(/n/'i^?iiU^u^ y€!>^ ^Q^i'^^r^tcay M VL.,!y/yJ,.,. i/n.,.r.,/y ,/ /J./. J " THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME. AN ATLAS OF THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. By JOHN CODMAN ROPES. Designed to accompany the author's " Cannpaign of Waterloo; a Military History." Price, $5.00 net. CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, Publishers, New York. THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO A MILITARY HISTORY JOHN CODMAN ROPES Member of the Massachusetts Historical Society, the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, and the Harvard Historical Society; Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Royal Historical Society; Honorary Member of the United States Cavalry Association, etc. Author of " The Army under Pope," in the Scribner Series of " Campaigns of the Civil War "; " The First Napoleon, a Sketch, Political and Military," etc. THIRD EDITION. NEW YORK CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 1893 «^3 COPYRIGHT, 1892, BY CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, M£NRY MORSE STETrHERS a^ PREFACE The need of another narrative of the campaign of Waterloo may not be at first sight apparent. There has been a great deal written on this subject, and much of it has been written by eminent hands. The last and the most unfortunate campaign of the great soldier of mod- ern times has naturally attracted the repeated atten- tion of military historians. Jomini, Clausewitz, Charras, Siborne, Kennedy, Chesney, Vaudoncourt, La Tour d'Auvergne, Thiers, Hooper, and many others have sought to explain the almost inexplicable result, — the complete defeat in a very brief campaign of the acknowl- edged master of modern warfare. One would suppose that the theme had been exhausted, and that nothing more remained to be said. But several circumstances have contributed to render the labors of these writers unusually difficult. In the first place, the overthrow of Napoleon, which was the immediate result of the campaign, operated to prevent a satisfactory account of it being given to the public from the French point of view at the time when the facts were fresh in men's minds. The Emperor, exiled at St. Helena, could indeed give his story ; but, unable, as he was, to verify or correct his narrative by citations from the orders that were given at the time, and by conferring -1C2G0 IV PREFACE. with the officers who had served under him, he has left us an account, which, though by no means without his- torical value, is yet so defective and erroneous in parts that it has aroused in the minds of men who are not alive to the great difficulties which always attend the composition of a military narrative, and who are not con- cerned to make fair allowance for the unavoidable and peculiar difficulties of one writing in the circumstances which surrounded Napoleon at St. Helena, grave doubts as to the trustworthiness of his recollection and even as to his veracity. The chief officers of the army have also rendered little assistance to the historian. Ney was shot a few months after the battle. Soult, Grouchy, d'Erlon and others were forced into exile. No detailed reports were ever made by them. The royal govern- ment did not concern itself about this episode in the experience of their predecessors. What the French commander and his subordinates had to say about the campaign came out by degrees, and much of it only after long years of waiting. Many of the narratives were written and published before all the facts had become known, — hence were necessarily more or less imperfect. With a few exceptions, too, the histories of this cam- paign have been gravely affected by the partisanship of their authors. It is well-nigh impossible for Thiers and La Tour d'Auvergne to admit any fault, for Charras and Quinet to admit any merit, in Napoleon's manage- ment of affairs. It is equally difficult for the majority of English writers to avoid taking sides against the Emperor in any of the numerous disputes to which the campaign of Waterloo has given rise. These influences have operated in many cases to deflect the narrative of the military operations into a criticism of those who have written from the opposite standpoint. Nevertheless, all this discussion has not been by any means without use. We have had many obscure corners cleared up, many seemingly inexplicable problems solved, PREFACE. V and we are now in possession, taking all our information together, of nearly all, if not quite all, the facts. It only remains to collect and co-ordinate them in a spirit of impartiality. This is the task attempted in the present volume. It may be added that the narrative and discus- sions will be confined to purely military topics. In the treatment of the subject, Napoleon will natur- ally be the central figure. The campaign was his cam- paign, planned and executed by him, frustrated by his opponents. It will be our endeavor to get at, as nearly as we can, his intentions, his expectations, his views from day to day of the facts of the case, so that we may, if possible, carry a personal interest into the varying for- tunes of those eventful days. This will be found entirely consistent, it is believed, with an equally careful attempt to view events from the standpoints which the English and Prussian commanders must have occupied from time to time during the campaign. The general method of Colonel Chesney in his " Water- loo Lectures " is adopted ; that is, the chapters will first contain a statement or narrative, and, afterwards, notes. In these we shall have occasion to examine most of the controversies concerning this campaign. Those persons who do not care for these discussions can read the chap- ters seriatim. Those controversies which would occupy too much space if given in the text proper will be found in appendices. A partial list of works relating to the campaign is prefixed. A map of the theatre of war in Belgium and another of the field of Waterloo are inserted in the book. For those students who desire to follow the campaign more carefully, an Atlas has been prepared, which is sold separately. It contains a general map of the whole theatre of war, eleven maps of Belgium, showing the varying positions of the three armies during the campaign, VI PREFACE. and two maps of the field of Waterloo, in which the topo- .graphical features are shown by contour lines taken from the government survey, and on which the positions of the troops are set down at the commencement and close of the battle. The references in the text to maps are to the maps in this Atlas. Copies of all the important orders and despatches will be found in Appendix C. The author desires to express his thanks for val- uable manuscripts, books and references kindly fur- nished him by Major General R. Oldfield, R. A., and Colonel F. A. Whinyates, R. A.; also for many useful suggestions, and for assistance in many ways, to Major \V. R. Livermore, Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army, and Captain A. H. Russell, Ordnance Department, U. S. Army. He desires also to acknowledge the aid rendered him by M. Eugene Wenseleers, Barrister of the Court of Appeal, Brussels, in ascertaining the location of the Chateau Marette, at Walhain, where (and not at Sart- a-Walhain, as has been generally believed) Marshal Grouchy was when he heard the sound of the cannon of Waterloo. 99 Mount Vernon Street: Boston: June i, 1892. J. C. R. NOTE TO THE THIRD EDITION. Since the publication of this book the writer has been put in possession of facts which have led him to reverse his opinion of the truth of the story that the Duke of Wellington rode to Wavre on the evening of the 17th of June, 1815. J. C. R. 99 Mount Vernon Street: Boston: May 17, 1893. CONTENTS. Pagk PREFACE CHAPTER I : THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN . . . i The general military situation 2 Reasons for taking the offensive . . . . • 2? 3 Napoleon decides to move against Wellington and Bliicher 3 Positions of the Anglo-Dutch and Prussian Armies . 3, 4 Napoleon's plan 4 As stated in Gourgaud's Narrative 4 And in the "Memoirs" 5 The other plans which were open to him ... 6 His expectation that Blucher would accept battle single-handed . . . • • • • • 7' ^ NOTE TO CHAPTER I 9 Napoleon's plan distinguished from certain other plans attributed to him 9 Alison's view that he threw himself between the two allied armies lO Condemned by Wellington and Clausewitz ... 10 But adopted by Hooper and Quinet . . . .11 Rogniat's theory, that Napoleon ought to have aimed at seizing both Quatre Bras and Sombreffe on the first day 12 Jomini's belief, that he did have this intention . . 12 Adopted by La Tour d'Auvergne . . . . • ^3 And by Charras 13 Their view opposed to that of Napoleon, Welling- ton and Clausewitz 13 Napoleon desired and expected a battle with the Prussians K? ^5 vii CONTENTS. CHAPTER II : THE FRENCH ARMY . The army as affected by Napoleon's return from Elba ....... Confidence of the soldiers in Napoleon . Lack of confidence in the high officers . Napoleon's choice of Soult to take Berthier's place Soult's unfitness for the position of chief-of-staff The five corps-commanders .... Estimate of the defects of the French general officers by Napoleon and by Charras . Probability of the truth of their views What Napoleon expected from his lieutenants Marshal Ney sent for at the last moment Sudden appointment of Marshal Grouchy to the command of the right wing Napoleon's error in not taking Marshal Davout with him .... Estimate of Napoleon's own bodily ana mental vigor at this period .... Portrait of Napoleon by General Foy Estimate of the French Army It was not the best army which Napoleon had ever led But it was a better army than either that of WeL lington or of Bliicher Its strength and composition . NOTE TO CHAPTER II Napoleon's health — Gardner — Segur The Gudin story .... Napoleon more or less a sufferer ; but on the w^hole possessed of good health and strength CHAPTER III : THE ALLIED ARMIES Strength and composition of the Prussian army Location of the different corps Temper and spirit of the army Marshal Bliicher The Duke of Wellington's army Its strength and composition . Location of the various divisions Merits and defects of the several parts of the army i6 17 17 17 iS 18 19 19 20 2C 22 23-24 24 24 25 25-2S 29 29 30 30 32 31 32 33 33 34 34 34 35-38 38 39 CONTENTS. IX The generals : the Prince of Orange . ... 40 Lord Hill,— Sir T. Picton 4° The Duke of Wellington ...... 40 The internal economy of the three armies . . 4i» 4^ That of the French army 4^ That of the English army 42 That of the Prussian army 42 NOTE TO CHAPTER III 43 Defects peculiar to the inexperienced English regi- ments ... ...... 43 CHAPTER IV: THE FIFTEENTH OF JUNE: NAPOLEON 44 Napoleon assembles his army near Charleroi . . 44» 45 He addresses it at Avesnes on the 14th .... 45 His letters to his brother Joseph and to Davout confirm the view above given of his plan of campaign -45 The general order of movement issued on the even- ing of the 14th of June 45' 4^ Accident in the transmission of his orders to General Vandamme on the 15th ...... 46 Desertion of General Bourmont ..... 47 The operations in the centre under Napoleon's im- mediate supervision -47 Positions of the centre and right on the night of the 15th and i6th 4^ Operations of the left wing. Arrival of Ney . . 48, 49 He pushes the divisions of Bachelu and Pire to Frasnes . 49 And leaves those of Jerome and Foy at Gosselies . . 49 Backwardness of the I st Corps .... 50~52 At 3 A. M. of the i6th one division had not arrived at the Sambre 5^ D'Erlon to blame for this tardiness 5^ Napoleon's own summary of the situation on the eveningof the 15th 53 He had purposely abstained from occupying Som- breffe 53 He expected Blucher to fight the next day for the preservation of his communications with Wel- lington 53 X CONTENTS. He gets a few hours' sleep during the evening of the 15th 54 NOTES TO CHAPTER IV 55 1. Marshal Ney's lack of a proper staff . ... 56 2. Discussion of the results of the operations on the 15th 56 e/ seq. Jomini and Charras consider them incomplete and unsatisfactory ....... 56 A. The question, as regards the non-occupation of Sombreffe on the evening of the 15th . . 57-61 Rogniat's criticism 57 Napoleon's answer ....... 57 Charras and Jomini 58, 59 Re-statement of Napoleon's plan and expectations . . 59 The plan suggested by Rogniat, Jomini and Charras no improvement on that of Napoleon ... 60 B. The question as regards the non-occupation o' Quatre Bras on the evening of the 15th . 61-63 (i.) Reasons why the effect on Bliicher of the occupation of Quatre Bras might be different from that of the occupation of Sombreffe . . 61 (2.) The occupation of Quatre Bras on the evening of the 15th not necessary to Napoleon's scheme . 62 3. Reasons why Napoleon blamed Ney for not having occupied Quatre Bras on the 15th . . 63 4. Did Napoleon give Ney a verbal order to seize Quatre Bras on the 15th? .... 64 The statements of Gourgaud and the Memoirs . . 64 The statement in the Bulletin of the Army, sent off in the evening of the 15th . . . . , d^ The published statement of Marshal Grouchy in 1 8 18 that he heard the Emperor blame Ney for having disobeyed his orders to seize Quatre Bras on the 15th ...... 65, n. 28 The subsequent hearsay evidence of little value . 66-67 The Bulletin much the best evidence that we have 67-69 That no mention is made in the written orders of the 1 6th of the verbal order of the day before, is not material 69 CONTENTS. XI CHAPTER V : THE FIFTEENTH OF JUNE : BLUCHER AND WELLINGTON 70 Bliicher on the 14th ordered his army to concentrate at Sombreffe ........ 7^ And without consulting Wellington .... 70 The nature of the understanding between them . 70 et seq. Miiffling's statement generally misunderstood . . 7^ There was every intention to act in concert, but no definite agreement as to details .... 72 Billow's disobedience of orders 73 Gneisenau's remissness in not giving him full in- formation of the situation ..... 73 Wellington's desire to protect Ghent and Brussels . 74 He retained his headquarters at Brussels ... 74 He thought it probable that the French would advance by way of Mons ..... 74 Hence he would not hastily move in force in the direction of Quatre Bras 75 The Prince of Orange hears of the French advance . 76 And brings word of it to the Duke at Brussels at 3 P. M. of the 15th 77 Wellington's first orders were issued between 5 and 7 P. M 77 They were simply for the concentration of the vari- ous divisions of his army • . . . -7^ But they implied that Nivelles and not Quatre Bras was likely to be the point of concentration for the whole army 78 Information that Bliicher is concentrating at Som- breffe arrives in the evening at Brussels ... 7^ And Wellington issues, about 10 P. M., his "After Orders" which direct a general movement towards the east 79 Difficulty of reconciling the evidence as to the sub- sequent orders of the Duke 79 The Duke's oflEicial report states that he ordered the whole army to Quatre Bras in the early morn- ing of the i6th 80 Miiffling's statement 80 The Duke's conversation with the Duke of Rich- mond 81, n. 37 Xll CONTENTS. The instructions issued to Colonel de Lancey have been lost 8i The orders to Hill in the early morning of the i6th . 82 They indicate that no decision for a concentration at Quatre Bras had then been reached ... 83 This inference may be also drawn from the halt of Picton's division at Waterloo ..... 83 It has even been maintained that as late as 10 A. M. of the 1 6th the Duke had not decided to hold Quatre Bras 84, n. 50 But the Letter of the Duke to Marshal Bliicher and the "Disposition" of Sir W. De Lancey con- tradict this supposition ...... 85 Character and meaning of the " Disposition " . . 86 The "Disposition" evidently the foundation of the Letter to Bliicher 87-88 Taken together, they show that the Duke ordered a concentration of his army at Quatre Bras in the early morning of the i6th 88 But not until after he had given the orders above mentioned to Hill and Picton .... 88 His decision was probably arrived at while he was at the Duchess of Richmond's ball ... 89 NOTES TO CHAPTER V 90 1. The Duke's "Memorandum on the Battle of Waterloo" 90 Its surprising statements ...... 9c 2. No definite plan of action agreed on by Wel- ington and Bliicher in the event of a French invasion 91 3. Wellington does not deserve credit for prompt- ness in deciding to concentrate at Ouatre Bras 92 4. Wellington's original intention of concentrating at Nivelles considered 93 It is approved by Colonel Maurice 93 A. But when Wellington knew that the French main army was in front of Bliicher at Som- breffe he could run no great risk in concen- , trating at Qiiatre Bras 94 CONTENTS. XIH B. His fault was in delaying to issue the order to do so -94 If his orders had been strictly carried out, Ney would have occupied Quatre Bras without opposition, and been able to assist Napoleon atLigny 95 C. Napoleon attached great importance to Quatre Bras, and gave Ney a large force in order to make sure of its acquisition . . . . 95 » 9^ 5. The extent of the cantonments of the allied armies criticized 96 Opinion of Sir James Shaw-Kennedy .... 96 Opinions of Charras and Napoleon . . . 97? 98 6. Napoleon's criticism on Bliicher for fixing Som- breffe as the point of concentration for his army, well supported 98 But his censure of Wellington for concentrating at Quatre Bras undesei-ved ..... 99 Because this decision of Wellington's was based on Napoleon's having already concentrated in front of Sombreffe 99, 100 CHAPTER VI: THE DUTCH-BELGIANS . . loi Prince Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar occupies Quatre Bras in the afternoon of the 15th .... loi And is attacked by Reille's advance between 5 and 6P. M loi The other brigade of Perponcher's division, By- landt's, ordered there also 102 The Prince of Orange arrives at Quatre Bras at 6 A.M. of the 1 6th 102 NOTE TO CHAPTER VI 103 Maurice's criticism on the occupation of Qiiatre Bi-as by the Dutch-Belgian generals . . . 103 But the fact that they knew of the concentration of the French and Prussian armies near Sombreffe fully justifies their course .... 103, 104 CHAPTER VII : THE MORNING OF THE SIX- TEENTH OF JUNE : WELLINGTON . .105 The Duke leaves Brussels about 7.30 A. M. of the i6th 105 XIV CONTENTS. And rides at once to Quatre Bras ..... io6 His letter to Bliicher io6 Comparison of the statements in the Letter with those in the "Disposition" of Sir \V. De Lancey ........ 107-10S He evidently accepted the "Disposition" as con- clusive 108 He rides over to Brj-e to confer with Bliicher . . 108 And returns to Quatre Bras between 2 and 3 P. M. . 109 No doubt expecting to find a large part of his army there 109 Delbriick's theory, that the Duke deliberately mis- represented the situation of his army, entirely unsupported ....... 109, no NOTES TO CHAPTER VII in 1. Actual positions of Wellington's divisions at 7 A.M. of the 16th iii-ris 2. Whether, if the Duke had known the truth, he would have stayed at Quatre Bras, — qucere . 114 3. Wellington badly served by his subordinates in the matter of the transmission of intelligence from the front ...... 114-115 CHAPTER VIII: THE MORNING OF THE SIX- TEENTH OF JUNE : NEY . . . .116 Ney returns f rom Charleroi to Gosselies at 2 A. M. . 116 And at first orders Reille to set out at once for Frasnes . . . . . . . . .116 But afterwards changes his mind, and allows Reille, with the divisions of Jerome and Foy, to re- main in Gosselies . . . . . . .117 He ought to have sent them to Frasnes at once . -117 And to have filled their places at Gosselies with the divisions of the ist Corps . . . . .118 He does nothing to bring up the ist Corps till late in the forenoon . . . . . , .119 Soult's first order to him on the 1 6th . . . .120 Received about 6 A.M. , and answered before 7 A.M. . 1 20 Ney then returns to Frasnes, leaving Reille at Gos- selies, with instructions to march to the front at once on receipt of orders from army headquar- ter 120 CONTENTS. XV About 9 A. M. Rellle receives word from Girard that the Prussians are massing at Fleurus . .121 And at ic A. M. he reads the Emperor's letter to Ney, brought by Flahaut . . . . .121 But defers his march to Frasnes till he gets further orders from Ney .122 He gets further orders, and leaves Gosselies at 1 1 .45 A.M 122 Soult's second order directs Ney to march on Quatre Bras 122 The Emperor's letter to Ney 123 The ist and 2d Corps and Kellermann's cavalry are all put at Ney's disposal 123 The third order to Ney from Soult that morning . 123, 124 Its peremptory character 124 Ney refuses fully to obey his orders . . . ,124 His unwillingness to take the risks which they involve . 124 He proposes to keep half his force in reserve „ . .125 NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII 126 1. Summary of Ney's conduct on the morning of the i6th 126 2. He evidently did not intend to obey his orders strictly .127 3. The light his conduct on the i6th throws on his failure to seize Quatre Bras the day before . .127 4. No criticism can be made on Napoleon and Soult . 128 5. Why Napoleon did not send Ney an earlier order to seize Quatre Bras, answered in Chapter IX .128 CHAPTER IX: THE MORNING OF THE SIX- TEENTH OF JUNE : NAPOLEON . .129 Ney and Napoleon at Charleroi during the night of the 15th and i6th ....... 129 Napoleon, impressed by the backwardness of d'Erlon, decides to wait until the left wing is ready 130 The formal order to Ney to seize Quatre Bras not given until Ney's report of the state of his com- mand had arrived — between 8 and 9 A. M. . 131 The advance of the centre and right also delayed to conform to the movements of the left . . 131,132 XVI CONTENTS. Napoleon's expectations as to the forwardness of Ney's command 13^) ^33 Napoleon prepares and sends letters to Ney and Grouchy, in view of the possible withdrawal of Marshal Bliicher I34' ^35 He seems to have thought this probable . . . 136 But he made every preparation for encountering the enemy in force both at SombrefTe and at Quatre Bras 137 The 6th Corps regarded as a reserve for the whole army 13^ NOTES TO CHAPTER IX 139 1. The censure generally passed on Napoleon for his delays on the morning of the i6th not deserved 139 Opinions of Wellington and Clausewitz . . . 139, n. 5 2. Ney not responsible for the backwardness of the 1st Corps during the night .... 140 3. Ney's inactivity on returning to Gosselies . .140 4. No evidence thus far of indolence or irresolu- tion on the part of Napoleon . . . .140 5. Error of supposing that he ever thought of pressing on to Brussels between the two allied armies — Chesney and Clinton .... 141 His letters to Ney and Grouchy conclusive as to this 141, 142 His object was to destroy the allied armies in succes- sion — Jomini ....... 142 CHAPTER X: THE BATTLE OF LIGNY: BLUCHER'S DECISION TO ACCEPT BATTLE NOT DEPENDENT ON WEL- LINGTON'S ASSURANCE OF SUPPORT . 143 Bliicher concentrated his army without receiving any assurance of support from Wellington . . 143 He got Wellington's letter about noon of the 1 6th . . 144 Wellington arrived at Brye at i P. M 144 Their conversation ....... 144 Wellington gave no unconditional promise . . .145 Bliicher's decision to fight was arrived at before he heard from or saw Wellington .... 146 And on entirely independent grounds .... 147 CONTENTS. XVll NOTE TO CHAPTER X 148 Bliicher's reasons for deciding to accept battle at Ligny as given by Damitz . . . . .148 He was unwilling to retreat 148 Suggestions of Ollech and Delbriick not of any value here ........ 149 Bliicher expected to concentrate his whole army of 120,000 men 149 And was unwilling to change his decision when he found he could not count upon Billow's arrival . 150 CHAPTER XI: THE BATTLE OF LIGNY . . 151 Position of the Prussian army at Ligny . . . » 151 Napoleon examines the position . . . . .153 The most obvious plan of battle was to turn the Prussian right . . . . . . .153 But Napoleon decides to attack the centre . . • ^53 Positions taken by the French .... 153, 154 The 2 P. M. order sent to Ney to cooperate with the main army 154 The battle begins at 2.30 by attacking Ligny and St. Amand 154 The 3.15 P. M. order to Ney 155 Napoleon determines about half-past five o'clock to put in the Guard ....... 156 The unexpected appearance of d'Erlon's Corps causes a delay of nearly two hours .... 157 The attack by the Guard breaks the Prussian centre . 15S The Prussians fall back to Brye and Sombreffe . '159 Losses of the Prussians and French .... 159 The non-employment of the 6th Corps . . . 159, 160 Extent of the victory 160, 161 It was not equal to Napoleon's hopes, but it had disposed of the Prussians for a time . . 161, 163 NOTES TO CHAPTER XI 163 1. Napoleon's delay in beginning the battle . . '163 His reasons considered ....... 164 2. His plan of battle criticised by Rogniat and others ......... 164 Napoleon's reply to Rogniat ...... 165 XVlll CONTENTS. His reasons for taking the course he did • . . i6k The criticism of Davout and Clausewitz considered 3. Ciausewitz's doubts as to the decisive result of Ney's movement ...... The question fully stated and Napoleon's expecta- tions justified ....... 4. What Napoleon had a right to expect from Ney 5 Whether Napoleon's plan v^^as the best, con- sidering that he could not absolutely rely on Ney's cooperation ...... 6. Why Napoleon did not order d'Erlon to remain and take part in the battle .... He must have assumed that d'Erlon had come upon the field for this purpose .... And there was not time to send him orders 7. Napoleon's skill well displayed at Ligny . Ciausewitz's review of the battle .... He points out that Napoleon was more economical in the use of his troops than Bliicher Severe and unwarranted criticism of Marshal Davout on Napoleon's tactics ..... Napoleon not responsible for the error which brought d'Erlon on the field .... 8. Whether Napoleon was wise in arresting the progress of the battle on the appearance of the strange corps (d'Erlon's), — ^ucsre . . 174-175 9. Napoleon to be censured for not having made use of the 6th Corps . . . . . -175 CHAPTER XII : THE BATTLE OF QUATRE BRAS 176 Resume of Marshal Ney's doings in the forenoon of the i6th 176 He should have ordered Jerome and Foy to Gosse- lies in the early morning 177 He scattered his command instead of uniting it, as he was ordered to do 177 He begins the action at 2 P. M., with the divisions of Bachelu, Foy and Pire . . . . . 17S Jerome's division arrives at 3 P. M. . . . . 17S Wellington returns to Quatre Bras at 2.30 P. M. . . 17S Picton's division arrives at 3.30 P. M 178 166 167 167 1 68 169 170 170 170 171 71-173 173 174 CONTENTS. XIX Alten's division arrives at 5 P. M. .... 179 At this hour Ney has only the 3d Corps on the field . 179 Reasons for the non-arrival of the 1st Corps . . -179 Its delay in starting 180 Its leading division — Durutte's — turned off by an aide of the Emperor's from Frasnes towards St. Amand 180 The corps is seen approaching St. Amand about 5 P. M. . ' iSo It must, therefore, have left the Charleroi road at Frasnes about 4.30 P. M. iSi This was two hours and a half after Jerome's divis- ion had passed through Frasnes . . . .181 Responsibility of Ney and d'Erlon for this extra- ordinar}^ state of things . . . . . . iSi Marshal Ney not to blame for recalling D'Erlon to Qiiatre Bras 181 It was probably the staff-officer who carried the 2 P. M. order who turned the ist Corps off from the turnpike 182 For the non-arrival of Kellermann's cavalry Ney alone was responsible 182 He ordered it to remain in the rear at Frasnes and Liberchies 182, 183 In this he deliberately disobeyed orders . . -183 He finally, at 6 P. M., puts in one brigade of Kellermann's Coi-ps . . . . . •183 Which is at first successful, but is afterwards driven back with loss 184 The French retire to Frasnes 184 The casualties on both sides 184 If d'Erlon's Corps had not been turned off, it is probable that Wellington would have been badly beaten 184, 185 If Ney had concentrated his whole command be- tween 12 M. and 2 P. M., Quatre Bras would probably have been evacuated . . . 1S5, 186 In this case Ney could have spared 10,000 or 20,000 men to assist Napoleon ...... 1S6 Criticism on Marshal Ney's management . . . 186 Wellington's skilful handling of his troops . . 1S7, 18S XX CONTENTS. NOTES TO CHAPTER XII . . . . ; . 189 1. Charras' erroneous statements as to Ney's orders in regard to the employment of Kellerman's cavalry ......••• 189 2. Napoleon's mistakes in his account of the matter in his Memoirs . . . . • .190 But his principal censure on Ney for not having got his command together and used it as a whole, is fully borne out 191 3. Curious error of Siborne's ..... 191 4. Jomini's defence of Reille's delay to march to Frasnes • 192 It overlooks the necessity of occupying Frasnes in any event, and therefore cannot be accepted . -193 5. Baudus' account of his carrying an order from Soult to d'Erlon 193 Reasons for thinking that this order must have been directed to Ney 194 Baudus probably carried the duplicate of the 3.15 P. M. order to Ney 195 The evidence on certain minor points conflicting . .196 CHAPTER XIII: THE SEVENTEENTH OF JUNE: NAPOLEON 197 i?e'52<»/e of the campaign up to date .... 197 Napoleon had no reason for delay 197 He had a disposable army composed almost entirely of fresh troops • '197 Reasons for thinking that the Prussians might soon recover from the defeat of Ligny . . . .198 Opportunity open to Napoleon of overwhelming that part of Wellington's army which was at Quatre Bras 199 Napoleon's inactivity on this morning .... 200 Probably the result of fatigue 200 Ney sends no report to the Emperor .... 200 Soult's first order to him to move on Quatre Bras . . 201 Napoleon presumes that Wellington has long since fallen back 201 Napoleon's lack of energy and activity this morning . 202 Before noon, however, the 6th Corps and the Guard are ordered to Marbais 203 CONTENTS. XXI Second order to Ney at noon 203 Girard's division of the 2d Corps left at Ligny . . 203 Napoleon's reasons for supposing that Bliicher had retired on Namur 203, 204 Of which the principal was that he had on the day before employed so large a part of his army in holding the Namur road 204 Pajol captures some prisoners and a battery on the road to Namur 205 Napoleon's neglect to send out cavalry to explore the country to the north 205 Napoleon determines to send Grouchy with the 3d and 4th Corps to pursue the Prussians . . . 206 His verbal orders to Grouchy, and Grouchy's re- monstrances 207 Grouchy's points not well taken 207 Grouchy's denial that he ever received on that day a written order 20S Berton reports a whole Prussian corps at Gembloux . 209 The Emperor, then, in the absence of Soult, dic- tates to Bertrand an order to Grouchy . . . 209 Full text of this order 209,210 This order changes entirely the task assigned to Grouchy 210 He is to ascertain whether the Prussians intend to separate from the English or to unite with them to cover Brussels or Liege in trying the fate of another battle 211 And is left full discretion as to his course in either event 211 Strength and composition of his command . . .212 He reaches Gembloux that evening . . . .212 And writes to the Emperor a report in which he says he shall try to separate the Prussians from Wellington 212, 213 Strength of Welhngton's force at Quatre Bras . .214 At Quatre Bras the Emperor in person leads the pursuit of the English 214 His remark to d'Erlon 215 Interesting picture of the march by the author of " Napoleon a Waterloo " 215 XXll CONTENTS. Skirmish at Genappe 216 The English take up positions south ot the hamlet of Mont St. Jean 216 NOTES TO CHAPTER XIII 217 1. Napoleon not to be blamed for not having pur- sued the Prussians in the early morning of the 17th. Clausewitz's opinion . . . . .217 2. Napoleon probably would not have detached Grouchy had he known that the Prussians had retired on Wavre 218 3. Effect on the contemporary historians of Grouchy's concealment of the Bertrand order — e. ^., on Clausewitz . . . . . .218 4. Curious sur\4val of this effect on historians who wrote after the order had come to light . . .219 OnChesney 219 On Maurice 219 On Hamley 221 On Hooper 222 5. Whether the Bertrand order was sufficiently explicit. Charras' opinion ..... 222 6. The reasons for directing Grouchy on Gem- bloux considered 223 7. Valuable suggestions- of Maurice as to the rea- sons which induced Napoleon to suppose that the Prussians had retreated to Namur . . . 223 8. It was an error for Napoleon to trust to the prob- abilities, when so much was at stake . . 224, 225 CHAPTER XIV : THE SEVENTEENTH OF JUNE : BLUCHER AND WELLINGTON . . .226 Zieten and Pirch I. fall back towards Wavre . . 226 Renunciation of the line of Namur 226 But a general concentration at Wavre not necessanly implied 226 Although it was rendered possible by Gneisenau's action ......... 227 Gneisenau unwilling to renounce all hope of union with the English 228 Although he recognized the difficulties attending it . 228 And doubted whether he could rely on Wellington . .329 Bliicher carried off the field to Mellery .... 229 CONTENTS. XXlll Hardinge's story of the discussion between Bliicher and Gneisenau ....... 230 The Prussian generals decide to march to join Wel- lington ......... 230 Movements of Thielemann and Billow .... 231 Admirable conduct of the Prussian corps-com- manders . . . . . . . . '231 The Prussians fall back on Wavre 232 Leaving a detachment at Mont St. Guibert . . . 232 The artillery trains arrive at Wavre at 5 P. M. . . 232 Wellington at Qiiatre Bras on the morning of the 17th 233 His message to Bliicher sent through Lieut. Massow . 233 Bliicher replies about midnight, promising support . . 234 Wellington's uncertainty during the day and even- ing of the 17th ....... 234 The risk which he ran ...... 235, 236 NOTES TO CHAPTER XIV 237 1 . Maurice's correction of Siborne .... 237 2. The story of the Duke's ride to Wavre on the evening of the 17th ..... 23S-242 Lockhart's brief statement ...... 239 Lord Ellesmere's denial of Lockhart's statement . . 239 The story as told by the Rev. Julian Charles Young 239-241 Mr. Coltman's recollection of his father's statement about it . 241 Reasons for rejecting the story ..... 242 3. Napoleon's criticism on the course of Welling- ton and Bliicher after the battle of Ligny . . . 243 Clausewitz denies that Wellington ran any risk . . 243 His view not tenable ....... 244 The question of the advisability of running the risk stated 244 CHAPTER XV : THE EIGHTEENTH OF JUNE : GROUCHY AND BLUCHER . . . .245 Grouchy's letter from Gembloux of 10 P. M. not really satisfactory ....... 245 But Napoleon and Soult do not give him further instructions or any information .... 246 Napoleon thinks Grouchy may arrive by the bridge of Moustier and sends Marbot to look out for him . 247 XXIV CONTENTS. Grouchy was acting under the Bertrand order . Which laid upon him the task of ascertaining the intentions of the Prussians .... And then left him entire Hberty of action Errors of Gardner and Maurice as to this latter point Grouchy at lo P. M. of the 17th issues his orders for the next day to move on Sart-a-Walhain at 6 and 8 A. M But at daybreak he has learned that the Prussians had retired on Brussels .... Yet he does not change his orders . He should have marched for the bridge of Moustier at daybreak ...... Opinion of Jomini Opinion of Clausew^itz ..... Opinion of Charras ..... Grouchy neglects to reconnoitre to his left He arrives at Walhain and stops at the house of M. Hollert, a notary . . . He writes a despatch to the Emperor Analysis of this despatch .... The sound of the cannon of Waterloo is heard Grouchy's plain duty Gerard's advice Grouchy refuses to follow it . And resumes his march on Wavre . Condition of the roads and bridges . Grouchy might have crossed the Dyle after having arrived at La Baraque .... Three general misconceptions 1. As to the place where the sound of the cannon was heard ...... 2. As to the necessity of marching by way of JMont St. Guibert 3. As to the resistance to be expected at the bridges Grouchy might have been across by 4 P. M. Positions of the IVth and lid Prussian Corps at that moment ..... And of the 1st Corps ..... Probability that Grouchy would have arrested the march of Biilow and Pirch I. . . . . 248 • 249 . 249 249, 250 255> 250 252 253 253 253 253 254 255 255 256 256 256 256 257 257 258 259 259 259 259 260 260 261 261 261 CONTENTS. XXV Zieten's march, however, would not have been interfered with 261 Billow reaches St. Lambert at noon .... 262 Pirch I. and Zieten do not leave Wavre till nearly noon 262 Tardiness of these movements 263 Accounted for by Gneisenau's distrust of Wellington . 263 His postscript to the letter to Muffling . . . .263 His doubts as to Wellington's accepting battle dis- pelled by the sound of the cannon of Waterloo . 264 The combat at Wavre 264, 265 The bridge of Limale carried by the French between 6 and 7 P. M 265 Soult's 10 A. M. order to Grouchy .... 265 Analysis of this order 266 Its main object • • 266 It furnishes no justification for Grouchy's course . . 267 Inconsistency between this despatch and the instruc- tions given to Marbot 268-270 The despatch probably not revised by Napoleon . . 270 The I P. M. order to Grouchy .... 270,271 Both despatches show that Napoleon was relying on Grouchy 272 The postscript to the second shows that the Emperor had become alarmed 272 NOTES TO CHAPTER XV 273 I. The wisdom of detaching Grouchy with 33,000 men considered ....••• 273 This course was decided on when it was believed that the Prussians had retreated on Namur . . 273 For Grouchy was not needed for the battle with the Anglo-Dutch army 274 But the Bertrand order shows that Napoleon feared that Blucher might have undertaken to join Wellington 274 In which case he would have had a long start by the time when Grouchy could move . . . 275 Yet Napoleon adhered to the original decision to send Grouchy off, although he gave him a dis- tinct warning ....••• 270 Risks incurred by this course 276 XXVI CONTENTS. It would have been far safer to have taken Grouchy and his two corps with the main army . . . 277 2. Kennedy's reason against the detachment of Grouchy 277 But it was not to beat Wellington that Grouchy was needed, but to keep off Bliicher .... 27S 3. Importance of treating independently of the conduct of Napoleon and Grouchy . . . .279 4. Hamley's opinion as to Grouchy's proper course given and commented on ..... 2S0 5. The probable results, if Grouchy had marched for Moustier at daybreak . . . . . 2S1 It would seem that he might easily have concealed the object of his marcli . . . . . .281 Charras, however, is of a different opinion . . . 282 Examination of his views ...... 2S2 Probability that Grouchy could have effected a crossing at Moustier and Ottignies by 1 1 A. M. . 2S3 And that Biilow would have stopped to concentrate his corps and fight ....... 2S3 And that Pirch I. and Thielemann would have rein- forced Biilow ........ 284 Zieten, however, if he chose to do so, might have continued his march ...... 284 6. Charras' view as to the difficulty of Grouchy's eflecting a crossing after he had arrived at La Baraque ........ 284 His statements as to the Prussian force in the vicinity of the lower bridges unsupported . . 285 7. It is generally stated that Grouchy was at Sart- a-Walhain when he heard the sound of the cannon of Waterloo ...... 2S6 Statements of the different narratives . . . 2S6, 287 He was, hovv^ever, at Walhain, at the Chateau Marette, then the residence of M. Hollert, the Notary of Nil St. Vincent .... 287, 2S8 CHAPTER XVI: THE BATTLE OF WATER- LOO 289 Napoleon examines the allied position at i A. M. . . 289 Early in the morning he again goes to the front to see if the English are there ..... 290 CONTENTS. XXVI 1 His expectation of victory The role which he expected Grouchy to play He does not seem to have drawn the very natural inference that Wellington was expecting Bliicher ; or, if he did, he certainly did not act upon it ...... . The rain ceased about S A. M. The original intention was to begin the battle at 9 o'clock ...... But Drouot suggested delay and Napoleon acquiesced Napoleon forms the army in three lines . His delay in beginning the action criticised And his neglect to send word to Grouchy Every hour's delay a gain to Wellington Whose army was unequal to the shock without the assistance of the Prussians Kennedy's explanation of Wellington's course Risks that Wellington took .... Wellington had had the field surveyed Description of the English position Composition and strength of Wellington's army Positions of the various troops Hougomont and La Haye Sainte . Strength and composition of the French army Positions of the corps Napoleon's plan of battle .... Establishment of a great battery east of the Charleroi turnpike ...... It has been universally commended The attack on Hougomont, ordered as a prelim nary to the main attack, which was to be on the centre, very rashly and carelessly conducted The assault by d'Erlon's Corps Formation of the troops .... No assignable reason for such a peculiar and un wieldy formation ..... The attack is made and repulsed Napoleon sees the Prussians on the heights of St Lambert Capture of La Haye Sainte .... The great cavalry attacks on the English centre 290 290 291 291 293 292 293 293 294 294 294 295 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 301 302 303 303 303^ 304 304-307 • 305 305 307 307 307 308 CONTENTS. They were made against troops in good condition to stand them ...... Napoleon is called away at 4 P. M. to take charge of the resistance to the Prussians . Necessity of maintaining the Charleroi road and Planchenoit against their assaults . Napoleon's personal supervision needed . The great cavalry charges .... They accomplish little and the cavalry is ruined French batteries placed to the south of La Haye Sainte enfilade the English line west of the turnpike ....... But this was only done to a limited extent The attack by the heavy cavalry of the Guard Napoleon succeeds in repulsing Biilow . The battle against the English not actively carried on after the cessation of the cavalry attacks But the English line at this period becomes from various causes very weak. Kennedy's descrip tion of it What Napoleon might have accomplished against the English had he not been fighting the Prus sians at this time ..... The fight with the Prussians terminated, Napoleon returns to the front .... Wellington has made every effort to restore hi line ; its condition to the west of the pike Ney is ordered to make preparations for an attack to be made by the Imperial Guard . Disposition at this time of the various battalions of the Guard ...... Strength and composition of the attacking force The Emperor leads up and hands to Ney two regi ments of grenadiers and two of chasseurs They are formed in columns of battalions and march in. echelon, the right in advance Premature attack of a body of French horse on th left of the Guard . . . . . No support furnished by Reille Admirable conduct of d'Erlon . 316 CONTENTS. XXIX The leading battalions of the Guard strike Maitland's brigade of guards . . . . . . .319 Captain Powell's account 319 The leading battalions of the Guard are beaten . . 320 General Maitland's account . . . . . • 321 Skilful and gallant conduct of Sir C. Halkett . . 322 The left and rear battalions of the Guard continue to advance ........ 323 But are attacked in flank by the 5 2d regiment . . 324 And are completely overthrown ..... 324 The failure of the attack largely due to the absence of supports ........ 324 Arrival of the van of Zieten's Corps on the field . . 324 The French right wing retires in confusion . . . 325 Charge of the cavalry-brigades of Vivian and Van- deleur 325 Exertions of Napoleon to restore order . . . -325 He is finally forced to retire 326 The French retreat blocked at Genappe . . . 326 The result of the battle due to the intervention of the Prussians -32 7 Probable course of Zieten if Grouchy had detained Billow and Pirch I. ...... 32S Grouchy, however, not solely responsible for the defeat 32S NOTES TO CHAPTER XVI 329 1. The French tactics generally censured . . . 329 Napoleon and Ney both to blame ..... 329 Injurious effect on the French chances of success of Napoleon's absence at Planchenoit .... 330 The attack on Hougomont criticised .... 330 The defence of Planchenoit praised . . . • 33^ 2. The English tactics exceedingly good . . • 33^ 3. The attack of the Imperial Guard . . . • 33^ A. No foundation for the hypothesis of two columns . 332 B. The claims of the 52d regiment considered . . 333 The notion that it was only the skirmishers of the Imperial Guard who were driven off by Mait- land's brigade refuted by the testimony of eye witnesses 334 The great credit due to Colborne 335 XXX CONTENTS. 4. Napoleon's reasons for ordering the attack con- sidered ......... 336 Zieten's inter\-ention not anticipated .... 336 The English reported as growing weaker . . . 337 Ney ordered and expected to support the attack by Bachelu's division and by cavalry on the left . 337 Ney disappoints the Emperor's expectations in both respects 337 The charge of the Guard might have been properly supported ........ 338 Contrast between Ney and Wellington . . . 33S Note on Ney's state of mind .... 33S, n. 22 5. Wellington's course in leaving i8,ooo men at Hal and Tubize, not to be defended . . . 339 6. As to the effect upon the Prussians of the ap- pearance of Grouchy's force marching from the Dyle 339 7. The rout of the French army due to the irrup- tion of Zieten's Corps ...... 340 The comparative weakness of the Anglo-Dutch army at the close of the action .... 341 8. Relative responsibility of Napoleon and Grouchy for the intervention of the Prussians . . . 341 Both are responsible for it 343 CHAPTER XVH: CONCLUDING OBSERVA- TIONS 343 The principal points treated of in this book . . 343-350 Appendix A. On some characteristics of Napoleon's Memoirs . •351 Injustice done Napoleon by Charras and others . • 351 Peculiarity of Napoleon's memory 352 He recalls his expectations, but not the tenor of the orders which he gave 352 Illustration from the orders sent to Ney on the after- noon of the i6th 3-2 The same thing probably true as to the order sent to Grouchy ........ 353 The orders given in the "Memoirs" were probably never sent -^-^ x\nd the Bertrand order, which was sent, was for- gotten 3^4 CONTENTS. XXXI Appendix B. On Marshal Grouchy and the Bertrand order » . 355 Denials by Marshal Grouchy in his pamphlets pub- lished in Philadelphia that he received on the 17th any written order. ...... 355 He relied on the fact that no copy of the Bertrand order was among the major-general's papers . . 356 Publication of the order in 1842 357 It is now recognized in the Grouchy Memoirs . . 357 Original text of the Bertrand Order .... 358 Grouchy's report to the Emperor dated Gembloux, 10 P. M., June 17, given in full .... 359 It is in reality a reply to the Bertrand order . . . 360 Mutilation by Marshal Grouchy of the text of this report ......... 360 Object of the change 360 No doubt as to the correct reading . . . •361 Appendix C. I. Napoleon's Address to his army, June 14, 1815 363 II. Order of movement, June 14, 1815 . . . 363 III. Order to the Count Reille, 8.30 A. M., June 15' 1S15 .366 IV. Order to the Count d'Erlon, 10 A. M., June ^5^ 1815 367 V. Order to the Count d'Erlon, 3 P. M., June 15, 1815 367 VI. Subsequent Order to the Count d'Erlon, June 15. 1815 367 VII. Order to Gen. Nogues, 3 A. M., June 16, 1815 . . / . .... 368 VIII. Bulletin of the army, June 15, 1815, evening . 369 IX. Wellington's first Memorandum of Orders, June 15, 1815 370 X. Wellington's letter to the Due de Feltre, 10 P. M., June 15, 1815 371 XL Wellington's " After Orders," 10 P. M., June i5» 1815 371 XII. Extract from Wellington's Report of the Operations, June 19, 1815 373 XXXll CONTENTS. XIII. Wellington's Conversation with the Duke of Richmond, June i6, 1S51 XIV. Wellington's Orders to Lord Hill, June 16, 1S15 XV. Extract from Wellington's "Memorandum on the Battle of Waterloo " . XVI. Wellington's Letter to Bliicher, 10.30 A. M., June 16, 1815 ...... XVII. Soult's first order to Ney, June 16, 18 15 XVIII. The Emperor's Letter to Ney, June 16, 1S15 XIX. Count Reille's Letter to Ney, June 16, 181 5 XX. Ney's Orders to Reille and d'Erlon, June 16, 1815 XXI. Soulf s formal Order to Ney to carry Quatre Bras, June 16, 1815 XXII. Soult's second Order to Ney to carry Quatre Bras, June 16, 1815 XXIII. Flahaut's Letter to the Duke of Elchingen . XXIV. Napoleon's Letter to Grouchy, June 16, 18 15 XXV. The 2 P. M. —June i6th — Order to Ney . XXVI. The 3.15 P. M. —June i6th — Order to Ney XXVII. Soult's Letter to Ney, June 17, 1815 . XXVIII. Soult's Order to Ney, 12 M., June 17, 1S15 XXIX. Capt. Bowles' story of Wellington at Qiiatre Bras, June 17, 1815 XXX. Grouchy's report to Napoleon from Sart-a- Walhain, 11 A.M., June 18, 1815 XXXI. General Order of preparation for the Battle of Waterloo, June 18, 1815 XXXII. Order for the attack to begin at i P.M., June 18, 1815 XXXIII. The 10 A. M.— June i8th— Order to Grouchy XXXIV. The I P. M.— June 1 8th— Order to Grouchy 373 374 374 376 377 377 379 379 3S0 381 3S2 3S2 383 384 384 385 386 386 387 388 388 389 MAPS. (At end of this volume.) The Theatre of War. The Field of Waterloo at ii A.M., June 'I5. Jov CrVK£^ irv^- vX A PARTIAL LIST OF WORKS RELATING TO THE CAMPAIGN.' ^ ALISON: History of Europe from the commencement of the French Revolution to the Restoration of the Bourbons in 1815. By Archibald Alison, LL. D. New Edition with Portraits. Vols. XIII and XIV. Wm. Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh & London, MDCCCL. \j( BATTY: An Historical Sketch of the Campaign of 1815, illustrated by Plans of the Operations and of the Battles of QuatreBras, Ligny and Waterloo. By Captain Batty, of the First or Grenadier Guards. 2d Edition, Considerably Enlarged. London, 1820. Y Histoire de la Campagne de 1815 : Waterloo : Par le Lt-Colonel Charras, 5 ^ J/ >v| -IZ 5me Edition, revue et augmentde. Avec un Atlas nouveau. Leipzig : F. A, Brockhaus. (No date.)/i' a) ^ 2,*-;^' • ^ V CHESNEY: Waterloo Lectures: A Study of the Campaign of 1S15. By Colonel Charles C. Chesney, R. E., late Professor of Military Art and History in the Staff College. Third Edition. London : Longmans, Green & Co. 1874. , /CHURCHILL'S LETTER: Letter to his father written by Major Chatham Horace Churchill, of the ist Foot Guards, Aide to General Lord Hill. (Waterloo Roll Call, pp. 2, 14, 92, and Appendix.) The letter was first printed in the Life of Sir William Napier, pp. 175 et seq. It was reprinted, with some omissions and some ad- ditions, in an English magazine called Atalanta, in November, 1887, where it erroneously said to have been " hitherto unpublished." The writer's name is not given. Mr. Dalton, the compiler of the Waterloo Roll Call, states in the Appendix (p. 235) that a copy of the letter is in his possession. It would be weU worth while to republish it textually with notes. i^" V CLAUSEWITZ: Der Feldzug von 1815 in Frankreich. Hinterlassenes Werk des Gen- erals Carl von Clausewitz. Zweite Auflage. Berlin: Ferd. Diimmler's Verlagsbuchhandlung: 1862. CLINTON: The War in the Peninsula, and Wellington's Campaigns in France and Belgium. With original maps and plans. By H. R. Clinton. London: Frederick Warne & Co. 1878. ir» 4 - 5 ■/ CORRESPONDANCE de Napoldon ler, publiee par ordre de I'Empereur / Napoleon III. Tome XXVI I L Tome XXXT, CEuvres de Napoleon lerk St. H^lbne. Paris: Imprimerie Imp^riale. 1869. ^ / RELATING TO THE CAMPAIGN. XXXV COTTON : i' A Voice from Waterloo : a history of the battle, &c. By Sergeant- *^ major Edward Cotton, late 7th Hussars. •, ^ ,--, Fifth Edition, revised and enlarged. Printed for the author. London. '■ "^ •' •> - R. Green. 1854. CRAAN, W. B. : Plan du Champ de Bataille de Waterloo. Bruxelles: 1816. DAMITZ: Histoire de la Campagne de 1815 : Par le major de Damitz, ofificier prussien, d'apr^s les documents du Gdndral Grolman, Quartier- Maitre-G^n^ral de I'armde prussienne en 1815. Traduite de I'AUemand par L^on Griffon. Avec Plans. 2 Volumes. Paris. Correard. 1840. D'AUVERGNE: See La Tour d'Auvergne. DAVOUT: Histoire de la Vie Militaire, Politique, et Administrative du Mardchal Davout, Due de Auerstaedt, Prince d'EckmiihI. D'aprfes les documents ^^ )r%,^ \^ officiels. Par L. J. Gabriel de Chenier. Paris: Gosse, Marchal & Cie: 1866. ^DOCUMENTS INfiDITS: Documents inddits sur la campagne de 1815, publics par le Due d'Elchingen. Paris. 1840. ^^ Oq'J) C DRAME DE WATERLOO: Le Drame de Waterloo : Grande Restitution Historique. Avec un plan. 3me edition. Paris: Au Bureau de la Revue Spiritualiste. 1868. & »v«; J # ^ \J V'^t DROUET: Le Mardchal Drouet, Comte d'Erlon. Notice sur la vie militaire, dcrite par lui-meme et dedide k ses amis. Publide par sa famille. Avec portrait. Paris : Gustave Barba : Libraire fiditeur. 34 Rue Mazarine. 1844. xXeLLESMERE: Essays on History, Biography, Geography, Engineering, &c. Contrib- uted to the Quarterly Review : By the late Earl of Ellesmere. London : John Murray. 1858. FRAGMENTS HISTORIQUES : See Grouchy. / tV ERASER: Letters written during the Peninsula and Waterloo Campaigns. \J j3r~ By Sir A,^ Fra^r. London: 1859. y . «^*-; /* . ^ YX FRASER: Words on Wellington — the Duke — Waterloo — the Ball. By Sir Wm. Eraser, Baronet. London. John C. Nimmo: 1889. ^ XXXVl PARTIAL LIST OF BOOKS v/. J GARDNER: Quatre Bras, Ligny and Waterloo. A narrative of the campaign in Belgium in 1815. By Dorsey Gardner. London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co. 1882. GAWLER : The Crisis and Close of the Action at Waterloo. By an Eyewitness. Dublin. Richard Milliken & Son: 104 Grafton Street. 1833. I A /)l)^ \1^ GfiRARD : V hJ/ at / I. Quelques Documents sur la Bataille de Waterloo, propres k dclairer question portee devant le public par M. le Marquis de Grouchy. Par le G^n^ral Gerard. Paris: Denain: Novembre, 1829. (With a Map.) 2. Derniferes Observations sur les Operations de I'aile droite de TArmde Frangaise h la Bataille de Waterloo, en rdponse h. M. le Marquis de Grouchy. Par le G^ndral Gdrard. Paris: Denain: 1830. (With a Map.) 3. Lettre h MM. Germain Sarrut et B. Saint Edme, Rddacteurs de la Biographie des Hommes du Jour. Paris: 12 Mars, 1840. GIRAUD: The Campaigns of Paris in 1814 and 1815, etc. Translated from the French of P. F. F. J. Giraud by Edmund Boyce. 2d Edition, enlarged. London. 1816. ""^r la qui iD lo ^ 6-f:ji| \ ^ / GNEISENAU: Das Leben des Feldmarschalls Grafen Reithardt von Gneisenau. Vierter Band. 1814, 1815. Von Hans Delbriick. Fortfetzung des Gleich- namigen Werkes von G. H. Pertz. Berlin. 18S0. / GOMM: v' Letters and Journals of Field-Marshal Sir William Maynard Gomm, G. C. B. From 1799 to Waterloo, 1815. Edited by Francis Culling Carr- Gomm. London: John Murray. 18S1. GORE: An Historical Account of the Battle of Waterloo ; intended to elucidate the topographical plan executed by W. B. Craan, J. U. D. Translated from the French, with explanatory notes, by Captain Arthur Gore, 30th Regiment of Foot. With Plates. London. Printed for Samuel Leigh. 1817. aV ^. GOURGAUD (original) : ' "^ ' Campagne de dix-huit cent quinze : ou Relation des Operations Mili- aires qui ont eu lieu en France et en Belgique, pendant les Cent Jours. £crite h. Sainte H^lfene. Par le Gdn^ral Gourgaud. Paris : iSi8. GOURGAUD (translation) : The Campaign of 1815. Written at St. Helena by General Gourgaud. London: 1818. ' Our citations are from this (original) edition. RELATING TO THE CAMPAIGN, XXXVU ^, GRENADIER GUARDS: The Origin and History of the First or Grenadier Guards. By Lieut. Gen. Sir F. W. Hamilton, K. C. B. In three volumes. London: John Murray, 1874. GROUCHY: 1. Observations sur la Relation de la Campagne de 1815, publide par le Gdndral Gourgaud, et Refutation de quelques unes des Assertions d'autres Merits relatifs k la bataille de Waterloo. Par le Mardchal de Grouchy. Philadelphie. 1818. 2. The same, with omissions and changes. Philadelphia, 1819. 3. The same title except that the author's name is given as " le Comte de Grouchy." Reprinted, with many omissions and changes, from the Phila- delphia edition of 1819. Paris: Chez Chaumerot Jeune, Libraire, Palais Royal. 1819.' 4. Doutes sur I'Authenticitd des Mdmoires historiques attribuds h Napo- Idon et premifere refutation de quelques unes des assertions qu'ils renferment. Par le Comte de Grouchy: Philadelphie: Avril, 1820. 5. Fragments Historiques relatifs k la Campagne de 1815 et k la Bataille de Waterloo. Par le G^ndral Grouchy. Lettre k Messieurs Mdry et Barthdlemy. Paris: Firmin Didot Frferes, 20 Novembre, 1829. yV , — 6. Fragments Historiques, &c. ^ / ..,^^ y. De I'influence que peuvent avoir sur I'opinion les documents publics par •'^ M. le Comte Gerard. O^^-^J/' Paris: Firmin Didot Frferes,'2oDecembre, 1829. " ^'Aa 7) \X *— 7- Le Mardchal de Grouchy du 16 au 19 Juin 1815. Par le G^ndral de ' ^^9kjy ' Division Sdnateur Marquis de Grouchy. Paris. E. Dentu. 1864. » -• _. 8. Mdmoires du Marechal de Grouchy. Par le Marquis de Grouchy, officier de I'^tat-major. vol.4. Paris : E. Dentu. 1874. / ■^ : ^ HOOPER: ' fC ^' Waterloo : the Downfall of the First Napoleon : A History of the Cam- , ■] paign of 1815. By George Hooper: author of "The Italian Campaigns of General Bonaparte." With Map and Plans. London: Smith, Elder & Co. 1862. . y , y ' . I IMPERIAL GUARD : See Histoire de I'Ex-Garde. See St. Hilaire. \X -^ V JOMINI (original) : ^ ^ ' Precis Politique et Militaire de la Campagne de 1815, pour servir de iO ^-Jy X i" supplement et de rectification k la Vie Politique et Militaire de Napoldon ' racont^e par lui-meme. Par le Gdn^ral J. Paris: 1839. JOMINI (translation):* The Political and Military History of the Campaign of Waterloo. Translated from the French of General Baron de Jomini, by Capt. S. V. Ben^t, Ordnance Dept. U. S. Army. Second Edition. New York: D. Van Nostrand: 1862. JONES : The Battle of Waterloo, with those of Ligny and Quatre Bras, ^described by eye-witnesses, and by the series of official accounts published by authority. To which are added Memoirs of F. M. the Duke of Welling- ton, F. M. Prince Bliicher, the Emperor Napoleon, etc., etc. Illustrated by Maps, Plans, and Views of the Field, and Thirty-four Etchings from Draw- ings. By George Jones, Esq., R. A. Eleventh Edition, enlarged and cor- rected. London: L. Booth: Duke Street. 1852. KENNEDY: Notes on the Battle of Waterloo. By the late General Sir James Shaw- Kennedy, K. C. B., acting at the time of the battle on the Quarter- Master- General's Staff of the Third Division of the Army. London : John Murray : 1865. LA TOUR D'AUVERGNE: Waterloo: £tude de la Campagne de 1815. Par le Lieutenant-Colonel Prince fidouard de La Tour d'Auvergne. Avec Cartes et Plans. Paris : Henri Plon: 1870. LEEKE: The History of Lord Seaton's Regiment (the 52d Light Infantry) at the Battle of Waterloo. By the Reverend William Leeke, M. A. 2 vols. Lon- don : Hatchard & Co. 1866. LOBEN SELS: See Van Loben Sels. pih i^^ xT i^^V A^ ' Our citations are from this translation. vV RELATING TO THE CAMPAIGN. XXXIX LOCKHART: The History of Napoleon Buonaparte. By J. G. Lockhart. Third edi- '201 C i^-H'X tion. 2 vols. London : John Murray. 1835. The History of Napoleon Buonaparte. Reprinted from the Family Library. London: William Tegg. 1867. MARfiCHAL DE GROUCHY EN 1815 : See Grouchy. MAURICE: ARTICLES ON WATERLOO: By Col. J. Fo Maurice, R. A. From the United Service Magazine. Vol. 123. In the years 1890 and 1891. ^MfiMOIRES (original): M^moires pour servir k I'Histoire de France en 1815, avec le plan de la § '^OoD^S bataille de Mont St. Jean. ^ Paris: 1820. 1 Ij-^iX'^fiXj^i/u^ ^ r- '^ '-• ^ /^^a;,*s . MEMOIRS (translation): Ywf'CR^t^ \ £>^\^-^x<^ , Historical Memoirs of Napoleon. Book IX. 1815. Translated from the original Manuscript by B. E. O'Meara. London: Printed for Sir Rich- ard Phillips & Co. 1820. MERCER: Journal of the Waterloo Campaign. Kept throughout the Campaign of 1815. By the late General Cavalid Mercer, commanding the 9th Brigade Royal Artillery. In 2 vols. Wm. Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh & London. 1870. MORRIS, O'CONNOR: See O'Connor Morris. MUDFORD : An Historical Account of the Campaign in the Netherlands in 18 15 under his Grace the Duke of Wellington and Marshal Prince Bliicher. By William Mudford. Illustrated. London. 1817. MUFFLING : PASSAGES : -^ Passages from my Life ; together with Memoirs of the Campaign of 1813 and 1814. By Baron von Miiffling. Edited with notes by Col. Philip Yorke, F. R. S. Second Edition, revised. London : Richard Bentley, New Burling, ton Street. 1853. Part II., beginning with page 197, contains an account of the Waterloo Campaign. ^ MyjlKLlNG : SKBT€H : A Sketch of the Battle of Waterloo, to which are added the Official Despatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, Field Marshal Prince Bliicher, and Reflections on the Battles of Ligny and Waterloo. By General Muffling. With Craan's Map of the Field. Sbcth Edition. Waterloo. H. Gerard, Publisher. 1870. ^^ f<| ! J^' I'XOS" Z' Au \^c^ LA^.. h^,^ ip^ ^ IcfoVec, 1^^ v/ Xl PARTIAL LIST OF BOOKS MUQUARDT: Precis de la Campagne de 1815 dans les Pays-Bas. Bruxelles . Libraire Militaire C. Muquardt : Merzbach and Falk, Editeurs. 1887. NAPIER: Life of General Sir William Napier, K. C. B., Author of the " History of the Peninsular War." Edited by H. O. Bruce, M. P. 2 vols. London: John Murray. 1864. NAPOLEON: See Correspondance. " Memoires. " Memoirs. NAPOLfiON A WATERLOO : Souvenirs Militaires. Napoldon k Waterloo, ou Precis rectifid de la Campagne de 1S15. Avec des Documents nouveaux et des Pieces in^dites. Par un ancien officier de la Garde Imp^riale, qui est rest^ pr^s de Napoldon pendant toutela campagne. Paris: J. Dumaine, 1866. NIEMAN'S DIARY: The Journal of Henri Nieman of the 6th Prussian Black Hussars. From the English Historical Magazme for July, 1S88. O'CONNOR MORRIS: Great Commanders of Modern Times, and the Campaign of 1815. By William O'Connor Morris. London: W. H. Allen & Co.: 1891. OLDFIELD: Letters on the Battle of Waterloo. MSS. By John Oldfield, Captain and Brigade-Major, Royal Engineers. y \} / OLLECH : v/\ y^ \j Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1815 nach archivalischen Quellen. Von ^3s0^l) 11 Ollech, General der I nfanterie. Berlin: 1876. ' / O'MEARA: See Memoirs. / \)^ f ^ 'V PAJOL: Pajol, Gdndral en Chef. Parle g^n^ral de division Comte Pajol — son fils aind. 3 vols. Paris. Firmin Didot Frferes. 1S74. PASCALLET: Notice Biographique sur M. le Mardchal Marquis de Grouchy, Pair de France, avec des Eclaircissements et des Details historiques sur la Campagne de 1815 dans le midi de France, et sur la Bataille de Waterloo. Par M. E. Pascallet, Fondateur and Rddacteur en chef de la Revue Gdndrale, Biograph- ique, Politique and Litteraire. ae Edi.tion. Paris. 1842. \X RELATING TO THE CAMPAIGN. xH / QUINET: • / Histoire de la Campagne de 1815. Par Edgar Quinet. Paris: Michel ' L^vyFr^res. ,862. S3^^2)^^ ^T RELATION BELGE: ^ ^" See Campagne de la Belgique. ROGNIAT: Rdponse aux notes critiques de Napoleon sur I'ouvrage intituld " Con- siderations sur I'Art de la Guerre." Paris. 1823. SIBORNE: History of the War in France and Belgium in 1815. Containing minute Details of the Battles of Quatre Bras, Ligny, Wavre and Waterloo. By Capt. W. Siborne; Secretary and Adjutant of the Royal Military Asylum Constructor of the "Waterloo Model." 2d Edition. 2 vols. London T. & W. Boone : 1^44. With an Atlas of Maps and Plans. STANHOPE:^ ' '' O'l0^J\^ ^ f Notes of Conversations with the Duke of Wellington. 1831-185 1. By Philip Henry, sth Earl Stanhope. New York, Longmans, Greene & Co. 1886. ST. HILAIRE: Histoire, anecdotique, politique et militaire, de la Garde Impdriale. Par Emile Marco de Saint-Hilaire. Paris: Eugfene Penaud. 1847. . y SUPPLEMENTARY DESPATCHES: ^ The Supplementary Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda of j ^Ht Field Marshal Arthur, Duke of Wellington, K. G. Edited by his son, the ' "■ Duke of Wellington, K. G. Volume X. London : John Murray. 1863. .V THIERS: V History of the Consulate and the Empire of France under Napoleon. By M. A. Thiers. Vol. XX. London: Wilhs and Sotheran. 1861. TREUENFELD: Die Tage von Ligny und Belle-Alliance. Von v. Treuenfeld, Premier- Lieutenant im 2 Hessischen Infanterie-Regiment No. 82. Mit 11 Karten. Hanover, 1880. Helwing'sche Verlags-Buchhandlung : Schlagerstrasse 20. VANDAMME: Le Gdndral Vandamme et sa Correspondance. Par A. Du Casse. 2 Vols. Paris : Didier et Cie. 1870. L\b \3^ 2f VAN LOBEN SELS: Prdcis de la Campagne de 1815 dans les Pays-Bas. Par le major d'artil- lerie E. Van Loben Sels, aide-de-camp de S. A. R. le Prince Fr^ddric des Pays-Bas. Avec Plans. Traduit du HoUandais. La Haye : Chez les Heri- tiers Doorman : 1849. I VAUDONCOURT: Histoire des Campagnes de 1814 et 1815 en France. Par le Gdndral Guillaume de Vaudoncourt. Tome Quatri^me. Paris. 1826. { ■, Xlii PARTIAL LIST OF BOOKS RELATING TO THE CAMPAIGN. VAULABELLE: \Onl) 55^' Campagne et BataiUe de Waterloo. Par AchUle de Vaulabelle. Brux- / '^ elles. 1853. 0( J WATERLOO LETTERS: Waterloo Letters. A selection from original and hitherto unpublished letters bearing on the operations of the i6th, 17th and 1 8th June, 1815, by officers who served in the campaign. Edited, with explanatory notes, by Major General H. T. Siborne, late Colonel R. E. Illustrated with numerous Maps and Plans. London : Cassell & Co. Limited. 1891. WATERLOO ROLL CALL: The Waterioo Roll Call. By Charies Dalton, F. R. G. S. London, Wm. Clowes & Sons, Limited. 13 Charing Cross, S. W. 1890. WELLINGTON : See Gurwood, and, also, Supplementary Despatches. CHAPTER I. THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. Napoleon entered Paris on his return from Elba on the twentieth of March, 1815. His first endeavor, after quieting the not very formidable movements of the royalists in the south and west of France, was to open communications with the great powers. He proclaimed his policy to be strictly one of peace, and we have every reason to believe that his intentions were sincerely pacific. But his agents were turned back on the frontier. The nations of Europe refused to treat with him on any terms, and entered into an offensive and defensive alli- ance against him with the avowed purpose of driving him from the throne of France. The armies of the neighbor- ing powers began immediately to concentrate on the border, and even Russia set her troops in motion for the general attack upon France and her Emperor. To meet this formidable coalition Napoleon bent all his energies. The army had, since his first abdication, been reorganized, and many high commands had natur- ally been given to the chiefs of the royalist party. Much had to be done before the new arrangements, necessitated by the re-establishment of the Imperial government, could be effected. These changes in the military organization of the country required time. Besides, Napoleon was not '2 ' ' " ' ""th*e''plan of campaign. [chap. I.] desirous to precipitate matters. He was naturally solicit- ous not to appear to commence an avoidable war. He was, moreover, much occupied with domestic politics, but of his dealings with the chambers and of his new consti- tution we do not propose to speak. Besides increasing and reconstituting the army, work was begun on the fortifications of the principal cities. By the first of June, no change having taken place in the relations of France with her neighbors, it became incumbent on the Emperor to decide what he would do. The situation was, in brief, as follows: Two large armies, one composed of English, Dutch, Belgian and Hanoverian troops, with contingents from Brunswick and Nassau, the whole under command of the Duke of Wellington, the other composed of Prussians, Saxons, and other Germans under Marshal BlUcher, lay scattered in their cantonments in Belgium to the north and east of the rivers Sambre and Meuse. On the eastern fron- tier, the Austrians were collecting a formidable force, and were expecting to be reinforced in July by a powerful Russian army. If Napoleon should maintain a strictly defensive attitude, France would again be the theatre of hostilities, as in the previous year. True, time would be gained by the delay, and time was most important for filling the ranks of the army, completing the fortifications, manufacturing ammunition, and generally putting the country into a state of defence. But when the invasion came, it would be made in overwhelming force. It was possible, certainly, to hope for the repetition of the exploits of 1814, for victories like Champ Aubert, Mont- mirail and Rheims; on the other hand, bloody and indecisive battles like those of Brienne, Laon, and Arcis- sur-Aube were to be expected with equal probability. The thing for Napoleon to do, if possible, was to reduce this tremendous disparity of numbers, and this could only be effected by beating his enemies in detail. If he could dispose of the armies of Wellington and BlUcher now, he [chap. I.] THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. 3 would have so much the better chance against the Aus- trians and the Russians. And Napoleon undoubtedly hoped that if fortune should favor him in 1815 as in 1805 and 1806, for instance, — if he should be able to repeat in Belgium the astonishing successes of Austerlitz and Jena, — he would not find it impossible to make peace with his father-in-law, the Emperor of Austria, and that Russia, whose interests in the war were remote and really theoret- ical, would willingly retire from the contest. When we add to this that Napoleon's y^r/^? was the offensive, that his genius was specially adapted for enterprising and daring strategy, we are not surprised that he should have decided to move at once, with all his available force, upon the armies of Wellington and Blucher. ' These armies were, as has been stated, lying in their cantonments on and behind the Belgian frontier. (See Map I.) Their front covered, roughly speaking, an ex- tent of a hundred miles, from Namur and Huy on the east to Mons and Tournay on the west. They were distributed in numerous towns and villages, some of these being as far back as forty miles from the frontier. With the location of the various detachments Napoleon was undoubtedly, to a great extent, acquainted. He cal- culated that Wellington's forces, which were scattered over a wide extent of country, could not be concentrated in less than two days; and that it would require more than one day for Bliicher to assemble the four corps of which his army was composed. The high-road, which runs from Charleroi north through Quatre Bras, Genappe and Waterloo to Brussels, ran between these armies, — that of the Duke of Welling- ton lying to the westward of the road and that of Marshal Blucher lying to the eastward of it. The Prussians lay considerably closer to the frontier than the English and Dutch. Wellington's headquarters were at Brussels; See Clausewitz, chaps. 8, 14. 4 THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. [CHAP. I.] Blucher's at Namur. The turnpike, which runs from Namur through Quatre Bras to Nivelles, was the main avenue of communication between these two armies. The Prussian lines of supply extended by way of Liege and Maestricht to the Rhine; the English by way of Ostend and Antwerp to the sea. The bases of the two armies were thus situated in opposite directions. It was, of course, probable that if either of these armies should be obliged to retreat, it would retreat towards its own base. But to retreat towards its own base would be to march away from its ally. On this peculiarity in the situation Napoleon's plan of campaign was, to a great degree, founded. The situation was far more favorable for him than if the 220,000 men in Bel- gium had all belonged to one army, for now, not only were there two armies, under two commanders, in whose operations he might safely count upon the existence of more or less misunderstanding and failure fully to meet each other's expectations, but the two armies were bound, in case of disaster to either or both, to follow lines of retreat which were wholly divergent. We are now prepared to consider Napoleon's plan. He proposed to assemble his own forces with all possible secrecy in the neighborhood of Charleroi,— near the point of junction of the two opposing armies. He expected that, on the first news of his approach, the two armies would respectively concentrate, and then endeavor to unite. He expected that the Prussians, being less scat- tered than the English, and being likely to know of the approach of the French before the English could possibly hear of it, would be the first to concentrate, and he expected therefore to encounter them alone and unsup- ported by their allies. The statement of Napoleon's plan of campaign in Gourgaud's narrative is as follows : — ^ ■Gourgaud, pp. 42, 43. [chap. I.] THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. 5 "•The Prussian army, having intimation of the enemy's intentions eight or ten hours before the English, would accordingly be first concentrated. Hopes were even entertained of attacking the Prus- sians before their four corps were united, or of obliging them to fall back in the direction of Liege and the Rhine, which was their line of operations ; and by thus separating them from the English, to create an opportunity for new combinations. "In these calculations, the characters of the enemy's commanders were much to be considered. The hussar habits of Marshal Bliicher, his activity and decided character, formed a strong contrast with the cautious disposition, the deliberate and methodical manner of the Duke of Wellington. Thus, it was easy to foresee, that the Prus- sian army would be the first to be concentrated, and also that it would evince more decision and promptitude in hastening to the aid of its ally [than the English army would if the Piiissians should be the first to be attacked] . If Bliicher had only two battalions ready to act, he would be sure to employ them in support of the English army ; but there was reason to believe that Wellington, unless his whole army was united, would not attack the French to succor Bliicher. All these considerations rendered it desirable that the attack should be commenced against the Prussian army ; It necessarily would, so we thought, be the first to be concentrated, and this turned out to be the fact." To the same effect the Emperor says in his "Me- moirs": — ^ "The [Prussian] army was to assemble in rear of Fleurus. * * * In the night between the 14th and 15th, confidential messengers returned to the French headquarters at Beaumont, and announced that everything was tranquil at Namur, Brussels and Charleroi ; this was a happy presage. To have thus succeeded in concealing from the enemy the movements which the French army had made for the last two days, was to have already obtained a great advantage. The Prussian army found itself obliged either to establish a point of concentration further back than Fleurus, or to receive battle in that position without being able to be assisted by the Anglo-Dutch army. * * * ^jj j-j^g measures of Napoleon had therefore for their object to attack the Prussians first." ^Corresp., vol. 31, pp. 195, 197, 198. 