illitHillMllUlt 

 
 THE LIBRARY 
 OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 LOS ANGELES 
 
 GIFT OF 
 
 FLOYD G. BUBTCHEm?
 
 A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORIES 
 ANCIENT AND MEDIAEVAL

 
 A HISTORY OF POLITICAL 
 THEORIES 
 
 ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL 
 
 BY 
 
 WILLIAM ARCHIBALD DUNNING, PH.D. 
 
 PKOFKSSOR Or HISTORY IN COLUMBIA UNIVKBSITT 
 
 If flrft 
 THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 
 LONDON: MACMILLAN & CO., LTD. 
 1921 
 
 All right* reitrvtd
 
 COPYRIGHT, 1902, 
 BY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY. 
 
 Set up and electrotyped. Published January, 1909. 
 
 NortoooB 
 
 J. 8. Cashing & Co. Berwick <fc Smith Co. 
 Norwood, Mass., U.S.A.
 
 Bus. Admin. 
 Library 
 
 JA 
 81 
 
 v. 
 
 Co 
 PROFESSOR JOHN W. BURGESS 
 
 WHO HAS SO POWERFULLY STIMULATED 
 
 THE STUDY OF BOTH HI8TOBY AND POLITICAL THEORY 
 
 IN AMERICA 
 
 THIS HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 IS DEDICATED 
 
 BY THE AUTHOR 
 
 '.iC-ft-
 
 PREFACE 
 
 THAT comprehensive systems of political theory 
 should never have had much vogue in England and 
 America is a fact that may be explained by certain 
 well-established race or national characteristics. But 
 it is not so easy to understand why the history of 
 political theories has attracted but little attention. 
 The possession and application of eminently just 
 ideas of government have been the boast of English- 
 speaking peoples on both sides of the Atlantic. But 
 with all the devotion of their scholars to historical 
 research, especially in the last quarter of a century, 
 there has been no serious attempt to trace out, in 
 origin and development, the life of these ideas in 
 the broad field of the world's progress. English- 
 speaking students have indeed discarded the long- 
 prevalent notion that little worthy of scholarly his- 
 torical investigation ever happened in political life 
 or thought prior to the Reformation or outside the 
 circle of so-called Anglo-Saxon interests. Ancient 
 and mediaeval life and institutions have received 
 much attention and have been the source of a lit- 
 erature which throws a brilliant lustre upon the 
 
 yii
 
 viii PREFACE 
 
 scholarship of England and America. Besides the 
 political and ecclesiastical institutions that have par- 
 ticularly attracted investigators, the conscious reflec- 
 tion of the peoples treated has been traced out with 
 much diligence in the fields of belles-lettres, theology, 
 metaphysics and ethics ; but no one hitherto has 
 sought to follow through ancient and mediaeval 
 times the course of ideas on the topics of political 
 science. 
 
 It is to fill the void here indicated that the present 
 volume is submitted to an indulgent public. The 
 author feels no overweening confidence that the 
 work is worthy of the subject; yet he hopes to 
 have contributed something toward a clarification 
 of our knowledge. If the successive transformations 
 through which the political consciousness of men 
 has passed from early antiquity to modern times 
 are rendered in any degree more intelligible, or even 
 if any suggestion is given through which another 
 pen may hereafter render them more intelligible, 
 this volume will not have been issued in vain. 
 
 To aid in a fuller study of the subject than is 
 possible from the condensed presentation in the 
 text, references have been appended to each chap- 
 ter covering the topics treated therein ; and at the 
 end of the volume has been placed an alphabetical 
 list containing full information as to all the works 
 referred to, together with many additional titles. 
 This bibliographical apparatus is due chiefly to the
 
 PREFACE ix 
 
 diligence of Mr. W. Maitland Abell, sometime Uni- 
 versity Fellow in Political Science at Columbia. 
 
 The chapters on Aristotle and Machiavelli have 
 already been published, in much the same form as 
 here, in the Political Science Quarterly and the In- 
 ternational Monthly respectively. For valuable sug- 
 gestions on various portions of the work in the 
 manuscript the author is under great obligation to 
 his colleagues, Professors Munroe Smith and James 
 Harvey Robinson ; and to Mr. Abell, for the untiring 
 labour devoted to preparing the references and bib- 
 liography and to reading the proofs, he makes special 
 and most grateful acknowledgment. 
 
 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, 
 December 26, 1901.
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 PAQB 
 
 INTRODUCTION XT 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 INSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF GREEK THKOBT 
 
 1. The Hellenic Peoples in General 1 
 
 2. The Constitution of Sparta 6 
 
 3. The Constitution of Athens 11 
 
 References 16 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF PLATO 
 
 1. The Precursors of Plato 18 
 
 2. General Character of Plato's Thought 23 
 
 3. The Republic 27 
 
 4. The Statesman 34 
 
 5. The Laws 37 
 
 6. Plato's Theory and Hellenic Facts 43 
 
 References 47 
 
 CHAPTER m 
 THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 
 
 1. Method and Character of the Politics 49 
 
 2. The Nature of the State and of the Household ... 55 
 
 3. Organization of the State : Constitution, Citizenship, Govern- 
 
 ment 62 f 
 
 4. The Sovereign Power . . . . . . . 67 / 
 
 5. The Forms of Constitution 71 
 
 zi
 
 xii CONTENTS 
 
 FAOB 
 
 6. The Best State 78 
 
 7. Revolutions 84 
 
 8. The Hellenic and the Universal in Aristotle .... 93 
 References 98 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 POLITICAL THEORY OF LATER GREECE AND OF ROME 
 
 1. Political Extinction of Hellas 99 
 
 2. Epicurean and Stoic Influences 102 
 
 3. The Constitutional Development of Rome .... 106 
 
 4. Polybius 113 
 
 5. Cicero 118 
 
 6. The Imperial Jurists 125 
 
 References . . . 129 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEDIAEVAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
 1. Christianity in the Declining Roman Empire . . . 131 
 
 2. Rise of the Papacy 136 
 
 3. Rise of the Mediaeval Empire 141 
 
 4. The Era of Conflict between the Secular and the Spiritual 
 
 Power 144 
 
 References 151 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 POLITICAL THEORY IN THE EARLY CHURCH 
 
 1. Jesus and the Apostles 152 
 
 2. The Fathers of the Church : Ambrose, Augustine, Gregory 
 
 the Great 155 
 
 References 160
 
 CONTENTS 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 1. Development and Method of Reasoning ..... 161 
 
 2. The Dogma of the Two Powers 165 
 
 3. The Argument for Sacerdotal Preeminence .... 169 
 
 4. The Argument for Princely Independence .... 176 
 
 5. St. Bernard and John of Salisbury 181 
 
 References 188 
 
 CHAPTER VHI 
 
 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS AND HIS SCHOOL 
 
 1. General Character of the System 189 
 
 2. Theory of Law and Justice 192 
 
 3. The Nature and Forms of Political Authority . . . 197 
 
 4. The Functions of Government 202 
 
 5. The Secular and the Spiritual Power 205 
 
 6. St. Thomas's Doctrine as formulated by ./Egidius Romanus . 207 
 
 7. Summary 212 
 
 References 214 
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 THEORIES DURING THE DECLINE OF THE PAPAL 
 HEGEMONY 
 
 1. Pro-papal Doctrine 215 
 
 2. New Elements in the Anti-papal Theory .... 220 
 
 3. The Supporters of Philip the Fair 224 
 
 4. The De Monarchia of Dante 230 
 
 5. The Conflict between Lewis of Bavaria and Pope John XXII 235 
 
 6. Marsiglio of Padua 238 
 
 7. William of Ockam 244 
 
 8. Marsiglio and Ockam on Sovereignty and Representation . 248 
 References 253
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER X 
 THE PASSING OF THE MIDDLE AG 
 
 1. Political and Ecclesiastical Tendencies 255 
 
 2. Wycliffe and Huss 260 
 
 3. Gerson and the Council of Constance 265 
 
 4. Nicholas of Cues and the Council of Basel .... 270 
 
 5. The Jurists and the Theory of the Corporation . . . 276 
 
 6. Summary 280 
 
 References 284 
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 MACHIAVELLI 
 
 1. His Life and Times 285 
 
 2. Method of his Philosophy and his Point of View . . . 291 
 
 3. His Attitude toward Morality and Religion .... 297 
 
 4. Theory of Political Motives 303 
 
 5. The Forms of Government 306 
 
 6. On the Extension of Dominion 310 
 
 7. On the Preservation of Dominion 315 
 
 8. Summary and Conclusion 322 
 
 References 325 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 327 
 
 INDEX 347
 
 INTKODUCTION 
 
 IN every community of human beings there may 
 be detected some form, however rude, of regulating 
 authority, which determines in some degree, how- 
 ever slight, the relations of the members of the 
 community with one another. The forms and func- 
 tions of this authority are as diverse as the times 
 and places in which these communities are found. 
 The ancient Greek TroAis and the modern British 
 Empire differ as widely hi characteristics as in time ; 
 the Papuan tribe and the French nation more widely 
 than in place. In times and places where no ad- 
 vance has been made out of the social conditions 
 which are designated as barbarous, the exercise of 
 and submission to this regulating authority are 
 matters for the most part of physical force or un- 
 reasoning habit. With developing civilization, how- 
 ever, man seeks some explanation of the phenomena 
 of authority that shall satisfy the rational spirit. 
 The first results of this seeking are often ridiculous 
 enough, in the judgment of more advanced reason, 
 though not more so than the earliest results of 
 investigation into the phenomena of the physical 
 world. But whatever the results may be, whenever 
 
 XT
 
 XVI INTRODUCTION 
 
 and wherever any well-defined ideas are to be found 
 in reference to the origin, nature and scope of the 
 authority through which the relations of the mem- 
 bers of the community to one another are determined, 
 then and there is material for the history of political 
 theories. 
 
 It is not, however, the purpose of this work to 
 cover so wide a field as is here indicated. There 
 is to be excluded, in the first place, the whole mass 
 of primitive political theory, that is, the ideas 
 that are characteristic of primitive peoples. For 
 this sweeping exclusion the limitations of space 
 would be an adequate ground; but there are others 
 at hand of a more scientific character. It is hardly 
 too much to say that our knowledge of primitive 
 political thought is as vague as it is vast. Recent 
 research has enormously extended our acquaintance 
 with primitive institutions, but the interpretation of 
 those institutions tends to be rather advanced than 
 primitive. What idea the early Teuton associated 
 with his customs he has nowhere recorded ; the 
 political theory that passes for his is likely to be in 
 reality that of Tacitus, lamenting the Roman Repub- 
 lic, or of Freeman, preaching the unity of history. 
 That primitive politics lies so largely in the realm 
 of conjecture and controversy is an ample justifica- 
 tion for its exclusion from the work. But it is even 
 possible to concede that primitive political theory is 
 not political at all, but purely sociological. Of all
 
 INTRODUCTION Xvii 
 
 the multifarious projects for fixing the boundary 
 which marks off political from the more general 
 social science, that seems most satisfactory which 
 bases the distinction on the existence of a political 
 consciousness. Without stopping to inquire too 
 curiously into the precise connotation of this term, 
 it may safely be laid down that as a rule primitive 
 communities do not and advanced communities do 
 manifest the political consciousness. Hence, the 
 opportunity to leave to sociology the entire field of 
 primitive institutions, and to regard as truly politi- 
 cal only those institutions and those theories which 
 are closely associated with such manifestation. A 
 history of political theories, then, would begin at 
 the point at which the idea of the state, as distinct 
 from the family and the clan, becomes a determining 
 factor in the life of the community. 
 
 The appearance of the idea of the state implies a 
 relatively high stage of intellectual development in 
 any people, but it does not necessarily imply that 
 reflection on political subjects has assumed the char- 
 acter of a science in the technical sense of that term. 
 A history of political theories may properly include 
 much that would be out of place in a history of 
 political science. The title of this work has been 
 chosen in view of this distinction. Many political 
 doctrines of the utmost historical interest and value 
 have had an origin and a career quite out of relation 
 to any formal body of scientific dogma. To set rigid
 
 xviii INTRODUCTION 
 
 barriers against the consideration of such doctrines 
 would almost certainly result in a distortion of both 
 history and philosophy. It would be to make Greek 
 philosophy begin, rather than culminate, with Aris- 
 totle ; to leave the Middle Ages almost a total blank ; 
 to pass Burke by with at most a simple allusion ; 
 and to ignore nearly all that has been wrought by 
 one of the most thoroughly political communities 
 known to history, namely, the people of the United 
 States. Finally, it would give recognition to an 
 idea that has produced much error and confusion 
 in these latter days the idea that formal political 
 science is more a cause than a result of objective 
 political history. 
 
 While the scope of the work thus is not to be 
 identical with that of political science, it is also to 
 be distinguished from that of political literature. 
 As we shall often pass far beyond the limits of 
 the one, we shall often be well within the limits 
 of the other. The value and interest of a truly 
 comprehensive history of the literature of politics 
 are not to be doubted; but in the purpose of the 
 present work exhaustiveness is not a controlling 
 factor. We shall pass over with scant notice or in 
 total silence much that may have the highest value 
 from the standpoint of literary art, or of poetic 
 fancy, or even of abstract logic. The criterion of 
 selection will be a pretty definite and clearly dis- 
 cernible relationship between any given author's
 
 INTRODUCTION XIX 
 
 work and the current of institutional development. 
 The history of political theory, in other words, is 
 to be kept always in touch with the history of 
 political fact ; and, with this purpose in view, it will 
 be indispensable at times to depart entirely from the 
 field of literature and to derive a notion of theory 
 from an immediate interpretation of institutions. 
 
 In addition to the considerations just treated, an 
 orientation of our subject requires some reference 
 to the relation of political to other philosophy. A 
 high degree of differentiation in the field of human 
 knowledge is a characteristic mark of very advanced 
 civilization. Among primitive peoples the ideas that 
 later come to be designated as political are inex- 
 tricably blended with conceptions known to us as 
 legal, ethical, theological, ecclesiastical and even 
 mathematical. The disentanglement of this con- 
 fused mass and the isolation and definition of what 
 is purely political is practically never fully accom- 
 plished. But progress is made in the work, and the 
 history of political theory is in a large sense merely 
 an account of the progress. Where for any reason 
 progress in this direction ceases, the history of 
 political theory ceases. Hence it is that the scope 
 of the present work will be limited practically to 
 the philosophy of the European Aryan peoples. The 
 Oriental Aryans never freed their politics from the 
 theological and metaphysical environment in which 
 it is embedded to-day. The Semitic Jews and
 
 XX INTRODUCTION 
 
 Saracens at times achieved rather more, but their 
 achievement was not permanent. The Turanian Chi- 
 nese attained a strikingly advanced position in the 
 evolution of ethical doctrine; but neither in theory 
 nor in practice did they ever take the further and 
 decisive step of discriminating between ethical and 
 political conceptions. The Aryans of Europe have 
 shown themselves to be the only peoples to whom 
 the term " political " may be properly applied, 1 and 
 it is to their theories that this history will substan- 
 tially be confined. 
 
 From the fact that political philosophy in all ages 
 has stood in such intimate relationship with other 
 philosophy, it is inevitable that a historical treat- 
 ment of the special should involve a good deal of 
 attention to the general field. Particularly obsti- 
 nate is the entanglement of politics with ethics and 
 jurisprudence. A by no means insignificant propor- 
 tion of the thought of political philosophers has been 
 devoted to defining the interrelationship of the three, 
 or to demonstrating that no distinction can be drawn 
 between them. Ethical and juristic concepts, there- 
 fore, must figure largely in a history of political 
 
 1 Cf. Burgess, Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law, 
 Vol. I, p. 30 et seq. Critics of the use of this term have assailed it as 
 implying an arrogant assumption of superiority for our own race. 
 The assaults are without foundation. Whether, from the standpoint 
 of God, or nature, or the Unknowable, or abstract reason, " political 
 peoples " are superior to other peoples, is not involved in the term ; 
 the only point is that a distinction may be perceived between the two 
 classes of peoples.
 
 INTRODUCTION xxi 
 
 concepts. Indeed, the special character of such a 
 history will be pretty clearly determined by the 
 importance which the particular writer attaches to 
 the one or the other of the two related sciences. To 
 him who looks upon the state as primarily an ethi- 
 cal entity, the development of political ideas will 
 present one aspect ; to him who looks upon the state 
 as primarily jural, that development will present a 
 distinctly different aspect. Possibly an ideal history 
 would eliminate absolutely the idiosyncrasy of the 
 writer; but a useful history can be produced on 
 either of the lines suggested. At the present day 
 the juristic conception of the state seems to be the 
 most characteristic and the most useful. So far, 
 then, as discrimination and selection are inevitable, 
 the present history will prefer those lines of develop- 
 ment in which political ideas appear as legal rather 
 than as ethical. 
 
 A further limitation of the field of the work is 
 made necessary by the extent to which differentia- 
 tion has proceeded within the confines of distinctly 
 political theory. Until within quite modern times, 
 writers on politics included in their works a treat- 
 ment of the topics that are included to-day under 
 the heads of public law and political economy. But 
 the whole group of special sciences which these 
 names suggest international law, constitutional 
 law, administrative law, pure and applied economics, 
 finance and statistics have sloughed off and have
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 expanded until each has a history and a dogma quite 
 too comprehensive for any but special treatment. 
 Political theory proper still furnishes the heads of 
 chapters for these special branches, and the reflex 
 influence of the offshoots upon the main stern has 
 been very considerable. Some general account of 
 the movement of ideas in the special fields is, there- 
 fore, in some cases indispensable. As a rule, how- 
 ever, it will be necessary to leave the special just 
 where it becomes clearly distinguishable from the 
 general. 
 
 No history of political theories of just the charac- 
 ter indicated in the foregoing sections has ever been 
 published, at least in the languages of Western 
 Europe. The nearest approach to it is Janet's elabo- 
 rate and most admirable work, the Histoire de la 
 Science Politique dans ses JRapports a la Morale 
 (second edition, Paris, 1887). Despite the form of 
 the title, Janet includes much more than what is 
 strictly the " science " of politics in his survey, and 
 thus makes his field include all political theories. 
 But, on the other hand, he avowedly exhibits politi- 
 cal theory in its relation to ethical doctrine ; and 
 while the breadth of his scholarship, the depth of 
 his philosophy and the charm of his style are all 
 brilliantly exhibited in the parts of the work that 
 deal with politics, it is no disparagement of his 
 magnificent creation to say that the treatment of 
 ethical theories is the overshadowing feature of the
 
 INTRODUCTION xxiii 
 
 work and gives to it the special quality which it is 
 the purpose of the present treatise to avoid. 
 
 In German literature the lack of a history of 
 political theories is surprising, in view of the enor- 
 mous activity of scholars during the last century 
 in all phases of historical research. Some approach 
 to the vacant field is made by Robert von Mohl's 
 Geschichte und Literatur der Staatswissenschaften 
 (Erlangen, 1855) ; but this is little more than a 
 classified bibliography of politics, useful, indeed, but 
 very far from any pretensions to the character of 
 a connected history. Much nearer to the sort of 
 work under consideration is Karl Hildenbrand's Ge- 
 schichte und System der Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie 
 (Leipzig, 1860). The point of view adopted recog- 
 nizes the importance of objective history in determin- 
 ing the lines of political theory, and both the title 
 and the text of the work suggest the intimate rela- 
 tionship and interdependence of juristic and purely 
 political philosophy. If the author had completed 
 his work, it might have occupied a place in Ger- 
 man literature analogous to that of Janet's in the 
 French; but only a single volume was ever pub- 
 lished, and that brought the history only to the 
 close of classical antiquity. J. K. Bluntschli's pro- 
 lific pen made some contribution to the history of 
 political theory in his Geschichte der neueren Staats- 
 wissenschaft (third edition, 1881). This is a solid, 
 respectable piece of work, but it deals only with the
 
 XXiv INTRODUCTION 
 
 period since the thirteenth century, and it is devoted 
 primarily to an account of the systematic philosophy 
 of Germany. 
 
 In English the first and only attempt at a history 
 of political theory is to be found in the two volumes 
 of Robert Blakey, The History of Political Literature 
 from the Earliest Times (London, 1855). Though 
 the title of the work indicates that the author's 
 concern is with literature alone, his plan as described 
 in the Introduction would give full weight to the 
 influence of institutions on political science. More- 
 over, he includes under the term " political litera- 
 ture" the public documents and all the records of 
 governmental action. If his execution were at all 
 comparable with his plan, his work would be of 
 great value. But the two volumes that were pub- 
 lished, coming down to 1700 A.D., are crude, scrappy 
 and superficial, and abound in errors of simple fact. 
 The promise of a scholarly and adequate treatment 
 of the subject is embodied in Sir Frederick Pollock's 
 Introduction to the History of the Science of Politics 
 (Macmillan, 1890) ; but this slight sketch is only a 
 promise, and the preoccupation of the talented author 
 with the special field of jurisprudence seems to have 
 definitively extinguished by this time all hope of 
 fulfilment. 
 
 As compared with the works just referred to, the 
 present history is intended to be more comprehen- 
 sive than those of Pollock, Bluntschli and Hilden-
 
 INTRODUCTION XXV 
 
 brand, and more systematic and accurate than that 
 of Blakey; to avoid the bibliographical character 
 of Mohl's three volumes; and, with the utmost ad- 
 miration and respect for Janet's interpretation of 
 political theory in its relation to ethical theory, to 
 present rather an interpretation of the development 
 of political theory in its relation to political fact.
 
 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 INSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF GREEK THEORY 
 
 1. The Hellenic Peoples in General 
 
 A HISTORY of political theories of the scope 
 defined above must begin with the thought of 
 that brilliant aggregation of Mediterranean peoples 
 whose astonishing development in intellectual cul- 
 ture, twenty-three centuries in the past, is still the 
 wonder and despair of civilized man. Probably in 
 no field save that of art are Greek ideals more 
 highly appreciated at the present day than in politi- 
 cal theory. This is in some measure due to the 
 wide prevalence of democratic thought and feeling ; 
 but more decisive is the fact that the great thinkers 
 of Hellas explored the entire height and depth of 
 human political capacity and outlined the principles 
 which at all times and in all circumstances must 
 determine the general features of political life. 
 With all its universality, however, Hellenic thought, 
 like that of every other age and people, was deter- 
 mined primarily by the institutions amid which it 
 developed. The only path of approach to an accu- 
 rate apprehension of political philosophy is through
 
 2 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 political history. Our attention must, therefore, 
 first be devoted to the salient facts in the growth 
 of Greek constitutions. 
 
 The opening of authentic history, about 700 B.C., 
 reveals the Hellenic world as a group of little 
 communities scattered about among the hills and 
 valleys of the peninsula which they afterward made 
 so famous, and on the adjacent coasts and islands. 
 Politically each community was isolated and inde- 
 pendent ; but the tradition of a common origin per- 
 vaded them all and was the basis of various social 
 and religious institutions. In the peninsula itself 
 some tendency was indicated toward the creation 
 of larger political aggregates through the voluntary 
 coalescence of neighbouring communities or through 
 the forcible absorption of the weaker by the stronger. 
 On the other hand, the practice of colonization in 
 distant places both reduced the absorptive power of 
 the mother city, and, through the autonomy of the 
 colony, confirmed the influence of the characteristic 
 type. The TroXts, or city-state, already fixed the lines 
 within which the theory and practice of Hellenic 
 politics were always to move. 
 
 In the period now under consideration no single 
 form of government was universal throughout the 
 various communities. But in practically all the 
 more progressive and powerful states, save Sparta, 
 some species of aristocracy or oligarchy prevailed. 
 The patriarchal kingship, which must have been 
 characteristic of the times depicted by Homer, had 
 disappeared, and supreme authority was vested in
 
 HELLENIC INSTITUTIONS IN GENEEAL 3 
 
 a relatively small number of privileged persons, 
 whose distinction was based on social or religious 
 tradition. The power wielded by these aristocracies 
 was by no means purely political. The communities 
 themselves were still permeated by the ideas of 
 family and clan relationship, and the aristocratic 
 government expressed merely the recognition of 
 general preeminence to certain families and clans. 
 The heads of these social organizations constituted 
 the body which regulated the whole social, economic, 
 religious and political life of the community. This 
 aristocratic type was characteristic of the Hellenic 
 world during the seventh century B.C. 
 
 In the succeeding century the process of social 
 evolution resulted in the general prevalence of 
 another governmental type : aristocratic govern- 
 ment was succeeded by tyrannic. Two causes 
 figured largely in this transformation. On the one 
 hand the growth and prosperity of the cities, the 
 expansion of their commerce, and the general intel- 
 lectual development introduced elements into social 
 thought and structure which tended steadily to 
 undermine the moral foundations of the old system. 
 On the other hand, the degeneracy and dissension 
 that were manifested in the aristocracy itself gave 
 frequent opportunity for an able and ambitious 
 man to take the power into his individual control. 
 Practically every important city of the Hellenic 
 world (Sparta again being a notable exception) 
 passed under the sway of a tyrant. Monarchy 
 thus became again the prevailing type of govern-
 
 4 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 ment ; unlike the Homeric king, however, the tyrant 
 had in most cases no support whatever in social tra- 
 dition or religious sentiment, but rested his authority 
 on force pure and simple. The very fact of tyrannic 
 power, therefore, must have had much influence in 
 promoting the rationalization of political thought 
 in removing political reflection from its ancient chan- 
 nel to that which was marked out by the primary 
 consideration, not of the right of the governor, but 
 of the welfare of the governed. 
 
 The violence and cruelty which characterized the 
 rule of the tyrant were at first displayed chiefly 
 toward the aristocracy the supplanted ruling class. 
 In time, however, the whole subject population felt 
 the full force of his arbitrary sway. The many and 
 the few were brought by common suffering to com- 
 bine for the common relief. One by one the tyrants 
 were expelled from Hellas and a new page was un- 
 rolled in Greek political experience. The new era 
 presented, however, no such uniformity as that of 
 the preceding periods. No single type of govern- 
 ment attained general recognition ; but instead there 
 developed that conflict between democracy and oli- 
 garchy which persisted until the distinctive political 
 character of Hellas disappeared. The coalition of 
 aristocracy and populace that overthrew the tyrants 
 vanished at once before the problem of providing an 
 organization to take the place of that which was 
 destroyed. To the aristocrats it seemed obvious that 
 the ancient power of the privileged classes must be 
 restored. But the age of the tyrants had been an
 
 HELLENIC INSTITUTIONS IN GENERAL 5 
 
 age of enormous advance in material prosperity and 
 intellectual culture, and the pretensions of the old 
 aristocracy, none too favourably regarded when the 
 tyrant came, were violently resisted when he dis- 
 appeared. The perturbations of the Persian wars 
 gave new wrenches and strains to all the old ideals, 
 and from the general unsettlement arose that demo- 
 cratic wave which threatened to ingulf all Hellas. 
 Conservatism rallied, however, and resisted the 
 shock, and under the leadership of Sparta main- 
 tained some hold on power till the coming of the 
 Macedonian. It was in the midst of the wide- 
 spread conflict between aristocracy and democracy 
 that the most brilliant contributions of Greek 
 thought to political theory began to appear. 
 
 While the internal politics of each of the city- 
 states had made familiar the facts of aristocracy, 
 tyranny, oligarchy and democracy, the relations of 
 the states with one another had evoked the concep- 
 tion of a Hellenic national unity. From the earliest 
 times community of language, of oracles and of re- 
 ligious worship had served to mark off the Hellenes 
 from the outer world which they called barbarian, 
 and to impress upon their consciousness the idea of 
 race unity. But only under pressure of danger from 
 the Persian power did this consciousness express 
 itself in institutions of a political character. First 
 to Sparta and then to Athens was assigned by general 
 consent of the threatened states a "hegemony," or 
 ill-defined leadership in the operations against the 
 enemy. Each of the leading states in turn sought
 
 6 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 to expand its military hegemony into an imperial 
 dominion, but neither attained more than a tempo- 
 rary and limited success. Political unity through 
 federation might have been achieved if the two 
 strongest states could have cooperated harmoniously ; 
 but socially and intellectually Athens and Sparta 
 had nothing in common, and politically they 
 embodied the opposite extremes of democratic and 
 aristocratic tendency. Hence the rivalry which 
 wrecked Hellas in the Peloponnesian War. The idea 
 of political unity, however, by no means disappeared. 
 It played a part in the general movement of Hellenic 
 politics throughout the supremacy of Sparta and of 
 Thebes (404-362 B.C.), and furnished in some sense 
 a theoretical basis for the absorption of the Greek 
 states by Macedon. That the idea received no recog- 
 nition in the political science of the day is largely 
 due to the fact that in every case in which the idea 
 had been to any extent realized, brute force had been 
 conspicuously the determining factor in the result; 
 and philosophy had not yet reached the stage where 
 it could calmly analyze the workings of brute force. 
 
 2. The Constitution of Sparta 
 
 The institutions which most influenced Greek 
 political theory include not only those involved in the 
 widespread movements sketched above, but also many 
 that were peculiar to individual states. Particularly 
 important in this respect are the two systems which 
 embodied the constitutions of Sparta and Athens. 
 Some special consideration of the organization and
 
 THE CONSTITUTION OF SPARTA 7 
 
 development of these two representative states is 
 indispensable to a comprehension of Greek philosophy. 
 
 In Sparta the first fact to be noticed is the social 
 basis of the state. Here we find a rigid classification 
 of the people that remained substantially the same 
 from the earliest to the latest period of her history. 
 The population of Spartan territory fell into three 
 classes Spartans, Perioikoi and Helots. The last 
 named were the most numerous, but their position 
 was at the bottom of the social structure. They 
 were the peasant serfs whose manual labour, almost 
 exclusively agricultural, supplied the subsistence of 
 the whole population. In rights, either civil or 
 political, they had no share ; their condition was that 
 of abject slavery, from the burden of which the only 
 relief seems to have come through their employment 
 at times as light-armed troops in the army. The 
 class called Perioikoi constituted in a sense the middle 
 class of the population. They enjoyed full civil 
 rights and apparently a degree of local self-govern- 
 ment. Engaged to some extent in agriculture, they 
 conducted practically all the operations of industry 
 and commerce. But in the political life of the state, 
 in its general sense, they had no share whatever. 
 
 The political people of Sparta was to be found 
 exclusively in the first named of the three classes 
 the Spartans proper. This class, representing his- 
 torically the small band of Dorians who conquered a 
 home for themselves in the Peloponnesus in prehis- 
 toric times, was numerically an almost insignificant 
 element of the population; but it never lost the
 
 8 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 absolute control which it originally assumed over all 
 the affairs of public life. The Spartan, indeed, had 
 no occupation but the training for and performance 
 of public duties. His support was drawn from the 
 land whicll the Helots cultivated; trade and com- 
 merce were absolutely prohibited to him; and all 
 that remained was the military and political career. 
 The institutions attributed to Lycurgus provided 
 a round of duty which determined the daily life of 
 the Spartan down to very minute details ; and the 
 observance of the Lycurgean rules gave to the class 
 the character of a military brotherhood whose sole 
 function was dominion. At seven years of age the 
 children were removed from parental care and taken 
 in charge by the officials of the state. By a severe 
 and engrossing system of gymnastic training, they 
 were brought to the highest attainable perfection in 
 physical development. For the boys the training 
 gradually took on a purely military character, so 
 that by the age of manhood they were expert in all 
 the duties of a soldier ; for the girls the goal kept in 
 view was the capacity to bring forth hardy offspring. 
 Till the maturity of his physical life was passed the 
 Spartan was chiefly occupied with military affairs ; 
 in his declining years he assumed the duties of the 
 magistracy, and shared in counsel and administration. 
 A variety of institutions insured the maintenance of 
 the character which this system impressed upon the 
 community. Most famous was the public mess. 
 Every adult male Spartan was obliged to take his 
 meals with his fellows at a public dining hall, under
 
 THE CONSTITUTION OF SPARTA 9 
 
 the supervision of the magistrates. The diet pre- 
 scribed left no room for the insidious influence of 
 inequality and luxury. A similar purpose was mani- 
 fest in the discouragement of family life in every 
 form, in the prohibition of the pursuit of trade or 
 agriculture, and in the restriction of intercourse with 
 foreigners to the narrowest possible limits. Finally, 
 an express provision of the Lycurgean discipline for- 
 bade written laws, and declared conclusive in every 
 controversy the judgment of the magistrate. Liti- 
 gation thus, like other luxuries that played so large 
 a part in Athenian life, never gained a foothold in 
 the economy of Sparta. 
 
 The enormous influence exerted by the Spartan 
 constitution on Greek thought is due more to the 
 peculiar system just sketched, which marked off 
 the Spartans as a class in the population, than to the 
 organization through which this class performed its 
 political functions. Some notice of this organization 
 is, however, necessary. At the nominal apex of the 
 system stood the kings, two in number, precisely 
 equal in dignity and authority ; next came a senate 
 of twenty-eight members, elected for life ; third, an 
 assembly consisting of the whole body of Spartans ; 
 and, finally, the ephors, an annually elected board of 
 five members. At the time with which we are par- 
 ticularly concerned the functions of these different 
 organs were somewhat as follows. The kings held 
 the highest official positions in the military and in 
 the religious system ; their actual authority, however, 
 was not great. The senate performed a variety of
 
 10 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 administrative functions, mostly of a judicial charac- 
 ter. The assembly had practically no significance, 
 meeting only on very rare occasions to register its 
 approval of some especially important project. In 
 the ephorate, on the other hand, was to be found the 
 real centre of the system. This institution seems to 
 have had its origin in a desire to set up a check on 
 the authority of the kings and senate, at the time 
 when the assembly ceased to be efficient for this pur- 
 pose. By a process of gradual encroachment, the 
 ephors displaced all the other organs in the final 
 determination of administrative and general policy. 
 Even the actual direction of the army in the field 
 was at times taken from the kings, though as a rule 
 the military authority was left intact with royalty. 
 
 The aristocratic character of the Spartan state was 
 primarily expressed in the exclusion of the two larg- 
 est classes of the population from political life. From 
 the standpoint of the governing class alone, the actual 
 system might appear democratic ; for the ephors were 
 the annually elected representatives of the people. 
 In fact, however, but a small part of the Spartans 
 themselves, in historic times, participated in political 
 life. For, despite the design of the Lycurgean legis- 
 lator to secure both equality and fraternity in his 
 system, the former feature, if it ever existed, very 
 early disappeared. The public tables were supported 
 by the contributions of the Spartans from the produce 
 of their lands. Failure to contribute entailed, not a 
 forfeiture of the right or duty of eating at the com- 
 mon mess, but the loss of all right to participate in
 
 THE CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS 11 
 
 the government. A progressive decrease in the num- 
 ber of landowners in Sparta characterized the whole 
 of her authentic history, with the consequence that 
 the governing class correspondingly narrowed. It 
 was this class which was represented in the ephorate 
 a fact which sufficiently explains the opinion of 
 the Greeks themselves that the Spartan state, while 
 in form partly royal and partly democratic, was in 
 essence intensely oligarchic. 
 
 3. The Constitution of Athens 
 
 The Athenian state presented in every respect the 
 sharpest contrast to the Spartan. Historically, the 
 constitution passed through all the various stages 
 which characterized the general development of Hel- 
 lenic politics, and at last it became both in form and 
 in essence intensely democratic. The social basis 
 of the state lay primarily in the distinction between 
 slaves and freemen, and secondarily in the division 
 of the latter into nobles (evvrar/otScu) and commons. 
 The servile class had not, however, as at Sparta, the 
 character of a conquered population depressed into 
 serfage ; nor was there, between nobles and com- 
 mons, any such traditional distinction of race as 
 between Spartans and Perioikoi. Further, in the 
 fulness of maritime and commercial prosperity, a 
 large resident alien element (/xe'roiKoi), which had 
 no counterpart whatever in Sparta, became more or 
 less identified with the social and economic life of 
 Athens. Politically, however, Athenian institutions 
 involved only the nobility and commons, who to-
 
 12 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 getlier constituted the citizen-body of the state. 
 Democratization was complete when all members 
 of these two classes stood on an equality so far as 
 participation in political power was concerned. 
 
 The dawn of authentic history reveals all authority 
 of a political character in the hands of the small 
 privileged class of Eupatridae, or nobles. 1 The prin- 
 cipal organs through which this authority was exer- 
 cised consisted of nine annually elected officers, later 
 known collectively as archons, and a council or 
 senate which took its familiar name from the place 
 of its meeting, the Areopagus. About the end of the 
 seventh century B.C., serious disturbances, due chiefly 
 to ill feeling between the wealthy nobles and the 
 poorer commons, resulted in the reforms associated 
 with the name of Solon. The essence of the new 
 system lay in the substitution of wealth for birth 
 as the basis for participation in political power. The 
 monopoly of the Eupatridse was broken, but the 
 commons were admitted to power only in proportion 
 to their property. A fourfold classification of the 
 whole people according to income served to deter- 
 mine eligibility to office ; the highest positions, such 
 as that of archon, being open only to the first class, 
 and no office at all being attainable by the fourth 
 class. In the existing distribution of wealth, this 
 insured to the nobles still a predominating influence in 
 
 1 The precise basis on which this class vested is unknown ; perhaps 
 there was nothing precise about it. Grote describes the class as 
 "seemingly a few specially respected gentes, and perhaps a few dis- 
 tinguished families of all the gentes." History of Greece, Pt. II, 
 ch. XL
 
 THE CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS 13 
 
 administration. But the germ of democracy lay in 
 two new governmental organs which appeared in 
 the Solonian system, the ekklesia, or general as- 
 sembly of the people, 1 and the Senate of the Four 
 Hundred. The assembly, which included without 
 discrimination all classes of the free citizens, elected 
 the archons, approved or disapproved the official 
 conduct of all magistrates, and exercised a general 
 political and judicial authority. Its activity was 
 regulated, however, by the Senate of the Four Hun- 
 dred, or " preconsidering senate." This was an 
 elected body 2 which determined when meetings of 
 the assembly should be called and what matters 
 should be brought before it, and further exercised a 
 wide administrative authority in seeing that the 
 decrees of the assembly were executed. The powers 
 attributed to these two new organs limited pro tanto 
 the importance of the senate of the Areopagus. This 
 body, being recruited by the entrance each year of 
 the retiring archons, remained the stronghold of 
 the old governing class, and continued to exercise 
 judicial functions that gave it a powerful influence 
 in the state. 
 
 From 560 to 510 B.C., constitutional life at Athens 
 was in a sense suspended by the tyranny of Pisis- 
 tratus and his sons. Yet the forms of the Solonian 
 system were for the most part preserved, subject to 
 the overruling will of the tyrant. Upon the final 
 
 1 The ekklesia had probably had a nominal existence before ; it 
 became important for the first time through Solon. 
 
 3 Probably only the highest class of citizens were eligible.
 
 14 POLITICAL THEOKIES 
 
 expulsion of the Pisistratidse a sharp democratic 
 impulse was given to the constitution by the legisla- 
 tion of Kleisthenes, and within the next century, prin- 
 cipally through the influence of Pericles, the progress 
 was steady to the complete realization of democracy. 
 In its final shape the system presented the following 
 features. At the centre lay the assembly the gen- 
 eral body of citizens, paid for attendance at its meet- 
 ings. It was the supreme political organ of the state, 
 and spoke the final word in all matters that it chose 
 to consider. The function of the assembly, however, 
 was regarded as primarily executive rather than leg- 
 islative. Its acts were decrees (i//^^)icr/xara), not laws 
 (I/O/ACH), and were theoretically always subordinate to 
 the vaguely defined body of ancient custom to which the 
 term i/d/xot applied. In fact, the assembly was its own 
 final interpreter of the vojuoi, and accordingly the latter 
 per se imposed no check upon the popular will. Prac- 
 tically, however, there existed certain restraints upon 
 the assembly. Every proposition which was recog- 
 nized as affecting the vo^oi was subject to a special 
 procedure of a judicial character, involving its consid- 
 eration by a board known as the nomothetse. But 
 more effective than this as a conservative force was 
 the indictment for violation of the laws (ypafyri 
 Trapavopuv). The mover of any proposition before 
 the assembly was subject to indictment and trial, at 
 any time within a year, for illegal action. This im- 
 posed a serious and definite responsibility upon every 
 individual who sought to influence the assembly. It 
 enabled the people, after violating the vo^oi in a fit of
 
 THE CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS 15 
 
 passion, to atone for its lapse by punishing the mover 
 of the act which it had approved. 1 
 
 The detailed administration of the government in 
 civil affairs was practically in the hands of the Senate 
 of the Five Hundred the Solonian preconsidering 
 senate as reorganized by Kleisthenes. The body 
 was chosen by lot from the general body of citizens, 
 and its members alternated by lot from day to day 
 in presiding over the conduct of public business. 
 Through their function of preparing the agenda of 
 the assembly they acted in some measure as a check 
 upon its action. In military and diplomatic affairs 
 the state was represented by the generals (crrpar^yoi), 
 a board of ten elected by the people in their ten 
 administrative divisions called tribes (<jtaAcu). These 
 were the only officials of importance that were chosen 
 by election, rather than by lot, in the Athenian 
 democracy. 
 
 The judicial authority of the state by no means 
 so narrowly marked off from the domain of politics 
 and administration as in modern times was exer- 
 cised through popular courts, called dikasteries (Si/ca- 
 crTT^ta). Five thousand citizens, drawn by lot from 
 the general body, were divided into ten panels, among 
 which all important judicial business was distributed. 
 Every juror received pay for his services. As the 
 assembly had absorbed practically all the political 
 
 1 The trial of prosecutions under the ypacftr) trapavo^v was held in 
 the dikasteries, whose composition, as described below, together with 
 the procedure that characterized them, insured a pretty faithful reflec- 
 tion, in their judgments, of the varying phases of popular sentiment.
 
 16 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 functions of the archons and the Senate of the 
 Areopagus, so the administrative powers of these 
 ancient organs had all gone to the Senate of the 
 Five Hundred, and their judicial authority to the 
 dikasteries. The archons, indeed, now chosen by 
 lot from the general body of citizens, had become 
 mere presiding officers of the popular courts, with 
 some petty police-court jurisdiction of their own; 
 and the Areopagus existed merely as a court for 
 the trial of homicide. 
 
 In general, the Athenian constitution, in its final 
 form, opened to every citizen an equal opportunity 
 to share in every species of political authority. With 
 reference to all who could claim Athenian citizenship, 
 therefore, democracy was complete. With reference 
 to the total population, however, the existence of 
 a slave and alien element that vastly outnumbered 
 the citizens, rendered the designation democracy, in 
 the modern sense, quite inapplicable. 
 
 SELECT REFERENCES 
 
 CURTITJS, History of Greece, trans, by Ward, Book II, chaps, 
 i and ii ; Book III, chap. i. DUNCKER, Griechische Geschichte, 
 
 I, 256-285, 375-383, 425-442, 452-476, 523-531; II, 15 
 et seq., 120-137, 161-219, 341 et seq. GROTE, History of 
 Greece, Part I, chap, xx; Part II, chaps, ii, v-vi, x-xi, 
 xxx-xxxi, xlvi, Ixii-lxiii, Ixv-lxvi. KENYON, Aristotle on the 
 Constitution of Athens, Greek text (1892), trans. (1891). 
 ED. MEYER, Forschungen zur alien Geschichte, I, 211-286; 
 
 II, 1-195, 512-548. FANTA, Der Stoat in der Ilias und 
 Odyssee. FOWLER, City State of the Greeks and Romans, 
 p. 65 et seq. FREEMAN, Comparative Politics. FUSTEL DE
 
 THE CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS 17 
 
 COULANGES, La, Cite antique (The Ancient City, trans, by 
 Small). GARDNER and JEVONS, Manual of Greek Antiquities, 
 Book VI, p. 404 et seq. GILBERT, Handbuch der griechischen 
 Staatsalterthumer (Constitutional Antiquities of Sparta and 
 Athens, trans.). GLADSTONE, Studies on Homer and the 
 Homeric Age, Vol. Ill, chap. i. GREENIDGE, Greek Consti- 
 tutional History. HERMANN, Lehrbuch der griechischen Anti- 
 quitaten, Bd. I (Political Antiquities of Greece, trans.). JANNET, 
 Les Institutions societies et le droit civil a Sparta. MUELLER, 
 Die Dorier (The History and Antiquities of the Doric Eace, 
 trans, by Tupnell and Lewis). PLASS, Die Tyrannis in 
 ihren beiden Perioden. SCHOEMANN, Antiquities of Greece, 
 trans. ; Athenian Constitutional History . . . examined, trans. 
 WHIBLET, Greek Oligarchies.
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF PLATO 
 
 1. The Precursors of Plato 
 
 IT was only when the institutional development 
 sketched in the preceding chapter had run its full 
 course, that a coherent and comprehensive form was 
 given to political speculation. Plato and Aristotle 
 analyzed and classified the principles and organs of 
 a state life that had passed its prime and was rap- 
 idly waning. The characteristic features of this life 
 were determined by influences and motives in which 
 rational generalizations and ideals had little part, 
 and when systematic reflection began, the result was 
 rather explication of the past than anticipation of 
 the future. 
 
 The various phases of early social and political 
 thought find some illustration in the literary remains 
 of Hellas. The Homeric epos could have taken 
 shape only in a patriarchal regime, based on reli- 
 gious myth. Kings appear always as Zeus-born 
 (Stoycvets) and Zeus-nurtured (Stor/oe^et?), and rule 
 as shepherds of the people (Troi/xeVes Xauv). Some 
 significance is attached to the lesser chiefs, who 
 likewise claim divine ancestry, but for the common 
 people Homer shows only a general contempt. In 
 
 18
 
 THE PRECURSORS OF PLATO 19 
 
 Hesiod there may be detected a change of attitude, 
 or at least a different point of view. More stress is 
 laid on the duties than on the rights of kings, and 
 they are judged with reference to the justice rather 
 than the success of their acts. A similar strain 
 appears in the sayings attributed to the Seven Sages 
 and in the fragments of the Gnomic poets. There 
 is a tendency to measure kings by the same standard 
 as other men, and thus to weaken the supports of 
 royalty. From this it is clear that an ethical con- 
 sciousness developed during the period of transition 
 from the monarchic to the aristocratic and tyrannic 
 types of government, acting as both cause and effect 
 of the political movement. 
 
 That strenuous century which began with the Per- 
 sian and ended with the Peloponnesian War brought 
 the Hellenic world face to face with every kind of 
 practical problem in statecraft, on a scale beyond 
 anything that had preceded. The close contact with 
 the Persian despotism, the rise and decline of the 
 Athenian Empire, the antithesis and death-grapple of 
 Spartan oligarchy and Athenian democracy, brought 
 into the range of everyday experience the gravest 
 questions of political practice, and correspondingly 
 stimulated political reflection. Not only in this par- 
 ticular field, however, but in every department of 
 intellectual life there was the greatest activity. Lit- 
 erary and plastic art achieved the triumphs which 
 have rendered the age of Pericles famous for all 
 time, and general philosophy began under the guid- 
 ance of the Sophists and Socrates to take the path
 
 20 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 which led straight to the immortal work of Plato 
 and Aristotle. The ethical consciousness which had 
 been awakened during the preceding centuries found 
 scope now for the fullest development, especially in 
 the administration of democratic government. As 
 in every other age of what may be called aggressive 
 enlightenment, the general religious faith of the 
 Greek world was tending to disappear at this time, 
 and the peoples entered upon the realization of popu- 
 lar supremacy without a sure support in even that 
 somewhat inadequate moral doctrine which the old 
 myth-ridden theology had embodied. Questions of 
 right and wrong in political practice imperatively 
 demanded a rational solution ; and it was in offering 
 some sort of satisfaction to this demand that the 
 Sophists came into prominence. 
 
 The work of the group of men commonly desig- 
 nated by this term requires no special analysis in this 
 place. After bearing for twenty-two centuries the 
 obloquy of the civilized world, due chiefly to the 
 odium philosophicum which Plato manifested toward 
 them, they at last received a measure of just recog- 
 nition through the insight of Hegel 1 and Grote. 2 
 The function of the Sophists was primarily educa- 
 tional. They supplied the demand for instruction in 
 all that would fit a young man for a successful career 
 in the practical life of a citizen. Such a career, in 
 the conditions then existing, could be achieved only 
 
 1 Geschichte der Philosnphie, in his Works (Berlin, 1840), Vol. XIV, 
 p. 5 et seq. 
 
 2 History of Greece, Pt. II, ch. 67.
 
 THE PRECURSORS OF PLATO 21 
 
 through the exercise of political functions ; for indus- 
 try, commerce and agriculture were not recognized 
 as worthy pursuits for the citizen. The teaching of 
 the Sophists, therefore, centred about those branches 
 which were most essential in public life, especially 
 rhetoric and oratory. From a modern standpoint the 
 education which they gave tended to be technical 
 rather than liberal; they emphasized rather the prac- 
 tical methods of pushing a policy to success than the 
 philosophic basis on which the choice of policy should 
 rest. It was at this point that Socrates, himself a 
 public teacher, not distinguishable to the masses from 
 the rest of his class, took issue with his fellows and 
 laid the foundations of a moral science which should 
 include within it the whole of political science. 
 Plato, the pupil of Socrates, represented the rest of 
 the teaching body of the day as tending to set up 
 pleasure and pain as ultimate moral standards, and 
 might as the criterion of political right. That such 
 doctrine was current at the time seems beyond dis- 
 pute, but that it was held by the Sophists as a class is 
 more than doubtful. Against the doctrine in all its 
 phases a vigorous protest was expressed in that career 
 which makes Socrates so conspicuous a figure in the 
 history of enlightenment. 
 
 It is only indirectly that Socrates claims attention 
 in connection with political theory. His most char- 
 acteristic work was in the capacity, first, of inventor 
 of a scientific method, and second, of founder of an 
 ethical system. The method which he introduced 
 was that of doubt and definition. In the exuber-
 
 22 POLITICAL THEOEIES 
 
 ance of intellectual growth that attended the triumph 
 of democracy at Athens there was a fair field for the 
 criticism of so cynical a mind as that of Socrates. 
 With the frost of his tantalizing irony, he nipped 
 many a promising blossom of political omniscience. 
 He insisted that every claimant to the possession of 
 knowledge should define with precision the nature of 
 his treasure. Definition is notoriously the most diffi- 
 cult task of the trained thinker ; the demand for it 
 from the ordinary or the immature mind, or even 
 from the superior and cultivated mind suddenly and 
 with premeditated craft, could have only the ludi- 
 crous results in which Socrates found such delight. 
 But the influence of his method in the stimulation of 
 close thinking and exact reasoning needs no better 
 illustration than the works of his disciples. 
 
 The ethical system of which Socrates laid the 
 foundation is embodied for the most part in the 
 doctrine that virtue is identical with knowledge, vice 
 with ignorance. A proper appreciation of this doc- 
 trine requires that it be taken in close connection 
 with the theory of knowledge which his method im- 
 plied. If by one who "knows" we understand one 
 whose knowledge is of that thorough and ultimate 
 kind that will satisfy the demands for exact defini- 
 tion, then the dictum that nobody who knows the 
 right will do the wrong is not so hopelessly absurd 
 as might at first sight appear. Accordingly, to Soc- 
 rates, the just man is he who knows what is just. 
 From this point of view he formulated a doctrine 
 which expressed his idea as to the relation of politics
 
 THE PRECUESOES OF PLATO 23 
 
 to ethics. 1 Specifically, the knowledge which was 
 identical with justice he laid down to be a knowledge 
 of the laws. But laws he proceeded to define as 
 including the two species written, or the laws of 
 the state, and unwritten, or the will of the gods. 
 The former he held to be of limited and local obliga- 
 tion ; the latter to be of universal binding force, and 
 hence to take precedence of all others. Xenophon's 
 record of the conversation in which Socrates lays 
 down this doctrine is the first appearance in extant 
 literature of a theme which has been a staple of sci- 
 entific controversy in every succeeding age the rela- 
 tion, namely, of political to divinely sanctioned moral 
 obligation. In both his life and his death the great 
 Athenian illustrated a steadfast conviction that what 
 he conceived to be the will of the gods must guide 
 his actions in preference to the undoubted will of the 
 Athenian state. 
 
 Beyond what has just been mentioned, the work of 
 Socrates did not enter into the field of political the- 
 ory. The general principles which he laid down 
 became, however, the guiding lines of his disciple 
 Plato, in whose system both moral and political 
 philosophy received elaborate treatment. 
 
 2. General Character of Plato's Thought 
 
 An accurate description of Plato's political theories 
 in a reasonable compass is for various reasons a task 
 of much difficulty. His treatment of politics is in a 
 large measure incidental to other topics, and takes 
 
 1 Xenophon, Memorabilia, IV, 4.
 
 24 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 on a different character with each variation in the 
 point of view. As a path-breaker in systematic 
 ethics and metaphysics he frequently employs politi- 
 cal doctrine merely as a resource in surmounting the 
 obstacles which he meets, with scant attention to the 
 coherency of the doctrine. The progressive modifi- 
 cation of his ideas with the advance of age is also 
 clearly discernible in his works ; so that the chro- 
 nology of his productions must be considered in an 
 account of his views. And finally, the peculiar char- 
 acter of Plato's genius impressed upon his philosophy 
 a poetic vagueness which makes the comprehension 
 of it more a matter of feeling than of cold reason- 
 ing. Especially is this true of his most famous work, 
 The Republic. All his philosophy is represented here, 
 but the treatise is, after all, essentially a romance, 
 embellished with a series of brilliant but not care- 
 fully correlated essays on morals and metaphysics. 
 The most satisfactory approach to his political 
 thought is through his relation to the work of Soc- 
 rates. The latter, as has been stated, founded, first, 
 a theory of knowledge and a method for all science, 
 and, second, a system of ethical doctrine. Plato ex- 
 panded the first into a far-reaching metaphysics, 
 and developed the other into a comprehensive ethics. 
 Definition, which the Socratic irony had demanded 
 as the starting-point of all real knowledge, was itself 
 defined by Plato. It was shown to involve the rejec- 
 tion of the transient and accidental in any phenom- 
 enon, and the determination of the permanent and 
 essential. Real knowledge, therefore, was attainable
 
 PLATO'S THOUGHT IN GENERAL 26 
 
 only through a process of abstraction which should 
 leave that residuum of qualities which has later been 
 named the general notion. The discovery of the 
 general notion was an achievement of the first im- 
 portance in the history of the human intellect, and 
 Plato's exuberant fancy ran riot among the possibili- 
 ties inherent in his advance. Not things as they 
 presented themselves to common observation, but 
 things as embodied in their abstract ideas, were the 
 subject-matter of real knowledge of philosophy in 
 its true sense. Not this, that or the other horse, but 
 horse in general, or the idea of horse, was the real 
 horse and the subject of equine science ; and, piling 
 abstraction on abstraction, not this, that or the other 
 policy, but policy in general, was real policy and the 
 subject of political science. This idealism, which by 
 the linguistic vagary of a later age is both identical 
 
 O O i/ O 
 
 with and at the remotest extreme from, realism, per- 
 vades the whole of Plato's thinking on politics, but 
 determines in a particular way the character of his 
 dialogue on The Statesman, and of some parts of The 
 Republic. 
 
 In the development of Socrates's ethical doctrine 
 Plato made equal progress beyond the point reached 
 by his master. He was faithful to the dogma that 
 virtue was identical with knowledge ; but his theory 
 of knowledge gave a much better support to the 
 doctrine than it originally possessed. Real virtue 
 was only the ultimate " idea " of virtue, and real 
 knowledge was only the perception of this idea. 
 Hence good in its true sense could only be predi-
 
 26 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 cated of one who had attained this absolute and 
 abstract knowledge. The Socratic dogma, accord- 
 ingly, assumed substantially this form, that the 
 all-wise philosopher alone could attain to virtue. 
 But Plato was too faithful to the practical purpose 
 of his master's teaching to be satisfied with so 
 barren a moral doctrine as this. Human conduct 
 required some less forbidding guidance than exhor- 
 tation to the attainment of the unattainable. Hence 
 Plato worked out a scheme of practical and particu- 
 lar virtues for the actualities of life. He based this 
 system on a psychology which embodied a threefold 
 analysis of the human soul into the rational, the 
 spirited (#u/xos) and the sensual or appetitive facul- 
 ties. From the interrelationship of these elements 
 he drew his definition of the particular virtues. 
 Courage was the subordination of the spirited to the 
 rational faculty ; temperance (crtofypocrvvrj), the sub- 
 jection of the appetitive to the rational. And justice 
 was described (one can hardly say defined 1 ) as the 
 regulative virtue which produces a general harmony 
 in character and general good order in conduct. 
 The just man, be says, is like a well-ordered city; 
 the unjust, like anarchy. These three particular 
 virtues were presented with profound and fascinating 
 art by Plato, but he never lost sight of his funda- 
 mental principle, that they were rooted in " opinion " 
 (Soa), that partial, fluctuating knowledge which even 
 common men possess, while the one supreme virtue, 
 wisdom in its absolute sense (cro^ta), was immanent 
 
 1 See Republic, IV, 443.
 
 PLATO'S THOUGHT IN GENERAL 27 
 
 only in the complete and permanent " science " 
 (iTTia-TrujL-rf) to which the philosopher attained. The 
 abstract ideal of the good, as determining fixed and 
 immutable canons of morality, was the standpoint 
 from which he assailed the utilitarian ethical and 
 political doctrines which he ascribed to the Sophists. 
 In his view right and justice remained always the 
 same ; the demands of a narrow and temporary ex- 
 pediency could never change them could never 
 convert them into injustice and wrong. 
 
 In the expansion of the Socratic metaphysics and 
 ethics is inseparably infolded Plato's political theory. 
 His thought on politics, profound and brilliant as it 
 often was, never assumed the independent and sys- 
 tematic form of a science. Three dialogues contain 
 substantially all his political ideas, Tlie Statesman, 
 Tlie Republic, and The Laws. Of these the first 
 is primarily an exercise in dialectic, and the sec- 
 ond is mainly a treatise on ethics, individual and 
 social. Only the third sets out with a deliberate 
 purpose of dealing with political subjects, and in 
 this, the work of his old age, the writer proceeds 
 steadily within the lines which the matured habit of 
 a long life has made indispensable. In all three of 
 the works, however, there is much that is most val- 
 uable and suggestive from both the historical and 
 the scientific point of view. 
 
 3. Tlie Republic 
 
 The Republic is in every respect Plato's great- 
 est work. Both the substance of his thought and
 
 28 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 the form in which it is expressed have fascinated all 
 succeeding generations and have stimulated endless 
 imitation. The familiar name of the dialogue, how- 
 ever, gives a somewhat erroneous idea of its true 
 character. 1 The ideal state, whose outlines are so 
 boldly and beautifully set forth as often to monopo- 
 lize the attention of the reader, is avowedly a mere 
 incident in the main theme of the dialogue. Plato 
 proceeds to formulate the conception of a state in 
 which justice prevails, in order to discover by anal- 
 ogy the philosophic idea of justice in the individual 
 man. 2 This method expresses in itself the two dom- 
 inant characteristics of the writer's political philoso- 
 phy its idealism and its subordination to ethical 
 science. 
 
 The first cause of the state Plato finds in the di- 
 versity of men's desires and the necessity of mutual 
 assistance in satisfying them. 3 A community arising 
 from this cause must embrace three classes of people : 
 producers of sustenance, to supply the physical wants 
 of the population ; warriors, to protect the labourers 
 and insure a sufficient territory for the purposes of 
 the state ; and finally, counsellors and magistrates, 
 to regulate the general welfare of the community. 
 These three classes, working in proper correlation, 
 will insure the maximum of well-being throughout 
 the state. Every member of the community must 
 be assigned to the class for which he proves himself 
 
 1 The alternative title, On Justice, is more expressive of the 
 contents. This title, however, was not known to Aristotle. Cf. 
 Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato, III, vi. 
 
 2 Rep. II, 368. Ibid. 369.
 
 THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 29 
 
 best fitted. Thus a perfect harmony and unity will 
 characterize both the state and every person in it. 1 
 In laying down this social and economic basis for 
 his republic the philosopher manifests a high apprecia- 
 tion of the principle of specialization and division of 
 labour which has received such marked attention in 
 recent days. His assignment of political functions 
 has hardly so modern a tone. To the third of the 
 classes mentioned above, the guardians (c^vXa/ces), as 
 he calls them, consisting of the oldest and wisest of 
 the community, he ascribes untrammelled discretion 
 in the ordering of the state's affairs. This class, 
 on whose character and attributes Plato dwells 
 with the most particular interest, 2 is the ultimate 
 product of the long course of training in which the 
 life of a citizen must be passed. Only those who 
 have proved themselves perfect in true knowledge 
 may enter the class, and the judgment of the guar- 
 dians themselves is conclusive as to the qualification. 
 To the members 'of this close corporation is assigned 
 a manner of life which is conceived to be appropriate 
 to their exalted character. They have no individual 
 family or property interests ; they live in public, eat 
 at common tables and sleep in tents. With the sup- 
 port of their physical existence reduced to the abso- 
 lute minimum of concern to them, they are enabled 
 to cultivate philosophy and rise to those heights of 
 
 1 "... so each may become not many men, but one, and the 
 city may be not many, but one." Rep. Ill, 424. 
 
 2 The warriors are described almost exclusively with reference to 
 the selection of guardians from among them, and the labouring class 
 receives practically no attention at all after the first brief definition.
 
 30 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 omniscience which afford an unerring insight into 
 all human affairs. Hence their fitness to guide the 
 state without other rule than the true wisdom in 
 which they share. 
 
 Upon the relation of this picture of an ideal com- 
 munity to Plato's ethical discussion it is unnecessary 
 here to dwell. In brief, the allegory is simply this : 
 The three classes of the people symbolize the three 
 faculties of the soul, appetitive, spirited and ra- 
 tional, and the just man, like the ideal state, is 
 found where the first two are in proper subordina- 
 tion to the third. 1 On the political side proper the 
 ideas which he brings out in highest relief are, first, 
 the necessity of an organic unity in social life ; sec- 
 ond, the importance of systematic education, as con- 
 trasted with haphazard legislation, in regulating the 
 common interest ; and third, the rational basis of 
 aristocracy in government. 
 
 The ideal unity of a state Plato explains in his 
 celebrated discussion of communism. 2 As private 
 property and family relationships appear to be the 
 chief sources of dissension in every community, 
 neither is to have recognition in the perfect state. 
 Unity and harmony require that no individual should 
 differ from any other in the feeling of pleasure or 
 pain in respect to any third person or any object 
 whatever. All must " rejoice and grieve alike at 
 the same gains and the same losses " ; " the words 
 ' mine ' and ' thine ' must be pronounced by all simul- 
 taneously." 3 Private property, therefore, can have 
 
 1 Rep. IV, 427 et seq. 2 Ibid. Bk. V. 8 Ibid. V, 462.
 
 THE KEPUBLIC OF PLATO 31 
 
 no existence in the ideal state, and, further, Plato 
 works out an ingenious scheme through which chil- 
 dren shall not know their own parents, or parents 
 then* own children. The discord-making devotion 
 of fathers, and especially of mothers, to their own 
 offspring is thus precluded at the outset. Indeed, 
 the relations of the sexes in general are to be 
 wholly severed from the influence of individual 
 emotion, and are to be subject to the absolute con- 
 trol of the magistrates. Men and women are to be 
 mated with sole reference to a harmonious balance 
 of qualities in the young ; and the elements of per- 
 fect character thus insured at birth are to be devel- 
 oped to maturity by a system of uniform public 
 education. 
 
 In education Plato sees the only true way to the 
 permanent stability of the state. The hope of 
 moulding the citizens to the system of the commu- 
 nity by legislation must always be futile. If the 
 character of the people is sound, laws are unneces- 
 sary ; if unsound, laws are useless. Character can 
 be fixed only by a training that begins with the ear- 
 liest years and proceeds on lines suitable to the 
 maturing of the mind until the climax of life. In 
 the ideal state the function of the magistrates is 
 practically limited to the conduct of such a training. 1 
 Physical and mental culture receive equal attention 
 in the earlier years. After the age of twenty the 
 latter gradually assumes the chief place, and after 
 thirty those individuals who have shown the most 
 
 1 Education is treated in Bk. VII of The Republic.
 
 32 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 capacity confine themselves to the pursuit of dialec- 
 tic the ultimate science. As the developments of 
 this training enable the magistrates to determine 
 the peculiar capacity of the novices, the latter are 
 assigned to the respective classes for which they are 
 found to be fitted. The residuum of exalted minds 
 who are adapted to philosophy in its highest sense 
 enter at fifty into the class of magistrates and assume 
 their part in administration. Premising the unerr- 
 ing wisdom of those who have attained to true 
 knowledge, the relations between the individual and 
 society are so determined by this system as to pre- 
 clude any of the discord that inheres in the ordinary 
 political life. 
 
 It appears from the whole tenor of the discussion 
 in The Republic that the Platonic ideal of government 
 is aristocratic. The particular form of aristocracy 
 that of intellect is determined largely by the 
 philosopher's preoccupation with his philosophical 
 theories. The real state exists only in the abstract 
 idea of the state ; and hence the real rulers are only 
 those who possess the knowledge of this idea. In 
 the presence of this conception, the democratic idea 
 of government by the uninstructed masses, as well 
 as the monarchic notion of government by the unin- 
 structed one, had no room for existence. But Plato 
 had more than a mere theoretical basis for his dislike 
 of democracy. The Athenians, in the full tide of 
 democracy, had put Socrates to death a man in 
 whom Plato, like all his other disciples, could find 
 no guile. This act must have contributed powerfully
 
 THE EEPUBLIC OF PLATO 33 
 
 to confirm the conclusions of his philosophy that 
 authority was only justifiable when based on the 
 broadest culture. 
 
 Unless it shall come to pass that philosophers are kings, 
 or that those who are now called kings and potentates be 
 imbued with a sufficient measure of genuine philosophy that 
 is to say, unless political power and philosophy be united, . . . 
 there will be no cessation of ills for states, nor yet, I believe, 
 for the human race ; neither can the commonwealth, which we 
 have now sketched in theory, ever till then see the light of 
 day. 1 
 
 The relation of existing polities to his ideal is 
 indicated by Plato in a fanciful account of the 
 process through which the various types have origi- 
 nated. 2 The process is one of progressive degenera- 
 tion from the perfect aristocracy, through timocracy, 
 oligarchy and democracy, to tyranny. By timocracy, 
 the form exhibiting the least deviation from the 
 ideal, lie means a system dominated by the love 
 of honour (rt/xif) or glory, rather than of justice; 3 and 
 it is very significant that he regards Sparta as essen- 
 tially of this type. Oligarchy springs from the rise 
 of private property, and is the rule of the wealthy 
 few over the poorer many. Democracy reverses 
 this situation and exaggerates liberty into anarchy. 
 Finally, like a true Greek, Plato sets tyranny at the 
 end of the scale at the farthest remove from the 
 abode of justice. But the tyrant is merely the fruit 
 of democracy. By taking advantage of the dissension 
 among the people he makes himself their master. 
 
 1 Rep. V, 473. 2 Rep. VIII, 546 et seq. 
 
 * Power is in the hands of the warrior rather than of the guardian class.
 
 34 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 4. The Statesman 
 
 In The Statesman Plato's chief purpose is to 
 develop the " idea " of a ruler, and to set political 
 science in its proper place in the broad scheme of 
 knowledge. The result is embodied in an identifica- 
 tion of the true statesman with the all-wise philoso- 
 pher, and an identification of politics with education 
 and character-building. 1 These conceptions have 
 already been formulated in The Republic, but they 
 receive in The Statesman a more precise definition, 
 and are cast in a more rigidly scientific mould. The 
 ideal ruler and the abstract political science are set 
 off with the utmost distinctness from the practical 
 politician and the principles of practical administra- 
 tion. Plato here, as elsewhere in his works, 2 relegates 
 to a wholly inferior category those arts and those men 
 that are concerned with the management of military 
 and fiscal details in the city's life, and even those 
 who administer justice according to the laws. The 
 function of the true statesman is to make the citizens 
 conform to the ideal standards of virtue ; and true 
 political science is that knowledge by which men are 
 taken care of either with or without law, either with 
 or without their own consent. 3 From the point of 
 view of ultimate truth there is no significance what- 
 ever in the various characteristics which are com- 
 monly employed in discriminating governments as 
 
 1 Statesman, 306 et seq. 2 Gorgias, 515. 
 
 Statesman, 293.
 
 THE STATESMAN OF PLATO 35 
 
 good or bad. That the rulers be few or many, or 
 rich or poor, or that the subjects obey willingly or 
 unwillingly, has nothing to do with the matter. The 
 true physician is he who cures us, " whether he cures 
 us against our will or with our will . . . whether he 
 practises out of a book or not out of a book, and 
 whether he be rich or poor " ; and the principles he 
 applies are true medical science. Not otherwise are 
 to be judged the statesman and his science. 
 
 This conception of politics precludes the considera- 
 tion of law and legislation as factors in ideal govern- 
 ment. 1 But in The Statesman, as in The Republic, 
 Plato discusses the relation between the ideal and 
 the actual, and this gives the opportunity for a strik- 
 ing analysis of the function of law (I>O/AOS). Ideally the 
 discretion of the all-wise philosopher is a perfect guar- 
 antee of excellence in administration, and stands in 
 marked contrast to the narrow and inflexible pre- 
 scriptions of a past time. To restrain the discretion 
 of such a being by rigid rules, would be like restrict- 
 ing the trained physician or the skilled pilot to spe- 
 cific modes of action regardless of circumstances. 
 But conceding that the all-wise philosopher is una- 
 vailable, Plato attributes the utmost importance to 
 law, as the expression of experience and practical 
 wisdom. No actual man or group of men possesses 
 so much of the spirit of true political science as is 
 embodied in the written laws and national customs 
 of a people, 2 and undeviating conformity to these 
 
 1 Cf. supra, p. 31. 
 
 8 TO, ytypap-fieva /cat Trarpta Wt]. Statesman, 301.
 
 36 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 is the first essential of those imperfect systems of 
 government which exist among men. 
 
