in 
 1830 : $9,100 in 1831. From 1829, the date of Jack 
 son s first attack, the bank spent money on pamphlets 
 and newspapers to influence public opinion in its favor. 
 
 (11.) Large contingent expenditures. There was a 
 contingent fund account, the footings of which, in 1832, 
 were $6 million, to sink the losses of the first few years, 
 the bonus, premiums on public stocks bought, banking 
 house, etc., etc. 
 
 (12.) Loans to members of Congress in advance of 
 appropriations. Adams objected to this as an evil prac 
 tice. He said afterwards that the investigation into 
 this point was dropped, because it was found that a 
 large number of congressmen of both parties had had 
 loans. 
 
 (13.) Refusal to give a list of stockholders resident 
 in Connecticut, so that that State might collect taxes 
 from them on their stock. 
 
 (14.) Usurpation of the control of the bank by the 
 exchange committee of the board of directors, to the 
 exclusion of the other directors. This charge was de 
 nied. 
 
 In all this tedious catalogue of charges we can find 
 
 nothing but frivolous complaints and ignorant criticism 
 
 successfully refuted, except whwi we touch the branch 
 
 drafts. The majority of the committee, if all theii 
 
 1 Document D. 
 
268 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 points are taken together, thought that the bank ought 
 to lend the public deposits liberally, and draw them in 
 promptly when wanted to pay the debt, yet refuse no 
 accommodation (especially to any one who was em 
 barrassed), not sell its public stocks, not increase its 
 circulation, not draw in its loans, not part with its 
 specie, not draw on the debtor branches in the West, 
 not press the debtor state banks, and not contract any 
 temporary loans. The student of the evidence and re 
 ports of 1832, if he believes the bank s statements in the 
 evidence, will say that the bank was triumphantly vin 
 dicated. Two facts, however, are very striking : (1) 
 The most important of the charges against which the 
 bank successfully defended itself in 1832 were the very 
 acts of which it was guilty in 1837-38, and they were 
 what ruined it; these were the second charge, which 
 involved Whitney s veracity, and the fourteenth charge, 
 which the bank denied. (2) Whether the bank was 
 thoroughly sincere and above-board in these matters is 
 a question on which an unpleasant doubt is thrown by 
 the certainty that it was not thoroughly honest in some 
 other matters. In regard to the three per cents, it is 
 certain that Biddle wanted to defer the payment for the 
 sake of the bank. He was embarrassed already by tbe 
 debt of the Western branches, which had been produced 
 by the operation of the branch drafts. Their effect was 
 just beginning to tell seriously. There was a great 
 movement of free capital in the form of specie to this 
 country in 1830, on account of revolutions in Europe, 
 fn 1830 and 1831 the United States paid its stock note 
 in the capital of the bank. Capital was easy to borrow. 
 In October, 1#31, a certain stringency set in. Th 
 branch drafts were transferring the capital of the 
 
BIDDLE S PLAUSIBILITY. 269 
 
 to the Western branches, and locking it up there in 
 accommodation paper, indefinitely extended by drawing 
 and redrawing. Biddle could not make the Western 
 branches pay. He was forced to curtail the Eastern 
 branches. At such a juncture it was impossible for him 
 to see with equanimity a debt which bore only three 
 per cent interest paid off at one hundred, when the 
 market rate was seven or eight per cent. He wanted 
 to get possession of that capital. Even before he re 
 ceived notice that the three per cents were to be paid, 
 he tried to negotiate with Ludlow, the representative 
 of a large number of holders of the three per cents, 
 for the purchase of the same. Ludlow had not power to 
 sell. 1 Great consequences hung on the strait into which 
 the branch drafts had pushed the bank, and this meas 
 ure of relief to which Biddle had recourse. Biddle was 
 too plausible. In any emergency he was ready to write 
 a letter or report, to smooth things over, and present a 
 ood face in spite of facts. Any one who has carefully 
 studied the history of the bank, and Biddle s "state 
 ments," will come to every statement of his with a dis 
 agreeable sense of suspicion. It is by no means certain, 
 whatever the true explanation of the contradiction may 
 be, that Whitney told a lie in the matter in which his 
 word and Biddle s were opposed. 
 
 Biddle s theory of bank-note issues was vicious and 
 false. He-thought thaUhe business of a bank was to 
 furnish a paper medium for trade and commerce. He 
 thought that this medium served as a token and record 
 of transactions, the exchange turning upon itself, as it 
 trere, so that the transactions to be accomplished called 
 wit the paper, and when accomplished brought the paper 
 1 Folk s Minority Report, 833, Document E. 
 
270 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 oack. There could then be no inflation of the paper, ii 
 it was only put out as demanded for real transactions. 
 Therefore he never distinguished between bills of ex 
 change and money, or the true paper surrogate for 
 money, which is constantly and directly interchangeable 
 with money, so that it cannot degenerate into a negoti 
 able instrument like notes and bills. His management 
 of the bank was a test of his theory on a grand scale. 
 The branch drafts were a special test of it. It was 
 proven that they had none of the character of convertible 
 bank-notes or money, but were instruments of credit, 
 and, like all instruments of credit which have cut loose 
 from actual redemption in capital, there was no more 
 limit to their possible inflation than to the infinity of 
 human hopes and human desires. Only a few months 
 after this investigation, November, 1832, the president 
 of the Nashville branch wrote to Biddle, " Be assured, 
 sir, that we are as well convinced as you are that too 
 many bills are offered and purchased, amounting to 
 more than the present crop of cotton and tobacco will 
 pay ; I mean, before all these papers are taken up." It 
 does not appear that, in the spring of 1832, Biddle yet 
 perceived the operation of the branch drafts, and it 
 3ould not be said that sincerity required that he should 
 avow a mistake to a hostile committee ; but his letter to 
 Clayton, appended to the report of 1832, is meretricious 
 and dazzling, calculated to repel investigation and cover 
 up weakness by a sensational assertion. " The whole 
 policy of the bank for the last six months has been ex 
 clusively protective and conservative, calculated to miti 
 gate suffering and yet avert danger." He sketches out 
 MI broad and bold outlines the national and interna 
 tional relations of American industry and commerce 
 
BIDDL&S INSINCERITY. 271 
 
 Mid the financial relations of the Treasury, with the bank 
 enthroned over all as the financial providence of the 
 country. This kind of writing had a great effect on the 
 uninitiated. Who could dispute with a man who thus 
 handled all the public and private finance of the whole 
 country as a school-master would tell boys how to do a 
 sum in long division ? However, it was all humbug, and 
 especially that part which represented the bank aa 
 watching over, and caring for the public. As Gouge 
 most justly remarked, after quoting some of Biddle s 
 rhetoric : " The true basis of the interior trade of the 
 United States is the fertility of the soil and the industry 
 of the people. The sun would shine, the streams would 
 flow, and the earth would yield her increase, if the Bank 
 of the United States was not in existence." ] If the 
 bank had been strong, Biddle s explanations would all 
 have been meretricious ; as it was, the bank had been 
 quite fully occupied in 1831-32 in taking care of itself, 
 nitigating its own sufferings and averting its own dan 
 gers. 
 
 No doubt the bank was the chief sufferer from the 
 shocks inflicted on the money market by the sudden and 
 heavy payments on the public debt. Long credits were 
 given for duties. When paid they passed into the bank 
 as public deposits. They were loaned again to mer 
 chants to pay new duties, so that one credit was piled 
 upon another already in this part of the arrangement. 
 Then the deposits were called in to meet drafts of the 
 Treasury to pay the debt, and so passed to the former 
 fund-holders. These latter next entered the money 
 market as investor, and the capital passed into new em 
 ployments. Therefore Benton s argument, which all the 
 1 Gouge, 56. 
 
272 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 anti-bank men caught up, that the financial heats and 
 chills of this period were certainly due to the malice of 
 the bank, is of no force at all. The disturbances were 
 such, they necessarily lasted so long, and they finally 
 settled down to such uncalculable final effects that all 
 such deductions as Benton made were unwarranted. A 
 public debt is not a blessing, but it is not as great a 
 curse as a public surplus, and it is very possible to pay 
 off a debt too rapidly. We shall, on two or three fur 
 ther occasions in this history, find the " public deposits " 
 banging about the money market like a cannon ball 
 loose in the hold of a ship in a high wind. 
 
 While the committee was investigating the bank the 
 political strife was growing more intense, and every 
 chance of dealing dispassionately with the question of 
 recharter had passed away. In January, Van Buren s 
 nomination as minister to England was rejected by the 
 Senate. 1 The Legislature of New York had passed 
 resolutions against the recharter of the bank. 2 This 
 hurt Van Buren in Pennsylvania. Such was the strange 
 combination of feelings and convictions at this time that 
 Jackson could demolish the bank without shaking his 
 hold on Pennsylvania, but Van Buren was never for 
 given for the action of his State against the bank. It 
 illustrated again the observation made above, that the 
 popular idol enjoys an unreasonable immunity, while 
 others may be held to an unreasonable responsibility. 
 All Jackson s intensest personal feelings, as well as the 
 choice of the kitchen cabinet, now converged on Vair 
 Buren s nomination. The Seminole war grudge, hatred 
 af Calhoun. the Eaton scandal, and animosity to th| 
 Senate contributed towards this end. 
 
 i See page 161. 2 2 Hammond, 351. 
 
DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION- -1832. 273 
 
 Parton gives us one of Lewis s letters, which shows 
 the wire-pulling which preceded the first democratic 
 convention. Kendall was in New Hampshire in the 
 spring of 1831. Lewis wrote to him to propose that a 
 convention should be held in May, 1832, to nominate 
 Van Buren for Vice-President. He suggested that the 
 New Hampshire Legislature should be prompted to 
 propose it. Kendall arranged this and wrote a letter, 
 giving an account of the meeting, resolutions, etc., 
 which was published anonymously in the " Globe," July 
 6, 1831. The " Globe " took up the proposition and 
 approved of it. The convention met at Baltimore, May 
 21, 1832. John H. Eaton was a delegate to the con 
 vention. He intended to vote against Van Buren, for, 
 although Van Buren had taken Mrs. Eaton s part, he 
 had not won Eaton s affection. Lewis wrote to Eaton 
 that he must not vote against Van Buren " unless 
 he was prepared to quarrel with the general." Van 
 Buren was nominated by 260 votes out of 326. The 
 44 spontaneous unanimity " of this convention was pro- 
 vluced by the will of Andrew Jackson and the energetic 
 discipline of the kitchen cabinet. It may well be 
 doubted whether, without Jackson s support, Van Buren 
 could have got 260 votes for President or Vice-Presi 
 dent in the whole United States, in 1832. The " Globe " 
 dragooned the whole Jackson party into the support of 
 Van Buren, not without considerable trouble. The con 
 vention adopted an address prepared by Kendall, con 
 taining a review of Jackson s first administration. 1 
 
 May 7, 1832, a national republican convention of 
 young men met in Washington. ^Vllliam Cost Johnson 
 Iras president. The convention ratified the nomination 
 1 Kendall s Autobiography 296. 
 18 
 
274 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 f Clay and Sergeant, and passed a series of resolutions 
 in favor of tariff and internal improvements, and ap 
 proving the rejection of Van Buren s nomination. 1 
 
 During the spring and summer Biddle took quarters 
 in Washington, from which he directed the congressional 
 campaign on behalf of the recharter. He was then at 
 the zenith of his power and fame, and enjoyed real re 
 nown in Europe and America. He and Jackson were 
 pitted against each other personally. Biddle, however, 
 put a letter in Livingston s 2 hands, stating that he would 
 accept any charter to which Jackson would consent. 8 
 Jackson never fought for compromises, and nothing was 
 heard of this letter. Jackson drew up a queer plan of 
 a " bank," which he thought constitutional and suitable, 
 but it remained in his drawer. 4 The anti-bank men 
 affirmed that Biddle was corrupting Congress. 
 
 The charter passed the Senate June llth, 28 to 20, 
 and the House, July 3d, 107 to 85. It was sent to the 
 President July 4th. The Senate voted to adjourn July 
 16th. It was a clever device of theirs to force Jackson to 
 sign or veto by giving him more than ten days. They 
 wanted to force him to a direct issue. It is not prob 
 able that there was room for his will to be any further 
 stimulated by this kind of manoeuvring, but he never 
 flinched from a direct issue, and the only effect waa 
 to put him where he would have risked his reelection 
 and everything else on a defiant reply to the challenge 
 
 1 42 Niles, 206, 236. 
 
 2 Livingston was on the side of the bank. (Hunt s Livingston. 
 153.) 
 
 Ingersoll, 268. On the same page it is said that Biddle waf 
 aiked of for President of the United States. 
 4 Ingersoll, 283. 
 
VETO OF THE BANK. 275 
 
 offered. Niles says 1 that, a week before the bill passed, 
 the best informed were " as six to half a dozen," whether 
 the bill, if passed, would be vetoed, but that, for the 
 two or three days before the bill was sent up, a veto 
 was confidently expected. The veto was sent in, July 
 10th. 2 The reasons given for it were : (1) The bank 
 would have a monopoly for which the bonus was no 
 equivalent. (2) One fifth of the stockholders were 
 foreigners. (3) Banks were to be allowed to pay the 
 Bank of the United States in branch drafts, which in 
 dividuals could not do. (4) The States were allowed 
 to tax the stock of the bank owned by their citizens, 
 which would cause the stock to go out of the country. 
 
 (5) The few stockholders here would then control it. 
 
 (6) The charter was unconstitutional. (7) The business 
 of the bank would be exempt from taxation. (8) There 
 were strong suspicions of mismanagement in the bank. 
 
 (9) The President could have given a better plan. 
 
 (10) The bank would increase the distinction between 
 rich and poor. 
 
 The bill was put to vote in the Senate July 13th, but 
 failed of two thirds (22 to 19). If the bank was to 
 continue to exist it was now necessary to defeat Jackson. 
 The state bank interest, however, had now been aroused 
 to the great gain it would make if the Bank of the 
 United States should be overthrown. The Jackson party 
 thereby won the adhesion of an important faction. The 
 safety-fund banks of New York were bound into a solid 
 phalanx by their system, and they constituted a great po- 
 
 1 42 Niles, 337. 
 
 2 Congress has chartered national banks as follows: 1791, 
 *15 (vetoed), 1816, 1832 (ve^ei 1841, ^wo bills, both vetoed 
 
 863. 
 
276 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 litical power. The chief crime alleged against the Bank 
 of the United States was meddling with politics. The 
 safety-fund hanks of New York were an active political 
 power under Van Buren s control, and they went into 
 this election animated hy the hope of a share in the de 
 posits. The great bank also distributed pamphlets and 
 subsidized newspapers, fighting for its existence. The 
 Jackson men always denounced this action of the Bank 
 of the United States as corrupt, and as proof of the 
 truth of Jackson s charges. 
 
 Jackson got 219 electoral votes ; Clay, 49 ; Floyd, 11 
 (of South Carolina, the nullification ticket) ; Wirt, 7 
 (of Vermont). There were two vacancies (in Mary 
 land). Clay carried Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Con 
 necticut, Delaware, and Kentucky, and five votes in 
 Maryland. For Vice-President Van Buren got 189. 
 Pennsylvania would not vote for him. She gave her 30 
 votes to William Wilkins. Sergeant got 49 votes ; 
 Henry Lee, of Massachusetts, 11 (of South Carolina) ; 
 Ellmaker, 7. At this election South Carolina alone 
 Jirew her vote by her Legislature. The popular vote 
 was 707,217 for Jackson ; 328,561 for Clay ; 254,720 
 for Wirt. Jackson s majority, in a total vote (excluding 
 Srath Carolina) of 1,290,498, was 123,936. In Alar 
 bama there was no anti-Jackson ticket 
 
CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 TARIFF, NULLIFICATION, AND BANK DURING JAOKSOX s 
 SECOND ADMINISTRATION. 
 
 GENERAL JACKSON now advanced to another develop 
 ment of his political philosophy and his political art. 
 No government which has felt itself strong has ever had 
 the self-control to practice faithfully the non-interference 
 theory. A popular idol at the head of a democratic 
 republic is one of the last political organs to do so. 
 The belief in himself is of course for him a natural 
 product of the situation, and he is quite ready to be 
 lieve, as he is constantly told, that he can make the 
 people happy, and can " save the country " from evil 
 and designing persons, namely, those who do not join 
 the chorus of adulation. A President of the United 
 States, under existing social and economic circum 
 stances, has no chance whatever to play the role of Cae 
 sar or Napoleon, but he may practise the methods of 
 personal government within the limits }f the situation. 
 Jackson held that his reelection was a triumphant vindi- 
 cati9ii of him in all the points in which he had been 
 engaged in controversy with anybody, and a kind of 
 charter to him, as representative, or rather tribune, of 
 the people, to go on and govern on his own judgment 
 over and against everybody, including Congress. His 
 action about the Cherokee Indians, his attitude to the 
 Supreme Court, his construction of his duties under the 
 
78 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 Constitution, his vetoes of internal improvements and 
 the bank, his defence of Mrs. Eaton, his attitude toward 
 Calhoun and Clay, his discontent with the Senate, all 
 things, great and small, in which he had been active and 
 interested, were held to be covered and passed upon by 
 the voice of the people in his reelection. 1 Adulation and 
 success had already done much to make Jackson a dan 
 gerous man. After his reelection, his self-confidence 
 and self-will became tenfold greater. 2 Moreover, his in- 
 intimates and confidential advisers, Kendall, Lewis, 
 Blair, and Hill, won more confidence in themselves, and 
 handled their power with greater freedom and certainty. 
 It has already been shown in this history that they were 
 perfect masters of the art of party organization, and 
 they had a strong hatred of the bank ; but they had no 
 statesman-like ideas in finance or public policy, and they 
 governed by playing on the prejudices and vanity of 
 Jackson. 
 
 1 We may test this theory in regard to one point, the bank. 
 The Legislature of Pennsylvania, on the 2d of February, 1832 fl 
 within eight months of the election at which Jackson got three 
 fifths of the vote of Pennsylvania, instructed the senators and 
 representatives in Congress from that State, by a unanimous 
 rote in the Senate, and by 77 to 7 in the House, to secure the re- 
 charter of the bank. 
 
 2 "The truth is, I consider the President intoxicated with 
 power and flattery." " All the circumstances around him [when 
 he came to office 1 were calculated to make him entertain an ex- 
 ilted opinion of himself, and a contemptuous one of others. His 
 ,wn natural passions contributed to this result." (Duane, 133, 
 under date October, 1833.) "There is a tone of insolence and 
 insult in his intercourse with both Houses of Congress, especially 
 since his reelection, which never was witnessed between the Ex 
 icntive and the Legislature before." (9 Adams, 51 : Decembel 
 
 *, 1833.) 
 
PERSONAL GOVERNMENT. 279 
 
 Jackson s modes of action in his second term were 
 those of personal government. He proceeded avow 
 edly, on his own initiative and responsibility, to experi 
 ment, as Napoleon did, with great public institutions 
 and interests. It came in his way to do some good, 
 to check some bad tendencies and to strengthen some 
 good ones ; but the moment the historian tries to ana 
 lyze these acts, and to bring them for purposes of 
 generalization into relations with the stand-point or 
 doctrine by which Jackson acted, that moment he per 
 ceives that Jackson acted from spite, pique, instinct, 
 prejudice, or emotion, and the influence he exerted sinks 
 to the nature of an incident or an accident. Then, al 
 though we believe in personal liberty with responsibility, 
 and in free institutions ; although we believe that no 
 modern free state can exist without wide popular rights ; 
 although we believe in the non-interference theory, and 
 oppose the extension of state action to internal improve 
 ments and tariffs ; although we recognize the dreadful 
 evils of bad banking and fluctuating currency ; and 
 although we believe that the Union is absolutely the 
 first political interest of the American people, yet, if we 
 think that intelligent deliberation and disciplined reason 
 ought to control the civil affairs of a civilized state, we 
 must say of Jackson that he stumbled along through 
 a magnificent career, now and then taking up a chance 
 without really appreciating it ; leaving behind him dis 
 torted and discordant elements of good and ill, just fit 
 to produce turmoil and disaster in the future. We 
 have already seen, in some cases, what was the tyranny 
 of his popularity. It crushed out reason and common 
 lense. To the gravest arguments and remonstrances, 
 lie answer was, literally, " Hurrah for Jackson ! " Is, 
 
280 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 then, that a sound state of things for any civilized state ? 
 Is that the sense of democracy? Is a democratic re 
 public working fairly and truly by its theory in such a 
 case ? Representative institutions are degraded on the 
 Jacksonian theory, just as they are on the divine-ri^lil 
 theory, or on the theory of the democratic empire. 
 There. is not a worse perversion of the American system 
 of government conceivable than to regard the President 
 as the tribune of the people, endowed by his election 
 with prerogative to check, warn, correct, guide, and 
 watch the representatives of the nation in Congress as 
 sembled. 
 
 One of the most remarkable modes of personal rule 
 employed by Jackson was the perfection and refinement 
 given to the " organ "as an institution of democratic 
 government. In the hands of Blair the " Globe " came 
 to be a terrible power. Every office-holder signed his 
 allegiance by taking the " Globe." In it both friend 
 and foe found daily utterances from the White House 
 a propos of every topic of political interest. The sug 
 gestions, innuendoes, queries, quips, and sarcasms of the 
 " Globe " were scanned by the men who desired to 
 recommend themselves by the zeal which anticipates, 
 and the subserviency which can even dispense with, a 
 command. The editorials scarcely veiled their inspira 
 tion and authorization. The President issued a message 
 to his party every day. He told the political news con 
 fidentially, and in advance of the mere newspapers) 
 while deriding and denouncing his enemies, praising the 
 Adherents who pleased him, and checking, warning, or 
 stimulating all as he thought best to promote discipline 
 und efficiency. When we say " he " did it, we speak, ol 
 course, figuratively. If it was Blair s voice, Jacksoi? 
 
NULLIFICATION CONVENTION. 281 
 
 ratified it. If it was Jackson s will, Blair promulgated 
 it 
 
 The South Carolinians thought that the limit ot 
 proper delay and constitutional agitation had been 
 reached when the tariff of July, 1832, was passed. In 
 the year 1832 the milliners, for the first time, got con 
 trol of South Carolina. The Legislature was convened, 
 by special proclamation for the 22d of October 1832, 
 a month earlier than usual. An act was passed, October 
 25th, ordering a convention to be held on the 19th of<5r.C ^ 
 November. The Legislature then adjourned until its 
 regular day of meeting, the fourth Monday in Novem 
 ber. The convention met as ordered ; Governor Hamil 
 ton was president of it. It adopted an ordinance that the"* 
 acts of Congress of May 19, 1828, and July 14, 1832, 
 were null and void in South Carolina. These proceed 
 ings conformed to a theory of the practice of nullification 
 which the South Carolina doctrinaires had wrought out : 
 namely, that the Legislature could inot nullify, but that 
 a convention, being the State in some more original 
 capacity, and embodying the " sovereignty " in a purer 
 emanation, could do so. The theory and practice of 
 nullification was a triumph of metaphysical politics. 
 The South Carolinians went through the evolutions, by 
 which, as they had persuaded themselves, nullification 
 could be made a constitutional remedy, with a solem 
 nity which was either edifying or ridiculous, according 
 as one forgot or remembered that the adverse party 
 attached no significance to the evolutions. 
 
 The ordinance provided that no appeal from a South 
 Carolina court to a fedaral court should bo allowed 
 in any case arising under any of the laws passed in 
 pursuance of the ordinance ; such an appeal to be a 
 
282 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 contempt of court. All officers and jurors were to take 
 an oath to the ordinance. South Carolina would secede 
 if the United States should attempt to enforce anything 
 contrary to the ordinance. November 27th the Legis 
 lature met again, and passed the laws requisite to put the 
 ordinance in operation. Goods seized by the custom 
 house officers might be replevied. Militia and volun 
 teers might be called out. A thousand stand of arms 
 were to be purchased. 
 
 A Union convention met at Columbia early in Decem 
 ber. It declared itself ready to support the federal 
 government. It appeared, therefore, that there would 
 be civil war in South Carolina. The Union men were 
 strong in Charleston and in the Western counties. 
 
 Jackson immediately took up the defiance which 
 South Carolina had offered to the federal government. 
 He ordered General Scott to Charleston, and caused 
 troops to collect within convenient distance, although 
 not so as to provoke a collision. He ordered two war 
 vessels to Charleston. He issued, December 10th, a 
 proclamation to the people of South Carolina. It was 
 written by Livingston, who, as we have seen, 1 had taken 
 up a position against nullification more than two years 
 before. He represented the only tariff State in the 
 S ou th, Louisiana. It has been asserted that Jackson 
 did not like the constitutional doctrines of the procla 
 mation, which are Madisonian federalist, and not such as 
 lie had held, but that he let the paper pass on account 
 of the lack of time to modify it, 3 There is nothing of 
 
 1 See page 214. 
 
 2 Lewis in . 3 Parton, 466; Tyler s Taney, 188. Taney re- 
 torded. in 1861, that he should have objected to some of the doo 
 trines of th*> proclamation, if he had been in Washington at thf 
 time. 
 
ANTI-NULLIFICATION PROCLAMATION. 283 
 
 the Jacksonian temper in the document. It is strong, 
 moderate, eloquent, and, at last, even pathetic. 1 It is 
 very long : The following passage is perhaps the most 
 important in it : " I consider the power to annul a law 
 of the United States, assumed by one State, incompatible 
 with the existence of the Union, contradicted expressly 
 by the letter of the Constitution, unauthorized by its 
 spirit, inconsistent with every principle on which it was 
 founded, and destructive of the great object for which 
 it was formed." This proclamation voiced the opinion 
 and^ feeling of the whole country, except the nullifiers in 
 South Carolina and a few of their comrades in other 
 Southern States. The dignified tone of the paper was 
 especially satisfactory. It was the right tone to take to 
 men who had allowed their passionate temper to commit 
 them to unworthy and boyish proceedings, and who had 
 sought a remedy for civil grievances in acts which made 
 liberty and security impossible. Jackson found him 
 self a national civil hero for once, and he enjoyed 
 the plaudits of people who had detested him the most 
 earnestly. He lives in popular memory and tradition 
 chiefly as the man who put down this treason, but the 
 historian must remember that, if Jackson had done his 
 duty in regard to Georgia and the Indians, nullification 
 would never have attained any strength . The Southern 
 ers were astonished at the proclamation. It seemed to 
 them inconsistent, even treacherous. 2 The constitutional 
 theories were not at all such as Jackson had been under 
 stood to hold. They ascribed Jackson s attitude on this 
 
 1 Jackson contributed a suggestion of the pathos. (Hunt i 
 Livingston, 373.) 
 
 2 Hodgson, 173. Cf. Resolution o* he South Carolina Leg!* 
 Ature, 43 Niles, 300. 
 
284 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 question to hatred of Calhoun. Old John Randolph, 
 who was in a dying condition, roused himself as the 
 champion of state rights, although he had been a strong 
 adherent of Jackson, and went through the counties of 
 Virginia, in which he had once been a power, in his 
 carriage, to try to arouse the people to resist the danger 
 ous doctrines of the proclamation, 1 and yet to uphold 
 the Union. 
 
 December 20th, Governor Hayne of South Carolina 
 issued a proclamation in answer to Jackson s. Calhoun 
 resigned the vice-presidency, December 28th. He was 
 elected senator in Hayne s place. He had been Vice- 
 President for eight years. He now returned to the 
 floor and to active work. He never afterwards took 
 position in any party. He was an isolated man, who 
 formed alliances to further his ends. South Carolina 
 also remained an isolated State until 1840, when she 
 voted for Van Buren and came back into the ranks. 
 Calhoun seemed to have lost the talent for practical 
 statesmanship which he had shown in his earlier years. 
 He involved himself tighter and tighter in spinnings of 
 political mysticism and fantastic speculation. Harriet 
 Martineau calls him a cast-iron man, and describes his 
 eager, absorbed, over-speculative type of conversation 
 and bearing, even in society. 2 " I know of no man who 
 lives in such utter intellectual solitude. He meets men 
 and harangues them by the fireside as in the Senate. 
 He is wrought like a piece of machinery, set going 
 vehemently by a weight, and stops while you answer 
 He either passes by what you say, or twists it into suit 
 ability with what is in his head, and begins to lector* 
 
 i 2 Garland s Randolph, 360. 
 
 8 1 Martineau, Western Travel, 148. 
 
JACKSON ASKX FOR INCREASED POWERS. 285 
 
 again." He " is as full as ever of his nullification doc 
 trines [1836], .ind those who krow the force that is in 
 him, and his utter incapacity of modification by other 
 minds, . . . will uo more expect repose and self-reten 
 tion from him than from a volcano in full force. Re 
 laxation is no longer in the power of his will. I never 
 saw any one who so completely gave me the idea of 
 possession." 
 
 In his message of 1832, Jackson said that the pro 
 tective system must ultimately be limited to the commod 
 ities needed in war. Beyond this limit that system had 
 already produced discontent. He suggested that the 
 subject should be reviewed in a disposition to dispose of 
 it justly. December 13th the Senate called on the 
 Secretary of the Treasury to, propose a tariff bill. De 
 cember 27th, in the House, the Committee on Ways and 
 Means reported a bill based on the Secretary s views. 
 It proposed an immediate and sweeping reduction, 
 with a further reduction, after 1834, to a " horizontal " 
 rate of fifteen per cent or twenty per cent. January 16, 
 1833, Jackson sent in a message, in which he informed 
 Congress of the proceedings of South Carolina, and 
 asked for power to remove the custom house and to^^o/fe^ 
 hold goods for customs by military force ; also for pro 
 visions that federal courts should have exclusive juris-1 
 diction of revenue cases, and that the Circuit Court of l 
 the United~States might remove revenue cases from state C*-- w 
 courts. Calhoun, in reply to this message, declared that 
 South Carolina was noi hostile to the Union, and he 
 <iade one unanswerable point against Jackson s position. 
 Jackson had referred to the Supreme Court as the 
 proper authority to decids the constitutionality of the 
 aariff. The nullifiers had always wished to get. tha 
 
286 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 tariff before the Supreme Court, but there was no way 
 to do so. The first tariff of 1789 was preceded by a 
 preamble, in which the protection of domestic manufact 
 ures was specified as one of the purposes of the act, 
 out this form had not been continued. The anti-tariff 
 men tried to have such a preamble prefixed to the tariff 
 act of 1828, but the tariff majority voted it down. 
 Congress had unquestioned power to lay taxes. How 
 could it be ascertained what the purpose of the majority 
 in Congress was, when they voted for a certain tax law ? 
 How could the constitutionality of a law be tried, when 
 it turned on the question of this purpose, which, in the 
 nature of the case, was mixed and unavowed ? l It 
 was not, therefore, fair to represent the nullifiers as 
 neglecting an obvious and adequate legal remedy. A 
 grand debate on constitutional theories arose out of Cal- 
 houn s criticism of Jackson s message and proclamation. 
 Calhoun, Grundy, and Clayton each offered a set of 
 resolutions, 2 and a flood of metaphysical dogmatizing 
 about constitutional law was let loose. As it began no 
 where, it ended nowhere. In these disputes, the dis 
 putants always carefully lay down, in their resolutions 
 about " the great underlying principles of the Constitu 
 tion," those premises, which will sustain the deductions 
 which the disputant in question wants to arrive at for 
 the support of his interests. In the mean time the 
 merits of the particular question are untouched. To 
 inform one s self on the merits of the question would 
 require patient labor. To dogmatize on "great prin 
 
 1 The principle is covered fully by the decision in Loan Asso 
 iiation vs. Topeka (20 Wallace, 655), but the practical difficult* 
 probably remains. 
 
 * 43 Niles, Su/>p. 222. The debate is there -iveii 
 
ENFORCEMENT ACT. 287 
 
 eiples" and settle the question by an inference ii 
 easy. Consequently, the latter method will not soon bi 
 abandoned. 
 
 On the 21st of January, 1833, a bilLf or enforcing the 
 collection of the revenue was reported to the Senate. It 
 gave the powers and made the provisions which Jackson 
 had asked for. On the next day Calhoun introduced 
 his resolutions : that the States are united " as parties to 
 a constitutional compact; " that the acts of the general 
 government, outside of the defined powers given to it, 
 are void ; that each State may judge when the compact 
 is broken ; that the theory that the people of the United 
 States * are now or ever have been united on the prin 
 ciple of the social compact, and as such are now formed 
 into one nation or people," is erroneous, false in history 
 and reason. It would only be tedious to cite the other 
 resolutions offered. Webster was good enough lawyer 
 to get tired of the metaphysics very soon. Hodgson 
 says that he withdrew, defeated by Calhoun. 1 The 
 appearance of the " social compact " as an understood 
 and accepted element of political philosophy is worth 
 noting. 
 
