illitHillMllUlt THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES GIFT OF FLOYD G. BUBTCHEm? A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORIES ANCIENT AND MEDIAEVAL A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORIES ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL BY WILLIAM ARCHIBALD DUNNING, PH.D. PKOFKSSOR Or HISTORY IN COLUMBIA UNIVKBSITT If flrft THE MACMILLAN COMPANY LONDON: MACMILLAN & CO., LTD. 1921 All right* reitrvtd COPYRIGHT, 1902, BY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY. Set up and electrotyped. Published January, 1909. NortoooB J. 8. Cashing & Co. Berwick O/AOS). Ideally the discretion of the all-wise philosopher is a perfect guar- antee of excellence in administration, and stands in marked contrast to the narrow and inflexible pre- scriptions of a past time. To restrain the discretion of such a being by rigid rules, would be like restrict- ing the trained physician or the skilled pilot to spe- cific modes of action regardless of circumstances. But conceding that the all-wise philosopher is una- vailable, Plato attributes the utmost importance to law, as the expression of experience and practical wisdom. No actual man or group of men possesses so much of the spirit of true political science as is embodied in the written laws and national customs of a people, 2 and undeviating conformity to these 1 Cf. supra, p. 31. 8 TO, ytypap-fieva /cat Trarpta Wt]. Statesman, 301. 36 POLITICAL THEORIES is the first essential of those imperfect systems of government which exist among men. On the basis of this conception, Plato frames a classification of governments which differs consider- ably from that outlined in The Republic? As one basis of division, he adopts that of the number of persons exercising supreme authority a basis al- ready common in Greek thought and employed by Herodotus ; 2 but crossing this, Plato applies also the relation of the government to law. His ideas may be expressed in the subjoined table : SUBJECT TO LAW UNRESTRAINED BY LAW The rule of One is Royalty Tyranny The rule of the Few is Aristocracy Oligarchy The rule of the Many is Democracy Democracy None of these forms, of course, is absolutely good. But practically considered, from the standpoint of the citizen, the rule of one is at the same time the best and the worst of the six. That is to say, when sub- ject to law it is the best, and when unrestrained by law (tyranny) it is the worst. Aristocracy and oli- garchy are intermediate in respect to good and evil. The rule of the many stands in a position the reverse of that occupied by monarchy. That is to say, democ- racy is the worst of governments that are subject to law, but the best of those that are without law. This relative excellence arises, however, exclusively from 1 Supra, p. 33. 2 Cf. the discussion of the Persian conspirators after the death of the false Smerdis, Bk. Ill, c. 80. The historian puts Greek ideas into barbarian mouths. THE LAWS OF PLATO 87 the fact that democracy is in every respect weak and inefficient, and unable to effect much either of good or of evil ; it is therefore least oppressive of the three where the restraints of law are absent. 1 Thus, from a point of view quite different from that in The Republic, Plato is enabled to demonstrate the same conclusion that democracy is essentially bad. 5. The Laivs The last and most extensive treatise of Plato on politics, The Laws, signifies by its title the last step in the transition of his philosophy from the field of the ideal to that of the actual. In The Republic he considers the ideal state almost exclusively. In The Statesman he retains this point of view, but descends, as we have just seen, to the discussion of some highly significant phases of actual government. In The Laws, finally, he formally abandons his idealism, and seeks to set forth a system that would be workable among imperfect men. Having demonstrated in The Statesman that a regime of legal and constitutional limitations, though logically irreconcilable with the perfect ideal of government, was indispensable to ex- cellence in actual states, 2 he purposes in The Laws to formulate a code that shall absolutely determine the life of the community, and shall thus insure the best results possible in a practicable political system. The spirit of this code manifests very clearly, how- ever, the persistence of the earlier ideas. Plato clings 1 Statesman, 303. 2 For a striking passage sustaining the thesis that law should be above man, see Laws, IV, 715. 38 POLITICAL THEORIES as far as possible to the broad principles of The Repub- lic, introducing modifications with frank reluctance only when the requirements of a practical community seem imperatively to demand it. Thus he concedes the necessity of marriage and of family life ; but the government is authorized to persuade the union of couples in whose contrasting qualities is found the hope of well-balanced offspring, to inspect and regu- late the most intimate details of domestic routine, and to compel the presence of the women as well as the men at the public mess. 1 Again, education ceases to be the almost exclusive occupation of the magistrates, but a system is prescribed which is to be most rigidly enforced upon all the youth, and the intellectual and artistic development of the citizens is made subject to a thoroughgoing censorship, in comparison with which the most rigid system of actual history would be lax and lifeless. In respect to property also Plato concedes that the communism of TJie Republic is impracticable. The principle of private property is therefore admitted, but the evils of an inequitable distribution are guarded against by precautions that to the modern mind seem fatal to the principle. The philosopher fully appre- ciates the economic basis of political discord. A tranquil state will be one in which there is neither extreme poverty nor extreme wealth; hence the laws 1 Laws, VI, 773 et seq. For the administration of these powers Plato would have the primary authority in the hands of a ward com- mittee of women, whose chief duty should be the close supervision of young couples for the first ten years of married life. THE LAWS OF PLATO 39 must promote equality of possessions. 1 Especially must the ownership by citizens of equal shares of land be safeguarded ; and through the discouragement of commercial pursuits by all possible means the accu- mulation of wealth in other forms must at least be impeded. 2 Despite all legislation to obstruct it, how- ever, inequality in property will arise, and so far as it is inevitable, it must be taken into account in the organization of government. Accordingly, Plato bases his classification of the people, for the assign- ment of offices and honours, on wealth, and not, as in The Republic, on intellect. Four classes are provided for. The first consists of those who possess only the equal allotment of land which the state guarantees to every citizen as the "limit of poverty." The other three classes are determined by the possession of wealth to the amount of two, three and four times the value of the share of land ; and property accumulated by any citizen in excess of the fourfold measure is subject to summary confiscation by the government. 8 In describing the governmental organization of his polity Plato avowedly seeks a mean between mon- archy and democracy. These two forms he takes as representative of the contradictory principles of authority and liberty. Either principle carried to excess results in disaster to the state, as may be seen 1 Laws, V, 744. 2 Gold and silver are excluded from the state by Plato's code, except so far as the treasury of the state requires a store for use in foreign relations. V, 742. V, 744. 40 POLITICAL THEORIES in the history of Persia and of Athens. 1 Moderation is essential to the maintenance of good feeling between rulers and ruled ; and Plato attributes the highest importance in politics to this, relation to the principle of friendship, as he calls it. Indeed, he lays it down as according to nature that government should be " the rule of law over willing subjects, and not a rule of compulsion " a proposition which is much like the " natural law " of modern days, that government rests on the consent of the governed. 2 The monarchic government, then, must be so organ- ized as to check the undue extension of the principle of authority; Sparta, in the restraints imposed by senate and ephors upon the kings, seems to Plato to have attained this end. On the other hand, demo- cratic liberty must be prevented from degenerating into license. 3 Especially must the conception of equality, which is the foundation of democracy, be properly understood. For equality is of two kinds, absolute and proportionate. The former requires that every citizen have precisely the same oppor- tunity to perform every public service ; the latter, 1 Laws, III, 693 et seq. Plato's analysis of the decline of these two governments is characteristic. In the one case the primary cause, he declares, was the failure of the strong monarchs, Cyrus and Darius, to give their sons a proper education ; in the other, the failure of the authorities to exclude corrupting novelties in music and drama from the Athenian stage. 2 Laws, III, 690 ; cf. VIII, 832. For an anticipation of the contract theory of the relation between king and people, see Plato's interpreta- tion of early Peloponnesian history, Til, 684. 8 Even the sports of the children are to be carefully watched, lest innovation should creep in and plant the seeds of destructive radical- ism in politics. VII, 797. THE LAWS OF PLATO 41 that part in the government be proportioned to the merit of each. In appointment to office, therefore, choice by lot will be the mode expressive of absolute equality ; some other mode, such as election, must be combined with this if proportionate equality is to find recognition. 1 The details of the administrative organization which Plato sketches out for his state need not particularly detain us. 2 The chief place in the ad- ministration he gives to a board of thirty-seven, called guardians of the laws, chosen by election in three stages by the citizens who bear arms. Only men of fifty years of age and upward are eligible, and each retires when he reaches seventy. These guar- dians constitute the general advisory and supervisory authority for the whole administration. Military officials are elected, on nomination, primarily, by the guardians. Provision is also made for an admin- istrative council of 360, chosen through a combina- tion of election and lot, with functions similar to those of the Athenian preconsidering senate. A general assembly of the citizens (eK/cX^crta) is pre- sumed, 3 rather than described, as an element in the governmental system, but its functions consist chiefly in the election of the various magistrates. The judicial organization is based formally on the prin- ciple that all citizens should have a voice in the administration of justice ; but the methods of pro- cedure and appeal are so arranged as to insure a 1 Laws, VI, 757. 2 See Bk. VI, at large. 8 Cf. VI, 758, 764. 42 POLITICAL THEORIES predominant influence to a select court oi magis- trates. 1 Finally, as the capstone of the whole gov- ernmental edifice, Plato ordains a council consisting of the ten oldest guardians of the laws, the priests that have been distinguished for virtue, and those magistrates who have had charge of education, to- gether with a number of younger men equal to that of the older. 2 To this body, which shall meet daily between dawn and sunrise, 3 is assigned the supreme duty of determining when and to what extent changes shall be made in the laws of the state. For legislation in the familiar modern sense no especial provision is made in The Laws. The pre- scriptions of the code are assumed to cover all important points all matters that are worthy the wisdom of a scientific lawgiver. Moreover, the form of the code is such as to present, not only the rule, but the purpose and justification of the law, so that persuasion as well as penalty shall play a part in securing obedience. This Plato considers a very important feature of legislative art. 4 On the basis of the laws thus formulated, the elaboration of details may be left to administrative officials guided by experience. 5 Finally, no written laws, however detailed, will altogether displace the customs or unwritten laws of a people ; hence it is that the 1 VI, 767, 768. 2 XII, 951, 961. 8 This body is known commonly as the " nocturnal council." 4 Bk. IV, 718; cf. also VII, 822. As Janet points out, Plato dis- cerns the principle of the expose de motif oi modern continental legis- lation. 5 Bk. VI, 770 ; cf. VIII, 828. PLATO'S THEORY AND GREEK FACTS 43 utmost attention is to be paid to the education of the young. 1 It is impossible to discover in The Laws the crite- rion by which Plato distinguished the general and important from the secondary and unimportant in legislation. The work is for the most part an un- systematic assemblage of ideas on the most diverse features of social life. Besides the matters already considered, it embodies regulations touching many varieties of crime and tort, various phases of con- tract law, testament, trade, witchcraft, the treatment of slaves, treasure-trove, funerals, agriculture, divorce and many other things. In this mass of matter there is much that is exceedingly valuable from the standpoint of social history and comparative juris- prudence. The philosophy of the state is chiefly to be found in the points that have already been particularly considered. 6. Plato's Theory and Hellenic Facts The a priori and idealizing method of Plato's politi- cal philosophy does not conceal from even the casual reader the intimate relation between the doctrines enunciated and the currents of practical Greek poli- tics. It does not require the explicit eulogy of Sparta which several times occurs 2 to reveal that the Pelo- ponnesian state and the system she represents consti- tute the model from which the philosopher draws his inspiration. The foundations of The Republic are indeed carefully laid in abstract ethics and dialectic, 1 VII, 793. 2 Rep. X, 599; Laws, III, 691 et seq. 44 POLITICAL THEORIES but the superstructure discloses, both in general effect and often in details, the lines of the Lycurgean insti- tutions. In Sparta, as in The Republic, the govern- ing class was occupied exclusively with political affairs, lived a life of publicity and, in theory at least, of austerity, participated in and supervised a vigorous discipline designed to maintain a uniformity of type among citizens, and ruthlessly sacrificed every individual or family interest to the interest of the state. Lycurgus in the real, as Plato in the ideal, commonwealth prohibited written laws and money of gold and silver ; and in the one polity as in the other, polyandry and the exposure of weak and deformed infants were recognized as useful and proper devices for preserving the physical integrity of the people. Sparta's successful career in Hellenic politics, culmi- nating in the destruction of Athenian power through the Peloponnesian War, made a powerful impression upon all reflecting Greeks. It is hardly surprising that the philosopher should have attributed special virtue to the peculiar constitution of the triumphant little state. Not only her success abroad, but also the stability of her government at home, made her exceptional in Hellas. But on the other hand, the Spartans were notoriously without part in the intel- lectual progress of the times. Hence the criticism which Plato makes upon their system, and hence the deviation of his ideal from their practical state. He finds their training one-sided physical and military, without balance on the side of intellect and philos- ophy. The method of their discipline he adopts, PLATO'S THEOKY AND GREEK FACTS 45 but the substance will not fulfil the demands of a rounded character, and is supplemented, therefore, in The Republic, by adequate attention to the lacking elements. In The Laws Plato makes some amend to his native Athens for the injuria spretce formce in his ear- lier work. Hellenic history during his later life had furnished ground for a revision of judgment as to the supreme efficiency of the Spartan system, even in the purely military and political sense. That Athens, once crushed to the earth, had shown sufficient recu- perative power to stand once more on equal terms with her conqueror, may well have contributed some- thing to the modification of the philosopher's ideas. It is certain, at all events, that many more sugges- tions of Athenian institutions are to be found in TJie Laws than in The Republic. The governmental organization in the first-mentioned work bears very obvious kinship to the constitution of Solon ; the fourfold classification of the people according to wealth, and the form and functions of the great ad- ministrative council, are almost identical with con- spicuous features of the Solonian scheme ; and both the guardians of the laws and the " nocturnal coun- cil " strongly suggest the senate of the Areopagus. Perhaps the extent to which democratic ideas ought to be recognized in political practice was about the same in the minds of Plato and of Solon. For the development of popular government effected through Kleisthenes and Pericles, Plato shows no more sym- pathy in The Laws than in The Republic. He is, in 46 POLITICAL THEORIES fact, by Athenian standards, some two centuries behind the times. In general, then, the political philosophy of Plato involves an interpretation of Greek history and a judgment upon existing institutions. His perception of the principles that underlie these institutions is in many cases keen and sure, but his attempts to suggest practical improvements that shall more faith- fully express the principles never take him beyond the bounds of Hellenic experience. His conception of the state is that of a small group of persons striv- ing to realize a high ideal of moral and intellectual attainment through self-discipline and through the judicious adaptation of the powers of a much more numerous body of persons associated with them in the political community. To him the state exists only in the select few, devoted exclusively to its service. No citizen, he holds, should engage in mercantile pursuits or mechanical trades ; these occupations are suited only to slaves and aliens. 1 Nor is the attainment of great power or great wealth an end to be considered for either the city or the citizens. 2 Not dominion by land and sea, but excellence and happiness must be the aim of the true legislator. In The Laios Plato fixes the number of citizens at 5040, with slaves and other elements duly proportioned to the needs of these, and commands that this number shall remain absolutely fixed. Such a rule, he believed, would insure a sufficient equip- ment of all the qualities necessary to social happiness. 1 Laws, VIII, 842, 846. 2 Ibid. V, 742. PLATO'S THEORY AND GREEK FACTS 47 The aristocratic city-state thus was the absolute limit of Plato's thought. Not even that degree of imperialism which had been realized by Athens and Sparta received recognition in his philosophy. Yet at the time of his death a far more striking imperial- ism was near at hand in the Greek world. But so fixed is the backward look of philosophy that some nineteen centuries were destined to elapse before political theorists freed themselves from the influ- ence of the city-state idea, and adjusted their specu- lations to the fact of systems in which the citizens were numbered by millions. SELECT REFERENCES BEKKEK, Platonis Scripta Graece Omnia: Bd. IV, pp. 479 et seq. (HoXiTwco's) ; VI, 251-560 ; VII, 1-229 (IIoAiT'a) ; VII, 403-566; VIII (Nd/tw). BENARD, Platon, pp. 399-483. BLAKEY, I, pp. 47-53. BOSANQUET, A Companion to Plato's Eepublic. DAVIES and VAUGHAN, The Republic of Plato, trans. FOUILLEE, La Philosophic de Socrate, I, 35-138, 259- 390 ; II, 1-75 ; La Philosophic de Plato, II, 33-95. GOMPERZ, Griechische Denker, Bd. I, Buch III, chaps, iii and v (Greek Thinkers, trans.). GRANT, Greece in the Age of Pericles. GROTE : History of Greece, Part II, chaps. Ixvii-lxviii ; Plato and other Companions of Socrates, Vol. I, chap, vi; II, pp. 475-500 (Statesman) ; III, 27-242 (Republic), 301^50 (Laws). HENKEL, Geschichte der griechischcn Lehre vom Staat, pp. 38-74, 121 et seq. HILDENBRAND, Geschichte und System der Rcchts und Staatsphilosophie, pp. 41-222. JANET, Vol. I, pp. 53-164. JOWETT and CAMPBELL, Plato's Eepublic, Greek Text. JOWETT, The Dialogues of Plato, trans., 3d edition. Loos, Studies in Aristotle and Plato, p. 179 et seq. MAHAFFY, History of Classical Greek Literature, Vol. II, chap, vii, especially pp. 194-210. MOHL, Geschichte der Staatswissen- 48 POLITICAL THEORIES schaften, I, 171 et seq. NETTLESHIP, Lectures on the Republic of Plato ; Theory of Education in Plato's Republic, in Hellenica, pp. 61-165. NEWMAN, The Politics of Aristotle, Vol. I, pp. 50-55, 374-461, 552. PATER, Plato and Platonism, pp. 66, 240. RITTER, Geschichte der Philosophic, Bd. II, pp. 443-522 (History of Ancient Philosophy, trans., Vol. II, pp. 385-452). STALL- BAUM, Platonis Opera Omnia (1881), pp. 266-285 (Politicus), 289-384 (De Republica), 384-498 (De Legibus). SUSEMIHL, Die genetische Entwickelung der platonischen Philosophie, I, 312-329 (Der Staatsman) ; II, 58-312 (Der Stoat) ; 559-696 (Die Gesetze). VAN DER REST, Platon et Aristote, pp. 6-344. VOIGT, Das jus naturale, Vol. I, 17-23. ZELLER, Die Phi- losophie der Griechen, I, 932-1041 (Die Sophisten) ; II, 1, 91 et seq., 281 et seq., 867-925 (Staaf), 946-982 (Gesetze) ; Plato and the Older Academy, trans., chaps, x, xi, xiii. CHAPTER III THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 1. Method and Character of The Polities THE capital significance of Aristotle, in the history of political theories, lies in the fact that he gave to politics the character of an independent science. He differs from his master, Plato, much more in the form and method than in the substance of his thought. Most of the ideas which seem characteristically Aris- totelian are to be found in Plato. 