 On the basis of this conception, Plato frames a 
 classification of governments which differs consider- 
 ably from that outlined in The Republic? As one 
 basis of division, he adopts that of the number of 
 persons exercising supreme authority a basis al- 
 ready common in Greek thought and employed by 
 Herodotus ; 2 but crossing this, Plato applies also the 
 relation of the government to law. His ideas may 
 be expressed in the subjoined table : 
 
 SUBJECT TO LAW UNRESTRAINED BY LAW 
 The rule of One is Royalty Tyranny 
 
 The rule of the Few is Aristocracy Oligarchy 
 
 The rule of the Many is Democracy Democracy 
 
 None of these forms, of course, is absolutely good. 
 But practically considered, from the standpoint of the 
 citizen, the rule of one is at the same time the best 
 and the worst of the six. That is to say, when sub- 
 ject to law it is the best, and when unrestrained by 
 law (tyranny) it is the worst. Aristocracy and oli- 
 garchy are intermediate in respect to good and evil. 
 The rule of the many stands in a position the reverse 
 of that occupied by monarchy. That is to say, democ- 
 racy is the worst of governments that are subject to 
 law, but the best of those that are without law. This 
 relative excellence arises, however, exclusively from 
 
 1 Supra, p. 33. 
 
 2 Cf. the discussion of the Persian conspirators after the death of 
 the false Smerdis, Bk. Ill, c. 80. The historian puts Greek ideas into 
 barbarian mouths.
 
 THE LAWS OF PLATO 87 
 
 the fact that democracy is in every respect weak and 
 inefficient, and unable to effect much either of good 
 or of evil ; it is therefore least oppressive of the 
 three where the restraints of law are absent. 1 
 
 Thus, from a point of view quite different from that 
 in The Republic, Plato is enabled to demonstrate the 
 same conclusion that democracy is essentially bad. 
 
 5. The Laivs 
 
 The last and most extensive treatise of Plato on 
 politics, The Laws, signifies by its title the last step 
 in the transition of his philosophy from the field of 
 the ideal to that of the actual. In The Republic he 
 considers the ideal state almost exclusively. In The 
 Statesman he retains this point of view, but descends, 
 as we have just seen, to the discussion of some highly 
 significant phases of actual government. In The 
 Laws, finally, he formally abandons his idealism, and 
 seeks to set forth a system that would be workable 
 among imperfect men. Having demonstrated in The 
 Statesman that a regime of legal and constitutional 
 limitations, though logically irreconcilable with the 
 perfect ideal of government, was indispensable to ex- 
 cellence in actual states, 2 he purposes in The Laws to 
 formulate a code that shall absolutely determine the 
 life of the community, and shall thus insure the best 
 results possible in a practicable political system. 
 
 The spirit of this code manifests very clearly, how- 
 ever, the persistence of the earlier ideas. Plato clings 
 
 1 Statesman, 303. 
 
 2 For a striking passage sustaining the thesis that law should be 
 above man, see Laws, IV, 715.
 
 38 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 as far as possible to the broad principles of The Repub- 
 lic, introducing modifications with frank reluctance 
 only when the requirements of a practical community 
 seem imperatively to demand it. Thus he concedes 
 the necessity of marriage and of family life ; but the 
 government is authorized to persuade the union of 
 couples in whose contrasting qualities is found the 
 hope of well-balanced offspring, to inspect and regu- 
 late the most intimate details of domestic routine, and 
 to compel the presence of the women as well as the 
 men at the public mess. 1 Again, education ceases to 
 be the almost exclusive occupation of the magistrates, 
 but a system is prescribed which is to be most rigidly 
 enforced upon all the youth, and the intellectual and 
 artistic development of the citizens is made subject 
 to a thoroughgoing censorship, in comparison with 
 which the most rigid system of actual history would 
 be lax and lifeless. 
 
 In respect to property also Plato concedes that the 
 communism of TJie Republic is impracticable. The 
 principle of private property is therefore admitted, 
 but the evils of an inequitable distribution are guarded 
 against by precautions that to the modern mind seem 
 fatal to the principle. The philosopher fully appre- 
 ciates the economic basis of political discord. A 
 tranquil state will be one in which there is neither 
 extreme poverty nor extreme wealth; hence the laws 
 
 1 Laws, VI, 773 et seq. For the administration of these powers 
 Plato would have the primary authority in the hands of a ward com- 
 mittee of women, whose chief duty should be the close supervision 
 of young couples for the first ten years of married life.
 
 THE LAWS OF PLATO 39 
 
 must promote equality of possessions. 1 Especially 
 must the ownership by citizens of equal shares of land 
 be safeguarded ; and through the discouragement of 
 commercial pursuits by all possible means the accu- 
 mulation of wealth in other forms must at least be 
 impeded. 2 Despite all legislation to obstruct it, how- 
 ever, inequality in property will arise, and so far as 
 it is inevitable, it must be taken into account in the 
 organization of government. Accordingly, Plato 
 bases his classification of the people, for the assign- 
 ment of offices and honours, on wealth, and not, as in 
 The Republic, on intellect. Four classes are provided 
 for. The first consists of those who possess only the 
 equal allotment of land which the state guarantees 
 to every citizen as the "limit of poverty." The 
 other three classes are determined by the possession 
 of wealth to the amount of two, three and four 
 times the value of the share of land ; and property 
 accumulated by any citizen in excess of the fourfold 
 measure is subject to summary confiscation by the 
 government. 8 
 
 In describing the governmental organization of his 
 polity Plato avowedly seeks a mean between mon- 
 archy and democracy. These two forms he takes 
 as representative of the contradictory principles of 
 authority and liberty. Either principle carried to 
 excess results in disaster to the state, as may be seen 
 
 1 Laws, V, 744. 
 
 2 Gold and silver are excluded from the state by Plato's code, except 
 so far as the treasury of the state requires a store for use in foreign 
 relations. V, 742. 
 
 V, 744.
 
 40 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 in the history of Persia and of Athens. 1 Moderation 
 is essential to the maintenance of good feeling 
 between rulers and ruled ; and Plato attributes the 
 highest importance in politics to this, relation to 
 the principle of friendship, as he calls it. Indeed, he 
 lays it down as according to nature that government 
 should be " the rule of law over willing subjects, and 
 not a rule of compulsion " a proposition which is 
 much like the " natural law " of modern days, that 
 government rests on the consent of the governed. 2 
 The monarchic government, then, must be so organ- 
 ized as to check the undue extension of the principle 
 of authority; Sparta, in the restraints imposed by 
 senate and ephors upon the kings, seems to Plato to 
 have attained this end. On the other hand, demo- 
 cratic liberty must be prevented from degenerating 
 into license. 3 Especially must the conception of 
 equality, which is the foundation of democracy, be 
 properly understood. For equality is of two kinds, 
 absolute and proportionate. The former requires 
 that every citizen have precisely the same oppor- 
 tunity to perform every public service ; the latter, 
 
 1 Laws, III, 693 et seq. Plato's analysis of the decline of these two 
 governments is characteristic. In the one case the primary cause, he 
 declares, was the failure of the strong monarchs, Cyrus and Darius, 
 to give their sons a proper education ; in the other, the failure of the 
 authorities to exclude corrupting novelties in music and drama from 
 the Athenian stage. 
 
 2 Laws, III, 690 ; cf. VIII, 832. For an anticipation of the contract 
 theory of the relation between king and people, see Plato's interpreta- 
 tion of early Peloponnesian history, Til, 684. 
 
 8 Even the sports of the children are to be carefully watched, lest 
 innovation should creep in and plant the seeds of destructive radical- 
 ism in politics. VII, 797.
 
 THE LAWS OF PLATO 41 
 
 that part in the government be proportioned to the 
 merit of each. In appointment to office, therefore, 
 choice by lot will be the mode expressive of absolute 
 equality ; some other mode, such as election, must be 
 combined with this if proportionate equality is to find 
 recognition. 1 
 
 The details of the administrative organization 
 which Plato sketches out for his state need not 
 particularly detain us. 2 The chief place in the ad- 
 ministration he gives to a board of thirty-seven, called 
 guardians of the laws, chosen by election in three 
 stages by the citizens who bear arms. Only men 
 of fifty years of age and upward are eligible, and 
 each retires when he reaches seventy. These guar- 
 dians constitute the general advisory and supervisory 
 authority for the whole administration. Military 
 officials are elected, on nomination, primarily, by 
 the guardians. Provision is also made for an admin- 
 istrative council of 360, chosen through a combina- 
 tion of election and lot, with functions similar to 
 those of the Athenian preconsidering senate. A 
 general assembly of the citizens (eK/cX^crta) is pre- 
 sumed, 3 rather than described, as an element in the 
 governmental system, but its functions consist chiefly 
 in the election of the various magistrates. The 
 judicial organization is based formally on the prin- 
 ciple that all citizens should have a voice in the 
 administration of justice ; but the methods of pro- 
 cedure and appeal are so arranged as to insure a 
 
 1 Laws, VI, 757. 2 See Bk. VI, at large. 
 
 8 Cf. VI, 758, 764.
 
 42 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 predominant influence to a select court oi magis- 
 trates. 1 Finally, as the capstone of the whole gov- 
 ernmental edifice, Plato ordains a council consisting 
 of the ten oldest guardians of the laws, the priests 
 that have been distinguished for virtue, and those 
 magistrates who have had charge of education, to- 
 gether with a number of younger men equal to that 
 of the older. 2 To this body, which shall meet daily 
 between dawn and sunrise, 3 is assigned the supreme 
 duty of determining when and to what extent changes 
 shall be made in the laws of the state. 
 
 For legislation in the familiar modern sense no 
 especial provision is made in The Laws. The pre- 
 scriptions of the code are assumed to cover all 
 important points all matters that are worthy 
 the wisdom of a scientific lawgiver. Moreover, the 
 form of the code is such as to present, not only the 
 rule, but the purpose and justification of the law, 
 so that persuasion as well as penalty shall play a 
 part in securing obedience. This Plato considers 
 a very important feature of legislative art. 4 On the 
 basis of the laws thus formulated, the elaboration 
 of details may be left to administrative officials 
 guided by experience. 5 Finally, no written laws, 
 however detailed, will altogether displace the customs 
 or unwritten laws of a people ; hence it is that the 
 
 1 VI, 767, 768. 2 XII, 951, 961. 
 
 8 This body is known commonly as the " nocturnal council." 
 
 4 Bk. IV, 718; cf. also VII, 822. As Janet points out, Plato dis- 
 cerns the principle of the expose de motif oi modern continental legis- 
 lation. 
 
 5 Bk. VI, 770 ; cf. VIII, 828.
 
 PLATO'S THEORY AND GREEK FACTS 43 
 
 utmost attention is to be paid to the education of 
 the young. 1 
 
 It is impossible to discover in The Laws the crite- 
 rion by which Plato distinguished the general and 
 important from the secondary and unimportant in 
 legislation. The work is for the most part an un- 
 systematic assemblage of ideas on the most diverse 
 features of social life. Besides the matters already 
 considered, it embodies regulations touching many 
 varieties of crime and tort, various phases of con- 
 tract law, testament, trade, witchcraft, the treatment 
 of slaves, treasure-trove, funerals, agriculture, divorce 
 and many other things. In this mass of matter 
 there is much that is exceedingly valuable from the 
 standpoint of social history and comparative juris- 
 prudence. The philosophy of the state is chiefly 
 to be found in the points that have already been 
 particularly considered. 
 
 6. Plato's Theory and Hellenic Facts 
 
 The a priori and idealizing method of Plato's politi- 
 cal philosophy does not conceal from even the casual 
 reader the intimate relation between the doctrines 
 enunciated and the currents of practical Greek poli- 
 tics. It does not require the explicit eulogy of Sparta 
 which several times occurs 2 to reveal that the Pelo- 
 ponnesian state and the system she represents consti- 
 tute the model from which the philosopher draws his 
 inspiration. The foundations of The Republic are 
 indeed carefully laid in abstract ethics and dialectic, 
 
 1 VII, 793. 2 Rep. X, 599; Laws, III, 691 et seq.
 
 44 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 but the superstructure discloses, both in general effect 
 and often in details, the lines of the Lycurgean insti- 
 tutions. In Sparta, as in The Republic, the govern- 
 ing class was occupied exclusively with political 
 affairs, lived a life of publicity and, in theory at 
 least, of austerity, participated in and supervised a 
 vigorous discipline designed to maintain a uniformity 
 of type among citizens, and ruthlessly sacrificed every 
 individual or family interest to the interest of the 
 state. Lycurgus in the real, as Plato in the ideal, 
 commonwealth prohibited written laws and money of 
 gold and silver ; and in the one polity as in the other, 
 polyandry and the exposure of weak and deformed 
 infants were recognized as useful and proper devices 
 for preserving the physical integrity of the people. 
 Sparta's successful career in Hellenic politics, culmi- 
 nating in the destruction of Athenian power through 
 the Peloponnesian War, made a powerful impression 
 upon all reflecting Greeks. It is hardly surprising 
 that the philosopher should have attributed special 
 virtue to the peculiar constitution of the triumphant 
 little state. Not only her success abroad, but also 
 the stability of her government at home, made her 
 exceptional in Hellas. But on the other hand, the 
 Spartans were notoriously without part in the intel- 
 lectual progress of the times. Hence the criticism 
 which Plato makes upon their system, and hence the 
 deviation of his ideal from their practical state. He 
 finds their training one-sided physical and military, 
 without balance on the side of intellect and philos- 
 ophy. The method of their discipline he adopts,
 
 PLATO'S THEOKY AND GREEK FACTS 45 
 
 but the substance will not fulfil the demands of a 
 rounded character, and is supplemented, therefore, 
 in The Republic, by adequate attention to the 
 lacking elements. 
 
 In The Laws Plato makes some amend to his 
 native Athens for the injuria spretce formce in his ear- 
 lier work. Hellenic history during his later life had 
 furnished ground for a revision of judgment as to the 
 supreme efficiency of the Spartan system, even in the 
 purely military and political sense. That Athens, 
 once crushed to the earth, had shown sufficient recu- 
 perative power to stand once more on equal terms 
 with her conqueror, may well have contributed some- 
 thing to the modification of the philosopher's ideas. 
 It is certain, at all events, that many more sugges- 
 tions of Athenian institutions are to be found in TJie 
 Laws than in The Republic. The governmental 
 organization in the first-mentioned work bears very 
 obvious kinship to the constitution of Solon ; the 
 fourfold classification of the people according to 
 wealth, and the form and functions of the great ad- 
 ministrative council, are almost identical with con- 
 spicuous features of the Solonian scheme ; and both 
 the guardians of the laws and the " nocturnal coun- 
 cil " strongly suggest the senate of the Areopagus. 
 Perhaps the extent to which democratic ideas ought 
 to be recognized in political practice was about the 
 same in the minds of Plato and of Solon. For the 
 development of popular government effected through 
 Kleisthenes and Pericles, Plato shows no more sym- 
 pathy in The Laws than in The Republic. He is, in
 
 46 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 fact, by Athenian standards, some two centuries 
 behind the times. 
 
 In general, then, the political philosophy of Plato 
 involves an interpretation of Greek history and a 
 judgment upon existing institutions. His perception 
 of the principles that underlie these institutions is 
 in many cases keen and sure, but his attempts to 
 suggest practical improvements that shall more faith- 
 fully express the principles never take him beyond 
 the bounds of Hellenic experience. His conception 
 of the state is that of a small group of persons striv- 
 ing to realize a high ideal of moral and intellectual 
 attainment through self-discipline and through the 
 judicious adaptation of the powers of a much more 
 numerous body of persons associated with them in 
 the political community. To him the state exists 
 only in the select few, devoted exclusively to its 
 service. No citizen, he holds, should engage in 
 mercantile pursuits or mechanical trades ; these 
 occupations are suited only to slaves and aliens. 1 
 Nor is the attainment of great power or great 
 wealth an end to be considered for either the city or 
 the citizens. 2 Not dominion by land and sea, but 
 excellence and happiness must be the aim of the true 
 legislator. In The Laios Plato fixes the number of 
 citizens at 5040, with slaves and other elements duly 
 proportioned to the needs of these, and commands 
 that this number shall remain absolutely fixed. Such 
 a rule, he believed, would insure a sufficient equip- 
 ment of all the qualities necessary to social happiness. 
 
 1 Laws, VIII, 842, 846. 2 Ibid. V, 742.
 
 PLATO'S THEORY AND GREEK FACTS 47 
 
 The aristocratic city-state thus was the absolute 
 limit of Plato's thought. Not even that degree of 
 imperialism which had been realized by Athens and 
 Sparta received recognition in his philosophy. Yet 
 at the time of his death a far more striking imperial- 
 ism was near at hand in the Greek world. But so 
 fixed is the backward look of philosophy that some 
 nineteen centuries were destined to elapse before 
 political theorists freed themselves from the influ- 
 ence of the city-state idea, and adjusted their specu- 
 lations to the fact of systems in which the citizens 
 were numbered by millions. 
 
 SELECT REFERENCES 
 
 BEKKEK, Platonis Scripta Graece Omnia: Bd. IV, pp. 479 
 et seq. (HoXiTwco's) ; VI, 251-560 ; VII, 1-229 (IIoAiT'a) ; VII, 
 403-566; VIII (Nd/tw). BENARD, Platon, pp. 399-483. 
 BLAKEY, I, pp. 47-53. BOSANQUET, A Companion to Plato's 
 Eepublic. DAVIES and VAUGHAN, The Republic of Plato, 
 trans. FOUILLEE, La Philosophic de Socrate, I, 35-138, 259- 
 390 ; II, 1-75 ; La Philosophic de Plato, II, 33-95. GOMPERZ, 
 Griechische Denker, Bd. I, Buch III, chaps, iii and v (Greek 
 Thinkers, trans.). GRANT, Greece in the Age of Pericles. 
 GROTE : History of Greece, Part II, chaps. Ixvii-lxviii ; Plato 
 and other Companions of Socrates, Vol. I, chap, vi; II, pp. 
 475-500 (Statesman) ; III, 27-242 (Republic), 301^50 (Laws). 
 HENKEL, Geschichte der griechischcn Lehre vom Staat, pp. 38-74, 
 121 et seq. HILDENBRAND, Geschichte und System der Rcchts 
 und Staatsphilosophie, pp. 41-222. JANET, Vol. I, pp. 53-164. 
 JOWETT and CAMPBELL, Plato's Eepublic, Greek Text. 
 JOWETT, The Dialogues of Plato, trans., 3d edition. Loos, 
 Studies in Aristotle and Plato, p. 179 et seq. MAHAFFY, 
 History of Classical Greek Literature, Vol. II, chap, vii, 
 especially pp. 194-210. MOHL, Geschichte der Staatswissen-
 
 48 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 schaften, I, 171 et seq. NETTLESHIP, Lectures on the Republic 
 of Plato ; Theory of Education in Plato's Republic, in Hellenica, 
 pp. 61-165. NEWMAN, The Politics of Aristotle, Vol. I, pp. 
 50-55, 374-461, 552. PATER, Plato and Platonism, pp. 66, 240. 
 RITTER, Geschichte der Philosophic, Bd. II, pp. 443-522 (History 
 of Ancient Philosophy, trans., Vol. II, pp. 385-452). STALL- 
 BAUM, Platonis Opera Omnia (1881), pp. 266-285 (Politicus), 
 289-384 (De Republica), 384-498 (De Legibus). SUSEMIHL, 
 Die genetische Entwickelung der platonischen Philosophie, I, 
 312-329 (Der Staatsman) ; II, 58-312 (Der Stoat) ; 559-696 
 (Die Gesetze). VAN DER REST, Platon et Aristote, pp. 6-344. 
 VOIGT, Das jus naturale, Vol. I, 17-23. ZELLER, Die Phi- 
 losophie der Griechen, I, 932-1041 (Die Sophisten) ; II, 1, 91 
 et seq., 281 et seq., 867-925 (Staaf), 946-982 (Gesetze) ; Plato 
 and the Older Academy, trans., chaps, x, xi, xiii.
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 
 
 1. Method and Character of The Polities 
 
 THE capital significance of Aristotle, in the history 
 of political theories, lies in the fact that he gave to 
 politics the character of an independent science. He 
 differs from his master, Plato, much more in the 
 form and method than in the substance of his thought. 
 Most of the ideas which seem characteristically Aris- 
 totelian are to be found in Plato. 1 But the Platonic 
 expression of them is generally suggestion or allusion 
 or illustration ; while in Aristotle they appear as 
 definite, clean-cut dogmas, bearing an unmistakable 
 relation to the general system of scientific doctrine. 
 This contrast is rooted in the respective intellectual 
 peculiarities of the two philosophers. Plato is im- 
 aginative and synthetic ; Aristotle is matter-of-fact 
 and analytic. Ideas present themselves to Plato more 
 through metaphor and analogy; to Aristotle more 
 through the processes of exact logic. Plato is 
 more impressed by the unity pervading phenomena ; 
 Aristotle, by the diversity. In ethics and politics, 
 accordingly, while Plato, working deductively from 
 
 1 Susemihl notes seventy-two places in The Politics that are par- 
 alleled to a greater or less extent in Plato. Aristoteles Politik (Leip- 
 zig, 1879), Einleitung, p. 11, note. 
 
 B 49
 
 50 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 his philosophic conceptions of virtue and the good, 
 blended inextricably the two bodies of doctrine, Aris* 
 totle, proceeding by extensive observation and minute 
 analysis of objective facts, marked out for each sci- 
 ence an independent field. 
 
 The foundation of his political theory was laid by 
 Aristotle in a detailed study of practically all the 
 existing governmental systems, both Hellenic and 
 barbarian. More than one hundred and fifty polities 
 are said to have been analyzed in a work which is 
 quoted in ancient literature as The Constitutions (at 
 TroXtreiat). Of this work the only part now known 
 by more than slight fragments is the recently discov- 
 ered Constitution of Athens? From this it is clear 
 that the author studied governments both in their 
 history and in their contemporary working, and that 
 his method was in the fullest sense objective and 
 scientific. In his systematic work, The Politics, Aris- 
 totle draws abundantly from the great store of facts 
 accumulated in The Constitutions. It is not exact, 
 however, to say that the principles of The Politics 
 are strictly generalizations from these facts. To a 
 less extent than Plato, but yet to a very great extent, 
 Aristotle depends for the categories and broad outline 
 of his philosophy upon the ideas that characterized 
 contemporary Hellenic thought. The results of his 
 study of other ages and other peoples are employed 
 more in the correction and illustration than in the 
 
 1 Cf. Aristotle on the Constitution of Athens. Translated, with 
 introduction, and notes, by F. G. Kenyon. London, George Bell & 
 Sons, 1891.
 
 POLITICS AND ETHICS IN ARISTOTLE 51 
 
 foundation of his political science. His method is 
 inductive, but not purely inductive. The intimate 
 relations which he enjoyed with the half -barbarian 
 court of Macedon l seem never to have moved him 
 from the conviction that in the pure Greek society 
 and government was to be found the political ideal. 
 That Aristotle, while not like Plato an idealist, never- 
 theless was often determined in his philosophy by an 
 ideal, will appear clearly enough in what is to follow. 
 The creation of an independent science of politics 
 by Aristotle was accomplished by the disentanglement 
 of political from ethical conceptions. In Plato's 
 thought the two were completely blended. The sep- 
 aration effected by Aristotle was not so much the 
 conclusion of a deliberate logical process as the un- 
 conscious outcome of the analytic method which he 
 applied with such rigour to the solution of ethical 
 problems. 2 Rejecting Plato's conception of a single 
 universal abstract " good," Aristotle considers that 
 " good " is relative to each species of being. What, 
 he asks, is the science which treats of the highest 
 " good " of man ? His answer is : political science. 
 For the good of man is the perfect development and 
 activity of all the powers that are in him, and this 
 result is impossible to the individual without the 
 association of his fellows that is, without the TrdXt?. 
 Therefore, the good of the individual is merged in 
 that of the state. But the state he conceives as 
 
 1 His father was court physician to King Amyntas, and he himself 
 was the tutor of Alexander the Great. 
 
 2 Grant, The Ethics of Aristotle, I, Appendix C.
 
 52 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 avrdpKrjs, or self-sufficing that is, as dependent on 
 no more ultimate form of being for the realization of 
 the good which is its end. Therefore the science of 
 the state, politics, is the dominant, " architectonic " 
 science, embracing within itself, as a part, that which 
 treats of man as an individual. 
 
 From the abstract point of view, thus, ethics is a 
 subdivision of politics. But Aristotle's treatment of 
 ethics never partook so much of abstract and ulti- 
 mate philosophy as of practical wisdom. The prin- 
 ciple of morality which he consistently set forth was 
 that of a rational choice of the mean between two 
 extremes of conduct. 1 The application of this prin- 
 ciple involved the fullest recognition of human free 
 will and led Aristotle often to ascribe to the self-con- 
 scious, rational intelligence of the individual the 
 character of self-sufficiency which he had ascribed 
 to the state. Thus, from the practical point of 
 view, at least, ethics was impressed with the char- 
 acter of an independent science. But Aristotle him- 
 self was not clear at this point. He often refers to 
 ethics as politics, sometimes intimates that the two 
 are distinct, and in at least one case seems to refer 
 to ethics as a different science. 2 His uncertainty is 
 illustrated also in the repeated consideration in The 
 Politics 8 of the question whether the virtue of the 
 
 1 For a charming exposition of Aristotle's Ethics, see Janet, 
 Histoire de la Science Polilique, I, 103 et seq. 
 
 2 The Politics, VII, i, 13, erepas o-^oX^s- The peculiar usage of 
 o-^oA.^s here has caused the passage to be suspected. Cf. Susemihl, 
 note 709. 
 
 8 III, iv ; v, 10 ; xviii, 1. IV, vii, 2. VII, xiv, 8.
 
 POLITICS AND ETHICS IN ARISTOTLE 53 
 
 good citizen is the same as that of the good man. 
 His conclusion seems to be, after much vacillation, 
 that the answer is negative in the practical, but 
 affirmative in the ideal or perfect state. Other evi- 
 dence unites with this conclusion to indicate that 
 Aristotle conceived of politics in a double sense : 
 first, with Plato, as a pure science (cro^ta), con- 
 cerned with the absolute good of man, and the abso- 
 lute perfect state ; second, as a practical science 
 (fypovrjaris}, treating of the constitutional and legal 
 relations of actual men in actual societies. In the 
 order of thought, then, politics in the first sense 
 would be prior both to ethics and to politics in the 
 second sense : pure political science would embody 
 the abstract theory of which ethics and practical 
 political science would be two distinct applications. 1 
 While such seems to have been the thought of the 
 philosopher, his treatment of politics, at least in the 
 works that have come down to us, was almost exclu- 
 sively, like that of ethics, on the practical side. 
 Hence, whether or not he fully realized the outcome 
 of his work, the separation of the two sciences was 
 definitely accomplished. The abstract ideal politics, 
 in which the norms of individual and social excel- 
 lence were identical, received only scanty attention 
 and exercised little influence on later thought. But 
 the keen, cold analysis to which he subjected the 
 forms and motives of practical social and political 
 
 1 Cf. Nicomachean Ethics, VT, 8, and the note of Grant, op. cit., 
 II, 169. In the Rhetoric, I, 4, 5, Aristotle uses the expression 17 ire/at 
 TO, y9r) iroXiTLK-q, which is very significant.
 
 54 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 activity gave to reflection on this subject an indi- 
 viduality, a mould and a technique that it was never 
 again to lose. 
 
 In the Aristotelian works on ethics are to be 
 found expositions of many of the principles which 
 lie nearest the border line of politics. Justice is 
 defined, and the distinction between distributive and 
 corrective justice, already noticed by Plato, is care- 
 fully worked out. 1 The relation of justice to law is 
 examined, and natural (TO ^VCTLKOV) is marked off 
 distinctly from legal right (TO vo/zi/coV). Equity also 
 (17 7rieiK6ia) is clearly denned as corrective of law. 
 But it is in The Politics that the full and rounded 
 exposition of these principles is to be found, as 
 applied in operations of state life. There are 
 indications that this work embodied originally a 
 comprehensive and well-proportioned plan. As the 
 treatise has come down to us, however, the plan is 
 far from clear and the execution is confused and 
 defective. The text abounds in repetitions, contra- 
 dictions, obscurities and obvious gaps. This result 
 is probably due, not only to accidents and errors in 
 the transmission of the manuscript through the cen- 
 turies, but also to the fact that the work never re- 
 ceived a final revision by its author. The difficulty 
 of ascertaining Aristotle's views has further been 
 increased by the very zeal of the modern commenta- 
 tors, who, with the praiseworthy purpose of making 
 the philosopher's work worthy of his reputation, 
 have emended, conjectured, transposed, elided and 
 
 1 Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. V.
 
 ARISTOTLE ON STATE AND HOUSEHOLD 55 
 
 inserted with an energy and a diversity that leaves 
 the reader only the impression of hopeless confusion. 
 But without radical editing, the treatise as it stands, 
 with all its imperfections, is as impressive an embodi- 
 ment of scientific genius and political insight as is 
 the mutilated Vatican torso of the sculptor's art. 1 
 
 2. The Nature of the State and of the Household 
 In the first book of The Politics the philosopher 
 sets forth the fundamental characteristics of the 
 state (770X15). It is an association an association 
 of human beings and the highest form of human 
 association. In the order of time it is preceded by 
 the household (ot/aa) and the village (KW^TJ) ; in the 
 order of thought it is prior to both. The household 
 has its source in the association of male and female 
 for the propagation of the race and the association 
 of master and slave for the production of subsistence. 
 The village has its source in the association of house- 
 holds for the better satisfaction of their wants. The 
 state springs from the union of villages into an asso- 
 ciation of such size and character as to be self- 
 sufficing. It is the last and the perfect association. 
 Originating in the bare needs of living, it exists for 
 the sake of complete life. 2 And because the indi- 
 
 1 The most annoying form of editorial modification is that which 
 consists in transposing the order of paragraphs, chapters and books. 
 No reference can be good for more than a single one of the really 
 erudite editions of The Politics. Without regard to the relative 
 merits of the various arrangements before the world, I have followed 
 here the order of Jowett, The Politics of Aristotle (Oxford, 1885), 
 to which all references have been made to apply. 
 
 2 No mere translation can express all that is contained in the 
 famous dictum of Aristotle : Tivop.fvr] pkv TOV ,i}v tveKtv, ovcra 8e TOV
 
 56 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 vidual can fulfil the end of his existence can live 
 a complete life only in the state, Aristotle declares 
 that man is by nature a political animal. 1 This 
 dogma leaves no room for such discussion as has 
 figured in later political theory, of a " state of 
 nature " in which the individual lives a life of bliss- 
 ful isolation from his kind. The being who cannot 
 live in association with his fellows, or who has no 
 need to do this, is, Aristotle says, either on the one 
 hand, a beast, or on the other, a god. There is no 
 place in the philosophy of human phenomena for 
 the consideration of such a being. 
 
 This conception of the state in its essential char- 
 acter does not, however, preclude the investigation 
 of the less ultimate forms of association which pre- 
 vail among men. Historically the 770X15 was pre- 
 ceded by conditions in which the household, ruled 
 by the patriarch, was the typical community. In 
 this fact is to be found the explanation of the 
 monarchic government of the earliest states ; for 
 the primitive king merely retained through custom 
 the authority of the patriarch. But Aristotle insists 
 that this historical relation of household to state 
 must not be allowed to distort our conception of 
 their logical relation. It is one of his numerous 
 charges against Plato that the latter represented the 
 state to be merely a large household and the ruler 
 
 1 *Av#pco7ros <f>v(rei TroAtriKov ^aov. " Nature " here means, as Aris- 
 totle explains, that condition in which all potentialities are fully 
 developed where everything fulfils its re'Aos, or true end. He 
 sometimes uses " nature " in the sense of primitive or undeveloped 
 condition.
 
 ARISTOTLE ON STATE AND HOUSEHOLD 57 
 
 of the state to be essentially the head of a family. 
 Such a conception Aristotle holds to be false ; state 
 and household differ, not in degree, but in kind. To 
 prove this he enters upon an exhaustive analysis of 
 the household, in the course of which are set forth 
 the philosopher's views upon many of the funda- 
 mental questions of economics. 1 
 
 The main argument is summarily as follows : The 
 household consists of an individual holding dominion 
 over wife, children and property, including slaves. 
 The relation of the head of the household to these 
 three elements is not one, but various. He rules the 
 wife, not as absolute despot, but as constitutional 
 adviser ; he rules the children, not as absolute des- 
 pot, but as the king, who looks to their good rather 
 than his own ; while property, both slaves and other, 
 he rules in full despotism, for the exclusive advan- 
 tage of himself. In this manifold relation of the 
 head of the household to the subordinate elements 
 lies the essential distinction between the household 
 and the state ; for in the latter, according to Aris- 
 totle, the relation of the ruler to each of the citizens 
 is precisely the same. 
 
 This argument, in itself, is not especially striking ; 
 it adds nothing to the force of the distinction made 
 in the primary principle, that the household exists 
 for the sake of the physical needs of life, the state 
 for the moral and intellectual needs. But the de- 
 tailed discussion of the nature and the function of 
 the various elements of the household embodies much 
 
 1 The care of the household he calls OLKOVO/UO.
 
 58 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 that is of high significance in social and economic 
 history and theory. At the very outset he is con- 
 fronted by the necessity of finding a rational justifi- 
 cation for slavery. The slaves constitute one of the 
 natural elements of the household, as he analyzes it. 
 " But some contend," he says, " that the distinction 
 between slave and freeman is a fact only of law and 
 not of nature, and that it is rooted not in justice but 
 in violence." l To meet this contention he presents 
 the first scientific discussion of the institution in 
 extant literature. He concedes that the relation of 
 master and slave is rational, only if it corresponds 
 to some universal principle of nature. Such a prin- 
 ciple is that which requires the combination of com- 
 mand and obedience for the attainment of any human 
 purpose. Men differ from one another in capacity 
 for the one or the other of these functions. There 
 are those whose high endowment of reason fits them 
 to command and direct ; there are those whose slight 
 endowment fits them only to comprehend and carry 
 out orders. The former are by nature masters ; the 
 latter are by nature slaves. Intellectual strength 
 is the chief characteristic of the former; physical 
 strength, of the latter. The combination of the two 
 is essential to the realization of those purposes for 
 which the household exists ; therefore slavery is in 
 accordance with nature. Aristotle is quite aware 
 that the actual institution does not correspond to 
 this rational foundation. He admits that in fact 
 many slaves are superior to their masters in intellect. 
 
 * 1, iii, 4.
 
 AKISTOTLE ON STATE AND HOUSEHOLD 59 
 
 This, however, does not affect the reasoning; it is 
 more or less accidental, due, he believes, to the 
 absence of any clearly discernible outward mark by 
 which the natural slave is to be distinguished from 
 the natural master. The common practice of enslav- 
 ing prisoners of war, Aristotle points out, can find 
 justification only so far as the fact of success in 
 battle can be taken as evidence of the superior in- 
 tellectual endowment of the victors; but a judg- 
 ment on this point is subject to many qualifications. 
 Finally, the principle he lays down is the logical 
 foundation of the widespread feeling among the 
 Greeks that they ought to hold in slavery only per- 
 sons of other races ; for the inherent intellectual 
 superiority of Hellenes over barbarians was one of 
 the primary and universal axioms of Greek thought. 1 
 As to its animate elements, then, the household is 
 organized with reference to the gradation of intellec- 
 tual capacity. This capacity exists in the woman in 
 a weaker form and in the child in a less developed 
 form than in the man. In the slave it has no exist- 
 ence whatever. Hence arise the three varieties of 
 paternal dominion, all working for the realization of 
 the highest good of the whole household. As to the 
 inanimate possessions of the household, there is no 
 question of the absolute dominion of the father. 
 Aristotle assumes without examination the validity 
 of the principle of private property. As to methods 
 of acquisition, however, he finds room for much re- 
 
 1 Cf. Plato, The Republic, V, 469 ; Aristotle, The Politics, I, vi, 6 ; 
 VII, vii, 3.
 
 60 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 flection, in the course of which he develops many 
 familiar principles of political economy. The pro- 
 duction of wealth has for him no high philosophical 
 significance. He regards it as a more or less dis- 
 agreeable necessity incidental to the maintenance of 
 life, and hence as a function of the household, but the 
 lowest of its functions. 1 From this point of view he 
 distinguishes between natural and unnatural methods 
 of acquiring wealth. The natural methods, which 
 alone fall within the scope of true economic science 
 (17 oi/coi/o/Ai/a?'), are those through which mere neces- 
 sary subsistence is procured. Among these he enu- 
 merates cattle-raising, agriculture and hunting, the 
 last including as subordinate species, fishing, the 
 chase of land animals, and oddly enough brigan- 
 dage (Xfloreia). 8 The unnatural methods of acquisition 
 are those which aim, not at the mere maintenance of 
 life, but at endless accumulation of wealth. These 
 fall within the field of a distinct science, chrematis- 
 tics (17 xprjiMdTLa-TLKr}). Of these methods trade, 
 whether in the form of barter or in that of sale for 
 money, may be natural, when pursued merely with 
 a view to procuring necessities of life, and not as 
 an end in itself. But through the use of money 
 to facilitate exchange men have been led to see in 
 
 1 Household management (OIKOVO/J.IO) has for its purpose rather to 
 make the members of the family virtuous than to make them rich. 
 I, xiii, 1. 
 
 2 I, viii, 7 and 8. The philosopher further notes that war, also, is 
 a species of hunting, and is allied to economic science so far as it aims 
 to bring into servitude men who, being slaves by nature, are unwilling 
 to submit. I, viii, 12.
 
 ARISTOTLE ON STATE AND HOUSEHOLD 61 
 
 money itself the end of trade; and hence has arisen, 
 among other evils, the lending of money at interest 
 In this practice money is made to reproduce itself 
 instead of being applied to the procurement of the 
 needs of life. Such a mode of acquisition, therefore, 
 has no logical justification and is, he concludes, 
 wholly unnatural. 
 
 This discussion of economics is on the whole as 
 remarkable for its weak as for its strong features. 
 The keen analytical faculty which is so characteristic 
 of Aristotle achieves excellent results in shaping the 
 questions that are to be solved. The elementary 
 ideas of production and exchange are fairly pre- 
 sented. He sees clearly enough the distinction 
 between value in use and value in exchange, and 
 the primary function of money has never been better 
 elucidated than by him. But he fails entirely to 
 grasp the notion of capital, and accordingly does not 
 rise above the very primitive and absurd conception 
 of interest. His glaring weakness at this point, and 
 the no less remarkable freak of including brigand- 
 age in the normal methods of acquiring wealth, 
 both may be traced back to an ambiguity in 
 his conception of nature (Averts). This term has, 
 throughout the history of political theory, proved a 
 stone of stumbling to philosophers. Aristotle, how- 
 ever, at the beginning of The Politics? assigns to 
 the word a clear and unambiguous meaning; namely, 
 a condition of perfect development of all potentiali- 
 ties. But here at the end of the first book he evi- 
 
 1 1, ii, 8.
 
 62 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 dently thinks of it as denoting a primitive and 
 undeveloped condition. In one place man is political 
 by nature, because the state is characteristic of fully 
 developed humanity. In the other place brigandage 
 is a natural method of obtaining wealth, because it 
 is a practice of undeveloped men, and the taking of 
 interest is not natural because, apparently, it is not 
 found among undeveloped men. 
 
 3. Organization of the State: Constitution, Citizen- 
 ship, Government 
 
 In approaching the consideration of the constitu- 
 tion which shall most faithfully embody the true 
 principles of political science, Aristotle first examines 
 critically those systems, whether actual or theoreti- 
 cal, which have attained a general reputation for 
 excellence. In the second book of The Politics, the 
 constitutions of Sparta, Crete and Carthage, and 
 the actual or projected legislation of distinguished 
 thinkers, like Hippodarnus, Phaleas and Solon, are 
 described and their most conspicuous features com- 
 mented upon. But the first place in the book is 
 devoted to a severe, and at times distinctly unfair, 
 criticism of Plato's ideas, as embodied in The Repub- 
 lic and The Laws. From the standpoint and with 
 the method adopted by Aristotle, it is a matter of 
 no great difficulty to exhibit many weaknesses in 
 the Platonic theories. But probably the most sig- 
 nificant feature of the critique is the attack on the 
 philosophic supports of communism. Aristotle con- 
 cedes that unity is of fundamental importance in
 
 AEISTOTLE ON COMMUNISM 63 
 
 any conception of the state, but the means advocated 
 by Plato for attaining it he holds to be destructive 
 of the end in view. Thus, Plato says that if a man 
 does not know his own children, he will feel an 
 equally high affection for all the children in the 
 state. But, answers Aristotle, the sense of personal 
 possession is the whole basis of affection ; therefore 
 the result will be, not great love for all, but no love 
 for any. Again, the degree of harmony to be ex- 
 pected from community of property is less than that 
 from a regime of individual ownership ; for, he 
 argues, the disputes that arise among persons having 
 joint interests are notoriously frequent and distress- 
 ing, and without private property there would be no 
 room for the establishment of those valuable social 
 bonds which accompany the exercise of liberality, in 
 accordance with the saying that all things are in 
 common among friends. 1 The Platonic reasoning is, 
 in fact, vitiated from the outset by an erroneous con- 
 ception of the unity that is essential to the state. 
 It is not a unity which consists in the obliteration 
 of all diversities in individuals. Such a conception 
 is fatal to the idea of the state, as identity in musical 
 tones is fatal to the idea of harmony. The unity of 
 the state is that which arises out of the proper 
 organization of relations among individuals who 
 differ from one another as rulers and ruled. 
 
 From this point of view Aristotle proceeds to the 
 positive presentation of constitutional relations. 2 A 
 
 1 Both Plato and Aristotle attached much importance to friendship 
 as a social virtue ; cf. supra, p. 40. a In Bk. HI.
 
 64 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 state, objectively considered, is an assemblage of 
 citizens. What is a citizen ? This question is an- 
 swered primarily on a basis of fact and of purely 
 Hellenic fact. The citizen, he says, is One who 
 participates in the functions of juror and legislator 
 (St/caorrys Kal e/c/cX^crtacTTT;?), either or both. In 
 other words, citizenship signifies merely the enjoy- 
 ment of political rights, and a state is a group of 
 persons exercising these rights. No part of the com- 
 munity not possessing such rights comes within the 
 purview of politics proper. But Aristotle raises the 
 further question, Who ought to be citizens ? Espe- 
 cially, Are mechanics and labourers fit for inclusion 
 in this class ? His answer is negative. The prime 
 qualification for citizenship is capacity both to rule 
 and to be ruled, and the cultivation of this twofold 
 capacity is indispensable. But those who must labour 
 in order to live are too dependent on the commands 
 of others ever to develop the capacity themselves to 
 command. 1 Freedom from concern about the neces- 
 sities of life is indispensable to the proper performance 
 of political duties. 2 The working classes are, indeed, 
 essential to the state's existence ; but this does not 
 constitute them citizens. While in practice they 
 have been admitted to citizenship in many states, 
 this, Aristotle thinks, has been justified only by the 
 regrettable lack of true material. 
 
 The state, then, which the philosopher must con- 
 sider consists in a self-sufficing body of such citizens 
 as he has defined. The general system of author- 
 
 1 IK, iv and v. a H, ix, 2.
 
 CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT 65 
 
 ity through which the functions of the state are 
 performed is the constitution (TroXtreta). In the 
 constitution are determined the number and inter- 
 relationship of the various organs of government, the 
 methods through which they are manned, and, par- 
 ticularly, the abode of the supreme or sovereign 
 power (TO Kvpiov, r\ KvpLa. ap^rj). 1 On this last point 
 depends the difference between constitutions ; for 
 the governing body (vroXtreu/aa) is sovereign, and 
 makes the constitution what it is. Accordingly, 
 where the people is the governing body, the consti- 
 tution is a democracy ; where the few govern, it is 
 oligarchy. 2 
 
 Aristotle employs this conception of the consti- 
 tution in determining when the identity of a state 
 changes. With logic that has not been confined to 
 ancient times and European lands, Greek govern- 
 ments had sought to repudiate debts on the ground 
 that they had been contracted not by the state, but 
 by the oligarchy or the tyrant. What, the philoso- 
 pher asks, is the essence of the state, and when does 
 it cease to be itself and become another ? And he 
 answers : The essence of the state is the constitution, 
 and the state changes its identity when the constitu- 
 tion changes, e.g. when from democracy it becomes 
 oligarchy or tyranny. But, he hastens to add, "it 
 is quite another question whether the state should or 
 
 1 IV, i, 10. 
 
 2 III, vi, 1. Aristotle says : Kvpcov ira.vTa\ov TO TroXirevfjua. ; but he 
 does not appear to mean what would be conveyed to modern minds 
 by the literal rendering : " The sovereign is everywhere the govern- 
 ment." Cf. ad loc. Jowett, Zeller, Susemihl.
 
 66 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 should not fulfil engagements when it changes its 
 constitution." This very impotent conclusion is 
 perplexing, especially as The Politics contains no 
 further discussion of the matter. From his identifi- 
 cation of the state with its constitution the obvious 
 inference would be that a democracy, for example, 
 is not responsible for the engagements of a tyrant 
 whom it has displaced. Either Aristotle here means 
 by constitution something more than what he says in 
 defining the term, or, not wishing to commit himself 
 to the approval of the repudiation of contracts, he 
 deliberately evades the logical dilemma. 1 
 
 From the nature of the state and of the constitu- 
 tion as defined above, the philosopher draws one 
 conclusion as to the normal, or natural, organization 
 of government. Though the state arises from man's 
 impulse to association with his kind, rather than 
 from a deliberate search for mutual assistance, yet 
 the advantages springing from political organization 
 have a great influence in the maintenance of the 
 social bond. These advantages, then, should be com- 
 mon to all the citizens. All alike should profit by 
 the capacity of each in either ruling or being ruled. 
 Hence the constitution should provide for the service 
 in office of each of the citizens in his turn. Such at 
 least should be the rule where the state is really a 
 society of equal citizens. Quite different, the philos- 
 opher sententiously observes, is the actual practice ; 
 
 1 A third alternative, always to be presumed in The Politics, is that 
 the text is corrupt or defective. But there is no indication of such 
 a condition in this passage. Ill, iii, 9.
 
 ARISTOTLE ON SOVEREIGNTY 67 
 
 for, through selfish craving for the emoluments of 
 public service, men seek for and cling to office as if 
 their lives depended on it. 1 
 
 4. The Sovereign Power 
 
 Conceiving the essence of the state to be expressed 
 in the constitution, and the crucial feature of the 
 constitution to be the supreme or sovereign authority 
 (TO Kvpiov), the question at once arises : On what 
 rational principle is the abode of this sovereignty to 
 be determined ? Controversy is particularly keen, 
 Aristotle notes, between those who favour the prin- 
 ciple of mere numbers and those who favour that of 
 wealth and intelligence. The former, advocating 
 democracy, claim that all who are equal in respect 
 to freedom should be recognized as equal in political 
 power, and that, accordingly, the sovereignty should 
 rest in the general body of citizens. Against these 
 the advocates of oligarchy contend that superiority 
 in wealth or intelligence or birth should carry 
 superiority in power, and that the supreme authority 
 should therefore rest in the few. Both these argu- 
 ments, Aristotle declares, miss the precise criterion, 
 which is to be found only after reaching a correct 
 conception of the nature and end of the state. The 
 state is not an association for the acquisition of 
 wealth, or for the mere maintenance of life, or, like 
 an international alliance, for the promotion of defi- 
 nite political and commercial interests of the con- 
 tracting parties. Tha end of the state^ is_not that 
 
 1 in, vi, 10.
 
 68 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 certain persons shall have a common dwelling-place, 
 and shall refrain from mutual injury and shall be in 
 habitual intercourse with one another. The state 
 embraces within itself associations for all these and 
 other purposes, but such associations are based on 
 friendship (<i\ta) and look merely to living together. 
 On the other hand, the state has for its end living 
 well living happily and nobly : it is an association 
 not for mere life, but for noble actions. 1 
 
 From this point of view, the greater share in 
 political power should belong to those who contribute 
 most to the perfect life. Virtue, especially that 
 species called justice, is to be the criterion, rather 
 than freedom or birth or wealth. Must sovereign 
 power, then, be ascribed to the mass of the people, 
 or to some limited class, or to some individual ? 
 Primarily, Aristotle answers, to the mass of the peo- 
 ple. For the aggregate virtue 2 of the whole people 
 exceeds that of any particular part. The same 
 answer, indeed, would follow from a rigid applica- 
 tion of the principle of wealth ; for the whole is 
 wealthier than any of its parts. But popular sover- 
 eignty, as thus conceived, is subject to an important 
 qualification. 
 
 In the controversies of Hellenic politics over oli- 
 
 1 III, ix. 
 
 2 Virtue (dpe-n;) must always be understood in its ancient philo- 
 sophical sense. It connotes much more than strict moral excellence. 
 " Ability " would be perhaps nearer to the Greek idea, though defec- 
 tive as connoting no moral quality whatever. Custom has confirmed 
 the translation of aptrr) by virtue, and I shall adhere to this, subject 
 to the caution here noted.
 
 ARISTOTLE ON SOVEREIGNTY 6& 
 
 garchy and democracy the underlying thought was 
 that the people (6 8^/xos) and the few (ol oXtyot) in 
 any given community constituted in fact two states, 
 each existing or ceasing to exist as the one or the 
 other faction gained control. This idea had much 
 justification in the facts of the conflict. Democratic 
 triumph in most cases meant the actual physical 
 expulsion of the oligarchs from the community; 
 while oligarchic triumph meant the exclusion of the 
 mass of the people from all political rights and 
 hence from the state, in the sense in which Aristotle 
 defined it. 1 The unsatisfactory character of Aris- 
 totle's discussion as to the identity of the state 2 
 illustrates how prone he was to adopt the popular 
 conception, and regard sovereignty as inhering in the 
 dominant faction of the community. But more com- 
 monly he conceives the sovereign power rather as the 
 highest authority in the administrative hierarchy, or 
 as that part of the administrative organization which 
 deals with the most important questions of policy. 
 In other words, he thinks of the sovereign as subor- 
 dinate to the state, and of the state as existing apart 
 from any particular possessor of the chief govern- 
 mental power. 
 
 The latter conception of sovereignty is that which 
 the philosopher employs in deciding that the mass of 
 the people must be sovereign. This does not imply 
 that either the people as a whole or every individual 
 alike is best adapted to administer all the offices of 
 the state ; but that the greatest and most fundamen- 
 
 1 Supra, p. 64. 2 Supra, p. 65.
 
 70 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 tal questions must be finally passed upon by the 
 whole people. In practice this would mean, he ex- 
 plains, that the function of the popular body should 
 be chiefly the election and censure of the officers of 
 administration. For such functions the people as a 
 whole is eminently fitted. It may, indeed, be argued 
 that statesmen of eminent wisdom and experience 
 would give a better judgment than the mass that 
 the few, rather than the many, are the logical sov- 
 ereign in this sense. But Aristotle rejects this con- 
 tention. The verdict of the general public is valid 
 in politics, just as it is in musical contests and in 
 banquets ; not the musician and the cook, but they 
 who hear the music and eat the dinner are best quali- 
 fied to render judgment. 
 
 The sovereignty of the whole people, therefore, 
 subject to the qualification that it be manifested in 
 the election of magistrates and in holding them to 
 account for their conduct in office, is the primary 
 solution of the problem as to the location of ultimate 
 power in the state. This solution presumes, however, 
 that the citizens are on the whole not far from the 
 same general level of virtue. Suppose, on the con- 
 trary, that among them is a small number, or even a 
 single individual, whose virtue overwhelmingly ex- 
 ceeds that of all the rest, whether taken individually 
 or collectively. In such a case, there can be, Aris- 
 totle holds, but one answer : the preeminently virtu- 
 ous few or one is the logical sovereign. It is a 
 consciousness of this fact, he explains, that has led 
 democracies to devise the institution of ostracism.
 
 THE SOVEREIGNTY OF LAW 71 
 
 An actual popular sovereign cannot tolerate in the 
 body politic an individual who in any way embodies 
 the possibility of becoming the ideal sovereign. 
 
 Finally, above every form of personal sovereignty, 
 whether of the one, the few, or the whole people, 
 must be placed, according to Aristotle, the sover- 
 eignty of the law (ot vo^oi). Only where the law is 
 uncertain or incomplete may the authority of man 
 be conclusive. Granting that, as some contend, the 
 rigidity of law works frequent in justice; yet less injus- 
 tice will spring from the prescriptions of customary 
 law (ot i/o/xot ot /caret TO e#os) than from the unchecked 
 will of any man. For such law is free from the 
 influence of human passions. The rule of law, Aris- 
 totle finely says, is the rule of god and reason only ; 
 in the rule of man there appears in addition some- 
 thing of the brute. 1 
 
 5. The Forms of Constitution 
 
 Aristotle primarily classifies constitutions, first, 
 according to the mere number of those in whom 
 sovereign power is vested, and, second, according 
 to the end to which the conduct of government is 
 directed. The latter principle distinguishes pure 
 from corrupt forms, for the true end of the state is 
 the perfection of all its members. When the govern- 
 ment is administered with this end in view, the state 
 is pure ; when the administration aims at the inter- 
 est, not of all the citizens, but of the governing body 
 
 1 HI, XT!, 5.
 
 72 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 alone, the state is corrupt. The classification of con- 
 stitutions then assumes this form : * 
 
 SOVEREIGNTY OF PURE FORM CORRUPT FORM 
 
 The one Royalty Tyranny 
 
 The few Aristocracy Oligarchy 
 
 The whole people Polity Democracy 
 
 In respect to this classification it is to be observed 
 that the pure forms are based on an ideal which 
 belongs to political science in its broadest and most 
 abstract sense ; 2 while the corruptions (7ra/>eK/3ao-eis), 
 so called because they deviate from the ideal, are 
 what fall strictly within the field of politics in its 
 practical and independent character. Aristotle's con- 
 ceptions of royalty and aristocracy are hardly less 
 idealistic and fanciful than Plato's. Royalty is sub- 
 stantially the rule of the one perfect man ; aristoc- 
 racy is the rule of the few perfect men, not easily 
 to be distinguished in their attributes from Plato's 
 "guardians." If Aristotle had confined himself to 
 an abstract and idealistic treatment of these various 
 constitutions, his work would have exhibited little 
 divergence from Plato's. But in The Politics, as we 
 have it, 3 the discussion is of an eminently practical 
 
 1 III, vii. Cf. also Nich. Eth. V, 10, where a somewhat different 
 nomenclature is employed. 
 
 2 Supra, p. 53. 
 
 8 The text of Books IV, VI, VII and VIII, which cover this 
 subject, is in a condition of such corruption as to render the precise 
 order of thought which Aristotle intended to follow hopelessly uncer- 
 tain. By transposition of the order of the books and by high-handed 
 rearrangement of paragraphs, various plausible schemes have been 
 devised in which coherency of development is preserved. These are 
 all ingenious, and most of them are scientific. Whether any of them 
 is Aristotelian, no one can say.
 
 FORMS OF CONSTITUTION 73 
 
 character, and the ideal constitutions, while cropping 
 out from time to time, are quite overwhelmed in the 
 mass of historical and critical commentary on the 
 perversions, which alone are in vogue among actual 
 men. Only in the case of the polity is an ideal 
 brought into close relation with a possible constitu- 
 tion. The term TroXtreia, which means constitution 
 in general, is applied by Aristotle also to the special 
 form of democratic constitution. And polity, in this 
 narrow sense, he views in some places as an abstract 
 ideal, but in others as a system quite susceptible of 
 realization through a proper tempering of actual 
 democracy. 
 
 For monarchy the philosopher can find a rational 
 justification only in the purely ideal case of an indi- 
 vidual absolutely preeminent in virtue. To such an 
 ideally perfect man may be ascribed the right to 
 rule, 1 unrestrained by law. But for actual states the 
 best possible law has a better ground for supremacy 
 than the best possible man. And for the work of 
 government subject to law, the capacity of an indi- 
 vidual can never equal that of an aggregation of 
 individuals. The many is less easily corrupted than 
 the one ; and even though the one may have nominal 
 supremacy, the physical impossibility of conducting 
 the administration single-handed renders necessary 
 a plurality in government which is not different in 
 kind from a plurality immediately under the consti- 
 tution. Aristotle's conclusion is, in fact, that mon- 
 
 1 But Aristotle points out that not even here could the principle 
 of hereditary succession be recognized.
 
 74 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 archy not only is illogical, but also is practically 
 impossible. 1 Tyranny, the corrupt form of royalty, 
 Aristotle regarded as resting purely on force, and 
 therefore as having no place in a purely rational 
 system of politics. 
 
 For his detailed examination of the non-monarchic 
 constitutions, Aristotle points out that the different 
 forms rest upon a deeper foundation than that of 
 mere number in the sovereign body. Oligarchy and 
 democracy signify, respectively, the domination of 
 the rich and that of the poor ; while practically these 
 classes are the few and the many, the greater impor- 
 tance lies in the economic, not in the arithmetical, 
 fact. But these two forms again require, according 
 to Aristotle, further subdivision. Democracies differ 
 from one another, and the same is true of oligarchies ; 
 here again the various shades, 2 of which he enumer- 
 ates four under each form, have a close relation to 
 social and economic facts. 3 The form, amount and 
 diffusion of wealth play a large part in the peculiar 
 adjustments of political organization. 
 
 In the detailed treatment of aristocracy and polity, 
 the original character of the two is almost entirely 
 lost sight of by Aristotle. Their relation to oligarchy 
 
 1 He considers only Greek states. The system of the great barbarian 
 monarchies does not lie within his category of constitution (TroXirtta). 
 
 2 The distinction between these varieties is made to turn partly 
 upon the extent to which government is subject to law. This cri- 
 terion had been used by Plato. 
 
 3 For example, the four varieties from most moderate to most 
 extreme democracy correspond in general to the predominance of 
 agricultural, mechanical, mercantile and maritime pursuits among 
 the mass of the people. IV, iv, 21 and vi, 1-6.
 
 FORMS OF CONSTITUTION 75 
 
 and democracy appears no longer as that of the pure 
 to the corrupt, dependent upon the end to which 
 government is directed. On the contrary, the dis- 
 tinctions are made to turn upon the characteristic 
 principle that determines participation in political 
 functions. The principles that are in conflict for 
 supremacy in every community, Aristotle says, are 
 liberty, wealth, virtue and good birth (evyeveia). 
 Where part in the conduct of the government is 
 assigned on the basis of liberty (and equality, which 
 is an essential element in liberty), the constitution is 
 democratic; where on the basis of wealth, it is oli- 
 garchic ; where on the basis of virtue, in the strictly 
 ideal sense, it is aristocratic. * Polity is the constitu- 
 tion that embodies a blending (/uis) of the two prin- 
 ciples, liberty and wealth. When with these two 
 virtue also is combined, the resulting form is entitled 
 to, and generally receives, the name of aristocracy. 
 But this mixed aristocracy he carefully distinguishes 
 from the pure and ideal aristocracy of which the 
 principle is virtue alone. 
 
 The full application of Aristotelian analysis thus 
 gives a rather formidable aggregate of forms of con- 
 stitution ; and it is doubtful if the philosopher in his 
 best estate could have assigned an actual govern- 
 ment clearly and categorically to any one particular 
 class. Certainly The Politics, as we have it, is very 
 far from clear in distinguishing each from all the 
 
 1 Good birth Aristotle disregards ; for, he says, it is merely long- 
 standing wealth and virtue. i/ euyeraa eoriv dperr) Kai TrAoSros 
 ios- IV, viii, 9.
 
 76 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 rest. Polity and the mixed aristocracy are especially 
 difficult to disentangle, 1 and various shades of democ- 
 racy and oligarchy approach perplexingly near to 
 both. But there can be no doubt as to the success 
 of the philosopher in detecting the broad underlying 
 influences, historical, social and economic, through 
 which the manifold variety in political organization 
 is determined. It is his realization of the diversity 
 in these influences that leads him more or less un- 
 consciously to shift from time to time the basis of 
 his classification. 
 
 The practical significance of the distinction between 
 constitutions on the basis of principle is best revealed 
 in his refined analysis of the three elements essential 
 to every government. 2 These necessary elements 
 are : first, a deliberative organ (TO ftovXe 
 second, a system of magistracies (TO nepl ra<; 
 and, third, a judicial organ (TO SIKCIOI>). On the 
 divergencies of form and function in these three 
 elements depends the character of the various consti- 
 tutions. It is because these divergencies are practi- 
 cally infinite in number that the forms of constitution 
 shade imperceptibly from one to another of the promi- 
 nent types. In extreme and unquestionable democ- 
 racy the deliberative organ would be an assembly of 
 all the people, determining directly all questions 
 pertaining to this organ ; 8 the magistracies would be 
 
 1 Sparta is given in different places as an example of each of these 
 forms. Cf. IV, vii, 4 and ix, 6-10. 2 IV, xiv el seq. 
 
 8 Aristotle enumerates as such : peace, war and alliances ; legisla- 
 tion ; infliction of penalties in cases punishable with death, exile and
 
 FORMS OF CONSTITUTION 77 
 
 filled by lot, and all citizens would be eligible for all 
 offices; the administration of justice would be in the 
 hands of a jury court, chosen by lot from the general 
 body of citizens and exercising jurisdiction over all 
 kinds of cases. In extreme oligarchy, the delibera- 
 tive organ would be a close corporation of very 
 wealthy citizens, with unlimited powers ; the magis- 
 tracies would be based on a high property qualifica- 
 tion for eligibility ; and the jury court, with general 
 jurisdiction, would consist of a small body, elected 
 on a high property qualification. Polity would ex- 
 hibit some such combination as this : for the delibera- 
 tive organ, a body of citizens, with at most a moderate 
 property qualification, exercising jurisdiction over 
 only a part of the subjects normal to this organ ; * 
 the magistracies filled through election, either alone 
 or in combination with the lot, but with a property 
 qualification for eligibility; the administration of 
 justice divided among a number of courts and magis- 
 trates, the jurors, like the magistrates, being chosen 
 by a combination of lot and election, and with a 
 moderate property qualification. Practically, the 
 most conspicuous characteristics of the various forms 
 are conceived to be: in democracy, concentration of 
 important functions in the general body of citizens, 
 assignment of offices by lot, as the guaranty of per- 
 fect equality, and compensation for public services ; 
 in oligarchy, concentration of functions in a narrow 
 
 confiscation of property ; election of magistrates and review of their 
 official conduct. 
 
 1 The other subjects would be in charge of various magistrates.
 
 78 POLITICAL THEOKIES 
 
 body of the wealthy, assignment of offices on a 
 property qualification, and unpaid public services; in 
 polity, diffusion of functions among various organs, 
 assignment of offices by a combination of lot and 
 election. Practical or mixed aristocracy would be 
 determined by the employment of oligarchic forms, 
 subject to a primary regard for fitness, rather than 
 for wealth, in the ruling body. 
 
 6. The Best State 
 
 In approaching the question as to which form of 
 constitution is the best, the same analytical method 
 which so minutely distinguished the different varie- 
 ties is applied, with the result that no categorical 
 answer is recognized. We must consider, Aristotle 
 declares, not only what form is the best absolutely 
 (T^V dpLo-T-rjv aTrXw?), but what is the best attainable 
 by actual men and on the average (^ctXto-ra Tracrcus 
 rat? TToXecrii' dp/xo^ofcrav), and what is the best under 
 given conditions (e/c rwv vTro/cet/xeVwv). 
 
 As to the absolute or ideal state, there is no room 
 to doubt that the dominion of absolute and ideal vir- 
 tue or fitness must determine. That is, the best must 
 rule ; if one man is preeminent in excellence (aptTrj), 
 the form will be royalty; otherwise, pure aristocracy. 
 Leaving these aside and considering actual men, the 
 criterion of preference among constitutions is the 
 same as in respect to individual conduct : the mean 
 (TO /xecrov) must control. In human society extremes 
 of wealth and poverty are the main sources of evil. 
 The one brings arrogance and a lack of capacity to
 
 ARISTOTLE ON THE BEST STATE 79 
 
 obey; the other brings slavishness and a lack of 
 capacity to command. Where a population is divided 
 into the two classes of very rich and very poor, there 
 can be no real state ; for there can be no real friend- 
 ship between the classes, and friendship is the essen- 
 tial principle of all association. 1 That state, there- 
 fore, will be the best in which the middle class is 
 stronger than either or both of the extremes. In 
 such a state the influences which make for peace 
 and order will wholly prevail and stability will be 
 insured. The constitution which in all respects em- 
 bodies the principle of the mean is polity. This con- 
 stitution, therefore, must be on the average the best. 2 
 But it is not to be understood that this form, which 
 is on the average the best, is necessarily the best for 
 every people and under every set of conditions. Cir- 
 cumstances, Aristotle holds, may make any form the 
 best. The general principle here is that the element 
 which desires the existing constitution to stand shall 
 be stronger than those which desire change. In other 
 words, stability is the criterion ; and that constitu- 
 tion is best which under the circumstances will last 
 the longest. In this sense, democracy is best where 
 the poor greatly exceed the rich in numbers ; oligar- 
 chy, where the superiority of the rich in resources 
 and power more than compensates for their inferior- 
 ity in numbers ; polity, where the middle class is 
 clearly superior to all the rest. 
 
 1 ff KOLVwvia <f>i\LKOv, IV, xi, 7. 
 
 2 Mixed aristocracy is not clearly enough distinguished by Aris- 
 totle from polity to warrant giving it a preferential position. Theo- 
 retically, it would apparently stand first of the two.
 
 80 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 So far as it is possible to arrange an order of ex- 
 cellence with reference to all the various points of 
 view from which Aristotle considers the different 
 forms of government, the following 1 would convey 
 his ideas : 1, ideal royalty ; 2, pure aristocracy ; 3, 
 mixed aristocracy ; 4, polity ; 5, most moderate 
 democracy ; 6, most moderate oligarchy ; 7, the two 
 intermediate varieties of democracy and oligarchy, 
 the former having preference over the corresponding 
 grades of the latter; 8, extreme democracy; 9, ex- 
 treme oligarchy; 10, tyranny. 
 
 The plan of The Politics contemplates a detailed 
 exposition of the conditions essential to the best con- 
 stitution. It is not clear whether this feature of the 
 work was intended by Aristotle to deal primarily 
 with the best absolutely or with the best on the 
 average. 2 In his treatment of the subject there is 
 much that is abstract and idealizing, suggesting that 
 he has in mind the pure aristocracy ; there is 
 also very much of the characteristic Aristotelian 
 practicality, suggestive of the polity. But in 
 the text of The Politics, as it has come down 
 to us, the details of constitutional organization 
 are wholly lacking ; and attention is confined to 
 the determination of the most favourable external 
 conditions for the state and the most effective meth- 
 ods of character-building for the people. 3 A prelim- 
 
 1 Cf. Susemihl, note 1:305. 
 
 2 Book III, end. Here the discussion is announced in general 
 terms. The specific purpose is a moot question in the controversies 
 of the commentators as to the order of the books. 
 
 3 The best state is the subject of Bks. VII and VIII, the latter 
 being a mere fragment.
 
 ARISTOTLE ON THE BEST STATE 81 
 
 inary discussion, devoted to a nearer definition of the 
 true end of the state, develops the conclusion that 
 for the state, as for the individual, the best life lies 
 in the pursuit of virtue, rather than of power or 
 wealth. As there is nothing noble or exalted in the 
 ruling of slaves by an individual ; so there is nothing 
 noble or exalted in the exercise of despotic dominion 
 by a state. 1 Conquest, therefore, through aggressive 
 war is not to be recognized as an end to be kept 
 in view by the philosophic legislator. 2 A peaceful 
 career, devoted to self-perfection through the harmo- 
 nious and unceasing activity of all the elements of 
 political and social organization, is the true ideal, 
 and that which involves complete happiness for both 
 state and people. 
 
 The realization of this ideal depends partly upon 
 external conditions, which must be more or less 
 determined by chance, but to a far greater extent 
 upon the character and culture of the people, which 
 may be fixed through scientific legislation. Aris- 
 totle's treatment of both branches of the subject 
 strongly suggests that of Plato in The Laws. He 
 aims to present the desirable features of a city-state, 
 without exceeding the limits of the possible, and he 
 employs constantly the doctrine of the mean. The 
 size of the population and the extent of territory 
 
 1 But Aristotle recognizes the justice of non-despotic dominion, 
 '.. that which is directed to the good of the subject state rather 
 than of the master state. VII, xiv, 21. 
 
 2 In strict accordance with his theory of slavery, Aristotle inti- 
 mates that aggressive war is just when directed against those who are 
 by nature slaves. Ibid. 
 
 G
 
 82 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 must be sufficiently great to make the state self-suf- 
 ficing. But the number of people must not exceed 
 what can be well supervised (evorwoTrros) ; the com- 
 munity must be a city (77-0X15) and not a people 
 (etfvo?). 1 The city should be situated near enough 
 to the sea to procure what is necessary from abroad, 
 but not near enough unduly to stimulate commerce 
 and the seafaring class. In natural endowments the 
 population should resemble the Greeks, who combine 
 the spirit and courage of the northern races with the 
 intellectual keenness of the Asiatics. 2 The elements 
 essential to make the state self-sufficing are agricul- 
 turists, artisans, warriors, well-to-do people, priests, 
 and administrators (K/HTCU TO>V Si/ccuW /cat orvfji(f>ep6i>- 
 TCOV). Of these the first two, on principles already 
 mentioned, while in the state cannot be of it. The 
 other classes are as to personnel one. They must 
 constitute the citizens proper, must own the land (in 
 severalty, save a part owned by the state), and must 
 perform at successive periods of life the functions of 
 warriors, administrators (participants in all forms of 
 purely political life) and priests. Performing thus in 
 succession the various duties of citizenship, they will 
 
 1 " What commander," he asks, " could marshal so huge a host, or 
 what herald, save with the voice of Stentor ? " That is, the limit of 
 the number of citizens depends upon the possibility of conducting 
 a public assembly at which all should be present. VII, iv, 11. 
 