 The state Legislatures also passed resolutions. Mas 
 sachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, New York, Missouri, 
 Tennessee, and Indiana pronounced against nullification ; 
 North Carolina and Alabama against nullification and 
 tariff; Georgia against the tariff, also that nullification 
 is unconstitutional, and that a convention of the Gulf 
 States should be held ; New Hampshire, that the tariff 
 should be reduced ; Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Ver 
 mont, New Jersey, and Pecnsylvama, that the tariff 
 1 Hodgson 174. 
 
288 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 imght not to be reduced. Virginia offered to mediate 
 between the United States and South Carolina. 1 
 
 The House was at work on the tariff during January 
 February 12th, Clay introduced the compromise tariff IB 
 the Senate, to supersede all other propositions and be a 
 final solution of all pending troubles. Of all the duties 
 which were over twenty per cent by the act of July 14, 
 1832, one tenth of the excess over twenty per cent waa 
 to be struck off after September 30, 1835, and one tenth 
 each alternate year thereafter until 1841. Then one 
 half the remaining excess was to be taken off, and in 
 1842 the tax would be reduced to twenty per cent as a 
 horizontal rate, with a large free list, home valuation, and 
 no credit. Credit for duties worked very mischievously. 
 An importer sold his goods before he paid his duties. 
 The price he obtained contained the duties which he had 
 not yet paid. Hence he was able to get capital from 
 the public with which o carry on his business. In the 
 end perhaps he became bankrupt, and did not pay the 
 duties at all. In 1831 a report from the Treasury 
 Etated the duty bonds in suit a $6.8 million, of which 
 only $1 million was estimated to be collectible. Clay s 
 compromise, as first drawn, had a preamble, in which it 
 tvas stated that, after March 3, 1840, all duties should 
 oe equal, " and solely for the purpose and with the in- 
 lent of providing such revenue as may be necessary to 
 an economical expenditure by the government, without 
 regard to the protection or encouragement of any branch 
 of domestic industry whatever." 2 
 
 Webster objected to the horizontal rate, and to ar 
 (jjbltempt to pledge future Congresses. He was now re 
 duced, after having previously made some of the mosj 
 * 8 Ann. lieq. 4 . 2 \ Curtis s Webster, 434, 455. 
 
ENFORCEMENT AND COMPROMISE. 289 
 
 masterly arguments ever made for free trade, to defend 
 jirotection by such devices as he could. Now he de 
 rided Adam Smith and the other economists. 1 He first 
 paltered with his convictions on the tariff, and broke his 
 moral stamina by so doing. Many of the people who 
 have been so much astonished at his " sudden " apostasy 
 on slavery would understand it more easily if their own 
 judgment was more open to appreciate his earlier 
 apostasy on free trade. February 13th, he introduced 
 resolutions against the compromise. 2 
 
 The enforcing act passed the Senate, February 20, 
 1833, by 32 to 8. On the 21st the compromise tariff 
 was taken up in the Senate. On the 25th the House 
 recommitted the tariff bill which was there pending, 
 with instructions to the committee to report the com 
 promise bill. On the 26th the latter was passed, 119 to 
 85. On the same day the Senate laid Clay s bill on the 
 table, took up the same bill in the copy sent up from 
 the House, and passed it, 29 to 16. On the 27th the 
 House passed the enforcing bill, 111 to 40. Thus the 
 olive branch and the rod were bound up together. 
 
 There was one moment in January when ex-Governor 
 Hamilton seemed ready to precipitate a conflict, and 
 when Governor Hayne seemed ready to support him ; 8 
 but the leading nullifiers determined to wait until Con 
 gress adjourned. February 1st was the day appointed 
 ror nullification to go into effect, but all action was post 
 poned. The Legislature replied to Jackson s procla 
 mation by a series of resolutions which charged him 
 usurpation and tyranny. 4 Tackson was annoyed 
 
 1 1 Webster s Correspondence, 5ft" 
 
 a 43 Niles, 406. 3 8 Ann. Reg. 290 
 
 * 43 Niles, 300. 
 
 19 
 
290 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 by these resolutions, and made threats against the lead 
 ing nullifiers in January. The Governor had summoned 
 the convention to meet again oh March llth. The com 
 promise tariff was regarded as a substantial victory. It 
 became a law on March 3d, the day on which the tariff 
 of July 14, 1832, went into effect. The convention 
 repealed the ordinance of nullification, passed another 
 ordinance nullifying the enforcement act, and adjourned. 
 It is not quite clear whether the last act was a hit oi 
 fireworks to fete the conclusion of the trouble, or was 
 seriously meant. If it was serious, it strongly illus 
 trated the defective sense of humor which characterized 
 all the proceedings of the nullifiers. The gentlemen 
 who had nullified a tax, and then nullified a contingent 
 declaration of war, would probably, in the next stage, 
 have tried, by ordinance, to nullify a battle and a de 
 feat. 
 
 The compromise tariff settled nothing. The fact was 
 that Clay had been driven, by the rapacity of the pro 
 tected interests, to a point from which he could neither 
 advance nor recede, and Calhoun had been driven by 
 the nullification enterprise into a similar untenable 
 position. Benton says that Calhoun was afraid of Jack 
 son, who had threatened to hang the nullifiers. Curtis, 
 pn the authority of Crittenden, says that Calhoun, in 
 alarm, sought an interview with Clay, and that Clay in 
 tervened. 1 They met and patched up the compromise, 
 by which they opened an escape for each other. For 
 ten years afterwards they wrangled, in the Senate, over 
 he question who was in the worse predicament and whc 
 won most in 1833. Clay claimed that he rescued pro 
 Section from the slaughter which awaited it in Vef 
 1 1 Curtis s Webster, 444. 
 
THE BANK AND THE THREE PER CENTS. 291 
 
 planck s bill. Calhoun claimed that the coir, promise 
 tariff was a free-trade victory, won by nullification. 
 Clay said that he made the compromise out of pity for 
 Calhoun and South Carolina, who were in peril. Cal 
 houn said that nullification killed the tariff, and that 
 Clay was flat on his back until Calhoun helped him to 
 rise and escape by the compromise. The protected in 
 terests were as angry with Clay as if he had never 
 served them. They accused him of treachery. He 
 
 . never gained anything by his devotion to protection. 
 He was right at least in saying that protection would 
 have been overthrown in 1833 if it had not been for 
 
 \ the compromise tariff. 1 
 
 Jackson s animosity towards the bank, in the autumn 
 of 1832, had gathered the intensity and bull-dog ferocity 
 which he always felt for an enemy engaged in active 
 resistance. In the matter of the three per cents, the 
 bank gave him a chance of attack. In July General 
 Cadwallader was sent to Europe to try to negotiate with 
 the holders of the three per cents for an extension of 
 the loan for a year beyond October, the bank becoming 
 the debtor, and paying, if necessary, four per cent on 
 the extension. The bank, then, instead of paying the 
 lebt for the government, desired to intrude itself into 
 the position of the Treasury, and extend a loan which 
 the Treasury wanted to pay. Its object of course was 
 to get a loan at three or four per cent. This proceed 
 ing was obviously open to grave censure. The obliga 
 tion of the Treasury would not cease, although the bank 
 irould have taken the public money appropriated to the 
 
 1 See a speech by Clapton on Hugh L. White s action, Oc 
 tober 5, 1842. (63 Niles*106 ) Tarton (III. 478) has the sam< 
 <orv. 
 
292 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 payment of the debt. Five million dollars were in fact 
 transferred, in October, to the Redemption of the Public 
 Debt Account. It seems to be indisputable that the 
 bank, in this matter, abused its relation to the Treasury 
 as depository of the public funds. August 22d General 
 Cadwallader made an arrangement with the Barings, 
 by which they were to pay off all the holders of the 
 stocks who were not willing to extend them and take 
 the bank as debtor. The Barings bought $1,798,597, 
 and extended $2,376,481. The arrangement with the 
 Barings was to be secret, but it was published in a New 
 York paper, October llth. October 15th, Biddle re 
 pudiated the contract, because, under it, the bank would 
 become a purchaser of public stocks, contrary to the 
 charter. Would he have repudiated the contract if it 
 had not been published ? 
 
 The message of 1832 was temperate in tone, but very 
 severe against the bank. The President interpreted 
 the eagerness of the bank to get possession of the three 
 per cents as a sign of weakness, and he urged Congress 
 to make a " serious investigation " to see whether the 
 public deposits were safe. An agent, Henry Toland, 
 was appointed to investigate on behalf of the Treasury. 
 lie reported favorably to the bank. The Committee on 
 Ways and Means also investigated the bank. The 
 President s message created considerable alarm for a 
 Hme, and, at some places, there were signs of a run on 
 the branches. 1 February 13, 1833, Polk reported a bill 
 V sell the stock owned by the nation in the bank. It 
 vras rejected, 102 to 91. The majority o the Committen 
 -m Ways and Means reported (Verplanck s report) that 
 ihe bank was sound and that the deposits were safe 
 i 43 Niles, 315. 
 
REPORTS OF 1833 ON THE BANK. 298 
 
 On January 1, 1833, the assets were $80.8 million, 
 the liabilities $37.8 million ; leaving $43 million to pay 
 $35 million of capital. The circulation was $17.5 
 million ; specie $9 million. The state banks were esti 
 mated to have $68 million circulation and $10 million 
 or $11 million specie. The minority report (Folk s) 
 doubted if the assets were all good, and hence doubted 
 the solvency of the bank. It referred to the Western 
 debts, and the minority gave, in a supplemental report, 
 evidence of the character of these debts. The com 
 mittee investigated the proceedings of the bank in re 
 lation to the three per cents. The minority reported 
 that they could not find out clearly what was the final 
 arrangement made by the bank, but it appeared that 
 the certificates had been surrendered, and that the bank 
 had, by and through the former transaction, obtained a 
 loan in Europe. The majority said that the bank had 
 receded from the project, and that there was nothing 
 more to say about it. 1 
 
 October 4, 1832, Biddle informed the directors that 
 the bank was strong enough to relax the orders given to 
 the Western branches, in the previous winter, to con 
 tract their loans and remit eastward. He then supposed 
 that the arrangement with the Barings about the three 
 per cents had been concluded. The Western affairs, 
 however, were at this time approaching a crisis. The 
 supplementary report (Folk s) by the minority of the 
 Committee on Ways and Means, March 2, 1833, 2 con- 
 -ains conclusive evidence that the Western branches 
 were in a very critical condition ; that there had beer, 
 drawing and redrawing between the branches, and that 
 Biddle knew it. The directors nad testified to the 
 1 Document E a Ibid. 
 
294 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 committee that they knew nothing of any such proceed 
 ings. Some of the most important points in evidence 
 are as follows, September 11, 1832, the cashier of the 
 branch at Lexington, Kentucky, wrote that he was en 
 during a run. Two hundred and seventy-five thousand 
 dollars were sent to him from Philadelphia, Louisville, 
 St. Louis, New Orleans, and Natchez. A letter from 
 Biddle to the president of the Nashville branch, dated 
 November 20, 1832, shows plainly that he knew that 
 redrawing was going on. In a letter from the president 
 of the Nashville branch, November 22d, the following 
 passage occurs : " We will not be able to get the debts 
 due this office paid ; indeed, if any, it will be a small 
 part; the means are not in the country." The same 
 branch officer, in a letter of November 24th, plainly 
 states that he had been forced to collect drafts drawn 
 on him by the parent bank, and the New York, Balti 
 more, Washington, Richmond, Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, 
 Louisville, and Lexington branches, and that he could 
 not prevent a protest save by redrawing on New Or 
 leans. Again, November 26th, he states that he had, 
 within a year, collected drafts for a million dollars for 
 the bank and branches, " which, with small exceptions, 
 have been paid through our bill operations." The 
 majority of the committee of 1832-33 had interpreted 
 the fluctuations in the amount of bills at Nashville as 
 proof that, when the crops came in, the debts were can 
 celled. The minority show that these fluctuations were 
 due to the presence of the " racers " at one or the other 
 end of the course. It is quite beyond question that a 
 mass of accommodation bills were chasing each othei 
 from branch to branch in the years 1832-33, and tha 
 they formed a mass of debt, which the bank could not 
 *or the time, control. 
 
THE DRAFT ON FRANCE. 296 
 
 March 2, 1833, the House adopted, 109 to 46, a 
 resolution that the deposits might safely be continued in 
 the bank. The reports of the committee had not been 
 carefully considered by anybody. The bank question 
 was now a party question, and men voted on it accord 
 ing to party, not according to evidence. Whatever 
 force night be attributed to any of the facts brought out 
 by Polk in the minority report, it does not appear that 
 anybody in Congress really thought that the bank was 
 insolvent and the deposits in danger. His supplemental 
 report bears date March 2d. Polk did not propose to 
 withdraw the deposits. He wanted to avoid any posi 
 tive action. McDuffie objected to this policy that, if 
 Congress took no action, Jackson would remove the 
 deposits on the principle that silence gives consent. 1 
 
 The first instalment of the payment by France was 
 due February 2, 1833. The Secretary of the Treasury 
 did not draw until February 7th. Then he drew a sight 
 draft, which he sold to the bank for $961,240.30. Con 
 gress, March 2d, passed an act ordering the Secretary 
 to loan this sum at interest. The treaty of July 4, 1831, 
 was unpopular in France, and the French Chambers had 
 not passed any appropriation to meet the payments pro 
 vided for in it. The draft was therefore protested, 
 and was taken up by Hottinger for the bank, because it 
 bore the indorsement of the bank. The bank had put 
 the money to the credit of the Treasury, and it claimed 
 to prove, by quoting the account, that the funds had 
 been drawn. Hence it declared that it was out of funds 
 for twice the amount 01 the bill. It demanded fifteen 
 per cent damages under an old law of Maryland, which 
 w& *he law of the District of Colambia. The Treasr 
 1 44 Niles, 108. 
 
296 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 ttry paid the anuunt of the bill, and offered to pay tht 
 actual loss incurred. July 8, 1834, Biddle informed 
 the Secretary of the Treasury that the sum of $170,041 
 would be retained out of a three and a half per cent 
 dividend payable July 17th, on the stock owned by the 
 United States. March 2, 1838, the United States 
 brought suit against the bank, in the federal Circuit 
 Court of Pennsylvania, for the sum so withheld. It got 
 judgment for 251,243.54. The bank appealed to the 
 Supreme Court, which, in 1844, reversed the judgment, 
 finding that the bank was the true holder of the bill and 
 entitled to damages. 1 On a new trial the Circuit Court 
 gave judgment for the bank. The United States then 
 appealed on the ground that a bill drawn by a govern 
 ment on a government was not subject to the law mer 
 chant. The Supreme Court sustained this view, in 1847, 
 and again reversed the decision of the Circuit Court. 3 
 No further action was taken. 
 
 In the spring of 1833, McLane was transferred from 
 the Treasury to the State Department. He was opposed 
 to the removal of the deposits by executive act, which 
 was now beginning to be urged in the inmost adminis 
 tration circles. William J. Duane, of Pennsylvania, was 
 appointed Secretary of the Treasury. This appointment 
 .vas Jackson s own personal act. He had admired 
 Duane s father, the editor of the " Aurora," and he de 
 clared that the son was a chip of the old block. In this 
 he was mistaken. Duane was a very different man 
 from his father. 8 He was a lawyer of very good stand- 
 
 1 2 Howard, 711. 2 5 Howard, 382. 
 
 3 Partoii obtained from William B. Lewis an inside account o? 
 jhs removal of the deposits. Dnane wrote a full account of it 
 Und there is another account in Kendall s Autobiography hut i 
 * by the editor, and onlv at: second Innd from KeiidaL 
 
PROJECT OF REMOVING THE DEPOSITS. 297 
 
 ing. He had never been a politician or office-holder, 
 but had shunned that career. Lewis says that he does 
 not know who first proposed the removal of the deposits, 
 but that it began to be talked of in the inner adminis 
 tration circles soon after Jackson s second election. In 
 the cabinet McLane and Cass were so earnestly opposed 
 to the project that it was feared they would resign. 
 McLane sent for Kendall to know why it was desired 
 to execute such a project. This was before McLane 
 left the Treasury. Kendall endeavored to persuade him. 
 Cass finally said that he did not understand the ques 
 tion. Woodbury was neutral. Barry assented to the 
 act, but brought no force to support it. Taney strongly 
 supported the project. He was an old federalist, who 
 had come into Jackson s party in 1824, on account of 
 Jackson s letters to Monroe about non-partisan appoint 
 ments. 1 He was Jackson s most trusted adviser in 1833 : 
 BO his biographer says, and it seems to be true. Van 
 Buren warmly opposed the removal at first. Kendall 
 persuaded him. He seems to have faltered afterwards, 
 but Kendall held him up to the point. 2 Benton warmly 
 approved of the removal, but was not active in bringing 
 it about. Lewis opposed it. 
 
 The proceeding is traced, by all the evidence, to Ken 
 dall, and Blair as the moving spirits, 8 with Reuben M. 
 Whitney as a coadjutor. These men had no public 
 official responsibility. They certainly were not recog- 
 Viized by the nation as the men who ought to have a 
 controlling influence on pubdc affairs. They were ani 
 mated by prejudice and rancor sixteen years old. An- 
 irew Jackson s power and popularity, moving novi 
 
 1 Tyler s Taney, 158. 2 Kendall s Autobiography, 383. 
 
 * Kendall s Autobiography, 375. 
 
298 AX DREW JACKSON. 
 
 tinder the impulse of the passions which animate ,11 
 Inctiah on the war-path, were the engine with which 
 these inen battered down a great financial institution. 
 The bank had been guilty of great financial errors, but 
 they were not by any means beyond remedy. The 
 Bank of England, at the same period, was guilty of 
 great financial errors. Blair and Kendall were not 
 working for sound finance. Blair s doctrine was that 
 the bank would use the public deposits as a means of 
 corrupting the political institutions of the country. If 
 that were true, it proved the error of having a great 
 surplus of public money in the Treasury, i. e., in the 
 bank. He said that the bank would corrupt Congress. 1 
 In August Duane wrote, "It is true that there is an 
 irresponsible cabal that has more power than the people 
 are aware of." " What I object to is that there is an 
 under-current, a sly, whispering, slandering system pur 
 sued." 2 In his history of the matter, written five years 
 later, he says : " I had heard rumors of the existence 
 of an influence at Washington, unknown to the Consti 
 tution and to the country ; and the conviction that they 
 were well founded now became irresistible. I knew 
 that four of the six members of the last cabinet and 
 hat four of the six members of the present cabinet op 
 posed a removal of the deposits, and yet their exertions 
 were nullified by individuals, whose intercourse with 
 the President was clandestine. During his absence [in 
 New England] several of those individuals called on 
 me, and made many of the identical observations, in the 
 identical language used by himself. They represented 
 Congress as corruptible, and the new members as is 
 of special guidance. ... In short. I felt satisfied 
 1 Lewis in 3 Parton, 503. - Duane, 130 
 
REMOVAL OF THE DEPOSITS. 299 
 
 from all that I saw and heard, that factious and selfish 
 views alone guided those who had influence with the 
 Executive, and that the true welfare and honor of the 
 country constituted no part of their objects." l Lewis 
 gives a report of a conversation with Jackson, in which 
 he (Lewis) tried to persuade Jackson to desist from 
 the project. Jackson s points were, " I have no con 
 fidence in Congress." " If the bank is permitted to 
 have the public money, there is no power that can 
 prevent it from obtaining a charter ; it will have it if 
 it has to buy up all Congress, and the public funds 
 would enable it to do so !" " If we leave the means of 
 corruption in its hands, the presidential veto will avail 
 nothing." 2 .The statements in Kendall s "Autobiogra 
 phy " are in perfect accord with these. It is perfectly 
 plain who was at the bottom of this project, what their 
 motives were, how they set to work, how they gave a 
 bias to Jackson s mind, and furnished him with argu 
 ments and phrases. It is also worthy of the most care 
 ful attention that they and Jackson were now busy 
 "saving the country," holding in check the constitu 
 tional organs of the country, above all Congress ; and 
 that they were proceeding upon assumptions about the 
 motives and purposes of the bank which were not true, 
 and had not even been tested, and upon assumptions in 
 regard to the character of Congress which were insult 
 ing to the nation. The Jeffersonian non-interference 
 theories were now all left far behind. Jacksonian democ 
 racy was approaching already the Napoleonic type of 
 the democratic empire, in which " the elect of the 
 nation" is charged to prrtect the state against every 
 body, chiefly, however, against any cc istitutional organs, 
 i Duane, 9. 2 Lewis in 3 Fatten, 505 fg. 
 
300 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 On the first day of Duane s official life, June 1, 183$ 
 Whitney called on him, obviously in a certain ambas 
 Badorial capacity, and made known to him the project 
 to remove the deposits from the bank, and to use state 
 banks as depositories and fiscal agents. A few days 
 later Jackson started on a progress through New Eng 
 land. The recent overthrow of nullification had ren 
 dered him very popular. No one knew of any ne\t 
 trouble brewing, and there was a general outburst of en 
 thusiasm and satisfaction that a great cause of political 
 discord had been removed, and that peace and quiet 
 might be enjoyed. Jackson was feted enthusiastically 
 and generally. Harvard College made him a Doctor of 
 Laws. Adams said that it was " a sycophantic compli 
 ment." Jackson was very ill at this time. Adams wrote 
 a spiteful page in the " Diary," alleging that " four fifths 
 of his sickness is trickery, and the other fifth mere fa 
 tigue." " He is so ravenous of notoriety that he craves 
 the sympathy for sickness as a portion of his glory." l 
 The low personal injustice which is born of party hatred 
 is here strikingly illustrated. 
 
 Duane did not accept the role for which he had beec 
 selected. He objected to the removal of the deposits. 
 Jackson sent to him from Boston a long argument, 
 written by Kendall, to try to persuade him. Jackson re 
 turned early in July. The question of the removal was 
 then debated between him and Duane very seriously, 
 Duane standing his ground. It is evident that Taney was 
 then asked to take the Treasury in case Duane should 
 continue recalcitrant. Jackson left Washington on an 
 excursion to the Rip Raps without having come to ai 
 trrangement with Duane. 2 
 
 1 4 Adams, 5. 
 
 s In May, 1833, Jackson laid the corner-stone of a monnmem 
 
KENDALL S NEGOTIATIONS. 301 
 
 In July rumors became current that the Presiden 
 intended to remove the deposits. 1 August 5, 1833, 
 while Jackson was absent, Taney wrote to him, encourag 
 ing him to prosecute the project of removal, and thor 
 oughly approving of it. It is a sycophantic letter. 2 In 
 August Kendall went on a tour through the Middle 
 and Eastern States to negotiate with the state banks so 
 as to find out whether they would undertake the fiscal 
 duties. His first project seems to have been based on 
 the New York Safety Fund system. He got no en 
 couragement for this. 8 To more general inquiries as to 
 a willingness to enter into some arrangement he got a 
 number of favorable replies. 4 Commenting on these 
 replies, Duane says, " It was into this chaos that I was 
 asked to plunge the fiscal concerns of the country at a 
 moment when they were conducted by the legitimate 
 agent with the utmost simplicity, safety, and despatch." 5 
 
 On Jackson s return he took up the business at once. 
 Of course Kendall s negotiations could not be kept se 
 cret. " Niles s Register " for September 7, 1833, con 
 tains a long list of extracts from different newspapers 
 presenting different speculations as to the probability of 
 4ie removal of the deposits. The money market was, 
 of course, immediately affected. The bank had ordered 
 
 ;o Washington s mother. On his way to the site of the monu 
 ment, while the steamboat was at Alexandria, Lieutenant Ran 
 dolph, who had been, dismissed from the navy because he could 
 Dot make his accounts good, committed an assault on the Pres 
 ident, and attempted to pull his nose. Considerable politico* 
 heat was excited by the ex -.ra .egal measures taken to punisk 
 Randolph for his outrage. (44 Nibs, J 70.) 
 i 44 Niles, 353. 2 Tyler s Taney, 195. 
 
 Document F. page 10. * Document F. 
 
 * Duane, 96. 
 
802 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 its branches to buy no drafts having over ninety days 
 to run. This was too short a time for " racers," consid 
 ering the difficulty of communication. The Western 
 debts had now been considerably curtailed by the stren 
 uous efforts which had been made during the year. In 
 the cabinet, Duane was still resisting. The sixteenth 
 section of the bank charter gave to the Secretary of the 
 Treasury, by specific designation, the power to remove 
 the deposits. 
 
 By the acts of July 2, 1789, and May 10, 1800, the 
 Secretary of the Treasury reports to the House of Rep 
 resentatives. John Adams objected to the position thus 
 created for the Secretary of the Treasury. 1 At other 
 times also it has caused complaint. 2 His position cer 
 tainly was anomalous. His powers and responsibilities 
 were in no consistent relation to each other. He was 
 independent of the President in his functions, yet might 
 be removed by him. He reported to Congress what he 
 had done, yet could not be removed by Congress except 
 by impeachment. Jackson now advanced another step 
 in his imperial theory. He said to Duane : I take (hu 
 responsibility ; and he extended his responsibility over 
 Duane on the theory that the Secretary was a sub 
 ordinate, bound only to obey orders. What then was 
 the sense of providing in the charter that the Secretary 
 might use a certain discretion, and that he should stato 
 to Congress his reasons for any use he made of it ? 
 Jackson s responsibility was only a figure of speech ; he 
 was elected for a set term, and could rot and would not 
 
 1 1 Gibbs, 569. 
 
 2 4 Adams, 501. See a history of the Treasury Department ii 
 l report of the Committee on Ways and Means, March 4, 18fl4 
 
 4<5 Xiles 3!. 
 
PAPER READ IN THE CABINET. 303 
 
 tand again. As Congress stood there was no danger of 
 impeachment. His position, therefore, was simply that 
 he was determined to do what he thought best to do, 
 because there was no power at hand to stop him. 
 
 On the 18th of September the President read, in the 
 meeting of his cabinet, a paper prepared by Taney, 1 in 
 which he argued that the deposits ought to be removed. 
 The grounds were, the three per cents, the French bill, 
 the political activity of the bank, and its unconstitu 
 tionally. He said that he would not dictate to the 
 Secretary, but he took all the responsibility of deciding 
 that, after October 1st, no more public money should be 
 deposited in the bank, and that the current drafts should 
 withdraw all money then in it. Duane refused to give 
 the order and refused to resign. He was dismissed, 
 September 23d. Taney was transferred to the Treas 
 ury. He gave the order. Taney told Kendall that he 
 was not a politician, and that, in taking a political office, 
 he sacrificed his ambition, which was to be a judge of 
 the Supreme Court. 2 Duane at once published the final 
 correspondence between the President and himself, in 
 which he gave fifteen reasons why the deposits ought 
 not to be removed. 3 One of them was, " I believe that 
 the efforts made in various quarters to hasten the re 
 moval of the deposits did not originate with patriots or 
 Btatesmen, but in schemes to promote factious and self 
 ish purposes." The administration press immediately 
 burned upon Duane with fierce abuse. 
 
 The removal of the deposits was a violent and unnec 
 essary step, even from Jackson s stand-point, as Lewis 
 fried to persuade him. 4 The bank had no chance of a 
 
 1 Tyler s Taney, 204. Kendau s Avtobhyraphy, 386. 
 
 45 Niles. 236. * Lewis in 3 1 arton. 506. 
 
304 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 recharter, unless one is prepared to believe that it could 
 and would buy enough congressmen to get a two-thirds 
 majority. If it had been willing to do that, it had 
 enough money of its own for the purpose, even after the 
 deposits were withdrawn. The removal caused a great 
 commotion, even a panic. 1 Bank stock fell one and 
 one half per cent at New York. But it recovered when 
 the paper read in the cabinet was received, because the 
 grounds were only the old charges. The public con 
 fidence in the bank had not been shaken by the charges, 
 investigations, and reports. The bank replied to the 
 President s paper by a long manifesto, in which it pur 
 sued him point by point. 2 No doubt Biddle wrote this 
 paper. In order to defend the bank in the matter of the 
 three per cents, he resorted to the tactics noticed before. 
 He said that there was heavy indebtedness to Europe 
 in 1832, on account of the importations of 1831. He 
 wanted to prevent an exportation of specie and give the 
 country leisure to pay that debt. He says that the 
 bank was at ease, and would have kept quiet if it had 
 considered only its own interests. Nothing less than the 
 movements which involve continents and cover years 
 will do for him to explain his policy. No motive less 
 than universal benevolence will suffice to account for the 
 action of the bank. These pretences were, as similar 
 ones almost always are, not true. 
 
 The average monthly balance in the bank, to the 
 credit of the Treasury, from 1818 to 1833, was $6.7 
 million. In 1832 it was $11.3 million. In 1833 it 
 was $8.5 million. In September, 1833, it was $9.1 
 million. 3 Kendall reported to a cabinet meeting thf 
 results of his negotiations with the banks. One bani 
 - 45Nile8. 6f, 2 45 Niles. 248. Document H. 
 
DISORDER IN THE FISCAL SYSTEM. 305 
 
 was objected to " on political grounds." 1 Twenty-three 
 were selected before the end of the year. The chance 
 for favoritism was speedily perceived. The first in 
 tention was to use the Bank of the Metropolis, Washing 
 ton, as the head of the system of deposit banks, although 
 no system was devised. In fact, the administration had 
 taken the work of destruction in hand with great vigor, 
 but it never planned a system to take the place of the 
 old one. The Bank of the United States had, of course, 
 been compelled to devise its own measures for carrying 
 on the business of the Treasury, so far as it was charged 
 with that business. The Treasury was now forced to 
 oversee, if it did not originate, the system of relations 
 between the deposit banks. January 30, 1834, Silas 
 Wright made a statement which was understood to be 
 authoritative. He said that the Executive had entered 
 again upon the control of the public money which be 
 longed to him before the national bank was chartered ; 
 that the administration would bring forward no law to 
 regulate the deposits, but that the Executive would pro 
 ceed with the experiment of using state banks. Webster 
 expressed strong disappointment and disapproval, claim 
 ing that there should be a law. 2 March 18, 1834, Web 
 ster proposed a bill to extend the charter of the Bank of 
 the United States for six years, without monopoly, the 
 public money to be deposited in it, it to pay to the 
 Treasury $200,000 annually on March 4th, none of its 
 notes to be for less than $20.00. The bank men would 
 not agreo to support it. It was tabled and never called 
 ap. 8 April 15, 1834, sis. moi^hs after the deposits were 
 
 1 Kendall s Autobiography, 387. 2 *o Niles, 400. 
 
 * 46 Niles, 52 ; 1 Curtis s Webster, 485 ; 4 Webster s Worka 
 W. 
 
306 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 removed, Taney sent to the Committee on Ways and 
 Means a plan for the organization of the deposit hank 
 By stem, but it was a mere vague outline. 1 December 
 15, 1834, Woodbury sent in a long essay on currency 
 and banking, but no positive scheme or arrangement. 
 It was not until June, 1836, that the system was regu 
 lated by measures aiming at efficiency and responsibility. 
 Taney desired that Kendall should be president oi 
 the Bank of the Metropolis and organize the system, 
 but Kendall s readiness, which had not before failed, 
 had now reached its limit. The Bank of the Metropolis 
 was then asked to admit Whitney as agent and corre 
 spondent of the deposit banks. The bank refused to do 
 this, and the plan of making that bank the head was 
 given up. 2 The banks were recommended to employ 
 Whitney as agent and correspondent at Washington for 
 their dealings with the Treasury. He was thus placed 
 in a position of great power and influence. He did not 
 escape the charge of having abused it, and an investiga 
 tion, in 1837, produced evidence very adverse to his 
 good character. Part of the correspondence between 
 him and the banks was then published. From that cor 
 respondence it is plain that the chief argument brought 
 to support an application for a share of the deposits, or 
 other favor, was devotion to Jackson and hatred of the 
 Bank of the United States. 3 It is not proven that the 
 deposits were ever used by the Bank of the United 
 States for any political purpose whatever. It is con 
 clusively proven that the deposits were used by Jack 
 son s administration, through Whitney s agency, to re 
 ward adherents and to win supporters. The first banki 
 
 1 46 Niles, 157. 2 Kendall s Autobiography, 388. 
 