1 But the Platonic expression of them is generally suggestion or allusion or illustration ; while in Aristotle they appear as definite, clean-cut dogmas, bearing an unmistakable relation to the general system of scientific doctrine. This contrast is rooted in the respective intellectual peculiarities of the two philosophers. Plato is im- aginative and synthetic ; Aristotle is matter-of-fact and analytic. Ideas present themselves to Plato more through metaphor and analogy; to Aristotle more through the processes of exact logic. Plato is more impressed by the unity pervading phenomena ; Aristotle, by the diversity. In ethics and politics, accordingly, while Plato, working deductively from 1 Susemihl notes seventy-two places in The Politics that are par- alleled to a greater or less extent in Plato. Aristoteles Politik (Leip- zig, 1879), Einleitung, p. 11, note. B 49 50 POLITICAL THEORIES his philosophic conceptions of virtue and the good, blended inextricably the two bodies of doctrine, Aris* totle, proceeding by extensive observation and minute analysis of objective facts, marked out for each sci- ence an independent field. The foundation of his political theory was laid by Aristotle in a detailed study of practically all the existing governmental systems, both Hellenic and barbarian. More than one hundred and fifty polities are said to have been analyzed in a work which is quoted in ancient literature as The Constitutions (at TroXtreiat). Of this work the only part now known by more than slight fragments is the recently discov- ered Constitution of Athens? From this it is clear that the author studied governments both in their history and in their contemporary working, and that his method was in the fullest sense objective and scientific. In his systematic work, The Politics, Aris- totle draws abundantly from the great store of facts accumulated in The Constitutions. It is not exact, however, to say that the principles of The Politics are strictly generalizations from these facts. To a less extent than Plato, but yet to a very great extent, Aristotle depends for the categories and broad outline of his philosophy upon the ideas that characterized contemporary Hellenic thought. The results of his study of other ages and other peoples are employed more in the correction and illustration than in the 1 Cf. Aristotle on the Constitution of Athens. Translated, with introduction, and notes, by F. G. Kenyon. London, George Bell & Sons, 1891. POLITICS AND ETHICS IN ARISTOTLE 51 foundation of his political science. His method is inductive, but not purely inductive. The intimate relations which he enjoyed with the half -barbarian court of Macedon l seem never to have moved him from the conviction that in the pure Greek society and government was to be found the political ideal. That Aristotle, while not like Plato an idealist, never- theless was often determined in his philosophy by an ideal, will appear clearly enough in what is to follow. The creation of an independent science of politics by Aristotle was accomplished by the disentanglement of political from ethical conceptions. In Plato's thought the two were completely blended. The sep- aration effected by Aristotle was not so much the conclusion of a deliberate logical process as the un- conscious outcome of the analytic method which he applied with such rigour to the solution of ethical problems. 2 Rejecting Plato's conception of a single universal abstract " good," Aristotle considers that " good " is relative to each species of being. What, he asks, is the science which treats of the highest " good " of man ? His answer is : political science. For the good of man is the perfect development and activity of all the powers that are in him, and this result is impossible to the individual without the association of his fellows that is, without the TrdXt?. Therefore, the good of the individual is merged in that of the state. But the state he conceives as 1 His father was court physician to King Amyntas, and he himself was the tutor of Alexander the Great. 2 Grant, The Ethics of Aristotle, I, Appendix C. 52 POLITICAL THEORIES avrdpKrjs, or self-sufficing that is, as dependent on no more ultimate form of being for the realization of the good which is its end. Therefore the science of the state, politics, is the dominant, " architectonic " science, embracing within itself, as a part, that which treats of man as an individual. From the abstract point of view, thus, ethics is a subdivision of politics. But Aristotle's treatment of ethics never partook so much of abstract and ulti- mate philosophy as of practical wisdom. The prin- ciple of morality which he consistently set forth was that of a rational choice of the mean between two extremes of conduct. 1 The application of this prin- ciple involved the fullest recognition of human free will and led Aristotle often to ascribe to the self-con- scious, rational intelligence of the individual the character of self-sufficiency which he had ascribed to the state. Thus, from the practical point of view, at least, ethics was impressed with the char- acter of an independent science. But Aristotle him- self was not clear at this point. He often refers to ethics as politics, sometimes intimates that the two are distinct, and in at least one case seems to refer to ethics as a different science. 2 His uncertainty is illustrated also in the repeated consideration in The Politics 8 of the question whether the virtue of the 1 For a charming exposition of Aristotle's Ethics, see Janet, Histoire de la Science Polilique, I, 103 et seq. 2 The Politics, VII, i, 13, erepas o-^oX^s- The peculiar usage of o-^oA.^s here has caused the passage to be suspected. Cf. Susemihl, note 709. 8 III, iv ; v, 10 ; xviii, 1. IV, vii, 2. VII, xiv, 8. POLITICS AND ETHICS IN ARISTOTLE 53 good citizen is the same as that of the good man. His conclusion seems to be, after much vacillation, that the answer is negative in the practical, but affirmative in the ideal or perfect state. Other evi- dence unites with this conclusion to indicate that Aristotle conceived of politics in a double sense : first, with Plato, as a pure science (cro^ta), con- cerned with the absolute good of man, and the abso- lute perfect state ; second, as a practical science (fypovrjaris}, treating of the constitutional and legal relations of actual men in actual societies. In the order of thought, then, politics in the first sense would be prior both to ethics and to politics in the second sense : pure political science would embody the abstract theory of which ethics and practical political science would be two distinct applications. 1 While such seems to have been the thought of the philosopher, his treatment of politics, at least in the works that have come down to us, was almost exclu- sively, like that of ethics, on the practical side. Hence, whether or not he fully realized the outcome of his work, the separation of the two sciences was definitely accomplished. The abstract ideal politics, in which the norms of individual and social excel- lence were identical, received only scanty attention and exercised little influence on later thought. But the keen, cold analysis to which he subjected the forms and motives of practical social and political 1 Cf. Nicomachean Ethics, VT, 8, and the note of Grant, op. cit., II, 169. In the Rhetoric, I, 4, 5, Aristotle uses the expression 17 ire/at TO, y9r) iroXiTLK-q, which is very significant. 54 POLITICAL THEORIES activity gave to reflection on this subject an indi- viduality, a mould and a technique that it was never again to lose. In the Aristotelian works on ethics are to be found expositions of many of the principles which lie nearest the border line of politics. Justice is defined, and the distinction between distributive and corrective justice, already noticed by Plato, is care- fully worked out. 1 The relation of justice to law is examined, and natural (TO ^VCTLKOV) is marked off distinctly from legal right (TO vo/zi/coV). Equity also (17 7rieiK6ia) is clearly denned as corrective of law. But it is in The Politics that the full and rounded exposition of these principles is to be found, as applied in operations of state life. There are indications that this work embodied originally a comprehensive and well-proportioned plan. As the treatise has come down to us, however, the plan is far from clear and the execution is confused and defective. The text abounds in repetitions, contra- dictions, obscurities and obvious gaps. This result is probably due, not only to accidents and errors in the transmission of the manuscript through the cen- turies, but also to the fact that the work never re- ceived a final revision by its author. The difficulty of ascertaining Aristotle's views has further been increased by the very zeal of the modern commenta- tors, who, with the praiseworthy purpose of making the philosopher's work worthy of his reputation, have emended, conjectured, transposed, elided and 1 Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. V. ARISTOTLE ON STATE AND HOUSEHOLD 55 inserted with an energy and a diversity that leaves the reader only the impression of hopeless confusion. But without radical editing, the treatise as it stands, with all its imperfections, is as impressive an embodi- ment of scientific genius and political insight as is the mutilated Vatican torso of the sculptor's art. 1 2. The Nature of the State and of the Household In the first book of The Politics the philosopher sets forth the fundamental characteristics of the state (770X15). It is an association an association of human beings and the highest form of human association. In the order of time it is preceded by the household (ot/aa) and the village (KW^TJ) ; in the order of thought it is prior to both. The household has its source in the association of male and female for the propagation of the race and the association of master and slave for the production of subsistence. The village has its source in the association of house- holds for the better satisfaction of their wants. The state springs from the union of villages into an asso- ciation of such size and character as to be self- sufficing. It is the last and the perfect association. Originating in the bare needs of living, it exists for the sake of complete life. 2 And because the indi- 1 The most annoying form of editorial modification is that which consists in transposing the order of paragraphs, chapters and books. No reference can be good for more than a single one of the really erudite editions of The Politics. Without regard to the relative merits of the various arrangements before the world, I have followed here the order of Jowett, The Politics of Aristotle (Oxford, 1885), to which all references have been made to apply. 2 No mere translation can express all that is contained in the famous dictum of Aristotle : Tivop.fvr] pkv TOV ,i}v tveKtv, ovcra 8e TOV 56 POLITICAL THEORIES vidual can fulfil the end of his existence can live a complete life only in the state, Aristotle declares that man is by nature a political animal. 1 This dogma leaves no room for such discussion as has figured in later political theory, of a " state of nature " in which the individual lives a life of bliss- ful isolation from his kind. The being who cannot live in association with his fellows, or who has no need to do this, is, Aristotle says, either on the one hand, a beast, or on the other, a god. There is no place in the philosophy of human phenomena for the consideration of such a being. This conception of the state in its essential char- acter does not, however, preclude the investigation of the less ultimate forms of association which pre- vail among men. Historically the 770X15 was pre- ceded by conditions in which the household, ruled by the patriarch, was the typical community. In this fact is to be found the explanation of the monarchic government of the earliest states ; for the primitive king merely retained through custom the authority of the patriarch. But Aristotle insists that this historical relation of household to state must not be allowed to distort our conception of their logical relation. It is one of his numerous charges against Plato that the latter represented the state to be merely a large household and the ruler 1 *Av#pco7ros v(rei TroAtriKov ^aov. " Nature " here means, as Aris- totle explains, that condition in which all potentialities are fully developed where everything fulfils its re'Aos, or true end. He sometimes uses " nature " in the sense of primitive or undeveloped condition. ARISTOTLE ON STATE AND HOUSEHOLD 57 of the state to be essentially the head of a family. Such a conception Aristotle holds to be false ; state and household differ, not in degree, but in kind. To prove this he enters upon an exhaustive analysis of the household, in the course of which are set forth the philosopher's views upon many of the funda- mental questions of economics. 1 The main argument is summarily as follows : The household consists of an individual holding dominion over wife, children and property, including slaves. The relation of the head of the household to these three elements is not one, but various. He rules the wife, not as absolute despot, but as constitutional adviser ; he rules the children, not as absolute des- pot, but as the king, who looks to their good rather than his own ; while property, both slaves and other, he rules in full despotism, for the exclusive advan- tage of himself. In this manifold relation of the head of the household to the subordinate elements lies the essential distinction between the household and the state ; for in the latter, according to Aris- totle, the relation of the ruler to each of the citizens is precisely the same. This argument, in itself, is not especially striking ; it adds nothing to the force of the distinction made in the primary principle, that the household exists for the sake of the physical needs of life, the state for the moral and intellectual needs. But the de- tailed discussion of the nature and the function of the various elements of the household embodies much 1 The care of the household he calls OLKOVO/UO. 58 POLITICAL THEORIES that is of high significance in social and economic history and theory. At the very outset he is con- fronted by the necessity of finding a rational justifi- cation for slavery. The slaves constitute one of the natural elements of the household, as he analyzes it. " But some contend," he says, " that the distinction between slave and freeman is a fact only of law and not of nature, and that it is rooted not in justice but in violence." l To meet this contention he presents the first scientific discussion of the institution in extant literature. He concedes that the relation of master and slave is rational, only if it corresponds to some universal principle of nature. Such a prin- ciple is that which requires the combination of com- mand and obedience for the attainment of any human purpose. Men differ from one another in capacity for the one or the other of these functions. There are those whose high endowment of reason fits them to command and direct ; there are those whose slight endowment fits them only to comprehend and carry out orders. The former are by nature masters ; the latter are by nature slaves. Intellectual strength is the chief characteristic of the former; physical strength, of the latter. The combination of the two is essential to the realization of those purposes for which the household exists ; therefore slavery is in accordance with nature. Aristotle is quite aware that the actual institution does not correspond to this rational foundation. He admits that in fact many slaves are superior to their masters in intellect. * 1, iii, 4. AKISTOTLE ON STATE AND HOUSEHOLD 59 This, however, does not affect the reasoning; it is more or less accidental, due, he believes, to the absence of any clearly discernible outward mark by which the natural slave is to be distinguished from the natural master. The common practice of enslav- ing prisoners of war, Aristotle points out, can find justification only so far as the fact of success in battle can be taken as evidence of the superior in- tellectual endowment of the victors; but a judg- ment on this point is subject to many qualifications. Finally, the principle he lays down is the logical foundation of the widespread feeling among the Greeks that they ought to hold in slavery only per- sons of other races ; for the inherent intellectual superiority of Hellenes over barbarians was one of the primary and universal axioms of Greek thought. 1 As to its animate elements, then, the household is organized with reference to the gradation of intellec- tual capacity. This capacity exists in the woman in a weaker form and in the child in a less developed form than in the man. In the slave it has no exist- ence whatever. Hence arise the three varieties of paternal dominion, all working for the realization of the highest good of the whole household. As to the inanimate possessions of the household, there is no question of the absolute dominion of the father. Aristotle assumes without examination the validity of the principle of private property. As to methods of acquisition, however, he finds room for much re- 1 Cf. Plato, The Republic, V, 469 ; Aristotle, The Politics, I, vi, 6 ; VII, vii, 3. 60 POLITICAL THEORIES flection, in the course of which he develops many familiar principles of political economy. The pro- duction of wealth has for him no high philosophical significance. He regards it as a more or less dis- agreeable necessity incidental to the maintenance of life, and hence as a function of the household, but the lowest of its functions. 1 From this point of view he distinguishes between natural and unnatural methods of acquiring wealth. The natural methods, which alone fall within the scope of true economic science (17 oi/coi/o/Ai/a?'), are those through which mere neces- sary subsistence is procured. Among these he enu- merates cattle-raising, agriculture and hunting, the last including as subordinate species, fishing, the chase of land animals, and oddly enough brigan- dage (Xfloreia). 8 The unnatural methods of acquisition are those which aim, not at the mere maintenance of life, but at endless accumulation of wealth. These fall within the field of a distinct science, chrematis- tics (17 xprjiMdTLa-TLKr}). Of these methods trade, whether in the form of barter or in that of sale for money, may be natural, when pursued merely with a view to procuring necessities of life, and not as an end in itself. But through the use of money to facilitate exchange men have been led to see in 1 Household management (OIKOVO/J.IO) has for its purpose rather to make the members of the family virtuous than to make them rich. I, xiii, 1. 2 I, viii, 7 and 8. The philosopher further notes that war, also, is a species of hunting, and is allied to economic science so far as it aims to bring into servitude men who, being slaves by nature, are unwilling to submit. I, viii, 12. ARISTOTLE ON STATE AND HOUSEHOLD 61 money itself the end of trade; and hence has arisen, among other evils, the lending of money at interest In this practice money is made to reproduce itself instead of being applied to the procurement of the needs of life. Such a mode of acquisition, therefore, has no logical justification and is, he concludes, wholly unnatural. This discussion of economics is on the whole as remarkable for its weak as for its strong features. The keen analytical faculty which is so characteristic of Aristotle achieves excellent results in shaping the questions that are to be solved. The elementary ideas of production and exchange are fairly pre- sented. He sees clearly enough the distinction between value in use and value in exchange, and the primary function of money has never been better elucidated than by him. But he fails entirely to grasp the notion of capital, and accordingly does not rise above the very primitive and absurd conception of interest. His glaring weakness at this point, and the no less remarkable freak of including brigand- age in the normal methods of acquiring wealth, both may be traced back to an ambiguity in his conception of nature (Averts). This term has, throughout the history of political theory, proved a stone of stumbling to philosophers. Aristotle, how- ever, at the beginning of The Politics? assigns to the word a clear and unambiguous meaning; namely, a condition of perfect development of all potentiali- ties. But here at the end of the first book he evi- 1 1, ii, 8. 62 POLITICAL THEORIES dently thinks of it as denoting a primitive and undeveloped condition. In one place man is political by nature, because the state is characteristic of fully developed humanity. In the other place brigandage is a natural method of obtaining wealth, because it is a practice of undeveloped men, and the taking of interest is not natural because, apparently, it is not found among undeveloped men. 3. Organization of the State: Constitution, Citizen- ship, Government In approaching the consideration of the constitu- tion which shall most faithfully embody the true principles of political science, Aristotle first examines critically those systems, whether actual or theoreti- cal, which have attained a general reputation for excellence. In the second book of The Politics, the constitutions of Sparta, Crete and Carthage, and the actual or projected legislation of distinguished thinkers, like Hippodarnus, Phaleas and Solon, are described and their most conspicuous features com- mented upon. But the first place in the book is devoted to a severe, and at times distinctly unfair, criticism of Plato's ideas, as embodied in The Repub- lic and The Laws. From the standpoint and with the method adopted by Aristotle, it is a matter of no great difficulty to exhibit many weaknesses in the Platonic theories. But probably the most sig- nificant feature of the critique is the attack on the philosophic supports of communism. Aristotle con- cedes that unity is of fundamental importance in AEISTOTLE ON COMMUNISM 63 any conception of the state, but the means advocated by Plato for attaining it he holds to be destructive of the end in view. Thus, Plato says that if a man does not know his own children, he will feel an equally high affection for all the children in the state. But, answers Aristotle, the sense of personal possession is the whole basis of affection ; therefore the result will be, not great love for all, but no love for any. Again, the degree of harmony to be ex- pected from community of property is less than that from a regime of individual ownership ; for, he argues, the disputes that arise among persons having joint interests are notoriously frequent and distress- ing, and without private property there would be no room for the establishment of those valuable social bonds which accompany the exercise of liberality, in accordance with the saying that all things are in common among friends. 1 The Platonic reasoning is, in fact, vitiated from the outset by an erroneous con- ception of the unity that is essential to the state. It is not a unity which consists in the obliteration of all diversities in individuals. Such a conception is fatal to the idea of the state, as identity in musical tones is fatal to the idea of harmony. The unity of the state is that which arises out of the proper organization of relations among individuals who differ from one another as rulers and ruled. From this point of view Aristotle proceeds to the positive presentation of constitutional relations. 