 2 The Hellenes, he observes, are in a peculiar measure fitted for 
 political life, and could, if united in a single government, rule the 
 world. (VII, vii, 2, 3 ; cf. Plato, Republic, IV, 435.) Several philoso- 
 phers since Aristotle have adopted his principle, and have applied it 
 so as to show that their own particular people, because lying south 
 of some nations and north of others, are especially qualified for
 
 ARISTOTLE ON THE BEST STATE 83 
 
 maintain that equality which is distinctive of the 
 free citizen and will round out the civic character 
 by experience in both ruling and being ruled. Sup- 
 ported by the produce of their land, they will enjoy 
 that leisure without which true virtue is impossible. 
 
 In addition to these important considerations Aris- 
 totle discusses many minor features of the internal 
 ordering of the city, and devotes particular attention 
 to the arrangements for defence against attack. His 
 ideal city is not contemplated as remote from the 
 contingencies of foreign war. The topography of 
 the site, the water supply, the arrangement of the 
 streets, all must have reference to a possible siege ; 
 and fortifications, both walls and citadel, he regards 
 as indispensable. Clinging firmly to his principle 
 that aggressive war is excluded from the purposes of 
 the ideal state, he maintains that a full provision of 
 all the latest improvements in warlike equipment 
 must be made as the surest guaranty against attack. 
 
 As to the means through which the ideal character 
 is to be developed in the citizens of the state, Aris- 
 totle finds it, as did Plato, in scientific education 
 (TraiScia). The ultimate function of the state is ped- 
 agogic. For the perfection of the community de- 
 pends upon the perfection of its constituent members, 
 and the perfection of the latter can be achieved only 
 through the cultivation of moral and intellectual 
 excellence. Hence a system of uniform, compulsory, 
 public education is the first essential of the best state, 
 and the administration of such a system is the most 
 important function of government. Aristotle's proj-
 
 84 POLITICAL THEOEIES 
 
 ect of educational legislation is of the same general 
 character as that of Plato. It aims at mental cul- 
 ture rather than practical utility, lays due stress 
 upon the physical side of the training, 1 and attaches 
 to music a moral significance and a character-making 
 influence that are quite incomprehensible to the mod- 
 ern mind. The full application of this system is to 
 begin in the case of each citizen at the age of seven. 
 But no less important to Aristotle than to Plato 
 seems governmental supervision of life from its very 
 inception. We find in The Politics provision for a 
 rigid regulation of the times and conditions of mar- 
 riage and procreation and of the care of the young. 2 
 Thus will be insured the ideal basis for the later 
 training, the finished product of which will be a 
 matured manhood of physical grace and beauty, com- 
 bined with a moral and intellectual fitness for the 
 lofty thought and noble action that are worthy of 
 the free man's leisure. 
 
 7. Revolutions 
 
 Ideally, the stability of a constitution would be in- 
 sured by the system just described. From this point 
 of view, Aristotle made no important advance over 
 Plato. Practically, however, instability and trans- 
 formation had been a most characteristic feature of 
 
 1 In connection with this, Aristotle inveighs even more strongly 
 than Plato against the undue attention given by the Spartans to 
 merely military exercises, and declares that the decline of Sparta 
 proves that the system has been a failure. 
 
 2 The physical integrity of the population is to be maintained by 
 the exposure of defective infants, and the legal limit of its size by the 
 practice of abortion. VII, xvi, 15.
 
 ARISTOTLE ON REVOLUTIONS 85 
 
 Hellenic constitutional life, and as such it afforded a 
 particularly appropriate field for the application of 
 the Aristotelian method. Plato's systematic treat- 
 ment of the subject was limited to a fanciful sketch 
 of the evolution of existing constitutions from his 
 ideal form ; l Aristotle devoted to it a whole book of 
 The Politics, embodying an enormous mass of his- 
 torical facts and a masterly exhibition of scientific 
 analysis. The general trend of development, from 
 royalty through oligarchy and tyranny to democracy, 
 was explained by Aristotle as a concomitant of social 
 and economic progress in Hellas. 2 A more specific 
 determination of the sources of constitutional trans- 
 formation was imperatively required, not only to 
 complete the system of rational political specula- 
 tion, but also to explain the chronic insurrection 
 and revolution 8 which made the reality of Hellenic 
 politics so different from the calm and orderly ex- 
 istence of the philosophic ideal. Indeed, the ideal 
 doubtless took its character largely from the aversion 
 which the violent and ignoble features of actual 
 politics inspired in the reflecting mind. 
 
 The most general cause of revolutionary move- 
 ments (o-racrts) Aristotle finds to be the craving of 
 men for equality. As already noticed, equality has 
 
 1 Supra, p. 33. Aristotle's criticism of this part of Plato's work 
 is unmerciful, and also to a considerable degree unfair. Politics, V, 
 xii, 7-18. Cf. Jowett's notes ad loc. 
 
 2 Cf. Ill, xv, 11-13 ; IV, xiii, 9-12. 
 
 8 The political history of Hellas during the two centuries preced- 
 ing the Macedonian conquest was, from this standpoint, not unlika 
 the history of Latin America since 1800.
 
 86 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 a double character absolute and proportional. The 
 masses are ever seeking for absolute equality for 
 the same privileges and power that are possessed by 
 the few ; the few strive for proportionate equality 
 for a superiority in privilege and power corresponding 
 to their superior wealth or ability or birth. 1 By 
 this one broad principle, thus, may be explained the 
 manifold phenomena of the conflicts for the estab- 
 lishment of monarchy, aristocracy, oligarchy and 
 democracy. Of the particular causes which are 
 operative in revolutions the philosopher enumerates 
 a large number, grouping them according as they lie 
 more in the sphere of human passions (jealousy, arro- 
 gance, fear, etc.) or in that of impersonal facts. His 
 remarks under the latter head exhibit his insight at 
 its best, tracing, as he does, political transformation 
 to obscure social and economic sources. 2 Particular 
 stress is laid upon the fact that the causes of revolu- 
 tions are to be regarded as quite distinct from the 
 occasions. The latter may be, and often are, inci- 
 dents of trifling character; the former are always 
 profound. Thus the private quarrel of Harmodius 
 and Aristogiton with the Pisistratidse, while undoubt- 
 edly the occasion, was by no means the cause of the 
 downfall of the tyranny at Athens. 
 
 These doctrines as to the causes of revolutions are 
 applied by Aristotle to each of the special forms of 
 
 1 But noble birth, he explains again, signifies merely inherited 
 wealth and virtue. Cf. supra, p. 75, note. 
 
 3 V, iii. For example, he notes how an oligarchy based on a prop 
 erty qualification may be converted into democracy by a mere rise in 
 values. Cf. V, vi, 17.
 
 AKISTOTLE ON REVOLUTIONS 87 
 
 constitution. Democracy, oligarchy, polity and aris- 
 tocracy are subjected in turn to a searching examina- 
 tion, through which the manner of their undoing is 
 laid bare. 1 This investigation duly sets forth the 
 influences which produced the broad trend of gov- 
 ernment from monarchy to democracy, but at the 
 same time explains all the manifold deviations from 
 this general order. Democracy has not always been 
 the last term of the series, but has often passed into 
 oligarchy and tyranny. For both these transforma- 
 tions the demagogues have been responsible. In the 
 early days the fighting demagogue, by posing as the 
 friend of the people, made himself tyrant; in later 
 days the talking demagogue, ever assailing the rich, 
 drives them to oligarchic revolution in self-defence. 
 More common, however, is the transformation of 
 democracy from the more moderate to the extremest 
 variety, through the conviction impressed by the 
 demagogues upon the masses that the people are 
 above even the law. Oligarchy, Aristotle finds, falls 
 chiefly through dissensions and ambitions in the 
 privileged classes themselves. Where the rulers 
 are harmonious, he says, an oligarchy is not easily 
 overturned. But this form of constitution may, like 
 democracy, be transmuted, not into a wholly distinct 
 form, but into another variety of itself; and this 
 often happens. As to the mixed constitutions, aris- 
 
 1 This investigation is an almost perfect example of the applica- 
 tion of the historical method in political science. The facts adduced 
 by Aristotle as the basis of his reasoning constitute a valuable body 
 of sources for Greek history, and at the same time throw a rather 
 lurid light on Hellenic politics.
 
 88 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 tocracy and polity, revolutions may most often be 
 traced to an inexact adjustment of the different 
 principles which are combined in them. Aristoc- 
 racy tends to become oligarchy, through the undue 
 encroachment of the richer classes ; polity to become 
 democracy, through the undue aspiration of the 
 poorer classes. Stability can be maintained only 
 by proportionate equality and by giving to each 
 his own. It is in these mixed constitutions in par- 
 ticular that transformations are apt to take place 
 unnoticed, through the imperceptible modification of 
 social and economic conditions. 
 
 Aristotle follows up his elaborate array of the causes 
 that produce revolutions by an equally impressive 
 array of means for preventing them. 1 The character 
 of the particular causes suggests at once the character 
 of the corresponding remedies. In the mixed consti- 
 tutions especial care must be taken to detect the 
 obscure beginnings of new conditions making for polit- 
 ical change. In aristocracy and oligarchy the inferior 
 classes must be well treated, and the principles of 
 democratic equality must be strictly applied among 
 the privileged classes. 2 The body of citizens inter- 
 ested in political stability must often be roused by 
 the cry that the constitution is in danger. 3 No single 
 man should be permitted to attain to power either 
 suddenly or in a disproportionate degree. "Men," the 
 philosopher reflects, " are easily spoiled, and not every 
 
 1 V, viii. 
 
 2 E.g. offices must be held for short terms, so that all may partici- 
 pate in them. 8 V, viii, 8.
 
 ARISTOTLE ON REVOLUTIONS 89 
 
 one can bear prosperity." Access to positions of 
 power should be made gradual and slow, and undue 
 influence on the part of any individual should be met, 
 if necessary, by ostracism. In every state, further, 
 the utmost care should be taken to exclude the officers 
 from all opportunity of pecuniary gain. Especially 
 important is this in oligarchy ; for while the masses 
 may be contented to leave political office to others 
 and devote themselves to money-making, they will 
 always resent being excluded from positions that bring 
 not only honour but also profit. The surest way to 
 satisfy both the classes and the masses is to throw the 
 offices open to all, but without salaries. This will in- 
 sure in practice the manning of the offices chiefly by 
 the well-to-do. But every care must be taken, through 
 public statements as to the condition and conduct of 
 the finances, to inspire confidence that the treasury is 
 not being exploited by the officials. It is desirable, 
 moreover, that no class should have a monopoly of the 
 offices. In oligarchy the poor, and in democracy the 
 rich, should be encouraged to share in those adminis- 
 trative functions which do not affect the sovereign 
 power. 1 This corresponds to the broad dictate of good 
 policy, not to push to extremes the principle of any 
 particular form. Extremes provoke resistance ; the 
 
 1 The qualities demanded by Aristotle in those who fill the supreme 
 offices of the state are strikingly suggestive of Jefferson's triad of test 
 questions. Aristotle enumerates : " (1) loyalty to the established con- 
 stitution; (2) the greatest administrative capacity; (3) virtue and 
 justice proper to each form of government." Jefferson asked : " la 
 he honest? Is he capable? Is he faithful to the constitution?" 
 The Politics, V, ix, 1 ; Jefferson's Works (1854), IV, 405.
 
 90 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 mean should be observed ; for, whatever element may 
 rule, all the other elements are valuable to the state. 
 Finally, the most efficient of means for the preserva- 
 tion of the state from revolution is that which is in 
 general the least considered a system of education 
 in the spirit of the constitution. Legislation is likely 
 to avail little unless the youth of the city are trained 
 to appreciate what is truly essential to the mainte- 
 nance of their particular system. But this does not 
 mean that oligarchic training is to involve merely 
 what is agreeable to the wealthy, and democratic 
 training what is agreeable to the masses. That would 
 only emphasize the evils which already exist. For in 
 oligarchies the aristocratic youth pass their time in 
 idleness and profligacy, while the masses are left to 
 toil and plot rebellion ; and in democracies distorted 
 notions of liberty and equality lead to license and to 
 the overthrow of all constitutional restraint. 1 
 
 Aristotle's discussion of the monarchic constitutions 
 is particularly noteworthy for his finished exposition 
 of tyranny as an art. Royalty, as a practical insti- 
 tution, is in his eyes only a more or less interesting 
 survival from archaic times and conditions. It was 
 essentially the unchecked rule of a supereminent 
 individual or family over willing subjects. But with 
 general enlightenment the preeminence of any one 
 man has become impossible, and the passing of roy- 
 alty cannot be prevented ; for when the subjects cease 
 to yield the monarch willing obedience, whatever abso- 
 lute power he retains must rest on force, and he is 
 
 1 V, ix, 15.
 
 ARISTOTLE ON TYRANNY 91 
 
 therefore no king, but a tyrant ; and if, on the other 
 hand, he submits to limitations on his power, he may 
 remain king in name, but is no longer a monarch in 
 fact. As distinct from royalty, tyranny is to Aristotle 
 a political phenomenon sufficiently modern to demand 
 the same scientific consideration as actual constitu- 
 tions. 1 Of all the species of government it is as a 
 rule the least permanent ; therefore the causes which 
 lead to its downfall require special attention. In 
 general these causes are the same as those which 
 operate in the extremest varieties of democracy 
 and oligarchy. The inherent likeness of these 
 forms to tyranny is, in fact, the theme of reiter- 
 ated comment by Aristotle. 2 
 
 To counteract the influences working against him 
 and to maintain his power, the tyrant has, the phi- 
 losopher points out, the choice between two dia- 
 metrically opposite policies. That most commonly 
 adopted is one of ruthless and unqualified repression: 
 the best citizens are slain or banished; whatever 
 makes for a noble and exalted life among the people 
 is suppressed ; association for intellectual or social 
 purposes is forbidden ; espionage renders dangerous 
 all freedom of intercourse ; vast enterprises, whether 
 of peace 3 or of war, are devised to keep the people 
 
 1 Tyranny was not a TroAtTeui in the Aristotelian sense of the term. 
 IV, viii, 2. 
 
 2 E.g. " The people likes to be a monarch. Wherefore, the para- 
 site is esteemed by both, . . . for the demagogue is the parasite of 
 the people." V, xi, 12. 
 
 3 Aristotle cites the Egyptian Pyramids, among other examples of 
 this.
 
 92 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 occupied and poor; and the tyrant himself, sur- 
 rounded by a servile crowd of foreigners, lives a life 
 of undisguised luxury and selfishness. The more 
 rare, but in Aristotle's opinion the more effective, 
 policy is that according to which the tyrant keeps a 
 firm hold on the essence of power, but disguises the 
 reality of the tyranny by the semblance, at least, of 
 beneficent rule. The administration is ostentatiously 
 economical ; the public interest is made a subject of 
 the ruler's grave concern ; those who come in contact 
 with him are inspired with respect, rather than with 
 fear ; he patronizes genius, shows constant respect for 
 the things of religion and avoids all public displays 
 of sensuality or luxury. It is essential to this policy, 
 however, that the tyrant shall win a reputation for 
 at least the military virtues ; that he shall select his 
 subordinates from men of plodding, rather than enter- 
 prising character; and that, while inspiring the rich 
 and the poor with distrust of each other and confi- 
 dence in him, he shall, when choice must be made 
 between them, side always with the stronger. 1 In 
 short, the characteristics of monarchic rule of this 
 kind are that it be rather paternal than despotic, that 
 it be based on moderation rather than excess, and 
 that it be popular winning the classes by friend- 
 ship and the masses by the arts of the demagogue. 
 On such principles the tyrant's rule will be better for 
 
 1 Another and very famous dictate of policy suggested by Aristotle 
 is, that all the rewards and honours of state should be bestowed by 
 the ruler in person, while the punishments and disgraces should flow 
 through other channels. V, xi, 26.
 
 THE HELLENIC IN ARISTOTLE 93 
 
 the subjects, will be more lasting, and will tend to 
 have a beneficial influence on the character of the 
 ruler himself. 
 
 8. The Hellenic and the Universal in Aristotle 
 
 The foregoing sketch of Aristotle's work should at 
 least suggest the importance of the purely Hellenic 
 elements in his political philosophy. His historical 
 research went far beyond the confines of Hellas, but 
 the system which he framed was determined in its 
 most essential characteristics by the conditions that 
 prevailed within those confines. The postulates of 
 his thought, as of Plato's, were : the general superi- 
 ority of the Greeks over other races ; the inherent 
 necessity and justice of slavery as the basis of social 
 organization ; the typical character of the city-state 
 in political organization ; the incompatibility of bread- 
 winning pursuits with the moral and intellectual 
 attributes of good citizenship; the supreme impor- 
 tance of state-directed education and training in the 
 maintenance of political virtue ; and, finally, the sub- 
 ordination of all personal motives and conduct to 
 the dictates of law conceived either as the purely 
 impersonal and more or less mystic product of divine 
 or natural forces, or as the formulated wisdom of 
 some individual of almost superhuman sagacity. 1 
 In the course of the ages most of these ideas either 
 
 1 Aristotle, while ascribing law in general to the slow working of 
 custom, manifests at times the influence of the common Hellenic idea v 
 that a perfect code may be, as it has been, projected into operation 
 by an all-wise legislator.
 
 94 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 have passed entirely out of consideration or have 
 been so modified as to lose the significance which 
 Aristotle attached to them. But when we look fur- 
 ther into his philosophy, beneath the general outlines 
 determined by these Hellenic dogmas, we find a long 
 series of principles which are as ultimate as human 
 nature itself, and which, in almost the exact shape 
 in which Aristotle formulated them, are features of 
 political science at the present day. 
 
 Prominent among these is the distinct and unequivo- 
 cal conception of the ultimate problem of politics 
 the reconciliation of liberty and authority. The 
 primary fact of the state he represents to be the dis- 
 tinction between rulers and ruled. That is, political 
 organization is inconceivable without the submission 
 of one human will to another. The anarchist's con- 
 ception of liberty and equality, incompatible with this 
 doctrine, is denounced by Aristotle. Describing the 
 tendencies of extreme democracy, he says : 
 
 Equality is held to signify the rule of the majority, and 
 liberty and equality to mean that each may do as he will. 
 Hence, in democracies each follows his own inclinations. But 
 this is evil. For life in subjection to the constitution is not to 
 be regarded as slavery, but as the highest welfare. 1 
 
 This view as to the relation between the individual 
 and the state is duly supplemented by the doctrine as 
 to the qualifications under which the personal author- 
 ity in government is manifested. The most charac- 
 teristic function of the officer is, indeed, declared to 
 be the issuing of orders. 2 But above the officer he 
 
 V,ix, 15. *IV, XT, 4.
 
 THE UNIVERSAL IN AEISTOTLE 95 
 
 insists must be the impersonal factors in the consti- 
 tution namely, public opinion and customary law. 
 The latter force he describes with perfect clearness ; 
 the former, though less distinctly defined, is undoubt- 
 edly what he has in view in ascribing to the people as 
 a whole the function of final judgment on official con- 
 duct and in defending the thesis that the opinion of 
 the mass is preferable to that of the expert. 1 
 
 In respect to the ultimate idea of sovereignty Aris- 
 totle discerns, rather than adopts, the theories of 
 modern times. He realizes the importance of a de- 
 terminate human superior, whose undoubted will is 
 final ; but he recurs again to the thought of a law 
 controlling even this sovereign. He prefers that this 
 ultimate human superior should be the whole people ; 
 but he qualifies this solution, first, by limiting it to 
 a society in which the general level of virtue i.e. 
 of moral and intellectual attainment is high, and 
 second, by limiting the field of sovereign legislative 
 activity to the region not previously occupied by law. 
 Aristotle cannot, in fact, think of the sovereign as 
 essentially legislator. The normal function of the 
 supreme organ is administration ; but, almost with- 
 out being aware of it, the philosopher resigns the key 
 to his whole position by assuming that it is the duty 
 of the sovereign to legislate when on any point " the 
 law is either inadequate or improper." 1 Nothing 
 more than this was needed to justify the proceedings 
 of the popular assembly in extreme democracy, which 
 
 1 Supra, pp. 69-70. 
 
 2 *O<ra Se /u,^ Swarov TOV v6fj.ov Kpivuv r) oXws rj ev. Ill, XV, 6.
 
 96 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 Aristotle wholly abhors ; for the substitution of 
 decrees of the assembly for law would be merely a 
 judgment by the sovereign that the law was either 
 inadequate or improper. 1 
 
 The doctrine of The Politics as to the three ele- 
 ments necessary in the organization of constitutional 
 government is another example of striking insight. 
 In this case, however, the relation of his theory to 
 the modern theory of the separation of powers may 
 easily be mistaken. Aristotle distinguishes three 
 essential organs, which he designates as the delibera- 
 tive, that pertaining to the offices, and the judicial. 
 Each of these has something in common with, respec- 
 tively, the legislative, the executive and the judicial 
 departments of modern analysis. But he contem- 
 plates no such distinction in respect to functions as 
 has been made the basis of the latter. His delibera- 
 tive organ is, indeed, legislative, but only to the extent 
 indicated above that, namely, of supplementing the 
 preexisting law ; his officers are executive, but scarcely 
 more so than the deliberative organ ; and his judicial 
 organ differs from the deliberative rather in constitu- 
 tion and procedure than in function. 
 
 Finally, the permanent and universal side of Aris- 
 totle's philosophy is peculiarly illustrated by the 
 importance which he attaches to economic influences 
 in political organization and activity. From the 
 theoretical point of view the validity of private prop- 
 erty is maintained, and from the practical point of 
 view the eternal friction between those who have and 
 1 Cf. IV, iv, 31.
 
 THE UNIVERSAL IN ARISTOTLE 97 
 
 those who have not is made to explain many of the 
 most conspicuous phenomena of government. On 
 this turn his classification of forms, his adjustment 
 of administrative machinery, and, to a very large 
 extent, his explanation of revolutions. And from 
 this is derived that doctrine which has been so im- 
 pressively confirmed by later history, that stability 
 and prosperity are most to be found where extremes 
 of wealth and poverty are unknown and the middle 
 class is the strongest. 
 
 If The Laws of Plato leaves in one's mind the 
 vague but unmistakable suggestion of an Atticized 
 Sparta, The Politics of Aristotle leaves somewhat 
 more distinctly the impression of a Spartanized 
 Athens. This corresponds to the success of the 
 later philosopher in combining in his thought the 
 Hellenic and the universal. For no other Hellenic 
 state was so universal as Athens. In both things 
 material and things of the spirit she sounded the 
 depths and crowned the heights of human nature. 
 A genius peculiarly susceptible to Athenian inspira- 
 tion must necessarily be in many respects as univer- 
 sal as humanity itself. Such a genius was Aristotle's, 
 and such was the character of his philosophy. And 
 hence it is that we find, in systems so diverse as 
 those of military Rome, of the theological Middle 
 Age and of the materialistic modern era, the essential 
 features of political organization and activity expli- 
 cable, and actually explained, on the lines of the Aris- 
 totelian analysis.
 
 98 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 SELECT REFERENCES 
 
 BLAKEY, I, pp. 53-62. BRADLEY, Aristotle's Conception of 
 the State, in Hellenica, pp. 166-222. BURNET, Ethics of Aris- 
 totle, introduction and text. CONGREVE, The Politics of 
 Aristotle, introduction. COPE, Introduction to Aristotle's 
 Khetoric, pp. 239-244 (Aristotle's idea of the law of 
 nature). DAVIDSON, Aristotle and Ancient Educational 
 Ideals, pp. 151-235. GRANT, the Ethics of Aristotle, essays 
 and text. HENKEL, Geschiclite der griechischen Lehre vom 
 Staat, pp. 74-97. HILDENBRAND, pp. 250-487. JACKSON, 
 The Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics. JANET, I, 
 191-232. JOWETT, The Politics of Aristotle, introduction, 
 trans, and notes. LANG, The Politics of Aristotle, introductory 
 essays. Loos, Politics of Aristotle and the Eepublic of Plato. 
 MAHAFFY, Classical Greek Literature, II, 414-427, 424 
 et seq. NEWMAN, The Politics of Aristotle, Vol. I (introduc- 
 tion). ONCKEN, Die Staatslehre des Aristoteles. PETERS, The 
 Nicomachean Ethics, trans. RAUMER, Die Begriffe von Recht, 
 Staat und Politik, pp. 16-21. HITTER, Geschiclite der Philo- 
 sophic, Bd. Ill, pp. 301-405 (trans. Ill, 259-340). SAINT- 
 HILAIRE, Politique d' Aristote, preface. SUSEMIHL, Aristoteles 
 Politik (1879). SUSEMIHL and HICKS, The Politics of Aristotle, 
 introduction and text. TEICHMFLLER, Die aristotelische Ein- 
 iheilung der Verfassungsformen. THUROT, Etudes sur Aristote. 
 VAN DER REST, Platon et Aristote, pp. 345-598. WELLDON, 
 English trans, of the Politics, with notes. WHIBLEY, Greek 
 Oligarchies, chaps, i, ii and iv, 28, 29 and 30. WILAMO- 
 wiTz-MoELLENDORFF, Aristoteles und Athen, I, 39 et seq., 
 II, 363 et seq. ZELLER, Die Philosophic der Griechen, Bd. II, ii, 
 pp. 672-754 (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, trans., 
 Vol. II, chaps, xii and xiii).
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 POLITICAL THE OK Y OP LATER GREECE AND OF ROME 
 
 1. Political Extinction of Hellas 
 
 WHEN Aristotle died, 322 B.C., Alexander the 
 Great had already been dead a year. But though 
 the philosopher survived his former pupil, in none of 
 his works as we know them is there any sign that he 
 realized the significance of that pupil's astonishing 
 career. 1 It was indeed less easy then than it is now 
 to perceive that Hellas was politically extinct, and 
 that the conditions which determined the character 
 of Plato's and Aristotle's philosophy were to be 
 henceforth of little or no consequence in the march 
 of history. Through the conquests of Alexander and 
 the partition of his dominion among his successors, 
 the constitutional city-state was entirely overwhelmed 
 by the absolute military empire as the type of politi- 
 cal organization ; and through the fusion of races and 
 of culture that sprang from the new conditions, the 
 pure and exclusive Hellenic character was gradually 
 supplanted by the moral and intellectual type which 
 we call Hellenistic. But for centuries after the 
 
 1 Much ingenuity has been displayed by certain commentators in 
 discovering allusions to Alexander and his work in The Politics. 
 But all that have been adduced are, in fact, illusions of the critics, 
 rather than allusions of the philosopher. See, for example, Oncken, 
 Die Staatslehre des Aristoteles, Buch III, iv, passim. 
 
 99
 
 100 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 Macedonian conquest government in many of the 
 Greek cities continued to move in the forms of 
 the classical era. From time to time, moreover, 
 there arose conditions in which for a little while or 
 in some degree these forms were imbued with real 
 vitality. Especially in the Hellenic peninsula itself, 
 which pertained to the least powerful of Alexander's 
 successors, was this the case. And here developed 
 and flourished for a time a constitutional system 
 which seemed well adapted to counteract the particu- 
 laristic tendencies of the Hellenic spirit. In the 
 career of the ^Etolian and the Achaean League, the 
 principles of federal government were so developed 
 and administered as to maintain throughout central 
 Greece and the Peloponnesus for several generations 
 a large degree of autonomy. But what availed 
 against Macedon was not a match for the conquer- 
 ing power of Rome, and before the policy of this 
 latter, federation went the way that the city-state had 
 gone before. The complex constitutional organiza- 
 tion of the Achaean League became, like the Athenian 
 democracy and the Spartan oligarchy, a mere insig- 
 nificant phase of local government in the imperial 
 dominion of Rome. 
 
 The two centuries of social and political trans- 
 formation that followed the death of Alexander were 
 characterized by a steady decline in systematic politi- 
 cal speculation. The spirit of the times was little 
 favourable to philosophizing about government. In 
 the kaleidoscopic changes attending the succession to 
 Alexander's power the salient fact was the domina-
 
 POLITICAL EXTINCTION OF HELLAS 101 
 
 tion of military force, and of military force resting 
 not upon any principle of popular organization, but 
 upon mercenary service pure and simple. Empire 
 building was the order of the day, and the welding 
 of civilizations. In such a transition period political 
 philosophy is wont to lose its bearings, and to await 
 in silence the subsidence of the storm. When the 
 turmoil has ceased and a new order has become 
 established, philosophy reappears, with formulas 
 adapted to the situation, and works out a system 
 just in time to be overthrown by some new convul- 
 sion. Thus it was that from the rise of Alexander's 
 empire to the establishment of Roman dominion in 
 the East, political theory was practically dumb ; 
 Polybius and Cicero then explained the conspicuous 
 fact of the pax Romano, by a well-rounded theory, 
 which the work of Julius and Augustus promptly 
 deprived of all relation to reality. 
 
 In the lost Greek and Hellenistic literature of the 
 third and second centuries before the Christian era 
 there was doubtless much that treated of political 
 topics. 1 But that the works lacked originality and 
 influence is apparent from the character of the great 
 philosophical systems which arose and flourished dur- 
 ing that period. The schools of Plato and Aristotle 
 sank into insignificance as compared with those of 
 
 1 Cicero, De Legibus, III, 6, mentions with praise the works of 
 Heraklides Ponticus, a follower of Plato, Theophrastus, an Aristote- 
 lian, Dio the Stoic and Demetrius Phalereus. To the writings of the 
 last named, who had much experience in the government of Athens, 
 both philosophic excellence and practical value are ascribed by 
 Cicero, who then characteristically classes himaelf with Demetrius.
 
 102 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 the Stoics, the Epicureans and even the Sceptics; 
 and these three later schools, various as was their 
 doctrine in other respects, agreed in minimizing the 
 concern of philosophy with political affairs. To the 
 problems of ethics they devoted especial attention, 
 and they worked out elaborate codes of conduct 
 adapted to the promotion of right living. But while 
 Plato and Aristotle had found the key to the good 
 life in a scientifically organized state, Zeno and Epi- 
 curus found it in absolute indifference to political 
 conditions. The separation of politics from ethics 
 was carried to the extreme, and the individual, over- 
 whelmed in the state by the earlier systems, was by 
 the later set to solve the problems of life in isola- 
 tion. 1 The relation of this attitude of philosophy 
 to external conditions is obvious. Public life in the 
 Greek cities was fast losing importance. The springs 
 of political action were to be found, not in the assem- 
 bly or the council of a given city, but at the courts of 
 the Macedonian, the Syrian and the Egyptian mon- 
 archs, and in the camps of the Roman consuls. 
 Reflecting minds turned away from the considera- 
 tion of constitutional forms which had no reality, 
 and dignified the loss of political life by the theory 
 that such life was irrational. 
 
 2. Epicurean and Stoic Influences 
 
 There were, however, certain features of Epicurean 
 and Stoic doctrine that were destined to exercise 
 
 1 Cf. ZeUer, Die Philosophic der Griechen (Leipzig, 1880), Bd. 3, 
 Theil 1, s. 19.
 
 EPICUREAN INFLUENCES 103 
 
 a considerable influence on the politics and on the 
 political theory of later ages. Epicurus and his 
 followers took cognizance of society and of the 
 state, but only to emphasize the indifference of the 
 philosopher in reference to them. Social and legal 
 relations were explained as resting wholly upon indi- 
 vidual self-interest, and upon the desire of each to 
 secure himself against injury. Obedience to law, 
 it was held, is rational only so far as law promotes 
 this end. Justice has no existence in the abstract; 
 it inheres merely in some convention for mutual 
 advantage. The wise man will have no part in 
 political life unless his interests imperatively require 
 it. Such life is burdensome and incompatible with 
 the repose of spirit essential to an ideal existence. 
 
 In these views we have a line of thought which 
 had already been represented to some extent by the 
 Sophists, and which was destined to gain great celeb- 
 rity centuries later in the series of doctrines known 
 as the contract theory of the state. The practical 
 teaching of Epicureanism was that of submission to 
 any form of political authority that was attended by 
 peace and order. To the devotee of this school it was 
 a matter of total indifference whether the quiet which 
 he demanded was due to smoothly working constitu- 
 tional government or to efficient despotism. Hence 
 the Macedonian garrison was to him as good a politi- 
 cal sovereign as any other. The suitability of such 
 a philosophy to the life of Hellas after Alexander is 
 self-evident. In Rome, under Augustus, analogous 
 conditions prevailed, and there Epicurean indifferent-
 
 104 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 ism found an attractive exposition in the genial 
 exhortations of Horace. 1 
 
 The influence of Stoic doctrine on later political 
 thought and practice was of quite another character. 
 This influence developed chiefly through the theory 
 of justice and law. The Stoics conceived of nature 
 in a pantheistic sense as the embodiment of supreme 
 universal law. Justice they held to be immanent in 
 nature a form of universal reason, and therefore 
 fixed and immutable. The ideal life was the life in 
 conformity to this universal law. From the practi- 
 cal point of view such conformity was to be sought 
 through the cultivation of the human reason, pure 
 and simple. Those who through this process divested 
 themselves of all influence of the emotions and of 
 material conditions were alone worthy of imitation. 
 They alone would attain the true goal of philosophy, 
 and all such, regardless of external circumstances, 
 would be as fellow-citizens of one great republic. 
 Stoicism, in short, brought into prominence the fate- 
 ful doctrines of natural law and cosmopolitism. 
 
 The latter doctrine had, indeed, been definitely 
 enunciated by the Cynics, on whose teaching Zeno 
 founded the Stoic school. But before the work of 
 Alexander the Great had been achieved the soil was 
 not favourable for the development of such an idea. 
 When, however, the barrier between Greek and bar- 
 barian had been entirely broken down, in fact, when 
 Athenian and Thracian and Asiatic and Egyptian 
 had become actual members of one political system, 
 
 1 In Epist. I, iv, 16, the poet avows his Epicureanism.
 
 STOIC INFLUENCES 105 
 
 the value of civil and social distinctions on the basis 
 of petty race and state lines faded away, and world 
 citizenship, with all its far-reaching social corollaries 
 became an acceptable doctrine to reflecting men. In its 
 early form the idea had, of course, little practical sig- 
 nificance. The qualifications for participation in the 
 Stoic cosmopolis were as purely ideal and as absolutely 
 unattainable as those of Plato's philosopher guardi- 
 ans. To some extent, perhaps, the dogma of world 
 citizenship embodied the reaction of intellect against 
 physical force : excluded by the reign of violence from 
 influence in the actual political life of the day, phi- 
 losophy conceived a republic in which reason and 
 intelligence should have their own. In this sense 
 cosmopolitism was wholly aristocratic. But the ethi- 
 cal doctrine of the Stoics tended always to take a 
 practical form ; and hence the democratic interpreta- 
 tion of world citizenship made great progress in the 
 discussion of social duty. Cosmopolitism, in fact, 
 expanded into humanitarianism. The dignity which 
 at first was ascribed exclusively to men of especially 
 exalted intelligence came to be ascribed, in theory 
 at least, to all who possessed human nature. Such 
 a tendency could not but produce very important 
 results in a society based upon the institution of 
 slavery. 
 
 It was under the sway of the Roman state that 
 political and social conditions came to correspond 
 most clearly to the Stoic ideals. Universal law and 
 universal citizenship became practical facts. Pri- 
 marily these results were due to the military and
 
 106 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 administrative genius of the Romans, and were not in 
 the least determined by abstract philosophy. In the 
 constructive work of the Republic, Stoicism played no 
 part. Its doctrines found a home only in the spirit of 
 men like Cato the Younger, Cicero and Brutus, whose 
 ideas were as impotent in the presence of Cassar as 
 Aristotle's had been in the presence of Alexander. 
 But in the social adjustment during the stable days 
 of the Principate, Stoic doctrines exercised a positive 
 and far-reaching influence. Preached by Seneca, the 
 chief minister of state, and Marcus Aurelius, the 
 emperor, the universal brotherhood of man necessa- 
 rily became something more than a sterile abstrac- 
 tion ; and the conception of a law of nature and a 
 principle of justice common to all men, became pro- 
 lific in practical fruit when accepted and developed 
 by Papinian, Paul and Ulpian, who were succes- 
 sively chief justices of the Empire, and whose opinions 
 had the force of law throughout the civilized world. 
 Christianity took over and adapted these doctrines, 
 that were represented both in theory and in fact in 
 the Roman Empire, and transmitted them, with the 
 profoundest results, to modern times. 
 
 3. Tlie Constitutional Development of Rome 
 
 The contribution of Rome to the literature of po- 
 litical theory was very slight, and its influence is in 
 no way comparable to that exerted on later philoso- 
 phy by her actual institutions. For this reason, as 
 well as for a better understanding of the little con- 
 temporary theory that did appear, some consideration
 
 THE ROMAN CONSTITUTION 107 
 
 must be devoted to the governmental organization 
 through which her power was developed and main- 
 tained. 
 
 Rome made her appearance in history as a 
 monarchic city-state. As a republican city-state she 
 achieved her greatness ; but in her decline she was 
 in the fullest sense imperial and despotic. The royal 
 period lasted from prehistoric times to about 500 B.C. 
 The governmental organs were an elective king, with 
 ultimate civil and military authority; an advisory 
 council called the senate ; and an assembly, the 
 comitia curiata, whose chief function was the election 
 of the king, and the formal bestowal of supreme 
 and lifelong authority upon him. Political rights 
 pertained to only part of the population, known as 
 patricians ; the remaining part, which before the end 
 of the royal period had become the larger, was known 
 as the plebs. The pressure of this latter element for 
 some share in the government became strong under 
 the later kings, and resulted in the organization of a 
 new assembly, the comitia centuriata, in which plebs 
 as well as patricians had a part. The purely patri- 
 cian assembly, the comitia curiata, continued to exist. 
 
 In 510 B.C. Tarquinius Superbus was expelled from 
 the state, and the Republican era began. For two 
 centuries Rome's constitutional development turned 
 chiefly upon the conflict between patricians and 
 plebeians for control of the government. The ulti- 
 mate result was the amalgamation of the two classes 
 in a single body of Roman citizens enjoying entire 
 equality in political as well as in civil rights. Before
 
 108 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 this end was achieved, however, great changes were 
 effected in the governmental organization. Upon the 
 destruction of royalty, the power of the king, both 
 civil and military, was vested in two annually elected 
 officers called consuls. To the consulship only patri- 
 cians were eligible, though the election was by the 
 comitia centuriata. 1 In the course of time other patri- 
 cian magistracies were established to share with the 
 consuls the governmental power. The prsetors took 
 over much of the judicial administration, and the 
 censors were clothed with the extensive authority 
 incidental to the census and lustration. For great 
 emergencies the dictatorship also played for a time 
 a prominent part in the constitutional system. Ple- 
 beian policy was directed steadily to the attainment 
 of eligibility to these magistracies, but at the same 
 time the whole plebeian body developed an exclusive 
 organization of its own, side by side with that of 
 the other order. An assembly, the concilium plebis, 
 adopted resolutions (plebis scita) which were recog- 
 nized by its members as binding, and elected officers 
 to conduct business under its direction. The chief 
 of these officers was the tribune (tribunus plebis), 
 in whom was recognized from the outset the right 
 to intervene on behalf of the plebeians in the pro- 
 cedure of the patrician government, and to interpose 
 an effective veto upon any consular act. Ultimately 
 the plebeians attained the right to fill the great 
 patrician magistracies, and the tribunate thus lost its 
 
 1 At the outset this assembly was so organized, on the basis of 
 wealth, that the patrician element was assured the controlling power.
 
 THE KOMAN CONSTITUTION 109 
 
 primary significance. But the office remained, and, 
 with the great powers which had become attached to 
 it during the conflict of the orders, it played a most 
 important part throughout the later history of the 
 constitution. 
 
 With the amalgamation of the orders the plebeian 
 assembly developed also into a feature of the regular 
 constitution. When the distinction between patrician 
 and plebeian vanished, the concilium plebis became 
 the comitia tributa, which was, in the later days of 
 the Republic, the most familiar law-making organ 
 of the state. The comitia centuriata still remained 
 the organ for the election of consuls; it also held 
 them responsible for their conduct in office, acted as 
 ultimate court of appeal in criminal procedure, and 
 retained its original power to pass finally upon the 
 questions of peace and war. The old comitia curiata 
 gradually lost significance during the Republican 
 period, and endured as a mere form in the transac- 
 tion of unimportant religious business. The senate, 
 on the other hand, continued to play a large part 
 in the operations of the government. Originally a 
 stronghold of the patricians, it retained to the end 
 an aristocratic character. After the amalgamation 
 of the orders its membership became limited practi- 
 cally to those persons who had held the great magis- 
 tracies, and it thus embraced the most eminent and 
 experienced politicians of the Republic. In theory its 
 function was merely advisory ; its resolutions (sena- 
 tus consulta) lacked the technical character of law 
 (lex) which inhered only in acts sanctioned in the
 
 110 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 assemblies by the Populus Romanus. But certain 
 departments of governmental business came to be 
 controlled so exclusively by the senate that it was 
 practically coordinate with the popular bodies. This 
 was particularly the case after Roman dominion had 
 been widely extended. Relations with foreign na- 
 tions and with the subjects and allies of Rome were 
 almost exclusively in the hands of the senate ; and 
 the same was true of the state finances and the regu- 
 lation of social and political privileges. 
 
 During the two centuries of internal stress the 
 Roman Republic maintained with difficulty its exist- 
 ence as against foreign foes. With the definite 
 conclusion of the struggle between patricians and 
 plebeians its aggressive career began. The problem 
 of dealing with the peoples that fell one after another 
 under Roman dominion was, from the legal and 
 political point of view, well solved. 1 The development 
 began with the subjection of the neighbouring Latin 
 and Italian states. To such of these as were recog- 
 nized as allies (socw), practically complete autonomy 
 in local government was permitted. Where this was 
 not expedient, local political rights were vested in a 
 colony of citizens sent out from Rome, or in a single 
 official called a prefect. The greatest burden of the 
 subject peoples was the obligation to military service 
 in the armies of Rome, but this burden rested upon 
 
 1 The evils which distressed the conquered peoples and eventually 
 revolutionized Rome were due to the reaction of conquest upon the 
 moral character of the conquerors, rather than to any inherent vicious- 
 ness in the provincial system.
 
 THE ROMAN CONSTITUTION 111 
 
 Roman citizens as well. Participation in the govern- 
 ment at Rome was of course limited to the latter ; 
 but a qualified citizenship known as the ius Latii was 
 enjoyed by many of the allies, and, after an agitation 
 that culminated in a serious revolt, practically all the 
 peoples south of the Po were, in 90 B.C., admitted to 
 full citizenship. This insured to the Italians certain 
 nominal guarantees of rights of life and property 
 from which they had been excluded before, and 
 which, in the progressive corruption of Roman 
 administration, had become apparently very desirable. 
 But the demoralization of the assemblies at Rome by 
 the enormous increase in the number of their mem- 
 bers justified the reluctance with which the concession 
 of citizenship was made. 
 
 Beyond the Italian peninsula the normal type of 
 administration over conquered peoples was the pro- 
 vincial. Supreme civil and political power in each 
 province was vested in a magistrate despatched from 
 Rome and known in later times as proconsul or pro- 
 praetor. During the Republican period Roman citi- 
 zenship was not extended to the provincials, and the 
 only guarantee against maladministration was the 
 possibility of impeaching the magistrate at Rome upon 
 the expiration of his term of office. When abuse of 
 power in the provinces became flagrant and notori- 
 ous, the social and political conditions at Rome were 
 such as to render this procedure wholly worthless, 
 and until after the Republic fell the condition of the 
 subject regions was generally deplorable. 
 
 After the work of Julius Caesar the Roman state
 
 112 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 was essentially a military despotism. Till about 
 300 A.D., however, a considerable influence of ancient 
 forms persisted and the monarchic character of the 
 government was more or less disguised by the admin- 
 istrative activity of the senate. The transformation 
 of the Republican constitution effected by Julius and 
 Augustus consisted primarily in concentrating in 
 a single individual, for his lifetime, the magisterial 
 powers which had previously been diffused. The 
 tribunician and the proconsular authority alone 
 were sufficient to make Augustus and his succes- 
 sors supreme in Italy and the provinces respectively ; 
 but the functions of consul and censor were also 
 assumed from time to time by the princes, with prec- 
 edence over their colleagues in these offices. The 
 senate, under the new system, remained an important 
 factor in the government, and its resolutions (senatus 
 consultd) became the normal form of legislation. But 
 the imperator, as princeps senatus, exercised an impor- 
 tant if not a decisive influence in determining its 
 membership, and his proposition (oratio) was the 
 usual source of important projects of law. The 
 popular assemblies gradually ceased to have any 
 significance. The last remnants of criminal jurisdic- 
 tion were taken from them by Augustus ; the elec- 
 tion of officers since Julius a mere form, carried 
 out at the dictation of the prince was transferred 
 to the senate by Tiberius; and the ancient forms of 
 legislation, through which the Roman people in the 
 tribes or centuries for a time registered the will of 
 the prince, ceased to be regarded by 100 A.D.
 
 THE BOMAN CONSTITUTION 118 
 
 With the wide-reaching administrative reform 
 effected by Diocletian and Constantine (circ. 300 
 A.D.) the connection with ancient ideas was to a great 
 extent definitely dropped. The fiction that the mon- 
 arch received his power from the Eoman people, 
 which the lawyers, at least, always maintained, was 
 obscured by the theory that the imperial authority 
 descended from heaven. In pagan times this idea 
 had been cultivated by the attribution of a divine 
 character to the monarch, and by his worship as a 
 god. When Christianity became the state religion, 
 this system was modified by regarding only the 
 power and not the person of the emperor as par- 
 taking of divinity. He ruled, it was held, by virtue 
 of God's will, and from him authority descended to 
 all the officials of the state. Long before this develop- 
 ment was completed at the apex of the system, the 
 gradual extension of Roman citizenship to the pro- 
 vincials (completed by Caracalla at the end of the 
 second century) had dissipated the vestiges of the 
 city-state at the base. Practically the unification of 
 citizenship throughout the state meant nothing at 
 this time but uniformity in the manner of subjection 
 to the monarch's will. But as a confirmation of the 
 theories of cosmopolitism and universal law, it had 
 an influence that has affected political philosophy 
 to the present day. 
 
 4. Polybius 
 
 The political sagacity of the Roman people is 
 abundantly attested, not only by the authentic his-
 
 114 POLITICAL THEOKIES 
 
 tory, but also by the treasured traditions, of their 
 institutional development. In perfecting the system 
 under which the Republic flourished, they manifested 
 not only an exceptional military genius, which pre- 
 served their independence and extended their domin- 
 ion, but also a remarkable sense of legal and consti- 
 tutional expediency, which struck out a line of well- 
 regulated conservative progress in their internal 
 policy. Of broad speculation on political subjects, 
 however, we have no evidence in the early days. 
 No more in political than in other philosophy was 
 the Roman character adapted to make its mark, 
 and the general attitude of the early Roman mind 
 toward the refinements of intellectual culture is 
 doubtless very well reflected in the procedure of Cato 
 the Censor, when he unceremoniously bundled the 
 Greek philosophers out of the city. Rome was the 
 strongest power in the world before any analysis of 
 its government was attempted, and the beginning in 
 this direction had to be made by a Greek. Polybius, 
 held in Italy as a hostage of the Achaean League 
 for sixteen years (167-151 B.C.), became intimately 
 acquainted with the Roman constitution and the 
 Roman statesmen of the day, and utilized his oppor- 
 tunities in writing the history of the great Republic. 
 Incidentally to his narrative he paused to discover 
 the essential principles of the system of government 
 at Rome, in order to account thus for the dizzy 
 height of power to which she had risen. 1 The result 
 
 1 This excursus constitutes the major part of Bk. VI of his history 
 as it has come down to us.
 
 POLYBIUS 115 
 
 of his investigation has had an important influence 
 on later political theory. 
 
 Polybius premises the classification of governments 
 set forth by Plato and Aristotle, and describes a 
 normal cycle in which these different systems suc- 
 ceed one another in history. The starting-point is a 
 condition in which the arts of civilization and the 
 habits of social life are unknown. Such a condi- 
 tion, he thinks, is bound to recur from time to time, 
 as the result of flood, famine, pestilence or other such 
 calamity, by which the human race is reduced to a 
 small and brutish remnant. These few, associating 
 with one another by force of instinct, submit like 
 other animals to the guidance of the strongest and 
 boldest ; and thus originates the earliest form of 
 government monarchy based on force. With the 
 development of reason and the teaching of experi- 
 ence, the ideas of justice and duty assume prominence, 
 and monarchic power comes to be regarded as based 
 upon morality. Thus the natural despotism is trans- 
 formed into royalty, and the monarch is properly 
 called king. When the king ceases to regard justice 
 and morality, he becomes a tyrant, and is supplanted 
 in power by the virtuous leaders of the people, con- 
 stituting aristocracy. This form in turn degenerates 
 into oligarchy the unjust and immoral rule of the 
 few. Out of this arises democracy, which in its turn 
 degenerates into ochlocracy, or mob rule pure and 
 simple. The violence and excesses of the mob lead 
 ultimately to the rise of a new despot, ruling by 
 force, and the cycle begins its course once more.
 
 116 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 Each of the three primary forms of government 
 thus contains within itself the germs of its decay 
 and ruin. To avoid the successive transformations 
 which this fact makes inevitable, it is essential to 
 combine in a constitution all the various forms, that 
 each may counteract the subversive tendencies of 
 the others. This method of insuring stability Polyb- 
 ius finds to have been characteristic of the Spartan 
 system, and this he proceeds to exhibit as the main- 
 spring of Roman greatness. But in the case of 
 Sparta he attributes the employment of the principle 
 to the genius and foresight of Lycurgus, who solved 
 the problem of stability by sheer force of reason. 
 The Romans, on the other hand, have reached, he 
 thinks, the same result by gradually adapting their 
 system to the lessons taught them by many difficul- 
 ties and by great disasters. 
 
 In the Roman constitution, he points out, are to 
 be found three organs, embodying respectively the 
 principles of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. 
 In the consuls is monarchic power, the senate is 
 essentially aristocratic, and the popular assemblies 
 are clearly democratic. But in the working of the 
 governmental machine the check and balance of 
 the various elements is obvious. The quintessence 
 of the consul's authority is his absolute military 
 power without the city ; but the senate controls the 
 supplies for his armies, determines whether or not 
 he shall retain command at the expiration of his 
 term of office, and decrees or withholds the triumph, 
 which is the utmost goal of his ambition ; while the
 
 POLYBIUS 117 
 
 comitia may hold him to account for his conduct, 
 and may always, by its control over the questions 
 of peace and war, effectively obstruct his military 
 career. The senate has extensive administrative 
 powers in the finances and in transactions with 
 allies and foreign nations; but the popular assem- 
 blies can by law restrict the general authority of 
 the senate, and any single resolution, or even the 
 very assembling of that body, can be prevented by 
 the simple veto of the people's especial representa- 
 tive, the tribune. Finally, the assemblies are sub- 
 ject to a restraint on their activity, first, because 
 the senate controls all contracts for public works 
 throughout Italy in which very large numbers of 
 the people are interested financially, and from the 
 senators are drawn the juries in most lawsuits ; and 
 second, by the fact that every citizen is likely to 
 come sooner or later, as a soldier, under the absolute 
 power of the consul. Hence arises an indisposition 
 to reckless opposition to the projects and authority 
 of the senate and the consuls, for fear of reprisals. 
 
 This analysis of the Roman system falls a little 
 short of perfect symmetry, 1 and might be questioned 
 on some points of fact. It is interesting in the 
 history of theory as the first formal exposition of 
 the principle of check and balance in constitutional 
 organization. Both Plato and Aristotle had ap- 
 proved the combination in one system of the prin- 
 ciples peculiar to the various simple forms. 2 But 
 
 1 No check of the senate by the consuls is mentioned ; but the text 
 contains many gaps. 2 Supra, pp. 39-40, 75, 79.
 
 118 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 their suggestions look to the employment of these 
 principles in the constitution and operation of organs 
 which should express but a single concrete form. 
 Thus Aristotle's polity is in essence a democracy, 
 though the part played by the sovereign people is 
 regulated by aristocratic methods, such as election 
 rather than lot in the choice of officers. Polybius, 
 on the other hand, conceives of a mixed constitution 
 as expressed in the existence of three organs, em- 
 bodying each a distinct principle and acting through 
 self-interest as restraints upon one another. In the 
 earlier philosophers the instability incident to a sim- 
 ple form was to be obviated by a blending of prin- 
 ciples ; in Polybius the same end was sought by a 
 reciprocal antagonism of organs. Both devices have 
 been recognized in theory and in practice in all later 
 ages, but it is the latter, rather than the former, 
 that has the greater affinity with the modern notion 
 of check and balance among the three departments 
 of government. 
 
 5. Cicero 
 
 The work was hardly finished wherein Polybius so 
 wisely determined the principles which insured the 
 stability of the Kornan constitution when the agita- 
 tion of the Gracchi inaugurated the turbulent era 
 which ended in its destruction. The check and bal- 
 ance system works through deadlock between the 
 different organs. In normal conditions the deadlock 
 is broken by mutual concession and compromise ; 
 but in times of social tension it is always likely to
 
 CICEEO ON THE STATE 119 
 
 be broken by force. The latter became the rule dur- 
 ing the last century of the Roman Republic. Eco- 
 nomic transformation due to the extension of its 
 dominion divided the Roman people into two great 
 classes, the wealthy nobles and the pauperized com- 
 mons, as antithetic as in ancient days had been the 
 patricians and the plebeians. These hostile classes 
 found in the senate and the assemblies their respec- 
 tive representatives, and the recurring deadlocks be- 
 tween the organs were broken by civil war. During 
 the period in which the politics of Rome turned upon 
 the projects of the Gracchi, of Marius and Sulla, of 
 Pompey and Caesar, political speculation could not 
 be expected to flourish. Only in Cicero was found 
 enough of the philosophic temperament to seek 
 rational props for the constitution which he saw 
 falling in ruins. His two works, De Republica 
 and De Legibus, were designed to recall the Ro- 
 mans to the old methods of working their govern- 
 ment. The effort was as noble as it was Quixotic ; 
 the works embodied all the most admirable qualities 
 of the writer's thought and diction; but they had 
 no effect at the time, and while they profoundly 
 influenced imperial lawyers and early Christian 
 writers, they have come down to the present day 
 in so fragmentary a condition as to perplex and irri- 
 tate rather than enlighten the student who seeks to 
 use them. 
 
 The practical purpose of Cicero's writing is not 
 disguised. In the De Republica he seeks to set forth 
 the conception of an ideal state as Plato had done in
 
 120 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 his greatest work. The Platonic dialogue is em- 
 ployed as the form of the treatise, with Scipio taking 
 the part of Socrates as the chief disputant. But 
 Cicero makes no attempt to rival the Greek in evolv- 
 ing a fanciful polity that has no relation to the 
 actual life and nature of man. On the contrary, he 
 avowedly confines himself to the consideration of the 
 Roman state and its history as illustrating and em- 
 bodying the ideals of political science. 1 He assumes 
 the essential idea of " state " to be " commonwealth," 
 and formulates the fundamental conception of his 
 philosophy as follows : 
 
 The commonwealth is the wealth of a people ; understanding 
 by a people, not every group of human beings however brought 
 together, but a multitude united by a common sense of right 
 and by a community of interest. 2 
 
 The primary cause of union he finds in the social 
 instinct of men, rather than in any consciousness of 
 weakness in isolation ; and that same instinct leads 
 to the institution of government, in order that the 
 unity may be preserved. Of the three primary forms 
 of government, royalty, aristocracy and democracy, 
 he considers that each possesses certain advantages, 
 but embodies at the same time the germ of cor- 
 
 1 De Republica, II, 11. Cicero here congratulates himself on hav- 
 ing devised a method superior to any exhibited " in Graecorum 
 libris." 
 
 8 " Est respublica res populi ; populus autem non omnis hominum 
 coetus, quoquo modo congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis iuris con- 
 sensu et communione utilitatis sociatus." De Republica, I, 25. In 
 the next section, Cicero apparently distinguishes between "respublica" 
 and " civitas " : " civitas, quae est constitutio populi . . . respublica, 
 quae ut dixi populi res est. ..." But the distinction is not adhered 
 to in what follows, and the two terms are used interchangeably.
 
 CICERO ON FORMS OF STATE 121 
 
 ruption, which produces a cycle of revolutions. 1 To 
 counteract this tendency a mixed form is necessary, 
 combining the advantages of all three simple forms, 
 but avoiding their weaknesses. This conclusion, 
 precisely that of Polybius, is followed by an elabo- 
 rate exposition of the constitutional development of 
 Rome, so conceived as to emphasize the necessity of 
 check and balance, and to represent the fully ma- 
 tured Republican system as a perfect example of the 
 mixed form. 2 Monarchy, he shows, was discarded 
 because the king became the tyrant; the patrician 
 aristocracy, overbearing in its monopoly of power, 
 was forced to yield to the restraint of plebeian 
 elements in the system ; and Cicero is too much of 
 a conservative politician not to indicate that the 
 troubles of the state since the Gracchi have been 
 due to an exaggeration of democratic influences. 
 
 That the thought of Cicero follows very closely the 
 suggestions of Polybius cannot be denied. But to 
 conclude that the Roman made no contribution to 
 political science beyond that of the Greek, is a step 
 hardly warranted by the facts. The fragments of 
 the work De Republica are altogether too scanty and 
 disjointed to form the basis for a just estimate of 
 Cicero's thought. They contain much to warrant the 
 judgment that his idea of check and balance was less 
 mechanical than that of Polybius that the equi- 
 poise to be sought was rather that of force, influence 
 and liberty, as principles, than of magistrates, senate 
 
 1 De Republica, I, 29. 
 
 a Ibid. Bk. II ; cf. especially II, 39.
 
 122 POLITICAL THEOKIES 
 
 and assemblies as organs. 1 Whatever the precise truth 
 on this point may be, there can be no doubt that in 
 the border region where ethics, jurisprudence and 
 politics meet, Cicero performed a work which gives 
 him an important place in the history of political 
 theory. This work was, the development and prac- 
 tical application of the concept, natural law. 
 
 As has already appeared, the doctrine that the 
 principles of right and justice were eternal and im- 
 mutable had been a cardinal feature of Plato's ethics, 
 and had been adopted by the Stoics. In Plato the 
 doctrine had largely a metaphysical character and 
 import. By the Stoics it was made a concomitant 
 of their pantheistic conception of nature as supreme 
 universal law. Cicero, following the trend of 
 Plato's later thought, found for eternal justice a 
 source in the providence of the gods, conceived not 
 as identical with, but as the creators of, nature ; 
 and on the other hand, following the trend of later 
 Stoic thought, he brought the dictates of abstract 
 and universal reason and law into immediate relation 
 with the activity of concrete human reason and of 
 civil legislation. 
 
 In Greek philosophy the distinction between right 
 (SiKaiov) and law (i/o/xog) had been recognized, but 
 right had been regarded as in source and content 
 antecedent to and largely independent of law. In 
 the term "right" were embodied, in fact, two dis- 
 
 1 Cf. II, 33 : Nisi aequabilis haec in civitate conpensatio sit et 
 iuris et officii et muneris, ut et potestatis satis in magistratibus et 
 auctoritatis in principum consilio et libertatis in populo sit, non posse 
 hunc incommutabilem rei publicae conservari statum.
 
 CICEEO ON NATURAL LAW 123 
 
 tinct concepts : first, that of abstract goodness or 
 righteousness; and second, that of an aggregate of 
 privileges pertaining to a definite individual or group 
 of individuals a sense best expressed in English 
 by the collective plural, " rights." Greek philosophy 
 had busied itself chiefly with the first of these con- 
 cepts, while the tendency among the Romans was 
 toward primary interest in the second. Under the 
 influence of this tendency Cicero reversed the earlier 
 Greek conception of the relation between law and 
 rights, and proceeded to make right (ius) in every 
 sense subordinate to and dependent upon the idea of 
 law (lex). His argument is as follows : J All nature 
 is ruled by God. 2 Man is the highest of created 
 things ; through the possession of reason he is dis- 
 tinct from other creatures and like the Creator. 
 By virtue of the divine element in human nature, 
 man participates in the ultimate principles of right 
 and justice, which are merely elements of the law 
 by which God rules the universe. Further, all men 
 possess by nature the consciousness of those prin- 
 ciples ; for all men are alike rational. The oneness 
 of human nature is absolute ; " no one is so like to 
 himself as all are like to all," though evil habits may 
 bring apparent diversity. But " to whomsoever rea- 
 son is given by nature, so also is right reason ; hence 
 also law, which is right reason in commanding and 
 forbidding ; and if law, also right ; but reason is 
 
 1 This argument is the subject of De Legibus, Bk. I. 
 
 2 Cicero used sometimes the plural (1, 7), but generally the singular 
 of deus.
 
 124 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 given to all ; therefore right is given to all." * Thus 
 the law of nature (lex naturalis), or law pure and 
 simple, is the source and limit of all rights, even the 
 natural rights (ius naturale). As against this doc- 
 trine there is no validity in the contention that 
 human rights are based on shrewd calculations of 
 interest, or that the wide diversity in institutions 
 and laws among the nations of the earth indicates 
 a real diversity in right and justice. Law in the 
 true and ultimate sense is eternal wisdom, ruling 
 the world. Among men it is the rational dictate of 
 the sage (sapientis) as to what is to be commanded 
 and what forbidden. The local and temporary enact- 
 ments of the peoples are called law (lex) only by cour- 
 tesy ; and enactments contravening natural morality 
 have no claim to the name. 2 
 
 From the standpoint of exact logic, this demon- 
 stration leaves something to be desired ; the concept 
 " nature " is nowhere closely defined, and the word 
 is used in several senses ; 3 while Cicero manifests at 
 critical points the orator's tendency to drop from rea- 
 soning into rhetoric. 4 But the circumstances of the 
 ages following his lifetime conspired to give to his 
 writings a wide influence. It was not, however, till 
 fifteen centuries after he wrote that a practical appli- 
 
 1 Quibus enim ratio a natura data est, iisdem etiam recta ratio 
 data est, ergo et lex, quae est recta ratio in jubendo et vetando ; si lex, 
 ius quoque; et omnibus ratio; ius igitur datum est omnibus. I, 12. 
 
 2 De Leg. II, 5. 
 
 8 In De Leg. I, 7-12, this term is used to denote (1) the universe 
 as created ; (2) the forces of the physical world ; (3) the creator of 
 man ; and (4) several concepts that defy concise definition. 
 
 * E.g. I, 18.
 
 THE IMPERIAL JURISTS 125 
 
 cation was attempted of his doctrine that an enact- 
 ment that contravened the law of nature had no force 
 as law. 
 
 In his work De Legibus, the discussion outlined 
 above is designed as the prelude to a detailed exposi- 
 tion of a code, constitutional and civil, that shall 
 conform to the principles of the law of nature. But 
 the three books 1 which we have are little more 
 than a commentary on certain religious and political 
 institutions of Rome. The eternal and universal law 
 of nature proves to be thus simply the law of Rome, 
 with certain modifications designed to render more 
 easy the triumph of Cicero's party in current politics. 
 The circumstances under which the great orator lost 
 his life surround with an air of pathos his efforts to 
 find the elements of rational perfection in the mori- 
 bund institutions of the Republic. 
 
 6. The Imperial Jurists 
 
 It was through the private law of the post-republican 
 centuries that the juristic conceptions which Cicero 
 discussed first became actually fruitful. When polit- 
 ical life was extinguished outside the palace of the 
 prince, the aptitude of the Roman character for gov- 
 ernment found a field for activity in the adjustment 
 of non-political relations throughout the great do- 
 minion. The particular historical work of the Prin- 
 cipate was the welding of all the heterogeneous 
 elements of the civilized world into administrative 
 unity. In the course of this work the juristic genius 
 
 1 The work is incomplete ; six books were contemplated in the plan.
 
 126 POLITICAL THEOEIES 
 
 of the Romans rose to the climax of its brilliancy 
 and evolved that body of principles which consti- 
 tutes to-day the basis of European law. 
 
 Under the Republic the private law of Rome was 
 twofold in character, including the ius civile and the 
 ius gentium. The ius civile was the body of rules in 
 accordance with which were determined the prop- 
 erty and family rights of Roman citizens ; the ius 
 gentium applied to non-citizens, that is, to resident 
 aliens and to subjects. The ius civile was based on 
 the code of the Twelve Tables, which, through the 
 conservatism of the Roman mind, was rarely sub- 
 jected to legislative amendment. In the ius gentium 
 on the other hand, were embodied not only the 
 principles of natural equity which developed, with 
 growing enlightenment, at Rome itself, but also the 
 customs and legal ideas of foreign and subject peo- 
 ples ; and the Roman magistrate (prcetor), in apply- 
 ing the law, was at liberty to modify its doctrines 
 with no restriction save his own sense of justice. 
 The Twelve Tables were the product of a period 
 (450 B.C.) at which Roman social development was 
 relatively slight and legal concepts and conditions 
 were very primitive. As the city grew and the 
 relations of civil life became complex, the ius civile 
 tended to fall behind the requirements of the times. 
 This was made conspicuous by comparison with the 
 ius gentium; for in the latter, especially after the 
 conquests east of the Adriatic, were incorporated 
 the principles and usages of a highly refined society. 
 The disadvantage under which the Roman citizen
 
 THE IMPERIAL JURISTS 127 
 
 often found himself in business enterprises as com- 
 pared with the alien or provincial had produced, 
 before the fall of the Republic, a tendency toward 
 the fusion of the two bodies of law. Under the Prin- 
 cipate this tendency was greatly fostered by the cen- 
 tralization of administration and judicature at the 
 court of the prince. For the determination of 
 appeals that came up on points of law from all parts 
 of the dominion the rulers gathered about them- 
 selves the best of the jurists hi which Rome was for 
 three centuries very prolific, and from the opinions 
 of these men the Roman law received the character 
 which is expressed in the great code of Justinian. 
 
 The scientific work of the jurists was to systema- 
 tize and to blend into harmonious unity the ius civile 
 and the ius gentium. Under the latter head were 
 included all the various systems which, by the edicts 
 of successive praetors, had developed in the court for 
 aliens at Rome and in the provinces. Out of this 
 enormous mass of most 1 diverse local and racial 
 customs and ideas, the jurists were called upon to 
 determine which conformed to the general principles 
 that should be applicable to the whole Empire. This 
 task called for the profoundest consideration of the 
 ultimate nature of rights and justice. The greatest 
 of the jurists were of Stoic tendencies, and hence we 
 find at the basis of their work the characteristic doc- 
 trines of the Stoic philosophy. Dealing, as they 
 were, with the practical affairs of the whole civilized 
 world, the conception of a universal law and of the 
 brotherhood of man took on a character of concrete-
 
 128 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 ness that it wholly lacked in the days of the early 
 Stoics and even of Cicero. 
 
 In the philosophy of the jurists rights (ius) rather 
 than law (lex) was the basal concept, and Cicero's lex 
 naturalis received scant consideration as compared 
 with the ius naturale. The latter, natural rights, 
 assumed great prominence, and its character and 
 content were elaborately determined. Because the 
 ideas and usages of the many peoples subject to Rome 
 were found to have much in common, the ius gentium, 
 or totality of these ideas and usages, came to be 
 regarded as identical with the ius naturale, and as an 
 actual embodiment of that natural reason, which was 
 the chief element in natural right. When the man 
 whose opinion was law for the Empire declared, in 
 treating of slavery, that "so far as pertains to natu- 
 ral rights, all men are equal," 1 or that " by natural 
 law all men are born free," 2 or that " slavery is an in- 
 stitution contrary to nature," 3 the practical tendency 
 of Stoic doctrine in social matters was made very 
 clear. These dicta had, indeed, nothing whatever of 
 the political significance that long afterward became 
 attached to them. But they gave great definiteness 
 to the idea of natural rights ; and when the formulas 
 embodying this idea were introduced with Justinian's 
 code into the jurisprudence of modern Europe, the 
 extension of their application was as normal a process 
 as that through which they were originally created. 
 
 1 Ulpian in Digest, L, xvii, 32. 
 
 2 Institutes of Justinian, I, ii, 2. 
 
 3 Digest, I, v, 4 : Servitus est constitutio iuris gentium qua quii 
 dominio alieno contra naturam subiicitur.
 
 LATER GREECE AND ROME 129 
 
 How foreign to the Roman jurisprudence was any 
 political suggestion in the theory of natural rights, 
 appears clear from the doctrine as to the supreme 
 legislator. Universal reason was the source of rights 
 (ius : ius naturale), but the will of the prince made 
 law : " Quidquid principi placuit legis habet vigo- 
 rem." l In the days of the Empire the actual con- 
 ditions left no doubt as to whether universal reason 
 or princely will took precedence in practical affairs. 
 The case was not so clear in the ages when Jus- 
 tinian's code was the common law of Europe, and 
 in all controversies as to the relations of prince and 
 people, the dictum touching the supremacy of the 
 monarch in law was as diligently quoted on the one 
 side as were those touching the liberty and equality 
 of men by natural right on the other. 
 