 " 58 Nilea SI 
 
THE TRANSFER DRAFTS. 307 
 
 nrhich took up the system also, in some cases, used the 
 deposits which were given to them to put themselves in 
 the position which they were required, by the theory of 
 the deposit system, to occupy. Taney assumed that 
 the Bank of the United States would make a spiteful 
 attempt to injure the deposit banks by calling on them 
 to pay balances. It was then considered wrong and 
 cruel for one bank to call on another to pay balances 
 promptly. Taney, therefore, placed some large drafts 
 on the Bank of the United States in the hands of 
 officers of the deposit banks at New York, Philadelphia, 
 and Baltimore, so that they might offset any such ma 
 licious demand. Otherwise, the drafts were not to be 
 used. The bank took no steps which afforded even a 
 pretext for using these drafts, but the president of the 
 Union Bank of Maryland cashed one of them for 
 $100,000 a few days after he got it, and used the money 
 in stock speculations. 1 For fear of scandal this act was 
 passed over by the Executive, but it led to an investiga 
 tion by Congress. Taney was a stockholder in the 
 Union Bank. 2 The Manhattan Company used one of 
 these drafts for $500,000. 3 Taney claimed the power 
 to make these transfers. He referred it back to a pre 
 cedent set by Crawford, 4 who, in his turn, when he had 
 been called to account for it, had referred it back to 
 Gallatin. The source of the stream, however, was not 
 
 1 Kendall s Autobiography, 389. Cf. Document H. page 339 
 It is well worth while to read these two passages together in 
 arder to see how much deceit there was in tne proceedings about 
 the removal of the deposits 
 
 2 Quincy s Adams, 227. He sold his stock Feoruary 18, 1834 
 Document M.) 
 
 8 Document H. 
 Document F. 
 
308 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 Gallatin, but William Jones, Acting Secretary. 1 Thf 
 baneful effects of the large surplus of public money are 
 plain enough. 
 
 At the session of 1833-34 the message alleged, as the 
 occasion of removing the deposits, the report of the 
 government directors of the bank, which showed, aa 
 Jackson said, that the bank had been turned into an 
 electioneering engine. It was never alleged that the 
 bank had spent money otherwise than in distributing 
 Gallatin s pamplilet on currency, McDuffie s report of 
 1830, and similar documents. Some might think that 
 it was not wise and right for the bank so to defend it 
 self, since politics were involved ; but its judge was now 
 the most interested party in the contest, the one to whom 
 that offence would seem most heinous, and he. insisted 
 on imposing a penalty at his own discretion, on an ex 
 parte statement of his own appointees, and a penalty 
 which could not be considered appropriate or duly 
 measured to the offence. He also charged the bank 
 with manufacturing a panic. Taney reported "his" 
 reasons for the removal. He argued that the Secretary 
 must discharge his duties under the supervision of the 
 President ; that the Secretary alone had power to re 
 move the deposits ; that Congress could not order it to 
 be done ; that the Secretary could do it, if he thought 
 best, for any reason, not necessarily only when the bank 
 had misconducted itself. He put the removal which had 
 beoa executed on the ground of public interest. The 
 people had shown, in the election, that they did not 
 tvant the bank rechartered. It was not best to remove 
 
 1 American State Papers, 4 Finance, 266, 279. Cf 1 Gal 
 latin s Writings, 80. It has been asserted that Hamilton use*, 
 she same power. (Ingersoll 279. Cf. 6 Hamilton s Works. 175. 
 
WAR WITH THE SENATE. 809 
 
 ihe deposits suddenly when the charter should expire. 
 He blamed the bank for increasing its loans from De 
 cember 1, 1832, to August 2, 1833, from $61.5 million 
 to $64.1 million, and then reducing them, from that date 
 until October 2, 1833, to $60 million. He said that 
 the bank had forfeited public confidence, had excluded 
 the government directors from knowledge to which they 
 were entitled, had shown selfishness in the affair of the 
 French bill, had done wrongly about the three per cents, 
 had granted favors to editors, and had distributed docu 
 ments to control elections. He favored the use of the 
 state banks as fiscal agents of the government. 
 
 December 9th the bank memorialized Congress against 
 the removal of the deposits as a breach of contract. A 
 great struggle over the bank question occupied the whole 
 session. The Senate refused, 25 to 20, to confirm the 
 reappointment of the government directors, who were 
 eaid to have acted as the President s spies. Jackson 
 sent the names in again with a long message, 1 and they 
 were rejected, 30 to 11. Taney s appointment as Secre 
 tary of the Treasury was rejected, to Jackson s great 
 indignation. Taney was then nominated for judge of 
 the Supreme Court, and again rejected. Marshall died 
 in July, 1835. Taney was appointed Chief Justice, De- 
 tember 28, 1835, and confirmed, March 15, 1836. 
 
 December llth Clay moved a call for a copy of the 
 paper read in the cabinet. Jackson refused it on the 
 ground that Congress had no business with it. The 
 document, in fact, had no standing in our system of 
 government. It was another extension of personal 
 government, by the adoption of a Napoleonic procedure, 
 The Emperor made known his vill by a- letter of in 
 1 46 Niles, 180. 
 
310 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 Btructions to his minister, and this, when published 
 informed the public. Jackson used his " paper read in 
 the cabinet " in just that way. By publishing it he 
 violated the secrecy and privilege of the cabinet, and 
 made it a public document, but when it was called for 
 he fell back on cabinet privilege. 1 If Jackson s doctrine 
 was sound, there would be modes of governing this 
 country without any responsibility to Congress, and the 
 " cabinet," as such, would come to have recognized 
 functions as a body for registering and publishing the 
 rescripts of the President. It was a thoroughly con 
 sistent extension of the same doctrine that Jackson, in 
 his reply, in which he refused to comply with the call 
 of the Senate, professed his responsibility to the Amer 
 ican people, and his willingness to explain to them the 
 grounds of his conduct. Such a profession was an insult 
 to the constitutional organ of the mind and will of the 
 American people worthy of a military autocrat, and al 
 though it might have a jingle which would tickle the 
 ears of men miseducated by the catch-words of democ 
 racy, a people which would accept it as a proper and 
 lawful expression from their executive chief would not 
 yet have learned the alphabet of constitutional govern 
 ment. 
 
 In January, 1834, Jackson sei.t in a message com 
 plaining that the bank still kept the books, papers, and 
 funds belonging to the pension agency with which it had 
 aitherto been charged. The Senate voted, May 26th, 
 26 to 17, that the Secretary of War had no authority to 
 remove the pension funds from the bank. 
 
 Clay introduced resolutions which finally took thii 
 hape : u Resolved, (1) That the President, in the lat* 
 1 45 Niles, 247. 
 
CENSURE OF JACKSON, 811 
 
 xecutive proceedings in relation to the public revenue, 
 has assumed upon himself authority and power not com- 
 Ferred by the Constitution and the laws, but in deroga 
 tion of both. (2) That the reasons assigned by the 
 Secretai y for the removal are unsatisfactory and insuf 
 ficient." Benton offered a resolution that Biddle should 
 be called to the bar of the Senate to give the reasons for 
 the recent curtailments of the bank, and to answer for the 
 use of its funds for electioneering. 1 January 5, 1834, 
 Webster reported from the Committee on Finance in 
 regard to the removal of the deposits. Clay s second 
 resolution was at once adopted, 28 to 18. March 28th 
 the first resolution was adopted, 26 to 20. April 15th, 
 Jackson sent in a protest against the latter resolution. 
 The Senate refused to receive it, 27 to 16, declaring it 
 a breach of privilege. The main points in the protest 
 were that the President meant to maintain intact the 
 rights of the Executive, and that the Senate would be 
 the judges in case of impeachment, but for that reason 
 ought not to express an opinion until the House saw fit 
 to impeach. The bank charter provided that the Secre 
 tary should report his reasons to Congress. On the 
 doctrine of the protest, however, one House of Congress 
 could adopt no expression of opinion on the report sub 
 mitted, because it must wait for the other. The ad 
 ministration press kept up truculent denunciations of 
 the Senate all winter. The " Pennsylvanian " said : " The 
 democrats never heartily sanctioned it, and now, having 
 the power, should amend or get rid of it once and for- 
 aver." 2 The New York " S^a.idard " called the sena 
 tors " usurpers." 3 
 
 1 45 Niles, 332. 2 46 Niles, 131. 
 
 * Ibid. 147. 
 
812 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 The debates of the winter were acrimonious in the 
 extreme. Probably no session of Congress before 
 1860-61 was marked by such fierce contention in Con 
 gress and such excitement out-of-doors. Chevalier, 
 who was an acute and unprejudiced observer, said that 
 the speeches of the administration men resembled the 
 French republican tirades of 1791-92. They had the 
 same distinguishing trait, emphasis. " Most generally 
 Ihe pictures presented in these declamations are fantas 
 tical delineations of the moneyed aristocracy overrun 
 ning the country, with seduction, corruption, and slavery 
 in its train, or of Mr. Riddle aiming at the crown." l 
 The chief weapon of debate was emphasis instead of 
 fact and reason. With an " old hero " to support and the 
 "money power" to assail, the politicians and orators of 
 the emphatic school had a grand opportunity. There 
 is also an unformulated dogma, which seems to command 
 a great deal of faith, to this effect, that, if a man is only 
 sufficiently ignorant, his whims and notions constitute 
 " plain common sense." There are no questions on 
 which this dogma acts more perniciously than on ques 
 tions of banking and currency. Wild and whimsical 
 notions about these topics, propounded with vehemence 
 and obstinacy in Congress, helped to increase the alarm 
 tmt-of-doors. 
 
 Senators Bibb, of Kentucky, and White, of Tennes 
 see, went into opposition. Calhoun, also, for the time, 
 Allied himself heartily with the opposition. 
 
 The Virginia Legislature passed resolutions condemn 
 ing the dismissal of Dtiane and the removal of the de 
 posits. In pursuance of the dogmas of Virginia demoo 
 , Rives, senator from that State and supporter of th 
 1 Chevalier, 61. 
 
EXPUNGING AND INSTRUCTIONS. 813 
 
 administration measures, resigned. B. W. Leigh was 
 elected in his place. 
 
 As soon as the resolution of censure was passed, Ben- 
 ton gave notice of a motion to expunge the same from 
 the records. He introduced such a resolution at the next 
 session, and the Jackson party was more firmly consoli 
 dated than ever hefore in the determinatior to carry 
 it. The personal element was present in that enterprise, 
 with the desire for revenge, and the wish to demonstrate 
 loyalty. March 3, 1835, the words " ordered to be ex 
 punged " were stricken from Benton s resolution, 39 to 
 7, and the resolution was tabled, 27 to 20. The agita> 
 tion was then carried back into the state elections, and 
 " expunging " came to be a test of party fealty. Ben- 
 ton renewed the motion December 26, 1836. The Leg 
 islature of Virginia adopted instructions in favor of it. 
 John Tyler would not vote for it, and resigned. Leigh 
 would not do so, and would not resign. He never re 
 covered party standing. 1 Rives was sent back in Tyler s 
 place. This martyrdom and Tyler s report on the bank, 
 mentioned below, made Tyler Vice-President. 2 The vice 
 of the doctrine of instructions was well illustrated in 
 these proceedings. If the Virginia doctrine were ad 
 mitted, senators would be elected, not for six years, but 
 nntil tjie politics of the State represented might change. 
 The senator would not be a true representative, under 
 the theory of representative institutions, but a delegate, 
 or ambassador. It would be another victory of purd 
 democracy over constitutional institutions. 
 
 The administration had a majority in the Senate in 
 1836, but Benton says that a caucus was held on expung 
 
 1 See his letter of reply ; SO Niles, 28. 
 
 2 Wise, 158. 
 
814 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 ing. The resolution was passed, 24 to 19, that black 
 ins should be drawn around the record on the journal 
 ui the Senate, and that the words " expunged, by order 
 of the Senate, this 16th day of January, 1837," should 
 be written across it. It was a great personal victory for 
 Jjickson. The Senate had risen up to condemn him for 
 something which he had seen fit to do, and he had suc 
 cessfully resented and silenced its reproof. It gratified 
 him more than any other incident of the latter part of 
 his life. It was still another step forward in the de 
 velopment of his political methods, according to which 
 his personality came more and more into play as a 
 political force, and the constitutional institutions of the 
 country were set aside. The day after the resolution 
 was expunged, leave was refused, in the House, to bring 
 in a resolution that it is unconstitutional to expunge any 
 part of any record of either House. 1 
 
 March 4, 1834, Polk reported from the Committee on 
 Ways and Means on the removal of the deposits, sup 
 porting Jackson and Taney in all their positions. He 
 offered "four resolutions, which were passed, April 4th ; 
 as follows : (1) that the bank ought not to be re 
 chartered, 132 to 82 ; (2) that the deposits ought not 
 to be restored, 118 to 103 ; (3) that the state banks, 
 ought to be depositories of the public funds, 117 to 105 ; 
 that a select committee should be raised on the 
 l>ank and the commercial crisis, 171 to 42. The coin- 
 
 * There was a case of expunging in Jefferson s time. A ref 
 lation which had been passed contained a statement that cer 
 tain filibusters thought that they had executive sanction. This 
 was expunged. (1 Adams, 439.) A case is mentioned in Massa 
 chusetts. Quincy s resolution against rejoicing in naval victories 
 was expunged. (Ingersoll, 23.) For a discussion of other prece 
 in*.s <fc* the speeches of Rives and Leigh. (50 Niles, 168, 173- 
 
REPORTS OF 1834. 815 
 
 mittee last mentioned reported May 22d.* The ma 
 jority said that the bank had resisted all their attempts 
 to investigate. They proposed that the directors should 
 be arrested and brought to the bar of the House. The 
 position of the bank seemed to be, at this time, that 
 since the bank charter was to expire and the deposits 
 had been withdrawn, any further investigations were 
 only vexatious. The minority of the committee (Ed 
 ward Everett and W. W. Ellsworth) reported that the 
 committee had made improper demands, and that the 
 instruction given to the committee to examine the banJ- 
 in regard to the commercial crisis was based on iro 
 proper assumptions. The Senate, June 30th, instructec 
 the Committee on Finance to make another investiga 
 tion of all the allegations against the bank made bj 
 Jackson and Taney in justification of the removal. Tha* 
 committee reported December 18, 1834, by John Tyler. 3 
 The report goes over all the points, with conclusions 
 favorable to the bank on each. The time was long gone 
 by, however, when anybody cared for reports. 
 
 The excitement about the removal of the deposits was 
 greatly exaggerated. The public was thrown into a 
 panic, because it did not quite see what the effect would 
 be. It is untrue that the bank made a panic, and it is 
 untrue to say that there was no real crisis. The statistics 
 >f loans, etc., which the hostile committees were fond of 
 gathering, proved nothing, because they proved anything. 
 If the bank loans increased, the bank was extending 
 its loans to curry favor. If they decreased, the bank 
 was punishing the public, and making a panic. As bank 
 cans always fluctuate, the argument nev^r slackened. 
 Vhe figures appended to Tyler s report cover the whol 
 l 46 Niles. 221, 225. - Document I. 
 
316 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 history of the bank. There are no fluctuations thew 
 which can be attributed to malicious action by the bank 
 The root of all the wrong-doing of the bank, out oi 
 which sprang nearly all the charges which were in any 
 measure just, was in the branch drafts and the bad 
 banking in the West. The loans increased up to May, 
 1832, when they were $70.4 million. The increase, so 
 far as it was remarkable, was in the Western branches. 
 The operation of the " racers " is also distinctly trace 
 able in the accounts of the parent bank and some of the 
 branches. The effect of the general restraint imposed 
 can also be seen, and the movement can be traced by 
 which the bank, drawing back from the perilous position 
 into which it was drifting in 1832, got its branches into 
 better condition, and improved its whole status from 
 October, 1832, to October, 1833. It was this course 
 which afforded all the grounds for the charge of panic- 
 making. 
 
 The bank was very strong when the deposits were 
 removed. The loans were $42.2 million; domestic 
 exchange, $17.8 million ; foreign exchange, $2.3 mill 
 ion ; specie, $10.6 million ; due from state banks, 
 $2.2 million ; notes of state banks, $2.4 million ; pub 
 lic deposits, $9 million ; private deposits, $8 million ; 
 circulation, $19.1 million. It also held real estate 
 wrorth $3 million. During the winter of 1833-34 there 
 was a stringent money market and commercial distress. 
 The state banks were in no condition to take the public 
 deposits. They were trying to strengthen themselves, 
 a-nd to put themselves on the level of the Treasury re 
 quirements in the hope of getting a share of the deposits. 
 [t was they who operated a bank contraction during tha 
 winter. It was six months, and then only by the favo 
 
COMMERCIAL CRISIS. 317 
 
 nd concession of the Treasury, before the local hanks, 
 " pet banks " as they soon came to be called, could get 
 into a position to take the place of the Bank of the 
 United States. This was the " chaos " into which 
 Duane, like an honest man, and man of sense, had re 
 fused to plunge the fiscal interests of the country. 
 The administration, however, charged everything to 
 Biddle and the bank. Petitions were sent to Congress. 
 Benton and the others said that there was no crisis, and 
 that the petitions were gotten up for effect, to frighten 
 Jackson into restoring the deposits. The proofs of the 
 genuineness and severity of the crisis, in the forty-fifth 
 volume of " Niles s Register," are ample. In January, 
 1834, exchange on England was at one hundred and 
 one and a half (par one hundred and seven) ; capital 
 was loaning at from one and a half per cent to three per 
 cent per month ; bank-notes were quoted at varying 
 rates of discount. 1 Delegations went to Washington to 
 represent to Jackson the state of the country. He be 
 came violent ; told the delegations to go to Biddle ; 
 that he had all the money ; that the bank was a " mon- 
 Bter," to which all the trouble was due. In answer to 
 a delegation from Philadelphia, February 11, 1834, Jack 
 son sketched out the bullionist programme, which the 
 administration pursued from this time forth as an off 
 set to the complaints about the removal of the deposits. 8 
 Up to this time it had been supposed that Jackson 
 rather leaned to paper-money notions. He now pro 
 posed, as an "experiment" (so he called it), to induce 
 
 1 46 Niles, 133. 
 
 * Taney made the first official statement of the plan of the ad 
 ministration in a letter to the Com jait.ee *n Ways and Means, 
 *vpril 15, 1834. 
 
318 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 the banks, by promising them a share in the deposits, to 
 give up the use of notes under $5.00, later to do away 
 with all under $10.00, and finally to restrict bank-notea 
 to $20.00 and upwards, so as to bring about a circulation 
 of which a reasonable part should be specie. The no 
 tion was good as far as it went, but had precisely the 
 fault of a good financial notion in the hands of incompe 
 tent men ; the scheme did not take into account all the 
 consequences of distributing the deposits as proposed. 
 It persuaded the banks to conform to external rules 
 about circulation, but, under the circumstances, these 
 rules did not have the force they were supposed to have, 
 and the bank loans were stimulated to an enormous in 
 flation, which threw the whole business of the country 
 into a fever, and then produced a great commercial 
 crisis. For a short period, in the summer of 1834, the 
 currency was in a very sound condition. The Bank of 
 the United States was, by the necessity of its position, 
 under strong precautions. The state banks, by their 
 efforts to meet the Treasury requirements, were stronger 
 than ever before. The popular sentiment, however, had 
 now swung over again to the mania for banks. Each 
 district wanted a deposit bank, so as to get a share in the 
 stream of wealth from the public Treasury. If a deposit 
 could not be obtained, then the bank was formed in 
 order to participate in the carnival of credit and specu 
 lation, for a non-deposit bank could manage its affairs 
 as recklessly as it chose. The deposit banks speedily 
 drew together to try to prevent any more from being 
 admitted to share in the public deposits. The mania 
 for banking was such that formal riots occurred at tlu 
 subscription to the stock of new banks. 1 The favored 
 
 1 42 Niles, 257 ; 44 Niles, 371. See some of these facts an* 
 "ie nse made of them in Brothers s (faite.J S stes p. c <i 
 
MANIA FOR BANKS. 319 
 
 few, who could subscribe the whole, sold to the rest at 
 an advance. To be a commissioner was worth from 
 $500 to SljOOO. 1 There was a notion, borrowed per 
 haps from the proceedings of the government of the 
 United States in the organization of both national banks, 
 that to make a bank was a resource by which a group of 
 insolvent debtors could extricate themselves from their 
 embarrassments. The Tammany society being in debt, 
 a plan was formed for paying the debt by making a 
 bank. 2 When the great fire occurred in New York, De 
 cember, 1835, a proposition was made to create a bank 
 as a mode of relieving the sufferers. "To make a 
 bank," said Niles, " is the great panacea for every ill 
 that can befall the people of the United States, and yet 
 it adds not one cent to the capital of the community." 8 
 The effect of this multiplication of banks, and of the 
 scramble between them for the public deposits, was that 
 an enormous amount of capital wap arbitrarily distrib 
 uted over the country, according to political favoritism 
 and local influence, and in entire disregard of the in 
 dustrial and commercial conditions. The public debt 
 was all paid January 1, 1835. After that date the pub 
 lic deposits increased with great rapidity, and there was 
 no occasion to spend them. The state of things was 
 therefore this : an immense amount of capital was being 
 collected by taxes, and then was being distributed to 
 favored corporations, as a free loan for an indefinite 
 period, on which they could earn profits by lending it 
 at interest. No monster bank, under the most malicious 
 management, could have produced as much harm, either 
 political or financial, as this system produced while it 
 lasted. 
 1 46 Niles, 188. 2 Mackeinzie, 7J 8 49 Niles, 298. 
 
820 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 November 5, 1834, Secretary Woodbury informed 
 the Bank of the United States that the Treasury would 
 not receive branch drafts after January 1, 1835. This 
 led to a spirited correspondence with Biddle, in which 
 the latter defended the drafts as good, both in law and 
 finance. 1 In the message of 1834 Jackson recapitulated 
 the old complaints against the bank, and recommended 
 that, on account of its " high-handed proceedings," its 
 notes should no longer be received by the Treasury, and 
 that the stock owned by the nation should be sold. The 
 session of 1834-35 was, however, fruitless as to banking 
 and currency. January 12, 1835, on Benton s motion, 
 the Committee on Finance was ordered to investigate 
 the specie transactions of the bank. Tyler took fire at 
 this, because it reflected on the report which he had just 
 made. In view of subsequent history, it is worth while 
 to notice the profession of faith whicli was drawn from 
 Tyler at this time. He said that he was opposed to any 
 national bank on constitutional grounds, but that he was 
 free from Jacksonism, and that he wanted to be just to 
 the existing bank. January 10th Polk introduced a bill 
 to forbid the receipt of notes of the Bank of the United 
 States at the Treasury, unless the bank would pay at 
 once the dividend which had been withheld in 1834. 
 Bills were also proposed for regulating the deposits in 
 the deposit banks. No action resulted. 
 
 In the message of 1835 Jackson referred to the war 
 which (as he said) the bank had waged on the govern 
 ment for four years, as a proof of the evil effects of such 
 an institution. He declared that the bank belonged to 
 a system of distrust of the popular will as ay regulator of 
 political power, and to a policy which would supplan/ 
 1 Document J. 
 
REVIEW OF THE BANK WAR. 321 
 
 ur system by a consolidated government. Here, then, 
 at the end of the bank war, we meet again with the sec 
 ond of the theories of the bank which Ingham formulated 
 in his letter to Biddle of October 5, 1829, 1 at the be 
 ginning of the bank war. Ingham said that some peo 
 ple held that theory. The assumption that the bank 
 held that theory concerning itself had been made the 
 rule of action of the government, and the laws and ad 
 ministration of the country had been made to conform 
 to that assumption as an established fact. At the ses 
 sion of 1835-36 an attempt was made to investigate the 
 transactions of members of Congress with the bank. 
 It was abandoned when Adams declared that a similar 
 attempt in 1832 had been abandoned, because it cut 
 both ways. 
 
 1 See page 240. 
 
 2! 
 
CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 IPECULATION, DISTRIBUTION, CURRENCY LEGISLATION 
 AND END OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 IN the spring of 1835 the phenomena of a period oi 
 speculation began to be distinctly marked. There was 
 great monetary ease and prosperity in England and 
 France, as well as here. Some important improvements 
 in machinery, the first railroads, greater political satisfac 
 tion and security, and joint stock banks were especially 
 favorable elements which were then affecting France 
 and England. The price of cotton advanced sharply 
 during 183435. Speculation seized upon cotton lands 
 in Mississippi and Louisiana, and on negroes. Next it 
 affected real estate in the cities at which cotton was 
 handled commercially. The success of the Erie Canal 
 led to numerous enterprises of a like nature in Pennsyl 
 vania, Maryland, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. Capital 
 for these enterprises was not at hand. The States en 
 deavored to draw the capital from Europe by the use 
 of their credit. The natural consequence was great 
 recklessness in contracting debt, and much " financier 
 ing " by agents and middle-men. The abundant and 
 a ,heap capital, here and abroad, of 1835-36 favored all 
 the improvement enterprises. These enterprises were, 
 however, in their nature, investments, returns from 
 which could not be expected for a long period. In 
 the mean time, they locked up capital. It appears 
 
SPECULATION. 1835-36. 328 
 
 that labor and capital were withdrawn for a time from 
 agriculture, and devoted to means of transportation. 
 Wheat and flour were imported in 1836. 1 The land of 
 the Western States had greatly risen in value since the 
 Erie Canal had been open. Speculation in this land 
 became very active. Timber lands in Maine were an 
 other mania. 2 The loans of capital from Europe in 
 creased month by month. The entire payment of the 
 public debt of the United States had a great effect upon 
 the imagination of people in Europe. It raised the 
 credit of the United States. It was thought that a 
 country which could pay off its debt with such rapidity 
 must be a good country in which to invest capital. The 
 credit extended to the United States depressed the ex 
 changes, and gave an unusual protection to the excessive 
 bank-note issues in the United States. Those issues 
 sustained and stimulated the excessive credit which the 
 public deposits were bringing into existence. The banks 
 had an arbitrary rule that a reserve of specie for one 
 third of the circulation would secure them beyond any 
 danger. So long as the exchanges were depressed by 
 the exportation of capital from Europe to America, no 
 shipment of specie occurred, and the system was not 
 tested. All prices were rising; all was active and 
 hopeful ; debt was the road to wealth. If one could 
 obtain capital for margins, and speculate on differences 
 in stocks, commodities, and real estate, he had a chance 
 to win enormous profits while the credit system went 
 on. Large classes of persons were drawn to city occu 
 pations, exchange, banking, and brokerage, because these 
 industries were most profitable. Cities grew, rents ad 
 vanced, real estate rose in va?ue. Down to October 1 
 1 50 Niles, 50, 74; 51 Niles, 17 2 48 Niles, 167. 
 
824 ANDREW JACKSOx. 
 
 1836, the following States had forbidden notes undei 
 $5.00 : New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Georgia, Lou 
 isiana, Indiana, Alabama, New Jersey, Maryland, North 
 Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Maine. It appears, 
 however, that small notes of earlier issue were still in 
 circulation, and the state of things which the legislation 
 meant to bring about never was reached, so far as one 
 can now learn. 
 
 In the autumn of 1835, the money market became 
 more stringent. This fact was charged to the pet banks 
 and to fears of trouble with France. 1 The pet banks 
 had every interest to arrest inflation. If they were held 
 to conservative rules, while the non-deposit banks about 
 them were not so held, the former only left free room 
 for the latter, and then the former had to receive the 
 notes of the latter. In January, 1836, the rate of dis 
 count at Philadelphia was two per cent per month. 8 
 Banks were still being multiplied. 8 During 1836 prices 
 continued to rise, speculation was active, rates for cap 
 ital increased ; there was complaint of a scarcity of 
 money, and a demand for more banks. Governor 
 Marcy, of New York, in his message for 1836, pointed 
 out the " unregulated spirit of speculation " which pre 
 vailed, and he warned the Legislature against the falla 
 cies involved in the demand for more banks. 4 In April 
 the best commercial paper was quoted, at New York, 
 at thirty per cent to forty per cent per annum ; second 
 rate, at one half of one per cent per day. 6 At Bostoc 
 the rate was one per cent per month. Exchange or 
 Kn gland at New York was one hundred and five (pai 
 
 l 49 Niles, 225, 281. 2 49 Niles, 313. 
 
 * 49 Niles, 435. 4 2 Hammond, 449. 
 
 Evening Post, in 50 NileB, 134. 
 
LAND DISTRIBUTION. 825 
 
 one hundred and nine and three fifths), showing the cur 
 rent of capital in spite of the inflation. In May Niles 
 said, " There is an awful pressure for money in most 
 of the cities," 1 yet he also describes the unprecedented 
 activity of business in Baltimore. 
 
 In the first message after his reelection, in 1832, Jack 
 son proposed, in regard to the public lands, that they 
 should be sold to the new States and to actual settlers at 
 a very low price. December 12th of that year Clay re- 
 introduced his land bill. 2 He succeeded in getting it 
 passed, but it was sent to the President within ten days 
 of the end of the session. Jackson did not sign it. In 
 December, 1833, he sent in a message stating his rea 
 sons for not doing so. He objected especially to the 
 policy of giving away the proceeds of the lands while 
 levying heavy duties on imports. The session of 1833-34 
 was fully occupied with the bank question and the re 
 moval of the deposits. At the session of 1834-35 Clay 
 again brought in a land bill, but no action was taken. 
 Relations with France occupied the attention of Con 
 gress during that session, which was a short one. At 
 the session of 1835-36 Clay introduced a bill to dis 
 tribute the net proceeds of the lands, after taking out ten 
 per cent for the ten new States. Calhoun introduced a 
 joint resolution to amend the Constitution so that the 
 surplus revenue could be distributed among the States. 
 He also introduced a bill to regulate the public deposits. 
 A bill to distribute the surplus revenue was also intro 
 duced. The land bill passed the Senate May 4, 1836, 
 by 25 to 20. It was tabled in the House, 104 to 85, 
 June 22d. The distribution bill and the deposit bill 
 were consolidated into one, and passed by the Senate 
 
 i 50 NUes, 185. 2 See page 19a 
 
326 
 
 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 June 17th, 38 to 6. On the 20th of June, in the Housej 
 an effort was made to divide the bill, so as to separate 
 the regulation of the deposits from the distribution, but 
 the effort failed. The House then changed the plan of 
 distributing the surplus to the States as a gift into a 
 plan for " depositing " it with them subject to recall. 
 En this shape the bill passed, 155 to 38, and became a 
 law by the concurrence of the Senate and the President. 
 The u Globe " l said that Jackson would have vetoed 
 the bill as it came from the Senate. He thought the 
 plan of " depositing " the surplus was free from consti 
 tutional objections, but the " Globe " gave notice to all 
 whom it might concern that the President would not 
 sign any bill the effect of which would be to raise 
 revenue by federal taxation, and distribute the proceeds 
 among the States. The distribution measure was one 
 of those errors which are apt to be committed on the 
 eve of a presidential election, when politicians do not 
 dare to oppose measures which gratify class or local 
 feelings or interests. Webster opposed distribution, un 
 less the land income could be separated. He said that 
 taxes must be reduced even at the risk of injuring some 
 industries. 2 It was provided in the bill that there 
 should be in each State a deposit bank, if a bank could 
 be found which would fulfil the prescribed conditions. 
 Each of these banks was to redeem all its notes in specie, 
 and to issue no notes for less than $5.00 after July 4. 
 
 1836. The Treasury was not to receive, after that date, 
 the notes of any bank which did issue notes under $5.00. 
 Li was to pay out no note under $10.00 after the passagf 
 >f the act, and no note under S20.00 after March 3 
 
 1837. If the public deposits in any bank should ex 
 * 60 Nilei. 281. 1 Curtis s Webster. 537. 
 
THE DEPOSIT AND DISTRIBUTION ACT. 327 
 
 eeed one fourth of the capital of the hank, it was to pay 
 two per cent interest on the excess. No transfer of de 
 posits from bank to bank was to be made by the Sec* 
 retary, except when and because the convenience of the 
 Treasury required it. In that case, he was to transfer 
 from one deposit bank to the next deposit bank in the 
 neighborhood, and so on ; i. e., not from one end of the 
 country to the other. As to distribution, the bill pro 
 vided that all the money in the Treasury, January 1, 
 1837, in excess of $5 million, was to be deposited with 
 the States in the proportion of their membership in the 
 electoral college, and in four instalments, January, April, 
 July, and October, 1837. The States were to give nego 
 tiable certificates of deposit, payable to the Secretary or 
 his assigns on demand. If the Secretary should negoti 
 ate any certificate, it should bear five per cent interest 
 from the date of assignment. While not assigned, the 
 certificates bore no interest. 1 
 
 In his message of 1836 Jackson offered a long and 
 very just criticism on this act. His objections were so 
 pertinent and so strong that we are forced to believe 
 that he did not veto only on account of the pending 
 election. A number of doubtful States were " improve 
 ment States ; " that is, they had plunged recklessly into 
 debt for canals, etc., which were not finished, and credit 
 was declining while the money market was growing 
 stringent. Those States were very eager (or, at least, 
 many people in them were) to get the money in the fed 
 eral Treasury with which to go on with the works. 
 Jackson argued in favor of the redaction and abolition 
 if all the taxes with which the compromise tariff allowed 
 Congress to deal, and he exposed completely the silly 
 i 50 Niles. 290 
 
328 ANDREW JACKSON, 
 
 device by which the whigs tried to justify distribution 
 separating the revenue in imagination, and pretending 
 to distribute the part which came from land. Jackson 
 made a lame attempt to explain the recommendations 
 which he had made in his early messages in favor of dis 
 tribution. He gave a table showing the effect of dis 
 tribution according to the ratio of membership in the 
 electoral college as compared with that on the ratio of 
 federal population. The small and new States gained 
 enormously by the plan adopted. 
 