6 THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. [CHAP. I.] In a word, Napoleon believed that the allied generals had fixed the points of concentration of their armies too near the frontier for that concentration to be effected in season to oppose to his army an overwhelming force ; he thought it very likely also, for the reasons above stated, that he would have only the Prussian army to deal with in the first encounter of the campaign. There were, to be sure, other courses open to him. He might direct his army upon the communications of the Prussians by passing to the eastward of them and turning their left flank. But this operation involved a wide detour over a difficult country, and in the battle which was certain to result, the Prussian and the Eng- lish armies would, beyond a doubt, both be united against him. On the other hand he could turn Wellington's right by moving via Lille, Valenciennes or Mons upon Ghent or Brussels. An advance in this direction pre- sented, to be sure, fewer difficulties than the one just spoken of, and promised greater advantages. The Duke himself always maintained that this would have been Napoleon's best move. It probably would have cut the English communications with Ostend, and would very likely have forced Wellington to evacuate Brussels with- out a battle, that is, unless he cared to risk an engage- ment without the aid of his ally. But the Prussians in the meantime would have concentrated without molesta- tion their whole army of 120,000 men, and if Wellington had been successful in avoiding a battle with the French superior force, the two allied generals ought to have been able either to manoeuvre Napoleon out of Belgium or to force him to battle on disadvantageous terms. It is prob- able that in neither of these flanking movements would there be an opportunity afforded for a direct, immediate, crushing blow upon one of the allied armies, such as that which Napoleon thought it very possible that the temerity of Marshal Bliicher was going to present to him, if he advanced by way of Charleroi. [chap. I.] THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. 7 We have seen that Napoleon seems to have thought it very likely that Bliicher would fight, but, of course. Napo- leon could but conjecture what Bliicher would do; he could not certainly know that he would not now, as he had done in Germany in 1813, avoid a direct conflict with him, and retire on his base of operations. If Bliicher should do this, the two armies, it is true, would be separ- ated and could be dealt with accordingly; but the difficul- ties of the campaign would be vastly greater than if the Prussian army should be practically disposed of by a de- cisive victory at the outset. For if the Prussians should fall back without hazarding a battle, they would have to be pursued, certainly far enough to ascertain their real intentions, and to become assured that they were, for the time being at least, definitely separated from the army of Wellington. If this should appear to be the case the question would then arise, which of the two armies should be followed up; and in considering this question, the importance of the occupation of Brussels, at that time the capital of the Netherlands, would naturally influence Napoleon in favor of throwing the bulk of his forces against the Anglo-Dutch. Napoleon, however, as we have already said, seems to have thought it on the whole probable, knowing, as he did, the daring and reso- lute character of the man, that Bliicher would fight, with or without the assistance of the English army, and he also thought that the situation of the English army was such that Bliicher would not be likely to get much assist- ance from it. Napoleon, therefore, hoped to open the campaign with a signal victory, crippling, perhaps de- stroying, the Prussian army, and he knew that the result of such a victory must be the retreat of the beaten Prus- sians in a direction certain to separate them entirely and definitely from their English and Dutch allies. The French Emperor would then be free to carry the great bulk of his forces against the English and Dutch. If Wellington stood, he expected to beat him ; if he retreated. 8 THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. [CHAP. I.J he would leave Belgium and perhaps Holland at the dis- posal of the French. Such, in brief, were Napoleon s calculations and expec- tations. NOTE TO CHAPTER I. The view given above of Napoleon's plan has been by no means universally accepted. It is often stated that he intended to separate the two armies and attack them in detail, but if this expression is to be understood as meaning that the former operation was to precede the latter in point of time, it is not in our judgment a correct statement. There never was, we believe, any expecta- tion on Napoleon's part that he could, by throwing his army between those of Wellington and Bllicher, or by merely occupying strategic points, separate the allied armies definitely from one another. What he did expect, was, as we have seen,' to encounter one of these armies, that commanded by Marshal BlUcher, alone and unsup- ported by its ally. If it should decline an engagement, or should fight and be beaten, he calculated on its retir- ing towards its own base of operations, and so separat- ing itself by every march taken in that direction from its ally. But several writers on the campaign present us with quite other ideas of Napoleon's intended operations. And as it is obviously of the first importance that we should start with a correct idea of Napoleon's plan, if we would follow the events of the campaign intelligently, we will examine these other theories somewhat in detail. Take first the view that Napoleon's intention was to throw his army between those of Wellington and BlUcher. ^Ante, pp. 4 et seq. 10 THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. — NOTES. [CHAP. I.] This is Alison's view. We cite him, not because his name carries any weight as a military authority, but because his error has been so clearly pointed out by no less a person than the Duke of Wellington, in a criticism^ of Alison's History of Europe written by the Earl of Ellesmere, who wrote, as is well known, under the Duke's inspiration. In the following passage a quotation is made from the work of the famous German military critic, Clausewitz : — "Mr. Alison (Hist, of Europe,^ etc., vol. x, p. 991) speaks of 'Buonaparte's favorite military manoeuvre of interposing between his adversaries, and striking with a superior force first on the right hand and then on the left,' as having been attempted by him and baffled in this campaign. We doubt whether the expression of interposing between two adversaries can be correctly applied to any of Buonaparte's successful campaigns, and we almost suspect that, if he had in contemplation a manoeuvre of so much hazard on this occasion, it was the first on which he can be said to have attempted it. Hear Clausewitz on this matter : — "All writers who have treated of this campaign set out by say- ing that Buonaparte threw himself between the two armies, in order to separate them. This expression, however, which has be- come a terminus technicus in military phraseology, has no clear idea for its foundation. The space intervening between two armies cannot be an object of operation. ^ It would have been very unfortunate if a commander like Buonaparte, having to deal with an enemy of twice his force, instead of falling on the one half with his united strength, had lighted on the empty interval, and thus made a blow in the air, losing his time, whilst he can only double his own force by the strictest economy of that commodity. '^Ellesmere, pp. 161, 162. See Maurice, pp. 333 et seq.; Jan. 1891. ^In the edition of 1850, this passage (as we suppose it to be) is found iu vol. xiii, p. 625, and reads somewhat differently, but the idea is precisely the same. ^Thiers ; vol. xx, book Ix, p. 23, says : " He had conceived the belief that the English and Prussians * * * would leave between their respective forces a space, not very strongly guarded, and he thought that, by bringing the whole strength of his army to bear upon this point, he might become master of the position." [chap. I.] THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. — NOTES. II Even the fighting the one army in a direction by which it will be pressed away from the other, even if it can be effected without loss of time, incurs the great danger of being attacked in the rear by the other. If the latter, therefore, be not far enough removed to put this risk out of the question, a com- mander will scarcely ventui'e on such a line of attack. Buonaparte, therefore, chose the direction between the two armies, not in order to separate them bywedgmg Jiim self between y> but because he ex- pected to find and fall on Bliicher's force in this direction, either united or in separate bodies [corps]." Feldzug von 1815, &c., ******** His main object was evidently to find the Prussian army, and beat it." Nevertheless we find Hooper,^ who wrote long after Clausewitz, making the very statement which Clause- witz thought so objectionable : — "He (Napoleon) calculated that if he struck at the centre of the two armies he should be able to -wedge himself in between them, crushing any divisions which attempted to obstruct his progress, and, having won a position of vantage, he imagined that it would be in his power to manoeuvre with rapidity from side to side and defeat each army in succession." To the same effect writes Quinet : — "He (Napoleon) will place himself between the two armies, at the centre of the line, that is to say, at the extreme right of the Prussian cantonments. By this move, the Duke of Wellington and Marshal Bliicher will be separated from the first hour. The occa- sion, the moment, will decide on which of the two armies it will be best to strike the first blow."^ It is unnecessary to repeat what has been so well said above in opposition to this view. It is plain that these ^The italics are our own. *In the edition of 1S62, this passage is found in Chap. 22 on pages 46 and 47. ^Hooper, p. 58. See also, by the same author, Wellington, p. 207. To the same effect, see Clinton, p. 378. Cf. Rogniat, Considerations, p. 339, who was the first to announce this theory. ^Quinet, p. 75. 12 THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. — NOTES. [CHAP. I.] writers have misconceived Napoleon's plan. But we must consider this more fully. This conception of the campaign is practically identi- cal with the theory first put forth by Rogniat in hij " Considerations de I'Art de la Guerre," and repeated ir his "Reponse aux Notes critiques de Napoleon," in th- form of a criticism of Napoleon's operations. He main- tains that Napoleon should have aimed first at seizing the two points of Quatre Bras and Sombreffe on the Nivelles-Namur road, over which the allied armies com- municated with each other. "If, instead of six leagues, he had made eight or nine (and he had time enough, inasmuch as the Sambre was crossed at two o'clock), in pushing his left to Frasnes and his advance-guard to Qiiatre Bras, the centre and right to Sombreffe, with the reserves at Fleurus, he would have obtained the precious advantage he ought to have aimed at, that of separating the two opposing armies, of retarding the union of their corps, of taking a central position and of attacking them one at a time. In fact, Quatre Bras and Sombreffe are on the high-road from Namur to Brussels; master of these points, he could then have opposed the junction of the English on one side, of the Prussians on the other."9 This view has also received the endorsement of Jom- ini,'° who evidently thinks that Napoleon must have entertained it. "Napoleon perceived that their (the Prussian) army sought to assemble between Namur and the causeway leading from Charleroi to Brussels, as it was by this route that the English would come to their assistance : now, under this supposition, the Emperor had but one wise course to follow; the most simple glance at the map would sufficiently indicate that it was essential to seize upon Som- breffe on the one side, and the central point of Qiiatre Bras on the other. * * * Because, once master of these two points, he was in position to act at will on either of the opposing armies, and prevent their junction." To the same effect is the sketch of Napoleon's plan 'Reponse, &c., pp. 261, 262. *°Jomini, p. 122, 123 ; also, pp. 213, 225, 226. [chap. I.] THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. — NOTES. 1 3 put forth by his advocate, the Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne in his " Waterloo " : "The Sambre crossed, he (Napoleon) would seize the line of communication of the Anglo-Dutch and Prussians. Two columns would be charged to establish themselves, one at Qiiatre Bras, the other at Sombreffe. "The separation consummated, he would easily make an end of both the Prussians and the Anglo-Dutch. For this would only be to renew a manoeuvre familiar to him, and which had so often given him the victory. "" Charras, one of the Emperor's hostile critics, takes the same view of his intentions : "It requires only a glance at the map to indicate with certainty the point which it was his intention to reach in dictating his order of movement. * * * "The French army, occupying these places [Qtiatre Bras and Sombreffe] in force, would find itself placed between the Anglo- Dutch and the Prussians, thenceforward really capable, — to borrow from Napoleon his own expression, — of attacking them in detail, leaving to them, if they would escape from this misfortune, — the greatest that could befall them, — only the alternative of yielding ground and of uniting their forces at Brussels or beyond it."'^ Against this array of authority we oppose with confi- dence that of Napoleon himself, of Wellington, and of Clausewitz. It was Napoleon's expectation, as we have seen above, that the Prussian army would be the first to be concentrated, that it would offer battle at or near Fleurus, and that he would be able to attack and over- come it before it could be joined by the Anglo-Dutch forces.'^ If BlUcher fought at all at that stage in the campaign, it stood to reason that he would fight to the zouth of Sombreffe, for the preservation of his line of "La Tour D'Auvergne, pp. 41, 42 : also, pp. 73 et scq. '-Charras, vol. i, pp. 115, 116. See also Quinet, p. loi,— " Pour empecher la reunion (of the English and Prussian armies) il etait indispensable de farmer k la fois les deux passages (Sombreffe and Quatre Bras)." "Siborne (vol. i, p. 47) is perfectly clear on this point. 14 THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. — NOTES. [CHAP. I.] co7mnu7iicatio7i with Wellingfoft, — the Namur-Nivelles road. Hence, the intention of occupying Sombreffe, as a prelimmary to a battle with the Prussians, could not, as we venture to think, have entered Napoleon's mind On the contrary, he believed that the seizure of Sombreffe would inevitably necessitate the retreat of the Prussians to some point further north, as Wavre, or even to the neighborhood of Brussels, where their junc- tion with the English could be effected without moles- tation. '^ But the last thing which Napoleon wanted was that the allied armies should retire to Wavre, or to the neigh- borhood of Brussels, and there unite. He needed a battle, and a decisive success,'^ and he needed it at once. A war of manoeuvres was not the game for him to play at this crisis. It was of vital importance for him to rout, if possible, in succession, the armies of Bliicher and Wellington ; a battle, therefore, was what he sought, and he expected that Bliicher would fight him, and fight him alone. It was only by routing BlUcher's army, or forc- ing it to retreat, that he expected to separate it from that of Wellington. It must also be borne in mind, that the mere occupation of two points on the line of communication between two allied armies does not in any way prevent the unimpeded concentration of each army, and its being moved, when concentrated, in any direction that its commander may decide on. The "line of communication" seized is not to be confounded with the line of supplies or the line of retreat of either army. No doubt, the occupation of any point or points on the line by which two allied armies communicate with each other tends to embarrass them, to hinder any combined movements, and to delay their union; but to direct the march of an invading army '"» Corresp. : vol. 31, p. 471. " Cf. Clausewitz, ch. 14. [chap. I.] THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. — NOTES. 1 5 merely to compass this end, when it is possible to defeat one of these opposing armies by engaging it where it cannot be supported by its ally, is to miss the opportu- nity of the campaign. I CHAPTER II. THE FRENCH ARMY. The French army, it is hardly necessary to state, had been seriously affected by the sudden and complete change in government through which France had passed in April, 1814. Without going into particulars, it is suffi- cient to say that Napoleon found on his return from Elba much which needed to be undone and more which it was necessary to do. But the details of this partial reorgan- ization do not greatly concern us. Napoleon unquestion- ably did his utmost to bring the troops into a state of efficiency. And he certainly was in great measure suc- cessful. The larger part of the Marshals and high offi- cers remained in France and took command with cheer- fulness, and the younger officers and the men were unanimous in their devotion to the cause of their country against the coalition. But some of the Marshals and generals high in rank had retired into Belgium with Louis XVIII.; others declined active service; and where there were so many defections, there was inevitably not a little suspicion and disquietude. In the reorganization, which was beyond a question necessary, great changes had to be made in the higher commands, and the regi- ments, even, were to a greater or less extent recast. The Guard was also reconstituted, a measure obviously wise, taking account of the prestige which this famous corps had always possessed, but a measure which, car- [chap. 2.] THE FRENCH ARMY. 17 ried out as it had to be, in a very brief period of time, could not but injure to a considerable extent the value of the reg-iments of the line. It is true that France at this time was full of veteran soldiers ; some 200,000 men had returned into the country from foreign prisons. There was an abundance of excellent material. But the circum- stances under which the existing military force was re- organized and increased in numbers were unfavorable to the moral of the soldiers and of the army generally, and there was not sufficient time before the outbreak of hostilities to overcome the disturbing influences insepar- able from such a state of things. The men were full of enthusiasm for and confidence in Napoleon; but they mistrusted many of their commanders. They were old soldiers, nearly or quite all of them, and understood their work perfectly; but the changes of the last eighteen months had been so utterly perplexing, — so thorough, — the new organization had been so recent and attended by so many disquieting circumstances and disturbing rumors, that the absolute confidence, which ought to ex- ist between the officers and men of an army as strongly as between the members of a family, did not prevail. ' Coming now to \}lv<^ personnel oi the army: Napoleon's old chief-of-staff, Berthier, who had served him in this capacity for twenty years, who had grown accustomed to his ways, and was able by reason of his long experience to supplement his defects, had retired into Belgium with the King. To supply his place the Emperor selected Marshal Soul t, certainly a very singular choice.* Soult was a man of Napoleon's own age, — he had for several years commanded an army in Spain, and had had, of course, a chief-of-staff of his own. To place such a man at such a time of his life on staff duty when he should be 'Charras, vol. i, pp. 69, 70: Histoire de la Garde Imperiale: Saint Hilaire, p. 654. * lb., pp. 653, 654- 1 8 THE FRENCH ARMY. [CHAP. 2.] commanding troops, must strike any one as strange. Such an officer is not fitted by his experience in an in- dependent command for the duties of a chief-of-staff. Those duties he has been for years accustomed to turn over to a subordinate. The personal attention which they need he has for years expected to be given by a junior officer. It is out of the question that he can, all at once, assume the extremely laborious duties which belong to the chief-of-staff. We shall, before we get through, have more than one opportunity to see how Soult performed his new tasks. It is safe to say that there was many a younger officer in the French army who would have served with much more efficiency in this all-important place, for which the utmost vigor and alertness of mind and body are wellnigh indispensable. For the invasion of Belgium, Napoleon destined the I St, 2d, 3d, 4th, and 6th Corps, and the Imperial Guard, besides a large force of cavalry. The five corps-com- manders, d'Erlon, Reille, Vandamme, Gerard and the Comte de Lobau were all men of experience and admitted capacity. Vandamme was known specially as a hard fighter. Gerard was a comparatively young officer of great promise. The Comte de Lobau, under his origi- nal name of Mouton, had distinguished himself in the Austrian campaign of 1809. But no one of them equalled in military talent the leading generals in the Italian or Austerlitz campaigns, — Massena, Lannes, Davout, Desaix, and their fellows. The commander of the cav- alry, Grouchy, was a veteran of twenty years' hard fight- ing, but was not credited with possessing any great capacity. The fact is that Napoleon himself could not do for his own army what the turmoil and chaos of the Revolution had done for the army of the republic, and that was to override seniority and all ordinary claims to promotion, and to open the door wide to youthful vigor and ambition. It was to the confusion created by the Revolution that the formidable list of warriors [chap. 2.] THE FRENCH ARMY. IQ who served France so brilliantly for twenty years owed in great measure their rapid advancement. Napoleon himself constitutes no exception to this remark. Napoleon^ says of his officers at this period : — "The character of several of the generals had been weakened by the events of 1S14 ; they had lost something of that audacity, of that I'esolution, of that confidence, which had * * * contributed so much to the successes of former campaigns. " '• Charras has a passage to the same effect : ^ — "Enriched, systematically corrupted, by the prodigality of the Empire ; enervated by luxury and pleasure ; fatigued by twenty years of war, several among the generals would have preferred the tranquil life of their own homes to the labors of the march and the discomforts of the bivouac. They had tasted of peace for a whole year ; they looked back on that period with regret. Some among them had met with rude defeats while in independent commands, and they I'emembered them well. Others, shaken by the cruel recollections of 1813 and 1S14, despaired of the issue of the war in view of the enormous armies of the coalition and of the feebleness of our means of defence. All remained brave, intrepid ; but all had not preserved the activity, the resolution, the audacity of their early days. Their moral was no longer equal to sustaining a reverse." These statements may very possibly be somewhat too highly colored, but there is little doubt that there was a good deal of truth in them. It is significant that they are made by writers who wrote of the campaign from opposite points of view. Napoleon in his narrative of the campaign sought to show that he was not the sole or even the chief cause of its failure, and claimed that his orders were not carried out with the spirit and energy which his lieutenants had once possessed. Charras on the other hand, throughout his history, is uniformly harsh in his comments on the Emperor's conduct, and insists ^ Corresp., vol. 31, p. 249. * Cf. Gourgaud, pp. 67, 68. * Charras, vol. i, p. 70. 20 THE FRENCH ARMY. [CHAP. 2.] that he was greatly lacking both in physical strength and in energy of character. That both Charras and Napo- leon, therefore, state that the higher ofHcers of the army were not up to the mark of their earlier campaigns ren- ders it very probable that such was the actual fact. The importance of this fact is to be seen in its true light only when we bear in mind to how great an extent Napoleon's campaigns required for their successful con- duct qualities in his lieutenants by no means universally found even in respectable corps-commanders, — qualities far in excess of those commonly demanded. Napoleon was not content with mere obedience ; he expected from his chief ofificers an intelligent comprehension of his views, and a vigorous and daring execution of the parts assigned to them, — a sort of cooperation, in fact. The movements with which the campaign of 1809 opened will best illus- trate, perhaps, what is here referred to. It is not too much to say that without this hearty and intelligent work on the part of his lieutenants many of Napoleon's most brilliant and successful campaigns could never have been carried out. We shall see in the course of this narrative how much he expected from Ney and Grouchy. Hence any inability or unwillingness on the part of the leading officers to render this assistance must be fully taken into account when we are seeking to understand this cam- paign of Waterloo. We have not spoken of the commander of the Guard, Marshal Mortier, because he was taken ill just before the opening of the campaign, and no one replaced him. Gen- eral Drouot, an artillery officer of great merit, was the adjutant-general of the Guard, and orders were given through him. At the last moment, on the eve of the opening of hostil- ities, the Emperor sent for Marshal Ney. Why the orders to this distinguished officer were not given earlier, we are not informed; it seems like an unpardonable over- sight, to say the least. As such Ney certainly regarded [chap. 2.] THE FRENCH ARMY. 21 it/ Ney was given no time for preparation ; it was only by the exercise of great diligence that he reached the front when he did, and that was at five o'clock in the afternoon of the 15th, after the Sambre had been crossed. He was assigned to the command of the ist and 2d Corps, commanded by the Counts d'Erlon and Reille respect- ively; but he was ignorant of their organization, and had even to learn the names of the division commanders. It is difficult, if not impossible, to understand this strange neglect of Napoleon. No one knew better than he how important it is that the commander of an army or of a wing of an army should have ample time to know his troops and to be known by them, and that this was especially necessary where a reorganization had recently taken place. In the army, thus constituted, there were, then, three Marshals. Of these, one, Soult, was serving in a new capacity for him, that of chief-of-staff ; another, Ney, had not been given a fair chance to get a good hold on the troops assigned to him; the third. Grouchy, was not a man of superior capacity, had never commanded an army-corps in his life, and had only just been made a Marshal. Grouchy was at first assigned to the command of the reserve cavalry, consisting of the four cav- alry corps of Pajol, Exelmans, Kellermann and Milhaud, numbering in all 13,784 men. But the campaign had scarcely opened when he was relieved from this duty, and placed in command of the right wing of the army, con- sisting of the 3d and 4th Corps, those of Generals Van- damme and Gerard, together with a considerable force of cavalry. Here again was a singular neglect on Napo- leon's part of the importance of allowing the new Marshal time to get used to his new duties; and, as we shall ultimately have occasion to see, this circumstance oper- ated most unfavorably when Grouchy found himself in ^Ney's letter to the Duke of Otranto ; Jones, p. 385. 22 THE FRENCH ARMY. [CHAP. 2.] an independent command. It looks very much as if Na- poleon only decided to send for Ney at the last minute, and as if the assignment of Grouchy to the command of the two corps of Vandamme and Gerard was not deter- mined on until the campaign had opened. But not only was the organization of the army not as perfect as it might have been by reason of the course which Napoleon pursued in regard to Ney and Grouchy; there was an officer whom he ordered to stay behind when he might have had him with himself as well as not, a man of the highest reputation, the Duke of Auerstadt, the Prince of Eckmlihl, Marshal Davout. The Emperor had made him Minister of War, but Davout begged to have a command in the field. He represented to the Emperor, — ^ "That the defence of Paris, notwithstanding its incontestable im- portance, was, like all questions of interior defence, only second- ary, and essentially subordinate to the result of military operations ; that when it was a question of jilaying a decisive part on the field of battle, it was not the time to make experiments with new men ; that it was necessary, on the contrary, for the Emperor to surround himself with men who had given good account of themselves and who had had long experience in high command. The Marshal did not succeed in convincing the Emperor, who contented himself with replying: 'I cannot entrust Paris to any one else.' 'But, sire,' replied Davout, ' if you are the victor, Paris will be yours ; and if you are beaten, neither I nor any one else can do anything for you.' " There can be no question that the Marshal's reason- ing was sound; but Napoleon persisted in his course. What he lost by not having Davout with him in this campaign, it is not easy to estimate ; it is perhaps foolish to conjecture. But it would probably not be going too far to say that Davout in the place of either Ney or Grouchy would have prevented the catastrophe of Waterloo. 'Davout, p. 540. [chap. 2.] THE FRENCH ARMY. • 2$ This sketch of the personnel of the French army natur- ally leads up to an estimate of its chief, that is, of his comparative fitness at this period of his life to undertake the tasks of such a daring-, laborious and perilous cam- paign as this attack on Blucher and Wellington was sure to prove. Most historians have agreed that in point of bodily activity the Emperor did not show himself in this campaign the equal of his former self; in fact, most writers have gone farther than this ; they have attributed to him a lassitude of mind as well as of body, they have found a want of the mental activity and a lack of the resolute will, which had been so characteristic of him in his earlier days. The portrait of Napoleon by General Foy is one of the best we have, and is of especial value as having been drawn by a contemporary, who served throughout his wars and commanded a division at Waterloo. "With his passions, and in spite of his errors, Napoleon is, tak- ing him all in all, the greatest warrior of modern times. He car- ried into battle a stoical courage, a profoundly calculated tenacity, a mind fertile in sudden inspirations, which by unhoped-for re- sources disconcerted the plans of the enemy. * * * Napoleon possessed in an eminent degree the faculties requisite for the profession of arms ; temperate and robust, watching and sleep- ing at pleasure, appearing vinawares where he was least suspected, he did not disregard the details to which important results' are sometimes attached. * * * He carried with him into bat- tle a cool and impassible courage ; never was a mind so deeply meditative more fertile in rapid and sudden illuminations. On be- coming Emperor he ceased not to be the soldier. If his activity decreased with the progress of age, this was owing to the decrease of his physical powers." And in a note he adds : " In the latter yeai^s the Emperor had grown fat ; he ate more, slept longer, and rode less ; but he retained all the vigor of his mind, and his passions had lost little of their strength."^ ^Foy's History of the War in the Peninsula; vol. i, pp. 110-112 : Histoire de la Guerre de la Peninsula ; pp. 161-164. 24 THE FRENCH ARMY. [CHAP, 2.] There is in fact no reason to doubt that Napoleon's habitual activity and even his capacity for physical exer- tion had in 1815 sensibly diminished. Like most men of forty-five, he was not so full of energy as he had been at five and twenty. He had also grown stout, and he was furthermore a sufferer from some painful maladies which rendered it difHcult for him to keep on horseback for any great length of time.^ All these circumstances would naturally tend to diminish, more or less, the once ceaseless activity of his mind; we may, therefore, expect to find him less thoughtful, less vigilant, less careful, than he had been in his earlier campaigns. But it is plain that the standard by which the Napoleon of 181 5 is tested is no ordinary standard,' ° and it may well be that although he may have failed to come up to the high mark which he formerly attained, we shall nevertheless find in this campaign of Waterloo no conspicuous lack of ordinary activity and energy. In conclusion, we may fairly say that while we recog- nize that the army with which Napoleon was preparing to take the field in June, 181 5, was not as well-organized a body of troops as some of the armies which he had led to victory, that its corps-commanders were not as bril- liant soldiers as were many of the distinguished generals of that period, that peculiar circumstances rendered Soult, Ney and Grouchy less serviceable than they prob- ably would have been had things been otherwise ordered, and that the Emperor himself was more or less deficient 'Thiers, vol. xx, book Ix, p. 37, n.: Grouchy M6m., vol. 4, p. 44, n. 2 ; id. in Le Mai de G., p. 18, n. 2. '°Soult told Sir W. Napier : " The Emperor seemed at times to be changed ; there were moments when his genius and activity seemed as pow- erful and fresh as ever ; at other moments he seemed apathetic. For exam- ple, he fought the battle of Waterloo without having himself examined the enemy's position. He trusted to General Haxo's report. In former days he would have examined and re-examined it in person." Life of Sir W. F. V/. Napier, vol. i, p. 505. [chap. 2.] THE FRENCH ARMY. 2$ in the never-resting activity of mind and body which he had once possessed, we must not forget that the soldiers and their officers were all veterans, that their generals had won their rank by distinguished service on many a bloody field, and that no man living surpassed their leader in military talent. It is not correct to say" that the army which Napoleon led into Belgium was the finest he had ever commanded, but it is quite certain that it was by far the best of the three armies then in the field. The strength and composition of this army, was, according to Charras,''' whom we may safely follow, as follows : — ist Corps: d'Erlon. Four divisions of infantry, — Allix, Donzelot, Marcognet, Durutte 16,885 Men One division of cavalry,— J aquinot 1,506 Artillery,— 46 guns,— engineers, etc. 1,548 Total, 19,939 " 2d Corps: Reille. Four divisions of infantry, — Bachelu, Jerome Napoleon,'^ Girard, Foy 20,635 Me^ One division of cavalry, — Pire 1,865 Artillery,— 46 guns,— engineers, &:c. 1,861 Total, 24,361 " Carried forward 44,300 "As do Chesney, p. 67, and Hooper, pp. 62, 161. '^Charras, vol. i, pp. 65-68. — "Charras, vol. i, p. 196, n., says that Jerome's command was purely nomi- nal, and that Guilleminot, his chief-of-sta£f, really commanded this division. 26 THE FRENCH ARMY. [CHAP. 2.] Brought forward 44,300 Men 3d Corps: Vandamme. Three divisions of infantry, — Lefol, Habert, Berthezene 16,851 One division of cavalry, — Domon 1,017 Artillery, — 38 guns, — engineers, &c. 1,292 Total, 19,160 " 4th Corps: Gerard. Three divisions of infantry, — Pecheux, Vichery, Bourmont"* 12,800 One division of cavalry, — Maurin 1,628 Artillery, — 38 guns, — engineers, &c., 1,567 Total, 15,995 6th Corps: Lobau. Three divisions of infantry, — Simmer, Jeannin, Teste 9,218 Artillery, — 32 guns, — engineers, &c., 1,247 Total, 10,465 Imperial Guard: Old Guard: One division, — Friant, — grenadiers 4,140 Middle '5 Guard: One division, — Morand, — chasseurs 4,603 Carried forward 8,743 89,920 '"Bourmont deserted to the enemy early on the 15th June, and was suc- ceeded by Hulot. "We here follow many historians in calling Morand's command the Middle Guard, " la moyenne Garde." [chap. 2.] THE FRENCH ARMY. 27 Brought forward 8,743 89,920 Men Young* Guard : One division, — Duhesme, — volti- geurs, &c., 4,283 " Two divisions of cavalry, Guyot, Lefebvre-Desnouettes 3,795 " Artillery, — 96 guns, — engineers, &c., 4,063 " Total, 20,884 " Reserve Cavalry : Grouchy. 1st Cavalry Corps : Pajol. Two divisions, — Soult, Suber- vie 2,717 Artillery, — 12 guns, 329 3,046 2d Cavalry Corps : Exelmans. Two divisions : Stroltz, Chastel 3,220 Artillery, — 12 guns, 295 3,515 3d Cavalry Corps : Kellermann. Two divisions, — L'Heritier, Roussel 3>36o Artillery, — 12 guns, 319 3,679 4th Cavalry Corps : Milhaud. Two divisions, — Wathier, Delort 3,194 Artillery, — 12 guns, 350 3,544 Total, 13,784 " Workmen, waggoners, &c., about 3,500 " Grand Total, 128,088 28 THE FRENCH ARMY. [CHAP. 2.] Leaving out the last item as consisting chiefly of non- combatants, we have an army consisting of 124,588 men. Of these, the infantry numbered, 89415 Men the cavalry, including the horse artillery of the reserve cavalry, numbered, 23,595 " the artillery (344 guns including the above) numbered, 11,578 " Total,'^ as above, 124,588 '^Charras' summing up of the cavalry and artillery varies from ours, and would seem to be 500 less than the number before given by him. NOTE TO CHAPTER IT The opinion expressed here In regard to the health of the Emperor is substantially that entertained by Thiers and Chesney. The former says that the Emperor's brother Jerome, and also one of the surgeons on the Em- peror's staff, both told him that Napoleon was a sufferer at this time from an affection of the bladder. But this was, he says, denied by Marchand, the Emperor's valet. *' Whatever may have been the health of Napoleon at this epoch, his activity was not diminished."' To the same effect is Chesney's opinion,^ opposing that of Charras.^ Further evidence on the subject has been collected by Mr. Dorsey Gardner.^ His conclusion is entirely opposed to that of Colonel Chesney, and in our judgment he places altogether too much reliance on that delightful, but gossipy, writer, the Comte de Segur. Segur's History of the Russian Campaign is the best known work on the subject, but It is essentially a romance. In it he advances with great boldness his favorite theme of the breaking down of Napoleon's health.^ But the Emperor's health was able to endure ' Thiers, vol. xx, book Ix, p. 37, n. * Chesney, p. 72, n. 'Charras, vol. 2, p. 203, n. H. < Gardner; Quatre Bras, Ligny and Waterloo; pp. 31-37; p. 220, n. 138. ^Histoirede Napoleon et de la Grande Armde pendant I'ann^e 1812. Paris, 1825. Book 4, chaps. 2 and 6. 30 THE FRENCH ARMY. — NOTES. [CHAP. 2.] without injury that terrible strain ; he certainly showed in 1813 and 1814 every evidence of physical vigor. No doubt the peculiar maladies from which he suffered occa- sionally impaired the activity of both mind and body; but the talk of Segur verges at times on puerility. Gour- gaud s Exameii Critique of Segur's work points out its defects cleverly and unsparingly. As for the conversa- tion, referred to by Gardner, which the Earl of Albe- marle^ reports as having taken place in 1870 between his son and General Gudin, who was, in 1815, a page in wait- ing on the Emperor, to the effect that Napoleon secluded himself all the forenoon of the day of the battle of Waterloo, and that " it was nearly noon when the Em- peror descended the ladder that led to the sleeping room and rode away," it is really impossible to accept the story. Charras, who for his own reasons (and, by the way, not for the reasons which Chesney very naturally supposes actuated him), endeavors to magnify Napo- leon's inactivity throughout this campaign, represents him as, on this morning of the i8th, reconnoitring the position after eight o'clock, ^ giving his orders for the marshalling of the army, watching the deployment of the troops between nine and half-past ten, riding along the lines, and dictating the order of battle before eleven o'clock. On all such points we are quite safe in follow- ing Charras, and we must consider Gudin's story as having (to say the least) suffered greatly in its transmis- sion. Besides, there was no "ladder that led to the sleeping room," in the house ^ in which Napoleon slept the night before Waterloo. ^ Fifty Years of my Life : by the Earl of Albemarle, p. 98. Cf. Thiers, vol. XX, p. 37, note, ' Charras, vol. i, pp. 270, 271. This, as will be seen later on, was the third recormoissance since midnight. * Cf. Fraser, Words on Wellington, p. 250. The Caillou house was set on fire by the Prussians, but the principal rooms were spared, and the house was afterwards carefully restored. [chap. 2.] THE FRENCH ARMY. — NOTES. 3I To repeat, then, once more. Napoleon in this cam- paign was troubled by and doubtless suffered consider- ably from some painful maladies ; and, even apart from this fact, we cannot look for the youthful vigor and activity of 1796 or 1805 in the year 18 15. He was not in these respects equal to his former self; and it was further to be expected that the deficiency of his physical energy would be accompanied by a diminished mental alertness and vigilance. All the same, we think it will be found that he showed in this campaign a very fair degree of strength and activity. But we shall know more about this as we proceed with the narrative. CHAPTER III. THE ALLIED ARMIES. The army which was commanded by Field Marshal BlUcher numbered about 124,000 men, and was thus composed: — ' 1st Corps : Zieten. Four divisions of infantry, — Steinmetz, — Pirch II., — Jagow, — Henckel 27,887 Men One division of cavalry, — Roder 1,925 " Artillery, — 96 guns, — engineers, &c. 2,880 Total 32,692 lid Corps: Pirch I. Four divisions of infantry, — Tippelskirchen, — Krafft, — Brause, — Langen 25,836 One division of cavalry, — Jiirgass 4,468 Artillery, — 80 guns, — engineers, &c. 2,400 Total 32,704 Carried forward 65,396 » Charras, vol. i, pp. 8i, 82. See vol. 2, p. 202, note G, where it is shown that the number of men in the artillery given by Wagner is much too small I [chap. 3.] THE ALLIED ARMIES. ^^ Brought forward 65,396 Men 1 1 Id Corps: Thielemann. Four divisions of infantry, — Borcke, — Kampfen, — Luck, — Stiilpnagel 20,611 " One division of cavalry, — Marwitz 2,405 " Artillery, — ^48 guns, — engineers, &c. 1,440 " Total 24,456 IVth Corps: Billow. Four divisions of infantry, — Hacke, — Ryssel, — Losthin, — Hiller 25,381 One division of cavalry, — Prince William of Prussia 3,o8i Artillery, — 88 guns, — engineers, &:c. 2,640 Total 31,102 Workmen, waggoners, &c., about 3,120 Grand total 124,074 Leaving out the last item, we have an army consisting of 120,954 men. Of these, the infantry numbered 99,7 15 Men " cavalry " 11,879 " " artillery, 312 guns, numbered 9,360 " Total as above 120,954 " The headquarters of Zieten's Corps were at Charleroi, of Pirch I. at Namur, of Thielemann at Ciney, and of Biilow at Liege. The first three of these places were near the frontier. The Prussian army was mainly composed of veterans ; even of the youngest soldiers most had seen service in 181 3 or 1814. The corps-commanders were experienced 34 THE ALLIED ARMIES. [CHAP. 3.] officers, though only one of them, Billow, had ever had an independent command. Biilow had in 1813 won the bat- tle of Dennewitz against Marshal Ney. The troops were certainly not so inured to war as were those of Napo- leon's army, nor were they so well led ; but they knew their trade, and were prepared for battle. Bliicher himself was a veteran of the Seven Years' War. He had seen more than fifty years of service. In the campaigns of 1806 and 1807 he had displayed conspicuous zeal and courage. In those of 1813 and 1814, although too old and infirm to as- sume all the tasks which ordinarily devolve on an army- commander, he had yet, with the assistance of his chief- of-staff, markedly increased his reputation. Nevertheless no one considered him a general of a high order of talent. His conceptions of strategy were crude and imperfect, and his blunders caused his command to be more than once badly defeated by Napoleon in the winter campaign in France in 1814. But Bliicher was a thorough soldier, active, daring and resolute, and never was afraid of tak- ing responsibility. He was moreover a great favorite with the army. He was animated by an almost insane hatred of Napoleon, and he entered on the work as- signed to him by the allied powers with an eager deter- mination that bordered upon ferocity. This spirit of his infused itself into the army;'' every man was ready to fight, and every man expected to beat in the end. His chief-of-staff, Gneisenau, was an able administrator, and relieved the old field-marshal from all attention to de- tails. The army commanded by the Duke of Wellington was a very heterogeneous body of troops. Although nominally divided into corps, after the fashion of the armies of the continent, this arrangement, being one * The view of the Prussian army presented here is that of Charras (vol. r, p. 89); but Delbriick, the biographer of Gneisenau, states that many of the troops were inexperienced, and some were half-hearted in the cause. Gneisenau, vol. 4, pp. 381, 382. Cf. Siborne, vol. i, pp. 302, 303. [chap. 3.] THE ALLIED ARMIES. 35 which had never been adopted by the Duke before, was only imperfectly^ practised in the campaign of 1815. We shall get a better idea of the strength of Wellington's forces if we enumerate them according to their different nationalities. Leaving out the troops employed on garri- son duty at Antwerp, Ostend, Ghent and other places, estimated at 12,233 men,'* we find the forces available for the field to have been thus composed: — British: Nine brigades of infantry, — Maitland (Guards), — Byng (Guards), — Adam,— Mitchell,— Halkett,— John- stone, — Kempt, — Pack, — Lambert 20,310 Men Three brigades of cavalry, — Somerset (Guards), — Ponsonby, — Vandeleur 367^ " Six regiments contained in four brigades Dornberg, — Grant, — Vivian, — Arents- schildt, — composed of British troops and those of the King's German Legion 2,335 *' Artillery, — 102 guns 5,030 " Total British force. King's German Legion: Two brigades of infantry,— Duplat,— Ompteda Add men on detached service 3,285 16 -3,301 31 >253 - Carried forward 3,301 31 >253 3 For instance, at the battle of Waterloo, troops of the ist Corps, that of the Prince of Orange, were stationed on both ends of the line. '^ These figures are taken from Siborne. 36 THE ALLIED ARMIES. [CHAP. 3.] Brought forward 3,301 31,253 Men Cavalry: Five regiments contained in the four brigades of Dornberg, Grant, Vivian and Arentsschildt. 2,560 Artillery,— 18 guns 526 Total King's German Legion 6,387 " Hanoverians : Five brigades of infantry, — Kielmansegge, — Halkett, — Best, — Vincke, — Lyon 1 3)788 One brigade of cavalry, — Estorff 1,682 Artillery, — 12 guns 465 Total Hanoverians 15,935 Dutch-Belgians: Seven brigades of infantry,— Bylandt, — Prince Bernard of Saxe Weimar,5— Ditmers, — d'Aubreme, — Hauw, — Kerens,— Anthing 24,174 Three brigades of cavalry, — Trip,— Ghigny— Merlen 3,405 Artillery,— 48 guns 1,635 Total Dutch-Belgians 29,214 Carried forward 82,789 *This brigade was composed of one regiment of Nassau, in three battal- ions, and one regiment of Orange-Nassau, and numbered 4,300 men. HAP. 3.] THE ALLIED ARMIES. 37 Brought forward Brunswickers : 82,789 Men Two brigades of infantry, — Buttlar,— Specht Two regiments of cavalry,— Artillery, — 16 guns 5,376 922 510 Total Brunswickers 6,808 " Nassau Contingent: Kruse. One regiment of infantry : three battalions 2,880 " Engineers, sappers, miners, waggon-trains and staff-corps 1,240 " Total disposable army in the field 93>7i7 " Of these the Infantry numbered 69,829 Cavalry " 14,482 Artillery " 196 guns 8,166 Engineers, waggon-trains, &c. 1,240 93,717 " Or, according to nationality, the British numbered 31,253 " King's German Legion ^,?>^7 " Hanoverians " 15,935 " Dutch-Belgians' " 29,214 " Brunswickers 6,808 " Nassau contingent 2,880 " Engineers, &c., 1,240 93,717 This army was organized, as we have said above, into two corps and a reserve, in addition to which was a large Including 4,300 Nassauers. 38 THE ALLIED ARMIES. [CHAP. 3.] body of cavalry, and a small force of reserve artillery. There were six (so-called) British divisions in the army, only one of which, the ist, Cooke's, was composed entirely of British troops, — the Guards; the others contained troops of the King's German Legion and Hanoverians. To each of these divisions were attached two batteries. Six troops of horse-artillery were attached to the cav- alry. The ist and 3d British divisions, those of Cooke and Alten, with the 2d and 3d Dutch-Belgian divisions of Perponcher and Chasse, composed the ist Corps under the Prince of Orange. They covered the front of the army from Quatre Bras to and beyond Enghien, occupy- ing the country in and around Nivelles, Roeulx, Soignies and Braine-le-Comte. They numbered 25,233 men, with 48 guns. The 2d and 4th British divisions, those of Clinton and Colville, with the ist Dutch-Belgian division of Stedmann, and Anthing's Indian brigade, constituted the 2d Corps under Lord Hill. They continued the line of the army to the north and west, occupying the country in and around Ath, Grammont and Audenarde. They numbered 24,033 men, with 40 guns. The Reserve, or rather that portion of it destined for service in the field, and not counting the troops on gar- rison-duty, was under the immediate direction of the commander-in-chief. It was composed of the 5th and 6th British divisions, those of Picton and Cole, of the Bruns- wick Corps under the Duke of Brunswick, and of the Nassau contingent under General Kruse. They num- bered 20,563 men, with 64 guns. The British and King's German Legion cavalry was composed of seven brigades, the whole under Lord Uxbridge. They numbered 8,473 n^en. To this corps were attached, as has been stated, six horse batteries. This cavalry was stationed mainly in rear of the 2d Corps, near Ninove and Grammont; but one brigade under [chap. 3.] THE ALLIED ARMIES. 39 General Dornberg was at and in the neighborhood of Mons. The Hanoverian, Brunswick and Dutch-Belgian cav- alry were attached respectively to the various divisions of these troops. They numbered 6,009 men, with one horse-battery of 8 guns. To recapitulate: — ist Corps: Prince of Orange 25,233 Men 2d Corps: Lord Hill 24,033 || Reserve 20,563 Lord Uxbridge's cavalry corps 8,473 Other Cavalry 6,009 '^'^ Artillery— 196 guns 8,166 Engineers, &c. 1,240 Total as above given 93>7i7 Of this miscellaneous force the Duke relied really only on his English troops and those of the King's German Legion, a corps raised originally in Hanover, which had for many years belonged to the English crown. These troops had served in the Peninsula for several years with great credit. The Hanoverian contingent, strictly so called, was composed of very raw troops, and the same was true of the Dutch-Belgians. Little was known about the Brunswickers and Nassauers. The fidelity of many of the allied troops was strongly suspected, as they had been raised in countries which had for the past few years been subject to France, and the sympathies of the soldiers were supposed to be with Napoleon.^ The Duke's opinion of his army is well known. He con- sidered it the poorest he had ever led.^ Very possibly he may have underestimated its quality; but certain it ^Muffling, Passages; pp. 204, 223. *Gurwood, vol. xii, pp. 358, 509,— letters to Lt. Gen. Stewart, May 8, and to Earl Bathurst, June 25, i£iS- 40 THE ALLIED ARMIES. [CHAP. 3.] is that the force which he commanded was a very hetero- geneous collection of troops, that they had never acted in the field as an army before, and that the character and steadiness of a considerable number were, on account of either disaffection or inexperience, gravely doubted by their commander. All this was in all probability known to Napoleon, and served as the basis of his expectations, as we shall see later on. Of the principal ofHcers of this motley force, it is not necessary to say much. The Prince of Orange, who commanded the ist Corps, though an officer of experi- ence, had not distinguished himself as a general. Lord Hill, who led the 2d Corps, was a very valuable man, whose merit had been thoroughly ascertained in the Peninsula. Sir Thomas Picton had a well-won repu- tation as a man of energy, courage, and capacity in all the positions in which he had served. Then there were many junior officers of great merit. The Duke himself was in the prime of life, having just passed his forty-sixth birthday. He had never met Napoleon before, but he had often met and defeated his Marshals. His career had been one of almost uninter- rupted success. His experience in the field against French soldiers had been large, and he was for this reason peculiarly fitted for the work he had now in hand. He had shown very varied ability. His military imagi- nation, if one may use such a word, may not have been large, but he had few equals in the faculty of making up his mind what it was best to do under ascertained cir- cumstances. His decisions were always dictated by practical reasons. He never allowed sentiment to hinder the exercise of his common sense. He could advance or retreat, fight or decline to fight, with equal ease, — with him it was a mere question of what it was best under the circumstances to do. Though esteemed a cautious officer, he had shown over and over again [chap. 3.] THE ALLIED ARMIES. 4I that he possessed not only courage and firmness, but that in daring, and in coolly taking great risks, he was equal to any emergency. His hold on his army, that is, on his own troops, was perfect. In ability, reputation, and in social rank, his preeminence among the officers of the British army and the King's German Legion was cheerfully acknowledged, and over these parts of his army he exercised a perfect and unquestioned control. And his long experience in dealing with his Spanish allies had given him an uncommon facility in adminis- tering the affairs of such a composite body of troops as he was now to command. These three armies were curiously different in their internal economy. Napoleon, as we have said before, expected from his high officers a sort of cooperation. The " Correspondence of Napoleon "is full of long and confidential letters to his marshals, written during his campaigns, explaining the situation, stating his own intentions at length, giving them not only orders to be executed, but suggestions for their guidance in case of the happening of certain contingencies. We shall see excellent specimens of these letters in the course of this narrative. Napoleon had been for years constantly in the habit of directing complicated movements, in which the active and intelligent comprehension of his main object and purpose on the part of his lieutenants who were operating at a greater or less distance from him, was essential to success. Hence these elaborate commu- nications, in which the style of the military order is but barely preserved, and in which the effort of the writer to impart all the information in his power to his corre- spondent and to give him an intelligent and precise knowledge of the objects of the campaign, is very evident. In the English army there was nothing of this sort. Obedience, not cooperation, was what Wellington re- quired, and it was all he needed. Operating as he did 42 THE ALLIED ARMIES. [CHAP. 3.] on a much smaller scale than Napoleon, his simpler methods were quite adequate to his wants. It is need- less to say that such a relation as that which existed between Napoleon and his old companions in arms, who had begun their careers with him in Italy or Egypt, never existed to the least extent in the English service. The Prussian army was managed differently from either the English or French. Baron Muffling, who was the Prussian attache at the headquarters of the Duke of Wellington, says : — ^ " I perceived that the Duke exercised far greater power in the army he commanded than Prince Bliicher in the one committed to his care. The rules of the Enghsh service permitted the Duke's suspending any officer and sending him back to England. * * * Amongst all the generals, from the leaders of corps to the commanders of brigades, not one was to be found in the active army who had been known as refractory. " It was not the custom in this army to criticise or control the commander-in-chief. Discipline was strictly enforced ; every one knew his rights and his duties. The Duke, in matters of service, was very short and decided." It is clear that Baron Muffling had seen a very differ- ent state of things prevailing in the Prussian service,'" where it would seem that advice was sometimes thrust upon the general-in-chief, and even criticism was not silent. Perhaps the fact that the Prussian army was always organized in corps, and that the chiefs of corps and all the other high officers were men of an equal social rank, rendered it hard to conduct matters accord- ing to the far more soldierly ways prevailing in the English service. Whatever may have been the reason, however, such would seem to have been the fact in the early part of this century. 'Miiflaing, Passages; pp. 213, 214. '°See, for instances, Muffling, Passages; pp. 15-18, 83, 304,311: See also Stanhope, p. no, for the "great discussion" the night after the battle of Ligny, when "Bliicher and Grolmann carried the day for remaining in com munication with the English army" against Gneisenau. See post, p. 230. NOTE TO CHAPTER III. The Earl of Ellesmere, who wrote, as has been before said, under the inspiration of the Duke of Wellington, has given us the following critical estimate of a portion of the Duke's army. He is speaking of the English and German infantry, some thirty thousand in all, which fought at Waterloo.' "Of this very body, which bore the brunt of the whole contest, be it remembered that not above six or seven thousand had seen a shot fired before. It was composed of second battalions to so great an extent that we cannot but imagine that this disadvantage would have been felt had the Duke attacked the French army, as he would have attacked it at Quatre Bras on the 17th, if the Prussians had maintained their position at Ligny — as he would have attacked it on the 1 8th at Waterloo, if the army with which he entered the south of France had been at his disposal. For purposes of resist- ance the fact is unquestionable that these raw British battalions were found as effective as the veterans of the Peninsula ; but it might have been hazardous to manoeuvre under fire, and over all contingencies of ground, with some of the very regiments which, while in position, never flinched from the cannonade or the cavalry charges through the livelong day of Waterloo." 'Ellesmere, page 299. CHAPTER IV. THE FIFTEENTH OF JUNE. — NAPOLEON. Napoleon, as we have said above,' "proposed to assem- ble his own forces with all possible secrecy in the neigh- borhood of Charleroi," and this step was, of course, the essential preliminary to the opening of the campaign. The five corps of which the army was to be chiefly com- posed, were widely separated from each other, and each was at a considerable distance from Charleroi. The ist and 2d Corps lay to the westward of Charleroi, in the neighborhood of Lille and Valenciennes respectively, the 3d and 4th Corps to the southeastward of Charle- roi, near Mezieres and Metz ; the 6th Corps was at Laon, about half way from Charleroi to Paris, and the Guard partly at Paris, and partly, not far off, at Com- piegne. The four cavalry corps were stationed to the north of Laon, between that place and Avesnes. The larger part of these commands were placed on or near the frontier, and any movements on their part were likely to be observed by the enemy. Nevertheless the concen- tration of the army was safely and secretly effected. The 4th Corps, which was near Metz, broke camp as early as the 6th of June, the ist Corps, which was near Lille, as early as the 9th, the Guard left Paris on the 8th, the other corps left their encampments at somewhat later dates. The Emperor left Paris at half-past three o'clock ^Ante, p. 4. [chap. 4.] THE FIFTEENTH OF JUNE. — NAPOLEON. 45 on the morning of the 12th, and so well were his calcu- lations made that, on the evening of the 14th, his head- quarters were at Beaumont, not more than sixteen miles south of Charleroi, with the entire army within easy reach. And, by the expedient which he adopted, of caus- ing demonstrations to be made at various points on the frontier, from the English Channel on the west almost to Metz on the east, he diverted the attention of the enemy's pickets and created false alarms, so that his formidable army was concentrated without arousing the serious con- cern of the chiefs of the allied armies. On the evening of the 14th, at Avesnes, the Emperor issued to his soldiers one of his stirring orders ; "" he re- minded them that this was the anniversary of Marengo and Friedland; he called upon them to conquer or die. As confirming what has been said above as to his plans and expectations, he wrote to his brother Joseph the same morning, as follows : ^ " To-morrow I go to Charleroi, where the Prussian army is ; that will occasion either a battle or the retreat of the enemy." To the same effect he wrote at the same time to Davout : ^ " I shall pass the Sambre to-morrow, the 15th. If the Prussians do not re- tire, we shall have a battle." These letters show how per- fectly clear his plan lay in his own mind, — not as a pro- ject of separating the allied armies from one another by occupying any points on the line by which they commu- nicated with each other, but as an intention of attacking and defeating the army of Bliicher before it could be sup- ported by that of Wellington, unless, indeed, it should fall back before him. That evening at Beaumont was issued a general order' for the forward movement of the army, to commence at *Corresp., vol. 28, p. 324, No. 22,052 : App. C, I ; post^ p. 362, 3 lb., vol. 28, p. 322, No. 22,050. *Ib., vol. 28, p. 323, No. 22,051. *Ib., vol. 28, p. 325, No. 22,053: App. C, II ; post, p. 363. 46 THE FIFTEENTH OF JUNE. — NAPOLEON. [CHAP. 4.] half-past two o'clock the next morning, the 15th. For each corps special directions were given, and also for each of the three divisions of the Imperial Guard, — Marshal Mortier, its commander, having through illness been obliged to remain at Avesnes. The 2d Corps, followed by the ist, was to advance on the left of the army; the 3d and 6th and the Guard on the centre; and the 4th Corps, which was at Philippeville, on the right. Charleroi was stated to be the general objective point of the movement: but Reille was warned that the 2d Corps would probably cross the Sambre at Marchienne, a few miles higher up, and Gerard was by a later order ^ directed to cross with the 4th Corps at Chatelet, a little lower down. The sappers were to precede each column to repair the roads and bridges, which had been in the past few months broken up by the French, in order to obstruct the march of the allies, should they cross the frontier. The centre columns were to be preceded by the cavalry of the 3d Corps and by the cavalry-corps of General Pajol. The other three cavalry-corps, under the command of Marshal Grouchy, were to follow the army. (See Map 2.) By the carelessness of the headquarters-staff in sending but one officer to Vandamme, and in not requir- ing a receipt^ from him, and by the accident of this officer being thrown from his horse and failing to deliver his message, Vandamme did not get this order in season ; he consequently was not able to get the 3d Corps on the road till seven o'clock. This delay was, of course, vexa- tious, and operated to hinder the movement upon Charleroi, and to render it less decisive than it otherwise would have been. ^La Tour d'Auvergne, p. 62. 'Charras, vol. i, pp. 101,117: La Tour d'Auvergne, p. 57,11. Cf. Stanhope, pp. 65, 24S. * Maurice, p. 547 : Sept. 1890. [chap. 4.] THE FIFTEENTH OF JUNE. — NAPOLEON. 47 An unhappy incident occurred to the 4th Corps. General Bourmont, who commanded its leading division, deserted to the enemy, accompanied by his staff. Bour- mont was an old royalist, but he had apparently given in his unqualified adhesion to the imperial cause. His trea- son could not but have a very unfortunate effect on the soldiers, creating a feeling of distrust in their officers, particularly in those of high rank. With these deductions, the day of the fifteenth of June was decidedly a successful one for the French. Although the Prussian General Zieten, who, with the ist Prus- sian Corps, held the line of the Sambre, having advance- posts on the right or south bank, opposed at all points to the French a skilful and obstinate resistance,^ the superi- ority of his adversaries was too decided for a successful stand to be made anywhere. In the centre, the operations were under the immediate direction of the Emperor, who mounted his horse at three in the morning.'" In the march on Charleroi the Young Guard followed the cavalry, Vandamme's Corps having been, as we have seen, delayed. Everywhere the enemy were pushed back. Pajol entered Charleroi about noon. Here a halt was made to allow Vandamme time to arrive, and the enemy took up a strong position on the heights of Gilly, a little to the north and east of Charleroi. Their firm attitude seems to have imposed somewhat" on Marshal Grouchy, who had come up with the cavalry- corps of Exelmans, and on Vandamme, who in the after- noon arrived and took his proper post in the advance ; and it was not until about five o'clock," when Napoleon assumed command in person, and with a vigor that 'For a valuable discussion of Zieten's conduct, see Col. F. Maurice's Article on Waterloo in the United Service Magazine for October, 1890. '° Corresp. vol. 28, p. 330, No. 22,055 : Baron Fain to Prince Joseph. " But see Grouchy : Observations, pp. 60 et seq. '^ Charras, vol. i, p. iii. 48 THE FIFTEENTH OF JUNE. — NAPOLEON. [CHAP. 4.] savored perhaps of impatience assaulted the position, put- ting in even the cavalry of the headquarters-guard, that the enemy gave way, and retired to Fleurus. Vandamme and Grouchy, with Pajol's and Exelmans' cavalry, bivouacked a mile or two south of Fleurus. The Guard rested between Charleroi and Gilly; the 6th Corps on the south bank of the river, near Charleroi. On the right, the corps of Gerard crossed the river at Chatelet, and remained for the night on the road to Fleurus. Thus, three corps, — the 3d, 4th, and 6th,— the Guard, and the greater part of the cavalry, were concentrated near Charleroi and between that place and Fleurus, ready to attack the Prussians at Fleurus or Sombreffe the next day. The Emperor's headquarters were fixed at Charleroi. Coming now to the operations of the left wing,— Reille, at the head of the 2d Corps, starting from Leers, on the Sambre, at three in the morning, drove the enemy from point to point, occupying the various bridges across the river, until he reached Marchienne.'^ By the terms of an order ''^ dated 8.30 A. M. he was allowed to pass the Sambre at this point, and by another order, which is not preserved, but only referred to in an order to d'Erlon,'^ he was directed to march on Gosselies, and to attack a body of the enemy which appeared to be there. In obedience to his instructions, Reille crossed the bridge at Marchienne and moved directly upon Jumet, a village on the road leading from Charleroi to Brussels. Here he encountered a Prussian rear guard, which he quickly overthrew, and at once moved upon Gosselies. It was " at this moment," when he was marching on Gosselies, " Charras, vol. i, pp. 99, 100. ^ Doc. Indd., Ill, p. 22 ; App. C, III ; post, p. 366. « lb., V, p. 25 ; App. C, V ; post, p. 367. See Napolifon ^ Waterloo, p. 58. [chap. 4.] THE FIFTEENTH OF JUNE. — NAPOLEON. 49 he says, that Marshal Ney arrived and took command.'^ This was about five o'clock in the afternoon.'' Ney, who had just overtaken the army on the march, had ridden over from Charleroi, where he had seen the Emperor, and had received'^ from him the command of the 1st and 2d Corps. Napoleon had told him that Reille was marching on Gosselies, and, when he reached Reille, he found him, as we have just seen, in the very act. On his arrival at Gosselies, Ney carried forward with himself to Frasnes the cavalry of the 2d Corps, Pire's, and the division of Bachelu. About half-past six,'^ Ney with these troops drove the enemy, — a brigade under Prince Bernard of Saxe Weimar, — from Frasnes. They fell back to Quatre Bras. The division of Girard was sent in pursuit of the Prussians, who had retired from Gosselies on Fleurus. The other two divisions, — those of Jerome and Foy, — remained at Gosselies. A division of cavalry of the Guard, under Lefebvre-Desnouettes, about 2000 strong, which had been lent temporarily to Ney, was placed by him in support of the troops at Frasnes.'° Ney remained at Frasnes till a late hour in the evening. '^ Doc. Indd., p. 56 : Statement of General Reille. " Charras, vol. i, p. 123. '^ Doc. Ined., p. 4, statement of Colonel Heym^s. The hour given by Heymes, seven o'clock, is much too late. We can fix the time of this conver- sation from a statement of Marshal Grouchy's. That officer (Observations, p. 61) tells us that on going to Charleroi to take his orders from the Emperor just before the attack on Gilly, he found him giving instructions to Ney. The attack on Gilly was ordered, as we have seen above, at five o'clock, so that Ney must have joined the Emperor some time before five, and probably reached Reille about half or three-quarters of an hour later. Cf. Van Loben Sels, p. 140. '9 Report of Prince Bernard, given in full in Van Loben Sels, p. 134, n. Heymes' statement is all wrong as to the hours. He says Ney met the Emperor at seven, put himself at the head of the 2d Corps at eight, and occupied Frasnes at ten. Doc. In^d., p. 4. ^°Doc. Indd., pp. 4, 5. Col. Heym&s' Statement. 50 THE FIFTEENTH OF JUNE. — NAPOLEON. [CHAP. 4.] Thus the 2d Corps had accomplished its tasks for the day. Its commander had shown himself energetic and capable. The advance at Frasnes observed the enemy's post at Quatre Bras. The troops had had a very exhausting day and needed a good night's rest. The ist Corps, under the Count d'Erlon, did not do so well by any means. To begin with, d'Erlon did not start at 3 A. M., as he was ordered to do, but at 4 o'clock.^' His troops had no fighting to do; they simply followed in the rear of the 2d Corps." They had, to be sure,^^ five miles farther to go, having bivouacked at Solre-sur-Sambre, and they were, no doubt, affected by that tendency to delay \vhich seems always to attend the last half of a long marching column ; it is well known that the last half never keeps up, relatively, with the first half. D'Erlon had also been required to detach part of his troops at the various crossings of the Sambre."^ But these facts afford no adequate explanation of the tardi- ness of this corps. At night d'Erlon's headquarters were at Marchienne; his leading division, Durutte's, had reached Jumet;^^ but at least one-fourth of his troops had not crossed the river. Nevertheless, by an order'^ dated 3 P. M., d'Erlon had been informed that Reille had "See Napoldon k Waterloo, p. 53, where d'Erlon's order to his troops to break camp at 4 A. M., instead of at 3 A. M., as had been directed, is given in full, and severely commented on. "Charras, vol. i, p. 98. Cf. the 10 A. M. order to d'Erlon : Doc. Ined., \Y, p. 24 ; App. C, iv ; post, p. 367. This directed d'Erlon to cross the Sambre at Marchiennes or Ham, and take up a position close to that of ReiUe. ^^Ib., p. 98, n. ^Charras, vol. 2, pp. 207, 208. ^5 Durutte's statement, Doc. I n^d., p. 71, that this Corps camped at night beyond Gosselies, is wholly unsupported. Durutte probably meant Jumet, not Gosselies. The divisions of Foy and Jerome, of the 2d Corps, occupied Gosselies. ^'Doc. In^d., v., p. 25 ; App. C, v ; post. d. '567. [chap. 4.] THE FIFTEENTH OF JUNE. — NAPOLEON. 5 1 been ordered to march on Gosselies and to attack the enemy there, and that the Emperor wished him, d'Erlon, also to march on Gosselies and to support this operation. Later in the day, or perhaps in the evening,''^ after Marshal Ney had assumed command of the two corps, d'Erlon was informed'^ that it was the Emperor's inten- tion that he should join the 2d Corps at Gosselies, and that Ney would also give him orders to that effect.''^ This last sentence must imply that Napoleon had en- joined on Ney to bring up these troops. It is true that Charras^° says that, on the evening of the 15th, the ist Corps was in echelon from Marchienne to Jumet, imply- ing that all the troops had crossed the river; and this is the generally accepted belief.^' But we find a despatch,^' dated at Marchienne at 3 A. M. of the i6th, from the chief-of-sta£f of the 3d division of the ist corps, Marcognet's, to General Nogues, who commanded the ist brigade of that division, informing him that the 2d brigade would remain at Marchienne until the arrival of the ist division, that of General Allix. This shows beyond a doubt that, notwithstanding the order of three o'clock in the afternoon for the ist Corps to reach Gosselies and support Reille in attacking the enemy, and the subsequent order to the same effect, yet, ^^At six or seven o'clock, Charras thinks. Charras, vol. 2, p. 224. ^^Doc. Indd., VI., p. 25 ; App. C, vi ; post, p. 368. ^9In some unaccountable way Chesney (Waterloo, pp. 118, 119) has over- looked these orders that Napoleon gave to d'Erlon to close up on ReUle at Gosselies. The Documents Itiedits are not among the authorities given in the List which follows his Table of Contents, although they are referred to on page 119, and this may account for this regrettable oversight. His blame of Napoleon, which is very severe, is, therefore, entirely undeserved. ^°Charras, vol. i, p. no. 3'La Tour d'Auvergne, p. 91 ; Siborne, vol. i, p. 82 ; Quinet, p. 90 ; Hooper, p. 76 : The author of " Napoleon k Waterloo " alone states (p. 34) that a part of the ist Corps had not crossed at night. See also p. 60. ^Napoldon h. Waterloo, p. 144 ; App. C, vii ; post, p. 368. 