 SELECT REFERENCES 
 
 DUBOIS, Les Ligues etolienne et acheenne. FREEMAN, Federal 
 Government, I, chap. v. GREENIDGE, Greek Constitutional 
 History, chaps, vii and viii. HERMANN, Political Antiquities 
 of Greece, pp. 371-399. SCALA, Die Staatsvertrdge des Alter- 
 tums. SHUCKBURGH, The Histories of Polybius, Vol. I, Intro., 
 3 ; trans., pp. 458-508. THIRLWALL, History of Greece, chaps. 
 Ixi, Ixiii. COURTNEY, Epicurus, in Hellenica, pp. 223-243. 
 GRANT, The Ethics of Aristotle, I, 304-371. HAAKE, Die 
 Gesellschaftslehre des Stoiker. HILDENBRAND, p. 503 et seq. 
 JANET, I, 233-262. HENKEL, pp. 98-115. RAUMER, p. 21 
 et seq. BITTER, Geschichte der Philos., Bd. Ill, pp. 627-735 ; 
 IV, 79-176 (trans., Ill, 557-658; IV, 75-162). ZELLER, 
 Philosophic der Griechen, Bd. Ill, i, pp. 26-63, 272-309, 346- 
 378, 450-477 (Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, trans., chaps, 
 iii, xii, xiv, xv, xx, xxi). 
 
 1 Inst. I, ii, 6. From Ulpian, in Digest, I, iv, 1.
 
 130 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 ABBOTT, Roman Political Institutions. ARNOLD, History 
 of Rome; Roman Provincial Administration. FOWLER, City 
 State of the Greeks and Romans, pp. 74 et seq., 105-112, 
 188-244, 217 et seq. FREEMAN, Comparative Politics. FUSTEL 
 DE COULANGES, La Cite antique (The Ancient City, trans, 
 by Small). GREENIDGE, Roman Public Life. GIBBON, Decline 
 and Fall, chaps, iii, xiii, xvii. KARLOWA, Romische Rechts- 
 geschichte. MERIVALE, History of the Romans. MOMMSEN, 
 Romische Geschichte, esp. Bd. I (trans, by Dickson) ; Romische 
 Staatsrecht. 
 
 DAVIDSON, Polybius, in Hellenica, pp. 353-387. SCALA, 
 Die Studien des Polybios. Ciceronis scripta . . . omnia (Teubner, 
 1878), Part IV, Vol. ii, pp. 271-450 (De Republica et De Legibus). 
 FEATHERSTONHAUGH, The Republic of Cicero, trans. 
 
 HUNTER, Historical Exposition of Roman Law. IHERING, 
 Geist des romischen Rechts. LAFERRIERE, L' 'Influence du stoi- 
 cisme sur la doctrine des jurisconsultes remains, in Acad. des 
 sci. mor. et pol., Mem., X, 579-685. MACKENZIE, Studies 
 in Roman Law. MAINE, Ancient Law, chaps, ii-iv. MOREY, 
 Outlines of Roman Law. MOYLE, Institutes of Justinian, 
 text and trans. MUIRHEAD, Introduction to the Private 
 Law of Rome; Gaius and Ulpian, text and trans. RIVIER, 
 Introduction historique au droit romain. SAVIGNY, Geschichte 
 des romischen Rechts im Mittelalter. SCHULIN, Geschichte des 
 romischen Rechts. SOHM, The Institutes of Roman Law, trans, 
 by LEDLIE. VOIGT, Das jus naturale, Bd. I (for Cicero, pp. 
 176-212).
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEDIEVAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
 1. Christianity in the Declining Eoman Empire 
 
 FROM the standpoint of political philosophy the 
 cardinal fact of mediaeval history is the establish- 
 ment of the Christian religion throughout and even 
 beyond the confines of the Roman Empire, and the 
 development of the Christian church. The govern- 
 mental institutions of Rome were transformed, in the 
 East by the subtle and slow-working influence of the 
 Hellenistic spirit, in the West by the violent im- 
 pact of the Teutonic nations. But in the one region 
 as in the other Christian doctrine and ecclesiastical 
 authority furnished the principles which dominated 
 all conscious reflection. The astounding bankruptcy 
 of Grseco-Roman culture, manifest centuries be- 
 fore the political extinction of Rome, left no intel- 
 lectual resource for the times of turmoil, and Europe 
 relapsed into despairing faith and ignoble supersti- 
 tion. The Middle Age was unpolitical. Its aspira- 
 tions and ideals centred about the form and content 
 of religious belief. The political institutions which 
 ultimately developed out of the wreck of the Roman 
 Empire received their characteristic impress from 
 this fact. And when, in the renascence of intellect- 
 ual life, political speculation revived, the problem 
 which demanded almost exclusive attention was that 
 
 131
 
 132 POLITICAL THEOEIES 
 
 of disentangling the state from the church. Medi- 
 eval political philosophy is in fact exhausted when 
 it has propounded a theory as to the relation of 
 secular to ecclesiastical authority. 
 
 The growth of Christianity during the first three 
 centuries of its existence is from every point of 
 view an astonishing phenomenon. Originating in 
 an obscure region of the Empire, among a despised 
 and persecuted people, the creed and ritual of 
 the Christians had become by the beginning of the 
 fourth century the religion of the most influential 
 classes of the Roman world. Adopted by Con- 
 stantine as the official creed of the state, it easily 
 triumphed over the expiring forces of paganism 
 within the Empire ; and through the zeal of its 
 adherents it won its way to extensive authority 
 among the Teutonic peoples who were soon to rend 
 the imperial dominion into fragments. Prior to the 
 conversion of Constantine, the organization of the 
 Christian communities the church was deter- 
 mined partly by the democratic conditions of the 
 early days of the faith, and partly by the traditions 
 of the apostolic succession. The positions of over- 
 sight and authority in the management of the affairs 
 of each community were filled by the formal or in- 
 formal choice of the believers, while in respect to 
 the general interests of all particular deference was 
 paid to the counsels of those churches which, either 
 through the tradition of apostolic foundation or 
 through the size and importance of the cities in 
 which they were situated, had a position of marked
 
 CHRISTIANITY IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE 133 
 
 prominence. On both these grounds the Roman 
 church and its bishop enjoyed from the earliest 
 times a distinct preeminence. After Christianity 
 became the state religion many circumstances con- 
 spired to hasten the complete and precise adjust- 
 ment of the ecclesiastical organization. But the 
 decisive authority in questions touching this matter 
 was, under the new conditions, the Emperor. Coun- 
 cils of the church passed upon questions of creed and 
 of organization, but it remained with the imperial 
 authorities to confirm and execute the anathemas 
 against recurring heresy or the decisions as to con- 
 flicting claims of power and precedence. For good 
 or for evil the church was in politics. 
 
 The century and a half between the reign of Con- 
 stantine and the fall of the Western Empire was 
 characterized by a general increase in the power of 
 the ecclesiastical as compared with the political hier- 
 archy. To this end conspired the weakness and 
 incapacity of most of the emperors, the commanding 
 ability of many of the bishops, the attractiveness of 
 Christian hope in the midst of universal social de- 
 cay, and the frequent exemption of religious institu- 
 tions, whether through reverence or contempt, from 
 the devastating fury of the barbarian invaders. 1 This 
 was the age when Ambrose, Bishop of Milan, defied 
 the authority of the weak Valentinian wishing to 
 install Arianism in Milan, 2 and by exclusion from 
 
 1 Hodgkin, Italy and her Invaders, Vol. I, Part IT, p. 796. 
 
 2 The practical worldly wisdom of Ambrose appears clearly from 
 an incident in this affair. His refusal to deliver up a church of his
 
 134 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 the eucharist brought the powerful Theodosius to 
 submission and repentance ; when Augustine, the 
 Bishop of Hippo, gave to Christian doctrine the 
 moulding force of his able and prolific pen, and pro- 
 moted his views by the subtler methods of influence 
 at the imperial court ; * when Jerome propagated by 
 precept and example the monastic ideas which con- 
 tributed so much to the upbuilding of Christianity in 
 a despairing age ; and when Leo, Bishop of Rome, 
 won for his faith and for his see the gratitude and 
 homage of civilized men by staying the hand of the 
 dreaded Hun, when it was about to be laid in wrath 
 upon the Eternal City. 2 
 
 After the extinction of imperial authority in the 
 West the church remained the only efficient repre- 
 sentative of Roman ideas in the barbarian monarch- 
 ies that grew up in the ancient provinces. Legal 
 and political institutions were subordinated or 
 adapted to the customs and traditions of the Teu- 
 tons, but the forms and content of ecclesiastical 
 authority were in great measure left intact. Until 
 the fusion of the races had made much progress, the 
 chief dignities of the church were held almost exclu- 
 
 see to Auxentius, the Arian appointee of the Emperor, and his vigor- 
 ous denunciation of the imperial policy, gave rise to serious popular 
 tumults on the part of his adherents in the city. He was urged by 
 the civil authorities to allay the excitement. This he refused to do, 
 saying : " in meo jure esse ut non excitarem ; in Dei manu ut mitiga- 
 ret." Epist. xx of Classis I in Migne, Patrologia Latina, Vol. XVI. 
 
 1 Cf. Milman, Latin Christianity, I, 170 (N.Y. 1862). 
 
 2 That Attila's withdrawal was due exclusively to the action of 
 Pope Leo, is by no means so clearly established as is the fact that 
 such was universally believed to be the truth.
 
 CHRISTIANITY IN THE EOMAN EMPIRE 135 
 
 sively by Romans, and the far-reaching effects of this 
 fact may be readily imagined when it further appears 
 that from very early times the bishops constituted a 
 recognized element in the legislative and administra- 
 tive order of the Teutonic kingdoms. 1 Religious 
 conviction or emotion played a large if not a decisive 
 part in the career not only of the short-lived polities 
 of the Vandals, the Burgundians and the Ostro- 
 goths, but also of the more permanent monarchies of 
 the Visigoths and the Franks. From the chaos of 
 the conflicts in which these peoples were involved the 
 Christian church, though barbarized in creed and in 
 practice, emerged with its organization strengthened 
 and its prestige, if not enhanced, at least still un- 
 impaired. 
 
 In the East the persistence of the Roman author- 
 ity preserved the ancient relation of church and 
 state. The faith escaped the brutalizing influence 
 of unintellectual barbarians, but suffered from the 
 curious refinements of the super-intellectual Greeks. 
 Heresies swarmed forth from the East and gave 
 hardly less occupation to the imperial authorities 
 there than the barbarian invaders gave to the rulers 
 of the West. But the unbroken continuance of the 
 power at Constantinople left no such opportunity 
 for the development of ecclesiastical independence 
 as was afforded by the fall of the Empire in the 
 West. The Eastern church remained in the closest 
 connection with the imperial court and suffered the 
 decadence that affected the imperial power. After 
 
 1 Cf. Milman, op. cit., I, 524 et seq.
 
 136 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 Mohammedanism in the seventh century all but over- 
 whelmed Christianity, the dependence of the ecclesi- 
 astical on the secular arm was riveted by the impact 
 of the common foe, and church and state were in- 
 distinguishably blended. 
 
 2. Rise of the Papacy 
 
 The decline of imperial authority in the West had 
 a great if not the decisive influence in exalting the 
 Bishop of Rome to formal primacy in the church. 
 At the conversion of Constantine the Roman bishop 
 became at once, by virtue of his proximity to the 
 court, the chief adviser of the Emperor in ecclesiasti- 
 cal affairs, and the intermediary through which ques- 
 tions affecting the church in all parts of the Empire 
 were submitted to the judgment of the sovereign 
 ruler. The removal of the court to the shores of the 
 Bosphorus tended somewhat to relax the bonds which 
 held the great Eastern prelates at Antioch, Alexan- 
 dria and Constantinople in submission to the Roman 
 pontiff, but throughout the provinces of the West 
 Gaul, Spain and Africa the prestige of the popes 
 remained unaffected. The chief theoretical basis of 
 Roman precedence was the foundation of the see by 
 Peter, whose preeminence among the Apostles was 
 universally recognized. To this was added the claim 
 that the provincial churches in the West had been 
 established under the auspices of Rome and therefore 
 owed to the Roman bishop the allegiance due to 
 metropolitan authority. At the time when the strife 
 between Arianism and Orthodoxy was convulsing the
 
 RISE OF THE PAPACY 137 
 
 church and the Empire, the Council of Sardica 
 (347 A.D.) formally assigned to the Bishop of Rome 
 appellate jurisdiction over the decrees of other 
 bishops. This recognition of Roman primacy by 
 ecclesiastical authority was reenforced in the next 
 century by the sanction of the supreme political 
 power. Valentinian III, Emperor of the West, con- 
 stituted the Bishop of Rome the legal court of appeal 
 for ecclesiastical causes from all parts of the domin- 
 ion, and declared his supremacy over all other 
 bishops. 
 
 But the official sanction of papal authority was 
 more a symptom than a cause of Roman primacy. 
 From the beginning of the fifth century great pon- 
 tiffs, like Innocent I and Leo I, asserted the authority 
 of Rome in ecclesiastical controversies with marked 
 ability and success; and the effect of their policy 
 was enhanced by the commanding distinction of 
 the bishop in the civil affairs of the city when the 
 imperial regime was overthrown by the barbarians. 
 During the Herulian and Ostrogothic dominion in 
 Italy the Roman see was the mainstay of Ortho- 
 doxy against the Arianism of the rulers. The wars 
 through which the Gothic power was broken, and 
 Italy made an integral part of the Eastern Empire, 
 wrought great havoc in the whole social order of 
 the contested realm, and especially of Rome itself. 
 Scarcely was the ruined land reduced to tolerable 
 quiet, when the Lombards descended from the north 
 and devastated anew the whole peninsula. The 
 authority of the Emperor at Constantinople was
 
 138 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 hopelessly inadequate to the task of defending Italy. 
 When the Lombards appeared before Rome Gregory 
 the Great was on the papal throne, and upon him 
 fell the task of making formal terms with the 
 besiegers. 
 
 The pontificate of Gregory (590-604 A.D.) marks 
 fairly well the transition in the character of the 
 Papacy. From that time the political affairs, at 
 first of Rome and then of all Italy, became a defi- 
 nite charge upon the attention of the popes. For 
 a time the suzerainty of Constantinople and the 
 authority of its Exarch at Ravenna were sedulously 
 recognized. But when to the encroachments of the 
 Lombards in Italy were added, in the seventh cen- 
 tury, the triumphant assaults of the Mohammedans 
 in the East, the interest and influence of the imperial 
 court in the city of Rome became infinitesimal. 
 Ecclesiastical causes also contributed to the sever- 
 ance of relations between the old and the new Rome. 
 Inspired by his close connection with the court, the 
 Patriarch of Constantinople laid claim from time to 
 time to a preeminence over all other authorities in 
 the church. This pretension, which received some 
 measure of imperial recognition, was bitterly resented 
 by the popes, and confirmed their tendency to inde- 
 pendence in political affairs. Finally arose the great 
 controversy over image-worship, through which were 
 brought to a crisis all the divergent tendencies of 
 Greek and Roman Christianity. The church was 
 severed in twain and the Roman pontiff, followed 
 by all the West which Mohammedanism had not
 
 RISE OF THE PAPACY 139 
 
 overrun, stood isolated, ecclesiastically as well as 
 politically, from the authority of the East. 
 
 Upon the extinction of the Exarchate of Ravenna 
 by the revolt which followed the iconoclastic decrees 
 of Leo the Isaurian and his successors, the city of 
 Rome, of whose interests the Pope appears as the 
 exclusive guardian, was left entirely exposed to the 
 aggressive tendencies of the Lombard kings. To 
 the attempts of these rulers to incorporate the city 
 within their domain the popes opposed the most 
 resolute resistance, and, in despair of success, sum- 
 moned to their aid, in the name of St. Peter, the 
 powerful Franks. Both Charles Martel and his son 
 Pippin responded to the summons, and the latter 
 not only drove the Lombards from the ecclesiastical 
 estates which they had occupied, but also con- 
 quered the remainder of the territory formerly 
 held by the exarchs and bestowed it upon the Pope. 
 Thus the Papacy became formally, what it had long 
 been in fact, the holder of political power. Of equal 
 significance in respect to the position of the popes 
 was the act of Zacharias in sanctioning the usur- 
 pation by Pippin of the royal power among the 
 Franks, and that of Stephen in performing the 
 ceremony of coronation and unction through which 
 Pippin's usurped dignity was confirmed (754 A.D.). 
 When, after half a century of successful expansion, 
 the Frankish kingdom had been developed into the 
 great dominion of Pippin's son, Charlemagne, the 
 coronation of the latter as Emperor by Pope Leo III 
 (800 A.D.) scarcely made more definite than before
 
 140 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 the exalted position of the Roman see in European 
 politics. 
 
 The weakest point in the Pope's political position 
 was his relation to the population of Rome. From 
 the days of the old Empire the choice of a new bishop 
 had frequently been the occasion of popular tumults 
 and bloodshed. The transition to mediaeval condi- 
 tions brought the office under the control of the 
 powerful noble families who divided the city among 
 themselves. With the growth of political influence 
 in the Papacy, the contests among these families for 
 possession of the dignity became more and more 
 intense and bitter. While all Western Europe 
 looked with reverence upon the Pope, he was him- 
 self, in many cases, the mere puppet of some un- 
 scrupulous Roman noble. During the tenth century 
 the personal character of the popes reached a very 
 low level from this cause, and an inevitable reaction 
 was manifest upon the authority of the Papacy. 
 This source of weakness was in a measure removed 
 by the reform of 1059, when, by act of the second 
 Lateran Council, the chief power in the election of a 
 pope was vested hi the cardinals a definite body, 
 presumably characterized by the most eminent sacer- 
 dotal virtues. This reform was but one of a series 
 that included the enforcement of celibacy among the 
 clergy and the stringent proceedings against simony 
 which precipitated the struggle over investitures. 
 The Hildebrandine epoch had arrived the epoch 
 in which great popes, from Gregory VII to Inno- 
 cent III, brought the dignity and power of their
 
 THE KINGDOM OF THE FRANKS 141 
 
 office, from both the secular and the spiritual point 
 of view, to the utmost limit of exaltation. 
 
 3. Rise of the Mediaeval Empire 
 
 The prestige of the Papacy was closely paralleled 
 by that of its great secular rival, the Holy Roman 
 Empire. This institution, whose career embodies a 
 political summary of the Middle Ages, had its origin 
 in the Frankish monarchy, which, founded by Clovis 
 on the soil of Roman Gaul, was expanded to truly 
 imperial dimensions three centuries later by Charle- 
 magne. The Franks were converted to Christianity 
 in the time of Clovis, and stood alone among the 
 barbarian invaders as Orthodox instead of Arian in 
 faith. Their institutions expressed most faithfully 
 the characteristics of Christianized Teutonism. No- 
 where more strongly than in Gaul, under the Mero- 
 vingians, did the church impress itself upon the 
 political and social order. In both the councils of 
 the royal court and the humbler concerns of town 
 and provincial life, the bishops and abbots wielded 
 a commanding influence. Early in the eighth cen- 
 tury the royal line was supplanted in power by the 
 East-Frankish family, later known as the Carolin- 
 gians. The genius and valour of Charles Martel won 
 the applause of trembling Christendom by setting a 
 final bound to the sweep of Saracen conquest in the 
 West. To the victorious Frank it was natural that 
 the Pope should turn for support against the threaten- 
 ing Lombards; and a favourable response to the Pope's 
 appeal was clearly dictated not only by the religious
 
 142 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 sentiment but also by the political aspirations of the 
 ambitious ruler. Hence arose that entente through 
 which Pippin became, with the papal sanction, King 
 of the Franks, and Charlemagne, after adding the 
 Lombard domain to his possessions, received from 
 the Pope the insignia and title of Emperor. 
 
 To the chief participants in that famous corona- 
 tion in St. Peter's on Christmas day, 800 A.D., the 
 significance of the ceremony was quite destitute of 
 the subtlety which was ascribed to it by the contro- 
 versial ingenuity of later days. That Charlemagne 
 supposed he was receiving from the Pope a grant of 
 political authority of any sort whatever, is impossible ; 
 that the Pope supposed that he was granting such 
 power, is very improbable. By his military and 
 administrative genius the Frankish monarch had 
 extended his sway over a territory fairly commen- 
 surate with that of the ancient Empire in the West ; 
 his conquests had consistently promoted the cause of 
 Christianity against both the Saracen and the pagan ; 
 having become the possessor in fact of imperial author- 
 ity, he received from the Pope, through the rites long 
 customary in Christian lands, formal recognition as 
 successor of the early emperors. Through this act, 
 however its significance may have been misinter- 
 preted, the relation of Teutonic politics to Latin 
 Christianity assumed a public form that was des- 
 tined to produce extraordinary results. The embodi- 
 ment of these results is the history and the theory 
 of the Holy Roman Empire. 
 
 Charlemagne's empire fell to pieces within less
 
 THE MEDL3SVAL EMPIRE 143 
 
 than half a century of his death. The territory that 
 he had ruled was divided into independent kingdoms. 
 But throughout the anarchy of this process the idea 
 of an empire and of an emperor survived, and of an 
 emperor whose authority would be formally complete 
 only after coronation by the Pope at Rome. The 
 persistence of this idea was promoted not only by 
 papal policy, which sought the support of superior 
 power against the Italian princes, but also by the 
 ambition of every ruler who, having succeeded to 
 some share of Charlemagne's dominion, could hope 
 to claim the whole. In 962 Otto I, the German 
 king, a monarch whose character and achievements 
 justly won for him the epithet of " Great," added 
 Italy to his possessions and received or extorted from 
 the Pope recognition as Emperor. With the corona- 
 tion of Otto begins definitely the history of the Holy 
 Roman Empire. 
 
 From the purely secular point of view this history 
 is concerned with the long struggle of German kings 
 to maintain the imperial unity of Germany and 
 Italy. 1 The varying phases of the struggle turn 
 chiefly on three facts : first, the thoroughly feudalized 
 character of the royal power in both Germany and 
 Italy; second, the racial antagonism between the 
 Teutonic and the Latin populations ; and third, the 
 enormous development of ecclesiastical and especially 
 of papal power. The feudal conception of royal 
 power hopelessly hampered the efficiency of the 
 
 1 The western portion of Charlemagne's empire stood apart from 
 this struggle, and developed independently into the French monarchy.
 
 144 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 monarch's action; the dislike of the Italians for 
 everything German, which to them was synonymous 
 with barbarian, was a constant stimulus to seditions 
 and revolt ; and the tortuous policy of the popes, 
 who ruthlessly employed their power to insure that 
 the Emperor should be their ally but not their mas- 
 ter, raised up in both Germany and Italy obstacles 
 which ultimately proved fatal to the development of 
 a really imperial system. For a century after the 
 great Otto, the German monarchs preserved a fairly 
 strong hold on Italy and asserted their ancient con- 
 trol over the Roman see. But then arose Hildebrand, 
 and the era of the great struggle was at hand which 
 ended a century and a half later in the extinction of 
 the imperial authority, if not the imperial name, in 
 all the region south of the Alps. 
 
 4. The Era of Conflict between the Secular and the 
 Spiritual Power 
 
 The dramatic struggle between the Emperor Henry 
 IV and Pope Gregory VII focussed the controversy 
 as to the relation of spiritual to secular authority at 
 the point where, in the belief of the time, each species 
 of authority had its culmination. In the early days, 
 before the ecclesiastical primacy of the Bishop of 
 Rome had been clearly established, the Emperor had 
 been recognized as head of both state and church. 
 Yet a sphere had always been assigned to the ecclesi- 
 astical authorities, which, though not denned with 
 entire clearness, included at least the power to in- 
 flict purely spiritual penalties for moral delinquencies.
 
 PAPACY AGAINST EMPIRE 145 
 
 This power had been exercised by Ambrose, the 
 energetic Archbishop of Milan, upon no less a per- 
 sonage than the Emperor Theodosius the Great, who 
 was excluded from the communion for breaking faith 
 with and slaughtering certain rebellious subjects. 
 Throughout the succeeding centuries excommunica- 
 tion was employed with ever-increasing freedom by 
 the higher church officials both against one another 
 and against men in other stations in life. With the 
 centralization of ecclesiastical power in the Pope, 
 however, excommunication at his hands, recognized 
 and enforced by an obedient clergy, could be made to 
 assume a very serious aspect. The tendency was to 
 extend the consequences of the penalty more and 
 more into the field of temporal concerns. Thus de- 
 veloped the doctrine that an excommunicated prince 
 was no longer entitled to the allegiance of his sub- 
 jects, and ceased ipso facto to reign. 
 
 The earliest stage of the conflict between Papacy 
 and secular power is exemplified in the case of Pope 
 Nicholas I and King Lothaire of Lorraine. The king, 
 with the consent of an obsequious synod of prelates 
 of his own dominion, divorced his wife and espoused 
 his mistress. Nicholas intervened, and after a long 
 struggle forced Lothaire to take back his wife. 
 Against the Pope were joined the king, his brother 
 the Emperor Louis, and all the powerful prelates who 
 had sanctioned the divorce. But the moral issue in 
 the case was so obvious that the terrors of the papal 
 excommunication prevailed against all. Though the 
 Emperor, in behalf of his brother, led an army against
 
 146 POLITICAL THEOEIES 
 
 the city of Rome, and entered the walls without re 
 sistance, yet he was soon glad to make his peace 
 with the Pope and retire from the controversy. In 
 the course of this struggle claims of power were 
 made on behalf of the Pope that trenched deeply on 
 the secular jurisdiction. It was not, however, till 
 two centuries later that these claims took practical 
 shape in the conflict over investitures. 
 
 Here the issue was made up on a ground where 
 the moral bearings were greatly obscured by other 
 considerations. Gregory VII (Hildebrand) decreed 
 in 1075 that no ecclesiastic should thereafter be 
 invested with the symbols of his office by a secular 
 prince, under penalty of excommunication to both 
 parties to such a transaction. The avowed purpose 
 of this decree was to put an end to the simoniacal 
 purchase and sale of the dignities of the church a 
 practice that had become universal and inveterate. 
 But behind this object, which would command the 
 sympathy of such enlightened public opinion as the 
 time could boast, lay the larger idea which permeated 
 all Gregory's projects that of a purified hierarchy, 
 headed by the Pope, guiding without responsibility 
 to any temporal power all the destinies of mankind. 
 The effect of his decree would be to transfer to the 
 Roman see that dominant influence in the filling of 
 bishoprics and abbacies which had been wielded by 
 the secular potentates. To these latter, however, the 
 obvious consequences of the Pope's policy were very 
 startling. The landed estates possessed by the epis- 
 copal churches and monasteries constituted in all
 
 PAPACY AGAINST EMPIRE 147 
 
 Western Europe a very large proportion of the soil, 
 and the bishops and abbots were, as tenants of these 
 estates, the feudal vassals of the monarchs. The 
 decree of the Pope would practically deprive the 
 latter of all the incidents of suzerainty which were 
 involved in the feudal tenure, and would reduce the 
 royal power to nullity. In Germany and Italy the 
 ecclesiastical estates were exceptionally large and 
 the tendencies to revolt against the imperial author- 
 ity exceptionally strong. The Emperor, moreover, 
 was invested by the sentiment of the times with a 
 superiority over all other secular rulers. To Greg- 
 ory, aspiring to the summit of authority, the subjec- 
 tion of the Emperor would go farthest toward the 
 attainment of his end. Hence it was that, in the 
 eleventh and twelfth centuries, the conflict of secular 
 and spiritual powers was centred in the conflict of 
 Papacy and Empire. 
 
 The struggle was precipitated by the peremptory 
 summons addressed in 1076 by Gregory to Henry of 
 Germany to appear before the papal court and an- 
 swer charges of disregarding certain decrees of the 
 Pope. Henry's reply was the deposition of the Pope 
 by a council of German prelates. Gregory thereupon 
 solemnly asserted the utmost authority ever claimed 
 by the Roman see, by excommunicating and deposing 
 the king and absolving his subjects from their oaths 
 of allegiance. By fostering the discontent and am- 
 bitions of the great German nobles and prelates the 
 Pope was able to bring the king to the profound 
 humiliation and submission of Canossa. This, how-
 
 148 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 ever, was but the beginning of the long struggle. 
 Henry recovered his power for a time and avenged 
 himself on Gregory, but the principles at issue were 
 too far-reaching to admit of an unequivocal settle- 
 ment. On the narrow question of investitures, a 
 rational compromise was reached in 1122. But 
 the broad issue between papal and imperial power 
 continued, through a bewildering multiplicity of inci- 
 dents, to form the core of European politics for 
 nearly two centuries. Only with the extinction of 
 the house of Hohenstaufen, in 1254, was the triumph 
 of papal policy made clear. From that date the dis- 
 integration of the Empire was a fact which the lin- 
 gering veneration for the imperial title could but 
 scantily disguise. Of the constituent elements of 
 the dominion which Otto the Great had restored, 
 Germany was a mere confederation of princes, and 
 Italy a group of city republics and petty principali- 
 ties of which the only bond was the feud of Guelf 
 and Ghibelline. 
 
 What the ancient imperial ideal failed to achieve 
 against the extreme pretensions of papal power was 
 ultimately accomplished by the national monarchies 
 that arose beyond the bounds of the Empire. The 
 power of the Pope to hold kings and other princes 
 to account for moral delinquency was freely asserted 
 in extra-imperial lands by Gregory VII and his suc- 
 cessors. Largely through the influence of the Cru- 
 sades the prestige of the popes expanded by leaps 
 and bounds during the twelfth century and culmi- 
 nated in the reign (for reign it truly was) of Innocent
 
 PAPACY AGAINST EMPIRE 149 
 
 III (1198-1216). The records of this pontiff's rela- 
 tions with secular princes illustrate fairly well the 
 status of the Papacy in European politics. In the 
 Empire he openly claimed the right to judge finally 
 between the rivals in a disputed succession, and act- 
 ually determined the occupation of the throne in 
 turn by Philip, Otho IV and Frederick II. In 
 France, by putting the kingdom under an interdict, 
 he forced the truculent Philip Augustus to take back 
 a discarded wife and cast off a noble mistress. John 
 of England, in a memorable struggle, was obliged to 
 yield his kingdom formally as a fief of the Roman 
 see and to become the vassal of the Pope. The 
 realms which the Christian princes of Spain and 
 Portugal were laboriously wresting from the Moors 
 were treated by Innocent (and with slight opposition) 
 as papal dependencies, on the theory, already gener- 
 ally recognized, that land conquered from heathen 
 and infidels was at the disposal of the Roman see. 1 
 The King of Aragon, with full feudal ceremony, as- 
 sumed the status of vassal to the Pope. Throughout 
 Christendom, in short, the spiritual lordship of Rome 
 was recognized as involving in some measure the 
 attributes of political sovereignty. 
 
 A century after Innocent III, the prestige of the 
 Papacy received a fatal shock in the memorable con- 
 flict between Boniface VIII and Philip the Fair of 
 France. The exalted position of the popes in secular 
 
 1 Henry II of England asked and received from Rome author- 
 ity to conquer Ireland, though the Irish were neither heathen nor 
 infidel, but merely refused to conform to the Roman ritual.
 
 150 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 affairs had been due largely to the unsubstantial 
 character of feudal lordship from the standpoint of 
 real power. Suzerainty tended to become merely 
 nominal and ceremonial, and for suzerainty of this 
 character the Papacy, destitute of military force, was 
 well adapted. The chief instrument by which the 
 popes had asserted real power over monarchs had 
 always been the rebellious tendencies of the great 
 vassals. During the thirteenth century, however, 
 the French kingship, largely through the ability of 
 Louis IX, assumed a high degree of solidity. When, 
 therefore, Boniface VIII opposed to the policy of 
 Philip the Fair an energetic demand for the exemp- 
 tion of ecclesiastical property from taxation, save 
 with the papal consent, the king was able to defy 
 the Pope, and to win general support from, both lay 
 and ecclesiastical subjects. Further, Philip found 
 opportunity, in the distracted condition of Italian 
 politics, to carry the war into the Pope's immediate 
 territory. The outcome was the so-called " Babylon- 
 ish Captivity," during which the Papacy, having re- 
 moved its abode from Rome to Avignon, was little 
 more than an adjunct of the French monarchy. 
 From Avignon it waged another violent and in some 
 measure successful contest with the holder of the 
 imperial title. But its prestige had been seriously 
 impaired, and it suffered yet more severely in the 
 Great Schism (1378-1415). Though the restoration 
 of harmony and unity in the church was so effected 
 as to save the appearance of papal independence, the 
 aggressive attitude of the Pope toward temporal
 
 PAPACY AGAINST EMPIRE 151 
 
 princes could no longer be maintained. The feudal 
 order of society was waning. Where its influence 
 still persisted most strongly in the Empire the 
 Roman church could still assume an air of aggressive 
 political consequence; but in the rising national 
 states of France, England and Spain, her power was 
 henceforth wholly employed in the defence of rapidly 
 shrinking remnants of temporal dignity. 
 
 SELECT REFERENCES 
 
 ADAMS, Civilization during the Middle Ages, chaps, iii, 
 vi et seq., x, xvi. BBYCE, Holy Roman Empire, chaps, iii-v, 
 x and xiii. DILL, Roman Society in the Last Century of the 
 Western Empire. DURUY, Histoire du moyen dge (History of 
 the Middle Ages, trans.), chaps, xvii, xviii, xxv. EMERTON, 
 Introduction to the Middle Ages, chaps, ix, xiv; Mediaeval 
 Europe, chaps, ii-x, xii. GIBBON, Decline and Fall, chaps, xv, 
 xvi, xx-xxi, xxviii, xxxvii, xlix. GIESEBEECHT, Geschichte der 
 deutschen Kaiserzeit, Bde. Ill, IV. GBEGOBOVIUS, Rom im 
 Mittelalter (Rome in the Middle Ages, trans, by Hamilton), 
 Buch III, cap. vii. HODGKIST, Italy and Her Invaders, Vol. 
 V, chaps, vii-x ; VI, ix, xiii-xiv ; VII, vii et seq. ; VIII, v. 
 JANSSEN, Geschichte des deutschen Folkes, Bd. I, S. 427^472 
 (History of the German People, trans., Vol. II, pp. 105-160). 
 KAUFMANN, Deutsche Geschichte, Bd. II, S. 235 et seq. LAN- 
 CIANI, Pagan and Christian Rome, chap. i. LAVISSE ET RAM- 
 BAUD, Vol. II, chaps, ii-iv. LAURENT, Histoire de Vhumanite, 
 Toms. IV, VI. LEA, Studies in Church History, pp. 112-169, 
 288-299. MERIVALE, The Conversion of the Roman Empire. 
 MILMAN, Latin Christianity, Vol. I, pp. 41-163, 397-402, 542 
 et seq. ; II, 39-49, 73 et seq. ; III, 361 et seq. ROCQUAIN, La 
 Papaute au moyen dge. SCHAFF, History of the Christian 
 Church, Vol. I, chaps, viii, x ; II, i, iv ; III, iii, v. SHEPPARD, 
 The Fall of Rome and the Rise of New Nationalities. SHULTE, 
 Deutschen Reichs- und Rechtsgeschichte. TOUT, The Empire and 
 the Papacy, chaps, vi, xi, xvi.
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 POLITICAL THEORY IN THE EARLY CHURCH 
 
 1. Jesus and the Apostles 
 
 To the founder of Christianity no idea or doctrine 
 that can be designated as political seems to have had 
 the slightest interest. The teachings of Jesus, as 
 recorded in the Gospels, embody a moral code of 
 marvellous simplicity and completeness and the Jew- 
 ish Messianic theology. The Golden Rule, which 
 sums up his conception of the relations of man to 
 man, is in some degree unpolitical; since in pro- 
 portion as it is lived up to, the coercive function of 
 government loses significance. 1 A like unpolitical 
 influence springs from the pity for the oppressed and 
 the suffering which pervades all his thought. In 
 bringing hope to the lowly, the powerful of the earth 
 are disparaged and counted for nought. But the 
 hope that he holds out embodies no element what- 
 ever of revolutionary suggestion. The "kingdom" 
 into which his followers are to enter is most carefully 
 distinguished from the realms of this world. It is 
 the kingdom of Heaven, mystically conceived as the 
 abode of God. From every attempt to attribute to 
 
 1 Cf. Janet, Histoire de la Science politique, I, 284 (ed. 1887). 
 
 162
 
 JESUS AND THE APOSTLES 153 
 
 him the characteristics of temporal dominion, he 
 turns with indifference or scorn. The efforts of his 
 adversaries to embroil him with the Roman authori- 
 ties evoke the pregnant injunction, " Render unto 
 Csesar the things that are Caesar's "; 1 and at the cri- 
 sis of his life he convinces Pilate by the disclaimer : 
 " My kingdom is not of this world." 2 The ingenuity 
 of later ages, as will appear in subsequent chapters, 
 extracted from the text of the gospels doctrines that 
 stood in violent contrast to these; but the indiffer- 
 ence to temporal power which these express accords 
 with the whole spirit of Jesus himself. 
 
 It is this spirit which clearly animated the apostles 
 in spreading the faith among Jews and Gentiles. The 
 soul of Paul's admirable epistles is exhortation to up- 
 right living and to saving faith in the new Evangel. 
 Of pure and uplifting morality and of subtle and pro- 
 found theology his works are full, but of politics we 
 find only that injunction of passive obedience : " Let 
 every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For 
 there is no power but of God ; the powers that be are 
 ordained of God," 3 etc. Paul conceives of government 
 as an instrument for the execution of God's will. And 
 this conception is even more fully expressed by Peter : 
 " Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for 
 the Lord's sake ; whether it be to the king, as supreme ; 
 or unto governors, as unto them that are sent by him 
 for the punishment of evil-doers and for the praise of 
 them that do well." 4 It was in the spirit of these 
 
 1 Matt, xxii, 17 ; cf. Matt, xvi, 24-27. 
 
 2 John xviii, 36. Rom. xiii, 1-7. 4 1 Peter ii, 13-17.
 
 154 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 texts, supported by the injunctions to meekness and 
 humility that pervaded the teachings of both Jesus 
 and the apostles, that the roll of Christian martyrology 
 was made up j for passive submission found its abso- 
 lute limit in that world-old refuge of religious dissent : 
 " We ought to obey God rather than men." 1 
 
 The political indifferentism of primitive Christian- 
 ity was supplemented by a social indifferentism that 
 tended often to aggressiveness. For the humble 
 classes from which Jesus drew his followers, it was 
 natural to interpret the Master's denunciations of the 
 rich in a communistic spirit. 2 But the sober sense of 
 Paul and his followers corrected this extreme ten- 
 dency, and preached that no earthly condition was a 
 bar, as none was a key, to entrance into the Christian 
 fellowship. Faith in Jesus constituted the sole test, 
 and in this faith there was no distinction of rich or 
 poor, high or low, slave or free. Thus in the lowly 
 classes at the base of the social structure in the 
 Roman Empire developed a principle of equality and 
 brotherhood analogous in its bearings to that which 
 Stoicism was propagating among the intellectual 
 classes at the social apex. 3 As Christianity spread 
 upward among the people, its way was made easier 
 by the prevalence of Stoic concepts ; the oneness of 
 humanity, which had been conceived as centring in 
 the Stoic cosmopolis, received a much more definite 
 and attractive realization in the promise of the 
 Christian heaven. 
 
 1 The Acts v, 29. 2 The Acts, ii, 44, 45. Supra, pp. 105-108.
 
 AMBROSE OF MILAN 155 
 
 2. The Fathers of the Church: Ambrose, Augustine, 
 Gregory the Great 
 
 When, in the fourth century, Christianity became 
 the official creed of the Roman state, the general tone 
 of the writers who treated of doctrinal matters was 
 that of Jesus and the apostles. Humility, political 
 indifferentism and other-worldliness were dominant. 
 But by this time the church had become a huge 
 social, quasi-political institution. It possessed great 
 property ; its relations with the imperial administra- 
 tion were close and complicated ; and it was distracted 
 by heresy. These conditions injected into ecclesias- 
 tical writings a new note, illustrated by the able and 
 vigorous Ambrose of Milan. The rights and dignity 
 of the church began to be set on even terms with 
 those of the Empire, and in relation to the injunction 
 of Jesus was suggested the vital question: What is 
 Caesar's and what is God's ? The great Theodosius, 
 guilty of barbarous cruelty toward his rebellious sub- 
 jects, was reproved and brought to repentance by 
 Ambrose, and gave full recognition to sacerdotal 
 sway over the moral life of the Christians. When 
 Valentinian ordered that the claim of an Arian to 
 the see which Ambrose held should be brought before 
 the imperial court for trial and decision, the latter 
 indignantly refused to comply. "In a matter of 
 faith," he boldly declared, " bishops are wont to judge 
 emperors, not emperors bishops." 1 This is pre- 
 
 1 Quis est qui abnuet in causa fidei . . . episcopos solere de Impe- 
 ratoribus christianis, non Imperatores de Episcopis judicare. Am- 
 brosii Epistola, xxxii, in Goldast, II, p. 10.
 
 156 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 scribed even by imperial laws, which must not be 
 repealed ; for " I would not that thy law should be 
 above the law of God." And when ordered to de- 
 liver certain of the churches of his see to his rival, 
 Ambrose, in his Oratio de Basilicis Tradendis? gave 
 passionate utterance to the claim that there was a 
 line within which imperial authority could not in- 
 trude. Tribute the Emperor may take ; the lands of 
 the church he may take, but the temple of God not. 
 "Palaces belong to the Emperor; churches to the 
 priest." " That which is divine is not subject to the 
 imperial power." But the decree of the Emperor 
 he would not resist by violence. The prayers of 
 the faithful were the only weapons of his defence. 
 " Tradere Basilicam non possum, sed pugnare non 
 debeo." 
 
 In Ambrose the growing self-consciousness of the 
 Christian church is manifest, but the sphere claimed 
 for its independence is still little more than apostolic. 
 Things moral and divine, where its authority is un- 
 disputed, are understood as trenching very slightly on 
 the temporal sphere, in which the authority of the 
 state is undisputed and even glorified. In Augustine 
 there is more manifest a tendency to depreciate the 
 importance of the forms and functions of political 
 authority, and to exalt by comparison the spiritual 
 life of the faithful. His most comprehensive work, 
 De Civitate Dei, though covering substantially the 
 whole realm of human history, theology and philoso- 
 
 1 Goldast, II, 12. Cf. also the letter to his sister, in which Ambrose 
 tells the story of the whole affair. Ibid. 16.
 
 SAINT AUGUSTINE 157 
 
 phy, has for its central theme the concept of God's 
 elect as constituting a commonwealth of the redeemed 
 in the world to come a commonwealth of which 
 the church is a symbol on earth. In developing this 
 idea, he works consciously on Plato's lines 1 and 
 formulates from the political philosophy of that mas- 
 ter and of Cicero a system in which the leading dog- 
 mas of the Christian faith assume a controlling part. 
 But while dealing with law and politics, and the 
 relations of men and nations in this world, all such 
 subjects are set forth as merely subsidiary and inci- 
 dental to the divine scheme of salvation for the saints 
 and their eternal blessedness. 2 The summwn bonum 
 the end of the universe is peace, harmony, order. 
 But the pax terrena, of which the household, the city 
 and the social world are expressions, is of slight con- 
 sequence compared with the pax ceterna the order 
 of life immortal. The peace of the body is as nought 
 compared with the peace of the soul. The right of 
 dominion given by God to man over soulless things 
 illustrates the relative significance of the two. And 
 Augustine here incidentally lays down the Christian 
 justification of slavery. The lot of the slave is the 
 wages of sin. 8 The theory of the Roman jurists that 
 the slave is he whom the conqueror in battle has 
 spared (servare) is adopted, with the additional con- 
 ception of the judgment of God : " Every victory, 
 
 1 Cf. for his appreciation of Plato, De Civ. Dei, Lib. VIII, cap. 5, 6 
 et seq. 
 
 2 De Civ. Dei, Lib. XIX, esp. cap. 14 et seq. 
 
 3 " Conditio quippe servitutis jure intelligitur imposita pecca- 
 tori."
 
 158 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 even though it falls to the wicked, is a divine judg- 
 ment and through the downfall of the vanquished 
 either atones for or punishes sin." But to the Chris- 
 tian submission to an earthly master is of little 
 moment, in the assurance that in life immortal all is 
 equality. 
 
 The character of Augustine's thought is as well as 
 anywhere illustrated in his criticism of Cicero's concep- 
 tion of commonwealth and people. 1 Embodying the 
 element of justice, the definition will not apply, the 
 critic holds, to a people that does not recognize God. 
 For " justice is that virtue which gives to each his 
 own," and it cannot be predicated of the community 
 which takes man himself away from God and gives 
 him to demons. This is not giving but denying to 
 God his own. 2 Justice can exist only in a people who 
 worship the true God. Augustine thus not only de- 
 preciates the earthly state as compared with the state 
 of the future life, but denies to non-Christian earthly 
 states all social virtue. For he early in his work 
 lays it down that without justice there is nothing to 
 distinguish a state from a band of brigands. 3 
 
 Two centuries after Augustine, in the writings of 
 Gregory the Great, " the last of the fathers," we find 
 the same general spirit as in Augustine, with an 
 accentuation of the stress on the church, the priest- 
 hood and the things of the spiritual life. Gregory 
 was thoroughly monkish in temperament ; a seer of 
 
 1 Ante, p. 120. 
 
 2 Op. cit., Lib. XTX, cap. 21 ; cf. 23 end, and 24. 
 
 8 Remota justitia, quid sunt regna nisi magna latrocinia? Lib. 
 IV, cap. 4.
 
 GREGORY THE GREAT 159 
 
 visions, a doer and discoverer of miracles and a deviser 
 of fanciful interpretations of the sacred writings. He 
 lived in a constant sense of besetting angels and 
 demons, and of the impending judgment of God. 
 Yet at the same time he displayed a remarkable 
 appreciation of the policy demanded by the actual 
 conditions which surrounded him ; and thus, while on 
 the one hand he greatly promoted the tendency of 
 the faith to ignorance and superstition, on the other 
 he maintained Rome from being overwhelmed by the 
 Lombards, and set the Roman see fairly on the way 
 to independence and exaltation. To the Emperor at 
 Constantinople Gregory observed and even emphasized 
 the forms of servility which were the custom of the 
 day. He proclaimed himself mere " dust and worm," 
 and when the Emperor called him a simpleton, merely 
 sought consolation in the Scriptures. 1 But this pol- 
 icy could find a cause in the ever-present danger 
 from the Lombards, and it in no way altered the 
 writer's conviction that the secular power was less 
 noble than the spiritual. In protesting against a law 
 that soldiers should not be admitted to monasteries, 
 he declared it to be the end of the imperial rule "that 
 the way to heaven may be more accessible and that 
 the earthly may serve the celestial kingdom." 2 
 Monks are the soldiers of God, and priests are the 
 servants of God are like angels and to be esteemed 
 divine. Finally, no one can rightly wield secular 
 
 1 See letters in Goldast, II, 21-22. 
 
 2 Ut . . . Coelorum via largius pateat, et terrestre regnum coelesti 
 regno famuletur. Ibid,
 
 160 POLITICAL THEOEIES 
 
 power who knows not how to deal with things divine; 
 " the peace of the state depends on the peace of the 
 universal church." 
 
 After Gregory and largely through his influence 
 sacerdotal literature and other literature there was 
 none became destitute of political bearing till the 
 stirring ages of the Carolingians. The Gregorian 
 type of thought definitely superseded the Augustin- 
 ian; the ancient pagan writers were discarded as 
 profane, and the sole recourse of the monkish scribes 
 for history, theology or law was to the Bible or to 
 the " fathers." This fact gave a peculiar character 
 to the controversies of the Middle Age. 
 
 SELECT REFERENCES 
 
 BLAKEY, Vol. I, chaps, v and viii. BAXMANN, Die Politik 
 der Pdpste von Gregor I bis auf Gregor VII, Buch I, cap. i-iv. 
 BURY, Later Roman Empire, Vol. I, chaps, i-iii ; II, pp. 149- 
 158. DILL, Roman Society, pp. 59 et seq., 387-391. GIESELER, 
 Church History, trans., Vol. I, pp. 66-94, 263-267, 439- 
 462. JANET, Vol. I, pp. 279-325. LAURENT, Histoire de 
 Phumanite, Tome IV, pp. 65-234, 495 et seq. MILMAN, Latin 
 Christianity, Vol. I, pp. 120-124; II, 39-103. MOELLER, 
 History of the Christian Church, A.D. 1-600, pp. 49-93, 453 
 et seq. NOURRISSON, La Philosophic de Saint Augustin, Tome 
 I, chap, v; II, 398 et seq. PINGAUD, La Politique de Saint 
 Gregoire le Grand. SCHAFF, History of the Christian Church, 
 Vol. I, pp. 103, 107-110, 197-205, 739 et seq.; Ill, 85-89, 816- 
 856, 961-972, 988 et seq. CARLYLE, " The Political Theory of 
 the Ante-Nicene Fathers," in The Economic Review, IX, 
 361-371.
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 THEORIES DURING THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECCLESI- 
 ASTICAL HEGEMONY 
 
 1. Development and Method of Reasoning 
 
 THE momentary impulse given to learning by 
 Charlemagne's enlightened policy did not result in 
 any notable contribution to political theory during 
 the Emperor's own lifetime. But the leading part 
 taken by the higher clergy in the conflicts over the 
 partition of his dominion precipitated the debate on 
 what has been said to have constituted the core of 
 mediaeval political thought the relation of the 
 ecclesiastical to the secular power. The general 
 trend of this debate, from the ninth to the thir- 
 teenth century, following closely the trend of objec- 
 tive fact, was toward a well-rounded theory, first of 
 ecclesiastical and then of papal hegemony in world 
 politics. The literature in which this theory is 
 embodied is for the most part a literature of con- 
 troversy on concrete temporary issues. For our 
 purpose it is not necessary to follow the varying 
 phases of the debate. We may be content with the 
 mere mention of the leading participants, and a 
 more or less systematic account of the doctrine to 
 the ensemble of which all of them contributed. 
 
 M 161
 
 162 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 In the ninth century the great names are those of 
 Agobard, 1 Bishop of Lyons (779-840 ?), prominent 
 in the strife between Emperor Loitis the Pious and 
 his sons ; Hincinar, 2 Archbishop of Rheims (806 ?- 
 882), the all-powerful primate of the Gallic church ; 
 and Pope Nicholas I (pontificate S58-867). 3 The 
 tenth century is practically a blank for our purpose, 
 but the next two centuries are rich in powerful 
 debaters of the theory under discussion. In the 
 Hildebrandine age may be named, besides Pope 
 Gregory VII himself (pontificate 1073-1085) 4 and 
 his imperial adversary, Henry IV, 5 Manegold of Lut- 
 terbach, who put forth an elaborate argument in 
 behalf of the Pope/ and the German bishops, The- 
 oderic of Verdun and Waltram of Naumburg, who 
 wrote in behalf of the Emperor. The twelfth cen- 
 tury produced on the one side St. Bernard, 7 John of 
 Salisbury 8 and the influential Decretum of Gratian, 9 in 
 which, by the collection, comparison and reconcili- 
 ation of ecclesiastical authorities, the hierarchical 
 theory was reduced to the form of a legal system ; 
 and on the other, the supporters of the Emperor 
 Frederick Barbarossa and the jurists of the Civil Law, 
 whose commentaries on Justinian afforded the best 
 theoretical defence for the imperial jurisdiction. The 
 
 1 Works, in Migne, Patrologia Latina, Vol. 104. 
 
 2 Ibid. Vols. 125, 126. 
 
 8 Ibid. Vol. 119. * Ibid. Vol. 148. 
 
 6 His official documents are in Goldast, Collectio Constitutionum 
 Imperialium. Also in the Monumenta Germanics Historica, Constitu- 
 tiones. 
 
 6 In the Monumenta, Libelli de Lite, Vol. I, p. 308. 
 
 i Migne, Vols. 182-185. 8 Ibid. Vol. 199. 9 Ibid. Vol. 187.
 
 METHOD OF REASONING 163 
 
 fully rounded ecclesiastical theory, at the climax of 
 actual ecclesiastical power, is to be found in the writ- 
 ings of Pope Innocent III (pontificate 1198-1216). 1 
 
 The method characteristic of all the reasoning of 
 these centuries was that to which Gregory the Great 
 had given the impulse. A certain few precedents 
 of profane history were appealed to, but beyond this 
 the Bible and the teachings of the church fathers 
 were held to 'be conclusive. Of the latter, St. Au- 
 gustine was most abundantly drawn upon, with 
 Gregory the Great in the second place. Augustine's 
 extensive ramblings in secular history were, how- 
 ever, disregarded, though the influence of his appeal 
 to history was manifest in the use made of the Old 
 Testament. The increasing resort to the Old Testa- 
 ment as compared with the New furnishes, indeed, a 
 fairly accurate measure of the intensifying of the 
 conflict between the ecclesiastical and the secular 
 power. The indifferentism and submissiveness of 
 Jesus and the apostles were feeble weapons in com- 
 parison with the aggressive tone found in the law 
 and the prophets of the Old Dispensation. It was 
 universally assumed that the history of the children 
 of Israel was a direct prefiguring of the life of the 
 Christian church, and that the canonical Scriptures 
 were literally inspired by God, and hence were in- 
 fallible guides. On these assumptions, the appeal 
 to Israelitish history and institutions could not be 
 attacked by either side, and had to be made by 
 both. Hence it was that the discussions of the 
 1 Migne, Vols. 214-217.
 
 164 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 period consisted very largely in citations from the 
 Bible, interpreted and commented upon in what is to 
 the modern mind an insufferably blind and uncritical 
 spirit. And thus it was that human experience, out- 
 side of the one people whose records were embodied 
 in the Scriptures, had slight influence upon the 
 political theory of the Middle Age. 
 
 As described in the Old Testament, the institu- 
 tions of the Israelitish state appear purely theocratic. 
 Government is administered under laws and through 
 organs whose existence is derived from the direct 
 manifestation of God's will. The Levitical priest- 
 hood, the judges and the prophets perform the grav- 
 est functions in the state under immediate divine 
 mandates. And when royalty is established in 
 Israel, the kings are represented as hedged about 
 by the ancient theocratic traditions, and as com- 
 monly determined, in both the origin and the exer- 
 cise of their power, by priests and prophets, through 
 whom the will of God is made manifest. 
 
 By this conception of the Israelitish state, the 
 mediaeval theory of politics was decisively influenced. 
 No doubt was raised that the priesthood of the 
 Christian church was prefigured by the Levites and 
 the prophets of the old dispensation, and that the 
 relations of the latter to the kings in Israel and Ju- 
 dah were a divinely ordained symbol of the relations 
 that ought always to prevail. Accordingly, argu- 
 ment took the form of a citation of instances in 
 which God's favour could be construed as resting 
 decisively with royal or with sacerdotal authority
 
 OLD TESTAMENT PRECEDENT 165 
 
 respectively. In this sort of discussion the ecclesias- 
 tical debaters had a distinct advantage in the fact 
 that the ancient record almost invariably ascribed 
 the greatest prosperity to those monarchs who were 
 most subservient to the priests and prophets. It 
 seems clear, moreover, that the resort to the Old 
 Testament and the resulting advantage to the eccle- 
 siastical argument were promoted by the mere fact 
 that secular authority in Europe passed from an 
 emperor to a series of kings. No such dignitary 
 as Imperator or Augustus or Caesar appears in the 
 Old Testament, while kings figure there in great 
 numbers. To the mediaeval mind a text embodying 
 a reference to a " king " by that title was decisive 
 without further investigation. " Emperor " signified 
 something higher, and the claims of imperial au- 
 thority had to be met by a somewhat different line 
 of reasoning. 1 Kings could be denounced in the 
 very words of divine inspiration; to humble the 
 Emperor resort was necessary to the general preemi- 
 nence of the spiritual authority. 
 
 2. The Dogma of the Two Powers 
 
 The starting-point in all mediaeval theorizing on 
 politics was the dogma of the two powers. The 
 
 1 The consciousness of this distinction is shown in the letter of 
 Gregory VII to Hermann of Metz (Registrum, lib. iv, epist. 2) : 
 " Ambrosius non solum regem sed etiam revera imperatorem . . . 
 excommunicavit." Gregory never recognized Henry IV as Emperor. 
 The earlier distinction between royal and imperial dignity is exhibited 
 in a letter of Alcuin quoted in Gieseler, Church History (translation. 
 N.Y. 1865), Vol. II, p. 38, note. For the whole letter, see Jaffe, Biblio- 
 theca Rerum Germanicarum, Vol. VI, p. 463.
 
 166 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 accepted formula for the dogma was a dictum said to 
 have occurred in a letter of Pope Gelasius to the 
 Emperor Anastasius (494 A.D.) : 
 
 There are two systems under which chiefly this world is 
 governed, the sacred authority of the priests and the royal 
 power. Of these the greater weight is with the priests in so 
 far as they will answer to the Lord even for kings in the last 
 judgment. 1 
 
 This text recurs very frequently throughout the con- 
 troversies of the times. To the ecclesiastics the 
 second clause naturally rendered it especially attrac- 
 tive. Hincmar cites it wherever he touches on the 
 subject-matter ; 2 Gregory VII employs it in defending 
 his proceedings against Henry of Germany; and it 
 found a place in the compilation of Gratian. 8 Nor 
 was the fact of the twofold authority disputed by the 
 opponents of ecclesiastical pretensions. The actuality 
 of sacerdotal power was too conspicuous a feature 
 of the period to be disregarded, however stoutly the 
 extreme deductions of the priests as to the extent 
 of their sway might be resisted. 
 
 For the establishment and perpetuation of the dual 
 system of authority, proofs of divine sanction were 
 
 1 Mansi, Sacrorum Conciliorum Collectio, VIII, 31 ; cf. Gieseler, II, 
 49. " Duo quippe sunt, imperator Augusts, quibus priiicipaliter 
 mundus hie regitur, auctoritas sacrata pontificum et regalis potestas. 
 In quibus tanto gravius est pondus sacerdotum quanto etiam pro ipsis 
 regibus Domino in divino reddituri sunt examine rationem." 
 
 2 E.g., Ad Proceres Regni pro institutions Carlomanni Regis, cap. i; 
 Ad Episcopos Regni Admonitio, cap. i; Capitula in Sijnodo apud 
 S. Macram, cap. i ; Epist. ad Ludovicum III, Regem ; De Divortio 
 Lotharii et Tetbergae. 
 
 8 Decretum, Dist. 96, can. 10.
 
 DOGMA OF THE TWO POWEKS 167 
 
 brought forward in abundance. Hincmar's doctrine 
 was that Jesus alone could have become, like the 
 pagan rulers, both priest and king, but he elected not 
 to unite the two functions ; and after his ascension 
 no king presumed to exercise priestly, nor priest to 
 mingle in royal, powers. 1 And another dictum of 
 Pope Gelasius enjoyed throughout the Middle Ages 
 equal authority with that referred to above : 
 
 The Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, 
 by marking out the methods and dignities appropriate to each, 
 so distinguished between the duties of the two powers . . . 
 that the Christian emperors should need the priests for the 
 sake of eternal life, and the priests should make use of the 
 imperial laws for the course of temporal affairs only. 2 
 
 With the resort to the Old Testament fully estab- 
 lished, the authority of Jesus to separate the two 
 powers was found prefigured in that of Melchisedek, 
 who was both priest and king, and of David, who was 
 prophet and king, and in the fact that Jesus was of 
 both royal and sacerdotal lineage. 3 Even the creation 
 of the sun and moon, which was made by Innocent III 
 the basis of a rather striking simile, 4 assumed the 
 character of a calculated symbol of the divine will in 
 respect to the two species of authority. The distinc- 
 tion between body and soul afforded another analogy 
 which was frequently appealed to; and the "two 
 
 1 Capitula apud S. Macram, cap. i. Also Admonitio ad Episcopos, 
 cap. i. 
 
 2 Decretum Gratiani, Dist. 10, can. 8, and Dist. 96, can. 6. In both 
 places the passage is quoted from a letter of Pope Nicholas I. 
 
 8 Innocent III, Responsio Nuntiis Philippi, Reg. de Neg. Rom. 
 Imp. 18. * Reg. lib. i, epist. 401.
 
 168 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 swords" exhibited to Jesus by the disciples 1 played 
 ultimately a prominent part in the thought of an age 
 that was inordinately sensitive to dualism. 
 
 But however fixed the idea of a distinction of 
 powers, there was theoretically no cause for conflict 
 between them. A perfect harmony was conceived 
 as the divinely ordained relation. Things temporal 
 were the domain of royalty, things spiritual that of 
 the priesthood. The sphere of each was decreed by 
 God for the exclusive administration of each. As the 
 emperors and kings claimed no authority in spiritual 
 affairs, so the bishops and popes claimed no authority 
 in secular affairs. The purpose of the distinction 
 between the two powers was clearly laid down in 
 the continuation of the passage last quoted from 
 Gelasius : 
 
 In order that spiritual action may be free from carnal inter- 
 ruptions, and thus that " no man who warreth for God should 
 entangle himself in the affairs of this world " (2 Tim. ii, 4) ; 
 and in turn that he who has been involved in secular business 
 should not be seen directing what is divine. 
 
 Theoretically, thus, there would appear to have been 
 no basis for the age-long conflict of the powers. But 
 the difficulty arose from the lack of any clear defi- 
 nition as to what was secular and what was spiritual. 
 The ground on which the great churchmen attacked 
 princes was that the latter were encroaching upon 
 the spiritual domain, and the plea of the princes 
 always was that the churchmen were mingling in 
 
 1 Luke xxii, 38. See St. Bernard, De Consider atione, lib. iv.
 
 SACERDOTAL PREEMINENCE 169 
 
 secular affairs. 1 In the nature of the things the 
 dispute could never be definitely decided by theory. 
 As in all similar matters of wide human concern 
 there was a broad field in which no precise and per- 
 manent line of demarcation could be drawn, and in 
 which the assignment of specific cases to the one or 
 the other category must vary with social conditions 
 and with the general spirit of the age. 
 
 3. The Argument for Sacerdotal Preeminence 
 
 In the centuries during which the clash of the 
 powers was most intense, the social and intellectual 
 conditions were wholly favourable to the ecclesi- 
 astical cause, and a theory of general sacerdotal 
 preeminence was matured which appealed very 
 effectively to the sentiment of the times. The 
 development of this theory stood in close relation 
 to the doctrines upon which was erected the suprem- 
 acy of the Roman see in the church. But since the 
 latter lie without the field of political theory, they 
 will be passed over. The only effect of the so-called 
 Petrine dogma upon the general argument was to 
 shift somewhat the emphasis placed upon the par- 
 ticular items. 
 
 This argument, broadly considered, followed two 
 lines : first, that from the essential character of the 
 
 1 1 have found no case in the period with which we are concerned 
 of a claim by laymen to spiritual power as such ; and no claim by the 
 clergy to direct control in temporal affairs, except that Innocent III 
 asserted for the Papacy in certain cases an incidental jurisdiction : 
 " certis causis inspectis, temporalem jurisdictionem casualiter exerce- 
 mus." Reg. lib. v, epist. 128.
 
 170 POLITICAL THEOEIES 
 
 two species of authority the greater dignity pertained 
 to the spiritual and hence gave precedence to those 
 in whom its exercise was vested ; second, that God 
 had directly conferred upon the church such power 
 of inspection and correction in reference to the char- 
 acter and motives of secular rulers as carried neces- 
 sarily, though indirectly, a control over their acts 
 wherever a question of sin or morals was involved. 
 The first idea was an immediate consequence of 
 the views of the early church as to the relative im- 
 portance of the earthly life and the life to come. 1 
 As the saving of souls was infinitely more important 
 than the regulation of mere physical life, so the 
 savers of souls were infinitely more worthy of honour 
 than the regulators of physical life. Ambrose had 
 said that the glory of princes was to the glory of 
 bishops as the brightness of lead to the brightness of 
 gold ; and this saying was a feature of all the sacer- 
 dotal arguments of the later age. Kings and princes, 
 said Gregory VII, in that letter to Hermann of 
 Metz 2 in which the professions of humility are in 
 such striking contrast to the manifestations of arro- 
 gance, cannot cast out devils, cannot rescue from 
 perdition the soul of a dying sinner, nay, must them- 
 selves come humbly to the priests for baptism and 
 absolution. No king or emperor has raised the dead 
 to life, has healed the lepers, or has made the blind 
 to see. " From which is gathered how far the sacer- 
 dotal dignity exceeds the princely." This conclusion 
 was also supported by the analogy of the body and 
 
 1 Supra, pp. 155, 157. 2 Reg. lib. viii, epist. 22.
 
 SACERDOTAL PREEMINENCE 171 
 
 the soul as the soul is more noble than the body, 
 so is the priesthood than royalty and by that of 
 the sun and moon, symbolizing sacerdotium and reg- 
 num respectively. And finally, a characteristic in- 
 terpretation of Old Testament history derived a proof 
 of greater dignity from the greater antiquity of the 
 sacerdotal office. Innocent III saw in Noah, as cap- 
 tain of the ark (rector arcoe), a symbol of the priest 
 of the church (quasi sacerdos eccksice), but was able 
 to get even nearer the beginning of things by point- 
 ing to the sacerdotal act of Abel, who " brought of 
 the firstlings of his flock and of the fat thereof ; and 
 the Lord had respect unto Abel and his offering." l 
 
 The second line of argument in the theory of cleri- 
 cal supremacy developed its peculiar strength out of 
 the distinction which early became so clearly marked 
 between the clerical and the lay elements in the 
 church and the elimination of the latter element 
 from all authority in ecclesiastical functions, whether 
 spiritual or merely administrative. Secular princes 
 were laymen. To the sacerdotal mind they were of 
 all laymen the class most prone to sin, and therefore 
 most in need of clerical censure. No fault can pos- 
 sibly be found with the ideal of character and conduct 
 which the mediaeval clergy set up for princes. 2 But 
 
 1 Innocent III, Reg. de Neg. Rom. Imp. xviii. This argument was 
 used as early as Agobard. Cf. his Epist. ad Bernardum : De Priv. et 
 Jure Sacerdotii. In the above cited decretal of Innocent is contained 
 an elaborate and formal argument for the superior dignity of the 
 priesthood, including the citation of many other texts of Scripture 
 whose connection with the subject cannot to-day be detected ; e.g. the 
 vision of Peter recorded in Acts x. 
 
 2 Cf. Hincmar, Ad, Episcopos Admonitio pro Carolomanno, cap. 3,4.
 
 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 just in proportion as the requirements were more 
 exacting the occasions for priestly reproof were more 
 numerous. Among the duties of kings that were 
 most imperatively insisted upon were respect for 
 and protection of the church and its ministers. 
 Upon the form and manner of fulfilling this duty 
 there were naturally wide divergences of opinion 
 between churchmen and secular rulers, and out of 
 these differences arose the most critical of the 
 mediaeval controversies. 
 
 The case for sacerdotal jurisdiction was effectively 
 presented by Hincmar in his discussion of the divorce 
 of Lothaire. 1 The contention of the king's defenders 
 that the king's acts are independent of episcopal 
 judgment and subject only to that of God, is con- 
 cisely declared to be blasphemous and diabolical. 
 This contention may be true, Hincmar admits, of the 
 good king; but the unjust or tyrannical ruler, like 
 all sinners, must be judged by the priests, 2 " who are 
 the thrones of God, in whom he has his seat and 
 through whom he decrees his judgments." From 
 the Scriptures Hincmar gathers all the texts which 
 were most relied upon throughout the period. Jesus 
 himself directly conferred on the church the final 
 authority in disputes between brethren, adding this 
 
 1 De Divortio Lotharii et Tetbergce, Qusestio VI, of the seven supple- 
 mentary questions at the end of the work. Cf. supra, p. 145. 
 
 2 " Vel secrete vel publice " ; that is, in the confessional or in the 
 synod. The extension of the power of absolution of penitents after 
 confession, to cover the claim to the right of publicly absolving or 
 condemning a king for his official acts, was characteristic of the 
 period under consideration.
 
 SACERDOTAL PREEMINENCE 173 
 
 plenary grant of power to the disciples : " What- 
 soever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in 
 heaven ; and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth shall 
 be loosed in heaven." 1 The Old Testament record 
 shows God continually employing the prophets as 
 messengers of his wrath or mercy to kings. Samuel 
 announced the divine judgment to Saul, Nathan to 
 David, Ahijah to Jeroboam. 2 And in the law of 
 Moses the symbol of sacerdotal jurisdiction is found 
 embodied in the formal establishment of a court of 
 Levites for last resort in difficult and doubtful cases. 3 
 Later protagonists of the ecclesiastical cause dis- 
 covered or emphasized other texts from the word 
 of God. Gregory VII and all the adherents of the 
 advanced Petrine theory, laid especial stress on the 
 injunction of Jesus to Peter, " Feed my sheep," 4 
 which was construed as a charge of universal pas- 
 toral authority from which kings were not ex- 
 empted. 5 And Innocent III, whose ingenuity in 
 defending his claims to jurisdiction was quite com- 
 mensurate with his boldness in asserting them, fairly 
 exhausted the possibilities of this species of reason- 
 ing. He even derived from an interpretation of 
 Deuteronomy xvii, 8-12, the conclusion that difficult 
 and doubtful questions of all kinds, both ecclesiasti- 
 cal and civil, might properly be referred to the papal 
 see for adjudication. 6 
 
 1 Matt, xviii, 15-18. Cf. Luke, x, 16. 
 
 2 1 Sam. xiii and xv ; 2 Sam. xii ; 1 Kings xi. 8 Deut. xvii, 8-13. 
 * John xxi, 15-17. 5 Gregory VII, Reg. lib. iv, epist. 2. 
 6 Lib. v, epist. 128. This is a " leading case " in the mediaeval 
 
 " conflict of the laws." It contains the papal decision on an applica-
 
 174 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 After the time of Gregory VII, however, the crux 
 of the claim to superior authority by the ecclesias- 
 tical power lay in the method of enforcing its judg- 
 ments, especially against the bearers of ultimate 
 political power. The final penalty of the church 
 was excommunication and anathema. This, it was 
 consistently held, corresponded to the death penalty 
 in the Mosaic law : for the church of the New Dis- 
 pensation did not wield the sword of blood; its 
 weapon was the sword of the spirit. But when the 
 terrors of excommunication ceased to make rulers re- 
 spect the church, the power to depose a monarch was 
 asserted, and was made effective through the power 
 to release subjects from the oath of allegiance. Under 
 the feudal organization of society the political signifi- 
 cance of this oath was very great. But the relation 
 to God that was created by the oath easily brought 
 the matter within the domain of things spiritual. 1 
 
 A specific grant of control over the bond between 
 ruler and subjects was found in the authority to " bind 
 and loose " conferred by Jesus on the disciples in the 
 text of Matthew quoted above. But the Old Testa- 
 ment yielded a host of confirmatory texts. Most far- 
 
 tion for the legitimation of the natural children of William, Lord of 
 Montpellier. The decision is that legitimating is a secular act, and 
 the petition is denied. But the Pope argues at length that the papal 
 jurisdiction might cover it ; for the adultery from which the children 
 sprang was a sin, and subject to sacerdotal judgment. The whole 
 document is characteristic of the times ; and the interpretation of the 
 text of Deuteronomy is particularly noteworthy. Cf. Janet, op. cit., 
 I, 352. 
 