 The best that can be said in excuse for distribution is 
 that the surplus was doing so much mischief that the 
 best thing to do with it was to throw it away. Unfort 
 unately, it could not be thrown away without doing 
 other harm. We have already noticed the shocks given 
 to the money market by the debt-paying operation. 1 The 
 removal of the deposits took place before that was com 
 pleted, and produced a new complication. The credit 
 relations formerly existing towards and around the great 
 bank were rudely cut off, and left to reconstruct them 
 selves as best they could. As soon as the new state of 
 things had become a little established, there was an accu 
 mulation of a great surplus, nominally in the deposit 
 banks, really loaned out to individuals, and fully en 
 gaged in speculative importations with credit for duties, 
 or in speculative contracts payment on which was to be 
 received in state bonds and scrip, or in still other inde 
 scribable repetitions of debt and contract. The capital, 
 when thus fully absorbed, was next all called in again, 
 in order to be transferred to the States. The States did 
 not intend to loan the capital, they intended to spend it 
 in public works ; that is, for the most part, corsideriug 
 1 See page 271. 
 
STATE LEPOS1T FUNDS. 329 
 
 the acttuil facts as they existed, to sink it entirely. In 
 one way or another these funds were squandered by all 
 the States, or worse than squandered, since they served 
 corruption and abuse. In 1877 it was declared that the 
 Controller of New York did not know what had become 
 of the deposit fund of the State. For many years the 
 commissioners of only nine counties had made any re 
 port. The Controller asked for $15,000 with which to 
 find out what had become of the $4 million which was 
 the share of New York. The fact that the funds were 
 squandered was the least of the purely financial evils at 
 tendant on distribution. The effect on all the relations 
 of capital, credit, and currency, that is, the effect on 
 every man s rights and interests, was the most far-reach 
 ing and serious consequence. 
 
 On the 1st of June, 1836, 1 the deposit banks stood 
 thus : capital, $46.4 million ; due to the Treasurer of 
 the United States, $37.2 million ; due to public officers, 
 $3.7 million ; circulation, $27.9 million ; other depos 
 its, $16 million; due to other banks, $17.1 million. 
 Contra : loans, $71.2 million ; domestic exchange, $37.1 
 million ; due from banks, $17.8 million ; notes of other 
 banks, $10.9 million ; specie, $10.4 million. It appears 
 then that these banks owed the United States $41 mill 
 ion, while their whole capital was only $46 million , 
 that is to say, the public deposits furnished them with a 
 capital nearly equal to their own. If their " other depos 
 its " had been all cash capital deposited, four elevenths 
 of all their loanable funds would have been public de 
 posits, which would have Wen " called " by the act of 
 June 23, 1836. It is also noti eabie what a large sum 
 is due to and from other banks, The feeling that banks 
 1 50 Niles, 313. 
 
830 AJVUKEW JACKSON. 
 
 ought to forbear demands on each other seems to hava 
 been an outgrowth of the war against the Bank of the 
 United States. The consequence was that the banks 
 were all locked together, and when the trouble came 
 they all went down together. 
 
 In December, 1836, Calhoun introduced another dis 
 tribution bill to distribute any surplus which might be in 
 the Treasury on January 1, 1838. It was finally added 
 as a " rider " to an appropriation bill, providing money 
 for fortifications. The Senate passed the bill and rider, 
 but the House rejected the whole. Clay also intro 
 duced another land distribution bill. Schemes of dis 
 tribution were great whig measures down to Tyler s 
 time. 
 
 The first and second instalments of the distribution 
 of 1837 were paid in specie, in January and April. 
 The commercial crisis began in March. The banks 
 suspended in May. The third instalment was paid in 
 notes in July. Before August the Treasury, which was 
 giving away $35 million, was in the greatest straits. 
 Van Buren was forced to call an extra session of Con 
 gress. That body had no more urgent business than to 
 forbid the Secretary to negotiate any of his " deposit " 
 certificates, or to call on any of the States for the money 
 deposited with them. The payment of the fourth in 
 stalment was postponed until January 1, 1839. At 
 that date there was debt, not surplus, and the fourth 
 instalment never was paid. Congress has never re 
 called any part of the other three instalments. Even 
 when the civil war broke out, it would not venture to do 
 Ihis. The amount of the three instalments, $28 mill 
 ion, stands on the books as unavailable funds. The 
 Secretary of the Treasury was obliged to draw his firs. 1 
 
SPECIE CURRENCY. 331 
 
 three instalments where he could get them, so he drew 
 them from the North and East, the banks of the South 
 west being really ruined. The fourth instalment re 
 mained due from the banks of the Southwestern States. 
 It was years before any part of it could be recovered. 
 The Southwestern States participated in the distribu- 
 ion of the three instalments. 1 
 
 Reference has be*en made above 2 to the plans of the 
 administration for a specie currency, as a complement 
 or offset to the removal of the deposits and destruction 
 of the bank. 3 Benton, who was the strongest bullionist 
 in the administration circle, was under an exaggerated 
 opinion of the efficacy of a metallic currency to prevent 
 abuses of credit. A metallic currency is not liable to 
 certain abuses, and it requires no skill for its manage 
 ment. In contrast with paper, therefore, it is surer and 
 safer. It, however, offers no guarantees against bad 
 banking. At most it could relieve the non-capitalist 
 wage-receiver from any direct share or risk in bad bank 
 ing. In contending against plutocracy democracy ought 
 to put a metallic currency high up on its banner. The 
 most subtle and inexcusable abuse of the public which 
 has ever been devised is that of granting to corporations, 
 without exacting an equivalent, the privilege of taking 
 out of the circulation the value currency, for which the 
 public must always pay, whether they get it or not, and 
 putting into it their own promises to pay. The subtlety 
 of this device and the fallacies which cluster about it and 
 impose upon uneducated people are a full justification 
 for men of democratic cenvictions, if they say : We 
 do not understand it well enough to control it. We 
 
 1 See table, 53 Niles, 35. 2 See page 317. 
 
 The G/o6 in46Nilea,33t. 
 
532 ANDJtEW JACJCSON. 
 
 cannot spend time and attention to watch it. We will 
 not allow it at all. Such confession of ignorance and 
 abnegation of power, however, is hardly in the spirit of 
 democracy. As a matter of history, the bullionist ten 
 dencies of a section of the Jacksonian party were at war 
 with other parts of the policy of the same party, notably 
 the distribution of the public deposits in eighty banks, 
 with encouragement to loan freely. 
 
 The opposition party, on the other hand, took up 
 cudgels for banks and bank paper, as if there would be 
 no currency if bank paper were withdrawn, and as if 
 there would be no credit if there were no banks of 
 issue. In their arguments against the bullionist party, 
 they talked as if they believed that, if the public Treas 
 ury did its own business, and did it in gold, it would get 
 possession of all the gold in the country, and that this 
 would give it control of all the credit in the country, 
 because the paper issue was based on gold. 
 
 In 1834 the administration was determined to have 
 a gold currency. The Committee on Ways and Means 
 reported, April 22, 1834, 1 that it was useless to coin 
 gold while the rating remained as it was fixed by the 
 laws of 1792 and 1793. The coinage law had often 
 been discussed before. Lowndes studied it and re 
 ported on it in 1819 ; J. Q. Adams in 1820. In 1830 
 Sanford, of New York, proposed a gold currency with 
 subsidiary silver. In the same year Inghain made a 
 report, recommending the ratio 1 : 15.625. In 1831 a 
 coinage bill passed the Senate, but was not acted on in 
 the House. At the session of 1831-32 White and Ver- 
 planck, of New York, wanted silver made sole money 
 On account of the difficulty and delicacy of the subject 
 1 46 Niles, 159. 
 
BULLION MARKET. 333 
 
 ao action had been reached. In 1834 a new interest 
 came in. The gold product of the Southern Alleghanies 
 was increasing. In 1832 there came to the mint from 
 that region $678,000 value of gold, and in 1833 
 $868,000. There was a protectionist movement in be 
 half of gold, the interest of which was that gold should 
 supplant silver, to which end an incorrect rating was 
 desired. 1 By the laws of 1792 and 1793 the gold eagle 
 weighed 270 grains and was \\ fine. The silver dollar 
 weighed 416 grains and was |f|| fine, giving a ratio of 
 1 : 15. The market ratio was, from 1792 to 1830, about 
 1 : 15.6. Therefore gold was not money, but merchan 
 dise. From 1828 to 1833 the average premium on gold 
 at Philadelphia was 4| per cent. 2 The reports before 
 Congress in 1834 showed that the real ratio was be 
 tween 1:15.6 and 1:15.8. The mint put 1:15.8 as 
 the highest ratio admissible. Duncan, of Illinois, in a 
 speech, showed that the ratio since 1821 had been, on an 
 average, 1:15.625. 8 These authorities were all disre 
 garded. 
 
 The administration politicians had determined to have 
 gold as a matter of taste, and the Southern gold interest 
 wanted it. The law of June 28, 1834, made the gold 
 eagle weigh 258 grains, of which 232 grains were to be 
 pure ; fineness, .8992. The silver dollar was unaltered. 
 The ratio of gold to silver, by this law, was therefore 
 1 : 16.002. The old eagles were worth in the new ones 
 $10.681, or old gold coins were worth 94.827 cents per 
 pennyweight in the new. Taking gold to silver at 
 1 : 15.625, an old silver dollar was worth $1.024 in the 
 new gold one, and as the silver dollar had been the 
 standard of prices and contracts, and the new gold one 
 
 1 Rrtguet, 236. Ragost 250. 47 Nites, 29 
 
334 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 now was such, the money of account had been clepre 
 elated 2| per cent. In the new standard a pound steiv 
 ling was worth, metal for metal, $4. 87073, and if the 
 old arbitrary par, 1 =: $4.44|, were 100, the true par 
 of exchange would be 109.59. Of course the supposed 
 gain to the gold producers from the incorrect rating was 
 a pure delusion. They got no more goods for their gold 
 than they would have got before, save in so far as the 
 United States added some small increment to the 
 previous demand in the whole world for gold. The 
 bullion brokers won by exchanging gold coins for silver 
 coins and exporting the latter. 
 
 In December, 1834, Woodbury, who had become 
 Secretary of the Treasury, gave the following statistics 
 of the circulation on December 1st : state bank paper, 
 from $57 million to $68 million ; Bank of the United 
 States paper, $16 million ; gold, $4 million ; silver, 
 $16 million ; total active circulation per head, $7.00. 
 In bank : specie, $18 million ; paper, $35 million ; 
 grand total per head, $10. OO. 1 The currency was then 
 in a very sound condition 2 
 
 The bank paper increased before the gold could be 
 brought into circulation, and the gold currency never 
 was made a fact. Silver rose to a premium, and was 
 melted or exported. 8 The new mint law therefore 
 produced the inconvenience of driving out silver just 
 when the administration was trying to abolish small 
 notes. A gold dollar had been proposed in the new 
 \aw, but the provision for it was stricken out. The 
 silver dollars then on hand appear to have been aL 
 flipped or worn. 4 The first which had been coined sinci 
 
 1 Document K. p. 64. 2 See page 318. 
 
 8 47 Niles, 147. * . 57 Niles, 393 
 
THE "SPECIE CIRCULAR." 835 
 
 1805 were coined in 1836. 1 They could not, howeve^ 
 be kept in circulation. By the act of January 18, 1837, 
 two tenths of a grain were added to the pure contents of 
 the eagle. This made the fineness just .900. The pure 
 contents of the silver dollar were left unaltered, but the 
 gross weight was reduced to 412 grains, so that the 
 fineness of this coin also was .900. The ratio of the 
 metals in the coinage was then 1:15.988. One pound 
 sterling was then worth $4.8665, or, if $4.44f be as 
 sumed 100, par of exchange was 109-f . As soon as the 
 crisis broke out, in 1837, all specie disappeared, and 
 notes and tickets for the smallest denominations came 
 into use. 
 
 At the session of 1835-36 Benton tried to get a reso 
 lution passed that nothing but gold or silver should be 
 taken for public lands. He did not succeed. After 
 Congress adjourned, July 11, 1836, the Secretary of the 
 Treasury issued, by the President s order, a circular to 
 all the land offices, known afterwards as the " specie 
 circular," ordering that only gold, or silver, or land 
 scrip should be received for public lands. The occa 
 sion for this order was serious. The sales of public 
 lands were increasing at an extraordinary rate. Lands 
 irere sold for $4.8 million in 1834 ; for $14.7 million 
 in 1835 ; for $24.8 million in 1836. The receipts for 
 the lands consisted largely of notes of irresponsible 
 banks. Land speculators organized a " bank," got it ap 
 pointed a deposit bank if they could, issued notes, bor 
 rowed them and bought land ; the notes were deposited, 
 they borrowed them again, and so on indefinitely. The 
 guarantees required of the deposit banks were idle 
 igainst such a scheme. There was, of course, little 
 1 51 Niles 241. 
 
536 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 specie in the West on account of the flood of papei 
 there. The circular caused inconvenience, and bad 
 temper on the part of those who were checked in theii 
 transactions. It also caused trouble and expense in 
 transporting specie from the East, and it no doubt 
 made a demand for specie in the East against the banks 
 there. In the existing state of the Eastern banks, this 
 demand was probably just the touch needed to push 
 down the rickety pretense of solvency which they were 
 keeping up. Specie could not be drawn in from Europe, 
 except by a great fall in prices and a large contraction 
 of the currency. Either through demand for specie or 
 fall in prices, the inflated currency must collapse, and 
 the crisis was at hand. Moreover, the banks were un 
 der notice to surrender, on January 1st, one fourth of 
 the public deposits. Thousands of people who were 
 carrying commodities or property for a rise, or who 
 were engaged in enterprises, to finish which they de 
 pended on bank loans, found themselves arrested by the 
 exorbitant rate for loans. The speculative period in 
 England had also run its course, and the inflation here 
 could no longer be sustained by borrowing there. From 
 all these facts, it is plain that the specie circular may 
 have played the role of the spark which produces an ex 
 plosion when all the conditions and materials have been 
 prepared ; but those who called the circular the cause of 
 the crisis made a mistake which is only too common in 
 the criticism of economic events. A similar circular 
 was issued in Adams s administration, which has hardly 
 beon noticed. 1 There was a great deal of outcry agains* 
 he President for high-handed proceedings in this mat 
 ter, V lt without reason. There were only two forms o 
 1 7 AdamH, 427. 
 
WINDING UP THE UNITED STATES BANK. 337 
 
 Currency which were at this time by law receivable for 
 ,ands, specie and notes of specie value. 1 The notes 
 ivhich were being received in the West were not of 
 specie value. 
 
 A bill to annul the specie circular passed the Senate, 
 41 to 5, and the House, 143 to 59. The President sent 
 it to the State Department at 11.45 P. M., March 3, 
 1837, and filed his reasons for not signing it, it having 
 been sent to him less than ten days before the end of 
 the session. His reason for not signing the bill was that 
 it was obscure. 
 
 The charter of the Bank of the United States was to 
 expire March 3, 1836. The history of the internal 
 affairs of the bank, after Tyler s report in 1834, was 
 not known to the public until 1841, when committees of 
 the stockholders published reports, from which we are 
 able to state the internal history of the bank in its true 
 historical connection. March 6, 1835, by a resolution of 
 the directors, the exchange committee was directed to 
 loan the capital of the bank, so fast as it should be re 
 leased, on call on stock collateral. The exchange com- 
 miteee, from this time on, secured entire control of the 
 bank. During the year 1835 branches were sold for 
 bonds having from one to five years to run. Down to 
 November, fifteen branches had been sold. 2 In No 
 vember projects began to be talked about for getting a 
 state charter from Pennsylvania. 3 There was a great 
 deal of jealousy at this time between New York and 
 Philadelphia. There was a proposition for a great fifty- 
 million-dollar bank at New York, and it seemed that if 
 
 1 Report by Silas Wright, May 16 ^838, with history of the 
 &W8 about currency receivable at the Treasury, 55 Niles, iu6 
 a 49 Niles, 182. 8 49 Niles, 162. 
 
B38 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 Philadelphia lost her bank, and New York got one, th* 
 financial hegemony would be permanently transferred 
 In December, 1835, after the great fire in New York, 
 the Bank of the United States was asked to give aid. It 
 did so by opening credits for $2 million in favor of the 
 insurance companies. 1 
 
 The act of the Pennsylvania Legislature, by which 
 the United States Bank of Pennsylvania was chartered, 
 is, on its face, a piece of corrupt legislation. Its cor 
 ruption was addressed to the people of the State, not to 
 private individuals. It comprised three projects in an 
 obvious log-rolling combination, remission of taxes, 
 public improvements, and bank charter. The bank was 
 chartered 2 for thirty years. It was to pay a bonus of 
 $2 million, pay $100,000 per year for twenty years for 
 schools, loan the State not over a million a year in tem 
 porary loans at four per cent, and subscribe $640,000 
 to railroads and turnpikes. Personal taxes were re 
 pealed by other sections of the bill, and $1,368,147 
 were appropriated, out of the bank bonus, for various 
 canals and turnpikes. Either this bill was corruptly 
 put together to win strength by enlisting local and per 
 sonal interests in favor of it, or else the Pennsylvanians, 
 having got their big bank to themselves, set to work to 
 plunder it. The charter passed the Senate, 19 to 12, 
 *nd the House, 57 to 30. 8 Inasmuch as the democrats 
 nad a majority in the Senate, it was charged that private 
 corruption had passed the bill. An investigation re 
 sulted in nothing. There was found, in 1841, an entry, 
 of about the date of the charter, of $400,000 expendi 
 ture, vouchers for which could not be produced. 4 Biddle 
 
 A *^ Niles, 307. 2 49 Niles, 377, 396. 
 
 49 Niles, 434. 4 Second report, 1841, 60 Niles, 20i 
 
RETROSPECT OF THE BANK WAR. 33S 
 
 represented the case as if the proposition that the State 
 should charter the bank had originated with leading 
 members of the Legislature, who asked the bank if it 
 would accept a state charter. 1 The act was dated 
 February 18, 1836. The bank accepted the charter, 
 and presented a service of plate to Biddle. 2 
 
 In the story of the bank war, which has been given 
 in the preceding pages, the reader has perceived that 
 the writer does not believe that Jackson s administration 
 had a case against the bank, or that the charges it made 
 were proven. To say this is to say that Jackson s ad 
 ministration unjustly, passionately, ignorantly, and with 
 out regard to truth assailed a great and valuable 
 financial institution, and calumniated its management. 
 Such was the opinion of people of that generation, at 
 least until March 3, 1836. Jackson s charges against 
 the bank were held to be not proven. The effect of 
 them naturally was to make confidence in the bank 
 blind and deaf. In January, 1836, when it was ex 
 pected that the bank would wind up in two months, its 
 stock stood at 116. For four years afterwards, nothing 
 seemed able to destroy public confidence in the bank. 
 One thing alone suggests a doubt, and makes one hold 
 back from the adoption of a positive judgment in favor 
 of the bank, even down to the end of its national char 
 ter : that is, a doubt of Biddle s sincerity. If he was 
 not sincere, we have no measure for the degree of mis- 
 epresentation there may have been in his plausible 
 statements and explanations, or for how much may have 
 been hidden under the financial expositions he was so 
 fond of making, and which were, IIKC the expositions of 
 t juggler, meant to mystify the audience still more. 
 
 * Biddle to Adams, 51 Niles, 230. 2 4 Niles, 441. 
 
840 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 The final catastrophe of the bank lias always affected 
 the judgment which all students of its history have 
 formed of the merits of its struggle with Jackson. The 
 Jackson men always claimed that the end proved that 
 Jackson and his coterie were right all the time. This 
 has probably been the general verdict. The whigs felt 
 the weight of the inference, and they tried to distin 
 guish between the Bank of the United States and the 
 United States Bank of Pennsylvania. A little reflec 
 tion will show that both these views are erroneous. A 
 bank may go on well and be sound for twenty years, 
 and then go wrong. It may make mistakes and re 
 cover, and then make more mistakes and perish. We 
 must go by the facts all the way along. The state bank 
 and the national bank of the United States had an 
 unbroken life. The attempt to save one and condemn 
 the other, aside from an investigation of the merits, is 
 a partisan proceeding. It is not sound historically or 
 financially. We have now reached as just an opinion 
 as we can form about the bank up to the time of its 
 state charter. 
 
 The bank started on its new career under very bad 
 auspices. It never threw off the suspicion which at 
 tached to its legislative birth. It was too large for its 
 new sphere, yet pride prevented its reduction. It had 
 other aims than to win profits by sound banking. It 
 wanted to prove itself necessary, or to show itself a 
 public benefactor, or to sustain the rivalry of Philadel 
 phia with New York. Biddle, freed from the restraints 
 of the old organization, launched out into sensational 
 banking, and tested his theories of banking to th* 
 utmost. There is scarcely anything vicious and un 
 sound in banking which the great bank did not illustrate 
 
UNITED STATES BANK OF PENNSYLVANIA. 34} 
 
 during the next five years. Its officers plundered it. 
 Its end was so ignominious that no one wanted to re 
 member that he had ever believed in it. 
 
 On the 1st of February, 1836, the account of the 
 bank l showed a surplus of $7.8 million, which was ex 
 pected to pay off the bonus, notes, etc. There were $20 
 million loaned on stocks, and there was the state bonus, 
 the government stock, and the circulation of the old 
 bank to be paid. New stock was sold to pay off the 
 government stock. 1 million were borrowed in Lon 
 don, and 12.5 million francs in Paris. 2 Jaudon was 
 sent to England as agent of the bank. In May, the 
 money market at New York being very stringent, the 
 bank was asked for aid, which it gave. 8 By an act of 
 June 15, 1836, Congress repealed the 14th section of 
 the bank charter. This put an end to the receipt of 
 the notes of the old bank by the Treasury, and crippled 
 the circulation of the bank. In October there was a 
 report that the bank would surrender its state charter 
 if it could get back its bonus. 4 In that same month, 
 however, Biddle wrote another letter to Adams to show 
 the wrong of trying to repeal the state charter. June 
 23d, Congress authorized the Secretary of the Treasury 
 to treat with the bank for the payment of the govern 
 ment stock. No agreement was reached, but, February 
 25, 1837, the bank sent a memorial to the Speaker, in 
 which it offered to pay off the public shares, at $115.58 
 per share, if four instalments, September, 1837-38- 
 3940. This proposition was accepted March 3, 1837, 
 ind the instalments were all paid. 
 
 In his message, 1836, Jackson discharged a last 
 
 i 60 Nilcs, 106. 2 First report, 841, 60 Niles, 106. 
 
 50 Niles, 267. 4 51 Niles, 113. 
 
342 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 broadside at the bank. He seemed to be as angry thai 
 the bank had escaped annihilation as he was in 1818 
 that Billy Bowlegs got across the Suwanee river. He 
 complained that the bank had not paid off the public 
 stock, and was reissuing its old notes. This latter pro 
 ceeding was stopped by an act of July 6, 1838. The 
 bank failed three times during the years of commercial 
 distress which followed, namely, May 10, 1837, with all 
 the other banks ; October 9, 1839, when it carried down 
 with it all which had resumed, except those in New 
 York and a few in New England ; February 4, 1841, 
 when it was entirely ruined. Its stockholders lost all 
 their capital. 
 
 Biddle had resigned March 29, 1839, but he had been 
 so identified with the bank that its ruin was attributed 
 to him. He fell into disgrace. He was arraigned for 
 conspiracy to plunder the stockholders, but escaped on 
 a technicality. He died, insolvent and broken-hearted, 
 February 27, 1844, aged fifty-eight. 1 
 
 Webster declared, in 1842, that a bank of the United 
 States founded on a private subscription was an " obso 
 lete idea ; " 2 but perhaps the unkindest cut of all was 
 that the Whig Almanac for 1843 could refer to " Nick 
 Biddle " as a rascal, and to " his bank " as one which 
 was " corruptly managed." 
 
 1 Ingersoll, 285 ; a very touching description of Biddle * lad 
 rents. 
 
 2 Webster s Works, 135. 
 
CHAPTER XV. 
 
 THE KEW SPIRIT IN VARIOUS POINTS OF FOREIGN AD 
 DOMESTIC POLICY. 
 
 THE neglect of France to fulfil the stipulations of the 
 treaty of July 4, 1831, offered the occasion for the most 
 important diplomatic negotiation in which Jackson was 
 engaged. In his message of 1834, he gave a full ac 
 count of the treaty and of the neglect of the French 
 Chambers, at two sessions, to appropriate money to meet 
 engagements which had been made, on behalf of the 
 French nation, by the constitutional authorities of 
 France. The King had shown strong personal interest 
 in the matter, 1 and had exerted himself to secure a 
 satisfactory settlement and to prevent any bad feeling 
 from arising between the two nations. In the mean 
 time the United States had reduced the duties on wine, 
 according to the engagement in the treaty, by an act of 
 July 13, 1832, and France was getting the benefit of the 
 treaty without performing her share of it. It seemed to 
 Jackson that this state of things called for spirited 
 action. Moreover, Livingston wrote a very important 
 dispatch from Paris, November 22, 1834, 2 in which he 
 laid that there was a disposition in France to wait and 
 lee what the message would be ; also that the moderate 
 
 1 Livingston s dispatch, 47 Nilcs, 417 Hires came hcroe in 
 1831. Livingston went out in 1833. 
 * 47Nile8, 417. 
 
44 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 tone of the United States up to this time had had a bad 
 effect. " From all this you may imagine the anxiety I 
 shall feel for the arrival of the President s message. 
 On its tone will depend very much, not only the pay 
 ment of our claims, but our national reputation for 
 energy." If Jackson had made a bad effect by toe 
 great moderation, that was precisely the error he knev 
 b.ow to correct, and our " reputation for energy " wa<? 
 just what he was prepared to sustain. Accordingly he 
 prepared his message for 1834. The Due de Broglie, 
 the French minister, afterwards declared that the ap 
 propriation would have been passed in December, 1834, 
 if copies of this message had not been just then received. 
 Jackson was under erroneous information as to the time 
 of meeting of the French Chambers. The Due de 
 Broglie had also, in the March previous, when the bill 
 drawn by the American Treasury went to protest, found 
 fault with the American government for selling the bill 
 to a bank, instead of receiving the money through a 
 liplomatic agent. 1 He argued that the United States 
 Dught not to have regarded the treaty as definitive until 
 all the organs of the French government had assented to 
 it. In his message, before mentioned, Jackson suggested 
 that, if Congress inferred from the inaction of France 
 that she did not intend to fulfil the treaty, it might pro 
 ceed to measures of coercion, amongst which he men 
 tioned, as suitable and u peaceable," reprisals. He 
 proposed that a law should be passed authorizing re 
 prisals, if France should neglect the fulfilment of the 
 reaty beyond a certain time. He added that this sug 
 gestion ought not to be regarded by France as a 
 * menace." Chevalier thought that Jackson, having 
 i 47 Niles, 327. 
 
RELATIONS WITH FRANCE. 345 
 
 nad Ids bout with the nullifiers, found his hlood heatea 
 and his appetite for war reawakened ; that he satisfied 
 this appetite first in the bank war, and then in tho 
 difficulty with France. 1 
 
 The message caused great excitement in France. 
 The French journals all regarded it as a menace. 
 J he feeling was aroused that France could not then pay 
 without dishonor. 2 Additional embarrassment arose 
 from the fact that the King s active interest was re 
 vealed by the documents published in America. The 
 bad temper of the French was still further increased 
 when they read Rives s letters, in which he seemed to 
 boast of having outwitted the French minister, and 
 Livingston s letter, in which he suggested that France 
 never would pay unless the message brought her be 
 havior before Congress in a spirited way. The Com 
 mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate made a 
 report, 8 in which they expressed full agreement with the 
 President on all the essential points, but they regarded 
 the proposition to employ reprisals as premature, and 
 likely to embarrass the negotiations. In the House two 
 reports were made, 4 but they were not important. The 
 Senate voted unanimously, January 14, 1835, that it 
 was not expedient to adopt any legi e ative measures in re 
 gard to the relations with France. In the House, J. Q. 
 Adams took the lead in sustaining Jackson s position, 
 and was largely influential in securing the adoption by 
 the House, unanimously, March 2, 1835, of a resolution 
 mat the execution of the treaty should be insisted on, 
 The French minister tc the United States was recalled 
 
 1 Chevalier, 177. See his estimate of Jackson s character. 
 
 2 French newspapers quoted, 47 Niles, 327. 
 
 47 Niles, 344. 4 48 Niles, 5 and 6. 
 
846 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 His final note of January 14, 1835, was not received bj 
 Jackson, but was referred back to tbe French govern 
 ment. They approved of it. 
 
 In December, 1834, the French Chambers rejected a 
 bill appropriating money to pay the indemnities. A 
 cabinet crisis followed, not on account of this vote, but 
 also not entirely, as it appears, without reference to it. 
 The Due de Broglie, however, returned to office with 
 thq understanding that provision was to be made for 
 fulfilling the treaty. April 25, 1835, the French 
 Chambers passed the appropriation, but with a condi 
 tion that no money should be paid until " satisfactory 
 explanations " of the President s message of 1834 
 should be received. The original condition in the law 
 was, "until it shall have been ascertained that the 
 government of the United States has adopted no meas 
 ures injurious to French interests ; " l but it was after 
 wards changed to the other form 2 by amendment. 
 Livingston wrote a note, April 25, 1835, declaring that 
 the message was a domestic document, for which no 
 responsibility to any foreign power would be admitted ; 
 that the message of 1834 itself contained a sufficient 
 disclaimer ; and f hat the condition which had been in 
 corporated in the act of the French Chambers would pre 
 vent it from being a satisfactory settlement. 8 He then 
 came home. In Congress, whose session ended March 
 4th, an amendment to the usual appropriation bill for 
 fortifications was proposed, by which $3 million were 
 appropriated for extraordinary expenditures for defence, 
 in case such should become necessary before the next 
 session. The whole bill was lost, borne down, as it ap 
 pears, by this amendment. As the relations with Franci 
 i 47 Niles, 436. 2 48 Niles, 220. 3 48 Niles, 318. 
 
RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATION*. 347 
 
 were still more critical when Congress next met, and 
 nothing had been done for defence on account of the 
 failure of that bill, a great deal of crimination and re 
 crimination took place in an effort to fix the blame 
 and responsibility. No result was reached. It is an 
 interesting instance of the working of the element of 
 responsibility under the American system. 1 
 
 In the message of 1835 Jackson reviewed the whole 
 affair, insisted that he had never used menace, and 
 alluded to Livingston s final note to the French minister 
 as having clearly so stated. He said that he would 
 never apologize. A long dispatch of the Due de Brog- 
 lie to the French charge here, in June, 1835, set forth 
 the French case. It was read to Forsyth, but he de 
 clined to receive a copy. 2 Jackson directed Barton, 
 charge d affaires at Paris, to make a specific inquiry 
 what France intended to do. The Due de Broglie re 
 plied that France would pay whenever the United 
 States would say that it regretted the misunderstanding, 
 that the misunderstanding arose from mistake, that the 
 good faith of France had not been questioned, and that 
 no menace was ever intended. This question and 
 answer were exchanged in October, 1835. 3 Barton 
 came home in January, 1836, and Pageot, the French 
 charge, was recalled at the same time, so that diplomatic 
 relations were entirely broken off. 
 
 January 18, 1836, Jackson sent in a special message 
 on the relations with France, 4 sending copies of Bar 
 ton s correspondence. Livingston toned down 5 this 
 message somewhat from the first intention ; nevertheless 
 Jackson again recommended coercive measures. He 
 
 i 49 Niles, 446. 2 49 N ; les, 3>3. 3 49 Niles, S47. 
 