52 THE FIFTEENTH OF JUNE. — NAPOLEON. [CHAP. 4.] at three o'clock in the morning of the i6th, twelve hours afterwards, one division had not arrived at the river, and another division (two brigades) was still at Marchienne. This state of facts, it must be recollected, existed when the whole 2d Corps had been at and beyond Gosselies for more than eight hours! It is impossible not to blame d'Erlon for this excessive tardiness in the movements of his corps, — not only for not having exe- cuted the order of three o'clock in the afternoon to pro- ceed at once to Gosselies, but generally, for not having seen to it that his troops were, during the entire march, within a short distance" of the 2d Corps, a measure certainly, when all the circumstances are taken into account, — and especially that the advance of Reille was to be made in an enemy's country and was actually stoutly resisted, — of the most obvious necessity. And it must not be forgotten that in Belgium in the middle of June, it is light until nine o'clock in the evening, and the sun rises before four. It may be remarked that the controversies which have been waged in regard to the truth of Napoleon's state- ment that he, on the 15th, gave Ney verbal orders to seize and occupy Quatre Bras, have deflected the atten- tion of historians from the subject now under considera- tion,— the conduct of d'Erlon in regard to the march of the I St Corps on the 15th,— a subject closely connected, as we shall hereafter see, with the operations of the army on the succeeding day. In regard to the much vexed question referred to above, we shall say nothing here. It is not pretended that Napoleon gave to Ney on the 15th any written orders to go to Quatre Bras. Napoleon's statement^ ^ that he gave him verbal orders to that effect has been ^^Charras, vol. i, p. 98. ^•Corresp. vol, 31, p. 199 : Gourgaud, p. 47. [chap. 4.] THE FIFTEENTH OF JUNE. — NAPOLEON. 53 denied, and is widely disbelieved. We prefer, for many reasons, to confine our narrative to generally admitted facts, or to those which admit of definite proof. What we have to say about this matter will be found in the Notes to this chapter. In summing up the situation, we may fairly conclude, that, with the exception of the backwardness of the ist Corps, the progress made ! during the day had been satisfactory to the Emperor. He says himself : — "All the Emperor's manoeuvres had succeeded to his wishes; he had it thenceforth in his power to attack the armies of the enemy in detail. To avoid this misfortune, the greatest that could befall them, the only means they had left was to abandon the ground, and assemble at Brussels or beyond that city."35 Napoleon had in fact concentrated in front of Fleurus a sufficient force wherewith to fight the Prussians, if, as he thought it not unlikely, they should risk a battle on the next day. He was not apprehensive of the Anglo- Dutch army joining their allies in this battle, for Wel- lington, as he calculated, could not concentrate in sea- son a sufficient force to overcome the two corps which, under Ney, he intended should occupy Quatre Bras the next forenoon. He had purposely abstained from occupying Sombreffe, for he feared that if he did this, Blucher, finding his communications with Wellington blocked at this point, would retire without a battle, and endeavor to effect a junction with the English at Wavre, or elsewhere to the northward ; whereas, so long as the road which connected his army with that of Wellington remained free, BlUcher might with confidence be ex- pected to risk a battle for the preservation of that line of communication, that is, at or near Fleurus, with the ex- pectation of being reinforced by his ally. But if he ventured upon this course. Napoleon expected to beat him, for Napoleon calculated that, by the occupation ^^Corresp. vol. 31 ; p. 202. 54 THE FIFTEENTH OF JUNE. — NAPOLEON. [CHAP. 4.] of Quatre Bras the next morning, he could prevent Bliicher's receiving any assistance from his Anglo- Dutch allies. A letter ^^ written by Baron Fain, one of the Emperor's secretaries, to Joseph Bonaparte, dated Charleroi, June 15th, at 9 o'clock in the evening, states that the Emperor has just returned, very much fatigued, having been on horseback since three in the morning, and has thrown himself on his bed for a few hours' repose; but that he will mount his horse again at midnight. This, how- ever, as we shall see hereafter, he did not do, as at mid- night Marshal Ney came to confer with him, having just ridden back from his extreme front at Frasnes. ^Corresp. vol. 28; p. 330, No. 22,055. NOTES TO CHAPTER IV. I. Marshal Ney was acting under considerable dis- advantage during this afternoon and evening. We have spoken of this subject before. His difhculties are well pointed out by Colonel Maurice in a recent paper,' in which much stress is laid, and very justly, on the fact that Ney had not with him a proper staff. It is true that Ney was no neophyte in the practice of war, and that he was perfectly well known to his corps-command- ers, and in fact to his entire command. But he arrived at the front late in the day,— at nearly five o'clock in the afternoon, — and with but a single staff -officer. It was only natural and right that he should personally occupy himself with the conduct of the advance to Frasnes, that he should accompany the cavalry, and should attend to the posting of Bachelu's infantry division in support. And he may very possibly have found the leading divis- ion of the I St Corps, Durutte's, between Jumet and Gosselies" on his return, late in the evening, from Frasnes to the latter place. That the ist Corps had not fully executed its part of the programme must have been, however, only too plain to him ; and the necessity of exerting himself energetically to bring it up to the 'United Service Magazine : Sept., 1890 : pp. 541 et seq. *Doc. Indd., p. 71. Statement of General Durutte. As we have before remarked, this officer probably mistook Jumet for Gosselies. See ante, p. 50, note 25. 55 56 JUNE 15th. — NAPOLEON. — NOTES. [CHAP. 4.] front^ if he would have his whole command well in hand for to-morrow's work must have appeared, in view of d'Erlon's slowness, most imperative. At least, there is every reason to suppose this. 2. As to whether Napoleon accomplished as much as he had intended to accomplish, or as much as he ought to have intended to accomplish, on this day of the fifteenth of June, writers have differed. Those who, like Jomini and Charras,'* maintain the theory that his intention was to seize both Sombreffe and Quatre Bras at once, and those who, like Rogniat, insist that this ought to have been his intention, whatever it may in reality have been, hold that the operations of this first day were incomplete. Jomini sa^^s: — ^ *' Napoleon had to renounce the idea of pushing on the 15th as far as Sombreffe and Qiiatre Bras, which were to be the pivots of all his after movements." "One may feel assured," says Charras,^ " that the haste which Napoleon intended should characterize the march of the army had for its object the occupation of Quatre Bras and Sombreffe on the first day of the campaign. This occu- pation failed, in consequence of a considerable loss of time; the principal avenue of communication between Bliicher and Welling- ton remained free, although menaced ; it is for this reason that we hold that Napoleon told the truth in writing that 'this loss of time was very injurious' and that we add, — the day of the 15th had been incomplete." ^"An error was committed by suffering it [the ist Corps] to remain, dur- ing the night of the 15th, echeloned between Marchienne and Jumet." Gourg. p. 66. *A7ite, pp. 12, 13. sjomini, p. 125. Jomini says (p. 123J that "Napoleon gave Grouchy a verbal order to push as far as Sombreffe that very evening, if possible "; but no evidence of such an order is cited. See Jomini's letter to the Due d'Elchingen, pp. 225, 226. Cf. La Tour d'Auvergne, p. 69. That Napoleon nowhere blames Grouchy for not having pushed on to Sombreffe on the 15th, — taken in connection with his censure of Ney for not having seized Quatre Bras that evening, — is pretty good evidence that he neither ordered nor expected Grouchy to reach Sombreffe. ^Charras, vol. i, p. 116 : cf. vol. 2, p. 225, Note K. [chap. 4.] JUNE 15th. — NAPOLEON. — NOTES. 57 The passage to which Charras here refers is to be found in the Memoirs/ and it runs thus: — "On the same day [the 15th], the attack of the woods before Fleurus, which had been ordered to commence at four o'clock in the afternoon, did not take place until seven o'clock. Night came on before the troops could enter Fleurus, where it had been the project of the chief to place his headquarters that very day. This loss of seven [^sicY hours was very injurious at the opening of a campaign." A. Let us first consider this question so far as it affects the operations of the centre and right of the army, — that is, with reference to the non-occupation of Sombreffe on the 15th. Rogniat's criticism, that the Emperor ought to have aimed at seizing Sombreffe on the 15th, is especially in- teresting, as it was answered by Napoleon himself from St. Helena. " He [Napoleon] ought to have carried his whole army the same day as far as Fleurus, by a forced march of eight to ten leagues, and to have pushed his advance guard as far as Sombreffe ; but, instead of hastening to arrive in the midst of his enemies, he stopped at Charleroi, whether because he was retarded by the bad weather or for other motives. "9 To this Napoleon replied: — '° "The Emperor's intention was that his advance guard should occupy Fleurus," keeping [the bulk of] his troops concealed ' Corresp., vol. 31, p. 249. ^Evidently a misprint for "three" ; the word "seven" having obviously been carelessly repeated. 'Rogniat : Consid., p. 339 : cited in Corresp., vol. 31, p. 471. '° Corresp., vol. 31, p. 471. "Rogniat claims that there is a serious inconsistency between this state- ment, as to the occupation of Fleurus by the advance guard, and that in the Memoirs, where it is said that the Emperor intended to place his head- quarters there. This seems rather hypercritical. Charras (vol. 2, p. 221) says "It stands to reason that if he had had his headquarters in that city [Fleurus], he would have occupied Sombrefife." But this is surely going too 58 JUNE 15th. — NAPOLEON. — NOTES. [CHAP. 4.] behind the wood near this city;" he took good care not to let his army be seen, and^ above all, not to occupy So?7ibreffe.^'^ This [the occupation of Sombreffe] would of itself have caused the failure of all his manoeuvres; for then Marshal Bliicher would have been obliged to make Wavre the place for the concentration of his army, the battle of Ligny would not have taken place, and the Prussian army would not have been obliged to give battle [as it did] in its then not fully concentrated condition, and not supported by the English army." In his " Reponse aux Notes critiques de Napoleon,"''* Rogniat criticises this observation as follows : — "In occupying Sombreffe on the 15th, Napoleon would have won, without striking a blow, the immense result of isolating the two opposing armies in order to fight them separately, a result which the victory of Ligny, so dearly purchased, did not obtain for him."'S While Rogniat thus condemns Napoleon for not hav- ing proposed to himself to occupy Sombreffe on the 15th, Charras'^ summarily dismisses Napoleon's state- ment just quoted, as unworthy of serious attention. Not to have aimed at occupying Sombreffe on the 15th, he says, would have been contrary to " the very principles of his strategy." He accordingly finds that in this re- far. Headquarters might well have been in Fleurus, while the Prussians held the heights of Brye and Sombreffe, and even the villages of Ligny and St. Amand; and this actually was the case the next day,— the i6th. Fleurus, half way between Charleroi and Sombreffe, was a very natural place for the Emperor to aim at as his resting place for the night of the 15th. "Clausewitz, ch. 30, p. 60. But see Rogniat, Rdponse, p. 262. "The italics are our own. '''pp. 264, 265. "It is not easy to see what is meant here. It is certam that, without hav- ing occupied Sombreffe on the 15th, Napoleon did fight the Prussians separately on the i6th. That Ligny was not a more decisive victory was due to special causes. "■Vol. I, p. 115, note. Quinet, p. 102, does not follow Charras here. [chap. 4.] JUNE 15th. — NAPOLEON. — NOTES. 59 spect Napoleon had failed on the evening of the 15th to attain his objective point. Jomini's view'' of Napoleon's plan, as we have seen above, coincides with that of Charras.'^ In respect to these criticisms, we observe in the first place that these writers have adduced no sufficient rea- son for distrusting Napoleon's own account of his plan and intentions. That account is perfectly clear and con- sistent throughout. He wanted, he tells us, to fight at the outset a decisive battle with one of the allied armies. He looked for great results from such a battle. He ex- pected, he says, that the Prussians would be promptly concentrated, and would offer battle near Fleurus,— to the south of Sombreffe ; and that owing to the unreadi- ness of the Anglo-allied army, and his proposed seizure of Quatre Bras on the first day of the campaign, he would be able to fight the Prussians, isolated, for the time being, from the English.'^ While he claims to have ordered the occupation of Quatre Bras on the first day, he nowhere says that he proposed to occupy Sombreffe on the first day. When he is criticised for not having attempted this, he maintains that he was right. He con- sidered, he says, that Bllicher's object in fighting a battle at this stage in the campaign must be the maintenance of his communications with his allies;" the Prussians would, therefore, fight, if they fought at all, to the south of the Namur-Quatre-Bras turnpike, somewhere to the south of Sombreffe. And, as he expected great and perhaps decisive results'' from such a battle, he con- "Jomini, pp. 123, 125. "La Tour d'Auvergne, pp. 73 et seq. takes the same view. '5Vaudoncourt, vol. 3, 2d part, pp. 134, 135, states the Emperor's plan with admirable clearness. But on pp. 165, 166, he slides into the theory of Jomini. ^"Cy. Clausewitz, ch. 22, p. 46. " It was certainly to be assumed that both generals would remain in communication with each other." ^"' Bonaparte hoped, if he met Blucher's main body, to destroy it by a quick attack, before WeUington could arrive." lb., ch. 22, p. 46. 60 JUNE 15th. — NAPOLEON. — NOTES. [CHAP. 4.] tented himself on the 15th of June with threatening with his centre and right this turnpike, and purposely ab- stained from occupying Sombreffe. For if Bllicher should find Sombreffe occupied and his line of communications with Wellington actually in the enemy's hands, it was probable, so Napoleon thought, that he would retire to some point further north, where a union of the two armies could easily be effected, and so this opportunity of fighting the Prussians alone and isolated from the English would be lost. In the second place, we fail to see that the plan which Rogniat blames Napoleon for not having adopted, and which Jomini and Charras believe he really entertained, but failed to carry into effect, that is, the plan of occupy- ing both Sombreffe and Quatre Bras on the 15th, was an improvement in any way over Napoleon's plan as de- scribed by himself, as stated above. These WTiters would have Napoleon begin the campaign by separating the two hostile armies by occupying two points on the road by which they communicated with each other. Napo- leon says that if he had done this, while the two armies would certainly have been separated, his chances of deal- ing decisively with one of them, alone and unsupported by its ally, would most likely have vanished. And the probabilities are that Napoleon was right in this opinion. Bllicher would naturally have retired, if he had found the N am ur- Quatre- Bras road occupied at Sombreffe by the French in force; he would have tried to concert with Wellington some combined operation in the neighbor- hood of Wavre or Brussels; and thus the opportunity which Napoleon had at Ligny, where the Prussians were exposed to the attack of the main French army without the assistance of a single English soldier, would not have been offered by Bllicher. It seems to us that Napoleon is right in his conten- tion, and that the great chance which he had at the bat- tle of Ligny of defeating one of his two adversaries alone [chap. 4.] JUNE 15th. — NAPOLEON. — NOTES. 61 and unsupported, was in exact accordance with his ex- pectations, and, was, as much as such things ever are, the result of his well-calculated dispositions. We conclude, therefore, that there is no good reason to suppose that Napoleon intended on the evening of the 15th to push forward to Sombreffe and hold the Namur-Nivelles road at that point. He may very possi- bly have expected to fix his headquarters at Fleurus, but, although he did not succeed in doing this, his object had been substantially attained at the close of the first day of the campaign, so far as the operations of the right and centre were concerned. B. Let us now consider the other branch of the ques- tion, — Did Napoleon intend to occupy Quatre Bras on the 15th? (i.) If we are correct in the view taken above, namely, that Napoleon did not intend to seize Sombreffe on the 15th, because he feared that if Bliicher found his line of communications with Wellington occupied in force at Sombreffe, he would retire to the northward, and there form a junction with the Anglo-Dutch army, it would seem at first blush as if Bliicher might be expected to take the same course if he found the turnpike to Nivelles oc- cupied in force by the enemy at Quatre Bras. But this seems to be pushing the argument too far. Bliicher could hardly be expected to be affected by the report of the occupation of Quatre Bras so much as by the expul- sion of Zieten's Corps from Sombreffe, and by the occu- pation of that place by the main French army. Theo- retically, so to speak, the seizure of any one point on the Namur-Nivelles turnpike ought to produce the same effect on Marshal Bliicher's mind, and, therefore, on his subsequent movements, as the seizure of any other. Yet one can easily see that, practically, this might not be so. On the other hand, there was certainly the risk that Bliicher would not fight at or near Sombreffe unless he thought he could count on receiving aid from Welling- 62 JUNE 15th. — NAPOLEON. — NOTES. [CHAP. 4.] ton, and this expectation could hardly be entertained, if he knew that the French were in possession of Quatre Bras. Still, the importance of preventing Wellington, by an early occupation of Quatre Bras, from assisting the Prussians in their resistance to the attack which he hoped to make upon them the next day, may well have induced Napoleon to give on the 15th to Marshal Ney orders to occupy Quatre Bras at once, and to take the chance of the result of this step being the withdrawal of the Prussian army to Wavre or Brussels, (2.) But the matter is really of very little consequence, so far, at least, as the successful carrying out of Napoleon's plan is concerned. Let us assume that Napoleon is cor- rect in his statement that he gave a verbal order to Ney on the 15th to push forward to Quatre Bras. We have nevertheless just seen that the Memoirs testify to the Emperor's general satisfaction on the evening of the 15th with the progress that had been made during the day, notwithstanding the non-occupation of Quatre Bras. Napoleon has in fact nowhere said that it was necessary to occupy Quatre Bras on the 15th. The written orders to Ney, on the morning of the i6th, which we shall shortly have occasion to consider, imply that, at the time he wrote them, Napoleon was content with Ney's having on the 15th occupied Frasnes and threatened Quatre Bras, and that he then desired the movement on the latter point to take place on the forenoon of the i6th, while he himself was massing his troops for the advance on Sombreffe and the expected battle with the Prussians in the afternoon. In truth, when we consider that the bulk of the army under Napoleon in person could hardly have been in condition to engage the Prussians at daybreak of the 1 6th, we can easily comprehend that Napoleon, — what- ever he might have enjoined on Ney at five o'clock in the afternoon before, when he no doubt expected that much more progress would be made before the next morning than actually was made, — should have been quite con- [chap. 4.] JUNE 15th. — NAPOLEON. — NOTES. 63 tent with Ney's not having reached a point so far to the front as Quatre Bras.^' As for Jomini" and Charras,'^ they admit that, when Napoleon perceived the impossibility of seizing Sombreffe on the 15th, he ceased to desire the occupation of Quatre Bras, and was quite content with Ney's advance remain- ing for the night at Frasnes. In their conclusion we may, for the reasons we have just given, well agree, with- out committing ourselves to their theory of Napoleon's plan, which, as we have seen above, differs materially from his own account of it. We conclude, therefore, that the result of the operations of the first day had also been satisfactory so far as the non-occupation of Quatre Bras was concerned. But Marshal Ney's command was far from being well in hand at the close of the day, as we have had occasion to point out above."* 3. But, it may fairly be asked, in view of what has been said, assuming that Napoleon gave Ney a verbal order at five o'clock in the afternoon of the 15th, why, if the non- occupation of Quatre Bras by Ney on that evening did not really disarrange Napoleon's plans, did Napoleon blame Marshal Ney for not having occupied it } Because, in the first place, it was a disobedience of orders ; secondly, because Napoleon believed that Ney's stopping at Frasnes, this side of Quatre Bras, was dictated by an exaggerated caution, which it was equally surprising and annoying to find in a man like Ney; and, thirdly because when he came to write his narrative of the cam- paign, he connected this hesitation to take risks, which Ney had evinced on the 15th, with Ney's very singular management of his command on the next day, — of which " But see La Tour d'Auvergne, pp. 75, 76. ^ Jomini, pp. 125, 215. ^'Charras, vol. i, p. 124. Cf. Quinet, p. 102. ^ Ante, PP- 5I) 52- Gourg. p. 66. 64 JUNE 15th. — NAPOLEON. — NOTES. [CHAP. 4.] we can here say nothing without anticipating our story. It was to Ney's supposed faulty arrangements on the 1 6th that the Emperor — who never knew all the facts of the case, by the way, — naturally attributed the failure of the ist Corps to take part either in the battle of Quatre Bras or in that of Ligny. Hence we find Napoleon severe on Ney for not boldly pushing out to Quatre Bras on the evening of the 15th, not because it was necessary to oc- cupy the cross-roads that night, — for the next morning would have done quite as well, — but because Ney's hesi- tation seemed to the Emperor to indicate in him a lack of that boldness and energy on which he had always counted hitherto with entire confidence. 4. In what has just been said, we have assumed that Napoleon gave to Ney a verbal order at five o'clock on the 15th to push forward with the two corps and seize Quatre Bras. But was this the fact ? This question has been the subject of a great deal of controversy, as every student of the campaign knows to his cost. In our view, as we have just pointed out, it is not a matter of much consequence. Napoleon nowhere claims that the failure of Marshal Ney to carry out this order was a serious matter, although he does attribute his failure to carry it out to an undue prudence and an unnecessary caution, for which he censures him. Still, the matter has been so hotly contested, that it may be best to address ourselves to it briefly. The statements in Gourgaud's narrative'^ and the Memoirs,'^ that Napoleon ordered Ney, at their meeting near Gilly, to advance boldly to Quatre Bras with his two corps and to take up a position beyond it, with guards on the roads to Nivelles, Brussels and Namur, are exceed- ingly positive and explicit. These statements were written in 18 18 and 1820. The only piece of strictly contempo- ^5 Gourgaud, p. 47. "' Corresp. vol. 31, p. 199. [chap. 4.] JUNE 15th. — NAPOLEON. — NOTES. 65 raneous evidence that we have is the statement in the official bulletin of the army,'"' which was sent off from Charleroi on the evening of the 15th, that Ney's head- quarters were that evening at Quatre Bras, — and it cer- tainly is a very strong confirmation of Gourgaud and the Memoirs. ^^ ^' Corresp., vol. 28, p. 333 : " L'Empereura donnd le commandement de la gauche au prince de la Moskowa, qui a eu le soir son quartier gdndral aux Quatre Chemins, sur la route de Bruxelles." This Bulletin was printed in the "Moniteur" of the i8th. App. C, viii; post^ pp. 369, 370. It is to be found in Jones, pp. 378, 379. *^ Marshal Grouchy, in 1S18, only three years after the battle, in the first edition of the pamphlet which he published in Philadelphia, entitled " Observa- tions sur la Relation de la Campagne de i8i5,publi^e par le G^n^ral Gourgaud," in defending himself for having, on the i8th of June, as he claims, strictly obeyed his orders, instead of marching to the sound of the cannon of Water- loo, says (p. 32):— " Besides, this way of looking at the matter was fortified in my eyes by the disapproval which Napoleon had shown in my presence of the conduct of Marshal Ney. / had heard him blame him for having stispended the move- ment of his troops on the 13th at the sound of the cannonade between Gilly and Fletirus, for having halted Reille's Corps between Gosselies and Frasnes, and for having sent a division towards Fleurus, where the fighting was going on, in place of keeping himself to the execution, pure and simple, of his orders, which p7'escribed to hifn to march on Quatre Bras. (The italics are ours.) And again, when speaking of his own refusal to entertain the suggestion that he should march to the sound of the cannon, he says (p. 61) : — "Could I, moreover, so soon forget that Napoleon had censured Marshal Ney for having halted at the sound of the cannon which were being fired near Fleurus, for having sent troops in that direction, and for having per- mitted himself to depart from the Hteral execution of his orders ? " Grouchy must be referring here to the scene at the Emperor's headquar- ters on the night of the 15th and i6th {sto. post, p. 116). In the edition published in Philadelphia in 1819, and in the reproduction of the pamphlet from this edition in Paris in the same year. Grouchy omits the statement that he heard the emperor blame Ney, and rests his argument on the censure on Ney's conduct contained in the Gourgaud Narrative. One may not unreasonably conjecture that, after publishing the edition of i8i8, he was informed that Ney's family denied that Ney had received on the 15th any order to go to Quatre Bras, and that Grouchy was unwilling to give evidence in this controversy against this contention of the friends of the Marshal. Captain Pringle, R. E., in an Appendix to Scott's Napoleon (Paris edition, 66 JUNE 15th. — NAPOLEON. — NOTES. [CHAP. 4.] Again, the reason given in Gourgaud^^ and the Memoirs ^° as inducing Ney to halt this side of Quatre Bras, namely, that he deemed it unwise to advance further to the front than the main body had proceeded, — judg- ing by the sound of the cannon, which came from the neighborhood of Fleurus and Gilly, — is a very natural^' one. It is no doubt the reason he gave to the Emperor at their interview that very night at Charleroi. Neither Ney nor Soult have left any statements in writing ^^ about the matter. Nor is it claimed that Ney ever made any verbal statement on the subject. Thiers " asserts that Soult "frequently said * * * that on the afternoon of the fifteenth of June he heard Napoleon order Marshal Ney to proceed to Quatre Bras," and he cites the memoirs of General Berthezene, who commanded one of Vandamme's divisions, to the effect that Soult had told him that Napoleon gave these orders to Ney. 1828, p. 833, n.), is the only author who cites the above-quoted statements of Marshal Grouchy. ^9 Gourgaud, p. 48, n. 3°Corresp., vol. 31, p. 200. ^' C/. Jomini, p. 214, to whom the hesitation of Ney to occupy Quatre Bras seems justifiable, " unless the order to rush headlong on Quatre Bras had been expressed in a formal manner." ^ In his letter to the Duke of Otranto (Jones, 386), Ney says : " The Emperor [on the 15th] ordered me immediately to put myself at the head of the ist and 2d Corps, &c., &c. With these troops * * * I pursued the enemy, and forced him to evacuate Gosselies, Frasnes, Millet, Heppignies. There they took up a position for the night. * * * " On the i6th I received orders to attack the English in their position at Quatre Bras." It will be observed that Ney omits to state what directions, if any, the Emperor gave him on the 15th. He confines himself to enumerating the troops placed under his orders and to stating what he accomplished with them. The remark that he was ordered on the i6th to attack Quatre Bras throws no light on the question we are examining, viz. : — what orders were given to him on the 15th. "Thiers, vol. xx, p. 31, n. [chap. 4.] JUNE 15th. — NAPOLEON. — NOTES. 67 On the other hand we have a statement of Ney's son, then Duke of Elchingen, that Colonel Heymes, Ney's aide-de-camp, said in 1841 to him,^'^ that the name of Quatre Bras was not pronounced in the conversation between the Emperor and Marshal Ney on the after- noon of the 15th. The Duke furthermore tells us^^ ^j-j^f in 1829, Marshal Soult told him and Colonel Heymes that the Emperor had no idea of having Quatre Bras occupied on the evening of the 15th, and gave no orders to that effect. But how is it possible to reconcile this hearsay evidence, with the undeniable fact that the official bulletin states Ney's headquarters on the evening of the 15th to be at Quatre Bras ? It is surely much more likely that these reports by Marshal Ney's son, of statements by Heymes and Soult, of their recollections, given respectively four- teen and twenty-six years after the occurrence, are defect- ive in some way, than that the bulletin made up on the very evening should have contained a statement that Ney was at Quatre Bras when he had never been directed to go there. The contents of the bulletin must have been known to Soult, the chief-of-staff of the army; in fact, the bulletin itself must have been either actually composed by him or under his immediate direction ; and it is simply incredible that he should have inserted a statement that Ney's headquarters were, on the evening of the 15th, at Quatre Bras if he knew that the Emperor had no intention of having Quatre Bras occupied that evening, and had given no orders to that effect. It is to be noted also that Charras makes but an incidental men- tion of the bulletin,^^ which is the only bit of contempo- *• Letter from the Duke of Elchingen to General Jomini, i6 October, 1841, published in the "Spectateur Militaire," Dec. 15, 1841, as cited in Charras, vol. I, p. 119, n. Cf. Heymes' Statement, Doc. Ined., p. 4. ^Doc. Indd., p. 30. ^See/^j/y p. 69, n. 38. 68 JUNE 15th. — NAPOLEON.— NOTES. [CHAP. 4.] raneous evidence that we have, and confines his discus- sion of the testimony to an examination of these reported sayings of Soult and Heymes. When we take also into account that, in his carefully drawn Narrative," Heymes does not explicitly state that Quatre Bras was not men- tioned, that there is nothing whatever from Soult over his own signature, that these sayings of Soult and Heymes rest on mere hearsay evidence, and that they Vv^ere spoken, if spoken at all, many years after the campaign, it is evident that the statement in the bulletin is by far the best evidence that we have. The mention of Quatre Bras in the bulletin was made at the time, — before any controversy had arisen, — it was mxoreover a mere incidental mention, and cannot be supposed to have been intended to serve a purpose of any kind. Where the evidence is so conflicting, it is impossible for many persons to make up their minds. As we remarked before, the matter is not one of any great im- portance in its bearing on the fortunes of the campaign. The question, whether Ney received at five in the after- noon of the 15th of June verbal orders to seize Quatre Bras that evening, is of consequence mainly with refer- ence to the scope of Napoleon's plan at that moment, and also with respect to his reproach of unwarrantable hesitation on the part of Marshal Ney. It seems to us, we frankly say, on the whole, almost certain that the order was given. At any rate, we can hardly doubt that, when the bulletin was sent off that evening to Paris, it vras believed at the headquarters of the army that Mar- shal Ney was at Quatre Bras ; we must admit this, unless v/e gratuitously invent an intention to deceive the pub- lic on a point of this kind. And as Ney could hardly have been supposed to occupy Quatre Bras without orders, he must have been supposed by those who drew up the bulletin, — that is, Soult, the chief-of-staff of the " Doc. In^d., p. 4. [chap. 4.] JUNE 15th. — NAPOLEON, — NOTES. 69 army, and the Emperor himself, — to have proceeded to Quatre Bras in conformity with the verbal order given him that afternoon.^^ The fact that the subsequent written orders to proceed to Quatre Bras, issued on the morning of the i6th, make no mention either of this verbal order, or of Ney's failure to comply with it, does not seem to us to tend in any way to show that the verbal order had not been given. There would not only be no need of referring to such a fact in a subsequent written order, but such a mention of it would be unusual and unmilitary.^^ What light, if any, the contents of the written orders throw on the question of the previous giving of a verbal order, is a matter that will be considered hereafter. 33 We cannot find any allusion to the evidence furnished by this bulletin in any of the authorities, except in the " Waterloo " of La Tour d'Auvergna (P- 75)> in Mr. William O'Connor Morris's " Campaign of 1815 " (Great Com- manders of Modern Times, p. 327, note), and in the work entitled "Napoleon h Waterloo," p. 24, n., where the proper weight is given to the matter. Hence the elaborate discussions of Charras and Chesney, failing as they do, to meet this important piece of evidence, do not greatly assist in arriving at a decision. The bulletin is not alluded to in the Duke of Elchingen's notes to the despatches collected in his "• Documeiits Incdits." The probability is that the existence of this Bulletin escaped Chesney's attention. Charras, however, cites the Bulletin (vol. i, pp. 113, 114, notes). The fact that " Napole'on k Waterloo" was a reply to the work of Charras, and that the " Waterloo " of La Tour d'Auvergne was a reply to Chesney, accounts for our not finding the subject discussed by Chesney and Charras. It is, how- ever, difficult to understand why Charras in his elaborate work should have overlooked the inference to be drawn from the statement in the bulletin. 39 Cf. Charras, vol. i, p. 120. CHAPTER V. THE FIFTEENTH OF JUNE: BLUCHER AND WELLINGTON. Marshal Blucher had long since fixed upon Som- breffe as the point of concentration for his army, in the event of the French crossing the Sambre at or near Charleroi, and he had even chosen the Hne of the brook of Ligny, which borders the villages of St. Amand, Ligny, and Balatre, as a possible battlefield.' On the night of the 13th of June, Zieten, who com- manded the 1st Prussian Corps, and whose headquar- ters were at Charleroi, saw the French bivouac fires at Beaumont and Solre;'' and, on the evening of the 14th, Bliicher ordered the lid, 1 1 Id and IVth Corps to concentrate at or near Sombreffe. Zieten with the 1st Corps was to make as obstinate resistance as possible and fall back to and hold the village of Fleurus, thus gaining time for the concentration of the whole army.^ These measures, it is admitted by all writers, were taken without any consultation being had with the Duke of Wellington at the moment. But it is claimed that there existed a definite understanding between the two commanders, in pursuance of which Bliicher acted.'* There had been a meeting between Wellington and 'Clausewitz, ch. 15, ch. 16. Sib., vol. i, p. 39. *Chesney, p. 71 : Siborne, vol. i, p. 54. ^Clausewitz, ch. 23, p. 48: Chesney, p. 71. *Charras, vol. i, p. 127, states this to be the fact, but cites no authority. [chap. 5.] BLiJCHER AND WELLINGTON. 7 1 Blucher at Tirlemont on May 3d, which the Duke^ in a letter to the Prince of Orange pronounces "very satis- factory." Baron Miiffling, who was the Prussian military attache at the Duke's headquarters, states^ that the lines of march which the English and Prussian armies should respectively pursue in case France should be invaded, were definitely agreed upon and laid down in writing. This agreement may have been arrived at at that interview, though Muffling does not say so. He then goes on to say: — ^ "The junction of the English and Prussian armies for a defen- sive^ battle * * * y^diS so distinctly prescribed by circu77istances and by the locality that no doubt whatever could be raised on the point." He then proceeds to give his views, and ends by saying: — "The point of concentration for the Prussian army was accord- ingly marked out between Sombreffe and Charleroi, and for the English, en dernier tieu^ between Gosselies and Marchiennes." We do not think^ that Muffling intends here to state that Bliicher and Wellington had made any agreement ^Gurwood, vol. xii, p. 345. Clausewitz, ch. 11, p. 28, probably refers to this meeting, though he locates it at St. Trond. Cf. Chesney, p. 77. ^Passages, p. 231. 'lb. p. 232. *The italics are ours. 'As does Chesney, for instance (p. 77), who says that the English and Prus- sian chiefs agreed to assemble their armies respectively at the points given in the above citation from Muffling. Maurice also (pp. 145, 146, May, 1890) makes the same statement. Both these writers evidentiy rest on the statement of Muffling, cited above, which does not seem to us to sustain them. They are, howev^er, careful to confine the agreement to the measures to be taken in case the French advanced by way of Charleroi. Cf. IjSi Tour D'Auvergne, p. 107. Siborne (vol. i, pp. 39 and 40) says that Bliicher and Wellington had agreed in the above-mentioned event to concentrate respectively at Som- breffe and Quatre Bras, but he gives no authority for the statement. Jomini (p. 122) says substantially the same thing. Charras (vol. i, p. 84) makes the same statement, also without citing any authority for it. Very possibly he took it from Siborne. Cf. Chesney, p. 93. 72 THE 15111 OF JUNE: [CHAP. 5.] as to their respective action in case Napoleon should be the invader; he only tells us what in his judgment was the true course for them to take, — the course marked out, as he thought, by the cir- cumstances and the locality. That we are right in this, will appear when the likelihood of Wellington's having definitely agreed to advance his army to the very borders of the Sambre and the immediate vicinity of Charleroi, in view of his well-known anxiety for his communica- tions, is considered for a moment.'" We believe that the Duke, although doubtless informed of Marshal Bliicher's intention to concentrate his army at Sombreffe in case the enemy advanced by way of Charleroi, made no agreement whatever with him as to his own movements. The two commanders no doubt fully intended to act in concert, and expected and relied upon the hearty support of each other, but there was not, as we believe, any defi- nite agreement as to the particular steps to be taken in the event of a French invasion. This matter is an important one to settle, because some Prussian historians claim that Bl'dcher gave battle at Ligny relying on Wellington's agreement to support him. We cannot decide on this question at the present stage of our narrative; but we have already seen that Blucher gave orders for his four corps to concentrate at Sombreffe without any definite agreement or under- standing with Wellington that he was to be assisted by the English in the battle that was almost certain to occur as a consequence of this concentration. All he had a right to expect was, that the Duke, as soon as he was informed of the situation, would at once assemble his forces, and, if he could safely and wisely do so, would march to the assistance of his ally." But ^°Cf. Supp. Desp., vol. X, p. 521 : Memorandum on the Battle of Waterloo. App. C, XV ; post, pp. 374, 375. 376. ""Naturally, then, Prince Blucher * * * would expect to be [chap. 5.] BLUCHER AND WELLINGTON. 73 the Prussian Marshal took the risk of the EngHsh general's not coming to his support in the next day's battle ; for, in the first place, he knew the scattered situation of the Anglo-Dutch troops, and that it would take a couple of days or so to get them together ; and, secondly, he could not be sure that Napoleon might not, by operating with a part of his army by way of Mons and Hal, induce the Duke to concentrate his forces so far to the westward as to put it out of his power to render any help to an army that was fighting in front of Sombreffe. We have stated that, on the evening of the 14th, Bliicher ordered the lid, 1 1 Id and IVth Corps to concentrate at or near Sombreffe. In compliance with these directions the lid and 1 1 Id Corps respectively concentrated, and marched rapidly towards Sombreffe. But Biilow, whose headquarters were at Liege, and who had, in obedience to his first orders, concentrated his corps, took it upon himself to disobey a subsequent order which he received about eleven o'clock in the morning of the 15th, directing him to march at once upon Hannut, and to put off the execution of this order until the next day. It is hardly worth while to undertake to decide how far Gneisenau, Bllicher's chief-of-staff, was, as has been often asserted, partly to blame for this mis- chance, by not inserting in the order a statement to the effect that hostilities were imminent. The matter has been often discussed;'' it would seem that Biilow ought to bear the largest share of the blame; but why Gneisenau, upon whose shoulders lay the burden of effecting a concentration of the entire army by the morning of the i6th, should have omitted, when a supported by Wellington, so far as the existing situation would make this support possible to the Duke." OUech, p. 124. '^Clausewitz, ch. 20; Chesney, pp. 82, loi ; Siborne, vol. i, pp. 70, 71, n. Charras, vol. i, p. 128, n.; Gneisenau, vol. 4, pp. 360 et seq.\ Ollech, pp. 90 et seq. Cf. Maurice, p. 259: June, 1890; also, p. 546: Sept., 1890. 74 THE 15th OF JUNE: [CHAP. 5.] battle was imminent, to put the commander of his most distant corps in possession of the facts of the situation and of Marshal Bllicher's intentions, it is certainly not easy to see. In such an exigency, the chief-of-staff must be held to the duty of omitting nothing that would tend to accomplish his task. The Duke of Wellington had been, as had Marshal Bliicher, aware for the last few days of the movement of large masses of French troops near the frontier, but he had not deemed it necessary or desirable in any way to alter his dispositions. He felt that his army was the force relied upon to protect Brussels, where the King of the Netherlands was, and Ghent, where the King of France was, and that it was of the utmost importance that Napoleon should not be allowed to gain the politi- cal advantage of putting those newly made sovereigns to flight,'^ and repossessing himself of Belgium and Hol- land. Moreover, of the importance of preserving his own communications with Antwerp and Ostend the Duke was well aware. He believed that Napoleon's best move would be against his communications;''^ and he felt that, under this belief, he ought to hesitate before concentrating his army and moving it by its left to gain a union with that of Marshal Bliicher.' ^ Hence he retained his own headquarters at Brussels, thirty-four miles'^ from Charleroi. His army, as has been already stated, lay in cantonments to the westward of the Charleroi-Brussels turnpike. It is well known that Wellington looked for a movement of the French either on the road from Mons to Brussels or to the westward of that road. He had repaired the fortifica- "Supp. Desp., vol. X, p. 521; Memorandum on the Battle of Waterloo; App. C, XV ; post, pp. 374, 375. 376; Ellesmere, p. 171. '* Supp. Desp., vol. X, p. 530. App. C, x\'; post, pp. 374, 375. 376. '^Maurice, pp. 148, 149: May, 1890. "Chesney, p. 76. [chap. 5.] BLiJCHER AND WELLINGTON. 75 tions of Mons, Ypres, Tournay and other places, and put them in a state of defence.' ^ It is also to be observed that for the last three days before the opening of hostili- ties the information that came to him of the enemy's movements indicated a probable concentration of their forces near Mons.'^ Wellington's troops, if they re- mained in the positions which they occupied on June 12th, for instance, could be concentrated at Braine-le- Comte or Hal, — towns on the road from Mons to Brus- sels, — much more readily than at Quatre Bras or Gosselies, — that is, they were well situated to oppose such a movement of the French as that which the Duke thought it most likely Napoleon would make. They were, it is true, still in their cantonments, scattered about in the towns and villages, but the Duke evidently thought that he would have time enough to assemble his various detachments and concentrate his army after the movements of his adversary should have been clearly ascertained. For holding this opinion he has been sharply criticised, but this we will consider in another place. We must, therefore, bear in mind, first, that Welling- ton thought it likely that Napoleon would advance, if he advanced at all, by way of Mons, or to the westward of it, and, secondly, that he thought his own army was well placed to meet such an advance. In fact we may go further, and say that Wellington having this opinion about the line which the French would prob- ably take, felt it all the more necessary to retain his troops in their existing positions, from which they could, as he judged, easily be assembled to meet such an attack, because he saw clearly that no assistance, certainly no "Siborne, vol. i, p. 33. "See this information collated in Maurice, pp. 147, 148 : May, 1890. He is also inclined to think that Napoleon ordered the temporary occupation of Binche, with the intention of creating the belief that a part, at least, of the French army was moving on Mons. 76 THE 15th OF JUNE: [CHAP. 5.] immediate assistance, could be expected from the Prus- sians, in such an emergency, so remote were they from the Mons-Brussels route. If Napoleon was to be met or baffled in such a movement it must be by the Anglo- Dutch army. And the Duke also saw with equal clear- ness that nothing could serve the purpose of the French, if they were making their main attack by way of Mons, better than a premature movement of the Anglo-Dutch army towards Quatre Bras and Sombreffe, by which the communications of that army would be exposed through- out their whole length. Hence it was to be expected that the Duke would be most careful not to make such a premature movement, and, therefore, that he would insist on being convinced that the main French attack was by way of Charleroi before doing more than effect- ing the assembling of his scattered troops at their respective places of rendezvous. It so happened that the Prince of Orange, who com- manded, as we have said, the ist Corps, left his head- quarters at Braine-le-Comte early on the morning of the 15th, rode to the outposts, heard some firing in the direc- tion of Thuin, a village some ten miles west of Charleroi, and then rode straight to Brussels'^ without stopping on his way at his own headquarters. During his absence'" reports had been forwarded to him from Generals Dorn- berg and Behr, who were at Mons, to the effect that all was quiet in their front, and from Van Merlen, whose command lay a little to the eastward of Mons, that Steinmetz's Prussian brigade had been attacked early in the morning-' and that the enemy's movements seemed to be directed on Charleroi. These reports remained some hours at the Prince's headquarters, and were then ''Ollech, p. 115. ^°Ib., pp. 114, 115. Maurice, p. 540: Sept., 1890. "Steinmetz sent this message to Van Merlen at S A. M. Van Loben Sels, p. 125, note. Chesney, p. 94, note. [chap. 5.] 3LUCHER AND WELLINGTON. 77 forwarded to the Duke at Brussels, where they arrived in the evening. But before that time, in fact by or before 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the Prince himself had arrived, bringing his own report, which was a very indefinite one, and which was to the effect that the enemy had attacked the Prussian outposts near Thuin. This was the first information which the Duke received of the outbreak of hostilities." About the same time, also, a despatch^^ sent by Zieten to Miiffling arrived, announc- ing that he had been attacked before Charleroi. Wellington gave sufficient credence to these reports to issue orders^'* for the immediate concentration of the different divisions'^ at the points designated for them re- spectively, and for their being in readiness to march at a moment's notice, but waited till further reports from Mons should come in before doing more.^^ These orders were despatched between five and seven o'clock.^^ They provided simply, as we have said above, for the ^Charras, who says, vol. 1, p. 130, that Wellington received at nine o'clock in the morning a despatch from Zieten, announcing that his advance posts had been attacked, is clearly in error. Hooper, p. 83, points out that the ex- pression on which Charras bases his conclusion really means that 9 A. M. was the date of the latest intelligence from Charleroi. Siborne, vol. i, p. 164, n., severely criticises the arrangements of the Prince of Orange for the transmission of intelligence. ^^Miiffling, Passages, p. 22S. '^^Gurwood, vol. xii, p. 472. App. C, ix; post, p. 370. We rely mainly on the " Memorandum for the Deputy Quartermaster General," from which he drafted the orders. In some cases we know that the orders actually sent varied somewhat from the terms of the Memorandum ; this was no doubt true in all cases; but the differences were not material. See Van Loben Sels, p. 177. note (i). '^^Ollech (p. 1 16) says Cooke's division was not mentioned in these orders. He is in error ; it is Clinton's division that is not mentioned. Cooke's was ordered to collect at Ath, not Clinton's, as Ollech has it. ^^Miiffling, Passages, p. 229. "Chesney, p. 83, n. MiifHing, p. 229. Maurice, p. 69: April, 1S90. Charras, vol. i, p. 132, n., says between eight and half-past nine. 78 THE 15th OF JUNE: [CHAP. 5.] assembling of the various divisions of the army at cer- tain convenient places. There is, however, one passage in these orders that requires attention. Alten's divis- ion— the third British division — had been directed in the first part of the order to assemble at Braine-le-Comte, but it was further ordered to march to Nivelles (where the two Dutch-Belgian divisions of Chasse and Per- poncher had been directed to assemble), if Nivelles had been attacked during the 15th, yet not until it should be found " quite certain that the enemy's attack is upon the right of the Prussian army and the left of the British army."^^ This concentration of three divisions of in- fantry with cavalry and artillery, say about 25,000 men, at Nivelles, seven miles west of Quatre Bras, was thus the only provision made in this first order or set of orders for the contingency of the French attack being made on the lines on which it actually was made ; and it would seem to be a legitimate inference from this ar- rangement that Nivelles, and not Quatre Bras, had been selected by Wellington as the point of concentration for his army in case Napoleon advanced by way of Charleroi. In this connection it is important to note that in a letter dated 7 P. M., but probably not sent off till midnight, Muffling wrote to Bliicher that the Duke would be in the morning in the region of Nivelles with his whole force.^^ Later in the evening, a despatch from Bliicher to Muffling, sent from Namur, arrived,^" announcing the concentration of the Prussian army at Sombreffe, and requesting Muffling " To give him speedy intelligence of the concentration of Wellington's army. I immediately," says Muffling, "communicated this to the Duke, who quite acquiesced ='«Gurwood, vol. xii, p. 473 ; App. C, ix ; post, p. 370. *9Gneisenau, vol. 4, p. 365, note. '"Muffling, Passages, p. 229. [chap. 5.] BLUCHER AND WELLINGTON. 79 in Blucher's dispositions. However, he could not resolve on fixing his point of concentration before receiving the expected news from Mons." This inforrtiation from Bllicher, however, induced the Duke to issue, about ten o'clock in the evening,^' a sec- ond set of orders, having for their object a general movement of the army towards the east.^^ Alten's divis- ion was now positively ordered to Nivelles; Cooke's division of guards, which had been ordered to collect at Ath, some thirteen miles south-west of its headquarters at Enghien, was now ordered on Braine-le-Comte, eight miles south-east of Enghien ; and the second and fourth divisions, and the cavalry of Lord Uxbridge, which con- stituted the extreme right of the army and had been cantoned between Ath and Audenarde on the Scheldt, were now ordered to Enghien. Enghien is about eight miles north-west of Braine-le-Comte, which is about nine miles west of Nivelles, which in its turn is about seven miles west of Quatre Bras. No orders were issued to the reserves. Up to this point we can go by the records. But here we encounter serious difficulties in the evidence. Every- body knows that, somehow or other, the Duke of Wel- lington collected the next day at Quatre Bras a consider- able part of his army. We also know that it has been claimed that during the night of the 15th and i6th the Duke ordered the whole army to Quatre Bras. We shall presently have occasion to describe how the Dutch- Belgian troops got there without his orders; but our task now is to examine the orders which Wellington gave after the despatch of those the substance of which 3' At 10 o'clock, however, it was not known at Brussels that Charleroi had been taken. In a letter to the Due de Feltre, dated lo P. M., the Duke says that the enemy " appears to menace " Charleroi. Gurwood, vol. xii, p. 473 ; App. C, x; post, p. 371. ^Gurwood, vol. xii, p. 474; App. Q, xi j 4)ost, p. 371. 80 THE 15th OF JUNE: [CHAP. 5.] has just been given, and his Report of the campaign, and also his own doings on the morning of the i6th, and see what hght these documents and doings throw upon the statements and claims which have been made and set up in his behalf. The Duke's official report," dated Waterloo, June 19th, seems to contain express reference to three sets of orders. "I did not hear," he says, " of these events [the French attack on the Prussian posts on the Sambre] till in the evening of the 15th; and I immediately ordered the troops to prepare to march," that is, by the orders which were sent off betsveen 5 and 7 o'clock P. M., "and afterwards," that is, by the orders issued at 10 o'clock, "to march to their left, as soon as I had intelligence from other quarters to prove that the enemy's movement upon Charleroi was the real attack." Then, after stating how the Prince of Orange rein- forced the brigade of Prince Bernhard at Quatre Bras, and had, early in the morning of the i6th, regained part of the ground which had been lost the evening before, he goes on to say : — " In the meantime," — that is to say, before the " early morn- ing," — " I had directed the whole army to march uj)on Les Qiiatre Bras."34 Mliffling says" that, towards midnight,^^ the Duke entered his room, and said : " I have got news from Mons, from General Dornberg, who re- ports that Napoleon has turned towards Charleroi with all his ^^ Gurwood, vol. xii, pp. 478, et seq. App. C, xii ; post^ p. 372. ^It is remarkable that this distinct and unequivocal statement, made in an ofi&cial report the day after the battle, should have received so slight atten- tion. It is hardly, if at all, alluded to either by those who believe that Wel- lington did order his army to concentrate at Quatre Bras, or by those who do not believe this. There is no mention of it in Siborne, Chesney, Hooper, Kennedy, Maurice, O'Connor Morris. 3spassages, p. 230. Cf. Maurice, p. 261 : June, 1890. ^Siborne (vol. i, pp. 79, 80) says this information arrived about 10 P. M. Charras (vol. i, p. 134) says it was "towards eleven o'clock." [chap. 5.] BLUCHER AND WELLINGTON. 81 forces, and that there is no longer any enemy in front of him ; there- fore orders for the concentration of my army at Nivelles and Qiiatre Bras are already despatched. * ♦ * Lg^- ^g^ therefore, gos? * * * ^.q j-he ball." In spite of this evidence, there is no little difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that orders for a general con- centration of the Anglo-Dutch army at Quatre Bras were issued by the Duke of Wellington either during the night of the 15th and i6th, or on the morning of the i6th. It is not only that no such orders as Mliffling says the Duke told him he had despatched,^^ that no orders directing (to use the Duke's own words) "the whole army to march upon Les Quatre Bras," — have ever been produced, — that, in fact, not a single order of Wel- lington's, directing any troops, except those belonging to the reserves, upon Quatre Bras, has ever been brought to light. This, though true, is not conclusive. It is stated by Colonel Gurwood^^ that the original instruc- tions issued to Colonel De Lancey^° were lost with that ''C/. Letters of the First Earl of Malmesbury, vol. 2, p. 445 (London, Bentley, 1870,), where a similar statement is said to have been made by Wel- lington to the Duke of Richmond just before the former left the ball- room. See App. C, xiii ; post, p. 373. ^^Miiffling's letter to Gneisenau, dated 7 P. M. but no doubt sent off about midnight (Passages, pp. 229, 230) says that " as soon as the moon rises, the reserves will march ; and, in case the enemy should not attack Nivelles, the Duke will be in the region of Nivelles with his whole force in the morning in order to support your Highness." Gneisenau, vol. 4, p. 365, note. The let- ter does not mention Quatre Bras. Delbriick, in his Life of Gneisenau, vol. 4, p. 367, says that " Muffling also reported about midnight to the Prussian commander-in-chief that the allied army would be concentrated in twelve hours, and that at ten o'clock on the following morning 20,000 men would be at Quatre Bras, and the cavalry corps would be at Nivelles." But he cites neither Muffling nor any other authority for this amazing statement. Miiffling tells us himself that in his judgment the cavalry could not reach Quatre Bras before nightfall, — hence they could reach Nivelles only two or three hours before nightfall. Muffling, Passages, p. 235. ^'Gurwood, vol. xii, p. 474. (y. Maurice, p. 144: May, 1890. Van Loben Sels, p. 181. Ellesmere, pp. 173, 174. '*°The Deputy Quarter Master General, or chief-of-staff. 82 THE ISth OF JUNE: [CKAP. 5.] officer's'*' papers; and it is of course possible that there may have been instructions for him to issue orders for the different corps or divisions to concentrate at Quatre Bras which were thus lost."' But the real difficulty in holding the theory that, at some time during the night, or in the early morning of the i6th, the Duke issued such instructions, is, that such a theory is apparently inconsistent with the only orders'*^ given on the early morning of the i6th, of which we have copies, and also, with the Duke's actions during the same period. Let us consider these points in their order. The orders to which we have just referred are two in num- ber; they are said to have been signed by Colonel Sir W. DeLancey, the Deputy Quarter Master General (or chief-of-stafi). They are simply dated 1 6th June, 1815; neither the place nor the hour is given, but they must have been written at Brussels ; ^^ and in the early morn- ing. They are both addressed to Lord Hill. The first directs him to move the second division of infantry upon Braine-le-Comte, and informs him that the cavalry have also been ordered to the same place. Now, although to move from Enghien, to which place these divisions had been directed in the preceding order, to Braine-le-Comte, is to approach Quatre Bras ; it certainly is not the same thing as to march to Quatre Bras. Braine-le-Comte is in fact sixteen miles west of Quatre Bras. This des- patch closes by saying : — " His Grace is going to Water- loo." This would seem to indicate that the Duke had not made up his mind at that time whether he would personally go to Nivelles or to Quatre Bras, the roads to ■"He was killed at Waterloo. "^The orders themselves, however, would be received at the headquarters of the different corps or divisions, and might, possibly, be even now in ex- istence. ■♦^Gurwood, vol. xii, p. 474; App. C, xiv; />ost, p. 374. AS Hussars ) beyond Waterloo " to Genappeand Quatre Bras. Remainder of the cavalry Braine le Comte " to Nivelles and Quatre Bras. Duke of Brunswick's Corps, beyond Waterloo " to Genappe. Nassau " to Genappe. The above disposition written out for the information of the Commander of the Forces by Colonel Sir W. De Lancey. The centre column of names indicates the places at which the troops had arrived or were moving en. The column on the right of the paper indicates the places the troops were ordered to proceed to at 7 o'clock A. M., 16th June, previous to any attack on the British. (Signed) DeLacy Evans. By the phrase — "the places at which the troops had arrived or were moving on " — the writer means, in all probability, the places to which the troops were, in his judgment, nearest, at 7 A. M. 5' Waterloo Roll Call, pp. 4, 19. 5"^ Maurice (June, 1890, p. 261) adopts a different construction of the state- ment ; he thinks it means that the orders to march to the various points named were issued at seven o'clock A. M. But why should it have been thought necessary to give to the Commander of the Forces information of the hour of i.ssuing the orders? What he would want to know would be where the various divisions probably were at a given hour, and to what points they W'.'re marching. [chap. 5.] BLUCHER AND WELLINGTON. B)'] That this " Disposition " was reHed on by WelHngton when he wrote his letter to Bliicher, seems, by compar- ing the two papers, very clear. We find, for example, that the " Disposition " states that, of the four divisions of the ist Corps, Cooke's was at 7 A. M. at Braine-le- Comte, marching to Nivelles and Quatre Bras, Alten's was at Nivelles, and marching to Quatre Bras, and those of Chasse and Perponcher were at Nivelles and Quatre Bras. We then find the Duke writing to Bliicher, that, at 10.30 A. M., one division of this corps was at Quatre Bras and the rest at Nivelles. It cannot be denied that, so far as this corps is concerned, certainly, the two papers hang together perfectly well. Wellington had a perfect right to suppose that Cooke could get from Braine-le- Comte to Nivelles, or nearly there, between seven and half-past ten ; and as for the positions of the other divisions, he simply follows the memorandum which his chief-of-staff has prepared for his information, and on which he had an undoubted right to rely. We shall give, later on, other instances of this agreement between these two papers. They seem to us to demonstrate the authenticity of the " Disposition." Assuming now the authenticity of this memorandum, we wish to point out that its statements necessarily imply that orders had been issued to the army other than those of which we have copies, — that is, other than those of which we have given abstracts above. Thus, all we have hitherto been able to ascertain in regard to the orders to Cooke's division is, that it was by the 10 P. M. order of June 15, directed to march from Enghien on Braine-le-Comte. It would appear from the DeLancey Memorandum that it had been subsequently ordered to Nivelles and Quatre Bras. And the Duke does not hesitate to tell Marshal Bliicher — on the strength of DeLancey's statement, that, at 7 A. M., Cooke was at Braine-le-Comte, — that Cooke must have arrived at Nivelles by half-past ten, — he being, according to 88 THE 15th OF JUNE: [CHAP. 5.] De Lancey's memorandum, under orders to proceed there. So with the cavalry. We have seen above that in an early morning order of the i6th, it is said that the cav- alry had been directed on Braine-le-Comte. Yet there must have been some subsequently issued order to Lord Uxbridge, for we find the "Disposition" stating that the cavalry is, at 7 A. M., at Braine-le-Comte, and is marching to Nivelles and Quatre Bras ; and Wellington, relying on this statement of his chief-of-staff, that a sub- sequent order had been sent out ordering the cavalry to continue their march to Nivelles, does not hesitate to tell Marshal BlUcher, that his cavalry will be at Nivelles at noon. We shall have occasion hereafter to examine both papers in detail ; but what we have just pointed out will suflfice for the purpose now in hand. That is to say, the " Disposition " prepared for the Duke's information by Colonel DeLancey, and the letter of the Duke to Marshal Blucher are pieces of strictly contemporaneous evidence; and show beyond a doubt that further orders, issued subsequently to those of which we know the tenor, and directing the army on Quatre Bras, were really given in the morning of the i6th, as Wellington, in his Report of the battle, explicitly states was the case. Thus, — to recur for a moment to the orders dated on the i6th, and to the inferences drawn from them, — although at the time when the despatch dated the i6th to Lord Hill, to move the second division on Braine-le- Comte, in which it was stated that the Duke was going to Waterloo, was issued, the Duke assuredly had not made up his mind to concentrate his army at Quatre Bras, nevertheless, he did subsequently, and probably not long afterwards, make up his mind so to do, and thereupon he issued an order for that division to march to Nivelles, as the " Disposition " states. As for Stedmann's division and [chap. 5.] BLUCHER AND WELLINGTON. 89 Anthing's brigade, which were the subjects of the other order written on the i6th, the "Disposition " simply em- bodies the purport of this order. And as for the halt of Picton's division at Waterloo, to which we have called attention above, if we suppose that, before he left Brus- sels for Quatre Bras, the Duke had issued orders for the concentration of the whole army, or, at any rate, of the bulk of the army, at Quatre Bras, he may well have passed Picton's division on its march to Waterloo, as- sured that, after a brief rest at that place, which would do the men no harm, an order would arrive from Brus- sels, where very possibly the staff ^7 were writing out the orders to the army, for Picton to continue his march to Quatre Bras. Wellington's decision to concentrate at Quatre Bras the whole army, — or the bulk of the army, — for it does not appear even from the DeLancey Memorandum that he ever expected the far distant divisions of Col- ville and Stedmann to arrive in season, — was reached, in all probability, while he was at the Duchess of Rich- mond's ball. He went to the ball at or soon after lo P. M., and he stayed there until after 2 A. M.^' He told the Duke of Richmond, just before he left the house, that he had " ordered the army to concentrate at Quatre Bras."^^ At some time, therefore, after the issuing of the orders to Lord Hill, which are dated the i6th,^° and before 2 or 2.30 A. M., the Duke decided to concentrate the army at Quatre Bras. " Major Oldfield states that the Duke rode out to Quatre Bras unattended by his Quartermaster-General, DeLancey, or by the other heads of depart- ments. Oldfield, MSS. 58 Lady Jane Dalrymple Hamilton, in her most interesting Journal, now in the possession of her granddaughter. Lady Manvers, says : " We found him [the Duke] there [at the ball] on our arrival at lo o'clock. . . . We re- mained till past two, and, when I left, the Duke was still there." *9 App. C, xiii; ^ost., p. 373. ^Ante, p. 82. NOTES TO CHAPTER V. I. We may properly devote a few words here to the Duke of Wellington's " Memorandum on the Battle of Waterloo," written in 1842, in reply to Clausewitz's His- tory of the Campaign of 181 5. There are some state- ments contained in this paper which fairly take one's breath away. For instance, we learn that the Duke, "having re- ceived the intelligence of " the French " attack only at three o'clock in the afternoon of the 15th, was at Qiiatre Bras before the same hour on the morning of the 16 th,"^ with a sufficient force to engage the left of the French army."" The fact is, that, at 3 A. M. of the i6th only the brigade of Prince Bernhard of Saxe Weimar was at Quatre Bras, and he had taken it there entirely on his own responsi- bility, and not, as is implied in the above statement, in obedience to orders from the Duke of Wellington. But it is unnecessary to set forth in detail any refuta- tion of such statements as the above. The best English authorities do not rely^ on this Memorandum, alleging that the Duke's memory, when he wrote it, was no longer exact.'' We are quite within bounds when we say 'The italics are ours. But SQt post, p. 374 , n. 2. ^Supp. Desp., vol. X, p. 523; App. C, xv; post, pp. 374, 376, 376, ^Chesney, p. 83, n. ; p. loi ; p, 131. *Ib., p. loi ; p. 131. [chap. 5.] WELLINGTON AND BLUCHER. — NOTES. QI that this Memorandum adds nothing to our knowledge of the facts. We may add that it is a pity that this is so. WeUington wrote this Memorandum in 1842, — twenty- seven years only after the date of the battle of Waterloo. This is not so very long after the occurrence : we are now twenty-nine years after Gettysburg. Very many officers conversant with the facts must have been then alive ; and the Duke had access to all the official papers. It is a pity, we repeat, that he did not set himself to the task of drawing up an exhaustive and accurate narrative of the facts of the campaign. 2. We desire to call attention again to the absence of evidence that Wellington and BlUcher had formulated any definite plan of concerted action in the event of Napoleon's invading Belgium. One thing, at any rate, is quite clear, and that is that neither of the allied commanders acted, so far as we can judge, in pursuance of any such agreement. Blucher, when he hears of Napoleon's advance to Charleroi, orders his army to assemble at Sombreffe, and then sends word to Wellington of what he has done ; the lat- ter, as we have seen, although he learns that the enemy's main attack is by way of Charleroi and therefore upon the Prussians, and although he has long known that in this event it was Bliicher's intention to concentrate his army at Sombreffe, takes no instant steps to bring his army into close union with that of Bliicher. His first idea, certainly, is to assemble his army at Nivelles. This difficulty, it is true, does not seem greatly to trouble the writers who have adopted the theory of a previous un- derstanding or arrangement ; it seems to be possible, for instance, for Siborne, to believe that Wellington had agreed to concentrate at Quatre Bras,^ and yet actually to call attention^ to the fact that he halted Picton's divis- ^Siborne, vol. i., p. 40. 'lb., p. 102, note. 92 THE 15th OF JUNE: — NOTES. [CHAP. 5.] ion at Waterloo, hours after he had known that Blucher was concentrating at Sombreffe, because he had not then made up his mind whether to send Picton to Nivelles or to Quatre Bras. But he and those other historians who have followed him, or have adopted the same theory, have certainly a serious difficulty to con- tend with. The Duke had been informed about mid- night^ that Quatre Bras was occupied by a part of Perponcher's division, and he had heard also that Blucher was concentrating his army at Sombreffe. If he had agreed with Blucher to concentrate the Anglo- Dutch army at Quatre Bras, he would assuredly have given his orders accordingly, and in season, — at least one would suppose so, — and he certainly could have had a large force there by ten o'clock in the morning. But he acted, on the other hand, as if he thought that he pos- sessed perfect discretion as to what he would do, — as if he was bound by no agreement whatsoever. It is evi- dent, in fact, that he did not make up his mind till shortly before he left Brussels to go to Quatre Bras him- self, whether he would undertake to hold the place or not. 3. It is, however, to be noted that the action that was fought at Quatre Bras assumed at once such importance in the eyes of the world, that those historians who have been great admirers of the Duke have very generally asserted that he had, almost from the first news of the French attack, determined to concentrate his army there. This assertion has been accompanied by many eulogistic remarks, in which Wellington's prescience and power of quick decision have been held up to an undeserved admiration. " At ten the same night, however " [the 15th], says Gleig,^ "the enemy's movements had suffi- ^By a despatch sent to the Prince of Orange at Brussels from Braine-le- Comte at 10 P. M. Van Loben Sels, p. 176, note. *Gleig's Life of the Duke of WelUngton, p. 308. [chap. 5.] WELLINGTON AND BLUCHER. — NOTES. 