2 A 1 Both Plato and Aristotle attached much importance to friendship as a social virtue ; cf. supra, p. 40. a In Bk. HI. 64 POLITICAL THEORIES state, objectively considered, is an assemblage of citizens. What is a citizen ? This question is an- swered primarily on a basis of fact and of purely Hellenic fact. The citizen, he says, is One who participates in the functions of juror and legislator (St/caorrys Kal e/c/cX^crtacTTT;?), either or both. In other words, citizenship signifies merely the enjoy- ment of political rights, and a state is a group of persons exercising these rights. No part of the com- munity not possessing such rights comes within the purview of politics proper. But Aristotle raises the further question, Who ought to be citizens ? Espe- cially, Are mechanics and labourers fit for inclusion in this class ? His answer is negative. The prime qualification for citizenship is capacity both to rule and to be ruled, and the cultivation of this twofold capacity is indispensable. But those who must labour in order to live are too dependent on the commands of others ever to develop the capacity themselves to command. 1 Freedom from concern about the neces- sities of life is indispensable to the proper performance of political duties. 2 The working classes are, indeed, essential to the state's existence ; but this does not constitute them citizens. While in practice they have been admitted to citizenship in many states, this, Aristotle thinks, has been justified only by the regrettable lack of true material. The state, then, which the philosopher must con- sider consists in a self-sufficing body of such citizens as he has defined. The general system of author- 1 IK, iv and v. a H, ix, 2. CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT 65 ity through which the functions of the state are performed is the constitution (TroXtreta). In the constitution are determined the number and inter- relationship of the various organs of government, the methods through which they are manned, and, par- ticularly, the abode of the supreme or sovereign power (TO Kvpiov, r\ KvpLa. ap^rj). 1 On this last point depends the difference between constitutions ; for the governing body (vroXtreu/aa) is sovereign, and makes the constitution what it is. Accordingly, where the people is the governing body, the consti- tution is a democracy ; where the few govern, it is oligarchy. 2 Aristotle employs this conception of the consti- tution in determining when the identity of a state changes. With logic that has not been confined to ancient times and European lands, Greek govern- ments had sought to repudiate debts on the ground that they had been contracted not by the state, but by the oligarchy or the tyrant. What, the philoso- pher asks, is the essence of the state, and when does it cease to be itself and become another ? And he answers : The essence of the state is the constitution, and the state changes its identity when the constitu- tion changes, e.g. when from democracy it becomes oligarchy or tyranny. But, he hastens to add, "it is quite another question whether the state should or 1 IV, i, 10. 2 III, vi, 1. Aristotle says : Kvpcov ira.vTa\ov TO TroXirevfjua. ; but he does not appear to mean what would be conveyed to modern minds by the literal rendering : " The sovereign is everywhere the govern- ment." Cf. ad loc. Jowett, Zeller, Susemihl. 66 POLITICAL THEORIES should not fulfil engagements when it changes its constitution." This very impotent conclusion is perplexing, especially as The Politics contains no further discussion of the matter. From his identifi- cation of the state with its constitution the obvious inference would be that a democracy, for example, is not responsible for the engagements of a tyrant whom it has displaced. Either Aristotle here means by constitution something more than what he says in defining the term, or, not wishing to commit himself to the approval of the repudiation of contracts, he deliberately evades the logical dilemma. 1 From the nature of the state and of the constitu- tion as defined above, the philosopher draws one conclusion as to the normal, or natural, organization of government. Though the state arises from man's impulse to association with his kind, rather than from a deliberate search for mutual assistance, yet the advantages springing from political organization have a great influence in the maintenance of the social bond. These advantages, then, should be com- mon to all the citizens. All alike should profit by the capacity of each in either ruling or being ruled. Hence the constitution should provide for the service in office of each of the citizens in his turn. Such at least should be the rule where the state is really a society of equal citizens. Quite different, the philos- opher sententiously observes, is the actual practice ; 1 A third alternative, always to be presumed in The Politics, is that the text is corrupt or defective. But there is no indication of such a condition in this passage. Ill, iii, 9. ARISTOTLE ON SOVEREIGNTY 67 for, through selfish craving for the emoluments of public service, men seek for and cling to office as if their lives depended on it. 1 4. The Sovereign Power Conceiving the essence of the state to be expressed in the constitution, and the crucial feature of the constitution to be the supreme or sovereign authority (TO Kvpiov), the question at once arises : On what rational principle is the abode of this sovereignty to be determined ? Controversy is particularly keen, Aristotle notes, between those who favour the prin- ciple of mere numbers and those who favour that of wealth and intelligence. The former, advocating democracy, claim that all who are equal in respect to freedom should be recognized as equal in political power, and that, accordingly, the sovereignty should rest in the general body of citizens. Against these the advocates of oligarchy contend that superiority in wealth or intelligence or birth should carry superiority in power, and that the supreme authority should therefore rest in the few. Both these argu- ments, Aristotle declares, miss the precise criterion, which is to be found only after reaching a correct conception of the nature and end of the state. The state is not an association for the acquisition of wealth, or for the mere maintenance of life, or, like an international alliance, for the promotion of defi- nite political and commercial interests of the con- tracting parties. Tha end of the state^ is_not that 1 in, vi, 10. 68 POLITICAL THEORIES certain persons shall have a common dwelling-place, and shall refrain from mutual injury and shall be in habitual intercourse with one another. The state embraces within itself associations for all these and other purposes, but such associations are based on friendship (eK/3ao-eis), so called because they deviate from the ideal, are what fall strictly within the field of politics in its practical and independent character. Aristotle's con- ceptions of royalty and aristocracy are hardly less idealistic and fanciful than Plato's. Royalty is sub- stantially the rule of the one perfect man ; aristoc- racy is the rule of the few perfect men, not easily to be distinguished in their attributes from Plato's "guardians." If Aristotle had confined himself to an abstract and idealistic treatment of these various constitutions, his work would have exhibited little divergence from Plato's. But in The Politics, as we have it, 3 the discussion is of an eminently practical 1 III, vii. Cf. also Nich. Eth. V, 10, where a somewhat different nomenclature is employed. 2 Supra, p. 53. 8 The text of Books IV, VI, VII and VIII, which cover this subject, is in a condition of such corruption as to render the precise order of thought which Aristotle intended to follow hopelessly uncer- tain. By transposition of the order of the books and by high-handed rearrangement of paragraphs, various plausible schemes have been devised in which coherency of development is preserved. These are all ingenious, and most of them are scientific. Whether any of them is Aristotelian, no one can say. FORMS OF CONSTITUTION 73 character, and the ideal constitutions, while cropping out from time to time, are quite overwhelmed in the mass of historical and critical commentary on the perversions, which alone are in vogue among actual men. Only in the case of the polity is an ideal brought into close relation with a possible constitu- tion. The term TroXtreia, which means constitution in general, is applied by Aristotle also to the special form of democratic constitution. And polity, in this narrow sense, he views in some places as an abstract ideal, but in others as a system quite susceptible of realization through a proper tempering of actual democracy. For monarchy the philosopher can find a rational justification only in the purely ideal case of an indi- vidual absolutely preeminent in virtue. To such an ideally perfect man may be ascribed the right to rule, 1 unrestrained by law. But for actual states the best possible law has a better ground for supremacy than the best possible man. And for the work of government subject to law, the capacity of an indi- vidual can never equal that of an aggregation of individuals. The many is less easily corrupted than the one ; and even though the one may have nominal supremacy, the physical impossibility of conducting the administration single-handed renders necessary a plurality in government which is not different in kind from a plurality immediately under the consti- tution. Aristotle's conclusion is, in fact, that mon- 1 But Aristotle points out that not even here could the principle of hereditary succession be recognized. 74 POLITICAL THEORIES archy not only is illogical, but also is practically impossible. 1 Tyranny, the corrupt form of royalty, Aristotle regarded as resting purely on force, and therefore as having no place in a purely rational system of politics. For his detailed examination of the non-monarchic constitutions, Aristotle points out that the different forms rest upon a deeper foundation than that of mere number in the sovereign body. Oligarchy and democracy signify, respectively, the domination of the rich and that of the poor ; while practically these classes are the few and the many, the greater impor- tance lies in the economic, not in the arithmetical, fact. But these two forms again require, according to Aristotle, further subdivision. Democracies differ from one another, and the same is true of oligarchies ; here again the various shades, 2 of which he enumer- ates four under each form, have a close relation to social and economic facts. 3 The form, amount and diffusion of wealth play a large part in the peculiar adjustments of political organization. In the detailed treatment of aristocracy and polity, the original character of the two is almost entirely lost sight of by Aristotle. Their relation to oligarchy 1 He considers only Greek states. The system of the great barbarian monarchies does not lie within his category of constitution (TroXirtta). 2 The distinction between these varieties is made to turn partly upon the extent to which government is subject to law. This cri- terion had been used by Plato. 3 For example, the four varieties from most moderate to most extreme democracy correspond in general to the predominance of agricultural, mechanical, mercantile and maritime pursuits among the mass of the people. IV, iv, 21 and vi, 1-6. FORMS OF CONSTITUTION 75 and democracy appears no longer as that of the pure to the corrupt, dependent upon the end to which government is directed. On the contrary, the dis- tinctions are made to turn upon the characteristic principle that determines participation in political functions. The principles that are in conflict for supremacy in every community, Aristotle says, are liberty, wealth, virtue and good birth (evyeveia). Where part in the conduct of the government is assigned on the basis of liberty (and equality, which is an essential element in liberty), the constitution is democratic; where on the basis of wealth, it is oli- garchic ; where on the basis of virtue, in the strictly ideal sense, it is aristocratic. * Polity is the constitu- tion that embodies a blending (/uis) of the two prin- ciples, liberty and wealth. When with these two virtue also is combined, the resulting form is entitled to, and generally receives, the name of aristocracy. But this mixed aristocracy he carefully distinguishes from the pure and ideal aristocracy of which the principle is virtue alone. The full application of Aristotelian analysis thus gives a rather formidable aggregate of forms of con- stitution ; and it is doubtful if the philosopher in his best estate could have assigned an actual govern- ment clearly and categorically to any one particular class. Certainly The Politics, as we have it, is very far from clear in distinguishing each from all the 1 Good birth Aristotle disregards ; for, he says, it is merely long- standing wealth and virtue. i/ euyeraa eoriv dperr) Kai TrAoSros ios- IV, viii, 9. 76 POLITICAL THEORIES rest. Polity and the mixed aristocracy are especially difficult to disentangle, 1 and various shades of democ- racy and oligarchy approach perplexingly near to both. But there can be no doubt as to the success of the philosopher in detecting the broad underlying influences, historical, social and economic, through which the manifold variety in political organization is determined. It is his realization of the diversity in these influences that leads him more or less un- consciously to shift from time to time the basis of his classification. The practical significance of the distinction between constitutions on the basis of principle is best revealed in his refined analysis of the three elements essential to every government. 2 These necessary elements are : first, a deliberative organ (TO ftovXe second, a system of magistracies (TO nepl ra<; and, third, a judicial organ (TO SIKCIOI>). On the divergencies of form and function in these three elements depends the character of the various consti- tutions. It is because these divergencies are practi- cally infinite in number that the forms of constitution shade imperceptibly from one to another of the promi- nent types. In extreme and unquestionable democ- racy the deliberative organ would be an assembly of all the people, determining directly all questions pertaining to this organ ; 8 the magistracies would be 1 Sparta is given in different places as an example of each of these forms. Cf. IV, vii, 4 and ix, 6-10. 2 IV, xiv el seq. 8 Aristotle enumerates as such : peace, war and alliances ; legisla- tion ; infliction of penalties in cases punishable with death, exile and FORMS OF CONSTITUTION 77 filled by lot, and all citizens would be eligible for all offices; the administration of justice would be in the hands of a jury court, chosen by lot from the general body of citizens and exercising jurisdiction over all kinds of cases. In extreme oligarchy, the delibera- tive organ would be a close corporation of very wealthy citizens, with unlimited powers ; the magis- tracies would be based on a high property qualifica- tion for eligibility ; and the jury court, with general jurisdiction, would consist of a small body, elected on a high property qualification. Polity would ex- hibit some such combination as this : for the delibera- tive organ, a body of citizens, with at most a moderate property qualification, exercising jurisdiction over only a part of the subjects normal to this organ ; * the magistracies filled through election, either alone or in combination with the lot, but with a property qualification for eligibility; the administration of justice divided among a number of courts and magis- trates, the jurors, like the magistrates, being chosen by a combination of lot and election, and with a moderate property qualification. Practically, the most conspicuous characteristics of the various forms are conceived to be: in democracy, concentration of important functions in the general body of citizens, assignment of offices by lot, as the guaranty of per- fect equality, and compensation for public services ; in oligarchy, concentration of functions in a narrow confiscation of property ; election of magistrates and review of their official conduct. 1 The other subjects would be in charge of various magistrates. 78 POLITICAL THEOKIES body of the wealthy, assignment of offices on a property qualification, and unpaid public services; in polity, diffusion of functions among various organs, assignment of offices by a combination of lot and election. Practical or mixed aristocracy would be determined by the employment of oligarchic forms, subject to a primary regard for fitness, rather than for wealth, in the ruling body. 6. The Best State In approaching the question as to which form of constitution is the best, the same analytical method which so minutely distinguished the different varie- ties is applied, with the result that no categorical answer is recognized. We must consider, Aristotle declares, not only what form is the best absolutely (T^V dpLo-T-rjv aTrXw?), but what is the best attainable by actual men and on the average (^ctXto-ra Tracrcus rat? TToXecrii' dp/xo^ofcrav), and what is the best under given conditions (e/c rwv vTro/cet/xeVwv). As to the absolute or ideal state, there is no room to doubt that the dominion of absolute and ideal vir- tue or fitness must determine. That is, the best must rule ; if one man is preeminent in excellence (aptTrj), the form will be royalty; otherwise, pure aristocracy. Leaving these aside and considering actual men, the criterion of preference among constitutions is the same as in respect to individual conduct : the mean (TO /xecrov) must control. In human society extremes of wealth and poverty are the main sources of evil. The one brings arrogance and a lack of capacity to ARISTOTLE ON THE BEST STATE 79 obey; the other brings slavishness and a lack of capacity to command. Where a population is divided into the two classes of very rich and very poor, there can be no real state ; for there can be no real friend- ship between the classes, and friendship is the essen- tial principle of all association. 1 That state, there- fore, will be the best in which the middle class is stronger than either or both of the extremes. In such a state the influences which make for peace and order will wholly prevail and stability will be insured. The constitution which in all respects em- bodies the principle of the mean is polity. This con- stitution, therefore, must be on the average the best. 2 But it is not to be understood that this form, which is on the average the best, is necessarily the best for every people and under every set of conditions. Cir- cumstances, Aristotle holds, may make any form the best. The general principle here is that the element which desires the existing constitution to stand shall be stronger than those which desire change. In other words, stability is the criterion ; and that constitu- tion is best which under the circumstances will last the longest. In this sense, democracy is best where the poor greatly exceed the rich in numbers ; oligar- chy, where the superiority of the rich in resources and power more than compensates for their inferior- ity in numbers ; polity, where the middle class is clearly superior to all the rest. 1 ff KOLVwvia i\LKOv, IV, xi, 7. 2 Mixed aristocracy is not clearly enough distinguished by Aris- totle from polity to warrant giving it a preferential position. Theo- retically, it would apparently stand first of the two. 80 POLITICAL THEORIES So far as it is possible to arrange an order of ex- cellence with reference to all the various points of view from which Aristotle considers the different forms of government, the following 1 would convey his ideas : 1, ideal royalty ; 2, pure aristocracy ; 3, mixed aristocracy ; 4, polity ; 5, most moderate democracy ; 6, most moderate oligarchy ; 7, the two intermediate varieties of democracy and oligarchy, the former having preference over the corresponding grades of the latter; 8, extreme democracy; 9, ex- treme oligarchy; 10, tyranny. The plan of The Politics contemplates a detailed exposition of the conditions essential to the best con- stitution. It is not clear whether this feature of the work was intended by Aristotle to deal primarily with the best absolutely or with the best on the average. 2 In his treatment of the subject there is much that is abstract and idealizing, suggesting that he has in mind the pure aristocracy ; there is also very much of the characteristic Aristotelian practicality, suggestive of the polity. But in the text of The Politics, as it has come down to us, the details of constitutional organization are wholly lacking ; and attention is confined to the determination of the most favourable external conditions for the state and the most effective meth- ods of character-building for the people. 3 A prelim- 1 Cf. Susemihl, note 1:305. 2 Book III, end. Here the discussion is announced in general terms. The specific purpose is a moot question in the controversies of the commentators as to the order of the books. 3 The best state is the subject of Bks. VII and VIII, the latter being a mere fragment. ARISTOTLE ON THE BEST STATE 81 inary discussion, devoted to a nearer definition of the true end of the state, develops the conclusion that for the state, as for the individual, the best life lies in the pursuit of virtue, rather than of power or wealth. As there is nothing noble or exalted in the ruling of slaves by an individual ; so there is nothing noble or exalted in the exercise of despotic dominion by a state. 1 Conquest, therefore, through aggressive war is not to be recognized as an end to be kept in view by the philosophic legislator. 2 A peaceful career, devoted to self-perfection through the harmo- nious and unceasing activity of all the elements of political and social organization, is the true ideal, and that which involves complete happiness for both state and people. The realization of this ideal depends partly upon external conditions, which must be more or less determined by chance, but to a far greater extent upon the character and culture of the people, which may be fixed through scientific legislation. Aris- totle's treatment of both branches of the subject strongly suggests that of Plato in The Laws. He aims to present the desirable features of a city-state, without exceeding the limits of the possible, and he employs constantly the doctrine of the mean. The size of the population and the extent of territory 1 But Aristotle recognizes the justice of non-despotic dominion, '.. that which is directed to the good of the subject state rather than of the master state. VII, xiv, 21. 