 * 49 Niles 345. 8 Hunt s Livingston^ 428. 
 
548 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 proposed to exclude French ships and products from the 
 ports of the United States ; that is to say, his reserve 
 of force by which to sustain his spirited diplomacy waa 
 the old, imbecile, and worn-out device of a commercial 
 war. He said that France was strengthening her navy ; 
 if against us, an apology from us was out of the ques 
 tion. 
 
 Thus this question had been pushed into the worst 
 kind of a diplomatic dead-lock, out of which neither 
 party could advance without fighting, and neither could 
 recede without (supposed) dishonor. That is the evil 
 of spirited diplomacy, for good diplomacy would avoid 
 such a dead-lock as one of the worst blunders possible 
 in the profession. The English government now inter 
 vened, and offered its good offices as mediator. The 
 French government declared to the English that the 
 President s message of 1835 had removed the bad im 
 pressions of that of 1834. This declaration was made 
 known to Forsyth by the English minister at Washing 
 ton, and was transmitted to Congress, with a message, 
 by the President, February 22, 1836. 1 It was very 
 good-natured of France to regard the message of 1835 
 PS compliance with the demands which had been made 
 to Barton in October. She simply covered her retreat, 
 for she had been in the wrong on the merits of the 
 question from the beginning, and she justly bore half 
 the blame of the diplomatic dead-lock. March 19, 
 1836, the King of France ordered four instalments of 
 the indemnity to be paid at once, in order to settle the 
 matter down to date, according to the terms of the 
 treaty 
 
 Barry, the Postmaster-General, was the only membei 
 1 49 Niles, 442, 
 
THE POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT. 349 
 
 &t the cabinet retained in 1831. In his hands the ad 
 ministration of the Post-Office Department, both in its 
 business and its finance, steadily declined. The com 
 plaints in 1834-35 of the irregularity and delay of the 
 mails were very numerous and bitter. The department 
 was also running in arrears in its finances. Both Houses 
 of Congress, at the session of 1834-35, investigated the 
 department. Barry s personal honesty does not seem 
 to have been questioned, but his chief clerk, Rev. 
 Obadiah B. Brown, 1 became for the time a very distin 
 guished man, on account of relations with mail contract 
 ors, which, if. innocent, were very improper. The 
 contractors had made use of familiar devices, " straw- 
 bids," u unbalanced bids," " expedited service," etc., if 
 not of corrupt influences on subordinates in the depart 
 ment, by which devices shrewd men take advantage of 
 inefficient public officers. 2 Barry refused to answer 
 some of the questions put to him, and, after the fashion 
 of the time, published an " Appeal to the American 
 People," 8 instead. Brown resigned in an official docu 
 ment, imitated apparently from Van Buren s resignation 
 of 1831. 4 He also published an " Appeal," etc. Jack 
 son selected Kendall for Barry s successor, May 1, 1835. 
 Kendall s administrative ability was great, and he 
 speedily reorganized the department, and restored its 
 efficiency. There was great doubt, however, when he 
 was appointed, whether he would be confirmed. Barry 
 was sent as minister to Spain, but died on his way 
 thither. 
 
 The emancipation of the slaves in the British West 
 Indies in 1833 gave a great impulse in the United 
 
 1 See page 377. 47 Niles, 381, 393. 
 
 8 46 Niles, 338. * 47 Niles. 39fi. 
 
850 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 States to abolition sentiment and effort, which had not 
 been active since the compromise of 1820 was adopted 
 The new spirit was manifested in the organization of 
 societies, distribution of pamphlets and newspapers, peti 
 tions to Congress to abolish slavery in the District of 
 Columbia, and other forms of agitation. The first 
 efforts of this kind were frowned down all over the 
 North, but the general movement grew. The senti 
 ments of democracy and of religion were both against 
 slavery, and every step which was taken to arrest the 
 agitation the gag law in Congress, by which peti 
 tions about slavery were practically shut out, and the 
 mob violence which was employed against the agitators 
 only strengthened it. Towards the end of Jackson s 
 second administration the antislavery agitation was a 
 real growing movement, and an element in the social 
 and civil life of the nation. The story of these things 
 has been often told in detail, and may be passed over 
 here. The history of the United States has, in fact, 
 been studied by the present generation chiefly with re 
 gard to the slavery question. Jackson s administration 
 was not called upon to act on the slavery issue save in 
 one or two points. 
 
 The abolition societies adopted the policy of sending 
 documents, papers, and pictures against slavery to the 
 Southern States. If the intention was, as was charged, 
 to incite the slaves to revolt, the device, as it seems to 
 us now, must have fallen far short of its object, for the 
 chance that anything could get from the post-office into 
 the hands of a black man, without going through the 
 hands of a white ma*i, was poor indeed. These publica 
 tions, however, caused a panic and a wild indignation in 
 Ihe South. The postmaster at Charleston, being led 
 
KENDALL S ORDER ABOUT THE MAILS. 351 
 
 nred by the people there on his duty, turned to the 
 Postmaster-General for orders. August 4, 1835, Ken 
 dall gave an ambiguous reply, so far as orders were 
 concerned. He, however, threw the postmaster on his 
 own discretion, and then said for himself, " By no act 
 or direction of mine, official or private, could I be in 
 duced to aid, knowingly, in giving circulation to papers 
 of this description, directly or indirectly " (i. e., papers 
 alleged by the postmaster to be " the most inflamma 
 tory and incendiary, and insurrectionary to the last 
 degree "). " We owe an obligation to the laws, but a 
 higher one to the communities in which we live, and, if 
 the former be perverted to destroy the latter, it is pa 
 triotism to disregard them. Entertaining these views, 
 I cannot sanction, and will not condemn, the step you 
 have taken " [in refusing to deliver certain mail-matter]. 
 August 22d Kendall wrote a long letter to Gouverneur, 
 postmaster at New York, elaborating and defending his 
 position. 1 Politics were already combined with the 
 slavery question in this incident. Kendall s confirma 
 tion by the Senate was very doubtful, and Van Buren s 
 Southern support was ready to abandon him at a mo 
 ment s notice if slavery came into account. Kendall 
 won enough Southern votes to carry his confirmation. 
 
 When J. Q. Adams, in 1819, was negotiating with 
 the Spanish minister the treaty by which the western 
 boundary of the United States was defined, he could get 
 no encouragement from Monroe or any of his ministers 
 x> try to push the boundary westwards. 2 Monroe ap 
 peared to think the United States would be weakened 
 by including territory west of the Sabine. 8 It was not 
 long, however, before the Southern slave-holding in 
 
 i 49 Niles, 8. 2 See page 67 8 U Ada m 348- 
 
352 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 tcrest began to see the error of this view of the matter 
 After the Missouri Compromise was adopted, it appeared 
 that wild land for the formation of new free States was 
 owned north of that line from the Mississippi to the 
 Pacific, while south of that line similar land, available 
 for new slave States, extended only to the Sabine and 
 the 100 degree meridian. Only a few persons, however, 
 as yet perceived this view of the matter. In 1819 (June 
 23d), one James Long proclaimed the independence of 
 Texas. 1 In 1821 Austin colonized three hundred famil 
 ies in Texas, by permission of Mexico. In 1826 some 
 American immigrants at Nacogdoches declared Texas 
 independent. In 1824 the Emperor of Russia tried to 
 establish exclusive control over the Northern Pacific, 
 and the attention of the most far-seeing statesmen was 
 drawn to the interests of the United States in the North 
 west and on the Pacific. It seems necessary to bear in 
 mind, all through the history of the annexation of Texas, 
 the connection of that question with the acquisition of 
 California, including the port of San Francisco, which 
 was then the chief reason for wanting California. 
 Adams, when President (1827), sent to Poinsett, min 
 ister of the United States in Mexico, orders to try to 
 buy Texas for a million dollars. Poinsett did not 
 make the attempt. He gave as his reason the danger 
 of irritating Mexico by a proposition which was sure to 
 be rejected. 2 
 
 In 1824 Mexico took the first steps towards the aboli 
 tion of slavery. By a decree of September 15, 1829 
 
 1 17 Niles, 31 ; Jay. 
 
 2 The attempt to buy Texas seems to have been Clay s act 
 Cf . 7 Adams, 239, 240; 9 Adams, 379; especially 11 AJama 
 MS, 
 
SLAVERY IN TEXAS. 853 
 
 slavery was definitively abolished. In the mean time, 
 Americans had emigrated to Texas, chiefly from the 
 Southern States, and had taken slaves thither. They 
 resisted the abolition decree, and the Mexican govern 
 ment saw itself forced to except the State of Texas 
 from the decree. It, however, united Texas with Coa- 
 huila, as a means of holding the foreign and insubor 
 dinate settlers in check. The abolition of slavery by 
 Mexico affected the Southern States doubly : first, it 
 lessened the area open to slavery ; second, it put a free 
 State on the flank and rear of the slave territory. The 
 interest of the Southwestern States in the independence 
 of Texas, or its annexation, was at once aroused. A 
 fanciful doctrine, in the taste of the Southwestern states 
 men, was immediately invented to give a basis for 
 stump-speaking in defence of a real act of violence. It 
 was declared that the United States must RE-annex what 
 had once been maliciously given away by a Northern 
 statesman. The gravity and care with which re-ami PX- 
 ation was talked about had its parallel only in the 
 theatrical legislation of nullification. In 1780 Spain 
 claimed that the eastern boundary of Louisiana was such 
 as to include nearly all the present State of Alabama, 
 and the Hiawasee, Tennessee, Clinch, and Cumberland 
 rivers through what is now Tennessee and Kentucky. 1 
 Inside of this claim she would take what she could get. 
 The boundaries to the westward were still more vague. 
 Therefore, any one who chose to dabble In the author 
 ities could prove anything he liked, and think himself 
 no contemptible scholar into the bargain. " Texas," as 
 a State of the Mexican confederation, embraced only 
 1 Ramsey, 523 
 
 m 
 
354 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 the southeastern corner of the territory now included 
 in the State of that name. 1 
 
 In the summer of 1829 Van Buren sent instructions 
 to Poinsett to try to buy Texas, and five million dollars 
 were offered for it. In 1830 Mexico, which had at first 
 welcomed the immigrants, forbade Americans to settle 
 in Texas. Of course this law had no effect. 
 
 We are indebted to a Di. Mayo, who was a hanger-on 
 at Washington during Jackson s tune, for a little book 
 in which most of the Texas intrigue is laid bare. Mayo 
 was in the way of picking up certain information, and 
 more came to him by accident. He gives also many 
 documents. He was intimate with ex-Governor Samuel 
 Houston, of Tennessee, an old companion in arms of 
 Jackson, who came to Washington in 1829 to get Jack 
 son s connivance at an enterprise which Houston had 
 in mind for revolutionizing Texas. That Jackson did 
 connive at this enterprise, just as he supposed Monroe 
 connived at his own proceedings in Florida, cannot be 
 established by proof, but it is sustained by very strong 
 inference. 3 
 
 April 5, 1832, two treaties with Mexico were pub 
 lished, one of commerce and one of boundaries, 
 confirming the boundary of the Florida treaty. 
 
 In 1833 a revolution broke out in Mexico, which 
 threw the whole country into anarchy, Texas with th 
 rest. Santa Anna gradually established his authority. 
 
 1 Carey & Lea s Atlas, 1822. Cf. Carey s map of 1814. ou 
 which Texas eems to be delineated as extending from the Nue- 
 ces to the Sabine. 
 
 2 See 11 Adams, 41, 347, 357, 363; and his I 
 Speech, of June, 1838. Wise (Decades, 148), affirms it very pos 
 itively. He is better authority on this point than on some oth 
 bout which he is very positive, e. g., the Adams-Clay bargain. 
 
INDEPENDENCE OF TEXAS. 355 
 
 [n the autumn of 1835 he tried to extend it over 
 Texas, but he met with armed resistance, and was de 
 feated. In July, 1835, Jackson authorized an offer of 
 an additional half million dollars if Mexico would allow 
 the boundary, after the cession of Texas, to follow the 
 Rio Grande up to the thirty-seventh degree, and then 
 run on that parallel to the Pacific. 1 All propositions 
 to purchase failed. After the Texans proved able to 
 beat the Mexicans in battle, no further propositions of 
 that kind were made. 
 
 March 2, 1830, a Declaration of Independence, on 
 behalf of Texas, was adopted. March 6th the fort of 
 the Alamo was taken by the Mexicans, and its de 
 fenders massacred. On the 27th Colonels Fannin and 
 Ward, with other Texan (or American) prisoners, were 
 massacred. On the 17th of March the Constitution of 
 Texas was adopted. It contained the strongest pro 
 visions in favor of slavery. The massacres aroused 
 great indignation in the Southwest, and hundreds of 
 adventurers hastened to Texas, where Houston was now 
 chief in command, to help him win independence. 2 The 
 decisive battle was fought at San Jacinto April 21st, 
 when Santa Anna was routed and captured. He prom 
 ised everything in captivity, but cancelled his promises 
 after he was released. In June, 1836, Judge Catron 
 wrote to Webster, from Tennessee, that the spirit was 
 abroad through the whole Mississippi Valley to march 
 to Texas. 8 Perh aps the disposition to march was not 
 BO strong elsewhere, but immense speculations in land 
 Had already been organized, and great speculatiors in 
 
 1 11 Adams, 362. 2 Jav. 28. 
 
 3 1 Webster s Correspondence, 523. 
 
856 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 Texan 1 securities soon after began, which enlisted th 
 pecuniary interests of great numbers of people in the 
 independence of Texas. 
 
 A correspondence now began between the representa 
 tives of the governments of the United States and 
 Mexico, which no American ought to read without 
 shame. It would be hard to find an equally gross in 
 stance of bullying on the part of a large State towards a 
 small one. Jackson had ordered that General Gaines 
 should enter the territory of Texas, and march to 
 Nacogdoches, if he thought there was any danger of 
 hostilities on the part of the Indians, and if there was 
 suspicion that the Mexican general was stirring up the 
 Indians to war on the United States. Here we have 
 another reminiscence of Florida revived. Gaines under 
 stood his orders, and entered the Mexican territory. 
 Understanding also, no doubt, that the Jacksonian pro 
 ceedings of 1818 had now been legitimized as the cor 
 rect American line of procedure for a military officer, 
 he called on the governors of the neighboring States for 
 militia. Although companies were forming and march 
 ing to Texas under full organization, this " call " was 
 overruled by the War Department. The energetic re 
 monstrances of the Mexican minister finally led to an 
 >rder to Gaines to retire from Texan territory, not, 
 aowever, until after the Mexican minister had broken 
 off diplomatic relations. 
 
 In July, 183G, both Houses voted, fhe Senate unam 
 inously, that the independence of Texas ought to be 
 acknowledged as soon as Texas had proved that she 
 
 The first issue of Texan .bonds was authorized in Novembei 
 \836. The first Treasury notes were issued November 1, 1837 
 Gouge s Texas, 57, 71.) 
 
DEFINITION OF "TEXAS." 357 
 
 Gould maintain it. Texas was already represented by 
 agents applying for annexation. Jackson recommended 
 longer delay in a message of December 21, 1836. The 
 fact was that the geographical definition of " Texas " 
 was not yet satisfactorily established, and it was not de 
 Birable to have annexation settled too soon. An act 
 was passed by the Legislature of Texas, December 19, 
 1 836, by which the Rio Grande was declared to be the 
 western boundary of Texas. In his message of Decem 
 ber 22d Jackson submitted the report of his agent that 
 the boundaries of Texas, before the last revolution, were 
 the Nueces, the Red, and the Sabine rivers, but that 
 she now claimed as her boundary the Rio del Norte to 
 its source, and from that point eastward and south 
 ward the existing boundary of the United States. 1 That 
 is as if Maine should secede and claim that her boun 
 daries w.ere the Alleghanies and the Potomac. Jackson s 
 message distinctly pointed out that in taking Texas then, 
 or later, the United States would take her with her new 
 boundary claims. That is as if Maine should join the 
 Dominion of Canada, and England should set up a claim 
 to the New England and Middle States based on the 
 " declaration " of Maine above supposed. The policy 
 was to keep the Texas question open until California 
 could be obtained. The Mexican war ultimately be 
 came necessary for that purpose, and for no other ; for 
 Texas, even to the Rio Grande, could have been ob 
 tained without it. 2 Another reason for delay was that 
 opposition to the annexation of Texas had been aroused 
 in the North, and there was not jt^ strength enough to 
 carry it. May 25, 1836, Adams 8 made a speech against 
 
 1 Document L. 
 
 2 3 Von Hoist, 67, 81, 103, 108, 112; Jay, 13C 
 
 50 Niles, 276 
 
358 ANDKEW JACKSON. 
 
 a war with Mexico to conquer Texas, which had great 
 influence in the North. 
 
 March 1, 1837, the Senate recognized the indepen 
 dence of Texas, 23 to 19. The House did not concur in 
 full form, hut in effect. 
 
 In 1836 the government of the United States opened 
 a new battery against that of Mexico in the shape of a 
 series of claims and charges. The diplomatic agent of 
 the former power, Powhatan Ellis, performed his duties 
 in such a rude and peremptory manner that one is forced 
 to suspect that he acted by orders, especially as his 
 rank was only that of charge d affaires. The charges 
 were at first 15 in number, then 46, then 57. They 
 were frivolous and forced, and bear the character of at 
 tempts to make a quarrel. 1 Ellis abruptly came home. 
 In August, 1837, the agent of Texas, Memucan Hunt, 
 made a formal proposal for annexation. Van Buren 
 declined it. Mexico next proposed a new negotiation 
 with arbitration in regard to the claims and charges 
 made against her by the United States. The opposition 
 to annexation in the North had grown so strong that de 
 lay was necessary, and negotiations were opened which 
 resulted in the convention of August 17, 1840. Mexico 
 i ,ould not fulfil the engagements she entered into in that 
 treaty, or in a subsequent one of 1843, and so the ques 
 tion, was reopened, and finally was manoeuvred into a 
 war. It appears that Van "Buren had the feeling which 
 any President will be sure to have, adverse to any war 
 during his administration. The Mexican war was forced 
 wii by a cabinet intrigue, and Tyler forced it on Polk. 
 
 The Texas intrigue and the Mexican war were full ol 
 Jacksonian acts and principles. There are constanJ 
 1 Jay, 36 fg. 
 
BRTSCOE vs. BANK OF KENTUCKY. 359 
 
 wtcroppings of the old Seminole war proceedings and 
 doctrines. The army and navy were corrupted by 
 swagger and insubordination, and by the anxiety of the 
 officers to win popularity by the methods of which Jack 
 son had set the example. 1 The filibustering spirit, one 
 law for our3elves and another for every one else, gained 
 a popularity for which Jackson was much to blame. 
 During the Texas intrigue Jackson engaged in private 
 and personal correspondence on public questions with 
 diplomatic agents, who were not always accredited, after 
 the fashion of Louis XV. in the King s Secret. 2 His 
 " spirited diplomacy " was reduced to a farce when two 
 such men as Polk and Buchanan tried to employ it in 
 the Oregon question. 
 
 In 1834 the case of Briscoe vs. The Bank of the Com 
 monwealth of Kentucky was argued before the Supreme 
 Court. 3 Briscoe and others gave a note, in 1830, 
 which they did not pay at maturity. In the state Cir 
 cuit Court, Briscoe pleaded " no consideration," on the 
 ground that the note was given for a loan of notes of 
 the Bank of the Commonwealth, which were " bills of 
 credit " within the prohibition of the Constitution, and 
 therefore of no value. The state court found for the 
 bank. The state Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. 
 The case was carried to the Supreme Court of the 
 United States on a writ of error. The court consisted, 
 in 1834, of Chief Justice Marshall, of Virginia, ap 
 pointed by Adams in 1801 ; and Associate Justices 
 
 1 In 1824 Commodore Porter was guilty of an outrage at 
 Foxardo, Porto Rico. When court-mart:alled, he made an 
 ilaborate comparison of his proceedings with those of Jackson in 
 Florida, by way of defence. V 28 Niles, 370., He was cashiered. 
 
 a 11 Adams, 357 a 8 p etere , us. 
 
860 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 Johnson, of South Carolina, appointed by Jefferson in 
 1804 ; Duvall, of Maryland, appointed hy Madison in 
 1811 ; Story, of Massachusetts, appointed in the same 
 year by the same ; Thompson, of New York, appointed 
 by Monroe in 1823 ; McLean, of Ohio, appointed by Jack- 
 Bon in 1829 ; and Baldwin, of Pennsylvania, appointed 
 by Jackson in 1830. Johnson was absent all the term. 
 Duvall was absent part of the term. Of the five who 
 heard the argument in Briscoe s case, a majority thought 
 that the notes of the Bank of the Commonwealth were 
 bills of credit under the decision in Craig vs. Missouri, 1 
 but there were not four, a majority of the whole, who 
 concurred in this opinion. The rule of the court was 
 not to pronounce a state law invalid for unconstitution- 
 ality unless a majority of the whole court should concur. 
 Hence no decision was rendered. 
 
 The Circuit Court of Mercer County, Kentucky, de 
 cided in 1834, under the decision in Craig vs. Missouri, 
 that the notes of the Bank of the Commonwealth were 
 bills of credit. 2 
 
 Judge Johnson died in 1834. Duvall resigned m 
 January, 1835. Wayne took his seat January 1 4, 1835. 
 Hence there was one vacancy in 1835, and Briscoe a 
 case went over. Marshall died July 6, 1835. In 1836 
 there were only five judges on the bench of the court. 
 Taney was confirmed March 15, 1836. P. P. Barbour, 
 of Virginia, was confirmed on the same day. This made 
 the court complete again. Three changes had taken 
 place since 1834, and five of the seven judges were now 
 Jackson s appointees. 
 
 Briscoe vs. The Bank was decided in January, 1837 
 The decision was by McLean. It was held that a bL 
 
 1 See page 135. 2 46 N les, 210, 
 
DEFINITION OF BILLS OF CREDIT. 861 
 
 jf credit tk is a paper issued by the sovereign power, 
 Eontaining a pledge of its faith and designed to circulate 
 as money." Notes, to be bills of credit, must be issued 
 by the State and bind the faith of the State. Coinmis- 
 nonen of issue must not impart any credit by signature, 
 nor be responsible. Hence it was held that the notes of 
 the Bank of the Commonwealth were not bills of credit. 
 Story rendered a very strong and unusually eager dis 
 senting opinion. In it he gave a summary history and 
 analysis of " bills of credit " as they existed before the 
 Revolution, and as they were understood by the Consti 
 tution-makers. He explicitly referred to the former 
 hearing of the case, and said that Marshall had been 
 in the majority against the constitutionality of the is 
 sues. 
 
 The decision in Briscoe s case marks the beginning of 
 * new era in the history of the constitutional law of the 
 United States. Up to that time the court had not 
 failed to pursue the organic development of the Consti 
 tution, and it had, on every occasion on which it was 
 put to the test, proved the bulwark of constitutional 
 liberty, by the steadiness and solidity of judgment with 
 which it had established the interpretation of the Con 
 stitution. Our children are familiarized, in their school- 
 books, with the names of statesmen and generals, and 
 popular tradition carries forward the fame of men who 
 have been conspicuous in public life ; but no one who 
 really knows how the national life of the United States 
 has developed will dispute the assertion that no man can 
 be named to whom the nation is more indebted for solid 
 and far-reaching services than it is to John Marshall. 
 The proceedings of the Supreme Court are almost always 
 overlooked in ordinary narrations of history, but he who 
 
362 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 looks for real construction or growth in the institution! 
 of the country should look to those proceedings first oi 
 all. Especially in the midst of a surging democracy, 
 exposed to the chicane of political mountebanks and 
 the devices of interested cliques, the firmness and cor 
 rectness with which the court had held its course on 
 behalf of constitutional liberty and order had been of 
 inestimable value to the nation. The series of great 
 constitutional decisions, to which reference has been 
 made in the preceding pages, have now entered into 
 the commonplaces of our law. They have been tested 
 through three quarters of a century. To see in the ret 
 rospect that they were wise, and that the contrary decis 
 ions would have produced mischief, is one thing ; to see 
 at the time, in the heat of controversy and under the 
 clamor of interests, what was the sound and correct in 
 terpretation, and to pronounce it in spite of abuse, was 
 another thing. 
 
 In Briscoe s case the court broke the line of its de 
 cisions, and made the prohibition of bills of credit 
 nugatory. 1 If the degree of responsibility and inde 
 pendent authority which the directors of the Bank of 
 the Commonwealth of Kentucky possessed, and the 
 amount of credit they gave to the notes aside from the 
 credit of the State, was sufficient to put those notes out 
 side the prohibition of the Constitution, then no State 
 could find any difficulty in making a device for escaping 
 the constitutional prohibition. Wild-cat banking was 
 granted standing ground under the Constitution, and the 
 
 1 " A virtual nnd incidental enforcement of the depreciated 
 potes of the state banks, by their crowding out a sound medium 
 though a great evil, was not foreseen." (Madison to C. J. Inge) 
 oil, February 22, 1831 ; 4 Elliott, 641.) 
 
EFFECT ON THE COURT. 368 
 
 boast that the Constitutional Convention hftd closed and 
 barred the door against the paper money with which the 
 colonies had been cursed was without foundation. The 
 great " banks " set up by the southwestern States be 
 tween 1835 and 1837 were protected by this decision. 
 They went on their course, and carried those States 
 down to bankruptcy and repudiation. The wild-cat 
 banking which devastated the Ohio States between 1837 
 and 1860, and miseducated the people of those States 
 until they thought irredeemable government issues an 
 unhoped-for blessing, never could have existed if Story s 
 opinion had been law. The legal-tender notes of 1862 
 and the decisions of the Supreme Court on the constitu 
 tionality of the legal-tender act must have borne an 
 entirely different color, if Marshall s opinion had pre 
 vailed in Briscoe s case. 
 
 Jackson s appointments introduced the mode of actior 
 by the Executive, through the selection of the judges, 
 on the interpretation of the Constitution by the Supreme 
 Court. Briscoe s case marked the victory of Kentucky 
 relief finance and state-rights politics over the judiciary, 
 The effect of political appointments to the bench is al 
 ways traceable, after two or three years, in the reports, 
 which come to read like a collection of old stump 
 speeches. The climax of the tendency which Jackson 
 inaugurated was reached when the court went to pieces 
 on the Dred Scott case, trying to reach a decision 
 which should be politically expedient, rather than one 
 which should be legally sound. A later and similar 
 instance is furnished by the legal-tender cases. As for 
 the immediate effect of Jac&son s appointments, it may 
 oe most decorously stated by quoting from Story s 
 reasons, in 1845, for proposing to resign : " I have been 
 
ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 long convinced that the doctrines and opinions of the 
 old court were daily losing ground, and especially those 
 on great constitutional questions. New men and new 
 opinions have succeeded. The doctrines of the Consti 
 tution, so vital to the country, which, in former times, 
 received the support of the whole court, no longer main 
 tain their ascendency. I am the last member now 
 living of the old court, and I cannot consent to remain 
 where I can no longer hope to see those doctrines 
 recognized and enforced." 1 
 
 During Jackson s second term the growth of the 
 nation in wealth and prosperity was very great. It is 
 plain, from the history we have been pursuing, in spite 
 of all the pettiness and provincialism which marked 
 political controversies, that the civil life of the nation 
 was growing wider and richer. It was just because 
 there was an immeasurable source of national life in the 
 physical circumstances and in the energy of the people 
 that the political follies and abuses could be endured. 
 If the politicians and statesmen would only let the 
 nation alone it would go on, not only prosperously, but 
 smoothly ; that is why the non-interference dogma of the 
 democrats, which the whigs denounced as non-govern- 
 jaent, was in fact the highest political wisdom. On re 
 flection it will not be found strange that the period 1829 
 to 1837 should have been marked by a great deal of 
 violence and turbulence. It is not possible that a grow 
 ing nation should spread over new territory, and feel 
 the thrill of its own young energies contending success 
 fully with nature in all her rude force, without social 
 commotions and a certain recklessness and uproar. The 
 icntagion of these forms of disorder produces other anj 
 1 2 Story s Story, 527. 
 
VIOLENCE 865 
 
 less excusable forms. On account of the allowance to 
 be made for violence and lawlessness under the circum 
 stances, and also on account of the disagreeableness of 
 recalling, if it can be avoided, old follies, no recapitu 
 lation of the outrages, mobs, riots, etc., of the period will 
 here be attempted. Suffice it to say that they were 
 worse and more numerous than either before or since, 
 Brawls and duels between congressmen, and assaults on 
 congressmen by persons who considered themselves ag 
 grieved by words spoken in debate, were very frequent 
 at Washington. The cities possessed, as yet, no police. 
 The proposition to introduce police was resented as an 
 assault on liberty. Rowdies, native Americans, protest- 
 ants, firemen, anti-abolitionists, trades-unionists, anti- 
 bank men, etc., etc., in turn produced riots in the streets 
 of the great Eastern cities. From the South came 
 hideous stories of burning negroes, hanging abolition 
 ists, and less heinous violence against the mails. From 
 Charlestown, Massachusetts, came the story of the cruel 
 burning of a convent. Niles, in August, 1835, gathered 
 three pages of reports of recent outrages against law and 
 order. 1 A month later he has another catalogue, and 
 he exclaims in astonishment that the world seems upside 
 down. 2 The fashion of the time seemed to be to pass at 
 once from the feeling to the act. That Jackson s char 
 acter and example had done something to set this 
 fashion is hardly to be denied. Harriet Martineau and 
 Richard Cobden, both friendly critics, were shocked and 
 disappointed at the social condition. Adams, in 1834, 
 wrote thus : " The prosperity of the country, indepen 
 dent of all agency of the government, is so great that the 
 ueople have nothing to disturb them but their own way- 
 i 48 Niles, 439. * 49 Nileg, 49 
 
366 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 ^ardness and corruption. They quarrel upon dissei> 
 sions of a doit, and split up in gangs of partisans of A, 
 B, and C. without knowing why they prefer one to 
 another. Caucuses, county, state, and national conven 
 tions, public dinners and dinner-table speeches, two or 
 three hours long, constitute the operative power of 
 electioneering ; and the parties are of working men, 
 temperance reformers, anti-masons, Union and state- 
 rights men, nullifiers, and, above all, Jackson men, Van 
 Buren men, Clay men, Calhoun men, Webster men, 
 and McLean men, whigs and tories, republicans and 
 democrats, without one ounce of honest principle to 
 choose between them." 1 In his long catalogue he yet 
 omitted abolitionists and native Americans, the latter of 
 whom began to be heard of as soon as foreign immigra 
 tion became great. Great parties did not organize on 
 the important political questions. Men were led off on 
 some petty side issue, or they attached themselves to a 
 great man, with whom they hoped to come to power. 
 The zeal of these little cliques was astonishing. One 
 feels that there must have been a desire to say to them : 
 No doubt the thing you have taken up as your hobby is 
 fairly important, but why get so excited about it, and 
 why not pursue your reformatory and philanthropic 
 vork outside of politics ? Why not go about your pro 
 posed improvement soberly and in due measure ? The 
 truth was that nearly all the cliques wanted to reach 
 their object by the short cut of legislation, that is, to 
 force other people to do what they were convinced it 
 was a wise thing to do, and a great many of them also 
 wanted to make political capital out of their " causes. 
 There was something provincial about the gossip and 
 1 9 Adams, 187. 
 
ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF JACKSON. 367 
 
 news-mongering over small things, and about the din 
 ners and ovations to fourth-rate men. One wonders if 
 the people had not enough interesting things to occupy 
 them. Thev could not have been very busy or hard- 
 worked, if they had time to spend on all these things. 
 There was something bombastic, too, about the way in 
 which an orator took up a trifle. Everything in the 
 surroundings forced him to be inflated and meretricious, 
 in order to swell up to the dimensions of the occasion 
 the trifle with which he was forced to deal. At the 
 same time serious things, like nullification, were treated 
 by the same inflated method, which made them ridicu 
 lous. On every occasion of general interest the peo 
 ple ran together for a public meeting. Their method 
 of doing their thinking on any topic seemed to be to 
 hear some speeches about it. No doubt this was one 
 reason why there was so much heat mixed up with all 
 opinions. 
 
 The prevailing disposition to boast, and the over- 
 sensitiveness to foreign criticism which was manifested, 
 were additional symptoms of immaturity. 
 