93 ciently disclosed his intentions; and the whole army, with the exception of the reserve, was put in motion. It marched by various roads upon Quatre Bras." Cap- tain Pringle, of the Royal Engineers, upon whom Sir Walter Scott largely relied for his narrative of the campaign, says :^ " Having obtained further intelligence about II o'clock [on the evening of the 15th], which confirmed the real attack of the enemy to be along the Sambre, orders were immediately given for the troops to march upon Quatre Bras." We have just seen that no such orders were given un- til the early morning hours of the i6th. 4. Assuming now, as we fairly may, that the Duke did not direct a general concentration of his army at Quatre Bras until shortly before he left Brussels, say, for a guess, at 2 A. M. of the i6th, let us endeavor to get a notion, if we may, of his first intentions and expecta- tions, as shown in his previously issued orders. He had directed three divisions on Nivelles, — all his reserves to a point on the Charleroi-Brussels pike from which they could easily be moved to Nivelles, — and his more westerly divisions to Enghien and Braine-le-Comte, in the direction of Nivelles. Among the troops thus directed on Nivelles were some that had been stationed at Genappe and Quatre Bras. He had in fact ordered his army to concentrate at Nivelles; notwithstanding that he had been informed that the French attack was by way of Charleroi, that Blucher was concentrating at Sombreffe, that a brigade of Dutch-Belgians was at Quatre Bras, and that it had been skirmishing with the enemy. The question of the appropriateness of his action to these facts is certainly an interesting one. Colonel Maurice, the most recent military commen- tator on the campaign, discusses this question, and arrives at the conclusion that Wellington's original 'Scott's Life of Napoleon, p. 833. Paris; Galignani; 182S. 94 THE I5tll OF JUNE: — NOTES. [CHAP. 5, j intention of concentrating his army at Nivelles, was in accord with the principles of war/° " If there is one thing which rests on more certain experience than another," says he, "it is that an army ought not to expose itself piecemeal to the blows of a concentrated enemy. Wel- lington, therefore, contemplated concentrating his army out of reach of the advancing French. Napoleon, from his general knowledge of the position of the English army, assumed that they would, of course, not venture to oppose him till they had fallen back to concentrate. As the case actually happened, only the wild wandering of d'Erlon's Corps prevented Ney from overwhelming the force in his presence at Quatre Bras." To this it may be replied: — A. That Wellington, as we have stated above," knew at II P. M. of the 15th that the main body of the French under Napoleon in person were concentrating in front of the Prussians, who were themselves concen- trating at Sombreffe. He might, therefore, fairly reckon on being able, if he acted with promptness, to assemble at Quatre Bras during the next forenoon a force quite as large as any that might reasonably be expected to be spared from the main body of the French to oppose him. He, therefore, would not have exposed his troops "piecemeal to the blows of a concentrated enemy," if he had ordered a general concentration at Quatre Bras after making sure that the main body of the French was at or near Fleurus, and that the main body of the Prussians was ready to receive them there. B. It is perfectly true that had d'Erlon's Corps come up in due time, the forces which Wellington had at Quatre Bras, including the several bodies of reinforce- ments, as they successively arrived, w^ould have been '"Maurice, pp. 344 et seg. Quly, 1890.) Contra, Charras, vol. i, pp. 132, et seq. "AnU, p. 80, n. 36. [chap. 5.] WELLINGTON AND BLUCHER. — NOTES. 95 overwhelmed in detail. But then, as we shall shortly show, Wellington did not issue his orders for his army to concentrate at Quatre Bras in season to effect his object. Had he done so, on the night of the 15th and 1 6th, he would have had by noon, certainly, a very much larger body of men than he actually did have, very possibly enough to oppose successfully both d'Erlon and Reille. It must be remembered that it was not until (say) 2 o'clock in the morning, or thereabouts, that he gave any orders to any troops to proceed to Quatre Bras. We conclude, therefore, that Wellington would not have run any unwarrantable risk by ordering his army to assemble at Quatre Bras as soon as he had learnt of the French advance by way of Charleroi. And that this was the true course for him to take is virtually admitted by his own subsequent accounts of his doings,''' on which we have commented above in our remarks on his " Mem- orandum on the Battle of Waterloo." {Ante, p. 90.) Had the instructions which he actually gave been strictly carried out, had the brigade of Prince Bernhard of Saxe Weimar been withdrawn to Nivelles in obedience to the orders of 10 P. M., Ney might have occupied Quatre Bras without opposition, in the morning of the i6th. And although it is possible, and, in fact, probable, that he would have been attacked by the English during the afternoon, and while it would have been obviously out of the question for him to have advanced on Brussels, leaving the English army at Nivelles, yet, supposing that he had had both his corps with him, as he ought to have had, he assuredly would have been able to spare a part of his forces to take the Prussians in rear while they were fighting at Ligny, as the Emperor (as we shall see) desired him to do. C. As for Napoleon's expectations in regard to the 'Chesney, p. loi. 96 THE 15th OF JUNE: — NOTES. [CHAP. 5.] English occupation of Quatre Bras as given to us by Colonel Maurice, it must certainly be admitted by every- body that Napoleon considered the occupation of the cross-roads as of very great importance for himself, and that the reason why he gave Ney 45,000 men of all arms was in order to make a sure thing of it. Very possibly he did not expect that the English general would be able, scattered as his army was in its cantonments, to assem- ble a very large force there during the morning of the i6th. But it is evident that he thought that his adver- sary's getting 30,000 or 40,000 men together, and either assisting the Prussians or attacking his left flank, was a thing so likely to occur, and so dangerous a thing, if it did occur, that he gave his two largest corps to his best fighting general in order to provide fully for this contin- gency by seizing and occupying the cross-roads of Quatre Bras. If the emergency arose. Napoleon was bound to be prepared for it. If he had regarded it as extremely improbable that the English would be encountered in force at or near Quatre Bras, he would probably have strengthened his main army with one of the corps which he gave to Ney. 5. That Wellington and Bliicher erred in allowing their armies to remain in their widely extended canton- ments until Napoleon attacked them is now generally admitted. Sir James Shaw-Kennedy's remarks '^ on this point sum up the question forcibly : — ' ' They [the allied commanders] determined to continue in the cantonments which they occupied until they knew positively the line of attack. Now it may safely "be predicted that this deter- mination will be considered by future and dispassionate historians as a great mistake ; for, in place of waiting to see where the blow actually fell, the armies should have been instantly put in motion to assemble. Nor was this the only error : the line of cantonments occupied by the Anglo-Allied and Prussian armies was greatly too "Kennedy, pp. 168-170, See, also, Clausewitz.chaps. 11, 15, 17. Charras, vol. I, p. 80, Corresp., vol. 31, p. 254. [chap. 5.] WELLINGTON AND BLUCHER. — NOTES. 97 extended. * * * From the time, therefore, that it be- came known that Napoleon's army was organized and formed into corps ready to take the field, the armies of Wellington and Bliicher should have been so placed in cantonments as to be prepared to meet any of the cases supposed," — i. e., an advance of the French by any one of the great Flanders roads, — * * * " and from the moment that it was known that the French army was at all in movement, the allied armies should have been with- drawn from their cantonments and placed very near to each other." Wellington and Bliicher, it will be remembered, had known for several days that Napoleon was massing his forces, and yet they put off till the last moment even the assembling their corps and divisions in their respect- ive places of rendezvous. Sir James Shaw-Kennedy then proceeds to discuss the proper " line of cantonments " of the allied armies from the time when " it was known that Napoleon had a large organized army ready to take the field," ''^ and he gives it as his opinion that Bliicher should have "made Genappe his headquarters, cantoning his army between Louvain and Gosselies, occupying the line of the Sambre from Namur to the frontier by strong bodies of cavalry, &c.," and that Wellington, having his headquarters at Brussels, should have cantoned his army between Brus- sels and Soignies, with cavalry outposts. Charras '^ expresses the same opinion as to the line of cantonments of Wellington's army, but he holds that by the end of May the Duke should have carried his head- quarters six or eight leagues [15 or 20 miles] in advance of Brussels : '^ while Bliicher ought at the same time to have removed his headquarters to Fleurus, '^ and to have concentrated his forces within a radius of six or eight '< Kennedy, p. 171. " Charras, vol. i, p. 80. " This is also the opinion of Clausewitz ; ch. 18. "Charras, vol. i, p. 83. Clausewitz, ch. 18, says "nearer Nivelles," /. ^., nearer than Namur is. 98 THE 15th OF JUNE: — NOTES. [CHAP. 5.] leagues (fifteen or twenty miles) ; having outposts on the Sambre and Meuse. In this last opinion, as he says, he follows Napoleon. '^ The latter, it is to be noted, does not criticise Welling- ton, as do Charras and Clausewitz, for retaining his head- quarters in Brussels, but only, — in this connection, that is, — for the excessive extent of his cantonments. "^ Na- poleon's view seems to be that Brussels was the right place for the headquarters of the Anglo-Dutch army and Fleurus for those of the Prussian army ; and that from the 15th of May both generals should have greatly re- duced the extent of their cantonments, so that no part of their troops, except the advance-posts, should be more than twenty miles distant from the headquarters of the army. Had this course been adopted, he says the Prus- sians might have been assembled at Ligny at noon of the i5th,^° ready to receive the attack of the French army. He does not, however, go on and state his view of the mode and time of the cooperation of the English army in that event. We must content ourselves with merely stating these opinions. 6. That Marshal Bliicher, who had allowed his troops to remain in their widely scattered cantonments until the last moment, erred in giving Sombreffe as the point of concentration of his army, seems on principle and au- thority very clear. Napoleon's remarks^' on this are as follows : — " Marshal Bliicher ought, as soon as he knew that the French were at Charleroi [that is to say, on the evening of the 15th,] to have given, as the point of assembling of his army, not Fleurus, nor " Corresp., vol. 31, p. 253. "lb, p. 254. ^ lb, p. 253. " lb, p. 254. The words in brackets are in the edition of 1820, known as the " M^moires," but are not in the " Correspondance." The " M^moires " also substitute "the 17th" for "the evening of the i6th." [chap. 5.] WELLINGTON AND BLUCHER. — NOTES. 99 Ligny, which were aheady under the cannon of the enemy, but Wavre, where the French could not arrive until the evening of the i6th. By doing so, he would have had all the day of the i6th, and the night between the 1 6th and 17th, to effect the junction of his whole army." He also for the same reasons censures Wellington " for establishing- " Quatre Bras as the point of reunion " for his army. Sir James Shaw-Kennedy '^ says to the same effect: ** The determination of Wellington and Bliicher to meet Na- poleon's advance at Fleurus and Qiiatre Bras was totally incon- sistent with the widely scattered positions in which they had placed their armies ; their determination in this respect amounted in the fullest extent to that error which has so often been committed in war, by even great commanders, of endeavoring to assemble on a point which could only be reached by a portion of the troops intended to occupy it, while the enemy had the power of concentra- ting upon it his whole force." We do not believe, as we have pointed out above, that any such determination had been arrived at by Wel- lington and Bliicher beforehand ; but, Bliicher's taking the decisive step of ordering a concentration of his army at Sombreffe, instead of at Wavre, for instance, placed Wel- lington, as we have just pointed out, under the necessity of ordering a concentration of his army, or a part of it, at Quatre Bras, unless he was prepared to leave his ally with- out support. The criticisms of Napoleon and of General Shaw-Kennedy, are, therefore, we submit, really confined to BliAcher's action. Napoleon is not considering what Wellington ought to have done hi view of the step which Bliicher took in concentrating at Sombreffe, but is only giving his opinion, that, on general principles, Quatre Bras was not the proper place of concentration for the English, just as Sombreffe was not the proper place of concentration for the Prussians, after the French were " Corresp. vol. 31, p. 255. *^ Kennedy, p. 172. 100 THE 15th OF JUNE: — BLUCHER AND WELLINGTON. known to be advancing on Charleroi. It must be noted that Napoleon and Kennedy both assume that the two allied generals had agreed upon Sombreffe and Quatre Bras respectively/'* If there was no such agreement, (and w^e think there was not any), then we cannot prop- erly consider Wellington's decision to concentrate at Quatre Bras except in connection with the fact that Bliicher had committed himself to a battle at Ligny and needed his support. Corresp., pp. 195, 197. Kennedy, p. 172. CHAPTER VI. THE FIFTEENTH OF JUNE : THE DUTCH-BELGIANS. Turning now from the consideration of the arrange- ments ordered by the allied commanders, our first atten- tion is due to the occupation of Quatre Bras by the brigade of Prince Bernhard of Saxe Weimar, belonging to the Dutch-Belgian division of Perponcher in the corps commanded by the Prince of Orange. This brigade, which was cantonned along the turnpike from Genappe to Frasnes and in the neighboring villages,' was, on the first news of hostilities, concentrated by its commander at Quatre Bras, with its outposts at Frasnes, an act which, done without orders, as it was, did him great credit.^ As a matter of fact, however, orders were on the way directing the same thing. In the absence of the Prince of Orange at Brussels, his chief-of-staff. General Constant Rebecque, having heard of the advance of the French, had already^ sent to Perponcher an order to assemble one brigade of his division at Quatre Bras, and the other at Nivelles. Between 5 and 6 o'clock of the afternoon of the 15th Prince Bernhard 's brigade was attacked near Frasnes by the advance of Reille's Corps.'* At 9 he sent off to Nivelles a report of the action ; this was immediately forwarded to Braine-le-Comte, 'Van Loben Sels, p. 130. ^Ib., pp. 131, 132. Chesney, p. 100. ^Van Loben Sels, p. 128, note. 4lb., pp. 133, 134, note. 'iO^' "' ' ' JUNE 15th: THE DUTCH-BELGIANS. [CHAP. 6.] where the headquarters of the Prince of Orange were;^ but he being at Brussels at the Duchess of Richmond's ball, Rebecque, his chief-of-sta£f, took it upon himself to order Perponcher to support Prince Bernhard's brigade at Quatre Bras with the other brigade of his division, Bylandt's.^ Rebecque then, at lo P. M., sent a despatch to the Prince of Orange at Brussels informing him what he had done. About II o'clock,^ an hour at least after this order had been expedited, arrived Wellington's 5 o'clock order to the Prince of Orange " to collect at Nivelles the 2d and 3d divisions of the army of the Low Countries." In obedience to this, a new order^ was made out and sent to Perponcher, but he took it upon himself to carry out his earlier instructions to assemble his whole division at Quatre Bras, and in this he was supported by his corps-commander, the Prince of Orange. The greater part of Bylandt's brigade arrived in the early morning of the i6th. Perponcher arrived in person at 3 A. M.,^ the Prince of Orange at 6 o'clock.'" (See Map 3.) Thus was Quatre Bras occupied on the evening and night of the 15th, not only without orders from Welling- ton, but contrary to his orders. Had his orders been obeyed, Ney would have found on the next morning no one to oppose him. ^Van Loben Sels, p. 175. ^Ib., p. 176. ^Ib., p. 176, note. *Ib., p. 178, n. It would seem that the sending to Perponcher the order to return to Nivelles was a mere form. nh., p. 183. '°Ib., p. 185. NOTE rO CHAPTER VI. "Almost all historians " says Colonel Maurice,' "write as if the occupation of Quatre Bras by Prince Bernhard was a step for which he not only deserves the greatest credit, but one which in itself was sure to be of vast ad- vantage to the English army." In this opinion Colonel Maurice does not share. We have fully treated of this subject before.'' All we need say here is to repeat, that the question of the suitableness of Quatre Bras as the point of concentration for the Anglo-Dutch army could not have been considered by the Duke of Wellington at this moment apart from the fact that Marshal Blucher was concentrating his army at Sombreffe; and that, when this fact was ascertained, the Duke must concen- trate at Quatre Bras or abandon all hope of assisting his ally. We have also pointed out that the fact that the main French army was opposed to the Prussians consti- tuted this case an exception to the general rule ; for, in this instance, ex hypothesis the Duke would encounter only those troops which Napoleon would feel himself strong enough to detach from his main body. If we are right in this contention, therefore, then the Dutch-Belgian generals, — Constant Rebecque, Per- poncher, and the Prince of Saxe Weimar, — having learned the situation of the French and Prussian armies before the Duke heard of it, did what Wellington, had he ^Maurice, p. 345 : July, 1890. 'Ante, pp. 94 et seq. 104 JUNE 15: THE DUTCH-BELGIANS.-NOTES. [CHAP. 6] known what they knew, would have ordered to be done.^ And it may be added, that we fully concur in the com- mendation which has so generally been awarded to them for their prompt and vigorous action. 3Chesiiey, p. 102 ; Hooper, p. 84. CHAPTER VII. THE MORNING OF THE SIXTEENTH OF JUNE : WELLINGTON. The Duke of Wellington, as we have seen, did not decide on ordering a general concentration of his army at Quatre Bras until the early morning hours of the i6th of June. We have produced above two orders, both addressed to Lord Hill, written at Brussels on the morning of the i6th of June, and we have shown that the first, at any rate, was written and sent out before the Duke had made up his mind to concentrate his army at Quatre Bras. We have also, however, shown, that before he left Brussels, he did make up his mind to do this, and that orders to this effect were, no doubt, then issued. We cannot fix the hour or hours at which this was done, but it was undoubtedly before the Duke left Brussels. This last hour has been differently fixed,' but it was probably about half-past seven. He, then, leaving the Deputy Quar- ter Master General and the other heads of departments in Brussels, — ^ presumably to attend to the issuing of the orders for the concentration of the army at Quatre ' Miiffling (Passages, p. 230) says about 5. Mudford puts it at 7. Gardner, p. 58, at 8. Sir A. Frazer (Letters of Colonel Sir A. S. Frazer, London, 1859, p. 536), writes at 6 A. M., that he has "just learned that the Duke moves in half an hour." The Duke had 22 miles to ride to arrive at Quatre Bras, and he got there about 10 A. M. His letter to Blucher is dated 10.30 A. M. Old- field (MSS.) puts the time of the Duke's departure as before that of Sir George Wood and Lieutenant Colonel Smyth, who " drove out in a caleche of the latter" " between seven and eight o'clock," and soon after the depart- ure of the Brunswick troops, which was " at an early hour." ^Oldfield, MSS. I06 JUNE I6.-MORNING: [chap. 7.] Bras, — rode to the latter place, where he arrived about 10 o'clock. Here he found only Perponcher's division of Dutch-Belgian troops, under command of the Prince of Orange. At half-past ten, he wrote to Marshal Bliicher the let- ter before referred to, which, as we have said above, never, as we believe, saw the light until it was published in Berlin,^ in 1876, in Von Ollech's History* of the Campaign of 181 5. We give a translation of it here in full. On the Heights behind Frasnes : June 16, 1815. 10.30 A. M. My dear Prince : My army is situated as follows : The Corps d'Armee of the Prince of Orange has a division here and at Ouatre Bras, and the rest at Nivelles. The Reserve is in march from Waterloo to Genappe, where it will arrive at noon. The English Cavalry will be at the same hour at Nivelles. The Corps of Lord Hill is at Braine-le-Comte. I do not see any large force of the enemy in front of us, and I await news from your Highness and the arrival of troops in order to determine my operations for the day. Nothing has been seen on the side of Binche, nor on our right. Your very obedient servant, Wellington. Let us see precisely how far this letter agrees with Colonel DeLancey's Memorandum, which he drew up — presumably before the Duke left Brussels — for the Duke's information, and of which we have before spoken, 'Von Ollech, p. 125. Maurice, June, 1S90, p. 257. App. C, xw\;post, pp. 376, 377- ■♦Charras, vol. i, p. 192, note, refers to it to show that Wellington was opposite Frasnes at 10.30 A. M., but he make.s no other reference to it. [chap. 7.] WELLINGTON. IO7 entitled " Disposition of the British army at 7 o'clock A. M., i6th June." (See Map 4.) The ist Corps, says the Duke in his letter, has a division here, — that is, in rear of Frasnes, — and at Quatre Bras. This, as we have seen above, was the 2d division of Dutch-Belgian troops, — Perponcher's. The rest of the ist Corps, says the Duke, are at Nivelles. Now, of the three divisions, — those of Chasse (Dutch-Belgian), Alten, and Cooke, which constituted the rest of the ist Corps, — the first two had been or- dered to Nivelles the previous evening, — the last, Cooke's, is stated in the DeLancey " Disposition " to be, at 7 A. M., at Braine-le-Comte. The Duke, therefore, might well suppose that it would accomplish the greater part of the distance between Braine-le-Comte and Nivelles, nine miles, in three hours and a half. The Duke next says " The Reserve is in march from Waterloo to Genappe, where it will arrive at noon." For this statement the Duke did not have to refer to the " Disposition." He had passed Picton's division on the road, a mile or two north of Waterloo, probably a little before 9 A. M. ; and, supposing, as he did, that Picton either had then received, or shortly would receive, orders to push on to Quatre Bras, he was warranted in saying that the division would reach Genappe at noon. He did not take the trouble to except from his general statement, which he doubtless thought was sufficiently accurate for all practical purposes, the division of Sir Lowry Cole, which the " Disposition " placed at Assche, eight miles north-west of Brussels, nor the 5th Hanoverian brigade, which was at Hal. The Duke next says that the English Cavalry will be at Nivelles at noon. The " Disposition " puts them at Braine-le-Comte at 7 A. M. Relying on this statement, the Duke says they will accomplish the nine miles be- tween that place and Nivelles by noon. lOS JUNE 16.-MORNING: [chap. 7.] " The Corps of Lord Hill is at Braine-le-Comte," is the next and last statement in the letter. That corps con- sisted of the 2d and 4th British divisions, of the ist Dutch-Belgian division, and of Anthing's brigade. As respects the 2d division, the " Disposition " states that it was at 7 A.M. at Braine-le-Comte. The 4th division, the " Disposition " states, was at Audenarde at 7 A. M. and was marching on Braine-le-Comte ; but the Duke certainly could not have supposed it possible that that division could have marched from Audenarde to Braine-le-Comte, a distance of more than thirty miles, between seven and half-past ten in the morning. And as for the ist Dutch- Belgian division and the Indian brigade, the "Dis- position " puts them at Sotteghem, a village near Aud- enarde, at 7 A. M., and states that they are marching on Enghien. The Duke, therefore, had not the authority of the " Disposition " for the statement made in his letter as to these portions of Lord Hill's Corps ; but then these divisions had been stationed so far away, that probably he never counted on them at all in his own mind in con- nection with a concentration at Quatre Bras. These were the troops which he left at Hal and Tubize on the day of Waterloo to protect his right. It is, therefore, we submit, easy to see that the Duke had the " Disposition " before him when he wrote the letter to Marshal BlUcher. He seems to have taken it, — so to speak, — blindfold ; it never seems to have occurred to him that it was practically impossible that his various divisions could have been at seven o'clock that morning where his chief-of-staff had said that they were. He accepted the memorandum as official, and followed it sub- stantially — with a few deviations, to be sure, as we have pointed out — in his letter to Blucher. Not only this ; the Duke acted at once on the faith of the representations contained in the " Disposition." He, about noon, rode over to Brye to confer with Marshal Blucher, and to propose to cooperate with him. It is evident from the narra- ^ [CIIAP. 7.] WELLINGTON. IO9 tive 5 of Baron Mlifflfng, who accompanied the Duke, that Wellington was, in his opinion, laboring under grave misconceptions as to the whereabouts of his army. The conversation, according to Miiffling, was mainly con- cerned with the manner of the promised cooperation, — Gneisenau wishing the Duke to march from Quatre Bras to Brye, and Wellington being unwilling thus to expose his communications with Brussels and Nivelles. To- wards the close of the discussion, says Muffling, the Duke adopted a suggestion of his, and said " I will over- throw what is before me at Frasnes and will direct my- self on Gosselies." We cite this simply to show how con- fident Wellington was that he would find a sufficiently large force at Quatre Bras on his return from Brye, at about half-past two o'clock. If Alten's division was at Nivelles at 7 A. M., en route for Quatre Bras, it should have arrived there before noon. The reserves, which marching from Brussels for Quatre Bras, had by 7 A. M. nearly reached Waterloo, ought to be at Quatre Bras, which is not over eleven miles further, by 2 or 3 P. M. If the cavalry was actually at Braine-le-Comte at 9 A. M. it might well be at Nivelles by noon, and at Quatre Bras, only seven miles further, by 3 P. M. Cooke might be expected about the same time, with his division of Guards. These expectations were no doubt in the mind of the Duke of Wellington as he rode back to Quatre Bras from his meeting with Marshal Bliicher. The theory advanced, or perhaps suggested, by the Prussian biographer of Gneisenau, Delbrlick,^ that the Duke misrepresented the position of his army for the purpose of inducing Bliicher to give battle at Ligny on the strength of his promise to support him, and of his ability to keep his promise, so that he, Wellington, might gain the necessary time for the concentration of his army, has 5 Muffling, Passages, p. 236. Ollech, p. 126. ' Gneisenau, vol. 4, pp. 369, 370. no JUNE i6.-morning:-wellington. [chap. 7.] not, in our judgment, anything to support it/ The truth plainly is, that the Duke was himself entirely de- ceived by the statement drawn up for his information by his chief-of-staff. He took it for granted that the troops were where they were stated to be, and made his disposi- tions accordingly. He was destined thereby not only to be greatly disappointed, but to incur imminent danger of defeat. For, as a matter of fact, many of his divisions were at seven that morning nowhere near the positions assigned them in Colonel DeLancey's Memorandum. We shall refer to this matter in another place ; suffice it to say now that the Duke's reinforcements came on the field very much later than he had reason to expect ; that the allied troops were for a couple of hours or so in a very precarious situation, and would without doubt have been disastrously defeated had Napoleon's orders been carried out. ' At the same time, it must be said that Delbriick was quite naturally led to adopt this suggestion. It is only on the supposition that the " Disposition " is an authentic document and that the Duke followed it blindly, but honestly, in his letter to Marshal Bliicher, that we can find a satisfactory answer to Delbruck's suggestion. NOTES TO CHAPTER VII. I,. It may be worth while to state, as nearly as we can, the actual positions at 7 A. M. of the i6th of the various bodies of troops mentioned in the "Disposi- tion." (See Map 5.) The ist division was not at 7 A. M. at Braine-le- Comte. It did not reach that place from Enghien until 9 A. M.' Its commander, General Cooke, having re- ceived no further orders, halted the division till noon, when he took upon himself the responsibility of con- tinuing the march to Nivelles, where he arrived at 3 P. M. Here he received orders to proceed at once to Quatre Bras. The 2d division, Clinton's, which was also stated in the " Disposition " to have been at 7 A. M. at Braine-le- Comte, and to be marching on Nivelles, did not, in fact,^ receive the order to march from the neighborhood of Ath, where it was stationed, to Enghien till twelve hours after it was dated, — i. e., not until 10 A. M. of the i6th ! The troops did not reach Enghien till 2 P. M., and missing, apparently, the direct road, did not arrive at Braine-le-Comte till midnight. The 3d division, Alten's, is said in the " Disposition " to have been at Nivelles at 7 A. M., and marching to Quatre Bras. It did not arrive at Nivelles till noon.^ The 4th division, Colville's, was no doubt correctly 'Grenadier Guards, vol. 3, p. 15. ^Leeke, vol. i, pp. 10, 11. ^Siborne, vol. i, p. 90. 112 JUNE i6.-morning:-notes. [chap. 7.] stated in the " Disposition " to have been at Audenarde at 7 A. M. The 10 P. M. orders of the 15th of June directed it on Enghien ; and we must presume, for the reasons given above, that further orders to march on Braine-le-Comte had been issued. The 5th division, Picton's, was not " beyond Waterloo " at 7 A. M., as stated in the " Disposition." In point cf fact, it must have been some six miles on the Brussels side of Waterloo at that hour.'* Included in this division was the 4th Hanoverian brigade,^ and the Duke of Brunswick's Corps. The 6th division, Cole's, is no doubt correctly stated in the " Disposition " to have been at 7 A. M. at Assche ; but whether orders for it to march to Genappe and Quatre Bras had arrived at so early an hour, may be doubted. Similar observations apply to the 5th Hanoverian bri- gade, stated in the " Disposition " to have been at 7 A. M. at Hal, and marching to Genappe and Quatre Bras, and to the 1st Dutch-Belgian Division and Anthing's Indian brigade, stated to be at Sotteghem, and marching to Enghien. The " Disposition " states that the 2d and 3d divisions of the Army of the Low Countries were at Nivelles and Quatre Bras at 7 A. M. This was not true of the 3d division, Chasse's, which did not assemble at Nivelles till near noon.^ The 2d division, Perponcher's, as we have seen, was at Quatre Bras at 7 A. M. As for the statement in the " Disposition " that Major •«Siborne, vol. i, p. 102, note. Gomm, pp. 353, 354. Waterloo Letters, pp. 23, 24. Gomm says Picton's division left Brussels at 5 A. M., marched to , Waterloo (a distance of about eleven miles), and halted there two hours; and then at i P. M. resumed its march for Quatre Bras, where it arrived at 3.30 P. M. Siborne (vol. i, p. 102) says that Picton arrived at a quarter before 3 P. M., having left Waterloo about noon. As the distance is about thirteen miles, the later hour of arrival given by Gomm is probably correct. ^Siborne, vol. i, p. 103, n. 'Van Loben Sels, p. 232. [chap, 7.] WELLINGTON-NOTES. II3 General Dornberg's brigade and the Cumberland Hus- sars were " beyond Waterloo" at 7 A. M., it certainly was far from correct. Dornberg had been directed by an order sent off from Brussels between 5 and 7 P. M. of the 15th to retire his brigade from the neighborhood of Mons to Vilvorde, a town seven miles north of Brussels. He could not have reached Vilvorde, which is a distance of forty-five miles, until late in the after- noon. As for the " remainder of the cavalry," which was sta- tioned in and near Ninove, it not only was not at Braine- le-Comte at 7 A. M., as stated in the " Disposition," but it did not receive the first order, — sent off from Brussels about 10 o'clock in the evening of the 15th, — until shortly before six in the morning.^ It was therefore only an hour's march from Ninove on its way to Enghien at seven o'clock. It did not reach the field till " the evening was far advanced and the conflict had ceased."^ Nor could Kruse's Nassau brigade have passed Water- loo at 7 A. M., as stated in the " Disposition," e7i route for Genappe, for it did not arrive at Quatre Bras in sea- son to take part in the action. We have been at some pains to lay the facts in regard to this " Disposition " before the reader, because it cer- tainly is the most misleading statement ever drawn up "for the information" of a commanding general. No thought seems to have been given either to the time at which the orders could be received, or to the time re- quired to carry them out. An officer of sufficient experi- ence in war to occupy the post of chief-of-staff to the Duke of Wellington ought certainly to have been quite competent to give to his commanding officer an esti- mate of the probable positions at any given time of the 'Historical Record of the Life Guards, p. 193 : 2d Ed. London; Longmans; 1840. Bullock's Journal; English Historical Magazine, July, 18S8, p. 549. 'Life Guards, p. 194. Bullock, p. 549, says eight o'clock. 114 JUNE i6.-morning:-notes. [chap. 7.] various divisions of the army, on which it would be safe to rely.^ 2. Whether, if such an estimate had been made, Wel- lington would have stayed at Quatre Bras, may be a question, but he probably would have risked it, as he evidently did not suppose the French to be in great force in his front, and it was obviously of prime im- portance to retain his communications with Bliicher, if possible. 3. Finally, it must be said that the Duke of Wellington was not well served by his subordinates on the day of the 15th in respect to the transmission to him of infor- mation from the front.'" His first news of the attack on the Prussian lines near Thuin did not arrive till 3 P. M., although the French movement must have been pro- nounced some ten or eleven hours before that hour. Charleroi was occupied by the main French column at noon, but all the Duke had heard at 10 P. M. simply warranted him in writing that the enemy " appeared to menace Charleroi." Brussels is only 35 or 36 miles from Charleroi ; and by a good despatch system news of such importance ought to have been transmitted in four hours. If that had been done, — if Wellington had known at four or five o'clock in the afternoon positively that the French had occupied Charleroi in force, and if his information from Mons had arrived at the same time, as certainly ought to have been the case, — there is every reason to suppose that he would at once have issued orders for the concentration of the army at Quatre Bras. The orders which he did issue to this effect were not sent out, as we have seen, till the early morning hours of 'It ought to be remembered, however, that the " Disposition " was in all probability drawn up in a great hurry. Wellington had put off the decision to concentrate at Quatre Bras so late that both the giving of the necessary orders and the preparation of this "Disposition " must have been done in the greatest haste. ^°Cf. Siborne, vol. i, p. i66, note. [chap. 7.] WELLINGTON-NOTES. 1 1 5 the 1 6th, some nine or ten hours later than those which we may fairly suppose he would have issued, had in- formation of the French movements been promptly transmitted to him. But how far the commander-in- chief is himself responsible for such delays as this is, of course, a question. It is and must be for him to devise efficient methods, and to put them to the test often enough beforehand to feel justified in relying on them in a sudden emergency. And the situation in which the Duke of Wellington was in the month of June, 1815, certainly would seem to have called for the utmost watchfulness and for the taking of every precaution. It is impossible not to conclude that he failed in these re- spects. CHAPTER VIII. THE MORNING OF THE SIXTEENTH OF JUNE: NEY. Marshal Ney, as we have seen, ' rode back from the front at Frasnes to report to the Emperor at Charleroi, where he arrived at midnight of the 15th. He informed the Emperor, so Colonel Heymes says,^ " Of the dispositions he had made. The Emperor made him stay to supper, gave him his orders, and received the Marshal with the frank confidence of the camp; he unfolded to him his pro- jects and his hopes for the day of the i6th, v^hich w^as very soon to begin. He talked with him a long time in the night of the 15th and i6th. All the officers of the Imperial headquarters can attest this." Among these ofhcers was, no doubt, Marshal Grouchy. It goes without saying that at this interview Ney told the Emperor that he had not occupied Quatre Bras, and why he had not done so. With almost equal certainty may it be believed that Napoleon told him that he must occupy the place the next forenoon. Heymes then proceeds as follows : ^ "The i6th, at two o'clock in the morning, the Marshal returned to Gosselies (z.e., from Charleroi), where he stopped some minutes in order to confer with General Reille ; he gave him the order to set out, as soon as he could, wath his two divisions and his artillery, and to get his troops together at Frasnes, where the Marshal him- self would arrive almost as soon." ^ Ante, p. 54. ' Doc. Inifd., Heymfes' Rel. p. 6. See attte, p. 65, n. 28. ' lb., pp. 6, 7. [chap. 8.] JUNE 16.-MORNING: NEY. II7 And he adds that at 8 A. M. Reille at the head of his two divisions was en route for Frasnes. Gen- eral Reille, however, while he says ^ that his troops were ready to march in the morning,^ says also that at 7 A. M. he went to see Marshal Ney, to ask for orders ; and that the Marshal said he was expecting them from the Emperor. One may infer from these statements, which are not perfectly consistent with each other, that Ney, on his return to Gosselies from Charleroi, told Reille that they must be ready to move at a mo- ment's notice, and that that officer at once proceeded to get his men into marching order, and that he had them on the Charleroi-Brussels turnpike, ready to march, before seven o'clock. One may, perhaps, infer more than this ; namely, that Ney, immediately on his return from see- ing the Emperor, ordered Reille to proceed with his two divisions, as soon as he could, from Gosselies to Frasnes, so that, when the order to seize Quatre Bras should ar- rive, it might be executed promptly ; but that he after- wards reconsidered the matter, and allowed Reille to remain in Gosselies till the written orders should come. Whether this be so or not, however, it is plain that when Ney had been, as Heymes says he had been, in- formed by the Emperor himself of his projects for the ensuing day, he ought certainly to have ordered Reille up to Frasnes at once, with the two divisions then at Gosselies, — thereby uniting all of the 2d Corps that was under his control,^ — and to have seen to it that the ist Corps was ready to follow promptly in their rear. No special authority for this was needed. In fact it was ob- viously necessary to get these two divisions out of the way of the 1st Corps, which ought to be assembling at Gosse- lies in the early morning, if it was to accomplish anything " Doc. Indd., Reille, Xot. Hist, p. 57. 5 From the context, he would seem to mean before 7 A. M. ^Girard's division was with the main army under Napoleon. Il8 JUNE 16.-MORNING: NEY. [chap. 8.] of consequence during the forenoon. But Ney, whatever may have been his first intentions on returning from see- ing Napoleon, did actually nothing of this kind. '' One cannot avoid the feeling that he was unwilling to take the slightest responsibility, even that involved in uniting the three divisions of the 2d Corps at Frasnes, and sup- plying their place at Gosselies with the four divisions of the 1st Corps, — a step which, taking account of the situation, and of the written orders that had been issued to the 1st Corps, it was his manifest duty to take. The consideration, that, by this course, the formal order to seize Quatre Bras, which he undoubtedly expected, could be executed at once, while, by retaining Reille at Gosselies until the order should be received, the time required to march the five miles which lay between Gosselies and Frasnes would postpone the carrying out of the movement by some two hours or more, does not seem to have had any weight with him. In fact, beyond getting Reille in readiness to march, Ney really seems to have made no preparations to facilitate the execution of the important order which he fully expected to receive. That this statement is not too strong, appears when we consider what Ney did to get the ist Corps up and well in hand, a matter which assuredly demanded his most strenuous and active efforts at this moment. Ney arrived at Gosselies from Charleroi, as we have seen, about 2 A. M. He stayed there, apparently, till shortly after 7 A. M.^ We know^ that, even at 3 A. M. one division of the ist Corps had not arrived at the river, and that an- other was still at Marchienne. The other two divisions had crossed the Sambre, and the leading one '° was be- "> Cf. La Tour D'Auvergne, p. 189. Muquardt, pp. 145, 146. ^Doc. Indd., Reille, p. 57. ^Ante, p. 51. ^Ante, p. 50, n. 25. [chap. 8.] JUNE 16.-MORNING: NEY. II9 tween Jumet and Gosselies. Colonel Heymes, after stating the positions of the English at Quatre Bras, " says : '' " In default of staff-officers, of whom the Mar- shal had none, officers of the chasseurs and lancers of the Guard were sent to meet the ist Corps in the direction of Marchienne-au-Pont ; they had orders to press its march to Frasnes." But we shall presently see, that it was not until ii A. M., when Reille, with the divisions of Foy and Jerome, was ordered to advance from Gosse- lies to Quatre Bras, that the first three divisions of d'Erlon's Corps were ordered to Frasnes. It appears, then, from Heymes' statement, that the activity exhibited by Marshal Ney, to which he calls attention, was not shown until Ney had ordered these divisions to Frasnes, that is, until after eleven o'clock. That this conjecture is correct, appears also from the fact, stated by Colonel Heymes, '^ that the regiments of the chasseurs and lancers of the Guard, from which officers were detailed on staff duty, as above stated, were in reserve behind the village of Frasnes, and, therefore, not at Gosselies. There is, therefore, nothing to show that Marshal Ney did anything in regard to getting up the ist Corps until after ii o'clock A. M."* If he had. Colonel Heymes, who was on his staff, would doubtless have mentioned it. And it seems to be an unavoidable inference from what Colonel Heymes says, that at the time when these extem- porized staff -officers were sent to find the ist Corps and hurry it up, part of it, at any rate, was supposed by Marshal Ney to be yet in the neighborhood of Mar- chienne. " Doc. Indd., Heymes, pp. 7, 8. " lb., p. 8. "lb., pp. 5, 7. Anie,p.4g. '* lb., Reille, p. 57. 120 JUNE i6.-morning: ney. [chap. 8.] The first written order '^ which Marshal Ney received on this morning of the i6th, was from Marshal Soult, who informed him that the Count of Valmy had been ordered to Gosselies with his corps of cavalry, and placed under his, Ney's, orders ; these troops were to replace the division of cavalry of the Guard under Lefebvre-Des- nouettes.'^ Marshal Soult then inquired whether the ist Corps had executed its movement, that is, had crossed the river, and had joined the 2d Corps at Gosselies, in pursuance of the orders'^ to the Count d'Erlon of the day before. He further desired that Ney would inform him as to the exact positions of the ist and 2d Corps, and of the two divisions of cavalry, which were attached to them. We do not know what answer Marshal Ney returned to these interrogatories, but he told Reille,'^ in the course of the conversation to which we have be- fore referred, shortly before seven o'clock in the morning, that he had rendered to the Emperor an account of his situation. This first order, therefore, must have arrived about 6 A. M. ; and from its contents, and also from the hour when it was sent, as well as from the tenor of the orders to d'Erlon of the day before, we can see how care- fully the operations of the left wing were watched at the headquarters of the army. Shortly after this conversation between Ney and Reille, the Marshal went back to Frasnes, "^ leaving word with Reille that, if any orders for the movement of troops should arrive in his absence, they were to be exe- cuted at once, and their contents communicated to the Count d'Erlon, who was at Jumet, or in rear of that place. " Doc. Indd., VII, pp. 26, 27 ; App. C,xvii; posi, p. 377. ^^Ante, p. 49. " Doc. In^d., Heym^s. V, VI, p. 25 ; App. C, v, vi ; post, pp. 367, '« lb., ReiUe, p. 57. "lb., p. 57. [chap. 8.] JUNE 16.-MORNING: NEY. 121 About 9 o'clock, General Reille continues, ^° a report was received from General Girard, who commanded that division of the 2d Corps which had gone off to the right and joined the main army, to the effect that the Prussians were forming beyond Fleurus. This report Reille transmitted at once to the headquarters of the army at Charleroi ; but he sent no word of it to Ney, at Frasnes, at that time. About an hour afterwards, that is, about 10 A. M., " General Flahaut of the Emperor s staff, passed through Gosselies, bringing with him an imiportant letter" for Marshal Ney, written by the Emperor himself, the con- tents of which Flahaut communicated to Reille. Of this letter we shall speak at length in another con- nection. Suffice it to say here, that it treated of the oc- cupation of Quatre Bras, the formal order for which, emanating from the chief-of-staff, it stated would arrive about the same time. This no doubt was the case. ^^ Reille's orders from Ney, it will be recollected, were imperative and precise, to execute "* at once during Ney's absence, any instructions for the movement of troops that might arrive. Yet we find him writing '^ from Gosselies at 10.15 A. M., to Ney at Frasnes, — a distance of five miles, — to say that he has been informed by General Flahaut of the contents of the Emperor's letter, but that, in consequence of the information as to the Prussians taking up their positions near Fleurus, which *° Doc. Indd., Reille, p. 57. ^'Reille in his " Notice Historique " says ii A. M. But his despatch to Ney, in which he says that he read the Flahaut order, is dated 10.15 A.M. Doc. Indd., XI, pp. 21^ 38; App. C, •xix^post, p. 379. " lb., X, pp. 32 et seq. App. C, xviii ; post, pp. 377, 378. *' lb., p. 30 : at least this was the opinion of Marshal Ney's son. ^Vo., Reille, p. 57. *5 lb., XI, pp. 37, 38. App. C, xix; post, p. 379, He does not mention in his " Notice Historique " that he delayed executing Ney's order. 122 JUNE i6.-morning: ney. [chap. 8.] he had received from Girard before 9 A. M., he has thought it best to postpone the march of his two divis- ions from GosseHes to Frasnes until the return of his messenger. ^^ And this, too, just after he had read a let- ter from the Emperor himself, prescribing what disposi- tions Ney should make of his troops after he had executed the movement on Quatre Bras. One cannot but recall the criticisms on the generals in this army made by both Napoleon and Charras, which we have given in an ear- lier chapter.''^ If Reille thought the information sent by Girard was so important, why did he not send it to Ney at once, instead of waiting an hour and a half ? Marshal Ney sent back a peremptory order to Reille to move up to the front at once. ^^ The march began at about a quarter before twelve o'clock, ^^ the division of Foy leading. Let us now look at the Emperor's letter and at the orders which Ney received from Soult during the morn- ing of the 1 6th. The orders which were received by Ney on the i6th prior to the commencement of the battle of Quatre Bras, were three in number. Of the first ^° we have already spoken.^' The second,^'' which was the formal order, directed the Marshal to put the 2d and ist Corps, and the 3d Corps" of cavalry, in march for Quatre Bras, where he was to take up a position, and make reconnois- ^*The delay thus occasioned is estimated by Charras (vol. 2, p. 238) at an hour and a quarter. It was really an hour and three-quarters, as Reille ought to have started at ten. '^ Ante, p. 19. »« Doc. Indd., Reille, XII, p. 38 ; App. C, xx ; post, pp. 379, 380. ^ Charras, vol. i, p. 189. Cf. vol. 2, p. 238. »° Doc. Indd., VII, pp. 26, 27 ; App. C, xvii ; post, p. 377. ^^ Ante, p. 120, ^ Doc. Indd., VIII, p. 27 ; App. C, xxi; post, pp. 380, 381. " That of the Count of Valmy, Kellermann. [chap. 8.] JUNE 16.-MORNING: NEY. I23 sances in the directions of Brussels and Nivelles. He was to station a division with cavalry at Genappe, and another division at or near Marbais. The letter^'* states that the major-general (Soult) has issued the orders, but that Ney may perhaps receive this letter a little sooner, as the Emperor's aides are better mounted. The Emperor then tells Ney what his own plans are for the day, — a subject which will be more appropriately treated in another place, — and then says: — "You can then dispose of your troops in the fol- lowing manner : the first division at two leagues in front of Quatre Bras ; * * * six divisions of in- fantry at and near Quatre Bras and another at Marbais, so that I can order it to me at Sombreffe, if I have need of it. * * * The corps of the Count of Valmy * * * at the intersection of the Roman and Brussels roads, so that I may draw it to me, if I have need of it. * * * Your wing will be composed of the four divisions of the ist Corps, of the four divisions of the 2d Corps, of the two divisions of light cavalry [those of Jaquinot and Pire], and of the two divisions of the corps of Valmy." It has been asserted" that this letter restricted Ney in the employment of the cavalry of the Count of Valmy ; but it seems perfectly clear that all the above-mentioned bodies of troops are put explicitly at Ney's disposal for the purpose of carrying out the orders which he would receive from the major-general; and that the disposi- tions of his command which Ney is requested to make, are to be made only after the accomplishment of the m,ain object of the movemejit, — the seizure of the cross-roads. But it is impossible that Ney could have had any doubt on the subject, inasmuch as there was a third formal order sent by Marshal Soult. **Doc. Indd., X, pp. 32 et seq.\ App. C, xviii;/cj/, pp. 377, 378. " Charras, vol. i, pp. 204, 205. 124 JUNE i6.-morning: ney. [chap. 8.] This order ^^ informs Ney that an officer of lancers re- ports considerable bodies of the enemy near Quatre Bras. It then proceeds thus : " Unite the corps of the Counts Reille and d'Erlon and that of the Count of Valmy, " who has this instant started to join you ; with these forces you ought to be able to beat and destroy any force of the enemy which you may meet." It then says that it is not very likely that Bllicher has sent any troops to Quatre Bras, so that Ney will have to do only with the troops coming from Brussels. It concludes by stating that Grouchy has made the movement on Sombreffe of which Ney had been informed in the former order. Now these orders, and certainly the last one, are as plain as plain can be. They do not admit of two con- structions. Yet Ney, still unwilling to surrender his own judgment, still deeming it injudicious to push his com- mand so far in advance of the main army, orders ^^ the first three divisions of the ist Corps to take up a position at Frasnes. Frasnes, it must be remembered, is two miles and a half from Quatre Bras, — nearly two miles from the field of battle, — an hour's march. Not only this, but he orders the two divisions of cavalry of the Count of Valmy to establish themselves at Frasnes and Liberchies, — the latter a village two miles south- west of Frasnes. Consider this a moment. The principal formal order directed Ney, in so many words, to unite the two corps d'armee, and the corps of cavalry, and to take position at Quatre Bras, — not at Frasnes. Even if the Emperor's letter admitted of a construction at variance with this, so far as the cavalry of the Count of *Doc. Indd., IX, p. X31 ; App. C, xxii;/^j-/, p. 381. ^''Charras (vol. i, p. 190) says that this order differed from Soult's previous orders in authorizing Ney to employ the cavalry of the Count of Valmy. But both Soult's orders direct this in express terms. 38 Doc. In^d., XII, pp. 38, 39; App, C, xx; post, pp. 379, 3S0. [chap. 8.] JUNE 16.-MORNING: NEY. I25 Valmy was concerned, the last order of Soult's was unmistakable. It left no room for latitude of construc- tion. All the troops were to be united in the effort to get possession of the intersection of the roads, and the cavalry of the Count of Valmy is explicitly included. Instead of carrying out this order, which was both plain and peremptory, and called for the simultaneous employ- ment of his entire command, or, at any rate, for the employment of as much of his command as he could assemble, more than half the force which had been placed at Ney's disposal was ordered by him to halt and "take position," "establish themselves," two miles and more to the south of the cross-roads. He himself, in his letter to the Duke of Otranto, ^^ states that the ist Corps " had been left by him in reserve at Frasnes." Although this statement is incorrect, inasmuch as that unlucky command never got quite so far as Frasnes, yet it shows beyond controversy what Marshal Ney inte^ided \.o do with the ist Corps. He furthermore says in this letter, that it was at the moment when he was about to order it up from Frasnes, that he learned that the Emperor had disposed of it. That is to say, he had actually intended to keep a whole corps of 20,000 men (or at least three-fourths of them) tvv^o miles from the battle-field till five o'clock in the afternoon, for (as we shall see hereafter) it was not until five o'clock that he learned that d'Erlon's Corps had wandered off. ^' Jones, p. 386. Charras, vol. i, p, 215. NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII. I. The conduct of Marshal Ney on the 15th and i6th has been the subject of violent and bitter disputes. One principal cause of these disputes lies in the sup- position that Napoleon in his accounts of the campaign has misrepresented the facts, so as to throw a large part of the blame for the final disaster undeservedly upon Ney. Accordingly, what Napoleon has said about Ney, and his motives in saying it, have been the subjects of discussion, rather than what Ney himself did. We have strictly confined our narrative to the considera- tion of Ney's acts, orders, and statements, supplemented by those of one of his corps-commanders and his chief-of- staff. From these it appears, (a) That Ney was informed of the Emperor's inten- tions during the night of the 15th and i6th: (b) That he contented himself, on his return to Gos- selies at two o'clock in the morning, with ordering Reille to get his two divisions ready to move: he did not order Reille up to Frasnes as he might have done ; nor did he see to it that the places of Reille's divisions at Gosselies were taken by the two divisions of d'Erlon's Corps, which, as we have seen,' were, at that hour well across the river: (c) That instead of pushing right on to Quatre Bras with all his disposable force when he finally got his writ- ^Ante, p. 51. [chap. 8.] JUNE 16.-MORNING: NEY.-NOTES. 1 27 ten orders, as those orders in express terms peremptorily directed him to do, he ordered three divisions of the ist Corps to take up a position at Frasnes, two miles from the field of battle, and Kellermann's two divisions of cavalry " to establish themselves " partly there and partly at Liberchies, a village still further from the field: (d) That he deliberately intended those three divisions of the ist Corps and those two divisions of cavalry to stay at Frasnes and Liberchies, as his reserve, instead of having them with him for immediate use on the field of Quatre Bras : (e) Lastly, all these things are admitted to be true ; they are not accusations against him; they are facts, stated by himself, either in his own orders or letters, or by his own chief-of-staff, or by General Reille. 2. There is certainly one inference to be drawn from these facts. It is that Marshal Ney was not, in that night and morning, preparing for a decisive blow. So much, we presume, will be conceded. It is also plain that he was not proposing strictly to obey his orders. He evidently had his doubts about the wisdom of his orders. He was not going to embark too deep in what he evidently feared might prove a disastrous venture. He would pro- ceed to Quatre Bras with the three divisions of the 2d Corps, but he would leave three divisions of the ist Corps and the two divisions of Kellermann's cavalry to protect his flank and line of retreat, and also to be at hand in case the Emperor should need them. He did not dare to trust the Emperor fully. He must, he felt, in this emergency, act according to his own judgment. 3. If we are right in this conclusion, we can easily understand why Ney failed to carry out the order given to him at five o'clock on the afternoon of the 15th, to seize Quatre Bras that evening. We have left the much disputed question of the giving of this order on one side 128 JUNE 16.-MORNING: NEY.-NOTES. [CHAP. 8.] in our narrative^ for reasons already stated ; but we have, nevertheless, expressed our opinion^ that the order was given. Ney's conduct on the i6th is of a piece, we be- lieve, with his conduct on the 15th. 4. No serious criticism can be passed, we think, on the tenor of the orders issued to the corps-commanders of the left wing, or to the commander of that wing, dur- ing the afternoon of the 15th and the morning of the i6th. Neither the Emperor nor Soult could well have done more than they did to arouse the energy of the officers who had charge of the operations there/ The orders were precise and imperative. The trouble was that the officers to whom they were addressed lacked either the disposition or the energy requisite to carry them into effect. 5. But why, it may be fairly asked, did not Napoleon, as soon as he had found out that Ney had not seized Quatre Bras on the evening of the 15th, order him forth- with to proceed to do so in the early morning of the i6th? Why this delay in sending him a formal written order ? This question will be considered in the next chapter, when we come to describe Napoleon's doings on the i6th. 'Ante, p. 52. *Anie, pp. 67, 68. ^For an explanation of Chesney's (pp. 118, 119) severe strictures, see ante, p. 51, n. 29. CHAPTER IX. THE MORNING OF THE SIXTEENTH OF JUNE : NAPOLEON. It is time that we returned to the headquarters of the French army. Marshal Ney, as we have seen in the last chapter, re- ported in person to the Emperor at Charleroi at mid- night of the 15th. " He rendered account" to him, says Colonel Heymes,' "of the dispositions he had made." Napoleon was thus informed that Ney had halted at Frasnes and had not occupied Quatre Bras, the evening before. Ney must have stopped at Charleroi about an hour and a half, as he reached Gosselies on his return about two in the morning. He must have told the Em- peror where some, at any rate, of his troops were, — that Bachelu's infantry division and Fire's cavalry division of the 2d Corps were at Frasnes ; that the divisions of Jerome and Foy were at Gosselies; that Durutte's division of the 1st Corps was between Jumet and Gosselies. So much as this Ney knew. But his arrival at the army had been so recent, and his occupations since his arrival had been so engrossing, that he could not probably have had much more information to give the Emperor as to the whereabouts of the ist Corps. His almost total deficiency of staff officers was a grievous drawback, and prevented him from getting that hold on his entire command which otherwise he no doubt would have se- cured even by this time. Very possibly he had already 'Doc. Indd., Heym^s, p. 6. 130 JUNE 16.-MORNING: [chap. 9.] sent word to d'Erlon to hurry up to the front. But he must have reported to the Emperor that a large part of the ist Corps, perhaps half of it, was still far to the rear. Napoleon does not mention this interview in his Memoirs, or in the Gourgaud Narrative, nor does he anywhere say that he, on the morning of the i6th, gave to Marshal Ney any other orders than the written ones of which we have in the last chapter given the sub- stance. It would seem from these orders that Napoleon thought it inexpedient that Ney should make any further endeavor to carry Quatre Bras by a coup-de-main. The situation was a different one from that which existed (as Napoleon correctly supposed) the evening before. It might now be expected that the cross-roads would be held by a respectable force from Wellington's army; or, at least, it was obviously unwise and hazardous not to make adequate preparations for this very possible state of things. It was also plain, from what Ney had stated at the mid- night conference, that his command would not be, in the early morning hours, sufficiently concentrated for any decisive stroke.^ Hence, somewhere about five o'clock, the first of the three orders of which we have spoken in the last chapter was sent off from Charleroi ; the one in which Ney was informed that Kellermann's cavalry had been ordered to him to take the place of that of Lefebvre- Desnouettes, and in which he was directed to report to the Emperor whether the ist Corps had "executed its movement," and to inform him of the exact positions of the ist and 2d Corps. This order, as we have seen, Ney replied to before 7 A. M. His reply, which, we may as- sume, contained some news of the advance of the ist Corps, and also stated that the divisions of Jerome and Foy of the 2d Corps were at Gosselies ready to march, ^Cf. La Tour D'Auvergne, pp. 91, 92. [chap. 9.] NAPOLEON. I3I must have reached headquarters shortly before 8 A. M. As soon as this reply was received, Napoleon and Soult prepared the formal order for the conduct of the left wing during the forenoon. That order, as we have seen, directed Ney to unite the I St and 2d Corps and the cavalry of the Count of Valmy, and to proceed at once to take possession of Quatre Bras. It was issued as soon as the Emperor had become satisfied, from Ney's report, that such a movement had become practicable, — that is, that it could be made in sufficient force to overcome any opposition it would be likely to encounter. Until he had become satisfied of this, it was deemed unadvisable to issue the order to ad- vance beyond Frasnes. We are able to fix the hour at which this formal order to seize Quatre Bras was prepared by Soult with quite an approach to accuracy. We know that Napoleon dic- tated a letter to Ney, which he sent by Count Flahaut,' and which arrived at Gosselies about the same time* with the formal order, — that is, — about lO A. M.^ Flahaut wrote^ to Marshal Ney's son, then Duke of Elchingen, that, to the best of his recollection, the Emperor dictated the letter to him between 8 and 9 o'clock in the morning. Such a letter, dictated between 8 and 9, and afterwards reduced to proper form, would have reached Gosselies, a distance of about four miles and a half from Charleroi, about 10 A. M., as Reille^ says it did. This accords per- fectly with the statement made above that Napoleon waited to hear more definitely from Ney before framing his order for the morning's operations. But the backwardness of d'Erlon's Corps not only de- ^Doc. Indd., X, p. 32 ; App. C, xviii; post, pp. 377, 378. '^Ante, p. 121, note 23. ^Ante, p. 121, note 21. *Doc. Indd., XXI, p. 62, ; App. C, xxiii; post, p. 382. 'lb., XI, pp. 37, 38; App. C, xix; post, p. 379. 132 JUNE i6.-morning: [chap. 9.] ferred the forward moment of the left wing; it seems to have delayed the advance of the main body. Until Napo- leon could be sure that Ney with the large force that had been assigned to him was in march on his left, able to give a good account of any Anglo-Dutch forces which might attempt to unite with the Prussians or to molest the left flank of the main French army, he seems to have been unwilling to move upon Blucher. It was part of his plan that Ney with the left wing should at least " contain " that part of Wellington's army which that general might reasonably be expected to get to- gether at Quatre Bras. Hence, when Ney reported to the Emperor at midnight the very backward state of the 1st Corps, the latter not only decided to wait before giving him further orders until something more definite and satisfactory should be learned respecting that corps, and until Ney could fairly be supposed to have had time enough to get his entire command well in hand, but he also postponed his own forward movement upon Fleurus and Sombreffe until Ney could move simultaneously upon Quatre Bras. These considerations certainly go far to account for and justify the delay in the early morn- ing hours of the i6th, which has drawn down upon the Emperor so much severe and almost contemptuous criti- cism. Napoleon, in truth, could have done nothing else, unless he had risked a battle with the Prussians on the chance that Ney, with the 2d Corps alone, could prevent their being assisted by the English. It is true, this is what actually happened ; but it was Napoleon's intention that Ney should operate against the English with his entire command, and in deferring the giving of orders for the advance of the army until he had reason to be- lieve that Ney could do this, he was simply carrying out his original scheme. To finish now with Napoleon's intentions and expec- tations in regard to his left wing. He may well have expected that Ney had, in advance of receiving the [chap. 9.] NAPOLEON. 1 33 formal order, sent Reille to Frasnes with his two divis- ions, which Ney's reply to his early morning inquiry had informed him were then all ready to march, thus uniting the entire 2d Corps, mimis Girard's division ; also, that the leading divisions of the ist Corps would be gotten under arms without delay in Gosselies, so as to be ready to march at once. He must have expected his order to reach Gosselies by 10 A. M., and Frasnes by 11 A. M., and he may well have thought it quite possible, — as indeed it would have been, — that Ney, at the head of three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, might be able to drive out of Quatre Bras the Dutch- Belgians who had been encountered the evening before, unless, indeed, they had been largely reinforced. At or about I P. M., however, the ist Corps ought to be arriv- ing at Quatre Bras, as its leading divisions would leave Gosselies — as Napoleon would have a right to suppose — between 10 and 11 A. M.; so that, by 2, or, at any rate, by 3 P. M., Marshal Ney would have his entire com- mand at Quatre Bras, well in hand, and, pretty certain, — at least so Napoleon would be likely to think, — to be successful over any troops they mJght encounter. On these expectations, which, as we have seen, were quite warranted by the information he had received, he based his calculations for the day's doings. While Napoleon was thus awaiting at Charleroi defi- nite news of the progress and condition of the left wing of his army, he employed his time, — or a part of it, at least, — in determining on the lines of action he would pursue in view of possible emergencies. As we have already seen, he desired nothing so much as to join battle with Marshal Bliicher on the i6th of June. It had been his expectation^ that the Prussian general would assemble his army near Sombreffe, and fight a battle, somewhere to the south of that village, for the ^^«/t', pp. 5, 13, 14- 134 JUNE 1 6 -morning: [chap. 9.] preservation of his line of communications with the Duke of WelHngton,— the Namur-Nivelles turnpike. At the same time, it was, of course, perfectly possible that the allied commanders had made other arrange- ments.5 It was not impossible, for instance, that Napo- leon's concentration had been such a surprise to them that they were purposing to fall back, for the present at least, either divergently towards their respective bases, or in a northerly direction by parallel lines. In any event it would be manifestly desirable to inform the commanders of the right and left wings of the army of the Emperor's probable course in any such event, so that every advantage might be promptly taken of the situation. It was certainly true, that instructions of this nature might not be required ; they would assuredly not be required if Bliicher should do what Napoleon had thought it likely he would do. In that case there would be no need of elaborate instructions being given to either Ney or Grouchy; the issue of the battle would settle everything. But in order to be prepared for the other state of affairs, Napoleon employed himself with pre- paring letters to the commanders of the wings of the army. The letter'" to Ney, which, as we have seen, was dic- tated by the Emperor to General Flahaut between 8 and 9 A. M., and was carried by that officer to Ney, whom it must have reached at Frasnes shortly before eleven o'clock," informs him that Marshal Grouchy is marching on Sombreffe with the 3d and 4th Corps; that the Emperor is taking the Guard to Fleurus, where he will be before midday ; that he will attack the enemy if he meets him, and will clear the road as far to the east- 'Ollech, p. 123. »°Corresp., vol. 28, p. 334- Doc. Indd., X, p. 32 ; App. C, xviii ; post. pp. 377, 378- "Flahaut, says Reille, passed through Gosselies about 10 A. M. Doc. Indd., XI, pp. 37, 38; App. C, xix; post, p. 379- [chap. 9.] NAPOLEON. 1 35 ward as Gembloux. There, at Gembloux, the Emperor will make up his mind what to do next, — perhaps at three in the afternoon, perhaps not till evening. But he tells Marshal Ney that, just as soon as he has made up his mind, he wants him to be ready to march on Brus- sels ; that he will support him with the Guard, which will be at Fleurus or Sombreffe," and that he would like to get to Brussels the next morning. He then tells him where he would like him to station his various divis- ions.'^ He informs him that he has divided his army into two wings and a reserve ; that Ney's wing will con- sist of the 1st and 2d Corps, comprising eight divisions of infantry and two of light cavalry, and of the cavalry of the Count of Valmy; that Marshal Grouchy com- mands the right wing; that the Guard will constitute the reserve. He closes by reiterating the importance of Ney's dispositions being so well made that he can march on Brussels, — 2. ^., from Quatre Bras, — as soon as ordered to do so. To Grouchy the Emperor sent a similar"* letter, giving him the command of the 3d and 4th Corps, — those of Vandamme and Gerard, — and of the three cavalry-corps of Pajol, Milhaud and Exelmans. He orders him to Sombreffe with his entire command ; the cavalry are to be sent off at once, the infantry to follow without halting anywhere. The Emperor states that he is removing his headquarters from Charleroi to Fleurus, where he will arrive between 10 and 11 A. M., and that he is going to Sombreffe, leaving the Guard, unless it should be neces- sary to employ it, at Fleurus. "If the enemy is at Sombreffe," he goes on to say, " I propose to attack him ; I propose to attack him even at Gembloux, and to pos- "This seems to imply that the Emperor did not propose to carry the Guard to Gembloux. "See ante,-^. 123. '■•Corresp., vol. 28, p. 336; App. C, xxiv; post, pp. 382, 383. 136 JUNE i6.-morning: [chap. 9.] sess myself of that position ; my intention being, after having explored {connu^ these two positions, to set out this night, and operate with my left wing, which Marshal Ney commands, against the English." He then desires Grouchy to send him reports of everything he may learn, and finishes by saying: — "All my information is to the effect that the Prussians cannot oppose to us more than forty thousand men." It is quite true, that this last remark shows, as several writers'5 have pointed out, that the Emperor was to a considerable extent mistaken on this morning of the 1 6th in his apprehension of the situation. But it is an error to take these letters as if they were written for the purpose of giving Napoleon's estimates of the probabili- ties; they are rather instructions in the event of the occurrence of not impossible contingencies. The fact in the case was just this, — the main army was about to make a forward movement against the Prussians ; if they were found to be in force and offered battle, the result of this battle would of course settle everything ; but if they should retire, instead of offering battle, they must be followed, and that involved the separation of the French army into two unequal portions. Hence it was very desirable to inform Ney, from whom in this event the right wing and reserves would march away, about how far the Prussians would be followed, and, especially to enjoin upon him, in case the Emperor should deem it safe to leave the care of the Prussians to Grouchy, and should himself retrace his steps, and, with his Guard, join the left wing, to be ready to march on Brussels at an instant's notice. It must be noted, too, that these letters, especially when taken in connection with tne formal orders of Soult to the two Marshals, show how absolutely Napoleon ''Ollech, pp. 112, 113: D'Auvergne, pp. 103, 104: Charras, vol. i, pp. 143. 