2 In strict accordance with his theory of slavery, Aristotle inti- mates that aggressive war is just when directed against those who are by nature slaves. Ibid. G 82 POLITICAL THEORIES must be sufficiently great to make the state self-suf- ficing. But the number of people must not exceed what can be well supervised (evorwoTrros) ; the com- munity must be a city (77-0X15) and not a people (etfvo?). 1 The city should be situated near enough to the sea to procure what is necessary from abroad, but not near enough unduly to stimulate commerce and the seafaring class. In natural endowments the population should resemble the Greeks, who combine the spirit and courage of the northern races with the intellectual keenness of the Asiatics. 2 The elements essential to make the state self-sufficing are agricul- turists, artisans, warriors, well-to-do people, priests, and administrators (K/HTCU TO>V Si/ccuW /cat orvfji(f>ep6i>- TCOV). Of these the first two, on principles already mentioned, while in the state cannot be of it. The other classes are as to personnel one. They must constitute the citizens proper, must own the land (in severalty, save a part owned by the state), and must perform at successive periods of life the functions of warriors, administrators (participants in all forms of purely political life) and priests. Performing thus in succession the various duties of citizenship, they will 1 " What commander," he asks, " could marshal so huge a host, or what herald, save with the voice of Stentor ? " That is, the limit of the number of citizens depends upon the possibility of conducting a public assembly at which all should be present. VII, iv, 11. 2 The Hellenes, he observes, are in a peculiar measure fitted for political life, and could, if united in a single government, rule the world. (VII, vii, 2, 3 ; cf. Plato, Republic, IV, 435.) Several philoso- phers since Aristotle have adopted his principle, and have applied it so as to show that their own particular people, because lying south of some nations and north of others, are especially qualified for ARISTOTLE ON THE BEST STATE 83 maintain that equality which is distinctive of the free citizen and will round out the civic character by experience in both ruling and being ruled. Sup- ported by the produce of their land, they will enjoy that leisure without which true virtue is impossible. In addition to these important considerations Aris- totle discusses many minor features of the internal ordering of the city, and devotes particular attention to the arrangements for defence against attack. His ideal city is not contemplated as remote from the contingencies of foreign war. The topography of the site, the water supply, the arrangement of the streets, all must have reference to a possible siege ; and fortifications, both walls and citadel, he regards as indispensable. Clinging firmly to his principle that aggressive war is excluded from the purposes of the ideal state, he maintains that a full provision of all the latest improvements in warlike equipment must be made as the surest guaranty against attack. As to the means through which the ideal character is to be developed in the citizens of the state, Aris- totle finds it, as did Plato, in scientific education (TraiScia). The ultimate function of the state is ped- agogic. For the perfection of the community de- pends upon the perfection of its constituent members, and the perfection of the latter can be achieved only through the cultivation of moral and intellectual excellence. Hence a system of uniform, compulsory, public education is the first essential of the best state, and the administration of such a system is the most important function of government. Aristotle's proj- 84 POLITICAL THEOEIES ect of educational legislation is of the same general character as that of Plato. It aims at mental cul- ture rather than practical utility, lays due stress upon the physical side of the training, 1 and attaches to music a moral significance and a character-making influence that are quite incomprehensible to the mod- ern mind. The full application of this system is to begin in the case of each citizen at the age of seven. But no less important to Aristotle than to Plato seems governmental supervision of life from its very inception. We find in The Politics provision for a rigid regulation of the times and conditions of mar- riage and procreation and of the care of the young. 2 Thus will be insured the ideal basis for the later training, the finished product of which will be a matured manhood of physical grace and beauty, com- bined with a moral and intellectual fitness for the lofty thought and noble action that are worthy of the free man's leisure. 7. Revolutions Ideally, the stability of a constitution would be in- sured by the system just described. From this point of view, Aristotle made no important advance over Plato. Practically, however, instability and trans- formation had been a most characteristic feature of 1 In connection with this, Aristotle inveighs even more strongly than Plato against the undue attention given by the Spartans to merely military exercises, and declares that the decline of Sparta proves that the system has been a failure. 2 The physical integrity of the population is to be maintained by the exposure of defective infants, and the legal limit of its size by the practice of abortion. VII, xvi, 15. ARISTOTLE ON REVOLUTIONS 85 Hellenic constitutional life, and as such it afforded a particularly appropriate field for the application of the Aristotelian method. Plato's systematic treat- ment of the subject was limited to a fanciful sketch of the evolution of existing constitutions from his ideal form ; l Aristotle devoted to it a whole book of The Politics, embodying an enormous mass of his- torical facts and a masterly exhibition of scientific analysis. The general trend of development, from royalty through oligarchy and tyranny to democracy, was explained by Aristotle as a concomitant of social and economic progress in Hellas. 2 A more specific determination of the sources of constitutional trans- formation was imperatively required, not only to complete the system of rational political specula- tion, but also to explain the chronic insurrection and revolution 8 which made the reality of Hellenic politics so different from the calm and orderly ex- istence of the philosophic ideal. Indeed, the ideal doubtless took its character largely from the aversion which the violent and ignoble features of actual politics inspired in the reflecting mind. The most general cause of revolutionary move- ments (o-racrts) Aristotle finds to be the craving of men for equality. As already noticed, equality has 1 Supra, p. 33. Aristotle's criticism of this part of Plato's work is unmerciful, and also to a considerable degree unfair. Politics, V, xii, 7-18. Cf. Jowett's notes ad loc. 2 Cf. Ill, xv, 11-13 ; IV, xiii, 9-12. 8 The political history of Hellas during the two centuries preced- ing the Macedonian conquest was, from this standpoint, not unlika the history of Latin America since 1800. 86 POLITICAL THEORIES a double character absolute and proportional. The masses are ever seeking for absolute equality for the same privileges and power that are possessed by the few ; the few strive for proportionate equality for a superiority in privilege and power corresponding to their superior wealth or ability or birth. 1 By this one broad principle, thus, may be explained the manifold phenomena of the conflicts for the estab- lishment of monarchy, aristocracy, oligarchy and democracy. Of the particular causes which are operative in revolutions the philosopher enumerates a large number, grouping them according as they lie more in the sphere of human passions (jealousy, arro- gance, fear, etc.) or in that of impersonal facts. His remarks under the latter head exhibit his insight at its best, tracing, as he does, political transformation to obscure social and economic sources. 2 Particular stress is laid upon the fact that the causes of revolu- tions are to be regarded as quite distinct from the occasions. The latter may be, and often are, inci- dents of trifling character; the former are always profound. Thus the private quarrel of Harmodius and Aristogiton with the Pisistratidse, while undoubt- edly the occasion, was by no means the cause of the downfall of the tyranny at Athens. These doctrines as to the causes of revolutions are applied by Aristotle to each of the special forms of 1 But noble birth, he explains again, signifies merely inherited wealth and virtue. Cf. supra, p. 75, note. 3 V, iii. For example, he notes how an oligarchy based on a prop erty qualification may be converted into democracy by a mere rise in values. Cf. V, vi, 17. AKISTOTLE ON REVOLUTIONS 87 constitution. Democracy, oligarchy, polity and aris- tocracy are subjected in turn to a searching examina- tion, through which the manner of their undoing is laid bare. 1 This investigation duly sets forth the influences which produced the broad trend of gov- ernment from monarchy to democracy, but at the same time explains all the manifold deviations from this general order. Democracy has not always been the last term of the series, but has often passed into oligarchy and tyranny. For both these transforma- tions the demagogues have been responsible. In the early days the fighting demagogue, by posing as the friend of the people, made himself tyrant; in later days the talking demagogue, ever assailing the rich, drives them to oligarchic revolution in self-defence. More common, however, is the transformation of democracy from the more moderate to the extremest variety, through the conviction impressed by the demagogues upon the masses that the people are above even the law. Oligarchy, Aristotle finds, falls chiefly through dissensions and ambitions in the privileged classes themselves. Where the rulers are harmonious, he says, an oligarchy is not easily overturned. But this form of constitution may, like democracy, be transmuted, not into a wholly distinct form, but into another variety of itself; and this often happens. As to the mixed constitutions, aris- 1 This investigation is an almost perfect example of the applica- tion of the historical method in political science. The facts adduced by Aristotle as the basis of his reasoning constitute a valuable body of sources for Greek history, and at the same time throw a rather lurid light on Hellenic politics. 88 POLITICAL THEORIES tocracy and polity, revolutions may most often be traced to an inexact adjustment of the different principles which are combined in them. Aristoc- racy tends to become oligarchy, through the undue encroachment of the richer classes ; polity to become democracy, through the undue aspiration of the poorer classes. Stability can be maintained only by proportionate equality and by giving to each his own. It is in these mixed constitutions in par- ticular that transformations are apt to take place unnoticed, through the imperceptible modification of social and economic conditions. Aristotle follows up his elaborate array of the causes that produce revolutions by an equally impressive array of means for preventing them. 1 The character of the particular causes suggests at once the character of the corresponding remedies. In the mixed consti- tutions especial care must be taken to detect the obscure beginnings of new conditions making for polit- ical change. In aristocracy and oligarchy the inferior classes must be well treated, and the principles of democratic equality must be strictly applied among the privileged classes. 2 The body of citizens inter- ested in political stability must often be roused by the cry that the constitution is in danger. 3 No single man should be permitted to attain to power either suddenly or in a disproportionate degree. "Men," the philosopher reflects, " are easily spoiled, and not every 1 V, viii. 2 E.g. offices must be held for short terms, so that all may partici- pate in them. 8 V, viii, 8. ARISTOTLE ON REVOLUTIONS 89 one can bear prosperity." Access to positions of power should be made gradual and slow, and undue influence on the part of any individual should be met, if necessary, by ostracism. In every state, further, the utmost care should be taken to exclude the officers from all opportunity of pecuniary gain. Especially important is this in oligarchy ; for while the masses may be contented to leave political office to others and devote themselves to money-making, they will always resent being excluded from positions that bring not only honour but also profit. The surest way to satisfy both the classes and the masses is to throw the offices open to all, but without salaries. This will in- sure in practice the manning of the offices chiefly by the well-to-do. But every care must be taken, through public statements as to the condition and conduct of the finances, to inspire confidence that the treasury is not being exploited by the officials. It is desirable, moreover, that no class should have a monopoly of the offices. In oligarchy the poor, and in democracy the rich, should be encouraged to share in those adminis- trative functions which do not affect the sovereign power. 1 This corresponds to the broad dictate of good policy, not to push to extremes the principle of any particular form. Extremes provoke resistance ; the 1 The qualities demanded by Aristotle in those who fill the supreme offices of the state are strikingly suggestive of Jefferson's triad of test questions. Aristotle enumerates : " (1) loyalty to the established con- stitution; (2) the greatest administrative capacity; (3) virtue and justice proper to each form of government." Jefferson asked : " la he honest? Is he capable? Is he faithful to the constitution?" The Politics, V, ix, 1 ; Jefferson's Works (1854), IV, 405. 90 POLITICAL THEORIES mean should be observed ; for, whatever element may rule, all the other elements are valuable to the state. Finally, the most efficient of means for the preserva- tion of the state from revolution is that which is in general the least considered a system of education in the spirit of the constitution. Legislation is likely to avail little unless the youth of the city are trained to appreciate what is truly essential to the mainte- nance of their particular system. But this does not mean that oligarchic training is to involve merely what is agreeable to the wealthy, and democratic training what is agreeable to the masses. That would only emphasize the evils which already exist. For in oligarchies the aristocratic youth pass their time in idleness and profligacy, while the masses are left to toil and plot rebellion ; and in democracies distorted notions of liberty and equality lead to license and to the overthrow of all constitutional restraint. 1 Aristotle's discussion of the monarchic constitutions is particularly noteworthy for his finished exposition of tyranny as an art. Royalty, as a practical insti- tution, is in his eyes only a more or less interesting survival from archaic times and conditions. It was essentially the unchecked rule of a supereminent individual or family over willing subjects. But with general enlightenment the preeminence of any one man has become impossible, and the passing of roy- alty cannot be prevented ; for when the subjects cease to yield the monarch willing obedience, whatever abso- lute power he retains must rest on force, and he is 1 V, ix, 15. ARISTOTLE ON TYRANNY 91 therefore no king, but a tyrant ; and if, on the other hand, he submits to limitations on his power, he may remain king in name, but is no longer a monarch in fact. As distinct from royalty, tyranny is to Aristotle a political phenomenon sufficiently modern to demand the same scientific consideration as actual constitu- tions. 1 Of all the species of government it is as a rule the least permanent ; therefore the causes which lead to its downfall require special attention. In general these causes are the same as those which operate in the extremest varieties of democracy and oligarchy. The inherent likeness of these forms to tyranny is, in fact, the theme of reiter- ated comment by Aristotle. 2 To counteract the influences working against him and to maintain his power, the tyrant has, the phi- losopher points out, the choice between two dia- metrically opposite policies. That most commonly adopted is one of ruthless and unqualified repression: the best citizens are slain or banished; whatever makes for a noble and exalted life among the people is suppressed ; association for intellectual or social purposes is forbidden ; espionage renders dangerous all freedom of intercourse ; vast enterprises, whether of peace 3 or of war, are devised to keep the people 1 Tyranny was not a TroAtTeui in the Aristotelian sense of the term. IV, viii, 2. 2 E.g. " The people likes to be a monarch. Wherefore, the para- site is esteemed by both, . . . for the demagogue is the parasite of the people." V, xi, 12. 3 Aristotle cites the Egyptian Pyramids, among other examples of this. 92 POLITICAL THEORIES occupied and poor; and the tyrant himself, sur- rounded by a servile crowd of foreigners, lives a life of undisguised luxury and selfishness. The more rare, but in Aristotle's opinion the more effective, policy is that according to which the tyrant keeps a firm hold on the essence of power, but disguises the reality of the tyranny by the semblance, at least, of beneficent rule. The administration is ostentatiously economical ; the public interest is made a subject of the ruler's grave concern ; those who come in contact with him are inspired with respect, rather than with fear ; he patronizes genius, shows constant respect for the things of religion and avoids all public displays of sensuality or luxury. It is essential to this policy, however, that the tyrant shall win a reputation for at least the military virtues ; that he shall select his subordinates from men of plodding, rather than enter- prising character; and that, while inspiring the rich and the poor with distrust of each other and confi- dence in him, he shall, when choice must be made between them, side always with the stronger. 1 In short, the characteristics of monarchic rule of this kind are that it be rather paternal than despotic, that it be based on moderation rather than excess, and that it be popular winning the classes by friend- ship and the masses by the arts of the demagogue. On such principles the tyrant's rule will be better for 1 Another and very famous dictate of policy suggested by Aristotle is, that all the rewards and honours of state should be bestowed by the ruler in person, while the punishments and disgraces should flow through other channels. V, xi, 26. THE HELLENIC IN ARISTOTLE 93 the subjects, will be more lasting, and will tend to have a beneficial influence on the character of the ruler himself. 8. The Hellenic and the Universal in Aristotle The foregoing sketch of Aristotle's work should at least suggest the importance of the purely Hellenic elements in his political philosophy. His historical research went far beyond the confines of Hellas, but the system which he framed was determined in its most essential characteristics by the conditions that prevailed within those confines. The postulates of his thought, as of Plato's, were : the general superi- ority of the Greeks over other races ; the inherent necessity and justice of slavery as the basis of social organization ; the typical character of the city-state in political organization ; the incompatibility of bread- winning pursuits with the moral and intellectual attributes of good citizenship; the supreme impor- tance of state-directed education and training in the maintenance of political virtue ; and, finally, the sub- ordination of all personal motives and conduct to the dictates of law conceived either as the purely impersonal and more or less mystic product of divine or natural forces, or as the formulated wisdom of some individual of almost superhuman sagacity. 1 In the course of the ages most of these ideas either 1 Aristotle, while ascribing law in general to the slow working of custom, manifests at times the influence of the common Hellenic idea v that a perfect code may be, as it has been, projected into operation by an all-wise legislator. 94 POLITICAL THEORIES have passed entirely out of consideration or have been so modified as to lose the significance which Aristotle attached to them. But when we look fur- ther into his philosophy, beneath the general outlines determined by these Hellenic dogmas, we find a long series of principles which are as ultimate as human nature itself, and which, in almost the exact shape in which Aristotle formulated them, are features of political science at the present day. Prominent among these is the distinct and unequivo- cal conception of the ultimate problem of politics the reconciliation of liberty and authority. The primary fact of the state he represents to be the dis- tinction between rulers and ruled. That is, political organization is inconceivable without the submission of one human will to another. The anarchist's con- ception of liberty and equality, incompatible with this doctrine, is denounced by Aristotle. Describing the tendencies of extreme democracy, he says : Equality is held to signify the rule of the majority, and liberty and equality to mean that each may do as he will. Hence, in democracies each follows his own inclinations. But this is evil. For life in subjection to the constitution is not to be regarded as slavery, but as the highest welfare. 1 This view as to the relation between the individual and the state is duly supplemented by the doctrine as to the qualifications under which the personal author- ity in government is manifested. The most charac- teristic function of the officer is, indeed, declared to be the issuing of orders. 2 But above the officer he V,ix, 15. *IV, XT, 4. THE UNIVERSAL IN AEISTOTLE 95 insists must be the impersonal factors in the consti- tution namely, public opinion and customary law. The latter force he describes with perfect clearness ; the former, though less distinctly defined, is undoubt- edly what he has in view in ascribing to the people as a whole the function of final judgment on official con- duct and in defending the thesis that the opinion of the mass is preferable to that of the expert. 