 January 30, 1835, * Jackson attended the funeral, at 
 the Capitol, of Warren R. Davis, of South Carolina. 
 As he came out through the rotunda, a man named 
 Richard Lawrence snapped two pistols in succession at 
 him. Neither was discharged. Lawrence gave half a 
 dozen inconsistent reasons for the act. He was plainly 
 insane. Jackson immediately gave the attack a political 
 significance. Some days after it occurred Harriet Mar- 
 tineau called upon him, and referred to the " insane at 
 tempt." " He protested, in the presence of many 
 itraugers, that there was no insanity ^n the case. I was 
 1 4? Nile*, 340. 
 
ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 silent, of course. He protested that there was a plot, 
 and that the man was a tool." 1 He went so far as to 
 name Senator Poindexter, of Mississippi, as the insti 
 gator. He was at feud with Poindexter, although the 
 latter had been with him at New Orleans, and had de 
 fended him in Congress in the Seminole war affair. 
 Harriet Martmeau says it was expected at Washington 
 that they would have a duel as soon as Jackson s term 
 was out. This was probably based on a reputed speech 
 of Poindexter, to which the " Globe " gave currency. 2 
 That paper, nearly a month after the attempted assassina 
 tion, treated the charge against Poindexter as not at all 
 incredible. Poindexter obtained an investigation by the 
 Senate, when the charge was, of course, easily proven to 
 rest upon the most frivolous and untrustworthy asser 
 tions, no one of which would bear the slightest exami 
 nation, and some of which were distinctly false. The 
 incident, however, illustrated one trait of Jackson s char 
 acter, which has been noted several times before. The 
 most extravagant and baseless suspicion of a personal 
 enemy in connection with an injury to himself struck his 
 arind with such- a degree of self-evident truth that ex 
 ternal evidence to the contrary had no influence on liim. 
 In the present case, this fault laid him open to a charge 
 of encouraging persons who had committed perjury and 
 suborned others to do so. Lawrence, on his trial, con 
 tinually interrupted the proceedings. He was acquitted 
 ind remanded to custody as an insane person. 
 
 A faction arose in New York city in 1834-35, whicli 
 
 * 1 Martineau, Western Travel, 162. She was in the Capita 
 when the attack occurred. 
 48 Niles, 33. 
 
THE EQUAL RIGHTS PARTY. 369 
 
 called itself the " equal rights party," or the " Jeffer 
 sonian anti-monopolists." The organization of the 
 Tammany Hall democrats, under Van Buren and the 
 regency, had become rigid and tyrannical. The equal 
 rights faction revolted, and declared that Tammany 
 \\ is aristocratic. They represented a new upheaval of 
 democracy. They took literally the dogmas which had 
 been taught them, just as the original Jackson men had 
 done ten years before, only that now, to them, the Jack 
 son party seated in power seemed to have drifted away 
 from the pure principles of democracy, just as Monroe 
 had once appeared to the Jackson men to have done. 
 The equal rights men wanted " to return to the Jeffer- 
 sonian fountain " again, and make some new deductions. 
 They revived and extended the old doctrines which 
 Duane, of the "Aurora," taught at the beginning of the 
 century in his "Politics for Farmers," and similar 
 pamphlets. In general the doctrines and propositions 
 might be described as an attempt to apply the procedure 
 of a township democracy to a great state. The equal 
 rights men held meetings at first secretly, at four differ 
 ent places, and not more than two successive times at 
 the same place. 1 They were, in a party point of view, 
 conspirators, rebels, " disorganizes, " in short ; and 
 .hey were plotting the highest crime known to the polit 
 ical code in which they had been educated, and which 
 they accepted. Their platform was : No distinction be 
 tween men save merit ; gold and silver the only legiti 
 mate and proper circulating medium ; no perpetuities 
 or monopolies ; strict conduction of the Constitution ; 
 no bank charters by States (because oanks of issue 
 favor gambling, and are " calculated to build up and 
 
 i Byrdsall, 16. 
 24 
 
370 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 strengthen in our country the odious distribution ol 
 wealth and power against merits and equal rights ") ; 
 approval of Jackson s administration ; election of Presi 
 dent by direct popular vote. They favored the doc- 
 trine of instructions. They also advocated free trade 
 and direct taxes. 1 They had some very sincere and 
 pure-minded men among them, a large number of over 
 heated brains, and a still larger number of demagogues, 
 who were seeking to organize the faction as a means of 
 making themselves so valuable that the regular managers 
 would buy them. The equal rights men gained strength 
 BO rapidly that, on the 29th of October, 1835, they were 
 able to offer battle to the old faction at a primary meet 
 ing in Tammany Hall for the nomination of a con 
 gressman and other officers. The " regular " party 
 entered the hall by the back entrance, and organized 
 the meeting before the doors were opened. The anti- 
 monopolists poured in, nominated a chairman and 
 elected him, ignoring the previous organization. The 
 question of " equal rights " between the two chairmen 
 was then settled in the old original method which has 
 prevailed ever since there has been life on earth. The 
 equal rights men dispossessed the other faction, and 
 so proved the justice of their principles. The non- 
 equal rights party then left the hall, but they " caused " 
 the equal rights men "to be subjected to a deprivation 
 of the right" to light by turning out the gas. The 
 equal rights men were thus forced to test that theory 
 of natural rights which affirms that said rights are 
 only the chance to have good things, if one can (jet them 
 In spite of their dogma of the equality of all men, whick 
 would make a prudent man no better than a careles* 
 1 Byrclsall, 103. 
 
THE "LOCO-FOCOS." 371 
 
 one, and a man with capital no better than one without 
 capital, the equal rights men had foreseen the emer 
 gency, and had provided themselves with capital in the 
 shape of candles and loco-foco matches. They thus 
 established their right to light, against nature and 
 against their enemies. They duly adopted their plat 
 form, nominated a ticket, and adjourned. The regular 
 leaders met elsewhere, nominated the ticket which they 
 had previously prepared, and dispensed, for that occa 
 sion, with the ornamental and ceremonious formality of 
 a primary meeting to nominate it. 
 
 On the next day the " Courier and Enquirer " dubbed 
 the equal rights party the loco-focos, and the name 
 clung to them. 1 Hammond quotes a correspondent 2 
 who correctly declared that " the workingmen s party 
 and the equal rights party have operated as causes, 
 producing effects that will shape the course of the two 
 great parties of the United States, and consequently 
 the destinies of this great republic." The faction, at 
 least in its better elements, evidently had convictions 
 and a programme. It continued to grow. The " Even 
 ing Post " became its organ. That paper quarrelled 
 with the administration on Kendall s order about the 
 mails, and was thereupon formally read out of the party 
 by the " Globe." 3 The loco-focos ceased to be a re 
 volting faction. They acquired belligerent rights. The 
 faction, however, in its internal economy ran the course 
 of all factions. It went to extremes, and then began 
 to split up. In January 1836, it declared its indepen 
 dence of the democratic-republican party. This alienated 
 all who hated the party tyranny, but who wanted re- 
 
 1 49 Niles, 162. -! 2 Hammond, 503. 
 
 49 Niles, 78. 
 
872 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 form in the party. The faction declared itself opposed 
 to all acts of incorporation, and held that all such acts 
 were repealable. It declared that representative insti 
 tutions were only a practical convenience, and that 
 Legislatures could not create vested rights. 1 Then it 
 went on to adopt a platform of u equality of position, as 
 well as of rights." 
 
 In October, 1836, Tammany made overtures to the 
 equal rights men for a reunion, in preparation for the 
 presidential election. Some of the loco-focos wanted 
 to unite ; others refused. The latter were the men of 
 conviction ; the former were the traders. The former 
 called the latter " rumps ; " the latter called the former 
 " buffaloes." Only one stage now remained to com 
 plete the old and oft-repeated drama of faction. A 
 man named Slamm, a blatant ignoramus, who, to hia 
 great joy, had been arrested by order of the Assembly 
 of New York for contempt and breach of privilege, 
 and who had profited to the utmost by this incident 
 to make a long " argument " against the " privilege " 
 of an American Legislature, and to pose as a martyr 
 lo equal rights, secured his own election to the posi 
 tion of secretary of the equal rights party. He then 
 secured a vote that no constitutional election could be 
 held unless called by the secretary. He never would call 
 one. There were those who thought that he sold out 
 the party. 
 
 Thus the faction perished ignominiously, but it was 
 not without reason that its name passed, a little later, 
 co the whole Jackson-Van Buren party ; i. e., to the rad 
 cal anti-paper currency, not simply anti-United States 
 Bank; wing of the national democratic party. The 
 1 Byrdsall, 41. a Byrdsall, 178. 
 
INFLUENCE OF TEE LOCO-FOC08. 375 
 
 iqual rights men maintained impracticable doctrines of 
 civil authority and fantastic dogmas about equality, but 
 when these were stripped away there remained in their 
 platform sound doctrines and imperishable ideas. They 
 first put the democratic party on the platform which for 
 five or six years it had been trying to find. When it 
 did find that platform it was most true to itself, and it 
 contributed most to the welfare of the country. To 
 day the democratic party is, by tradition, a party of 
 hard money, free trade, the non-interference theory of 
 government, and no special legislation. If that tradi 
 tion be traced up to its source, it will lead back, not to 
 the Jackson party of 1829, but to the loco-focos of 
 1835 
 
CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 THE ELECTION OF 1836. END OF JACKSON S CAREER. 
 
 THE attempt was made in 1834 to unite and organize 
 the whole opposition to Jackson. Niles first mentions 
 the party name "whig" in April, 1834. 1 He saya 
 that it had come into use in Connecticut and New York. 
 It was adopted with antagonistic reference to the high 
 prerogative and (as alleged) tory doctrines of Jackson. 
 The anti-masons and national republicans ultimately 
 merged in the new whig party, but time was required 
 to bring about that result. In 1834 it was impossible. 
 The anti-masons insisted on acting independently. Their 
 candidate for President then was Francis Granger. 3 
 Clay would not run in 1836 because he could not unite 
 the opposition. He was disgusted with public life, and 
 desired to retire. 3 
 
 The administration party, on the other hand, was 
 perfectly organized. The corps of federal office-holders 
 had been drilled by the " Globe " into thorough disci 
 pline and perfect accord of energy and will. Each offi 
 cer was held to " revere the chief," and to act in obedi 
 ence to the indications of his will which came through 
 the " Globe." They did so. There was no faltering. 
 There was only zealous obedience. It caused some 
 bewilderment to remember that this was the party which 
 Had denounced Adams for using the federal officers ta 
 
 1 46 Nileo, 101. 2 50 Niles 234. 8 9 Adama, I70i 
 
DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION 1835. 375 
 
 electioneer. Lewis had been known to interfere di 
 rectly in elections, and Blair had done the same in his 
 private capacity. 1 The party had been wonderfully held 
 together. In 1830 there were only four anti-Jackson 
 Legislatures in the Union, namely, Vermont, Massa 
 chusetts, Connecticut, and Delaware. In the six years 
 from 1830 to 1835, both inclusive, twenty-seven States 
 held 162 sessions of their Legislatures. Of these 116 
 had Jackson majorities, 40 anti-Jackson, and 4 Cal- 
 houn. 2 There was some talk of a third term for Jack 
 son, but it never grew strong. The precedents were 
 cited against it. Jackson s bad health and Van Buren s 
 aspirations were perhaps stronger objections. Adams 
 says that Jackson had " wearied out the sordid subser 
 viency of his supporters." 8 That is not at all improb 
 able. 
 
 The democratic convention was held at Baltimore, 
 May 20, 1835. Jackson had written to Tennessee 
 recommending that a convention should be held of 
 "candidates fresh fromthe people." There were not 
 wanting those who called this convention a caucus, and 
 said that it was the old congressional monster in a new 
 mask. Tennessee did not send any delegates. Even 
 Jackson could not bring that State to support Van Bu- 
 ren. Tennessee was a whig State until 1856. Her 
 hostility to Van Buren was adroitly combined with that 
 of Pennsylvania, in 1844, by the selection of Polk as a 
 candidate, to defeat Van Bur^n. In 1835 a caucus of 
 the New Hampshire Legislature, which nominated Hill 
 for Governor, passed a resolution begging Tennessee not 
 ko divide the party. 4 Tennessee, however, had another 
 
 i 40 Niles, 299. 2 63 Niles, 308. 
 
 8 9 Adams, 312. 4 48 Nile* 822. 
 
37ti ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 very popular candidate, Hugh L. White, a former friend 
 of Jackson, whom Jackson now hated as a traitor and 
 renegade. 1 John Bell, the Speaker, was a supporter of 
 White, and he and his friends claimed that they were 
 not in opposition ; that they and White were good repub 
 licans, and that they preferred White to the man whom 
 Jackson had selected. 2 The "Globe" attacked Bell 
 with bitterness. Jackson was greatly enraged, and ex 
 erted himself personally and directly against White. 3 
 One Tennessee man, being in Baltimore when the con 
 vention was held, took upon himself to represent that 
 State. His name was Rucker, and to " ruckerize " 
 passed into the political slang of the day, meaning to as 
 sume functions without credentials. 
 
 The Baltimore convention was largely composed of 
 office-holders. Twenty-one States were represented. 4 
 Andrew Stevenson, of Virginia, was chairman. The 
 two-thirds rule was adopted, because Van Buren was 
 sure of two thirds. He actually got a unanimous vote, 
 265. For Vice-President, R. M. Johnson, of Kentucky, 
 got 178 votes; W. C. Rives, of Virginia, 87. The 
 Virginia delegation declared, on the floor of the con 
 vention, that Virginia would never vote for Johnson, be 
 cause he favored tariff, bank, and internal improve 
 ments, and because they had no confidence in his 
 principles or character. 6 Van Buren, in his letter of 
 acceptance, 6 said that he had been mentioned as Jack 
 son s successor " more through the ill-will of opponents 
 han the partiality of friends." That statement was 
 jo adroit that it would take a page to tell whether i* 
 
 1 See page 312. 2 Bell s speech in 48 Niles, 334. 
 
 49 Niles, 35. * 48 Niles, 207, 227, 244. 
 
 * 48 Niles, 248. 6 48 Niles, 257. 
 
CANDIDATES AND PLATFORMS 1S36. 377 
 
 was true or not. He made a full and eager declaration 
 that he had asked for no man s support. He said that 
 he would " endeavor to tread generally in the footsteps 
 of President Jackson, happy if I shall he ahle to per 
 fect the work which lie has so gloriously begun." 
 Johnson, in his letter of acceptance, 1 declared that he 
 was opposed to the old bank, or to one like it, but 
 thought that such a bank as Jackson talked of in his 
 earliest messages might be a good thing. On tariff and 
 internal improvements he said that he agreed with 
 Jackson. Van Buren was fifty-four years of age and 
 Johnson fifty-six. Johnson had been in Congress ever 
 since 1807, except during the second war with England, 
 when he took the field. He served with some distinc 
 tion, but a ridiculous attempt to credit him with the kill 
 ing of Tecumseh has caused his real merits to be for 
 gotten. As a public man he managed to be as near as 
 possible to the head of every popular movement, and to 
 get his name connected with it, but he never contrib 
 uted assistance to any public business. His name is 
 also met with frequently as a messenger, middle-man, 
 manipulator, and general efficiency man of the Jackson 
 party. He made a report, in 1829, on the question of 
 running the mails on Sunday, which was one of his 
 claims to fame. It was written for him by the Rev. O. 
 B. Brown. 2 A chance was found in this report to utter 
 some noble sentiments on religious liberty, and to lay 
 down some specification of American principles in that 
 regard which were not likely to provoke contradiction. 
 This valuable production was printed on cloth, and hung 
 ap in stage offices and bar-rooms all o~er the country 
 
 1 48 Niles, 329. 
 
 * See page 349. Kendall s Autc&iography, 107. 
 
378 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 Johnson had nourished presidential aspirations for some 
 years. He did not abandon them till 1844. 
 
 The anti-Jackson men, in 1834-35, were opposed, on 
 principle, to a national convention. They said that 
 the convention was King Caucus revived. The anti- 
 masons held a state convention at Harrisburg, Decem 
 ber 16, 1835. l It was decided not to caH a national 
 convention. They thought the free action of the people 
 would be best brought out by state conventions. They 
 nominated William H. Harrison by 89 votes to 29 for 
 Webster and 3 for Granger. For Vice-President, 
 Granger got 102 votes ; Hugh L. White, 5 ; William 
 Slade, of Vermont, 5 ; and William A. Palmer, of Ver 
 mont, 7. The whigs of Pennsylvania adopted the nom 
 inations of the anti-masons, and coalesced with them. 
 Webster was very anxious, at this time, to be nominated 
 and supported by the whigs. It pleases some people to 
 think that Webster ought not to have had this ambition. 
 He was a strange compound of the greatest powers and 
 some mean traits. To such a man the presidential am 
 bition is very sure to mean moral shipwreck. Still it 
 was not wrong for Webster to want the insignia of suc 
 cess in his career. His dissatisfaction was well-founded 
 when, after his plendid services, he saw William Henry 
 Harrison preferred before him ; and it is a point which 
 deserves careful attention, that, if Webster s just am 
 bition had been fairly gratified, he would have been a 
 better man. He was nominated by the Legislature of 
 Massachusetts. 
 
 Huo-h L. White, of Tennessee, was nominated by the 
 Legislatures of Alabama, Tennessee, and Illinois. Judgt 
 McLean was nominated in Ohio. He had had presi 
 J 49Niles, 265, 287. 
 
ADMISSION OF MICHIGAN. 379 
 
 dential aspirations ever since 1828. 1 The Northern 
 whigs supported Harrison, and the Southern \vliigs sup 
 ported White. Thus the opposition went into the cam 
 paign disorganized and devoted to defeat. 
 
 Harrison and White were of the same age, sixty-three. 
 Harrison was a man of no education. He had done 
 some good service as an Indian fighter. The anti-Jack 
 son men, who had derided Jackson s candidature be 
 cause he was not a statesman, selected, in Harrison, the 
 man nearest like him whom they could find. They 
 hoped to work up a popularity for him on the model of 
 Jackson s popularity. 2 Harrison answered the ftnti- 
 masons that he was not a mason, and did not like 
 masonry, but that the federal government had nothing 
 to do with that subject. This did not satisfy Thaddeus 
 Stevens, who wanted Webster. 8 White has been men 
 tioned several times. He had a fair education, a good 
 character, and was very much respected, but he was a 
 man of only ordinary ability. 
 
 During the winter of 1835-36 there was a great strug 
 gle in the House over a contested election in North Car 
 olina. It was thought very probable that the presiden 
 tial election might be thrown into the House, and the 
 vote of North Carolina might decide the result. The 
 sitting member (Graham) was unseated, and the case was 
 referred back for a new election. 
 
 There were two States whose admission was pending 
 when the election approached, Arkansas and Michi 
 gan. In 1835 Michigan became involved in a boundary 
 
 1 Kendall s Autobiography, 304 
 
 2 For an estimate of Harrison, written in 1828, which is per 
 haps too highly colored to quo 3, see 7 Adaro, 530 
 
 8 9 Adams, 273 
 
380 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 dispute with Ohio. The act which organized the terri 
 toiy of Michigan, January 11, 1805, described, as its 
 southern boundary, a due east and west line running 
 through the southernmost point of Lake Michigan. The 
 Constitution of Ohio gave that State, as its northern 
 boundary, a line drawn from the southernmost point of 
 Lake Michigan to the northernmost cape of Maumee 
 Bay Indiana s northern boundary had been described 
 as a due east and west line ten miles north of the 
 southernmost point of Lake Michigan. The northern 
 boundary of Illinois had been placed on the parallel of 
 42 30 . Michigan, therefore, found her territory re 
 duced. Jackson, at first, on the advice of Butler, the 
 Attorney-General, took the side of Michigan. The peo 
 ple of Michigan held a convention in September, 1835, 
 and framed a Constitution, which was to go into effect in 
 November. In October, the Assistant Secretary of State, 
 Asbury Dickens, wrote, at the President s orders, that 
 no such reorganization of the government could take 
 place without the consent of Congress. In 1835-36 there 
 was some danger of an armed collision between Ohio and 
 Michigan ; but it is not easy, on account of the rhetoric 
 which was then in fashion, to judge how great this dan 
 ger was. June 15, 1836, Arkansas and Michigan were 
 admitted together; but Michigan was put under the 
 condition that she must accept the southern boundary 
 which resulted from the northern lines of Indiana and 
 Ohio, and accept compensation on the peninsula north of 
 Lake Michigan. The Legislature of Michigan, in July, 
 called a convention, which met September 26th, and re 
 jected the condition. On the 5th and 6th of December, 
 by the spontaneous action of the people, delegates wen 
 elected to a convention, which met December 14, 1836 
 
THE VOTE IN 1836. 381 
 
 ind assented to the condition. Jackson, in a message, 
 December 26th, informed Congress of the action of 
 Michigan. 1 Michigan was admitted January 26, 1837. 
 She offered a vote in the presidential election. In an 
 nouncing the vote, the vote of Michigan was included in 
 the alternative form. 
 
 In the spring of 1836 Sherrod Williams interrogated 
 the candidates for President. Harrison 2 favored dis 
 tribution of the surplus revenue and of the revenue from 
 lands ; opposed internal improvements except for works 
 of national scope and importance ; would charter a bank, 
 but with great reservations ; thought that neither House 
 of Congress had a right to expunge anything from its rec 
 ords. Van Buren opposed national bank, internal im 
 provements, and all distribution. The equal rights men 
 interrogated the candidates. The committee reported 
 that they were greatly pleased with Johnson s replies, 
 but that Van Buren s were unsatisfactory. Many " ir 
 reconcilable " equal rights men refused to vote for Van 
 Buren. Later, however, he became fully identified with 
 that wing of the national democratic party which took 
 up the essential features of the loco-foco doctrine. 
 
 In the election 8 Van Buren received 170 votes, count 
 ing 3 of Michigan ; Harrison, 73 ; White, 26 (Georgia 
 and Tennessee) ; Webster, 14 (Massachusetts) ; W. P 
 Mangum, of North Carolina, 11 (South Carolina). Van 
 Buren s majority over all was 46. Van Buren s and 
 Harrison s votes were well distributed geographically. 
 Van Buren carried Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Isl 
 and, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, 
 North Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi. Louisiana, Illi 
 tois, Missouri, Arkansas, Michigan. Harrison carried 
 
 1 51 Niles, 278. 2 51 N les, 23 8 58 Niles, 392. 
 
382 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 Vermont. New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky 
 Ohio, and Indiana. The popular vote was : for Van 
 Buren, 761,549 ; for all others, 736,656 ; Van Buren s 
 majority, 24,89s. 1 For Vice -President, R. M. Johnson 
 got 147 votes ; Francis Granger, 77 ; John Tyler, 47 , 
 William Smith, of Alabama, 23 (Virginia). As no one 
 had a majority, the Senate elected Johnson. In Janu 
 ary, 1837, Webster wrote to Massachusetts 2 that he 
 should resign his seat. He intended to retire from pub 
 lic life, at least temporarily. 
 
 Van Buren was now at the height of his ambition ; 
 but the financial and commercial storm which had been 
 gathering for two or three years, the accumulated result 
 of rash ignorance and violent self-will acting on some of 
 the most delicate social interests, was just ready to burst. 
 High prices and high rents had already before the elec 
 tion produced strikes, trades-union conflicts, and labor 
 riots, 8 things which were almost unprecedented in the 
 United States. The price of flour was so high that 
 493,100 bushels of wheat were imported at New York 
 in 1836, and 857,000 bushels before April, in 1837. 4 
 Socialistic notions of course found root, and flourished 
 like weeds at such a time. An Englishwoman, named 
 Fanny Wright, became notorious for public teachings of 
 an " emancipated " type. The loco-focos were charged 
 with socialistic notions, not without justice. There were 
 socialists amongst them. The meeting held in the City 
 Hall Park, at New York, February 13, 1837, out of 
 which the " bread riots " sprang, was said to have beei 
 
 1 American Almanac for 1880. The figures in Niles are full o 
 jbvious erroi s. 
 
 * 2 Webster s Correspondence, 25 fg. 
 48 Niles, 171 ; 50 Niles, 130. * 52 Niles, 147. 
 
THE BREAD RIOTS. 383 
 
 lalled by them. They certainly had habituated the city 
 populace to public meetings, at which the chance crowd 
 of idlers was addressed as " the people," with all the 
 3iurent catch-words and phrases, and at which blatant 
 orators, eager for popularity and power, harangued the 
 crowd about banks, currency, and vested rights. Of 
 course in these harangues violence of manner and lan 
 guage made up for poverty of ideas, and the minds of 
 the hearers were inflamed all the more because they 
 could understand nothing of what the orators said, except 
 that they were being wronged by somebody. On that 
 day in February the crowd got an idea which it under 
 stood. 1 Some one said : Let us go to Hart [a provision 
 merchant], and offer him eight dollars a barrel for his 
 flour. If he will not take it ! In a few hours the 
 mob destroyed five hundred barrels of flour and one 
 thousand bushels of wheat. The militia were needed to 
 restore order. 2 The park meetings were continued. 
 
 The commercial crisis burst on the country just at 
 the beginning of March, when Jackson s term ended. 
 There was a kind of poetic justice in the fact that Van 
 Buren had to bear the weight of all the consequences of 
 Jackson s acts which Van Buren had allowed to be 
 committed, because he would not hazard his standing 
 in Jackson s favor by resisting them. Van Buren dis 
 liked the reputation of a wire-puller and intriguer, but 
 Vie had well earned his title, the " little magician," by 
 the dexterity with which he had mano3uvred himself 
 across the slippery arena of Washington politics and up 
 to the first place. He had just the temper for a poli- 
 
 1 Byrdsall (103) says the riot waa aot toe fault of the loct 
 locos. 
 
 * 51 Nsis. 403. 
 
884 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 tician. Nothing ruffled liim. He was thick-skinned, 
 elastic, and tough. He did not win confidence from 
 anybody. He was, however, a man of more than aver 
 age ability, and he appears to have been conscious of 
 lowering himself by the political manoeuvring which he 
 had practised. As President he showed the honorable 
 desire to have a statesman-like and high-toned adminis 
 tration, and perhaps to prove that he was more than a 
 creature of Jackson s whim. He could not get a fair 
 chance. The inheritances of party virulence and dis 
 trust which he had taken over from Jackson were too 
 heavy a weight. He lost his grip on the machine with 
 out winning the power of a statesman. He never was 
 able to regain control in the party. American public 
 life is constituted out of great forces, which move on in 
 a powerful stream, under constantly changing phases 
 and combinations, which it is hard to foresee. Chance 
 plays a great role. If a man, by a chance combination 
 of circumstances, finds himself in one of the greater 
 currents of the stream, he may be carried far and high, 
 and may go on long ; but if another chance throws him 
 out, his career is, almost always, ended forever. The 
 course of our political history is strewn with men who 
 tfere for a moment carried high enough to have great 
 ambitions and hopes excited, but who, by some turn in 
 the tide, were stranded, and left to a forgotten and dis 
 appointed old age. Van Buren illustrated all these 
 p,ases. 
 
 Parton quotes a letter of Jackson to Trist, 1 written 
 
 March 2, 1837, in which he says : " On the 4th I hop* 
 
 to be able to go to the Capitol to witness the glorioui 
 
 acene of Mr. Van Buren, once rejected by the Senate, 
 
 i 3 Parton, 624 
 
JACKSON S LAST DAYS. 885 
 
 sworn into office by Chief Justice Taney, also being re 
 jected by the factious Senate." The election of Van 
 Buren is thus presented as another personal triumph of 
 Jackson, and another illustration of his remorseless pur 
 suit of success and vengeance in a line in which any one 
 had dared to cross him. This exultation was the temper 
 in which he left office. He was satisfied and triumph 
 ant. Not another President in the whole list ever went 
 out of office in a satisfied frame of mind, much less 
 with a feeling of having completed a certain career in 
 triumph. 
 
 On the 7th of March Jackson set out for Tennessee. 
 He was surrounded to the last with affection and re 
 spect. On his way home he met more than the old 
 marks of attention and popularity. He was welcomed 
 back to Nashville as he had been every time that he 
 had returned for twenty years past. These facts were 
 not astonishing. He retained his popularity. Hence 
 he was still a power. It was still worth while to court 
 him and to get his name in favor of a man or a measure. 
 Parton says that office-seekers pursued and pestered 
 him up to his last days. Politicians sought to get let 
 ters from him which they could use for their purposes. 
 In 1843 a letter was obtained from him favoring the 
 annexation of Texas, which was then being pushed for 
 ward by a new intrigue in and around Tyler s cabinet. 
 This letter was evidently prepared for Jackson after the 
 fashion of Lewis. It was held back for a year, and 
 then published with a false date. So Jackson was used 
 by the annexation clique to ruin his friend Van Buren. 
 The party which he and Van Buren had consolidated 
 passed, by the Texas intrigue, away from Van Buren 
 wid under the control rf the slavery wing of it. The 
 M 
 
886 ANDREW JACKSON. 
 
 last-mentioned letter of Jackson brought him again into 
 collision with Adams, for in it Jackson repeated hia 
 former assertions that he had always disapproved of 
 the treaty of 1819, and of the boundary of the Sabine. 
 Adams produced the entries in his " Diary " as proof to 
 the contrary. Jackson lent all his influence to Polk in 
 1844. Probably he was mortified that Tennessee voted 
 for Clay, although by only 113 majority in a vote of 
 120,000. Letters signed by him favoring Polk were 
 constantly circulated through the newspapers, and they 
 no doubt had their effect. This was his last public ac 
 tivity. He died June 8, 1845. He had had honors 
 beyond anything which his own heart had ever coveted. 
 His successes had outrun his ambition. He had held 
 more power than any other American had ever pos 
 sessed. He had been idolized by the great majority of 
 his countrymen, and had been surfeited with adulation. 
 He had been thwarted in hardly anything on which he 
 had set his heart. He had had his desire upon all his 
 enemies. He lived to see Clay defeated again, and to 
 help to bring it about. He saw Calhoun retire in de 
 spair and disgust. He saw the bank in ruins ; Biddle 
 arraigned on a criminal charge, and then dead broken 
 hearted. In his last years he joined the church, and, 
 on that occasion, under the exhortations of his spiritual 
 adviser, he professed to forgive all his enemies in a 
 body. It does not appear that he ever repented of 
 anything, ever thought that he had been in the wrong ir 
 anything, or ever forgave an enemy as a specific inii 
 vidual. 
 
FULL TITLES OF BOOKS REFERRED TO IN THIfl 
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 ...arey s Letters : Nine Letters to Dr. Adam Seybert ; by Mat 
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588 FULL TITLES OF BOOKS REFERRED TO. 
 
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 Document D. 22d Congress, 2d Session, 1 Exec. Docs. No. 9. 
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FULL TITLES OF BOOKS REFERRED TO. 389 
 
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 Tyler. Murphy : Baltimore, 1872. 
 Von Hoist : The Constitutional and Political History of the 
 
 United States ; by Dr. H. von Hoist (translated). 3 vols. 
 
 Callaghan : Chicago, 1878-81. 
 Webster s Correspondence : The Private Correspondence ol 
 
 Daniel Webster ; edited by Fletcher Webster. 2 vols. Little, 
 
 Brown & Co. : Boston, 1857. 
 
 Webster s Works : The Works of Daniel Webster. 6 vols. Lit 
 tle, Brown & Co. : Boston, 1851. 
 Wheaton : See Howard. 
 Whig Almanac : The Whig Almanac (from 1838). Horace 
 
 Greeley : New York. 
 Wilson s Works: The Works of James Wilson, LL. D. 3 
 
 vols. Philadelphia, 1804. 
 Wisr>- Se?en Decades of the Union; by Henry A. Wise. Lip 
 
 pincctt. Philadelphia, 1872 
 
INDEX. 
 
 A. B./> 83. 
 
 iberdeen, Lord, 169. 
 
 Abolition. See Slavery. 
 
 Accommodation paper. 268 294. 
 
 Adair, General, 40, 125. 
 
 Adams, John, 27, 29, 118, 145, 171, 
 215, 302. 
 
 Adams, J. Q., 47-386 passim. 
 
 Addresser," 83. 
 
 Alamo, the, 355. 
 
 Alien act. See Law. 
 
 Almanac, the Whig, 342. 
 
 Ambrister, R., &9, 60, 62. 
 
 Amelia Island, 54 
 
 Amendment of the Constitution, 104, 
 106, 128, 325. 
 
 American, the N. Y., 139. 
 
 American System," 194, 19&, 198, 
 212, 222. 
 
 Amiens, peace of, 19. 
 
 Ancestry, Jackson s, 1. 
 
 Animosity, Jackson s, 68, 91, 291, 
 298. 
 
 Anti-bank, 120, 234, 259, 272, 274. 
 