144- [chap. 9.] NAPOLEON. I37 adhered to his original conception of the campaign, as we have before described it. To attack the Prussians first,— to follow them up for a considerable distance, so as to be assured of the direction which their retreat was taking, — and then, and only then, to return to the Brus- sels road and advance on the English, — such was the programme marked out in the two letters to Ney and Grouchy. We shall have occasion to refer to this in another place. Lastly, while the Emperor expressly states in his letter to Grouchy that he estimates that the Prussians can not oppose to him a force of over forty thousand men, and while it may perhaps be inferred from his letter to Ney that he thought that that officer would meet with little or no opposition, it is to be observed that Napoleon acted in all respects as if he expected that the enemy would be found in force. Both Ney and Grouchy were explicit- ly directed to employ the whole of their respective forces. We have spoken of this before as it affected Ney. It was the same with the movement prescribed to Grouchy, — "Take your right wing to Sombreffe," — '^ i. e., the two corps-d'armee, and the three cavalry corps. Whatever Napoleon may have conjectured as to the force or intentions of the enemy, both of his movements this forenoon, — that of the main army on Sombreffe, and that of the left wing on Quatre Bras, — were to be made in force, — with all the force he could muster. If he did expect, as some writers think, that his enemies would retire before him, he at any rate made every preparation to fight and overcome them, should they give him battle. It was in order, as we have pointed out, that these movements might be made simultane- ously, and in sufficient force, that they were deferred to such a late period in the day, — the backwardness of the '^ " Rendez-vous avec ceite aile droite a Sombreffe^ 138 JUNE 16.-MORNING: NAPOLEON. [CHAP. 9.] I St Corps having postponed for several hours the con- centration of the left wing. It will be noticed that in none of these letters or formal orders is the 6th Corps under the Count of Lobau mentioned. The inference is, that, at that time, the Emperor desired to retain this body of troops as a reserve for the whole army. He wanted to get along, if he could, without employing it at all in the present stage of the campaign. NOTES TO CHAPTER IX. I. The very simple explanation suggested in this chapter of the cause of the delay on the morning of the i6th in the movement of the main body of the French army under the Emperor in person, namely, that that movement was deferred because of the inability of the left wing of the army to make a simultaneous movement on Quatre Bras, does not seem to have occurred to most of the historians of this campaign/ But surely, when allow- ance is made for this fact, the severe criticisms of Jomini,'' Charras, ^ SibornC* and others, must be held to be quite beside the mark. Had Ney occupied Quatre Bras on the evening of the 15th, the forward movement of the main French army would certainly not have been thus delayed. It would doubtless have been made in the early morning of the i6th, even though it might have been necessary to give Ney the 6th Corps in place of the backward ist. But as Quatre Bras had not been occupied the evening before, and as the backward state of d'Erlon's Corps rendered it impossible for Ney to make a forward movement with the entire force which had been assigned to him until the forenoon was well advanced, the operations of the main body were post, poned, and the troops were allowed what would other- wise have been an unnecessary ^ time to rest and recruit. 'It is, however, given in Du Casse's Vandamme, vol. 2, p. 562. • Jomini, pp. 129, 130. 'Charras, vol. i, pp. 138, 145, 182. * Siborne, vol. i, p. 85. 5 The Duke of Wellington, however, thought the inactivity of Napoleon on the morning of the 16th was necessitated by the long marches of the past few days. Ellesmere, pp. 296, 297. So, Clausewitz, ch. 25, p. 53. 140 JUNE i6-mornixg:-notes. [chap. 9.] 2. It is to be observed here, that for the backwardness of the ist Corps at midnight of the 15th, Marshal Ney was in no wise responsible. His recent arrival at the army and his lack of a proper staff exonerate him com- pletely from any blame for this unfortunate delay. For this d'Erlon alone must be held responsible. 3. It is unnecessary to repeat here what we have said above as to Ney's conduct on his return to Gosselies from his interview wath Napoleon at Charleroi. It seems to us that any competent and energetic officer, bent upon getting ready to execute his orders as soon as they should be received, and to execute them to the letter when he should receive them, would have accom- plished far more than Marshal Ney accomplished that morning. 4. We desire to call attention to the fact that up to this time there is no evidence whatever of indolence, or irresolution, on the part of the Emperor Napoleon. From the time when he left Paris at half-past three in the morning of the 12th to the time of which we are now writing, he seems to have been fully up even to his own high standard of military activity and capacity. His general order for the movement of the army on the 15th was as clear and full as it was possible for an order to be. His energy and dash on the 15th were noticeable. His vigor and endurance also seem to have been equal to the demands put upon them. From three in the morning to eight in the evening of the 15th he was on horseback, and in personal command of the troops. At midnight he had a long conference with Marshal Ney. Since the result of that conference was, as we have seen, to induce the postponement of the advance of the army, the Emperor may, very possibly, have taken some rest in the early morning hours of the i6th. But the despatch to Ney requesting from him an exact account of his position must have been sent off about five, and at or soon after eight we find him dictating to Count Flahaut the letters [chap. 9.] NAPOLEON.-NOTES. I4I to Ney and Grouchy. It is hardly necessary to add, that if the explanation given above of the causes of the delay in the advance-movement of the army on the morning of the 1 6th be correct, there is not the slightest foundation for the charges of hesitation or irresolution, which have been so often made. ^ 5. It seems to be difficult for some writers to keep steadily in mind the absolute necessity of Napoleon's either defeating the Prussians or compelling them definitely to retreat, before he undertook any movement in the direction of Brussels, either with the view of attacking the English or of occupying that city. Thus Chesney,7 speaking of Napoleon's intentions on the morning of the i6th, says : — " His morning orders clearly prove that he expected no serious opposition from them (the Prussians) or the English at present, and was divided only in his mind between the thought of pressing on direct to Brussels between the two allied armies, or striking at the supposed Prussian right, driven back on Fleurus the day before." But Napoleon's letters to Ney and Grouchy, to which Chesney here refers, explicitly contradict this supposition. Napoleon says in his letter to Ney : — ^ "I am sending Marshal Grouchy with the 3d and 4th Corps of infantry to Sombreffe. I am taking my Guard to Fleurus, and I shall be there myself before noon. I shall there attack the enemy if I meet him, and I shall clear the road as far as Gembloux. There, after what shall have passed, I shall make up my mind." And he directs Ney to be all ready to march to Brussels, as soon as he (Napoleon) shall have arrived at a decision. But this decision, it is to be observed, was not to be taken until the Prussians should either have been attacked and ^Anfe,pp. 132, 139. 'Chesney, pp. 138, 139 : See also, Clinton, p. 380. •Corresp., vol. 28, p. 334: Doc. In^d., X, p. 32; App. C, xviii; posf, pp. 377, 378. 142 JUNE i6.-morning: napoleon.-notes. [chap. 9.] defeated, or should have fallen back at least as far as Gembloux. To the same effect is the letter to Grouchy : ^ " If the enemy is at Sombreffe I am going to attack him ; I am going to attack him even at Gembloux, and to carry even that position ; my intention being, after having explored {connu) these two positions, to set out this night and to operate with my left wing, which is under the command of Marshal Ney, against the English." It is plain from both these letters that to say that Napoleon was " divided in his mind " between " pressing on direct to Brussels betvv^een the two allied armies" and attacking the Prussians in front of him, — in other words, that he was hesitating which of these two courses he would take, is a statement utterly without foundation. In both despatches he states unequivocally his immediate intention, — namely, to attack the Prussians ; and it was only after he should have attacked and driven the Prussians and forced them as far to the eastward as Gembloux, that he proposed to retrace his steps, to rein- force Ney, and march against the English. Brussels, indeed, was regarded by Napoleon as perhaps the most important result of the campaign, next to the enormous military advantage which would be secured by the defeat or dispersion of the armies of Wellington and Blucher. But this was all. For the Emperor to gain Brussels, these hostile armies must either be attacked and beaten, or else they must definitely separate, each retiring towards its own base. The idea of passing between the two armies at this stage of the campaign, and so arriving at Brussels, it is safe to say, never entered Napoleon's mind. His object, as Jomini '° correctly states, was "not to occupy Brussels, but to destroy the opposing masses in succession." 9Corresp., vol. 28, p. 336; App. C, xxiv ; post, pp. 382, 383. *° Jomini, p. 112. CHAPTER X. THE BATTLE OF LIGNY. BLUCHER's DECISION TO ACCEPT BATTLE NOT DEPENDENT ON WELLINGTON'S ASSURANCE OF SUPPORT. Marshal Blucher, as we have seen,' had. on the even- ing of the 14th, ordered a concentration of his entire army in the neighborhood of Sombreffe. This, as has been pointed out above, was done without consultation, at the moment certainly, with the Duke of Wellington ; and we have before stated that we do not find that it was done in pursuance of any previous arrangement between the two commanders. At any rate it is not disputed that Marshal BlUcher took up a position in order of battle to the south of the Namur-Nivelles turnpike without having received either by letter or word of mouth any assurance whatsoever that his English ally was prepared to support him, other than that contained in MUffling's despatch, sent off from Brussels about midnight, and informing him that Wellington expected to be at Nivelles at 10 A. M. in strong force. Zieten's (1st) Corps, about five o'clock in the morning of the i6th, withdrew' from the neighborhood of FleUrus, where it had passed the night of the 15th, to the north side of the brook of Ligny, and took up position in the villages of St. Amand, Brye and Ligny. Between 9 and 10 A. M. the lid Corps, commanded by Pirch I.,^ arrived, and took ^Ante, p. 70. "Ollech, p. 120. •Pirch II. commanded a brigade in the 1st Corps. 144 THE BATTLE OF LIGNY. [CHAP. 10.] up a position behind that occupied by the 1st Corps."* Between ii A. M.and 12 M.the 1 1 Id Corps, Thielemann's, came up, and occupied the hne between Sombreffe and Tongrinelle. These were the positions which were held during the battle by the three corps which had been gotten together; the IVth Corps, Billow's, it was then known could not come up during the day. Not until noon^ did Wellington's letter, dated "On the heights behind Frasnes, 10.30 A. M.," arrive. Not until i P. M.^ did the Duke himself meet Marshal Bliicher. Then a conversa- tion took place between them. There is no doubt that Wellington expressed'' himself as practically certain that the bulk of his army would be assembled at Quatre Bras early in the afternoon. His verbal statements to Marshal Bliicher were to the same effect as the statements con- tained in his letter. We have seen how mistaken he was in these, and how he came to be mistaken. What he wrote and said, however, he honestly believed ; and he certainly did give to Marshal Bliicher some assurance that hQ should be supported by the Anglo-Dutch forces in his impending struggle with the bulk of the French army. According to some authorities, his assurance took the form of a positive promise of support ; and these writers do not hesitate to assert that Bliicher's decision to accept battle at Ligny was based upon this definite promise.^ " Upon this assurance," says Charras, " the ■♦OUech, p. 123. ^Gneisenau, vol. 4, p. 373. ^Ollech, p. 125. ^Miiffling: Passages, 230,231,237. ^Charras, vol. i, pp. 150, 151, and note. Damitz, p, 92. Gneisenau, vol. 4, p. 375. Charras states in the note cited above that Clausewitz " says that it was the promise of help from Wellington that decided Bliicher to receive battle," — but we have not been able to find the passage. He also says that Siborne substantially follows Damitz in this matter; but we can not find that Siborne represents Wellington as making any such promise. In his official report of the battle Bliicher does not claim that such a promise was given. Jones, pp. 320, 321. BLUCHERS DECISION. I45 Prussian general decided to receive the battle which he could have avoided." The principal knowledge we have of the conversation between Wellington and Bllicher comes from what Muffling has told us about it.^ According to him the last words the Duke spoke were : — " Well ! I will come, provided I am not attacked myself." General Dorn- berg's evidence'" is to the same effect. The latest Prus- sian historian of the campaign" does not claim that the Duke gave Bliicher any unconditional promise of sup- port. That a different impression should have obtained currency with the Prussians is very natural. The Duke's statements of the proximity of his army, made vjiih per- fect honesty, but based, as we have seen, on very errone- ous da/a, no doubt raised false hopes in the minds of the Prussian generals. That these statements after- wards assumed in the mind of General Gneisenau, the Prussian chief-of-staff, the aspect and dimensions of a positive pledge of support, seems from Delbriick's life of Gneisenau quite probable." But the evidence, what there is of it, and tlie probabilities of the case, are all the other way. That is to say, Bllicher decided to fight at Ligny, without having any such definite promise of sup- port from Wellington, as the latter relied upon when he decided to await the attack of the French at Waterloo, two days later. This will appear more clearly when we consider the other assertion made on behalf of the Prussian com- mander, of which we have made mention above, — namely, that Bluchers decision to accept battle at Ligny was 'Miiffling : Passages, pp. 233-237, '°011ech, p. 127, note. "lb., p. 127. "011ech(p. 142; quotes Gneisenau as writing on the 17th: "We received from the Duke of Wellington the written promise that if the enemy should attack us, he would attack them in the rear." There is no such promise in Welling- ton's letter to Bllicher. 146 THE BATTLE OF LIGNY. [CHAP. 10.] based upon this promise of support from Wellington.'^ Delbriick, in his Life of Gneisenau/'* says : " Although this position [z. e., at and near Ligny] had been carefully considered and taken up with all caution, it was yet not fully decided to receive battle." This decision was not arrived at, we are given to understand, until Bliicher had received from Wellington a promise of support. That could not have been until between i and 2 o'clock P. M., for the Duke did not arrive at Brye till one o'clock. Miiffling says'^ that it was "when the heads of Napoleon's attacking columns showed themselves moving upon St. Amand" that "the Duke asked the Field Marshal [Bliicher] and General von Gneisenau : 'Qzie voulez-vous que je fasse? '" That is, we are asked to believe that Bliicher had not fully decided to await the attack of these French columns, now seen to be advancing, in the positions which had been deliberately selected, and on which the troops had been carefully stationed, until the Duke of Wellington had stated himself able to do what Bliicher and Gneisenau wished him to do. We are asked to believe that Bliicher would have retreated if Wellington had told him that his situation was such that he could not bring him any aid. We must say that such a contention seems to us hardly to deserve serious consideration. It is surely plain enough that Bliicher had chosen a battle-field, — had posted his army there, — had encouraged his troops to expect a conflict with the French, — without taking counsel with the English general.'^ Had he determined to fight only if he should receive assurance of support from -Wellington, would he not have taken some pains to "La Tour D'Auvergne, p. 109, entirely disbelieves this assertion. '^Gneisenau, p. 372. "Muffling : Passages, p. 234. '* Bliicher's Report leaves the question open. Jones, pp. 320, 321. [chap. 10.] blucher's decision. 147 obtain such assurance ? Would he have left it entirely to the chance of Wellington's writing him a letter, or riding over to his headquarters ? These questions answer them- selves. We conclude, then, that it is a fact beyond contro- versy that Marshal Blucher decided to accept battle at Ligny altogether independently of any support or assist- ance that might be afforded him by the Anglo-Dutch army. He deliberately ran the risk of encountering, unsupported by his allies, and with such only of his troops as he could on short notice collect close to the frontier, the bulk of the French army under Napoleon himself. How far he was wise in this we will consider in another place ; what we have sought to make plain now is that such was the fact. NOTE TO CHAPTER X. What were the reasons which induced Marshal Bllicher to take up a defensive position at Ligny, and there await the attack of Napoleon ? The question is certainly an important one. We have considered above and rejected the answer to this question offered by some Prussian writers, that Bllicher accepted battle only on the definite promise of support from Wellington. It remains to see what other reasons have been adduced for his taking a step so perilous to the fortunes of the allies. Neither Clausewitz nor Jomini pay any attention to the question. Damitz" explanation is as follows : — "Marshal Bliicher was free to refuse the combat; he could very well have avoided it, and have waited until the IVth Corps should have joined him. But, seeing himself at the head of 80,000 men, it was not in his firm and decided character to turn his back on an adversary. He knew that he could not vanquish Napoleon by skil- ful manoeuvres, but only by repeated blows. The General and his army felt themselves strong enough ; that was of itself a reason for not avoiding a battle." He then goes on to show that a march to join the English army would involve a temporary renunciation of the Prussian base of operations. These are the reasons he gives. He adds most unex- 'Damitz, p. 85. [chap. 10.] BLUCHERS DECISION. — NOTES. I49 pectedly: — "" "It is then evident that the Prussians decided on accepting battle because the Duke of Wel- lington had given them his word." But of any such fact as this no mention whatever is made until the writer has occasion to speak^ of the conversation between Welling- ton and Bliicher between i and 2 P. M., when the French were deploying their columns for the attack. It is impossible to believe that Bliicher had not before this made up his mind to fight, altogether independently of anything Wellington might say to him. Ollech'^ suggests, as an answer to the question, " Why did Bliicher give battle on the i6th although a whole army corps had not arrived ? " that he did it in order to give the English army time to concentrate. This writer does not pretend that Wellington gave the Field Marshal any definite promise of support.^ Delbriack, in his Life of Gneisenau, says^ that Bliicher, relying on Wellington's promise, and still hoping that at least late in the evening a portion of the IVth Corps would arrive, concluded to give battle. There is really not much to be said on this subject. The truth is plain enough. Bliicher had, as we have said above,^ long ago fixed upon Sombreffe as the point of concentration for his army in case the French should cross the Sambre at or near Charleroi ; and he had, most likely, communicated this determination to the Duke of Wellington. In arriving at this determination he undoubtedly assumed that he would be able to collect his whole army together,— say, 120,000 men. He thought, and he had a right to think, that if Napoleon "Damitz, p. 87. 'lb., p. 92. ^Ollecli, pp. 123, 124. *Ib., p. 127. 'Gneisenau, vol. 4, P- 375- 'Ante, p. 70. 150 THE BATTLE OF LIGNY. — NOTES. [CHAP. 10.] should advance by way of Charleroi, he would be sure to attack the Prussian army if it should be found posted at or south of Sombreffe; and that Napoleon would be obliged to employ against it the bulk of his army. Hence Bliicher calculated that the Anglo-Dutch concen- tration could be effected without serious molestation, and that some assistance at any rate from that quarter might safely be counted on. But when the day arrived, he found that he could not reckon on the arrival of one of his corps in time for the battle. Yet he still adhered to his determination to accept the contest, partly from unwillingness to retreat at the outset of the campaign, and partly in the hope that important aid would be received from Wellington. This determination, how- ever, was arrived at without consultation with Welling- ton and before his letter was received,— in which, it is to be noted, there is no promise whatever,— and, of course, before the Duke himself rode over to Brye. What Wellington said no doubt strengthened the Field Marshal in his belief in the soundness of his decision ; it reinforced his judgment ; it gave him hopes of victory. But to say that his decision to receive the attack of the French at Ligny was based upon any promise of sup- port made by Wellington, is entirely contrary to the evidence. CHAPTER XI. THE BATTLE OF LIGNY. Marshal Blucher had taken up a position, which although in some respects determined by the nature of the ground, was nevertheless intended to secure two objects, — first, his line of communications with Namur, and an unobstructed march for his expected I Vth Corps, Billow's, and, secondly, his avenue of communication with the Anglo-Dutch army, from which he expected to receive at least some assistance in the course of the afternoon. It thus came about that the centre of the Prussian army was at Sombreffe, — that the line of the right wing ran through the villages of Ligny and St. Amand in a south-westerly direction, and that that of the left wing ran from Sombreffe through the hamlet of Mont Potriaux to Tongrinelle and Balatre in a south- easterly direction. This left wing consisted entirely of the II Id Corps, Thielemann's. It contained 22,051 infantry, 2,405 cavalry, and 48 guns. ' The 1st Corps, Zieten's held the front of the centre and right wing, and was supported by the lid Corps, that of Pirch I., throughout its whole extent. These two corps contained 56,803 infantry, 6,093 cavalry, and 176 guns.' The right wing was " in the air " ; it was possible to turn it completely, by way of St. Amand and Wagnelee. Behind Ligny and St. Amand, and on commanding Charras, vol. i, p. 155, n. lb., p. 155, n. 152 THE BATTLE OF LIGNY. [CHAP. II.] ground, was the village of Brye. Bluchers whole force thus consisted of 87,352 men, of whom 8,498 were cavalry, — with 224 guns. Napoleon, having finished giving his orders shortly after nine, arrived at Fleurus about 11 A. M. ^ He busied himself, while the troops were arriving, with examining the enemy's position. From the tower of an old and disused windmill in the outskirts of the town he made, it is said, his first observations. Then he went, — wdthout his staff, as his custom was before a battle, — partly on horseback and partly on foot, along the front of the enemy's position, seeing for himself everything that could be seen. By the time the troops had arrived in the neighborhood of Fleurus, he had formed his plan. He had not, however, correctly estimated the numbers of the force opposed to him ; the nature of the ground prevented his being able to see all the enemy's troops. ^ The more natural and obvious plan for Napoleon would have been to direct his attack upon the exposed Prussian right wing, and to operate in conjunction with the column under Marshal Ney, so far as that might seem expedient. By moving upon Wagnelee and Brye, he would turn the position of St. Amand, and almost cer- tainly secure a victory. But Napoleon did not see in this operation any chance of inflicting a decisive blow. ^ At most, he would only have defeated an exposed wing of the enemy's army. There w^ould have been nothing to prevent its falling back upon the centre and left wing. The Prussians would no doubt be worsted, but their defeat could hardly be of a character to cripple them. Nor would their communications be in the slightest degree imperilled. What Napoleon determined on was an operation far ^ Charras, vol. i, p. 145. * lb., p. 150. 5 For a further discussion of this subject see the Notes to this chapter. [chap. II.] THE BATTLE OF LIGNY. 153 more decisive. He saw that that part of the Prussian army which lay in the neighborhood of Sombreffe, Tongrinelle and Balatre, placed there, as it had been, for the purpose of protecting the communications with Namur, would in all probability not dare to move from its position, and would accordingly not be able to take any active part in the battle. He would therefore have to deal only with that portion of the enemy's army which lay between Sombreffe and St. Amand, — say, two-thirds of their entire force. He also saw that if the enemy's centre, between Ligny and Sombreffe, could be broken, the Prussian right wing would be separated from the rest of the army, and that he might hope to overwhelm it. He saw also one other thing. If, at or about the time when this success should be obtained, a strong column from Marshal Ney's command could march down the Quatre Bras-Namur turnpike and move upon Brye, that success would almost certainly be of the most decisive character. ^ Attacked in front and rear at the same time, its connection with the rest of the army severed, surrounded by superior numbers, the utter rout of that part of the Prussian army was inevitable. (See Map 6.) At one o'clock the French army had arrived, and was in and about Fleurus. The Emperor threw the 4th Corps, Gerard's, about 16,000 strong, ^ with 38 guns, far to the right, opposite the whole front of the village of Ligny; the 3d Corps, Vandamme's, about 19,000 strong, ^ with 38 guns, connected with the left of the 4th Corps, and, assisted by Girard's division of the 2d Corps, * " A movement that would certainly have obtained an immense victory." Jomini, p. 223. "> Charras, vol. i, p. 155, n. The division of Hulot and the cavalry of Maurin were stationed opposite the bend in the enemy's line, beyond Ligny. lb., p. 161. *Ib., p. 155, n. 154 THE BATTLE OF LIGNY. [CHAP. II.] about 4,300 Strong, ^ with 8 guns, menaced the Prussians in the village of St. Amand ; while the cavalry of Pajol and Exelmans, to the number of about 6,500 men, '° with 24 guns, supported by Hulot's division of the 4th Corps, observed the Prussian left wing, — stationed from Sombreffe to Balatre. The Guard, with Milhaud's Cuirassiers, in all about 22,000 men, with 102 guns," was kept in reserve, near Fleurus, ready to strike the final blow when the enemy in Ligny and St. Amand should have been sufificiently weakened by a continuous struggle of three or four hours. The whole force consisted of 67,787 men, of whom 13,394 were cavalry, with 210 guns. " These dispositions consumed perhaps an hour or more. At 2 o'clock the chief-of-sta£f, Soult, wrote '^ to Marshal Ney, informing him that, at half-past two Marshal Grouchy, with the 3d and 4th Corps, would commence an attack on a Prussian corps stationed between Sombreffe and Brye ; that it was the Emperor's intention that Ney should also attack the enemy before him ; and, after having vigorously driven them, should fall back upon the main army to join in enveloping this Prussian corps, of which mention had just been made. Then, at half-past two precisely, the battle began ; '^ Gerard vigorously attacked Ligny, — Vandamme and Girard, St. Amand. With equal vigor did the Prussians defend their positions. The engagement immediately 9 Charras, vol. i, p. 155, n. '°Ib., p. 155, n. "lb., p. 15s, n. "lb., p. 155, n. This is exclusive of the 6th Corps, which was in reserve. It numbered 10,465 men, with 32 guns. "Doc. Indd., XIII, p. 40; App. C, xxv; post, pp. 383, 384. •■•The battle of Ligny has often been described. Charras, La Tour d'Auvergne, Thiers, on the French side, Clausewitz and OUech on the Ger- man side, give excellent descriptions. Siborne's account is also very clear and good. It is unnecessary to repeat the details here. [chap. II.] THE BATTLE OF LIGNY. 155 became very hot, and very sanguinary. Both sides fought with singular determination. In less than an hour Napoleon was convinced that he had more than a single corps to deal with, — as he had written to Ney, — it was an army. The success, therefore, could be made more decisive than he had at first thought possible, if only at the proper time Ney's cooperation could be secured. Without that cooperation, indeed, he was practically sure of victory; it was plain to him that the Prussians in the villages of Ligny and St. Amand and its neighboring hamlets, and on the heights in the rear of these villages, were becoming exhausted, and were suffering terribly from the fire of his guns, to which their position on the heights exposed them;'^ he knew that when the proper moment arrived he could defeat them ; but he wanted something more than a defeat ; he saw that the rout or capture of this part of the Prussian army was a certain thing if Ney could only make that movement from Quatre Bras upon their right and rear, of which he had spoken in his 2 o'clock order. Hence at a quarter-past three Soult wrote to Ney again,'^ urging him to manoeuvre at once, so as to envelop the enemy's right, and to fall on his rear. He told him that the Prussian army was lost if he acted vigorously ; that "the fate of France was in his hands." "Thus," the order proceeds, " do not hesitate an instant to make the movement which the Emperor orders, and direct yourself on the heights of Brye and St. Amand to assist in a victory perhaps decisive." The officers who carried these orders had some » Sir Henry Hardinge, speaking to the Duke of Wellington, said: " When you had examined the Prussian position, I remember you much disapproved of it, and said to me, 'if they fight here they will be damnably mauled.' " * * * The Duke added : " They were dotted in this way — all their bodies along the slope of a hill, so that no cannon-ball missed its effect upon them." Stanhope, p. 109. Cf. Hooper, p. 96. '6 Doc. Indd., XIV, p. 42 ; App. C, xxvi; post, p. 384. 156 THE BATTLE OF LIGNY. [CHAP. II.] thirteen miles to ride, about six miles on cross-roads, as far as Gosselies, and the remainder on the great Brussels turnpike, on which d'Erlon's troops were marching towards Frasnes. Their errands could not have been performed in less than two hours, ''' and as a matter of fact they required three hours. Napoleon could hardly have expected the first order to reach Ney much before 5 P. M., and the second hardly before 6 P. M. The distance from Quatre Bras to Marbais, where the road branches off from the Namur turnpike in the direction of Wagnelee, is nearly four miles. If then at 5 o'clock it should be in Marshal Ney's power to execute the 2 P. M. order, his troops might be looked for or heard from in the direction of Marbais about 7 o'clock. If he should be unable to obey the 2 o'clock order, but should be able to execute the 3.15 order, his movement down the Namur road might be looked for about 8 o'clock. The battle then went on with unabated determination and with heavy loss on both sides. Bliacher reinforced his troops from time to time ; in this way he exhausted his reserves ; nearly all his divisions were brought under fire. Napoleon on the other hand was exceedingly chary of giving aid to the two corps engaged ; he wished to keep his reserves as large as possible ; at half-past five he had employed ten thousand fewer men than his adversary. '^ At this time, also, the 6th Corps was well on its way from Charleroi. The hour was approaching, too, when Ney's cooperation might be expected. Up to this time Napoleon had remained in his position in front of Fleurus ; '^ it was a central position, and noth- ing had called for his personal superintendence elsewhere. "The Duke of Elchingen — Doc. Indd., p. 41 — estimates the distance at nearly five leagues, that is, i2h miles, and allows two hours for the time occupied, Charras, vol. i, page 204, n., makes the distance six leagues (15 miles) and estimates the time at three hours. '8 Charras, vol. i, p. 166. «9Ib., p. 164. [chap. II.] THE BATTLE OF LIGNY. 1 57 But now he prepared to strike the decisive blow. He determined to put in the Guard. He proposed to send to Vandamme the infantry division known as the Young Guard, and one of the two brigades of the division known as the chasseurs of the Guard ; ''° the other bri- gade of this division he would place at the disposal of Gerard. He himself, at the head of the infantry division of grenadiers of the Guard, known as the Old Guard, with all the artillery of the Guard, with Guyot's division of the heavy cavalry of the Guard, and Milhaud's division of cuirassiers of the line, — to take the place of Lefebvre-Desnouettes' division of light cavalry of the Guard which was with the left wing under Marshal Ney, — prepared to carry the village of Ligny, and the com- manding heights above and to the right of the village, thereby breaking the centre of the enemy's line. At this moment, however, word came from Van- damme that a column of the enemy was seen de- bouching from a wood some two miles away, and apparently marching on Fleurus. This was not the quarter in which the expected reinforcement from Ney was looked for. Curiously enough, Vandamme did not ascertain what this column was. Why he should not have done this it is not easy to see. Had he sent a patrol to find out who these troops were, time would have been saved, and time, at that hour in the day, was most important. The Emperor sent one of his own aides to ascertain the facts; and, pending his report, suspended the projected attack. The battle went on as before, but BlUcher drew more and more from his centre and left wing to support his right at St. Amand and the neighboring villages. In something less than two hours the aide returned. ''"Sometimes classed as part of the Old Guard, as in Charras, vol. i, p, 67 and La Tour d'Auvergne, p. 48, and sometimes as " the Middle Guard" {la Garde moyetine). See " Napoleon \ Waterloo," p, 315, n. i ; p. 325. 158 THE BATTLE OF LIGNY. [CHAP. II.] The troops which Vandamme had reported advancing were those of d'Erlon's Corps/' All anxiety was relieved. Napoleon naturally concluded" that d'Erlon had been sent by Ney, and would immediately move on Brye. He instantly resumed the suspended movement.^^ Before half-past seven, Vandamme had received his reinforce- ments, and had renewed the fight with energy. At the same time the Emperor, at the head of the grenadiers and cavalry of the Guard and of Milhaud's cuirassiers, marched for the village of Ligny, of which the eastern portion was already in the possession of Gerard's Corps. The Prussians, though fighting desperately, were speed- ily overcome; the village was carried; the brook of Ligny, a serious obstacle for both cavalry and artillery, was crossed on the bridges in the town ; and at half-past eight o'clock"^ the French troops, passing out of the northern end of the village, deployed on the heights lying between that village and Sombreffe, and ascended the plateau, the key to the field of battle, on which stood the windmill of Bussy. The Prussian troops which BlUcher had allowed to remain on this part of the line offered a stout but ineffectual resistance. The old Marshal himself came up from St. Amand, where he had wrongly supposed that the crisis of the battle was being decided, and at the head of a body of cavalry fiercely charged the victorious French. In one of the encounters his horse was killed, he himself was badly bruised, and came very near being taken prisoner. ^'We shall consider in another place how d'Erlon's Corps came to be there. Shortly after it was seen by Vandamme it retired to Frasnes. "La Tour d'Auvergne, p. 135 : Jomini, pp. 13S, 139. "There was no delay, as suggested by Siborne, vol. i, p. 218. From where the Guard had been stationed to the northerly end of the village of Ligny, where it was put in, was at least two miles and a half. Only a small part of this distance had been traversed before the news from Vandamme caused a halt. ''''Charras, vol. i,p. 175, n. 2 : letter from Soult to Joseph Bonaparte. [chap. II.] THE BATTLE OF LIGNY. 159 Meantime, the Prussians fell back from St. Amand and the neighboring villages, which were at once occu- pied by Vandamme. Brye, however, was held until mid- night by Pirch I. with a strong rear guard, and Thiele- mann occupied Sombreffe and Point du Jour. The corps of Zieten, followed finally by that of Pirch I., retreated on Tilly, a town just north of Sombreffe, and in the direction of Wavre. The Prussians lost'^ in this battle about 18,000 men killed and wounded ; and, a day or two afterwards, about 10,000 or 12,000 more, who would seem to have done their duty in the fight, abandoned their colors, and retired towards Liege. These men belonged to prov- inces which had formerly been part of the French Empire, and their sympathies were with Napoleon.^^ The French captured some thousands of the Prussian wounded, and 25 or 30 guns. The French loss was between 11,000 and 12,000 men.'^ The battle was over at about half-past nine. The 3d Corps established itself in bivouac beyond St. Amand and Wagnelee ; the 6th Corps occupied the plateau of Bussy; the 4th Corps was on the right of the 6th, with one division at and near Potriaux. The Guard and Milhaud's cuirassiers occupied a line behind these troops.""^ At 1 1 P. M. the Emperor returned to Fleurus,''^ where he established his headquarters. All parts of the French army on the field had taken part in this action except the ist and 6th Corps. The ist Corps retired towards Frasnes soon after it had been seen. As "^Charras, vol. i, p. 179, where he discusses the Prussian authorities. Cf. Muquardt, p. 139, n. ^Cf. Gneisenau, vol. 4, pp. 381, 382. Muffling: Passages, pp. 204, 205, 223. Siborne, vol. i, pp. 302, 303. "Charras, vol. i, p. 180. "lb., pp. 177, 178. ■»Ib., p. 179. l60 THE BATTLE OF LIGNY. [CHAP. II.] for the 6th Corps, the order to Lobau, which was not sent until 2.30 P. M., could not have reached him in his bivouac near Charleroi till 3.30 P. M. He had eight miles to march before reaching Fleurus; he was then directed on Ligny, and he passed through Ligny, just after the successful attack of that place by the Imperial Guard, to his final position on the plateau of Bussy, between Brye and Sombreffe, where he arrived about 9.30 P. M. ^° It has been considered singular, that when Lobau arrived at Fleurus, say, about 7.30 P. M.,^' he should have been directed on Ligny, apparently to support the movement of the Guard ; whereas if he had been instructed to move on Brye by passing around St. Amand and Wagnelee it would seem that he might have struck the defeated Prussians in flank and rear, and accomplished substantially what Napoleon expected from Ney. But the withdrawal of the ist Corps could only be explained by the supposition that Ney had encountered the English in considerable force; and under these circumstances Napoleon may have deemed it wiser to retain the 6th Corps as a reserve for the whole army.^^ The battle of Ligny was a great victory, although it was not a decisive victory. Napoleon had diminished by one-third the strength of his opponent's army, and had also driven him from the field. He had certainly achieved a great success. But the advantage obtained was not all that he had a right to expect. Had it not been for the appearance of d'Erlon's Corps in the neighborhood of St. Amand, the attack by the Guard would have been made at half-past five o'clock, when there would have been sufficient daylight left to have made it possible to follow up the victory. On such a result as would have been ^'Charras, vol. i, p. 178. 3'Charras (vol. i, p. 184) thinks it was not later than 6.30 P. M. when the 6th Corps reached Fleurus. ^-Charras (vol. i, pp. 184, 185) severely criticises this decision. [chap. II.] THE BATTLE OF LIGNY. l6l obtained in this event Napoleon had a right to calculate, and that he did not obtain such a result was in no way his fault." For the purpose therefore, of estimating the adequacy of the Emperor's measures to the task before him, and the danger which Marshal Blucher ran when he accepted battle, we should consider what would have been the result, if the attack of the Guard had been made two hours earlier than it was made, and there had been two hours of daylight in which to complete the defeat and to pursue the enemy. As for the cooperation of Ney, that is a different matter. Napoleon could not know what resistance Ney might encounter; hence he could not calculate on his overcoming that resistance and sending a reinforcement to the main army, — he could only hope that Ney would be able to do this. If Ney should be able to keep off the English, all that Napoleon had a right to calculate on would be effected. Whether Ney could have accom- plished more than he did accomplish will be considered in another place. Owing, then, to the postponement of the attack on the Prussian centre caused by the unexpected apparition of a large body of troops (the ist Corps), in a quarter where it threatened the French left, the victory of Ligny was by no means so complete as it otherwise would have been. Darkness came on before the Prussians, retiring from St. Amand and the neighboring hamlets, could be vig- orously pressed. Nevertheless, the victory of Ligny had disposed of Bllicher for thirty-six hours, at the very least. It gave Napoleon an opportunity of attacking Wellington the next day without danger of interference from the Prussians. And as this success had been achieved with no loss at all on the part of the ist and 6th Corps and with a trifling loss on the part of the Guard, Napoleon ^^Unless he erred in arresting the attack of the Guard on the appearance of the strange corps. SQ&post, p. 174, notj 8. l62 THE BATTLE OF LIGNY. [CHAP. II.] was in excellent condition to take advantage of the opportunity thus presented. That is to say, the decision of Marshal Blucher to accept battle when he had collected only three-fourths of his army, and the inability of the Duke of Wellington to render him any assistance, had produced this result at the close of the second day of the campaign, — that one of the allied armies had been badly beaten, and that Napoleon was perfectly free to attack the other the next day with superior forces, most of which consisted of fresh troops. NOTES TO CHAPTER XI. I. Napoleon has been often blamed because he did not begin the battle of Ligny till between two and three o'clock in the afternoon. We have spoken of this criticism before, and recur to it now merely to repeat that the greater part of this delay may (in all probability) be accounted for by his wish that his own advance-move- ment should be contemporaneous with that of the left wing, one-half of which was far in the rear. There was probably also an unusual amount of time spent in examining the position of the enemy. Clausewitz' is undoubtedly right in saying that " If the actual tactical shock of battle could have been arranged to take place in the morning of the i6th, it would have been an enor- mous mistake in Napoleon to have delayed it, for Blticher was col- lecting his troops at that time, and, as the whole force of the Prus- sians [including Billow's Corps, which for anything Napoleon knew to the contrary, might arrive during the day] was far superior to the 75,000 men which he could use against it, nothing was so im- portant as to offer battle before it was all got together." It is also true, ' that, had Napoleon advanced early in the morning with the main body of his army, leaving Ney to push forward with the left wing as soon as he could, he would have been able to interrupt the formation of the Prussian line of battle, and would not have been in the 'Clausewitz, ch. 25, p. 53. ^Cf. Charras, vol. i, pp. 182, 183, 163 l64 THE BATTLE OF LIGNY.-NOTES. [CHAP. II.] least interfered with by the Anglo-Dutch army. But Napoleon, although it is plain from his letters to Grouchy and Ney that he did not expect to find either the Prus- sians or the English in great force, preferred on the whole to make his own advance coincide in point of time with that of Marshal Ney. He could not estimate with any certainty the number of troops which Bllicher might have on the heights of Ligny or within call ; he could not know how large a part of his army Wellington had been able to collect. Hence he decided to defer his own movement until Ney was ready, or, at least, ought to have been ready, with all the troops which had been assigned to him, to protect the left flank of the main army from all danger of an attack by the Anglo-Dutch forces. The question is one on which different opinions will always exist. The course adopted by Napoleon was unquestionably the one most in accordance with the principles of war. Whether a chance of success justifies a departure from the practice of those principles, or whether such a departure is warranted only in cases of emergency, is the real question. We have no room to discuss it further here. 2. Napoleon's plan of battle at Ligny has been severely criticised. Clausewitz, ^ Rogniat, ^ Marshal Davout, 5 are especially pronounced in their opinion that Napoleon should have manoeuvred so as to turn the Prussian right, and not to pierce their centre. The question is thus stated by Rogniat : "We arrived upon their right flank; reason counselled us to attack this wing ; in this way we should have avoided in part the defiles of the brook ; we should have approached our own left wing, which was fighting at Quatre Bras, so that both armies could have helped each other, and finally we should have thrown the Prussians far from the English, in forcing them to retire on Namur." ^Clausewitz, ch. 34. *Cons. sur I'Art de la Guerre, p. 339, cited in Corresp., vol. 31, p. 472. 'Davout, p. 545. [chap. II.] THE BATTLE OF LIGNY.-NOTES. 165 To this Napoleon^ replied from St. Helena: " The question in this battle was not that of separating the English from the Prussians ; we knew that the English could not be ready to act till the next day ; but here the point was to hinder that part of the Illd Corps of Bliicher which had not joined him by 1 1 A. M., and which came by way of Namur, and also the IVth Corps, which came from Liege by way of Gembloux, from uniting [with the 1st and lid Corps] on the field of battle. In cutting the enemy's line at Ligny, his whole right wing at St. Amand was turned and compromised ; while by simply becoming masters of St. Amand, we should have accomplished nothing." In other words, Napoleon defends his plan of battle by showing that it aimed at a decisive tactical success ; that its accomplishment would practically have destroyed half of the Prussian army ; which an attack upon the exposed right wing would not have effected. He contends that the Prussians being, as they certainly were, on this day, completely separated from the English, the best thing he could possibly do was to take advantage of their faulty formation, and cut off and destroy the two exposed corps. This he calculated he could effect with the troops he had in hand. Then he undoubtedly hoped that he would get assistance from Ney in this operation. ' The order to Ney at 2 P. M. shows this beyond a question ; and this order was reiterated at a quarter-past three. Napoleon said to Gerard during the battle,' "It is possible that in three hours the issue of the war may be decided. If Ney executes his orders well, not a cannon in the Prussian army can escape capture. That army is taken enjiagrant deliC This last expression occurs also in the 3.15 P. M. order. The possibility of Ney's sending a force down the Ouatre-Bras-Namur turnpike to take ^Corresp., vol. 31, p. 472- ^Clausewitz (ch. 34, pp. 81 et seq.) points out that Ney's cooperation could not have formed an essential part of Napoleon's plan of battle, for Napoleon " could not know whether Ney would be able to spare him a single man." ^Corrcsp., vcl. 31, p. 2c6. l66 THE BATTLE OF LIGNY.-NOTES. [CHAP. II.] the exposed Prussian right wing in rear, was therefore an additional reason for inclining him to make his main attack at Ligny, and thereby isolate this wing, with the hope of surrounding and destroying it. That he had no right to count on Ney's cooperation is certainly true, as has been stated above ; but then Napoleon believed that he could carry out his plan without Ney's cooperation, and that if Ney should assist him, his success would be overwhelming. To the reasons advanced by Rogniat for making the main attack upon the right flank of the Prussians, Marshal Davout adds another : — ^ " He ought not to have left the Prussian army between himself and Marshal Ney ; because, in that case, if he should beat the Prussians, he would force them to retire in the direction of the English." To the same effect Clausewitz '° asks, " whether Bona- parte ought to have arranged his attack so as to drive Bllicher towards Wellington, or so as to push him away from him," — implying that the result of the battle as fought by Napoleon had the former effect, "If," says Clausewitz, "Bonaparte had attacked St. Amand with his right wing, Wagnelee with his left, and had advanced with a third column against the road fi'om Brussels," the Prussians, if they lost the battle, would have been forced to retreat along the Roman road, that is, towards the Meuse, and a union with Wellington in the days immediately following the battle would have been very uncertain, perhaps impossible." We can have no hesitation in admitting that if the Prussians had been driven in the direction of the Meuse as the result of the battle, they could not have afforded aid to the English on the i8th of June. But we can hardly believe that if Napoleon had destroyed their 1st 'Davout,^ p. 545- '"Clausewitz, ch. 34, p. 83. "It is not quite clear in which direction this column was to advance. [chap. II.] THE BATTLE OF LIGNY.-NOTES. 167 and lid Corps, which he expected would be the result of his plan of battle, the Prussians could possibly have afforded any further assistance to the English. Still, while the decision of the Prussian generals after the battle to maintain their communication with the Duke of Wellington, and to come to his assistance at Waterloo with their whole army, was not arrived at merely or chiefly because the two corps which had been beaten at Ligny were able to fall back in a northerly direction instead of in an easterly direction, in retiring from the field of battle," it is certainly true that this fact did make the task easier of accomplishment ; it saved time, also. At the same time, it did not affect in any way the risk involved in the operation, — that of renouncing for the time being their line of supplies. 3. We have seen that Napoleon believed that Ney s intervention, which, as we have seen, might have occurred at the moment when the Prussian centre was being pierced, would have gained him a great victory. But Clause witz'^ asks: "Why was it inevitable that 10,000 men in the rear of the strong Prussian army of 80,000 men, in an open country, where one can see on all sides, should bring about its complete overthrow ? " In other words. Napoleon was not warranted (so Clausewitz contends) in expecting such a decisive success, even if Ney should send 10,000 men down the Namur road. But Clausewitz has not in his question, above quoted, put the case quite fairly. The question which Napoleon considered was this : — What would in all probability be the effect upon two Prussian corps, numbering at the commencement of the action not over 63,000 men, attacked vigorously for three or four hours, subjected •^Maurice, pp. 350, 351: July, 1890. Maurice thinks that the beaten troops must have crossed the turnpike, even if they w^ere intending to retreat towards the Rhine. "^Clausewitz, ch. 31, p. 66. l68 THE BATTLE OF LIGNY -NOTES. [CHAP. II.] during that time to a most destructive fire of artillery, reduced by casualties to a force not greatly exceeding 50,000 men, assailed in front by over 20,000 fresh troops in addition to their opponents of the last few hours, forced to make a precipitate retreat by having their connection with the rest of their army broken, — what would be the effect upon them at this moment of an unexpected and vigorous attack in rear of 10,000 fresh troops ? Napoleon thought and said, that, in his judg- ment, the result would be the total rout of the two corps, the capture of all their guns and perhaps half of their men. It is probable that he was right in his opinion. 4. But how far was Napoleon warranted in expecting aid from Ney ? As to Ney's whereabouts at the time when the 2 P. M. order should reach him, say, at 5 P. M., we have spoken before,''* and have shown that, long before that hour, certainly as early as 4 P. M,, the whole of the 2d Corps and the greater part of the ist Corps ought to have arrived at Quatre Bras. In fact, it will be remembered that had Reille obeyed at once Ney's order to him he would have arrived at Quatre Bras at noon; and there was nothing to prevent d'Erlon following promptly on his traces. Napoleon, it is true, as we learn from his own narrative, had heard of this vexatious delay, caused by Reille, — which he naturally but erroneously attributed to Reille's superior, Ney, — but he still seemed to think it possible that Ney could be at Quatre Pras at noon, notwithstanding. This, to be sure, was absolutely out of Ney's power, as we have seen ; but there was no reason whatever why Ney should not have had long before 5 P. M. his whole command well in hand, at or in front of Quatre Bras. Napoleon was perfectly justified in assuming this to be the case. But though Ney might well be at Quatre Bras with u A lite, p. 133. [chap. II.] THE BATTLE OF LIGNY.-NOTES. 1 69 his whole force, he might yer be entirely unable to comply with the Emperor's order to detach a force to attack the Prussians in rear. Clausewitz 's points out that Ney with his 40,000 men could easily encounter 50,000 to 60,000 English and Dutch. This is certainly true. It may be added that the last despatch '^ sent to Ney informed him that an ofhcer of lancers had just informed the Emperor that large masses of the enemy were to be seen near Ouatre Bras. This information was incorrect, as a matter of fact, yet it was believed to be true at the time the despatch was written. Of course the truth may have been ascertained before the 2 P. M. order was sent to Ney; but we do not know this for a fact. There was certainly no reason why Napoleon should have felt certain that Ney would find it possible to send troops to his assistance ; it all depended upon the forwardness of the concentration of the Duke of Wellington's army; and as to this Napoleon could but guess, — he had no information at all. 5. If Napoleon, then, could not rely with any certainty on Ney's assistance, was he justified in adopting a plan of battle, to the full success of which Ney's cooperation v/as essential ? Would it not have been wiser for him to have adopted the plan recommended by Rogniat, Davout and Clausewitz, and to have thrown his whole force on the exposed right wing of the Prussians ? This question cannot be properly answered without a careful examination of the tactical conditions, and this no one of Napoleon's critics has attempted with any detail. We will leave the matter, therefore, with this single observation. Napoleon, when he had completed his examination of the Prussian position, saw that there were open to him two plans of attack, each giving excellent "Clausewitz, ch. 31, p. 65. '^Doc. Indd., IX, p. 31 ; App. C, xxii; pos^, p. 381. 170 THE BATTLE OF LIGNY.-NOTES. [CHAP. II.] promise of success. He chose the one which in his judgment offered the greater chance of success, inde- pendent of Ney's cooperation, and promised a decisive success if Ney's cooperation could be secured. As it was, without Ney's assistance, and in spite of an unfortunate accident which caused an injurious delay in the final attack, he gained a great victory. It hardly seems worth our while to speculate on what the results would have been if he had adopted the other plan. 6. Why did not Napoleon order d'Erlon's Corps to remain and take part in the action ? For not doing this he has been most severely criticised by Charras '^ and others. But Napoleon must have supposed that d'Erlon had come upon the field under orders from Marshal Ney expressly to remain and take part in the action. Why, then, should he send him any orders ? Jomini, indeed, says '7 that Napoleon should have sent d'Erlon an order directing him on Brye. We can see now that this would have been wise; but it might well have appeared unnecessary at the time, inasmuch as the order of 2 P.M. by implication directs Ney's troops on Brye. It must also be remembered that at this moment Napoleon had all he could attend to in organizing the decisive move- ment on Ligny. If any other explanation than the above be needed, it has been furnished by Clausewitz.'^ He says that the lateness of the hour probably prevented Napoleon from directing personally the employment of the ist Corps. " Napoleon seems to have received information of the approach of this corps somewhere in the neighborhood of half-past five ; it took till seven before the nevv^s that it was d'Erlon was brought him ; it would have taken an hour before d'Erlon could have received the order, and another hour would have passed before he could have '^Charras, vol. i, pp. 170, 171, 183, 184. "Jomini, p. 138. '^Clausewitz, ch. 34, p. 84. [chap, II.] THE BATTLE OF LIGNY.-NOTES. I7I appeared In the neighborhood of Brye," i. ost, pp. 377. 378- »Ib., VIII, p. 27 ; App. C, xxi; post, pp. 380, 381. 'lb., IX, p. 31 ; App. xxii; i^^j/, p. 381. This refers to the prior order in distinct terms. 189 IQO THE BATTLE OF QUATRE BRAS -NOTES. [CHAP. 12.] also that of the Count of Valmy, and says in so many words that with these forces he ought to be able " to beat and destroy " the enemy. There is not either in the letter or in these orders a single word limiting the employment of Kellermann's cavalry to " a case of necessity." Yet this is what Charras states'* was contained in Soult's order. He even says that Ney did not dare ^ to employ but one out of the four brigades of which Kellermann's Corps consisted, — meaning that he was so hampered by his orders. Hooper^ also says that Ney used Kellermann's cavalry " sparingly, in obedience to the instructions of Napoleon." The orders speak for themselves. Ney was not only permitted to use Kellermann's Corps, but was positively directed to do so. It was only in his use of the cavalry of the Guard — the division of Lefebvre-Desnouettes^— that he was restricted. 2. Napoleon in his account of the campaign labored under a mistake as to the time when he gave Ney his orders on the i6th. He says it was in the night. This involved him in another mistake, namely, that the orders directed Ney "to push on at daybreak beyond Quatre Bras." It is true that he rendered it possible for the readers of his book to rectify these errors, for he says that Flahaut was the bearer of these orders, and he survived the campaign. Doubtless if the Emperor could have had access to him, these mistakes would have been rectified ; as it is, they render much of what Napoleon says of no value. Then, Napoleon never learned the truth about the wanderings of d'Erlon's Corps ; and this of course, invalidates his criticisms as to that matter. '•Charras, vol. i, p. 205. ^Ib., p. 206. 'Hooper, p. 127. 'Even in regard to this division, Soult's order plainly implies that Ney light make use of it. Doc. In^d., VIII, p. 28 ; App. C, xxi. ; post, pp. 3S0, 381. [chap. 12.] THE BATTLE OF QUATRE BRAS.-NOTES. IQI But in regard to the main point made in this chapter, the Emperor's opinion is given explicitly. He blames Ney^ for not having "executed his orders and marched on Quatre Bras with his 43,000 menr That Ney should concentrate his entire command was in reality, the burden of his orders. That this neglect to keep his command together was in Napoleon's eyes Ney's principal fault in his conduct on the 1 6th, appears unmistakably from the following passages in Soult's despatch^ to Ney of the next day: — " The Emperor has seen with pain that you did not yesterday unite your divisions ; they acted independently of each other ; hence they experienced losses. " If the corps of the Counts d'Erlon and Reille had been together, not an Englishman of the troops which attacked you would have escaped. If the Count d'Erlon had executed the movement upon St. Amand which the Emperor had ordered, the Prussian ai'my would have been totally destroyed, and we should have taken perhaps 30,000 prisoners. "The corps of Generals Gerard and Vandamme and the Imperial Guard have always been united : one exposes one's self to reverses when detachments are put in peril. " The Emperor hopes and desires that your seven divisions of infantry and your cavaliy shall be well united and organized, and that together they shall not occupy more than one league of ground, so that you may have them under your hand and may be able to employ them at need." What Soult told Sir William Napier, '° years after- wards, is without question the truth : — " Ney neglected his orders at Quatre Bras." 3. It may be worth while to correct a curious error into which Siborne has fallen in his anxiety to show that Ney was not ordered to seize Quatre Bras early in the morning. He " calls attention to the fact that the 2 P. M. ^Corresp., vol. 31, p. 209. 9Doc. Indd., XVII, p. 46; App. C, xxvii; :post, pp. 384, 385, '°Lifeof General Sir W. Napier, vol. i, p. 505. "Siborne, vol. i, p. 146, n. 192 THE BATTLE OF QUATRE BRAS.-NOTES. [CHAP. 12.] order to Ney was addressed on the back of the letter to the Marshal at Gosselies. " This circumstance," he says, " proves that Napoleon was under the impression that Ney had not at that time (two o'clock) commenced his attack, but was still at Gosselies." But this argument, if it is good for anything, shows that Napoleon supposed that Ney and, of course, the bulk of his command also, would be at Gosselies when the bearer of the letter arrived there, say at 3 o'clock, which is simply absurd. The fact is that, Ney having the previous night had his headquarters at Gosselies, all orders to him were naturally and properly sent there first. 4. Jomini," in a letter to the Duke of Elchingen, suggests that Napoleon might well have left Reille's corps and Lefebvre-Desnouettes' cavalry at Frasnes to watch the enemy at Quatre Bras, and thrown d'Erlon's Corps and Kellermann's cavalry on the rear of the Prussians at Brye, a manoeuvre which, he says, " could be executed from Frasnes as well as from Quatre Bras." Into the merits of this suggestion we do not propose to enter; there is certainly much to recommend it. But in a postscript General Jomini takes special pains to express his opinion that General Reille is not " deserving of the least censure " for having deferred putting his corps in motion from Gosselies for Frasnes, on the morning of the 1 6th, until he had communicated Girard's information to Marshal Ney. " We must not forget that General Reille had just sent — nine o'clock — positive information of the presence of the entire Pmssian army towards Ligny : he must have concluded from this that the left would be called upon to take part in the attack of this army, and that it would be unfortunate if, after such information, he took the Genappe [Quatre Bras] route when it would be necessary to turn to the right towards Brye. This reasoning was more than logical, it was based on the laws oi la grafide tactique"'^ »^Joniini, pp. 219, 221. "lb., p. 226. [chap. 12.] THE BATTLE OF QUATRE BRAS.-NOTES. I93 In this passage Jomini seems to overlook what he has just before said about Frasnes. Even if the left should be called upon to take part in the attack of the Prus- sians instead of being concentrated for the attack of Quatre Bras, it would still be necessary for a large force to establish itself at Frasnes, in order to observe the enemy at Quatre Bras ; to proceed then to Frasnes, with the two divisions of Foy and Jerome, from Gosselies, where he was when the Emperor's order reached him, was the right thing for Reille to do in any event. Jomini in fact suggests this very thing as in his judgment the correct course, viz.: to leave the 2d Corps at Frasnes and to throw the ist Corps on Brye. This attempt, therefore, to justify Reille's delay in marching to Frasnes, fails. 5. Other theories than the one we have adopted as to the cause of the wanderings of d'Erlon's Corps have been broached. Thiers thinks that Napoleon sent d'Erlon a direct order ; Charras''* has combated this view in a careful examination of the evidence, and we agree with him. There is, however, considerable conflict of tes- timony. Lieutenant-Colonel de Baudus, who was on the staff of Marshal Soult in this campaign, in his " Etudes sur Napoleon," '^ tells this story : — " At the moment when the affair [the battle of Ligny] was at its height, Napoleon called me and said to me : 'I have sent an order to the Comte d'Erlon to direct his whole corps in the rear of the right of the Prussian army ; go and carry to Marshal Ney a duplicate of this order, which ought to be communicated to him. You will tell him that, whatever may be the situation in which he finds himself, it is absolutely necessary that this disposition should be executed; that I do not attach any great importance to what is passing to-day on his wing; that the important affair is here, where I am, because I want to finish with the Prussian army. As for him, he must, if he can- not do better, confine himself to keeping the English army in ■''Charras, vol. 2, pp. 242 et seq. "Vol. I, pp. 210 et seq. Paris: 1841. 194 THE BATTLE OF QUATRE BRAS.-NOTES. [CHAP. 12.] check.* '^ When the Emperor had finished giving me his instruc- tions, the major-general [Soult] recommended me in the most ener- getic terms to insist most forcibly on the Duke of Elchingen that, on his part, nothing should hinder the execution of the movement prescribed to the Comte d'Erlon." Notwithstanding this circumstantial narrative, we do not beheve that Napoleon sent d'Erlon a direct order. Napoleon had in all his communications with Ney placed d'Erlon under him; the letter written to Ney that morn- ing by the Emperor said : — " The major-general has given the most precise instructions, so that there shall be no difficulty about obedience to your orders when you are detached from the main army; when I am present, the corps-commanders will take their orders from me." Now Napoleon must have supposed that d'Erlon would be with Ney at 5 P. M. Baudus' book was published twenty-six years after the battle. His recollection of the fact that he was sent on such a mission was no doubt clear; very likely he remembered with approximate accuracy what Napoleon and Soult said to him; but he may easily have been mistaken as to the order itself. It would be very natural that an order to Ney directing him to send the i st Corps to attack the Prussian right might be mistaken for an order to d'Erlon, who commanded the ist Corps, to do this. And what to our mind settles the matter is, that if the order had really been one directed to d'Erlon, neither the Emperor nor Soult would have wasted their time in asking Baudus to ask Ney not to interfere with its exe- cution. If, on the other hand, it was an order to Ney, '^ This is exactly what was enjoined on Ney by the 3.15 P. M. order. It is to be noted that, while the 2 P. M. order expressly directed Ney to attack the EngHsh, and only after having vigorously pushed them, to turn back and operate against the Prussians, the 3.15 P. M. order directed him to manoeuvre at ,post, p. 358. [chap. 15.] GROUCHY AND BLUCHER. 267 tions; to keep up your communications with us; therefore you ought to get to Wavre as soon as possible. The object of directing Grouchy on Wavre was therefore that he might approach the main army ; that he might keep in strict communication with it, — might be within the sphere of its operations. There is no strate- gical or other object even hinted at in directing Grouchy on Wavre, save that of approaching the main army. ^^ Nor is there any difficulty whatever in discerning the meaning of the writer. It is also perfectly plain that no opposition to Marshal Grouchy's occupation of Wavre was apprehended. It is therefore fairly to be inferred that the writer intended, that, if the situation should be such from any cause that the occupation of Wavre or the attempt to occupy it, would not subserve the purpose of enabling Grouchy to draw nearer to the main army, he should carry out this purpose in some other way. It seems to us foolish to say that this despatch would have justified Grouchy in taking the course which he did take, supposing, that is, that he had received it in time for it to affect his action. If, for example, a gentleman on a walking tour should order his servant to bring his baggage to a certain town, so that he might easily get at it from the place where he was himself expecting to be the next day, and the servant should find that all communication between this town and the region where his master expected to be had been interrupted by some accident, like the destruction of a railway-bridge, for instance, and he should nevertheless bring his master's baggage to that town, instead of "Gerard (Dern. Obs. p. rg) remarks : — " If one analyzes separately the text of these two despatches, * * * one perceives that the Emperor has spoken of the direction of Wavre only because he finds it indicated in the reports of the commander of the right wing. The principal object of both of them was to insist upon movements which would bring the troops of the right wing near the main body." Gerard is here referring to the order sent to Grouchy at i P. M. {post, p. 270), as well as to that dated 10 A. M. 268 JUNE i8: [chap. 15.] bringing it within his master's reach by carrying it to some other place, justifying himself by the terms of the letter, he would generally be regarded as having acted like a fool. Yet this is very nearly a parallel case to that of Marshal Grouchy, supposing that he had received the despatch in time to have acted on it, and had then acted as he did. The only thing needed to make it absolutely parallel is, that the servant in the case supposed should be in possession of information, of which his master was ignorant, making the carrying of the baggage to him at the earliest possible moment a matter of the utmost importance. Then the cases would be on all fours with each other. But we have delayed perhaps too long to show that this order cannot justify Grouchy 's action. Our excuse is that it has been so used by more than one authority.^'* Nor does the order show that Napoleon would have made the same mistake that Grouchy did, as has some- times been thoughtlessly said ; for Napoleon, at the time the despatch was sent off, knew nothing, as has just been pointed out, of the circumstances then under Grouchy's observation. It cannot, of course, be contended that Napoleon was not responsible for this order of 10 A. M. A commander- in-chief must be supposed to know what orders are issued in his name. Yet it is certainly true that the directions given to Marbot do not tally at all with this order to Grouchy. According to the latter. Grouchy would be looked for in the direction of Wavre, — that is, of Lasne and St. Lambert ; but Marbot was given to understand that the Emperor expected Grouchy to cross the Dyle at the bridges of Moustier and Ottignies. Colonel Marbot, in a letter written to Marshal Grouchy in 1830, says : — ^^ ^"Chesney, p. 206 ; Kennedy, p. 162; Gardner, p. 161, n. ; Grouchy Me'm., vol. 4, pp. 78, 80, 87. "Marbot, vol. 3, pp. 404 et seq. This letter is chiefly made up from his [chap. 15.] GROUCHY AND BLUCHER. 269 " At the commencement of the action, towards 11 A. M., I was detached from the division with my own regiment and a battahon of infantry, which had been placed under my command. These troops were posted on our extreme right, behind Frischermont, fac- ing the Dyle. " Particular instructions were given to me on the part of the Emperor by his aide-de-camp, Labedoyere, and by a staff officer whose name I do not recall. They prescribed to me to leave the bulk of my command always in view of the field of battle, to post 300 infantry in the Wood of Frischermont,^^ one squadron at Lasne, having outposts as far as St. Lambert; another squadron, half at Couture, half at Beaumont, sending reconnoissances as far as the Dyle, to the bridges of Moustier and Ottignies." He then describes the arrangements for the speedy transmission of intelligence, and proceeds : — "A note from Captain Eloy,^7 which the intermediate posts promptly transmitted to me, informed me that he had found no force at Moustier, nor at Ottignies, and that the inhabitants assured him that the French on the right bank of the Dyle would pass the river at Limale, Limelette and Wavre." He sent this word to the Emperor, who ordered him to push reconnoissances in those directions. Then, half a mile beyond St. Lambert, they captured some Prus- sians, who informed him that they were followed by a large part of the Prussian army. He then says : — " I proceeded to St. Lambert with a squadron to reinforce the troops there. I saw in the distance a strong column, approaching St. Lambert. I sent an officer in all haste to forewarn the Emperor, who replied, telling me to advance boldly, that this body of troops could be nothing else than the corps of Marshal Grouchy, coming from Limale, and pushing before it some stray Pixissians, of whom the prisoners I had just taken were a part." report, which is to be found in " Napoleon k Waterloo," pp. 344 ef seg. The editors of Marbot's Memoirs say (vol. 3, p. 408) that the steps they have taken to find the report at the War Office have been unsuccessful. ^''Sometimes called the Wood of Paris. ^^He commanded the picket at Moustier. 