1 In respect to the ultimate idea of sovereignty Aris- totle discerns, rather than adopts, the theories of modern times. He realizes the importance of a de- terminate human superior, whose undoubted will is final ; but he recurs again to the thought of a law controlling even this sovereign. He prefers that this ultimate human superior should be the whole people ; but he qualifies this solution, first, by limiting it to a society in which the general level of virtue i.e. of moral and intellectual attainment is high, and second, by limiting the field of sovereign legislative activity to the region not previously occupied by law. Aristotle cannot, in fact, think of the sovereign as essentially legislator. The normal function of the supreme organ is administration ; but, almost with- out being aware of it, the philosopher resigns the key to his whole position by assuming that it is the duty of the sovereign to legislate when on any point " the law is either inadequate or improper." 1 Nothing more than this was needed to justify the proceedings of the popular assembly in extreme democracy, which 1 Supra, pp. 69-70. 2 *Olrtical man is asjmtirely dissociated from all standards of conduct save success in the establish- ment and extension of governmental power as is the "..economic man" of the orthodox schooFl[rom all save success in the creation of wealth. The employment of violence, cruelty, bad faith and all the other vices is discussed, in both The Prince, and The Discourses, with only the most per- functory expressions of moral disapproval, 2 and the employment of virtue and religion with as little evi- dence of moral appreciation. A scientific indifference so thoroughgoing as that of Machiavelli could hardly have failed to subject him to the reproach of sympa- thy with evil. He lays it down, for example, that while it is most praiseworthy for a prince to be good, 1 Supra, p. 51 e.t seq. 2 Cf. the comparison of cruelty " badly used " with cruelty " well used," " se del male e lecito dire bene." The Prince, c. 8. RELATION OF POLITICS AND MORALITY 299 nevertheless one who wishes to maintain his authority must be ready to lay aside his goodness at any moment, and in general to employ it or not according to circumstances. Moreover, since no man can be expected to possess all the virtues, the discreet ruler will particularly avoid the infamy of those vices which endanger the state, and will thus be relieved of concern about those which are necessary to pre- serve it. 1 And again, in perhaps the most famous passage in his works, he refers to the common impres- sion that the keeping of faith is praiseworthy, and then proceeds to demonstrate that, for the sake of maintaining political power, deceit and hypocrisy are indispensable. 2 " The prince must appear all sin- cerity, all uprightness, all humanity, all religion ; " but he must have his mind so disciplined that, when it is necessary to save the state, he can act regardless of these. " Let the prince, then, look to the main- tenance of the state ; the means will always be deemed honourable and will receive general approbation." And when Machiavelli is treating of republics, his conclusions are the same : " I believe that when there is fear for the life of the state, both monarchs and republics, to preserve it, will break faith and display ingratitude." 3 Moral judgments, thus, are wholly subordinate, in Machiavelli' s philosophy, to the exigencies of political existence and welfare. He is not immoral, but un- moral in his politics. And the same attitude appears in relation to religion. He is not irreligious, but 1 The Prince, c. 15. 2 Ibid. c. 18. 8 Discourses, Bk. I, c. 59. 300 POLITICAL THEORIES unreligious. So far as religious practices involve the operation of forces above the influence of human reason, they are entirely out of his sphere ; but so far as religion is operative in determining relations to the state and the trend of political development, it is sub- jected to the same cold-blooded analysis as appears in his treatment of morality. Religious sentiment is viewed as an important instrument of state policy, and as such it must be taken account of by statesmen always. Not at all, however, because of any profound truth to which the sentiment corresponds, but because the decline of respect for religion is the surest sign of approaching ruin for the state, and because wise statesmen are able, through appeal to this sentiment, to achieve reforms which otherwise would be beyond their power. 1 Always, thus, Machiavelli has in mind the neces- sity of the existence of the state as the first principle of his philosophy. The whole effect of this point of view is summed up in the dictates of unscrupulous patriotism : " Where the safety of one's country is at stake there must be no consideration of what is just or unjust, merciful or cruel, glorious or shameful ; on the contrary, everything must be disregarded save that course which will save her life and maintain her independence." 2 1 Sono molti beni, conosciuti da uno prudente, i quali lion hanno in sfe ragioni evident! da poterli persuadere ad altri. Pero gli uomini savi ricorrono a Dio. Cosi fece Licurgo, cosi Solone. Discorsi, 1, 11. 2 Dove si delibera al tutto della salute della patria, non vi debbe cadere alcuna considerazione ne di giusto ne d' ingiusto, ne de pietoso ne di crudele, ne di laudabile ue d' iguoniinioso ; anzi, posposto ogni EFFICIENCY VERSUS MORALITY 301 A second influence which was obviously at work in determining Machiavelli's treatment of the relation j)f politics to morality and religion was his admiratiofT .lor power and efficiency in man. This feeling was temperamental and largely unconscious. The philoso- pher could not avoid a sense of pleasure in any mani- festation of the ability to reach a desired end with clear-cut and indisputable success. He had in him the stuff that the hero-worshipper is made of. The strong man and his art constituted a theme to which Machiavelli's genius inevitably returned. His intimate familiarity with the workings of government in the weak Florentine republic, where divided coun- sels, temporizing and vacillation were so conspicuous, strongly confirmed the natural disposition to minute analysis of the elements which combined to make the policy of a state fixed, definite and coherent. Hence his rather unfortunate favourable judgment upon Caesar Borgia, 1 which involves approval, not of either the end or the means of that tyrant's policy, but merely of the relation between end and means. And hence, too, the reproach visited upon the Baglioni for not slaying Pope Julius II when the opportunity was given ; 2 without passing any judgment upon the morality of the policy which the tyrant should have pursued, Machiavelli merely points out the utter inconsistency of an ill-timed scruple with the policy in question. And the same characteristic of the altro rispetto, seguire al tutto quel partito che le salvi la vita e man- tenghile la liberta. Discorsi, III, 41. 1 The Prince, c. 7. 2 Discourses, I, 27. 302 POLITICAL THEORIES philosopher's thought is seen in his reiterated dis- paragement of a middle course in affairs of state. 1 Finally, the separation of politics from ethics and religion is maintained by Machiavelli consciously as a result of the conviction that this corresponds most closely to the facts of human existence. He is in thejiullest jsense a student of practical politics, and he seeks to determine the workings of a real, not of an ideal, political life. Imaginary and impossible states have for him no interest whatever. His pur- pose is " to get bacTTio ftTe actual truth of things." 2 There is, he says, the greatest difference between the way in which men live and that in which they ought to live ; and the former, not the latter, is deliberately chosen as the subject of his investigations. This point of view was, of course, most useful. It corrected the tendency to make of political science a mere congeries of moral and religious precepts. At the same time it involved the interpretation of his- tory and the formulation of political philosophy in terms of the most advanced rationalism of the pagan Renaissance. In the intellectual classes of Machia- velli's day moral and religious emotion was practi- cally extinct. A calculating self-interest served for a practical standard of conduct, and a perfunctory observance of the forms of the Christian religion did not disguise a widespread rejection of its substance. It was easy, therefore, in such an environment for Machiavelli to formulate his political philosophy 1 Discourses, I, 26 and 30. 2 . . . mi e parso piu conveniente andare dietro alia verita effettu- ale della cosa. // Principe, cap. 15. MACHIAVELLI 303 independently of ethical and theological influences. It was easy for him, also, in the presence of such careers as those of the Borgias, to present "the actual truth of things " as expressed in the disso- ciation of political from moral and religious prin- ciples and practices. And it was very natural for him to heap invective upon the Roman Church, not so much for having abandoned its religion, as for having violated all the scientific proprieties by assuming a leading place in politics. 1 On the whole it must be said that while Machia- velli's attitude toward morality and religion was scientifically justifiable, and contributed greatly to the clarification of the problems of politics, the lack of feeling which characterized the expression of his views afforded considerable ground for the suspicion that he was not only scientifically unmoral, but also practically immoral, and for the criticism to which he has been subjected throughout succeeding cen- turies. Yet it may be doubted whether, with all the reproach that is due him, he has not been too severely punished by having to bear the odium that is concentrated in the term " Machiavellian." 4. Theory of Political Motives So far as Machiavelli's method requires generaliza- tions or .assumptions as to tho -motiv-e& by which men are guided in social and political life, his doctrine is essentially identical with- tharM^-which Hobbes later gave a very precise scientific form. Men are looked 1 The Prince, c. 11; Discourses, I, 11. 304 POLITICAL THEORIES upon as purely selfish, and as actuated always by impulses in which the so-called social virtues have no part. A narrow self-interest affords for Machia- velli a sufficient explanation of all political phe- nomena. His cynical judgments on this subject are even more repulsive than those of Hobbes, for the reason that they lack the broad psychological foun- dation on which the latter carefully placed them. Particularly frank are Machiavelli's opinions as expressed in The Prince. Generally speaking, he says, men are "ungrateful, fickle, deceitful, cow- ardly and avaricious." From this is drawn the conclusion that a monarch should aim rather to be feared than to be loved. Love, he argues, implies a bond of obligation which men, being essentially selfish, break on every occasion where their own interest demands it ; while fear, for the same reason, holds them indefinitely. 1 Again, the simple-minded- ness of men and their readiness ever to submit to the necessity of the moment make them an easy prey to an unscrupulous leader. " He who wishes to deceive will always find some one to be deceived." 1 Men judge altogether by appearances, and this gives opportunity to the crafty ruler. But further, men are not only in general weak and ignorant, they are naturally vicious, and are made good only by necessity. It is for this reason that the wise prince can never trust to counsellors, but must depend upon his own judgment. 3 1 The. Prince, c. 17. 2 Ibid. c. 18. 3 " . . . gli uomini sempre ti riusciranno tristi, se da una neces- gitk non scmo fatti buoni. Pero si conchiude che li buoni consigli, da MATERIALISTIC END OF THE STATE 305 .These pessimistic conceptions of human nature appear abundantly also in the "Discourses, where they receive a somewhat fuller psychological setting. Mach- iavelli brings over bodily from PoTyBius the latter's theory as to the origin and cycle of governments and the foundation of social institutions. This theory puts into the background the Aristotelian view of the social nature of man and is readily adaptable to the \ , view. _that society has its origin in a calculating * > self -interest on the part of the individual. 1 Machia- ,^) _. - r A? velli gives to this general line of thought a distinctly materialistic turn in his comments on the Agrarian laws at Rome. Here, in a thoroughly Hobbesian manner, he sets forth that men have by nature end- less desires, and that the craving for additional satis- faction of them is the mainspring of all human action. One of the most potent of these desires is that which finds satisfaction in private property. In The Prince' 2 ' Machiavelli declares that " men more readily forget the death of a father than the loss of a patrimony," and bases on this the injunction that executions should be reasonably few, but confiscations none at all. In the Discourses this same idea receives fuller develop- ment, and a materialistic individualism is made the explanation of the love of independence and self- government. To a small extent these ends are sought from the desire to exercise power, but it is only a few individuals who are actuated by this qualunque venghino, conviene naschino dalla prudenza del Principe, e non la prudenza del Principe da' buoni consigli." II Principe^ cap. 23. 1 Discourses, I, 2. Cf. supra, p. 115. a c. 17. 306 POLITICAL THEORIES motive; the masses seek only security for person and property. 1 Republican government is desired because it gives a chance of material gain to a majority of the people; under monarchy the prince absorbs all the profit himself. And independence is desired because wealth multiplies most in states that are not subject to others. 2 Material prosperity is, in short, Machiavelli's idea of the chief conscious basis of political life among men. How far this conception is from that of the ancient philosophers, that the state is an institution devoted to the moral and intellectual uplifting of a community, and from the mediaeval notion, that the end of the state is primarily to smooth men's way to eternal salvation, it is not necessary further to demonstrate. 5. The Forms of Government Machiavelli's treatment of the classification of gov- ernments starts with a perfunctory adoption of the Aristotelian system, namely, monarchy, aristocracy and constitutional democracy, with the three corre- sponding corruptions tyranny, oligarchy and democ- racy ; and the same conclusion is reached with that of Polybius and Cicero, that a mixed form is the best and most stable. 3 This line of thought is not followed 1 Una piccola parte di loro desidera d' essere libera per comandare ; ma tutti gli altri, che sono infiniti, desiderano la libertk per vivere sicuri. Discorsi, I, 16. 2 Discourses, II, 2. The rule of a conquering republic is in Machi- avelli's opinion far more destructive to the prosperity of subject states than that of a conquering prince. 8 Discourses, I, 2. COMMONWEALTH VERSUS MONARCHY 307 out to any extent, however, and serious attention is concentrated on the characteristics and relative ad- vantages of monarchies, or principalities, and popu- lar governments, or republics. The blending of the ideas of antiquity with the influence of contemporary conditions is obvious at every step in the progress of his reflection. The isolated and non-expanding Hellenic city-state, republican or despotic, with its analogue in the Italian city-state ; the expanding city- state of Rome, with its imperial development ; and the recently founded quasi-national monarchy, all combine in determining his conclusions. The Prince is essentially a study of monarchy in relation to the extension of political dominion, and The Discourses is in like manner a study of popular government in relation to the same end. As between the princely and the popular form Machiavelli is very far from being the thorough- going advocate of despotism that an unfortunate reputation has tended to make him. His apprecia- tion of republican government is no less pronounced than that of Aristotle himself, and in respect to this form the judgments of the Italian, making allowance for the difference in ideals, are in substantial agree- ment with those of the Greek. For a community in which a general economic equality prevails, Machia- velli holds that the commonwealth is the best and, indeed, the only possible form of government. 1 The people as a whole is, he thinks, wiser and no more 1 ... dove e equalitk, non si puo fare Principato ; e dove la non fe, non si puo far Repubblica. Discorsi, I, 55. 308 POLITICAL THEORIES vacillating than a prince. The ingratitude of repub- lics is no greater than that displayed by princes. 1 The judgment of the people, especially in such matters as the choice of officers and the assignment of honours, is in general sound and unimpeachable. 2 Granting that a prince is best suited to the original establishment of political or legal institutions, a popu- lar government is best qualified to maintain them. 8 Again, republics keep faith better than princes, if not by choice, at least through the slower working of their organs. 4 And finally, in respect to that adaptation to times and circumstances which is essen- tial to the success of any policy, the republic has an advantage over the monarchy, in that the character of the prince will not change with conditions, while among the many characters which participate in the service of a republic, one may always be found that is just suited to the particular needs of a given time. 5 Machiavelli thus manifests no irrational preference for monarchy ; and his judgments in respect to aristo- cratic power are almost wholly unfavourable. The an- tithesis of the great (i grandi) and the masses (il popolo) he considers a prime factor in the life of every city-state (citify, and his feeling is frankly with the latter. The mass of the people he believes to be the 1 Discourses, I, 58. a IUd . Tj 47 _4 8 . C yi III, 34. Ibid. I, 58. * Ibid. I, 59. 5 Ibid. Ill, 9. He illustrates by the rise of Fabius and Scipio at different stages of the Punic wars, and, on the other hand, by the career of Pope Julius II, whose fiery impetuosity never varied what- ever the circumstances. MACHIAVELLI ON ARISTOCRACY 309 best support for an elective monarch, 1 to be the most effective instrument for the maintenance of inde- pendence, and to be far less productive of internal disturbance than the aristocracy. 2 The leading motive of the upper class he conceives to be in all cases the passion for the exercise of authority, while the masses desire only peace and order. 3 A landed aristocracy (gentiluomini], in particular, renders free government impossible. 4 This class, indeed, when possessing castles and subjects of their own, he con- siders fatal to all social order (nimici d' ogni civilta). Where such conditions exist, as is the case in many parts of Italy, not only is the establishment of re- publican government impossible, but even monarchy can be set up only through the extinction or syste- matic transformation of the " gentlemen." A high degree of appreciation for the common- wealth based on the mass of equal citizens, is thus a distinguishing feature of Machiavelli's philosophy. But he fully recognizes that circumstances require different forms of organization at different times and in different places, and he is particularly attracted by the problem as to what system of organization and action is best adapted to the establishment of far- reaching dominion. Thus what Plato and Aristotle regarded as unworthy of consideration by either statesman or philosopher, becomes with Machiavelli the central point of interest. 1 The Prince, c. 9. 2 Discourses, I, 5. 8 Ibid. I, 16. 4 Dove sono gentiluomini, non si possa ordinare repubblica. Discorsi, I, 55. 310 POLITICAL THEORIES 6. On the Extension of Dominion The theory and practice of extending monarchic dominion is chiefly to be found in The Prince, while the expansion of republics is the theme of The Dis- courses. The process in each case is regarded by Machiavelli not as involving the blending of two or more social or political organisms, but as con- sisting in the subjection of a number of states to the rule of a single prince or commonwealth. The French and Spanish monarchies, in whose constitu- tions Machiavelli finds much to admire, are regarded as groups of states rather than as single organiza- tions, and in his plea for a united Italy he clearly has in mind a similar union. " No province," he says, "was ever united or happy save by becoming sub- ject in its entirety to a single commonwealth or a single prince, as has happened in France and in Spain." 1 This conception of unity has little in common with that which inspired the heroic national politics of the nineteenth century ; but it is precisely that which was to determine all the transformations of political geography in western Europe for three centuries after Machiavelli's death. In The Prince the chief heads of the discussion are, first the acquisition and second the exten- sion of princely power. Under the first head are set forth the methods by which principalities are 1 Veramente alcuna provincia non fu mai unita o f elice, se la non viene tutta alia ubbidienza d' una Repubblica o d' un Principe, come e awenuto alia Francia ed alia Spagna. Discorsi, L, 12. THE EXTENSION OF PRINCELY POWER 311 founded, illustrated by the policy of characters so diverse as those of Moses and Caesar Borgia. The former, with Cyrus, Romulus and Theseus, is taken to illustrate the acquisition of power by the indi- vidual's own resources and ability ; l while the Bor- gia is taken as a typical instance of those who owe their success to good fortune and the aid of others. All these heroes were founders of new states. The extension of dominion by a prince already at the head of a government gives rise to what Machia- velli calls a mixed principality (principato misto). His discussion of the methods best adapted to the creation and enlargement of such organiza- tions exhibits most fully, at the same time, the philosopher's intellectual acumen and his moral indifferentism. The line of least resistance to the ambitious prince is through peoples of his own race. It is easy to hold acquisitions made in the same country (pro- vincia) and where the same language is used; the conqueror has merely to extinguish the line of the former prince and let the old institutions remain. But acquisition of states (stati) in a country differ- ing in language and institutions from that of the conqueror involves more complex problems, the solution of which was, on the whole, achieved most successfully by the Romans. 3 The most serious difficulties to a conquering prince arise in 1 Virtu. This term is used by Machiavelli, like the Latin virtus and the Greek dpcriy, without any ethical connotation. 2 The Prince, c. 5. 312 POLITICAL THEORIES connection with a state that has been under repub- lican government prior to the conquest. Here the name of liberty and the memory of the ancient constitution will always serve as an inspiration to revolt ; and the only safe policy is utterly to destroy the community. 