 Anti-masons and -masonry, 252-255, 
 379. 
 
 Anti-relief. See Relief. 
 
 Appalachicola, 52, 53. 
 
 Appointments, 104, 105, 106, 112, 
 148; correspondence of Jackson 
 and Monroe on, 50, 51, 79, 297. 
 
 Arbuthnot, A., 58, 59, 60, 62, 66. 
 
 Argus, the Albany, 87, 88, 117. 
 
 Argus, the Frankfort, 142, 159. 
 
 Aristocracy, colonial, 4. 
 
 Arkansas, 379. 
 
 Army, the, 68, 109, 359. 
 
 Arrogance, Jackson s, 278. 
 
 issaasination, attempted, of Jack 
 son, 367. 
 
 Assault on Jackson, 301. 
 
 Ithens, Ga., 216. 
 
 ,. uction, 76. 
 
 Auctioneering, 47. 
 
 Aurora, the, 151, 296, 369. 
 
 tury, 54. 
 
 Austin, S. P., 352. 
 Autobiography, Kendall s, 242. 
 
 BACHE, 116. 
 
 Balch, 152. 
 
 Baltimore, 231, 254, 273, 326, 376. 
 
 Bank: of Cairo, 122; of the Com 
 monwealth of Kentucky, 124-134. 
 142, 159, 247, 361, 362, (vs. Wister) 
 135, (Briscoe vs.) 359-363 ; of Eng 
 land, 228, 298 ; of Illinois, 122 ; of 
 Kentucky, 120-125, 261 ; Manhat 
 tan Co. , 307 ; of the Metropolis, 305, 
 306 ; of North America, 227 ; State, 
 of Illinois, 122 ; of Tennessee, 122 ; 
 Union, of Maryland, 307 ; of the 
 United States (the first), 12, 41, 83, 
 84, 227-229, 232 ; (the second), 88, 
 121-123 128, 129, 132, 142, 159, 191, 
 231-249, 257-272, 274, 276, 278, 291- 
 310, 315-320, 330, 337-341; (of 
 Pennsylvania), 338, 340-342, 386, 
 (vs. Halsted) 128, (vs William Ow 
 ens) 261, (vs. Planters Bank) 129, 
 135, see Rechaner and Removal; 
 charters, 230, 231, 245, 246 ; demo 
 crats, 259; contraction, 316; ma 
 nia, 120, 229, 318. 323, 324 ; na 
 tional, 13, 82, 224\ 225, 232, 234, 
 246, 257 275, 305, 320, 342 ; notion 
 of a, 230, 319 ; proposed by Jack 
 son, 244, 246, 248, 258, 274 ; re 
 striction, 13 ; swindles, 134, 230, 
 234, 335 ; theor" of a national, 
 240, 241, 321 ; war, 241, 246, 257, 
 261, 320, 321, 339, 345. 
 
 Banking, 119, 232, 233, 234, 312, 331, 
 340, 362. 
 
 Bank-notes. 229, 230, 234, 269, 270, 
 317, 323, 324, 331, 362, 369. 
 
 Bankruptcy, 109. 
 
 Banks, 41, 132, 363,369; "th for 
 ty," of Kentucky, 120-124 ; local 
 or state, 275, 301, 305, 309, 316, 318 
 331, 336; the "pet" or deposit 
 305-307, 317, 318, 324, 328, 329 
 
394 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 335 ; and politics, 227, 228, 237- 
 239, 241, 259, 275, 276, 305-308,311 ; 
 safety fund, 275, 276, 301. 
 Banquet, Jefferson s birth-day, 156, 
 
 157. 
 
 Banquo s ghost, 152. 
 Harbour, P. P., 236. 
 Bargain, 98 ; between Clay and Ad 
 ams, 90-96, 106, 139, 152," 354. 
 Baring Bros., 292, 293. 
 Barry, W. T., 127, 135, 141, 144, 160, 
 
 297, 348. 
 
 Barton, T. P., 347. 
 Batavia, N. Y.,250. 
 Bell, J., 376: 
 
 Belligerent 1 regulations, 13, 27. 
 Ben ton, Jesse, 3 1. 
 
 Benton, T. H 30, 31, 88, 91, 96, 97, 
 105, 106, l58, 145, 154, 178, 188, 
 190, 248, 257, 260, 271, 272, 297, 
 311, 313, 317, 320, 331, 335. 
 Berrien, J M., 141, 160, 173, 216. 
 Beverly, Carter, 94. 
 Bibb, Q. M., 190, 312. 
 Biddle, Nicholas, 234, 237-240, 248, 
 257, 259-275, 292-296, 304, 3lf,312 
 317, 320, 321, 338-342, 386?. 
 Biddle, Thomas, 263, 264. 
 Billiard-table, 115. 
 Biuney, II., 235. 
 Binns, J., 112-114, 148, 244. 
 Birth-place, Jackson s, 1. 
 Black George, 101. 
 Black-leg, 101. 
 Blair, F. P., 92, 159, 160, 243, 259, 
 
 278, 280, 297, 298, 375. 
 Blifil.101. 
 
 Blount, Governor, 8, 10 
 Boleck, 58, 66, 342. 
 Boss, 102. 
 
 Boston, 137, 221, 230. 
 Boundary : of Florida, 19 ; of Loui 
 siana, 67, 353 ; of Michigan, 379. 
 Bowlegs. See Boleck. 
 Branch, J., 141, 160. 
 branch drafts, 235, 236, 261-270,315, 
 
 320. 
 
 Briscoe vs. The Bank of the Com 
 monwealth. See Bank. 
 Broglie, Due de, 344, 346, 347. 
 Brokers, 334. 
 Brooke, P., 02. 
 Brown, General, 68. 
 Brown, Rev. 0. B., 349. 377. 
 Buchanan, James, 94, 174, 359. 
 Bucktails, 74, 252, 253. 
 Buffalo, 239. 
 Buffaloes, "372. 
 Bullionism See Currency, specie. 
 Bund, the German, 131. 
 Burke, E., 118. 
 Burr, A., 19, 21, 33, 104. 
 
 Butler, missionary, 181 
 Butler, B. F., 247, 380. 
 
 CABAL, 298. 
 
 Cabinet, 137, 140 ; paper read in th 
 303, 304, 309, 310 ; the kitchen 
 140, 141, 157, 159, 264, 272, 273 
 298. 
 
 Cadwallader, General, 291, 292. 
 
 Caesar, 277. 
 
 Calhoun, J. C., 51-3S6 passim. 
 
 Calhoun, Mrs. J. C., 150. 
 
 California. 3-2, 357. 
 
 Callava, 69-71. 
 
 Cambreleng, C. C., 152, 261. 
 
 Campaign methods, 112, 114, 115. 
 
 Campbell, G. W., 22. 
 
 Campbell, Rev. Mr., 150, 162. 
 
 Canada, 29, 40, 168 357. 
 
 Canal, the Erie, 86, 110 322 323 
 
 Candles, 167. 
 
 Canning, George, 168, 169. 
 
 Capital, 224, 225, 319, 322 
 
 Carey, M., 229 
 
 Cass, L., 162, 248, 297. 
 Catron, Judge, 3~>5. 
 Caucus: 102 313, 375; congrei 
 sional, 73, 79. 84, 85, 100, 254,375 
 state, 80, 156 ; " King," 100, 108 
 878. 
 
 Censure. See Resolutions. 
 Central America, 107. 
 Ceremonies, 137. 
 Charleston, S. C., 5, 10, 112,220,288 
 
 350. 
 
 Charlestons, Mass., 365. 
 Charter, 130. See Bank. 
 Chatham, Lord, 118. 
 Chattahoocb.ee, 177. 
 Cherokees, 49, 138, 174-183, 277. 
 Chevalier, M., 312, 344. 
 Cheves, L., 234, 235, 265. 
 Chickasaws, 179. 
 China, 264, 265. 
 Choctaws. 53, 179, 183. 
 Cholera, 266. 
 Circulation, 318, 323, 334. See Cm 
 
 , 83, 103, 116, 118, 146- 
 147. See Patronage. 
 Civilization of Indians, 178. 
 Clark, Judge, 125. 
 Clay, II., 29-386 passim. 
 Clayton, A. S., 180, 182, 216, 380. 
 Clayton, J. M., 270, 286, 291. 
 Clinton, George, 229. 
 Clinton, De Witt, 80, 86, 89, 100,96* 
 
 Clintonians, 74, 252, 263. 
 Coahuila, 353. 
 Cobb, T. W., 216. 
 Cobden, R., 366 
 
INDEX. 
 
 395 
 
 Oochmne, Admiral, 42. 
 
 Code of honor, 17. 
 
 Coffin hand-bills, 114. 
 
 Cohens vs. Virginia, 130. 
 
 Coin, 262. 
 
 Coleman, Dr., 76 ; letter to, 139 
 
 Colombia, 105. 
 
 Colonial system, 164. 
 
 Colonies, Spanish, 20. 
 
 Colonization Society, 216. 
 
 Columbia, S. , 282. 
 
 Columbia, District of, 295 350 
 
 Columbian Observer, 92. 
 
 Committee, party, 102, 103. 
 
 Common sense, plain, 312. 
 
 Community, frontier, 2, 3, 5, 16, 17, 
 251. 
 
 Compromise, the Missouri, 350, 352 ; 
 tariff. See Tariff of 1833. 
 
 Concord, N. H., 238 
 
 Congress : American, 107, 108 ; of 
 the United States, 101, 104, 105, 
 108, 330; Jackson a member of, 
 10-13. 
 
 Connecticut, 254, 267, 374. 
 
 Conscription, 41. 
 
 Constitution, the, 97, 104, 109, 128. 
 130-132, 212-216, 246, 255, 278, 283, 
 298, 311, 361-363 ; the English, 
 138 ; state, 137. 
 
 Constitutional theories, 285, 286. 
 
 Constitutionality, 119, 126-130, 173, 
 360. 
 
 Continental system, 170. 
 
 Contracts, 119, 121, 130. 
 
 Controller of New York, 73, 74. 
 
 Controversy between Adams and the 
 federalists, 116. 
 
 Convention : 87, 102, 216 ; anti-ma 
 sonic state, 253, 378 ; the consvitu- 
 tional, of 1787, 363; free trade, 
 220; Harrisburg tariff, 201, 204; 
 Hartford, 41, 50, 157, 213; nullifi 
 cation, 219, 281, 290 ; protectionist, 
 220; union, 282.; national, 254, 
 378 ; of anti-masons, 254, 255 ; of 
 democrats, 273, 375 ; of -national 
 republicans, 258, 273. 
 
 Coosa, 177. 
 
 Coppinger, 71. 
 
 Corn laws, 202, 203, 2D6. 
 
 Correspondence of Jackson and Mon 
 roe. See Appointments. 
 Corruption, political, 105, 329. 
 Cotton, 136, 322. 
 
 Countervailing, 164, 165, 168, 170, 
 
 195, 197, 198, 206. See Reciprocity. 
 
 Courier and Enquirer, 114, 155, 156, 
 
 243, 263, 271. 
 
 Court: contempt of, 46, 173, 174, 
 282 ; supreme, of the United States, 
 12S, 132, 277, 359, 361. 
 
 Craig vs. Missouri, 135, 360. 
 
 Crawford, W. H., 49, 51, 65, 66, 82 
 83, 86, 89. 99, 101, 109, 111, 113 
 152-158, 193, 216, 229, 307. 
 
 Credit : 226, 265, 328, 332 ; abuse of 
 5, 16, 126, 234, 323 ; bills of, 135 
 359-362 ; for duties, 76, 206, 271 
 288, 328; public, 12, 119, 231; 
 system, 123, 323. 
 
 Creeks, the, 32. 35, 37, 38, 49, 52, 55 
 60, 63, 174-183. 
 
 Crisis: commercial, 229, 318, 336; 
 of 1798, 13, 17 ; of 1819, 75, 234 : 
 of 1825, 197 ; of 1834, 315-317 ; of 
 18S7, 330, 383. 
 
 Crittenden, J. J., 290. 
 
 Cumberland Road, 191, 192. 
 
 Currency, 229, 312, 331. See Circu 
 lation ; of Europe, 12, 75 ; of the 
 States, 16, 120, 134, 135; of the 
 United States, 41, 75, 76, 229, 231- 
 234, 243-245, 318, 332, 334, 336; 
 specie, 317, 331, 332, 334, 369; 
 value, 331. 
 
 Curtis, G. T., 290. 
 
 DALLAS, Q. M., 47, 87, 116, 259. 
 
 Damages. See France, Draft on. 
 
 Dancing Rabbit Creek, 183. 
 
 Dartmouth College, 142; vs. Wood 
 ward, 129. 
 
 Davis, W. R., 367. 
 
 Dearborn, H. A. S., 221. 
 
 Debt : 121, 126, 222, 256, 260, 322 ; 
 the public, 110, 189, 220, 266, 272, 
 319, 323. 
 
 Debtors, 119, 124, 126-128, 319. 
 
 Defaulter, 74, 116, 145. 
 
 Democracy, 7, 97, 127, 136, 157, 234, 
 241, 280, 299, 310-313, 331, 332, 350 
 362, 369. 
 
 Democratic Press, 113. 
 
 Democrats. See Party. 
 
 Deposit Act of 1836, 325, 326. 
 
 Deposits : the public, 228, 232, 240, 
 243, 265, 271, 272, 276, 292, 295, 
 298, 299, 304, 307, 316-319, 326, 
 329, 332, 336, see Removal ; regu 
 lation of the, 305, 3U6, 320, 325, 
 326. 
 
 Desertion, 68. 
 
 Desha, Governor, 132, 133. 
 
 Diary of J. Q. Adams, 95, 160, 300, 
 386. 
 
 Dickens, A., 380. 
 
 Fickenson, C., 18. 
 
 Differential duties, 165,166, 168, fl)6 
 
 Dinsmore, S. , 22. 
 
 Directors, government, 308, 309. 
 
 Disorgairzers, 79, 87, 152, 253, 3 J9 
 
 Distribution, 189, 193, 325-330 
 
 District attorney, Jackson, 8. 
 
396 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Dividend withheld. See France, 
 
 Draft on. 
 Divorce, 8, 9. 
 Donelson, J., 8. 
 Donelson, Mrs. A. J., 150 
 Donelson, Mrs. J., 8. 
 Do. elson, Rachel, 8. 
 Draytoo, \V., 49, 50, 163. 
 Dred Scott case, 363. 
 Duane, W., 120, 296, 369. 
 Duane, W. J., 296, 298 300, 302, 303, 
 
 312, 317. 
 
 Duel, 18, 52, 101. 
 Duncan, J., 333. 
 
 BAST ROOM, the, 114. 
 
 Eaton, J.. II., 91, 105, 141, 144, 148- 
 
 153, 160-162, 272, 273. 
 Eaton, Mrs. J. 11., 149-153, 161, 162, 
 
 273, 278. 
 
 Editors, 145, 148, 159. 
 Education, Jackson s, 2. 
 Edwards, N., >-3. 
 Election : 79, 97, 98, 116, 118, 127, 
 
 182, 242, 313, 326 ; contested, 379 ; 
 
 presidential, of 1796, 10 ; of 1800, 
 
 104 -, of 1808, 49 ; of 1812, 29 ; of 
 , 1816. 49 : of 1820, 73, 76 ; of 1824, 
 
 89, 90, 98, 105, 151 ; of 1828, 105, 
 
 106, 116, 242, 253 ; of 1832, 182, 
 
 221, 223, 249,250-276 ; of 1836, 372, 
 
 379 ; of 1844, 375, 386. 
 Electioneering, 77,91,106, 112, 113, 
 
 146,152.308,311,366,375. 
 Electors, 87. 
 Ellis, P., 358. 
 Ellmaker, A., 254. 
 Ellsworth, W. W., 315. 
 Ely, Rev. Mr., 150. 
 Embargo, 13, 27, 28, 75, 83, 210. 
 Emissaries, 57, 59, 63. 
 Emphasis, 185, 252, 312, 367, 383. 
 Empire, the democratic, 299. 
 Encroachments, federal, 133, 135. 
 Eneigy : Jackson s, 33, 34, 38, 43, 
 
 170 ; American, 136. 
 Enforcement Act, 285, 287, 289. 290. 
 England: 11, 13. 17, 27, 57, 62, 66, 
 
 161, 165, 167-169, 174, 357; King 
 
 of, 166. 
 
 English, the, 2, 52, 53, 58. 
 Enquirer, the Richmond, 263. 
 Epitaph, 139. 
 Era of good feeling, 101. 
 Etiquette. 82, 137, 149. 
 Etowah, 177. 
 Everett, A. II., 220. 
 Everett, Edward, 315. 
 Exchange committee, the, 267. 
 Sxchauges: the domestic, 233 f:r- 
 
 , 317, 323, 324. 
 quer bills, 213. 
 
 Execution, sales under, 122,124, 129 
 Executive, the, 107, 247, 278, 299 
 
 305. 311, 3R3. 
 Expedition : Burr s, 21 ; Miranda ^ 
 
 20; the Nickajack, 15. 
 Experiment, 315, 317. 
 Expunging. See Resolution. 
 Extravagance, 113. 
 
 FACTIONS, 74, 76, 77, 101-103, 109, 110 
 139, 151, 155, 249, 366, 371 
 
 Fair-traders, 196. 
 
 Fannin, Colonel, 355. 
 
 Federalism, 214, 282. 
 
 Federalist, 88, 213, 228, 297. 8e 
 Party. 
 
 Filibusters, 53, 314, 359. 
 
 Financiering, 322. 
 
 Finances, public, 41. 
 
 Fine, Jackson s, 47. 
 
 Fire at. New York, 319, 338. 
 
 Fisheries, 81, 95. 
 
 Flint River, 177. 
 
 Florida : 19, 36, 37, 52, 54, 56, 153 
 157, 159, 162, 354, 356, 359 ; cessioi 
 of, 69 ; invasion of, 60-65, see War 
 Seminole ; Jackson governor of 
 68, 70, 71, 242 : laws for, 69 : pur 
 chase of, 20, 67, 69, 246. S<* 
 Treaty of 1819. 
 
 Foot, S. A., 166. 
 
 Forbes, firm of, 70. 
 
 Forsyth, J., 153, 154. 347, 348. 
 
 Fort : Bowyer, 37, 40 ; Jackson, 85, 
 44; Mims, 32; Negro, 52, 53; Ni 
 agara, 250 ; Scott. 66. 
 
 Fortifications, 109, 330, 346 
 
 Fowltown, 55, 66, 63. 
 
 Foxardo, 359. 
 
 France : 13, 17, 27, 170, 171, 295 324 
 325, 343-348; draft on, 295/303 
 309, 320, 344, 345; King of (Louii 
 Philippe), 343, 345, 348. 
 
 Franklin, 7. 
 
 Freemasons and masonry, 250, 252. 
 
 Free trade, 76, 166, 167, 210, 217, 220 
 289, 370, 373 ; convention, 220. 
 
 Fromentin, E., 70 71. 
 
 Frontier, 2, 5, 35, 261 
 
 Funding, 12. 
 
 Funds, state deposit, 32S. 
 
 GAINES, General, 63-55, 356. 
 
 Gales and Seaton, 263. 
 
 Gallatin, A.., 14, 41, 42, 86, 164, 168 
 
 191, 220, 228, 307, 308. 
 Galphinton, 175. 
 Gardner, J. B., 147. 
 Georgia, 53, 66, 84, 117, 176-188, 216 
 
 218, 283. 
 Ghent, 40, 41, 46, 69, 60, 81, 84, 81 
 
 95,231 
 
INDEX. 
 
 897 
 
 Hbbons vs. Ogden, 130. 
 
 Hies, W. B., 116. 
 
 Hlmer, Governor, 181, 216. 
 
 rlobe, the, 156, 159, 160, 273, 280, 
 326,368,371, 374,376. 
 
 ilold, 332-334. 
 
 jJouge, W., 125, 264, 271. 
 
 Bouverneur, S. L.,351. 
 
 government: constitutional, 97 ; pa 
 ternal, 109, 258 ; personal, 277 279, 
 280, 299, 302, 309, 314 ; non-iater- 
 ference theory of, 256, 277, 279, 
 299, 364, 373. 
 
 Granger, F., 374, 378. 
 
 Ireat Britain. See England. 
 
 -Jreeley, II., 182. 
 
 Jreen, Duff, 104, 105, 140, 143, 157, 
 159, 263. 
 
 Sreen vs. Biddle, 129. 
 
 Jrundy, F.,286. 
 
 HABEAS CORPUS, 46, 70, 72. 
 
 Halifax, 165. 
 
 Hall, Judge, 46. 
 
 Hamilton, A., 11, 41, 227, 230, 231, 
 
 308. 
 
 Hamilton, James, 212, 289. 
 Hamilton, James A., 152, 153. 
 Hammond, J., 371. 
 Hard Times, 75, 204. 
 Harper, II. G., 104. 
 Harrison, W. II., 378, 379, 381. 
 Harvard College, 254, 300. 
 Hayne, R. Y., 152, 190, 198, 217, 284, 
 
 289. 
 
 Health, Jackson s, 34, 154, 300. 
 Iliawassee, 177, 353. 
 Hickory Ground, 35, 177 
 Hill, I. , 140, 143, 148, 157, 163. 237- 
 
 239, 242, 248, 259, 278, 375. 
 Hillis Hajo, 58. 
 Himollemico, 58. 
 Holston, 176. 
 Holy Ground, 35. 
 Honorable, title of, 137. 
 Hopewell, 175. 
 Horse Shoe Bend, 35. 
 Hottinger, 295. 
 House of Representatives, 64, 190, 
 
 230 ; on the Bank, 247, 248, 274, 
 
 314 ; power of, to elect President 
 
 97. 
 
 Houston, S., 354, 355 
 Hunt, M., 358. 
 Huskisson, W., 167, 197, 198. 
 Huyghens, Mrs., 150. 
 
 ILLINOIS, 122, 189,380. 
 Illiteracy, Jackson ; s, 15, 49. 
 immaturity, 367. 
 Immigration, 110. 
 
 t, 174, 302, 308, 311. 
 
 Impressment, 30, 43. 
 Improvements, internal, 17, 81, 82 
 
 109, 188, 191-194, 216, 221, 256, 262 
 
 278, 279, 327. 
 Inaugural, Adams s, 104. 
 Inaugural, Jackson s, 139, 145. 
 Inauguration, Adams s, 93. 
 Inauguration, Jackson s, 138. 
 Incendiary publications, 350. 
 Indiana, 189. 380. 
 Indians, 174-183, 219, 283; &ggn 
 
 sions by or on, 14, 31, 54, 55, 175 
 
 356 ; treaty rights of, 181. 
 Indian Spring, 177, 178. 
 Indian Territory, 179, 180, 183. 
 Indian title to land, 13, 176. 
 Inflation, 120, 236, 261, 270, 318, 824 
 
 325. 
 Ingham, S. D., 116, 141, 160, 162,236- 
 
 242, 261, 321, 332. 
 Insolvent laws, 128. 
 Institutions, representative, 280, 313 
 
 372. 
 Instructions, 96, 108, 212, 243, 278 
 
 313, 370 ; to Me Lane. 161, 169. 
 Insubordination, 33, 34, 44, 359. 
 Interference theory. See Govern 
 ment , paternal. 
 Intrigues, 90. 
 Iron, 206. 
 Irreconcilables, 13 
 
 JACKSON, A., SEN., 1. 
 
 Jackson, A., Jr., 2. 
 
 Jackson, Mrs. A., Jr., 9, 18, 49, 130 
 
 149. 
 
 Jacksonism, 320. 
 Jacobinism, 11, 216. 
 Jaudon, S., 341. 
 Jay, J., 11, 41. 
 Jefferson, T., 10. 12, 14, 22, 27-29,83, 
 
 41, 72, 88, 104, 115, 127, 145, 16C 
 
 171, 174, 213, 215, 228, 314. 
 Jeffersonians. See Party. 
 Jeffersonian school, 131, 256. 
 Jingo policy, 108. 
 Johnson, R. M., 73, 128, 139, 146,260 
 
 376, 377, 381. 
 Johnson, W. C., 273. 
 Jones, W.. 308. 
 Jamaica, 166. 
 Judge, Jackson a, 14. 
 "Judge-breaking," 125, 127. 
 Judiciary, the, 119, 120, 126, 127, 863 ; 
 
 the federal, 1 >9, 127-130, 136, 171- 
 
 174, 180. 
 Judiciary Act, 130. 
 
 KENDALL, A., 1, 5, 8, 15, 140, 142, 148 
 146. 148\ 257, 159. 160. 242, 243,248 
 259, 273 278, ^96^06 349, 361 
 37l! 
 
B9S 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Kenhigee, 54. 
 
 Kentucky, 9, 19, 21, 96, 119. 121,123, 
 
 126, 128, 129, 132 193, 204, 211, 222, 
 
 242, 257, 353. 
 King s Chapel, 137 
 Kremer, G., 92. 
 
 LACOCK, A., 67, 258. 
 
 Land, 16, 17, 69, 109, 184-186, 191, 256, 
 325, 335. 
 
 Latour, 39. 
 
 TAW, alien and sedition, 13, 213-215 ; 
 coinage, 332-334 ; constitutional, 
 131,361: endorsement and replevin, 
 122, 124-126, 129, 133 ; the " gag," 
 350; homestead, 186, 189; insol- 
 Tent, 128; international, 62, 107; 
 martial, 38, 45, 46 ; merchant, 296 ; 
 occupying claimant, 129, 133 ; rev 
 enue, 69 ; student, Jackson a, 2 ; 
 the study of, 3,4 ; Spanish, 69. 
 
 Lawless, L., 174. 
 
 Lawrence, R., 367, 368. 
 
 Laws, Jackson a Doctor of, 300. 
 
 Lawyers, 4. 
 
 Lee, II., 49, 91, 105, 144, 147, 153. 
 
 Legal-tender, 125; act, 363 ; cases, 
 363 : notes, 363. 
 
 Leigh, B. W., 313, 314 
 
 Letcher, J., 95, 96, 129. 
 
 Letters, campaign. 76, 93. 
 
 Lewis, W. B., 49, 50, 76-79, 91, 93, 105, 
 140-145, 151-162, 243, 248, 273, 278, 
 282, 296, 297, 299, 375, 385. 
 
 Lexington, Ky., 121, 294, 303. 
 
 Liberty, constitutional, 99, 132, 224, 
 279, 283, 361,362 ; religious, 377. 
 
 Liquidation, 16, 234. 
 
 Livingston, K., 11, 38, 45, 49, 91, 105, 
 145, 162, 214, 274, 282, 343, 345- 
 347. 
 
 Loco-focos. See Party. 
 
 Log-rolling, 191 
 
 Long, J., 352. 
 
 Louaillier. 38, 46. 
 
 Louisiana, 19, 20, 67, 98, 201, 246, 
 282, 322, 353. 
 
 Louis XIV., 99 ; XV., 359 ; Philippe, 
 170. See France, King of. 
 
 Louisville, Ky., 121. 
 
 Lowndes, \V. f 332. 
 
 MACHINE, 79, 84. 
 
 Madis /n, J., 29, 30, 145, 191, 193,214, 
 
 215, 230. 
 
 Kidisonian federalism, 214, 282. 
 Mails, incendiary documents in the, 
 
 350,372: Sunday, 377. 
 Haine, 179, 323, 357. 
 Hajor-general, Jackson a, 15, 36. 
 Majority, the, 15<. 210, 217, 224. 
 Hallary, \. C., 200, 202-204, 219. 
 
 Manners, Jackson s, 14, 88, 188 
 
 Marcy, W. L., 162, 2^7, 324. 
 
 " Marmion, the, 130. 
 
 Marriage, Jackson s, 9, 115. 
 
 Marshall, J., 131, 182, 309, 361. 
 
 Martin vs. Hunter s Lessee, 130. 
 
 Martineau, H., 284, 365, 367. 
 
 Maryland, 98. 
 
 Mason, J., Ill, 144, 236-239. 
 
 Masons. See Freemasons. 
 
 Massachusetts, 254, 314, 378. 
 
 Massacre, 32, 55, 355. 
 
 Mayo, Dr., 354. 
 
 McCulloch vs. Maryland, 128, 246. 
 
 McDuffle, G.. 207, 219. 221, 222, 34" 
 259, 260, 295, 308. 
 
 McGillivray, 175. 
 
 McGregor, 54. 
 
 Mclntosh, 177. 
 
 McLane, L., 161, 162, 169, 190, 228 
 249, 296, 297. 
 
 McLean, J., 112, 116, 141, 254, 378 
 
 McNairy, J., 5, 18. 
 
 Message, 280 ; Adair s, 126 ; Adams s 
 108; Desha s, 132; Jackson s, o 
 1829, 179, 189, 193, 243, 244, 247 
 of mO, 248 ; of 1831, 222, 248, 249 
 267 ; of 1832, 285, 292 ; of 1833, 308 
 of 1834, 344, 346, 348 ; of 1835, 347 
 348 ; of 1836, 341 ; special, on Frencl 
 relations, 347, 348 ; special, on 
 Texas, 357. 
 
 Metcalf, Governor, 135. 
 
 Methodists, 116. 
 
 Mexico, 107, 264, 352-359 ; mission to 
 72, 89. 
 
 Michigan, 379-381. 
 
 Military service, Jackson s, 61. 
 
 Militiamen, " the six," 44. 
 
 Minimum, 199, 200, 205, 2J8. 
 
 Missionaries, 181, 182. 
 
 Mississippi, 180, 183,322; river, 10 
 19, 20. 42, 81, 95, 352 ; valley, 119 
 134,355. 
 
 Missouri, 96, 135. 
 
 Mitchell. ex-Governor, 54, 65. 
 
 Mobile, 21, 30, 36, 37. 
 
 Money, 16 ; money-market, 231, 266 
 267, 2^1, 272, 301, 324, 327, 328. 341 
 " money power," 225-230, 312. 
 
 Monroe, j"., 42-193 passim, 361, 354 
 369. 
 
 Monroe doctrine, 108. 
 
 Morgan, W.. 250-252, 256. 
 
 Mortgage, 122, 124, 128, 135. 
 
 Muter, Judge, 120. 
 
 NACOGDOCHES, 352, 356 
 
 Napoleon Bonaparte, 21, 26, 27, 8f 
 
 42, 170 277, 279. 
 National <. laracter, 136. 
 National Intelligencer, 263 
 
INDEX. 
 
 399 
 
 Nashville. 6, 8, 270, 294. 
 
 Natchez, 9. 30, 33. 
 
 Naval school, 109. 
 
 Navigation system, 164, 167, 168. 
 
 Navy, the, 40, 41, 359. 
 
 Negro fort. 53, 69. 
 
 Negroes, 6$, 67, 130. 
 
 " New Court," 127, 133, 242. 
 
 New England, 28, 76, 82, 198, 204, 
 
 New Hampshire, 82, 144, 273. 
 
 New Jersey, 98. 
 
 New Orleans, 19. 30, 36, 38, 42, 44, 
 
 48, 112, 242, 368 ; battle of, 39. 
 Newspapers, partisan, 35, 103, 104, 
 
 112; 115, 148. 
 
 New York city, 67. 82, 337, 338, 840. 
 New York State, 85, 100, 147, 179, 254, 
 
 272, 329, 374. 
 Nichols, Colonel, 57. 
 Niles, H., 52-374 passim. 
 Nomination of Calhoun, 1822, 82; 
 
 of Clay, 1832, 258, 274 ; of Jackson, 
 
 1822, 79, 87 ; 182S, 104 ; 1832, 154- 
 
 156 ; of Van Buren, 18&, 154, 161, 
 
 272, 273. 
 
 Nominations by Jackson, 147 
 Non-intercourse, 75. 
 Non-interference. See Government. 
 Non-user, 263. 
 North Carolina, 7, 8, 79, 98, 216, 218, 
 
 220, 379. 
 
 Nova Scotia, 168. 
 Nueces, 357. 
 Nullification, 154-159, 183, 207-223, 
 
 281-291, 300, 345, 353 
 
 OAKLET, T. J., 193. 
 
 Obligations, international. 130. 
 
 Occupying claimant, 129, 132, 133. 
 
 Office-holders, 145, 160, 374, 376. 
 
 Office-seekers, 145, 385. 
 
 Ohio, 121,204,254, 257, 380. 
 
 "Old Court." See " New Court. 1 
 
 Oligarchy, 102. 
 
 O Neil, Peggy. See Mrs.J. H.Eaton. 
 
 " Onslow," 111. 
 
 Order, Jackson s departmental, 51 ; 
 Jackson s genera,!, 68 ; Kendall s 
 mail, 350, 371 ; in council, 30, 166 
 168. 
 