270 JUNE i8: [chap. 15.] Soon after, the fact that the approaching column was composed of Prussian troops was manifest. The Emperor was now sure that Grouchy would come by the upper bridges : — " My adjutant, whom I had ordered to go and inform the Emperor of the positive arrival of the Prussians at St. Lambert, returned, saying to me that the Emperor ordered me to inform the head of Marshal Grouchy's column, which ought at this moment to be debouching by the bridges of Moustier and Ottignies, since it had not come by Limale and Limelette, of the fact that the Prussians were advancing by way of St. Lambert." It is plain from the above narrative that the Emperor, when he sent Marbot off, shortly before 11 A. M., expected Marshal Grouchy to arrive during the after- noon,°^ and that his first idea was that he would arrive by the bridges of Moustier and Ottignies. This seems to show that the Emperor did not revise the 10 A. M. despatch sent off by Soult, which indicated that they expected Grouchy to arrive from Wavre. Napoleon must have been at this hour, — lo-ii A. M., — making his final preparations for the battle. Then there was another despatch to Grouchy, which we also give here in full : — ^^ Field of Battle of Waterloo, the iSth of June: i P. M. Marshal : You wrote to the Emperor at 2 o'clock?" this morning, that you would march on Sart-lez-Walhain ; your plan then is to proceed to Corbaix or?' to Wavre. This movement is conformable to his Majesty's arrangements which have been communicated to ^'This was Marbot's own conviction ; vol. 3, p. 40S. ^'La Tour d'Auvergne, pp. 270, 271 ; Charras, vol. i, pp. 286, 287 ; Siborne, vol. I, pp. 400, 401; Napoleon h. Waterloo, pp. 279, 280; App. C, xxxiv; ^osi, p. 3S9. ^The Grouchy Memoirs (vol. 4, p. 82) give this as 3 o'clock. "The text given in the Grouchy Memoirs, vol. 4, p. 82, replaces this "or" by an " and." This is not followed in any other work. [chap. 15.] GROUCHY AND BLUCHER. 27I you. Nevertheless, the Emperor directs me to tell you that you ought always to manoeuvre in our direction. 7^ It is for you to see the place where we are, to govern yourself accordingly, and to con- nect our communications, so as to be always prepared to fall upon any of the enemy's troops which may endeavor to annoy our right, and to destroy them. "At this moment the battle is in progresses on the line of Water- loo. The enemy's centre is at Mont St. Jean ; manoeuvre, there- fore, to join our right. The Marshal, Duke of Dalmatia. " P. S. A letter, which has just been intercepted, says that Gen eral Biilow is about to attack our right flank ; we believe that we see this corps on the height of St. Lambert. So lose not an instant in drawing near us and joining us, in order to crush Biilow, whom you will take in the very act." In this letter the Emperor's desire that Grouchy would manceuvre in his direction is expressed again and again, and even in the body of the letter it is plain that some apprehension is entertained at headquarters of an attack upon the right of the army by the Prussians. The post- script, of course, speaks for itself. Grouchy did not receive this letter till between 6 and 7 P. M., ''^ when it was too late for him to accomplish much. He, however, carried the bridge of Limale, and established himself on the left bank of the Dyle for the night. '^The text of the Grouchy Memoirs inserts here the f oUowing : — " and to seek to come near to our army, in order that you may join us before any body of troops can put itself between us. I do not indicate to you the direction you should take. " "^The original is " engagde." " This letter," says Marshal Grouchy (Fragm. Hist, Lettre k MM. M^ry et Barthdlemy; p. 14), "was in a hand writ- ing so difficult to decipher that I read it, as did also my chief-of- staff, and my senior aide-de-camp, ' gagnde.' " The chief-of-staff, General Le Sdndcal, says that the Marshal closely questioned the officer who was the bearer of the despatch, but he was so intoxicated that they could not get anything from him. Grouchy Mdm., vol. 4, pp. 132, 133. Cf. Gerard, Dern. Obs., p. 20, n. ^'•Grouchy Mdm., vol. 4, p. 87. 272 JUNE l8: GROUCHY AND BLUCHER. [CHAP. I5.] Taking the two letters together, — and leaving out of view for the moment the postscript of the second, — we see that Napoleon was expecting that Grouchy would approach him. He had learned of the "pretty strong column" which had passed by Gery and Gentinnes, directed on Wavre. He, no doubt, supposed that Grouchy had also learned of it; and he knew from Grouchy's despatches of lo P. M. of the 17th and 2 A. M. of the 1 8th, that Grouchy had recognized the necessity of manoeuvring in the direction of Wavre, if the mass of the Prussian army should have taken that course. Hence he expected to see him. He thought it likely that he would come by the bridges of Moustier and Ottignies, and strike in on his right and keep off any of the enemy's troops who might seek to molest him. Of any apprehension of a serious attack by the Prus- sians in force there is no trace till we come to the post- script to the second letter. Up to the time when this postscript was written. Napoleon would seem to have felt pretty sure (though perhaps with some misgivings), either that Grouchy would prevent the Prussians from attacking him, or would himself join, or connect with, the main army. But the appearance of the Prussians at St. Lambert and the absence of any information from Grouchy evidently alarmed him. NOTES TO CHAPTER XV. I. The first question that demands consideration in connection with the matters narrated in this chapter is this: — Was it wise in Napoleon to detach from his main army such a large force as that which he gave to Grouchy ? Or, — to state the question more carefully, — Napoleon, being, at i P. M. of the 17th (through his own neglect, but the cause is not important in this connection), in ignorance of the direction of the retreat of the Prussians, but having in mind that they might be intending to unite with the English and fight another battle for the defence of Brussels, ' — was it wise in him to detach 33,000 men from his main army to find out about and take care of the Prussians? This question, it must be observed, is quite a different one from that presented to Napoleon in the forenoon of the 17th, when he and Grouchy and every one else believed that the Prussians had fallen back on Namur. If the Prussians had retreated on Namur, they had assuredly given up all idea of further cooperation with the English, at any rate for the present. The two corps entrusted to Marshal Grouchy might perhaps accelerate their retreat, and ought to be able to prevent an offensive return on their part against the communications of the French. For this purpose they could perfectly well be spared ; for the army which Napoleon was taking with See the Bertrand order, ante^ p. 210. 373 274 JUNE i8 :-NOTES. [chap. 15.] him to Waterloo was able alone to defeat the army of Wellington. It was a somewhat larger army, ^ — it was composed throughout of excellent troops, — it was full of enthusiasm, — and it was commanded by the greatest general of the day. Nor was it a matter of any great importance that Grouchy could not well be detached till after twelve o'clock, owing to the necessity of giving his troops time to recover from the fatigues of the battle of the day before, the stress of which had fallen almost wholly on them, for, if the Prussians had retreated oh Namur and Liege, there was no special and imminent danger to be apprehended.^ To detach Marshal Grouchy with 33,000 men under these circumstances, which were then believed to exist, was one thing. But the question we are now considering is, — whether Napoleon's adhering to the plan of sending Grouchy off with two corps is to be justified after he had seen reason to be apprehensive of the possibility of the Prussians uniting with the English to fight another battle for the defence of Brussels. This danger of the union of the two allied armies was, as the Bertrand order shows, distinctly recognized as a possible danger by Napoleon when he dictated the order to Bertrand. It is true that Napoleon did not think it likely that this union would be made, but he knew perfectly well that if it should be made, it would place him in the greatest peril. He, therefore, expressly warned Grouchy that the Prussians might be intending to unite with the English to fight another battle for the defence of Brussels; and we have seen that, in the event of ^ This statement is true only of the army which the Duke had in line of battle at Waterloo. There were besides some 18,000 men, stationed at Hal and Tubize, of whom he did not avail himself. 3" Napoleon would not have lost his line of communication with France had Bliicher immediately reoccupied the position of Ligny upon Napoleon's leaving it ; for his advance upon Wellington necessarily opened to him both the Mons and Lille great lines to France." Kennedy, pp. 154, 155. [chap. 15.] GROUCHY AND BLUCHER.-NOTES. 275 Grouchy's finding this to be the case, Napoleon expected him to cross the Dyle and act in conjunction with the main army. If this was, in Napoleon's opinion, to be his true course in the not impossible event of Blucher's fall- ing back on Wavre, why send him off at all ? What was there to be gained by sending him off which made it worth while to run the risks inseparable from detaching such a large force from the main army when such a terrible danger as the union of the Prussian and English armies was even remotely apprehended ? For there cer- tainly was a chance of Grouchy's not coming back in time to prevent the catastrophe; Napoleon ran the risk of Grouchy's not receiving accurate or trustworthy informa- tion as to the doings of the enemy, — of his not acting on the information which he might obtain in accordance with sound military principles, — of his being delayed by the destruction of the bridges, and by the manoeuvres of the enemy. But this is not all. If the Prussians had fallen back on Wavre with the intention of uniting with the English and fighting another battle for the defence of Brussels, as Napoleon in the Bertrand order warns Grouchy they might be intending to do, they must have carried out their project in great part at the time when Napoleon was dictating his order to Bertrand. On this hypothesis, they had certainly already obtained a great advantage over any force sent to pursue them or to interrupt the execution of their scheme. Was it not therefore much wiser to keep the whole army together, well in hand, and under the Emperor's immediate direction ? These risks and chances, and others, Napoleon took, when he sent Grouchy off with his 33,000 men ; and for what ? The fact probably is this ; that Grouchy was originally ordered to follow up and observe the Prussians when every one supposed them to be retreating towards the Rhine, and especially to prevent or check any offensive 276 JUNE l8:-N0TES. [chap. 15.] return upon the French communications ; and that when Napoleon, between 12 and i, received information which awakened in his mind doubts of the correctness of this supposition, and even some apprehension that Bliicher might be intending to unite with WelHngton and fight another battle for the defence of Brussels, he adhered to his original disposition of Grouchy's force, contenting himself with giving him an express warning of the danger to be apprehended. The question then comes down to this : — If the Prussians were going to separate themselves from the English, there was no great risk in making such a large detachment from the main army, and there might very possibly be occasions in which a force of 33,000 men might accomplish more than a smaller one. It may, however, well be questioned whether half the number would not have answered every end, and allowed the Emperor the use of 15,000 more men in his contest with Wellington, who certainly could have brought to the encounter 18,000 more men than he actually had on the field. On the other hand, if the Prussians were intending to unite with the English, as Napoleon had some reason at any rate to believe, and if Grouchy did not rejoin the main army, or at least act in connection with it, or defeat the Prussians while marching to the field of battle. Napoleon was ruined. There was then the risk of his not doing either of these things, — whether through the Prussians having so many hours the start of him, — or through ignorance of the facts, — bad roads, — broken bridges, — unsound judgment, — it mat- ters not, — and that risk was assumed by Napoleon when he detached him, without, as it seems to us, any com- pensating advantage. Our conclusion, then, is this: if Napoleon had sent off Grouchy with his 33,000 men in the full belief that the Prussians had fallen back on Namur, he would be [chap. 15.] GROUCHY AND BLUCHER. -NOTES. 277 chargeable only with neglect in not having found out where they had gone ; but his sending off this large force after he had so much reason to apprehend that the Prussians were intending to unite with the English that he expressly warned Grouchy to that effect, was to take a wholly unnecessary and very dangerous risk. It was to persist in carrying out a plan which new information had rendered entirely inapplicable to the circumstances as now understood to exist. Had Napoleon, when he had come to entertain the apprehension that the Prussians might be intending to unite with the English, followed on the 17th the same general plan which he had adopted on the 15th, and, leaving, say, Pajol with the division of Teste, to find out where the Prussians had gone and what they were proposing to do, had taken the rest of the army with him, sending Grouchy at daybreak of the i8th with one, or perhaps both, of his corps to St. Lambert, with instruc- tions to delay the Prussians in every way possible should they come from Wavre either to attack the main army or to reinforce Wellington, he would have taken no serious risk, and he would have had his whole army under his own eye and subject to his immediate control on the day of the great battle. In this case Grouchy would have performed at St. Lambert the task which Ney performed at Quatre Bras, — of preventing the intervention of the other allied army in the battle then in progress. There is not the least reason to suppose that this course would have affected the decision either of Wellington to accept battle or of Bllicher to support him. But the chances in favor of Napoleon's success in the battle would have been vastly greater than they actually were. 2. We have expressed the doubt whether, even if the Prussians were known to be separating from the English, it would not have been wiser if Napoleon had given Grouchy only one corps wherewith to pursue them. But while this may be true, we cannot agree with Sir James 278 JUNE l8:-NOTES. [chap. 15.] Shaw-Kennedy in his reasons for criticising the detach- ment of Grouchy's force from the main army. He says : — * " His (Napoleon's) great difficulty — as he ought well to have known from the experience of a whole succession of disastrous campaigns to his armies in Spain — was the overthrow of the Anglo- Allied army ; and against it he should have led his last man and horse, even had the risk been great in the highest degree ; which, as has been seen, s it clearly was not. Had Napoleon attacked the Anglo-Allied army with his whole force, and succeeded in defeating it, there could be little question of his being able to defeat aftei'wards the Prussian army when separated from Wellington." And again : — ^ " If Grouchy's proper place was on the field of battle at Waterloo, then Napoleon should have sent for him at daylight on the morning of the 1 8th, when he saw the Anglo-Allied army in position and determined to attack it." The difficulty with this reasoning, as it seems to us, Hes in the fact that it was not that he might be strong enough to defeat Welhngton that Napoleon needed to have all his army on the field of Waterloo, but in order to prevent his being overwhelmed by the union of the army of Bliicher to that of Wellington. With the army of Wellington the force Napoleon had at Waterloo was abundantly able to cope ; but against the two armies of Wellington and Bliicher united, he was certain to suc- cumb. Hence, inasmuch as he, at i P. M. of the 17th, had changed his mind as to the Prussian retreat, had come to regard as very questionable the view which until after 12 o'clock of that day he certainly had entertained, that the Prussians were separating themselves definitely from the English, and had recognized the possibility of their uniting with the English and even joining with * Kennedy, p. 157. */i«/^, p. 274, n. 3. 'Kennedy, p. 160; Chesney, pp. 206, 207. [chat. 15.] GROUCHY AND BLUCHER.-NOTES. 279 them in a battle to be fought for the defence of Brussels, he should have changed his dispositions accordingly. He should have left a comparatively small force, — perhaps of cavalry only, — to follow up and find out about the Prussians, and should have taken all his army- corps with him, because if the Prussians should attempt to take part in the battle he would be sure to need every man he could muster. ' 3. It seems for many writers to be well-nigh impos- sible to treat separately of the conduct of Marshal Grouchy. This may require some effort of mind ; but it surely is worth while to make it. ^ Suppose we are of opinion that Napoleon made a mistake in the first place in detaching him with his 33,000 men; that he was furthermore inexcusable in not advising him on the night of the 17th and i8th of the most important fact that the two armies were confronting each other at Mont St. Jean, — in not sending him the information which Domon had picked up as to the retreat of a part of the Prussians towards Wavre, — and, finally, in not directing him in precise terms, that, if he should find that the Prussians were retiring on Wavre, he should cross the Dyle at Moustier and Ottignies, and operate in connection with the main army. Suppose, we say, we find all this to be true. We have yet to pass upon Grouchy 's conduct. ^Marshal Soult, according to Baudus (vol. r, pp. 222, 223), was opposed to detaching Grouchy with the large bodyiof troops assigned to him. He said to one of his aides that it was a great fault to detach so considerable a force from the army which was going to march against the Anglo-Belgian troops ; that in the condition in which the defeat of the evening before had put the Prussian army, a feeble force, with the cavalry of General Exelmans, would suffice to follow and observe it in its'retreat. We concur in Marshal Soult's conclusion, but not with his reasons. It was not because the Prussian army was so weak, but because it was still so formidable, that Napoleon should have kept all his army together. *See the admirable observations of Sibome (vol. i, pp. 318 ^/j^^.); and of Van Loben Sels, pp. 319 et seq. With many writers, to blame Napoleon is to exonerate Grouchy; with others, again, to blame Grouchy is to exonerate Napoleon. 280 JUNE l8:-N0TES. [CHAP. I5.] The Emperor's faults cannot excuse Grouchy's faults, nor can his faults excuse those of the Emperor. ^ The object of military criticism is not to see which officer made the most mistakes. 4. As to the proper course for Marshal Grouchy to take after he became satisfied (as he did about daybreak of the 1 8th) that the Prussians were retreating on Wavre, we have seen that the principal continental critics, — Jomini, Clausewitz and Charras, — are of opinion that he should at once have manoeuvred to his left and crossed the Dyle, so as to get in communication with the main army under the Emperor. But General Hamley '° is of a different opinion. He approves of Grouchy's direct movement on Wavre. After remarking that Grouchy did not know that Wellington would stop to fight at Waterloo, he says : — " He thought the Prussians, if they were really moving on Wavre, intended to join Wellington at Brussels. * * * And were they so moving, he, by marching to Wavre, would threaten decisively their communications with their base by Louvain, and so either prevent the execution of their project, or render it disastrous." It is unnecessary to say anything in regard to this observation, except that, if Grouchy thought as Hamley thinks he did, — and as he very likely did, — he was wholly mistaken as to the intention of Marshal Bllicher. Very possibly he might have injured the Prussians a good deal had they been intending to go to Brussels ; but, as they were, on the contrary, intending to join Wellington, who had taken up a position for battle to the south of the Forest of Soignes, Grouchy's calculations, as given us by Hamley, were beside the mark, and his movements were entirely useless. ^Cf. Kennedy, pp. 160, 161 ; Chesney, pp. 206, 207. On the other hand see Van Loben Sels, pp. 323, 324. '° Operations of War, p. 196 et sen. [chap. 15.] GROUCHY AND BLUCHER.-NOTES. 281 It is certainly true, as Hamley says, " that Grouchy did not know that " WeUington would stop to fight at Waterloo." But Grouchy expressly says that Napoleon told him " that he was going " to march upon the English, and fight them, if they stood this side [/. e., south of ] the Forest of Soignes," i. e., at Waterloo. This indicated that Napoleon thought it quite possible that the English might take their stand there and fight. And the Bertrand order warned Grouchy that the Prussians might be intending to unite with them to fight a battle for the defence of Brussels. But this order, as we have observed before, is utterly ignored by General Hamley. 5. We have pointed out in the text that the three princi- pal Continental critics, — Jomini, Clausewitz and Charras, — unite in the opinion that Marshal Grouchy should have marched at daybreak for the bridge of Moustier, — cover- ing the movement by his cavalry. What would have been the result of this manoeuvre 1 (See Map 9.) Let us suppose that the Prussian detachment of Ledebur, which was stationed at Mont St. Guibert to observe the movements of Marshal Grouchy 's column, had been driven out of their position, or flanked out of it (as they finally were), before six in the morning, by the French cavalry, and had been compelled to retire to the neighborhood of Wavre. The movements of the main body of Grouchy's command might, therefore, without much difficulty, have been concealed from observation. At least this seems to be assumed by Jomini, '^ who says that Grouchy could have been at the bridge of Moustier at 10 A. M., — and then have moved "on Wavre by Limale, pushing Exelmans' dragoons on St. Lambert, or else have marched to Lasne himself." " Hamley, p. 196. '^Frag. Hist; Lettre k MM. M^ry et Barthdlemy, p. 5; Grouchy Mdm., vol. 4, p. 44. '^Jomini, p. 176. 282 JUNE l8:-N0TES. [CHAP. 1 5.] But Charras ''* thinks that the movement to Moustier would have been at once perceived by Ledebur's cavalry, and that Grouchy would probably, on arriving at Moustier and Ottignies, have found himself in face of 40,000 men and 150 pieces of cannon, in position behind the Dyle, and that it could only have been by a very unlikely con- currence of circumstances that Grouchy could have seized these bridges before the Prussians would have been in sufficient force to oppose him. These conclusions seem to us very strained. Grouchy had 6,000 excellent cavalry. Ledebur's detachment consisted of two battalions of infantry, four squadrons of cavalry and two guns, — possibly 1,500 men in all. '^ A movement on Corbaix would have compelled him to fall back to La Baraque as surely at five in the morning as at one in the afternoon, when, as we have seen, it had this effect. Certainly, Ledebur could have been got out of the way, and could only have reported that the French were very active, and were manoeuvring apparently on Wavre by way of Corbaix and La Baraque. We see no reason to doubt that Jomini is perfectly correct in sup- posing that the column of Marshal Grouchy, with the exception of one of his cavalry divisions, say, that of Pajol, supported, perhaps, by the infantry division of Teste, could have crossed the bridges of Moustier and Ottignies, without any molestation whatever, by or soon after 10 A. M., and that they might have been well on their way towards Lasne and St. Lambert before the Prussians were aware what they were about. '* Charras, vol. 2, pp. 62, 63. Hooper's view [pp.342 ef seg.] is substan- tially that of Charras. He also seems to think that unless Grouchy could succeed in defeating the Prussian troops opposed to him, his intervention would be useless. It seems to us, on the other hand, that all that it was needful for Grouchy to do was to engage, and so to detain, the corps of Billow and Pirch I. ; and by marching from the Dyle upon their line of march from Wavre to St. Lambert, he was, it seems to us, certain to accomplish this. This view is well presented by Quinet, pp. 301-304. " Charras, vol. 2, p. 42. [chap. 15.] GROUCHY AND BLUCHER.-NOTES. 283 In speculations of this kind, it is very easy, of course, to omit by accident some of the data of the problem. But when it is remembered that the principal subject which the Prussians were contemplating that morning was not the movements of the 12,000 or 15,000 men, who were (as they supposed) '^ all the troops which Napoleon had detached against them, but the very serious question whether the whole army, or three-fourths of it, should march across the country to attack Napoleon and succor Wellington, we can hardly believe that any reports which Ledebur could have brought in would have brought 40,000 men to the bridges of Moustier and Ottignies by 10 or 10.30 A. M. It seems to us, then, altogether probable that Marshal Grouchy could have crossed the Dyle at Moustier and Ottignies with the bulk of his forces before 1 1 A. M. '^ At this hour, only " the advanced guard of Bulow's corps had * * * reached St. Lambert. The i6th, and then the 13th, brigade arrived much later, and the 14th brigade, which formed the rear-guard was a long way behind." " At this hour the 1st, lid and 1 1 Id Corps were still in and about Wavre. It would have been at this moment, when the IVth Corps was thus strung out, toiling through the bad roads, that Grouchy would have made his appearance, and have commenced his march from Moustier and Ottignies to Lasne and St. Lambert. Can it be believed that he would not have stopped Billow ? What else could Bulow have done but halt, and concentrate his command, and await the rein- forcements which were expected from Wavre.? But this would have involved him in an engagement with ^^ Ante, p. 232. '^Siborne (vol. i, p. 320) thinks that Grouchy could have successfully crossed the Dyle even if he had not started from Gembloux earlier than he did. " Siborne, vol. i, p. 311 ; Charras, vol. 2, pp. 72, 73. 284 JUNE lS:-NCTES. [chap. I5.] Grouchy's force, from which he could be released only by the arrival of those reinforcements. When would they have arrived? (See Map lo.) If Grouchy's movement on Moustier had not been observed and promptly reported to Blucher, — which is the assumption on which we are proceeding, as being on the whole the most probable, — there is no reason to suppose that the 1st and lid Prussian Corps would have moved out of Wavre earlier than they did, — that is, about noon. '9 The lid Corps followed the IVth, and would of course have become engaged with Grouchy. The 1 1 Id would in time very likely have followed the lid; but it probably would not have left Wavre till much later. These three corps would have been Grouchy's oppo- nents ; they would have outnumbered him considerably, and would, no doubt, ultimately have worsted him. But he probably would have prevented any portion of their troops from attacking the main army under Napoleon. As for the 1st Corps, there would have been nothing to prevent its marching along the northerly road by way of Chain to join Wellington, if Zieten had thought it safe to run the chance of the Anglo-Dutch army holding out until his arrival. What effect these operations would have had on the issue of the battle of Waterloo will be considered later. 6. We have stated above '° that Grouchy, once arrived at La Baraque, might have crossed the Dyle by the four bridges of Moustier and Ottignies, Limale and Limelette, v/ithout, as it seems probable to us, encountering serious opposition.'' This view is strongly maintained by Thiers, and as strongly contested by Charras. The '5 Charras, vol. 2, p. 43; Siborne, vol. i, pp. 311, 312. Kennedy (p. 163) seems to suppose that Pirch I. and Zieten followed Biilow without any interval. '°AnU, p 259. "Van Loben Sels (pp. 322, 323, 340) is very positive as to this. [chap. 15.] GROUCHY AND BLUCHER.-NOTES. 2S5 latter's principal reason for doubting the feasibility of this movement is the supposed presence in the woods of Sarats and Warlombrout, which line the road from La Baraque to Wavre on the east and west sides respectively, just after passing the former place, of the two divisions of Reckow and Brause of the lid Corps, some i i,ooo or 12,000 men. " The wood of Warlombrout lies between the road leading to Moustier and that leading to Limelette. We think Charras in error as to the advanced position of these two brigades, or divisions, as they may more properly be called. Siborne makes no mention at all of the occupation of the wood of Warlombrout, and says that that of Sarats was occupied by some battalions of the 8th brigade, Reckow's, ^^ and that the rest of the brigade was in rear of the wood. He says that the 7th brigade, that of Brause, was in reserve. Ollech ^'^ says that Reckow's brigade sent two battalions into this wood of Sarats, '^ and that the brigade took up position between Manil and St. Anne, which is nearly a mile in rear of the wood ; and that the other brigade was in rear of this. He says nothing about the occupation of the wood of War- lombrout. We do not know w^iere Charras obtained his informa- tion ; but it seems quite clear that the movement to the bridges would not have met wdth the amount of oppo- sition which he claims. These brigades of Reckow and Brause were portions of the Hd Corps, and were expect- ing to cross the Dyle at Wavre, and march to support Billow. No one, of course, can say what these troops would have done had Grouchy attempted to cross the ^^ Charras, vol. 2, p. 376 ; also, p. 44. ^^ Siborne, vol. i, p. 313. He strictly follows Damitz, p. 247. ^ Ollech, pp. 208, 209. "^ Called by him Lautelle. It is sometimes called the wood of Lauzel, as it adjoins a farm of that name. 286 JUNE i8:-N0TES. [chap. 15.] Dyle by the bridges or any of them ; but it is certain that these troops were not then expecting any such movement, nor were they stationed where they could at once or easily have interfered with it. 7. Where was Grouchy when he heard the sound of the cannon of Waterloo, and rejected the advice of Gerard to march to the support of the Emperor ? That it was at Sart-a-Walhain where Marshal Grouchy heard the sound of the cannon of Waterloo, is the universally accepted belief. But it is an error. It may be interesting to see how it originated. Berton, who wrote in 181 8, says^^ that Grouchy's column "was still at the village of Walhain when it heard the first cannon-shots of Mont St. Jean," and that it was there that Gerard gave his advice. ^' Grouchy, writing his " Observations " the same year in Philadelphia, which were reprinted in Paris in 1819, states ""^ that the cannon was heard while they were skirmishing in the wood of Limelette, between i and 2 P. M. Gerard, in a letter also written in 1819, states ^^ that it was "at Wallin, or Sart-a-Wallin." He says he found the Marshal eating some strawberries. It was about 1 1 A. M., a little more, or a little less. He gives an account of the interview, and then says " We quitted Wallin, &c." His acting chief-of-sta£f, Colonel Simon Loriere, says in his report : — ^° "At II o'clock the Third [Fourth] Corps was entirely assembled at Walin. "The Count Gerard, who preceded the march of his corps, learnt that Marshal Grouchy had stopped at a house in the village =^ Berton, p. 55. " Berton, pp. 55, 59. ^^ Grouchy, Obs., p. 16. -9 Quelques Doc, p. 7. He means Walhain and Sart-a-Walhain. ^ lb., 12. By " Walin," he means Walhain. [chap. 15.] GROUCHY AND BLUCHER.-NOTES. 287 belonging to a M. Hollaert ; he went there with the officers of his staff ; he told me to follow ; we found his Excellency at breakfast." Colonel Denniee of Gerard's staff locates the incident at Sarra-Walin, and speaks of Gerard's having found the Marshal at breakfast. ^' Gerard wrote to a friend of his at Brussels to look up M. Hollaert ; he did so, and wrote ^^ to Gerard to say that he had been to see him at Sarra-Walin. This seems to have decided Gerard that the place was Sart-a-Walhain ; for he writes in 1820 to Colonel Grouchy, a son of the Marshal, as follows : — ^^ "It was not at 3 o'clock in the afternoon that I rejoined the commander-in-chief of the right wing, but towards 1 1 o'clock in the morning; he was at Sarra-Walin, at the house of a M. Hollaert, a notary, where he was breakfasting." Grouchy finally conceded to Gerard that it was long before they were skirmishing in the wood of Limelette, that the sound of the cannon of Waterloo was heard. He admitted in a letter '^ published in 1829, that it was at Sart-a-Walhain, and at ii.30^A. M. This is also the statement made in the Grouchy Memoirs. ^^ Nevertheless it was at Walhain and not at Sart-a- Walhain where Marshal Grouchy was when he heard the sound of the cannon, and Gerard proffered his advice to march toward the field of battle. It is certain that the incident took place at the house of a notary — a M. Hollaert (or Hollert, as it should be spelled), — for many of the officers who give their recollections mention his name ; and it is in no wise remarkable that the name of the village in which his house stood should have made no s' Quelques Doc, pp. 17, 18. By " Sarra-Walin," he means Sart-^-Walhain, ^ lb., p. 19. His letter was dated September 30, 1819. "lb., p. 24. See also Gdrard's " Lettre h. MM. Germain-Sarrut et B. Saint Edme," pp. 10, 11 ; and his " Derniferes Observations," pp. 8, 29. ^ Fragm. Hist. ; Lettre k MM. M6ry and Barthelemy, p. 9. 35 Grouchy M6m., vol. 4, pp. 71, 75- 288 JUNE l8: GROUCHY AND BLUCHER.-NOTES. [CHAP. I5.] distinct impression on their memories. Now there was at that time no notary at Sart-a-Walhain. There is none now. It is a very small village. There was not in fact a notary's office at Walhain in 1815 ; there was none until 1818. But M. Joseph Hollert was in 181 5 the notary of the neighboring town of Nil St. Vincent, and he lived in a large house in Walhain known as the Chateau Marette. It was here that he received Marshal Grouchy in the forenoon of the i8th of June, 181 5, and it was into his garden that the officers went out from the house to catch the direction of the firing. ^^ The matter is of no very great importance. Still, Walhain was certainly a good mile nearer than Sart-a- Walhain to the bridges, whether Grouchy marched by way of Mont St. Guibert or La Baraque. (See Map 11.) ^* The writer has abundant proof of the above statements. He has also visited the house. M. Wenseleers, who is referred to in the Preface, obtained for him this information in iS8S and 18S9. CHAPTER XVI. THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. Napoleon, as we have seen, took up his headquarters on the evening of the 17th at the Caillou house on the Brus- sels road, about a mile and a half south of the little tavern known then and now as La Belle Alliance. All the afternoon and night it rained hard. We may sup- pose that, as his custom was, he slept during the evening. At I A. M. of the i8th,he mounted his horse, and, with Bertrand, rode out to the front.' Here he rode or walked along the line of the pickets until he had satisfied himself that Wellington's army was in position, awaiting battle. The fires at which the soldiers of the English and Dutch army were drying and warming themselves left no doubt of this. He must have been occupied in this way more than two hours, as he was near the wood of Hougomont at half-past two in the morning. After returning, various reports came in. Between 7 and 8 A. M. he received from an officer who had been sent to the advanced posts, word that the enemy were retiring. This information he at once communicated to d'Erlon,^ whose corps was in the first line,— that of Reille not having got fully up,— and ordered him to put his troops in march and to pursue the enemy with vigor. But d'Erlon having judged the enemy's movement quite differently, sent his chief-of-staff to the Emperor to tell 'Corresp., vol. 31, p. 219 ; Charras, vol. i, p. 263. ^Drouet, pp. 96, 97 ; Vaudoncourt, vol. 4, p. 24. 290 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. [CHAP. 1 6.] him that he, d'Erlon, thought that the EngHsh were making their dispositions to receive battle. D'Erlon proceeds : — "The Emperor came immediately to the advanced posts. I accompanied him ; we dismounted in order to get near the enemy's vedettes, and to examine more closely the movements of the English army. He perceived that I was right, and being convinced that tlie English army was taking position, he said to me : — " Order the men to make their soup, to get their pieces in order, and we will determine what is to be done towards noon.' " Napoleon seems in fact not to have spared himself any trouble, and there evidently was no very conspicuous deficiency in the physical energy of a man who, after a good afternoon's work in the saddle in directing the march of an army, was able to go out twice in the deep mud during a rainy night and morning to visit the outer pickets of his line of battle, nearly two miles from the house where he had established his headquarters. The reason of this apparently rather unnecessary solic- itude is really not far to seek. Napoleon felt as confi- dent of beating Wellington's army that day as he had felt of beating Bliicher's army on the day but one before, provided only that it would accept battle. He believed, and he was justified in believing, that his army was superior to that opposed to him, in fighting capacity cer- tainly, and even, possibly, in numbers. He trusted to Grouchy to keep the Prussians off, as he had on the day of Ligny trusted to Ney to protect him against the Eng- lish, and he may also have thought it possible that Grouchy would arrive on the field in time to make the victory more crushing, — playing, in this way, much the same role which Napoleon had marked out for Ney at Ligny. He accordingly feared nothing so much as the retreat of the English. That he supposed that Grouchy would cross the Dyle at Moustier is certainly a fair inference from Marbot's report and letter, from which we have made extracts [chap. 1 6.] THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 29 1 above.^ That he should have been so certain about it, however, is remarkable, as he had given Grouchy no instructions^ of any kind whatsoever since he had sent him the Bertrand order, and that left him entire freedom of action. Another very remarkable thing is that Napoleon should not have drawn from the fact that Wellington was awaiting battle the inference that he was expecting the assistance, and the powerful assistance, of Bliicher.^ At least it would seem pretty certain that he did not draw this inference, for he took neither of the steps which, if he had come to that conclusion, would seem to be dictated by common sense, — he neither attacked Wellington as early as he possibly could, nor did he do anything to make sure of Grouchy 's intervention until 10 A. M., when he sent him the order which we have given above.^ If, on his return to the Caillou house at half-past three or thereabouts in the morning, he had sent an officer to order Grouchy to march towards the main army by the bridges of Moustier and Ottignies, he would have done only what the fact of Wellington's confronting him, which he had just ascertained with his own eyes, should have led him to do. The rain ceased, according to Charras/ at 6 A. M. ; Vaudoncourt,^ a much earlier authority, puts it at 8 o'clock ; Van Loben Sels^ says that the rain had dimin- ished at break of day, but it was not until lo o'clock that the atmosphere became clear ; Baudus,'° who was at the ^Ante, pp. 268 et seq. *The question of the alleged orders sent to Grouchy during this night will be treated of in Appendix A ; post, p. 353. 'Van Loben Sels, p. 319. ^Ante, p. 265. 'Charras, vol. i, p. 265. ^Vaudoncourt, vol. 4, 24. 'Van Loben Sels, p. 270. »°Baudus, vol. x, p. 225. 292 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. [CHAP. 1 6.] battle on S cult's staff, says the rain ceased towards 9 o'clock. We may probably assume that the rain had ceased by 8 o'clock, and that in another hour, had Napo- leon so chosen, he might have begun the battle. This, in point of fact, he originally intended to do. He had issued an order in good season to the corps-com- manders, that they should see that the soldiers cleaned their guns and got their breakfasts, so that at 9 o'clock precisely they should be ready to commence the battle." Drouot, who was a distinguished artillery-officer, and was then acting as adjutant-general of the Guard, tells us" that Napoleon intended to begin the battle by 8 or 9 at the latest. But Drouot advised a delay of two to three hours on account of the condition of the ground, which the heavy rain of the past afternoon and night had ren- dered too soft for the rapid and effective movements of artillery ; and Napoleon, who was himself an artillery ofiEicer, and always made great use of this arm, yielded to the suggestion, and determined to put off the main attack till towards one o'clock P. M. About 8 A. M. the Emperor rode along the lines,'^ examining the enemy's position, which he had already, as we have seen, inspected twice since midnight. He then dictated an order of battle, or, rather, an order of move- ment, the result of which would be that the army would be arranged in three lines, ready for the attack. This marshalling of the army was, according to all accounts, a magnificent and imposing spectacle ; the bands played ; the men shouted "Vive I'Empereur!"; the movement was skilfully designed and beautifully executed; but, except as a way of occupying the time, it would probably never have been thought of. It began shortly before "Doc. Indd., XVIII, p. 52 ; App. C, xxxi ; i>ost, p. 387. '^Thiers, vol. xx, p. 157, n. "Charras, vol. i, p. 270. [chap. 1 6.] THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 293 nine and was over by half-past ten/^ It showed at any rate that had it been thought advisable, the battle might have been begun at 9 A. M. After this pageant " Napoleon passed before the lines and was received by immense, by enthusiastic acclama- tions." '5 He then, shortly before eleven o'clock, dictated his plan of attack. Of this we shall speak later on. One cannot but be struck with a recurrence here of the same error to which we have had occasion to call attention before, — namely, the error of acting on the prob- abilities of the situation when it is admitted that a differ- ent state of things may nevertheless, in spite of the prob- abilities, exist, and that, if it does exist, a wholly different course of action must be taken, or a fatal result will inevi- tably follow. Napoleon was, very likely, warranted in thinking it probable that morning that, what with the loss and demoralization consequent on their defeat at Ligny, and what with the interference with their plans which Grouchy with his 33,000 men could reasonably be expected to make, he himself was safe against any inter- vention on the part of the Prussians. But he did not and could not know where the Prussians were ; in fact, he had great reason to believe that a large part of them had gone to Wavre ; and at that very moment he thought it very likely that their action in going to Wavre would induce Grouchy to come to him by way of Moustier. If, then, the exigency called in the Emperor's mind for this course on the part of Grouchy, why did it not equally demand from Napoleon the promptest action against Wellington, and the exertion of every means to make sure of Grouchy's intervention ? This criticism is, in fact, only an extension of that made in reference to the step taken by Napoleon in detaching Grouchy's large force when he felt it necessary at the same time to warn Grouchy '"•Charras, vol. i, p. 274. "5Ib., p. 275. 294 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. [CHAP. 1 6.] expressly that the Prussians might be intending to unite with the English. However we may explain these apparent contradictions, they certainly existed in Napoleon's mind and also in his actions. He was so sure of having only the Anglo-Dutch army to fight that he deliberately postponed attacking it until he could do so in the most approved style ; he was confident that if the Prussians had gone in the direction of Wavre with the intention of joining the English or of attacking the French, Grouchy would return to him by the bridge of Moustier. And yet, from i P.M. of the after- noon of the 17th to 10 A. M. of the i8th, he sent Grouchy no orders, and no information. Where such is the lack of ordinary care on the part of the commanding general, a great deal surely must depend upon the energy and capacity of the subordinate. While this was the general situation at the French headquarters, the Duke of Wellington, having with his customary carefulness set his army in battle array, was quietly waiting until it should suit his adversary to assault his lines. Every hour's delay was a dis- tinct gain to him; and he knew .'t. He knew, what Napoleon of course could not know, that the Prussians were on their way to attack the French and to join the English. At the same time, it must not be supposed that the Duke had no cause for anxiety. Of the defects of his army he was well aware. No one knew better than he that such a conglomerate mass of troops as that which he commanded, consisting, too, in great part of raw and untried soldiers, could not possibly be equal to the well- appointed army of Napoleon's veterans whose blows he was soon to receive. His only reliance, therefore, was on Bliicher's promised support. As Sir James Shaw-Ken- nedy well says : — '^ ^Kennedy, p. 131. [chap. 1 6.] THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 295 " In ordei- at all to understand the views of the Duke of Welling- ton as to accepting battle on the field of Waterloo, it is essential to keep this arrangement [«'. e., with Bliicher] fully in view; other- wise the Duke might justly be accused of the utmost temerity and folly in accepting battle, as much the greater portion of his army consisted of mere Landwehr and of Dutch-Belgian troops. The latter, from political and other causes, could not be depended upon; which, in fact, had been already proved on the i6th. It would be an error to suppose that it was from any want of courage that the Dutch-Belgian troops could not be depended upon; proof enough exists that the people of those countries are capable of the most heroic and persevering exertions when engaged in a cause that they care to support ; but under the circumstances in which they were placed on this occasion, they were without confidence, were not acting in a cause which they cordially supported, and showed that it was not one in which they wished to oppose themselves seriously to French troops." But Wellington felt that he could rely on Bllicher's promise, and he took his chance that Bliicher would be able to fulfil his promise, and that he himself would be able to hold out until the promise should be fulfilled. These risks, however, were by no means small. In the first place, the Duke not only did not know that Napoleon had given Grouchy two whole corps ; he even supposed that he had given him but one, and that Napo- leon was confronting him on the morning of the battle with his whole army, "with the exception of the 3d Corps, which had been sent to observe Marshal Bliicher.'''^' This risk, fortunately for the Duke of Wel- lington, was not actually incurred. But, all the same, Wellington is entitled to the credit of having faced it with his eyes open. Secondly, there was the chance that Grouchy might intervene, and prevent the Prussians from fulfilling their promise. We have already shown what Grouchy could have done in this way had he either acted of his own "Wellington's Official Report: Gurvvood, vol. xil, p. 481 ■296 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. [CHAP. 16.] motion in accordance with the demands of the situation by marching at daybreak for the bridge of Moustier, or had followed the counsel of Gerard at noon. The issue of the battle of Waterloo, in fact, might have been entirely changed if the movements of troops not under the control of either of the commanding generals had been other than they were ; it is this fact among others which gives the battle a peculiar interest. The position to the south of the villages of Mont St. Jean and Waterloo, known as the field of Waterloo, had been, some time before the campaign opened, reconnoitred by the English engineers; "the sev- eral sketches of the officers had been put together, and one fair copy made for the Prince of Orange ; a second had been commenced for the Duke."'^ The chief-of-engineers, Lieutenant-Colonel Smyth, who was present at the action of Ouatre Bras, sent back to Brus- sels during the afternoon, presumably by the Duke's direction, for a plan of this position ; and the original sketches, which, together, constituted a plan, were for- warded to him by Captain Oldfield, the brigade-major of engineers.'^ The next morning, " upon the receipt of a communication from Bliicher," ^° the Duke obtained from Colonel Smyth these sketches, and gave them to Sir William De Lancey, his Deputy-Quartermaster-General, or chief-of-staff, "with orders " (as Major Oldfield states)" " to take up the ground on which we fought the next day. Colonel Smyth was at the same time desired to take the "Oldfield IMSS. ; Porter's Hist. Royal Engineers, vol. i, p. 380. A copy of this sketch is inserted opposite page 565 of C. D. Yonge's " Life of Wel- lington"; London: Chapman and Hall ; 1S60. See, also, p. 6i6 of the same work. '^Curiously enough they were very nearly lost in the action; the officer who had them in his keeping, Lieutenant Waters, being unhorsed in the fne/ee. ""Probably the information brought by Lieutenant Massow ; ante, p. 233. "Oldfield MSS. [chap. 1 6.] THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 297 necessary measures for entrenching the village of Braine-la-Leud." To this position, then, well understood and mapped out, the Duke of Wellington fell back on the afternoon of the 17th from Quatre Bras with that part of his army which was under his immediate command, and to it also he directed the greater part of the troops which were at Nivelles and other places. (See Map 13.) The position was a strong one. The first or main line of battle crossed the Charleroi-Brussels pike at right angles where the road from Ohain and Wavre strikes into it, nearly three-quarters of a mile south of the hamlet of Mont St. Jean, where the chatcssee to Nivelles branches off from the pike. To the east of this pike the English left extended for a mile or so, — for more than half this distance on the crest of a gentle slope ; but the little vil- lages of Smohain, Papelotte and La Haye, lying from a quarter to a half a mile in front, were occupied. To the west of the pike the line ran along the same ridge for nearly a third of a mile, when it turned somewhat towards the southwest, but still ran along the crest of the ridge,' and so continued for nearly a half a mile farther. Here the line was covered by a garden and a consider- able wood enclosing a solid old building, known as the Chateau of Hougomont. This building and its enclos- ures lay about 350 yards in front of the main line of bat- tle, at its extreme right, and they were occupied in force. The ridge was admirably suited for defensive purposes. The reverse slope offered excellent protection for infantry lying behind it ; and in front, there were no trees or other impediments ; every movement of the enemy was plainly to be seen, and was exposed to fire. Moreover the ground over which the enemy must advance for the attack was so moist and muddy, that all rapidity of movement, even of cavalry, was out of the question. Wellington had on the field the whole of the ist, 2d, 3d, 5th and 6th British divisions, one brigade (Mitch- 298 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. [CHAP. 1 6.] ell's) of the 4th division, the 2d and 3d Dutch-Belgian divisions, and the contingents from Brunswick and Nas- sau, — numbering in all 49,608 infantry, 12,408 cavalry and 5,645 artillery, with 156 guns, — a total of 67,661 men." These troops, as we have before observed,^^ were sta- tioned on the field without reference to the corps to which they belonged. The reason for this probably was that the Duke desired to distribute his foreign troops, on some, at any rate, of whom he placed no great reliance, among his British troops and those of the King's Ger- man Legion, which were his main dependence. Then, inasmuch as the army had never before acted by corps, or, in fact, at all, in the field, no special inconvenience was to be apprehended from this arrangement. The army of the Duke was composed as follows : — ^'^ British troops : — Infantry 15,181 Cavalry 5,843 Artillery 2,967 King's German Legion : — Infantry 3,301 Cavalry i,997 Artillery 526 23>99i 5>824 Total British and King's German Legion 29,815 Men Hanoverians : — Infantry 10,258 Cavalry 497 Artillery 465 11,220 Carried forward 41,035 ^Siborne, vol. r, pp. 460, 461 ;'App. xxx. Charras, vol. i, p. 269, n. 2, raises the total to 70,187 men of all arms, of whom 13,432 were cavalry. He gives the number of guns as 159. '^Anie, p. 35, n. 3. '^Sibome, vol. i, pp. 460, 461 : App. xxx. [chap. 1 6.] THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 299 Brought forward 4i,035 Men Brunswickers : — Infantry • 4,586 Cavalry 866 Artillery 510 5,962 Nassauers : — Infantry 2,880 Dutch-Belgians : — Infantry 13,402 Cavalry 3,205 Artillery 1,177 17,784 Total as above. 67,661 " To the eastward, or English left, of the turnpike, were stationed in the first line the 5th and 6th British divisions, the 2d Dutch-Belgian division, and the British cavalry brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur. This part of the line seems to have been commanded by Sir Thomas Picton, ^^ although it is not clear whether he had any authority except over his own division, the 5th. Of these troops the cavalry were stationed on the extreme left. One brigade of Dutch-Belgians, that of Prince Bernhard of Saxe Weimar, occupied the villages of Smohain, Papelotte and La Haye. The English infantry were placed on the reverse of the slope of the ridge, so as to be sheltered from the enemy's fire. But the other Dutch- Belgian brigade, Bylandt's, was, as Sir James Shaw- Kennedy says, ^^ " posted, most unaccountably, in front of the Wavre road, on the slope. * * * j^ this position, it was jutted forward in front of the real line of battle, which was mainly the Wavre road. It was directly exposed to the fire of the greatest French battery ^^ Sir Lowry Cole, commanding the 6th British division, was not in the action. *^ Kennedy, p. 6i ; Waterloo Letters, pp. 30, 31, Sir W. Gomm, 300 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. [CHAP. 1 6.] that was on the field, and singly exposed to the first onset of the French attacking columns." Who was responsible for this inconsiderate and dangerous measure we do not know. In rear of the left wing, and protected from the French fire, stood the Union brigade, so called, of Major General Sir William Ponsonby, composed of the Royal Dragoons, the Scots Greys, and the Inniskilling Dra- goons. The right of the left wing rested on the Charleroi turn- pike. The 3d British division, Alten's, continued the line to the west of the turnpike. On the westerly side of the pike, and about 300 yards to the south of the point where the Wavre road crosses it, was the farmhouse of La Haye Sainte, which was strongly occupied by a battalion of the King's German Legion under Major Baring. An abatis was formed across the road at the south end of the boundary wall of the house, ""^ but it was broken up during the course of the battle. Beyond the third division, on the allied right, were stationed the two brigades constituting the ist division, Cooke's, — a part of the 2d brigade, Byng's, occupying, with some Nassau and other foreign troops, the Chateau and enclosures of Hougomont. The 2d division, Clinton's, was in reserve near Merbe Braine, as was also the Brunswick contingent. The 3d Dutch-Belgian division, Chasse's, was on the extreme right, and partly in the village of Braine-la-Leud. The heavy cavalry brigade of Lord Edward Somerset was stationed in the rear, near the Charleroi pike ; the Dutch- Belgian cavalry were farther to the right. It is plain from the foregoing that, with the exception of the unfortunate brigade of Bylandt, the army was skilfully arranged so as to escape as far as was possible the fire of the enemy's artillery, which was known to be extremely formidable. The occupation of Hougomont was most carefully attended to; the walls were loop- *' Waterloo Letters, pp. 403, 40i. [chap. 1 6.] THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 3OI holed, — not only of the house, but of the garden ; and, surrounded, as it was, on the sides nearest the French by a considerable wood, it was a really strong place. So long as it was held, the right of Wellington's line was practically unassailable. ^^ The farmhouse of La Haye Sainte on the Brussels road was also made very strong, although, owing to some oversight, no adequate mode of reinforcing the defenders, or of supplying them with ammunition, was provided. No earth-works had been thrown up anywhere. ^^ An abatis had, as has been observed, been placed across the Charleroi road, and another was thrown across the Nivelles road in rear of Hougomont. Napoleon brought to the field of Waterloo the ist, 2d, and 6th Corps {minus the division of Teste), the Im- perial Guard, the heavy cavalry of Kellermann and Milhaud, the light cavalry of Domon, detached from the 3d Corps, and of Subervie, detached from the cavalry- corps of Pajol, — a total of 71,947 men, of whom 48,950 were infantry, 15,765 cavalry, and 7,232 artillery. There were 246 guns. ^° The ist Corps constituted the right of the first line. Its left rested on the Charleroi turnpike near the inn of La Belle Alliance, and its light cavalry observed the villages of La Haye and Papelotte on the extreme right. The 2d Corps continued the first line to the west, the cavalry of Pire being stationed beyond the Nivelles road. The 6th Corps and the Guard, with the cavalry of Kellermann and Milhaud, were in reserve. Of the three divisions of the 2d Corps present at the battle, — that of Girard having been left at Ligny, — the division of Jerome was on the left, that of Foy in the ^' Kennedy, p. 65. ^Oldfield MSS. *'Siborne, vol. i, p. 461 : App. xxxi. Charras (vol. i. p. 238, n.) gives the total as 72,447 men and 240 guns. 302 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. [CHAP. 1 6.] centre, and that of Bachelu on the right, — its right resting on the Charleroi road. Of the four divisions of the ist Corps, that of Donzelot was the left, and its left rested on the Charleroi road ; then came that of Allix, commanded by Quiot ; then that of Marcognet, and then that of Durutte. This last was opposite Papelotte and La Haye. The two armies were nearly equal in numbers; and had that of the Duke of Wellington been equal in point of material to that of the Emperor, the advantage of position which it possessed would have fully made up for the slight superiority in numbers possessed by the French. As it was, however, the superiority of the French, not only in artillery and cavalry, but so far as a large part of the Anglo-Dutch army was concerned, in moral, was unquestionable, and Wellington's only justifi- cation for receiving battle lay, as Kennedy points out above, in his expectation of receiving help from Bllicher. Napoleon, as we have seen, dictated his plan of battle before eleven o'clock. It provided that, '' as soon as the whole army should be ranged in order of battle, about i P. M., and the Emperor should give the order to Marshal Ney, the attack should commence, having for its object to get possession of the village of Mont St. Jean, where the road from Nivelles strikes into the Charleroi turn- pike. This attack was to be made by the ist Corps, supported on the left by the 2d Corps. To aid this attack a formidable battery of seventy-eight guns, many of them twelve-pounders, was to be moved forward on the east side of the road to a ridge which ran in front of and parallel to the French line of battle, and only 600 yards from the English position. The Emperor had then definitely decided before eleven o'clock to defer the principal move of the day till about one in the afternoon. In this decision he was mainly, if ^ Doc. Indd., XIX, pp. 53, 54; App. C, xxxii; j)ost, p. [chap. 1 6.] THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 3O3 not wholly, influenced by the difficulties which he saw would be caused by the deep mud of the fields over which his troops would have to manoeuvre. The determination of Napoleon to make his main effort against the village of Mont St. Jean, so as to possess himself of the principal avenue of retreat open to the enemy, — the road to Brussels, — has always elicited the commendation of military men. The Emperor undoubtedly intended to aid the attack of the ist Corps by advancing the 6th Corps in its support ; but this, as we shall see, owing to the intervention of the Prussians, he did not attempt. Whether, in case the attack had succeeded, so far as to give to the French the possession of the Brussels road, the Forest of Soignes would have afforded cover to Wellington's retreating army, as English writers have always maintained, or would have neces- sitated the abandonment of the greater part of their artillery, as Napoleon contended, is a question which we will not undertake to discuss here. At 1 1.30 A.M., before the time arrived for beginning the main operation of the day. Napoleon ordered Reille to attack Hougomont with his left division, that of Prince Je- rome.^" This movement, intended only as a diversion, was undertaken without any sufficient examination of the en- emy's position, and in the most inconsiderate manner. " Neither Jerome, who commanded the division, nor *^,We shall not attempt to give a complete tactical description of the battle of Waterloo. The narratives of Siborne, Charras, Hooper, La Tour d'Au- vergne, and others give aU the facts. With the exception of two or three points, their accounts do not differ materially. " The following extract from a letter by Baron Miiffling written on June 24, 1815, is directly in point here : — " Before we arrived there I said to the Duke, ' If only there were an ap- parently weak point in the right flank of your position, so that Bonaparte might assail it right furiously, and neglect his own right wing to such an extent that he should fail to discover the march of the Prussians ! ' " And see ! when we arrived there, there lay the advanced post of Hougomont, upon which he (B.) indeed fell." Militar Wochenblatt, Nov. 14, 1891. 304 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. [CHAP. 1 6.] Guilleminot, who, Charras maintains, really controlled its operations, took the pains to direct the boiling courage and superfluous energy of the men, which, skilfully used, might have resulted in obtaining at least partial success. For example, the western entrance of the Chateau was perfectly open to artillery fire, and, had a few heavy guns been employed, the doors and adjacent wall would have been demolished, and the building would probably have been taken, ^"^ although it is doubtful if it could have been held. Bags of powder, also, would have destroyed the garden wall, but no one thought of supplying them to the men. " In consequence of these neglects, the soldiers of Jerome's division, after possessing themselves of the wood and orchard, were shot down by their opponents from behind the garden wall, and from the loopholes in the house and its outbuildings, and could make no further progress. This, of itself, was, perhaps, of no great consequence; but Reille, impatient of being thwarted, and still neglecting to ascertain the precise reasons of the ill-success of the attack, sent in the division of Foy to support that of Jerome. In fact, later in the day, the division of Bachelu was also employed in this useless and most costly attempt to get possession of Hougomont. When it is considered that the 2d Corps contained on this morning not far from 12,000 foot soldiers, and that very few of them assisted in the attacks on the main line of the English army, one gets an idea of the wasteful, and, in fact, inexcusable mismanagement of the resources of the French army on this day. Not more than half the above number of men were employed to maintain the position. The main operation of the day was to be, as we have said, an advance by the ist Corps under d'Erlon to break the centre of the English line at and near the junction of ^ La Tour d'Auvergne, p. 266 ; Charras, vol. i, p. 281. "Charras, vol. 2, p. 18. [chap. 1 6.] THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 3O5 the Wavre road with the turnpike. The great battery of seventy-eight pieces of cannon continued firing for an hour and a half at a distance of less than a third of a mile from the crest in front of which lay the brigade of Bylandt, and behind which lay the brigades of Kempt and Pack and Best of Picton's division. At half-past one Napoleon ordered d'Erlon forward. His attack was to be made in four columns, marching in echelon, the left in advance. The formation of these columns was so extraordinary^ and so ill-suited for the work to be done, that it has always excited the comment of military men. We owe to Charras ^^ a clear explanation of this formation. The first, or left, column consisted of the brigade of Bourgeois of the division of Allix, — the other brigade of this division, that of Quiot, being assigned to the special task of capturing La Haye Sainte. This brigade of Bourgeois contained four battalions, one behind another ; each battalion stood in three ranks, one behind the other ; and there was a distance of five paces between the battalions. The front of this column, there- fore, consisted of one-third of the number of men in the leading battalion ; and there being four battalions in the brigade, there were of course tv/elve ranks in the column. It was the same, mutatis mutandis, v/ith the other columns. Donzelot's division, which contained nine battalions, had, therefore, twenty-seven ranks in its column ; the divisions of Marcognet and Durutte, which had only eight battalions each, had each twenty-four ranks. This formation was quite an exceptional one. A column very generally in use at that day consisted of a battalion in the centre, in line, — that is, in three ranks, — flanked on either side, by battalions in column of divisions, capable of promptly forming line or square. And then there were other convenient formations in frequent use. But these formations of d'Erlon's divis- * Charras, vol. 1, p. 2S8, and note 2. 306 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. [cHAP. 1 6.] ions were unwieldy, — they lacked mobility. Why Ney and d'Erlon should have departed from the usual practice on this occasion, no one knows." The story of d'Erlon's charge has been often told. ^^ How the soldiers of the unfortunate brigade of Bylandt, utterly unable, as they were, after having" been exposed to the fire of the great battery for an hour and a half, to resist alone the impact of such an enormous force, broke in confusion and fell to the rear amid the undeserved curses of their English allies ; ^^ how the French in their unwieldy masses pressed forward to the crest of the ridge to receive the fire at short range of the brigades of Pack and Kempt, which only the leading battalions were able, owing to the faulty formation of the columns, to return at all ; and how, when staggered by the fire, and while endeavoring to disengage their closely following ranks, Ponsonby's brigade of heavy cavalry charged them furiously, riding down between the columns, throwing them into confusion, cutting down the exposed foot- soldiers, capturing two eagles, and many prisoners, disabling some 15 guns, and forcing the three left columns to fall back in disorder, — all this is familiar to all readers of the story of Waterloo. It is difficult to find a parallel to this clumsily executed movement of d'Erlon's. At the same time, faulty as the formation of the columns was, the troops got actually on the crest of the British position ; and had there been any timidity or hesitation on the part of their adversaries, the columns would undoubtedly have forced their way through the British line. But the necessary time was not allowed them. Sir Thomas Picton was alive to the danger ; he was prompt to seize the opportunity; his troops by their close and ''' Charras, vol. i, p. 28S; La Tour d'Auvergne, p. 274. D'Erlon in his autobiography throws no light on the matter; Drouet, p. 97. '^ Nowhere better, perhaps, than in Erckmann-Chatrian's " Waterloo." ^ Siborne, vol. 2, pp. 5, 6. [chap. 1 6.] THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 3O7 deadly fire threw the heads of the columns into confusion, and then charged them with the bayonet. Lord Uxbridge, who commanded the cavalry, rode over from his own position on the other side of the turnpike, and ordered Ponsonby to charge. He then returned to lead Somerset's cavalry brigade in a successful charge on the west of the pike. The whole affair was a great and deserved success for the English. Their cavalry, how- ever, was very severely handled on returning to its original positions. Shortly before d'Erlon moved out, Napoleon had seen a body of troops on the heights of St. Lambert, far off on his right. It was soon ascertained that they were Prussians. He then sent off the i P. M. order to Grouchy. '*° By the time that the unfortunate charge of the ist Corps had resulted in the repulse narrated above, certainly before 3 P. M:, Napoleon had decided that he must employ the 6th Corps in resisting the Prussians, and not in supporting the ist Corps in further operations against the English, as he had originally intended to do. But whatever shape the next movement might assume, the first thing to be done was evidently to carry the farm- house of La Haye Sainte, which had just been unsuccess- fully attempted. This was undertaken in the same reckless and careless manner which had characterized the assault on Hougo- mont. Although the French had an abundance of heavy guns, none were used to batter down the doors and walls, in front of which the bravest officers and men could accomplish but little, and were sacrificed to no pur- pose.'