1 With all his admiration for the strong man, and all his confidence that the ability and resources of one truly great can determine the fate of states, Machiavelli nevertheless has a just appreciation of the persistent power inherent in the fundamental institutions (gli ordini) of a community. The surest test of the great man is his ability to introduce and maintain a new social and political constitu- tion. The reformer is hampered by the open hos- tility of those who derive profit from the old order, and by the lukewarmness of those who have only hope, but no certainty, of benefit from the new. The prince who takes over the sovereignty of a state and leaves it to go on under its old institu- tions has a simple task ; but he who assumes power in order to reform the constitution undertakes the most doubtful and dangerous of enterprises. 2 Suc- cess in this respect is what justifies the assignment of high position among statesmen to Moses, Cyrus, Romulus and Theseus; and the key to their success Machiavelli characteristically finds in the fact that they all took pains to have at hand armed force 1 Chi diviene padrone di una cittk consueta a vivere libera, e non la disfaccia, aspetti di essere disfatto da quella. The Prince, c. 5. 2 Ibid., c. 6. REPUBLICAN EXPANSION 313 sufficient to defend the new constitutions when persuasion ceased to be effective. That the inherent excellence of a new constitution is no guarantee of its permanence is proved, Machiavelli thinks, by the failure of reforming prophets who have not sustained themselves by arms, and notably by the recent case of Savonarola. The tendency toward extension of dominion is, in Machiavelli' s opinion, inevitable in both republics and monarchies. A prince is resistlessly impelled to such a policy by the insatiable craving for power, which is natural to men, and a republic, if not impelled by choice, is sure to be driven to it by necessity. 1 If the constitution of a republic is not such as to be suited to a policy of expansion, the foundations of the state will be torn away when the necessity for such a policy arises, and the constitution will be destroyed. 2 In carrying out the extension of its dominion, the Roman Republic set an example which, in Machia- velli' s opinion, no commonwealth can do better than implicitly follow. The elements of the Roman sys- tem he summarizes thus : Increase the population of the city ; acquire allies rather than subjects ; estab- lish colonies in the conquered territory ; turn all booty into the treasury ; carry on war rather by field cam- paigns and pitched battles than by sieges ; keep the state rich and the individual poor; and with the 1 Discourses, I, 6 ; II, 19. 2 Avendo ordinata una Repubblica atta a mantenersi non ampli- ando, e la necessity la conducesse ad ampliare, si verrebbe a torre via i f ondamenti suoi, ed a f aria rovinare piu presto. Discorsi, I, 6. 314 POLITICAL THEORIES utmost care maintain a well-trained army. 1 It is noteworthy that the greatest stress here, as in the discussion of successful monarchy, is put upon the force of arms. It is Machiavelli's fixed belief, due as much to his observation in Italian politics as to the teachings of history, that a well-trained citizen- soldiery is indispensable in a republic, not only for the purpose of aggrandizement, but even for main- taining existence. Both his active career in the Florentine administration and his philosophical writ- ings testify to his interest in the substitution of a popular militia for the mercenary bands that con- stituted the bulk of the fighting forces of his day. 2 In the Discourses he devotes a very clever chapter to demonstrating the falsity of the common saying that " money is the sinews of war." 3 Not money, but good soldiers, are in reality the essence of strength ; for, he says, " money will not always procure good soldiers, but good soldiers will always procure money." But with all Machiavelli's cynical exaltation of physical force as the foundation of the greatness of states, he will not, in last analysis, concede that this factor is as decisive as craft. He holds it unques- \ tionable truth that men never rise from insignificance \to greatness without the use of force and craft; but while force without craft is never sufficient, craft 1 Discourses, IT, 19. 2 He carried out in Florence a project for the organization of a citizen militia. See Villari, Niccolb Machiavelli e i suoi tempi, I, 509 et seq. 8 Discourses, II, 10. MACHIAVELLI 315 without force will meet with success. 1 This principle applies not only to principalities, but also to repub- lics, as he amply demonstrates by reference to the career of the Romans. 7. On the Preservation of Dominion While the more or less definite conviction that every government must either extend its authority or perish, gives to Machiavelli's doctrine of aggran- dizement the chief importance in his philosophy, nev- ertheless his works abound in striking presentations of the principles on which depends the ordinary peaceful working of both monarchic and republican institutions. For the, stability of princely governments, the first great rule of policy is respect for the established institutions and customs of the land. Men who are well governed, and whose familiar ways of life are let alone, will not seek for any further liberty. 2 This is a consideration which should guide both hereditary and usurping monarchs. In the former class, how- ever, Machiavelli's interest is not very great ; with ordinary sagacity the hereditary prince has an easy task. 3 But the newly established prince has to con- front a more troublesome situation, and the dictates of sound policy for such a ruler are always more par- // ticularly in Machiavelli's mind. The Prince embodies 1 Io stimo che rado o non mai interveiiga che gli uomini di piccola fortuna vengono a gradi grand! senza la forza e senza la fraude. . . . Ne credo si truovi mai che la forza sola basti, ma si troverk bene che la fraude sola bastera. Discorsi, II, 13. 2 Discourses, III, 5. 8 The Prince, c. 2. 316 POLITICAL THEOKIES a comprehensive analysis of the art of tyranny, with conclusions that in very many respects coincide with those of Aristotle in his discussion of the same subject. 1 Because all government rests ultimately on force, 2 the prince must have a good army a proposition which excludes dependence on foreign mercenaries or allies. He must, on the whole, be parsimonious with his own money and that of his subjects, but lavish in distributing the spoils of war. 3 Severity rather than mildness must characterize his attitude in public affairs, but above all things he must keep his hands off the property and the women of his subjects. 4 He should endeavour to be, so far as possible, at the same time feared but not hated by the people ; and accord- ingly those duties of administration which involve odious responsibility should be performed by subordi- nates, while acts of grace should be attended to by the prince in person. 5 He must, moreover, embrace every opportunity to develop a reputation for exalted purposes and character. He must keep the people busy with great enterprises, must surround all his actions with an air of grandeur, must take open and decided part in the controversies of neighbouring 1 In The Politics ; cf. supra, p. 91 et seq. 2 I principal! fondamenti die abbino tutti gli stati . . . sono le buone leggi e le buoni armi ; e . . . noil possono essere buone leggi dove non sono buoni armi. II Principe, c. 12. 3 Ibid. c. 16. 4 Ibid. Abtise of subjects in these two respects is the most fruit- ful cause of conspiracies. See Discourses, III, 6, where conspiracies receive most elaborate and exhaustive discussion. 6 The Prince, c. 19. Machiavelli regards the French parlement as an institution devised by the king to relieve the crown of the hostility aroused by curbing the power of the nobles. THE PRESERVATION OF REPUBLICS 317 states, must pose as the patron of distinguished ability in the fine arts, and, finally, must liberally encourage the useful arts of commerce and agricul- ture, and refrain from interfering with them by bur- densome taxation. These dictates of enlightened despotism are thor- oughly blended, in their presentation, with the max- ims of non-moral conduct which have already been described. 1 The combination is a pretty good picture of the actual working of monarchic government in Machiavelli's own time. His corresponding discus- sion of the principles of republican government also involves a faithful reflection of actual conditions. But on this subject there is distinguishable at times an undertone of personal feeling which is totally lacking in The Prince, and which gives evidence of the fact that at heart Machiavelli had a preference for popular government. His idea of a commonwealth, or republic (Eepub- blica), is wholly that of antiquity, namely, a city- state. The thought that popular government could be organized for a whole "province" never appears. So also, as in ancient thought, the commonwealth implies the rule of the mass of the people (il popolo) as distinguished from the aristocracy (i grandi ; la nobilta). " Liberty " (liberta] is used, without dis- crimination, to designate either independence with respect to any external power, or a condition in which government is in the hands of the people rather than of the nobles or an individual. 2 The ancient distinc-* 1 Supra, p. 298 et seq. 2 Cf. Discourses, II, 2. 318 POLITICAL THEORIES tion between "pure" and "corrupt" republics is maintained by Machiavelli, "corruption" meaning the absence of a sense of equality among the citi- zens. " Corruption " is recognized as an economic rather than a political phenomenon, caused by the unequal accumulation of wealth, and as such the philosopher does not undertake to discuss the ways and means of preventing it, but merely assumes its existence. 1 His problem is to indicate what is essen- tial for the maintenance of popular government in either pure or corrupt communities. The example of Rome is so influential in determining his philoso- phy on these points that his views amount to a panegyric on the Roman Republic as idealized by the poets and historians of the post-republican age. It is worth while to consider, however, a few par- ticular judgments in which Machiavelli, while basing himself primarily on the recitation and eulogy of Roman practice, gives to his reflections the char- acter of universal political science. Here belongs his analysis of the interrelationship of constitution, custom and law in their bearing upon the permanence of republican government. The dis- tinction between the fundamental law of the state (gli ordini) and ordinary legislation (le leggi) is con- sistently maintained by Machiavelli. 2 Legislation 1 He does, however, repeatedly declare that the citizens should be kept poor, even if the state become rich. 2 In the Discourses, I, 18, he uses, in addition to the collective term, gli ordini, the phrase I' ordine del governo, o vero dello stato, indi- cating the sense of a distinction between state and government, such as was a little later put into systematic form by Bodin. CONSTITUTION AND CUSTOM 319 and custom, lie sees, are closely interdependent; a change in custom will easily be followed by corre- sponding changes in the laws. But the constitution does not thus share these changes. Remaining intact, it becomes by degrees out of harmony with custom and legislation, and therefore a source of ruin to the state. An adaptation of constitution as well as law to the varying conditions in a state is indispensable to the preservation of republican government. If the con- stitution is not flexible, the necessary adjustment will be effected, after disastrous delay, suddenly and by iolence rather than gradually and by peaceful pro- cedure, and the result is likely to be the entire destruction of the old order, as happened in Rome. But modification of the fundamental law in republics should always be made with the least possible devia- tion from ancient forms, however great the change in substance ; for people are in general content with appearances and do not penetrate to the realities of / things. 1 No less noteworthy than this appreciation of con- stitutional reform as a means of escaping revolution is Machiavelli's appreciation of the necessity of pro- vision in a republic for the exercise of absolute power by some officer of the government in great emergen- ) cies. The dictatorship he regards as one of the most \ essential features of the republican constitution of I Rome, and one of those which contributed most to the greatness of the state. 2 Popular governments 1 L'universale degli uomini si pasce cosi di quel che pare come di quello che e. Discorsi, I, 25. 2 Discourses, I, 34. 320 POLITICAL THEORIES particularly need provision for prompt and efficient action in critical times, from the fact that the normal action of the administration, requiring as it does the cooperation of many wills, is feeble and slow. If the constitution does not provide for the necessary con- centration of authority, the constitution will be broken when the stress comes and the requisite action will be taken regardless of the fundamental law. Thus, however, a precedent will be created in a good cause which may later be followed in a bad. The Roman dictatorship, therefore, carefully limited as it was by well-defined methods of creation and termi- nation, furnishes a model for all free governments. 1 This judgment upon the necessity of dictatorial power in republics was as sound as it was unusual. On another prominent feature of Roman history, Machiavelli likewise takes issue with the common opinion. The party controversies between plebs and nobles he regards not as evidence of unsoundness and sources of disaster in the state, but as an indispen- sable condition of Roman greatness. 2 His reasoning approaches that of the modern school which sees in friction and strife the conditions of continuous exist- ence. One must not be deceived, he in substance says, by the noise and tumult of party contention. These 1 The idea that it was the existence of the dictatorship that ena- bled Caesar to enslave Rome, and that hence such an institution is dangerous, is dismissed with the characteristic observation that it was the power and not the official title of Csesar that overthrew the repub- lic, and that if the name and office of dictator had not been at hand, the power which he employed would merely have taken some other name. Discourses, I, 34. 2 Ibid. I, 34. PARTY STRIFE AND FOREIGN WAR 321 are not of the essence of the matter. Under cover of the shouting and the stress of the controversy are pro- duced results which, while not consciously in the pur- pose of the contestants, are of vital importance to the state. Party struggles furnish a necessary vent to the emotions and ambitions of the common peo- ple, test the powers and demonstrate the ability of the leading citizens, and call into existence the insti- tutions and laws which prove the mainstay of the government in later days. All these results are dis- coverable in the history of Rome, and all are essen- tial to an expanding republic. 1 Channels through which the feelings (umori) of the common people may find adequate and harmless expression are, in Machiavelli's opinion, of the greatest importance, and he suggests various other means to this end, par- ticularly approving ample facilities for the making and judicial investigation of charges against public characters. 2 Men of real distinction and marked ability are always looked upon with suspicion by the masses. In times of peace and quiet they are wholly neglected in republics, and the leadership falls into the hands of the rich and well connected. 3 An es- cape from the perils of such a tendency was found by Rome, he thinks, in the policy of incessant war, through which the best of her citizens were kept always to the front. For the republic which would correspond most 1 Sparta and Venice, as types of the non-expanding republic, did not exhibit the phenomena of party strife. Discourses, I, 6. 2 Ibid. I, 7. s Ibid. Ill, 16. 322 POLITICAL THEORIES closely to Machiavelli's ideal, therefore, vehement internal party strife and an ever aggressive foreign policy, would be normal and indispensable conditions of existence. This again throws a strong light on the divergence, which the many resemblances serve to em- phasize, between the Machiavellian and the Aristotelian politics. 8. Summary and Conclusion The influence of Machiavelli upon the history of political theories can hardly be exaggerated. Not only the method and substance of his philosophy but also the marvellous literary art with which it was expressed served to win for it universal attention. Criticism of his doctrine developed into vehement controversy, in which a grotesquely distorted concep- tion of his system, labelled Machia veil ism by its adversaries, brought much open obloquy upon the philosopher, and at the same time stimulated, though less conspicuously, much respect for and adoption of his method and his real principles. By far the fore- most among the ideas which the Florentine made prominent in political science was that of a distinc- tion between the standards of public and of private morality. On this point has turned most of the dis- cussion of which Machiavellism has been the centre. The whole trend of theory under the influences which characterized the time of the Reformation was against the view which Machiavelli propounded ; but the prac- tice of the age continued to furnish, like all preceding ages, incontestable evidence that the " reason of state " INFLUENCE OF MACHIAVELLI 323 took precedence, in political life, of the moral code which was recognized as valid Between man and man. In Frederick the Great of Prussia Machiavellian doc- trine received a particularly noteworthy confirmation. For Frederick, as a mere irresponsible philosopher, roundly berated the Italian for the immoral teachings of The Prince ; but in later life, as the ambitious head of a struggling and sorely beset state, he exemplified in his policy some of the very maxims which he had most solemnly denounced. Next in importance to his view of the relation between politics and morality, in its influence on later political philosophy, was Machiavelli's method his reunion of theory and practice. Though the mediaeval tendency to philosophize " in the air " to speculate on the basis of conditions which had lost, if they ever had possessed, the semblance of reality by no means entirely disappeared after Machiavelli's time; though it continued fora century or more to characterize a large body of political lit- erature : yet his relentless empiricism gave an impulse to the method of observation and experience which was not exhausted till the last vestiges of medievalism in political theory had vanished. Finally, a summary of the chief influences which radiated from Machiavelli into the broad field of political science must include reference to his doctrine of aggrandizement. In the assumption that extension of power was the test of excellence in government, he established a philosophic basis for accepting as rational and as a fit subject for reflection, that con- 324 POLITICAL THEORIES solidation of states which was so prominent a fact of the times. In suggesting for he did not strongly press the idea that the logical limit of this con- solidation in any case was the limit of ethnic homo- geneity, he projected an influence which was felt in the nineteenth century. But the doctrine of nationality, which has thus far played so prominent a part in the expansion of states, has in reality no logical relation to Machiavelli's fundamental principle. Already a multitude of other bases for conquest, more adequate to later necessities, are familiar to current thought. To justify the extension of political power the Aryan is devised, with a claim to dominate the Semite or the Turanian, the "political peoples" are assigned the desired preeminence over the " non- political," the civilized over the uncivilized. Nation- ality has proved merely a temporary and transitional phase of the trend toward expansion on Machiavellian lines, which has in fact no logical limit save that of power. Machiavelli is sometimes called the first modern political philosopher. It is quite as accurate to say that he ends the mediaeval era as that he begins the modern. Great as was his influence in stimu- lating reflection, it was not by his radical rejection of all the characteristics of mediaeval political theory that the modern era was introduced. Western Europe could not be rationalized and paganized off-hand. Before the death of Machiavelli, Luther gave the signal for the movement which was to keep the MACHIAVELLI 325 intellectual energy of Europe fully occupied for a hundred and fifty years in the fields of theology and morals. Machiavellian doctrine was influential dur- ing this time, though Machiavelli's name was exe- crated by all parties. Only after the Keformation had been succeeded by the Revolution was frank and open recognition given to Machiavelli's philo- sophical depth and practical political sagacity. SELECT REFERENCES BLAKEY, Vol. I, pp. 266-273. BLUNTSCHLI, Geschichte der neuern StaatswissenscJiaft, pp. 13-26. DETMOLD, The His- torical, Political and Diplomatic Writings of Niccolo Machia- velli, trans. ELLINGER, Die antiken Quellen der Staatslehre Machiavellis, in Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, Vol. 44. FRANCK, Reformateurs et Publicistes, moyen age, p. 287 et seq. HALLAM, Literature of Europe, Vol. I, pp. 411- 417. JANET, Vol. I, p. 491 et seq. (Bibliography of Machia- velli, pp. 596-601). MACAULAY, Machiavelli, Essays, Vol. I, pp. 267-320. MOHL, Geschichte und Literatur der Staatswissen- schaften, Bd. Ill, S. 521 et seq. (Bibliography of Machiavelli literature). MORLEY, Machiavelli (Romanes Lecture, 1897). Morley's Universal Library, The Prince, trans. OWEN, Skep- tics of the Italian Renaissance, pp. 165-172. SYMONDS, Renais- sance in Italy (Age of the Despots), pp. 308-370. THOMSON, Machiavelli's Discourses on the First Decade of Livy, trans. VILLARI, Niccold Machiavelli e i suoi tempi, esp. Vol. II, pp. 268-473 (II Principe e i Discorsi); Vol. Ill, pp. 198-292 (Istorie Florentine) ; Vol. I, trans. BIBLIOGRAPHY I. TEXTS AND EDITIONS OF WRITERS RECEIVING SPECIAL CONSIDERATION Aegidius Romanus. De Regimine Principum. Roma, 1482. For a French version see below, Molenaer. JEne&s Sylvius. Tractatus de Ortu et Autoritate Imperil Romani, in Goldast, Monarchia, Vol. II, p. 1558 et seq. Agobard, Bishop of Lyons. Works in Migne, Patrologia Latina, Vol. 104. Ambrose, Bishop of Milan. Works in Migne, Vols. 14-17. A few letters are also in Goldast, Monarchia, Vol. II. Aristotle. The Politics : Susemihl, Aristoteles Politik. Leipzig, 1879. Susemihl and Hicks, The Politics of Aristotle. A revised text, etc. London, 1894. For translations of The Politics, see Jowett, Welldon, in second part of this list. The Nicomachean Ethics : Greek text with English notes, by Sir Alexander Grant. 