 Oregon, 359. 
 
 Organ, 104, 143, 148, 159, 160, 280. 
 
 Osborn vs. United States Bank, 128 
 
 Overton, Judge, 155. 
 
 Owens, 183. 
 
 PACIFIC, the, 352. 
 Palmer, W. A.. 378. 
 Pamphlets, 114, 267, 276. 
 Panama Congress. 106-10& 
 *anic, 304, 30 sis, 316 
 
 Paper money, 119, 121, 122, 126, 230 
 246, 363. 
 
 Parliament, Act of, 165, 167, 168. 
 
 Parton, J., 1, 3, 15, 21, 23, 49, 70, 76 
 79, 117, 151, 154, 159, 160, i62, 273 
 291, 296, 384, 385. 
 
 Party, 280; the anti-Jackson, 260 
 256., 374, 378, 379 ; the anti-masonic, 
 253-255, 374; the anti-monopoly, 
 see the equal-rights : the demo* 
 cratic-republican Jeffersonian, 1L 
 18, 21, 26, 27, 29, 41, 50, 80, 101, 
 102, 106, 120, 136, 144, 173 191 
 228-230, 234,. 253, 371, 372; the 
 equal-rights, or loco-foco, 369-373 
 381, 382; the federal, 11, 12, 2fl 
 60, 96, 101, 102, 112, 115, 116, 139 
 144, 238, 252 ; the Jackson, 139 
 1.54, 173, 188, 205, 236, 248, 256, 257, 
 313, 374, 375; the Jackson- Van 
 Buren, 372 ; the national republi 
 can, 139. 187, 374 ; the nullifica 
 tion, 212; the people s, 86; the 
 whig, 328, 330. 332, 340, 374, 379 ; 
 the union, 163; discipline, 248, 
 313; exigency, 109, 192; hatred, 
 300, 384 ; policy, 221 ; strife, 139. 
 
 "Patrick Henry, "111. 
 
 Patriot, the New Hampshire, 143 ; th 
 Baltimore, 146. 
 
 Patronage, 102, 106, 112, 116, 118, 147, 
 149. See Civil Service. 
 
 Peck, Judge, 173. 
 
 Pennsylvania, 82, 117, 147, 155, 187 
 188, 204, 205, 211, 227, 254, 257 
 272, 278, &37, 375. 
 
 Pennsylvania Reporter, 156. 
 
 Pennsylvanian, the. 311. 
 
 Pensacola, 30, 36-38, 53, 56, 60, 64, 
 67, 70. 
 
 Pension, 120, 221; agency, 238, 248, 
 310. 
 
 People, will of the, 96-98. 
 
 Perdido, 20. 
 
 Personal feeling, Jackson s, 23, 24, 
 65, 156, 162, 219, 272, 313, 314. 
 
 Phi Beta Kappa, 264. 
 
 Philadelphia, 10, 14, 80, 87, 112,116, 
 231, 233, 254, &4, 3371 338, 346. 
 
 Pickering, T., 96. 
 
 Pinckney, T., 35. 
 
 Pinkney, W.,43. 
 
 Pioneers, 6, 33. 
 
 Piracy, 64. 
 
 Pitkin, T., 228, 231. 
 
 Planter, Jackson a, 16, 17 
 
 Plaster trade, 197. 
 
 Platform, 253. 
 
 Plumer, W., 27, 73, 144, 238. 
 
 Plutocracy 226, 331. See Mo**i 
 power. 
 
 Poindcxter, G., 888 
 
400 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Poinsett, J. R., 352, 354. 
 
 Police, 365. 
 
 Political philosophy, Jackson s, 277. 
 
 Politics, 104 ; domestic, 26 ; national, 
 
 119 ; New York, 102, 103. 
 Polk, J. K., 292, 314, 320, 358, 359, 
 
 375, 386. See Report. 
 Popularity. Jackson s, 14, 15, 31. 34- 
 
 36, 43, 49, 63, 64, 68, 72, 78, 100, 
 
 135, 156, 187, 259, 279, 297, 379, 
 
 385. 
 
 Porter, P. B., 179 ; Commodore, 359. 
 Portsmouth, N. H., 236, 238, 239, 248, 
 
 261. 
 
 Post, N. Y. Evening, 371. 
 Post-office, 349-351. 
 Potomac, 117, 357. 
 Powers, implied, 109. 
 Presidency, the, 47, 100, 102. 
 President, the. See the Executive. 
 Press, the, 263. 
 Prices, 12l, 382. 
 Primary, 87, 102. 
 Principles, political, 138, 246, 286. 
 Printing, public, 148, 160. 
 Privateers, 53. 
 Privileges, 130. 
 Procedure, 172. 173. 
 Proclamation, anti-nullification, 282, 
 
 289; on West India trade, 169; 
 
 Monroe s, 165. 
 Prohibitory taxes, 221. 
 Proscription, party, 102, 111 , 112, 141, 
 
 144-146, 149; of the federalists, 
 
 96; of printers, 148. 
 Prosperity, 110, 121, 364, 365. 
 Protectionists. 167, 170, 187, 209, 212, 
 
 216, 220, L 
 "rotective duties, 75, 81, 84, 196, 206, 
 
 220, 221, 223, 326 ; system, 166, 168, 
 
 188, 207, 208, 210, 285, 286, 288-290, 
 
 333. See Tariff. 
 Protest, Jackson s, 311. 
 Proxies, 85. 
 
 Public prosecutor, 5, 7. 
 Puritan, 101. 
 
 QUARREL, 52 ; of Jackson and Cal- 
 
 houn, 158, 160. 
 Quarrelsomeness, Jackson s, 17, 47, 
 
 62, 60, 67, 72, 80. 
 Quincy, J., 314. 
 
 RABUN, Governor, 60 
 Race-horse bills," 236, 294, 302, 
 
 316. 
 
 Radicals, 109. 
 Randolph, J., 88, 101, 102, 111,174, 
 
 284 ; Lieutenant, 162, 301. 
 Ratio of value, gold to silver, 333. 
 Itecharter of the first national bank, 
 
 11, 83, 84, 228, 229, 245, 248 ; of the 
 
 second, 244, 257, 259, 260, 272, 274 
 
 275, 304, 308. 
 
 Reciprocity and retaliation, 164, 166- 
 168, 195-197. See Countervailing. 
 
 Redrawing, 293, 294. 
 
 Red River, 357. 
 
 Red Sticks, 55. 
 
 Reelection, Jackson s interpretatios 
 of his, 2(7, 278. 
 
 TCrform, 113, 117. 
 
 Regency, 86, 87, 369. 
 
 Register, the Annual, 19, 105, 110 
 118, 202, 203; the Mobile, 72 
 Niles s, 85, 200, 301, 317. 
 
 Reid, Major, 141. 
 
 Relief system, 122, 124, 126, 127 
 132-135, 142, 159, 172, 241, 242, 363. 
 
 Removal, from office, 106, 113, 118 
 145, 147; of judges, 125, 127, eet 
 " Judge-breaking ; " of the public 
 deposits, 232, 240, 241, 295-304 
 306-315, 325, 328, 331. 
 
 Rents, 382. 
 
 Report, on the bank. 247, 259, 260, 
 268, 92-294, 295, 308, 315, 33/ ; on 
 manufactures, 221 ; on the Mor 
 gan outrage, 251 ; on the removal 
 of the deposits, 308 ; on the Semi- 
 nole war, 64, 67, 258 ; on the tariff, 
 207, 223. 
 
 Republicans. See Party. 
 
 Resignation, Jackson s, of senator- 
 ship, 104 ; Clay s, 374 ; Webster s, 
 378. 
 
 Resolutions, Virginia and Kentucky, 
 212, 213, 215 j Calhoun s, 287; 
 Clay s, censuring Jackson, 310- 
 313 ; Benton s expunging, 313, 314. 
 
 Responsibility of the President, 246, 
 310. 
 
 Resumption of specie payments, 231, 
 233. 
 
 Retaliation. See Reciprocity and 
 Countervailing. 
 
 Retrenchment, 113. 
 
 Revenue taxes, 221, 223; surplus, 
 325, 328. 
 
 Revolutions, 170, 268, 354. 
 
 Rhea, J.,56, 65, 157,158. 
 
 Rights, belligerent, 63; protection 
 of, 126; natural, 370; notioni 
 about, 230, 260 ; vested, 119, 130 
 372. 
 
 Ringold, 153. 
 
 Rio Grande del Norte, 357. 
 
 Riots, 318, 382, 383. 
 
 Ritchie, T., 263. 
 
 Rives, W. C., 170, 312-314, 34ff, Ml 
 
 376. 
 
 Roane, A., 16. 
 Robards, L., 8,9. 
 Robards, Mn. L., S, 9. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 401 
 
 Robinsfc vra, Me., 191. 
 Rowan, J., 123, 172. 
 Rucker, to " ruckerize," 376. 
 " Rumps," 372. 
 
 Bush, R., 66, 111, 164, 188, 202, 235. 
 Russia, Emperor of, 115, 352; mis 
 sion to, 72, 102. 
 
 SABINE, 67, 351, 352, 357, 386. 
 
 Saddler, Jackson a, 2. 
 
 St. Augustine, 64. 
 
 St. John s, 165. 
 
 St. Mark s, 57-60, 64. 
 
 St. Mary s, Ga., 191. 
 
 Salisbury, N. C., 2. 
 
 Sanford, N., 332. 
 
 San Francisco, 352. 
 
 San Jacinto, 355. 
 
 Santa Anna, 354, 355. 
 
 Sargent, N., 107, 259. 
 
 Sargent, T., 116. 
 
 Scandal, 52. 
 
 Scire facias, 263. 
 
 Scott, General, 51, 88, 282 
 
 Scott, J., 96. 
 
 Secession, 116, 216, 282. 
 
 Secessionist, 213. 
 
 Secret, the King s, 359. 
 
 Self-government, 102, 127, 147, 155, 
 226. 
 
 Self-will, Jackson s, 278. 
 
 Senate, 67, 106, 111, 113, 128, 147, 
 148, 172, 177, 189, 190, 230, 268 ; 
 democracy vs. the, 311 ; on the 
 Bank, 247, 248, 274, 275, 315 ; Jack 
 son s quarrel with the, 272, 278, 
 314, 384 ; committees of the, 111. 
 
 Senator, Jackson a, 10, 76. 
 
 Sergeant, J., 258. 
 
 Sevier, Governor, 15, 18. 
 
 Seward, W. H., 254. 
 
 Seybert, A., 229. 
 
 Shoulder Bone Creek, 175. 
 
 Silver, 120, 123, 332, 333. 
 
 Blade, W., 378. 
 
 Slamm, 372. 
 
 Slavery and slaves, 349-352, 355. 
 
 Slave-trade, 23, 64, 69. 
 
 Smith, A., 289. 
 
 Smith, S., 247 
 
 Socialists, 382. 
 
 South American republics. 84, 105, 
 107, 108, 202. 
 
 South Carolina 215-220, 281-291; 
 police act, 130, 173, 215. 
 
 Sovereignty, 185, 224, 281. 
 
 Spain, 19, 21, 36, 53, 64, 67, 62, 64, 66 
 107, 353. 
 
 especial legislation, 194. 
 
 Ipecie, 120, 121, 123, 125. 134, 135, 
 231, 264, 268, 304, 318, 320. 323, 835- 
 887 ; circular, the, 335-337 ; pay- 
 26 
 
 ments, 121, 230, 232. See Rtsump, 
 
 tion, Suspension, and Currency. 
 Speculation, 322-324; Texan Umd 
 
 and sto< k, 355. 
 Spencer, A., 255. 
 Spencer, J. C., 251. 
 Spoils, 108, 146, 147, 162. 
 Spoliation claims, 170, 171, 221, 256. 
 Stanbaugh, Colonel, 155. 
 Standard, the, New York. 311. 
 State rights, 82, 109, 123, 130-134, 18 
 
 157, 173, 256, 284, 363. 
 Steamboats, 136. 
 Stevens, Thad., 254, 379. 
 Stevenson, A., 202, 376. 
 Stock-jobbing, 13. 
 Storekeeper, Jackson a, 16. 
 Story, J., 131, 254,361,363. 
 Strict construction, 109, 134, 256. 
 Strikes, 382. 
 Stump speaking, 6, 113. 
 Sturges vs. Crowninshield, 128. 
 Suability of a State, 129, 135. 
 Sub-treasury, 248. 
 Suspension of specie payments, 121 
 
 Suwanee River, 58, 342. 
 Swartwout, 91, 93, 105 
 
 TAMMANY, 86,117,369.372. 
 
 Taney, R. B., 163, 282, 297, 300-309 
 314, 317, 385. 
 
 Tariff, 188, 194-209, 212, 215, 218, 
 221, 222, 279, 285, 286, 288-291, see 
 Protective duties and Nullification ; 
 of 1789, 286 ; of 1816, 75 ; in 1820, 
 76; of 1824, 76, 197: of 1828 ("of 
 abominations ), 206, 207, 211,212, 
 216-220, 281; of 1832, 222, 223 
 281, 288. 290; "compromise," of 
 1833, 285\ 288, 289-291, 327 ; J. Q 
 Adams on the, 81, 109 ; Calhoun 
 on the, 82 : constitutionality of 
 the, 220, 285; convention, 220,- 
 Jackson on the, 76, 139, 256, 257 ; 
 and land, 186, 188, 190. 
 
 Tassel, G., 180,181. 
 
 Taxes, 69, 75, \S7, 217, 218, see Pro- 
 hibitory, Revenue, and Protective : 
 levied on the United States Bank 
 123, 128, 132. 
 
 Tecumseh, 31, 32, 36, 877. 
 
 Telegraph, the, 104, 114, 148, 165 
 159, 160, 263. 
 
 Tellico, 176. 
 
 Tennessee, 6, ". 8. 10, 13, 14, 16, 19 
 21. 56, 104, 105, Il7, 121, 122, 150 
 355, 375, 386 ; river, 353. 
 
 Texas, 67, 352-359, 385. 
 
 Thames, battle of the, 36. 
 
 Theatricalism in po itics, 77. 
 
 Third term, 376. 
 
402 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Three per cents, the. 266, 268. 269. 
 291-293, 303, 304, 309. 
 
 Timberlake, Mrs. See Mrs. J. H. 
 Eaton. 
 
 Titles, contested land, 129, 132; of 
 courtesy, 137. 
 
 Toast, Jackson s union, 156. 219 
 
 Tohopeka, 35. 
 
 Toland, II., 292. 
 
 Tomkins, D. D.. 73. 
 
 Trade, illicit, 166. 169, 170. 
 
 Trades unions, 382. 
 
 Transfer drafts, 307. 
 
 Treasury, the federal, 74, 114, 115, 
 secretary of the, 232, 302, 308, 311. 
 
 Treaty, with France (1778), 195 : 
 with England (1795), 11, 12, 27, 
 130 ; with Spain (1795), 19 ; of St. 
 Ildefonso, 19 ; with France (1803), 
 186; proposed with England (1806), 
 28 ; with Spain (1819), 20, 67. 69, 
 186, 354, 386 ; with France (1831), 
 171, 295, 343, 344, 346 ; with Mex 
 ico (1832), 354, (1840 and 1843), 
 358 ; commercial, 164, 194, 195 ; 
 Indian, 174-183. 
 
 Trist, N. P., 384. 
 
 Troup, Governor, 177, 178, 216. 
 
 Trustee, Jackson a, 15 
 
 Tyler, J., 47, 313, 325, 330, 358, 385. 
 
 UNION, the, 12, 19, 29, 157, 210, 216, 
 
 279, 283-285. 
 Union, the Nashville, 95. 
 University, national, 109. 
 Usages, diplomatic, 137- 
 Usury, 261. 
 
 VAN BUREN, 84-384 passim. 
 
 Veracity, "adjourned question of," 
 95. 
 
 Vermont, 254. 
 
 Verplanck, G. C., 292, 332. See Re 
 port. 
 
 Veto. 124, 134, 193, 194, 230, 274,275, 
 299\ 325\ 
 
 Vidal, heirs of, 70. 
 
 Vindictiveness, Jackson s. 148. 386. 
 
 Violence, mob, etc., 350, 363, 365. 
 
 Virginia. 8, 9, 85, 129, &0, 218, 288, 
 o-i n QIQ S7(5 
 
 fote for President, 89, 90, 117, 276, 
 
 Votes cast by Jackson, 13, 77, 139. 
 
 WAGES, 136, 186, 189. 
 
 War, 285 ; civil, 133, 282, 330 ; com 
 mercial, 12, 27, 28, 348 ; the Creek 
 33, 35; with France, 13, 29; In 
 dian, 15, 32, 33, 175, 176 ; the Mex 
 ican, 357, 358 ; Revolutionary, 2, 3 
 62, 174, 361 ; of 1812, 26, 29, 30 
 40, 42, 43, 68, 75, 234; the Senri 
 nole, 55, 61, 65. 151, 157, 161, 2W 
 272, 356, 359, 368. 
 
 Ward, Colonel, 355. 
 
 Warren, Admiral, 30. 
 
 Washington, G., 8, 10-12, 27, 146 
 175; mother of, 301. 
 
 Washington, city of, 33, 37, 42, 48 
 70, 105, 138, 143, 145, 149, 166, 168 
 221, 231, 239. 
 
 Watkins, T., 146. 
 
 Wayman vs. Southard, 129. 
 
 Wayne, J. M., 216. 
 
 Weatherford, 32. 
 
 Webb, J. W.,263. 
 
 Webster, D., 82-379 passim 
 
 West Indies, 202, 349. 
 
 West India trade, 161, 164-170, 266. 
 
 Whig. See Party. 
 
 Wheat imported. 323, 382. 
 
 White, C. P., 332. 
 
 White, II. L., 13, 162, 291, 812, 876 
 378, 379. 
 
 White House, 114, 115, 150, 160,280. 
 
 Whitney, R. M., 263, 268, 269, 297 
 300, 306. 
 
 Wilkinson, General, 21, 80, 86. 
 
 Williams, J., 76. 
 
 Williams, S., 381. 
 
 Wire-pulling, 77, 154, 273. 
 
 Wirt, W., 72, 130, 173, 236, 254 
 255. 
 
 Woodbury, L., 116, 162, 236-288,297 
 
 306, 320, 334. 
 Wool, 199. 
 
 Woollens, 198, 199, 208, 207- 
 Woollens bill, 200, 201. 
 Worcester, missionary, 181. 
 Worthington, 71. 
 Wright, Fanny, 382. 
 Wright, S., 204, 305. 
 Writs of execution, 129, 188, 172 ; 
 
 error, 181, 182 
 
American Statesmen. 
 
 A Series of Biographies of Men famous in the 
 
 Political History of the United States. Edited by 
 
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 gilt top, $1-25; half morocco, $2.50. 
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CRITICAL NOTICES. 
 
 JOHN Q UINCY ADAMS. rinta main 
 
 be those of posterity we have very little doubt, and he has set an 
 admirable example to his coadjutors in respect of interesting 
 narrative, just proportion, and judicial candor. New York 
 Evening Post. 
 
 The biography of Mr. Lodge is calm and 
 dignified throughout. He has the virtue 
 rare indeed among biographers of impartiality. He has 
 done his work with conscientious care, and the biography of 
 Hamilton is a book which cannot have too many readers. It is 
 more than a biography ; it is a study in the science of govern 
 ment. St. Paul Pioneer-Press. 
 
 CAIHOUN Notnm g can exceed the skill with which the 
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 is portrayed in these pages. The work is superior to any other 
 number of the series thus far, and we do not think it can be sur 
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 in relation to Calhoun s position is eminently philosophical and 
 just. The Dial (Chicago). 
 
 Professor Sumner has ... all in all, made 
 the j ustest i ong estimate of Jackson that has 
 
 had itself put between the covers of a book. New York 
 
 Times. 
 
 J? A TWnnr PIT ^he book has been to me intensely inter 
 esting. . . It is rich in new facts and side 
 
 lights, and is worthy of its place in the already brilliant series 
 of monographs on American Statesmen. Prof. MOSES COIT 
 TYLER. 
 
 ]\/rr\ 7\TR O F ^ n c l earness f style, and in all points of liter 
 ary workmanship, from cover to cover, the 
 volume is well-nigh perfect. There are also a calmness of judg 
 ment, a correctness of taste, and an absence of partisanship 
 which are too frequently wanting in biographies, and especially 
 in political biographies. American Literary Churchman (Bal 
 timore). 
 
 The book is exceedingly interesting and 
 readable. The attention of the reader is 
 strongly seized at once, and he is carried along in spite of him 
 self, sometimes protesting, sometimes doubting, yet unable to 
 lay the book down. Chicago Standard. 
 
 J/T7J7 K <ZT7? P It will be read by students of history ; it will 
 " be invaluable as a work of reference; it 
 will be an authority as regards matters of fact and criticism ; it 
 hits the keynote of Webster s durable and ever-growing fame ; 
 it is adequate, calm, impartial ; it is admirable. Philadelphia 
 Press. 
 
It is one of the most carefully prepared of 
 these very valuable volumes, . . . abound 
 ing in information not so readily accessible as is that pertaining 
 
 to men more often treated by the biographer 1 he whole 
 
 work covers a ground which the political student cannot afford 
 to neglect. Boston Correspondent Hartford Courant. 
 
 **- A r> r<?n AT The execution of the work deserves the high- 
 MAL>1SU1\. egt pra i se . it is very readable, in a bright 
 and vigorous style, and is marked by unity and consecutiveness 
 of plan. The Nation (New York). 
 
 ~ TT*7 A r\ * */rv A good piece of literary work. ... It 
 JOHN ADAMS. co j ers ^ he ground thoroughly, and 
 
 gives just the sort of simple and succinct account that is wanted. 
 _ Evening Post (New York). 
 
 *rAr>?u-ATT Well done, with simplicity, clearness, pre- 
 MAKStlAl^^. cision, and judgment, and in a spirit of 
 moderation and equity. A valuable addition to the series. 
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 VAMTTKT ADAM^ Thoroughly appreciative and sym- 
 SAMU-bL ADAMS. p at hetic, yet fair and critical. . . . 
 This biography is a piece of good work a clear and simple 
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 spirit of candor and humanity. Worcester Spy. 
 
 wArrnAr An interesting addition to our political liter- 
 &JLJMJ. U1V. ature ^ and win be of great serv i c e if it spread 
 
 an admiration for that austere public morality which was one of 
 the marked characteristics of its chief figure. The Epoch 
 (New York). 
 
 rr A v We have in this life of Henry Cla y a bi g ra P h y of 
 
 (^J^SLX. one of the most distinguished of American states 
 men, and a political history of the United States for the first 
 half of the nineteenth century. In each of these important and 
 difficult undertakings, Mr. Schurz has been eminently successful. 
 Indeed, it is not too much to say that, for the period covered, 
 we have no other book which equals or begins to equal_this life 
 of Henry Clay as an introduction to the study of American pol 
 itics. Political Science Quarterly (New York). 
 
 77-77 A/7? V Professor Tyler has not only made one of the 
 JiaiVJl * . best and most reada bie of American biographies ; 
 he may fairly be said to have reconstructed the life of Patrick 
 Henry, and to have vindicated the memory of that great man 
 from the unappreciative and injurious estimate which has been 
 placed upon it. New York Evening Post. 
 
 MH /?/?/"<? Mr - Roosevelt has produced an animated and 
 muimJ.^. i ntensely interesting biographical volume. . . . 
 Mr. Roosevelt never loses sight of the picturesque background 
 of politics, war - governments, and diplomacy. Magazine of 
 American History (New York). 
 
^ more generous, appreciative, or j jst 
 biography, and no more interesting or 
 philosophical piece of political history has appeared in this valu 
 able series . . . than this absorbing book. ... To give any ad 
 equate idea of the personal interest of the book, or its intimate 
 bearing on nearly the whole course of our political history would 
 be equivalent to quoting the larger part of it. Brooklyn Eagle. 
 
 WASHINGTON ^ r> Lodge has written an admirable 
 biography, and one which cannot but 
 
 confirm the American people in the prevailing estimate concern 
 ing the Father of his Country ; but its deepest and most impor 
 tant significance appears to us to consist in its testimony to the 
 exaltation and the uniqueness of a character whose like comes 
 seldom to the world, and only in periods of great stress and cri 
 sis. New York Tribune. 
 
 TT7? A TVR~T TAT He has managed to condense the whole 
 mass of matter gleaned from all sources 
 into his volume without losing in a single sentence the freedom 
 or lightness of his style or giving his book in any part the 
 crowded look of an epitome. He has plenty of time and plenty 
 of room for all he wishes to say, and says it in the very best and 
 most interesting manner. The Independent (New York). 
 
 %* For sale by all Booksellers. Sent, post-paid, on receipt of 
 price by the Publishers, 
 
 HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY, 
 4 PARK ST., BOSTON; u EAST I;TH ST., NEW YORK. 
 
American jtflen of lUtters. 
 
 EDITED BY 
 
 CHARLES DUDLEY WARNER* 
 
 A series of biographies of distinguished America* 
 authors, having all the special interest of biography, 
 and the larger interest and value of illustrating the 
 different phases of American literature, the social, 
 political, and moral influences which have moulded 
 these authors and the generations to which they be 
 longed. 
 
 Washington Irving. By CHARLES DUDLEY WARNER. 
 Noah Webster. By HORACE E. SCUDDER. 
 Henry D. Thoreau. By FRANK B. SANBORN. 
 George Ripley. By OCTAVIUS BROOKS FROTHINGHAM. 
 J. Fenimore Cooper. By THOMAS R. LOUNSBURY. 
 Margaret Fuller Ossoli. By T. W. HIGGINSON. 
 Ralph Waldo Emerson. By OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES. 
 Edgar Allan Poe. By GEORGE E. WOODBERRY. 
 Nathaniel Parker Willis. By HENRY A. BEERS. 
 Benjamin Franklin. By JOHN BACH McMASTER. 
 William Cullen Bryant. By JOHN BIGELOW. 
 
 Others to be announced hereafter. 
 
 Each volume, with Portrait, i6mo, gilt top, $1.25 ; 
 cloth, uncut edges, paper label, $1.50; half morocco t 
 $2.50- 
 
"WASHINGTON IRVING." 
 
 Mr. Warner has not only written with sympathy, mi 
 nute knowledge of his subject, fine literary taste, and that 
 easy, fascinating style which always puts him on such 
 good terms with his readers, but he has shown a tact, 
 critical sagacity, and sense of proportion full of promise 
 for the rest of the series which is to pass under his 
 supervision. New York Tribune. 
 
 It is a very charming piece of literary work, and pre 
 sents the reader with an excellent picture of Irving as a 
 man and of his methods as an author, together with an 
 accurate and discriminating characterization of his works* 
 - Boston Journal. 
 
 It would hardly be possible to produce a fairer or more 
 candid book of its kind. Literary World (London). 
 
 "NOAH WEBSTER." 
 
 Mr. Scudder s biography of Webster is alike honorable 
 to himself and its subject. Finely discriminating in alt 
 that relates to personal and intellectual character, schol 
 arly and just in its literary criticisms, analyses, anJ 
 estimates, it is besides so kindly and manly in its tone, its 
 narrative is so spirited and enthralling, its descriptions 
 are so quaintly graphic, so varied and cheerful in their 
 coloring, and its pictures so teem with the bustle, the 
 movement, and the activities of the real life of a by-gone 
 but most interesting age, that the attention of the reader 
 rs never tempted to wander, and he lays down the book 
 with a sigh of regret for its brevity. Harper s Monthly 
 Magazine. 
 
 It fills completely its place in the purpose of this se* 
 ties of volumes. The Critic (New York). 
 
 "HENRY D. THOREAU." 
 
 Mr. Sanborn s book is thoroughly American and truly 
 fascinating. Its literary skill is exceptionally good, and 
 there is a racy flavor in its pages and an amount of exact 
 knowledge of interesting people that one seldom meets 
 with in current literature. Mr. Sanborn has done Tho- 
 reau s genius an imperishable service. American Church 
 Review (New York). 
 
 Mr. Sanborn has written a careful book about a curious 
 man, whom he has studied as impartially as possible; 
 whom he admires warmly but with discretion ; and the 
 story of whose life he has told with commendable frank- 
 ness and simplicity. New York Mail and Express. 
 
 It is undoubtedly the best life of Thoreaa. extant.^ 
 - 
 
"GEORGE RIPLEY." 
 
 Mr. Frothingham s memoir is a calm and thoughtful 
 and tender tribute. It is marked by rare discrimination, 
 and good taste and simplicity. The biographer keeps 
 himself in the background, and lets his subject speak. 
 And the result is one of the best examples of personal 
 portraiture that we have met with in a long time. The 
 Churchman (New York). 
 
 He has fulfilled his responsible task with admirable 
 fidelity, frank earnestness, justice, fine feeling, balanced 
 moderation, delicate taste, and finished literary skill. \\ 
 is a beautiful tribute to the high-bred scholar and gener 
 ous-hearted man, whose friend he has so worthily por 
 trayed. Rev. William H. Channing (London). 
 
 "JAMES FENIMORE COOPER." 
 We have here a model biography. The book is charm 
 ingly written, with a felicity and vigor of diction that are 
 notable, and with a humor sparkling, racy, and never 
 obtrusive. The story of the life will have something of 
 the fascination of one of the author s own romances. - 
 New York Tribune. 
 
 Prof. Lcunsbury s book is an admirable specimen of 
 literary biography. . . . We can recall no recent addition 
 to American biography in any department which is supe 
 rior to it. It gives the reader not merely a full account 
 of Cooper s literary career, but there is mingled with this 
 a sufficient account of the man himself apart from his 
 books, and of the period in which he lived, to keep 
 alive the interest from the first word to the last. New 
 York E veiling Post. 
 
 "MARGARET FULLER OSSOLI." 
 Here at last we have a biography of one of the noblest 
 and the most intellectual of American women, which does 
 full justice to its subject. The author has had ample 
 material for his work, all the material now available, 
 perhaps, and has shown the skill of a master in his 
 use of it. ... It is a fresh view of the subject, and adds 
 important information to that already given to the public. 
 REV. DR. F. H. HEDGE, in Boston Advertiser. 
 
 He has filled a gap in our literary history with excel 
 lent taste, with sound judgment, and with that literary 
 skill which is preeminently his own. Christian Union 
 (New York). 
 
 Mr. Higginson writes with both enthusiasm and sym 
 pathy, and makes a volume of surpassing interest. 
 .Commercial Advertiser (New YorkV 
 
"RALPH WALDO EMERSON." 
 
 Dr. Holmes has written one of the most delightful 
 biographies that has ever appeared. Every page sparkles 
 with genius. His criticisms are trenchant, his analysis 
 clear, his sense of proportion delicate, and his sympa 
 thies broad and deep. Philadelphia Press. 
 
 A biography of Emerson by Holmes is a real event in 
 American Literature. Standard (Chicago). 
 
 "EDGAR ALLAN POE." 
 
 Mr. Woodberry has contrived with vast labor to con 
 struct what must hereafter be called the authoritative 
 biography of Poe, a biography which corrects all others, 
 supplements all others, and supersedes all others. The 
 Critic (New York). 
 
 The best life of Poe that has yet been written, and no 
 better one is likely to be written hereafter. This is high 
 praise, but it is deserved. Mr. Woodberry has spared no 
 pains in exploring sources of information; he has shown 
 rare judgment and discretion in the interpretation of what 
 he has found. Commercial Advertiser (New York). 
 
 "NATHANIEL PARKER WILLIS." 
 Prof. Beers has done his work sympathetically yet can. 
 didly and fairly and in a philosophic manner, indicating 
 the status occupied by Willis in the republic of letters, 
 and sketching graphically his literary environment and 
 the main springs of his success. It is one of the best 
 books of an excellent series. Buffalo Times. 
 
 "BENJAMIN FRANKLIN." 
 
 One of the most interesting and instructive volumes of 
 the series, overflowing with instructive matter concerning 
 the Bostonian whose name is so closely identified with 
 the history of Philadelphia, and, indeed, with that of the 
 whole country as it existed in his day. The pictures 
 which are given of the momentous period in which he 
 lived are full of vigor, and betray an astonishing amount 
 cf research in many directions. The simplicity of style 
 and the critical ability so abundantly displayed make the 
 work very fascinating reading throughout. The estimate 
 of Franklin s character, ability, and attainments is a very 
 just one. Boston Gazette, 
 
 *** For sale by all Booksellers. Sent, post-paid, on receipt 
 vf price by the Publishers, 
 
 HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY, 
 BOSTON AND NKW YORK. 
 

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