*' The place was finally taken shortly before 4 P. M. '^ *° Ante, p. 270. *' Charras, vol. 2, p. iS. Colonel Heym^s of Ney's staff says that more than 2,000 men were killed in endeavoring to get possession of La Haye Sainte. Doc. Indd., p. 17. This, however, must be an excessive estimate. "^ Charras, vol. i, pp. 302, 303 ; vol. 2, p. 18 ; Hooper, p. 213, n. ; O'Connor 308 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. [CHAP. 1 6.] But the capture of La Haye Sainte was only a necessary preliminary to a serious attack on the enemy's main line. Napoleon (or perhaps Ney) seems to have thought that the troops of d'Erlon had been too severely handled to warrant the expectation of any immediate aid from them. They would require an hour or two, perhaps, to recover. At any rate, it was determined to assail the English centre to the west of the Charleroi road, and as the infantry of the ist Corps were not for the moment available, and as that of the 2d Corps, or at least, the greater part of it, was engaged in attacking Hougomont, it vv^as decided to make the assault this time with cavalry alone. The troops on this portion of Wellingtons line, — between the Charleroi road and Hougomont, — had been subjected only to artillery fire, and even that had not been anything like as severe as that sustained by the troops exposed to the great French battery on the opposite side of the road. They consequently were in good condition to resist cavalry, '^^ especially considering that the bad ground over which the cavalry must pass would be certain to diminish the force of their assaults. Sir James Shaw-Kennedy, who was on this part of the line, tells us that the opinion at the time among the English officers was that the attack was premature. This was also Napoleon's own opinion ; he seems to have yielded to Ney's solicitations against his own judg- ment. But at this time, shortly after 4 P. M., the advance of Billow's Corps occupied the constant attention of the Emperor ; he was constrained to leave the conduct of the Morris, p. 352. Other authorities put the capture of La Haye Sainte two hours later. Colonel Heym^s of Ney's staff places the hour between 6 and 7 P. M. Doc. In6d., pp. i8, 19. *' Kennedy, pp. 114-116. Kennedy's account of this part of the battle, as indeed of all parts of it, is most valuable ; but we think he is in error in sup- posing that La Haye Sainte had not fallen before these cavalry attacks were made. [chap. 1 6.] THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 3O9 battle against Wellington to Marshal Ney, in whose tactical skill and management he had great confidence, and to devote himself mainly to the task of directing the movements of the 6th Corps and of those portions of the Guard, which from time to time he was obliged to detach for its support, so as to prevent the Prussians from seiz- ing the village of Planchenoit and thus menacing the communications of the army. Napoleon's neglect of the conduct of the operations against the English has often been the subject of comment and severe criticism ; but we imagine that he was far more anxious to hinder the Prussians, who were aiming, so to speak, at a vital part, from succeeding, than even to defeat the English. To fend off the Prussians was an absolute necessity ; to drive the English from the field, a thing no doubt very desirable; but as there was no fear that they would take the offensive, and as, if they did, the army, or, at least, the great bulk of it, was in line of battle opposed to them, no great danger was to be apprehended from them. Whereas the Prussians were striking at the flank and rear, aiming to get control of the Charleroi road, and thus of the line of communications and retreat of the army. To prevent their succeeding in this was, therefore, of vital importance. Hence Napoleon attended to this himself, and left to Ney the conduct of the fight against Wellington's army. Marshal Ney, then, determined to carry the allied centre by charges of cavalry. He seems to have made no effort to support this attack by the infantry of the 2d Corps, although it would certainly have been quite possible to have withdrawn at least Bachelu's division from the wood of Hougomont and to have used it with good effect. But Ney was originally an officer of cavalry ; this fact may have made him think it possible to accomplish more with cavalry alone than to others would seem practicable. At any rate, from 4 to 6 P. M. the splendid divisions of Milhaud, Lefebvre-Desnouettes, Kellermann 310 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. [CHAP. l6,] and Guyot were successively launched against the English lines. Every one has heard of the magnificent gallantry of these fine troops; every one knows the indomitable steadiness with which their repeated onsets were borne. At the close of these assaults the French cavalry had become wellnigh exhausted; and they had not broken a single square. Nevertheless, the English, Hanoverian, Nassau and Brunswick troops had suffered severely; obliged to remain in squares for fear of the repeated irruptions of the French cavalry, they presented an easy mark to the French infantry skirmishers of Donzelot's division, which with a portion of Quiot's was finally brought over from the east side of the turnpike, as well as to the artillery from the French main position, which, necessarily silent while the cavalry were on the plateau, constantly recommenced its fire as soon as the cavalry retired down the slope, as was done many times during these two hours. In fact this part of the allied line was finally weakened so much that it was very near giving way, as we shall shortly see. At one time, all the troops for nearly half a mile to the west of the Brussels pike had retired from exhaustion, and in disorder, and the Duke himself had to lead up fresh troops to take their places. ""^ More, however, might have been accomplished by the French. For instance, the enfilading batteries, which towards the close of the day, dismounted Mercer's guns *^ and practically destroyed several squares of infantry, might have been employed quite as easily two hours before, and more of them might well have been used. ^^ ** Kennedy, pp. 127 ef seq. ; Siborne, vol. 2, pp. 152 et seq. *' Mercer, vol. i, p. 325 ; Napoldon h. Waterloo, p. 315 ; Siborne, vol. 2, pp. 154, 155. Mercer in his Diary seems to think these enfilading batteries were Prussian; but see his letter and plan in the Waterloo Letters, pp. 214 et seq. Cf. Waterloo Letters, p. 330. **Van Loben Sels, p. 333. [chap. 1 6.] THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 3II But no use whatever was made, except as above stated, of the very great advantage afforded by the position of La Haye Sainte for the posting of batteries which should sweep the whole line of the allies, dismount their guns, riddle their squares, and render their infantry unable to resist the shock of cavalry. Nor was the infantry of the I St Corps brought up in season. As for that of the 2d Corps, Ney hardly made any use of it at all ; he suffered it to remain in the wood and enclosures of Hougomont. Napoleon said, and it cannot be seriously disputed, that the heavy cavalry of the Guard, the division of Guyot, went in without his orders. Whether Ney ordered it in is, however, doubtful. His chief-of-sta£f. Colonel Heymes, denies that he did. He says that the cavalry of the Guard went in of its own accord. (Doc. Ined., pp. 16, 17.) At any rate, it was a great mistake, whoever committed it, as all the authorities freely say. It de- stroyed the last cavalry-reserve of the army. While these operations were going on in front. Napo- leon was personally superintending the desperate and gallant fight made by the two divisions of the 6th Corps under Lobau against Billow's advance. The two leading divisions of the I Vth Corps, which moved out about 4.30 P. M., were easily checked at first ; but they rallied, and were reinforced by the rest of the corps ; and, between 5 and 6 P. M., Lobau was driven back, and Planchenoit itself was threatened. The Emperor was obliged to put in the Young Guard, which, with three batteries, occupied Planchenoit, while the 6th Corps extended on its left so as to connect with the right of the ist Corps. But the Prussians drove the Young Guard out of the village ; and the Emperor had to order in three battalions of the Old and Middle Guard with two batteries. These troops, gallantly supported by the Young Guard, retook the town, and the Prussians fell back some distance. Napoleon then seems to have thought that the attack of the Prussians was exhausted. It was nearly seven 312 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. [CHAP. 1 6.] o'clock. ^"^ In this action the fighting on both sides was very obstinate. The French troops were superior in point of experience to those of Billow, — those of the 6th Corps were led by a very able officer, Lobau, and the regiments of the Guard were the elite of the arm}'-. Hence, though much inferior in numbers, they obtained this success, which under other circumstances, would have been decisive. But in this case their enemies had reinforcements at hand. Pirch I., at the head of the lid Corps, was only two miles in rear. This, however. Napoleon of course could not know. Hence, thinking that the danger from the Prussians was practically over, he hastened towards the front, where for the last hour, ever since the conclusion of the cavalry attacks, the battle had languished. It had in fact con- sisted during this period only of a general skirmish firing along the centre of the English position to the west of the Brussels pike, the result of which, however, was, undoubtedly, to weaken perceptibly the strength and moral of the allied troops. This part of the English line was in fact in a bad way at this period of the battle. ^^ As Sir James Shaw-Kennedy, who was on this part of the line on the staff of the 3d division, says : — "^^ " La Have Sainte was in the hands of the enemy; also the knoll on the opposite side of the road ; also the garden and ground on the Anglo-Allied side of it ; Ompteda's brigade was nearly annihilated, and Kielmansegge's so thinned, that those two brigades could not hold their position. That part of the field of battle, therefore, which was between Halkett's 5° left and Kempt's s' right, was *' Charras, vol. i, p. 318. **Siborne, vol. 2, pp. 152 et seq.\ Van Loben Sels, p. 295. Cf. Porter's Hist. Royal Engineers, vol. i, p. 382: Waterloo Letters, p. 339, where the hour is fixed by Lieutenant-Colonel Dawson Kelly at " about half-past six. " ^'Kennedy, p. 127. 5° Halkett's brigade was on the main line, nearly half of a mile west of the pike. " Kempt's brigade was on the east side of the Brussels pike ; its right rested on it. [chap. 1 6.] THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 3I3 unprotected; and being the very centre of the Duke's line of battle, was consequently that point, above all others, which the enemy wished to gain. The danger was imminent ; and at no other period of the action was the result so precarious as at this moment. Most fortunately Napoleon did not support the advantage his troops had gained at this point by bringing forward his reserve ; proving that he did not exert that activity and personal energy in superintending and conforming to the progress of the action, which he ought to have done." As to this last observation, we have just seen how the Emperor was employed during this critical period of the action. He was in truth fighting another battle with inferior forces against the Prussians, and this, too, at a distance of a mile and a half from the English line of battle. ^^ The criticism on Napoleon is therefore unfounded ; it is due simply to the fact that his occupa- tion during this period of the battle was not borne in min-d by General Shaw-Kennedy. But the fact remains ; if there had been no other battle to fight, — no desperate action at Planchenoit, requiring the presence and per- sonal direction of the Emperor, — if the attack upon the allied lines could have been made under the eye and direct orders of Napoleon himself, — in the opinion of Kennedy, whose account of the battle is one of the best we have, it would have gone hard with Wellington's army. Add to this, that if there had been no other battle to fight, the Emperor could have brought 16,000 fresh men to bear upon this exhausted force of Wellington's. It should be added, also, that the English heavy cavalry of Somerset and Ponsonby, which had been well nigh exhausted by their charges at the beginning of the action, and had suffered more or less during the afternoon, were not able to render efficient service at the close of the day. '' It is almost exactly a mila and a half from the point of intersection of the Brussels turnpike with the VVavre road to the church in Planchenoit. 314 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. [CHAP. 1 6.] Napoleon, as we have seen, as soon as he had, as he supposed, definitely repulsed the Prussians in the neigh- borhood of Planchenoit, hastened to the front, where he must have arrived somewhere about seven o'clock. His absence from the field during this time was, as we have seen, not due to any fault or neglect of his, but neverthe- less it was most unfortunate for the success of his army. " Marshal Ney had exhausted, as he supposed, ^^^ all the resources available to him. Over the Imperial Guard he had no authority ; and the only infantry in the army that had not been put in belonged to the Guard. Meanwhile Wellington had exerted himself to the utmost to restore at least a semblance of strength to his line of battle west of the turnpike ; he had rallied the men of Alten's divis- ion, who had been shaken by the fall of that officer, who was severely wounded; he had brought forward some Brunswick troops ; he had ordered Chasse's (3d) Dutch- Belgian division from its position near Merbe Braine to a position in rear of the guards; he had brought over to the centre the light cavalry brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur from the extreme left. He had, in fact, done all that could be done, and he was now awaiting the next move of his antagonist with a coolness, vigilance and alertness which the discouraging aspects of the fight did not in the least affect. But his situation was a perilous one. His losses had been very great. His English troops were much exhausted; the patience and confidence of most of his foreign allies were nearly worn out ; and on that part of his line lying to the west of the turnpike his artillery was mostly dismounted. He had, however, in reserve som.e of his best troops, and one or two batteries. '^See Napol(5on h. Waterloo, pp. 313, 31S. ^* The principal question as to this is in regard to the corps of Reille, a part of which, certainly, might have been more usefully employed in sustaining the cavalry attacks than in fighting in the wood of Hougomont, or on the Nivelles road on the west side of Hougomont. See Heym^s' statement in Doc. Indd., pp. 17, 18. [chap. i6.] the battle of WATERLOO. 3I5 Maitland's brigade of guards and Adam's brigade of Clinton's division had suffered but little, and were troops of the best quality. Ney had acquainted the Emperor with the state of things in his front, and had been informed that, as soon as he could, the Emperor would sustain him with a part of the Guard. Meantime, he was to collect as much of the cavalry, and of Reille's infantry, as he could, to sup- port the attack which might soon be expected to be made by the Guard, supported by the infantry of the ist Corps. It was, as must be sufficiently apparent to the reader, out of the question at this period of the action for Napoleon to organize an attack against the English lines with the Impe- rial Guard, in any such fashion as that which he employed with such crushing effect on the day but one before, at Ligny. To begin with, the cavalry of the Guard, both the light and the heavy, had been shattered, and virtually ruined for the time being, by their repeated, ineffectual, and costly efforts to carry the plateau during the previous few hours. Then, but a fraction of the infantry and artillery of the Guard was disposable. The Young Guard, consisting of eight battalions, organized in four regiments, with twenty-four guns, was in Planchenoit, " where, also, was one of the eight battalions of the Old Guard (grenadiers), two battalions of the Middle Guard (chasseurs), and two batteries. ^^ Two more battalions ^^ of the Old Guard and one battery were on the road which, leading from Planchenoit to the Charleroi pike, comes out near the Maison du Roi, and one battalion of the Middle Guard was at the farm of Chantelet, in the neighborhood of the Caillou house, where were the head- quarters-baggage and trains. As each of the divisions of " Charras, vol. i, p. 316. =^Ib.,p.3i7- " lb., p. 321, n. ; correcting the statement on p. 318, which speaks of onlji one battalion of grenadiers being on the road to the IMaison du Roi. 3l6 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. [CHAP. 1 6.] the Guard consisted of eight battahons, there were there- fore but ten battahons left which could be employed against the English. ^^ But, in addition to these detach- ments, for which we have the authority of Charras, we learn from Damitz, ^^ who states with more minuteness than any other author the disposition made of the Imperial Guard, that one battalion of grenadiers and one of chasseurs were brought forward from Rossomme and stationed near La Belle Alliance. This left but eight battalions disposable for the projected attack. These eight battalions^" constituted four regiments, namely, the 3d and 4th grenadiers (Old Guard) and the 3d and 4th chasseurs (Middle Guard). The 3d and 4th regiments of grenadiers constituted the brigade of General Roguet ; the 3d regiment was comimanded by General Poret de Morvan, the 4th by General Harlet. The 3d and 4th regiments of chasseurs constituted the brigade of General Michel; the 3d regiment was com- manded by General Mallet, the 4th by General Henrion.^' The whole force, which could not have much exceeded 3,000 men, was under the command of General Friant, a very distinguished officer, titular colonel of the ist reg- iment of foot-grenadiers of the Guard. The Imperial Guard, which consisted of 24 battalions, organized into 12 regiments, of which 4 belonged to the 5^ Charras, vol. i, p. 321. " Damitz, vol. i, p. 285. Damitz gives a complete roster of the Guard, and, in fact, of the whole army, at the end of his first volume. He also gives the numbers of the regiments and battalions detached in and around Planchenoit. ^° Damitz, vol. i, p. 285, states that owing to the losses suffered at Ligny these eight battalions had been consolidated into six. Batty (pp. 106, 107) also says that the 4th regiment of grenadiers consisted of but one battalion, and that the same was true of the 4th regiment of chasseurs. " At least this was the fact on the i6th of June, prior to the battle of Ligny. See the Roster at the end of Damitz' first volume. AU these officers, except Henrion, are mentioned by Charras (vol. i, p. 322) as participating in this charge. Cf. Gore, p. 59. This work is an explanation, in 181 7, of Craan's Map of the Field. [chap. 1 6.] THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 317 Old Guard, 4 to the Middle Guard, and 4 to the Young Guard, had been stationed at the beginning of the day just in front of the farm of Rossomme, and on either side of the Charleroi turnpike. From this point 16 battalions had been detached to various points, as we have seen. The Emperor in person now took the remaining 8 battalions ^' from this position to the front, and handed them over to Ney just to the south of La Haye Sainte. This was about 7 P. M. Here he addressed them ; he encouraged them, and urged them to make their best efforts. These eight (or, probably, only six battalions) were then formed in as many columns, each of a front of two companies, and arranged in echelon,^^ the right battalion in front. ^* This w^as the ist battalion of the 3d regiment of grenadiers, commanded by General Poret de Morvan. Two batteries of horse-artillery, placed on the left flank, accompanied the infantry. There seems to have been no arrangement for the proper support of the movement by cavalry, although a body of cuirassiers did, shortly before the main shock took place, charge Napier's battery. They were, however, easily and speed- ily driven off. The French cavalry was, in fact, nearly exhausted. Protection on the left of the advancing column, however, the Guard imperatively needed, as, in its march towards the enemy, its left flank would inevitably be exposed to all the troops stationed between the north end of Hougomont and the main British line. On its '^ Ney : Letter to the Duke of Otranto ; Jones, p. 3S7. But Drouot (Jones, p. 227) and Napoleon (Corresp., vol. 31, p. 238) say four battalions only, and the latter adds " of the Middle Guard." It is not unlikely that the other battalions had previously been brought up to the neighborhood of La Haye Sainte. " Charras, vol. i, p. 321. ''^ This is implied in Damitz' statement, vol. i, p. 2S6, as well as from Charras' statement that the horse-batteries were on the left flank of the column. It is distinctly so stated in Van Loben Sels, p. 295. 3l8 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. [CHAP. 1 6.] right, the column was protected from a flank attack by the troops of the ist Corps. (See Map 14.) It was, according to all the accounts, Napoleon's inten- tion that Reille should disengage at least one division of his corps from the enclosures of Hougomont, and support this charge of the Guard on the left ; but this does not seem to have been even attempted. D'Erlon, on the other hand, must have exerted himself to the utmost to support the Guard ; for the divisions of Donzelot and Quiot most gallantly and forcibly attacked the Anglo- Allied line for about a third of a mile to the west of the turnpike, overthrowing and driving back the Brunswick and Nassau troops, and even the Hanoverians and English, so that the personal interposition of the Duke was required to reestablish the line. These attacks were made about the time when the Guard began its forward movement, and they had the effect of shaking the allied troops on this part of the field so much that they cer- tainly could not have stood another serious and well- sustained assault, such as might have been delivered by the Imperial Guard. But the movement of the column^^ of the Imperial Guard was not made in this direction, but diagonally across the field towards the enemy's right centre, where Wellington had stationed his reserves, and where he had at least one battery, Bolton's, then commanded by Napier, in good condition. The English, as soon as they perceived the famous bearskin caps of the Imperial Guard, directed all their disposable guns upon their approaching foes; but, whether it was owing to the smoke, or to the inequalities of the ground, the Guard does not seem to have ^^We call the whole mass, consisting of columns of battalions, — division (or two company) front, — arranged in echelon, — a column, merely for con- venience' sake. It may be remarked that the French infantry were formed in three ranks. [chap. 1 6.] THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 3ig suffered until it got to close quarters with the ist (Maitland's) brigade of the English guards.^^ The leading battalion of the Guard was, as we have seen, formed in column with a front of two companies in three ranks. As each battalion had four companies,^^ and consisted of about 500 men,^^ there would be about 75 men in the front rank of the leading battalion, allow- ing for the file-closers. To its left and rear, marching in echelon, were the other battalions which constituted the attacking force, accompanied by two batteries of horse artillery of six pieces each, which kept up a destructive fire as the infantry advanced. We quote from the jour- nal of an of^cer^^ in the English guards : — " Suddenly the firing ceased, and, as the smoke cleared away, a most superb sight opened on us. A close column of Grenadiers (about seventies in front) of la Moyenne Garde^''° about 6,000 strong, led, as we have since heard, by Marshal Ney, were seen ascending the rise, au pas de charge^ shouting" ViveV Empereur." They continued to advance till within fifty or sixty paces of our front, when the brigade?' were ordered to stand up. Whether it was from the sudden and unexpected appearance of a corps so near them, which must have seemed as starting out of the ground, or the tremendously heavy fire we threw into them, La Garde^ who had never before failed in an attack, suddenly stopped. Those, who from a distance and more on the flank could see the affair, tell '^Waterloo Letters, pp. 254, 257 ; Contra, Siborne, vol. 2, p. 166. ''St. Hilaire : Hist, de la Garde, p. 634. "Charras, vol. i, p. 67. ^^Captain Powell, in Waterloo Letters, pp. 254, 255. '°This is an error, " La Moyenne Garde " consisted solely of the chasseurs of the Guard ; the grenadiers constituted the Old Guard, strictly so called. It is not uncommon to find the grenadiers and chasseurs spoken of as consti- tuting the Old Guard ; this is Charras' usage. But it is an error to speak of the grenadiers of the Middle Guard. The grenadiers whom he saw were the ist battalion of the 3d regiment, — ante, p. 317. See Napoleon k Water- loo, p. 315, n. I ; pp. 321, 325, 327, n. i. Contra, Gore, p. 75. "The ist brigade of guards, about 1,800 strong, — Siborne, vol. i, p. 460. App. XXX. They were formed in four ranks. 320 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. [CHAP. 1 6.] US that the effect of our fire seemed to force the head of the col- umn bodily back. "In less than a minute above 300 were down. They now wavered, and several of the rear divisions began to draw out as if to deploy, whilst some of the men in their rear beginning to fire over the heads of those in front was so evident a proof of their confusion that Lord Saltoun * * * holloaed out, '■Now's the tiine^ my boys' Immediately the brigade sprang forward. La Garde turned, and gave us little opportunity of trying the steel. We charged down the hill till we had passed the end of the orchard of Hougomont, when our right flank became exposed to another heavy column (as we afterwards understood, of the chasseurs of the Garde') who were advancing in support of the former column. This circumstance, besides that our charge was isolated, obliged the brigade to retire towards their original position." It is plain from this account that the head of the French column consisted of some 70 (or 75) men, as we have pointed out would be the case if the leading battalion was in column with a two company front; and that the fire of Maitland's brigade, which must have had a front of about 450 men, added to that of a part of Hal- kett s brigade, to that of Napier's battery, and to that of the Dutch-Belgian battery of Van der Smissen/' which General Chasse had most opportunely brought up, de- stroyed this leading battalion and one or more of those in echelon with it on its left and rear. It is also clear from this account that the pursuing troops soon found themselves flanked by the other battalions of the Imperial Guard, which they took to be a separate column, and were obliged to fall back. It is very unlikely, by the way, that they advanced as far as the end of the orchard of Hougomont, a quarter of a mile from their position. It may be that the rear battalions of the Guard inclined in their advance, by accident or oversight, more to their left than they should have done, and thus pre- '^ Relation Beige, pp. 74 et seq. [chap. 1 6.] THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 32 1 sented the appearance of a separate column. General Maitland says : — " " As the attacking force moved forward, it separated ; the chasseurs inclined to their left. The grenadiers ascended the accHvity towards our position in a more direct course, leaving La Haye Sainte on their right, and moving towards that part of the eminence occupied by the ist brigade of Guards. " He also speaks of the effect of the fire of the batteries which accompanied the Guard : — "Numerous pieces of ordnance were distributed on the flanks of this column. The brigade suffered by the enemy's artillery, but it withheld its fire for the nearer approach of the column. The lat- ter, after advancing steadily up the slope, halted about twenty paces from the front rank of the brigade. " The diminished range of the enemy's artillery was now felt most severely in our ranks ; the men fell in great numbers before the discharges of grape shot and the fire of the musketry distributed among the guns. " General Maitland goes on to describe the repulse of the French attack : — " The smoke of the [French] artillery happily did not envelop the hostile column, or serve to conceal it from our aim. " With what view the enemy halted in a situation so perilous, and in a position so comparatively helpless, he was not given time to evince. " The fire of the brigade opened with terrible effect. " The enemy's column, crippled and broken, retreated with the utmost rapidity, leaving only a heap of dead and dying men to mark the ground which it had occupied." The attempt of some of the rear battalions to deploy, noticed by Captain Powell, is thus mentioned by Char- ras : — ''^ ^" Unhappily, whether by orders, or by the instinct of the soldier, the Guard deploys, in order to reply to the musketry which deci- mates it from moment to moment ; and, by this movement, it masks "Waterloo Letters, pp. 244, 245. ^^Charras, vol, i, pp. 325, 326. 322 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. [CHAP. 1 6.] the two batteries which have followed it, which have taken posi- tion on the crest of the plateau, and whose fire has, up to this instant, protected its flanks." But what the leading battaHons of the Guard needed at the moment when they were being destroyed by the superior fire of the brigade of EngHsh guards was not so much the continued effect of the fire of artillery upon the brigade as the prompt advance of cavalry, w^hich would have compelled Maitland to throw his regiments into squares. Failing this, the best thing for the Guard would have been a flank attack on Maitland's brigade by troops of the 1st Corps; but this was averted by the gallant and skilful conduct of Sir Colin Halkett and Colonel Elphin- stone in bringing the remains of Halkett's brigade, which had suffered terribly during the past hour, to the left of the English guards, and thus protecting them in their con- test with the Imperial Guard. ^^ In fact the attack on Halkett's brigade by Donzelot's troops at this time was very sharp, and at one time caused great confusion. It was a critical moment; for, if Halkett had been beaten, Donzelot's troops would have flanked Maitland's bri- gade, and, attacked as it then would have been, on front and flank, it would have been forced to retire, and per- haps even routed. Donzelot's troops did their best to gain a foothold on the plateau ; they did gain a tempo- rary success; they knew the importance of the task assigned to them, and gallantly strove to support the charge of the Guard. On the other hand, the intelligent appreciation of the emergency on the part of Halkett and his subordinates, and their obstinate and courageous maintenance of their exposed position deserve the high- est commendation. If this attack of the Imperial Guard had been sup- "See Waterloo Letters, pp. 320, 321 ; Siborne, vol. 11, pp. 170 171, n. ; See, also, Waterloo Letters, pp. 33c, 331, 339, 3-10. [chap. 1 6.] THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 323 ported on the right by cavalry, this resistance on the part of Halkett's and Maitland's commands could not have been encountered. It seems probable that the failure of the attack of the' Guard upon Maitland's brigade involved in confusion both the 3d and 4th regiments of grenadiers (Old Guard), the four (or, more probably, three) battalions of which were the leading battalions in the whole column. This, however, is by no means certain. All we know is, that those troops which were not swept off the field by the charge of Maitland's guards, among which assuredly were the 3d and 4th regim.ents of chasseurs (Middle Guard), ignorant, probably, of the fate which had befallen their comrades, steadily pursued their way towards the right centre of the English position. As the eight (or, more probably, six) battalions of the original column were formed in echelon, the right in advance, it is plain that the march of the four (or, more probably, three) rear battal- ions would bring them on a part of the English line to the English right of the position of Maitland's brigade, — in fact, " towards that part of " the English " position which had been vacated by the second brigade of Guards, when it moved to Hougomont." ^^ In this direction, then, these remaining battalions of the Imperial Guard advanced. To all intents and purposes they now constituted a sec- ond column. As a second column they must have appeared not only to the men of Maitland's brigade, when their pursuit of the leading and defeated battalions brought them on a line with the left echelons of the orig- inal formation, but also to the troops of the brigade of Sir Frederick Adam, who, having been lying behind a ridge, a little to the north of Hougomont, were now advanced, and found the French guard in full march for the summit of the acclivity. The initiative seems to have been assumed without a ^* Waterloo Letters, p. 245 ; Maitland's narrative. 324 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. [CHAP. 1 6.] moment's hesitation by Sir John Colborne, the lieuten- ant-colonel of the 52d regiment, who brought his command into line parallel to the flank of the Imperial Guard, and at once opened fire. This action was approved on the spot by General Adam, who ordered the other regiments of the brigade to support the 5 2d. The French column was obliged to halt, and to deploy to its left, in order to return the fire, and for a few minutes the action was very heavy on both sides.^'' But the other British regiments coming up, and the French, who were acting at a mani- fest disadvantage in being thus compelled to halt when half way up the slope, and resist an unexpected and reso- lute attack on their flank while they were exposed also to the fire from the enemy's batteries in front, becoming evidently uneasy, Colborne ordered a charge, which broke the column up completely. He followed the dis- integrated and demoralized battalions without an instant's hesitation even across the Charleroi turnpike. In this attack, the Imperial Guard was supported on its left flank neither by cavalry nor by the infantry of Reille's Corps. Had either been employed, the disaster could not have happened. A charge of cavalry would have forced the 5 2d to form square ; an advance of Bachelu's division, or a part of it, would have engaged all the attention of Adam's brigade, and permitted the Guard to pursue its way unmolested to the crest of the hill. What would have succeeded the repulse and defeat of the Imperial Guard had the Prussians not interposed, no one of course can tell. But while these movements were going on, about 7.30 P. M., the van of Zieten's Corps reached Papelotte ; ^^ and the division of Steinmetz, sup- ported by cavalry and artillery, turning at once the right "Waterloo Letters ; Colbome's narrative, pp. 284, 285 ; Gawler's narra- tive, p. 293. ^^Charras, vol. 1, p. 327, n. [chap. 1 6.] THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 325 of the ist Corps and the left of the 6th, advanced upon the field of battle, spreading terror and confusion through- out the right wing of the French army. Durutte's and Marcognet's divisions abandoned their positions ; Lobau retired towards Planchenoit ; while the immense success which the English had obtained over the French left in routing the Imperial Guard was instantly improved by Wellington in ordering his two remaining and as yet untouched cavalry brigades, those of Vivian and Vande- leur, to charge. These bodies of horse, which had been, in the latter part of the afternoon, brought over from the English left to the rear of their centre, were now launched upon the troops of Donzelot and Quiot, and the remains of the French cavalry; and then the Duke, seeing that the battle was won, ordered the whole line to advance. (See Map 12.) There was no resistance of any consequence made, except by the scattered regiments of the Imperial Guard, and by the 6th Corps under the Count de Lobau, which held Planchenoit against the renewed assaults of Bulow's Corps, supported now by two divisions of the corps of PIrch I. until the retreat of the army beyond that point was assured. The Emperor did what he could; he exerted himself in every way ;^'^ his headquarters-cavalry charged the English light horse ; but the army was too much exhausted to make any extraordinary exertions ; and, attacked both In front and flank as the French were, nothing but extraordinary exertions could possibly suf- fice to check the victorious enemy, superior in numbers as well as in position. Hence with the exception of the 6th Corps, whose task was a definite one, and undoubt- edly comprehended by every soldier in it, and of which one of the most courageous and efficient officers in the French army had charge, no resistance on a large scale was offered. The ist Corps was hopelessly disorganized, ''Charras, vol. i, p. 331 326 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. [CHAP. 16.] and necessarily so ; the 2d Corps could no doubt have effected an orderly retreat on Nivelles,^° but Reille did not see the necessity of this course, and perhaps could not have been expected to do so. Most of the battalions of the Guard preserved their organization, and resisted heroically to the last. The Emperor was finally forced to take refuge in one of the squares of the Guard, and in its midst he was safely borne off his last field of battle.^' The French army was routed ; but its condition was made exceptionally bad because only one avenue of retreat was follow^ed, and also because this avenue was practically blocked at Genappe by the supposed necessity of crossing the Dyle on a single bridge. ^^ Had the army been able to spread itself over an open countr}^ it is not likely that the rout would have been so complete, and it is quite certain that the captures of artillery would not have been so great. But the Prussian cavalry took up the pursuit which neither the Prussian nor the British infan- ti-y were sufficiently fresh to maintain; and in the ex- hausted condition of body and bewildered state of mind in which the mass of the French soldiers were when the catastrophe came, little was needed to complete their demoralization. At Genappe over a hundred pieces of cannon were abandoned, and from that point on no attempt was made to keep up even a semblance of order. Such was the famous battle of Waterloo. It has become a synonym for hopeless and irremediable dis- aster. It is not, however, necessary here to review the causes of the catastrophe. What we have still to say on this head we shall put into the Notes to this chapter. But there is one subject that properly belongs here. What would have been the effect if Grouchy had detained the corps of Biilow and Pirch I., so that they could not have taken part in the action ? *°Doc. Indd., p. 62 ; Reille's Statement. "Hist, de I'Ex-Garde, pp. 53S, 539- ^-Charras, vol. i, p. 334. [chap. 1 6.] THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. 327 In this discussion we shall assume the correctness of our conclusions, reached previously, that if Grouchy had started at daybreak for the bridge of Moustier, or even if he had followed the counsel of Gerard, he would almost certainly have prevented Billow, Pirch I. and Thielemann from taking any part in the battle. ^^ We shall not reargue these questions, for they have been already fully discussed. Let us suppose, then, that Napoleon could have uti- lized his whole force against the army of Wellington dur- ing the w^hole afternoon ; that he could have given his personal direction to the conduct of the action ; that he could have followed up the repulse of the ist Corps with a new attack in which Lobau should support d'Erlon, and in which the cavalry should take its proper part ; that he had been on the spot when La Haye Sainte fell, and had improved that advantage as he well knew how to do ; that he had had the whole of the Imperial Guard, — infantry, cavalry, and artillery, — at his disposal for the car- rying of Wellington's position ; it seems to us there can be no reasonable question as to the result ; the Duke would have been badly beaten, and the action would in all probability have been over, or substantially so, by six o'clock. This question is not asked to gratify the imagination, or for purposes of speculation, but simply that we may form a judgment on the adequacy of Napo- leon's means to the end which he had in view ; for, if military history cannot assist us in forming correct opinions on the adequacy of certain available means to the attainment of certain proposed objects, it is of no use whatever. The view we hold as to the necessity of Bllicher's support to Wellington's success is the same as that which we have seen^'* put forth by Sir James Shaw- ^^Ante, pp. 261, 283. ^*Afite, pp. 294, 295. 328 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO. [CHAP. 1 6.] Kennedy, where he is justifying the Duke for accepting- battle at Waterloo.'^ As for Zieten, he could not have come up till half- past seven o'clock, which would have been too late for him to be of any use to the English. The prob- ability is that he would have joined the other corps that were fighting Grouchy. It is hardly likely that he would have pursued his intention of joining Wellington, after he had heard that the other three corps were not likely to interfere in the battle between Napoleon and Wel- lington. This would have been to run a great risk ; and one that under the circumstances no prudent officer would run. We are supposing now that Zieten hears at Ohain, for instance, that the other corps are engaged with Grouchy at St. Lambert or Couture, — now, then, he must admit that if Grouchy shall be able, owing to obstinate or skilful fighting, or to the lateness of the hour, or to chance, to prevent Bulow, Pirch I. and Thielemann from attacking Napoleon that afternoon, the chances are that Napoleon will defeat Wellington before he, Zieten, can possibly arrive ; and, therefore, for him to proceed further than Ohain will simply be to involve himself in the disaster of the Anglo-Dutch army. But while we must state our conviction that Grouchy would have prevented the defeat of Napoleon had he crossed the Dyle, we certainly do not consider him the sole cause of the defeat. ^^Cf. Wellington's Report (Gurwood, vol. xii, p. 484; App. C, xii; post, pp. 372, 373), where he says that he attributes the successful result of the day to the assistance he received from the Prussians. NOTES TO CHAPTER XVI. I. That the tactics employed by the French at the battle of Waterloo in their operations against the army of the Duke of Wellington were unworthy of the experi- ence and reputation of their commanders is almost uni- versally admitted. The word "commanders" is used advisedly, because Ney seems to have had the immediate direction of the ist and 2d Corps even when the Em- peror was personally superintending the battle, and when Napoleon was called off to direct the defence of Planche- noit, Ney was certainly in sole control. But this does not fully exonerate the Emperor from responsibility for the dispositions which were made. The faulty formation of d'Erlon's Corps in its great assault on the English left was the first blunder. The employment of the whole of Reille's Corps in the attack on Hougomont was the next. Then the negligent and wasteful way in which the attacks on both Hougomont and La Haye Sainte were conducted warrant severe criti- cism. The employment of all the reserve cavalry of the army was a most unheard of and uncalled for proceed- ing ; they were all put in, and kept in until they were all exhausted. One would certainly suppose that Ney, who was responsible for this proceeding, must have seen, long before the close of the afternoon, that the cavalry were being completely ruined, and that no appreciable injury was being inflicted on the enemy. 330 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.-NOTES. [CHAP. 1 6.] We cannot but think that if Napoleon had personally directed the battle at this period, this useless and waste- ful employment of the cavalry would not have been made. And we cannot help thinking, also, that the Em- peror would have brought some at least of Reille's troops out of the enclosures of Hougomont to support any attacks of cavalry which he might have ordered, either in conjunction with the divisions of Donzelot and Quiot, or with the Imperial Guard, which, but for the attack of the Prussians, he would no doubt have put in between 4 and 5 o'clock. We must bear in mind, that Napoleon was fighting the Prussians near Planchenoit during a large part of the afternoon, and, in fact during the critical period of the battle ; and that he cannot fairly be held liable to the censure for the tactics used in the fight against the English, which some English writers, in for- getfulness of this fact, have undertaken to apply to him. The 1st Corps, after its severe repulse, rallied well and did extremely good work. The persistent attacks of Quiot's and Donzelot's infantry showed great enterprise and daring, up to the very last ; and these troops deserve all praise. No doubt the bravery of the men of the 2d Corps in their ineffectual attacks on Hougomont was equally commendable ; but it was a great waste of material to employ the entire corps in such an operation as attacking Hougomont. Hougomont should have been attacked, undoubtedly, but only by a moderate force ; very possibly it might have been carried, had proper means been employed.' But it w^as of far more impor- tance to utilize the infantry of the 2d Corps in breaking the English lines to the eastward of Hougomont, in conjunction with cavalry or the Imperial Guard, than to persist in throwing fresh regiments against the brick walls of the house and garden. Hougomont might in M«A', pp. 303, 304. [chap. 1 6.] THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.-NOTES. 33 1 fact have been turned ; and, if the last charge had suc- ceeded, it would have been. A notable exception to the unfavorable criticism on the French tactics on this day is made by all historians when speaking of the gallant, skilful and obstinate defence of Planchenoit against the Prussians by the 6th Corps under the Count de Lobau, assisted by the Young Guard and some regiments of grenadiers and chasseurs. No praise is too high for these troops. 2. The English tactics deserved, and have always received, the high commendation of historians. Not only was the Duke himself always watchful and alert, but his efforts were admirably seconded by his officers. The unfailing energy and enterprise shown even at the very close of this exhausting day by the Duke himself and his lieutenants is at least quite as remarkable as the obsti- nacy and courage displayed in resisting the repeated attacks of their antagonists. The conduct of Maitland, Halkett and Colborne in the last great emergency exhib- its the tenacity, courage, presence of mind, and readi- ness to seize the opportunity, which are the great mili- tary virtues, existing in undiminished vigor at the close of a most bloody and doubtful contest. 3. The account given in the text of the charge of the Imperial Guard does not agree fully with any of the nar- ratives, but will be found, on reflection, it is submitted, to harmonize most of the conflicting evidence. The sub- ject is a large one, and the testimony is very confusing. It is impossible to reconcile all the statements. But it is believed that the view maintained in the text, — that the Imperial Guard advanced in one body, or column, not in two ; that this column (as we may call it, for lack of a better term) consisted at most of eight, and probably of only six battalions, each formed in close column of grand divisions, — that is, with a front of two companies, — the usual practice in those days, — presenting about 75 men in the front rank, — that these battalions advanced in ;^^2 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO -NOTES. [CHAP. 1 6.] echelo7t, the right in advance, — explains most of the dis- crepancies, and accounts for all or nearly all the impor- tant statements contained in the different narratives. It was the leading" battalions of this column which were met and defeated by Maitland's guards ; it was the rear battalions which were flanked and routed by the 5 2d and the other regiments of Adam's (light) brigade. A. There is, in our judgment, no foundation for the hypothesis of two columns, which, introduced by Siborne, has received the indorsement of Chesney, Ken- nedy and Hooper. It is opposed to the contemporane- ous authorities of both nations. Napoleon's report of the battle,'— Ney's letter to the Duke of Otranto,^— Drouot's speech in the chamber of Peers,'* — speak but of one column, — of one attack, — of one repulse. Sir Digby Mackworth, who was on Lord Hill's staff, in a position where he could observ^e ever}''thing, wrote in his journal at eleven o'clock at night, after the battle was over, as follows : — ^ " A black mass of the grenadiers of the Imperial Guard, with music playing and the great Napoleon at their head, came rolling onward from the farm of La Belle Alliance. * * * "Yho. point at which the enemy aimed was now evident. It was an angle formed by a brigade of guards [Maitland's] and the light bri- gade [Adam's] of Lord Hill's Corps." Mackworth then goes on to describe the contest, and the rout of the enemy. There is not a word of there being two columns and two attacks. This is true, it is believed, of all the early narratives by British officers.'' It may fairly be deduced from this evi- ^Corresp., vol. 28, p. 343 ; Jones, p, 384. ^Jones, p. 387. *Ib., p.227. ^Sidney's Life of Lord Hill, p. 309. ^Jones (Artillery Operations), p. 177; Sharpin in the " Waterloo Letters,'" pp. 228 etseq. ; Gore, pp. 58 et seq. See, also, Captain Batty s account (pp. [chap. 1 6.] THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.-NOTES. 2>33 dence that the repulse of the right and advanced battal- ions by the guards, and the attack on the left and rear ones by the light brigade were nearly synchronous, — the latter being probably a few minutes later than the former. B. The claims put forward on behalf of the light bri- gade (Adam's), and specially of the 5 2d regiment, next demand our consideration. Gawler, a distinguished officer of the 52d, in his " Crisis and Close of the Action at Waterloo " '' admits that " the headmost companies of the Imperial Guard * * * crowned the very summit of the posi- tion." He says that " the fire of the brigade of guards then opened upon them, but they still pressed forward." And he claims^ that their attack was repulsed not " by a charge of General Maitland's brigade of guards," " but * * * by a charge of the 5 2d, covered by the 71st regiment, without the direct cooperation of any other portion of the allied army." Unfortunately for this claim, however, we have it from another officer of the 52d, Leeke, that Gawler was on the extreme right of the regiment.^ In this position, as 106 (?/ seq.,) in his "Historical Sketch of the Campaign of 1815": London, 1820. He was an ensign in the ist regiment of foot-guards in Maitland's brigade. He speaks, it is true, of the chasseurs of the Guard "forming another attack " ; but he says that it was when Maitland was advancing, that he perceived the chasseurs " so far advanced as to menace the right flank of the brigade," — which is substantially the view maintained in the text. Cf. Siborne, vol. 2, p. 170, where the same statement is made. Yet Siborne (vol. 2, p. 174) says that " between the heads of the two attacking columns there was a distance during their advance oi/rom ten to twelve minutes'' march!''' How such an interval was possible, when the contest of the Guard with Mait- land's brigade was of such extremely short duration, is not apparent. See Maitland's statement in "Waterloo Letters, pp. 244, 245 ; also statements of Powell and Dirom ; pp. 255 ; 257, 258. ^Gawler, p. 15. "lb. pp. 31, 32. 'Leeke, vol. i, p. 84. 334 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.-NOTES. [cHAP. l6,j Leeke remarks, he could not have seen what took place at the head of the French column/" When he says, therefore, that the flank attack of the 5 2d alone over- threw the Imperial Guard, he is speaking without any- personal knowledge of what took place in the front of that column, and we are thrown back on the evidence of the officers of Maitland's brigade. Leeke has a curious theory on this matter. He says that the advance of the Guard was preceded and covered by " a mass of skirmishers," " and that it was these skir- mishers and these only that were driven off by Mait- land's brigade. In order to maintain this contention, Leeke is com- pelled to assume the presence in front of the main body of the Imperial Guard of " massed skirmishers " thrown out by the Guard, and also that the battalions of the Guard never got nearer to Maitland's brigade than 300 yards." But this is mere guess work. Sharpin, an officer in Napier's battery, which was stationed close to Maitland's brigade, says : — '^ " We saw the French bonnets just above the high corn and within 40 or 50 yards of our guns. I believe they were in close columns of grand divisions." Says Captain Powell of the ist Foot Guards : — '* "A close column of grenadiers (about seventies in front) * * * were seen ascending the rise * * * They contin- ued to advance till within 50 or 60 paces of our front." '°Lord Seaton, then Sir John Colborne, who commanded the 52d, admits that he did not himself see, and could not have seen, any movement of the guards. He simply claims that the Imperial Guard halted when his skir- mishers opened fire on their flank. Leeke, vol. i, p. loi. "lb., pp. 43, 44, 84. '^Leeke, vol. i, p. 84. See also his letter to the Editor of the Army and Navy Gazette, August 17, 1867. "Waterloo Letters, p. 229. Cf. a statement of an officer in the same bat- tery, — Jones, p. 177,— probably Sharpin. '♦Waterloo Letters, pp. 254, 255. [chap. 1 6.] THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO -NOTES. 335 Says Captain Dirom of the same regiment : — '^ "The Imperial Guard advanced in close column with ported arms, the officers of the leading division in front weaving their swords. The French columns showed no appearance of having suffered on their advance, but seemed as regularly form ed as if at a field-day. When they got within a short distance we were ordered to make ready, present and fire." Leeke's theory of "massed skirmishers" needs no further refutation. There can be no question that the officers of Maitland's guards saw right before them the leading battahons of the Imperial Guard formed in the ordinary manner, in close columns of grand divisions. The skirmishers had all been withdrawn by the time the leading battalions reached the top of the acclivity. It should, however, be added that the left and rear battalions which Colborne attacked in flank were entirely unaffected by the charge of Maitland's brigade. The British guards did undoubtedly charge the troops in their front, and drove them down the hill a short distance, but on finding other troops, i. e., the four (or, more probably, three) rear and left battalions of the Imperial Guard, on their right flank, they retired to the crest of the hill, and certainly did not assist the 52d and the other regiments of Adam's brigade in their brilliant flank attack. The credit of having overthrown the rear half of the column of the Imperial Guard is due entirely to that brigade ; and it assuredly was a most skilfully designed and daringly exe- cuted movement. Colborne saw at a glance that the several battalions of the Guard could not be deployed in such a way as to return anything like as destructive a fire as that which the unbroken line of the 5 2d could deliver. The Guard undoubtedly did its best ; the firing was very hot for a time ; Gawler says '*" his regiment lost 150 officers and men in four or five minutes. But his " Waterloo Letters, p. 257. '* lb., p. 293 ; Cf. Colbcrne's Letter, p. 2S5. 33^ THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.-NOTES. [CHAP. 1 6.] men were perfectly steady ; their fire was at very close range and well kept up ; they had the advantage of posi- tion ; the loss of the French columns was fearful ; '^ and when Colborne, perceiving that the moment had come, ordered a charge, the Guard broke into a confused mass, and were pursued to and across the Charleroi road. The flank attack of Adam's brigade was certainly a most bril- liant, and yet a well-justified, manoeuvre, — impossible to any but veteran troops, and which none but an experi- enced, vigilant and daring officer would ever have ordered. Colborne took, it must be admitted, great risks. He says himself'^ that, as his skirmishers opened fire on the Guards, his attention was completely drawn to his posi- tion and dangerous advance, — a large mass of cavalry having been seen on the right. Certainly it must have required some nerve to decide to run such a risk as this, and on his own responsibility too, for he advanced his regiment before receiving any order from General Adam. But success justified his decision. 4. Whether Napoleon was warranted in ordering the Guard forward, or rather that portion of it which could be mustered, is a question which has been much dis- cussed, and, we are inclined to think, to no great profit. The answer must depend on the extent of the informa- tion possessed by Napoleon as to the actual condition of things at the time when he ordered the movement ; and this, of course, must be mainly a matter of conjecture. The order was given somewhere about half-past six o'clock, — an hour before Zieten arrived at Papelotte ; and Napoleon certainly did not expect him. BUlow had been forced to retire. The news from the front received by the Emperor when he was conducting the fight against the Prussian flank attack near Planchenoit had been decidedly favorable. The army of Wellington was Leeke, vol. i, p. 104; Letter of Colonel Brotherton. lb., p. loi. [chap. 1 6.] THE BATTLE OF WATERTOO -NOTES. ZZ7 reported as manifestly getting weaker and weaker. The guns placed near La Haye Sainte had done serious damage to the English squares and batteries. The activity and energy of Quiot's and Donzelot's infantry showed no abatement. It seems to us that the Emperor had good reason to think that the English lines would give way before a determined attack made by fresh troops, and those the veterans of the Imperial Guard. He told Ney to mass on the right of Hougomont all the troops of Reille s Corps that he could collect, to concentrate the divisions of Quiot and Donzelot near La Haye Sainte, and to prepare to support the attack with cavalry. "^ He must, however, have been grievously disappointed as to the execution of this order by Marshal Ney. When the Emperor brought up the Guard, Bachelu's infantry had not been drawn out of the wood of Hougomont. '° Fire's cavalry, which were in perfectly good condition, had not been brought over from the Nivelles road. ^' No attempt apparently had been made to organize any cavalry force from the wrecks of the splendid divisions which Ney had so obstinately and blindly launched again and again upon the English squares. And the Emperor, who must have expected that an officer of the ability and experience of Marshal Ney would have made some at least of the necessary arrangements for the proper support of the charging column, must have experienced a disap- pointment as sudden as it must have been bitter, w^hen he saw the battalions of the Guard ascend the plateau without a regiment of cavalry to protect their flanks, or any part of the 2d Corps supporting their attack. The charge, such as it was, of the Imperial Guard at '9 Charras, vol. i, p. 321. ^Wellington brought up about this time to the right centre of his line Chass^'s Dutch-Belgian Division, besides other troops. ^' WeUington about this time brought over the brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur to the threatened centre of his line, as well as the remnants of Somerset's and Ponsonby's brigades. 338 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.-NOTES. [CHAP. 16.] Waterloo was most firmly and gallantly met and repulsed. But it should never be forgotten that it was not the sort of charge which Napoleon was in the habit of making with his Guard ; that it was, at best, a charge of 8 battal- ions out of 24, — of 1 2 guns out of 96, — and that no cavalry at all, light or heavy, supported the charging column. Made, as it was, without supports, except so far a: Donzelot's gallant infantry protected its right flank, it was a terrible mistake to make it. And it is all but cer- tain that if proper care and skill had been expended on the preparations and accompaniments of the movement, — if, in a word, Ney had kept his head cool and his hand steady, as did the Duke, — Pire's lancers and Bachelu's division would have given abundant employment to the whole of Adam's brigade, and a few squadrons of horse could have protected the advance on the right. This is not, we submit, going too far in the region of conjecture. Bachelu and Pire, at any rate, were close at hand, and under Ney's command, and were, so far as we know, doing nothing at the time when the charge was ordered. Ney, in fact, contributed apparently little, except his example of desperate courage, to the success of the day. But courage, though indispensable, does not take the place of judgment and presence of mind." Ney failed most un- mistakably to make the most of his resources ; he lost sight, practically, of one of the two corps under his orders ; he used up all his cavalry ; and he neglected to make even the preparations and arrangements which were yet feas- ible to second the attack of the Guard. It is impossible not to contrast his conduct with that of Wellington, whose admirable forethought and coolness gave him the ^ On Marshal Ney's state of mind at this time, see Gourgaud, pp. 4S, n.; Ill, 112; Corresp., vol. 31, pp. 249, 250; Muquardt, p. 149, n.; Life of Sir W. Napier, vol. i, p. 505, — where Soult gives his opinion on Ney's conduct; Berton, p. 41, where Ney's extraordinary letter to Fouche Qones, pp. 3S5 et seq.) is examined. [chap. 17.] THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO -NOTES. 339 control of the situation, and enabled him to utilize fully all the resources which at the close of this trying day still remained to him. 5. We have not thought it necessary to do more than to call attention to the fact that the Duke of Wellington retained some 18,000 men of Colville's division at Hal and Tubize throughout this perilous and bloody day. The best English authorities '^ unhesitatingly condemn the Duke's action in this regard. Says Sir James Shaw- Kennedy : — '^ "Wellington certainly ought to have had Colville, with the force under his command, on the field of battle at Waterloo. There was no cause whatever for his being kept in the direction of Hal. It would have been a gross error on the part of Napoleon to have detached any important force on that road, and Colville should, early on the morning of the iSth, have been ordered to march to Waterloo, if he had no information of the advance of the enemy on Hal." 6. It may be thought by some that the effect upon the corps of Billow and Pirch I. of the appearance of Marshal Grouchy's command, marching from Moustier and Ottignies upon Lasne and St. Lambert, has been stated too strongly in the text. But we cannot think so. Imag- ine 30,000 or 40,000 men marching in a long column along miry roads to attack an enemy, and still some miles from the field of battle, perceiving a body of troops of apparently equal or nearly equal strength moving right upon their line of march, which is also their line of com- munications. How many officers in Bialow's position would not have halted to resist such an attack ? It is to be observed, that the dilemma in which Biilow and Pirch I. were placed by knowing that Grouchy was attacking Wavre was quite a different one. In the first place, they, as we now know, estimated Grouchy's force Chesney, p. 217 ; Hamley, p. 198, Kennedy, p. 174. 340 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.-NOTES. [CHAP. 1 6.] at only half its strength, — they never, it must be remem- bered, actually saw it ; and in the second place, Grouchy might well be detained by Thielemann at and about Wavre until the battle of Waterloo had been won. If, however. Grouchy had been observed marching from the Dyle directly on their columns en route for Planch e- noit, the Prussian commanders almost certainly would have been compelled to halt and to give him battle. And this they must have done even although they might have been satisfied that their forces were superior in numbers. A smaller force, if it is directed on the line of march of a larger one, almost inevitably must detain it. 7. The complete ruin which overtook the French army at Waterloo is to be attributed mainly to the unexpected appearance and vigorous attack of Zieten's Corps at the close of the day, when the French had become thoroughly exhausted, and when, owing to the darkness, it was impossible for the Emperor to accomplish anything in the way of rallying them or making new dispositions. The English had certainly won a great success in routing the Imperial Guard ; but they were not strong enough to drive the French army from the field, even with the assistance which Blilow and Pirch I. afforded on the side of Planchenoit. They had cleared their front of the enemy from Hougomont to the turnpike ; but they were in no condition to attack the strong position of the French, defended by the troops of the 2d Corps, and crowned with many and powerful batteries. The French centre, Miifiling tells us, ^^ remained immovable after their right wing was in full retreat, and it was not until some of Zieten's batteries, which had been brought over to the west of La Haye Sainte, opened fire, that it began to retire. Then Wellington ordered his whole line to advance. But it was a very thin line indeed, consisting, as Muffling says, only of small bodies, of a few hundred Muffling ; Passages, p. 249. [chap. i6.] the battle of WATERLOO-NOTES. 34I men each, and at great intervals from each other. Muffling goes on to say : — ^^ " The advance of such weak battalions, with the great gaps between, appeared hazardous, and General Lord Uxbridge, who commanded the cavalry, drew the Duke's attention to the danger ; the Duke, however, would not order them to stop. ♦ * * The Duke with his practised eye perceived that the French army was no longer dangerous ; he was equally aware, indeed, that, with his infantry so diminished, he could achieve nothing more of im- portance : but if he stood still, and resigned the pursuit to the Prussian army alone, it might appear in the eyes of Europe as if the English army had defended themselves bravely indeed, but that the Prussians alone decided and won the battle." The rout of the divisions of Durutte and Marcognet was entirely due to Zieten's attack; this is universally admitted. Had it not been for Zieten, then, the only contest that would have gone on that evening would have been at and near Planchenoit ; and it is hard to suppose that Napoleon could not have maintained his position there, if he had had his whole army to draw from when the Young Guard and Lobau needed reinforcements. To the unexpected irruption of Zieten's Corps, — or rather of his leading division of infantry, all his cavalry, and most of his artillery, — arriving at the close of the day, on the flank of the army, and in perfectly open ground, is the rout of the French army, therefore, princi- pally to be attributed. 8. It only remains to discuss the question of the responsibility for the intervention of the Prussians, as between the Emperor and Marshal Grouchy. It may fairly be said that if either of them had taken all the steps which the situation, as it presented itself to his mind, demanded, this intervention might have been prevented. If the Emperor, when he thought it possible that the Prussians might be intending to unite with the English, ^^Miiffling; Passages, p. 250. 342 THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.-NOTES. [CHAP. 1 6.] had taken Grouchy with him, and had stationed his two corps, or one of them, on the day of the battle, at or near Lasne and St. Lambert, or if he had employed one or both of Grouchy's corps in attacking the English, Bliicher, it is safe to say, would not have interfered in the duel between Napoleon and Wellington. If, after sending Grouchy off. Napoleon had informed him of the impending battle, and had charged him to return to the main army by way of Moustier if he found that the Prussians had gone to Wavre, it is altogether probable that the march of the Prussians would have been arrested. On the other hand, if Grouchy had acted of his own motion on sound military principles at daybreak of the 1 8th, or even had been willing to follow the counsel of Gerard at noon, the same result would probably have been attained. Napoleon took a wholly unnecessary risk when he detached Grouchy with such a large force, after he had reason to apprehend that the Prussians were intending to unite with the English, and he negligently omitted to take the usual means to reduce this risk by supplying his lieutenant with the necessary information, and with precise orders in case he should find that Bliicher in- tended to cooperate with Wellington. He trusted to Grouchy to take the right course, and Grouchy failed to do so. Both Napoleon and Grouchy are therefore re- sponsible for the intervention of the Prussians and the loss of the battle. CHAPTER XVII. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS. The justification for this book on the well-worn subject of the campaign of Waterloo is to be found, if at all, in its treatment of certain topics to which we now propose very briefly to advert. 1. First among them is Napoleon's plan of campaign.' In regard to this we have followed his own account, and have pointed out the difference between it and the plan which it has been claimed he either really did entertain or ought to have entertained. 2. In regard to the much-vexed question of the alleged verbal order to Marshal Ney to seize Quatre Bras on the afternoon of the 15th of June, new light, it is submitted, has been thrown.^ The contemporaneous evidence of the bulletin, and the statement made by Marshal Grouchy in 1818, make it very difficult to disbelieve Napoleon's account of this matter. 3. The true cause of the delay on the morning of the 1 6th of June has been, we submit, pointed out.^ The fact that d'Erlon's Corps was so far in the rear seems to have been the chief reason for delaying the forward movement both of the left wing and of the main army. 4. It has been shown by Marshal Ney's orders to his command, and from other evidence furnished by his 'Chapter I, and Notes : Notes to Chapter IV. ^Anie, pp. 64 et seq. ^Afae,i)p. 131. 132; 139. 344 CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS. [CHAP. 1 7.] defenders, that his arrangements for carrying out his instructions on the i6th were extremely defective, and, in fact, that he perversely departed from the letter and spirit of his orders.'* It has also been shown that a vigorous and unhesitating compliance with the orders which he received would in all probability have changed the issue of the campaign. 5 5. In regard to the movements of d'Erlon's Corps on the 1 6th, it has been shown that its leading division was two hours and a half behind the rear divisions of the 2d Corps on the road to Quatre Bras ; and that if d'Erlon's Corps had closely followed the rear divis- ion of the 2d Corps, it could not have been turned aside by the staff-ofiicer's blunder.^ 6. Attention has been called to Napoleon's plan of battle at Ligny, and to the criticisms which it has met with/ 7. The view of those writers who regard it as great negligence on the part of Napoleon that on the morning of the 17th he did not take adequate measures to ascertain the direction of the Prussian retreat, is fully adopted.^ 8. It is also maintained that Napoleon should on that morning at daybreak have marched with the 6th Corps and the Guard to attack the English at Quatre Bras in conjunction with Ney's forces, — a point on which most writers strongly insist.^ 9. The connection between the injunction contained in the Bertrand order and the new idea as to the projects of Marshal Bliicher, which Berton's discovery of a Prussian corps at Gembloux had started in Napoleon's -•Chapter VIII., and Notes. ^Ante, pp. 184-1S6. ^Ante, p. I Si. ''Ante, pp. 164 et seq. ^Anie, p. 205. '^Anfe, pp. 197 ei seq. [chap. 17.] CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS. 345 mind, is brought out;'° and Napoleon is censured for having on the afternoon of the 17th detached so large a force from his army when he had reason to apprehend that a movement by BlUcher with the intention of co- operating with Wellington had been in operation since the previous evening." 10. The warning contained in the Bertrand order is given its due prominence; and the fact that Marshal Grouchy was acting under that order, and therefore had entire liberty to take any steps which his own judgment might approve to frustrate the attempt of the Prussians to act in conjunction with the English, is strongly insisted on.'^ 11. It is shown that Grouchy was at Walhain, and not at Sart-a-Walhain when he heard the sound of the cannon of Waterloo and rejected the counsel of Gerard.'^ 12. That Napoleon expected Grouchy to arrive on the left bank of the Dyle by crossing it at the bridge of Moustier is shown by Marbot's testimony ; and attention is called to the inference which this fact warrants, that Napoleon was not cognizant of the language used in the 10 A. M. order to Marshal Grouchy, which seemed to imply that Grouchy was expected to reach Wavre first. '^ 13. It is pointed out that from about four o'clock in the afternoon of the i8th of June to about half-past six, Napoleon's attention was absorbed by the attack of BiJlow's Corps upon the right and rear of the French army ; and that, for the mistakes committed during this period in the assaults on the English army, Ney is mainly responsible.'^ It is furthermore shown that by ^°Ante, p. 209. "Chapter XV., note i. "An/e, p. 211 ; pp. 249 et seq. ^^Atite, p. 255 ; pp. 286 et seq. ^^Au/e, pp. 268 e^ seq. ^'Ante, pp. 311 ^^ seq.'j p. 330. 346 CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS. [CHAP. 1 7.] reason of this distraction of the Emperor's attention from the operations in his front, valuable opportunities for success against Wellington's army were lost.'^ 14. Marshal Ney is censured for having done so little in the way of preparation for the successful charge of the Imperial Guard.'^ 15. The questions relating to the formation of the Imperial Guard in its charge against the English, and of its repulse and defeat by the English guards and the light brigade, have received particular attention. It is believed that the view here presented will be found to harmonize nearly all the conflicting statements.'^ 16. It is maintained that Marshal Grouchy, if he had started for the bridge of Moustier at daybreak,'*^ or had followed the advice of Gerard at noon,''° would probably have stopped Biilow and Pirch I. by engaging them, and that Zieten, in all probability, would not have proceeded further than Chain ; ^' in which case Napoleon would have been able to employ his whole army against that of Wellington, and would have defeated it. Coming now to the Allies : — 17. It is contended that the definite understanding as to the steps to be taken in the event of a French invasion, which has generally been attributed to the Duke of Wellington and Marshal Bliicher, did not exist. " 18. That the Duke, in the early morning hours of the 1 6th, ordered a general concentration of his army at Quatre Bras, as he says in his Report he did, is shown by ^^Ante, pp. 314, 330- "Ante, pp. 337, 338. ^^Ante, pp. 316 ef seq.; pp. 331 et seg, ^"^Ante, pp. 281 et seq. ^Ante, pp. 259 et seq. ^^Ante, p. 328. ^Ante, pp. 70 et seq.; p. 91. [chap. 17.] CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS. 347 an examination of his letter to Marshal BlUcher, and a comparison of that letter with the statement as to the situation and destination at 7 A. M. of the 1 6th of the different divisions of his army, known as " The Disposi- tion," drawn up by Sir William De Lancey, the Deputy Quartermaster General, before the Duke left Brussels.^^ 19. That the Duke, in issuing the order for concen- trating at Quatre Bras after he had become satisfied that Napoleon was concentrating in front of Bliicher, was act- ing in strict accordance with the demands of the situa- tion, is maintained : ^^ but it is shown that it was several hours after Wellington received this information as to Bliicher and Napoleon before he issued the order, and that this delay was not only uncalled for, but that it gravely imperilled the success of the allies. ^^ 20. It is shown that it is not true that Bliicher's deci- sion to fight at Ligny was based on a promise of support from Wellington.^^ 21. Attention is called to the now generally admitted fact that it was not until the early morning hours of the 1 8th that Bliicher was able to give Wellington definite assurance of his support in the battle of Waterloo.'^ 22. The evidence in regard to the story that the Duke rode over to Wavre on the evening of the 17th is given,^^ and, on that evidence, the story is rejected. A few words in conclusion. I. It does not seem to us that Napoleon can be charged with any lack of activity or decision of character, except on the morning after the battle of Ligny, when he was, as we imagine, pretty well tired out. But his energy '■^Ante, pp. 87 et seq. '*Ante, p. 94. -^Ante, p. 89. ^^ Chap. X. ^''Ante, p. 234. ^^A7tte, pp. 238 et seq. 348 CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS. [CHAP. 1 7.] speedily returned, and we find him conducting the pur- suit of the Enghsh during the afternoon, and making an examination of their position in the mud and rain in the middle of the night. 