4th ed. London, 1885. For translation of the Ethics, see Peters. Augustine, Bishop of Hippo. De Civitate Dei. Libri 22. Lipsiae, Teubner, 1877. Bernard of Clairvaux. Works in Migne, Vols. 182-185. The work De Consid- eratione is also in Goldast, Monarchia, Vol. II, p. 68 et seq. Cicero. M. Tullii Ciceronis Scripta quae manserimt omnia recog- novit C. F. W. Mueller. (Sumptibus et typis B. G Teubneri.) Lipsiae, 1878. Part IV, Vol. II, pp. 271- 379 (De Republica), 380-450 (De Legibus). For trans- lation of the Republic, see below, Featherstonhaugh. 327 328 POLITICAL THEORIES Dante Alighieri. De Monarchia, in Opere Latine, edited by Giuliani, Flor- ence, 1878. The De Monarchia, translated by F. J. Church. London, 1879. Dubois, Peter. De Eecuperatione Terre Sancte, in Collection de textes pour servir a Fetude de Phistoire ; edited by Langlois. Paris, 1891. Gebhard of Salzburg. Work in Migne, Vol. 148 ; also in Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Libelli de Lite, Vol. I, p. 261. Gerson, Johannes Carlier. Opera, edited by Louis-Ellier du Pin. 5 vols., in fol. Amsterdam, 1703. His chief treatises on subjects of political import are also in Goldast, Vol. II, 1384 et seq. Goldast, Melchior. Collectio Constitutionum Imperialium. 4 vols. Franco- forti, 1713. Monarchia Sancti Romani Imperii; sive Tractatus de jurisdictione imperiali . . . et pontificia. . . . Franco- fordiae et Hanoviae, 1611-1614. 3 vols. Gratian. The Decretum is in Migne, Vol. 187, and also in every edition of the Corpus Juris Canonici. Gregory VII. Works in Migne, Vol. 148. Henry IV. Official documents in Goldast, Collectio Constitutionum Imperialium ; also in Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Constitutiones, Vol. I. Hincmar, Archbishop of Rheims. Works in Migne, Vols. 125-126. Hugo Floriacensis. Tractatus de Regia Potestate et Sacerdotali Dignitate, in Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Libelli de Lite, Vol. II, p. 465 et seq. Huss, John. Determinatio de Civili Dominio Clericorum, in Goldast, Monarchia, Vol. I, p. 232 et seq. Innocent III. Works in Migne, Vols. 214-217. BIBLIOGRAPHY 329 John of Paris. De Potestate Regia et Papali, in Goldast, Vol. II, p. 108. John of Salisbury. Works in Migne, Vol. 199. Machiavelli. Niccolo. Opere. Milano, 1804. Historical, Political and Diplomatic Writings, translated by C. E. Detmold. 4 vols. Boston, 1882. . II Principe, edited by L. Arthur Burd, with an Introduc- tion by Lord Acton. Oxford, 1891. The Prince, translated, in Morley's Universal Library. London, 1889. Discourses on Livy, translated by Thomson. London, 1883. Manegold of Lutterbach. Work in the Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Libelli de Lite, Vol. I, p. 308 et seq. Marsiglio of Padua. Defensor Pacis. Frankfort, 1612. Also in Goldast, Mo- narchia, Vol. II, pp. 154-312. Migne, Jacques Paul. Patrologiae cursus completus ab aevo apostolico ad tem- pora Innocentii III, anno 1216. Series Latina. 221 toms. Lutetiae Parisiorum, 1844-1864. Nicholas I. Works in Migne, Vol. 119. Nicolaus Cusanus (Nicholas of Cues). Opera Omnia. Basel, 1565. 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Oxford, 1901. Storrs, Richard S. Bernard of Clairvaux. The Times, the Man and his Work. New York, 1892. Strachan-Davidson, James Leigh. See Hellenica. Stumpf, Theodor. Die politischen Ideen des Nicolaus von Cues. Koln, 1865. 344 POLITICAL THEORIES Sullivan, James. Marsiglio of Padua and William of Ockam, in the Ameri- can Historical Review, Vol. II (1896-1897), pp. 409-426, 593-610. Susemihl, Franz. Die genetische Entwickelung der platonischen Philosophic. 2 Bde. Leipzig, 1855-1860. Bd. I, pp. 312-329 (Der Staatsmann) j II, pp. 58-312 (Der Staat) ; 559-696 (Die Gesetze). Aristoteles Politik. Leipzig, 1879. (Greek text with Introduction and Notes^) Susemihl, (Franz) and Hicks (R. D.). The Politics of Aristotle. A Revised Text with Introduc- tion, Analysis and Commentary (Books I-V). Lon- don, 1894. Symonds, John Addington. Renaissance in Italy : Part I The Age of the Despots. New York (1881), 1883. Taylor, T. M. A Constitutional and Political History of Rome from the Earliest Times to the Reign of Domitian. London, 1899. Teichmuller, Gustav. Die aristotelische Eintheilung der Verfassungsformen. St. Petersburg, 1859. (Cf. the review by Susemihl in Jahrb. f. Phil., CIII (1871), p. 137 et seq.) Thirlwall, Cannop. History of Greece. 2 vols. New York, 1845. (Chaps. Ixi, Ixiii : Achaean and ^tolian leagues.) Thomson, Ninian Hill (trans.). Machiavelli's Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius ; translated from the Italian. London, 1883. Thurot, C. Eludes sur Aristote. Paris, 1866. Tout, T. F. The Empire and the Papacy, 918-1273. New York, 1898. Ueberweg, Friedrich. History of Philosophy from Thales to the Present Time, trans, from the 4th German edition by George S. Morris 2 vols. New York, 1874-1885. BIBLIOGRAPHY 345 Van der Rest, E. Platon et Aristote. Essai sur les commencements de la science politique. Bruxelles, 1876. Villari, Pasquale. Niccolo Machiavelli e i suoi tempi, illustrati con nuovi documenti. 3 torn. Firenze, 1877-1882. Niccolo Machiavelli and his Times. Translated by Linda Villari. 2 vols. London, 1878. (Translation of Vol. I of the original.) Voigt, Moriz. Das jus naturale, aequum et bonum und jus gentium. 4 Bde. Leipzig, 1856-1875. Walter, Ferdinand von. Geschichte des romischen Eechts bis auf Justinian. 2 Bde. Bonn, 1860-1861. Welldon, James Edward Cowell. English translation of the Politics of Aristotle, with notes. London, 1883. Whibley, Leonard. Greek Oligarchies, their Character and Organization. London, 1896. Wilamowitz-Mollendorff, Ulrich Friedrich W. E. von. Aristoteles und Athen. 2 Bde. Berlin, 1893. Zeller, Eduard Gottlob. Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Ent- wicklung. 3 Bde. in 5. 3te Aufl. Leipzig, 1876-1889. Bd. 1: Allgemeine Einleitung. Vorsokratischen Phi- losophie. Bd. II: i, Sokrates und die Sokratiker. Plato und die alte Akademie; ii, Aristoteles und die alten Peripatetiker. Bd. Ill, i-ii : Die nacharistotelische Philosophie. A History of Greek Philosophy, from the Earliest Period to the Time of Socrates, trans. 2 vols. London, 1881. Plato and the Older Academy, translated from the Ger- man by S. F. Alleyne and A. Goodwin. London, 1876. Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, translated by B. F. C. Costelloe and J. H. Muirhead. 2 vols. London, 1897. Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics. Translated by 0. J. Reichel. New edition, London, 1880 ; and 1892. INDEX Abel : symbol of priesthood, 171. Achaean League, 100 ; Polybius a hostage of, 114. JEgidius Romanus (Colonna) : his treatise on politics, 208 ; holds the kingdom to be higher than the city-state, 209 ; prefers monarchy, 210 ; his classification of law and rights, 210 ; on universal property rights of Pope, 217. JEneas Sylvius : his work on the Roman Empire, 283. JEtolian League, 100. Agobard, Bishop of Lyons, 162. Ailly, Peter of, 266. Alexander VI (Pope), policy of, 288. Alexander the Great: effect of his conquests on Greek philosophy and politics, 99 ; conquests of, promoted cosmopolitism, 104-105. Ambrose, Bishop of Milan : relations with the emperors, 133; asserts theory of sacerdotal authority over emperors, 155 ; denies impe- rial right over churches, 156 ; on greater dignity of bishops as com- pared with princes, 170 ; acts of, cited in mediaeval argument, 176. Aquinas : see Thomas. Aragon : a fief of the Pope, 149 ; power of nobles in, 256. Areopagus : constitution and func- tions of, 12 ; as reformed by Solon, 13 ; under democratic constitu- tion, 16 ; suggestions of, in Plato's Laws, 45. Aristocracy : in early Greek states, 2, 3 ; relative excellence of, in Plato's Statesman, 36; a pure form of government in Aristotle, 72 ; based on virtue, 75 ; ideally the best form, 78 ; causes and preventives of revolution in, 88 ; in Polybius's theory, 115; Cicero's conception of, 120 ; Wy cliff e's view of, 262 ; Machiavelli on, 308-309. Aristotle : compared with Plato, 49 ; study of existing constitutions, 50 ; his method and his ideal, 51 ; dis- tinguishes politics from ethics, 51 ; interested in practical rather than ideal politics, 53 ; doctrines as to justice, rights and equity, 54 ; general Greek postulates of his theory, 93 ; on the conciliation of liberty and authority, 94 ; on the supremacy of public opinion and law, 95 ; on the sovereignty of the people, 95 ; on the three neces- sary organs of government, 96 ; on the political influence of eco- nomic conditions, 96 ; decline of his school after Alexander, 101 ; compared with Polybius, 118 ; introduction of his works into Western Europe, 190 ; influence in scholasticism, 191 ; on St. Thomas's theory, 192, 196, 199, 202, 203, 205; on ^Egidius Ro- manus, 208; on fourteenth-cen- tury adversaries of Papacy, 221 ; on Dante, 230; on Marsiglio of Padua, 239 ; on Ockam, 246 ; re- lation of, to Machiavelli, 291, 294 et seq., 298, 305, 306, 307, 309, 316. See also Politics. Athens: hegemony of, in Persian 347 348 INDEX wars, 5 ; influence of its constitu- tion on Greek political theory, 6 ; classes of people in, 11 ; early aristocratic government of, 12 ; reforms by Solon in, 12 ; tyranny of Pisistratus in, 13 ; democratic policy of Kleisthenes and Pericles, 14 ; constitutional system in fifth century B.C., 14 ; carried liberty to ruinous excess (Plato), 40; influ- ence of, on Plato's Laws, 45 ; Aristotle's work on the constitu- tion of, 50; slightly esteemed by Machiavelli, 296. Augustine, Bishop of Hippo : influ- ence of, 134; his Civitas Dei, 156; exaltation of future life as compared with earthly, 157 ; justi- fication of slavery, 157 ; on justice in the state, 158 ; influence of, on mediaeval reasoning, 163 ; influ- ence of, on scholasticism, 191 ; on St. Thomas's theory of law, 192 ; on his theory of slavery, 199. Augustinus Triumphus: his theory of papal power, 218. Augustus Caesar : his modification of the Roman constitution, 112. Avignon, seat of Papacy removed to, 150. Basel, Council of, 269; more radi- cal than Constance, 270 ; follows theory of Cusanus, 271 ; is de- feated by Pope, 276. Bernard, St. (of Clairvaux) : writ- ings of, 162 ; general character of, 181 ; his work De Consider atione, 182 ; criticism of papal adminis- tration, 183; doctrine of "the two swords," 184. Boniface VIII : conflict with Philip the Fair, 150, 213, 215, 224. Brutus, a Stoic, 106. Caesar Borgia, judgment of Machia- velli on, 301, 311. Canon Law : content and impor- tance of, in fourteenth century, 222 ; influence on Dante, 230 ; ignored by Machiavelli, 291. Castile, power of nobles in, 266. Cato the Censor : and the Greek philosophers, 114. Cato the Younger, a Stoic, 106. Censor : in the Roman constitution, 108, 112. Charlemagne : crowned Emperor, 139, 142 ; coronation of, as con- strued by mediaeval debaters, 175. Charles VIII of France, 286, 289. Charles Martel, 139, 141. Check and balance : principle set forth by Polybius, 117 ; actual working at Rome, 119. Chrematistics : relation to econom- ics in Aristotle, 60. Christian Church : early organiza- tion of, 132 ; increase of its power in declining Western Empire, 133 ; influence of Teutons on, 134 ; con- dition of, in Eastern Empire, 135 ; divided into Greek and Roman, 138. Cicero : Stoic influences in, 106 ; purpose of his De Republica and De Legibus, 119 ; on origin and nature of state, 120 ; on forms of government, 120 ; compared with Polybius, 121 ; his doctrine of natural law and rights, 123 ; this doctrine criticised, 124 ; influence of, on Augustine, 167, 158 ; influ- ence on St. Thomas's theory of law, 192. Citizens : constitute the state, in Plato, 46 ; not to engage in com- merce or trades, 46 ; limited to 5040 in the Laws, 46 ; Aristotle on qualifications of, 64 ; working classes not qualified as, in Aris- totle, 82 ; under Republican con- stitution of Rome, 107, 111 ; after INDEX 349 Caracalla, 113. See also Cosmo- politism. City-state : the ideal of Plato's phi- losophy, 47 ; assumed as typical organization by Plato and Aris- totle, 93 ; supplanted as type by military empire, 99 ; held less per- fect than the province and king- dom, 197, 209 ; in Italy, 287 ; in Machiavelli's philosophy, 317. Civil Law : content and importance of, in fourteenth century, 222 ; influence on Dante, 230 ; ignored by Machiavelli, 291 . See also Jus- tinian. Clement V, 218. Clovis : founds Prankish monarchy, 141. Comitia: functions of, in Eoman constitution, 107, 109, 112; demo- cratic element in constitution (Polybius), 116. Commonwealth in Cicero and Mach- iavelli : see Democracy. Communism : in Plato's Republic, 30 ; Aristotle's criticism of Plato's ideas, 63. Consent of the governed, as basis of government: Plato on, 40 ; Marsig- lio on, 251 ; Cusanus on, 271, 273. Constance, Council of, 258 ; hostility to Wycliffe and Huss, 265 ; adopts Gerson's theories, 270. Constantine : reforms Roman admin- istration, 113 ; adopts Christianity, 132. See also Donation. Constitution: defined by Aristotle, 65 ; pure and corrupt forms of, according to Aristotle, 71 ; should embody principle of check and balance (Polybius), 116, (Cicero), 121 ; reform of, a serious task (Machiavelli), 312; relation of, to custom and law (Machiavelli), 318. Consuls : functions of, in Roman constitution, 108, 109, 112 ; mo- narchic element in constitution (Polybius), 116. Corporation : Cusanus's conception of, 274 ; legal theory of, influential in conciliar era, 277 ; furnished model for organization and action of general council, 278 ; conception of, worked against monarchy, 279. Cosmopolitism : brought into promi- nence by Stoics, 104 ; growth and influence of, 106. Council : see General Council. Cusanus : see Nicholas of Cues. Dante Alighieri : his political point of view, 230 ; argument for uni- versal monarchy, 231 ; interpre- tation of Roman history, 232 ; on the Holy Roman Empire, 233 ; refutation of pro-papal arguments, 234. Decretalists, Dante on, 233. Defensor Pacts : see Marsiglio. Demagogue : produces revolution in democracies, 87. Democracy : disliked by Plato, 32 ; its place in the succession of gov- ernmental forms, 33 ; the best and the worst government, 36 ; based on the principle of liberty, 39 ; and equality, 40 ; a corrupt form of government in Aristotle, 72 ; is really the rule of the poor over the rich, 74 ; based on liberty and equality, 75 ; form and functions of governmental organs in, 76 ; where the poor are much more numerous than the rich, the best state, 79 ; causes of revolution in, 87 ; preventives of revolution in, 88 ; in Polybius's theory, 115 ; Cicero's conception of, 120 ; Mach- iavelli's ideas of government in, 307, 317 et seq. Deposition of monarch: right of, asserted after Gregory VII, 174 ; texts and precedents in support 850 INDEX of right, 175 ; theory of Thomas Aquinas on, 207 ; theory of Augus- tinus Triumphus on, 218. Dictatorship : in Roman constitu- tion, 108 ; Machiavelli on, 319. Diocletian, 113. Discourses on Livy, Machiavelli's : chiefly a study of the Romans, 292 ; a study of the strong repub- lic, 294, 307 ; unmoral doctrines of, 298-299 ; unreligious doctrines of, 300 ; view of human nature in, 305 ; on the methods of extend- ing dominion, 313 ; on the main- tenance of republican government, 317. Divine right of kings : theory of, in Middle Ages, 177 ; claimed for French monarchs, 225. Donation of Constantine, 175 ; Peter Dubois on, 228 ; Dante on, 234 ; discredited by Cusanus and Valla, 259 ; ignored by Machiavelli, 291- Dubois, Peter : his doctrine as to French monarchy and Papacy, 228. Duel, Dante's theory of, 232. Economic conditions : political influ- ence of, recognized by Aristotle, 74, 86, 96; divided the Roman people and ruined the Republic, 119 ; Machiavelli on influence of, 307. Economics : distinguished by Aris- totle from chrematistics, 60. Education : importance and system of, in Plato's Republic, 31 ; in Plato's Laws, 38. 43 ; Aristotle's system of, 83, 84 ; a preventive of revolution, 90 ; indispensable function of state in Plato and Aristotle, 93. Ekklesia : under Solonian constitu- tion at Athens, 13 ; under the democratic constitution, 14. Empire, Holy Roman : origin and character of, 143 ; relations of Germany and Italy under, 144 ; disintegration of, in thirteenth century, 148 ; rulers of, deter- mined by popes, 149 ; jurists' theory as to, 180 ; Thomist the- ory of, 201 ; relative insignifi- cance of, in fourteenth century, 224; Dante's plea for rights of, 233 ; slighted by Marsiglio, 241. England : a fief of the Pope, 149 ; nobles crushed in, 256. Epicureans : prominence after Alex- ander, 102 ; emphasized ethics and neglected politics, 102 ; doc- trines of, as to society, law and justice, 103. Equality : the foundation of democ- racy, 40 ; absolute and proportion- ate, 40 ; method of filling offices determined by, 41 ; various ideas of, the general cause of revolu- tion, 86 ; of men under natural law, 128, 273. Equity : defined by Aristotle, 54 ; John of Salisbury's idea of, 186. Ethics : Aristotle's treatment of its relation to politics, 51 et seq. ,* separated from politics by Machi- avelli, 298. Excommunication : early theory and practice of, 144, 145 ; held analo- gous with death penalty in Mosaic law, 174 ; Peter Dubois on papal employment of, 229 ; subject to control of secular sovereign (Mar- siglio), 243 ; Wycliffe's theory of, 263. Executive : distinguished from legis- lator by Marsiglio, 240 ; by Cu- sanus, 274. Expansion : Machiavelli's idea of, and its influence, 323. Federal government : in Greece after Alexander, 100. Ferdinand of Spain, 286, 287. INDEX 351 Feudal aristocracy, decline of, in fifteenth century, 256. Florence : centre of Renaissance, 290; workings of government in, 301. Forms of Government: in Plato's Republic, 33 ; in Plato's States- man, 36 ; Aristotle's classification of, 72 ; principles underlying, 76 ; Aristotle's test of excel- lence in, 79 ; in Polybius, 115 ; in Cicero, 120 ; Machiavelli on, 306 et seq. France : strength of royal power in, during thirteenth century, 150 ; nobles crushed in, 256 ; has mixed form of government (Gerson), 269. Franciscans : their theory of evan- gelical poverty, 236. Frankish monarchy : saved popes from Lombards, 139; early his- tory of, 141 ; mediaeval theory as to origin of, 225. Frederick Barbarossa, encourage- ment of lawyers by, 179. Frederick the Great : on Machia- velli, 323. French monarchy : its influence on political theory in fourteenth cen- tury, 223 ; theory of its indepen- dence of pope and emperor, 225 ; Dubois on hegemony of, 229; its control over the popes at Avignon, 236. Friendship : considered by Plato an important principle in politics, 40. Gelasius (Pope) : dictum as to the two powers, 166, 167, 168. General Council : French lawyers' theory of, 227 ; fourteenth-cen- tury imperialists' theory of, 238 ; Marsiglio's theory as to organiza- tion and functions of, 241 ; Mar- siglio on representation in, 261 ; Ockam's scheme of representation in, 252 ; introduced into constitu- tion of the church, 258 ; theory of the corporation applied t(\ 277-278. Germany : relations with Italy under Holy Roman Empire, 144 ; power of nobles in, 266. Gerson: his conciliar theory, 266; theory of necessity as basis of council, 266 ; on plenary power, 267 ; his preference for mixed form of government, 269 ; moder- ate views of, 270. Government : origin of, according to Polybius, 115 ; distinguished from state by Marsiglio, 250. See also Forms. Gratian : the Decretum of, 162 ; on the two powers, 166 ; dictum of, as to subordination of princes to church, 180. Greece : early political institutions of, 2 et seq. ; conflict of oligarchy and democracy in, 4 ; influences making for national unity in, 6 ; effect of Persian and Peloponne- sian wars in, 19 ; Aristotle on constitutional transformation in, 85 ; characteristic political life of, extinguished by Alexander, 99 ; persistence of forms of city-state in, 100. Greeks : assumed by Plato and Aris- totle to be superior to other races, 93. Gregory I (the Great) : influence of, in development of Papacy, 138 ; character of, 158 ; view of, as to chief end of imperial authority, 159 ; influence of, on political lit- erature, 160 ; on mediaeval rea- soning, 163. Gregory VII : reforming decrees of, 146 ; conflict with Henry IV, 147 ; writings of, 162 ; on the dogma of the two powers, 166 ; 352 INDEX on greater dignity of priests as compared with princes, 170 ; on jurisdiction of priests over princes, 173. \ Hellas : see Greece. Hellenistic: moral and intellectual type, 99 ; literature lacking in original political thought, 101 j spirit transformed Koman govern- ment in East, 131. Helots : position of, in Spartan state, 7. Henry IV : conflict with Gregory VII, 147 ; writings of, 162. Henry VII, Emperor, 218. Henry VII, of England, 256, 286. Hesiod: political point of view of, 19. Hildebrand : see Gregory VII. Hincmar, Archbishop of Rheims, 162 ; on the dogma of the two powers, 166 ; on the jurisdiction of priests over princes, 172. Hobbes, resemblance of Machia- velli to, 303. Homer : depicts patriarchal regime, 18. Horace: an Epicurean in view of life, 104. Household : distinguished from state by Aristotle, 57 et seq. Hundred Years' War, 255. Huss : promotes ideas of Marsiglio and Wycliffe, 264-265 ; con- demned by Council of Constance, 265. Imperialism : sought in vain by Athens and Sparta, 6 ; no proper aim for individual or state, accord- ing to Plato, 46 ; according to Aristotle, 81 ; the necessary aim of a state according to Machiavelli, 295, 315, 323. Imperium Continuum, 180 ; ignored by Machiavelli, 291. Innocent III : extensive influence of, 149 ; writings of, 163 ; on the two powers, 167 ; on the greater dignity of priests as compared with princes, 171 ; on jurisdiction of priests over princes, 173 ; on the universal church, 180. Investitures : conflict over, 146. Israelitish state : theocratic char- acter of, 164 ; considered a mired government by Gerson, 270. Italy : relations with Germany under Holy Roman Empire, 144 ; political condition of, in Machia- velli's time, 287, 289. lus Civile : character of, 126 ; blended with ius gentium, 127. lus Gentium : character of, 126 ; blended with ius civile, 127 ; identified with ius naturale, 128 ; limits human legislation (Ockam), 248. Jeremiah, God's commission to, 175. Jerome, influence of, 134. Jesus : unpolitical character of his teaching, 152, 177 ; held to have distinguished spiritual from secu- lar power, 167 ; power to bind and loose conferred by, 173 ; pastoral power given to Peter by, 173. John XXII : conflict of, with Lewis of Bavaria, 213, 218, 235 ; contro- versy with Franciscans, 236. John of Jandun : attacks John XXII, 237 ; collaborates on Defen- sor Pacts, 238. John of Paris : his work in behalf of Philip the Fair, 226. John of Salisbury : general charac- ter of, 181 ; on " the two swords," 185 ; his Polycraticus, 185 ; po- litical ideas of, 186 ; on tyrants and tyrannicide, 187. Julius Caesar : his modification of the Roman constitution, 111. INDEX 353 Jurists: work of, in Roman Em- pire, 127 ; work of, in fourteenth century, 222. Justice : immutable, according to Plato, 27 ; real subject of Plato's Republic, 28 ; definition and rela- tion to law in Aristotle, 54 ; Epi- curean view of, 103 ; Stoic view of, 104 ; distinguishes pure from corrupt forms of government (Polybius), 115 ; Cicero's concep- tion of, 122 ; Augustine on, 158 ; Thomas Aquinas on, 196 ; Dante on, 231. Justinian's Digest : study of, at Bologna, 179 ; basis of the Civil Law, 222. See also Civil Law. Kingdom : a self-sufficing political organization in Thomas Aquinas, 198 ; theory of, in John of Paris, 226 ; Ockam's definition of, 246. Kleisthenes : legislation of, at Athens, 14 ; democratic reforms disliked by Plato, 45. Law : written and unwritten, distin- guished by Socrates, 23 ; com- pared by Plato with discretion of all-wise philosopher, 35 ; as basis of classification of governments by Plato, 36 ; indispensable in actual states, 37 ; written, cannot do away with unwritten, 42 ; held by Aristotle to be better than man as sovereign, 71 ; supreme over all personality in Plato and Aristotle, 93 ; Cicero on divine origin of, 123 ; held to be source of rights (IMS), 123 ; will of prince has force of (Roman jurists), 129; denned and classified by Thomas Aquinas, 192 ; rational and voli- tional elements in, 193 ; classified by ./Egidius Romanus, 210 ; the basis of government (Marsiglio), 239 ; Cusanus's theory of consent as basis of, 273. Laws (The) of Plato: his only strictly political work, 27 ; em- bodies a practicable code for an actual state, 37 ; communism of the Republic abandoned, 38 ; amount of private property lim- ited, 39 ; people classified accord- ing to wealth, 39 ; governmental organization a mean between monarchy and democracy, 39; combines liberty and authority, 40 ; magistrates and assemblies, 41 ; the nocturnal council, 42 ; the theory of the expose de motif, 42 ; miscellaneous subjects treated, 43; Athenian institutions incor- porated in, 45 ; suggests an Atti- cized Sparta, 97. Legislation : less useful than educa- tion in maintaining social order, 31 ; no place in ideal state, 35 ; distinguished by Marsiglio from executive function, 240. Leo I, Bishop of Rome: saved Rome from Attila, 134. Leo III : crowns Charlemagne, 139. Levites: regarded as prefiguring Christian priesthood, 164 ; judi- cial authority of, as type of sacer- dotal jurisdiction, 173. Lewis of Bavaria : conflict of, with John XXII, 213, 218, 235. Liberty : the principle of democracy, 39 ; not incompatible with subjec- tion to law (Aristotle) , 94 ; Dante on, 231 ; Machiavelli's conception of, 317. Lombards, career of, in Italy, 137 et seg. Lothaire, King of Lorraine, contro- versy over divorce of, 145. Louis XI of France, 256, 286. Lycurgus : institutions ascribed to, in Sparta, 8 ; influence of his institutions on Plato's theory, 44 ; praised by Polybius, 116. 