 1 The right to absolve is defended at length in a letter of Gebhard 
 of Salzburg to Hermann of Metz, in Migne, Patrologia, Vol. 148, 
 p. 847.
 
 SACERDOTAL PREEMINENCE 175 
 
 reaching was God's commission to the prophet Jere- 
 miah : " See, I have this day set thee over the 
 nations and over the kingdoms, to root out, and 
 to pull down, and to destroy, and to throw down, 
 to build, and to plant." l In addition, appeal was 
 made to the whole series of incidents in which tyran- 
 nic kings in Israel had been denounced, and their 
 doom foretold, by prophets. And finally a number 
 of precedents in the history of Christian times were 
 always cited, to show that practice had conformed to 
 this theory of ecclesiastical control. Theodosius, it was 
 said, was deprived by Ambrose of the exercise of his 
 imperial powers till he should have repented of his sin. 2 
 Chilperic, the last of the Merovingians, was deposed 
 and his subjects were released from their oath by 
 Pope Zacharias, and this not because of sin on the 
 part of the king, but merely because of incompetency. 
 The coronation of Charlemagne by Pope Leo came 
 to be habitually treated as a transfer of imperial 
 authority from the East to the West, and as a grant 
 of such authority to the Frankish monarch, with the 
 corollary that he who bestowed could deny or with- 
 draw it. In the greatest heat of controversy, further- 
 more, much stress was laid by some defenders of the 
 papal cause on the fable known as the " Donation of 
 Constantine." This story, which became especially 
 prominent through its incorporation in the Decretum 
 
 1 Jer. i, 11. Cf. an elaborate comparison of this with the commis- 
 sion of Jesus to the disciples, by Innocent III, in Reg. de Neg. Rom. 
 Imp. xviii. 
 
 2 This exaggerated version of the incident (supra, p. 145) is given by 
 John of Salisbury, Polycraticus, Bk. IV, ch. iii.
 
 176 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 of Gratian, 1 narrated with much detail how Constan- 
 tino the Great, upon his removal to Constantinople, 
 had conferred all his imperial authority in the West 
 upon Pope Sylvester, thus giving to the latter the 
 priority as a secular ruler over all the kings in that 
 region. But the most clear-sighted supporters of the 
 Papacy disregarded this argument, as implying that 
 some portion of the papal power was derived from man 
 rather than from God direct, and found a much more 
 secure basis for their position in the general character of 
 the sacerdotal function as compared with the political. 
 With a wide basis in custom and public sentiment 
 for the exercise of jurisdiction over many classes of 
 legal controversies ; with an exclusive control of 
 such as could be shown to be spiritual in character ; 
 with the facility for extending this control that 
 inhered in the doctrine that it embraced whatever 
 actions were in any way tainted with sin ; and with 
 the power to enforce its interpretation of its author- 
 ity by the deposition of secular rulers from power, 
 the mediaeval church was in fact, if not in theory, a 
 most potent political institution. 
 
 4. The Argument for Princely Independence 
 
 The ground taken by the secular rulers in opposi- 
 tion to the claims of the ecclesiastical power was in 
 general that which is known at the present time as 
 
 1 Dist. 96, can. 13 and 14. The other famous work of forgery 
 in the mediaeval conflict, the pseudo-Isidorian Decretals, have no 
 direct interest in this place, as they were designed and employed 
 almost exclusively in the purely ecclesiastical struggle which estab- 
 lished the primacy of the Roman see.
 
 PRINCELY INDEPENDENCE 177 
 
 the doctrine of the divine right of kings. Conceding 
 the distinction of the two powers by Jesus, it held 
 that the prince's function was as much divine in 
 origin and character as the priest's, and that the 
 final responsibility for princely acts was to God 
 alone. 1 That kings ought to rule with justice, to 
 protect and promote the welfare of the church and 
 its priesthood, and to be benefactors of their people, 
 was freely admitted. But failure in any of these 
 respects did not divest them of the royal character 
 or subject them to other than purely spiritual pen- 
 alties. Their punishment would ensue, not in this, 
 but in the future life. The king, whether good or 
 bad, is, so the argument ran, the instrument of a 
 divine purpose. His beneficence betokens God's 
 mercy, his cruelty, God's wrath toward the subject 
 people. The duty of all is submission to his will, 
 and the only recourse against the evils of tyranny is 
 repentance for sin and prayer to God. 2 
 
 This whole doctrine, with its conclusion of passive 
 obedience, was made to rest, in the resort to Scripture 
 texts, mainly on the disclaimer by Jesus of secular 
 authority and on the injunctions of Paul and Peter. 3 
 
 1 This doctrine is concisely stated, for the purpose of refutation, 
 in Hincmar's essay, De Div. Loihar. et Tet. : Dicunt alii Sapientes quia 
 iste princeps rex est, et nullorum legibus vel judiciis subjacet nisi 
 solius Dei . . . et sicut a suis episcopis, quidquid egerit, non debet 
 excommunicari, ita ab aliis episcopis non potest judicari, quoniam 
 solius Dei principatui debet subjici, a quo solo in principatu consti- 
 tuit, et quod facit et qualis est in regimine, divino sit nutu. 
 
 2 For a temperate exposition of this doctrine, see Hugo Floriacen- 
 sis, Tractatus de Regia Potestate et Sacerdotali Dignitate, in Monumenta 
 Germanice Historica, Libelli de Lite, II, 465 ; esp. lib. i, cap. 9, and 
 lib. ii, cap. 6. 8 Rom. xiii, 1-7 ; 1 Peter ii, 15-17.
 
 178 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 The apostolic commands were indeed so direct and 
 explicit that it gave the ecclesiastics no little trouble 
 to escape the force of their literal application. 1 Paul 
 declares : 
 
 The powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever there, 
 fore resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God. . . . 
 He is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon 
 him that doeth evil. Wherefore ye must needs be subject, not 
 only for wrath, but also for conscience' sake. 
 
 And Peter enjoins obedience " to every ordinance of 
 man for the Lord's sake" to the king and to his 
 subordinates ; " for so is the will of God, that with 
 well doing ye may put to silence the ignorance of 
 foolish men." The sacerdotal debaters sought to evade 
 the issue here presented by distinguishing between 
 the king and the tyrant, 2 claiming that the apostolic 
 teaching applied only to the former, and also by 
 asserting that these injunctions were only for the 
 laity and not for the clergy, who were, like the 
 apostles, the teachers of the masses. 3 Such interpre- 
 tations were, however, obviously felt to be somewhat 
 strained and illogical and were much less promi- 
 nent in the sacerdotal argument than the Old Testa- 
 ment texts, where a special disclaimer of God's 
 responsibility for all kings was found in the often 
 
 1 The command of Jesus, " Render unto Caesar," etc., was less 
 cogent, for the obvious reason that it embodied no criterion as to 
 what was Caesar's, and what was God's. 
 
 2 This distinction is common from Hincmar throughout the period. 
 
 8 Cf. Innocent III, in a letter to Alexius, Emperor at Constanti- 
 nople. Prima Collectio Decretalium, tit. ii, 2; in Migne, Vol. 216, 
 col. 1182.
 
 PRINCELY INDEPENDENCE 179 
 
 cited passage, " They have set up kings, but not by 
 me ; they have made princes, and I knew it not." l 
 The supporters of secular independence readily fol- 
 lowed their adversaries to the Old Testament and 
 drew from it a notable array of doctrines favourable 
 to their cause. From Saul down kings were shown 
 to have enjoyed the direct sanction and conspicuous 
 favour of God, and to have been instruments of the 
 divine purpose. 2 But the princely cause was on the 
 whole at a disadvantage here ; for on the assumption 
 that the Levites and the prophets symbolized the Chris- 
 tian priesthood, the chronicles of Israel, transmitted as 
 they were by the ancient sacerdotal class, were of a 
 distinctly anti-royal character. A similar reason gave 
 to the hierarchical cause an advantage in the appeal 
 to precedents of Christian times. The accessible 
 historical records were very largely the work of the 
 priests and monks, and embodied the legends and 
 traditions peculiar to these classes. It was very diffi- 
 cult, therefore, to derive from current conceptions of 
 history any correctives for the distorted versions of 
 the attitude of even such noted rulers as Constantine, 
 Theodosius and Charlemagne. 
 
 With the revival of the study of Justinian's code 
 at Bologna, the lawyers, under the encouragement 
 of Frederick Barbarossa in the twelfth century, 
 began to make some influential contributions to the 
 theory of the relations of the Empire to the Papacy. 
 
 1 Hosea viii, 4. 
 
 2 For a battle royal of the texts, see the correspondence of Waltram 
 of Naumburg and Stephen of Halberstadt, for and against Henry IV 
 of Germany, in Migne, Patrologia, Vol. 148, col. 1442.
 
 180 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 The legislative absolutism of the prince was, as has ap- 
 peared above, 1 the foundation of the Roman system. 
 To emphasize this principle was to set an impassable 
 limit to the extension of papal jurisdiction. It 
 stood in perfect contradiction to the principle of 
 Gratian in his Decretum: "The decrees of princes 
 do not take precedence over, but follow, the decrees 
 of the church." 2 The encouragement given by 
 Frederick to the Roman law was incidental to the 
 general policy of the Hohenstaufen emperors, to 
 identify their dignity with that of the ancient Ro- 
 man rulers. To the papal theory that the German 
 emperors owed their authority to the " translation of 
 imperial power " (translatio imperil) by Pope Leo to 
 Charlemagne, was thus opposed the jurists' theory 
 of " unbroken imperial power" (imperium continuum). 
 The one doctrine had at least as good a foundation 
 in fact as the other. And the imperialistic theory 
 admirably supplemented and confirmed the idea of 
 a universal monarchy as the normal type of political 
 organization. Innocent III employed as an argu- 
 ment in demonstrating the superior dignity of the 
 spiritual power, the fact that the authority of a 
 prince was over only a limited region, while that 
 of the church was universal. 8 To such an argument 
 there was a cogent reply in the doctrine that the 
 sway of the Emperor extended de jure over all the 
 ancient Roman world, as well as over the German 
 territory that had been added to this dominion. 
 This universal jurisdiction was easily sustained by 
 
 1 Supra, p. 129. 2 Dist. x. 3 Reg. de Neg. Rom. Imp. xviii.
 
 ST. BERNARD 181 
 
 both the general spirit and the literal expressions 
 of the Corpus Juris Civilis ; and the theory of im- 
 perial independence of ecclesiastical authority re- 
 ceived strong support from the jurists. But this 
 particular form of argument for the secular power 
 naturally found little favour outside of the Holy 
 Eoman Empire ; for the English, French and Span- 
 ish kings and their supporters could gain little from 
 a doctrine which might save them from a Pope only 
 to subject them to an Emperor. 
 
 5. St. Bernard and John of Salisbury 
 
 In addition to the foregoing account of the syste- 
 matic contentions in behalf of the two powers, an 
 account of the political theory of this part of the 
 Middle Age requires some notice of two men of 
 great prominence in the twelfth century, whose ideas, 
 however, presented certain marked contrasts with 
 those that have just been considered. The two 
 men were St. Bernard and John of Salisbury. Both 
 were ecclesiastics, and both were thoroughly imbued 
 with the spirit of their order in respect to secular 
 authority. But in other respects they stood widely 
 apart. Bernard was a reforming monk, striving to 
 instil into the practice of religion the ascetic and 
 mystical spirit of the Fathers. John of Salisbury 
 was a man of letters and a man of the world, the 
 pupil of Abelard, from whom he imbibed that taste 
 for good literature of all kinds that made him one 
 of the most learned persons of his day. Bernard de- 
 spised secular learning as he despised all things of
 
 182 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 this world; and from the standpoint of his pure 
 spiritualism he assailed what he conceived to be 
 the temporal tendencies in the development of the 
 church and the Papacy. John, on the other hand, 
 accepting and sustaining the common dogmas of 
 ecclesiastical theory, enriched the argument by ex- 
 tensive recourse to the ideas of classic paganism. He 
 was the precursor of the greatest scholastics. While 
 Bernard strove to recall into control the spirit of 
 Gregory the Great, John systematically contravened 
 that spirit by finding and stimulating delight in 
 the literature which Gregory had banned. Bernard 
 represented a type which was to have little influ- 
 ence in the church before the reforming movement 
 of the sixteenth century, while John's methods were 
 to become within a short time characteristic of all 
 philosophy. 
 
 The attitude of St. Bernard is fully expressed in 
 his short but remarkable work, On Reflection? ad- 
 dressed to Pope Eugenius III (1145-1153). This is 
 in substance an energetic protest against the growing 
 absorption of the papal interest and energy in the ad- 
 ministrative and non-spiritual concerns of the church. 
 The maintenance, not to speak of the extension, of 
 the Roman church's territorial possessions in Central 
 Italy, as well as the world-wide business of organiz- 
 ing the second Crusade, made the papal court a centre 
 of great activity in politics, with all the incidents of 
 intrigue, ambition and avarice that are associated 
 
 1 De Considerations Libri V- Printed in Goldast, Monarchic., etc^ 
 II, 68. Also in Migne.
 
 ST. BERNARD 183 
 
 with such conditions. That the time and attention 
 of the Pope should be taken up with worldly matters 
 was to the lofty soul of Bernard unendurable. 
 " What," he asks, " is more slavish and unworthy, 
 especially in the chief pontiff, than to sweat every 
 day and almost every hour over such things ? " It 
 may be said that this is necessary in order to build 
 up the church and meditate in the law. "And in- 
 deed," Bernard remarks, "law resounds every day 
 through the palace ; but it is the law of Justinian, 
 not the law of the Lord." Jesus declined with scorn 
 to decide a dispute over property, though he decides 
 the eternal fate of souls ; and it is a false logic which 
 declares that the successors of the apostles must take 
 jurisdiction over temporal concerns merely because 
 they have authority over what is greater. Between 
 the power and dignity of absolving from sin and that 
 of dividing estates, there is no comparison. These 
 grovelling things of the earth are to be passed upon 
 by kings and princes. "Why do you rush into 
 another's field ? Why do you set your sickle to 
 another's crop ? " 
 
 The exaltation of the papal dignity is put by Ber- 
 nard in the most unqualified terms. 1 But the func- 
 tion of the Pope is pastoral, not princely. "Lordship" 
 (Dominatio) is denied to him in emphatic and reiterated 
 expressions. Christ alone is dominus, and the Pope 
 
 1 " Tu princeps episcoporum, tu haeres apostolum, tu primatu 
 Abel, gubernatu Noe, patriarchatu Abraham, ordine Melchizedek, 
 dignitate Aaron, auctoritate Moyses, judicatu Samuel, potestate 
 Petrus, unctione Christus."
 
 184 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 is his steward for all the world. The duty of this 
 stewardship is to nourish, not to govern (ut dispenses, 
 non imperes). And the abuses consequent upon the 
 policy of continually extending the appellate juris- 
 diction of the papal see are denounced in glowing 
 language. The venality of the court never received 
 a more direct and cutting rebuke than from Ber- 
 nard, 1 and the same is true of the ostentation, 
 frivolity and extravagance that ruled there. And 
 referring to a recent attempt of the Pope to maintain 
 his territorial interests by force, Bernard points out 
 that when a sword was drawn to defend Jesus at his 
 betrayal, the Master commanded that it be returned 
 to its scabbard. But, he continues, in a passage 
 which became a commonplace in later controversy, 
 the two swords of which Jesus said, " It is enough," 
 both belong to the church, 2 the spiritual and the 
 material; "but the latter must be used for the 
 church, the former also by the church; the former 
 by the hand of the priest, the latter by the hand of 
 the soldier, though at the suggestion (ad nutum) of 
 the priest and the command of the Emperor." 
 
 This passage strikingly illustrates the whole trend 
 of Bernard's thought. Secular affairs are to be let 
 alone by the priesthood not so much because they are 
 outside of its sphere as because they are beneath its 
 dignity and degrading in their nature. Political 
 
 1 " Quae dabis mihi . . . pretio sen spe pretii non interveniente ? " 
 Cf. the Goliardic line, " Curia Romana non quaerit ovem sine lana." 
 Emerton, Mediaeval Europe, p. 475. 
 
 2 If this were not true, Jesus would have said, not " satis est," but 
 " nimis est." The text is Luke xxii, 35-38.
 
 JOHN OF SALISBURY 185 
 
 authority, in short, has its function in the perform- 
 ance of the menial duties essential to the mainte- 
 nance and protection of the church. This idea is 
 baldly and uncompromisingly set forth by John of 
 Salisbury in dealing with the symbol of the two 
 swords. 1 The prince, he says, receives the sword of 
 blood from the church, who employs it by the hand 
 of the prince, reserving the spiritual sword for the 
 priests. 
 
 The prince, therefore, is indeed the servant (minister) of the 
 priesthood, and performs the part of the sacred duties which 
 seems unworthy of the hands of the priesthood. For while 
 every duty of the divine laws is religious and holy, neverthe- 
 less that of punishing crimes is inferior and seems in a way to 
 represent that of the executioner. 
 
 So unflattering a conception of political authority 
 is only set forth, however, when this species of power 
 is brought into comparison with the sacerdotal. The 
 Polycraticus? the chief work of John of Salisbury, 
 embodies a somewhat ambitious attempt at a broad 
 philosophy of politics, in which the elements of 
 princely rule receive in many respects a just and 
 impartial consideration. His method of treatment 
 is diffuse, and though it combines the appeal to 
 ecclesiastical authority with copious references to 
 pagan literature 8 and to pagan philosophy, it exhib- 
 
 1 Polycraticus, lib. iv, cap. 3. 
 
 2 The meaning of this title is unknown. For a conjecture as to 
 the title and an analysis of the work, see Poole, Illustrations of Medice- 
 val Thought (London, 1884), p. 216 et seq. 
 
 8 The author frequently apologizes for such references, excusing 
 himself on various grounds, e.g. that St. Paul drew illustrations from
 
 186 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 its in only a rudimentary way the harmonizing of 
 the two systems of thought that is characteristic 
 of the next century. The substance of his politics is 
 ethical rather than legal or constitutional. That is, 
 he has no doctrine to present as to the organization 
 of government, the distribution and inter-relationship 
 of functions, or even as to the various forms of state 
 and government. Monarchy is the only form of 
 which he takes cognizance ; and the administrative 
 organization of monarchy is considered only so far 
 as that of the old Roman Empire is known to him. 
 The general view of the state embodied in the work, 
 thus, is that suggested by the Roman Empire and 
 modified by the Jewish monarchies of the Old Testa- 
 ment. Assuming that the state is incarnate in the 
 prince, 1 the author dilates on the duties of the mon- 
 arch toward those who are over him the priests. 3 
 The most significant points of the work in the his- 
 tory of political theory are those touching (1) the 
 relation of the prince to law and (2) the distinction 
 between prince and tyrant. 
 
 As to the first, the doctrine is repeated again and 
 again that the prince is subject to law ; not, however, 
 to his own statutes, but to the divine law of eternal 
 justice, whose rule is equity. Equity is that general 
 
 profane history when he spoke to the Athenians (lib. iv, cap. 3) ; 
 and that in the case of Plutarch, any divergence from the true faith 
 and morals "tempori potius quam viro ascribatur" (lib. v, prol.). 
 
 1 He must bear in mind that " universitatis subjectorum se perso- 
 narn gerere, et se non sibi suam vitam sed aliis debere." Lib. iv, cap. 3. 
 
 2 The order of obligation is as follows : " Totum se Deo debet, plu- 
 rimum suae patriae, multum parentibus, propinquis, extraneis mini- 
 mum, nonnihil tamen." Ibid.
 
 JOHN OF SALISBURY 187 
 
 harmony in things through which a just proportion 
 is preserved, and each receives his own. 1 This doc- 
 trine, enforced by obvious allusions to the Roman 
 law, is gradually worked around into a basis for the 
 subjection of the prince to the priesthood, as the 
 guardians of divine justice. 2 
 
 The distinction between prince and tyrant receives 
 from John a sharper definition than had been formu- 
 lated during all the centuries throughout which the 
 ecclesiastics had denounced hostile rulers as tyrants. 
 He takes up the classical conception on this point 
 and in substance, though not in precise terms, makes 
 the distinction turn on the conformity of the ruler 
 to law. 2 More broadly, however, any abuse of power 
 constitutes its author a tyrant, and in this sense there 
 may be tyrant priests, as described in Ezekiel xxxiv. 
 As to tyrannicide, he holds it to be entirely permis- 
 sible and just, and in support of the righteousness of 
 such action adds to the familiar examples from pagan 
 history the instances of Eglon, Holofernes and others 
 from the Old Testament. His respect for authority, 
 however, leads him to make a curious distinction as 
 to the means of removing the tyrant. The deed 
 must be done without offence to religion and de- 
 cency ; and the use of poison is to be avoided, as 
 having no precedent in the Scriptures. 
 
 This approval of tyrannicide on principle by an 
 
 1 The text for this argument is found in Deut. xvii, 14-20. Note 
 the ingenious way in which the author draws from the words, " and 
 he shall read therein all the days of his life," the conclusion, " quam 
 necessaria sit principibus peritio litterarum." 
 
 2 Lib. viii, cap. 17-21.
 
 188 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 ecclesiastic has been made the basis of severe re- 
 proach against John of Salisbury. It is due to him 
 to point out, however, that he declared that the 
 safest and most useful method of getting rid of the 
 tyrant is by prayer and by averting the wrath of 
 God of which tyrants are the instrument. His re- 
 currence to the primitive Christian idea after fully 
 committing himself to the pagan principle is quite 
 characteristic of all his thought. 1 
 
 SELECT REFERENCES 
 
 BAXMANN, Die Politik der Pdpste von Gregor I bis auf 
 Oregor VII. BLAKEF, Vol. I, pp. 162-183, 225-226, 313-342, 
 469 et seq. BRYCE, Holy Eoman Empire, chap vii. FRIED- 
 BERG, Die mittelalterlichen Lehren uber das Verhdltniss von 
 Staat und Kirche. GIERKE, Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht, 
 Bd. Ill, S. 502-644 : Die publicistischen Lehren des Mittel- 
 alters (Political Theories of the Middle Ages, trans, by Mart- 
 land). GIESELER, Church History, trans., Third Period, 
 20-23, 47-63. JANET, Vol. I, p. 320 et seq. LAURENT, 
 Histoire de Vhuma/nite, Tome VI, pp. 56 et seq., 100 et seq. MA- 
 BILLON, Life and Works of St. Bernard, Abbot of Clairvaux, 
 trans. MATHEWS, Select Mediaeval Documents, esp. (Sec.) III. 
 MIRBT, Publizistik im Zeitalter Gregors VII (an excellent in- 
 troduction to the controversial literature of this period). 
 Monumenta Germanice Historica, Libelli de Lite. POOLE, Illus- 
 trations of Mediaeval Thought, esp. pp. 161-166, 183-197, 
 216-225, 233-239. STORRS, Bernard of Clairvaux, pp. 509-583. 
 
 1 Lib. viii, cap. 20.
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS AND HIS SCHOOL 
 
 1. General Character of the System 
 
 THE culmination of papal influence in European 
 politics was synchronous with a widespread revival 
 of speculative philosophy. During the twelfth cen- 
 tury a very marked activity in all forms of intellec- 
 tual life was manifest. The philosophical expression 
 of this activity was the extensive literature in which 
 was embodied the doctrines of scholasticism. In its 
 most general aspect, scholasticism was a system of 
 thought in which philosophy, in the purely rational 
 sense, was so subordinated to established theological 
 doctrines "that where philosophy and theology trod 
 on common ground, the latter was received as the 
 absolute norm and criterion of truth." 1 Because 
 the mediaeval mind was essentially dependent upon 
 authority for the bases of its speculative activity, 
 the rational element in scholasticism was furnished 
 by the philosophy of the ancients and the theological 
 element by the church fathers. The earlier scho- 
 lastics, from the ninth to the twelfth centuries, were 
 obliged, in the absence of fuller sources, to follow in 
 their systems the scanty outlines of Stoic and Pla- 
 
 1 Ueberweg, History of Philosophy (translation, New York, 1871), 
 I, 355. 
 
 189
 
 190 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 tonic doctrine that had been transmitted through the 
 Dark Ages in more or less accurate compends. Of 
 Aristotle, but few works were known, and these, as 
 Symonds says, through " Latin translations made by 
 Jews from Arabic commentaries on Greek texts." 
 The Aristotelian logic, however, imperfectly as it 
 was understood, constituted the chief source of the 
 rigid syllogistic method that is so common in scho- 
 lastic reasoning. 
 
 In the latter half of the twelfth century the com- 
 plete works of Aristotle began to enter Western 
 Europe by way of Spain, where Latin translations of 
 them had long been used in the Moorish universities. 
 A little later Greek texts were brought from the 
 East by the Crusaders, so that by the middle of 
 the thirteenth century the greatest work which the 
 human reason had yet produced was before the phi- 
 losophers of the time. The result was the shaping 
 of scholasticism into its later and most perfect form. 
 Through the systematizing industry of compilers and 
 commentators the doctrines of the church fathers 
 and the dogmas of the church itself had by this time 
 been digested into compact and intelligible form. 
 Aristotle's works embodied a complete system of 
 rational philosophy. From the two bodies of doc- 
 trine it was now the task of the schoolmen to forge 
 out a single system of ultimate science which should 
 blend, in final harmony, the products of reason and 
 of revelation. 
 
 This purpose is the key to the philosophy of St. 
 Thomas Aquinas. He is the greatest of the later
 
 POLITICAL WOEKS OF AQUINAS 191 
 
 scholastics, and perhaps of all scholastics. Through 
 him politics enters once more into the circle of the 
 sciences, and assumes a position like that assigned 
 to it by Aristotle, always subject, however, to that 
 principle which permeates all mediaeval thought 
 that the dogma of the saint takes precedence over 
 the reasoned conclusion of the philosopher. Because 
 Augustine had been the most prolific and the most 
 respected of the fathers of the church, and had 
 touched most of all on political questions, the politi- 
 cal doctrine of Aquinas presents, even more strik- 
 ingly than many other branches of his system, the 
 characteristic which applies to scholasticism as a 
 whole the reconciliation of St. Augustine and 
 Aristotle. 
 
 St. Thomas was a very prolific writer, and though 
 he died at the early age of forty-seven, the works 
 that he left are of enormous volume. On the politi- 
 cal side, these include Commentaries on the Politics 
 of Aristotle and the Rule of Princes (De Eegimine 
 Principum). The former work is almost wholly 
 expository, and contains little of Thomas's own 
 philosophy. The latter was designed as a syste- 
 matic treatment of political science, but was unfin- 
 ished at the death of St. Thomas. Of its four books, 
 only the first and part of the second were written 
 by him. The rest are by another hand, and, while 
 maintaining with much fidelity the master's general 
 principles and point of view, are noticeably deficient 
 in the clearness and coherency which are peculiar 
 to him. Thomas's greatest philosophical work, the
 
 192 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 Summa Theologica, was also unfinished at his death; 
 but the completed part of this masterpiece included 
 the treatment of those ethical and juristic concepts 
 which lie at the basis of politics; and it is with 
 these concepts, which he developed with extraordi- 
 nary acuteness, that the study of his political 
 philosophy must begin. 1 
 
 2. Theory of Law and Justice 
 
 St. Thomas's theory of law and justice is the 
 channel through which the doctrines of Aristotle, 
 the Stoics, Cicero, the Roman Imperial Jurists and 
 St. Augustine, blended into a rounded whole, were 
 transmitted to modern times. His analysis and 
 definitions of the two concepts gave much pre- 
 cision to the vague and ill-formulated ideas in 
 which they had long been enveloped. Like Cicero, 
 he started from the notion of law (lex). Law he 
 defined as " an ordinance of reason for the com- 
 mon good, promulgated by him who has the care 
 of a community." 2 The full scope of this definition 
 is best revealed in the fourfold classification of the 
 species of law; namely, eternal, natural, human and 
 divine. The lex ceterna is the controlling plan of the 
 universe, existing in the mind of God. Natural law 
 (lex naturalis) is that participation of man, as a 
 
 1 A useful compilation of St. Thomas's political ideas is contained 
 in the little work of Baumann, Die Staatslehre der h. Thomas von 
 Aquino (Leipzig, 1873). 
 
 2 Quaedam rationis ordinatio ad bonum commune, et ab eo qui 
 curam communitatis habet promulgata. Summa Theologica, II, 1, 
 90,4.
 
 AQUINAS ON LAW 193 
 
 rational creature, in the eternal law (or the divine 
 reason), through which he distinguishes between 
 good and evil and seeks his true end. Human law 
 is the application, by human reason, of the precepts 
 of natural law to particular earthly conditions. The 
 divine law in the special sense is that through which 
 the limitations and imperfections of human reason 
 are supplemented, and man is infallibly directed to 
 his supramundane end eternal blessedness; it is 
 the law of Revelation. 
 
 St. Thomas's definition of law marks a stage in the 
 development of the concept. Greek philosophy had 
 regarded law as impersonal in origin as a conclu- 
 sion of reason and not as an expression of will. 
 Roman jurisprudence had ascribed the character of 
 law to either a conclusion of reason or an expression 
 of will. St. Thomas denned law as at once a con- 
 clusion of reason and an expression of will. This 
 progressive enhancing of the volitional element finds 
 its explanation in the importance respectively of the 
 Roman Emperor and the Christian God, as concepts 
 dominating human reflection. Just in proportion as 
 the agency of a well-defined personality was recog- 
 nized as a determining factor in men's affairs, the con- 
 ception of law as the will of this personality assumed 
 greater prominence. St. Thomas does indeed declare 
 that law is rather a rule and measure (regula et men- 
 sura] of action than a command ; but the latter idea 
 is clearly involved in his ascription of the origin of 
 law to a superior, and in his elaborate contention that 
 promulgation is of the essence of the concept. The
 
 194 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 importance which he attaches to the imperative element 
 appears also in the argument that law cannot spring 
 from the rational impulse of any one at random, but, 
 having for its end the common good, must have its 
 source either in the society as a whole or in the public 
 person who has the care of the society. 1 Moreover, 
 law must have a sanction in order to be effective ; but 
 the private individual can only advise, not punish, 
 and hence his rational injunction lacks the character 
 of law. 
 
 Of the four classes of law which are so ingeniously 
 distinguished, the first and the last embody character- 
 istic conclusions of Christian theology. The eternal 
 
 o/ 
 
 law is the design of the universe, conceived as the 
 supreme reason of God the creator; the divine law, 
 with its two subdivisions of old and new, is the will 
 of God as revealed in the Old and New Testaments. 
 Thomas's exposition of eternal and divine law has 
 been of high significance in the history of philos- 
 ophy and theology. In political theory his treatment 
 of natural law and of human law, especially the 
 former, has had most important results. 
 
 The lex naturalis he sums up, so far as its pre- 
 cepts are concerned, in the general rule, pursue the 
 good and avoid the evil. The particular rules are 
 merely rational means to this end. All men, as 
 rational beings, share in or are subject to this law. 
 For all men it is the same as to its first principles, 
 
 1 Condere legem vel pertinet ad totam multitudinem vel pertinet 
 ad personam publicam quae totius multitudinis curam habet. 
 Summa Theol. II, 1, 90,3.
 
 AQUINAS ON NATURAL LAW 195 
 
 though in some deductions made from these prin- 
 ciples there is divergence among different peoples. 
 Thus the Germans in Caesar's time did not regard 
 robbery as wrong, though it is directly contrary to 
 natural law. Being universal and essentially uniform 
 among men, the lex naturalis might be supposed to 
 be immutable. Not so, according to St. Thomas ; it 
 may be enlarged in content by the addition of what 
 contributes to human welfare. Such extensions are 
 to be found, for example, in the institutions of 
 private property and slavery. The original law 
 was community of goods and general freedom ; but 
 distinction of property and slavery, though not pri- 
 mary inclinations of man's nature, were neverthe- 
 less developed by reason for the utility of human 
 life. 1 In the same manner the law of nature may 
 be changed when a change of human conditions 
 renders the observance of any of its derivative pre- 
 cepts no longer possible. St. Thomas nowhere gives 
 a list of the specific rules which make up the lex 
 naturalis. It is therefore difficult to form an idea 
 as to what the proportion might have been between 
 those which he regarded as immutable and the others. 
 Human law, working through fear of penalties, is 
 essential to a peaceful social existence. It is derived 
 from natural law and may be either a deduction from, 
 or an application of, some principle of the latter. So 
 indispensable is the connection of the two that any 
 provision of the human that is at variance with natu- 
 ral law is not law at all, but a corruption of law. 2 
 
 1 Summa, II, 1, 94, 5. 2 Ibid. II, 1, 95, 2.
 
 196 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 Justice St. Thomas, following substantially the 
 Roman jurists, defines as the fixed and perpetual 
 will to give to every one his own rights. 1 But 
 the Aristotelian doctrine is also closely followed, 
 in explaining the fundamental principle of justice 
 to be that of equality. Equality, St. Thomas then 
 shows, may be based either upon nature itself, 
 "as when one gives so much that he may receive 
 back precisely the same," or upon human determi- 
 nation, as when popular custom or princely decrees 
 require that two things shall be regarded as equal. 
 This distinction differentiates natural right (ius na- 
 turale) from positive right (ius positivum], the latter 
 resting upon the lex humana. Written human laws 
 are thus fully recognized as a source of rights and 
 justice. But Thomas insists that they derive their 
 force, not from being written, but from nature itself. 
 Accordingly, written law is vitiated and loses binding 
 force whenever and so far as it deviates from natural 
 justice. 2 
 
 In general, Thomas's treatment of law and justice 
 exhibits well the salient characteristics of his philos- 
 ophy. Some of his most acute distinctions and con- 
 ciliations appear here, where he must bring into 
 harmony the Aristotelian, the Roman Stoic and the 
 Christian conceptions as to the basis of social order. 
 The most original contribution that he makes to the 
 subject is that definition and analysis of law through 
 which he displaces at the ultimate source of authority 
 
 1 Constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuere. 
 Summa Theol. II, 2, 58, 1. 2 Ibid. II, 2, 60, 5.
 
 NATUEE OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY 197 
 
 the impersonal forces of nature and reason, and sub- 
 ordinates them to the personal Christian God. It 
 is in accomplishing this that he emphasizes the 
 importance of volition, in comparison with mere 
 ratiocination, as an element in the definition of law. 
 
 3. The Nature and Forms of Political Authority 
 
 In St. Thomas's discussion of politics proper, Aris- 
 totelian doctrine furnishes the basis both as to method 
 and as to content. But for the first time in mediaeval 
 thought appears at some points a very distinct influ- 
 ence of contemporary political, as distinct from eccle- 
 siastical, institutions. Unlike John of Salisbury, who 
 illustrated his philosophy almost exclusively by insti- 
 tutions that had ceased to exist centuries before, St. 
 Thomas, in the full spirit of Aristotle, amplified the 
 system of the Greek by reflection on the things about 
 him. The Thomist political theory exhibits also very 
 conspicuously the historical spirit, though the sources 
 depended upon are almost entirely the Old Testament 
 and Augustine's version of Roman history. 
 
 In the De Regimine Primipum, Aristotle's funda- 
 mental principle is adopted, that man is by nature a 
 social being (animal sociale et politicum), that social 
 existence makes government (aliquod regitivum) nec- 
 essary for the common welfare, and that the city 
 (civitas) is the self-sufficing and perfect association. 
 But here Thomas feels that Aristotle did not go far 
 enough, and accordingly declares that a " province/' 
 including a number of city-states, has a higher degree 
 of self-sufficiency because of the greater resources
 
 198 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 for defence against enemies. 1 The province, or as 
 it is also called, the kingdom (regnum), which Aris- 
 totle regarded as beyond the purview of rational 
 ideals, is thus introduced fully into the system 
 of political philosophy. It is treated throughout 
 Thomas's works as a "natural" organization, and 
 as embodying the rational principle of that larger 
 and more characteristic mediaeval entity, the Empire. 
 The formal treatment of the latter institution is not 
 found, however, in the authentic part of the Rule of 
 Princes! 2 ' 
 
 While government is thus traceable, on Aristotle's 
 theory, to the nature of man, political authority is 
 also explained, like all other authority (dominium), 
 as traceable to God. The dictum of St. Paul, 
 "There is no power but of God," and numerous 
 other texts of the Bible, 3 are cited as conclusive of 
 this; but the thesis is defended also by Aristotle's 
 metaphysical doctrines of final cause and first mover 
 (primum mobile), and by Augustine's interpretation 
 of Roman history as exemplifying God's bestowal 
 of authority on a deserving people. 4 Dominion of 
 man over man is divisible into two distinct classes : 
 that which takes the form of slavery was introduced 
 into the world on account of sin, as St. Augustine 
 
 1 De Reg. Princ. I, 1 ; cf. 13 end. 
 
 2 The nature of imperial dominion is discussed in Lib. Ill, cap. 
 12-19. 
 
 8 E.g., " The king's heart is in the hand of the Lord . . . : he 
 turneth it whithersoever he will." Prov. xxi, 1. 
 
 4 De Reg. Princ. Ill, 2-6. This view of Roman history appeared 
 prominently later in Dante's work. Cf. infra, p. 232.
 
 AQUINAS ON SLAVERY 199 
 
 holds; while that which imports the duty of coun- 
 selling and directing would prevail in a state of 
 innocence, and is incidental to the social instinct 
 implanted by God in man. Society requires order, 
 order implies inequality; and therefore directive 
 authority rests upon divine sanction. 
 
 As to slavery, there is presented in the Rule of 
 Princes a rather striking addition to the justifying 
 principles adduced by Aristotle and Augustine. The 
 former based the institution on differences in intel- 
 lectual endowment; the latter regarded it as a 
 divine system for the punishment of sin; but St. 
 Thomas looks upon it as also designed to stimulate 
 bravery in soldiers. That the vanquished will be 
 enslaved is an effective inducement not to be van- 
 quished; and for this view he cites not only the 
 practice of the Romans, but also the precepts of 
 God in Deuteronomy. 1 
 
 As to the forms of political authority, St. Thomas 
 follows the Aristotelian classification, based upon the 
 distinction between those that aim at the good of 
 all and those that aim at the good of the ruler 
 alone. The former only are just. As between the 
 monarchic and the democratic form his preference 
 is as fluctuating as that of Aristotle, but leans, on 
 the whole, about as distinctly toward monarchy as 
 the Greek leans toward democracy. St. Thomas 
 rests for his preference chiefly upon the abstract 
 argument that unity is the end of society, and hence 
 is the essential principle in governmental organiza- 
 
 1 De Reg. Princ. H, 10.
 
 200 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 tion. The chief good of a society is " that its unity 
 be preserved, which is called peace"; 1 and this is 
 best promoted by "that which is in itself a unit." 
 This is supported by analogies throughout the uni- 
 verse the heart in man " ruling " all the other 
 members, the king (rex) in every swarm of bees, 
 and God himself in what he has created. Experi- 
 ence also demonstrates, St. Thomas believes, that 
 monarchic government has been the best that 
 cities and provinces under democratic rule have 
 been filled with dissension, while monarchies have 
 rejoiced in peace and prosperity. The most serious 
 danger in monarchy is that it may take the form 
 of tyranny the worst species of government. But 
 still, Thomas believes that tyranny springs from 
 democratic even more than from monarchic rule. 
 His general discussion of the subject is characterized 
 by great moderation and good sense. 2 In respect to 
 individual action in slaying tyrants, he observes that 
 it is more often bad men than good that undertake 
 such an enterprise, and that, since bad men find 
 the rule of kings no less burdensome than that of 
 tyrants, the recognition of the right of private citi- 
 zens to kill tyrants involves rather more chance of 
 losing a king than of being relieved of a tyrant. 
 The anarchic character of the argument for tyran- 
 nicide has never been more clearly exposed, or its 
 conclusions more concisely refuted, than by St. 
 Thomas in this passage. 
 
 The last two (and therefore unauthentic) books 
 
 1 De. Reg. Princ. I, 2. 3 Ibid. cap. 3-6.
 
 KINDS OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY 201 
 
 of the Rule of Princes contain a discussion of various 
 kinds of political authority based on the classification 
 into (1) sacerdotal and royal, (2) royal, (3) political 
 and (4) economic. The first class is exemplified 
 solely in the Papacy, and this will be examined 
 later; the fourth class is not taken up at all. As 
 to the royal and the political species, the distinction 
 is primarily that of Aristotle between government 
 without law and government subject to law. The 
 writer of the work manifests much vacillation and 
 unclearness, however, in this respect, and at times 
 confuses royal with despotic government, and politi- 
 cal authority with that which characterizes the Aris- 
 totelian "polity." Of some interest, however, is 
 the attempt to distinguish and set in its proper 
 category that most prominent fact of mediaeval poli- 
 tics imperial authority (dominium imperiale). 1 The 
 nature of this species is explained first through a long 
 historical narrative, in which the Empire of Christ 
 appears as the fifth world-monarchy, following those 
 of the Assyrians, the Medes and Persians, the Greeks 
 and the Romans. It is then set forth that Christ, 
 though Lord of the world, lived a lowly and secret 
 life on earth ; but afterwards, at the Donation of Con- 
 stantine, assumed openly his due authority through 
 the church, and exercised it by transferring the 
 imperial power to the West, in the person of Charle- 
 magne, and by taking control of the choice of 
 emperors. Imperial authority thus has, from its 
 origin, a character that clearly distinguishes it from 
 1 Lib. Ill, cap. 12-19.
 
 202 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 the other species. At the same time, apart from 
 this peculiarity, it is, in operation, substantially iden- 
 tical with royal power, and is therefore, in general, 
 to be regarded as a special form of this class. Its 
 relation to subjects and to the law is the same. 
 
 4. The Functions of Government 
 
 The general function of the political ruler is, 
 through his supreme control of secular matters, to 
 establish, maintain and promote right living among 
 his subjects. This Aristotelian principle is fully 
 accepted by Thomas, as are also, in large measure, 
 the details of its application. The most important 
 instrumentality in the attainment of this end is 
 " that unity which is called peace." No feature of 
 the Greek theory was more elaborately developed by 
 the scholastics than that which set up unity and per- 
 manence as the prime criteria of excellence in politi- 
 cal organization. This fact expressed in mediaeval 
 as in ancient times a philosophical reaction against 
 widespread turbulence and anarchy. 1 For the regu- 
 lation of the life of his dominion, then, the prince 
 was bound, according to St. Thomas, to see that the 
 population was properly kept up, to provide rewards 
 and penalties through which to secure obedience to his 
 laws, and to defend his people against external foes. 
 In the elaboration of these duties the Rule of Princes 
 follows Aristotle closely enough. But contemporary 
 conditions suggest, and the Bible is made to confirm, 
 
 1 Cf. supra, p. 86.
 
 THE FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT 203 
 
 a number of other functions on which the Greek did 
 not dwell. For example, it is laid down 1 that the 
 prince must keep the roads in his dominion safe and 
 free. This is purely a Roman conception, and is 
 illustrated by the Roman practice ; but in addition, 
 an indication of divine sanction is extorted from the 
 Old Testament in the fact that the Amorites were 
 devoted to destruction for refusing a free road through 
 their territory to the Israelites. 2 
 
 .Again, the prince must provide a special coinage 
 for his realm, and also a system of weights and 
 measures. The latter duty is sustained in character- 
 istic mediaeval style. 3 The argument from expediency 
 is effectively put that a governmental standard 
 diminishes quarrels and litigation but more stress 
 is laid on the Bible. It is declared in the Book of 
 Wisdom, ch. xi, that " God has ordered all things by 
 number, weight and measure." This proves that 
 weight and measure are of the nature of things. 
 But what originates in nature is most necessary in a 
 state, because the laws of a state have their source 
 in natural right. Therefore a system of weights and 
 measures is necessary and must be established in every 
 state. 
 
 But the Thomist theory is most distinctly differ- 
 entiated from that of the ancients by ascribing to the 
 ruler of the state the duty of providing for the poor. 
 In this we are on purely Christian ground, though 
 Aristotle is laboriously dragged into the argument. 4 
 
 * De Reg. Princ. II, 12. 2 Ibid. cap. 12. 
 
 Ibid. II, 14. * Ibid. II, 15.
 
 204 POLITICAL THEOKEES 
 
 Two philosophical dicta of the Greek seem to have 
 struck an especially responsive chord in the mediaeval 
 mind. They were these : " Nature is never wanting 
 in necessaries," and " Art imitates nature." It was 
 difficult to conceive a logical dilemma from which the 
 scholastic dialectician could not extricate himself by 
 means of one or the other of these. In proving 
 that the state should provide for the poor the Rule 
 of Princes uses both the favourite phrases. Thus : 
 nature is never wanting in necessaries; the same 
 must be true of art, which imitates nature ; but of all 
 arts that of governing is the highest ; therefore those 
 who exercise this art must not be wanting in neces- 
 saries to those who lack them. Moreover, the author 
 gravely demonstrates that in alms-giving (eleemosyna) 
 princes, who through their human weakness must go 
 astray from time to time, have a sort of currency by 
 which their debt of sin may be discharged. This 
 argumentation, like so much that fills the volumes of 
 scholastic lore, shocks the modern mind by the lack 
 of relation between premises and conclusion ; but 
 nevertheless the conclusion itself as to the function 
 of the state in charity is a most significant fact in 
 the history of political theory. Though ancient prac- 
 tice in respect to the needy and suffering had not 
 differed so widely from that of the Christian era, the 
 ancient theory had embodied an idea of governmental 
 responsibility for these classes that was at the farthest 
 possible remove from that of St. Thomas. The enor- 
 mous modern apparatus of public charity finds its 
 first justification in political science in the bizarre
 
 SPIRITUAL PREEMINENCE 205 
 
 argument but humane conclusion of the passage which 
 has just been summarized. 
 
 5. The Secular and the Spiritual Power 
 
 On the great question of the Middle Ages, that of 
 the relation between secular and spiritual power, 
 Thomas, a churchman of the straitest sect, could add 
 nothing to the solution that had long since been elab- 
 orated by the great men of the institution of which 
 he was a part. His contribution to the discussion 
 was merely to clothe in the formulas of his method 
 and to distribute accurately among the niches of 
 his philosophical system the doctrines that had been 
 moulded into definite form by his predecessors. The 
 initial assumption of his whole philosophy was that 
 certain truths, and those of the highest importance to 
 man, were not demonstrable by reason but must enter 
 human cognition through faith and immediate divine 
 revelation. Such were the concepts of original sin, 
 the incarnation and the sacraments. The depository 
 of judgment and authority in respect to all matters 
 concerned with this reserved field was the church, 
 whose voice was final and was the voice of God him- 
 self. This primary dogma of St. Thomas necessarily 
 gave to the ecclesiastical organization an overwhelm- 
 ing preeminence in relation to any form of merely 
 human authority. But such preeminence was also 
 demonstrable, he conceived, by purely rational meth- 
 ods. By Aristotelian doctrine, to govern is to bring 
 the thing governed to its true end. But what is the 
 true end of man ? Not, as the ancients supposed, to
 
 206 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 live according to virtue, but rather, through a virtu- 
 ous life, to attain to the eternal enjoyment of God 
 (ad fruitionem divinam). If this end could be obtained 
 through merely human virtue, the function of the 
 king of the highest political power would be 
 sufficient. But since the end transcends mundane 
 life, the government through which it is reached must 
 be of a higher, that is, the sacerdotal, kind. Hence, 
 while the king is supreme in temporal affairs, these 
 must be directed to the higher end, and to this extent 
 he is subject to the priest under the law of Christ. 1 
 
 This is of course the long familiar case for ecclesi- 
 astical hegemony, thinly veneered with Aristotle. In 
 the unauthentic part of the Rule of Princes' 2 ' this 
 general doctrine is carried out in a formal, but not 
 novel, argument for the supremacy of the Pope. 
 Noticeable, however, and in the full spirit of Thomas, 
 is the careful and explicit limitation of papal jurisdic- 
 tion to cases which involve a matter of sin. 3 This 
 limitation was tending, in the height of the spiritual 
 hegemony, to be more and more neglected. 
 
 In the Summa Theologica* the attitude of the 
 Christian state toward infidels, including heretics and 
 apostates, is concisely defined. A sharp line is drawn 
 between those who have never received the faith, like 
 Jews and pagans, and those who have lapsed from it 
 into heresy or apostasy. The former are in general 
 
 1 De Reg. Princ. I, end. 2 Ibid. Ill, 10. 
 
 8 Quamvis in omnibus istis summi Pontifices non extenderunt 
 manum nisi ratione delicti. Ibid. 
 4 II, 2, qusest. 10-12.
 
 THE CHURCH AND INFIDEL PRINCES 207 
 
 to be tolerated ; the latter, not. But especially im- 
 portant is the question whether infidels may justly 
 exercise political authority over the faithful. Thomas 
 distinguishes here. Setting up a new control of this 
 kind the church cannot permit. As to an already 
 established dominion the case is different. The rela- 
 tion of sovereign and subject is a matter of human 
 law ; the distinction between believers and unbelievers 
 is a matter of divine law. But the divine law, which 
 springs from the grace of God, does not destroy hu- 
 man law, which is based on natural reason. Hence, 
 authority over Christians is not destroyed by the mere 
 fact that the ruler is an infidel. But, Thomas hastens 
 to add, if the church, in the plenitude of her power 
 under divine law, decrees that the authority of the 
 infidel shall cease, her word is conclusive. So also as 
 to an apostate prince. The instant that the church 
 declares him excommunicated for apostasy, his sub- 
 jects are ipso facto released from his authority, and 
 their oaths of allegiance lose all binding force. 
 
 6. St. Thomas's Doctrine as Formulated by ^Egidius 
 
 Romanus 
 
 The general character of St. Thomas's political 
 philosophy is sufficiently indicated by what has already 
 been said. Owing, however, to the fact that his 
 De Regimine Principum was not finished by his 
 own hand, the detailed development of his system 
 was in many respects unsatisfactory, and was put 
 in a much more worthy shape in a work of the 
 same name by his devoted disciple, JSgidius Ro-
 
 208 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 inarms. 1 Both the master's treatise and the disci- 
 ple's were designed as books of instruction for scions 
 of royal houses, and doubtless owe some of their not- 
 able characteristics to that fact. A special interest 
 attaches to the work of ^Egidius in that the young 
 prince for whose instruction the book was written was 
 none other than he who, as King Philip the Fair, gave 
 so severe a blow to papal dignity and prestige. 
 
 The plan of ^Egidius's treatise involves a three- 
 fold division, comprising a system of ethics, a system 
 of economics and a system of politics. That is to 
 say, the character of a prince is determined by his 
 personal morality, his domestic relations and his 
 governmental activity, and each of these demands 
 particular consideration. As to method, ^gidius is 
 in the highest degree systematic and precise. Each 
 of his books is a clearly distinguished division of the 
 whole subject; each of his chapters is a precisely 
 denned topic of the book; and in each chapter the 
 doctrine enunciated is sustained by a series of argu- 
 ments carefully propounded and numbered in advance. 
 The result of this method, pursued as it is with un- 
 varying consistency, is to give great clearness to the 
 theory which the author is seeking to inculcate. As 
 to the content of this theory, so far as politics is con- 
 cerned, it may fairly be described as exclusively that 
 of Aristotle and St. Thomas. Some writers have 
 
 1 Known also as ^Egidius Colonna, from the name of his family. 
 A thirteenth-century French version of his work has been recently 
 published by the Columbia University Press under the title Li livres 
 du gouvernement des rois, edited by Dr. S. P. Molenaer (New York, 
 Macmillan, 1899).
 
 ^GIDIUS KOMANUS 209 
 
 claimed a degree of originality for ^Egidius, 1 but 
 such a claim is very difficult to substantiate. That 
 he put in a more intelligible form some of the doc- 
 trines of his master, is probably the utmost that can 
 be said. A marked peculiarity of his treatise is 
 that the church fathers are very rarely referred to. 
 The same, indeed, is true as to St. Thomas. Aris- 
 totle, "the philosopher," furnishes the premises for 
 perhaps nine-tenths of ^Egidius's demonstrations ; 
 and for the remainder the argument follows, though 
 without citation of the authority, the line already 
 indicated by Aquinas. It will be useful, however, 
 to dwell briefly on some features of ^Egidius's 
 work. 2 
 
 St. Thomas's justification of the kingdom as a use- 
 ful and " natural " form of association is amplified 
 somewhat by ^Egidius. 3 He demonstrates on Aris- 
 totle's own principles that an aggregation of cities 
 (civitates) has a higher degree of self-sufficiency than 
 a single one, both in respect to the material means 
 of existence and in respect to the incentives to virtu- 
 ous living. These are in addition to the advantage 
 of a greater force for defence against outer foes, 
 which is the consideration on which the chief stress 
 is laid by St. Thomas. 
 
 In laying out the plan of his discussion of the gov- 
 ernment of a state in time of peace, ^Egidius adopts 
 a rather striking analysis of royal government into 
 
 1 Cf. Molenaer, Introduction, p. xx. 
 
 2 The political doctrines proper are contained chiefly in the third 
 book. References are to the edition of 1482. For list of printed 
 editions, see Molenaer, p. 457. 8 Lib. Ill, pars, ii, cap. 5.
 
 210 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 its elements. 1 The state must be ruled according to 
 just laws ; and these the prince enacts, the senate 
 (consilium) devises, the judiciary (pretorium) applies 
 to concrete cases, and the people observe. It is the 
 function of the senate to seek for what is useful 
 (conferens) and avoid the harmful (nocivum) ; of the 
 judiciary to seek the just and avoid the unjust ; of 
 the people to seek the praiseworthy (laudabilia) and 
 avoid the blameworthy (vituperabilia). Royal gov- 
 ernment, as thus constituted, is ^Egidius's idea of the 
 best form of political organization. His reasons for 
 this conclusion are those of St. Thomas, but he adds 
 a temperate argument for hereditary succession by 
 primogeniture as the best rule by which to regulate 
 the transmission of authority. 2 
 
 In discussing the judiciary (pretorium)) ^Egidius 
 sets forth his notions of law and rights, in which 
 at several points are found very clearly stated ideas 
 which were indicated but not so distinctly formulated 
 by St. Thomas. Laws (leges) and rights (ius) are 
 declared to be subject to precisely the same classifi- 
 cation ; for laws are merely " certain rules of right 
 (ius) through which we determine what is just and 
 what unjust in our actions." 3 And after pointing 
 out the various kinds of right that have been distin- 
 guished by Aristotle and the jurists written and 
 unwritten, general (commune) and particular (pro- 
 prium), natural and positive, ius gentium and ius 
 civile, he declares that all are practically reducible 
 to two classes, ius naturale and ius positivum. 
 
 1 Lib. Ill, pars, ii, cap. 1. 3 Ibid. cap. 5. * Ibid. cap. 24.
 
 JEGIDIUS ROMANUS 211 
 
 Law, therefore, is reducible to the same categories ; 
 for example, the lex humana corresponds to the ius 
 humanum positivum. 1 But like St. Thomas, and 
 much more distinctly, jEgidius sets forth the impor- 
 tance of the element of personal volition and com- 
 mand in the conception of law. "Nothing is law 
 unless proclaimed by him whose function is to direct 
 to the common good ; for if a law is divine and 
 natural, it is enacted (condita) by God." And 
 again : 
 
 Any one of the people can induce and persuade another to 
 act rightly; but advice and persuasion of this kind are not 
 called laws, because they have no coactive element (nihil coacti- 
 vum). Only by an extension of the term law can all kinds of 
 direction and advice be called laws. 2 
 
 ^Egidius's discussion of the subject of lex and ius 
 reveals the completion of a movement that appeared 
 first in the thought of Cicero, when he put forth his 
 doctrine of the law of nature (lex naturalis). 3 This 
 movement was toward the idea that all rights have 
 their source in law. To the Roman jurists nature 
 and reason were sources of rights even more than 
 was law (lex). But to the mediaeval mind nature 
 and reason were identified in last analysis with the 
 personal Christian God, and natural rights flowed 
 from his will and were guaranteed by his coactive 
 power. Natural law was in the fullest sense law ; it 
 possessed the same imperative and coactive elements 
 as the legislative enactments of man. This concep- 
 tion was destined to long sway in jurisprudence and 
 
 1 Lib. Ill, pars, ii, cap. 26. 2 Ibid. pars, ii, cap. 27. * Supra, p. 123.
 
 212 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 politics. Only when, after the Reformation, the gen- 
 eral respect for authority gave way, were philoso- 
 phers able again to detach natural law from God and 
 transfer it to impersonal human reason, and then to 
 deny to it altogether the volitional quality which 
 would give it the character of law. 
 
 7. Summary 
 
 In the perspective of history the Thomist political 
 theory marks the end of an era. It is the calm dis- 
 passionate expression of a habit of thought and feel- 
 ing which had received its character through centu- 
 ries of strenuous conflict. The thirteenth century is 
 less controversial than its predecessors; it manifests 
 the distinctly philosophical quality of seeking rather 
 to coordinate than to achieve. Ecclesiastical hege- 
 mony in social life is assumed and explained rather 
 than debated. Monarchic government receives the 
 theoretical justification which its general prevalence 
 suggests. The kingdom, as the typical form of state, 
 supplants the city, though the ancient idea on this 
 point still remains influential and finds support not 
 only in the theories of the omnipotent Aristotle, but 
 also in the facts which the decline of imperial au- 
 thority is making significant in the position and 
 aspirations of Venice, Genoa, Pisa and other com- 
 mercial centres of the,. Italian peninsula. Law, right 
 and justice are cast in the mould and fixed upon 
 the foundation which the religious and ecclesiastical 
 development of past centuries had wrought out of 
 Roman jurisprudence. All the fundamental concepts
 
 CONTROVERSIES AFTER AQUINAS 213 
 
 of political theory are impressed by Aquinas with the 
 character of dogmatic finality that springs from a 
 conviction that controversy is past and that the emo- 
 tions are under the permanent sway of pure reason. 
 
 But twenty years after St. Thomas passed away, 
 Boniface VIII ascended the papal throne (1294). 
 Promptly arose the conflict with Philip the Fair, and 
 the fourteenth century opened with the age-long con- 
 troversy of ecclesiastical and secular powers absorb- 
 ing all the thought and energy of both. Philosophic 
 calm disappeared at once under the flood of polemic 
 passion. The quarrel of Boniface and Philip was fol- 
 lowed soon by that of John XXII and Lewis of 
 Bavaria, and this in turn by the sundering of the 
 church in the Great Schism. So far from the settled 
 and placid progress of Christendom under the princi- 
 ples which the Thomist philosophy had proclaimed 
 as final, the fourteenth century presented, in both 
 theory and practice, a condition of profound and 
 widespread unset tlement. The _ trend of political 
 s^iecjilatlojLin jbhe Conflicts of this period _was_tqward 
 the rejection or radical transformation of what was 
 most fundamental in the preceding century. A 
 wholly novel spirit was manifested by the oppo- 
 nents of the papal hierarchy. Aristotle and St. 
 Augustine were re-read and re-interpreted. The 
 Bible itself was turned with energy if not with skill 
 against the ecclesiastical hegemony. Within fifty 
 years, in short, of St. Thomas's death, political theory 
 abounded in heraldings of the Reformation and the 
 Revolution.
 
 214 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 SELECT REFERENCES 
 
 THOMAS AQUINAS, Opera Omnia (Paris, 1871-80) : Summa 
 Theologica, in Vols. I- VI ; on Law and Justice, see especially 
 Vols. II and III; for De Regimine Principum, Vol. XXVII, 
 opusc. 16. ^EGIDIUS ROMANUS, De Regimine Principum, Roma, 
 1482. BAUMANN, Die Staatslehre des h. Thomas von Aquino. 
 BUBBI, Le Teorie politiche di San Tommaso e il moderno diritto 
 pubblico. FEUGUEBAY, Essai sur les doctrines politiques de 
 Saint Thomas d'Aquin, pp. 15-216. FBANCK, Reformateurs et 
 publicistes, moyen dge, pp. 39-102. JANET, Vol. I, pp. 360-413. 
 JOUBDAIN, La Philosophie de St. Thomas d'Aquin, Tom. I, 
 pp. 141-149, 363-434; II, 9-29, 450 et seq. MOLENAEB, Li 
 livres du gouvernement des rois. POOLE, Mediaeval Thought, 
 pp. 239-246.
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 THEORIES DURING THE DECLINE OP THE PAPAL 
 HEGEMONY 
 
 1. Pro-papal Doctrine 
 
 THE quarrel between Pope Boniface and King 
 Philip has a special significance in the history of 
 political thought for two reasons. In the first place 
 it presented clearly the question as to the general 
 relation of spiritual to temporal power, apart from the 
 complications due to the peculiar history and tradi- 
 tions of the Empire. The French king made no pre- 
 tentions to universal dominion, and his case against 
 the Pope was just to that extent stronger. In the 
 second place the matter of taxation, out of which 
 chiefly the quarrel arose, involved the whole question 
 of property rights, and so sharpened the issue to a 
 point at which the purely temporal character of 
 the interests concerned was undeniable. These two 
 particular features of the controversy account in 
 some measure for the fact that the arguments put 
 forth in behalf of Boniface embody the most ex- 
 treme claims ever made in respect to ecclesiastical 
 jurisdiction. By this time the title of the Papacy 
 to all the power of the church had passed practi- 
 cally beyond the field of controversy. The Pope 
 was, so far as authority was concerned, the church. 
 
 215
 
 216 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 And his power was now, by his most zealous sup- 
 porters, asserted distinctly to include things tem- 
 poral as well as things spiritual, and to extend 
 over all the princes of the earth. 
 
 That Boniface himself officially committed him- 
 self to this position is not clear. He was a man 
 of violent temper and corresponding speech, and 
 may have used expressions privately, or even pub- 
 licly, that he would not deliberately have put on 
 record. He passionately denounced as false the 
 allegation that he had asserted that Philip was sub- 
 ject to him in respect to the French kingdom and 
 was bound to recognize his suzerainty. But he with 
 equal explicitness declared that the king was subject 
 to him on the ground of sin, and in a very peremp- 
 tory letter ascribed to the Pope it is said without 
 qualification : " We wish you to understand that you 
 are subject to us in spirituals and in temporals." l 
 There is some question as to the authenticity of 
 this latter expression. But there is no doubt that 
 the qualification, ratione peccati, was not regarded 
 in papal circles as of more than theoretical sig- 
 nificance, and that no practical limit excluded from 
 ecclesiastical interference whatever business the 
 church regarded as of interest to itself. The 
 famous bull Unam Sanctam (1302), which was the 
 official embodiment of the papal position, recited 
 
 1 In a contemptuous reply Philip retorted : " Let your most distin- 
 T guished Fatuousness be assured that in temporals we are subject to 
 \ no one." The leading documents in this famous case are in Gieseler, 
 X Vol. II, p. 348, note 21.
 
 THE POPE AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 217 
 
 the familiar doctrine of the two swords, the com- 
 mission of Jeremiah and the other hackneyed texts, 
 and ended with the formal declaration that "for 
 every human being submission to the Roman Pon- 
 tiff is indispensable to salvation." l 
 
 But if Boniface himself was careful not to carry 
 the papal theory beyond the point reached by Inno- 
 cent III, the less exalted debaters of the time very 
 openly passed that point. In an unpublished tract of 
 ^Egidius Romanus, 1 who seems to have abandoned 
 his royal pupil in the time of the quarrel with the 
 Pope, the thesis is sustained that the ultimate own- 
 ership of temporal goods is in the church and 
 hence is subject to the determination of the Pope. 
 The reasoning in support of this view is cogent : 
 The end of temporal things is the support of the 
 body ; the body is subordinate to the soul, which in 
 turn is subject to the guidance of the Pope; 
 therefore, the art of governing a people, the treat- 
 ise holds, consists essentially in bringing them into 
 proper relations with the laws of the church. No 
 possessor of a piece of property by law of the state 
 holds it justly save by authority of the church. The 
 child who inherits property owes it less to his father 
 than to the church; the father has begotten him 
 according to the flesh, but the church has regenerated 
 him according to the spirit, which is more than the 
 flesh. And finally, infidels and, indeed, all who obsti- 
 
 1 " Porro subesse Romano Pontifici omni humanae creaturae decla- 
 ramus, dicimus, definimus et pronuntiamus omnino esse de necessitate 
 salutis." 2 Summarized in Janet, I, 411.
 
 218 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 nately remain without the fold of the church, have 
 no just title to property. 
 
 This position was well calculated to sustain the 
 cause of Boniface. After the death of the latter, his 
 successors, Clement V and John XXII, made their 
 peace with the French monarchy and, domiciled at 
 Avignon under its influence and protection, engaged 
 in hot conflicts with the Emperors Henry VII and 
 Lewis of Bavaria. The issues here turned on the old 
 contention as to the relation of the Pope to the Em- 
 pire, and for the most part the pro-papal argument fol- 
 lowed precisely the lines that we have already noticed 
 in connection with Gregory VII and Innocent III. 
 But in some particulars the protagonists of the Pope 
 pushed the exaltation of the Papacy to a more extreme 
 point than had ever before been reached. The friar 
 Augustinus Triumphus seems entitled to the greatest 
 distinction in this respect. In his work, Summa de 
 Potestate JEcdesiastica, he ascribes to the Pope, as the 
 vicar of God, many of the divine attributes. 1 " His 
 jurisdiction is greater than that of any angel." Lay- 
 men are bound to obey him rather than any king or 
 emperor. Even pagans are subject to him. Besides 
 the plenary power (plenitudo potestatis) which he en- 
 joys over the Emperor, to set up, depose or control, he 
 can depose or set up any king whatever, though in 
 respect to kings Augustinus still qualifies "when 
 there is reasonable cause." That is, the old qualifi- 
 
 1 A full analysis of the work is given in Friedberg, Die mittelalter- 
 lichen Lehren tiber das Verhdltniss von Staat und Kirche. Cf. also Poole, 
 Illustrations of Mediaeval Thought, p. 253; also Gieseler, III, 33.
 
 AUGUSTINUS TRIUMPHUS 219 
 
 cation, " rations peccati" which was vague and elastic 
 enough, gives way to the infinitely less determinate 
 u causa rationalis " ; and it is carefully explained that 
 any delinquency of either people or king is good 
 ground for papal action in either deposing or institut- 
 ing a king. Nor will Augustinus permit the lord of 
 all the world to refrain from using his authority. 
 " The Pope cannot exempt any one from his power in 
 temporals," for this would be to deny that he is the 
 vicar of God. And finally, the plenary power of the 
 Pope in the matter of tithes is defended in this far- 
 reaching argument : " Private property ceases to be 
 such by natural law in case of necessity, by divine 
 law, for the sake of charity, and by the civil law, for 
 the benefit (utilitas) of the state " : but the Pope, as 
 the vicar of God, is the interpreter and ordainer of 
 all law ; therefore he can at his discretion, on either 
 of the grounds, take the property of private citizens, 
 and even of kings and other potentates. 
 
 This magnificent conception of the papal power 
 found very little support in the actual conditions 
 which prevailed when it was formulated. Indeed, 
 the exaggeration of the ecclesiastical pretensions in 
 theory proceeded pari passu with the decline of the 
 papal prestige. The policy of the curia at Avignon 
 was pretty generally recognized as guided from Paris, 
 and because of this even the German princes who had 
 so often been the mainstay of the popes against the 
 Emperor now stood by Lewis of Bavaria. In Italy 
 also the respect for papal authority, whether spiritual 
 or temporal, steadily declined. And while the exter-
 
 220 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 nal conditions were shaping themselves thus, in the 
 field of speculation and debate a corresponding move- 
 ment was revealed by the volume and the spirit of 
 that literature in which the papal pretensions were 
 assailed and confuted. 
 