2. Nor was there any defect in his plan of campaign. Had Ney executed his orders with promptness and with- out hesitation, the campaign would have been finished on the 1 6th of June, either by Ney's furnishing the needed force to take the Prussians in rear at Brye and Wagnelee, or by his defeating Wellington badly by the help of the ist Corps. If either of these things had hap- pened, there could not possibly have been any battle of Waterloo ; the Prussian and English armies would have been definitely separated ; one, and perhaps both, would have been beaten ; and never, in all probability, would they have acted together again. For this failure to achieve success on the second day of the campaign, Ney and not Napoleon was responsible. 3. But for not overwhelming at Quatre Bras on the early morning of the 17th the two-thirds of his army which Wellington had collected there, no one but Napo- leon was responsible ; and his failure to do this must be attributed to his excessive fatigue. 4. Then, for his neglect to ascertain the direction of the Prussian retreat on the same morning, Napoleon is responsible ; and although Soult ought to have attended to this, in his capacity of chief-of-sta£f, yet, as the Em- peror does not appear to have blamed him for not having reconnoitred in the direction of Wavre, we must con- sider Napoleon as open to this censure. It is true, it was not likely that Bliicher had retired in the direction of Wavre ; but it was of vital importance to know whether he had or not. Hence it was a great neglect not to find out. 5. Napoleon is also solely responsible for having per- sisted in his original design of detaching Grouchy in pur- suit of the Prussians after he had reason to believe that they [chap. 17.] CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS. 349 were intending to unite with the EngHsh, and to suspect, in fact, that they had been approaching the EngHsh dur- ing the previous night and morning; and for contenting himself with merely giving Grouchy a warning that this might be their intention. He laid upon Grouchy, in fact, a burden which to that officer, as Napoleon was well aware, was entirely new ; hence, the Emperor was not v/ar- ranted in risking so much on the chance of Grouchy s be- ing able to sustain it. It is this that Napoleon is to blame for in this connection ; for having, when he saw that the Prussians might (as the Bertrand order expresses it) be " intending to unite with the English to cover Brussels in trying the fate of another battle," persisted in adher- ing to his original plan, — devised when he and Grouchy and everybody else supposed that the Prussians had gone to Namur, — of sending Grouchy in pursuit of them with two corps cTarmee. Many writers will have it that " Napo- leon did not in the least foresee the flank march of the Prussians." ""^ This, — if to foresee be equivalent to expect, — may be true. But Napoleon certainly did, at i P. M. of the 17th, recognize the possibility of the Prussians unit- ing with the English ; and the true criticism on him is, as it seems to us, that, having this in mind, as a possibil- ity, he should have detached Marshal Grouchy with ,33,000 men from the main army, and have been content to rely on Grouchy's being able to prevent this project of the Prussians from being carried out. It must be added to this, that his neglect to send Grouchy any information of his own situation, and any orders as to what he expected him to do if he found the Prussians were marching to join Wellington or to attack the main French army, showed an unjustifiable reliance on the favors of fortune. 6. To Marshal Grouchy belongs the blame of having entirely failed to apprehend his mission, as indicated to ^Chesney, p. 207; Kennedy, pp. 163, 164. 35° CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS. [CHAP. 1 7.] him by the express warning contained in the Bertrand order. Had he acted intelligently in accordance with the information which he acquired in the night of the 17th and i8th, he could have prevented the Emperor from being overwhelmed by both the allied armies. At daybreak, as appears from his letter to Pajol, he knew that the Prussians had retired towards Wavre and Brus- sels. But the meaning of this fact he utterly failed to grasp. He made no change in his previously ordered dispositions, which this news should have shown him were wholly unsuited to the situation as now ascertained. Nor did the sound of the cannon of Waterloo produce on him a greater effect. He would not accept the sug- gestion of Gerard. He persisted in a course which com- pletely isolated his command, and prevented it from playing any part in the events of that memorable day. Napoleon, as we have pointed out, made a great mistake in trusting so much to Grouchy's good judgment; he took a wholly unnecessary risk ; he might, as well as not, have taken Grouchy, with far the larger part of his command, with the main army; had he done so, the catastrophe of Waterloo could not, so far as we can judge, have happened. But had Grouchy acted up to the demands of the situation in which he found himself, he also would have averted the ruin which the unhin- dered union of the allies brought upon Napoleon and his army. APPENDIX A. ON SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF NAPOLEOn's MEMOIRS. Probably no military narratives that ever were written have been subjected to more harsh and unjust criticism than the two accounts of the campaign of Waterloo, which, under the names of the Gourgaud Narrative and the Memoirs, were dictated or written by Napoleon at St. Helena. To read the remarks of Charras, Chesney, Hooper, and others, about these books, one would sup- pose that a military narrative is the easiest, plainest sort of narrative to write, and that if a general wished to com- pose it properly he would isolate himself from his fellow- officers and subordinates, and get into some secluded corner of the world thousands of miles from the records of the war-department. For if this is not the view of these writers and of others like them, they are either ignorant of the extreme difficulty which attends the com- position of a military narrative, or else are bent upon treating the fallen Emperor with gross injustice. For instance, Napoleon says in his " Memoirs " ' that " on the 14th in the evening'' ^ General Bourmont deserted to the enemy. The whole army broke camp in the early hours of the 15th. When the 4th Corps moved at five o'clock, it was discovered that Bourmont had left. Charras states that the staff-records of the 4th Corps, to which Bourmont belonged, mention that he deserted on the 15th, and that he wrote a letter to Gerard announcing his desertion dated at Philippeville on the 15th. But ' Corresp., vol. 31, p. 251. '^ The italics are ours. 352 APPENDIX A. Napoleon at St. Helena had neither the staff-records of the 4th Corps to go by, nor the letter of Bourmont to Gerard. Yet Charras ' calls the Emperor's statement a designed misstatement {luie inexactitude calculee). But we have no disposition to dwell on harsh criticisms of this kind. Our purpose at present is to call attention to a peculiarity of Napoleon's which may serve to explain the existence in his Memoirs of very definite statements which are apparently very wide of the truth. This peculiar- ity is, that while his orders to his lieutenants were often very general in their character, — pointing out clearly enough, it is true, the thing to be aimed at, or the danger to be feared, — but leaving entirely to the officer the course to be adopted if the emergency should arise, — yet these orders never seem to have been retained in Napoleon's memory in the shape in which they were given, but what he did recall about them was his expectation that, on receiving his order, his lieutenant would act in such or such a manner. This expectation, that such or such action would be taken by his lieutenant on receiving such or such an order, was all that was left of the order in his mind ; and, when he came to write his narrative, he would often (at any rate) state that he had given definite instruc- tions to such or such an effect, when all he had really done was to give a general order, from the giving of which he expected such or such a course of action to be taken by his subordinate. Thus, take the orders to Ney, issued on the afternoon of the 1 6th, at 2 and 3.15 P. M. ^ They were, as we have seen, very general in character; Ney was directed, after he should have beaten, or, at least, checked, the English, to turn round, and manoeuvre so as to take the Prussians in flank and rear. But the " Memoirs " ^ say : — ' Charras, vol. i, p. 104, n. i. * Doc. Indd., XIII., p. 40; XIV., p. 24; App. C, xxv., xxvi ; post, pp. 3S3, 384. ^ Corresp., vol. 31, p. 204. APPENDIX A. 353 *'He [Napoleon] reiterated the order for him to push on In front of Quatre Bras ; and, as soon as he should have taken posi- tion there, to detach a column of 8,000 Infantry, with the cavalry- dlvlslon of Lefebvre-Desnouettes, and 28 pieces of cannon, by the turnpike which ran from Qiiatre Bras to Namur, which he was to leave at the v^Illage of Marbais, in order to attack the heights of Brye, in the enemy's rear." It is to be observed that the Memoirs make no men- tion of the orders which were actually sent to Ney that afternoon. And Napoleon sent to Ney no such order as this. What he here calls an order was really what he expected Ney to do when he should get the 2 and 3.15 P. M. orders. That this was so, appears from what fol- lows : — "After having made this detachment, there would still remain to him [Ney] in his position of Quatre Bras 32,000 men and 80 pieces of cannon, which would be sufficient to hold in check all the Eng- lish troops which could be expected to arrive from their canton- ments during the day of the i6th." That is, — the Emperor had figured it all out in his own head, as if he were in Ney's place. Ney could spare so many men and so many guns ; he would have so many men and so many guns left. But, in fact, the orders to Ney left it to him to make these calculations for himself. Let us apply now this mode of working of Napoleon's mind to his statements in regard to the orders which he says in his " Memoirs " he sent to Grouchy. ^ "At ten o'clock in the evening the Emperor sent an officer to Marshal Grouchy, whom he supposed to be at Wavre, to inform him that there would be a great battle the next day ; that the Anglo- Dutch army was in position in front of the Forest of Soignes, its left resting on the village of La Haye; that he ordered him to detach before daybreak from his camp at Wavre a division of 16,000 men of all arms and 16 pieces of cannon on St. Lambert, in order to connect with the main army and operate with it ; that as soon as he should be assured that Bliicher had evacuated Wavre, whether to continue his retreat on Brussels or to move in any other ' Corresp., vol. 31, p. 216 ; ijee, also, p. 354 APPENDIX A. direction, he (Grouchy) was to march with the larger part of his troops to support the detachment which he had sent to St. Lambert." Thiers ^ finds in the minuteness of detail in which this supposed order is stated in the Memoirs a proof that it could not have been invented. We do not so regard the matter. To our mind, the terms in which Napoleon has, in the extract given above, framed what he says was the order which he sent to Grouchy, simply express the expec- tations formed in his own mind of what Grouchy would do, when, after having received the Bertrand order, he found that Blijcher had fallen back towards the English. We think the orders sent to Ney on the afternoon of the battle of Ligny should serve as a guide to us here. We do not believe that Napoleon sent to Grouchy any such order as that which he gives in his Memoirs ; but then we do believe that he sent him the Bertrand order, which he does not even mention in his Memoirs, and which in fact he no doubt forgot all about. And we believe that, having a distinct recollection of having sent Grouchy an order, and also a very distinct recollection of what he expected Grouchy would do when he got the order, he has fused the two things in his mind, and has given us his order in the terms of his expectations. There is nothing very uncommon about this. It is certainly to be distinguished from deliberate misrepre- sentation. It is partly, at any rate, the result of an active imagination working on facts imperfectly recollected, but which have been dwelt upon until the mind has become disturbed and warped. ' Thiers, vol. xx, p 95, n. APPENDIX B. ON MARSHAL GROUCHY AND THE BERTRAND ORDER. We have stated {ante, p. 208) that Marshal Grouchy "denied, over and over again, in his pamphlets written about the battle, ever having received any written order, whether from Napoleon or Soult, until the next day (the i8th) " ; and we have pointed out the grave misconceptions of the conduct of Napoleon which have been the result of these denials on the part of Marshal Grouchy, which, for many years, were very generally credited. We now propose to prove the truth of our statement. In 1818 Marshal Grouchy published in Philadelphia his ''Observations snr la Relatioii de la Campagne de 181 5 publiee par le General Gourgattd^ After giving an account of the verbal orders which Napoleon gave him, of his observations in regard to them, and of the Emperor's reply {ante, p. 207), he says : — ' " Such are the only dispositions which were communicated to me; the only orders which I received." In the same pamphlet he says : — ^ " But why, unceasingly repeats this ' Combatant of Waterloo,' — why does not Marshal Grouchy publish the text of the orders which he received ? " The reason is simple. It is that they were only transmitted to ' Obser\^ations, Phila. ed. iSiS, p. 13. In the Philadelphia edition of 1819, p. 12, and in the Paris edition, 1819, p. 13, the statement is made somewhat stronger by the insertion of the words " word for word." ^ Obs., Phila. ed., 1818, pp. 26, 27 ; ed. 1819, pp. 24, 25 ; Paris ed., pp. 30, 31. 356 APPENDIX B. me verbally. Those who have sensed under Napoleon know how rarely he gives them in writing. * * * If it is of any consequence to show that they wei'e only verbal, I can find if not a proof, certainly a strong indication of it in the letter of the Major-General, Marshal Soult, in speaking of my march on Sartavalin. He expresses him- self in these terms : — "'This movement is conformed to the dispositions which have been communicated to you.' "He would not have failed to say to the instructions or the orders which I have transmitted to you, and which you are acting under, if I had received any except verbal orders." The point of this argument is fully seen only when we remember that the Bertrand order was dictated by the Emperor in the absence of Soult, the chief-of-sta£f, and therefore no copy of it was likely to be found on the regu- lar official files. But fortune enabled Grouchy to make sure of this, for he had, soon after Waterloo, an opportu- nity of examining the records of the chief-of-sta£f. Accordingly, we find him, soon afterwards,^ in support of his denial of having received the orders alleged in the Memoirs to have been sent to him, saying, not, as he ought to have done, that he did receive an order through Bertrand, which, however, was entirely different in its tenor from those given in the Memoirs, but that he re- ceived on the 17th no written order at all. ' The proof of this is In the order-book and correspondence of the major-general, the organ of communication of the General-in- chlef with his lieutenants. This irrefutable document, which, when I received the command of the army after the loss of the battle of Waterloo, came into my possession, shows that no orders or in- structions except those contained in the two letters given herewith, and dated at 10 A. M. and i P.M. of the iSth, were ever sent to me." In a work published in Paris in 1829, speaking of the 10 A. M. order to him of the i8th of June, he says: — '^ ' Doutes sur Tauthenticitd des Mdmoires Historiques attribu^s k Napole'on. Par le Cte de Grouchy. Philadelphie ; Avril, 1820. ■• Fragments Historiques : Lettre h. MM. M'iry et Barthdlemy, p. 5, note. APPENDIX B. 357 " This letter, and that dated from the field of battle of Waterloo, at one o'clock, are the only ones which I received and which were written to me on the 17th and iSth. The book of the orders and correspondence of the major-general, which I possess, proves this. It gives the hours at which orders are given, and the names of the officers who carry them ; and its details do not permit a suspicion of an omission any more than of a misstatement." It is rather remarkable, to say the least, that General Bertrand should not have stated what he recollected about the matter. But he does not appear to have done so ; unless the mention in Jomini's " Political and Mili- tary History of the Campaign of Waterloo,"^ that General Bertrand sent Grouchy a positive order to march on Gembloux, may be attributed to information received from Bertrand. The Bertrand order first saw the light in 1842, — twenty-seven years after the battle of Waterloo. It was printed in a work entitled ''Notice Biographique sur le Marechal de Grouchy, &c.','^ by E. Pascallet, editor of a Review treating of Biography, Politics and Letters. The biography is eulogistic. The order is accompanied by no explanation of the repeated denials, to which we have called attention above, of any such order ever having been received by the Marshal.'' After this publication, however, the Bertrand order was acknowledged in the memoirs of Marshal Grouchy. It is found in the work of the Marquis de Grouchy, pub- lished in 1S64, entitled '' Le Marechal de Grouchy du 16 a2i \^ jirin, 1815,"^ written to refute the accusations of Thiers, and in the 4th volume"' of the '' Memoircs du Mar- echal de Gj'ouchy',' by his son, the Marquis. In neither of ^Jomini, p. 149. Jomini's Preface is dated in 1838. ^Pascallet, p. 79. "^Cf. Napoldon k Waterloo, p, 199, n. ^Le Mai de Grouchy en 1815, pp. 26-28. 'Grouchy Mdm., vol. 4, pp. 50, 51. 358 APPENDIX B. these books is there any attempt at explaining away the point blank denials of the Marshal's having received any written order on the 17th of June. It would certainly not be easy to conjecture what explanation could be given. The order reads as follows (Pascallet, p. 79) : — " Rendez-vous a Gei7ibloux avec le corps de cavaleric de general Pajol^ la cavalerie Icgere du qtiatrieme corps^ le corps de caval- erie du general Excelmans^ la division du general Teste^ dont vous aurez un soin particulier^ ctant detachee de son corps d'armee^ et les troisieme et quatrieme corps d'infantcrie. Vous vous ferez eclairer sur la direction de Namur et de Afaestricht, et vous pour- suivrez Vennemi. Eclairez sa marche^ et instruisez-moi de ses manoeuvres^ de nianicre que je puisse penetrer ce qu'il veut faire. Je porta mon quartier-general azix ^uatre- CJicmins^ ok ce matin etaient encore les Anglais. Notre communication sera done directe par la route pavee de Natnur. Si V enne?ni a evacuc Namur^ ecrivez au general commandant la detixieme division militaire a Charlemont^ de faire occuper Namur par quelques bataillons de garde nationale et quelques batteries de ca7207t qu'il formera a Charlemont. II donnera ce commandement a un mar- echal-de-camp . II est important de penetrer ce que Vennemi veut faire : ou il se separe des Anglais^ ozi ils veulent se reunir encore^ pour couv- rir Bruxelles et Liege ^ e7t tentant le sort d'une nouvelle bataiUe. Dans totis les cas^ tenez constamment vos deux corps d'infanterie reunis dans une lieue de terrain^ et occupez tozis les soirs une bonne position militaire^ ayant plusieurs debouches de retraitc. Placez detache?nens de cavalerie interjnediaires pour comtjiuni- quer avec le quartier-general. Ligny^ le lyjuin, 1813. i^Dicte par Vempereur^ en I' absence du major-geticral^ au grand-marechal Bertrand.) Passing now to Marshal Grouchy 's report to the Emperor, dated Gembloux, June 17, 1815, 10 P. M. This was printed for the first time in the Count Gerard's '' Dernier es Observations sur les Operations de VAile Droite de VArmee Franfaise a la BataiUe de Waterloo',' published in Paris in 1830. It reads as follows : — '° 'Gdrard: Dern. Obs., p. 15. APPENDIX B. 359 " Sire: '■'■ J''ai rhonneur de vous rendre compte que f occupc Gembloux^ et que ma cavalerie est a Sauvenihres. L''enne7ni^fort d'etiviron trente mille ho7nmeSi contlmce son niouvetnent de retraite; on lui a saisi ici un pare de 4.00 betes a cornes^ des mag-asms et des bagages. " II parait d'aprcs tons les rapports^ qzi" arrives a Sauvenihres^ les Prussiens se sont diviscs en deux colonnes : Vzine a dti prendre la route de Wavres, en passaitt par Sart-a- Waiiain; V autre colonne parait s^ctre dirigce sur Perivcs. " On peut peut-etre en infer er qu^2ine portion va joi?idre Wel- lington^ et que le centre, qui est Varmee de BlUcher, se retire sur Li'-four hours' march on me." The Duke of Richmond said, " What do you intend doing ? " The Duke of Wellington replied, "I have ordered the army to concentrate at Quatre Bras ; but we shall not stop him there, and if so I must fight him here " (at the same time passing his thumb-nail over the position of Waterloo). He then said adieu and left the house by another way out. He went to his quarters, slept six hours and breakfasted, and rode at speed to Quatre Bras, where he met Hardinge and went with him to Bliicher, who took him over the position at Ligny. The Duke of Wellington suggested many alterations, but Bliicher would not consent to move a man. The conversation in the Duke of Richmond's dressing-room was repeated to me, two minutes after it occurred, by the Duke of Richmond, who was to •Captain George Bowles (Guards). 374 APPENDIX C. have had the command of the reserve, if formed, and to whom I was to have been aide-de-camp. He marked the Duke of WeUington's thumb-nail with his pencil on the map, and we often looked at it together some months after- wards. XIV. WELLINGTON'S ORDERS TO LORD HILL: June i6, 1S15. Gurwood, vol. xii, p. 474. INSTRUCTIONS For the Movement of the Army on the i6th. * Signed by Colonel Sir W. DeLancey, Deputy Quarter Master General. To General Lord Hill, G. C. B. i6th June, 1815. The Duke of Wellington requests that you will move the 2d division of infantry upon Braine le Comte immediately. The cavalry has been ordered likewise on Braine le Comte. His Grace is going to Waterloo. To General Lord Hill, G. C. B. 16th June, 1815. Your Lordship is requested to order Prince Frederick of Orange to move, immediately upon the receipt of this order, the ist division of the army of the Low Countries, and the Indian brigade, from Sotteghem to Enghien, leaving 500 men, as before directed, in Audenarde. * The original instructions issued to Colonel DeLancey were lost with that officer's papers. These memorandums of movements have been collected from the different officers to whom they were addressed. XV. EXTRACT FROM WELLINGTON'S " ^^lEMORANDUM ON THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO." SUPPLEMENTARY DESPATCHES, &c., of the Duke of W^ellington: vol. X, pp. 523 et seq. But what follows will show that, notwithstanding the extension of the Allied army under the command of the Duke of Wellington, such was the celerity of communication with all parts of it, that in point of fact "^ his orders readied all parts of the army in six hours after he had issued them; and that he was in line in person with a sufficient force to resist and keep in check the enemy's corps which first attacked the Prussian corps under General Zieten at daylight on the 15th of June; having received the intelligence of that attack only at three o'clock in the afternoon of the 13 th, he was at Quatre Bras before the same hour on the tnorning of the idtJi^ with a sufficient force to engage the left of the French army. ' The italics are ours. 2 The text cited is from the Supplementary Despatches ; but it seems to us quite possible that the reading of this passage given in the Appendix to C. D. Yonge's "Life of Wellington,"— London ; Chapman & Hall, i860, — is the correct one. It there reads as follows : — " He was at Quatre Bras before twenti'-four hours on the i6th,""— that is by 3 P. M., on the i6th,— which was the fact. There are other points where these versions differ, but this is the nest important one. See ante, p. 90. APPENDIX C. 375 It was certainly true that he had known for some days of the augmentation of the enemy's force on the frontier, and even of the arrival of Buonaparte at the army ; but he did not deem it expedient to make any movement, excepting for the assembly of the troops at their several alarm posts, till he should hear of the decided movement of the enemy. The first account received by the Duke of Wellington was from the Prince of Orange, who had come in from the out-posts of the army of the Netherlands to dine with the Duke at three o'clock in the afternoon. He reported that the enemy had attacked the Prussians at Thuin; that they had taken posses- sion of, but had afterwards abandoned, Binch ; that they had not yet touched the positions of the army of the Netherlands. While the Prince was with the Duke, the staff officer employed by Prince Bliicher at the Duke's head- quarters. General Miiffling, came to the Duke to inform him that he had just received intelligence of the movement of the French army and their attack upon the Prussian troops at Thuin. It appears by the statement of the historian' that the posts of the Prussian corps of General Zieten were attacked at Thuin at four o'clock on the morning of the 15th ; and that General Zieten himself, with a part of his corps, retreated and was at Charleroi at about ten o'clock on that day ; yet the report thereof was not received at Bruxelles till three o'clock in the after- noon. The Prussian cavalry of the corps of Zieten was at Gosselies and Fleurus on the evening and night of the 15 th. Orders were forthwith sent for the march of the whole army to its left. The whole moved on that evening and in the night, each division and por- tion separately, but unmolested ; the whole protected on the march by the defensive works constructed at the different points referred to, and by their garrisons. The reserve, which had been encamped in the neighborhood and cantoned in the town and in the neighborhood of Bruxelles, were ordered to assemble in and in the neighborhood of the park at Bruxelles, which they did on that evening; and they marched in the morning of the i6th upon Quatre Bras, towards which post the march of all the troops consisting of the left and centre of the army, and of the cavalry in particular, was directed. The Duke went in person at daylight in the morningof the i6th to Qiiatrt .5rflj, where he found some Netherland troops, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, which had been engaged with the enemy, but lightly ; and he went on from thence to the Prussian army,* which was in sight, formed on the heights behind Ligny and St. Amand. He there communicated personally with Marshal Prince Bliicher and the headquarters of the Prussian army. In the meantime the reserve of the Allied army under the command of the Duke of Wellington arrived at Quatre Bras. The historian asserts that the Duke of Wellington had ordered these troops to halt at the point at which they quitted the Foret de Soignics, He can have no proof of this fact,^ oj 3 Clausewitz. * About I o'clock, at the Windmill of Bussy, between Ligny and Brie : so Hardinge told me. -J.G. 5 Cf. Siborne, vol. i, p. 102, n. ; Gomm, p. 352; Waterloo Letters ; Gomm ; p. 23. Z7^ APPENDIX C. which there is no evidence; * and in point of fact the two armies were united about mid-day of the i6th of June, on the left of the position of the Allied army under the command of the Duke of Wellington. These troops, forming the reserve, and having arrived from Bruxelles, were now joined by those of the 1st division of infantry^ ' and the cavalry ; and notwithstanding the criticism of the Prussian historian on the positions occupied by the army under the command of the Duke of Wellington, and on the march of the troops to join with the Prussian army, it is a fact, appearing upon the face of the History, that the Allied British and Netherland ar?ny was in line at Quatre Bras, not only twenty four hours sooner than one whole corps of the Prussian army under General Billow, the absence of which is attributed by the historian to an accidental mistake, but likewise before the whole of the corps under Gejieral Zieten, which had been the first attacked on the 13th, had taken its position in the line of the aruty assembled on the heights behind Ligny, and havifig their left at Sombref It was perfectly true that the Duke of Wellington did not at first give credit to the reports of the intention of the enemy to attack by the valleys of the Sambre and the Meuse. The enemy had destroyed the roads leading through those valleys, and he considered that Buonaparte might have made his attack upon the Allied armies in the Netherlands and in the provinces on the left of the Rhine by other lines with more advantage. But it is obvious that, when the attack was made, he was not unprepared to assist in resisting it : and, in point of fact, did, on the afternoon and in the evening of the i6th June, repulse the attack of Marshal Ney upon his position at Quatre Bras, which had been com- menced by the aid of another corps d'armde under General Reille. These were the troops which had attacked on the 15th, at daylight, the Prussian corps under General Zieten, which corps the Allied troops, under the Duke of Wellington, relieved in resistance to the enemy. XVI. WELLINGTON'S LETTER TO BLUCHER: 10.30 A.M., June 16, 1815. Ollech, opposite p. 124. Sur les hauteurs derrifere Frasne le i6me Juin 1815 k 10 heures et demi. Mon cher Prince : Mon arm^e est situd comma 11 suit : Le Corps d'Armde du Prince d'Orange a une division iciet ^ Quatre Bras; et le reste k Nivelles. La Reserve est en marche de Waterloo sur Genappe ; ou elle arrivera k Midi. * The italics are ours. 7 The ist division did not arrive on the field until after 6 PM. {ante, pp. 183, 184), and the cavaky, not at all. APPENDIX C. 377 La Cavalerie Anglaise sera h la meme heure h Nivelles. Le Corps de Lord Hill est h Braine le Comte. Je ne vols pas beaucoup de I'ennemi en avant de nous; et j 'attends les nouvelles de votre Altesse, et Tarrivee des troupes pour decider mes opera- tions pour la journde, Rien n'a paru du cotd de Binch, ni sur notre droite. Votre tr5s obdissant serviteur Wellington. XVIL SOULT'S FIRST ORDER TO NEY: June i6, 1815. Doc. Indd., p. 26. A M. LE MARfiCHAL PRINCE DE LA MOSKOWA. Charleroi, le 16 juin 1815. Monsieur le mardchal, I'empereur vient d'ordonner k M. le comte de Valmy, commandant le 36 corps de cavalerie, de le rdunir et de le dinger sur Gosselies, ou il sera k votre disposition. L'intention de Sa Majestd est qui la cavalerie de la garde, qui a dtdportde sur la route de Bruxelles, reste en arrifere et rejoigne le restant de la garde imp^riale ; mais, pour qu'elle ne fasse pas de mouvement retrograde, vous pourrez, aprbs I'avoir fait remplacer sur la ligne, la laisser un peu en arriere, ou il lui sera envoyd des ordres dans le mouvement de la journee- M. le lieutenant general Lefebvre Desnoettes enverra, h. cet effet, un officier pour prendre des ordres. Veuillez m'instruire si le ler corps a opdrd son mouvement, et quelle est, ce matin, la position exacte des ler et 2e corps d'armde, et des deux divisions de cavalerie qui y sont attach^es, en me faisant connaitre ce qu'il y a d'ennemis devant vous, et ce qu'on a appris. Le major gdndral, Due de Dalmatie. XVIIL THE EMPEROR'S LETTER TO NEY: June 16, 1815. Doc. Indd., p. 32. : Corresp. vol. 28, p. 334. AU MARfiCHAL NEY. Mon cousin, je vous envoie mon aide de camp, le general Flahaut, qui vous porte la presente lettre. Le major gdneral a du vous donner des ordres ; mais vous recevrez les miens plus tot, parce que mes officiers vont plus vita que les siens. Vous recevrez I'ordre de mouvement du jour, mais je veux vous en ^crire en detail parce que c'est de la plus haute importance. Je porte le mardchal Grouchy avec les 36 et 46 corps d'infanterie sur Sombref. 378 APPENDIX C. Je porte ma garde k Fleurus et j'y serai de ma personne avant midi. J'y attaquerai I'ennemi si je le recontre, et j'tfclairerai la route jusqu' h. Gem bloux. Lh., d'apres ce qui se passera, je prendrai mon parti, peut-etre a trois heures apres midi, peut-etre ce soir. Mon intention est que, immediatement apres que j'aurai pris mon parti, vous soyez pret h marcher surBruxelles. Je vous appuierai avec la Garde, qui sera a Fleurus ou a Sombref, et je ddsirerais arriver k Bruxelles demain matin. Vous vous mettriez en marche ce soir meme, si je prends mon parti d'assez bonne heure pour que vous puissiez en etre inforrae de jour et faire ce soir 3 ou 4 lieues et etre demain k 7 heures du matin k Bruxelles. V^ous pouvez done disposer vos troupes de la maniere suivante. Premiere division k deux lieues en avant des Ouatre-Chemins, s'il n'y a pas d'inconvenient. Six divisions d'infanterie autour des Quatre-Chemins et une division k Marbais, afin que je puisse I'attirer k moi k Sombref, si j'en avals besoin. EUe ne retarderait d'ailleurs pas votre marche. Le corps du comte de Valmy, qui a 3,000 cuirassiers d'dlite, k Pintersection du chemin des Romains et de celui de Bruxelles, afin que je puisse I'attirer k moi, si j'en avals besoin ; aussitot que mon parti sera pris, vous lui enverrez I'ordre de venir vous rejoindre. Je desirerais avoir avec moi la division de la Garde que commande le general Lefebvre Desnoettes, et je vous envoie les deux divisions du corps du comte de Valmy pour la remplacer. Mais, dans mon projet actuel, je prefere placer le comte de Valmy de maniere k le rappeler si j'en avals besoin, et ne point faire faire de fausses marches au general Lefebvre Desnoettes, puisqu'il est probable que je me deciderai ce soir k marcher sur Bruxelles avec la Garde. Cependant, couvrez la divis- ion Lefebvre par les deux divisions de cavalerie d'Erlon et de Reille, afin de manager la Garde; s'il y avait quelque echauffourde avec les Anglais, 11 est preferable que ce soit sur le ligne que sur la garde. J"ai adopte comme principe gene'ral pendant cette campagne, de diviser mon armee en deux ailes et une reserve. Votre aile sera composee des quatre divisions du ler corps, des quatre divisions du 2e corps, de deux divisions de cavalerie leg^re, et de deux divisions du corps du Comte de Valmy. Cela ne doit pas etre loin de 45 k 50 mille hommes. Le marechal Grouchy aura k peu pres la meme force, et commandera d'aile droite. La Garde formera la reserve, et je me porterai sur I'une ou I'autre aile, selon les circonstances. Le major general donne les ordres les plus precis pour qu'il n'y ait aucune difficulte sur Tobeissance a vos ordres lorsque vous serez detach^; les commandants de corps devant prendre mes ordres directement quand je me trouve present. Selon les circonstances, j'affaiblirai I'une ou I'autre aile en augmentant ma reserve. Vous sentez assez I'importance attach^e a la prise de Bruxelles. Cela pourra d'ailleurs donner lieu a des incidents, car un mouvement aussi prompt et aussi brusque isoleral'armde anglaise de Mons, Ostende, etc. Je desire que vos dispositions soient bien faites pour qu'au premier ordre, vos huit divisions puissent marcher rapidement et sans obstacle sur Bruxelles. Charleroi, le 16 juin 1S15. N. APPENDIX C. 379 XIX. COUNT REILLE'S LETTER TO NEY : June i6, 1S15. Doc. Indd., p. 2,7- A M. LE MARfiCHAL Prince de la Moskowa. Gosselies, le 16 juin 1815, 10 heures et quart du matin. Monsieur le Marechal, J'ai I'honneur d'informer Votre Excellence du rapport que me fait faire verbalement le general Girard par un de ses officiers. L'ennemi continue h. occuper Fleurus par de la cavalerie legere qui a des vedettes en avant ; Ton apergoit deux masses ennemis venant par la route de Namur et dont la tete est k la hauteur de Saint-Amand; elles se sont formdes peu k peu, et ont gagnd quelque terrain k mesure qu'il leur arrivait dumonde: on n'a pu guere juger de leur force k cause de I'eloignement; cependant ce general pense que chacune pouvait d'etre de six bataillons en colonne par bataillon. On apercevait des mouvements de troupes derriere. M. le lieutenant general Flahaut m'afait part des ordres qu'il portait k Votre Excellence; j'en ai prevenu M.le comte d'Erlon, afin qu'il puisse suivre mon mouvement. J'aurais commencd le mien sur Frasnes aussitot que les divi- sions auraient d te sous les armes ; mais d'apres le rapport du gdneral Girard, je tiendrai les troupes pretes k marcher en attendant les ordres de Votre Ex- cellence, et comme ils pourront me parvenir tr^s vite, il n'y aura que triis peu de temps de perdu. J'ai envoyd k I'empereur I'officierqui m'afait le rapport du general Girard. Je renouvelle k Votre Excellence les assurances de mon respectueux ddvouement. Le gdndral en chef du 2e corps. Comte Reille. XX. NEY'S ORDERS TO REILLE AND D'ERLON : June 16, 1S15. Doc. Indd., p. 38. A M. LE COMTE REILLE, Commandant le 2E Corps d'Arm^e. Ordre de Mouvement. Frasnes, le 16 juin iSi^. Conformement aux instructions de I'empereur, le 2e corps se mettra en marche de suite pour aller prendre position, la cinquifeme division' en arrifere de Gennapes, sur les hauteurs qui dominent cette ville, la gauche appuyee k la grande route. Un bataillon ou deux couvriront tous les debouchds en 'That of Bachelu. 380 APPENDIX C. avant sur la route de Bruxelles. Le pare de reserve et les Equipages de cette division resteront avec la seconde ligne. La neuvi^me division^ suivra les mouvements de la cinqui^me, et viendra prendre position en seconde ligne sur les hauteurs h droite et h. gauche du village de Banterlet^. Les sixieme et septi^me divisions^ h I'embranchement de Quatre-Bras, ou sera votre quartier general. Les trois premieres divisions du comte d'Erlon viendront prendre position k Frasnes; la division de droite s'etablira a Marbais avec la deuxieme division de cavalerie Idgi^re du general Pire; la premiere couvrira votre marche, et vous ^clairera sur Bruxelles et sur vos deux flancs. Mon quartier k Frasnes. Pour le Mar^chal prince de la Moskowa, Le Colonel, premier aide de camp, Heymfes. Deux divisions du comte de Valmy, s'^tabliront k Frasnes et h. Liberchies. Les Divisions de la garde des gdndraux Lefebvre Desnoettes et Colbert resteront dans leur position actuelle de Frasnes. XXI. SOULT'S FORMAL ORDER TO NEY TO CARRY QUATRE BRAS: June 16, 1815. Doc. In^d., p. 27. A M. LE MARfiCHAL PRINCE DE LA MOSKOWA. Charleroi, le 16 juin 1815. Monsieur le Mardchal, I'empereur ordonne que vous mettiez en marche les 2e et ler corps d'armee, ainsi que le 36 corps de cavalerie, qui a dtd mis k votre disposition, pour les diriger sur I'intersection des chemins dits les Trois-Bras (route de Bruxelles), ou vous leur ferez prendre position, et vous porterez en meme temps des reconnaissances, aussi avant que possible, sur la route de Bruxelles et sur Nivelles, d'oii probablement I'ennemi s'est retird. S. M. desire que, s'il n'y a pas d'inconv(^nient, vous dtablissiez une division avec de la cavalerie k Genappe, et elle ordonne que vous portiez une autre divi- sion du c6t6 de Marbais, pour couvrir I'espace entre Sombref et les Trois-Bras. Vous placerez, prfes de ces divisions, la division de cavalerie de la garde impdriale, command^e par le gdndral Lefebvre Desnoettes, ainsi que le ler regiment de hussards, qui a dtd ddtachd hier vers Gosselies. Le corps qui sera k Marbais aura aussi pour objet d'appuyer les mouve- ^That of Foy. 3A village on the Brussels turnpike half a mile north of Quatre Bras. *Those of Jerome and Girard. This shows that Ney expected that Girard's division would be returned to him. APPENDIX C. 381 ments de M. le mardchal Grouchy sur Sombref, et cie vous soutenir h la position des Trois-Bras, si cela devenait ndcessaire. Vous recommanderez au gdndral, qui sera h. Marbais, de bien s'dclairer sur toutes les directions, particulii^rement sur ceiles de Gembloux et de Wavre. Si cependant la division du gdndral Lefebvre Desnoiittes dtait trop engagde sur la route de Bruxelles, vous la laisseriez et vous la remplacericz au corps qui sera k Marbais par le 3e corps de cavalerie aux ordres de M. le comte de Valmy, et par le ler rdgiment de hussards. J'ai I'honneur de vous prdvenir que I'empereur va se porter sur Sombref, oil, d'apr^s les ordres de Sa Majestd, M. le marechal Grouchy doit se dinger avec Ies3eet4e corps d'infanterie, et les ler, se et 46 corps de cavalerie. M. le marechal Grouchy fera occuper Gembloux. Je vous prie de me mettre de suite h meme de rendre compte h I'empereur de vos dispositions pour exdcuter I'ordre que jevousenvoie, ainsi que de tout ce que vous aurez appris sur I'ennemi. Sa Majestd me charge de vous recommander de prescrire aux gdndraux commandant les corps d'armde de faire rdunir leur monde et rentrer les hommes Isolds, de maintenir I'ordre le plus parfait dans la troupe, et de ral- lier toutes les voitures d'artillerie et les ambulances qu'ils auraient pu laisser en arrifere. Le marechal d'empire, major gdndral. Due de Dalmatie. XXII. SOULT'S SECOND ORDER TO NEY TO CARRY QUATRE BRAS : June 16, 1S15. Doc. Indd., p. 31. A M. LE MARfiCHAL Prince de la Moskowa. Charleroi, le 16 juin 1815. Monsieur le Marechal, Un officier de lanciers vient de dire h I'empereur que I'ennemi prdsentait des masses du cotd des Quatre-Bras. Reunissez les corps des comtes Reille et d'Erlon, et celui du comte de Valmy, qui se met k I'instant en route pour vous rejoindre; avec ces forces, vous devrez battre et ddtruire tons les corps ennemis qui peuvent se prdsenter. Bliicher dtait hier h. Namur, et il n'est pas vraisemblable qu'il ait portd des troupes vers les Quatre-Bras; ainsi, vous n'avez affaire qu'k ce qui vient de Bruxelles, Le mardchal Grouchy va faire le mouvement sur Sombref, que je vous ai annoncd, et I'empereur va se rendre h Fleurus ; c'est Ik ou vous adresserez vos nouveaux rapports k Sa Majestd. Le mardchal d'empire, major gdndral, Due de Dalmatie. 382 APPENDIX C. XXIII. FLAHAUT'S LETTER TO THE DUKE OF ELCHINGEN. Doc. Indd., p. 63. A M. LE DUG D'ELCHINGEN. Paris, 24 novembre 1829. Je voudrais, mon cher Due, pouvoir rdpondre d'une manifere plus precise k vos questions ; mais, n'ayant pas pris de notes, il m'est impossible, aprfes un intervalle de quinze ann^es, de me rappeler les details que vous tenez k savoir. C'est moi qui ai portd, le 16, h. monsieur votre p^re, I'ordre de marcher aux Quatre-Bras et de s'emparer de cette position. L'empereur me I'a dictd le matin de bonne heure, autant qu'il m'en souvienne, entre huit et neuf heures. Quant h. celle h laquelle je I'ai remis h M. le mardchal Ney, il me serait impossible de le dire, n'y ayant pas attach^ d'importance dans le moment. Aprfes le lui avoir remis, j'ai pris les devants et ai dtd rejoindre le gdn^ral Lefebvre Desnoettes, qui commandait I'avant-garde. L'infanterie s'est fait longtemps attendre, mais dfes que monsieur votre pfere nous a rejoints, et avant qu'elle fCit arrivde, il a fait attaquer les troupes anglaises. Voilk tout ce dont je puis me souvenir; je regrette que ce ne soit pas plus circonstancie, puisque vous tenez h. avoir des details plus precis. Croyez, mon cher Due, k la sincdritd de I'amitid que je vous ai voude. Comte Ch. FLAHAUT. XXIV. NAPOLEON'S LETTER TO GROUCHY: June 16, 1815. Corresp. vol., 28, p. 336. 22059. — AU MARfiCHAL COMTE GROUCHY Commandant l'aile droite de l'armee du Nord. Charleroi, 16 juin 1815. Mon Cousin, je vous envoie Labddoyfere, mon aide de camp, pour vous porter la prdsente lettre. Le major gdn^ral a du vous faire connaitre mes intentions ; mais, comme il a des officiers mal montds, mon aide de camp arrivera peut-etre avant. Mon intention est que, comme commandant l'aile droite, vous preniez le commandement du 30 corps que commande le gdndral Vandamme, du 46 corps que commande le gdn^ral Gerard, des corps de cavalerie que com- mandent les gdneraux Pajol, Milhaud et Exelmans; ce qui ne doit pas faire loin de 50,000' hommes. Rendez-vous avee cette aile droite k Sombreffe. Faites partir en consequence, de suite, les corps des gdneraux Pajol, Milhaud, Exelmans et Vandamme, et, sans vous arreter, continuez votre mouvement sur Sombreffe. Le 46 corps, qui est k Chatelet, regoit directement, I'ordre de se rendre k Sombreffe sans passer par Fleurus. Cette observation est APPENDIX C. 383 importante, parce que je porte mon quartier gdnfral h. Fleurus et qu'il faut ^viter les encombrements. Envoyez cle suite un officier au general Gerard pour lui faire connaitre votre mouvement, et qu'il execute le sien de suite. Mon intention est que tous les gendraux prennent directement vos ordres ; ils ne prendront les miens que lorsque je serai present. Je serai entre dix et onze heures k Fleurus; je me rendrai h Sombreffe, laissant ma Garde, infanterie et cavalerie, h Fleurus ; je ne la conduirais k Sombreffe qu'en cas qu'elle fut ndcessaire. Si I'ennemi est k Sombreffe, je veux I'attaquer ; je veux meme I'attaquer b. Gembloux et m'emparer aussi de cette position, mon intention dtant, apres avoir connu ces deux positions, de partir cette nuit, et d'opdrer avec mon aile gauche, que commande le mar^chal Ney, sur les Anglais. Ne perdez done point un moment, parce que plus vite je prendrai mon parti, mieux cela vaudra pour la suite de mes operations. Je suppose que vous etes k Fleurus. Communiquez constamment avec le g^n- dral Gerard, afin qu'il puisse vous aider pour attaquer Sombreffe, s'il dtait necessaire. La division Girard est k portde de Fleurus ; n'en disposez point k moins de ndcessitd absolue, parce qu'elle doit marcher toute la nuit. Laissez aussi ma jeune Garde et toute son artillerie k Fleurus. Le comte de Valmy, avec ses deux divisions de cuirassiers marche sur la route de Bruxelles ; il se lie avec le mardchal Ney, pour contribuer k I'opdra- tion de ce soir, k I'aile gauche. Comme je vous I'ai dit, je serai de dix a onze heures k Fleurus. Envoyez- moi des rapports sur tout ce que vous apprendrez. Veillez k ce que la route de Fleurus soit libra. Toutes les donnees que j'ai sont que les Prus- siennes ne peuvent point nous opposer plus de 40,000 hommes. NAFOLfiON. D'apr^s la copie. Ddpot de la guerre. XXV. THE 2 P.M. — June i6th — ORDER TO NEY. Doc. Indd., p. 40. A M. LE MARfiCHAL Prince de la Moskowa. En avant de Fleurus, le i6 juin k 2 heures. Monsieur le Mardchal, I'empereur me charge de vous prdvenir que I'ennemi a reuni un corps de troupes entre Sombref et Bry, et qu'k deux heures et demie M. le mardchal Grouchy, avec les troisieme et quatrieme corps, I'attaquera; I'intention de Sa Majesty est que vous attaquiez aussi ce qui est devant vous, et qu'apr^s I'avoir vigoureusement poussd, vous rabattiez sur nous pour concourir k envelopper le corps dont je viens de vous parler. Si ce corps dtait enfoncd auparavant, alors Sa Majestd ferait manoeuvre* dans votre direction pour hater dgalement vos operations. 3^4 APPENDIX C. Instruisez de suite Tempereur de vos dispositions et de ce qui se passe sur votre front. Le mare'chal d'empire, major gdndral, Due de Dalmatie. Au dos de cet ordre est dcrit : A M. le Mardchal Prince de la Moskowa, A Gosselies, sur la route de Bruxelles. Et au crayon : Wagnde Bois de Lombuc. Un duplicata de cet ordre porte A M. le Mardchal Prince de la Moskowa, A Gosselies, sur la route de Bruxelles. Wagnde. Ransart. XXVI. THE 3.15 P. M. — June 1 6th— ORDER TO NEY. Doc. In^d., p. 42. Monsieur le Mar^chal, je vous ai dcrit, il y a une heure, que I'empereur f erait attaquer I'ennemi h. deux heures et demie dans la position qu'il a prise entre le village de Saint-Amand et de Bry: en ce moment I'engagement est trfes prononce ; Sa Majeste me charge de vous dire que vous devez manoeuvrer sur-le-champ de maniere k envelopper la droite de I'ennemi et tomber h. bras raccourcis sur ses derrieres ; cette armee est perdue si vous agissez vigoureuse- ment; le sort de la France est entre vos mains. Ainsi n'hesitez pas un instant pour faire le mouvement que I'empereur vous ordonne, etdirigez vous surles hauteurs de Bry etde Saint-Amand, pour concourirkunevictoire peut- etre decisive. L'ennemi est pris en flagrant delit au moment ou il cherche a se rdunir aux Anglais. Le major general. Due de Dalmatie. En avant de Fleurus, le 16 juin 1815, h. 3 heures un quart. XXVII. SOULT'S LETTER TO NEY: June 17, 1815. Doc. Indd., p. 45. A M. LE MARfiCHAL Prince de la Moskowa. Fleurus, le 15 [17] juin 1815. Monsieur le Mardchal, le gdndral Flahaut, qui arrive h I'instant, fait con- naitre que vous etes dans I'incertitude sur les rdsultats de la journee d'hier. Je crois cependant vous avoir prevenu de la victoire que I'empereur a rem- portee. L'armde prussienne a 6t6 mise en ddroute, le gdndral Pajol est h. sa poursuite sur les routes de Namur et de Li^ge. Nous avons ddjk plusieurs milliers de prisonniers et 30 pieces de canon. Nos troupes se sont bien con- duites: une charge de six bataillons de la garde, des escadrons de service et APPENDIX C. 385 la division de cavalerie du gdndral Delort a pcrcd la ligne ennemie, portd le plus grand ddsordre dans ses rangs et enlevd la position. L'empereur se rend au moulin de Bry ou passe la grande route qui con- duit de Namur aux Quatre-Bras; il n'est done pas possible que I'armde anglaise puisse agir devant vous ; si cela dtait, l'empereur marcherait directe- ment sur elle par la route des Quatre-Bras, tandis que vous I'attaqueriez de front avec vos divisions qui, h. present, doivent etre reunies, et cette armde serait dans un instant detruit, Ainsi, instruisez Sa Majestd de la position exacte des divisions, et de tout ce qui se passe devant vous. L'empereur a vu avec peine que vous n'ayez pas rduni hier les divisions ; elles ont agi isoldment ; ainsi, vous avez dprouvd des pertes. Si les corps des comtes d'Erlon et Reille avaient dtd ensemble, il ne rdchappait pas un Anglais du corps qui venait vous attaquer. Si le comte d'Erlon avait execute le mouvement sur St. Amand que l'empereur a ordonnd, I'armee prussienne etait totalement detruite, et nous aurions fait peut-etre 30,000 prisonniers. Les corps des gdndraux Gdrard, Vandamme et la garde impdriale ont toujours 6t6 rdunis; Ton s'expose h des revers lorsque des ddtacliements sont compromis. L'empereur esp&re et desire que vos sept divisions d'infanterie et la caval- erie soient bien reunies et formdes, et qu'ensemble elles noccupent pas une lieue de terrain, pour les avoir bien dans votre main et les employer au besoin. L'intention de Sa Majestd est que vous preniez position aux Quatre-Bras ainsi que I'ordre vous en a dte donne ; mais si, par impossible, cela ne peut avoir lieu, rendez-en compte sur-le-champ avec detail, et l'empereur s'y portera ainsi que je vous I'ai dit ; si, au contraire, il n'y a qu'une arrifere-garde, attaquez-la, et prenez position. La journee d'aujourd'hui est necessaire pour terminer cette operation, et pour completer les munitions, rallier les militaires isoles et faire rentrer les detachements. Donnez des ordres en consequence, et assurez-vous que tous lea blesses sont pauses et transportds sur les derri^res : Ton s'est plaint que les ambulances n'avaient pas fait leur devoir. La fameux partisan Lutzow, qui a 6t6 pris, disait que I'armee prussienne dtait perdue, et que Bliicher avait expose une seconde fois la monarchic prussienne. Le mardchal d'empire, major gdndral. Due de DALMATIE. XXVII L vSOULT'S ORDER TO NEY : 12 M., June 17, 1815. Doc. Indd., p. 44. A M. LE MARfiCHAL Prince de la Moskowa. '46 corps d'armde [sic], h Gosselies. En avant de Ligny, le 17 h. midi. Monsieur le Mardchal, l'empereur vient de faire prendre position, en avant 'This mention of the 4th Corps, G6rard's, must be an error. 386 APPENDIX C. de Marbais, h un corps d'infanterie et h. la garde imperiale; S. M.me charge de vous dire que son intention est que vous attaquiez les ennemis aux Quatre-Bras, pour les chasser de leur position, et que le corps qui est k Marbais secondera vos operations; S. M. va se rendre k Marbais, et elle attend vos rapports avec impatience. Le mardchal d'empire, major gdndral. Due de Dalmatie. XXIX. CAPTAIN BOWLES' STORY OF WELLINGTON AT QUATRE BRAS: June 17, 1815. Captain Bowles in Lord Malmesbury's Letters, vol. 2, p. 447. " On the morning of the 17th, my company being nearly in front of the farmhouse at Quatre-Bras, soon after daybreak the Duke of Wellington came to me, and, being personally known to him, he remained in conversation for an hour or more, during which time he repeatedly said he was surprised to have heard nothing of Bliicher. At length a staff-officer arrived, his horse covered with foam, and whispered to the Duke, who without the least change of countenance gave him some orders and dismissed him. He then turned round to me and said, ' Old Bliicher has had a d d good licking and gone back to Wavre, eighteen miles. As he has gone back, we must go too. I suppose in England they will say we have been licked. I can't help it ; as they are gone back,we must go too.' He made all the arrangements for retiring without moving from the spot on which he was standing, and it certainly did not occupy him five miuutes." XXX. GROUCHY'S REPORT TO NAPOLEON FROM SART-A- WALHAIN: 11 A.M., June 18, 1815. Grouchy Mdm. vol. 4, p. 71. Sart-k-Walhain le 18 juin, onze heures du matin. Sire: Je ne perds pas un moment h vous transmettre les renseignements que je recueille ici ; je les regarde comme positifs, et afin que Votre Majesttf les reqoive le plus promptement possible, je les lui exp^die par le major La Fresnaye, son ancien page ; il est bien montd et bon ^cuyer. Les ler, 2e et 3e corps de Bliicher marchent dans la direction de Bruxelles. Deux de ces corps ont pass^ h Sart-h,-Walhain, ou h peu de distance, sur la droite; ils ont ddfil^ en trois colonnes, marchant h. peu prfes de meme hauteur. Leur passage a durd six heures sans interruption. Ce qui a defile en vue de Sart-h-Walhain peut-etre 6va.\u6 h trente mille hommes au moins, et avait un materiel de cinquante h. soixante bouches k feu. APPENDIX C. 387 Un corps venant de Lidge a effectud sa jonction avec ceux qui ont com battu h. Fleurus. (Ci-joint une rdquisition qui le prouve.) Quelques-uns des Prussiens que j'ai devant moi se dirigent vers la plaine de la Chyse, situde prfes de la route de Louvain, et ii deux lieues et demie de cette ville. II semblerait que ce serait h. dessein de s'y masser ou de combattre les troupes qui les y poursuivraient, ou enfin de se rdunir k Wellington, projet annoncd par leurs officiers, qui, avec leur jactance ordinaire, pre'tendent n'avoir quittd le champ de bataille, le 16, qu'afin d'opdrer leur reunion avec I'armde anglaise sur Bruxelles. Ce soir, je vais etre massd h. Wavres, et me trouver ainsi entre Wellington, que je presume en retraite devant Votre Majestd, et I'armde prussienne. J'ai besoin d'instructions ultdrieures sur ce que Votre Majestd ordonne que je fasse, Le pays entre Wavres et la plaine de la Chyse est difficile, coupd, et mardcageux. Par la route de Wivorde, j'arriverai facilement h. Bruxelles avant tout ce qui sera arretd h. la Chyse, si tant il y a que les Prussiens y fassent une halte. Daignez, Sire, me transmettre vos ordres ; je puis les recevoir avant de commencer mon mouvement de demain. La plupart des renseignements que renferme cette lettre me sont fournis par la propridtaire de la maison ou je me suis arrete pour dcrire k Votre Majestd ; cet officier a servi dans I'armde frangaise , est decord, et parait entiferement ddvoud h. nos interets. Je les joins k ces lignes. XXXI. GENERAL ORDER OF PREPARATION FOR THE BAT- TLE OF WATERLOO: June 18, 1815. Doc. Indd. p. 52. A M. LE MARfiCHAL PRINCE DE LA MOSKOWA. L'empereur ordonne que I'armde soit disposde k attaquer I'ennemi h. 9 heures du matin; MM. les commandants des corps d'armde rallieront leurs troupes, feront mettre les armes en dtat, et permettront que les soldats fassent la soupe ; ils feront aussi manger les soldats ; afin qu'k 9 heures prdcises chacun soit pret et puisse etre en bataille avec son artillerie et ambulances, k la position de bataille que l'empereur a indiqude par son ordre d'hier soir. MM. les lieutenants-generaux, commandant les corps d'armde d'infanterie et de cavalerie, enverront sur-le-champ des officiers au major-gdndral pour f aire connaitre leur position et porter des ordres. Au quartier-gdndral imperial, le 18 juin 1815. Le mardchal d'empire, major-gdndral, Due de Dalmatie. 388 APPENDIX C. XXXII. ORDER FOR THE ATTACK TO BEGIN AT i P. M., June i8, 1815. Doc. Indd. p. 53. Une fois que toute I'armde sera rangde en bataille, h peu pr&s k 1 heure aprfes midi, au moment ou I'empereur en donnera I'ordre au Mardchal Ney, I'attaque commencera pour s'emparer du village de Mont St. Jean ou est I'intersection des routes. A cet effet, les batteries de 12 du ame corps et celle du 6me se rduniront k celle du ler corps. Ces 24 bouches k feu tireront sur les troupes du Mont St. Jean, et le comte d'Erlon commencera I'attaque, en portant en avant sa division de gauche et la soutenant, suivant les circon- stances, par les divisions du ler corps. Le 26 corps s'avancera k mesure pour garder la hauteur du comte d'Erlon. Les compagnies de sapeurs du ler corps seront pretes pour se barricader sur-le-champ h Mont St. Jean. Au crayon et de I'dcriture du Mardchal Ney. Ajoutd par M. le Mardchal Ney. Le comte d'Erlon comprendra que c'est par la gauche que I'attaque com- mencera, au lieu de la droite, Communiquer cette nouvelle disposition au gdndral en chef Reille. AU DOS. Ordres dictds par I'empereur, sur le champ de bataille du Mont St. Jean, le 18, vers onze heures du matin, et ecrits par le mardchal Due de Dalmatie, major gdndral. Paris, le 21 juin 1S15. Le Mardchal Prince de la Moskowa Pairde France, Ney. XXXIII. THE 10 A.M.— JUNE iSth — ORDER TO GROUCHY. Grouchy Memoires, vol. 4, p. 79. En avant de la ferme de Caillou, le 18 juin, 1815, h. dix heures du matin. Monsieur le mardchal, I'Empereur a re^u votre dernier rapport, datd de Gembloux. Vous ne parlez k Sa Majestd que de deux colonnes prussiennes qui ont passe k Sauvenifere et k Sart-k-Walhain. Cependant des rapports disent qu'une troisieme colonne, qui dtait assez forte, a passe par Gery et Gentines, se dirigeant sur Wavres. L'Empereur me charge de vous prdvenir qu'en ce moment Sa Majestd va faire attaquer I'armee anglaise, qui a pris position k Waterloo, pres de la foret de Soignes. Ainsi, Sa Majesty desire que vous dirigiez vos mouve- ments sur Wavres, afin de vous rapprocher de nous, vous mettre en rapport d'opdrations et her les communications, poussant devant vous les corps de I'armde prussienne qui ont pris cette direction et qui auraient pu s'arreter k Wavres, ou vous devez arriver le plus tot possible. Vous ferez suivre les colonnes ennemies, qui ont pris sur votre droite, par APPENDIX C. 389 quelqucs corps Idgers, afin d'observer leurs mouvements et ramasser leurs trainards. Instruisez-moi imm^diatement de vos dispositions et de votre marche, ainsi que des nouvelles que vous avez sur les ennemis, et ne negligez pas de licr vos communications avec nous. L'Empereur desire avoir tr^s- souvent de vos nouvelles. Le mardchal due de DALMATIE. For translation, see ante p. 265. XXXIV. THE I P. M.— JUNE iSth — ORDER TO GROUCHY. La Tour d'Auvergne, p. 270. Du champ de bataille de Waterloo, le 18 juin, k une heure aprfes midi. Monsieur le IVIardchal, Vous avez dcrit, ce matin k deux heures, h. I'Empereur, que vous marcher- iez sur Sart-lez-Walhain; done votre projet ^tait de vous porter k Corbais ou k Wavre. Ce mouvementest conforme aux dispositions de Sa Majesty, qui vous ont ete communiqudes. Cependant, I'Empereur m'ordonne de vous dire que vous devez toujours manoeuvrer dans notre direction. C'est k vous de voir le point ou nous sommes pour vous regler en consequence et pour Her nos communications, ainsi que pour etre toujours en mesure de tomber sur les troupes ennemies qui chercheraient k inquieter notre droite et de les ^eraser. Dans ce moment, la bataille est engag^e sur la ligne de Waterloo ; le centre ennemi est a Mont-Saint-Jean; ainsi manoeuvrez pour joindre notre droite. P. S. Une lettre qui vient d'etre interceptee porte que le general Billow doit attaquer notre flanc. Nous croyons apercevoir ce corps sur les hauteurs de Saint-Lambert; ainsi, ne perdez pas un instant pour vous rapprocher de nous et nous joindre, et pour ecraser Biilow, que vous prendrez en flagrant ddlit. Le mare'chal due de DALMATIE. For translation, see ante, p. 270. INDEX. A. Adam, General Sir Frederick, commander British brigade, 35; his troops of the best quality, 315; his light brigade at Waterloo, 323-324, 332, 333, 335, 336. Albemarle, Earl of, his Fifty Years of lily Life, reports story of Napoleon's secluding himself on forenoon of bat- tle of Waterloo, 30. Alison, Sir Archibald, his History of Europe criticised by Wellington and the Earl of EUesmere, lO; not a mili- tary authority, 10; his view that Napo- leon intended to throw himself between the allied armies, 10. Allies. (See Armies.) AUix, General, commander division 1st French corps, 25 ; his division at Water- loo, commanded by Quiot, 302, 305. Alten, Lieutenant-General Count, com- mander 3d British division, 38; arrival of two of his brigades gives Wellington an equality of force at Quatre Bras, 179, 183; position at Waterloo, 300; wounded, his division rallied by Wel- lington, 314. Anglesea, Marquis of. (See Uxbridge.) Anthing, commander brigade Dutch-Bel- gians, 36; his brigade ordered to En- ghien, 83, 89; reported near Aude- narde, at 7 a.m., June l6th, 108. Appendices : — A. On some Characteristics of Napo- leon's Memoirs, 351-354- B. On Marshal Grouchy and the Ber- trand Order, 355-361. C. Orders and Despatches, 362-389. Arentsschildt, Colonel Sir F., commander cavalry brigade King's German Legion, 35, 36. ARMIES: — Allied, in concert of action against Napoleon; troops of England, Bel- gium, Holland, Hanover, Brunswick, Nassau, and Prussia, 2-4; their can- 390 tonments on and behind the Belgian frontier, 3, 96; strength, organization, and internal economy of, 32-43. Anglo-Dutch, positions in Belgium be- fore the campaign, 2-4; their extended cantonments, 2, 96; commanded by the Duke of Wellington, 34; heterogene- ous character of, 34, 294; organization, 34-35; troops employed on garrison duty, 35; strength and composition in detail, 35-37, 39; location of the vari- ous divisions, 38-39; merits and de- fects of, 39-40, 43; principal officers, 40; Wellington as a commander, 40- 41; internal economy of, 41-42; posi- tions of troops as given in the "Dispo- sition," at 7 A.M., June 16, 85, n. 54; actual positions, 1 1 i-i 1 3 ; badly served with information from the front, 114; at Quatre Bras, 178-179, 183; strength at Quatre Bras 184; losses, 184; at Quatre Bras morning of 17th, 214; position, composition, and strength at Waterloo, 297-299; in the battle of Waterloo, 294 et seq. ; 18,000 men detached at Hal and Tubize, 339. British, strength and composition in detail, 35; mainly relied upon by Wellington, 39, 298; at Quatre Bras, 178-179, 184; steadiness of infantry, 179; in the skirmish at Genappe, 216; strength at Waterloo, 298; positions at Waterloo, 299-300; charge of the Union brigade, 306-307; suffered se- verely in d'Erlon's assault, 310; the brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur brought to the centre at a critical moment, 314; repulse of the Imperial Guard by the Guards, 319-321; skil- ful use of troops by Sir Colin Halkett and Colonel Elphinstone in support of the Guards, 322; services of the light brigade, 323-324, 332-336. Brunswick contingent (see also Bruns- wick, Duke of) ; strength and com- position in detail, 37-38; in the action INDEX. 391 at Quatre Bras, 178-179, 183; broke in disorder, the Duke being killed, 179; strength at Waterloo, 299; position at "Waterloo, 299-300; brought into ac- tion, 314; driven back by the French divisions of Donzelot and Quiot, 318. Dutch-Belgians, strength and composi- tion of, in detail, 36; positions of, 38; raw troops, 39; occupation of Quatre Bras, loi ; occupation criticised by Maurice, 103; fully justified, 104; the first troops to receive the attack at Quatre Bras, loi, 178; suffered se- verely, 183; strength and composi- tion at Waterloo, 299, 314; Bylandt's brigade badly placed, 299; breaks in confusion, 306; Chasse's division sup- ports the British guards, 314; oppor- tune employment of Van der Smissen's battery, 320, Hanoverians, strength and composition in detail, 36; raw troops, 39; at Quatre Bras, 179; fought stubbornly, 179; strength at Waterloo, 298; in the battle, 312. King's German Legion, strength and composition in detail, 35-36; posi- tions, 38-39; relied upon by Welling- ton, 39, 298; strength at Waterloo, 298; position, 300. Nassau contingent, strength and compo- sition in detail, 37; in the reserve, 38; strength at Waterloo, 299; position, 300; suffered severely, 310; driven back by divisions of Donzelot and Quiot, 318. Prussians (allied), positions in Belgium before the campaign, 2-4; extended cantonments, 2, 96; strength and com- position in detail, 32-33; locations of different corps, 33; composed mainly of veterans, ^;i; temper and spirit of, 34; Marshal Bliicher, 34; internal economy of, 42; ordered to concentrate at Sombreffe on the 14th, 70, 143; strength and positions at Ligny, 143- 144, 1 51-152, 172; in the battle of Ligny, 154-159; losses, 159; Bliicher disabled, 158, 226, 229; retreat towards Wavre, 159, 226 ei seq. ; Bliicher de- cides to join Wellington, 230 ; admi- rable conduct of commanders after the battle of Ligny, 231; pledged to support Wellington, 234, 237; delay in the march to support Wellington, 262, 264; the combat at Wavre, 264- 265; in the battle of Waterloo, 307- 309, 311, 313-314. 324-328, 336, 339- 342. (See also Battles of Ligny, Wavre, and Waterloo.) French, condition of, upon Napo- leon's return from Elba, i, 16, X7; Soult made chief of staff, 17; confi- dence in Napoleon, 17; the corps com- manders, 18; estimates of general officers, 19; what Napoleon expected of his lieutenants, 20; Ney sent for at last moment, 20; Grouchy suddenly appointed to command of right wing, 21 ; Napoleon's mistake in leaving Davout at Paris, 22; estimate of the army, 24-25 ; strength and composition in detail, 25-28; internal economy of, 41; assembled near Charleroi, 44-45; addressed by Napoleon at Avesnes on the 14th, 45 ; general order of move- ment, 45-46; desertion of Bourmont, 47; operations on the 15th, 47-69; arrival of Ney, 49; delays in move- ment, 46, 50-53, 55, I18-119, 121- 122, 125-127, 130-132, 138, 139-140, 157, 161, 163 et seq., 176-178, 180- 187, 197 et seq., 2II-2I2, 252-254, 256-257; the 2d corps attacks the Dutch-Belgians at Quatre Bras on the 15th, loi; operations on the morning of the i6th, 116-142; in the battle of Ligny, 152-175; strength at Ligny, 154, 171; losses, 159; in the battle of Quatre Bras, 176-196; strength at Quatre Bras, 184; losses, 184; operations on the 17th, 197-225; force detached with Grouchy, 212, 220; pursuit of the English on the 17th led by the Emperor in person, 214; skirmish at Genappe, 216; Grouchy's march on Wavre, 211-213, 245-262, 264-267, 272, 279, 288; the combat at Wavre, 264-265 ; position at Water- loo, 301; strength and composition, 301 ; in the battle of Waterloo, 2S9- 342; unwieldy formation of d'Erlon's troops, 304-307; the great cavalry charges upon the English centre, 308- 311; the charge of the Imperial Guard, 315-326, 331-338; tactics em- ployed at Waterloo, 329-331; the rout of the French army due to vigorous attack of Zieten's corps at close of the day, 340. (See also Battles of Ligny, Quatre Bras, Wavre, and Waterloo.) Audenarde, on the Scheldt, one limit of Lord Uxbridge's cantonment, 79. Austria, concentrates a formidable force on the eastern frontier for ulti- mate co-operation against Napoleon, 2. Auvergne. (See La Tour d'Aiwergne.) Avesnes, Napoleon issued stirring order here "to conquer or die," on the 392 evening of June 14th, 45; Marshal Mortier detained here by illness, June 14th, 46. B. Bachelu, General, commander division 2d French corps, 25 ; advance to Frasnes, 49; at Quatre Bras, 178; position at Waterloo, 302; in the attack upon Hou- gomont, 304; Ney neglects to use this division to support his cavalry charge, 309; or in support of the charge of the Guard, 337. Baring, Major, his battalion of the King's German Legion occupies farmhouse of La Haye Sainte, 300. Battle of Ligny, 143-175; Prussian strength and position, 143-144, 151 ; Napoleon's plan of battle, 152, 153; position of the French, 153, 154; battle begins at 2.30, 154; orders to Ney, 154, 155; fought with determina- tion on both sides, 156; nearly all the Prussian divisions under fire, 156; Napoleon decides to put in the Guard, ^56, 157; delay caused by d'Erlon's corps, 157; the Guard breaks Prussian centre, 158; Prussians fall back to Brye and SombrefFe, 159; Prussian desertions, 159; losses, 159; non-em- ployment of the 6th French corps, 159, 160; extent of the French victory, 161, 162; discussion of the battle, 163-175. Battle of Quatre Bras, 176-196; attack begun by Ney at 2 p.m., 178; at that hour only Perponcher's Dutch-Belgian division opposed him, 178; at 2.30 ^Yellington arrived and took com- mand, 178; arrival an hour later of Picton's division followed by the Duke of Brunswick's corps, 178; the Dutch-Belgians retire after two hours' fighting, 179; the Brunswickers break, the Duke being killed, 179; at 5 p.m. two brigades of Alten's division arrive, 1 79) 183; Ney even then has in action only half the force assigned him, 179; and is therefore unable to execute Napoleon's orders, 183; Kellermann's gallant charge, 183, 184; arrival of Cooke's division of the English guards, 184; the French retire, 184; forces engaged, 184; losses, 184; defeat of the French due to diversion of d'Erlon's corps, 184; and to Ney's disregard of orders, 187; Wellington's skilful handling of his troops, 187, 188; dis- cussion of the battle, 189-196. Battle of Waterloo, 289-342; the field surveyed before the campaign by Eng- INDEX. lish engineers, 296; strength and com- position of the Anglo-Dutch army, 298, 299; positions, 297, 299-301 ; strength of the French army engaged, 301; position, 301, 302; relative strength and efficiency of the two armies, 302; Napoleon's plan of bat- tle, 302; the French attack upon Hougomont, 303-304; d'Erlon's as- sault upon the allied centre, 304-307; unwieldy formation of his troops, 305, 306; gains the crest of the British position, 306; deadly fire and bayonet charge of Picton's division, 306, 307; the charge of Ponsonby s British cav- alry, 306, 307; repulse of d'Erlon's charge, 307; the French capture La Haye Sainte at great sacrifice, 307; Billow's corps (Prussian) advances and threatens Planchenoit, requiring Napo- leon's withdrawal from the field, 309; Ney left in command, 309; splendid onsets of French cavalry, 309-31 1; repulse of Billow, 31 1; return of Napoleon to the front, 314; Alten's British division rallied by Wellington, 314 ; the Brunswick troops brought for- ward, 314; Chasse's Dutch-Belgian di- vision placed in rear of British guards, 314; the light cavalry brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur brought to the centre, 314; the English troops ex- hausted, the allies discouraged, much artillery dismounted, 314; the reserves, with Maitland's guards and Adam's brigade combined at centre, 315; Ney ordered to collect infantry and cavalry to support an attack by the Imperial Guard, 315; the attack upon the Anglo-allied hne by Donzelot and Quiot, 318; the broken lines rallied by Wellington, 318; steady advance of the Imperial Guard, 318, 319; destructive repulse of the Guard, 319 etseq.; persistency of the rear battal- ions of the Guard, 323-324; timely charge of the 52d regiment, supported by the rest of Adam's brigade, 324; the rout of the Guard complete, 324; Zieten's attack, 324, 325; the French right wing shattered, 325; charge of the British cavalry brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur, 325; Wellington orders his whole line to advance, 325; the French routed, 326; Napoleon borne away in one of the squares of the Guard, 326; the victory of the allies complete, 326; discussion of the battle, 329-342. Battle of Wavre, Thielemann's corps left to defend the town, 264; Grouchy's INDEX. 393 attack without skill, 264; the troops of Vandamme entangle themselves in the attempt to carry the lower bridges, 264-265; the 4th French corps in vain attack the Mill of Bierges, above the town, 265 ; Gerard wounded, 265 ; Pajol carried the bridge of Limale, 265 ; battle conducted gallantly by the French, but without method, 265; re- sistance of the Prussians worthy of all praise, 265. Batty, Captain, Historical Sketch of Cam- paign ofiSis, cited, 333. Baudus, Lieutenant-Colonel de, his Etudes stir Napoleon, cited, 193, 194, 195, 196, 279, 292. Beaumont, headquarters of Napoleon on the evening of June 14th, 45. Belgium, acts in concert with other nations of Europe against France and Napoleon, 2-4 (see also Armies Al- lied) ; territory occupied by the can- tonments of the allied armies, 3, 74; Brussels the headquarters of Welling- ton, 3; daylight in, from before sunrise at 4 A.M. until 9 P.M., 52, 251. Bernhard, Prince. (See Saxe-Weimar.) Berthier, Marshal, Napoleon's old chief of staff, retired into Belgium with Louis XVIII., 17. Berton, General, commander French bri- gade, reports to Napoleon the discovery of a Prussian corps at Gembloux, 209; his Precis, historique, tnilitaire et critique, des batailles de Fleuriis et de Waterloo, cited, 258, 286, 338. Bertrand, Grand Marshal (French), to whom Napoleon dictated order to Grouchy, 209, 210. (See Grouchy.) Bierges, Mill of, Gerard wounded in attack upon, 265. Bliicher, Field-Marshal Prince, com- mander of the Prussian army, 32; his character as an officer, 34; hatred of Napoleon, 34; chose the line of the brook of Ligny as a possible bat- tle-field, 70; orders concentration of his army at Sombreffe, 70, 143; his understanding with Wellington, 70 et seq.; 91, loo, 143-145; advises Miiff- ling of the concentration of the Prussian army at Sombreffe, 78; his cantonments too greatly extended, 96 et seq.; hears from Wellington, 144; determines to fight Napoleon at Ligny on independent grounds, 143-147; his reasons for accepting battle, 148-150; his position, 151; battle formation and force, 151, 152; his position criticised by Wellington, 155, n. 15; leads cav- alry charge against the French and narrov^ s^ JSep'55PW t^^ ^C^ u^fe^ %' WJGSIISSSLtf UD gfS-»^ ei'i^'^st.- j^j,,,l_50»l.' TU 17^/6