354 INDEX Macedon : theory on which Greece was absorbed by, 6 ; Aristotle's connection with the court of, 61. Machiavelli : suggested by Peter Dubois, 228 ; European politics in time of, 285 et seq. ; influence of absolute monarchs on, 286 ; in- fluence of national states on, 287 ; official life of, in Florence, 289 ; influence of Eenaissance on, 290 ; his method, 291 ; his point of view, 293 ; compared with Aris- totle, 294 ; preference for Rome over Greece, 296 ; separation of politics from ethics, 298 ; attitude toward religion, 300 ; admiration for the strong man, 301 ; studies real, not ideal, politics, 302 ; takes Hobbesian view of human nature, 303 ; materialistic individ- ualism of, 306 ; on forms of gov- ernment, 307 ; expansion the ideal of, 309 ; on the extension of princely power, 311 ; on exten- sion of power by republics, 313 ; on the importance of military force, 314 ; on the art of tyranny, 316 ; on the principles of repub- lican government, 317 ; on party controversies, 320 ; influence of, in political theory, 322. Majority : Marsiglio on rule of, 250. Manegold of Lutterbach, 162. Marcus Aurelius, Stoic doctrines of, 106. Marsiglio of Padua : attacks John XXII, 237 ; on the corruption of the times, 239 ; on popular sover- eignty in state, 240, 250 ; on pop- ular sovereignty in church, 241 ; on distinction between ecclesias- tical and secular functions, 242 ; on the limits of priestly authority, 243 ; on the Petrine dogma, 244 ; on sovereignty (plenary power), 249 ; on representative system, 251 ; influence of, on Wycliffe, 260 ; relation of, to Gerson, 266. Maximilian of Germany, 286. Michael of Cesena : attacks John XXII, 237. Mixed form of government : pre- ferred by Cicero, 121 ; and by Gerson, 269 ; approved by Machi- avelli, 306. Mohammedanism: consolidated state and church in Eastern Em- pire, 136 ; diverted Eastern em- perors from care of Italy, 138 ; spread of, stopped in West by Charles Martel, 141. Monarchy : based on principle of authority, 39 ; considered prac- tically an impossible government by Aristotle, 73 ; Polybius's theory of, 115 ; Thomas Aquinas on, 200 ; Dante's conception of, 230 ; ruler of, a mere agent of people (Marsiglio), 240 ; Ockam on,- 246 ; Wycliffe's view of, 262 ; Machi- avelli's judgment on, 308. See also Universal. National monarchy : tendency to development of, 255; realized in Europe, 286 ; Machiavelli's con- ception of, 310. Natural law : Stoic doctrine of, 104 ; Cicero's conception of, 123- 124 ; Thomas Aquinas on, 192, 194 ; ^Egidius Romanus on, 211; relation of Pope to property under, 219 ; limits all human legis- lation (Ockam), 248 ; ignored by Machiavelli, 297. Natural right or rights (IMS natu- rale} : Aristotle on, 64 ; Cicero on, 124 ; all men equal in (Roman jurists), 128 ; Thomas Aquinas on, 196 ; idea of, in fifteenth century, 281. Nature : as used by Aristotle, 61 ; by Cicero, 124. INDEX 355 New Testament, influence of, in mediaeval reasoning, 163. Nicholas I : conflict with Lothaire of Lorraine, 145 ; writings of, 162. Nicholas V, policy of, 288. Nicholas of Cues : discredits Dona- tion of Constantine, 259 ; his De Concordantia Catholica, 271 ; his theory of harmony, 271 ; general council as source of power in both state and church, 272 ; consent the basis of all authority, 273 ; on popular sovereignty, 274 ; on representation in government, 275 ; becomes supporter of Pope, 276. Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle's, 54. Noah : symbol of priesthood, 171. Ochlocracy: in Polybius's theory, 115. Ockam, William of : 221 ; attacks John XXII, 237; obscurity of his method, 244 ; his political works and general conceptions, 245-246 ; on the functions of state and government, 247 ; on sover- eignty (plenary power) , 249 ; on representative system, 252 ; doc- trines of, promoted by Wycliffe and Huss, 265. Offices : lot compared with election as method of filling, 41 ; should be held in turn by all citizens, 66 ; appropriate methods of filling, in democracy, oligarchy and polity respectively, 76, 77 ; rotation in, the principle in oligarchy, 88 ; should not be means of pecuniary gain, 89 ; nor be monopolized by any one class, 89. Old Testament : influence of, in me- diaeval reasoning, 163 ; arguments from, as to royalty, 165, 179. Oligarchy : conflict with democracy in Greece, 4 ; in Spartan system, 11 ; Plato's conception of, 33 ; rel- ative excellence of, 36 ; a corrupt form of government in Aristotle, 72 ; is really the rule of the rich over the poor, 74 ; based on wealth, 76 ; form and functions of the gov- ernmental organs in, 77 j where the rich are greatly superior, the best form, 79; causes of revolu- tion in, 87 ; preventives of revo- lution in, 88 et seq. ; unsalaried offices the best rule in, 89 ; in Po- lybius's theory, 115. Otto the Great, 143. Papacy : early recognized as pre- eminent, 136 ; sustained Ortho- doxy against Arianism, 137 ; led in defence of Italy against Lom- bards, 138; alliance of, with the Franks, 139 ; relations of, with people of Rome, 140 ; relations of, with Charlemagne, 142 ; atti- tude toward German emperors, 144 ; power of excommunication assumed by, 145 ; claims of, as to investitures, 146 ; prestige of, en- hanced by Crusades, 148 ; exalted position of, in thirteenth cen- tury, 149 ; decline of prestige in fourteenth century, 150 ; seat of, transferred to Avignon, 150 ; claims of, under Boniface VIII, 215 ; exaltation of, by Augustinus Triumphus, 218 ; under French influence at Avignon, 219 ; four- teenth-century assaults on, 220 ; lawyers' theory of subordination to general council, 227 ; Peter Dubois on, 228 ; Dante on, 234 ; claims of, as against Lewis of Bavaria, 235 ; Marsiglio's theory of, 244 ; effect of the Great Schism on, 258 ; triumphs over Council of Basel, 259 ; Gerson's theory as to relation of council to, 267 ; sub- ject to law (Gerson) , 269 ; cor- 356 INDEX poration law determines relation of, to general council, 278 ; secu- lar policy of, in time of Machia- velli, 288 ; Macbiavelli's opinion of, 288. Papinian, Stoic influence on, 106. Parties, benefits from conflicts of (Machiavelli), 320. Passive obedience, theory of, in Middle Ages, 177. Patriarchal government : depicted by Homer, 18. Patricians, political rights of, in early Borne, 107. Paul the Apostle : his injunction of passive obedience, 153, 178. Paul, the Koman jurist, Stoic influ- ence on, 106. Peloponnesian War, effect of, on Greece, 6. Pericles : influence of, at Athens, 14 ; his democratic reforms disliked by Plato, 45. Perioikoi, rights and position of, in Spartan state, 7. Persia : carried principle of author- ity to ruinous excess, 40. Peter the Apostle : his injunction of passive obedience, 153, 178. Petrine dogma : effect of, 169 ; at- tacks of Marsiglio on, 244. Philip the Fair : conflict with Boni- face VIII, 150, 213, 215, 224; anti-papal work of jurists under, 222. Pippin the Short, 139, 142. Pisa, Council of, 258. Pisistratus, tyrant of Athens, 13. Plato : method in treatment of polit- ical topics, 24 ; relation to work of Socrates, 24 ; theory of knowl- edge and the general notion, 24 ; theory of virtue, 25 ; psychology of, 26 ; definition of justice, 26 ; his political dialogues, 27 ; con- nection of his theories with Greek practical politics, 43 ; influence of Spartan institutions dominant in the Republic, 44 ; of Athens, especially Solon, more noticeable in theZ.aws,45; his philosophy deter- mined by the city-state idea, 46 ; compared with Aristotle, 49 ; ideas on communism criticised by Aris- totle, 62 ; general postulates of his political theory, 93 ; decline of his school after Alexander, 101; compared with Polybius, 117 ; method and form of philosophy of, adopted by Cicero, 120 ; influ- ence of, on Cicero's theory of law, 122 ; influence of, on Augus- tine, 157. See also Republic; Statesman; Laws. Plebeians : in early Roman state, 107 ; special governmental organs of, 108. Plenary power (plenitudo potesta- tis*) : Augustinus Triumphus on, 218 ; defined by Marsiglio and Ockam, 249 ; Gerson's theory of, 267. Politics (The) of Aristotle: defec- tive condition of text, 54 ; origin and character of the state (ir6\is), 65 ; political life essential to man, 56 ; distinction between state and household, 57 ; rational justifica- tion of slavery, 58 ; analysis of concepts of wealth and exchange, 60; ambiguous use of " nature," 61 ; criticism of Plato's commu- nism, 62 ; citizenship defined and described, 64 ; nature and content of a constitution and of sover- eignty, 65 ; participation of all citizens in offices, 66 ; sovereignty primarily in the mass of the people, 68 ; but exercised mainly through election and censure of officers, 70 ; the one overwhelmingly su- perior man would be the true sovereign, 70 ; but law is better than man, 71 ; classification of con- INDEX 357 stitutions, 72 ; monarchy a practi- cally impossible form, 73 ; oli- garchy and democracy mean rule of rich and of poor respectively, 74 ; liberty, wealth and virtue as principles in organization of gov- ernment, 75 ; the three organs essential in every government, 76 ; functions of each organ in the various forms, 77 ; the best state, 78; virtue, not power or wealth, the true end of the state, 81 ; external conditions of an ideal city, 81 et seq. ; education the ultimate func- tion of the state, 83 ; revolutions in Hellas, 85 ; general and special causes of revolutions, 86 et seq. ; preventives of revolutions, 88 et seq. ; the art of tyranny, 91 ; sug- gests a Spartanized Athens, 97. Polity : a pure form of government in Aristotle, 72 ; based on blend- ing of two principles, liberty and wealth, 75 ; form and functions of governmental organs in, 77 ; on the average, and where the middle class is the strongest, the best form, 79 ; causes and pre- ventives of revolution in, 88. Polybius : his acquaintance with Roman politics, 114 ; his cycle of governmental forms, 115 ; theory of check and balance, 116 ; its application to the Roman consti- tution, 116 etseq.; ideas of, taken by Machiavelli, 305, 306. Polycraticus, of John of Salisbury, 185. Poor, care of, a function of the government (St. Thomas), 203. Pope : see Papacy. Popular government: see Democracy. Population : classes of, in Plato's Republic, 28 ; classes of, in Pla- to's Laws, 39 ; Aristotle on neces- sary elements of, 82. Prsetor: functions of, in Roman constitution, 108 ; juristic work of, 127. Prince (The) of Machiavelli: in- fluence of contemporary politics on, 293 ; a study of the strong monarch, 294, 307 ; unmoral doc- trines of, 298, 299 ; unreligious doctrines of, 300 ; view of human nature in, 304 ; principles of, as to extension of power, 311 ; the art of tyranny in, 316 ; criticised by Frederick the Great, 323. Principate (Roman) : administra- tive work of, 125 ; juristic work of, 127. Proconsul : in the Roman constitu- tion, 111, 112. Property : communistic theories of, in Plato's Republic, 30 ; limi- tations on amount of, in Plato's Laws, 39 ; principle of, assumed by Aristotle, 59 ; ultimate owner- ship held to be in Pope, 217, 219 ; John of Paris on relation of Pope to, 226 ; distinction between ownership and jurisdiction over, 227 ; controversy over theory of, between John XXII and the Fran- ciscans, 236, 237 ; Wycliffe's views on, 261 et seq. ; fifteenth- century idea of, 281 ; Machiavelli on men's devotion to, 305. Prophets : regarded as prefiguring Christian priesthood, 164. Public mess : in Sparta, 8 ; in Plato's Republic, 29 ; in Plato's Laws, 38. Public opinion: indicated by Aris- totle as controlling force in state, 95. Renaissance : influence in political theory, 259 ; influence of, on Machiavelli, 289 ; rationalism of, 302. Representation : Marsiglio's theory as to, 251 ; Ockam's scheme of, 252. 358 INDEX Kepublic (as form of government) : see Democracy. Republic (The) of Plato: general character of, 24 ; idealism in, 26 ; predominantly ethical, 27 ; classes of population in, 28 ; the guar- dians and their functions, 29 ; communistic doctrine of, 80 ; edu- cational system in, 31 ; an aris- tocracy of intellect, 32 ; relation to actual states, 33. Revolutions : frequency in Greece, 85 ; Aristotle's theory as to causes of, 86 ; as to preventives of, 88 et seq. Right or Rights (SlKaiov, iws) : nat- ural distinguished from legal by Aristotle, 54 ; ambiguous mean- ing of, 122 ; source of, to be found in law (Cicero), 123; Imperial jurists' treatment of, 128 ; nat- ural distinguished from positive (Thomas Aquinas), 196; ^Egid- ius Romanus on, 211 ; Wycliffe's view of, 261. Roads, care of, a function of the government (St. Thomas), 203. Roman Constitution : in royal pe- riod, 107 ; in time of conflict be- tween patricians and plebeians, 108 ; government of dependencies under, 110; as transformed by Julius and Augustus, 112 ; as re- formed by Diocletian and Con- stantine, 113 ; as analyzed by Polybius, 116 ; working of check and balance system in, 119 ; as viewed by Cicero, 121, 125; the ideal of Machiavelli, 296. Rosellinus (Antonius de Rosellis), 281 note, 282, 291. Royal power: distinguished from priestly, 166 et seq. Royalty : relative excellence of, in Plato, 36 ; Aristotle's idea of, 72 ; ideally the best form where one man is preeminent, 78 ; prac- tically an extinct form for en- lightened peoples, 90 ; Cicero's conception of, 120. See also Monarchy. Sacerdotal power : distinguished from royal, 166 et seq. ; argument for preeminence of, 169 et seq. Sceptics : neglect of politics by, 102. Schism, the Great, 267 et seq. Scholasticism, general character of, 189 et seq. Senate : organization and functions of, in Roman constitution, 107, 109, 112 ; Polybius on, 116. Seneca, a Stoic, 106. Sixtus IV, policy of, 288. Slavery : justified on rational grounds by Aristotle, 58 ; assumed by Plato and Aristotle as neces- sary, 93 ; effect of cosmopolitism on, 105 ; contrary to natural rights (Roman jurists), 128 ; justified by St. Augustine, 157 ; by Thomas Aquinas, 199 ; Wycliffe's view of, 262. Socrates : relation of, to Sophists, 21 ; his method and ethical doc- trine, 22 ; on laws, written and unwritten, 23 ; relation of Plato to work of, 24. Solon : reforms of, at Athens, 12 ; influence of his constitution on Plato's theory, 45. Sophists : nature of work of, 20, 21 ; doctrines of, renewed by Epicu- reans, 103. Soul, Plato's analysis of, 26. Sovereignty : defined by Aristotle, 65 ; argument for basis of num- bers, of wealth and of intelli- gence, 67 ; should be in mass of people, according to Aristotle, 68 ; various ideas of, in Greece, 69 ; claims of the one perfect man, 70; impersonal law better than any person as bearer of, 71 ; of people INDEX 359 subject to that of law (Aristotle), 95 ; in people as legislator (Mar- siglio), 239 ; Marsiglio and Ockam on, 248 et seq. ; held by Cusanus to be in people, 273. See also Plenary Power. Sparta : no early aristocracy in, 2 ; leader of conservatives in Greece, 6 ; hegemony of, in Persian Wars, 5 ; influence of, on Greek political theory, 6 ; classes of people in, 7 ; Lycurgean institutions in, 8 ; con- stitutional organization of, 9 ; oli- garchic character of government in, 10 ; a timocracy, according to Plato, 33 ; in Plato's opinion, a properly limited monarchy, 40 ; many institutions of, in Plato's Republic, 44 ; Polybius's view of institutions of, 116 ; slightly es- teemed by Machiavelli, 296. State (as a concept of political science): Aristotle on origin and character of, 55 ; necessary to hu- man existence, 56 ; distinguished from household, 57 ; identity changes, according to Aristotle, with change of constitution, 65; Aristotle on best form of, 78 etseq.; on the true end of, 81 ; Ockam on functions of, 247 ; distinguished from government by Marsiglio, 250. See also Government. State of Nature, idea of, in fifteenth century, 282. Statesman ( The) , of Plato : idealism of, 25 ; deals primarily with dia- lectic, 27; develops "idea" of ruler, 34 ; depreciates practical statesmanship, 34 ; and legisla- tion, 35 ; classification of govern- ments in, 36. Stephen (Pope): crowns Pippin, 139. Stoics : prominence after Alexander, 102 ; emphasized ethics and neg- lected politics, 102 ; theory of justice and law, 104 ; develop- ment of cosmopolitism by, 105 ; in the Roman state, 106 ; influ- ence of, on Cicero's theory of natural law, 122 ; influence of, on Roman jurisprudence, 127 ; principles of, in relation to Chris- tianity, 154 ; influence on St. Thomas's theory of law, 192. Sun and moon : symbol of spiritual and secular powers, 167, 171. Swords, the two, text referring to, 168, 184. Teutonic nations: transformed Ro- man government in West, 131 ; influence of, on Christian Church, 134. Theodoric of Verdun, 162. Theodosius : excommunicated by Ambrose, 134 ; recognizes sacer- dotal sway over morals, 155. Thomas Aquinas : general character of his philosophy, 190 et seq. ; po- litical works of, 191 ; his theory of law, 192 ; on justice and rights, 196; on politics proper, 197; on the province or kingdom as more perfect than city-state, 198 ; on slavery, 198 ; prefers monarchy to democracy, 199 ; on tyranny, 200 ; on the Holy Roman Empire, 201 ; on certain novel functions of government, 203 ; on the preemi- nence of priest over king, 205 ; on the treatment of infidels by Christian rulers, 206 ; on the depo- sition of princes by the church, 207 ; his influence on ^gidius Romanus, 209 ; his system in re- lation to political facts, 213. Timocracy : Plato's conception of, 33 ; Gerson's idea of, 269. Towns, political significance of, in fifteenth century, 256. Translatio imperil, 180 ; Dante on, 234. 360 INDEX Tribune, powers of, at Rome, 108. Twelve Tables, code of the, 126. Tyranny : Plato's conception of, 33, 36 ; held by Aristotle to be a corrupt form of state, 72 ; the least permanent form of govern- ment, 91 ; may be maintained by uniform severity and harshness, 91 ; or by uniform mildness and craft, 92 ; in Polybius's theory, 115 ; distinguished from royalty in Middle Ages, 178 ; John of Salis- bury on, 187 ; Thomas Aquinas on, 200 ; Machiavelli on the art of, 316. Ulpian, Stoic influence on, 106. Unam Sanctam, the Bull, 216. Unity : essential in government of church, but not of state, 226 ; Dante's exaltation of, 231 ; Cu- sanus on, 271 ; influence of theory of corporation on mediaeval idea of, 279. Universal Monarchy : as normal po- litical organization, 180 ; argument against, by John of Paris, 226 ; Dante's plea for, 230 et seq. ; the- ory of, slighted by Marsiglio, 240 ; discussed by Ockam, 246. Valentinian II : defied by Ambrose, 133. Valentinian III: decrees appellate supremacy of Roman Bishop, 137. Valla : discredits Donation of Con- stantine, 259. Wai tram of Naumburg, 162. Wars of the Roses, 256. Wycliffe : general position as to pol- itics, 260 ; his theory of lordship, 261 ; on monarchy and aristocracy, 262 ; on slavery, 262 ; on relation of church to property, 263 ; influ- ence of feudalism on, 264 ; views of, adopted by Huss, 264 ; con- demned by Council of Constance, 265. Xenophon : record of Socrates's doc- trine as to justice and law, 23. Zacharias (Pope) : sanctions usur- pation by Pippin, 139 ; cited by mediaeval debaters, 175. Zeno the Stoic, 102. Printed in the United States of America. University of California SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY 305 De Neve Drive - Parking Lot 17 Box 951388 LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90095-1388 Return this material to the library from which it was borrowed. 3 1 Graduate Sch >ol of Business Administration L 005 069 338 1 001311282 e