 2. New Elements in the Anti-papal Theory 
 
 The fourteenth-century adversaries of the Papacy 
 manifested in every instance a more confident and 
 aggressive spirit than that found in the earlier advo- 
 cates of princely independence. The latter were at 
 the best feeble and halting in their argument and were 
 obviously conscious that they were on the defensive 
 and that the spirit of the age was against them. Not 
 so the men of the fourteenth century. Their works 
 abound in revelations of new forces working in the 
 thought of the time forces which were all on the 
 side of the secular authority. In form and method 
 the philosophic literature of the fourteenth century 
 retains and intensifies the characteristics impressed 
 upon it by the preceding scholastics. The dogmas of 
 authority are cited and are refuted by opposing dog- 
 mas ; all literature, sacred and profane, is ransacked 
 for fables that can be exploited to sustain a cause ; 
 syllogistic deductions are elaborately demonstrated to 
 contain the formal fallacies of the syllogism ; distinc- 
 tions that cannot be seen by the modern mind to 
 distinguish are triumphantly brought to the determi- 
 nation of every conflict of great authorities ; and " the 
 subtle manipulation of unverified words," as John 
 Morley calls it, reaches its climax in the monstrous
 
 THE FOURTEENTH-CENTURY JURISTS 221 
 
 verbal output of the Doctor Sulttilissimus, William of 
 Ockarn. 1 But the tiresome method and form of the 
 literature do not conceal the new elements in the 
 thought of the writers. While the ancient argu- 
 ments from the texts of the Scriptures and the 
 church fathers are always dealt with at length, there 
 appear in addition, and often with even greater 
 emphasis, an appeal to the doctrine of Aristotle and 
 an extensive recourse to the canon and the civil law. 
 
 St. Thomas had, as we have seen, ingeniously 
 applied the philosophy of the Greek to the purposes 
 of his own system. But it was quite open to the 
 opponents of Thomas's political doctrine to avail 
 themselves also of the Aristotelian principles. In- 
 deed, no speculation of any sort was now formally 
 complete without some basis in those principles. 
 Hence we find the antagonists of the popes drawing 
 freely from "the philosopher." And it is easily 
 conceivable that the innermost spirit of the Greek's 
 thought, alien as it was to the ecclesiastical spirit 
 of the Middle Ages, gave most stimulus to those 
 who were at war, though unconsciously, with what 
 was characteristically mediaeval. 
 
 On the other hand, the legal and juristic influence 
 which wrought so powerfully in the controversies 
 of the fourteenth century contributed to the cause 
 of the secular power less through theory than in- 
 directly through fact. All the set arguments in 
 behalf of princes against the Papacy included ex- 
 
 1 For an amusing judgment on Ockam, and a frank non possumus 
 as to understanding him, see Janet, I, 446.
 
 222 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 haustive discussions of Canon and Civil law. 1 The 
 Canon law had by this time become a large body 
 of principles and rules derived from the decretals 
 of popes and commentaries (glossce) thereon; the 
 Civil law consisted of Justinian's Digest and the 
 commentaries that had accumulated since the revival 
 of legal studies in the twelfth century. Through 
 the development of the Canon law into a system, 
 universally applied in the ecclesiastical courts, the 
 advantage derived by the secular rulers from the 
 Roman law 2 had been neutralized. In the vary- 
 ing phases of the controversy over jurisdiction, the 
 jurists of the Civil law the Civilians were con- 
 fronted by an equally well-trained body of Canonists. 
 Each strove to demonstrate the supremacy of his 
 own system of authority. From the standpoint of 
 pure theory the controversy was indecisive. But 
 the keenness of the discussions and the activity 
 of the lawyers had a practical result when Philip 
 the Fair and other princes began systematically to 
 extend the jurisdiction of the royal courts at the 
 expense of both lay vassals and the church. In 
 this policy the lawyers were always ready with plau- 
 sible grounds in both Civil and Canon law for the 
 extension in view, and with this support in theory 
 the physical force of the secular ruler could always 
 
 1 Cf. the treatise entitled Qucestio de Utraque Potestate, in Goldast, 
 Monarchia Sancti Romani Imperil, II, 106. The author proclaims 
 his purpose to prove that the Pope has no dominium in temporals by 
 four arguments, viz. : " Per rationes physicas " (Aristotle) ; " per rati- 
 ones theologicas " (the texts of Scripture and the fathers) ; " per jurs 
 canonica " ; and " per jura civilia." 2 Cf. supra, p. 180.
 
 THE FOURTEENTH-CENTURY JURISTS 223 
 
 be depended upon in last resort to make his claim 
 of right prevail. With every successful assertion of 
 the royal power the influence of its juristic advisers 
 became more noteworthy, and thus the lawyers and 
 their methods of thought assumed a leading place 
 in the consolidation of national monarchies which 
 was just beginning. 
 
 Besides the Aristotelian and juristic doctrine that 
 gave a new tone to fourteenth-century theory, the 
 singular prominence assumed by the French monar- 
 chy profoundly modified the trend of speculation. 
 The relative insignificance of imperial power as com- 
 pared with that of Philip the Fair could not be dis- 
 guised, and accordingly the universal dominion of the 
 Emperor so long a postulate of mediaeval theory 
 began to lose its hold along with the temporal 
 pretensions of the Pope. Its strongest supporters, 
 indeed, were now to be found among the advocates 
 of the papal pretensions. Boniface VIII himself, 
 in memorable words, relegated the French king and 
 his people to the sovereignty of the Emperor. " Let 
 not the Gauls say in their arrogance that they recog- 
 nize no superior. They lie; for of right they are 
 and ought to be subject to the King of Rome and 
 the Emperor." l The motive for this suggestion is 
 obvious. At this time the power of the Pope over 
 the Emperor was notorious, and Boniface was argu- 
 ing primarily his own case, not that of the Emperor. 
 
 1 " Nee insurgat hie superbia Gallicana quae dicit quod non recog- 
 noscit superiorem. Mentiuntur ; quia de jure sunt et esse debent sub 
 rege Romano et Imperatore."
 
 224 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 What small influence the claim had in France ap- 
 pears from the projects that were openly put forth 
 by Philip's advocates, looking to the extension of the 
 king's power over all Europe in the interest of peace. 1 
 The Empire had become, in fact, a mere thing to 
 conjure with, but without serious significance. Not 
 only did the French lawyers cast aside with disdain 
 the idea of universal temporal dominion and set 
 forth in elaborate arguments the claim that it was 
 irrational, but even the ablest and clearest headed 
 of imperialistic writers evaded committing himself to 
 its assertion and defence. 2 
 
 3. Tlie Supporters of Philip the Fair 
 
 Underlying all the reasoning by which the case 
 of Philip against Boniface was sustained was the 
 more or less conscious sentiment of French nation- 
 ality. The ethnic and geographical elements of this 
 thought appear in the designation of the king some- 
 times as Rex Francice and sometimes as Rex Fran- 
 corum, while the most conclusive manifestation of 
 the thought was the practically unanimous support 
 given to the king by all orders of his subjects. 
 
 In the controversial literature of the time the 
 independence of the French monarchy is sustained 
 by earnest, if somewhat uncritical, appeals to history. 
 Philip's reply to one of the Pope's fulminations 
 asserts concisely the argument from antiquity : 
 " Before there were any priests, the King of France 
 
 1 See next section. 2 Marsiglio, Defensor Pads, I, 17.
 
 FEENCH MONARCHY AGAINST PAPACY 225 
 
 had the care of his kingdom and could make laws 
 for it." * The details of this contention are found 
 in a short treatise entitled De Utraque Potestate? 
 It is set forth that after the fall of Troy twelve 
 thousand Trojans settled in Pannonia, where they 
 remained until the Emperor Valentinian expelled 
 them for their persistent refusal to pay tribute to 
 Rome. They moved to Germany near the Rhine, 
 took the name of Franks on account of their in- 
 vincible courage in resisting Rome, and ultimately 
 occupied Gaul. Thus, the writer says, they were 
 never subject to either the Emperor or anybody 
 else. But, he continues, with a characteristic change 
 of base from history to law, even if ever at any 
 time they were subject to any emperor or pope, 
 it must have been very long ago, and their indepen- 
 dence rests securely enough on prescription ; for by 
 the Canon law itself a prescription of one hundred 
 years runs against the Roman church. 3 From the 
 standpoint of either fact or law, thus, the king is 
 free from responsibility to the Pope. His right is 
 divine right. " He holds and possesses his kingdom 
 immediately of God alone ; " and the sacred source 
 of his power is testified, the writer declares, by 
 the miracles which the French monarchs have 
 wrought. 
 
 1 " Antequam essent clerici, Rex Franciae habebat custodiam regni 
 et poterat statuta facere." Cf. John of Paris in the work treated be- 
 low : " Prius f uerunt reges Franciae in Francia quam Christiani." 
 
 2 In Goldast, op. ciL II, 106. 
 
 8 " Nam etiam contra Romanam Ecclesiam currit praescriptio cen- 
 tenaria." 
 
 Q
 
 226 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 In a more elaborate work * in behalf of Philip by 
 John of Paris, the philosophic basis of the kingdom 
 (regnum), as distinct from the Empire and the ecclesi- 
 astical hierarchy, is effectively laid down. Conceding 
 that the organization of the clergy under a single 
 monarchic head is altogether desirable, he argues 
 that the same is not true as to temporal rulers. 2 
 The reasons he sets forth are noteworthy, as indi- 
 cating the reaction from the idea of universal em- 
 pire. The faith necessary to salvation, he declares, 
 is one and the same everywhere, and hence requires 
 unity in ecclesiastical control. But in their non- 
 spiritual aspects and relations Christians are most 
 diverse and require leadership corresponding to this 
 diversity. Moreover, for one man to rule the whole 
 world is possible in spirituals, but not in temporals. 
 The former government works through mere words, 
 while the latter works through force ; and it is easy 
 enough to send words everywhere, but impossible to 
 exercise force effectively at long range. And finally, 
 the property of laymen in their temporal relations 
 is individual, while that held by the clergy belongs 
 to the whole body of the church ; therefore a single 
 steward (dispensator) is not necessary in the former 
 case as in the latter. 
 
 That the Pope is steward, rather than owner 
 (dominus), of the property pertaining to the church, 
 
 1 De Potestate Regia et Papali. In Goldast, II, 108. 
 
 2 The title of his third chapter is : " De ordine ministrorum ad 
 unum summum ; quod non est necesse omnes principes ad unum 
 reduci, sicut ministros Ecclesiae ad unum supremum."
 
 JOHN OF PARIS 227 
 
 is the very backbone of the royal defence. And 
 in sustaining this thesis great ingenuity is employed 
 on purely legal concepts. The whole subject of 
 property rights is exhaustively investigated. John 
 of Paris contends, for example, that the Pope, even 
 if he had ownership as to the possessions of lay- 
 men, would not on that account have jurisdiction 
 over them; for jurisdiction is quite a different 
 concept from ownership, and pertains to the prince. 
 Furthermore the Pope, in exercising the supreme 
 stewardship which he enjoys in respect to ecclesi- 
 astical goods, is bound to be guided himself by 
 the good of the faith. Failing this he may be 
 deposed. 
 
 The deposition of the Pope was at this time a com- 
 mon topic with the supporters of Philip. John of 
 Paris held that such action would justly follow per- 
 sistent hostility to the French king. But the right 
 to depose was not ascribed to the king; in this re- 
 spect his purely national authority left no room for 
 such claim to regulate the Papacy as was set up for 
 the Emperor in the character of divinely established 
 universal monarch. The instrumentality to which 
 Philip's lawyers made resort in their projects of depo- 
 sition was the general council of the church. The 
 bearings of this idea, that a general council, rather 
 than the Pope, was the depository of ultimate eccle- 
 siastical sovereignty, will appear more particularly 
 in later pages. 
 
 Of all the writings in behalf of Philip the Fair 
 the most noteworthy and original are those of Peter
 
 228 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 Dubois, 1 a jurist high in the councils of the king. 
 Dubois presents no set scholastic argument for the 
 royal cause, but, for the realization of certain mediae- 
 val ideals, proposes methods that frankly ignore all 
 the broad political conceptions that are character- 
 istically mediaeval, and rest on a view of existing 
 conditions that is almost brutally practical. His 
 two chief works embody respectively a project for 
 the speedy and successful termination of the wars 
 and controversies in which the French monarchy is 
 engaged, and a scheme for the recovery of the Holy 
 Land from the infidels. The basal thought in each 
 work is that the French king is, regardless of all 
 the traditional theories as to imperial and papal 
 supremacy, the only possessor of actual political 
 power sufficient for the highest welfare of Christen- 
 dom. Theoretically the Pope, as a political ruler, is 
 above the Emperor by the Donation of Constantine. 
 But it requires force to assert this power, and suffi- 
 cient force the Pope of himself can never possess. 
 Dubois sets forth, with a calm cynicism that suggests 
 Machiavelli, the emptiness of right without might. 
 The Pope is no warrior, and ought not to be; his busi- 
 ness is to save souls, while by meddling in politics 
 he has sent many to hell. Moreover, the men who are 
 elected popes are generally decrepit old men, without 
 that family influence and connection which are essen- 
 
 1 For a full account of his life and works, see Renan, Etudes sur 
 la politique religieuse de Philippe le Bel. The text of the De Recupe- 
 ratione Terre Sancte, edited by Langlois, is in the Collection de textes 
 pour servir a V etude de I'histoire, Paris, 1891. Cf. also Poole, Mediaeval 
 Thought, p. 256 et seq.
 
 PETER DUBOIS 229 
 
 tial to wide power in temporal affairs. They should 
 confine themselves therefore to their spiritual minis- 
 trations. Meanwhile, their temporal functions and 
 their temporal revenues should be committed to the 
 administration of some one competent to perform 
 the task well. No one is better qualified for this 
 task than the French monarch ; and thus the essence 
 of the writer's project is revealed to be, that the 
 King of France shall appropriate to his own use the 
 territories of the Pope and employ them in asserting 
 a leadership over Christendom. 
 
 The same underlying idea is manifest in the scheme 
 for the recovery of the Holy Land. The disastrous 
 failure of all efforts hi this direction has been due to 
 the disunity of Christendom, a condition for which 
 the feebleness of the Papacy has been largely respon- 
 sible. But with papal influence confined to spirituals, 
 and with temporals under French hegemony, success 
 will be assured. Dubois dwells with especial itera- 
 tion on the demoralizing effects of the free use by 
 the Popes of excommunication ; it brings, he holds, 
 damnation to many souls, without exercising upon 
 the actions of men so much positive influence as do 
 temporal penalties. His project involves, in addition 
 to the special points just noted, suggestions of very 
 wide social and political reforms in Christian Europe 
 as preliminary to the great enterprise against the 
 infidels. Though many of his notions are hopelessly 
 unpractical and visionary, the spirit in which he 
 presents them is remarkable, and foreshadows the 
 approaching philosophy of the Renaissance.
 
 230 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 4. The De Monarchia of Dante. 
 
 Of the thinkers who contributed to the anti-papal 
 doctrine from the standpoint of the imperial interest, 
 Dante Alighieri is noteworthy rather for triteness 
 than for novelty in the substance of his thought. 
 While the French writers and his own associates in 
 the imperial cause were propounding doctrines that 
 breathed forth the spirit of a new age, Dante brooded 
 over the past. His Latin work, De Monarchic/,, 1 is in 
 substance a plea for that secular world-empire which 
 had had a basis of reality in the days of the Hohen- 
 staufen, but had since become the shadow of a name. 
 Dante's genius gave to his treatise a form, however, 
 which makes it logically the most complete and per- 
 fect system that we have of imperialistic philosophy. 
 The manifold and confused argumentation by which 
 the cause of the emperors had been for centuries 
 upheld is so condensed, and its elements are so corre- 
 lated, as to present a clearly defined and impressive 
 ideal of the system. To this end are made to con- 
 tribute the Aristotelian metaphysics and politics, 
 Roman and Jewish history and the Civil and 
 Canon law, as well as the myths and the texts of 
 Scripture which were still on every tongue. 
 
 By "monarchy" Dante means universal dominion 
 over all things temporal, 2 and monarchy in this sense 
 
 1 The date of the work is uncertain. It is held by many to have 
 been suggested by the expedition of Henry VII of Germany to Rome 
 in pursuit of the imperial crown, and to have been written about the 
 time of that event, 1310-13. 
 
 2 Unus principatus et super omnes in tempore vel in iis et super 
 iis quae tempore mensurantur. Bk. I, c. 2.
 
 DANTE 231 
 
 is the theme of his work. The three books into* 
 which the work is divided deal respectively with; 
 three questions : (1) whether such monarchy is essen- \ 
 tial to the well-being of the world ; (2) whether the 
 Roman people rightfully acquired the monarchic 
 office ; and (3) whether the monarchic authority is 
 derived immediately from God, or rather from some 
 servant or vicar of God. The answer to the first 
 question takes the form of a set plea for universal 
 empire as a condition of human welfare. By re- 
 course to Aristotle, Dante demonstrates that the 
 indispensable prerequisite of man's perfect existence 
 is general peace, and then proceeds to show that this 
 condition is attainable only by a unified governmental 
 system under a single head. Only in such a system 
 is the unity of human nature and human destiny 
 duly expressed, and the unity of the Creator rightly 
 imitated. 1 Only in the world-monarch can be found 
 a final court of appeal for the decision of princely 
 controversies. 2 And in the government of such a 
 ruler must be the maximum of justice: for justice 
 depends upon power and will; and the world-mon- 
 arch, by the nature of his position, possesses both the 
 absolute power and, because envy and desire cannot 
 exist in one so perfectly situated, also the immovable 
 will to do justice. 8 By like reasoning, Dante demon- 
 strates that real liberty is most to be found in the 
 universal monarchy, and that the concord of wills 
 that is essential to peace and happiness is insured in 
 the dominance of the one imperial will. He does 
 1 Bk. I, c. 5. 2 Ibidt c . 12, Hid. c . 13, 15.
 
 232 POLITICAL THEOEIES 
 
 not intend, however, that the local authorities of 
 earth shall all be obliterated by the one supreme 
 government. The ^ajrticjjlajc^^ia^^ differ- 
 
 ej3^Lpej}ks_muslJ&J^ of 
 
 law, 1 wj^le__thejm^n^^ various 
 
 cjgmmjmitiejtjx)^^ 
 
 Assuming, then, that world-monarchy, or empire, 
 is the ideal system of government, Dante's next 
 thesis is that the Roman people acquired the impe- 
 rial authority of right (de iure) and by the will of 
 God. This he sustains first by an interpretation of 
 early Roman history on Virgilian lines, showing that 
 the heroes of royal and republican ages were embodi- 
 ments of supreme virtue and true nobility, and that 
 the conquests of the Romans were always consciously 
 directed to the public good. 2 And in the very fact of 
 their unprecedented success he sees conclusive evi- 
 dence of divine sanction. "The people which tri- 
 umphed over all the other peoples that contended 
 for the empire of the world, triumphed by the judg- 
 ment of God." 3 For the ordeal by battle is the final 
 test of justice. " What is acquired by duel is acquired 
 3y right." 4 Combat (collisio)., Dante explains, whether 
 
 force of mind or force of body, must always deter- 
 mine in last instance where justice lies, in the affairs 
 
 1 Habent namque nationes, regna et civitates inter se proprietates 
 quas legibus differentibus regular! oportet. Ibid. c. 16. 
 
 2 Declaranda igitur duo sunt : quorum unum est quod quicunque 
 bonum reipublicae intendit finem iuris intendit ; aliud est quod Ro- 
 manus populus, subiiciendo sibi orbem bonum publicum intendit. 
 Bk. II, c. 6. 3 f bi(L c . 9. 
 
 4 Quod per duellam acquiritur de iure acquiritur. Ibid. c. 10.
 
 DANTE 233 
 
 either of individuals or of peoples ; and he sets forth 
 in some detail thejbheory of the ordeal by battle, com- 
 bining^ the^ purejjmedi9eval_conceptions on this point 
 with something vaguely suggestive of the modern 
 " struggle for existence/' Finally, the rightfulness 
 of Roman world-rule is deducible, he holds, from the 
 principles of the Christian faith and the doctrine of 
 the atonement. ' For Christ, bearing the sins of the 
 whole human race, could have truly expiated them 
 only through a penalty imposed by an authority 
 having jurisdiction over the whole race. Hence, the 
 very fact that he suffered under Pilate, the vicar of 
 Tiberius, proves that the Roman dominion was 
 universal de iure. 1 
 
 That the Empire of his own day is the direct succes- 
 sor of the old Roman Empire, embodying all the right- 
 ful authority of the latter, is tacitly assumed by Dante, 
 and the concluding book of the De Monarchic/, is de- 
 voted to a somewhat acrimonious attack on those who 
 hold that the imperial title and authority are derived 
 from the Pope, and to a systematic refutation of their 
 arguments. Toward "those who call themselves 
 Decretalists " 2 he is especially severe, and their asser- 
 tion that tradition is the foundation of the church is 
 the text of a destructive criticism. 3 " The traditions 
 which are called Decretals " are indeed, he says, to be 
 venerated ; but it cannot be doubted that they must 
 
 1 For this very curious argument, couched in the precise forms of 
 the syllogism, see Bk. II, c. 11. 
 
 2 Those, that is, who argue chiefly from the Canon law. 
 
 3 Bk. Ill, c. 3.
 
 234 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 yield precedence to the Scriptures as the true founda- 
 tion of the church. In this more than in any other 
 passage of his work, Dante speaks with the voice 
 of the fourteenth century, foreshadowing the great 
 reform. When, however, he proceeds to combat 
 gsejiajim the arguments for ecclesiastical supremacy, 
 he gets but little beyond the anti-papal writers of the 
 preceding two centuries. He depends more on the 
 Aristotelian formal logic and the concepts of juris- 
 prudence than on Scriptural texts, and in this consists 
 the chief distinction from his predecessors. With 
 analysis that is often acute and ingenious but also 
 often puerile, he takes up the familiar arguments 
 the sun and moon, the two swords, Saul and Samuel, 
 the commission to bind and loose and proves them 
 fallacious either formally or in substance. To the 
 Donation of Constantine he devotes especially earnest 
 consideration, 1 elaborately contending, not that the 
 alleged gift was never made, but that the Emperor had 
 no right to make it that unity was the essence of 
 the Empire and a division was in the power of no man. 
 And the " translation " of imperial power to Charle- 
 magne is dismissed with the curt comment : " Usur- 
 pation of right makes no right." 2 Dante's final 
 conclusion on the whole matter is that the Pope has 
 not received either from God, or from any emperor, or 
 from the whole or a majority of the human race, any 
 share in the imperial authority, and hence cannot 
 bestow it on the Emperor. On the contrary, God has 
 directly created the two distinct species of authority 
 
 1 Bk. Ill, c. 3. 3 Usurpatio iuris non facit ius.
 
 EMPIRE AGAINST PAPACY 235 
 
 that are essential to man's welfare, and has directly 
 bestowed one species on the temporal world-monarch. 
 
 5. The Conflict between Lewis of Bavaria and Pope 
 John XXII 
 
 Dante's formulation of a rationalistic theory of the 
 Empire was clearly prompted by the anarchic condi- 
 tions in Italian politics. The De Monarchia was a 
 Ghibelline manifesto against the pro-papal Guelfs. 
 During the last years of Dante's life 1 Germany also 
 suffered from the demoralization of a desperate civil 
 war, on the question of succession to the crown. 
 Pending the outcome the Pope, John XXII, asserted 
 and enlarged the old papal claim of a right to exer- 
 cise imperial powers in case of vacancy in the impe- 
 rial office. Refusing to recognize either of the rivals 
 in Germany, he strengthened in every way the posi- 
 tion of the Guelfs in Italy and prepared to wield, 
 like Innocent III, a decisive, direct influence in 
 German affairs. The civil war ended in the triumph 
 of Lewis of Bavaria, 2 who assumed the dignity of 
 German king, and at once manifested a purpose to 
 assert his rights as Emperor in Italy. This brought 
 forth from the papal court at Avignon a series of 
 decrees which, by excommunication of Lewis and 
 his supporters and interdict upon the regions that 
 recognized him, reproduced the conspicuous phases of 
 the famous conflict over investitures. The struggle 
 thus begun continued, through many fluctuations of 
 
 i He died in 1321. 
 
 a By the victory at Miihldorf , 1322, over Frederick of Austria.
 
 236 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 advantage, to the end of the monarch's life, in 1347, 
 and was the occasion of an enormous controversial 
 literature. But though the lines of the formal 
 debate were the old lines of antithesis of universal 
 secular and universal spiritual power, the unsubstan- 
 tial character of the actual Empire was clearly 
 in the consciousness of the age; and it was recog- 
 nized that the essence of the complex situation was 
 the national rivalries of France and Germany and 
 Italy. 1 Behind the Papacy the policy of the French 
 kings was not hard to detect, and the aspirations of 
 the Italian princes and cities to independence were 
 hardly disguised by their affiliations with papal or 
 with imperial policy. In a general way the dogma 
 of the world-sway of the Emperor had for its prac- 
 tical end the maintenance of German ascendency 
 in Italy, and the dogma of papal suzerainty, for 
 its end the extension of French dominion at the 
 expense of Germany. 
 
 Under such circumstances political philosophy would 
 probably not have been greatly enriched during this 
 period had not a doctrinal controversy within the 
 church itself alienated from the Pope some of the 
 keenest and best-trained minds of the time, and 
 driven them to the support of the imperial cause. 
 In 1322 John XXII formally condemned, as hereti- 
 cal, the tenet of evangelical poverty which was held 
 by the powerful Franciscan order, and summarily 
 ended the practice through which the friars became 
 
 1 Cf. Riezler, Die literarischen Widersacher der Papste zur Zeit 
 Ludwig des Balers, p. 9 et seq.
 
 ANTI-PAPAL DOCTRINE 237 
 
 wealthy in spite of their vows. 1 This action brought 
 upon the Pope the most violent denunciations from 
 a group of ecclesiastics, Franciscans and their sym- 
 pathizers, including Marsiglio of Padua, John of 
 Jandun, Michael of Cesena and William of Ockam. 
 Theological learning and dialectic skill were con- 
 spicuous in this group, and the treatises that they 
 poured forth brought John XXII under imputation 
 of heresy, with which, indeed, his assailants openly 
 charged him. For men engaged as they were in 
 attacking the Pope, Italy and France at this time 
 furnished no safe place of abode; hence, when the 
 conflict of the German king with the Pope devel- 
 oped, they betook themselves to Germany, and con- 
 tinued at the court of Lewis to wage strenuous 
 literary warfare on the Papacy and all its works. 
 
 The concurrence of a theological with a more 
 purely political issue accounts for many of the promi- 
 nent characteristics of the pro-imperial literature and 
 doctrine. It was, in the first place, much more 
 strongly anti-papal than pro-imperial. It nowhere 
 sets out in so clear and well-defined a form as we 
 see in Dante the conception of universal monarchy. 
 It dwells more on the shortcomings of the Pope and 
 the existing evils in the church than on the inherent 
 power and excellency of the state. And it is essen- 
 tially in the search for ways and means of purify- 
 
 1 The ownership (dominiwn) of things by Christ and the apostles 
 was denied by the Franciscans, and only the use (MSM.S) admitted. So 
 the ownership of things donated to the order had been ascribed to the 
 Roman church, while the use was retained by the friars. Cf. triese- 
 ler, op. cit. Ill, p. 121 et seq.
 
 238 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 ing the church from heresy and maladministration 
 that the most striking contributions to the theory 
 of the state are made. From an heretical or a 
 tyrannical Pope the church, it was declared, can 
 only be saved by recourse to the whole body of 
 believers. Hence, we find the supporters of the 
 Empire reviving the idea which had had such 
 vogue twenty years before in France that the 
 ultimate authority in the church must be found in 
 the general council. For such a theory the Empire 
 formed a much more secure foundation than any 
 kingdom; for the traditions of conciliar action in 
 the early church all showed the Emperor as the 
 mainspring of power. 
 
 6. Marsiglio of Padua 
 
 Of the numerous works put forth by the writers 
 named above the most noteworthy for our present 
 (purpose is that entitled Defensor Pads, the joint 
 [production of Marsiglio of Padua and John of Jan- 
 /dun, but generally ascribed exclusively to the former. 1 
 This treatise, not voluminous according to the stand- 
 ard of the times, presents a theory of state and of 
 church that is in many respects out of all relation to 
 the current of mediaeval thought and accords with 
 the full spirit of the Reformation and the Revolu- 
 tion; and the vigour of the writer's dialectic is quite 
 equal to the radicalism of his views. In the title, 
 
 1 The work is printed in Goldast, II, 154, and in several separate 
 editions. Cf. Riezler, op. cit. 193. See also Sullivan, " Marsiglio and 
 Ockain," in American Historical Review, Vol. II, pp. 409, 593. I have 
 used the edition of Frankfort, 1612.
 
 MARSIGLIO ON SOVEREIGNTY 239 
 
 The Defender of the Peace, is suggested the same 
 basis which Dante had used in supporting the 
 Emperor the necessity of some authority capable 
 of maintaining order. Marsiglio duly laments the 
 turbulence and disorders of the times, and duly 
 defends the imperial power. On the other hand, he 
 dwells at great length on the luxury and extrav- 
 agance that prevail and the corrupting pursuit of 
 wealth, maintaining as the corrective for this the 
 righteousness of Franciscan poverty. His doctrines 
 on these two points are not distinguishable from those 
 of the other anti-papal writers. But in his theory 
 as to the organization and the powers of political and 
 ecclesiastical societies, he strikes out a new path. 1 
 
 The substance of his doctrine as to the origin and 
 end of political life is taken from Aristotle. Associ- 
 ation springs from the nature of man, and government 
 is a necessity of social p.Tiat.p.np.e. The working force 
 in rational government is law, and in the law-maker 
 is the essence of the state. On this point Marsiglio 
 dwells with the utmost particularity, and he develops 
 from it with grejJLjagcigion the principle of popular 
 sovereignty : 
 
 According to truth and the opinion of Aristotle the legis- 
 lator ... is the people, or a majority of them . . . command- 
 ing or determining that something be done or refrained from 
 in the field of social human action, under pain of some temporal 
 punishment. 8 
 
 1 The Defensor is divided into three parts, of which the first deals 
 chiefly with the state, the second with the church, while the third is 
 a concise statement of forty-three " conclusions " which embody the 
 substance of his doctrine. a Defensor, Bk. I, c. 12.
 
 240 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 The legislator's will may be expressed either by 
 the assembly of the citizens acting directly, or by 
 some individual or group to whom the authority has 
 been delegated. But in the latter case the "legis- 
 later," in the strict sense, is still the people; the 
 delegate is but the agent. Adhering rigidly to this 
 distinction, Marsiglio draws a clear line between the 
 legislative and the executive functions in government. 
 The executive organ he calls the pars principans, and 
 in this category he includes monarchs. 
 
 The concept of popular sovereignty had been, as 
 we have seen, thoroughly incorporated in the Roman 
 law, and it was a commonplace of the legists that the 
 Emperor was the representative of the people. But 
 Marsiglio' s exposition of the concept exhibits much 
 more conspicuously the spirit of the Greek republics, 
 where the application was practical, than that of the 
 Roman Empire, where the application was purely 
 theoretical. He dwells at length, for example, on the 
 duty of the " legislator " to punish the " principans " 
 for violations of the law 1 a doctrine that has little in 
 common with the jurists' maxim, princeps legibus so- 
 lutus. There does not appear in the Defensor any 
 conception of the Emperor as the omnipotent ruler of 
 the world. Marsiglio, despite the circumstances under 
 which he wrote, is far more faithful than Dante to 
 the actualities of the fourteenth century. The im- 
 perial office per se does not appear at all, in fact, 
 among the features of Marsiglio's purely political sys- 
 tern. Inferentially it might be included in the cate- 
 
 1 Bk. I, c. 18.
 
 SUPREMACY OF THE GENERAL COUNCIL 241 
 
 gory of elective monarchy, to which some attention 
 is devoted, and for which, as compared with heredi- 
 tary monarchy, a scientific preference is indicated. 1 
 But that in a work designed to sustain the cause of 
 the Empire, so slight regard is paid to the traditional 
 significance of the Emperor, proves that Marsiglio 
 was as well endowed with audacity as with insight. 
 The full import of Marsiglio's theory of the state 
 only appears when he presents his theory of the 
 church, which is really the chief topic of the book. 
 The doctrine of popular sovereignty is carried bodily 
 over into the ecclesiastical field and is made the basis 
 of his whole treatment. In the first place the church 
 is conceived as a social aggregate existing by virtue 
 of God's plan of human life. The essence of the 
 church, therefore, is not at all the priesthood alone, 
 but the general body of believers. 2 As in any other 
 aggregate of individuals, then, the ultimate authority, 
 under God, is in the whole, not in any part. The 
 organ for the expression of this authority is the gen- 
 eral council the assembly of all Christians or of 
 their delegates, so chosen that every important prov- 
 ince or community of the earth shall have a represen- 
 tation proportioned to the number and character of its 
 inhabitants. 3 The laity as well as the clergy must have 
 
 1 Bk. I, c. 16. 
 
 2 After discriminating between the different senses in which the 
 word ecclesia is used, he declares this to be " verissimam et propriissi- 
 mam : universitas fidelium credentium et invocantium nomen Christi." 
 -11,2. 
 
 8 Secundum proportionem in quantitate ac qualitate persona- 
 rum II, 19 (in Goldast, c. 20, on account of an error in numbering 
 that begins with c. 7).
 
 242 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 a part in the assembly, though the latter element is 
 especially desirable on account of their training in the 
 divine law. In this general council, acting by ma- 
 jority vote, lies, according to Marsiglio, the power to 
 fix definitively the interpretation of the Scriptures, 
 to pass the sentence of excommunication, to regulate 
 the ceremonial of Christian worship and to fill the 
 offices of church government. Whatever corresponds 
 in spiritual life to legislation in temporal is in 
 the competence of this supreme assembly, and the 
 officials of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, from the Pope 
 down to the humblest acolyte, are subject to its 
 determinations. 
 
 But it is as far as possible from Marsiglio' s thought 
 to recognize anything more than a mere analogy in 
 the comparison of ecclesiastical with civil organiza- 
 tion and functions. Between the two he makes a 
 distinction in kind that is as radical as has ever been 
 made even in the heyday of Protestantism. There 
 is not in the church, he holds, any element of juris- 
 diction or coactive power in the true sense of these 
 terms. Its function is purely to promote in men 
 the faith that leads to salvation in the future life. 
 Its method is to teach men the true way and to 
 persuade them to enter it, but compulsion in any 
 sense is beyond its sphere. Hence, the general 
 council itself, much less any particular ecclesiastic, 
 cannot enforce its conclusions. This body, indeed, 
 finds the ultimate cause of its assembling in the 
 importance of avoiding scandal and disorder in the 
 temporal life of Christian peoples. Hence the power
 
 MARSIGLIO ON SPIRITUAL POWER 243 
 
 to convoke a council, to pass upon its membership, 
 and to enforce its opinions upon both clergy and 
 laymen is in the supreme human legislator, or sov- 
 ereign. Not even the purely ecclesiastical penalties 
 of interdict and excommunication can be employed 
 save by the authority of the legislator; for their 
 application by irresponsible persons interferes with 
 the peace and quiet of the faithful, which it is the 
 function of the secular ruler to defend. 1 
 
 The minute analysis to which Marsiglio subjects 
 all the conflicting claims of the secular and the 
 spiritual authorities results in reducing the role of 
 the latter to as humble proportions as those assigned 
 to the former by the extremest pro-papal debaters. 
 His attack on the hierarchy is as keen on the side 
 of doctrine as on that of external history. The 
 power of the keys and the power to bind and loose, 
 which summed up the largest pretensions of the 
 priesthood, are shattered by his powerful attack. 
 Not only does the authority implied in these terms 
 include nothing of temporal import, it does not even 
 signify real power in the spiritual sense. It is not 
 the priest that forgives the sin and remits the pen- 
 alty to the sinner. God alone judges in these mat- 
 ters, and the function of the priest is merely to 
 certify to the divine act. The priest is indeed the 
 bearer of the keys of the kingdom of heaven, but 
 he bears them in the capacity merely of turnkey 
 (claviger) no wielder of jurisdiction, but a humble 
 servitor. 2 This dictum of Marsiglio furnishes the 
 
 1 Defensor, II, 20. 2 II, 6, end.
 
 244 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 obverse of that concept noticed above, in which the 
 secular ruler figures as the hangman. 1 
 
 It goes without saying that the Defensor Pacis 
 embodies the most radical antagonism to the Petrine 
 dogma in all its bearings. The Bishop of Home is 
 emphatically placed on a plane of precise equality 
 with every other bishop so far as the possession of 
 jurisdiction is concerned. As to dignity, Marsiglio 
 concedes that some gradation is expedient for the 
 convenience of administration and direction in spirit- 
 ual life, and that in such gradation a preeminence 
 may properly be assigned to the Roman see. But, 
 in general, his whole attitude toward the historical 
 development and the dogmatic supports of the Ro- 
 man church is precisely that which was assumed 
 by the Protestants after the Lutheran revolt. 
 
 7. William of Ockam 
 
 Far more prolific than Marsiglio in literary product, 
 but distinctly less influential on the side of political 
 jtheory, was the celebrated Englishman, William of 
 lOckam. 2 The method adopted by Ockam in his 
 principal works makes it impossible for the most 
 careful reader to ascertain the writer's opinion on 
 more than a very few of the subjects discussed. On 
 (the ground that truth would gain nothing by the 
 
 1 Supra, p. 185. 
 
 2 See his biography in the Dictionary of National Biography. His 
 life and works are also treated at length by Riezler, op. cit., and a valu- 
 able study of his relations with Marsiglio and the relative influence 
 of the two is made by Sullivan, American Historical Review, loc. cit.
 
 WILLIAM OF OCKAM 245 
 
 revelation of his personal belief, and that scandal to 
 the faith might be caused by dogmatizing on either 
 side of the great controversies of the time, he deliber- 
 ately cast his works in the form of academic disputa- 
 tion, in which both sides are stated with the utmost 
 fulness, but no decision is allowed to appear. 1 More- ' 
 over, every question proposed is analyzed into its ele- 
 ments with extraordinary subtlety, and the pros and 
 cons of each element are fully given, with the result 
 that the general trend of the discussion is at times 
 wholly lost sight of. Under such circumstances it 
 is only possible to assume the general hostility of 
 Ockam to current papal pretensions, and to regard 
 his writings as a storehouse of reasoning in that 
 sense. Every form of argument that had ever been 
 adduced against ecclesiastical and papal predomi- 
 nance is to be found in Ockam, together with many 
 which his own subtle intellect evolved. On the other 
 hand, the positive claims of the Empire receive anal- 
 ogous treatment, and, in his exposition of the func- 
 tions of the secular power in general and of the 
 Empire in particular, the writer furnishes abundant 
 evidence that he is conscious of the influences that 
 moved Dante and Marsiglio. 
 
 The two works of Ockam in which the doctrines 
 of political philosophy are extensively discussed are 
 the Eight Questions concerning the Power and Dignity 
 of the Pope and the Dialogue? the former a short and 
 the other, even in the incomplete state in which we 
 
 1 Cf. the peroration of the Octo Qucestiones and the prologue of the 
 Dialogus. Goldast, II, 391, 398. 2 Both in Goldast, II.
 
 246 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 know it, an enormously long treatise. His general 
 point of view seems to be rather more that of Dante 
 than that of Marsiglio. That is to say, the universal 
 Empire rather than any less mediaeval conception is 
 most conspicuous in his thinking. He gives much 
 attention to the Aristotelian Politics? but he does 
 not push its principles to the extremes reached by 
 Marsiglio. Monarchy seems^to be his preferencejfor 
 governmental organization, though the purely execu- 
 tive character of the monarch's office is not dilated 
 upon. His interpretation of Aristotle's classification 
 of monarchies dwells particularly on the distinction 
 between the despotism, the tyranny and the royal 
 monarchy (principatus regalis), with a noteworthy 
 emphasis on the last, of which he declares it to be the 
 characteristic mark, that the ruler, while free from 
 all restraint of human law, is nevertheless subject to 
 the law of nature. 2 This particular idea was destined 
 to have, as we shall see, a distinguished career in the 
 annals of absolute monarchy. In applying Aristotle's 
 doctrines to contemporaneous conditions, Ockam fol- 
 lows St. Thomas and ^Egidius Romanus 3 in regard- 
 ing the kingdom as subject to the same fundamental 
 principles as the city-state. Each is a form of asso- 
 ciation (communitas), the one of persons dwelling 
 together, the other of those who, while dwelling in 
 places that are distant from one another, neverthe- 
 less have many things in common and are gov- 
 erned by the same prince. Hence much that is 
 
 1 Cf. Dialogus, Ft. HI, Treatise I, Bk. 2, at large. 
 
 2 Ibid. c. 6. 3 Supra, pp. 197, 209.
 
 WILLIAM OF OCKAM 247 
 
 true of the city-state must, he holds, be understood 
 as applicable proportionately to the kingdom. 1 
 
 As functions of the state in general, Ockam enu- 
 merates legislation, the maintenance of justice and 
 the promotion of virtue ; but the chief function is, as 
 Marsiglio had insisted, the punishment of offenders. 2 
 This last is indeed the characteristic function; the 
 others may, without derogating from the excellence 
 of the state, be omitted, but the coercive authority 
 must always be in the prince. On the supreme ques- 
 tion as to the justification of universal secular em- 
 pire, the arguments in favour of the idea are so 
 strongly presented as almost to warrant a conclusion 
 that they expressed Ockam's personal opinions. 3 But 
 the Emperor is not conceived as unlimited in author- 
 ity, even in temporals. 4 Like every other monarch, 
 he is subject to the requirements that his govern- 
 ment be just and be useful to the people. Ockam's 
 detailed study of the limitations presents, in addition 
 to the rules of divine law, substantially the same 
 conceptions that came later to be embodied in the 
 formula "the law of nature and of nations." 5 Thus, 
 private property is secure against the monarch save 
 so far as the general welfare necessitates its applica- 
 
 1 Dialogus, HI, i, 2, 5 ; Goldast, II, 794. Ockam speaks of " reg- 
 num vel ducatus," as Aquinas of " regnum vel provincia." 
 
 2 Ad hoc videtur esse principalissime constitutus, ut corrigat et 
 puniat delinquentes. Octo Qucestiones, III, 6. 
 
 8 This question is the topic of Dialogus, Pt. Ill, Treatise ii, Bk. 1, 
 Goldast, II, 870. 
 
 4 The rights (iurd) of the Emperor in temporals is the subject of 
 in, ii, 2. 
 
 6 "lus naturale et gentium."
 
 248 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 tion to public purposes ; and he is bound to conform 
 to the laws common to all nations, 1 such, for example, 
 as those touching war, embassies, the treatment of 
 prisoners, postliminy, etc. As to the laws which he 
 himself makes, neither the Emperor nor any other 
 monarch is bound by them of necessity, though pro- 
 priety requires that he respect them. Such is the con- 
 struction to be put upon the phrase, Imperator legibus 
 solutus. This dictum has reference only to legislation 
 enacted by a particular human authority, and the 
 supreme power of every legislator must be regarded 
 as qualified by the ius gentium and the ius naturale. 
 
 8. Marsiglio and Ockam on Sovereignty and Repre- 
 sentation 
 
 In this last doctrine of Ockam there is found his 
 attitude toward the theory which was elaborately de- 
 bated by both him and Marsiglio under the head of 
 plenary power (plenitudo potestatis}. This term is 
 shown by the discussions to which it was subjected 
 to have had practically the same meaning that 
 has for the last three centuries been expressed 
 by the word sovereignty. 2 Plenary power was first 
 predicated of the Pope, and was interpreted by the 
 papal protagonists (especially, as we have seen, by 
 Augustinus Triumphus) 3 to include the absolutely 
 unrestricted authority, both temporal and spiritual, 
 
 1 Save when they infringe upon the general welfare (utilitas com- 
 mum's), III, ii, 2, 28. Goldast, II, 924. 
 
 2 Cf. Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Ages (translated by 
 Maitland), p. 35, and notes. 8 Supra, p. 218.
 
 THEORY OF SOVEREIGNTY 249 
 
 which must by the nature of things pertain to the 
 representative of God. Against this extreme view 
 Marsiglio and Ockam proceeded first, as was their 
 custom, by discriminating the various senses in which 
 the term is used. 1 Marsiglio enumerates eight and 
 Ockam five different shades of meaning, and both 
 deny to the Pope and to the church in any of its 
 organs the jurisdiction that is implied in the far- 
 reaching definitions of the term. Ockam, moreover, 
 carries the concept over into the discussion of tempo- 
 ral rule, and questions whether the prince has in this 
 field authority corresponding to the plenary power 
 claimed for the Pope in spirituals. His conclusion 
 is clearly in the negative. He lays it down, for ex- 
 ample, following Aristotle, that ruling slaves is no 
 mark of the best state, and in like manner the exer- 
 cise of power that is equivalent to that over slaves is 
 not to be recognized as pertaining to the ideal ruler. 2 
 Moreover, he so qualifies the conception of the purely 
 legal sovereign 8 as to exhibit the real nature of his 
 thought. His definition of plenary power, formu- 
 lated for general use, shows this same characteristic. 
 It ishe ^says,bhe powejrj3v__vjrt^^ mlp.r 
 
 contrary tQjthe 
 
 2fj^ He thinks, thus, of sov- 
 
 ereignty only as limited. Marsiglio also defines the 
 absolute sense of the term only to set it quickly aside ; 
 
 1 Defensor Pads, IT, 22 ; Dialogus, I, i, 1, 1. 
 
 2 Octo Quccstiones, III, 5. 3 Cf. last section. 
 
 4 " . . . ut omnia possit quae non sunt expresse contra legem Dei 
 neque ius naturae."
 
 250 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 and the attitude of these writers is the general attitude 
 of the time. 1 Indeed, throughout all the centuries 
 down to the eighteenth, limitation was presumed in 
 all the thinking about an ultimate fount of authority 
 in the state, and was lost sight of by certain theorists 
 only through an irrational striving after mathemati- 
 cal exactness in a science which is not exact. 
 
 In addition to this impulse to the discussion and 
 definition of sovereignty, Marsiglio's contribution to 
 the history of political theory includes also the detec- 
 tion of a distinction between state and government. 
 For this is the essence of his thought in marking oS 
 so clearly the "legislator" from the executive, or 
 pars principans? His " legislator " is not necessarily 
 identical with the formulator and promulgator of 
 ordinary laws. He conceives that the legislative 
 authority in this latter sense may be vested in the 
 prince or in some other organ of government ; but 
 behind such organ, and superior to it, always stands 
 the people as a whole, in whose collective will consists 
 the essence of law in the broadest sense, and in whose 
 aggregate life is the essence of the state. In the 
 democratic city-state the manifestation of this essen- 
 tial force is most direct and immediate, but in aristo- 
 cratic government the force is no less determinative ; 
 for the consent of the majority 3 of the citizens, he 
 
 1 Cf. Gierke, loc. cit. 2 Supra, p. 240. 
 
 8 " Valentior pars." Whether this expression ever in Marsiglio's 
 usage signifies anything different from mere numerical majority is 
 doubtful. In many places there seems to be a suggestion of capacity 
 rather than number in " valentior." Cf. especially Defensor Pads, I, 
 12 and 13.
 
 MARSIGLIO ON REPRESENTATION 251 
 
 holds, is the absolute condition of the persistence of 
 any state whatever. This is the fourteenth-century 
 version of the dogma that all governments rest upon 
 the consent of the governed. 
 
 In his discussion of political organization Marsiglio 
 is too close to Aristotle to free himself entirely from 
 the conception that the popular sovereign must either 
 act directly in all governmental affairs or make a 
 general delegation of its authority. But in discours- 
 ing of the church, he resorts to a plan which is sub- 
 stantially a system of representative government. 
 The constitution which he sketches for the general 
 council 1 is a remarkable project for the fourteenth 
 century, and suggests that the history of the influ- 
 ences that worked in the development of parlia- 
 mentary government must for accuracy explore a 
 somewhat wider field than that of the English consti- 
 tution. The idea of representation which is embodied 
 in the dogma that the Emperor represented the Roman 
 people or that the electoral princes of Germany repre- 
 sented the people of the whole world, 2 was common- 
 place for centuries. But this differs toto codo from 
 the thought of Marsiglio' s pregnant phrase suggesting 
 that the world of Christian believers be so represented 
 that each province or community have delegates ac- 
 cording to the "number and quality" of its inhab- 
 itants. No explanatory comment is added to this 
 proposition, and the succeeding paragraphs of the 
 chapter reveal merely that Marsiglio's ideas were 
 influenced largely by the history of the great coun- 
 
 1 Supra, p. 241. a Cf. Ockam, Octo Qucestionet, VIII, 3.
 
 252 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 cils of the early Christian church. But nothing in 
 this history suggests proportionate representation of 
 the various provinces and communities of the Empire. 
 Marsiglio seems to have thrown out a wholly novel 
 suggestion when he proposed an apportionment of 
 membership on the basis of numbers. The associated 
 basis of " quality of persons " has an obvious source 
 in the social and ecclesiastical class distinctions that 
 were so characteristic of the time; but for the basis 
 of numbers the only probable source in actual institu- 
 tions was the municipal organization of some of the 
 cities with which as an Italian Marsiglio was familiar. 
 
 It was left for Ockam, with his accustomed thor- 
 oughness, to work out in detail the project of a rep- 
 resentative general council. 1 Assuming the right of 
 every people, every community and every corpora- 
 tion (corpus) to legislate under certain circumstances 
 for itself, and citing St. Paul as authority for the con- 
 ception that the church universal is a corporation, he 
 points out that the legislative body could be consti- 
 tuted as follows : a primary assembly of all believers 
 in each parish or other small community could choose 
 delegates to an electoral assembly for the diocese or 
 kingdom or other political division, and by these 
 assemblies the delegates to the council could be 
 chosen ; and such a council would truly represent the 
 church, even though there should be no Pope to 
 summon or to preside over it. 
 
 These ideas of Marsiglio and Ockam on sovereignty 
 and representation in the church are of the highest 
 
 1 Dialogus, I, vi, 84.
 
 FOURTEENTH-CENTURY DOCTRINES 253 
 
 significance in the history of political theories in its 
 modern phases. For a hundred years they were the 
 core of violent debate in the ecclesiastical field, and 
 their application and influence in issues of purely 
 political significance grew apace. The jurists of both 
 the Civil and the Canon law wrought them into the 
 fabric of their respective systems, and contributed 
 greatly to give them a precise and practical form. 1 
 These doctrines, in fact, constitute the leading lines 
 along which it is necessary to penetrate the tangle 
 of theories which characterizes the age of the great 
 pre-Reformation councils. 
 
 SELECT REFERENCES 
 
 DUBOIS, De Recuperations Terre Sancte (ed. Langlois). Du 
 PUT, Histoire du differend entre le Pape Boniface VIII et 
 Philippe-le-Bel, Roy de France. BAILLET, Histoire des demelez 
 du Pape Boniface VIII avec Philippe-le-Bel (additions aux 
 preuves de Dupuy). FRANCK, Reformateurs et publicistes de 
 I'Europe, moyen dge, pp. 103-285. FRIEDBERG, Die mittelalter- 
 lichen Lehren iiber das Verhaltniss von Staat und Kirche. 
 GIERKE, Political Theories of the Middle Ages, trans. 
 GIESELER, Church History, Third Period, 59-66. JANET, 
 Vol. I, pp. 416-461. LAURENT, Histoire de I'humanite, Tom. 
 VI, pp. 318 et seq., 353 et seq., 378-394. MULLER, Der Kampf 
 Ludwigs des Bayern mit der romischen Kurie. POOLE, Illustra- 
 tions of Mediaeval Thought, pp. 249-281 ; also art. Ockham 
 
 1 It is the chief thesis of Gierke that the Roman law of the corpo- 
 ration (universitas) was the main source of the characteristic dogmas 
 of Marsiglio and Ockam. See his Political Theories of the Middle Ages 
 (trans, by Maitland), pp. 37-67. This passage is a marvellous exhi- 
 bition of accurate and exhaustive scholarship. Yet I think that 
 Marsiglio is credited with a rather more complete and precise theory 
 of representation than the text of the Defensor Pacts justifies.
 
 254 POLITICAL THEOKIES 
 
 or Occam, in Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. XLI, 
 pp. 357-362 (Bibliography, p. 362). KENAN, Etudes sur la 
 politique religieuse du regne de Philippe-le-Bel. RIEZLER, Die 
 literarischen Widersacher der Pdpste zur Zeit Ludwig des Baiers. 
 BLAKE Y, Vol. I, pp. 377 et seq. (Dante). BRYCE, Holy 
 Roman Empire, pp. 265-269. CHURCH, The De Monarchia of 
 Dante, trans. MOORE, Studies in Dante, 2d Series, pp. 12-34, 
 GOLDAST, Monarchia, Vol. II, 154 et seq. (Ockam's Works and 
 the Defensor Pads). JOTIRDAIN, La Philosophic de St. Thomas 
 d'Aquin, Tom. II, pp. 174-207 (Ockam). LABANCA, MarsUio 
 di Padova. SULLIVAN, Marsiglio of Padua and William of 
 Ockam, in American Historical Review, Vol. II, pp. 409-426, 
 593-610.
 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 THE PASSING OF THE MIDDLE AGE 
 
 1. Political and Ecclesiastical Tendencies 
 
 THE century and a half that followed the death of 
 Ockam 1 witnessed the transformations which mark 
 the advent of the modern era. Politically the changes 
 appeared, as is commonly the case, rather in institu- 
 tions than in speculation about them. Theorizing 
 about politics was but sparingly indulged in, but the 
 progress of events exhibited clearly enough the prin- 
 ciples that were unconsciously in men's minds. In 
 the first place the national, as distinct from the impe- 
 rial idea, became increasingly potent. It was this that 
 gave character to the Hundred Years' War between 
 France and England and saved the former from dis- 
 memberment by the latter ; it was this that drew to- 
 gether the Spanish kingdoms into a single monarchy; 
 and it was this that widened beyond hope of repair the 
 breach between the cisalpine and transalpine fractions 
 of the old Empire, and inspired the vague early con- 
 ceptions of German and of Italian unity. In the sec- 
 ond place, within each of the regions in which the 
 nationalizing tendency was most pronounced, this 
 period witnessed first an exaggeration and then a great 
 decline in the political power of the feudal aristocracy. 
 
 1 The most probable date of his death is 1349. 
 255
 
 256 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 The English Parliament and the French Estates-general 
 played in the fourteenth century a large part in fixing 
 the financial and military conditions under which the 
 monarchs must conduct their wars ; but before the end 
 of the fifteenth century the great nobles who con- 
 trolled these assemblies had been crushed, in England 
 through the Wars of the Roses and the cold-blooded 
 energy of Henry VII, in France through the Hundred 
 Years' War and the subtile policy of Louis XL And 
 as the Spanish kingdoms assumed prominence in 
 European affairs, the tendencies of the times received 
 conspicuous illustration in the large power enjoyed 
 by the nobles of Castile and especially of Aragon, 
 and in the strenuous efforts of the monarchs, both 
 before and after the union of the two kingdoms, to 
 escape the restrictions which the ancient systems 
 imposed upon the royal power. In Germany, finally, 
 the realization of the aristocratic ideal was most 
 complete and, for the period with which we are 
 now concerned, was permanent. Royal power hero 
 became almost nominal, and the great feudal princes 
 appropriated to themselves, at first jointly and 
 then by degrees in severalty, all the substance of 
 sovereignty. 
 
 A third element in the general trend of events 
 was the increased political significance of the towns, 
 manifesting the influence of commercial and indus- 
 trial development. The normal antagonism between 
 the towns and the territorial aristocracy produced 
 now its perfect result. In England, in France and 
 in Spain, the burghers, after suffering greatly in tin-
 
 INFLUENCE OF THE TOWNS 257 
 
 period of aristocratic predominance, became the main- 
 stay of the crown in overthrowing the nobility. 
 Thus in these three lands the burgher element 
 assumed substantial importance in the monarchic 
 national governments ; while in Germany the towns 
 became, in the decline of royal authority, practically 
 independent, and in Italy they assumed wholly the 
 character of the city-states of antiquity. There is 
 evident in such events as the struggles between the 
 towns of Flanders and Charles the Bold, and between 
 the Swabian League and the South German princes, 
 the existence of an aggressive political consciousness 
 in parts of the population that had for centuries been 
 devoid of significance, and to this extent the tendency 
 was democratic ; but it is not at all necessary to 
 exaggerate the prevalence of the tendency by refer- 
 ence to the insurrection of Wat Tyler in England 
 or the French Jacquerie. These latter movements 
 expressed essentially mere local reactions against 
 oppressive economic conditions caused chiefly by the 
 plague. 
 
 While the various tendencies just noticed unques- 
 tionably produced some influence on political philoso- 
 phy, it was to the course of ecclesiastical affairs that we 
 must look for the most positive and direct impression 
 upon systematic thinking. In 1378 the long French 
 ascendency in the papal court at Avignon produced 
 its perfect result in the election of an antipope. 1 The 
 
 1 The cardinals first elected an Italian, Urban VI, at Rome, but 
 a few months later declared his election invalid, on the ground that 
 they had been put under duress by the Romans. Thereupon, at 
 Fondi, they elected Clement VII, who betook himself to Avignon 
 
 3
 
 258 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 schism thus begun was perpetuated by successive 
 papal elections, and its results affected not only eccle- 
 siastical, but also political, conditions throughout the 
 Christian world. In the presence of two popes en- 
 gaged in reciprocal excommunications and anathemas, 
 and supported by various governments on grounds 
 that were obviously of a purely political character, 
 the unity of the church, and the necessarily monar- 
 chic character of its government, faded rapidly out 
 of men's minds. Good men who shuddered at the 
 scandal to the faith laboured earnestly to heal the 
 breach, but in the presence of the countless obstacles 
 that lay in their way if they should adhere to the 
 theory of papal autocracy, resort was had with ever- 
 increasing fervour to the idea of a general council as 
 the true source of ultimate authority in the church. 
 The actual assembling of such a body at Pisa in 1409 
 hardly fulfilled the high purposes of the conciliar 
 theorists ; for the immediate result was a third pope 
 and all the complications of a threefold schism. But 
 the Council of Constance, in 1414-1418, at last suc- 
 ceeded in installing a pope whom all the church 
 recognized. This result was attended, however, by 
 the institution of reforms in the government of the 
 church, that in a large measure substituted conciliar 
 for papal authority. The general council was made 
 a permanent element in the constitution of the 
 church, and a resolute purpose was manifested to 
 convert autocracy into limited monarchy. But 
 
 and was recognized and supported by France. Castile, Aragon and 
 Navarre recognized Clement ; Germany and England, Urban.
 
 FIFTEENTH-CENTURY TENDENCIES 259 
 
 against this purpose the Pope and his supporters 
 made a strong and successful resistance. The con- 
 test lasted, in a variety of phases, through the period 
 of the Council of Basel (1431-1443), and ended in 
 the practical disappearance of the conciliar system. 
 But though the Papacy nominally triumphed, its 
 prestige and its real power were enormously dimin- 
 ished after the councils. Its victory was only achieved 
 through means that brought into the clearest relief 
 its weakness as a political institution. 
 
 The controversies of the conciliar period absorbed 
 the attention of jurists and philosophers, and stimu- 
 lated a radical overhauling of accepted canons of 
 history and right. Not only the acute scholastic 
 spirit of Marsiglio and Ockam, but also the free criti- 
 cal methods of the rising Italian Renaissance were 
 discernible in the doctrines of the time. Thus, at 
 the suggestion of Nicholas of Cues, and by the demon- 
 stration of Valla in 1440, the Donation of Constan- 
 tine was definitively relegated to the domain of myth. 
 Moreover, in the very organization and procedure of 
 the councils there were presented in unmistakable 
 form the same tendencies which appeared in the con- 
 cerns of external politics. The grouping of the peo- 
 ples of Europe received definite recognition in the 
 method of voting by " nations," which was adopted 
 at Constance ; l the antithesis of aristocracy and mon- 
 archy was as clearly expressed in the deposition of 
 popes at Pisa and Constance by assemblies of the pre- 
 
 1 There were five " nations " : the Italian, French, German, Eng- 
 lish and Spanish.
 
 260 POLITICAL THEOKIES 
 
 lates as it was in the deposition of Richard II of Eng- 
 land by the Parliament; and finally, the rising political 
 influence of the townsmen, as against the feudal aris- 
 tocracy, finds its parallel in the prominence at Basel 
 of the lesser clergy, as compared with the prelates, 
 and in the aggressive policy of the former, which 
 ultimately brought the council to a futile end. 
 
 2. Wy cliff e and Huss 
 
 Prior to the complete realization of the con- 
 ciliar idea, the movements in England and Bohemia 
 that are associated, respectively, with the names of 
 Wycliffe and Huss faithfully reflected the character- 
 istic tendencies of the times. Both movements were 
 national and anti-papal in spirit and more or less 
 democratic in manifestation. Their doctrinal appa- 
 ratus shows very clearly the influence of Marsiglio 
 and Ockam. But Wycliffe to a great extent, 
 and Huss almost exclusively, devoted themselves 
 to purely theological and ecclesiastical questions. 
 Where they verge on politics their teaching is 
 that of the early church the recognition of earthly 
 power only to depreciate it. Incidentally, however, 
 Wycliffe developed a theory of authority in general 
 which is not without interest and significance in a 
 history of political thought. This theory is embodied 
 in his works on Lordship (Dominiuin), Divine and 
 Civil. 1 
 
 By lordship Wycliffe means the abstract relation 
 
 1 The works of Wycliffe are in course of publication, with full 
 critical apparatus, by the Wycliffe Society
 
 WYCLIFFE ON LORDSHIP 261 
 
 of the being that is served to the being that serves. 1 
 Thus the term designates the relation of God to the 
 universe, of the king to his subjects, and of the pro- 
 prietor to his slaves or other property. But these 
 various manifestations of the principle do not all 
 stand on the same plane. The lordship of God is 
 the highest and greatest of all. He may be called 
 lord-in-chief (capitalis dominus)? and his authority is 
 not, like that of other monarchs, distributed through 
 various grades of vassals, but is exercised immedi- 
 ately upon everything that is subject to it. This is 
 divine lordship. Of the lower species there are two 
 classes, natural and civil. The dominium naturale, 
 or evangelicum, is that which is shared under the 
 law of the Evangel by all who are in the state of 
 grace the righteous, the universitas predestinato- 
 rum. Dominium civile is of human institution, was 
 occasioned by sin, and is in all respects inferior to 
 the other species. Rights, in the true sense, are 
 possessed only by those who share in evangelical 
 lordship who have in truth all the goods of God. 
 Civil wealth and power are but the shadows of the 
 lordship which pertains in reality to the redeemed. 
 All the familiar incidents of what is called property 
 management all transfers, bequests, etc. char- 
 acterize merely the administration of that of which 
 the essential right is in God and, under his law, in 
 his elect. 
 
 1 His definition is: Habitude naturae rationalis secundum quam 
 denominatur suo praefici servienti. De Dominio Divino, Bk. I, c. 1. 
 
 2 De Dom. Div. I, 5.
 
 262 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 It is entirely characteristic of all Wy cliff e's 
 thought that property rights and political authority 
 are blended indistinguishably in the conception of 
 lordship. His point of view is feudal, and the rela- 
 tion of divine to civil lordship is repeatedly illus- 
 trated by that of feudal lord and vassal. 1 As to 
 human government, he devotes some attention to 
 the relative merits of monarchy and aristocracy. 
 The latter he conceives to be the true form in the 
 state of innocence under divine law, 2 but the former 
 is required by the conditions of the state of sin. 
 The kingly power, however, depends not really on 
 human law, but on grace ; neither hereditary succes- 
 sion nor election, therefore, gives true royal authority. 
 An unbaptized heir, being in mortal sin, can have no 
 lordship till the defect be removed. Every Christian 
 king, knight or other civil lord is held more to his 
 spiritual than to his carnal father a doctrine which 
 recalls that already used by the pro-papal party in 
 building up the dogma of papal supremacy. 3 Simi- 
 larly, in respect to slavery, he presents almost pre- 
 cisely the doctrine of St. Augustine: that it is a 
 human institution resulting from sin, and that to 
 God's elect the earthly condition of servitude is a 
 matter of indifference, since in essence they are all 
 equally free and noble. " Servitude," he says, " is of 
 three kinds : as it denotes subjection to God, to man 
 
 1 E.g., De Dom. Civ. I, 18 passim. 
 
 2 Wycliffe's aristocracy exhibits a blending in thought of Plato's 
 "guardians," Aristotle's aristocracy of virtue, and the "judges" of 
 the Israelites. De Dom. Civ. I, 27. 3 Supra, p. 217.
 
 WYCLIFFE ON LORDSHIP 263 
 
 or to sin. Of these the first is excellent, the second 
 a matter of indifference, and the last the worst 
 possible." 1 
 
 Wycliffe's application of his theory to questions 
 touching temporal property, in the ordinary sense, 
 and the relation of the church thereto, was what 
 brought him most distinctly under imputation of 
 heresy. From the secondary and subordinate char- 
 acter of human lordship, he drew the conclusion 
 that a grant of perpetual civil property right could 
 be made neither by any individual man, nor by the 
 whole human race, nor by God himself. A corol- 
 lary of this and the application which had imme- 
 diate practical significance in consequence of the 
 refusal of the English Parliament to continue pay- 
 ment of the tribute promised by King John to Pope 
 Innocent III was that ecclesiastical persons or 
 corporations had no indefeasible right to temporal- 
 ties, which might be taken away in case of misuse. 
 Wycliffe derived from his principal thesis support 
 also for the view of absolution and excommunication 
 that had been strongly upheld by Marsiglio and 
 Ockam. The function of the priest in these, as in 
 all other human acts, was held to be conditioned by 
 conformity to the law of Christ; so that the judg- 
 ment in any case, no matter how strongly fortified 
 by bulls or other documents, had real and essential 
 validity only so far as confirmed by the will of God. 
 
 1 Triplex est servitus, scilicet Dei, hominum et peccati ; quorum 
 prima est optima, media neutra et tercia pessima. De Dom. Civ. 
 1,34.
 
 264 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 The pardon of sin or exclusion from the church may 
 be testified to by human acts, but really takes 
 place without them; 1 just as the formalities and 
 documents purporting to determine the title to civil 
 lordship do not affect the actual lordship as deter- 
 mined in the forum of God. From these doctrines 
 is drawn finally the very important deduction that 
 tithes and other contributions of temporal property 
 to the church cannot be exacted by excommunication. 
 
 In a general way Wycliffe's doctrine is one which 
 is common to all the Christian ages, namely, of 
 the supremacy of divine or natural over positive 
 human law. His most characteristic peculiarity is 
 the importance which he attaches to the analogy of 
 feudal relationships. The suzerainty of God and his 
 law is sustained and explained, not only by the 
 principles of Platonic idealism, but also by those of 
 the social system of Europe. Feudal overlordship 
 had become by Wycliffe's time so dissociated from 
 immediate and manifest connection with the con- 
 cerns of daily life, that it afforded an obvious ana- 
 logue for that divine suzerainty whose essence lay 
 in the domain of spirituality and faith. 
 
 Huss added nothing to the doctrines of political 
 import which he took freely from Wycliffe. 2 His 
 work, so far as we are concerned with it, was to 
 
 1 " Non est possibile hominem excommunicari nisi excommunicetur 
 primo et principaliter a se ipso." 
 
 2 Cf. his Determinatio de Ablatione Temporalium a Clericis, in Gold- 
 ast, I, 232. Huss here defends at length the right of secular rulers to 
 deprive ecclesiastics of property on the ground of abuse, and the argu- 
 ment is taken in places verbatim from Wycliffe.
 
 THE COUNCIL OF CONSTANCE 265 
 
 carry forward by a generation the movement of 
 reaction against the extremest pretensions of cleri- 
 cal omnipotence, and to strengthen again in Central 
 Europe the dogmas which had been propounded by 
 Marsiglio and Ockam, namely, that the temporal pos- 
 sessions of the church were no essential element of 
 its constitution, that the papal monarchy was no 
 divinely ordered institution, and that the whole 
 body of the faithful, rather than any individual or 
 group of individuals, was the real church. 1 
 
 3. Gerson and the Council of Constance 
 
 The Council of Constance was in no small meas- 
 ure a result of the causes which worked in produc- 
 ing the doctrines of Wycliffe and Huss. But to 
 the radicalism of these doctrines the council mani- 
 fested the sternest opposition. Huss was burned at 
 the stake, and Wycliffe suffered posthumous mar- 
 tyrdom. To the men who laboured so strenuously 
 to heal the schism that was destroying the church, 
 it was not through innovations in creed but through 
 reform in organization and administration that the 
 way to a restoration of peace and order appeared 
 feasible. Conscious of the revolutionary tendency 
 of their purpose to subject the Pope to the general 
 council, they stood firmly opposed to any modifica- 
 tion of the old order beyond what they regarded 
 
 1 Huss maintained as fully as Wycliffe that the church consisted 
 essentially in the whole body of the predestinated (universitas pre- 
 destinatorurri) . See Gieseler, op. cit., Vol. Ill, p. 423, note 18.
 
 266 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 as absolutely indispensable. They were in a real 
 sense reformers and not revolutionists. 
 
 The leading spirits in the whole conciliar move- 
 ment were John Gerson, the learned and eloquent 
 chancellor of the University of Paris, and his revered 
 preceptor, the Cardinal Peter of Ailly. For years 
 these men laboured strenuously to bring about an 
 effective general council, and in the fruition of their 
 efforts at Constance they were looked to by all 
 parties for guidance in the tortuous way of successful 
 reform. Gerson's writings, 1 both before and during 
 the sessions of the council, presented a well-rounded 
 theory of limited monarchy as the true form of 
 ecclesiastical organization. This theory involves a 
 systematic repudiation of the long-triumphant Pe- 
 trine dogma, and it embodies many features of the 
 doctrine of Marsiglio. But Gerson is less radical 
 than his predecessor. He will hear nothing of the 
 Marsiglian democracy. His church, governmentally 
 considered, is the hierarchy, not the general body 
 of believers. He is, in short, aristocratic in his 
 conception of ecclesiastical politics. 
 
 The conservatism, and at the same time the revo- 
 lutionary character, of the conciliar movement are 
 particularly illustrated by the care with which " ne- 
 cessity " and the " general welfare " (utilitas omnium) 
 are made the basis of the most far-reaching reforms. 
 Resistance to a Pope, for example, or refusal to obey 
 him, while conceivably at times a right and a duty 
 
 1 The most important of those which are of interest to us are 
 printed in Goldast, Monarchia, IT, 1384 et seg.
 
 GERSON'S CONCILIAR THEORY 267 
 
 of Christians, must spring from some pious necessity 
 (pia quaedam necessitas] and from the pressure of 
 overwhelming circumstances (manifestis causis urgen- 
 tibus). 1 In fact, the most essential steps in the 
 process of terminating the schism were frankly based 
 on this confession of illegality. The frequent recur- 
 rence of this idea of necessity strongly suggests the 
 theories of the Whig revolution in England, 2 and the 
 parallel becomes very pronounced when it is con- 
 sidered that Gerson and the Whigs were both striving 
 to justify the termination of autocracy without fur- 
 nishing a basis for the exaltation of democracy. The 
 absolute authority which was to be transferred from 
 the Pope and the king to the council and the Parlia- 
 ment respectively on the plea of overruling necessity, 
 had to be prevented at any sacrifice of consistency 
 from passing on under a like plea to the general 
 body of subjects. 
 
 Gerson' s doctrine of supreme power in the church 
 (plenitudo potestatis ecdesiasticce) is skilfully framed 
 so as to give substantial supremacy to the council while 
 doing as little violence as possible to the traditional 
 authority of the Pope. Formally the plenary power 
 is in the Roman Pontiff; but behind this and sup- 
 plementary to it is the plenary power of the church, 
 as organized in and represented by the general coun- 
 cil. To the latter belongs the function of caring for 
 the unity of the church, 8 of assigning the exercise 
 
 1 De Auferibilitate Papce, 13. 
 
 2 Cf. Burke, in his Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs. 
 8 " Claves datae sunt non uni sed unitati."
 
 268 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 of power to this or that person, and of regulating 
 by law the manner in which the papal power shall 
 be used. 1 The Pope becomes, in fact, an adminis- 
 trative agent of the church, with discretionary power 
 in important matters only because the council is not 
 permanently in session and cannot be readily sum- 
 moned. 2 This substantial extinction of papal sover- 
 eignty is disguised, indeed, by Gerson through frequent 
 recurrence to the familiar formulas of pontifical exalta- 
 tion, and through the no less frequent suggestion that 
 the assertion of conciliar supremacy is mainly to be 
 justified by the scandals of the schism and the mortal 
 peril of the church. Yet the trend of the system 
 which is set forth is clearly manifest, and the con- 
 sciousness that doctrines subversive of the ancient 
 ecclesiastical order are in the air is unmistakable. 
 
 That these doctrines of limitation upon monarchy 
 were applicable to the political as well as to the 
 ecclesiastical order, was well understood at the 
 time. The debate over the power and activity of 
 the council was for half a century the central topic 
 of interest in the intellectual circles of Western 
 Europe, and political speculation, though quite over- 
 shadowed by the magnitude of the ecclesiastical 
 issues, received a most significant impress from the 
 controversies of the churchmen. Gerson manifests 
 throughout his works the clearest consciousness that 
 his fundamental principles are those of political as 
 well as of ecclesiastical government. Retaining the 
 
 1 Tract, de Potestate Ecclesiastica, 11. 
 
 2 Ibid. 10.
 
 GERSON'S CONCILIAR THEORY 269 
 
 familiar distinction between the universality of the 
 law given by Christ to the church and the diversity 
 of purely secular law according to place and time, 1 
 he finds, nevertheless, that the relation of the ad- 
 ministrator to the law and the general adjustment 
 of the governmental organization are determined on 
 principles that are identical in church and state. 
 
 His general argument demands, of course, the 
 most explicit denial to the Pope of that superiority 
 to law which was ascribed to the Emperor. The 
 dicta quidquid principi placuit and princeps legibus 
 solutus, whatever their validity in secular law, have no 
 application, he holds, in the church. To say that the 
 Pope is supra ius is " smooth, deceitful and treacher- 
 ous flattery." 2 So far as any authority is above the 
 law of the church, it is the general council, in which 
 is vested power to interpret, modify or repeal what 
 has been enacted by popes or previous councils. The 
 Aristotelian classification of governments furnishes 
 the suggestion of that which should prevail in the 
 church ; namely, the mixed form, composed of royal, 
 aristocratic and timocratic elements. 3 France, Gerson 
 thinks, has carried out the principle of the mixed 
 form so far as to embody the royal and aristocratic 
 elements in the king and the parlement, but falls 
 short of the complete blending that would be best. 
 This is to be found historically in the organiza- 
 
 1 De Auferibilitate Papa, 10; Tract, de Pot. Eccl. 13. 
 
 2 Blanda, f allax et subdola adulatio. Sermo factus xxii Julii, 
 1415. Goldast, II, 1407. 
 
 8 Sermo factus xxii Julii. Goldast, II, p. 1410. Gerson gives the 
 name timocratia to the popular form which Aristotle calls polity.
 
 270 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 tion of the Israelitisli commonwealth under Moses, 
 wherein Moses himself constituted the royal ele- 
 ment, the seventy-two elders the aristocratic, and 
 the lesser magistrates the timocratic or popular. 1 
 
 The clean-cut and acute, but never intemperate, 
 pleas of Gerson and his allies in behalf of limited 
 government, the reign of law, and the subordination 
 of strict law and tradition to the requirements of 
 equity 2 and the general welfare, received the complet- 
 est ratification in the decrees of the Council of Con- 
 stance, and thus became merged in the intellectual 
 consciousness of the time. In view of this fact, there 
 is a justification for the suggestions put forth by a 
 recent writer, that this council 
 
 first exhibited the conflicts of pure politics on the grand scale ; 
 that in it the notions of constitutionalism gained the hall-mark 
 of European acceptance; . . . that it set forth a system of 
 politics which was consistent yet scarcely doctrinaire, which 
 saved the rights of the crown while it secured the liberties of 
 the people ; . . . that it paved the way for the constitutional 
 reformers of future generations. 3 
 
 4. Nicholas of Cues and the Council of Basel 
 
 The Council of Basel, in which the system of eccle- 
 siastical government ordained at Constance found its 
 fullest realization and later its destruction, gave occa- 
 sion for much more radical theories than those just 
 considered. The reactionary attitude of the papal 
 court toward the council called the left wing of 
 
 1 Tract, de Pot. Ecd. 8. 
 
 2 See especially his treatise De Unitate Ecclesiastica, Pars II. 
 
 8 J. Neville Figgis, " Politics at the Council of Constance," in the 
 Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 1899, p. 103.
 
 NICHOLAS OF CUES 271 
 
 the reforming party to the front and stimulated the 
 extension of the antimonarchic argument from the 
 aristocratic ground at which Gerson had stopped, full 
 into the territory of democracy. Nicholas of Cues 
 (Nicolaus Cusanus), a German of wide learning, of 
 scientific spirit in the modern sense, and of logical 
 acumen equal to that of the best of the scholastics, 
 furnished the council with a theory adapted to its 
 needs in his treatise, De Concordantia Caiholica? 
 This very noteworthy work presents a doctrine that 
 is distinguished by originality and exceptional force, 
 and is as clearly unique as was, a century earlier, 
 that of Marsiglio, which it in some respects resembles. 
 Two points in the doctrine demand our special atten- 
 tion in their bearing upon the transition of political 
 theory from the mediaeval to the modern type. The 
 first point is the theory of harmony or unity (con- 
 cordantia) ; the second, the theory of popular consent 
 as the basis of government. 
 
 In the theory of harmony Cusanus lays down the 
 substantial unity of all phenomena material and 
 spiritual and the essentialness of all parts, even 
 the least, to the nicely correlated scheme of the 
 whole. God's universe is conceived as an organism 
 in which every element has its vital part to play. 
 So in human affairs each element of the general 
 providential scheme consists of a congeries of lesser 
 elements, working in harmony for the perfect end 
 of the whole. The church and the Empire are the 
 two great institutions in which human affairs are 
 
 1 In his Opera (Basel, 1565), Tom. II, p. 692.
 
 272 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 organized, and each of these embodies a series of 
 parts whose relations to the whole are one and the 
 same. Thus it is of the essence of the thought of 
 Cusanus that the principles which determine the 
 interrelationship of ecclesiastical organs are precisely 
 the same as those which prevail in secular govern- 
 ment. Having laid down the theory of the council 
 as the central organ of church government, he con- 
 sistently maintains that a council must hold the 
 central place in political organization. 1 The parallel 
 between the two appears to him, not as a matter of 
 mere analogy or convenience, but as a fact rooted in 
 the foundations of existence. By the emphasis placed 
 by Cusanus on this thought, the close connection 
 and reciprocal influence of ecclesiastical and political 
 theory receives the most impressive illustration. 2 
 
 Having in mind, then, this conscious association 
 of the two species of governmental power, we may 
 readily appreciate the significance of the doctrine 
 which he presents as to the source of legislative and 
 other authority in the general council. Proving his- 
 torically, by an examination of the early church 
 councils, that the formal pronouncements (canones] 
 of those bodies received their force from the consent 
 of those present, he proceeds to the broad doctrine 
 
 1 De Concord. Cath. Ill, 12. 
 
 2 In seeking to work out the parallel between the church and the 
 Empire, Cusauus finds himself in great difficulties, owing to the dis- 
 integrated condition of the latter, which he is too sure an observer 
 not to realize. " Mortalis morbus imperium Germanicum invasit : cui 
 nisi subito salutari antidoto subveniatur, mors indubie sequetur, et 
 quaeretur imperium in Germania et non invenietur ibi." De Con- 
 cord. Cath. Ill, 32.
 
 CONSENT AS THE SOURCE OF LAW 273 
 
 that the acceptance or consent of those to whom it 
 applies is the basis for the validity of every law. 1 
 The acceptance may be indicated by use or custom, 
 and it is in this sense only that the decretals of the 
 popes may be regarded as law. That general consent 
 is the sole source of obligation is a principle of divine 
 and natural right. 2 The demonstration of this truth 
 by Cusanus has precisely the form that became com- 
 monplace in the eighteenth century. Since all men, 
 he says, are by nature free, all government, whether 
 in the form of written law or of a ruler's will, springs 
 solely from the consent of the subjects. And since all 
 men are by nature equally endowed with power, the 
 superior position of any one can be due only to the 
 choice and consent of the rest. 3 Thus the source of 
 personal dominion as well as the source of law is to 
 be found in the people. 
 
 This argumentation of Cusanus, destined to so 
 famous a career in the history of political thought 
 and action, bears on its face the impress of novelty. 
 The general phrases on which it rests were familiar 
 and had frequently appeared in discussions of natu- 
 ral rights ever since the days of the Roman imperial 
 
 1 Vigor legis ex concordantia subjectionali eorum qui per earn 
 ligantur subsistit. De Concord. Cath. II, 12. 
 
 2 Contra hanc conclusionem nulla prescriptio vel consuetude 
 valere potest, sicut nee contra jus divinum et naturale a quo ista 
 conclusio dependet. Ibid. 
 
 8 Ibid. 14. Cum natura omnes sunt liberi, tune omnis principa- 
 tus, sive consistat in lege scripta sive viva apud principem . . . est 
 a sola concordantia et consensu subjective. Nam si natura aeque 
 potentes et aeque liberi homines sunt, vera et ordinata potestas unius 
 . . . non nisi electione et consensu aliorum constitui potest, sicut etiam 
 lex ex consensu constituitur.
 
 274 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 jurists ; but the application of the principles had been 
 confined to questions of morality and of private law. 1 
 In carrying them over into politics proper and mak- 
 ing them the basis of a theory of public law, Cusanus 
 manifests the insight and boldness of a daring inno- 
 vator. That he was entirely conscious of the signifi- 
 cance of his doctrine is indicated by his remark at 
 the opening of the chapter, that the considerations he 
 is about to advance require a much fuller treatment 
 than he is able under the circumstances to give them. 2 
 
 On the basis of the doctrine of popular sovereignty 
 he erects the more familiar theory that the personal 
 ruler is in fact merely the chosen executor of the 
 law. He is the symbol and representative of the 
 body from which his authority is derived, and his 
 function as guiding and directing representative is 
 more perfect and precise in proportion as he is in 
 immediate touch with his constituency. Thus the 
 bishop (and the episcopal dignity is, like all other, 
 elective and representative) more exactly symbolizes 
 (figuraf) the church than does the Pope. Cusanus 
 will in nowise depreciate the importance and neces- 
 sity of the executive function (cura praesidentialis) ; 
 it is essential to the universal principle of harmony 
 (concordantia) ; and executive and subjects together, 
 organized through consent, constitute the rational 
 corporation (corpus). 
 
 The principle that authority emanates from the 
 
 1 See supra, p. 128. 
 
 2 Annecto aliam considerationem quae licet diffusius desideraret 
 explicari, brevitati studens . . . distinete perstringam eandem.
 
 CUSANUS ON REPRESENTATION 275 
 
 people seems irreconcilable with the apostolic dictum 
 that all power is from God. But Cusanus finds the 
 conflict only superficial. The power of God works 
 in and through the people, and the manner of this 
 working he elucidates by analogies based on the 
 quaint conceptions of his time in respect to physical 
 phenomena. It is a beautiful reflection, he concludeSv 
 how all powers, spiritual, temporal and physical, are 
 latent in the people, while for the manifestation of 
 the executive force in action the stimulating influ- 
 ence must come from above. 1 
 
 When he seeks to formulate the practical organi- 
 zation through which the principles of popular sover- 
 eignty are to be applied in the secular state, Cusanus 
 is less acute and original than in his fundamental 
 theory. He gets little beyond the institutions of the 
 Empire. The voice of the people in the choice of the 
 monarch is the voice of the Imperial Electors, and in 
 the making of law the council which expresses the 
 popular consent is the assembly of the kings, dukes, 
 landgraves, etc., who collectively represent the whole 
 Empire. 2 Insistent as he is on the principle that the 
 source of power is the people, his idea of representa- 
 tion is that ancient one in which the magnates, by 
 virtue of their eminence, stand for the lesser men. 
 Cusanus makes no such suggestion as that found in 
 Marsiglio and Ockam, that representatives shall be 
 chosen by the people in specific constituencies and 
 according to numbers. Yet these would seem to be 
 the most obvious consequences of that doctrine on 
 
 1 De Concord. Cath. II, 19. 3 Ibid. HI, 4, 25.
 
 276 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 which he lays such stress, that the social organism 
 involves the correlated activity of all its elements, 
 from the greatest to the least. 1 
 
 The speculations of Cusanus, even more than the 
 theories of Gerson and his associates, express a ten- 
 dency in thought rather than in practice. The time 
 was not ripe for institutions that would demand the 
 complete and aggressive development of the doctrine 
 of popular sovereignty for their justification. At 
 Basel the reforming element in the council fought 
 a long and violent, but losing, fight against the 
 monarchic policy of the papal court. Gradually the 
 influences which centred at Rome proved themselves 
 the more powerful. The strong men of the conciliar 
 party took alarm at the disintegrating and schismatic 
 tendencies of the majority at Basel. Nicholas of Cues 
 himself passed over to the papal side and, as a cardi- 
 nal, became a protagonist of the Roman cause in 
 Germany. With the dissolution of the council in 
 1443 the ancient constitution of the church was 
 restored, but the doctrines that the conciliar move- 
 ment had called into prominence remained a signifi- 
 cant element in the philosophy of the time. 
 
 5. The Jurists and the Theory of the Corporation 
 
 It was in the consummation of the conciliar move- 
 ment in the fifteenth century that legal doctrine had 
 
 1 An interesting example of the ramblings of his curious and eager 
 mind is his ingenious scheme for securing secrecy in the voting for 
 Emperor and in the enactment of measures of taxation. He is im- 
 pressed with the importance of preserving freedom of opinion (libertas 
 iudicii). Ill, 36, 37.
 
 THEORY OF THE CORPORATION 277 
 
 its greatest influence in giving form and precision to 
 political ideas. That the power of the Emperor was 
 delegated originally by the people was a concept that 
 necessarily directed the thought of such minds as 
 those of Marsiglio and Cusanus to speculations on 
 the nature of " the people " as a general idea. In 
 like manner the collective entities known as church 
 and council demanded definition and analysis. The 
 corporation (universitas, corpus] was a familiar and 
 greatly exploited concept in the Roman law, and the 
 principles on which it was expounded were freely 
 drawn upon to explain the character and operation 
 of political and ecclesiastical organizations. As the 
 church and the council assumed the leading place 
 in the controversial thought of the times, it was to 
 the form and activity of these aggregates that the 
 juristic doctrines were most fully applied. 
 
 As has already appeared, the whole movement of 
 the conciliar party in the church had been based 
 upon the idea of extraordinary conditions and 
 extraordinary remedies. An imperative and over- 
 ruling necessity was asserted as the conclusive rea- 
 son for resort to a general council, even regardless 
 of the Pope's consent. The juristic doctrine of the 
 validity of acts based on necessity played a part in 
 this contention. 1 Much more distinct was the influ- 
 ence of legal ideas in the conception of the church as 
 a corporation (universitas fidelium) consisting of all 
 believers and endowed with ultimate and residuary 
 powers. This was the thesis of the radicals who 
 
 1 Gierke, op. cit. p. 51.
 
 278 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 followed Marsiglio and the extremest speculations 
 of Ockam. But most explicit was the application oi 
 corporation law to the organization and action of the 
 general council. This body was conceived by the 
 school of Gerson to be in itself the corporate repre- 
 sentative of the church. In it the church had form 
 and the power of action. 1 There was no need, on 
 this theory, for particular examination of the ecclesi- 
 astical body as a whole, but the organization, powers 
 and procedure of the representative assembly required 
 the most exhaustive consideration. Thus the doctors 
 of law applied the whole paraphernalia of juristic 
 argumentation precedent, authority and the most 
 refined rules of interpretation to the task of solv- 
 ing all the problems of conciliar action by the princi- 
 ples embodied in Justinian's Digest and the Corpus 
 luris Canonici. The relation of the Pope to the 
 council was assimilated to that of the presiding 
 officer (rector) of the corporation (universitas). The 
 mode of summons was derived from that prescribed 
 in the Digest, and from the same source was drawn 
 the vital conclusion that if the Pope refused or was 
 unable to issue the summons, the council could assem- 
 ble spontaneously. 2 Likewise were determined the 
 questions of quorum and of majority. Whether two- 
 
 1 Videtur quod ecclesia, ut sparsim considerata, non habet illam 
 potestatem [ecclesiasticam] nisi in quodam material! seu potential! 
 [sc. sensu ?], sed congregatio sua et unitio, quae sit in concilio general!, 
 dat ei formam, sicut in aliis communitatibus exemplum dari potest. 
 Gerson, Tract, de Pot. Eccles. 4. 
 
 2 Cf. Antonius de Rosellis, Monarchia, II, 23, 24 (in Goldast, I, 252 
 et seq.).
 
 THEORY OF THE CORPORATION 279 
 
 thirds of those summoned should be necessary to a 
 quorum, as was prescribed in case of the universitas, 
 was answered affirmatively or negatively accord- 
 big to the predilections of the various debaters; 
 but the grounds for either answer were strictly legal. 
 The same was the case in the discussion as to the 
 relations of minority and majority, and in answering 
 the question whether unanimity was essential to valid 
 action. 
 
 The necessary tendency of this manner of thought 
 was to give a high degree of precision to the concep- 
 tion of collective unity in bodies of men. From the 
 clearly formulated notion of such smaller aggregates 
 as synods and councils it was an easy step to a work- 
 ing concept of the larger aggregates like the church 
 and the Empire. Marsiglio and Ockam and Cusanus 
 took the step and presented fairly well denned theo- 
 ries of great multitudes of individuals so organized as 
 to express a unity without reference to that subordi- 
 nation to a single man (ordinatio ad unum) which was 
 the common thought of the earlier Middle Age. The 
 legal theory of the corporation combined with the 
 Hellenic idea of the city-state to draw men's thoughts 
 away from the one and to the many. Not the head 
 of the church, but the church, became the centre of 
 theory. The idea of representation which became so 
 significant during the conciliar era made quite easy 
 to grasp the distinction between the administrator 
 and the source of power. The application of this dis- 
 tinction to the demand for popular sovereignty in 
 political life was not fully made till well into the
 
 280 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 sixteenth century ; but the ground for the application 
 was laid in the conciliar controversy in the fifteenth. 
 The Roman law of corporations played only a slightly 
 lesser part in leading up to the theory of the revolu- 
 tion time than the Roman law of contract played in 
 the revolutionary theory itself. 
 
 6. Summary 
 
 The fifteenth century was the last in which the 
 general lines of political philosophy were essentially 
 mediaeval. It was the last in which the functions 
 and relations of Papacy and Empire were even nomi- 
 nally the central point of theory. The whole trend 
 of thought was toward limitation and qualification in 
 that conception of plenary authority in the monarch 
 which had been prevalent in the preceding centuries. 
 The idea of unity through organization and adjust- 
 ment in the elements of the body supplanted that of 
 unity through the oneness of the head. But this 
 notion of the corporate group was not applied at this 
 time to aggregations of individuals into nations ; it 
 received its character chiefly from the working of the 
 estates in the various political divisions, the synods 
 and councils in the church, and, where it approached 
 most nearly to the modern conception of an organ- 
 ized people, from the free municipal states of 
 Germany and Italy and the half autonomous com- 
 munes of France. The general prosperity and 
 power of these organizations afforded an impressive 
 illustration of collective efficiency and representative 
 administration.
 
 OWNERSHIP AND SOVEREIGNTY 281 
 
 In addition to the development of the conciliar idea 
 and its corollaries, which was the chief characteristic 
 of the fifteenth century, the philosophy of the period 
 in its general aspects exhibited a progressive trans- 
 formation of mediaeval concepts along the line which 
 led to the modern era. The effort of Wycliffe and 
 his followers to incorporate the basal principle of 
 feudalism in political theory by a systematic identi- 
 fication of ownership and sovereignty, was rendered 
 unavailing by the unanimous rejection of the idea 
 by the leading thinkers of the time. 1 Dominium 
 (ownership) and iurisdictio (jurisdiction) were care- 
 fully distinguished, and the sanctity of private prop- 
 erty as against the wielder of political authority 
 was generally maintained, especially by the jurists. 
 The limitation of the supreme power was not con- 
 ceived, however, as due to any substantial and inher- 
 ent right of the individual, but as embodied in the 
 ius naturale, which continued to be regarded as abso- 
 lutely conditioning the exercise of every kind of 
 human authority and the enactment of all positive 
 law. 2 Natural right was in fact the starting-point 
 of all theory, and was as conscientiously employed by 
 Cusanus in his exposition of popular and representa- 
 
 1 Cf. Gerson, De Pot. EccL 13; Almain, Expositio de Sup. Pot. 
 Eccl. et Laica, II, 1 (in Goldast, I, 588 et seq.). 
 
 2 See Antonius de Rosellis, IV, 8, for a characteristic discussion 
 of the question as to the power of Pope or Emperor to deprive indi- 
 viduals of their property. The conclusion is that deprivation can be 
 effected only cum causa legitima. Cf. in general the preceding chap- 
 ter, on the question : " Pontifex vel Imperator an contra iura natura- 
 lia possunt dispensare?"
 
 282 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 tive government 1 as by Rosellinus in his exposition 
 of monarchy. 
 
 It was from the assumption of natural rights as the 
 basis of theory that depended the whole doctrine of 
 general welfare (bonum commune ; utilitas omnium) in 
 church and state which was the mainspring of the 
 conciliar movement. For from the time of Aquinas 
 it had been accepted doctrine that utility was a first 
 principle of the ius naturale, and that the interest of 
 the whole took precedence over the interest of any 
 part. 2 This principle and the use made of it in the 
 fifteenth century pointed straight to the theory of the 
 revolution time. For it established the tendency to 
 regard ecclesiastical and political institutions, not 
 as unchangeable embodiments of the divine will, but 
 as instruments of human advantage, subject to 
 modifications dictated by reason and experience. 
 
 The conciliar period witnessed also some consid- 
 erable development of the notion that political and 
 social institutions originated historically in the delib- 
 erate and rationally planned action of men. Cusanus, 
 as has appeared, laid great stress on the consensual 
 and contractual foundation of authority. But in 
 addition to this we have the conception of an histori- 
 cal condition preceding the manifestation of this 
 consent a condition which later assumed great 
 definiteness of character under the name, the state 
 of nature. This idea in its fifteenth-century form 
 
 1 De Concord. Cath. II, 14. Omnis constitutio radicatur in iure 
 natural!, et si ei contradicit, constitutio valida esse nequit. 
 
 2 Cf. supra, Chap. VIII, sec. 2 ; and see Gerson, De Statibus Ecclesi? 
 asticis, I.
 
 DOCTRINE OF A STATE OF NATURE 283 
 
 received the most perfect literary expression in the 
 short work of ^Eneas Sylvius on The Rise and Power 
 of the Roman Empire. 1 Here the Biblical account of 
 paradise is blended with the fancies of Plato and 
 Polybius. After the expulsion of the first parents 
 from Eden, men, it is narrated, lived in the woods 
 like beasts, till reason taught them to come together 
 in communities, and for their common welfare to 
 build cities and develop the arts of civilized life. 
 Justice and equity guided all actions, and government 
 was by the most virtuous. Kingly government by 
 force became necessary only when injustice and 
 oppression gained vogue, and the Roman Empire was 
 ultimately established to maintain universal peace. 
 The treatise is in its purpose a panegyric of the 
 Empire ; its interest for us lies in the presentation 
 of one phase in the evolution of a concept which, 
 combined with that of the law of nature, for a time 
 dominated all political philosophy. 
 
 In general the closing century of the Middle Age 
 embodied in its philosophy ideas as to sovereignty, 
 the popular basis of government, natural law and 
 rights, and the social contract which, under the 
 impulse of changed conditions in objective life, were 
 to characterize the modern age. But those who 
 devoted themselves to systematic thought remained 
 still too much under the influence of the old ideals of 
 Papacy and Empire to free themselves in either the 
 method or the content of their philosophy from the 
 
 1 Tractatus de Ortu et Autoritate Imperii Romani, in Goldast, II, 
 1558.
 
 284 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 standards of the preceding ages. The signal for a 
 change in the whole spirit of political theory was 
 sounded just after the end of the fifteenth century 
 by the genius of Machiavelli. 
 
 SELECT REFERENCES 
 
 BROCKHAUS, Nicolai Cusani de Concilii Universalis Potestate 
 Sententia. CREIGHTON, History of the Papacy, Books I-III 
 (Vols. I and II). DURUY, History of Modern Times, chaps, 
 i-iv. GIERKB, Das deutsche Genossenschaftsreckt, Bd. Ill (Die 
 Staats- und Corporationslehre des Alterthums und des Mit- 
 telalters), pp. 247-261, 322-330, 351^362, 466-476, 502-510 
 (list of authorities on the period from the eleventh to the six- 
 teenth century) ; pp. 502-644 cover the part translated by 
 Maitland. MAITLAND'S Gierke, pp. 70-77 (an extensive 
 list of authorities on the period from the ninth to the six- 
 teenth century, Gierke's list with additions) and passim. 
 GIESELER, Church History, Third Period, 124-125, 131 
 et seq. HUBLER, Die constanzer Reformation und die Korikor- 
 date von 1418. Huss, Determinatio, etc., in GOLDAST, De 
 Monarchia, I, 232. GERSON, Opera (1703) ; cf. GOLDAST, 
 Monarchia, II, 1384 et seq. JANET, Vol. I, pp. 463475. 
 LECHLER, Johann von Wiclif und die Vorgeschichte der Refor- 
 mation; translated in abridged form by Lorimer under the 
 title, John Wiclif and his English Precursors ; see esp. Vol. II, 
 pp. 47-65. NICOLAUS C us ANUS, Opera Omnia, Vol. II, p. 692 
 (De Concordantia Catholica). PASTOR, History of the Popes 
 from the Close of the Middle Ages, ed. by Antrobus, Vol. I. 
 POOLE, Mediaeval Thought, chap. x. WYCKLIFFE, De Domi- 
 nio Divino; De Civili Dominio (Poole's editions). J^NEAS 
 SYLVIUS, Tractatus de Ortu et Autoritate Imperil Romani, in 
 GOLDAST, II, 1558 et seq.
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 
 MACHIAVELLI 
 
 1. His Life and Times 
 
 IN no system of political philosophy is the influ- 
 ence of environment more manifest than in that of 
 Machiavelli. The brilliant Florentine was in the 
 fullest sense the child of his times. Born in 1469, 
 he entered public life twenty-nine years later, and 
 died in 1527. The period of his maturity thus coin- 
 cided with the first quarter of the sixteenth century. 
 What, then, were the political and intellectual con- 
 ditions and tendencies of this period that would be 
 likely to impress themselves upon a mind of so fine 
 a texture as that of Machiavelli ? 
 
 In the first place, at the opening of the sixteenth 
 century the movement for limited government in 
 church and state that attained such considerable 
 headway in the conciliar period had entirely disap- 
 peared. A monarchic reaction had swept away 
 almost all vestiges of the aristocratic regime. In the 
 church the popes had successfully evaded the require- 
 ment of periodical councils that had been decreed 
 at Constance, and though the Lateran Council of 
 1511-1517 was called together, after long delay, in 
 response to the demands of the discontented, it became 
 merely an instrument for materially strengthening 
 
 285
 
 286 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 the position of the Roman See. 1 The great secular 
 states of Europe exhibited the full establishment 
 of absolute monarchy. Henry VII in England, 
 Louis XI, Charles VIII and Louis XII in France, 
 and Ferdinand in Spain had relegated the feudal 
 assemblies of their respective dominions to a position 
 of obscurity and impotence. Even Maximilian of Ger- 
 many endeavoured in his feeble way to impress him- 
 self upon the administration of his disjointed realm. 
 The era was that of the strong man, in both secular 
 and ecclesiastical politics, and Machiavelli's writings 
 give copious evidence that he realized this fact. 
 
 But he was conscious also of the fact that the ten- 
 dency of the times was toward the expression of 
 nationality as well as of monarchy in political organ- 
 ization. The distinctions between English, French, 
 Germans, Italians and Spanish had now become a 
 commonplace of political observation, and had en- 
 tered extensively into the policy of statesmen. As 
 against this fact the ancient notion of an empire 
 coextensive with Christian Europe lost all its signifi- 
 cance. Not even the peril of a Mohammedan con- 
 quest and the exhortations to a crusade against the 
 Turk could reawaken the notion that the Emperor 
 was the secular head of Christendom. The national 
 monarchy was the political type which alone inspired 
 interest and respect. Of all the groups of provinces 
 
 1 Through this council Leo X secured a concordat with Francis I 
 which abolished the Pragmatic Sanction of 1438, and greatly dimin- 
 ished the privileges of the French prelates as against the Papacy. On 
 the little interest in this council felt by Europe in general, see 
 Creighton, History of the Papacy, IV, 234.
 
 UNIFYING TENDENCIES IN ITALY 287 
 
 and cities that were tending toward consolidation, 
 Italy had made the least progress. For about three 
 hundred years the Italian peninsula had been the 
 abode of numerous city-states whose history had been 
 singularly prolific in analogies with that of the Hel- 
 lenic world. By the beginning of the sixteenth cen- 
 tury a process of consolidation and of internal trans- 
 formation had resulted in the division of practically 
 the whole peninsula among five states : the Kingdom 
 of Naples, the territory of the Roman Church, the 
 Duchy of Milan, and the Republics of Venice and 
 Florence. Further consolidation was an obvious pos- 
 sibility; and the unification of the whole country 
 under a national monarch, on the model of France or 
 Spain, was an ideal that particularly inspired Machia- 
 velli. In the way of realizing this, however, stood 
 not only the reciprocal jealousies of the existing secu- 
 lar states and the fact that there was no one prince 
 whose moral influence and material resources assured 
 him such recognition of leadership in Italy as Ferdi- 
 nand, for example, had acquired in Spain, but also 
 the peculiar position and policy of the Papacy. 
 
 Largely as a result of the removal to Avignon and 
 
 O / O 
 
 the disorganization of the schism, the region in cen- 
 tral Italy immediately subject to the Roman See had 
 fallen into anarchy. Upon the resumption of their 
 abode at Rome the popes were practically without 
 any control over the petty lords who had established 
 their sway outside of the city. These conditions 
 made it natural that progress toward further consoli- 
 dation of Italy should proceed primarily through the
 
 288 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 incorporation by the stronger states of the disorderly 
 little territories whose nominal superior was the 
 Pope. But to the steps in this direction taken by 
 Naples and Venice the wielders of the papal power, 
 when once the danger of the conciliar movement 
 was past, opposed the most vehement resistance. 
 From the time of Nicholas V (1447-1453) the policy 
 of maintaining and enhancing the secular dignity 
 and power of the Papacy was pushed by the aid of 
 every resource which the curia could command. This 
 policy, in one or another of its phases, is the key 
 to the career of Sixtus IV and Alexander VI 
 (Borgia), whose methods gave such scandal to Chris- 
 tendom, and it attained its final success under Jul- 
 ius II (1503-1513), whose energetic procedure in 
 diplomacy and on the battlefield confirmed for three 
 hundred and fifty years the hold of the Papacy on 
 the government of central Italy. It was claimed by 
 the popes, and there was much reason in the claim, 
 that an independent position politically was the only 
 security against the recurrence of such a condition 
 of subservience to some temporal ruler as character- 
 ized the " Babylonish captivity " at Avignon ; but the 
 methods by which independence was realized and 
 maintained afforded only too good grounds for the 
 cynical judgment of Machiavelli and others that the 
 Papacy had become primarily a secular institution, 
 all the more to be feared because of the traditions 
 of spirituality which afforded so convenient a mask 
 for its designs. 
 
 In maintaining the integrity of the States of the
 
 MACHIAVELLI'S PUBLIC LIFE 289 
 
 Church the popes contributed largely if not decisively 
 to prevent the consolidation of Italy. But just as 
 Machiavelli attained manhood, in 1494, the invasion 
 of the peninsula by Charles VIII of France inaugu- 
 rated that practice which turned Italy into the 
 battlefield of the great monarchies. In the con- 
 flict of France and Spain and Germany the little 
 Italian states had scant hope of preserving their 
 independence by material force ; but, like other weak 
 powers under similar circumstances, they developed 
 boundless resources of craft and diplomacy. Italian 
 politics was the field of a most complex activity, and 
 Machiavelli, who during fourteen years (1498-1512) 
 held an important office in the Florentine adminis- 
 tration, was in the midst of it. Practical experience 
 thus combined with his philosophical temperament 
 to give character to his speculations. The missions 
 on which he was sent by his government gave him 
 personal knowledge and experience not only of 
 Italian men and affairs, but also of the greater 
 nations of Europe. 1 His extensive and acute obser- 
 vation of government in its actual working left a 
 most vivid impress on his thought and writings. 
 
 But with all the influence of contemporary politi- 
 cal conditions, Machiavelli's philosophy was to an 
 even greater extent the product of that admiration 
 for pagan antiquity which was the hall-mark of the 
 Renaissance. It was in his time that this culture- 
 movement was producing in Italy its most perfect 
 results. Art and literature had thrown off entirely 
 
 1 He visited France and Germany.
 
 290 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 the forms of medievalism and looked for all their 
 inspiration to the models of the ancient world. Phi- 
 losophy and science were following in the same path ; 
 and the paganizing of morals and even of religion 
 was only too clearly manifest in the life of the times. 
 The dominant intellectual note of the age was free- 
 dom freedom from the limitations and restraints 
 which had been imposed upon men's thought and 
 action by the methods and dogmas of scholasticism, 
 and freedom to revel in every species of activity 
 which the untrammelled spirit of the ancients had 
 suggested. Florence was the acknowledged centre 
 of Italian culture during the Renaissance, and 
 Machiavelli was to the core of his being a Floren- 
 tine. His intellectual training and equipment corre- 
 sponded to the characteristics of his environment. 
 The literature of antiquity, particularly the histo- 
 rians, was the staple of his diet, and in it he satis- 
 fied all the cravings of his nature. With the best 
 writers of ancient Rome he was thoroughly familiar, 
 and his acquaintance with those of Greece was fairly 
 extensive, though there is no conclusive evidence 
 that he understood their language. 1 It was under 
 the stimulus of the spirit embodied in this literature 
 that his naturally acute intelligence attacked the 
 problems of politics and propounded solutions which, 
 in both method and results, were as distinct from 
 those of the preceding twelve centuries as if those 
 centuries had never existed. 
 
 1 On this point see Villari, Niccolo Machiavelli, translation, II, 11 
 et seq. (London, Kegan Paul, 1878).
 
 MACHIAVELLI 291 
 
 2. Method of his Philosophy and his Point of View 
 
 The form and method of Machiavelli's philosophy 
 had no prototype later than Aristotle and the Aris- 
 totle of Hellas, not of Christian Europe. All the 
 paraphernalia of the scholastics and of the jurists were 
 simply ignored in his speculation. A comparison of 
 the chapter heads of The Prince with those, for exam- 
 ple, of the Monarchia of Rosellinus, who wrote only 
 fifty years earlier, would hardly suggest that the two 
 writers lived in the same world. The dogma of the 
 two powers, the relations of Pope and Emperor, the 
 conflict of spiritual and secular jurisdiction, the doc- 
 trine of imperium continuum, the Donation of Con- 
 stantine and all the rest of the long familiar captions 
 receive scarcely an allusion from Machiavelli. To 
 the opinions of the church fathers and the medieval 
 doctors he makes no reference, and he never cites a 
 text of the Canon or of the Civil law. His work 
 was as completely dissevered from the long accepted 
 system of political theory as the contemporary work 
 of Columbus was from the long accepted system of 
 geography. 
 
 The true method in the science of politics was, in 
 Machiavelli's opinion, the historical method. Men 
 had been, he believed, in all ages and places the same 
 as at present, had been influenced by the same motives, 
 and had been called upon to solve the same problems 
 with the same means. A study of the past, therefore, 
 would throw the fullest light on the needs of the 
 present and would even, he thought, make prediction
 
 292 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 of the future an easy matter. 1 He felicitated himself 
 on being the first to perceive the true relation of 
 history to politics, and on entering upon a new and 
 untried path in political speculation. But the past 
 which Machiavelli studied in his own works, and 
 from which he supposed himself to be drawing his 
 conclusions, was almost exclusively the past of classi- 
 cal antiquity. It w r as Greece and particularly Rome 
 that furnished him with political truth. This manner 
 of applying the historical method corrected, of course, 
 and most usefully, that of the scholastic philosophy, 
 which tended to teach that a deep gulf divided Chris- 
 tians from pagans, and that the experience of the 
 latter, as a source of lessons for mankind, was prac- 
 tically worthless, owing to their lack of participation 
 in the divine revelation. Yet Machiavelli, in restor- 
 ing the history of the Greeks and Romans to its 
 proper place in the edification of the human race, 
 himself erred on the other side in leaving almost 
 entirely out of account the history of the peoples in 
 whose development Christianity played so large a 
 part. The work which was avowedly an application 
 of his new method, the Discourses on the First Decade 
 of Titus Livius? dealt with the Romans almost ex- 
 
 1 Discourses on Livy, I, Introduction. Si cognosce facilmente come 
 in tutte le cittk e in tutti i popoli sono quelli medesimi desideri e 
 quelli medesimi umori, e come vi furono sempre ; in modo che egli e 
 facil cosa . . . prevedere in ogni Repubblica le future [cose]. I, 
 39. 
 
 2 Discorsi soprn la Prima Deca di T. Livio. In Works (Milano, 1804), 
 Vols. II and III. Translated in Detmold, The Historical, Political 
 and Diplomatic Writings of Niccolo Machiavelli, Boston, Osgood & Co., 
 1882.
 
 MACHIAVELLI'S METHOD 293 
 
 clusively; and in TJie Prince Machiavelli's interest 
 was clearly determined by contemporary conditions. 
 The comparative method, which is essential to fruit- 
 fulness in the historical, was employed only to a 
 slight extent and mostly in a rudimentary form. 1 
 
 In fact, Machiavelli's method was historical rather 
 in appearance than in reality. The actual source of 
 his speculations was the interest he felt in the men 
 and conditions of his own time. In the history of 
 the ancients he found parallels that appealed strongly 
 to him by their relation to existing conditions, and 
 he seized upon them as revelations of essential truth. 
 Of the circumstances of his own time he was a most 
 accurate observer and a most acute analyst. This 
 determined the method which he really depended 
 upon. His conclusions were reached empirically, 
 and were then reenforced by appeals to history. He 
 used Livy, in the Discourses, rather for the purpose 
 of sustaining, than for the purpose of discovering, 
 principles. The haec fabula docet often adorned a 
 tale that from the standpoint of serious history was 
 absurd ; yet Machiavelli's teaching, like ^Esop's, was 
 generally sound even when the story was weakest. 
 
 These characteristics of method are closely related 
 to the point of view from which he regards politics. 
 His philosophy is a study of the art of government, 
 rather than a theory of the state. Machiavelli's fiel( 
 is Politik, not Staatslehre. He is interested in the 
 establishment and operation of the machinery of gov- 
 
 1 For an admirable use of the comparative method in answering * 
 single definite question., see Discourses, I, 5.
 
 294 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 ernment in the forces through which governmental 
 power is generated and applied. He views things 
 from the standpoint of the governing, not of the gov- 
 erned class. 1 The spirit and motives of the latter are 
 treated merely as incidental to the activity of the 
 former. This is notoriously true of The Prince, which 
 has given so bad a reputation to its author; but i^ 
 is also true, in a hardly less degree, of the Discourses] 
 If the former work analyzes the political system oi 
 the strong monarch, the latter analyzes that of thel 
 strong republic. In one, the main theme is the suc- 
 cessful creation of a principality by an individual;! 
 in the other it is the creation of an empire by a| 
 free city. But in both the centre of his thought is 
 the methods of those who wield the power of the 
 state, rather than the fundamental relationships in 
 which the essence of the state consists. 
 
 It follows, therefore, that while the affinity be- 
 tween Machiavelli and Aristotle is, from the point 
 of view of method, very marked, in substance the 
 Italian covers a much narrower field than that cov- 
 ered by the Greek. Aristotle does indeed devote 
 much attention to the workings of government, to 
 the practical questions of policy and administration ; 
 but he subordinates this phase of his work to the 
 investigation of the broader aspects of organized 
 social and political life. He has a theory of the 
 state in the wide sense, and he sets forth this 
 
 1 Cf. Villari : " Lo scopo finale delle sue ricerche e della sua scienza 
 e pur sempre il dar precetti sulla condotta politica che debbono tenere 
 gli uomini di stato." Op. cit. (Firenze, 1881), II, 320. The English 
 version of Villari includes only the first of the three Italian volumes.
 
 AN EXPANDING STATE THE IDEAL 295 
 
 theory at length. Machiavelli, while conscious of 
 a broad philosophical basis for his views, gives only 
 perfunctory attention to this, and hastens to take up 
 the questions of immediate practical concern. Here 
 his doctrine as well as his method approaches very 
 nearly at many points to that of Aristotle. He is 
 far less systematic ; he makes scarcely any attempt 
 at a logical presentation of the science or art of 
 government ; but the principles of practical policy 
 for given conditions are substantially identical in 
 the minds of the two philosophers. Running all 
 through, however, may be discerned the influence of 
 the distinction that, while the ideal of Aristotle, pretty 
 consistently adhered to, was a state hi which immo- 
 bility and philosophic calm constituted the supreme 
 end to be kept in view, the ideal of Machiavelli was 
 a state whose end was expansion and the attainment 
 V of widespread dominion. The Italian recognized the 
 abstract excellence of the Greek's ideal, but regarded 
 it as too far removed from attainability to be worthy 
 of serious consideration. Doubtless, he says, a per- 
 fectly balanced state, free from internal party con- 
 flicts, would be the true political existence. " But all 
 human affairs are in motion and it is impossible to 
 stand still ; they must progress or decline ; and where 
 reason does not lead, necessity often drives." Hence a 
 state organized with a view to mere existence without 
 expansion is likely to be forced into the latter policy, 
 and thus to be brought the more quickly to ruin. 1 
 
 1 Senza dubbio credo che potendosi tenere la cosa bilanciata in 
 questo modo, che e' sarebbe il vero vivere politico e la vera quieta
 
 296 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 It is this ideal of successful expansion that accounts 
 for Machiavelli's generally low estimate of the Greek 
 states, and his particular interest in Rome. To him 
 Athens and Sparta seemed to lack the chief elements 
 of political wisdom. Measured by his standard, they 
 were failures. Rome, on the other hand, achieved 
 empire, and was therefore a success. If Aristotle 
 had witnessed the career of Rome, he might have 
 been inspired in his philosophy by an ideal analogous 
 to that of Machiavelli. The Greek had a sufficient 
 appreciation of power of the capacity to cope with 
 circumstances and with men ; and when he treated 
 of the strong man in his philosophy, his conclusions 
 were very similar to those of the Italian. 1 But Aris- 
 totle lived after the age of the Hellenic despots, and 
 when little of them survived save a name of great 
 odium. Machiavelli, on the other hand, lived when 
 the Italian despot and the absolute monarch were in 
 the full tide of their success, and when much of what 
 men call prosperity was flourishing under their sway. 
 His environment, therefore, as well as his tempera- 
 ment, operated to prevent any such depreciation of 
 the tyrant's art as was involved in the system of 
 Aristotle. 
 
 d' una citta. Ma sendo tutte le cose degli uomini in moto, e non 
 potendo stare salde, convieiie che le saglino o che le scendino ; e a 
 molte cose che la ragione non t' induce, t' induce la necessitk; tal- 
 mente che, avendo ordinata una Repubblica atta a mantenersi non 
 ampliando, e la necessity la conducesse ad ampliare, si verrebbe a 
 torre via i fondamenti suoi ed a farla rovinare piu presto. Dis- 
 corsi, I, 6. ! Supra, p. 91 et seq.
 
 MACHIAVELLI 297 
 
 3. His Attitude toward Morality and Religion 
 
 Not less important, scientifically, than his adoption 
 of the historical method, and far more influential in 
 establishing the reputation of Machiavelli, was his 
 attitude toward morality and religion. It is this by 
 which Machiavelli is best known, and it is this that 
 contributes most to make him the expression of a 
 definite break with the Middle Ages. Mediaeval 
 political theory did take some account of history, 
 and the jurists in particular supported their a priori 
 doctrines by more or less reference to the past. But 
 in no philosopher of either ancient or mediaeval times 
 were the dictates of religion and morality so frankly 
 relegated to a subordinate, and even insignificant, 
 position in relation to the theory and practice ^f 
 politics. That law of nature in which both ancient 
 and mediaeval philosophy had placed the source and 
 limits of political science received from Machiavelli 
 scarcely the recognition of a passing allusion ; and 
 the law of God, so far as it was manifested to man 
 through direct revelation, was considered to be ipso 
 facto removed from the field of his speculation. 1 
 
 This wholly unprecedented position in political 
 theory is presented in several different aspects in 
 Machiavelli's thought. In the first place, it is neces- 
 sary to recognize in his philosophy the first formal 
 
 1 Thus in The Prince, chap. 6, Moses, whom Machiavelli seemed 
 disposed to regard as one of the strong men of history, is dropped out 
 of the discussion because he merely executed the policy dictated by 
 God. The reason that would have made Moses the chief theme of 
 discussion in the philosophy of another, excludes him from considera- 
 tion in that of Machiavelli.
 
 298 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 and conscious separation of politics as a science from 
 the science of ethics. We have seen that this sepa- 
 ration was practically involved in the work of Aris- 
 totle, 1 though it was rather an incident than an essen- 
 tial in his system. He never flatly proclaimed the 
 independence of political from moral doctrine, but 
 systematically maintained that the latter conditioned 
 the former. Machiavelli, on the other hand, as syste- 
 tf matically sought to isolate the phenomena of politics 
 and to study them wholly without reference to the 
 scientific priority of the facts of a moral existence. 
 He did not at all deny the excellence of the moral 
 virtues, but he refused to consider them as essential 
 to, or conditions of, the political virtues. Machia- 
 velli^ jx>lrtical man is asjmtirely dissociated from all 
 standards of conduct save success in the establish- 
 ment and extension of governmental power as is the 
 "..economic man" of the orthodox schooFl[rom all 
 save success in the creation of wealth. 
 
 The employment of violence, cruelty, bad faith 
 and all the other vices is discussed, in both The 
 Prince, and The Discourses, with only the most per- 
 functory expressions of moral disapproval, 2 and the 
 employment of virtue and religion with as little evi- 
 dence of moral appreciation. A scientific indifference 
 so thoroughgoing as that of Machiavelli could hardly 
 have failed to subject him to the reproach of sympa- 
 thy with evil. He lays it down, for example, that 
 while it is most praiseworthy for a prince to be good, 
 
 1 Supra, p. 51 e.t seq. 
 
 2 Cf. the comparison of cruelty " badly used " with cruelty " well 
 used," " se del male e lecito dire bene." The Prince, c. 8.
 
 RELATION OF POLITICS AND MORALITY 299 
 
 nevertheless one who wishes to maintain his authority 
 must be ready to lay aside his goodness at any 
 moment, and in general to employ it or not according 
 to circumstances. Moreover, since no man can be 
 expected to possess all the virtues, the discreet ruler 
 will particularly avoid the infamy of those vices 
 which endanger the state, and will thus be relieved 
 of concern about those which are necessary to pre- 
 serve it. 1 And again, in perhaps the most famous 
 passage in his works, he refers to the common impres- 
 sion that the keeping of faith is praiseworthy, and 
 then proceeds to demonstrate that, for the sake of 
 maintaining political power, deceit and hypocrisy are 
 indispensable. 2 " The prince must appear all sin- 
 cerity, all uprightness, all humanity, all religion ; " 
 but he must have his mind so disciplined that, when 
 it is necessary to save the state, he can act regardless 
 of these. " Let the prince, then, look to the main- 
 tenance of the state ; the means will always be deemed 
 honourable and will receive general approbation." 
 And when Machiavelli is treating of republics, his 
 conclusions are the same : " I believe that when 
 there is fear for the life of the state, both monarchs 
 and republics, to preserve it, will break faith and 
 display ingratitude." 3 
 
 Moral judgments, thus, are wholly subordinate, in 
 Machiavelli' s philosophy, to the exigencies of political 
 existence and welfare. He is not immoral, but un- 
 moral in his politics. And the same attitude appears 
 in relation to religion. He is not irreligious, but 
 
 1 The Prince, c. 15. 2 Ibid. c. 18. 8 Discourses, Bk. I, c. 59.
 
 300 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 unreligious. So far as religious practices involve the 
 operation of forces above the influence of human 
 reason, they are entirely out of his sphere ; but so far 
 as religion is operative in determining relations to the 
 state and the trend of political development, it is sub- 
 jected to the same cold-blooded analysis as appears 
 in his treatment of morality. Religious sentiment is 
 viewed as an important instrument of state policy, 
 and as such it must be taken account of by statesmen 
 always. Not at all, however, because of any profound 
 truth to which the sentiment corresponds, but because 
 the decline of respect for religion is the surest sign 
 of approaching ruin for the state, and because wise 
 statesmen are able, through appeal to this sentiment, 
 to achieve reforms which otherwise would be beyond 
 their power. 1 
 
 Always, thus, Machiavelli has in mind the neces- 
 sity of the existence of the state as the first principle 
 of his philosophy. The whole effect of this point of 
 view is summed up in the dictates of unscrupulous 
 patriotism : " Where the safety of one's country is at 
 stake there must be no consideration of what is just 
 or unjust, merciful or cruel, glorious or shameful ; on 
 the contrary, everything must be disregarded save 
 that course which will save her life and maintain her 
 independence." 2 
 
 1 Sono molti beni, conosciuti da uno prudente, i quali lion hanno 
 in sfe ragioni evident! da poterli persuadere ad altri. Pero gli uomini 
 savi ricorrono a Dio. Cosi fece Licurgo, cosi Solone. Discorsi, 
 1, 11. 
 
 2 Dove si delibera al tutto della salute della patria, non vi debbe 
 cadere alcuna considerazione ne di giusto ne d' ingiusto, ne de pietoso 
 ne di crudele, ne di laudabile ue d' iguoniinioso ; anzi, posposto ogni
 
 EFFICIENCY VERSUS MORALITY 301 
 
 A second influence which was obviously at work in 
 determining Machiavelli's treatment of the relation 
 j)f politics to morality and religion was his admiratiofT 
 .lor power and efficiency in man. This feeling was 
 temperamental and largely unconscious. The philoso- 
 pher could not avoid a sense of pleasure in any mani- 
 festation of the ability to reach a desired end with 
 clear-cut and indisputable success. He had in him 
 the stuff that the hero-worshipper is made of. The 
 strong man and his art constituted a theme to 
 which Machiavelli's genius inevitably returned. His 
 intimate familiarity with the workings of government 
 in the weak Florentine republic, where divided coun- 
 sels, temporizing and vacillation were so conspicuous, 
 strongly confirmed the natural disposition to minute 
 analysis of the elements which combined to make the 
 policy of a state fixed, definite and coherent. Hence 
 his rather unfortunate favourable judgment upon 
 Caesar Borgia, 1 which involves approval, not of either 
 the end or the means of that tyrant's policy, but 
 merely of the relation between end and means. And 
 hence, too, the reproach visited upon the Baglioni for 
 not slaying Pope Julius II when the opportunity was 
 given ; 2 without passing any judgment upon the 
 morality of the policy which the tyrant should have 
 pursued, Machiavelli merely points out the utter 
 inconsistency of an ill-timed scruple with the policy 
 in question. And the same characteristic of the 
 
 altro rispetto, seguire al tutto quel partito che le salvi la vita e man- 
 tenghile la liberta. Discorsi, III, 41. 
 
 1 The Prince, c. 7. 2 Discourses, I, 27.
 
 302 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 philosopher's thought is seen in his reiterated dis- 
 paragement of a middle course in affairs of state. 1 
 
 Finally, the separation of politics from ethics and 
 religion is maintained by Machiavelli consciously 
 as a result of the conviction that this corresponds 
 most closely to the facts of human existence. He is 
 in thejiullest jsense a student of practical politics, and 
 he seeks to determine the workings of a real, not of 
 an ideal, political life. Imaginary and impossible 
 states have for him no interest whatever. His pur- 
 pose is " to get bacTTio ftTe actual truth of things." 2 
 There is, he says, the greatest difference between the 
 way in which men live and that in which they ought 
 to live ; and the former, not the latter, is deliberately 
 chosen as the subject of his investigations. 
 
 This point of view was, of course, most useful. 
 It corrected the tendency to make of political science 
 a mere congeries of moral and religious precepts. At 
 the same time it involved the interpretation of his- 
 tory and the formulation of political philosophy in 
 terms of the most advanced rationalism of the pagan 
 Renaissance. In the intellectual classes of Machia- 
 velli's day moral and religious emotion was practi- 
 cally extinct. A calculating self-interest served for 
 a practical standard of conduct, and a perfunctory 
 observance of the forms of the Christian religion did 
 not disguise a widespread rejection of its substance. 
 It was easy, therefore, in such an environment for 
 Machiavelli to formulate his political philosophy 
 
 1 Discourses, I, 26 and 30. 
 
 2 . . . mi e parso piu conveniente andare dietro alia verita effettu- 
 ale della cosa. // Principe, cap. 15.
 
 MACHIAVELLI 303 
 
 independently of ethical and theological influences. 
 It was easy for him, also, in the presence of such 
 careers as those of the Borgias, to present "the 
 actual truth of things " as expressed in the disso- 
 ciation of political from moral and religious prin- 
 ciples and practices. And it was very natural for 
 him to heap invective upon the Roman Church, not 
 so much for having abandoned its religion, as for 
 having violated all the scientific proprieties by 
 assuming a leading place in politics. 1 
 
 On the whole it must be said that while Machia- 
 velli's attitude toward morality and religion was 
 scientifically justifiable, and contributed greatly to 
 the clarification of the problems of politics, the lack 
 of feeling which characterized the expression of his 
 views afforded considerable ground for the suspicion 
 that he was not only scientifically unmoral, but also 
 practically immoral, and for the criticism to which 
 he has been subjected throughout succeeding cen- 
 turies. Yet it may be doubted whether, with all 
 the reproach that is due him, he has not been too 
 severely punished by having to bear the odium that 
 is concentrated in the term " Machiavellian." 
 
 4. Theory of Political Motives 
 
 So far as Machiavelli's method requires generaliza- 
 tions or .assumptions as to tho -motiv-e& by which men 
 are guided in social and political life, his doctrine is 
 essentially identical with- tharM^-which Hobbes later 
 gave a very precise scientific form. Men are looked 
 
 1 The Prince, c. 11; Discourses, I, 11.
 
 304 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 upon as purely selfish, and as actuated always by 
 impulses in which the so-called social virtues have 
 no part. A narrow self-interest affords for Machia- 
 velli a sufficient explanation of all political phe- 
 nomena. His cynical judgments on this subject are 
 even more repulsive than those of Hobbes, for the 
 reason that they lack the broad psychological foun- 
 dation on which the latter carefully placed them. 
 
 Particularly frank are Machiavelli's opinions as 
 expressed in The Prince. Generally speaking, he 
 says, men are "ungrateful, fickle, deceitful, cow- 
 ardly and avaricious." From this is drawn the 
 conclusion that a monarch should aim rather to be 
 feared than to be loved. Love, he argues, implies 
 a bond of obligation which men, being essentially 
 selfish, break on every occasion where their own 
 interest demands it ; while fear, for the same reason, 
 holds them indefinitely. 1 Again, the simple-minded- 
 ness of men and their readiness ever to submit to 
 the necessity of the moment make them an easy 
 prey to an unscrupulous leader. " He who wishes 
 to deceive will always find some one to be deceived." 1 
 Men judge altogether by appearances, and this gives 
 opportunity to the crafty ruler. But further, men 
 are not only in general weak and ignorant, they 
 are naturally vicious, and are made good only by 
 necessity. It is for this reason that the wise prince 
 can never trust to counsellors, but must depend upon 
 his own judgment. 3 
 
 1 The. Prince, c. 17. 2 Ibid. c. 18. 
 
 3 " . . . gli uomini sempre ti riusciranno tristi, se da una neces- 
 gitk non scmo fatti buoni. Pero si conchiude che li buoni consigli, da
 
 MATERIALISTIC END OF THE STATE 305 
 
 .These pessimistic conceptions of human nature 
 appear abundantly also in the "Discourses, where they 
 receive a somewhat fuller psychological setting. Mach- 
 iavelli brings over bodily from PoTyBius the latter's 
 theory as to the origin and cycle of governments and 
 the foundation of social institutions. This theory 
 puts into the background the Aristotelian view of the 
 social nature of man and is readily adaptable to the 
 \ , view. _that society has its origin in a calculating 
 
 * > self -interest on the part of the individual. 1 Machia- 
 
 ,^) _. - r 
 
 A? velli gives to this general line of thought a distinctly 
 materialistic turn in his comments on the Agrarian 
 laws at Rome. Here, in a thoroughly Hobbesian 
 manner, he sets forth that men have by nature end- 
 less desires, and that the craving for additional satis- 
 faction of them is the mainspring of all human action. 
 One of the most potent of these desires is that which 
 finds satisfaction in private property. In The Prince' 2 ' 
 Machiavelli declares that " men more readily forget the 
 death of a father than the loss of a patrimony," and 
 bases on this the injunction that executions should 
 be reasonably few, but confiscations none at all. In 
 the Discourses this same idea receives fuller develop- 
 ment, and a materialistic individualism is made the 
 explanation of the love of independence and self- 
 government. To a small extent these ends are 
 sought from the desire to exercise power, but it is 
 only a few individuals who are actuated by this 
 
 qualunque venghino, conviene naschino dalla prudenza del Principe, 
 e non la prudenza del Principe da' buoni consigli." II Principe^ 
 cap. 23. 
 
 1 Discourses, I, 2. Cf. supra, p. 115. a c. 17.
 
 306 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 motive; the masses seek only security for person 
 and property. 1 Republican government is desired 
 because it gives a chance of material gain to a 
 majority of the people; under monarchy the prince 
 absorbs all the profit himself. And independence 
 is desired because wealth multiplies most in states 
 that are not subject to others. 2 
 
 Material prosperity is, in short, Machiavelli's idea 
 of the chief conscious basis of political life among 
 men. How far this conception is from that of the 
 ancient philosophers, that the state is an institution 
 devoted to the moral and intellectual uplifting of a 
 community, and from the mediaeval notion, that the 
 end of the state is primarily to smooth men's way 
 to eternal salvation, it is not necessary further to 
 demonstrate. 
 
 5. The Forms of Government 
 
 Machiavelli's treatment of the classification of gov- 
 ernments starts with a perfunctory adoption of the 
 Aristotelian system, namely, monarchy, aristocracy 
 and constitutional democracy, with the three corre- 
 sponding corruptions tyranny, oligarchy and democ- 
 racy ; and the same conclusion is reached with that of 
 Polybius and Cicero, that a mixed form is the best and 
 most stable. 3 This line of thought is not followed 
 
 1 Una piccola parte di loro desidera d' essere libera per comandare ; 
 ma tutti gli altri, che sono infiniti, desiderano la libertk per vivere 
 sicuri. Discorsi, I, 16. 
 
 2 Discourses, II, 2. The rule of a conquering republic is in Machi- 
 avelli's opinion far more destructive to the prosperity of subject states 
 than that of a conquering prince. 8 Discourses, I, 2.
 
 COMMONWEALTH VERSUS MONARCHY 307 
 
 out to any extent, however, and serious attention is 
 concentrated on the characteristics and relative ad- 
 vantages of monarchies, or principalities, and popu- 
 lar governments, or republics. The blending of the 
 ideas of antiquity with the influence of contemporary 
 conditions is obvious at every step in the progress 
 of his reflection. The isolated and non-expanding 
 Hellenic city-state, republican or despotic, with its 
 analogue in the Italian city-state ; the expanding city- 
 state of Rome, with its imperial development ; and 
 the recently founded quasi-national monarchy, all 
 combine in determining his conclusions. The Prince 
 is essentially a study of monarchy in relation to the 
 extension of political dominion, and The Discourses 
 is in like manner a study of popular government in 
 relation to the same end. 
 
 As between the princely and the popular form 
 Machiavelli is very far from being the thorough- 
 going advocate of despotism that an unfortunate 
 reputation has tended to make him. His apprecia- 
 tion of republican government is no less pronounced 
 than that of Aristotle himself, and in respect to this 
 form the judgments of the Italian, making allowance 
 for the difference in ideals, are in substantial agree- 
 ment with those of the Greek. For a community in 
 which a general economic equality prevails, Machia- 
 velli holds that the commonwealth is the best and, 
 indeed, the only possible form of government. 1 The 
 people as a whole is, he thinks, wiser and no more 
 
 1 ... dove e equalitk, non si puo fare Principato ; e dove la non 
 fe, non si puo far Repubblica. Discorsi, I, 55.
 
 308 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 vacillating than a prince. The ingratitude of repub- 
 lics is no greater than that displayed by princes. 1 
 The judgment of the people, especially in such 
 matters as the choice of officers and the assignment 
 of honours, is in general sound and unimpeachable. 2 
 Granting that a prince is best suited to the original 
 establishment of political or legal institutions, a popu- 
 lar government is best qualified to maintain them. 8 
 Again, republics keep faith better than princes, if 
 not by choice, at least through the slower working 
 of their organs. 4 And finally, in respect to that 
 adaptation to times and circumstances which is essen- 
 tial to the success of any policy, the republic has an 
 advantage over the monarchy, in that the character 
 of the prince will not change with conditions, while 
 among the many characters which participate in 
 the service of a republic, one may always be found 
 that is just suited to the particular needs of a given 
 time. 5 
 
 Machiavelli thus manifests no irrational preference 
 for monarchy ; and his judgments in respect to aristo- 
 cratic power are almost wholly unfavourable. The an- 
 tithesis of the great (i grandi) and the masses (il 
 popolo) he considers a prime factor in the life of every 
 city-state (citify, and his feeling is frankly with the 
 latter. The mass of the people he believes to be the 
 
 1 Discourses, I, 58. a IUd . Tj 47 _4 8 . C yi III, 34. 
 
 Ibid. I, 58. * Ibid. I, 59. 
 
 5 Ibid. Ill, 9. He illustrates by the rise of Fabius and Scipio at 
 different stages of the Punic wars, and, on the other hand, by the 
 career of Pope Julius II, whose fiery impetuosity never varied what- 
 ever the circumstances.
 
 MACHIAVELLI ON ARISTOCRACY 309 
 
 best support for an elective monarch, 1 to be the most 
 effective instrument for the maintenance of inde- 
 pendence, and to be far less productive of internal 
 disturbance than the aristocracy. 2 The leading 
 motive of the upper class he conceives to be in all 
 cases the passion for the exercise of authority, while 
 the masses desire only peace and order. 3 A landed 
 aristocracy (gentiluomini], in particular, renders free 
 government impossible. 4 This class, indeed, when 
 possessing castles and subjects of their own, he con- 
 siders fatal to all social order (nimici d' ogni civilta). 
 Where such conditions exist, as is the case in many 
 parts of Italy, not only is the establishment of re- 
 publican government impossible, but even monarchy 
 can be set up only through the extinction or syste- 
 matic transformation of the " gentlemen." 
 
 A high degree of appreciation for the common- 
 wealth based on the mass of equal citizens, is thus 
 a distinguishing feature of Machiavelli's philosophy. 
 But he fully recognizes that circumstances require 
 different forms of organization at different times and 
 in different places, and he is particularly attracted by 
 the problem as to what system of organization and 
 action is best adapted to the establishment of far- 
 reaching dominion. Thus what Plato and Aristotle 
 regarded as unworthy of consideration by either 
 statesman or philosopher, becomes with Machiavelli 
 the central point of interest. 
 
 1 The Prince, c. 9. 2 Discourses, I, 5. 8 Ibid. I, 16. 
 
 4 Dove sono gentiluomini, non si possa ordinare repubblica. 
 Discorsi, I, 55.
 
 310 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 6. On the Extension of Dominion 
 
 The theory and practice of extending monarchic 
 dominion is chiefly to be found in The Prince, while 
 the expansion of republics is the theme of The Dis- 
 courses. The process in each case is regarded by 
 Machiavelli not as involving the blending of two 
 or more social or political organisms, but as con- 
 sisting in the subjection of a number of states to 
 the rule of a single prince or commonwealth. The 
 French and Spanish monarchies, in whose constitu- 
 tions Machiavelli finds much to admire, are regarded 
 as groups of states rather than as single organiza- 
 tions, and in his plea for a united Italy he clearly has 
 in mind a similar union. " No province," he says, 
 "was ever united or happy save by becoming sub- 
 ject in its entirety to a single commonwealth or a 
 single prince, as has happened in France and in 
 Spain." 1 This conception of unity has little in 
 common with that which inspired the heroic national 
 politics of the nineteenth century ; but it is precisely 
 that which was to determine all the transformations 
 of political geography in western Europe for three 
 centuries after Machiavelli's death. 
 
 In The Prince the chief heads of the discussion 
 are, first the acquisition and second the exten- 
 sion of princely power. Under the first head are 
 set forth the methods by which principalities are 
 
 1 Veramente alcuna provincia non fu mai unita o f elice, se la non 
 viene tutta alia ubbidienza d' una Repubblica o d' un Principe, come 
 e awenuto alia Francia ed alia Spagna. Discorsi, L, 12.
 
 THE EXTENSION OF PRINCELY POWER 311 
 
 founded, illustrated by the policy of characters so 
 diverse as those of Moses and Caesar Borgia. The 
 former, with Cyrus, Romulus and Theseus, is taken 
 to illustrate the acquisition of power by the indi- 
 vidual's own resources and ability ; l while the Bor- 
 gia is taken as a typical instance of those who owe 
 their success to good fortune and the aid of others. 
 All these heroes were founders of new states. The 
 extension of dominion by a prince already at the 
 head of a government gives rise to what Machia- 
 velli calls a mixed principality (principato misto). 
 His discussion of the methods best adapted to 
 the creation and enlargement of such organiza- 
 tions exhibits most fully, at the same time, the 
 philosopher's intellectual acumen and his moral 
 indifferentism. 
 
 The line of least resistance to the ambitious prince 
 is through peoples of his own race. It is easy to 
 hold acquisitions made in the same country (pro- 
 vincia) and where the same language is used; the 
 conqueror has merely to extinguish the line of the 
 former prince and let the old institutions remain. 
 But acquisition of states (stati) in a country differ- 
 ing in language and institutions from that of the 
 conqueror involves more complex problems, the 
 solution of which was, on the whole, achieved 
 most successfully by the Romans. 3 The most 
 serious difficulties to a conquering prince arise in 
 
 1 Virtu. This term is used by Machiavelli, like the Latin virtus 
 and the Greek dpcriy, without any ethical connotation. 
 
 2 The Prince, c. 5.
 
 312 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 connection with a state that has been under repub- 
 lican government prior to the conquest. Here the 
 name of liberty and the memory of the ancient 
 constitution will always serve as an inspiration to 
 revolt ; and the only safe policy is utterly to destroy 
 the community. 1 
 
 With all his admiration for the strong man, and 
 all his confidence that the ability and resources of 
 one truly great can determine the fate of states, 
 Machiavelli nevertheless has a just appreciation of 
 the persistent power inherent in the fundamental 
 institutions (gli ordini) of a community. The surest 
 test of the great man is his ability to introduce 
 and maintain a new social and political constitu- 
 tion. The reformer is hampered by the open hos- 
 tility of those who derive profit from the old order, 
 and by the lukewarmness of those who have only 
 hope, but no certainty, of benefit from the new. 
 The prince who takes over the sovereignty of a 
 state and leaves it to go on under its old institu- 
 tions has a simple task ; but he who assumes power 
 in order to reform the constitution undertakes the 
 most doubtful and dangerous of enterprises. 2 Suc- 
 cess in this respect is what justifies the assignment 
 of high position among statesmen to Moses, Cyrus, 
 Romulus and Theseus; and the key to their success 
 Machiavelli characteristically finds in the fact that 
 they all took pains to have at hand armed force 
 
 1 Chi diviene padrone di una cittk consueta a vivere libera, e non 
 la disfaccia, aspetti di essere disfatto da quella. The Prince, c. 5. 
 
 2 Ibid., c. 6.
 
 REPUBLICAN EXPANSION 313 
 
 sufficient to defend the new constitutions when 
 persuasion ceased to be effective. That the inherent 
 excellence of a new constitution is no guarantee of 
 its permanence is proved, Machiavelli thinks, by 
 the failure of reforming prophets who have not 
 sustained themselves by arms, and notably by the 
 recent case of Savonarola. 
 
 The tendency toward extension of dominion is, in 
 Machiavelli' s opinion, inevitable in both republics and 
 monarchies. A prince is resistlessly impelled to such 
 a policy by the insatiable craving for power, which 
 is natural to men, and a republic, if not impelled by 
 choice, is sure to be driven to it by necessity. 1 If 
 the constitution of a republic is not such as to be 
 suited to a policy of expansion, the foundations of 
 the state will be torn away when the necessity for 
 such a policy arises, and the constitution will be 
 destroyed. 2 
 
 In carrying out the extension of its dominion, the 
 Roman Republic set an example which, in Machia- 
 velli' s opinion, no commonwealth can do better than 
 implicitly follow. The elements of the Roman sys- 
 tem he summarizes thus : Increase the population 
 of the city ; acquire allies rather than subjects ; estab- 
 lish colonies in the conquered territory ; turn all booty 
 into the treasury ; carry on war rather by field cam- 
 paigns and pitched battles than by sieges ; keep the 
 state rich and the individual poor; and with the 
 
 1 Discourses, I, 6 ; II, 19. 
 
 2 Avendo ordinata una Repubblica atta a mantenersi non ampli- 
 ando, e la necessity la conducesse ad ampliare, si verrebbe a torre via 
 i f ondamenti suoi, ed a f aria rovinare piu presto. Discorsi, I, 6.
 
 314 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 utmost care maintain a well-trained army. 1 It is 
 noteworthy that the greatest stress here, as in the 
 discussion of successful monarchy, is put upon the 
 force of arms. It is Machiavelli's fixed belief, due 
 as much to his observation in Italian politics as to 
 the teachings of history, that a well-trained citizen- 
 soldiery is indispensable in a republic, not only for 
 the purpose of aggrandizement, but even for main- 
 taining existence. Both his active career in the 
 Florentine administration and his philosophical writ- 
 ings testify to his interest in the substitution of a 
 popular militia for the mercenary bands that con- 
 stituted the bulk of the fighting forces of his day. 2 
 In the Discourses he devotes a very clever chapter 
 to demonstrating the falsity of the common saying 
 that " money is the sinews of war." 3 Not money, 
 but good soldiers, are in reality the essence of 
 strength ; for, he says, " money will not always 
 procure good soldiers, but good soldiers will always 
 procure money." 
 
 But with all Machiavelli's cynical exaltation of 
 
 physical force as the foundation of the greatness of 
 
 states, he will not, in last analysis, concede that this 
 
 factor is as decisive as craft. He holds it unques- 
 
 \ tionable truth that men never rise from insignificance 
 
 \to greatness without the use of force and craft; but 
 
 while force without craft is never sufficient, craft 
 
 1 Discourses, IT, 19. 
 
 2 He carried out in Florence a project for the organization of a 
 citizen militia. See Villari, Niccolb Machiavelli e i suoi tempi, I, 509 
 et seq. 
 
 8 Discourses, II, 10.
 
 MACHIAVELLI 315 
 
 without force will meet with success. 1 This principle 
 applies not only to principalities, but also to repub- 
 lics, as he amply demonstrates by reference to the 
 career of the Romans. 
 
 7. On the Preservation of Dominion 
 
 While the more or less definite conviction that 
 every government must either extend its authority 
 or perish, gives to Machiavelli's doctrine of aggran- 
 dizement the chief importance in his philosophy, nev- 
 ertheless his works abound in striking presentations 
 of the principles on which depends the ordinary 
 peaceful working of both monarchic and republican 
 institutions. 
 
 For the, stability of princely governments, the first 
 great rule of policy is respect for the established 
 institutions and customs of the land. Men who are 
 well governed, and whose familiar ways of life are 
 let alone, will not seek for any further liberty. 2 This 
 is a consideration which should guide both hereditary 
 and usurping monarchs. In the former class, how- 
 ever, Machiavelli's interest is not very great ; with 
 ordinary sagacity the hereditary prince has an easy 
 task. 3 But the newly established prince has to con- 
 front a more troublesome situation, and the dictates 
 of sound policy for such a ruler are always more par- // 
 ticularly in Machiavelli's mind. The Prince embodies 
 
 1 Io stimo che rado o non mai interveiiga che gli uomini di piccola 
 fortuna vengono a gradi grand! senza la forza e senza la fraude. . . . 
 Ne credo si truovi mai che la forza sola basti, ma si troverk bene che 
 la fraude sola bastera. Discorsi, II, 13. 
 
 2 Discourses, III, 5. 8 The Prince, c. 2.
 
 316 POLITICAL THEOKIES 
 
 a comprehensive analysis of the art of tyranny, with 
 conclusions that in very many respects coincide with 
 those of Aristotle in his discussion of the same 
 subject. 1 
 
 Because all government rests ultimately on force, 2 
 the prince must have a good army a proposition 
 which excludes dependence on foreign mercenaries or 
 allies. He must, on the whole, be parsimonious with 
 his own money and that of his subjects, but lavish in 
 distributing the spoils of war. 3 Severity rather than 
 mildness must characterize his attitude in public 
 affairs, but above all things he must keep his hands 
 off the property and the women of his subjects. 4 He 
 should endeavour to be, so far as possible, at the same 
 time feared but not hated by the people ; and accord- 
 ingly those duties of administration which involve 
 odious responsibility should be performed by subordi- 
 nates, while acts of grace should be attended to by 
 the prince in person. 5 He must, moreover, embrace 
 every opportunity to develop a reputation for exalted 
 purposes and character. He must keep the people 
 busy with great enterprises, must surround all his 
 actions with an air of grandeur, must take open and 
 decided part in the controversies of neighbouring 
 
 1 In The Politics ; cf. supra, p. 91 et seq. 
 
 2 I principal! fondamenti die abbino tutti gli stati . . . sono le 
 buone leggi e le buoni armi ; e . . . noil possono essere buone leggi 
 dove non sono buoni armi. II Principe, c. 12. 3 Ibid. c. 16. 
 
 4 Ibid. Abtise of subjects in these two respects is the most fruit- 
 ful cause of conspiracies. See Discourses, III, 6, where conspiracies 
 receive most elaborate and exhaustive discussion. 
 
 6 The Prince, c. 19. Machiavelli regards the French parlement as 
 an institution devised by the king to relieve the crown of the hostility 
 aroused by curbing the power of the nobles.
 
 THE PRESERVATION OF REPUBLICS 317 
 
 states, must pose as the patron of distinguished 
 ability in the fine arts, and, finally, must liberally 
 encourage the useful arts of commerce and agricul- 
 ture, and refrain from interfering with them by bur- 
 densome taxation. 
 
 These dictates of enlightened despotism are thor- 
 oughly blended, in their presentation, with the max- 
 ims of non-moral conduct which have already been 
 described. 1 The combination is a pretty good picture 
 of the actual working of monarchic government in 
 Machiavelli's own time. His corresponding discus- 
 sion of the principles of republican government also 
 involves a faithful reflection of actual conditions. 
 But on this subject there is distinguishable at times 
 an undertone of personal feeling which is totally 
 lacking in The Prince, and which gives evidence of 
 the fact that at heart Machiavelli had a preference 
 for popular government. 
 
 His idea of a commonwealth, or republic (Eepub- 
 blica), is wholly that of antiquity, namely, a city- 
 state. The thought that popular government could 
 be organized for a whole "province" never appears. 
 So also, as in ancient thought, the commonwealth 
 implies the rule of the mass of the people (il popolo) 
 as distinguished from the aristocracy (i grandi ; la 
 nobilta). " Liberty " (liberta] is used, without dis- 
 crimination, to designate either independence with 
 respect to any external power, or a condition in which 
 government is in the hands of the people rather than 
 of the nobles or an individual. 2 The ancient distinc-* 
 
 1 Supra, p. 298 et seq. 2 Cf. Discourses, II, 2.
 
 318 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 tion between "pure" and "corrupt" republics is 
 maintained by Machiavelli, "corruption" meaning 
 the absence of a sense of equality among the citi- 
 zens. " Corruption " is recognized as an economic 
 rather than a political phenomenon, caused by the 
 unequal accumulation of wealth, and as such the 
 philosopher does not undertake to discuss the ways 
 and means of preventing it, but merely assumes its 
 existence. 1 His problem is to indicate what is essen- 
 tial for the maintenance of popular government in 
 either pure or corrupt communities. The example 
 of Rome is so influential in determining his philoso- 
 phy on these points that his views amount to a 
 panegyric on the Roman Republic as idealized by 
 the poets and historians of the post-republican age. 
 It is worth while to consider, however, a few par- 
 ticular judgments in which Machiavelli, while basing 
 himself primarily on the recitation and eulogy of 
 Roman practice, gives to his reflections the char- 
 acter of universal political science. 
 
 Here belongs his analysis of the interrelationship 
 of constitution, custom and law in their bearing upon 
 the permanence of republican government. The dis- 
 tinction between the fundamental law of the state 
 (gli ordini) and ordinary legislation (le leggi) is con- 
 sistently maintained by Machiavelli. 2 Legislation 
 
 1 He does, however, repeatedly declare that the citizens should be 
 kept poor, even if the state become rich. 
 
 2 In the Discourses, I, 18, he uses, in addition to the collective 
 term, gli ordini, the phrase I' ordine del governo, o vero dello stato, indi- 
 cating the sense of a distinction between state and government, such 
 as was a little later put into systematic form by Bodin.
 
 CONSTITUTION AND CUSTOM 319 
 
 and custom, lie sees, are closely interdependent; a 
 change in custom will easily be followed by corre- 
 sponding changes in the laws. But the constitution 
 does not thus share these changes. Remaining intact, 
 it becomes by degrees out of harmony with custom and 
 legislation, and therefore a source of ruin to the state. 
 An adaptation of constitution as well as law to the 
 varying conditions in a state is indispensable to the 
 preservation of republican government. If the con- 
 stitution is not flexible, the necessary adjustment will 
 be effected, after disastrous delay, suddenly and by 
 iolence rather than gradually and by peaceful pro- 
 cedure, and the result is likely to be the entire 
 destruction of the old order, as happened in Rome. 
 But modification of the fundamental law in republics 
 should always be made with the least possible devia- 
 tion from ancient forms, however great the change 
 in substance ; for people are in general content with 
 appearances and do not penetrate to the realities of 
 / things. 1 
 
 No less noteworthy than this appreciation of con- 
 stitutional reform as a means of escaping revolution 
 is Machiavelli's appreciation of the necessity of pro- 
 vision in a republic for the exercise of absolute power 
 by some officer of the government in great emergen- 
 ) cies. The dictatorship he regards as one of the most 
 \ essential features of the republican constitution of 
 I Rome, and one of those which contributed most to 
 the greatness of the state. 2 Popular governments 
 
 1 L'universale degli uomini si pasce cosi di quel che pare come di 
 quello che e. Discorsi, I, 25. 2 Discourses, I, 34.
 
 320 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 particularly need provision for prompt and efficient 
 action in critical times, from the fact that the normal 
 action of the administration, requiring as it does the 
 cooperation of many wills, is feeble and slow. If the 
 constitution does not provide for the necessary con- 
 centration of authority, the constitution will be 
 broken when the stress comes and the requisite 
 action will be taken regardless of the fundamental 
 law. Thus, however, a precedent will be created in 
 a good cause which may later be followed in a bad. 
 The Roman dictatorship, therefore, carefully limited as 
 it was by well-defined methods of creation and termi- 
 nation, furnishes a model for all free governments. 1 
 
 This judgment upon the necessity of dictatorial 
 power in republics was as sound as it was unusual. 
 On another prominent feature of Roman history, 
 Machiavelli likewise takes issue with the common 
 opinion. The party controversies between plebs and 
 nobles he regards not as evidence of unsoundness and 
 sources of disaster in the state, but as an indispen- 
 sable condition of Roman greatness. 2 His reasoning 
 approaches that of the modern school which sees in 
 friction and strife the conditions of continuous exist- 
 ence. One must not be deceived, he in substance says, 
 by the noise and tumult of party contention. These 
 
 1 The idea that it was the existence of the dictatorship that ena- 
 bled Caesar to enslave Rome, and that hence such an institution is 
 dangerous, is dismissed with the characteristic observation that it was 
 the power and not the official title of Csesar that overthrew the repub- 
 lic, and that if the name and office of dictator had not been at hand, 
 the power which he employed would merely have taken some other 
 name. Discourses, I, 34. 2 Ibid. I, 34.
 
 PARTY STRIFE AND FOREIGN WAR 321 
 
 are not of the essence of the matter. Under cover of 
 the shouting and the stress of the controversy are pro- 
 duced results which, while not consciously in the pur- 
 pose of the contestants, are of vital importance to 
 the state. Party struggles furnish a necessary vent 
 to the emotions and ambitions of the common peo- 
 ple, test the powers and demonstrate the ability of 
 the leading citizens, and call into existence the insti- 
 tutions and laws which prove the mainstay of the 
 government in later days. All these results are dis- 
 coverable in the history of Rome, and all are essen- 
 tial to an expanding republic. 1 Channels through 
 which the feelings (umori) of the common people 
 may find adequate and harmless expression are, in 
 Machiavelli's opinion, of the greatest importance, 
 and he suggests various other means to this end, par- 
 ticularly approving ample facilities for the making 
 and judicial investigation of charges against public 
 characters. 2 Men of real distinction and marked 
 ability are always looked upon with suspicion by the 
 masses. In times of peace and quiet they are wholly 
 neglected in republics, and the leadership falls into 
 the hands of the rich and well connected. 3 An es- 
 cape from the perils of such a tendency was found 
 by Rome, he thinks, in the policy of incessant war, 
 through which the best of her citizens were kept 
 always to the front. 
 
 For the republic which would correspond most 
 
 1 Sparta and Venice, as types of the non-expanding republic, did 
 not exhibit the phenomena of party strife. Discourses, I, 6. 
 
 2 Ibid. I, 7. s Ibid. Ill, 16.
 
 322 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 closely to Machiavelli's ideal, therefore, vehement 
 internal party strife and an ever aggressive foreign 
 policy, would be normal and indispensable conditions 
 of existence. This again throws a strong light on the 
 divergence, which the many resemblances serve to em- 
 phasize, between the Machiavellian and the Aristotelian 
 politics. 
 
 8. Summary and Conclusion 
 
 The influence of Machiavelli upon the history of 
 political theories can hardly be exaggerated. Not 
 only the method and substance of his philosophy but 
 also the marvellous literary art with which it was 
 expressed served to win for it universal attention. 
 Criticism of his doctrine developed into vehement 
 controversy, in which a grotesquely distorted concep- 
 tion of his system, labelled Machia veil ism by its 
 adversaries, brought much open obloquy upon the 
 philosopher, and at the same time stimulated, though 
 less conspicuously, much respect for and adoption of 
 his method and his real principles. By far the fore- 
 most among the ideas which the Florentine made 
 prominent in political science was that of a distinc- 
 tion between the standards of public and of private 
 morality. On this point has turned most of the dis- 
 cussion of which Machiavellism has been the centre. 
 The whole trend of theory under the influences which 
 characterized the time of the Reformation was against 
 the view which Machiavelli propounded ; but the prac- 
 tice of the age continued to furnish, like all preceding 
 ages, incontestable evidence that the " reason of state "
 
 INFLUENCE OF MACHIAVELLI 323 
 
 took precedence, in political life, of the moral code 
 which was recognized as valid Between man and man. 
 In Frederick the Great of Prussia Machiavellian doc- 
 trine received a particularly noteworthy confirmation. 
 For Frederick, as a mere irresponsible philosopher, 
 roundly berated the Italian for the immoral teachings 
 of The Prince ; but in later life, as the ambitious head 
 of a struggling and sorely beset state, he exemplified 
 in his policy some of the very maxims which he had 
 most solemnly denounced. 
 
 Next in importance to his view of the relation 
 between politics and morality, in its influence on 
 later political philosophy, was Machiavelli's method 
 his reunion of theory and practice. Though the 
 mediaeval tendency to philosophize " in the air " 
 to speculate on the basis of conditions which had 
 lost, if they ever had possessed, the semblance of 
 reality by no means entirely disappeared after 
 Machiavelli's time; though it continued fora century 
 or more to characterize a large body of political lit- 
 erature : yet his relentless empiricism gave an impulse 
 to the method of observation and experience which 
 was not exhausted till the last vestiges of medievalism 
 in political theory had vanished. 
 
 Finally, a summary of the chief influences which 
 radiated from Machiavelli into the broad field of 
 political science must include reference to his doctrine 
 of aggrandizement. In the assumption that extension 
 of power was the test of excellence in government, 
 he established a philosophic basis for accepting as 
 rational and as a fit subject for reflection, that con-
 
 324 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
 solidation of states which was so prominent a fact of 
 the times. In suggesting for he did not strongly 
 press the idea that the logical limit of this con- 
 solidation in any case was the limit of ethnic homo- 
 geneity, he projected an influence which was felt 
 in the nineteenth century. But the doctrine of 
 nationality, which has thus far played so prominent 
 a part in the expansion of states, has in reality no 
 logical relation to Machiavelli's fundamental principle. 
 Already a multitude of other bases for conquest, more 
 adequate to later necessities, are familiar to current 
 thought. To justify the extension of political power 
 the Aryan is devised, with a claim to dominate the 
 Semite or the Turanian, the "political peoples" are 
 assigned the desired preeminence over the " non- 
 political," the civilized over the uncivilized. Nation- 
 ality has proved merely a temporary and transitional 
 phase of the trend toward expansion on Machiavellian 
 lines, which has in fact no logical limit save that of 
 power. 
 
 Machiavelli is sometimes called the first modern 
 political philosopher. It is quite as accurate to say 
 that he ends the mediaeval era as that he begins 
 the modern. Great as was his influence in stimu- 
 lating reflection, it was not by his radical rejection 
 of all the characteristics of mediaeval political theory 
 that the modern era was introduced. Western Europe 
 could not be rationalized and paganized off-hand. 
 Before the death of Machiavelli, Luther gave the 
 signal for the movement which was to keep the
 
 MACHIAVELLI 325 
 
 intellectual energy of Europe fully occupied for a 
 hundred and fifty years in the fields of theology and 
 morals. Machiavellian doctrine was influential dur- 
 ing this time, though Machiavelli's name was exe- 
 crated by all parties. Only after the Keformation 
 had been succeeded by the Revolution was frank 
 and open recognition given to Machiavelli's philo- 
 sophical depth and practical political sagacity. 
 
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 BLAKEY, Vol. I, pp. 266-273. BLUNTSCHLI, Geschichte der 
 neuern StaatswissenscJiaft, pp. 13-26. DETMOLD, The His- 
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 Machiavellis, in Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 
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 Tractatus de Ortu et Autoritate Imperil Romani, in 
 
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 327
 
 328 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
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 Historical, Political and Diplomatic Writings, translated 
 
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 334 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
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 BIBLIOGKAPHY 335 
 
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 338 POLITICAL THEORIES 
 
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 INDEX 
 
 Abel : symbol of priesthood, 171. 
 
 Achaean League, 100 ; Polybius a 
 hostage of, 114. 
 
 JEgidius Romanus (Colonna) : his 
 treatise on politics, 208 ; holds the 
 kingdom to be higher than the 
 city-state, 209 ; prefers monarchy, 
 210 ; his classification of law and 
 rights, 210 ; on universal property 
 rights of Pope, 217. 
 
 JEneas Sylvius : his work on the 
 Roman Empire, 283. 
 
 JEtolian League, 100. 
 
 Agobard, Bishop of Lyons, 162. 
 
 Ailly, Peter of, 266. 
 
 Alexander VI (Pope), policy of, 
 288. 
 
 Alexander the Great: effect of his 
 conquests on Greek philosophy 
 and politics, 99 ; conquests of, 
 promoted cosmopolitism, 104-105. 
 
 Ambrose, Bishop of Milan : relations 
 with the emperors, 133; asserts 
 theory of sacerdotal authority 
 over emperors, 155 ; denies impe- 
 rial right over churches, 156 ; on 
 greater dignity of bishops as com- 
 pared with princes, 170 ; acts of, 
 cited in mediaeval argument, 176. 
 
 Aquinas : see Thomas. 
 
 Aragon : a fief of the Pope, 149 ; 
 power of nobles in, 256. 
 
 Areopagus : constitution and func- 
 tions of, 12 ; as reformed by Solon, 
 13 ; under democratic constitu- 
 tion, 16 ; suggestions of, in Plato's 
 Laws, 45. 
 
 Aristocracy : in early Greek states, 
 2, 3 ; relative excellence of, in 
 
 Plato's Statesman, 36; a pure 
 form of government in Aristotle, 
 72 ; based on virtue, 75 ; ideally 
 the best form, 78 ; causes and 
 preventives of revolution in, 88 ; 
 in Polybius's theory, 115; Cicero's 
 conception of, 120 ; Wy cliff e's view 
 of, 262 ; Machiavelli on, 308-309. 
 
 Aristotle : compared with Plato, 49 ; 
 study of existing constitutions, 50 ; 
 his method and his ideal, 51 ; dis- 
 tinguishes politics from ethics, 51 ; 
 interested in practical rather than 
 ideal politics, 53 ; doctrines as to 
 justice, rights and equity, 54 ; 
 general Greek postulates of his 
 theory, 93 ; on the conciliation of 
 liberty and authority, 94 ; on the 
 supremacy of public opinion and 
 law, 95 ; on the sovereignty of the 
 people, 95 ; on the three neces- 
 sary organs of government, 96 ; 
 on the political influence of eco- 
 nomic conditions, 96 ; decline of 
 his school after Alexander, 101 ; 
 compared with Polybius, 118 ; 
 introduction of his works into 
 Western Europe, 190 ; influence 
 in scholasticism, 191 ; on St. 
 Thomas's theory, 192, 196, 199, 
 202, 203, 205; on ^Egidius Ro- 
 manus, 208; on fourteenth-cen- 
 tury adversaries of Papacy, 221 ; 
 on Dante, 230; on Marsiglio of 
 Padua, 239 ; on Ockam, 246 ; re- 
 lation of, to Machiavelli, 291, 294 
 et seq., 298, 305, 306, 307, 309, 316. 
 See also Politics. 
 
 Athens: hegemony of, in Persian 
 
 347
 
 348 
 
 INDEX 
 
 wars, 5 ; influence of its constitu- 
 tion on Greek political theory, 
 6 ; classes of people in, 11 ; early 
 aristocratic government of, 12 ; 
 reforms by Solon in, 12 ; tyranny 
 of Pisistratus in, 13 ; democratic 
 policy of Kleisthenes and Pericles, 
 14 ; constitutional system in fifth 
 century B.C., 14 ; carried liberty to 
 ruinous excess (Plato), 40; influ- 
 ence of, on Plato's Laws, 45 ; 
 Aristotle's work on the constitu- 
 tion of, 50; slightly esteemed by 
 Machiavelli, 296. 
 
 Augustine, Bishop of Hippo : influ- 
 ence of, 134; his Civitas Dei, 
 156; exaltation of future life as 
 compared with earthly, 157 ; justi- 
 fication of slavery, 157 ; on justice 
 in the state, 158 ; influence of, on 
 mediaeval reasoning, 163 ; influ- 
 ence of, on scholasticism, 191 ; on 
 St. Thomas's theory of law, 192 ; 
 on his theory of slavery, 199. 
 
 Augustinus Triumphus: his theory 
 of papal power, 218. 
 
 Augustus Caesar : his modification 
 of the Roman constitution, 112. 
 
 Avignon, seat of Papacy removed 
 to, 150. 
 
 Basel, Council of, 269; more radi- 
 cal than Constance, 270 ; follows 
 theory of Cusanus, 271 ; is de- 
 feated by Pope, 276. 
 
 Bernard, St. (of Clairvaux) : writ- 
 ings of, 162 ; general character of, 
 
 181 ; his work De Consider atione, 
 
 182 ; criticism of papal adminis- 
 tration, 183; doctrine of "the 
 two swords," 184. 
 
 Boniface VIII : conflict with Philip 
 
 the Fair, 150, 213, 215, 224. 
 Brutus, a Stoic, 106. 
 
 Caesar Borgia, judgment of Machia- 
 velli on, 301, 311. 
 
 Canon Law : content and impor- 
 tance of, in fourteenth century, 
 222 ; influence on Dante, 230 ; 
 ignored by Machiavelli, 291. 
 
 Castile, power of nobles in, 266. 
 
 Cato the Censor : and the Greek 
 philosophers, 114. 
 
 Cato the Younger, a Stoic, 106. 
 
 Censor : in the Roman constitution, 
 108, 112. 
 
 Charlemagne : crowned Emperor, 
 139, 142 ; coronation of, as con- 
 strued by mediaeval debaters, 
 175. 
 
 Charles VIII of France, 286, 289. 
 
 Charles Martel, 139, 141. 
 
 Check and balance : principle set 
 forth by Polybius, 117 ; actual 
 working at Rome, 119. 
 
 Chrematistics : relation to econom- 
 ics in Aristotle, 60. 
 
 Christian Church : early organiza- 
 tion of, 132 ; increase of its power 
 in declining Western Empire, 133 ; 
 influence of Teutons on, 134 ; con- 
 dition of, in Eastern Empire, 135 ; 
 divided into Greek and Roman, 
 138. 
 
 Cicero : Stoic influences in, 106 ; 
 purpose of his De Republica and 
 De Legibus, 119 ; on origin and 
 nature of state, 120 ; on forms of 
 government, 120 ; compared with 
 Polybius, 121 ; his doctrine of 
 natural law and rights, 123 ; this 
 doctrine criticised, 124 ; influence 
 of, on Augustine, 167, 158 ; influ- 
 ence on St. Thomas's theory of 
 law, 192. 
 
 Citizens : constitute the state, in 
 Plato, 46 ; not to engage in com- 
 merce or trades, 46 ; limited to 
 5040 in the Laws, 46 ; Aristotle 
 on qualifications of, 64 ; working 
 classes not qualified as, in Aris- 
 totle, 82 ; under Republican con- 
 stitution of Rome, 107, 111 ; after
 
 INDEX 
 
 349 
 
 Caracalla, 113. See also Cosmo- 
 politism. 
 
 City-state : the ideal of Plato's phi- 
 losophy, 47 ; assumed as typical 
 organization by Plato and Aris- 
 totle, 93 ; supplanted as type by 
 military empire, 99 ; held less per- 
 fect than the province and king- 
 dom, 197, 209 ; in Italy, 287 ; in 
 Machiavelli's philosophy, 317. 
 
 Civil Law : content and importance 
 of, in fourteenth century, 222 ; 
 influence on Dante, 230 ; ignored 
 by Machiavelli, 291 . See also Jus- 
 tinian. 
 
 Clement V, 218. 
 
 Clovis : founds Prankish monarchy, 
 141. 
 
 Comitia: functions of, in Eoman 
 constitution, 107, 109, 112; demo- 
 cratic element in constitution 
 (Polybius), 116. 
 
 Commonwealth in Cicero and Mach- 
 iavelli : see Democracy. 
 
 Communism : in Plato's Republic, 
 30 ; Aristotle's criticism of Plato's 
 ideas, 63. 
 
 Consent of the governed, as basis of 
 government: Plato on, 40 ; Marsig- 
 lio on, 251 ; Cusanus on, 271, 273. 
 
 Constance, Council of, 258 ; hostility 
 to Wycliffe and Huss, 265 ; adopts 
 Gerson's theories, 270. 
 
 Constantine : reforms Roman admin- 
 istration, 113 ; adopts Christianity, 
 132. See also Donation. 
 
 Constitution: defined by Aristotle, 
 65 ; pure and corrupt forms of, 
 according to Aristotle, 71 ; should 
 embody principle of check and 
 balance (Polybius), 116, (Cicero), 
 121 ; reform of, a serious task 
 (Machiavelli), 312; relation of, 
 to custom and law (Machiavelli), 
 318. 
 
 Consuls : functions of, in Roman 
 constitution, 108, 109, 112 ; mo- 
 
 narchic element in constitution 
 (Polybius), 116. 
 
 Corporation : Cusanus's conception 
 of, 274 ; legal theory of, influential 
 in conciliar era, 277 ; furnished 
 model for organization and action 
 of general council, 278 ; conception 
 of, worked against monarchy, 279. 
 
 Cosmopolitism : brought into promi- 
 nence by Stoics, 104 ; growth and 
 influence of, 106. 
 
 Council : see General Council. 
 
 Cusanus : see Nicholas of Cues. 
 
 Dante Alighieri : his political point 
 of view, 230 ; argument for uni- 
 versal monarchy, 231 ; interpre- 
 tation of Roman history, 232 ; on 
 the Holy Roman Empire, 233 ; 
 refutation of pro-papal arguments, 
 234. 
 
 Decretalists, Dante on, 233. 
 
 Defensor Pacts : see Marsiglio. 
 
 Demagogue : produces revolution in 
 democracies, 87. 
 
 Democracy : disliked by Plato, 32 ; 
 its place in the succession of gov- 
 ernmental forms, 33 ; the best and 
 the worst government, 36 ; based 
 on the principle of liberty, 39 ; 
 and equality, 40 ; a corrupt form 
 of government in Aristotle, 72 ; 
 is really the rule of the poor over 
 the rich, 74 ; based on liberty and 
 equality, 75 ; form and functions 
 of governmental organs in, 76 ; 
 where the poor are much more 
 numerous than the rich, the best 
 state, 79 ; causes of revolution in, 
 
 87 ; preventives of revolution in, 
 
 88 ; in Polybius's theory, 115 ; 
 Cicero's conception of, 120 ; Mach- 
 iavelli's ideas of government in, 
 307, 317 et seq. 
 
 Deposition of monarch: right of, 
 asserted after Gregory VII, 174 ; 
 texts and precedents in support
 
 850 
 
 INDEX 
 
 of right, 175 ; theory of Thomas 
 Aquinas on, 207 ; theory of Augus- 
 tinus Triumphus on, 218. 
 
 Dictatorship : in Roman constitu- 
 tion, 108 ; Machiavelli on, 319. 
 
 Diocletian, 113. 
 
 Discourses on Livy, Machiavelli's : 
 chiefly a study of the Romans, 
 292 ; a study of the strong repub- 
 lic, 294, 307 ; unmoral doctrines 
 of, 298-299 ; unreligious doctrines 
 of, 300 ; view of human nature 
 in, 305 ; on the methods of extend- 
 ing dominion, 313 ; on the main- 
 tenance of republican government, 
 317. 
 
 Divine right of kings : theory of, in 
 Middle Ages, 177 ; claimed for 
 French monarchs, 225. 
 
 Donation of Constantine, 175 ; Peter 
 Dubois on, 228 ; Dante on, 234 ; 
 discredited by Cusanus and Valla, 
 259 ; ignored by Machiavelli, 291- 
 
 Dubois, Peter : his doctrine as to 
 French monarchy and Papacy, 
 228. 
 
 Duel, Dante's theory of, 232. 
 
 Economic conditions : political influ- 
 ence of, recognized by Aristotle, 
 74, 86, 96; divided the Roman 
 people and ruined the Republic, 
 119 ; Machiavelli on influence of, 
 307. 
 
 Economics : distinguished by Aris- 
 totle from chrematistics, 60. 
 
 Education : importance and system 
 of, in Plato's Republic, 31 ; in 
 Plato's Laws, 38. 43 ; Aristotle's 
 system of, 83, 84 ; a preventive 
 of revolution, 90 ; indispensable 
 function of state in Plato and 
 Aristotle, 93. 
 
 Ekklesia : under Solonian constitu- 
 tion at Athens, 13 ; under the 
 democratic constitution, 14. 
 
 Empire, Holy Roman : origin and 
 
 character of, 143 ; relations of 
 Germany and Italy under, 144 ; 
 disintegration of, in thirteenth 
 century, 148 ; rulers of, deter- 
 mined by popes, 149 ; jurists' 
 theory as to, 180 ; Thomist the- 
 ory of, 201 ; relative insignifi- 
 cance of, in fourteenth century, 
 224; Dante's plea for rights of, 
 233 ; slighted by Marsiglio, 241. 
 
 England : a fief of the Pope, 149 ; 
 nobles crushed in, 256. 
 
 Epicureans : prominence after Alex- 
 ander, 102 ; emphasized ethics 
 and neglected politics, 102 ; doc- 
 trines of, as to society, law and 
 justice, 103. 
 
 Equality : the foundation of democ- 
 racy, 40 ; absolute and proportion- 
 ate, 40 ; method of filling offices 
 determined by, 41 ; various ideas 
 of, the general cause of revolu- 
 tion, 86 ; of men under natural 
 law, 128, 273. 
 
 Equity : defined by Aristotle, 54 ; 
 John of Salisbury's idea of, 186. 
 
 Ethics : Aristotle's treatment of its 
 relation to politics, 51 et seq. ,* 
 separated from politics by Machi- 
 avelli, 298. 
 
 Excommunication : early theory and 
 practice of, 144, 145 ; held analo- 
 gous with death penalty in Mosaic 
 law, 174 ; Peter Dubois on papal 
 employment of, 229 ; subject to 
 control of secular sovereign (Mar- 
 siglio), 243 ; Wycliffe's theory of, 
 263. 
 
 Executive : distinguished from legis- 
 lator by Marsiglio, 240 ; by Cu- 
 sanus, 274. 
 
 Expansion : Machiavelli's idea of, 
 and its influence, 323. 
 
 Federal government : in Greece after 
 
 Alexander, 100. 
 Ferdinand of Spain, 286, 287.
 
 INDEX 
 
 351 
 
 Feudal aristocracy, decline of, in 
 fifteenth century, 256. 
 
 Florence : centre of Renaissance, 
 290; workings of government in, 
 301. 
 
 Forms of Government: in Plato's 
 Republic, 33 ; in Plato's States- 
 man, 36 ; Aristotle's classification 
 of, 72 ; principles underlying, 
 76 ; Aristotle's test of excel- 
 lence in, 79 ; in Polybius, 115 ; in 
 Cicero, 120 ; Machiavelli on, 306 
 et seq. 
 
 France : strength of royal power in, 
 during thirteenth century, 150 ; 
 nobles crushed in, 256 ; has mixed 
 form of government (Gerson), 
 269. 
 
 Franciscans : their theory of evan- 
 gelical poverty, 236. 
 
 Frankish monarchy : saved popes 
 from Lombards, 139; early his- 
 tory of, 141 ; mediaeval theory as 
 to origin of, 225. 
 
 Frederick Barbarossa, encourage- 
 ment of lawyers by, 179. 
 
 Frederick the Great : on Machia- 
 velli, 323. 
 
 French monarchy : its influence on 
 political theory in fourteenth cen- 
 tury, 223 ; theory of its indepen- 
 dence of pope and emperor, 225 ; 
 Dubois on hegemony of, 229; its 
 control over the popes at Avignon, 
 236. 
 
 Friendship : considered by Plato an 
 important principle in politics, 
 40. 
 
 Gelasius (Pope) : dictum as to the 
 two powers, 166, 167, 168. 
 
 General Council : French lawyers' 
 theory of, 227 ; fourteenth-cen- 
 tury imperialists' theory of, 238 ; 
 Marsiglio's theory as to organiza- 
 tion and functions of, 241 ; Mar- 
 siglio on representation in, 261 ; 
 
 Ockam's scheme of representation 
 in, 252 ; introduced into constitu- 
 tion of the church, 258 ; theory 
 of the corporation applied t(\ 
 277-278. 
 
 Germany : relations with Italy under 
 Holy Roman Empire, 144 ; power 
 of nobles in, 266. 
 
 Gerson: his conciliar theory, 266; 
 theory of necessity as basis of 
 council, 266 ; on plenary power, 
 267 ; his preference for mixed 
 form of government, 269 ; moder- 
 ate views of, 270. 
 
 Government : origin of, according to 
 Polybius, 115 ; distinguished from 
 state by Marsiglio, 250. See also 
 Forms. 
 
 Gratian : the Decretum of, 162 ; on 
 the two powers, 166 ; dictum of, 
 as to subordination of princes to 
 church, 180. 
 
 Greece : early political institutions 
 of, 2 et seq. ; conflict of oligarchy 
 and democracy in, 4 ; influences 
 making for national unity in, 6 ; 
 effect of Persian and Peloponne- 
 sian wars in, 19 ; Aristotle on 
 constitutional transformation in, 
 85 ; characteristic political life of, 
 extinguished by Alexander, 99 ; 
 persistence of forms of city-state 
 in, 100. 
 
 Greeks : assumed by Plato and Aris- 
 totle to be superior to other races, 
 93. 
 
 Gregory I (the Great) : influence of, 
 in development of Papacy, 138 ; 
 character of, 158 ; view of, as to 
 chief end of imperial authority, 
 159 ; influence of, on political lit- 
 erature, 160 ; on mediaeval rea- 
 soning, 163. 
 
 Gregory VII : reforming decrees of, 
 146 ; conflict with Henry IV, 
 147 ; writings of, 162 ; on the 
 dogma of the two powers, 166 ;
 
 352 
 
 INDEX 
 
 on greater dignity of priests as 
 compared with princes, 170 ; on 
 jurisdiction of priests over princes, 
 
 173. 
 
 \ 
 
 Hellas : see Greece. 
 
 Hellenistic: moral and intellectual 
 type, 99 ; literature lacking in 
 original political thought, 101 j 
 spirit transformed Koman govern- 
 ment in East, 131. 
 
 Helots : position of, in Spartan 
 state, 7. 
 
 Henry IV : conflict with Gregory 
 VII, 147 ; writings of, 162. 
 
 Henry VII, Emperor, 218. 
 
 Henry VII, of England, 256, 286. 
 
 Hesiod: political point of view of, 
 19. 
 
 Hildebrand : see Gregory VII. 
 
 Hincmar, Archbishop of Rheims, 
 162 ; on the dogma of the two 
 powers, 166 ; on the jurisdiction 
 of priests over princes, 172. 
 
 Hobbes, resemblance of Machia- 
 velli to, 303. 
 
 Homer : depicts patriarchal regime, 
 18. 
 
 Horace: an Epicurean in view of 
 life, 104. 
 
 Household : distinguished from state 
 by Aristotle, 57 et seq. 
 
 Hundred Years' War, 255. 
 
 Huss : promotes ideas of Marsiglio 
 and Wycliffe, 264-265 ; con- 
 demned by Council of Constance, 
 265. 
 
 Imperialism : sought in vain by 
 Athens and Sparta, 6 ; no proper 
 aim for individual or state, accord- 
 ing to Plato, 46 ; according to 
 Aristotle, 81 ; the necessary aim 
 of a state according to Machiavelli, 
 295, 315, 323. 
 
 Imperium Continuum, 180 ; ignored 
 by Machiavelli, 291. 
 
 Innocent III : extensive influence 
 of, 149 ; writings of, 163 ; on the 
 two powers, 167 ; on the greater 
 dignity of priests as compared 
 with princes, 171 ; on jurisdiction 
 of priests over princes, 173 ; on 
 the universal church, 180. 
 
 Investitures : conflict over, 146. 
 
 Israelitish state : theocratic char- 
 acter of, 164 ; considered a mired 
 government by Gerson, 270. 
 
 Italy : relations with Germany 
 under Holy Roman Empire, 144 ; 
 political condition of, in Machia- 
 velli's time, 287, 289. 
 
 lus Civile : character of, 126 ; 
 blended with ius gentium, 127. 
 
 lus Gentium : character of, 126 ; 
 blended with ius civile, 127 ; 
 identified with ius naturale, 128 ; 
 limits human legislation (Ockam), 
 248. 
 
 Jeremiah, God's commission to, 175. 
 
 Jerome, influence of, 134. 
 
 Jesus : unpolitical character of his 
 teaching, 152, 177 ; held to have 
 distinguished spiritual from secu- 
 lar power, 167 ; power to bind 
 and loose conferred by, 173 ; 
 pastoral power given to Peter by, 
 173. 
 
 John XXII : conflict of, with Lewis 
 of Bavaria, 213, 218, 235 ; contro- 
 versy with Franciscans, 236. 
 
 John of Jandun : attacks John 
 XXII, 237 ; collaborates on Defen- 
 sor Pacts, 238. 
 
 John of Paris : his work in behalf 
 of Philip the Fair, 226. 
 
 John of Salisbury : general charac- 
 ter of, 181 ; on " the two swords," 
 185 ; his Polycraticus, 185 ; po- 
 litical ideas of, 186 ; on tyrants 
 and tyrannicide, 187. 
 
 Julius Caesar : his modification of 
 the Roman constitution, 111.
 
 INDEX 
 
 353 
 
 Jurists: work of, in Roman Em- 
 pire, 127 ; work of, in fourteenth 
 century, 222. 
 
 Justice : immutable, according to 
 Plato, 27 ; real subject of Plato's 
 Republic, 28 ; definition and rela- 
 tion to law in Aristotle, 54 ; Epi- 
 curean view of, 103 ; Stoic view 
 of, 104 ; distinguishes pure from 
 corrupt forms of government 
 (Polybius), 115 ; Cicero's concep- 
 tion of, 122 ; Augustine on, 158 ; 
 Thomas Aquinas on, 196 ; Dante 
 on, 231. 
 
 Justinian's Digest : study of, at 
 Bologna, 179 ; basis of the Civil 
 Law, 222. See also Civil Law. 
 
 Kingdom : a self-sufficing political 
 organization in Thomas Aquinas, 
 198 ; theory of, in John of Paris, 
 226 ; Ockam's definition of, 246. 
 
 Kleisthenes : legislation of, at 
 Athens, 14 ; democratic reforms 
 disliked by Plato, 45. 
 
 Law : written and unwritten, distin- 
 guished by Socrates, 23 ; com- 
 pared by Plato with discretion of 
 all-wise philosopher, 35 ; as basis 
 of classification of governments 
 by Plato, 36 ; indispensable in 
 actual states, 37 ; written, cannot 
 do away with unwritten, 42 ; held 
 by Aristotle to be better than man 
 as sovereign, 71 ; supreme over all 
 personality in Plato and Aristotle, 
 93 ; Cicero on divine origin of, 
 123 ; held to be source of rights 
 (IMS), 123 ; will of prince has 
 force of (Roman jurists), 129; 
 denned and classified by Thomas 
 Aquinas, 192 ; rational and voli- 
 tional elements in, 193 ; classified 
 by ./Egidius Romanus, 210 ; the 
 basis of government (Marsiglio), 
 239 ; Cusanus's theory of consent 
 as basis of, 273. 
 
 Laws (The) of Plato: his only 
 strictly political work, 27 ; em- 
 bodies a practicable code for an 
 actual state, 37 ; communism of 
 the Republic abandoned, 38 ; 
 amount of private property lim- 
 ited, 39 ; people classified accord- 
 ing to wealth, 39 ; governmental 
 organization a mean between 
 monarchy and democracy, 39; 
 combines liberty and authority, 
 40 ; magistrates and assemblies, 
 41 ; the nocturnal council, 42 ; the 
 theory of the expose de motif, 42 ; 
 miscellaneous subjects treated, 
 43; Athenian institutions incor- 
 porated in, 45 ; suggests an Atti- 
 cized Sparta, 97. 
 
 Legislation : less useful than educa- 
 tion in maintaining social order, 
 31 ; no place in ideal state, 35 ; 
 distinguished by Marsiglio from 
 executive function, 240. 
 
 Leo I, Bishop of Rome: saved 
 Rome from Attila, 134. 
 
 Leo III : crowns Charlemagne, 
 139. 
 
 Levites: regarded as prefiguring 
 Christian priesthood, 164 ; judi- 
 cial authority of, as type of sacer- 
 dotal jurisdiction, 173. 
 
 Lewis of Bavaria : conflict of, with 
 John XXII, 213, 218, 235. 
 
 Liberty : the principle of democracy, 
 39 ; not incompatible with subjec- 
 tion to law (Aristotle) , 94 ; Dante 
 on, 231 ; Machiavelli's conception 
 of, 317. 
 
 Lombards, career of, in Italy, 137 
 et seg. 
 
 Lothaire, King of Lorraine, contro- 
 versy over divorce of, 145. 
 
 Louis XI of France, 256, 286. 
 
 Lycurgus : institutions ascribed to, 
 in Sparta, 8 ; influence of his 
 institutions on Plato's theory, 44 ; 
 praised by Polybius, 116.
 
 354 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Macedon : theory on which Greece 
 was absorbed by, 6 ; Aristotle's 
 connection with the court of, 
 61. 
 
 Machiavelli : suggested by Peter 
 Dubois, 228 ; European politics in 
 time of, 285 et seq. ; influence of 
 absolute monarchs on, 286 ; in- 
 fluence of national states on, 287 ; 
 official life of, in Florence, 289 ; 
 influence of Eenaissance on, 290 ; 
 his method, 291 ; his point of 
 view, 293 ; compared with Aris- 
 totle, 294 ; preference for Rome 
 over Greece, 296 ; separation of 
 politics from ethics, 298 ; attitude 
 toward religion, 300 ; admiration 
 for the strong man, 301 ; studies 
 real, not ideal, politics, 302 ; 
 takes Hobbesian view of human 
 nature, 303 ; materialistic individ- 
 ualism of, 306 ; on forms of gov- 
 ernment, 307 ; expansion the ideal 
 of, 309 ; on the extension of 
 princely power, 311 ; on exten- 
 sion of power by republics, 313 ; 
 on the importance of military 
 force, 314 ; on the art of tyranny, 
 316 ; on the principles of repub- 
 lican government, 317 ; on party 
 controversies, 320 ; influence of, 
 in political theory, 322. 
 
 Majority : Marsiglio on rule of, 250. 
 
 Manegold of Lutterbach, 162. 
 
 Marcus Aurelius, Stoic doctrines of, 
 106. 
 
 Marsiglio of Padua : attacks John 
 XXII, 237 ; on the corruption of 
 the times, 239 ; on popular sover- 
 eignty in state, 240, 250 ; on pop- 
 ular sovereignty in church, 241 ; 
 on distinction between ecclesias- 
 tical and secular functions, 242 ; 
 on the limits of priestly authority, 
 243 ; on the Petrine dogma, 244 ; 
 on sovereignty (plenary power), 
 249 ; on representative system, 
 
 251 ; influence of, on Wycliffe, 
 260 ; relation of, to Gerson, 266. 
 
 Maximilian of Germany, 286. 
 
 Michael of Cesena : attacks John 
 XXII, 237. 
 
 Mixed form of government : pre- 
 ferred by Cicero, 121 ; and by 
 Gerson, 269 ; approved by Machi- 
 avelli, 306. 
 
 Mohammedanism: consolidated 
 state and church in Eastern Em- 
 pire, 136 ; diverted Eastern em- 
 perors from care of Italy, 138 ; 
 spread of, stopped in West by 
 Charles Martel, 141. 
 
 Monarchy : based on principle of 
 authority, 39 ; considered prac- 
 tically an impossible government 
 by Aristotle, 73 ; Polybius's theory 
 of, 115 ; Thomas Aquinas on, 
 200 ; Dante's conception of, 230 ; 
 ruler of, a mere agent of people 
 (Marsiglio), 240 ; Ockam on,- 246 ; 
 Wycliffe's view of, 262 ; Machi- 
 avelli's judgment on, 308. See 
 also Universal. 
 
 National monarchy : tendency to 
 development of, 255; realized in 
 Europe, 286 ; Machiavelli's con- 
 ception of, 310. 
 
 Natural law : Stoic doctrine of, 
 104 ; Cicero's conception of, 123- 
 124 ; Thomas Aquinas on, 192, 
 194 ; ^Egidius Romanus on, 211; 
 relation of Pope to property 
 under, 219 ; limits all human legis- 
 lation (Ockam), 248 ; ignored by 
 Machiavelli, 297. 
 
 Natural right or rights (IMS natu- 
 rale} : Aristotle on, 64 ; Cicero 
 on, 124 ; all men equal in (Roman 
 jurists), 128 ; Thomas Aquinas on, 
 196 ; idea of, in fifteenth century, 
 281. 
 
 Nature : as used by Aristotle, 61 ; 
 by Cicero, 124.
 
 INDEX 
 
 355 
 
 New Testament, influence of, in 
 mediaeval reasoning, 163. 
 
 Nicholas I : conflict with Lothaire 
 of Lorraine, 145 ; writings of, 162. 
 
 Nicholas V, policy of, 288. 
 
 Nicholas of Cues : discredits Dona- 
 tion of Constantine, 259 ; his De 
 Concordantia Catholica, 271 ; his 
 theory of harmony, 271 ; general 
 council as source of power in both 
 state and church, 272 ; consent 
 the basis of all authority, 273 ; 
 on popular sovereignty, 274 ; 
 on representation in government, 
 275 ; becomes supporter of Pope, 
 276. 
 
 Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle's, 
 54. 
 
 Noah : symbol of priesthood, 171. 
 
 Ochlocracy: in Polybius's theory, 
 115. 
 
 Ockam, William of : 221 ; attacks 
 John XXII, 237; obscurity of 
 his method, 244 ; his political 
 works and general conceptions, 
 245-246 ; on the functions of state 
 and government, 247 ; on sover- 
 eignty (plenary power) , 249 ; on 
 representative system, 252 ; doc- 
 trines of, promoted by Wycliffe 
 and Huss, 265. 
 
 Offices : lot compared with election 
 as method of filling, 41 ; should be 
 held in turn by all citizens, 66 ; 
 appropriate methods of filling, in 
 democracy, oligarchy and polity 
 respectively, 76, 77 ; rotation in, 
 the principle in oligarchy, 88 ; 
 should not be means of pecuniary 
 gain, 89 ; nor be monopolized by 
 any one class, 89. 
 
 Old Testament : influence of, in me- 
 diaeval reasoning, 163 ; arguments 
 from, as to royalty, 165, 179. 
 
 Oligarchy : conflict with democracy 
 in Greece, 4 ; in Spartan system, 
 
 11 ; Plato's conception of, 33 ; rel- 
 ative excellence of, 36 ; a corrupt 
 form of government in Aristotle, 
 72 ; is really the rule of the rich 
 over the poor, 74 ; based on wealth, 
 76 ; form and functions of the gov- 
 ernmental organs in, 77 j where 
 the rich are greatly superior, the 
 best form, 79; causes of revolu- 
 tion in, 87 ; preventives of revo- 
 lution in, 88 et seq. ; unsalaried 
 offices the best rule in, 89 ; in Po- 
 lybius's theory, 115. 
 Otto the Great, 143. 
 
 Papacy : early recognized as pre- 
 eminent, 136 ; sustained Ortho- 
 doxy against Arianism, 137 ; led 
 in defence of Italy against Lom- 
 bards, 138; alliance of, with the 
 Franks, 139 ; relations of, with 
 people of Rome, 140 ; relations 
 of, with Charlemagne, 142 ; atti- 
 tude toward German emperors, 
 144 ; power of excommunication 
 assumed by, 145 ; claims of, as to 
 investitures, 146 ; prestige of, en- 
 hanced by Crusades, 148 ; exalted 
 position of, in thirteenth cen- 
 tury, 149 ; decline of prestige in 
 fourteenth century, 150 ; seat of, 
 transferred to Avignon, 150 ; 
 claims of, under Boniface VIII, 
 215 ; exaltation of, by Augustinus 
 Triumphus, 218 ; under French 
 influence at Avignon, 219 ; four- 
 teenth-century assaults on, 220 ; 
 lawyers' theory of subordination 
 to general council, 227 ; Peter 
 Dubois on, 228 ; Dante on, 234 ; 
 claims of, as against Lewis of 
 Bavaria, 235 ; Marsiglio's theory 
 of, 244 ; effect of the Great Schism 
 on, 258 ; triumphs over Council of 
 Basel, 259 ; Gerson's theory as to 
 relation of council to, 267 ; sub- 
 ject to law (Gerson) , 269 ; cor-
 
 356 
 
 INDEX 
 
 poration law determines relation 
 of, to general council, 278 ; secu- 
 lar policy of, in time of Machia- 
 velli, 288 ; Macbiavelli's opinion 
 of, 288. 
 
 Papinian, Stoic influence on, 106. 
 
 Parties, benefits from conflicts of 
 (Machiavelli), 320. 
 
 Passive obedience, theory of, in 
 Middle Ages, 177. 
 
 Patriarchal government : depicted 
 by Homer, 18. 
 
 Patricians, political rights of, in 
 early Borne, 107. 
 
 Paul the Apostle : his injunction of 
 passive obedience, 153, 178. 
 
 Paul, the Koman jurist, Stoic influ- 
 ence on, 106. 
 
 Peloponnesian War, effect of, on 
 Greece, 6. 
 
 Pericles : influence of, at Athens, 14 ; 
 his democratic reforms disliked 
 by Plato, 45. 
 
 Perioikoi, rights and position of, in 
 Spartan state, 7. 
 
 Persia : carried principle of author- 
 ity to ruinous excess, 40. 
 
 Peter the Apostle : his injunction of 
 passive obedience, 153, 178. 
 
 Petrine dogma : effect of, 169 ; at- 
 tacks of Marsiglio on, 244. 
 
 Philip the Fair : conflict with Boni- 
 face VIII, 150, 213, 215, 224; 
 anti-papal work of jurists under, 
 222. 
 
 Pippin the Short, 139, 142. 
 
 Pisa, Council of, 258. 
 
 Pisistratus, tyrant of Athens, 13. 
 
 Plato : method in treatment of polit- 
 ical topics, 24 ; relation to work 
 of Socrates, 24 ; theory of knowl- 
 edge and the general notion, 24 ; 
 theory of virtue, 25 ; psychology 
 of, 26 ; definition of justice, 26 ; 
 his political dialogues, 27 ; con- 
 nection of his theories with Greek 
 practical politics, 43 ; influence 
 
 of Spartan institutions dominant 
 in the Republic, 44 ; of Athens, 
 especially Solon, more noticeable in 
 theZ.aws,45; his philosophy deter- 
 mined by the city-state idea, 46 ; 
 compared with Aristotle, 49 ; ideas 
 on communism criticised by Aris- 
 totle, 62 ; general postulates of 
 his political theory, 93 ; decline of 
 his school after Alexander, 101; 
 compared with Polybius, 117 ; 
 method and form of philosophy 
 of, adopted by Cicero, 120 ; influ- 
 ence of, on Cicero's theory of 
 law, 122 ; influence of, on Augus- 
 tine, 157. See also Republic; 
 Statesman; Laws. 
 
 Plebeians : in early Roman state, 
 107 ; special governmental organs 
 of, 108. 
 
 Plenary power (plenitudo potesta- 
 tis*) : Augustinus Triumphus on, 
 218 ; defined by Marsiglio and 
 Ockam, 249 ; Gerson's theory of, 
 267. 
 
 Politics (The) of Aristotle: defec- 
 tive condition of text, 54 ; origin 
 and character of the state (ir6\is), 
 65 ; political life essential to man, 
 56 ; distinction between state and 
 household, 57 ; rational justifica- 
 tion of slavery, 58 ; analysis of 
 concepts of wealth and exchange, 
 60; ambiguous use of " nature," 
 61 ; criticism of Plato's commu- 
 nism, 62 ; citizenship defined and 
 described, 64 ; nature and content 
 of a constitution and of sover- 
 eignty, 65 ; participation of all 
 citizens in offices, 66 ; sovereignty 
 primarily in the mass of the people, 
 68 ; but exercised mainly through 
 election and censure of officers, 
 70 ; the one overwhelmingly su- 
 perior man would be the true 
 sovereign, 70 ; but law is better 
 than man, 71 ; classification of con-
 
 INDEX 
 
 357 
 
 stitutions, 72 ; monarchy a practi- 
 cally impossible form, 73 ; oli- 
 garchy and democracy mean rule 
 of rich and of poor respectively, 
 74 ; liberty, wealth and virtue as 
 principles in organization of gov- 
 ernment, 75 ; the three organs 
 essential in every government, 76 ; 
 functions of each organ in the 
 various forms, 77 ; the best state, 
 78; virtue, not power or wealth, the 
 true end of the state, 81 ; external 
 conditions of an ideal city, 81 et 
 seq. ; education the ultimate func- 
 tion of the state, 83 ; revolutions 
 in Hellas, 85 ; general and special 
 causes of revolutions, 86 et seq. ; 
 preventives of revolutions, 88 et 
 seq. ; the art of tyranny, 91 ; sug- 
 gests a Spartanized Athens, 97. 
 
 Polity : a pure form of government 
 in Aristotle, 72 ; based on blend- 
 ing of two principles, liberty and 
 wealth, 75 ; form and functions 
 of governmental organs in, 77 ; 
 on the average, and where the 
 middle class is the strongest, the 
 best form, 79 ; causes and pre- 
 ventives of revolution in, 88. 
 
 Polybius : his acquaintance with 
 Roman politics, 114 ; his cycle of 
 governmental forms, 115 ; theory 
 of check and balance, 116 ; its 
 application to the Roman consti- 
 tution, 116 etseq.; ideas of, taken 
 by Machiavelli, 305, 306. 
 
 Polycraticus, of John of Salisbury, 
 185. 
 
 Poor, care of, a function of the 
 government (St. Thomas), 203. 
 
 Pope : see Papacy. 
 
 Popular government: see Democracy. 
 
 Population : classes of, in Plato's 
 Republic, 28 ; classes of, in Pla- 
 to's Laws, 39 ; Aristotle on neces- 
 sary elements of, 82. 
 
 Prsetor: functions of, in Roman 
 
 constitution, 108 ; juristic work 
 of, 127. 
 
 Prince (The) of Machiavelli: in- 
 fluence of contemporary politics 
 on, 293 ; a study of the strong 
 monarch, 294, 307 ; unmoral doc- 
 trines of, 298, 299 ; unreligious 
 doctrines of, 300 ; view of human 
 nature in, 304 ; principles of, as 
 to extension of power, 311 ; the 
 art of tyranny in, 316 ; criticised 
 by Frederick the Great, 323. 
 
 Principate (Roman) : administra- 
 tive work of, 125 ; juristic work 
 of, 127. 
 
 Proconsul : in the Roman constitu- 
 tion, 111, 112. 
 
 Property : communistic theories of, 
 in Plato's Republic, 30 ; limi- 
 tations on amount of, in Plato's 
 Laws, 39 ; principle of, assumed 
 by Aristotle, 59 ; ultimate owner- 
 ship held to be in Pope, 217, 219 ; 
 John of Paris on relation of Pope 
 to, 226 ; distinction between 
 ownership and jurisdiction over, 
 227 ; controversy over theory of, 
 between John XXII and the Fran- 
 ciscans, 236, 237 ; Wycliffe's 
 views on, 261 et seq. ; fifteenth- 
 century idea of, 281 ; Machiavelli 
 on men's devotion to, 305. 
 
 Prophets : regarded as prefiguring 
 Christian priesthood, 164. 
 
 Public mess : in Sparta, 8 ; in Plato's 
 Republic, 29 ; in Plato's Laws, 38. 
 
 Public opinion: indicated by Aris- 
 totle as controlling force in state, 
 95. 
 
 Renaissance : influence in political 
 theory, 259 ; influence of, on 
 Machiavelli, 289 ; rationalism of, 
 302. 
 
 Representation : Marsiglio's theory 
 as to, 251 ; Ockam's scheme of, 
 252.
 
 358 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Kepublic (as form of government) : 
 see Democracy. 
 
 Republic (The) of Plato: general 
 character of, 24 ; idealism in, 26 ; 
 predominantly ethical, 27 ; classes 
 of population in, 28 ; the guar- 
 dians and their functions, 29 ; 
 communistic doctrine of, 80 ; edu- 
 cational system in, 31 ; an aris- 
 tocracy of intellect, 32 ; relation 
 to actual states, 33. 
 
 Revolutions : frequency in Greece, 
 85 ; Aristotle's theory as to causes 
 of, 86 ; as to preventives of, 88 
 et seq. 
 
 Right or Rights (SlKaiov, iws) : nat- 
 ural distinguished from legal by 
 Aristotle, 54 ; ambiguous mean- 
 ing of, 122 ; source of, to be found 
 in law (Cicero), 123; Imperial 
 jurists' treatment of, 128 ; nat- 
 ural distinguished from positive 
 (Thomas Aquinas), 196; ^Egid- 
 ius Romanus on, 211 ; Wycliffe's 
 view of, 261. 
 
 Roads, care of, a function of the 
 government (St. Thomas), 203. 
 
 Roman Constitution : in royal pe- 
 riod, 107 ; in time of conflict be- 
 tween patricians and plebeians, 
 108 ; government of dependencies 
 under, 110; as transformed by 
 Julius and Augustus, 112 ; as re- 
 formed by Diocletian and Con- 
 stantine, 113 ; as analyzed by 
 Polybius, 116 ; working of check 
 and balance system in, 119 ; as 
 viewed by Cicero, 121, 125; the 
 ideal of Machiavelli, 296. 
 
 Rosellinus (Antonius de Rosellis), 
 281 note, 282, 291. 
 
 Royal power: distinguished from 
 priestly, 166 et seq. 
 
 Royalty : relative excellence of, in 
 Plato, 36 ; Aristotle's idea of, 72 ; 
 ideally the best form where one 
 man is preeminent, 78 ; prac- 
 
 tically an extinct form for en- 
 lightened peoples, 90 ; Cicero's 
 conception of, 120. See also 
 Monarchy. 
 
 Sacerdotal power : distinguished 
 from royal, 166 et seq. ; argument 
 for preeminence of, 169 et seq. 
 
 Sceptics : neglect of politics by, 102. 
 
 Schism, the Great, 267 et seq. 
 
 Scholasticism, general character of, 
 189 et seq. 
 
 Senate : organization and functions 
 of, in Roman constitution, 107, 
 109, 112 ; Polybius on, 116. 
 
 Seneca, a Stoic, 106. 
 
 Sixtus IV, policy of, 288. 
 
 Slavery : justified on rational 
 grounds by Aristotle, 58 ; assumed 
 by Plato and Aristotle as neces- 
 sary, 93 ; effect of cosmopolitism 
 on, 105 ; contrary to natural rights 
 (Roman jurists), 128 ; justified 
 by St. Augustine, 157 ; by Thomas 
 Aquinas, 199 ; Wycliffe's view of, 
 262. 
 
 Socrates : relation of, to Sophists, 
 21 ; his method and ethical doc- 
 trine, 22 ; on laws, written and 
 unwritten, 23 ; relation of Plato 
 to work of, 24. 
 
 Solon : reforms of, at Athens, 12 ; 
 influence of his constitution on 
 Plato's theory, 45. 
 
 Sophists : nature of work of, 20, 21 ; 
 doctrines of, renewed by Epicu- 
 reans, 103. 
 
 Soul, Plato's analysis of, 26. 
 
 Sovereignty : defined by Aristotle, 
 65 ; argument for basis of num- 
 bers, of wealth and of intelli- 
 gence, 67 ; should be in mass of 
 people, according to Aristotle, 68 ; 
 various ideas of, in Greece, 69 ; 
 claims of the one perfect man, 70; 
 impersonal law better than any 
 person as bearer of, 71 ; of people
 
 INDEX 
 
 359 
 
 subject to that of law (Aristotle), 
 95 ; in people as legislator (Mar- 
 siglio), 239 ; Marsiglio and Ockam 
 on, 248 et seq. ; held by Cusanus 
 to be in people, 273. See also 
 Plenary Power. 
 
 Sparta : no early aristocracy in, 2 ; 
 leader of conservatives in Greece, 
 6 ; hegemony of, in Persian Wars, 
 5 ; influence of, on Greek political 
 theory, 6 ; classes of people in, 7 ; 
 Lycurgean institutions in, 8 ; con- 
 stitutional organization of, 9 ; oli- 
 garchic character of government 
 in, 10 ; a timocracy, according to 
 Plato, 33 ; in Plato's opinion, a 
 properly limited monarchy, 40 ; 
 many institutions of, in Plato's 
 Republic, 44 ; Polybius's view of 
 institutions of, 116 ; slightly es- 
 teemed by Machiavelli, 296. 
 
 State (as a concept of political 
 science): Aristotle on origin and 
 character of, 55 ; necessary to hu- 
 man existence, 56 ; distinguished 
 from household, 57 ; identity 
 changes, according to Aristotle, 
 with change of constitution, 65; 
 Aristotle on best form of, 78 etseq.; 
 on the true end of, 81 ; Ockam on 
 functions of, 247 ; distinguished 
 from government by Marsiglio, 
 250. See also Government. 
 
 State of Nature, idea of, in fifteenth 
 century, 282. 
 
 Statesman ( The) , of Plato : idealism 
 of, 25 ; deals primarily with dia- 
 lectic, 27; develops "idea" of 
 ruler, 34 ; depreciates practical 
 statesmanship, 34 ; and legisla- 
 tion, 35 ; classification of govern- 
 ments in, 36. 
 
 Stephen (Pope): crowns Pippin, 
 139. 
 
 Stoics : prominence after Alexander, 
 102 ; emphasized ethics and neg- 
 lected politics, 102 ; theory of 
 
 justice and law, 104 ; develop- 
 ment of cosmopolitism by, 105 ; 
 in the Roman state, 106 ; influ- 
 ence of, on Cicero's theory of 
 natural law, 122 ; influence of, 
 on Roman jurisprudence, 127 ; 
 principles of, in relation to Chris- 
 tianity, 154 ; influence on St. 
 Thomas's theory of law, 192. 
 
 Sun and moon : symbol of spiritual 
 and secular powers, 167, 171. 
 
 Swords, the two, text referring to, 
 168, 184. 
 
 Teutonic nations: transformed Ro- 
 man government in West, 131 ; 
 influence of, on Christian Church, 
 134. 
 
 Theodoric of Verdun, 162. 
 
 Theodosius : excommunicated by 
 Ambrose, 134 ; recognizes sacer- 
 dotal sway over morals, 155. 
 
 Thomas Aquinas : general character 
 of his philosophy, 190 et seq. ; po- 
 litical works of, 191 ; his theory 
 of law, 192 ; on justice and rights, 
 196; on politics proper, 197; on 
 the province or kingdom as more 
 perfect than city-state, 198 ; on 
 slavery, 198 ; prefers monarchy 
 to democracy, 199 ; on tyranny, 
 
 200 ; on the Holy Roman Empire, 
 
 201 ; on certain novel functions of 
 government, 203 ; on the preemi- 
 nence of priest over king, 205 ; 
 on the treatment of infidels by 
 Christian rulers, 206 ; on the depo- 
 sition of princes by the church, 
 207 ; his influence on ^gidius 
 Romanus, 209 ; his system in re- 
 lation to political facts, 213. 
 
 Timocracy : Plato's conception of, 
 33 ; Gerson's idea of, 269. 
 
 Towns, political significance of, in 
 fifteenth century, 256. 
 
 Translatio imperil, 180 ; Dante on, 
 234.
 
 360 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Tribune, powers of, at Rome, 
 108. 
 
 Twelve Tables, code of the, 126. 
 
 Tyranny : Plato's conception of, 
 33, 36 ; held by Aristotle to be 
 a corrupt form of state, 72 ; the 
 least permanent form of govern- 
 ment, 91 ; may be maintained by 
 uniform severity and harshness, 
 91 ; or by uniform mildness and 
 craft, 92 ; in Polybius's theory, 
 115 ; distinguished from royalty in 
 Middle Ages, 178 ; John of Salis- 
 bury on, 187 ; Thomas Aquinas 
 on, 200 ; Machiavelli on the art 
 of, 316. 
 
 Ulpian, Stoic influence on, 106. 
 
 Unam Sanctam, the Bull, 216. 
 
 Unity : essential in government of 
 church, but not of state, 226 ; 
 Dante's exaltation of, 231 ; Cu- 
 sanus on, 271 ; influence of theory 
 of corporation on mediaeval idea 
 of, 279. 
 
 Universal Monarchy : as normal po- 
 litical organization, 180 ; argument 
 against, by John of Paris, 226 ; 
 Dante's plea for, 230 et seq. ; the- 
 
 ory of, slighted by Marsiglio, 240 ; 
 discussed by Ockam, 246. 
 
 Valentinian II : defied by Ambrose, 
 
 133. 
 Valentinian III: decrees appellate 
 
 supremacy of Roman Bishop, 137. 
 Valla : discredits Donation of Con- 
 
 stantine, 259. 
 
 Wai tram of Naumburg, 162. 
 
 Wars of the Roses, 256. 
 
 Wycliffe : general position as to pol- 
 itics, 260 ; his theory of lordship, 
 261 ; on monarchy and aristocracy, 
 262 ; on slavery, 262 ; on relation 
 of church to property, 263 ; influ- 
 ence of feudalism on, 264 ; views 
 of, adopted by Huss, 264 ; con- 
 demned by Council of Constance, 
 265. 
 
 Xenophon : record of Socrates's doc- 
 trine as to justice and law, 23. 
 
 Zacharias (Pope) : sanctions usur- 
 pation by Pippin, 139 ; cited by 
 mediaeval debaters, 175. 
 
 Zeno the Stoic, 102. 
 
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